1

Filed 6/29/16 S.W. v. Superior Court CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

S.W., et al., Petitioners,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MARIN COUNTY, Respondent; MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES et al., Real Parties in Interest. A147823
( Marin County S uper. Ct. No. JV26076A)

S.W. (father) and C.A. (mother) challenge the juvenile court’s order terminating
reunification services after six month s and setting a hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26

. 1 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(a).) Specifically,
f ather c hallenges the court ’s finding s that he was provided with reasonable services and failed to make substantial progress in his case plan. Mother similarly challenges the

court ’s finding s he failed to make substantial progress in her case plan
, and also contends
the court erred in failing to make findings on the pr obabili ty of R.W.’s return to her care
and by decreasing her visitation with R.W. We conclude the court did not err and substantial evidence supports the challenged findings

.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.2 B ACKGROUND On February 2, 2015, the Marin County Health and Human Services Depa rtment (Department) received a call from mother reporting she was unable to care for R.W. (born in December 2014) or provide for his needs due to a deterioration in her mental health. Mother stated she needed psychiatric help , was feeling “ ‘ crazy in [her ] head, ’ hypersensitive
, and angry at people
, ” and felt overwhelmed. She was not currently on any medications
, but in the past has been diagnosed with Anxiety, Depression, Bipolar Disorder and ADHD. Mother acknowledged she is an alcoholic.
That same d ay, the Department received another report of domestic violence
between the parents that occurred on Christmas Day 2014. Father and mother had been drinking
, and an argument escalated to the point they thr ew beer bottles and push ed and
hit one another. P olice arrested father for choking mother, who was too drunk to feed R.W. Maternal grandmother came to the apartment and took R.W. into her care. It was also reported that another incident took place on January 31, 2015, during w hich the parents started a rguing and father threatened to hit mother wh ile she was holding R.W. Mother went to maternal grandmother’s home but later returned to the apartment, leaving
R.W. in the grandmother’s care. On February 3, 2015, social worker Melanie Schmidt held a family meeting at maternal grandparents ’ home. Grandparents expressed concerns about the danger of injury to R.W. due to the small size of parents’ apartment and the proximity of the child
to domestic violence. Mother admitted she is an alcoholic and dri nks hard alcohol to the point of blacking out. Mother also acknowledged she needs mental health and substance abuse support. Mother stated the police reports of domestic violence were true
, but did not acknowledge this beforehand for fear father could go to jail. Mother disclosed “she has seen more escalating violence from [father] since [R.W.] has been born.” He verbally abuses her on a daily basis, sometimes grabs her by the wrist or head, and although she loves him, sh e is afraid of him.3

On Februar y 4, 2015, t he Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of
R.W. alleging he was at risk due to mother’s mental illness and to domestic violence
between the parents

. At the detention hearing on February 9, 2015, the parties submitted on the
deten tion report. The court ordered R.W. detained and placed in the care of maternal grandparents . The court ordered the following services for mother: alcohol and d rug testing; substance abuse treatment; parenting education; mental health services; and
dome stic violence services. As for father, the court ordered parenting education and
domestic violence services. It allowed supervised v isitation with R.W.
The Department prepared a jurisdiction report in connection with the hearing set for March 16, 2015. The Department reported M other recognize d she needs to be sober
and address her mental health issues before she can care for R.W. She admitted she left
the confidential domestic violence shelter on February 20 and moved back in with father. After a few nights
, she recognized this was a mistake and move d back to the shelter. Father agreed he and mother should live apart

. He stated he and mother met in a sober living environment, but he does not have “an issue with drinking” now. R.W. was then three months old and “extremely vulnerable physically and emotionally.” His caregivers put his needs first and were provid ing an environment that

encourage d his development, ensure d his safety and was free of violence. Parents
continue d to struggle with the consequences of their volatile behavior toward one another
and ha d not followed through with services. Mother need ed to address her alcoholism
and mental health issues and father need ed to add ress his anger and alcohol use. On March 16, 2015, the court continued the jurisdiction hearing to address father’s request for a restraining order against mother . The court issued a verbal order
that mother stay 100 yards away from father and his apart ment e xcept to collect her

c lothing and effects.
On March 23, 2015, the court assumed jurisdiction without objection on an amended petition filed the same date and appointed a sp ecial a dvocate for the child

. The

court also granted the Department discretion to place R.W. with mother at a residential4

drug/ alcohol treatment program on 72 hour s ’ notice to the child’s counsel, and continued
the matter to April 27 for a disposition and restraining order hearing

. In a report prepared for the dispositi on hearing , the Department recommended the court declare R.W. a dependent of the court, offer family reunification services to parents
and affirm the Department ’s case plan. The Department reported that R.W. was still in the home of his maternal grandpare nts. Grandparents advise d that when R.W. was initially placed with them he frequently was startled by any loud noise, but this reaction has dissip ated over the pas t two months. They now fe lt R.W. was bonded to them and they were bonding more with him eac h day. They advise d R.W. has “an extremely pleasant disposition [ , ] likes to laugh and is a pleasure to care for.” Also, they report ed
R.W. was healthy and on t rack developmentally. Parents each had the opportunity for supervised visitation with R.W. up to three times per week for a total of 4.5 hours per week. Mother had nine visits with R.W. at the
residential treatment house and missed 14 other possible visits. During visits, mother

was engaged and cared appropriately f or R.W. The reasons mother m issed visits included illness and scheduling conflicts with other appointments. Given the scheduling conflicts, t he Department had instructed mother to telephone by 9.00 a.m. on the day of a planned visit to e nsure she would be present

. Subsequently, sh e m issed multiple visits
because she did not call on time. Further, mother left the residential program on April 11, and the Department was unable to reach her until she called on April 22 to
inform it she was now at the Helen Vine Detox C enter and wished to schedule a visit with R.W. on April 27.
Father ha d eight visits with R.W. at a Department office and also missed 14 other possible visits. During visits, father was engaged and provide d R.W. appropriate care.
He misse d visits because his work schedule change d weekly. Father informed the Department on March 30 he was starting a new, full

- time job (8:00 a.m. to 6.30 p.m.) and requested weekend visitation . The Department was assessing whether weekend visitation

c ould be provided under the supervision of R.W.’s caregivers.5

The d isposition hearing was continued for a settlement conference requested by father’s counsel. Following the settlement conference, the Department filed a first
addendum to its disposition report
, s tating the parties had reached agreem ent on the case plan. Under it , mother’s responsibilities were to attend “Seeking Safety” classes and demonstrate the strategies learned ; continue to work with Marin Adult Mental Health
Services and follow directions f or medi c ation and treatment; drug test twice a week and stay clean for six weeks; participate in the Alliance In Recovery (AIR) program or attend AA meetings three times a week to support her sobriety. Father’s responsibilities were to
meet at least once a week with a licensed therapist, focusing on anger management, his
role in the domestic violence in his relationship with mother, and appropriate and safe relationships. Also, father had to attend a parenting program focusing on child
devel opment and car e. At the hearing
, the parties submitted on the disposition reports . The court adjudged R.W. a ward of the court , continued him in out

- of

- home placement, and adopted the case plan outlined in the Department ’s addendum report. The court set a
sixth

- month review hearing for November 30, 2015.
The Department ’s six

- month status report recommended that the court terminate family reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing

. In regard to current family c ircumstances, t he report state d mother had o btained full

- time employment as an assistant maintenance worker at a community c enter and father
continue d to work in construction.
In mid

- August , the parents met with the social worker and told her they were living together again and w anted to reunify with R.W. as a couple. The social worker agreed to parents’ “change of heart” and provisionally amended the case plan to allow joint visitation and an opportunity for parents to demonstrate “that they were safe together and with [R.W.]” Maternal grandparents continue d to care for R.W

. , but they
ha d a close relationship with the paternal grandmother, who care d for R.W. on most
weekends , during which father visited the infant

. At one point, however, paternal grandmother refused father weekend visitation on account of his “attitude” and animosity6

toward her, and because he spent time constantly texting the mother. Paternal grandmother agreed to resume visitation after father “go t it together” and focused on
R.W. ’s needs during visits.
The social worker also reported that father continue d to deny there was domestic violence in his relationship with mother. In particular, during one meeting with the social
worker and her supervi sor on October 21, 2015, father raised his vo ice, grew agitated, pointed at the social workers , and declaimed loudly there was no domestic violence in his relationship with mother, saying “ ‘ there never was, I never hit her! ’ ” Mother believe d
she c ould s afely care for R.W. if reunified with father
, and she need ed housing to provide
a stable environment for the child. The social worker recommended the court terminate services because parents had not utilized “the 11 months of services they already had t o address the necessary changes needed to care for [R.W.] ” The social worker opined parents “have used the majority of the time to struggle to take care of themselves, and sadly have not made substantial progress with their case plan and therefore do not have the necessary skills to keep [R.W.] safe. ”
The Department subsequently filed a n addendum reporting parents had located a

two

- bedroom apartment in Fairfax
, and on December 4, 2015, mother requested that a social worker visit the new housing. Before a visit could be arranged, however, mother
contacted the s ocial worker to report she was “secretly” leaving father and the new apartment. When father spoke with the social worker on January 22, 2016, he s aid he was unaware mother was going to lea ve him and he could not afford the apartment on his

own

. Father opined he and mother were not “ ‘ super ready to get [R.W.] back but they could prove themselves if they were given more time. ’ ” He and mother “ ‘ are still seeing how things go. ’ ” The adde ndum state d it “is unclear” why mother decided to leave father, but note d the Department was aware of a n incident in November 2015 when police were called to a Novato motel room parents were sharing
, due to a “fight”
between father and a friend
, Max.7

The six

- month review hearing was held on February 3 and March 3, 2016. In lieu of direct testimony by the case worker from summer 2015 until mid

- December 2015
, Maria Rosas, the court received into evidence her six

- month review report

. On cross,
Rosa s tes tified she did not know of any reports of domestic violence incidents between parents ov er the past 10 months. She also confirmed she had been informed by mother’s

pr escribing psychiatric nurse pra ctitioner that mother was compliant with her medication

an d ha d been actively engaged in the medication management of her m ental health
disorder. Rosas further testified on cross that father had attended counseling therapy
since June 2015 with two different counselors to address anger management and
domestic vio lence ; he had already been referred to Christie Hudson for such therapy
when she took over the case in June 2015 ; he later switched to evening sessions with
Ruth Horton to accommodate his work schedule

. Horton reported father was participating in a p ositive way in therapy. Rosas’ notes indicated father requested parenting classes in July 2015 and started attending those classes sometime thereafter. On cross by minor’s counsel, Rosas acknowledged one of the issues father was to address in therapy wa s domestic violence
, but he continue d to deny domestic violence
between himself and mother. Also, father’s first therapist Christie Hudson reported father was progressing in June and July but “went backwards” when he reunited with mother in August 2015. Father’s relationship wit h mother was “on and off again.” Rosas also acknowledged that father was referred to parenting classes
, agreed to attend a parenting program in May 2015, but did not start those classes until October 2015, seven months after the d is positional hearing.
Social worker Erin Lynch supervised t he c ase from detention onwards; she supervised all three social workers who were involved in the case and was involved in the preparation of all the reports filed in the case

. Lynch testified to mother’s resp onses to her service objecti ves and client responsibilities. She opined m other did not meet the service objective of taking appropriate action to avoid being a vict im of further domestic violence or her client responsibility of demonstrating strategies to avoid domestic
violence. Lynch testified that in June 2015, mother was referred to Seeking Safety, a8

program targeting domestic violence
, but mother did not like the placement and failed to engage in the program. Mother was also referred to the AIR program
, but mother never
made contact . In short, mother never demonstrated to the Department any strategies she learned with regar d to domestic violence. Lynch further testified that f or the most part mother worked with Marin Adult
Mental Health Services and followed their recommendations for medication and

treatment . Mother also received individual therapy sessions from that organization, but
had missed three sessi ons in the last month. Also, Lynch opined m other failed in her client resp onsibility on substance abuse testing . U nder her case plan, she was req uired to drug test twice a week, with drug testing to be discontinued if she tested clean for six weeks, but she never tested clean for the required period. Many times mother simply
f ailed to appear for drug testing despite the Department arranging for drug testing on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at mother’s request. Also, mo ther’s case plan called for her to
attend the A I R program, or alternatively, participate in AA meetings three times per week to support her sobriety. However, moth er never participated in the A I R program or provided the Department with any evidence that she attended AA meetings. Lynch also testified to father’s reunification service objectives and client

respons ibili ties under his case plan. She opined f ather did not meet the case plan requirement to show his ability and willingness to have custody of his child or demonstrate he c ould provide a stable and peaceful environment for the child. In support of her opinion, Lynch observed that during the reunification period
, parents “couch surfed all the time, so we were never abl e to see a home.” In December, parents found an apartment in Fairfax
, but they broke up again before the Department soc ial worker could visit the home. Further, during the pendency of the review period, father never indicated
to the Department that he was ready and willing to have custody of R.W., and in fact was
insistent he could not care for the child on his own and wa nted to work with mother to
establish a home for the child. Another service objective for father was that he would take action to avoid being
involved in domestic violence and demonstrate to the Department strategies on how to9

maintain a peaceful environ ment on beh alf of his child. According to Lynch, f ather did not meet that service objective. In this regard, Lynch stated that a lthough father made some progress in therapy on this issue in the early months
, according to his therapist he regressed when h e and mother atte mp ted to reunite in August 2015. And whereas father met his responsibility of meeting with a licensed therapist once a week, he had yet to
d emonstrate to the Department that he could apply what he learned in therapy in caring
for R.W.
, wh ich is critical to the child’s safety

. T he Department was never able to
determine whether therapy a ctually resulted in any modification of father’s behavior because parents’ living environment was so unstable ; parents would not allow the Department social worker home visits because they were “couch surfing” and they never
established a “regular consistent environment” where they could care for the child. Lynch also testified father has always been adamant there was no domestic
violence b etween him and mother, and domestic violence “was not anything that he
needed to deal with because he was not convicted o f domestic violence.” And in regard to father’s responsibility to attend a parenting class focusing on child development, Lynch testified the co urt ordered the program in June 2015 and father did not participate until October 2015. Also, father had yet to demonstrate to the Department that he could apply le arned parenting skills in a non superv ised environment. Both p arents testified at the hear ing and also called witnesses on their behalf. Mother testified she has been addressing domestic violence in therapy and learned to deal with situations so they do not escalate and be come confrontational. S he initially attended the Seeking Safety program
, but she stopped going because numbers in the group dropped and she did not think it met her needs. At the start of the case, mother stated she
was suicidal
, but in March or April 2015 began cons ulting with Dr. Violet Lakeland.
Dr. Lakeland put her on t he correct medication, which she only has to take once a month.
Since then
, mother has been consistent and stable o n her medication. On cross, mother
stated she has not seen Dr . Lakeland since December 2015 and has started to see a new psychiatrist through Kaiser Permanente, D r. Monica Caselli, whom she sees roughly once

every three weeks.10

M other also testified she attended the A I R program for only a short time. She stated the program was unsuitable because it included persons who were “still in th eir
addiction
, ” whereas her alco hol addiction was no longer “an issue now becaus e of the medication.” While she had struggl ed with alcohol abuse when the case first started , she
claimed it is no longer a problem now that she is on medication

. As for her housing situation, mother was rent ing a room in Terra Linda
, but her longer term plan was to move into Section 8 housing, for which she ha d just been approved. In regard to her relationship with father, mother stated she intends to stay apart from him bec ause she realizes that if they try to raise R.W. together the “same triggers, the same stresses a re going to come up.”
L icensed Marriage and Family Therapist Jodi Klugman

- Rabb, a contracted vendor
with the Department , was called as a witness on mother’s behalf. Klugman

- Rabb
testified that her first session with mother was September 8, 2015; she had 22 sessions
scheduled with mother and mother attended 13 of them. Nine sessions were cancelled late, usually an hour befo re the scheduled time

. In addressing domestic violence, the therapy sessions focused on helping mother understand “ the pattern of relationships in her past and how it affects her c hoice in relationships going forward.” Klugman

- Rabb opined mother had made progress on this issue, and a lso on the issue of parenting, in which she helped mother identify any “limitations that she has with mental health a nd
relationsh ips and support.” She also observed mother had “a strong desire to remain
stable” in her mental condition and continued medication. Klugman

- Rabb opined mother
coul d meet her case plan objectives

— avoiding domestic violence, ability to have custody of her child, and comply with p sychological treatment

— if she had additional time and
services because s he had “shown improvement thus far.” Nevertheless
, Klugman

- Rabb stated she was “unclear” about whether mother was committed to making con tinued

progress. On cross, Klugman

- Rabb admitted she had not seen the reports in this case

. Also,

m other never told Kl ugman

- Rabb she was an alcoholic. Substance abuse is outside of her scope of practice, but Klugman

- Rabb acknowledged the possibility of alcoholism11

should be factored into any opinion about mother’s progress toward the ability to parent appropriately. Klugman

- Rabb was also unaware mother had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety, and she has never had contact with mother’s trea ting psychiatrist.
Father testified he began therapy with Ruth Horton in August 2015 after spending
a few months with Ch ristie Hudson, whom he stopped seeing due to conflict with his
work schedule. His case plan goals are recognizing and avoiding dysfunctional relationships, parenting and anger management
, and he addresses all these issue s in therapy. Specifically in rega rd to domestic violence, therapy taught him preventative

measures , such as separating in order to diffuse a situation, listening to the other person
, and show ing kindness and understanding. Father testified he is no longer in a relationship with mother ; t heir “on again and off again” relationship finally terminated at the end of 2015

. Father testified he participates in a parenting class learning about childhood development and how to “help[] the child learn himself.” His first social
worker never referr ed him to a parenting clas s and only when Maria Rosas took over did
he receive a referral t o a parenting class. Father acknowledged he had adamantly denied there had been domestic violence in his relationship with mother

. H e claimed he had thought domestic violence meant
committ ing a criminal offense and he had not realize d it included “arguing and fighting in
a verbal manne r.”
Father called John Mavre dakis as a witness. Mavred akis is a senior s upport service w orker for the Department , and beginn ing in February 2015 he superv ised
visitation between parents and R.W. during February

– March 2015 and again from mid

December 2015 to the time of the hearing

. During those times, father visited twice a
week and ha d been consistent in his visits. Father’s visits were “check

- in visits,” where the support worker would check in every 15 to 30 minutes during the visit. Mother’s
visits are “check

- in” also

. During the “cross

- over time” between visits, when mother was leaving after her visit and fathe r was just arriving, they often chat ted about what happened during mother’s vi sit

. Their interactions were calm
, and Mavre d akis ne ver saw them arguing. Mavred akis testified that during visits with R.W., father present ed12

appropriately, greet ed the child in an affectionate tone , fed R.W., change d his diapers and play ed with him.
Father also called Michell e Kemp as a witness. Kemp works for the Family Partnership Program and contracts with the Department in providing classes in positive parenting. Father was a student in her class and enrolled at the beginning of October
2015. The cl ass teaches how to parent in a “democratic” manner, i.e., neither
authoritative ly or passive ly, but in a way that “allows a child to grow up with some choice making, learning how to negotiate

. . . [and] learn the life s [ k ] ills as developmentally a ppropriate.” The class also teaches parent

- child communication skills. When father first started attending
, he was quiet and reserved, and just obser ved what was going on. As time progressed, he began to participate m ore , ask questions, and offer his experiences and insight in response to the situations presented. Kemp could not give an example of father demonstrating the communication skills learned in class bec ause “I ju st see this litt le piece of an hour and

- a

- half o nce a week in my classroom and . . . [¶]

. . . he’s never had a need to demonstrate anything wit hin the classroom.” Kemp stated she could “only go by the questions he asks and how he responds, which is gener ally very

appr opriate and positive.” On cross, Kemp testified mother also attended her class and participates
conscient iously in the program. Kemp has never obse rved parents with R.W. Kemp stated it is common that parents participate more in her class over time as they get to know the program and her style of teaching. Kemp has never seen father use the skills taught in class, such as being able to lessen conflict in a hig h stress situation. Kemp stated her classes start every w eek and were available June through September 2015 and father could have signed up anytime during that period . Kemp did not know if parents were attending class “as a couple” but they were ther e at the same time.
After argument by counsel
, the juvenile court took the matter under sub mission. The court announced its ruling at a hearing on March 14, 2016, stating that after reviewing “the evidence and the testimony provided at the hearing, the Court finds it
would be a substantial risk and detriment to [R.W.’s] safety and well

- being if he’s13

returned to either parent. [¶] While each parent clearly loves [R.W.] and each has made progress, the Court finds clear and convincing evidence that the parents did not participate regularly in the services provided to them and that substan tial progress in their

res pective case plans was not made.” The juvenile court set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing and reduced parents’ visitation to one visit of 1.5 hours per
month.
D ISCUSSION A. Applicable Legal Standards
Due to the special needs of infants and toddlers for permanency and stability,

court

- ordered services for children who are younger than three years old , such as R.W.,
are limited by statute to “ six months from the dispositional hearing ... but no longer than
12 mo nths from the date the child entered foster care

. . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1 ) (B) ; see also Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1027 ( Fabian L. ) [noting unique developmental needs of infants and toddlers justifies a greater emphasis on establishing permanency and stability earl y in the dependency process ] .) The juvenile court must order return of the child to his parents at the six

- month review hearing unless the court finds doing so would create a “substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection
, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) A parent’ s failure “t o participate regularly and mak e substantive progress in court

- ordered treatment programs” is prima facie evidence return would be
detrimental. ( Ibid. ) Additionally, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

a parent has not mad e substanti ve progress in court

- ordered treatment programs
, the juvenile court may terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. ( Fabian L. , supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027.) If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability the child may be returned to a parent at or before the 12

- month permanency hearing
, or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court sh all
continue the case to the 12

- mon th permanency planning hearing. ( Ibid. )
We review a juvenile c ourt’ s find ings for substantial evidence. ( In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th14

758, 763 .) In doing so, we review the record in the light most favorab le to the court’ s findings and draw all reasonable inf erences in support thereof. ( In re Julie M. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46.) I f t he law calls for proof by clear and convincing evidence, the sufficiency of such evidence is primarily a questi o n of fact for the trial court, which we
also review for substantial evidence

. ( See Sheila S. v. Superior Court (20 00)
84 Cal

. App.4th 872, 880

– 881 [ “[O] n appeal from a judgment required to be based upon
clear and co nvincing evidence, ‘ the clear and convincing test disappears .

. . [and] the
usual rule of confli cting evidence is applied, givin g full effect to the respondent’ s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.’ ”] .) Moreover, under substantial evidence review, “ an appellate court

. . . has no power to judge the effect or value of, or to weigh the evidence; to consider the credibility of witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or deductions from the evidence. We review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no opportunity to observe the

a ppearance and demeanor of the witnesses. [Citation.] ‘ Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court.’ [Citations.] ” ( In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187,
199

– 200 ; Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 689 [“ ‘ We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but simply determine whether
the record discloses sufficient fa cts to support the findings

. . . .’ ” ]. ) With these standards in mind we turn now to address the contentions raised in the par ents ’ writ petitions.
B. Father’s Contentions Father contends he was not provided with reasonable reunification services. Specifically, he asserts the Department delayed in providing him with therapy and parenting classes, which imposed a significant ti me delay and negatively affected his ability to succeed on his case plan, citing In re M aria S. (2011) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032,
1040

– 1041 ( Maria S. ) [record contained “ no evidence whatsoever ” to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services had been provided because mother received no services while incarcerated and upon release was “deported before she could avail herself of the services recommended” by the Department ]. ) In contrast to Maria S

. ,15

the record here shows the parties agreed on the case plan
, the Department provided
services consistent with the case plan, and father availed himself of those services. “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the servic es were reasonable under the circumstances.” ( In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [ observing that in “almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the s ervices provided were imperfect ” ].) Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding the Department provided
reasonable services. The c ase plan called for father to engage in weekly therapy to address anger management and domestic violence and to attend a parenting program focusing on child development and care

. The record shows the Department provided the therapy component of services at or about the time of the disposition hearing o n June 1,
2015. 2 In this regard, a letter father introduced into evidence from his therapist Ruth Horton, states he began receivi ng services on August 5, 2015. Moreover, Horton was the second therapist father consulted. According to father’s own testimony, he engaged in therapy sessions for “a few months ” with Christie Hudson, then switched from Hudson to
Horton to better accommodate his work schedule

. As for the parenting component of father’s service plan, father did not begin parenting classes until October 6, 2015, as evidenced in a letter from his parenting
instructor , Mi chelle Kemp

. It is also evident that as of the date of Kemp’s testimony on February 3, 2016, father w as still a student in her class . T hus, father received fully four months of parenting services. The record is less clear as to whether father ’s delay in starting p arenting classes was due to his tardiness in following up on the Department ’s referral, or due to the Department ’s tardiness in providing the referral. 3 In any case,

2 Section 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B) provides that for a child under three years of age on the date of initial removal, “court ordered services shall be p rovided for a period of six months from the dispositional hearing . . . .”

3 On the one hand, father claims he went to parenting class as soon as he received the referral. On the other hand, social worker Maria Rosas testified he had been referred to par enting class before she took the case in the summer of 2015, but when she first met16

because father received fully four months of parenting classes and a full comp lement of therapy services, we conclude the court’s finding that reasonable services were provided is supported by substantial evidence. Father also contends “ [ t ] he court improperly found no substantial probability of

return .” 4 However, neither the juvenile court’s oral or written orders mad e a ny findi ng on the probability of return. Rather, the court ’s orders show the court specifically found by clear and convincing evidence that parents failed to make substantive progress in their

case plan and
, in the exercise of its discretion, set a section 366.26 hearing based on that finding. T he court acted entirely in accordance with section 366.21, subdivision (e)(3)

. Its finding
, by clear and convincing evidence
, that father failed to make su bstantive progress in his case plan also foreclosed a finding of a substantial probability of return. (See fn. 4, ante .) Furthermore, the juvenile court’s finding as to father’s lack of substantive progress in his case plan is supported by substantial evidence. The case plan states R.W. came to
the attention of the Department “due to multiple incidents of domestic violence between his parents.” Accordingly, father’s main responsibility under the case plan was to engage in therapy focusing on his role in the domestic violence and anger management, and to

with him he did not have the information. She later clarified that a case note dated July 30, 2015, indicated father was still awaiting a referral and that a coordinator a t SENECA would email him the information. However, father did not begin classes until October 6, 2015, and instructor Kemp testified the parenting class had open enrollment every week. In sum, the record indicates any delay in father starting parenting c lasses was due to a combination of a possible later referral by the Department followed by father’s tardiness in joining the class.

4 In order to find a substantial probability of return, the juvenile court must make all three of the following findin gs: (1) the parent consistently and regularly contacted and visited the child; (2) the parent made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the child’s removal from the home; and (3) the parent demonstrated the capacity and ability to co mplete the objectives of the treatment plan and provide for the child’ s safety, protection, and physical and emotional well

- being. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)

– (C) , italics added. ) Findings (2) and (3) are contrary to the court’s finding under section 366.2 1, subd. (e)(3) that father failed to make substantive progress in his case plan.17

“demonstrate for the Department the strategies he has learned to ensure he can provide a
safe environm ent for his son.” Whereas father consistently engaged in therapy, substantial evidence supports the court’s fi nding it did not result in substantive progress

on his issues with domestic violence and anger management

. In this regard, it was only on the day of his testimony at the six

- month hearing that
father even acknowledged he engaged in domestic v iolence; he claimed his prior denial
of domestic violence was based on a misunderstanding that domestic violence meant he
h ad committed a criminal offense, and he did not realize domestic violence included “arguing and fighting in a verbal manner.” Patent ly, the court did not credit his testimony on this point and we will not disturb that finding on appeal. ( See In re Sheila
B. , supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 200 [ ‘Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court.’ [Citations.]” ].) Furthermore, father’s belated attempt to minimize his domestic violence behavior by characterizing it as “verbal” arguing and fighting is belied by the record. The incidents that led to this dependency proceeding involved physical violence as well as
verb al abuse

. Such v iole nce included the parents throwing objects at each other
, father
h olding mother down on the couch and choking her until she almost passed out, as well

as mother’s report of father’s “escalating violence” from daily verbal abuse to grab bing her by the wrist and head.
The record also reflects substantial evidence father failed to make substantive progress on his anger management issues

. For example, paternal grandmother
discontinued father ’s weekend visitation at one point on account of his “attit ude” and animosity toward her. And at a meeting between parents and the social worker and her supervisor, mother terminated the meeting when f ather began to lose his temper by raising his voice, growing agitated, gesticulating at t he social w orkers, and declaiming there was no domestic violence in his relationship with mother

.18

In sum, the juvenile court’s finding that father failed to make substantive progress in addressing the domestic violence component of his case plan is supported by
substantial evidence. 5 Last, father appears to challenge the juvenile court’s termination of services on constitutional grounds. However, father’s citation to cases addressing termination of parental rights are inapposite at this stage of the proceedin gs. C. Mother’s Contentions
Mother similarly contends no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding she had not made substantive progress on her case plan

. O ne of mother’s case plan objectives was to take appropriate action to avoid bein g a victim of further domestic violence . To that end, and beginning in June 2015, she agreed to attend “ Seeking Safety ” classes and then demonstrate to the department the strategies she learned in the class
, and also to meet regularly with a counselor fro m the
A I R program to address her alcoholism. But , a s reported Department’s November 2015 status review, m other represented to the social worker in July that she had started Seeking Safety classes , then in August told the social worker the group “dissolved,” and when the
social worker checked with a Seeking Safety program manager in October about mother’s participation, the social worker learned mother had never partici pated in any
classes. Furthe rmore , Department social worker and case supervisor Erin Lynch testified
that the A I R program has a domestic violence component, but mother failed to engage in that program either , claiming “it didn’t work out.” And according to Lynch, mother has

5 We note that on March 30, 2016, after the court issued its findings and orders, mother filed a request for a restraining order against father, alleging that on March 17, parents got in an argument and father punched mother nine times in the head while grabbing her by the hair. Without deciding whether we are precluded as a matter of law from considering this evidence (see In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413 [appellat e court may not consider “postjudgment evidence of changed circumstances in an appeal of an order terminating parental rights” in order to “ reverse juvenile court judgments and remand cases for new hearings”], italics added), we do not rely upon it in any event in concluding substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that father did not make substantive progress in his case plan.19

never de monstrated to the Department any strategies she learned with regard to deali ng with domestic violence. Also, mother’s case plan stipulated that if she did not attend the A I R program,
then she would participate in AA meetings three times per week to suppo rt her sobriety. However, mother never participated in the A I R program or provided the Department any
evidence sh e attended AA meetings. Rather, mother asserted at the six

- month hearing
that alcohol is no longer a problem for her because she is on medica tion and has lost th e craving for it, despite the fact that when R.W. was removed mother ac knowledged she
was an alcoholic and dr ank hard liquor to the point of blacking out. Even mother’s family therapist Jodi Klugman

- Rabb acknowledged mother had never told her about her alcohol problem and that alcoholism should be factored into any opinion about mother’s

progress toward the ability to parent appropriately

. Additionally, under the case plan mother agree d to drug test two times per week,
to be disco ntinued if she tested clean for six weeks. Lynch testified mother failed in her client responsibility on substance abuse testing

. Many times mother simply failed to appear for drug testing despite the Department arranging for drug testing on Tuesdays
and Wednesdays at mother’s request. And mother never had a clean drug test
, as all the
tests were either no

- shows or tested positive for marijuana. In sum, reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings and drawing all re asonable inferences in support thereof ( In re Julie M. , supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 46), we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother did not make substantive progress in her case plan. Mother also contends the juveni le court erred by failing to make a finding under

s ection 366.21, subdivision (e)(3 ), regarding whether there was a substantial probability
R.W. would be return ed to her care within six months
, and as serts the matter should be
remand ed for such finding. Even assuming the juvenile court was required to make an express finding on the probability of return, its failure to do so does not require remand because we generally imply such findings where they are supported by substantial evidence. ( See In re Marqu is D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1825 ; see also In re Albert20

B. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 361, 374 [findings on adoptability “need not always be express”]; In re Corienna G. ( 1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 83

– 84 [implied finding appropriate where substantial eviden ce supports it].) An implied finding in support of the judgment is certainly warranted here on the question of the probability of return , because,
as we noted above in connection with a similar contention by father , the juvenile court’s finding by clear a nd convincing evidence that mother failed to make substantive progress
in her case plan foreclosed a finding of a substantial probability of return. (See fn. 4,

ante .) Next, m other argues that the court abused its discretion by reducing her visitation with R.W. following termination of services and erred in ordering such reduction in visitation absent a finding of detriment. Mother’s argument is without merit

. Prior to termination of services, mother was permitted weekly visitation with R.W. Following termination of services, the court ordered that mother may visit once per month for one

- and

- a

- half hour s. “In any case in which the court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 shall be held, it shall also order the termination of

reu nification services to the parent or legal guardian. The court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that
visitation would be detrimental to the child

. . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).) Here, the court did continue to permit visitation following termination of reunification servi ces, albeit on
a red uced scale. Nothing in section 366.21, subdivision (h) requires the court to make a finding of detriment where it permits visitation to conti nue

. Moreover, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and st ability

. ’ ” ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 , 317.) And the juvenile court’s determination regarding the needs of the child in relation to custody issues is reviewed for clear abuse
of discretion. ( Id. at p. 318 [reviewing court will not distu rb a custody determination

“ ‘ “ unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently ab surd determination ” ’ ”]

. ) Here, the court adopted the21

Department’s recommendation for reduced visitation because the court was informed

one

- year

- old R.W. is very attached to his caregivers , is at an age developmentally where
he d oes not want to be separated from them , and the long 30 to 45 minute drive each way to supervised visitations at the Department offices causes him great distress and to become hysterical when he has to get in the car. Accordingly, th e juvenile court’s
decision to reduce visitation was a rational me asure to meet R.W.’s needs for

permanen cy and stability. As such, the court’s decision was not an abuse of its discretion. ( I

d. at p p. 317

– 318 )
D ISPOSITION Father’s and mother’s petitions for extraordinary relief are denied on the merits and the juvenile court’s order setting a section 366.26 permanency hearing is affirmed.
This decision is final in this court up on filing . (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i) & 8.490(b)(2)(A). )22 _________________________ Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________ Humes, P. J.

_________________________ Margulies, J.

A147823, S.W. v. Superior Court of Marin County