McNair Paper Number 44, Chapter 9,  October 1995
**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMET:  ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
 Historian Barbara Tuchman once observed, "One needs to step outside a phenomenon in order to see itsshape, . . . to be able to look back and say, '*There* was the turning point.'"(Note 61)  From its vantage point,  the INSS study groupbelieves that the 1991 Expanded IMET amendment provides International Military Education andTraining with its first turning point.  This legislation both reaffirmed and challenged the successful 1976program.  In particular, it reaffirmed the program's two original aims.  The United States first wantedto help countries utilize their resources more effectively, improving military doctrine, technical andtactical competence, and defense management skills in order to increase national self-reliance in securitymatters.  Second, the United States used the medium of military education to advance understanding ofU.S. culture, institutions and values, especially as they relate to human rights.  These two objectivesremain relevant, useful and worthy of funding support, and the rightness of the program's focus--militaryofficers--continues to be upheld.
	In addition, Congress in 1991 recognized that the changing international security environment posesan expanding set of non-traditional requirements for this military program, such as assisting armed forcesto adjust to new democratic norms and exploring the challenging demands associated with coalition peaceoperations.  But Congress went beyond professional military education and competency training and gavethe IMET program a political-military task--to help educate several categories of civilian officials in howto oversee, manage and work with national military establishments.  The U.S. legislators also challengedthe foreign aid community to find ways to adapt to the evolving U.S. domestic security context.  In thefuture, IMET will operate with fewer resources, be subject to closer interest group and Congressionalscrutiny, and respond to greater international requirements for U.S. security assistance training.   	The INSS team found today's IMET program, and foreign military education and training in general,in a state of transition from the old methods of Cold War vintage toward a new approach that is stilltaking shape.  Congressional action in 1991, the recognition by unified commanders that low-visibilitydefense instruction has exceptional value in promoting both democracy and military cooperation, plusemotional criticism of the U.S. Army School of the Americas by media and religious activists have thrustIMET into the policy limelight.  While progress has been made in adjusting to current circumstances,International Military Education and Training has had to become many things to different constituenciesand, consequently, its center of gravity has been lost.  In an effort to help chart the best course for thefuture, the study group went beyond an examination of IMET's effectiveness as a policy instrument andlooked at two other aspects of the program: foreign military education and training today, andcontemporary pressures on the IMET system.

**The Nature of Foreign Military Education and Training Today**
**Misleading terminology**.  The considerable success that the United States has enjoyed with its foreign military education and training programs relies on three different funding sources: the modest grant appropriation in the security assistance budget (IMET);(Note62) Foreign Military Sales for training, which regularly funds over 50 percent of internationalstudents; and a small counterdrug grant initiative funded by the State Department's Bureau ofInternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement.  Lacking a term that consolidates the different categoriesof foreign military education and training, the practice today is to misleadingly refer to all threecollectively as IMET.     
**The investment**.  DOD has long viewed foreign military education and training as a valuableinvestment in future bilateral and multilateral defense and diplomatic relations.  Experience has shownthat most visiting junior and middle-grade officers will move into national decision-making hierarchies. Thus far, the investment has paid substantial dividends in such areas as access to military and politicalleaders, resource management, procurement, doctrine development, and training practices.  
	There also is a second, less visible, near-term investment.  It is derived from DOD's efforts toimprove human rights awareness among foreign military and civilian students.  The immediate objectiveis to positively influence personal behavior after graduates return home, possibly saving lives in theextreme.  This investment is akin to an accident prevention program that relies heavily on awareness anda willingness to follow guidelines.  Success with such a program is very difficult to measure accuratelyin quantifiable ways.  It is defined largely after the fact in terms of what has not occurred, e.g., noaccidents, military coups, or violations of human rights.  Observers are hard pressed to determine howmany incidents were avoided as a result of this educational experience, but clearly, as critics attest, theUnited States is held accountable for the failures.(Note 63)
**Education in three parts**.  The Defense Department's traditional approach to foreign militaryeducation and training is poorly understood, even within DOD.  The method combines three elements:English language training (as required); a course of instruction in the service, joint or defense educationsystem conducted in the United States (ideally more than 8 weeks long); and DOD's voluntaryInformational Program (IP).  
	Whether visiting military and civilian students understand the United States, admire it, and want toidentify with its values and overseas objectives, or cooperate militarily with it, may hinge directly on thequality of experience they have while undergoing training in this nation.  Integrating all three elementsshapes the experience, creating a positive environment that affects the knowledge and attitudes about theUnited States and its Armed Forces these visitors carry back home.  English language training and theInformational Program are the unseen and underappreciated variables in the IMET experience.   INSS'sresearch, however, finds them to be the most influential elements, constituting the core of DOD'sapproach to human rights awareness.
	Unavoidable tradeoffs have been made in the quality of this experience, diminishing the DODprogram's full impact.  The use of Mobile Training Teams to teach short courses outside the UnitedStates often are the only and best option to provide the technical instruction that a country needs.  A fewcourses in the United States are so brief that students cannot participate in an IP.  DOD's Spanish-language schools are examples of a compromise, as are the main components of today's E-IMETprogram.
**Emergence of a separate E-IMET experience**.  Responding to Expanded IMET legislation, theimmediate Defense response was to adapt it to the original IMET experience and gradually introduce newcourses.  Initially, it was assumed that routine procedures could be followed to satisfy E-IMET'sguidelines.  Civilian defense officials, for example, would simply join military counterparts in establishedcountry IMET programs.  However, finding sufficiently qualified civilian students has proven morecomplicated than expected and highly disruptive in many newly democratic countries with a limitednumber of candidates.  Recently, Congress expanded civilian participation to include legislative andnongovernmental personnel involved in defense matters, with a corresponding growth annually in thepercentage of the IMET appropriation "fenced" for this purpose ($5 million in FY 95).  The expansionof IMET to training civilians, which is a "strongly encouraged" but not mandated requirement (officereducation can use E-IMET funds for specific courses), does have a negative impact.  It still eliminates,for example, a significant amount of the professional military education sought by foreign governmentsand limits the restoration of programs, especially in Africa, that were gutted by earlier reductions infunding and shifts in policy interest to Central and Eastern European programs.  The E-IMET initiativealso further reduces funding support for English language training and the Informational Program at atime when these two important components are most needed.  
	With a better appreciation today for the problems associated with civilian governance in newdemocracies and a clearer understanding of their political-military requirements, the Defense Departmentis beginning to increase the number of short, tailored courses conducted overseas.  The use of mobileeducation teams (MET) is sensitive to foreign cultures and institutions, focuses on helping governmentseducate their small pools of civilian officials, provides confidence-building opportunities at senior levelsin both civilian and military sectors that are impossible to achieve outside the participating countries,improves the image of the U.S. mission, and minimizes negative aspects of E-IMET (e.g., civilianofficials gone for extended periods, inadequate English language proficiency).  The emerging METformula suggests that rather than trying to further modify, and possibly distort, the original model forIMET-funded education, Expanded IMET can provide its own unique professional experience--one thatconcentrates on affecting change in the near-term as well as investing in the future, is less dependent onEnglish language proficiency and travel to the United States, and brings a sample of Americana to theparticipants.
	A second and more troubling dimension of the E-IMET experience is the introduction of a trendtoward shifting more funds from traditional IMET programs into expanded IMET initiative courses andtraining.  The sources of the trend are statements explaining congressional intent in appropriationcommittee reports in 1992 (House) and 1993 (Senate).  It is not yet clear whether or not new Republicanleaders in these committees share the intent of the Democrats.  The trend, however, continues.  Eachyear since its inception in FY 1991, an additional $1 million has been obligated for E-IMET ($5 millionin FY 1995), based on report language.  There is no indication of an upper limit for this annualoccurrence.  When combined with the directive to "shift more funds from traditional IMET programs,"the future organization of foreign military education and training is in question.  How will PME offeringsbe balanced with education in the "softer" aspects of military science--resource management, civiliancontrol and human rights?  The Military Departments manage the traditional programs; DSAA managesthe E-IMET initiative and oversees the entire security assistance training opportunity.  The trend, if itcontinues, is to progressively pull military instruction away from professional education.
**Democracy and human rights**.  The INSS research team found that, with the exception ofDOD's three Latin American schools, there is generally little consideration for a supplemental democracyand human rights curriculum in mainstream professional military education designed for a U.S. studentpopulation.  Opposition to incorporating these topics into standard command and staff and war collegecourses, beyond instruction on leadership, discipline and military law, seems to stem from a negativepredisposition of U.S. faculty and students who do not see the relevance of these subjects to U.S. officersand the traditional "battlefield."  The strong workhorses in foreign military education on issues ofdemocracy and human rights continue to be the Informational Program, which recently has beenstrengthened internally and made uniform across the services, and English language training, which nowincorporates the two themes in its instructional material as well as in courses taught at Lackland AFB. The Latin American program presents a different situation.  The U.S. Army School of the Americasactually incorporated democracy and human rights in its curriculum in 1990 before passage of the E-IMET amendment; the smaller Air Force and Navy programs followed suit.  All these programs havecontinued to refine their instructions.
**Post-graduation contact program**.  There is a promising fourth element of foreign military education and training--a program to reinforce the U.S. experience by maintaining contact withgraduates.  Today, the program is ad hoc and highly personalized.  Each military school has its ownapproach, and the degree of effectiveness varies.  Some attempts have been made to share currentprofessional literature.  The Naval War College, which may have the most successful program, has beenable to hold periodic, small group reunions of Command Course graduates in various foreign countries. A large part of the difficulty in postgraduation contact is maintaining current locator data.  Embassiesare irregular in keeping information on students trained under the IMET or FMSprograms--recordkeeping too often depends on individual motivation.  The INSS team found no recordof embassy initiatives to keep in contact with officer-graduates in a manner similar to that accomplishedfor other foreign education programs, such as the Fulbright program.  DSAA does not have completeor adequate historical records on IMET graduates other than an annual report on positions of prominence(undefined) attained by former students.(Note 64)  Thereare no data on officers educated with FMS funding.  Also incomplete is information on theaccomplishments of graduates, which might suggest "subjective ties" to the United States attributable toforeign military education.  The INSS study group found general agreement that the advent of E-IMETprograms, particularly for civilians, offered a promising opportunity to institute a common programdesigned to maintain contact with foreign students throughout their careers.  DSAA recently started workto develop a computer database to track students trained in the United States.

**Contemporary Pressures on the IMET System**
**Internal trends**.  While the level of foreign interest in U.S. professional military education and, to a lesser degree, technical training is at an all time high, in practice fewer military students from morecountries are funded with progressively less money.  This situation, extending from FY 1986 forward,underscores several findings about foreign military education and training:
	The IMET dollar today buys less military training than at any other time.  Course and living costs are high, particularly for multimonth professional military education programs.  

	As the reduction of the Defense Department continues, the number of spaces in U.S. militaryclassrooms made available for international students also is decreasing.  All forms of securityassistance training have begun to feel this pinch. 

	As the number of U.S. officers in school declines because of personnel reductions and budgetcuts, greater attention needs to be given to finding a balance between service quotas for foreignstudents at military schools stemming from Defense policy interests and requirements for U.S. seatsin these schools.  There currently are no instructions (OSD or Joint Staff) to the U.S. militaryeducation community that would guide the gradual reduction in the number of seats reserved forforeign enrollment or, perhaps, set minimum standards. At this time, the Services are supportive ofinternational training requirements, but under fiscal pressure their continued goodwill is not assured. 

	Today 20 percent of IMET funding supports the E-IMET program.  This has createdconsiderable, unnecessary tension within the foreign military education and training system.  Initiatives to develop professional military skills and strengthen civil-military relations now vie forfunds.  Embassy officials find themselves seeking loopholes in DSAA's guidelines to get credit for"strongly encouraged" civilian and mandatory participation in E-IMET courses while still respondingto the host government's desire for professional military education, instead of using E-IMET andIMET experiences in complementary ways.  A greater use of METs can help in this regard. 

	 U.S. professional military education is becoming more technology-oriented, placing mostinternational students, unaccustomed to a high degree of  technical sophistication, at a disadvantagein the classroom.  Many schools have successfully addressed this issue by providing basic computertraining during the preparatory portions of their international programs.

	U.S. policy interests today encourage the assistance of newly democratic governments,particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.  Reduced funding levels and the high cost of militaryeducation gut programs in other regions.  Africa is the perennial target.  Continuing to provide mostcountries an IMET allocation, without regard to the reduced funding, does not necessarily best serveU.S. interests.  When resources are scarce, funds could be managed more effectively if there werea prioritization of countries designated to receive IMET funding within regions and minimumstandards for IMET support to foreign governments.	

**English language training (ELT)**.  The INSS research team found repeated evidence that ELTprograms overseas are limited and often ineffective in their preparation of students for U.S. militaryschools.  Problems are related to insufficient funding in support of a policy requiring English languageeducation, and they take several forms.  In some countries, the United States has provided language labsand training materials under IMET, but governments have decided to "save" decreasing IMET funds byunderutilizing their ELT capability.  In recently established U.S. programs in Central and EasternEurope, where governments are investing heavily in ELT, the problem is one of rapidly growing studentpopulations and insufficient resources.  Central and Eastern Europe need additional funding to expandtheir ELT programs, train more English language instructors, and increase training materials.  The FY1996 IMET request includes funds to develop these programs.
	Spanish-speaking countries in the Hemisphere present a different problem.  These governments needto revitalize languishing ELT programs and make greater use of the Defense Language Institute, but thereis no incentive to do so.  Many Latin American officials continue to depend heavily on Spanish-speakingschools like the U.S. Army School of the Americas instead of participating in English-languageprograms.  This is the only region for which the U.S. Government deviates from one of IMET's basicprinciples--professional military development is accomplished by training alongside U.S. military andcivilian personnel.  Many officers from across the Americas view these programs with suspicion andcharacterize them as a second-class education because top U.S. officers do not attend them.  The INSSstudy group believes that the continuing importance and utility of Spanish-language courses for middle-level and senior officers in this era of interoperability should be reexamined.  The maximum benefit ofthe foreign military education and training experience, furthermore, can only be realized with languageproficiency.  Regional governments are beginning to agree.  Argentina and Guatemala now demandproficiency in English for officers to progress in rank.  Guatemala has recently introduced a languagestandard for promotion to general officer.
**Program management**.  The worth of international military education and training as a diplomaticand defense policy instrument is generally underappreciated across the U.S. Government, and itseffectiveness is underestimated.  IMET's management history is in large measure responsible for thisview.  Unfortunately, this inappropriate situation will continue unless there is both a more useful,flexible, and reliable vision to guide the contemporary program and a more responsible and responsiveoverall management system.
	In Washington, IMET is important twice a year--when the government submits its budget to Congressand when the Department of State allocates the program's appropriation.  Otherwise, there is noconstituency for, little interest in, or understanding of this "military" program in the department that, bylaw, owns it.  For example, there have been no guidelines for embassies in selecting military and civilianstudents and screening them for past human rights abuse.  Overseas, IMET has traditionally been a minorforeign and security policy tool managed in embassies by junior military or foreign service officers orforeign nationals.  State's senior leadership and ambassadors still view the program as "pocket change"to be used to show immediate interest in foreign military and U.S. goodwill.  Such a gesture--the offerof orientation tours for senior officers--was made recently to the Bosnian Federation.  Ambassadors needto be educated about the deeper value of the IMET program beyond language training and orientationtours.  They need to understand what is expected of them in terms of recruiting, reporting, and follow-up.  In sum, more active participation by ambassadors is necessary if country IMET and E-IMETprograms are to fulfill their potential.
	State's ambivalence toward IMET is reflected in the Department's propensity to use this grantprogram in short-range "carrot and stick" diplomacy.  The Defense educational experience has not beenviewed in the same light as equivalent civilian programs run by USIA and USAID;  their programs arenot curtailed, suspended or conditioned to signal U.S. displeasure with the government.  IMET is treatedas the expendable program.  Research revealed that DOD often is not consulted in advance when acountry program is suspended or terminated.  Unified Commands have little confidence in State'swillingness to engage Congress heartily to increase funding levels for IMET or to defend individualcountry programs when scrutinized.
	Nor has the Office of the Secretary of Defense shown serious policy interest in a program that itmanages--until last year.  As the collapse of foreign aid begins to eliminate options, IMET has assumednew importance.  The program traditionally has been a relatively small, low-cost and low-riskappropriation with sound annual Congressional support--a "bonsai" program in DOD's security assistanceforest.  The Department's policy interest and involvement with State in allocating IMET funds, beyondDSAA's input, have been minimal.  Similarly, when Congressional committees have asked about specificcountry IMET programs, OSD and Joint Staff officials, other than DSAA's staff officers, have usuallykept a low profile.  Comments from Unified Commanders in support of these programs most often arepassed to State to bolster its arguments in defense of this assistance.  OSD has often played no role.
	Policy makers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including DSAA, have taken little interest in the academic dimension of the foreign military education and training experience--what the United States is teaching foreign officers and how it is being taught.  The educational process has remained decentralized, without any sense of shared responsibility among OSD, Joint Staff, and militarydepartments.  DSAA and the Joint Staff today provide only administrative manuals and regulations toguide training program management.  The Agency, however, has taken a more all-inclusive role inoverseeing the Expanded IMET program.
	The 1991 legislation focuses on four classic areas of interest for the Office of the Secretary ofDefense: the military's role in a democratic society, defense resource management, military justicesystems, and education of civilians to oversee and work with the military institution.  DSAA is movingforward in response to congressional directives, but it does so without guidance on how senior officialsin OSD view their responsibilities for educating their civilian counterparts in these four areas.  TheSecretary's staff has not addressed several issues:
	The impression made on foreign students if instruction to empower foreign civilian defense and security managers only takes place in military schools

	Whether the education of civilians be a primary task for OSD-sponsored programs, such ascourses offered by the Defense Resource Management Institute and the National Defense University

	What can be learned from the preparation of U.S. officials for their roles in the executive andlegislative branches of government that can benefit foreign counterparts

	Where the focal point within OSD to oversee issues related to the complex role of the defenseestablishment in a democracy ought to be. 

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