IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-139

No. 458A20

Filed 5 November 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: L.G.G., L.G., and L.J.G.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 13

August 2020 by Judge Larry Leake in District Court, Watauga County. This matter 

was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 2021 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Chelsea Bell Garrett for petitioner-appellee Watauga County Department of 

Social Services.

Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.

Sean P. Vitrano for respondent-appellant father.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental 

rights in the minor children L.G.G., L.G., and L.J.G. (Gary, Richard, and John).1

Because we hold the trial court did not err in concluding grounds existed to terminate 

respondents’ parental rights based on neglect and did not abuse its discretion in 

 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ privacy and for ease of reading.
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

determining that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in Gary’s 

best interests, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 On 23 January 2018, Watauga County Department of Social Services (DSS)

filed juvenile petitions alleging that seven-year-old Gary, three-year-old Richard, and 

two-year-old John were neglected juveniles. The petitions alleged that on or about 22 

September 2017, DSS received a report alleging issues of inappropriate discipline and 

lack of supervision of the children. During the first week of DSS’s assessment, 

respondent-mother called DSS and reported that she and respondent-father had 

gotten into a fight the night before and that she had left the home. She further 

reported that the children were in the home during the domestic violence incident 

but were sleeping. The social worker observed respondents’ home to be “in an extreme 

state of despair and filth.”

¶ 3 The family entered into a safety plan on or about 6 October 2017. Respondents 

agreed to refrain from domestic violence and to clean up their house and the 

surrounding area. On or about 11 October 2017, DSS transferred the case to In-Home 

Services finding the family to be in need of continuing services. During the initial 

visit by the In-Home Services Social Worker on 17 October 2017, “the home was again 

in a deplorable state.” DSS discussed the need for additional services with 

respondents and they entered into a case plan agreeing to conduct an intake with 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

Daymark Recovery Services for Intensive In-Home Services and to follow all 

recommendations for treatment. 

¶ 4 Respondents missed several of their scheduled intake sessions and ongoing 

appointments with Daymark. Respondents did not complete their intake 

appointment until two months after entering into the case plan. Daymark 

recommended that the family participate in Intensive In-Home Services and that 

Gary be transferred to a day treatment program “to address his extreme behavioral 

problems[.]” Respondents did not enroll Gary within the thirty days required under 

the assessment, and an additional intake session was required in order for any 

services to be provided. After Daymark was able to initiate their Intensive In-Home 

Services program, respondents attended their first meeting but failed to schedule 

another visit.

¶ 5 Gary’s elementary school reported that he frequently complained of tooth pain 

and that it hurt for him to eat. A dental screening on 16 November 2017 at Gary’s 

elementary school revealed that he had several cavities and “required extensive 

dental work.” Respondent-mother did not schedule a dentist appointment or verify 

that Gary was still on Medicaid for several weeks, and DSS ultimately scheduled the 

appointment for 20 December 2017. The day before the appointment, respondentmother contacted DSS to reschedule the appointment stating that Gary had a 

Christmas presentation at school the next day and insisted he be allowed to 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

participate. DSS rescheduled the appointment for 2 January 2018. The dental 

appointment confirmed Gary had multiple cavities and required “extensive 

treatment.” The dentist stated that Gary may need to be hospitalized in order to 

conduct all of the necessary work. A follow-up appointment was scheduled for 22 

January 2018 to begin the dental work. DSS attempted to contact respondent-mother 

the morning of the appointment to confirm her need for transportation. However, 

DSS did not receive a response from the family the entire day, and Gary did not 

attend the appointment.

¶ 6 On 8 February 2018, respondents appeared in court for an adjudicatory 

hearing on the juvenile petitions. Following an agreement between respondents and 

DSS, the matter was continued until 1 March 2018 to allow respondents time to 

demonstrate compliance and engagement in their case plan activities.

¶ 7 After the hearing, respondents allowed their Medicaid insurance to lapse again 

by failing to provide the Medicaid office with the necessary paperwork, and Gary’s 

12 February 2018 follow-up dental appointment had to be rescheduled. Respondentmother rescheduled the appointment for one month later on 5 March 2018. 

Meanwhile Gary continued to complain of constant teeth pain to his teachers. On 13 

February 2018, respondents did not pick up Gary from the school bus, and school 

personnel were unable to get in contact with them.

¶ 8 On 14 February 2018, DSS took the children into nonsecure custody and filed 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

additional petitions alleging the children to be neglected and dependent juveniles.

Following a 17 April 2018 hearing on the juvenile petitions, the trial court entered a 

consent order on 31 May 2018 adjudicating the children as neglected juveniles. The 

court ordered respondents to enter into and comply with the components of a case 

plan requiring them to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all 

treatment recommendations; complete a parenting assessment and follow all 

recommendations; complete parenting classes; secure reliable transportation; 

maintain safe, stable, appropriate housing; participate in recommended services for 

the children; meet with DSS to discuss the needs of the children and family; tend to 

the children’s medical and dental needs; and attend visitations. Respondents were 

granted a minimum of one hour of supervised visitation per week.

¶ 9 The trial court held a review hearing on 14 June 2018. In an order entered 6 

August 2018, the court found that respondents were not being cooperative with DSS 

or the court; “continued to use methamphetamine and have demonstrated no 

willingness to deal with that problem[;]” and admitted they would fail drug screens 

for methamphetamine. The trial court set the primary plan as reunification with a 

concurrent plan of adoption. Respondents’ visitation was suspended until they 

showed to the satisfaction of DSS that they were making progress with their 

substance abuse treatment by providing a clean drug screen.

¶ 10 Following a permanency planning hearing held 6 December 2018, the trial 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

court entered an order on 17 January 2019 maintaining the permanent plan of 

reunification with a secondary plan of adoption finding that the parents had “recently 

made considerable progress” “after doing essentially nothing for a long period of 

time[.]”

¶ 11 In its next review order entered 16 April 2019, the trial court found that 

respondents “seem to be making great effort to comply” with their case plans at times, 

and “[a]t other times, they appear to be ignoring the requests of DSS and the 

mandates of [the c]ourt.” The court found respondents had missed several drug 

screens and that respondent-mother tested positive for methamphetamines on or 

about 7 November 2018 but denied using drugs. Although respondents were 

attending visitations and behaving appropriately, the court found the children’s 

behaviors had regressed since the visitations had resumed.

¶ 12 On or about July 2019, Gary and Richard reported to their therapist, Robin

Spicer, that they had viewed pornography while in respondents’ home. Richard also 

disclosed instances where he observed Gary and John engaging in sexualized 

behavior with each other. John acknowledged the behavior to Ms. Spicer. Richard 

later disclosed that he also engaged in the sexual behavior with his brothers. Ms. 

Spicer testified at the termination hearing that the children’s assessment score was

“the highest level of these kind of sexualized behaviors” and that the children “had 

really high symptoms that were off the charts[.]” The children all exhibited sexualized 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

behaviors when they entered foster care. On 31 July 2019, DSS and Ms. Spicer 

discussed with respondents the recent disclosures by the children. Respondents did 

not believe the sexual behavior had happened in their home.

¶ 13 In a permanency planning order entered 4 October 2019, the trial court 

changed the permanent plan to adoption with a secondary plan of guardianship and 

relieved DSS of further reunification efforts. The trial court found the children’s 

behaviors had further regressed and they “appear to be out of control.” Gary became 

more aggressive towards himself and defiant of his foster parents, Richard began 

wetting the bed, and John started showing aggression toward animals in his foster 

home. The court found that respondents both missed an appointment with the 

children’s therapist; that respondents “have charged out of therapy sessions with the 

therapists, expressing frustration and doubts about the validity of these therapy 

sessions”; and that although respondents had made progress in improving the 

condition of their home, their two bedroom home “would not be adequate to meet the 

needs of the three Juveniles.” The court found that respondents had “failed to do those 

things which were asked of them in March” and “still deny any responsibility for their 

actions, blaming the Department and the Court for their difficulties.”

¶ 14 On 12 March 2020, DSS filed motions to terminate respondents’ parental 

rights to the children. DSS alleged that grounds existed to terminate respondents’ 

parental rights based on neglect, willfully leaving the children in foster care for more 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions 

that led to the children’s removal from the home, and dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1)–(2), (6) (2019). Respondents filed their answers to the motions on 23–24

April 2020.

¶ 15 Following a hearing held 16 and 18 June 2020, the trial court entered an order 

terminating respondents’ parental rights to the children on 13 August 2020. The 

court concluded that grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights based 

on neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress and that termination of 

respondents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondents 

appealed.

II. Analysis

¶ 16 Respondents challenge the trial court’s adjudication that grounds existed to 

terminate their parental rights to their children. Respondent-father separately

challenges the trial court’s dispositional determination that terminating his parental 

rights was in Gary’s best interests.

¶ 17 The Juvenile Code provides for a two-stage process for the termination of 

parental rights: adjudication and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). At 

the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent,

and convincing evidence” that one or more grounds for termination exists under 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f) (2019). “If a trial court finds one or 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

more grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. 7B-1111(a), it then 

proceeds to the dispositional stage[,]” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019), at which it 

“determine[s] whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 

interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). 

A. Adjudication

¶ 18 Respondents contend the trial court erred by adjudicating grounds for 

termination of their parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2).

¶ 19 “We review a trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 ‘to determine 

whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the 

findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019)

(quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “Findings of fact not challenged 

by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on 

appeal. Moreover, we review only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s 

determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In re 

T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (citations omitted). “The trial court’s conclusions of 

law are reviewed de novo.” In re M.C., 374 N.C. 882, 886 (2020).

¶ 20 Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), a trial court may terminate parental 

rights if it concludes the parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Section 7B-101(15) defines a

neglected juvenile, in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose parent, guardian, 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; or 

who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is 

not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the 

juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15).

Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory 

ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 

termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 

from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 

showing of a likelihood of future neglect by the parent. 

When determining whether such future neglect is likely, 

the district court must consider evidence of changed 

circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect 

and the time of the termination hearing.

In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (cleaned up). “The determinative factors must 

be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at 

the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Z.V.A., 373 N.C. 207, 212 (2019) (citing 

In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715).

¶ 21 On appeal, respondents challenge several of the trial court’s findings of fact 

and argue that the remaining findings do not support a conclusion that grounds for 

termination exist based on neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). We address only 

those challenged findings that are necessary to support the court’s adjudication of 

neglect. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407.

¶ 22 Respondent-mother first objects to finding of fact 8(sss) in which the court 

found that “[r]espondents told [child and family therapist Robin Spicer] that they did 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

not feel that the parenting classes they took prior to August 29, 2019 taught them 

anything new and believed the classes were not helpful to them.” Respondent-mother 

notes she took multiple parenting classes and “testified that she did not learn 

anything new because the material in [the] second class was [the] same material.”

However, Ms. Spicer testified respondents reported to her that they had completed 

their parenting and mental health groups and “they repeatedly stated that they did 

not learn anything new about parenting and that the groups were not helpful.” This 

testimony supports the trial court’s finding of fact 8(sss). See In re G.G.M., 377 N.C. 

29, 2021-NCSC-25, ¶18 (“It is the trial court’s responsibility to pass upon the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” (cleaned up)).

¶ 23 Respondent-father challenges the evidentiary support for finding of fact 

8(uuu), which states:

Even after taking additional parenting classes since the 

August 2019 hearing, during the life of this case, 

Respondents have failed to take responsibility for their 

actions, failed to meaningfully engage in therapy to 

address the reasons their children came into DSS custody 

and, failed to acknowledge or address the disturbing 

disclosures made by the Juveniles in therapy – other than 

to deny them and become combative when they were 

brought up.
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

Respondent-father points to his and respondent-mother’s testimonies regarding the 

classes they completed, the therapy they participated in, and their interest in the 

children’s medical diagnoses and communication with the children’s therapists.

¶ 24 At the termination hearing, Social Worker Melanie Ellis acknowledged 

respondents’ participation in the components of their case plans but noted they 

waited for more than a year after the children entered DSS custody to begin to engage 

in the case plans. Ms. Ellis also testified respondents never fully acknowledged 

responsibility and had a significant pattern of denial throughout the case, never

admitted to any instances of domestic violence or inappropriate sexual behavior in 

the home, and have “continued some of the repeated concerns and issues that . . . led 

to the removal of the children[.]” Ms. Spicer testified that when respondents were 

informed of the sexual behavior disclosures, respondent-father “was very angry and 

reactive and agitated and stated that [Ms. Spicer] told [Richard] to make those 

statements.” She further testified that respondent-father neither believed the 

disclosures nor that the children “had done those things under their supervision in 

the home[.]” This testimony supports the trial court’s findings in finding of fact 

8(uuu).

¶ 25 Respondent-father next challenges findings of fact 8(iiii)–(kkkk) pertaining to 

respondents’ progress with their housing. The trial court found that respondents were 

not able to secure suitable housing and that the suitability of their housing had been 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

a reoccurring issue in the case. The court further found that respondents’ twobedroom home was not adequate to meet the needs of the three boys with a history of 

boy-to-boy sexual misbehavior and that the therapists “are also of the opinion that it 

would not be appropriate for [Gary] to share a bedroom and believe that all the boys 

will need additional and hypervigilant supervision.”

¶ 26 Respondent-father argues that respondents took steps to improve the safety 

and cleanliness of their home and that the home was now suitable to live in. He notes

that both he and respondent-mother testified that they would be willing to sleep in 

another area of the home so the boys would not have to share the same room.

Respondent-father asserts that Ms. Spicer testified she had no concerns regarding 

Richard and John sharing a room, and in regard to Gary, that “families are able to 

work these situations out but there has to be . . . hypervigilance, especially at night 

with sleeping so that children who have engaged in improper sexualized behavior are 

not . . . co-sleeping.” Finally, respondent-father asserts that the two other therapists 

who testified at the hearing “offered no opinions regarding the appropriateness of the 

home.”

¶ 27 Respondents were aware the trial court did not find their two-bedroom home 

suitable for the three children after the court found in the 4 October 2019 permanency 

planning order that the two-bedroom home “would not be adequate to meet the needs 

of the three Juveniles.” Yet respondent-father testified at the termination hearing 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

that he believed the two bedrooms in the home would be sufficient. Respondent-father 

also testified that he planned to add a third bedroom but did not provide any further 

explanation regarding his plans or expected time frame for the addition. Additionally, 

although respondents both testified that they would sleep in a different area of the 

home so the three children would not have to share a bedroom, respondents did not 

offer any plan in providing the additional supervision and hypervigilance 

recommended by Ms. Spicer.

¶ 28 Ms. Spicer testified that respondents “did not feel comfortable acknowledging 

and talking about like [sic] path forward if the court decided to send the boys back 

home, where the boys would share a bedroom, that was a point of contention for them 

as far as like how would they work that out . . . .” Her testimony supports a finding 

that she is of the opinion that it would not be appropriate for Gary to share a bedroom 

and that the children “will need additional and hypervigilant supervision.” However, 

respondent-father is correct that the other two therapists at the termination hearing 

did not express an opinion on the appropriateness of the home. Thus, we disregard 

finding of fact 8(kkkk) to the extent it indicates that all of the therapists that testified 

at the hearing are of the opinion that Gary should not share a bedroom and that the 

children will need additional supervision. See In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 901 (2020) 

(disregarding findings of fact not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence).
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

¶ 29 Respondents both challenge finding of fact 8(llll) but for different reasons.

Finding of fact 8(llll) states: 

Given their continued lack of appreciation, acceptance of 

responsibility, and the pattern of behavior exhibited by the 

parents of technically – but not meaningfully – engaging in 

their case plan, these Juveniles are very likely to be 

neglected in the future if they are returned to the 

Respondent Parents.

¶ 30 Respondent-father contends that the finding concerning the likelihood of 

neglect is speculative and inconsistent with the record. Respondent-father challenges 

the trial court’s characterization of his attitude and actions, arguing that the record 

establishes that he accepted responsibility for the condition of the home, domestic 

violence, and his lack of supervision of the children. He asserts that his “completion 

of his case plan and participation in services even after the change in the permanent 

plan demonstrated his desire and willingness to do whatever was necessary to regain 

custody of his children.” Thus, he contends the trial court’s finding of a likelihood of 

repetition of neglect is mere speculation. We disagree.

¶ 31 Ms. Ellis testified that respondents had not fully acknowledged responsibility 

for why the children came into DSS’s care. Ms. Spicer testified that respondents never 

acknowledged “any kind of responsibility for the children’s” behavior and that “[t]he 

only event that [respondents] both acknowledged that could have possibly been 

negative was the missed dental appointment for [Gary].” This testimony supports the 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

trial court’s finding that respondent-father continued to lack an appreciation and 

acceptance of responsibility.

¶ 32 Additionally, the trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact:

[8.]ooo. . . . [W]hen Ms. Spicer attempted to discuss the 

boys’ behaviors with Respondents, especially the 

disclosures regarding inappropriate sexual behavior, 

Respondent Father became angry and abruptly left the 

therapy session yelling [and] creating a scene in Ms. 

Spicer’s office/waiting room. Respondent Mother remained, 

but Respondent Father returned shortly thereafter to 

demand that she leave as well. Respondents expressed 

displeasure with Ms. Spicer, questioned the validity of the 

therapy and accused Ms. Spicer of telling the Juvenile, 

[Richard], “to say that” – referring to the disclosures about 

inappropriate sexual behaviors between the Juveniles.

ppp. Although it is not uncommon for parents of children 

taken into custody of DSS to feel initial anger and be 

resistant, the failure by Respondents here to accept 

responsibility appears heightened and has persisted 

through the life of the case.

. . . .

vvv. Further, at this termination hearing, over two years 

since the Juveniles were taken into custody, Respondents’ 

testimony regarding the disclosure by the Juveniles about 

viewing pornography defies human logic. Respondents 

have offered conflicting testimony as to the source of the 

pornography to which the Juveniles were exposed, how it 

happened and who was to blame.

. . . .

dddd. Respondents completed substantially all of their case 

plan but, despite their participation, they have shown that 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

they have not gleaned sufficient insight into why their 

three children came into DSS custody.

eeee. When Respondent Mother was asked what trauma, if 

any, she believed the Juveniles experienced, the only event 

she acknowledged was the death of the Juveniles’ 

grandmother. Respondent Father also failed to voice an 

acknowledgment of the traumas about which the Juveniles’ 

therapists testified[.]

ffff. At no point during this termination hearing did 

Respondent Mother or Respondent Father acknowledge 

that the Juveniles’ diagnoses and behaviors were linked to 

any inappropriate sexual event/behavior, viewing 

pornography, domestic violence or substance abuse in the 

home. This failure on Respondents’ part is especially 

concerning when, according to therapist testimony, the 

Juveniles’ sexualized behaviors were considered “extreme.”

These findings demonstrate that respondent-father failed to acknowledge 

responsibility for his actions and how they affected the children and failed to 

acknowledge the traumas experienced by the children, and that these failures 

rendered it difficult for respondent-father to understand how the children’s past 

experiences impact their behavior issues. The unchallenged findings also show that 

respondent-father failed to acknowledge any responsibility throughout the life of the 

case. The trial court’s findings and the record evidence support the court’s finding 

that the children would likely be neglected if returned to respondents’ care.

¶ 33 Respondent-mother challenges as unsupported by the evidence the trial court’s 

statement in finding of fact 8(llll) that she “technically – but not meaningfully –

engag[ed] in [her] case plan[.]”Respondent-mother “admits that the evidence in the 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

case shows that [she] did not totally appreciate or accept responsibility for her 

conduct in this case which resulted in the removal of the children from her home.”

She argues, however, that her “failure to accept responsibility does not equate to a 

conclusion that . . . the children would be neglected in the future if they were returned 

home because of [her] progress with her court ordered case plan.”2 She contends that 

“[a]lthough [she] has not taken responsibility for her prior conduct, [she] nevertheless 

has corrected the conditions which led to the children’s removal” because she has 

refrained from using illegal drugs, refrained from domestic violence, participated in 

dialectical behavioral therapy through Daymark, participated in numerous parenting 

classes, and engaged in appropriate visits with the children.

¶ 34 However, “[a]s this Court has previously noted, a parent’s compliance with his 

or her case plan does not preclude a finding of neglect.” In re J.J.H., 376 N.C. 161, 

185 (2020) (citing In re D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 339–40 (2020)); see also In re Y.Y.E.T., 

205 N.C. App. 120, 131 (2010) (acknowledging that “parents must demonstrate 

acknowledgement and understanding of why the juvenile entered DSS custody as 

well as changed behaviors”). Here, the trial court found that respondents “completed 

substantially all of their case plan but, despite their participation, they have shown 

that they have not gleaned sufficient insight into why their three children came into 

 

2 Respondent-mother also challenges finding of fact 8.mmmm. However, 8.mmmm 

pertains more to the ground of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and is not necessary to support the 

ground of neglect. Therefore, we do not address this challenge. See In re T.N.H., 372 at 407.
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

DSS custody.” Respondent-mother does not challenge this finding. Therefore, 

respondent-mother’s argument is without merit. As stated above, the trial court’s 

findings and the record evidence support the trial court’s finding that the children 

would likely be neglected if returned to respondents’ care.

¶ 35 Finally, respondents argue the trial court’s findings do not support the 

conclusion that their parental rights were subject to termination based on neglect.

Respondents do not challenge the children’s prior adjudication of neglect. Rather, 

they contend that the evidence and findings of fact do not support the trial court’s 

determination that there was a likelihood of future neglect if the children were 

returned to their care.

¶ 36 Terminating parental rights on the ground of neglect 

requires a showing of neglect at the time of the termination 

hearing or, if the child has been separated from the parent 

for a long period of time, there must be a showing of a 

likelihood of future neglect by the parent. When 

determining whether such future neglect is likely, the 

district court must consider evidence of changed 

circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect 

and the time of the termination hearing.

In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. at 841 (2020) (cleaned up).

¶ 37 The children were previously adjudicated neglected on 30 May 2018. The trial 

court’s findings establish that the children were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 

disorder and suffered from behavioral issues as a result of the trauma experienced 

while in respondents’ care. The findings also establish that respondents failed to 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

accept responsibility for their actions and for the trauma the children experienced 

and failed to acknowledge or address the disclosures of inappropriate sexual behavior 

between the children. Consequently, we conclude the trial court’s findings of fact 

support its conclusion that respondents neglected the children and that there was a 

high likelihood there would be a repetition of neglect if they were returned to their

care. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that grounds existed to 

terminate respondents’ parental rights based on neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B1111(a)(1). Because the ground of neglect is sufficient to support the trial court’s order 

of termination, we need not address respondents’ arguments as to the remaining 

ground under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In re A.W., 377 N.C. 238, 2021-NCSC-44, ¶44

B. Disposition

¶ 38 Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s dispositional 

determination that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests. Respondent-father challenges the court’s conclusion only with regard to his 

oldest child, Gary. Respondent-father argues the trial court abused its discretion in 

determining that termination of his parental rights was in Gary’s best interests. We 

disagree.

¶ 39 If the trial court finds a ground to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1111(a), it proceeds to the dispositional stage where it must “determine whether 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest” based on the 

following factors:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 

the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 

juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 

the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 

other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). Although the trial court must consider all six of the 

enumerated factors, it is required to enter written findings of fact concerning only 

those factors that are relevant. In re A.K.O., 375 N.C 698, 704 (2020).

¶ 40 We review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether 

they are supported by the evidence received before the trial court. See In re J.J.B., 

374 N.C. 787, 793 (2020). Dispositional findings not challenged by respondent are 

binding on appeal. In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019). “The trial court’s 

assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at the dispositional stage is reviewed solely 

for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 6 (2019). “[A]buse of discretion 

results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 

101, 107 (2015) (citing State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 (1988)). 

¶ 41 In determining termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in 

Gary’s best interests, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:

10. Disposition. . . . All statutory factors were considered 

including, but not limited to those discussed below:

. . . .

b. As to [Gary], despite his diagnosis unrelated to trauma 

– those being Autism and ADHD – [Gary] is highly 

functioning and has made progress in therapy and while in 

foster care. He has learned and exhibited better coping 

skills and a greater awareness of his behaviors (“Why can 

I be good when I don’t see my parents?”). [Gary] does have 

a bond with Respondent parents because of his age when 

he came into DSS custody. However, that bond is, in some 

ways, unhealthy. [Gary] is more concerned about his two 

younger brothers and shows a greater desire to visit them 

than he does his parents. [Gary] has viewed himself as the 

caregiver for the two younger children for too long. He has 

memories of his relationship with Respondents which are 

unhealthy. In fact, [Gary] has expressed a desire to be 

adopted and to not return to Respondents’ home. His 

current placement is a good placement but not an adoptive 

placement. Adoption, while not an immediate option 

because he is not in an adoptive placement, is a realistic 

possibility for him as he continues to show improvement 

over the next year or two.

c. The best way this Court can give these Juveniles the 

opportunity to lead healthy, successful lives is for the 

Respondents’ parental rights to be terminated.

11. Best Interest/Placement/Visitation. The best interests 

of the Juveniles would be served by terminating the 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

parental rights of Respondent Mother and Respondent 

Father in order to achieve the permanency plan of 

Adoption for the Juveniles. It is also in the Juveniles’ best 

interests that there be no further contact with 

Respondents. 

¶ 42 Respondent-father first challenges as “speculative and unsupported by the 

evidence” the trial court’s finding that adoption was a “realistic possibility” for Gary.

Respondent-father argues the evidence showed that Gary was at risk of losing his 

current foster placement and that his likelihood of adoption was low. Respondentfather specifically points to incidents occurring one week before the termination 

hearing where the foster parents called the police multiple times, reported that Gary 

had tried to assault them, and called mobile crisis due to his behavior.

¶ 43 Licensed clinical social worker associate Nicholas Bailey testified regarding 

the incidents occurring the week before the termination hearing and stated that Gary 

had an increase in aggression and “[a] moderate regression” in behavior. However, 

he also testified that “since then, he has actually been doing quite well over the last 

three to four days” and that the foster mother informed him the morning of the 

hearing that Gary “was doing quite well.” Social worker Ms. Ellis testified that “there 

was some concern that [Gary] might not be able to remain in that foster home[.]”

However, she also testified that Gary’s behavior had improved and that his 

medications had been addressed. 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

¶ 44 Ms. Ellis testified that although Gary was not in a position for adoption at the 

time of the hearing and that it was uncertain when he may be in a position to be 

adopted because “it depend[ed] on his treatment and his continued progress[,]” she 

also testified that “he’s continuing to progress and has – you know, last year, he . . . 

stepped down to a therapeutic foster home, and he’s begun to stabilize.” Ms. Ellis 

testified that she believed it was possible for him to eventually step down from leveled 

care and find a long-term or adoptive foster home. This testimony supports the trial 

court’s finding that adoption “is a realistic possibility for [Gary] as he continues to 

show improvement over the next year or two.”

¶ 45 Respondent-father does not challenge the remainder of the trial court’s 

findings of fact, and they are binding on appeal. He argues, however, that the 

statutory factors do not support the trial court’s determination that it was in Gary’s 

best interests to terminate his parental rights because Gary “was nearly ten years 

old at the time of the hearing, would have remained bonded to his parents but for the 

trial court’s termination of visitation, and had special needs that respondents were 

prepared to manage.”

¶ 46 However, the record and findings of fact demonstrate that the trial court

considered the appropriate dispositional factors and “performed a reasoned analysis 

weighing those factors.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 101. The court found that Gary was 

highly functioning despite his diagnoses and was making progress in his treatment 
IN RE L.G.G., L.G., L.J.G.

2021-NCSC-139

Opinion of the Court

and in foster care; that his bond with respondents was “in some ways, unhealthy[;]” 

that Gary had expressed a desire to be adopted and to not return to respondents; and 

that termination would aid in achieving the plan of adoption. Although Gary was not 

in an adoptive placement at the time, “[t]he absence of an adoptive placement for a 

juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental 

rights.” In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 512 (2020); see also In re C.B., 375 N.C. 556, 561 

(2020) (“[T]he trial court need not find a likelihood of adoption in order to terminate 

parental rights.”). We conclude the trial court’s determination that terminating 

respondent-father’s parental rights was in Gary’s best interests was not so manifestly 

unsupported by reason as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

III. Conclusion

¶ 47 In summary, we conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that grounds 

existed to terminate respondents’ parental rights on the ground of neglect and did 

not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of respondent-father’s 

parental rights was in Gary’s best interests. Respondent-mother did not challenge 

the trial court’s best interests determination, and respondent-father did not challenge 

the trial court’s best interests determination regarding Richard and John.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondents’ parental 

rights to the children.

AFFIRMED.