COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Frank and Kelsey 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

ROBCHEL WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0127-02-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

 NOVEMBER 19, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge 

 Sonya A. Weaver for appellant. 

 Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Robchel Williams (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial 

of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-415. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support this conviction. Finding no error, we affirm 

his conviction. 

 When considering the sufficiency questions on appeal in a 

criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, considering all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 

Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The conclusions of 

the fact finder on issues of witness credibility may be 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
disturbed only if we find the witness' testimony was "inherently 

incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it 

unworthy of belief." Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299, 

321 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1984). 

 Appellant first contends the situs of the offense, Walgreen's 

Drug Store, was not a "public place," as required by Code 

§ 18.2-415.1 Appellant contends that, since no witness explicitly 

stated the store was "open to the public," the Commonwealth did 

not prove this element of the offense. We disagree.2

 The Supreme Court has discussed the term, "public place," in 

the context of an earlier disorderly conduct statute: 

Webster's International Dictionary, 2d Ed., 

defines "place" as "a portion of space 

occupied by a body;" "any particular spot or 

locality." The same authority defines 

"public" as "open to the knowledge or view 

of all; generally seen, known, or heard; 

without privacy, concealment, etc." 

 1

 Code § 18.2-415 states, in part: 

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, 

with the intent to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or 

recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 

A. In any street, highway, public building, 

or while in or on a public conveyance, or 

public place engages in conduct having a 

direct tendency to cause acts of violence by 

the person or persons at whom, individually, 

such conduct is directed . . . . 

2

 The parties submitted a statement of facts rather than a 

transcript, pursuant to Rule 5A:8(c). 

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* * * * * * * 

Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines "public 

place" as "any place so situated that what 

passes there can be seen by any considerable 

number of persons, if they happen to look." 

While the statute is penal and must be 

construed strictly against the Commonwealth, 

the dominant purpose of its enactment was to 

preserve peace and good order. 

* * * * * * * 

A person violates the statute if, while 

physically present in the highway, his 

conduct is such as tends to corrupt public 

morals or to outrage the sense of decency of 

others who may not be in the highway but may 

be within sight or hearing of the 

perpetrator. Such person is equally guilty 

if, while not physically present in the 

highway, he sets in motion an agency that 

tends to corrupt public morals or outrage 

the sense of decency of others using the 

highway in a peaceful and lawful manner. In 

either event, the crime has been committed 

in a highway or other public place. In the 

first instance, the perpetrator was 

physically present in the highway when he 

committed the criminal acts or uttered the 

words. In the second instance, he was not 

physically present in the highway but his 

acts or words were seen or heard by others 

lawfully using the highway. The statute 

prohibits disorderly behavior in public. 

Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 891-92, 45 S.E.2d 241, 

242-43 (1947) (discussing former Code § 4533(a) (repealed)). 

 Here, appellant's offensive conduct was observed by 

Walgreen's customers. Detective L. Cox testified the store was 

"open for business." People in the Walgreen's were having 

prescriptions filled. The incident and its situs were "open to 

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the knowledge or view of all . . . without privacy, concealment, 

etc." Id. at 892, 45 S.E.2d at 242-43. The store was a "public 

place" for the purposes of Code § 18.2-415. 

 Appellant next contends the evidence did not prove his 

conduct had a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence," as 

required by Code § 18.2-415. He contends, since no one actually 

reacted violently to his statements,3 he was not guilty of 

disorderly conduct. Appellant misreads the statute. 

 The statute requires that a defendant's conduct have a 

"direct tendency to cause acts of violence," not that the 

conduct, in fact, causes acts of violence. The standard is an 

objective one, i.e., whether the conduct in question "would 

cause a reasonable [person] to respond with physical force or 

violence." Ford v. City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 144, 

474 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1996). The statute, like the "fighting 

words" statute, serves to prevent conduct that is "likely to 

provoke a violent reaction and retaliation." Mercer v. Winston, 

214 Va. 281, 284, 199 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1973) (discussing Code 

§ 18.2-255). 

 3

 We are not asked to address the portion of Code § 18.2-415 

that states: 

However, the conduct prohibited under 

subdivision A, B or C of this section shall 

not be deemed to include the utterance or 

display of any words or to include conduct 

otherwise made punishable under this title. 

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 Detective Cox testified, when he arrived at Walgreen's, he 

heard appellant tell the store manager that he would "kick his 

ass" and that "he would come back and f--- him up." However, 

appellant did not attempt to strike the manager. On 

cross-examination, Cox admitted appellant's words did not 

provoke or incite anyone into action. 

 Appellant cites Ford, 23 Va. App. 137, 474 S.E.2d 848, to 

support his position. However, that case is distinguishable on 

its facts. Ford used offensive, but not threatening, language. 

Id. at 144, 474 S.E.2d at 851. While Ford threw "his arms about 

in the air," he made no threatening gestures. Id. This Court 

found Ford's conduct had no "direct tendency to cause violence." 

Id. His words, while offensive and loud, were "'verbal 

criticism and challenge directed at police officers,'" not 

threats of violence. Id. at 143, 474 S.E.2d at 851 (quoting 

City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987)). 

 Here, Walgreen's manager had just fired him, so appellant 

was upset. He admitted that he then confronted the manager, 

threatening to "kick his ass" and to return "and f--- him up." 

Unlike in Ford, appellant did not criticize the manager nor did 

he simply use offensive language. He threatened physical harm. 

Appellant also refused to speak to the officer when he arrived. 

Eventually, Officer Cox had to physically remove appellant from 

the store. Appellant "would not submit to being arrested." He 

did not become calm until placed in the police vehicle. 

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 The trial court, as fact finder, determined appellant's 

threatening language constituted disorderly conduct under Code 

§ 18.2-415. The evidence supports this finding. The manager 

did not need to testify he was moved to violence. A reasonable 

person, under these facts, would likely respond to appellant's 

conduct with violence. We affirm the conviction. 

Affirmed.

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Benton, J., concurring. 

 Several matters are not at issue in this appeal. The 

officer "testified that he placed [Robchel Williams] under 

arrest for his conduct inside [the store] and not for any 

behavior that occurred when he tried to arrest [Williams]." In 

addition, the statement of facts indicates Williams contended 

that the evidence failed to prove his "actions or words [in the 

store] had a direct tendency to cause acts of violence." 

Williams did not contend at trial he was convicted for uttering 

words protected by the First Amendment. Because the latter 

issue is not before us, I concur in the opinion. 

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