*

 This successive appeal has been submitted to the panel that decided the

original appeal. See Operating Procedure 6(b). After examining the briefs and the

record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is

submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 25, 2006*

Decided April 28, 2006

Before

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3799

PETER LEWIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ODIE WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Central

District of Illinois.

No. 99 C 1050

Harold A. Baker, 

Judge.

O R D E R

In this successive appeal, Illinois inmate Peter Lewis argues that the district

court erred in granting the defendants, officers of the Illinois Department of

Corrections, summary judgment on his claim that they conspired to deny him his

right of access to the courts. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3799 Page 2

The factual background of this case was thoroughly described in our earlier

opinion in Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2002), so we will only briefly

touch on it here. Lewis filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the

defendants failed to protect him from an attack by his cellmate and that they

conspired to cover up their misconduct by refusing to respond to a number of his

grievances and requests. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that

Lewis failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison

Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We upheld the dismissal of the

failure-to-protect claim for lack of exhaustion, but we remanded the conspiracy

claim because the district court did not give it distinct consideration in ruling that

Lewis failed to exhaust. On remand, the district court found that the conspiracy

claim had been exhausted and permitted Lewis to amend his complaint. He then

alleged that the goal of the conspiracy was to deny him access to the courts. The

district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on its

finding that Lewis failed to state a claim for deprivation of his right of access to the

courts.

As a preliminary matter, the district court erred in purporting to make

separate dispositions with respect to conspiracy and access to the courts. Lewis

appears to have misled the court into thinking that conspiracy is an independent

basis of liability under § 1983; it is not. “Section 1983 does not . . . punish

conspiracy,” Goldschmidt v. Patchett, 686 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1982); conspiracy

in this context is merely a legal mechanism for imposing liability on defendants who

did not participate directly in the violation of civil rights, see Walker v. Thompson,

288 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d

416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that “there is no constitutional violation in

conspiring to cover-up an action which does not itself violate the Constitution”)

(internal citation and quotation omitted). Nonetheless, the district court correctly

focused on whether the defendants caused Lewis’s failure to exhaust. Because they

did not, there could be no denial of his right of access to the courts and therefore no

basis of liability under § 1983. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, and we draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d

544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 732 (7th

Cir. 2005). Lewis first argues that the district court failed to draw all appropriate

inferences in his favor because it did not credit his assertion that the defendants

caused his failure to exhaust. He claimed that the defendants effectively prevented

him from appealing the denial of his grievance because they “strung [him] along”

until the time for appeal had elapsed; they foresaw and intended that he would wait

for a response to his further requests, believing that the decision was not yet final. 

But the district court is never required to accept unreasonable factual inferences,

Stachowski v. Town of Cicero, 425 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 2005), and no
No. 04-3799 Page 3

reasonable factfinder could infer that the defendants proximately caused Lewis’s

failure to appeal the denial of his grievance simply by failing to respond to

additional grievances. Cf. Alston, Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Comm’r

of Internal Revenue, 165 F.3d 572, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim that IRS’s

failure to respond caused plaintiff’s failure to sue before statute of limitations

elapsed). 

Lewis next argues that the district court applied an erroneous standard of

causation in ruling that the defendants did not cause his failure to exhaust. He

asserts that none of our precedents on exhaustion holds that the defendants’ actions

need be the “sole cause” of the failure to exhaust and invites us to apply principles

of comparative fault in order to find the defendants liable for at least a proportional

detriment. But he points to no case in which a court has ever assessed comparative

fault in deciding a question of exhaustion, and we can find none. Moreover, the idea

is incompatible with our precedents holding that there must be a “concrete” or

“actual” injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Nance v. Vieregge, 147

F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1998). These cases show that the defendants’ actions must

do more than cause the plaintiff to incline in a certain direction. It is also clear that

not every attempt at deception in connection with judicial proceedings violates the

right of access to the courts. See Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir.

1995); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (7th Cir. 1990). The

district court did not misapply the rule of causation.

Because Lewis fails to invalidate the district court’s finding that he suffered

no violation of his constitutional rights, we need not go on to consider whether his

evidence of conspiracy was adequate to survive summary judgment. But we will

briefly respond to his contention that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment because, in his view, the defendants failed to satisfy their burden of

production. Contrary to Lewis’s belief, the moving party need not negate his

opponent’s claims; his burden is satisfied by a showing that his opponent has no

evidence to support his case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986);

Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 979 (7th Cir. 1996); Bank of

Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996);

Chicago Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 826 F.2d 725, 728 (7th

Cir. 1987). In this case, it was enough for the defendants to point out that on the

facts as Lewis himself reported them there was no basis for his claim that they

caused his failure to exhaust. 

The district court properly grants summary judgment where the plaintiff

fails to state a claim. Culver v. McRoberts, 192 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.