Docket No. 90776–Agenda 12–September 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

								GLEN HALL, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 21, 2001.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

	The defendant, Glen Hall, pleaded guilty to forgery, and the

Vermilion County circuit court placed him on a two-year term of

probation conditioned upon, inter alia, his cooperation with substance abuse counseling or treatment recommendations. Less

than a year later, the State filed a petition to revoke the defendant’s

probation, alleging that he failed to report to the probation office

and that he was unsuccessfully discharged from Prairie Center, a

substance abuse treatment facility.

	On July 23, 1999, at the probation revocation hearing, defense

counsel informed the trial court that the defendant would admit the

State’s allegations. This exchange followed:

			“THE COURT: You are Glen Hall?

			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

			THE COURT: Do you understand that you would be

admitting allegations in the petition *** which, in effect,

allege that you violated the probation order by not

reporting to probation since October 26, ’98, and that you

were unsuccessfully discharged from the Prairie Center on

February 11, ’99?

			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

			THE COURT: You’ve had enough time to talk to Mr.

Sohn [defense counsel] about these allegations?

			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

			THE COURT: Mr. Sohn, have you explained to your

client the possible penalties that he faces?

			MR. SOHN: Forgery is a Class Two, is it not? No, it’s

a Class Three.

			[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Three.

			MR. SOHN: Yes, we have, your Honor.

			THE COURT: Has anybody forced you into coming in

and entering into this admission, sir?

			THE DEFENDANT: No, Ma’am.

			THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises to you

in return for your admission?

			THE DEFENDANT: No.

			THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs

or alcohol?

			THE DEFENDANT: No.

			THE COURT: Taking any prescription medication?

			THE DEFENDANT: No.

			THE COURT: You know clearly what you’re doing?

			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

			THE COURT: It’s a free and voluntary act on your

part, sir?

			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

			THE COURT: Could I have a factual basis, please.

			[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Judge, we’d present

testimony from representatives from Prairie Center that on

February 11 of this year he was unsuccessfully discharged

from the program at Prairie Center.

			We’d also present testimony from Jana Arbuckle from

the Vermilion County Probation Office that Mr. Hall has

not reported as of the date of filing of this petition since

October 26, 1998.

			THE COURT: Would that be a substantially correct

recitation as you understand it?

			MR. SOHN: Yes, your Honor.

			THE COURT: Do you still wish to admit, Mr. Hall?

			THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

			THE COURT: I’ll accept your admission, finding it

knowingly and voluntarily made. A violation finding will

be made. I will reserve the question of revocation of your

probation. That means you’re still under the probation

order.”

	On December 17, 1999, the trial court revoked the defendant’s

probation and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The

trial court denied a motion to reconsider the defendant’s sentence.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the proceeding where he

admitted probation violations did not comply with due process.

The appellate court disagreed with the defendant, affirming his

probation revocation and sentence. No. 4–00–0188 (unpublished

order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

	We granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 177

Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

ANALYSIS

	Before this court, the defendant again contends that his due

process rights were violated because the trial court accepted his

admission to probation violations without admonishing the

defendant that he had a right to a probation revocation hearing at

which he could confront adverse witnesses, and without

determining whether the defendant understood the applicable

sentencing range. Our review of this legal question is de novo. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 162 (2001).

	Fairness, the core meaning of our due process guarantees (see

U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2), is a flexible

concept which calls for procedural safeguards tailored to the

demands of a particular legal context. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600

(1972). Probation revocation proceedings occur only after a

criminal conviction, and a defendant responding to a petition to

revoke probation is entitled to fewer procedural rights than a

defendant facing trial. See People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 313 (1985); People v. DeWitt, 78 Ill. 2d 82, 85 (1979); People v. Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d 949, 955 (2000). In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-

62 (1973), the United States Supreme Court outlined the minimum

requirements of due process in a probation revocation hearing: (1)

written notice of the claimed probation violation; (2) disclosure of

the evidence against the defendant; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and present testimonial and documentary evidence; (4)

the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a

neutral arbiter; and (6) a written statement of the evidence relied

upon and the reason for revoking probation. This case, however,

does not involve the constitutionality of a probation revocation

hearing, but rather the constitutionality of proceedings which

resulted in the defendant’s admission to probation violations.

	We first addressed what due process means in this context in People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96 (1972). In Pier, the defendant was convicted of burglary and placed on probation. The State later filed

a petition alleging that the defendant had violated his probation. At

a hearing on the State’s petition, the defendant admitted his

probation violation and was sentenced to 2-15 years’

imprisonment. In a post-conviction petition, the defendant claimed

that his admission was induced by an unfulfilled prosecution

promise to recommend a lower sentence. The trial court dismissed

the defendant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, and the

defendant appealed.

	We held that the trial court improperly dismissed the

defendant’s petition. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 100. Regarding the defendant’s admission, we stated:

		“The consequences of a determination that the probation

order has been violated are so serious that the appellate

courts have surrounded the defendant at a revocation

hearing with many of the same due-process safeguards

that are accorded to a defendant a[t] a trial to determine

his guilt. [Citations.] Since the results of a probation

revocation may be a deprivation of liberty and,

consequently, as serious as the original determination of

guilt, we agree with the holdings of these cases that due

process of law requires that a defendant charged with

having violated his probation be entitled to a conscientious

judicial determination of the charge according to accepted

and well recognized procedural methods. *** Justice

demands that he also be entitled to the protection of the

same due-process requirements which pertain to pleas of

guilty when he waives his right to a judicial determination

of the charge that he violated his probation and confesses or admits the charges of the revocation petition. If he does

so in reliance upon an unfulfilled promise by the State’s

Attorney, then his confession or admission to the charge

is not voluntary for the same reason that a plea of guilty

entered in reliance upon an unfulfilled promise of the

State’s Attorney is not voluntary.” Pier, 51 Ill. 2d at 99- 100.

	Two years later, in People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220 (1974), we again addressed the due process requirements for admissions to

probation violations. The defendants in consolidated cases both

were charged with violating the terms of their probation. Both

defendants admitted probation violations, and both were sentenced

to imprisonment. The defendants appealed, claiming that they were

denied due process because they did not receive warnings

comparable to the admonitions required under Supreme Court Rule

402 (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 402) for defendants pleading guilty.

	We reviewed Pier and limited its broad language to the facts of that case:

			“We cannot subscribe to the broad constitutional basis

which defendants seek to engraft upon our decision in

People v. Pier. *** In People v. Pier we did not consider the applicability of Rule 402 upon probation revocation

proceedings. We merely expressed the view that due

process required that a defendant’s admission must be

voluntarily made.” Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 225.

 We concluded that due process concerns did not necessitate Rule

402 admonitions for defendants admitting probation violations.

Beard, 59 Ill. 2d at 226-27. See also People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66, 75 (1995) (Supreme Court Rule 605(b), governing admonitions

to defendants about rights on appeal, does not apply to defendants

who admit violations of conditional discharge).

	Our appellate court has struggled to reconcile Pier and Beard. See, e.g., People v. Butcher, 288 Ill. App. 3d 120, 122 (1997). In People v. Followell, 165 Ill. App. 3d 28, 30-31 (1987), the appellate court quoted at length from Pier before concluding:

			“Although the trial court need not give all of the

admonitions contained in Supreme Court Rule 402 [citation] prior to accepting an admission to a petition to

revoke probation [citation to Beard], we believe that in order to protect a defendant’s due process rights, and to

make a conscientious judicial determination of the charge,

the court must at least determine that the defendant knows

what the specific allegations in the petition are, that he

knows that he has a right to a hearing with counsel

present, that he is not making the admission on the basis

of any promises or coercion, and that he understands the

consequences of his admission.”

See also People v. Foehrer, 197 Ill. App. 3d 754, 755-56 (1990).

	In the present case the appellate court correctly observed that

“Illinois law regarding due process in the context of probation

revocation proceedings is not well defined.” After reviewing

relevant case law, the appellate court stated that a fact-based

approach to determining due process standards in the context of

admissions to probation violations “may not be preferable, for

comprehensive adherence to the considerations enumerated in

Followell carries the virtue of ensuring consistency and uniformity within our judicial system.” The appellate court, however,

ultimately held that the defendant’s admission met due process

requirements: “[O]ur reading of the entire record here does not

convince us that the instant proceedings were fundamentally

deficient or unfair ***.”

	Although we disagree with the conclusion reached by the

appellate court in this case, we agree that Followell provides a suitable framework for protecting defendants’ due process rights. People v. Barker, 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59 (1975), and People v. Baker, 94 Ill. 2d 129, 134 (1983), where we held that a waiver of counsel in

a probation revocation proceeding is invalid unless the court

admonishes the defendant as to the purpose of the proceeding and

the nature of the alleged violation, as well as his rights of

confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel,

provide additional guidance. In an effort to clarify the meaning of

due process in this context, we now hold that before accepting a

defendant’s admission to a probation violation, the trial court

should admonish the defendant to determine whether:

			(1) the defendant understands the specific allegations in

the State’s petition to revoke probation;

			(2) the defendant understands that he has the right to a

hearing with defense counsel present at which that the

State must prove the alleged violation, and that he has the

rights of confrontation and cross-examination at such a

hearing;

			(3) the defendant’s admission is voluntarily made and

not made on the basis of any coercion or promises, other

than any agreement as to the disposition of his case;

			(4) the defendant understands the consequences of his

admission or the sentencing range for the underlying

offense; and

			(5) a factual basis exists for the admission.

	These warnings appropriately balance the interests of the State

with the liberty of defendants, and they also comport with the

language of the probation revocation statute. See 730 ILCS

5/5–6–4(b) (West 1998) (the defendant has the right to a hearing

on the alleged probation violation); 730 ILCS 5/5–6–4(c) (West

1998) (at a probation revocation hearing, the State bears the

burden of proof, and the defendant has the rights of confrontation,

cross-examination, and representation by counsel); see People v. Bell, 296 Ill. App. 3d 146, 152 (1998).

	Here, the trial court’s exchange with the defendant and

defense counsel touched upon some of the requisites of due

process which we have identified. The court initially determined

whether the defendant understood the allegations of the State’s

petition. The court also determined that the defendant’s admission

was voluntary and was not prompted by prosecution promises.

Defense counsel indicated that he had discussed the sentencing

range with the defendant, and in accepting the defendant’s guilty

plea, the court previously had advised the defendant of the possible

penalty for forgery. See People v. Cox, 197 Ill. App. 3d 239, 244- 45 (1990). Finally, the State offered a factual basis for the

defendant’s admission.

	The court, however, did not advise the defendant of his right

to a probation revocation hearing or the specifics of such a hearing. This deficiency denied the defendant due process. See People v. Marion, 275 Ill. App. 3d 494, 496 (1995) (the defendant’s admission to a probation violation did not satisfy due process

where the trial court did not admonish the defendant that by her

admission she was waiving her right to present and confront

witnesses); People v. Hoyt, 129 Ill. App. 3d 331, 337 (1984) (the trial court afforded the defendant minimum due process when,

prior to accepting the defendant’s admission to a probation

violation, it admonished the defendant that she was waiving her

right to a hearing).

CONCLUSION

	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgments

of the appellate and circuit courts and remand to the circuit court

for further proceedings.

Appellate courtJudgments reversed;

cause remanded.

	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.