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[Senate Report 110-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                      110-2

======================================================================

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                                _______
                                

                January 24, 2007.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Rockefeller, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted 
                             the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                   ADDITIONAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 372]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 372) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2007 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

 EXCEPT FOR MINOR CHANGES, THIS BILL IS IDENTICAL TO THE BILL THAT THE 
          COMMITTEE REPORTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION

    On April 26, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5020, its proposed 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which was 
then placed on the Senate Calendar. On May 25, 2006, the 
Committee favorably reported S. 3237, its proposed Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. After a sequential 
referral, S. 3237 was reported by the Committee on Armed 
Services (without any recommended changes) on June 21, 2006, 
thereby joining the House bill on the Senate Calendar. However, 
just as had occurred with the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006, the Senate did not proceed to 
consideration of either the House or Committee bill during the 
109th Congress.
    The bill that the Committee is now reporting is identical 
to S. 3237 except for minor changes in eight sections: (1) a 
change in Sections 102, 103, and 106 so that references are to 
the 110th Congress rather than the 109th Congress; (2) a change 
in the date in Section 313 for submission of a classified 
report by the Director of National Intelligence; (3) the 
substitution in the heading of Section 314 of the word ``any'' 
for the word ``alleged'' to conform the heading to the text of 
the section; (4) the deletion of inadvertently repeated words 
in Section 401; and (5) technical corrections in Sections 408 
and 432.

                         CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT

    The classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of the details 
of its budgetary recommendations. As in the past, the Committee 
has prepared a Classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Committee has also prepared a Classified Annex that explains 
the Committee's actions in the Schedule of Authorizations. 
Sections 102 and 103 of the bill provide for incorporation of 
the Schedule and Annex and for the obligation of the Executive 
Branch to adhere to their requirements.
    The classified supplement, which consists of the Schedule 
and the Annex, is available for review by any Member of the 
Senate subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of 
the 94th Congress. It is also being provided to the House and 
Senate Committees on Appropriations, to the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and to the President. The 
President shall provide for appropriate distribution within the 
Executive Branch.
    The classified supplement that accompanies the bill and 
this report is identical to the classified supplement that 
accompanied S. 3237 and S. Rep. No. 109-259 of the 109th 
Congress. In addition to reconciling differences between the 
House and Senate, the conferees on the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 will need to account for 
the fact that the fiscal year has begun and that funds have 
been appropriated and that other budgetary actions have been 
taken for the fiscal year in advance of the conference report. 
Also, the Classified Annex has dates for actions to be taken by 
the Intelligence Community that may need to be adjusted in 
light of present circumstances in the course of a conference 
with the House. The Committee requests that the Director of 
National Intelligence, or the heads of elements of the 
Intelligence Community as appropriate, promptly inform the 
Committee about the status of responses to directions in the 
Classified Annex, including the projected time for responding 
to matters that remain pending.

     AUTHORIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE

    The Committee was established in 1976. Section 12 of S. 
Res. 400 of 1976, the basic charter of the Committee, provides 
that apart from continuing resolutions no funds shall be 
appropriated for intelligence activities unless previously 
authorized by a bill that has passed the Senate. The section-
by-section analysis placed in the record by Senator Ribicoff, 
Chairman of the Committee on Government Operations and the 
floor manager of the resolution, explained that ``Periodic 
authorizations of the intelligence agencies will constitute a 
very important aspect of the committee's oversight over the 
agencies. It should assure a regular review of each agency's 
intelligence activities, its efficiency, and its priorities.'' 
122 Cong. Rec. 13684 (1976). In a colloquy with Senator Nunn, 
Senator Ribicoff stressed that the annual authorization 
requirement ``constitutes a commitment, on behalf of the 
Senate, that funds will not be appropriated for these agencies 
before such an authorization.'' Id. at 14649.
    Senator Church, whose investigation led to creation of the 
Committee, told the Senate that annual authorization authority 
would be the committee's ``main legislative tool'' in carrying 
out oversight:

          The power of the purse is the most effective means 
        that the Legislature can have to assure that the will 
        of Congress is observed. There has never been an annual 
        authorization of the intelligence community budget. The 
        proposed oversight committee, for the first time, under 
        appropriate security safeguards, would be able to 
        consider all budgetary requests of the national 
        intelligence community on an annual basis.

Id. at 13892.
    The Committee's counterpart, the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, was established the following year. 
In 1978, the two Intelligence Committees reported bills that 
led to passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1979, beginning a 27-year sequence of annual authorization 
acts that was unbroken until this past Congress. Even when a 
presidential veto had initially prevented passage of an 
authorization act, as occurred in 1990 and 2000 for the Fiscal 
Year 1991 and 2001 bills, a second effort by Congress resulted 
in enactment of authorizations for those years.
    Fiscal Year 2006 was the first year, since Fiscal Year 
1978, for which Congress did not enact an intelligence 
authorization. The Committee's objective in reporting a Fiscal 
Year 2007 bill a second time is to ensure that the Committee, 
and then the Senate and Congress, fulfill their 
responsibilities for Fiscal Year 2007. As the 2007 bill 
proceeds to enactment, the Committee will be working on the 
2008 authorization so that not only does the current fiscal 
year end with an enacted intelligence authorization but that 
the coming fiscal year begins with one.

              SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

    As described above, the bill is identical to S. 3237 of the 
109th Congress other than for several minor changes that are 
also described above. Accordingly, the section-by-section 
analysis in the report which accompanied that bill, S. Rep. No. 
109-259, is set forth here (with minimal changes that 
correspond to the minor changes in the bill and a few other 
nonsubstantive edits) as the Committee's analysis and 
explanation of the bill that the Committee is now reporting.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for fiscal year 2007.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2007 are 
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Incorporation of classified annex

    Section 103 incorporates into law the Classified Annex to 
this Report. Unless otherwise specifically stated, the amounts 
authorized in the Classified Annex are not in addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of 
the Act or by the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
    The Committee has taken the step of incorporating the 
Classified Annex because the Executive Branch, in the past, has 
refused to treat with equal weight the language in the 
classified annexes and the text of recent authorization acts 
and their accompanying classified schedules of authorizations. 
This Committee, and Congress, will not permit the Executive 
Branch to ignore the clear instructions of Congress merely 
because the directives are contained, by necessity of 
classification, in an annex accompanying the report associated 
with intelligence authorizing legislation. The Committee 
directs the Executive Branch to comply fully with any directed 
transfers, temporary limitations on use (fences), or other 
limitations or instructions contained in the Classified Annex 
to this Report.

Section 104. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 104 authorizes the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), with the approval of the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2007 to 
authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the 
personnel ceilings applicable to the elements of the 
Intelligence Community under Section 102 by an amount not to 
exceed 2 percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under 
Section 102. The DNI may exercise this authority only if 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions. Any exercise of this authority must be reported to 
the intelligence committees of the Congress.

Section 105. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 105 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (CMA) of the DNI and sets the 
personnel end-strength for the elements within the CMA for 
fiscal year 2007.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $648,952,000 
for fiscal year 2007 for the activities of the CMA of the DNI. 
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced 
research and development to remain available for two years.
    Subsection (b) authorizes 1,575 full-time personnel for 
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2007 and provides that 
such personnel may be permanent employees of a CMA element or 
detailed from other elements of the United States government.
    Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and 
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule 
of Authorizations and permits the additional funding for 
research and development to remain available through September 
30, 2008.
    Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in Section 
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from 
another element of the United States government shall be 
detailed to an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, 
except that for temporary functions such personnel may be 
detailed on a non-reimbursable basis for periods of less than 
one year.

Section 106. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 106 incorporates into the Act by reference each 
requirement to submit a report contained in the Joint 
Explanatory Statement to accompany the Conference Report or in 
the Classified Annex accompanying the Conference Report.

Section 107. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding 
        information

    Section 107 would require the President to disclose the 
aggregate amount of funds requested for the National 
Intelligence Program in the annual budget submission for the 
program. The section would also require Congress to disclose 
the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, 
and the aggregate amount appropriated, for the National 
Intelligence Program. It also directs the DNI to conduct a 
study to assess the advisability of publicly disclosing the 
aggregate amount of funding requested, authorized, and 
appropriated for each of the 16 elements of the Intelligence 
Community. The report must be submitted to Congress within 180 
days of enactment of this Act.

Section 108. Response of intelligence community to requests from 
        Congress for intelligence documents and information

    Section 108 provides for certain procedural requirements 
related to the ability of Congress to gain access, through the 
intelligence committees and other committees of jurisdiction, 
to intelligence reports, assessments, estimates, legal 
opinions, and other intelligence information. The provision 
states that elements of the Intelligence Community must provide 
to the intelligence committees any intelligence documents or 
information requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman (or 
Ranking Minority Member) of such committees. The statutory 
requirement applies only to existing intelligence documents and 
information and would not apply to requests to generate new 
intelligence assessments, reports, estimates, legal opinions, 
or other information.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$256,400,000 for fiscal year 2007 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 303 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as 
``elements of the intelligence community'' of other elements of 
departments and agencies of the United States government not 
listed in Section 3(4).

Section 304. Improvement of notification of Congress regarding 
        intelligence activities of the United States Government

    Section 304 amends the requirements for notifications to 
Congress under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a & 413b). First, Section 304 amends 
the definition of ``congressional intelligence committees'' in 
Section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
401a(7)), specifically including ``each member'' of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives within such definition. Second, Section 304 
requires that, in the event that the DNI or the head of an 
Intelligence Community element does not provide to all Members 
of the ``congressional intelligence committees'' the 
notification required by Section 502 (relating to intelligence 
activities other than covert actions) or Section 503 (relating 
to covert actions) of the National Security Act of 1947, that 
all Members will be provided with a notification of this fact 
and will be provided with a summary of the intelligence 
activity or covert action in a manner sufficient to permit such 
Members to assess the legality, benefits, costs, and 
advisability of the intelligence activity or covert action. 
Third, Section 304 extends requirements in Section 502 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 on the form and contents of 
reports to the ``congressional intelligence committees'' on 
intelligence activities other than covert actions to the 
requirements for notifications to Congress under Section 503 of 
that Act (relating to covert actions). Fourth, the section 
requires that any change to a covert action finding under 
Section 503 of that Act must be reported to the committees, 
rather than the existing requirement to report any 
``significant'' change.

Section 305. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
404k) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier 
when it is consistent with Intelligence Community mission 
requirements or, more specifically, is required for cover 
purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional 
circumstances. As presently written, the DNI may only delegate 
this authority to the Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) or, with 
respect to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees, to the 
Director of the CIA.
    Section 305 of this bill provides that the DNI may delegate 
the authority in Section 116 of the National Security Act of 
1947 to the head of any element of the Intelligence Community. 
This expansion is consistent with the view of the Committee 
that the DNI should be able to delegate authority throughout 
the Intelligence Community when such delegation serves the 
overall interests of the Community.
    Section 305 also provides that the head of an Intelligence 
Community element to whom travel authority has been delegated 
is also empowered to delegate the authority to senior officials 
of the element as specified in guidelines issued by the DNI. 
This allows for administrative flexibility, consistent with the 
guidance of the DNI, for the entire Community. To facilitate 
Congressional oversight, the DNI shall submit the guidelines to 
the intelligence committees of the Congress.

Section 306. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 306 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) 
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the 
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. 
L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004)) (governing the transfer and 
reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding). In 
particular, this conforming amendment replaces the ``unforeseen 
requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a clearer 
standard to govern reprogrammings and transfers of funds 
authorized for a different intelligence or intelligence-related 
activity. Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer 
would be authorized if, in addition to the other requirements 
of Section 504(a)(3), the new use of funds would ``support an 
emergent need, improve program effectiveness, or increase 
efficiency.'' This modification brings the standard for 
reprogrammings or transfers of intelligence funding into 
conformity with the standards applicable to reprogrammings and 
transfers under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 
1947. The modification preserves Congressional oversight of 
proposed reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the 
Intelligence Community's ability to carry out missions and 
functions vital to national security.

Section 307. Additional limitation on availability of funds for 
        intelligence and intelligence-related activities

    Section 307 specifies that appropriated funds may be 
obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-
related activity only if the ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' have been ``fully and currently informed'' of that 
activity, or if all Members have been provided a summary of the 
activity, consistent with the requirements of Sections 502(b) 
and 503(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
413a(b) & 413b(c)(5)), as amended by Section 304 of this Act.

Section 308. Increase in penalties for disclosure of undercover 
        intelligence officers and agents

    Section 308 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act 
(50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for 
individuals with authorized access to classified information 
who intentionally disclose any information identifying a covert 
agent, if those individuals know that the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States. Currently, the 
maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who has had 
``authorized access to classified information that identifies a 
covert agent'' is 10 years. Subsection (a) increases that 
maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the maximum sentence 
for disclosure by someone who ``as a result of having 
authorized access to classified information, learns of the 
identity of a covert agent'' is 5 years. Subsection (b) 
increases that maximum sentence to 10 years.

Section 309. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of 
        the intelligence community

    Section 309 adds a new Section 1103 to the National 
Security Act of 1947, authorizing Intelligence Community 
elements to accept, retain, and--for certain purposes--use 
amounts received from private parties as repayment of debts 
owed to such element.
    Each year some property purchased with appropriated funds 
is damaged beyond use or is lost through the negligence of a 
private party or an employee of the Intelligence Community. The 
damaged or lost property may have been used to support wartime 
activities or other national intelligence missions and, thus, 
waiting for additional funds to be provided through the next 
annual appropriation cycle inhibits the Intelligence 
Community's ability to quickly and efficiently support the war 
fighter and other national intelligence missions.
    Section 309 addresses this shortcoming by authorizing 
elements of the Intelligence Community to accept and retain 
reimbursement, outside of the annual appropriations cycle, from 
a private party, including a Federal employee, who has been 
found to have negligently lost or damaged property. As a 
result, elements of the Intelligence Community will be able to 
expeditiously repair or replace lost or damaged property 
without waiting for the next appropriation cycle. Similarly, 
this new section also authorizes elements of the Intelligence 
Community to retain funds paid by Intelligence Community 
employees or former employees as repayment of a default on the 
terms and conditions of scholarship, fellowship, or other 
educational assistance provided by the Community to the 
employee. The section authorizes crediting payments only to the 
current appropriation account related to the debt and limits 
the subsequent use of the funds.

Section 310. Pilot program on disclosure of records under the Privacy 
        Act relating to certain intelligence activities

    As a result of reporting requirements in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 
(Dec. 13, 2003)) intended to improve information access, the 
Intelligence Community, Department of Defense (DoD), Department 
of Homeland Security, and Federal law enforcement agencies 
formed the Information Sharing Working Group (ISWG) to, inter 
alia, identify impediments to information access in existing 
laws and in Intelligence Community and DoD policies. The ISWG 
issued its report in December 2004.
    In the report, the ISWG noted that certain provisions of 
the Privacy Act could prevent the sharing of intelligence 
information within the Executive Branch. Generally, the Privacy 
Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) precludes the dissemination of information 
regarding U.S. persons stored within a system of records 
maintained by the United States government without the consent 
of that individual. There are, however, twelve exceptions to 
this general rule. For example, one exception permits the 
sharing of information to support a civil or criminal law 
enforcement activity under certain prescribed circumstances. 
There is no exception permitting Intelligence Community 
elements and other United States government agencies to share 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information 
(including information concerning international terrorism or 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) between or with 
elements of the Intelligence Community.
    To address this shortcoming, Section 310 creates a pilot 
program to study a narrow intelligence exception to the Privacy 
Act. Specifically, the provision allows transfers under three 
circumstances. First, the provision permits elements of the 
Intelligence Community to share with other elements of the 
Intelligence Community information covered by the Privacy Act 
pertaining to an identifiable individual when that information 
is relevant to a lawful and authorized foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence activity. To share such foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence information under this 
provision pertaining to other than an identifiable individual 
would require the authorization of the DNI or his designee. 
Second, the provision permits the head of an element of the 
Intelligence Community to request in writing from another 
United States government agency Privacy Act records relevant to 
a lawful and authorized activity of that element to protect 
against international terrorism or the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Third, the provision authorizes heads of 
non-Intelligence Community agencies to share Privacy Act 
records with an element of the Intelligence Community if the 
record constitutes ``terrorism information'' (as defined in 
Section 1016(a)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004)) or 
information concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, if the receiving element of the Intelligence 
Community is lawfully authorized to collect or analyze the 
information to protect against international terrorism or 
proliferation. When necessary to determine whether a record 
held by a non-Intelligence Community agency constitutes 
terrorism information or information concerning the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the head of such 
agency may consult the DNI or the Attorney General. Section 310 
also extends to the pilot program an exemption from certain 
records access and disclosure accounting requirements. In order 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure, this exemption is similar to the exemption extended 
to the DNI under Section 416 of this Act.
    Section 310 will not be effective until the DNI and the 
Attorney General issue guidelines governing the implementation 
and exercise of the authorities granted by the section. The 
guidelines will ensure that Section 310 is implemented in a 
manner designed to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. 
persons and consistent with existing law, regulations, and 
Executive orders governing the conduct of intelligence 
activities.
    It is important to note that Section 310 facilitates the 
sharing only of intelligence information already lawfully 
collected and maintained within United States government record 
systems and relevant to a lawful and authorized foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence activity (with a particular 
focus on sharing by non-Intelligence Community elements of 
information concerning international terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). The provision 
expressly states that the new authority to share already 
collected information does not permit the collection or 
retention of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
information not otherwise authorized by law.
    To ensure that the exception to the Privacy Act permits 
necessary sharing of critical foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence information while providing appropriate 
protections for the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. 
persons, Section 310 establishes a three-year pilot program. 
The exception to the Privacy Act will expire three years after 
the DNI and the Attorney General issue the guidelines discussed 
above, unless renewed. During the course of the program, the 
DNI and the Attorney General, in consultation with the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, are required to submit to 
the intelligence committees annual reports on the status and 
implementation of the pilot program. Additionally, six months 
prior to the expiration of the program, the DNI and the 
Attorney General, in coordination with the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board, will submit a final report to the 
intelligence committees, including any recommendations 
regarding continued authorization of the exception. Similarly, 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board will submit to 
the intelligence committees a separate report providing the 
Board's advice and counsel on the development and 
implementation of the authorities provided under this Section.
    Section 310 includes modifications proposed by the Armed 
Services Committee, the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, and individual Members of the Senate during 
consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006. Both the Office of the DNI and the Department of 
Justice (DoJ) have expressed their support for this provision. 
Specifically, in a letter to the Committee dated December 1, 
2005, referring to a provision similar to Section 310 in the 
Committee-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2006, the DNI wrote, the ``Administration strongly supports 
this provision because it would facilitate the type of 
information sharing mandated by the [Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004], consistent with the need to 
protect privacy and civil liberties.'' Similarly, in a separate 
letter to the Committee dated November 28, 2005, the Assistant 
Attorney General for Legislative Affairs wrote, ``We support 
section 307 [of the Committee-passed Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2006]. . . . We believe that this provision 
would help in resolving some of the concerns that some agencies 
have expressed about sharing information with the FBI for 
counterterrorism purposes.'' In fact, the DNI included a 
Privacy Act exception similar to Section 310 in the DNI's 
Fiscal Year 2007 request for legislative authorities.

Section 311. Extension to intelligence community of authority to delete 
        information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and 
        decorations

    Current law requires that certain Federal ``employees''--a 
term that generally applies to all officials and personnel of 
the Intelligence Community and certain contractors, spouses, 
dependents, and others--file reports with their ``employing'' 
agency regarding the receipt of gifts or ``decorations'' from 
foreign governments. See 5 U.S.C. 7342. Following compilation 
of these reports, the ``employing'' agency is required to 
annually file with the Secretary of State detailed information 
about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations reported by 
its employees, including the source of the gift. See 5 U.S.C. 
7342(f). The Secretary of State is then required to publish a 
comprehensive list of the agency reports in the Federal 
Register. See id. With respect to the activities of the 
Intelligence Community, the public disclosure of such gifts or 
decorations in the Federal Register has the potential to 
compromise intelligence sources (e.g., the confirmation of an 
intelligence relationship with a foreign government) and could 
undermine national security. Recognizing this potential 
concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted 
a limited exemption from reporting certain specified 
information about such foreign gifts or decorations where the 
publication of the information could adversely affect United 
States intelligence sources. See Pub. L. No. 95-105, Sec. 
515(a) (Aug. 17, 1977). Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 
17, 2004) (``Intelligence Reform Act''), extended a similar 
exemption to the DNI (in addition to amending the existing 
exemption to apply to the Director of the CIA).
    Section 311 amends existing law to provide to the heads of 
each Intelligence Community element the same limited exemption 
from specified public reporting requirements that is currently 
authorized for the DNI and the Director of the CIA. The 
national security concerns that prompted the initial DCI 
exemption, and the subsequent exemptions for the DNI and 
Director of the CIA, apply with equal weight to other 
Intelligence Community elements--the publication of certain 
information relating to foreign gifts or decorations provided 
to employees of all Intelligence Community agencies could 
adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 
311 provides the exemption necessary to protect national 
security, but mandates that the information not provided to the 
Secretary of State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued 
independent oversight of the receipt by Intelligence Community 
``employees'' of foreign gifts or decorations.

Section 312. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of 
        personal effects, household goods, and automobiles

    Section 312 provides the CIA and the Office of the DNI the 
same authority that is granted to the Department of State by 
Section 2677 of Title 22, United States Code, when travel and 
transportation authorized by valid travel orders begins in one 
fiscal year, but may not be completed during that same fiscal 
year. The Committee believes this authority will relieve the 
administrative burden of charging the eligible costs to two 
fiscal years' appropriations and adjusting associated accounts.

Section 313. Director of National Intelligence report on compliance 
        with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

    Section 313 requires the DNI to submit a classified report 
to the intelligence committees on all measures taken by the 
Office of the DNI, and by any element of the Intelligence 
Community with relevant responsibilities, on compliance with 
two provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. S. 3237 
provided that the report should be submitted no later than 
September 1, 2006. The bill now being reported establishes a 
new no-later-than date for the report, May 1, 2007.
    The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provides, in part, that 
no individual in the custody or under the physical control of 
the United States, regardless of nationality or physical 
location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The report required by Section 313 
shall include a description of any detention or interrogation 
methods that have been determined to comply with this 
prohibition or have been discontinued pursuant to it.
    The Detainee Treatment of Act of 2005 also provides, in 
part, for the protection, against civil or criminal liability, 
for United States Government personnel who had engaged in 
officially authorized interrogations that were determined to be 
lawful at the time. Section 313 requires the DNI to report on 
actions taken to implement that provision.
    The report required by Section 313 shall also include an 
appendix containing all guidelines on the application of the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to the detention or 
interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the 
Intelligence Community. The appendix shall also include all 
legal opinions of the DoJ about the meaning of the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 or its application to detention or 
interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the 
Intelligence Community.

Section 314. Report on any clandestine detention facilities for 
        individuals captured in the Global War on Terrorism

    Section 314 requires the DNI to submit a classified, 
detailed report to the Members of the intelligence committees 
that provides a full accounting on each clandestine prison or 
detention facility, if any, currently or formerly operated by 
the United States Government, regardless of location, at which 
detainees in the global war on terrorism are or have been held. 
Section 314 sets forth required elements of this report: the 
location and size of each such prison or facility, its 
disposition if no longer operated by the United States 
Government, plans for the ultimate disposition of detainees 
currently held, a description of interrogation procedures used 
or formerly used, and whether those procedures are or were in 
compliance with United States obligations under the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention Against Torture. The classified 
report is to be submitted no later than 60 days after enactment 
of this Act.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Section 401. Additional authorities of the Director of National 
        Intelligence on intelligence information sharing

    Section 401 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the DNI statutory authority to use National 
Intelligence Program funds to quickly address deficiencies or 
needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing 
capabilities. The new Section 102A(g)(1)(G) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 authorizes the DNI to provide to a 
receiving agency or component--for that agency or component to 
accept and use--funds that have been authorized and 
appropriated to address intelligence information access or 
sharing needs. In the alternative, the DNI may provide to a 
receiving agency necessary or associated services and equipment 
procured with funds from the National Intelligence Program. The 
new Section 102A(g)(1)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 
also grants the DNI the authority to provide funds to non-
National Intelligence Program activities for the purpose of 
addressing critical gaps in intelligence information access or 
sharing capabilities. Without the authority, the development 
and implementation of necessary capabilities could be delayed 
by an agency's lack of authority to accept or utilize systems 
funded from the National Intelligence Program, inability to use 
or identify current-year funding, or concerns regarding the 
augmentation of appropriations. These new DNI authorities are 
similar to authority granted to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) with respect to imagery and imagery-
related systems. See Section 105(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-5).

Section 402. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director 
        of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence 
        sources and methods

    Section 402 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
modify the limitation on delegation by the DNI of the authority 
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure. The provision permits the DNI to delegate the 
authority to the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence or 
the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. A 
previous provision in the National Security Act of 1947 had 
vested the power to protect sources and methods in the DCI, but 
did not constrain further delegation of the authority.

Section 403. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to 
        manage access to human intelligence information

    Section 403 provides the DNI with the authority to ensure 
the dissemination of intelligence information collected through 
human sources, including the underlying operational data 
necessary to understand that reporting, to appropriately 
cleared analysts or other intelligence officers throughout the 
Intelligence Community. Recent intelligence failures--
particularly related to pre-war intelligence assessments on 
Iraq--have demonstrated the importance of rebuilding and 
improving the nation's human intelligence capabilities. While 
the Intelligence Community is making some progress in this 
regard, a great deal remains to be done, particularly in the 
area of access to intelligence gathered through human 
intelligence operations.
    The Committee's review of the Intelligence Community's 
prewar assessments on Iraq highlighted the impact of 
unnecessary restrictions on access by intelligence analysts to 
human intelligence information. In its Report of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's 
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, the Committee 
concluded that the Intelligence Community's failure to provide 
cleared analysts with a legitimate ``need-to-know'' broader 
access to human intelligence reporting, including the 
operational data underlying that reporting, contributed to the 
flawed intelligence assessments on Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction programs. Access to this data--controlled by the 
agencies that collected the information--would have provided 
analysts with a better understanding of the reliability of the 
sources of the reporting, as well as other significant 
intelligence information required for their work.
    The Intelligence Reform Act provides the DNI with a number 
of tools to foster greater information access within the 
Community. Section 403 builds on these tools by providing the 
DNI with the specific authority to ensure analysts and other 
Intelligence Community officers are provided with improved 
access to human intelligence reporting, consistent with the 
DNI's determinations regarding the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods. Although the Committee expects that 
individual elements will continue to retain human intelligence 
operational data, access decisions will be made by the DNI as a 
neutral arbiter of need-to-know. No longer will these access 
decisions be left to individual agencies with a parochial--and 
understandable--desire to protect sources at all costs. Access 
to human intelligence reporting, and underlying operational 
reporting, must be balanced against real threats to sources and 
methods. Under Section 403, the Committee expects the DNI to 
perform the necessary balancing. Section 403 also provides the 
DNI with full and regular access to the information necessary 
to ``manage and direct . . . the tasking of, collection, 
analysis, production, and dissemination of national 
intelligence by elements of the intelligence community.'' See 
Section 102A(f)(1)(A)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-1(f)(1)(A)(ii)).
    To effectively implement Section 403, the DNI should 
standardize security clearance processes across Intelligence 
Community elements to resolve issues that have hampered 
information access in the past. The Committee does not believe 
that working in a particular agency makes one Intelligence 
Community officer inherently more trustworthy than a 
counterpart with the same security clearance and a legitimate 
``need-to-know'' at another element. Resolution of disparate 
clearance standards and processes, however, should provide 
Intelligence Community elements with an additional degree of 
comfort that, while information from sources for which those 
agencies are responsible has received greater distribution, the 
recipients of that information are appropriately cleared 
consistent with DNI standards. Based on the authorities 
provided to the DNI in the Intelligence Reform Act and this 
section, the Committee is confident that the DNI can implement 
the protections necessary for intelligence sources and methods, 
while making human intelligence information more readily 
available to appropriately cleared intelligence officers who 
need the information for the conduct of their duties.

Section 404. Additional administrative authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    From an organizational standpoint, the DNI should be able 
to rapidly focus the Intelligence Community on a particular 
intelligence issue through a coordinated effort that uses all 
available resources. The ability of the DNI to respond with 
flexibility and to coordinate the Intelligence Community 
response to an emerging threat should not depend on the time-
sensitive vagaries of the budget cycle and should not be 
constrained by general limitations found in appropriations law 
(e.g., 31 U.S.C. 1532) or the annual limitation set forth in 
the ``General Provisions'' of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of 
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. See, 
e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Division H--
Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 2005, Section 610, Pub. L. No. 
108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004); see also, e.g., In re: Veterans 
Administration Funding of Federal Executive Boards, 65 Comp. 
Gen. 689 (July 1, 1986) (discussing history of prohibition on 
interagency financing of boards, commissions, councils, 
committees, or similar groups).
    To provide this needed operational and organizational 
flexibility, Section 404 grants the DNI the authority--
notwithstanding certain specified provisions of general 
appropriations law--to approve interagency financing of 
national intelligence centers (authorized under Section 119B of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-2)) and of 
other boards, commissions, councils, committees, or similar 
groups established by the DNI (e.g., ``mission managers,'' as 
recommended by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD 
Commission)). Under Section 404, the DNI could authorize the 
pooling of resources from various Intelligence Community and 
non-Intelligence Community agencies to finance national 
intelligence centers or other organizational groupings designed 
to address identified intelligence matters. Once approved by 
the DNI, the provision also expressly permits other United 
States government departments and agencies, including 
Intelligence Community elements, to fund, or participate in the 
funding of, the authorized activities.
    The Committee recognizes the need for coordinated responses 
to national security threats and intelligence problems. To 
better understand how the DNI intends to utilize the authority 
provided under Section 404, the Committee directs the DNI to 
provide an annual report--through the end of fiscal year 2010--
providing details on how this authority has been exercised, 
what amount of appropriated funds attributable to each 
interagency contributor has been accessed to finance each 
national intelligence center or other organizational grouping 
under this section, and whether the National Intelligence 
Program or other budget account has been modified to provide 
specific funding for such national intelligence centers or 
other organizational groupings or whether funding will continue 
to be provided under the authority of Section 404.

Section 405. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 405 clarifies that the ban on co-location of the 
Office of the DNI with any other Intelligence Community 
element, which is slated to take effect as of October 1, 2008, 
applies to the co-location of the headquarters of the Office of 
the DNI with the headquarters of any other Intelligence 
Community agency or element. This provision provides 
flexibility to ensure that components of the Office of the DNI 
may be located in the most appropriate facility or facilities, 
including co-location with components of Intelligence Community 
agencies or elements. The Committee is aware that the DNI 
intends to find a headquarters that is separate and apart from 
the headquarters of the various Intelligence Community 
elements, consistent with the expressed intent of Congress.

Section 406. Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    As part of the restructuring of the nation's intelligence 
infrastructure in the Intelligence Reform Act, Congress created 
a Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the 
DNI. Under the Act, the Director of Science and Technology 
serves as the DNI's chief representative for science and 
technology, assisting the DNI in formulating a long-term 
strategy for scientific advances in the field of intelligence 
and on the science and technology elements of the intelligence 
budget. Additionally, the Director of Science and Technology 
chairs the DNI's Science and Technology Committee responsible 
for coordinating advances in intelligence-related research and 
development.
    The House-passed version of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5020 (109th Cong., 2d Sess.), 
contains a provision (Section 403) that further expounds on the 
role of the Director of Science and Technology. Section 403 in 
H.R. 5020 would require the Director of Science and Technology 
to systematically identify the Intelligence Community's most 
significant challenges requiring technical solutions and to 
develop options to enhance research and development efforts to 
meet requirements in a timely manner. Section 403 would also 
require the DNI to submit to Congress a report detailing the 
strategy for development and use of technology throughout the 
Intelligence Community through 2021. The report is to identify 
the Community's highest priority intelligence gaps that may be 
resolved by the use of technology; identify goals for advanced 
research and development; explain how advanced research and 
development projects funded under the National Intelligence 
Program address the identified gaps; specify current and 
projected research and development projects; and provide a plan 
for incorporating technology from research and development 
projects into National Intelligence Program acquisition 
programs.
    Section 406 incorporates additional requirements into a 
provision otherwise similar to Section 403 of H.R. 5020.
    The Committee supports the House provision, but also 
believes that such a provision should make clear that it is the 
responsibility of the Director of Science and Technology to 
assist the DNI in ensuring that the Intelligence Community's 
research and development priorities and projects are consistent 
with national intelligence requirements; that a priority be 
placed on addressing identified deficiencies in the collection, 
processing, analysis, or dissemination of national 
intelligence; that the research and development priorities and 
projects account for program development and acquisition 
funding constraints; and that such priorities and projects 
address system requirements from collection to final 
dissemination.
    The Committee further requires the Director of Science and 
Technology, at the direction of the DNI, to develop and 
maintain an integrated Technical Standards System for major 
acquisitions. The Technical Standards System should improve the 
availability of technical standards for the design, 
development, and operation of Intelligence Community programs 
and projects; reduce duplication of effort and improve 
interoperability within the Intelligence Community, with the 
private sector, and with international partners; and enhance 
awareness of standardization in the Intelligence Community. 
Under this provision, the Director of Science and Technology 
will develop standards that document uniform engineering and 
technical requirements for processes, procedures, practices, 
and methods, including requirements for selection, application, 
and design criteria of particular items. The Committee 
encourages the DNI to consult, as appropriate, with the heads 
of other United States government departments and agencies 
(e.g., the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Secretary of 
Homeland Security) when developing standards and specifications 
under this provision.

Section 407. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 407 converts the position of Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) of the Intelligence Community from an appointment 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to an appointment by the DNI. The provision also 
expressly designates the position as CIO of the Intelligence 
Community. The modification to the title of the position of CIO 
is consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as 
outlined in Section 103G(b) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g(b)). Section 407 shall apply with 
respect to any appointment of an individual to serve as CIO of 
the Intelligence Community that is made on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.
    The CIO of the Intelligence Community has reorganized his 
office to reflect his legislative responsibilities. The 
reorganized office consists of the following units: (1) 
Intelligence Community Governance; (2) Intelligence Community 
Enterprise Architecture; (3) Information Sharing and Customer 
Outreach; (4) Intelligence Community Information Technology 
Management; and (4) Enterprise Services. The CIO of the 
Intelligence Community has also established mechanisms to bring 
together the chief information officers of major elements of 
the Intelligence Community.
    The creation of a CIO of the Intelligence Community 
(Section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-487 (Dec. 23, 2004))), combined with 
the budgetary authorities and information technology 
responsibilities of the DNI (see, e.g., Section 1011 of the 
Intelligence Reform Act), laid an important foundation for 
improvements in the information technology infrastructure of 
the Intelligence Community. The Committee believes that the CIO 
of the Intelligence Community must provide direction and 
guidance to all elements of the Intelligence Community to 
ensure that information technology research and development, 
security, and acquisition programs support information access 
throughout the Intelligence Community. The modification to the 
manner in which the CIO of the Intelligence Community is 
appointed should not be construed to diminish the authorities 
or responsibilities of the position.

Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes the 
DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI 
determines that an Inspector General ``would be beneficial to 
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the 
DNI.'' It further provides that the DNI may grant to the 
Inspector General ``any of the duties, responsibilities, and 
authorities'' set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. 
The DNI has now appointed an Inspector General and has granted 
the Inspector General certain authorities pursuant to Director 
of National Intelligence Instruction No. 2005-10 (Sept. 7, 
2005). The duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the 
Inspector General, and his ability to exercise his authorities 
across all elements of the Community, remain ambiguous, 
however. In H.R. Rep. 109-411 (April 6, 2006) (report of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives (HPSCI) to accompany H.R. 5020, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007), the HPSCI 
has also expressed concerns that ``[the Office of the Inspector 
General] is currently chartered in a way that does not ensure 
the maximum utility of that office to act as a coordinating 
organization for all Intelligence Community Inspector Generals 
[sic], specifically with regard to keeping the Committee 
informed of its activities and findings.''
    The problems expressed by the HPSCI report and the concerns 
identified in the Committee's oversight must be addressed by an 
empowered and effective Inspector General to serve the DNI and 
the Intelligence Community. A strong Inspector General is vital 
to achieving the goal, set forth in the Intelligence Reform 
Act, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the 
Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the 
broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever 
they may be found in the Intelligence Community, including the 
manner in which elements of the Community interact with each 
other in such matters as providing access to information and 
undertaking joint or cooperative activities. To that end, by 
way of a proposed new Section 103H of the National Security Act 
of 1947, Section 408 of this Act establishes an Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community.
    The office will be established within the Office of the 
DNI. The Inspector General will keep both the DNI and the 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about 
problems and deficiencies in Intelligence Community programs 
and operations and the need for corrective actions. The 
Inspector General will be appointed by the President, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and will report directly to 
the DNI. To bolster the Inspector General's independence within 
the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General may be 
removed only by the President, who must then communicate the 
reasons for the Inspector General's removal to the intelligence 
committees.
    The DNI may prohibit the Inspector General from conducting 
an investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines 
that such action is necessary to protect vital national 
security interests. If the DNI exercises the authority to 
prohibit an investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons for 
taking such action to the intelligence committees within seven 
days. The Inspector General may, as necessary, provide a 
response to the intelligence committees regarding the actions 
of the DNI.
    The Inspector General will have direct and prompt access to 
the DNI and any Intelligence Community employee, or employee of 
a contractor, whose testimony is needed. The Inspector General 
will also have direct access to all records that relate to 
programs and activities for which the Inspector General has 
responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for 
appropriate administrative action.
    The Inspector General will have subpoena authority; 
however, information within the possession of the United States 
government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject 
to the DNI's concurrence, the Inspector General may request 
information from any United States government department, 
agency, or element. Upon receiving such a request from the 
Inspector General, heads of United States government 
departments, agencies, and elements, insofar as practicable and 
not in violation of law or regulation, must provide the 
requested information to the Inspector General.
    The Inspector General must submit semiannual reports to the 
DNI that include a description of significant problems relating 
to Intelligence Community programs and operations and to the 
relationships between Intelligence Community elements. The 
reports must include a description of Inspector General 
recommendations and a statement whether corrective action has 
been completed. Within 30 days of receiving the report from the 
Inspector General, the DNI must submit each semiannual report 
to Congress.
    The Inspector General must immediately report to the DNI 
particularly serious or flagrant violations. Within seven days, 
the DNI must transmit those reports to the intelligence 
committees, together with any comments. In the event the 
Inspector General is unable to resolve differences with the 
DNI, the Inspector General is authorized to report the serious 
or flagrant violation directly to the intelligence committees. 
Reports to the intelligence committees are also required with 
respect to investigations concerning high-ranking Intelligence 
Community officials.
    Intelligence Community employees, or employees of 
contractors, who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent 
concern''--such as a violation of law or Executive order, a 
false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from 
Congress--may report such complaints and supporting information 
to the Inspector General. Following a review by the Inspector 
General to determine the credibility of the complaint or 
information, the Inspector General must transmit such complaint 
and information to the DNI. On receiving the complaints or 
information from the Inspector General (together with the 
Inspector General's credibility determination), the DNI must 
transmit such complaint or information to the intelligence 
committees. If the Inspector General does not find a complaint 
or information to be credible, the reporting individual may 
submit the matter directly to the intelligence committees by 
following appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. 
Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting individuals 
constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.'' The Committee will 
not tolerate actions by the DNI, or by any Intelligence 
Community element, constituting a reprisal for reporting an 
``urgent concern'' or any other matter to Congress. 
Nonetheless, reporting individuals should ensure that the 
complaint and supporting information are provided to Congress 
consistent with appropriate procedures designed to protect 
intelligence sources and methods and other sensitive matters.
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General 
for another Intelligence Community element (or a parent 
department or agency), the Inspectors General must 
expeditiously resolve who will undertake the investigation, 
inspection, or audit. For investigations, inspections, or 
audits commenced by an Inspector General of an Intelligence 
Community element prior to the enactment of this Act, the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community should exercise 
his authority in a manner that does not disrupt the timely 
completion of such investigations, inspections, or audits or 
result in unnecessary duplication of effort. An Inspector 
General for an Intelligence Community element must share the 
results of any inspection, investigation, or audit with any 
other Inspector General, including the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, who otherwise would have had 
jurisdiction over the investigation.
    Consistent with existing law, the Inspector General must 
report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or 
complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
violations of Federal criminal law.
    Section 408 includes modifications proposed by the Armed 
Services Committee of the Senate during its sequential 
consideration of S. 1803, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006. In addition to technical modifications, 
these proposed modifications: (1) removed the authority of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to serve as the 
final arbiter of jurisdictional disputes among Intelligence 
Community Inspectors General; (2) exempted initial 
investigations, inspections, or audits of the DoD Inspector 
General, or any other Inspectors General within the DoD, from 
the authority of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community to conduct a subsequent investigation, inspection, or 
audit of the same matter if the initial investigation, 
inspection, or audit was deemed deficient; and (3) deleted a 
requirement that Intelligence Community Inspectors General must 
comply fully with requests for information or assistance from 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. Compare S. 
1803, Section 408, as reported by the Committee (S. Rep. 109-
142 (Sept. 29, 2005) (adding proposed subsection (g)(1), 
(g)(3), and (h)(3)(C) of new Section 103H of the National 
Security Act of 1947)) with S. 1803, Section 408, as reported 
by the Armed Services Committee (S. Rep. 109-173 (Oct. 27, 
2005) (modifying proposed subsection (g)(1), (g)(3), and 
(h)(3)(C))).

Section 409. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 409 expressly places four officials within the 
statutorily-defined Office of the DNI: (1) the CIO of the 
Intelligence Community; (2) the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community; (3) the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center; and (4) the Director of the National 
Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). It also provides that the 
DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC.
    The establishment of a Director of the NCPC is consistent 
with Section 1022 of the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 1022 
added a new Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947, 
which provides that the President shall establish an NCPC. 
Under the Act, the NCPC has seven missions and objectives and 
should serve as the primary organization within the United 
States government for analyzing and integrating all 
intelligence pertaining to proliferation. Among its other 
powers, the NCPC is authorized to coordinate the counter 
proliferation plans and activities of all United States 
government departments and agencies. Section 119A also provided 
that the NCPC should conduct ``strategic operational planning'' 
for the United States government to prevent the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and materials 
and technologies.
    Congress provided the President with the authority to waive 
any, or all, of the requirements of Section 119A if it was 
determined that they did not materially improve the 
nonproliferation ability of the United States. At the time 
Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, the WMD 
Commission had not completed its work. Congress provided that 
the President, after receiving the WMD Commission report, 
should submit to Congress his views on the establishment of the 
NCPC.
    In its March 31, 2005, report, the WMD Commission 
recommended that the President establish a relatively small 
NCPC that manages and coordinates analysis and collection 
across the Intelligence Community on nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons. The WMD Commission supported the concept of 
``strategic operational planning,'' but recommended that it not 
be performed by the NCPC.
    On June 29, 2005, the White House announced that the 
President had endorsed the establishment of an NCPC. The 
statement provided that the NCPC would exercise ``strategic 
oversight'' of the Intelligence Community's weapons of mass 
destruction activities. The DNI would ensure that the NCPC 
establishes strategic intelligence collection and analysis 
requirements regarding WMD that are consistent with United 
States policies. Under the President's plan, the NCPC would be 
established within the Office of the DNI, and the DNI would 
appoint the Director of the NCPC who would then report to the 
DNI. On August 8, 2005, the DNI announced the appointment of 
the first Director of the NCPC. This appointment represented an 
important first step in the establishment of the NCPC.
    Section 409 does not amend any other procedural or 
substantive provision of Section 119A of the National Security 
Act of 1947. If the President determines not to assign to the 
NCPC any power provided by Section 119A, notice must be 
provided to Congress in writing as required by that section.

Section 410. National Space Intelligence Center

    The United States maintains a very large investment in 
satellites, and this investment has grown dramatically in 
recent years. These satellites serve the commercial and 
national security needs of the nation. As such, a loss of any 
or all of these assets could do tremendous harm to our economy 
and security.
    At the same time, our investment in intelligence collection 
concerning threats to our interests in space has declined 
markedly as a function of our overall investment in space 
systems. Despite this significant investment, some estimates 
indicate that we commit only 10 percent of what we did nearly 
25 years ago to the analysis of threats to space systems. 
Recent international events have only served to highlight this 
problem.
    In an effort to better understand the future threats to our 
space assets, as well as potential threats to the United States 
from space, Section 410 establishes a National Space 
Intelligence Center (NSIC). It is not the intent of the 
Committee that the NSIC be a physical consolidation of existing 
intelligence entities with responsibilities for various types 
of intelligence related to space. Rather, the Committee 
believes that the first function of the NSIC is to coordinate 
all collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence 
related to space, as well as participate in Intelligence 
Community analyses of requirements for space systems. The NSIC 
augments the existing efforts of the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center (NASIC) and Missile and Space Intelligence 
Center (MSIC); it is not designed to replace them. Indeed, the 
Committee intends that the NSIC work closely with NASIC and 
MSIC to ensure a coordinated Intelligence Community response to 
issues that intersect the responsibilities of all three 
organizations.
    The Director of the NSIC shall be the National Intelligence 
Officer for Science and Technology, and the Committee 
encourages the appointment of an Executive Director from the 
Senior Intelligence Service. Further details related to the 
mission of the NSIC can be found in the Classified Annex.

Section 411. Operational files in the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    Section 411 adds a new Section 700 to the National Security 
Act of 1947. It ensures that protected operational files 
provided by elements of the Intelligence Community to the 
Office of the DNI carry with them any exemption such files had 
from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements for search, 
review, publication, or disclosure.
    In the CIA Information Act, Congress authorized the DCI to 
exempt operational files of the CIA from several requirements 
of the FOIA, particularly those requiring search and review in 
response to FOIA requests. In a series of enactments codified 
in Title VII of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress has 
extended the exemption to the operational files of the NGA, the 
National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It has 
also provided that the files of the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) should be treated as 
operational files of the CIA (to the extent they meet the 
criteria for CIA operational files).
    The components of the Office of the DNI, including the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), require access to 
information contained in operational files. The purpose of 
Section 411 is to make clear that the operational files of any 
component of the Intelligence Community, for which an 
operational files exemption is applicable, retain their 
exemption from FOIA search, review, disclosure, or publication.
    The new Section 700 of the National Security Act of 1947 
provides several limitations. The exemption does not apply to 
information disseminated beyond the Office of the DNI. Also, as 
Congress has provided in the operational files exemptions for 
the CIA and other Intelligence Community elements, Section 700 
provides that the exemption from search and review does not 
apply to requests by United States citizens or permanent 
residents for information about themselves (although other FOIA 
exemptions, such as appropriate classification, may continue to 
protect such files from public disclosure). The search and 
review exemption would not apply to the subject matter of 
Congressional or Executive Branch investigations into 
improprieties or violations of law.
    In the DNI's annual request to the Committee for 
legislative authorities during the fiscal year 2006 legislative 
cycle, the Office of the DNI asked for a broader exemption from 
the FOIA than currently provided in Section 411. The Committee 
considers it likely that the operations of the Office of the 
DNI, in particular the activities of the NCTC and the NCPC, may 
require an operational files exemption. Before acting on such a 
request, the DNI, through the CIO of the Intelligence Community 
or other appropriate officers, should systematically study and 
report to the intelligence committees regarding the application 
of the FOIA to the Office of the DNI.
    As part of this review, the DNI should report on the 
responsibility assigned by Congress in the Intelligence Reform 
Act concerning operational file exemptions. Congress amended 
each operational file statute to provide that the exemption 
should be made only with the coordination of the DNI. Congress 
also provided that the decennial review of the exemptions in 
force must be undertaken with the DNI. These decennial reviews 
must include consideration of the historical value or other 
public interest in categories of files and the potential for 
declassifying a significant amount of the material in them. The 
DNI should advise the intelligence committees on the benefits 
of coordinating the five decennial reviews which now occur at 
different times.

Section 412. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 412 updates Section 402 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-215 
(Dec. 9, 1983)) to reflect and incorporate organizational 
changes made by the Intelligence Reform Act. Section 412 also 
makes other technical and stylistic amendments and strikes a 
subsection of the law that applied only during fiscal year 
1987.

Section 413. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 413 amends the authorities and structure of the 
Office of the NCIX to eliminate certain independent 
administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX 
when that official was appointed by, and reported to, the 
President. Those authorities are unnecessary, redundant, and 
anomalous now that the NCIX is to be appointed by, and under 
the authority, direction, and control of the DNI.

Section 414. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to 
        advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
(5 U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees 
throughout the Federal Government. The FACA sets forth the 
responsibilities of Congress and the Executive Branch with 
regard to such committees and outlines procedures and 
requirements for such committees. As originally enacted in 
1972, the FACA expressly exempted advisory committees utilized 
by the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. Section 414 amends 
the FACA to extend this exemption to those advisory committees 
established or used by the Office of the DNI.

Section 415. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 415 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI's designee, as 
a Member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board 
established under Section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States 
Code, in place of the Director of the CIA, or the Director of 
the CIA's designee.

Section 416. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of 
        National Intelligence and Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) has long contained a 
provision under which the Director of the CIA could promulgate 
rules to exempt any system of records within the CIA from 
certain disclosure requirements under the Act. The provision 
was designed to ensure that the CIA could provide adequate and 
appropriate safeguards for certain sensitive information in its 
records systems. In assuming the leadership of the Intelligence 
Community, the DNI similarly requires the ability to safeguard 
sensitive information in records systems within the Office of 
the DNI. Section 416 extends to the DNI the authority to 
promulgate rules under which certain records systems of the 
Office of the DNI may be exempted from certain Privacy Act 
disclosure requirements.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Section 421. Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    The Intelligence Reform Act established the positions of 
the DNI and the PDDNI and abolished the positions of DCI and 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as those positions had 
previously existed. The DNI and PDDNI are responsible for 
leading the entire Intelligence Community, which includes many 
components from the DoD. Moreover, the DNI and PDDNI must 
ensure that the war fighter continues to receive timely, 
actionable intelligence. Accordingly, the Intelligence Reform 
Act continued the tradition of permitting a commissioned 
officer to serve as either the leader or principal deputy of 
the Intelligence Community, so long as both positions are not 
filled by commissioned officers at the same time.
    In establishing the positions of DNI and PDDNI, the Act 
separated the leadership of the Intelligence Community from the 
leadership of the CIA. Although the Act explicitly provided for 
a Director of the CIA, it did not provide for a statutory 
deputy to the Director.
    Section 421 establishes the position of Deputy Director of 
the CIA. The Deputy Director will be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and will assist the Director of the CIA in carrying out the 
duties and responsibilities of that office. In the event of a 
vacancy in the position of Director of the CIA, or during the 
absence or disability of the Director, the Deputy Director will 
act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director. The DNI will 
recommend a nominee to the President to fill any vacancy in 
this position.
    With the amendments made by Section 421, the Presidential 
nomination of both the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA 
must be confirmed by the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Given the sensitive operations of the CIA, nominees for the 
positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIA merit 
close scrutiny by Congress to examine the nominees' 
qualifications prior to their assumption of the duties of these 
offices. With respect to the Deputy Director of the CIA, the 
requirement for Senate confirmation also provides assurance 
that, in the event of a vacancy in the position of Director of 
the CIA, or during the absence or disability of the Director, 
Congress will have previously expressed its confidence in the 
ability of the nominee to assume those additional duties.
    Section 421 also requires that both the Director and Deputy 
Director of the CIA be appointed ``from civilian life.'' The 
considerations that encourage appointment of a military officer 
to the position of DNI or PDDNI do not apply to the leadership 
of the CIA. Indeed, given the CIA's establishment in 1947 as an 
independent civilian intelligence agency with no direct 
military or law enforcement responsibilities, the Committee 
does not believe that a similar construct of military 
leadership is appropriate at that agency. Accordingly, the 
Committee recommends that both the Director and Deputy Director 
of the CIA should be appointed from civilian life. To preserve 
the important liaison relationship between the military and the 
CIA, the Committee recognizes the important role played by the 
Associate Director of the CIA for Military Support and 
continues to support the appointment of a current military 
officer to that position.
    Unlike the requirement that the Secretary of Defense be 
appointed ``from civilian life'' (see 10 U.S.C. 113(a)), 
Section 421 does not contain any limitation on how long a 
nominee must have been ``from civilian life'' prior to 
appointment. The only restriction is that an active duty 
officer must first retire or resign his or her commission and 
return to civilian life prior to being appointed as either the 
Director or Deputy Director of the CIA. Thus, the President 
retains the flexibility to nominate candidates with significant 
military experience for either or both positions.
    Given the nomination by the President of General Michael V. 
Hayden to serve as Director of the CIA, this Committee's 
favorable reporting of that nomination to the full Senate, and 
the Senate's confirmation of General Hayden, the Committee has 
included a provision that will make the requirement that the 
Director of the CIA be appointed ``from civilian life'' 
applicable to the nomination of the successor to the Director 
of the CIA in office on the date of enactment of this Act.
    With respect to the Deputy Director of the CIA, the 
Committee has also included a provision that will make the 
nomination and confirmation requirements of Section 421 
applicable to the successor to the individual administratively 
performing the duties of the Deputy Director of the CIA on the 
date of enactment of this Act. The prohibition on an active 
duty commissioned officer serving as the Deputy Director of the 
CIA and the requirement that the position be filled by a 
Presidential nominee confirmed by the Senate will not take 
effect until the earlier of the date the President nominates an 
individual to serve in such position or the date the individual 
presently performing the duties of that office leaves the post.
    To insulate an officer serving as the Director or Deputy 
Director of the CIA from undue military influence, Section 421 
provides that so long as the individual continues to perform 
the duties of the Director or Deputy Director of the CIA, he 
may continue to receive military pay and allowances, but he is 
not subject to the supervision or control of the Secretary of 
Defense or any of the military or civilian personnel of the 
DoD.

Section 422. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency 
        intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure

    Section 422 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the Director of the CIA the authority to protect CIA 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, 
consistent with any direction from the President or the DNI. 
Prior to the Intelligence Reform Act, the authority to protect 
intelligence sources and methods had been assigned to the DCI, 
as head of the Intelligence Community. The CIA relied on the 
DCI's sources and methods authority as the CIA's primary 
statutory basis for protecting a range of CIA information, 
including its human sources, from public or unauthorized 
disclosure in a wide range of contexts and proceedings. This 
authority proved critical for assuring current and potential 
human intelligence sources that CIA could, and would, keep the 
fact of their association with the United States government 
secret, whether in civil litigation, administrative 
proceedings, or other arenas. In Section 102A(i) of the 
National Security Act, as added by the Intelligence Reform Act, 
Congress transferred this DCI authority to the DNI.
    In the DNI's annual request to the Committee for 
legislative authorities during the fiscal year 2006 legislative 
cycle, the DNI asked that a provision similar to Section 422 be 
enacted to supplement the grant of authority to the DNI with a 
comparable grant to the Director of the CIA, subject to the 
direction of the President or DNI. It is intended to underscore 
for intelligence sources that the CIA has explicit statutory 
authority to protect its sources and methods. The revision to 
Section 104A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 is not 
intended to, and does not, authorize the Director of the CIA to 
withhold from the DNI any CIA information to which the DNI is 
entitled by statute, Executive order, Presidential directive, 
or other applicable law or regulation.
    Section 422 also makes conforming changes to Section 6 of 
the CIA Act of 1949.

Section 423. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency 
        requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 423 modifies statutory provisions pertaining to 
foreign language proficiency for certain senior officials in 
the CIA. Currently, Section 104A(g) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (Section 421 of the Committee's bill results in the 
re-designation of Section 104A(g) as 104A(h)) provides that an 
individual cannot be appointed to a position in the Senior 
Intelligence Service in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence 
(DI) or Directorate of Operations (DO) (now the National 
Clandestine Service) unless the individual demonstrates at 
least a specified level of professional speaking and reading 
proficiency in a foreign language. Current law also grants the 
Director of the CIA limited authority to waive this requirement 
with respect to a position or class of positions with 
notification to the intelligence committees.
    Section 423 enhances CIA management flexibility by 
authorizing the Director of the CIA to waive the foreign 
language proficiency requirement, not just with respect to 
positions or categories of positions, but also as to individual 
officers or categories of individual officers--subject to the 
Director of the CIA's determination that such proficiency is 
not necessary for the successful performance of the duties and 
responsibilities involved. The section also adds a 
``grandfather'' clause to the language proficiency requirement, 
creating a transition period that will allow CIA leadership to 
more effectively manage the senior Agency workforce during a 
critical period of change. Section 423 also updates an outdated 
reference to the DO, now the ``National Clandestine Service.'' 
Finally, Section 423 makes appropriate conforming changes to 
the report on waivers currently required by Section 104A(g).
    The Committee expects the CIA to move forward in its 
commitment to enhance its overall language capabilities. The 
personnel flexibility granted by Section 423 will allow the 
Director of the CIA to better integrate requirements for 
language skills into leadership training, promotion, and 
retention decisions and to plan for the projected influx of new 
DI and National Clandestine Service officers.

Section 424. Additional functions and authorities for protective 
        personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 424 amends Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) which authorizes protective functions by 
designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective 
details.
            a. Arrest Authority
    Section 424 authorizes protective detail personnel, when 
engaged in the performance of protective functions, to make 
arrests in two circumstances. Under this section, protective 
detail personnel may make arrests without a warrant for any 
offense against the United States--whether a felony, 
misdemeanor, or infraction--that is committed in their 
presence. They may also make arrests without a warrant if they 
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be 
arrested has committed or is committing a felony, but not other 
offenses, under the laws of the United States.
    Regulations, approved by the Director of the CIA and the 
Attorney General, will provide safeguards and procedures to 
ensure the proper exercise of this authority. The provision 
specifically does not grant any authority to serve civil 
process or to investigate crimes.
    By granting CIA protective detail personnel limited arrest 
authority, the provision mirrors statutes applicable to certain 
Federal law enforcement agencies that are authorized to perform 
protective functions. The authority provided under this section 
is consistent with those of other Federal elements with 
protective functions, such as the Secret Service (see 18 U.S.C. 
3056(c)(1)(c)), the State Department's Diplomatic Security 
Service (see 22 U.S.C. 2709(a)(5)), and the Capitol Police (see 
2 U.S.C. 1966(c)). Arrest authority will contribute 
significantly to the ability of CIA protective detail personnel 
to fulfill their responsibilities to protect officials against 
serious threats without being dependent on the response of 
Federal, State, or local law enforcement officers. The grant of 
arrest authority under this amendment is supplemental to all 
other authority that CIA protective detail personnel have by 
virtue of their statutory responsibility to perform the 
protective functions set forth in the CIA Act of 1949.
            b. Protection of Personnel of the Office of the DNI
    Section 424 also authorizes the Director of the CIA, on 
request of the DNI, to make CIA protective detail personnel 
available to the DNI and to other personnel within the Office 
of the DNI. The DNI, in consultation with the Director of the 
CIA and the Attorney General, should advise the intelligence 
committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act on whether 
this arrangement meets the protective needs of the Office of 
the DNI or whether other statutory authority is needed.

Section 425. Director of National Intelligence report on retirement 
        benefits for former employees of Air America

    Section 425 provides for a report by the DNI on the 
advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to United 
States citizens who were employees of Air America or an 
associated company prior to 1977, during the time that the 
company was owned or controlled by the United States and 
operated by the CIA. There were bills in the Senate and House 
(S. 651 and H.R. 1276) in the 109th Congress that would have 
provided federal retirement benefits for those employees. By 
including Section 425 in this authorization bill, the Committee 
takes no position on the merits of that legislation. The sole 
purpose of Section 425 is to direct the DNI to undertake a 
study about Air America, its relationship to the CIA, the 
missions it performed, and casualties its employees suffered, 
as well as the retirement benefits that had been contracted 
for, or promised to, the employees and what they received. The 
DNI shall make recommendations on the advisability of 
legislative action and include any views that the Director of 
the CIA may have on the matters covered by the report. On the 
request of the DNI, the Comptroller General shall assist in the 
preparation of the report in a manner consistent with the 
protection of classified information.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Section 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training program

    Section 16 of the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
authorizes the NSA to establish and maintain an undergraduate 
training program to facilitate the recruitment of individuals 
with skills critical to the NSA's mission. Under the program, 
the government has always had the right to recoup the 
educational costs expended for the benefit of employees whose 
employment with NSA is ``terminated''--either voluntarily by 
the employee or by the NSA for misconduct.
    Section 431 amends Section 16(d) of the NSA Act of 1959 to 
clarify that ``termination of employment'' includes situations 
in which employees fail to maintain satisfactory academic 
performance as defined by the Director of NSA. Such employees 
shall be in breach of their contractual agreement and, in lieu 
of any service obligation arising under such agreement, shall 
be liable for repayment. Failure to maintain satisfactory 
academic performance has always been grounds for default 
resulting in the right of the government to recoup the 
educational costs expended for the benefit of the defaulting 
employee. Thus, this provision is a clarification of that 
obligation.
    In addition, Section 431 permits the Director of NSA to 
protect intelligence sources and methods by deleting a 
requirement that the NSA publicly identify to educational 
institutions which students are NSA employees. Deletion of this 
disclosure requirement will enhance the ability of NSA to 
protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the 
ability of training program participants to undertake future 
clandestine or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure is 
appropriate when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources 
or methods, would endanger the life or safety of the student, 
or would limit the employee's or prospective employee's ability 
to perform intelligence activities in the future. Despite the 
deletion of the disclosure requirement, the Committee expects 
the NSA to continue to prohibit participants in the training 
program from engaging in any intelligence functions at the 
institutions they attend under the program. See H.R. Rep. 99-
690, Part I (July 17, 1986) (``NSA employees attending an 
institution under the program will have no intelligence 
function whatever to perform at the institution.'').

Section 432. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency 
        protective personnel

    Section 432 amends the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
by adding a new Section 21, to clarify and enhance the 
authority of protective details for the NSA.
    New Section 21(a) would authorize the Director of the NSA 
to designate NSA personnel to perform protective detail 
functions for the Director and other personnel of the NSA who 
are designated from time to time by the Director of the NSA as 
requiring protection. Section 11 of the NSA Act of 1959 
presently provides that the Director of NSA may authorize 
agency personnel to perform certain security functions at NSA 
headquarters, at certain other facilities, and around the 
perimeter of those facilities. The new authority for protective 
details would enable the Director of the NSA to provide 
security when the Director or other designated personnel 
require security away from those facilities.
    New Section 21(b) would provide that NSA personnel, when 
performing protective detail functions, may exercise the same 
arrest authority that Section 424 provides for CIA protective 
detail personnel. The arrest authority for NSA protective 
detail personnel would be subject to guidelines approved by the 
Director of the NSA and the Attorney General. The purpose and 
extent of that arrest authority, and the limitations on it, are 
described in the section-by-section explanation for Section 
424. That analysis applies equally to the arrest authority 
provided to NSA protective detail personnel by Section 21(b).
    While this bill provides separately for authority for CIA 
and NSA protective details, the DNI should advise the 
intelligence committees whether overall policies, procedure, 
and authority should be provided for protective services, when 
necessary, for other elements or personnel (or their immediate 
families) of the Intelligence Community.

Section 433. Inspector General matters

    The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452 (Oct. 
12, 1978)) established a governmentwide system of Inspectors 
General, some appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and others ``administratively appointed'' 
by the heads of their respective Federal entities. These 
Inspectors General were authorized to ``conduct and supervise 
audits and investigations relating to the programs and 
operations'' of the government and ``to promote economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and . . 
. to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and 
operations.'' See 5 U.S.C. App. 2. These Inspectors General 
also perform an important reporting function, ``keeping the 
head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently 
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 
administration of . . . programs and operations and the 
necessity for and progress of corrective action.'' Id. The 
investigative authorities exercised by Inspectors General, and 
their relative independence from the government operations they 
audit and investigate, provide an important mechanism to ensure 
that the operations of the government are conducted as 
efficiently and effectively as possible.
    The Inspectors General of the CIA and the Departments of 
Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and 
Treasury are appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. These Inspectors General--authorized by 
either the Inspectors General Act of 1978 or Section 17 of the 
CIA Act of 1949--enjoy a degree of independence from all but 
the head of their respective departments or agencies. These 
Inspectors General also have explicit statutory authority to 
access information from their respective departments or 
agencies or other United States government departments and 
agencies and may use subpoenas to access information (e.g., 
from a department or agency contractor) necessary for them to 
carry out their authorized functions.
    The NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA have established their own 
``administrative'' Inspectors General. Because they are not 
identified in Section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, 
however, these Inspectors General lack the explicit statutory 
authorization to access information relevant to their audits or 
investigations, or to compel the production of such information 
via subpoena. This lack of authority has impeded access to 
information--in particular, information from contractors--that 
is necessary for these Inspectors General to perform their 
important function. These Inspectors General also lack the 
indicia of independence necessary for the Government 
Accountability Office to recognize the annual financial 
statement audits of these Inspectors General as compliant with 
the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-576 
(Nov. 15, 1990)). This lack of independence also prevents the 
DoD Inspector General, and would prevent the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community, from relying on the results of 
NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA Inspector General audits or 
investigations that must meet ``generally accepted government 
auditing standards.''
    To provide an additional level of independence and to 
ensure prompt access to the information necessary for these 
Inspectors General to perform their audits and investigations, 
Section 433 amends Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978 to include the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA as 
``designated federal entities.'' As so designated, the heads of 
these Intelligence Community elements will be required by 
statute to administratively appoint Inspectors General for 
these agencies. As designated Inspectors General under the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, these Inspectors General will be 
responsible to the heads of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA. The 
removal or transfer of these Inspectors General from their post 
by the heads of their respective office or agency must be 
promptly reported to the intelligence committees. These 
Inspectors General will also be able to exercise other 
investigative authorities, including those governing access to 
information and the issuance of subpoenas, utilized by other 
Inspectors General under the Inspector General Act of 1978.
    To protect vital national security interests, Section 433 
permits the DNI or the Secretary of Defense to prohibit the 
Inspectors General of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA from 
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation they are otherwise authorized to conduct. This 
authority--similar to the authority of the Director of the CIA 
under Section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949 with respect to the 
Inspector General of the CIA and the authority of the Secretary 
of Defense under Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
with respect to the DoD Inspector General--provides the 
President, through the DNI or the Secretary of Defense, a 
mechanism to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources 
and methods or other vital national security interests. The 
Committee expects that this authority will be exercised rarely 
by the DNI or the Secretary of Defense.

Section 434. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components 
        of the intelligence community

    Under present law and practice, the directors of the NSA, 
NGA, and NRO--each with a distinct and significant role in the 
national intelligence mission--are not confirmed by the Senate 
in relation to their leadership positions at these agencies. 
Presently, the President appoints the Directors of NSA and NGA, 
and the Secretary of Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. 
None of the appointments must be confirmed by the Senate, 
unless a military officer is promoted or transferred into the 
position. Under such circumstances, Senate confirmation of the 
officer's promotion or assignment to that position is the 
responsibility of the Committee on Armed Services. The review 
of the Committee on Armed Services, however, relates to the 
military promotion or assignment and not specifically to the 
assumption by the individual of the leadership of these 
critical Intelligence Community elements.
    Section 434 provides, expressly and uniformly, that the 
heads of each of these entities shall be nominated by the 
President and that such nominations will be confirmed by the 
advice and consent of the Senate. The NSA, NGA, and NRO play a 
critical role in the national intelligence mission of the 
United States government. The spending of these agencies 
comprises a significant portion of the entire intelligence 
budget of the United States, and a substantial portion of the 
National Intelligence Program. Through advice and consent, the 
Senate can enable the Congress to fulfill more completely its 
responsibility for providing oversight to the intelligence 
activities of the U.S. Government. Section 434 does not alter 
the role of the Committee on Armed Services in reviewing and 
approving the promotion or assignment of military officers.
    Section 434(b) provides that the amendments made by Section 
434 apply prospectively. Therefore, the Directors of NSA, NGA, 
and NRO as of the date of the enactment of this Act will not be 
affected by the amendments, which will apply initially to the 
appointment and confirmation of their successors.

Section 435. Clarification of national security missions of National 
        Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination 
        of certain intelligence information

    The National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (Pub. 
L. No. 104-201 (Sept. 23, 1996) (NIMA Act)) formally merged the 
imagery analysis and mapping efforts of the DoD and the CIA. In 
the NIMA Act, Congress cited a need ``to provide a single 
agency focus for the growing number and diverse types of 
customers for imagery and geospatial information resources 
within the Government . . . to harness, leverage, and focus 
rapid technological developments to serve the imagery, imagery 
intelligence, and geospatial information customers.'' See 
Section 1102(1) of the NIMA Act. Since then, there have been 
rapid developments in airborne and commercial imagery 
platforms, new imagery and geospatial phenomenology, full 
motion video, and geospatial analysis tools.
    Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)) changed 
the name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The name change was 
intended to introduce the term ``geospatial intelligence'' to 
better describe the unified activities of the NGA related to 
the ``analysis and visual representation of characteristics of 
the earth and activity on its surface.'' See S. Rep 108-46 (May 
13, 2003) (accompanying The National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004, S. 1050, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.).
    Though the NGA has made significant progress toward 
unifying the traditional imagery analysis and mapping missions 
of the CIA and the DoD, it has been slow to embrace other 
facets of ``geospatial intelligence'' that have recently been 
enabled by advances in technology, including the processing, 
storage, and dissemination of full motion video (FMV) and 
ground-based photography. The NGA's current library of 
geospatial products reflects its heritage--predominantly 
overhead imagery and mapping products. While the NGA is 
beginning to incorporate more airborne and commercial imagery, 
its products are nearly devoid of FMV and ground-based 
photography.
    The Committee believes that these new products (including 
FMV and ground-based photography) should be included, with 
available positional data, in NGA libraries for retrieval on 
DoD and Intelligence Community networks. Current mission 
planners and military personnel are well-served with 
traditional imagery products and maps, but FMV of the route to 
and from a facility or photographs of what a facility would 
look like to a foot soldier--rather than from an aircraft--
would be of immense value to our military personnel and 
intelligence officers. Ground-based photography is amply 
available from open sources, as well as other government 
sources such as military units, U.S. embassy personnel, Defense 
Attaches, Special Operations Forces, foreign allies, and 
clandestine officers. These products should be better 
incorporated into NGA data libraries.
    To address these concerns, Section 435 adds an additional 
national security mission to the responsibilities of the NGA. 
To fulfill this new mission, the NGA would be required, as 
directed by the DNI, to ``analyze, disseminate, and incorporate 
into the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence, 
likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by ground-based 
platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken 
by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations 
or available as open-source information.'' Section 435 also 
makes clear that this new responsibility ``does not include the 
authority to manage or direct the tasking of, set requirements 
and priorities for, set technical requirements related to, or 
modify any classification or dissemination limitations related 
to the collection of, handheld or clandestine photography taken 
by or on behalf or human intelligence collection 
organizations.'' Although Section 435 does not give the NGA 
direct authority to set technical requirements for the 
collection of ``handheld or clandestine photography,'' the 
Committee encourages the NGA to engage Intelligence Community 
partners on these technical requirements to ensure that their 
output can be incorporated into the National System for 
Geospatial-Intelligence.
    Section 435 does not modify the definition of ``imagery'' 
found in Section 467(2)(A) of Title 10, United States Code, or 
alter any of the existing national security missions of the 
NGA. Section 435 stresses the merits of FMV and ground-based 
photography and clarifies that the NIMA Act's exclusion of 
``handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of 
human intelligence organizations'' from the definition of 
``imagery'' does not prevent the exploitation, dissemination, 
and archiving of that photography. In other words, the NGA 
would still not dictate how human intelligence agencies collect 
ground-based photography, have authority to modify the 
classification or dissemination limitations applicable to such 
photography, or manage collection requirements for such 
photography. Rather, the NGA should simply avail itself of this 
photography, regardless of the source, but within the security 
handling guidelines consistent with the photography's 
classification as determined by the collecting organization.

Section 436. Security clearances in the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Although the NSA and the NGA have much in common as 
technical intelligence agencies administratively linked with 
the DoD, their present authorities for handling security 
clearances differ significantly. The Secretary of Defense has 
delegated to the NSA authority for contracting out background 
investigations and performing adjudications on individuals 
doing work for the agency--both for government employees and 
contractors. In contrast, the NGA must rely on the Defense 
Security Service (DSS) or the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) for background investigations and on the DIA for 
adjudication. The consequences for processing times are 
dramatic, particularly regarding contractor clearances. 
According to information provided by the DNI's Special Security 
Center, the average end-to-end processing times for contractors 
in July 2005 was 73 days for NSA and 540 days for NGA. The NSA 
and the NGA processing times for contractors in the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2006 showed that this significant 
discrepancy has continued. Moreover, the ability of the DSS to 
mitigate the problem suffered a setback on April 25, 2006, when 
the DSS temporarily suspended its acceptance of new contractor 
security clearance applications.
    The NGA's long backlog for contractor clearances is 
deleterious for both the agency and the contractors that 
support it. For the NGA, the backlog drives up financial costs 
and makes it more difficult to compete for talent. The backlog 
also distorts efficiencies and good business practices in the 
private sector, as contractors adjust to the realities of 
significantly different agency clearance timelines.
    The Committee calls upon the DNI to follow closely the 
progress made by the NGA in reducing processing times and to 
monitor the variation between the processing times of other 
intelligence agencies with similar requirements. The Committee 
anticipates that the arrangement created by Section 436 will be 
a temporary measure, pending the consistent attainment of 
reduced processing times by the OPM, the DIA, and the DSS.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Section 441. Foreign language incentive for certain non-special agent 
        employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 441 authorizes the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) to pay a cash award, up to 5 percent of 
basic pay, to any FBI employee who uses or maintains foreign 
language skills in support of FBI analyses, investigations, or 
operations to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities. Such awards are subject to 
the joint guidance of the Attorney General and the DNI.
    The Committee believes that the guidance of the Attorney 
General and DNI should reward FBI employees who are using one 
or more foreign languages in the regular performance of their 
official duties or maintaining proficiency in an obscure 
language that is of occasional operational significance. An 
employee should not automatically receive a 5 percent award for 
proficiency in any language. An FBI employee working in support 
of the FBI's counterintelligence mission who is fluent in 
French, German, or Spanish should not be eligible for a foreign 
language incentive, unless that employee is using those 
language skills in the regular performance of his or her 
official duties. However, the joint guidance should recognize 
that there are certain languages of operational significance 
that are not used on a routine basis, but for which a 
significant incentive should be awarded to maintain the 
necessary proficiency so that the employee can use the skill 
for operational purposes when the need arises. Finally, the 
joint guidelines should also provide for enhanced language 
incentive awards for those employees who use multiple languages 
in the performance of their duties, provided that no language 
incentive award can exceed the cap of 5 percent of basic pay.

Section 442. Authority to secure services by contract for the Bureau of 
        Intelligence and Research of the Department of State

    Section 442 authorizes the Secretary of State, in certain 
circumstances, to enter into personal services contracts to 
support the mission of the Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR). The authority, which is similar to that 
provided to the DoD (see 10 U.S.C. 129b), will enable INR to 
obtain the services of personal services contractors to respond 
to unanticipated surge requirements prompted by emergent events 
or crises or under unique circumstances (e.g., to provide 
temporary backup that will permit full-time employees to seek 
needed training). Personal services contractors, particularly 
those with previous INR experience, would also be valuable to 
train and mentor new INR personnel.

Section 443. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
        Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence 
        community

    Section 443 restores, with respect to the United States 
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' 
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that 
service. See 50 U.S.C. 401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence 
Reform Act modified the definition of ``intelligence 
community,'' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion 
in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or 
those portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis 
of intelligence. Section 444 clarifies that all of the Coast 
Guard's intelligence elements are included within the 
definition of ``intelligence community.''
    Section 443 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and 
Attorney General to designate an office within the Drug 
Enforcement Administration as an element of the Intelligence 
Community.

Section 444. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 444 clarifies that the establishment of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the 
Treasury (Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003))), and 
its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence (Section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations 
Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004))), do 
not affect the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with 
respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an 
element of the Intelligence Community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Section 501. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 501 corrects several inadvertent technical 
anomalies in the National Security Act of 1947 arising from the 
amendments made to that Act by the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 502. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 502 makes technical clarifications to Section 102A 
of the National Security Act of 1947 to preserve the 
participation of the DNI in the development of the annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the 
successor program of the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. Section 502 
also preserves the requirement for consultation by the 
Secretary of the Defense with the DNI in the reprogramming or 
transfer of MIP funds.

Section 503. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 503 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in the specified sections of the Intelligence Reform 
Act.

Section 504. Technical amendments to Title 10, United States Code, 
        arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 504 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in Title 10, United States Code, arising from enactment 
of the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 505. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
        of 1949

    Section 505 amends Section 5(a)(1) of the CIA Act of 1949 
by striking or updating outdated references to the National 
Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform Act significantly 
restructured and renumbered multiple sections of the National 
Security Act of 1947, leaving references in Section 5(a)(1) of 
the CIA Act to provisions that no longer exist or that are no 
longer pertinent.

Section 506. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 506 updates the ``multiyear national foreign 
intelligence program'' provision to incorporate and reflect 
organizational and nomenclature changes made by the 
Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 507. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 507 makes several technical corrections to the 
Executive Schedule. This section substitutes the ``Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency'' for the previous reference in 
Executive Schedule Level II to the ``Director of Central 
Intelligence.'' See 5 U.S.C. 5313. Section 507 also strikes 
outdated references to Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence 
from Executive Schedule Level III. See 5 U.S.C. 5314. The 
provision also corrects the erroneous reference to the 
``General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director'' in 
Executive Schedule Level IV. See 5 U.S.C. 5315.

Section 508. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
        National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 508 makes several technical and conforming changes 
to existing law to bring these provisions in line with the 
change in name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to 
the NGA, as provided for in Section 921(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 
108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)).

                            COMMITTEE ACTION

Motion to close

    On January 10, 2007, on the motion of Chairman Rockefeller, 
the Committee agreed by voice vote to close the markup because 
matters under consideration at the meeting would require the 
discussion of information necessary to be kept secret in the 
interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of 
the foreign relations of the United States. The Committee then 
proceeded to discuss the bill and report in closed session.

Motion to report committee bill favorably

    On January 17, 2007, on the continuation of the markup in 
closed session and a quorum for reporting being present, the 
Committee voted to report the bill favorably by a vote of 12 
ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as 
follows: Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; 
Senator Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--aye; Senator 
Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--aye; Senator Warner--aye; 
Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Senator Hatch--no; 
Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Burr--no.

                           ESTIMATE OF COSTS

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On January 
18, 2007, the Committee transmitted this bill to the 
Congressional Budget Office and requested it to conduct an 
estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out its provisions.

                    EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        CHANGES IN EXISTING LAWS

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

            ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN AND FEINGOLD

    We are pleased that the Committee has chosen to continue to 
push the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
toward passage. This is a critically important piece of 
national security legislation, and the fact that our 
intelligence agencies have operated without authorizing 
legislation for two years represents an unfortunate failure of 
Congressional oversight.
    The intelligence authorization bill is Congress' primary 
vehicle for exercising oversight of our national intelligence 
community. This bill addresses and legislates in many areas of 
national security law, in addition to authorizing the 
classified budget for the various intelligence agencies. We are 
particularly pleased with provisions that strengthen oversight 
by further clarifying sections of law relating to Congressional 
notification of intelligence activities.
    There are a few sections of the bill that merit further 
examination and debate before they should be passed into law. 
In particular, section 310 of the bill creates new exemptions 
to the Privacy Act, with the purpose of improving information 
access. The potential effects of this section have not been 
fully explored, and the provision's impact on both privacy and 
on information sharing needs to be examined further.
    Those sections of the bill granting new arrest authorities 
to NSA and CIA security personnel also merit further 
discussion. It is important that these individuals have all the 
authority that they need in order to do their jobs, but the 
language in the bill may be broader than necessary, and the 
Executive Branch has not yet explained sufficiently why new 
authorities are necessary.
    We recognize that this bill is very important and long 
overdue, and support the Committee's decision to report it. We 
look forward to addressing our remaining concerns in conference 
with the House of Representatives.

                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Russell D. Feingold.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WARNER

    The annual intelligence authorization bill is vital 
legislation that authorizes the Intelligence Community's 
efforts against national security threats such as terrorism, 
proliferation, and rogue states. It also provides legislative 
tools and strategic guidance to reform the Intelligence 
Community and to support and enhance its capabilities to 
protect the United States, its interests, and its allies. At 
the time of the Committee's establishment in 1976, the 
authorization bill was considered to be the Committee's most 
effective means to ensure that the will of Congress be observed 
by the Intelligence Community. Indeed, the authorization bill 
was considered so important for oversight that the resolution 
creating the Committee stated that ``apart from continuing 
resolutions, no funds shall be appropriated for intelligence 
activities unless previously authorized by a bill that has 
passed the Senate.'' It is for these reasons that I decided to 
support the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, despite misgivings I share with some of my colleagues 
about Section 304 of the bill.
    There is a history of cooperation and compromise between 
the Congress and the President on the oversight of intelligence 
activities, particularly with respect to sharing with Congress 
sensitive information regarding intelligence sources and 
methods. While briefings to all members and staff may be the 
preferred method of notification of intelligence activities, 
the congressional intelligence committees have historically 
acquiesced to requests by the Executive branch to limit access 
on particularly sensitive matters to the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman. I support such limited notification when absolutely 
necessary.
    In seeking to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 
force the Executive Branch to disclose certain intelligence 
activities to the full membership of the Senate and House 
intelligence committees, Section 304 attempts to strip the 
Executive of authorities specifically recognized by the 
National Security Act itself. The National Security Act 
provides that information be shared ``with due regard for the 
protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources or 
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.'' This allows 
the Executive, in certain exceptional circumstances, to limit 
this information to the leadership of the Senate and House 
intelligence committees.
    Rather than ensure that Members receive the information 
they are seeking, Section 304 could instead merely provoke a 
stalemate as the Executive branch challenges the bill as 
usurping Presidential authorities. My foremost concern is the 
prospect that the President could veto this legislation, 
thereby jeopardizing many other important provisions, 
particularly in the area of intelligence reform.
    Those reform provisions, in large part, are why I chose to 
support this bill, notwithstanding Section 304. In particular, 
Section 403 of the bill enhances the authority of the Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage access to human 
intelligence information, one of the most important areas for 
intelligence reform.
    Numerous commissions, and the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence's own reports on the 9/11 and Iraq Weapons of Mass 
Destruction intelligence failures, have noted that excessive 
compartmentation of human intelligence has contributed to 
several recent intelligence failures. For example, the 
Committee's Iraq WMD report found that in the years before 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CIA protected its Iraq weapons of 
mass destruction sources so well that some of the information 
collected was kept from the majority of analysts with a 
legitimate need to know. In a number of cases, CIA analysts 
were provided with sensitive information that was not made 
available to analysts who worked the same issues at other all-
source analysis agencies. Despite these and other findings, 
little has been done to meaningfully improve this situation. 
CIA testimony to the Committee and its staff indicate that the 
agency has no intention of sharing this ``sensitive'' 
information on a wider basis, particularly with analysts 
outside the CIA.
    Section 403 gives the DNI tools to correct this situation 
by providing him the authority to ensure the dissemination of 
intelligence information collected through human intelligence, 
including the underlying operational data necessary to fully 
understand that reporting, to appropriately cleared analysts or 
other intelligence officers throughout the Intelligence 
Community. The provision makes the DNI a neutral arbiter in 
making decisions about which analysts in the Intelligence 
Community have a need to know the information. It also makes 
him responsible for determining whether the risks of expanding 
access to cleared analysts are truly greater than the risks of 
keeping information so tightly compartmented that the analysts 
who need it to make informed judgements are kept in the dark.
    Currently the process by which the Intelligence Community 
calculates the benefits and risks of sharing sensitive human 
intelligence remains too heavily skewed toward withholding 
information. Provision 403 will give the DNI the authority, but 
also the responsibility, to ensure that this calculation takes 
into account the terrible costs to national security when 
information is too heavily compartmented. This provision is a 
necessary step in the right direction toward improving human 
intelligence, information sharing, and analysis.

                                                       John Warner.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HATCH

    The intelligence authorization process provides the 
essential mechanism by which the intelligence committees of the 
United States Congress provide direction and support to the 
Intelligence Community, in fulfillment of our statutory duty to 
provide oversight. I am pleased that the Committee is committed 
to reporting our annual legislation, as the failure to do so 
undermines our relevancy and fails the public's expectation of 
meaningful congressional oversight. Such authorizing 
legislation provides the central vehicle by which the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence authorizes expenditures and 
directs ongoing reform of the Intelligence Community, the need 
for which has been exposed in several Committee investigations 
since September 11, 2001, to include the Joint Inquiry Into the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (released December, 
2002) and, more recently, the Committee report on the U.S. 
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on 
Iraq (released July, 2004). Related to this continuing focus on 
reform, I note Section 403's requirement of the DNI to expand 
access to human intelligence in the Intelligence Community. 
Such initiatives included in our authorization vehicle 
demonstrate the active role this oversight Committee must 
maintain.
    Other provisions in the bill create, in my opinion, 
unnecessary conflict with Executive prerogatives long-
established on questions of access to particular notifications. 
For example, I refer the reader to the Vice Chairman's well-
reasoned Additional Views on Section 304. But that is not the 
reason I have chosen to vote against this authorization. That 
reason is explained in the classified annex accompanying our 
report.

                                                    Orrin G. Hatch.

     SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN BOND AND SENATORS WARNER, 
                          CHAMBLISS, AND BURR

    The most important means that the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence has for conducting effective oversight of the 
Intelligence Community is the annual intelligence authorization 
bill. As soon as the Republican Leader announced my appointment 
to be the Vice Chairman of the Committee for the 110th 
Congress, I sent a letter to then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller 
identifying the priorities upon which I believed the Committee 
should focus in the immediate future. At the top of my list was 
passing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
(last year's bill) because I believed that the need to pass an 
authorization bill overrode my immediate concern with a few of 
the bill's onerous provisions. I was happy to learn that 
Chairman Rockefeller was in complete agreement with me on this 
priority to pass our bill.
    Chairman Rockefeller and I also agreed that the fastest way 
to return the bill to the Senate legislative calendar would be 
to adopt last year's bill, without amendment, as the Chairman/
Vice Chairman mark. This approach resulted in a bill, report, 
and classified annex that were nearly identical to those that 
were passed out of the Committee last year, with only slight 
changes made necessary to update the text. The Committee's bill 
contains 62 substantive provisions. Most of these provisions 
are based upon, or derived from, the proposed bills submitted 
by the Executive branch for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007. They 
contain important enhancements to Intelligence Community 
authorities and operational needs.
    Notwithstanding these enhancements, there are two 
provisions, namely Sections 304 and 314, that I and some of my 
Republican colleagues voted against last year because we did 
not believe that they advanced the goal of Congressional 
oversight. Under current law, the Executive branch may exercise 
its discretion to protect sensitive intelligence sources and 
methods when notifying the Congressional Intelligence 
Committees about its intelligence activities and covert 
actions. In sharp contrast to the National Security Act of 
1947, Section 304 imposes new requirements when the Executive 
branch determines that disclosure to less than the full 
membership of the Committees is appropriate. According to 
Section 304, in those cases the Executive branch must notify 
all members of the Congressional Intelligence Committees and 
provide them with a written summary of the activity, sufficient 
to permit the Members to assess the legality, benefits, costs, 
and advisability of such activities. Although we believe in 
comprehensive oversight, we also believe in working in comity 
with the Administration regarding the President's 
constitutional authority concerning what extremely sensitive 
details he determines to disclose from extremely sensitive 
programs. We believe there are other ways to ensure effective 
oversight of such programs without enshrining this provision in 
statute.
    The interpretation of these requirements will likely only 
increase the tension between the Executive and Legislative 
branches over information access. The President has the 
constitutional responsibility to ensure the protection of 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods. 
Compartmentalization is one key means at his disposal to ensure 
that this important responsibility is met. Ultimately, Section 
304 cannot resolve these conflicting concerns, because each 
branch will likely interpret the notice and written summary 
requirements to the detriment of the other. Either Congress 
will complain about the lack of detail provided in the required 
summaries or the President will argue that he had to provide 
the very detail that guided his initial decision to limit 
disclosure in the first place. Moreover, while there is 
substantial judicial authority for the breadth of Presidential 
powers in foreign affairs under Article II of the Constitution, 
it is unlikely that this conflict between the Executive and 
Legislative branches can be resolved by the courts, because it 
presents a political question that the courts may well refuse 
to address. That is why we believe this issue is best reserved 
for a separate discussion that should not jeopardize our entire 
Bill with the provision's inclusion here.
    Additionally, Section 314 requires the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit a classified report to the Members of 
the Congressional Intelligence Committees which gives a full 
accounting of any clandestine prison or detention facility 
currently or formerly operated (to include locational data) by 
the United States government. The Executive branch has met its 
obligations to keep the Committee fully and currently informed 
about these clandestine detention facilities by briefing all of 
the Committee Members on the program. (The President publicly 
announced the existence of these facilities in September 2006.) 
The Section 314 report creates another unnecessary source of 
conflict between the Executive and Legislative branches. The 
level of detail required by the report, to include all 
locations of current and formerly operated sites, is simply not 
necessary for effective oversight, and will likely be resisted 
by the Executive branch. Moreover, such disclosure to Congress 
could have a negative impact on current and future 
relationships with certain allied foreign intelligence services 
and governments who have cooperated in this program with the 
understanding that their assistance would remain completely 
confidential. This backward looking provision continues a 
misguided practice of retroactive oversight.
    Neither Section 304 nor Section 314 will advance the 
Committee's goal of providing meaningful oversight to the 
activities of the Intelligence Community. By creating 
unnecessary conflicts between the Legislative and Executive 
branches, these provisions will only distract the Committee and 
the Intelligence Community from focusing on other important 
matters. We therefore look forward to working with members on 
the floor and in conference to lessen likely conflicts with the 
Executive branch that could endanger the enactment of this bill 
into law.
    Senator Warner joins in these supplemental views, except as 
they pertain to the discussion of Section 314.

                                   Christopher S. Bond.
                                   John Warner.
                                   Saxby Chambliss.
                                   Richard Burr.

                                  
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