### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 02 00 -C R

______________________________ J ASON MYERS GI BSON, A ppellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appea l from the 71st J udicial District Court

Har rison County , Texas Trial Court No. 07-0168X

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleyT EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 30.02(d) ( Ver non 2003). 1 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON J ason My ers Gibson was convicted by a Harrison County jury of the fir st-deg ree felony of burg lary of a ha bit a tio n and

wa s se nte nc e d to nin e ty -n ine y e ars ' imp ri so nme nt. 1 On his appea l, Gibson ra i s es two issues: (1) The jury ' s verdict f ound him guilty

both of burg lary and of the lesser- included off ense of ag g ravated assault. The trial court a cce pted the finding of g uilt on the char g e of burg lary and ignor ed the verdic t on ag g ravated assault. Gibson maintains that the trial court err ed when it a cce pted the g reater conviction rathe r than t h e l es s er -included offe nse. (2) Gibson reque sted that the jury be g iven instructions of s elf-defe nse on both the ag g ravated assault char g e and the burg lary char g e. He alleg es that the trial c ourt committed err or by re fu sin g Gi bs on ' s re qu e st and ins tr uc te d the jur

y on se lf -d e fe ns e on ly

on the a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult char g e. We af

firm Gibson' s conviction and sente nce. F ac ts of t he Offen se J ohn Morrison and his wife , Ka y , we re t o g ether in their home with Kay ' s infant g randson (Gibson' s son) the eve ning of J anuar y 19, 2007. Gibson is Kay ' s son. Gibs o n had a history of abusi n g me th a mp h e ta

mi n e an d a lc o h o l an d w a s e s tr an g e d f r o m h is w if

e , th e mo th e r o f his child. L ikewise, due to his subst ance abuse, Gibson' s relationship with Kay had been on rocky g round for about seve n y ear s, a per iod d u ri n g wh i ch Gi bson had often be en ag g ressive a nd violent. The prec eding Christmas, Kay had "wash[ed] [her] hands" of Gibson due to one of the se incidents, but3

Kay maintained a c lose relationship t o Gibson' s wife, a nd the Morrisons fr eq u en t l y k ept the g randc hild in their home. On at lea st two occa sions during the wee k before January 19, the Morrisons had notice d thing s mi s s in g f

r o m t h e ir h o me ( in c lu d in g a

. 3 5 7 ma g n u m p is to l) an d s u s p e c te d

th a t G ib s o nh ad enter ed their home without their permission and st olen t hings. Unbeknownst to them, Gibson had been living in the woods behind the Morr i s on home. On January 19, around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., Gibson knocked on the back door of the Morrison home; when J ohn answe red the knock and sa w that it was Gibson, he told Gibs o n t h at he wa s unwelcome there and that Gibson' s mother did not want to see him, telling him to leave

. Morrison then closed the door and wa lked bac k into the other part of the house. The door upon which Gibson had knoc ked wa s the kitchen door, w hich was e ither the prim ary entr an c e o r

th e s o le e n tr an c e in to th e h o me ; i no r d e r to a p p r o a c h it

f r o m t h e in te r ior , J ohn had to close a

door lea ding f

rom the utility

room to the kitchen. J ohn said that afte r he w alked into the other part of the house, he hear d loud ba ng s which he thought we re gunshots. Remembering the missing .357 pistol, J ohn believed the loud bang s from the a rea o f t h e entry

door wa s Gibson dis c ha rg ingthe pis tol thr ou g h the do or . A fe w day s bef or e thi s, the Mo rr iso ns ha d f ound the ir ho us e burg larized; one missing item wa s J ohn' s .357 pistol. J ohn hurried to the bedroom and g ot Kay ' s .38 p i s t o l t o d e f

e n d h i m s e l f

, t h i n k i n g t h a t G i b s o n h a d " l o s t i t " an d w a s c o m i n g i nt o s h o o tJ o h nan d K a y. J ohn returne d to the kitchen/living a rea to see G ibson with the pistol pointed direc tly at him, so J ohn discharg ed the gun he held a nd shot G ibson. Almost simultaneously with the firing of one shot fr omKay said she was not in the habit of leaving the blinds open while they wer e g one; there was 2 testimony that throug h the open blinds one c ould se e whether any one wa s approa ching the house.

4 the pistol which he held, John said he felt his own arm ge t shot and g o limp; he could fee l blood

ru nn ingdo wn

his arm and he dr op pe d the re vo lve r wi th wh ic h he ha d arm e d h ims e lf . Joh n b e c a me disoriented and sat down in a cha ir in the room they call the of

fice . He ha d been shot in the a rm. Ka y c on fi rm e d muc h of he r hu sb and ' s te sti mony . She sa id that on Janu ary 12 and 17 , a s w e ll

as ea rlier on the da

y of the incide nt w hich cause d the filing of the c harg es, she a nd/or she and John toge ther ha d returne d home to discover t h ei r wi ndow blinds open and thing s missi ng . On the 2 eveningof January

19, J ohn answe red a knock at the door. Kay hear d J ohn tell Gibson he was not welcome and she did not want to t alk to him. Kay was e x plicit that J ohn clea rly told Gibson he was not welcome a

nd that he nee ded to leave . J ohn then closed the d o o rs an d walked back into the house. Ka

y then hea rd glass breaking and what sounded to her like gunshots. J ohn told her to g et the ba by and g e t on the g ro un d a s h e ra

n to the be dr oo m to g e t th e pis tol . Sh e the n s aw G ibs on in the kitchen holding a pistol with his arm raised. At this point , J ohn returne d from the be droom are a,

arme d with a g un of his own; both men shot the pistols they wer e holding

. Gibson testified in his own defe nse. Under his version of the story , when John answere d Gi bs on ' s k

no c k at th e do or , a lth ou g h G ibs on c ou ld t e ll that Mo rr iso n w a s a ng ry , Joh n n e ith e r t old Gibson to leave nor

told him t hat he wa s unwelcome at the house. Gibson denied shooti ng the door or bre aking any

windows. Gibson said that he followe d Morrison into the house and that whe n he5

walked into the kitche n, he sawJ ohn pointing a pistol at Gibson' s head. I n wh at m u st have be en extremely rapid movement, Gibson maintained that he was able to pull a .357 mag num pistol from the pocke t of his car g o pants with his left hand, tra nsfer the g un from his left hand to his rig ht hand,

an d f ir e th e g u n

— a lm o s t s im

u lt an e o u s ly

w it h th e d is c h ar g e o f

th e g u nw h ic h Jo h nh e ld

. G ib s on

re pe a te dly c la ime d tha t Kay , his moth e r, ha d li e d in he r t e sti mony

a bo ut h e r l oc a tio n a

nd the e ve nts of that evening . He c laimed he ha d been c amping in the woods behind the Morr isons' house for thr e e da y s and a dmi tte d h a vin g take n th ing s f ro m th e Mo rr iso ns ' ho me ; ho we ve r, he s aid that hi s purp os e in c omi ngto t

he ir ho me on the e ve nin g of

the 19 th w a s to re tur

n the ite ms he ha d p re vio us ly borrowe d while they

wer e aw ay . After the exchang e of gunfire, John tried to use the home' s telephone to c all the police, but discovere d that it was not working ; he later found that the tele phone interf ace outside the house had been disc onnecte d. Gibson said he pre viously remove d a telephone from inside the house a nd plugg ed it into the interfac e box outs ide wher e he had t ried to call a fema le frie nd of his who worke d at a de tention unit; he denied havingdisconnec ted the telephone line to the house. Kay used her cellular telephone to c all the police; all three (John, Kay , and Ka y ' s g randson) exit ed the house , but Gibson r emained inside. When the police ar rived, Gibson would not re spond to law enf

orce ment' s attempts to contact him, and they eventua lly

shot tearg as ca

nisters into the house and a

pprehe nded Gibson.6

Two V e r dic ts , Tr ialCo ur t A c c e pt s t he G r e at e r Offen se Parag raph Aof the indictment cha rg ed Gibson with burg lary : enteringa habitation without

c on se nt a nd c omm itt ingor

a tte mpt ingto c omm it a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , u sin g or

e xhibi tin g a

de a dly

wea pon; Parag raph B char g ed Gibson with injuring the vi ct i m b y s h o o ting him, while using or exhibi ting a

deadly wea pon. The jury

signe d both of th e fi rs t two verdic t forms, finding Gibson g uilty of burg lary

and ag g ravated assault. As a m at t er o f h o u s ekee ping, w e point out that the two piece s of conduc t alleg ed in the indictment are more acc urate ly termed "c ounts" as opposed to " para g raphs." Separate par ag raphs within a single count may alleg e diffe rent methods of c ommitt in g t h e s ame of fense . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 21.24(b) (Ve rnon 1989). When the S tate wishes to char g e multiple offense s in a sing le indictment, it is require d by statute to set out eac h separ ate of fense in a sepa

rate "c ount." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art . 2 1. 24 (a ) ( Ve rn on 19 89 ). Sin c e e a c h " c ount" a lle g e s a sin g le offe nse, an indictment c annot authorize more c onvictions than there are counts. Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 225 S.W .3d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). On t he other hand, ea ch count may contain as ma

ny

se pa rate pa ra g ra ph s c ha rg ing that of

fe ns e a s n e c e ssa

ry , s o lo nga s n o mo re tha n o ne of fe ns e is

c ha rg e d in any c ount (see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . ar t
. 2 1

. 2 4 (a ), (b ))

. T h u s , t h e t er m ''co u n t '' is used to char g e the of

fense itself, and a ' ' para g raph' ' is a portion or subset of a count, which c harg es a method of c ommitt i ng the offe nse. Se e Ri le yv . S tat e , 658 S.W .2d 818, 819 (Tex. App.—For t Wor th 1 9 8 3 , n o p e t
. )

. T h e s u b s t an c e o f

t h e a l l e g a t i o n , n o tt h e t e r m i n o l o g y u s e d , d e t e r

m i n e s i ts7

c ha ra c te r a s a

c ount o r a

pa ra g ra ph . H e re , th e ind ic tme nt a lle g e d tw o act s of c ri min a l c on du c t: burg lary of a ha bitation and aggra v ated a ssault. I t is true that ag g ravated assault, in the instant situation, is a n element of burg lary ; even so, it is also a lesser -included of fense of the kind of burg lary as cha rg ed in this case. Th e pr ob le m a t tr ia l ( and the su bje c t of the fi rs t po int

of e rr or ), c e nte rs on an in art fu lly dr a ft e d ju ry c ha rg e . T he a

pp lic a tio n p ara g ra

phof the jur y c ha rg e re a d a s f

oll ow s: Now if y ou find from the e videnc e b ey o n d a re asonable doubt that on or about the 19th day of Janu ar y , 2007 in Harr ison County , Texas, the defe ndant, J ason My ers Gibson, did then and there , intentionally or knowing ly enter a habitation, without the eff ective c onsent of John Morrison, the owner there of, and attempted to commit or committed the felony

offe nse of a g g ravated assault and the defe ndant did then and the re us e or e xhibi t a de a dly we a po n, to- wi t: a

fi re arm du ri ngthe c omm iss ion

of sa id of fe ns e , th e n y ou wi ll fi nd the de fe nd ant guil ty of burg lary a s c ha rg e d in Para g ra phA o f t he ind ic tme nt; or

if y ou fi nd fr om t he e vid e nc e be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt that on or about t he 19th day of J anuar y , 2007, in Harr ison County , Texas, the defe ndant, J ason My ers Gibson, did then a nd there intentionally , knowing ly , or rec klessly cause bodily

injury to J ohn Morrison by

shooting him with a fire arm, a nd the de fe nd ant d id t

he n an d th e re us e or

e xhibi t a de a dly we a po n, to- wi t: a

fi re arm , during the commission of said assault, then y ou will find the defe ndant g uilty of ag g ravated assault as c harg ed in Para g raph B of the indictment. The c harg e fa ils to specifically instruct the jury

to consider the c harg e of a g g ravated assault (c harg ed in P ara g ra

phB ) on ly if th e y

have a re a so na ble do ub t a s to the c ha

rg e of burg lary (c ha rg e d in Parag raph A ). I t would have be en pre fer able to instru ct t h e j u ry that should the jurors enter tain a

rea sonable doubt as to whe ther Gibson wa s g uilty of burg lary

as charg ed, they

should find him not g uilty , and consider whether he was guilty of the lesse r off

ense of ag g ravated assault. See 3 T EX AS C RI M I N A L P RACTI CE G UI DE § 73D.103 (2008).8

I n the ca se at ba

r, the trial c ourt' s char g e simply joi n ed t h e two alleg ations (burg lary and ag g ravated assault) w ith the conjunction "or ," and di d not predicate the jury ' s consideration of the l es s er o ff en s e up o n fi rs t h av i n g a re as o n ab l e do u b t t h at Gi b s o n h adco m m i t t edt h e p ri m ary ch ar ge of burg lary . Howeve r, this imprecision in the charg e did not aff ect the outcome of the t rial. The jury fo un d, be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, t

hat G ibs on

wa s g uil ty

of bo th burg lary and a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult

. The findingon ag g ravated assault wa s a nec essar y predic ate to the jury finding that Gibson committed burg lary

as cha rg ed in the indictment. After the jury ' s verdicts we re r ead, a conf ere nce at the bench w as held; this confe renc e wa s not tr anscr ibed. Outside the prese nce of the jury , the discussion c ontinued later. T h e t ri al co urt stated, The Court has r eviewe d case law and I am of the opi nion that the j ury having found the def endant guilty

bey ond a re asonable doubt of burg lar y an d al s o g uilty bey ond a r ea s o n ab l e d o u

b to f a ggra v at edas s au l t , t h at Iwi l l i gn o re t h e s ec o n d as b ei n g a lesser inc luded. The State c harg ed the de fenda nt w ith burg lary

to commit rather than with intent

. I t i s cl ear ly

a lesser included off

ense a nd the ca se law is cle ar that the c ourt c an ig no re the se c on d s inc e - - y ou have to f ind him g ui lty of the se c on d in order to find him guilty

of the fir st any

way . Th e State c ite s Ra ng e l v . S tat e , 1 79 S.W. 3d

64 , 6 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 05 , p e t. ref'd ), a ca s e wh ich appe ars to squar ely addre ss this i ssue. Rang el was c onvicted in Count Ifor burg lary of a ha bitation and in Count I Ifor a g g ravated assault; the San Antonio cour t modified the judgme nt to acquit Rang el of the Count I I char g e on double jeopa rdy g rounds. I n that case , Count I of the indictment cha rg ed that Rang el " intentionally or knowing ly

enter [ed] a habitationBut see Ex parte Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d 333, 338 (T ex . Crim. App. 2006) (over ruling 3 Lan de rs to e xten t it

he ld f a c tor s su c h a s d e g re e of

fe lony , r ang e of

punis hme nt, and

pa ro le e lig ibi lity rules should be c onsidered w hen dete rmining most serious off ense)

. 9 without the effe ctive conse nt of . . . the owner there of, and attempted to commit or committ ed the fel on y off ens e of a gg rava ted ass aul t. " Id

. a t 70

. I n Cou nt I I , th e ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d th a t Ra

ng e l " did then and there intentionally , knowing ly , or rec klessly cause bodily

injury to [ victim] by

stabbing the

sa id [v ic tim ] wit

h a kn if e ; and [Rang e l] di d th e n a

nd the re us e or

e xhibi t a de a dly we a po n, to w it: a kn if e, duri ng th e com mi ss io n o f sa idass aul t. " Id. This is almost ide ntical to th e l an gu age employ ed in the indictment in Gibson' s case . The Ra ng e l court c oncluded, " The a ppropriate reme dy for any do ub le j eop ardy

vi ol ati on is to vaca t e o n e o f t he co nv ict io ns ." Id. (citing Ball v. United States , 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985); Lan de rs v . S tat e , 957 S.W .2d 558, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). 3 When a def

endant is subjecte d to multi ple punishments f or the same conduct, the re medy is to affirm the conviction for the m ost serious offense a nd vacate any

other c onvictions. Bi

go n v . S tat e , No. PD1 7 6 9 -0 6 , 2 0 0 8 T ex . C ri m . Ap p . L E XIS 1 , at * 3 0 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . J an . 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Cavazos , 20 3 S. W.3 d 3 33 ; Lan de rs , 957 S.W .2d 558). I n Ochoa , the San Antonio court found the trial cour t should have instructed the jury on the law of le sser-inc luded offe nses; as a r esult, the jury returne d g uilty

verdic ts both for ag g ravated

se xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d a nd fo r i nd e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d. Re a so nin g that sin c e the State pr ov e d a ll the e le me nts of

a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d, the a

pp e llate c ourt

fo un d th a t th e State ha d a lso

nece ssarily proved the elements of indece ncy with a child: "if the trial cour

t had prope rly

instructedTo the extent that Gibson complains (particula rly at o ra l argument) of the possibility of a 4 nonunanimous verdict, we find Gibson did not preser ve this point for appe llate r ev i ew . More importantly , we f

ind very littl e likelihood of a nonuna nimous verdict. The jury was require d by the char g e to make a

decision ab o u t aggr avated assault as a predic ate to a c onviction of the burg lary char g e. Gibson did not ask the jury be polled. Af

ter rea ding the two verdic ts aloud, the trial cour t asked, "I s there a

ny one that disag ree s with the verdict a s Ihave r ead it? " T he re porter' s rec ord indic at es "( No audible re sponse)," and the tria l court stated, " All the heads a re shaking, no." The char g e does inc lude ac curate lang uag e requiring unanimity and instructing the jury

that if it found Gi bs on g uil ty be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t of

on e or the oth e r, the y mus t r e so lve that c on fl ic t in Gi bs on ' s f

a vo r a nd fi nd him g uil ty on ly of the le sse r o ff

e ns e of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

. 10 the jury on lesser inc luded offe nses, the only chang e to the conviction would have be en the a bsence of the c onviction for indec ency with a child. F or these r easons, we find that the jury found Appe llant g uilty of the g reater off

ense of ag g ravated sexual assault and not of the lesser offense of indece ncy wi th a chi ld ." O c h o a v . S tat e , 9 5 5 S

. W .2d 389, 393 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997), a ff 'd , 982 S.W .2d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). I n the pre sent ca se, the trial c ourt' s stated re asoning (" y ou have to f ind him g uil ty of the se c on d in ord e r t o f

ind him g uil ty of the fi rs t any

wa y " ) i s si mil ar t o th a t in Ochoa . We find that rea soning to be sound: a finding of g uilt for burg lary was pre dicated upon a finding Gibson either committ ed or attempted to commit ag g ravated assault, that being an ele ment of the burg lary

offe nse with which he was c harg ed. Acc ording ly , t he trial c ourt was c orre ct in acc epting the jury ' s verdict f or burg lary

and ignor ing or

dismiss ing its convic tion for agg ravated assault. We over rule Gibson' s first point of

err or. 411

Self -De fense In struct ion L im ited to Aggr avated Assault Allegation Gibson' s second point of err or complains about the trial court only instructing the jury on the law of se lf-def

ense in re g ard to the a g g ravated assault cha rg e. Gibson had a sked the de fe n s ive instruction be made a

pplicable to the bur g lary

char g e too, but the trial cour t declined. I f e vid e nc e fr om a

ny so ur c e , b e it s tr on g , w e a k, un imp eache d, or c on tr a dic te d, ra ise s a defe nsive theory , it must be included in the c ourt' s char g e. Ha y es v. St ate , 728 S.W .2d 804, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). I n his testimony , Gibs o n t o l d t h e j u ry that he had c ome to the Morrison home to r e tu

r nit e ms w h ic h h e h a d

ta k e n , in c lu d in g th e . 3 5 7 p is to l w h ic h h e s a id h e w a s c arry ing in his left f

ront pocket. I t is hard to r econc ile why , if the trial cour t found that Gibson was e ntitled to an ins tr uc tio n on se lf

-d e fe ns e re g ard ing a g g ra

va te d a ssa ult , h e wo uld

no t be lik e wi se e nti tle d to it on the burg lary

char g e. Abse nt an af

firmative jury

finding that Gibson committed or attempted to c omm it a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult upon John , G ibs on

c ou ld o nly

have be e n f

ound g uil ty of , at mo st, criminal trespa ss. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 30.05 (Ve rnon Supp. 2007). Gibson made a

timely objection to the trial cour t's lim itation of the self-de fense instruction to the a ssa

ult c ha rg e . A tri a l court mus t cha rg e the jur y fu lly and a ff

ir ma tiv e ly on the law a pp lic a ble to every issue raised by

the evidenc e. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.14 (V ernon 2007) ; Tay lor v . S tat e , 856 S.W .2d 459, 470 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1993), a ff 'd , 885 S.W .2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)

. I f evidenc e prese nted at trial raises an issue and a jury char g e is reque sted on that issue, then a c harg e on that issue must be g iven. Taylor , 856 S.W .2d at 470–71. Rever sal12

is r e qu ir e d for an er

ro r that has be e n p ro pe rl y pr e se rv e d o nly

if " so me ha rm " to t he a c c us e d r e su lts fro m t he error

or i f t he error

is "calcu lat ed t o i nj ure t he ri ghts of d e fend ant ." Id. a t 47 4; see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 3 6. 19 (V e rn on

20 06 ); Al

ma nz a v . S

tat e , 6 8 6 S. W. 2 d

1 5 7 , 1 7 1 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ) ( op . o n r e h' g ); Bo ok e r v. S tat e , 7 12 S.W. 2d

85 3, 85 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist.] 1986, pet. re f' d). In assessing harm, the revie wing court c onsiders the e ntire jury char g e, the state of the evidenc e, the a rg uments of counse l, and other r eleva nt information as found in the r ecor d

as a whol e. Al

ma nz a , 6 86 S.W. 2d

a t 17 1; Re

y no lds v . S

tat e , 2 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d

3 5 5 , 3 6 1 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

2007, no pet.). When one considers possible ha rm to Gibson due to the fa ilure to i nc lud e a

se lf -d e fe ns e ins tr

uc tio n c on c e rn ingthe burg lary c ha rg e , o ne ob se rv e s t hat it i s h ig hly unlikely that the jury

would have f

ound that Gibson was not acting in self-de fense with reg ard to the assault cha

rg e, y et would have found that he did a ct in se lf-def ense on the same assault that was a n element of

the burg lary

char g e. We f ind it was err or for the tr ial court to limit t he jury ' s consideration of self-de fense to the char g e of a g g ravated assault; howeve r, we find this error to have be en a harmless one. Be cause the jury issued a ve rd i ct s p ecif

ically finding Gibson g uilty

bey ond a re asonable doubt of ag g ravated

a ssa ult , it c le arl y re je c te d h is c la im that he a c te d in se lf -d e fe ns e . We fi nd

no thi ngin t

he re c or d to

su g g e st the jur

y wo uld have ma de a

dif fe re nt f ind ingha d it

be e n in str

uc te d to c on sid e r s e lf

-d e fe ns e as it deliberated the cha

rg e of bur g lary . We overrule this point of er ror.13

We affir m the trial court' s judgme nt.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: J une 18, 2008 Date D ecide d: J uly 2, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh