June 2010

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION 

INFORMATION-SHARING GUIDEBOOK

For

TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT 

CENTERS, EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 

CENTERS, AND FUSION CENTERS

i

NOTICE

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the department of transportation 

in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability 

for its contents or use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard, specification, or 

regulation. 

The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade and 

manufacturers’ names appear in this report only because they are considered essential to 

the object of the document.
Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No.

FHWA-HOP-09-003

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient’s Catalog No.

4. Title and Subtitle

Information Sharing Guidebook for Transportation Management Centers, 

Emergency Operations Centers, and Fusion Centers

5. Report Date

June 2010

6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)

Nancy Houston, John Wiegmann, Robin Marshall, Ram Kandarpa, John Korsak, 

Craig Baldwin, Jeff Sangillo, Susan Knisely, Kevin Graham, Andrea Vann Easton

8. Performing Organization Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

Booz Allen Hamilton

8283 Greensboro Drive

McLean, Virginia 22102

HNTB Corporation

11414 West Park Place, Suite 300

Milwaukee, WI 53224

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

Federal Highway Administration, HOTO-1

U. S. Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE

Washington, D. C. 20590

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

Final Report

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

HOTO, FHWA

15. Supplementary Notes

Kimberly Vasconez, FHWA Team Leader, Emergency Transportation Operations, Contracting Officer’s Technical 

Representative (COTR)

16. Abstract

This guidebook provides an overview of the mission and functions of transportation management centers, emergency operations centers, and fusion centers. The guidebook focuses on the types of information these centers 

produce and manage and how the sharing of such information among the centers can be beneficial to both the 

day-to-day and emergency operations of all the centers. Challenges exist to the ability to share information, and 

the guidebook addresses these challenges and options for handling them. The guidebook also provides some lessons learned and best practices identified from a literature search and interviews/site visits with center operators.

17. Key Words

Transportation Management Center, Traffic Management Center, 

Transportation Operations Center, Emergency Operations Center, 

Fusion Center 

18. Distribution Statement

No restrictions.

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

Unclassified.

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Unclassified.

21. No. of Pages

144

22. Price

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1

1.1 The Information-Sharing Situation Today.................................................................................3

1.2 The Potential Value of Sharing Transportation-Related Information.............................. 4

1.3 Guidebook Content ..........................................................................................................................6

Chapter 2. Missions and Characteristics........................................................................... 7

2.1 Roles and Characteristics................................................................................................................7

2.2 Statistics, Locations, Jurisdictions..............................................................................................11

2.3 Processes and Operations.............................................................................................................15

2.4 System Capabilities and Resources...........................................................................................19

2.5 Information Managed and Exchanged....................................................................................24

2.6 Communications Links..................................................................................................................33

Chapter 3. Opportunities for Collaboration...................................................................37

3.1 Transportation-Related Information Managed/Used by TMCs.......................................39

3.2 Transportation-Relevant Information Managed/Used by EOCs.....................................56

3.3 Transportation-Relevant Information Managed/Used by FCs........................................61

Chapter 4. Challenges and Options for Information Exchange....................................69

4.1 Center/Stakeholder Policies and Regulatory Issues............................................................69

4.2 Technical and Vulnerability Challenges...................................................................................76

4.3 General Options and Principles to Address the Challenges.............................................80

Chapter 5. Lessons Learned and Successful Practices...................................................85

5.1 Lessons Learned...............................................................................................................................85

5.2 Successful Practices.........................................................................................................................89

5.3 TMCs, EOCs, and FCs Working Together..................................................................................96

Chapter 6. Summary – Assessing the Value of TMC/EOC/FC Information-Sharing...101

Appendix A. References ................................................................................................105

Appendix B. TMC and FC Locations..............................................................................109

Appendix C. FC Key Data Sources.................................................................................115

Appendix D. Funding and Responsibility Chart of U.S. DOT, U.S. DOJ, DHS/FEMA..117

Appendix E. FC Interoperability Challenges ...............................................................123

Appendix F. Top Sites To Benefit From Collaboration................................................125

Appendix G. Technical Considerations and Vulnerability Improvements.................129

Appendix H. Inventory of Training Resources ............................................................133
iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1: Centers’ Links..................................................................................................................................3

Figure 2-1: FC Intelligence Process..............................................................................................................19

Figure 2-2: VEOC SITREP Extract...................................................................................................................29

Figure 3-1: Comparison of Typical TMC-EOC-FC Characteristics......................................................38

Figure 5-1: RISS Regional Centers................................................................................................................93

Figure D-1: U.S. DOT, DHS, and U.S. DOJ Funding Diagram ............................................................ 119

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1: TMC Common Functional Areas................................................................................................1

Table 1-2: EOC Common Functional Areas.................................................................................................2

Table 1-3: FC Common Functional Areas....................................................................................................2

Table 1-4: Common Information Types Across Centers......................................................................... 5

Table 2-1: Operations Management Center Descriptions ................................................................... 7

Table 2-2: FC Mission Areas..............................................................................................................................9

Table 2-3: FC Baseline Capabilities..............................................................................................................10

Table 2-4: Urban vs. Rural TMCs ...................................................................................................................12

Table 2-5: Governmental Jurisdictions............................................................................................................................................... 13

Table 2-6: EOC Categories..............................................................................................................................14

Table 2-7: TMC Traffic Management ..........................................................................................................16

Table 2-8: Illustrative EOC Functions and Processes ............................................................................17

Table 2-9: TMC Monitor Systems and Resources ...................................................................................20

Table 2-10: TMC Inform Systems and Resources....................................................................................20

Table 2-11: TMC Control Systems and Resources...................................................................................21

Table 2-12: TMC Indirect Functions Systems and Resources ..............................................................22

Table 2-13: TMC Data Types and Sources..................................................................................................25

Table 2-14: EOC Data Types and Sources..................................................................................................30
v

Table 2-15: TMC Communications Summary ..........................................................................................34

Table 2-16: Available EOC Communications Capabilities...................................................................35

Table 3-1: TMC Operational Information: Description and Potential Uses by 

EOCs and FCs......................................................................................................................................................39

Table 3-2: TMC Records and Logs Information: Description and Potential Uses by 

EOCs and FCs......................................................................................................................................................49

Table 3-3: TMC Physical Infrastructure Information: Description and Potential Uses by 

EOCs and FCs......................................................................................................................................................50

Table 3-4: EOC Situational/Operational Information: Description and Potential Uses 

by TMCs and FCs................................................................................................................................................57

Table 3-5: EOC Records and Logged Information: Description and Potential Uses by 

TMCs and FCs......................................................................................................................................................60

Table 3-6: FC Operational Information: Description and Potential Uses by TMCs and FCs...62

Table 5-1: Summary of Information-Sharing Methods by Surveyed Public Safety Entities....91

Table 5-2: Observed Best Practices for Emergency Integration........................................................97

Table B-1: FC and RIC Locations and Functions Supported............................................................ 111

Table D-1: Primary Federal Funding Sources for TMCs, EOCs, and FCs....................................... 117

Table F-1: Top Sites to Benefit from TMC-EOC-FC Collaboration................................................... 125
vi
1

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Transportation management centers (TMCs) exist in many large population and traffic concentration areas across the country to manage and enhance the efficient operation, safety, 

and health of major metropolitan and regional transportation networks and corridors. TMCs 

perform a wide variety of transportation management functions, depending on the authority and capability vested in the centers. Table 1-1 lists the most common TMC functional 

areas.

Table 1-1: TMC Common Functional Areas

TMC Common Functional Areas

Management of traffic control systems and assets

Incident response and clearance functions

Emergency response functions

Monitoring and surveillance of transportation network conditions

Acquisition and communication of traffic information

The extent of the leading and supporting roles of TMCs in these functional areas varies 

depending on specific jurisdictional situations, incidents, or emergencies. TMCs are also 

sometimes referred to as traffic management centers or transportation or traffic operations 

centers (TOCs). While there is no standard definition for these terms, those referred to as 

transportation rather than traffic may have a multi-modal focus—not just a roadway focus. 

Those centers referred to as operations rather than management centers may have a larger 

role in overall transportation operations, including incident management, through a more 

fully integrated team with law enforcement and other emergency responders as well as 

other proactive response functions such as operating a safety/service patrol. 

Emergency operations centers (EOCs) exist in some form in virtually every State and local 

jurisdiction in the country. Their primary roles include management of and response to 

emergencies of all kinds that threaten or result in significant impact on public health and 

safety, infrastructure, commerce, and/or national security. EOCs typically are communications centers and physical locations where responsible government officials, along with 

law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and infrastructure management 

authorities, gather to coordinate emergency response. EOCs usually define and tier coordination and leadership roles along jurisdictional lines, and full operations of these centers 

are “stood up” according to defined criteria for declaring emergency conditions.1

 Table 1-2 

lists the most common EOC functional areas.

1 Many EOCs continuously staff personnel to maintain preparedness and monitor alerts and developing conditions that may lead to declared emergencies. In emergencies, designated officials assemble and manage operational decisions from or through the center. 
2

Table 1-2: EOC Common Functional Areas

EOC Common Functional Areas

Communications management and coordination

Physical facility for assembly of responsible officials and staff

Emergency response decision-making and management of response functions

Monitoring and surveillance of emergency situation and response activity

According to the Fusion Center Guidelines, a fusion center (FC) is a collaborative effort of two 

or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the 

goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and 

terrorist activity. Some forms of FCs address specific laws such as driver licensing, banking 

crime, or specific critical infrastructure elements. At the same time, some FCs also exist to 

synthesize information and focus on a much wider set of public safety and national security 

challenges (such as terrorism, major criminal activities, public health risks, major economic 

risks, critical infrastructure protection, and major natural hazards). Table 1-3 lists the most 

common FC functional areas.

Table 1-3: FC Common Functional Areas

FC Common Functional Areas

Aggregation and synthesis of safety and security-related information 

Assessment and reporting of safety and security threats

Monitoring and surveillance of critical infrastructure conditions

The three types of centers distinctly differ in their primary missions, and each center type 

acquires and processes information that is unique and may not be of common interest. 

However, significant actual and potential information exchange can benefit the centers’ assessments, decision-making, and operations.

The potential benefits of TMC, EOC, and FC center-to-center information sharing are most 

apparent when addressing the centers’ common uses of various types of information about 

regional and local transportation networks. Categories of transportation information best 

suited for common use or exchange are those regarding configuration, operations status, 

and incidents on the transportation network. This guidebook addresses sharing2 of transportation information between centers and explores information-sharing logic, benefits, 

barriers, and solutions.

2 Many EOCs continuously staff personnel to maintain preparedness and monitor alerts and developing conditions that may lead to declared emergencies. In emergencies, designated officials assemble and manage operational decisions from or through the center.
3

1.1 The Information-Sharing Situation Today

TMCs, EOCs, and FCs have established information-gathering and communications channels that tap into external sources, as well as “owned” equipment and operations systems. 

They interconnect with partner agencies and with deployed assets (e.g., cameras, sensors, 

and control systems) via landline, wireless, and Internet links. Key external communications links for TMCs and EOCs also include weather services, 911 centers, law enforcement 

dispatch systems (e.g., computer-aided dispatch [CAD] and similar systems), and the traffic 

reporting media. 

Communications links for the many variations of FCs are more difficult to characterize 

because they are very specific to the particular criminal, safety, or hazard focus of each 

center. FCs employ landline, wireless, and Internet links, and, where practical, integrated 

data systems. Often, the data and communication connections include law-enforcementsensitive or classified information, so equipment for relaying information is specialized.

Figure 1-1 characterizes the centers’ respective information sources, using linkages that are 

representative of the various centers researched.

Figure 1-1: Centers’ Links

Transportation 

Management 

Center (TMC)

Fusion Center 

(FC)

Trac 

Sensors

Message 

Signs Road 

Weather Video 

Cameras

911 

Centers

Dispatch 

Centers

Weather 

Services

Service 

Patrols

Road 

MX 

Operations

News 

Feeds

Signal 

Controls

Police Fire

Emergency 

Operations Center 

(EOC)

911 

Centers Dispatch 

Centers

Road MX Operations

News 

Feeds

Police

Fire

EPAs

Ports

Agriculture

Banking

Energy

DOI

Criminal

Infonets

S&L 

Gov’t

Licensing,

Registration

Justice Depts

FBI

Utilities

EMS

S&L Gov’t

Intelligence

Agencies

Intelligence Agencies

Public

Health

Public Health

FEMA

FEMA

DoD

DOT

DOT DHS

DHS

Information Exchange

Information Exchange

Information Exchange

Public Works

Each EOC maintains seats and terminals dedicated for any local or regional agency that 

might be engaged in particular emergencies (e.g., police, fire, public works, transit, and 

intelligence agencies; EMS; TMCs; departments of transportation; and bridge, tunnel, and 

toll road authorities) and represents a functional area (e.g., transportation and mass care). 

Principal agencies involved in the specific FC missions jointly staff the FCs.
4

The trend in and importance of information sharing is on the rise today, as more resources 

have been invested in sophisticated intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and surveillance 

technologies, as major terrorist and natural emergencies have overstressed real-time communications, and as increasingly congested roadways lead to incidents that impede traffic 

flows and threaten lives and property. These incidents have clearly shown the high public 

costs of information gaps, preparedness deficiencies, and insufficient situational awareness 

by decision-makers. 

While many kinds of information sharing can be logical and useful for TMC, EOC, and FC 

missions, achieving the sharing of information can require significant dedication and investment in the proposition. Legitimate and significant technical and policy barriers to information exchange can come into play and must be resolved. This guidebook explores the 

following hurdles:

• Legal and privacy concerns related to surveillance and traveler information

• Control and security of criminal and potentially litigious information

• Prudent and appropriate release of information to the public domain

• Varying levels of concern between centers over security, reliability, and sustainability of 

specific information flows

• “Language” complexities, including data and message standards, geo-referencing 

systems, usage conventions

• Technical barriers in linking together legacy media, hardware, and systems (e.g., digital 

video feeds and multiple wireless standards and frequencies) 

• Specific policies and mandates of participating agencies—regarding ownership of 

resources, mission priorities, and logical and physical access restrictions.

The communication and information-sharing barriers are classic problems—both complicated and frequently addressed by policy-makers and practitioners with irony and resignation. As the challenges that TMCs, EOCs, and FCs face continue to grow more complex, 

policy practices are becoming more sophisticated and improved technologies are facilitating better ways to gather, process, properly synthesize, and share information. 

1.2 The Potential Value of Sharing Transportation-Related 

Information

TMCs, EOCs, and FCs similarly gather, process, and synthesize at least three basic kinds of 

information to make operational decisions or reach conclusions on actions needed:

• Operational Information (Situational) – Critical for making fast and informed 

operational decisions and for communicating accurate alerts and notifications on 

incidents, threats, and emergencies

• Recorded Information – Basis for operational assessments, investigation, planning, and 

after-action reporting
5

• Physical Infrastructure Information – Framework for setting and communicating 

priorities, determining risks, and deploying field resources. 

Table 1-4 presents these common information types and potential value to centers, characterized by transportation network examples.

Table 1-4: Common Information Types Across Centers

Information 

Type

Transportation 

Information 

Examples

Application

TMC EOC FC

Operational Traffic flows, 

video feeds, 

localized surface 

weather

Traffic control, 

snow/ice tactics

Assessment 

of emergency 

situation and risks

Real-time threat, 

risk assessment

Recorded Incident logs, 

video records, 

traffic records

Traffic safety 

assessment and 

planning

After-action 

assessment

Law enforcement, 

investigation

Physical 

Infrastructure

Maps, physical 

feature data

Work zone 

management, 

resource 

deployment

Data and 

framework 

for decisions, 

communications

Framework 

for threat, risk 

assessment

Information handled by EOCs can assist and enhance fulfillment of TMC and FC missions. 

Most of the information handled by EOCs during incident operations falls in the real-time 

category—in the form of alerts and notifications and advance indications of needs for transportation support from the transportation representatives at the EOC. Those transportation 

representatives at the EOC will need to maintain contact with their TMC, if not co-located, 

to ensure they keep the EOC up to date on traffic conditions and other such real-time situational information that can be supplied by the TMCs. Information coordinated by EOCs 

during and after emergency operations may also assist some FCs in their investigative and 

threat assessment roles.

Advanced FC information on threat assessment and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities 

would also assist TMCs and EOCs in planning and managing emergency preparedness, 

response, and recovery operations as well as inform potential future investments in transportation infrastructure.

Over the next 10 years, traffic and congestion challenges will continue to build rapidly in 

urban areas. Transportation managers will likely deploy more advanced traffic management 

and tolling technologies, and will no doubt integrate more multi-modal operations data 

to provide a more robust picture of the total transportation network in a region. Vehicle 

Infrastructure Integration (VII) or IntelliDriveSM initiatives will ultimately lead to more proactive control3

 systems for transportation movements during emergencies. This evolution 

will likely enable TMCs to share more comprehensive “situational awareness” information to 

3 Enabled by navigation systems, roadside dedicated short-range communications (DSRC), vehicle location, and 

speed data.
6

enhance EOC and FC operations. More fully integrated EOC voice and data communications 

systems will enable these centers to better and more quickly leverage outside information 

sources.

1.3 Guidebook Content

The purpose of this guidebook is to explore the possibilities, challenges, and logical benefits for increased information sharing between TMCs, EOCs, and FCs. The intent is to interest center managers and operators in new collaborative initiatives that may not have been 

considered and to provide information that may assist interested practitioners and policymakers in pursuing those new initiatives.

The remainder of the guidebook includes the following chapters:

• Chapter 2. Missions and Characteristics – Describes the TMC, EOC, and FC characteristics, 

functions, and information handled

• Chapter 3. Opportunities for Collaboration – Describes the information exchange 

opportunities 

• Chapter 4. Challenges and Options for Information Exchange – Describes the technical 

and policy challenges

• Chapter 5. Lessons Learned and Successful Practices – Provides lessons learned in 

practice

• Chapter 6. Summary – Assessing the Value of TMC/EOC/FC Information-Sharing.

California State Emergency Operations Center

California Emergency Management Agency Preparedness Division
7

Chapter 2. MISSIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

This chapter provides the current footprint, mission statement, and operational perspectives for TMCs, EOCs, and FCs. It also defines the following for each type of center:

• Roles and characteristics

• Statistics, locations, and jurisdictions

• Processes and operations

• System capabilities and resources

• Information managed and exchanged

• Communications links.

2.1 Roles and Characteristics

The roles and characteristics of TMCs, EOCs, and FCs are distinctive yet related in many 

areas of responsibilities and incident management. Table 2-1 provides descriptions of TMCs, 

EOCs, and FCs, as defined by various relevant institutions. 

Table 2-1: Operations Management Center Descriptions 

Type of Center Description

Transportation 

Management 

Center

The Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California-Berkley 

summarized the mission of a TMC as “the hub of a transportation management 

system, where information about the transportation network is collected 

and combined with other operational and control data to manage the 

transportation network and to produce traveler information. It is the focal 

point for communicating transportation-related information to the media and 

the motoring public, a place where agencies can coordinate their responses 

to transportation situations and conditions. The TMC links various elements 

of Intelligent Transportation Systems such as variable message signs, closed 

circuit video equipment, roadside count stations, etc., enabling decision makers 

to identify and react to an incident in a timely manner based on real-time data.”
8

Type of Center Description

Emergency 

Operations 

Center

The National Incident Management System4 defines EOCs as “The physical 

location at which the coordination of information and resources to support 

domestic incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may 

be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently 

established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a 

jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, 

law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, State, 

regional, county, city, tribal), or some combination thereof.”5

Fusion Center The Fusion Center Guidelines developed by the U.S. Department of Justice and 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security define an FC as “a collaborative effort of 

two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the 

center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, 

and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”6 The core function of a fusion 

center is the intelligence process. Simply stated, the “intelligence process” (or 

cycle) is an organized process by which information is gathered, assessed, and 

distributed.

2.1.1 TMC Overview

TMCs are responsible for a variety of functions to improve traffic conditions on transportation infrastructure, including highways, arterials, and transit, to increase efficiency and 

safety. In addition to personnel, ITS technologies located at the TMC and embedded in the 

infrastructure support TMC functions, some serving to support multiple functions. ITS represents an additional area of core functionality of TMC operations. To make these improvements in line with long-term strategic planning, regional TMCs implement ITS, which are 

used to monitor and control traffic. However, each region faces different transportation 

issues, including variations in geography, congestion issues, and incidents. Current planning for TMCs envisions their use as dispatch centers for local, regional, and State transportation assets, such as safety/service patrols and road maintenance efforts, leading to a more 

operational role. Some TMCs and TOCs already function in these capacities. 

2.1.2 EOC Overview

EOCs coordinate information and resources to support domestic incident management 

activities. EOCs generally participate in both preparing for and responding to such incidents. For example, an EOC may support the evacuation of a community threatened by an 

incident such as a hazardous materials release or wildfire threat; response operations during 

a hurricane, tornado, or earthquake; and recovery activities following a flood, terrorist, or 

other malicious incident. 

4 On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–5, Management 

of Domestic Incidents, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National 

Incident Management System (NIMS). This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, 

State, local, and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together 

effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 

cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism.

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004. Page 129.

6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines.
9

As noted in Section 2.1, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) definition recognizes that implementation of these centers may occur in a variety of ways based on several 

parameters, including:

• Persistence – Some operate on a continuous basis. Others are activated only in response 

to an incident; once the incident has been resolved, they are de-activated.

• Functional Discipline – In some implementations, an EOC may address a single 

functional discipline (e.g., law enforcement or medical services). In others, an EOC may 

address any combination of functional disciplines.

• Jurisdiction – EOCs may function at the Federal, State, regional, county, city, or tribal 

jurisdictional levels.

A combination of the persistence, functional, and jurisdictional parameters provides the 

basis for the implementation of a particular EOC. As with an EOC’s operating status (e.g., 

incident-driven or standing) or organization, the resources available to an EOC directly 

reflect the community’s particular needs and investment in emergency operations. 

Regardless of how an EOC is implemented, a functional transportation infrastructure (and 

current information on the condition of that infrastructure) is critical to the EOC’s ability 

to accomplish its mission of facilitating the community’s preparation for, response to, and 

recovery from adverse incidents. 

2.1.3 FC Overview

The formation of FCs resulted from the events of September 11, 2001, and the need, 

identified by the 9-11 Commission, to close the information-sharing gaps that have existed 

between the Federal government and States, primarily in the areas of homeland security 

and law enforcement. Missions among FCs vary and include, but are not limited to, three 

main areas—all-crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism, as presented in Table 2-2. 

Table 2-2: FC Mission Areas

All Crimes Any crime or investigative support related to a single criminal act or larger 

criminal enterprises and organized or destabilizing crimes (e.g., drug trade, 

gangs, terrorism, and organized crime).

All Hazards Identifying and prioritizing types of major disasters and emergencies, 

beyond terrorism and crime that could occur within their jurisdiction. For 

this approach, fusion centers gather, analyze, and disseminate information 

that would assist the relevant responsible agencies (law enforcement, fire, 

public health, emergency management, critical infrastructure, etc.) with the 

prevention, protection, response, or recovery efforts of those incidents.7

Counterterrorism Practice, tactics, techniques, and strategies adopted to prevent or mitigate 

specific terrorist acts. 

7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Draft Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502: Considerations for 

Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center Coordination, 2009, page 14.
10

The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers outlines the major 

functional, management, and administrative capabilities of FCs. Fusion process capabilities 

outline the standards necessary to perform the steps of the Intelligence Process within an 

FC. Management and administrative capabilities enable the proper management and functioning of an FC. Table 2-3 shows the specific capabilities for each type.8

Table 2-3: FC Baseline Capabilities

Fusion Process Capabilities 

Planning and Requirements 

Development

• Lay the foundation for the types of information that will 

be collected

Information Gathering/Collection 

and Recognition of Indicators and 

Warnings

• Develop and implement planning and requirements

• Collect information from various sources, including law 

enforcement agencies, public safety agencies, and the 

private sector

Processing and Collation of 

Information

• Evaluate the information’s validity and reliability 

• Collate information, including sorting, combining, 

categorizing, and arranging the data collected so 

relationships can be determined

Intelligence Analysis and 

Production

• Transform the raw data into products that are useful

• Develop a report that connects information in a logical 

and meaningful manner to produce an intelligence 

report that contains valid judgments based on analyzed 

information, including trends or information that will 

prevent a terrorist attack or other criminal activity

Intelligence/Information 

Dissemination

• Distribute analyzed intelligence utilizing certain protocols 

in the most appropriate format to those in need of 

the information to facilitate their accomplishment of 

organizational goals

Reevaluation • Assess current and new information, assist in developing 

an awareness of possible weak areas as well as potential 

threats

• Strive to eliminate previously identified weaknesses that 

have been hardened as a result of the Fusion Process

• Provide an opportunity to review the performance or 

effectiveness of the FC’s intelligence function

Management and Administrative Capabilities

Management/Governance • Develop clear priorities and create a supported 

environment that frames the ability for the center to 

function and operate, assign tasks, allocate and manage 

resources, and develop and enforce policy

8 U.S. Department of Justice, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to 

the Fusion Center Guidelines, September 2008.
11

Information Privacy Protections • Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil 

liberties policy

• Protect the rights of Americans throughout informationsharing efforts

• Balance information sharing with privacy at all levels 

of government, in order to maintain the trust of the 

American people

Security • Ensure appropriate security measures are in place for the 

facility, data, and personnel

Personnel and Training • Achieve a diversified representation of personnel based 

on the needs and functions of the center

Information Technology/ 

Communications Infrastructure, 

Systems, Equipment, Facility, and 

Physical Infrastructure

• Integrate technology, systems, and people

Funding • Establish and maintain the center based on funding 

availability and sustainability

According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the most frequently cited reason 

for establishing an FC was the need to share information among Federal, State, and local 

entities. At the State and local level, the enhancement of information sharing within their 

own jurisdictions and across the various disciplines was another reason for the establishment of centers.9

 The inability for coordination and information sharing at these two levels 

resulted in a failure to “connect the dots” prior to September 11, 2001. Today, FCs consider 

themselves force multipliers to, and a support structure for, existing EOCs, which have the 

main responsibility of response during large-scale incidents and disasters, either man-made 

or natural.10 Because some incidents may have components that are law enforcement or 

security sensitive, some EOCs have taken extra steps to ensure they have people on staff 

with appropriate clearances to review such information. They may also have developed 

methods for handling such data such as a secure communications system and designating 

a part of their facility to meet the National Security Agency’s requirements of a Sensitive 

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

2.2 Statistics, Locations, Jurisdictions

Each type of center manages a distinctive footprint in terms of size, geographic area, population served, and physical characteristics. This section defines the census and geographic 

distribution of each center and categorizes the types and jurisdictions of the various 

centers. 

9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004, page 129.

10 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Address Some Challenges 

Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers, April 2007.
12

2.2.1 TMCs

TMCs are regional information management centers that gather and maintain transportation-related data. Across the United States, over 100 TMCs currently leverage their ITS 

resources to monitor, inform, and control drivers in a localized region. Each center has 

unique applications, resources, size, and functionality. State departments of transportation 

(DOTs), county and city governments, or other municipalities, often collaborating with other 

agencies and each center, can fund and operate such centers. 

The TMC footprint can be categorized primarily by urban or rural geographies. A variety of 

sources identified at least 85 TMCS as operating in metropolitan areas. In 2004, there were 

50 additional TMCs providing a range of transportation-related services in statewide/rural 

capacity.11 Table 2-4 defines the distinctions in these types of TMCs. It is also important to 

note that TMCs can be virtual in nature. 

Table 2-4: Urban vs. Rural TMCs 

Urban Urban TMCs often focus on freeways and traffic signal management and possibly 

transit operations integration, with their key function revolving around the 

detection, response, and management of traffic incidents to keep traffic moving. 

They are frequently larger in size and more developed because of their substantial 

resources and funding. Because they have been operating longer, they have had 

the opportunity to establish working relationships with other agencies, including 

taking advantage of co-located facilities. Staff and management at urban TMCs often 

have specific job categories and responsibilities. Many TMCs in larger urban areas 

are integrating CAD and liaisons with local law enforcement to become immediately 

aware of police dispatches to an incident scene on a highway.

Rural Rural TMCs are often much smaller and have fewer resources accessible to them, even 

though they are often responsible for a wider geographic area. Without an expansive 

ITS infrastructure, they focus on emergency services and rural transit service. Their 

smaller size results in a smaller, less-specialized staff and managers.

As each region faces different transportation issues, TMCs’ mission and goals correlate to 

the needs of a local region. TMCs do not typically exist in more rural areas or on tribal lands 

due to the lack of traffic congestion and a lack of technology resources such as fiber optic 

networks by which to share data and information. Some states, such as New Mexico, coordinate with tribal lands on ITS projects. TMCs may serve larger geographic boundaries including cities and metropolitan areas, regions, municipalities, or States. Appendix B provides a 

listing of major TMCs. 

2.2.2 EOCs

EOCs are the “front line” of incident response. By necessity, their reach must extend sufficiently to provide an immediate response to the affected areas within their jurisdictions. At 

least one EOC covers a jurisdiction, with smaller jurisdictions most likely sharing an EOC and 

larger jurisdictions having multiple EOCs. Tribal lands may also have EOCs that are eligible 

11 U.S. Department of Transportation, ITS Deployment Statistics, 2004, http://www.itsdeployment.its.dot.gov, 

accessed 2010. 
13

for funding through the DHS. In the case of a small or sparsely populated State, the State 

EOC may cover every jurisdiction (cities, counties, or other jurisdictional entities) within that 

State. In contrast, a densely populated State with densely populated cities may have other 

EOCs in addition to the State EOC. 

Every jurisdiction is covered by an EOC (or a combination of EOCs) that addresses the full 

array of functional disciplines. For example, a small city may not have its own EOC; however, 

it may have a fire station that fulfills the EOC function for response to a limited type of incident (e.g., fires and similar emergencies within the jurisdiction), with other functional disciplines being covered by a shared EOC (e.g., a county, State, or regional EOC that responds to 

hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes across the broader jurisdiction). Table 2-5 illustrates the 

various types and numbers of governmental jurisdictions across the United States and its 

territories, commonwealths, and possessions.

Table 2-5: Governmental Jurisdictions12

Type Number

States 50

U.S. Territories (3), Commonwealths (2), and Possessions (6)13 11

Counties or County Equivalents14 3,141

Cities (population 25,000 or more)15 1,248

Other16 (incorporated places with populations less than 25,000) 18,161

Total 22,611

EOCs fall into three general geographic footprints, as presented in Table 2-6. 

12 U.S. Census Bureau, County and City Data Book, 2007, 

http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/07ccdb/ccdb-07.pdf, accessed 2010. 

13 R.G. Price, “Territories, Possessions, and Influenced Areas of the United States of America,” 2003, 

http://rationalrevolution.net/articles/territories.htm, accessed 2010.

14 The primary political divisions of most States are termed ‘‘counties.’’ In Louisiana, these divisions are known as 

‘‘parishes.’’ In Alaska, which has no counties, the county equivalents are the organized ‘‘boroughs’’ and the ‘‘census 

areas’’ that are delineated for statistical purposes by the State of Alaska and the U.S. Census Bureau. In four States 

(Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia), there are one or more cities that are independent of any county organization and, thus, constitute primary divisions of their States. These cities are known as ‘‘independent cities’’ and are 

treated as equivalent to counties for statistical purposes. The District of Columbia has no primary divisions, and the 

entire area is considered equivalent to a county for statistical purposes [County and City Data Book, 2007].

15 The term ‘‘city’’ refers to incorporated places with a 2000 population of 25,000 or more [County and City Data 

Book, 2007]. The number of cities was obtained from the 2002 Census of Governments, Volume 1, Number 1, 

Government Organization, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as provided by the National 

League of Cities [http://www.nlc.org/about_cities/cities101.aspx].

16 The number of incorporated places with a 2000 population of under 25,000 was obtained 

from the 2002 Census of Governments, Volume 1, Number 1, Government Organization, DC: U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as provided by the National League of Cities 

[http://www.nlc.org/about_cities/cities101.aspx].
14

Table 2-6: EOC Categories

Jurisdiction Characteristics

Local 

Community EOC

• Continuously staffed and ready to respond to routine incidents affecting a 

limited jurisdiction (e.g., medical emergencies, fires)

• Resources typically funded and controlled by the jurisdiction

• Becomes a virtual component of EOCs with more extensive geographical 

jurisdictions when the impact of an incident extends beyond the local 

community (e.g., a hurricane)

State/

Metropolitan 

EOCs

• May be minimally staffed (e.g., a single watch officer on duty 24/7), with a 

surge capability when an incident warrants response

• May directly own/control minimal resources but response involves 

coordinating resources typically funded and controlled by local community 

EOCs and/or other Federal or State entities

• Jurisdiction is broader than that of a local community EOC, covering a 

densely populated or extensive geographic area

Federal EOCs • Watch function may be more robustly staffed than State/metropolitan 

EOCs, but surge capability is triggered by incidents that may impact:

– An extensive geographic area where response requirements exceed the 

response capability of local community and State/metropolitan EOCs and 

the State provides a request for Federal resources; or

– National emergency, including security threats or incidents

• Funded by Federal sources, but also coordinates resources funded and 

controlled by local community or State/metropolitan EOCs

• May focus on a single functional area (e.g., response tailored to 

nuclear incidents or to incidents causing widespread, high-impact 

telecommunications service outages, such as the National Communications 

System’s National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications within the 

Department of Homeland Security)

• Jurisdiction covers the entire United States, its territories, and tribal nations

In addition to these State and local EOCs, there are also EOCs at the Federal level including 

the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA). According to the National Response Framework (NRF), the NRCC is a multiagency center that provides overall Federal response coordination for Incidents of National 

Significance and emergency management program implementation. In addition, the NRF 

envisions Federal-level EOCs being established when a large-scale incident requires the 

establishment of such a temporary EOC to manage the response activities. 

2.2.3 FCs

Research suggests that there are significant differences among FCs and that, heretofore, 

there was no “one-size-fits-all” model, despite the issuance of the FC guidelines in January 

2008 by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers document 

released in September 2008 provides supplemental guidance to the centers on standardized capabilities. As of July 2009, DHS and DOJ recognize 72 FCs nationwide, and the DHS 
15

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has deployed over 36 intelligence operations 

specialists to the FCs to facilitate the two-way sharing of information and intelligence and 

to bridge the gap in information sharing among Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal 

levels of government.17 In September 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced a 

realignment of I&A to create a new Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFCPMO) to strengthen DHS cooperation with FCs.18 Appendix B provides a partial list of these 

centers and the functions they support. 

The level of Federal, State, and local participation varies from FC to FC. The jurisdiction of an 

FC is limited only by the State or region that it serves. Jurisdictional cooperation between 

State FCs or between State FCs and Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs) provides an opportunity for information sharing to a level only imagined a decade ago. RICs are defined as 

“multi-jurisdictional centers cooperatively developed within a logical geographical area that 

coordinate Federal, State, and local law enforcement information with other information 

sources to track and assess criminal and terrorist threats that are operating in or interacting 

with the region.”19 Statistically, law enforcement agencies lead the day-to-day operations 

of most FCs. Of those law enforcement entities involved in FC operations, State police are 

often cited as the main organization spearheading their efforts. However, since FCs vary in 

location and mission, the lines that determine a lead agency are not as clear as the desire 

for participating agencies to be partners in their mission. 

2.3 Processes and Operations

This section provides insights into the day-to-day functions, processes, and operations as 

well as emergency modes across TMCs, EOCs, and FCs. 

2.3.1 TMCs

Generally, full-scale TMC operations focus on four primary function classifications: 

• Monitor: Monitoring transportation infrastructure for traffic incidents/conditions

• Inform: Disseminating information to the public and relevant agencies

• Control: Controlling and managing traffic including optimization of available 

infrastructure and assets, such as safety/service patrols, to decrease congestion and 

mitigate incidents

• Indirect: Managing overhead activities for the TMC. 

17 See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, State and Local Fusion Centers, 

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm, accessed 2010.

18 See Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, “Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland” (Written 

Testimony), September 30, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1254321524430.shtm, 

accessed 2010.

19 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, September 2008.
16

Across TMCs, these functions vary in terms of the extent to which and how they provide 

these services. Table 2-7 presents aspects of the incidents monitored, systems leveraged, 

and processes and operations of the TMC, revolving around the four primary functions. 

Table 2-7: TMC Traffic Management 

Incidents Monitored Technologies and Tools Utilized Actions

Relevant roadweather data Automated roadway detection 

including road weather 

information systems (RWIS)

Broadcast of warnings and 

instructions if necessary

Permanent fixed-route evacuation 

signing (in some areas)

Incidents Cell phone calls to local law 

enforcement and 911 dispatchers, 

closed-circuit television (CCTV), 

CAD, and similar systems

Incident responder deployment 

including fire, police, paramedics, 

and/or safety/service patrols

Congestion CCTV, loop detectors, vehicle 

probes

Dynamic message signs (DMS), 

also known as variable message 

signs (VMS) or changeable 

message signs (CMS), display 

appropriate messages providing 

travel time or congestion-level 

messages 

Work zones CCTV, radio and cellular 

communication with road crews

Monitoring sensors in barrels or 

cones

Intrusion alert devices

DMS display appropriate messages 

providing travel time

Detour routes implemented and 

instructions provided as necessary

Real-time monitoring of speeds 

around work zones and intrusion 

into a work zone

Special events CCTV, signal timing adjustments, 

radio and cellular communications 

with State DOT field staff

Monitoring of special events and 

work with law enforcement to 

direct traffic as necessary

Signal timing CCTV, Advanced Traffic 

Management Systems (ATMS), 

traffic signal algorithms

Monitoring of traffic including 

intersection movement, 

adjustment of signal times for 

optimal traffic flow

2.3.2 EOCs

At the most fundamental level, EOCs perform five primary functions and one administrative function—monitoring the jurisdiction, receiving notification of an incident affecting 

the jurisdiction, assessing the incident to determine the appropriate response, responding 

to the incident, closing out the incident, and administering the organization. The jurisdiction’s emergency management plan defines who operates the EOC and how it is operated. 

At the Federal level, the NRF serves this purpose. EOCs are often organized around operations, planning, logistics, finance, and administrative departments—key Incident Command 
17

System (ICS) organizational elements—to fulfill the basic EOC functions. EOCs establish 

processes required to fulfill the five primary EOC functions and document the processes in 

standard operating procedures (SOPs). The SOPs define how the operations, planning, logistics, finance, and administration components interact and how the EOC as a whole works 

with external entities (e.g., Federal, State, and local government entities and the private 

sector). Table 2-8 provides a sample of the processes defined by the EOC SOPs and the EOC 

functions with which these processes are associated.

Table 2-8: Illustrative EOC Functions and Processes 

Functions Processes

Monitoring • Maintain steady-state watch

• Monitor radio frequencies and CAD systems for police and fire 

departments

• Survey all 911 calls and emergency response units

• Track weather conditions

• Monitor news media (e.g., CNN, MSNBC)

• Monitor status of emergency response teams and resources

Incident 

Assessment

• Prioritize objectives

• Make recommendations to government executives on evacuations, 

closures, disaster declaration, cessation of services

Incident Response • Obtain resources 

• Deploy resources

• Coordinate with other agencies and organizations

• Assign tasks to Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)

• Brief staff

• Update government officials

• Update news media (e.g., local/national news organizations)

Incident Closure • Develop after-action reports for incident and/or exercise

EOC Administration • Track time and costs of incident

• Analyze data

• Develop, maintain, and update action plans

• Maintain duty log

• Manage and train response personnel

• Manage resource inventory (e.g., medical supplies) 

• Maintain equipment (e.g., vehicles, backup generators)

• Provide administrative and legal support

• Update Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and Memorandums 

of Agreement (MOAs) with neighboring jurisdictions and internal 

organizations

Note that, particularly in more widespread, complex incidents, these functions may be iterative and overlapping, rather than sequential and discrete. This is particularly the case with 

the monitoring, assessment, and response functions. Further, EOCs work closely with local 
18

community resources frequently to manage incidents. The community owns monitoring 

and response resources and assets, which may include: 

• E-911 call centers

• Local law enforcement agencies (to include law enforcement personnel, facilities, 

vehicles, etc.)

• Fire stations (to include firefighters, associated EMS personnel, facilities, and specialized 

vehicles such as ambulances).

However, EOCs with more extensive jurisdictions may own some facilities and have a few 

key staff, but they usually coordinate the monitoring and response resources rather than 

own them. EOCs are dynamic organizations depending on their operating status. During 

the watch or monitoring stage, the operating staff is minimal. During a full-scale operation, 

EOCs house representatives from multiple agencies and organizations ranging from executive government officials to volunteer organization coordinators. 

In contrast with the local community-level response entities, whose fire departments, law 

enforcement agencies, and medical organizations are in continuous operation, EOCs with 

more extensive jurisdictions typically have a small core staff on duty until an incident occurs 

that requires activating the EOC’s full capabilities. In some cases, “core staff” may be limited 

to having a single watch officer on duty on a 24/7 basis. 

2.3.3 FCs

FC guidelines state that the principal role of the FC is to compile, analyze, and disseminate 

criminal and terrorist information and intelligence and other information to support efforts 

to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal and terrorist activity.20 FCs leverage all information and intelligence to rapidly identify patterns and trends that may reflect 

emerging threats. The primary functions and goals for FCs, as defined by the guidelines, 

are to:

• Rapidly identify emerging threats

• Support multidisciplinary, proactive, and community-focused problem-solving activities

• Support predictive analysis capabilities

• Improve the delivery of emergency and non-emergency services. 

Of these activities, the primary function of an FC is to gather and analyze data, resulting in 

a finished, timely, credible, and actionable product that is useable in the decision-making 

process. 

When a threat is identified, FCs gather and exchange information from all sources for analysis with the appropriate official from the local, State, tribal, or Federal government agency 

represented at that FC, based upon the threat. While law enforcement or homeland security 

sources and databases or portals provide nearly all intelligence and information that FCs 

20 Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, January 2008.
19

collect, agencies external to law enforcement, such as transportation agencies, fire departments, private sector, and public health entities, may also provide critical information to 

formulate a comprehensive analysis.21 Depending on the nature of the threat, the FCs may 

share this threat information with DHS and, when terrorism related, coordinate with Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) that exist in 100 cities nationwide including the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation’s (FBI’s) 56 field offices. 

The local, State, tribal, or Federal government representative that will be taking action 

against the threat stores the products produced by an FC, based on the specific threat. 

Storing of that product is done in accordance with any FC and/or department policy, to 

include local, State, and Federal classified information requirements and privacy laws.22

Figure 2-1 illustrates the FC intelligence process.

Figure 2-1: FC Intelligence Process23

Reevaluation

Planning and

Direction

Processing/

Collation

Collection

Analysis

Dissemination

6

1

2

3

4

5

2.4 System Capabilities and Resources

Defining the systems capabilities and resources for TMCs, EOCs, and FCs is a key element to 

understanding the opportunities for collaboration across these entities. This section sum21 Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, January 2008.

22 Ibid.

23 Source: U.S. Department of Justice, The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, October 2003. 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/NCISP_Plan.pdf, accessed 2010.
20

marizes the resources and systems that enable each center to fulfill its core functions and 

processes as defined in previous sections. 

2.4.1 TMCs

TMCs maintain specific resources and systems to enable the fulfillment of their four primary 

functions. Monitoring arterial and freeway traffic is one of the primary functions of TMCs. 

Only with situational awareness of local conditions can TMC managers make decisions on 

how to increase transportation safety and throughput. ITS applications that are installed in 

the transportation infrastructure, including traffic sensor systems to monitor traffic conditions perform much of the surveillance and detection of traffic conditions.

In addition to monitoring transportation infrastructure for traffic management functions, 

the same surveillance and detection technologies can be used to monitor the infrastructure 

safety and security of transportation infrastructure. Table 2-9 provides examples of monitoring systems.

Table 2-9: TMC Monitor Systems and Resources 

Description Systems/Resources

Monitor Traffic Loop, acoustic, radar, and video imaging detectors and control, 

CCTV, IntelliDriveSM, on-board equipment (OBE), wide-area wireless 

communications between the vehicle and center, dedicated short-range 

communications (DSRC) between passing vehicles and the roadside, probe 

data (cellular, Global Positioning System [GPS], toll transponders), police 

reports (incidents and congestion)

Monitor Safety 

and Security

In-vehicle and facility surveillance, employee credentialing, remote video 

systems, speed sensors, safety/service patrols

After collection of information regarding a traffic incident and decision making regarding 

the appropriate actions and responses, TMCs disseminate traffic information to system 

users to inform them of conditions and possible actions. Information can be disseminated 

to users both before and during driving, as illustrated in Table 2-10. 

Table 2-10: TMC Inform Systems and Resources

Description Systems/Resources

Disseminate 

Information

DMS (fixed and portable); in-vehicle systems; Highway Advisory Radio 

(HAR)/Low Power FM (LPFM); 511/Voice Response Phone Systems; 511 Web 

Portals (real-time traffic maps); email, pager, fax, short message service (SMS)

Implement Road 

Geometry Warning 

Systems

Ramp rollover, curve speed warning, downhill speed warning, overheight/

overwidth warning

Table 2-11 presents how TMCs employ the information gathered to control traffic and manage incidents and ongoing activities that impact traffic on a daily basis.
21

Table 2-11: TMC Control Systems and Resources

Description Systems/Resources

Control Traffic Transit signal priority, emergency vehicle preemption, adaptive 

signal control, advanced signal systems, variable speed limits, 

lane use/road closure, vehicle restrictions

Manage Lanes High occupancy vehicle/high occupancy toll (HOV/HOT) 

facilities, reversible flow lanes, pricing, lane control, variable 

speed limits, DMS (fixed and portable), emergency evacuation

Control Ramps Ramp metering, ramp gates, interchange metering, priority 

access

Incident Management Safety/service patrols, CCTV, police reports of incidents and 

congestion, CAD, access restriction and authentication, firewalls, 

antivirus and network monitoring software, physical barriers

Manage Work Zones Temporary traffic and incident management, lane control, 

variable speed limit, speed enforcement, intrusion detection, 

road closure management

Manage Special Event 

Transportation

Occasional and frequent events, temporary TMCs, automatic 

vehicle location (AVL)

Manage Transportation 

Demand

Ride sharing/matching, dynamic routing and scheduling, service 

coordination, pricing

Manage Assets Fleet and infrastructure management

Manage Electronic Tolling 

and Pricing (tolling; transit, 

parking, and multi-use)

Radio frequency identification (RFID), barcodes, smart cards

Facilitate Evacuation 

Response and Recovery

Early warning system, response management, evacuation and 

re-entry management

Coordinate EMS Telemedicine, 911 coordination

To tie together their other direct functions, TMC staff also manage communications among 

their operations center, the infrastructure, mobile responders (e.g., safety/service patrols), 

and other relevant agencies and operations centers. This requires TMCs to have access to all 

necessary communications links and to develop integrated control strategies that enable 

inter-jurisdictional traffic management. TMCs’ communications include land and wireless technologies as well as digital and hard lines. Additionally, it is also important to note 

that TMCs must plan for remaining functions in emergency and disaster situations. Local 

weather alert and warning systems, such as the National Warning System (NAWAS) and 

the Tsunami Warning System (TWS), used by EOCs or FCs could give TMCs critical real-time 

weather alert information on dangerous weather in an area, thus allowing TMCs to better 

prepare for these emergencies. When faced with such situations, TMCs must implement 

and install system redundancies to ensure that their systems stay online during an incident. 

Table 2-12 presents systems and resources that support the indirect functions of a TMC.
22

Table 2-12: TMC Indirect Functions Systems and Resources 

Description Systems/Resources

Coordination of 

Communications

Additional communications links and integrated control strategies that 

enable integrated inter-jurisdictional traffic management, phone systems, 

(e.g., land line, special 1-800 call-in lines, conference call lines), mobile and 

satellite phones, dedicated lines, priority telephone services—Wireless 

Priority Service (WPS), priority cellular services—Government Emergency 

Telecommunications Service (GETS), push-to-talk services, email/text 

messaging, personal data assistants (PDAs), pagers, radio communications 

system (center-to-field, field-to-field, field-to-center), PCs/laptops, Internet

Redundancies Back-up servers and facilities

Security Encryption software, access restriction and authentication (username and 

passwords), firewalls, antivirus and network monitoring software, physical 

barriers (e.g., fence, spike strips, electronic locks)

2.4.2 EOCs

An EOC often functions as the hub of emergency management in a community and, in 

some instances, is co-located with an FC, ensuring that resources are available to respond to 

a full array of incidents:

• On a day-to-day basis, some EOCs oversee the response to routine incidents (e.g., a fire 

or an automobile crash) and are generally self-sufficient with respect to their resources. 

For example, EOC staff and the emergency management offices may own vehicles (e.g., 

fire trucks and ambulances) and hire employees (e.g., firefighters, police, or emergency 

medical technicians [EMTs]), or these may be the resources of law enforcement or fire 

departments. 

• When incidents occur that affect a broader geographical area (e.g., a hurricane) or are 

non-routine (e.g., a chemical spill), the community EOCs seek assistance from an EOC 

with either a broader geographical jurisdiction or an EOC that may have specialized 

capabilities to respond to incidents that are not part of the EOC’s day-to-day area of 

responsibility. In such cases, the community EOC may function as a component of the 

higher-level or specialized EOC for the duration of the incident, and its resources may be 

augmented by those of other organizations such as State or Federal government or nongovernment organizations (e.g., the Red Cross).

As is the case for an EOC’s operating status or its functional organization, the resources 

available to an EOC depend on a community’s individual needs and investment in preparedness, perceived risks, emergency management, and public safety capabilities. With 

respect to technologies for managing their resources and information, EOCs do not typically have access to specialized technologies. Certain factors mitigate the availability of specialized technologies in EOCs. In many cases, EOC 24/7 staffing constitutes a single watch 

officer on duty at any given time. The EOC is fully activated only when a significant situation 

arises that warrants a response. Consequently, highly specialized technologies would be 

used only intermittently, and the cost-per-use may be prohibitive. Further, if such technologies are not used routinely, there is no opportunity for the staff to become sufficiently profi-
23

cient with them to warrant the expense. It may even impede response if EOC staff members 

had to re-acquaint themselves with the technology every time the EOC is activated.

More often, EOCs rely on output from the systems owned and operated by other agencies 

or use technology that is available to most citizens, including, for example:

• Output from other agencies’ systems: EOCs benefit from technologies operated by 

other agencies because those agencies have staff that are familiar with the technologies 

and can provide useful output to the EOCs. This allows the EOCs to benefit from these 

systems without having to invest their limited resources in them. Modeling tools 

represent the type of technology borrowed by the EOC as needed.

• Radio and TV: EOCs use information available via radio and TV, which in most cases 

offers up-to-the-minute information on breaking situations, again without requiring the 

EOCs to expend any resources on such information.

• Internet: Internet access allows EOCs to access information available to the general 

public, such as the weather reports provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Weather Service (NWS). This is also a method for 

accessing information generated by the technology owned and operated by other 

agencies.

Although the commonly available technologies such as radio, TV, and the Internet may not 

be tailored to the EOCs’ requirements, they provide valuable information without incurring 

expense and requiring continuous training on the technologies. There are some EOCs that 

have more advanced technologies. These are generally the EOCs for jurisdictions with high 

populations or that have significant strategic importance, such as those having high-traffic 

ports or key government facilities. Examples of more advanced technologies used by EOCs 

include software programs (e.g., Geographic Information System [GIS]), warning systems, 

videoconferencing equipment to coordinate with external responders to receive real-time 

damage estimation, and specialized encryption and security communication areas.

Warning systems such as NAWAS are networks of telephone lines used by emergency personnel for coordination and response to natural and man-made disasters. The lines avoid 

local telephone switches to avoid congestion during an emergency. Both of these warning 

systems are based on human intervention and can easily be linked to TMCs (e.g., call forwarding, conference calls, and party lines). One of the benefits of this linkage would be near 

instantaneous information on dangerous weather approaching an area, which the TMC 

could then use to notify the driving public and place emergency road crews on standby.

2.4.3 FCs

Many FCs have access to unclassified and classified DHS and FBI systems and networks such 

as HSIN, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN). HSIN 

is an encrypted DHS network established to strengthen the real-time, collaborative flow of 

threat information to State and local communities.24 HSIN links to DHS’ National Operations 

24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Information Network, 2004, 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0418.shtm, accessed 2010.
24

Center (NOC) via the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES), which is also a 

secure network that offers FC applications including imaging and mapping resources. 

Information for FCs is usually gathered through law enforcement or homeland security 

sources, i.e., LEO and HSIN, but also draws from the emergency management and functional 

communities (e.g., transportation, health and human services). The agencies that operate 

within the FCs are able to operate as long as secure portal access is available to them from 

their home agency. DHS/I&A intelligence operations specialists are deployed to the FCs 

with both unclassified and classified systems. 

Problems are usually encountered when FCs without a specific Federal, State, local, or tribal 

representative in their center are unable to access some specific piece of information that 

they need from that State, local, or tribal jurisdiction. This often results if the right people do 

not have necessary clearances and a need to know. In many cases where the information is 

of an unclassified nature, there are other avenues, a phone call for example, to obtain the 

desired information. 

2.5 Information Managed and Exchanged

An important aspect of establishing effective information exchange is integration and information sharing among partnering agencies to avoid inefficient exchanges of information. 

Establishing a system includes defining the data for exchange and compensating for any 

differences in how agencies code their data, including data fields, abbreviations, or summary methodologies. Each agency must account for the available incoming information 

for exchange with other agencies, considering the information that is of interest to each 

agency as well as security. Coordination must also occur with software and hardware vendors to ensure that linked systems are able to still share information after updates and so 

that software release schedules are coordinated with agency project schedules. Also, while 

data duplication should be minimized to decrease redundancy, redundant communications 

paths are necessary to ensure the reliable delivery of messages during incidents.

2.5.1 TMCs

TMCs gather real-time information and data with a key focus on near-term regional 

operational transportation information including proactive steps to manage congestion 

and other bottlenecks. Table 2-13 summarizes the types of traffic data collected and the 

resources used to acquire the data. 
25

Table 2-13: TMC Data Types and Sources

Data Type Source

Traffic Speed • Loop Detectors and Control

• Acoustic Detectors and Control

• Probe Data – Cellular, GPS, E-ZPass

• Radar Detectors and Control including iCone in work zones

• Video Imaging Detectors and Control

• Models and algorithms to enhance traffic information

• In-Vehicle Systems

Travel Time • Probe Data – Cellular, GPS, E-ZPass

• Models and algorithms to enhance traffic information

Traffic Incidents • In-Vehicle Systems

• HAR

• DMS (fixed and portable)

• 511/Voice Response Phone Systems

• Safety/Service Patrols

• Police Reporting of Incidents and Congestion

• Police Dispatch

• CCTV

Delays and 

Congestion

• Adaptive Signal Control

• In-Vehicle Systems

• HAR

• DMS (fixed and portable)

• 511/Voice Response Phone Systems

• Safety/Service Patrols

• Police Reporting of Incidents and Congestion

• CCTV

Traffic Volume • Loop Detectors and Control

• Radar Detectors and Control

• Video Imaging Detectors and Control

• Adaptive Signal Control

Roadway Weather • 511/Voice Response Phone Systems

• Surface sensors and roadside weather stations

Work Zones • DMS (fixed and portable)

• HAR

The main commodity that TMCs offer is information regarding local traffic conditions and 

incidents that affect them. They are responsible for three types of transportation-related 

information:

• Operational information including real-time situational information on the transportation 

infrastructure
26

• History and records information including incident logs and traffic/transportation history

• Transportation network information including information about physical transportationrelated assets.

TMCs can disseminate collected and owned information to the public via:

• Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) – Roadside signs with a communications link to the 

TMC that the TMC can use to display short–route messages to system users including 

emergency information such as evacuation shelter locations or AMBER AlertsTM with child 

abduction information and Silver alerts providing information on missing senior citizens.

• Highway Advisory Radio (HAR) and Low-Power FM Radio – Low-power radio stations 

that TMCs use to provide traffic and weather updates, advertised via roadside signs.

• In-Vehicle Communications – New technologies (IntelliDriveSM) allowing new methods 

for TMCs to communicate directly with drivers in their vehicles.

• 511 Traveler Information Systems – 511 is the Federal Communications Commission’s 

designated nationwide three-digit telephone number for traveler information. It is 

usually an automated hotline, although some 511 systems are staffed with live operators, 

providing an automated phone message (sometimes multi-lingual) to system users 

regarding local traffic or weather conditions. Some 511 systems allow users to also access 

information via a Web site, and some feature personalized services such as custom routes 

and alerts via phone, text, or e-mail. The 511 system can be used to provide emergency 

information (e.g., evacuation route information) via a floodgate message at the start of 

the 511 recorded message to all callers. According to the 511 Deployment Coalition, as of 

the end of 2009, 511 will be accessible to 70 percent of the U.S. population.25

In addition to outgoing information, 511 systems could be modified to handle incoming information from the public. A few 511 systems have implemented this option for 

key personnel but not the general public. For example, if someone witnesses a vehicle 

crash, he/she could dial 511 on a cell phone and be presented with two options. Option 1 

would be to listen to current traffic information and advisories, and option 2 could be rerouting the call to a statewide or the nearest TMC. Current applications require the user 

to provide a personal identification number so the TMC knows the information is coming 

from a trusted source. The caller can then record a message with the relevant information. The call is then automatically routed to the TMC. The routing could use information 

given by the caller (e.g., highway name and mile marker) as well as cell phone data (e.g., 

approximate location data based on cell-tower triangulation) to provide proper routing. Once the TMC has received the message, operators can verify it, notify emergency 

response personnel and cleanup crews, and update the 511 outgoing information line. 

If the incident meets a certain threshold (e.g., size, duration), the TMC could route the 

information to the EOC and FC.

25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Information Network, 2004, 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0418.shtm, accessed 2010.
27

• Third-Party Communications – Authorized dissemination of TMC-provided information 

(e.g., Traffic.com).

In addition to providing information to the public, TMCs can specifically collaborate with 

and exchange information with other State, local, and municipal agencies including EOCs, 

FCs, and law enforcement. In this way, TMCs can offer a valuable service by providing 

real-time situational awareness to other decision-making agencies and responders on 

the ground. Information collected by TMCs that may be exchanged with other agencies 

includes:

• Real-time video images provided with CCTV video feeds via access to a common portal or 

a direct video feed

• Traffic sensor data providing congestion information such as speed, volume, and travel 

time, shared via common Internet portal

• Weather sensor data providing regional, area, and surface condition data including 

temperature, pressure, and precipitation

• IntelliDriveSM on-board equipment (OBE) providing aggregate data from hundreds of 

vehicles including temperature, wiper status, anti-local brake system (ABS) status, and 

brake status among others

• IntelliDriveSM-based algorithms, such as “Icy Conditions,” “Incidents,” “Link Speed,” “Travel 

Time,” and “Volumes,” providing near real-time information about road conditions and 

possible evacuation routes

• IntelliDriveSM Advisory Message Delivery System providing near instantaneous two-way 

communication with the driving public across vast areas

• Reverse 911 systems providing continuous updates to first responders, decision makers, 

and other members of the non-driving public

• Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) utilizing data from TMCs to alert the 

general public with life-saving information quickly

• Incident and congestion notifications providing location, cause, extent, time, detection, 

and clearance of incident and congestion via radio, fax, or phone (incident logs and 

network statistics are also available for historical information)

• Planned projects, work zone, and special events in-progress information including 

providing location, extent, time, and status via the Internet, radio, fax, or phone 

• GPS and GIS data providing vehicle location and speed as well as special information 

from multiple sources via Internet portal

• Traffic control systems data providing information regarding the activity/inactivity and 

operational status of ramp meters, traffic signal control, lane control signals, and DMS 

content via common Internet portal
28

• Public transit systems data including passenger vehicle times, locations, trajectories, 

origins, and destinations

• CAD systems providing response information including incidents, dispatch information, 

and status via a linked software program that allows a computer to automatically 

dispatch emergency responders.

While much of this information can be collected and shared, agencies must be mindful of 

laws on sharing sensitive information. Typically 911 centers have access to law enforcement networks (e.g., the Virginia Criminal Information Network or the New York State Police 

Identification Network). These law enforcement databases provide police officers with 

access to motor vehicle license and registration information, wanted information, missing 

persons, stolen vehicles/articles, etc. Access to this data is tightly controlled and may be 

exempt from Federal and State information access laws and would not be shared outside 

of the law enforcement agency. Exemptions would be necessary for TMCs to receive only 

pertinent data related to their objectives.

Some data, like medical information and crash information have specific protection. For 

example, medical information falls under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 

Act (HIPAA) regulations, while other personally identifiable information (PII) would come 

under the Privacy Act and other Federal or State and local protections. Crash data, such 

as data from passenger vehicle event data recorders and OnStar systems provide at least 

several dozen crash data elements (e.g., speed at time of a crash, whether a seat belt was 

in use), but may require a court order for access to the data. TMCs need an exemption to 

receive such data, after stripping of PII.

Data sharing between municipal agencies, working for the same local government, is easily 

accomplished. However, some city, State, and Federal laws prevent the release of data from 

one entity to another either entirely or partially but with built-in safeguards. There are many 

restrictions on data sharing at different levels. To accomplish efficient data sharing that 

respects individuals’ rights, one has to look at how a particular entity intends to use that 

data.

• A driver’s medical history may be of great importance to 911 call centers and first 

responders, but a TMC may not need that information. 

• An explosion at a chemical plant would not concern a TMC, unless that plant was near a 

highway that would be impacted by the explosion.

There is a need for more data-sharing agreements between the State and these centers, 

especially FCs. It is best to have detailed agreements in place before the creation of an FC. 

One such agreement could provide for direct feeds of appropriately redacted data from 911 

centers into the FCs.

As a result of recent concern about alleged racial and ethnic profiling in traffic stops, a 

number of law enforcement agencies (both local and State) now operate under policies 

requiring statistical review and audits of traffic stop and other police encounter data. Other 

agencies may want to review the results of those audits and evaluations to determine 
29

whether anticipated information collection and enforcement initiatives are consistent with 

the findings of such oversight. Access to this data may require special requests because the 

analyses may not be covered by standard information-sharing agreements between and 

among law enforcement agencies.

2.5.2 EOCs

To support their coordinating role, many EOCs use information management tools, such as 

WebEOC®, to exchange information and prioritize requests during an incident. Availability 

of these information-sharing tools may be limited to personnel in the EOC or may be 

extended to the broader emergency response community, to include first responders in the 

field or TMCs. These information tools may include CAD and GIS mapping capabilities and 

are usually customized for individual EOCs.

Access to continuously updated information is critical to successful incident response. One 

important function is providing Situation Reports (SITREPs) every few hours during a major 

incident. Figure 2-2 shows a sample SITREP. SITREPs describe the situation on the ground, 

response priorities, and actions taken or underway to resolve the most urgent issues. 

Depending on the situation and the level of priority, SITREPs may include synthesized data 

provided by a TMC, such as a status report on a crash along a key evacuation route.

Figure 2-2: VEOC SITREP Extract

Virginia Emergency Operations Center (VEOC) 

Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) Virginia Emergency Response Team (VERT) 

March 4 2008 TORNADOES 

SITUATION REPORT # 13 

14 April 2008, 1400 Hours 

New information is in BOLD ITALICS. 

SUMMARY

In the early evening hours of March 4 a cold front moving across the Commonwealth generated storm activity. These 

storms produced rain, wind and reported tornadoes. National Weather Service Morristown confirmed that an EF1 

Tornado did touch down in Big Stone Gap, Wise County Virginia. Preliminary damage reports have been received from 

several jurisdictions and state agencies. No injuries or deaths were reported. 

EXECUTIVE ACTION

EOC Activation: The Virginia VEOC is at Recovery Operations with normal staffing. 

State of Emergency: Governor Kaine declared a State of Emergency at 1119 hours 5 March 2008. 

Executive Order – NUMBER SIXTY-FOUR (2008)

Federal Declaration: No declaration has been requested at this time. 

Protective Actions: Local Emergency Declared by:

Wise County at 1800 hours 4 March 2008 

 Town of Big Stone Gap at 1700 hours 4 March 2008 

 Essex County at 0800 hours 5 March 2008 

WEATHER

Forecast: Southwest VA: Monday 14 April: Mostly cloudy with rain showers likely; high 

 temperatures in upper 30’s to low 40’s; north winds 10 to 15 MPH. Monday 

night: Mostly cloudy with slight chance of rain showers and snow showers in 

 the evening and snow showers after midnight; patchy frost possible toward 

 daybreak; low temperatures in the low 30’s; north winds 5 to 10 MPH. 

Tuesday 8 April: Sunny; high temperatures upper 40s to low 50s; north winds 5 

 to 10 MPH. Tuesday night: Clear; low temperatures in low 30’s; light and 

 variable winds.

OPERATIONS SECTION

ESF 5 – Emergency Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM)

Management: Event created in WebEOC “2008-03 Tornadoes 03-04-08”. VDEM and localities 

posting event related information and resource requests in WebEOC. VDEM is 

monitoring recovery operations. 

Local Liaison: VDEM Region 4 Coordinator continues to monitor recovery activities and remains 

available to assist if needed. 

 

INFRASTRUCTURE BRANCH

ESF 1 – Transportation: Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT)

VDOT provided signage, 2 front end loaders, 2 dump trucks, transportation, 

chainsaws and safety equipment to support Department of Correction personnel in 

debris removal in Big Stone Gap. VDOT signs were demobilized on 10 March and 

additional VDOT resources and crews demobilized on 17 March. 

LOGISTICS SECTION

This extract SITREP from the Virginia EOC (VEOC) includes transportation specific information following a series of tornadoes in 

April 2008. The full SITREP can be viewed at http://www.vdem.

state.va.us/newsroom/sitreps/2008/mar4_tornadoes/sitrep13.pdf. 
30

SITREPs can be tailored for particular audiences. For example, they may be designed 

to communicate with the general public, in the form of a press release, or they may be 

designed to communicate classified or otherwise sensitive information to law enforcement 

or military personnel during a terrorist incident. 

Producing effective SITREPs and incident management plans requires EOCs to gather, analyze, and prioritize large quantities of data from a variety of sources. When representatives 

from different agencies are physically present in the EOC during an incident, they can serve 

as expert conduits of information to the lead EOC staff. For instance, the ESF-126 (transportation) representative usually coordinates the exchange of critical information between the 

EOC and the affected transportation agencies and providers. With advances in communications technologies, however, representatives can accomplish this objective remotely. 

Section 2.6.2 of this guidebook provides details on communications capabilities typical of 

EOCs. There are challenges associated with communications technologies as well; Section 

4.2 of this guidebook discusses these. 

EOCs are in the best position to help decision makers at the TMCs by providing them with 

useful and timely information. Integrating TMC information systems with information management and reporting systems such as WebEOC® and providing TMCs with SITREPs that 

go beyond the information included in press releases will greatly enhance TMC personnel’s 

ability to deal with unplanned events. Regulatory and privacy concerns can be addressed 

by ensuring that the information shared with the TMC only includes aggregate data.

Table 2-14 reflects data and its sources coming into the EOCs, which they use to conduct 

their emergency operation functions (e.g., monitoring the jurisdiction, receiving notification 

of an incident affecting the jurisdiction, assessing the incident, responding to the incident, 

and closing out the incident). 

Table 2-14: EOC Data Types and Sources

Data Type Data Source

Weather • Direct feed

• Commercial broadcast media

• Public Internet sites

• GIS

• Hard-copy maps

• Public Internet sites

• Remote sensing data and maps

26 ESF-1 is defined by FEMA as transportation assisting Federal agencies, State and local governmental entities, 

and voluntary organizations requiring transportation capacity to perform response missions following a major 

disaster or emergency. ESF -1 also serves as a coordination point between response operations and restoration of 

the transportation infrastructure.
31

Data Type Data Source

Resource Deployment • CAD

• EOC staff

• On-site responders

• RFID and GIS technology

• Resource tracking tools

Situational Status • Commercial broadcast media

• CAD

• Police/fire radio traffic (911 dispatch)

• TMCs/TOCs

• EOC staff

• On-site responders 

• General public

• Remote sensing data and maps

Incident Response Plans • Hard copy 

• LAN

2.5.3 FCs

Traditionally, information that FCs have managed and exchanged has been done through 

law enforcement and/or homeland security agencies. However, because many FCs have 

an All-Crimes or All-Hazards mission approach, they are engaging non-traditional information and intelligence sources for information management and exchange. Many FCs have 

developed a Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) Program—a network of FC liaison officers who 

are members of law enforcement, fire service, public health, and other agencies (including 

public works, corrections, and emergency management). Several States have established 

these programs to facilitate communication with FC stakeholders, including law enforcement and emergency management. FLOs coordinate information-sharing activities among 

the private sector and CIKR partners, such as electric companies, oil refineries, banks, and 

entertainment facilities. With the help of this network, FCs receive homeland security and 

crime-related information for assessment and analysis.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Presidential Executive Order 13356, issued on 

August 27, 2004, provided the impetus for a national effort to improve information sharing 

and defined the DHS’ initial role in this effort.27 This role has been expanded and refined in 

subsequent statutes, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 

as amended (IRTPA).28 IRTPA ensured that DHS would have a central part in the Information 

Sharing Environment (ISE).29 FCs reported to the GAO that they issue a variety of products, 

such as:

• Daily bulletins on general crime and information

27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Information Sharing Strategy, April 

2008, http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1212068752872.shtm, accessed 2010.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.
32

• Weekly bulletins on criminal or intelligence information

• Assessments for in-depth reporting on emerging threats, groups of interest, or crime.

To obtain daily information, FCs access databases from the Federal Trade Commission, DHS, 

US DOJ, the Office for the Program Manager for the ISE (appointed by the President), and 

even limited information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Each of these organizations has taken steps to provide FCs with access to Federal information systems. Appendix C

of this report provides a listing of databases that the FCs may access. 

DHS reports that, as of August 2009, the HSDN is deployed at 29 FCs. This communications 

network allows the Federal government to move information and intelligence to the States 

at the secret level. Through HSDN, FC staff can access the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC), which is a classified portal of the most current terrorism-related information according to its Web site. Many FCs will have an SCIF where they have access to classified information, operated either by the FBI, DHS I&A, or other designated agencies. Collaborative 

network capabilities exist for the purposes of sharing information between the Regional 

Information Sharing Systems (RISS), LEO, and DHS’ HSIN. 

In many cases, concern over information management systems is due to the fact that 

State systems cannot work with other systems within the State or regionally since there is 

no single national-level system. Despite Federal efforts to promote the use of Extensible 

Markup Language (XML) as the standard format across all levels of government for justice 

and public safety information management systems, FCs and States continue to purchase 

systems that operate using proprietary language and that cannot “speak” to other systems 

without additional equipment and costs.30 However, information sharing has been a longstanding practice among justice agencies, particularly within the law enforcement community according to FC guidelines. 

FCs have been providing their partners with alerts, bulletins, reports, and assessments, all 

in an effort to improve the quality of information and the process of information sharing. 

In the beginning, most of the partners were Federal and law enforcement organizations. 

However, this has been evolving as the centers move toward an “All Hazards” approach. 

The intelligence alerts and bulletins serve to provide immediate information and updates, 

respectively, to present situational awareness and a clearer operating picture to first 

responders. Daily and intelligence reports look at larger regional and global issues. These 

reports serve to inform the recipients of trends or concerns in various sectors such as:

• Agriculture and food

• Banking and finance

• Hazardous materials (HazMat) and the chemical industry

• Education

• Emergency management

30 Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are 

Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, October 2007.
33

• Entertainment and retail

• Fire and emergency medical services

• Government

• Military

• Private security

• Postal and shipping

• Public health

• Telecommunications

• Transportation

• Utility and water.

These reports are exchanged between FCs and stakeholder agencies and are intended to 

educate the person(s) working for the agency who has a right and need to know. FCs often 

do not want these reports disseminated without their prior permission. 

In addition to alerts, bulletins, and reports, FCs will provide assessments. These are usually 

for the locality under their jurisdiction. These assessments are used to generate the State of 

Affairs or an Annual Threat Assessment report that can be presented to the governor of the 

State and/or any other officials who have a need to know this information. 

2.6 Communications Links

2.6.1 TMCs

TMC management often includes an approach to interagency cooperation—where the 

strategic missions of multiple stakeholders have overlapping elements. In these cases, open 

lines of communication are important for sharing information and coordinating in common 

mission areas. Common TMC communications linkages include:

• Face-to-face communications consist of personal interactions between staff from 

different agencies in co-located facilities such as joint operations centers or mobile 

command posts. When possible, it is effective for sharing information and coordinating 

response. Regular face-to-face interaction facilitates collaboration and trust.

• Radio is the most common form of communication between the field and operations 

centers to communicate on-scene traffic incident information. First responders such as 

law enforcement and safety/service patrols frequently use it. However, radio is often a 

challenging medium of communication between agencies because of the many different 

radio types and frequencies employed to maintain clear communications within each 

agency’s own operating units.
34

• Wired telephones are the primary means of center-to-center interagency 

communication. They are still the most accurate and immediate method to describe 

transportation incidents. Hotlines can also establish a constant direct audio feed.

• Cellular telephones, which continue to improve technologically and gain in popularity, 

provide radio-like operability and wired-telephone connectivity and improve mobility. 

Push-to-talk systems and priority access mimic radio features.

• Alphanumeric pagers, cellular SMS text messaging, and email are used to communicate 

within and among agencies. Although still not a primary means of communication, 

advanced systems can include graphical maps, AVL, and in-vehicle mobile data terminals 

(MDTs) that can interact with CAD systems.

• CAD systems automatically dispatch services via a computer. A CAD system consists of 

a suite of software programs that can route calls, make dispatches, and monitor status. 

The program can send messages to responders via an MDT and can also be used to store 

and retrieve data. Responders in the field can receive messages via two-way radio, text 

message, pagers, and/or wireless telephone. Often, multiple agencies share systems to 

facilitate communication and increase efficiency.

• Video-imaging systems can be shared easily where partner agency staff members are 

co-located at TMCs. Video and still images can also be shared remotely via Internet 

portal. Video and images can also be shared with the media. Control of the pan-tilt-zoom 

functions on cameras can also be shared by agencies if desired. If such access is granted, 

protocols must be established on how and when such functions can be used.

Table 2-15 provides a summary of the TMC communication systems in terms of reliability, 

speed, security, and availability. 

Table 2-15: TMC Communications Summary

Link System Reliability Speed Security Availability

Face-to-face 4 2 4 1

Radio 2 4 0 4

Wired telephone 3 4 3 4

Cellular telephone 2 3 2 3

Pager/Text Messaging/Email 2 2 2 3

CAD 2 3 2 2

Video imaging 2 2 2 2

Key 4 = Good 0 = Poor
35

2.6.2 EOCs

The communications capabilities available to an EOC will generally depend on its primary 

jurisdiction. For example, a local community EOC’s communications capabilities are likely to 

be more basic than those of EOCs serving a densely populated metropolitan area or a State. 

Table 2-16 presents the communications capabilities available and describes some of the 

characteristics associated with each.

Table 2-16: Available EOC Communications Capabilities

Capability Characteristics

Wireline 

telecommunications

The wireline network (Public Switched Network) is ubiquitous. Although 

it is susceptible to physical damage (a backhoe operator may cut a 

fiber cable; a hurricane may uproot telephone poles; an accidental—or 

intentional—fire may destroy or damage key telecommunications 

facilities), telecommunications service providers have advanced 

technologies for rapidly rerouting communications traffic and have more 

than 100 years of experience restoring the physical infrastructure. 

Wireless 

telecommunications

Although there are some areas where coverage may be limited or nonexistent, the wireless network is rapidly becoming as ubiquitous as the 

wireline network. It offers greater mobility to users than the wireline 

network. 

Two-way/highfrequency radioThe advantage of this communications capability is that it does not 

depend on the same communications infrastructure as the wireline 

and wireless networks and it offers mobility to emergency responders. 

However, it is often the case that the radio communications used by 

different emergency responders are not interoperable, even within the 

same jurisdiction (e.g., law enforcement officers may not be able to 

communicate with fire department personnel).

Commercial 

broadcast 

communications

Although these media offer only one-way communications, EOCs can use 

this communications capability to issue alerts to the general public and 

obtain information about developing incidents of interest.

Direct feeds Some EOCs may have continuous, direct feeds from weather services 

and news organizations. This may provide information of interest more 

quickly than is the case with commercial broadcast communications. 

Data links Some EOCs may have data links to various information sources, which 

may give them access to sources of information not otherwise available 

and may also allow them to receive content in formats the other 

communications capabilities do not support (e.g., maps).

Human interaction When ESF representatives are physically present in the EOC, and when 

emergency responders (e.g., police officers, firefighters, EMTs) are in 

the field, they exchange information (and have insights about that 

information and the situation) that make a substantial contribution to the 

coordination of the response effort.
36

2.6.3 FCs

Because of the investment, expertise, and capabilities that exist with FCs, the FC guidelines 

suggest that center plans support the jurisdiction’s emergency management structure 

during crises. Since the State police primarily operate and control most FCs, the centers are 

involved in any natural disasters that may occur. Additionally, some FCs are beginning to colocate with EOCs and have emergency management personnel working in their centers full 

time to help facilitate communications. FCs are expected to play a role during crisis management and recovery operations in coordination with the ICS, NIMS, and NRF.

Many FCs communicate via networks like HSIN. As an example of one of the main networks 

FCs use to communicate, HSIN gives FCs the ability to collaborate with other FCs and their 

Federal partner over an end-to-end encrypted network. HSIN provides communication, collaborative tools, and information. 

Thomas Muir briefs Secretary Napolitano about the flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota at the 

National Operations Center.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Bahler
37

Chapter 3. OPPORTUNITIES FOR 

COLLABORATION

This chapter provides a description of information exchange possibilities to suggest 

opportunities for TMCs, EOCs, and FCs to explore and formalize processes and channels for 

collaboration—to the extent that the centers may find them beneficial. 

This guidebook focuses mainly on the viability and practical use of TMC information 

resources by EOCs and FCs, but it also addresses opportunities for two-way information 

flows among all of the center types. The following sections outline transportation-related 

data managed and used by all three center types, and how center counterparts might use 

each kind of information. The sections are organized as follows:

• Transportation-related information managed and used by TMCs and how EOCs and FCs 

may utilize the information

• Transportation-related information managed and used by EOCs and how TMCs and FCs 

may utilize the information

• Transportation-related information managed and used by FCs and how TMCs and EOCs 

may utilize the information.

These sections distinguish among three basic categories of transportation-related 

information: 

• Operational information (real-time or very recent)

• Records and logs information (recent or historical) 

• Infrastructure information (locations, routes, dimensions, resources, nodes, etc.).

These categories of information have strong value implications for each center type, 

depending on the mission, jurisdictional, and temporal focus of each center.

Each type of center—TMC, EOC, and FC—operates under different (and in some cases 

overlapping) missions. Their missions determine the categories of transportation-related 

information that they collect and use, as well as the official sources and information that 

may be beneficial if available from other types of centers. In fact, the three center types 

already often obtain and process similar information from external sources. Examples are 

news feeds, weather information, and 911 call/dispatch data. 

Figure 3-1 illustrates the differences in typical characteristics of the center types with 

respect to the overall focus of their respective missions. Each characteristic should be seen 

as a continuum. 
38

The characteristics used to typify centers include:

• Geographical coverage (i.e., does the center focus primarily on the local, regional, 

statewide, national, or global environment?)

• Infrastructure focus (i.e., does the center focus on one particular infrastructure, such as 

the transportation infrastructure, or does it focus on multiple infrastructures?)

• Temporal nature of mission or operations (i.e., does the center focus primarily on today’s 

situations, or does it focus on situations that may occur in the future?)

• Functional roles (i.e., does the center focus on operational functions or on analytical 

functions?)

• Deployment triggers (i.e., does the center focus primarily on reacting to adverse 

situations or on preventing them?).

There are, of course, wide variations in the characteristics of specific TMCs, EOCs, and FCs. 

For example, EOCs (in some form) exist at virtually every jurisdictional level. But the context 

of this guidebook involves regular regional and local information-sharing relationships 

between proximate or linked centers of the three types. 

Figure 3-1: Comparison of Typical TMC-EOC-FC Characteristics

Jurisdiction

TMC

EOC

FC

Focus Function

Triggers

Temporal

Operation

Mostly in urban 

regions

Some statewide or 

in corridors

Transportation 

network

Day-to-day network 

operations

Transportation 

incidents

Continuous

Virtually in all local 

and regional 

jurisdictions, states, 

and nationwide

Multiple 

infrastructures

Signicant incidents 

and declared 

emergencies

When incidents or 

emergencies occur

Most stand-by at 

other times

Mostly in 

regional/major 

urban areas

Multiple public 

safety and security 

threats

Critical 

infrastructures

Known or 

discovered 

vulnerabilities

Emerging threat 

indications

Continuous

The following sections describe transportation-related information that is managed and 

used by each type of center and how it could be leveraged effectively by other types of 

centers.
39

3.1 Transportation-Related Information Managed/Used by 

TMCs

The primary mission of a typical TMC is to monitor traffic and facilitate efficient movement 

on regional transportation infrastructure. To meet these goals, TMCs employ a variety of 

technologies to gather and use information related to the status and operations of the local 

or regional transportation infrastructure, including highways, bridges, arterials, and transit 

operations. TMCs can share information gathered about the infrastructure with other local 

agencies that need to gain insight as to the status of any or the entire infrastructure, including EOCs and FCs. TMCs are responsible for a variety of categories of information related to 

the management of their transportation infrastructures.

3.1.1 Information Categories

TMCs manage and use all three of the primary categories of information:

• Operational information, including real-time situational traffic and network status 

information gathered by ITS resources, sensors and surveillance equipment, safety/

service patrols, vehicles equipped with IntelliDriveSM OBE, and other internal or external 

sources.

• Records and logs of special events, incidents, and emergencies affecting, either directly 

or indirectly, the transportation infrastructure. TMCs also typically record network 

statistics and traffic data.

• Infrastructure information including maps, resources, and physical data on transportation 

infrastructure assets and operating condition.

Table 3-1 summarizes operational information and its potential use to other center types. 

Details and considerations are summarized in the text following Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: TMC Operational Information: Description 

and Potential Uses by EOCs and FCs

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

Transportation and ITS 

infrastructure disruptions 

(e.g., disruptions due to 

power outages, flooding, 

communications breakdown)

• Determine how disruptions 

will affect response team 

activities

• Support continuous 

situational awareness during 

an incident

• Determine how disruptions 

may result in cascading 

effects on CIKR

IntelliDriveSM probe data and 

algorithm results

• Continually update 

evacuation routes

• Re-route first responders

• Develop advanced 

algorithms for early warning 

of secondary incidents

• Develop advanced 

algorithms for threat 

assessment
40

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

Incidents that potentially 

impact transportation 

operations (e.g., industrial 

accidents, civil disruption, 

hostage situations)

• Determine whether 

incident warrants alerts or 

notification to the public and 

responders

• Use information for threat 

assessment

Traffic incidents • Determine how disruptions 

will affect response team 

activities

• Traffic incidents may be 

monitored to identify 

patterns and potential for 

secondary incidents

Video camera feeds • Visually confirm situational 

information from other 

sources

• Assist with an emergency 

evacuation

• Maintain situational 

awareness and factor 

information into incident 

response measures31

Planned projects that 

impact the transportation 

infrastructure (e.g., surface and 

subsurface construction and 

maintenance)

• Assist informed planning 

of emergency response 

activities

• May use this information in 

conjunction with other data 

to assess threats

Special events in progress 

that potentially impact 

transportation operations (e.g., 

sports event)

• Determine whether the 

special event warrants alerts 

or notification to the public 

and responders

• Use information for threat 

assessment depending on 

the special event

Planned special events and 

associated road closure/traffic 

pattern data

• Plan for potential 

emergencies

• Support continuous 

situational awareness

• Information32 used to 

determine impact on other 

activities (e.g., visit of highprofile person)

Activity/inactivity and 

operational status of:

• Bridges

• Tunnels 

• HOV/HOT lanes

• Reverse lanes

• Weigh stations

• During an incident, monitor 

status of conditions and 

inform affected stakeholders 

(nature and extent of the 

incident will determine the 

level of coordination and 

participation)

• Information used to 

determine impact on other 

activities (e.g., tunnel closure 

requiring HazMat rerouting)

31 Some FCs are co-located with EOCs or have access to video feeds. Those FCs that do not have such access can 

use the TMC Web site or other open source Web sites to monitor traffic cameras in the area.

32 Information is used when planning for special movements of people or materials. Information can be 

exchanged as movements are taking place for situational awareness of law enforcement personnel.
41

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

Localized surface and 

atmospheric conditions (e.g., 

icing, fog, water table level 

status)

• Determine how road 

surface conditions will affect 

response team activities

• Support continuous 

situational awareness during 

weather events

• Possible notifications to 

stakeholders for safety/

preparation for ongoing 

operations

•

Emergency management 

notification status (e.g., 

roadway HazMat incident)

• Use information to 

determine activation levels

• Use information to 

coordinate resources as 

needed

• Monitor situation and 

report updates as needed to 

stakeholders, both internal 

and external, depending on 

the situation

Localized traffic flow data (e.g., 

speed)33

• Determine impact on 

emergency responders

• Evaluate alternate routes

• Monitor traffic during 

planned special events

DMS status (including location, 

direction, message)34

• Everyday incidents: 

EOC defers to TMC and 

responders on everyday 

incidents

• Emergencies: EOC will 

coordinate messages and 

incidents requiring multiagency collaboration

• Useful for posting messages 

such as Amber and Silver 

Alerts

Status of:

• Transit operations and 

ridership

• Public parking capacity

• Bridge posting

• Incident deployment and 

evacuation management

• Location of bus and rail 

vehicles relative to security 

sensitive buildings

3.1.1.1 Transportation and ITS Infrastructure Disruptions

Description: TMCs use a variety of resources, including ITS and personnel, to track the current condition of transportation and ITS infrastructure and potential disruptions, including 

disruptions due to power outages, flooding, and communications breakdowns. When operable, video feeds provide an excellent opportunity for TMCs to assess the situation on the 

transportation network. This information can be shared with EOCs and FCs via a Web portal. 

In many TMCs, cameras contain power and communications redundancies to allow continued use in case of a disruption. However, in a severe communications breakdown, even 

redundant systems can collapse. 

33 Accessed via police, TMC, or mobile video systems (forward command systems). Open sources can be accessed 

as well but do not provide the control of the camera that may be needed in certain incidents.

34 Most of this information is monitored by State police (HOV violations, ramp metering).
42

Potential Uses by EOCs: If such disruptions had a significant impact on an EOC’s jurisdiction (e.g., a collapse of a bridge carrying hundreds of vehicles during rush hour in a large 

metropolitan area) and the EOC was in the monitoring phase, this information may be used 

to determine whether to go into the activation phase. In most circumstances, however, 

where a disruption is less severe, an EOC may use this information only when it has already 

been activated and when the information would be useful as part of continuous situational 

awareness and to determine how such a disruption may affect response team activities. For 

example, disruption to a key arterial may require re-routing response teams or changing 

evacuation plans.

Potential Uses by FCs: Information concerning transportation and ITS infrastructure disruptions could be used by an FC to determine how disruptions may produce cascading effects 

for critical infrastructure assets.

3.1.1.2 Incidents that Potentially Impact Transportation Operations

Description: TMCs monitor non-transportation incidents that could indirectly impact transportation operations including industrial accidents and chemical spills, civil disruption, and 

hostage situations. While not directly related to transportation movements, TMCs must be 

aware of any incidents that could potentially affect transportation operations and respond 

accordingly, potentially coordinating operations with other agencies. For example, while a 

major chemical spill at a regional port would not directly affect highway or arterial infrastructure, it might require an evacuation of all people within a certain radius of the spill. The 

TMC would be required to work to ensure that necessary steps toward a full evacuation are 

taking place.

Potential Uses by EOCs: As with disruptions to the transportation infrastructure itself, this 

type of incident may also endanger the public or impede emergency responders. Because 

both types of situations have the same impact on emergency response, EOCs would use 

information on these incidents both to determine whether to activate (if the incident 

profoundly affected the EOC’s jurisdiction) or to determine how a given incident may affect 

response team activities.

Potential Uses by FCs: Information about incidents that could potentially impact overall 

transportation operations can aid an FC’s overall coordination effort during an emergency, 

depending on the incident. However, State police usually manage the day-to-day operations and are on alert for these activities (HOV violations, ramp metering issues). The FCs 

also often monitor radio communications concerning potential incidents. 

3.1.1.3 Traffic Incidents

Description: TMCs track traffic incidents that occur on highways and arterials, often taking 

proactive steps to remove the incident to prevent additional congestion and crashes, and 

maximize road capacity. Using ITS resources such as CCTV cameras, TMCs identify and verify 

traffic incidents. Safety/service patrols can also identify and verify incidents, relaying situational information to the TMC. Once a safety/service patrol operator, State police, or other 

responder verifies an incident, the TMC directs actions to remove the incident from the 

roadway through a coordinated traffic incident management (TIM) response. In many TMCs, 
43

traffic incidents are recorded and displayed on the Web in real time to inform TMC stakeholders and roadway users. Incidents may also be reported to drivers via 511 systems.

Potential Uses by EOCs: During the monitoring phase, information on traffic incidents 

would not usually be of interest to the EOCs. During the activation phase, EOCs would 

find this information useful in determining how such disruptions will affect response team 

activities.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs may monitor traffic incidents to help identify patterns and analyze the potential for secondary incidents. For high-profile traffic incidents or major crashes, 

FCs are often notified by the State police dispatch so that the FC has an awareness of what 

is going on in case another incident occurs before the initial incident is resolved. 

3.1.1.4 Video Camera Feeds

Description: Most TMCs own and operate CCTV cameras focused on the roadway infrastructure. The TMCs use these cameras to obtain situational awareness of the transportation infrastructure, which can be shared with partner agencies through a direct Web portal 

as well as to both agencies and system users through the Web site, www.trafficland.com. 

TMCs connect to cameras via T1 lines, often with back-up dial-up connections. Additionally, 

some TMCs have the capability to record and retain traffic data for a period of hours or days. 

Others do not possess any recording capabilities generally due to privacy and litigation 

concerns.

Potential Uses by EOCs: In most situations, EOCs would not find this information useful. 

However, in the activation phase, information from video camera feeds may be used to confirm situational information from other sources. Because initial reports may be inaccurate, 

or an initial report from one source may conflict with that from another, the video camera 

feeds can help the EOCs achieve a more accurate understanding of a situation. For example, 

live video could be very useful in monitoring traffic conditions during an evacuation. As 

part of the iFlorida project, Florida’s statewide EOC (SEOC) was connected to the Florida 

DOT’s (FDOT’s) 25 Statewide monitoring cameras. To provide improved access to the video 

feeds, the SEOC upgraded the bandwidth of its network connection with FDOT’s system. 

Prior to this connection, the SEOC could get access from FDOT’s traffic monitoring locations, 

but it was not real-time data and was provided as part of a public web site that the SEOC 

could monitor. The iFlorida project final report includes additional information about the 

use of ITS to support hurricane evacuations.35

Potential Uses by FCs: Since some FCs are co-located with EOCs, they will have access to 

video feeds as long as an EOC is tied into a video network. For traffic-related issues, those 

FCs that do not, or cannot, utilize EOC or TMC video feeds will access traffic cameras via 

public or private sector Web sites that have access to traffic cameras in the area. However, 

access to Web-based video cameras does not offer the control, or access to the controllers, 

that an FC might need to pan and zoom. FCs can use the information provided by video 

cameras to maintain situational awareness and will factor information provided by the cam35 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, iFlorida Model Deployment Final Evaluation 

Report, 2009, http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop08050/chap_9.htm, accessed 2010.
44

eras to determine incident response measures. If the cameras also cover critical infrastructure, FCs could monitor such infrastructure as required. Such cameras may be in addition 

to those surveillance cameras sometimes deployed by law enforcement agencies that are 

generally not available to TMCs for monitoring traffic. In some locations, such as the City 

of Chicago, law enforcement personnel can monitor surveillance cameras installed in the 

“Loop” area (i.e., the historic city center) for law enforcement purposes. These cameras can 

also provide secondary traffic incident information. Shared use of images from both TMC 

and FC cameras may be a topic for further exploration by these organizations.

3.1.1.5 Planned Projects That Impact the Transportation Infrastructure

Description: TMCs maintain awareness of planned projects and construction that affect 

transportation operations, both directly and indirectly. This could include both surface and 

subsurface construction and maintenance for transportation infrastructure, utilities, and 

other construction projects such as new buildings. If a planned construction project will 

disrupt traffic flow, TMCs take active steps to create detours and other mitigation strategies.

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs could use this information to build their emergency response 

plans. For example, if a portion of an interstate highway within the EOC’s jurisdiction was 

under construction, advance notice of this activity would allow an EOC to evaluate alternate 

routes and adapt its response plan accordingly until completion of the construction. This 

would be particularly important when reviewing evacuation plans in preparation for hurricane season, for example.

Potential Uses by FCs: Normally, an FC will receive notifications about major road closures 

in advance for two reasons: 

• To coordinate State police efforts to have a patrol car and officer in place to protect 

workers during construction

• To maintain a list of major/long-term road closures in case of an evacuation and/or be 

able to identify any false closing of roads by a criminal entity near a section of critical 

infrastructure (e.g., bridge).

Information about planned projects that will impact the transportation infrastructure can 

be used in conjunction with other data to assess threats. 

3.1.1.6 Special Events in Progress That Potentially Impact Transportation Operations

Description: In addition to planning for projects and construction that affect transportation 

infrastructure, TMCs track and monitor special events in progress that have the potential 

to impact transportation operations including sports events, concerts, and parades. Some 

special events will have a known effect on transportation operations, including regularly 

scheduled special events. However, other events that do not take place on a regular basis, 

like a victory parade for a sports team, may have far-reaching consequences that are 

unknown. Additionally, mismanagement or unforeseen circumstances of a planned special 

event can lead to an incident.
45

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs could use such information while in the monitoring stage 

to contribute to situational awareness so they could consider the event should an incident 

occur that warrants advancing to the activation stage.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs will use information about special events in progress that 

potentially impact the transportation infrastructure operations as part of their role in the 

coordination effort during the event. Information about special events in progress will be 

reported to the FCs depending on the incident (e.g., natural disaster, shooting, hostage situation requiring road closures, operational support/tactical team deployment). FCs will then 

work to coordinate this information with their partner organizations and agencies. 

3.1.1.7 Planned Special Events and Associated Road Closure/Traffic Pattern Data

Description: TMCs are part of the planning process for planned special events including 

developing congestion mitigation strategies for potential transportation bottlenecks.

Potential Uses by EOCs: Depending on the duration and the extent of the impact on the 

transportation infrastructure, this information may be useful to EOCs in their planning 

activities. For example, a special event such as the Olympics would have significant impact 

on evacuation plans, and the EOCs would need to adapt such plans in case an incident 

occurred that warranted evacuation. Some special events may require pre-positioning of 

medical and law enforcement personnel and firefighters. This information is also useful 

because it supports continuous situational awareness.

Potential Uses by FCs: Planned special events and the road closures/traffic pattern data 

associated with them are used to determine impact on other activities. This information 

is used when an FC is engaged in planning for special movements of people (e.g., visit of 

high-profile person, convoy operations of VIPs/high-profile prisoners) or materials. An FC 

could be on the lookout for demonstrations, explosions, shootings, etc. on major roads 

that, combined with planned special event data, could impact their operations. Data is 

exchanged in real time, and the FCs disseminate the information to give the agencies 

involved, usually law enforcement, a better level of situational awareness. Information 

about planned special events and associated road closure/traffic pattern data is used on an 

as-needed basis. 

3.1.1.8 Activity/Inactivity and Operational Status of Critical Infrastructure

Description: TMCs track the operational status of critical transportation infrastructure. In 

addition to knowing whether a piece of infrastructure is active or inactive, TMCs can track 

aspects of the infrastructure including number of lanes in use and approximate average 

traffic volume and speed. Some of the types of critical infrastructure that TMCs typically 

track include:

• Bridges

• Tunnels 

• HOV/HOT lanes

• Reverse lanes
46

• Commercial vehicle weigh stations.

Potential Uses by EOCs: During the monitoring stage, this information may not be useful 

for EOCs because such operational status is in continuous flux. However, during the activation stage, EOCs could monitor the status of conditions and inform affected stakeholders 

and the public if required. The nature and extent of the incident that resulted in activation 

will determine the level of coordination and participation required.

Potential Uses by FCs: The operational status of transportation assets can be information 

that an FC uses to determine the impact on other activities (e.g., tunnel closure requiring 

HazMat rerouting).

3.1.1.9 Localized Surface and Atmospheric Conditions

Description: Road Weather Information Systems (RWIS), a series of small sensors embedded 

in the transportation infrastructure, provide the TMC with information regarding localized 

surface and atmospheric conditions. TMCs have the ability to detect the temperature of 

both the local atmosphere as well as the pavement surface. Additionally, moisture sensors 

have the ability to detect the presence of moisture on the pavement. In combination with 

other ITS sensors such as CCTV, TMCs can detect such weather events as icing, fog, and 

water-level status.

Potential Uses by EOCs: As with the operational status of transportation infrastructure 

components such as bridges, tunnels, HOV/HOT lanes, reverse lanes, and weigh stations, 

localized surface and atmospheric conditions are continually in flux and would not have 

great utility for an EOC during the monitoring stage. However, once an EOC is activated, 

this information becomes useful in anticipating how road surface conditions might affect 

response team activities and in supporting continuous situational awareness during emergency response.

Potential Uses by FCs: While information on localized surface and atmospheric conditions 

will be available via multiple sources, FCs can pass along notifications to partner agencies and/or Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs) to help them safely plan for operational 

activities or to make adjustments to existing/ongoing operations. If an incident response 

is warranted due to a severe weather event, FCs will send out notifications to stand up 

coordination activities. FCs will coordinate their efforts with the EOCs to provide emergency 

response support to such incidents as road closures and traffic management issues caused 

by localized surface and atmospheric conditions. These resources could include State and 

local police assets depending on the FC.

3.1.1.10 Emergency Management Notification Status

Description: TMCs flag incidents and emergencies on transportation infrastructure and can 

alert partner agencies and other stakeholders of such occurrences. Using ITS assets, TMCs 

have the ability to detect some emergencies before other responders. For example, a TMC 

might have knowledge of the location of a HazMat spill on a major interstate and may be 

able to provide early information about the hazardous material that was spilled so responders can arrive at the scene properly equipped.
47

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs may use this information to determine whether EOC activation is warranted.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs use emergency management notification information to coordinate resources, as needed, during an incident, emergency, or natural disaster. FCs will 

monitor the situation and report updates to partner agencies, both internal and external, 

depending on the type of situation.

3.1.1.11 Localized Traffic Flow Data

Description: Using ITS resources including CCTV and loop detectors, TMCs have situational 

information related to the movement of traffic including current traffic speed and volume. 

This data can be disseminated to the public and other agencies via a Web portal with a realtime map indicating average traffic speed and reported through a 511 system. As well as 

being a key indicator for traffic incidents and other traffic bottlenecks, TMCs can utilize flow 

data for roadway capacity and congestion planning.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information is also in continuous flux, so it would only be 

useful to EOCs when they are activated and they may use it to determine the impact on 

emergency responders.

Potential Uses by FCs: If FCs are monitoring a special event, such as a visit by a high-ranking official or a National Special Security Event (NSSE),36 information about current traffic 

conditions could be helpful in monitoring and/or adjusting motorcade operations or other 

transportation needs surrounding an NSEE.

3.1.1.12 DMS Status

Description: DMS are programmable electronic signs displayed along roadways as both 

permanent fixtures and movable displays. The signs can be programmed for the TMC to 

display traffic, weather, congestion, alternate route, or emergency information to system 

users. It is important for motorists to be able to comprehend the information posted on 

the DMS so FHWA has published the Changeable Message Sign Operation and Messaging 

Handbook to provide guidance on day-to-day messages as well as emergency messages.37

TMCs generally communicate with signs via a T1 Internet connection. Often, a dial-up 

connection serves as a back-up system. If the connection between the TMC and the sign is 

severed, but power to the sign remains, the sign usually continues to display its most recent 

message. Using their connection with the sign and receiving verification via CCTV cameras, 

TMCs have information regarding the location (including which direction of traffic the sign 

faces) and the current message being displayed.

Potential Uses by EOCs: During routine incidents (e.g., a car crash that may impede or block 

traffic until it has been cleared), EOCs would defer to the TMC and responders. However, 

36 According to DHS, a number of factors are considered when designating an event as an NSSE including: 1) 

anticipated attendance by dignitaries, 2) size of the event, and 3) significance of the event.

37 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Changeable Message Sign Operation and 

Messaging Handbook, 2004, http://tmcpfs.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/cfprojects/uploaded_files/CMS%20Operation%20

and%20Messaging%20Handbook-Final%20Draft.pdf, , accessed 2010.
48

during emergencies, EOCs may coordinate messages and incidents for posting on the DMS 

that require multi-agency collaboration. One example may be during an evacuation prior 

to a hurricane, in which the EOCs may collaborate with the TMCs regarding the messages 

displayed to direct citizens to the evacuation routes and shelters.

Potential Uses by FCs: The primary use for DMS is to post traffic conditions and incident 

information for motorists. However, they have also been used for specialized law enforcement purposes such as the posting of Silver Alerts and AMBER Alerts. The AMBER AlertTM 

Program is a voluntary partnership among law enforcement agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the wireless industry, to activate an urgent bulletin in the most serious child-abduction cases. The program has specific criteria under which an AMBER Alert 

will be posted on a DMS. Understanding the status of the DMS will allow law enforcement 

agencies and TMCs to cooperate in more quickly posting any necessary information. See 

http://www.amberalert.gov/ for additional information on the program.

3.1.1.13 Status of Transit Operations and Ridership, Public Parking Capacity, Bridge

Posting

Description: TMCs located in areas with transit operations generally have some level of 

integration with local transit operations. Transit-focused TMCs monitor and control transit 

bus and rail fleets to maximize coordination and efficiency. Transit vehicles can also be 

guided and utilized in emergency situations such as evacuations.

Some TMCs have the capability to monitor parking capacity. Parking areas can be utilized in 

emergency situations for a mobile operations center or to stage responder vehicles.

TMCs track regional bridge postings. Bridge postings can include height/weight restrictions, HazMat restrictions, weather warnings, etc. These postings help the TMC determine 

the current proper use of bridges.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information is potentially relevant to incident deployment and 

evacuation management.

Potential Uses by FCs: Information on the location of bus and rail vehicles relative to the 

locations of security-sensitive government buildings might be useful to FCs both in monitoring day-to-day operations and in incident response. 

Table 3-2 summarizes records and logged information and its potential use to other center 

types. Details and considerations are summarized in the text following Table 3-2.
49

Table 3-2: TMC Records and Logs Information: 

Description and Potential Uses by EOCs and FCs

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

Incident Logs • Determine need for 

emergency responders

• Support performance 

measurement for incident 

response planning purposes

• Traffic incidents may be 

monitored to identify 

patterns and potential for 

secondary incidents

Historical network statistical 

records

• Typical traffic pattern data

• Toll transaction records

• Red-light and speed camera 

records

• Traffic records

• Weather records

• Recorded – retained video 

data

• Information could be used to 

support planning for detours 

and/or an evacuation

• Information could be used 

to support exercise scenario 

development

• Statistical support for annual 

risk assessments38

• Potential law enforcement 

applications

3.1.1.14 Incident Logs

Description: TMCs track reported traffic incidents on the roadway system for which they 

are responsible and may have the capability to monitor/record incidents on other roadway 

systems. Traffic incidents are sometimes reported by a responder, such as a safety/service 

patrol operator and State police, and recorded by the TMC and/or CAD system. Information 

includes date, time, location, responder(s), and a detailed description of the incident. Often, 

incident logs are available in real time via the Internet. The time of day when the incident is 

cleared is often recorded to assist in performance measurement.

Potential Uses by EOCs: These logs may assist in after-action reporting and revisions to 

SOPs as well as workforce planning for incident response. Many agencies measure response 

times to evaluate the effectiveness of their TIM programs and how well they are coordinated with other emergency responders to reduce response times and clear roadway incidents as quickly as possible to avoid congestion and the possibility of secondary incidents. 

Potential Uses by FCs: An FC will monitor traffic incidents to identify whether there are 

patterns and potential for secondary incidents. Incident logs are not kept at FCs according 

to one source, but they will have access to this information on an as-needed basis via State 

Police Division Offices and/or the TMC operator.

3.1.1.15 Historical Network Statistical Records

Description: TMCs track statistical measures of local traffic conditions including:

38 State police divisions will provide to FCs if requested.
50

• Typical traffic pattern data including daily congestion patterns

• Toll transaction records

• Red-light and speed camera records

• Traffic records

• Weather records

• Recorded – retained video data.

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs have a role in evacuation planning, and information such as 

historical traffic data, congestion patterns, and speed data can be useful in planning evacuation operations. Likewise, EOCs are often responsible for developing training and exercises, 

and the historical data could be used to assist in scenario development for such exercises.

Potential Uses by FCs: Historical network statistical records will support an FC as it develops 

its annual risk assessments. These records are not kept at the FCs, but FCs will have access to 

this information via State Police Division Offices and/or the TMC operator. Recorded video 

images from CCTV can sometimes be considered for use in law enforcement operations. 

If such a use is contemplated, strict controls on the images captured and stored must be 

defined and followed to ensure the information can be used in legal proceedings.

Table 3-3 summarizes physical infrastructure information and its potential use to other center types. Details and considerations are summarized in the text following Table 3-3.

Table 3-3: TMC Physical Infrastructure Information: 

Description and Potential Uses by EOCs and FCs

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

Maps/GIS39 • Develop training, testing, 

and exercise programs

• During incidents to give a 

better operating picture 

to response teams and 

coordinating agencies (e.g., 

fire stations)

• Infrastructure information 

awareness and planning, 

vehicle tracking, and 

incident response support

Critical infrastructure locations • Prioritize response efforts • Assess the impact of critical 

infrastructure failure (e.g., 

overall impact that damage 

to a particular train bridge 

would have on a city)

39 Critical information is stored in databases to be accessed depending on the nature of the incident and provides readily available data for rapid response to incidents (e.g., shelters, schools, pharmacies). Information may 

include graphic information on metro station incidents and closures; evacuation routes; medical evacuation activities; decontamination sites; and proximity to schools, hospitals, and HazMat or industrial sites.
51

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

Population/building density 

maps40

• Prioritize response efforts 

and assess response 

resources required

Planning and modeling 

purposes such as:

• To help first responders 

conduct damage 

assessments following 

incidents

• As input for risk assessments 

(e.g., determining the value 

of a particular target)

Shelter locations41 • Direct people to safe areas 

and assess deployment 

of supplies and support 

personnel (e.g., American 

Red Cross, medical 

personnel)

• Planning and modeling 

purposes

Transportation infrastructure 

statistics (e.g., locations and 

number of bridges, number of 

overpasses, posting status)

• Use a ready reference display 

of critical infrastructure 

information stored in 

databases to be accessed 

depending on the incident 

including bridge, overpass, 

and/or tunnel status (e.g., 

active/closed/posted). 

Specific information 

pertaining to weight, 

wind resistance, load, etc., 

will require professional 

individual insight and will 

not always be stored in data 

files by the EOC

• Used to coordinate with 

other internal and external 

agencies

• Critical infrastructure 

assessments

• Locations are monitored 

during incidents to identify a 

trend or an evolving terrorist 

incident42

HazMat routing information • Response team planning 

activities and/or general 

awareness

• Monitor information for 

planning purposes and 

during a high-profile 

incident. Routes will be 

monitored and evaluated for 

vulnerabilities

40 May be included in GIS information.

41 May be included in GIS information.

42 Information typically kept by the FC analyst/specialist for a particular infrastructure.
52

TMC Information

Potential Uses 

EOCs FCs

System configuration (e.g., 

bridge clearance, access, type)

• Deploying responders and 

equipment43

• Use for statistical support 

for annual risk assessments. 

Information on pavement 

thickness and connection 

points to the main roads 

on the system is used for 

vulnerability assessments

Parking, station, and terminal 

locations

• Manage an evacuation • Vulnerability assessments

Sensor and camera locations • Use for situational awareness • Plan for monitoring

• Surveillance of critical 

infrastructure

Locations and types of traffic 

control devices

• Coordinated traffic control at 

incident locations

• Emergency responder 

routing

• Route planning and special 

events management

3.1.1.16 Maps/GIS

Description: Many TMCs have the capability of GIS automatic mapping. Such programs can 

continuously update mapping features and locations of ITS devices for incident management. GIS applications are capable of locating a street, intersection, or other feature based 

on vector data. Programs can also display raster images (bitmaps), aerial photos, or street 

directory maps.

Potential Uses by EOCs: It is very important to have reliable and readily available mapping 

and location information for display and assessment of the extent of an incident’s effects 

and for clear communication of tactics as resources are deployed. In a large-scale response 

when responders may be from outside the immediate area, readily available maps are 

essential for their use. 

Potential Uses by FCs: Most FCs use ArcGIS or similar software products. They use these 

mapping products to provide them with information on:

• Infrastructure 

• Tracking of vehicles

• Support for incident response activities including:

– Tracking road closures

– Evaluating and monitoring evacuation routes

– Determining medical evacuation areas and decontamination sites

– Learning the proximity of schools, hospitals, and HazMat/industrial sites to an incident.

43 Information pertaining to weight, wind resistance, load, etc., will require professional individual reference and 

will not always be stored in data files by the EOC.
53

Mapping and GIS are also used for infrastructure information awareness, exercises, and 

planning purposes. 

3.1.1.17 Critical Infrastructure Locations

Description: TMCs are aware of the locations of identified critical infrastructure including 

critical buildings, major roadways, evacuation routes, bridges, and tunnels.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information assists in situational assessment and rapid judgment of risks to critical infrastructure for emergencies in which physical proximity is a critical risk.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs use critical infrastructure information to assess the impact of 

infrastructure failure or vulnerability to attacks. For example, an FC may use this information 

to determine the overall impact that damage to a particular bridge would have on a city. 

This information is normally held by an FC analyst/specialist for that particular infrastructure. An analyst tasked with rail infrastructure will have information on all the bridges the 

train transits, the volume and type of explosives needed to bring the bridge down, bridge 

placement, and weak-points, etc. The analyst/specialist will also analyze the debilitating 

effect of one piece of infrastructure being disabled versus another (e.g., in Washington, DC, 

what effect does the Key Bridge being out of service have versus the Memorial Bridge being 

out of service?).

3.1.1.18 Population/Building Density Maps

Description: Using GIS and other data resources, TMCs can map local populations including locations and densities. For example, the locations of specific populations that might 

require transportation assistance in an evacuation could be mapped along with their proximity to public transportation.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information assists in situational assessment and rapid judgment of risks to the public and commerce for emergencies in which physical proximity is a 

critical risk.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs use population and building density maps, much like mapping 

and GIS, for planning and modeling purposes. The centers use this information to aid first 

responders in their efforts as well as to conduct damage assessments following incidents. 

For risk assessment purposes, population and building density maps provide input for 

determining the value of a particular target.

3.1.1.19 Shelter Locations

Description: In case of an evacuation, TMCs know the locations for designed shelters, shelter capacities and amenities, and potential highway routes leading to and away from shelters. They also have an inventory of traffic monitoring and control devices in the vicinity of 

shelters. One example is DMS that could provide shelter location information to motorists.

Potential Uses by EOCs: When reliable, and when connected to current mapping data, 

information enables coordination and effective control of routes and dispatching of evacuation operations. 
54

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs may use this information for planning and modeling purposes. 

This information can be stored in mapping and GIS databases and referred to during 

incidents and emergencies to aid first responders and assess a possible threat. In addition, 

law enforcement agencies are often tasked with providing security at shelter locations, so 

readily available shelter location information could aid in deploying these law enforcement 

resources.

3.1.1.20 Transportation Infrastructure Statistics

Description: TMCs have detailed statistics on the number and location of bridges and 

overpasses. Additionally, they are aware of relevant postings on infrastructure including the 

height/weight restrictions on bridges and HazMat restrictions in tunnels.

Potential Uses by EOCs: These statistics support operational decisions involving the movement of heavy equipment and buses, as well as determination of physical risk to transportation infrastructure during emergencies.

Potential Uses by FCs: Critical transportation infrastructure locations are monitored during 

an incident to identify a trend or an evolving terrorist incident. The FC analyst/specialist who is tasked with that particular infrastructure typically keeps this information. FCs 

can also use transportation infrastructure statistics information for annual infrastructure 

assessments. 

3.1.1.21 HazMat Routing Information

Description: In addition to recommended HazMat routes, TMCs also keep information 

regarding bridge and tunnel postings that might place restrictions on various types of hazardous materials moved via highway and/or rail facilities.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information may aid planning for potential HazMat-related 

emergencies, risk assessment during emergencies, and routing of the removal of dangerous materials. HazMat may also need to be re-routed in case an incident impacts its primary 

route.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs will monitor information on HazMat movements when information is made available to them. They will be involved in the planning process for a highprofile movement or during a HazMat incident. The FC will monitor the routes that HazMat 

will take and will evaluate them for vulnerabilities prior to the movement. An FC is an active 

participant during a high-profile incident by sharing and coordinating information to 

ensure safe passage of the material. 

3.1.1.22 System Configuration

Description: TMCs have records on infrastructure configurations including the bridge and 

tunnel type, access limits, clearances, and weight restrictions.

Potential Uses by EOCs: Information could be useful for assessment of risk to infrastructure and/or alternative response tactics involving use of the transportation network. For 

example, if specialized equipment that is overheight and/or overweight is required for a 
55

response, access to such system information will allow for quicker designation of safe highway access routes.

Potential Uses by FCs: The FC can use system configuration information for statistical support of its annual risk assessments. Any information on thicknesses or connection points 

of pieces of critical infrastructure along major arterials is used as part of the vulnerability 

assessments. 

3.1.1.23 Parking, Station, and Terminal Locations

Description: TMCs have records on parking facilities, capacity limits, and potentially even 

current capacity. Additionally, TMCs that focus on transit operations have plans of transit, 

vehicles, stations and terminals, and system ridership and capacity.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information is useful to EOCs for managing clearance of vehicles and people from incident locations, or for managing staging tactics for response teams.

Potential Uses by FCs: In conducting vulnerability assessments, FCs should consider 

parking areas serving large numbers of people such as transit stations and terminals. 

Information about the number of parking spaces, layout of the parking area, whether the 

parking is an at-grade or multi-level facility, and other such information can be useful in 

assessing the vulnerability of such locations. 

3.1.1.24 Sensor and Camera Locations

Description: TMCs have records of locations of all traffic sensors and CCTV cameras including the direction in which the asset is focused and the approximate camera angle.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information may aid in determining whether visual or sensor 

information is available for specific incident sites to direct camera resources quickly and 

accurately.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs can use the locations of sensors and cameras to develop a plan 

for monitoring critical infrastructure and/or routine traffic conditions. As an example, some 

bridges in central Florida are equipped with a sensor that will sound an alarm at the TMC if 

a truck or other large vehicle is parked underneath the bridge for a certain time period. The 

cameras could then be used to evaluate that vehicle to determine whether law enforcement action is necessary.

3.1.1.25 Locations and Types of Traffic Control Devices

Description: TMCs have records on locations of traffic control devices including emergency 

vehicle preemption signal control, variable speed limit devices, HOV facilities, reversible 

flow lanes, and ramp metering and closures.

Potential Uses by EOCs: This information could be useful to EOCs for coordinated traffic control/diversion tactics in the vicinity of incidents. It may also be useful for routing 

emergency responders particularly through traffic signals with emergency vehicle signal 

preemption.
56

Potential Uses by FCs: This information could be useful to FCs for route planning for dignitaries requiring a secured roadway route and/or planning and management of special 

events.

3.1.2 Summary of Transportation-Related Information Managed/Used by

TMCs

TMCs own and manage a variety of information related to the management of transportation infrastructure, including both current and historical data. As part of their mission focus, 

EOCs and FCs are also responsible for the safety of transportation operations, although not 

necessarily on a daily basis.

• EOCs must maintain specific knowledge of real-time transportation operations and 

detailed understanding of existing transportation infrastructure to plan for and conduct 

emergency operations for their jurisdiction. Furthermore, some special events and 

incidents, and emergencies involving the transportation infrastructure, require EOC 

participation.

• FCs are responsible for gathering information for a variety of external sources, 

consolidating the data, and making judgments regarding hazard operations, potential 

threats, and criminal prosecution. As part of this mission, transportation-related 

information plays an important role in the information they receive and analyze.

3.2 Transportation-Relevant Information Managed/Used by 

EOCs

The primary EOC mission is to prepare for and respond to emergencies. Even when an EOC 

focuses on a single functional discipline, such as telecommunications, the incident may 

be caused by any number of different factors (e.g., an earthquake or a terrorist attack). In 

some situations, EOCs may have advance warning of an incident. For example, hurricanes 

and political demonstrations are often preceded by ominous weather patterns and public 

gatherings, respectively. In other cases, little or no warning is possible, such as an industrial 

accident in which toxic fumes are released. 

Consequently, both the types of information available from an EOC and the categories of 

external information that may be useful to an EOC are driven by that primary mission—

emergency preparedness and response. This section describes the categories of information EOCs typically use and suggests how that information may be useful to TMCs and FCs 

for purposes of operating and protecting the transportation infrastructure. 

3.2.1 Information Categories

EOCs utilize both situational/operational information and record and logged information.

• Situational/operational information is used for immediate incident response and 

consists of:

– Information about internal resources (i.e., the personnel and physical resources owned 

by, or otherwise available to, the EOC)
57

– Real-time situational information provided by on-site first responders

– Information about external resources (e.g., nongovernmental organizations such as 

the American Red Cross and private sector owners and operators of infrastructure 

elements critical to incident response, such as the telecommunications, electric power, 

and water delivery infrastructures).

• EOCs’ records and logged information provide a record of emergency response activities 

and are used to both verify that procedures were followed correctly and identify lessons 

learned to improve future incident response capabilities. This information typically is 

organized in connection with after-action reports following both real emergencies and 

emergency response exercises.

Table 3-4: EOC Situational/Operational Information: 

Description and Potential Uses by TMCs and FCs

EOC Information

Potential Uses 

TMCs FCs

Personnel resources (e.g., 

available/on-call responder 

personnel status; available skill 

sets; contact information)

Physical resources for response 

(e.g., location, number, type, 

and status of response vehicles; 

location, availability and 

accessibility of supplies)

• Resource deployment 

assessment (e.g., determine 

what demands these 

resources will make on 

available transportation 

infrastructure)—i.e., assess 

redistribution of portable 

DMS

• Immediate use: Support 

incident response

• Post-incident use: Input to 

overall risk assessments (e.g., 

adequacy of staffing and 

deployment measures)

Real-time situational 

information from on-site first 

responders

• Assess damage, determine 

impact on transportation 

infrastructure, and 

coordinate applicable 

response efforts

• Immediate use: Support 

incident response

• Post-incident use: Input to 

overall risk assessments (e.g., 

adequacy of staffing and 

deployment measures)

Information on utilities (e.g., 

telecommunications, power, 

water), such as contact 

information on utilities 

personnel, extent of damage 

to infrastructure, and status of 

restoration activities

• Assess the extent of outages/

disruptions and restoration 

status to determine 

impact on transportation 

infrastructure

• Immediate use: Support 

incident response

• Post-incident use: Input to 

overall risk assessments (e.g., 

adequacy of staffing and 

deployment measures)

3.2.1.1 Internal Resources

Description: As described in Section 2.2: Statistics, Locations, Jurisdictions, some EOCs 

own and directly control their emergency response resources and others primarily coordinate, rather than own, these resources. Regardless of how an EOC is organized or funded, 

it will have information on the personnel and physical resources available for emergency 

response. This information enables the EOC to deploy the personnel, equipment, and supplies required for any given incident.
58

Information on personnel resources includes: 

• Availability/on-call status of first responders

• Skill sets of available personnel

• Contact information for personnel.

Information on physical resources includes:

• Location, number, type, and status of response vehicles

• Availability and accessibility of equipment and supplies.

Potential Uses by TMCs: TMCs focus on ensuring the accessibility and optimization of transportation infrastructure. 

• To that end, TMCs could use information regarding an EOC’s internal resources to 

determine what demands the deployment of these resources may place on the available 

transportation infrastructure and whether actions are needed to accommodate that 

deployment. For example, an EOC may need to deploy particularly heavy equipment 

to respond to an incident and the most direct route to the incident site may involve 

crossing over a bridge that could accommodate that equipment only if no other vehicles 

are on the bridge. The TMC could then activate or re-deploy ITS technologies to keep 

other vehicles off the bridge until the heavy equipment has been transported across the 

bridge. If the bridge could not accommodate the equipment at all, the TMC could clear 

an alternate route for transporting the equipment to the incident site.

• As part of the operations of many TMCs, TMC-managed safety/service patrols are tasked 

to provide quick removal of disabled vehicles and debris from a traffic incident to prevent 

increased congestion. TMCs would benefit from being aware of EOC deployments that 

may be operating in locations near safety/service patrol operating areas to coordinate 

activities and prevent duplication of efforts. 

Potential Uses by FCs: An FC could use information on an EOC’s internal resources in two 

ways. The FC could use this information immediately to support incident response. In the 

longer term, the FC could use this information as input to its overall risk assessments in 

terms of evaluating the adequacy of personnel and physical resources and deployment 

measures.

3.2.1.2 On-site Situational Information

Description: First responders provide on-site situational information once they have 

arrived at the incident site. Such information is used to conduct damage assessments and 

determine the adequacy of the on-site or en route resources. This firsthand information can 

be invaluable, particularly when information from citizen observers or the news media is 

incorrect or incomplete. As a hypothetical example, a water main breaks in a central business district. The news media reported that the water at a particular location was 25 feet 

deep. In fact, the water was not 25 feet deep; rather, the water was shooting up 25 feet high. 
59

The EOC would have deployed very different resources to respond to each of these two 

situations. 

Potential Uses by TMCs: Just as the EOC used the on-site responder’s information to adjust 

the resources it deployed to respond to this incident, the TMC in this jurisdiction would also 

benefit from this more accurate description of the incident. The TMC can use the information to assess damage, determine the impact on the transportation infrastructure, and 

coordinate response efforts. In the example above, TMC actions taken to respond to water 

that is 25 feet deep may have involved closing down a larger perimeter around the incident 

site than was really warranted in this example. The on-site situational information may also 

prove invaluable to notify the driving public of adverse conditions. In system-wide emergencies, EOCs and FCs could be given access to fixed and portable DMS to alert the public.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs would use this information in the same ways as they would use 

the information on internal resources—to support incident response and as input to risk 

assessments.

3.2.1.3 External Resources

Description: External resources do not have any formal organizational relationship with 

the EOCs (in terms of authority or funding) but are critical to incident response. External 

resources may be nongovernmental organizations (e.g., American Red Cross) or resources 

primarily owned and operated by the private sector (e.g., telecommunication, power, and 

water). EOCs may maintain point-of-contact information on key decision-makers for these 

external resources. In addition, during emergency response, EOCs receive continuous 

updates from these external resources. For example, the Red Cross may provide updates 

on available resources and their deployment status. Public utilities may provide continuous updates about the extent of damage to the infrastructure and the status of restoration 

activities. Local fire and police send information to EOCs in a variety of ways depending on 

the jurisdiction. City EOCs would have better connectivity to real-time police, fire, and rescue operations because their scope is concentrated on the same jurisdictional area (e.g., the 

New York City EOC likely has extensive connectivity/monitoring of the New York City Police 

Department, New York City Fire Department, Port Authority Police, EMS). State EOCs are 

looking across the State to strategically monitor overall weather patterns and lower-level 

EOC activity for more significant events. 

EOCs use this information to manage deployment of response personnel. For example, 

before first responders can enter an area where power lines are down, the power company 

must confirm that the electricity has been shut off to those lines so that the first responders 

can safely enter the area. EOCs would also use information about the expected duration of 

an electric power outage to make decisions about certain response activities. For example, 

a hospital’s back-up generators may offer 3 hours of power. The EOC’s response will vary, 

depending on when the electric company estimates that the power will be restored—the 

response to a 1-hour outage will be very different from the response to a 1-day outage. 

In addition to providing the fundamental ability to communicate with new technologies 

and almost any communications device, the Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG 9-1-1) will enable 

location-independent call access and transfer between and redundancy of 911 centers 
60

throughout the country once implemented nationwide. Employing an open-architecture, 

interoperable system of systems, NG 9-1-1 will allow these emergency communications 

centers to share information more quickly and with greater accuracy, and to provide access 

to crucial data at a level not currently available. NG 9-1-1 will also allow for information to 

be transmitted to the 9-1-1 call center via text, image, and video in addition to the current 

voice transmission function.

Potential Uses by TMCs: TMCs can use information on external resources to assess the 

extent of the outages/disruptions and the restoration status to determine the impact on the 

transportation infrastructure and the actions required to effectively manage the transportation infrastructure during the incident.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs would use this information just as they would use the information on internal resources and on-site reports—to support incident response and as input 

to risk assessments.

Table 3-5: EOC Records and Logged Information: 

Description and Potential Uses by TMCs and FCs

EOC Information

Potential Uses 

TMCs FCs

After-Action Reports • Gap Assessments/Lessons 

Learned (e.g., resources, 

information, or process 

improvements that may 

facilitate more effective 

response and recovery)

• Long-term vulnerability 

assessments that could be 

used to plan infrastructure 

improvements

• Gap Assessments/ Lessons 

Learned (e.g., resources, 

information, or process 

improvements that may 

facilitate more effective 

response and recovery)

• Long-term vulnerability 

assessments that could be 

used to plan infrastructure 

improvements

Description: EOCs typically prepare after-action reports following incidents and exercises. 

The after-action reports document the response activities and their effectiveness. EOCs use 

the report results to improve their processes, including identification and remediation of 

any resource gaps. 

Potential Uses by TMCs: TMCs can use EOCs’ after-action reports in much the same way as 

the EOCs use them—to conduct gap assessments and capture lessons learned (e.g., identifying resources, information, or process improvements that may facilitate more effective 

response and recovery activities). In addition, TMCs may use these reports to conduct longterm vulnerability assessments that could be used to plan infrastructure improvements. 

For after-action reports involving traffic incidents, EOC reports can be catalogued with and 

compared to TMC incident logs.

Potential Uses by FCs: FCs would use the information in EOCs’ after-action reports in much 

the same ways as TMCs use such information (i.e., for lessons learned and for vulnerability 

assessments).
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3.2.2 Summary of Transportation-Relevant Information Managed/Used by

EOCs

Just as the category of information available from an EOC is driven by the EOC’s primary 

mission of responding to adverse incidents of all types, the way in which EOC information 

could be used by TMCs and FCs is also driven by their respective missions:

• Although TMCs focus on the accessibility of the transportation infrastructure (rather 

than all infrastructures), knowledge of how the transportation infrastructure both 

facilitates and is affected by EOCs’ incident response activities can help TMCs improve 

the transportation infrastructure’s accessibility for incident response and identify 

vulnerabilities for future consideration. 

• The FC’s mission is to gather information from disparate sources and aggregate it to 

form a comprehensive, multi-dimensional perspective of the environment that informs 

the FC’s approach to response and risk assessment. Information available from the EOCs 

can be a valuable complement to the other information that forms the basis of the 

FC’s analysis, which may be used both for immediate response and for longer-term risk 

assessments. 

3.3 Transportation-Relevant Information Managed/Used by FCs

FCs typically collect and analyze information from many available sources to produce and 

disseminate actionable intelligence to stakeholders for strategic and tactical decision-making. This information generally falls into the “operational” category, in regard to transportation relevance. 

3.3.1 Information Categories

Just as the category of information available from an FC is driven by the FC’s primary mission of collection, analysis, and dissemination, the way in which FC information could be 

used by TMCs and EOCs is also driven by their respective missions.
62

Table 3-6: FC Operational Information: Description 

and Potential Uses by TMCs and FCs

FC Information

For Official Use Only

Potential Uses 

TMCs EOCs

Intelligence Alerts

• Immediate alerts within 10-15 

minutes of incident

• Limited details

• Imminent or existing threat 

occurring in FC’s jurisdiction

• Includes events such as severe 

weather, explosions, major traffic 

incidents

• Broadcast messages to predefined 

list of recipients (phone, pager, 

email distribution lists configurable 

by area of interest/focus)

• Intelligence alerts that 

could have an effect 

on local transportation 

network

• Notify responders to 

stand by for a potential 

incident response

• Determine whether/

when to activate/change 

status of EOC (e.g., from 

monitoring status to 

partial or full activation)

Intelligence Bulletins

• Additional details beyond alert 

information

• Information updates to ongoing 

situations

• Less urgent, upcoming situations, 

special event planning and 

coordination

• Can include special events such as 

planned protests

• Distributed as needed

• Intelligence bulletins 

that could have an effect 

on local transportation 

network 

• Pre-planning for special 

events

• Use information updates 

to modify EOC status 

and determine situation 

response

• Use information on 

upcoming situations, 

special events to plan 

for such special events 

(e.g., augment law 

enforcement personnel; 

crowd control; preposition medical response 

personnel)

Daily Report

• Daily intelligence gathered from 

open source and classified sources

• Global and regional impact

• Standard format

• International, local

• Published at end of day

• Typically distributed via email, may 

be posted to portal

• Interested in incidents 

that could have an effect 

on local or regional 

transportation network

• Interested in incidents 

that may affect 

the community or 

infrastructure within the 

EOC’s jurisdiction

Intelligence Reports

• Usually the day after a situation

• Large-picture, macro analysis of 

major incident

• After-action reports

• Use for lessons learned 

(changes to staffing 

and physical resources; 

process improvement) 

and input for future 

exercises

• Use for lessons learned 

(changes to staffing 

and physical resources; 

process improvement) 

and input for future 

exercises
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FC Information

For Official Use Only

Potential Uses 

TMCs EOCs

Threat Assessments

• Annual

• Quarterly

• Incident-specific

• State of Affairs or Annual Threat 

Assessment, inclement weather 

season preparation, major 

construction impact

• Distributed usually via email

• Near-term threat 

assessments that could 

affect mobility on the 

transportation network 

including: 

– Increased congestion

– Transit delays

– HazMat

– Evacuation routes 

• Long-term threat 

assessments can be used 

for infrastructure and ITS 

planning

• Use information for 

near-term planning (e.g., 

staffing levels, availability 

of physical resources)

• Use information for 

long-term planning (e.g., 

budgeting for additional 

staffing/physical 

resources)

3.3.1.1 Intelligence Alerts

Description: Intelligence alerts can address both imminent and existing threats that occur 

in an FC’s jurisdiction. These alerts can contain many types of information, from incoming 

weather, to an explosion occurrence, or a major traffic incident. This information can come 

to the FC from any source (e.g., police officer on the street, transportation agency work 

crews, news agencies). First reporting is usually limited and may not be completely reliable. 

However, the alert gives an initial warning to supporting agencies for awareness and immediate response or preparation, depending on the incident.

The intelligence alerts are usually sent out within 10 to 15 minutes of an incident being discovered and are usually broadcast to a predefined list of recipients either via phone, pager, 

or through an e-mail distribution list that is configurable by the area of interest or focus. 

The alerts are sent out to first responders and agency partners through a tiered system for 

dissemination of information. Agencies outside the first responder tier can also be included 

on the alert distribution list if they are regularly involved with emergency response (e.g., 

transportation officials and emergency management officials). The individuals within these 

agencies who receive these alerts are screened to verify their suitability to have access 

to sensitive information44 and their need to know such information. In most cases, these 

individuals are senior-level officials or cooperating law enforcement and first responder 

agencies who have responsibility for initiating response activities.

As is normally the case, the originator of the information will send it to his/her contact 

lists. In turn, an agency on that contact list will forward the message to its contact list. In 

many cases, there will be redundant messaging. However, as FCs receive information on an 

incident from many different agencies, they fuse these differing reports and data through 

analyses and then disseminate the information based on a more complete understanding 

of the incident. 

44 They may have security clearances or the agencies may have conducted some level of background investigation on them to verify their trustworthiness.
64

Potential TMC Uses: TMCs are interested in any information that would affect mobility 

on the transportation infrastructure. TMCs often collect their own information about the 

incidents and special events that could affect the transportation network. However, intelligence alerts from an FC would benefit a TMC because there might be some information 

that the TMC has not yet received; it also serves as a way to verify information from an 

additional source.

Potential Uses by EOCs: An EOC could use information from intelligence alerts in two ways:

• To notify responders to stand by for a potential emergency

• To determine whether/when to activate or change the status of the EOC (e.g., from 

monitoring status to partial or full activation).

In some cases, the FC’s jurisdiction may not be congruent with the EOC’s jurisdiction. For 

example, the FC’s geographical jurisdiction may include multiple EOCs, but the incident 

that provoked the intelligence alert may not require a response from all of the EOCs. In such 

cases, this information is most immediately useful to the affected EOC. However, the information may also be useful for the other EOCs if the incident has the potential to affect their 

jurisdictions or if the affected EOC may need personnel or physical resources as mutual aid 

from those EOCs not currently affected. A wildfire is one example where this could be the 

case. The resources needed to contain the fire may exceed those available to the affected 

EOC, and it is certainly in the best interests of the surrounding EOCs to help the affected 

EOC contain the fire so that it does not spread to their jurisdictions. The intelligence alert 

would also allow those unaffected EOCs to begin to position themselves to respond if the 

fire spread into their jurisdictions and take actions such as sending text messages to volunteer firefighters to be prepared to respond if needed. 

3.3.1.2 Intelligence Bulletins

Description: Intelligence bulletins follow alerts and are issued as the FC gathers more information, validates information already provided, and continues to track the progress of the 

ongoing incident. In addition to providing updates regarding ongoing incidents and special 

events, these bulletins can contain updates and information on upcoming situations, special event planning and coordination, and planned protests. These bulletins are distributed 

as needed to those agencies and individuals that have been identified as having a need to 

know or have a focus, and operate, in that particular area of interest. (This list of recipients 

will usually be the same as the recipients of the initial alert, with possible additions as the 

situation dictates.) 

The additional details provided by an FC beyond the alert information can provide first 

responders and support agencies with a clearer operating picture. The bulletins include 

analysis of a situation as it has unfolded and has been tracked by the FC’s professional 

analysts. The FC will normally continue to issue intelligence bulletins until the incident has 

reached closure and will send out a final bulletin notifying recipients of a closed incident.

Potential TMC Uses: TMCs would value continued updates on activities affecting the transportation infrastructure. Information on planned special events could support pre-planning 
65

activities. Additional details would increase the reliability of the decision making regarding 

transportation infrastructure.

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs could use information updates from intelligence bulletins in 

two ways:

• EOCs could use information on ongoing situations to modify the EOC status and 

determine how to respond to the situation

• EOCs could use information on planned special events to determine what measures 

are needed to prepare for the special event (e.g., augment law enforcement personnel, 

implement crowd control measures, and pre-position medical response personnel). 

Using the example of a wildfire, the additional details and updates about an ongoing 

incident would allow the affected EOC to refine its response and would allow the potentially affected EOCs to determine whether the fire was advancing in a way that warranted 

modifying their status from “monitoring” to “activating.” 

With respect to information in intelligence bulletins regarding planned special events, the 

EOCs could take actions such as informing personnel that they may not schedule vacation 

during the timeframe within which the special event will occur or renting equipment (e.g., 

such as crowd control fences) that may not ordinarily be readily available. 

3.3.1.3 Daily Report

Description: FC daily reports consist of daily intelligence based on both open source (newspapers, television news, partner agencies, etc.) and classified source information. These 

reports are published at the end of every day and are distributed to all of the FCs across 

the country and other recipients. This information is usually transmitted via e-mail or may 

be posted to a secure portal. Reports reflect information that has both regional and global 

impacts because anything could be of relevance and could impact the ongoing analysis 

process. Both local and international trends are shared with other centers to help with 

ongoing investigations, highlighting a trend, or just simply providing awareness of a situation. The reports also include any threat to a particular infrastructure that has a regional or 

nationwide impact. Each FC follows its own standard format for these reports, but formats 

may vary among centers. 

Potential TMC Uses: TMCs would value continued updates on activities affecting the transportation infrastructure. Additional details would increase the reliability of decision making.

Potential Uses by EOCs: Daily reports contain information that has both global and 

regional impact. An EOC would use a subset of this information, specifically any information 

about incidents or special events that may affect the community or infrastructure within 

(or perhaps adjacent to) its jurisdiction. Such information may inform the EOC’s monitoring 

activities for the following day. 

3.3.1.4 Intelligence Reports

Description: Once an incident is closed, the FC analysts will begin reconstructing the 

incident from its inception to closure to compile an intelligence report. Intelligence reports 
66

are usually issued the day (or week) after an incident. Not to be confused with after-action 

reports, the intelligence reports provide analysts and partner agencies with a large-picture 

overview, or macro analysis, of a major incident or special event that has just occurred. 

Intelligence reports can be shared across the country with other FCs to share best practices 

or lessons learned. These reports can also be used to strengthen overall operations and 

procedures and will include detailed information about the incident as well as provide an 

analysis of how the incident pertains to the area of responsibility, a particular critical infrastructure, law enforcement, or national security. Intelligence reports also provide valuable 

input to quarterly and annual threat assessments. 

Potential TMC Uses: As with after-action reports, intelligence reports involving traffic 

incidents can be catalogued along with, and compared to, TMC incident logs to assess the 

effectiveness of the response and implement necessary SOP revisions.

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs could use the information in intelligence reports much as 

they use information from their own after-action reports (e.g., to identify changes required 

in personnel and physical resources or processes and as input for future exercises). For 

example, if the intelligence report identified deficiencies in staffing, physical resources, or 

response processes, the EOC could remediate those deficiencies and then use the incident 

addressed in the intelligence report as the scenario for the exercise. This would test whether 

the deficiencies had been adequately remediated. If not, the EOC could identify additional 

measures required. Further, EOCs can even benefit from after-action reports about incidents 

in which they may not have been involved—they can factor the lessons learned elsewhere 

into their own exercises and planning. 

3.3.1.5 Threat Assessments

Description: Each FC develops periodic threat assessments for the locality under its jurisdiction. These assessments are used to generate the State of Affairs or an Annual Threat 

Assessment—reports that can be presented to the Governor of the State and any other 

officials who have a need to know this information. These reports contain information on 

topics such as inclement weather preparations, major construction impacts, the overall 

jurisdictional threat assessment, critical infrastructure assessments, and evacuation planning and preparation. Typically, these assessments are distributed via e-mail, but presentations are also made as requested. A threat assessment can offer insight about the 

jurisdiction’s vulnerabilities and operational capabilities. Legislators and agencies can use 

this information to focus resources to mitigate vulnerabilities identified in the report and 

identify ways to enhance the jurisdiction’s operational capabilities to respond to an incident 

or special event.

Potential TMC Uses: TMCs would find any threat assessments useful that would affect 

transportation infrastructure. Threat assessments affecting mobility could improve the 

TMC’s situational awareness and allow it to focus current efforts on the most critical threats. 

In the case of a transportation-related threat, TMCs could use threat assessments to prepare or position resources to deal with threats that would increase congestion or delay 

transit operations. For example, if a threat is related to the release of hazardous materials 

on or near roadways, TMCs could begin to implement precautions to protect travelers and 
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develop alternate routes. If a major threat is imminent that would involve the evacuation of 

citizens from an area, the TMC could use the advance warning to begin setting up evacuation routes, to include preparing for traffic control activities such as reverse lane flow operations. Long-term threat assessments can also benefit the TMCs by identifying vulnerabilities 

of the infrastructure and ITS resources, which TMCs could use for planning purposes.

Potential Uses by EOCs: EOCs could use threat assessments in two ways:

• Incident-specific threat assessment information would be useful for near-term planning. 

• Longer-term threat assessment information would be useful in long-term planning, such 

as developing budgets and identifying capital projects that may be required to develop 

capabilities to adequately respond to emerging threats. For example, a State of Affairs 

Report might reflect that our adversaries are becoming interested in attacking the water 

delivery infrastructure. The EOC may then need to explore how to respond, addressing 

issues such as the location of alternate sources of water, the quantity of water available, 

and orderly distribution methods. 

From the EOC perspective, intelligence alerts, bulletins, and reports are generally of greater 

interest than the daily reports and threat assessments. 

Along the axis of immediate versus long term, the EOCs focus most of their efforts on 

immediate situations. They certainly also have longer-term interests. For example, they 

conduct exercises to better prepare themselves to respond to future incidents and, just as 

all organizations, they need to be forward-looking in terms of their budgets and evolving in 

concert with their environment. However, their primary day-to-day mission is to respond to 

immediate incidents.

Along the axis of local versus national, EOCs focus most of their efforts on those factors that 

affect the geographical jurisdictions (or, in some cases, the functional disciplines) for which 

they are responsible. They are concerned with situations beyond their immediate jurisdictions or functional disciplines primarily to the extent that more global incidents or special 

events may materialize. This could directly affect their areas of responsibility, or offer lessons 

learned in case similar emergencies or special events affect their areas of responsibility in 

the future.

In contrast, FC products such as daily reports and threat assessments tend to have a longterm, big picture, global focus, reflecting:

• How a discrete incident or special event may impact the more global situation

• How a global situation may impact the local environment

• How a situation affecting one infrastructure component/functional discipline may affect 

another. 
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3.3.2 Summary of Transportation-Relevant Information Managed/Used

by FCs

The category of information available from an FC is driven by the FC’s primary mission, and 

by information security and privacy constraints. But as FCs collect, analyze, and then disseminate information, it is also important to understand that information sharing is one of 

the key components to the viability of an FC.

Arizona Traffic Operations Center

Arizona Department of Transportation
69

Chapter 4. CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR 

INFORMATION EXCHANGE

This chapter provides an overview of key challenges and barriers to information exchange 

among centers, as well as alternatives to overcome them. The chapter discusses center policies and regulatory issues, technical challenges, and potential solutions. 

Primarily, the communications and data management capabilities needed to address 

information-sharing are within today’s state of the art. Appendices E and G of this report 

address the reliability, security, and vulnerability of the information sources, data transmission channels, and equipment.

When analog television converted to digital television on June 17, 2009, the 700 MHz spectrum that broadcasters owned for that purpose was no longer needed. That spectrum was 

turned back to the Federal government to allow the Federal Communications Commission 

(FCC), the Federal agency that manages the spectrum, to begin the process of reallocating the spectrum. In July 2007, in advance of the conversion to digital television, the FCC 

revised the 700 MHz band plan and service rules to promote the creation of a nationwide 

interoperable broadband network for public safety and to facilitate the availability of new 

and innovative wireless broadband services for consumers. 

During the summer of 2009, following the conversion, the National Interoperability 

Information eXchange (NIIX)45, as part of the National Public Safety Telecommunications 

Council (a federation of organizations whose mission is to improve public safety communications and interoperability through collaborative leadership) through their Governance 

and Operations Working Groups, has developed definitions and other material to help 

define who should be included to use the national interoperable broadband wireless 

spectrum.

This chapter primarily focuses on three topics—privacy, security, and (on the technical side) 

data integration and vulnerability.

4.1 Center/Stakeholder Policies and Regulatory Issues

One of the key challenges facing the centers’ ability to exchange information revolves 

around policy and regulatory issues. 

4.1.1 Information Technology (IT) and Data Management Policy

Policy issues that often present roadblocks to information exchange in specific cases 

include:

45 See National Interoperability Information eXchange, http://www.niix.org/niix/index.jsp, accessed 2010.
70

• Organization-wide IT/security and firewall policies that have typically been tailored to 

specific agency or more broadly held policies (e.g., statewide) to prevent or limit external 

access to sensitive databases

• Contracts and agreements with commercial interests or other agencies on the use and 

dissemination of information with financial or other value to these interests/agencies

• “Ownership” and liability for the proper use and cost of misuse of information, which is 

provided with the expectation that it is valid and appropriate for the intended use.

4.1.2 Privacy

Two key laws impact the ability for these centers to exchange information—the Privacy Act 

of 1974, Public Law 93-579, and title 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23. This section includes a discussion of these laws, as well as the limitations and concerns they impose 

on the centers.

The Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law 93-579, states:

No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any 

means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record 

pertains...46

Broadly stated, the purpose of the Privacy Act is to balance the Federal Government’s need 

to maintain information about individuals with the rights of individuals to be protected 

against unwarranted invasions of their privacy stemming from Federal agencies’ collection, 

maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal information about them.47

28 CFR Part 23 regulates operating policies for all domestic organizations receiving Federal 

funding for criminal intelligence systems. 28 CFR Part 23, most recently updated in 2001, 

defines a criminal intelligence system as “the arrangements, equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, storage, interagency exchange or dissemination, and analysis 

of criminal intelligence information.”48 This definition is now applied to FCs. It also governs 

the basic requirements for the intelligence system process. This process includes:

• Information submission or collection

• Secure storage

• Inquiry and search capability

• Controlled dissemination

• Purge and review process.

46 U.S. Department of Justice, Privacy Act of 1974, http://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacyact1974.htm, accessed 

2010.

47 U.S. Department of Justice, 28 CFR Part 23, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=172, accessed 2010.

48 U.S. Department of Justice. 28 CFR Part 23, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies. 1998.
71

This regulation recognizes that certain crimes (e.g., drug trafficking, smuggling) involve 

some degree of coordination and permanent organization over a large geographical area. 

28 CFR Part 23 acknowledges that pooling information about such activities is necessary 

but could represent a threat to the privacy of individuals. It is reported that the US DOJ now 

trains FCs on 28 CFR Part 23 twice a year to assure compliance. 

As an example of the reach of Part 23, in 2002, the Americans Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 

filed a class action lawsuit against the Denver Police Department when it was found to have 

collected and retained information on non-criminal elements (American Friends Service 

Committee v. City and County of Denver). The lawsuit filed by the ACLU against the police 

involved in the sharing of this intelligence information challenged the monitoring and 

recording of peaceful citizens. The ACLU also stated in its suit that the police falsely labeled 

its clients as “criminal extremists.” Those so labeled apparently included peace activists and 

education and human rights organizations, suspected as possible threats to public safety. 

Mayor Webb came out following the lawsuit to say that Denver police had gone too far, 

compiling “intelligence files” on 3,200 individuals and 208 organizations that demonstrated 

no credible threat. The Mayor also ordered all intelligence records be archived at the Denver 

Public Library and “preserved for study.” Part of this archive is available to the public (copies 

of newspaper clippings, pamphlets, flyers, articles, and photographs). Restricted files are 

now made available only to persons or organizations named in the files until 2055, when all 

files will be released to the public. 

For TMCs, privacy issues are often cited as a key challenge. While the TMC primary function 

does not include law enforcement, the information gathered and monitored by the TMC 

can assist law enforcement officials. However, some TMCs, such as those operated by the 

Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT),49 state, for example, that their field equipment is incapable of identifying license plates of passing traffic and that they do not record 

video feeds. The Rhode Island Department of Transportation50 asserts that its TMCs maintain a camera system privacy policy, where their operators are instructed to: “(1) Only focus 

the cameras on the highway and highway related areas, and (2) Only zoom into an accident 

scene to determine incident response needs and then zoom out to monitor traffic flow.” 

Additionally, cameras are “blanked out” on the Web site and cable channel when they are 

being used in responding to an incident.

In addition, there are potential privacy and liability concerns when handling 9-1-1 calls. 

In March 2002, the 511 Deployment Coalition published Deployment Assistance Report #2, 

Transfer of 511 Calls to 911, examining the issue of a 511 system receiving a call intended 

for 9-1-1 and what concerns there may be for the 511 system to transfer the call to 9-1-1. 

While there are some technical issues to overcome to allow the transfer to happen, the 

report states, “In order to transfer a call to a 911 center, the carrier must provide the callers Automatic Identification Number (AIN). While it is technically feasible for the carrier to 

provide this information, they will be hesitant to do so because of privacy concerns and 

other State legal considerations.” In addition, there may be liability concerns because “511 

49 Jeff Sturgeon, “VDOT regional traffic management center has Virginia roads covered,” Roanoke.com, November 

29, 2007, http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/141528, accessed 2010.

50 State of Rhode Island Traffic Management Center, FAQs, http://www.tmc.state.ri.us/faqs.asp, accessed 2010.
72

operators, both public and private, are concerned that they could face potential liability 

if, for example, a call transferred to a public safety answering point (“PSAPs”), the facilities 

that answer 911 calls for emergency assistance, is dropped during the transfer or the call is 

directed to a PSAP located further from the caller than another PSAP. Under these or similar 

scenarios, a caller needing emergency assistance could suffer an aggravated injury or, at 

worst, death if the 511 call center fails to transfer the call properly.”

4.1.3 Classified Information

Issues also exist concerning the classification of information. Personnel within FCs are 

aware of the different types of information that they are both handling and disseminating 

from the FC. This information can be public, sensitive, or secret. Classification types will 

determine how each piece of information is shared, not only with outside agencies but also 

among the agencies operating within the FC itself. Over-classification can present operational challenges when personnel are not able to read or pass information because the 

source has classified the information at a level that makes information sharing across the 

normal lines of communication difficult. 

4.1.4 Legal Process and Rules of Evidence

When there is a potential for surveillance information and transactions like 9-1-1 calls to 

contain evidence that could be relevant to ongoing investigations and/or legal proceedings, enforcement agencies (and many FCs) are very cautious about release, alteration (such 

as redaction of privacy-sensitive information), chain-of-information “ownership,” verification, 

and security of information used and retained. Therefore, while it may make operational 

sense for an FC to receive or provide transportation-related information, this exchange 

can be handicapped—because the required standards of reliability and verification may 

be higher than practical for TMCs to meet. In comparison, practical limits exist for TMCs 

because they gather real-time or near-time data for (usually) non-emergency operational 

purposes and can, in most situations, tolerate some reliability issues because of redundant 

information sources and assets in the field.

4.1.5 Training Needs Assessment

TMC personnel may be called upon to physically serve in an EOC or FC to provide on-site 

subject-matter expertise in support of incident management activities. Preparing personnel 

for this type of work requires training that may be different from information analysis training or other technical training relevant to the person’s primary position.

In assessing the training needs of EOC and FC support personnel, the functional requirements discussed in the previous section must be mapped to training needs to meet these 

requirements. As discussed, the functional (and thereby training) requirements differ 

between the EOC and FC, with EOC requirements being more widely recognized than those 

of the FC. Appendix H includes an inventory of training resources.
73

4.1.5.1 Emergency Operations Centers

EOCs are typically staffed 24 hours per day by a dedicated watch responsible for monitoring potential or actual emergency situations in a given jurisdictional area. When certain 

threats emerge and reach a level that requires EOC “activation,” an “event team” or “incident 

management team” is activated and responds to the EOC to support a multi-agency, crossfunctional response and recovery effort.

A large portion of the event or incident management team is comprised of predetermined 

ESFs, with ESF positions filled by pre-designated personnel from the ESF lead department 

or agency. In the case of ESF-1, personnel are typically assigned from within the jurisdiction’s transportation department, and sometimes fill this position as a collateral duty assignment. Whether a full-time or collateral duty assignment, ESF-1 personnel have specific 

training needs based on the nature of the ESF-1 role in overall emergency management. 

Training needs must be mapped to specific requirements that are determined by overall 

training mandates and specific training needs based on function. In emergency management, the standardized training mandates can be traced back to Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive - 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, in which the development of NIMS is mandated. Published in 2004, NIMS provides “a consistent nationwide 

approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently 

together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 

cause, size, or complexity.” Further, as directed in HSPD-5, NIMS includes “a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering...training; ...and qualifications 

and certification” in order “to provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, 

State, and local capabilities.”51

As further described in NIMS: 

Incident management organizations and personnel at all levels of government, and 

within the private-sector and nongovernmental organizations, must be appropriately 

trained to improve all-hazards incident management capability nationwide. Incident 

management organizations and personnel must also participate in realistic exercises—including multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional events and private-sector and 

nongovernmental organization interaction—to improve integration and interoperability. Training involving standard courses on incident command and management, 

incident management structure, operational coordination processes and systems—

together with courses focused on discipline-specific and agency-specific subjectmatter expertise—helps ensure that personnel at all jurisdictional levels and across 

disciplines can function effectively together during an incident.52 [Emphasis added]

Designed for Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector 

and nongovernment organizations, NIMS serves as a means to effective coordination in 

emergency response and recovery operations. As such, all levels of government are encour51 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.

52 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, March 2001, p. 43.
74

aged to adopt NIMS through a formal process called NIMS Implementation, which outlines 

particular implementation steps for all levels of government and nongovernment sectors. 

Since most EOCs are operated at the State and local levels, the NIMS Implementation Matrix 

for States and Territories and the NIMS Implementation Matrix for Tribal and Local Jurisdictions 

provide the necessary guidance. Developed and issued by the NIMS Integration Center 

under FEMA, the matrices serve as a guide for specific jurisdictions to use in developing and 

executing NIMS-compliant preparedness and operational programs and functions.

Because transportation sector personnel would serve in an EOC as part of the interagency 

emergency coordination effort in support of the ICS during a response and recovery 

operation, transportation entities would need to ensure that assigned personnel meet the 

documented training and exercise requirements as outlined in the relevant matrix. Further, 

due to the nature of the work performed at the EOC, most EOC SOPs require that assigned 

personnel be employees of the represented agency with decision-making authority on 

behalf of that agency. These criteria, as they pertain to training requirements, indicate that 

assigned personnel serve, at a minimum, as middle managers within their agencies. This is 

important, as training requirements are based on management level and command authority of personnel.

In studying both the State and local matrices, it was concluded that the same compliance 

criteria exist for preparedness training and exercises as they relate to both State and local 

workers. As previously cited, there are two areas of training required under NIMS:

• Standard courses (which address the NIMS requirement for incident command and 

management, incident management structure, and operational coordination and 

systems)

• Discipline- and agency-specific subject matter expertise.

In fulfilling the “standard courses” requirements, transportation personnel assigned to the 

EOC must meet the following criteria as outlined in the matrix documents:

• Complete IS-700, NIMS: An Introduction

• Complete IS-800, National Response Plan: An Introduction

• Complete ICS-100, Introduction to the ICS

• Compete ICS-200, ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents

• Complete ICS-300, Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents

• Participate in a multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional all-hazards exercise.

In addition, self-study is available through the FHWA’s Simplified Guide to the ICS for 

Transportation Professionals published in February 2006.

These training activities would prepare the discipline-specific specialist for support operations in the EOC environment. As such, it is assumed that the ESF-1 designee will have completed appropriate discipline- and agency-specific subject matter training, and will have 

gained expertise in required areas.
75

4.1.5.2 Fusion Centers

FC intelligence analysts are trained in law enforcement and intelligence disciplines. As part 

of their professional responsibilities, general intelligence analysts may be assigned to focus 

areas such as critical infrastructure and transportation as part of the strategic mission on 

countering terrorist activity. As such, transportation specialists are typically not assigned 

to an FC. Further, general intelligence analysts assigned to cover critical infrastructure and 

transportation sectors have immediate access to specific transportation centers, agencies, 

and personnel through interagency collaboration based on case needs.

As previously described, many FCs are operated by the principal State law enforcement 

agency, and are geographically located as a stand-alone operation. Many other FCs are 

co-located with the State TMC. In situations where the FC is not co-located, general intelligence analysts employed at the FC focus on transportation sectors as part of their overall 

responsibilities, and may call upon transportation industry experts for input and advice as 

required. In the co-location environment, FC and TMC personnel work closely on a regular 

basis, providing information and support daily.

Regardless of the location of the FC, transportation personnel may at some point be called 

upon to provide direct support to FC operations based on need and area of expertise. To 

adequately support FC mission requirements, transportation personnel must understand 

the law enforcement and intelligence environment to fully understand and provide for 

the mission. As such, adequate basic training on law enforcement intelligence processes is 

warranted. When transportation experts understand the law enforcement intelligence and 

analysis process, they will be better equipped to provide relevant and timely information 

and data that could be vital to the intelligence fusion process. 

4.1.6 Training for TMC Personnel Working in EOCs and FCs

4.1.6.1 EOCs

Based on the functional and training requirements for transportation personnel working 

in an EOC, it is recommended that TMCs, or other appropriate transportation agencies, 

develop a training and certification program for emergency transportation personnel. The 

training program should be NIMS compliant in that personnel should be trained and certified in their respective areas of expertise. However, it is important that personnel assigned 

to EOCs complete the additional training and exercise participation to be fully competent 

in emergency operational support roles. Specifically, training for transportation specialists 

should include courses that provide an overview of the emergency management industry; 

the ICS; and the nation’s strategy for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from 

major incidents or disasters.

Such training may include independent study courses provided by the Emergency 

Management Institute, covering instruction in NIMS, NRF, and ICS.

4.1.6.2 FCs

The transportation industry is a key element in counter-terrorism and disaster response 

operations. As a target, the transportation infrastructure requires ongoing monitoring and 
76

protection; and as a critical element of the supply chain, the transportation infrastructure 

needs to be operationally maintained to support the U.S. economy and serve as a means for 

moving critical resources during disaster operations.

Transportation agencies must ensure that interagency coordination and collaboration with 

FCs are established and utilized. Such efforts will ensure that relevant information is shared 

with appropriate entities in a timely manner and will further solidify the cross-jurisdictional 

and cross-functional partnerships necessary for countering criminal and terrorist activities. 

Because interagency coordination is largely relationship-based, transportation agencies 

should designate a core group of technical experts that will collaborate with FC personnel 

on an ongoing basis. Similar to the ESF-1 emergency operations assignments, designated 

transportation specialists assigned to support intelligence operations may establish interagency relationships with State law enforcement and intelligence offices and personnel and 

gain general awareness of their functions and operational needs. 

In preparing transportation specialists for assignments in support of law enforcement and 

intelligence operations, transportation agencies also need to ensure that personnel receive 

adequate awareness and training that will enhance support capabilities to law enforcement and intelligence operations. Specifically, transportation specialists should attend and 

participate in basic criminal intelligence operations, intelligence analysis, and anti-terrorism 

awareness and training. Most available courses are short in length, but provide the appropriate level of awareness for State and local personnel supporting multi-agency intelligence 

operations.

Unlike NIMS in the emergency management industry, the law enforcement and intelligence 

industries do not currently offer prescribed training packets for interagency liaison personnel. As such, individual States and FCs, in particular, must develop specific requirements for 

liaison officers based on available resources that meet the needs of the organization.

4.2 Technical and Vulnerability Challenges

Enabling the use of information in centers’ legacy information management systems and 

processes represents a key challenge for the exchange of information among TMCs, EOCs, 

and FCs. Key issues include the standards for correct interpretation and use of information 

by receiving centers, capacity and bandwidth of communications resources typically available to centers, and the reliability and vulnerability of needed information, both routine and 

especially in connection with incidents.

4.2.1 System Integration, Message Standards, Language

Thirty regional agencies in the Philadelphia area that are determined to establish an 

integrated regional information-sharing network have been facing a major challenge. One 

of the most challenging barriers is the development, agreement, and implementation of 

data and message standards, a location-referencing framework, and terminology system 

that would support rapid transfer of information between agency practitioners and legacy 

systems that do not otherwise function with compatible information structures. There are 

parallels with the TMC, EOC, and FC information-sharing initiatives addressed here because 
77

the participating agencies have long-established systems of organizing, parsing, interpreting, and using data in ways needed for their unique purposes and for their unique missions.

“Open” access to information (in this illustration, video feeds) presents coordination issues 

for users and providers, too. In Delaware, one of these issues was discovered when the TMC 

cut off one of its traffic cameras that was able to view a State police bomb squad operation. 

Unknown to the TMC, the State police bomb squad, at their own location during the incident, were viewing the movement of their remote bomb squad robot via a public Web site 

that had that camera online. When the TMC cut the feed, the State police were no longer 

able to see the robot. The TMC and the State police did not know that there was no other 

way for the State police to access that feed once it was cut. 

Ideally, a permanent command and control center would serve every disaster area. The center would have all of the necessary equipment and enough independent power sources to 

not be dependent on local infrastructure. However, having a permanent operations facility 

at every possible disaster area is neither feasible nor recommended. 

Instead, a mobile and/or rapid deployment facility is more cost effective and scalable. For 

example, Broward County, Florida, has a Mobile EOC/Command Post Vehicle. The vehicle 

was purchased at a price of $500,000 with Federal funds and has the following features:

• Conference area

• State-of-the-art interoperability radio communication system, which provides 

connectivity to different radios with multiple frequencies

• Weather station

• Satellite Internet capability

• Satellite telephone

• Multiple cell phone ports

• Wi-Fi computer capability

• GIS capability

• Direct TV

• Multiple plasma screens for viewing video and video conferencing

• Remote-controlled outside cameras for monitoring and surveying.

The vehicle took 6 months to complete and has a Freightliner body and chassis.

4.2.2 Vulnerability

ITS can be vulnerable to a variety of disruptions, both naturally occurring and man-made, 

such as extreme weather, floods, earthquakes, power outages, hazardous material incidents, 

fire, and intentional attack. To ensure uninterrupted functionality of ITS technologies, it 

makes sense to plan for such situations. This can involve the design and implementation of 
78

back-up systems that duplicate or support some of the most important functions needed; 

planning for a large-scale community-wide incident; and management, testing, and 

documentation for backup systems to ensure their functionality in case of primary system 

failures.

Appendix G of this report addresses technical considerations for planning and implementing vulnerability improvements for ITS.

4.2.3 Unique FC Issues

FCs have unique information-sharing issues. Issued in August 2006, the FC Guidelines were 

designed to help law enforcement, public safety, and private partners come together with a 

common purpose and to improve their ability to protect the homeland and prevent crime. 

The working group that was established to develop the FC Guidelines developed 18 areas 

of guidance. These areas include:

• The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the Intelligence and Fusion Processes 

• Mission Statement and Goals 

• Governance 

• Collaboration 

• Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Non-Disclosure Agreement 

• Database Resources 

• Interconnectivity 

• Privacy and Civil Liberties 

• Security 

• Facility, Location, and Physical Infrastructure 

• Human Resources 

• Training of Center Personnel 

• Multidisciplinary Awareness and Education 

• Intelligence Services and Products 

• Policies and Procedures 

• Center Performance Measurement and Evaluation 

• Funding 

• Communications Plan.
79

Despite offering guidance in these areas to both new and already established FCs, an 

October 2007 GAO report on FCs still found that there were issues reported concerning 

interoperability, clearances and classification, training, and the sustaining of operations.

The push for Federal intelligence information sharing and law enforcement information 

sharing led to the existence of FCs. In spite of this, a long-standing issue for FCs continues to be interoperability and interagency communication of information. Integration of 

information systems among the Federal, State, and local government and tribal communities continues to be a major technical challenge. These issues exist not only when FCs try 

to communicate data with Federal, State, local, and tribal partners but also from FC to FC. 

In some cases, centers may not be equipped to handle classified material or may not even 

have staff cleared to the necessary levels to receive certain information. 

FCs have also reported having issues trying to receive training and guidance from DHS and 

U.S. DOJ. At issue are the standards that should be set for analyst training as well as information-sharing policies and procedures. These issues can present technical challenges for the 

FCs as well. Training shortfalls, such as a lack of a standardized nationwide training program 

for analysts, impact the ability to have effective communication among centers. When centers are unable to receive guidance on information-sharing policies and procedures, they 

are not able to properly identify shortfalls and gaps that may exist in the fusion process or 

the methods of sharing and gathering information.

As a supplement to the guidelines created in 2006, DHS’s I&A clarified the role that FCs 

would play in the intelligence process and the support that the Federal government would 

provide by issuing the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

outlined in Table 2-3. 

The I&A seeks to create an environment in which federal resources are aligned to assist FCs 

in achieving their goals through promoting partnerships, enhancing the lawful sharing 

of information, and coordinating interactions between Federal, State, and local resources 

through communication, collaboration, understanding, coordination, and management 

support: 

• DSS seeks to ensure efficient and effective communication with FCs by creating the 

Single Point of Service (SPS) to ensure that all inquires are responded to expeditiously 

by the appropriate elements within DHS and developing other communications 

tools, including the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), the Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN), and the HSIN-Intelligence portal—to improve 

communications with FCs.

• New guidelines also enhance collaboration through partnerships that deepen 

connections among analysts with expanded collaborative analysis, assessment, 

and planning capabilities including with fire service, public health, and emergency 

management personnel.

• The I&A has also implemented programs to increase understanding of agency 

capabilities and needs through expanded partnerships, including needs recognition and 

training programs.
80

• DHS also seeks to improve coordination by continuing to develop processes and tools to 

increase the transparency of activities and information exchanged with the FCs.

• By establishing a baseline level of capability for all FCs through the Global Fusion 

Center Guidelines, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence – Information Sharing 

Environment Implementation Plan, and the Interaction with State and Local Fusion 

Centers Concept of Operations, the I&A seeks to integrate support programs and provide 

management support across DHS, DOJ, and other government entities.53

In a Statement for the Record on March 4, 2010, before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Caryn Wagner, Undersecretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis for DHS, recognized the need to continue to share intelligence and information 

and strength relationships between the I&A and the State and local FCs.54

4.2.4 System Ownership and Funding

Centers of all three types frequently encounter policy and political issues with ownership 

and investment costs associated with information sharing—particularly when funding for 

significant information-gathering systems (e.g., ITS) and communications systems have 

been justified by a center’s specific mission and provided by a specific agency. Centers are 

typically held accountable for the value produced by those investments and for deploying 

systems that are specifically fit for the purpose of the funding agency’s objectives.

At the same time, one of the frustrations by political entities and the public is on the 

redundancy of equipment, which has in part resulted from the ownership and funding 

issues identified above. During the spring 2007 meeting of the National Conference of State 

Legislatures, members expressed frustration at the U.S. DOT and DHS due to their mounting 

of surveillance cameras at the same locations but not sharing the information/images from 

the cameras. However, there are examples of coordinated camera image sharing such as the 

2008 Republican National Convention in Minneapolis - St. Paul when the Minnesota DOT, 

the two local police departments, capital security, and the transit agency shared images 

from their 900 individual camera systems and broadcast them into both a traffic control 

center and the multi-agency communications center.

4.3 General Options and Principles to Address the Challenges

Overcoming the challenges and barriers addressed above will depend on the determination of both partners in any specific information exchange initiative—and their “political 

will” to revisit key policy and rules interpretations and to invest in the technical solutions 

needed. This, plus the inevitable investment of management attention, effort, and money, 

suggests that TMCs, EOCs, and FCs should study the needs and opportunities and carefully select their first initiative to pursue. Initial focus should be on selected information

53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers, Concept of Operations, 

December 2008.

54 U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Homeland Security Statement for the Record, Caryn Wagner, 

Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis for the Department of Homeland Security. March 4, 2010.
81

exchange solutions that are clearly needed, with benefits that can be convincingly demonstrated. This focus, of itself, is a formidable challenge. 

4.3.1 IT and Data Management Policy

Many long-standing IT policies and rules are candidates for review and updating in light 

of the continuing development of firewall and secure communications technology. For 

example, one State agency (following its IT policy) did not permit one of its TMCs to connect to the State network because of the existence of other “open” Web-based applications 

being employed at the TMC. 

Solutions can be found in clear definitions of information and appropriate use, security 

needs justified and defined, interagency MOUs, compartmentalization of sensitive data, and 

effective tools for secure communication available today.

4.3.2 Privacy

Each organization that shares information resources must have its own policies and procedures to comply with Federal, State, local, and tribal privacy laws. Processes and agreements 

are needed to assure that information transmitted is limited in form or content to conform 

to the policies of both organizations. Information that contains or might contain surveillance data should be covered in agreements to forms and content that comply with both 

organizations’ policies. Uses of such data should be specified, as well as the users authorized 

to access the data. 

4.3.3 Classified Information

Transmission of classified information “in the blind” is neither practical nor lawful. This is a 

major barrier to sharing of classified information. The options are few. Two options are: (1) 

to require special handling, redaction, or processing to truncate information to exclude 

the classified information, or (2) to encrypt the transmission and ensure that access on the 

receiving end is only by properly cleared and authorized personnel (including methods to 

vet the actual identity of those persons) and that appropriate control can be maintained in 

the receiving facility. Both approaches are expensive. 

The first approach (redaction/truncation) requires labor-intensive, time-consuming effort 

by cleared personnel, or very sophisticated programming and technology, and a secure 

facility. This approach generally compromises the value and timeliness of the information 

finally transmitted. 

The second approach (encrypted transmission to cleared entities) also requires investments 

in facilities, technology, and properly cleared personnel—if not already available at the 

receiving center. If the information is properly received and secure, there would still be the 

potential for the value of the data to be reduced if only part of it can be passed on to uncleared operators or decision-makers at the receiving center. 
82

4.3.4 Legal Process and Rules of Evidence

The options for transmitting information that is—or could become—part of a legal process 

are fairly similar to the two options for classified data, with some additional hurdles. In this 

case, the restrictions needed may not be fully known or understood prior to the completion of an ongoing investigation, or until all subsequent legal processes are completed. 

Determining this would require expertise in law enforcement and legal process and possibly court orders. 

Information that is public knowledge and otherwise recorded facts or qualified observations could probably be exchanged freely—but again, significant effort by qualified experts 

would be needed to “scrub” the exchange. 

4.3.5 System Integration, Message Standards, Language

By leveraging technology, centers can begin to address some of the technical and vulnerability challenges described in the previous section. These technology solutions include 

interconnection equipment, database, middleware, integration, and business intelligence 

tools. But the best approach to developing and integrating these technologies is to implement solutions that utilize industry standard products, services, and processes. 

The U.S. DOT encourages the use of the National Transportation Communications for ITS 

Protocol (NTCIP) and other related standards for ITS implementations. For FCs, U.S. DOJ 

encourages the use of industry standards including the Global Justice XML Data Model and 

the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM). The approach to successful information 

sharing includes the use of XML data models, the Common Alerting Protocol messaging 

standards, and service-oriented architectures. 

With transportation departments seeking to emphasize corridor management and emergency preparedness, a document-centric single delivery information method poses several 

problems when broadcasting information to all parties regardless of relevance or appropriate level of detail, leading to circular reporting and information overload. A new trend in 

TMC traffic and fleet management systems is the development of automated decision support systems. New enterprise systems provide rapid information collection from not only 

their own devices and equipment but also from diverse network sources that can meet the 

center’s needs. 

4.3.6 Vulnerability

Vulnerability to loss of operational effectiveness or continuity is a concern for all of the 

center types addressed in this guidebook. Whether damage to operations is direct (resulting from natural events, accidents, or intentional acts) or indirect (resulting from unforeseen 

technical problems or loss of utility support), the acceptable tolerance vulnerability varies 

considerably. In other words, the amount that each center is willing to spend to reduce 

vulnerabilities has to be a practical choice by type, category, and mission criticality of each 

center. 
83

With practicality in mind, the most common measures for coping with vulnerability and 

operational continuity risks involve redundancy of systems, facilities, and supporting utilities. Common redundancy measures fall along a spectrum of investment, as follows:

• Fully redundant and operational back-up systems and facilities

• Redundant “hot sites” with back-up system equipment (non-operational, often shared)

• Shared (usually) “cold sites” with space, utilities, possibly furnished

• Cooperative agreements to utilize, work with, or shift functions to other operational 

centers. 

Each of these general approaches has different implications on cost, operational continuity, recovery, and robustness of interim services. Appendix G of this report discusses these 

measures further.

4.3.7 Unique FC Issues

For many of the reasons cited earlier (security classification, privacy, legal process issues, 

etc.), FCs have had to cope with significant barriers to information exchange and interoperability with other FCs—not to mention TMCs and EOCs. 

As a result, FCs have typically communicated via specifically prepared products, including alerts, bulletins, reports, and situational/risk assessments. This approach has obvious 

implications for the timeliness, detail, and value of information in some of the products, but 

it can facilitate direct communication with properly cleared decision-makers.

Appendix E of this report provides more information on these issues.

4.3.8 System Ownership and Funding Issues

Solutions to the policy and political issues with ownership and investment costs associated 

with information sharing must be addressed by agencies in an objective way, with thoughtful exposition (from the viewpoints of each center/agency) of the relative need and both 

the value and the cost of meeting the need, as well as the savings benefits of sharing some 

or all of the cost. A simple example of two centers deploying video resources at a common 

location illustrates this:

• Center “A” requires a reliable, fixed video camera feed at a specific location, at 5-minute 

intervals to fill an important gap in traffic flow observation. This camera costs $3,000.

• Center “B” requires a reliable camera with additional resolution and other functionality. 

This specification takes about $6,000 to meet. 

• Both centers have determined for their needs that the respective investments are 

justified by the cost of the respective cameras.

• Both centers agree that the more expensive system could be shared operationally and 

could meet the needs of both centers.
84

• Center “A” agrees to pay one-third ($2,000) of the cost, thereby saving $1,000.

• Center “B” agrees to pay two-thirds ($4,000) of the cost, thereby saving $2,000.

• Assuming Center “B” needs included movable surveillance, the automated routine could 

return to the traffic surveillance position every few minutes to send a feed to meet the 

needs of Center “A.”

• On the (rare) occasion of an incident in the viewing range, Center “B” may have to train 

the camera and interrupt the regular traffic feed for a short time.

This simplistic scenario implies what some of the typical operational policy compromises 

might involve to better enable sharing of information and information-gathering resources, 

as well as to minimize the cost. The implications of this example also show how the benefits 

and needs for information exchange have to be considered objectively from the points of 

view of each entity involved in the exchange. 

Frisco, California Emergency Operations Center

Frisco, California Fire Department
85

Chapter 5. LESSONS LEARNED AND 

SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES

This chapter provides a compilation of lessons learned and successful practices based on 

case and field research. The focus of the research and findings presented is on exchange 

opportunities, solutions to exchange barriers, and benefits gained.

Interagency exchange of information promotes rapid, efficient, and appropriate response 

from all agencies. Public safety agencies benefit from obtaining closed-circuit television pictures for verification and assessment of an incident as they begin their response. This visual 

information helps the agencies to dispatch the appropriate response teams and to recall 

those teams if the incident clears up before they arrive. Public safety agencies can also benefit from information regarding traffic conditions on the response route and special information, such as blocked railroad crossings or construction that might affect the response.55

5.1 Lessons Learned

The Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) – Traffic Management Center (TMC) Field Operational Test: 

(FOT): State of Utah Final Report56 provides lessons learned on the field test conducted that 

aimed to integrate the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP), the Utah Department of Transportation 

(UDOT), Salt Lake City Fire and Police Departments, the Utah Transit Authority (UTA), and 

the Valley Emergency Communications Center (VECC) information systems to enable the 

real-time exchange of incident data. The FOT documented lessons learned, which include:

• Involve IT staff early in the project planning process. Interviewees mentioned the 

importance of involving agency IT staff early in the development of the integrated 

system. This is important so the IT organization provides technical input to the system to 

assure that the computing and communication environments fit within each agency and 

can be effectively maintained.

• Understand the importance of close working relationships from the start. All of 

those interviewed by the Evaluation Team mentioned the importance of the close 

working relationship among the agencies involved in this FOT. The work these agencies 

did in preparation for and during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games strengthened the close 

working relationship. Although not every region can strengthen relationships among 

agencies by hosting the Olympic Games, agencies should consider how to build these 

relationships in advance of implementing an integrated system.

55 Transportation Research Board, NCHRP Report 20, Sharing Information between Public Safety and Transportation 

Agencies for Traffic Incident Management, 2004.

56 U.S. Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Computer-Aided Dispatch – Traffic 

Management Center Field Operational Test: State of Utah Final Report, U.S. DOT ITS Program Assessment Support 

Contract, July 2006.
86

• Provide dedicated staff working on integration, or staff with emphasis on 

integration. Interviewees mentioned that it was often difficult to spend enough time 

on the integrated system. Decisions and work items sometimes took longer than those 

involved would have preferred. Even though every agency supported the integrated 

system, staff had normal responsibilities with integration duties added on. It would be 

ideal if staff involved had a priority on the integrated system tasks.

• Build in short development cycles to reduce staff turnover issues. Interviewees 

mentioned that some agencies had critical staff turnover during the implementation of 

the integrated system. Staff turnover can be disruptive to implementation schedules and 

budgets as new people have to come up to speed on the system. If the system is planned 

to have incremental implementations (see Section 4.2: Technical and Vulnerability 

Challenges), then the development cycles for each incremental implementation can 

be short to minimize the likelihood that staff will turnover during a given development 

cycle. Staff turnover between cycles is not as disruptive as turnover during a 

development cycle.

• Understand the importance of considering the role of business practices in the 

integrated system. As discussed earlier in this document, it is important that the 

integrated system not require a change in the operator’s or dispatcher’s work process. 

However, if other aspects of an agency’s business practice would improve the integrated 

system, it should be considered. For example, VECC agencies were concerned about 

providing certain information to the integrated system. UDOT is planning to develop an 

MOU with the VECC agencies that will specify how the information will be used. This may 

allow a change in those agencies’ business practices that will lead to more information 

shared in the integrated system.

• Understand the importance of coordination meetings. Interviewees mentioned the 

importance of ongoing, periodic coordination meetings with the partner agencies. These 

meetings kept communication open and emphasis on the integrated project.

• Define what data is exchanged and when. In the Utah system, the IEEE 1512 standard 

was selected for incident management messages and codes. However, not all vendors 

supported those codes. It is important for agencies to prepare for differences in codes 

and determine how to handle these differences.

• Decide what incidents will be shared among agencies and what information will 

be exchanged when an incident is shared. The experience in Utah is leading the 

participating agencies to automatically send incidents of interest and allow the receiving 

systems to filter those incidents to display the ones that are likely to be of most interest 

to the operators.

• Understand the importance of incremental implementation. In the Utah system, 

agencies learned a lot in the initial implementation of the integrated system. The 

agencies are using that knowledge to plan improvements to the integrated system. For 

agencies planning an integrated system, it is recommended that they plan an initial 

implementation and at least one subsequent, incremental improvement. Any group of 

agencies is almost certain to learn how they would prefer to have the system operate. 
87

The project and related contracts should be arranged to allow the agencies to implement 

what they learn in the initial implementation.

• Understand the importance of redundant communication path. As discussed in 

Section 4.3.6, a back-up communication pathway is important. Agencies should plan to 

include redundant communications in an integrated system.

• Minimize or avoid duplicate entry. Because not all needed information is transferred 

from the VECC to the integrated system, the UDOT operators have to enter data in their 

system that was already entered by VECC dispatchers in their system. Ideally, any given 

piece of information would only be input once by any operator in the integrated system. 

This is an important concept to plan for in any integrated system.

Information sharing across agencies promotes a strong basis for collaboration and coordination in managing incidents. Much evidence in case studies on operational performance 

benefits is anecdotal and has not been formally quantified. For example: 

• Incident responders in San Antonio have estimated that joint training and planning 

activities of the TMC have resulted in a 40-percent decrease in incident clearance times.

• The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) has developed a quarterly 

reporting process to track various performance and accountability measures for routine 

review by the Washington State Transportation Commission and others. The report 

includes a section on incident response, including the total number of responses by 

month, the average clearance times by month, and the number of incidents that lasted 

more than 90 minutes.

A challenge in identifying operational performance benefits was generally a lack of baseline 

performance data from which to measure. 

The FOT conducted by Utah also provided a summary of the benefits that may be achieved 

through the CAD and TMC system integration. Benefits cited in the study included:

• Enhanced field operations associated with locating and responding to incidents. To 

a significant extent, Utah previously realized this benefit. UDOT and UHP had previously 

co-located staff at TMCs, and CAD terminals were placed in TMCs to enable data sharing. 

The most significant benefit realized by the project was the ability to engage in direct 

data exchange between legacy systems, rather than having an operator observe two 

or more terminals. This real-time exchange of data adds to the benefits previously 

obtained through interagency cooperation, represents an additional enhancement of 

field operations, and fills what had been a gap in the existing incident management and 

response program already in place in Utah.

• Geo-location for placing incidents and marginal improvement in scene clearance. 

Observed benefits included the use of Geo-location in providing a mechanism to place 

incidents without operator intervention, and from interviews, a qualitative assessment 

that scene clearance time seemed to improve marginally. Better traveler information 

offers the public the opportunity to bypass the incident, which leads to less congestion 
88

and better response sooner (response units getting to the scene via a clear route). This 

logic seems sound; however, data was not available to support these conclusions.

• Enhanced communications among responders; enhanced on-scene activities. The 

evaluation was not able to completely assess this benefit. The system is newly deployed 

and, while operational, is still undergoing refinement. This benefit would be more 

accurately assessed when the system has matured and has been in use for a period of 

several years instead of several months.

• Enhanced efficiency in documenting the incidents. In the first 2 months of operation, 

the number of incidents documented by the integrated system increased by about 

800 percent. The number of incidents for which the TMC maintained data increased 

significantly after the CAD-TMC integration. The main difference observed between 

the before and after data discussed above was that UDOT seemed to maintain much 

more complete incident records after the deployment, both in terms of the number 

of incidents recorded and the details recorded about each incident. It is believed that 

this increase is due in large part to the fact that CAD data was more readily available to 

TMC operators after the CAD-TMC deployment. This is supported, in part, by the large 

number of incidents in the after data for which Dispatch Services/9-1-1 were listed as the 

reporting agency.

• Improved data quality. The electronic data collection, particularly in recording 

the incident start and stop times, has significantly improved overall data quality. An 

additional example of this is reflected in a decrease in the error rate for the coding of 

incidents by type.

• Improved interagency working relationships. Utah had already achieved substantial 

progress in this area, and the project represented a continuation of this benefit. Utah’s 

success in this area is represented by the interagency discussions on the amount 

and type of data that should be exchanged between the systems; the interagency 

cooperation that enabled this data exchange established the venue for addressing this 

type of system refinement based on initial deployment experience.

• Enhanced communication with the traveling public and media. This benefit would be 

more properly addressed at system maturity. While anecdotal evidence obtained during 

after-project interviews indicates that enhanced communication is occurring, assessing 

this metric based on several years of implementation experience will provide a more 

accurate measure of the benefit of enhanced communication to the traveling public 

and the media. From observations, efficiency in documenting incident management 

improved. Input for some fields was automated so the UDOT operators did not have to 

enter this data.

According to a June 10, 2009, article in the Salt Lake Tribune, “New System Aids 

Communication in Emergencies,” the system is now finishing the testing phase allowing 

incidents to be instantly shared electronically. “It also includes a mapping program that provides real-time displays of incident locations and resources deployed, which will improve 

communications and ensure efficient use of resources, officials said.”
89

A 2006 companion report, Computer-Aided Dispatch – Traffic Management Center Field 

Operational Test: Washington State Final Report, was also prepared and contains conclusions 

and recommendations that can be of value to other agencies considering such a system.57

The FHWA funded FDOT’s iFlorida project to test a number of ITS applications including 

TMC, 511, and CAD integration. The iFlorida Model Deployment Final Evaluation Report58

included three lessons learned during the test including:

1. FDOT should work with the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) to ensure that practices 

are in place to enter key information needed by FDOT in the correct fields within 

the CAD system. The data needs of FHP were different from those of FDOT, so 

some data fields that were key to FDOT but not key to FHP were not always entered 

consistently. One example was the road name, which was sometimes entered in the 

FHP CAD system as part of the free text description rather than in the road name field. 

FHP cooperated closely with FDOT by encouraging its dispatchers to follow more 

stringent data entry requirements with respect to these fields. 

2. Transferring data from the FHP CAD system required translation of some coded 

values from FHP’s values to those recognized by FDOT. An example was the incident 

type. Because FHP sometimes revised the list of acceptable values for incident types 

and their meanings, FHP instituted procedures to ensure that the tables used to 

translate FHP incident type values to FDOT values would be updated whenever such 

changes occurred. 

3. Event-driven messaging is subject to errors related to dropped messages. A 

system that uses event-driven messaging should include methods for identifying and 

recovering from dropped messages. 

5.2 Successful Practices

This section provides examples of how centers are currently sharing information and the 

barriers that exist to successful information sharing, as well as a discussion of the processes 

that enable it.

5.2.1 Case Examples of Information Sharing

The Transportation Research Board (TRB) report (see footnote at the beginning of Chapter 5 

of this guidebook) defines four primary means of information sharing:

• Face-to-Face. Encompasses direct interpersonal activities, usually at joint operations or 

shared facilities

57 U.S. Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Computer-Aided 

Dispatch – Traffic Management Center. Field Operational Test: Washington State Final Report, 2006, 

http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/jpodocs/repts_te/14325_files/index.htm, accessed 2010.

58 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, iFlorida Model Deployment Final 

Evaluation Report, 2009, http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop08050/chap_5.htm, accessed 2010.
90

• Remote Voice. Includes common communications options such as telephones and land 

mobile radio

• Electronic Text. Involves text messaging via paging, facsimile, or email devices and text 

access to traffic incident-related data systems, including CAD

• Other Media and Advanced Systems. Comprises technology-dependent methods 

not addressed in previous categories, such as video and other imaging systems, and 

integrated technologies such as advanced traffic management systems.

The study found that the primary means of center-to-center interagency communications 

remains standard wireline communications. Where transportation centers operate freeway 

management systems by CCTV or other video systems, embedded sensors in roadways, 

DMS, and HAR systems, the information generated by these systems is readily shared with 

co-located public safety officials. In some cases, control of these systems is shared remotely.

In the case of the Kentucky Intelligence FC (KIFC) and the State TOC, both operations are 

not only housed in the same building but operate out of the same room. Operations are 

kept separate, allowing TOC staff to not need national security clearances. However, staff do 

undergo a thorough background check before they are able to work in this tightly secured 

facility. 

The facility itself was assessed once it was built, and it was determined that the space, along 

with the common threads between the centers, warranted their co-location. While there 

might be a clear division between centers, there is no hesitation between center staff to 

share information. Any TOC data that is recorded (e.g., back-ups, crashes, other incidents) is 

posted to the Internet and is available to anyone who needs access to the data, including FC 

staff. The State Police Vehicle Enforcement Unit, formerly an operation run by the State DOT, 

continues to maintain its station at the TOC for coordination purposes. Vehicle Enforcement 

and the TOC share information through CAD. However, because the KIFC and the TOC 

work in the same facility, besides CAD, much of the information exchange is informal. 

Conversations, e-mails, and phone calls are the primary methods used to exchange data as 

needed. Currently, the TOC has 179 traffic cameras in the State and 38 DMS, with most of 

them controlled out of the TOC. For the KIFC staff, access information that can be provided 

by these traffic cameras or the ability to have messages posted on DMS is literally just a few 

steps away. It is also important to point out that while none of the TOC and KIFC systems are 

linked, staff at both centers feel that there is still a very good flow of information. 
91

Table 5-1: Summary of Information-Sharing Methods 

by Surveyed Public Safety Entities59

Location Face-to-Face Remote Voice Electronic 

Text

Other Media 

and Advanced 

Systems

Albany, NY Two co-location 

sites

Some sharing 

of public safety 

radios; some use of 

commercial wireless 

service “talk groups”

Shared CAD 

system

Roadway data, 

images, and video 

shared remotely

Austin, TX Co-location site 

ready to open*

Safety/service patrols 

equipped with local 

police radios

CAD data to 

be shared 

remotely

CCTV control 

shared with local 

police

Cincinnati, 

OH

Transportation 

center hosts 

regional incident 

management 

team operations

Some sharing 

of public safety 

radios; some use of 

commercial wireless 

service “talk groups”

Shared 

CAD under 

development

CCTV and 

other traveler 

information are 

shared with public

Minneapolis, 

MN

Multiple 

co-location sites

Shared radio 

systems; some use of 

commercial wireless 

service “talk groups”

Shared CAD 

data

CCTV and 

other traffic 

management 

systems are shared

Phoenix, AZ Safety/service patrols 

equipped with local 

police radios; shared 

radio system to be 

deployed

State 

DOT data 

workstations 

provided 

to local 

public safety 

agencies

CCTV shared 

with local fire 

department

Salt Lake 

City, UT

Co-location site Safety/service patrols 

equipped with local 

police radios

Shared CAD 

data

CCTV and 

other traffic 

management 

systems are shared

San Antonio, 

TX

Co-location site Safety/service patrols 

equipped with State 

patrol radios; centerto-center intercom 

system

Shared CAD 

data

CCTV and 

other traffic 

management 

systems are shared

San Diego, 

CA

Co-location site Shared CAD 

data

CAD data are 

posted on traveler 

information Web 

site

59 Transportation Research Board, NCHRP Report 20, Sharing Information between Public Safety and Transportation 

Agencies for Traffic Incident Management, 2004.
92

Location Face-to-Face Remote Voice Electronic 

Text

Other Media 

and Advanced 

Systems

Seattle, WA Shared CAD 

data

Control of CCTV is 

shared with State 

patrol

* Combined Transportation Emergency Coordination Center (CTECC) is operational

Another example of successful information sharing came about when a “hot truck,” a truck 

suspected of carrying radiological materials, alerted a sensor at a weigh station in Laurel 

County, Kentucky, that it may be carrying a radiological substance. Since this vehicle was 

not supposed to be carrying such material, the State police vehicle enforcement desk, 

located in the TOC, was immediately notified of the situation. As the vehicle was intercepted 

by State police units, the KIFC worked to gather all available intelligence on the vehicle, the 

driver, operating company, manifest, etc. The KIFC staff worked through the TOC and vehicle 

enforcement to provide the officers on the scene with all of the relevant information necessary so that they were able to safely and successfully handle the situation.

The KIFC and State DOT representatives were quick to point out that while these operations 

may have been unique at the time, the way the incidents are handled together has become 

part of their day-to-day coordination activities. 

Another example of information sharing is in the District of Columbia metropolitan area, 

which includes the collaboration of the District, Maryland, and Virginia DOTs. Information, 

incident response responsibilities, and evacuation plans are all shared via the Information 

Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities program and the Regional Integrated Transportation 

Information System (RITIS), with the regional TMC as the central command center.

Many FCs across the country are members of the RISS. FCs, such as the Delaware 

Information Analysis Center, use this system for information-sharing purposes. According to 

its Web site, RISS is a national program of regionally oriented services designed to enhance 

the ability of local, State, Federal, and tribal criminal justice agencies. The focus of RISS is 

rapid information exchange for criminal activities; however, RISS also offers training to 

member States and enhances information sharing. 

RISS is broken into six regional centers, as shown in Figure 5-1:

1. MAGLOCLEN – Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement

2. NESPIN – New England State Police Information Network

3. MOCIC – Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center

4. WSIN – Western States Information Network

5. RMIN – Rocky Mountain Information Network

6. ROCIC – Regional Organized Crime Information Center.
93

Figure 5-1: RISS Regional Centers60

While criminal information sharing is the overall focus of RISS, other pieces of information 

are exchanged to enhance the quality of the analysis and to provide useful information to 

other partners. 

5.2.2 Approaches to Overcoming Institutional, Operational, and Technical

Barriers

Where the TRB report found the greatest successes in information sharing, formal frameworks have served as the cornerstone for those successes. The frameworks stem from 

broader regional cooperative efforts and include regional traffic management or incident 

management organizations. Examples include:

• In New York State, the relationship between the Thruway Authority and the State police 

epitomizes public safety and transportation integration. At the Thruway State Operations 

Center, TIM (Transportation Information Management) information sharing between 

public safety and transportation is seamless; single individuals serve as the nexus for 

both agencies. The seamless integration is made possible by transportation funding of 

State police operations and by Thruway Authority employees serving as public safety 

dispatchers.

• San Antonio region organizations established a TMC in the 1960s to address 

regional transportation management issues. As the importance of managing traffic 

incidents has increased, the TMC has proven to be an effective mechanism for 

fostering communication and coordination among responders. The TMC consists of 

60 Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS). Institute for Intergovernmental Research Website. 

http://www.iir.com, accessed 2010.
94

representatives from the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the San Antonio Public Works 

Department, Alamo Dome, the San Antonio Police Department, the Bexar County 

Sheriff’s Department, EMS providers, towing and recovery service providers, and county 

health agencies.

• Washington State Patrol (WSP) and WSDOT have cooperatively developed a joint 

operations policy statement. The purpose of this working agreement is to document the 

joint policy positions between the two agencies regarding issues of mutual interest in 

operating State highways. As a result, both agencies are able to make decisions internal 

to their own agencies to provide the foundation that ultimately supports information 

sharing between the two agencies.

• Minnesota DOT and State police have established multiple MOU and guidelines since 

1999 that lay the groundwork for coordinated TIM and interagency information sharing. 

• Salt Lake City established closer working relationships between transportation and 

law enforcement in the region. Early in the process, the senior leadership in both 

departments signed a memorandum of agreement between their respective agencies. 

This expression of commitment and support proved to be an effective tool for bringing 

the members of each department closer together. The close working relationship was 

evidence that the spirit of the agreement was emphasized in the following years by 

senior and mid-level management in both departments, and it has come to be regarded 

as a native and natural way of doing business together.

Utah’s field test aimed to demonstrate how the integration of CAD and TMC systems could 

improve incident response capabilities and how institutional barriers could be overcome.61

Utah’s technical approach was intended to include the following elements and perform the 

associated functions:

• Create a common message set, structured in a uniform and open format, to enable 

the exchange of information among multiple agencies with unique requirements, 

policies, and operating environments. Two interagency shared data messages (ISDM) 

are planned—the interagency service requests (ISR) and the interagency Advanced 

Traffic Management System (ATMS) message (IAM). The ISR specifically requests services 

rendered by public safety agencies and secondary responder services. ISRs may be 

between CAD systems and/or between CAD systems and ATMS to specifically request 

public safety and secondary responder services. The IAM relates to traffic condition 

advisories and traffic control requests between CAD systems and the ATMS.

• Support the ISR via data specification sets (DSS) that incorporate the standard data 

elements found in all CAD systems. The DSS will specify an XML application to import and 

export (I/X) the data sets. The DSS will also specify the data standards for each element, as 

per the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE) standards, including IEEE 

1512-2000, 1512.1, and 1512.2, as available and applicable. The ISR-DSS specifications will 

be in the public domain.

61 U.S. Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Computer-Aided Dispatch – Traffic 

Management Center Field Operational Test: State of Utah Final Report, U.S. DOT ITS Program Assessment Support 

Contract, July 2006.
95

• Select a commonly used operating system and language (e.g., Windows 2000 and 

Visual Basic) to develop legacy system interfaces (LSIs) between existing UHP and UDOT 

systems to enable information exchange. The LSI will be a stand-alone server program 

in the public domain designed for nationwide application at TMCs for the ISR and IAM 

messages between different vendor CAD systems and between CAD systems and ATMS.

• Develop LSIs between the State systems and county and municipal government 

systems (VECC, Salt Lake City).

• Integrate the new UTA CAD system currently under development.

• Continue UDOT ITS Division-developed unique browser-based Event Tracking 

System (ETS) to manage and update planned events (e.g., roadway construction), 

and in real time for subsequent dissemination to the traveling public. The ETS is 

being deployed statewide, and will be used by local city, county, and State agencies. 

Information from the ETS will be updated and integrated into the CommuterLink traffic 

management system, including 511, using XML.

5.2.3 Training Examples

Overall, TMCs, FCs, and EOCs typically do not engage in cross training or analyst exchanges. 

However, States involved with RISS have the opportunity to engage in conferences that 

provide both training and information sharing. This section provides a discussion of TMC 

training findings as well as the differentiated training needs of FCs. 

According to a U.S. DOT study, Transportation Management Center Concept of Operations, 

Improving Transportation Network Efficiency, training of staff is critical for ensuring successful TMC operations. In a survey of eight key centers, the report details training operations 

and procedures for three sample centers—Boston, Toronto, and Atlanta. Innovative training and documentation procedures observed include Boston’s plans for online procedures, 

Toronto’s “functionally” oriented help function, and Atlanta’s use of hypertext in help and 

training materials. The following are excerpts from the study’s findings on training.

• Boston—due to the constantly changing condition of its road network because of the 

construction of the Central Artery/ Tunnel—has a program of continually updating its 

procedures.

• Toronto has reorganized its operations department to include an individual assigned 

to maintain and update its procedures, and Atlanta has created a training and 

documentation staff within its operations department. Atlanta has also created a position 

in its ITS organization for document control.

• Because of the frequent change of its procedures, Boston has implemented desktop 

rehearsal and new and altered procedure simulations to ensure operational readiness. 

• Atlanta periodically assigns its operators to accompany the services they support and 

interact with, such as the motorist assistance patrol. Atlanta’s training program offers 

examples of several valuable practices. Atlanta has established a training unit in its 

planning department, which prepares operations procedures. New operators begin with 
96

a 2-week formal training program on the operator console and software and progress 

to 3 to 4 days each of training on various duties, procedures, and response plans. New 

hires are provided tours of the project area to gain familiarity with the road network and 

device locations. They also ride with the motorist assistance patrol during their new-hire 

training.

Although it was not one of the three centers whose training operations and procedures 

were specifically studied in the report, the study reported that staff at Wisconsin DOT’s 

MONITOR program in Milwaukee recognized the need for a different orientation in the 

training of its law enforcement partner and they developed a customized training manual 

for its use. Milwaukee has provided a system workstation at the law enforcement dispatch 

site and has received positive feedback from the law enforcement dispatchers regarding 

this access.

Topics of training specifically for FCs focus on a different set of skills, and can include antiterrorism training, crime-specific investigative techniques, surveillance techniques, use of 

specialized equipment, officer safety information, and analytical techniques.62 A specific 

example of the development of a training program at an FC is the Michigan Intelligence 

Operation Center (MIOC). While awaiting DHS to finish development of its field training 

for intelligence and information sharing, MIOC has begun to develop and offer various 

forms of training for local law enforcement and partners of the intelligence cycle. The 

MIOC considers public safety and private sector components of the fusion process to be 

its partners in the intelligence cycle. To the MIOC, these components represent nontraditional gatherers of information, and it views their interaction as opportunities to enhance 

and increase the amount of information that is shared. The MIOC has developed a recommended list of Federal training programs for its partners’ consideration; however, some of 

the training may not be available to agencies unless they can be sponsored by a local law 

enforcement entity. 

5.3 TMCs, EOCs, and FCs Working Together

The intent of this section is to provide detailed examples of where TMCs, EOCs, and FCs are 

currently working together, the strategies employed to facilitate the information exchange, 

and the benefits gained through collaboration. 

The first examples provided include a discussion on information sharing and collaboration 

in Kentucky and New Jersey. The KIFC and the State TOC provide insights into coordination 

through the use of technology. Officials at the joint KIFC and State TOC stated that they 

coordinate efforts to track shipments when nuclear/radiological materials are moved from 

Oak Ridge National Laboratories to the depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion facility 

(DUF6) in Paducah, Kentucky. KIFC staff will use the TOC cameras to track the movement of 

the shipment while the TOC staff supply route information and updates. 

62 Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), Institute for Intergovernmental Research Web site. 

http://www.iir.com, accessed 2010.
97

The New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (ROIC) and the MIOC not only 

function as traditional FCs, but also act as the statewide operations center during an incident. Richard Cañas, director of New Jersey’s Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 

suggests using FCs in emergency response: “[it] may be a concept that could be a model for 

other states.”63 In the event of a school shooting, for instance, the ROIC facilitates a seamless 

flow of information between the various agencies that would be responding.64 The center’s 

100-seat facility can project live aerial footage, building blueprints, and hospital locations 

onto its 32-foot screen, which all partner agencies can work from to coordinate their efforts. 

Table 5-2 provides specific examples on observed best practices for integration that illustrate how TMCs, EOCs, FCs, and other transportation agencies have successfully worked 

together during incidents.

Table 5-2: Observed Best Practices for Emergency Integration65

Best Practice Locations Observed Implementation

Placement of 

TMC workstations 

in related EOC 

– Technical 

Integration

Houston TranStar

Location of regional EOC in the same building as the 

TMC allows data networks to be connected, giving 

EOC workstations full access to TMC data resources

Austin Combined 

Transportation, 

Emergency and 

Communications 

Center (CTECC)

Location of regional EOC in the same building as the 

TMC allows data networks to be connected, giving 

EOC workstations full access to TMC data resources

Georgia 

NaviGAtor

Location of the TMC on the same campus as 

the statewide EOC allows placement of a TMC 

workstation connected to the NaviGAtor system in 

Atlanta with full functionality

Maryland 

Coordinated 

Highways Action 

Response Team 

(CHART)

Connection of the statewide emergency 

management center to the CHART system using 

ATM protocols on commercial communication 

infrastructure gives the CHART workstation at the 

EOC full functionality and acceptable video quality

63 Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), Institute for Intergovernmental Research Web site. 

http://www.iir.com, accessed 2010.

64 Council on Foreign Relations, Eben Kaplan, Fusion Centers, February 22, 2007, 

http://www.cfr.org/publication/12689/, accessed 2010.

65 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Integration of Emergency and Weather 

Elements into Transportation Management Centers, February 2006.
98

Best Practice Locations Observed Implementation

Establishment 

of interagency 

agreements at 

management 

level – institutional 

integration

Houston TranStar

Formal agreements among local and State 

government agencies carrying signatures from highranking officials covering establishment, funding, 

management, and operations of the combined 

center

Austin CTECC

Formal agreements among local and State 

government agencies carrying signatures from highranking officials covering establishment, funding, 

management, and operations of the combined 

center

Orlando Florida 

Department of 

Transportation 

(FDOT) D5

A general MOU establishes an organizational 

structure and documents commitment for 

information sharing and implementation 

coordination

Implementation 

of a data network 

on publicly owned 

infrastructure 

and available 

only to regional 

cooperating 

agencies – technical 

integration

Orlando FDOT D5

Installed fiber owned by individual consortium 

members is interconnected to establish a regionwide Ethernet network private to the consortium 

used for sharing video, data, and remote server 

access

Salt Lake City

Installed fiber is interconnected with local partner 

agencies to establish a region-wide Ethernet 

network private to the agencies used for sharing 

video and data

Co-location of 

operational 

agencies – physical 

integration

Houston TranStar

Co-location of primary operations site of State 

DOT district operations, transit dispatch, and 

transit police along with representatives from 

regional police, traffic operations, and commercial 

traffic reporters allows pooling of resources and 

establishment of familiarity among staff members 

from all agencies

Austin CTECC

Co-location of operations site for several 

organizations in the facility housing multi-agency 

EOC brings benefits in availability of resources and 

familiarity of staffs to emergencies requiring an 

activation of the EOC

Restricted access 

Web site – technical 

integration

Pennsylvania 

Turnpike

Access from the TMC and other authorized 

organizations to a Web site operated by the 

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 

allows for a two-way flow of highly accurate incident 

information with higher reliability to the Web site 

than publicly available Web sites provide
99

Best Practice Locations Observed Implementation

Regular interaction 

among agencies 

when responding 

to localized 

emergencies 

– operational 

integration

Pennsylvania 

Turnpike, 

Austin, Orlando, 

Houston, Salt 

Lake City, 

CalTrans D7, 

Maryland CHART

Many of the centers encourage staff interaction 

on both a task basis and a casual basis to foster 

working relationships among staff members. The 

most common interaction is between TMC staff and 

law enforcement, but also can include emergency 

medical, fire, transit, and hazardous materials 

agencies.

The following provides a more detailed discussion of examples from Boston, Houston 

TranStar, and Kentucky.

5.3.1 Boston – Integrated Project Control System (IPCS)

The Boston IPCS is an integrated traffic management and tunnel systems control application for Boston’s 7.5-mile central artery and tunnel system. The system is operated by the 

Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MassPike) out of its Operations Control Center (OCC). 

The OCC also works with the 511 service; Smart Routes; other transit and traffic agencies 

including the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Massachusetts Port 

Authority (Massport), and MassHighway; and the City of Boston. The control center works 

very closely with other agencies and emergency services including the State police, local 

fire departments, EMS, towing services, and roadway maintenance to provide up-to-theminute communication on travel conditions and incident response.66 Boston IPCS found 

that, once established, public and other agencies began to depend on IPCS services, regardless of internal or external pressures that developed. To satisfy this consistent demand, 

Boston IPCS has implemented several redundant computer systems to ensure operation 

even if the primary computer fails. In Boston, other agencies depend on the information 

that Boston IPCS is able to provide. Additionally, computer systems provide traffic management functions and life-critical functions such as ventilation and fire control in area tunnels. 

To achieve this, Boston runs hot backup systems, so that the loss of the primary system does 

not result in the disruption of the entire system. The system also distributes its processing 

among multiple sites, so that functions from malfunctioning processors can be allocated 

to others. In June 2009, Governor Deval Patrick signed a bill creating the Massachusetts 

Department of Transportation (MassDOT) that combines MassHighway, MBTA, MassPike, 

and the Registry of Motor Vehicles. MassDOT began operations on November 1, 2009. 

According to the mass.gov website, “transportation employees working together have 

co-located the MassPike OCC and the MassHighway Traffic Control Center in a single facility. Tobin Bridge traffic cameras were also redistributed to the combined facility in South 

Boston. From this single location, operators of the State’s bridges, tunnels, and surface roadway systems can now share images and information and communicate directly regarding 

incidents that may impact different operations. 

The communications link between the Tobin Bridge and OCC required the installation of 

cable including a video and data link to provide operational efficiencies in roadway safety, 

security, and event response. The combined OCC is staffed 24 hours a day to monitor sev66 See Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, http://www.masspike.com/bigdig/background/occ.html.
100

eral major State highways and facilities and detect and report incidents with more than 630 

cameras.”67

5.3.2 Houston – TranStar

TranStar is a multi-agency TMC that provides traffic management, traveler information, 

and emergency management to the Houston metropolitan area. To facilitate collaboration, 

the center hosts law enforcement staff from both Houston Metro and Harris County in a 

control room. These officers participate in special event planning including special event 

execution and coordination. Additionally, Houston’s EOC is also co-located within the TMC. 

Communication is facilitated to allow each agency to focus on its skills, resources, and primary purpose in any situation, resulting in faster consensus. 

5.3.3 Frankfort, Kentucky TOC

The Frankfort, Kentucky TOC is a multi-functional center that collects and disseminates traffic and highway incident information to the traveling public. The TOC has implemented an 

extensive email notification system to relay information to stakeholders around the State, 

including weather watches and warnings as well as real-time traffic incident information. 

Additionally, an Office of Homeland Security-mandated FC is co-located in the same center, 

allowing multiple agencies with different specialties to pool resources to respond to a variety of threats. During a special event or incident, representatives from the Department of 

Highways; Homeland Security Offices; Kentucky State Police; Kentucky Vehicle Enforcement; 

FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Kentucky National Guard; 

and Kentucky EOC each have the opportunity to join staff at the TOC to address relevant 

issues, having access to TOC resources and information.

67 See Massachusetts Department of Transportation, “MassDOT Reforms: Traffic Operations Control,” http://

transportation.blog.state.ma.us/blog/2009/10/massdot-reforms-traffic-operations-control.html, accessed 2010.

Kentucky Emergency Operations Center

Jeff Sangillo
101

Chapter 6. SUMMARY – ASSESSING THE VALUE 

OF TMC/EOC/FC INFORMATION-SHARING

TMCs face on a daily basis the demands of making fast operational decisions that affect the 

efficiency and safety of the transportation network. The need for these decisions is paced 

by traffic, events, incidents, and emergencies that—with a few exceptions—cannot be 

anticipated in terms of exact timing and location. To maximize the quality and timeliness of 

the operational decisions needed, TMCs need the best possible real-time (or near-real time) 

situational information, communications, and detailed knowledge of the transportation 

network configuration. Most TMCs have significant investments in gathering and synthesizing situational information on the operational and physical aspects of the transportation 

network. 

In many ways, EOCs and FCs have even greater decision-making challenges to address, 

because the right decisions have to be made quickly before, during, and after major incidents and emergencies occur—with significant potential impacts on public safety; multiple 

infrastructures; the economy; and often, national security. Although the centers may have 

some early warning on the risks of specific major incidents, events, and emergencies, the 

extent, location, and specific impacts on the public and infrastructure can usually not be 

fully assessed until the event, incident, or emergency is in process.

Although TMC managers and State DOTs understand that transportation network information is only a part of the information that EOCs and FCs synthesize, most believe that they 

monitor the best-available up-to-the minute situational awareness information regarding 

operations on the network. It is also apparent that the broader decisions and situational 

assessments made by EOCs and FCs have value to TMC operations before, during, and after 

incidents and emergencies affecting the TMC jurisdictions.

Chapter 3 of this guidebook identifies several potential kinds of data exchanges and communications that may be of value to at least two of the three center types, with discussions 

of the potential uses of these exchanges. The focus of this guidebook (and Chapter 3) is on 

transportation-related information that is used, or may be used, in achieving the missions of 

some or many TMCs, EOCs, and FCs. Practitioners of all three center types may review these 

exchange opportunities and assess the value gained through addressing and overcoming 

the issues and constraints involved in establishing means to implement some or many of 

the exchanges outlined.

What kinds of values/benefits should be considered? Some suggested considerations 

include:

• Savings in the costs of rapidly assembling situational information and keeping it current 

when needed, versus savings in leveraging current network data maintained by TMCs. 

Quickly obtaining situational knowledge is an expensive and unreliable process if 
102

the means have not been developed to quickly tap, share, and corroborate existing 

information.

• The value of diverting staff from collecting and “scrubbing” data to the real functions of 

the center—assessing situations and making sound operational and risk judgments. 

• Reduced “decision-risk” through supplemented or corroborative situational information. 

The potential costs of poor or untimely emergency or threat management decisions 

based on limited or unreliable facts could be very high in terms of hazards to the public, 

security, or economic and political fallout. 

• The value of better common information held and utilized by TMCs, EOCs, and FCs. A 

greater number of agencies involved in a major incident raises the likelihood that not 

all agencies are acting on the same basic information, increasing the opportunity for 

conflicting or less-than-ideal incident management. Normal communication facilities 

may be down or disrupted, and redundant information channels may be needed. 

• The value of routine, pre-arranged information exchange before and during an incident. 

Telephone and Internet access could be disrupted, and normal points of contact for 

information may not be reached or established at the right times. Messages may not be 

received and relayed properly, or agencies needing information may not get it through 

ad hoc channels.

• The value of improved utilization of ITS assets and other data-gathering assets already 

deployed in the region.

• Potential savings on deployment of new ITS and other data-gathering assets for common 

use.

• The value of improved inter-center communications and better interpretation of 

available data through common use and experience with the formats and protocols used 

by the “source” agencies. 

What are the key issues and questions that should be explored by centers in evaluating

information exchange opportunities? An initial checklist includes:

• What is available in this data that we do not already have?

• If it is nearly the same, can we save by sharing the cost of information acquisition once, 

rather than twice?

• Are there opportunities for sharing?

• Will information granularity or detail be improved by this exchange?

• What investment in time or equipment do we need to take advantage of the 

information?

• Can our policies on IT systems, data privacy, security, and firewalls accommodate this 

exchange, or can reasonable adjustments be made for compatibility?
103

• Do we need to adjust or manipulate the information to fit with our formats, conventions, 

or protocols for it to useful (e.g., location referencing)?

• Do we have sufficient communications and data management resources to make it work?

• Can we work around hours/days-of operation differences to communicate the 

information when needed?

• Are there other opportunities for cost savings to offset potential costs?

• Can we envision a case where better information, better corroboration, or more timely 

data would have improved our service or products? How do we value this?

The center-to-center dialogue on information, beginning with suggested opportunities in 

Chapter 3 and the initial checklist questions above, can lead to an objective assessment of 

information-specific and center-specific information exchange opportunities. The intent is 

for each center to consider the issues in terms of its own mission, jurisdiction, management 

challenges, and existing operating environment.
104
105

Appendix A. REFERENCES

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March 2002.

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Christin, Paul, and Stampfli, David, Establishing Data Fusion Center Baseline Technology 

Capabilities, 2009, http://proceedings.esri.com/library/userconf/hss09/homeland/papers/

establishing_data_fusion_center_baseline_technology_capabilities.pdf, accessed 2010.

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and 

Options for Congress, January 18, 2008, http://opencrs.com/document/RL34070, accessed 

2010.

Consensus Systems Technologies, New Mexico Statewide ITS Architecture Sausage Diagram, 

http://www.consystec.com/nm/web/files/rptpdfs/rptSausageDiagram.pdf, accessed 2010.

Dallas County Office of Security and Emergency Management, “Emergency Operations 

Center Status,” http://www.dallascounty.org/department/osem/status.html, accessed 2010.

Federal Emergency Management Agency and Emergency Management Institute, National 

Incident Management System, 2008.

Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Address 

Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers, April 2007.

Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees: Homeland Security, 

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local 

Information Fusion Centers, October 2007.

Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, 

Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 17, 2008.

Harris, Blake, “Fusion Centers May Strengthen Emergency Management,” Government 

Technology, May 30, 2008, http://www.govtech.com/em/365393, accessed 2010.

Institute for Intergovernmental Research Web site. Regional Information Sharing Systems 

(RISS). http://www.iir.com, accessed 2010.
106

Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California at Berkeley and Caltrans, 

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summary.html, accessed 2010.

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Kaplan, Eben, Fusion Centers, Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2007, 

http://www.cfr.org/publication/12689/, accessed 2010.

Kimley-Horn & Associates, Bay Area Freeway Concept of Operations: Key Institutional and 

Technical Issues, September 2001.

National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), Report 520: Sharing Information 

between Public Safety and Transportation Agencies for Traffic Incident Management, 2004. 

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Management Systems, September 4, 2001, https://www.nysdot.gov/divisions/operating/

oom/transportation-systems/systems-optimization-section/ny-moves/repository/mov_tv_

policy.pdf, accessed 2010.

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Operations Center Grants, December 16, 2008, http://www.ok.gov/homeland/News/2008/

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Price, R.G., “Territories, Possessions, and Influenced Areas of the United States of America,” 

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http://www.houstontranstar.org/about_transtar/docs/Annual_2003_TranStar.pdf, 

accessed 2010.

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2004, p. 129.

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107

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U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 

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108

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National Security Agency Operations Center

Jeff Sangillo
109

Appendix B. TMC AND FC LOCATIONS

The following summarizes existing TMCs and the FCs across the United States that were 

identified as part of the research for this guidebook. It is not an exhaustive list, as additional 

facilities may exist in other locations or have opened since the initial research was completed. The list of FCs and RICs in Table B-1 was compiled from a variety of sources, as there 

is no public listing of all such centers in the United States. The centers listed here are all that 

could be readily identified as part of the research.

• Albany, Schenectady, Troy, NY

• Albuquerque, NM

• Allentown, Bethlehem, Easton, PA

• Asheville, NC

• Atlanta, GA

• Austin, TX

• Bakersfield, CA

• Baltimore, MD

• Baton Rouge, LA

• Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX

• Bellingham, WA

• Birmingham, AL

• Boise City, ID

• Boston, Lawrence, Salem, MA

• Buffalo, Niagara Falls, NY

• Charleston, SC

• Charlotte, Gastonia, Rock Hill, NC

• Chattanooga, TN

• Chicago, Gary, Lake County, IL

• Cincinnati, Hamilton, OH

• Cleveland, Akron, Lorain, OH

• Columbia, SC

• Columbus, OH

• Dallas, Fort Worth, TX

• Dayton, Springfield, OH

• Daytona Beach, FL

• Denver, Boulder, CO

• Des Moines, IA

• Detroit, Ann Arbor, MI

• El Paso, TX

• Eugene, OR

• Fort Myers, FL
110

• Fort Wayne, IN

• Fresno, CA

• Grand Rapids, MI

• Greensboro, Winston-Salem, High Point, NC

• Greenville - Spartanburg, SC

• Hampton Roads, VA

• Harrisburg, Lebanon, Carlisle, PA

• Hartford, New Britain, Middletown, CT

• Honolulu, HI

• Houston, Galveston, Brazoria, TX

• Huntsville, AL

• Indianapolis, IN

• Jackson, MS

• Jacksonville, FL

• Janesville-Beloit, WI

• Kansas City, KS

• Knoxville, TN

• Las Vegas, NV

• Little Rock, North Little Rock, AK

• Los Angeles, Anaheim, Riverside, CA

• Louisville, KY

• McAllen, TX

• Memphis, TN

• Miami, Fort Lauderdale, FL

• Milwaukee, Racine, WI

• Minneapolis, St. Paul, MN

• Modesto, CA

• Montgomery, AL

• Nashville, TN

• New Haven, Meriden, CT

• New London, CT

• New Orleans, LA

• New York, Northern New Jersey, Southwestern Connecticut

• Oklahoma City, OK

• Omaha, NE

• Orlando, FL

• Pensacola, FL

• Philadelphia, Wilmington, Trenton, PA

• Phoenix, AZ

• Pittsburgh, Beaver Valley, PA

• Portland, Vancouver, WA

• Providence, Pawtucket (RI), Fall River. (MA)
111

• Provo – Orem, UT

• Raleigh-Durham, NC

• Reno, NV

• Richmond, Petersburg, VA

• Roanoke, VA

• Rochester, MN

• Sacramento, CA

• Salinas, CA

• Salt Lake City, Ogden, UT

• San Antonio, TX 

• San Diego, CA

• San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, CA

• San Luis Obispo, CA

• Santa Barbara, CA

• Sarasota-Bradenton, FL

• Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, PA

• Seattle, Tacoma, WA

• Spokane, WA

• Springfield, MA

• Springfield, MO

• St. Louis, MO

• Stockton, CA

• Syracuse, NY

• Tampa, St. Petersburg, Clearwater, FL

• Toledo, OH

• Tucson, AZ

• Tulsa, OK

• Washington, DC 

• West Palm Beach, Boca Raton, Delray, FL

• Wichita, KS

• Youngstown, Warren, OH

Table B-1: FC and RIC Locations and Functions Supported

State Name of Fusion Center All Crimes All Hazards Counterterrorism

Alabama Alabama Information 

Fusion Center

x

Alaska Alaska Fusion Center x x x

Arizona Arizona Counter Terrorism 

Information Center (AcTIC)

x

Arkansas Arkansas Fusion Center x x x
112

State Name of Fusion Center All Crimes All Hazards Counterterrorism

California State Terrorism Threat 

Assessment Center (STTAC)

x x

California Los Angeles, Joint Regional 

Intelligence Center (JRIC)

x x

California Sacramento, Regional 

Terrorism Threat 

Assessment Center (RTTAC)

x x

Colorado Colorado Information 

Analysis Center (CIAC)

x x

Connecticut Connecticut Intelligence 

Center (CTIC)

x

Delaware Delaware Information 

Analysis Center (DIAC)

x x

Florida Florida Fusion Center x x

Georgia Georgia Information 

Sharing and Analysis Center 

(GISAC)

x x

Hawaii Hawaii Fusion Center x

Illinois Chicago Crime Prevention 

and Information Center 

(CPIC)

x x

Illinois Statewide Terrorism and 

Intelligence Center (STIC)

x

Indiana Indiana Intelligence Fusion 

Center (IIFC)

x

Iowa Iowa Intelligence Fusion 

Center

x

Kansas Kansas Threat Integration 

Center (KSTIC)

x

Kentucky Kentucky Intelligence 

Fusion Center (KIFC)

x

Louisiana Louisiana State Analysis 

and Fusion Exchange 

(La-SAFE)

x x

Maine Maine Intelligence and 

Analysis Center

x

Maryland Maryland Coordination and 

Analysis Center (MCAC)

x x

Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion 

Center (CFC)

x x
113

State Name of Fusion Center All Crimes All Hazards Counterterrorism

Michigan Michigan Intelligence and 

Operations Center (MIOC)

x

Michigan Detroit and Southeastern 

Michigan Regional Fusion 

Center

x x x

Minnesota Minnesota Joint Analysis 

Center (MN-JAC)

x x

Mississippi Mississippi Analysis & 

Information Center

x x x

Missouri Missouri Information 

Analysis Center

x x

Montana Montana All-Threat 

Intelligence Center (MATIC)

x

Nebraska Nebraska Fusion Center x x x

Nevada Nevada Analytical and 

Information Center

x x x

New 

Hampshire

New Hampshire Fusion 

Center

x x

New Jersey Regional Operations 

Intelligence Center (ROIC)

x x

New Mexico New Mexico All Source 

Intelligence Center 

(NMASIC)

x x x

New York New York Police 

Department (NYPD) 

Intelligence Division

x x

New York Rockland County 

Intelligence Center

x

New York New York State Intelligence 

Center (NYSIC)

x

North Carolina North Carolina Information 

Sharing and Analysis Center 

(ISAAC)

x x

North Dakota North Dakota Fusion Center x x x

Ohio Strategic Analysis and 

Information Center (SAIC)

x x

Oklahoma Oklahoma Information 

Fusion Center

x x
114

State Name of Fusion Center All Crimes All Hazards Counterterrorism

Oregon Terrorism Intelligence and 

Threat Assessment Network 

(TITAN) Fusion Center

x x x

Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Criminal 

Intelligence Center

x

Rhode Island Rhode Island Fusion Center x

South Carolina South Carolina Information 

Exchange (SCIEx)

x x

South Dakota South Dakota Fusion 

Center

x x

Tennessee Tennessee Regional 

Information Center (TRIC)

x

Texas North Central Texas Fusion 

Center (NTFC)

x x

Texas Texas Fusion Center x x

Utah Utah Fusion Center x x

Vermont Vermont Fusion Center x

Virginia Virginia Fusion Center x x

Washington Washington Joint Analytical 

Center (WAJAC)

x x x

Washington, 

D.C.

Metropolitan Washington 

Fusion Center (MWFC)

x x

West Virginia West Virginia Fusion Center x x x

Wisconsin Southeastern Wisconsin 

Terrorism Alert Center 

(STAC)

x x x

Wisconsin Wisconsin Statewide 

Intelligence Center (WSIC)

x x x

Wyoming Wyoming Office of 

Homeland Security

x
115

Appendix C. FC KEY DATA SOURCES

The research for this guidebook included a review of a number of sources, and this information is a compilation of that research. Databases that various FCs access include: 

• State motor vehicle administrations – operators driver’s license, vehicle registration, 

vehicle license tag information

• Location information (411, addresses, and phone numbers)

• Public records information (Accurint®)

• Law enforcement arrest and incarceration databases

• International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network, and the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC)

• Public and private sources (security industry databases, identity theft databases, gaming 

industry databases)

• Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS)/Law Enforcement Online (LEO)

• United States Private-Public Partnership (U.S.P3)—formerly HSIN-CI

• Organizational and association resources (InfraGard, The Infrastructure Security 

Partnership)

• Corrections (Bureau of Prisons, National Inmate Status)

• Sex offender registries

• Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP)

• Health- and public health-related databases (Public Health Information Network, Health 

Alert Network)

• Weapon permit information

• Internet Registry (American Registry for Internet Numbers – American Registry for 

Internet Numbers [ARIN]; Internet Service Provider [ISP] Information)

• CyberCop

• Federal Protective Service (FPS) Portal

• Lesson Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)

• National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

• Open Source Center
116

• Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA)

• Regional Computer Forensics Group

• Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Portal

• TRIPwire ATF information portal

• U.S. Secret Service e-Information Network

• U.S. Coast Guard Homeport information portal

• Real estate/tax information

• El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)

• FBI’s National Date Exchange (N-DEx)

• FBI’s Regional Data Exchange (R-DEx)

• Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

• High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)

• Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)

• International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA)

• International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA)

• International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

• Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU)

• National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

• National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)

• National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C)

• Nlets—The International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network

• RISS Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX)

• RISSNETTM—RISSNET provides the six RISS centers with a secure criminal intelligence 

network for communications and information sharing by local, State, tribal, and Federal 

law enforcement agencies.

• Department of Defense (DoD) Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) – A secure 

network used to send classified data to select FC personnel with a Federal security 

clearance who will be able to access specific terrorism related information resident on the 

SIPRNet.68

68 DHS Announces New Information Sharing Tool to Help FCs Combat Terrorism, September 14, 2009. 

http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1252955298184.shtm.
117

Appendix D. FUNDING AND RESPONSIBILITY 

CHART OF U.S. DOT, U.S. DOJ, DHS/FEMA

Table D-1: Primary Federal Funding Sources for TMCs, EOCs, and FCs

Funding Resource Grant Type* Eligible 

Activities

Eligible Recipients**

TMC EOC FC

FHWA

National Highway System 

and Surface Transportation 

Programi

Formula Transportation 

Operating, 

Capital



Congestion Mitigation and 

Air Quality Improvement 

Program (CMAQ)ii

Formula Transportation 

Operating, 

Capital



National Highway Institute 

Trainingiii

Formula Transportation 

Training



DHS Homeland Security Grant Program and FEMA Grants and Assistance Programs

Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC) Grant Program iv

Discretionary EOC 

Construction



Interoperable Emergency 

Communications Grant 

Program (IECGP)v

Discretionary Planning, 

Training, 

Exercises for 

Communications

  

Buffer Zone Protection 

Programvi

Discretionary Prevention 

and Critical 

Infrastructure 

and Key 

Resource 

Capabilities

 

Competitive Training Grant 

Program (CTGP)vii

Discretionary Training   

Emergency Management 

Performance Grants (EMPG)viii

Discretionary Management 

Enhancements



Interoperable Emergency 

Communications Grant 

Program (IECGP)ix

Discretionary Communications 

Equipment

  
118

Funding Resource Grant Type* Eligible 

Activities

Eligible Recipients**

TMC EOC FC

State Homeland Security 

Program (SHSP)x

Discretionary Planning, 

Organization, 

Equipment, 

Training, 

Exercises

  

Urban Areas Security 

Initiative (UASI)xi

Discretionary 

among highrisk areas

Multidisciplinary 

Planning, 

Organization, 

Equipment, 

Training, 

Exercises

  

Metropolitan Medical 

Response Program (MMRP)xii

Discretionary Medical 

Response

  

Operation Stonegarden 

(OPSG)xiii

Discretionary 

among land 

border states

Border 

Operations

  

Regional Catastrophic 

Preparedness Grant Program 

(RCPGP)xiv

Discretionary Integration 

Planning

  

U.S. DOJ

Justice Assistance Grant 

Programxv

Formula 

Block Grants

Crime Prevention 

Activities



Antiterrorism and Emergency 

Assistance Programxvi

Discretionary Victim Assistance  

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

Discretionary grant 

programsxvii

Discretionary Special Project 

* Decisions for FHWA funds are allocated by formula, and decisions for individual projects 

are made at the State or metropolitan planning organization level and are included in the 

State Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP) or metropolitan Transportation Improvement 

Plan (TIP). Most DHS and U.S. DOJ funds are allocated at the State level through the State 

Administrative Agency (the Governors’ designee). 

** While eligible recipients for some grant programs include all State and local agencies, often 

DOJ and DHS grant funds FC activities, DHS grants fund EOC activities, and DOT grants fund 

TOC activities. Programs where State and local agencies are eligible grant recipients may be 

opportunities for TMCs, EOCs, and FCs to submit a combined request. 

*** Program descriptions, eligibility, and application procedures for all Federal grant programs 

may be found in the Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (https://cfda.gov). In addition, 

web pages for these specific programs are included in the footnote for each grant program 

below. 
119

Figure D-1: U.S. DOT, DHS, and U.S. DOJ Funding Diagram

3

3

Federal Roles

• Standards

• Guidance

• Technical assistance

• Training

• Outreach

• Research

• Research

• Grant funding

• Grant oversight

State, Local, 

Regional 

TOC-funded 

Activities

• Planning

• Operating

• Equipment

• Maintenance

• Training/exercises

State, Local, 

Urban EOC- and 

FC-funded 

Activities

• Planning

• Operating

• Equipment

• Maintenance

• Training/exercises

• Personnel

USDOT/

FHWA

Formula 

Allocations

State DOTs

Prioritized, Multi-year 

Transportation Plans 

(STIP and TIPs)

DHS (FEMA/ODP)

10–12

Annual DHS Grant 

Announcements

State, Local, Urban 

Regional EOC/FC 

Project Requests

2

2

3

1

State and 

Metropolitan Agency 

Project Requests

State Administrative 

Agency (SAA)

(Governors’ Designee)

DOJ 

Formula Allocations 

and Discretionary 

Grant 

Announcements

4

4

5

1

1

i FHWA National Highway System and Surface Transportation Program: The operating 

costs for traffic monitoring, management, and control systems, such as integrated traffic 

control systems, incident management programs, and traffic control centers, are eligible for 

Federal reimbursement from National Highway System and Surface Transportation Program 

funding. Operating costs include labor costs, administrative costs, costs of utilities and rent, 

and other costs, including system maintenance costs, associated with the continuous operation of the system. For both National Highway System (NHS) and Surface Transportation 

Program (STP), the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy 

for Users (SAFETEA-LU) continues the eligibility of capital and operating costs for traffic 

monitoring, management, and control facilities and programs. Also, the Transportation 

Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) clarified and SAFETEA-LU continues the eligibility 

of NHS and STP funds for ITS capital improvements to specifically allow funds to be spent 

for infrastructure-based ITS capital improvements. 

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/federalaid/projects.cfm

ii

 FHWA Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ): For 

projects located in air quality non-attainment and maintenance areas, and in accordance 

with the eligibility requirements of 23 USC 149(b), Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality 

Improvement Program funds may be used for operating costs for a 3-year period, so long as 

those systems measurably demonstrate reductions in traffic delays. Operating costs include 

labor costs, administrative costs, costs of utilities and rent, and other costs, including system 

maintenance costs, associated with the continuous operation of the system. 

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cmaqpgs/index.htm
120

iii FHWA National Highway Institute: States may use funds not to exceed one half of 1 

percent of the amount apportioned to each State under Section 104(b)(3) for the surface 

transportation program for training their employees or employees of local transportation agencies. Such expenditures may not exceed 80 percent of the total cost of tuition 

and direct education expenses (excluding salaries) in connection with the education 

and training activities. Courses and study programs may be obtained from universities, 

other government agencies, the private sector, and/or the National Highway Institute. 

http://www.nhi.fhwa.dot.gov/home.aspx

iv DHS Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program: Intended to improve 

emergency management and preparedness capabilities by supporting flexible, sustainable, secure, and interoperable EOCs with a focus on addressing identified deficiencies and 

needs. Funds are available for grants for construction or renovation of a State, local, or tribal 

government’s principal EOC. The State Administrative Agency (SAA) is the only eligible 

entity able to apply for the available funding on behalf of qualified State, local, and tribal 

EOCs. 

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/eoc/index.shtm

v

 DHS Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP): Intended 

to improve local, tribal, regional, statewide, and national interoperable emergency communications, including communications in collective response to natural disasters, acts 

of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. Funds are available for planning, training, 

exercise, and personnel activities consistent with the goals and objectives of the Statewide 

Communication Interoperability Plans (SCIP) and aligned with the National Emergency 

Communications Plan (NECP). The State Administrative Agency is the only agency eligible to 

apply for FY 2008 IECGP funds. http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/iecgp/index.shtm

vi DHS Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP): BZPP provides grants to build security 

and risk-management capabilities at the State and local level to secure pre-designated Tier 

I and Tier II critical infrastructure sites, including chemical facilities, financial institutions, 

nuclear and electric power plants, dams, stadiums, and other high-risk/high-consequence 

facilities. Specific BZPP sites within 45 States have been selected based on their level of risk 

and criticality.

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/bzpp/index.shtm

“DHS encourages projects funded through the FY 2010 BZPP to support the coordination 

and direct interaction with State, regional, and/or urban area fusion centers, and/or EOCs 

located in the region of the identified BZPP site. Examples include allowing fusion centers 

and/or EOCs access to video camera surveillance feeds resulting from cameras purchased 

through the BZPP or ensuring the jurisdiction responsible for the BZPP site has an identified liaison officer responsible for coordinating with and reporting suspicious activity to 

the fusion center.” http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/2010/fy10_bzpp_kit.pdf. 

March 18, 2010

vii DHS Competitive Training Grants Program (CTGP): Awards funds to competitively 

selected applicants to develop and deliver innovative training programs addressing high-
121

priority national homeland security training needs.

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/ctgp/index.shtm

viii DHS Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG): Provides funds to assist 

State and local governments to sustain and enhance all-hazards emergency management 

capabilities. 

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/empg/index.shtm

ix Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP): Provides funds to 

improve local, tribal, regional, statewide, and national interoperable emergency communications, including ensuring communications in collective response to natural disasters, acts 

of terrorism, and other man-made disasters is available for planning, training, exercise, and 

personnel activities consistent with the goals and objectives of the SCIP and aligned with 

the NECP. http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/iecgp/index.shtm

x

 DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP): Provides funds to build capabilities at the State and local levels through planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise activities. SHSP also supports the implementation of State homeland 

security strategies and key elements of the national preparedness architecture, including the National Preparedness Guidelines, the NIMS, and the NRF. Eligible entities for 

SHSP are all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, 

Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. Available funds are distributed to each 

State based upon the risk and effectiveness scores associated with each application and 

also on a minimum allocation consistent with the statutory formula set by the 9/11 Act. 

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm#1

xi Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI): Addresses the unique multi-disciplinary planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs of high-threat, high-density 

urban areas, and assists them in building and sustaining capabilities to prevent, protect 

against, respond to, and recover from threats or acts of terrorism. This program provides 

funding to high-risk urban areas based on risk and effectiveness. Funds are allocated 

based on risk and anticipated effectiveness upon completion of the application review 

process. The 60 candidates are eligible to apply for funding under the UASI program. 

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm

xii Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (MMRS): Grants support local 

preparedness efforts to respond to all-hazards mass casualty incidents, including epidemic 

disease outbreaks; natural disasters; large-scale hazardous materials incidents; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive attacks. Equal funding allocations are made 

to 124 cities to establish and sustain activities. 

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm#4

xiii DHS Operation Stonegarden (OPSG): Focuses on enhancing law enforcement preparedness and operational readiness along the land borders of the United States. OPSG 

provides funding to designated localities to enhance cooperation and coordination among 

Federal, State, tribal and local law enforcement agencies to secure the United States’ land 

borders.

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/opsg/index.shtm
122

xiv DHS Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP): Provides 

funding to advance catastrophic incident preparedness to pre-designated highrisk urban areas. The goal of RCPGP is to support an integrated planning system 

that enables regional all-hazard planning for catastrophic events and the development of necessary plans, protocols, and procedures to manage a catastrophic event. 

http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/rcp/index.shtm

xv U.S. DOJ Justice Assistance Grants (JAG): Allows States and local governments to 

support a broad range of activities to prevent and control crime and to improve the 

criminal justice system. JAG replaces the Byrne Formula and Local Law Enforcement Block 

Grant (LLEBG) programs with a single funding mechanism that simplifies the administration process for grantees. Funds are allocated by a formula based on population and 

crime statistics, in combination with a minimum allocation to ensure that each State 

and territory receives an appropriate share. JAG funds can be used to pay for personnel, overtime, and equipment. Funds provided for the States can be used for statewide 

initiatives, technical assistance and training, and support for local and rural jurisdictions. 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/funding/current-opp.html

xvi U.S. DOJ Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program: Provides assistance to 

jurisdictions to address victim needs in the aftermath of an act of terrorism or mass violence. Funds may be used to compensate and assist victims within or outside the United 

States. 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/pdftxt/antiterrorapplication.pdf

xvii Bureau of Justice Assistance Discretionary Programs (BJA): Awards discretionary 

grants to local governments, States, American Indian and Alaska Native tribes and tribal 

organizations, educational institutions, private nonprofit organizations, and for-profit 

organizations. Some discretionary awards are competitive and make a pool of funds available to a targeted group of applicants. Examples of limited competition programs are the 

Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program, Gang Resistance Education and Training, Indian 

Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program, Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program, 

Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, Prisoner Reentry Initiative, and Tribal Courts 

Assistance Program.

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/funding/current-opp.html
123

Appendix E. FC INTEROPERABILITY 

CHALLENGES

In 2008, in the results of the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices (NGA 

Center) annual survey of governors’ homeland security advisors, survey respondents identified developing interoperable communications as the issue for which States most need 

Federal assistance—in the form of funding and guidance, with FCs serving as the primary 

method for sharing information with DHS. 

In April 2008, the GAO revisited the areas of concern that it reported to the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs’ Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, 

Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration. In the report, there were still areas 

where more work needed to be done, and the GAO reported that DHS and U.S. DOJ were 

still working to correct the problem areas. 

Concerning interoperability, the GAO reports that DHS, U.S. DOJ, and the Program Manager 

for Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) have taken steps to give FCs more access to 

Federal information systems. Of the 43 FCs interviewed by the GAO, 40 reported having 

access to HSIN, 16 were awaiting access to the DHS classified network, 39 have access to 

LEO, and 23 are in the process of gaining access to FBI classified systems. However, while FCs 

are primarily designed to serve the jurisdictions within which they operate, thus purchasing 

systems that they feel best serve their needs, centers are working to overcome the issue of 

interoperability. FCs have developed a solution to interoperability by producing alerts, bulletins, reports, and assessment products that can be transmitted in an unclassified format 

over everyday mediums such as text, e-mail, and fax. This information is usually intended 

to educate and inform those individuals who have the right and need to know the information. However, phone calls are the most often-used method by FCs when dealing with 

outside agencies. Individuals identified in an agency as a person with “need to know” status 

or the appropriate clearance and “need to know” status can be the recipient of information 

from an FC despite a lack of formal interoperability between the FC and the other agency. 

On the opposite end of a lack of interoperability and the lack of information is an FC receiving too much data. To tackle the concern over information overload in FCs, one strategy 

involves funneling information to the proper analysts.69 For example, in the Virginia FC, 

information concerning a particular mode of transportation (e.g., rail, freight, and highway) 

would be reviewed by an expert specializing in that mode, while information about gangs 

would go to that analyst. “These folks are trained researchers,” explains Richard W. Kelly, 

Director of New Jersey’s FC. “They know what to look for when they stick a ladle into that 

great stream of information.”70 DHS, U.S. DOJ, and PM-ISE are also working to streamline 

69 Kaplan, Eben, Fusion Centers, Council on Foreign Relations website. http://www.cfr.org/publication/12689/, 

February 22, 2007.

70 Ibid.
124

the information process. It has even been recommended to the GAO that DHS and U.S. DOJ 

limit the number of existing systems or develop a unified platform for information sharing between FCs and between FCs and the Federal government. Following the national 

FC conference held in March 2008, Charlie Allen, Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis at DHS, reported that DHS was committed to building a national FC network to 

connect the FCs in all 50 States and all major cities. Such a network would be the solution 

that could address many of the current FC issues. In 2009, Director Robert Riegle, State and 

Local Program Office, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, testified before the U.S. House 

of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, that the use of a common FC backbone/platform for information sharing has been recognized as key to better information 

sharing and collaboration. FC directors indicated that leveraging the framework of the 

Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative could be beneficial in further standardizing 

the use of technology across the FC network.

Clearances and classification of documents is another concern. While DHS and US DOJ 

work to provide clearances to the backlog of individuals that need them, over-classification 

of documents can make information gathering or sharing slow for the FCs. Issues still are 

reported to exist between FBI and DHS accepting each other’s clearances. This problem 

exists because each agency conducts its own clearance process resulting in gaps between 

the two organizations’ processes. One solution to overcoming this issue is the deployment 

of DHS officials to 36 operational FCs across the country. In addition, the FBI has assigned 

114 employees to assist in 38 FCs. These professional analysts will assist at the centers 

where they are assigned and could be used to help with the handling of classified materials 

above the level assigned to the analyst. Another strategy to overcome classification issues 

is to grant clearances at the top secret (TS) level. However, it is important to point out that 

an individual with a TS may not necessarily have “need to know” status either. For outside 

agencies working with FCs, having an individual in that agency with “need to know” status 

or having the appropriate clearance and “need to know” status will aid them in receiving the 

information needed from the FC to complete its mission. 

The August 2006, FC Guidelines were designed to provide guidance, technical assistance, and training to FCs. Based on the April 2007 GAO report, this area still needs to be 

addressed further. Until FCs are able to receive the type of training and guidance they 

report to need, training of partner agencies will be difficult. The March 2008 national FC 

conference saw the establishment of baseline-level FC capabilities; however, feedback is 

pending. In the meantime, FCs like the Michigan Intelligence Operation Center have begun 

to offer various forms of training for local law enforcement and partners of the intelligence 

cycle. This solution by outreach not only trains partner agencies that may not be familiar 

with the needs of and products produced by the FCs but also builds stronger relationships 

and a better understanding for one another. 
125

Appendix F. TOP SITES TO BENEFIT FROM 

COLLABORATION

FHWA has an interest in encouraging State and local TMCs, EOCs, and FCs to establish more 

effective communication links and promote information sharing. Some metropolitan areas 

already have at least one TMC, EOC, and FC in close proximity to each other, creating a situation where each of the three centers would likely have interest in similar information, the 

bulk of which was discussed in Chapter 3 of this guidebook.

Table F-1 provides a list of sites where collaboration between TMCs, EOCs, and FCs would 

most likely be successful. These sites were chosen based on the following criteria:

• Metropolitan area

• Established TMC, EOC, and FC in close proximity to each other

• Robust TMC that will be able to provide transportation-related information to the EOC 

and FC.

Some of the sites on this list already work closely with the other sites in their vicinity 

through partnerships and information-sharing agreements. In addition to outlining potential areas where greater connectivity could be achieved, the list also provides a resource for 

lesser-developed sites as to the potential sites on which new information-sharing programs 

might be based.

Table F-1: Top Sites to Benefit from TMC-EOC-FC Collaboration

TMC EOC FC City State

City of Phoenix 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

State EOC is located 

on the Papago Park 

Military Reservation

Arizona Counter 

Terrorism Information 

Center (ACTIC)

Phoenix AZ

Los Angeles 

Regional 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

County of Los Angeles’ 

Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC)

Regional Terrorism 

Threat Assessment 

Center (RTTAC)/Los 

Angeles/Joint Regional 

Intelligence Center 

Los Angeles CA

Caltrans District 

3 Regional 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

Sacramento Regional 

Homeland Security 

and Emergency 

Management Training 

Center

State Terrorism Threat 

Assessment Center/

Sacramento Regional 

Terrorism Threat 

Assessment Center

Sacramento CA
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TMC EOC FC City State

Colorado 

Transportation 

Management 

System 

Denver Emergency 

Operations Center

Colorado Information 

Analysis Center

Denver-area CO

Deltrac 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

Delaware Emergency 

Management 

Operations Center

Delaware Information 

Analysis Center

Dover-area DE

Georgia NaviGAtor Atlanta-Fulton County 

Emergency Operations 

Center

Georgia Information 

Sharing and Analysis 

Center 

Atlanta GA

Gary-ChicagoMilwaukee 

(GCM) Corridor 

Transportation 

Information Center

City of Chicago Joint 

Operations Center

Chicago Crime 

Prevention and 

Information Center

Chicago IL

Indianapolis 

TrafficWise

State of Indiana 

Emergency Operations 

Center

Indiana Intelligence 

Fusion Center

Indianapolis IN

Kentucky 

Transportation 

Operations Center

State Emergency 

Operations Center

Kentucky Intelligence 

Fusion Center 

Frankfort KY

Advanced Traffic 

Management 

and Emergency 

Operations Center

Advanced Traffic 

Management and 

Emergency Operations 

Center

Louisiana State 

Analytical and Fusion 

Exchange (LA-SAFE)

Baton Rouge LA

Boston 

Transportation 

Department Traffic 

Management 

Center

Boston Emergency 

Operations Center

Commonwealth Fusion 

Center/Boston Regional 

Intelligence Center

Boston MA

Intelligent 

Transportation 

Systems Center

SE Michigan Detroit 

Edison Emergency 

Operations Center

Michigan Intelligence 

Operations Center

Detroit MI

Regional 

Transportation 

Management 

Center 

City of Minneapolis 

Emergency Operations 

Center

Minnesota Joint 

Analysis Center

MinneapolisareaMN

Triangle 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

Wake County 

Emergency Operations 

Center

North Carolina 

Information Sharing 

and Analysis Center 

(ISAAC)

Raleigh NC
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TMC EOC FC City State

DalTrans 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

Dallas County 

Emergency Operations 

Center

North Central Texas 

Fusion Center

Dallas TX

Greater Houston 

Transportation 

and Emergency 

Management 

Center

Greater Houston 

Transportation 

and Emergency 

Management Center

Houston Regional 

Intelligence Service 

Center

Houston TX

WSDOT Traffic 

Systems 

Management 

Center (TSMC)

Fire Station 10 

Emergency Operations 

Center

Washington State Joint 

Analytical Center

Seattle WA

MONITOR 

Transportation 

Management 

Center

Milwaukee Emergency 

Operations Center

Southeast Wisconsin 

Terrorism Alert Center 

(STAC)

Milwaukee WS
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Appendix G. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 

VULNERABILITY IMPROVEMENTS

Introduction

ITS are vulnerable to a variety of disruptions, both naturally occurring, such as hurricanes 

and earthquakes, and man-made, including power outages and hazardous materials. To 

ensure uninterrupted functionality of ITS technologies, it is necessary to plan for such disasters. Planning for supply and other varieties of disruptions involves the design and implementation of a backup system that duplicates some of the most important functions of the 

original system; planning for a large-scale community-wide incident; and the management, 

testing, and documentation for backup systems to ensure their functionality in case of 

primary system failures.

Backup System Strategies

If the primary TMC site becomes unavailable, an alternate site should be identified for a 

backup system, for which plans have been documented. Four alternate site possibilities 

exist. Each provides different features and relative costs. Ordered from most to least costly, 

they include redundant site, hot site, cold site, and cooperative agreement. Additionally, 

there are derivatives of each type.

A redundant site entails a second operations center that is always standing ready with the 

hardware, software, and communications infrastructure already in place and running. This 

backup site may take over operations at any point needed, without any specific startup to 

execute. With the availability of a redundant site, part of the operations may always be run 

from the second site. In this scenario, the only difference that would occur during a system 

outage at the primary site would be that all staff would work from the one operations center rather than being spread over two installations. While the fastest mode of recovery, it is 

normally the most expensive. Another issue with a redundant site is that it normally resides 

close to the main operations center. If the incident is community-wide, both the primary 

and redundant sites may become inoperable.

A hot site is an operations center that is set up with all the needed hardware and network 

infrastructure, but lacking the necessary software for normal operations. Hot sites are 

normally shared by several different organizations, serving as backup sites for agencies on 

a first-come first-serve basis. If a community-wide incident occurs, it is possible that the 

hot site may not be available. Such an incident may require transfer to an alternate site in a 

different region or the possibility of having no site available to meet agency needs. If open, 

the hot site is immediately available upon the declaration of an emergency. Before becoming operational, the site must be restored with the operating organization’s software. Hot 

sites are normally subscription services where an annual fee is paid providing for testing 
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time and the ability to use a site if needed. Use of the site for an emergency is frequently at 

an additional cost.

Cold sites provide the infrastructure of a building as well as some wiring; heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC); and a private branch exchange (PBX). If movement to 

a cold site is necessary, rooms may then be quickly filled by the occupying organization 

with hardware to run operations. Setting up operations in a cold site will take longer than 

either a redundant site or hot site, but use is generally less costly. Depending upon the 

exact requirements, a cold site may be able to be delivered to a desired location via a trailer, 

or may be a quickly constructed building. Frequently, a cold site is utilized after an initial 

period of time spent in a hot site.

The least costly alternative is a cooperative agreement, a reciprocal accord with either 

another municipal agency in the region or an equivalent agency in an adjoining municipality. These agreements frequently have little or no cost associated for rental of the space. 

While inexpensive, exercising cooperative agreements can be difficult in an emergency. 

Because many agency operations managers are asked to work with as few resources as 

possible while maintaining a high level of service to their customers, it is uncommon that 

operations centers would have enough extra equipment and space to enable an influx of all 

of the personnel and work from another operations center, which may last for a considerable amount of time. Also unlikely is the ability to periodically take space from an existing 

operation to test a contingency plan.

Regardless of the nature of the backup system, several issues need to be addressed:

• All software licenses must allow for running the system at an alternate location for either 

tests of emergency situations or true emergencies.

• Any backup files that exist must also be able to be easily and quickly transported or 

communicated to the alternate site.

• Communications lines that normally terminate in an operations center must be able to 

be rerouted to the alternate center.

Planning

While planning for a backup TMC system, the planner must expect and account for the 

unexpected. An example of an unexpected system failure was the Great Lakes Blackout in 

2003. This blackout was initiated by a brush fire that knocked out a single power line south 

of Columbus, Ohio. This was followed by the failure of a second power line connecting 

eastern and northern Ohio, which in turn was followed by the failure of a third power line in 

northern Ohio due to excess loading. As more power lines progressively started to disconnect from the grid, the failures accelerated. Five power lines between Ohio and Michigan 

failed about 8 minutes after the first failure. This led to failure of the entire power system 

around the Great Lakes region, leaving cities from Cleveland to the cities in the East Coast 

like New York in a profound blackout. This incident was the initiator of a cascading set of 

failures, leading to a vast swath of 3,700 miles of North America without power. A set of 
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seemingly minor failures acting in concert led to the largest blackout in American history. 

These minor incidents acting in concert were not expected, eventually having a devastating 

impact. A compounding of minor incidents leading to major disaster is often true of many 

community-wide disasters. 

During such periods of operational recovery and mitigation, most TMCs have found that 

significant problems exist with communications. To avoid such problems, state-of-the-art 

communications practice for TMCs includes the use of multiple communications paths, 

which ideally avoid systems outages. By maintaining multiple communications paths, the 

TMC is able to avoid a systems outage based on a single communications outage from a 

single central office or an individual line. It is also possible that during emergencies and outages, telephone calls from TMCs cannot be completed even if the system is available due 

to excessive phone calls from system users inquiring about the nature of the incident and 

the welfare of the area. TMCs could circumvent these problems by utilizing the Government 

Emergency Telecommunication System (GETS). Another provision that TMCs could use is 

voice telephones that do not require electricity for operations. Mitigation of power supply 

problems could be accomplished by having multiple feeds from various power stations or 

grids. Finally, in case of the entire grid or multiple power station failure, TMCs could utilize 

Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) systems to supply emergency power.

Good planning mitigates the effects of unexpected system failures. An example of good 

planning and interagency cooperation was demonstrated during the New York City 

Blackout of August 2003. The I-95 Corridor Coalition contacted member agencies that were 

not affected by the blackout to post messages informing motorists of the problem. The 

notification allowed the motorists the ability to avoid the affected areas, helping to relieve 

traffic congestion in the New York City area. Another method to ensure the functionality of 

the system during community-wide emergencies is that of working from alternative sites. 

These sites may include connecting into the system from the staff member’s home or an 

alternate office arrangement. By connecting into the system from an alternative location, 

fundamental goals of the TMC may be handled without full access to the operations center.

Testing

Testing of a backup system provides a number of benefits to a TMC. One of the most important benefits that the test provides is an initial and continuous validation of the TMC backup 

plan. Another important benefit to testing is the evaluation of the effects that external 

interfaces and changes to the TMC have on the recovery and mitigation plan.

Documentation

Recovery and mitigation documents must be confidential yet widely available to TMC staff. 

The documentation must have all the information needed to rapidly reconstruct the TMC. 

Network layouts, security infrastructure, systems complexities, internal procedures, and 

complete staff contact lists are some of the critical and confidential information that 

must be included in a plan. During system outages and emergency TMC relocation, the 
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documentation must be available away from the operations center. Some TMCs make the 

documentation available through the Internet. In these cases, the documentation must be 

stored in servers that are not co-located with the TMC. Others centers provide the document in full or in part in hardcopy or on various softcopy devices such as CDs or thumb 

drives.
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Appendix H. INVENTORY OF TRAINING 

RESOURCES 

Training resources include the following:

IS-700, NIMS: An Introduction

Emergency Management Institute, Independent Self-study Program

http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is700.asp

IS-800, National Response Framework: An Introduction

Emergency Management Institute, Independent Self-study Program

http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is800b.asp

ICS-100, Introduction to the Incident Command System

Emergency Management Institute, Independent Self-study Program

http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is100.asp

ICS-200, ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents

Emergency Management Institute, Independent Self-study Program

http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is200.asp

ICS-300, Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents

Emergency Management Institute Training Catalog, page 150. Available at: 

http://training.fema.gov/EMICourses/EMICatalog.asp

Course is available through individual State training officers.

FHWA’s Simplified Guide to the ICS for Transportation Professionals

Available at: http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/ics_guide/index.htm

Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (28 CFR, Part 23)

Training Institute for Governmental Research, Law Enforcement Research and Training

Information available at: http://www.iir.com/28cfr/

State and Local Anti-terrorism Training (SLATT)

Institute for Governmental Research, Law Enforcement Research and Training

Information available at: http://www.iir.com/slatt/

Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program (AIATP) 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Information available at: http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/state-local/

training-opportunities/anti-terrorism-intelligence-awareness-training-program-aiatp/
134

Multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional all-hazards exercises include the following:

IS-120, An Introduction to Exercises

Emergency Management Institute, Interactive Web-based course

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS120A.asp

IS-130, Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Planning

Emergency Management Institute, Interactive Web-based course

http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS130.asp

Exercise participation

Information on scheduled Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) exercises may be found at: https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Highway Administration

Office of Operations

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov

FHWA-HOP-09-003

June 2010