2016 UT App 98

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF Z.G.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

H.V.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20150457-CA

Filed May 12, 2016

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Kimberly K. Hornak

No. 1106176

Julie George, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred.

1

BENCH, Senior Judge:

¶1 H.V. (Guardian) appeals the juvenile court’s ruling 

declining to order reunification services. We affirm.

 

1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as 

authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6).
In re Z.G.

20150457-CA 2 2016 UT App 98

BACKGROUND

¶2 Guardian was awarded permanent custody and 

guardianship of Z.G. (Child) in December 2014 after Child was 

adjudicated to have been neglected by her mother. Two months 

later, Child was temporarily removed from Guardian’s custody 

due to police involvement but was soon returned. Just six weeks 

after that, Guardian was arrested on drug charges. On April 7, 

2015, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) filed a 

verified petition alleging that Guardian had been incarcerated 

and that Guardian’s mother, who had been caring for Child

since Guardian’s arrest, could not provide long-term care for 

Child. The juvenile court adjudicated Child neglected by 

Guardian and granted custody and guardianship of Child to 

DCFS.

¶3 Apparently anticipating that Guardian might request 

reunification services, Child’s appointed guardian ad litem

moved the court to deny reunification services to Guardian. The 

juvenile court held a hearing on the motion and determined that

under Utah Code section 78A-6-312, Guardian did not have 

standing to request reunification services and that even if she 

did have standing, reunification was not in Child’s best interests.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶4 Guardian appeals the juvenile court’s order denying 

reunification, arguing that the juvenile court erred in 

determining that she lacked standing to request reunification 

services under the Juvenile Court Act. The juvenile court’s 

“interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act is a question of law, 

reviewed for correctness.” In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10, ¶ 24, 268 

P.3d 831. The ultimate decision whether to provide or deny 

reunification services is a determination that we review for 

abuse of discretion. In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 

1998).
In re Z.G.

20150457-CA 3 2016 UT App 98

ANALYSIS

I. Permanent Guardians Have Standing to Seek Reunification 

Services.

¶5 The Juvenile Court Act is unclear as to whether 

reunification services are available to non-parents. However, 

Guardian and the State agree that “the best interpretation of the 

[Juvenile Court Act] is that they are.” Having reviewed the 

statute, we agree that an individual who has been granted 

permanent custody and guardianship over a minor child has 

standing to seek reunification services when that child is 

involuntarily removed from his or her custody.

¶6 First, we look to the statutory language to determine the 

legislature’s intent. “We analyze the language of a statutory 

provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or 

act, and we attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance 

with the legislative intent so as to give meaning to each 

provision.” Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery 

Special Serv. Dist. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 

1174.

¶7 Section 78A-6-312, governing reunification services, 

indicates that if the court has ordered “continued removal at the 

dispositional hearing, and that the minor remain in the custody 

of the division,” then the court shall (1) “establish a primary 

permanency plan for the minor” and (2) determine whether 

“reunification services are appropriate for the minor and the 

minor’s family.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(2) (LexisNexis 

Supp. 2015). Further provisions in this section pertaining to 

actions the court should take in facilitating or terminating 

reunification services refer specifically to “parents” and do not 

mention guardians. Id. § 78A-6-312. However, other sections of 

the Juvenile Court Act appear to contemplate reunification 

services for guardians. For example, section 78A-6-306 requires

DCFS to report to the juvenile court at the shelter hearing “the 
In re Z.G.

20150457-CA 4 2016 UT App 98

available services that could facilitate the return of the child to 

the custody of the child’s parent or guardian” and directs the 

court to determine whether “the provision of . . . services” could 

permit the child to be “safely returned to the custody of the . . . 

parent or guardian.” Id. § 78A-6-306(6), (10) (emphasis added). 

Likewise, section 78A-6-314 contemplates the return of a minor 

to a “parent or guardian” following reunification services and 

outlines circumstances where the juvenile court might 

determine, after reunification services have been ordered, that a 

minor should not be returned to a “parent or guardian.” Id.

§ 78A-6-314(2), (4) (emphasis added). Despite the language of 

section 78A-6-312, it would be inconsistent for the legislature to 

include language in sections 78A-6-306 and 78A-6-314 referring 

to guardians if it intended that reunification services be 

provided only to parents.

¶8 This conclusion is further supported by the fact that

provisions in the Juvenile Court Act contemplate the possibility 

that a guardian may be responsible to provide financial support 

for a child when the child is in the custody of DCFS. See id.

§ 78A-6-306(2)(f) (providing that when a child has been removed 

from his or her home or placed in the custody of DCFS, DCFS 

“shall issue a notice that contains . . . a statement that the parent 

or guardian is liable for the cost of support of the child” 

(emphasis added)); id. § 78A-6-1106(1) (providing that when 

legal custody of a child has been vested in an organization or 

individual other than the child’s parents, “the court shall order 

the parents, a parent, or any other obligated person to pay child 

support for each month the child is in custody” (emphasis 

added)). But see id. § 75-5-209(4)(a) (providing in the context of 

the Uniform Probate Code that “a guardian of a minor is not . . . 

legally obligated to provide from the guardian’s own funds for 

the ward”). Indeed, the juvenile court’s order adjudicating Child 

neglected by Guardian ordered Guardian to “contact the Office 

of Recovery Services (ORS) to determine a support amount for 

the period that [Child+ is in the custody of DCFS.” It would be 
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20150457-CA 5 2016 UT App 98

inconsistent with the apparent intent of the legislature and 

public policy to conclude that a guardian retains financial duties 

to a child who has been removed from his or her custody but 

does not have the right to seek reunification services.2

¶9 Furthermore, our case law on the subject, while not 

determinative, appears to contemplate the possibility that a 

permanent guardian could obtain reunification services. For 

example, in In re K.G., 2009 UT App 116U (per curiam), we 

acknowledged the possibility that a guardian could receive 

reunification services but did not reach the question, because the 

aunt seeking reunification had never obtained legal recognition 

as the child’s guardian. Id. para. 3 & n.2. Likewise, in In re T.S., 

927 P.2d 1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), we left open the question of 

whether a permanent guardian might be entitled to rights akin 

to those of a parent, though we ultimately did not reach that 

issue because we determined that the guardian in that case had 

waived it. Id. at 1127.

¶10 Finally, denying permanent guardians the opportunity to 

seek reunification is inconsistent with permanent guardianship 

being a stable, long-term permanency goal. Along with 

reunification and adoption, guardianship is one of the main 

potential permanency goals when a child has been removed 

from his or her home due to abuse or neglect. See Utah Admin. 

Code R512-300-4(4)(b) (listing reunification, adoption, 

 

2. Guardian asserts that permanent guardians retain a bundle of 

“residual rights” following removal and granting of temporary 

custody to DCFS. This argument is unpreserved and, apart from 

its application to reunification services, undeveloped on appeal. 

Thus, while we conclude that a permanent guardian has the 

right to seek reunification services, we do not consider whether 

other residual rights, similar to those enjoyed by parents, might 

apply to permanent guardians.
In re Z.G.

20150457-CA 6 2016 UT App 98

guardianship, and “[i]ndividualized [p]ermanency” as potential 

permanency goals); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-314(4) (directing 

the juvenile court, once it has terminated reunification services, 

to determine “whether termination of parental rights, adoption, 

or permanent custody and guardianship is the most appropriate 

final plan for the minor”). Indeed, it is considered such a 

permanent arrangement that the Juvenile Court Act precludes a

parent from filing a petition for restoration of custody “during 

the existence of a permanent guardianship established for the 

child.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-1103(3)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2015). The only other circumstances where such a petition is 

precluded are where the child is in a secure youth corrections 

facility or the parent’s parental rights have been terminated. See 

id. § 78A-6-1103(1), (3)(a). Guardianship also divests parents of 

certain residual parental rights. Id. § 78A-6-105(35)(b). In light of 

the status the legislature has granted permanent guardianship, 

we cannot see how it would further the goals of the legislature to 

deny permanent guardians any opportunity to obtain 

reunification services.

¶11 For these reasons, we conclude that permanent guardians 

have standing to seek reunification services. We now turn to the 

question of whether the juvenile court exceeded its discretion by 

granting the guardian ad litem’s motion to deny services to 

Guardian.

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Exceed Its Discretion in Denying 

Reunification Services to Guardian.

¶12 Despite agreeing with Guardian that she had standing to 

seek reunification services, the State maintains that the juvenile 

court acted within its discretion in determining that reunification 

services were not in Child’s best interests under the 

circumstances of this case. Guardian does not address this issue 

and instead requests that we remand the case for the juvenile 

court “to consider whether a grant of reunification services to 
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20150457-CA 7 2016 UT App 98

*Guardian+ is warranted.” Because the juvenile court already 

addressed this issue, in spite of its alternative ruling that 

Guardian lacked standing, we decline to remand the case.

¶13 Even parents have no absolute right to receive 

reunification services. In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955–56 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1998).

Whenever the court orders continued removal at 

the dispositional hearing, and that the minor 

remain in the custody of the division, the court 

shall first: (a) establish a primary permanency plan 

for the minor; and (b) determine whether, in view 

of the primary permanency plan, reunification 

services are appropriate for the minor and the 

minor’s family . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). Thus, 

“reunification services need only be considered when they are 

implicated by the primary permanency goal for a child.” In re 

A.T., 2015 UT 41, ¶ 17, 353 P.3d 131.

¶14 Here, the juvenile court found that “ordering 

reunification services to [Guardian] would not be in the best 

interests of” Child. The court observed that in a very short 

period of time, Child had been removed from her mother, 

removed from Guardian twice, and given up by Guardian’s 

mother. The court expressed reluctance to leave Child in limbo 

while Guardian or Child’s parents attempted to get their lives 

back on track: “And how long am I supposed to put *Child’s+ life 

on hold? She’s almost three years old. Until she’s five? Until 

she’s six? Until she’s 16?” The court was also concerned with 

Guardian’s lack of honesty regarding her drug use. Given these 

concerns, the juvenile court did not exceed its discretion in 

determining that reunification services were not in Child’s best 

interests.
In re Z.G.

20150457-CA 8 2016 UT App 98

CONCLUSION

¶15 We determine that a permanent guardian has standing to 

seek reunification services. However, under the circumstances of

this case, the juvenile court did not exceed its discretion in 

determining that reunification services were not in Child’s best 

interests. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s grant of the 

guardian ad litem’s motion to deny reunification services to 

Guardian.