DA 06
- 0750 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2007 MT 299 JERREL D. BALLAS AND MICHELE BALLAS, Plaint iffs and Appellees,
v. MISSOULA CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; MISSOULA OFFICE OF PLANNING AND GRANTS; CI TY OF MISSOULA, MONTANA; JAMES ANTHONY TERZO and JENNIFER EL IZABETH TERZO, husband and wife,

Defendants, ANTHONY J. TERZO, JR. and MYRNA S. TERZO, husband and wife, and 216, LLC, a Montana limited liabilit y co mpany, Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL FROM: Di strict Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

In and For the County

of Missoula, Cause No. DV 03

- 867 Honorable James A. Haynes, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant s : Darrel L. Moss, Sullivan, Tabaracci & Rhoades, Missoula, Montana For Appellee s : Richard M. Baskett , Baskett Law Office, Missoula, Montana Charles E. McNeil

and Alan McCormick, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, Montana James P. Nugent and Susan A. Firth, Cit y Attorney’s Office, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 19, 2007 Decided: November 19, 2007 Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk November 19 20072

Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Anthony J. Terzo, Jr., Myrna S. Terzo , an d 216, LLC( collectively, the Lot 14A Defendants ) appeal from the District Court’s denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings based on lack of jurisdiction/standing. We dismiss
. ¶2 We restate the issue as follows: ¶3 Did the District Court err when it determined it had subject matter jurisdiction? BACKGROUND ¶4 In 2003, J ames and Jennifer Terzo (collectively, Terzo) owned two adjacent residential lots, Lot 14 and Lot 15, on South Avenue East in Missoula, Montana. E ach l ot w as zoned as R
- 1 single family residential and measured 30’ x 139 ’ ( 4,170 square feet) . A house straddled the two lots. The City of Missoula approved Terzo ’s May 2003 request to reconfigure the properties’ boundary lineto create two lots measuring 60’ x 69.5’ ( 4,170 square feet eac h) , presently known as Lot 14A and Lot 15A. The reconfiguration’s effect was to p lace the original residenceentirely on Lot 14A. The Missoula Office of Planning and Grants (OPG) then granted T erzo ’s application for a building permit to construct a houseon Lot 15A. ¶5 Jerrel and Michele Ballas( collectively, Ballas) , Terzo’s next - door neighbors, appealed to the MissoulaC ity Board of Adjustment (BOA), contesting the building permit ’s issuance. Ballas contended that aMissoula City Ordinancerequired a minimum lot area of 5,400 square feet for a residential structure; thus, because Terzo’s lots were each 4,170 square feet, the building permit violated the City ordinance and should not be issued. Ballas also argued that OPG incorrectly had determined the proper setback3

required for Terzo’s new house. BOA denied both appeals , and Ballas appealed to the District Court

in October 2003. ¶6 In the midst of the ongoing litigation, Terzo generated a flurry of deeding activity. O n June 29, 2004, Terzo conveyed L ots 14 and 15 to James Terz o’s parents, Anthony J. Terzo , Jr. (Anthony) and Myrna S. Terzo (Myrna). A month later, Terzo issued a corrected deed, which conveyed Lots 14A and 15A to Anthony and Myrna. Terzo issued
another corrected deed ag ain conveying Lo ts 14A and 15A to Anthony and Myrna on September 20, 2004. That same day, Anthony and Myrna conveyed Lot 14A to 216, LLC , a Montana Limited Liability Company located at the same address as Anthony and Myrna
. ¶7 On September 15, 2005, Ballas filed a supplemental complaint joining the Lot 14A Defendants as parties to the lawsuit. Anthony and Myrna then executed a quitclaim deed conveying any interest in Lot 15A to Terzo on September 29, 2005. ¶8 The Lot 14A Defendants then filed several motions including a mo tion for judgment on the pleadings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Lot 14A D efendants appeal the District Court’s denial of this motion. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9 A district court’s decision to grant or d eny a motion to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law which we review for correctness. Lurie v. Blackw

ell, 285 Mont. 404, 407
- 08, 948 P.2d 1161, 1163 (1997). The inquiry is
whether the complaint states facts that, if true, would grant the district court

s ubject matter jurisdiction. Barthule v. Karman , 268 Mont. 477, 483, 886 P.2d 971, 975 (1994 )
.4

A district court’s denial of a mo tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewable prior to final judgment. M. R. App. P. 6(3)(c). O ur r eview is restricted to whether the district court correctly decided the limited question of subject matter jurisdiction. DISCUSSION ¶10 Did th e District Court err when it determin ed it ha d subject matter jurisdiction? ¶11 The Lot 14A Defendants assert the Di strict Court erred in determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction over them because Ballasf ailed to establish standing to challenge the boundary line relocation that created Lot 14A. The Lot 14A Defendants argue that Ballas “must have some basis under the law granting them standing, i.e., subject matter jurisdiction, to appeal or challenge the common boundary line relocation.” The Lot 14A Defendants claim that Ballas has failed to establish standing; thus, th ey reason, the District Court erred in determining that it had subject matter jurisdiction. ¶12 Subject matter jurisdiction refers simply to a court’s power to hear and adjudicate
a case . Harland v. Anderson Ranch Co. , 2004 MT 132, ¶ 31, 321 Mont. 338, ¶ 31, 92 P.3d 1160, ¶ 31. D istrict courts have original jurisdiction in all civil matters. M ont. Const. art. VII , § 4
. Additionally, district courts are authorized to hear appeals from municipal board of adjustment decisions. S ection 76
- 2
- 327, MCA
. Ballas’s First Amended Complaint appeals the Missoula BOA’s denial of Ballas’schallenges to OPG’s issuance of Terzo’s b uilding permit
. The District Court is statutorily authorized to hear5

such appeals , and we conclude that the District Court has subject matter jurisdictionover this case
. ¶13 The Lot 1 4A Defendants tie their lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim to their contentionthat Ballas lacks standing. The brief filed with the District Court contain ed no substantivec hallenges to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but challenge d only B allas’s standing. S imilarly, on appeal, the Lot 14A Defendants reason that theD istrict Court lacks s ubject matter jurisdiction because B allas failed to satisfythe standing requirements. ¶14 The Lot 14A Defendants mistakenly link the requirement that a court havesubject matter jurisdiction with the requirement that a plaintiff have standing to sue; though both
are required , they are not interdependent
. As discussed i n ¶ 1 2 , subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a particular type of c ase. S tanding, on the other hand, refers to the threshold j usticiability requirement that a plaintiff have a personal stake in a particular case. Bow en v. McDonald, 276 Mont. 193, 201, 915 P.2d 201, 206 (1996). I f a plaintiff lacks standing, a court c an grant no relief because a justiciable controversy does not exist. Powder R iver County v. State , 2002 MT 259, ¶ 101, 312 Mont. 198, ¶ 101, 60 P.3d 357, ¶ 101. A party’s lack of standing, however, does not deprive adistrict court of its subject matter jurisdiction. ¶15 Perhaps some of the confusion stems from the broadn ature of the term “jurisdiction
. ” Black’s Law Dictionary has defined jurisdiction as a “term of comprehensive import embracing every kind of judicial action. . . . It is the power of the court to decide a matter in controversy and presupposes the existence of a duly6

constituted court with control over the subject matter and the parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary853 (6th ed., West 1990) (citations omitted)
. Further, jurisdiction exists whe n
a court has cognizance of the class of cases involved, the proper parties are present, and the points to be decided are within the court’s powers. Black ’ s Law Dictionaryat 8 53 (citation omitted)
. Thus, the term “ jurisdiction, ”when referred to general ly, encompasses subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, i ssue jurisdiction, and constitutional requirements, such as ripeness and standing. ¶16 Although a party’s lack of standing can effectively divest a court of jurisdiction, or power, to resol ve a case, the party’s lack of standing does not affect a court’s subject matter jurisdictionover the type of case
. We recognized in In re Parenting of D.A.H. th e close link between standing requirement s and a court’s jurisdiction , and we stated that a
c ourt “that would otherwise have jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter will not have jurisdiction if a person without standing attempts to bring the action.” 2 005 MT 68, ¶ 8, 326 Mont. 296, ¶ 8, 109 P.3d 247, ¶ 8 ; see also Edwards v. Burke , 2004 MT 350, ¶ 2 2, 324 Mont. 358, ¶ 22, 102 P.3d 1271, ¶ 22 ( case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on party’s lack of standing)
. We emphasize that a court lacks thepower to resolve a case brought by a party without standing b ecause such a party can present n o actual case or controversy, not because the court has been stripped of its subject matter jurisdiction
. ¶17 In this case, the District Court determined that Ballas had standing tochallengethe boundary line relocation. In substance the Lot 14A Defendants appeal this determination. Though M. R. App. P. 6(3)(c) allows interlocutory appeals from an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no such rule exists to challenge a7

court’s ruling on standing. T hus, the Lot 14A Defendants ’ appeal is premature. We refuse to reviewadistrict court’s standing determination prior to final judgment. Additionally, we will not allow a party’s characterization of an issue to eclipse its substance, nor will w e allow parties to relitigate adistrict court’s ruling merely because the appealing party has stylized the issue on appeal as one of subject matter jurisdiction. Searight v. Cimino , 238 Mont. 218 , 222, 777 P.2d 335, 337 (1989)
. ¶18 We conclude the District Court has subject matter juris diction over this case, and
we dismissa s prematurethe Lot 14A Defendants ’ appealand remand to the District Court for further proceedings.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY /S/ JOHN WARNER /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ BRIANMORRIS