IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-60451

Summary Calendar

MALIK AKBAR BHAI, also known as Malik Akbarbhai Virani, also known as 

Malik Akbar-Bhai Virani, also known as Malik Abbar-Bhai Virani; SHAMA 

MALIK, also known as Shama Malik Virani,

Petitioners

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A076 652 945

BIA No. A076 643 946

Before SMITH, DENNIS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Malik Akbar Bhai and Shama Malik, natives and citizens of India, 

petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

denying their motion to reopen their removal proceedings and an order denying

reconsideration. Although they sought reopening on several grounds, in their 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 31, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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petition for review they challenge only the determinations that they had not 

demonstrated material changed country conditions and that their allegedly 

defective Notices to Appear did not deprive the immigration judge of 

jurisdiction.

We review the denial of a motion to reopen under a “highly deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Nunez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 499, 505 (5th Cir. 

2018). We will affirm the BIA’s decision if it “is not capricious, racially 

invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational 

that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The denial of a motion for 

reconsideration also is reviewed “under a highly deferential abuse of discretion 

standard.” Le v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 2016). 

Relying primarily on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the 

petitioners first argue that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction because 

their Notices to Appear were not valid charging documents. We recently 

rejected similar arguments in Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2019), 

petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 16, 2019) (No. 19-779). Despite the petitioners’ 

arguments that Pierre-Paul was wrongly decided, it remains binding. See 

United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1999).

Next, we note that an alien has a “heavy burden” to demonstrate 

changed country conditions for purposes of a motion to reopen. Nunez, 

882 F.3d at 508. This requires “making a meaningful comparison between the 

conditions at the time of the removal hearing and the conditions at the time 

the alien filed her motion to reopen.” Id.

Rather than directly challenging the BIA’s determination, the 

petitioners instead argue that it made a number of legal errors, such as 

misconstruing and misapplying the standards for demonstrating changed 

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country conditions, mischaracterizing and misconstruing some of their specific 

claims, and distorting and arbitrarily disregarding crucial evidence. After 

reviewing the record and the BIA’s decision, we conclude that the petitioners 

“received full and fair consideration of all circumstances that give rise” to their

claims. Ghotra v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, although the BIA did not 

address all evidence in the record, we conclude that the BIA’s decision

“reflect[s] meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial evidence 

supporting the alien’s claims,” Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 

1996), and explains its decision “in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court 

to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted,” Ghotra, 

912 F.3d at 290 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

We now turn to whether the BIA’s denial of reopening was an abuse of 

its discretion. See Nunez, 882 F.3d at 505. As the BIA recognized, petitioners 

presented evidence of deteriorating conditions for Muslims in India, but it 

concluded that they failed to show a material change in country conditions. 

Because the BIA’s decision was not capricious, racially invidious, utterly 

without foundation in the evidence, or so irrational that it was arbitrary, we 

conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ 

motion to reopen. See Nunez, 882 F.3d at 505. Therefore, the petition for 

review from the denial of the motion to reopen is DENIED.

Finally, the petitioners filed a separate petition for review from the BIA’s 

denial of their motion for reconsideration. Because the motion to reconsider 

raised many of the same issues already discussed, and because we conclude 

that none of the other issues raised show an abuse of discretion, we conclude 

that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for 

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reconsideration. See Le, 819 F.3d at 104. Therefore, the petition for review 

from the denial of reconsideration also is DENIED.

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