UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4000

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MARK EDWARD SLAYTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:14-cr-00201-CCE-1)

Submitted: September 29, 2015 Decided: October 27, 2015

Before KING, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, PA, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Mark Edward Slayton appeals from his 78-month sentence 

imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to accessing child 

pornography. On appeal, he contends that his below-Guidelines 

sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

Specifically, he contends that the district court failed to 

consider his individual circumstances, gave too much deference 

to the Guidelines range determined by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 2G2.2 (2013), and imposed an impermissibly harsh 

sentence. We affirm.

We review the district court’s sentence, “whether inside, 

just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” 

under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In conducting this 

review, we first ensure “that the district court committed no 

significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or 

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] 

§ 3553(a) [2012] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 

sentence.” Id. at 51. “When rendering a sentence, the district 

court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented,” applying the “relevant § 3553(a) factors to the 

specific circumstances of the case before it.” United States v. 
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Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks and emphasis omitted). The court must also “state in open 

court the particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence” and 

“set forth enough to satisfy” this court that it has “considered 

the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising 

[its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

If the sentence is free from procedural error, we then 

review it for substantive reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

“Substantive reasonableness review entails taking into account 

the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any 

variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley, 

511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51). Even if we would have imposed a different sentence, “this 

fact alone is ‘insufficient to justify reversal of the district 

court.’” Id. at 474 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). We apply a 

presumption on appeal that a sentence within or below a properly 

calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United 

States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 

135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).

Here, the district court properly calculated and considered 

the applicable Guidelines range and heard argument from counsel 

and allocution from Slayton. In imposing sentence, the court 

explicitly considered the majority of the statutory factors, 
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including the circumstances of the crime, deterrence and just 

punishment. The court was particularly concerned about the 

seriousness of the crime and referred to the details in the 

presentence report about the content of some videos found on 

Slayton’s computer. The court further stated that, while it 

heard and considered Slayton’s arguments for a probationary

sentence, the court was of the opinion that none of Slayton’s 

circumstances warranted a greater variance than the standard 

variance the court imposed for such crimes.* Nonetheless, the 

court acknowledged that Slayton’s arguments supported a sentence 

at the low end of the variant Guidelines range. 

Contrary to Slayton’s arguments, the court considered his 

individual circumstances. While the court determined that 

Slayton’s circumstances were generally those of most other 

defendants charged with the same crime, this determination came 

after consideration of Slayton’s specific characteristics. 

Moreover, while Slayton argued that the court overweighted the 

Guidelines range and failed to consider whether the sentence was 

greater than necessary, the court explicitly considered the 

sentencing factors and concluded that a variant sentence below 

 * The district court calculated a downward variance based 

upon its conclusion that the USSG § 2G2.2 overweighted the 

number of images involved and the use of a computer. The court 

stated that its regular practice was to calculate a variance 

sentence based on a two-offense-level reduction in such cases.
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the Guidelines range was appropriate. Moreover, the court noted 

that the requested probationary sentence was not supported by 

the statutory factors. As such, we conclude that the court made 

no procedural errors in imposing sentence. See United States v. 

Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2015) (“To require more 

explanation would unnecessarily intrude upon the district 

court’s primary and unique role in the sentencing process.”).

Next, Slayton contends that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable because the district court relied too heavily on 

the “flawed” child pornography guidelines. Slayton avers that 

these particular guidelines lack any empirical basis and almost 

always result in a range near the statutory maximum, even for 

low level offenders. We have previously rejected similar 

arguments and held that courts should “give respectful attention 

to Congress’s view that child pornography crimes are serious 

offenses deserving serious sanctions.” United States v. 

Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2012) (alterations and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 

Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009) 

(recognizing that appellate courts are not required to discard 

presumption of reasonableness for sentences based on 

non-empirically-grounded Guidelines and applying presumption 

accordingly); United States v. McLaughlin, 760 F.3d 699, 707-08 

(7th Cir. 2014) (holding that sentencing court could consider 
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whether the applicable Guidelines were outdated and 

disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the 

Guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable). 

Here, the court balanced the statutory factors, particularly the 

seriousness of the crime, against Slayton’s lack of a criminal 

record, his efforts at therapy and rehabilitation, his 

expression of remorse, his support system, and his positive work 

history. The court concluded that Slayton’s offense was too 

serious to justify a lower sentence. “It would be almost 

unprecedented to credit a defendant’s challenge to a sentence as 

substantively unreasonable when the district court actually 

reduced the term of imprisonment below the recommended 

Guidelines range.” Helton, 782 F.3d at 155. 

Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, 

Slayton has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness 

applicable to his below-Guidelines sentence and has failed to 

show that the district court’s considerable discretion was 

abused. Thus, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED