COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick,* Judge Elder and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

BEVERLY ENGLISH CROUCH 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1917-96-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 DECEMBER 23, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 

H. Selwyn Smith, Judge Designate 

 Roger A. Inger (Massie, Inger & Iden, P.C., 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Beverly English Crouch (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of driving while under the influence of alcohol in 

violation of Code § 18.2-266. On appeal, he argues that the 

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results 

of his breath analysis because the traffic checkpoint at which he 

was stopped was improperly established. Finding no error, we 

affirm the trial court. 

 State Trooper Michael Hodges established the disputed 

checkpoint on October 6, 1995, in response to an assignment he 

received the "beginning of his work week" requiring him to 

conduct a traffic checking detail some time during that "work 

week." Hodges' supervisor directed him to set up the detail at 

 

 *On November 19, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick succeeded Judge 

Moon as chief judge. 
 2 

the intersection of Routes 29 and 211. The assignment did not 

specify a date or time for the detail within the week, nor did it 

indicate whether the checkpoint should stop eastbound or 

westbound traffic. 

 The State Police Traffic Checking Plan provides guidelines 

for establishing a checkpoint. Under the plan, field officers 

must obtain pre-approval from a supervisor before beginning a 

detail. The plan also provides that vehicles "will not be 

stopped on a discretionary basis," and limits the duration of a 

traffic checking roadblock to between thirty minutes and two 

hours. The plan contains additional provisions, including 

requirements for record keeping and site selection for 

roadblocks. The intersection of Routes 29 and 211 was one of 

about twenty Fauquier County sites approved under these 

requirements. 

 Just before 7:00 p.m. on October 6, 1995, Trooper Hodges 

determined that "weather conditions were appropriate and that 

Trooper Downs was available to assist" him with the checkpoint. 

He called his dispatcher and obtained the required approval to 

begin the assigned roadblock. The traffic checking detail 

paperwork indicates that Sergeant Reynolds gave "verbal 

permission" to proceed. At approximately 7:00 p.m., Troopers 

Hodges and Downs established the traffic checkpoint on the 

eastbound side of Route 211. At about 7:15 p.m., appellant 

stopped his vehicle at the checkpoint. After observing the odor 
 3 

of alcohol "emanating from the defendant," Trooper Hodges asked 

him to perform a series of "field sobriety tests." Based upon 

the results of those tests and a preliminary breath analysis, the 

defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of 

alcohol. A subsequent breath analysis revealed a blood alcohol 

concentration of 0.12 grams/210 liters. 

 We evaluate the constitutionality of a traffic checking 

roadblock according to established principles. "Persons in 

automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have 

their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled 

discretion of police officers." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 

648, 663 (1979). However, "[t]his holding does not preclude [a 

state] from developing methods for spot checks that . . . do not 

involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of 

all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible 

alternative." Id. 

 In Virginia it is well settled that 

 "[t]o ensure that an individual's expectation 

of privacy is not subjected to arbitrary 

invasion solely at the unfettered discretion 

of police officers in the field, seizures at 

roadblocks must be carried out pursuant to 

plans embodying explicit, neutral limitations 

on the conduct of the individual officer." 

Brown v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 21, 24, 454 S.E.2d 758, 759 

(1995) (quoting Hall v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 972, 973, 406 

S.E.2d 674, 675 (1991)). See Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 

200, 202, 380 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1989) (traffic checking roadblock 
 4 

established "without any prior direction from . . . superiors and 

without an existing plan" held unconstitutional); Thomas v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 735, 739, 473 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1996) 

(roadblock held unconstitutional because Commonwealth failed to 

present "evidence that the officers were using an objective, 

nondiscretionary procedure"). 

 The validity of a checkpoint depends upon the amount of 

discretion remaining with the field officers operating the 

roadblock. Clearly, roadblocks are constitutional when conducted 

according to explicitly neutral plans which completely eliminate 

the discretion of the operating officers.1

 See Raymond v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 64, 435 S.E.2d 151 (1993) (sobriety 

checkpoint established according to a formal plan at a 

pre-arranged time and location which stopped all vehicles without 

discretion was valid); Crandol v. City of Newport News, 238 Va. 

697, 701, 386 S.E.2d 113, 115 (1989) (roadblock found 

constitutional based on "proof of advance decisions by superior 

officers as to the time and location [and that the field 

officers] conducted the roadblock [according to] explicitly 

neutral criteria"); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 352, 337 

S.E.2d 273, 277 (1985) (sobriety checkpoint held constitutional 

 

 1Deviations by field officers from checkpoint guidelines may 

constitute sufficient discretion to invalidate the roadblock. 

See Brown v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 21, 454 S.E.2d 758 (1995) 

(roadblock was held unconstitutional because troopers moved the 

checkpoint to the designated alternate location for unauthorized 

reasons). 
 5 

where officer followed plan which "is safe and objective in its 

operation, employs neutral criteria, and does not involve 

standardless, unbridled discretion by the police officer in the 

field"). 

 The issue before us is whether a field officer's control 

over the timing of the checkpoint constitutes unbridled 

discretion sufficient to render the checkpoint unconstitutional. 

 In Hall v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 972, 974, 406 S.E.2d 674, 

676 (1991), the field officer had discretion to decide both the 

location and the timing for a roadblock. He "had the authority 

to select his checking detail from fifty-four pre-approved sites, 

and to decide exactly when to conduct the detail during the week 

his superiors had ordered him to do so." Id. He also was 

required to obtain his supervisor's approval, but not until after 

he completed the detail. Id. at 974, 406 S.E.2d at 675. "While 

his discretion may not have been totally [unbridled], the plan 

unnecessarily left the individual trooper with such broad 

discretion that it was subject to abuse," particularly because 

"Accomack County is not so large that fifty-four checkpoint stops 

constitute a significant limitation." Id. at 975, 406 S.E.2d at 

676. We concluded that, as written, "the guidelines did not 

properly limit the officer's discretion" and that the seizure was 

unconstitutional. Id. at 973, 406 S.E.2d at 675. 

 The instant case differs from Hall in several respects. 

Although Trooper Hodges was allowed to designate the timing of 
 6 

the traffic checking detail, he had no discretion to decide the 

location of the assigned roadblock,2

 and he was required to 

obtain approval from a supervisor before he began stopping 

vehicles. The Commonwealth argues that Hodges' limited authority 

to determine the specific time of the roadblock during the 

designated work week does not constitute unbridled discretion. 

We agree. The need to evaluate weather conditions and determine 

the availability of other officers provides a reasonable basis 

for this procedure. Hodges complied with the restrictions, which 

limited any potential for abuse. His supervisor determined the 

site of the roadblock in advance. Hodges could not stop any 

individuals who did not pass the intersection of Routes 29 and 

211. Also, Hodges checked "[a]ll vehicles, regardless of type," 

according to the guidelines. Additionally, the checkpoint was 

operated for one hour, which was within the State Police 

Guideline limiting the duration of a checkpoint to between 

one-half hour and two hours. Finally, Hodges was required to 

gain pre-approval of the roadblock from a supervisor who was not 

part of the detail. Under these facts, we hold that the traffic 

checkpoint was properly established; the trooper exercised 

limited, supervised discretion under explicitly neutral 

guidelines. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 

 2We reject appellant's argument that Trooper Hodges' ability 

to choose which direction of traffic to stop gave him excessive 

discretion. The designation of a specific pre-approved site for 

the detail was sufficient guidance with respect to location. 
 7 

 Affirmed.