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Home : Media : Speeches / Testimony

# PACOM House Armed Services Committee Testimony

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOLDS A HEARING ONMILITARY TECHNOLOGY SUPERIORITY
 
APRIL 15, 2015
 
WITNESSES: CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSEFOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 
ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III (USN), COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFICCOMMAND
 
GENERAL CURTIS SCAPARROTTI (USA), COMMANDER, U.S. FORCESKOREA
 
[*] THORNBERRY: Committee will come to order. Let me thankour members, witnesses and guests for being here today.
 
Before we start on the topic of today's hearing, let me justtake a moment to welcome formally the newest Member of the House Armed ServicesCommittee.
 
Steve Russell represents Oklahoma's 5th District, a retiredLieutenant Colonel in the Army, Steve is deployed to Kosovo, Kuwait,Afghanistan and commanded the first battalion's 22nd Infantry in Tikrit. Hisunit played a key role in the capture of Saddam Hussein. So he's already in ourbriefings and so forth, made an important contribution to the Committee andwe're very glad to have Steve join our members.
 
THORNBERRY: Today we hold a hearing on the risk of losingmilitary technological superiority and its implications for U.S. Policy,Strategy and Posture in the Asia Pacific.
 
We probably need to get a little better about succincttitles for our hearings. But it does, I think, bring together a lot of what wehave been examining over the past couple three months. And I appreciate thesenior-level attention within the Department on the Asia-Pacific region, aswell as technological superiority.
 
I realize that there are a number of serious security issuesaround the world all happening at the same time. The reason that we've had somepeople testify that it is unprecedented in our country's history to have somany serious security issues all happening at the same time. But we cannot,either on this Committee, the Department of Defense, or the country, ingeneral, cannot allow limited band width to have us ignore what's happening inthe Asia Pacific.
 
Among the issues that come to the fore, I think, in theregion for which you all have responsibility is the technological superiorityissue which has been a key focus of this committee. We've had Under SecretaryKendall, for example, testify about our eroding technological superiority,specially in light of some of the key investments that China is making.
 
It also brings together some individual unconventionalwarfare tactics. We focused a lot on what Russia's been doing with little greenmen. But it wasn't that long ago I read a paper about the three warfares ofChina, including psychological media and legal warfare. They have their ownunconventional tactics. And of course, we have in the region North Korea andits asymmetric attempts, both to the cyber, its missile and nuclear programs,just to keep everyone off balance. So this region brings together a lot of whatwe've talked about so far this year. And again, we appreciate everybody beinghere.
 
Mr. Smith is not able to be with us this week. But I willyield to the distinguished gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, in hisplace, for any comments she'd like to make.
 
SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, to our panel,thank you for being before us. Obviously, the Indo-Asia Pacific arena is anincredibly important one to our United States and to security in our world. I'malways a little amused with the fact that everybody talks about pivotingtowards that direction. I'm a Californian. We've always been on the Pacific. Soto a large extent, we've had the opportunity to look across that Pacific andwork with the nations and except a lot of people who are originally from thosecountries to our (ph) California. So I think that we are well positioned, inparticular, as Californians, with respect to understanding and having ties tothose regions.
 
The collective security of our world is not only one ofdefense and high-tech solutions to some of that, but it is also about cultureand the economy. And so, I believe that we should continue to work in the manymyriad of ways to, as we look towards that region, maintaining a significantU.S. Military capability advantage is clearly a top priority for us from anational security perspective. And it's entirely appropriate to take a look atthe capabilities, especially with high technology that these countries in thatregion are doing.
 
Again, we should not pre-suppose. I think that there'smalice involved when somebody is beefing up their military or are workingtowards higher military capabilities. And we shouldn't, I think, presume thatthe conflict is inevitable, rather, we should be geared toward working togetherin good faith of preservation of our international order.
 
And I think that the most significant thing that Congresscan do to help bolster the U.S. Military's technological edge and to helpadvance strategic objectives in the Indo-Asia Pacific region is to eliminatesequestration (ph).
 
And I'm talking not just here in the Defense Committee, butacross the federal board. As I remember, Secretary Gates once said, if we don'teducate our people if our economy is not good -- and I'm paraphrasing, I'm notsaying directly -- then we don't have to worry about out our military becauseit's about our economy and about our people. So I'm looking forward to hearingthe testimony today.
 
And Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Mr. Smith'sstatement for the record. Thank you.
 
THORNBERRY: Thank you. Without objection, it is so ordered.And without objection the witnesses's complete written statements will be madepart of the record. We are pleased to have with us today the HonorableChristine Wormuth, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Admiral SamuelLocklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and General Curtis Scaparrotti,the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.
 
Again, thank you all for being with us. As I said, yourstatements will be -- your complete statements will be made part of the record.And your -- I would -- we would appreciate you summarizing in your openingcomments before we turn to questions.
 
Ms. Wormuth?
 
WORMUTH: Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry and distinguishedMembers of the Committee for having us here today. We're looking forward to theconversation. And I'm sending my best wishes to Ranking Member Smith for aspeedy recovery. I know he's not enjoying that process. THORNBERRY: Madam,excuse me. Would you mind getting that microphone right in front of you?
 
WORMUTH: Sure. Is that better?
 
THORNBERRY: That's -- that's better.
 
WORMUTH: OK.
 
WORMUTH: The only way it works is talking right into it. So,thank you.
 
THORNBERRY: OK. It's a pleasure to be here to talk with youabout certainly a top priority for Secretary Carter and myself, which is ourrebalance to Asia-Pacific. I'm also very pleased to be here alongside AdmiralLocklear and General Scaparrotti. We worked closely together on a lot ofdifferent issues. They are doing a tremendous job. And the men and women whoare out there working Pacific Command and at U.S. Forces Korea are really theday-to-day face of our rebalance for a lot of countries in the region. So wereally appreciate the work that they do.
 
Both Secretary Carter and I have recently come back fromAsia, different parts of the region. But I think we both heard in a veryresounding way a lot of support from the countries out there for the rebalancethat we've undertaken and also a lot of desire to have even greater U.S.leadership and engagement with the countries that are there.
 
In the past seven years, it's obviously been a time oftremendous change and opportunity for the Asia-Pacific region. As nations thererise and become more prosperous, it's created a lot of opportunity, at the sametime that dynamism in the region has also created a much more complex securityenvironment in which we are now operating.
 
In particular, China's very rapid military modernization,its opaque defense budget, the -- its actions in space and cyberspace and itsbehavior in places like the East and South China Seas raise a number of seriousquestions for us.
 
THORNBERRY: Though China's expanding interests are a naturalpart of its rise, it does continue to pursue activities and to make investmentsthat leave many countries in the region, including the United States, to havesome serious questions about its long-term intentions
 
WORMUTH: China's behavior in the maritime domain, I think,in particular, has created significant friction for its neighbors. TheGovernment's efforts to incrementally advance its claims in the East and SouthChina Sea and its extensive land reclamation activities, particularly theprospect of further militarizing those outposts are very concerning to us.
 
We've urged China to show restraint and to refrain fromfurther activities that undermine regional trust. We also have continued tourge China to clarify the meaning of its ambiguous nine-dash line claim as astarting point as a way to start reducing tensions and provide greatertransparency to countries in the region.
 
While the United States and China are not allies, we alsodon't have to be adversaries. I think both of us, both the United States andChina recognize that a constructive U.S.-China relationship is essential forglobal peace and prosperity.
 
We're therefore not only talking to China about actions theyundertake that concern us, but we are also talking to them in undertakingactivities to build transparency and to improve understanding, particularlythrough our military-to-military engagement with the PLA.
 
We also face a number of other challenges, obviously, in theregion. Particularly, I think, of greatest concern to us in DOD is NorthKorea's dangerous pursuit of ballistic missiles and its weapons of massdestruction program. North Korea, as you all know, has repeatedly demonstratedits willingness to use provocation as a means to achieve its end. And just inthe last year, we saw a very significant cyber attack on Sony PicturesEntertainment.
 
There are also other challenges in the region that aremagnified by a growing range of non-traditional threats, such as the increasedflow of foreign fighters, both to and from Asia, the trafficking of illegalgoods and people and devastating natural disasters, such as the cyclone we sawlast month in Bonowati.
 
So in response to these shifting dynamics, DOD hasconsistently worked to implement President Obama's whole-of-government strategytowards rebalancing in the Asia Pacific.
 
One of the most important pieces of the administration'swork in the area of the rebalance is to finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership.Our military strength ultimately rests on the foundation of our vibrant andgrowing economy. So we believe strongly that TPP is not just part of oureconomic agenda, but it also a very important part of our national securityagenda. And I would urge Congress to pass Trade Promotion Authority and allownegotiators to conclude this very important agreement.
 
In DOD, we're really focused in terms of the rebalance on acouple of key lines of effort. First is strengthening our securityrelationships with allies and partners in the region. In Japan, for example,we're very close to completing a historic update of the defense guidance whichreally wouldn't have been possible a decade ago.
 
We are also working with the Republic of Korea to develop acomprehensive set of alliance capabilities to counter the North Korean threat.And in Australia and the Philippines last year, we signed importantgroundbreaking posture agreements that will give us enhanced access for ourforces and also allow us a lot of new combined training opportunities for ourpartners in Australia and the Philippines.
 
Our strong friendships in the region also go beyondtraditional alliances to some of our new relationships, particularly in southand Southeast Asia. In addition to our very strong partnership with Singapore,where I just visited a couple weeks ago, we also are strengthening ourrelationships with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. And finally,we're investing, of course, in our partnership with ASEAN, which is reallyleading the way in terms of trying to build a more robust security architecturein the region.
 
And lastly, in terms of relationships, the U.S-Indiarelationship is a very important and very exciting partnership. As you allknow, just this January, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi signed a JointVision Statement. We also completed the first update in 10 years to our defenseframework with India. And we concluded four path finder projects for technologydevelopment with India under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative.
 
In tandem with our efforts to modernize relationships in thePacific, the Department is also updating our forward presence. And this isn'tjust about putting more assets into the region. It's also about using thoseassets in new ways. For example, we've developed a more distributed model forour Marine Corps that is reducing our concentrated presence in Okinawa throughrelocating Marines to Australia, Guam, Hawaii and Mainland Japan.
 
The Navy is also working more on its rotational presenceconcept to include being on track to have our goal of having four littoralcombat ships rotating through Singapore by 2017. We've had two of our LCS shipsgo to Singapore already. And the Army will be initiating its first rotationaldeployment of a brigade combat team to the Korean Peninsula later this spring.Finally, and I think going very much to the issue of the technology concernsthis Committee is interested in, we're also bringing our best capabilities tothe Asia-Pacific region. We're making significant investments to sustain ourAmerican technological edge into the future in the air, land, sea and underseadomains. We are investing in precision munitions that will increase our abilityto strike adversaries from greater standoff distances and we're working on newcapabilities to allow us to continue to operate freely in space and cyberspace.
 
All of these efforts demonstrate the seriousness of ourdepartment's commitment to protecting U.S. Military primacy in the Asia-Pacifictheater. And our focus on technology is really the impetus for our DefenseInnovation Initiative, which is a long-term comprehensive effort to make surethat we enhance our military competitive edge, even as we face budgetconstraints.
 
The Department's rebalance efforts, as well as those of ourinteragency colleagues, are part of a long-term project that reflect, I think,the enduring interest the United States has in the Asia- Pacific region. Welook forward to continuing to work with Congress on the rebalance and I lookforward to questions.
 
Thank you.
 
THORNBERRY: Thank you.
 
Admiral?
 
LOCKLEAR: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, anddistinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appearbefore you today with Secretary Wormuth and General Scaparrotti, who I'veworked very closely with both of them.
 
Before we begin, I'd like to ask that my written testimony besubmitted for the record?
 
For more than three years, I've had the honor and theprivilege of leading the exceptional men and women, military and civilian, ofthe United States Pacific Command. These volunteers are skilled professionalsdedicated to the defense of our nation, are serving as superb ambassadors torepresent the values and strengths that make our nation what it is -- great.
 
I want to go on record to formally thank our servicemembers,civilians and their families for their sacrifices. U.S. PACOM continues tostrengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in theregion and demonstrate U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard our U.S. nationalinterests.
 
When I spoke to you last year, I highlighted my concern forseveral issues that could challenge the security environment across theIndo-Asia- Pacific. Those challenges included responding to humanitarianassistance and disaster relief events, dealing with an increasingly dangerousan unpredictable North Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remainaligned in addressing. A continued escalation of complex territorial disputes,increasing regional transnational threats and the complexity associated withChina's continuous rise. In the past years, these challenges have not eased.They will not away soon. But the Asia rebalance strategy is and has taken hold.It is achieving its intended goals.
 
However, the greatest challenge remains the continuedphysical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. The Budget Control Actremains enforces, the greatest challenge in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will bedealing with the consequences to the security of our national interest as werespond to a rapidly changing world.
 
I echo the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JointChiefs and the Service Chief's testimony before Congress. Our nation is beingforced into a resource-driven national security strategy, instead of oneproperly resourced and driven by our enduring national interest.
 
In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, we are accepting more risk a lotless. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in force size, structure andreadiness that will reduce liability to manage crisis faced (ph) provideoptions to the President and the Congress and diminishes United States'prestige and credibility in the region and around the globe.
 
In the last year, a great expense to the readiness of thesurge force's position in the continental United States, U.S. PACOM hasmaintained its forward forces focused on protecting the homeland, deterringaggressors such as North Korea, strengthening alliances and partnerships anddeveloping the concepts and capabilities required for us to remain dominant ina world that is growing in complexity with threat that continue to increaseagainst a seemingly unending stream of constraints.
 
Without adequate resources, we'll be forced to makedifficult choices today that will have strategic consequences to our future.I'd like to thank the Committee for your continued interest and the support. Ilook forward to your questions.
 
THORNBERRY: Thank you, sir.
 
General?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez anddistinguished members of the Committee, I'm honored to testify today as thecommander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and UnitedStates Forces Korea and also alongside Admiral Locklear and Under SecretaryWormuth.
 
On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians, contractors, andtheir families who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea, one of ourmost important allies, thank you for your support.
 
I've prepared some brief opening remarks and I thank you forsubmitting them to the record. Last year, I testified that the combined andjoint forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea were capable andready to deter. And if necessary, respond to North Korean threats and actions.Due our accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that our strong alliance ismore capable of addressing the rapidly evolving and increasingly asymmetricNorth Korean threat.
 
In recent years, North Korea has aggressively developed andutilized asymmetric capabilities such as cyber warfare, nuclear weapons andballistic missiles to advance its interests. To put this in perspective overtime, in 2012, my predecessor noted North Korea's advances in cyber and nuclearcapabilities during his opening statement to this Committee.
 
A year later, North Korea conducted cyber-attacks on SouthKorea's banks and broadcasting stations. And in 2014, they boldly projectedtheir cyber capabilities against Sony Pictures in the United States in aneffort to inflict economic damage and suppress free speech.
 
This example represents a trend that is persistent acrossseveral North Korean asymmetric capabilities. My top concern is that we willhave little to no warning of a North Korean asymmetric provocation, which couldstart a cycle of action and counteraction leading to unintended escalation.This underscores the need for the alliance to maintain a high level ofreadiness and vigilance.
 
SCAPARROTTI: Last year, the alliance took significant stepsin improving its capabilities and capacities to deter aggression and to reduceits operational risk. But our work is not done. In 2015 we will maintain thismomentum by focusing on my top priority, sustaining and strengthening the alliance,with an emphasis on our combined readiness. This includes ensuring the rapidflow of ready forces into Korea in the early phases of hostilities andimproving ISR capabilities and critical munitions.
 
Based on the national security strategies of both ournations, the United States will continue to be a steadfast strategic partner toSouth Korea, and South Korea is poised to be a long-lasting and important allyto America. Our enduring military partnership with South Korea is thepreeminent example of bilateral security cooperation and a visible element ofAmerican leadership and our nation's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.
 
The men and women serving on freedom's frontier defendingthe Republic of Korea remain thankful for this committee's unwavering supportin prioritizing resources that enable us to defend our national interests inAsia, while advancing universal values and international order. I'm extremelyproud of our service members, civilians and their families serving in theRepublic of Korea and never lose sight of the fact that they are at freedom'sfrontier, defending one of our most important allies and vital Americaninterests.
 
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
 
THORNBERRY: Thank you.
 
I want to ask, Admiral and General, each of you about thisissue of technological superiority. I mentioned Undersecretary Kendall hastestified that our technological superiority that we have enjoyed for years iseroding, and we have had many other witnesses support that. There are a varietyof factors that have played into it -- what we have done to ourselves withbudget cuts, a procurement process that cannot keep up with changes intechnology, the fact that some of our competitors have stolen incredibleamounts of information from us and benefited from it. All of these things andprobably others contribute to it.
 
But each of you are responsible for dealing with the worldtoday as we find it and being prepared with plans and contingencies and usingthe forces that we have today. So I would be interested, as a combatantcommander, as a commander responsible for a key area of the world, are youconcerned about these trends in technology and our ability to keep up? Arethere some areas that concern you more than others, given your area ofresponsibility? Are there suggestions you have about how we, the United States,could and should adjust to meet these changes? Kind of a broad picture of whatit's like from your end as war fighting commanders.
 
Admiral?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, sir. Over my career myobservation is that when we were dealing with the Soviet Union in the cold warthat we had a concerted effort as a military to have that technological edgethat really provided a tremendous amount of benefit and allowed us to prevail,I think, during that time.
 
As we entered the last part of this past century and westarted efforts in the Middle East, we predominantly were dealing with wars andevents where we had such a large technological superiority that -- we had airdominance, we had undersea dominance, we had dominance in every area. And thatwas good and we used that dominance.
 
During that time I think that our priorities for watchingwhat the rest of the world was doing as countries came along that had theability and the desire to want to improve their militaries and improve theirtechnological capabilities that we kind of took a little bit of a break anddidn't make the types of investments that we needed to make.
 
During that time our relative superiority I think hasdeclined and continues to decline. Some of the reasons for that, I think, arebecause countries have more money to spend. There is a greater proliferation oftechnology. Some of it has been stolen through intellectual property, some ofit has been sold around the world in different venues that you all are awareof.
 
The other thing that makes it challenging for us is ourgeneral vulnerability. When it comes to the Asia-Pacific, we are a Pacificnation but we are also an island nation, so we rely very heavily on powerprojection, which means we have to be able to get the forces forward, tosustain them forward, and we rely heavily on systems that several decades agoweren't even known about or thought about too much and that really exist now inthe cyber world, in the space world, which if we are not careful will unveilvulnerabilities that we have to pace with technological advancements.
 
To the degree of how we address these, what's important tome is making sure that the forces we have, number one, are dominant. You neverwant to go into any crisis or even in deterrence to try to manage a situationwith a force that's not dominant. It needs to be technologically superioracross multiple domains. So if you start at the top and you go from space tocyber to air to integrated air and missile defense, to sea, maritime, tosubsurface maritime, there is technological challenges as all the militaries ofthe world get better in these domains, that we must continue to pace for us tobe able to be relevant in the domains that allow us to project U.S. power indefense of U.S. interests. Now in the build-up up to this presidential budgetsubmission, I made it clear through a series of processes in the Pentagon thetypes of key areas where we need to maintain our focus on technologicaladvancement, and I think most of those were accurately represented in SecretaryKendall's testimony. I think that if the president's budget is supported inthose areas that it will continue to get at the types of technological advancesthat are critical for us to stay forward and to protect U.S. interests in theAsia-Pacific.
 
SCAPARROTTI: Mr. Chairman, I would echo what AdmiralLocklear had to say, particularly on the peninsula. You discussed earlier theasymmetric capabilities are being developed by North Korea. As they developthose asymmetric capabilities they are specifically orienting on what theyconsider to be some of our vulnerabilities, and through their development theyare trying to close our dominance basically.
 
We have to continue to develop our capabilities, to changeour posture, our concepts, our employment in order to ensure that we maintaindominance.
 
The last thing I would say on the peninsula is because weare operating on a peninsula, it's a relatively small theater. Air and navaldominance is very important to the agility that I have on the peninsula itselfif we have a crisis. So all of these things are things that I think about quiteoften.
 
And finally, the specific asymmetric capabilities that Ithink about the most is the ballistic missile capability North Korea possessesand our continued ability to be able to counter that. And then finally, ISR.Many of our adversaries are becoming more proficient in determining how to workinside of our capabilities, our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissancecapabilities, and also how to use deception and other means in order to limitthat advantage that we have today.
 
THORNBERRY: It seems to me in no area of the world is itmore true that a loss of technological superiority means increased risk toAmerican lives than on the Korean Peninsula, so I think that's another way tokeep in mind.
 
Ms. Sanchez?
 
SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again foryour testimonies. I represent the largest Vietnamese population outside ofVietnam in the world, sitting right there in Orange County, California. As Isaid, we've always had our view to what's going out in the Asian countries andthe Pacific region.
 
Last year Vietnam and the United States agreed to ease itslethal weapons embargo on Vietnam in order to improve the maritime security andto address the ongoing conflicts in regards to the islands in the East Sea. Buton the other hand, I've worked enough on the Vietnamese issues to understandthat Vietnam still has -- is lacking so much with respect to its human rightsissues.
 
In particular, in 2000, when I went with President Clintonfor the bilateral trade agreement and then later when we took Vietnam off ofthe countries of particular concern list with respect to religious infractionsin order for them to be able to go into the World Trade Organization. So wecontinue to see that things don't get better with respect to the human rightsissues, or marginally at times and then worse.
 
So can you address for me the road map for weapons sales toVietnam and what types of lethal weapons would be precluded if Vietnamcontinues on its road of not changing its human rights record, even withrespect to, for example, Human Rights Watch and our own State Department? Theyare consistently marked very, very low with respect to human rights.
 
What do you see or what can we expect from thisadministration and this Pentagon with respect to weapons sales to Vietnam? Arewe going to tie any conditions to lifting that embargo?
 
WORMUTH: Congresswoman Sanchez, thank you very much for thatquestion.
 
We are still in the process now of working with theDepartment of State, our colleagues there to work through how best to leveragethe partial lifting of the lethal weapons ban. But certainly a part of thoseconsultations is looking at the human rights picture in Vietnam, and we arevery much, even as we and the Department of Defense are very interested indeepening our relationship with Vietnam, we also are committed to pushing forgreater progress on the human rights front. So that is something that we arevery much taking into account as we look at how best to work with Vietnam.
 
WORMUTH: I think it's fair to say that broadly speaking thekinds of capabilities that we think would be most useful for Vietnam in termsof its security needs are those that would be helpful to them in terms ofmaritime security, in terms of maritime domain awareness, in terms of helpingthem strengthen their ability to provide humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief.
 
So those are the kinds of areas that we're focused on withthem, and looking at what kinds of arms might be relevant to that. But we'restill in the process of figuring out how best to approach specific items theymight be interested in.
 
SANCHEZ: And, Madam Secretary, we've also seen, obviously, apretty aggressive stance by China with respect to territorial rights, orclaimed territorial rights in the E.C. What types of help could we give toVietnam to ensure its sovereignty over the islands that it believes are part oftheir integral country?
 
WORMUTH: Well, I think first, as you know, we don't take aposition on the territorial claims. But we are very much committed to wantingto see countries in the region work through diplomacy to try to resolve thoseterritorial disputes. So we're focused on encouraging all of the countries toseek peaceful means for resolution, and to use diplomacy, and use availablemechanisms.
 
At the same time, I think helping countries in the regionlike Vietnam, but other countries as well, strengthen again their own maritimesecurity capabilities, and their own maritime domain awareness capabilities.It's helpful that -- to them in terms of them being able to, again, maintainsome visibility over their territorial waters, for example. And I don't knowwhether Admiral Locklear would want to add on that.
 
SANCHEZ: And might you also explain to me the timeline, orhow we could work together to ensure that this partial release of the weaponsban is not detrimental with respect, in particular, to our -- I believe whatshould be, and it is for me, at least -- requirement that we see better humanrights from Vietnam? What is the process in which you're going through to takea look and figure out how we will help militarily?
 
WORMUTH: First and foremost, we're working with the StateDepartment, again, I think to try to make sure that we have agreement on whatare the basic policy parameters for how we would approach how best to leveragethe partial lifting of the ban. We are then in consultations with Vietnam aboutwhat their needs are. So the State Department really has the lead on the -- ontalking with them about human rights, and the importance of making progress inthat area. We reinforce that message, but we have a process internal to ourgovernment to sort of lay out our basic parameters, and then we have an ongoingdialogue with Vietnam about what their needs are.
 
And that's a very active dialogue. My assistant secretaryfor Asia-Pacific affairs is actually a former ambassador to Vietnam. So we havea very active conversation with them.
 
SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 
THORNBERRY: Thank you. Mr. Jones?
 
JONES: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to --Madam Secretary, I took down some notes, what you had said in your preparedremarks, and also what you said today. We urge the Chinese, actions thatconcern us, we bring this to the Chinese attention.
 
I am one of the individuals in the Congress that for yearshave been speaking out publicly back in my district, the 3rd District of NorthCarolina, about the growing debt of our nation, because I believe sincerelythat that is the biggest threat to our national security, is the growing debt.
 
Admiral, that's why we passed the bill. I did not vote forit, to be honest about it, the sequestration. And then I see we continue toplay a shell (ph) game with the budget, and with the American people's money,and find ways to continue to puff up the needs for our military.
 
I believe in honesty in budgeting. I don't believe indishonesty -- but anyway -- in budgeting. But I'm for honesty in budgeting.
 
This is my question to you: I have long thought -- maybethis because I was raised in Eastern North Carolina -- that if you owe someonemoney, and you can't pay them back, they just don't have the same respect foryou.
 
And I look at the fact that President Bush raised the debtceiling seven out of eight years that he was the president. Mr. Obama hasraised the debt ceiling seven out of six (sic) years that he's been thepresident. And you know, when we raise the debt ceiling, what we're saying tothe world is we can't pay our bills; that we have to sell our financialinstruments (ph) and somehow finance our debt.
 
OK. The Chinese buy a lot of our debt. So I really wouldlike to know when our representatives of our government, whether the militaryor non-military are sitting there facing the Chinese, if it is a respect,because we continue to have to borrow money from the Chinese to pay our bills.
 
And they see all the news articles of how we're spendingbillions and billions in Afghanistan, that much of it, according to John Sopko,is wasted. And yet, we're taking the billions and billions that we're spendingoverseas that's wasted, taking away from building our military, which needs tobe rebuilt. And I get to a point that I just don't understand anadministration. And I would say this if it was a Republican administration.
 
How in the world can we continue to play this game ofspending, spending, spending, and borrow, borrow, borrow, and then we think wegot equal placement to talk to the Chinese about, "Read (ph) our concernabout this, and we urge you to do that," do they really listen to us?
 
WORMUTH: Congressman, I certainly agree that, as I said inmy opening remarks, the foundation of our vitality as a country is a strongeconomy. And that underpins our ability to have a strong military.
 
And again, I think that's one of the reasons why we in theDefense Department have been expressing our support for important agreements,like the Transpacific Partnership, for example. I think China -- again, youknow, we have a very independent -- interdependent global economy at thispoint. And we're very important customers for China, as are many othercountries around the world.
 
So I think having a robust and growing economy in the UnitedStates is important. And the Chinese see the value of that for them. We have --and I also think they recognize very much that even as they modernize theirmilitary, the United States military remains the premier military force in theworld.
 
And then in addition to our very strong technological trackrecord, we also have an operational track record that is unmatched. I mean, ourmilitary's combat experience is unmatched by almost any country in the world.And it's been honed over the last more than 10 years, and I think China verymuch respects that as we -- as we talk to them about our concerns.
 
JONES: Well, I also found it very interesting that youmentioned trade promotion authority in your comments. There are many of us whobelieve sincerely that any president, Democrat or Republican, if you give themtrade promotion authority, then you are damaging our constitutional ability tomaintain a fairness in trade.
 
But thank you for your testimony. I yield back.
 
THORNBERRY: Mr. Langevin?
 
LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank ourwitnesses for your testimony today. In particular, Admiral Locklear, I want tothank you for your leadership at PACOM for the last three years. I thank youfor your service, and I wish you all the best of luck in your future endeavors.
 
If I could start with you, Admiral, you mentioned China'saggressive shipbuilding program in addition to their significant advances in(inaudible) warfare capabilities, Admiral. How do our forces in PACOM comparein those aspects? And where do you believe improvements need to be made,besides continued and sustained investment of the U.S. nuclear submarine force,as you mentioned? I'm particularly concerned and interested -- I think theChinese at this point are confident that they could potentially turn the lightsoff on our use of cyber capabilities on our fleet, our ability to respond, bothfiguratively and literally. And so I want to know where you -- what your viewsare, and how we stand.
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, sir. It's my assessment that weremain the most dominant military power in the world from all aspects. And Ithink that there's hardly a country -- there's not a country in the world,would disagree with that today, even though I think they would recognize thatthe relative parody of our relative gap between how good we are, versus howsome of the other forces may be developing, is shrinking.
 
In the case of the maritime forces that you've talked aboutwith the PRC, they are on aggressive strategy and aggressive shipbuildingcampaign. They have -- seem to have limited restrictions on how fast they canproduce systems, how fast they can produce ships, submarines. And they'reproducing what I would consider to be pretty good ships and submarines.
 
But I still believe that we remain -- and we have the bestships. We have clearly the best ships, the best submarines, the best aircraftcarriers, and the best people running them in the world. So I'm generallypretty good in that case.
 
But when it comes to dealing day to day in the Asia-Pacific,what I require -- first of all, we have a forward-deployed force that operateswith our host nations -- Japan, Korea -- operates extensively in that region.And that force needs to be ready, because it's not only ready for, you know,day to day to maintaining the deterrent oversight security of the region, thisis also critical to ensure that we're prepared for a quick reaction if we haveto do something in North Korea.
 
So those forces need to be ready. They need to be the bestthat we have. They need to be of the highest technical capability that we have.And to the degree that we can get -- continue to get good host nation support,which I think we have today, we need to pursue that.
 
LANGEVIN: I want to speak specific to electronic warfarecapabilities, if you could, Admiral.
 
LOCKLEAR: Electronic warfare arena, you know, I think thatwe are -- because we've operated in environments, as I said in earlierstatements, around the globe where we have limited denied area throughelectronic means, I think our electronic warfare capability has diminished, hasnot kept pace with where we need to be in the future. And we're taking somesteps to take a harder look at how we get at electronic warfare.
 
Of course, as you talk about electronic warfare, then itstarts to get into the whole cyber issues, which are now being -- we're workinghard to try to determine how we best defend our cyber assets, how we organizeourselves to do that, how we train our workforce to be able to do that. Andthat's all part of the president's budget that's come forward that gets atthose particular issues.
 
LANGEVIN: Well, I share your concern there, Admiral. Withregards to North Korea, both you and General Scaparrotti mentioned in yourtestimonies that there are cyber actors that continue to conduct cyber actionsagainst South Korean military and civilian networks. How confident are you thatthis isn't happening to our U.S. forces, Korea infrastructure as well? Andadditionally, how are we defending ourselves, as you mentioned in yourtestimony, China generating insights into our U.S. security policies, defensenetworks, logistics and military capabilities through their cyber program?
 
LOCKLEAR: Thank you. And in regards to Korea and the threatfrom North Korea, I'm confident of our ability to defend our military networks.We work very closely with the Republic of Korea, our partners and allies, toensure that, because we have a combined command and control system that weclose any vulnerabilities there.
 
And we have -- we've been working in the past year very hardto develop our cyber capabilities as a team. However, you know, that's anongoing challenge that we have to stay on top of. North Korea is getting betterevery day.
 
LANGEVIN: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
 
THORNBERRY: Mr. Forbes?
 
FORBES: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Madam Secretary, General,Admiral, thank you so much for your service to our country. Thank you for beinghere today. We've had a couple of milestone in the last few weeks. When theJapanese now have exceeded the number of planes they've had to scramble againstChinese and Russian planes since the Cold War, as I understand it.
 
We also had the Office of Naval Intelligence print thisreport -- first time they've done it since 2009 -- talking about a compellingconcern about Chinese activity in the disputed borders off the East and SouthChina Sea.
 
I also concur with your comments about sequestration, as itrelates to national defense, although I really question anyone on thisCommittee or the administration that would suggest that we shouldn't removedefense sequestration, unless we can also give the EPA, the IRS, and the GSAall the money they want, or unless we can quench the thirst of every otheragency that drinks from every federal trough. To hold defense sequestrationhostage against that would be unconscionable. My concern today, as we talkabout it, Admiral Locklear, in this Committee, we talk about the high-endtechnological superiority. But I'm also concerned about what we're seeinghappen at the lower end. You mentioned, I think, correctly, China launched morenaval ships than any other country in 2013 and '14. And they expect the samefor 2014 and 2015.
 
But I'm also concerned about what they're doing with theirCoast Guard. They now have 95 large cutters, 110 small cutters. That's a totalof 205. That's 68 ships less than the entire U.S. Navy. And they have moreships in their Coast Guard than Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia andSingapore have combined.
 
We don't always rate those as naval ships. But you've seenthis picture, I'm sure. This picture is of a Chinese Coast Guard vessel. Theyhave labeled on here tugboat number 25. It's painted white. This is one oftheir amphibious naval ships. It's number 908. It's painted gray. Other thanbeing painted gray and the number on there, there's virtually no difference, Idon't think, between these two ships. And that's something that's reallyconcerning me, because we don't always measure those.
 
So my question for you today is not the high-endtechnological superiority. But when we're seeing Iranians in Yemen, we'reseeing Russians in the Ukraine, we're seeing Chinese on the Senkakus and theartificial islands are building up, what strategies, concepts, forces and capabilitiesdo you think we need to counter this kind of gray zone aggression we're seeingin Asia?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, sir. Your -- the two pictures youshowed, I think, were accurate, the way I understand it. The Chinese areengaging in a comprehensive military modernization program that wants totransform not only the PLA into a high-end kind of network- centric militarycapable of large-scale operations, so we can talk about that.
 
But they're also working on the lower end to ensure thatthey have a maritime security force, which we would equate to a Coast Guard ora fisheries patrol that, by numbers, you add up all their numbers and everybodyelse's and Asia's, in that category they exceed everybody else's put together.And I think that they went down that path, after they saw what was happening inthe Senkakus. They took some of the gray holes and we observed them ship thoseover to be what they would call non-combatants or maritime patrol ships bymaybe just changing the color of them.
 
They show no slowdown in the pace of their militarymodernization, particularly in their navy. Even though their economy hasdropped a little bit, they're still on a -- about a 10-percent increase in2014, 2015 will be a little bit more. And it's the fifth straight year we'veseen them do double-digit increases.
 
Of course, their military is -- on the high end, preparesfor issues around Taiwan and their, what they would call, their near-seas.Their maritime security are put in a position to be able to gain influence,particularly in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, to further their --what their consider their national interest there.
 
Now they are doing this in combination with what we haveseen to be fairly massive land reclamation in the Spratly Islands and in the --and upgrades to facilities in the Paracel Islands, which are the two regions inthe South China Sea.
 
Now the implications of that for us are that it provides anability for them to deploy more of these lower-end ships down there, providesan ability to base them down there, to resupply them. It allows them to exert,basically, greater influence over a contested -- what's now a contested area.It -- expanded land features down there also could eventually lead to thedeployment of things, such as long- range radars, military and advanced missilesystems and it might be a platform for them, if they ever wanted to establishan air defense -- an air defense -- an ADIZ zone down there for them to be ableto enforce that from.
 
Up to this point in time, the nations around them, the SouthEast Asian claimants have really had little success in formulating an effectiveresponse to the PRC actions down there. None of their efforts have slowed thePRC in the South China Sea. And they recognize that stopping the PRC wouldrequire a change in the strategic environment down there.
 
So what types of things do we need to do (ph) down there?Well, first, the force will need to stay forward. We need to have the types ofIntelligence and Search, ISR assets that allow us to maintain our knowledge ofwhat's going on. These are globally stressed, because of the things that we'redoing in Afghanistan and in Iraq and in Yemen. And those -- many of those assetsare similar in type to the ones we would use in that arena. So we need toensure that we can sense and see what's going on, because it allows me tooptimally use the forces that we have.
 
FORBES: Admiral, my time has expired. But would you mindsubmitting that to us for the record? It's important that we have it as aCommittee.
 
THORNBERRY: Absolutely.
 
FORBES: And I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
 
THORNBERRY: Thank you. I appreciate it.
 
Ms. Bordallo?
 
BORDALLO: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, SecretaryWormuth and Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti. I want to thank you forcoming today. And as the Representative from Guam, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman,your calling the Committee together for taking time to further examine ourposture in the Asia-Pacific Region.
 
Admiral Locklear, I have a question for you. As the RankingMember of the Readiness Subcommittee, I would like to focus on trainingcapabilities in the Asia Pacific Region. Our Marines in Okinawa have degradedtraining capabilities and the Army and the Air Force have significantdegradation of training capabilities elsewhere in the region. Can you commenton how the Department is looking at improving these capabilities? We are movingforward with a live-fire training range on Guam. But what about larger trainingexercises and the need for improving capabilities in the Northern MarianasIslands? I think that the Committee has questions about the cost and Iunderstand PACOM has a handle on many of these matters. So could you answer thatfor me?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, thanks for the questions. It's clear thatfor us to be as far forward as we are, that we need to have adequate facilitiesto be able to train and keep our forces ready at the high end. So it requires,I think, a multi-pronged strategy. One is -- you mentioned first is your homeis in Guam, is ensuring that the Guam plan that we have for the relocation ofthe Marines there stays on track and we really appreciate the support of thisCommittee in doing that as we go forward. And it is on track.
 
As we look at the entire Guam complex and bringing thoseMarines there, we envision, with the support of the Marianas Islands, NorthernMarianas Islands, governments up there, to be able to put in place a range upthat that allows not only us to keep our Marines that are there ready, but alsocould bring other nations into play in that strategic part of the world for usto be able to learn together train together and maximize the opportunity forinteroperability between our militaries.
 
It's also very important that in Alaska that we get therange systems in Alaska correct, that we maintain those and that -- becausethat's where we get much of our high-end training in those ranges in Alaska. Asyou know, we're also working very closely with our allies in Australia and inNorthern Australia for having access to those really magnificent broad rangesthat are there, so that we could work together with them. So I think we have agood plan, if we can bring it all together.
 
BORDALLO: Thank you. Thank you very much. Admiral, I haveanother question for you. Can you comment on the progress of the U.S.-Japandefense guidelines and what do you envision occurring to implement theseguidelines in the near term?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, the guidelines process is ongoing. And weanticipate that later this year that the guidelines will be completed andsigned. I think I --
 
BORDALLO: I was going to ask...
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes.
 
BORDALLO: ... yes, the Secretary as well.
 
LOCKLEAR: And what we -- the real key to the guidelines ismaking sure that we -- first of all, that we militarily -- both countriesrecognize the importance of the alliance. This is one of the most importantalliances in the world, for not only Japan, but for the United States, but alsofor the region. And ensuring that we get this right and that we're able to goforward in military way that provides a peace and security and prosperity forthe region for both countries is important. And it starts to get at the -- morespecifics of how we're going to do that. And it also forces, I think in thiscase, or encourages the Japanese to kind of look at how they view the allianceand how they're going to participate as we go forward.
 
BORDALLO: Thank you.
 
Madam Secretary?
 
WORMUTH: Just to add on that, I think we anticipatefinishing up the defense guidelines right around the time that Prime MinisterAbe comes to Washington later this month.
 
BORDALLO: Oh, very good.
 
WORMUTH: And a couple of things that I think that are reallynotable and important about the defense guidelines are, first of all, thatthere will be a whole section that really speaks to the collective self-defensevision that Japan has for the role of its self-defense forces. But it also willhave a new alliance coordination mechanism which will, again, further ourability to work with Japan to help with its security needs, but also to look atour security needs.
 
There will be a section on peacetime cooperation in theareas of ISR, maritime domain awareness, missile defense. We will also have awhole section that looks at international activities, as well as additionalcooperation in space and cyber. So I think that will be, you know, reallyimportant document to bring the alliance to the next level.
 
BORDALLO: Thank you. Thank you very much.
 
Mr. Chairman, I have just one quick question.
 
Admiral Locklear, what will be the impact of our rebalancestrategy if sequestration remains in place?
 
LOCKLEAR: It remains in place, in general, in short, you'llhave less force that are less ready, that are less technologically capable inan increasingly technological environment.
 
BORDALLO: Thank you very much. And I yield back, Mr.Chairman.
 
THORNBERRY: The gentlelady's time is expired. The chairrecognizes the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, forfive minutes.
 
WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you forbeing here today. I just really have been impressed, Ms. Wormuth, with yourcomments. And, Admiral, I'm just grateful that I have a son who's currentlyserving in the Navy, and I've got three in the Army. So -- and my visits,General, to the DMZ, again, such extraordinary people that you serve with, andmaking such a difference indeed for the Republic of Korea, and theirprotection.
 
And that's why, as I'm thinking about the cyber offensive ofNorth Korea, General, how is that being countered with the efforts that they'vemade to disrupt the banks of South Korea, and other activities? How is thisbeing addressed? SCAPARROTTI: Well, sir, I think first of all, we're working veryclosely with our allies as a multinational community in this regard. And wehave a very good cyber capability in the United States that's growing as well.This is a domain that we don't necessarily have superiority in. I think there'sa lot -- there's a lot of simultaneity out there in this domain, so we work itvery hard.
 
I think we've stayed away -- stayed ahead of it well, butwill take that kind of effort and resourcing in order to -- in order tocontinue to develop our capability. That's about what I'd say here. It'sdifficult to get into that much without -- you know, in an open hearing.
 
WILSON: Well, again, we just appreciate your efforts somuch. Additionally, Ms. Wormuth, I'm really grateful to be the chairman of theEmergency Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. The unconventional warfaretactics are a great concern to the entire committee, and to myself. Could youplease characterize your assessment of the unconventional strategy and tacticsbeing used by China, and the challenge these pose to the DOD's ability tocounter them?
 
WORMUTH: Thank you, Congressman. I think, as CongressmanForbes talked about, in terms of the Coast Guard capability, for example, orthe maritime law enforcement's capabilities that China has, China's has been --China uses those assets to assert -- to try to assert additional control overwhat it sees as its territorial claims. And I think that's a way where they'resort of using assets in an unconventional way.
 
We're really focused, I think, on the building partnercapacity side, in trying to help partners in the region, some of the smallercountries in Southeast Asia, for example, work on their own maritime securitycapabilities to try to counter that kind of unconventional use of assets.
 
We also, though, are looking at -- on the more technologyside, we are looking at certainly our intelligence capabilities, and are tryingto strengthen our information operation capabilities, for example. And thosecapabilities are relevant, obviously, not just in the Asia-Pacific theater, butin many theaters around the world. I think, you know, we've seen a considerableuse of unconventional techniques in Europe recently, given Russia's activitiesin Ukraine, for example.
 
WILSON: And certainly, that's to me such a tragedy, theinvasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. I know that I had just so hopedfor a modern European-inclined Russian Federation. And that doesn't seem to bedeveloping.
 
Additionally, I'm very concerned about North Korea's nuclearweapons policy. Ms. Wormuth, what does North Korea, the regime, what is their-- what do you see as their capability of enhancing nuclear weapons deliverycapabilities?
 
WORMUTH: Well, Congressman, we're certainly concerned,obviously, about North Korea's weapons-of-mass-destruction capability, and itsnuclear program in particular. You know, we -- North Korea has not tested someof its capabilities, and we don't yet fully know what they're able to do interms of their ability to miniaturize, for example, a nuclear weapon.
 
But it's our assessment that it is prudent to plan for theworst- case scenario, which is why we're so focused on our National MissileDefense program, for example, and why we've made the investments to expand thenumber of ground-based interceptors from 30 to 44, to try to make sure thatwe're keeping track with that -- with that threat.
 
I think fundamentally, the North Korean regime believes thathaving a nuclear capability under -- basically guarantees their regimesurvival, which is why they see it as so important. I would ask, I think,General Scaparrotti to elaborate.
 
THORNBERRY: The gentleman's time is expired, so would askthe general if he could do that for the record. And the chair recognizes Ms.Gabbard from Hawaii for five minutes.
 
GABBARD: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll continuealong the same topic here. And I think it's important for us to recognize thatNorth Korea remains the most immediate military threat, not only to ourinterests within the region, but really to the U.S. directly. And important forus to focus on, this immediate threat, especially within the context of thegreater conversation that's taking place now, in seeing how we can prevent Iranfrom getting to the point of having this nuclear capability.
 
So General Scaparrotti, I'm wondering if you can speak toMr. Wilson's question, but also specifically to the status of ballistic missiledefense policy within the region, and the level of cooperation that you aregetting from our partners there within the Republic of Korea and Japanspecifically?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Well, thank you. First of all, to the NorthKorean nuclear capability, I would state it this way; that they claim to have acapability to deliver a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile.
 
They've paraded it, they've shown it to us, but they haven'ttested it, as the undersecretary mentioned. And that's very important insomething that's as complex as this. But I as a commander, I have to beprudent, and assume that they can deliver one, and act on that basis.
 
Secondly, in terms of ballistic missile defense, we bringour best systems to the peninsula. We work very closely with the Republic ofKorea. This year, just this funding year, they committed in the last couplemonths to upgrade their PAC-2 systems to PAC-3, and they'll be doing that overthe next couple of years. And we're working closely with them over the nextyear or so to increase our interoperability, and the ability to have a commonoperating fixture.
 
So I think we're moving in the right direction. Given thethreat, we have to keep pace with that. We have to continue to keep our focuson that. GABBARD: Thank you. Admiral Locklear, in your written statement, youstated that currently there are roughly 1,300 ISIS foreign fighters who arecoming from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Can you speak to specifically whichcountries predominantly they're coming from? What is drawing them to ISISspecifically? And how do you characterize the threat of these foreign fighterscoming back and returning to their home countries in the region, and continuingthese activities there?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, thank you, Congresswoman. We are workingclosely with our fellow COCOM and CENTCOM to actually have a -- try to get abetter sense of this phenomenon of foreign fighters that would be moving out ofpredominantly Asia, Southeast Asia.
 
They come from a broad range of countries. It wouldn't --you know, if you take a look at the list, it wouldn't surprise you that they --you know, it wouldn't be what you thought. They come from a number of differentplaces. We're not sure how many of them are dedicated fighters that go forward,or they're just kind want-to-be's that kind of trundle over there and decidethey want to sign up for a new cause.
 
And the numbers that are coming back, we don't have goodfidelity on that at this point in time. But what it has done, it has opened upour information-sharing with all the countries in the region that are concernedabout this problem, which all of them are. And this isn't just a mil-to-mil,this is a whole government agency, FBI, those types of agencies that areworking hard on the problem.