NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA MORTON, AKA Melissa Ann 

Morton, AKA Melissa Thomson Morton, 

AKA Melissa Thomson, AKA Melissa Ann 

Thomson; et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-56099 

D.C. No. 

8:19-cv-01957-PSG-ADS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 16, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: BERZON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,** District 

Judge.

Appellants appeal the district court’s dismissal of their quiet title action 

against the United States for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the 

Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 1 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s dismissal de 

novo, DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019),

and we affirm. 

Appellants claim ownership of real property located at 8801 Riderwood 

Drive in Sunland, California. They brought this suit against the United States to 

quiet title to that property. Specifically, Appellants sought to remove a cloud on the 

title caused by two instruments related to a previous lawsuit: a 2007 notice of lis 

pendens recorded by the United States and a 2008 default judgment obtained by 

the United States against a prior lienholder. Shortly after receiving the complaint, 

the United States filed a disclaimer with the district court disclaiming “any interest 

in the real property that is the subject of this quiet-title action.” The district court 

confirmed this disclaimer and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. Appellants timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in 

dismissing the case because the United States did not specifically disclaim the lis 

pendens and default judgment by instrument number. 

The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the United States from suit 

except where it has consented to be sued. United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 9 

(2012). The Quiet Title Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States as 

necessary to “adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States 

claims an interest.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). But “[i]f the United States disclaims all 
3 

interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time 

prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by 

order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease.” § 2409a(e).

Appellants’ contention on appeal that the disclaimer was insufficient 

because it did not specifically reference the lis pendens and default judgment by 

instrument number is without merit. The United States disclaimed “any interest” in 

the subject property. This unrestricted language necessarily includes the lis 

pendens and the default judgment to whatever extent those instruments represented 

interests claimed by the United States in the first place. See, e.g., Webster’s Ninth 

New Collegiate Dictionary 93 (1989) (defining “any” as a synonym of “all”). Once 

the United States filed its disclaimer of interest and the district court confirmed that 

disclaimer, the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case ceased under the plain terms of

§ 2409a(e). Dismissal was therefore proper.1

AFFIRMED.

1 Appellants’ challenge to the assignment of this case to Judge Gutierrez lacks 

merit. See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2013) (observing that “judges are vested with ‘inherent’ authority to transfer cases 

among themselves ‘for the expeditious administration of justice’” (quoting United 

States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam))).