Fiscal Year 2020

Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan

Report to Congress

July 2019

National Nuclear Security Administration

United States Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page i

Message from the NNSA Administrator

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) was created to 

safeguard and support our Nation’s security through the application of nuclear science. Since the days of 

the Manhattan Project, the highly talented men and women of the nuclear security enterprise have 

applied unique capabilities to promote U.S. security in the face of an ever-evolving global security 

environment. Nuclear deterrence has been, and remains, the cornerstone of our Nation’s security 

posture. Providing the tools of deterrence to our military is the highest priority mission for DOE/NNSA. 

DOE/NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) describes plans to 

ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and to maintain the 

scientific and engineering tools, capabilities, and infrastructure that underpin the nuclear security 

enterprise. The SSMP is a companion document to the annual Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic 

Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats: FY 2020 – FY 2023 report to Congress, which outlines the equally 

vital missions of reducing the threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. In keeping with our 

commitments to Congress and the public, updated versions of these reports are published each year. 

The fiscal year (FY) 2020 SSMP summarizes the activities being performed within DOE/NNSA’s national 

laboratories, production facilities, and security sites in support of our national security missions. In 

particular, this report describes DOE/NNSA’s plan to achieve the program requirements of: producing at 

least 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030; achieving the first production unit of the W80-4 warhead by 

FY 2025; and delivering the first production unit of the B61-12 gravity bomb and the W88 Alteration 370 

warhead. 

In FY 2019, DOE/NNSA completed production of the W76-1 Life Extension Program, began work on the 

W76-2 low yield ballistic missile warhead, and restarted design activities for the W78 replacement 

warhead (the W87-1). The nuclear security enterprise is at its busiest since the demands of the Cold War 

era. 

DOE/NNSA’s ability to execute the priorities outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review depends upon 

a modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear security infrastructure. This SSMP reflects continued investments 

in the repair and recapitalization of the laboratories, production facilities, and security sites that are 

crucial to deliver on the Nation’s defense priorities and, most importantly, to support our greatest asset, 

our workforce. Together with continued support from Congress, DOE/NNSA will ensure that our worldclass workforce has the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure needed to steward the systems 

that comprise our deterrent today and, should the need arise, to design the systems of tomorrow. 

The challenges facing our Nation follow only one pattern—that of constant change. This rapidly evolving 

threat environment underscores the need for the United States to maintain a diverse set of nuclear 

capabilities that can provide flexible, tailored options to enhance deterrence and achieve objectives 

should deterrence fail. As described in this report, the scientific and technological expertise found at 

DOE/NNSA’s laboratories, production facilities, and other sites is the intellectual backbone that supports 

the United States’ continued deterrence of adversarial aggression and preservation of peace for our 

Nation and our allies. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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For 75 years, the nuclear security enterprise has met every challenge, leading the country in incredible 

scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries that the benefit of the Nation as a whole. As we 

begin the next decade, DOE/NNSA will continue to stand together to anticipate future security challenges 

and ensure our Nation is ready to meet them. 

Pursuant to statute, this FY 2020 SSMP is being provided to the following members of Congress: 

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable James Inhofe

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Deb Fischer

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Martin Heinrich

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Nita Lowey

Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Kay Granger

Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Adam Smith

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Appropriations
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page iii

The Honorable Mike Simpson

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Jim Cooper

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Michael Turner

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

Should you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ms. Bridget Forcier, Office 

of the Chief Financial Officer, at (202) 586-0176; or Ms. Nora Khalil, NNSA Associate Administrator for 

External Affairs, at (202) 586-7332. 

Sincerely,
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page v

Message from the Secretary

National security is a fundamental mission of the Department of Energy (DOE). Maintaining a safe, secure, 

and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile is performed through the work of DOE’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA). This mission accounts for more than a third of the Department’s discretionary 

budget. It comprises the developments made at the national security laboratories, production facilities, 

and security sites in science-based stockpile stewardship, advanced manufacturing, high performance 

computing, and other areas that benefit DOE and other departments and agencies throughout the 

Government. 

DOE/NNSA has been working in close partnership with the Department of Defense (DoD) to implement 

the national security requirements laid out in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Today’s dynamic global 

threat environment includes an unprecedented range and mix of threats. The nuclear deterrent remains 

an essential element of our Nation’s defense to protect our interests and those of our allies. The joint 

DOE and DoD efforts to implement the Nuclear Posture Review requirements will provide additional 

diversity in the attributes and flexibility of our deterrence options. This year’s Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) continues to document our plans and progress on this critical 

initiative.

For the 23rd consecutive year, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program has allowed DOE and DoD 

to certify the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile to the President 

without the use of nuclear explosive testing. This impressive scientific achievement is enabled by 

DOE/NNSA’s most valuable resource, its workforce. DOE/NNSA’s ability to recruit, train, and retain the 

next generation of world-class scientists, engineers, and technicians is a major priority. Additionally, it is 

imperative that DOE/NNSA continues revitalization and modernization of its infrastructure to ensure the 

nuclear security enterprise can continue its work safely and effectively.

With continued congressional support for the program described in this SSMP, we will continue to meet 

our Nation’s evolving nuclear security requirements while keeping the nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and 

effective.

Sincerely, 

Rick Perry
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Executive Summary

This Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), including its classified Annex,

describes the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) program for 

maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile over the next 25 years. 

DOE/NNSA publishes the SSMP annually, either in full report form or as a summary, in response to 

statutory requirements, to support the President’s Budget Request to Congress for Weapons Activities. 

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 SSMP is a full report. This annual plan provides a single, integrated picture of 

current and future nuclear security enterprise activities and capabilities funded by the Weapons Activities 

account in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent and is developed to be consistent with the Nuclear 

Weapons Council Strategic Plan for FY 2019–2042.

This SSMP lays the foundation for meeting the nuclear deterrent objectives laid out in the National 

Security Strategy (White House 2017) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (DoD 2018). Maintaining the 

range of flexible nuclear capabilities needed to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent can only be realized 

through enduring world-class science, technology, and engineering expertise and a responsive and 

resilient nuclear infrastructure. 

Maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent:

With five warhead modernizations underway, DOE/NNSA is executing an unprecedented variety of 

complex component development and production work. Highlights of near-term and out-year mission 

milestones for the nuclear deterrent include:

 Deliver the B61-12 gravity bomb.

 Deliver the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 (with a refresh of the conventional high explosive).

 Achieve the first production unit of the W80-4 warhead by FY 2025, complete the life extension 

program (LEP) by 2031, and ensure alignment with the Department of Defense Long Range 

Standoff cruise missile replacement program.

 Deliver the W76-2 initial operational capability warheads to the Navy.

 Support fielding the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent by FY 2030 and advance the W87-1

Modification Program (W78 Replacement) planning basis for warhead replacement 

modernization activities by 1 year.

 Sustain the B83-1 unit until a suitable replacement is identified.

 Continue execution of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program.

 Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 

80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030 by expanding plutonium pit production capabilities.

 Assure a continuous and reliable supply of strategic materials for military needs, including 

plutonium, uranium, lithium, and tritium.

Accomplishments include:

 Completed 100 percent of the total production units of the W76-1 LEP, one of the two warheads 

associated with the Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missile. This LEP will add an additional 

30 years of service life to the W76.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 The W88 Alt 370 program accelerated activities for the change-out of the high explosives (HE) in 

the W88, the other submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead. 

 The B61-12 LEP, a nuclear gravity bomb for the Air Force, is currently in the production 

engineering phase and continues to meet its qualification test schedule; multiple flight tests were 

completed during the past year. Once completed, the LEP will add at least 20 years to the life of 

the system and consolidate four models of the B61 into a single variant.

 DOE/NNSA made significant progress on the W80-4 LEP and entered Phase 6.3 (Development 

Engineering) in February 2019.

 In alignment with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, DOE/NNSA advanced restart of the W87-1

Modification Program (W78 Replacement) to FY 2019 to support fielding the Air Force GroundBased Strategic Deterrent by 2030. The program was reauthorized by the Nuclear Weapons 

Council to restart Feasibility Study and Design Options (Phase 6.2) in September 2018.

Strengthen key science, technology, and engineering capabilities:

The nuclear weapons stockpile and key nonproliferation activities are supported by the technical expertise 

resident in DOE/NNSA’s Federal and management and operating partner workforces. DOE/NNSA

cultivates technical expertise at the cutting edge in manufacturing, diagnostics, evaluation, and other 

areas at our plants and sites. In addition, DOE/NNSA maintains unparalleled scientific and engineering 

capabilities at our three national laboratories that execute science-based stockpile stewardship.

Highlights of near-term and out-year mission milestones for science, technology, and engineering 

capabilities include:

 Advance the innovative experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, and computational 

capabilities necessary to ensure stockpile safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness.

– Achieve exascale computing and deliver a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s.

– Develop an operational enhanced capability (advanced radiography and reactivity 

measurements) for subcritical experiments by the mid-2020s.

– Ensure an enduring trusted supply of strategic radiation-hardened microsystems beyond 

2025.

 Maintain state-of-the-art manufacturing technologies in support of production operations.

 Implement the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to fully exercise the workforce and capabilities 

of the nuclear security enterprise.

 Nurture Strategic Partnership Programs that support other customers’ needs while advancing the 

long-term capabilities and workforces of the national laboratories.

Accomplishments include:

 The National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, 

California and the Z pulsed power facility at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, 

New Mexico once again pushed the envelope in the field of high energy density science with 

record performances for output. High energy density and inertial confinement fusion 

experiments support stockpile stewardship, as well as other national security applications and 

discovery science.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page ix

 The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) completed integrated hydrodynamic experiments that examined the effects of 

component aging and the changes proposed in the LEPs.

 The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

(JASPER) gas gun at the Nevada National Security Site

completed 18 experiments, including two with plutonium. 

Sixteen experiments on other special nuclear materials 

readied the platform for advanced diagnostics in support of 

upcoming plutonium experiments.

 The Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications 

(MESA) Complex at SNL produced integrated circuits for the 

nuclear security enterprise, including circuits used in state-ofthe-art diagnostic detectors.

 The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) fielded 122 experiments critical to 

understanding nuclear weapons performance and an additional 546 experiments for other users, 

including other government organizations, universities, and industry (under proprietary user 

agreements). The proton radiography facility and the Lujan Center both executed shots in support 

of the B61-12 LEP and future stockpile options. The Weapons Neutron Research Facility measured 

nuclear criticality data, as well as radiochemical data from underground tests.

 The Sierra high performance computing system at LLNL has been accepted and is scheduled to 

move to full operations in FY 2019. With a speed of 119 petaFLOPS,1Sierra represents an almostthreefold performance increase over the previous supercomputer, Trinity at LANL, which will 

continue to serve the needs of the mission alongside Sierra.

Modernize the nuclear security infrastructure:

DOE/NNSA continues to revitalize and reinvigorate the facilities and corresponding infrastructure that 

make up the nuclear security enterprise. These upgrades are necessary to create a responsive and 

resilient nuclear enterprise that can meet our national security missions today and into the future. With 

the assistance and support of Congress, we will be able to reduce deferred maintenance and modernize 

the nuclear security enterprise.

Highlights of near-term and out-year mission milestones for nuclear security infrastructure include:

 Recapitalize existing infrastructure to implement a plan to produce no less than 80 ppy by 2030. 

The recommended strategy is a two-site solution: 

– Produce no fewer than 30 ppy at the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at LANL in Los Alamos, 

New Mexico, beginning in 2026.

– Repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, 

South Carolina as part of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility to produce at 

least 50 ppy by 2030. 

 

1 PetaFLOPS = one million billion or 1015 floating point operations per second.

 DOE/NNSA laboratories, plants, 

and sites took home 13 R&D 100 

Awards, known as the “Oscars of 

Invention.” 

 Over $65 million in grants were 

awarded to academic institutions 

across the Nation to support 

fundamental research relevant to 

DOE/NNSA’s stockpile 

stewardship mission. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page x | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Phase out mission dependency on Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee and deliver the Uranium Processing Facility.

 Ensure long-term actinide chemistry and materials characterization and deliver the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project.

 Modernize lithium and tritium facilities.

 Recapitalize the HE and nuclear weapons assembly infrastructure.

 Provide modern office and laboratory spaces to support the world-class workforce needed to 

maintain capabilities of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

 Reduce deferred maintenance and repair needs by not less than 30 percent by 2025.

Accomplishments include:

 The Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 remained on track and on budget, facilitating the start of 

construction of the main buildings. 

 Approved Critical Decision 4 (CD-4; Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion) at the 

High Explosive Pressing Facility at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) outside Amarillo, Texas. The High 

Explosive Pressing Facility will improve operational safety and security, thereby enhancing the 

quality and efficiency of HE production at Pantex.

 The John C. Drummond Center opened at Pantex, providing a modern work environment for more 

than 1,100 employees and replacing 52 Cold War-era facilities. 

 Two critical subprojects for the CMRR project at LANL are on track to achieve CD-4 in FY 2022 on 

budget and schedule. The CMRR project will make it possible for mission-critical technical 

capabilities, such as analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and metallurgy research and 

development, to be relocated to modern laboratory facilities that meet or exceed current safety 

and environmental protection standards.

 Working with the Army Corps of Engineers, completed the 100-percent design phase for the 

Albuquerque Complex Project and broke ground on July 2, 2018. This is an important milestone 

on the path to a modern and efficient facility for over 1,200 DOE/NNSA employees in New Mexico.

 A groundbreaking was held at the Nevada National Security Site near Las Vegas, Nevada for the 

Mercury Modernization program. Mercury serves as the “base camp” for the Nevada National 

Security Site, housing facilities such as the operations command center, a fuel station, office 

buildings, and other support structures. The modernization effort will consolidate facilities into a 

smaller footprint, reduce energy costs, and provide a modern, sustainable infrastructure.

Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

DOE/NNSA has made substantial progress on near-term priorities to ensure the stockpile remains safe, 

secure, and effective for as long as nuclear weapons exist. However, there remains a need for significant 

and sustained investments in critical elements over the coming decades to ensure that DOE/NNSA will be 

able to maintain a responsive and resilient enterprise into the 2030s and beyond. 

While the service lives of existing warhead types are being extended through refurbishment, new 

capabilities will be necessary to avoid stockpile age-out, support LEPs, and prepare for future uncertainty. 

The following table reflects the mission growth since 2010 that is necessary to sustain the modern 

stockpile.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xi

To ensure the capabilities to meet these mission requirements are both responsive and resilient will 

require significant and sustained investments over the coming decade to correct. There is no margin for 

further delay in modernizing NNSA’s scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities and recapitalizing 

the infrastructure needed to produce strategic materials and components for U.S. nuclear weapons.

SSMP Structure

The overview in Chapter 1 provides background information that is useful for understanding the entire 

SSMP. The remainder of the document is organized programmatically and functionally. The appendices 

include additional information to aid in understanding the material covered, along with detailed 

information about each of DOE/NNSA’s national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production 

facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site. 

Mission Prior to 2010 Current Mission

Replacement components and materials harvested from 

retired weapons or domestic reserves

New capacity demands require reinstating production of 

components and materials

Plutonium pit requirements satisfied through reuse Restoring plutonium pit production capability

Sufficient tritium reserve available Increasing tritium production

Sufficient lithium resources available Restarting lithium processing capabilities

Depleted uranium and binary capabilities not required Re-establishing several uranium production capabilities

Depleted uranium and binary capabilities necessary

Developing domestic uranium enrichment capability
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan

Table of Contents

Legislative Language ....................................................................................................................... xix

Chapter 1 Overview .......................................................................................................................1-1

1.1 Policy Framework Summary ....................................................................................................1-2

1.2 Summary of Strategic Environment and Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.....................................1-2

1.3 Partnership with the Department of Defense .........................................................................1-5

1.3.1 Stockpile Strategy ......................................................................................................1-5

1.4 The Nuclear Security Enterprise ..............................................................................................1-6

1.4.1 National Security Laboratories..................................................................................1-7

1.4.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities.....................................................................1-8

1.4.3 Nevada National Security Site .................................................................................1-10

1.4.4 Capabilities That Support the Nuclear Security Mission .........................................1-10

1.4.5 Highlights of Ongoing Nuclear Security Enterprise Changes 

Affecting Multiple Locations....................................................................................1-10

1.5 Overall Strategy, Objectives, and Prioritization of Weapons Activities.................................1-11

1.6 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan .........................1-12

Chapter 2 Stockpile Management...................................................................................................2-1

2.1 Maintenance ............................................................................................................................2-2

2.1.1 Limited Life Components...........................................................................................2-3

2.1.2 Other Alterations.......................................................................................................2-4

2.1.3 B83-1 Sustainment ....................................................................................................2-5

2.2 Surveillance..............................................................................................................................2-5

2.2.1 Surveillance Challenges and Strategies.....................................................................2-7

2.2.2 Disassembly and Inspection ......................................................................................2-7

2.2.3 System Flight Testing.................................................................................................2-8

2.2.4 System Laboratory Testing ........................................................................................2-8

2.2.5 Component Testing ...................................................................................................2-8

2.2.6 Test Equipment..........................................................................................................2-8

2.2.7 Anomaly Investigative Process..................................................................................2-8

2.2.8 Weapon Reliability.....................................................................................................2-9

2.2.9 Annual Assessment....................................................................................................2-9

2.3 Crosscutting Programs.............................................................................................................2-9

2.3.1 Production Support .................................................................................................2-10

2.3.2 Management, Technology, and Production............................................................2-11

2.3.3 Weapon Technology Development.........................................................................2-13
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2.3.4 Advanced Manufacturing Development .................................................................2-15

2.3.5 Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics ....................................................................2-19

2.4 Strategic Components and Materials ....................................................................................2-21

2.4.1 Plutonium ................................................................................................................2-21

2.4.2 Uranium...................................................................................................................2-23

2.4.3 Highly Enriched Uranium.........................................................................................2-23

2.4.4 Depleted Uranium ...................................................................................................2-25

2.4.5 Domestic Uranium Enrichment ...............................................................................2-27

2.4.6 Tritium .....................................................................................................................2-28

2.4.7 Lithium.....................................................................................................................2-30

2.4.8 Energetic Materials..................................................................................................2-32

2.4.9 Material Recycle and Recovery and Storage ...........................................................2-34

2.5 Modernizing the Stockpile .....................................................................................................2-37

2.5.1 The Strategy.............................................................................................................2-37

2.5.2 W76-2 Modification Program..................................................................................2-38

2.5.3 W88 Alteration 370 Program...................................................................................2-39

2.5.4 B61-12 Life Extension Program ...............................................................................2-40

2.5.5 W80-4 Life Extension Program................................................................................2-42

2.5.6 W87-1 Modification Program (Formerly W78 Replacement Warhead) .................2-43

2.5.7 Ballistic Missile Warhead Follow-up Systems..........................................................2-45

2.5.8 Sea-Launched Cruise Missile ...................................................................................2-46

2.6 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition ............................................................................2-46

2.6.1 Accomplishments ....................................................................................................2-46

2.6.2 Status.......................................................................................................................2-47

2.6.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................2-47

Chapter 3 Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and Engineering...........................................3-1

3.1 Enduring Drivers for Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and Engineering...............3-2

3.1.1 Assessment of the Current Stockpile.........................................................................3-2

3.1.2 Ensuring the Future Stockpile....................................................................................3-3

3.1.3 Responsiveness..........................................................................................................3-4

3.1.4 Integration with Other NNSA Missions .....................................................................3-4

3.1.5 Attracting and Retaining Expert Stockpile Stewards.................................................3-5

3.2 Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and Engineering Elements and Status ..............3-5

3.2.1 Science Program........................................................................................................3-5

3.2.2 Engineering Program...............................................................................................3-11

3.2.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program................................3-15

3.2.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ......................................................3-19

3.3 Strategies for the Future........................................................................................................3-23

3.3.1 Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule ..............................................................3-23

3.3.2 Capital Investments Supporting Stockpile Stewardship..........................................3-23

3.3.3 Defense Programs Advisory Committee..................................................................3-25

3.4 Nuclear Test Readiness..........................................................................................................3-25

Chapter 4 Physical Infrastructure....................................................................................................4-1

4.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................4-1

4.2 Acquisition Through Line-Item Construction...........................................................................4-4

4.2.1 Programmatic Line-Item Projects..............................................................................4-5

4.2.2 Mission Enabling Line-Item Construction Projects..................................................4-14
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4.2.3 Defense Nuclear Security Line-Item Projects..........................................................4-16

4.3 Modernization through Minor Construction and Recapitalization .......................................4-17

4.3.1 Recapitalization Program.........................................................................................4-17

4.3.2 Site-Directed Minor Construction Investments.......................................................4-19

4.3.3 Defense Nuclear Security Minor Construction Investments...................................4-20

4.4 Sustainment...........................................................................................................................4-20

4.4.1 Infrastructure Operations and Facility Sustainment ...............................................4-20

4.4.2 Programmatic Facility Sustainment.........................................................................4-21

4.4.3 Site-Directed Sustainment Investments..................................................................4-22

4.4.4 Sustainment through Leased Facilities....................................................................4-22

4.4.5 Defense Nuclear Security Sustainment Investments ..............................................4-23

4.4.6 Chief Information Officer Sustainment Investments ..............................................4-23

4.5 Addressing Excess Facilities ...................................................................................................4-23

4.6 Modernization of Programmatic Equipment.........................................................................4-24

4.6.1 Programmatic Equipment Investments...................................................................4-24

4.6.2 Capabilities-Based Investments...............................................................................4-25

4.6.3 Production Support Equipment Investments..........................................................4-26

4.6.4 Infrastructure Recapitalization, Operations, and Maintenance Equipment 

Investments.............................................................................................................4-27

4.6.5 Site-Directed Equipment Investments ....................................................................4-27

4.6.6 Defense Nuclear Security Investments....................................................................4-27

4.6.7 Chief Information Officer Equipment Investments.................................................4-27

4.7 Modernization of Information Technology and Cybersecurity Infrastructure ......................4-28

4.7.1 Ongoing NNSA OCIO Activities ................................................................................4-28

4.7.2 Planned NNSA OCIO Projects in 2020......................................................................4-28

4.8 Leveraging Weapon Activities Investments Across DOE/NNSA.............................................4-30

4.8.1 Support of Nonproliferation Efforts........................................................................4-30

4.8.2 Support of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation and Emergency 

Operations Efforts ...................................................................................................4-32

4.9 Management and Performance.............................................................................................4-34

Chapter 5 Secure Transportation Asset...........................................................................................5-1

5.1 Status .......................................................................................................................................5-2

5.1.1 Major Elements of the Secure Transportation Asset ................................................5-2

5.1.2 Changes from the FY 2019 SSMP...............................................................................5-3

5.2 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................................5-4

Chapter 6 Security..........................................................................................................................6-1

6.1 Defense Nuclear Security.........................................................................................................6-1

6.1.1 Accomplishments ......................................................................................................6-1

6.1.2 Status.........................................................................................................................6-2

6.1.3 Challenges and Strategies..........................................................................................6-5

6.2 Information Technology and Cybersecurity.............................................................................6-7

6.2.1 Contributions to NNSA’s Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals.....................................6-7

6.2.2 Accomplishments ......................................................................................................6-9

6.2.3 Status.......................................................................................................................6-10

6.2.4 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................6-13
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Chapter 7 Sustaining the Workforce ...............................................................................................7-1

7.1 Status .......................................................................................................................................7-1

7.1.1 Workforce Size and Composition ..............................................................................7-1

7.1.2 Age and Other Demographics of the Workforce.......................................................7-5

7.2 Workforce Planning .................................................................................................................7-7

7.2.1 Federal Workforce Planning ......................................................................................7-8

7.2.2 M&O Workforce Planning .........................................................................................7-9

7.2.3 Additional Elements in Workforce Planning............................................................7-10

7.2.4 Unique Set of Essential Skills for Nuclear Weapons Work ......................................7-11

7.3 Challenges and Strategies......................................................................................................7-11

7.3.1 Recruiting and Hiring ...............................................................................................7-11

7.3.2 Developing, Retaining, and Sustaining the Workforce............................................7-13

7.3.3 Training and Knowledge Transfer to the Next Generation .....................................7-15

7.4 Workforce Accomplishments.................................................................................................7-16

Chapter 8 Budget and Fiscal Estimates............................................................................................8-1

8.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget ......................................................................8-1

8.2 Directed Stockpile Work ..........................................................................................................8-2

8.2.1 Budget........................................................................................................................8-2

8.2.2 Accomplishments ......................................................................................................8-2

8.2.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted ..........................................8-3

8.2.4 Key Milestones ..........................................................................................................8-5

8.3 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation .........................................................................8-9

8.3.1 Science.......................................................................................................................8-9

8.3.2 Engineering..............................................................................................................8-12

8.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield...............................................8-15

8.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing .....................................................................8-18

8.3.5 Advanced Manufacturing Development .................................................................8-20

8.4 Secure Transportation Asset..................................................................................................8-23

8.4.1 Budget......................................................................................................................8-23

8.4.2 Accomplishments ....................................................................................................8-23

8.4.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted ........................................8-23

8.4.4 Key Milestones ........................................................................................................8-24

8.5 Infrastructure and Operations...............................................................................................8-24

8.5.1 Budget......................................................................................................................8-24

8.5.2 Accomplishments ....................................................................................................8-25

8.5.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted ........................................8-25

8.5.4 Key Milestones ........................................................................................................8-26

8.5.5 Infrastructure Maintenance and Recapitalization Investments..............................8-26

8.6 Other Weapons Activities......................................................................................................8-27

8.6.1 Budget......................................................................................................................8-27

8.6.2 Defense Nuclear Security ........................................................................................8-27

8.6.3 Information Technology and Cybersecurity ............................................................8-29

8.7 Budget Projections Beyond FY 2024 ......................................................................................8-30

8.7.1 Basis for Budget Projections....................................................................................8-30

8.7.2 Stockpile Sustainment.............................................................................................8-31

8.7.3 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations......................................................8-32

8.7.4 Construction ............................................................................................................8-42
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8.8 Weapons Activities 25-Year Program ....................................................................................8-44

8.9 Affordability Analysis.............................................................................................................8-47

Chapter 9 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................9-1

Appendix A Requirements Mapping .............................................................................................. A-1

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to Statutory Reporting 

Requirements and Related Requests...................................................................................... A-1

A.2 Ongoing Requirements........................................................................................................... A-1

A.3 Other Requirements ............................................................................................................. A-16

Appendix B Weapons Activities Capabilities................................................................................... B-1

Appendix C Exascale Computing Initiative...................................................................................... C-1

C.1 Challenges................................................................................................................................C-1

C.2 Approaches and Strategies......................................................................................................C-2

C.3 Conclusion................................................................................................................................C-4

Appendix D Workforce and Site-Specific Information.....................................................................D-1

D.1 National Nuclear Security Administration .............................................................................. D-2

D.1.1 Federal Workforce.................................................................................................... D-2

D.2 National Security Laboratories................................................................................................ D-6

D.2.1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................................................................ D-6

D.2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory............................................................................. D-15

D.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories ................................................................................. D-25

D.3 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities................................................................................ D-38

D.3.1 Kansas City National Security Campus ................................................................... D-38

D.3.2 Pantex Plant............................................................................................................ D-50

D.3.3 Savannah River Site ................................................................................................ D-58

D.3.4 Y-12 National Security Complex ............................................................................. D-70

D.4 The National Security Site..................................................................................................... D-78

D.4.1 Nevada National Security Site ................................................................................ D-78

Appendix E Glossary.......................................................................................................................E-1

Appendix F Acronyms and Abbreviations........................................................................................F-1

Appendix G List of Figures and Tables............................................................................................G-1
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Legislative Language

Title 50 of United States Code Section 2523 (50 U.S.C. § 2523), requires that:

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials 

of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually update 

a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile 

stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program 

direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan shall 

be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent annual 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. 

Pursuant to previous statutory requirements, the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 

Administration (DOE/NNSA) has submitted reports on the plan to Congress annually since 1998, with the 

exception of 2012.

1

 

The Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is a detailed report of 

DOE/NNSA’s 25-year program of record to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear 

stockpile and is primarily captured in this single, unclassified document. A classified Annex to the SSMP

contains supporting details concerning the U.S. nuclear stockpile and stockpile management.

 

1

In 2012, a Fiscal Year 2013 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan was not submitted to Congress because analytical work 

conducted by the Department of Defense and NNSA to evaluate the out-year needs for nuclear modernization activities across 

the nuclear security enterprise had not yet been finalized. 

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-1

Chapter 1

Overview

The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is tasked with carrying 

out the mission and authority drawn from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 United States Code [U.S.C.]

§ 2011 et seq.) and, more specifically, the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. § 2401 

et seq.), from which DOE/NNSA’s core mission pillars are derived. NNSA’s enduring missions remain vital 

to the nationalsecurity of the United States and include maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness 

of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism 

around the world; and providing nuclear propulsion for the Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers and 

submarines.

DOE/NNSA continue to make essential contributions to U.S. and global 

national security now and into the future1 with a talented and dedicated 

team that includes Federal, management and operating (M&O) partners,

and other strategic partners within the U.S. interagency community.

This Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

(SSMP) is DOE/NNSA’s 25-year strategic program of record for the 

nuclear weapons mission and was developed to be fully consistent with 

the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Weapons Council’s

Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2019–2044 along with other guiding 

policy documents listed in Section 1.1. The annual SSMP has two primary 

purposes:

 The SSMP documents DOE/NNSA’s plans to maintain the current

stockpile, support required stockpile modernizations as needed 

to respond to evolving deterrent needs, enhance understanding 

of the internal nuclear weapons function through science-based 

stockpile stewardship, modernize the supporting infrastructure,

and sustain DOE/NNSA’s highly skilled workforce.

 The SSMP provides DOE/NNSA’s formal response to multiple 

statutory reporting requirements, which can be found in 

Appendix A, “Requirements Mapping.”

The FY 2020 SSMP includes budget information for the FY 2020 Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

(FYNSP), along with life extension program (LEP)schedules, preliminary infrastructure resource planning, 

and the long-term DOE/NNSA strategy through FY 2044 to ensure the Nation’s nuclear deterrent.

2

 

1 Additional details are available in the National Nuclear Security Administration Enterprise Strategic Vision, December 2018.

2 See 50 U.S.C. § 2453, Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, for a detailed description of the FYNSP.

“Recapitalizing the nuclear 

weapons complex of 

laboratories and plants is also 

long past due; it is vital we 

ensure the capability to design, 

produce, assess, and maintain 

these weapons for as long as 

they are required.” 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-2 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

1.1 Policy Framework Summary

The National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. § 2401, 

et seq.) directs DOE/NNSA, “To maintain and enhance the safety, 

reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 

including the ability to design, produce, and test, to meet national 

security requirements.” 

Several policy documents provide additional direction to DOE/NNSA on 

accomplishing the nuclear weapons mission. These include the 2017 

National Security Strategy and the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reinforced the 

requirement for a nuclear weapons infrastructure that has the design, 

engineering, and manufacturing capabilities necessary to be flexible,

responsive, and resilient enough to meet changing geopolitical 

challenges.

Accomplishing this mission is complex and technically challenging. It 

requires long term planning of numerous, highly interconnected 

programs conducted at multiple sites, making use of cutting edge 

technological and manufacturing capabilities, and a workforce with 

unique expertise. DOE/NNSA works as one team to meet this critical

nuclear mission. DOE/NNSA has to meet the current and near term needs of the stockpile and sustain the 

infrastructure and workforce that makes this work possible for the indefinite future. Doing so requires 

continual assessment of and improvement in our programs, processes and capabilities to overcome 

challenges. DOE/NNSA must address the gaps and shortfalls in critical infrastructure and in the 

manufacturing of warheads. DOE/NNSA must ensure the availability of expertise and modern advanced 

facilities across all sites, laboratories, and plants to qualify and certify the current and future stockpile. 

DOE/NNSA must also continually review and assess its enterprise-wide governance and management 

culture to ensure that the workforce and mission are effectively and responsibly managed.

The FY 2020 SSMP describes the current state of the strategic program of record for the nuclear weapons 

mission and the status of the workforce and supporting infrastructure. The NNSA Nuclear Posture Review 

Implementation Plan Report to Congress (2019) outlines the specific tasks necessary to further update the 

DOE/NNSA program of record to meet the national security responsibilities, strategic priorities, and policy 

directives detailed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

1.2 Summary of Strategic Environment and Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile

The current strategic environment includes an unprecedented 

range and mix of threats that have resulted in increased

uncertainty and risk. The United States must maintain a diverse 

set of nuclear capabilities that provide flexible and tailored 

deterrence options across the spectrum of adversaries, threats, 

and contexts. The nuclear triad (which includes capabilities at

sea, on land, and by air) provides the diversity of platforms, 

weapons, and modes of operation necessary for the 

“Nuclear weapons...are the 

foundation of our strategy to 

preserve peace and stability by 

deterring aggression against 

the United States, our allies, 

and our partners.”

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review found 

that the current threat environment and 

an uncertain future necessitate a 

national commitment to maintain modern 

and effective nuclear forces and the 

infrastructure needed to support them. 

Sustaining and replacing existing nuclear 

capabilities is critical to preserving our 

ability to deter threats to the Nation. 
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-3

United States to implement its deterrence strategies and achieve its objectives if deterrence fails. 

Figure 1–1 shows examples of U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery platforms. 

Figure 1–1. Examples of U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery systems

The size and composition of the nuclear stockpile has evolved as a consequence of the changing global 

security environment and U.S. national security needs. The average age of weapons in the stockpile 

remains high. Many weapons are well past their original design life and require specific actions to assess 

their condition, perform routine maintenance to ensure operability, and extend weapon lifetimes. The 

evolution in the size and age of the nuclear weapons stockpile is illustrated in Figure 1–2.

The current stockpile consists of active and technical/geopolitical hedge weapons that are necessary to 

meet military requirements. Retired weapons are not included in the count of stockpile weapons.

Table 1–1 reflects the major characteristics of the Nation’s current stockpile, which is composed of two 

types of submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads, two types of intercontinental ballistic missile 

warheads, several types of bombs, and a cruise missile warhead.

The classified Annex includes specific technical details about the stockpile by warhead type.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 1–2. Size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2017

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems

Warheads—Strategic Ballistic Missile Platforms

Type

a

Description Delivery System Laboratories Mission Military

W78 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W87 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LLNL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W76‐0/1/2 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwaterto 

surface

Navy

W88 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwaterto 

surface

Navy

Bombs—Aircraft Platforms

B61‐3/4 Non‐strategic bomb F‐15, F‐16, certified

NATO aircraft

LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force/Select 

NATO forces

B61‐7 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B61‐11 Strategic bomb B‐2 bomber LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B83‐1 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

Warheads—Cruise Missile Platforms

W80‐1 Air‐launched cruise 

missile strategic weapons

B‐52 bomber LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

LANL = Los Alamos National Laboratory NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory SNL = Sandia National Laboratories

a The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb type (e.g., “-0/1” for the W76) represents the modification associated with 

the respective weapon.
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1.3 Partnership with the Department of Defense

DOE/NNSA and DoD work collaboratively to maintain and modernize the delivery systems and stockpile. 

DoD generates military requirements for the nuclear delivery platforms, while NNSA generates safety and

security requirements and oversees the assessment, design development, production, test, and research 

programs that respond to DoD requirements. These complementary efforts are coordinated through the 

congressionally mandated Nuclear Weapons Council. The Council is a joint DoD-DOE/NNSA activity 

established by 10 U.S.C. § 179, as amended, and chaired by the DoD Under Secretary of Acquisition and 

Sustainment to facilitate cooperation and coordination, reach consensus, and establish priorities between 

the two Departmentsin fulfilling stockpile management responsibilities. The Council is also the focal point 

for routine interagency activities to maintain the stockpile. 

1.3.1 Stockpile Strategy

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for a tailored approach to maintain deterrence across a spectrum 

of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Increased demand for diversity and flexibility of platforms, 

weapons, and modes of operation has reinforced the necessity to continue sustaining and modernizing 

the enduring stockpile. 

As detailed in the NNSA Nuclear Posture Review 

Implementation Plan (2019), DOE/NNSA is committed to 

the execution of policy direction provided by the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review. While its impact to most 

modernization programs was minimal, the 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review did notably modify and add to the program 

of record. To meet the emerging requirements of U.S. 

strategy, the United States will enhance the flexibility and 

range of its tailored deterrence options in a variety of ways:

 B83-1 Retention. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

recommended retaining the B83-1 gravity bomb 

past its planned retirement date to support military 

needs until a suitable capability replacement is 

identified. On August 28, 2018, the Nuclear 

Weapons Council authorized this retention. NNSA

completed the planning, scheduling, and budgeting 

required to maintain the B83-1 through the Nuclear 

Weapons Council-determined retirement date.

 Low-Yield Ballistic Missile Warhead. The 2018

Nuclear Posture Review recommended modifying a 

small number of existing submarine-launched 

ballistic missile warheads to provide a low-yield 

ballistic missile option. The low-yield ballistic 

missile warhead is a modification (Mod) of the 

existing W76-1 weapon system and is designated as 

the W76-2 by naming convention. The W76-2 provides a low-yield option capable of overcoming 

adversary air defenses. See Section 2.5.2 for details.

Major Goals of Weapons Activities

 Complete W76-1 production in FY 2019.

 Cease programmatic operations at the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility at 

LANL. 

 Deliver the B61-12 gravity bomb.

 Deliver the W88 Alt 370 (with refresh of the 

conventional high explosives).

 Synchronize NNSA’s W80-4 life extension 

with DoD’s Long Range Standoff cruise 

missile program and complete the life 

extension program by 2031.

 Provide the enduring capability and capacity 

to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no 

fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. 

 Phase out mission dependency on 

Building 9212 at Y-12 by the end of 2025.

 Provide experimental and computational 

capabilities to support annual assessment 

and certification of the stockpile.

 Enhance the predictive capability to certify 

and assess the stockpile via theory, 

modeling, and experimental validation using

advanced scientific tools.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 Define the Capability to Effectively Engage and Defeat Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets. 

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review identified the need to hold hardened and underground targets

at risk. The Nuclear Weapons Council established a joint NNSA/DoD Hard and Deeply Buried 

Target Defeat Team, coordinated through the DoD Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs/Office of Nuclear Matters, to determine future options 

for defeating such targets.

 Pursue a Sea-Launched Cruise Missile. As recommended in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, 

development of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile enhances the flexibility and diversity 

of U.S. nuclear capabilities to help address an ever-changing geopolitical environment. Feasibility 

studies of this capability are being coordinated by a joint DoD-DOE working group led by DoD’s 

Office of Nuclear Matters. 

 Advance the W78 Replacement (W87-1). The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for advancing

the W78 warhead replacement program by 1 year, to FY 2019, to support fielding it on the 

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent by 2030. On August 28, 2018, the Nuclear Weapons Council

provided the Air Force with authorization to restart modification activities for the W87-1 in a 

MK21 aeroshell. NNSA has restarted the program in Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study).

The United States must continue the ability to maintain and certify a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal. Synchronized with DoD replacement programs, DOE/NNSA will sustain and deliver on time the 

warheads necessary to support the Nation’s strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities by: 

 Completing the W76-2 Mod

 Completing the B61-12 LEP

 Completing the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370

 Synchronizing NNSA’s W80-4 life extension with DoD’s Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile 

program and completing the W80-4 LEP by FY 2031

 Replacing the W78 with the W87-1 to meet DoD and DOE/NNSA requirements for performance, 

safety, and security

 Exploring future ballistic missile warhead options to meet the required military characteristics 

based on the threats and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries, including the possibility of 

common reentry systems for Air Force and Navy systems

1.4 The Nuclear Security Enterprise

DOE/NNSA’s Nuclear Security Enterprise, illustrated in Figure 1–3, consists of NNSA Headquarters

(located in Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and Albuquerque, New Mexico); NNSA field offices;

three national security laboratories (two of which have production missions); four nuclear weapons 

production facilities; and the Nevada National Security Site. The highly-trained workforce consists of 

approximately 2,172 Federal civilians, approximately 43,000 contractor employees at NNSA’s M&O sites, 

assigned members of the military, and non-M&O personnel (i.e., support service contractors or postdoctoral students).

3

 (More detailed descriptions of the workforce and each M&O site can be found in 

Chapter 7, “Sustaining the Workforce,” and Appendix D, “Workforce and Site-Specific Information.”)

 

3 These numbers do not include Naval Reactors.
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Figure 1–3. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise

NNSA Headquarters implements the overall nuclear weapons strategy in collaboration with its M&O 

partners and oversees and coordinates activities to ensure these are accomplished in an efficient, fiscally 

responsible manner. Information is available in other chapters about other capabilities funded by the 

Weapons Activities programs. See Chapter 4, “Physical Infrastructure;” Chapter 5, “Secure Transportation 

Asset;” and Chapter 6, “Security.”

1.4.1 National Security Laboratories

The primary mission of DOE/NNSA’s national security laboratories is to develop and sustain nuclear 

weapons design, simulation, modeling, and experimental capabilities and competencies to ensure 

confidence in the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. All three laboratories are managed and 

operated by Federally Funded Research and Development Centers.

4 They engage in long-term research, 

development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities for primary nuclear weapon missions and apply 

science, engineering, and technology to solve other national security challenges. Other DOE national 

laboratories also support the Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs.

 

4 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) are unique contractor entities that are sponsored and funded 

by the U.S. Government to meet special long-term research or development needs that cannot be met as effectively by existing 

government or other contractor resources. Various Federal government agencies contract with 43 different FFRDCs currently. 

Most own their own facilities, while the national security laboratories are sited in government-owned facilities. All FFRDCs are 

often characterized by their commitment to the public interest, objectivity, independence, and long-term focus.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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The three national security laboratories are Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, 

California; Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico; and Sandia National 

Laboratories (SNL) in both Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California.5 All three laboratories 

also support nuclear counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. LLNL is one of two national security 

laboratories for the design of nuclear components of weapons. LLNL is 

responsible for nuclear design activities for the legacy B83, W80, and W87 

systems and for the W87-1 Modification Program and the W80-4 cruise missile 

warhead LEP. Other LLNL core capabilities include high performance computing, 

high energy density physics, plutonium research and development (R&D), 

hydrodynamic and weapons engineering environmental tests, advanced 

manufacturing and materials science, tritium target development and

fabrication, and high explosives (HE) R&D.

Los Alamos National Laboratory. LANL is the other national security laboratory 

whose FFRDC is responsible for designing the nuclear components of weapons. 

LANL is responsible for nuclear design and engineering of the legacy B61, W76, 

W78, and W88 systems and for the W76-1, W76-2, B61-12, and W88 Alt 370

modernization programs. LANL also provides plutonium operations for R&D and 

pit manufacturing capabilities. LANL’s other core missions include advanced 

radiography, tritium, and HE R&D; detonator, radioisotope thermoelectric 

generator power supply, and other non-nuclear component production and 

testing; and special nuclear material accountability, storage, protection, 

handling, and disposition.

Sandia National Laboratories. SNL is the national security laboratory 

responsible for systems engineering and integration of nuclear weapons and for 

designing, developing, qualifying, sustaining, and retiring the non-nuclear 

components of nuclear weapons, which represent the vast majority of the 

components that comprise these weapons. SNL ensures (1) internal systems 

integration of all non-nuclear systems and components, (2) integration between 

the non-nuclear and nuclear portions of weapons, and (3) integration of 

weapons with their delivery systems. SNL’s other core missions include

production of neutron generators; radiation-hardened microelectronics; other

non-nuclear components; and engineering, design, and technical systems 

integration for the NNSA Office of Secure Transportation.

1.4.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

A range of activities that support the stockpile are conducted at DOE/NNSA’s four nuclear weapons 

production facilities.6 The Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC) in Kansas City, Missouri,

produces non-nuclear components. The Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas, manufactures and tests 

HE components and assembles, disassembles, and refurbishes stockpile weapons and components. The 

Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, manufactures uranium components and 

dismantles and stores highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, 

 

5 DOE’s Savannah River National Laboratory conducts research and development in support of tritium processing and gas transfer 

system design and certification activities.

6 Some production capabilities also exist at LANL and SNL. 
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South Carolina, extracts, recycles, and loads tritium into gas transfer systems (GTSs). These nuclear 

weapons production facilities perform other activities, including uranium and plutonium processing, to 

meet DOE/NNSA’s nonproliferation goals and counterterrorism activities.

Kansas City National Security Campus. KCNSC is focused on procurement, 

production, and life-cycle support of non-nuclear weapons components for the 

Nation’s nuclear stockpile, including electronic, mechanical, and engineered 

materials components. In partnership with the national laboratories to 

transition weapon modernization concepts through design and development 

and into production and sustainment, the site is responsible for over 80 percent

of the components across all active and emerging nuclear stockpile systems. 

KCNSC consists of a 1.5-million square foot main facility and two satellite office 

facilities in Kansas City, Missouri, which are primarily focused on the Nuclear

Weapons Programs mission. The site supports Nuclear Nonproliferation, 

Emergency Management, and Counterterrorism missions, as well as a Global 

Security mission that involves development and delivery of field-ready 

engineering solutions for other government agencies’ national security 

missions. Facilities in Albuquerque, New Mexico, primarily focus on the 

development, manufacture, and delivery of products and services for the Office 

of Secure Transportation and products to support the nuclear weapons 

stockpile.

Pantex Plant. Pantex manufactures and tests HE components; assembles, 

disassembles, refurbishes, repairs, maintains, and surveils stockpile weapons 

and components; fabricates joint test assemblies and performs postmortems; 

assembles and disassembles test beds; conducts interim staging and storage of 

components from dismantled weapons; and performs pit requalification, reuse, 

surveillance, and packaging.

Savannah River Site. SRS is NNSA’s Tritium Center of Excellence and the 

primary location for NNSA’s tritium operations. The tritium facilities use unique 

separation and extraction systems developed by Savannah River National 

Laboratory to supply the radioactive hydrogen gas for nuclear weapons. That 

activity, which is an integral part of the Nation’s nuclear defense, has been 

central to the SRS mission for more than 60 years. SRS’s primary activities 

include extracting tritium from irradiated target rods, separating and recycling 

the gas from field returns, managing the tritium inventory for the stockpile, 

loading tritium and deuterium into GTSs, performing surveillance of GTSs to 

support stockpile certification, and recovering helium-3.

Y-12 National Security Complex. Y-12 is the Uranium Center of Excellence for 

the nuclear security enterprise. Y-12 manufactures uranium and other 

components for nuclear weapons. Y-12 also dismantles, stores, and performs 

test and evaluation of these components for surveillance purposes. Y-12 is the 

main storage facility for Category I/II quantities of HEU and supplies HEU for 

naval reactors. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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1.4.3 Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site provides facilities, infrastructure, and 

personnel to the national security laboratories to conduct unique nuclear and 

non-nuclear experiments that are essential to maintaining the stockpile. It is the 

primary location where experiments with radioactive and other high-hazard 

materials are conducted and the only location where HE-driven plutonium 

experiments can be conducted at weapon scale using weapon-relevant amounts 

of special nuclear material. Other missions include developing and deploying 

state-of-the-art diagnostics and instruments, analyzing data, storing 

programmatic materials, conducting criticality experiments, and supporting 

nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation, and nonproliferation

activities.

1.4.4 Capabilities That Support the Nuclear Security Mission

DOE/NNSA and DoD together deliver the capabilities needed to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent that 

will provide the Nation with the ability to adapt and respond to a dynamic security environment, emerging 

strategic challenges, and geopolitical and technological surprises. Underpinning this responsibility for the 

deterrent is the technical expertise resident at DOE/NNSA’s national laboratories, production sites, the

Nevada National Security Site, and within the nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

The expert workforce and advanced capabilities necessary to maintain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent are 

found at DOE/NNSA’s eight nuclear security enterprise sites. Each of these sites contribute in 

complementary ways to ensure the Nation has the full range of capabilities needed to maintain the safety, 

security, reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. A list of the Weapons Activities 

capabilities is defined in Appendix B. The Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan –

Biennial Plan Summary describes the Weapons Activities capabilities that support the nuclear security 

enterprise in detail. Figure 1–4 depicts the interrelationship of the important nuclear weapons-related 

product flow between the sites.

1.4.5 Highlights of Ongoing Nuclear Security Enterprise Changes 

Affecting Multiple Locations

To meet the requirement to achieve no fewer than 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030, the preferred 

alternative calls for NNSA to expand its pit production capabilities by simultaneously maximizing pit 

production activities at LANL and adding a second pit production site by repurposing the former Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at SRS. This proposed dual-site approach, with at least 50 ppy produced at 

SRS and at least 30 ppy at LANL, manages the cost, schedule, and risk of such a vital undertaking. This 

approach also improves the resiliency, flexibility, and redundancy of the nuclear security enterprise by 

eliminating reliance on a single production site and assures a production capability for the next 50 years 

and beyond. LANL will remain a consolidated Center of Excellence for plutonium research, development, 

and manufacturing activities. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-11

Figure 1–4. Site nuclear weapon product flow

1.5 Overall Strategy, Objectives, and Prioritization of Weapons 

Activities

DOE/NNSA and DoD implement the Nation’s objectives to maintain 

strategic stability with other major nuclear powers, deter potential 

adversaries, and reassure allies and partners as to the national 

security commitments of the United States. DOE/NNSA priorities are 

to sustain and maintain the stockpile while balancing infrastructure 

and RDT&E investments to meet technical and national security 

challenges in the near and long term.

There are three major strategies to sustain and maintain the 

stockpile:

 Assess and certify the stockpile annually through sciencebased stockpile stewardship, including assessing whether the 

safety and reliability of the future nuclear stockpile can be 

assured in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and 

as a safeguard, maintain a nuclear test capability. 

 Extend the life of select nuclear warheads through modernizations by replacing obsolete 

technology while enhancing stockpile safety and security and meeting military requirements, 

treaties, and other international obligations.

“Our nuclear deterrent is nearing a 

crossroads. To date, we have 

preserved this deterrent by extending 

the life span of legacy nuclear forces 

and infrastructure—in many cases 

for decades beyond what was 

originally intended. But these 

systems will not remain viable 

indefinitely. In fact, we are now at a 

point where we must concurrently 

modernize the entire nuclear triad 

and the infrastructure that enables its 

effectiveness.”

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Paul Selva, 2017
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-12 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Ensure the capabilities to support the nuclear stockpile near and long term. 

– Address aging infrastructure and equipment obsolescence by making strategic investments 

aligned with integrated, risk-informed, data-driven prioritization plans that sustain and 

advance weapon activity capabilities. Make facility and infrastructure investments that target 

reduction of safety, security, and programmatic risks and dispose of excess facilities at the 

eight M&O partner sites. 

– Augment the Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management Programs with an effective 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program7to provide a greater breadth of opportunities that exercise 

key capabilities and skills across the entire nuclear weapon life cycle while maintaining the 

capability to design, develop, and produce nuclear warheads with new or different military 

capabilities if required in the future. Exercising these capabilities also provides a mechanism 

to preserve and transfer knowledge across the workforce. 

– DOE/NNSA is investing in advanced manufacturing technologies to reduce development and

production costs, improve design and development cycle time, and protect against product 

and manufacturing obsolescence. Advanced manufacturing will also enable novel design 

opportunities and increase in-house production of nuclear weapon components.

– To better assure supply chain protection and viability, DOE/NNSA has implemented several 

initiatives through the Nuclear Enterprise Assurance program to address threats to critical 

products and processes. The program focuses on restricting information, enhancing and 

sustaining designs, establishing robust secure manufacturing and testing processes, and 

augmenting supply chain management to protect against malicious hardware or software 

entering nuclear security enterprise products (see Annex for additional information). 

– NNSA partners with the DOE Office of Science on the DOE Exascale Computing Initiative to 

ensure that future high performance computing architectures will support modeling and 

simulation requirements of the nuclear security enterprise. In addition, NNSA is planning 

strategic investments in several experimental capabilities to collect higher-fidelity data to 

validate modeling and simulation capabilities into the future.

1.6 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan

The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise requires major 

recapitalization to ensure the deterrent remains modern, robust, 

flexible, resilient, responsive, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st

century threats. Responding to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review will 

require an analysis of capabilities and capacities to determine the 

improvements necessary for the nuclear security enterprise to

support additional weapon modernization programs. DOE/NNSA

must build a more modern enterprise, as more than half of NNSA’s 

facilities are over 40 years old. The demands of the LEPs and the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program have stressed the aging infrastructure, even before considering the needs 

generated by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Without infrastructure modernization, the risk to NNSA’s 

 

7 For additional information, see the DOE/NNSA February 2018 report to Congress, Stockpile Responsiveness.

“Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons 

complex of laboratories and plants is 

also long past due; it is vital we 

ensure the capability to design, 

produce, assess, and maintain these 

weapons for as long as they are 

required.”

2018 Nuclear Posture Review
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-13

missions will increase. Science, technology, and engineering; infrastructure; and workforce needs are 

discussed further in Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 9.

Four key challenges must be addressed:

 The current stockpile program of record represents a continued increase in scope, including 

restarting production operations that have been dormant for decades and increasing overall 

production rates of many components. NNSA is restoring capabilities and enhancing capacity at 

the production plants to address needs as the current LEPs and Alts enter the production phase. 

Planning is underway to determine the long-term capacity and capability needs to avoid stockpile 

age-out, support LEPs, and prepare for future uncertainty. 

 The increased number of concurrent system builds require maturing new deterrence options with

shortened development cycles; advancing the ability to predict weapon performance in 

configurations that were not tested underground; and evaluating the impact of new materials 

and processes, the reuse of aging components in future systems, and enhancing production 

throughput. The nuclear weapons stockpile requires updated technologies that require 

investment in new processes, technologies, and tools to produce, qualify, and certify warheads in 

accordance with stringent stockpile specifications and requirements.

 Trustworthiness of the nuclear weapons supply chain must be sustained to protect against

potential sabotage, malicious introduction of an unwanted function, or subversion of a function 

without detection. DOE/NNSA’s radiation-hardened silicon microelectronics capability, the 

Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications (MESA) Complex at SNL, relies on tools and 

capabilities that are no longer supported by manufacturers. DOE/NNSA is installing new tooling 

and planning recapitalization efforts to extend the life of the MESA facilities. DOE/NNSA is also 

engaging with DoD and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory to 

establish R&D efforts that could also serve as a production capability.

 The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise has many retirement-eligible employees who are 

expected to leave the workforce in the near future (Figure 1–5). To prepare for these high 

numbers of retirements, aggressive programs are necessary to recruit and retain high-quality 

individuals capable of obtaining security clearances, and to provide new personnel with 

opportunities that establish the experience and expert judgment necessary to sustain the 

stockpile. 

Figure 1–5. Nuclear security enterprise headcount distribution by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-1

Stockpile Management

Stockpile management encompasses the Directed Stockpile Work 

(DSW) Program, along with technology maturation programs that 

support the stockpile. Stockpile management activities are 

undertaken to directly sustain or support the stockpile or to 

understand and report on its status. These activities include 

maintenance, surveillance, significant finding investigations (SFIs), 

reliability reporting, annual assessment, provision of required 

materials and technologies (for warhead components and 

production of those components), life extension, and 

dismantlement and disposition. Activities that can be reasonably 

attributed to specific warheads are funded by individual warhead 

budget lines in the Stockpile Systems or life extension program 

(LEP) budget lines. Activities that are not warhead-specific are 

funded by Stockpile Services budget lines or funding lines 

specifically for the activity, such as Advanced Manufacturing 

Development, Strategic Materials, and Weapons Dismantlement 

and Disposition. Subsequent sections of Chapter 2 describe each 

of these activities in more detail but they can be related to each other in the following manner. 

The stockpile undergoes annual assessments, while surveillance and maintenance occur on a scheduled 

basis throughout a weapon’s lifetime. While conducting surveillance, assessment, or maintenance, an 

issue of interest may arise and give cause to conduct an SFI to determine the issue’s potential impact on 

warhead performance and safety. The results of the SFI may lead to a corrective action, an alteration 

(Alt), or modification (Mod) to a weapon system (conducted as part of maintenance), or the issue may be 

resolved without any changes to the stockpile. At some point in their life cycle, warheads, if they are to 

remain in the stockpile, need to undergo life extension to 

comprehensively address aging issues and modernize the warheads to 

meet updated policy requirements for safety and security. 

Conducting these life extensions (and other warhead component 

changes as part of maintenance) requires modern technologies, 

production capabilities, and special materials.

This update reflects the current approved program of record 

consistent with Presidential direction and congressional 

authorizations and appropriations. Last year, DoD issued the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018), which reiterated the 

importance of ongoing modernization efforts and initiated new 

efforts to address increasing geopolitical threats. One new effort was 

a low-yield ballistic missile warhead (W76-2). With congressional 

authorization, DOE/NNSA successfully completed a W76-2 first 

production unit in February 2019. In FY 2019, DOE/NNSA also

Stockpile Management 

Accomplishments

 Completed Cycle 23 of the annual 

assessment process.

 Completed W76-1 last production unit.

 Completed W76-2 first production unit.

 Qualified and sold the first additively 

manufactured component to War 

Reserve production stores.

 Qualified CoLOSSIS II at Pantex.

 Delivered a substantial subset of first 

production units of B61-12 and 

W88 Alt 370 weapon components 

early or on time at KCNSC.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-2 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

restarted the W87-1 Modification Program (formerly known as the W78 warhead replacement) 1 year 

earlier than previously planned. Other Nuclear Posture Review recommendations, such as pursuing a sealaunched cruise missile and identifying a replacement for the B83-1 strategic bomb, are in the beginning 

stages of review. Sustaining the current stockpile, continuing ongoing modernization efforts, and 

responding to new initiatives places heavy demands on the nuclear security enterprise. Efficient and 

effective stockpile management ensures the United States is able to maintain and certify a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear arsenal now and in the future and requires comprehensive planning to ensure that 

all stockpile elements fit cohesively into an integrated system.

2.1 Maintenance

Stockpile maintenance includes three areas of focus:

 Limited life components (LLCs) such as gas transfer systems (GTSs), 

power sources, and neutron generators require periodic 

replacement to sustain system functionality. 

 Alts, such as changing the type of LLC, incorporation of surety 

features, and other changes to respond to emerging issues that do 

not rise to the level of a major Alt or LEP, are addressed on a priority 

basis, depending on stockpile impact. Surety provides a level of 

confidence that a system will operate exactly as planned under both 

expected and unexpected circumstances. Each weapon system that 

is retained in the stockpile long term will incorporate an Integrated 

Surety Architecture. 

 Minor repairs to individual weapons as a result of transportation and 

handling. 

Figure 2–1 shows some of the sustainment elements required to maintain

the current stockpile. This includes LLCs such as neutron generators, GTSs, joint test assemblies (JTAs),

and Integrated Surety Architecture. LLCs will be discussed further in Section 2.1.1; JTAs are discussed in 

Section 2.2.

Figure 2–1. Sustainment of current stockpile

Sustain the Triad: 

“Eliminating any leg of the 

triad would greatly ease 

adversary attack planning 

and allow an adversary to 

concentrate resources and 

attention on defeating the 

remaining two legs. 

Therefore, we will sustain 

our legacy triad systems 

until the planned 

replacement programs are 

deployed.”
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-3

2.1.1 Limited Life Components

Weapons contain LLCs that require periodic replacement to sustain system functionality. Age-related 

changes affecting these components are predictable and well understood, and surveillance is conducted 

to ensure the components continue to meet performance requirements throughout their stockpile life. 

Periodic LLC exchanges replace these components throughout a weapon’s lifetime. DOE/NNSA produces 

LLCs, while DOE/NNSA and DoD jointly manage component delivery and installation of replacements on 

a planned schedule.

2.1.1.1 Gas Transfer Systems

GTSs are designed, produced, filled, and delivered to DoD for existing weapon systems. SNL and LANL are 

the design agencies; KCNSC produces the systems; and SRS fills them. Modern GTS designs have extended 

LLC intervals and have increased the weapon performance margin, thereby improving maintenance 

efficiency and enhancing weapon safety and reliability. SNL and LANL conduct development hardware 

function testing to validate performance characteristics and to provide tritium research and development 

(R&D) to inform GTS designs supporting the current and future stockpile. The Savannah River National 

Laboratory at SRS works closely with SNL and LANL to evaluate new GTS designs and verify that GTSs can 

be loaded in the production facilities and meet weapons systems performance characteristics. In parallel 

with R&D efforts, SRS maintains production facilities for tritium-loading operations, GTS surveillance, and 

tritium recovery from end-of-life GTSs. 

2.1.1.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–1 provides a high-levelsummary of challenges related to GTSs and the strategiesto address them.

Table 2–1. Summary of gas transfer systems challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Formal risk analyses indicate that deterioration of 

infrastructure and programmatic equipment threaten the 

continuity of SRS efforts in both production and R&D.

DOE/NNSA faces infrastructure challenges in aging facilities

in addition to evolving requirements that affect facility 

modifications. 

SRS will maintain both production and R&D capabilities by 

(1) refurbishing or constructing R&D facilities separate from the 

production infrastructure, (2) recapitalizing the existing process 

equipment and infrastructure, and (3) fully replacing some 

production facilities through line-item construction. 

The increasing GTS workload associated with multiple 

upcoming LEPs and Alts is increasing the demand on 

technical staff and production and infrastructure 

capabilities at SRS and KCNSC.

To address capacity needs, SRS will modify the process and 

infrastructure equipment in multiple facilities and has 

requested additional staff for some production and 

infrastructure areas. 

KCNSC is executing a plan to increase capacity by replacing or

adding additional multi-axis machines to improve efficiencies 

and provide additional cleared personnel on multiple shifts. 

2.1.1.3 Power Sources

Current and future planned nuclear weapons and life-extended warheads require compact, highpowered, highly variable power sources that have long-term reliability. Requirements for size, weight, 

active life, responsiveness, and output are unique to nuclear weapon applications. This capability 

supports other national security mission needs that require advanced power sources to meet stringent 

requirements that are not available from commercial vendors. This capability also includes prototyping 

and parts development, and the full life-cycle requirements of power source components through earlystage R&D and modeling, technology maturation, design and development, production, surveillance, and 

disassembly. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-4 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

2.1.1.4 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–2 provides a high-level summary of challenges related to power sources and the strategies to 

address them.

Table 2–2. Summary of power sources challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Instabilities in the supplier base put the primary production 

capability at risk, and facility inadequacies put SNL’s research, 

development, test and evaluation and production capabilities 

at an elevated risk of not meeting the mission. 

Modern infrastructure is required to meet the long-term, 

full life-cycle requirements for power source capabilities. 

DOE/NNSA has initiated a project to determine mission 

needs and analyze alternatives to ensure capabilities are 

sustained. The facility housing the power sources capability is beyond its 

design life and does not meet evolving mission needs or

modern building code requirements. It has been repurposed 

many times and was not originally built to house this capability. 

Corrective measures and modifications have been employed to 

convert the facility to adjust to mission requirements, but the 

investments are not cost-effective, resulting in the need for an 

alternative solution.

2.1.1.5 Neutron Generators 

Neutron generators are highly complex LLCs that provide neutrons at specific times and rates to initiate 

weapon function. SNL’s neutron generator enterprise, which is an integrated design and production 

agency, manages the neutron generators’ entire life cycle to meet DOE/NNSA’s commitments, including 

scientific understanding through design, development, qualification, production, surveillance, 

dismantlement, and disposal. 

2.1.1.6 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–3 provides a high-level summary of the challenges related to neutron generators and the 

strategies to address them.

Table 2–3. Summary of neutron generators challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Aging facilities, infrastructure, and equipment are 

the primary challenges to sustaining neutron 

generator production.

Near-term investments will focus on sustainment through ongoing 

recapitalization of existing facilities, infrastructure, and equipment, 

while making incremental improvements in process efficiency and 

cleanliness. Formal planning is ongoing to establish long-term 

capabilities that will ensure that mission deliverables are met while 

allowing consolidation, increased flexibility, and expanded 

capabilities. These improvements include clean room enhancements, 

advanced manufacturing, increased use of automation, and 

streamlined safety and security management.

2.1.2 Other Alterations

Weapon Alts are required to improve the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons. While major 

Alts (such as the W88 Alt 370) are covered under Section 2.5, “Modernizing the Stockpile,” other Alts are 

routinely incorporated into nuclear weapons to respond to emerging issues, including issues identified 

during surveillance activities. Weapon systems that will remain in the stockpile will incorporate an 

Integrated Surety Architecture. Other Alts are scheduled on a priority basis, depending on their impact 

to the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-5

2.1.3 B83-1 Sustainment

2.1.3.1 Overview

The B83-1 gravity bomb holds a variety of protected targets at risk. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

directed sustainment of the B83-1 past its current planned retirement date until a suitable replacement 

is identified. In coordination with DoD through Nuclear Weapons Council authorization, DOE/NNSA is 

sustaining the B83-1 beyond its original retirement date. Currently, no Alts are anticipated during the 

extended sustainment period. 

2.1.3.2 Current Status

The B83-1 is executing sustainment activities, including surveillance and weapon assessments. DOE/NNSA 

is working with the design and production agencies to ensure requirements are met in accordance with 

the Nuclear Weapons Council authorization to sustain the B83-1 through the program of record. Design 

analysis considerations help determine how to sustain the system without alteration. 

2.1.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–4 provides a high-level summary of B83-1 sustainment challenges and the strategies to address 

them.

Table 2–4. Summary of B83-1 Sustainment challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Maintain sufficient hardware quantities for surveillance. Evaluate hardware and provisioning needs to achieve program 

of record requirements.

Conduct the required volume of system-level and 

component surveillance testing.

Conduct surveillance planning activities and maintain directive 

documents in accordance with program of record objectives.

Margins are increasingly challenged by LLC exchange 

extensions.

Conduct analysis of operational trade space to enable system 

sustainment without alterations to inform system sustainment 

decisions and assess potential impacts.

2.2 Surveillance

DOE/NNSA’s surveillance activities provide data to evaluate the safety, security, reliability, and 

performance of the stockpile in support of annual assessments. The cumulative body of surveillance data 

supports decisions regarding weapon life extensions, Alts, Mods, repairs, and rebuilds. The Surveillance 

program has six goals: 

 Identify manufacturing and design defects that affect safety, security, performance, or reliability

 Assess the appropriate risks to the safety, security, and performance of the stockpile

 Determine the margins between design requirements and performance at the component and 

material levels

 Identify aging-related changes and trends at the subsystem or component and material levels

 Further develop capabilities for predictive assessments of stockpile components and materials

 Provide critical data for the annual Weapon Reliability Report and the annual Report on Stockpile 

Assessments
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-6 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The Surveillance Enterprise leverages of the Stockpile Evaluation program and the Enhanced Surveillance 

subprogram. These two program elements work closely together to execute the surveillance enterprise 

requirements and develop new surveillance capabilities at the system, component, and material levels. 

The Stockpile Evaluation program conducts surveillance evaluations of weapons, assemblies, and 

components for both the existing stockpile (i.e., weapon returns from DoD) and new production 

(i.e., Retrofit Evaluation System Test units). Anomalies, when discovered, are assessed through SFIs.

The Enhanced Surveillance subprogram develops the diagnostics, processes, models, and other tools 

needed by the Stockpile Evaluation Program to improve the ability to predict and detect initial or age‐

related defects, assess reliability, and estimate component and system lifetimes. 

DOE/NNSA conducts stockpile evaluation through weapon disassembly and inspection (D&I), stockpile 

flight testing, stockpile laboratory testing, component testing and material evaluation, and test 

equipment. The number of disassemblies, inspections, and major component tests completed in FY 2018

and baselined for FY 2019 are delineated in Table 2–5.

Table 2–5. FY 2018 actual and FY 2019 baselined major Directed Stockpile Work stockpile

evaluation activities (as of January 8, 2019)

The numbers of major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2018 and projected by the program of 

record for FY 2019 through FY 2024 are delineated in Table 2–6. The national security laboratories, in 

conjunction with DOE/NNSA and the nuclear weapons production facilities, continually refine these 

planning requirements based on new surveillance information, deployment of new diagnostics, annual 

assessment findings, and analysis of historical information using modern assessment methodologies and 

computational tools.

18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19 18 19

B61 9 7 5 5 4 4 16 27 1 2 11 12 4 2 4 8 0 4 17 19 71 90

W76-0 4 4 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 4 4 1 1 6 11 4 4 6 4 31 30

W76-1 30 28 6 3 22 18 37 51 1 3 14 23 1 5 6 17 6 5 19 17 142 170

W78 8 10 4 1 7 1 18 27 0 2 19 13 2 2 4 6 4 4 6 8 72 74

W80-1 19 13 4 3 10 5 61 32 3 2 1 0 1 1 4 12 4 5 28 0 135 73

B83-1 2 2 1 1 1 1 11 11 2 6 1 0 1 1 3 3 1 1 0 4 23 30

W84 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 0 1 9 3

W87-0 9 9 1 3 7 5 13 13 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 9 1 1 4 4 40 47

W88 7 6 4 3 7 0 14 14 0 1 2 0 2 1 10 14 3 4 0 8 49 51

TOTALS 89 80 27 19 58 34 174 175 7 20 54 52 13 14 39 80 31 29 80 65 572 568

CSA = canned subassembly D-tests = destructive tests JTA = joint test assembly

D&I = disassembly and inspection GTS = gas transfer system NDE = nondestructive evaluation

DCA = detonator cable assembly HE = high explosive

Fiscal Years

Warheads

CSA

D-Tests

GTS

Tests

HE 

D-Tests

DCA

Tests

Program

Totals D&Is

JTA

Flights

Test Bed

Evals

Pit

NDEs

Pit

D-Tests

CSA

NDEs
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-7

Table 2–6. Major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2018 and the program of record for 

FY 2019 through FY 2024 (as of January 8, 2019)

2.2.1 Surveillance Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–7 provides a high-level summary of Surveillance program challenges and the strategies to address 

them.

Table 2–7. Summary of Surveillance program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Potential shortfalls with pit and canned subassembly

testing due to capacity limitations and a historical 

test backlog. 

DOE/NNSA is working to improve efficiency by conducting highestpriority testing and delaying or eliminating lower-priority testing. 

Aging surveillance capabilities and capacities across 

the enterprise (e.g., test equipment).

Ongoing formal planning is being conducted to establish surveillance 

capabilities and capacities to ensure that mission deliverables are 

being met while enabling a flexible, tailorable, and a more responsive 

Stockpile Evaluation Program. 

The Stockpile Evaluation program contains the following elements: weapon D&I, stockpile flight testing, 

stockpile laboratory testing, component testing and material evaluation, test equipment, and anomaly 

investigation. Adjunct activities include reliability and annual assessments. These elements will be 

discussed in the following subsections.

2.2.2 Disassembly and Inspection

Weapons sampled from the production lines or returned from DoD are inspected during disassembly. 

Weapon disassembly is conducted in a controlled manner to identify any abnormal conditions and 

preserve the components for subsequent evaluations. Visual inspections of, for example, color changes, 

cracking, or flaking during D&I can also provide state-of-health information. 

FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024

D&Is 89 80 91 87 77 83 74 492

JTA Flights 27 19 25 28 25 26 27 150

Test Bed Evals 58 34 49 79 62 53 49 326

Pit NDEs 174 175 202 225 217 222 162 1203

Pit D-Tests 7 20 15 18 19 17 19 108

CSA NDEs 54 52 40 47 38 47 42 266

CSA D-Tests 13 14 20 21 19 20 18 112

GTS Tests 39 80 103 76 57 57 66 439

HE D-Tests 31 29 44 39 38 36 33 219

DCA Tests 80 65 74 96 96 75 91 497

TOTALS 572 568 663 716 648 636 581 3812

CSA = canned subassembly D-tests = destructive tests HE = high explosive

D&I = disassembly and inspection FY = fiscal year JTA = joint test assembly

DCA = detonator cable assembly GTS = gas transfer system NDE = nondestructive evaluation

Major

Activity

FY 2018

Actual

Approved Baseline FY 2019 - FY 2024

FY 2019 - FY 2024 

Total
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-8 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

2.2.3 System Flight Testing

A subset of weapons that have undergone D&I are reassembled into JTA configurations to represent the 

original build to the extent possible. Non-nuclear componentsfrom these systems are used directly, along 

with surrogate parts for the nuclear components. For example, plutonium and highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) are replaced with either surrogate materials and/or instrumentation. Some JTAs contain extensive 

telemetry instrumentation to provide detailed information on component and subsystem performance

during flight environments. The JTA units are delivered to and flown by the DoD operational command 

responsible for the system. JTAs are flown on delivery platforms to gather the information required to 

assess the effectiveness and reliability of the weapon, the launch or delivery platform, and the associated 

crews and procedures. System-level flight tests are conducted jointly with the Air Force and Navy.

2.2.4 System Laboratory Testing

After D&I, certain components of selected weapons are reassembled into test bed configurations, using 

parent unit parts. Stockpile laboratory tests conducted at the subsystem or component level assess major 

assemblies and components and, ultimately, the materials that comprise the components (e.g., metals, 

polymers, glasses, plastics, ceramics, foams, electronics, optical, and explosives). This surveillance process 

enables detection and evaluation of the onset of aging, trends, and anomalous changes at the component

or material level.

2.2.5 Component Testing

Components and materials from the D&I process undergo further evaluations to assess component

physical configuration, functionality, performance margins and trends, material behavior, and aging 

characteristics. The testing can involve both nondestructive evaluation techniques (e.g., radiography, 

ultrasonic testing, electrical testing, and dimensional measurements) and destructive evaluation 

techniques (e.g., disassembly and coring of pits and canned subassemblies (CSAs), live firing of detonators 

and high explosive (HE) samples, as well as chemical assessments). 

2.2.6 Test Equipment

Testers are complex systems that can be applied to systems, subsystems, major components, and 

processes. Testers perform two key functions. First, they provide the mechanical, electrical, and 

radiofrequency stimuli to the system in a specified sequence to simulate a weapon employment scenario. 

Second, the testers simultaneously collect data on the performance of components and subsystems. The

data collected are used as input to assess the performance and assert the continuation of the certification 

of the weapon system as safe, secure, and reliable.

2.2.7 Anomaly Investigative Process

When anomalies arise that could significantly affect weapon safety, security, reliability, or performance,

surveillance data are taken and then assessed to determine whether observations are serious enough to 

open an SFI for specific weapon or component issues. SFIs are also opened for anomalies discovered 

anywhere in the stockpile when unexpected phenomena are observed. Such occurrences are investigated 

by the design agency responsible for the anomalous component. Investigations can include modeling of 

historical data, focused materials experiments, research and studies, major system test replication 

(i.e., hydro tests), and subsystem and subcomponent tests. These SFIs can continue through several 

annual assessment cycles. SFIs are closed once the impacts to system performance or safety have been 

assessed and follow-up actions are determined. A tracking and reporting system monitors SFI progress 
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from the discovery of an anomaly through to its closure report and the status of any corrective actions. 

Most SFIs close with little to no impact to safety and reliability.

2.2.8 Weapon Reliability

Nuclear weapon reliability is the probability that a designated weapon can deliver the specified nuclear 

yield at the target, assuming all required DoD inputs are correct. The stockpile also undergoes an annual 

weapon reliability assessment, which is compiled into the Weapon Reliability Report. This report

communicates to DoD the major aspects (yield and reliability) for the military effectiveness of the 

stockpile. The Weapon Reliability Report is the principal DOE/NNSA report on reliability for U.S. Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM), which uses it for overall strategic planning actions and targeting.

2.2.9 Annual Assessment

The directors of the three DOE/NNSA national security laboratories and the Commander of USSTRATCOM 

provide a written annual assessment on the state of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

The annual stockpile assessment review process is not an annual recertification of the warheads in the 

stockpile. It is an assessment of each warhead’s existing certification basis considering information 

generated by the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the past year. Each annual assessment builds on 

continuing experience with each weapon system and incorporates new information from stockpile 

maintenance, surveillance, experiments, simulations, and other sources to enhance the technical basis of 

each weapon type. 

The annual stockpile assessment process evaluates the safety, security, and effectiveness of weapons 

based on physics and engineering analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. Assessments may 

also evaluate the effect of aging on performance and quantify performance thresholds, uncertainties, and 

margins. These evaluations rely on all available sources of information on each weapon type, including 

surveillance, non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests, subcritical experiments, materials evaluation, modeling 

and simulation, and aging and lifetime evaluation techniques. 

The overall assessment philosophy and approach involves quantification of weapon characteristics and 

rigorous review of the results and certification basis by teams of weapons scientists and engineers. The 

laboratory teams responsible for each weapon type and its assessment include individuals with extensive 

weapons experience and access to both historical and new data. The assessments and conclusions in the 

Annual Assessment Reports are reviewed by independent peers, Red Teams (subject matter experts 

appointed by each laboratory’s director), program managers, senior laboratory management, and the 

Laboratory Directors. Specific results related to the stockpile systems are provided in the latest Report on 

Stockpile Assessments.

2.3 Crosscutting Programs

Crosscutting programs support multiple aspects of stockpile management, including surveillance activities 

and provisioning materials and components for stockpile maintenance and modernization. Program 

activities include production support for manufacturing and engineering operations, provisioning of 

products and services for multi-weapon system surveillance, maturation of advanced and exploratory 

weapons technologies, demonstration and deployment of advanced manufacturing processes, and 

provisioning of energetic materials and radiation-hardened microelectronics.
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2.3.1 Production Support

The Production Support Program is a DSW Program that funds multi-system, manufacturing-based 

activities that provide individual site production capabilities and capacity for the LEPs, LLC production, 

weapon surveillance, and weapon assembly and disassembly operations. The Production Support

Program also enables the modernization of production capabilities to improve efficiency and ensure that 

manufacturing operations meet future requirements. This includes maintenance/calibration services for 

manufacturing operations to meet DoD War Reserve requirements. 

Collectively, these activities directly support execution of systems engineering concepts and production 

integration. The Production Support Program provides DSW with the capability to conduct life extension 

work, stockpile surveillance, dismantlement work, neutron generator production, and detonator cable 

assembly production. 

2.3.1.1 Accomplishments

 Analytical laboratories continued to grow their workforce in support of more than 8,000 work 

orders and 50,000 analytical tests. Inspected more than 153,000 piece parts at over 90 vendors

 Conducted required maintenance and calibration actions on process equipment to ensure the 

required availability to meet production deliverables

 Onboarded new commodity vendors in cables, tooling, materials, and machined parts and 

implemented supplier improvement plans for key existing partners in all commodity teams 

 Completed installation of the new measurement and test equipment management tool

 Provided multi-system operations, maintenance, and laboratory support to meet LLC exchange

production delivery and GTS surveillance deliverables

 The neutron generator enterprise met its production build and shipment goals in FY 2018 in 

accordance with the Neutron Generator Implementation Program Plan and the LLC Production 

Control Document (the Neutron Generator Implementation Program Plan and LLC Production 

Control Document are both part of Production Support’s yearly deliverables)

 The Electronic Neutron Generator (ELNG) Product Realization Team successfully completed the 

qualification testing of the B83, legacy B61, and B61-12 ELNGs; these are the first ELNGs produced 

at SNL. ELNGs in the current stockpile were produced at the Pinellas Plant 

 Continued execution of the Manufacturing Modernization Project, a multi-year project to 

transition to digital product acceptance 

2.3.1.2 Status

The Production Support Program assists missions at seven national security sites and its portfolio is 

subdivided into seven major functional elements: Engineering Operations; Manufacturing Operations;

Quality Supervision and Control; Tool, Gage, and Equipment Services; Purchasing; Shipping; and Materials 

Management and Electronic Product Flow.

The Production Support Program currently provides the manufacturing capabilities (e.g., engineering, 

manufacturing, quality assurance) and capacity for LEP production, enduring stockpile weapon assembly, 

weapon disassembly, weapon safety and surveillance testing, and reliability testing that are required to 

meet directive and DoD delivery schedules. It also supports manufacturing investments for detonator and 

detonator cable assembly production and the neutron generator enterprise. Detonator production is 

expanding to encompass eight product lines, and the neutron generator line maintains five product lines 

using new equipment to enable higher yield rates, increased maintenance/calibration services, and 
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improved shop floor efficiency. Expanding engineering and quality assurance processes for B61-12 LEP 

non-nuclear component production is also captured under the Production Support Program. Continued 

work on the Manufacturing Modernization Project continues to support digital product production and 

acceptance, specifically completing the upgrade of the detonator manufacturing line (scheduled to be 

complete in FY 2021). The program also began implementing electronic work instruction processes and 

procedures for the visual factory shop floor, and migrating from a paper-based product life-cycle 

management system to electronic media.

2.3.1.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–8 provides a high-level summary of the Production Support Program’s challenges and the 

strategies to address them.

Table 2–8. Summary of Production Support Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Demands on the program continue to increase as the enterprise 

strives to have manufacturing capabilities and capacity in place 

to meet LEP production schedules.

Ensure facilities and equipment are maintained and 

calibrated to support schedules. 

The Manufacturing Modernization project faces challenges due 

to changes and upgrades in the plutonium manufacturing 

requirements versus capability. 

Work with LANL and the Plutonium Sustainment Program 

to ensure Manufacturing Modernization project

deployment is aligned with product lines with mature 

capabilities.

2.3.2 Management, Technology, and Production

The Management, Technology, and Production (MTP) Program’s work scope is a multi-system,

production-based program that promotes nuclear security enterprise integration and enhances efficiency. 

MTP activities provide the products, components, and/or services for multi-weapon system surveillance 

(laboratory/flight test data collection and analysis); weapons reliability reporting to DoD; DSW 

requirements tracking and execution; management and operation; and stockpile planning. The MTP 

Program funds plant and laboratory personnel to sustain the stockpile through activities related to

surveillance; weapons response process improvements; engineering authorizations; safety assessments;

use control technologies; containers; base spares; studies and assessments for nuclear operation safety;

production of weapon components for use in multiple weapons systems; and transportation/handling 

gear for use in multiple weapons systems. The MTP Program also includes activities that benefit the 

nuclear security enterprise mission, as differentiated from Production Support activities, which support 

internal site-specific production missions.

2.3.2.1 Accomplishments

 Delivered the Weapons Reliability Report to DoD, an annual requirement for the program

 Responded to and informed DOE/NNSA requests for 2018 Nuclear Posture Review planning using 

Enterprise Modeling and Analysis Consortium support teams

 Completed each Weapon Response scope on schedule using a combination of analysis, testing, 

and expert knowledge

 Completed a series of tests in support of nuclear safety R&D deflagration/detonation studies

 Continued establishing the Cold Hearth Melting capability to support recycling, refinement, and 

alloying of scrap uranium-niobium alloy
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 Completed a 2-year product data management system redeployment effort to improve audit 

readiness, sustainability, and extensibility and support increased throughput of product definition 

release

 Completed the first production release of the logistics, accountability, planning, and scheduling 

solution on September 21, 2018 (this phase of the solution allows DOE/NNSA to author, manage, 

and coordinate the directive schedules for DSW across the nuclear security enterprise)

 Enhanced the Livermore Independent Diagnostic Scoring System by imitating new design on radar 

rafts and on the recorder board used for neutron data capture (upgraded system rafts with new 

components)

2.3.2.2 Status

The MTP Program’s portfolio maintains base production capability at six national security sites. MTP is 

subdivided into the elements of General Management Support, Product Realization Integrated Digital 

Enterprise (PRIDE), Weapons Training and Military Liaison, Studies and Initiatives, Surveillance, Support 

for External Production Missions, Production of New Non-Weapon Specific Base Spares, Maintenance of 

Existing Non-Weapon Specific Base Spares, and Assessments and Studies. Other activities involve 

planning, integration and program management, ensuring a viable workforce, and weapon component 

testing and production.

The program includes 10 critical activities:

 Executing stockpile sustainment activities

 Providing products, components, and/or services for multi-weapon surveillance

 Weapons reliability reporting to DoD

 Accounting for weapon logistics and accountability

 Processing special materials (including depleted uranium processing)

 Stockpile planning

 Developing the surveillance testers (stronglink, environmental testing equipment, and 

centrifuges) required to support LEP testing requirements and the multi-system weapon response 

and external production resources needed to conduct nuclear safety studies to ensure 

uninterrupted nuclear explosive operations at production plants

 Conducting use control studies and equipment procurements to align with nuclear weapon first 

production units and enduring stockpile refresh opportunities

 Sustaining efforts to re-establish a special nuclear material manufacturing capability and capacity 

at Y-12 and upgrading flight testing support and related equipment at the Tonopah Test Range

 Ensuring that all Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory surveillance activities are executed in 

accordance with the baseline plans

The program is also currently funding models-based environment investments to enable DOE/NNSA to 

exchange classified three-dimensional (3D) product definition via common computer-aided design and 

drafting architecture from weapon component sourcing to quality inspection. 

2.3.2.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–9 provides a high-level summary of MTP Program challenges and the strategies to address them.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

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Table 2–9. Summary of Management, Technology, and Production Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Preparing for model-based enterprise and the use of models 

as the authorized design basis without a return to explosive 

nuclear testing.

Pilot projects have been funded to identify and address 

implementation issues.

Recapitalizing aging equipment and infrastructure at the 

Tonopah Test Range to support increased demand for 

surveillance flight testing.

Funding increased to support requirements.

Increased usage of the Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory 

capabilities to support LEP qualification stressing availability of 

test assets for surveillance testing.

Working issues and requirement through the capital 

acquisition process.

Enhance product realization data management and

collaboration tools.

Work scope defined in DSW Program Execution Plan.

2.3.3 Weapon Technology Development

The primary mission of the Weapon Technology Development program is to perform advanced and 

exploratory R&D and systems engineering to ensure viable technology options for modernization and 

enhancement of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Currently, it takes 5 to 7 years to mature technologies 

for integration into system architectures and provide options to address current and future stockpile 

needs. The focus of the R&D programmatic scope is to improve existing capabilities, provide solutions for 

addressing capability gaps and shortfalls, evolve capabilities to meet emerging threats and changing 

policy, and use improved technologies and methods to reduce development times and life-cycle costs. 

These efforts, funded via the DSW R&D Certification and Safety and R&D Support Programs, are organized 

under the focus areas of Technology Development and Integration, Technology Demonstrators, and 

Weapon Technology Development Support.

The Technology Development and Integration scope, funded through R&D Certification and Safety,

focuses on R&D, engineering, and integration of technologies that improve capabilities in the areas of 

safety, security, and effectiveness with the intended application to multiple weapon systems in the 

enduring and future stockpile. This work is accomplished through early development of components to 

replace aging technologies; nuclear safety assessments and studies; systems engineering; system 

requirements; new engineering models and algorithms; and design studies with the objective of 

sufficiently advancing technologies to be adopted for future applications. Technology Demonstrators,

also resourced via R&D Certification and Safety, conduct scaled demonstrations of technologies 

anticipated for insertion into the stockpile. The Weapon Technology Development program provides 

support to the administrative and organizational infrastructure that provides stockpile studies and 

programmatic work for multiple systems. This support includes program management activities, flight 

test diagnostic capabilities, updates of R&D and engineering tools, quality assurance, Nuclear Enterprise 

Assurance Program support activities, and operations and maintenance of Joint Integrated Lifecycle 

Surety capabilities, funded under R&D Support. 

There are five primary goals of the Weapon Technology Development program:

 Develop and mature agile, affordable, and assured technologies

 Demonstrate new technologies within subsystem or system contexts in relevant environments

 Identify and address stockpile capability gaps, shortfalls, issues, and risks

 Produce viable responses to address emerging threats and avoid technological surprise

 Employ tailored systems engineering to develop, demonstrate, and integrate capabilities into 

future system architectures
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2.3.3.1 Accomplishments

 The High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test, or HOT SHOT, program successfully 

launched its first research rocket from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii. HOT 

SHOT provides a test platform with a high-risk tolerance for new technologies that can duplicate 

many of the combined launch environments needed to qualify components, technologies, and 

subsystems. These activities support DOE/NNSA’s goal to accelerate development cycles and 

shorten the duration of future weapons modernization programs. The first flight validated 

analyses of mechanical responses in a combined environment, explored the dynamic 

performance of additively manufactured structures, and matured a digital data architecture for 

future weapons and tools for real-time data acquisition.

 The Research and Sounding Rocket project was also piloted, serving as a feed-in structure to the 

HOT SHOT program. This project provides a portfolio of low-cost, high-frequency, preliminary 

flight vehicle test beds to evaluate and prove-in early technology development work, new 

instrumentation options, and advanced modeling and simulation codes. The high tempo and 

quick turnaround nature of these flights enables creation and validation of the necessary mode 

of operations for subsequent flight tests. Six flight tests were conducted during FY 2018 in 

collaboration with rocket programs at the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University, 

creating relevant multi-dimensional environments for a variety of experiments and payloads.

 Accelerated technology maturation of the neutron generator monitor application-specific 

integrated circuits (ASICs), which allowed insertion to JTA units for additional programs. The new 

ASIC provides several technical enhancements, including increased and decreased neutron 

generator monitor circuit mass.

 Successfully advanced the system readiness level for the Joint Technology Demonstrator (JTD)

project through the System Technical Review 2 and successful completion of Gate 2 review. 

Conducted subsystem-level builds and demonstrations of the electrical system functional test bed 

with positive results. 

 Initiated the Air Force and DOE/NNSA Demonstrator Initiative and conducted a customer 

requirements review that established the technical basis for multiple flight tests in FY 2022.

2.3.3.2 Status

The Weapon Technology Development program is poised to continue advancing technology options for 

down-select by future weapon systems, particularly for the next insertion opportunities (i.e., W87-1 and 

the Next Navy Warhead). The program is currently maturing non-nuclear components and systems 

architectures and demonstrating technologies in relevant environments to de-risk technology options. 

Weapon Technology Development supports technology R&D in multiple major technical areas, including

neutron generators; safety mechanisms; sensors; energetics; power sources; systems engineering for 

nuclear explosive packages; mounts; arming, fuzing, and firing (AF&F) subsystems and all internal 

components; detonators; material science; and GTSs. There are eight major ongoing activities:

 Advancing development of hardware, materials, equipment, and processes, and demonstrating 

technology or manufacturing readiness levels sufficiently to transition to a program of record

 Developing cost-efficient technology solutions to enhance the safety, security, reliability, and 

performance of the stockpile 

 Increasing technology development activities for high-energy, low-sensitivity energetic 

components for future systems
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 Developing and testing conformal thermal batteries, launch accelerometers, and replacement 

inertial sensor technologies 

 Executing JTD activities in collaboration with the United Kingdom (UK) to explore technology 

applications in a systems context

 Continuing to develop and use the capability to demonstrate technologies in a system or 

subsystem context in relevant environments using low-cost, high-frequency demonstrators

 Maturing foundation bus technology for transformation of capabilities supporting future systems

 Continuing to plan multiple flight experiments necessary to de-risk technologies 

The Weapon Technology Development program will continue efforts to ensure the availability of 

technology options and system architectures for future systems. The program is seeking support from 

other DOE/NNSA offices to enhance the sounding rocket flight testing infrastructure at the Kauai Test 

Facility. This program will provide real-time flight performance data for model validation and accelerated 

qualification.

2.3.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–10 provides a high-level summary of Weapon Technology Development program challenges and 

the strategies to address them.

Table 2–10. Summary of Weapon Technology Development program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Conduct and complete technology maturation activities as 

planned to support future weapons programs.

Identify high-priority technologies in coordination with the 

end user and maintain frequent communication with 

relevant partners.

Leverage resources from the UK, as authorized under the 

Mutual Defense Agreement, and other NNSA programs.

Develop high-quality insensitive high explosives raw materials to 

meet the requirements of future systems 

Collaborate with Stockpile Services to continue work as 

planned. Continue development of alternative insensitive 

high explosive formulations based on new molecules.

Effectively communicate Joint Technology Demonstrator (JTD) 

milestones, accomplishments, issues, and intentions to senior 

leadership.

Ensure that all JTD participants are properly trained and 

informed of relevant national priorities. Conduct quarterly 

updates with DOE/NNSA and continue to work with UK 

partners to ensure senior management is informed of JTD 

outcomes.

Transitioning technology findings and benefits to LEP process. Negotiate early and continually with weapon program 

managers to ensure that interface requirement 

agreements are developed and approved and the benefits 

are well understood.

2.3.4 Advanced Manufacturing Development

The Advanced Manufacturing Development Program develops, demonstrates, and deploys nextgeneration production processes and manufacturing tools so that future weapons are agile and assured. 

Advanced manufacturing methods are essential to achieving the efficiency and agility required for 

production of the future stockpile. Laboratory and plant management and operating (M&O) Centers of 

Excellence have been established to coordinate, explore, and exercise transformative manufacturing 

approaches to support stockpile responsiveness as legacy methods may no longer be reproducible. R&D 

of these methods and assessment of their impacts on nuclear explosive package performance are key 
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elements of the program and are supported by elements of the Advanced Simulation and Computing, 

Science, Technology Maturation, and Stockpile Responsiveness Programs. 

The Advanced Manufacturing Development Program has three subprograms: Component Manufacturing 

Development, which focuses on modernizing manufacturing technology and process development; 

Additive Manufacturing, which focuses on technology also known as 3D printing; and Process Technology 

Development, which currently supports uranium processing technologies. The Additive Manufacturing 

subprogram has a broad impact on DOE/NNSA’s mission by enabling new and novel design alternatives 

(including designs that cannot be manufactured by traditional methods), simplifying component 

production, accelerating design iteration and production development schedules, and reducing costs. 

Analyzing the behavior of materials and components made with this advanced technology is challenging 

because behavior must be characterized over a range of scales from microscale to mesoscale and 

validated by testing. 

2.3.4.1 Component Manufacturing Development

The Component Manufacturing Development subprogram seeks to develop the innovative manufacturing 

processes necessary to replace sunset technologies, upgrade existing technologies, and introduce future 

enabling technologies across the nuclear security enterprise in support of maintaining the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of the stockpile. This subprogram is responsible for developing the proofs of concept 

for manufacturing processes and validating that those processes meet component design requirements 

with initial prototype builds. The subprogram coordinates with other programs to ensure proper 

transition of the technology. These efforts are system-agnostic and prioritized to ensure the critical 

mission need is addressed. The Component Manufacturing Development subprogram focuses on the 

successful transition of technologies from design agency to production agency. 

The four Component Manufacturing Development subprogram focus areas are described below. 

Advanced Production Development. Draws on exploratory manufacturing research across the 

laboratories and plants to inform decisions on process improvements. This focus area is intended to 

improve current capabilities through the development of new techniques for manufacturing specific 

materials and production processes. 

Manufacturing Process Integration. Facilitates introduction of new manufacturing techniques into 

production lines to ensure the materials and components produced by novel manufacturing processes 

meet design requirements and are on a well-defined path for insertion into a weapon system or 

production line. 

Manufacturing Diagnostic Development. Enables new manufacturing processes by developing process 

monitoring and control diagnostics to observe and study novel production methods and materials. These 

diagnostics provide a path to qualification and certification for manufacturing processes and ensure the 

integrity of the nuclear weapons supply chain. 

Material Obsolescence and Sunset Processes. Pursues alternatives for obsolete or hazardous materials 

and aging production processes and includes new approaches designed to better conserve materials that 

are scarce or challenging to produce. These alternative approaches must be developed and deployed

before aging issues or material shortages affect the status of LEPs, Alts, or Mods. 

Top Priorities in the Component Manufacturing Development subprogram:

 Directly affect the agility and responsiveness of DOE/NNSA’s manufacturing infrastructure 

 Focus on innovative technologies in time for insertion in the W87-1 while continuing to advance 

technology for later systems [this focus is in response to a key lesson learned from previous LEPs; 
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that technology needs to be sufficiently mature prior to the weapon program entering Phase 6.3 

(Development and Engineering)]. 

 Facilitate the sites replacement of conventional polymer processes with additive manufacturing 

processes by 2023 (benefits include seeing a process step reduction from 11 to 3 major steps, 

reducing production footprint from 10,000 square feetto 1,000 square feet, and increasing part 

yield from 70 percent to over 95 percent, all resulting in reduced material wastes and maintaining 

schedule and cost confidence for future weapon programs)

 Replace specific hazardous and obsolete processes by Phase 6.3 (FY 2023) of the W87-1

Modification Program (benefits include reducing process steps from 16 to 4 major steps, reducing 

cost per part from $238,000 to $100,000, and increasing part yield from 5 percent to over 

50 percent)

 Develop a suite of technologies to mitigate material supply chain risks, address quality 

considerations, and integrate schedule and cost confidence levels into processes for current and 

future programs of record

 Create an integrated digital manufacturing network at each of the production sites, leveraging 

ongoing activities in Laboratory and Plant Direct Research and Development programs, as well as 

Advanced Simulation and Computing on artificial intelligence/big data/machine learning

 Leverage industry advancements to integrate their manufacturing machines into our aging and 

obsolete production lines; manage large manufacturing data sets generated from modern 

manufacturing processes; and automate processes where a strong business case exists 

Accomplishments

 Developed the first small batch of additively manufactured chip slapper detonators, reducing the 

process development time by 50 percent and exceeding product quality expectations 

 Transitioned product acceptance testers to assure readiness in meeting production capacity for 

the B61-12 LEP, W88 Alt 370, and MK21 Fuze Programs

 Increased new neutron generator tooling output by 25 percent in FY 2017 at less than half the 

cost and time compared to traditional manufacturing methods

 Transitioned ASIC production control software from fabrication factory works to a system called 

the Electronic Production Control System (the system automates tracking of ASICs through the 

production process, which will reduce human error in recording the information, and will result 

in an estimated cost avoidance of approximately $17.6 million, to be realized over the Future 

Years Nuclear Security Program)

Status

 Component Manufacturing Development portfolio projects are intended to directly affect the 

agility and responsiveness of DOE/NNSA’s manufacturing infrastructure (the subprogram will 

mature innovative, cost-saving technologies in time for insertion in the W87-1 with investments 

specifically targeting a handful of critical production needs that must be in place for the W87-1 to 

be successful)

 Component Manufacturing Development will continue to target high-value, long-term 

technologies that will be available to systems after the W87-1
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Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–11 provides a high-level summary of Component Manufacturing Development subprogram

challenges and the strategies to address them.

Table 2–11. Summary of Component Manufacturing Development subprogram 

challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Multiple Component Manufacturing Developmentfunded projects will transfer to the Strategic Materials 

Program over the next 5 to 10 years.

Coordinate with the strategic materials programs to develop a 

life-cycle management strategy to reduce future material supply 

chain risks.

2.3.4.2 Additive Manufacturing

The Additive Manufacturing subprogram capitalizes on 3D printing of polymers and metals for stockpile 

applications to shorten production schedules and design cycles. These time reductions for design and 

production will ultimately lead to lower life-cycle costs and enable production of components with 

qualities that are not possible using current manufacturing technologies. This subprogram focuses on 

innovative and revolutionary processes that have not yet been demonstrated in a relevant production 

environment, using multi-site collaborations to share results quickly and speed development. Additive 

manufacturing reduces risks to program schedules and avoids costs traditionally associated with 

subcontracting work to outside vendors in direct support of the nuclear security enterprise. Additive 

manufacturing plays an integral role in supporting the nuclear security mission through rapid prototyping, 

JTA component production, tooling, and polymer pad and cushion production. 

The Additive Manufacturing subprogram mission scope addresses four focus areas:

 Initial Capabilities: Establish advanced and exploratory additive manufacturing capabilities

 Prototype Production: Produce additive manufacturing prototypes that demonstrate the range 

of their benefits

 Science-Based Manufacturing: Develop methods that meet design and qualification requirements

 Accelerated Qualification and Certification: Accelerate qualification and certification of additively 

manufactured parts, enabling insertion into the stockpile

The Additive Manufacturing subprogram focuses on longer-term investments that reduce the cost of 

design-to-manufacture iterations. These specific processes require fully characterizing additively 

manufactured materials and capabilities and then producing methodologies that enable qualification and 

certification. Additive manufacturing also offers tremendous performance advantages in comparison to 

legacy manufacturing processes by promoting better and faster design cycles, lower production costs, and 

faster development and production cycles.

Accomplishments

 Developed Direct Ink Write technology for cushions and pads to Technology Readiness Level 5

 The nuclear security enterprise produced its first additively manufactured War Reserve 

component in 2018 

 Developed a stainless-steel powder bed additive manufacturing process that enables current and 

future programs to use additively manufactured GTS mass mocks and trainers (in comparison to 

traditional methods, this process results in a 50 percent shorter manufacturing cycle time and a 

cost avoidance of $793,000 per part)
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 Upgraded the arming and fuzing production line to increase process efficiency and reduce 

material waste streams (this will benefit current and future major modernization programs during 

production) 

 Acquired a patent at LLNL for additive manufacturing of energetic materials in FY 2019, 

demonstrating DOE/NNSA’s leadership in this field and enabling technological advancement 

across the nuclear security enterprise

 Printed an HE booster into a main charge cavity and proved initiation, demonstrating an attractive 

alternative approach to conventional manufacturing

Status

 Since 2013, KCNSC has printed over 63,000 tools, fixtures, and molds that help reduce schedule 

risk and have resulted more than $124 million in cost avoidance 

 An estimated 10 percent of all tools, fixtures, and molds in the enterprise and an estimated 

90 percent of prototype tools and fixtures are additively manufactured

Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–12 provides a high-level summary of Additive Manufacturing subprogram challenges and the 

strategies to address them.

Table 2–12. Summary of Additive Manufacturing subprogram challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Meet the need to accelerate the development of a large 

array of manufacturing capabilities to support the W87-1

Modification Program is required.

To support the W87-1 Modification Program, the subprogram 

will additively manufacture components; replace hazardous 

materials and related processes; develop manufacturing 

processes to support advanced arming, fuzing, and firing

designs; and develop a process to manufacture new gas 

transfer system reservoir materials.

2.3.4.3 Process Technology Development

The Process Technology Development subprogram supports development, demonstration, and use of 

new production technologies to enhance manufacturing capabilities for nuclear weapon materials. 

Funding will be used to deploy new technologies with the potential to shorten production schedules, 

reduce risks, enhance personnel safety, or reach optimal maturity levels in time to support mission needs.

At present, this subprogram focuses on uranium processing technologies and, more specifically, on 

acquiring major items of equipment for Y-12 by 2025. These include a calciner project, direct chip melt 

installation, and an electrorefiner project. These major items of equipment will relocate uranium 

processing capabilities into existing facilities at Y-12 to support phasing out mission dependency on 

Building 9212. Additional information about uranium can be found in Sections 2.4.2 through 2.4.5.

2.3.5 Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics

The electronics in nuclear warheads must function reliably in a range of operational environments. These 

environments include radiation sources ranging from cosmic rays to intrinsic radiation within the weapon 

and from hostile sources. A trusted supply of these strategic radiation-hardened advanced 

microelectronics performs critical, sensing AF&F functions to meet current program requirements, and 

supports R&D to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent in a 

diverse threat environment. 
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2.3.5.1 Accomplishments

 The Electronic Production Control System was developed and used to track ASIC parts through all 

production steps (this system implementation decreased product acceptance times from weeks 

to 2 days, while reducing quality documentation record errors using barcode scanning technology 

coupled with automated generation of electronic Log Record Books; this automation eliminates 

the need to perform manual data entry tasks)

 The Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications (MESA) complex delivered a record 

26,000 microfabricated parts to DOE/NNSA for the B61-12, W88 Alt 370, and Mk21 Fuze Programs 

(this is the largest ASIC production run in SNL history and includes components with new 

capabilities)

 The Silicon Fabrication Facility completed all planned life-of-program production and safety stock 

wafer fabrication for the modernization programs and delivered over 6,000 War Reserve parts to 

DOE/NNSA in support of baseline first production unit dates for the B61-12, W88 Alt 370, Mk21 

Fuze, and W80-4

2.3.5.2 Status

The MESA fabrication facilities at SNL produce custom, strategic, radiation-hardened microelectronics for 

nuclear weapons and space-based nuclear detonation detection systems. The Nation’s trusted, strategic 

radiation-hardened microelectronics development and manufacturing capability must be sustained 

beyond 2025 to support stockpile modernization as directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

DOE/NNSA uses collocated R&D and production to support rapid design, manufacturing, packaging, and 

testing of strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics that function properly when exposed to intense 

radiation environments. 

2.3.5.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–13 provides a high-level summary of radiation-hardened microelectronics challenges and the 

strategies to address them.

Table 2–13. Summary of Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Competing requirements among the Alt/LEP programs must be 

balanced while continuing the development and sustainment of 

the engineering and science-based microelectronics capabilities 

required to accomplish the Nation’s nuclear weapon missions. 

Prioritizing Alt/LEP support and microelectronics fabrication 

capabilities to achieve investment balance to enable delivery 

of the program of record.

Silicon Fabrication Facility infrastructure and aging and

unsupported equipment likely will require upgrades and 

replacements to sustain this capability through 2040. 

DOE/NNSA is working with SNL to address highest-risk 

infrastructure needs. SNL has already begun a 6- to 8-inch

tool conversion to support production for future programs of 

record. 

MESA Microsystems Fabrication Facility capabilities, which 

deliver strategic radiation-hardened semiconductor devices, 

need to be sustained over the next decade to meet nuclear 

weapon requirements. 

The fragility and capability limits of the MESA facility places risk 

on DOE/NNSA design and production efforts.

DOE/NNSA is addressing the strategic radiation-hardened 

microelectronics capability options through an Extended Life 

Program to sustain the capability through 2040 and beyond.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-21

2.4 Strategic Components and Materials

DOE/NNSA is focused on manufacturing nuclear weapons components of strategic interest that need to 

be replaced. These key components, including primaries, secondaries, and radiation cases, are critical to 

weapon performance, and their manufacture is tightly controlled. Production of these components and 

the materials needed to construct them was reduced or stopped during the 1990s when they were no 

longer required. Conducting LEPs and a greater emphasis on a responsive manufacturing infrastructure 

now require restoring or increasing the capacity of these material and component capabilities, 

necessitating new methods and approaches to provide sufficient throughput and efficiency. These 

strategic components require the availability of materials and subcomponent streams that are managed 

by DOE/NNSA and need to be tightly coordinated with component production. The facilities and 

operations required to process the materials and then fabricate and assemble the components have been 

grouped into seven material classes:

 Plutonium

 HEU

 Depleted Uranium

 Domestic Uranium Enrichment

 Tritium

 Lithium

 Energetic Materials

Material process flows and the recovery of material from dismantlement and disposition activities are

coordinated by the Material Recycle and Recovery (MRR) and Storage programs.

2.4.1 Plutonium

The United States no longer has the capability to produce new primaries for nuclear weapons, including 

plutonium subcomponents such as pits, at the rate needed. Specifically, the United States has not 

manufactured a War Reserve pit since 2012 and has not had the ability to manufacture more than 10 pits 

per year (ppy) for over two decades, since the Rocky Flats Plant closed. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

includes a requirement for a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure that provides “the enduring 

capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 ppy by 2030.” In May 2018, 

the DOE/NNSA Administrator provided Congress with DOE/NNSA’s recommended alternative to produce 

no fewer than 80 ppy by 2030; as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. 

This recommended alternative was endorsed by the chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council. DOE/NNSA’s 

recommended alternative to meet pit production requirements is twofold:

 Repurpose the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at SRS to produce 50 War 

Reserve ppy by 2030 (see Section 2.4.1.2)

 Concurrently, DOE/NNSA will continue to invest in LANL to produce 30 War Reserve ppy beginning 

in 2026; as practicable, DOE/NNSA will assess opportunities for LANL to produce above that 

quantity 

This two-pronged alternative is the optimal path forward to meet pit production requirements while 

managing the risks and costs associated with increasing production rates and maintaining existing 

plutonium operations at LANL. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-22 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

A modern, responsive, and resilient capability to process and handle plutonium is essential to assess and 

maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile. A responsive plutonium infrastructure requires proper storage 

facilities, safe and secure disposal pathways, and unique equipment and facilities for R&D activities. 

Manufacture and surveillance of plutonium components, as well as experiments and analysis of 

plutonium, currently occur at LANL’s Plutonium Facility (PF-4). DOE/NNSA also leverages additional 

capabilities and expertise at SNL, LLNL, Pantex, and the Nevada National Security Site to support defenserelated plutonium missions.

The largest portion of the U.S. weapons-usable plutonium inventory is in the form of retired pits. 

DOE/NNSA continues to repurpose and reconfigure nuclear material bays to stage pits at Pantex until a 

long-term staging facility is available. LANL and LLNL continue to manage annual pit surveillance at LANL, 

LLNL, Pantex, and the Nevada National Security Site. DOE/NNSA continues to invest in additional pit 

nondestructive evaluation throughput capacity. The Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and 

Imaging System (CoLOSSIS) II and the Laser Gas Sampling Station II in FY 2018 are examples of steps to 

improve the efficiency and affordability of surveillance activities. This data collection and analysis 

supports sustaining an overall healthy feedstock supply chain that will support plutonium processing for 

the nuclear weapons program as necessary to maintain a ready nuclear deterrent.

Almost all plutonium processing for the nuclear weapons program (e.g., recovery, characterization, 

component fabrication, nondestructive analysis, and surveillance) and basic and applied research on 

plutonium are conducted in LANL’s PF-4. PF-4 is the only DOE/NNSA facility authorized to produce pits 

for the enduring stockpile. DOE/NNSA continues to invest in PF-4 to establish an enduring 30 ppy

production capability by FY 2026 and to maintain LANL as the Nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence for 

R&D. 

2.4.1.1 Accomplishments

 Fabricated five Development W87-like pits to support a transition to the process prove-in phase 

 Continued investments to replace end-of-life pit production equipment required to manufacture 

the first War Reserve pit in FY 2023 

 Conducted preconceptual design activities for pit production at SRS

2.4.1.2 Status

DOE/NNSA continues to invest in LANL capabilities to meet pit production requirements and is developing 

design documentation to create a pit production capability at SRS. On October 10, 2018, DOE/NNSA 

began transition activities. MFFF has been renamed to the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility 

(SRPPF), and a conceptual design will be used to develop CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost 

Range) for the Deputy Secretary’s final review and decision. 

DOE/NNSA is recapitalizing facilities and equipment (i.e., acquiring, installing, configuring, and authorizing

equipment for operation) to replace an aging base capability to manufacture and certify pits. Through a 

series of Technical Area 55 (TA-55) Reinvestment Projects (TRP I, TRP II, and TRP III), DOE/NNSA is 

addressing PF-4’s aging infrastructure and systems. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

(CMRR) project maintains continuity in analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities by 

transitioning these activities from the Cold War-era Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility to 

newer facilities. Risk reduction activities through the MRR program regarding material-at-risk are 

continuing in CMR through significant removal of the nuclear material inventory currently housed in the 

legacy facility. The first two CMRR subprojects have approved baselines and are on schedule to be 

completed in 2022. The Plutonium Pit Production Project was created during the FY 2019 appropriations 

process and includes the unbaselined scope of the CMRR project, which is associated with expanding 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-23

analytical chemistry and materials characterization, and pit manufacturing equipment installation to 

produce a minimum of 30 ppy.

FY 2020 goals and milestones include:

 Fabricate five process prove-in pits

 Continued investments in pit production equipment required a minimum of 30 ppy production 

capability

 Complete the conceptual design and CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) for 

SRPPF

2.4.1.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–14 provides a high-level summary of Plutonium Program challenges and the strategies to address 

them.

Table 2–14. Summary of Plutonium Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

DOE/NNSA must increase pit production over the next 

decade to meet a capacity of no fewer than 80 pits per 

year (ppy) by 2030. The current schedule includes a War 

Reserve first production unit in FY 2023, building to a 

production capability of 10, 20, and at a minimum, 30 War 

Reserve ppy in 2024, 2025, and 2026, respectively, at LANL, 

and 30 ppy thereafter. Concurrently, DOE/NNSA is 

repurposing facilities at SRS to provide no fewer than an 

additional 50 War Reserve ppy capability by 2030. Meeting 

these deliverables remains a challenge as DOE/NNSA 

continues to re-optimize existing available space, replace 

end-of-life manufacturing equipment, and invest in 

additional manufacturing equipment, associated facilities, 

and staff. DOE/NNSA also faces space challenges caused 

by the need to store retired pits and the deteriorating 

condition of aging Cold War-era infrastructure.

Continue to invest in PF-4 to establish a minimum 30 ppy

production capability at LANL by FY 2026 and maintain LANL 

as DOE/NNSA’s Plutonium Center of Excellence for Research 

and Development. 

Continue to execute project development activities related 

to building a pit production capability at SRS. Execute

Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility project in time 

to support production milestones. 

Address LANL plutonium infrastructure challenges through 

construction such as the CMRR project. Modernize waste 

processing and treatment facilities through recapitalization 

and line-item projects such as the TA-55 Reinvestment 

Project and the Radiological Liquid Waste Treatment Facility 

Project.

Maintain subject matter expertise at the national 

laboratories in base R&D capabilities to support plutonium 

production.

Continue two-way communication between the nuclear 

weapons production facilities and the national security 

laboratories. The laboratories will determine a path forward 

to provide the expertise necessary to meet production 

needs and recommend improvements that can be applied to 

plutonium production.

2.4.2 Uranium

Uranium is a strategic national defense asset with different assays and enrichments, to include depleted 

uranium, low-enriched uranium (LEU), high-assay LEU, and HEU. Uranium has a variety of defense and 

nuclear nonproliferation applications, including weapon components, fuel for naval reactors, fuel for 

commercial power reactors to produce tritium, and fuel for commercial and research reactors that 

produce medical isotopes. 

2.4.3 Highly Enriched Uranium

HEU is uranium in which the concentration of the fissile isotope, uranium-235, is increased to 20 percent 

or greater. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-24 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

2.4.3.1 Accomplishments

 Initiated planning and prioritization efforts to phase-out mission dependency on Building 9212

 Increased the reliability of existing uranium capabilities in casting sustainment and machining 

sustainment investments 

 Removed enriched uranium material from Area 5 to achieve the Y-12 de-inventory milestone and 

continued enabling efforts to establish and maintain target working inventory levels 

 Installed radiography capability in Building 9201-2E

 Achieved Performance Baseline and Start of Construction (CD-2/3) for all seven Uranium 

Processing Facility subprojects

 Achieved CD-2/3 for the Y-12 Electrorefiner project

2.4.3.2 Status

Y-12 is home to the Nation’s primary uranium processing and storage infrastructure. LANL and LLNL both 

house uranium R&D capabilities, and Y-12 also has a development laboratory that supports uranium 

activities. Y-12’s Building 9212 contains the most hazardous enriched uranium operations. At more than 

70 years of age, Building 9212 does not meet modern nuclear safety and security standards. DOE/NNSA 

is phasing out mission dependency on Building 9212 through a series of enriched uranium capability 

relocations into existing facilities at Y-12, as well as the Uranium Processing Facility, when completed. To 

successfully execute this transition, new technologies will be deployed and existing processes will be 

simplified or eliminated to increase the overall safety and efficiency of enriched uranium operations. 

During this transition period, efforts to reduce the material-at-risk will continue through the material 

recycle and recovery.

Infrastructure investment in Buildings 9215 and 9204-2E is integral to the overall strategy. These two 

buildings were constructed in the 1950s and late 1960s, respectively, and their construction predates 

many of the modern safety standards applicable to nuclear facilities. The infrastructure and 

programmatic equipment in both buildings are degrading due to age and condition, and replacement 

facilities are not planned for several decades. Both the machining operations in Building 9215 and the 

assembly and disassembly operations in Building 9204-2E must safely continue with high reliability 

through the 2040s. The Plant Laboratory, Building 9995, provides chemical analysis for the entire site. 

Building 9995 was built in the 1950s to support operations in Building 9212. The infrastructure and 

analytical chemistry capabilities in Building 9995 also require additional investments to continue to 

support the mission. 

The Uranium Processing Facility will provide new floor space for the high-hazard, high-security operations 

in Building 9212 that are not suitable to relocate to existing facilities. Completion and startup of the 

Uranium Processing Facility, along with completion and operation of the Process Technology 

Development Program’s Y-12 Electrorefiner and Calciner Projects, will enable DOE/NNSA to fully phase 

out mission dependency on Building 9212.

FY 2020 goals and milestones include: 

 Complete construction of the Uranium Processing Facility substation

 Complete design package and begin installation for the Decontamination, Sort, and Segregate 

facility
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-25

2.4.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–15 provides a high-level summary of Uranium Program challenges and the strategies to address 

them.

Table 2–15. Summary of Uranium Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Transition enriched uranium capabilities into existing and 

new-build facilities to phase out mission dependency on 

Building 9212. This will shut down Building 9212’s 

production processes, drain and isolate systems, and 

facilitate post-operations cleanout of the facility in 

accordance with the Building 9212 Exit Strategy. 

DOE/NNSA must maintain operations in Building 9212 

while the Uranium Processing Facility is under 

construction and make investments to extend the 

operational life of enduring enriched uranium facilities 

where key processes will be relocated and facilities on 

which the uranium strategy is dependent, such as the 

Plant Laboratory in Building 9995. 

Implement the Building 9212 Exit Strategy.

Execute key technology transitions and process relocations by 

the end of 2022, including direct chip melt in Building 9215, 

electrorefining in Building 9215, and calciner in Building 9212.

Maintain direct communications with Y-12, LANL, and LLNL to 

support accomplishment of the overall mission while closely 

tracking the progress of construction and relocation activities. 

Advance technologies currently planned for deployment in the 

field and those technologies required to meet future mission 

needs (including technologies to reduce production footprints). 

DOE/NNSA faces challenges in maintaining subject matter 

expertise at the national security laboratories in base R&D

capabilities and production support as a result of 

retirements combined with industry competition for a 

small pool of highly skilled, technical employees.

Continue two-way communications between the nuclear 

weapon production facilities and the national security 

laboratories. The laboratories are exploring a viable path 

forward to provide the expertise necessary to meet production 

needs and recommend improvements that can be applied to 

highly enriched uranium production.

Extend the operational lifetime of existing enriched 

uranium processing facilities (Buildings 9215 and 9204-2E 

and the Plant Laboratory in Building 9995).

Sustain existing enriched uranium capabilities through 

enhanced equipment maintenance and the purchase of critical 

spare parts to improve the availability and reliability of 

production systems. Execute planned investments in electrical 

modernization in Buildings 9204-2E and 9215.

Many of the uranium processes currently performed in 

Building 9212 cannot be transferred to another operating 

facility and must be replaced.

Execute the Uranium Processing Facility project to provide new 

floor space for the high-hazard, high-security operations in 

Building 9212 that are not suitable to relocate to existing 

facilities.

2.4.4 Depleted Uranium

Depleted uranium is a by-product of the enrichment process that has a lower ratio of uranium-235 to 

uranium-238 than naturally occurring uranium. DOE/NNSA has a long-term requirement for high-purity 

depleted uranium feedstock to meet national security needs. The capability to produce, process, and 

handle depleted uranium supports a number of key missions within the nuclear security enterprise, from 

providing parts for LEPs to downblending HEU to LEU. 

2.4.4.1 Accomplishments

 With DOE Office of Environmental Management’s Paducah-Portsmouth Project Office (PPPO), 

began initial design of a potential depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) to depleted uranium 

tetrafluoride (DUF4) conversion line and initiated cost and schedule development

 Began establishing an interface mechanism between PPPO and a Phase 2 (DUF4 to metal) 

conversion capability
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-26 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Collaborated with DoD to document mutual interest in depleted uranium supply and outline 

efforts to reduce operational risk

 Began working initial feasibility and estimated cost of procurement/cost avoidance for DoD

through completion of a depleted uranium recycle pilot project

2.4.4.2 Status

DOE/NNSA is currently exhausting usable inventories of high-purity depleted uranium metal feedstock

used for weapons production. DOE has a large quantity of depleted uranium in the form of DUF6 stored 

in cylinders at its sites in Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. Currently, DOE/NNSA does not have 

the capability to convert DUF6 to DUF4. DOE/NNSA evaluated various options for re-establishment of the 

capability to convert DUF6 to DUF4 and is working with DOE’s Office of Environmental Management on the 

potential installation and operation of equipment at the Portsmouth DUF6 Conversion Facility to convert 

DUF6 to DUF4 to meet nuclear stockpile requirements. The MRR program began efforts to re-establish the 

depleted uranium feedstock capability in FY 2019, including initiation of design work for the construction 

of a DUF6 to DUF4 conversion line at the Portsmouth site.

Y-12 uses an alloying process, along with a set of wrought and machining capabilities, to produce binary 

alloy components for use in national security applications. The process is less efficient than other possible 

production capabilities and relies on an aging infrastructure. Y-12 also uses casting, machining, inspection, 

and certification capabilities to deliver components and subassemblies for use in nuclear weapons 

production. DOE/NNSA has begun the process of developing technologies intended to phase out the 

wrought process, including direct casting. 

FY 2020 goals and milestones include:

 Begin component procurement and potential installation at PPPO

 Leverage efforts with DoD to sustain phase 2 vendor production capabilities

2.4.4.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–16 provides a high-level summary of Depleted Uranium Program challenges and the strategies to 

address them.

Table 2–16. Summary of Depleted Uranium Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Commercial capabilities do not exist to convert 

DUF6 to DUF4. Conversion of DUF6 to DUF4 is 

needed to support depleted uranium metal 

production, which is required to meet future 

mission needs. DOE/NNSA projects a shortfall of 

depleted uranium between FY 2029 and FY 2031.

Continue advancing technologies currently planned for deployment in 

the field and those technologies required to meet future mission 

needs.

Investigate alternate processes and technology improvements that 

can increase the efficiency of traditional manufacturing processes.

DOE/NNSA is working toward re-establishing the capability to convert 

DUF6 to DUF4 at the Portsmouth site. Re-establishment efforts will 

begin in FY 2019 (see Section 2.4.8, Material Recycle and Recovery

and Storage).

DoD and NNSA depend on a limited vendor base 

for depleted uranium metal production.

Increase supply and more closely interface with DoD. DOE/NNSA is 

exploring the capability for recycling depleted uranium resulting from 

processing of by-products and waste. This effort has the potential to 

provide an alternate source for a small portion of the demand. 

DOE/NNSA is working with DoD counterparts to establish a clear 

understanding of the shared need for this material.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-27

2.4.5 Domestic Uranium Enrichment

Enriched uranium contains higher concentrations of the fissile uranium-235 isotope than natural uranium

and is required at varied enrichment levels for national security and medical isotope production. A

domestic uranium enrichment capability will provide a reliable supply of enriched uranium to support a 

variety of U.S. missions, including support for tritium production, nonproliferation, and the Naval Reactors

Program. 

2.4.5.1 Accomplishments

 Continued execution of an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to identify and evaluate solutions to the 

LEU mission need 

 Completed design and began testing of a small centrifuge design at Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

 Began execution of the Downblend Offering for Tritium campaign to extend the need date for 

delivery of LEU fuel for tritium production to 2041

2.4.5.2 Status 

The U.S. Government currently has no uranium enrichment capability. While commercial LEU sources 

exist, their use has domestic peaceful use restrictions, leading to these sources to be “encumbered.” 

Mission needs for enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States’ remaining HEU stockpile, 

which is a finite, currently irreplaceable source. DOE/NNSA is funding centrifuge R&D efforts for potential 

deployment in an enrichment facility. DOE/NNSA is conducting an AoA for a domestic uranium 

enrichment capability. The AoA is planned to conclude in 2019. In October 2018, DOE/NNSA initiated 

another campaign to downblend excess HEU from its stockpiles to provide unobligated LEU fuel in support 

of its tritium production mission. This campaign extends the need date for delivery of unobligated LEU 

fuel for tritium production out until 2041.

DOE/NNSA is pursuing a three-pronged strategy to provide a reliable supply of unobligated and 

unencumbered enriched uranium:

 Downblend HEU to LEU to extend the tritium fuel need date to 2041. DOE/NNSA has identified 

existing unobligated and unencumbered material to power the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

reactors through 2041. Much of the material is HEU “scrap,” which is unattractive for use by other 

programs. Downblending activities will continue through FY 2025. This effort maintains

continuous operations at the only commercial downblender, which would otherwise close in the 

absence of feed material. However, because the HEU inventory is finite and, at present, 

irreplaceable, downblending is a temporary solution. 

 Develop enrichment technology options. Following an analysis of available enrichment 

technologies, DOE/NNSA determined that centrifuge technologies have the highest technical 

maturity and lowest risk. DOE/NNSA is funding centrifuge R&D efforts at Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory. 

 Execute an acquisition process to deploy an enrichment technology. Because of the finite nature 

of the HEU inventory, the United States will eventually need a new uranium enrichment capability. 

DOE/NNSA approved the mission need (CD-0) for this capability in December 2016. If the AoA 

adds construction of an enrichment capability, conceptual design work for a pilot plant will begin 

in 2020. Successful operation of a pilot plant will inform design, construction, and operation 

decisions for a full-scale uranium enrichment facility.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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FY 2020 goals and milestones include: 

 Complete testing of Oak Ridge National Laboratory small centrifuge design

 Complete AoA and recommend a solution to the LEU mission need

 Begin conceptual design for a centrifuge pilot plant, depending on the outcome of the AoA

 Continue execution of the Downblend Offering for Tritium Program to extend the need date for 

delivery of LEU fuel for tritium production to 2041

2.4.5.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–17 provides a high-level summary of Domestic Uranium Enrichment Program challenges and the 

strategies to address them.

Table 2–17. Summary of Domestic Uranium Enrichment Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

U.S. policy requires enriched uranium for defense missions,

such as tritium production, to be free from domestic 

peaceful use restrictions (unencumbered) and from foreign 

peaceful use obligations (unobligated). Because the U.S. 

Government does not currently possess a uranium 

enrichment capability using U.S. technology and stocks of 

the HEU used to meet defense needs are finite, construction 

of an enrichment facility will be necessary. 

Execute acquisition strategy to re-establish a domestic 

uranium enrichment capability.

Continue R&D of two domestic centrifuge technologies.

DOE/NNSA has a near-term need for unobligated LEU for its 

tritium mission.

Continue downblending of excess HEU to produce 

unobligated LEU fuel.

2.4.6 Tritium

Tritium, which has a short radioactive half-life, is a critical material necessary for the functioning of nuclear 

weapons in the stockpile. As discussed in the Section 2.1.1.1, tritium is used in weapons to meet weapon 

system military characteristics, increase system margins, and ensure weapon system reliability. GTSs 

store the tritium to be delivered to the primary during weapon activation. Tritium inventories are 

maintained to meet this and other national security needs. Two sources of tritium support and maintain 

this inventory: (1) material recycle and recovery of tritium, primarily from GTS reservoirs, and 

(2) production by irradiation of lithium targets in reactors and extraction of tritium from these targets 

at SRS. 

2.4.6.1 Accomplishments

 Commenced irradiation of 1,584 tritium-producing burnable absorber rod (TPBARs) in the TVA 

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1’s (WBN1) Cycle 16

 Submitted a License Amendment Request to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for tritium 

production at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN2) to begin in early FY 2021

 Awarded a long-term transportation services contract 

2.4.6.2 Status

Tritium Production

DOE/NNSA has the capability to meet planned workload and mission deliverables. As indicated below, 

tritium production is ramping up and on schedule to meet requirements. The tritium production goal 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-29

independently certified by the Nuclear Weapons Council in 2015, as requested by Congress, increased 

tritium production capabilities from 1,700 grams to 2,800 grams per two 18-month reactor cycles of 

production at TVA by 2027. This increased production requirement necessitated the use of two reactors.

WBN1 has been in tritium production since 2003 and is one cycle away from achieving the maximum 

licensed TPBAR irradiation rate of up to 1,792 TPBARs per 18-month reactor cycle. 

Irradiating 1,792 TPBARs in each of two reactors has a 98 percent confidence level of producing 

2,800 grams per the 18-month cycle. Planned reactor production can be adjusted once full operations 

have been demonstrated. A license amendment request for tritium production in WBN2 was approved 

in May 2019 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Tritium Processing at SRS

After being irradiated, TPBARs are transported to the Tritium Extraction Facility at SRS, where tritium is 

extracted by heating the rods. The processes to produce and extract tritium use unique and specialized 

equipment. For tritium that is recycled, the GTSs are unloaded of their contents and the tritium and 

helium-3 are recovered and recycled as part of the process of maintaining tritium inventories. 

Functions necessary to sustain this inventory include processing, storing, purifying, separating hydrogen 

isotopes, waste gas processing, and producing tritium. Associated functions include loading and 

unloading GTS reservoirs, shipping and receiving bulk tritium shipping containers, disposing of helium-3, 

and supporting functions that maintain capabilities. Much of this work is currently housed in the H-Area 

Old Manufacturing facility. The Tritium Finishing Facility is a capital line-item project to construct a 

modern facility to replace the H-Area Old Manufacturing facility.

While DOE/NNSA has the tritium processing capabilities and capacity to meet foreseeable workload 

requirements, the facilities that house the processes were built in the 1990s. DOE/NNSA is currently 

monitoring the health of equipment, infrastructure, waste gas processing, and other facility attributes to 

meet program deliverables. A plan to maintain and recapitalize the facilities to meet processing 

requirements and other delivery schedules is currently in development. The plan focuses on both the 

need to maintain the facilities themselves and the need to ensure the supply chain, which includes unique 

vendors and tritium R&D capabilities, is maintained.

This includes maintaining the supply chain from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s tritium R&D 

capabilities, to the TVA reactors, to SRS’s extraction capabilities and capacities.

There are eight FY 2019–2020 goals and milestones:

 Fabricate and deliver 1,792 TPBARs for WBN1’s Cycle 17

 Complete irradiation of 1,584 TPBARs for WBN1’s Cycle 16

 Fabricate and deliver approximately 1,000 TPBARs for WBN2’s Cycle 4

 Complete three shipments to SRS’s Tritium Extraction Facility

 Complete one waste shipment of TPBAR baseplates

 Complete post-irradiation of TPBARs at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

 Extract 1,200 TPBARs at the Tritium Extraction Facility

 Begin the CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) process for the Tritium Finishing 

Facility
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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2.4.6.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–18 provides a high-level summary of Tritium Program challenges and the strategies to address 

them.

Table 2–18. Summary of Tritium Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Tritium processing and extraction capabilities need to be 

maintained/sustained while meeting mission deliverables.

Develop a comprehensive recapitalization plan to maintain 

capabilities while ensuring the continuity of tritium 

processing and extraction operations, such as the isotope 

separation column and storage bed replacement.

Availability of unique equipment and qualified vendors to 

deal with low molecular weight materials, such as hydrogen 

isotopes.

Work to strengthen the commercial supply chains and 

manage the associated risks, assess procurement processes 

to aid in retaining the tritium supplier base, and develop the 

ability to refurbish and replace unique equipment. 

Retention and development of specialized staff. Work to establish pathways with local educational institutions 

for training and hiring personnel while exploring and 

developing new strategies for training and retaining 

experienced staff.

The gas transfer system loading systems require 

recapitalization to provide the anticipated loading capacities 

and accommodate the expanded demand generated by the 

2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The strategy includes 

complex system designs and concurrent production of 

multiple weapon systems. 

Implement modifications to the loading process equipment in 

multiple SRS facilities by FY 2020 to support the mission and 

avert this issue. 

DOE/NNSA plans to produce 2,800 grams of tritium per 

cycle at TVA reactors by 2027. The overall program is 

considered to pose moderate risk related to suppliers.

Work to maximize tritium production as tritium-producing 

burnable absorber rod production increases. Monitor 

programmatic risk to ensure the supply chains are 

sustainable. 

The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 licenses will be at 

the 60- and 40-year renewal points, respectively, in 2055. 

Monitor the nuclear energy industry to determine whether

the commercial light water reactor program is still a feasible 

alternative past 2055. Studies over the next several years will

monitor emerging technologies to determine whether better 

alternatives for tritium production are feasible, particularly 

post 2055. While there are a range of options, strategies will 

depend on where the commercial nuclear industry stands at 

that time. Many factors will be monitored as decision points 

are approached. 

2.4.7 Lithium

DOE/NNSA uses lithium to manufacture nuclear weapon components and supplies lithium to the 

Department of Homeland Security, the DOE Office of Science, and others. 

2.4.7.1 Accomplishments

 Met Defense Programs deliverables for lithium material supply

 Completed installation and qualification of the Small Scale Wet Chemistry Facility

 Advanced the technology readiness levels of future lithium process technologies

2.4.7.2 Status

DOE/NNSA created the lithium strategy to ensure sufficient lithium processing capabilities (raw materials 

to finished assemblies) are available to meet near- and long-term requirements. The strategy includes 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-31

(1) sustaining the current Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and equipment until transition to the 

Lithium Processing Facility, (2) increasing the usable supply of lithium by dismantling and recycling lithium 

components using small-scale technologies to purify and convert lithium, and (3) designing and 

constructing the Lithium Processing Facility to house lithium processing capabilities by 2030.

DOE/NNSA has also updated the Lithium Strategy Document and developed the Lithium Technology 

Maturation Plan. DOE/NNSA is maturing technologies for insertion into the Lithium Processing Facility

that will make lithium purification and processing safer and more efficient. DOE/NNSA is preparing for

CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) for the Lithium Processing Facility in 2019. CD-4 

(Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion) is scheduled for 2027. 

FY 2019 – FY 2020 goals and milestones include:

 Approve CD-1 and begin detailed design work for the Lithium Processing Facility

 Complete installation and qualification of Small Scale Wet Chemistry

 Install and qualify legacy processing capability restart projects

 Continue advancement of the technology readiness levels for process technologies in support of 

insertion into the Lithium Processing Facility 

2.4.7.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–19 provides a high-level summary of Lithium Program challenges and the strategies to address 

them.

Table 2–19. Summary of Lithium Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

The United States no longer maintains full lithium 

purification capabilities and relies on recycling as its 

primary source of lithium for weapon systems. At 

75 years old, the current lithium facility at Y-12 is one 

of the oldest operating facilities in the nuclear 

security enterprise. Until the new Lithium Processing 

Facility is operational, much of the risk to lithium 

sustainment is associated with the age and 

degradation of the existing facility.

Continue using the legacy lithium facility and equipment to meet 

near-term stockpile needs while implementing a lithium strategy 

and establishing the Lithium Processing Facility to address longterm capability requirements. 

Identified inventories that can serve as a source for recycled lithium 

for future LEP use. 

Began re-establishing a small purification capability and restarting

some legacy processing capabilities to supplement recycling 

activities. 

Develop and mature new purification and process technologies to 

make current and future processes more efficient. 

Restart the support equipment to convert some weapons quality 

raw materials into weapons materials. 

Develop and mature lithium process technologies to introduce 

efficiencies into the current process and prepare for insertion of 

these new technologies into the Lithium Processing Facility.

The lithium strategy also depends on the ability of 

Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition to 

dismantle weapons systems to provide the lithium 

materials needed for LEPs.

Restart a small purification capability and legacy processing 

capabilities in the legacy lithium facility to provide additional 

feedstock material. 

Deploy a new material recycle cleaning station to provide additional 

capacity. 

Authorized a specification change by the design laboratories that 

increases the available inventory of material suitable for recycle for 

weapons production.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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2.4.8 Energetic Materials

A safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent requires energetic materials such as HE, pyrotechnics, and 

propellants. DOE/NNSA ensures nuclear weapon sustainment and modernization program requirements 

for these critical materials are met through investment in development and production capabilities, safe 

and secure facilities, effective logistics, and a reliable supplier base. DOE/NNSA’s energetic materials and 

associated components are highly specialized and must meet rigorous quality and performance 

requirements. 

Energetic materials are an enduring requirement for each weapon system in the stockpile. The existing 

stockpile, planned LEPs and major Alts, LLC exchanges, and future modernization programs will continue 

to have a heavy demand for energetics. Due to the integrated nature of HE and energetic materials with 

the specific components and systems, development and production funding is typically tied directly to the 

component and system. The nuclear security enterprise must maintain reliable production; science, 

technology, and engineering (ST&E) capabilities; integrated infrastructure; and the necessary logistics 

(handling, storage, and delivery) for raw materials and final War Reserve products.

Energetic materials are used in many aspects of nuclear weapons and are integral to the design and 

performance of components. Changes to these components can induce changes to the performance 

requirements of the energetic material. 

DOE/NNSA organizes its energetic materials efforts to meet weapon delivery schedules and address 

challenges through implementation of the DOE/NNSA Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic 

Materials. The energetic materials mission covers three main efforts:

 Surveillance, maintenance, and LLC replacement of existing stockpile material

 Development and production of new material for modernization efforts

 R&D, diagnostics, and safety studies of novel materials and processes 

DOE/NNSA mission priorities ensure that energetic materials and products are available to meet 

production base and capability objectives and other commitments in the 2017 National Security Strategy

of the United States of America and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review:

 Meet full rate weapon production, component production, surveillance, and assessment

requirements

 Develop viable solutions to meet the needs of current and future modernization efforts 

 Research novel and existing energetics and to ensure the stockpile mission’s success

 Continue modernization of design agency ST&E, adding capacity for growing programs and further 

enabling both design agency and production agency efficiency and throughput

 Foster and enhance relationships with commercial entities and vendors, and develop long-term 

strategic partnerships that ensure the sustainability of the DOE/NNSA complex’s production

 Promote novel R&D to gather unprecedented data to validate predictive models for annual 

assessments and certification and implement artificial intelligence strategies to parse data
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

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2.4.8.1 Accomplishments

 Coordinated with DoD for use of the DX (highest national priority) rating through the Defense 

Priorities and Allocations System for procurements pertaining to the authorized DoD DX-rated 

systems

 Completed 100 percent design of the High Explosive Science and Engineering facility at Pantex

 Completed Critical Decision 0 (CD-0; Approve Mission Need) for the High Explosive Synthesis, 

Formulation, and Production Facility at Pantex

 Began planning for other HE infrastructure investments, including Energetic Materials 

Characterization CD-0 and start of an AoA in FY 2019

 Began activities to establish the SNL Internal Production for Explosive Components capability 

starting in FY 2019

 Completed complex-wide site visits for the Government Accountability Office audit on the 

management of HE capabilities started in FY 2018, with the final report anticipated in late FY 2019

 Qualified War Reserve conventional high explosive (CHE) in the High Explosive Pressing Facility

 Produced the first lot of a plastic-bonded explosive, with newly produced and legacy raw materials 

to meet performance specifications from the Holston Army Ammunition Plant since 2005

 Re-established synthesis formulation of key insensitive high explosive (IHE) material components 

to be used in future LEPs

 Re-established the synthesis of War Reserve materials at Pantex for SNL neutron generator 

production

 Produced kilogram-quantities of IHE, with a novel process, demonstrating the ability to 

manufacture life-of-program quantities for the future systems

 Reconstituted DOE/NNSA’s capability to make detonator materials, applying advanced data 

analytics and synchrotron x-ray data from the Advanced Photon Source to identify performance 

changes with age and develop lifetime models for detonators

2.4.8.2 Status

In May 2018, Defense Programs designated the Director, Stockpile Services Division, within the Office of 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, as the Defense Programs Enterprise Manager for Energetic Materials. This 

led to the Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials in December 2018 and the 

establishment of the DOE/NNSA Energetics Coordinating Committee. Specific targets to enhance the 

goals and objectives of the Defense Programs energetics enterprise are outlined in the DOE/NNSA 

Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials. 

2.4.8.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–20 provides a high-level summary of Energetic Materials challenges and the strategies to address 

them.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 2–20. Summary of Energetic Materials challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Demand for energetic material Exercise initiatives within the Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic 

Materials and maintain a strong R&D capability within the national 

laboratories.

Supplier base Exercise suppliers to maintain proficiency on a more frequent schedule 

between procurements and continue technical exchanges.

Material requirements Document the detailed processes and specifications necessary to ensure 

energetic materials meet performance requirements.

Inventory consumption and replenishment Institute a more routine process to continuously exercise synthesis and 

formulation of energetic materials.

Infrastructure and equipment Coordination with Infrastructure and Operations and the Programmatic 

Recapitalization Working Group to improve energetic readiness.

Governance of energetics supply Affirm the role of the Enterprise Manager for Energetic Materials as 

designated by DOE/NNSA leadership with both internal Defense Programs

offices and external partners.

2.4.9 Material Recycle and Recovery and Storage

The MRR and Storage programs coordinate material process flows and the recovery of material from 

dismantlement and disposition activities. 

With materials recycled from assembly operations, LLCs, weapons dismantlement, and other production 

operations, the MRR program provides vital quantities of strategic materials feedstock by purifying the 

materials (e.g., plutonium, uranium, and tritium) and recovering the intrinsic value of each (usable 

quantities of the material without impurities) to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. The MRR program

processes and dispositions by-products from purification and recovery activities to ensure the supply 

chains are maintained in a healthy state and strategic material value is optimally recovered. The MRR 

program is also responsible for re-establishing a depleted uranium feedstock capability to support 

Defense Programs’ enduring requirements. 

The Storage program manages materials storage and staging by sustaining capability health, managing

inventory logistics for nuclear and non-nuclear materials, conducting component and container 

surveillance activities for pits, and storing dismantled warhead components and materials. The Storage 

program is also responsible for leveraging capabilities across the enterprise to provide a more responsive 

storage and staging capability base. These capabilities fully support programmatic and 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review requirements, and include developing comprehensive system/material health 

assessments to ensure a strong supply chain.

2.4.9.1 Accomplishments

 Initiated efforts to re-establish the capability to convert DUF6 to DUF4 through capability 

improvements at the Portsmouth site, including beginning design and developing the cost and 

schedule of the potential conversion line (see Section 2.4.4, Depleted Uranium, for more detail)

 Began establishing an interface mechanism between PPPO and the Phase 2 (DUF4 to metal) 

conversion capability (see Section 2.4.4, Depleted Uranium, for more detail)

 Continued meeting MRR program production and planning goals for recovery and recycle of 

tritium from returned reservoirs and began execution of a recapitalization plan to support the SRS 

tritium enterprise
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-35

 Met first trimester goals ahead of schedule for the production of enriched uranium (purified metal 

and metal supply for casting) and reduced material-at-risk from briquettes at Y-12

 Continued reducing operational risk in PF-4 through material-at-risk reduction and transuranic

waste management and material disposition in support of exiting CMR at LANL

 Executed Pantex surveillance activities per the baseline plan

 Developed and began implementing storage/supply chain comprehensive health metrics at Y-12 

and LANL

 Continued Confinement Vessel Disposition Project cleanout activities for vessel nine

 Continued working on CMR exit strategy documentation regarding material disposition

 Began an initial risk-ranked listing of at-risk materials

2.4.9.2 Status

DOE/NNSA’s MRR program oversees these activities: 

 De-inventorying LANL’s CMR and PF-4 vault facilities to reduce material-at-risk, as well as 

continuing processing of by-products and disposing of transuranic wastes

 Recovering and recycling plutonium at LANL to support mission needs

 Re-establishing the capability to deliver high-purity depleted uranium feedstock and 

strengthening the interface with DoD to better sustain this commodity

 Recovering and recycling enriched uranium to provide feedstock (e.g., purified enriched uranium 

metal, characterized metal supply for casting) and dispositioning low-equity by-products at Y-12 

 Recovering, recycling, and purifying tritium after LLC unloading/extractions to enable loading the 

gas into GTSs at SRS 

 Recovering helium-3 by-product from tritium purification for other national security needs in 

collaboration with the DOE Office of Science 

DOE/NNSA’s Storage program oversees these activities:

 Sustaining storage capability and storage health for enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and 

lithium at Y-12

 Optimizing the PF-4 vault at LANL following de-inventory efforts, as well as standardizing

containers (the new SAVY 5-quart-size canister) to extend design life and reduce operational risk

 Increasing the responsiveness of staging capabilities across the nuclear security enterprise by 

optimizing storage and staging capacity at the Nevada National Security Site

 Increasing storage capacity and performing surveillance of pits and containers at Pantex

 Supporting the capability to comply with DOE Order 410.2, Management of Nuclear Materials

 Using the interface between the site storage programs to optimize efficiency and continuous 

improvement
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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FY 2020 goals and milestones include:

 Complete CMR de-inventory at LANL to support the CMR exit strategy

 Continue efforts to re-establish a high-purity depleted uranium feedstock supply capability, 

including beginning component procurement and potential installation at PPPO and leveraging

efforts with DoD to sustain Phase 2 vendor production capabilities 

 Meet stockpile needs for recycle and recovery of tritium and enriched uranium

 Continue reducing risk in PF-4 through material-at-risk reduction and transuranic waste 

management at LANL to support the plutonium sustainment mission

 Execute the Pantex surveillance mission and continue conversion of additional bays for staging

 Develop a comprehensive macro supply chain health assessment for enriched uranium and 

plutonium

2.4.9.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–21 provides a high-level summary of MRR and Storage program challenges and the strategies to 

address them.

Table 2–21. Summary of Material Recycle and Recovery and Storage program

challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Storage/staging capacity is a constraint 

across the nuclear security enterprise.

Provide responsive storage/staging capabilities across the nuclear security 

enterprise (e.g., LANL, Y-12, Pantex, Nevada National Security Site): 

 Work off inventory and optimize the footprint in the PF-4 vault to support 

pit production at LANL.

 Complete the capability responsiveness project at the Nevada National 

Security Site to support pit production surge capacity or other high-value 

DOE/NNSA priorities.

 Complete rack reconfiguration project at the Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility to increase capability responsiveness at Y-12.

 Implement comprehensive system health assessments for storage and 

staging capabilities across all storage sites.

Continue repurposing and reconfiguring nuclear material bays to stage 

plutonium pits to provide short-term capacity improvements until a long-term 

staging facility is available. 

Manage transuranic waste at LANL per the laboratory’s strategic plan until the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is fully operational. 

Recapitalization efforts are needed to 

sustain processing and storage 

capabilities.

Implement recapitalization plans to sustain processing and storage facilities, 

including hydride storage for tritium operations at SRS, and reduce dependence 

on Building 9212 at Y-12. The Nevada National Security Site currently has a 

project underway to increase the responsiveness of staging capabilities in 

support of nuclear security enterprise priorities. 

The staging capacity at Pantex is 

projected to become more constrained

within the next decade as more 

weapons are dismantled, creating 

additional operational inefficiencies 

involving required movements of these 

items.

Increase pit staging capacity through additional capacity projects to optimize 

footprints until the Material Staging Facility is operational. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-37

2.5 Modernizing the Stockpile

DOE/NNSA supports the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and is aligned with the Nuclear Weapons Council’s 

Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2019-2044. DOE/NNSA is modernizing the stockpile through a planned 

program of life extensions, Mods, and Alts that are supported by a robust set of ST&E activities.

DOE/NNSA’s program of record supports the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review with the additions of the lowyield ballistic missile (W76-2), extension of the B83 retirement date, and a study of a sea-launched cruise 

missile to ensure a viable U.S. nuclear weapon deterrent to address 21st century threats. This program of 

record is illustrated in Figure 2–2.

1

 The Navy will explore the feasibility of fielding the W87-1 on a Navy 

delivery platform. This long-term vision of the stockpile seeks to build flexibility for the Nation to enable 

rapid response to unforeseen contingencies while incorporating features and technologies that enhance 

safety and security, as appropriate and practicable. The schedule shown in Figure 2–2 is subject to change 

upon completion of the FY 2020-2045 Requirements and Planning Document.

Figure 2–2. NNSA warhead activities2

2.5.1 The Strategy

NNSA’s warhead modernization strategy envisions a modern, flexible, and resilient future stockpile by

pursuing modest supplements to the stockpile to deter adversaries from limited nuclear employment, 

assure allies, and provide options to meet U.S. objectives should deterrence fail. With this strategy, NNSA

will consider flexibility-enabling design strategies and features that promote future system 

modernizations to be accomplished at lower costs and with greater speed. The Nation will be postured 

to respond to the adversaries’ capabilities, stockpile aging, and shortfalls in U.S. hedge capabilities.

 

1 The Next Navy Warhead, Future Strategic Missile Warhead, and Sea-Launched Cruise Missile programs are still notional, require 

further coordination between DoD and NNSA, and are not established programs of record.

2 This schedule is under revision, see Sections 2.5.3 (W88 Alt 370) and 2.5.4 (B61-12 LEP).
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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2.5.2 W76-2 Modification Program

DOE/NNSA is supporting the low-yield ballistic missile from the 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review through the W76-2 Modification Program. DOE/NNSA has 

received authorization through the Nuclear Weapons Council to proceed 

forward to the engineering development phase (and any subsequent phase)

to modify or develop a low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles. DOE/NNSA also received congressional authorization 

through the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019

(P.L. 115-232) and an appropriation through the Energy and Water, 

Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs 

Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-244).

2.5.2.1 Accomplishments

 Completed production of the W76-2’s first production unit in 

February 2019

2.5.2.2 Status

DOE/NNSA’s laboratories and plants performed program planning activities 

related to scope, schedule, cost, and risk elements similar to activities 

typically accomplished during Phases 6.1 and 6.2/2A. These activities were 

completed in preparation for receipt of Nuclear Weapons Council authorization to proceed to the 

engineering development phase and subsequent phases. The DOE/NNSA laboratories and plants 

executed a compressed Phase 6.3 through 6.5 process and achieved the warhead first production unit in 

February 2019.

2.5.2.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–22 provides a high-level summary of W76-2 Modification Program challenges and the strategies

to address them.

Table 2–22. Summary of W76-2 Modification Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

New hazard analysis information requires modification to 

weapon response information that necessitate timely response.

Identify, analyze, and disposition new hazard analysis 

information. 

The logistics of the large volume of program documents 

required for release pose constraints on organizational 

resources that are not staffed to handle the increased volume.

Prioritize and plan the release of documents to avoid 

overwhelming the document release system.

Weapon response information is developed by the DOE/NNSA laboratories to determine the response of 

the weapon during assembly and disassembly operations based on hazard scenarios identified by Pantex. 

Given the scope of the W76-2 Modification Program, the project team is relying on existing weapon 

response information from the W76-1 warhead to bound and characterize the weapon response 

information related to the W76-2 warhead. To mitigate the risk of extended pauses to nuclear explosive 

operations, the team is identifying and analyzing potential impacts to the operation to ensure production 

activities are conducted safely. The volume of program documents (i.e., requirements documents, 

engineering drawings, product specifications, etc.) required for program execution is vast and requires a 

planned strategy to ensure the document release system is not overwhelmed. Document release must 

be properly timed to ensure approval and availability for implementation prior to the start of program 

gate reviews, design reviews, and follow-on production to the warhead first production unit.

“Expanding flexible U.S. 

nuclear options now, to 

include low-yield options, is 

important for the 

preservation of credible 

deterrence against regional 

aggression. It will raise the 

nuclear threshold and help 

ensure that potential 

adversaries perceive no 

possible advantage in 

limited nuclear escalation, 

making nuclear employment 

less likely.”
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-39

2.5.3 W88 Alteration 370 Program

The W88 Alt 370 Program includes a new AF&F assembly and a CHE refresh to replace the main HE 

charges, a new lightning arrestor connector, trainers, flight test assemblies, and associated handling gear

to maintain the W88 warhead in the existing nuclear weapons stockpile. The late addition of the CHE 

refresh required acceleration and compression of the design and development activities in the late stages 

of Phase 6.3. This action was required to align with the original W88 Alt 370 Program scope by Phase 6.4 

(Production Engineering). The W88 Alt 370 conversion is scheduled concurrently with the LLC exchanges 

of the GTSs and neutron generators.

2.5.3.1 Accomplishments

 Completed Commander Evaluation Test (CET-1) qualification flight test (June 2018)

 Completed AF&F Final Design Review (December 2017)

 Completed System Final Design Review (January 2018)

 Fabricated process prove-in pre-production functional hardware at the component, subsystem, 

and AF&F level for final qualification and validation

 Delivered trainer kits

 Completed LANL 3675 and 3676 hydrodynamic tests

 Completed on-time first production unit of nuclear major components: Penguin (October 2017), 

long tube subassembly (April 2018), taper tapes (April 2018), aft retainer ring (April 2018), and 

locator (August 2018)

 Completed on-time first production unit of non-nuclear major components: magnetically coupled 

stronglink (June 2018), launch accelerometer (June 2018), and electrical contact stronglink 

(July 2018)

 Wrote Joint Configuration Management Plan with B61-12

 Conducted seven annual site assessments and closed the corrective actions

 SNL, KCNSC, and multiple DOE/NNSA organizations piloted Earned Value Management reporting 

in a joint effort with the Navy 

 Delivered all hardware units for the Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO) 29 flight 

tests

2.5.3.2 Status

The W88 Alt 370 Program is now in Phase 6.4. The follow-on CET-1, DASO flight tests, and critical systemlevel and AF&F tests will be completed in FY 2019. The System Final Design Review was completed in the 

second quarter of FY 2018; all components are in the final stages of production evaluation and

qualification and 12/33 non-nuclear and nuclear components. Pantex will be authorized for nuclear 

explosive operations by the fourth quarter of FY 2019. 

DOE/NNSA completed a high-fidelity cost estimate (the Baseline Cost Report) in FY 2017. The report 

estimate is $2.6 billion, which is approximately $255 million (or 11 percent) higher than the estimate in 

the FY 2015 Selected Acquisition Report. The increased costs primarily resulted from increased testing 

and qualification plus planning margins for treating technical risks, accompanied by some offsetting 

reduction in the scope associated with the nuclear components. This estimate represents the program 

baseline and is reflected in the FY 2017 Selected Acquisition Report.
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At the time of publication, there is an unresolved technical issue related to the qualification of electrical 

components used in non-nuclear assemblies which is expected to delay the first production unit date for 

the W88 Alt 370. DOE/NNSA is pursuing additional testing and screening to determine the path forward 

for continued use of the affected components and the impacts the production schedule are still being 

assessed. DOE/NNSA is working to minimize any delays and is closely coordinating with the Navy.

2.5.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–23 provides a high-level summary of W88 Alt 370 Program challenges and the strategies to 

address them.

Table 2–23. Summary of W88 Alt 370 Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

The W88 Alt 370 Program faces a continued risk of late 

component design changes in Phase 6.4 Production engineering. 

As the program is an integrated effort with shared technology 

between the Air Force and Navy, changes and/or delays to one 

program may directly impact the progress of another. 

DOE/NNSA closely aligns efforts on the W88 Alt 370 

Program with those of its DoD partners to manage design 

changes and minimize production impacts. This close 

collaboration ensures scope, schedule, and cost decisions 

are aligned with strategic-level priorities.

2.5.4 B61-12 Life Extension Program

The B61 gravity bomb is the oldest nuclear weapon in the stockpile. The B61-12 LEP addresses multiple 

components that are nearing end of life, in addition to military requirements for reliability, service life, 

field maintenance, safety, and use control. The life extension scope includes refurbishment of both 

nuclear and non‐nuclear components and incorporates component reuse where possible. With the 

addition of an Air Force-procured tail-kit assembly, the B61‐12 LEP will consolidate and replace the B61-3, 

-4, -7, and -10 bomb variants, which will reduce the overall number of gravity bombs.

2.5.4.1 Accomplishments

 Successfully completed the first high-fidelity system flight test utilizing HE with a mock pit to 

assess with the Air Force F-15 in March 2018

 Conducted the fifth System Hydrodynamic Test Shot E in March 2018

 Successfully completed the first B-2A (System 2) qualification drop in June 2018

 Completed all component Final Design Reviews

 Completed the System-Level Final Design Review in September 2018

 Delivered trainer hardware to support a first Type 5B first production unit at Pantex

 Completed on-time first production units of nuclear major components: detonator preload 

assembly (January 2018), Lucas (May 2018), and pressure pads (August 2018)

 Completed on-time first production unit of non-nuclear major components: intent stronglink 

(July 2018), trajectory stronglink (July 2018), rolamite (July 2018), lightning arrestor connector 

(July 2018), and switch (July 2018)

2.5.4.2 Status

The Program continues in Phase 6.4, which is the final development phase prior to production of War 

Reserve units. The B61-12 LEP has completed Final Design Reviews of major components to allow the 

DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons production facilities to begin final process prove-in of the production 

processes. Qualification of component production processes, including certified tooling and testers, is 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-41

scheduled to continue in FY 2019. This qualification will enable the nuclear weapons production facilities 

to begin shipment of first production units for components to Pantex in FY 2019. System qualification of 

the B61-12 continues on schedule with the completion of over 45 system tests since the start of Phase 6.4, 

including 11 qualification flight test releases using B-2, F-15, and F-16 aircraft at the Tonopah Test Range. 

Certification activities that ensure the weapon meets DoD requirements, including joint qualification 

testing, will continue as the program moves into Phase 6.5.

The B61-12 LEP is proceeding within the cost documented in the October 2016 Baseline Cost Report, 

which estimated the program costs at $7.605 billion (then-year dollars). The B61-12 LEP is continuing to 

leverage other DOE/NNSA programs for multi-system production process improvements. The costs of 

these related programs are estimated to be $648 million. The overall program cost is $8.253 billion, which 

is within 1.1 percent of the initial baseline Selected Acquisition Report that was provided to Congress in 

FY 2013.

Similar to the W88 Alt 370, the B61-12 LEP is experiencing an unresolved technical issue related to the 

qualification of electrical components used in non-nuclear assemblies which is expected to delay the first 

production unit date. Further testing is required to ascertain the impacts and whether a change in Initial 

Operational Capability dates are necessary. A decision on first production unit and Initial Operational 

Capability dates is being jointly coordinated with the Air Force.

2.5.4.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–24 provides a high-level summary of B61-12 LEP challenges and the strategies to address them.

Table 2–24. Summary of B61-12 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

B61-12 LEP single point failures associated 

with critical manufacturing processes and 

capabilities.

The B61-12 LEP maintains a rigorous risk management program as part of 

the Risk and Opportunities Management Plan to identify critical equipment

and process single point failures that could impact production. The Federal 

program office works closely with the impacted production site(s) to assure 

the identified production risks have strong mitigation strategies and assure 

implementation proceeds as planned. As appropriate, the Federal program 

office deploys B61-12 contingency funds and/or works with other 

DOE/NNSA organizations to fund equipment mitigation and documents the 

resulting agreements in B61-12 Interface Requirements Agreements.

Improving component manufacturability, 

minimizing design changes, and assuring 

components’ schedules maintain appropriate 

lead-time to Pantex. 

The B61-12 LEP deployed new change control and configuration 

management tools in FY 2018 to tighten design change requests, establish 

new approval thresholds, and require more comprehensive impact 

assessments to assure that design changes, if implemented, are necessary 

and do not impact production schedules. The Federal program office 

improved tracking and monitoring of component producibility issues and 

jointly approved recovery plans to assure component first production units

continue to support the system first production unit at Pantex. 

Coordination of B61-12 and Air Force systems 

integration schedules

The B61-12 LEP works closely with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center to 

update and maintain the Joint Integrated Master Schedule, documenting 

handoffs and commitments among DOE/NNSA, the tail-kit Assembly, and 

Aircraft program offices. The B61-12 LEP Federal program office is an 

executive member in the B61-12 Project Officers Group and participates in 

the Project Officers Group subgroups that are responsible for All-Up-Round 

integration, shipment, aircraft nuclear certification activities, and fielding 

logistics to achieve an on-time initial operational capability at Air Force 

bases. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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2.5.5 W80-4 Life Extension Program

The AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile is now more than 25 years past its design life and faces 

continuously improving adversary air defense systems. The air-launched cruise missile carries the W80-1 

warhead, which is also well past its planned life span. Replacing the air-launched cruise missile is the 

mission of the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile program; extending the life span of the W80-1 is

the objective of the W80-4 LEP. These two synchronized programs will ensure the bomber force’s

capability to deliver stand-off weapons that can penetrate and survive advanced integrated air defense 

systems. 

2.5.5.1 Accomplishments

 Conducted Component Feasibility and Cost Gates for all active Product Realization Teams

 Conducted Component Requirements Reviews for active Product Realization Teams, with a few 

exceptions, including those Product Realization Teams related to the JTA

 Delivered Fit Check Units (FCU-1) to the Air Force to verify the mechanical interface between the 

W80-4 warhead and LRSO cruise missile

 Conducted Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction Phase Kickoff meetings with LRSO cruise 

missile program contractors

 Conducted various technical integration meetings with cruise missile program contractors to 

ensure technical alignment of the W80-4 warhead and LRSO cruise missile

 Developed and updated the Missile to Warhead-Interface Control Document, stockpile-to-target

sequence, and military characteristics with the W80-4 Project Officers Group

 Entered Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, in February 2019

 Conducted the System Cost Gate

 Developed W80-4 Weapon Design and Cost Report and completed reconciliation with the NNSA 

Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation

 Developed the W80-4 Major Impact Report

2.5.5.2 Status

The W80-4 LEP entered Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) in FY 2019, where the design will continue 

to be refined. DOE/NNSA will continue working closely with DoD. The primary Phase 6.3 deliverables are 

the baseline design, which will advance production engineering processes; the preliminary Design Review 

and Acceptance Group Review, which will indicate DoD acceptance of the baseline design and its 

associated plan for certification; generation of the Baseline Cost Report; and Nuclear Weapons Council 

approval of the military characteristics and stockpile-to-target sequence. The program completed 

Phase 6.2A activities, completing development of the Weapon Design and Cost Report and its 

reconciliation with the Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation’s Independent Cost Estimate, the 

NNSA Program Plan, the Joint Integrated Project Plan, the Phase 6.2A Report, and the System Cost Gate 

Review. 

The W80-4 LEP Federal program office, coordinating with the M&O partners, standardized Earned Value 

Management System practices and schedules across the sites by implementing a state-of-the-art 

Empower software tool to expedite Earned Value Management System data analysis. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

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The W80-4 LEP Federal program office compared cost and uncertainty risk analysis data compiled by the 

M&O sites with similar data from the B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370, validating its program cost and 

schedule projections.

The W80-4 LEP experienced a loss of $120 million in productivity due to delays associated with Continuing 

Resolutions from FY 2016-2018. As a result, ramp-up of M&O partner programs were constrained for 

3 years across the entire nuclear security enterprise, preventing the program from reaching the required 

staffing levels and delaying the Federal program office’s completion of Phases 6.2 and 6.2A by 4 months. 

FY 2020 planned activities include:

 Complete all Component Conceptual Design Reviews

 Complete ETU-1 deliveries to the Air Force

 Begin Separation Control Test Vehicle warhead deliveries to the Air Force

 Transition to the baseline design stage after completion of Component Conceptual Design 

Reviews

 Continue releasing Development Engineering Releases and producing Component Developmental 

Build Lots to progress designs toward Component Baseline Design Reviews in FY 2021

2.5.5.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–25 provides a high-level summary of W80-4 LEP challenges and the strategies to address them.

Table 2–25. Summary of W80-4 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

The program faces the challenge of a parallel design with 

the Air Force Long Range Standoff cruise missile. This is 

the first effort in more than 30 years to design a warhead 

and delivery platform on similar timeframes under 

significantly different security constructs.

DOE/NNSA closely aligns W80-4 LEP efforts with those of DoD to 

refine program goals and define the interface scope in detail. 

This collaboration ensures coordinated cost-informed decisions 

and interdepartmental schedule alignment.

Component product realization teams have completed 

Component Scope and Requirements Exchanges between 

national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production 

sites. This early involvement increases the effectiveness of the 

product realization process.

The scope of the W80-4 LEP and joint work with the 

Air Force present some cross-organizational risks, 

especially with respect to schedule and requirements 

validation. 

DOE/NNSA is constantly working to identify and implement 

opportunities to reduce schedule uncertainty and risk; modify, 

reduce, or eliminate requirements that do not impact safety, 

security, or the military effectiveness of the warhead; and 

develop processes for increased communication and efficiency 

between design and production activities.

Previous LEPs have used up existing supplies of certain 

materials. This program must reconstitute qualified 

material production streams and production capabilities.

DOE/NNSA will work with design agencies and production 

facilities to re-establish capabilities, modify specifications, and in 

some cases find suitable alternative material. 

2.5.6 W87-1 Modification Program (Formerly W78 Replacement 

Warhead)

After fielding of the B61-12, the W78 warhead will be the oldest warhead in the stockpile. DOE/NNSA’s 

mission is to sustain the nuclear stockpile and, where possible, improve the safety and security of the 

Nation’s nuclear weapons throughout their complete life cycles. Critical components within the W78 are 

aging, and the military requirements for the safety and security features of W78 warhead have changed 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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since entering the stockpile in 1979. DOE/NNSA will replace the W78 with the W87-1 to meet DoD and

DOE/NNSA requirements for performance, safety, and security and field it on the Ground-Based Strategic 

Deterrent by 2030, as specified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

2.5.6.1 Accomplishments

 Restarted Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and Down Select) Activities

 Released the W87-1 NNSA Program Plan

 Coordinated a joint MK21A/W87-1 Integrated Master Schedule with DoD

 Established key Product Realization Teams and Integrated Product Teams

 Published program documents, including a Systems Engineering Plan, Requirements Management 

Plan, Risk and Opportunity Management Plan, Integrated Product Teams Implementation Plan, 

and Program Control Plans

 Established an initial Work Breakdown Structure via functional decomposition

 Established technology maturation transition plans with supporting Defense Programs

organizations, as appropriate

 Developed program needs and coordinated with the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Posture Review

implementation task on a production and capabilities roadmap

 Completed the feasibility study of the conceptual W87-1 nuclear explosive package in the Navy 

Mk5 aeroshell

 Documented the W87-1 design architecture

2.5.6.2 Status

The Nuclear Weapons Council has authorized restart of Phase 6.2 activities, and the program is on track 

to support fielding on the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent by 2030. DOE/NNSA has developed program 

plans and management documents and is developing W87-1 design options for feasibility analyses. The 

program is also supporting a feasibility study of the W87-1 nuclear explosive package in a Navy flight 

vehicle, as specified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

FY 2020 planned activities include:

 Complete the Customer Requirements Review

 Continue the feasibility study of design options

 Advance technology maturation

 Continue program management and control implementation

 Conduct requirements analysis

 Integrate with Air Force acquisition programs

2.5.6.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–26 provides a high-level summary of W87-1 Modification Program challenges and the strategies

to address them.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-45

Table 2–26. Summary of W87-1 Modification Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Development must be integrated with Air Force

aeroshell acquisition schedules and the Ground-Based 

Strategic Deterrent delivery platform acquisition 

program.

DOE/NNSA is a member of the Air Force Project Officers Group and

maintains regular communication with the Air Force and its related 

acquisitions programs though the Project Officers Group.

Production is predicated on all newly manufactured 

components and a nuclear material manufacturing 

modernization strategy that relies on large, multi-year 

investments in component and material capabilities.

DOE/NNSA actively supports commodity and capability programs 

that will provide the materials, components, and capabilities in

time for the future stockpile. The W87-1 Modification Program will 

establish inter-program agreements with applicable commodity 

and capability programs to identify requirements, dependencies, 

risks reporting, and inter-program management strategies. To 

meet plutonium pit production requirements, DOE/NNSA will 

continue to invest in LANL production capabilities and repurpose 

the MFFF (now the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility) at 

SRS.

Program success is contingent on the development of 

new technologies to address antiquated design, 

material obsolescence, and performance expectations. 

The W87-1 Modification Program must meet stringent 

technical requirements, including a greater component 

life expectancy, reduced manufacturing cost and 

development time, increased safety and security, and 

improved maintainability.

DOE/NNSA finished a technology readiness assessment in FY 2018

and is establishing inter-program agreements with technology 

maturation programs to identify requirements, dependencies, risks 

reporting, and inter-program management strategies.

DOE/NNSA is incorporating lessons learned from previous life 

extension and major modernization programs into W87-1

Modification Program plans, including the W87-1 Modification 

Program Plan, Requirements Management Plan, Risk and 

Opportunity Management Plan, Configuration Management Plan, 

System Engineering Plan, and Program Control Plans.

2.5.7 Ballistic Missile Warhead Follow-up Systems

NNSA is working with DoD to implement the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review through defining the 

appropriate ballistic missile warheads to support threats anticipated in the 2030s. This involves the Next 

Navy Warhead (formerly referred to as the Interoperable Warhead 2 [IW2] or BM-Y) and the Future 

Strategic Missile Warhead (formerly referred to as IW3 or BM-Z). These analyses cover a broad range of 

activities to address the aging of systems such as the W87-0 and the timing of replacement of warheads 

that have recently been life-extended. For example, the W76-1 had a first production unit in FY 2008 that 

was designed and provisioned for a 30-year deployment criterion and by default falls within concerns for 

these advanced planning scenarios. These considerations are being evaluated for release of a more 

detailed implementation strategy later in FY 2019 that will enable DOE/NNSA to determine the initial 

scope and leveraging opportunities for components.

2.5.7.1 Accomplishments

DOE/NNSA and DoD are still coordinating on implementation. There is nothing significant to report.

2.5.7.2 Status

The Nuclear Weapons Council has charted a series of analyses to support out-year planning and will inform 

future decisions on the composition of warheads in the 2030s. These analyses will include deliverables of 

warheads anticipated in the 2030s that will, in turn, inform the design and certification workload in 

the 2020s.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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2.5.7.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–27 provides a high-level summary of Ballistic Missile Warhead Follow-up Systems challenges and 

the strategies to address them.

Table 2–27. Summary of Ballistic Missile Warhead Follow-up Systems challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Understanding the aging of existing components/systems 

that assure advanced planning for replacement before 

adverse actions occur.

Continue support of existing surveillance operations.

Assuring capabilities are available to address changing 

threat environments.

Commitment to programs such as Stockpile Responsiveness to 

assure the nuclear security enterprise can fully support 

contingency operations should they be called upon.

Assuring that the resources (e.g., people and physical 

infrastructure, etc.) are supported in the 2020s to enable 

the deliverables anticipated in the 2030s.

DoD/NNSA actively supports the design, certification, and 

production processes.

2.5.8 Sea-Launched Cruise Missile

DoD is conducting a study over the next couple of years to develop requirements and schedules for the 

sea-launched cruise missile. Many options are currently under evaluation.

2.6 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

The Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) Program disassembles retired weapons into their 

major components. Those components are then assigned for reuse, storage, surveillance, or disposal. 

Dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons is scheduled to provide the material and components required 

for the stockpile (including LEPs) and external customers to maintain the proficiency of technicians and to 

balance the work scope at the production plants. 

WDD spans all eight sites, and dismantlement rates are affected by many factors, including logistics, 

legislation, weapon system complexity, and the availability of qualified personnel, equipment, and 

facilities. DOE/NNSA’s current dismantlement plan balances these constraints while maintaining strict 

adherence to the National Defense Authorization Acts for FY 2017 and FY 2018. The WDD work scope 

includes management of retired nuclear weapon systems (e.g., managing safety issues), characterization 

of weapon components, disassembly of weapons and their components, and final component disposition. 

2.6.1 Accomplishments

 Trained production technicians at Pantex for future LEP work including hands-on experience with 

programs in dismantlement

 Developed and refined secondary dismantlement schedules at Y-12 to meet the material and 

component reuse demands of the B61-12 and W80-4 LEPs

 Finalized a special secondary dismantlement plan for legacy CSAs staged at Y-12 that pose a 

unique dismantlement challenge

 Completed W76-0 harvesting requirements for unique parts that will help sustain the W76-1

 Kept the size of legacy excess components from growing and reduced storage constraints at 

Pantex for incoming parts used by the stockpile
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-47

 Implemented Warhead Measurement Campaign requirements to capture unique weapon 

radiation signatures from the B61, W76, and B83 nuclear weapons

 Implemented the weapons and secondary dismantlement schedules per requirements

2.6.2 Status

DOE/NNSA continues to make significant progress on dismantling weapons and dispositioning 

components. WDD is on pace to complete the goal of dismantling the large number of weapons that were 

retired at the end of FY 2008. WDD has not identified safety issues with nuclear weapons in the retired 

status, and DOE/NNSA has developed return schedules to remove retired weapons from DoD facilities 

while fully meeting DoD operational requirements. Finally, WDD has characterized the components

coming from the dismantlement line, and sites are eliminating excess component inventories on schedule. 

2.6.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–28 provides a high-level summary of Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program 

challenges and the strategies to address them.

Table 2–28. Summary of Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Meeting weapon dismantlement and disposition 

requirements within legislative restrictions (e.g., John S. 

McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019

(P.L. 115-232 language).

Use process and cost models to evaluate future dismantlement 

excursions to inform decisions related to dismantlement plans.

Canned subassembly (CSA) dismantlement and disposition 

plans must provide sufficient strategic materials for 

upcoming LEPs, hold CSAs for reuse in other LEPs, and 

address the dismantlement of a special CSA type in storage 

at Y-12.

Work closely with all weapon program managers to balance 

material and component needs from dismantled CSAs against 

future reuse possibilities. Develop alternative CSA 

dismantlement plans that provide needed materials while 

maintaining CSAs with higher reuse potential. Finalize the 

dismantlement strategy for the special CSA type in storage at 

Y-12. 

Significantly reduce site legacy inventories of weapon 

components.

Work closely with sites to prioritize disposition projects that 

leverage the capabilities of other sites.

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-1

Chapter 3

Stockpile Stewardship Science, 

Technology, and Engineering

The Stockpile Stewardship Program is central to 

maintaining a credible deterrent and ensuring the safety, 

security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear 

stockpile. With more than three-quarters of warheads in 

some stage of the life extension process and to ensure a 

responsive and resilient nuclear deterrent as described in 

the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program sustains and advances science, 

technology, and engineering (ST&E) capabilities that are 

essential to qualify, assess, and certify nuclear weapons. 

With sustained investments, the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program enhances understanding of nuclear weapons and 

their performance in unique, severe, and evolving physical 

phenomena they are designed to experience. The Stockpile 

Stewardship Program exercises the nuclear security 

enterprise’s capabilities across the entire nuclear weapon 

life cycle that are critical for sustaining deterrence into the 

future. The program also ensures the ST&E proficiency of 

DOE/NNSA’s workforce for the future and helps maintain

the readiness of its infrastructure to support near-term and

future workloads. Finally, it provides foundational ST&E 

capabilities that provide a hedge against prospective and 

unanticipated risks and prevent technological surprise.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program was established in 1994 

to sustain the deterrent in the absence of nuclear explosive 

testing. Since then, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has 

advanced DOE/NNSA’s understanding of nuclear weapon 

ST&E. Key activities such as advanced modeling and 

simulation capabilities, subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments, high energy density (HED) physics

experiments, and test flights of high-fidelity simulators provide the capabilities to underwrite the present

day and future nuclear stockpiles. For more than 20 years, the program has developed and deployed 

capabilities that have provided DOE/NNSA with important, high-fidelity data to maintain the stockpile in 

the absence of nuclear testing.

The sections in this chapter discuss the drivers for the Stockpile Stewardship Program into the future, the 

current capabilities and anticipated advances, and the strategies and approaches that frame the program

in more detail. Areas of focus include: (1) sustaining the current evolving stockpile; (2) maturing new 

deterrence options for replacement systems to include shortened development cycles; (3) mitigating 

against an evolving threat environment; (4) advancing the ability to predict weapon performance in 

Major Stockpile Stewardship Program

Accomplishments

 Completed the Vega subcritical experiment, 

which concludes a series of experiments to 

assess modeling capabilities for studying the 

effects of substituting insensitive high 

explosives for conventional high explosives. 

 Conducted key plutonium experiments to 

increase understanding of the effects of aging 

on plutonium. 

 Developed an uncertainty quantification tool kit 

that aids in assessing and certifying stockpile 

nuclear weapon designs.

 Selected source and detector technologies for 

the Neutron Diagnosed Subcritical 

Experiments to be used in upcoming 

subcritical experiments. 

 Accepted DOE/NNSA’s new flagship High 

Performance Computing system, Sierra at 

LLNL, in September 2018.

 Simulations for the Large Scale Calculations 

Initiative have assessed the limits of existing

calculation capabilities and point the way 

toward future improvements.

 Achieved the highest fusion yield to date at 

the National Ignition Facility – 2×1016 neutrons 

or 55 kilojoules, approaching the burning 

plasma threshold.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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untested configurations; and (5) evaluating the effect of new materials and processes, the reuse of aging 

components in future systems, and enhancing production throughput. Enhanced experimental and 

simulation capabilities are required to recreate, interrogate, and provide data on materials and physics at 

weapon-like conditions to address these focus areas. Capabilities developed under the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program will be used to directly address items within the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

3.1 Enduring Drivers for Stockpile Stewardship Science, 

Technology, and Engineering

Responsible stockpile stewardship demands continuous development of a qualified workforce, as well as

computational, experimental, and testing capabilities. These capabilities are essential for stewardship of 

the current stockpile, but must be enhanced to improve understanding of nuclear weapons performance 

to ensure the effectiveness of the stockpile in the future. Enhancing capabilities for the future also 

ensuresthat the nuclear security enterprise will remain responsive and will attract and retain the requisite

stockpile expertise in the workforce.

3.1.1 Assessment of the Current Stockpile

The status of the current stockpile is monitored through continuous, multi-layered assessments of the 

safety, security, and effectiveness of each U.S. nuclear weapon system. The annual stockpile assessment 

process evaluates the safety, performance, and reliability of weapons based on physics and engineering 

analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. Assessments also may evaluate the effect of aging on 

performance and quantify performance thresholds, uncertainties, and margins. These evaluations rely on 

all available sources of information, including surveillance, non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests, subcritical 

experiments, materials evaluation, modeling and simulation, and enhanced surveillance techniques. They 

involve assembling a body of evidence to assess performance at the part, component, subsystem, and 

system levels to determine whether all the required performance characteristics are met. The processes 

are quantitative and combine data and theories with simulations of nuclear weapons to arrive at a 

conclusions that also relies on expert judgment. 

Weapons scientists and engineers are crucial to every aspect of the assessment process. The overall 

assessment philosophy and approach involves quantification of weapon characteristics and rigorous 

review of the results and certification basis by teams of weapons scientists and engineers. The laboratory 

teams responsible for each weapon type and its assessment include individuals with extensive weapons 

experience and access to both historical and new data. Several mechanisms exist to ensure that each 

national security laboratory has full and complete access to all relevant weapons data to support these 

assessments. These mechanisms include regular exchanges of electronic documents and databases 

between sites and several peer-to-peer data sharing options. The assessments and conclusions in the 

Annual Assessment Reports are reviewed by independent reviewers, federally mandated Red Teams 

(subject matter experts from the other national security laboratories who are appointed by their 

Laboratory Directors), program managers, senior laboratory management, and the Laboratory Directors. 

Specific results related to the stockpile systems are included in the latest Report on Stockpile Assessments.

At the conclusion of the annual assessment review, the Directors of the three national security 

laboratories and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) provide written assessments

on the state of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile. These annual assessment letters are 

included in the congressionally mandated Report on Stockpile Assessments that is signed by the 

Secretaries of Energy and Defense and delivered to the President.
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The annual stockpile assessment review process is not an annual recertification of the warheads in the 

stockpile; it is an assessment of each warhead’s existing certification basis in light of information 

generated by the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the past year.

3.1.2 Ensuring the Future Stockpile

The evolving international security environment and the aging stockpile drive requirements for life 

extension programs (LEPs), modern replacements for existing stockpile systems, and tailored 

supplemental deterrent capabilities. Ensuring the resiliency of the U.S. nuclear deterrent requires 

qualification- and certification-ready options, from materials through components to systems, to be 

available when needed for down-select decisions, development, and production. The qualification and 

certification pathways for these options must be matured ahead of time. This maturation necessitates 

advances in qualification and certification methodologies, improvements to the responsiveness of the 

nuclear security enterprise, better integration with other agencies, and development of new and 

emergent capabilities for the qualification and certification processes.

3.1.2.1 Certification

The Advanced Certification subprogram improves the methodology and physics-based capabilities used 

to assess and certify that the evolving stockpile will operate as intended and deliver matured technologies, 

diagnostic techniques, data analysis methods, and design options for future stockpile needs. The 

subprogram also preserves and reanalyzes legacy nuclear test data and conducts simulations of nuclear 

and non-nuclear test data to benchmark simulation codes to understand how weapons perform and how 

they may fail, improve the technical components of the quantification of margins and uncertainties

paradigm, and improve the fidelity and agility of certification methodologies.

3.1.2.2 Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties

Certifying the performance of a weapon by assessments employing predictive capabilities is a large annual 

effort requiring the coordination of significant resources and expertise. It is addressed through the 

quantification of margins and uncertainties methodology, which evaluates the confidence of a prediction, 

thus enabling risk-informed decisions. This methodology’s confidence factor of a prediction is the ratio 

of margin (M) to uncertainty (U), or M/U. The margin measures the degree to which the predicted value 

of a performance metric exceeds the point where that metric becomes unacceptable. Uncertainty is the

metric’s range of variability due to factors such as statistical uncertainty and gaps in knowledge. It is 

determined using both data gathered experimentally and data calculated via databases for physical 

quantities, physical models, and numerical simulations.

It is desired that the M/U confidence factor be significantly greater than 1.0. A value at or less than 1.0 

motivates actions to increase the confidence factor by increasing the margin or decreasing the 

uncertainty. Increasing the margin might include shortening the interval between limited lifetime 

component replacements or implementing changes during LEPs, modifications (Mods), or alterations

(Alts). The Stockpile Stewardship Program’s approach to decreasing the uncertainty is to perform

research and development (R&D) in areas such as characterizing the properties of materials to which 

weapon performance is sensitive or by improving the fidelity of the models used to simulate the operation 

of the warhead.

3.1.2.3 Qualification

The Delivery Environments (formerly called Weapons Systems Engineering Assessment Technology),

Nuclear Survivability, and Component Manufacturing Development subprograms concentrate on 

stewarding, advancing, and qualifying nuclear weapons components, subassemblies, and integrated 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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systems to meet the military characteristics across the stockpile-to-target sequence (STS) environment 

requirements (e.g., normal, abnormal, and hostile environments specified in the STS). These qualification 

activities are defined in qualification plans and use experimental and modeling/simulation capabilities. 

Experimental capabilities include flight tests, shock and vibration tests, thermal environment tests, and 

exposure to various forms of radiation. Modeling and simulation are used to interpolate and extrapolate 

into regions not addressed by testing and experiments. 

3.1.3 Responsiveness

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for rapid implementation of the Stockpile Responsiveness 

Program established by Congress in Section 3112 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2016 to “effectively respond to emerging threats, unanticipated events, and technological innovation 

through science and engineering” (Senate Report 114-236, Energy and Water Development 

Appropriations Bill, 2017). This program, along with the Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management 

Programs, will contribute to the overall stockpile responsiveness policy to ensure DOE/NNSA exercises all 

phases of the nuclear weapons life cycle. 

The Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management Programs exercise many, but not all, of the endto-end capabilities at the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities to 

maintain the ability to respond to new requirements that address emerging threats. In particular, detailed 

design, development, qualification, production, and certification of a prototype nuclear explosive package 

(NEP) are capabilities that are not exercised fully to respond to future warhead requirements.

DOE/NNSA established collaborations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear Matters), 

USSTRATCOM Commander, and relevant Air Force and Navy organizations and began technical work to 

execute this program in FY 2017. After reviewing emerging threats, technical challenges, and 

opportunities, DOE/NNSA has selected a set of challenge scenarios for concept studies and potential 

design, prototyping, and flight testing. 

3.1.4 Integration with Other NNSA Missions

Since their inception, the national security laboratories have applied their nuclear weapons expertise to 

challenges beyond maintaining the Nation’s stockpile. These challenges include nuclear nonproliferation, 

assessing and countering nuclear threats, and understanding the nuclear capabilities of adversaries.1 

Historically, these activities were built on the periphery of the core Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Today, the complex global security environment demands dedicated experiments, enhanced theoretical 

and computational models, and reinterpretation of archival nuclear test data. The Capabilities for Nuclear 

Intelligence program addresses many of these demands. In addition, global security programs leverage 

Stockpile Stewardship Program investments and capabilities that otherwise would not be available to the 

broader national security mission. In addition to global security applications, stockpile stewardship tools 

and capabilities increasingly are being applied to develop advanced conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) 

weapon systems. In performing such activities, national security laboratory experts exercise their critical 

design and engineering skills and provide broader experience and validation opportunities, turning 

synergistic technology advances in those areas into direct benefits for stockpile maintenance and 

sustainment (e.g., enabling efficient modern radar design for LEPs).

 

1 Additional information about these activities can be found in Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global 

Nuclear Threats: FY 2020 – FY 2024 (DOE/NNSA 2019).
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-5

3.1.5 Attracting and Retaining Expert Stockpile Stewards

The scientists, engineers, and technicians of the stockpile stewardship workforce and the expertise they 

possess are the lifeblood of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Their collective expertise, combined with 

DOE/NNSA’s world-class experimental and computational facilities, enables Stockpile Stewardship 

Program success and forms the backbone of the Nation’s deterrent. DOE/NNSA ensures that the best 

science and engineering options are available to support national security decisions, which requires 

recruiting and retaining highly skilled technical staff. 

Maintaining a consistent high-caliber workforce as NNSA transitions between generations is essential for 

retaining institutional knowledge and long-term program effectiveness. The DOE/NNSA core mission is 

compelling and provides a wide range of research opportunities. The eight management and operating 

(M&O)-managed national security sites must continue to develop and maintain leading-edge research 

facilities and forward-looking scientific and technical programs to attract and retain top talent to 

accomplish that mission. This mission-centered work is supplemented by broader national security 

applications that provide other important research challenges and working environments. New staff have 

the opportunity to pursue innovative research by teaming with more experienced staff who provide 

direction, mentorship, and institutional knowledge. Laboratory-, site-, and plant-directed R&D programs 

provide scientists and engineers the opportunity to pursue self-directed research in areas of national 

interest. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program provides additional opportunities for the workforce to 

develop and exercise skills that are crucial to maintaining and modernizing tomorrow’s stockpile.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program contributes to the pipeline of the future national security laboratory 

workforce through the Academic Alliances, including the Stockpile Stewardship Graduate Fellowship, 

Predictive Science Academic Alliance, and Laboratory Residency Graduate Fellowship programs. These 

alliances foster university research in fields that are unique to stockpile stewardship through direct 

funding. The research includes properties of materials under extreme conditions such as hydrodynamics, 

low-energy nuclear science, radiochemistry, and HED physics. For additional information on the 

DOE/NNSA workforce, see Chapter 7. 

3.2 Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and 

Engineering Elements and Status

Stockpile Stewardship Program ST&E elements play a major role in the full range of stockpile activities. 

The high-level FY 2018 accomplishments in the sidebar on page 3-1 are the result of using the program’s 

experimental, modeling, and simulation capabilities to design weapon subsystems and quantify their 

expected performance for the weapon program of record. These capabilities enable the nuclear 

survivability qualification of several components. The four major elements that enable Stockpile 

Stewardship science are the Science Program, the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, 

the Engineering Program, and the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) Program. 

3.2.1 Science Program

The Science Program designs and conducts scientific experiments to advance understanding of weapon 

performance. The data collected in those experiments are used to improve the accuracy of computer 

models of nuclear weapons’ physics and performance. This work enables the priorities set by the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review, namely, sustainment of existing stockpile systems, development of qualificationand certification-ready options for the future tailored deterrent, assessment and mitigation of diverse and 

advanced 21st century threats, and broad investments across the Science Program’s portfolio to enable 

more responsive and agile manufacturing capabilities through R&D. The Program emphasizes the use of 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-6 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

experimental data to address NEP performance issues and provides enabling capabilities required by its 

partners in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This work enables advanced performance assessments of 

nuclear weapons so that DOE/NNSA can meet emerging national security needs beyond stockpile 

maintenance. 

The Science Program deliverables and activities enable multiple mission tasks:

 Annual assessment of the stockpile

 Prompt resolution of stockpile issues (e.g., significant finding investigations [SFIs])

 Aging and lifetime assessments

 Threat assessment and mitigation options for a resilient nuclear deterrent

 Agreements between DOE/NNSA and DoD regarding LEP interface requirements for data delivery,

component development, and performance assessments

 Certification-ready design options for the future stockpile, including LEPs, modern system 

replacements, and tailored deterrence supplements

 Certification statements for LEPs and the future 

stockpile, based on advanced certification 

methodologies and requirements for data and 

performance assessments

 Production modernization through gains in 

efficiency and agility via production agency 

partnerships

 Advances in understanding and modeling of 

primary boost and secondary performance

 Non-nuclear materials innovation, 

characterization, testing, and evaluation in 

support of certification and replacement of 

legacy materials that are no longer available for 

modernization activities (see sidebar)

 Delivery of essential experimental facilities, 

diagnostic technologies, and capabilities for 

stockpile assessment, qualification, and 

certification

 Enhancing the pipeline of future stockpile 

stewards and refining their expertise via 

experimental proving grounds

Five types of experiments are supported by the 

program:

 Nuclear physics. To improve predictive 

capability, experiments are conducted at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE)

Weapons Neutron Research Facility to reduce the uncertainties in nuclear cross sections (i.e., the 

probabilities of nuclear reactions) and to study the physics of fission and fusion processes 

Material Strain Rate Maps. High-resolution local 

strain maps (left) show how titanium microstructures 

(right) deform during a tensile test. The initial 

material (1, top panels) transforms into the final 

deformed microstructure (3, bottom panels). Data 

are collected at various times during the tensile test, 

corresponding to the load drops in the stressdisplacement curve (middle right). Understanding 

microscopic deformation processes and bulk 

material failure is important when introducing new 

materials to the stockpile.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-7

 Plasma and atomic physics. Atomic data such as x-ray opacities (i.e., the probability of an x-ray 

interacting with matter) and plasma physics parameters are central to DOE/NNSA’s predictive 

capability 

 Chemistry. Laboratory-scale research on the chemistry of materials in weapon components, 

especially aged components, is critical to predicting the effect on weapons performance 

 High explosives. Understanding all aspects of the development, manufacturing, processing, and 

disposition of high explosives (HE) is essential for the safe and effective use of HE (the details of 

the dynamic behavior as HE detonates and burns are required for accurate predictions of primary 

performance; dynamic behavior is particularly important when considering replacement of 

conventional high explosives (CHE) with insensitive high explosives (IHE) within the context of 

operational safety in the nuclear security enterprise)

 NEP materials. Understanding the behavior of NEP materials at the extreme conditions in a 

nuclear weapon is essential to predict weapons performance in normal, abnormal, and hostile 

environments 

The Science Program consists of six subprograms and academic alliances:

 Advanced Certification 

 Primary Assessment Technologies 

 Dynamic Materials Properties 

 Advanced Radiography

 Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

 Secondary Assessment Technologies

 Academic Alliances and Partnerships

3.2.1.1 Accomplishments

 Completed the Vega subcritical experiment at the Nevada National 

Security Site (Vega was the final experiment in a series of subcritical 

experiments studying the effects of substituting IHE for CHE in 

stockpile systems)

 Completed a Level 12 milestone on the initial conditions of boost

(this body of work contributes to certification of current and future 

LEPs by advancing modeling predictions and assessments of the 

uncertainties of the initial conditions of the boost process in 

stockpile systems) 

 Completed experimental campaigns on the National Ignition 

Facility (NIF) and delivered HED data to enable assessment of 

legacy and potential replacement materials for W80-4 LEP 

applications

 

2

Level 1 milestones are multi-institutional deliverables that result in key outcomes or noteworthy advances in NNSA assessment, 

experimental, simulation, or production capabilities. These milestones typically require significant investment of resources across 

multiple subprograms.

Subcritical experiment at the 

Nevada National Security Site’s 

U1a Complex.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-8 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Conducted key plutonium experiments to increase understanding of the effects of aging on 

plutonium [diagnostic and facility improvements enabled additional plutonium experiments on 

Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) and other platforms]

 Began production science experimental efforts in plutonium chemistry aimed at improving pit 

certification methodologies and pit production efficiency 

 Formulated and initiated qualification of a large lot of HE material to provide a source of materials 

for LEPs, subcritical experiments, and future stockpile options 

 Developed less insult-sensitive explosives to help both DoD and DOE/NNSA formulate explosives 

that are safer for deployment without sacrificing energy and performance

 Selected the source and detector technology for the neutron diagnosed subcritical experiments 

that will be used in the upcoming Excalibur subcritical experimental series (the Excalibur series 

will qualify a new flash-neutron diagnostic for further studies of plutonium aging, manufacturing 

technologies, and future LEPs)

 Advanced the uranium production science initiatives for the future stockpile through 

(1) manufacture of castings with different specifications and (2) continued efforts to study the 

potential for reforming components to enable alternative techniques for the manufacture of 

future stockpile components 

 Completed multi-year HED experiments on NIF and the Omega laser facility (Omega) that 

provided data for validating and advancing ASC codes used to assess stockpile performance 

 Completed modern performance simulations of an atmospheric test event that differs 

significantly from current stockpile devices (this expands the validation domain to support a 

broader class of design options for future LEPs)

 Developed and fielded an improved Advanced Radiographic Capability at NIF to obtain new 

stockpile-relevant data 

 Conducted experimental campaigns on the Z pulsed power machine (Z) and NIF that developed 

platforms to study a specific aspect of weapons physics (these platforms will enable experiments 

whose data will be used to improve models and reduce uncertainties in annual assessment and 

LEP simulations) 

 Completed the planned Sierra Nevada series of development and qualification hydrotests on the 

Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT), Contained Firing Facility, and U1a Complex 

(U1a) in FY 2019 (this series of experiments will provide increased confidence in annual 

assessments, ensuring the safety of nuclear systems remains robust and enabling researchers to 

enhance safety, where possible, as they work to extend the life of the aging stockpile)

3.2.1.2 Status

The Science Program is vital to ensuring stockpile sustainment, stockpile modernization, and a resilient 

deterrent. To sustain the evolving stockpile, the Primary Assessment Technologies and Dynamic Materials 

Properties subprograms are improving the Nation’s understanding of the effect of aging on primary 

performance; experiments for the LEPs, Alts, and Mods; and investments to improve necessary 

experimental capabilities. The Secondary Assessment Technologies subprogram is investigating the effect 

of canned subassembly aging on secondary performance studies that are part of a key FY 2019 milestone. 

The Science Program supports the annual stockpile assessment through advances in the understanding of 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-9

boost, which also was the focus of an FY 2018 

milestone. This milestone was led by Primary 

Assessment Technologies in partnership with Advanced 

Certification and ASC. A more complete understanding 

of advanced weapon physics phenomena is also the goal 

of NIF, Z, and Omega HED platforms and upcoming 

subcritical experiment series such as Red Sage, Nimble, 

and Excalibur.

Resiliency of the deterrent is the driver for assessment 

capabilities development by (1) the Primary Assessment 

Technologies Capabilities for the Nuclear Intelligence 

focus area, (2) higher-fidelity testing environments

produced by Secondary Assessment Technologies, and 

(3) enhanced survivability options developed by 

Primary Assessment Technologies and Dynamic 

Materials Properties. 

Enhancing the experimental capabilities necessary to 

underwrite certification of the evolving stockpile is a 

principal driving force for the Science Program. Projects 

underway include: 

 The Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical 

Experiments (ECSE) facility will fill a key gap in late-time primary implosion data by delivering 

enhanced radiographic and neutron diagnostics for subcritical experiments 

 Providing intermediate-scale plutonium experiments is the intent of the Primary Assessment 

Technologies subprogram-sponsored effort to restore a capability to perform experiments at the 

LANSCE Proton Radiography Facility (plutonium material property experiments are also 

conducted at gas gun facilities, including JASPER; Technical Area 55; and HED facilities, including 

NIF and Z) 

 Increased demand for a full range of plutonium experiments to support aging and plutonium 

modernization and manufacturing options for the future stockpile is being addressed by new 

investments and national coordination by Dynamic Materials Properties subprogram 

 Uranium manufacturing, including maturation and qualification of direct cast manufacturing, is a 

new investment priority for Secondary Assessment Technologies subprogram 

Broad investments across the Science Program portfolio are being made to enable more responsive and 

agile manufacturing capabilities through R&D.

3.2.1.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–1 provides a high-level summary of the Science Program’s challenges and strategies.

Key Science Program Facilities

Stockpile modernization was the focus of the 

U1a Complex (U1a) subcritical experiment series, 

Lyra and Sierra Nevada; several Dual-Axis 

Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) and 

Contained Firing Facility hydro experiments; and 

many smaller-scale experiments executed for LEPs 

and pit reuse options in FY 2018. 

 U1a is presently the only complex where focused 

and integrated subcritical experiments combining

high explosives with plutonium can be 

conducted. The Enhanced Capabilities for 

Subcritical Experiments facility will be housed in 

this complex.

 DARHT uses two large x-rays to create ultra-fast 

motion pictures of materials undergoing 

hydrodynamic implosion. Experiments at 

DARHT use surrogates in place of plutonium.

 The Contained Firing Facility provides singleframe, single-axis, radiographic hydrodynamic 

test capabilities within a building rated for tests of 

the largest primaries in the stockpile. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 3–1. Summary of Science Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Sustainment of the Evolving Stockpile

Stewardship must provide the tools to promptly 

assess performance issues, including SFIs, aging, and 

evolving threat environments to underwrite the 

surety and effectiveness of the stockpile without 

underground nuclear tests

 Provide capabilities to assess the effects of plutonium aging and 

predict pit lifetimes

 Provide capabilities to support stockpile assessments, LEP reuse, 

and surety decisions

 Reinstate the capability for explosively driven plutonium 

experiments using proton radiography and continue to conduct 

plutonium experiments in relevant regimes

 Conduct experiments and analyses to resolve the principal 

remaining uncertainties associated with boost

 Conduct subcritical experiments to inform LEP options, assess aging 

effects, inform safety choices, provide needed data on the 

hydrodynamics of implosions, and underwrite stockpile 

performance

 Deliver constraining data using HED experimental platforms to 

inform choices of differently manufactured materials and to 

compare weapons output capabilities

 Complete systematic studies of the opacity of high-Z materials 

using Z and NIF

 Demonstrate new x-ray sources for weapons survivability testing

Future Deterrent

The development of options for LEPs, modern 

replacements, and tailored deterrence options that 

are certification-ready is a key element of stockpile 

responsiveness

 Deliver certification-ready options for LEPs and the future stockpile 

to inform down-select decisions. Enable assessment and 

certification of these options via sufficient range experiments.

 Advance certification methodologies to be used in future 

certification statements

Threat Mitigation

The 21st century threat environment is evolving 

rapidly; accurate assessment of the effect of these 

threats and development of mitigation options are 

key to a resilient U.S. nuclear deterrent

 Enhance computer codes that simulate the environments weapons 

may experience, especially combined environments, to ensure 

weapons will work as designed

 Develop and recapitalize experimental capabilities required for 

assessments with increasingly more realistic source environments

 Enable improved performance assessments for stockpile systems

 Mature mitigation options from materials, through components, to 

systems

Weapon Physics

Development of an empirical understanding of 

weapons’ physics, especially boost and 

thermonuclear burn processes, is important to 

advancing the ability to predict weapon performance, 

especially for untested weapon configurations

 Achieve a robust understanding of weapons’ physics, including 

boost, supported by a full range of experiments, including radiation 

transport; hydrodynamics; plasma, nuclear, and material 

properties; weapon output, effects, and survivability; and platform 

and diagnostics development [this work is conducted at HED

physics facilities (NIF, Z, and Omega)]

Weapon Materials 

Materials used in the stockpile have properties that 

affect weapons performance [the NEP performance 

effects of material changes (e.g., aging or

manufacturing changes) must be evaluated to 

determine the effect on weapons performance and

non-nuclear materials require characterization and 

analysis to support modeling and overall certification]

 Understand the effects on weapon performance of aging (in 

particular, aging plutonium) through execution of the National 

Plutonium Aging Strategy, studies on aging, canned subassembly, 

and evaluations of new materials and processes through 

Production Science partnerships on plutonium, uranium, and HE,

and non-nuclear materials

 Explore advanced material manufacturing technology, such as 

additive manufacturing

 Deliver high-pressure materials property data at weapon-relevant 

regimes for plutonium, its surrogates, and other weapons-relevant 

materials

 Continue R&D for scaled-up production of IHE for the post-B61 LEP 

and the W80-4 to ensure a robust material supply
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-11

Challenges Strategies

Advanced Diagnostics and Experimental Capabilities

Enhanced capabilities are required to recreate, 

interrogate, and diagnose materials and physics at 

weapon-like conditions at experimental facilities 

focused on delivering such data

 Provide the Nation with the ECSE facility, a world-class radiographic 

and neutron diagnostic system, to provide better understanding of

late-time implosion physics for the certification of the evolving 

stockpile

 Deliver world-class experimental capabilities, including 

hydrodynamic testing at both DARHT and the Contained Firing 

Facility; subcritical experiments at U1a; dynamic plutonium 

experiments on small-scale instruments; guns (e.g., TA-55 and 

JASPER); LANSCE’s Proton Radiography Facility; and nuclear 

science, materials’ characterization, and HED physics experiments

with NIF and Z

 Develop and exercise experimental and diagnostic capabilities to 

evaluate foreign and proliferant-based nuclear threats

 Develop capabilities to address potential changes in STS

environments (i.e., outputs and effects, thermal and mechanical 

environments)

 Sustain hydro facilities (e.g., Contained Firing Facility/flash x-ray

and DARHT) to ensure availability to support stockpile 

development programs

DARHT = Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

ECSE = Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

HE = high explosives

HED = high energy density

IHE = insensitive high explosive

JASPER = Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

LANSCE = Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

NEP = nuclear explosives package

NIF = National Ignition Facility

Omega = Omega Laser Facility

SFI = significant finding investigation

STS = stockpile-to-target sequence

TA-55 = Technical Area 55

U1a = U1a Complex

Z = Z pulsed power facility

3.2.2 Engineering Program

The Engineering Program provides capabilities for an agile and responsive nuclear stockpile that will 

survive the complex environments encountered during the lifetime of a weapon. The Engineering 

Program’s mission is focused on design, qualification, and assessment of the integrated weapon system 

prior to detonation. Nuclear weapons are complex systems with thousands of specialized components. 

Before arriving at its target, a weapon will have experienced many years of aging, the bumps and 

vibrations of travel on roads or submarines, the shocks and vibrations associated with flight, and possibly 

nearby nuclear explosions caused by an adversary’s attempt to disable the weapon. Confidence that all 

components will work together and properly function requires experiments, validated modeling and 

simulations, careful assessment and selection of materials with appropriate characteristics and properties 

for all components, and flight testing.

Execution of the Engineering Program involves collaboration with multiple DOE/NNSA programs and 

external DoD partners. The program partners with ASC by providing the experimental tools and 

diagnostics that are used to generate data that support validation and verification for simulation 

capabilities. The Engineering Program also partners with the Science Program in areas of component or 

system qualification and certification and nuclear survivability. Types of efforts involving significant 

collaborations supported by the Engineering Program include:

 Advanced manufacturing. Advanced manufacturing methods are essential to achieving the 

efficiency and agility required for production of the future stockpile. Moreover, legacy methods 

often cannot be replicated. R&D of these methods and assessment of their effect on NEP 

performance is an element of stockpile responsiveness. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 Non-nuclear materials science and engineering. Virtually every class of materials, including 

metals, polymers, glasses, ceramics, and electronic and optical materials, is used in the nonnuclear portions of nuclear weapons. All of the materials in these components and systems must 

be tested and certified for the many environments that a nuclear weapon experiences. 

 Engineering science. The ability to deliver a weapon safely and reliably and to arm, fuze, and fire 

it requires a broad suite of theoretical, computational, and experimental research. Some of that 

research, particularly materials science and radiation science, can 

be conducted in laboratory-scale facilities.

 Radiation science. Research on the interaction of radiation with a 

weapon and the weapon’s subsequent response is essential to 

meet military requirements. This multi-disciplinary research is 

coupled with engineering and materials science. Whereas many 

experiments require HED physics facilities such as Z, NIF, and 

Omega, the unique capabilities of Saturn, the High-Energy 

Radiation Megavolt Electron Source (HERMES) III, the Ion Beam 

Laboratory, and the Annular Core Research Reactor are key to 

advancing radiation science.

 Microsystems science. The extreme radiation requirements for 

weapons can far exceed the capability of commercial 

microelectronics to survive and function. Microsystems research 

provides designs and manufacturing processes that enable devices 

and circuits to meet stringent radiation requirements. 

The Engineering Program consists of five subprograms:

 Enhanced Surveillance provides surveillance diagnostics and 

material lifetime science needed to ensure that aging issues are 

identified in the stockpile before they affect performance.

 Delivery Environments (formally known as the Weapon System 

Engineering Assessment Technologies subprogram) is responsible 

for ensuring systems endure current and future STS environments 

in both normal and abnormal environments and perform effectively 

upon target execution.

 Enhanced Surety develops cost-effective, advanced safety, security, and use control technologies 

for incorporation into stockpile weapon systems.

 Nuclear Survivability provides the tools and technologies necessary to ensure that U.S. nuclear 

weapons survive current and future hostile, fratricide, and combined environments arising from 

adversary defensive actions and performance of friendly weapon systems in the battlespace.

 Stockpile Responsiveness strengthens the ability of the United States to accelerate the 

development cycle of nuclear weapons and respond to technological uncertainty.

3.2.2.1 Accomplishments

 Demonstrated the feasibility of advanced power supplies for NNSA applications 

 Developed and tested advanced use control technologies for next-generation weapon systems

Creating and studying atomicscale structures advance 

DOE/NNSA’s ability to predict 

material property changes over 

long periods of time due to 

factors such as extreme 

environments, aging and fatigue. 

As seen above, researchers 

funded by the DOE/NNSA often 

use engineering and silicon 

fabrication facilities such as the 

Center for Integrated 

Nanotechnologies to aid in 

these studies.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-13

 Developed high-fidelity environmental sensors for the High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket

program to investigate shock and vibration in flight and improve environmental response models

 Initiated a successful multi-site program to retrieve War Reserve components from all systems 

going through current or near-term dismantlement and/or alteration activities 

 Advanced a canned subassembly modeling code to a version that provides significant 

improvements in run times and the ability to run 3D sensitivity studies. Performed modeling for 

three systems in support of lifetime estimation

 Achieved full demonstration of an x-ray graded collimation diagnostic, resulting in high-quality 

imaging data and reduced imaging timelines for surveillance activities

 Completed a long-term investment to evaluate batteries and existing lifetime prediction models 

by assessing the material characteristics and performance for old batteries

 Initiated the Interagency (DOE/DoD) Threat Environments Working Group to identify challenges 

related to weapon delivery and survivability, and capabilities needed to address these challenges

(the group was established in April FY 2018 and in addition to NNSA/Engineering, its sponsors in 

DoD are Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force/A10, Navy 

Strategic Systems Programs, Missile Defense Agency)

 Evaluated application of current radiation transport methodologies to assess performance of 

advanced materials in radiation environments and developed plans for R&D to support 

certification, qualification, and assessment activities(this work leverages the source development 

and experimental opportunities provided by the Science and ICF Programs)

 Observed and characterized the effect and sensitivity of cavity system-generated electromagnetic 

pulse to desorption and cavity surface blow-off; improved basic understanding of phenomena and 

provided validation data for system-generated electromagnetic pulse modeling and simulation 

code suites

 Developed a 5-year plan for application of HED facilities and experiments to support studies of 

U.S. nuclear weapons performance in hostile radiation environments (Nuclear Survivability)

 Completed first round of consultations with DoD, resulting in the start of two challenge problems 

of mutual interest

3.2.2.2 Status

The Engineering Program is focusing on the future challenges of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The program 

considers future delivery environments, hostile threats, component and material aging concerns, and how 

to produce a deterrent within the timelines needed by the warfighter and military planners. As the 

program shares these concerns with a number of DOE/NNSA and DoD partners, the program has built 

robust working relationships with a number of outside agencies and internal DOE/NNSA groups to ensure 

efficient work toward a common goal. 

The Stockpile Responsiveness Program maintains and exercises the required capabilities to respond to 

emerging threats, technical challenges, and other issues that could threaten the deterrent. The program 

also identifies opportunities to accelerate the nuclear weapons development life cycle and reduce the 

costs of development and production. The Engineering Program provides experimental data, improved 

models, and a better understanding of weapon materials to inform stockpile assessments and the LEPs.

3.2.2.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–2 provides a high-level summary of the Engineering Program’s challenges and strategies.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 3–2. Summary of Engineering Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Technologies with the potential to effect survivability and 

other military requirements are changing; the United States 

must have an ability to anticipate and respond to these 

changes in a timely manner

Develop improved hydrodynamic and subcritical 

experimental capabilities to enable greater throughput and 

more accurate prediction of current and future 

configurations through the National Hydrodynamics Test 

Complex initiative

There are few weapons scientists and engineers with 

experience designing and qualifying new nuclear weapon 

systems; the window for transitioning this experience to the 

next generation of stockpile stewards is closing

The Archiving and Data Management Program managed in 

the Office of Engineering, Stockpile Assessments, and 

Responsiveness is responsible for the preservation of 

knowledge and expertise derived from U.S. nuclear testing, 

Stockpile Stewardship efforts following the testing 

moratorium, and making past, present and future collections 

accessible to the nuclear security enterprise workforce of 

today and tomorrow as needed

Weapons are being kept in the stockpile past their original 

lifetimes, and new materials with unique aging properties are 

being incorporated into LEPs; this challenge is exacerbated by 

a limited ability to conduct destructive surveillance testing

(establishing that aging will not adversely affect the stockpile 

will require new diagnostics and predictive science 

capabilities)

Prioritize nondestructive evaluation techniques through the 

Enhanced Surveillance subprogram, improving predictive 

models of aging issues

Environments associated with nuclear explosions created by 

adversary defenses and friendly systems cannot be completely 

replicated in the laboratory, and the number of nuclear tests 

that the United States conducted to understand these 

environments was limited and is of diminishing relevance to 

current and future technologies and environments (assuring 

that nuclear weapons will survive these environments will 

require improved experimental and simulation capabilities}

 Develop improved radiation and hostile environment 

experiments

 Improve testing, modeling, and simulation capabilities

 Develop technologies and system designs for enhanced 

survivability in evolving environments.

Higher-fidelity assessments of material changes due to aging, 

obsolescence, replacement for hazard mitigation, and the high 

cost of production modernization for NEP and non-NEP 

materials are required

Expand experimental and computational abilities to study 

these material changes through design-production agency 

partnerships, and to rapidly identify and deliver solutions to 

emerging materials issues

Equipment, facilities, and infrastructure for assessing the 

performance of nuclear weapons through delivery (normal 

and abnormal), hostile, and combined environments are 

significantly aged and in need of refurbishment and capability 

extension (support to current programs and fielded systems 

has historically been prioritized over the growing list of 

deferred maintenance and capability enhancements required 

to support the future complex)

 Prioritize stewardship of the Nation’s capability to test in 

normal, abnormal, hostile, and combined environments

 Expand investment in new and existing test and 

experimentation facilities to support the current and 

future stockpile

Assuring that weapons will survive flight increasingly relies on 

modeling and simulation validated by laboratory experiments 

(a predictive capability to describe the response of nuclear 

weapons to the conditions encountered during flight does not 

yet exist; closing this gap will require large-scale simulations 

and new experimental capabilities)

 Align priorities and develop plans to ensure DOE/NNSA can 

readily support experimental and predictive numerical 

capabilities (i.e., personnel, expertise, facilities) to ensure 

STS survivability (in normal, hostile, abnormal 

environments)

 This effort includes development and/or advancement of 

existing experimental and computational capabilities, 

refurbishment of existing facilities, and hiring of new 

personnel to ensure successful execution

 Efforts will be performed in an informed and collaborative 

manner with interagency partners)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-15

Challenges Strategies

Successfully transfer design expertise to the next generation 

while actually shortening the acquisition cycle

 Pursue challenge problems, as part of the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program, developed in consultation with 

DoD that stress these capabilities within the available 

funding 

 Develop out-year Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule 

(formerly called the Predictive Capability Framework)

pegposts to demonstrate the 2- and 5-year concept-toprototype responsiveness cycles that have been

established 

 The Stockpile Responsiveness Program emphasizes the use 

of early-career staff in these challenge problems, 

mentored by senior, experienced designers

NEP = nuclear explosives package

STS = stockpile-to-target

U.S.C. = United States Code

3.2.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

The vast majority of energy generated by a nuclear weapon is produced from matter in an HED state

(pressures greater than 1 million atmospheres), characterized by extreme temperatures and densities 

similar to conditions found in the center of the sun. Accessing these extreme weapon-relevant

environments outside of underground tests requires facilities containing state-of-the-art driver platforms

(e.g., lasers and pulsed power machines). DOE/NNSA’s ICF

Program focuses on exploring these extreme conditions 

through focused ignition and HED research initiatives. The

primary HED research facilities that access these conditions

include NIF, Z, and Omega. These facilities conduct both 

ignition and HED research to explore issues in materials 

science, radiation transport, and hydrodynamics that are 

relevant to nuclear weapon performance.

The ICF Program provides important scientific understanding 

and experimental capabilities to validate the weapons 

simulation codes and models that enable assessment of the 

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and certification of 

components and subsystems for LEPs. These facilities 

provide the only platforms on which the simulation codes 

that couple transport processes with hydrodynamic models can be experimentally validated. The program

supports development of experimental configurations and diagnostics to conduct HED physics research 

to address weapons physics, survivability, and performance issues. This experimental basis, combined 

with archived legacy data from underground nuclear tests, gives confidence in the codes and models used 

to support annual assessments and certifications, to plan LEPs, and to resolve SFIs.

The ICF Program directly supports long-term R&D efforts in ignition science, with the goal of developing a 

self-sustained, thermonuclear, burning plasma (i.e., ignition) platform, and ignition-generated fusion 

yields, for Stockpile Stewardship Program applications. An ignition platform would provide direct access 

to weapon-relevant regimes and nuclear environments for the study of high-yield, weapon-relevant 

conditions. Pursuing laboratory-scale thermonuclear ignition is an important objective of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program and is a scientific grand challenge. Development of a high-yield experimental 

platform would provide (in a laboratory setting) direct access to weapon conditions, weapon phenomena, 

and x-ray/nuclear fluences that have not been available since underground nuclear tests. Such a platform 

Secretary Perry visits the Z Pulsed Power Machine 

at Sandia National Laboratories.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-16 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

would be able to validate models at extreme conditions of pressure, temperature, and density that 

approach those achievable only with nuclear explosive testing. The demonstration of ignition, which will 

enable replication of the physics phenomena in a nuclear detonation without an actual nuclear test, 

remains a major unmet goal for DOE/NNSA.

The ICF Program consists of five subprograms:

 Ignition and Other Stockpile Programs

 Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support

 Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion

 Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory 

Plasmas

 Facility Operations and Target Production

3.2.3.1 Accomplishments

 Obtained data on a Z experiment to constrain aging 

models by comparing the response of new and 

naturally aged plutonium in regimes not previously 

attained for this alloy

 Began a series of experiments that will provide data 

needed to validate radiation transport 

understanding for legacy and future design options

 Performed plutonium experiments on NIF to 

measure plutonium strength and atomic structure 

at stockpile-stewardship relevant conditions in 

support of all weapons systems 

 Developed new or improved capabilities at each ICF 

facility this fiscal year:

– Achieved the highest fusion yield to date on NIF of 2×1016 neutrons, or 55 kilojoules

– Z achieved new levels of neutron output for future use in evaluating weapon performance in 

radiation environments

– Executed the first double-shell target implosions on NIF as another approach to investigating 

thermonuclear burn. These highly complex targets were built by a LANL/LLNL/General 

Atomics collaboration

– Executed chamber-confined tritium experiments on Z with 5 times more concentration of 

tritium than before, enabling new diagnostics that will provide critical data for ICF and 

weapon physics

– Performed experiments on NIF to enable assessment of potential replacement materials for 

stockpile applications, including a broad suite of experimental platforms and diagnostics,such 

as Advanced Radiographic Capability 

– Completed an inertial confinement fusion scaling design study at LANL, in collaboration with 

the Nevada National Security Site, based on historical and present data to gain insight on the 

approach to achieving ignition and robust burn on ICF platforms

– Improved direct-drive implosion performance at the Laboratory for Laser Energetics’ Omega 

Facility and established a new direct-drive yield record of 1.6×1014 neutrons

Key ICF Program Facilities

 The National Ignition Facility (NIF) was 

designed to produce thermonuclear ignition. 

Since completion of the National Ignition 

Campaign, NIF’s role has expanded to tackle 

a broad array of weapons physics issues, 

including material properties, radiation flow, 

thermonuclear burn, and outputs and effects, 

while continuing the pursuit of thermonuclear 

ignition. 

 The Z pulsed power machine (Z) is a 

pulsed-power facility capable of delivering 

26 million amps of current to small radii 

targets (10 centimeters or less), where the 

electromagnetic forces drive dynamic 

experiments to investigate weapon physics 

topics such as the properties of materials, 

opacity, radiation flow, and thermonuclear 

burn. 

 The Omega laser facility (Omega) provides 

a platform for HED physics experiments to 

investigate issues for both weapons 

performance and inertial confinement fusion. 

Omega also contributes to diagnostic 

development and serves as a staging 

platform for experiments at NIF.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-17

3.2.3.2 Status

DOE/NNSA’s ICF Program conducts both ignition and HED research to explore issues in materials science, 

radiation transport, and hydrodynamics that are relevant to nuclear weapon performance. Since 

conclusion of the National Ignition Campaign in 2012, the program has transitioned to achieve a balanced 

portfolio between near-term stockpile science experiments and longer-term ignition platform 

development, maintain a long-term strategy across its research portfolio, and improve operational 

efficiency at the HED facilities.

Currently, HED efforts conduct a broad area of research that is 

important to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. These efforts 

provide experimental data needed to inform design and material 

replacement options for LEPs, provide data to plutonium aging and 

manufacturing assessments, inform assessments of hostile threats 

against U.S. weapon survivability, and develop platforms that 

enable assessment of nuclear weapon performance and potential 

surveillance findings. To support these needs, the HED program is 

focusing upon four major technical areas (thermonuclear burn, 

radiation hydrodynamics and transport, materials and plasma properties, and outputs and survivability).

Early ignition experiments on NIF evaluating laser indirect drive capsules indicated differences between

the code predictions and the data. These indirect drive experiments revealed unexpected physical 

behavior and technical complexities that will require time to study and resolve. Advances in diagnostic

platforms and experimental techniques have provided insight into where the models used in the codes 

are diverging from the experimental data; this insight is of great interest to stockpile stewardship. Today, 

the implosion experiments are more hydrodynamically stable and yield performance closer to that 

predicted by the code simulations. Progress is being made in better understanding and controlling the 

hydrodynamic instabilities and implosion symmetry that will be required to advance nuclear performance. 

The ICF Program is pursuing two additional approaches to ignition. One path is laser direct drive, which 

is principally studied on Omega at the University of Rochester. If this path is shown to be promising, it 

may be possible to convert NIF to symmetric direct laser drive to achieve multi-megajoule yields with the 

present laser energy. The second path is magnetic direct drive, which is principally studied at the Z facility. 

If this path is shown to be promising, it may be possible to build a larger pulsed power facility capable of 

10-megajoule-class yields. 

Scientists and engineers working on all three approaches are collaborating in a nationally coordinated 

effort. This national effort is outlined in the 2018 Inertial Confinement Fusion Program Framework, which 

describes the ICF Program’s 2020 goal. This goal is to determine the efficacy of NIF for achieving ignition, 

along with developing credible scaling arguments for all three ignition approaches for achieving multimegajoule yields. The long-term goal is to establish the requirements for a future HED capability as a 

major capital project. This refers to several proposed capabilities:

 Consolidation of target fabrication and R&D activities at NIF

 A power and energy upgrade to NIF

 A next-generation pulsed power facility to succeed Z

The national ICF Program must continue to pursue the challenge of ignition because of its importance to 

experimental investigations of thermonuclear burn and survivability issues for the future stockpile. Much 

of the ICF research provides an avenue to establish the quality of relevant science through collaboration 

with the broader scientific community.

Research Grants

DOE/NNSA and the DOE Office of 

Science have awarded 26 research 

grants totaling $13.8 million to 

support work related to high energy 

density laboratory plasmas.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-18 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

3.2.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–3 provides a high-level summary of the ICF Program challenges and strategies.

Table 3–3. Summary of Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Thermonuclear Burning Plasmas

Demonstrate thermonuclear burn and, ultimately, high 

yield in the laboratory, which would enable new 

certification capabilities

Pursue R&D using three major ignition approaches: laser indirect 

drive, laser direct drive, and magnetic direct drive (these ignition 

efforts, technology development efforts, and the development 

of future stockpile stewards in this program is based on ICF 

Program planning documents (e.g., the 2018 Inertial 

Confinement Fusion Program Framework and the 2016 Pulsed 

Power Science & Technology Strategic Outlook), working group 

recommendations (e.g., National Implosion Stagnation Physics 

Working Group Report), and recommendations in the 2015 

Review of the Inertial Confinement Fusion and High Energy 

Density Science Portfolio.)

Radiation Transport and Hydrodynamics

Better understand the behavior and hydrodynamic 

coupling between radiation and materials

Conduct focused experiments targeting key aspects of complex 

hydrodynamic flows in the HED regime to gather benchmarking 

data.

Outputs and Survivability

Insufficient data exists to fully benchmark models of the 

radiation outputs from U.S. systems and adversaries’ 

systems, the response of U.S. systems to hostile 

environments, and extreme environments such as the 

electromagnetic pulses that nuclear weapons may create

Use HED facilities to provide intense x-ray and neutron sources 

that can be used to understand some of these scenarios and 

support the qualification of components of U.S. systems to meet 

nuclear survivability requirements 

Material Properties

From the late phases of a primary implosion through the 

secondary explosion, the nuclear weapon materials are 

heated to very high temperatures and pressures.

Understanding the response of key weapon components 

to these conditions is central to weapon assessments and 

certification 

Conduct focused materials experiments on the HED facilities to 

provide precision data on these properties at regimes that were

previously only accessible by theory or models to enable future 

assessments and certification of device performance in the 

absence of underground nuclear tests.

HED Code Validation and Verification

Modeling weapons-relevant HED experiments and 

phenomena requires multi-physics code capabilities and 

benchmarked input models (e.g., equations of state, 

opacity); maintaining robust experimental and theoretical 

support for validation and verification of these complex 

tools and models is needed for them to be effective

Ensure the continued use of the ICF Red Team to assess the 

progress each ignition approach has made, along with assessing 

cross-platform code validation, uncertainty quantification, and 

code sharing efforts

HED Experimental Operations

Improve the efficiency of facility operations and provide 

targets and transformative diagnostics for HED physics and 

ignition experiments

Use the ICF and HED Councils to review and prioritize key 

experimental campaigns that are then coordinated by each 

facility to ensure optimum experimental throughput

 A National Diagnostics Working Group identifies and pursues 

transformative diagnostics for each major HED facility within 

budget constraints that are tightly aligned with programmatic 

needs

 A Target Fabrication Working group ensures target R&D and 

production is balanced to meet experimental facility 

requirements

Future Stockpile Stewards

Recruiting, retaining, and maintaining a cadre of talented 

scientists and engineers

Pursue path to ignition as a national grand challenge to attract 

future stockpile stewards, advance the broad HED capabilities, 

and maintain healthy and vibrant fundamental science programs 

on HED facilities

HED = high energy density

ICF = Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-19

3.2.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

The ASC Program develops and 

deploys predictive simulation 

capabilities, via the integrated 

weapons codes, used in the 

certification work of the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program.

LEPs, SFIs, and other aspects of 

the Directed Stockpile Work rely 

on the people, state-of-the-art 

computational platforms, and 

validated simulation tools that 

are used in the annual 

assessment of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile. Simulation 

tools integrate experimental 

measurements and the 

foundational knowledge gained 

from legacy testing, so they 

represent the Nation’s current 

understanding of nuclear 

weapons’ physics and all aspects 

of weapon performance. 

Predicting a weapon’s performance throughout its life cycle requires simulation at many spatial and 

temporal scales. The image to the right highlights the importance of having the ever-improving simulation 

and computing capabilities to solve key weapons problems and quantify their uncertainties.

ASC trains and uses a stable community of subject matter experts with the know-how to leverage high 

performance computing (HPC) to better model the physical behavior of nuclear weapons systems 

performance at nominal or near-nominal conditions; understand engineering in normal, abnormal, and 

hostile environments; and know all aspects of weapons surety and weapons outputs. The program’s 

success also relies on the expertise and measured data from the Science, Engineering, and ICF Programs 

within the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

The costs to construct and maintain the high-tech infrastructure are leveraged with close collaborators,

such as the DOE Office of Science. The DOE Exascale Computing Initiative is an example of the partnership 

between the ASC and the Office of Science that provides a pooling of resources for better leveraging of 

R&D investments in next-generation computing technologies, software tools, and application codes with 

computer vendors, the national laboratories, and universities. Such collaboration will deliver two 

exascale-class system to the Office of Science in FY 2021–2022 and one to NNSA in FY 2023. NNSA and 

the DOE Office of Science are currently conducting a joint procurement of these exascale systems and will 

share non-recurring engineering costs for selected solutions that will meet NNSA and Office of Science

mission needs. This collaboration will save NNSA $40 to $60 million. More details of the initiative can be 

found in Appendix C.

Turbulence is one example of a physical phenomenon that is difficult to simulate and 

will require exascale computing to resolve for some stockpile applications. NNSA 

and the DOE Office of Science are working toward exascale computing platform 

advances that will make weapons simulations more realistic.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-20 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

3.2.4.1 Accomplishments

 Improved ability to perform NEP simulations under hostile and STS conditions using an improved 

HE model, which is necessary to perform sensitivity studies for the W80-4 LEP

 Added capabilities to more accurately simulate additive manufacturing via powder melt, which 

will allow better part designs and more targeted testing

 Performed a full system simulation of the Halfbeak underground nuclear test on the Trinity

system, the first ASC Advanced Technology System (this is one of the most detailed, large-scale 

calculations ever performed by the complex and will provide insights on long-standing questions 

related to weapon performance)

 Enhanced Monte Carlo transport capabilities to support the secondary performance and future 

stockpile management activities

 Completed simulations at all NNSA laboratories as part of the Large Scale Calculations Initiative 

to test the limits of current simulations capability and point the way toward future improvements

(the calculations addressed mission-relevant questions and have already led to enhancements of 

the integrated codes and associated workflows and identification of future needs)

 Installed and benchmarked NNSA’s first 

advanced architecture prototype HPC 

system – Astra at SNL (this system pioneers 

a new type of computing architecture at a 

large scale that is expected to perform very 

efficiently on weapons calculations)

 Accepted DOE/NNSA’s new flagship HPC 

system, Sierra, in September 2018 (the 

heterogeneous architecture required 

substantial efforts on the part of code 

development teams for the last several 

years to effectively use the graphics 

processing units, but is already showing 

order of magnitude speedups for many 

applications compared to runs on standard central processing units)

 Partnered with the DOE Office of Science to procure major systems through the Collaboration of 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and LLNL (CORAL-2)

– In this second effort, CORAL-2 will deliver exascale class systems

– Laboratory experts exhaustively reviewed proposals from multiple computer vendors, and 

this analysis provided hard evidence of the value of DOE’s R&D investments over the last 

decade

– The capability of the computers offered by vendors is 3-4 times greater than what would have 

been obtained without the combination of critical Exascale Computing Initiative R&D 

investments in vendor technology, and the intense level of competition engendered among 

the vendors by the large scale of the joint NNSA and Office of Science HPC procurements

3.2.4.2 Status

The ASC Program continues to provide qualified staff, integrated codes, and the HPC platforms needed to 

design, produce, certify, and qualify the current and future deterrents. The need to produce validated 

The Sierra Supercomputing System at LLNL is the second 

fastest computer in the world (as of November 2018) with 

125 petaFLOPS; over 90 percent of the computing power 

is in the graphics processing units.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-21

results with decreasing reliance on the underground test base is a principal driver for the Program. The 

ASC Program works toward meeting this need using several strategies:

 Develop more accurate and reliable models of weapons-relevant physical phenomena, thereby 

increasing trustworthiness of the codes

– Identification of phenomena and regimes that are becoming more relevant for the stockpile 

of the future (e.g., microstructure of materials manufactured by new techniques) and 

extension of the models and codes to properly represent them

– First principles atomistic-scale simulations play an important role in developing these models,

and machine learning will play a critical role in including these effects in a cost-effective 

manner in large, multi-physics simulations

 Improve the ability to analyze deformed (e.g., crash scenario) geometry to support the thermal 

safety assessment in an abnormal environment

 Port the ASC simulation capabilities to Sierra to demonstrate ASC code performance on nextgeneration computer architectures

 Identify phenomena and regimes that are becoming more relevant for the stockpile of the future 

(e.g., the microstructure of materials manufactured by new techniques) and extend models and 

codes to properly represent them (atomistic-scale simulations play an important role in

developing these models, and advanced machine learning will play a critical role in including these 

effects in a cost-effective manner in large, multi-physics simulations)

 Collaborate with the other ST&E elements to 

provide large- and small-scale experimental data to 

validate the models and codes

 Leverage modern HPC architectures to allow higherfidelity simulations, which will more properly 

represent the physics and engineering models (e.g., 

smaller-scale physical parameters) and allow more 

accurate 3D representations of weapons system 

components (see sidebar)

 Enhance the workflow tools that accompany the 

integrated codes (supporting the ability to run larger 

jobs), extract and visualize meaningful information, 

and formalize uncertainty quantification to provide 

more directly relevant information to decisionmakers

 Move to a more modular and agile simulation code 

base with abstraction layers to isolate machinespecific optimizations that can respond more readily 

to rapidly evolving computer architectures

 Explore methods (e.g., machine learning or data 

analytics) to enable sensitivity analyses with 

improved physics modeling and improved workflow 

elements

 Develop and implement new algorithms that are 

more performant to rapidly changing hardware

DOE/NNSA is developing new, high-order, 

hydrodynamic algorithms that will run more 

efficiently and robustly on future computer 

architectures with greater precision per zone 

(boxes). Pictured above is a comparison 

between older (left) and newer (right) LLNL 

simulation tools used to examine a shock wave 

propagating through a material. These 

advances in modeling capabilities allow 

DOE/NNSA to capture more accurate density 

gradients (indicated by the color map) and 

provide the ability to map curve features of the 

wave. Continued improvements like this are 

expected to make weapons simulations faster 

and less user intensive.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-22 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The need to maintain the current capability and keep it available to weapons designers, engineers, and 

analysts is another significant program driver. This requires adapting the integrated and science code 

base to new computer architectures whose evolution is being driven primarily by market forces that are 

not strictly aligned with DOE/NNSA’s programmatic needs. The program is being proactive in modernizing 

its current weapons modeling and simulations capabilities while undergoing this major computing 

paradigm shift.

3.2.4.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–4 provides a high-level summary of the ASC Program’s challenges and strategies.

Table 3–4. Summary of Advanced Simulation and Computing Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

The stockpile is evolving away from as-tested designs 

through aging LEPs, and manufacturing obsolescence

Partner with the DSW, Science, and Engineering Programs to 

understand the nature of these changes, establish 

requirements, and continue efforts to improve the ability to 

model and understand the physics of these problems

The threat space for which weapons must be certified is 

evolving

Coordinate with customers through implementation of the 

2018 Nuclear Posture Review to understand the new needs for 

threat response and respond with credible simulation 

capabilities

Current simulation capabilities are at risk because of 

evolving computer architectures

Develop codes that will migrate capabilities to new 

architectures, and partner with system vendors to coordinate 

on specific long-term research (the Large Scale Calculations 

Initiative will inform future strategies to mitigate the risks 

posed by this challenge)

Recruiting and retaining personnel with the necessary skill 

sets is difficult because of the unique training and 

experience requirements and the limited availability of 

qualified U.S. citizen graduates with advanced degrees in 

the requisite specialties and is further complicated by 

industry competition for those resources

Conduct the Predictive Science Academic Alliances Program, 

which supports work at universities and trains graduate 

students, many of whom come to work at the DOE/NNSA 

laboratories (the national security laboratories also maintain 

large summer intern programs and strong post-doctoral 

programs to familiarize potential hires with the laboratories 

and the DOE/NNSA mission)

The modeling capability is currently inadequate to 

incorporate advanced manufacturing methodologies fully 

with maximum efficiency

Develop new material property models and solution methods 

to allow simulation of both advanced manufacturing processes 

and the behavior of the resulting materials in DSW-relevant 

applications

 Water and power supply requirements are becoming 

inadequate and will drive changes in the facilities, 

network, and archival infrastructures. 

 Facility upgrades are required for Advanced Technology 

Systems 3 and 4 (ATS-3 and ATS-4), which will be 

delivered in 2020 and 2023, respectively

Complete the ongoing Exascale Class Computer Cooling 

Equipment and Exascale Computing Facility Modernization 

programs at LANL and LLNL, respectively

User demand for computer time for nuclear security 

applications is outstripping availability

Along with the Advanced Technology systems, ASC deploys 

Commodity Technology systems at the laboratories for 

additional computing capacity for the nuclear security 

enterprise user community (in FY 2020, it will kick off its 

Commodity Technology System 2 (CTS-2) procurement activity 

to procure next-generation, more powerful Commodity 

Technology systems to address the increasing demand for 

computing resources)

ASC = Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

DSW = Directed Stockpile Work Program
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-23

3.3 Strategies for the Future

The enduring drivers for the Stockpile Stewardship Program pose challenges that must be addressed. The 

first generation of science-based stockpile stewardship has ensured confidence in the nuclear deterrent,

without reliance on additional nuclear testing, through application of the innovative ST&E required to 

assess the current stockpile and certify changes to that stockpile. The next-generation science-based 

stockpile stewardship (NextGen science-based stockpile stewardship) will anticipate future threats and 

formulate responsive solutions; robustly compete ideas for best future solutions; predict aging 

mechanisms and the onset of failures; optimize production throughput rates; and ensure readiness, 

responsiveness, and agility. Benefits include lowering costs; exercising the skill base by practicing aspects 

of the warhead development cycle from design to prototype; developing next-generation tools and 

capabilities; and investing in infrastructure and facilities to provide an effective deterrent. DOE/NNSA 

must improve predictive capabilities for weapon-related phenomena through theory, simulation, and 

experimental capabilities.

3.3.1 Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule 

DOE/NNSA and the national security laboratories have revised an established framework to guide ST&E

capability development (Figure 3–1) in four key areas. In previous years this activity was called the 

Predictive Capability Framework; the name was recently changed to Stewardship Capability Delivery 

Schedule. The name change and the new focus areas better reflect the advances necessary for mission 

delivery, and to achieve objectives laid out in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Weapons 

Council Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2019-2044 in an integrated manner.

 Stockpile Sustainment will guide the efforts that support the needs of the current U.S. nuclear 

stockpile. 

 Future Deterrence will develop responsive technologies and architectures that will reduce cycle 

times for future weapon development. 

 Threat Mitigation will develop and mature technologies and experimental capabilities to simulate 

combined and emerging hostile environments that future weapons must be able to survive. 

 Modern Materials and Manufacturing will develop advanced materials and ways to manufacture 

materials and components to be robust to hostile environments, extend lifetimes, and reduce 

production life cycle time and cost. 

3.3.2 Capital Investments Supporting Stockpile Stewardship

To achieve the schedule illustrated in Figure 3–1, DOE/NNSA must invest in next-generation facilities in 

key capabilities such as advanced computing, radiography, pulsed power science, accelerators, advanced 

manufacturing, and advanced material characterization. Each of these areas has one or more capital 

projects in the conceptual planning phase to address foreseeable needs for the stockpile (see Table 3–5

below and Figure 4–5 in Chapter 4, “Physical Infrastructure” (the 25-year programmatic line-item 

schedule). In addition to addressing predictive capability needs, these investments will contribute 

significantly to the NextGen science-based stockpile stewardship vision and thereby increase confidence 

in the Nation’s future deterrent.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-24 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 3–1. Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule – the four key focus areas needed to 

address mission delivery

Table 3–5. Capital investments to ensure NextGen science-based stockpile stewardship

Project Significance

Advanced Radiographic and 

Diagnostics Hydrodynamic 

Test Building Upgrade

Enhances capability for non-SNM hydrodynamic experiments for LEP certification and annual 

assessments

DARHT Axis-1 

Modernization

Modernizes an aging facility that provides a unique, highly specialized capability to take dualaxis, multiple-exposure radiographs of materials and assemblies under hydrodynamic 

conditions

Sigma Replacement  Creates a new depleted uranium and beryllium research and advanced development 

processing facility, which supports plants, Alts, and LEPs with its depleted uranium materials 

science and hazardous materials component fabrication capability

 Modernizes the ability to design and qualify nuclear weapon electrical systems (materials, 

devices, and components) to survive severe x-ray and gamma-ray radiation environments.

Refurbish/Recapitalize 

SATURN Accelerator

Restores the original capability with modest modernization to design and qualify nuclear 

weapon electrical systems (materials, devices, and components) to survive severe x-ray and 

gamma-ray radiation environments (this will extend the life of Saturn to meet current 

requirements, but will not provide capabilities needed to respond to potential emerging 

threats)

Consolidated Environmental 

Test Facility

Consolidates capabilities currently housed in SNL’s Environmental Test Laboratory and 

Aerothermodynamics Laboratory and will enable performance of multiple, combined 

environmental tests

Combined Radiation 

Environments for 

Survivability Testing 

Complex

Combines current Annular Core Research Reactor capabilities (high-fidelity neutron and 

gamma-ray environments) with an independent gamma-ray irradiation capability in a safe, 

purpose-built facility for the ability to develop and certify weapons to survive combined 

radiation (neutron and gamma) environments
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-25

Project Significance

Future HED Capabilities Increases the performance and operational capabilities of NNSA’s HED facilities, Z and NIF, to 

achieve stockpile stewardship objectives through production of higher pressures and 

temperatures and higher neutron and x-ray fluence

Full Spectrum Anechoic

Chamber

Provides improved experimental and test capabilities for weapon response to intense 

electromagnetic environments for model validation and improved quantification of design 

margins

Microsystems Sustainment Replaces a portion of the radiation-hardened microelectronics production capabilities by 

providing agile cleanroom space that mitigates growing mission risks

Full Replacement of 

SATURN and HERMES 

Accelerators

Replaces the aging Saturn and HERMES capabilities with improved performance and 

operational capabilities to produce intense x-ray and gamma-ray radiation environments and 

enables long-term support of several key weapons-related activities in radiation effects

Test Capability 

Revitalization Process 

Phases 3/4

Focuses on NNSA’s large system- and subsystem-level test facilities in thermal, fire, 

acceleration, impact, shock, and other environments where a remote location is necessary to 

mitigate hazards associated with creating extreme environments

Energetic Materials 

Characterization

Advances predictive capabilities for safety and performance assessments, resolves SFIs, 

evaluates material responses to all phases of the stockpile-to-target sequence, and develops 

new and replacement materials in support of evolving HE technical requirements

Alt = alteration

DARHT = Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

HE = high explosive

HED = high energy density

NIF = National Ignition Facility

SFI = significant finding investigation

SNM = special nuclear material

Z = Z pulsed power facility

3.3.3 Defense Programs Advisory Committee

DOE/NNSA chartered the Defense Programs Advisory Committee in 2013 to provide independent advice

in crafting future strategies by providing analysis, evaluation, and guidance regarding stewardship and 

maintenance of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. The Committee is composed of external experts who 

advise DOE/NNSA.

The Defense Programs Advisory Committee’s activities may include, but are not limited to, periodic 

reviews of the diverse major activities of the Office of Defense Programs (i.e., assessments of the Nation’s 

stockpile; the research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure needed to maintain the stockpile 

and overall nuclear deterrent; and the nuclear weapons production facilities and related manufacturing 

technologies), and the overall DOE/NNSA. The Committee recently completed an assessment of NNSA’s 

understanding of plutonium aging and has begun an analysis of competing strategies in the post-exascale 

era (see Appendix C). The Committee’s next study, to be followed in FY 2020 or later, will be an 

assessment of progress by the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to achieve its mandated mission (see 

Section 3.2.2.3).

3.4 Nuclear Test Readiness

The United States continues to observe the 1992 nuclear test moratorium. DOE/NNSA maintains the 

readiness to conduct an underground nuclear test, if required, to ensure the safety and effectiveness of 

the Nation’s stockpile or if otherwise directed by the President. DOE/NNSA’s evaluation of the response 

time has changed over the years, and the fundamental approach taken to achieve test readiness has also 

changed. 

Nuclear test readiness covers a broad range of potential activities. Assessments of nuclear test readiness 

require a clearly defined technical basis and well-understood assumptions. Key considerations include 

the following:
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 DOE/NNSA is required by the 1993 PDD-15 to 

maintain the capability to conduct a nuclear test 

within 24 to 36 months.

 Nuclear test response time depends on the 

specific details of the test.

 Assuring full compliance with domestic 

regulations, agreements, and laws relating to 

worker and public safety and the environment, 

and international treaties, would significantly 

extend the time required for execution of a 

nuclear test.

 DOE/NNSA assumes that a test would be 

conducted only when the President has declared a national emergency or other similar 

contingency and only after any necessary waiver of applicable statutory and regulatory 

restrictions. 

Since FY 2010, there has been no funding specific to nuclear test readiness as a separate program. 

DOE/NNSA maintains test readiness by exercising capabilities and workforce at the national security 

laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site through the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Test

readiness is a product of a robust, technically challenging Stockpile Stewardship Program that exercises 

essential underground testing elements at the Nevada National Security Site, such as mining, and 

investments in both the personnel and infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise. 

Operations such as subcritical experiments at U1a are exercising the people, physical assets, and 

infrastructure required for an underground nuclear test. These involve critical skills and formality of 

operations; including weapons design; design, preparation, and fielding of advanced diagnostics; modern 

safety analysis; experimental execution; and recovery and analysis of the data. Subcritical experiments 

also exercise critical skills and concept of operations with respect to weapon design.

DOE/NNSA will continue to leverage subcritical experiments for test readiness as they are challenging, 

multi-disciplinary efforts that enhance the technical competency of the nuclear security enterprise 

workforce. DOE/NNSA will also leverage experiments on HED physics platforms such as NIF, Z, and Omega 

to preserve the capability for maintaining relevant measurement capabilities, such as prompt 

measurement of optical, x-ray, gamma-ray, and neutron flux from experiments with next-generation 

technologies similar to underground nuclear test measurements. The Stockpile Responsiveness program 

also contributes to ensuring the readiness of the workforce.

Some of the capabilities and technologies used during testing have been supplanted by newer 

technologies. It would be a significant challenge to regenerate some of the old technologies, as they are 

no longer available. The strategy to migrate to these technologies entails maintaining a key set of the 

historic capabilities to enable cross-calibration between the new capabilities and technologies available 

today. 

Finally, the test readiness strategy is to reconstitute underground testing elements when needed, rather 

than maintaining obsolete facilities and capabilities. Additional details that remain valid can be found in 

the 2011 Nuclear Test Readiness Report to Congress, Appendix B. This report is largely based on a 2006 

study, which for key skills noted that significant retirements had occurred in key positions.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review directs that,

“NNSA will maintain the capability to resume 

underground nuclear explosive testing if called 

upon to do so. The United States will not seek 

Senate ratification of the Comprehensive 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but will continue to 

observe a nuclear test moratorium that began 

in 1992. This posture was adopted with the 

understanding that the United States must 

remain ready to resume nuclear testing if 

necessary to meet severe technological or 

geopolitical challenges.”
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-1

Chapter 4

Physical Infrastructure

4.1 Overview

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review clearly calls out the need for 

infrastructure modernization to ensure a resilient, enduring, and 

credible stockpile; reduce the risk to mission; and improve 

employee, public, and environmental safety. The increased 

demand on the existing infrastructure due to multiple concurrent 

life extension programs (LEPs) and the science technology and 

engineering activities in the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

presents many complex challenges, including an aging 

infrastructure that is failing at increasing rates. In spite of these 

difficulties, DOE/NNSA has made significant efforts to modernize 

the infrastructure, eliminate excess facilities, and improve 

management practices. DOE/NNSA, with Congress’s support, has also increased the resources allocated 

to improving the condition and functionality of the infrastructure and disposing of unneeded facilities. 

Figure 4–1 illustrates the size and scope of the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise infrastructure that 

influence the challenges and strategies discussed in this chapter. Planning and managing the extensive, 

diverse infrastructure across DOE/NNSA’s eight sites requires an understanding of function, age, and 

condition and a variety of new tools, techniques, and approaches to manage the complex suite of 

infrastructure assets to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

DOE/NNSA has implemented new tools for collecting data on infrastructure systems to improve 

scheduling, anticipate needs, and improve prioritization. It has also devised better processes to operate 

more efficiently and prioritize investments across the nuclear security enterprise based on mission need, 

capability health, and risk reduction. These new approaches have already yielded some success, but many 

challenges remain. DOE/NNSA must sustain assets to support mission needs. Long-term asset 

management requires balanced investment decision-making across four key elements of life cycle asset 

management, as shown in Figure 4–2.

Chapter 4 begins with a set of high-level, enterprise-wide challenges as the backdrop for the subsequent 

discussions. More specific challenges are contained in the discussions for each subsection, as appropriate. 

The asset management life cycle model shown in Figure 4–2 is used to frame the discussion for different 

types of investments across a variety of funding sources and sponsoring programs. Sections 4.2 through 

4.5 each reflect a portion of that model. Each of these sections describes the different acquisition 

strategies and funding approaches necessary to build long-term infrastructure modernization programs. 

Programmatic equipment is then discussed in Section 4.6 as one of the three key elements of capability 

sustainment.1 Section 4.7 includes ongoing modernization activities for information technology and 

cybersecurity in support of the enterprise. Section 4.8 provides a discussion of how the portions of 

 

1 Most capability management models identify three basic capability components: Facilities and Infrastructure, Equipment, and

People. Chapter 4 covers the first two of these; people are covered in Chapter 7. 

Physical Infrastructure 

Major Accomplishments

 Began constructing the primary 

buildings replacing 70-year old uranium 

production facilities in Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee.

 Identified the recommended alternative 

for rebuilding America’s plutonium pit 

production capability by 2030.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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DOE/NNSA infrastructure size and scope

DOE/NNSA outside the direct nuclear weapons mission areas leverage the nuclear security enterprise 

investments for their own national security mission needs. Section 4.9 concludes the chapter with a 

discussion on management and performance. 

Within each section of Sections 4.2 through 4.5, various funding strategies and acquisition approaches are 

the organizing framework for discussion. The funding strategy to support any given type of project can 

vary greatly due to the budget structure, the scale of the project, and other factors. Acquisition 

approaches include line-item acquisition, recapitalization via minor construction, and sustainment 

investments. 

Asset management life cycle
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-3

Challenges and Strategies

DOE/NNSA is responsible for developing and implementing infrastructure modernization strategies to 

meet the following challenges posed by internal and external stakeholders to enable the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program:

 The need to address the poor condition of DOE/NNSA facilities

 The need for enterprise-wide life cycle asset management

 The need for a more responsive, resilient enterprise

 The need for more efficient, effective execution

This section outlines these challenges. The remainder of the chapter describes how DOE/NNSA is 

resolving these challenges through continuing improvements in data-driven long-term planning and 

project execution.

The condition of nearly one-third of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure is insufficient to meet mission needs (see 

Figure 4–3). Nearly 60 percent of facilities and equipment are more than 40 years old. Nearly 30 percent 

of facilities were constructed during the early Cold War era, and 10 percent are deemed excess to mission

needs. The success of DOE/NNSA’s unique national security mission is dependent upon safe, reliable, and 

modern infrastructure. However, the current state of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure poses risk to the 

availability, capacity, and reliability of Weapons Activities capabilities. 

Asset condition by replacement plant value percentage

The Need for Enterprise-Wide Life-Cycle Asset Management

While there has been strong support for several specific requirements for ensuring the safety, security, 

and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, such as the LEPs and construction of the Uranium 

Processing Facility, DOE/NNSA has not sufficiently prioritized sustaining many small capabilities that 

enable the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Going forward, DOE/NNSA must find a balance between 

execution of a handful of high-visibility megaprojects needed to produce strategic materials and 

recapitalization of the many smaller facilities necessary for the design, production, and qualification of

U.S. nuclear weapons components.

DOE/NNSA has approximately 300 major programmatic facilities that average over 40 years old. The 

remaining 5,000 mission-enabling assets such as office and laboratory buildings, electrical distribution 

systems, and security infrastructure, also have an average age of over 40 years old. Upgrading or replacing 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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this infrastructure will require significant and sustained investment. By addressing infrastructure needs, 

DOE/NNSA can also improve workforce recruitment and retention.

A More Responsive, Resilient Enterprise

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review identified the need for a more responsive and resilient infrastructure to 

support multiple concurrent weapon programs. The nuclear security enterprise of today lacks resiliency; 

aging facilities and equipment present a risk to mission execution. Further, the enterprise is not 

sufficiently responsive for the missions anticipated in the future; the existing infrastructure lacks the 

capacity in some areas to meet emerging mission requirements.

DOE/NNSA’s challenge is to develop an infrastructure modernization strategy that is responsive and 

resilient enough to enable development and deployment of new designs and refurbishments more rapidly 

and at lower risk than is currently possible to meet expected future demands. In addition to infrastructure 

planning, DOE/NNSA and its management and operating (M&O) partners can exercise a Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program to improve responsiveness via the full life-cycle spectrum of nuclear weapon 

conceptualization, development, design, manufacture, and retirement to face technological surprise and 

potential geopolitical shifts in the future. 

More Efficient, Effective Execution

DOE/NNSA is taking steps to arrest the declining state of infrastructure by enhancing and optimizing 

resources, including employing innovative management tools to facilitate a data-driven, risk-informed 

planning process that will guide investment decisions. Sites are also making efforts within their budgets 

to recapitalize facilities and equipment in support of multiple capabilities. The nuclear weapon enterprise 

aspires to have best-in-class safety and physical security practices, emergency preparedness and 

response, and enhanced cybersecurity, with expertise to counter the unexpected.

Overall, DOE/NNSA is shrinking its large infrastructure footprint while providing new, state-of-the-art 

facilities to meet growing mission requirements. DOE/NNSA must continue to improve project execution 

to address risks and meet mission needs. DOE/NNSA is constantly challenged by the magnitude of a failing 

and obsolete infrastructure that crosscuts all of the nuclear security enterprise with respect to 

sustainment, modernization, and life-cycle management. 

4.2 Acquisition Through Line-Item Construction

In 2018, DOE/NNSA has approximately 5,000 assets with an

average age of approximately 46 years. The largest and most 

complex of those facilities will require line-item construction 

projects for recapitalization. Since aging facilities represent 

increasing risk to mission execution and these projects 

require significant coordination over multiple years, 

DOE/NNSA is developing a 25-year line-item construction 

plan to address these major infrastructure issues.

The primary challenge to DOE/NNSA’s line-item construction 

portfolio is the timely enactment each year of the President’s 

budget. In addition, the sizes and complexities of these 

projects lead to several program and project management 

challenges. In spite of these challenges, DOE/NNSA has 

demonstrated success: NNSA is no longer on the 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-5

Government Accountability Office High-Risk List for the management of line-item projects under 

$750 million. However, the complexity of the DOE/NNSA acquisition processes can present a challenge 

to meeting enterprise needs in a responsive and timely manner.

DOE/NNSA is improving the Line Item Construction Planning processes to support the 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review, Weapons Activities requirements, and other DOE/NNSA mission requirements. These 

improved planning processes have identified a large capital outlay requirement over the 25-year planning 

period that more realistically captures NNSA’s modernization needs than previous resource projections. 

Programmatic Line-Item Projects

In 2018, DOE/NNSA has nearly 300 major programmatic facilities with an average age of approximately 

46 years that could eventually require line-item construction projects for replacement. Since aging 

facilities represent increasing risk to mission execution, DOE/NNSA is seeking a line-item portfolio solution 

to reduce the average facility age to a sustainable level while also meeting program requirements. 

Figure 4–4 demonstrates the historical average age growth of NNSA’s major programmatic facilities and 

the planned reduction in average age after completing the projects identified in NNSA’s new long-term 

major capital asset modernization strategy, which was developed via the Capital Acquisition (CapAx)

process. 

Historical average age growth of NNSA major programmatic facilities

and a projection of the planned stabilization of average age after executing the

FY 2020 President’s Budget Request-informed line-item plan
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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4.2.1.1 CapAx – the Long-Term Planning Process

In 2017 and 2018, DOE/NNSA developed CapAx to integrate the planning, programming, budgeting and 

evaluation process with the DOE capital acquisition process. This annual effort mirrors DOE/NNSA’s LEP 

planning process through the use of site expertise, programmatic reviews, and independent Federal cost 

and schedule estimates. Support is provided by representatives from all of the sites and responsible 

Federal offices across DOE/NNSA. The final 25-year schedule of major projects is determined by senior 

DOE/NNSA leadership.

DOE/NNSA will track the average age of major programmatic facilities from 2018 onwards to judge the 

adequacy of the long-term infrastructure modernization plan to improve infrastructure resiliency. 

Average age is an easily calculated metric that can be used as a proxy for risk to mission. NNSA 

infrastructure planners developed this approach after engaging with interagency peers from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration which has been using this metric as a key part of their strategic 

planning process since at least 2011. In addition to this portfolio-level metric, each mission area will be 

evaluated for future modernization needs. 

The planning estimates and schedule dates shown on the 25-year programmatic line-item schedule (see 

Figure 4–6 at the end of this section) are supported by the FY 2020 President’s Budget Request. The 

planned start and end dates for the “ongoing projects” are more certain than those in the “under review”

and “new proposals” categories. DOE/NNSA will continue to update the 25-year schedule annually based 

on new mission needs assessments, cost estimates, programmatic prioritization, and the availability of 

funding. Once DOE/NNSA begins each project and conducts an analysis of alternatives, some planned 

acquisitions may convert to alternate strategies to meet mission needs. These decisions could change 

future projections. 

DOE/NNSA manages line-item capital acquisition projects through a defined DOE acquisition process with 

five critical decision points shown in (Figure 4–5), which serve as major milestones approved by a Project 

Management Executive. Each critical decision marks further certainty in project scope and requires 

successful completion of the preceding phase. The NNSA will sometimes combine CD-2 and CD-3 to 

reduce acquisition time while maintaining program management requirements.

Critical Decision overview
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-7

DOE/NNSA 25-year programmatic line-item schedule
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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4.2.1.2 Current Projects

DOE/NNSA is currently executing multiple programmatic line-item projects that are past Critical Decision 1

(CD-1), “Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range.” These projects are listed in Table 4–1 and shown 

in Figure 4–6. Cost and schedule estimates for these projects vary from conceptual design-based 

estimates to baselined project estimates.

Table 4–1. Programmatic line-item projects that are past Critical Decision 1

Project Project Description

Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research 

Replacement (CMRR)

The CMRR Project will ensure continuity in enduring analytical chemistry and materials 

characterization capabilities for DOE/NNSA actinide-based missions in support of pit production 

and Plutonium Center of Excellence missions. Active subprojects will reconfigure space in 

Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building and Plutonium Facility (PF-4) and install additional 

analytical chemistry and materials characterization equipment.

High Explosives Science 

and Engineering Facility

The High Explosives Science and Engineering Facility will consolidate 15 aging facilities into three

new, efficient facilities to conduct science, technology, engineering, and production activities in 

assembly/disassembly and high explosives. Most of the current facilities were built over 70 years 

ago, lack the electrical infrastructure to meet mission requirements, and have safety and security 

limitations as a result of failing infrastructure. 

Transuranic Liquid Waste 

Facility

Treating transuranic liquid waste is a key support capability for DOE/NNSA operations at PF-4. 

The current facility that treats liquid waste has passed its useful life and does not meet current 

codes requirements. The Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility is designed to receive up to 29,000 

liters of liquid waste annually from PF-4 operations, which produces pits for the Nation’s 

enduring stockpile.

Uranium Processing 

Facility

The Uranium Processing Facility project ensures the long-term viability, safety, and security of 

DOE/NNSA’s enriched uranium capability. It supports the Nation’s capability to manufacture 

weapon subassemblies containing enriched uranium components and convert excess enriched 

uranium into forms suitable for safe, long-term storage and reuse. The new facility replaces 

Y-12’s enriched uranium processing operations, which are currently housed in numerous aging, 

inefficient buildings in poor condition that pose multiple risks to meeting the mission. The oldest 

building, 9212, does not currently meet codes and standards, is costly to operate, and has many 

operating issues. This project will complete the first phase of the Uranium Mission Strategy. 

Exascale Class 

Computing Cooling 

Equipment

This project will increase the cooling capacity for high performance computing. The scope 

includes installation of five additional open-celled cooling towers to the north of the existing 

towers, extension of the process loop piping to the east of the existing piping loop, seven new 

process water pumps, four new heat exchangers, and associated piping. The project also 

includes installation of the supporting electrical equipment and components necessary for the 

function of the mechanical equipment, and additions to the building’s automated control 

system. 

Exascale Computing 

Facility Modernization 

The project will modify the existing high performance computing center at LLNL to accommodate 

the increased infrastructure demands of exascale computing platforms, to include upgrades to 

the electrical and mechanical capabilities of the facility. The existing cooling tower complex will 

be expanded for additional cooling, and the electrical system will be upgraded to allow additional 

power for high performance computing. 

U1a Complex 

Enhancements Project 

and ECSE Advanced 

Sources and Detectors 

(ASD) Project

The U1a Complex Enhancement Project consists of infrastructure modifications to provide the 

U1a Complex at the Nevada National Security Site with the infrastructure to house and field 

multi-pulse radiography. This includes structures, systems, and components necessary for 

deployment of the ECSE ASD Project’s pulsed x-ray radiography equipment and potential future 

neutron-diagnosed subcritical experiments technology that will produce valuable data on the 

phenomena associated with the final stages of a weapon implosion.

ECSE = Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-9

4.2.1.3 Projects Under Review

DOE/NNSA is currently executing multiple projects that are past CD-0, “Approve Mission Need,” but have 

not yet completed CD-1. These projects are considered “under review” until the formal CD-1 alternative 

selection is made. These projects are listed in Table 4–2 and shown in the 25-year plan in Figure 4–6. For 

more detail on the programs and capabilities supported by these modernization projects, please review

SSMP Chapter 2, “Stockpile Management,” and Chapter 3, “Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, 

and Engineering.” Cost and schedule estimates for these projects vary from planning estimates to 

conceptual design-based estimates. 

Table 4–2. Programmatic line-item projects that are under review

Project Description

Domestic Uranium 

Enrichment

The Domestic Uranium Enrichment project will analyze options for (and if necessary establish) a 

reliable and economic supply of enriched uranium to support U.S. national security and 

nonproliferation needs. The U.S. Government does not currently have the capability to enrich 

uranium. Enriched uranium is required in varying assays and forms to meet U.S. national security and 

nonproliferation mission requirements, including low-enriched uranium as fuel for tritium production 

reactors; high-assay low-enriched uranium for fuel for research reactors; and highly enriched uranium 

for fuel for naval reactors. 

Lithium Processing 

Facility

The Lithium Processing Facility project at Y-12 replaces lithium component manufacturing capabilities 

currently located in a 75-plus-year-old building. The facility has structural issues such as cracked 

support beams and concrete spalling due to years of caustic chemical contamination that present a 

high-risk safety environment for both workers and process equipment. Lithium components are vital 

to canned subassembly production, and lithium capabilities support Directed Stockpile Work LEPs, 

joint test assemblies, international agreements, several DOE/NNSA offices outside the weapons 

programs, and other agencies beyond DOE. 

Material Staging 

Facility

Current staging facilities are not sufficient to meet staging capacity demands. Pantex has converted 

operational bays to staging bays to accommodate total material staging needs. The current material 

staging facilities are 46-70 years old and in need of refresh. This project has received CD-0 “Approval

of Mission Need” and is developing the material for a CD-1 “Approve Alternative Selection and Cost 

Range” approval. This project will resolve the mission staging gap as identified by DOE/NNSA.

Plutonium Pit 

Production Projects

DOE/NNSA requires a sustained production capacity of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. There 

are two distinct Plutonium Pit Production Projects under development: the Savannah River Plutonium 

Processing Facility (SRPPF) and the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4). The SRPPF 

recommended alternative will provide the capability to remanufacture, at a minimum, 50 War Reserve 

pits per year by 2030 at SRS. The LAP4 project will meet the remaining pit production demand. 

DOE/NNSA is reviewing how to implement LAP4 through the DOE Order 413 process given the 

maturity of LANL’s pit production program; the initial critical decision point for this program is under 

discussion. LAP4 is included in this section only as a reflection of the connection with SRPPF. 

Tritium Finishing 

Facility

The Tritium Finishing facility line-item project will construct two new production buildings and 

relocate the vulnerable reservoir-related capabilities from the current facility to the newer, 

centralized production facilities. This alternative will significantly reduce operational risk and increase 

facility reliability compared to continuing operation in the current facility for an additional 20 years. 

ECSE ASD Project Late-time plutonium implosion measurements are required to develop and refine modern predictive 

models that are used in certifying the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. DOE/NNSA cannot 

currently measure the final stages of a subcritical imploding plutonium system with the required 

fidelity. Pulsed x-radiography is a demonstrated capability for making these measurements. The ECSE 

ASD Project fills this capability gap through development of a four-pulse linear induction electron 

accelerator. The scope includes design, fabrication, testing, installation, commissioning, and 

execution of readiness at the U1a Complex. 

TA-55 Reinvestments 

Project, Phase 3 

The TA-55 Reinvestments Project will support design and construction of the fire alarm systems in

PF-4 at LANL and removal of the old system. The main fire alarm panel and supporting devices 

represent a single-point failure risk. 

ASD = Advanced Sources and Detectors

CD = Critical Decision

ECSE = Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

PF-4 = Plutonium Facility

TA-55 = Technical Area 55
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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4.2.1.4 New Projects with FY 2020 Funding Requests

Three new project proposals were identified, analyzed, and included in the FY 2020 Request by as part of 

the CapAx process. DOE/NNSA will determine appropriate out-year funding to develop and execute these

proposals as the projects mature. DOE/NNSA are evaluating the mission needs associated with these 

project proposals and performing analyses to determine whether or not to prioritize the execution of

these projects. Note that one project, the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production Facility, 

has already reached CD-0; this ability for DOE/NNSA to execute early critical decision gates faster for these 

new projects is a testament to the capital acquisition execution improvements enabled by the CapAx 

planning process.

The FY 2020 project proposals shown in Table 4–3 below reflect a new focus on modernizing DOE/NNSA’s 

non-special nuclear material (non-SNM) production capabilities. Over the past two decades, DOE/NNSA 

has focused on modernizing the high-cost, high-importance nuclear strategic materials capabilities. Over

the past 5 years, DOE/NNSA has begun to focus on the non-nuclear strategic materials, lithium and 

tritium. Now, DOE/NNSA is undertaking line-item projects that will improve the ability to produce and 

qualify non-SNM components.

Table 4–3. CapAx project proposals in the FY 2020 President’s Budget Request

Project Proposal Description

Power Sources 

Capability

All current and planned nuclear weapon systems require power source development and support 

from design, and production through surveillance activities. Requirements are unique to nuclear 

weapons, and commercial vendors are not viable for this work. There is an immediate risk to 

DOE/NNSA’s power sources capability because of the gap between the current state of the 

capability and the required state based on the forecast increased demand and poor facility 

conditions. DOE/NNSA also supplies advanced power sources for other national security mission 

needs that cannot be commercially sourced. The proposed project will mitigate risk by exploring 

options for a robust, agile, and reconfigurable facility that is adaptable to changing needs; enables

engagement with supply chain partners; supports technology development; and fosters innovation. 

Dedicated laboratories could include dry room, battery testing, and chemistry/wet laboratories. 

Specialized spaces could include rapid product realization, destructive testing, x-ray analysis 

laboratories, and hazardous storage.

Combined Radiation 

Environments for 

Survivability Testing 

(CREST) Complex 

The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) provides high-fidelity neutron and gamma-ray 

environments that emulate nuclear weapon environments in support of weapons development and 

certification. The current ACRR facility is nearly 60 years old, was not designed to house a nuclear 

reactor, and does not meet modern codes or standards. The age and condition of the facility have 

resulted in inefficiencies that have reduced test operations from 4 to 3 days per week. Nearly every 

weapon component in the stockpile undergoes testing at the ACRR; demand is increasing; and there 

is no backup capability in the Nation. The proposed CREST project would explore options to provide 

a replacement facility into which the existing reactor fuel could be relocated. CREST could also 

combine the current ACRR capabilities with an independent gamma-ray irradiation capability in a 

safe, purpose-built facility. New or improved nuclear material storage, handling, and processing 

space and associated laboratories, offices, and other infrastructure would also be considered in the 

scope.

High Explosives 

Synthesis, 

Formulation, and 

Production Facility

This project will address challenges at the supplier’s formulation facility and their difficulty with 

meeting DOE/NNSA production requirements. This project will consolidate limited legacy facilities 

that are inadequate for the mission need and will ensure the required capability and capacity is 

available to meet future high explosive workload and mission requirements. Areas to be addressed 

include explosive and mock formulation operations to support multiple weapon programs, 

technology development for future programs, and support for strategic partners. This project has 

already reached CD-0 after the program performed requirements development in 2018.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

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4.2.1.5 Other New Proposals

The project proposals in this section are a representative subset of the projects that were added to the 

25-year plan after approximately 200 project proposals were reviewed by DOE/NNSA. They are included 

to show the kinds of high-importance programmatic mission needs that are continuously under review by 

DOE/NNSA for modernization. No new programmatic line-item projects are scheduled to start between 

FY 2021 and FY 2024. As such, no funding is requested for these projects in the 2020 President’s Budget 

Request. Some of these projects could be accelerated into the Future Years Nuclear Security Program

(FYNSP) (or delayed further or cancelled) in the future after DOE/NNSA conducts more analyses. 

DOE/NNSA’s 25-year plan and the FY 2020 President’s Budget Request together present an executable 

and affordable schedule of line-item proposals.

The Government Accountability Office identified a “bow wave” of construction projects in previous 

DOE/NNSA line-item plans. Based on internal CapAx analysis, DOE/NNSA now recognizes that, given the 

amount of time necessary to start and build up the teams that complete line-item construction projects,

a trough is forming outside the FYNSP where planned annual line-item construction requirements 

decrease. DOE/NNSA is already analyzing this problem to determine potential solutions. The project 

proposals in the tables below could be a part of the solution to resolving this known planning gap. This 

and new emergent issues will be addressed during the ongoing FY 2021 to FY 2025 planning process. The 

trough can be seen in the 25-year budget project figure in Chapter 8 (Figure 8–31).

The potential projects shown in Table 4–4 could improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform the science, 

technology, and engineering (ST&E) that underpins the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Table 4–4. Potential projects to improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform science, 

technology, and engineering 

Project Proposal Description

Dynamic Mesoscale 

Material Science 

Capability

There is a gap in science tools for stockpile stewardship between atomic scale materials phenomena 

(addressed by facilities such as NIF and Z) and the integral scale (addressed by DARHT and the U1a 

Complex). This project would provide a new capability to characterize microstructure and materials 

responses in the middle scale or “mesoscale.” 

Energetic Materials 

Characterization

This project would support research and development (R&D) to advance predictive capabilities for 

safety and performance assessments and qualification and surveillance; evaluate material responses 

to all phases of the stockpile-to-target sequence; resolve significant finding investigations; provide 

technical data on which to base annual weapon assessments; and develop new/replacement 

materials in support of evolving high explosive technical requirements. The project would 

consolidate 18 structures into a single modern facility to reduce operating costs. Current structures 

are prone to sudden, unexpected failures and do not meet current design or safety standards.

Future HED Capability HED physics experiments provide data that are vital to maintaining the stockpile; existing facilities 

(Z, NIF, and others) will need refurbishments, and new capabilities will be proposed within this 

project to address future questions. The project scope is undefined. Defense Programs will perform 

a strategic review of the ICF HED portfolio and review a suite of alternatives for modernization of HED 

capabilities at a later date. 

High Explosive Test 

and Evaluation 

Facilities Upgrade

The High Explosives Application Facility, which integrates synthesis, formulation, and explosives 

testing operations in one facility, is at capacity for fielding stewardship and stockpile LEP 

development work. This infrastructure investment would provide critical capability and capacity 

upgrades to support near-term warhead development programs, and stockpile certification. The 

project would expand experimental bays and laboratory space for small-scale and component scale 

experiments, including integration of novel diagnostics. 

DARHT = Dual-Axis Radiography Hydrodynamic Test

HED = high energy density

ICF = Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

NIF = National Ignition Facility

Z = Z pulsed power facility
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-12 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The potential projects shown in Table 4–5 could improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform the production, 

engineering, and assembly missions that underpin the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Table 4–5. Potential projects to improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform production, 

engineering, and assembly missions

Project Proposal Description

California 

Environmental Test 

Revitalization

The capabilities housed in these facilities enable researchers to test the effects of normal, abnormal, and 

hostile environments (e.g., shock, vibration, vacuum, force, acceleration, thermal, pressure) on weapon 

systems and components. They provide a fundamental understanding of aging phenomena to support 

component lifetime assessments, and experimental capabilities, diagnostics, and data to understand the 

physics of component impact, subsystem response, and weapon performance when subjected to 

stockpile-to-target sequence environments. They directly support design, development, qualification, and 

evaluation of the stockpile. This project proposal would consolidate or refurbish five assets at SNL with 

multiple specialized laboratories and testing tools for weapons design and engineering analysis, system 

qualification, model validation, and significant finding investigations. Alternatively, a phased approach 

could be taken to stagger these necessary renovations. 

Environmental Test 

Complex

These experimental functions support warhead geometry and weapons assembly/subassembly 

experimental capabilities. This project proposal would recapitalize and modernize the environmental 

testing facilities and high explosives shock and vibration testing capabilities at LANL. The scope would 

include options for relocating mechanical testing. 

Integrated Weapon 

Evaluation 

Capability 

(Formerly Weapons 

Evaluation Facility 

Surveillance)

As part of the Annual Assessment cycle, SNL collects component, subsystem, system, and joint test 

assembly data to ensure the stockpile retains its deterrent value. Laboratory test equipment for 

qualification, surveillance, field testing, and aircraft compatibility are currently developed in multiple 

buildings. Many of the facilities housing test equipment are obsolete and/or in deteriorating condition 

and have high maintenance and repair costs. The conditions present increased risk to tester development 

schedules in support of weapon modernization design, qualification, and production activities. This 

project would consolidate testing facilities to enable faster and more efficient testing processes and allow 

the development of new testing strategies. Facility investment must provide secure high-bay, mid-bay, 

and light electrical laboratories; collaboration space; and general office space. A new R&D centrifuge 

would better support environmental and Nuclear Enterprise Assurance testing and enable the prove-in of 

new technologies to be implemented at the Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory at Pantex, thereby 

reducing integration times. 

Kauai Test Facility 

(KTF) High Op 

Tempo Testing 

Launch Capability 

Sustainment

KTF provides the key development, test, and evaluation capabilities that are essential to nuclear 

deterrence and broader national security missions. The High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight 

Test program would provide a test platform with a high-risk tolerance for new technologies that can 

duplicate many of the combined launch environments needed to qualify components, technologies, and 

subsystems. This would support DOE/NNSA’s goal to accelerate development cycles and shorten the 

duration of future weapons modernization programs. KTF needs investment to replace aging temporary 

facilities that support crucial test launches on behalf of the Nation’s nuclear deterrence efforts. This 

project would explore modernization solutions to include removal and replacement of the outdated 

trailers, the concrete loading dock, and the delaminating/rusting overhead structure with a facility 

designed and constructed to survive an errant launch or launch pad mishap

Microsystems 

Sustainment

The most pressing near-term strategic radiation-hardened microsystems infrastructure need is to address 

growing risks associated with the capabilities provided by the Silicon Fabrication Facility (SiFab), which was 

commissioned in 1988 with a 25-year design life. Without significant investment, SiFab cannot credibly 

support current and future technology needs through 2040. Compounding the growing risks is that 

SiFab’s ceiling height and outdated foundation design will not support the requirements of semiconductor 

replacement tools. This project proposal would consider replacing a portion of SiFab’s radiationhardening capabilities by providing agile clean room space that mitigates growing mission risks among 

other cost-effective alternatives.

Next-Generation 

LEP R&D 

Fabrication Facility

The ability to test stockpile systems at the subsystem and device scale involves engineering environmental 

testing and hydrodynamic experiments that rely on the ability to rapidly fabricate precision parts. 

Fabrication and inspection is a fundamental capability in supporting science, technology, and engineering

(ST&E) of stockpile LEPs and replacement programs and essential to streamlining and increasing 

throughput of the design agency development pipeline. This proposed LLNL facility would provide both 

critical capability and capacity augmentation to support design agency prototyping and stockpile system 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-13

Project Proposal Description

development for the stockpile certification. It would also serve as a production technology development, 

maturation, and insertion research hub for design/production agency collaboration on next-generation 

production technologies. This project proposal would replace or refurbish a set of important workshops at 

LLNL.

Neutron Generator 

Enterprise

Consolidation

Neutron generators must meet the highest levels of reliability and survivability and be periodically 

replaced. In 1995, when DOE/NNSA designated SNL as the production agency for neutron generators, 

operations were moved into existing buildings, resulting in operations housed in eight buildings on 

multiple sites. Material movement and product staging in multiple locations causes inefficiencies, 

suboptimal workflows, and increased time and risk factors (damage, loss, quality, and security). In 

addition, the facilities and infrastructure are aging, presenting increasing risks to mission work. The 

proposed consolidated complex would significantly improve workflow and efficiency, enabling

DOE/NNSA’s neutron generator operations at SNL to better meet national security needs. Flexible-use 

space would allow for agile response to unanticipated requirements, installation and testing of 

replacement equipment, and investigation of new technologies. 

Weapons 

Fabrication and

Engineering Facility

Consolidation of the weapons manufacturing capability in conjunction with localized engineering design 

and testing support would enable a more efficient, cost-effective, and expedient response to DOE/NNSA 

mission needs at LANL, and support site consolidation and transformation efforts. This project proposal 

would provide the consolidated fabrication and engineering facility necessary to provide reliable, 

effective, safe non-nuclear component machining in concert with enhanced engineering design, analysis, 

and prototype testing for the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s Pit Manufacturing and Plutonium 

Sustainment efforts. 

Weapon System 

Assembly and 

Disassembly Cell 

Upgrade

This project would provide additional production cell capacity to support the forecasted increase in 

workload. The proposed project would include installation of task exhaust; modifications to blast doors;

replacement of dehumidifiers; installation of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning equipment, hoists,

fire systems, and Radiation Alarm Monitoring Systems; and start-up activities. Expected activities for the 

third cell include installation of new flooring, minor system modifications, and start-up activities. 

Table 4–6 lists potential projects that could improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform the Strategic 

Materials production process development mission.

Table 4–6. Potential projects to improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform the 

Strategic Materials mission

Project Proposal Description

Applied 

Technologies 

Laboratory

Development capabilities currently performed in legacy facilities provide material to production, develop 

and demonstrate new uranium and lithium technologies, and provide weapons quality assurance. The 

improvements and technological advancements performed in these facilities are critical to flexibility in 

accommodating DOE/NNSA design laboratory requirements, improving productivity, reducing operating 

costs, and protecting workers and the public. Two facilities are over 70 years old and are in poor 

condition. Most work is currently conducted in three facilities totaling about 200,000 square feet. This 

project would provide a new facility to consolidate applied technology mission activities. 

Tritium 

Development 

Laboratory

Legacy facilities that support radiological R&D in the tritium production and handling process were shut 

down in 2003, concurrent with the legacy 232-H production facility. Prior to 2003, SRS Building 232-H 

was used for radiological development and technology demonstration for the current H Area New 

Manufacturing Facility. The Tritium Development Laboratory project would provide a new radiological 

Tritium R&D capability to resolve the Tritium R&D Mission gap. The NNSA nuclear security enterprise 

lacks the radiological capability to develop and demonstrate tritium process technologies and mature 

gas transfer systems with actual tritium. As a result, most technology development needed for risk 

reduction, efficiency, or modernization cannot proceed beyond Technology Risk Level 6. Until this 

Tritium R&D mission gap is resolved, opportunities for increasing efficiencies and reducing operations 

and maintenance costs are limited. This project proposal would explore creation of a new radiological 

tritium R&D facility with the capability to perform testing and demonstration to mature processes and 

gas transfer systems to Technical Readiness Level 7 in operational environments. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Mission Enabling Line-Item Construction Projects

In addition to programmatic line items, DOE/NNSA funds mission-enabling infrastructure line items such 

as site-wide utilities, office and laboratory space, and services to support the nuclear weapons mission

(see Figure 4–7). 

DOE/NNSA 25-year infrastructure line-item schedule

DOE/NNSA is already executing multiple ongoing mission enabling projects that are past CD-1. These 

projects are listed in Table 4–7.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-15

Table 4–7. Ongoing mission-enabling projects

Project Description

Technical Area 3 

Substation 

Replacement, LANL

The new modern substation will provide increased distribution capacity, improved reliability, reduced 

maintenance, support for greater operational flexibility, and increased worker safety. It will provide 

separate power feeds to both the LANL and Los Alamos County. 

Expand Electrical 

Distribution 

System, LLNL 

This project provides the most urgent electrical infrastructure needs by providing a reliable alternate 

electrical feed to mission-critical facilities at LLNL and SNL-California by expanding the electrical 

distribution systems at LLNL and providing a new electrical connection to the SNL-California site. As a 

supplement to the existing distribution system, it improves resiliency for certain mission-critical 

facilities at LLNL and SNL-California. 

Power 

Transmission 

System 

Replacement –

Mission Corridor, 

Nevada National 

Security Site

The project will replace a 55-year-old 138-kilovolt (kV) power transmission system in the Nevada 

National Security Site Mission Corridor in Mercury, Nevada to provide the Nevada National Security 

Site with reliable power and communications to mission-critical facilities. This project will design and 

construct a new 138-kV power transmission system in the Nevada National Security Site Mission 

Corridor. This power transmission system will replace and upgrade 23 miles of the degraded existing 

power transmission system and upgrade the collocated fiber optic lines to meet vital national security 

mission requirements. The project will be executed to allow continued operations of current missioncritical facilities.

Electrical Power 

Capacity Upgrade, 

LANL 

This project addresses projected increases in the capacity and distribution of the electrical 

transmission and distribution system at LANL to reliably support demand for multiple program 

activities being performed at the site. By 2024, power demand for all programs, including Directed 

Stockpile Work simulation requirements, is expected to exceed the capacity and performance 

requirements of LANL’s existing transmission and distribution system. A significant electrical demand 

increase will support critical Directed Stockpile Work requirements for LEPs, significant finding 

investigations, and ongoing Stockpile Stewardship Program, national security, R&D, and other work. 

Fire Station, Y-12 The project provides a single-story building (approximately 35,000 square feet) to meet all emergency 

response requirements including firefighting, emergency medical treatment and transport, hazardous 

materials spill mitigation, and technical rescue responses for all events within the site emergency 

response boundary at the Y-12 site. The new facility will be built to meet all safety standards and 

building codes to support 24-hour, 7 days-a-week operations under all environmental conditions. The 

facility will accommodate a workforce and a fleet of large fire apparatus vehicles, ambulances, 

emergency response vehicles, and other support vehicles. 

Albuquerque 

Complex Project

The NNSA Albuquerque Office Complex is beyond its design life and does not meet NNSA’s needs. 

Construction has started on a 333,000-square-foot building to house approximately 1,200 employees. 

The building is being constructed on DOE property in Albuquerque, New Mexico, adjacent to Kirtland 

Air Force Base. The new building is designed to Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Gold 

Standards.

Emergency 

Operations Center, 

Y-12

The project will provide a centralized, comprehensive emergency management capability for the

development, coordination, control, and direction of emergency planning, preparedness, readiness

assurance, response, and recovery actions. The current facility is not compliant with DOE 

Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System.

Emergency 

Operations Center, 

SNL

This project will provide a facility that meets DOE/NNSA and SNL standards and requirements, to 

include personnel parking, computing, communications, building systems, and fuel and water storage 

sufficient to mitigate all potential emergency operations/management response capabilities. 

Emergency 

Operations Center, 

LLNL

This project provides a new permanent Emergency Operations Center with comprehensive emergency 

management capabilities for the development, coordination, control, and direction of emergency 

planning, preparedness, readiness, assurance, response, and recovery actions. The 20,000-grosssquare-foot building will allow an occupancy rate needed during an emergency event that the current 

Emergency Operations Center cannot accommodate; provide additional parking; and contain or 

interface with approximately 60 systems, including closed-circuit television, metrology, site fire and 

life safety alarms, radio communication, emergency services disaster dispatching, etc. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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At the time of writing this SSMP, no mission-enabling projects are “under development” from CD-0 to 

CD-1. However, multiple new proposals for such projects are planned to begin in the FYNSP. A description 

of these proposed projects can be found in Table 4–8.

Table 4–8. New proposals for mission-enabling projects

Project Proposal Description

Mission Corridor New 

Water System, Nevada 

National Security Site

The project would replace end-of-life wells, tanks, distribution lines, pumps, and support 

facilities to provide water supply and distribution to the Device Assembly Facility, U1a Complex, 

Control Point, Area 6 Complex, and other critical mission facilities.

B256 Network 

Communication Center 

Replacement, LLNL

The project would provide a new facility to meet current and future communications needs. 

The existing facility has reached its capacity and cannot accommodate new or updated 

networks and systems. The facility will accommodate modern communication equipment 

configuration requirements and eliminate a single point-of-failure for networking, 

telecommunications, and safety alarms

Kansas City Office and 

Manufacturing Space 

Expansion Project

KCNSC needs a sustainable long-term office and manufacturing space solution to meet 

workload and mission needs or risk the inability to meet cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives An analysis of required spaces is being developed to inform decisions about longterm office and manufacturing space solutions. 

New Nevada Mission 

Support Complex

A proposed Nevada Mission Support Complex project would provide sustainable infrastructure 

that supports the health, safety, and welfare of the employee, the public, and the 

environment. As NNSA moves toward a smaller, safer, more secure, and less expensive 

enterprise, consolidation of functions into newer and fewer facilities at the Nevada National 

Security Site are necessary to align the site with DOE and NNSA Strategic Plans. The Nevada 

Mission Support Complex will collocate functions, improve collaboration and productivity, 

address workforce recruitment and retention challenges, and enable resources to be 

redirected toward critical mission work and away from infrastructure maintenance on obsolete 

facilities. 

Defense Nuclear Security Line-Item Projects

DOE/NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) Program continues to manage numerous projects, as 

outlined in the 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan submitted to Congress in August 2017. Two 

ongoing DNS line-item construction projects are beyond CD-1, as outlined below. DNS will continue to 

evaluate infrastructure needs to determine whether additional new projects are necessary in the future.

4.2.3.1 Ongoing Projects

West End Protected Area Reduction (WEPAR) – The WEPAR project will reduce the size of the protected 

area at Y-12 from 150 acres to approximately 90 acres. This project will have two beneficial outcomes. 

First, the sensitive facilities remaining within the now reduced perimeter will be protected by a new, 

correspondingly smaller, Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS), which will reduce 

security and operating costs. Second, DOE Environmental Management cleanup activities for facilities 

previously encompassed by the larger protected area may proceed more efficiently and cost-effectively 

because those facilities will no longer be in a protected area. This project is currently developing the 

approval performance baseline (CD-2) and the approval to start construction or execution (CD-3) package.

Device Assembly Facility (DAF) – The DAF Argus Project at the Nevada National Security Site will continue 

to install new security system elements into the DAF Building and perimeter. The installation has been 

completed on the perimeter, and installation of the interior is currently underway. Project completion is 

expected in FY 2021.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-17

4.3 Modernization through Minor Construction and 

Recapitalization

Minor construction and recapitalization projects provide an 

important vehicle for DOE/NNSA to sustain major facilities and 

replace smaller capital assets. These projects provide an

immediate return on investment and are an effective method for 

making improvements to increase DOE/NNSA’s mission 

performance and lower operating costs. They can be completed 

much faster than line-item construction, and they enable 

DOE/NNSA to be responsive to emerging infrastructure issues and 

changing stockpile requirements.

Recapitalization Program

The Recapitalization Program executes prioritized minor 

construction and recapitalization investments to improve the condition, reliability, efficiency, and 

capability of infrastructure to meet mission requirements. The program plans and executes replacement, 

installation, upgrades, and minor construction projects to revitalize existing facilities or construct new 

facilities and additions below the $20 million minor construction threshold. Examples of such projects are 

the completed Dynamic Equations of State Facility at LANL and the Battery Test Facility at SNL. These

investments are used in conjunction with line-item construction to provide timely, appropriately sized and 

integrated infrastructure solutions. 

In addition to supporting the enterprise through strategic minor construction investments, the 

Recapitalization Program sustains and modernizes NNSA infrastructure by improving the state of obsolete 

support and safety systems. The program provides funding to revitalize assets that are beyond the end 

of their design life and improve the safety, reliability, and capability of infrastructure to meet mission 

requirements. Recapitalization investments also achieve operational efficiencies; reduce safety, security, 

environmental, and program risk; and improve the quality of the workplace. 

Recapitalization Program investments are evaluated and prioritized using an enterprise-wide, risk-based 

assessment of program and safety impacts, sustainability, return on investment, and deferred 

maintenance reduction to obtain optimal benefits within the available budget. DOE/NNSA has also

incorporated enhanced project management practices that have increased transparency, reporting 

accuracy, project definition and readiness, and overall program performance.

In FY 2018, DOE/NNSA completed 56 recapitalization projects, a 21 percent increase from 2017. This 

improved performance reflects the impact of advanced planning based on detailed data and the use of 

the improved reporting tools and processes. 

Several completed projects serve as examples of addressing specific criteria in the risk-based assessments:

 White Space Modification for Additive Manufacturing Installation at KCNSC

 New Dynamic Equation of State Facility at LANL
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 High Explosives (HE) Synthesis Pilot Plant Renovation at LLNL

 Building 151 Hood Replacement at LLNL

 DAF Fire Suppression Lead-In Lines Replacement

at the Nevada National Security Site

 DAF Storage Vault Upgrade at the Nevada 

National Security Site

 Multiple Building Emergency light Replacements

at Pantex

 Primary Standards Laboratory Revitalization at SNL

 Electrical Substation Installation at SRS

 Building 9204-02 Penthouse Floor Shoring at Y-12

4.3.1.1 Current Recapitalization Projects

DOE/NNSA currently has approximately 240 active individual projects. The majority of these projects are 

below $10 million. There are more than a dozen projects ranging between $10-20 million that leverage 

new authorities provided by Congress to DOE/NNSA. Projects that have common attributes are placed 

into multi-year portfolios. Below are some examples of DOE/NNSA’s ongoing portfolios and projects. 

$10-20 Million Project Examples

 Revitalization for Crystal Laboratory Relocation at LANL

 Dual-Axis Radiography Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Weather Enclosure Addition at LANL

 Applied Materials and Engineering Capabilities Modernization Facility at LLNL

 New Mercury Building at the Nevada National Security Site

 New Gas Analysis Laboratory at Pantex

 Secondary Electrical Feed Installation at Pantex

 New Z pulsed power facility (Z) and Technical Area IV Missions Support Facility at SNL

 New Data Center Facility at SNL

Project Portfolio Examples

 Area Modification for Production Security Verification at KCNSC

 Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Fire Water Loop Component Replacement at LANL

 High-Level Radiochemistry Gloveboxes Laboratory Revitalizations at LLNL

 U1a Complex New Refuge Chamber Drift Installation at the Nevada National Security Site

 Bay and Cell Safety System Upgrades Portfolio at Pantex

 Obsolete Glovebox Oxygen Monitors Replacement Portfolio at SRS

 Diesel Generator Replacement at SRS

 Nuclear Facility Electrical Modernization Portfolio at Y-12

Equation-of-State Facility at LANL
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-19

4.3.1.2 Recapitalization Program Planning Improvements

DOE/NNSA is launching efforts to better understand long-term programmatic capability and associated 

capacity throughput requirements to better evaluate infrastructure options. One example is the biennial 

infrastructure planning “Deep Dive” reviews, which are held at each site as part of an effort to improve 

long-term planning and ensure that mature project proposals are integrated into the overall plan prior to 

receiving funding. This demonstrates an emphasis on facility life cycle management, which will result in 

better investment decisions based on understanding the overall condition, capabilities, capacity, 

readiness, and reliability of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure. Additionally, more front-end planning studies are 

being initiated to ensure that NNSA can integrate multiple Federal and M&O site organizations while 

designing multi-project plans to address complex infrastructure challenges. The new Kansas City Strategic

Infrastructure of Non-Nuclear Components (SINC) is an example of an ongoing DOE/NNSA integrated 

infrastructure front-end planning study.

Together, these efforts strengthen our modernization plans by ensuring that projects are fully scoped, 

well-integrated, and executed on time and within budget. Additionally, DOE/NNSA developed a Master 

Asset Plan to communicate more detailed infrastructure health and the modernization strategies 

developed to enable the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Site-Directed2 Minor Construction Investments

DOE/NNSA contracts for site management and operation contain requirements for M&O partners to plan 

for and manage DOE/NNSA assets for current and future missions. Sites fulfill these responsibilities in 

part by making minor investments in facilities and infrastructure from funds controlled at the sites. The 

sources for these investments can be direct programs (as discussed in the previous sections) or indirect 

funding pools, depending on the nature of the asset use and whether the site has a multi-program 

portfolio. 

Many DOE/NNSA M&O partners use indirect funding to address high-priority needs at each site. On multiprogram sites, indirect funding pools may be created through institutional assessments or other similar 

mechanisms. The pools are used to fund maintenance, utilities, and operations; some funding is set aside 

for site-wide investments. In all cases, expenditure of these funds is aligned with accounting standards 

for demonstrating a causal-beneficial relationship, i.e., indirect funds are used for multi-program 

functions and purchases that deliver benefits across programs. In addition, M&O partners are responsible

for maintaining Weapons Activities capabilities to meet mission needs and often use portions of their 

budgets to fund minor investments in facilities, infrastructure, and equipment to meet those

responsibilities. 

Examples of indirect expenditures include Institutional General Plant Projects (IGPPs) at multi-program 

sites, especially the laboratories. These IGPPs are often small refurbishments of legacy facilities or new 

moderately sized buildings to accommodate growth at the site and enable prudent space management 

for the institution to maintain facilities in good condition and replace worn-out assets. IGPPs can also 

provide upgrades/replacements for institutional services such as parking structures, cafeterias, or medical 

facilities.

Site-directed investments are reported through the DOE/NNSA Program Management Information 

System, Generation 2 (G2). Providing this information to one centralized system increases transparency 

and coordination for all infrastructure investments (both direct and indirect). Capturing the details of 

these projects in G2 ensures that indirect infrastructure investments align with DOE/NNSA’s strategic 

 

2 Another term for “site-directed” investments is “indirect-funded” investments.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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priorities; enhances integration between direct- and indirect-funded infrastructure investments; 

improves reporting to understand total infrastructure recapitalization costs across the enterprise; and 

ensures the capability to prioritize and plan for DOE/NNSA’s long-term stewardship responsibilities. 

Defense Nuclear Security Minor Construction Investments

The Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP) was created by DNS to address the significant 

decline in the physical security infrastructure supporting the DOE/NNSA mission at the eight sites. DNS

developed and submitted to Congress the 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan to outline and 

guide the scope of the SIRP effort. This plan contains a comprehensive condition assessment of the 

security infrastructure at each site and a nuclear security enterprise-wide prioritized listing of the 

upgrades required. The plan considers multiple funding vehicles, but the majority of the plan does not 

rise to line item construction level, with project costs under $20 million.

The 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan documents needed security infrastructure investments 

and is critical to the overall effectiveness of the revitalization effort Ever-changing threats, technologies, 

and system requirements present challenges to ensuring that capital projects effectively address the most 

current threats and mitigate current risks. 

DNS approved minor construction projects at six sites for FY 2019 (by site):

 TA-72 Outdoor Range Upgrades Project, LANL

 Range Facility Replacement, LLNL

4.4 Sustainment

Sections 4.1 through 4.3 described the ways in which 

DOE/NNSA acquires or modernizes facilities. This section

focuses on how DOE/NNSA maintains and operates existing 

infrastructure in support of the nuclear security mission. Each 

site sustains its assets to enable mission success and 

readiness; ensure operational safety and security; safeguard 

the workforce, public and environment; and, meet mission 

needs more efficiently and cost-effectively.

Infrastructure Operations and

Facility Sustainment

The Operations of Facilities Program is responsible for 

operating DOE/NNSA facilities in a safe and secure manner and includes essential support such as water 

and electrical utilities, safety systems, lease agreements, and activities associated with Federal, State, and 

local regulations associated with the environment and worker safety and health.

DOE/NNSA’s sustainment activities are carried out through a combination of innovative tools that feed 

into risk analyses that support infrastructure management decisions. These decisions ensure that critical 

resources are dedicated to maintaining facilities already in good condition and repairing the highest risks 

in DOE/NNSA assets. One of these innovative tools is BUILDER, a web-based software tool that enables 

decisions concerning when, where, and how to best maintain, repair, and recapitalize infrastructure. 

DOE/NNSA’s goal is to collect all condition assessment data in BUILDER and use it as an auditable, 

consistent single source of information on the condition of all of DOE/NNSA’s physical infrastructure. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-21

DOE/NNSA’s deployment of BUILDER is an ongoing multi‐year effort. Upon full implementation, 

DOE/NNSA will continue working to integrate each site’s computerized maintenance management system 

with BUILDER to capture data for long‐term sustainment. Integration of BUILDER with DOE/NNSA’s

Infrastructure Management programs, including the Recapitalization Program, will enhance the decision‐

making process by making use of risk-informed data.

Maintenance and repair activities aim at sustaining an acceptable condition of real property assets to 

perform their designated purpose or to mitigate risks posed by excess assets until their disposition. These 

efforts support the recurring day‐to‐day work that is required to sustain plant, property, assets, systems, 

roads, and equipment in a condition suitable for its designated purpose. Efforts include required 

maintenance through surveillance and predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities to 

maintain facilities, property, assets, systems, roads, equipment, and vital safety systems. Maintenance 

funding can be used for sustainment efforts or to respond to unexpected/urgent issues that require 

immediate correction to ensure safe, compliant, and reliable operations. In most cases, the funding does 

not have discrete cost, scope, and schedule milestones attached.

Deferred Maintenance is defined as maintenance activities that were not performed when they should 

have been or were scheduled to be and were put off or delayed for a future period. Repair Needs are the 

objective repairs required to ensure that a constructed asset is restored to a condition that issubstantially

equivalent to the most recently configured designed capacity, efficiency, or capability. Deferred 

Maintenance and Repair Needs are calculated and tracked by M&O partners in the Facilities Information 

Management System. 

The Asset Management Program repairs and replaces major building 

systems that are common across the DOE/NNSA enterprise (e.g., roofs; 

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC] systems; etc.). 

DOE/NNSA’s Roof Asset Management Program (RAMP) uses supply chain 

management strategies and economies of scale to increase purchasing 

power and improve the timeliness of procurements. RAMP prioritizes the 

highest-risk roofs across the enterprise and has repaired or replaced more 

than 6 million gross square feet of roofs since its inception in FY 2004. The 

Cooling and Heating Asset Management Program (CHAMP) uses systems 

engineering and supply chain management strategies to quickly and 

economically address HVAC issues, achieve economies of scale, and increase 

purchasing power. CHAMP provides reliable HVAC systems that are vital for 

maintaining precise temperature, humidity, and ventilation requirements for 

the production of mission-critical components. 

Programmatic Facility Sustainment

In some instances, the nature of core mission areas leads to direct programmatic sustainment funding for 

certain operations. For example, the ST&E Program is responsible for the high-performance 

computational capabilities needed for stockpile stewardship in modeling, simulation, and experiments 

conducted at various facilities and experimental capabilities such as inertial confinement fusion. Within 

ST&E, operational costs at facilities are directly supported and budgeted within the Inertial Confinement 

Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) and Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Programs. The ICF 

Facility Operations and Target Production subprogram supports efficient operations at the National 

Ignition Facility (NIF), Omega Laser Facility (Omega), Z, and the Trident and NIKE facilities (see Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.3, for more information on NIF, Z, and Omega). Similarly, the ASC Facility Operations and User 

RAMP Before and After 

at Pantex
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-22 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Support subprogram provides the facilities and services required to provide nuclear weapon simulations. 

Facility Operations include physical space, power, and other utility infrastructure; local area/wide area 

networking for local and remote access; and system administration, cybersecurity, and operations 

services for ongoing support. 

The ICF facilities provide experimental access to the 

HED physics regime and are principle tools used for 

primary assessment, secondary assessment, and 

nuclear survivability. These capabilities are further 

leveraged by mission partners at DoD and the UK’s

Atomic Weapons Establishment. As part of NNSA’s 

efforts for a more sustainable enterprise, Z was 

awarded an environmental management award of 

excellence for significantly reducing emissions of the 

powerful greenhouse gas, sulfur hexafluoride.

ASC is the primary user and chief programmatic 

advocate for the facilities and services required to run 

nuclear weapons simulations and operate Commodity 

Technology and/or Advanced Technology systems.

Each laboratory’s computing capability comprises not only the high performance computing (HPC) system 

itself, but also ancillary physical components such as physical space, power, storage, file systems, local 

area/wide area networking for local and remote access, and a host of system administration, 

cybersecurity, and operations services for ongoing support of HPC system and support equipment. There 

are also specific user services associated with items such as a computer center hotline and help-desk 

services, account management, web-based system documentation, system status information tools, user 

training, trouble-ticketing systems, common computing environment, and application analyst support

that are included in the fiduciary responsibilities of the program. As such, each center’s footprint can 

physically span or include multiple buildings.

ASC manages the costs associated with each laboratory’s current computing centers and considers 

multiyear budget planning to deliver future systems based on programmatic need. The funding necessary 

to operate and modify the computing centers comes from a combination of direct programmatic funding 

from the ASC and other DOE/NNSA programs, which may use the same buildings or indirect overhead 

charges brought in by the laboratories directly. Within Weapons Activities, the Infrastructure and 

Operations Program provides capabilities and SNM infrastructure for the nuclear security enterprise, but 

is not responsible for maintenance and operations of the ASC computing centers themselves.

Site-Directed Sustainment Investments

At multi-program sites, indirect pools may be created to pay for maintenance and operations. These funds 

are then used to pay utility bills; provide preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance to facilities 

and equipment; and replace equipment associated with facilities and infrastructure. These funds may 

also cover various site-wide services.

Sustainment through Leased Facilities

Leases are an important and useful real estate strategy to address short-term needs. They provide the 

flexibility needed to deal with surges in mission work, but can be more costly than construction and 

ownership if not well structured or if used as final solutions. 

Sulfur hexafluoride reclaiming system being used 

on Sandia National Laboratories’ Z Machine
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-23

DOE/NNSA is piloting a new lease rating system to provide a quantitative method for evaluating existing 

and future leases. This system evaluates the rent, terms and conditions, existing tenancy length, exit 

strategy, and space utilization rate to produce a unified score for a prospective lease. As this system 

matures, it will be increasingly integrated into the DOE/NNSA lease strategy and decision-making process.

Defense Nuclear Security Sustainment Investments

DNS has a process in place for funding operations and sustainment of safeguards- and security-related 

equipment and facilities. During the annual programming process, M&O partners submit requests for 

funding these sustainment activities. Some of these activities include upgrading or replacing training 

equipment and facilities. For FY 2019, numerous sustainment projects were approved, including firearms 

range refurbishments and replacement of Protective Force tactical training simulators.

Chief Information Officer Sustainment Investments

NNSA’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) has processes and procedures in place for providing 

funding to the sites for operations and sustainment of cybersecurity components, hardware, and software

related to sustainment of information assurance capabilities and operations, including replacement of 

network switches and routers.

4.5 Addressing Excess Facilities

DOE/NNSA infrastructure that is no longer needed must be 

dispositioned to minimize risks to workers, the public, the 

environment, and the mission. 

Approximately 10 percent of assets located on DOE/NNSA’s sites

are excess. DOE/NNSA’s highest disposition priorities are to 

stabilize degraded facilities, characterize hazards and conditions, 

remove hazardous and flammable materials, and place facilities in 

the lowest acceptable risk condition possible until they can be 

dispositioned. If facilities are process-contaminated and require 

more than $50 million to disposition then the responsibility to 

disposition resides with DOE’s Office of Environmental 

Management. 

DOE/NNSA’s FY 2018 budget included more than $50 million to continue reducing the risks posed by 

excess facilities and to demolish buildings. In FY 2018, DOE/NNSA: 

 Demolished the TA-16-0280 complex and characterized and planned for disposition of the 

TA-16-0460 complex in the HE area and Building TA-16-0306 at LANL

 Demolished 14 facilities operated by DOE/NNSA’s Kansas City Field Office 

on Kirtland Air Force Base (NC-135) in New Mexico (where SNL is 

collocated) in an area needed by the Air Force for flight path safety

 Eliminated one asset at the Nevada National Security Site as part of the 

modernization effort for the Mercury area

 Continued risk reduction at Y-12’s Alpha 5, Beta 4, and Building 9206,

including work to drain the Alpha 5 mercury house system, de-inventory 

oils and fluids in Alpha 5 and Beta 4, remove legacy material, and close 

tanks and dikes

NNSA Excess Facilities
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-24 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Demolished the Alpha-5 Annex and Building 9720-24 at Y-12, Building 232-1H at SRS, and 

Building 363 at LLNL

 Planned the isolation, disposition, and reroute of utilities at Alpha 5 and Beta 4, which is related 

to the reduction of the protected area at Y-12

 Characterized and planned for disposition of Buildings 9720-22 and the Beta 4 ancillary 

Buildings 9404-16, 9409-20, and 9811-04 at Y-12

In addition, in FY 2018, Congress provided $225 million to the DOE Office of Environmental Management

to demolish high-risk excess facilities at Y-12 and LLNL. 

4.6 Modernization of Programmatic Equipment

Facilities and infrastructure are just one of the three aspects of capability sustainment that must be 

managed in support of the mission; equipment and people are also critical to mission performance. The 

workforce aspects of capabilities are discussed in Chapter 7. This section focuses on the equipment 

aspects of capability sustainment. 

DOE/NNSA manages and funds equipment procurement across the nuclear security enterprise through 

multiple programs. Programs such as LEPs or the Engineering Program selectively fund mission-related 

equipment procurement to meet their schedule or new requirements. In addition to these, a number of 

other programs maintain nuclear security enterprise capabilities through equipment refurbishment and 

replacement. Those programs include Capabilities Based Investments (CBI), Production Support, and 

Operations of Facilities, Maintenance and Repair of Facilities, and in some cases, the Recapitalization 

Program. To add further complexity, the organization that initially funds procurement of a piece of 

equipment will most likely not be the only organization benefiting from the acquisition in the future. Part 

of the responsiveness of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure is defined by the ability to maintain and find new or 

improved uses for existing equipment.

While each base capability program serves the mission of its respective overarching office, the integrated 

nature of nuclear weapons work creates natural mission overlap between these offices and other 

programs. In these cases, to better align planning and programming activities among relevant DOE/NNSA 

programs, the Programmatic Recapitalization Working Group serves as a forum to coordinate efforts 

involving more complex equipment projects. The working group also provides guidance to M&O partners 

on appropriate funding offices for acquiring particular items of equipment.

Equipment modernization, replacement, and refurbishment are key activities tied to the 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review guidance to recapitalize the nuclear security enterprise’s infrastructure and provide an

effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure. It is also crucial to the maintenance 

of the nuclear security enterprise’s current capability. The investment strategies described below are in 

alignment with the Nuclear Posture Review mandate and provide the baseline activities essential to 

maintaining a functional nuclear security enterprise.

Programmatic Equipment Investments

Equipment investments by mission-specific programs are dictated by programmatic need. LEPs, Stockpile 

Systems, ST&E, and Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation are examples of programs in 

this category.

For the weapons programs (LEPs and Stockpile Systems), equipment purchased ranges from radiography 

machines, shaker tables, blast tubes, and centrifuges for qualification, certification, and surveillance 

activities that are specific to a weapon system. A weapon program might also require specific capabilities 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-25

in production equipment, such as specialized mills and lathes, to produce to component design and would 

cover these costs, as the requirements for that equipment would be tied directly to their program. For 

example the W88 Alt 370 supported purchase of the Molecular Beam Epitaxy tool used to produce 

strategic radiation-hardened heterojunction bipolar transistors and other testing equipment like the 

hypersonic wind tunnel and laser vibrometer required for design and qualification. The W80-4 LEP has 

funded programmatic equipment such as the digitizers needed for hydro shot diagnostics, a computer 

numerical controlled mill and lathe for both HE and radiological materials to meet integrated weapon 

experiment deliverables, and inspection equipment to validate that machines’ experimental components 

meet weapon engineer-specified part requirements.

Weapon programs also invest in equipment and infrastructure necessary to maintain their schedule. 

Many times, these investments are split among weapon programs that could benefit from such 

procurements in the future. For instance, the W88 Alt 370 benefited from investments made by the W76 

and B61-12 LEPs. Where multiple LEPs can benefit, CBI (described below) is also a major source of funding. 

ST&E Program investments cover a range of highly specialized and common equipment that is essential 

to the high tech work of stockpile stewardship. This equipment provides or facilitates environments for 

testing and experimentation, produces data from those experiments, and helps synthesize the data from 

the experiments to inform design, production, qualification, and surveillance activities. Examples include 

ASC Program needs, equipment tied to subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments, and advanced 

radiography. Given the specialized nature of this equipment, these investments can be quite costly. 

Typically, new equipment is procured by programs as mission needs arise or new facilities or capabilities 

come on line. In addition, as urgent needs arise, CBI makes investments in equipment tied to ST&E

Program missions that are tied to LEP schedules.

The Additive Manufacturing (AM) and Component Manufacturing Development (CMD) Programs, make 

equipment investments aimed at proving-in production and qualification processes that are vital to the 

future stockpile, with a long-term goal of reducing required production floor space and attendant 

infrastructure. While these programs may purchase one to two pieces of equipment with advanced 

capabilities, the weapon programs, CBI, or Production Support would be expected to purchase the 

remaining equipment needed to realize the AM/CMD-provided capability at full production scale. In some 

cases, the initial investment by these programs could fulfill production requirements, and the 

responsibility for the operations and maintenance of that equipment would transfer to the appropriate 

program. Examples of equipment procured through these programs include a variety of additive 

manufacturing machines, advanced testers, and other supporting equipment.

Capabilities-Based 

Investments

CBI supports programmatic equipment and facility 

investments at all DOE/NNSA sites. These projects 

are prioritized based on requirements and risks 

documented by the potential user programs. All CBI 

projects must provide an enduring capability and not 

be specific to a single weapon system. CBI projects 

support consolidation and replacement of unreliable 

facilities and infrastructure that have exceeded life 

cycle expectations and pose safety and program 

risks to people and the mission. Over the past year, 

the CBI portfolio has evolved. 

CBI Accomplishments

 Accelerated 12 projects from future years into the 

current fiscal year.

 Completed the High Explosive Synthesis Pilot Plant at 

LLNL, reconstituting the capability to perform synthesis 

of pilot-scale quantities of high explosives via remote 

operations reliably and safely to support LEPs.

 Completed the JASPER Large Bore Gun upgrade at 

the Nevada National Security Site, enabling plutonium

information gathering to support weapon design and 

certification.

 Completed special nuclear material workstations and 

facility modifications at Pantex, establishing a second 

requalification line to support current and future LEPs.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 4–9 provides a high-level summary of CBI challenges and strategies.

Table 4–9. Summary of Capabilities-Based Investments Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Planned projects for execution in a given fiscal year 

were delayed until project funds were made available, 

impacting execution and performance metrics.

CBI began disbursing dedicated planning funds in the current fiscal 

year to support project planning in the next two fiscal years.

Unclear responsibilities among DOE/NNSA 

organizations to fund projects to recapitalize/maintain 

nuclear security enterprise capabilities may cause 

confusion within DOE/NNSA and at the sites when 

determining funding alignments and priorities.

The Programmatic Recapitalization Working Group was established 

in 2018 as a forum for DOE/NNSA and the sites to raise and resolve 

issues around responsibility, and to increase DOE/NNSA’s

understanding of the state of programmatic infrastructure across 

the enterprise. Participants include representatives from 

DOE/NNSA organizations and the site M&O partners.

Production Support Equipment Investments

The Production Support Program provides base capabilities to enable assembly, disassembly, and 

production activities funded by the LEPs, Stockpile Systems Program, or Weapons Dismantlement and 

Disposition Program. The Production Support Program’s equipment scope is generally site-specific, as 

opposed to integrating multi-site activities, which is the mission of the Management, Technology, and 

Production Program. The program also maintains specific base production capabilities for critical nuclear 

weapon components, such as neutron generators at SNL and detonators at LANL. 

Equipment procurement and installation within the Production Support Program can range from the 

Major Item of Equipment level ($5 million and above) to the purchase of equipment well below $100,000. 

The program addresses a range of base capability replacements or repairs with a focus on multi-weapon 

system support and the nuclear security enterprise’s production agencies. Still, equipment funding out 

of the Production Support Program is small in relation to the labor costs associated with maintaining a 

functional and responsive nuclear security enterprise.

Typical investments funded by the Production Support Program include:

 Multi-weapons system base capabilities in component manufacturing, assembly, and 

disassembly, including gloveboxes, mills, and lathes

 Strategic materials-related process and production equipment in the absence of dedicated 

programs or resources for those projects

 Equipment for moving product

 Equipment for the production of multi-weapon system tooling and the qualification of materials 

to be used in production 

 Multi-weapon system capabilities for the qualification and surveillance of weapon components 

 Simulation capabilities, including HPC and qualified analysts, to support improved reliability (and 

thus decreased waste and costs) and an accelerated timeline for production activities, including 

the use of advanced manufacturing techniques
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Infrastructure Recapitalization, Operations, and Maintenance

Equipment Investments

The Operations of Facilities Program funds activities that include some costs associated with the existing 

scientific and/or process equipment that provides the nuclear security enterprise with the capabilities 

needed to accomplish programmatic milestones and activities:

 Costs associated with staffing needs to manage and support the equipment/capability 

 Activities used to run the equipment/capability in a safe, secure, reliable, and “ready for 

operations” manner (calibration, surveillance)

 Equipment/capability utilization analysis, modification and upgrade analysis, and the technical 

operations and staffing needs necessary for the equipment/capability to function effectively in 

support of programmatic needs

 Training required to operate the equipment/capability in a safe, secure, and effective manner

The Maintenance Program funds activities that include sustaining and preserving equipment in a condition 

that is suitable to perform its desired purpose. Maintenance funding can be used to replace equipment 

without an increase to capability or capacity.

The Recapitalization Program supports installation, replacement, or upgrade of personal property assets 

that directly support or are integral to weapon activity deliverables. There is a tradeoff between 

maintenance and operations funding and equipment or asset recapitalization.

Site-Directed Equipment Investments

As with facilities and infrastructure, sites may make investments in equipment for activities that support 

weapons and other site missions(multi-program), and these investments may either be made using direct

funds or include indirect cost pools (see Section 4.3.2). Programmatic equipment that supports multiple 

programs should be allocated to those programs in accordance with the benefits received.

Defense Nuclear Security Investments

For FY 2018, DNS directed numerous equipment purchases related to typical security equipment 

modernization. These approvals included arms, ammunition, body armor, vehicles, radios, electronic 

security system components, software system upgrades, tactical casualty care kits, and other security 

related purchases to improve, modernize, and maintain operations. 

Chief Information Officer Equipment Investments

NNSA’s OCIO provides funding to the sites for the purchase and upgrade of networks, systems, and 

applications related to cybersecurity operations. These purchases may include firewalls, intrusion 

protection systems, intrusion detection systems, security hardware components, software system 

upgrades, and other security-related purchases to improve, modernize, and maintain cybersecurity

operations. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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4.7 Modernization of Information Technology and 

Cybersecurity Infrastructure

NNSA’s OCIO continues to play a critical role in enhancing the responsiveness and resiliency of DOE/NNSA 

infrastructure by improving information technology (IT) and cybersecurity and focusing on threats and 

vulnerabilities. Classified computing for DOE/NNSA has grown dramatically over the past 30 years and, 

with each decade of growth, there have been substantive movements toward enterprise solutions. 

Reducing and mitigating cybersecurity risks, and supporting changes within the DOE/NNSA weapons life

cycle continue to be major drivers of this growth. The current cybersecurity risk driving development and 

implementation of Enterprise Secure Network (ESN) 2.0 is the necessary use of a global IT supply chain 

for the weapons programs. Three approaches are proposed to mitigate cyber risks:

1. Evaluate and replace all software and hardware having supply chain issues

2. Build an enterprise infrastructure that validates/distributes/controls all software and hardware 

including those with supply chain issues

3. Build and implement a security architecture that will ensure continued the protection of 

information and information assets

Implementation of the NNSA OCIO’s IT and cybersecurity projects is critical to the overall effectiveness of 

the nuclear security enterprise. Changing threats, technologies, and network and system requirements 

will continue to present challenges, but the criticality of DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security missions and the 

consequences of failure demand that all elements of the nuclear security enterprise remain secure.

Ongoing NNSA OCIO Activities

NNSA’s OCIO continues to manage IT and cybersecurity projects designed to help reduce risks. Note that,

while these efforts are projectized, they are not managed under the same acquisition policies as the lineitem construction or minor construction projects shown above. Table 4–10 below lists examples of 

ongoing and completed IT and cybersecurity projects.

Planned NNSA OCIO Projects in 2020

NNSA’s OCIO will begin six new projects in FY 2020:

 Deployment of Phase I of the hybrid cloud platform for the Enterprise Secure Computing (ESC)

cloud-based technologies for application hosting at LLNL

 Deployment Phase I of the hybrid cloud platform for the ESN 2.0 West Coast communication hub, 

which leverages cloud-based technologies for classified application hosting at LLNL

 Deployment of Phase I of the small hybrid cloud platform for the ESC testing environment for 

mission software at SNL

 Deployment of Phase I of the hybrid platform for the ESC cloud-based technologies for classified 

application hosting at the East Coast Data Center

 Deployment of a hybrid cloud platform in support of the Joint Technology Demonstrator project 

for Weapons Activities at KCNSC 

 Deployment activities to support network monitoring, including construction and monitoring 

services, at SRS
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-29

Table 4–10. Ongoing and recently completed information technology and cybersecurity projects

Activities Description

Virtual Desktop 

East/West

This project will provide standard desktop applications and processes for the nuclear security 

enterprise, ensuring a desktop configuration with flexibility and agility that will empower staff to 

complete their work. 

Network Sensor 

Monitoring Upgrade

DOE/NNSA is upgrading the enterprise portion of its network cybersecurity monitoring tools. This 

upgrade will bring unprecedented new capabilities to inspect network traffic to detect and respond to 

malicious network activity.

Enterprise Desktop A centralized, secure process for distribution of source code/binaries for all hosted applications will be 

utilized. This process will allow administrators to select pre-approved software packages or request 

evaluations of new packages as needs arise. These software packages will be downloaded from the 

original equipment manufacturers, validated, transferred to the Enterprise Secure Network (ESN), and 

loaded into a central software repository. Patches and updates for this software will follow consistent 

processes to increase network protection and promote anti-subversion security protocols.

Application Hosting DOE/NNSA will implement a private cloud infrastructure, using Microsoft Azure Stack, to host all 

enterprise applications. This infrastructure will be hosted at geographically separated locations. 

Applications will be able to utilize one or both sites as deployment hosting environments, depending 

on mission needs. The cloud infrastructure will have a storefront offering services and components 

that are pre-accredited. As the environment and the processes governing it mature, more 

components will be accredited and made available in the storefront. Configuration management 

processes and tools will be provided to application owners and will dictate technical refresh activities.

Enterprise Networks The new network will adopt platform and will reduce the requirement for application integration and 

patching of the underlying operating systems, application services, and other infrastructure elements. 

Platform as a service will be available for applications as they are ready to be migrated from ESN 1.0 

to the new network. 

Enterprise Secure 

Network

This project seeks to provide the comprehensive and consolidated logical secure infrastructure 

necessary to provide secure, reliable, effective non-nuclear components that will allow design, 

development, and prototyping of weapon hardware, software, systems, and applications. The 

architecture will allow DOE/NNSA programs to develop solutions using cloud-ready tools and 

applications in a classified cloud environment without redesign.

Application Migration Application rationalization will determine the suitability of applications to keep, upgrade, or terminate 

using a risk-based approach. Critical applications will be migrated from individual sites into the new 

cloud environment. During the application migration work stream, appropriate technologies and 

products will be selected and migrated to a streamlined and optimized DOE/NNSA application 

portfolio. A multi-year migration strategy for moving the applications into the cloud will be 

developed, with appropriate participation from stakeholders. The strategy will span both classified 

and unclassified networks to ensure efficient and secure investments in IT products.

Enterprise Services DOE/NNSA will implement products and services that will introduce a true enterprise cloud-based 

model for IT services and delivery. This opportunity to reexamine site hosting requirements and adopt 

more cloud-oriented architectures that will provide best-in-class security for the Defense Programs, 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation programs. This will 

move DOE/NNSA to a cloud model with common services and enterprise applications.

Center of Excellence 

for Threat 

Intelligence Project

DOE/NNSA will enhance the sensor stack to add increased capabilities and performance, meet 

departmental mandates regarding cybersecurity data taxonomy, and build a collaborative effort for 

developing, training, and leveraging site cybersecurity defenders focused on enterprise threat. 

Joint Development 

Environment (JODE) 

The United Kingdom’s (UK) Gateway Enhancements, also referred to as JODE, will automate existing 

collaboration processes between the United States and the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment. JODE 

is a joint U.S.-UK effort to create a collaborative environment within a secure network. To facilitate 

this automated joint collaboration, a secure Virtual Desktop Infrastructure will be established where 

users from the United States and the UK can share information in real time. Implementation JODE 

will provide a secure Virtual Desktop Infrastructure for classified data exchange improvements that 

enable effective communications while supporting real-time and large-scale information exchanges 

between the United States and the UK. 

Plutonium Pit 

Production Mission 

Support

DOE/NNSA will establish an infrastructure in support of implementation of unclassified and classified 

wired and wireless infrastructure, to include cybersecurity, IT, and Operational Technology 

components, in support of meeting the 80 pits per year mission.
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4.8 Leveraging Weapon Activities Investments Across 

DOE/NNSA

Several other DOE/NNSA programs (e.g., Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation [DNN], Counterterrorism and 

Counterproliferation, and Emergency Management Programs) rely on infrastructure funded by Weapons 

Activities. These programs are described in DOE/NNSA’s Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan 

to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2020 – FY 2024). 

Support of Nonproliferation Efforts

DNN’s Global Material Security Program relies on infrastructure maintained by other DOE/NNSA offices, 

as summarized below.

 Technical Area 5 at SNL conducts nuclear security training for the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and bilateral partners 

 The DOE/NNSA National Training Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, will, on a limited basis,

provide bilateral partners with Protective Force training

DNN’s R&D program relies on supportive capabilities at a number of laboratories, plants, and sites that 

enable mission-relevant R&D activities 

 The Nevada National Security Site hosts several experimental and applied test beds to 

demonstrate next-generation nonproliferation technologies for detecting foreign nuclear 

weapons development activities, which will result in new capabilities at the national laboratories

 The DAF hosts and facilitates detection experiments for university and laboratory projects that

transition to mature systems

 SNL, LANL, LLNL, and the Nevada National Security Site provide critical expertise and 

infrastructure to support a number of weapons-related experimental campaigns

 The Microsystems Engineering, Sciences, and Applications Complex at SNL provides resources to 

develop beyond leading-edge trusted microsystems technologies that enable space-based 

detonation detection capabilities

 SNM irradiation experiments are conducted at the National Criticality Experiments Research 

Center at the Nevada National Security Site, where criticality assembly machines provide the 

capability for research to improve precision measurements of nuclear fission product yields and 

other nuclear data parameters

 HPC is used for a broad range of modeling and simulation research across multiple research areas 

at SNL, LANL, and LLNL

DNN’s Material Management and Minimization Program relies heavily on the infrastructure maintained 

by other DOE/NNSA offices. Impacts of the aging infrastructure on the implementation of key 

nonproliferation programs are summarized below. 

 Conversion Program. Y-12’s uranium facilities perform casting activities that produce lowenriched uranium-molybdenum (LEU-Mo) material that will allow conversion of the U.S. highperformance research reactors that currently use highly enriched uranium (HEU). Aging casting 

furnaces at Y-12 are a programmatic risk to production of future LEU-Mo material. The casting 

technology for the Uranium Processing Facility will be different than what is currently available at 

Y-12, but the capabilities at the Uranium Processing Facility or other facilities at Y-12 could be 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-31

used to accommodate the Office of Material Management and Minimization’s casting needs for 

the U.S. high performance research reactors conversion project in the future. 

 Conversion Program. The Sigma facility at LANL develops and optimizes LEU-Mo fuel fabrication 

processes. 

 Material Disposition Program. 

– PF-4 at LANL disassembles nuclear weapon pits and converts the resulting plutonium metal 

into an oxide form using the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System. 

– Under the proposed Dilute and Dispose approach, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 

would be used to permanently dispose of diluted plutonium oxide. WIPP is also being used 

to dispose of transuranic waste generated from other nonproliferation activities. 

– The K Area Complex at SRS stores surplus plutonium that will be dispositioned. The K Area 

Complex is a DOE Environmental Management facility; however, DOE/NNSA plans to install 

equipment for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, and to construct a transuranic 

waste storage pad and loading capability for shipping diluted plutonium oxide to WIPP.

– The H-Canyon at SRS processes off-spec HEU into blended low-enriched uranium material for 

disposition. 

– Savannah River National Laboratory provides R&D for a variety of material disposition 

activities.

– Enriched uranium operations infrastructure at Y-12 allow analysis, processing, and packaging 

of materials to be down-blended or properly disposed. 

 Nuclear Material Removal Program.

– DOE/NNSA’s Secure Transportation Asset Program provides resources for multiple material 

removal campaigns. The Office of Secure Transportation facilitates these projects by 

providing safe and secure transport of nuclear material within the territory of the 

United States.

– The L-Reactor basin at SRS receives reactor fuel from the Removal Program and stores the 

material pending disposition.

– Savannah River National Laboratory operates the Mobile Plutonium Facility in support of 

international removal activities.

DNN’s Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) Program also relies on the infrastructure maintained by 

other DOE/NNSA offices, as summarized below. 

 NPAC relies on the availability of Category I, II, and III SNM standards and sealed sources for 

detector and system development and facilities for testing prototype safeguards equipment, and

for training foreign partner personnel in the fundamentals of safeguards and material 

measurement. While the health of the facility and SNM infrastructure remains sufficient at this 

time, downsizing over the last decade has required programs to use less Category I and II materials 

and more Category III and IV materials for detector development and training. As DOE/NNSA 

recapitalizes facilities that are critical to the NPAC mission, DNN offices will work with the 

appropriate program managers to ensure NPAC goals are incorporated as resources allow.

 NPAC uses the Nevada National Security Site as a training ground to develop a U.S. capability to

perform field verification activities for suspected nuclear explosions. Focused exercises will 
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coordinate with other programs’ activities as appropriate and are expected to begin at the Nevada 

National Security Site in FY 2020-2021, with the goal of an integrated field exercise, potentially at 

the Nevada National Security Site, in FY 2022-2023 to assess the readiness of the team, 

equipment, and procedures in a realistic field setting. Out-year efforts will focus on regular team 

training and targeted development to improve the capability, depending on needs and priorities.

 NPAC relies on facilities and operational expertise at Pantex to test warhead monitoring and 

verification capabilities and assess the feasibility of equipment deployment at weapons facilities. 

In FY 2019, this will include demonstration and testing of a prototype Portal Monitor for 

Authentication and Certification system, which is a radiation portal monitor designed specifically 

to facilitate deployment in sensitive nuclear weapons-related facilities in support of potential

future monitoring and verification initiatives. These types of demonstrations and evaluations at 

operational nuclear weapons facilities are essential for developing potential long-term solutions 

to the technical challenges of verifying nuclear weapon reductions, and support the U.S. ability to 

engage technically with partner countries under initiatives such as the International Partnership 

for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

 NPAC and various U.S. agencies work with DOE/NNSA Defense Programs to support transparency 

initiatives in fulfilling the Nation’s Article VI commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty. NPAC also co-hosted, with Defense Programs support, two Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty transparency visits for non-nuclear weaponsstate representatives to stockpile stewardship 

facilities at LANL and SNL. These visits demonstrated how stockpile stewardship supports the 

U.S. commitment to forego nuclear explosive testing.

 NPAC uses KCNSC, LANL, LLNL, SNL, and the Nevada National Security Site to conduct seminars 

on proliferation-sensitive commodities and technologies, particularly those subject to export 

controls and related to nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. These seminars and 

workshops provide the U.S. agencies with knowledge of these commodities that is available 

nowhere else, and participants can apply what they learn in their jobs in nonproliferation policy, 

export licensing, export enforcement, and other functions related to preventing weapons of mass 

destruction proliferation.

Support of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation and 

Emergency Operations Efforts 

The Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Program (CTCP) relies heavily on the infrastructure 

maintained and primarily used by other DOE/NNSA offices, in particular the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program. CTCP leverages both the physical infrastructure detailed below, and human capital and skill sets 

developed and occasionally co-supported by DOE/NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, intelligence 

and analytical programs, emergency response activities, and fuel-cycle related programs. While CTCP may 

use only a small portion of these human capital and physical assets’ total capacity, this shared use supports 

critical national security efforts and brings unique and scarce capabilities to bear on the counterterrorism 

and counterproliferation missions. 

 To deepen the scientific and technical knowledge of nuclear threat device concepts, CTCP makes 

use of the Neutron Science Center, DARHT, gas guns, Ancho Canyon, and the Proton Radiography 

Facility at LANL; the Superblock, Contained Firing Facility, High Explosives Application Facility, and 

gas guns at LLNL; the Z Facility and Thunder Range at SNL; and the National Criticality Experiments 

Research Center, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experiment Research gas gun, Big Explosives 

Experimental Facility, and Baker Compound at the Nevada National Security Site. Understanding 
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-33

nuclear threat device concepts also requires HPC platforms to design predictive models 

concerning device performance and experimental facilities to refine and validate these models. 

Computer platforms and codes supporting these functions include those developed specifically 

for nuclear counterterrorism analysis, and others developed for the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program.

 Technical nuclear forensics performance depends on the core capabilities developed during the 

U.S. nuclear weapons development and testing program. Weapons design expertise and the

simulation tools, manufacturing base, and experimental capabilities required for the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program provide a strong foundation for the technical nuclear forensics mission. The 

Stockpile Stewardship Program supports much of the expertise, facilities, nuclear material 

handling infrastructure, and historic knowledge necessary to perform technical nuclear forensics. 

DOE/NNSA’s Secure Transportation Asset provides safe and secure transportation of nuclear 

material in the United States and supports the CTCP response teams, including technical nuclear 

forensics. The technical nuclear forensics mission also relies on DOE’s broader ST&E capabilities, 

including laboratories maintained by DOE’s Offices of Science and Nuclear Energy.

 Finally, to support reachback and training to build international capacity, and in support the 

U.S. Government’s effective response to a nuclear or radiological incident or emergency, CTCP 

relies on a diverse base of rapidly deployable assets, including specialized facilities, vehicles, and 

equipment. These assets include the Radiation Assistance Program, based at nine DOE/NNSA 

locations around the Nation; the Aerial Measuring System stationed at the Radiation Sensing 

Laboratories at Joint Base Andrews (Washington, DC) and Nellis Air Force Base (Las Vegas, 

Nevada); the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center at LLNL; and Emergency Operating 

Centers located at several national laboratories. These infrastructure elements help ensure that 

the U.S. Government has dedicated resources that are capable of quickly responding to nuclear 

or radiological incidents worldwide, and the emergency management infrastructure required to 

coordinate the response effort. 

DOE/NNSA’s Office of Emergency Operations is DOE/NNSA’s primary office of interest in Continuity of 

Operations Planning and relies on the infrastructure maintained by other DOE/NNSA offices, as 

summarized below. 

 “Alternate Operating Facilities” is a term used to refer to alternate sites where essential functions 

are continued or resumed and where organizational command and control of essential functions 

occurs during a catastrophic emergency. An Alternate Operating Facility is sufficiently distanced, 

but within the same region from the primary facility used to conduct continuity operations, and 

is staffed by deployed Emergency Relocation Group members. The Primary Alternate Operating 

Facility for DOE/NNSA is the DOE Germantown Facility, located in Germantown, Maryland.

 Devolution planning supports continuity planning and addresses continuity events, catastrophes, 

and “notice” and “no notice” events. These events could render DOE/NNSA leadership and staff 

unavailable or incapable of providing control and direction to organizations performing essential 

functions. Devolution should be used when the Primary Operating Facility and Alternate 

Operating Facility are not viable or available. The primary DOE/NNSA Headquarters devolution 

of operations site is the DOE/NNSA Albuquerque Complex in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
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4.9 Management and Performance

Since 2011, DOE/NNSA has delivered approximately $2 billion in projects, a significant portion of NNSA’s 

total project portfolio, under budget. DOE/NNSA is committed to encouraging competition and increasing 

the universe of qualified contractors by streamlining major acquisition processes. DOE/NNSA will 

continue to focus on delivering timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all programs and projects, by 

using a tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that are appropriate for the special 

missions and risks at each site. DOE/NNSA continues to: lead improvements in contract and project 

management practices; provide clear lines of authority and accountability for program and project 

managers; improve cost and schedule performance; and ensure that Federal Project Directors and 

Contracting Officers possess the appropriate skill mix and professional certifications to manage 

DOE/NNSA’s work.
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-1

Secure Transportation Asset

The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program provides safe, 

secure transport of the Nation’s nuclear weapons, weapon 

components, and special nuclear material (SNM) throughout 

the nuclear security enterprise to meet nuclear security 

requirements and support Defense Programs and broader 

DOE/NNSA missions. STA provides secure transport for a 

variety of government agencies. STA is government-owned 

and -operated because of the control and coordination 

required and the potential security consequences of material 

loss or compromise.

The components of the STA security concept are specialized 

vehicles, secure trailers, specially trained Federal agents, and 

leading-edge communication systems.

DOE/NNSA Defense Programs is STA’s highest-priority 

customer. STA also provides secure transport for other NNSA and DOE programs and offices and other 

government agencies, such as the NNSA Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program, the 

NNSA Office of Naval Reactors, the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration. STA also supports international shipments. 

Since its formal creation in 1974, STA has a record of no loss of cargo and no radiological release on any 

shipment. To maintain that record, STA must replace aging transportation assets and communication 

systems for convoy safety and security. The Safeguards 

Transporter (SGT) fleet is beyond its design life. STA is

sustaining its capability by implementing a risk-reduction 

initiative to extend the life of the SGT until its replacement, 

known as the Mobile Guardian Transporter (MGT), becomes 

operational. Nuclear weapon life extension programs; limited

life component (LLC) exchanges; surveillance, dismantlement, 

and nonproliferation activities; and experimental programs rely 

on transport of weapons, components, and SNM on schedule 

and in a safe and secure manner. STA supports the DOE/NNSA

goals of consolidating storage of nuclear material and reducing

the dangers and environmental risks posed by domestic 

transport of nuclear cargo. 

Secure Transportation Asset 

Accomplishments

 Completed more than 140 over-the-road 

shipments and made 40 limited life

component deliveries without incident.

 Executed vehicle sustainment efforts to 

ensure mission vehicles are upgraded 

and maintained to provide reliable mission 

support.

 Awarded the Mobile Guardian Transporter 

Test Article 1 Rolling Chassis Contract 

and completed the Manufacturing 

Readiness Review for Test Article 2.

Armored Tractor
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5.1 Status

5.1.1 Major Elements of the Secure Transportation Asset

This section discusses the various property assets and personnel elements that comprise STA.

5.1.1.1 Vehicles

Modernizing and sustaining STA’s vehicle assets require an 

integrated, strategic plan and a substantial investment for 

life cycle replacement. The STA strategy includes steadystate initiatives such as eliminating outdated vehicles, 

refurbishing vehicles to extend their useful life, and 

procuring of new vehicles.

The process of identifying, designing, procuring, and 

manufacturing these vehicles takes several years. The 

vehicle fleet is currently being updated with replacement 

armored tractors, escort, and support vehicles. The STA 

program continues to assess and refurbish vehicles to 

extend life cycles until replacements are available. 

Evaluating demands on vehicles is a continuous effortto keep pace with operational requirements. 

5.1.1.2 Trailers

The trailer fleet is a critical asset for transporting nuclear weapons, weapon components, and SNM on 

public highways. The design, engineering, testing, production, and use of these trailers can span several 

decades. The design and construction features address public safety, unique cargo configurations, and

protection systems. The second-generation trailers began reaching their end-of-design life cycle in 2018,

years before the first MGT will enter production. STA implemented risk-reduction initiatives to maintain 

current capability until the new MGTs are produced and operational.

5.1.1.3 Aviation

The fleet of government-owned aircraft provides efficient and flexible airlift of LLCs, nuclear incident 

response elements, Federal agents, joint test assemblies, training assemblies, and personnel and 

equipment associated with national emergencies and disasters. STA is required to maintain an aircraft on 

continuous alert with a 4-hour response time to nuclear incidents. STA must also support evacuation and 

relocation of key personnel to maintain continuity of government operations.

These aircraft provide emergency response in support of the Nuclear Emergency Support Teams, which 

include the Joint Technical Operations Team, Accident Response Group, and Radiological Assistance 

Program. Two of the aircraft are Boeing 737 models manufactured in 1996. With both aircraft more than 

20 years old, a plan must be developed to replace them. STA also operates one McDonnell Douglas DC-9

aircraft that was manufactured in 1969 and is 50 years old.

A Business Case Analysis was performed that supports replacement of the aging DC-9. This replacement 

acquisition is planned for FY 2021. Replacement of the two 737 aircraft is planned in FY 2025 and FY 2029, 

respectively.

5.1.1.4 Communications

Reliable, secure, real-time communication is crucial to ensure STA mission success. Essential 

communications include information that is obtained, analyzed, and disseminated for mission planning; 
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-3

continuous monitoring and updating of that information during mission execution; and continuous 

communication during convoy operations. These various tiers of communication must be executed 

seamlessly in real time, while balancing the evolving need for cyber security to ensure system reliability 

and integrity.

5.1.1.5 Training

Federal agents receive training in full-scale emergency and tactical operational scenarios, tactical driving 

techniques, and a variety of weapons and explosives. Each Federal agent Command has facilities and staff 

to refresh primary skills and accomplish the majority of qualification training. The Training Command at 

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, supports basic to advanced training offerings for Federal agents, including special 

weapons, tactical scenarios, initial Nuclear Material Courier Basic (NMCB) training program for Federal 

agent candidates, and other general training, covering all aspects of convoy operations. The Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, at Glynco, Georgia, is an integral part of STA’s training curriculum. The 

center provides basic law enforcement authority, tactics, and other specialized training for Federal agents. 

Federal agent law enforcement authority and specialized training are continually evaluated to respond to 

the dynamic operational environment.

5.1.1.6 Safety and Security

Validation Force-on-Force exercises are assessments designed to test STA’s Active Security Doctrine and 

determine system effectiveness for STA’s Site Security Plan. The vulnerability assessment team designs, 

performs, evaluates, and documents the conduct of these assessments; the training and logistical staff 

support the execution of Validation Force-on-Force exercises and integrate them with the emergency 

command and control elements to provide the most realistic convoy scenarios possible. The Site Security 

Plan and the Documented Safety Analysis outline compliance with security and safety orders and 

regulations as related to nuclear operations within DOE and NNSA.

5.1.1.7 Liaison

STA maintains a liaison program with agencies and organizations that may be in contact with a convoy or 

have to respond to an STA emergency. This interface extends across the 48 continental states, with the 

focus on primary and secondary convoy routes. The scope of the liaison function includes Federal, state, 

tribal, and local agencies and involves interactions with law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency 

and hazardous materials responders, dispatchers, and military personnel.

5.1.2 Changes from the FY 2019 SSMP

 As previously mentioned, STA has completed the Business Case Analysis to review options to 

replace its aging DC-9. The analysis supports the purchase of a new aircraft for planned inclusion 

in the FY 2021 budget. Replacement of the two 737s is planned for FY 2025 and FY 2029,

respectively.

 The SGTs’ operational life has been extended to FY 2031.

 DOE/NNSA will begin first production units of the next-generation Armored Tractor (T4) and 

Escort Vehicle 4 (EV4) in FY 2020.

 The milestone/objective for Advanced Radio Enterprise System (ARES) II deployment was 

removed. STA will update the current ARES as software becomes available, eliminating the need 

for redesign.

 In response to staffing issues and long clearance wait times, modifications were implemented to 

position qualifications, level of risk acceptance associated with the Human Reliability Program, 
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Page 5-4 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

and a change in clearance requirements for Federal agent candidates to allow participation in 

NMCB training without a clearance.

 Additionally, STA introduced a modular training program allowing Federal agent candidates to be 

brought on board and placed into Federal agent training once psychological and medical 

screenings are complete.

5.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 5–1 provides a high-level summary of STA’s program challenges and strategies.

Table 5–1. Summary of Secure Transportation Asset Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

The SGT fleet is beyond its design life

SGT sustainment faces challenges associated with obsolete 

parts, including difficulty finding new manufacturers and the 

high cost of limited-run production.

Develop the MGT to replace the aging SGT.

SGT Degradation

SGT structural degradation occurs due to water intrusion, 

corrosion, and stress cracks.

Conduct SGT risk-reduction initiatives to address issues 

related to the aging SGT fleet. To ensure safe SGT operation, 

STA inspects the welds on all SGTs and conducts scanning to 

measure bolster plate thickness and wear from corrosion.

Sustainment of SGT

Sustainment issues may outpace STA’s capacity to mitigate 

its ability to meet Nuclear Explosive Safety Study 

requirements.

Work with partners to identify mitigation strategies to 

address Nuclear Explosive Safety Study requirements and 

sustain the capability.

Aircraft

Aircraft performance and payload restrictions render STA 

unable to consistently support mission-related cargo, 

security operations, and Office of Counterterrorism and 

counter proliferation requirements.

Procure a DC-9 replacement aircraft (FY 2021).

Lengthy Security Clearance Processing Modified position qualifications, level of risk acceptance 

associated with the Human Reliability Program, and a change 

in clearance requirements for Federal agent candidates to 

allow participation in the NMCB basic training without a 

clearance.

Maintain a modular training program that allows Federal 

agent candidates to be hired and placed into training once 

psychological and medical screening are successfully 

completed.

Manage the lengthy security clearance process for staff by 

providing alternative workspaces outside limited access 

areas.

MGT = Mobile Guardian Transporter

NMCB = Nuclear Material Courier Basic

SGT = Safeguards Transporter

STA = Secure Transportation Asset
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-1

Chapter 6

Security

The Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) and Information Technology (IT) and Cybersecurity Programs ensure 

the security of the Nation’s nuclear materials, physical infrastructure, workforce, and information assets 

at NNSA Headquarters and its field offices, national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production 

facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site. The Chief of Defense Nuclear Security is responsible to 

the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy for developing and implementing safeguards and 

security programs and activities. That responsibility includes protection, control, and accountability of 

special nuclear material (SNM) to prevent loss, theft, diversion, unauthorized access, misuse, or sabotage 

of radioactive materials and the physical security of all facilities in the NNSA nuclear security enterprise. 

Similarly, the NNSA Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) is responsible for managing and 

protecting all electronic information and information assets created, processed, transmitted, and stored 

by NNSA and its management and operating (M&O) partners. OCIO also coordinates with DoD, other 

government agencies, and allied nations to maintain strong cybersecurity defenses to ensure information 

is not compromised or subjected to unauthorized access or malicious acts.

6.1 Defense Nuclear Security

DNS leads, develops, and implements NNSA’s security program to enable the NNSA’s nuclear security 

enterprise missions by protecting materials, information, and people. DNS also has the critically important 

responsibility for adjudicating the personnel security clearances of the workforce at the NNSA field offices 

and the eight M&O partner sites. Beginning in FY 2019, NNSA assumed responsibility for funding the 

clearances of NNSA Headquarters personnel, consistent with direction provided in the Joint Explanatory 

Statement accompanying the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 

2017. To carry out its mission to protect NNSA assets from theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, 

unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile or noncompliant acts that may adversely affect 

national security, program continuity, and employee security, DNS coordinates with other programs 

(e.g., Counterintelligence and Insider Threat). DNS also provides facility clearances for contractor 

organizations performing classified work for NNSA and administers the classification program to ensure 

information is properly identified for appropriate handling and protection. Dedicated and specially 

trained security professionals using an array of weapons and technologies to address general and sitespecific threats, carry out the physical security mission at each field location. The programs and 

capabilities of DNS are arrayed against a broad range of threats to DOE/NNSA Headquarters and field 

offices, national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National 

Security Site. Physical security includes the safeguards and security programs that provide the day-to-day 

secure environment necessary to implement DOE/NNSA’s national security mission.

6.1.1 Accomplishments

Safeguards and security personnel, layers of physical security systems and technologies, and sophisticated 

cybersecurity systems protect and carry out DOE/NNSA’s missions in secure environments. Together, this 

approach protects DOE/NNSA’s facilities, SNM, employees, networks, and information. In FY 2018, 
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DOE/NNSA’s DNS Program implemented 42 of the 56 key initiatives contained in the DOE/NNSA Security 

Roadmap, along with other activities that contribute to program effectiveness:

 The Security Management Improvement program helps ensure continuous improvement of the 

physical security program, relying on Headquarters and field collaboration to prioritize and 

implement risk-based solutions within an effective oversight regimen. Visits have been 

completed at all DOE/NNSA sites, and the results were compiled in a final report disseminated to 

all field office managers in December 2018.

 An intensive test and evaluation program assessed alternatives for a system to address the threat 

posed by unmanned aircraft vehicles. Initial deployment and operational testing of the system 

have been completed. DNS completed all required consultation engagements with the Federal 

Aviation Administration in December 2018 and issued the final authority to operate at that time.

 An enterprise-wide security culture campaign was executed with site-by-site visits and awareness 

presentations to the workforce that emphasized an individual commitment to the goal of 

“Protecting What is Ours.”

 Security Infrastructure Revitalization program documentation was completed in 2017. In 2018,

substantial progress was made in executing these activities. This plan is the implementing 

document for a 10-year effort to refresh and replace vital security technology and infrastructure. 

The Security Infrastructure Revitalization Plan provides a time-phased, prioritized approach to 

system refresh requirements that is anticipated to provide more viable funding projections.

 Six Tactical Casualty Care Instructor courses were completed, yielding 96 trained and certified 

Protective Force members. To date, approximately 90 percent of DOE/NNSA’s Protective Force 

have been trained in hemorrhage control and have been issued individual first aid kits. This 

standardized first aid course is a crowning achievement in DOE/NNSA’s Protective Force Training 

Reform initiative.

The Headquarters Security Operations organization implements all aspects of the DOE security program 

for DOE/NNSA Headquarters operations, including overseas offices, which serve approximately 2,500 

partners. The organization also manages the newly established DOE/NNSA Headquarters Facility Survey 

and Approval program and assists all DOE/NNSA Headquarters offices in preparing for third-party security 

assessments and surveys. Activities included facilitating approximately 300 VIP and foreign national visits 

to Headquarters offices in FY 2018.

DOE/NNSA continues to provide comprehensive support in the areas of personnel and facility clearance 

processing. In FY 2018, over 27,000 adjudicative actions were performed, and three national-level 

requirements were implemented on schedule. In support of critical DOE/NNSA classified work, over 

50,000 pages were reviewed. DOE/NNSA leadership selected the Clearance Action Tracking System 

Stabilization and Enhancement automated clearance workflow system for all DOE cognizant personnel 

security offices. Five of the eight offices, comprising over 90 percent of DOE clearances, are now operating 

on this system.

6.1.2 Status

DOE/NNSA has a network of programs and technical capabilities that are integrated to achieve graded 

levels of protection for personnel, sensitive information, weapons-grade SNM, and mission-critical 

facilities, calibrated by threat and asset importance. DOE/NNSA deploys various technologies at M&O 

partner sites for alarm management and control, intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, 

barriers and locks, secure storage, material control and accountability, package inspection, 
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communications, Protective Forces, and technical surveillance countermeasures. These technologies are 

described below.

Alarm Management and Control Systems. DOE/NNSA sites with Category I or II quantities of SNM are 

expected to use the proprietary Argus system that meets all DOE/NNSA requirements for intrusion 

detection and access control to protect these materials. Three Category I sites have fully implemented 

the system, and the fourth site will complete installation in the fourth quarter of FY 2019. Three of the 

four non-Category I sites employ non-Argus, commercial systems. Two of these sites are scheduled to 

replace legacy systems with Argus in the near future.

Intrusion Detection Systems. An integrated, multi-layered suite of barriers, sensors, and assessment 

systems, including the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System for Category I or II quantities 

of SNM protects NNSA assets. 

Access Control Systems. Access control systems use a combination of entry and exit control, combined 

with multifactor authentication technologies and contraband detection technology to ensure authorized 

entry and exit. NNSA is in various stages of implementing the Identity, Credential, and Access 

Management (ICAM) program according to the Federal ICAM Roadmap.

Barriers and Lock Systems. State-of-the-art barrier technologies are used at some facilities, along with 

low-technology barriers such as concrete blocks or razor wire. 

Secure Storage Systems. These systems provide additional barriers when practical for specific materials.

Material Control and Accountability. NNSA has deployed specific technologies (e.g., accounting software, 

tamper-indicating devices and dispensers, measurement devices, and barcode readers) at sites with SNM. 

NNSA manages a project to modernize the software application that serves as the standard core nuclear 

material accountability system. This software application provides sites and facilities with basic nuclear 

material accountability capabilities and can be enhanced to accommodate site- or facility-specific 

requirements.

Package Inspection Systems. Multiple sites have deployed x-ray inspection equipment at shipping and 

receiving facilities to augment their capability to prevent introduction of contraband into protected or 

material access areas.

Communication Systems. These systems facilitate secure communication among members of NNSA’s 

Protective Force with system redundancy.

Protective Force Training Reform Initiative. Pursuant to review of multiple external audit reports 

spanning the last two decades and 2012 congressional hearings in which Protective Force training 

program deficiencies were identified, DNS worked closely with DOE’s National Training Center and 

Protective Force training subject matter experts from all DOE and NNSA sites to initiate a comprehensive 

analysis of the training program’s construct and effectiveness. The objective was to define a desired end

state for a “corporately developed” configuration that would optimally support the nuclear security 

enterprise’s ability to improve the focus, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Protective Force sustainment

training program. Exhaustive analyses revealed that clear, nuclear security-focused training objectives 

and performance expectation parameters common to all NNSA Protective Force mission areas had not 

been sufficiently established to assist Protective Force training managers in defining sustainment training 

content, appropriate annual training hours, or methods of instructional delivery. Overall, the analysis 

showed Protective Force training programs had little apparent consistency in program planning, 

management, and execution among the eight sites. 
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Informed by these audit reports, internal analyses, and studies, the first Training Reform Initiative effort 

was development of the Enterprise Mission Essential Task List (EMETL) Sustainment Training program. 

This effort involved several planning and development working group sessions and benefited from 

extensive collaboration among multiple entities.

Enterprise Mission Essential Task List. All DOE/NNSA field sites have implemented the EMETL program, 

which fundamentally restructures Protective Force training with a primary focus on critical tasks that 

directly contribute to mission success. The EMETL program identifies real-time training focused on 

improving performance and provides a clear picture of the best options for using precious resources (time, 

money, and personnel) for making needed improvements. EMETL requires sites to conduct rigorous, 

formal, eyes-on assessments of the Protective Force’s ability to perform specific individual, collective, and 

leadership tasks to identify areas in which improvement is needed. Local site training departments;

operations, performance testing, and vulnerability assessment groups; and field offices are all participant

organizations within the construct of the EMETL program. This mission-focused approach improves 

partners’ understanding of actual performance capabilities, promotes finite resources to be targeted at

areas with the highest priority for improvement, and ultimately improves mission performance. The 

EMETL program requires both on- and off-post training and performance testing of various tasks with 

continuous assessment by partners each quarter. 

Protective Force Tactical Systems. NNSA tactical systems increase Protective Force lethality and 

survivability. These systems include hardened vehicles and fighting positions, Protective Force tracking 

systems, friend or foe identification systems, shooter detection systems, non-explosive mechanical and 

thermal breaching equipment, and remotely operated weapons systems.

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures. Technical surveillance countermeasures are the systematic 

physical and electronic examinations of designated areas by federally trained, qualified, and equipped 

persons to discover electronic eavesdropping devices and electronic security hazards and weaknesses. 

DNS recently implemented a consolidated enterprise approach that will result in substantial cost savings.

Enterprise Safeguards and Security Planning and Analysis Program (ESSPAP). The ESSPAP is the strategic 

process that NNSA uses to conduct vulnerability assessments and risk analyses to meet the intent of DOE’s 

Design Basis Threat, which sets the safeguards and security standards for protecting Departmental 

operations and assets, including SNM and classified information. This process provides managers at all 

levels of the organization who have authority to accept risk with a consistent approach to guiding and 

managing safeguards and security programs throughout NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise. The ESSPAP 

Supplemental Directive standardizes vulnerability assessment methodology, modeling and simulation 

tools, and data analytics into a comprehensive enterprise security risk management process. The directive 

provides NNSA sites with programmatic technical guidance on conducting security analysis and planning 

activities to aid identification and communication of security risks in clear, concrete, and consistent terms.

Physical Access Controls (PACS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Depot and Modernization. NNSA 

has established a PACS and IDS equipment depot to centrally fund, procure, and manage all security 

system-related parts for six of the eight field sites. NNSA is also developing a standardized security 

systems training program for operators and system maintainers. Commercially available off-the shelf 

(COTS) IDS is being utilized at the other two sites. The COTS equipment has been determined to meet the 

protection needs, is readily available, and is a more cost effective alternative.

Security Management Improvement Program (SMIP). SMIP facilitates continuous, enterprise-wide 

improvement of the DNS program through consistent, effective, and efficient execution and program 

integration. SMIP enhances the ability of field security programs to oversee and understand security 

conditions, enabling better-informed decisions on oversight and execution activities and the allocation of 
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finite resources. The SMIP does this through program management, establishing a baseline profile of 

policies, practices, procedures, and capabilities with a focus on Federal field oversight. 

6.1.3 Challenges and Strategies

A major challenge for NNSA and the government more broadly, is identifying and addressing new and 

emerging security threats. Each threat is assessed and prioritized according to national security 

importance, taking into consideration the effectiveness of existing security measures. Through tactical 

and strategic planning and collaboration with counterparts, DOE/NNSA has developed programs to meet 

security challenges. As systems age and technology advances, meeting current and future challenges 

remains difficult. Table 6–1 provides a high-level summary of DNS challenges and the strategies 

developed to address them.

Table 6–1. Summary of Defense Nuclear Security Program challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Identifying emerging threats and ensure capabilities are 

developed and implemented to counter threats

 Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) participates in collaboration 

with numerous internal and external entities

 Departmental Collaboration is described in the Center for 

Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing 

(CSTART) program

Developing time-phased maintenance programs and a 

master schedule for upgrades and replacements at all 

DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise sites

The 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan has been 

provided to Congress and is described in the next section

Integrating and standardizing policies and procedures for a 

single safeguards and security program that is consistently 

executed at all DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise sites

DNS has a multipronged approach to standardize policies and 

procedures, including the DNS Strategic Plan, CSTART, 

Enterprise Safeguards and Security Planning and Analysis 

Program, and a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures 

consolidated enterprise approach

Ensuring security is considered in planning all new 

construction and any adjustments to facilities at the 

national security laboratories and nuclear weapons 

production sites

The Enterprise Safeguards and Security Planning and Analysis 

Program is the strategic process that NNSA uses to conduct 

vulnerability assessments and risk analyses to meet the intent 

of DOE’s Design Basis Threat, which sets the safeguards and 

security standards for protecting Departmental operations and 

assets, including special nuclear material and classified 

information 

Assessing and addressing the full range of threats, from 

protestor incursions to active, violent insiders or intruders

DNS has created a Security Analysis Cell to interface with the 

intelligence community and law enforcement agencies across 

the nuclear security enterprise for devising strategies to identify 

and counter the full range of current and evolving threats

Recent changes in nuclear policy have prompted an expansion of the nuclear security enterprise mission, 

especially in the areas of weapon modernization and infrastructure investment and recapitalization. This 

mission growth increases site staffing needs which will cause increases in clearances, reinvestigations, 

personnel security reporting, personnel verification (new personal identification verification for uncleared

hires), and security awareness briefings. Increases in square footage (buildings) have two effects: 

(1) standing up new facilities through installation, commissioning, inspections, documentation, and 

approvals and (2) ongoing day-to-day operational programs. These effects entail additional access control 

systems; intrusion detections; surveillance (cameras); Protective Force requirements (patrols, responses 

to alarms/incidents, training and testing of staff); incidents of security concerns; classified material 

protection and control (setting up classified areas, approvals, and ongoing oversight); technical 

surveillance and countermeasures (inspecting new equipment and classified areas); classification 
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program, programmatic management (risk assessments, plans, oversight); and vendor support. 

Modernization efforts have an even larger impact on cybersecurity programs, as more equipment, 

building controls, and security systems are computer-based, and the emerging threat continues to 

increase in sophistication.

6.1.3.1 Long-Term Vision and Strategy

The strategies for responding to physical security challenges are described below.

Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing (CSTART). DNS is continuing its efforts 

with CSTART to enhance standardization, integration, and cost-effectiveness across the DOE/NNSA 

nuclear security enterprise. This initiative uses a collaborative approach that includes working with SNL, 

LANL, and LLNL, other DOE national laboratories, DoD, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to achieve 

enterprise-wide solutions to security challenges. DNS uses CSTART to address the challenges of managing 

security risks for nuclear weapons and related programs, including the Security Infrastructure 

Revitalization Program. 

Counter Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). In 2015, the NNSA Administrator tasked DNS to develop and 

implement an enterprise-wide program to protect NNSA facilities against an unauthorized UAS. DNS 

rigorously tested and evaluated competing technology platforms, which led to the decision to develop 

and deploy an integrated system comprised of mature, commercial off-the-shelf components to meet this 

threat. 

Like other government agencies, NNSA has encountered numerous incursions, adding a degree of urgency 

to the DNS effort to field a viable Counter UAS capability and policy for its use.

10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan. Historically, DOE’s implementation of physical security 

technology has been site-centric, offering no corporate direction regarding selection, installation, 

operation, and maintenance of technologies at all sites. This approach has led to solutions at each site 

that increase the funding requirements to manage multiple systems performing similar functions. NNSA 

has worked to address these issues and, in August 2017, sent the 10- Year Physical Security Systems 

Refresh Plan to Congress detailing security system priorities over the next 10 years. The execution of this

10-year plan is codified in the Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program.

DNS Strategic Plan. The priorities in the DNS Strategic Plan include sustaining the security enhancements 

implemented at the sites since September 11, 2001; continuing reduction of physical security 

vulnerabilities; leading efforts to integrate security initiatives with DOE program offices, government 

agencies, and international partners; and assisting NNSA sites in applying risk management principles and 

processes to achieve cost-effective physical security.

Layered Protection Areas. NNSA applies its physical security technology capabilities by using a “layered 

protection strategy” beginning at the boundaries of designated property protection areas, protected 

areas, and within material access areas. Barriers of various types are used within these areas, along with 

personnel identification and verification procedures.

Departmental Collaboration. DNS participates in the Capital Acquisition (CapAx) process, the Integrated 

Planning Group, and the Management Council to maintain close collaboration with other parts of NNSA, 

including Defense Programs. Under one of the Security Roadmap initiatives, DNS revitalized collaboration 

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Homeland Security, the United Kingdom’s 

Ministry of Defense, and DoD to identify opportunities for collaborating on respective nuclear security 

programs. DNS also provides specialized nuclear security support for NNSA partners that are involved in 

nuclear nonproliferation, emergency response, homeland security, intelligence work, and the work of 

other U.S. Government agencies in these areas.
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6.2 Information Technology and Cybersecurity

NNSA’s Office of the Associate Administrator for Information Management and Chief Information Officer 

(NNSA OCIO) is the principal organizations for Federal information management, IT, and enterprise-wide 

cybersecurity for NNSA. The office has the responsibility for oversight, operations, modernization, and 

enhancement of IT and cybersecurity that are necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of

NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise. 

NNSA’s OCIO executes and governs the complex and dynamic program of value-added and missionenabling secure services, which span both classified and unclassified environments across Headquarters, 

national laboratories, plants, and field offices (see Chapter 3 of the classified Annex for a detailed map). 

The NNSA OCIO takes a risk management approach to developing IT applications and networks to ensure 

that cybersecurity is embedded in the IT fabric of the agency. Using an effective mix of technology, policy, 

and risk management practices enables NNSA to enhance information management across the NNSA

enterprise.

6.2.1 Contributions to NNSA’s Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The mission of the NNSA IT and Cybersecurity Program is to ensure that sufficient management, 

operational, and technical cybersecurity safeguards are implemented throughout NNSA’s nuclear security 

enterprise to maintain adequate protection of information and information assets. As such, this program 

has several responsibilities:

 Fostering a culture of information sharing

 Ensuring that IT investments and projects across NNSA are coordinated, have the necessary 

cybersecurity protection, and are in alignment with the NNSA Strategic Plan, DOE requirements 

and objectives, and national policies and standards

 Ensuring that IT is acquired and information resources are managed in a manner that implements 

the policies and procedures of legislation, including the Paperwork Reduction Act, the ClingerCohen Act, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), E-Government Initiative 

of the President’s Management Agenda, and the Federal Information Technology Acquisition and 

Reform Act (FITARA)

 Based on the goals and priorities set forth by the NNSA Administrator and the Secretary of Energy, 

the NNSA OCIO contributes to the enterprise by ensuring execution of these activities:

– Enabling classified and unclassified collaborative solutions for weapons activities throughout 

the enterprise

– Providing the technology infrastructure and protections for all collateral classified networks 

within NNSA and DOE

– Informing and advising incident responders from other government organizations about 

known threats

– Coordinating with other Federal agencies (i.e., DoD and Department of Homeland Security) 

and government programs (i.e., Intelligence) to establish and maintain strong cybersecurity 

defenses to ensure that electronic information and information assets are performing 

necessary operations and are protected from compromise, unauthorized access, and 

malicious actors that could adversely affect national and economic security and operational 

readiness
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– Fostering collaboration and coordination with international partners

– Defending electronic information and information assets from current and evolving threats 

to business and mission operations

– Maintaining the integrity and availability of Internet-based functions and transactions that 

are essential to NNSA’s mission, operational needs, and Federal obligations

– Providing dedicated and specially trained professionals and employing an array of 

technologies to address general and site-specific threats to business and mission operations

IT and cybersecurity have become ubiquitous with the functions of everyday business. This trend is 

expected to continue as the Federal Government mandates that agencies automate and reshape the way 

services are provided to the taxpayer and to other government agencies.

Today, the efficient and effective management of IT and cybersecurity is one of the most crucial factors 

in supporting the NNSA enterprise. The highly complex and global nature of the NNSA enterprise, coupled 

with resource priorities, makes it critically important that information and information assets are secured, 

managed, and protected using a risk-management approach. NNSA’s OCIO leadership recognizes that 

well-informed management decisions require a systematic understanding of the risks inherent in the use 

of information systems; thus, it is vital to ensure those systems are properly protected. Full integration 

of management processes organization-wide will reduce risk by providing greater degrees of security, 

privacy, reliability, and cost-effectiveness for core missions and business functions. 

Building on past organizational successes to modernize and strengthen an aging infrastructure, NNSA is 

moving toward a managed services model which, for a fixed rate, would provide reliable, comprehensive, 

and continuous IT network security and support for the enterprise. With the managed services model, 

NNSA’s networks will benefit from industry best practices, receive ongoing patching and monitoring, 

hardened configurations from a security perspective, fine-tuned settings for performance, and dynamic 

configurations to meet evolving business environments.

Enhancing the IT environment increases NNSA’s capacity to support an ever-evolving and ever-expanding 

set of mission priorities and defend against adversarial threats. It is important that NNSA renew its

commitment to consolidate and enhance the IT and cybersecurity services provided to the mission user 

and partners to maintain this capability. NNSA will strive to continue delivery of IT and cybersecurity 

modernization efforts for long-term program implementation and success. These efforts will transform 

NNSA's ability to manage the full life cycle of the nuclear stockpile and ensure nuclear security goals are 

completed.

IT and Cybersecurity. The IT and Cybersecurity Program manage the implementation and maintenance 

of IT assets within the NNSA classified and unclassified environments (excluding indirect funded M&O 

assets). The office provides NNSA with enterprise cybersecurity capabilities and assists with detection, 

analysis, and mitigation of cybersecurity threats and incidents. The IT and Cybersecurity Program also 

coordinates and supports DOE functions, including the integrated Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center 

(iJC3), Telecommunications Electronics Material Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmissions 

(TEMPEST)/Protected Transmission System, and serves as the Cybersecurity Service Provider.

Additionally, the NNSA OCIO directs the design, development, and maintenance of all aspects of NNSA 

computing activities including but not limited to, application development, integration, and deployment; 

application hosting; desktop provisioning; video teleconferencing; and provisioning voice and data 
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-9

resources. The office also oversees IT processes and services to provide NNSA staff with the IT resources 

necessary to achieve mission goals and objectives.

DOE uses a fully inclusive enterprise-wide approach to meet its cybersecurity goals. The DOE Cyber 

Strategy and corresponding implementation plan guide these efforts. Information Technology and 

Cybersecurity has established an innovative enterprise-wide cyber governance structure involving our 

Headquarters, 17 DOE/NNSA national laboratories, and multiple sites across the country. This 

collaborative approach has enabled DOE to make substantial progress on cyber information-sharing and 

safeguarding priorities. A critical priority currently under implementation, DOE’s Enterprise Cyber 

Distributed Shared Risk Management Framework, is designed to provide enterprise-wide cyber situational 

awareness to support cyber risk decisions on investments, policy, capabilities, and operations.

Office of Policy and Governance. The Office of Policy and Governance is responsible for providing 

leadership, policy, direction, guidance management, integration, and governance in support of the Chief 

Information Officer and other NNSA senior managers on the strategic use of IT and cybersecurity 

resources to support core business processes and achieve mission-critical goals. The office focuses on the 

development, dissemination, and oversight of NNSA’s IT and cybersecurity architecture policies, 

standards, and procedures to address internal and external requirements. The office uses an industry 

standard governance model to provide the appropriate degree of management oversight to ensure 

investments deliver the desired results within cost and schedule thresholds and comply with applicable 

regulations and best practices.

6.2.2 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments contributing to program effectiveness in FY 2020 include:

 NNSA’s OCIO collaborated with Microsoft to develop an IT Modernization Architecture that 

identified 14 areas of specific improvement to current NNSA IT capabilities that align with business 

goals and objectives. In partnership with Microsoft NNSA continues to refine the desired 

modernization outcomes, began planning for a production pilot program, and completed an 

independent analysis.

 NNSA has completed Phase 1 of the iJC3 implementation for Federal networks. NNSA has 

complete coverage of the NNSA environment, including unclassified, classified, and mission space. 

NNSA has developed the approach and standards to provide situational awareness of the nuclear 

security enterprise to the DOE OCIO. 

 NNSA’s OCIO worked in collaboration with DOE’s OCIO to establish DOE’s Data Taxonomy 

Framework. This effort was used to expand DOE Headquarters visibility across the DOE enterprise 

in relation to the response to cybersecurity incidents. 

 In partnership with SNL, NNSA’s OCIO created a Center of Excellence to improve and enhance the 

situational awareness, incident response, and incident management throughout the nuclear 

security enterprise.

 NNSA’s OCIO has made significant strides in meeting Department of Homeland Security’s binding 

operational directive requirements, substantially reducing the potential attack surface, and 

improving overall scores for DOE. NNSA’s OCIO continues to work, through continuous 

monitoring and continuous diagnostic monitoring activities, to determine what tools across the 

enterprise currently meet the core requirements and where additional tools may be needed to 

improve performance. 
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 NNSA’s OCIO led the cybersecurity and IT Mission Focus Areas for the Plutonium Pit Production 

Project. NNSA's OCIO also provided the cybersecurity Mission Focus Areas Implementation Plan 

Pit Production content and ensured alignment with the goals and objectives of the Plutonium Pit 

Production Program Office. The Cybersecurity Mission Focus Areas will highlight the approach, 

requirements, design, and implementation of unclassified and classified wired and wireless 

infrastructure, to include cybersecurity, IT, and operational technology components to support 

the 80 pits per year mission. 

 NNSA’s OCIO partnered with the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control to develop an elicensing and case management web portal specific to the 10 CFR Part 810 licensing process that 

has both Internet and intranet components. 

 NNSA’s OCIO completed its enterprise solution for email and document marking. Known as TITUS, 

this solution was in accordance with the policy requirements outlined in the July 26, 2017,

memorandum titled, Enterprise Standard for Email and Document Marking. OCIO successfully 

implemented TITUS on the Enterprise Secure Network (ESN), NNSA’s Secret Network, and all siteconnected networks.

6.2.3 Status

6.2.3.1 Information Technology Modernization

Secure, reliable, well-managed, and accessible IT solutions are critical components to executing the NNSA 

mission. Modernized IT systems are easier to secure from a cybersecurity standpoint. NNSA currently 

relies on the DOE model, which poses challenges with regard to communication, collaboration, and 

security capabilities. This is why NNSA’s OCIO is moving toward an NNSA-managed service model, which

will greatly improve these capabilities between Headquarters, M&Os, and other partners.

NNSA’s OCIO manages and protects all electronic information that is processed, transmitted, and stored 

by NNSA, and it is OCIO’s mission to ensure cybersecurity and information security are embedded into the 

fabric of the agency. Therefore, NNSA is undertaking an aggressive enterprise transformation initiative 

that will grow cloud services over time and deliver a modern, well-managed, secure computing 

environment that will eliminate many of the inefficiencies and performance degradations currently 

experienced by the workforce. 

OCIO’s focus on a managed service model will enable NNSA to take advantage of new and emerging 

technologies, provide opportunities to participate in economies of scale, and rely on industry’s rapid 

development and testing practices to ensure the use of safe, secure, and modern technology. 

NNSA’s OCIO is in the process of implementing Phase 1 of the IT Modernization effort. Within Phase 1,

OCIO will lead the development and implementation of the pilot program, which will support Microsoft 

Office 365, SharePoint Online, Skype for Business, and email. OCIO will maintain a hosting environment 

that contains tools, applications, and programs. OCIO will also be responsible for securing tools, 

applications, and programs and protecting information, along with login and access controls. Managed 

services also include offerings like analytics, data storage, and the increased ability to share data between 

users when necessary. The IT Modernization effort will improve the network infrastructure by updating 

and enhancing networking equipment through public/private cloud services, managed services, and

software and hardware enhancements.

In addition to the implementation of Phase 1, NNSA’s OCIO is in the process of launching the production 

pilot for desktop services, commodity applications, and cybersecurity architecture. 
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Finally, NNSA’s OCIO will work with DOE’s OCIO to complete modernization of the current IT infrastructure 

provided to Departmental elements and move to a managed service model.

6.2.3.2 Enterprise Secure Network

NNSA is pursuing a strategic initiative for its ESN as part of its larger Enterprise Secure Computing program. 

The project will: 

 Increase operational effectiveness through a shared services model

 Lower security risks by providing an enhanced protection strategy for information and 

information assets

 Increase visibility of the nuclear security enterprise software portfolio to promote enhanced 

integration across the nuclear security enterprise

 Upgrade and enhance the secure logical infrastructure

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance of an effective, responsive, and resilient 

nuclear weapons stockpile for U.S. national security interests. It goes on to state that the United States 

will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear 

weapons infrastructure. This initiative directly increases the capability, capacity, and responsiveness of 

the DOE classified infrastructure in direct support of the NNSA mission and the statutory requirements 

governing classified data protections and information assurance.

6.2.3.3 Restricted Data

NNSA’s OCIO continues to work with other government agencies (such as DoD and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation) to identify interagency needs and opportunities for accessing, sharing, and leveraging 

Restricted Data (RD) by:

 Providing a list of current cyber protection requirements and methodologies for RD

 Explaining the current congressional statutes that control dissemination of RD outside the

DOE/DoD environment

 Assessing the current state of the Federal Bureau of Investigation cybersecurity controls in 

correlation with RD protection requirements and assisting in the formulation of an official

memorandum from the Associate Director of the Render Safe Program to the NNSA OCIO,

requesting access to host RD

6.2.3.4 Multifactor Authentication and Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform 

Act Implementation Framework

NNSA’s OCIO worked with DOE to provide input on behalf of NNSA on the DOE FITARA and MFA 

implementation plans. NNSA OCIO supplemental plans outline NNSA’s strategy for effectively 

implementing and overseeing the FITARA and MFA activities.

6.2.3.5 Collaboration Efforts with DOE Partners

 Involvement in development and implementation of Physical Security Systems. NNSA’s OCIO is 

working to apply technology to improve physical security. While this technology is improving 

operations across DOE, it does introduce a new complexity to the way NNSA’s OCIO thinks about 

cybersecurity in reference to physical space. It is necessary to shift the current physical security 

approach to mitigate cyber threat vectors aimed at information security and safeguarding.
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 iJC3. NNSA’s OCIO completed Phase 1 of the iJC3 implementation for Federal networks. NNSA 

has complete coverage of the NNSA environment, including unclassified, classified, and mission 

space. NNSA has developed the approach and standards to provide situational awareness of the 

nuclear security enterprise to the DOE OCIO.

 TEMPEST Management. NNSA’s OCIO is responsible for implementing a TEMPEST program to 

establish control of any authority requirements introduced by the approved risk management 

model.

6.2.3.6 Technologies Deployed to Address Cybersecurity Threats

NNSA’s IT and Cybersecurity Programs maintain management, operations, and technical security 

safeguards throughout the nuclear security enterprise for adequate protection of information assets. The 

workforce that develops, deploys, and uses the security tools listed in Table 6–2 provides the first lines of 

defense against known adversaries and emerging threats. 

Table 6–2. Technologies deployed to address cybersecurity threats

Cybersecurity Framework 

Core Function Technology

Identify

Enterprise Governance, Risk, and Compliance

Center of Excellence Sensor Platform for Cybersecurity Intelligence 

Vulnerabilities Asset Management

Supply Chain Management Center Solution

Protect

Multifactor Authentication Identity and Access Control Management Solution

Encryption

Firewalls

Intrusion Prevention System

Detect

Network Monitoring

Configuration Management

Respond

Incident Response

Enterprise Forensics

6.2.3.7 Investment Prioritization Methodology

Strong IT governance and oversight ensures that NNSA is capitalizing on its IT and cybersecurity budget to 

deliver a strong, secure set of tools. Effective IT governance empowers program offices to make decisions 

about their IT requirements, while providing guidance and support to ensure their success. 

NNSA uses the continuous Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process that establishes an 

overall approach to enabling the mission of each individual program to be accomplished through mutually 

supportive budget inputs and outputs from appropriate partners. NNSA’s OCIO works closely with its 

internal Requirements Overview Council to appropriately align itself with the NNSA Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, and to focus on vetting the rigorous and efficient 

budget planning and submission inputs that are required on an annual basis. This process is conducted 

between Headquarters and the field, thus addressing the risks and effectively accomplishing the cyber 

and IT specific missions from an operational planning standpoint. 

During the planning and programming process, NNSA’s OCIO coordinates with the field offices to 

communicate strategic program initiatives they are desire to be reach over the next 3 to 5 years. The field 

offices then collaborate and provide the necessary cost inputs required to support strategic initiatives 

through an annual brief that includes all programmatic funded priorities in a formal budget planning 

meeting. During these briefs, all of the appropriate risks are captured so that OCIO Headquarters staff 
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can consolidate and submit their inputs to support the unified NNSA OCIO budget submission across each 

NNSA site in the form of the Integrated Priority List for the Administrator’s consideration. 

During the budgeting process, NNSA’s OCIO provides necessary briefing information to external partners,

including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the designated congressional appropriations 

committees, to successfully represent, inform, justify, and defend their program’s budget submission. 

During the evaluation phase, NNSA’s OCIO executes appropriated funding for a given fiscal year while 

constantly evaluating, monitoring, and overseeing the IT, cybersecurity, and operational activities that the 

OCIO provides to the NNSA enterprise.

The Requirements Overview Council is the primary decision-making body employed to ensure that NNSA 

has efficient IT project management and oversight. The Council uses mature project management 

processes to gain efficiencies and improve customer and partner interaction across the enterprise.

FISMA requires agencies to develop and implement an organization-wide information security program 

to address identification and prioritization of threats as they apply to information security. NNSA’s IT and 

Cybersecurity Program meets the FISMA threat-based requirements through application of the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology risk management framework influenced by DOE Order 205.1B, 

Department of Energy Cyber Security Program, and further outlined in NNSA Baseline Cybersecurity 

Program policy. 

NNSA’s cyber program and IT managers use results from multiple ongoing activities to identify and 

prioritize needed investments based on threats and the degree of risk posed to NNSA information assets 

and business operations. Activities include:

 Intelligence analyses

 System authorization activities

 FISMA Performance Reports

 Program reviews, audits, and inspections

 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan

 Technical impact assessments

 Operational impact assessments

6.2.4 Challenges and Strategies

The cyber threat landscape constantly evolves, with the most sophisticated threats changing to adapt to 

whatever defenses face them. NNSA is committed to providing an IT infrastructure to protect the highly 

complex, global nature of the stockpile stewardship and management missions using a collaborative, 

intelligence-informed approach to cyber operations and a response that employs the full capabilities of 

the nuclear security enterprise, DOE, and the Federal Government. Table 6–3 provides a high-level 

summary of the cybersecurity challenges and the strategies developed to address them.
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Table 6–3. Summary of Information Technology and Cybersecurity challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

Ensuring purchased equipment is from the 

manufacturer, as designed, without modification

Move toward centralized purchasing and equipment review before 

issuing equipment to the field will address current supply chain and 

software assurance issues

Insider Threat Work with counterintelligence on implementation of an insider threat 

program, concentrating first on the classified arena

Network Aging Infrastructure/IT Support  Improve network infrastructure by updating and enhancing 

networking equipment through public/private cloud services, 

managed services, software, and hardware enhancements

 Mature capabilities of aging infrastructures enterprise-wide to 

identify and alert concerning emerging threats

 Ensure faster development and implementation of these capabilities 

to counter such threats

Current network monitoring services restrictions Upgrade sites across the enterprise through deployment of new 

cybersecurity solutions

Not all buildings support network speeds that are 

fast enough for today’s scientific computing and,

with technology’s reliance on computers, 

capacities are being exceeded across the NNSA 

complex

Continued investment is needed in network communications systems 

and in the central networking and telecommunications facilities

Program effects from 2018 Nuclear Posture 

Review Implementation

 Resource requirements for IT and cybersecurity that are required to 

support the nuclear security enterprise mission will vary directly with 

any increases in weapons program workloads

 Additional work locations, increasing workforce numbers, and adding 

shifts will result in additional demand for IT and cybersecurity

resources to ensure a secure, protected, and innovative work 

environment

Fill critical cybersecurity and IT vacancies across 

the enterprise

Hiring a workforce that has the skillsets is included in NNSA’s OCIO 

strategic principles in the 2017-2019 Strategic Plan: “Principle 6: Invest 

in employee development to cultivate a high-performing workforce that 

will support NNSA's mission today and into the future”

Fulfill OMB guidance to consider and use cloud 

solutions in a secure manner

Modernize current services by capitalizing on cloud technology to 

increase performance and strengthen security

IT = information technology

OCIO = Office of the Chief Information Officer

OMB = Office of Management and Budget
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-1

Chapter 7

Sustaining the Workforce

DOE/NNSA’s ability to meet nuclear security missions

depends on a unique, diverse, and highly skilled 

workforce, requiring expertise across a broad array of 

disciplines, including science and engineering specialties 

that can only be exercised within the weapons programs. 

The technical staff and managers working in these areas 

possess advanced science, technology, engineering, and 

math degrees and years of experience working directly 

for DOE/NNSA or its management and operating (M&O)

partners. The need to recruit and retain highly skilled 

staff with unique expertise will continue to grow, given 

DOE/NNSA’s major modernization programs and 

workforce demographics.

DOE/NNSA and its M&O partners devote extensive effort to recruiting, training, sustaining, and 

revitalizing the workforce that supportsthe nuclear deterrent. Workforce-related activities are driven not 

only by current mission needs, activities are designed to

anticipate future challenges and developments that will 

require skills that are not currently in demand. 

This chapter provides an overview of the status, 

accomplishments, and challenges of the workforce, as 

well as the approaches and strategies that DOE/NNSA and 

its M&O partners use to mitigate those challenges. 

Appendix D of this report, “Workforce and Site-Specific 

Information,” includes the mission, capabilities, and 

workforce data for DOE/NNSA and each of the eight 

nuclear security sites.

7.1 Status

7.1.1 Workforce Size and Composition

The overall workforce has three basic components: the Federal workforce, the M&O partners,

1 and the 

non-M&O entities. The M&O partners that conduct DOE/NNSA’s stockpile activities consist of the three 

national security laboratories that operate as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, the 

four nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site. This government‐

owned, contractor‐operated, nuclear weapons enterprise is assisted by non-M&O entities (support 

 

1 M&O partners are consortia of industrial and academic contractors. More detail on these contractors may be found in 

Appendix D.

KCNSC Advanced Manufacturing Facility

Workforce Snapshot (Enterprise-Wide)

(as of September 30, 2018)

 Total Headcount: 42,690

 Average Age: 46.9

 Average Years of Service: 13

 Average Retirement-Eligible Population: 25.9%

 Hires (as of September 30, 2016): 9,219

 Separations (as of September 30, 2016): 5,813

 Net Change (as of September 30, 2016): 3,406
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service contracting firms, members of academia with technical expertise in specific areas, and industrial 

suppliers).

7.1.1.1 Overall Workforce

At the end of FY 2018, the combined Federal and M&O partner

workforce included 42,690 employees.

2 Collectively, the M&O 

partners reported a total of 40,518 employees. The sites 

reported 8,860 hires and 5,459 separations over the last 

2 fiscal years, resulting in a net increase of 3,401 employees. 

KCNSC reported the largest net population change, with an 

increase of 1,079 employees. No sites reported a net decrease 

in personnel during this period. While the largest amount of 

separations came from retirements, there is a notable, 

continuing trend of large numbers of separations occurring 

among employees with 0 to 5 years of service.3

7.1.1.2 Federal Workforce

NNSA’s Federal workforce is responsible for program and 

project management, as well as Federal contractor assurance 

oversight of the national security missions across the nuclear 

security enterprise, and includes significant numbers in the 

Office of Secure Transportation. The Federal workforce is

accountable to the President, Congress, and the public in 

performing inherently governmental functions such as4key 

planning functions, fiduciary oversight, risk prioritization,

product acceptance, and environmental, safety, and health 

oversight duties. At the end of FY 2018, the NNSA Federal 

workforce consisted of 2,172 employees.

5

 Given the growing 

number of life extension programs (LEPs) and major projects 

NNSA is pursuing legislation to enable removal of the overall 

artificial cap on full-time equivalents (FTEs). 

The Federal workforce is augmented by officers in the military 

services on rotational assignments. The senior military leader 

in Defense Programs6is a flag officer whose position is 

established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In 

addition to this position, a small cadre of active-duty military members serve on rotation at DOE/NNSA. 

 

2 This total excludes the Federal Naval Reactors workforce and excludes significant contractor populations on site and at 

Headquarters serving either as subcontractors or as support service contractors to the Federal workforce. For the SSMP, NNSA 

does not collect Naval Reactors numbers. 

3 Among the M&O contractors, as of January 2018, the median years of tenure with a current employer for total industry was 

4.2 years (data include age 16 and above). While half have less tenure, a median of 4.2 years matches up separations in the 0 to 

5 category; this becomes problematic given the many aspects of the nuclear security enterprise that require sustained work and 

“learning by doing” and the long clearance times, which affect retention.

4 As defined in Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, Public Law 105-270, these are functions that are so 

intimately related to the public interest that they require performance by Federal Government employees. 

5 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 capped the total number Federal employees under NNSA’s Federal 

Salaries and Expenses at 1,690 FTEs. Current numbers include Secure Transportation Asset couriers, but exclude the Office of 

Naval Reactors, whose data is not collected for the SSMP. This is headcount.

6 Defense Programs is the office within NNSA with the responsibility for most of the Weapons Activities work.

An Integrated Workforce

DOE/NNSA’s workforce consists of three 

essential integrated components, forming one 

team to accomplish DOE/NNSA’s nuclear 

security missions.

 The M&O partners perform the full spectrum 

of technical activities in support of 

DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security missions 

while the Federal workforce provides 

oversight. The M&O and Federal 

workforces partner to develop and 

implement strategic planning for the nuclear 

security enterprise. 

 Non‐M&O partners enable mission success 

by providing materials, components, and 

specialized services; access to 

supplemental experimental assets; and use 

of academia’s R&D resources. In several 

areas, NNSA is becoming more reliant on 

the non-M&O workforce, including vendors, 

subcontractors, and other service providers, 

to meet the mission requirements.

 The effectiveness of this integrated 

workforce is enhanced by personnel 

exchange and embedding programs (i.e., 

production sites embedding employees at 

the laboratories to learn design changes or 

site personnel advising Defense Programs’ 

leadership at Headquarters). Several M&O 

employees are currently on assignment in 

DOE/NNSA, DoD, and other Federal 

agencies, sharing their expertise while 

broadening their strategic perspective in 

national security.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-3

These military personnel bring a service perspective to Weapons Activities, assisting DOE/NNSA in better 

meeting DoD requirements and, in turn, giving military personnel a deeper understanding of the

DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise.

The Federal workforce resides at DOE/NNSA Headquarters (Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and 

Albuquerque, New Mexico) and at the field offices across the eight nuclear security sites. 

7.1.1.3 Management and Operating Workforce

The M&O workforce resides at eight government-owned or leased nuclear security enterprise sites. An 

analysis of the composition of the M&O workforces at these sites shows differences in the types of labor 

at the laboratories versus the production sites. A breakdown by Common Occupational Classification 

System (COCS) categories of the national laboratory population (including the Nevada National Security 

Site) and the production facility population can be found in Figures 7–1 and 7–2.

Although professional administrative and general management percentages are lower for the M&O 

partners than for the Federal staff, they still represent a substantial portion of the M&O workforce. This 

is a byproduct of the COCS code definitions. The COCS codes are established by job function, not by 

degree held, and the COCS categories mask the number of scientists and engineers functioning as 

technical managers or as program or project managers. Detailed site discussions and site-specific 

workforce data can be found in Appendix D, “Workforce and Site-Specific Information.”

Figure 7–1. Total workforce of national security laboratories and the Nevada National

Security Site by Common Occupational Classification System7(as of September 30, 2018)

 

7 The SSMP reports workforce data using the Common Occupational Classification System (COCS). Federal and M&O workforce 

data are reported in the standardized COCS categories to allow consistent comparison among the sites. However, these 

categories are not completely descriptive of the functions within each category. For example, the broad COCS category “General 

Management” also includes technical and scientific management functions, and the “Professional Administrators” category 

includes technical analysis and drafting design functions.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 7-4 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 7–2. Total workforce of nuclear weapons production facilities8

by Common Occupational Classification System (as of September 30, 2018)

7.1.1.4 Non-Management and Operating Workforce

The non-M&O workforce consists of a variety of entities that assist DOE/NNSA in fulfilling its national 

security missions across the nuclear security enterprise. These include, but are not limited to: 

 Support service contractors providing advisory and technical support and services

 Vendors providing the specific parts necessary to fulfill a key production mission

 Academic institutions supporting DOE/NNSA by providing a pipeline of highly skilled and educated 

talent to the nuclear security enterprise

Institutions operated by major research universities are a key component of the non-M&O workforce and 

are heavily used in providing talent for the nuclear security enterprise. DOE/NNSA’s M&O partners 

continue to build connections with these institutions through academic alliances to maintain a skilled, 

versatile, knowledgeable, and experienced workforce. Several universities have partnered with the sites 

to form a wide array of student internship and other outreach programs. 

 

8 This does not account for production functions at SNL and LANL. While these sites have significant production missions, for 

SSMP data reporting they are included in Figure 7–3.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-5

DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise also requires outside 

vendors and producers to supply certain materials and services. 

Two diverse examples of non-M&O vendors are the firms that 

fabricate tritium-producing burnable absorber rods and the 

Laboratory for Laser Energetics at the University of Rochester. 

Support service contracting companies in the non-M&O 

workforce at Headquarters provide advice and support to 

program and project managers responsible for infrastructure, 

systems, operational readiness, budgets, and policy; 

independent cost estimating, independent project review, and 

analyses of alternatives; and nuclear facility operations and asset 

management, and nuclear engineering and analysis services. 

These companies are a blend of both large and small businesses. 

DOE/NNSA continues to develop long-term vendor relationships

and to identify additional suppliers, researchers, and technical 

and management consultants to reduce the risk of relying on 

single-source providers with capabilities that are not duplicated 

or retained within the M&O workforce.

7.1.2 Age and Other Demographics of the 

Workforce

Age

Eighty-four percent of the nuclear security enterprise workforce 

is between the ages of 31 and 60, with 16 percent in the 56 to 60 

demographic alone. Sites are reporting rates of retirement 

eligibility from 15 percent to 44 percent, which will likely increase 

over the next 5 years as the 56 to 60 group ages into the 61 to 65 

age range. The average age among the sites ranges from 45 to 

49, a slight reduction from the average reported in the 

FY 2018 SSMP. 

Both the laboratories and plants exhibit bimodal age 

distributions, with large numbers of employees in the 36 to 40 

and 56 to 60 age ranges. Some sites have seen their bimodal age 

distribution peaks lessen over the years. Comparing the data 

reported in the FY 2018 SSMP to this data, the higher age 

categories have remained relatively constant, while there is a 

noticeable increase in personnel from ages 31 to 45. Figure 7–3

provides an illustration of the M&O workforce distribution by age

for the entire nuclear security enterprise. 

The M&O partner sites closely monitor their populations and are focused on planning to mitigate the 

impacts. For individual site reports, please see Appendix D, “Workforce and Site-Specific Information.”

Stewardship Science Academic 

Alliances Program

Four universities were selected to operate 

new centers of excellence fostering 

collaboration between DOE/NNSA and 

academia. This collaboration strengthens 

the nuclear security enterprise by advancing 

relevant science within the stockpile 

stewardship mission and ensures a pipeline 

of future scientists and engineers to carry 

out that mission.

In an effort to develop hard to find resources 

in the General Machinist and Toolmaker 

areas, KCNSC has developed a partnership 

with the Metropolitan Community Colleges of 

Kansas City to develop a training and 

certification program in these specialized 

fields. The General Machinist program 

allows employees with a manufacturing 

background, but no machining experience,

to learn technical skills and shadow 

machinists in a manufacturing setting. The 

more specific Toolmaker program is similar, 

but requires at least 2 years of machining 

experience. The jointly developed custom 

curriculum provides employees with 

certifications and enough credits to receive 

associate degrees. KCNSC has also 

adopted a new strategy to add relocation 

benefits for certain non-exempt 

classifications to allow national recruitment 

of toolmakers and technicians.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 7-6 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 7–3. Management and operating partner headcount distribution by age

(as of September 30, 2018)

Years of Service

Out of the reported M&O partner headcount of 40,518 employees, the 1 to 5 years of service category 

contains the largest number, with a headcount of 11,382. This holds true for the laboratories, the Nevada 

Nuclear Security Site, and the production plants. There is a noticeable drop beyond 20 years of service, 

with 70 percent of the workforce having 1 to 20 years of experience. Only 20 percent of the workforce 

has more than 20 years of experience. The average length of service at the nuclear security sites ranges 

from 11 to 14 years. Figure 7–4 illustrates NNSA’s M&O workforce distributed by years of service.

Figure 7–4. Management and operating partner headcount distribution by years of service

(as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-7

Separations

Since publication of the FY 2018 SSMP, the M&O workforce had 5,459 separations. Of these 2,071 were

voluntary separations, 600 were involuntary separations and 2,788 were retirements. Among the 

voluntary separations, more than 82 percent were in the 1 to 10 years of service range. Sixty-four percent 

of voluntary separations were within 1 to 5 years of service. While the sites have strategies to mitigate 

the number of separations within 1 to 5 years of service, the employee separation data show a noticeable 

and troubling challenge concerning the ability to retain early-career professionals in the workforce. Some 

major components of this trend include security clearance processing time,staff having to forego personal 

electronic devices for the majority of the day, location, and competition from other technical industries. 

The percentage of the workforce in the later-career stage has remained relatively stable or even 

decreased as a result of increased hiring combined with retirements, shifting the distribution toward 

early-career employees. This trend is accurate for every site. Figure 7–5 illustrates M&O partner site 

separations distributed by years of service.

Figure 7–5. Total management and operating separations by years of service

7.2 Workforce Planning

As DOE/NNSA continues its modernization programs, DOE/NNSA Headquarters and M&O partners face

emerging challenges in planning, managing, and sustaining the specialized workforce, especially in critical 

skills and key areas of expertise. Shortages in key sectors of the workforce and high demand from the

private sector will make it difficult to recruit, hire, and retain such a high-tech workforce. The role of NNSA 

Headquarters in workforce planning is focused on five areas:

 Planning for the Federal workforce

 Providing annual work scope guidance

 Enabling and monitoring the M&O partners’ management of the workforce in executing work 

scope

 Collecting NNSA workforce demographics for annual reports to Congress

 Working with the M&O partners to identify and resolve cross-cutting issues affecting multiple 

sites
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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NNSA is currently developing a more coordinated and collaborative effort across the nuclear security

enterprise, including a more comprehensive recruitment plan and strategy. To accomplish this, the NNSA 

Administrator has launched a team that will focus on attracting and retaining the best and brightest for 

the nuclear security enterprise.

7.2.1 Federal Workforce Planning

DOE/NNSA has a bimodal distribution in terms of experience; fewer employees have advanced experience 

(25 or more years of service) compared to many more employees with 6 to 15 years of service (see 

Figure 7–6). The potential experience gap is a risk; however, while some employees have fewer years of 

service, they are still fairly experienced and represent an opportunity to manage risk through 

development and training. Retirements, which have represented more than 60 percent of separations in 

the past few years, are still of particular concern as DOE/NNSA’s workload is expected to increase (see 

Figure 7–7). 

Figure 7–6. Federal employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)

Figure 7–7. Federal employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-9

Independent studies conducted by the Office of Personnel Management and the NNSA Office of Cost 

Estimating and Program Evaluation, in 2017 and 2018, identified the need to significantly increase NNSA 

Federal staffing by an additional 250 FTEs. As these studies were conducted before the 2018 Nuclear 

Posture Review and NNSA’s plutonium engineering assessment and workforce analysis, NNSA will need to 

conduct additional workforce planning to determine the actual, optimal NNSA workforce end-state level.

This potential increase in staffing provides DOE/NNSA an opportunity to reshape the workforce to both 

handle the increased workload and balance the skill mix in the future workforce. DOE/NNSA has increased 

its training budget to prepare for mission growth. DOE/NNSA will continue using excepted service 

authorities, and the pay-for-performance NNSA Demonstration Project’s alternate personnel system to 

recruit, hire, and retain the appropriate skill sets needed for DOE/NNSA’s national security missions. 

DOE/NNSA plans to use these personnel systems to obtain the right mix of skills needed to support 

evolving mission requirements.

NNSA supports efforts to formulate a comprehensive government-wide reform plan to create an 

accountable, efficient government workforce; to effectively and efficiently deliver NNSA programs; and 

to align the NNSA Federal workforce to meet the needs of today and the future. For more information on 

the Federal workforce, please see Appendix D, “Workforce and Site-Specific Information.”

7.2.2 M&O Workforce Planning

Concurrent with DOE/NNSA planning, M&O partner sites develop and implement workforce plans and 

approaches to manage staffing to maintain a stable workforce across the full spectrum of nuclear weapon 

capabilities.

Each NNSA site has workforce planning processes tailored to its unique needs:

 Long-term workforce hiring and staffing plans

 Training and qualification of workforce 

 Modeling and planning to address attrition 

 Robust student and postdoctoral programs

 Strategies with local, regional, and state communities to recruit and retain the workforce

 Limited-term and staff augmentation employment

 Leveraging resources from other programs (e.g., the Strategic Partnership Projects)

 Parent company reach-back9

 Deferring purchases, maintenance, travel, etc., to preserve headcount

Current M&O workforce projections reflect minimal growth over the Future Years Nuclear Security 

Program period (see Figure 7–8).

 

9 Parent company reach-back is the ability of operating contractors to leverage certain knowledge, skills, abilities, and business 

practices to respond to M&O partner needs, such as best practices, technical capabilities, or access to specialized resources and 

talent.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 7-10 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 7–8. Management and operating partner workforce projections by

Common Occupational Classification System for the current Future Years Nuclear

Security Program period10 (as of September 30, 2018)

7.2.3 Additional Elements in Workforce Planning

The nuclear security enterprise must address multiple aspects in workforce planning, given the specialized 

and challenging nature of the mission:

 Sites need to provide for knowledge transfer to new employees amid separations.

 Sites also need to plan for security clearance processing times, including hiring in advance of 

requirements and handling uncleared employees awaiting clearances that, in some cases, take 

around 18 to 24 months.

 As the workforce continues to grow at various M&O partner sites, requirements for supporting 

infrastructure will increase accordingly. Workforce planning must include increased office space 

for both cleared and uncleared personnel, parking, training facilities, cafeterias, etc.

 As DOE/NNSA modernizes the enterprise, infrastructure requirements such as space, associated 

with a temporary workforce for construction will need to be addressed.

 Inter-site exchanges need to be increased to better facilitate enterprise understanding and 

provide additional learning experiences.

 The impact of Nuclear Enterprise Assurance on the workforce as vendor/supply chain issues are 

uncovered will require new solutions and increased vetting.

 

10 COCS categories are detailed in Environmental Restoration/Waste Management Activities Common Occupational Classification 

System, Revision 3, May 1996, by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-11

7.2.4 Unique Set of Essential Skills for Nuclear Weapons Work

Essential skills are necessary to successfully provide

capabilities to support the nuclear weapons mission. 

While DOE/NNSA and the M&O partners monitor and 

manage the workforce providing these skills, they must 

closely manage certain essential skills that can only be 

obtained from disciplined experience. These skills cannot 

be learned in the classroom and are nontransferable from 

other industries. For example, the DOE/NNSA capability in 

simulation codes and modeling requiresskill setsin nuclear 

weapon design, production, and certification; such as:

 materials behavior subject matter experts working 

with software developers to create models that 

describe weapon effects in certain environments;

 plutonium physicists working with software 

developers to develop nuclear implosion models;

 engineering analysis and modeling subject matter 

experts producing integrated design codes to 

advance predictive capability; and

 manufacturing process subject matter experts 

working with software developers to simulate, 

design, and refine processes and perform failure 

analysis for the production of weapon 

components.

Other essential skills include, but are not limited to, 

nuclear criticality safety engineering, high explosives manufacturing and surveillance, weapon design, 

radiation effects sciences, welding, radar, and optics applications.

7.3 Challenges and Strategies

Building and retaining a workforce capable of maintaining the current stockpile and planning for an 

uncertain future poses many challenges for the Federal, M&O, and non-M&O workforce. Workforce 

planning efforts are focused on both the near- and long-term challenges in managing the increased 

workload necessary to support weapons modernization, while also backfilling key skills and transferring 

institutional knowledge as significant numbers of the workforce retire. These challenges are articulated 

for specific disciplines and areas of expertise in many of the challenge/strategy sections in Chapters 2, 3 

and 6 of this SSMP.

Through a variety of approaches and strategies, the Federal, M&O, and non-M&O components ensure a 

competent and sustained workforce that will provide the knowledge, skills, and experience needed to 

maintain the current and future stockpile while being able to respond to dynamic needs and expectations. 

The remainder of this section is organized by the talent management life cycle depicted in Figure 7–9.

7.3.1 Recruiting and Hiring

NNSA and its M&O partners continue to increase hiring to meet mission requirements. Each site employs 

mitigation strategies that address its unique recruiting and hiring challenges. Table 7–1 provides a highlevel summary of DOE/NNSA’s recruitment and hiring challenges and strategies.

Examples of Programs to Attract 

and Retain Personnel

 M&O partner sites have partnered with top 

universities to offer graduate degrees and 

certification programs in high-demand disciplines 

such as systems engineering and data science.

 KCNSC is implementing a formalized Career Path 

Model and tools to help employees own and 

manage their careers.

 SNL has five on-campus Academic Alliance 

programs to identify promising candidates at top 

universities before graduation and promote joint 

technology development research between 

graduate students and SNL researchers, pursuing 

topics with national security applications. 

 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory administers 

the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP). 

NGFP accepts graduate-level students from 

technical and policy backgrounds and provides 

hands-on experience in a variety of nuclear 

security missions. NGFP fellows have contributed 

to nuclear security for over 20 years and many 

serve in the Federal Government or at the nuclear 

sites.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 7-12 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 7–9. A simplified model of the talent management life cycle

Table 7–1. Summary of recruitment and hiring challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

 Limited awareness of career opportunities 

in the nuclear security enterprise

 Demonstrating the differentiating 

advantages of a national security career to 

prospective employees

 Increase outreach programs

 Recruit at career fairs and universities/colleges

 Increase social media presence

 Establish and leverage long-term university partnerships; hire employees 

that are alumni to these institutions

 Capture interest through initial student internships and post-doc 

appointments, with subsequent conversion to permanent employee status

 Use specialized, third-party recruiting services

 Increase the emphasis on the uniqueness and state-of-the-art research 

opportunities at NNSA sites via outreach programs

 Develop and market a distinct nuclear security enterprise “brand”

 Competition for high-demand disciplines, 

such as electrical engineering and computer 

science

 Proximity to high-tech industries, sparking 

intense competition for high-demand 

disciplines

 Promote access to unique, world-class R&D, science, technology, and 

engineering capabilities and facilities 

 Develop postdoctoral programs with opportunities to become career 

employees.

 Emphasize stable employment, even during economic downturns, with 

long-term financial stability and higher quality of life

 Introduce hiring bonus programs

 Create developmental programs for highly skilled disciplines; work on 

adding non-exempt relocation benefits to allow national recruitment of 

high-demand/hard to find disciplines (e.g., toolmakers and technicians)

 Investigate methods to increase compensation for hard to fill roles
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-13

Challenges Strategies

 Difficulty finding and hiring technical 

specialists in emerging disciplines, such as 

nanotechnologies, advanced manufacturing 

technologies, and high performance 

computing

 Limited availability of U.S. citizens earning 

advanced engineering and science degrees

 Develop partnerships with universities that offer specialization in these 

emerging disciplines

 Introduce students and early-career professionals to computing facilities 

via unclassified projects

 Increase military and veteran recruitment

 Target U.S. citizen students in university partnerships

 Use specialized, third-party recruitment services

 Use internships and special hiring programs to capture candidates’ interest 

before graduation

 Remote geographic location of some sites, 

resulting in difficulty recruiting nationally

 Target willing candidates via university partnerships

 Increase emphasis on local hiring and training; focus greater emphasis on 

internships and apprenticeships to increase the local pool of technologists 

and craft workers, particularly at the nuclear weapons production facilities

 Emphasize internal facility community

 Loss of candidates because of extended hire 

cycle time

 Work on processes to decrease hire cycle time, including consolidating

Human Resource systems and transitioning to applicant tracking systems

 Use innovative hiring strategies (e.g., hiring on the spot, hiring pools)

 Lower quality work environment because of

aging infrastructure issues

 Continue efforts to increase capital investments in modern facilities with 

modern amenities, collaborative space, and enhanced digital 

communications access

7.3.2 Developing, Retaining, and 

Sustaining the Workforce

Many aspects of nuclear weapons work require sustained 

and extensive experience and knowledge, which can be 

difficult to achieve when most non-retirement separations 

occur within the first 5 years of employment. Today’s 

workforce leans toward being increasingly mobile and 

desires more authority, more responsibility, and quicker 

advancement. These changes in expectations found in 

today’s workforce make it difficult to keep staff engaged, 

given lengthy security clearance wait times, multi-year 

training periods, and constantly changing workloads and 

priorities.

As a means to increase workforce engagement, DOE/NNSA 

offers Laboratory Directed Research and Development 

(LDRD), Site Directed Research and Development (SDRD),

and Plant Directed Research and Development (PDRD) 

programs to the national security laboratories, Nevada 

National Security Site, and nuclear weapons production 

facilities. These programs provide the nuclear security 

workforce with opportunities to collectively form the 

foundation of NNSA’s strategy for developing science and 

technology tools and capabilities to meet future national 

security challenges. 

KCNSC completed implementation of a new 100-

workstation Mock Factory, an evolution from the 

original Manufacturing Innovation Center, which is 

focused on the onboarding of direct hourly 

employees who support development, production, 

and other projects for the nuclear security 

enterprise. The Mock Factory provides uncleared 

employees with a better understanding of business 

processes and requirements at KCNSC, including 

work instructions, Enterprise Resource Planning 

functions, Calibration Management, and other 

business operating systems. Performing this 

training up front reduces the burden on cleared 

factory employees who would otherwise spend time 

training newly cleared employees on the business 

systems critical to success in the factory. This 

increases efficiency for employees already working 

on the B61, W88, and other weapon programs in 

the factory.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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There are five key objectives of the LDRD/SDRD programs: 

 Maintain the scientific and technical vitality of the laboratories

 Enhance the laboratories’ ability to extend LDRD work to address current and future DOE/NNSA 

missions

 Foster creativity and stimulate exploration of forefront areas of science and technology

 Serve as a proving ground for new concepts in research and development (R&D)

 Support high-risk, potentially high-value R&D

There are three key objectives of the PDRD program:

 Fund conceptual or preliminary designs of technology applications that hold a high potential 

payoff for their mission applications

 Fund capital expenditures for acquisition of general-purpose equipment if the equipment is 

required for PDRD projects

 Train, recruit, or retain essential personnel in critical engineering and manufacturing disciplines

The highly innovative and cutting edge nature of LDRD/SDRD/PDRD attracts high-quality candidates to 

the enterprise, while also providing those awaiting a clearance with a mechanism to work on missionrelevant basic R&D.

NNSA and its partners employ a number of strategies for development and retention, especially for earlyand mid-career employees.11 Table 7–2 provides a high-level summary of DOE/NNSA’s challenges and 

strategies associated with developing, retaining, and sustaining the workforce.

Table 7–2. Summary of workforce development, retention, and sustainment challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

 New hires must wait extended time periods for 

security clearances – currently greater than 1 year 

for Q clearance

 Perceived isolation while awaiting clearance

 Increase pre-clearance training programs

 Offer opportunity to work on unclassified R&D or other projects

 Use priority and interim clearance processes to shorten clearance 

times for new hires with essential skills

 Increasing attrition rates for early-career employees

 Retaining new hires in mid-career, especially those in 

high-demand disciplines and in locations with a large 

high-tech base and high cost of living

 Ensuring Federal technical employees possess the 

necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform 

their duties and responsibilities (e.g., safe operation

of defense nuclear facilities)

 Making the wide range of programmatic and 

technical oversight tasks to advance NNSA’s mission 

available to Federal employees across the nuclear 

security enterprise

 Maintain critical skills during and outside of LEPs 

across the entire weapon life cycle

 Offer advanced education, training, leadership, and mentoring

 Emphasize total compensation benefits (i.e., flexible work 

arrangements, royalty sharing, educational assistance, and work 

and life balance)

 Emphasize stable employment with long-term financial stability.

 Provide rotational development opportunities

 Explore possibilities for specific skill incentives (e.g., bonuses and 

pay for market differential)

 Offer broadening rotational assignments between the sites and 

NNSA, DoD, the White House, and other appropriate agencies

 Analyze exit interviews and employee satisfaction surveys to 

obtain additional insight

 Use the Technical Qualification Program, a structured training and 

development program, to identify the competencies that 

 

11 This section includes examples of programs that have been implemented by at least one site, but may not be available or 

feasible at other sites because the sites are operated under seven different M&O contracts; moreover, each M&O partner has its 

own business model, which may or may not be compatible with a particular approach. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-15

Challenges Strategies

employees must possess, and ensure that employees maintain 

those technical competencies

 Use the Nuclear Weapon Acquisition Professional Certification 

Program, which was established to combine education, training, 

and mentoring, to ensure the workforce meets current Federal 

program management standards in key technical areas (i.e., 

engineering, program management and science, and technology)

 Implement the Stockpile Responsiveness Program

7.3.3 Training and Knowledge Transfer to the Next Generation

Implementing training and knowledge transfer programs that are 

robust enough to stay ahead of the wave of retirement-eligible 

employees continues to be an area of emphasis for DOE/NNSA and 

its M&O partners.

The heavy stockpile modernization workloads provide an 

opportunity for new employees to learn on the job, although this 

must be accompanied by sufficient mentoring and guidance to be 

optimal. Many sites, especially the national security laboratories, 

have mentoring systems in place as part of an employee’s career 

development. These mentoring systems provide new employees 

opportunities to learn from experienced professionals while enabling 

the experienced employees, including retirees, to pass on their 

knowledge.

Aside from active mentorship, the knowledge and expertise of 

seasoned employees approaching retirement has to be documented

and preserved for future weapon designers. DOE/NNSA and the 

M&O partners recognize that efforts to gather weapons knowledge 

prior to the retirement of late-career employees must continue to be 

improved by enhancing existing programs and developing additional 

programs.

The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise sites have deployed a variety of approaches that reflect their 

strategies to address knowledge transfer challenges. Table 7–3 provides a high-level summary of 

challenges and strategies for training and transferring knowledge to the next generation.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 7–3. Summary of knowledge transfer and next-generation workforce training 

challenges and strategies

Challenges Strategies

 Transferring knowledge and skills 

prior to the expected retirement 

wave

 Provide programs to transfer the experience of weapon mentors and leaders to new 

hires, such as lunch and learn sessions and “Bombs 101” courses

 Digitize and catalogue weapon system-specific artifacts

 Design and implement education and training programs for weapons engineers and 

scientists

 Implement increased internship and postdoctoral opportunities for students and 

recent graduates

 Provide formal mentoring in weapon programs and in R&D, testing, and evaluation to 

accelerate on-the-job training

 Utilize recent retirees as consultants and mentors

 Initiate succession planning to identify personnel with critical skills and recruit 

replacement candidates for key positions

 Amount of time required to bring 

early-career scientists and 

engineers to technical and 

leadership competency

 Incorporate introductory live and web-based self-study modules

 Design education and training programs for weapons engineers and scientists

 Implement new hire orientation programs

 Design programs specifically for new employees within 6 months of hire

 Documenting, managing, and 

preserving subject matter 

expertise, critical technical skills, 

and key processes prior to an 

expected wave of retirements

 Develop or expand programs to identify, track, and manage mission-critical subject 

areas, essential skills, and key processes

 Develop data virtualization and interactive online tools to capture knowledge, 

improve collaboration, and expand the weapons knowledge base

 Enhance video and process documentation of weapon surveillance, annual 

assessment, LEP, and alteration expertise and processes and role descriptions for 

designers and engineers

7.4 Workforce Accomplishments

The nuclear security enterprise workforce continues to possess a track record of outstanding achievement

of scientific, technical, and professional excellence. The collective workforce includes dedicated 

individuals that not only contribute to DOE/NNSA’s mission, but also take great pride in contributing to 

their professions and communities. This is demonstrated through the numerous awards and accolades 

earned by members of the workforce. More detailed site-by-site accomplishments can be found in each 

site’s section of Appendix D, “Workforce and Site-Specific Information.”

 Over the past 2 years, the three national security laboratories and the Nevada National Security 

Site earned or partnered in over 30 R&D 100 awards. The sites have had impressive

representation in these awards for several years.

 The national security laboratories jointly published over 7,000 peer-reviewed, highly cited

technical publications over a variety of fields in 2017 and 2018. 

 In 2017 and 2018, DOE/NNSA sites were collectively issued more than 400 patents and copyrights;

additional patent applications and more than 300 invention disclosures were also submitted.

 DOE/NNSA sites collectively worked to implement efficiency improvements in a variety of areas 

such as security, human resources, and productivity. Some examples of these achievements 

include allowing employees to report to work earlier through improved security clearance 

processes; consolidating human resource processes to use best practices and enhance the ability 

to recruit and retain top talent; increasing efficiency through actions such as improving product 
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-17

loading, review, and shipping availability times and reducing single point failure; and completing 

multiple projects without safety issues.

 Several employees used their scientific, technical, and professional expertise to contribute while 

on assignment or detail supporting NNSA and other agencies in national security missions. 

Examples of these assignments include advising Defense Programs’ leadership by serving on the 

Defense Programs Science Council; serving in other positions at DOE/NNSA Headquarters;

participating at another nuclear enterprise site; advising DoD; serving at another government 

agency; and as detailees to congressional staffs.

 A number of employees and high-performing teams across the enterprise won diverse, 

distinguished, and prestigious awards. These include, but are not limited to,several 2018 Defense 

Programs Awards of Excellence; the Significant Technical Achievement Reward and Recognition 

award; DOE Early-Career Awards; five 2018 Black Engineer of the Year Awards;three 2018 Women 

of Color Awards; the National Organization of Gay and Lesbian Scientists and Technical 

Professionals’ Scientist of the Year award; multiple Asian American of the Year awards; and the 

2017 George Cotter Award for vision and leadership in the field of data analytics.

 Personnel at several sites were recognized for professional excellence through fellowship 

appointments to the American Physical Society, American Chemical Society, American Society of 

Mechanical Engineers, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, American Association 

for the Advancement of Science, and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

 The FY 2019 update to the Government Accountability Office High Risk List identified progress in 

contract, project, and program management in its biannual update to Congress.

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-1

Chapter 8

Budget and Fiscal Estimates

This chapter provides an overview of the key programmatic elements proposed in the Weapons Activities 

budget request for FY 2020. The chapter displays budgetary information based on the current program 

of record, including the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), for FY 2020 through FY 2024.

Each programmatic section in this chapter compares the FY 2020 budget request to the FY 2019 enacted 

budget and presents key milestones representing progress toward program goals. Milestones have been 

updated from the FY 2019 SSMP to reflect the milestones listed in the Department of Energy FY 2020 

Congressional Budget Request. Specific information on the status and accomplishments of each program 

can be found in Chapters 2 through 6. This chapter also includes a section that describes cost projections 

beyond the FYNSP and the basis of those cost projections. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the 

affordability of Weapons Activities program costs.

8.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget

Table 8–1 outlines program budget requests for Weapons Activities for FY 2020 – FY 2024.

Table 8–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget request for

Weapons Activities in fiscal years 2020 through 2024

a

Activity

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2019

Enacted

2020

Request

2021

Request

2022

Request

2023

Request

2024

Request

Directed Stockpile Work 4,658.3 5,426.4 5,986.7 6,279.1 6,534.0 6,312.9 

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 2,014.2 2,277.9 2,295.9 2,376.2 2,390.6 2,430.4 

Science 480.5 586.6 656.8 691.1 695.8 684.9 

Engineering 190.1 234.0 257.4 263.8 273.4 289.9 

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 

High Yield 544.9 480.6 492.0 504.8 517.1 530.7 

Advanced Simulation and Computing 717.1 839.8 774.6 799.5 782.3 794.0 

Advanced Manufacturing Development 81.6 136.9 115.0 117.1 122.1 130.9 

Secure Transportation Asset 278.6 317.2 356.8 292.7 285.5 310.1 

Infrastructure and Operations 3,087.9 3,208.4 3,033.3 2,938.8 2,767.7 3,165.3 

Defense Nuclear Security 690.6 778.2 773.1 773.9 785.1 800.8 

Information Technology and Cybersecurity 221.2 309.4 281.2 290.2 311.7 315.8 

Legacy Contractor Pensions 162.3 91.2 66.9 66.9 69.4 69.4 

Adjustments (13.1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Weapons Activities Total 11,100.0 12,408.6 12,793.8 13,017.9 13,143.9 13,404.5 

a Totals may not add because of rounding. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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The FY 2020 Weapons Activities budget request provides an 11.8 percent increase over the FY 2019 

enacted level to support the current stockpile, life extension programs (LEPs), enterprise modernization 

efforts, and the scientific tools necessary for these efforts. The FY 2020 budget request is consistent with 

the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and positions DOE/NNSA to support Nuclear Posture Review initiatives 

while continuing to work within the Nuclear Weapons Council to define military requirements and 

strategic direction. As military requirements are refined, the Administration will work with Congress to 

obtain the required adjustments in funding. 

DOE/NNSA’s plan to meet the objectives and strategies outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

consists of the 42 explicit and implicit tasks outlined in DOE/NNSA’s Nuclear Posture Review

Implementation Plan.

1

 DOE/NNSA will continue to work with DoD through the Nuclear Weapons Council

to translate Nuclear Posture Review policy into requirements that may impact future budget requests.

The figures that follow in each section enumerate the FY 2020 budget request. The tables compare the 

FY 2020 request to the FY 2019 enacted budget.

8.2 Directed Stockpile Work

Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) encompasses five major subprograms that sustain the nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile. These subprograms are: (1) LEPs, which extend the lifetime of the Nation’s nuclear 

stockpile while addressing defects and enhancing security and safety features, as well as alterations (Alts)

and modifications (Mods), which address aging or obsolete components to ensure continued service life; 

(2) Stockpile Systems, which directly performs sustainment activities for all enduring weapons systems in 

the stockpile, including surveillance for each weapon system; (3) Weapons Dismantlement and 

Disposition, which dismantles retired weapons and disposes of retired components from the stockpile; 

(4) Stockpile Services, which provides the foundation and capabilities for DOE/NNSA’s research, 

development, production, maintenance, and surveillance activities; and (5) Strategic Materials, which 

ensures sustainment of nuclear material processing capabilities and funds stabilization, consolidation, 

disposition, tracking, and accounting of nuclear materials. Research and development (R&D) in Stockpile 

Services is managed through the technology maturation R&D program and develops technologies from 

design concept through simulated environmental tests to support LEPs and future stockpile systems, 

which is distinct from the work done as part of the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 

portfolio. 

Budget

The funding schedule for DSW is illustrated in Figure 8–1. The budget request for DSW increased 

17 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget. The Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services lines in 

Figure 8–1 include the surveillance program funding listed in Table 8–2. 

Accomplishments

Major DSW accomplishments since the FY 2019 SSMP, in addition to the Annual Assessment Reports,

Laboratory Director Letters to the President, and scheduled replacements of limited life components 

(LLCs), are discussed in Chapter 2, “Stockpile Management.”

 

1 NNSA Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan Report to Congress, February 2018.
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Figure 8–1. Funding schedule for Directed Stockpile Work, fiscal years 2019 through 2024

Table 8–2. Core Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2013 through 2024

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Core Surveillance 

Program Funding a

217 225 236 217 213 231 264 264 274 279 294 298

a Core surveillance program numbers for FY 2019 through FY 2024 represent current planning estimates for Stockpile 

Systems and Management, Technology, and Production. Prior-year numbers reflect actual expenditures. The 

FYNSP estimates include increases to support retention of the B83 in the stockpile.

FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

8.2.3.1 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

 The budget request for the B61-12 LEP had no substantive changes from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget.

 No FY 2020 funding was requested for the W76-1 LEP due to the completion of the remaining 

W76 warhead refurbishments and associated deliveries to the Navy. 

 The budget request for the W76-2 Modification Program decreased 85 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget because of strong program performance and production efficiencies. This 

funding directly supports 2018 Nuclear Posture Review implementation.

 The budget request for the W88 Alt 370 had no substantive changes from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget.

 The budget request for the W80-4 LEP increased 37 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to 

continue performing Phase 6.3 activities. This increase reflects revised cost estimates resulting 
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from the Weapon Design and Cost Report (WDCR) process.2 The WDCR process captures higherfidelity cost estimates based on site-specific analysis.

 The budget request for the W87-1 Modification Program (formerly IW1) increased 111 percent 

from the FY 2019 enacted budget to continue Phase 6.2 activities. This request supports 2018

Nuclear Posture Review implementation.

8.2.3.2 Stockpile Systems

 The budget request for B61 Stockpile Systems increased 10 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget due to electronic neutron generator production for the B61-11 and transition costs 

associated with the B61-12 entering the stockpile.

 The budget request for W76 Stockpile Systems increased 7 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget due to a ramp-up in development of the Joint Test Assembly 3 flight test body.

 The budget request for W78 Stockpile Systems had no substantive changes from the FY 2019 

enacted budget.

 The budget request for W80 Stockpile Systems increased 7 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to support the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review sea-launched cruise missile study. 

 The budget request for B83 Stockpile Systems increased 47 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to implement continued surveillance and assessment activities to support the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review. 

 The budget request for W87 Stockpile Systems increased 18 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget due to growth in component development and production to support joint test flight 

requirements, Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent integration, and ramp-up of component 

production to support rebuild and retrofit schedules.

 The budget request for W88 Stockpile Systems decreased 8 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget due to reduced design and development costs for neutron generators and gas transfer 

systems.

8.2.3.3 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

 The budget request for Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition decreased 15 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget due to a reduction in legacy component disposition and canned 

subassembly activities consistent with the material and component needs of the stockpile and 

external customers. The Weapons Dismantlement program of record remains unchanged.

8.2.3.4 Stockpile Services

 The budget request for Production Support increased 7 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget 

to ensure production base capabilities and capacities are sufficiently resourced to support an

increased workload as LEPs reach full-scale production rates.

 The budget request for Research and Development Support increased 9 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to enhance production agency and design agency interactionsin early technology 

development.

 The budget request for Research and Development Certification and Safety increased 17 percent 

from the FY 2019 enacted budget to further invest in early development of new technologies, to 

 

2 More information about the WDCR can be found in Section 8.7.3.7.
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-5

advance existing technologies for the W87-1 and other future LEPs, and to support demonstration 

activities for flight test and ground-based capabilities. 

 The budget request for Management, Technology, and Production increased 1 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget in multi-weapon activities to support fielding the LEPs following first 

production unit, surveillance activities, and development of surveillance testers for weapons.

8.2.3.5 Strategic Materials

 The budget request for Uranium Sustainment increased 8 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to continue phasing out mission dependency on Building 9212 and executing ramp-up 

activities related to full-scale equipment prototyping for future uranium processes. 

 The budget request for Plutonium Sustainment increased 97 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to support the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review requirement for a responsive nuclear 

weapons infrastructure that provides “the enduring capability and capacity to produce pits at a 

rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030.” In May 2018, the DOE/NNSA Administrator 

provided Congress with DOE/NNSA’s recommended alternative to meet this requirement, which 

includes, repurposing SRS’s Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, renaming it the Savannah River 

Plutonium Processing Facility, to produce 50 ppy by 2030 and concurrently continuing to invest in 

LANL to produce a minimum of 30 ppy beginning in 2026.

 The budget request for Tritium Sustainment decreased 7 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget due to movement of funds to the Domestic Uranium Enrichment line; however, this 

program supports ramp-up of tritium production in the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor and 

commencement of irradiation of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) in the Watts 

Bar Unit 2 reactor. Funding supports increased extractions at the Tritium Extraction Facility and 

for down-blending highly enriched uranium (HEU) per the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, 

and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019. This request directly 

supports 2018 Nuclear Posture Review implementation.

 The budget request for Lithium Sustainment had no substantive changes from the FY 2019 

enacted budget.

 The budget request for Domestic Uranium Enrichment increased 180 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget largely due to the increased cost for down-blending activities to provide 

unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for tritium production and movement of those funds 

back into the Domestic Uranium Enrichment line from Tritium Sustainment.

 The budget request for Strategic Materials Sustainment increased 19 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to meet increased tritium and plutonium mission requirements through 

additional capability investment at SRS and the Plutonium Facility vault de-inventory, storage 

optimization, and transuranic waste process supply chain efforts at LANL.

Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for DSW. Figure 8–2 illustrates key milestones for LEPs, major Alts, 

component production, and dismantlement. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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8.2.4.1 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

Key milestones for LEPs and major Alts include:

 Carry out Phase 6.4 activities for the B61-12 LEP. The B61-12 schedule is under revision, see 

section 2.5.4 (B61-12 LEP) for details. A decision on first production unit and Initial Operational 

Capability dates is being jointly coordinated with the Air Force.

 Complete project closeout activities and production of arming, fuzing, and firing (AF&F) 

assemblies for the W76-1 LEP to support W76-1 life of program hardware provisioning in FY 2020.

 Complete remaining production of W76-2 warheads and execute program closeout activities in 

FY 2020.

 Carry out Phase 6.4 activities for the W88 Alt 370. The W88 Alt 370 schedule is under revision, 

see section 2.5.3 (W88 Alt 370) for details. 

 Carry out Phase 6.3 activities in support of the Air Force Long Range Standoff cruise missile 

program in FY 2020 and FY 2021. 

 Begin Phase 6.4 activities for the W80-4 LEP in FY 2022; deliver first production unit in FY 2025;

and deliver last production unit in FY 2031.

 Complete Phase 6.2 activities for the W87-1 Modification Program and transition to Phase 6.3 

activities in FY 2022.

 Deliver first production unit of the W87-1 Modification Program in FY 2030.

 Execute feasibility studies for the Next Navy Warhead in FY 2020 as part of the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program.

 Deliver first production unit of the Next Navy Warhead in FY 2034.

3

 Deliver first production unit of the Future Strategic Missile Warhead in FY 2037.

8.2.4.2 Stockpile Systems

Key milestones for Stockpile Systems include:

 Complete a sea-launched cruise missile study in the early 2020s as identified in the NNSA Nuclear 

Posture Review Implementation Plan.

8.2.4.3 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

Key milestones for Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition include:

 Complete dismantlement of weapons consistent with material and disposition needs for the 

stockpile and external customers.

8.2.4.4 Stockpile Services

Key milestones for Stockpile Services include:

 Complete the Manufacturing Modernization Project to support digital product production and 

acceptance, specifically the upgrade for the detonator manufacturing line completing in FY 2021.

 

3 The Nuclear Weapons Council continues to evaluate deterrence requirements from the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that will 

be resolved in the next several months. Among these are the first production units for the Next Navy Warhead and the Future 

Strategic Missile Warhead. The costs and updated delivery dates, once approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council, will be 

reflected in next year’s SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-7

 Complete demonstration studies for the Joint Technology Demonstrator for the Mk21 ground test 

unit by FY 2020 and United States/United Kingdom-developed systems by FY 2022.

 Evaluate and implement re-entry concepts/environments within the High Operational Tempo

Sounding Rocket (HOT SHOT) initiative by FY 2024.

 Complete the Weapons Reliability Report in FY 2020.

Figure 8–2. Key milestones for life extension programs and major alterations, Stockpile Systems, 

and Stockpile Services

8.2.4.5 Strategic Materials

As illustrated in Figure 8–3, key milestones4for Strategic Materials include:

 Obtain Critical Decision 4 (CD-4) approval for the Uranium Processing Facility5 by the end of 

FY 2025.

 Accomplish and certify the W87-like pit design, including production of development pits each 

year to sustain fabrication capability, according to the timeline:

– 1 W87-like War Reserve ppy in FY 2023

– 10 W87-like War Reserve ppy in FY 2024

– 20 W87-like War Reserve ppy in FY 2025

– 30 W87-like War Reserve ppy in FY 2026

– 80 W87-like War Reserve ppy in FY 2030

 

4 The Critical Decision process is outlined in Chapter 4, “Physical Infrastructure,” Figure 4–5.

5 The Uranium Processing Facility project is funded under Infrastructure and Operations.
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 Begin irradiation of TPBARs in a second reactor in FY 2021.

 Begin increasing TPBAR irradiation cycles to begin producing 2,800 grams of tritium per reactor 

cycle by FY 2025.

 Re-establish a lithium chloride conversion and purification process in FY 2020. 

 The Lithium Processing Facility6is scheduled to:

– Obtain Technology Readiness Level-7 for selected technologies for insertion into the Lithium 

Processing Facility in FY 2021.

– Obtain CD-2/3 approval in FY 2022.

– Obtain CD-4 approval in FY 2027.

 The Domestic Uranium Enrichment program is scheduled to:

– Complete Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) in FY 2020.

– Obtain CD-1 approval by the end of FY 2023.

– Complete down-blending of identified HEU to extend the need date for LEU fuel for tritium 

production in FY 2025.

– Obtain CD-4 approval in FY 2039.

Figure 8–3. Key milestones for Strategic Materials

 

6 The Lithium Processing Facility project is funded under Infrastructure and Operations.
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-9

8.3 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

The RDT&E programs develop and maintain the critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to 

support science-based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile 

without additional explosive nuclear testing. The funding schedule for the RDT&E portfolio is illustrated 

in Figure 8–4.

Figure 8–4. Funding schedule for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, 

fiscal years 2019 through 2024

Science

The Science Program provides the knowledge and expertise needed to maintain confidence in the nuclear 

stockpile without additional underground nuclear explosive testing. Capabilities developed and 

maintained in the Science Program provide: (1) the scientific underpinnings required to conduct annual 

assessments of weapon performance and certification of LEPs; (2) the information required to understand 

the effects of surveillance findings to assure that the nuclear stockpile continues to remain safe, secure, 

and effective; and (3) the core technical expertise required to be responsive to technical and geopolitical 

developments. Science deliverables also facilitate the assessment of current weapon and component 

lifetimes, development and qualification of modern materials and manufacturing processes, concepts for 

component reuse, and modern safety concepts for sustainment.

8.3.1.1 Budget

The funding schedule for Science is illustrated in Figure 8–5. The budget request for Science increased 

22 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 8–5. Funding schedule for Science, fiscal years 2019 through 2024

8.3.1.2 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from the Science Program and its subprogramssince 

the FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 3, “Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and 

Engineering.”

8.3.1.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

 The budget request for Advanced Certification had no substantive changes from the FY 2019 

enacted budget.

 The budget request for Primary Assessment Technologies increased 7 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to support design and development of an inner containment vessel at the

Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) proton radiography (pRad) facility and expanded 

nuclear science initiatives based on recent findings.

 The budget request for Dynamic Materials Properties increased 12 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to support an increased rate of subcritical experiments with improved 

diagnostics, plutonium characterization, advanced manufacturing, and new high explosive 

formulation for future stockpile options.

 The budget request for Advanced Radiography had no substantive changes from the FY 2019 

enacted budget.

 The budget request for Secondary Assessment Technologies had no substantive changes from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget.
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 The budget request for Academic Alliances and Partnerships decreased 16 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget to reflect priorities of other programs.

 The budget request for Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) increased

190 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to support: (1) the technical maturation and design 

activities needed in support of the Advanced Sources and Detectors (ASD) accelerator CD-3A 

submittal (FY 2020; long lead acquisitions); (2) development of the source and detectors 

associated with Neutron Diagnosed Subcritical Experiments; and (3) staff to support the overall 

preliminary and final designs needed to support an ASD accelerator FY 2021 CD-2/3 submittal. 

The ASD accelerator is an ~$800 million, multi-pulse (at least 4-pulses) x-ray machine being built 

at the Nevada National Security Site U1a Complex in Nevada.7

8.3.1.4 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for Science. The Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule (SCDS) 

(formerly known as the Predictive Capability Framework) pegposts and objectives previously included in 

this section were adjusted to better align with the needs of the current and future U.S. nuclear stockpile

and are described in Chapter 3. Note that SCDS is an organizational framework for ongoing initiatives in 

the RDT&E program and has no internal budget and makes no capital investments. Figure 8–6 illustrates 

the key milestones for Science, including:

 Conduct two subcritical experiments per year beginning in FY 2020.

 Reinstitute the capability for examining plutonium-bearing material at the LANSCE pRad facility in 

FY 2021.

 Develop the ability to fabricate plutonium thin films supporting target fabrication and surface 

studies by FY 2023.

 Develop updated lifetime assessment of aging based on new, experimental data by FY 2024.

 Execute ramp-compression experiments, providing equation of state data for high Z materials in 

a relevant pressure regime in FY 2023.

 Conduct six experiments to deliver high-pressure plutonium data using the Joint Actinide Shock 

Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) capability at the Nevada National Security Site in FY 2020.

 Complete R&D for the next-generation Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) and 

Flash X-Ray replacement accelerator architectures by FY 2024.

 Provide a pulsed neutron source that supports radiographic and reactivity measurements by

FY 2024.

 Deliver opacity data on multiple elements from the Z pulsed power facility (Z) and National 

Ignition Facility (NIF) experiments to improve and validate first-principles opacity models in 

FY 2020.

 Obtain CD-3A approval for long lead ECSE procurements in FY 2021 and approval of CD-2/3 for 

the ASD accelerator in FY 2022.

 Begin installation of ASD accelerator special equipment in the U1a Complex in FY 2021.

 

7 This x-ray machine is somewhat analogous to the 4-pulse second axis of DARHT at LANL. However, the design requirements are 

more stringent so as to be able to fit the ASD accelerator within the tunnel structure of the U1a Complex, and more importantly, 

the ASD accelerator system will be able to diagnose the late time behavior of plutonium, to eliminate the paucity of plutonium

data that exist within this extreme regime of temperature and pressure.
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 Complete the ASD accelerator injector testing at the integrated test stand in FY 2023.

 Establish sustainable ECSE capability at the Nevada National Security Site in FY 2025.

Figure 8–6. Key milestones for Science

Engineering

The Engineering Program is responsible for providing the engineering tools and capabilities for evaluating 

the stockpile of today and enabling the future deterrent. This program supports five key mission areas: 

(1) strengthening the science, technology, and engineering base by maturing advanced technologies to 

improve weapon surety; (2) providing tools for qualifying weapon components to hostile environments

without underground nuclear explosive testing; (3) providing tools for qualifying weapon components to 

a range of delivery environments, to include accident scenarios; (4) supporting annual stockpile 

assessments through improved weapons surveillance technologies and warhead component aging 

assessments; and (5) exercising all phases of the joint nuclear acquisition process through Stockpile 

Responsiveness.

8.3.2.1 Budget

The funding schedule for Engineering is illustrated in Figure 8–7. The budget request for Engineering

increased 23 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget.
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Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-13

Figure 8–7. Funding schedule for Engineering, fiscal years 2019 through 2024

8.3.2.2 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from Engineering and its subprograms since the 

FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 3, “Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and Engineering.”

8.3.2.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted 

 The budget request for Enhanced Surety increased 17 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget 

to produce flight test hardware to validate and qualify system performance for next-generation 

technologies and multi-point safety initial design concepts, and to support the simultaneous 

development of technologies at the design and production agencies.

 The budget request for Delivery Environments (formerly Weapons Systems Engineering 

Assessment Technology) increased 56 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to support joint 

DOE/NNSA-DoD interagency projects on delivery environments, provide diagnostics for sounding 

rocket experiments, and prepare for a planned hydrodynamic flight test in FY 2023. 

 The budget request for Nuclear Survivability increased 12 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to support x-ray radiation environment testing (Saturn) recapitalization, evaluations of 

new strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics, development of cold x-ray surrogate test 

capability, and radiation transport in advanced materials. 

 The budget request for Enhanced Surveillance increased 28 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to maintain characterization of high-risk stockpile components and materials.

 The budget request for Stockpile Responsiveness increased 17 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to begin work with the production agencies to explore new technology concepts. This 

funding supports 2018 Nuclear Posture Review implementation.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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8.3.2.4 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for Engineering. The SCDS pegposts and objectives previously included 

in this section were adjusted to better align with the needs of the current and future U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 

and are described in Chapter 3. Figure 8–8 illustrates key milestones for Engineering, including:

 Provide advanced surety options for the W87-1 weapon system by FY 2022.

 Assure advanced surety options are available for the Next Navy Warhead system by FY 2024.

 Develop integrated use control and physical security subsystems developed for Air Force weapon 

storage by FY 2023.

 Develop enhanced capability shipping configurations for current stockpile systems by FY 2023.

 Develop and apply experimental modeling capabilities and diagnostics to assess effects of delivery 

environments and accidents by FY 2024.

 Increase the fidelity of simulated weapons environments in predictive models using validation 

data from scaled experiments in FY 2023.

 Develop progressive methodologies for measuring engineering performance of materials, 

components, and systems needed for future qualification by FY 2022.

 Perform ground testing and model validation for reentry environments and flight test diagnostics 

in FY 2021.

 Extend nuclear environment test capabilities at the Z machine, Hermes, Saturn, and NIF through 

FY 2024.

 Provide the initial tools and technologies necessary to design and qualify components and 

subsystems to meet requirements to withstand radiation environments associated with hostile 

encounters by FY 2020 and provide advanced tools and technologies by FY 2023.

 Evaluate performance damage to non-nuclear components and evaluate damage modes to the 

nuclear explosive package yield by FY 2023.

 Develop and refine understanding of stockpile aging and age-aware models for weapon materials, 

components, and subsystems by 2024.

 Provide assessments of aging model status for highest-risk materials by FY 2022. 

 Qualify and deploy a new scintillator for the Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and Imaging 

System (CoLOSSIS) I and II in FY 2021.

 Complete assembly of a 10-megaelectronvolt neutron imaging machine at LLNL for plant 

installation in FY 2023.

 Conduct design competition associated with potential future strategic missile warheads exploring 

different manufacturing approaches and potentially different stockpile-to-target sequence

environments compared to today’s systems in FY 2020.

 Develop several design options to inform future strategic programs by FY 2024.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-15

Figure 8–8. Key milestones for Engineering

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield 

The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) Program provides data, experimental tools, 

and supporting expertise required for the ongoing assessment and certification of the nuclear weapons

stockpile. As warheads proceed through the LEP process, new materials and components must be 

qualified and accepted. The United States no longer conducts underground tests that allow these 

materials and components to be tested at extreme temperatures and densities. Instead, the unique 

facilities funded by the ICF Program can be used to generate the weapon-relevant environments that 

improve confidence in their certification. The capabilities provided by ICF for Stockpile Stewardship 

include experimental diagnostics, computational models, national high energy density (HED) facilities,

experimental platforms, and target engineering and production. 

8.3.3.1 Budget

The funding schedule for ICF is illustrated in Figure 8–9. The budget request for ICF decreased 12 percent 

from the FY 2019 enacted budget.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-16 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 8–9. Funding schedule for Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield,

fiscal years 2019 through 2024

8.3.3.2 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from ICF and its subprograms since the 

FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 3, “Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and Engineering.”

8.3.3.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

The Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations 

Act, 2019 combined Ignition with Support of Other Stockpile Programs into a single program: Ignition and 

Other Stockpile Programs. 

 The budget request for Ignition and Other Stockpile Programs decreased 45 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget to reflect a shift to higher priority DOE/NNSA efforts. DOE/NNSA will 

support highest-priority non-ignition HED stockpile experiments and delivery of the ICF 2020 

Report.

 The budget request for Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support decreased 15 percent 

from the FY 2019 enacted budget to reflect a shift to higher-priority DOE/NNSA efforts. Execution 

of the National Diagnostics Plan will continue with a focus on diagnostics needed for key materials 

and radiation effects platforms.

 The budget request for Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion increased 30 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget to continue its comprehensive experimental investigation of Magnetic 

Direct Drive. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-17

 The budget request for Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas increased

41 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to expand national participation in HED science 

research. 

 The budget request for Facility Operations and Target Production decreased 4 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget to support higher DOE/NNSA priorities. A reduction is consistent with 

the proposed reduction in ignition science work scope. Operations at the Omega Laser Facility 

and Z are unaffected.

8.3.3.4 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for ICF. The SCDS pegposts and objectives previously included in this 

section were adjusted to better align with the needs of the current and future U.S. nuclear stockpile and 

are described in Chapter 3. Figure 8–10 illustrates key ICF milestones based on experiments at the 

different facilities, including:

 Complete an independent study in FY 2020 to determine the efficacy of NIF for ignition and 

credible physics-scaling to multi-mega joule yields for all ignition approaches. 

 Increase energy coupled from the driver to the fusion fuel by FY 2023.

 Reduce uncertainties in yield scaling based on the 2010 ICF assessment by FY 2023.

 Perform thermonuclear burn experiments to inform understanding of primary boost by FY 2024.

 Establish mission need for a high-yield platform to support LEP and long-term stockpile 

stewardship requirements by FY 2024.

 Conduct major program review to assess the facility investments needed to meet future stockpile 

stewardship requirements by FY 2025.

 Experimentally constrain complex hydrodynamic models used in stockpile assessments by

FY 2022.

 Support the national plutonium aging and manufacturing assessment effort through crossplatform HED experiments by FY 2024.

 Reduce discrepancies between opacity experiments and models through a systematic study of 

high-temperature cross-platform measurements by FY 2024.

 Develop x-ray platforms for measuring thermo-mechanical shock to inform future LEP options in 

FY 2020.

 Enable system-generated electron magnetic pulse model validation using new warm x-ray 

capabilities by FY 2023.

 Measure the response of weapon-related components under high neutron fluence irradiation by

FY 2024.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-18 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 8–10. Key milestones for Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield

Advanced Simulation and Computing 

To meet the requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the Advanced Simulation and 

Computing (ASC) Program provides high-end simulation capabilities, including modeling and computing 

platforms and their supporting infrastructure. Modeling the complexity of nuclear weapons systems is 

essential to maintaining confidence in the performance of our stockpile without additional underground 

nuclear explosive testing. ASC provides the weapon codes that provide the integrated assessment 

capability supporting annual assessment and future sustainment program qualification and certification 

for the stockpile. ASC capabilities also inform decision-making related to the sustainment of the nuclear 

stockpile and future stockpile reductions in support of U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

8.3.4.1 Budget

The funding schedule for the ASC Program is illustrated in Figure 8–11. The funding schedule for the 

DOE/NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative, which is executed with ASC’s budget, is presented in 

Appendix C, Table C–1. The budget request for the ASC Program increased 17 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-19

Figure 8–11. Funding schedule for Advanced Simulation and Computing,

fiscal years 2019 through 2024

8.3.4.2 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from ASC and its subprograms since the FY 2019

SSMP are detailed in Chapter 3, “Stockpile Stewardship Science, Technology, and Engineering.”

8.3.4.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted 

 The budget request for ASC increased 18 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to reflect the 

transition of the integrated design codes to new architectures, the development and evaluation 

of new computing technologies and algorithms against advanced prototype hardware, and 

support for integration between platform procurement/deployment and computing center 

operations. These funding levels are necessary for delivering an exascale system in FY 2023.

 The budget request for ASC – Construction increased 6 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget 

to continue construction of the Exascale Computing Facility Modernization Project. This project 

will provide the infrastructure necessary to support advanced technology systems at LLNL.

8.3.4.4 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for ASC. The SCDS pegposts and objectives previously included in this 

section were adjusted to better align with the needs of the current and future U.S. nuclear stockpile and 

are described in Chapter 3. Figure 8–12 illustrates key milestones for ASC, including:

 Transition current integrated weapon design codes to the exascale system architecture in 

FY 2020.

 Accept Advanced Technology System (ATS)-3/Crossroads in FY 2021.

 Demonstrate performance portability for all integrated design codes on ATS-3 in FY 2023.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 Accept ATS-4/El Capitan in FY 2023.

 Complete analysis of Large Scale Calculation Initiative Phase I in FY 2020.

 Conduct final review of the Production Simulation Initiative in FY 2024.

 Assess machine learning for turbulent flow in the Cognitive Simulation Initiative in FY 2024.

 Demonstrate a Hostile Survivability Baseline Code capability in FY 2020.

 Complete Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment project in FY 2021.

 Complete the Exascale Computing Facility Modernization Project in FY 2022.

Figure 8–12. Key milestones for Advanced Simulation and Computing

Advanced Manufacturing Development

The Advanced Manufacturing Development Program directly affectsthe future agility and responsiveness 

of DOE/NNSA’s manufacturing infrastructure by providing capable, efficient, and effective manufacturing 

solutions to address technical challenges and respond to a changing geopolitical environment. The 

Program is focused on developing needed improvements that support future stockpile insertion 

opportunities. The Advanced Manufacturing Development Program conducts development in areas such 

as additive manufacturing (AM), automation, intelligent production systems, and high-precision 

manufacturing processes to reduce production time, waste, and floor space requirements. In 

accomplishing its mission, the Program enables the DOE/NNSA to accelerate the development of 

manufacturing technologies prior to Phase 6.3 of a future weapon program, which increases DOE/NNSA’s 

confidence in schedules and costs. 

8.3.5.1 Budget

The funding schedule for Advanced Manufacturing Development is illustrated in Figure 8–13. The budget 

request for Advanced Manufacturing Development increased 68 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-21

Figure 8–13. Funding schedule for Advanced Manufacturing Development Program, 

fiscal years 2019 through 2024

8.3.5.2 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from Advanced Manufacturing Development and its 

subprograms since the FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 2, “Stockpile Management.”

8.3.5.3 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted 

 The budget request for AM increased 54 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to support 

expanded use of AM for specific stockpile components, to develop a qualified AM process for 

metal components, to replace inefficient conventional polymer processes with more agile and 

responsive methodologies, and to invest in advanced technology for future weapon systems.

 The budget request for Component Manufacturing Development increased 25 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget to accelerate development of new manufacturing processes to replace 

hazardous and obsolescent processes and critical technologies to support the W87-1 Modification 

Program.

 The budget request for Process Technology Development increased 126 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to accomplish the Building 9212 calciner and electrorefiner projects, the 

completion of uranium activities for the direct chip melt furnaces, and activities to replace the 

uranium oxide to metal capability.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-22 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

8.3.5.4 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for Advanced Manufacturing Development. Figure 8–14 illustrates key 

milestones for Advanced Manufacturing Development, including:

 Transition AM machine capabilities to a production environment to deliver AM parts to the 

stockpile in FY 2020.

 Place filled AM gas bottles into long-term storage to gather material and component performance 

data in FY 2021.

 Investigate the applicability and viability of additively manufactured energetics and new types of 

plastics by FY 2022. 

 Develop trusted and secure manufacturing diagnostics to support advanced manufacturing 

processes to assure supply chain integrity by FY 2022.

 Develop methodologies required to qualify and certify AM for metal lattices by FY 2023.

 Transition direct casting technology from prototype facilities to the production facility in FY 2020.

 Develop and implement solutions to produce useable magnesium oxide for thermal batteries by 

FY 2021.

 Introduce several new manufacturing process control diagnostics by FY 2023 (e.g., defect 

detection capabilities).

 Accelerate development of new manufacturing processes to replace hazardous and obsolescent 

processes by Phase 6.3 of the W87-1 Mod in FY 2023.

 Complete installation and start-up of the Building 9212 calciner in FY 2022.

 Complete installation and start-up of electrorefiner process line in FY 2022.

 Begin installation of direct chip melt furnaces in FY 2020.

Figure 8–14. Key milestones for Advanced Manufacturing Development
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-23

8.4 Secure Transportation Asset

The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program safely and securely transports nuclear weapons, weapons 

components, and special nuclear material (SNM) to meet mission requirements. The STA Program 

includes the Operations and Equipment and Program Direction subprograms. The Operations and 

Equipment subprogram provides the transportation service infrastructure required for STA to meet 

DOE/NNSA’s national security mission. The Program Direction subprogram provides salaries, travel, and 

other related expenses for Federal agents and the secure transportation workforce.

Budget

The funding schedule for Secure Transportation Asset is illustrated in Figure 8–15. The budget request 

for STA increased 14 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget.

Figure 8–15. Funding schedule for Secure Transportation Asset, fiscal years 2019 through 2024

Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from STA and its subprograms since the 

FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 5, “Secure Transportation Asset.”

FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

 The budget request for Operations and Equipment increased 19 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to support long lead material purchases, development and testing of the Mobile 

Guardian Transporter (MGT), life extension and risk reduction efforts for the Safeguards

Transporter (SGT), and first production unit of the next generation armored tractor and Escort 

Vehicle 4.

 The budget request for Program Direction increased 6 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget 

to support increases to the Federal agent workforce and support service contracts.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-24 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for STA. Figure 8–16 illustrates key milestones for STA, including:

 Begin first production unit of the next generation armored tractor and Escort Vehicle 4 in FY 2020.

 Begin MGT production in FY 2025.

 Begin procurement of a new aircraft to replace the aging DC-9 aircraft in FY 2021. 

 Intend to replace the two aircraft in the remaining 737 fleet in FY 2025 and FY 2029.

 The last SGT will reach its end of design life cycle in FY 2031.

 Complete MGT production in FY 2034.

Figure 8–16. Key milestones for Secure Transportation Asset

8.5 Infrastructure and Operations

The Infrastructure and Operations (I&O) Program maintains, operates, and modernizes the DOE/NNSA

infrastructure in a safe, secure, and cost-effective manner to maximize return on investment, enable

program results, and reduce enterprise risk. The program also plans, prioritizes, and constructs state-ofthe-art facilities, infrastructure, and scientific tools.

The success of DOE/NNSA’s unique national security mission is dependent upon safe, reliable, and modern 

infrastructure. However, the current state of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure poses increasing risk to

availability, capacity, and reliability for weapons activities capabilities, as well as the safety of the 

workforce, the public, and the environment. 

While there has been strong support for several specific actions to ensure the safety, security, and 

reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, funding for sustaining key infrastructure in support of 

program deliverables has not kept pace. Upgrading or replacing aging facilities will require significant and 

sustained investment.

Budget

The funding schedule for I&O is illustrated in Figure 8–17. The budget request for I&O increased 4 percent 

from the FY 2019 enacted budget.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-25

Figure 8–17. Funding schedule for Infrastructure and Operations, fiscal years 2019 through 2024

Based on the total funding request shown in Figure 8–17, investments in I&O appear to decline during 

portions of the FYNSP. However, there is significant funding for Plutonium Sustainment in the DSW 

portfolio throughout the FYNSP for infrastructure investments to support efforts to produce pits at a rate 

of no fewer than 80 ppy by FY 2030. When combined, these reflect increased infrastructure investments 

throughout the FYNSP. DOE/NNSA continues to balance risk across portfolio investments to ensure 

resources are being properly applied to sustain and modernize infrastructure across the enterprise. 

Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from I&O and its subprograms since the FY 2019

SSMP are detailed in Chapter 4, “Physical Infrastructure.”

FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

 The budget request for Operations of Facilities increased 4 percent from the FY 2019 enacted 

budget to sustain an increasing workload supporting the W80-4 at SNL and B61-12 and W88 flight 

tests at Tonopah Test Range; increase hiring of critical skill employees at LLNL; increase resources 

at nuclear and high-hazard facilities to meet increased mission needs at the Nevada National 

Security Site and Y-12; and provide the additional resources needed to support safe and effective 

execution in the tritium facilities at SRS.

 The budget request for Safety and Environmental Operations increased 8 percent from the 

FY 2019 enacted budget to reflect transfer of scope from Operations of Facilities for five facilities 

at Y-12 that treat waste streams associated with the Long-Term Stewardship program and to fund 

the performance of required retained obligations at the Bannister Federal Complex in Kansas City.

 The FY 2020 budget request for Maintenance and Repair decreased 12 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget, allowing the sites to absorb the significant increases from the past 2 years by 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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increasing staffing levels to address the long-standing deficiency of a robust maintenance 

program. Overall funding for maintenance has grown significantly, but appropriately, over the 

last several budget cycles. This will address carryover balances and provide increased

maintenance staffing levels to maintain and preserve facilities in a condition that is suitable to 

meet an increasing mission demand.

 The budget request for Recapitalization: Infrastructure and Safety had no substantive changes 

from the FY 2019 enacted budget.

 The budget request for Recapitalization: Capability-Based Investments increased 24 percent from 

the FY 2019 enacted budget to include other project cost funding to develop new programmatic 

line item construction projects, as well as funding to continue the conceptual design for the 

Material Staging Facility. This increase also supports growth in programmatic equipment 

recapitalization requirements for the W80-4 LEP.

 The budget request for I&O: Construction increased 11 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget 

to support construction of the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12, the High Explosive Science and

Engineering Facility at Pantex, and the U1a Complex Enhancements Project at the Nevada 

National Security Site. The increase also supports design efforts of the Tritium Finishing Facility 

at SRS, the Lithium Processing Facility at Y-12, the 138-kilovolt Power Transmission System 

Replacement at the Nevada National Security Site, and the Emergency Operations Centers at both 

LLNL and SNL.

Key Milestones

Per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, DOE/NNSA established the Infrastructure 

Modernization Initiative program with the goal of reducing deferred maintenance and repair needs by no 

less than 30 percent by 2025. Major programmatic line-item project milestones and schedules are 

reflected in Chapter 4, “Physical Infrastructure,” Section 4.2.2, Figure 4–6.

Infrastructure Maintenance and Recapitalization Investments

In response to Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations, the following information is 

provided to improve transparency in the budget. Table 8–3 compares investments in Maintenance and 

Recapitalization to benchmarks (based on the percentage of Replacement Plant Value) derived from the 

DOE Real Property Asset Management Plan and associated guidance. To address these benchmark 

shortfalls, NNSA has increased recapitalization investments by $24 million from FY 2019 to FY 2020. 

Recapitalization continues to include deactivation and demolition of excess and underutilized facilities to 

reduce the NNSA footprint. Maintenance investments reflect a decrease of $59 million from FY 2019 to 

FY 2020 to allow the sites to absorb the significant increases in FY 2018 and FY 2019 funding by increasing 

staffing levels to address the long-standing deficiency of a robust maintenance program. Overall funding 

for maintenance has grown significantly, but appropriately, over the last several years. This decrease will 

address carryover balances and support growing maintenance staffing levels to maintain and preserve 

facilities in a condition that is suitable to meet an increasing mission demand. NNSA also continues to use 

the asset management programs that use supply chain management practices to increase purchasing 

power for common building components across the nuclear security enterprise (e.g., roofs and heating,

ventilating, and air conditioning). 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-27

Table 8–3. Projected fiscal year 2020 NNSA infrastructure maintenance and 

recapitalization investments

FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020

Replacement Plant Value (RPV) ($B) 50.4 51.4 52.5

Maintenance 

Benchmark 

2 – 4% RPV

Infrastructure & Safety Maintenance Investments ($K) 515,138 515,000 456,000

Other NNSA Maintenance Investments (direct and indirect funded) ($K) 299,851 284,922 298,008

Total NNSA Maintenance Investments (SK) 814,989 799,922 754,008

Maintenance as % RPV 1.62% 1.55% 1.44%

Recapitalization 

Benchmark 

1%

Infrastructure & Safety Recapitalization Investments ($K) 482,661 450,000 447,657

Other NNSA Recapitalization Investments ($K) 130,000 109,057 135,341

Total NNSA Recapitalization Investments ($K) 612,661 559,057 582,998

Recapitalization as % RPV 1.22% 1.09% 1.11%

$B = billion dollars

$K = thousand dollars

8.6 Other Weapons Activities

Budget

The funding schedule for Other Weapons Activities is illustrated in Figure 8–18.

Figure 8–18. Funding schedule for Other Weapons Activities, fiscal years 2019 through 2024

Defense Nuclear Security

DOE/NNSA’s missions must be carried out in a secure environment protected by safeguards and security 

personnel, layers of physical security systems and technology, and sophisticated cybersecurity systems. 

Together, this approach protects DOE/NNSA’s facilities, SNM, employees, networks, and information. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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8.6.2.1 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from the Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) Program 

and its subprograms since the FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 6, “Security.”

8.6.2.2 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

The budget request for DNS increased 13 percent from the FY 2019 enacted budget to support critical 

Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program projects to implement the 10-Year Physical Security 

Systems Refresh Plan at all DOE/NNSA sites. This includes Argus modernization; sustaining

implementation of a technical security program across the enterprise; sustaining implementation and 

operation of counter unmanned aircraft systems at sites possessing SNM; efforts to begin implementation 

of the Design Basis Threat policy; and planned equipment life cycle replacements.

8.6.2.3 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for DNS. Figure 8–19 illustrates key milestones for DNS, including:

 Sustain counter unmanned aircraft systems (CUAS) implementation and operation at sites 

possessing Category 0/I quantities of SNM in FY 2020.

 Complete deployment of Argus security system as the standard access control and alarm system 

at all Category I SNM sites in FY 2020.

 Begin CUAS implementation at remaining NNSA sites in FY 2021.

 Complete Y-12 West End Perimeter Area Reduction, Perimeter Intrusion Detection and 

Assessment System (PIDAS) modernization, and entry control facility upgrade in FY 2023.

 Complete Pantex PIDAS physical security system components and infrastructure refresh in 

FY 2024.

 Complete critical Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP) priorities in FY 2024.

 Complete execution of SIRP in FY 2030.

Figure 8–19. Key milestones for Defense Nuclear Security
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-29

Information Technology and Cybersecurity

DOE/NNSA prioritizes the delivery of Information Technology (IT) and Cybersecurity Program solutions 

that support and secure DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security missions. 

8.6.3.1 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from IT and Cybersecurity and its subprogramssince 

the FY 2019 SSMP are detailed in Chapter 6, “Security.”

8.6.3.2 FY 2020 Budget Request Compared to FY 2019 Enacted

The budget request for Information Technology and Cybersecurity increased 40 percent from the FY 2019 

enacted budget to continue IT and Cybersecurity modernization efforts.

8.6.3.3 Key Milestones

This section details key milestones for IT and Cybersecurity. Figure 8–20 illustrates key IT and 

Cybersecurity milestones, including:

 Implement Phase I of DOE/NNSA’s IT Modernization Plan in FY 2020 and Phase II in FY 2021.

 Perform cybersecurity program budget re-baseline site assessments in FY 2021.

 Complete the security architecture for the classified wireless network by FY 2023.

 Complete deployment of a new sensor platform across all DOE/NNSA sites in FY 2020.

 Establish centers of excellence to improve and enhance cybersecurity operations throughout the 

nuclear security enterprise by FY 2025.

 Begin development of the architecture of the classified wireless network for non-pit production 

facilities in FY 2021.

 Complete the phase I security architecture of the Wireless Pit Production Network by FY 2021.

 Develop and implement the Department of Homeland Security Continuous Diagnostics Program 

by FY 2025.

 Develop the secure cloud computing environment according to the timeline:

– LLNL Phase I of hybrid cloud platform for Enterprise Secure Computing (ESC) cloud 

environment by FY 2020

– SNL Phase I of small hybrid cloud platform for ESC cloud environment testing by FY 2020

– East Coast data center for secondary hybrid cloud platform for ESC cloud environment by 

FY 2020

– KCNSC deployment hybrid cloud platform in support of the Joint Test Demonstrator by 

FY 2021
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 8–20. Key milestones for Information Technology and Cybersecurity

8.7 Budget Projections Beyond FY 2024

This section explains the cost estimation methodology that DOE/NNSA uses to create long-term budget 

projections. Cost estimates and projections for stockpile sustainment, LEPs and major Alts, and 

construction are provided thereafter. Other programmatic estimates are escalated to account for future 

inflationary increases. Section 8.8 incorporates these projections and provides the 25-year program for 

Weapons Activities.

Basis for Budget Projections

The FY 2020 – FY 2024 budget request was generated as part of the DOE/NNSA planning and programming 

process and reflect the roll-up of individual estimates developed interactively by DOE/NNSA’s 

management and operating (M&O) partners and Federal program managers using historical cost data, 

current plans for programs and projects, and expert judgment. The budget estimates for FY 2025 and 

beyond reflect the costs of continuing the program of record described in this SSMP.

The budget projections beyond the FYNSP will vary depending on the individual program or subprogram. 

Some portions of the Weapons Activities portfolio are assumed to continue beyond the FYNSP at the same 

level of effort as during the FYNSP.

8

 For these cost projections, escalation factors representing basic levels 

of inflation were used. 

Some portions of the program will not proceed at the same level of effort for FY 2025 through FY 2044.

This applies to major construction projects, LEPs, and, because of the future evolution in the current 

stockpile configuration, stockpile sustainment, as represented by the funding lines for stockpile systems. 

The estimates and the basis for each of these elements of the Weapons Activities portfolio are described 

in more detail in the following sections.

Cost estimates are different than DOE/NNSA budget requests and should not necessarily be compared to 

determine program health. Cost estimates, described in more detail in the following sections, are 

developed early in the project concept stage with a significant amount of uncertainty. Budget requests, 

 

8 Projection of budget estimates for these efforts in this way assumes the continued manageability of whatever risks are present 

during the FYNSP at the same level of effort following the FYNSP period, as is typically represented by the funding level of the last 

year of the FYNSP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-31

on the other hand, are a result of DOE/NNSA’s programming process, resource-loaded project schedules, 

and other program and site-specific assumptions. Budget requests must also align with DOE/NNSA’s 

funding limits to ensure funding is available when needed in the program life cycle. 

Stockpile Sustainment

Costs associated with stockpile sustainment include warhead-specific assessment activities, LLC

exchanges, required and routine maintenance, safety studies, periodic repairs, resolution and timely 

closure of significant finding investigations, military liaison work, and surveillance to ensure the continued 

safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. These costs are incurred every year that a weapon is 

in the stockpile. Chapter 2, “Stockpile Management,” Figure 2–1 provides a roadmap of currently planned 

activities for current weapons.

Figure 8–21 enumerates, in then-year dollars, the annual sustainment costs for FY 2020 through FY 2024

that are attributable to a warhead type based on updated FY 2020 numbers and estimates of the total 

sustainment costs by year for warheads of all types for FY 2025 through FY 2044. Between FY 2021 and 

FY 2044, the dominant factor is a near-constant escalation rate of 2.1 percent.

Figure 8–21. Estimate of warhead-specific sustainment costs9

 

9 Stockpile sustainment costs estimates in previous SSMPs were obtained using methodologies largely based on a 3+2 strategy.

As long-range surveillance estimates are updated, the FY 2020 SSMP uses an escalation model to estimate long-term stockpile 

sustainment costs.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-32 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

Undertaken separately from stockpile maintenance, LEPs have the goal of extending the lives of warheads 

for several more decades. Although major Alts also make component changes, those changes do not 

address all the aging issues in a warhead that would require an LEP. Chapter 2, “Stockpile Management,” 

Figure 2–4, provides a roadmap of currently planned activities for current weapons.

The following sections summarize cost estimates for LEPs and major Alts within the current 25-year 

program of record. The cost estimates vary from those using top-down cost models (such as analogy 

comparisons to past work completed, parametric relationships, and subject matter expert judgment) to 

those using bottoms-up models (deterministic, unit cost, and activity-based), depending on where the 

warhead program is in the Phase 6.x Process. 

8.7.3.1 Cost Estimates throughout the Phase 6.x Process

LEP and major Alt cost estimates are planned and conducted using the Phase 6.x Process. Figure 8–22

shows the governing cost estimate type for each phase of the process. DOE/NNSA works in conjunction 

with DoD and its M&O partners to develop, refine, and update the estimates throughout the Phase 6.x

Process. 

Figure 8–22. Cost estimates across the Phase 6.x Process

Defense Programs independent cost estimates (ICEs) serve as the initial cost estimate generated by a 

Defense Programs office that is independent of the program office.10 These estimates initiate at very early 

design maturity (typically more than a decade before Phase 6.1 [Concept Assessment]) and are planning 

estimates for alternatives analysis, early programming, and budget deliberations. Notably, Defense 

Programs ICEs are:

 Performed by an independent organization separate from the Federal program office11

 Based on a known scope and cost uncertainty at the time and updated annually for the SSMP12

 

10 Defense Programs ICEs are performed annually by the Office of Cost Policy and Analysis for LEPs and major Alts for the SSMP. 

11 GAO extolls the value of ICEs using a different methodology and the potential benefit to decision-makers in its GAO Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide.

12 Planning estimates assume scopes that are in line with current policy objectives (such as a commitment to surety upgrades), in 

addition to extending the warhead life. The Nuclear Weapons Council approves the specific scope for the LEP or major Alt based 

on the alternatives developed during Phase 6.2. The cost estimate range used in a planning estimate reflects the uncertainty in 

implementing a single assumed point solution, rather than the range of every possible design solution.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-33

 Inclusive of both LEP (development and production) and non-LEP line-item costs that are critical 

to program success (namely Other Program Money and DoD costs)13

 Unconstrained from future budget availability, which may differ from future budget amounts if 

programming is constrained

These Defense Programs ICEs are captured in the SSMP as the program of record until the WDCR is 

approved. The Defense Programs ICE methodology is described in more detail in Section 8.7.3.2.

The WDCR is developed by the program team and provides preliminary cost estimates for design, 

qualification, production, and life cycle activities. The WDCR includes detailed multi-site input and,

although primarily performed using a bottoms-up approach, it may contain other methodologies (e.g., 

parametric, analogous, subject matter expertise). The WDCR developed during Phase 6.2A (Design 

Definition and Cost Study) is a key input into the Phase 6.2A study report to the Nuclear Weapons Council,

and is required prior to entry to Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering). Once approved by the Nuclear 

Weapons Council, the WDCR becomes the basis for the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) that starts on 

entry in to Phase 6.3.

The Baseline Cost Report (BCR), which is also developed by the program team, formally updates the WDCR 

based on late development and pre-production activities. The BCR is updated based on refined scopes

and schedule definitions and represents a more definitive cost estimate than either the Defense Programs 

ICE or WDCR. The NNSA Administrator approves a program baseline, including the BCR, prior to Phase 6.3. 

The BCR supersedes previous cost estimates and becomes the program of record, which is transmitted 

annually to Congress as part of the SAR. The BCR is updated upon entry into future phases and transmitted 

to Congress as part of the SAR.

A DOE/NNSA independent cost review is conducted prior to Phase 6.2A, and a DOE/NNSA ICE is conducted 

prior to entry into Phases 6.3, 6.4 (Production Engineering), and 6.5 (First Production).

14

8.7.3.2 Defense Programs’ Cost Estimating Methodology

Defense Programs ICEs are:

 Performed using a “top-down” analogy method that is consistent with early-stage planning.

15

 Informed by ongoing program costs (such as the development of the W76-1, B61-12, W88 Alt 370, 

and production of the W76-1) and the evaluation of the relative complexities of future systems.

16

 Based on time-phased development17 costs using standard, well-known Rayleigh profiles, as well 

as production costs using a nonlinear cost growth profile similar to that of the W76-1.

 

13 In estimating the cost of an LEP or major Alt, the weapon programs depend on an adequately funded base of other DOE/NNSA 

capabilities, are incremental to that base, and reflect both each program’s budgeted line item and increments to other critical 

activities (such as early-stage technology maturation [called Other Program Money]). As the overall program integrator, the 

Federal Program Manager identifies the funding streams needed for the program to be successful.

14 DOE/NNSA ICEs are statutorily performed by the Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation.

15 Additional detail on the cost estimating methodology of Defense Programs ICEs can be found in the technical paper, “Planning 

for the Future: Methodologies for Estimating U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Cost” (Lewis et al. 2016; Cost Engineering, 58 [5], pp. 6-12).

16 These program and subject matter experts evaluate the relative scope complexity between the complete W76-1 and nearcomplete B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 compared to each planned future LEP, which aids in providing a cost estimate range based on 

underlying technical and cost uncertainties.

17 Development costs include all design agency and production development costs, which is how DoD defines RDT&E and is 

consistent with Rayleigh profile usage in cost estimating.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-34 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Based on technical and programmatic inputs from Federal Program Managers, Federal site offices, 

and subject matter experts across the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons 

production facilities.

Cost ranges reflect the underlying technical and modeling uncertainties of the programmatic scope at the 

time, although early-stage LEPs may experience occasional scope changes, which may result in cost 

changes compared to previous SSMPs. These ranges will typically be greatest for earlier-stage programs 

and narrow over time.

8.7.3.3 Current Estimates

Figures 8–24 through 8–27 and Tables 8–5 through 8–13 provide cost estimates for each LEP and major 

Alt for the 25-year SSMP timeframe. Table 8–4 shows the type of cost estimate for each of the LEPs and 

major Alts included in the 25-year SSMP. 

Table 8–4. Cost estimates for life extension programs and major alterations

within the 25-year program of record18

Life Extension Program, Major 

Alteration, or Modification Program Type of Cost Estimate

Total Estimated Cost 

(FY 2019 dollars in billions)

Total Estimated Cost

(then-year dollars in billions)

W76 LEP BCR/SAR 4.2 3.5

W76-2 Modification Program BCR/SAR .075 .075

B61-12 LEP BCR/SAR 7.6 7.6

W88 Alt 370 BCR/SAR 2.6 2.6

W80-4 LEP WDCR 9.6 11.2

W87-1 Modification Program Defense Programs ICE 10.9 12.4

Next Navy Warhead Defense Programs ICE 10.9 14.4

Future Strategic Missile Warhead Defense Programs ICE 10.9 15.4

Next B61 Defense Programs ICE 10.0 18.5

BCR/SAR = Baseline Cost Report/Selected Acquisition Report

ICE = independent cost estimate

WDCR = Weapon Design and Cost Report

A summary table with high, low, and nominal (proposed budget or BCR/SAR Value) estimates for 

DOE/NNSA and DoD, in both constant FY 2019 and then-year dollars, is shown for each program. Where 

appropriate, the tables also include pre-SAR values to capture pre-Phase 6.2 costs.

19, 20, 21

 

18 SAR and WDCR values are provided when available. For programs that only have a Defense Programs ICE, the proposed budget 

is provided. Tables 8–7 through 8–13 provide values for high and low estimates, in addition to the SAR, WDCR, or Defense 

Programs ICE totals. Due to the differing types of cost estimates, the accuracy of these total program cost estimates varies.

19 DoD amounts reflect the costs for weapon components for which they are responsible, such as arming and fuzing. While not 

budgeted or executed by DOE/NNSA, these costs reflect the program’s best approximation and are published for transparency 

because they better reflect anticipated all-in costs. 

20 The total estimated cost is provided because LEP profiles have later portions that extend beyond the published 25-year SSMP 

timeframe.

21 The low estimates presented in the following tables and graphs as the green line represent the mid-point (p50) of the cost 

estimate rather than the 15 percent probability (p15) that has been used in previous SSMPs. The high estimates continue to 

represent the 85 percent (p85). This change was made to align the high and low ranges for the LEPs with the ranges used for

Capital Construction estimates. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-35

For early-stage programs using Defense Programs ICEs (such as the W87-1 Modification Program), the 

figures and tables reflect the current proposed FYNSP budget and, for years beyond the FYNSP, the 

midpoint between the Defense Programs ICE high and low. 

Items to consider when comparing estimates to one another:

 The constant-year cost totals in the tables are the most comparable because inflation effects 

become significant over LEP timeframes. Consideration should also be given to the varying 

quantities of warheads being refurbished for each system. The FY 2020 SSMP’s classified Annex 

provides additional information on production quantities.

 The then-year Defense Programs ICEs in the tables and figures are derived from constant-year 

estimates using the escalation rates in the OMB Table 10.1.

22

 For years beyond the 6 years 

projected in Table 10.1, the escalation rate for the final year is used.23 The escalation rate used 

by the sites to produce the WDCRs and BCRs can differ from the OMB number used in the Defense 

Program ICEs. One possible difference is that the official program office estimates use escalation 

rates specific to each site and function, rather than a national average. 

 Published estimate ranges are meant to reflect the underlying technical and cost uncertainty of 

the assumed scope. Early-stage programs, particularly those before Phase 6.3, may experience 

significant scope changes, as the Nuclear Weapons Council may update and/or down-select

design options and significantly impact the work scope and cost estimate.

 Only the Defense Programs ICEs include pre-Phase 6.2 costs. The WDCR and BCR/SAR estimates 

do not include these costs. 

When comparing a top-down Defense Programs ICE to the official bottom-up program counterpart (such 

as for the B61-12), DOE/NNSA primarily compares the total estimate amounts and the general shape of 

the time-phased profiles. If these two are in relative agreement, DOE/NNSA has increased confidence in 

the program estimate. DOE/NNSA does not perform or encourage additional year-by-year comparisons 

between the two published estimates.24

Figure 8–23 is a one-chart summary of the projected total nuclear weapons LEP and major Alt cost 

estimates from FY 2019 through FY 2044, based on the schedule reflected in Chapter 2, “Stockpile 

Management,” Figure 2–2 of this SSMP, and the nominal LEP costs shown in Figures 8–24 through 8–27.

25

Cost estimates for programs outside of the FYNSP are long-range planning estimates and will be revised 

as the programs continue through the Phase 6.x Process. The dotted line shows the total projected LEP 

cost reflected in the FY 2019 SSMP. The total cumulative LEP costs over the 25-year program have 

increased by approximately $4.0 billion from the FY 2019 SSMP estimate. The difference in the estimates 

is largely driven by 2018 Nuclear Posture Review implementation, refined requirements that increase 

scope complexity, accelerated production schedule milestones, updated assumptions for future 

warheads, and the escalation costs of a future year replacing a lower-cost early year.

 

22 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/.

23 Recommendation from OMB Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs.

24 The Defense Programs ICE profile reflects an idealized schedule and unconstrained budget, whereas the program profile is 

based on an integrated baseline schedule and programming results. This makes reconciling minor year-by-year profile 

discrepancies between the estimates generally infeasible; when differences arise, DOE/NNSA has much greater confidence in the 

year-by-year phasing of its baselined program estimate.

25 Nominal costs are used to allow a comparison of the total LEP costs from SSMP to SSMP. Unless baselined, the cost of any 

particular LEP should be regarded as a cost range, as shown in the tables accompanying each LEP figure.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-36 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 8–23. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs

for fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2044 (then-year dollars, nominal costs only)

8.7.3.4 W76 Life Extension Program (W76-1) Cost Estimate

The W76-1 last production unit was produced in December 2018 and is scheduled for delivery to the Navy 

during FY 2019. The program is making all warhead deliveries to the Navy on schedule and under budget.

Table 8–5 represents the cost estimate.

Table 8–5. Total estimated cost for W76-1 Life Extension Program

FY 2001 – FY 2019

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

SAR Total 4.2 3.5 N/A N/A

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

8.7.3.5 W76-2 Modification Program Cost Estimate

The DOE/NNSA laboratories and production facilities are currently executing a compressed Phase 6.3 

through 6.5 process. The FY 2020 request was reduced from $33 million to $10 million based on refined 

program estimates. Table 8–6 represents the total estimated costs.

Table 8–6. Total estimated cost for W76-2 Modification Program

FY 2019 – FY 2020

(dollars in millions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

Total Cost 75 75 N/A N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-37

8.7.3.6 B61-12 Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

The B61-12 LEP is executing within the cost documented in the October 2016 BCR, which estimated 

program costs at $7.6 billion (then-year dollars). The B61-12 LEP is continuing to leverage other 

DOE/NNSA programs for multi-system production process improvements. The costs of these related 

programs are estimated to be $648 million. The overall program cost is estimated at $8.3 billion, which is 

within 1.1 percent of the initial baseline SAR that was provided to Congress in FY 2013. The nominal values 

for development and production in Figure 8–24 and Table 8–7 reflect DOE/NNSA’s FY 2016 BCR as the 

B61-12 LEP entered Phase 6.4. The B61-12 LEP schedule is under revision, see Section 2.5.4 (B61-12 LEP) 

for details. A decision on first production unit and Initial Operational Capability dates is being jointly 

coordinated with the Air Force. Potential impacts to total project cost are not know at this time.

Figure 8–24. B61-12 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2019 to completion26

Table 8–7. Total estimated cost for B61-12 Life Extension Program

DOE/NNSA DoD

Dollars in Billions FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

Pre-SAR Cost 0.4 0.4 N/A N/A

FY 2012 – FY 2025

High Total 8.9 8.8 0.2 0.2

Low Total 8.1 7.9 0.2 0.2

SAR Total 7.6 7.6 N/A N/A

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

 

26 Costs represented from FY 2019 – FY 2025 are consistent with the latest BCR/SAR values. High and low estimates were 

determined using Defense Programs ICEs and are included for comparison to the original estimate. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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8.7.3.7 W88 Alt 370 Cost Estimate

DOE/NNSA completed a high-fidelity cost estimate (the BCR) in FY 2017. The report estimate is 

$2.6 billion, which is approximately $255 million (or 11 percent) higher than the estimate in the 2015 SAR. 

The increased costs were primarily caused by increased testing and qualification, as well as planning 

margins for treating technical risks accompanied by some offsetting reduction in the scope associated 

with the nuclear components. The W88 Alt 370 also leverages other DOE/NNSA programs for multisystem production process improvements. The costs of these related programs are estimated to be 

$171 million. The overall program cost is estimated at $2.78 billion. These estimates represent the 

program baseline and are reflected in the FY 2018 SAR. DOE/NNSA has completed a BCR that included 

the CHE refresh and other changes. The numbers in Figure 8–25 and Table 8–8 reflect this baseline. The 

W88 Alt 370 schedule is under revision, see Section 2.5.3 (W88 Alt 370) for details. DOE/NNSA is working 

to minimize any delays and is closely coordinating with the Navy. Potential impacts to total project cost 

are not know at this time.

Figure 8–25. W88 Alteration 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh)

cost fiscal year 2019 to completion27

Table 8–8. Total estimated cost for W88 Alteration 370

(with conventional high explosive refresh) Program

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

Pre-SAR Cost 0.1 0.1 N/A N/A

FY 2013 – FY 2025

High Total 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0

Low Total 2.7 2.7 1.0 1.0

SAR Total 2.6 2.6 N/A N/A

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

 

27 Costs represented from FY 2019 – FY 2025 are consistent with the latest BCR/SAR values. High and low estimates were 

determined using Defense Programs ICEs and are included for comparison to the original estimate. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-39

8.7.3.8 W80-4 Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

The W80-4 LEP completed its WDCR in February 2019, and those values are displayed in Figure 8–26 and 

Table 8–9. The differences observed in the WDCR estimate (blue bars) and the Defense Program ICE (red 

and green lines) arise from two factors. The first is a difference in escalation rates used for the estimates. 

The WDCR used site-derived escalations rates that averaged to 3.385 percent per year. These rates are 

more inclusive of site specific dependencies. The Defense Programs ICE used the OMB value of 

2.22 percent per year, which is the standard used for Defense Programs ICEs providing consistent siteagnostic estimates. Using the higher escalation rates increases the original high and low Defense 

Programs ICEs by approximately $1 billion over the life of the program. The second significant difference 

is time-phasing. The adjusted time-phasing reflected in the WDCR represents the current execution plan 

for FY 2019 and an updated profile to meet the FY 2025 first production unit. The program entered 

Phase 6.3 in FY 2019.

Figure 8–26. W80-4 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2019 to completion

Table 8–9. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Life Extension Program

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

Pre-WDCR Cost 0.9 0.9 N/A N/A

FY 2019 – FY 2032

High Total 9.6 10.8 0.2 0.2

Low Total 7.9 8.9 0.2 0.2

WDCR Total 9.6 11.2 N/A N/A

WDCR = Weapon Design and Cost Report
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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8.7.3.9 W87-1 Modification Program (formerly IW1) Cost Estimate 

The Nuclear Weapons Council authorized restart of Phase 6.2 activities, and the program is on track to 

support fielding of the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent by 2030. DOE/NNSA is developing W87-1 design 

options for feasibility analyses. The program is also supporting a feasibility study of fielding the W87-1 

nuclear explosive package in a Navy flight vehicle as directed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

The cost estimate in Figure 8–27 represents a high-complexity scope case. The scope complexity includes

multiple nuclear and non-nuclear components needed to reach the desired objectives for safety and 

surety, a significant portion of remanufacture components, and updated architectures. Additionally, 

there is a high level of system engineering and integration complexity due to revised design interfacing 

with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. The W87-1 Modification Program will use the Phase 6.2 

process to continue cost/benefit and trade space analysis for additional cost reductions. The estimates 

shown in Figure 8–27 and Table 8–10 do not include the incremental cost to get to a 30-pit-per-year 

plutonium capability by FY 2026 necessary support this LEP. Those costs are captured in Plutonium 

Sustainment in DSW. DOE/NNSA acknowledges that this program appears to be underfunded in the 

FY 2020 FYNSP; however, the program is exploring cost reduction opportunities in the design option space 

as the program moves through Phase 6.2.

Figure 8–27. W87-1 Modification Program cost fiscal year 2019 to completion28

 

28 Costs represented from FY 2019 – FY 2037 are consistent with the latest Defense Programs ICEs. High and low estimates were 

determined using Defense Programs ICEs and are included for comparison to the original estimate. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-41

Table 8–10. Total estimated cost for W87-1 Modification Program

8.7.3.10 Next Navy Warhead Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

The Next Navy Warhead LEP cost estimate (see Table 8–11) provides a planning estimate for a notional 

system based on an existing stockpile weapon scope with increased uncertainty. This estimate shows a 

reduction from the previous FY 2019 SSMP estimate largely driven by the transition away from an 

interoperable warhead model. DOE/NNSA acknowledges the potential Navy requirement for a new AF&F 

set and any adjustments to this estimate will be reflected as part of the FY 2021 President’s Budget 

Request and FY 2021 SSMP. These estimates will change as requirements and schedules are refined and 

will be updated in future versions of the SSMP.

Table 8–11. Total estimated cost for Next Navy Warhead Life Extension Program

FY 2023 – FY 2042

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 12.2 16.1 1.0 1.3

Low Total 9.7 12.8 0.9 1.2

Proposed Budget N/A 14.4 N/A 1.2

8.7.3.11 Future Strategic Missile Warhead Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

The Future Strategic Missile Warhead LEP cost estimate (see Table 8–12) provides a planning estimate for 

a notional system based on an existing stockpile weapon scope with increased uncertainty. These 

estimates will change as requirements and schedules are refined and will be updated in future versions 

of the SSMP.

Table 8–12. Total estimated cost for Future Strategic Missile Warhead Life Extension Program

FY 2027 – FY 2046

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 12.2 17.2 1.0 1.4

Low Total 9.7 13.6 0.9 1.3

Proposed Budget N/A 15.4 N/A 1.3

8.7.3.12 Next B61 Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

The Next B61 LEP cost estimate (see Table 8–13) provides a planning estimate for a notional system based 

on the current B61-12 scope with increased uncertainty. These estimates will change as requirements 

and schedules are refined and will be updated in future versions of the SSMP.

Table 8–13. Total estimated cost for Next B61 Life Extension Program

FY 2038 – FY 2056

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 11.8 21.9 0.2 0.4

Low Total 8.2 15.1 0.1 0.1

Proposed Budget N/A 18.5 N/A 0.3

FY 2019 – FY 2037

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2019 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 12.2 14.8 1.0 1.2

Low Total 9.7 11.7 0.9 1.1

Proposed Budget N/A 12.4 N/A 1.1
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-42 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

8.7.3.13 Summary of Cost Estimates

Figure 8–28 represents a summary of cost estimate ranges for all LEPs from FY 2019 through FY 2044.

Figure 8–28. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for 

fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2044 with high and low estimates (then-year dollars)

Construction

8.7.4.1 Cost Estimation for Capital Acquisitions

In FY 2019, programmatic capital acquisitions accounted for over 95 percent of the Infrastructure and 

Operations Construction Budget; the remaining costs are for general construction. In FY 2017, Defense 

Programs prioritized the development of improved programmatic capital acquisition cost and schedule 

estimates to inform long-term planning. 

In FY 2019, DOE/NNSA began publishing Defense Programs ICEs in the SSMP for early-stage capital 

acquisitions.29 Since these ICEs are performed at an early pre-acquisition stage (often a decade or more 

before a project’s initial CD-0 milestone), these planning estimates primarily inform the portfolio’s longterm cost projections and are supplemental to DOE acquisition requirements in DOE Order 413.3B.

 

29 ICEs are a best practice identified by GAO and other professional organizations as a tool to objectively compare to program 

estimates and identify potential issues early.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-43

Notably, these Defense Programs ICEs are: 

 Performed by an independent organization separate from the Federal program office.

30

 Performed using a top-down parametric method that is consistent with early-stage planning.

31

 Based on historic DOE/NNSA project schedules, costs, and project phasing.

 Based on current anticipated project scopes.

 Based on affordability analysis with total construction funding constrained.

 Updated annually for the SSMP.

Once a project begins the acquisition process, the approved cost estimate ranges at CD-0 (Approve 

Alternative Selection and Cost Range) supersede previous estimates and becomes the basis for resource 

planning. The project then progresses as described in DOE Order 413.3B (i.e., alternative selection and 

cost range at CD-1, performance baseline at CD-2, etc.). 

Note that, although the early-stage planning estimates use technical input based on an assumed scope, 

these assumptions do not predetermine the actual project’s acquisition strategy or the outcome of 

subsequent AoAs. The assumed scope should be considered notional until the project reaches its 

performance baseline at CD-2.

8.7.4.2 Fiscal Year 2020 through 2044 Estimates

The budget estimate for capital acquisition in FY 2020 through FY 2024, which is part of the I&O total 

included in Figure 8–30, reflects the DOE/NNSA current program. DOE/NNSA is executing the schedules 

of multiple ongoing major capital acquisition projects, such as the Uranium Processing Facility and U1a 

Complex Enhancements projects. A list of major capital acquisition project proposals has been developed 

through the efforts of a series of working groups and deep dives with representatives from DOE/NNSA 

sites and responsible Federal offices. DOE/NNSA reviewed hundreds of project proposals in 2018. The

schedule for the highest-priority project proposals is depicted by major capital acquisition projects and 

project proposals listed in Chapter 4, “Physical Infrastructure,” Figure 4–6. This planning schedule will be 

updated annually. Changes will be made based on available funding and programmatic priorities.

The current program and the program-vetted project proposals are the basis for the cost estimates. 

Table 8–14 lists low and high estimate projections in then-year dollars for Weapons Activities capital 

acquisition projects from FY 2020 through FY 2044. As mentioned in the previous section, several of these 

projects contain a high degree of scope and cost uncertainties, resulting in a significant cost range. This 

year’s SSMP high estimate benefits from several improvements to prior SSMP projection methodology, 

including:

 Collecting and validating capital acquisition requirements over the full 25-year SSMP timeframe.

 Performing a cost estimate for every validated project proposal (either a Defense Programs ICE, 

as described in the previous section for new construction projects, or site estimates for 

refurbishment projects).

32, 33

 

30 Defense Programs ICEs are performed by the Office of Cost Policy and Analysis.

31 GAO extolls the value of ICEs using a different methodology and the potential benefit to decision-makers in its GAO Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide.

32 The provisional $15 billion high estimate for the Domestic Uranium Enrichment capability in last year’s SSMP was adjusted 

based on further analysis to an $11 billion high estimate.

33 For purposes of establishing this budget, it was assumed that KCNSC will not require a line-item project to maintain forecast 

capabilities during the planning period.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-44 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Updating the high total to represent the 85th percentile of the confidence range for each project

and anticipated future scope.

34

 Expanding the table’s time horizon to match the full 25-year SSMP timeframe.

35

Table 8–14. Weapon Activities capital acquisition estimated costs, fiscal years 2020 through 2044

Then-Year Dollars, in Billions Low a High b

Weapon Activities capital acquisition estimated costs 52.9 79.2

a “Low” reflects the I&O Construction portfolio’s estimate in Figure 8–31. The low value is programmatically informed 

and affected by delays in construction within the FYNSP.

b “High” reflects the program provided I&O Construction portfolio with the 85th percentile of the Defense Programs 

independent cost estimates confidence level range, which is based on the underlying scope and cost uncertainties.

The difference in the high and low estimates as compared to the FY 2019 SSMP are a result of delaying

new construction projects within the FYNSP, revised cost estimates, the addition of new project proposals, 

and changing acquisition strategies.

8.8 Weapons Activities 25-Year Program

The projected future costs for the Weapons Activities portfolio for FY 2025 – FY 2044 should be 

interpreted as the range between the red high-range total lines and the green low-range total lines for 

Weapons Activities in the figure, which represent a quantification of uncertainty. This total cost range is 

necessary because of uncertainties related to the individual components of the estimates, the LEPs, and 

the construction costs described later in this chapter.36

Figure 8–29 depicts updated Weapons Activities budget projections beyond the FYSNP, based on the

FY 2020 President’s Budget Request. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the FY 2020 budget 

request is crucial for implementing the policy directives laid down by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

The 25-year budget estimates are based on the program of record described in Chapters 2 through 6. 

Figure 8–30 displays the relative makeup of the Weapons Activities Program in terms of major portfolios 

for the period FY 2019 through FY 2044 based on estimated program costs. This information illustrates 

the potential evolution of the program’s direction; it does not represent the precise costs for any of the 

portfolios other than within the FYNSP. 

 

34 Use of the 85th percentile is consistent with DOE Order 413.3B guidance to select an acceptable point estimate from a 

confidence level range. The new high estimate includes additions to the scope from the FY 2018 SSMP (such as non-nuclear 

production facility modernization) consistent with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Last year’s low estimate reflected an even 

lower amount of new infrastructure scope, including no funds for Plutonium Pit Production or Domestic Uranium Enrichment 

projects.

35 The table reflects only the 20-year post-FYNSP planning horizon in last year’s SSMP.

36 As shown in the previous sections, cost estimates for stockpile sustainment, LEPs, and construction projects were determined 

using various projection methodologies. Plutonium Pit Production project estimates at LANL and SRS after FY 2024 were included 

to create a more informed projection. Beginning in FY 2028, an additional $110 million per year was added to Plutonium 

Sustainment costs to adjust for increased production activities. All other programs were escalated normally.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-45

Figure 8–29. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities

in then-year dollars with high- and low-cost estimates

Figure 8–30. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities

in then-year dollars by portfolio
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-46 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The nominal cost of the Weapons Activities portfolio from FY 2019 – FY 2020 increases by approximately 

11.8 percent. This increase to the program reflects the expanded work scope including LEPs, construction 

projects, and strategic materials increases to meet changing requirements. Over the FY 2020 – FY 2024 

period, the program cost increases at an annual average rate of approximately 2.0 percent. 

The scope of the Weapons Activities portfolio has significantly increased with the need to support an 

increased number of LEPs, new strategic material initiatives, and the qualification of new technologies. 

Concurrently, significant and sustained investments across the entire enterprise are needed over the 

coming decade to ensure that DOE/NNSA will be able to deliver the capacity and capabilities needed to 

support the nuclear deterrent into the 2030s and beyond. 

While Figure 8–29 shows the total Weapons Activities budget estimates, Figure 8–30 separates the major

portfolio element estimates over the 25-year program. This figure does not capture the out-year 

uncertainty, but it does offer greater transparency into the Weapons Activities 25-year program estimate. 

The DSW estimate highlights some variability over the next 10 years, with stability over the remainder of 

the 25-year program. The significant increase within the FYNSP is driven by:

 Ten percent growth in total LEP funding supporting the W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Modification 

Program

 Forty-five percent growth in total strategic materials funding predominately driven by increased 

pit production investments at both LANL and SRS

The DSW increase between FY 2027 and FY 2030 represents a ramp up of LEP funding supporting the 

simultaneous execution of the W80-4, W87-1, Next Navy Warhead, and the Future Strategic Missile 

Warhead.

Decreases in DSW outside of the FYNSP are largely due to pit production infrastructure investments 

transitioning to the I&O funding line. This change also shows up as an increase to the I&O funding line 

during that same timeframe. 

The I&O estimate highlights variability over the next 10 years with a focused growth profile across the 

25-year program. A decrease within the FYNSP is driven by:

 The ramp-down of Uranium Processing Facility and CMRR projects

 Limited investments in new programmatic construction projects and conceptual design activities 

between FY 2021 – FY 2024 to address LEP requirements

The programmatic construction delay during the FYNSP creates a second dip in the I&O estimates 

between FY 2026 and FY 2029, while conceptual design activities mature enough for new construction 

estimates beginning in FY 2029. After FY 2031, the I&O estimates stabilize with focused growth outpacing 

the remainder of the Weapons Activities portfolio. Outside of the FYNSP, DOE/NNSA is projecting nearly 

60 unique programmatic construction and modernization projects that will need dedicated funding, 

fueling long-term focused growth in modernizing the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise.

Overall spending in the remainder of the Weapons Activities portfolio remains relatively constant from 

the FY 2019 SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-47

8.9 Affordability Analysis

In April 2017, GAO recommended that DOE/NNSA include an assessment of the affordability of the 

modernization programs portfolio in future versions of the SSMP.37 DOE/NNSA’s method for evaluating 

potential affordability is part of a portfolio management approach in line with the level of uncertainty 

affecting the out-years. DOE/NNSA has a rigorous process for developing the 5-year FYNSP budget 

request, while the SSMP provides the projected cost of continuing the program beyond the FYNSP, 

incorporating some amount of uncertainty in the out-year projects based on the uncertainties in LEP and 

construction costs. These later plans and estimates are compared to external straight-line budget 

projections that have not been adjusted to be more predictive. Variances are managed as the out-years 

estimates move into the FYNSP window, and greater scrutiny and prioritization are applied through the 

programming and budget processes.

Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs and Its Affordability

The projected future costs for the Weapons Activities portfolio for FY 2020 – FY 2044 should be 

interpreted as a range outside of the FYNSP and represents a quantification of uncertainty. This total cost 

range is necessary because of the uncertainties (risks) related to the individual components of the 

estimates, the LEPs, and the construction costs described earlier in this chapter. 

The blue line in Figure 8–31 represents the nominal total from the FY 2019 SSMP. Such costs are

principally from LEPs, pit production, and other 2018 Nuclear Posture Review implementation cost growth 

discussed previously in the chapter.

Figure 8–31. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities

in then-year dollars with high- and low-cost estimates, including the escalated

President’s Budget Request38

 

37 Action Needed to Address Affordability of Nuclear Modernization Programs, Government Accountability Office, GAO-17-341.

38 For the President’s Budget, OMB MAX values were used for FY 2025 – FY 2029 and then escalated for FY 2030 – FY 2044.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 8-48 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The dashed line represents the escalated President’s Budget Request after the FYNSP. This line represents 

a likely estimate of future years’ budget authority. The nominal cost of the Weapons Activities program 

does not significantly exceed the escalation line and generally falls between the low and high cost ranges. 

Based on the FY 2020 – FY 2024 programming process, congressionally mandated funding level 

adjustments, and the formal process of multi-agency budget development, DOE/NNSA created an 

affordable and executable program. Schedules and scopes can be adjusted for outyear activities, as part 

of annual programming, to address shortfalls and DOE/NNSA will use updated estimates for these 

activities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 9-1

Chapter 9

Conclusion

This DOE/NNSA Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), together with the 

classified Annex, is a key planning document for the nuclear security enterprise. The SSMP documents

the 25-year strategic program of record and plans developed across numerous DOE/NNSA programs and 

organizations to sustain the nuclear deterrent near-to-long-term through maintaining and modernizing

the stockpile, scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure mission success. The 

DOE/NNSA Federal workforce prepares each SSMP in collaboration with management and operating 

partners. The plan in the FY 2020 SSMP is also coordinated with DoD through the Nuclear Weapons 

Council and is consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Council’s Strategic Plan for 2019–2044. This SSMP is 

NNSA’s foundation for meeting the nuclear weapons mission laid out in the December 2017 National 

Security Strategy of the United States of America (White House 2017) and the 2018 Nuclear Posture 

Review (DoD 2018). In response to new demands and challenges related to stewardship and management 

of the stockpile, DOE/NNSA publishes a new version of the SSMP each year with updates to its strategic 

plans. The FY 2020 SSMP builds on previous SSMPs and updates the costs and resources required for 

execution of the program based on current mission needs, the strategic environment, and new guidance. 

While executing the current plan, DOE/NNSA had an outstanding FY 2018. DOE/NNSA maintained the 

existing nuclear weapons stockpile, made impressive progress on a number of life extension programs 

(LEPs), and continued to advance the science and engineering capabilities that underpin the Nation’s 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Extending the life of existing U.S. nuclear warheads was accomplished by replacing nuclear and nonnuclear parts or inserting new parts that use updated technologies. DOE/NNSA’s state-of-the-art 

capabilities for research, development, testing, evaluation, and production enabled this critical effort. The 

scopes, budgets, and schedules of the LEPs; infrastructure modernization; and DoD nuclear delivery 

systems reflect integrated and coordinated efforts. 

Although many warheads in America’s nuclear weapons stockpile have exceeded their original design 

lives, the Stockpile Stewardship Program also continues to survey, assess, and maintain the safety, 

security, and effectiveness of the aging nuclear weapons stockpile. This effort harnesses leading-edge 

science, engineering, high performance computing, and advanced manufacturing to enable the 

Secretaries of Energy and Defense to annually inform the President about the state of the stockpile 

without explosive nuclear testing. 

To facilitate future scientific and engineering excellence at the national security laboratories and nuclear 

weapons production sites, DOE/NNSA has continued university collaborations and science, technology, 

engineering, and mathematics educational outreach in applied and technical research supporting 

technology development to maintain a pipeline for the future workforce.

Finally, DOE/NNSA continues to strengthen weapons activities strategic planning. DOE/NNSA has 

integrated and improved the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process with improved 

portfolio analyses, high-quality cost-estimation techniques, and production of aggregate out-year funding 

wedges for portfolios such as capital assets. Annual updates to cost-estimating models enable DOE/NNSA 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 9-2 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

to posture the organization to efficiently execute upcoming projects with adequate resources. DOE/NNSA 

continues to develop strategies to ensure our capabilities will meet the mission requirements laid out in 

the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Together with support from Congress, DOE/NNSA will ensure that our 

workforce has the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure needed to steward the systems that 

comprise our deterrent today and, should the need arise, to design the systems of tomorrow.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-1

Appendix A

Requirements Mapping

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to 

Statutory Reporting Requirements and Related Requests

The Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) consolidates a number of 

statutory reporting requirements and related congressional requests. This appendix maps the statutory 

and congressional requirements to the respective chapter and section in the FY 2020 SSMP. 

A.2 Ongoing Requirements

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

§ 2521. Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, 

shall establish a stewardship program to ensure –

(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the 

United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system 

integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and 

certification; and 

(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the 

use of underground nuclear weapons testing.

Unclassified

All Chapters

Unclassified

All Chapters

(b) Program elements

The program shall include the following:

1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to 

enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with 

respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1, 3.2; 

Appendix B

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.4; 

Chapter 8,

Section 8.3.4;

Appendix C

(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such 

as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma 

physics, and materials research.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4, 3.5, 

3.6, 3.8, 3.10, 3.11

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.2, 3.2.3; 

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.3.1,

8.3.2, 8.3.3

(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the 

experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced 

hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for 

above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.7.5

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.3.2;

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.1,

4.2.2, 4.3.1;

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.3.1–

8.3.3, 8.5.3
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50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced 

experimental facilities of the United States, including -

(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory;

(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory;

(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and 

(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3–3.8, 

3.12, 3.14

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.3; Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3.1, 

8.3.3

(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with 

production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the 

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including -

(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and

(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national 

security laboratories.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.4, 

2.4.1–2.4.7; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.16–3.26

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.3.1, 2.3.2, 

2.3.4, 2.3.5, 

2.3.6, 2.4.1, 

2.4.3, 2.4.6–

2.4.8; Chapter 3,

Section 3.3.2;

Chapter 4,

Sections 4.2–4.4, 

4.6; Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.2.3, 

8.3.5, 8.5.1

(1) With respect to exascale computing—

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop and 

carry out a plan to develop exascale computing and incorporate such computing 

into the stockpile stewardship program under section 4201 of the Atomic Energy 

Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of 

the enactment of this Act [Dec. 26, 2013]

Unclassified

Appendix B

Unclassified

Appendix C

(b) MILESTONES.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include major 

programmatic milestones in—

(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile 

stewardship program; and

(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.19; 

Appendix B

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3.4; 

Appendix C

(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.—In developing the plan required by 

subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the Under 

Secretary of Energy for Science, the Secretary of Defense, and elements of the 

intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003[4]).

(d) INCLUSION OF COSTS IN FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.—The 

Administrator shall—

(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations 

reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under 

section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 

2453) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the costs of—

(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into 

the stockpile stewardship program; and

(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale 

computing; and

(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of 

the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of 

Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Section 8.3.4; 

Appendix C, 

Section C.2
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-3

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

(e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Administrator shall submit the plan required 

by subsection (a) to the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed 

Services and Appropriations of Senate and the House of Representative] with each 

summary of the plan required by subsection (a) of section 4203 of the Atomic 

Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) submitted under subsection (b)(1) of that 

section during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 

Act.

(f) EXASCALE COMPUTING DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘exascale 

computing’’ means computing through the use of a computing machine that 

performs near or above 10 to the 18th power floating point operations per second.

50 U.S. Code § 2522

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

§ 2522. Stockpile stewardship criteria 

(a) Requirement for criteria

The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging 

whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for 

determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are 

performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that the 

stockpile is safe and reliable.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 

2.2.1–2.2.4

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.7–

2.2.9; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1.2, 

3.2.1–3.2.4;

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3.1–

8.3.4

(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall 

coordinate with the Secretary of Defense. 

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

§ 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness

plan

(a) Plan requirement

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other 

appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, 

shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile 

management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program direction, 

infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan 

shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most 

recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

(b) Submissions to Congress

(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each evennumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a). 

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

N/A

(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each oddnumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a). 

N/A Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted 

in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

(c) Elements of biennial plan summary

Each summary of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a 

minimum, the following:

(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the 

number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each 

warhead type.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.4;

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.2, 

2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.1

Classified Annex

N/A

(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life 

extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace 

warhead types.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.1;

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1, 4.2, 

4.2.1, 4.2.2

N/A

(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of 

science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.2.3;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1–3.27

N/A

(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including 

programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of human 

capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules.

Unclassified

Chapter 1,

Sections 1.5, 1.8; 

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.28–

3.31; Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.2, 4.5, 

4.5.1–4.5.4, 4.7.5

Classified Annex

N/A

(5) A summary of the status, plans, and budgets for carrying out the stockpile 

responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title.

Unclassified

Chapter 4

N/A

(6) A summary of the plan regarding the research and development, 

deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of technologies described in subsection 

(d) (7).

Unclassified

Chapter 3

N/A

(7) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) regarding the 

execution of programs with current and projected budgets and any associated 

risks.

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.7.1

N/A

(8) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

Unclassified

Executive 

Summary; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.3, 

4.3.1–4.3.5, 4.4.9, 

4.5.3, 4.6.2, 4.6.3, 

4.7, 4.7.3, 4.7.4, 

4.7.5

Classified Annex

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-5

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

(9) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate. Unclassified

Classified Annex

N/A

(d) Elements of biennial detailed report

Each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall include, 

at a minimum, the following:

(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and 

stockpile responsiveness—

(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and 

age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead 

type;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.2; 

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1.12,

2.5, 2.5.1–2.5.9

Classified Annex

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2; 

Tables 2-1, 2-2

(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the 

date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of 

the report—

(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and 

inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and

(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of 

nuclear weapon;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.7.1–

8.7.3

Classified Annex

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.5; 

Tables 2-1, 2-3

(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension 

programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead 

types;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.5, 2.5.1–2.5.8;

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.2, 

8.7.3

Classified Annex

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.5;

Tables 2-3, 2-4

(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the 

lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the 

nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and 

inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.2, 

2.2.1–2.2.9; 

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1.1,

3.2.2

(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and 

reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.2, 

2.2.1–2.2.9; 

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1.1, 

3.1.2
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the 

Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in 

the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 

2.1.1, 2.2.7, 

2.3.6, 2.4.1, 

2.4.3, 2.4.6;

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.1.3, 

3.2.2.3, 3.2.3.3, 

3.2.4.3, 3.3

Classified Annex

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.5, 

Table 2-4

(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and 

modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as 

needed;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 

2.1.1, 2.2, 2.2.1–

2.2.7, 2.3, 2.3.1–

2.3.6, 2.4, 2.4.1–

2.4.8, 2.5, 2.5.1–

2.5.8; Chapter 3,

Section 3.2

(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for 

carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 2524 

of this title, including information relating to the aging of materials and 

components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or 

substitution of materials;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.2, 

2.2.1–2.2.7, 2.3, 

2.3.1–2.3.6;

Chapter 3,

Section 3.2

(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions 

for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production 

facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to 

ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and 

mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.4, 

1.4.1–1.4.3,

1.4.5; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1.5;

Chapter 7;

Appendix D

(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full 

and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review 

process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile required under section 2525 of this title;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.1.1

(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile 

management program required by section 2524 of this title, including 

allocations of funds by weapon type and facility; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.1, 8.2, 

8.3.1–8.3.3, 

8.7.2, 8.7.3

(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the 

program required under section 2524 of this title;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Section 8.1
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FY 2020

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(M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the 

stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.2;

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.2, 

8.3.2

(N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the 

program required under section 2538b of this title; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Section 8.2, 8.3.2

(O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear 

weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national 

security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and 

development that includes separate comments on the plan from the 

Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.

N/A N/A

(2) With respect to science-based tools—

(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear 

weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.2.1–

2.2.7, 2.2.9; 

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1, 

3.1.1, 3.1.2, 

3.2.1–3.2.4

(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in 

subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information 

and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on 

the criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) of this title; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1–

3.2.4

(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including any 

updates to such criteria).

N/A N/A

(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 

(a) of this title by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the 

national security laboratories, which shall set forth—

(A) an identification and description of—

(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; 

and

(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear 

testing;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.1.3, 

3.2.2.3, 3.2.3.3,

3.2.4.3, 3.3.1

Classified Annex

Chapter 2,

Section 2.5,

Table 2-4

(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory 

to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable 

without the use of nuclear testing;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1.1, 

3.2.1–3.2.4;

Appendix D

(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory 

that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based 

tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1.1, 

3.3.2;

Appendix D
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FY 2019

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FY 2020

Response

(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies 

required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program 

and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the 

Administration, including—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 7,

Section 7.3.4;

Appendix B

(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, 

required to maintain such competencies; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 7,

Sections 7.3.1, 

7.3.2;

Appendix D

(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the 

time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist 

during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security 

program.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 7,

Sections 7.4.1, 

7.4.2;

Appendix D

(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—

(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the 

Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed 

in—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4,

Sections 4.2, 4.3

(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the 

most recent national security strategy report of the President under 

section 3043 of this title if such strategy has been submitted as of the 

date of the plan; 

Unclassified

Chapter 4,

Sections 4.2, 4.3

(ii) the most recent quadrennial defense review if such strategy has 

not been submitted as of the date of the plan; and

Unclassified

Chapter 4,

Sections 4.2, 4.3

(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan; Unclassified

Chapter 4,

Sections 4.2, 4.3

(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under 

subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.21, 

4.2.2

(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines 

necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), 

including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which 

such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.5.1, 

8.7.4

(D) a description of—

(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the 

Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance 

and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and 

(II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on 

maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and

(III) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs 

complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of 

the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that 

such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement 

plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan 

for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise are being properly sustained.

Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Section 8.5.5

(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—

(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the 

Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once 

directed by the President to conduct such a test;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4
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FY 2020

Response

(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4

(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4

(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4

(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities 

described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants 

described in subparagraph (D).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4

(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and 

stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:

(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand 

plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured 

and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.2.3,

3.3.3

(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium 

at elemental and bulk conditions.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.3

(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for 

plutonium and plutonium components.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.4.1;

Appendix D, 

Section D.2.2

(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance 

under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and 

nonmanufactured conditions.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.1–

3.2.4

(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments 

described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.2.1.2, 

3.2.1.3

(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, 

and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period 

covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 2453 

of this title.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.2.1, 

8.2.3.5, 8.3.1, 

8.3.3, 8.8

(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified 

under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.2.1, 

8.2.3.5, 8.3.1, 

8.3.3, 8.8

(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the 

integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile 

stewardship needs.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.4.1

7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle 

sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security 

enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal 

years following the date of the report, together with—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6

Classified Annex

Chapter 3
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FY 2019

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FY 2020

Response

(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the 

technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats 

posed to that site; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6

Classified Annex

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 3.5; 

Tables 3-1, 3-2; 

Figure 3-2

(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used 

by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical 

and cybersecurity technologies; and 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6,

Sections 6.1.1–

6.1.3, 6.2.3, 6.2.4

Classified Annex

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3, 3.7

(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program 

element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the 

Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will 

help carry out that plan.

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.6.2, 

8.6.3

Classified Annex

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4.2, 

3.8; Tables 3-5, 

3-6

(8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be 

executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.7–8.9

(9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 8
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2019

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FY 2020

Response

(e) Nuclear Weapons Council assessment 

(1) For each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2), the 

Nuclear Weapons Council shall conduct an assessment that includes the 

following:

(A) An analysis of the plan, including—

(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security 

strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense 

review, as applicable under subsection (d)(4)(A), and the Nuclear 

Posture Review;

(ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described 

under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) and the schedule 

described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection are adequate to 

support such requirements; and

(iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program 

under section 2538b of this title in a manner that meets the objectives 

of such program and an identification of any improvements that may 

be made to the plan to better carry out such program.

(B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements 

for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise.

(C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not 

adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under 

subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure 

recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment 

with respect to—

(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; 

and

(ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile.

(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits 

the plan under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to 

the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment 

required under paragraph (1).

N/A N/A

(f) Definitions – In this section:

(1) The term “budget”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for 

that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 

1105(a) of title 31.

(2) The term “future-years nuclear security program” means the program 

required by section 2453 of this title.

(3) The term “nuclear security budget materials”, with respect to a fiscal year, 

means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support 

of the budget for that fiscal year.

(4) The term “quadrennial defense review” means the review of the defense 

programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years 

under section 118 of title 10.

(5) The term “weapons activities” means each activity within the budget 

category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration.

(6) The term “weapons-related activities” means each activity under the 

Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons 

technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—

(A) nuclear nonproliferation;

(B) nuclear forensics;

(C) nuclear intelligence;

(D) nuclear safety; and

(E) nuclear incident response.
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50 U.S. Code § 2524

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

§ 2524. Stockpile management program

(a) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security and 

in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in support 

of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective management of 

the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the extension of the 

effective life of such weapons. The program shall have the following objectives:

(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile of the United States.

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.2.3

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 

2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2,

2.2.1–2.2.9, 

2.3.1–2.3.6;

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1.1, 

3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.4

(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear 

weapons testing.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.1; 

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1–3.14

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1.3, 

3.2.3, 3.2.4.2

(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.7; 

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.5

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.6

(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the 

stockpile.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1–

2.2.5, 2.4.6

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 

2.3.3, 2.3.5;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.2, 

3.2.4

(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or 

entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.15, 3.16

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 

2.1.2, 2.3.3;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.2, 

3.2.4; Chapter 5

(b) Program limitations

In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the 

Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—

(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the objectives 

identified in subsection (a); and 

(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—

(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the 

maximum extent feasible, components that are well understood or are 

certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons

testing; and

(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the 

nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the 

existing stockpile.
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50 U.S. Code § 2524

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

(c) Program budget

In accordance with the requirements under section 2529 of this title, for each 

budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the 

amounts requested for the program under this section shall be clearly identified in 

the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget.
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50 U.S. Code § 2538a 

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

§2538a. Plutonium pit production capacity Unclassified Unclassified

(a) Requirement 

Consistent with the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise-

(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;

(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;

(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits;

(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and

(5) during a pilot period of not less than 90 days during 2027 (subject to 

subsection [b]), demonstrates the capability to produce war 

reserve plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to produce 80 pits per year.

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.1

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.4.5;

Chapter 2,

Section 2.4.1;

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.2.4; 

Appendix D, 

Section D.2.2

(b) Authorization of two-year delay of demonstration requirement

The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense may jointly delay, for not 

more than two years, the requirement under subsection (a)(5) if-

(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy jointly submit to the 

congressional defense committees a report describing-

(A) the justification for the proposed delay;

(B) the effects of the proposed delay on stockpile stewardship and 

modernization, life extension programs, future stockpile strategy, and 

dismantlement efforts; and

(C) whether the proposed delay is consistent with national policy regarding 

creation of a responsive nuclear infrastructure; and

(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command submits to the 

congressional defense committees a report containing the assessment of the 

Commander with respect to the potential risks to national security of the 

proposed delay in meeting-

(A) the nuclear deterrence requirements of the United States Strategic 

Command; and

(B) national requirements related to creation of a responsive nuclear 

infrastructure.

(c) Annual certification

Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year thereafter through 2027 (or, if the 

authority under subsection (b) is exercised, 2029), the Secretary of Energy shall 

certify to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense that 

the programs and budget of the Secretary of Energy will enable the nuclear security 

enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.4.1; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.2.4;

(d) Plan

If the Secretary of Energy does not make a certification under subsection (c) by 

March 1 of any year in which a certification is required under that subsection, by 

not later than May 1 of such year, the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council 

shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to enable the nuclear 

security enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a). Such plan shall 

include identification of the resources of the Department of Energy that the 

Chairman determines should be redirected to support the plan to meet such 

requirements.

N/A N/A
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50 U.S. Code § 2538b

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

§ 2538b. Stockpile responsiveness program Unclassified Unclassified

(a) Statement of policy

It is the policy of the United States to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and 

continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, 

develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the 

nuclear deterrent of the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and 

responsive.

All Chapters All Chapters

(b) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with 

the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a stockpile responsiveness program, along 

with the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 of this title and the 

stockpile management program under section 2524 of this title, to identify, sustain, 

enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required to 

conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy 

nuclear weapons.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.5, 1.7

Unclassified

Chapter 1,

Sections 1.5, 

1.7; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1.3, 

3.2.2

(c) Objectives The program under subsection (b) shall have the following objectives:

(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the 

capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, 

engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out 

all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both 

the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of the Department of 

Defense.

(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with 

respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process from one 

generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following 

generation.

(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of 

capabilities required, including prototypes, flight testing, and development of

plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.

(4) Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines to 

minimize the amount of time and costs leading to an engineering prototype and 

production.

(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all 

relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the Department of 

Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.

(6) The retention of the ability, in consultation with the Director of National 

Intelligence, to assess and develop prototype nuclear weapons of foreign 

countries and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.

Unclassified

Chapter 3

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.5, 

1.7; Chapter 3

(d) Joint nuclear weapons life cycle process defined

In this section, the term “joint nuclear weapons life cycle process” means the 

process developed and maintained by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of nuclear 

weapons.
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A.3 Other Requirements

H.R.244 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 115-31

FY 2019

Response

FY 2020

Response

SEC. 4. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.

The explanatory statement regarding this Act, printed in the House section of the 

Congressional Record on or about May 2, 2017, and submitted by the Chairman of the 

Committee on Appropriations of the House, shall have the same effect with respect to 

the allocation of funds and implementation of divisions A through L of this Act as if it 

were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

Congressional Record – House, Vol 163, No 76—Book II, page H3753, May 3, 2017

(Explanatory Statement to Accompany the FY 17 Omnibus Appropriations

[P.L. 115-31]]

Life Extension Reporting. – The NNSA is directed to provide to the Committees on 

Appropriations of both Houses of Congress a classified summary of each ongoing life 

extension and major refurbishment program that includes explanatory information on 

the progress and planning for each program beginning with the award of the phase 6.3 

milestone and annually thereafter until completion of the program.

Classified Annex Classified Annex

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 

2.2.1–2.2.6, 2.3
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Appendix B

Weapons Activities Capabilities

This table represents the breadth of capabilities that delineate the critical functions of Weapons Activities 

in the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) nuclear security 

enterprise. These capabilities should not be viewed in isolation or as mutually exclusive, as many overlap 

and are complementary. They represent the underlying disciplines, activities, and specialized skills 

required to meet NNSA missions. In part, this appendix supports legislative requirements listed in 

Appendix A.

Capability Definition

Advanced 

Experimental 

Diagnostics and 

Sensors

Advanced diagnostics and sensors provide detailed measurements of materials, objects,

and dynamic processes that are critical to weapon operation. Standard diagnostics 

provide lower-resolution data that are suitable for basic inquiries, but not detailed part, 

process, or physics qualification; continued diagnostic and sensor development is critical 

to addressing these limitations. An example of an advanced diagnostic is static or 

multiframe dynamic radiography at high resolution. Radiography is an imaging 

technique that uses x-rays or subatomic particles (e.g., protons, neutrons) to view the 

internal structure of an object that is opaque to visible light. Static radiography of a 

stationary object is used during the post-fabrication inspection process to ensure that 

components are defect-free and meet exacting quality requirements. Dynamic 

radiography takes multiple images of a dynamic process to examine physical behavior in 

progress.

Advanced 

Manufacturing

Advanced manufacturing uses innovative techniques from industry, academia, or 

internal research and development to reduce costs, reduce component development 

and production time, improve safety, and control waste streams. Examples include 

additive manufacturing, use of microreactors, microwave casting, and electrorefining. 

Atomic and Plasma 

Physics

Atomic physics is the study of atomic systems, such as a collection of atoms and

electrons, and their interaction with x-rays. Plasma physics is the study of systems 

containing separate ions and electrons that exhibit a collective behavior. The extremely 

high temperatures of functioning nuclear weapons generate plasma and x-rays. 

Chemistry Chemistry is the study of the fundamental (or elemental) composition, structure, 

bonding, and properties of matter. Chemistry is essential for purifying, synthesizing, 

processing, and fabricating materials. The stability of these materials and how 

properties and reactions change with time must be understood to ensure the quality, 

performance, reliability, and safety of the stockpile.

Environmental Effects 

Analysis, Testing, and 

Engineering Sciences

Environmental effects analysis, testing, and engineering sciences use an array of test 

equipment, tools, and techniques to create stockpile-to-target sequence conditions and 

measure the ensuing response of nuclear weapons. Examples of environmental testing

(normal, hostile, and abnormal) include shock, vibration, radiation, acceleration,

temperature, electrostatics, and pressure conditions. The engineering sciences that 

support this analysis include thermal and fluid sciences, structural mechanics, dynamics, 

aerodynamics, and electromagnetics. 
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Capability Definition

Handling, Packaging, 

Processing, and 

Manufacturing of 

Energetic and 

Hazardous Material 

Hazardous and energetic materials require safe and secure handling, packaging, 

processing, manufacturing, and inspection. Lithium, beryllium, and mercury have the 

potential to harm humans, animals, and the environment. Energetic materials 

(e.g., explosives, propellants) and hazardous materials require special conduct of 

operations, containment equipment, and facilities to handle, process, or manufacture 

products containing these materials. 

Handling, Packaging, 

Processing, and 

Manufacturing of 

Special Nuclear 

Materials

Special conduct of operations, physical security protection, facilities, and equipment are 

required to handle, package, process, manufacture, and inspect components that 

contain special nuclear materials (e.g., plutonium, enriched uranium). 

High Energy Density 

Physics

High energy density physics is the study of matter and radiation under extreme 

conditions such as those in a functioning nuclear weapon and in high-temperature 

experiments. Facilities such as the National Ignition Facility, Omega Laser Facility, and 

the Z pulsed power facility generate high energy density states and produce data for

determining the physical processes that occur during these conditions and validating

computational models.

High Explosives 

Science and 

Engineering

High explosives science and engineering is the study of detonation physics, shock wave 

propagation, and reaction initiation. It includes the design, synthesis, and manufacture 

of high explosives for specific applications. Knowledge of high-explosive behavior is 

necessary for understanding nuclear weapon performance.

High Performance 

Computing

High performance computing encompasses software, hardware, and facilities of

sufficient power to achieve the dimensionality, resolution, and complexity in simulation 

codes to accurately model the performance of weapon systems and components and 

the fundamental physical processes that are critical to nuclear operation.

Hydrodynamic and 

Subcritical 

Experiments

Hydrodynamic experiments explore implosion physics and provide data on the behavior 

of full-scale dynamic systems. Subcritical experiments are driven by high explosives and

contain special nuclear material that never achieves a critical configuration and does not 

create nuclear yield. Both types of experiments provide data that are essential to

validating models within multi-physics design codes and predicting nuclear weapon 

performance.

Information 

Technology and 

Cybersecurity

Information technology and cybersecurity provides infrastructure and protection for 

both classified and unclassified computer networks and environments. It ensures 

electronic information and information assets are operating nominally and are protected 

from unauthorized access and malicious acts that would adversely affect national and 

economic security.

Laser, Pulsed Power, 

and Accelerator 

Technology

These technologies produce safe, reliable, and efficient lasers, accelerators, and pulsed 

power drivers for diagnostics and facilities, generating data at similar pressure, 

temperature, and radiation conditions to those in an operating nuclear weapon. Lasers 

and pulsed power devices accumulate energy over long periods and release it very 

quickly. Accelerators use electromagnetic fields to accelerate charged particles to very 

high speeds. The charged particles can produce high-energy x-rays to take radiographs

or high-energy neutrons for nuclear physics investigations.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page B-3

Capability Definition

Materials Science and 

Engineering

Materials science, in the context of stockpile stewardship, is the study of how materials 

in a nuclear weapon behave under both moderate and extreme conditions of 

temperature and pressure. Materials engineering involves the evaluation and selection 

of materials for these environments. Strength, aging, compatibility, viability, and 

damage mechanisms are among the material characteristics to be evaluated. Materials 

science and engineering play a key role in resolving stockpile and production issues, 

validating computational models, and developing new materials (e.g., materials 

produced through additive manufacturing).

Metal and Organic 

Material Fabrication, 

Processing, and 

Manufacturing

Although many weapon components are supplied by U.S. industries, specialized 

components and materials must be produced within the nuclear security enterprise. 

This production requires synthesis of organic materials and processing, manufacturing, 

and inspection of metallic and organic products, based on knowledge of material 

behavior, compatibility, and aging. 

Non-Nuclear Weapon 

Component 

Manufacturing and 

Assembly

Many non-nuclear weapon components (e.g., microelectronics; gas transfer systems;

arming, fuzing, and firing assemblies; environmental sensing devices; radars; neutron 

generators; and batteries) require special manufacturing, assembly, and inspection 

protocols. 

Nuclear Physics and 

Radiochemistry 

Nuclear physics is the study of atomic nuclei and their interactions, especially fission and 

fusion. Knowledge is needed regarding the probabilities of interactions of neutrons with 

fissile material and of light nuclei that can result in fusion. Radiochemistry, the 

chemistry of radioactive materials, is used to evaluate data from legacy underground 

tests and from experiments at the National Ignition Facility, Omega Laser Facility, and 

the Z pulsed power facility.

Physical Security Physical security protects the Nation’s nuclear materials, infrastructure assets, and the 

workforce at NNSA sites involved in Weapons Activities. It protects assets from theft, 

diversion, sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile or 

noncompliant acts that may adversely affect national security, program continuity, and 

employee security.

Radiation-Hardened 

Microelectronics 

Design and 

Manufacturing

Design, production, and testing of radiation-hardened microelectronics is required for 

nuclear weapons to function properly in hostile environments. This capability requires a 

secure, trusted supply chain, including quality control of the materials used in the 

process and products.

Secure Transportation Protection and movement of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and special 

nuclear material between facilities includes design and fabrication or modification of 

vehicles, design and fabrication of special communication systems, and training of 

Federal agents. 

Simulation Codes and 

Models

Advanced computer codes and the models embedded in these codes are developed and 

used to simulate the behavior of nuclear weapons. Codes range in application from 

design of systems to fundamental science processes. NNSA codes operate on computers 

ranging from desktop machines to the world’s largest high-performance

supercomputers.

Testing Equipment 

Design and 

Fabrication

Design and fabrication of special test equipment to simulate environmental and 

functional conditions must ensure that products meet specifications. Data from test 

equipment provide evidence for qualification, certification, reliability, surety, and 

surveillance. 

Tritium Production, 

Handling, and 

Processing

Tritium has a 12-year half-life and must be periodically replenished in gas transfer 

systems. Production, handling, and processing of tritium includes the recovery, 

extraction, refinement, storage, filling, and inspection of gas transfer systems. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page B-4 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Capability Definition

Weapon Component 

and Material Process 

Development

Process development of weapon components involves small-lot production, precise 

controls, and a deep understanding of the hazards of working with special nuclear 

materials and other exotic materials. Component process development is needed 

whenever process changes are made to reduce cost or production time.

Weapon Component 

and System 

Prototyping

Development, qualification, and manufacture of high-fidelity, full-scale prototype 

weapon components and systems reduce the cost and life cycle time to develop and 

qualify new designs and technologies. This capability includes the ability to design, 

manufacture, and employ mockups with sensors to support laboratory and flight tests 

that provide evidence that components can function with Department of Defense

delivery systems in realistic environments. 

Weapon Component 

and System 

Surveillance and 

Assessment

Surveillance enhances integration across test regimes to demonstrate performance 

requirements for stockpile systems by inspections, laboratory and flight tests, 

nondestructive tests, and component and material evaluations. Comparing data over 

time provides the ability to predict, detect, assess, and resolve aging trends and 

anomalous changes in the stockpile and address or mitigate issues or concerns. 

Assessment is the analysis, largely through modeling and simulation, of data gathered 

during surveillance to evaluate the safety, performance, and reliability of weapon

systems and the effect of aging on performance, uncertainties, and margins.

Weapons Engineering 

Design, Analysis, and 

Integration

Elements of weapons engineering capability include the following life cycle phases: 

concept exploration, satisfaction of requirements, conceptual design, detailed design 

and development, production, and certification and qualification. This capability also 

encompasses system integration, which includes understanding and developing the 

interfaces among the non-nuclear subsystems, between the non-nuclear components 

and the nuclear explosives package, and between the DOE/NNSA and Department of 

Defense systems.

Weapon System 

Assembly and 

Disassembly

Weapons system assembly involves the final assembly of the nuclear and non-nuclear 

components. Assembly requires special conduct of operations, equipment, and 

facilities. Disassembly, inspection, and storage or disposal of the components require 

similar special conduct of operations, quality control, equipment, and facilities. 

Weapons Physics 

Design and Analysis

Design and analysis of the nuclear explosive package is required to maintain existing 

U.S. nuclear weapons, modernize the stockpile, evaluate possible proliferant nuclear 

weapons, and respond to emerging threats, unanticipated events, and technological 

innovation. Elements of design capability include concept exploration, satisfaction of

specifications, conceptual design, detailed design and development, production process

development, and certification and qualification. Weapons physics analysis includes 

evaluation of weapons effects.

Weapons Surety 

Design, Testing, 

Analysis, and 

Manufacturing

Weapons surety design, analysis, integration, and manufacturing employ a variety of

safety and use control systems to prevent accidental nuclear detonation and 

unauthorized use of nuclear weapons to ensure a safe and secure stockpile. This 

knowledge, infrastructure, and equipment requires strict classification control and 

secure facilities and equipment.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page C-1

Appendix C

Exascale Computing Initiative

The December 2017 National Security Strategy mandates that “to maintain our competitive advantage, 

the United States will prioritize emerging technologies critical to economic growth and security, such as 

data science, encryption, gene editing, new materials, nanotechnology, advanced computing 

technologies, and artificial intelligence.” In addition, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that the 

Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) will “maintain and enhance 

the computational, experimental, and testing capabilities needed to annually assess nuclear weapons.” 

To maintain competitive advantage and the necessary capabilities for the annual assessment, the United 

States must retain state-of-the-art capabilities in high performance computing (HPC). HPC will also help 

ensure national security, economic prosperity, technological strength, and scientific and energy research 

leadership. Failure to address national security, science, and growing big data needs will open the door 

to other Nations with a demonstrated commitment to HPC investment to take the lead in a number of 

areas. Risk would increase not only in high-end computing, but eventually in science, national defense, 

energy innovation, and the commercial computing market.

The National Strategic Computing Initiative (NSCI) was established as a Federal interagency campaign in 

2015 to maximize the benefits of HPC for U.S. economic competitiveness, scientific discovery, and national 

security. Other agencies with major responsibilities for the NSCI include the National Science Foundation, 

the intelligence community, and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. 

Major thrusts of the NSCI are the exploration and development of quantum computing, bio computing, 

and exascale computing. Within that initiative DOE, represented by a partnership between the DOE Office 

of Science and NNSA, has the lead responsibility for focusing and executing the joint Exascale Computing 

Initiative. This initiative focuses on advanced simulation through an exascale computing program that 

continues exploiting legacy MOSFET1technology to emphasize sustained performance and analytic 

computing to advance DOE/NNSA missions. The objectives and the associated scientific challenges define 

a mission need for a computing capability of 2 to 10 exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOPS = 1018 floating-point 

operations per second) in the early to mid-2020s.

C.1 Challenges

To deliver the exascale computing capability for the nuclear security mission within the next decade, while 

maintaining and modifying the integrated design codes, NNSA will need to:

 Develop HPC technologies and systems, in close partnership with computer vendors that will 

provide at least an 8-fold increase in sustained application code performance over the currently 

largest Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) supercomputer, Sierra, which is a 

125-petaFLOPS system (1 petaFLOPS = 1015 floating-point operations per second); 

 

1MOSFET stands for metal-oxide semiconductor, field-effect transistor. This technology, which has been the incumbent 

technology associated with Moore’s law in microelectronics since the 1960s, theoretically begins failing significantly at speeds 

faster than exascale speeds.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 Address code performance on the current advanced architecture and next-generation systems, 

which are employing heterogeneous architectures very different from the homogeneous 

computing environment we have experienced in the past 2 decades;

 Develop a tri-laboratory, open-sourced/community software stack that will run efficiently on new 

advanced architecture prototype systems to assess the viability of alternate HPC architecture 

paths for ASC; and 

 Modernize computing facilities for readiness of siting exascale platforms with increasing and 

evolving structural integrity, power, and cooling requirements.

C.2 Approaches and Strategies

To achieve DOE/NNSA’s exascale goals, the U.S. Government will interact with industry in HPC technology 

development. Past partnerships between the U.S. Government and industry have led to development of 

innovative technologies that met both Federal Government and private sector objectives. NNSA is 

continuing its partnership with the DOE Office of Science on the Exascale Computing Initiative, including 

investments in research and development (R&D) of software tools and applications with computer 

vendors, the national laboratories, and universities. In addition, the two organizations are collaborating 

on the joint April 2018 CORAL-2 procurement, which will deliver two exascale-class system to DOE’s Office 

of Science in FY 2021–2022 and another to NNSA in FY 2023. This joint procurement will allow the 

program offices to share critical non-recurring engineering development costs with the selected 

vendor(s). 

The current spend plan for Exascale Computing Initiative elements is shown in Table C–1. In FY 2020, the 

NNSA activities of the Exascale Computing Initiative includes ASC Advanced Technology Development and 

Mitigation (ATDM) subprogram, Construction: Exascale Computing Facility Modernization (ECFM) (at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]), and a portion of Computational Systems and Software 

Environment – Exascale System (El Capitan). The Exascale Computing Initiative constitutes is about

25 percent of the ASC program. Independent funding also supports associated construction (see 

Chapter 4).

Table C–1. NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative funding schedule for FY 2020 through 2024

Exascale Computing Initiative Elements

(dollars in millions)

FY 2020

Request

FY 2021

Request

FY 2022

Request

FY 2023

Request

FY 2024

Request

Advanced Technology Development and 

Mitigation

174.825 92 88 80 81

Construction: Exascale Computing Facility 

Modernization (at LLNL)

50 27 13 0 0

Computational Systems and Software 

Environment – Exascale System (El Capitan)

84.478 114 168 167 146

Total 309.303 233 269 247 227

Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation

A portion of the ASC ATDM subprogram is designated as part of the DOE Exascale Computing Project 

(ECP), a jointly managed collaboration between NNSA and DOE Office of Science via DOE Order 413.3B 

(tailored). This portion consists of the following three focus areas. 

 ATDM/ECP Application Development: NNSA will be responsible for determining the scope and 

management of the stockpile simulation application development that is included in this focus 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page C-3

area. Confidence in the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile relies on highfidelity simulations of all of the physical processes occurring within a nuclear weapon and its 

environments. This also includes the processes that support the design, production, 

maintenance, and evaluation of the nuclear arsenal, including life extension programs and 

weapons dismantlement. The ASC integrated design codes (IDCs) or more colloquially “bomb 

codes,” model various aspects of nuclear weapons and each have several million lines of code to 

accurately reflect the multi-scale, multi-physics phenomena occurring in a nuclear weapon. The 

accuracy of these IDCs underpins confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent and must be improved, 

with the ATDM Application funding, to ensure continued future confidence in the Nation’s 

stockpile. Exploiting the multi-level parallelism demanded by emerging computing architectures 

leading to exascale requires significant investment for new stockpile simulation code 

development over the next 5-7 years.

 ATDM/ECP Software Technology: Due to its stockpile stewardship mission and where 

appropriate, ASC will make strategic investments in ECP software technology to directly support 

its IDC development requirements. Funding will support further development of compilers and 

math libraries for the NNSA suite of weapons codes that are aligned with the algorithms and 

approaches used in those codes. This focused research is needed to optimize the performance of 

the algorithms within the overall simulations that are the most time demanding or require highest 

control of precision in numerical approximations. Also, investments will be made in various 

performance analysis tools and visualization techniques to aid code developers and users to 

navigate the new advanced architecture systems.

 ATDM/ECP Hardware and Integration: NNSA will complete its obligation to fund the vendor R&D 

PathForward projects in FY 2020. Where appropriate, ASC will make strategic investments to 

directly support its stockpile stewardship code development requirements such as scalable and 

high-performance interconnect technologies, multi-level memory management, and 

heterogeneous-architecture programming.

The remainder of the ATDM portfolio includes stockpile application and computing activities that directly 

relate to the weapons program and thus falls outside of ECP. NNSA will continue funding the development 

of hostile environment simulation capabilities and provide support for additional physics and engineering 

models, and new verification and validation methodologies required for its next-generation weapons 

codes. In FY 2020, NNSA will evaluate and transition, as appropriate, the viable and validated nextgeneration code capabilities into its IDC portfolio which will be used for annual assessment activities. 

Funding also supports projects at the NNSA Labs that will seek to increase the capacity and capability of 

an enduring national HPC ecosystem via inter-agency collaborations with other U.S. Federal agencies.

For the stockpile computing effort, NNSA will deploy additional advanced-architecture testbeds and 

prototype systems for the initial testing and iterations of its next-generation IDCs. Funding will also be 

applied to the development, maintenance and user support for the tri-lab software stack that will be 

required for the next-generation codes to run efficiently on advanced hardware testbeds. In addition, 

NNSA will invest in the application of advanced machine learning techniques, which are well suited to the 

imminent advanced architectures to solving stockpile stewardship problems.

Construction: Exascale Computing Facility Modernization (at LLNL)

In addition to hardware and software technology development efforts, the exascale systems must meet 

exacting power usage, reliability, and functionality criteria. Each exascale-class platform will require 

between 30 and 45 megawatts per year to operate, as well as requisite cooling. Managing a service load 

of this magnitude, which is over and above existing capabilities in ASC facilities, will necessitate major 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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facility modernizations. The ECFM project is intended to fill this gap by providing 85 megawatts of power 

and adding 18,000 tons of water cooling in calendar year 2022. A detailed engineering assessment in 

preparation for CD-2/3 (Approve Performance Baseline/Approve Start of Construction) proved the 

building already met requirements to support 315 pounds per square foot of rack load, so no additional 

investment is necessary in this area. The ECFM is essential for LLNL to successfully site the NNSA exascale 

system at the beginning of FY 2023. ECFM will issue contracts in FY 2020 and move into construction 

phase soon thereafter. 

Computational Systems and Software Environment – Exascale System (El Capitan)

NNSA will embark on a multi-year collaboration with the selected 2023 exascale system vendor to work 

on, non-recurring engineering and system integration issues for El Capitan, focusing on key advanced 

system engineering efforts and software technologies to turn the 2023 exascale system into a capable and 

productive computing resource for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

C.3 Conclusion

DOE/NNSA, through the ASC Exascale effort, is investing in products and approaches that are directly 

related to anticipated disruptive changes in the HPC ecosystem. Activities include R&D partnerships with 

multiple HPC vendors, development of next-generation weapons codes with new simulation capabilities, 

and procurement of an advanced architecture prototype system with a potential alternative HPC software 

stack. Cooperation with computer vendors has also led to significant advances in HPC software and 

hardware technologies. These activities have provided experience and lessons learned and have already 

delivered a variety of software development tools and libraries which many ASC applications now rely on. 

To complete this effort, more intensive research, development, and engineering effort is needed for 

DOE/NNSA to achieve the goal of deploying an exascale capability in 2023.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-1

Appendix D

Workforce and Site-Specific Information

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has eight nuclear 

security enterprise sites, spread across the Nation, that possess the expert workforce and advanced 

capabilities to maintain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. These eight sites include three national security 

laboratories (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL], Los Alamos National Laboratory [LANL], and 

Sandia National Laboratories [SNL]), four nuclear weapons production facilities (Kansas City National 

Security Complex [KCNSC], Pantex Plant [Pantex], Savannah River Site [SRS], and Y-12 National Security 

Complex [Y-12]), and the Nevada National Security Site. Specific information is included in this appendix 

to elaborate on each site’s mission, weapon activities capabilities, fiscal year (FY) 2020 budget request, 

recent accomplishments, and workforce data. 

Figure D–1. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Critical Importance of Investing in Advanced Capabilities, Infrastructure, and the Workforce

Planning and investing in advanced capabilities, infrastructure, and, most importantly, the workforce are 

at the heart of achieving U.S. nuclear security objectives. These aspects are also interrelated.

 The nuclear deterrent must provide decision-makers with capabilities that are modern, robust, 

flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats. DOE/NNSA’s 

capabilities for weapons activities enable these characteristics. Advanced capabilities help ensure 

evolving deterrence needs can be met.

 Modern stockpile stewardship, including major modernization programs, requires specialized 

technologies and processes, as demonstrated by the capabilities that DOE/NNSA requires for 

mission success (see Appendix B, “Weapons Activities Capabilities”). These technologies and 

processes include but are not limited to areas such as advanced manufacturing, processes that 

can produce and handle hazardous materials, materials science, and computer science.

 These special capabilities, technologies, and processes require specialized facilities that can 

successfully contain the necessary work, such as processing lithium or conducting experiments on 

plutonium. These facilities must ensure that the work can be done safely and on schedule.

 To successfully accomplish the mission, NNSA must attract, train, and retain a skilled and 

experienced workforce. The workforce provides the specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

operate specialized equipment, design and manufacture components, and understand how 

specialized materials interact, among other areas of knowledge. Without a safe and appropriate 

infrastructure, the ability to attract and grow the workforce would be limited. 

D.1 National Nuclear Security Administration

D.1.1 Federal Workforce

The Federal workforce plans, manages, and 

oversees the nuclear security enterprise and is 

accountable to the President, Congress, and the 

public. NNSA’s Federal workforce handles 

program and project management for 

DOE/NNSA’s major missions of maintaining the 

nuclear weapons stockpile, Naval Reactors, and 

nuclear threat reduction through 

counterterrorism and nonproliferation. In 

addition to these functions, Federal employees 

also perform important missions in areas such as 

physical security, cyber security, management and human resources, logistics, infrastructure planning and 

budgeting, and strategic communications and public affairs. The Federal workforce operates out of 

Headquarters facilities in Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

Federal staff are dispersed throughout field offices located at each of the sites. These field offices employ 

subject matter experts in a wide variety of fields to provide oversight for each site’s diverse national 

security missions. NNSA’s Federal workforce, like its contracted management and operating (M&O)

partners and other non-M&O contractors, is composed of dedicated professionals working to promote 

the nuclear security mission. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-3

In 2018, the NNSA Administrator launched a special working group for the purpose of developing an 

enterprise-wide strategy to attract and retain the best talent to sustain current and future nuclear security 

missions. Headquarters will partner with the field offices’ and M&O partners’ Human Resources 

personnel in developing and implementing this shared enterprise approach.

DOE/NNSA is currently pursuing legislation to lift the overall cap of 1,690 full-time equivalents in the 

Federal Salaries and Expenses account, given the increase in major projects, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

plans and life extension programs (LEPs), and the need for appropriate program and project oversight. 

NNSA has an opportunity to reshape its workforce with more people trained and positioned to address 

challenges with new talent and technologies. Increased staffing would be beneficial to the Federal 

workforce’s development and eliminate some single-point failures, given that many positions within NNSA 

are one person deep in terms of knowledge, experience, and skills.

In developing the Federal workforce, DOE/NNSA recognizes the need for effective leadership; 

performance measures; management consistency; increased focus on training at the entry, middle, and 

executive levels; and increased flexibility and adaptability in the current staff, as well as the need for 

aggressive knowledge transfer programs. DOE/NNSA has implemented foundational competencies and 

has begun to develop occupational competencies and career paths. These talent management initiatives 

will promote NNSA as an employer of choice, build the talent needed at all levels, and foster sustained 

mission excellence.

DOE/NNSA has a range of initiatives to develop and broaden experience including:

 Invigorated rotational programs, development programs, and support of university research and 

development (R&D) in areas relevant to the NNSA mission

 Rotational assignments of M&O employees to NNSA Headquarters

 Wide variety of professional and leadership development programs

 Use details and Intergovernmental Personnel Act Mobility Program

 Support for the Integrated University Program to cultivate the next generation of leaders in 

nuclear nonproliferation and domestic and international nuclear security

 Encourage programs involving undergraduate research experiences, high performance computing 

(HPC) access, and education

A major challenge that would be solved by additional personnel is balancing time between development 

and workload. Mentoring, cross-training, and rotations between organizations are all efforts that 

supervisors and employees would like to participate in to improve their knowledge and the variety of their 

work functions. Currently, many NNSA supervisors are unable to engage in the aforementioned

opportunities because of current workload. Experienced staff and supervisors also face challenges in 

finding time to mentor less experienced staff and share lessons learned. Given staffing shortages and 

workload, NNSA supervisors are precluded from engaging in strategic succession planning and knowledge 

management activities. A staffing increase would enable supervisors to apportion their workload to 

engage in succession planning and knowledge management activities and allow other employees the time 

to cross-train or develop additional skills and knowledge integral to DOE/NNSA’s national security 

missions.

The average age of Federal employees is about 48 years; about 15 percent are retirement-eligible. NNSA 

has a bimodal experience distribution among its employees, with years of service averaging 16. As 

opposed to the age of NNSA employees being skewed to the right, the experience is slightly skewed to 

the left. Most separations from the Federal workforce were retirements or voluntary separations, with 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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retirements higher among experienced workers and voluntary separations higher among those with fewer 

years of service. The amount of voluntary separations among those with 0-5 years of service is particularly 

noticeable and an enterprise-wide trend. For more detailed information on NNSA’s Federal workforce, 

please refer to Chapter 7, Figures D–2 through D–5, and the accompanying notes.

Notes:

Like most Federal agencies, NNSA age data is skewed right, especially considering that the average retirement age is 

about 60 years. The data set includes approximately 266 nuclear materials couriers who are, on average, younger 

than the rest of the workforce. Eighty-four percent of the courier workforce is 26 to 45 years of age, so those age 

categories are skewed slightly by that workforce. Challenges associated with an aging workforce have been identified 

and are addressed in the same manner as Years of Service challenges. 

Figure D–2. Federal employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

NNSA has a bimodal distribution, which can indicate some risk due to an “experience gap” in the valley between the 

two peaks. However, there are a significant number of experienced employees on the left side of the bimodal 

distribution (831 employees with 6-15 years of service), which represents an opportunity to manage the risk. To 

address these demographic challenges, NNSA has increased the NNSA Talent Management Training Budget from 

$3.5 million (FY 2013) to $5.8 million (FY 2018), empowering employees to refine skills and prepare for new NNSA 

mission growth. NNSA has also focused on shifting age, years of service, and retirement demographics by hiring 

more entry-level employees. Avenues used in this regard include the increased use of the NNSA Graduate Fellowship 

Program, Pathways Program, and Minority Servicing Institute Partnership Program. 

Figure D–3. Federal employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-5

Notes:

Retirements have represented a little over 60 percent of separations in the non-Office of Secure Transportation

workforce in the last few years. This presents a unique opportunity to reshape the workforce with more diverse 

people who are trained and positioned to address nuclear security challenges with new talent and new technologies. 

Figure D–4. Years of service of Federal employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

In FY 2015-2018, NNSA focused on shifting retirement eligibility demographics by using the excepted service 

authority to hire over 20 entry-level employees each year. 

Figure D–5. Federal employee trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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D.2 National Security Laboratories

D.2.1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

D.2.1.1 Mission Overview

DOE/NNSA sponsors the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California 

as a Federally Funded Research and Development 

Center (FFRDC) to provide research, development, 

test and evaluation (RDT&E) capabilities for the 

stockpile, as well as a broad range of national 

security needs integral to the mission and 

operation of DOE and other Federal agencies. LLNL 

is managed by Lawrence Livermore National 

Security, LLC.

 Locations: Main site, Livermore, California

(Site 200); Experimental Test Site, Tracy, 

California (Site 300)

 Total Employees: 6,277 (as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-program national security laboratory

 Website: www.llnl.gov

 Contract Operator: Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, a corporate subsidiary of Bechtel 

National; University of California; BWX Technologies, Inc.; the Washington Division of URS 

Corporation; and Battelle.

 Responsible Field Office: Livermore Field Office

D.2.1.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source

(total LLNL FY 2020 request = $1,842 million)

FY 2020 Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)

request for Weapons Activities ($1,512 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-7

D.2.1.3 Site Capabilities

LLNL is a DOE/NNSA Center of Excellence for Nuclear Design and Engineering, with core competencies in 

high explosives (HE) ST&E, high energy density (HED) physics, HPC, nuclear physics, and materials science 

and engineering. LLNL is the lead design physics laboratory for the W80-4 (the Air Force’s cruise missile 

warhead) LEP and the W87-1 Modification Program. LLNL has primary certification responsibility for the 

W80, W87, and B83.

LLNL operates several DOE/NNSA flagship facilities such as the National Ignition Facility (NIF), Livermore 

Computing Center, High Explosives Applications Facility, Contained Firing Facility, Flash X-Ray, and 

Plutonium Superblock. LLNL also manages the physical infrastructure and capabilities supporting research, 

development, science, and technology missions in weapons engineering and physics, advanced materials, 

HPC, and HED physics. 

LLNL capabilities related to design and development of stockpile systems and their associated challenges 

and strategies are described in Table D–1.

Table D–1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Capabilities

Weapons Physics Design and Analysis

LLNL is integral to the design and performance assessment of the nuclear explosive package and supports the capability to 

certify the stockpile without nuclear testing. LLNL characterizes primary and secondary performance, HE, and material 

performance via physics design and analysis and maintains critical capabilities such as advanced diagnostics and sensors; 

laser, pulsed power, and accelerator technology; hydrodynamic and subcritical experiments; and weapons surety design, 

analysis, integration, and manufacturing.

Challenges Strategies

Improvements in key capabilities are required for LEPs, 

including operational risk reduction activities for 

dynamic radiography, increased experimental 

workloads, and investment in advanced diagnostics for 

nuclear explosive package performance testing.

DOE/NNSA is investing in infrastructure support and 

recapitalization to modernize Site 300 capabilities, including firing 

sites at the Flash X-Ray and Contained Firing Facility, and in 

plutonium infrastructure and advanced diagnostics development 

to support weapons certification.

Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration

LLNL is responsible for weaponizing the physics package to ensure performance through the warhead stockpile-to-target 

sequence at sub-scale and device scale, and to support production engineering. Engineering design and analysis provide the 

fundamental capability to certify the stockpile without nuclear testing by destructive and nondestructive surveillance 

evaluations and reliability and condition assessments. This capability is also used to fabricate complex special nuclear 

material target assemblies to support design physics.

Challenges Strategies

LLNL will need continuous modernization of warhead 

test and evaluation capabilities and needs investment in 

and evaluation of disruptive manufacturing technologies 

such as advanced manufacturing.

DOE/NNSA is making multi-year sustainment investments in 

weapons engineering capabilities, including fabrication and 

inspection, nondestructive evaluation, environmental testing, 

plutonium science, and radioactive material processing. LLNL is 

continuing to invest in advanced manufacturing laboratory space 

and equipment development.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-8 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

High Explosives Science and Engineering

LLNL’s HE RDT&E capabilities support stockpile stewardship, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear counterterrorism efforts 

via a multidisciplinary approach to synthesis, formulation, characterization, processing, and testing of energetic materials, 

components, and warhead subassemblies. LLNL characterizes HE performance and safety at device and laboratory scales. 

Modernization activities support LEP and warhead assessments in facilities and equipment for HE large charge pressing, plotscale synthesis and formulation systems.

LLNL has demonstrated the first-known capability to additively manufacture three-dimensional HE structures and has

demonstrated their ability to detonate. LLNL holds three Records of Invention in HE-additive manufacturing technology.

Challenges Strategies

LLNL is responsible for qualifying insensitive high 

explosives (IHE) for assigned U.S. stockpile systems. HE 

processing capabilities require modernization for LLNL to 

meet programmatic demands for additional prototyping 

of warhead HE systems and support RDT&E capacities 

and throughputs. Infrastructure supporting HE pressing 

and machining capabilities needs continued condition 

assessment and recapitalization.

DOE/NNSA is investing in the High Explosives Applications Facility 

and Site 300 infrastructure through a 5-year program that 

addresses short- and long-term facility recapitalization for 

mission objectives. LLNL is currently implementing capabilitybased investments and minor construction projects that make 

investments in scaled HE synthesis and large charge pressing 

capabilities.

High Performance Computing

LLNL is a key contributor to the Nation’s ability to field premier computing platforms. Multi-laboratory collaborations have 

been developed to achieve exascale-class computing. LLNL HPC support includes operating systems, architecture, and code 

development.

Challenges Strategies

LLNL must anticipate, develop, and deploy new 

computing architectures to support weapons design 

codes and weapons design and certification needs. 

Planning for the exascale paradigm includes architecture, 

code-developing environments, operating systems, and physical 

infrastructure. DOE/NNSA plans to focus investment on the 

utility backbone of the laboratory, including electrical and water 

systems. Investment in computing facilities will support 

deployment of the first U.S. exascale-class computing platform.

High Energy Density Physics

LLNL conducts physical process experiments to ensure that, if called on, the nuclear explosive package can produce a 

militarily effective yield. NIF conducts major experimental campaigns on high-Z material properties, burn physics, radiation 

transport, radiation hydrodynamics, mix, and code validation.

Challenges Strategies

The priorities for infrastructure are currently too low to 

support an aggressive stockpile stewardship 

experimental program. LLNL must develop an enduring 

infrastructure capability base in target fabrication and be 

prepared to manage increased facility usage in the 

future.

LLNL has developed a 3-year investment plan to consolidate 

target fabrication equipment for efficiency while supporting 

more than 400 shots per year. Infrastructure recapitalization and 

modernization are essential to realizing this plan.

HE = high explosives

HPC = high performance computing

NIF = National Ignition Facility

RDT&E = research, development, test and evaluation
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-9

D.2.1.4 Accomplishments

 LLNL completed all deliverables for Cycle 23 of the Annual Assessment Review, including extensive 

peer review, as part of the Independent Nuclear Weapon Assessment Process. Laboratory 

scientists made significant physics improvements that added rigor to the Annual Assessment.

 In Phase 6.3, all W80-4 LEP requirements, goals, and objectives are being met through high-quality 

research, development, and engineering. LLNL is working closely with NNSA production agencies 

as they mature and transfer the design of the nuclear explosive package components through the 

product realization teams.

 The Sierra Initial Delivery system was sited, installed, and accepted. LLNL achieved the associated 

applications milestone, and the HPC system is successfully being used in support of the Advanced 

Computing and Simulation Program. LLNL is also providing leadership in DOE’s Exascale 

Computing Project. A Request for Proposals was issued for development of LLNL’s exascale 

system, “El Capitan,” and LLNL is managing a line item for the required facility upgrades.

 NIF experiments in FY 2018 provided valuable data for code validation focused on informing 

capsule and hohlraum designs that intend to push target performance toward burning plasma 

and ignition. NIF achieved 2.1 megajoules (115 percent design level) in a laser test shot, and the 

Advanced Radiographic Capability conducted its first Compton radiography experiments on 

layered implosions.

 LLNL researchers at the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) completed

the first precision measurements of shock-compressed plutonium sound speeds; NIF facility 

readiness is on track for future plutonium equation-of-state shots; and LLNL conducted key 

hydrodynamics experiments to prepare for subcritical experimental testing. 

 LLNL application of advanced manufacturing to make HE exemplified progress in a major initiative. 

LLNL is working with KCNSC and Y-12 to develop modernized production capabilities. A new open 

campus Advanced Manufacturing Laboratory at LLNL will work with industry to expand

DOE/NNSA’s capabilities.

 LLNL met requirements to sustain the four LLNL systems (W80, B83, W84, and W87). LLNL also 

executed four hydrodynamic tests to support LEPs and alterations (Alts), including two 

experiments for the W80-4 and one each for the B61-12 and the W88.

 LLNL provided leadership to address and expand the DOE/NNSA complex-wide facility solutions, 

including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning asset management (Cooling and Heating 

Assessment Management Program) and other tools such as the Mission Dependency Index and 

BUILDER. LLNL also chaired the Product Realization Integrated Digital Enterprise Program and 

supports all required nuclear explosive safety studies.

D.2.1.5 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Workforce

LLNL has 6,277 employees, with an average age of 48 years and an average of 14 years of service. 

Approximately 26 percent of LLNL’s employees are eligible to retire. Since the end of FY 2016, LLNL hired 

1,314 employees and experienced 820 separations, resulting in a net gain of 494. Retirement separations

are dispersed throughout many different “years of service” groups. Voluntary separations were most 

pronounced among employees with 5 years of service or less. LLNL’s population was reduced after a 

contract transition in FY 2008, although hiring has increased in the last 4 years. Recent hires have 

increased in the early-career workforce, while the mid- and advanced-career workforce has remained 

relatively stable over the last 4 years. LLNL anticipates growth over the FYNSP period, especially as the
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-10 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

work scope increases for W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Program activities. Workforce demographics are 

illustrated and discussed in Figures D–6 through D–14.

Notes:

Includes the core population.

Figure D–6. LLNL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Retirement eligible = 50+ years old and > 5 years of service.

LLNL’s overall average age is 48.4; 46.8 percent of the core population is greater than 50 years old; the median age 

of the core population is approximately 50 years. Succession planning is critical.

Figure D–7. LLNL employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-11

Notes:

Approximately 25.5 percent of LLNL’s population has 21+ years of service. While LLNL has an experienced 

population, increasing retirements and increasing new hires are lowering the average for years of service.

Figure D–8. LLNL employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Hires included 243 conversions from non-career (students/post-docs) to career appointment types.

Figure D–9. Change in last 2 fiscal years at LLNL

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-12 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Average age for retirement separations is approximately 62 years. Average age for non-retirement separations is 

approximately 40 years.

Figure D–10. Age of LLNL employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Average years of service for retirement separations is 27.7 years. Average years of service for non-retirement 

separations is 4.8 years.

Figure D–11. Years of service of LLNL employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-13

Notes:

The population generally decreased between FY 2011 and FY 2014 as budgets decreased, and as the cost of labor 

increased. LLNL has recently increased hiring. The biggest change in population was during FY 2008, when LLNL 

went through contract transition to Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, from the University of California. 

LLNL implemented an Involuntary Separation Plan and experienced a 16.4 percent population decrease. In FY 2013, 

LLNL experienced another significant decrease of 10.2 percent due to a restructuring in its Security Organization and 

the self-select voluntary separation plan.

LLNL’s aging population is a concern; the overall average age is 48.4; 46.8 percent of our core population is greater 

than 50 years old; and the median age of our core population is approximately 50 years.

Despite increasing retirements, increasing hires are resulting in a net population growth. We have ramped up hiring 

in all age ranges (except for 60+ years). The FY 2018 Early Career population has increased by 40.5 percent compared 

to last year.

Figure D–12. LLNL trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-14 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

The increase in FY 2008 was because of contract transition from the University of California to Lawrence Livermore 

National Security, LLC, and the Involuntary Separation Plan. The increase in FY 2013 was due to security 

restructuring and the self-select voluntary separation plan. Retirements were higher in FY 2012 and FY 2013 due to 

pending and actual changes in retiree benefits from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan. The dip 

in 2014 occurred due to the earlier retirements in 2012 and 2013. The spike in 2008 was caused by the transition 

to competitive contracting. 

Sixty-three percent of our separations in FY 2018 were retirements; retirements have been steadily increasing since 

FY 2014.

Figure D–13. LLNL employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Our population is expected to continue to grow over the FYNSP period to meet the laboratory missions and 

anticipated scope increase associated with the W80-4 LEP and the W87-1 nuclear design and certification activities.

Figure D–14. Total projected LLNL workforce needs by Common Occupational

Classification System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-15

D.2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory

D.2.2.1 Mission Overview

DOE/NNSA sponsors the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as an

FFRDC. LANL champions four “science pillars”: 

information science and technology, materials for 

the future, nuclear and particle futures, and the 

science of signatures. These pillars capture the 

laboratory’s diverse array of scientific capabilities 

and expertise to address global challenges in 

national and economic security, including nuclear 

nonproliferation and counterterrorism; medicine 

and health sciences; and advanced computational 

capabilities as an FFRDC, while also participating in 

DOE’s Strategic Partnership Projects.

 Location: Los Alamos, New Mexico

 Total Employees: 7,876 (as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-program national security laboratory

 Website: www.lanl.gov

 Contract Operator: Triad National Security, LLC, is made up of three members: Battelle Memorial 

Institute, Texas A&M University, and the University of California

 Responsible Field Office: Los Alamos Field Office

D.2.2.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source 

(total LANL FY 2020 request = $2,528 million)

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($1,967 million)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-16 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.2.2.3 Site Capabilities

LANL is one of two nuclear design and physics laboratories in the nuclear security enterprise and the

Center of Excellence for Plutonium. Core competencies at LANL include weapons physics design and 

analysis; weapons engineering, design, analysis, testing, and integration; stockpile component production 

and surveillance for pits, detonators, and radioisotope thermoelectric generators; HED physics; materials 

science and engineering; and HPC. LANL is the lead design physics laboratory for the B61, W76, W78, 

and W88.

LANL operates several DOE/NNSA flagship facilities such as the Plutonium Facility Complex (Technical 

Area 55 [TA-55]), Nicholas Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation, Dual-Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test Facility, Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, the National Explosives and Engineering 

Weapons Campus, Uranium R&D facility (Sigma), Center for Integrated Nanotechnologies, National High 

Magnetic Field Laboratory, and Waste Handling Facilities. LANL’s primary capabilities and their associated 

challenges and strategies are described in Table D–2.

Table D–2. Los Alamos National Laboratory Capabilities

Weapons Physics Design and Analysis

LANL performs integrated experiments and simulations to enable design and assessment of the nuclear explosives package for 

both enduring and future weapons systems. Design and assessment capabilities encompass hydrodynamic testing, HPC, HE

RDT&E, weapons engineering, surety, radiography, assembly, accelerator technology, and subcritical experiments. 

Challenges Strategies

Key challenges are continued aging in weapons 

materials and components, an aging workforce with 

weapons knowledge and experiments, a lack of 

programmatic needs to transition to the next 

generation of designers and engineers, and 

degrading design and certification infrastructure.

Current LEPs and Alts provide near-term opportunity to reinvest in 

current capabilities and exercise the workforce. LANL is working closely 

with DOE/NNSA to address aging enduring physical infrastructure and 

modernize specialized capabilities such as DARHT, Sigma, HPC, HE, and 

weapons engineering facilities. Strategies to recapitalize plutonium and 

detonator production capabilities are also being addressed. 

High Performance Computing

This core capability provides the supercomputers, facilities, and computer science that enable simulations of weapons 

performance for all aspects of stockpile stewardship. HPC enables scientists to routinely use multi-dimensional simulations to 

increase understanding of complex physics as well as to improve confidence in the predictive capability for stockpile 

stewardship for LEPs and significant finding investigations (SFIs). The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program leverages 

both the Advanced Technology System (ATS) and Commodity Technology System for this work.

Challenges Strategies

Near-term challenges, circa 2026, include 

accommodation of the next-generation 

supercomputer (ATS-5) at LANL. Additional 

electricity and cooling infrastructure will be 

needed. 

Planning is ongoing for both the near-term and long-term HPC 

infrastructure. Trinity (ATS-1) will be replaced in fiscal year 2021 by 

Crossroads (ATS-3). The Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment 

Project, scheduled for completion in FY 2020, will provide warm-water 

cooling for Crossroads.

Plutonium

The plutonium core capability consists of plutonium production and process R&D, manufacturing, and radioactive waste 

disposition. LANL provides the only fully functioning plutonium facility for R&D and the only pit manufacturing capability 

within the nuclear security enterprise. LANL is a consolidated Center of Excellence for plutonium R&D and manufacturing 

activities.

Challenges Strategies

Plutonium operations require increased capacity 

and modernized infrastructure.

LANL’s plutonium strategy has been adopted by DOE/NNSA and 

endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council. The Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research facility is continuing a small set of operations, with 

the goal of ceasing all programmatic work in anticipation of transferring 

these capabilities to the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building 

and the Plutonium Facility.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-17

Weapons Engineering and Energetics

Weapons engineering and HE capabilities provide the materials, components, and assemblies for weapons work. This 

capability includes the experimental testing to assess the current state of the stockpile; surveil the current stockpile and 

addresses SFIs; and provide qualified materials and HE for LEP and new options. Additional functions include modeling 

weapon performance, safety, engineering, and aging responses throughout their operating conditions and life cycle. 

Challenges Strategies

The primary challenge is aging physical 

infrastructure. A large number of the facilities were 

built in the 1950s and were optimized for the 

fabrication and engineering testing capabilities and 

processes of that time.

Recapitalization investments will ensure the long-term viability of 

enduring facilities. Several line-item investments for consolidation and 

replacement of facilities are proposed over the next decade, with the 

highest priority being the Energetic Materials Characterization. 

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments

Hydrodynamic and subcritical experimental capabilities supply data to weapon physicists and engineers to inform the annual 

assessment process and certification decisions, advance nuclear weapon science, refine weapon computational models, 

develop emergency response tools, assess foreign and terrorist designs, gauge technological surprise, and develop the skills 

and experience of weapon designers and engineers. 

Challenges Strategies

The hydrodynamic facilities and infrastructure are 

aging. Another challenge is the lack of ability to 

study late-implosion dynamics of subcritical 

experiments with penetrating radiography and 

reactivity measurements. Finally, procurement of 

the confinement vessels used in both types of 

experiments has struggled to meet experimental 

needs. 

Strategic investments are being planned and implemented to 

recapitalize DARHT, procure additional vessels, and replace DARHT Axis I. 

The Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments project will deliver

additional advanced diagnostics both at LANL and the Nevada National 

Security Site in the mid-2020s.

Alt = alteration

HPC = high performance computing

RDT&E = research, development, test and evaluation

DARHT = Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

Sigma = Uranium R&D Facility

D.2.2.4 Accomplishments

Complimentary to accomplishments listed in Chapters 2, 3, and 5, notable FY 2018 achievementsfor LANL

include:

 LANL has met or will meet all statutorily required deliverables for the annual assessment reporting 

process. Specifically:

– Annual assessment reports for the B61, W76, W78, and W88 were distributed on 

July 30, 2018.

– The Director’s Red Team briefed the Director on August 10, 2018.

– LLNL and LANL Independent Nuclear Weapons Assessment Teams briefed the LANL and LLNL 

Directors, respectively, during the week of August 13, 2018.

– The Director’s annual assessment letter was signed out on September 24, 2018.

 In support of Stockpile Assessment, LANL, and LLNL contributed to Stewardship Capability 

Delivery Schedule (formerly known as the Predictive Capability Framework) Level-1 Milestone, 

culminating in a final review meeting at SNL in August 2018. This milestone demonstrated 

significant advances in the understanding of boost initial conditions, anomalous performance, and 

stockpile assessment metrics.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-18 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 LANL continues successful execution of the B61-12 LEP and expects to meet first production unit 

in 2019. LANL has successfully passed all of the LANL-owned Final Design Review and associated 

Gate Review requirements for Phase 6.4. The detonator team began Quality Evaluation lot 

manufacturing of the 4E10 cable in May 2018 after starting this activity late in FY 2017; 

manufacturing of the Quality Evaluation lot is 90 percent complete. LANL also executed 14

additional mechanical tests on aged plutonium samples (beyond the original 24-test 

commitment) to provide plutonium aging data for LEPs.

 The Weapons Program continues successful execution of the W88 Alt 370 Program, with first 

production unit expected in 2019. Detonator production delivered the first lot of War Reserve

detonators in May 2018 (ahead of schedule); the third delivery is also on pace to be delivered 

ahead of schedule.

 The W88 Alt 940 Mechanical Assembly Final Design Review was passed with conditions addressed 

by a successful follow-on Delta Final Design review in August 2018. 

 LANL executed the Vega subcritical experiment, which completed the Lyra subcritical experiment 

series. This series provided important information about future stockpile options and plutonium

manufacturing. All seven subcritical experiments executed this decade for DOE/NNSA were led 

by the LANL Weapons Program.

 In FY 2018, LANL executed 14 hydrotests, including the Vega and LAMARCK confirmatory

subcritical experiments for LLNL.

 In FY 2018, the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) team redesigned the 

Scorpius injector, published a Conceptual Design Report, completed 2 independent Technology 

Readiness Assessments, and completed 17 Corrective Actions stemming from an independent 

cost review. ECSE’s Advanced Sources and Detectors met Critical Decision 1 in February 2019.

 LANL researchers are successfully developing and tailoring HE formulations that have insensitive 

high explosive (IHE)-like safety characteristics and conventional high explosive (CHE)-like 

performance characteristics.

 LANL scientists have completed a large-scale, three-dimensional full-system weapons simulation 

of a historic nuclear test on the Trinity supercomputer. This is the first simulation completed for 

the Advanced Computing and Simulation Large Scale Calculation Initiative. This simulation is 

already helping to resolve a 50-year-old question for the U.S. weapons program. 

 The Plutonium Sustainment program completed four pit development builds and produced feed 

material from the restarted electrorefining processes. The program also completed almost 

30 equipment construction and installation projects.

 In FY 2018, TA-55 produced the first batches of americium-241 in the United States since 1984

and the first purified plutonium metal produced since the 2013 pause. This successful project, 

which re-established a domestic supply in support of domestic energy security, can now transition 

to routine production operations.

 LANL produced and delivered 20 flight-quality fueled clads and eight spares as part of NNSA’s 

commitment to the Mars 2020 mission.

 LANL presented three power supply trainer units for the DOE/NNSA Diamond Stamp. These 

trainer units represent the first Mark Quality products manufactured at TA-55 since the last War 

Reserve W88 pit sale in May 2012. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-19

 LANL has taken on the production mission for detonator cable assemblies. Detonator production 

has also assisted LLNL in supporting the W80-4.

 On July 24-26, 2018, LANL hosted a Pit Production workshop on behalf of Defense Programs, with 

over 100 participants from DOE/NNSA, SRS, LLNL, and LANL. The workshop allowed participants 

to dive in to specific focus areas and collaborate on the Plutonium Pit Implementation Plan. LANL 

supported a second workshop at SRS in October 2018.

 LANL executed shock initiation experiments needed for the only full characterization of a lot of 

HE for the stockpile.

 LANL digitized over 94,000 items of historical weapons information (drawings, specifications, test 

data and videos).

D.2.2.5 Los Alamos National Laboratory Workforce

LANL has 7,876 employees, with an average age of 47 years and an average of 13 years of service. 

Approximately 44 percent of LANL’s employees are eligible to retire. Since the end of FY 2016, LANL has 

hired 1,966 employees and experienced 1,308 separations, resulting in a net gain of 658. More than half 

of LANL’s employee separations came through retirements, while the remainder were mostly voluntary 

separations among those with 15 years of service or less. Discounting the departure of 123 employees 

due to the Environmental Management contract split, the rate of voluntary separations has remained 

constant while retirements have slowly increased since FY 2013. The number of early-career employees 

has been growing steadily the past few years, and mid-career employees have experienced a recent uptick 

after years of decline. Staffing planning for NNSA programmatic drivers indicates that over the next 

5 years, hiring is expected to accommodate workforce growth (e.g., for pit production) and anticipated 

attrition. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures D–15 through D–23.

Notes:

LANL continues to see growth in the total headcount to match programmatic requirements. 

Data includes only regular employees. LANL’s Common Occupational Classification System-coded Laborers and most of 

the Craft are Union Craft employees who are not considered “permanent career employees,” and so were not included 

in this data. There are over 1,000 craft persons on site.

Figure D–15. LANL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-20 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

LANL continues to experience an increasing termination rate as retirements continue to rise. In addition, LANL has 

continued to make a concerted effort to plan for and hire people who would take those places and fill the increasing 

demand for LANL services. That increase in hiring is reflected most predominantly in the 31-40 age categories. This hiring 

and retirement pattern is shifting the average age lower than in previous submissions.

It is important to note that all Common Occupational Classification System-coded Laborers and most Crafts employed at 

LANL are considered temporary and are not considered “permanent career employees.” This approach matches prior 

LANL submissions.

Figure D–16. LANL employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

LANL’s effort to hire a larger number of employees again this year shows in the increased number of hires in the 0-5-year

service bands. Note that LANL grants service credit for some employees in non-career status (e.g., post-docs, term 

employees), so when they are granted career status, they come with pre-existing service time. For example, a postdoc 

may already have 2 years of service credit when converted to permanent staff. As a result, many FY 2018 hires fall into 

the 1-5-year service band.

Figure D–17. LANL employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-21

Notes:

Due to increasing budgets, LANL has conscientiously been hiring to grow. In addition, LANL is seeing an increasing number 

of retirements due to an aging workforce, and those employees need to be replaced. Calendar year 2018 saw an increased 

retirement rate because of the contract transition on November 1, 2018, as well as some increase in other voluntary 

terminations. 123 voluntary terminations were a result of the Environmental Management contract being transferred 

from Los Alamos National Security to N3B.

Figure D–18. Change in last 2 fiscal years at LANL (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-22 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Separation trends remain consistent with expectations. The spike in retirements in the 50-60 age band is largely attributed 

to employees retiring under LANL’s pension plan. Since 2006, new employees have been enrolled in a 401K retirement 

plan, where retirements tend to peak in the 61-65 age band.

Figure D–19. Age of LANL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Separation trends remain consistent with expectations. Those with less service primarily leave voluntarily, while those 

with more service primarily leave for retirement. As LANL has increased hiring over the last 3 years, the number of 

employees in the 0-5 years of service band has grown to nearly one third of the permanent workforce. The relatively large 

attrition count for that service band is a result of the increase in that population.

Figure D–20. Years of service of LANL employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-23

Notes:

As LANL has increased hiring over the last several years, particularly in the 31-40 age band, the count of early-career 

employees has continued to climb. The mid-career population is also beginning to increase due to both hiring and the 

maturation of the growing early-career population. The advanced career group population has declined because of an 

increase in retirements, as expected.

Figure D–21. LANL trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

FY 2018 saw an increase in attrition due to two key factors: (1) DOE split the Environmental Management contract into a 

new company, causing 123 voluntary terminations; and (2) the run-up to the M&O contract change on November 1, 2018,

inspired a noticeable increase in voluntary terminations, both retirement and non-retirement. Given the timing of the 

contract change, it is expected that a number of transition-related terminations will fall into the FY 2019 reporting period. 

Separations were higher in FY 2008 and FY 2012 because of scaled workforce actions due to budgetary reductions. The 

dips in 2009 and 2013 occurred due to the early retirements in 2008 and 2012. 

Figure D–22. LANL employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-24 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Workforce headcount needs are projected to increase modestly over the FYNSP.

Figure D–23. Total projected LANL workforce needs by Common Occupational

Classification System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-25

D.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories

D.2.3.1 Mission Overview

For more than 70 years, Sandia National 

Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico and 

Livermore, California has delivered essential 

engineering, science, and technology to resolve the 

Nation’s most challenging security issues. SNL 

began in 1945 as Z Division, the ordnance design, 

testing, and assembly arm of Project Y, which after 

World War II became Los Alamos Scientific 

Laboratory. Z Division was renamed Sandia 

Laboratory in 1948 and, in 1949, Sandia Corporation 

was established as an AT&T, Inc., subsidiary to 

manage the laboratory through a no-fee contract. 

In 1956, a second site was opened in California’s Livermore Valley. In 1979, Congress designated Sandia 

Laboratory as a DOE national laboratory. SNL has been operated by National Technology and Engineering 

Solutions of Sandia, LLC, since May 2017. As a multi-mission national laboratory and FFRDC, SNL serves 

as an objective, independent, and trusted advisor, drawing upon deep science and engineering experience 

to anticipate, innovate, create, and inform policy discussions for a broad range of decision-makers. SNL’s 

core purpose is to develop advanced technologies to ensure global peace. 

The nuclear deterrence mission exists at SNL within a framework of five interdependent portfolios that 

represent multiple missions. Most of these have a direct and symbiotic relationship with nuclear weapons 

work, and all strengthen SNL’s capability-based science and engineering foundation.

Together, these programs ensure the Nation receives the 

best possible return on its national security investments. 

SNL’s activities for other Federal agencies and for nonFederal entities leverage, sustain, and strengthen the unique 

capabilities, facilities, and essential skills that support both 

the Defense Programs mission and broader national security 

needs. SNL’s national security work currently includes the 

following programs’ portfolios:

 Nuclear Deterrence

 Global Security

 National Security Programs

 Energy and Homeland Security

 Advanced Science and Technology 

SNL’s traditional, long-term nuclear deterrence mission 

includes nuclear weapons research, design, development, qualification, testing, certification, and systems 

integration of all components to arm, fuze, and fire a weapon to military specifications and ensure safety 

and security. The integration role is evident in three key areas:

 Internal integration of all non-nuclear components, systems, and subsystems

 Integration between a weapon’s non-nuclear portion and its nuclear explosives package

 Integration of a weapon with its military delivery platform
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-26 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The current modernization programs to expand the life of existing stockpile systems constitute SNL’s 

largest, most complex design, development, and qualification work scope in the last 30 years. SNL is 

involved in all stockpile modernization programs currently underway (the W76-1 LEP, B61-12 LEP, W88 

Alt 370, W80-4 LEP, W87-1 Modification Program, and W76-2 Modification Program) and Mk21 Fuze, and

is responsible for the design to extend the life of the Safeguards Transporter and its replacement design 

(the Mobile Guardian Transporter) for secure transport of nuclear weapon materials and components to 

NNSA partner sites and DoD customer sites. SNL also has production agency responsibilities for some 

weapon components (e.g., neutron generators and trusted, strategic radiation-hardened microsystems).

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review underscores continuity in warhead modernization as a top priority and

the rebalancing of priorities in response to a deteriorated global security environment and uncertain 

future threats. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the United States must maintain the 

range of flexible, responsive, and tailored nuclear capabilities to protect ourselves and our allies against 

nuclear or non-nuclear aggression. This strategy translates to the need to sustain SNL’s capability-based 

science and engineering foundation to prepare for this uncertain future. As an FFRDC, part of this service 

to the Nation is to scan the horizon for emerging national security issues and articulate the challenges 

anticipated for the country.

 Primary Sites: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Livermore, California; Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; 

Kauai, Hawaii

 Total Employees: 11,471 (as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-mission national security laboratory

 Web site: www.sandia.gov

 Contract Operator: National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned 

subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc. 

 Responsible NNSA Field Office: Sandia Field Office

D.2.3.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source

(total SNL FY 2020 request = $3,360 million)

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($2,941 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-27

D.2.3.3 Site Capabilities

SNL develops advanced technologies to ensure global peace and is responsible for developing and 

sustaining the science and engineering capabilities that provide the foundation of the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent portfolio. A robust capability-based science and engineering foundation can serve as a 

deterrent, guard against technological surprise, and enable a rapid response to an evolving set of mission 

requirements. 

SNL’s broader set of capabilities supporting other national security needs include cybersecurity and 

intelligence science, physical and biological sciences and engineering, and synergistic global security 

engineering. Both Defense Programs and other national security missions will require a pool of engineers 

and scientists with advanced degrees in specialized disciplines of electrical engineering, computer science, 

computer engineering, and materials science to provide expertise in disciplines such as hypersonics, 

electromagnetics, radiofrequency design, and exascale computing. These and other emerging technical 

fields will be essential to keep pace with evolving threat environments and avoid technological surprise. 

To enhance the recruiting pipeline in these areas, SNL is initiating targeted university partnerships and 

other innovative approaches to provide skill sets to support national security missions. 

Weapon activity capabilities support an evolving set of mission requirements, are interdependent, and 

contribute across the entire weapons life cycle. SNL capabilities related to DOE/NNSA weapons activities 

and their associated challenges and strategies are described in Table D–3.

Table D–3. Sandia National Laboratories Capabilities

Agile Component and Systems Design, Engineering, Production, Surveillance and Integration

Systems engineering, surveillance, and integration are the core capabilities of SNL’s nuclear weapons program. SNL designs, 

develops, qualifies, and assesses arming, fuzing, and firing systems, neutron generators, gas transfer systems, power sources, 

energetic components, and weapon surety and nuclear safety and security systems for Alts, modifications, and LEPs. This 

capability also includes production responsibility for several non-nuclear components and robust prototyping that is enabled 

by model-based design and advanced manufacturing technologies. SNL partakes in surveillance evaluations and stockpile 

maintenance to assess nuclear weapon systems and detect or anticipate potential problems.

Challenges Strategies

The capabilities, programs, people, and equipment are 

scattered around the SNL New Mexico site in aging Cold 

War-era facilities. Housing these people and programs 

needs increased priority to continue meeting mission 

needs. SNL must also maintain power source R&D and 

production and surveillance testing capabilities.

Proactively engage with NNSA to ensure an integrated approach 

that collocates related capability assets to improve efficiency and 

effectiveness and recapitalizes aging and inadequate facilities. 

Threats by adversaries are evolving rapidly and 

unpredictably. Traditional weapon design development 

cycles are too long, impeding the ability to respond in a 

timely manner to emerging threats.

Seek ways to accelerate the development cycle and advance 

prototyping capabilities to more quickly respond to emerging 

threats; participate in the Stockpile Responsiveness Program.

Manage the workforce as multiple LEPs and Alts transition 

from development to production. 

SNL has developed and implemented a planning tool to estimate 

and project staffing needs and attrition. 

Competition is high for electrical engineers and computer 

scientists.

Leverage the existing recruiting program and initiate innovative 

on-campus research partnership, internships, and other creative 

mechanisms to develop a pipeline of future-generation warhead 

engineers. 

Major life extension activities have focused laboratory 

attention and resources on near-term deliveries, making 

maturation of new technologies and components difficult. 

Seek opportunities to advance technology development in a 

broad range of program venues, including the Strategic 

Partnership Projects, Laboratory Directed Research and 

Development, and DOE/NNSA programs such as the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program and R&D Certification and Safety.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-28 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Microsystems R&D and Manufacturing

Trusted, strategic, radiation-hardened advanced microelectronics (i.e., nanoscale and microscale system science, engineering, 

and technology).

Challenges Strategies

Trusted microelectronics fabrication facilities are aging 

and past their design lives.

Complete SNL Silicon Fabrication Revitalization. Work with NNSA 

in extended life planning to maintain the R&D capability and 

ensure an uninterrupted ability to produce trusted, strategic 

radiation-hardened microelectronics. 

Materials Science and Engineering and Advanced Manufacturing

Virtually every class of non-nuclear materials, including metals, polymers, glasses, ceramics, and electronic and optical 

materials and their interfaces and interactions with their environments, are critical to the safety, security, and effectiveness of 

the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. This capability at SNL includes (1) evaluation of materials for aging, compatibility, and 

model validation to resolve stockpile and production issues rapidly and (2) innovation to replace legacy materials and evaluate 

new materials for insertion into the stockpile. 

Challenges Strategies

SNL must support evaluating materials’ aging, 

compatibility, and model development/validation and 

sustain the innovation necessary to replace legacy 

materials and evaluate new materials for insertion into 

the stockpile.

SNL must advance material science R&D for response to evolving 

threats and future needs. This includes creating new 

measurement and analytical capabilities and conducting R&D to 

enhance our understanding of the structure and processing of 

materials to evaluate their behavior; capture the phenomenology 

driving this behavior; define and predict performance in current 

and future stockpiles; and enable applications in additive 

manufacturing with a science basis for qualification.

The material science and engineering facility at SNL 

California does not meet modern seismic and other 

building code standards. SNL Albuquerque facility 

operations exceed design intent and increased heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning capacity needed to 

enable mission-driven chemical operations.

Proactively engage with DOE/NNSA to ensure an integrated 

approach to resolving facility challenges. Develop an Integrated 

Facilities and Infrastructure Plan to capture infrastructure needs 

and define priorities. Commission studies to establish conditions 

and alternatives to best mitigate risk to the mission.

The current generation of materials scientists is 

approaching the end of their careers. The number of 

students seeking advanced degrees in material disciplines 

who choose to enter and work within the nuclear security 

enterprise may not be sufficient to meet future workforce 

needs. Competition is high for scientists and engineers 

qualified in these disciplines.

Leverage existing recruiting programs and initiate innovative oncampus research partnerships, internships, and other creative 

mechanisms to develop a pipeline of a future generation of 

materials science specialists for SNL’s unique needs. 

Engineering Sciences and Testing, Radiation Effects and High Energy Density Physics, and

Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors

Evaluation of the effects of operational and abnormal environments on nuclear weapon systems and components using an 

array of engineering science test equipment (e.g., the Annular Core Research Reactor, Z, Saturn, and HERMES), diagnostic 

tools, and techniques. Research and testing to support design, qualification, and surveillance.

Challenges Strategies

The workload imposed by concurrent LEPs is stressing the 

capacity and capability of aging facilities and equipment, 

and accelerating replacement needs. Experimental test 

capabilities to validate data models require more and 

higher-fidelity data to enable stronger coupling with 

integrated design codes (IDCs).

Select facility and equipment investments to ensure continuity of 

the engineering sciences capability. Support enhancement of the 

predictive capability by tightening the coupling and integration of

modelers and the data necessary for model validation. Advance 

diagnostic capabilities to capture higher-fidelity experimental 

data.

Next-generation pulsed power experimental capabilities 

are needed to ensure models that validate safe, secure, 

and reliable performance of the Nation’s weapons.

Develop an experimental and theoretical basis to provide 

confidence that the next-generation pulsed power experimental 

capability will attain needed pressures and fusion yields.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-29

The Annular Core Research Reactor delivers high-power, 

short bursts of neutron and combined neutron-gamma 

spectra to qualify designs under extreme combined 

radiation environments. The facility housing the reactor is 

older than 50 years and predates modern nuclear safety 

standards.

Proactively engage with NNSA to ensure an integrated approach 

to resolving this facility challenge. Develop an Integrated 

Facilities and Infrastructure Plan to capture infrastructure needs 

and define priorities.

Competition is high for certain specialists in radiation 

effects science.

Develop a pipeline of scientific and engineering expertise in 

radiation effects via current campus and diversity recruiting 

programs and initiate targeted, innovative on-campus 

partnerships, internships, and fellowships to secure highly 

talented graduates.

High Performance Computing and Codes, Models, Data Analytics

Modeling and simulation capabilities of physical phenomena.

Challenges Strategies

Enhance the predictive capabilities of IDCs to support 

design, development, qualification, and assessments of 

non-nuclear components and systems for normal, 

abnormal, and hostile environments. 

Participate in the DOE Exascale Computing Initiative; design and 

conduct experiments to support validation of IDCs that increase 

understanding of the physical phenomena and close the gap 

between models and the physical world. 

Competition for high-demand disciplines, such as 

computational modeling with an emphasis on engineering 

analysis, makes recruiting, training, and retaining technical 

staff increasingly challenging.

Leverage campus and diversity recruiting programs to develop a 

pipeline of future-generation HPC scientists and engineers.

Alt = alteration

HERMES = High-Energy Radiation Megavolt 

Electron Source

HPC = high performance computing

IDC = integrated design codes

Z = Z pulsed power facility

D.2.3.4 Accomplishments

Directed Stockpile Work/Weapon Engineering and Production Focus

 Delivering on nuclear weapons modernization and development programs. SNL successfully 

executed a significant increase in the workload associated with warhead LEPs, Alts, and similar 

programs—the largest and most complex nuclear deterrence design, development, and 

qualification workload at SNL in almost 30 years. SNL met or exceeded the cost, schedule, and 

technical performance criteria critical to the NNSA mission. 

 Production collaboration success. The SNL production community, in partnership with KCNSC, 

Pantex, and external suppliers, delivered over 40,000 components that support 51 products 

serving 6 different weapon systems. Nearly half of these components were new or modified 

designs. These collaborations resulted in risk avoidance/mitigation, increased productivity, 

reduction of backlogs, and leverage of resources to meet commitments on weapon-related 

deliverables while maintaining a historically high acceptance rate.

 Demonstrated advanced hypersonic capabilities. SNL capabilities in material science, guided 

flight systems, and modeling and simulation led to the technology advancements required for the 

successful launch of Conventional Prompt Strike Flight Experiment-1, demonstrating this 

capability for the Nation. 

 B61-12 LEP on track to meet 2020 first production unit. Proactive management of B61-12 design, 

test, and qualification activities has resulted in successful on-time deliverables, milestones, 

testing, and retirement of overall program risk. The program successfully completed final design 

reviews and executed aggressive flight and qualification test schedules. It also completed 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-30 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

mechanical, thermal, electrical, and electromagnetic radiation environments qualification 

activities for normal and abnormal environments. 

 W88 Alt 370 on track to meet 2019 first production unit. SNL kept life-of-program costs within 

the submitted Baseline Cost Report, while executing an aggressive testing schedule and standing 

up and upgrading a key qualification capability. The program successfully completed final design 

reviews, executed an aggressive flight and qualification test schedule, and simultaneously 

completed Production Readiness Reviews. 

 High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test (HOT SHOT). The HOT SHOT experiment 

better prepared NNSA to provide a robust, flexible, and resilient nuclear deterrent into the future. 

SNL developed, coordinated, and executed the first of a series of HOT SHOT experiments aimed 

at accelerating development cycles and increasing responsiveness. Using reconstituted sounding 

rockets, with experiments added on multiple decks, allowed prediction of the structural response 

of non-instrumented components during flight in combined environments. The experiment 

demonstrated more efficient collection of data for predicting component response and supported 

SNL computer model validation.

 Electronic Neutron Generators (ELNG) efficiencies. The SNL ELNG Product Realization Team 

successfully completed qualification testing of the first B83, B61, and B61-12 ELNGs produced at 

SNL, eliminating a hydrotest for a cost reduction of $2.8 million. SNL also developed a new testing 

capability that replicates required environments while minimizing the risks of over-testing. 

 Advanced surety technology activities. SNL completed several advanced surety technology 

activities that led to selection of a design that dramatically reduces cost, weight, and performance 

compared to currently deployed technology.

RDT&E/Weapon Science and Technology Focus

 Delivered foundational science and engineering capabilities to advance and sustain the Nation’s 

nuclear deterrent. SNL served as a leader in multiple weapon science and technology efforts, 

including an advanced architecture prototype HPC system, an unprecedented number of shots on 

the Z machine, and analysis of stockpile issues through numerical simulation that will have 

significant impact on future annual assessment reviews. 

 Engineering sciences and computational modeling key to B61-12 qualification. Data from 

B61-12 flight tests, full-scale wind tunnel tests, and computational simulation have been 

integrated to develop the aerodynamic performance model for the B61-12 qualification effort.

The model is being used to assess weapon margins against requirements. 

 Simulation improves manufacturing yield. Use of the Sierra/Aria simulation code enabled 

optimization of a weapon packaging process to improve manufacturing yield of a B61-12 

component. 

 Acquisition of advanced HPC system. SNL successfully led a tri-laboratory team to maintain the 

acquisition schedule for an advanced architecture prototype HPC system acquisition schedule 

while operating under tight fiscal constraints. This acquisition will enable NNSA to evaluate the 

feasibility of emerging HPC architectures as production platforms to support stockpile 

stewardship. 

 Silicon Fabrication facility (SiFab) pre-builds will support a flexible, responsive stockpile during 

fabrication conversion. SNL’s SiFab completed all planned life-of-program wafer fabrication for 

the modernization programs and delivered over 6,000 War Reserve parts to NNSA to support 

baseline first production unit dates for the B61-12, W88 Alt 370, Mk21 Fuze, and W80-4. This prebuild allows the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) facility to begin 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-31

6-inch to 8-inch wafer fabrication conversion without disrupting weapon deliverable schedules.

The conversion to 8-inch tools is required to support production for the W80-4, W87-1, and future 

weapons programs.

Attract, Retain, and Develop Talent

 The SNL FY 2019 Truman Fellowship attracted 17 qualified applicants from among the best 

nationally recognized PhD scientists and engineers; SNL made 2 offers and both applicants 

accepted. The newly established Jill Hruby Fellowship, honoring SNL’s former Director who was 

NNSA’s first female Laboratory Director, attracted women scientists and engineers interested in 

pursuing technical leadership careers in national security. From the 41 qualified applicants, SNL 

made 2 offers; both applicants accepted. 

 SNL established a cross-divisional recruiting team to address the challenges of attracting and 

retaining cybersecurity, computer science, and computer engineering personnel. As a result, SNL 

hired a total of 134 R&D employees in cybersecurity, computer science, and computer 

engineering, a 179 percent increase from FY 2017. 

 SNL’s leadership participates in the SNL National Security Leadership Development Program, 

which is built on foundational leadership principles and SNL’s heritage; SNL attracted 27 executive 

leadership participants through this effort. 

 SNL launched a new early-career leadership development program to expose early-career 

employees to leadership tools, methodology, and language. It attracted 30 high-potential 

participants in the first year and will enable future leaders to advance early in the employee life

cycle by providing clear promotion and development paths. 

 Since 1998, SNL has sponsored the Weapon Intern Program to accelerate the process of providing 

training to technical professionals across the nuclear security enterprise in nuclear weapon 

development. With over 450 program graduates, the Weapon Intern Program turns out about 

2 dozen students each year from all sites in the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA, and DoD 

officers/civilians. Topics include various weapon technology, design, development, evaluation, 

production, operations, process, policy, and management areas.

 The Military Academy Collaboration is a cooperative research program administered by NNSA’s 

Office of Defense Programs, through which cadets, midshipmen, and faculty are temporarily 

assigned to one of eight locations across the nuclear security enterprise. The Military Academy 

Collaboration program gives the opportunity to explore cutting-edge R&D in disciplines and 

technologies of mutual interest. SNL New Mexico and SNL California sponsor approximately 

40 cadets, midshipmen, and faculty each year from the 4 service academies.

Awards and recognition in 2017-2018. SNL received five coveted R&D 100 awards in each of the last 

2 years. SNL employees earned 17 national technical awards, and 23 were named as fellows of national 

and international technical societies. In addition, 15 others received awards from diversity organizations 

and universities for outstanding technical accomplishments, leadership, and community service. 

Infrastructure investments. SNL managed 6,000 direct- and indirect-funded construction projects 

totaling $265 million in FY 2017 and FY 2018. These investments addressed highest-risk areas affecting 

mission deliverables. One noteworthy accomplishment was completion of the Battery Test Facility, a 

7,500-square-foot facility for the testing of performance and electrochemical analysis of energy storage 

devices. Moving these operations to a specially designed, dedicated laboratory reduces the safety and 

programmatic risks caused by having these operations in the existing Power Sources facility, which houses 

high-density office and laboratory space.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-32 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Other DOE/NNSA Accomplishments

 Center of Excellence in Cyber Threat Intelligence. SNL deployed a network sensor that leverages 

behavior-based heuristics, machine-learning, and statistical techniques to five DOE/NNSA sites to 

provide enterprise-wide visibility into anomalous network behavior for analysis and mitigation. 

Cybersecurity analysts, dubbed “hunters,” have been actively analyzing cybersecurity events 

using the newly deployed network sensor in partnership with NNSA’s Information Assurance 

Response Center and have successfully identified multiple malware campaigns at various 

DOE/NNSA sites.

D.2.3.5 Sandia National Laboratories Workforce

SNL has a headcount of 11,471 employees; the average age is approximately 46 years, and 15.5 percent 

of the population is eligible for retirement. The average for years of service is 11.5 years, and the 

population is heavily concentrated among those with 1-10 years of service. Most separations involve 

retirements among those 51 years of age or older, but younger-aged groups have experienced many 

voluntary separations. Fifty-three percent of voluntary separations were clustered between ages 26 and 

40. Retirements were higher among those with 21 to 45 years of service, while a significant number of 

voluntary separations occurred among those with 0-5 years of service. SNL expects a stable workforce 

over the FYNSP period. Figures D–24 through D–32 illustrate these SNL workforce demographics and 

others.

Notes:

Sixty-two percent of SNL’s headcount is aligned with technical duties and responsibilities ranging from R&D to applied 

engineering to operations. 

SNL uses a systems integration approach to workforce assignments. Team members are matrixed to support key mission 

areas, including the Strategic Partnership Projects. Growth of approximately 1,465 in overall regular headcount since 

FY 2014 is consistent with robust program growth in LEP areas tempered by attrition. 

Advanced degrees are held by 54.7 percent of the workforce; 17.0 percent have PhDs, and 37.7 percent have Masters 

degrees.

Figure D–24. SNL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-33

Notes:

The average age of the employee population is 45.7 years. A large proportion of the population is aged 56 and above 

(25.2 percent). Approximately 13.1 percent of the population is aged 30 or less. The remaining 61.7 percent is between 

the ages of 31 and 55. 

Retirement-eligible SNL employees are at 15.5 percent; this rate has remained stable in the last 3 years. 

The bimodal age distribution has lessened in recent years due to increasing hiring of experienced professionals to meet 

skill gaps. While the bimodal distribution is not extreme, there are categories in which this is more pronounced (i.e., 

engineers and scientists). SNL continues to take this into account as it plans for mentoring and knowledge transfer.

The FY 2019 hiring projections reflect a continuing mix of hires between experienced and new college graduates to meet 

skill gaps. SNL is experiencing some challenges in attracting and hiring personnel in the science, technology, engineering,

and mathematics fields because of increased competition from the private sector. This is especially acute in the 

cybersecurity, computer science, and computer engineering skill areas. SNL is monitoring and adjusting its recruiting 

strategies accordingly to meet the talent needs of the enterprise. 

Based on the age distribution, retirement is anticipated to increase in coming years. These openings will place greater

pressure on recruiting future talent and retaining existing SNL employees. 

Figure D–25. SNL employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-34 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Employees with 15 or less years of service total 72.2 percent; 38.9 percent have 5 or less years of service. These numbers 

reflect the hiring of 3,345 new regular employees over the past 5 years (FY 2014 through FY 2018). 

The mix of both experienced and new college graduates assures that the necessary skills and capabilities are present to 

support SNL’s mission work. Strong hiring over the past 5 years ensures that a substantial percentage of employees are 

in the earlier phases of their careers to replace those in later career phases. This trend will require an increased focus on 

knowledge transfer and training programs.

Figure D–26. SNL employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

A net change of 815 regular employees reflects strong hiring efforts to meet mission demand in FY 2017 and FY 2018. 

Most of this growth is attributable to the growing mission scope related to stockpile modernization through LEP activities 

and growth in Strategic Partnership Programs. SNL has maintained downward pressure on support organizations where 

applicable to further drive direct mission support within allocated budgets.

Figure D–27. Change in last 2 fiscal years at SNL (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-35

Notes:

About 51.3 percent of voluntary separations are clustered between the ages of 26 and 40. Higher numbers of retirements 

are reflected in the age group between 56 and 65 years of age, which represents 37.4 percent of separated employees 

during the last 2 fiscal years.

Figure D–28. Age of SNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Of the voluntary employee separations, 67.8 percent had 5 or less years of service; 88.2 percent had 0-10 years of service;

and 97.2 percent had 15 or less years of service. This turnover may reflect the external demand for technical skills in the

highly competitive market where SNL competes for talent. These losses place increased importance on a speedier 

clearance process, training programs, and knowledge transfer to be able to train new staff entering SNL and a robust 

overall Employee Value Proposition that is current and relevant to the labor market.

Figure D–29. Years of service of SNL employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-36 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

The upward trend in headcount reflects an increase in mission work and demands. The mix of staff by career stage 

reflects the demand for new talent in all three career areas and the skills they bring to SNL for a balanced workforce. 

Within the advanced career segment, the net growth over time is heavily influenced by retirements from the workforce. 

The net impact is a generally steady advanced career population and slightly increasing mid- and early-career segments. 

As retirements increase at SNL due to older employees exiting the workforce, the size of the advanced career population 

is expected to begin a slight decline in the coming years.

Figure D–30. SNL trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Retirements were higher in FY 2011 and FY 2012 because of announced pending changes in retiree benefits, which 

encouraged some employees to leave early. The surge in retirement in FY 2011 and FY 2012 resulted in reduced 

retirements in FY 2013 and FY 2014. Retirements increased from FY 2015 to FY 2018 as expected as SNL returned to 

historical retirement rates and the workforce aged. SNL’s hiring projections are adjusted annually to assure talent is 

available to meet mission requirements.

Figure D–31. SNL employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-37

Notes:

The SNL workforce has grown by approximately 800 since the FY 2018 SSMP. Fluctuations in the workforce are a function 

of variations in workload among multiple programs, retirements, and separations. SNL’s best estimate of workload 

depicts a continued flat trend overall. SNL monitors workload fluctuations and manages the stability of the workforce 

through Strategic Partnership Projects, temporary staffing options, cross-training within programs, and strategic hiring.

Figure D–32. Total projected SNL workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification 

System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-38 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.3 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

D.3.1 Kansas City National Security Campus

D.3.1.1 Mission Overview

The Kansas City National Security Campus 

(KCNSC) in Kansas City, Missouri employs 

advanced scientific capabilities, statistical 

controls, simulation and modeling, and materials 

expertise to manufacture and procure 

DOE/NNSA’s most intricate and technically 

demanding electronic, mechanical, and 

engineered materials components. Thisincludes

radar systems, arming and fuzing systems, 

mechanisms, gas transfer systems (GTSs), secure 

transportation products, joint test assemblies

(JTAs), and specialty engineered material 

products. KCNSC partners with the national laboratories to evolve weapon concepts through design and 

development and into production and sustainment. The site is responsible for life-cycle management of 

over 80 percent of the components in a nuclear weapon across all active and emerging nuclear stockpile 

systems. In addition to its Nuclear Weapon Programs mission, the site supports Nuclear Nonproliferation, 

Emergency Management, and Counterterrorism missions. The site also supports a Global Security mission 

that involves the development and delivery of field-ready engineering solutions for other government 

agencies' national security missions.

 Locations: Kansas City, Missouri; Albuquerque, New Mexico

 Total Employees: 4,156 (as of end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-program nuclear weapons production facility

 Website: www.kcnsc.doe.gov

 Contract Operator: Honeywell Federal Manufacturing & Technologies

 Responsible Field Office: Kansas City Field Office

D.3.1.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source 

(total KCNSC FY 2020 request = $996 million)

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($940 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-39

D.3.1.3 Site Capabilities

KCNSC’s capabilities support both weapon systems currently in the stockpile and those being modernized 

via LEPs, Alts, and modifications (Mods). For legacy systems, these activities include Directed Stockpile 

Work in the management, production, processing, and delivery of hardware for limited life component

(LLC) exchanges and flight test systems; surveillance testing of components and materials; and 

maintenance and repair of weapons systems. For future stockpile systems, KCNSC’s work scope includes 

development and maturation of manufacturing processes and technologies, production of prototypes to 

support design development, and manufacturing of components and systems. 

KCNSC’s capabilities are used to research and develop new materials for legacy and future stockpile 

systems. Production capabilities include over 40 manufacturing technologies and manufacturing over 

1,000 unique product families, including arming, fuzing, and firing devices, safing devices, microcircuits, 

machined parts, polymers, plastics, and other engineered materials. KCNSC also designs, develops, and 

produces associated support equipment, tooling, fixtures, and test equipment.

KCNSC provides capabilities integral to the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program. KCNSC’s primary capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies are 

described in Table D–4.

Table D–4. Kansas City National Security Campus Capabilities

Non-nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly

KCNSC is the primary site for manufacturing and procuring non-nuclear components including arming, fuzing, and firing

systems, gas transfer systems, environmental sensing devices, strong links, and structural components and cushions made 

from engineered materials. The capability to manufacture and inspect these items is highly dependent upon specialized 

equipment and facilities (cleanrooms, environmentally controlled areas, etc.) and the ability to maintain them (i.e., calibration 

and metrology).

Challenges Strategies

 Balancing the growing maintenance needs of aging 

production equipment with the needs for emerging 

production technology for the LEPs.

 The availability of a cleared and ready labor force.

 Continue planning and budgeting through various funding 

sources, including programmatic and infrastructure-related

investment projects.

 Hire hourly resources in advance of needs to allow time for 

clearance, training, and certification.

 Use expedited clearance methodologies.

 Maximize onboarding efficiencies with training, certification, 

and working on unclassified product.

Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication

KCNSC designs and produces testing equipment to support its mission and that of the other sites within the nuclear security 

enterprise. Often, these testing systems are integrated with various types of environmental conditioning equipment, such as 

thermal chambers or centrifuges, to perform automated testing for weapon environments. These testing systems are vital to 

the development, qualification, and acceptance of weapon systems and components.

Challenges Strategies

A key challenge is the cyclical workload, which is very heavy 

during the development phases and lighter during the 

production phases.

 Complexity of Test Systems to meet program 

requirements

 Ability to staff appropriately in a dynamic business 

environment

 Production Agency/Design Agency coordination and 

availability of definition and early hardware to support 

tester development

To maintain the specialized workforce in this area, emphasize 

level loading of the workload to the extent possible, combined 

with providing flexibility in assignments. Opportunities for 

challenging work assignments include the Strategic Partnership 

Projects.

 Deploy Common Tester Architecture.

 Provide flexibility in assignment areas.

 Better plan and execute resource-loaded program schedules.

 Obtain appropriate funding to develop new capabilities.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-40 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 New capabilities required by emerging programs (e.g.,

shock, vibration, combined environments)

 Difficulty simulating realistic (combined) flight 

environments

 Use RASR [Research and Sounding Rocket] and HOTSHOT

[High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test] rocket 

flight tests to simulate environments.

Fabrication and Support of Secure Transportation Assets

KCNSC prepares Secure Transportation Asset (STA) vehicles in its New Mexico facility, including fabrication, repair, and 

modification of tractors, trailers, and escort vehicles. KCNSC also supports the design, fabrication, and maintenance of 

multiple system capabilities and facilitates safety engineering, technical documentation, and training of the Federal agents 

that perform STA functions. 

Challenges Strategies

 Manufacturability and sourcing limitations of future 

secure transportation programs, which could increase 

cost and schedule risks.

 Implementing modifications and upgrades to existing STA 

systems for compatibility with Integrated Surety 

Architecture systems.

 Continue partnering with design agencies to ensure that,

early in the process, the design work incorporates lessons 

learned from past trailer production and manufacturability 

reviews, and facilitate multiple-sourcing capabilities to reduce 

risks and costs.

 Early collaboration with design agencies to ensure 

manufacturability/sourcing risks are minimized.

Weapon Component Surveillance and Assessment

KCNSC supports surveillance and assessment of the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile through enhanced testing of various 

weapon components and materials, as well as production of telemetry, JTAs, and other hardware for laboratory and flight 

testing. The results from those tests are used to demonstrate continued performance of stockpile systems and predict, detect, 

assess, and resolve aging trends and anomalies in the stockpile. New testing and evaluation methods are also developed and 

implemented.

Challenges Strategies

 Maintaining test and measurement systems beyond 

design life to support surveillance testing.

 Engaging workforce in older technologies.

 Material availability due to sunset technologies for legacy 

JTA programs.

 Replace select test equipment and modernize capabilities.

 Successfully execute hiring, retention, and knowledge 

preservation strategies.

 Periodically update designs and modernize technology for JTA 

systems.

Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing and Manufacturing

KCNSC performs R&D activities to identify candidate materials for potential use in stockpile applications. KCNSC partners with 

the national laboratories to evaluate, select, and qualify new materials for the stockpile, and studies and re-engineers obsolete 

materials that are no longer available to support the legacy stockpile. The site also develops new manufacturing processes for 

material production and use.

Challenges Strategies

 Attracting and retaining individuals in specific technology 

areas.

 Materials are no longer available because of obsolescence 

or supplier interest.

 Partner with universities to identify and develop a pipeline of 

qualified candidates for potential hiring.

 Re-engineer obsolete materials and use microreactors to 

produce specialty materials in the right quantities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-41

Site-Wide Challenges of the Workforce Associated with Multiple Capabilities

Challenges Strategies

 Recruitment and retention of a skilled, diverse, and 

effective workforce.

 Competitive salaries for employers across the region and 

competition for top talent remains strong.

 Extended clearance times.

 Limited flexibility due to consumption of office space or 

non-laboratory production space.

 Advanced technology development and emerging 

programs are driving the need for increased office and 

manufacturing space.

 Develop innovative methods to shorten clearance times.

 Improve onboarding of new staff to meet critical needs.

 Implement succession planning and emphasize critical skills 

bench strength.

 Maintain a competitive Total Rewards package.

 Maximize the efforts of Career Path and Workforce Agility 

Teams.

 Expand the Manufacturing Innovation Center to prepare and 

train hourly staff while awaiting clearances.

 Hire in advance of needs to allow time for clearance and 

training.

 Partner with university relations programs and third-party 

targeted recruiting services.

 Continue Machinist and Tool and Die Maker development 

program.

 Implement advanced manufacturing technologies to 

regenerate whitespace.

 Secure additional workspace.

JTA = joint test assembly

D.3.1.4 Accomplishments

 Delivered first production units of 11 B61-12 weapon components early or on time and 56 B61-12 

Type 5B/5D trainer components. Delivered first production units of nine W88 Alt 370 components 

early or on time.

 Delivered over 158,619 items in support of the Defense Programs mission, including over 25,000 

items to support critical systems tests and trainers for the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370.

 Completed production requirements for 40 percent of the W76-1 LEP ship entities.

 Partnered with the Kansas City Field Office to complete final disposition of the Bannister Federal 

Complex by accelerating planned decommissioning actions, coordinating transfer of utilities, and 

supporting transfer of the Floodwall Operation.

 Qualified and sold the first War Reserve additively manufactured component to production 

stores. This milestone for the B61-12 has paved the way for additional parts in the near future 

and is the culmination of multiple technology development efforts across the nuclear security 

enterprise.

 The 13,000-square-foot KCNSC Advanced Manufacturing Facility was completed on time, 

consolidating advanced manufacturing operations in one area under a single management 

system.

 Realized Supply Chain Management Center total savings through centralizing the procurement 

function for the nuclear security enterprise and Environmental Management.

 The KCNSC Research and Sounding Rocket initiative flew its first test flights. The rocket flights are 

designed to expose new technologies to environments that cannot be replicated in 

ground/laboratory testing in a rapid, yet cost-effective, manner to increase knowledge and 

understanding of mechanical properties and performance.

 Digital Manufacturing has achieved a cost benefit of more than $124 million over the last 5 years, 

with $31.7 million in FY 2018 alone, through over 63,000 parts produced.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-42 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Surpassed 1 year of safety without a Days Away From Work Case; achieved 5 years without a Days 

Away From Work Case for KCNSC New Mexico operations.

 KCNSC has achieved a tremendous increase in skilled labor in its business. The population of 

operators has increased 75 percent over the past 2 years (FY 2017 – FY 2018) in preparation for 

production for B61-12, W88 Alt 370, and Mk21 arming and fuzing assembly.

 Completed the new 100-workstation expansion of the Manufacturing Innovation Center, which is 

focused on the onboarding, efficiency, and utilization of direct hourly employees who support 

development, production, and other reimbursable projects for the nuclear security enterprise.

 Selected as the production agency for the Mobile Guardian Transporter, which has a first delivery 

in FY 2025 based on capabilities and past performance.

 Onboarded new commodity vendors in cables, tooling, materials, and machined parts and 

implemented supplier improvement plans for key existing partners in all commodity teams.

 Received DOE/NNSA acceptance of earned value management in KCNSC’s production approach 

for the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370, which will be piloted and implemented in 2019.

 Initiated and led four W80-4 scheduling summits across the nuclear security enterprise and 

benchmarked scheduling methodologies to build resource-loaded Primavera P6 schedules for the 

program’s Weapon Design and Cost Report.

 Implemented a process improvement for the Interim Q clearance request process, submitting 

requests before employee start dates instead of 2-3 months after. Days to receive an Interim Q 

after the start date have been reduced from 122 days to 22 days (82 percent reduction).

 Led nuclear security enterprise implementation of NAP-24A (Weapon Quality Policy) 

Attachment 4, for which DOE/NNSA awarded a Defense Program Award of Excellence, and was 

the primary nuclear security enterprise responder to DoD regarding a new supply chain-focused 

Executive Order.

 Successfully built a tool for the W80-4, enabling the ability to monitor and track alignment of 

NNSA Integrated Master Schedule milestones for the program, resulting in the Federal Program 

Office officially tasking KCNSC with the responsibility of managing the tool and the alignment 

process for all nuclear security enterprise sites.

 Early delivery of W88 Alt 370 Demonstration and Shakedown Operation-29 qualification flight test 

hardware.

 The Code Management System completed all development build activities and delivered first 

process prove-in requirements. 

 W88 Alt 940 completed qualification and delivery of the first trainer units.

 Implemented a high-speed video capability with the release of a qualified tester for B61-12 and 

W88 Alt 370 mechanisms. These technologies have significantly surpassed the prior test 

capabilities for understanding and diagnosing stronglink products in development and 

production.

 Completed required qualification activities for 3X Acorn Quality Evaluation Review.

 Developed and implemented a CAT Milestone process and tools to track and manage key program 

milestones for the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370.

 Successfully collaborated with SNL to develop a plan to re-accept W80-1 Stockpile Management 

program Trajectory Sensing Signal Generator components at extreme temperatures.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-43

 Deployed a new application to manage orders and achieved 72 percent reduction of expired 

orders.

 Completed digitization of classified aperture cards in the Legacy Data Capture program. 

 Over 475 Honeywell employees have volunteered more than 3,200 hours at various community 

events.

D.3.1.5 Kansas City National Security Campus Workforce

KCNSC has 4,156 employees, with an average age of 42.86 years and over half of employees with 5 or 

fewer years of service. Approximately 23 percent of KCNSC’s employees are eligible to retire. KCNSC has 

a bimodal distribution for employee age; nearly 71 percent of employees have 10 years or less of service. 

Since the end of FY 2016, KCNSC has hired 1,684 workers and experienced 605 separations, resulting in a 

net gain of 1,079. Of those separations, many were voluntary separations by early-career employees,

while many advanced-career employees retired. Forty-seven percent of separations were employees with 

less than 5 years of service. Since FY 2014, the number of early- and mid-career employees has steadily 

increased, while the number of advanced-career employees has remained flat. KCNSC will continue to 

add staff over the FYNSP period as the workload for LEPs and Alts increases. Workforce demographics 

are illustrated and discussed in Figures D–33 through D–41.

Notes:

Headcount is up 577 from FY 2017 and 1,079 from FY 2016. KCNSC is preparing for production builds on the B61-12, 

W88 Alt 370, and Mk21 Fuze. Operator headcount has increased 75 percent from FY 2016 (980 from 559, 

respectively) and operators are now nearly one quarter (23.6 percent) of the plant population. Engineering continues 

to be steady, making up about one third of the plant population.

Figure D–33. KCNSC total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-44 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

The average age of the plant workforce (42.86 years) continues to decrease, down from 45.48 in FY 2016 and 43.65 

in FY 2017. One in four (24.2 percent) of plant workers is under the age of 30; one in two (50.3 percent) is under the 

age of 40; and only one in three (32.9 percent) is over the age of 50. Retirement-eligible employees continue to 

decrease, down from 32.27 percent in FY 2016 and 25.76 percent in FY 2017.

Figure D–34. KCNSC employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

The average for employee years of service is down to 10.07 from 13.83 in FY 2016 and 11.43 in FY 2017. One in five 

(21.6 percent) plant employees has 1 year or less of service; over half (58.23 percent) have 5 years or less; 

70.93 percent have 10 years or less; and 17.9 percent have more than 20 years of service.

Figure D–35. KCNSC employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-45

Notes:

KCNSC had a net increase of 1,079 employees in the period from FY 2017 and FY 2018; 577 of those were hired in 

FY 2018. For the reporting period, 53.6 percent of the separations were voluntary separations, and an additional 

32.6 percent were due to retirements.

Figure D–36. Change in last 2 fiscal years at KCNSC

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-46 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Looking at separations by age group as a percentage of the total separations for the period (2 years), 23.3 percent

were under 30 when they separated; 41.8 percent were under 40; and a similar number (41.5 percent) were 56 or 

older.

Figure D–37. Age of KCNSC employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Looking at separations by years of service and grouping them as a percentage of total separations for the period 

(2 years), nearly half of the separations (47.1 percent) occurred with 5 years of service or less; 55 percent occurred 

with 10 years of service or less; and only 30.4 percent occurred with 31 or more years of service.

Figure D–38. Years of service of KCNSC employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-47

Notes:

Early-career employees increased by 23.6 percent from FY 2017; mid-career employees increased by 24.2 percent 

from FY 2017; advanced-career employees increased by 3.8 percent from FY 2017; and the total increase was

16.1 percent from FY 2017. This is the first time KCNSC has had more early-career than advanced-career employees.

Figure D–39. KCNSC trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-48 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Employee separations for FY 2018 were lower than the previous year, but still higher than in recent history. While 

overall attrition is below industry averages, attrition has increased for the employee group with less than 5 years of 

service. The investment in Q-cleared employees is high in the first few years of service, which drives a need for a 

strategy for increasing retention.

Figure D–40. KCNSC employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-49

Notes:

The projected workforce needs over the FYNSP period shows an increase from last year’s estimates in both salary and 

hourly labor. The W80-4 LEP released its Weapon Design and Cost Report, which provided improved estimates of the 

required hourly and salary labor. Hourly labor also increased because of expected workload increases on the B61 LEP 

and a better line of sight into the scope required for the W87-1 and W88R. The labor category was also adjusted 

upward to incorporate expected timing for the W87-1, and future warhead programs.

Figure D–41. Total projected KCNSC workforce needs by Common Occupational 

Classification System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-50 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.3.2 Pantex Plant

D.3.2.1 Mission Overview

The Pantex Plant (Pantex) outside of Amarillo, Texas

is the only DOE/NNSA site authorized to assemble or 

disassemble nuclear weapons and, as NNSA’s High 

Explosive Production Center of Excellence, has 

cradle-to-grave responsibilities for HE production. As

a collaborative partner with the national security 

laboratories, Pantex provides capabilities to 

transition HE R&D from bench scale to production 

scale. In addition, Pantex collaborates and 

provides capabilities to DoD, the United Kingdom, 

universities, and commercial vendors. Pantex also 

supports the reduction of global nuclear threats through its nonproliferation activities.

 Location: Amarillo, Texas

 Total Employees: 3,266 (as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Single-program nuclear weapons production facility

 Website: www.pantex.energy.gov

 Contract Operator: Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS), LLC, a corporate subsidiary of Bechtel 

National, Leidos, ATK Launch Systems, and SOC, LLC

 Responsible Field Office: NNSA Production Office

D.3.2.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source

(total Pantex FY 2020 request = $959 million)

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($950 million)

D.3.2.3 Site Capabilities

Pantex’s mission capabilities include manufacture of specialty explosives; fabrication and testing of HE 

components; assembly, disassembly, refurbishment, maintenance, and surveillance of weapons and 

weapon components; dismantlement of retired weapons; sanitization and disposition of components 

from dismantled weapons; interim staging and storage of nuclear components from dismantled weapons; 

pit requalification; pit surveillance; and pit packaging (including container surveillances and 

recertification).
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-51

Pantex’s key capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies are described in Table D–5.

Table D–5. Pantex Plant Capabilities

Weapons Assembly and Disassembly

Assembly and disassembly of nuclear explosive warheads and bombs, assembly and post-mortem analysis of joint test 

assemblies (JTAs), assembly and disassembly analysis of test bed units, and electrical and mechanical tests of weapons and 

weapon components.

Challenges Strategies

Development, establishment, and implementation of the 

Documented Safety Analysis process for new 

programmatic weapons activities.

Streamline the Documented Safety Analysis process methodology 

for efficiency and effectiveness.

Surveillance

Nondestructive evaluation of pits and weapon components from stockpile units to support the Annual Assessment Reports 

and destructive and nondestructive evaluation of HE from stockpile units.

Challenges Strategies

Production downtime associated with aging pit 

surveillance equipment.

Develop and evaluate options for upgrading or acquiring 

replacement equipment.

High Explosives

Pantex is responsible for HE pressing, assembly of mock HE for JTAs, assembly of conventional high explosives and insensitive 

high explosives for LEPs and stockpile rebuilds, and disassembly and disposition of HE from surveillance and dismantlement 

units.

Challenges Strategies

Programmatic infrastructure (i.e., equipment) is aging, 

and some of the general-purpose infrastructure (i.e.,

buildings) is of 1940s vintage.

The High Explosives Pressing Facility received CD-4, Approve Start 

of Operations, in FY 2017. The High Explosives Pressing Facility 

consolidates HE operations from numerous buildings to reduce 

the movement of HE within the plant, benefiting worker safety 

and minimizing impact to other plant operations. High Explosive 

Science and Engineering and HE formulation facilities are 

planning recapitalization of end-of-life equipment needs and 

establishing major modernization plans. 

Special Nuclear Material Accountability, Storage, Protection, Handling, and Disposition

These are requalification capabilities for pits for LEPs and storage of pits and weapons.

Challenges Strategies

Pit storage capacity to support future directed stockpile 

work and production downtime associated with aging pit 

requalification equipment.

Implement pit staging projects to reconfigure operational 

facilities to increase the site storage capacity to address nearterm staging constraints and proceed with the CD process for the 

Material Staging Facility. Deploy new requalification equipment 

for upcoming LEPs. Upgrade existing requalification equipment.

CD = Critical Decision

HE = high explosives

D.3.2.4 Accomplishments

 Increased the margin on DOE/NNSA delivery commitments to the Navy and completed the most 

first-time assemblies in the history of the W76-1 LEP at Pantex.

 Exceeded FY 2018 baselined production deliverables (102 percent) and shipped all required units 

to DoD on schedule.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-52 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

 Exceeded the baseline for the W87 LLC exchange program and met the baseline for the 

W80 Alt 369 program at Pantex.

 Recovered a 6-month schedule delay on pit requalification activities, positioning Pantex to meet 

the B61-12 pit first production unit baseline in December 2018.

D.3.2.5 Pantex Plant Workforce

Pantex’s headcount at the end of FY 2018 was 3,266. The population’s average age is 47 years, and 

approximately 28 percent of the employees are retirement-eligible. Most employees are between 30 and 

60 years of age. The average employee has 14 years of service; most employees have 1-5 years of service.

Between the end of FY 2016 and FY 2018, Pantex had an overall increase of 20 employees. Retirement of 

older, advanced-career employees accounted for most of the separations, while younger, early-career 

employees accounted for more voluntary separations. A similar trend occurred in the years of service 

categories, with more retirements among those many years of service, and more voluntary separations 

among those with fewer years. Over the past few years, the number of mid-career employees has dipped,

while early- and advanced-career employees have slightly increased. Pantex anticipates a headcount 

between 3,000 and 3,500 over the FYNSP period. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed 

in Figures D–42 through D–50.

Notes:

Significant recruiting and hiring efforts replaced vacancies from attrition and built the technical skill base in 

preparation for the increased workload in FY 2019 and beyond. Attrition at Pantex remains between 5 and

6 percent. Competitive compensation and benefits are important factors in retention. On average, over 

50 percent of separations are retirements. FY 2019 will focus on hiring in preparation for the increasing weapons 

workload. This will include acquiring the necessary security clearances and developing new talent. Pantex is over 

98 percent funded by Defense Programs for core work. CNS saw an increase in its Common Occupational 

Classification System (COCS)-coded Engineers and a decrease in General Management and Scientists, partly as a 

result of CNS’s Compensation Redesign efforts. In addition to efforts to hire Engineers specifically, during 

Compensation Redesign, managers were tasked with assigning job titles based on job scope; which resulted in a 

shift among COCS categories. CNS views this as a positive change, that enables having the technical skills needed 

to fulfill mission work.

Figure D–42. Pantex total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-53

Notes:

The average age of the Pantex workforce is 47 years. The percentage eligible to retire at Pantex dropped from 

FY 2017 (30.22 percent) to FY 2018 (28.38 percent) because of increased hiring and replacement of retirees. 

Age diversity is well distributed. Pantex hires many retired veterans, which contributes to the experienced 

talent at the site, yet affects the average age of the workforce. Pantex was recognized by the Texas Workforce 

Commission and Texas Veterans Commission in 2018 as the large corporation “Veteran Friendly Employer”

for the Panhandle area. Although employees are eligible to retire at age 55, the average age of those retiring 

is 65. Many are choosing to work past normal retirement age. Pantex remains one of the best employers in 

the area. Craft persons, labor, operators, technicians, and clerical staff are hired locally and tend to remain 

until retirement.

Figure D–43. Pantex employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Weapons workload funding shifts from year to year, creating peaks and valleys in hiring. During peaks, large 

classes of Security Police Officers, production technicians, etc., are onboarded in classes of 25-40 at a time for 

group training. These positions are hired locally and employees stay for many years, creating groupings with 

the same years of service during hiring peaks. The valleys are created during years with lower funding and 

limited hiring. The current average term of service at the site is 14.15 years. The down side of hiring peaks is 

that employees hired at the same time reach retirement eligibility at the same time, creating potential gaps 

as they retire together in large numbers. Stable funding year to year would level hiring and more evenly 

distribute years of service and, ultimately, group retirements.

Figure D–44. Pantex employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-54 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Fewer employees left voluntarily for other employment in FY 2018. Attrition remains between 5-6 percent. Over 

half of those who leave are retiring. Competitive pay and benefits aid in retention of talent. In addition, the new 

John C. Drummond Center administrative complex was completed in FY 2018, and 1,100 employees were able to 

move to new, modern offices and leave behind less desirable work spaces. Pantex conducted special hiring events 

in FY 2018 to ramp up hiring in preparation for the increased weapons workload in FY 2019. 

Figure D–45. Change in last 2 fiscal years at Pantex

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Those voluntarily separating under age 50 are typically engineers and professionals who are more mobile. Those 

retiring closer to age 65 are spread across all jobs and functions. 

Figure D–46. Age of Pantex employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-55

Notes:

The majority of those leaving from 0-5 years of service are engineers or professionals who were under age 35. 

Those leaving with over 20 years of service are typically over 60 years of age. Voluntary separations are usually 

earlier in the careers of mobile, new graduate professionals who are recruited nationally. Several factors impact 

retention for this group: (a) the location and commute are less desirable than that of the competition; 

(b) electronic restrictions for I-Phones, I-Pads, etc.; (c) waiting for security clearances can cause professionals to 

lose interest; and (d) other high-tech industries compete for the same skilled professionals needed at Pantex. To 

address these concerns, CNS has increased its presence at military and college career fairs; improved work 

environments with the new John C. Drummond Center administrative complex; implemented talent management 

opportunities for career development; enhanced mentoring of new engineers and technical personnel; improved 

clearance processing cycle time by increasing the number of investigators to address the volume of hiring; and 

redesigned compensation to attract and retain critical skills. The balance of Common Occupational Classification 

System-coded employees such as Technicians, Operators, Crafts, and General Administration are hired locally and 

tend to stay until retirement.

Figure D–47. Years of service of Pantex employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 1, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-56 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Early careers grew in 2016 because of increased hiring for attrition replacement and the planned weapons 

workload. In the advanced career stage, employees are working longer, some into their 80s as health allows. The 

plant population has stayed between 3,000 and 3,400, depending on the workload and prioritization.

Figure D–48. Pantex trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

In recent years, attrition and the percentage of employees leaving voluntarily has decreased. The trend shifted 

from approximately 30 percent retirees to over 50 percent retirees as a percentage of attrition. This trend is a 

positive indicator that retention efforts are working. There were small voluntary separation programs in 2009, 

2010, and 2017, as shown in the higher numbers of involuntary separations in those years. The economy dipped 

at the end of FY 2008, causing employees to postpone retirement, as seen by the lower attrition rates in 2009 and 

2010 and the more recent increase in retirements. The boom in oil, gas, and alternative energy increased attrition 

in FY 2015 and tapered off in FY 2016 through FY 2018. Pantex typically experiences higher attrition for Engineers 

and Professional Administrators. Classifications such as Technicians, Operators, Crafts, and General Administration

are hired locally and have lower attrition rates, as they have established family roots in the area and perceive 

Pantex as one of the best employers in the area. 

Figure D–49. Pantex employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-57

Notes:

The total estimated number of full-time permanent employees will increase to 3,436 in FY 2019. The plant 

population at the end of FY 2018 was 3,266, with approximately 110 pending or open requisitions, mostly for 

Engineers, Professionals, Technicians, Crafts, and Laborers (Security). The additional hires will replace attrition and 

build the workforce to support the increase in production and infrastructure workload in FY 2019 and and beyond. 

Technicians and craft persons are typically filled quickly from the local market and military. Engineers and 

Professional Administrators are recruited from job fairs and universities. Internal realignment is used in some cases 

to fill critical vacancies. Plant attrition is 5-6 percent overall. Craft persons, technicians, and administrative staff

have lower attrition rates (less than 5 percent), while Engineers have higher attrition at 9 percent. This higher 

attrition is an ongoing concern, as other technologies are competing for the limited market of Engineers and 

technology majors nationally. Based on current hiring/termination statistics, Pantex anticipate gaps in engineering, 

tooling, and explosives technology in the next 10 years. Pantex is working closely with area universities and military 

bases to help fill the pipeline for Engineers and technology majors for years to come.

Figure D–50. Total projected Pantex workforce needs by Common Occupational 

Classification System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-58 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.3.3 Savannah River Site

D.3.3.1 Mission Overview

The Savannah River Site (SRS), which spans Aiken, 

Allendale, and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina, 

includes mission areas in tritium supply, stockpile 

maintenance, stockpile evaluation, tritium R&D, and 

helium-3 recovery. 

 Location: Aiken, South Carolina

 Total Employees: 635 direct tritium 

personnel, plus 889 in site support

(as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-program site; DOE’s Office of 

Environmental Management is the SRS 

landlord; NNSA is a tenant on site.

 Website: www.srs.gov and

www.savannahrivernuclearsolutions.com

 Contract Operator: Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (Fluor, Honeywell, Huntington Ingalls 

Industries)

 Responsible Field Office: Savannah River Field Office

SRS tritium operations are tightly integrated with activities at Savannah River National Laboratory, a DOE 

Environmental Management Laboratory that also supports NNSA’s Offices of Defense Programs, Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation, Emergency Operations, and Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation; DOE’s

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; DoD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Department 

of Homeland Security; and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

D.3.3.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source

(total SRS FY 2020 request = $2,901 million)

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($2,839 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-59

D.3.3.3 Site Capabilities

SRS has unique capabilities related to nuclear weapon LLCs and the broader national security mission of 

reducing global nuclear security threats for the United States and its allies. Tritium is a critical component 

of the Nation’s defense systems and must be continually replenished to meet the needs of the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent. SRS conducts large-scale tritium operations, and the SRS Savannah River Tritium Enterprise

(SRTE)1is the DOE/NNSA Center of Excellence Involving Large Quantities of Tritium. To sustain the tritium 

inventory, tritium is recovered from two sources at SRS. One source is end-of-life GTS reservoirs that are 

returned to SRS. Anothersource is irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) received 

from the Tennessee Valley Authority. SRS’s key capabilities and associated challenges and strategies are 

described in Table D–6.

Table D–6. Savannah River Site Capabilities

Tritium Recycling (Material Recycle and Recovery Program)

Systems for recovering and recycling tritium from returned GTS reservoirs.

Challenges Strategies

Tritium inventory systems contain LLCs, many of which 

are nearing life expectancy. Recovering the contents of 

the LLCs requires careful planning and coordination to 

avoid mission interruption. 

SRTE has short-term and long-term strategies for addressing the 

challenge of system replacements: 

 In the short-term, schedule replacement projects to maximize 

efficiency and reduce impact on operating schedules. 

 In the long-term, deploy new technologies to enhance system 

operating efficiency and reduce footprint. 

Tritium Extraction (Tritium Sustainment Program)

Tritium extraction from irradiated TPBARs.

Challenges Strategies

To meet supply requirements, SRTE requires additional 

workforce with training, qualifications, and proficiencies.

SRTE examines multi-year staffing needs and develops appropriate 

processes to ensure a continuous pipeline of knowledge, skills, and 

abilities to sustain tritium capabilities.

Tritium extraction requires the elimination of impure 

waste gas. Under current conditions, disposition of this 

gas is managed through a system obligated to multiple 

functions. This overdependence on critical infrastructure 

creates an increasing schedule constraint.

SRTE is executing a small project that will alleviate some 

dependency on existing resources by allowing waste gas to be 

managed safely at the source rather than transferred to another 

facility for disposition.

Replenishing Tritium in Gas Transfer System Reservoirs

Replenishing tritium in GTS reservoirs.

Challenges Strategies

Maintain facilities and equipment to support stockpile 

deliverables and future Alts, Mods, and LEPs.

SRTE uses a strategic investment process and prioritizes its 

infrastructure needs to ensure mission continuity. Priorities are 

identified through engineering analysis and risk assessment, 

vetted by leadership teams, and captured on a Strategic Roadmap. 

This process also includes infrastructure and equipment 

improvements.

DOE/NNSA’s strategy to revitalize the SRTE infrastructure is to

(1) relocate and right-size the remaining operational functions 

from functionally obsolete facilities into existing and new space via

 

1 SRTE is the collective term for the facilities, capabilities, people, and expertise at SRS related to tritium, and the SRTE umbrella 

extends beyond the tritium area to include vital mission-support functions. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this 

appendix will reference SRTE.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-60 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

the Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications (TRIM)

program and (2) recapitalize and sustain enduring facilities.2

TRIM consists of one line-item project (the Tritium Finishing 

Facility, formerly the Tritium Production Capability) and a suite of 

general plant and operating expense-funded projects. Work to 

achieve CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) was 

halted in FY 2018 and is expected to resume in FY 2019. To 

address the capacity issue, SRTE will modify the process and 

infrastructure equipment in multiple facilities and evaluate 

alternative options for some production areas. 

Addressing infrastructure needs in a high-hazard area 

without interrupting the mission schedule while adapting 

for multiple, more complex operations.

SRTE is modifying the process and infrastructure equipment and 

executing a strategic investment process to ensure continuity. 

SRTE is also evaluating critical systems to ensure optimal product 

capacity while carefully planning the production outages to 

maximize benefit.

Gas Transfer System Surveillance

SRTE function testing for GTS surveillance and tritium R&D.

Challenges Strategies

Maintain original function test equipment. SRTE is initiating R&D projects and transitioning to an extended 

schedule that will allow additional enhanced operations to 

eliminate the potential for capacity constraints.

Tritium Research and Development

SRTE function testing for GTS surveillance and tritium R&D.

Challenges Strategies

Provide dedicated R&D capacity for stockpile 

maintenance, stockpile evaluation, and operations 

workload in support of new technologies while 

maintaining and recapitalizing facilities and infrastructure.

SRTE will continue to develop planning options with DOE/NNSA to 

balance operational and R&D needs and fiscal resources. Current 

planning is focused on a Tritium Development Laboratory and 

several smaller new buildings to replace old infrastructure.

Helium-3 Recovery

Recovering, purifying, and bottling helium-3, the byproduct of tritium decay.

Challenges Strategies

None SRTE will continue to maintain and use this capability to meet 

U.S. Government needs.

Alt = alteration

AoA = Analysis of Alternatives

CD = Critical Decision

GTS = gas transfer system

LLC = limited life component

Mod = modification

SRTE = Savannah River Tritium Enterprise

TPBAR = tritium-producing burnable absorber rods

 

2 The preferred alternative from DOE/NNSA’s CD-1 AoA for the Tritium Finishing Facility project specifies two new facilities with 

a combined maximum footprint of 24,000 square feet.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-61

D.3.3.4 Accomplishments

 SRTE reached over 3.2 million safely worked man-hours and improved conduct of operations with 

no Technical Safety Requirements violations.

 SRTE performed extractions on 600 TPBARs and met established goals safely and ahead of 

schedule.

 SRTE reduced the average number of days to obtain the necessary Q clearance by 22 percent 

through targeted hiring, process change, and the use of expedited clearances. On average, SRTE

put employees to work 41 days earlier than the previous year.

 SRTE increased small project execution in FY 2018 by 78 percent over FY 2017, and five-fold from 

FY 2015 in preparation for the upcoming increased production period (FY 2020 – FY 2024), when 

production requirements will be markedly higher than previous operating levels.

 SRTE replaced its Function Test Station Data Acquisition System to improve reliability and 

flexibility for future missions. Savannah River National Laboratory also developed a streamlined 

method to calculate component statistics that reduces the potential for human error.

 Savannah River National Laboratory procured, received, installed, and placed into service an 

electron beam additive manufacturing metal printer to produce specialized parts in support of 

defense program activities.

D.3.3.5 Savannah River Site Tritium Workforce

SRTE has 635 employees, with an average age of 45 years. In FY 2018, the employee years-of-service 

distribution reversed from previous years: 55 percent have less than 10 years of SRS site experience and 

41 percent have over 25 years of service. Approximately 15 percent of SRTE’s employees are eligible to 

retire. Since FY 2016, approximately 400 employees were hired or transferred into SRTE reducing and 

mitigating the loss of knowledge risk associated with an aging workforce. SRTE achieved 101 percent of 

its staffing goal and ended the year with a net increase of 85 employees. A total of 134 people were hired. 

The SRTE attrition rate held to 9.8 percent versus the projected rate of 14 percent. This included 

retirements, terminations, and transfers to other parts of SRS.

SRS is unique relative to other NNSA sites across the complex because it is managed by the DOE Office of 

Environmental Management. Approximately 10 percent of the M&O workforce is dedicated to the 

defense mission. DOE/NNSA pays its share of an indirect allocation of M&O personnel to maintain 

infrastructure and services (e.g., roads, streams, fire water, electricity, medical, emergency personnel). 

The scope of Defense Programs work resides in the SRTE organization, which is managed as a severable 

entity within SRS.

To speed the clearance and qualification process, SRTE used an expedited clearance process and put an 

unclassified training simulator into operation to train personnel awaiting clearances. Advance hiring to 

provide adequate staffing and knowledge transfer can conflict with budgetary restriction. Addressing the 

budgetary constraint is critical. SRS’s Engineering Leadership Development Program and targeted 

recruiting of Navy candidates with previous nuclear experience attracted higher quality candidates, many 

of whom already held DoD clearances. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in 

Figures D–51 through D–59.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-62 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

With an aggressive strategic hiring plan and steady attrition, the majority of the workforce within SRTE has been stable 

over the past 2 years. In FY 2018, hiring focused on critical roles required for mission success. Actual attrition was lower 

than predicted, and SRTE did not experience an anticipated spike in retirement. As the workforce continues to age, 

replacements are hired who are not pension-eligible; therefore, retention is more difficult. Employee engagement, focus 

on the national security mission, and efforts to create a compelling workplace are focus points for SRS. Failure to reach 

and maintain mission-essential staffing in key positions is a risk. SRTE places hiring priority on the top 10 critical positions 

and remains focused on mission-essential staffing levels in those positions. Attrition at SRTE has been low and primarily 

reasons related to promotional opportunities at other facilities within SRS. Competition for skilled nuclear workers has 

diminished because of decreased demand and financial upset in the regional commercial nuclear industry. 

Numbers in the Professional Administrators Common Occupational Classification System category increased from 

FY 2017 because those positions were realigned from the General Administration category. 

Figure D–51. SRTE total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-63

Notes:

In FY 2018, the average employee age decreased from 47 to 45 years old. The average age of personnel hired within the 

last 5 years is 35 years. SRTE-Tritium is addressing workforce replacements to hire, clear, train, and qualify new 

employees as experienced employees leave the organization. The focus has also expanded to engagement, development,

and retention of new employees and knowledge transfer and preservation. SRTE implemented Knowledge Preservation 

Management software and continues initiatives to retain legacy knowledge. Retirement eligibility has decreased by 

3 percent and remains steady. The end of the M&O contract and expanding missions on site could pose a risk. 

Fifteen percent of the SRTE workforce will be fully retirement-eligible by 2019. To understand the full effect of potential 

retirements, SRS’s NNSA Operations and Programs office updated retirement eligibility and risk analyses, adding Social 

Security Administration retirement eligibility to the existing pension eligibility as the primary factor to retirement risk. 

Figure D–52. SRTE employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

The SRTE workforce is in transition. Forty percent of the SRTE workforce has between 21-45 years of experience—a 

10 percent decrease from the previous year. Additionally, 51 percent of the workforce has between 0-5 years of service. 

SRTE has continued aggressive strategic hiring focused on key critical positions, including control room operators, shift 

operations managers, first line managers, and trainers. SRTE will face steady retirements over the next 5 to 8 years, with 

an anticipated increase associated with M&O contract transition. Forty percent of the workforce has over 26 years of 

experience, a decrease of 8 percent from the previous year.

Figure D–53. SRTE employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-64 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

In FY 2018, hiring for SRTE exceeded its strategic staffing plan in terms of the number hired and the quality of new hires. 

Attrition was steady, but below expectations, with most leaving for retirement followed by those finding promotional 

opportunities within SRS. Significant workforce competition was curtailed following redirection in the regional 

commercial nuclear industry, but could become a concern again. SRTE will also face competition from other missions 

located at SRS. Hiring key critical positions and keeping new employees engaged in meaningful work until clearances are 

awarded will continue to be a challenge. With termination of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility project, the 

opportunity exists to hire cleared employees with an understanding of the SRS mission. The challenge is to have sufficient

funding to hire workers in advance of need. To motivate, recognize, and compensate employees in certain critical 

positions, SRTE implemented leadership engagement opportunities, retention bonuses for control room operators, and 

certification stipends. Expediting clearances has decreased overall clearance time, with most employees able to get an 

L clearance within 6 months and a Q clearance within 1 year. A Tritium-specific New Employee Orientation was 

implemented in FY 2018 to introduce new hires to the tritium mission and reinforce the importance of the SRTE workforce 

in mission success.

Figure D–54. Change in last 2 fiscal years at SRTE (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-65

Notes:

Attrition remained steady in FY 2018, but was less than forecast. Retirement accounted for over 50 percent of 

all attrition in FY 2018, slightly higher than the prior year. However, there was no spike in retirements as 

projected. Overall, retirement and voluntary attrition decreased slightly from the prior year, while involuntary 

attrition decreased significantly. Eight of the 19 voluntary transfers out of SRTE to SRS were for promotions

and salary increases. The remainder were for family relocation and personal reasons. Attrition is expected to 

remain steady and may increase because of M&O contract turnover and as new opportunities arise on site. 

Managing attrition from key critical positions remains a priority, as well as the ability to hire ahead of need, to 

allow time for the required clearance and training to occur. SRTE continued to enhance the screening and 

onboarding processes to identify candidates who may be more aligned to the work that is performed and those 

who may be more successful in the onboarding and clearance processes. Over the past 2 years, these 

improvements resulted in no attrition among the 48 non-exempt operators hired. SRTE will also need to hire 

operators in advance of need to allow existing operators to develop into more senior positions. 

Figure D–55. Age of SRTE employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-66 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

SRTE experienced a steady level of retirement occurring among employees with 26-35 years of service. There 

were no concerning trends. Employees leaving voluntarily within the 0-5-year category decreased and 

separations were primarily related to promotional opportunities on site with associated pay increases. The

focus was on continuing retention strategies for early-career employees. Engagement initiatives, including New 

Employee Orientation, leadership development, and mission-driven focus, are having a positive impact on 

worker retention.

Figure D–56. Years of service of SRTE employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-67

Notes:

The early-career workforce continues to increase and has surpassed the advanced-career workforce. In 

FY 2018, the advanced-career workforce continued to hold steady. Leadership training and retention of earlycareer hires has resulted in an improved number of mid-career employees. In addition, SRS supports a program 

designed to provide networking and professional development opportunities for mid-career employees. The

goal is to cultivate quality talent and recruit leaders to fill future needs.

Figure D–57. SRTE trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-68 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

Workforce retirement is expected to remain steady over the next 5 years. To prepare for the increased 

production period (FY 2020–FY 2024), SRTE continues to plan and execute workforce growth commensurate 

with mission requirements to recapitalize process equipment and surrounding infrastructure, increase GTS

work scope due to the LEPs, and offset expected retirements with time allowances for clearance and training 

processes. SRTE-Tritium will continue to hire replacements and to accommodate the increased work scope and 

will retain the new employees by providing meaningful work, leadership engagement, development 

opportunities, and a compelling place to work.

Figure D–58. SRTE employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-69

Notes:

SRTE will experience mission growth because of an increase in Tritium Extraction Facility production, project 

activity (line item and minor construction projects), maintenance on aging facilities and infrastructure, and 

implementation of Nuclear Enterprise Assurance requirements. SRTE will also experience growth in reservoir 

processing and surveillance because of the complexity of new LEPs. SRTE must continue to manage increased 

attrition (retirements and resignation) and employee retention. If an adequate number of personnel cannot 

be obtained and cleared prior to the retirement of qualified experienced personnel, SRTE will have a gap in 

mission support.

Figure D–59. Total projected SRTE workforce needs by Common Occupational 

Classification System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-70 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.3.4 Y-12 National Security Complex

D.3.4.1 Mission Overview

Every weapon in the U.S. nuclear stockpile has 

components manufactured, maintained, or 

dismantled at the Y-12 National Security Complex 

(Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Y-12 is 

DOE/NNSA’s Uranium Center of Excellence and is 

the Nation’s only source for enriched uranium 

components for nuclear weapons. For the legacy 

stockpile, Y-12 manufactures uranium 

components for nuclear weapons, cases, and 

other weapons components and evaluates and 

tests these components. Through LEP activities, 

Y-12 produces refurbished, replaced, and 

upgraded weapon components to modernize the enduring stockpile. Y-12 also serves as the main storage 

facility for Category I/II quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU); conducts dismantlement, storage, 

and disposition of HEU; and supplies HEU for use in naval reactors. 

 Location: Oak Ridge, Tennessee

 Total Employees: 4,632 (as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-program nuclear weapons production facility

 Website: www.y12.doe.gov

 Contract Operator: Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), a corporate subsidiary of Bechtel 

National, Leidos, ATK Launch Systems, and SOC, LLC

 Responsible Field Office: NNSA Production Office 

D.3.4.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source 

(total Y-12 FY 2020 request = $1,942 million) 

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($1,889 million)

D.3.4.3 Site Capabilities

Key mission capability areas at Y-12 are primarily in three areas: uranium and canned subassembly 

production; lithium; and material and process R&D. Key to all of these capabilities is the supporting 

infrastructure that provides power, water, and other critical services. Y-12’s key capabilities and their 

associated challenges and strategies are described in Table D–7.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-71

Table D–7. Y-12 National Security Complex Capabilities

Uranium and Canned Subassembly Production Capability

Y-12 produces uranium weapon components to refurbish the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. Y-12 also recycles and reprocesses 

the Nation’s existing supply of enriched uranium. The recycled metal also serves as feedstock for the Navy’s nuclear-powered 

submarines and aircraft carriers, for commercial power reactors that generate U.S. electricity, for medical isotope production, 

and for some domestic and foreign research reactor programs. Y-12 also helps recover and secure at-risk nuclear materials 

around the globe. The Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 houses the Nation’s cache of weapons-grade 

uranium. The Uranium Processing Facility now under construction will be a state-of-the-art facility for the enriched uranium 

operations that are currently performed in Building 9212. 

Challenges Strategies

To continue supporting all uranium missions, Y-12 must 

address its aging infrastructure. Buildings 9215 and 9204-2E 

are aging and require sustainment through the Extended Life 

Program. Enriched uranium capabilities must be maintained 

while the Uranium Processing Facility is being constructed. 

This requires relocation of enriched uranium functions to 

other Y-12 facilities and startup and proving of replacement 

technologies before uranium programmatic operations cease 

in Building 9212 by 2025. Y-12 must also complete reduction 

of material-at-risk quantities in current processing facilities 

by consolidating storage into the Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility.

The Uranium Processing Facility will replace most of the HEU 

production functions currently performed in Building 9212. 

The uranium strategy also includes upgrades and advanced 

technologies that will be started in existing Buildings 9204-2E 

and 9215.

Lithium Capability

Y-12 provides material purification, material preparation, component fabrication and inspection, salvage operations, and 

storage for lithium operations to support LEPs, JTAs, and complementary work. Without enriched lithium, the Nation’s

nuclear deterrent could not be maintained. 

Challenges Strategies

Current lithium capabilities are housed in Building 9204-2, a 

Manhattan Project facility built in 1943. The facility 

infrastructure is well beyond its expected life and is 

deteriorating rapidly. The process equipment is oversized for 

today’s missions, is also deteriorating rapidly, and has 

significantly exceeded its life expectancy. In addition, lithium 

production capabilities will be strained even more because of

material availability issues and future increases in mission 

goals. The age of the infrastructure and the limited material 

supply pose significant risks to meeting mission deliverables.

Because of the serious degradation of the existing lithium 

production infrastructure and limited material supply, 

implementation of the lithium strategy requires DOE/NNSA to 

sustain the current infrastructure; sustain the supply to meet 

customer demand; mature and deploy technologies to replace 

hazardous processes; and develop and deploy the new Lithium 

Processing Facility line item project to replace Building 9204-2

lithium process capabilities. 

Material and Process Research and Development Capability

Y-12’s Development Division serves as the focal point for development and preservation of uranium and lithium materials 

sciences and manufacturing technologies. R&D activities include material and metallurgical synthesis, forming, evaluation 

techniques and processes, material purification, and material characterization. Advanced technologies have been developed 

and are at varying stages of deployment readiness for enriched uranium and lithium. 

Challenges Strategies

Aging electrical, water distribution, and other process 

support systems in Y-12’s infrastructure put mission work at 

risk as the infrastructure continues to age. 

Y-12 is evaluating potential strategies to sustain and ensure 

material and process R&D capabilities, including moving 

operations, engineers, and scientists to more modern 

facilities. Y-12 is implementing electrical and water system 

recapitalization projects to address these issues.

HEU = highly enriched uranium

JTA = joint test assemblies
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-72 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.3.4.4 Accomplishments

 Exceeded FY 2018 baselined production deliverables.

 Processed the highest number of canned subassemblies for Stockpile Systems surveillance in the 

past 6 years.

 Completed the first production unit for the W88 Alt 370 component 15 months ahead of the 

system first production unit.

 Initiated assembly of the first B61-12 War Reserve canned subassemblies.

 Began construction on the Uranium Processing Facility project.

D.3.4.5 Y-12 National Security Complex Workforce

Y-12 has 4,632 employees. The Y-12 workforce’s average age is 49 years old, and 37 percent are 

retirement-eligible. Y-12 is replenishing its workforce for future needs, and half of the population has 

10 years or less of service. The average amount of years of service is 13 years. Approximately 45 percent 

of Y-12’s employees are eligible to retire. Most separations are retirements, with about 70 percent of 

separations occurring at age 56 and above; however, a large number of voluntary separations occur 

among those with 0-5 years of service. Since FY 2016, the early-career population has increased because 

of increased hiring, while retirements have led to a slight decrease in the advanced career population.

Y-12 anticipates slight increases in the overall population over the FYNSP period, especially from FY 2020 

through FY 2022. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures D–60 through D–68.

Notes:

The headcount has stayed consistent this reporting period compared to the last reporting period. CNS saw an increase 

in our Common Occupational Classification System (COCS)-coded Engineers and a decrease in General Management and 

Scientists, partly as a result of CNS Compensation Redesign efforts. In addition to hiring efforts within Engineering 

specifically, during Compensation Redesign, managers were tasked with assigning job titles based on job scope; this 

resulted in a shift among COCS categories. Y-12 views this as a positive change, enabling CNS to have technical skills 

needed to fulfill mission work.

Figure D–60. Y-12 total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-73

Notes:

Many employees elect to work beyond their earliest eligibility retirement age, as reflected in Y-12’s low attrition rate. 

This demographic shows that Y-12 is steadily replacing the workforce as employees leave. The average age of employees 

is 48.5, and 52 percent of the workforce are age 50 or below.

The percentage of retirement-eligible employees provided is based on the number of participants eligible to participate 

in the defined benefit pension plan and enhanced 401k contribution plan. 

Figure D–61. Y-12 employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

The average years of service at Y-12 is 13.06 years; 50 percent of the population have 10 years or less of service, 

indicating that Y-12 is replenishing its workforce for future needs. At this time, attrition remains low, thereby facilitating 

Y-12’s ability to retain a skilled workforce.

Figure D–62. Y-12 employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-74 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

The net change was positive over this reporting period because of increased hiring. Over half of those who leave are 

retiring. Competitive pay and benefits aid in retaining talent. 

As counted in years past, involuntary separation includes people who died, those who went out on disability, and those 

who were terminated for cause.

Figure D–63. Change in last 2 fiscal years (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

There are no irregularities with 70 percent of the terminations being age 56 and above. The largest group of 

terminations were in the 61-65 age band.

Involuntary separations are those people that “left involuntarily” from the site, including death disability, and those 

terminated for cause (clearance denied, conduct, etc.).

Figure D–64. Age of Y-12 employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-75

Notes:

The data show no irregularities. Most voluntary separations are employees under the age of 40 with less than 5 years 

company service, and most retirees leave with 36-40 years of service.

Involuntary count includes people who died, those who went out on disability, and those terminated for cause.

Figure D–65. Years of service of Y-12 employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

The early-career population grew in 2018 because of increased hiring. The slight decrease in the percentage of the 

advanced-career population is due to increased retirements.

Figure D–66. Y-12 trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-76 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

In FY 2008, a voluntary retirement incentive program was offered, which accounts for the high number of retirements 

that year. Effective July 1, 2014, CNS became the new managing contractor for both Y-12 and Pantex. A Voluntary 

Separation Program was offered April 24, 2014, with terminations effective no later than June 30, 2014. The Voluntary 

Separation Program at Y-12 resulted in 105 terminations, and there were seven involuntary reductions in forces during 

FY 2014. During FY 2015, the scope of work for the Uranium Processing Facility was transitioned to Bechtel National. 

With this transition, 169 employees left the CNS Y-12 payroll and joined Bechtel National. Voluntary Separation 

Programs involve incentives to leave a company’s payroll or take early retirement. During FY 2018, another Voluntary 

Separation Program was offered. 37 of these separations resulted in retirements accounting for the higher retirement 

number in FY 2018. 

Figure D–67. Y-12 employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-77

Figure D–68. Total projected Y-12 workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification 

System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-78 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

D.4 The National Security Site

D.4.1 Nevada National Security Site

D.4.1.1 Mission Overview

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) outside of 

Las Vegas, Nevada is the primary location within the 

DOE/NNSA complex where high-hazard experiments

with radiological and other high-hazard materials are 

conducted. It is the only location in the United States

that is authorized to conduct subcritical experiments

with both HE and weapons-relevant quantities of 

plutonium.

 Location: Las Vegas, Nevada

 Additional Operating Capabilities: Offices at 

LANL, LLNL, and SNL; Remote Sensing 

Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base and 

Andrews Air Force Base; and the Special 

Technologies Laboratory in Santa Barbara, California

 Total Employees: 2,205 (as of the end of FY 2018)

 Type: Multi-program experimental site

 Website: www.nnss.gov

 Contract Operator: Mission Support and Test Services LLC, a joint venture between Honeywell 

International, Inc.; Jacobs Engineering Group; and Huntington Ingals Industries Nuclear, Inc.

D.4.1.2 Funding

FY 2020 request – site funding by source

(total NNSS FY 2020 Request = $495 million)

FY 2020 FYNSP request for Weapons Activities

($369 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-79

D.4.1.3 Site Capabilities

NNSS supports stockpile stewardship through plutonium experiments in collaboration with LANL, LLNL, 

and SNL; data analyses from those experiments; diagnostic R&D; and reanalysis of legacy underground 

test data.

NNSS’ capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies are described in Table D–8.

Table D–8. Nevada National Security Site Capabilities

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments at Weapon’s Relevant Scales

NNSS performs subcritical experiments at U1a focus on early explosion-time hydrodynamic characterization of plutonium and 

plutonium surrogates in weapon-relevant geometries. NNSS, LLNL, LANL, and SNL plan to enhance U1a to enable well-diagnosed, 

early- and late-time radiographic and neutron reactivity measurements on hydrodynamic tests. These new data are the bases 

for assessing the effects of aging and manufacturing processes on stockpile weapons.

Challenges Strategies

Increasing the tempo, variety, and sophistication of 

subcritical experiments and enhanced capability for 

subcritical experiments by exploring major improvements in 

experiment and U1a operations efficiencies.

Implement a multi-user U1a operating model and an integrated, 

logic-linked framework schedule to optimize critical path 

contributors. Invest in U1a, Device Assembly Facility (DAF), 

diagnostics, and transportation for future subcritical 

experiments.

Weapons Science Experiments Using High-Hazard Materials

Activities include maturing capabilities in shock and compression experiments; dynamic phase change studies; capture of 

thermodynamic and constitutive properties; platform and source development; and materials diagnostic R&D on JASPER, the 

Dynamic Science Launcher, Z; and a variety of shock physics platforms at NNSS and Special Technologies Laboratory. JASPER is 

a two-stage light gas gun for studying the behavior of plutonium and other materials at high pressures, temperatures, and strain 

rates. Material property data are obtained on a wide variety of national security materials of interest in various phases and 

compositions owing to differences in manufacturing processes, surface preparations, and ages.

Challenges Strategies

Breakthroughs in materials science are limited by the rate of 

experimentation, staffing constraints, the range of dynamic 

conditions that are available to DOE/NNSA, and the need for 

higher-precision diagnostics that can measure phase 

changes, temperature, density, and two-dimensional

displacement/velocity-fields at very short time scales and 

very high temperatures, pressures, and densities.

NNSS is seeking efficiencies in operations to increase scientific 

throughput at its many shock physics platforms. Some of these 

efficiencies are realized through increased recruitment activities 

and development of newer, higher-precision diagnostics.

NNSS will leverage site-directed R&D-initiated new diagnostics,

mature these diagnostics, and optimize them for multi-platform 

use (e.g., hydrodynamic experiments, subcritical experiments, 

and JASPER) interferometry, diffractometry, radiography, 

pyrometry, and other spectroscopic techniques. 

Device Assembly Facility

DAF supports nuclear weapon experimental capabilities and is one of two facilities in the nuclear security enterprise that allows 

collocation of HE and SNM, including staging of large quantities of SNM in independent buildings, and provides the backbone to

support various missions using those materials in conjunction. For stockpile stewardship, the facility’s glove box, downdraft 

table, and radiography capabilities support assembly of SNM targets JASPER, and SNM and HE packages for subcritical 

experiments at U1a. DAF also hosts the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), a unique national asset. 

NCERC supports a mix of critical and subcritical benchmark quality experiments, detector development, inspector and first 

responder training, criticality safety training, and handling of damaged nuclear weapons. NCERC has the largest collection of

nuclear critical mass assembly machines in the western hemisphere.

Challenges Strategies

DAF has a wide range of unique capabilities. As demand for 

these capabilities grows across DOE/NNSA, space and 

scheduling challenges can be expected to grow to 

accommodate the number and breadth of programs hosted 

by the complex.

This capability will be maintained to meet U.S. Government 

needs. Options to increase these capabilities on a timescale 

complementary to anticipated experimental needs will need to 

be explored (e.g., enhanced surveillance and storage).
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-80 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors

NNSS’ core capabilities, in addition to fielding high-value, high-risk experiments in the national interest, include developing the 

next generation of high-precision, transformational diagnostics for subcritical, hydrodynamic, and dynamic materials

experiments. Some of the groundbreaking diagnostics that have been developed with NNSS’ collaboration and efforts include 

photon Doppler velocimetry; optical ranging (i.e., broadband laser ranging); surface imaging; soft x-ray radiography; holography;

dynamic pyrometry and emissivity; dynamic x-ray diffraction; prompt neutron and x-ray detectors; and advanced radiography 

sources for subcritical experiments (now approaching an $800 million cost) and other hydrodynamic platforms.

Challenges Strategies

Advanced diagnostics and sensors provide detailed 

measurements of materials, objects, and dynamic processes 

critical to weapon operation. Standard diagnostics provide 

lower-resolution data that are suitable for basic inquiries, but 

not detailed part, process, or physics qualification. Continued 

diagnostic and sensor development is critical to addressing 

these limitations. The current expense and pace for advanced 

diagnostics will require continued congressional support.

NNSS will involve nuclear security enterprise laboratories in 

defining and prioritizing diagnostic needs for future 

experiments, (subcritical experiments, Enhanced Capabilities 

for Subcritical Experiments, JASPER, the Big Explosives 

Experimental Facility, etc.).

HE = high explosives

JASPER = Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

SNM = special nuclear material

U1a = U1a Complex

Z = Z pulsed power facility

D.4.1.4 Accomplishments

 Vega, the final subcritical experiment in the Lyra series, was conducted on December 13, 2017. 

Vega used plutonium and IHE, and will be compared with previous Lyra experiments, completing 

a fundamental experimental assessment of surrogate/plutonium and CHE/IHE issues. 

 The Lamarck confirmatory was conducted at the U1a Complex on August 15, 2018. Lamarck 

represented the final preparatory experiment for Ediza, a plutonium subcritical experiment that 

occurred during February of FY 2019. The Ediza experiment provided essential data in support of 

the safety science programs within the DOE/NNSA.

 Diagnostic development – broadband laser ranging. NNSS continued collaborating with the 

national security laboratories to develop the broadband laser ranging diagnostic as the next 

generation of experimental probe. When paired with photon Doppler velocimetry, broadband 

laser ranging will provide unprecedented velocity and position measurements of imploding 

surfaces; this diagnostic was fielded successfully in the Vega subcritical experiments and Lamarck 

confirmatory. The development of photon Doppler velocimetry revolutionized the field of shock 

physics; this trend continues with the joint deployment of broadband laser ranging with photon 

Doppler velocimetry.

 JASPER Experimental Program. Supporting the accomplishment of an accelerated cadence, 

Nevada developed an integrated management system that includes all elements of preparing, 

conducting, and facility readiness needed to support national program initiatives. Twenty-nine 

experiments were completed in FY 2018, representing an 81 percent increase in cadence from 

FY 2017 and efforts are on track to increase cadence further. These experiments provided precise 

plutonium property data under dynamic conditions.

 Dense Plasma Focus. Nevada continued to execute experiments using the dense plasma focus 

pulsed energy source. A series of experiments testing the reliability of the dense plasma focus for 

use on a neutron diagnosed subcritical experiment were completed. This research has proven to 

be pivotal in developing a major diagnostic tool as a mainstay of subcritical experiments. This 

diagnostic will allow investigation into several new areas of physics that are important to 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-81

DOE/NNSA, including dynamic internal temperature measurement, neutron reactivity rates, and

neutron radiography.

D.4.1.5 Nevada National Security Site Workforce

NNSS had 2,205 employees at the end of FY 2018. The age of the workforce is heavily concentrated 

between the ages of 46 and 65 years, with an average age of 59 years. The percent of employees eligible 

for retirement is around 30 percent. The average years ofservice is around 11 years, while the population 

is concentrated below 20 years of service. The largest experience group consists of those with 1-5 years 

of service. Voluntary separations were the largest overall category of separations, were spread among 

several age groups, and were concentrated among those with less than 15 years of service. About 

26 percent of separations were retirements, and another 23 percent were involuntary terminations, many 

of which resulted from contract transition. Since FY 2016, early-, mid-, and advanced-career trend 

populations have slowly increased, while the overall percentage of advanced-career employees declined. 

Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures D–69 through D–77.

Notes:

Total site headcount increased by approximately 3 percent in FY 2018. The number of hires went down from last 

year because of limited hiring that occurred during and after a recent M&O contractor transition. The Business 

Professional job group (Professional Administrators COCS category) experienced the highest hiring rates (26 percent

of all FY 2018 hires), especially with Safeguards and Security Specialists and Project Controls Specialists. On 

July 1, 2018, MSTS took over the responsibilities that TechSource and Pro2Serve provided for NNSS, including 

operation of the badge offices, the operations security program, and security awareness. This action added 10 new 

Safeguards and Securities Specialists to the current workforce. MSTS has also experienced a large turnover of Project 

Controls Specialists, spurring the hiring of several new Specialists in that group. The next job groups experiencing 

large hiring rates were Scientists and Engineers (11 percent of all fiscal year hires). Most of these hires were Engineer 

I level. As predicted, the number of retirements went up in FY 2018 because of the site’s aging workforce and the 

contract transition. Both voluntary and involuntary terminations also increased in FY 2018.

Figure D–69. NNSS total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-82 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

The age of the workforce is still heavily concentrated between the ages of 46 and 65 years, which explains the high 

average age of 49.4 years and the percentage of retirement-eligible employees at 29.6 percent. These numbers 

decreased slightly from the FY 2017 numbers. The non-represented3 employee average age is 49.9 years old, and 

retirement-eligible employees number 33.2 percent. The represented employee average age is 47.7 years old, and 

retirement-eligible employees number 18 percent. The drastic difference in retirement eligibility between the nonrepresented and represented employees is because non-represented employees have longer tenure and are an 

older population. The population of early-career employees (less than 35 years old) increased by 11 percent during 

FY 2017 as NNSS implemented strategic college hiring goals and site-level internship programs that have expanded 

the technical and critical skill talent pipelines. As the site continues hiring early-career employees and retirements 

continue, the average age and percentage of those eligible for retirement will decrease slightly.

Figure D–70. NNSS employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)

 

3 The Nevada Nuclear Security Site’s Occupational Safety and Health Division has several key safety committees representing the

workforce. These include the Labor Alliance and Safety Committee that represent site workers, the Downtown Safety Committee, 

representing those in North Las Vegas and the Continuous Safety Improvement Committee for non-bargaining administrative 

employees.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-83

Notes:

The years of service of NNSS’ workforce stayed relatively constant from the end of FY 2017 to the end of FY 2018.

Employees with 16-20 years of service experienced the largest increase, at 40 percent, followed by employees with 

1-5 years of service, who increased by 14 percent. Most of the other service categories experienced a decrease or 

remained relatively stagnant. Employees with 1-15 years of service make up more than 75 percent of the employee 

population.

Figure D–71. NNSS employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

NNSS experienced a positive net increase in FY 2017 and FY 2018 and expects this trend to continue into FY 2019. 

As the site continues to make strategic organizational changes and analyze hiring needs, hires in most job groups 

will continue to increase. The site experienced several involuntary reductions in employment because of transition 

in FY 2018, although it is common to see an increase in voluntary terminations during a contract transition.

Figure D–72. Change in last 2 fiscal years (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-84 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

In FY 2018, 26 percent of all NNSS terminations were retirements, both early and normal. This is expected to 

increase asthe percentage of the population eligible to retire does. Approximately half of all terminations in FY 2018 

were voluntary terminations; a quarter were involuntary terminations. On the non-bargaining side, 74 percent of 

involuntary terminations were involuntary reductions in employment due to contract transition. No other 

reductions in employment took place in FY 2018 on the non-bargaining-side. NNSS does not foresee many 

reductions in employment in FY 2019. Fifty percent of all terminations in FY 2018 were voluntary terminations;

resignations and career advancement opportunities were the primary reasons for leaving service.

Figure D–73. Age of NNSS employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Of all terminations for FY 2017 and FY 2018, 40 percent had 0-5 years of service; 19 percent had 6-10 years of service;

and 17 percent had 11-15 years of service. In total, those with 0-15 years of service made up almost 77 percent of 

all terminations in FY 2017 and FY 2018. In both FYs 2017 and 2018, more retirements occurred among employees 

with 6-15 years of service.

Figure D–74. Years of service of NNSS employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-85

Notes:

The percentage of employees considered to be in their early- and mid-career stage went up slightly from FY 2017. 

The percentage of employees in the advanced-career stage went down 1.4 percent from FY 2017. Similar to FY 2017, 

the largest percentage of employees are in the advanced-career stage, which is consistent with the high average age 

of the employee population. NNSS implemented strategic college hiring goals and site-level internship programs 

that are increasing the early-career talent pipeline, particularly for technical positions. Thirty-five percent of all hires 

in FY 2018 were filled by employees considered early-career, while 36 percent of all hires in FY 2018 were filled by 

employees considered mid-career.

Figure D–75. NNSS trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)

Notes:

As expected, retirements and involuntary terminations increased slightly in FY 2018 from FY 2017 due to

employment reductions. Most of this increase can be attributed to contract transition. Retirements are expected 

to increase throughout FY 2019 as the population ages. Voluntary terminations also increased in FY 2018. Similar 

to FY 2017, the primary reasons given for voluntary turnover were resignations and career advancement 

opportunities. This is consistent with industry survey data citing the primary reason people voluntarily separate. 

Other major reasons for voluntary turnover included company culture, compensation, and family circumstances. 

NNSS will continue tracking the reasons for all terminations, analyzing for trends, and focusing on attracting, 

retaining, and growing employees, especially in the early- and mid-career positions.

Figure D–76. NNSS employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-86 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Notes:

NNSS continues to use subcontractors and other staff augmentation strategies to address peak workloads, but is 

implementing an initiative to decrease these in core and critical skill areas. A major projected need is a ramp-up in 

the number of technicians and engineers over the next 5 years to support anticipated Enhanced Capabilities for 

Subcritical Experiments capabilities.

Figure D–77. Total projected NNSS workforce needs by Common Occupational

Classification System over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-1

Appendix E

Glossary

3D printing—Also known as additive manufacturing, which turns digital three-dimensional models into 

solid objects by building them up in layers.

abnormal environment—An environment, as defined in a weapon’s stockpile-to-target sequence and 

military characteristics, in which the weapon is not expected to retain full operational reliability, or an 

environment that is not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and associated activities. 

additive manufacturing—A manufacturing technique that builds objects layer by layer, according to 

precise design specifications, compared to a traditional manufacturing technique in which objects are 

carved out of a larger block of material or cast in molds and dies. 

advanced manufacturing—Modern technologies necessary to enhance secure manufacturing capabilities 

and provide timely support for critical needs of the stockpile.

alteration (Alt)—A material change to, or a prescribed inspection of, a nuclear weapon or major assembly 

that does not alter its operational capability, yet is sufficiently important to the user regarding assembly,

maintenance, storage, or test operations to require controlled application and identification. 

annual assessment process—The authoritative method to evaluate the safety, reliability, performance, 

and military effectiveness of the stockpile by subject matter experts based upon new and legacy data, 

surveillance, and modeling and simulation. It is a principal factor in the Nation’s ability to maintain a 

credible deterrent without nuclear explosive testing. The Directors of the three national security 

laboratories complete annual assessments of the stockpile, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 

Command provides a separate assessment of military effectiveness. The assessments also determine

whether underground nuclear explosive testing must be conducted to resolve any issues. The Secretaries 

of Energy and Defense submit the reports unaltered to the President, along with any conclusions they

deem appropriate.

arming, fuzing, and firing (AF&F) system—The electronic and mechanical functions that ensure a nuclear 

weapon does not operate when not intended during any part of its manufacture and lifetime, but do

ensure the weapon will operate correctly when a unique signal to do so is properly activated. 

B61—An air-delivered gravity bomb.

B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP to consolidate four families of the B61 bomb into one and 

improve the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the U.S. arsenal.

B83-1—An air-delivered gravity bomb.

Boost—The process that increases the yield of a nuclear weapon’s primary stage through fusion reactions.

canned subassembly (CSA)—A component of a nuclear weapon that is hermetically sealed in a metal 

container. A CSA and the primary make up a weapon’s nuclear explosive package.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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certification—The process whereby all available information on the performance of a weapon system is 

considered and the Laboratory Directors responsible for that system certify, before the weapon enters 

the stockpile, that it will meet, with noted exceptions, the military characteristics within the environments 

defined by the stockpile-to-target sequence.

co-design—An inclusive process to develop designs that encourages participants to find solutions within 

the context of the total system rather than based upon individual areas of expertise and interest.

component—An assembly or combination of parts, subassemblies, and assemblies mounted together 

during manufacture, assembly, maintenance, or rebuild. In a system engineering product hierarchy, the 

component is the lowest level of shippable and storable entities, which may be raw material, procured 

parts, or manufactured items.

Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)—A dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of 

government networks and systems. CDM provides Federal departments and agencies with capabilities 

and tools that identify cybersecurity risks on an ongoing basis, prioritize these risks based upon potential 

impacts, and enable cybersecurity personnel to mitigate the most significant problems first. Congress 

established the CDM program to provide adequate, risk-based, and cost-effective cybersecurity and to 

allocate cybersecurity resources more efficiently.

continuous monitoring—A strategy that enables information security professionals and others to see a 

continuous stream of near real-time snapshots of the state of risk to their security, data, network, end 

points, and even cloud devices and applications.

conventional high explosive (CHE)—A high explosive that detonates when given sufficient stimulus via a 

high-pressure shock. Stimuli from severe accident environments involving impact, fire, or electrical 

discharge may also initiate a CHE. See also “insensitive high explosive.”

critical decision (CD)—The five levels a DOE project typically progresses through, which serve as major 

milestones approved by the Chief Executive for Project Management. Each CD marks an authorization to 

increase the commitment of resources and requires successful completion of the preceding phase. These 

five phases are CD-0, Approve Mission Need; CD-1, Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range; 

CD-2, Approve Performance Baseline; CD-3, Approve Start of Construction/Execution; CD-4, Approve Start 

of Operations or Project Completion.

cybersecurity—The physical, technical, administrative, and management controls for providing the 

required and appropriate levels of protections of information and information assets against unauthorized 

disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction, whether accidental or intentional. Cybersecurity also 

ensures the required and appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability for 

the information stored, processed, or transmitted on electronic systems and networks.

data loss prevention (DLP)—DLP is a strategy for making sure that end users do not send sensitive or 

critical information outside the corporate network. DLP also includes software products that aid network 

administrators in controlling what data end users can transfer.

defense-in-depth—The security approach whereby layers of cybersecurity and information assurance 

solutions are used to establish an adequate security posture. Implementation of this strategy also is 

recognized due to the highly interactive nature of the various systems and networks. Cybersecurity 

defense-in-depth must be considered within the context of the shared risk environment, given that any 

single system cannot be adequately secured unless all interconnected systems are adequately secured.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-3

design life—The length of time, starting from the date of manufacture, during which a nuclear weapon is 

designed to meet its stated military requirements.

deuterium—An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one neutron and one proton.

down-select—The process of narrowing the range of design options during the Phase 6.x Process,

culminating in a final design (normally exercised when moving from Phase 6.1 to 6.2, from Phase 6.2 to 

6.2A, and from Phase 6.2A to 6.3) through analysis of the ability to meet military requirements and 

assessment of schedule, cost, material, and production impacts. 

encryption—Technical controls to protect information as it passes throughout a network and resides on 

computers. These methods protect sensitive information during storage and transmission and provide 

functionality to reduce the risk of both intentional and accidental data compromise and alteration.

enterprise forensics—The performance of real-time, remote inspections at the binary level of all data on 

a given system. The inspections include operating memory, physical storage devices, and virtualization 

mechanisms on any machine at a given time. 

Enterprise Governance, Risk, and Compliance—The official corporate and enterprise program repository 

used to conduct continuous performance monitoring and reporting of information security program 

management, operations, and technical controls (e.g., authority-to-operate packages, deviations, incident 

management reporting).

Enterprise Information System—Systems within NNSA for which the authorization boundary covers 

multiple sites and multiple local Authorization Official jurisdictions.

exascale computing—Computing systems capable of at least 1 exaFLOPS, or a billion calculations per 

second. Such capacity represents a thousand-fold increase over the first petascale computer that came 

into operation in 2008. See also “floating point operations per second (FLOPS).”

firewalls—Systems that can be implemented in hardware and/or software that are designed to prevent 

unauthorized access to or from private networks connected to the Internet. 

first production unit—The first system, subsystem, or component manufactured and accepted by NNSA 

as verifiably meeting all applicable quality and qualification requirements. The first production unit for a 

weapon is a production milestone. For milestone completion, two events must occur: (1) DoD or the 

Nuclear Weapons Council accepts the design and (2) DOE/NNSA verifies that the first produced weapon 

meets the design specifications. 

fiscal year—The Federal budget and funding year that starts on October 1 and goes to the following 

September 30.

fission—The process whereby the nucleus of a particular heavy element splits into (generally) two nuclei 

of lighter elements, with the release of substantial energy.

floating point operations per second (FLOPS)—The number of arithmetic operations performed on real 

numbers in a second; used as a measure of the performance of a computer system.

fusion—The process whereby the nuclei of two light elements, especially the isotopes of hydrogen 

(i.e., deuterium and tritium), combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element with the release of 

substantial energy and a high-energy neutron.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)—A detailed description of the program elements (and 

associated projects and activities) for the fiscal year for which the annual budget is submitted and the four 

succeeding fiscal years.

general purpose infrastructure—The buildings, equipment, utilities, roads, etc., that support operation of 

the nuclear security enterprise, but are not specifically program-focused. 

high explosives (HE)—Materials that detonate, with the chemical reaction components propagating at 

supersonic speeds. HE are used in the main charge of a weapon primary to compress the fissile material 

and initiate the chain of events leading to nuclear yield. See also “conventional high explosive” and 

“insensitive high explosive.”

high performance computing (HPC)—The use of supercomputers and parallel processing techniques with 

multiple computers to perform computational tasks. 

ignition—The point at which a nuclear fusion reaction becomes self-sustaining—that is, more energy is 

produced and retained in the fusion target than the energy used to initiate the nuclear reaction.

Information Assurance Response Center—The NNSA facility that continuously monitors all activity going 

through the nuclear security enterprise computer firewall system, to provide intrusion detection and 

event forensics.

information system—A combination of information, computer, and telecommunications resources and 

other information technology and personnel resources that collect, record, process, store, communicate, 

retrieve, and display information. 

information technology (IT)—The equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment used 

in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, 

interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information. IT includes computers, ancillary 

equipment, software, firmware, and related procedures, services, and resources. 

Information Technology Infrastructure—The shared technology resources that provide the platform for 

the specific information system applications at a site or NNSA/DOE-wide. It consists of a set of physical 

devices and software applications that are required to operate the entire nuclear security enterprise.

insensitive high explosive (IHE)—A high explosive substance that is so insensitive that the probability of 

accidental initiation or transition from burning to detonation is negligible.

integrated design code (IDC)—A simulation code containing multiple physics and engineering models that 

have been validated experimentally and computationally. An IDC is used to simulate, understand, and 

predict the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear components and nuclear weapons under normal, 

abnormal, and hostile conditions.

intrusion prevention—A network security device that monitors network activities for malicious activities 

such as security threats or policy violations. The main function of an intrusion prevention system is to 

identify suspicious activity, log the information, and report it. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-5

Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (JC3)—The cybersecurity incident response coordination, 

reporting, and tracking element for the entire DOE enterprise. JC3 provides computer security support to 

collect, analyze, and share cybersecurity information for all of DOE, including DOE’s Energy Information 

Administration and Power Marketing Administration, as well as NNSA’s national security laboratories, 

nuclear weapons production facilities, and Nevada National Security Site. JC3 is managed and operated 

by the DOE Chief Information Officer.

joint test assembly (JTA)—(1) An electronic unit that contains sensors and instrumentation that monitor 

the weapon hardware performance during flight tests to ensure that the weapon components will 

function as designed. (2) An NNSA-developed configuration, based on NNSA-DoD requirements, for use 

in the flight test program.

life cycle—The series of stages through which a component, system, or weapon passes from initial 

development until it is consumed, disposed of, or altered in order to extend its lifetime.

life extension program (LEP)—A program that refurbishes warheads of a specific weapon type by replacing 

aged components to extend the service life of a weapon. LEPs are designed to extend the life of a warhead 

by 20 to 30 years, while increasing safety and security and addressing defects.

lightning arrestor connector—Advanced interconnected nuclear safety devices designed to limit voltage 

during lightning strikes and other extreme high-voltage, high-temperature environments.

limited life component—A weapon component or subsystem whose performance degrades with age and 

must be replaced. 

manufacturing readiness level (MRL)—A means of communicating the degree to which a component or 

subsystem is ready to be produced. MRLs represent many attributes of a manufacturing system 

(e.g., people, manufacturing capability, facilities, conduct of operations, and tooling). There are nine 

MRLs, with the lowest beginning at product development and ending with the highest, which is steadystate production.

mark quality—Weapon or weapon-related material that is certified by DOE/NNSA or its prime contractor 

quality organization to meet all applicable design requirements, drawings, and known design intent.

Sometimes called “Diamond Stamp.”

modernization—The changes to nuclear weapons or infrastructure due to aging, unavailability of 

replacement parts, or the need to enhance safety, security, and operational design features. 

modification (Mod)—A modernization program that changes a weapon’s operational capabilities. A Mod 

may enhance the margin against failure, increase safety, improve security, replace limited life 

components, and/or address identified defects and component obsolescence. 

multilayered malware protection—Commercial software that guards against multiple threat vectors such 

as viruses, spyware, and Trojans. The software searches a hard disk or other media for known threat 

vectors and removes any that are found.

national security laboratory—Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, or Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page E-6 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

national security system—Any telecommunications or information system operated by the 

U.S. Government whose function, operation, or use involves intelligence activities, cryptologic activities 

related to national security, command and control of military forces, or equipment that is an integral part 

of a weapon or weapons system or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions. 

The term excludes any system used for routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, 

finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). 

network—In relation to information technology and cybersecurity, a network is composed of a 

communications medium responsible for the transfer of information and all components attached to that 

medium.

network intrusion detection (NID)—An intrusion detection system inspects all inbound and outbound 

network activity and identifies suspicious patterns that may indicate an attempt to break into or 

compromise a system. NID systems(1) monitor all network traffic by inspecting and screening all inbound 

and outbound information technology network activity for patterns that may indicate an attempt to break 

in or compromise a system and (2) provide alerts based on predefined rules. These rules or signatures 

are updated as needed to reflect information learned from exploitation or attack attempts. When 

triggered, an NID system begins capturing network traffic related to the event in question, and the data 

are made available to security analysts. Notification is also sent to the Security Information and Event 

Management tool. 

network monitoring—The use of a system that constantly monitors a computer network, providing

vulnerability management and policy compliance tools; operating system, database, and application logs; 

and compilation of external threat data. A key focus is monitoring and managing user and service 

privileges, directory services, and other system configuration changes. Network monitoring also provides

log auditing and review of incident responses.

NNSA Information Technology System—An information system that is owned and/or operated by NNSA 

or by contractors on behalf of NNSA to accomplish a Federal function. Regardless of whether NNSA 

Federal employees have access, this does not include information systems operated by management and 

operating contractors unless such systems’ primary purposes are to accomplish Federal functions.

non-nuclear components—The parts or assemblies designed for use in nuclear weapons or in nuclear 

weapons training that do not contain special nuclear material; such components (e.g., radiation-hardened 

electronic circuits or arming, fuzing, and firing components) are not available commercially.

non-War Reserve—Weapon material that is not designated for the War Reserve stockpile, but is to be 

used by DOE/NNSA or delivered to DoD for the purpose of training, testing, and evaluating War Reserve 

material.

nuclear explosive package (NEP)—An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials, as well 

as the main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation. 

nuclear forensics—The investigation of nuclear materials to find evidence for the source, trafficking, and 

enrichment of the material. 

nuclear security enterprise—The physical infrastructure, technology, and workforce at the national 

security laboratories, the nuclear weapons production sites, and the Nevada National Security Site. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-7

Nuclear Weapons Council—The joint DOE/DoD Council composed of senior officials from both 

Departments who recommend the stockpile options and research priorities that shape national policies 

and budgets to develop, produce, surveil, and retire nuclear warheads and weapon delivery platforms and 

who consider the safety, security, and control issues for existing and proposed weapons programs.

nuclear weapons production site—The Kansas City National Security Campus, Pantex Plant, Y-12 National 

Security Complex, or Savannah River Site. Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National 

Laboratories also perform some specific weapons production activities.

Other Program Money—Funding that is found outside of a life extension program (LEP) funding line (in 

other program lines), but is directly (uniquely) attributed to an LEP. Such funding would not be needed 

were it not for the LEP, although the activity or effort might still be done at some future point along a 

different timeline.

out-years—The years that follow the 5-year period of the Future Years Nuclear Security Program. 

Phase 6.x Process—A time and organizational framework to manage the existing nuclear weapon systems 

that are undergoing evaluation and implementation of refurbishment options to extend their stockpile 

life or enhance system capabilities. The Phase 6.x Process consists of sub-phases that basically correspond 

to Phases 1 through 6 of the nuclear weapons life cycle.

physical security—The application of physical or technical methods that protect personnel; prevent or 

detect unauthorized access to facilities, material, and documents; protect against espionage, sabotage, 

damage, and theft; and respond to any such acts that occur.

pit—The critical core component in the primary of a nuclear weapon that contains fissile material.

Predictive Capability Framework (PCF)—A framework that defines high‐level research, development, test, 

and evaluation activities to be executed by Defense Programs. The PCF identifies the complex set of 

interlinked analytical, computational, and experimental activities needed for stockpile assessment, the 

evaluation of some surveillance data, and the coordination of related efforts. See also “Stewardship 

Capability Delivery Schedule.”

primary—The first stage of a two-stage nuclear weapon.

programmatic infrastructure—Specialized experimental facilities, computers, diagnostic instruments, 

processes, and capabilities that allow the nuclear security enterprise to carry out research, testing, 

production, sustainment, and other direct programmatic activities to meet national security missions. 

Protected Distribution Systems—Wireline or fiber optic distribution systems used to transmit and protect 

unencrypted classified signal and data lines that exit secure areas and traverse through areas of lesser 

classification or security control. 

qualification—The process of ensuring that design, product, and all associated processes are capable of 

meeting customer requirements. Authorizes the listed items for an intended use (i.e., War Reserve, 

Training, Evaluation, etc.). Generally includes Laboratory (Design Agency) review of production and 

inspection processes. Qualified items are reviewed for possible requalification after a significant process 

change or if production is inactive for 12 months.
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page E-8 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

quantification of margins and uncertainties—The methodology used in the post-nuclear-testing era to 

facilitate analysis and communicate confidence in assessing and certifying that stockpile weapons will 

perform safely, securely, and reliably. Scientific judgment of experts at the national security laboratories 

plays a crucial role in this determination, which is based on metrics that use experimental data, physical 

models, and numerical simulations. 

quantum computing—The area of study focused on developing computer technology based on the 

principles of quantum-mechanical theory, which explains the nature and behavior of energy and matter 

on the atomic and subatomic level.

radiation case—A vessel that confines the radiation generated in a staged nuclear weapon.

reservoir—A vessel containing deuterium and tritium that permits its transfer as a gas in a nuclear 

weapon.

Retrofit Evaluation System Test—A test program conducted during retrofit of an NNSA weapon system on 

randomly selected, newly retrofitted weapons to determine the effect of the retrofit on the weapon 

system’sreliability and to verify that the purpose of the retrofit is fully achieved. The program may consist 

of flight testing and/or laboratory testing.

Safeguards Transporter (SGT)—A highly specialized trailer designed to safeguard nuclear weapons and 

special nuclear materials while in transit.

secondary—The second stage of a two-stage nuclear weapon that provides additional energy release in 

the form of fusion and is activated by energy from the primary.

security—An integrated system of activities, systems, programs, facilities, and policies to protect classified 

matter, unclassified controlled information, nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon 

components, and DOE’s and its contractors’ facilities, property, and equipment.

security area—A defined area containing safeguards and security interests that requires physical 

protection measures. The types of security areas used by DOE/NNSA include property protection areas, 

limited areas, exclusion areas, protected areas, material access areas, and functionally specialized security 

areas such as sensitive compartmented information facilities, classified computer facilities, and secure 

communications centers.

security system—The combination of personnel, equipment, hardware and software, structures, plans 

and procedures, etc., used to protect safeguards and security interests.

service life—The duration of time that a nuclear weapon is maintained in the stockpile from Phase 5/6.5 

(First Production) to Phase 7 (Retirement, Dismantlement, and Disposition). The terms “stockpile life,” 

“deployed life,” and “useful life” are subsumed by service life. 

significant finding investigation (SFI)—A formal investigation by a committee, chaired by an employee of 

a national security laboratory, to determine the cause and impact of a reported anomaly and to 

recommend corrective actions as appropriate.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-9

special nuclear material (SNM)—Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes 

uranium-233 or uranium-235. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines three categories of quantities 

of SNM according to the risk and potential for its use in the creation of a fissile explosive. Category I is 

the category of the greatest quantity and associated risk; Category II is moderate; Category III is the 

lowest.

Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule (SCDS)—A planning framework for delivery of high‐level science, 

technology, and engineering capabilities for mission application. The SCDS identifies the complex set of 

interlinked computational, experimental, and technology maturation activities needed for stockpile 

annual assessment, resolution of significant finding investigations, qualification and certification of life 

extension programs, and identification of options for the future deterrent.

stockpile-to-target sequence—A document that defines the logistical and employment concepts and 

related physical environments involved in delivering a nuclear weapon from storage and assembly, testing

it, transporting it, and delivering the weapon to a target.

subcritical experiment—An experiment specifically designed to obtain data on nuclear weapons for which 

less than a critical mass of fissionable material is present and, hence, no self-sustaining nuclear fission 

chain reaction can occur, consistent with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

supply chain risk management (SCRM)—The coordinated efforts of an organization to help identify, 

monitor, detect, and mitigate threats to supply chain continuity. Threats to the supply chain include cost 

volatility, material shortages, supplier financial issues and failures, and natural and manmade disasters. 

SCRM strategies and software help an organization foresee potential issues and adapt to both those risks 

and unforeseeable supply chain disruptions as quickly and efficiently as possible.

surety—The assurance that a nuclear weapon will operate safely, securely, and reliably if deliberately 

activated and that no accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations will occur. Factors contributing 

to that assurance include model validation for weapon performance based on experiments and 

simulations, material (e.g., military equipment and supplies), personnel, and execution of procedures.

surveillance—Activities that provide data for evaluation of the stockpile, giving confidence in the Nation’s 

deterrent by demonstrating mission readiness and assessment of safety, security, and reliability

standards. These activities may include laboratory and flight testing of systems, subsystems, and 

components (including those of weapons in the existing stockpile, newly produced weapons, or weapons 

being disassembled); inspection for unexpected wear or signs of material aging; and destructive or 

nondestructive testing.

sustainment—A program to modify and maintain a set of nuclear weapon systems.

technology maturation—Advancing laboratory-developed technology to the point where it can be 

adopted and used by U.S. industry. 

technology readiness level (TRL)—A measurement system to assess the maturity level of a particular 

technology that includes nine levels, where TRL 1 is the lowest (the associated scientific research is 

beginning) and TRL 9 is the highest (a technology has been proven through successful operation). 

test readiness—The preparedness to conduct underground nuclear explosive testing if required to ensure 

the safety and effectiveness of the stockpile or if directed by the President for policy reasons. 
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page E-10 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

threat information—Any information related to a threat that might help an organization protect itself 

against a threat or detect the activities of an actor. Major types of threat information include indicators;

tactics, techniques, and procedures; security alerts; threat intelligence reports; and tool configurations.

tractor—A modified and armored vehicle to transport the Safeguards Transporter trailer.

tritium—A radioactive isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains two neutrons and one proton and is 

produced in nuclear reactors by the action of neutrons on lithium nuclei.

virtual desktop infrastructure—Software technology that separates the desktop environment and 

associated application software from the physical client device used to access it.

vulnerability scanning—The application of software that seeks out security flaws based on a database of 

known flaws, testing systems for the occurrence of these flaws, and generation of a report of the findings 

that can be used to tighten a networks security. 

W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP for the W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, 

delivered by a Navy Trident II.

W78—An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, delivered by an Air Force Minute Man III LGM-30.

W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP for the W80 warhead aboard a cruise missile, delivered by 

the Air Force B-52 bomber and future launch platforms.

W88—A submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, delivered by a Navy Trident II.

W88 Alt 370—An alteration of the W88 warhead to replace the arming, fuzing, and firing components and 

to refresh the conventional high explosive main charge.

W87-1—An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead designed to replace the W78 and support the 

Air Force’s Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent missile system planned to replace the Minuteman III.

warhead—The part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munitions that contains either the 

nuclear or thermonuclear system intended to inflict damage.

War Reserve (WR)—Nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon material intended for use in the event of war.

wireless security—Security solution designed to test and evaluate the impact of mobile and fixed wireless 

communication devices used in or near classified and sensitive unclassified activity areas for the purpose 

of determining risks and countermeasures.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page F-1

Appendix F

Acronyms and Abbreviations

3D three-dimensional

ACRR Annular Core Research Reactor

AF&F arming, fuzing, and firing

Alt alteration

AM Additive Manufacturing

AoA Analysis of Alternatives

ARES Advanced Radio Enterprise System

ASC Advanced Simulation and Computing

ASD Advanced Sources and Detectors

ASIC application-specific integrated circuit

ATDM Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation

ATS Advanced Technology System

BCR Baseline Cost Report

CapAx Capital Acquisition Process

CBI Capabilities Based Investments

CD Critical Decision

CHAMP Cooling and Heating Asset Management Program

CHE conventional high explosive

CMD Component Manufacturing Development

CMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

CMRR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

COCS Common Occupational Classification System

CoLOSSIS Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and Imaging System

CORAL Collaboration of Oak Ridge National laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, 

and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

COTS commercially available off-the shelf

CSA canned subassembly

CSTART Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing

CTCP Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation

D&I disassembly and inspection

DAF Devise Assembly Facility

DARHT Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

DASO Demonstration and Shakedown Operation

DNN Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

DNS Office of Defense Nuclear Security

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page F-2 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

DSW Directed Stockpile Work

DUF4 depleted uranium tetrafluoride

DUF6 depleted uranium hexafluoride

ECFM Exascale Computing Facility Modernization

ECP Exascale Computing Project

ECSE Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

ELNG Electronic Neutron Generator

EMETL Enterprise Mission Essential Task List

ESC Enterprise Secure Computing

ESN Enterprise Secure Network

ESSPAP Enterprise Safeguards and Security Planning and Analysis Program

ETU Environmental Test Unit

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act

FITARA Federal Information Technology Acquisition and Reform Act

FTE full-time equivalent

FY fiscal year

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program

G2 Generation 2

GAO Government Accountability Office

GTS gas transfer system

HE high explosives

HED high energy density

HERMES High-Energy Radiation Megavolt Electron Source

HEU highly enriched uranium

HOT SHOT High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test Program

HPC high performance computing

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

I&O Infrastructure and Operations

ICAM Identity, Credential, and Access Management

ICE independent cost estimate

ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield

IDS Intrusion Detection Systems

IGPP Institutional General Plant Project

IHE insensitive high explosive

iJC3 integrated Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center

IT information technology

JASPER Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

JODE Joint Development Environment

JTA joint test assembly

JTD Joint Technology Demonstrator

KCNSC Kansas City National Security Campus

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANSCE Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page F-3

LAP4 Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project

LDRD Laboratory Directed Research and Development

LEP life extension program

LEU low-enriched uranium

LEU-Mo low-enriched uranium-molybdenum

LLC limited life component

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LRSO Long Range Standoff

M&O management and operating

M/U margin to uncertainty

MESA Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications

MFA multifactor authentication

MFFF Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

MGT Mobile Guardian Transporter

Mod modification

MRR Material Recycle and Recovery

MTP Management, Technology, and Production

NEP nuclear explosive package

NGFP NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program

NIF National Ignition Facility

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NPAC Nonproliferation and Arms Control

NSCI National Strategic Computing Initiative

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer

OMB Office of Management and Budget

Omega Omega Laser Facility

PACS Physical Access Controls

Pantex Pantex Plant

PDRD Plant Directed Research and Development

petaFLOPS quadrillion floating point operations per second

PF-4 Plutonium Facility

PIDAS Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System

ppy pits per year

pRad proton radiography

PRIDE Product Realization Integrated Digital Enterprise

R&D research and development

RAMP Roof Asset Management Program

RD restricted data

RDT&E research, development, test and evaluation

SAR Selected Acquisition Report

SCDS Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule

SDRD Site Directed Research and Development

SFI significant finding investigation

SGT Safeguards Transporter
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page F-4 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

SiFab Silicon Fabrication facility

SIRP Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program

SMIP Security Management Improvement Program

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SNM special nuclear material

SRPPF Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

SRS Savannah River Site

SRTE Savannah River Tritium Enterprise

SSMP Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

ST&E science, technology, and engineering

STA Secure Transportation Asset

STS stockpile-to-target sequence

TA Technical Area

TEMPEST Telecommunications Electronics Material Protected from Emanating 

Spurious Transmissions

TPBARs tritium-producing burnable absorber rods

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

U.S. United States

U.S.C. United States Code

U1a U1a Complex

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UK United Kingdom

USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

WBN1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1

WBN2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2

WDCR Weapon Design and Cost Report

WDD Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

WEPAR West End Protected Area Reduction

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex

Z Z pulsed power facility
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page G-1

Appendix G

List of Figures and Tables

List of Figures

Figure 1–1. Examples of U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery systems....................................................................1-3

Figure 1–2. Size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2017........................................................1-4

Figure 1–3. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise ........................................................................................1-7

Figure 1–4. Site nuclear weapon product flow.....................................................................................................1-11

Figure 1–5. Nuclear security enterprise headcount distribution by age (as of September 30, 2018)..................1-13

Figure 2–1. Sustainment of current stockpile.........................................................................................................2-2

Figure 2–2. NNSA warhead activities....................................................................................................................2-37

Figure 3–1. Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule – the four key focus areas needed to 

address mission delivery....................................................................................................................3-24

Figure 4–1. DOE/NNSA infrastructure size and scope ............................................................................................4-2

Figure 4–2. Asset management life cycle ...............................................................................................................4-2

Figure 4–3. Asset condition by replacement plant value percentage ....................................................................4-3

Figure 4–4. Historical average age growth of NNSA major programmatic facilities and a projection of the 

planned stabilization of average age after executing the FY 2020 President’s Budget Requestinformed line-item plan.......................................................................................................................4-5

Figure 4–5. Critical Decision overview....................................................................................................................4-6

Figure 4–6. DOE/NNSA 25-year programmatic line-item schedule........................................................................4-7

Figure 4–7. DOE/NNSA 25-year infrastructure line-item schedule ......................................................................4-14

Figure 7–1. Total workforce of national security laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site 

by Common Occupational Classification System (as of September 30, 2018) ....................................7-3

Figure 7–2. Total workforce of nuclear weapons production facilities by Common Occupational 

Classification System (as of September 30, 2018)...............................................................................7-4

Figure 7–3. Management and operating partner headcount distribution by age 

(as of September 30, 2018) .................................................................................................................7-6

Figure 7–4. Management and operating partner headcount distribution by years of service 

(as of September 30, 2018) .................................................................................................................7-6

Figure 7–5. Total management and operating separations by years of service.....................................................7-7

Figure 7–6. Federal employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018) ...................................................7-8

Figure 7–7. Federal employees by age (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................7-8

Figure 7–8. Management and operating partner workforce projections by Common Occupational 

Classification System for the current Future Years Nuclear Security Program period 

(as of September 30, 2018) ...............................................................................................................7-10

Figure 7–9. A simplified model of the talent management life cycle ...................................................................7-12
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page G-2 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure 8–1. Funding schedule for Directed Stockpile Work, fiscal years 2019 through 2024 ................................8-3

Figure 8–2. Key milestones for life extension programs and major alterations, Stockpile Systems, and 

Stockpile Services ................................................................................................................................8-7

Figure 8–3. Key milestones for Strategic Materials................................................................................................8-8

Figure 8–4. Funding schedule for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, 

fiscal years 2019 through 2024............................................................................................................8-9

Figure 8–5. Funding schedule for Science, fiscal years 2019 through 2024 .........................................................8-10

Figure 8–6. Key milestones for Science ................................................................................................................8-12

Figure 8–7. Funding schedule for Engineering, fiscal years 2019 through 2024 ..................................................8-13

Figure 8–8. Key milestones for Engineering .........................................................................................................8-15

Figure 8–9. Funding schedule for Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield, 

fiscal years 2019 through 2024..........................................................................................................8-16

Figure 8–10. Key milestones for Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield ..........................................8-18

Figure 8–11. Funding schedule for Advanced Simulation and Computing, fiscal years 2019 through 2024..........8-19

Figure 8–12. Key milestones for Advanced Simulation and Computing.................................................................8-20

Figure 8–13. Funding schedule for Advanced Manufacturing Development Program, 

fiscal years 2019 through 2024..........................................................................................................8-21

Figure 8–14. Key milestones for Advanced Manufacturing Development.............................................................8-22

Figure 8–15. Funding schedule for Secure Transportation Asset, fiscal years 2019 through 2024........................8-23

Figure 8–16. Key milestones for Secure Transportation Asset...............................................................................8-24

Figure 8–17. Funding schedule for Infrastructure and Operations, fiscal years 2019 through 2024 .....................8-25

Figure 8–18. Funding schedule for Other Weapons Activities, fiscal years 2019 through 2024 ............................8-27

Figure 8–19. Key milestones for Defense Nuclear Security ....................................................................................8-28

Figure 8–20. Key milestones for Information Technology and Cybersecurity........................................................8-30

Figure 8–21. Estimate of warhead-specific sustainment costs...............................................................................8-31

Figure 8–22. Cost estimates across the Phase 6.x Process.....................................................................................8-32

Figure 8–23. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for fiscal year 2019 through 

fiscal year 2044 (then-year dollars, nominal costs only) ...................................................................8-36

Figure 8–24. B61-12 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2019 to completion.................................................8-37

Figure 8–25. W88 Alteration 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh) cost fiscal year 2019 

to completion ....................................................................................................................................8-38

Figure 8–26. W80-4 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2019 to completion .................................................8-39

Figure 8–27. W87-1 Modification Program cost fiscal year 2019 to completion ...................................................8-40

Figure 8–28. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for fiscal year 2019 through 

fiscal year 2044 with high and low estimates (then-year dollars).....................................................8-42

Figure 8–29. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities in then-year dollars 

with high- and low-cost estimates.....................................................................................................8-45

Figure 8–30. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities in then-year dollars 

by portfolio ........................................................................................................................................8-45

Figure 8–31. Projected out-year budget estimates for DOE/NNSA Weapons Activities in then-year dollars 

with high- and low-cost estimates, including the escalated President’s Budget Request ................8-47

Figure D–1. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise ....................................................................................... D-1

Figure D–2. Federal employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)...................................................................... D-4

Figure D–3. Federal employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018) .................................................. D-4

Figure D–4. Years of service of Federal employees who left service 

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018).......................................................................................... D-5
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page G-3

Figure D–5. Federal employee trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018).............................................. D-5

Figure D–6. LLNL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-10

Figure D–7. LLNL employees by age (as of September 30, 2018) ........................................................................ D-10

Figure D–8. LLNL employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)..................................................... D-11

Figure D–9. Change in last 2 fiscal years at LLNL (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) .............................. D-11

Figure D–10. Age of LLNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) ....................... D-12

Figure D–11. Years of service of LLNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) .... D-12

Figure D–12. LLNL trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018) ................................................................. D-13

Figure D–13. LLNL employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018) ................................................... D-14

Figure D–14. Total projected LLNL workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-14

Figure D–15. LANL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-19

Figure D–16. LANL employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)........................................................................ D-20

Figure D–17. LANL employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018) .................................................... D-20

Figure D–18. Change in last 2 fiscal years at LANL (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018).............................. D-21

Figure D–19. Age of LANL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)....................... D-22

Figure D–20. Years of service of LANL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018).... D-22

Figure D–21. LANL trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)................................................................. D-23

Figure D–22. LANL employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018) .................................................. D-23

Figure D–23. Total projected LANL workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-24

Figure D–24. SNL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-32

Figure D–25. SNL employees by age (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-33

Figure D–26. SNL employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018) ...................................................... D-34

Figure D–27. Change in last 2 fiscal years at SNL (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)................................ D-34

Figure D–28. Age of SNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)......................... D-35

Figure D–29. Years of service of SNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)...... D-35

Figure D–30. SNL trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)................................................................... D-36

Figure D–31. SNL employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)..................................................... D-36

Figure D–32. Total projected SNL workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-37

Figure D–33. KCNSC total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-43

Figure D–34. KCNSC employees by age (as of September 30, 2018) ..................................................................... D-44

Figure D–35. KCNSC employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018).................................................. D-44

Figure D–36. Change in last 2 fiscal years at KCNSC (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) ........................... D-45

Figure D–37. Age of KCNSC employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) .................... D-46

Figure D–38. Years of service of KCNSC employees who left service 

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)........................................................................................ D-46

Figure D–39. KCNSC trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................. D-47

Figure D–40. KCNSC employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018) ................................................ D-48

Figure D–41. Total projected KCNSC workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-49
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page G-4 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Figure D–42. Pantex total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-52

Figure D–43. Pantex employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)..................................................................... D-53

Figure D–44. Pantex employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018) ................................................. D-53

Figure D–45. Change in last 2 fiscal years at Pantex (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)........................... D-54

Figure D–46. Age of Pantex employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018).................... D-54

Figure D–47. Years of service of Pantex employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 1, 2018)... D-55

Figure D–48. Pantex trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018).............................................................. D-56

Figure D–49. Pantex employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)................................................ D-56

Figure D–50. Total projected Pantex workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-57

Figure D–51. SRTE total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-62

Figure D–52. SRTE employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)........................................................................ D-63

Figure D–53. SRTE employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018)..................................................... D-63

Figure D–54. Change in last 2 fiscal years at SRTE (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) .............................. D-64

Figure D–55. Age of SRTE employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) ....................... D-65

Figure D–56. Years of service of SRTE employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) .... D-66

Figure D–57. SRTE trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018)................................................................. D-67

Figure D–58. SRTE employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018)................................................... D-68

Figure D–59. Total projected SRTE workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-69

Figure D–60. Y-12 total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-72

Figure D–61. Y-12 employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)......................................................................... D-73

Figure D–62. Y-12 employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018) ..................................................... D-73

Figure D–63. Change in last 2 fiscal years (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)........................................... D-74

Figure D–64. Age of Y-12 employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)........................ D-74

Figure D–65. Years of service of Y-12 employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)..... D-75

Figure D–66. Y-12 trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018).................................................................. D-75

Figure D–67. Y-12 employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018).................................................... D-76

Figure D–68. Total projected Y-12 workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-77

Figure D–69. NNSS total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2018) .............................................................................................................. D-81

Figure D–70. NNSS employees by age (as of September 30, 2018)....................................................................... D-82

Figure D–71. NNSS employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2018).................................................... D-83

Figure D–72. Change in last 2 fiscal years (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)........................................... D-83

Figure D–73. Age of NNSS employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) ...................... D-84

Figure D–74. Years of service of NNSS employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018) ... D-84

Figure D–75. NNSS trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2018) ................................................................ D-85

Figure D–76. NNSS employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2018).................................................. D-85

Figure D–77. Total projected NNSS workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System 

over the FYNSP period (as of September 30, 2018).......................................................................... D-86
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page G-5

List of Tables

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.........................................................1-4

Table 2–1. Summary of gas transfer systems challenges and strategies ..............................................................2-3

Table 2–2. Summary of power sources challenges and strategies........................................................................2-4

Table 2–3. Summary of neutron generators challenges and strategies................................................................2-4

Table 2–4. Summary of B83-1 Sustainment challenges and strategies.................................................................2-5

Table 2–5. FY 2018 actual and FY 2019 baselined major Directed Stockpile Work stockpile evaluation 

activities (as of January 8, 2019)..........................................................................................................2-6

Table 2–6. Major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2018 and the program of record for 

FY 2019 through FY 2024 (as of January 8, 2019)................................................................................2-7

Table 2–7. Summary of Surveillance program challenges and strategies.............................................................2-7

Table 2–8. Summary of Production Support Program challenges and strategies...............................................2-11

Table 2–9. Summary of Management, Technology, and Production Program challenges and strategies..........2-13

Table 2–10. Summary of Weapon Technology Development program challenges and strategies.......................2-15

Table 2–11. Summary of Component Manufacturing Development subprogram challenges and strategies ......2-18

Table 2–12. Summary of Additive Manufacturing subprogram challenges and strategies ..................................2-19

Table 2–13. Summary of Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics challenges and strategies.................................2-20

Table 2–14. Summary of Plutonium Program challenges and strategies..............................................................2-23

Table 2–15. Summary of Uranium Program challenges and strategies ................................................................2-25

Table 2–16. Summary of Depleted Uranium Program challenges and strategies.................................................2-26

Table 2–17. Summary of Domestic Uranium Enrichment Program challenges and strategies.............................2-28

Table 2–18. Summary of Tritium Program challenges and strategies...................................................................2-30

Table 2–19. Summary of Lithium Program challenges and strategies ..................................................................2-31

Table 2–20. Summary of Energetic Materials challenges and strategies..............................................................2-34

Table 2–21. Summary of Material Recycle and Recovery and Storage program challenges and strategies.........2-36

Table 2–22. Summary of W76-2 Modification Program challenges and strategies..............................................2-38

Table 2–23. Summary of W88 Alt 370 Program challenges and strategies...........................................................2-40

Table 2–24. Summary of B61-12 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies............................................2-41

Table 2–25. Summary of W80-4 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies ............................................2-43

Table 2–26. Summary of W87-1 Modification Program challenges and strategies..............................................2-45

Table 2–27. Summary of Ballistic Missile Warhead Follow-up Systems challenges and strategies......................2-46

Table 2–28. Summary of Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program challenges and strategies............2-47

Table 3–1. Summary of Science Program challenges and strategies ..................................................................3-10

Table 3–2. Summary of Engineering Program challenges and strategies ...........................................................3-14

Table 3–3. Summary of Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program challenges 

and strategies ....................................................................................................................................3-18

Table 3–4. Summary of Advanced Simulation and Computing Program challenges and strategies...................3-22

Table 3–5. Capital investments to ensure NextGen science-based stockpile stewardship.................................3-24
July 2019 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page G-6 | Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

Table 4–1. Programmatic line-item projects that are past Critical Decision 1 ......................................................4-8

Table 4–2. Programmatic line-item projects that are under review.....................................................................4-9

Table 4–3. CapAx project proposals in the FY 2020 President’s Budget Request...............................................4-10

Table 4–4. Potential projects to improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform science, technology, 

and engineering .................................................................................................................................4-11

Table 4–5. Potential projects to improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform production, engineering, 

and assembly missions ......................................................................................................................4-12

Table 4–6. Potential projects to improve DOE/NNSA’s ability to perform the Strategic Materials mission.......4-13

Table 4–7. Ongoing mission-enabling projects ...................................................................................................4-15

Table 4–8. New proposals for mission-enabling projects ...................................................................................4-16

Table 4–9. Summary of Capabilities-Based Investments Program challenges and strategies ............................4-26

Table 4–10. Ongoing and recently completed information technology and cybersecurity projects....................4-29

Table 5–1. Summary of Secure Transportation Asset Program challenges and strategies...................................5-4

Table 6–1. Summary of Defense Nuclear Security Program challenges and strategies........................................6-5

Table 6–2. Technologies deployed to address cybersecurity threats .................................................................6-12

Table 6–3. Summary of Information Technology and Cybersecurity challenges and strategies.........................6-14

Table 7–1. Summary of recruitment and hiring challenges and strategies.........................................................7-12

Table 7–2. Summary of workforce development, retention, and sustainment challenges and strategies ........7-14

Table 7–3. Summary of knowledge transfer and next-generation workforce training challenges 

and strategies ....................................................................................................................................7-16

Table 8–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget request for Weapons Activities 

in fiscal years 2020 through 2024........................................................................................................8-1

Table 8–2. Core Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2013 through 2024 .............................................8-3

Table 8–3. Projected fiscal year 2020 NNSA infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization investments.....8-27

Table 8–4. Cost estimates for life extension programs and major alterations within the 25-year 

program of record..............................................................................................................................8-34

Table 8–5. Total estimated cost for W76-1 Life Extension Program...................................................................8-36

Table 8–6. Total estimated cost for W76-2 Modification Program.....................................................................8-36

Table 8–7. Total estimated cost for B61-12 Life Extension Program ..................................................................8-37

Table 8–8. Total estimated cost for W88 Alteration 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh) 

Program .............................................................................................................................................8-38

Table 8–9. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Life Extension Program...................................................................8-39

Table 8–10. Total estimated cost for W87-1 Modification Program.....................................................................8-41

Table 8–11. Total estimated cost for Next Navy Warhead Life Extension Program .............................................8-41

Table 8–12. Total estimated cost for Future Strategic Missile Warhead Life Extension Program ........................8-41

Table 8–13. Total estimated cost for Next B61 Life Extension Program ...............................................................8-41

Table 8–14. Weapon Activities capital acquisition estimated costs, fiscal years 2020 through 2044 ..................8-44
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | July 2019

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page G-7

Table C–1. NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative funding schedule for FY 2020 through 2024 ............................ C-2

Table D–1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Capabilities....................................................................... D-7

Table D–2. Los Alamos National Laboratory Capabilities ................................................................................... D-16

Table D–3. Sandia National Laboratories Capabilities........................................................................................ D-27

Table D–4. Kansas City National Security Campus Capabilities.......................................................................... D-39

Table D–5. Pantex Plant Capabilities .................................................................................................................. D-51

Table D–6. Savannah River Site Capabilities....................................................................................................... D-59

Table D–7. Y-12 National Security Complex Capabilities.................................................................................... D-71

Table D–8. Nevada National Security Site Capabilities....................................................................................... D-79


A Report to Congress

Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

July 2019

U.S. Department of Energy

National Nuclear Security Administration

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585

DOE/NA-0081