SPACE WARRIORS: 

THE ARMY SPACE SUPPORT TEAM 

Prepared by: 

Dr. James Walker 

& 

James T. Hooper 

March 1999, July 2003 (rev.) 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team ii 

FOREWORD 

In the fifteen years since the U.S. Army Space 

Command (USARSPACE) was activated, soldiers 

from this command have pioneered innovative and 

revolutionary ways for employing space capabilities 

on behalf of the warfighter. At the time this history 

was sent to press, Army space soldiers were deployed 

worldwide in support of a variety of critical missions. 

Army space support units were present during combat 

operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, 

providing force enhancement, missile attack warning, 

and information operations support to commanders in 

the U.S. Central Command area of operations. Other 

Army space soldiers, working in both the United States and overseas, delivered the 

worldwide long-haul satellite communications support and other space products 

needed to maintain an effective military deterrent in Korea and other areas. As 

these examples attest, Army space soldiers are today playing an important role 

across the entire spectrum of operations. 

This history considers the establishment and subsequent evolution of the Army 

Space Support Team (ARSST) organization, created to provide space products and 

expertise to field units, thereby enhancing their intelligence and operational 

planning capabilities. This history focuses on the period from 1986 to 1998, when 

a handful of soldiers and civilians experimenting with new technologies and 

concepts sought to leverage the “ultimate high ground” on behalf of the land force. 

The history discusses the hard-won lessons learned through repeated deployments 

and exercises, calling attention to their frustrations and setbacks as well as to their 

many successes. Ultimately, it seeks to explain how those early visionaries 

established a foundation for the progress that the Army has achieved over the past 

five years, as illustrated by the importance of space in today’s land combat 

operations, and how these early lessons continue to provide valuable insights for 

the Army as it transforms for the future. 

This history was originally written in 1998. We are publishing it now, with a new 

concluding chapter, because developments over the past five years underscore the 

importance of the early work accomplished by ARSST soldiers. In areas ranging 

from the formulation of space doctrine and operational concepts to the 

establishment of a new career field and Army space force structure, early 

experimentation by ARSST soldiers provided the foundation for subsequent Army 

initiatives. It is our hope that this early history of ARRST from 1986 to 1998 will 

contribute to a more complete understanding of the progress made since 1998, and 

to an informed vision of the future of Army space support. 

Why should soldiers read this book? All military operations today are affected by 

space-based communications, imagery, positioning and location support, missile 

warning, and related capabilities. As the Army transforms itself for the future, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team iii 

space will be essential for achieving the information dominance necessary for the 

advanced, full-spectrum Army operations of tomorrow. An understanding of 

space systems and capabilities is becoming an increasingly important part of the 

professional soldier’s craft, and we hope that this history will provide new and 

important insights into where we have come from and where we are going as an 

Army. 

 Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr. 

 Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 

 Commanding 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team iv 

PREFACE 

This history of Army Space Support Team (ARSST) operations was written to 

support soldiers—both present and future—as they seek new and better ways to 

use space as a force multiplier. The original publication of this history in 1998 

came just two years before a dramatic restructuring of the nation’s space 

organizations and equally dramatic changes in the national security environment. 

These changes have impacted and continue to impact the organization and scope 

of Army space support capabilities. In such an environment of rapid and 

continuous change, it is both interesting and useful to examine the past to gain an 

understanding of the historical foundations for some of these new ideas and 

organizations. It is hoped that this history of the Army Space Support Team will 

provide the reader with such an understanding. 

The history is dedicated to the soldiers of the Army Space Support Team. Since 

the ARSST was activated in October 1994, these soldiers have deployed to support 

warfighting units, experimented with new tactics and advanced technologies and, 

in the process, established a firm foundation for Army space initiatives extending 

into the next century. If, as many analysts claim, the United States is at the 

forefront of a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs,’ it is largely due to the efforts of 

soldiers such as these. 

This history represents the efforts not only of the authors, but also of a number of 

soldiers and civilians whose roles must be acknowledged. Without the 

sponsorship of Colonel Steve Bowman [Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Space 

Command (USARSPACE)] and the support of the entire USARSPACE 

leadership, this study would never have been conducted. Both Colonel Bowman 

and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons [Director of Current Operations, 

USARSPACE] provided extremely useful guidance and input. Many Army Space 

Support Team personnel provided exemplary support throughout the study, 

answering thousands of questions, helping gather data, and discussing their field 

experiences and space support insights in a series of oral history interviews. It is 

safe to say that this history would never have been completed without the 

assistance of Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer, Lieutenant Colonel Frankie 

Moore, Major Gwynne T. Burke, Major Scott Cuthbertson, Major Caesar Jaime, 

Major Michael McFarland, Captain Gerry Skaw, Captain David Strombeck, 

Sergeant First Class Howard Smith, Staff Sergeant William Bates, Staff Sergeant 

Mark Stroup, and Sergeant Eric Herrmann. Similarly valuable research support 

was provided by Mr. Gary Baumann [USARSPACE], Mr. Ed Kiker [formerly 

assigned to the Army Space Institute], and Mr. James Williamson [Brown 

International]. Finally, special thanks is due to Major Caesar Jaime who provided 

logistical support throughout the study process, arranged and scheduled interviews 

with a number of subject matter experts, and provided a conduit for the exchange 

of information between various elements of U.S. Army Space Command. 

During the analysis and production phases of this project, assistance was rendered 

by a number of analysts whose efforts should also be acknowledged. Mr. Roy 

McCullough of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) made 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team v 

significant editorial contributions to the 2003 edition of this history. Reviews, 

input, advice, and guidance for the original edition of the history, prepared in 

1998, were also provided by a number of personnel at SAIC, including Randy 

Jones [Lieutenant Colonel, USA (ret.)], Doug Brisson [Lieutenant Colonel, USA 

(ret.)], Chip Fackner [Colonel, USA (ret.)], Tom Molino [Colonel, USA (ret.)], 

and Jim Reams [Lieutenant Colonel, USA (ret.)]. In addition, research support, 

editorial assistance, and graphics development help were provided by Dr. Todd 

Clark [SAIC], Mrs. Sharon Lang [Historical Office, U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command (USASMDC)], Ms. Sherrye Alexander [Historical Office, 

USASMDC], Mr. Joe Kupsky [SAIC], Mr. Mike Gallardo [SAIC], Mr. Mark 

Torok [SAIC]. 

All ranks are given as they were at the time of the preparation of this study. 

Dr. James Walker 

 James T. Hooper 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team vi 

CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................x 

CHAPTER ONE: SPACE COMES TO THE WARFIGHTER .............................1 

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................2

TRAILBLAZING EFFORTS AT THE ARMY SPACE INSTITUTE............................3

BACKGROUND: THE ACTIVATION OF THE U.S. ARMY SPACE COMMAND...5

LESSONS LEARNED: THE ARMY SPACE INSTITUTE EXPERIENCE..................6

FROM TESTING AND DEMONSTRATION TO TACTICAL CAPABILITIES: THE 

FIELDING OF GPS AND THE GULF WAR.................................................................6

GPS Overview ..................................................................................................7 

The GPS Testing And Development Process – Army Involvement.................8 

The GPS In Desert Shield And Desert Storm...................................................9 

Lessons Learned During GPS Fielding And Employment.............................11 

FIELD EXPERIENCE AND THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF SPACE ................13

Satellite Communications ...............................................................................13 

SATELLITE WEATHER SUPPORT............................................................................15

Satellite Topographic Imagery........................................................................17 

Theater Missile Attack Warning.....................................................................18 

Key Lessons In Bringing Space To The Warfighter.......................................19 

SUMMARY...................................................................................................................22 

CHAPTER TWO: ESTABLISHMENT DECISIONS SHAPING ARSST 

ACTIVATION AND THE INITIAL CONOPS.....................................................31 

THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS ...............................................................................31

THE LOUISIANA MANEUVERS ...............................................................................32

THE COMMERCIAL SPACE PACKAGE...................................................................33

Background.....................................................................................................33 

Early Decisions ...............................................................................................33 

The Louisiana Maneuvers General Officer Working Group Meeting............35 

Senior-Level Review And Refinement Of The CSP Initiative.......................38 

Implementation: Procurement Actions For The CSP .....................................40 

COPS: THE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (SPACE) TEAM................................41

The Army Audit Agency Review Of 1994.....................................................41 

Standing Up The COPS Capability.................................................................42 

Developing The COPS Concept Of Operations..............................................43 

USSPACECOM And The Renaming Of COPS .............................................46 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team vii

THE TRANSITION TO ARSST (OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1994) ...................... 48

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 49 

CHAPTER THREE: EVOLUTION OF ARSST OPERATIONS....................... 55 

ARSST OPERATIONS AND EVOLUTION, 1995..................................................... 56

1995 Concept Of Operations.......................................................................... 56 

ARSST Field Deployments............................................................................ 57 

XVIII Airborne Corps Support ...................................................................... 59 

1995 ARSST Lessons Learned ...................................................................... 64 

ARSST OPERATIONS AND EVOLUTION, 1996..................................................... 64

1996 Concept Of Operations.......................................................................... 65 

ARSST Planning, January 1996..................................................................... 65 

Space Demonstration Program Planning, January 1996................................ 68 

ARSST Field Deployments, 1996.................................................................. 68 

ARSST Forward Deployment At Ft. Bragg................................................... 72 

July-August 1996: ARSST Division Long Range Planning.......................... 73 

Changes To The ARSST TDA, July 1996..................................................... 76 

1996 ARSST Lessons Learned ...................................................................... 77 

ARSST OPERATIONS AND EVOLUTION, 1997..................................................... 78

1997 Concept Of Operations.......................................................................... 79 

ARSST Field Deployments, 1997.................................................................. 79 

ARSST Self-Sustainment Capability............................................................. 83 

ARSST Reorganization – The Commanding General’s Briefing.................. 84 

Changes To The MOA With The XVIII Airborne Corps.............................. 92 

The Army Space Support Cell (ARSST Plus) Concept................................. 93 

1997 ARSST Lessons Learned ...................................................................... 96 

ARSST OPERATIONS AND EVOLUTION, 1998..................................................... 97

1998 Concept Of Operations.......................................................................... 97 

ARSST Field Deployments, 1998.................................................................. 98 

1998 ARSST Training ................................................................................. 102 

USARSPACE Long Range Planning........................................................... 104 

The Redeployment Of ARSST Team 4 To Colorado Springs..................... 106 

1998 ARSST Lessons Learned .................................................................... 106 

SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 108 

CHAPTER FOUR: KEY TRENDS AND ISSUES........................................... 115 

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY SPACE SUPPORT STRUCTURE.......................... 116

Organization And Programs......................................................................... 116 

Army Space Support: Intellectual Evolution ............................................... 117 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team viii 

The Bottom Line: The Army Has A Demonstrated Need For A Deployable 

Space Support Organization .........................................................................118 

ARSST RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND TRADEOFFS .....................................118

The Bottom Line: A Requirement For Resources ........................................121 

THE VIEW FROM THE FIELD: HOW SUPPORTED UNITS RATE ARSST 

SUPPORT ....................................................................................................................121

After-Action Reports And Observations From The Field ............................121 

The Bottom Line: Officers Who Have Trained With An ARSST Are 

Impressed With The Value Of Space Support..............................................123 

SPACE SUPPORT AND LESSONS LEARNED ANALYSIS ..................................124

The Original ARSST Reporting And Collection Process.............................124 

Implications Of The Failure To Capture ARSST Lessons Learned .............125 

The Bottom Line: A Systematic Process Should Be Established To 

Disseminate Space Support Lessons Learned Throughout The Total Army.

.......................................................................................................................125 

THE ARSST AND SPACE EDUCATION .................................................................126

CURRENT SPACE EDUCATION .............................................................................126

Future Army Space Education......................................................................127 

The Bottom Line: Continued Emphasis Should Be Placed Upon The 

Development Of Space Education And Training Programs.........................127 

THE ARSST AND SPACE DEMONSTRATION ......................................................129

The ARSST And Space System Demonstration Missions ...........................129 

The Bottom Line: The ARSST Should Continue To Demonstrate New Space 

Systems .........................................................................................................130 

SUMMARY.................................................................................................................131 

CHAPTER FIVE: FUTURE ARSST EVOLUTION ..........................................135 

THE ARSST LONG RANGE VISION, 1996-1998....................................................136

ARSST Long Range Vision: January 1996 .................................................136 

ARSST Long Range Vision: July 1996........................................................136 

ARSST Long Range Vision: 1997................................................................137 

ARSST Long Range Vision And Planning Thrusts: 1998 ...........................137 

THE ARSST LONG RANGE VISION: COMMON THEMES (1996-1998).............138

ARSST Long Range Planning Assumptions, 1998 ......................................139 

VISIONS FOR LONG TERM SPACE SUPPORT EVOLUTION .............................140

THE LONG TERM VIEW FROM THE ARSST: AREAS OF CONSENSUS ..........141

THE LONG TERM VIEW FROM THE ARSST: UNRESOLVED ISSUES.............143

FUTURE ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCTS.......................................................145

SUMMARY.................................................................................................................149 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team ix

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS.................................................................... 153 

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................ 159 

APPENDIX ONE: ARSST EQUIPMENT .......................................................... 165 

The Commercial Space Package.................................................................. 165 

The High Resolution Weather Satellite Receiver (HRWSR) ...................... 166 

The Mission Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS) ...................................... 168 

INMARSAT Communications Terminals ................................................... 169 

The Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor (MSIP) ........................................... 170 

Upgraded and New ARSST Equipment....................................................... 171 

THE SPACE SUPPORT PLATFORM (SSP)............................................................. 171

THE SPACE SUPPORT PLATFORM PLUS (SSP+)................................................ 172

THE MULTI-SOURCE TACTICAL SYSTEM (MSTS)........................................... 172

THE LAPTOP VISUALIZATION DEVICE (LVD).................................................. 173

THE ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM—WARLORD (ASAS WARLORD) ... 173

ARSST COMMUNICATIONS .................................................................................. 174 

APPENDIX TWO: ACRONYMS ....................................................................... 179 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team x 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In the period from 1986 to 1998, the Army experimented with a number of 

concepts and programs for providing space support to tactical commanders. 

During this period, the focus of Army efforts shifted from space systems 

demonstrations, to deployment support, to space analytic services. The Army 

Space Support Team (ARSST) spearheaded these efforts to utilize space 

capabilities in support of the warfighter. As the military space environment 

continues to evolve and the Army adapts to new and emerging Army requirements, 

the ARSST will continue to play an indispensable role in translating space 

capabilities into warfighting tools and knowledge. 

The primary goal of this history of the Army Space Support Team is to support 

decision-making—both present and future—by outlining the organizational and 

conceptual evolution of the ARSST from 1986-1998, identifying trends and issues 

of significance, and explaining how important problems were approached and why 

key decisions were made. 

ARSST Origins and Background 

The Army Space Support Team organization represents the culmination of twelve 

years of Army conceptual development and field experience in applying space to 

support tactical units. This historical background was punctuated by six key 

milestones, as summarized below: 

1986: The provisional activation of the Army Space Institute (ASI). As the 

coordinating body for the development of Army space concepts, doctrine, training, 

and equipment, ASI served a pivotal role in first introducing the Army to the 

benefits offered by space. 

1987: The decision to implement the Army Space Demonstration Program. 

The demonstration program provided an early education to many tactical 

commanders on methods of using space technologies to support planning and 

operations. Although this program was not designed, organized, or funded to 

provide operational support in the field, personnel later deployed in support of 

Army operations in Saudi Arabia, Haiti, and Bosnia. 

1988: The activation of U.S. Army Space Command (USARSPACE). This 

marked the end of a long evolutionary process that began with the activation of a 

four-man liaison element at Colorado Springs in 1984 and continued through 1988 

when USARSPACE was established as the central organization for providing 

operational space support to the Army. 

1990-1991: The DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM experience. In the 

deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and southern Iraq, the “rank-and-file” Army was 

exposed to the value of multi-spectral imagery, GPS position/navigation, satellite 

weather, ballistic missile warning, and satellite communications. In addition, this 

experience also demonstrated the need for the Army to activate a dedicated space 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team xi

support organization capable of providing training and operational support to units 

deployed in a theater of operations. 

1994: The Army’s decision to activate a deployable space support team 

(Contingency Operations—Space or COPS) at Colorado Springs. The COPS 

team was the first Army organization explicitly designed to provide sustained 

operational support for units in the field. 

1994-1998: The evolution and growth of the Army Space Support Team. The 

ARSST represented an extension of the original COPS idea for a deployable space 

support organization. Over the subsequent five years of ARSST operations, teams 

deployed worldwide to support units from battalion to theater level — and all 

echelons in between. Equally as important, the ARSST served as a conduit 

between the capabilities of USARSPACE and the needs of warfighting units. 

ARSST Operations 

Field units evaluated the quality and value of ARSST support highly. In a 1998 

survey of Army officers who trained with an ARSST team every respondent stated 

that, if deployed to war, he would request assistance from the Army Space Support 

Team. Typical comments included: “I still firmly believe that ARSSTs are truly a 

force multiplier and bring a wealth of space systems support” and “I am a believer 

in the capabilities made available by the ARSST.” ARSST personnel worked 

diligently to earn the trust of supported commanders and staffs, demonstrate the 

value of space systems and capabilities, and remain prepared to deploy within 48 

hours to support the full spectrum of Army missions. In the process, the members 

of the ARSST averaged more than 140 deployment days per year. 

1995: On 1 January 1995, the ARSST was officially activated and teams began 

deploying to the field to provide space support enhancement. The ARSST was 

initially divided into three teams, each aligned with a Combatant Command. Over 

the course of the year, a team was forward-deployed at Ft. Bragg to satisfy the 

heavy demands for support made by the XVIII Airborne Corps and special 

operations units. 

1996: The ARSST concept of operations and organizational structure underwent 

significant changes in 1996. Efforts were made to restructure the ARSST to 

support two Major Regional Conflicts, provide new systems and technologies to 

the teams, and enhance space advisory and liaison capabilities. 

1997: ARSST operations in 1997 were conducted under a new organizational 

construct, with five teams prepared to support each of the Corps Headquarters and 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The ARSST continued to explore ways 

to improve the level of space support, to include the forward deployment of 

ARSST teams and liaison personnel, the rotational deployment of teams, and the 

establishment of a self-sustainment capability. Additionally, USARSPACE began 

to experiment with the Army Space Support Cell (ASSC) concept. 

1998: During this year, the ASSC concept was exercised and tested. As part of 

this process, the Command took steps to develop a more formalized training 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team xii 

program for ARSST personnel. In another development, the forward-deployed 

ARSST team at Ft. Bragg was reassigned to Colorado Springs. 

Looking to the Future: ARSST Viewpoints in 1998 

By 1998, long range planning for the Army Space Support Team was based upon 

four key assumptions. First, the space capabilities of U.S. adversaries were 

expected to continue to improve. Second, the dependence of the United States 

upon space systems—both commercial and military—would also rise. Third, 

commercial space capabilities would expand, with a number of implications for 

military operations. Finally, a revolution in satellite communication systems 

would introduce new considerations for military command and control. Given 

these trends, ARSST personnel in 1998 strongly believed that the Army needed to 

be closely involved in exploiting space systems and capabilities in the future. To 

support this requirement, the ARSST sought to evolve into a space analysisfocused organization, capable not only of translating space capabilities into tools 

for the supported commander but also of understanding the threat from neutral and 

adversary space systems, fully exploiting the capabilities of U.S. and commercial 

space assets, anticipating space environmental impacts, proactively identifying and 

addressing U.S. vulnerabilities and opportunities, and developing a "space 

estimate" for incorporation into the warfighter’s planning process. 

Looking at the long-term trends in the military space environment and the Army’s 

requirements for space support, personnel assigned to the ARSST described three 

future organizational constructs for the teams. Under the first concept, the ARSST 

would continue to deploy as a task-organized team of space personnel, but would 

have self-contained and integrated equipment, mounted in a tactical vehicle. 

Under the second concept, technology would evolve to the point where a single 

soldier would be capable of providing the full spectrum of space support through a 

small laptop computer. Under a third vision of long term ARSST evolution, the 

successful implementation of space education throughout the Army coupled with 

the assignment of space operations officers on Corps and Division staffs would 

render the ARSST unnecessary. In other words, space analysis would be part of 

every Division and Corps Headquarters’ integral capabilities. 

Each of the visions for future evolution of the ARSST was dependent upon a 

number of variables—the future threat, the evolution of space technology, the 

development of Functional Area 40 and the introduction of a space operations 

officer to the field, and the level of resources allocated to space support and space 

operations by the Army. No matter how the military space environment evolves in 

the future or how the Army organizes the ARSST to address it, however, one fact 

remained unchanged: The Army Space Support Team experience established a 

firm foundation for the application of space on behalf of the warfighter. For years 

to come, this experience will guide how the Army addresses space at the tactical 

and operational levels of war. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 1

CHAPTER ONE: 

SPACE COMES TO THE WARFIGHTER 

“While the ultimate weapon of war is still the soldier with a trench-knife, those 

soldiers are precious and few. Space helps to preserve them, make them more 

lethal, get them to where they are needed on time, get them resupplied with enough 

and on time, and convince potential adversaries that these are soldiers who would 

make better friends than enemies.” 

-Ed Kiker, Army Space Institute, 19921

 

 

In October 1994 General Joseph Ashy, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space 

Command (USSPACECOM), directed that a closer relationship be forged 

between the unified command and its Service components. Shortly thereafter, 

USSPACECOM and each of its Service components formally activated Space 

Support Team organizations. This chapter examines early Army efforts to bring 

space products to the tactical and operational level, focusing upon key structural 

causes for the Army’s interest in activating a Space Support Team capability. 

Specifically, this chapter assesses: 

• The impact of Army Space Institute (ASI) efforts to bring space products to 

the tactical user, to include the establishment of a successful tactical space 

demonstration program. 

• Key lessons learned during the deployment and use of early space systems, 

using the Army’s experience with the Global Positioning System (GSP) as 

an illustrative case study. 

• Efforts by the U.S. Army to exploit space capabilities in DESERT SHIELD, 

DESERT STORM, and other subsequent deployments. 

• The critical need for trained Army space support personnel who can 

facilitate the optimal use and exploitation of space-based capabilities for 

ground commanders. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 2 

Introduction 

In October 1994, General Joseph Ashy, then serving as the Commander-in-Chief 

(CinC) of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), directed that a closer 

relationship be forged between the unified command and its Service components. 

Shortly thereafter, USSPACECOM and each of its Service components formally 

activated Space Support Team organizations, designed to “provide expertise, 

advice and liaison regarding the application of space systems capabilities for 

Theater Commanders, Joint Task Forces, and theater component commanders [and] 

to make space systems’ capabilities understandable, and useful for warfare.”2

 

While the proximate cause for the activation of the Army Space Support Team 

(ARSST) lies with General Ashy’s directive, the U.S. Army’s efforts to exploit 

space for tactical purposes actually extend much further into the past. Those efforts 

not only shaped the method in which 

the ARSST was later activated and the 

functions the ARSST was subsequently 

assigned; they also demonstrated the 

need for a team capable of providing 

operational space support at short notice 

and furnished valuable lessons for 

Army leaders. 

This chapter examines early Army 

efforts to bring space products to the 

tactical and operational level, focusing 

upon key structural causes for the 

Army’s interest in activating a Space 

Support Team capability. It assesses 

the impact of Army Space Institute (ASI) efforts to bring space products to the 

tactical user, to include the establishment of a successful tactical space 

demonstration program. This chapter also highlights lessons learned during the 

deployment and use of early space systems, using the Army’s experience with the 

Global Positioning System (GPS) as an illustrative case study. It briefly outlines 

efforts by the U.S. Army to exploit space capabilities in Operation DESERT 

SHIELD, Operation DESERT STORM, and other subsequent deployments. 

Finally, the chapter explains how the Army’s early experience shaped the attitudes 

of senior decision makers, who concluded that the Army had a critical need for 

trained personnel with the skills needed to exploit space-based capabilities for 

ground commanders. 

The Four Original Army Space 

Demonstration Program Efforts: 

1. Light satellite support for 

communications at the tactical and 

operational levels. 

2. WRAASE commercial satellite weather 

receivers for support at Corps and 

Division level. 

3. GPS position/navigation capability

demonstrations. 

4. GPS vehicle and weapons systems 

orientations.
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 3

Trailblazing Efforts at the Army Space Institute 

The Army Space Institute (ASI) was provisionally activated in 1986 and officially 

activated on 12 January 1988. The Institute was designated as the U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) proponent for space and space 

systems. In this role, ASI assumed responsibility for developing Army space 

concepts, doctrine, training, and equipment. As TRADOC Commanding General 

Maxwell Thurman emphasized at the ASI activation ceremony, “the Army must 

use space smartly — and that’s ASI’s role.”3

Early attempts by ASI to bring space products to the tactical user served as a 

precursor to the subsequent efforts of the Army Space Support Team. ASI 

aggressively pursued a vision for providing space support at the small unit level, 

established a demonstration program to educate tactical commanders on the use of 

space systems, and 

provided training 

and support to 

combat units 

deploying for 

Operation DESERT 

SHIELD. Simply 

stated, prior to 1990, 

ASI was the pivotal 

organization for 

thinking about and 

providing space 

support to the 

tactical commander. 

The ASI approach 

can best be summed 

up in one phrase: 

“tactical focus.” 

When ASI was 

provisionally 

activated in 1986, most military space systems were dedicated to supporting the 

strategic warfighting missions of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and 

the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). In a significant 

departure from previous practices, ASI emphasized the tactical uses of space 

systems by Army tactical units, down to the level of the infantry squad.4

 Even 

more remarkable was the aggressive manner in which ASI pursued that objective. 

At a time when Global Positioning System (GPS) technology had not even been 

fielded, ASI envisioned a not-so-distant future in which space systems would 

revolutionize operations at the battalion and company level. For example, in 1987 

the Commandant of ASI predicted that advanced positioning systems would soon 

be able to provide battalion commanders with continuous information on the 

location and status of their subordinate units; that tactical spaceborne 

communications would overcome the line-of-sight limitations of ground-based 

A WRAASE weather terminal, acquired as part of the original 

Army Space Exploitation Demonstration Program. U.S. Army

Europe and U.S. Army Forces Command made the decision to 

purchase the commercial WRAASE weather receiver in 1989. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 4 

radios, allowing small units to operate cohesively even when spread out over great 

distances or operating in rough terrain; and that a maneuver battalion’s intelligence 

section would have immediate access to satellite imagery and weather data.5 

ASI’s primary vehicle for experimenting with and demonstrating the tactical 

applications of space was the Army Space Demonstration Program (ASDP). This 

program originated from a 19 November 1986 decision by the Vice Chief of Staff 

of the Army directing the establishment of an Army Space Tactical (ASTAC) 

Demonstration program. The stated purpose of the program was to “determine how 

units, down to the squad level, might be supported using existing space 

technologies.”6 By June 1987, a series of space demonstration concepts had been 

developed under the program, now officially referred to as the ASDP. The first 

project involved experiments with light satellites (LIGHTSATs) to evaluate their 

ability to provide cost-effective support to military tactical/operational 

commanders. The second project was designed to provide satellite weather support 

to Corps and Division commanders via commercial weather receiver systems 

produced by the German company WRAASE. The third project involved 

demonstrations of the position/ navigation capabilities of the GPS system. A fourth 

ASDP project involved demonstrations of “the utility of GPS receivers on combat 

vehicles for orienting vehicles and weapon systems.”7 A fifth ASDP project, which 

was classified at the time, was the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS) 

demonstration. SEWS was an off-line technical demonstration using Defense 

Satellite Program (DSP) satellites to provide missile early warning data.8 The 

Army Staff formally approved the ASDP initiative in August 1987.9

By the eve of Operation DESERT SHIELD, significant progress had been made 

under the demonstration program, referred to after 1988 as the Army Space 

Exploitation Demonstration Program (ASEDP). Soldiers from ASI and the United 

States Army Space Command (USARSPACE) provided briefings on the program 

to Army Major Commands and work was progressing on the four demonstration 

projects. Under the LIGHTSAT program, two communications satellites were 

launched which were later used by logistical support units during Operation 

DESERT STORM. Under the weather support project, ASI provided training on 

satellite weather systems to the XVIII Airborne Corps, I Corps, Eighth U.S. Army, 

and a number of TRADOC elements.10 As a result of these efforts, U.S. Army 

Forces Command decided to purchase WRAASE weather receivers for every Army 

unit that had an assigned weather team.11 ASI also began conducting GPS training 

and demonstrations in 1989.12 

 In 1990, ASI was deactivated and the TRADOC Program Integration Office for 

Space (TPIO-SPACE) was established in its place. TPIO-SPACE was placed 

under the TRADOC Combined Arms Command and staffing levels were reduced 

from 42 personnel to ten.13 As part of this reorganization, responsibility for the 

Army Space Demonstration Program was transferred to USARSPACE. 

 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 5

Background: The Activation of the U.S. Army Space Command 

USARSPACE evolved over a period of six years from a 4-man liaison element 

stationed at Colorado Springs to the Army’s operational and planning focal point 

for space, with a total of 104 assigned personnel. The rapid growth of 

USARSPACE reflected two structural trends: First, the June 1985 Army Space 

Policy outlined an aggressive approach to exploiting space assets in support of 

ground operations, with particular emphasis placed on command and control, 

communications, weather, intelligence, and 

position/navigation capabilities, and as the 

Army took steps to implement the vision 

outlined in the Army Space Policy, 

USARSPACE was assigned a number of 

new functions, requirements, and 

responsibilities; The second cause for the 

rapid expansion of USARSPACE was the 

decision to assign responsibility for DoD 

space forces to USSPACECOM, a new 

Unified Command, in September 1985. As 

the Army’s component to USSPACECOM, 

U.S. Army Space Command was 

responsible for integrating Army 

requirements into the USSPACECOM 

planning process, for responding to 

USCINCSPACE-directed taskings, and for 

performing other joint duties and functions. 

USARSPACE can trace its orgins to the 

Army Staff Field Element, established as the 

first Army space organization at Colorado 

Springs in 1984. This four-person element 

was responsible for performing liaision 

duties with DoD space organizations. In 

1985, planning functions were added to the 

original Army Staff Field Element and it 

was renamed the Army Space Planning 

Group. After USSPACECOM was 

established, the Army again reorganized its 

space support structure by activating the 

Army Space Agency (ASA) in 1986. ASA 

was designated to “serve as the foundation of the Army’s operational capability in 

space” and was assigned 35 personnel.14 In 1988, another reorganization took place 

with the replacement of ASA by the new U.S. Army Space Command. In addition 

to the planning and coordination functions that were transferred when ASA was 

deactivated, U.S. Army Space Command assumed responsibility for the 

Consolidated Space Operations Center Detachment, the U.S. Army NASA-Johnson 

Space Center Detachment, and three Regional Space Support Centers.15 The 

Planning 

Group

Planning 

Group

1985

• Planning and

liaison element

ASA ASA

1986

• Planning and

liaison element

ARSPACE ARSPACE

1988

• Service component to

USSPACECOM

1984

• 4 person liaison element.

Army Staff

Field Element

Army Staff

Field Element

Figure 1: Early Evolution of the 

Army Space Command. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 6 

transfer of the space demonstration program from ASI to USARSPACE and the 

reassignment of the Army Signal Command's Defense Satellite Communication 

System platform and payload control mission to USARSPACE further extended the 

operational role of the new Command.16 

 Lessons Learned: The Army Space Institute Experience 

Early efforts by ASI to bring space products to the tactical user provided a number 

of lessons for Army leaders. First, although space systems had traditionally been 

used to support strategic-level missions, they could also be used at the tactical 

level. ASI accurately forecasted that space technologies could provide tactical 

commanders with enhanced position/navigation, weapons targeting, 

communications, intelligence, and weather support. To realize this objective, ASI 

conducted a series of experiments with space technologies through the Army Space 

Demonstration Program (ASDP). Second, the Army discovered that many existing 

military space systems were not suitable for tactical-level support. As a 

consequence, ASI began conducting experiments with light satellites to determine 

if they might provide more cost-effective support at the tactical and operational 

levels. In addition, ASI conducted experiments with commercial systems (such as 

WRAASE weather satellites) in areas where existing military systems did not fully 

satisfy Army requirements. 

The Army also learned that commercial, off-the-shelf space products could be 

leveraged to support tactical units. When the ASDP was initially established, the 

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed that maximum use be made of existing 

space technologies. By using off-the-shelf products, ASI was often able to fulfill 

Army space requirements in a low-cost, time-effective manner. Finally, the 

emerging Army space community determined that one of its key roles would be to 

support training in the field. As part of the ASDP, ASI and USARSPACE 

personnel frequently deployed to field units to provide training on space systems 

and capabilities. This capability would later prove to be invaluable when Army 

units began deploying for Operation DESERT SHIELD. Units deploying to 

Southwest Asia requested ASI assistance in exploiting GPS, satellite multi-spectral 

imagery, and satellite weather products. Personnel from ASI and USARSPACE 

were quickly dispatched to assist the requesting units. In addition, ASI developed a 

training program on the use of the GPS system to support XVIII Airborne Corps 

units.17 As described in more detail below, the ASI training program for GPS was a 

major factor helping to rush this developmental system into field use. 

From Testing and Demonstration to Tactical Capabilities: The 

Fielding of GPS and the Gulf War 

The use of GPS technology in DESERT STORM is frequently cited as an example 

of the value that space systems offer to the Army. Often forgotten, however, are 

the growing pains that accompanied system testing and deployment. Lessons 

learned during the fielding of GPS were a significant factor in shaping subsequent 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 7

developments in the Army space community (to include the activation of an Army 

Space Support Team capability) and provide relevant insights for leaders involved 

in bringing space capabilities to the field today. 

GPS Overview 

In the 1960s, two separate space positioning and navigation support programs were 

established within the Department of Defense. The U.S. Navy sponsored the 

Timation research program, focused on two-dimensional navigation technology, 

while the U.S. Air Force studied three-dimensional navigation technologies under a 

program dubbed 621B. In response to concerns within both the DoD and Congress 

that these programs were redundant, it was decided in April 1973 to consolidate 

Timation and 621B into a single, comprehensive system, referred to as the 

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. On 1 July 1973, the NAVSTAR GPS Joint 

Program Office was established, with the U.S. Air Force designated as the 

executive service. In June 1974, a contract to build nine GPS Block I satellites 

was awarded to Rockwell International. The first launch of a Block I satellite was 

conducted in May 1978. In December 1980, a contract to build 28 GPS Block II 

and Block IIA satellites was awarded to Rockwell International. The first Block II 

satellite was launched in February 1989, and the GPS system reached Full 

Operational Capability in April 1995.18

GPS currently serves as a satellite-based position/navigation (POS/NAV) tool for 

support of worldwide military operations. The system employs a constellation of 

satellites that function as spaceborne beacons. These satellites continuously 

transmit navigation data that, in turn, can be used by a GPS receiver to determine 

the operator’s location in a process similar to ‘triangulation.’ GPS is also used for 

a number of commercial and scientific purposes, ranging from mapping and 

surveying to international air traffic control. 

The GPS system consists of three major segments: the Space Segment, the User 

Equipment Segment, and the Control Segment. The Space Segment is based upon 

a constellation of GPS satellites, placed into orbits that allow a GPS receiver to 

obtain navigational inputs from multiple satellite systems. A GPS receiver can 

provide location data in two dimensions if it receives input from three satellites; 

location data in three dimensions can be provided by GPS if input is received from 

at least four satellites. At the time of DESERT STORM, 16 usable satellites were 

in operation, providing almost continuous two-dimensional coverage and 

approximately 19 hours of three-dimensional coverage per day in Southwest Asia.19 

The GPS User Equipment Segment is composed of a variety of different types of 

receiver units, as well as related test equipment, antennas, and software. GPS 

receiver units convert signals from the Space Segment into position, velocity, and 

time estimate data for the operator. The U.S. Army currently employs a number of 

hand-carried receiver units, as well as GPS receivers mounted in vehicles and on 

helicopters. When DESERT STORM began, most of the GPS receivers used by 

the Army were AN-PSN8 and AN-PSN9 manpack/vehicular (M/V) models and 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 8 

hand-held, commercial, small lightweight global positioning system receiver 

(SLGR) units.20

The GPS Control Segment is composed of a series of tracking systems. GPS 

monitoring stations are located in Hawaii, Diego Garcia, Ascension Island, the 

Marshall Islands, and Colorado Springs. These monitoring stations track each GPS 

satellite, compute orbital and clock corrections, and pass this data to the Master 

Control Facility at Schriever Air Force Base, CO. The Master Control Facility, in 

turn, uploads orbital and clock corrections to the satellites. 

In many respects, GPS proved to be the ideal position/navigation system for the 

Army. GPS provides extremely accurate position and velocity data, is available on 

a continuous basis at any location worldwide, and is not degraded by poor weather 

or environmental conditions. 21 In fact, GPS met almost every characteristic for the 

‘perfect’ POS/NAV system, defined by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat 

Development Activity in 1986: [1] Ability to provide worldwide coverage; [2] 

Operation in a “user-passive” mode; [3] Capability to deny use of the system to an 

enemy; [4] Capability to handle large numbers of users, without a “saturation 

limit”; [5] Resistance to electronic countermeasures employed by an adversary; [6] 

Resistance to natural disturbances; [7] Effective, real-time response to users; [8] 

Availability for combined operations; [9] Lack of difficulties in allocating 

frequencies; [10] Capability to provide a common grid reference for all users; [11] 

capability to provide POS/NAV data that is not “degraded by changes in altitude 

for air and land forces nor by time or year or time of day”; [12] The ability to 

provide accurate data while the user’s vehicle is maneuvering; [13] Ease of 

equipment maintenance, accomplished by unit-level operators; and [14] the ability 

for the POS/NAV equipment to be self-contained and mounted in the user’s 

vehicle.22

From the Army’s perspective, there were only three major disadvantages to the 

GPS system. First, low power levels are used to transmit GPS signals from space 

and, thus, it is relatively easy to jam the GPS signal with local or mobile jammers. 

Second, the GPS receiver needs to be in the line-of-sight of multiple GPS satellites. 

As a consequence, it does not work as well in rugged or built-up terrain. Finally, 

the GPS system is dependent on its ground-based control segment, which is 

susceptible to attacks.23

The GPS Testing and Development Process – Army Involvement 

The origins of the GPS program extend back to April 1973, when the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense provided formal authorization for the program to begin. GPS 

acquisition efforts were managed in three phases: Phase I (Concept Validation), 

Phase II (Demonstration/Validation), and Phase III (Full Scale Development/ 

Production). 

During Phase I, which lasted from 1973 to 1977, each of the Services conducted 

initial testing of the GPS concept. Results reported by all Services were 

satisfactory and the GPS test program proceeded to Phase II.24 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 9

Phase II (Demonstration/Validation) lasted from 1978 to 1988. As part of Phase II, 

the Army conducted a series of systems tests, to include the Army Operational Test 

(OT-II) program of September to December 1983.25 The initial results were 

disappointing. It was found that “the overall operational effectiveness of GPS user 

equipment was marginal except for the UH-60 user equipment.” Furthermore, 

“satisfactory performance often required operator or maintainer work around 

procedures or corrective actions to compensate for GPS initialization or GPS/host 

vehicle integration problems.”26 The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Agency cited 

28 problems with the GPS receiver itself, 9 problems with systems maintenance, 

and 6 problems with training.27

In a subsequent report, the U.S. Army Signal School also noted a number of 

problems with the GPS equipment, to include: [1] Inconsistent system reliability; 

[2] The need for a new antenna design; [3] A manpack receiver that was too heavy; 

[4] Problems with the self-test function on the receiver; [5] A display cable that 

was not durable; [6] Lockups of the receiver, resulting in frozen display units; [7] 

False “fail” messages; [8] Erratic displays; [9] Batteries running out of power 

during the course of the tests; [10] “Too many key strokes to enter information”; 

[11] A technical manual that was “poorly written”; and [12] Failure of the manpack 

unit during high and low temperature tests.28

By 1989, many of the system problems identified during Phase II had been 

addressed and the GPS program entered into Phase III (Full-Scale 

Development/Production). Unfortunately, the schedule for GPS to reach Full 

Operational Capability (FOC) slipped; in May 1988, the Army expected FOC to be 

achieved by Fiscal Year 1991 (FY91),29 but Interim Operational Capability (IOC) 

was not declared until 1993 and FOC was not reached until 1995.30

 

The GPS in Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

In 1989, ASI sponsored field demonstrations of the new GPS receivers. The 

earliest demonstrations were conducted in the fall of 1989, with USARSPACE 

scheduled to assume responsibility for the program in January 1990.31 By June 

1990, a number of Army units had trained with GPS and the demonstration was 

judged to be a success.32 However, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 

prompted the Army to rush GPS into immediate service. The GPS Joint Program 

Office quickly made 900 receivers available to units deploying for Operation 

DESERT SHIELD. In addition, an emergency purchase of commercial GPS 

receivers was authorized.33

With the exception of a few units that had been exposed to the GPS receivers 

during the initial ASI demonstration program, most soldiers receiving GPS 

equipment had no prior training or experience with the system. In August 1990, 

Major Carlos Velez (ASI) and Sergeant First Class Ball (USARSPACE) traveled to 

deployment sites at Ft. Bragg, Ft. Stewart, and Ft. Campbell to conduct a “trainthe-trainer” program as the GPS receivers were distributed.34 However, “as more 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 10 

units deployed to the Gulf, the train-the-trainer effort could not be sustained.”35 In 

September 1990, ASI developed the Unit and Sustainment Training Support 

Package for the Small Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (SLGR). 

This training support package was designed to support a two-hour block of 

instruction on SLGR operations and contained basic instruction on system 

capabilities, operations, and maintenance.36 

The deployment of GPS in Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT 

STORM proved to be of tremendous utility to units deployed in-theater. In an 

environment with few distinctive terrain features, GPS enabled combat units to 

navigate quickly to their objectives, helped guide convoy movements in the rear, 

and supported resupply operations. Iraqi minefields were located and precisely 

marked using GPS data. Forward observers used GPS when calling in artillery fire 

and air support, while gun batteries employed GPS as a tool for conducting field 

artillery surveys on the move. Signal units began to use GPS as a tool for 

positioning communications equipment. Simply stated, GPS supported a wide 

number of combat functions in Southwest Asia. This success can be attributed in 

large part to the deployment of personnel from USARSPACE and the Army Space 

Institute to conduct GPS systems training. Nevertheless, the rush deployment of 

the system and the lack of formal training for all units contributed to a series of 

problems. For example, “some users thought the receivers were more accurate than 

they really were, and others thought that the receivers worked only in particular 

parts of the world.”37 Units also reported that the extreme heat of the desert 

environment was causing system problems, to include operational failures and 

decreased battery life.38 

The difficulties that units experienced when employing GPS in DESERT SHIELD 

and DESERT STORM can only be partly attributed to a lack of formal training for 

all units. ASI and USARSPACE began conducting “train-the-trainer” sessions in 

August 1990 and an excellent training package was developed for the field in 

September 1990. Army units did not begin advancing into Kuwait and Iraq until 

February 1991. Clearly, sufficient time and resources were available for units to 

conduct user-level training on the GPS receiver. It would appear that some of the 

problems experienced by units using GPS reflected a more fundamental dynamic – 

an overall lack of familiarity with space products. Most of the soldiers who 

deployed to Southwest Asia in 1990 and 1991 had never previously been exposed 

to space systems; like the soldier who has never used a personal computer, they did 

not understand the technology and had not developed an intuitive sense of GPS 

capabilities and limitations. 

Despite the inevitable difficulties that accompanied the rush deployment of GPS on 

the eve of a war, most users of GPS reported that they were pleased with the 

system. In fact, the primary complaint voiced about the system during DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM was the shortage of available receivers.39 When 

the U.S. Army examined its position/navigation requirements in light of the Gulf 

War experience, numerous requests were made to expand the number of receivers 

mounted in aircraft40 and assigned to line units.41 Concurrently, the Army began to 

consider requirements for upgraded GPS systems. In August 1991, for example, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 11

the Department of the Army conducted a study of the requirement for GPS 

receivers possessing an accuracy as close as 2 meters42

.Although GPS was one of the major success stories of DESERT SHIELD / 

DESERT STORM, misperceptions regarding the capabilities and use of the system 

continued to persist for years after the war. For example, in 1997, U.S. Navy 

Captain George Slaven, a senior naval officer assigned to USSPACECOM, noted 

“a profound and disturbing lack of knowledge of the system equipment being used 

by our own forces.”43 Captain Slaven identified a number of areas where 

warfighting commanders and staffs continued to require help from military space 

experts, to include data on both friendly and enemy use of GPS, planning for the 

use of GPS Selective Availability, determination of the optimum launch or 

execution windows for military operations, the use of local area GPS 

enhancements, and options for GPS jamming.44

Lessons Learned During GPS Fielding and Employment 

The U.S. Army’s experience in getting GPS to the field provides a number of 

valuable lessons to leaders today. First, GPS was an extraordinarily powerful 

position/navigation system. The system proved its worth during DESERT SHIELD 

Figure 2: The Three Segments of the Global Positioning System. [SOURCE: GPS 

Joint Program Office] 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 12 

/ DESERT STORM. It has been used in every major U.S. military deployment and 

exercise since 1991. In the future, it will become increasingly valuable as a tool for 

weapons targeting, situational awareness, and command and control. 

Because GPS has been such a success since its operational debut in 1990-1991, it is 

often forgotten that the process of fielding the system was lengthy, timeconsuming, and involved. Although approval to initiate the GPS program was 

granted in 1973, the system did not achieve Full Operational Capability until 1995. 

This experience demonstrates the fact that the process of fielding new military 

space capabilities is typically time consuming and complex. 

Importantly, the Army’s experience in DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM also 

proved that civilian space systems can have a significant military impact. The use 

of off-the-shelf commercial GPS receivers provided an excellent example of how 

civilian systems could be employed by military units. This finding had a large 

impact on the subsequent decision to activate the Army Space Support Team 

organization. 

DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM also highlighted the fact that Army units 

may not fully recognize the value of space systems and capabilities in a peacetime 

environment. Prior to DESERT SHIELD, few Army units had been exposed to 

GPS. After deployment to Southwest Asia, however, GPS was in such high 

demand that “there were not enough receivers to go to all of the users who wanted 

them”45 and units competed for allocations of scarce GPS receivers. In future 

conflicts, field units may similarly demand access to new and emerging space 

products. The Army space community should be prepared to respond to such user 

requirements at short notice by procuring additional space systems and testing and 

validating their worth by supporting unit and individual-level training. 

In addition, the Army’s 1990-1991 experience demonstrated the importance of 

capturing and disseminating lessons learned within the Army space community. In 

the case of fielding GPS receivers, certain problems noted by soldiers during early 

testing of the system were experienced again in combat (e.g. operational failures 

and decreased battery life while operating in high temperatures). It is important 

that the Army space community capture, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned 

in order to avoid the repetition of such problems. 

Space systems and technology are often perceived by potential users to be 

technically difficult to use and too complex for field operations. During DESERT 

SHIELD / DESERT STORM, this factor contributed to misunderstandings 

regarding GPS system capabilities and limitations. To overcome this problem, 

familiarization training is needed to ‘normalize’ the use of space products. When 

communicating with units in the field, the space community must ensure that 

soldiers are not inundated with technical data. Users of space products at the 

tactical level are unlikely to grasp technical nuances. When unnecessary technical 

information is transmitted to tactical users, misconceptions and false assumptions 

will almost certainly result. Moreover, the ability to employ space systems 

successfully is a perishable skill. Even though GPS was successfully used to 

support combat operations in 1991, misconceptions regarding system capabilities 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 13

continued to persist for years afterwards. This highlights the need for sustainment 

training. 

The DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM experience also demonstrated that 

Army space experts can provide useful assistance to the field, even when dealing 

with ‘established’ space systems like the GPS. For example, more than five years 

after the end of the Gulf War, space experts reported that most military units did 

not understand the benefits and risks associated with GPS.46 Truly understanding 

and maximizing the potential capabilities of GPS, rather than simply using a 

receiver to acquire positional data, requires expertise beyond that organic to most 

units. 

In short, the Army’s experience in fielding GPS served as a watershed for the space 

community. GPS was the first space system widely disseminated among tactical 

units and its performance impressed most field commanders. In effect, GPS 

introduced the ‘rank-and-file’ Army to space. However, GPS was only one of 

many space systems that made its debut in DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM. 

Satellite communications, weather, topographic imagery, and missile warning 

assets also supported Army units. Like the lessons learned during GPS 

deployment, the Army’s experience with these space systems had a major impact 

upon the subsequent evolution of the Army space community. 

Field Experience and the Operationalization of Space 

Space products have been used to support tactical operations by U.S. forces in 

every major deployment and exercise since 1991. Although GPS garnered much of 

the attention in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, critical support was also 

provided by satellite communications, weather, topographic imagery, and early 

warning systems. Lessons learned during the deployment of these systems were of 

particular importance for the Amy’s decision to establish the Army Space Support 

Team organization. 

Satellite Communications 

Satellite communications systems served as an indispensable component of the 

command and control network established during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 

STORM. During the war, 15 military communications satellites were used to 

support U.S. operations47 and more than 1,500 satellite communications receivers 

were deployed in-theater.48 It has been observed that “satellite communication was 

the backbone of long-haul and intra-theater connectivity for the Gulf War.”49 

In the years since the Gulf War, satellite communications systems have continued 

to play a central role in support of U.S. military operations. For example, satellite 

systems were used as the primary method of communication during the early stages 

of Army deployments in Somalia and Zaire, where almost no established 

communications infrastructure was available. In addition to the increase in the 

overall reliance of U.S. forces on satellite communications systems, three key 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 14 

trends in the use of satellite 

communications emerged after 

1991. First, satellite 

communications systems were 

increasingly used for tactical 

purposes, particularly in areas 

with a rudimentary 

communications infrastructure. 

During DESERT SHIELD, for 

example, the Defense Satellite 

Communications System 

(DSCS) fulfilled “an important 

tactical as well as strategic 

communications role” because 

the Army had “never operated 

there before and lacks 

communications infrastructure 

in the region.” 50 Although 

DSCS was originally designed 

to support long-haul strategic 

communications, units in 

Saudi Arabia as small as 

brigades were equipped for 

DSCS communications intheater. Another example of 

the trend toward the use of satellite systems for tactical communications was 

provided during the U.S. deployment to Haiti. During this operation, satellite 

communications were used to control operations down to the company level. The 

10th Mountain Division (Light) found that “infantry company missions and tactical 

convoys out of a brigade sector required use of tactical satellite for command and 

control.”51 

A second major trend was the use of civilian satellite communications systems to 

supplement gaps in U.S. military communications capabilities. During DESERT 

STORM, commercial International Telecommunications Satellite (INTELSAT) 

terminals carried approximately 25 percent of the satellite communications traffic 

generated in theater.52 In Somalia, the International Maritime Satellite 

(INMARSAT) provided the “primary means of communications during the early 

stages of the deployment.”53 In Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 

the Joint Task Force headquarters made extensive use of commercial 

communications systems, to include a television satellite receiving station.54 In 

Zaire, it was observed that the news media possessed “better communications and 

data processing equipment than the military it covers.”55 U.S. forces in Zaire relied 

upon INMARSAT and commercial telephone systems for their communications 

needs. 

The third important trend in the use of satellite communications was the rapidly 

expanding demand for support, which made careful planning for the use of military 

After the 10th Mountain Division (Light) deployed 

to Haiti, it found that “infantry company missions 

and tactical convoys out of a brigade sector 

required use of tactical satellite for command and 

control.” [Lieutenant Colonel David T. Stahl, 10th

Mountain Division Operations in Haiti: Planning 

/Preparation /Execution; August 1994 Thru January 

1995.] 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 15

satellite communications resources imperative. For instance, in DESERT STORM 

the demand for satellite communications support was so great that it quickly 

outpaced the capabilities of available military systems.56 In response, the J-6 

“aggressively rationed communications links to assure that units first deploying 

into the region would not consume all available satellite communication 

(SATCOM) capabilities.”57 The requirement to ration satellite communications, 

however, was not a phenomenon limited to DESERT STORM / DESERT SHIELD. 

U.S. forces in Somalia used more than 10 different data systems (intelligence, 

personnel, logistics, finance, and other support functions), each of which competed 

for the scarce satellite communications resources that were available.58 

Satellite Weather Support 

In the midst of Operation DESERT STORM, the worst weather recorded in 14 

years swept across the theater of operations.59 U.S. Army units seeking to operate 

in this harsh environment became voracious consumers of satellite weather data. 

This experience helped shape the subsequent development of the ARSST, which 

was organized with the capability to provide weather and environmental products 

to a supported unit. 

In contrast to GPS, which most units had not been exposed to prior to the beginning 

of DESERT SHIELD, senior Army commanders clearly recognized the need for 

responsive weather support prior to deployment to Saudi Arabia. A 1990 

TRADOC plan to revamp the existing structure for weather support illustrates this 

point. In February 1990, six months prior to the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, 

TRADOC presented a concept for a new Division Standardized Command Post 

(SCP). One of the objectives of the SCP concept was to eliminate excess vehicles 

and equipment, thereby making the Division command post both easier to 

maneuver in the field and lighter for overseas transport. Existing Army doctrine 

called for the assignment of a nine-person Air Force weather team to each Division 

headquarters, along with communications and weather equipment mounted in a 5-

ton van. Under the SCP concept, the Division weather team would be reduced to 

two staff officers responsible for disseminating (rather than producing) weather 

information and the van would be eliminated. Weather products would instead be 

prepared at Corps level and sent down to each Division headquarters.60 

Objections to the TRADOC proposal for restructuring weather support were 

quickly voiced by a number of field units. For example, Headquarters 5th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) stated that it required “detailed, accurate, and tailored 

weather forecasts” and warned that “the current effort to standardize division TOCs 

has proposed a change that would seriously degrade weather support . . .”61 

Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) argued that the proposal would 

“have a negative impact on Division training and operations.”62 The Division G-3 

(Operations section) of the 6th Infantry Division (Light) labeled the new weather 

support concept “stupid, absolutely absurd!” 63 The U.S. Army Intelligence Center 

and School also registered a number of concerns. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 16 

Opposition to the SCP weather concept was noteworthy because it illustrated two 

essential points. First, field commanders placed a premium on the delivery of highquality, tailored weather products. Second, units were not satisfied with a system 

that simply disseminated weather data from a rear area headquarters; they desired 

the responsiveness inherent in collecting and analyzing weather data themselves. 

Both aspects were evident during DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM, during 

which additional space weather systems were deployed in theater to provide highquality, responsive support. 

The primary commercial satellite weather imagery system used by the Army in 

DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM was the WRAASE receiver. The 

WRAASE was selected for use by the Army because it had the capability to 

provide direct links to all civilian weather satellites flying over a theater of 

operations. This included the ability to download imagery from the GOES and 

METEOSAT geostationary satellites (providing weather imagery with a resolution 

of approximately 10 kilometers) and the TIROS and Meteor polar-orbiting 

satellites (offering a resolution of 2-4 kilometers).64 

Prior to DESERT SHIELD, WRAASE receivers had been procured by ASI for 

demonstration under the ASDP.65 U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. Army 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) had also purchased WRAASE receivers in 1989 

and most of the weather teams deploying to Southwest Asia had previously been 

equipped with the system. When DESERT SHIELD began, the XVIII Airborne 

Corps G-2 (Intelligence section) and the 30th Engineer Battalion (Topographic) 

requested additional weather support from ASI.66 Having previously assisted in the 

deployment of WRAASE weather receivers under the ASDP, ASI took steps to 

integrate weather imagery with existing terrain analysis systems. Two FORSCOM 

Automated Intelligence Support System computers were outfitted with a 

commercial software package, dubbed Weathertrac, and networked with WRAASE 

receivers. ASI subsequently reported: 

 “This combination provides the staff weather officer the ability to enhance 

the visible and infra-red imagery available from the US civilian weather 

satellites that pass over Saudi Arabia 8-10 times a day. With limited 

available knowledge of the Saudi weather and no established observation 

network in the area of operations, this satellite weather information 

provides the one means of seeing the battlefield.”67

Training support for the system was provided by Major Royal Koepsell of ASI, 

who instructed both weather and terrain analysis personnel. The relationship 

between satellite weather and satellite terrain imagery data was formalized when 

the 30th Engineer Battalion established a Topographic Technology Exploitation 

Cell (TTEC). This cell was assigned responsibility for analyzing satellite imagery 

products, combining terrain and weather data, and producing updated maps.68

Efforts to integrate weather and terrain analysis data through the TTEC represent 

one of the significant trends in satellite weather support that surfaced during 

DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM. The second key trend involved the 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 17

distribution of weather support systems to units throughout the theater of 

operations. During the war, 

“US Central Command took steps to procure more receiver terminals to 

enable the use of weather data at all levels of command. New lightweight 

prototype desktop receivers were distributed to ensure the Army had 

access to real-time weather data from a variety of weather satellites.” 69

A third major trend was the demand by analysts outside the staff weather office for 

access to raw weather imagery data. After the war, the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned (CALL) recommended that this demand be satisfied by collocating 

satellite weather receivers with unit intelligence and terrain analysis staffs.70

Satellite Topographic Imagery 

At the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, many maps of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 

were outdated and of limited utility to U.S. forces. To overcome this problem, the 

Army turned to space. 

The XVIII Airborne Corps was the first unit to deploy in DESERT SHIELD. 

Within hours of their deployment, the supporting 30th Engineer Battalion 

(Topographic) was providing satellite imagery data to the Corps G-2 (Intelligence 

section). ASI later reported, “In less than two days the 30th Engineer Battalion was 

providing LANDSAT imagery for delivery via satellite communications link from 

Ft Bragg to ground forces in Saudi Arabia.”71 These efforts were followed by the 

establishment of the Topographic Technology Exploitation Cell with support from 

Mr. Bob Krieger, a multi-spectral imagery expert assigned to ASI.72 The TTEC not 

only served as a central point for integrating weather and topographic data, as 

previously described; it also employed an ASI multi-spectral imagery workstation 

to update mapsheets with recent LANDSAT satellite imagery and conducted terrain 

analysis to determine battlefield trafficability conditions.73 

The impact of the TTEC upon XVIII Airborne Corps operations was significant. 

ASI reported: 

“Two thirds of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield can now be 

combined using as current information as the latest satellite pass allows. 

One month old LANDSAT imagery combined with weather satellite 

passes is providing a quantum leap in the ability of the commander to see 

his battlefield. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) can be 

accomplished on the fly and not remain a pre-deployment or pre-exercise 

pursuit.”74 

Unfortunately, the slow process for procurement of LANDSAT imagery 

“effectively left the topographic units without up-to-date imagery until midNovember 1990.” 75 Even worse, the Army was unable to obtain the funding 

needed to obtain access to large quantities of SPOT satellite imagery that could 

have been made available by the Air Force.76 Delays in obtaining imagery impeded 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 18 

the work of topographic analysts deployed in theater and, as a result, some 

Divisions were left “with little or no time to exploit the capabilities available.”77

Theater Missile Attack Warning 

Ballistic missile attack warning is the last key area in which space assets were used 

to support combat operations in DESERT STORM. During the war, 

USSPACECOM developed the Tactical Event Reporting System (TERS) to warn 

units of Iraqi Scud missile launches. Although TERS was unable to provide cueing 

and vectoring data for U.S. air defense batteries, the system was used to warn U.S. 

and Allied forces of an impending missile impact with mixed success. During the 

war, DoD analysts forecasted that the TERS capability “could be pivotal to saving 

a high percentage of civilians or combatants if the Iraqis launch a 

chemical/biological attack.”78 

TERS provides an interesting case study in the tactical use of space assets that were 

originally deployed for a strategic role. The TERS system was based upon the 

Defense Support Program (DSP), an early warning system employing a satellite 

constellation equipped with infrared sensors. The DSP network was developed in 

the 1970s to detect the launch of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 

and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), track their burn times, and 

determine the impact trajectories. DSP data was transmitted to a ground receiver 

that, in turn, furnished the early warning information to the Missile Warning Center 

at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. The Missile Warning Center would then 

integrate DSP data with data obtained from other sensors to determine the time and 

point of impact for the incoming missile. Finally, processed information would be 

provided to the USSPACECOM Mission Director and the NORAD Command 

Director.79

After the deployment of Patriot air defense units to Saudi Arabia and Israel during 

DESERT SHIELD, USSPACECOM took steps to connect the theater air and 

missile defense network to DSP early warning data. The DSP satellites were 

adjusted to detect Scud launches in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 

theater of operations. After launch warning was received at USSPACECOM, an 

initial warning would be transmitted to the theater over a voice line. As updates 

were received, they would also be transmitted by USSPACECOM via this voice 

line.80 Unfortunately, the “development of procedures and connectivity were 

constructed from scratch and took months to setup and finely tune.”81 

The performance of TERS left much to be desired. First, the DSP system had been 

designed to track strategic missiles possessing much longer flight times and 

brighter plume signatures than those of an Iraqi Scud missile. As a result, TERS 

could not provide specific impact prediction data.82 Second, TERS early warning 

alert data often proved to be “untimely.” 83 When Iraq began launching Scud 

missiles, TERS often took up to 120 seconds to transmit early warning data to the 

field.84 This left relatively little time for U.S. and Coalition forces to respond. 

Finally, units operating away from Corps air defense units had trouble receiving 

TERS information.85
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 19

Despite these problems, the activation of TERS represented an ingenious effort to 

apply strategic systems to support tactical operations. In the aftermath of DESERT 

STORM, USSPACECOM took additional steps to develop an improved missile 

warning system for tactical users. Of particular importance was the development of 

the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), a new missile early warning system 

operated by the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy that could be quickly deployed into a 

theater of operations, access and process DSP information, and provide early 

warning information to support theater missile defense operations. 

Key Lessons in Bringing Space to the Warfighter 

The Army’s early experience in space provided a number of lessons that influenced 

the subsequent organization of the Army Space Support Team. First, the Army 

discovered that space could serve as a powerful contributor at the tactical level. 

Space systems and products were successfully used to support such operations as 

DESERT STORM and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Army units relied on GPS for 

navigation, convoy control, resupply operations, minefield breaching and marking, 

and artillery surveying. Satellite weather receivers provided weather data 

immediately to tactical units. Satellite communications systems were used to allow 

geographically dispersed tactical units to operate effectively in areas of rough 

terrain. Satellite topographic imagery was utilized to enhance Army intelligence 

production, while satellite early warning systems alerted Army units to an 

incoming ballistic missile attack. After 1990, each of these capabilities 

significantly enhanced the ability of Army units to accomplish their assigned 

missions. 

Nonetheless, the Army’s early operational experience also demonstrated that few 

commanders knew how to employ space resources effectively. Officers assigned to 

USARSPACE repeatedly 

observed that tactical 

commanders possessed a 

low level of familiarity 

with space capabilities. 

Tactical commanders 

typically had little 

understanding of where 

military space products 

came from, what the 

limitations of space 

capabilities were, or how 

space could best be 

integrated into the military 

planning and decision 

making processes.

The Army also concluded 

that, if maximum value 

18 January 1991: Patriot launch unit from Battery A, 2nd

Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery outside Dhahran, 

Saudi Arabia. (SOURCE: XVIII Airborne Corps 

photograph DS-F-119-10.) 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 20 

was to be derived from military space, its use must be ‘normalized’ in the field 

through training and application. The Army space community actively sought to 

provide space products and support to tactical units. Army space experts conducted 

training in the field and the classroom, sponsored demonstrations of new 

equipment, and supported units during training exercises and overseas 

deployments. These early space soldiers learned that the full potential of spacebased capabilities would only be realized when space had been “normalized” as an 

element of tactical operations; in other words, when “the people who ultimately 

use space systems to maximize combat capabilities — airmen, soldiers and sailors 

— know what space capabilities are available to them, how to get the data, and how 

to best exploit it.”86

Prior to DESERT SHIELD, most Army units had not been exposed to military 

space systems. USARSPACE and ASI quickly organized training on specific 

systems (GPS and WRAASE weather receivers) for soldiers in-theater. Given the 

rush to put new space systems into service on the eve of a major offensive 

campaign, it is not surprising that training was often conducted in an ad hoc fashion 

and that field commanders were unprepared to exploit the full range of available 

military space capabilities. Drawing upon these lessons, one military officer 

emphasized that 

“peacetime training must simulate, as close as possible, wartime 

conditions to include the deployment and employment of space forces and 

of equipment required to take advantage of space. Realistic training is the 

cornerstone of planning for the use of and the continued normalization of 

space systems into the force structure.”87

Similarly, the Army discovered that the preplanning of space support to a theater of 

operations was critical to success. In a post-war assessment of military space 

operations in DESERT STORM, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space 

Command “identified preplanning for support from space as his command's 

number one lesson from the Gulf War.”88 Because space capabilities were never 

integrated into the joint operations planning process, “too few officers in-theater 

really understood how and to what extent space supported the theater commander's 

campaign objectives.”89 In the absence of a pre-established plan of support, a 

number of space systems were sent to the theater in a disjointed and ad hoc fashion. 

Many problems ensued, ranging from the requirement to procure commercial GPS 

and satellite communications systems on an emergency basis to the last-minute 

creation of a theater early warning system that was plagued by problems of 

inaccuracy and lack of timeliness. 

The Army’s early experience also highlighted the importance of providing space 

expertise to field units. Most Army units did not possess an organic capability to 

utilize space assets fully. Space experts deploying to the field were able to provide 

such a capability to the commander. For example, space experts may be able to 

improve communications to a theater of operations by maneuvering certain 

satellites into better positions. GPS capabilities can be maximized for a 

commander through a variety of techniques, including the jamming of enemy 

systems, certain local area enhancements, and the identification of optimum launch 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 21

or execution windows for operations. Space experts can also assist tactical 

commanders by developing a tailored process for detecting and disseminating 

missile attack warning data. Similarly, space experts can help established 

improved methods of exploiting satellite weather and multispectral imagery 

capabilities.90 

The Army discovered that civilian space systems can have a significant military 

impact. Commercial systems were used to support the entire gamut of military 

operations in DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM, and subsequent military 

deployments. Military satellite communications capabilities were supplemented by 

the commercial INTELSAT (carrying approximately 25 percent of all satellite 

communications traffic) in DESERT STORM91 and the INMARSAT provided the 

primary means of communications when U.S. forces first deployed to Somalia.92 

Commercial WRAASE satellite weather receivers were the primary weather 

imagery systems used by the Army in DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM,93

while the capabilities of topographic units were greatly expanded through 

commercial equipment and software procured during the war.94 Few Army units 

deployed during DESERT SHIELD had access to GPS until the Army sent 

commercial GPS receivers to the theater.95

The trend toward the increased use of civilian satellite systems for military 

purposes (e.g., weather, imagery, and communications) and military systems for 

civilian purposes (e.g., GPS) has led some analysts to claim that “the distinction 

between military and civilian space systems is rapidly disappearing and that 

structures and doctrines need to be adjusted.”96 While this may in fact prove to be 

true in the future, the primary lesson learned during DESERT SHIELD / DESERT 

STORM was that civilian space systems present unique operational considerations 

for the battlefield commander. For example, during the war the Iraqis were able to 

receive weather data from three U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) satellites. Fearing that the Iraqis could use this data to 

coordinate air operations or conduct Scud missile attacks, the U.S. Government 

considered shutting down the weather satellites when they were operating over the 

Middle East. However, such a course of action would have adversely affected U.S. 

allies in the region dependent on NOAA weather data, such as Israel, Turkey, and 

Egypt.97 In another example, the Air Force offered to provide SPOT imagery data 

of the theater of operations to the Army. However, the Army was unable to secure 

enough funding to pay royalties to the SPOT Corporation and, thus, could not 

access this source of imagery.98 

In a peacetime environment, Army units may not fully recognize the value of space 

systems. Army weather support teams were equipped with WRAASE satellite 

receivers prior to DESERT SHIELD, but it was only after the deployment began 

that this capability was integrated with satellite terrain imagery data. Similarly, 

few Army units had been exposed to GPS prior to deployment in DESERT 

SHIELD. After arriving in-theater, commanders clamored to receive as many GPS 

units as possible. Provisions for providing early warning data from DSP satellites 

to Patriot air defense batteries were not established until DESERT SHIELD began. 

As noted earlier, it should be expected that field units will similarly demand access 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 22 

to new and emerging space products during future deployments. The Army space 

community should be prepared to respond to such user requirements at short notice, 

not only by procuring additional space systems but also by supporting unit and 

individual-level training. 

Finally, the Army space community must capture and disseminate lessons learned. 

The Army defines a lesson learned as “validated knowledge and experience derived 

from observations and historical study of military training, exercises, and combat 

operations.”99 Efforts by the Army to capture and disseminate lessons learned are 

designed to fulfill a number of purposes. First, they serve to institutionalize 

successful practices and techniques. Second, they indicate areas where the Army 

needs to change its behavior. Finally, they are used to shape the future evolution of 

Army systems and concepts. For example, TRADOC’s Operational Capability 

Requirements (OCR) process, which is designed to articulate the capabilities 

required by the Army to fulfill its role under the National Military Strategy, is 

“derived within the framework of historical lessons learned from operational 

experiences as well as the opportunities provided from technology exploitation.”100 

While the Army was able to benefit greatly from early lessons that had been 

learned by organizations such as ASI and USARSPACE, too often these lessons 

were not received and internalized by soldiers and field commanders. 

Summary 

The provisional activation of ASI in 1986 marked the beginning of systematic 

Army efforts to use space systems and technologies in support of tactical 

operations. ASI took a proactive role in introducing space to units in the field, 

conducting a series of demonstrations and providing training. These efforts 

subsequently paid off in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, when GPS, 

multi-spectral imagery, weather, and satellite communications systems were used 

to great effect by U.S. forces. 

The Army’s early experience in using space systems to support tactical operations 

was significant for three key reasons: First, these early experiences demonstrated 

that space capabilities could exert a significant, positive impact on Army 

operations; Second, space systems and technologies were complex and continued 

to undergo rapid technological evolution and specialized expertise was required if 

the Army hoped to exploit the full potential offered by space; Finally, the Army 

needed to activate a deployable space support organization, capable of providing 

training and operational support to units deployed in a theater of operations. 

The early Army experience in space was also important because it helped establish 

the parameters under which USARSPACE would later activate the ARSST 

organization. This experience would help shape the role, functions, and structure 

of the ARSST, as well as the doctrine used for its employment. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 23

 

1

 Ed Kiker, Informal Thoughts on the Status of the Army Space Institute. 15 June 

1992. 

2

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space 

Command: 12 December 1994.). 

3

 General Maxwell Thurman, Comments at Army Space Institute Activation – Ft 

Leavenworth, 12 January 1988. 

4

 Marquis Shepherd, “Army unit to bring technology of space down to Earth for 

troops,” Kansas City Times, 13 January 1988, p. B-3. 

5

 Major Steven C. Siegel, “Army Space Institute,” Army Trainer (Summery 1987), 

pp. 20-21. 

6

 Lieutenant Colonel(P) John R. French, Jr., U.S. Army Space Institute Semiannual 

Historical Report 1 July – 31 December 1986, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army 

Space Institute, 26 January 1987). 

7

 Wencis R. Tovar, Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review: Army Space 

Institute Input, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute; 4 August 1989). 

8

 The SEWS demonstration was successful and later evolved into prototypical 

equipment - the Tactical Surveillance Demonstration (Europe) and TSD-Enhanced 

(Korea). It eventually evolved into what is now known as JTAGS. Editorial 

comments made by Mr. John Marrs, USARSPACE Technical Advisor, in an e-mail 

message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. For an in-depth history 

of U.S. Army development of missile early warning systems, see James Hooper, 

Todd Clark, and James Walker, The Joint Tactical Ground Station: Fielding and 

Operational Lessons Learned, (Huntsville, Alabama: U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, April 2000). 

9

 Public Affairs Brochure, "Army Space Exploitation Demonstration Program," 

(Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space Command, 6 October 1995). 

10 Briefing, "WRAASE," (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: CACDA Library, File ASI004, 1986). 

11 Public Affairs Summary, "Army Space Exploitation Demonstration Program," 

(Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space Command, 6 October 1995). 

12 U.S. Army Space Command, USARSPACE Information Paper (Peterson AFB, 

Colorado: U.S. Army Space Command, 31 July 1989). 

13 Army Space Institute/TPIO Space, Historical Review 1990 (Ft. Leavenworth, 

Kansas: Army Space Institute, 1990). 

14 Memorandum, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 

(DAMO-SWX), Subject: Implementation of Army Space Organization, Undated. 

15 United States Space Command, Directorate of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: U.S. 

Army Space Command, 7 April 1988. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 24 

 

16 Editorial comments made by Mr. Tom Callaghan, USARSPACE, in an e-mail 

message sent to Dr. James A. Walker, 16 February 1999. 

17 Major Korpsel and Mr. Freeman, Input to LAMP: Space Support for Desert 

Shield, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute, September 1990). 

18 U.S. Army Space Command (Forward), Space Support Reference Book, 20 

August 1997, p. NAV-5. 

19 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

20 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

21 U.S. Army Space Command (Forward), Space Support Reference Book, 20 

August 1997, p. NAV-6. 

22 U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, The Army Position 

and Navigation Master Plan. (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Combat 

Development Activity, May 1986), p. II-1. 

23 U.S. Army Space Command (Forward), Space Support Reference Book, 20 

August 1997, p. NAV-5. 

24 SD/CWN Headquarters Space Division (AFSC), Los Angeles Air Force Base, 

Multiservice Test and Evaluation Master Plan for the NAVSTAR Global 

Positioning System User Equipment. (Los Angeles Air Force Base, California: 

SD/CWN Headquarters, November 1987), pp. 4-2 to 4-3. 

25 SD/YEA Headquarters Space Division, Los Angeles Air Force Station, 

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Coordinated Test Program – II: Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan Army Annex. (Los Angeles Air Force Station, California: 

SD/YEA Headquarters, July 1982), p. 4-3. 

26 SD/CWN Headquarters Space Division (AFSC), Los Angeles Air Force Base, 

Multiservice Test and Evaluation Master Plan for the NAVSTAR Global 

Positioning System User Equipment. (Los Angeles Air Force Base, California: 

SD/CWN Headquarters, November 1987), pp. 4-2 to 4-3. 

27 Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Springer, Independent Operational Assessment of 

the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Army User Equipment (AUE) 

Operational Test II, November 1985/January 1986. (Falls Church, Virginia: U.S. 

Army Test and Evaluation Agency, 3 April 1986), pp. 45-79. 

28 United States Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, Final Draft: Operational 

Issues and Criteria for the Operational Test IOTE of the NAVSTAR Global 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 25

 

Positioning System (GPS) Army User Equipment (AUE) Manpack/Vehicular Set

(Ft. Gordon, Georgia: 9 August 1987), p. 8. 

29 GENSER Message, "Global Positioning System (GPS); DTG 031800Z MAY 

88." (Colorado Springs, Colorado: Army Space Command, 3 May 1988.). 

30 United States Naval Observatory, GPS System Description. 12 June 1998. 

31 U.S. Army Space Command, USARSPACE Information Paper. (Peterson AFB, 

Colorado: U.S. Army Space Command, 31 July 1989.). 

32 Editorial comments made by Mr. John Marrs, USARSPACE Technical Advisor, 

in an e-mail message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. 

33 “Desert Shield Prompts Acceleration of AMRAAM, SFW Testing,” Aerospace 

Daily (Vol. 155, No. 56, 19 September 1990), p. 457. 

34 Major Korpsel and Mr. Freeman, Input to LAMP: Space Support for Desert 

Shield. (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute, September 1990.). 

35 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

36 U.S. Army Space Institute, Unit and Sustainment Training Support Package for 

the Small Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (SLGR). (Ft. 

Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Space Institute, 28 September 1990.). 

37 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

38 GENSER Message, "GPS Navigation Availability for 30 Oct 90 (Day 303); DTG 

302045Z OCT 90." (Colorado Springs, Colorado: Army Space Command, 30 

October 1990.). 

39 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

40 GENSER Message, "Army Aviation Global Positioning System (GPS) 

Requirements; DTG 251600Z SEP 91." (Ft. Rucker, Alabama: U.S. Army 

Aviation Center). 

41 GENSER Message, "Global Positioning Systems; DTG 251830Z OCT 91." (Ft. 

McPherson, Georgia: U.S. Army Forces Command, 25 October 1991.). 

42 GENSER Message, "Improvement of Global Positioning System (GPS) 

Accuracy; DTG 151300Z AUG 91." (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 

of the Army, DAMO-FDC, 15 August 1991.). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 26 

 

43 Captain George E. Slaven, What the Warfighter Should Know About Space: A 

Report on U.S. Space Command Joint Space Support Teams. (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama: Air War College Air University, April 1997), p. 26. 

44 Ibid. 

45 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

46 Captain George E. Slaven, What the Warfighter Should Know About Space: A 

Report on U.S. Space Command Joint Space Support Teams. (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama: Air War College Air University, April 1997), pp. 32-33. 

47 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), p. 26. 

48 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

49 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), pp. 23-24. 

50 “Army Space Command Demo Efforts Go Operational in Desert Shield,” 

Aerospace Daily (Vol. 156, No. 34, 20 November 1990), p. 305. 

51 Lieutenant Colonel David T. Stahl, 10th Mountain Division Operations in Haiti: 

Planning/Preparation/Execution; August 1994 Thru January 1995, p. 31. 

52 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

53 10th Mountain Division (Light), US Army Forces, Somalia: After Action Report 

Summary. (2 January 1993), p. 38. 

54 Lieutenant Colonel David T. Stahl, 10th Mountain Division Operations in Haiti: 

Planning/Preparation/Execution; August 1994 Thru January 1995, p. 29. 

55 Headquarters United States European Command, Operation Support Hope 1994 

After Action Report (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute: 1994), p. 11-1. 

56 Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Spacecraft Played Vital Role in Gulf War 

Victory.” (Vol. 134, No. 16, 22 April 1991), p. 91. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 27

 

57 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), p. 26. 

58 C. Kenneth Allard, “Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine.” Joint 

Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1995), p. 106. 

59 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), pp. 28-29. 

60 Lieutenant Colonel Arthus C. Kyle and Colonel Nolan W. Schmidt, GENSER 

Message, "Weather Support to Hvy Div Standardized Command Post; DTG 

231930Z FEB 90." (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Center Staff 

Weather Officer, 23 February 1990.). 

61 GENSER Message, "Weather Support to Hvy Div Standardized Command Post 

(SCP); DTG 062200Z MAR 90." (Ft. Polk, Louisiana: 5th Infantry Division (M), 6 

March 1990.). 

62 GENSER Message, "Proposed Amendment to Standardized Command Post 

Concept; DTG ??2110Z MAR 90." (Ft. Stewart, Georgia: 24th Infantry Division 

(M), March 1990.). 

63 GENSER Message, "Support to Hvy Div Standardized Command Post (SCP); 

DTG 161715Z MAR 90." (Ft. Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center 

and School, 16 March 1990.). 

64 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). Briefing, "WRAASE." (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: CACDA Library, File ASI004, 1986.). 

65 Wencis R. Tovar, Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review: Army 

Space Institute Input. (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute; ATZL-SI, 

4 August 1989.). 

66 Major Korpsel and Mr. Freeman, Input to LAMP: Space Support for Desert 

Shield. (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute, September 1990.). 

67 Ibid. 

68 Ibid. 

69 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

70 Ibid. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 28 

 

71 Major Korpsel and Mr. Freeman, Input to LAMP: Space Support for Desert 

Shield. (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute, September 1990.). 

72 Ibid. 

73 Ibid. 

74 Ibid. 

75 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

76 Ibid. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Craig Covault, “USAF Missile Warning Satellites Providing 90-Sec. Scud Attack 

Alert” Aviation Week & Space Technology (Vol. 134, No. 3, 21 January 1991), p. 

60. For a more complete discussion of theater missile warning in Operations 

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, see James Hooper, Todd Clark, and 

James Walker, The Joint Tactical Ground Station: Fielding and Operational 

Lessons Learned, (Huntsville, Alabama: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command, April 2000). 

79Captain George E. Slaven, What the Warfighter Should Know About Space: A 

Report on U.S. Space Command Joint Space Support Teams. (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama: Air War College Air University, April 1997), pp. 22-23. Mr. John 

Marrs, USARSPACE Technical Adviser, later noted: "TERS warnings 

disseminated over TRAP went to radios, which for many Army units were provided 

by the USAF TENCAP and fielded by ASEDP personnel. The TRAP means of 

disseminating the warning had only gone active in July of 90 and had lots of bugs – 

mainly in how the TRAP receivers were setup to prioritize incoming messages. 

ASEDP personnel were instrumental in highlighting problems to CINC Space after 

the IRAQI test shots in December. Subsequently, getting the high level attention 

needed to get the problems fixed in time for the shooting war. During the SCUD 

days it was interesting to sit in the crisis action center – sequence was voice 

message, then TRAP warning, then sirens over CNN. In theater, the voice warning 

seldom reached the patriot units before the TRAP warning. (by the way 

ARSPACE had the only TRAP receiver in Colorado Springs and thus did quality 

control for US Space.) Keep in mind that TERS would not have existed except that 

the SEWS demonstration showed that detecting TBM’s was feasible and that the 

Army and Navy were pushing to get permission to build JTAGS. ALERT was 

built after the Army and Navy had forced the issue after the war." Editorial 

comments made by Mr. John Marrs, USARSPACE Technical Advisor, in an e-mail 

message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. 

80 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “James H. Williamson Oral History 

Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 22 October 1998. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 29

 

81 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), p. 25. 

82 Craig Covault, “USAF Missile Warning Satellites Providing 90-Sec. Scud Attack 

Alert” Aviation Week & Space Technology (Vol. 134, No. 3, 21 January 1991), p. 

60. 

83Captain George E. Slaven, What the Warfighter Should Know About Space: A 

Report on U.S. Space Command Joint Space Support Teams. (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama: Air War College Air University, April 1997), p. 23. 

84 Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Spacecraft Played Vital Role in Gulf War 

Victory.” (Vol. 134, No. 16, 22 April 1991), p. 91. 

85 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

86 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), pp. 25-26. 

87 Ibid., p. 30. 

88 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 

89 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 

90 Captain George E. Slaven, What the Warfighter Should Know About Space: A 

Report on U.S. Space Command Joint Space Support Teams. (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama: Air War College Air University, April 1997), pp. 21-22, 25, 32-33, 

35-36. 

91 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

92 10th Mountain Division (Light), US Army Forces, Somalia: After Action Report 

Summary. (2 January 1993), p. 38. 

93 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

94 Ibid. 

95 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994). pp. 24-25. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 30 

 

96 Captain George M. Moore, Colonel Vic Budura, and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Joint 

Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 

1994), p. 76. 

97 Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Iraqis Still Receive Weather Data from 

U.S. Satellites” (Vol. 134, No. 3, 21 January 1991), p. 26. 

98 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to 

the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. (Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 91-3, Oct 

91). 

99 Center for Army Lessons Learned, A Guide to the Services and the Gateway of 

CALL. (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 

No. 97-13), p. 1. 

100 TRADOC Pam 525-66: Operational Capability Requirements. (Ft. Monroe, 

Virginia: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 

December 1995.). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 31

CHAPTER TWO: 

ESTABLISHMENT DECISIONS SHAPING ARSST 

ACTIVATION AND THE INITIAL CONOPS 

“The Army’s ARSST capability is a direct evolution from the Army Space Exploitation 

and Demonstration Program (ASEDP) and a direct outgrowth of the Louisiana Maneuvers 

(LAM) Task Force.” 

— Army Space Support Team Concept of Operations (Draft), 12 December 1994.1

As the Army began to transform itself to cope with a post-Cold War 

environment, the Army Chief of Staff established the Louisiana Maneuvers 

Task Force to experiment with new warfighting techniques and technologies. 

The Commercial Space Package (CSP) initiative, developed as part of this 

process, was designed to provide cutting-edge space technologies for both 

battlefield support and Operations Other Than War. 

The CSP initiative was composed of two elements  a Support Package, 

consisting primarily of equipment designed for integration directly into Corps 

and Division headquarters, and a Contingency Operations Package, developed 

as an integrated package that USARSPACE could use to provide rapid space 

force enhancement to a deploying Army unit. Approval to acquire the CSP 

Contingency Operations Package was granted by the Army in early 1994 and 

subsequently formed the basis for establishment of the USARSPACE 

Contingency Operations (Space) program. In October 1994, this program was 

renamed the Army Space Support Team in accordance with a USSPACECOM 

directive. 

This chapter provides a detailed examination of the process that led to the 

creation of the Army Space Support Team, to include: 

• An examination of the Louisiana Maneuvers review and decision-making 

process used to evaluate the Commercial Space Package. 

• A consideration of the key decision parameters and issues involved with 

establishment of the Contingency Operations (Space) program. 

• A summary of the early concept of operations developed for the 

Contingency Operations (Space) program and the Army Space Support

Team, and how this concept of operations evolved in 1994. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 32 

The Louisiana Maneuvers 

With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army faced a fundamental transformation 

in which it would be forced to evolve from a forward-deployed force geared 

towards high-intensity conflict into a force projection Army based in the 

Continental United States (CONUS). At the same time the Army grappled with 

this transformation, it was assigned a series of new responsibilities and dispatched 

on an ever-increasing number of overseas deployments. For example, in the fiveyear period between 1991 and 

1995, the Army was involved in 

six major humanitarian 

assistance missions, four peace 

enforcement missions, two 

peacekeeping missions, and one 

show of force mission, each 

lasting for more than 12 

months. During the entire 

fifteen year period spanning 

from 1975 to 1990, the Army 

had only been involved in a 

total of six major peacekeeping, 

show of force, and humanitarian 

assistance missions. 

To energize and guide the Army 

during this period of 

restructuring, General Gordon 

Sullivan (Chief of Staff, U.S. 

Army, 1991-1995) established 

the Louisiana Maneuvers 

(LAM) process. General 

Sullivan consciously modeled 

the LAM process upon a series 

of maneuvers conducted by the 

U.S. Army prior to World War 

II in Louisiana and the 

Carolinas. During those earlier 

maneuvers, the Army had 

successfully experimented with 

new tactics, doctrine, and 

equipment. General Sullivan hoped that the LAM process would provide a similar 

opportunity for the Army of the 1990s. 

To institutionalize the LAM process, General Sullivan established the Louisiana 

Maneuvers Task Force (LAM TF). This task force was given responsibility for 

integrating and synchronizing the LAM process across the Army. The LAM TF 

would ensure that the Army was able to develop and explore new warfighting 

concepts, assess progress, provide a framework for decision making by the senior 

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, 

U.S. Army, 1991 to 1995. 

General Sullivan implemented the Louisiana 

Maneuvers process to enable the Army to 

experiment with new tactics, doctrine, and 

equipment. General Sullivan would later 

grant final approval to acquire the Louisiana 

Maneuvers Commercial Space Package, 

directing the Army Staff on 3 March 1994 to 

“get on with it.”
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 33

Army leadership, and facilitate the Army’s transformation. In addition, General 

Sullivan established a LAM General Officer Working Group (GOWG) as a twostar council and a LAM Board of Directors as a four-star executive group. Both 

groups would later be instrumental in determining the manner in which the Army 

would activate a formal capability to provide space systems enhancement during 

contingency operations. 

The Commercial Space Package 

Background 

The Commercial Space Package (CSP) initiative was designed by TRADOC and 

USARSPACE to provide a limited, near-term space support capability for each 

Corps and Division headquarters. CSP systems were intended to be low-cost, 

commercial, off-the-shelf products that had already been proven useful in Army 

experiments and demonstrations. The initiative was comprised of two basic 

elements: The first was a Contingency Operations Package, consisting of 

INMARSAT commercial satellite communications terminals, small weather 

receivers, Multi-Spectral Imagery Processors (MSIPs) capable of generating 

special map products, and Mission Planning Rehearsal Systems (MPRSs) designed 

to provide three-dimensional terrain images and electronic ‘fly-throughs’ of an 

area of operations. The Contingency Operations Package was designed to be 

maintained by USARSPACE for rapid deployment to a Joint Task Force, Corps, or 

other unit in need of space systems enhancement. The second basic element of the 

CSP was a Support Package, consisting of systems to be maintained by a field 

unit. Systems intended for deployment under the CSP Support Package included 

MSIPs for fielding with Corps, Division, and Separate Brigade headquarters, TriBand Terminals for fielding with the 269th Signal Company, and surrogate satellite 

systems for experimentation at the Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL) at 

Fort Gordon, GA.2

Early Decisions 

The original proponent for the development of the CSP was Major General 

Ellerson. While assigned to the Army Staff (DAMO-SW) in 1993, General 

Ellerson directed that a study of commercial off-the-shelf space products be 

conducted to determine what capabilities might be of immediate use at the Corps 

and Division level.3

 General Ellerson’s idea was subsequently briefed to 

Lieutenant General Lionetti (Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command), Major General Garner (Assistant Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development), Major General Lehowicz, 

Brigadier General Adams, Brigadier General Franks, and the Army Staff. As a 

result of this briefing, it was decided to validate the CSP concept through the 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 34 

TRADOC Louisiana Maneuvers process.4

 After further consultations with the 

Louisiana Maneuver Office, it was determined that the CSP would be made part of 

the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) LAM 

issue.5

 In May 1993, TRADOC tasked the Battle Command Battle Laboratory 

(BCBL) to assume responsibility for the development and validation of the CSP.6

 

From May to September 1993, the BCBL worked in close conjunction with 

USARSPACE to develop and refine the CSP concept. Under the basic CSP 

concept developed during this timeframe, two separate packages would be 

developed for the Army. The first space package, consisting primarily of MultiSpectral Imagery Processors and satellite communications systems, would be 

fielded directly to Corps and Division units. A second package, designed 

specifically for contingency operations, would consist of commercial off-the-shelf 

systems that had already been demonstrated by USARSPACE under the ASEDP. 

This equipment would include INMARSAT communications terminals, small 

satellite weather receivers, Multi-Spectral Imagery Processors, and Mission 

Planning Rehearsal Systems. USARSPACE would maintain this equipment and 

provide a team capable of deploying with it to support a Joint Task Force or Corps 

headquarters. USARSPACE took the initiative in developing the contingency 

operations portion of the CSP. In May 1993, USARSPACE prepared a manning 

document, estimating that an additional 20 manpower slots would be needed to 

acquire, field, train and provide CSP contingency operations support to the field.7

 

This manning document was submitted to the U.S. Army Force Integration 

Support Activity (USAFISA), which subsequently validated 11 of the 20 

manpower slots requested, consisting of four 2-person contingency teams and 

three headquarters support positions. In addition, the command assigned a civilian 

employee to provide configuration management and maintenance support.8 

Following this initial research, the BCBL hosted a video teleconference with 

USARSPACE on 3 August 1993 to refine the CSP concept.9 As a result of this 

groundwork, the TRADOC Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) 

reported that it supported the CSP initiative, stressing: 

“We need a package that provides assured communications to the combat 

service support (CSS) community. . . . SATCOM systems in this package 

that will specifically address CSS operational requirements are High Data 

Rate Tactical Satellites (HDRTSAT), International Maritime Satellites 

(INMARSAT), Multi-Spectral Imagery (MSI) processing, and surrogate 

satellites. . . . METT-T may demand additional data communications 

above and beyond the proposed LAM package for CSS units in a force 

projection Army. We would support a ‘plus up’ in the INMARSAT 

terminals for CSS commanders.”10

On 20 August 1993, Lieutenant General Don Lionetti (Commanding General, 

USASSDC) presented a comprehensive approach for deploying CSP systems, to 

include a project plan, management approach, project schedule, and resource 

allocation. Under the plan, USARSPACE would procure four of the systems in 

the CSP: INMARSAT satellite communications terminals, the MSIP, the MultiSource Tactical System (MSTS), and the Small Weather System (SWS). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 35

USASSDC based this recommendation on its experience with demonstrating those 

four systems, noting: 

“The four items selected have been previously demonstrated in the field 

by USARSPACE as part of the Army Space Exploitation Demonstration 

Program (ASEDP). The other two capabilities listed in the BCBL CSP 

(HDRSAT and Surrogate Satellite) cannot be supported by the expertise 

currently resident within USARSPACE since they have not been field 

demonstrated.”11

To accomplish the plan, USASSDC stated a need for an additional 7 civilian and 

13 military authorizations.12

The Louisiana Maneuvers General Officer Working Group Meeting 

The Louisiana Maneuvers General Officer Working Group (GOWG) reviewed the 

CSP concept on 9 September 1993. Mr. Whelen, (USARSPACE) briefed the 

GOWG on the space-based capabilities provided by the INMARSAT, the small 

weather receiver, the MSIP, and the MSTS. Afterwards, Colonel Roundtree 

(USARSPACE) briefed the GOWG on CSP acquisition and sustainment.13

During the briefing to the GOWG, it was explained that four primary objectives 

had been established for the Commercial Space Package: First, the CSP was 

intended to provide a limited space-based capability in the near term (defined as 

six to eight months); Second, the CSP would provide space support for day-to-day 

Army training; Third, the CSP would serve as a tool for developing confidence 

throughout the Army in space support systems; Finally, the CSP would provide a 

contingency support capability for Echelons Above Corps (EAC), special 

operations units, and Combat Service Support activities.14

The members of the GOWG were presented with four different approaches to 

funding the CSP, each geared to the level of emphasis the Army leadership 

believed the CSP initiative merited.15 In addition, the GOWG was presented six 

options for acquiring and fielding CSP systems. Under the first option briefed, the 

Army would acquire 71 CSP systems (44 INMARSAT receivers, 11 satellite 

weather receivers, 7 MSIP, and 9 MSTS with MPRS). All CSP systems would be 

assigned to USARSPACE and would be deployed to warfighting headquarters as 

needed. Under the second option briefed, a total of 104 CSP systems would be 

acquired, of which 64 would be assigned to USARSPACE, 6 would be assigned to 

Corps headquarters, and 34 would be assigned to Division and Separate Brigade 

headquarters. Under each of the remaining options briefed, a larger number of 

total CSP systems would be acquired, with a larger percentage assigned to Corps, 

Divisions, and Separate Brigades. The option recommended for adoption was 

Option #6, in which a total of 169 CSP systems would be acquired. Under this 

option, 41 CSP systems would be assigned to USARSPACE, 43 would be 

assigned to Corps headquarters, 82 would be assigned to Divisions and Separate 

Brigades, 1 would be assigned to the BCBL, and 2 would be assigned to the 

Engineer School.16
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 36 

The overall reaction of the General Officer Working Group (GOWG) to the CSP 

initiative was positive. However, the GOWG believed that additional coordination 

and analysis were required before the CSP initiative could proceed. Brigadier 

General Anderson, who subsequently summarized the results of the GOWG 

meeting, noted that four general concerns and comments about the CSP were made 

by the general officers in attendance: 

“What are the risks and level of expectations if we buy something that is 

not horizontally integrated and is not currently funded? We run the risk 

of losing an entire funding line for a program. We need to lay that out up 

front.”

“We need to determine the status of existing requirements documentation 

for similar systems and we need to develop an operational concept for the 

proposed capabilities. The fundamental questions are: When will the 

objective systems be fielded? What can we do in the interim? What can 

we do to graft interim capability onto the objective system?”

“We have had requirements for objective systems and have been working 

them for years. Yet every time a unit gets ready to deploy, they go to 

ARSPACE for support. We can put these CSP capabilities into soldier’s 

hands next year. The Army needs to have these capabilities, somewhere. 

Then, if the need arises, we can go back to the manufacturers and get 

more.”

“We can’t afford to resource duplicate capabilities. We need to have the 

right amount of the right capability.” 17

The Louisiana Maneuvers GOWG made two key decisions during the 9 September 

1993 meeting. First, additional analysis of the CSP initiative would be conducted 

prior to submission of the CSP Issue Decision Package (IDP) in October to the 

LAM Board of Directors. Second, responsibility for each of the CSP systems 

would be assigned to a general officer. 

The GOWG tasking for additional CSP analyses reflected the key areas of concern 

that had been expressed during the briefing. In response to concerns that the CSP 

equipment was not horizontally integrated, the GOWG directed that a cross-walk 

of each proposed CSP system be conducted to: [1] Determine whether the CSP 

system, by itself, would provide sufficient capability to meet the requirements 

driving an existing or planned objective system; [2] Describe in operational terms 

the capabilities of the CSP systems in comparison to planned or existing systems; 

[3] If the analysis revealed that the CSP and the planned objective system were 

redundant, to describe the duplication and explain why it is needed; and [4] To 

describe how CSP system capability might be horizontally integrated or otherwise 

applied to existing or planned equipment. In response to concerns regarding 

documentation of equipment requirements, the GOWG directed that a statement of 

the requirement for the CSP system be developed, as well as a statement of the 

operational concept. Finally, to address funding issues associated with CSP 

procurement, the GOWG directed that recommendations be developed for the 

quantities and timing of acquisition, the acquisition agent, the fielding plan and 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 37

agent, the sustainment plan and 

agent, and the training plan and 

agent. Furthermore, the GOWG 

directed that funding levels required 

to implement the CSP 

recommendation be summarized by 

fiscal year and procurement 

account.18

The second key decision made at 

the 9 September 1993 GOWG 

meeting was to assign each of the 

CSP systems to a flag-level officer. 

Major General Bob Gray (Signal 

Center) accepted the lead on the 

INMARSAT initiative. The general 

consensus expressed about the 

INMARSAT was that the current 

Army inventory needed to be 

upgraded and that the value-added 

by the INMARSAT over current 

and planned single-channel tactical 

communications satellite terminals 

needed to be identified. The 

GOWG also asked about the 

restrictions placed upon the use of 

INMARSAT for supporting military 

operations. 

For the Small Weather System and 

the Multi-Source Tactical System, 

Major General John Stewart 

(Intelligence Center) assumed 

responsibility. The general 

consensus at the GOWG was that 

the Small Weather System was 

required at the Corps and Theater levels but would be too bulky for use at the 

Division level. Concerns were expressed about the value-added of the Small 

Weather System when compared to the existing weather terminal (WRAASE) or 

the planned weather system (IMETS). For the MSTS, the general consensus was 

that the six systems should be acquired to ensure that each Corps headquarters 

could be equipped with the system and that enough equipment would be available 

for experimentation at the battle laboratory. A series of issues and concerns were 

raised regarding the MSTS, to include the amount of training time required to use 

the capability, the operational concept and impacts of using MSTS with the 

Success R Radio or Commander’s Tactical Terminal-Hybrid (CTT-H), whether 

MSTS software might simply be rehosted onto an existing system, and the 

General Frederick Franks, 

Commanding General, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, 1991 

to 1995. 

After commanding VII Corps during the 

Gulf War, General Franks was selected to be 

the TRADOC Commanding General. On 12 

January 1994, General Franks presented the 

TRADOC position on CSP procurement to 

the Army Chief of Staff, recommending that 

a contingency support capability be 

developed. General Franks’ recommendation 

was adopted by the Army, leading to 

subsequent activation of the Contingency

Operations (Space) team at USARSPACE 

(Forward). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 38 

Major General Jay Garner, Assistant 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 

Plans, Force Development, 1993-1994. 

General Garner attended the meeting in which 

the Commercial Space Package concept was 

originally proposed by Major General Ellerson 

(DAMO-SW). On 9 May 1994, Major General 

Garner took action to validate the Army’s 

requirement for the Commercial Space 

Package. As a Lieutenant General, Garner 

would later command USASSDC. 

capabilities of MSTS in 

comparison to other systems (such 

as the Aviation Mission Planning 

System or Battlefield 

Visualization Software).19 

Responsibility for the MultiSpectral Imagery Processor, the 

fourth CSP system, was assumed 

by Colonel Flowers (Engineer 

Center). The general consensus 

was that the MSIP should be 

fielded to each Division and Corps 

headquarters, as well as the 

Engineer Center. The primary 

issue raised during discussions at 

the meeting was whether or not 

the MSIP capability might later be 

grafted onto the objective system 

(DTSS).20

Senior-Level Review and 

Refinement of the CSP 

Initiative 

On 4 October 1993, the CSP 

initiative was briefed to General 

Frederick Franks, TRADOC Commanding General. Three deployment options for 

the CSP were presented: Under the first option, enough equipment would be 

acquired to allow USARSPACE to support warfighting headquarters during 

contingency missions; Under the second option, enough CSP equipment would be 

acquired to provide a USARSPACE contingency capability and to outfit the units 

scheduled for earliest deployment; The last option would permit CSP equipment 

to be provided both for a USARSPACE contingency capability and to outfit all 

Corps and Division headquarters. Each of the options was evaluated in terms of 

the impacts on doctrine, training, leader development, operations, and materiel.21

The recommendation made to General Franks was that the second option be 

selected and that the CSP be funded in FY94 to provide an immediate warfighting 

capability. General Anderson expected that the second option would, 

“improve the Army’s ability to conduct military operations; help close the 

gap between technology and modernization; will create demand pull for 

space based technology; give operators the opportunity to help define 

future requirements; and may show the way how to rapidly insert 

commercially available technology into the force.” 22
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 39

On 20 October 1993 the CSP was presented to the Louisiana Maneuvers Board of 

Directors (BOD). During this briefing, it was decided that the CSP initiative still 

needed to be matured. The Board of Directors directed that the CSP proposal be 

reviewed by Joint Task Force Somalia, that near-term CSP acquisition and 

deployment options be developed for FY94 and FY95, and that another CSP 

review be conducted with the Army Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, and the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.23

The TRADOC Combined Arms Center 

responded to the first Louisiana 

Maneuvers Board of Directors tasking on 

1 November 1993 by requesting input 

from JTF Somalia on the CSP initiative. 

The JTF Commander was asked to review 

a CSP package designed to support a 

Division-sized land joint task force with 

INMARSAT, small weather satellite 

receivers, Multi-Spectral Imagery 

Processors, Mission Planning Rehearsal 

Systems, and the surrogate satellite 

concept.24 On 18 November, the JTF 

Commander supported the CSP outlined 

by TRADOC. The JTF supported the 

quantities and types of systems suggested 

by TRADOC and provided examples of 

the use of such capabilities during 

operations in Somalia.25

On 23 November 1993, General Anderson 

coordinated the response to the second 

element of the Louisiana Maneuvers 

Board of Directors tasking. General 

Anderson recommended an FY94 CSP 

package designed for Joint Task Force 

contingency support. This package would 

consist of 12 INMARSAT terminals, 2 

small weather systems, 2 MSIPs (with an 

additional 17 MSIPs for Corps/Division 

terrain teams), 5 MPRS, and 2 surrogate 

satellite systems. For a CSP program 

follow-on in FY95, General Anderson prepared two alternatives. Under the first 

option, General Anderson recommended procurement of 28 INMARSAT 

terminals, 6 MPRS, 6 Tri-Band SHF terminals, and 4 surrogate satellite systems. 

Under the second option, General Anderson proposed that 76 INMARSAT 

terminals, 10 small weather systems, 17 MPRS, 6 Tri-Band SHF terminal, and 6 

surrogate satellite systems be acquired.26

Brigadier General Edward 

Anderson III, Deputy 

Commanding General, US Army 

Combined Arms Command and 

Ft. Leavenworth, 1993-1994. 

General Anderson took a leading role 

in developing, refining, and staffing

the Louisiana Maneuvers Commercial 

Space Package initiative. As a 

Lieutenant General, Anderson would 

later be appointed Commanding

General, U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 40 

Implementation: Procurement Actions For The CSP 

General Franks presented the TRADOC recommendation on CSP procurement to 

General Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, on 12 January 1994. General 

Franks recommended that enough CSP systems be procured in FY94 to support 

one Army deployment in support of a Joint Task Force. This CSP contingency 

support package would consist of 12 INMARSAT terminals, 2 small weather 

systems, 2 MSIPs, and 5 MPRS. In addition, General Franks recommended that 

the Army “buy 6 Tri-Band SHF Terminals to support the PowerPAC III Company, 

2 surrogate satellites for Battle Laboratory experimentation and contingency 

support, and 17 Multi-Spectral Imagery Processors for Corps and Division terrain 

analysis teams.” The estimated FY94 cost for the contingency support package 

was estimated to be $1.9 million, with an additional $15.3 million for procurement 

of the Corps and Division MSIP systems, $316,000 for the surrogate satellite 

systems, and $10,000 for the Tri-Band SHF Terminal systems. General Franks 

recommended to the Chief of Staff that the CSP initiative be extended into FY95, 

with a recommended purchase of CSP systems to be provided directly to those 

Army units slated for the earliest deployment. The total recommended FY95 

procurement consisted of 28 INMARSAT terminals, 6 MPRS, and 4 surrogate 

satellite systems, with an estimated total cost of $3.5 million. General Franks also 

recommended, however, that “Lieutenant General Don Lionetti, Major General 

Bob Gray, and Major General John Stewart validate the FY95 buy 

recommendation as part of Don’s LAM Space Issue. In this manner, we get some 

equipment on the ground this year, plan to buy more, but continue to revisit to 

keep our options open.”27

On 3 March 1994, General Sullivan responded positively to the TRADOC 

recommendations for the CSP initiative. In a letter to General Franks, the Chief of 

Staff wrote: “Appreciate the work your people have done to reaffirm the need for 

the JTF package and in refining the entire CSP. . . . The guidance I have given the 

staff is ‘to get on with it.’”28

With the approval of the Chief of Staff, the CSP initiative was rapidly executed. 

On 18 March 1994, General Anderson submitted an Operational Needs Statement 

(ONS) for the CSP to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 

Plans, Force Development (DAMO-FD).29 In the meantime, the Funds Mid-Year 

Review allocated funding for the CSP initiative30 and, on 30 March 1994, the 

Army staff released funding for procurement of CSP systems. Funding was 

provided to the Program Executive Office, Command and Control Systems (PEOCCS) for immediate acquisition of the small weather system, 2 MSIPs, and 5 

MPRS systems.31

Headquarters, Department of the Army formally approved the CSP concept plan 

on 1 April 1994 and authorized the immediate requisition and fill of manpower 

spaces requested by USARSPACE to support contingency operations. Twelve 

personnel positions were approved for addition to the USARSPACE Table of 

Distribution and Allowances (TDA).32 On 9 May 1994, Major General Jay Garner 

(Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development) 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 41

validated the Operational Needs Statement submitted by General Anderson on 18 

March. The validation memorandum sent by General Garner summarized four key 

decisions made in reference to the CSP initiative: First, authorization was 

provided for the acquisition of a single CSP package tailored for contingency 

operations support, as outlined in General Anderson’s ONS; Second, the CSP 

would be used only for contingency purposes and Operations Other Than War; 

Third, no additional personnel or manpower were authorized beyond the level set 

for USARSPACE by the Army Staff on 1 April 1994; Finally, $1.93 million in 

funding would be reprogrammed for the CSP Contingency Operations Package 

during the mid-year review. Of this amount, $1.77 million would be provided in 

FY94 OPA (Other Procurement, Army) funding and $0.16 million in FY94 OMA 

(Operations and Maintenance, Army) funding.33

 With senior Army leadership approval of the CSP secured, USARSPACE next 

focused its efforts on standing up a contingency deployment capability for the 

Army. This capability, dubbed the Contingency Operations (Space) team, or 

COPS, was scheduled for activation on 1 January 1995.34

COPS: THE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (SPACE) TEAM 

The CSP initiative established the key parameters for activation of a contingency 

deployment support capability by USARSPACE. When Major Mike Jensen was 

appointed to lead the Contingency Operations (Space) team, its mission, 

equipment, and personnel had already been established as a result of the CSP 

process. Nevertheless, a number of additional operational factors shaped the 

manner in which the contingency deployment capability was established, to 

include the USSPACECOM directive that resulted in the renaming of COPS as the 

Army Space Support Team (ARSST). 

The Army Audit Agency Review Of 1994 

The Army Audit Agency was conducting an analysis of space support operations 

at the same time that the senior Army leadership was assessing the merits of the 

CSP Contingency Operations Package. A draft report, issued by the Army Audit 

Agency on 8 June 1994, validated the need for an organization dedicated to 

providing warfighting commanders and staffs with space support. In this report, 

the Army Audit Agency noted that USARSPACE had successfully supported the 

Army during a number of contingency missions, specifically citing three cases. 

First, INMARSAT communications support had been provided for humanitarian 

relief efforts after Hurricanes Iniki in Hawaii and Andrew in Florida. Second, 

commercial space systems had been used to provide mapping, communications, 

weather, and GPS support to the 10th Mountain Division during Operation 

RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. Finally, commercial space capabilities had 

supported mapping and communications requirements during Operation 

PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia.35 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 42 

The Army Audit Agency observed that support to field units had been provided as 

part of the existing USARSPACE space demonstration program. However, they 

emphasized, 

“the mission of the program is to demonstrate space technologies to field 

soldiers in an attempt to identify operational needs, help shape operational 

requirements, and provide data for the materiel developer – not to actively 

support contingency missions with various assets from the program. 

Providing operational support for field commanders isn’t part of the Army 

Space Command mission.”36

Because USARSPACE had neither been assigned a contingency operations 

mission nor the resources required to perform such a mission, the Command had 

been unable to provide sustained, operational support to field units. The result was 

that “commanders must go to many different organizations to obtain needed space 

technology support and communications.”37

Based upon the USARSPACE experience in supporting field units during 

deployments and the space systems expertise resident within the organization, the 

Army Audit Agency recommended that the Army assign a contingency support 

mission to the Command. The auditors defined three components of this mission: 

[1] To support battle zone operations or other missions; [2] To bring the latest 

space technology to the field; and [3] To train soldiers to use the technology.38

Standing Up the COPS Capability 

After the Army granted formal authorization to procure the CSP Contingency 

Operations Package and provided USARSPACE with the requisite personnel and 

funding, the Command took active steps to develop the Contingency Operations 

(Space) capability. Major Mike Jensen, who was assigned responsibility within 

the Command for activating COPS, envisioned that staffing for the COPS teams 

and procurement of the CSP systems would take place from May to November 

1994. In December 1994, the COPS teams would train-up and prepare to support 

deployments. By 1 January 1995, COPS would be operational. 

 Although Major Jensen had a 

great deal of flexibility in 

establishing the concept of 

operations for COPS, three key 

parameters constrained his 

approach. First, the Army Chief 

of Staff had already defined the 

COPS mission. As Major Jensen 

noted in an early information 

paper, “General Sullivan directed 

that the mission of COPS will be 

to provide world-wide space 

operations support to contingency 

COPS Activation: Issues of Concern. 

• Uncertainty in COPS funding. 

• COPS equipment configuration 

management and equipment sustainment. 

• Officer requisition lead times. 

• COPS relationship with USSPACECOM. 

• Continuance of the CSP initiative in FY95. 

• Need for a COPS team to be prepared for 

an immediate contingency. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 43

missions and operations other than war like floods, earthquakes, or humanitarian 

support.”39 Second, COPS manning levels had already been established during the 

Louisiana Maneuvers process. The Contingency Operations (Space) program was 

assigned 12 personnel, who were scheduled for assignment to ARSPACE by 

October 1994.40 Third, each of the major items of equipment assigned to the 

COPS teams had already been selected during the Louisiana Maneuvers decisionmaking process. 

After being assigned the mission to activate the COPS capability, Major Jensen 

identified several areas of concern. First, funding levels for COPS in both FY94 

and FY95 were viewed as uncertain. During the USARSPACE Program Budget 

Advisory Committee (PBAC) conducted on 11 April 1994, no funding 

requirement had been identified.41 At the 21 June 1994 PBAC, a new requirement 

for $261,000 in funding was established for COPS; however, only $175,000 was 

funded, leaving an unfunded requirement of $86,000.42 USARSPACE funded the 

O&M costs ($175,000) of the COPS program, to include money for civilian pay, 

travel, training, and planning support.43 In the meantime, FY94 HQDA funding 

for COPS remained uncertain and the FY95 COPS program was unprogrammed. 

Second, there was no established equipment configuration management process or 

equipment sustainment program. Third, officer requisition lead times were 

estimated at 9 to 10 months, requiring realignment of personnel within the 

USARSPACE. Fourth, the COPS relationship to USSPACECOM was undefined. 

Fifth, it was unknown if the CSP program would continue in FY95 and, if so, what 

the USARSPACE role would be. Sixth, Major Jensen noted that a contingency 

mission could happen at any time and, thus, the COPS teams would have to be 

prepared to respond quickly.44

Developing The COPS Concept Of Operations 

Under Major Jensen’s initial concept of operations for the Contingency Operations 

(Space) program, two five-person teams would be prepared to deploy worldwide 

to support Army operations.45 Deployment taskings for the COPS teams would be 

made by Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), with units requesting 

support through the HQDA Emergency Operations Center. During a deployment, 

the COPS team would be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the 

supported unit.46

With only 11 personnel available to the COPS program, USARSPACE decided to 

acquire contractor support to refine the COPS concept of operations. A Task 

Order was prepared by USARSPACE for assistance to the COPS program in 

developing, staffing, and finalizing a COPS Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 

COPS Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), a training plan, a series of generic 

operations plans, and an exercise support plan.47 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 44 

A first draft of the COPS Standard Operating Procedures was submitted on 16 

August 1994. This SOP assumed that a four-phased deployment process would be 

used when a COPS team deployed on a contingency mission. Phase I, as outlined 

in the SOP, consisted of pre-deployment actions and alert notification. Phase II 

consisted of COPS team deployment actions and employment in the field. Phase 

III of the SOP outlined redeployment actions for the COPS team while Phase IV 

summarized recovery actions.48 In addition, the SOP outlined the major 

responsibilities of key USARSPACE staff officers, the COPS Division Chief, 

COPS team leaders, and all deployable personnel. 

Operating under the assumption that COPS teams must be prepared to deploy at a 

moment’s notice, the SOP also established three cycles for deployment readiness. 

The highest COPS deployment readiness posture was classified as the Blue Cycle 

(Deployment Standby), in which team personnel and equipment would be prepared 

for rapid movement overseas. Within the Blue Cycle, two separate levels of 

standby readiness were established. Under Blue High, a 2-hour recall requirement 

was placed into effect. Blue Normal entailed a 6-hour recall requirement. The 

second priority for COPS deployment was classified as the Green Cycle (Unit 

Planning). When a COPS team was placed on the Green Cycle, personnel would 

coordinate with supported units to help update operations plans, orders, and 

accompanying documentation. In addition, the COPS team would conduct 

systems demonstrations and training with supported units. The final COPS 

readiness posture was classified as the Red Cycle (Exercises and Training). A 

Deployment

Standby

Deployment

Standby

 BLUE CYCLE

• First priority for deployment in

support of contingency missions.

• Equipment is maintained and

prepared for immediate

deployment.

• The BLUE CYCLE includes two

levels for standby readiness.

• BLUE HIGH: 2 hour recall

requirement).

• BLUE NORMAL: 6 hour

recall requirement).

Unit

Planning

Unit

Planning

 GREEN CYCLE

• Second priority for deployment.

• Personnel conduct direct coordinate

with supported units to assist in the

updating of OPLANs, orders, etc.

• Team conducts demonstrations and

space support capabilities orientations.

Exercises and

Training

Exercises and

Training

RED CYCLE

• Deployment in support of actual

contingency missions by exception

only as fillers or for special task

organization.

• Personnel participate in scheduled

exercises and conduct training on

space support systems.

Figure 3: Original COPS Team Deployment Readiness Cycle Concept. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 45

COPS team on the Red Cycle would deploy in support of an actual contingency 

mission only as individual fillers for another team or as part of a special task 

organization. COPS personnel on the Red Cycle would continue to participate in 

unit exercises and training.49

The first draft of the COPS SOP contained procedures for only the pre-deployment 

and alert actions of a COPS deployment; it did not speak to the full process of 

COPS deployment planning, deployment actions, employment in-theater, or 

redeployment/recovery. When Colonel E. Paul Semmons (USARSPACE 

Commander) reviewed the document, he directed a series of revisions to the SOP. 

First, he directed that the SOP be printed as a pocket-sized document (rather than 

the 8 1⁄2 by 11 inch paper on which the draft had been printed). Second, he wanted 

the SOP to be written as a checklist-oriented document. Finally, Colonel 

Semmons wrote that the “operational concept is off track” and sketched a 

revamped concept on the back of the document.50

The original draft of the COPS Concept of Operations was also presented to 

USARSPACE in August 1994. The draft CONOPS elaborated on many of the 

themes that had been introduced in the COPS SOP, to include the level of units 

supported by the COPS teams, the deployment process, the command and control 

of the COPS teams, and the employment of COPS teams in the field, as described 

below. 

Units Supported by the COPS Teams. The draft CONOPS envisioned that the 

focal point for COPS team support would be at the Corps headquarters level. 

However, the concept of operations also stressed that the COPS teams had to be 

prepared to support a variety of other units. Examples cited in the draft CONOPS 

included, 

 “CONUS based non-contingency Corps assets, National Guard units, 

FORSCOM Army Reserve units, and other government agencies (Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Bureau of Land Management, Drug 

Enforcement Agency, State and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, 

State Adjutants General, etc.).”51

The COPS Deployment Process. The draft COPS Concept of Operations 

established a phased deployment process, much like that outlined in the draft SOP. 

The first phase of this process consisted of pre-deployment actions. During this 

phase, USARSPACE would establish communications with the unit to be 

supported and begin developing mission planning and support requirements. An 

Army Space Liaison Officer (ASPLO) from USARSPACE would lead an advance 

party to the supported unit to refine mission planning and support requirements. In 

the meantime, USARSPACE would tailor a COPS mission team, load equipment, 

and prepare to deploy within 48 hours. 

During the second phase of the COPS deployment process, USARSPACE would 

conduct mobility planning for the COPS team and its equipment. For movement 

within the Continental United States (CONUS), USARSPACE would arrange 

transportation via the Defense Transportation System, scheduled commercial 

airline flight, or ground movement. Movement outside of CONUS would be 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 46 

conducted “in accordance with supported unit approved OPLANS, the Time 

Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) and air flow plans.”52 As an alternate 

method for overseas movement, USARSPACE would schedule a commercial 

flight for the COPS Team. 

Once a COPS team was deployed to support a unit, the Army Space Liaison 

Officer would serve as both the COPS team leader and the “Space Capabilities 

Advisor” to the supported unit. The draft CONOPS envisioned the ASPLO role 

as “advising and recommending COPS employment based on the OPLAN and the 

operational situation, [providing] user assistance and interface between the unit 

and HQ USARSPACE, and [facilitating] logistics support for the equipment.”53 In 

the meantime, COPS team members would prepare hard copy products for use by 

the support unit and provide equipment training to supported unit personnel. 

After completion of the COPS mission, the team would initiate redeployment 

actions. During this phase of a COPS team deployment, the draft CONOPS 

envisioned that “the supported unit will arrange necessary transportation for 

movement of COPS assets to USARSPACE home station or other HQDA 

DCSOPS designated destination.”54 

The final phase of a COPS team deployment in the draft CONOPS was the 

recovery phase. Upon return to home station, the COPS team would be debriefed 

on lessons learned and a mission performance assessment would be conducted. 

The COPS team would then undergo “an intensive recovery program” to allow the 

team to redeploy again within two weeks.55

COPS Command and Control Relationships. Under the draft COPS CONOPS, 

approval and tasking for all support missions were the responsibility of 

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Upon deployment, the COPS team was 

directly attached to the supported Army organization for “operational control, 

rations, quarters, logistics, and UCMJ [judicial responsibility].” USARSPACE 

retained command and technical control of the COPS team during the deployment 

and was assigned responsibility for “providing administration and logistics 

support.”56

USSPACECOM and the Renaming Of COPS 

At the same time that Major Mike Jensen was activating the Contingency 

Operations (Space) program, decisions by U.S. Space Command affected the 

direction of Army efforts. For commonality and standardization, USSPACECOM 

directed in October 1994 that each of the contingency space capabilities of 

Services be referred to as Space Support Teams.57 In accordance with this 

directive, the Army Contingency Operations (Space) program was officially 

renamed the Army Space Support Team (ARSST). 

USSPACECOM’s interest in establishing a space support team capability to 

support theater commanders stemmed from two key factors. First, under the 1993-

1995 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) USSPACECOM was formally 

assigned responsibility for supporting the Combatant Commands. The JSCP is a 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 47

key planning document which fulfills three primary functions: [1] To provide 

guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands 

for the accomplishment of assigned tasks and missions; [2] To apportion resources 

among the Combatant Commands; [3] To serve as the principal vehicle for tasking 

of the Combatant Commands to develop Operations Plans, Concept Plans, and 

Functional Plans. The 1993-1995 JSCP assigned responsibility to 

USSPACECOM for providing “assured mission support from space systems 

throughout the spectrum of conflict to the National Command Authority (NCA), 

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), combatant commands and other agencies.”

58 To respond to the JSCP requirement to support the Combatant Commands, 

USSPACECOM developed the Support to Theater Operations Management Plan 

(STOMP). STOMP, in turn, established an early blueprint for providing space 

support for theater operations. 

The second major factor driving USSPACECOM’s effort to develop a space 

support team structure was the command emphasis exerted by General Chuck 

Horner, then serving as Commander-in-Chief at U.S. Space Command. While 

serving in Saudi Arabia during DESERT STORM, General Horner had been 

disappointed by the lack of support provided to U.S. Central Command by 

USSPACECOM. While USSPACECOM took few proactive steps to support the 

USCENTCOM commander and staff, each of the Services responded individually 

to the requirements of their own units in-theater. For example, USSPACECOM’s 

theater missile early warning system had to be cobbled together just prior to the 

initiation of hostilities. Simply stated, USSPACECOM had exerted 

minimalinfluence on combat operations during DESERT STORM. When General 

Horner assumed command of USSPACECOM, he took deliberate steps to ensure 

that a similar situation was not repeated in the future.59

By September 1994 USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command 

(AFSPACECOM) were involved in several initiatives to provide space support to 

theater commanders. One such initiative was the development of teams designed 

to provide space planning support, which were then referred to as “Annex N” 

teams.60 A second initiative was the activation of Forward Space Support in 

Theater (FSST) teams, which were intended to normalize the process of providing 

space support at the theater level. In addition, USSPACECOM and 

AFSPACECOM began to participate in and develop military space exercises.61 

These efforts, however, exerted little influence on either COPS or the Army Space 

Support Team. No direct line of control was established between USSPACECOM 

and the ARSST. No formal coordination mechanisms for joint operations were 

incorporated into the ARSST Concept of Operations, Standard Operating 

Procedures, or training programs. Tasking for an ARSST operation, like that for 

COPS team deployment, continued to be the responsibility of HQDA. If 

USSPACECOM sought to task an ARSST to provide support, it would have to 

forward this request “to HQDA DCSOPS by USARSPACE for concurrence and 

Army mission guidance.”62
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 48 

 No USSPACECOM oversight or review process was implemented for the Army 

Space Support Team. In short, USSPACECOM’s only major influence on how 

the Army activated its space support capability was the October 1994 directive that 

led to the renaming of COPS. 

The Transition to Arsst (October To December 1994) 

USARSPACE maintained most of the elements of the original COPS concept of 

operations when the Army Space Support Team was activated. No changes were 

made to the personnel or equipment assigned to the ARSST. In addition, the basic 

mission assigned to the teams remained unchanged. 

Similarly, there were few changes in organization made when the ARSST was 

activated. The December 1994 version of the ARSST CONOPS established a 

headquarters section, composed of the ARSST chief and a civilian analyst, and 

three deployable ARSST teams of 3 personnel each. As with the COPS capability, 

the ARSST teams would be maintained on a three-tiered readiness cycle. Each of 

the teams would be prepared for global deployment. The ARSST team on the 

highest readiness cycle would be prepared to deploy within 48 hours. In another 

carry-over from the original COPS concept of operations, the leaders of each of 

the ARSST teams were referred to as Army Space Planning Liaison Officers. 

The December 1994 draft of the ARSST Concept of Operations did introduce two 

new elements. First, not only would HQDA provide deployment taskings to the 

ARSST; it would also “review, validate and prioritize requests” and “resolve 

conflicts for ARSST support.”63 If USSPACECOM wanted to task the ARSST for 

a contingency support mission, it would have to forward a request to HQDA for 

consideration. HQDA would then task USARSPACE to provide ARSST team 

Equipm ent

Vendors

Equipm ent

Vendors

Platform

Operations

Center

Platform

Operations

Center

COPS

Operations

Center

COPS

Operations

Center USARSPACE

COPS

M ission Team

USARSPACE

COPS

M ission Team

USARSPACE

Contingency

Operations Division

USARSPACE

Contingency

Operations Division

USARSPACE USARSPACE

HQDA HQDA

Host

Nation

Host

Nation

Army

Component

Command

Army

Component

Command

Allocated

Army

Organization

Allocated

Army

Organization

Com m and/Tasking

Coordination

System s Control

Support Request

Figure 4: COPS Planning and Coordination Relationships, as diagrammed in the 

original Concept of Operations. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 49

support based on the most recent readiness status reports and USARSPACE 

recommendations. 

The second new element introduced in the December 1994 draft CONOPS was an 

extensive reporting process for the ARSST. Under this reporting process, monthly 

reports would be provided to both USASSDC and HQDA on “the operational 

status of each system, availability of each system, status of personnel, and location 

and posture of deployed systems and personnel. The monthly report will include a 

Commander’s Assessment of the ARSST capability readiness and availability.”64 

In addition, within two hours of mission completion USARSPACE would provide 

a “HOTWASH” report to USASSDC and HQDA, to be followed by a formal after 

action report within 30 days. A system of spot reports was established for 

“impacting events such as personnel or equipment losses, equipment failures, 

impacting personnel actions, or mission conflicts.”65

Summary 

As the Army experimented with new tactics, doctrine, and equipment under the 

Louisiana Maneuvers process, space was identified as a significant combat 

multiplier. Past operational experience in the field, coupled with ongoing space 

demonstration efforts, convinced the Army that space systems could be used to 

1994 CONOPS 1994 CONOPS 

HQ 1 ARSST Chief

1 Analyst

TM 1 TM 2 TM 3

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

• All teams prepared for 

 global deployment.

• Teams rotate through 

 deployment readiness cycles.

• One team arrives within 48 hours to 

 support warfighting CINC; other 

 teams follow to reinforce.

• All teams prepared for 

 global deployment.

• Teams rotate through 

 deployment readiness cycles.

• One team arrives within 48 hours to 

 support warfighting CINC; other 

 teams follow to reinforce.

ARSST Team

Figure 5: The ARSST Concept of Operations, December 1994. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 50 

assist warfighters at relatively low cost and risk. Better yet, the Army could 

purchase commercial space systems, many of which had already been 

demonstrated under the Army Space Exploitation and Demonstration Program, to 

achieve an immediate operational impact. 

In the meantime, the Army had repeatedly requested deployment support from 

USARSPACE for contingency missions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Continental 

United States. The Army Space Exploitation Demonstration Program had been 

used by USARSPACE as the vehicle for providing contingency space support but, 

due to competing missions and a lack of resources, ASEDP had been unable to 

provide sustained operational support in the field. As a result, Army units were 

forced to “go to many different organizations to obtain needed space technology 

support and communications.”66

To address this problem, the Army decided in 1994 to purchase a suite of 

equipment under the Commercial Space Package to support contingency 

operations. This equipment would be manned by personnel at USARSPACE 

under the Contingency Operations (Space) program. The program, commonly 

referred to as COPS, established a prototype space support organization prepared 

to deploy within 48 hours to support a Joint Task Force or Army headquarters. 

This marked a significant departure from earlier Army space initiatives. Unlike 

the previous demonstration efforts conducted by U.S. Army Space Command, 

COPS would receive the staffing, equipment, and training needed for deployment 

and integration into a field unit. Although the COPS teams would be prepared to 

conduct education and training, the primary focus of the team would be to use 

space systems to support a unit’s operational planning and execution. 

 

1

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command: 12 December 1994.). 

2

 Ibid. 

3

 Facsimile Transmission, Daryll Nottingham, USARSPACE, to Richard Koval, 

PEO CCS, Subject: Commercial Space Package Background. 23 June 1994. 

4

 Battle Command Battle Laboratory Briefing, “Louisiana Maneuver General 

Officer Working Group,” 9 September 1993. 

5

 Facsimile Transmission, Daryll Nottingham, USARSPACE, to Richard Koval, 

PEO CCS, Subject: Commercial Space Package Background. 23 June 1994. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Major Minnon (U.S. Army Space Command, MOSC-SR-F), Information Paper –

Manpower Requirements for Contingency Space Capabilities and Commercial 

Space Package. 18 February 94. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 51

 

8

 Ibid. Editorial comments made by Mr. Tom Callaghan, USARSPACE, in an email message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. 

9

 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Contingency Operations Space,” 

Undated. 

10 Memorandum, Colonel Ben E. Wedding, Director of Training, U.S. Army 

Combined Arms Support Command and Fort Lee, to Commander, U.S. Army 

Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavenworth, Subject: Louisiana Maneuvers 

(LAM) FY93 C4I Implied Task: Commercial Space Package. 11 August 1993. 

11 Memorandum, Lieutenant General Donald M. Lionetti, U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command, to Director, Battle Combat Battle Lab (BCBL), Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, Subject: Acquiring and Placement of Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 20 August 1993. 

12 Ibid. 

13 Battle Command Battle Laboratory Briefing, “Louisiana Maneuver General 

Officer Working Group,” 9 September 1993. Colonel Roundtree was later 

promoted to Brigadier General. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Ibid. 

17 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, Deputy Commanding 

General, US Army Combined Arms Command and Ft. Leavenworth, to Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Combat Development, Subject: FY93 LAM Commercial Space 

Package. 2 October 1993. 

18 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, Deputy Commanding 

General, US Army Combined Arms Command and Ft. Leavenworth, to BCBL 

LAM GOWG Participants, Subject: FY93 LAM Commercial Space Package 

(CSP), 14 September 1993. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Ibid. 

23 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, Deputy Commanding 

General, US Army Combined Arms Command and Ft. Leavenworth, to Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Combat Development, TRADOC, Subject: FY93 LAM 

Commercial Space Package (CSP). 23 November 1993. 

24 Ibid. 

25 Ibid. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 52 

 

26 Ibid. 

27 Memorandum, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, to General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, United States 

Army, Subject: FY93 LAM Commercial Space Package (CSP). 12 January 1994. 

28 Memorandum, General Gordon R. Sullivan, to Commander, Training and 

Doctrine Command, Subject: FY93 Commercial Space Package (CSP). 3 March 

1994. 

29 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ATTN: DAMOFD, Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 18 March 1994. 

30 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Contingency Operations Space,” 

Undated. 

31 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “HQDA Program Release Worksheet 

for Input into the Program Budget Accounting System to SAFM-BUI-I from 

SARD-RR.” 30 March 1994. Acquisition responsibilities were divided between 

four project managers, with PEO-CCS serving as the Milestone Decision 

Authority. Under this acquisition approach, the Project Manager Satellite 

Communications acquired the INMARSAT Terminals, the Project Manager CTIS 

acquired the MSIPs, the Program Manager IMETS was responsible for acquisition 

of the (2) weather receivers and worked the acquisition through the ARSPACE 

contracting office, and the Project Manager ASAS was responsible for the 

acquisition of the 5 MPRSs and worked the acquisition through the ARSPACE 

contracting office. Editorial comments made by Mrs. Daryll Nottingham, 

USARSPACE, in an e-mail message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 

1999. 

32 Editorial comments made by Mr. Tom Callaghan, USARSPACE, in an e-mail 

message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. The number of 

authorized personnel was listed as eleven in original source documentation. 

Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Draft Contingency 

Operations (Space) Concept of Operations (September 1994 Draft). Electronic 

copy of document on floppy diskette. Diskette found in ARSST Division files. 

33 Memorandum, Major General Jay M. Garner, Headquarters, Department of the 

Army (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans), to Assistant 

Secretary for Plans and Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Research, Development and Acquisition), Subject: Urgent Operational 

Requirement for a Commercial Space Package (CSP) Contingency Set. 9 May 

1994. 

34 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Contingency Operations Space,” 

Undated. 

35 Ibid. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 53

 

36 Ibid. 

37 Ibid. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Major Jensen, Call the COPS. (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space 

Command, undated.). 

40 Editorial comments made by Mr. Tom Callaghan, USARSPACE, in an e-mail 

message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. The number of 

authorized personnel was listed as eleven in original source documentation. Major 

Jensen, Call the COPS. (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space 

Command, undated.). 

41PBAC is a committee comprised of the principal staff officers of a command, 

agency, or installation headquarters, and established for the purpose of 

coordinating program and budget actions within the command. 

42 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “4th Qtr PBAC,” 21 June 1994. 

43 Editorial comments made by Mr. Tom Callaghan, USARSPACE, in an e-mail 

message sent to Dr. James A. Walker on 16 February 1999. 

44 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “COPS IPR,” Undated. 

45 Major Jensen, Call the COPS. (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space 

Command, undated.). 

46 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Contingency Operations Space,” 

Undated. 

47 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Task Order Plan 

95-08: Contingency Operations (Space) / COPS Documentation Development. 26 

September 1994. 

48 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Contingency 

Operations – Space (COPS) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) Initial Draft. 

16 August 1994. 

49 Ibid. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Draft 

Contingency Operations (Space) Concept of Operations (September 1994 Draft). 

Electronic copy of document on floppy diskette. Diskette found in ARSST 

Division files. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Ibid. 

54 Ibid. 

55 Ibid. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 54 

 

56 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Task Order Plan 

95-08: Contingency Operations (Space) / COPS Documentation Development. 26 

September 1994. 

57 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command: 12 December 1994.). 

58 U.S. Space Command, USSPACECOM Regulation 11-5: USSPACECOM 

Support to Theater Operations Management Program. (Peterson Air Force Base, 

Colorado: Headquarters United States Space Command, 14 April 1993), pp. 2-3. 

59 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “James H. Williamson Oral History 

Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 22 October 1998. 

60 In joint operational plans (OPLANs), Annex N was reserved to address space 

support. 

61 Ricky B. Kelly, Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a 

Joint Force Commander. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 22 September 1994), p. 32. 

62 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command: 12 December 1994.). 

63 Ibid. 

64 Ibid. 

65 Ibid. 

66 Memorandum, L.D. Pawlak, Army Audit Agency, to Commander, U.S. Army 

Space and Strategic Defense Command, Subject: Draft Report on the Audit of 

Mission Contingency Stock, U.S. Army Space Command. 8 June 1994. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 55

This chapter provides an historical summary of ARSST operations from 1995 to 

1998, tracing ARSST team deployments as well as the evolution of concepts for 

field space support. The chapter has been divided into four subsections, each 

corresponding to a particular year of ARSST operations. The subsections 

nclude an overview of the concept of operations, a synopsis of deployments, a 

consideration of the major issues, and a summary of key space support lessons 

learned. 

1995: On 1 January 1995, the ARSST was officially activated and teams began 

deploying to the field to provide space support enhancement. At the beginning 

of the year, the ARSST was divided into three teams, each aligned with a 

Combatant Command (EUCOM, PACOM, and CENTCOM). Over the course 

of the year, the ARSST took steps to respond to the heavy demands for support 

placed on the team by the XVIII Airborne Corps and Army special operations 

forces, negotiating an agreement under which an ARSST team would be 

forward-deployed at Ft. Bragg. 

1996: The ARSST CONOPS and organizational structure underwent significant 

changes in 1996. In January 1996, the ARSST formally reviewed lessons 

learned in 1995 and examined options for restructuring the teams to provide 

enhanced support to warfighting units. 

1997: ARSST operations in 1997 were conducted under a new organizational 

construct, with 5 teams prepared to support each of the Corps Headquarters and 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The ARSST continued to explore 

ways to improve the level of space support, however, to include the forward 

deployment of ARSST teams and liaison personnel, the rotational deployment 

of teams, and the establishment of a self-sustainment capability. 

1998: During this year, the Army Space Support Cell concept was 

implemented and exercised. In another development, the only forward-deployed 

ARSST team was reassigned from Ft. Bragg to Colorado Springs. 

CHAPTER THREE: 

EVOLUTION OF ARSST OPERATIONS (1995 TO 1998) 

 “Space is the highest hill around, but since it does not have dirt on it too many in the 

Army are not prepared to deal with it.” 

 --Ed Kiker, Army Space Institute, 1992. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 56 

Arsst Operations and Evolution, 1995 

On 1 January 1995, the ARSST teams officially began deploying in support of 

field units. During the course of the year, ARSST personnel would gain valuable 

insights into supported unit requirements, develop and refine processes for 

integrating the ARSST into field operations, and reorganize to provide more 

responsive support to the heaviest consumers of ARSST products (XVIII Airborne 

Corps and U.S. Army Special Operations Command). 

1995 Concept Of Operations 

On 20 April 1995, the draft ARSST Concept of Operations was formally approved 

by the Commander, USARSPACE (Forward).1

 In its essential elements, few 

changes had been made from the CONOPS that had been drafted and revised over 

the August-December 1994 timeframe. The April 1995 CONOPS still envisioned 

that the ARSST would be divided into three teams, each led by an Army Space 

1995 CONOPS 1995 CONOPS 

HQ 1 ARSST Chief

1 Analyst

TM 1 TM 2 TM 3

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

• Teams affiliated with CENTCOM,

 EUCOM, and PACOM.

• Warfighting affiliation for enhanced

 planning, coordination, & support.

• One team arrives within 48 hours to 

 support warfighting CINC; other 

 teams may follow to reinforce.

• Teams affiliated with CENTCOM,

 EUCOM, and PACOM.

• Warfighting affiliation for enhanced

 planning, coordination, & support.

• One team arrives within 48 hours to 

 support warfighting CINC; other 

 teams may follow to reinforce.

EUCOM EUCOM

CENTCOM CENTCOM PACOM PACOM

ARSST Team ARSST Team

Figure 6: The ARSST Concept of Operations, 1995. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 57

Liaison Officer and staffed with two non-commissioned officers who would be 

responsible for manning equipment and training supported units. As with previous 

versions of the CONOPS, an ARSST team was to be prepared to deploy within 48 

hours of an alert notification. The major difference between the April 1995 

CONOPS and previous versions was in the concept of deployment readiness 

cycles and ARSST team affiliation. The April 1995 CONOPS no longer included 

a three-tiered deployment readiness structure, with a Blue Cycle, a Green Cycle, 

and a Red Cycle. Instead, each of the three ARSST teams was aligned with a 

specific Combatant Command headquarters. The Combatant Command 

headquarters designated for support were U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), 

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Central Command 

(USCENTCOM). 

ARSST Field Deployments 

At the beginning of the year, the ARSST focused on training operators on 

employment of the satellite weather receiver and the Mission Planning Rehearsal 

System.2

 Once this training was completed in February 1995, the ARSST started 

deploying teams on an aggressive schedule of field exercises and system 

demonstrations. By the end of the year, the ARSST had supported six Corps and 

Joint Task Force-level exercises, three Division-level exercises, and three special 

operations exercises. In addition, the ARSST conducted an estimated 13 

equipment demonstrations and sent personnel to support three Force Projection 

Tactical Operations Center (FP TOC) exercises. Initially, the ARSST teams 

centered upon equipment support and demonstrations when they deployed to the 

field. From January to March 1995, the ARSST provided INMARSAT terminals 

and training support to both the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Army’s 7th

Transportation Group.3

 From 26 February to 3 March 1995, ARSST personnel 

supported FP TOC demonstrations conducted at the Army War College and the 

Pentagon.4 The ARSST would continue to provide demonstrations and equipment 

support to the field, including a training support mission to the U.S. Air Force 5th

Weather Squadron in Korea that lasted from 30 May to 15 June 19955

; 

INMARSAT training for the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) during exercise 

INTRINSIC ACTION in Kuwait; MPRS training for the III Corps terrain 

detachment; and INMARSAT support for an 82nd Airborne Division exercise in 

the Ukraine.6

 Nevertheless, the focus of ARSST support began to shift in spring 

1995 as teams were integrated into Corps- and Division-level exercises 

On 10 April 1995, ARSST Team 1 deployed to ROVING SANDS 95. After 

providing air and theater missile defense support in conjunction with the Force 

Projection Tactical Operations Center, the ARSST team redeployed to Colorado 

Springs on 28 May 1995.7 In the meantime, ARSST personnel had deployed in 

support of the 82nd Airborne Division’s exercise BIG DROP II. The ARSST 

supported BIG DROP II from 2 to 9 May 1995 by providing equipment 

demonstrations and field training.8

 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 58 

In 1995, the ARSST also supported the annual COBRA GOLD exercise in the 

Pacific theater of operations. ARSST team members participated in the planning 

of the exercise and supported a 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) Command Post 

Exercise (CPX) designed to prepare for COBRA GOLD that was conducted from 

20 to 31 March 1995. ARSST Team 3 subsequently deployed from 24 April to 31 

May 1995 in support of COBRA GOLD 95.9

The 82nd Airborne Division was supported again by an ARSST when Team 1 

deployed to GIANT STEP XX. Team 1 personnel participated in this Division 

exercise from 30 June to 20 July 1995.10 The ARSST also supported XVIII 

Airborne Corps during the annual FUERTAS DEFENSAS exercise. During 

FUERTAS DEFENSAS 95, ARSST Team 2 deployed to Panama from 14 August 

to 18 September 1995 to support the Corps headquarters.11

While ARSST Team 2 was deployed in Panama, ARSST Team 3 was providing 

support in Korea during ULCHI FOCUS LENS 95. ARSST team members 

participated in the ULCHI FOCUS LENS planning process from February to July 

1995, to include deployment to a 1st Special Force Group CPX from 10 to 20 July 

1995. During ULCHI FOCUS LENS, the ARSST provided support to both the 

Eighth U.S. Army staff and the 1st Special Forces Group.12

The ARSST also supported U.S. Army operations in Europe. The ARSST 

supported the 1st Armored Division during a Warfighting Exercise (WFX) from 13 

to 19 November 1995. ARSST personnel developed imagery maps and 3-

dimensional fly-throughs of Macedonia for the 1st Armored Division. In addition, 

the ARSST supported V Corps during exercises MOUNTAIN SHIELD I and II.13

ARSST Team 1 supported BRIGHT STAR 95 in Egypt from 28 October to 15 

November 1995, deploying in support of the 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized).14 During this exercise, the ARSST also supported the FP TOC with 

MPRS.15

One of the heaviest consumers of ARSST products in 1995 was the special 

operations community. During 1995, every one of the active-duty Special Forces 

Groups received support from an ARSST. The 1st Special Forces Group received 

equipment support in January 1995 and exercise support during COBRA GOLD 

95, ULCHI FOCUS LENS 95, and an internal CPX. The 3rd Special Forces Group 

received INMARSAT training during a deployment to Tunisia. The 5th Special 

Forces Group was supported with imagery products during ROVING SANDS 95. 

The 7th Special Forces Group was loaned ARSST equipment from 18 February to 

25 March 1995. During JRTC Rotation 95-6, the 7th Special Forces Group was 

provided INMARSAT, imagery, and training support. Also, the ARSST provided 

imagery support to the 7th Special Forces Group during a border dispute between 

Peru and Ecuador. Finally, the ARSST supported the 10th Special Forces Group 

during a Command Post Exercise from 4 to 8 October 1995. ARSST Team 2 later 

deployed to support the 10th SFG during the WARRIOR FOCUS Army 

Warfighting Experiment (AWE) exercise conducted at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center.16
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 59

XVIII Airborne Corps Support 

The XVIII Airborne Corps was a particularly heavy consumer of ARSST space 

support products in 1995. Consequently, the Corps headquarters staff and 

USARSPACE grappled throughout the year with the issue of how the ARSST 

could best be organized to support XVIII Airborne Corps units. In addition, the 

Figure 7: Key ARSST Deployments, 1995. 

Support Quarter Exercise 

1st Quarter 1995 

2nd Quarter 1995 COBRA GOLD 95 

3rd Quarter 1995 

I Corps 

4th Quarter 1995 

1st Quarter 1995 

2nd Quarter 1995 

3rd Quarter 1995 

III Corps 

4th Quarter 1995 

1st Quarter 1995 

2nd Quarter 1995 

3rd Quarter 1995 

V Corps 

4th Quarter 1995 V CORPS WARFIGHTER 

1st Quarter 1995 

BIG DROP II 

2nd Quarter 1995 GIANT STEP XX 

3rd Quarter 1995 FUERTAS DEFENSAS 95 

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps 

4th Quarter 1995 BRIGHT STAR 95 

1st Quarter 1995 JRTC ROTATION 95-6 (7th SFG) 

COBRA GOLD CPX (1st SFG) 2nd Quarter 1995 ROVING SANDS 95 (5th SFG) 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 95 (Eighth 

Army and 1st

3 SFG) rd Quarter 1995 

DYNAMIC MIX (EUCOM) 

Echelons 

Above 

Corps/Other 

4th Quarter 1995 WARRIOR FOCUS AWE JRTC 

rotation (10th SFG) 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 60 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), which was also located at 

Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, reported a high level of demand for ARSST support. 

These demands led USARSPACE to consider the permanent assignment of space 

support personnel to Ft. Bragg. 

On 24 April 1995, Major Toupin and Mr. Evans of USARSPACE met with the 

XVIII Airborne Corps G-2 (Colonel Seiter) and Corps G-3 (Colonel Groening) to 

discuss ARSST support. During this meeting, both Colonel Seiter and Colonel 

Groening emphasized their desire that an ARSST team be forward-deployed with 

the Corps Headquarters. The officers emphasized that, “if the ARSST was not part 

of the day to day business of the Corps, they would not be included in the 

OPLANS or be of value to the Corps.” Colonel Seiter cited the deployment of 

USARSPACE personnel to support the Corps during Operation UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY, noting that they arrived “too late to help influence the decision 

making cycle. Also, the team was not integrated into the TPFDL or into any G 

staff section.”17 After this meeting, USARSPACE received a formal request from 

Brigadier General Akers (XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Staff) for permanent 

attachment of an ARSST to the Corps. General Akers argued that the rapid 

deployment of XVIII Airborne Corps units necessitated that an ARSST team be 

integrated into the Corps headquarters staff on a daily basis.18

In response to the XVIII Airborne Corps request, Colonel E. Paul Semmens 

(USARSPACE Commander) developed three options for support. Under the first 

option, an ARSST team would be assigned to provide support to XVIII Airborne 

Corps, but would remain at Colorado Springs. This option would enable 

USARSPACE to task-organize an ARSST team for support to the Corps and 

would allow the ARSST to prepare supporting imagery data using the faster 

computers available at Colorado Springs. “Disadvantages are that the ARSST 

chosen to support the contingency will be working behind the power curve. Also 

there would not be the habitual working relationship and trust that comes from 

daily face to face interaction.”19 The second option considered by Colonel 

Semmens was the attachment of an ARSST team to the Corps G-2 (Intelligence) 

Section. The advantage of this approach would be that the ARSST could interface 

on a day-to-day basis with both the Corps Headquarters and the U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command. On the other hand, this option would result in the “loss of 

immediate control of an ARSST to the commander of USARSPACE (FWD).”20 

The last option considered by Colonel Semmons was to increase the 

USARSPACE Liaison Officer contingent at Fort Bragg to two personnel, one of 

whom would support the Corps Headquarters while the other supported USASOC. 

This would provide increased visibility for USARSPACE and ensure that space 

support was integrated into the planning cycle. “The disadvantage of this option is 

that the ARSST is not responsive to contingency as it could be deployed on 

another mission when a contingency occurs. This situation could call for a long 

spin up time for the ARSST and thus decrease the value of XVIII Corps/USASOC 

use of enhanced warfighting capabilities.”21 Of the three options, Colonel 

Semmens was inclined to adopt the second. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 61

A second analysis of ARSST forward deployment options was conducted on 17 

July 1995 by Major(P) Armando R. Macias (ARSPACE Director of Operations). 

In this analysis, Major Macias included an assessment of the impacts of stationing 

an ARSST team at Ft. Bragg upon USARSPACE's capability for supporting other 

Army exercises and contingency missions. Major Macias began his analysis by 

identifying a series of issues stemming from the proposal to assign an ARSST 

team permanently at Ft. Bragg. First, the team would have to cope with the issue 

of keeping imagery files on-hand for its MPRS equipment. Second, it would be 

more difficult to train ARSST personnel and maintain ARSST equipment if the 

team was located at Ft. Bragg rather than at the home station in Colorado Springs. 

Finally, support relationships with XVIII Airborne Corps and USASOC would 

have to be delineated. After identifying these key factors, Major Macias outlined 

three options for supporting XVIII Airborne Corps. 

OPTION 1: Attach a four-man ARSST team to XVIII Airborne Corps 

Headquarters with a standard suite of ARSST equipment (1 satellite weather 

terminal, 1 MSIP 1 MPRS, 4 INMARSAT terminals). Major Macias notes that 

this approach would reduce the timeline for deployment of an ARSST during an 

actual contingency mission and would “allow involvement in all XVIII ABC 

activities.” However, training and maintenance support for the team would be 

degraded. Furthermore, since the ARSST only had a total of 2 MSIPs and 2 

weather receivers assigned at the time, this would leave “only one complete suite 

of equipment ... to support the rest of the Army for both exercises and 

contingencies.”22

OPTION 2: Attach a four-man ARSST team to the Corps Headquarters with a 

modified suite of equipment (1 MPRS, 2 INMARSAT terminals). Send additional 

ARSST equipment from Colorado Springs as required. Major Macias believed 

that this approach would yield the same advantages of Option 1 (reduced timelines 

for ARSST deployment and involvement in all ARSST activities) and would 

suffer from similar disadvantages (training and equipment maintenance 

difficulties). However, this option would not degrade the ability of the ARSST to 

provide support to the rest of the Army. 

OPTION 3: Attach an officer to XVIII Airborne Corps to perform daily 

coordination and planning. Personnel from USARSPACE would deploy from 

Colorado Springs on temporary duty to support the Corps and USASOC as 

needed. ARSST equipment forward-deployed at Ft. Bragg would include 1 MPRS 

and 2 INMARSAT terminals. Major Macias cited a number of advantages 

stemming from this option. First, it would allow daily coordination between the 

ARSST and the Corps Headquarters. Second, ARSST personnel could be trained 

to standard at their home station in Colorado Springs. Third, there would be less 

degradation of technical and maintenance support. Fourth, USARSPACE would 

have maximum flexibility in the deployment of ARSST personnel and equipment 

to support other Army exercises and contingencies. Major Macias cited no 

disadvantages stemming from the adoption of Option 3. Given existing ARSST 

equipment and personnel resource constraints, Major Macias recommended that 

the Command adopt the third option.23
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 62 

Figure 8: Options for ARSST forward deployment (COLONEL 

Semmens). 

Option Advantages Disadvantages 

Designate an ARSST 

team at Colorado 

Springs to support 

XVIII Airborne 

Corps. 

Task-organize the 

ARSST for specific 

missions. 

Utilize the better 

equipment at 

Colorado Springs. 

ARSST not 

integrated into 

planning at early 

stage. 

Lack of daily 

interaction with 

supported units. 

Attach an ARSST 

team to the Corps G2. 

Daily interface with 

Corps and USASOC 

staff. 

Difficult for 

USARSPACE to 

control and support 

the ARSST team. 

Increase the size of 

the usarspace liaison 

at ft. Bragg. 

Daily LNO 

coordination with the 

Corps and USASOC 

staffs. 

Space support 

integrated into 

planning cycle. 

ARSST team support 

not be available 

during early stages 

of contingency 

planning and 

execution. 

Lieutenant General Jay Garner, then serving as Commanding General, U.S. Army 

Space and Strategic Defense Command, intervened on 26 July 1995 and made the 

decision to assign an ARSST team to the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters at 

Ft. Bragg. Three reasons were cited for this decision. First, this would allow 

XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units to make routine use of ARSST 

equipment and capabilities. Second, a habitual relationship would be established 

between the ARSST team and the supported units, allowing the ARSST to be 

integrated into all facets of operational planning and deployment. Finally, the 

forward deployment of an ARSST team would be in accordance with the Army’s 

“train-as-you-fight” principle.24 

In accordance with Lieutenant General Garner’s guidance, Major Toupin was 

reassigned to Ft. Bragg on 1 August 1995 and directed to establish the forwarddeployed ARSST team. Major Toupin requested that his ARSST team be 

provided the following equipment: 2 MPRS/MSTS, 2 MSIP, 1 High Resolution 

Weather Satellite Receiver (HRWSR), and 2 INMARSAT terminals.25 Five days 

later, the XVIII Airborne Corps requested that all personnel assigned to the 

ARSST team at Ft. Bragg be airborne qualified.26 These decisions would be 

incorporated into a Memorandum of Agreement between the XVIII Airborne 

Corps, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and U.S. Army Space 

Command (Forward), which was signed in March 1996. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 63

Figure 9: Options for ARSST forward deployment (Major Armando 

Macias). 

Option Advantages Disadvantages 

Attach a four-man 

ARSST team to 

XVIII Airborne 

Corps 

Headquarters with 

a full suite of 

equipment. 

Reduced timeline for 

deployment. 

Would allow frequent 

interaction with the 

Corps staff. 

Training and maintenance 

difficulties. 

Would leave only one 

complete suite of equipmen

for rest of the Army. 

Attach a four-man 

ARSST team to the 

Corps with a 

modified suite of 

equipment. 

Reduced timeline for 

deployment. 

Would allow frequent 

interaction with the 

Corps staff. 

Training and maintenance 

difficulties. 

LNO stationed at 

Fort Bragg. Some 

ARSST equipment 

forward- deployed. 

Arsst personnel 

deploy as needed. 

Interaction with Corps 

and USASOC staff. 

Train ARSST at home 

station. 

Better equipment 

support. 

Maximum 

USARSPACE 

flexibility to support 

other Army exercises 

and contingencies. 

None identified. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 64 

1995 ARSST Lessons Learned 

By the end of 1995, the ARSST had participated in a number of exercises and 

deployments. During a review of ARSST operations conducted on 11 January 

1996, a number of key lessons learned were identified and discussed. First, the 

ARSST must be able to provide all types of space support, rather than simply 

operating specific items of space support equipment. The existing commercial 

space package (CSP) equipment was insufficient to meet all requirements in Army 

field units and headquarters. Second, the ARSST teams needed a limited selfsustainment capability. A number of supported units had reported that the 

requirement to provide sustainment support to ARSST personnel placed heavy 

demands and burdens on their own operations. Third, the ARSST must obtain the 

capability to receive large data files in remote locations. This would enable the 

teams to access space products and capabilities generated by U.S. Army Space 

Command and U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Fourth, the 

operational process for the warfighter to obtain space support must be streamlined. 

Fifth, the existing force structure was insufficient to provide space support to more 

than one major regional conflict (MRC). Six, ARSST support had been largely 

focused at the corps and division headquarter level. ARSST personnel desired to 

extend space information, capabilities, and products down to brigade commanders 

and staffs, where the demand for space support seemed to be quite high. 

The ARRST teams also reported that they had little ability to communicate and 

interface with the deployed space support teams from other Services. Related to 

this issue was a need for communications security (COMSEC) equipment that met 

military standards. ARSST personnel also reported problems with existing 

maintenance procedures. Much of the equipment employed by the ARSST 

consisted of commercial, off-the-shelf systems. The ARSST teams identified the 

need to streamline and tailor maintenance procedures to account for military 

requirements. Finally, the ARSST teams emphasized the need for additional 

training and experience to incorporate space capabilities into the tactical decisionmaking process of field units. This issue would require further experimentation, 

exercises, and development by the Army.27

The collection, analysis, discussion, and dissemination of these lessons learned 

during the first year marked an important step in the evolution of the ARSST. 

Major Jensen would use these lessons as the basis for his efforts to upgrade the 

Army Space Support Team capability in 1996. 

Arsst Operations and Evolution, 1996 

During 1996, the ARSST attempted to digest the lessons learned during the 

previous year and restructure its operations to provide enhanced support to 

warfighting units. Major Jensen urged that the ARSST be upgraded to support two 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 65

major regional conflicts, that new systems and technologies be provided to the 

ARSST, and that the ARSST focus on space advisory and liaison functions. 

Throughout the year, the ARSST would pursue a number of initiatives intended to 

achieve this vision. 

1996 Concept of Operations 

When 1996 began, the only change to the ARSST Concept of Operations was the 

alignment of the ARSST teams with the Combatant Commands. Under the 1995 

ARSST concept of operations, the teams were affiliated with USCENTCOM, 

USEUCOM, and USPACOM. In January 1996, USSPACECOM reported an 

extended ARSST team alignment structure, with one team affiliated with both 

USCENTCOM and U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), one team affiliated with 

both USEUCOM and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and the last 

team affiliated with USPACOM.28

The ARSST organizational structure would undergo further revisions over the 

course of the year. In March 1996, a Memorandum of Agreement between XVIII 

Airborne Corps, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and USARSPACE 

(Forward) was signed under which an ARSST team would be forwarded-deployed 

at Ft. Bragg. The ARSST was reorganized to reflect this change. As of July 1996, 

the ARSST was authorized a headquarters section (3 personnel), a USCENTCOM 

team (2 personnel), a USEUCOM team and a USPACOM team (both with 4 

personnel), and a XVIII Corps team (3 personnel).29 By 1997, the focus of ARSST 

support had changed again. Rather than aligning the ARSST teams with 

Combatant Commands, the teams were aligned with each of the four Corps 

headquarters (I Corps, III Corps, V Corps, and XVIII Airborne Corps). In 

addition, based upon the repeated requests for ARSST support made by the special 

operations community, a fifth ARSST team was activated specifically to support 

special operations units. 

ARSST Planning, January 1996 

On 11 January 1996, the ARSST Division conducted another formal review of 

operations and lessons learned in 1995, with the goal of providing enhanced 

support to warfighting units in the coming year. A number of concerns were 

expressed by ARSST team members at this review session. From an operational 

standpoint, ARSST team members noted that they did not have the personnel or 

equipment to provide simultaneous support for more than one major Army 

deployment. Current resource levels also precluded the ARSST from providing 

support at the maneuver brigade level, where it was felt that space information and 

products would significantly enhance operations. In addition, ARSST team 

members expressed concerns about the logistical and administrative burdens 

imposed upon a supported unit by a deploying ARSST team. Furthermore, it was 

noted that the ARSST teams had had little interface with other deployed space 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 66 

support teams during exercises in 1995. This was viewed as another area of 

weakness. 

From an equipment standpoint, concerns were expressed in a number of areas. 

Foremost was the perception that the ARSST teams were simply manning the four 

systems acquired as part of the Commercial Space Package. It was asserted that 

the “ARSST must be able to provide all types of space support – not just four 

pieces of equipment.” ARSST team members also noted the need for a 

communications capability that would allow them to acquire large data files in 

remote locations, access the full spectrum of USARSPACE (Forward) capabilities 

while deployed in the field, and interface with other space support elements 

operating in theater. Finally, concerns were expressed regarding the maintenance 

of equipment; ARSST team members saw a need for the streamlining of the 

support process.30

 More fundamental than the concerns about weak areas of ARSST organization 

and employment, however, were fears that the ARSST was not truly providing a 

value-added to the supported unit. For example, during one briefing on Army 

1996 CONOPS 1996 CONOPS 

HQ 1 ARSST Chief

1 Analyst

TM 1 TM 2 TM 3

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

1 ASPLO

2 NCOs

• New Affiliation: PACOM, CENTCOM-

 USACOM, and EUCOM-SOUTHCOM.

• Warfighting affiliation for enhanced

 planning, coordination, & support.

• One team arrives within 48 hours to 

 support warfighting CINC; other 

 teams may follow to reinforce.

• New Affiliation: PACOM, CENTCOM-

 USACOM, and EUCOM-SOUTHCOM.

• Warfighting affiliation for enhanced

 planning, coordination, & support.

• One team arrives within 48 hours to 

 support warfighting CINC; other 

 teams may follow to reinforce.

EUCOM EUCOM

PACOM PACOM CENTCOM CENTCOM

USACOM USACOM

SOUTHCOM SOUTHCOM

ARSST Team ARSST Team

Figure 10: The ARSST Concept of Operations, 1996. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 67

space support it was claimed: “The Army views our capabilities with interest but 

has not really wanted them in T[ask] F[orce] XXI or Bosnia and, as a result, 

doesn’t have the best that is currently available. That means ASEDP, demos, 

ARSST have limited success.”31

Given these identified areas of concern, Major Jensen proposed three major efforts 

to upgrade the ARSST. First, he recommended that the ARSST Division be 

provided with additional personnel, equipment, and resources. This would allow 

the ARSST to support two simultaneous major regional conflicts, which Major 

Jensen viewed as a DoD requirement he was currently unable to meet. The 

National Security Strategy of the United States called for DoD to maintain the 

capability to fight two MRCs at once. Major Jensen may also have been 

influenced by the USARSPACE experience in Haiti, where “Both 10th Mtn 

Division and XVIII Airborne Corps perceived that they were slighted by the Space 

Support Team structure, which was designed for one division, but was split across 

two Joint Task Forces. In October [1994], when forces were alerted for 

deployment to Kuwait, little space support equipment was on hand to augment 

divisions slated for movement at that time.”32

Second, Major Jensen recommended that an aggressive strategy of equipment 

acquisition and upgrades be pursued. This would include close coordination with 

the Army Space Exploitation and Demonstration Program process to ensure that 

new technologies and systems were fed to the ARSST teams, as well as continued 

upgrades to existing equipment to remain on the technological cutting-edge. Most 

importantly, Major Jensen foresaw a need for the ARSST to focus on space advice 

and analysis. He emphasized, “Instead of just operating systems ARSST must be 

able to support warfighter on all space systems and issues.”33

Central to Major Jensen’s concept for upgrading the ARSSTs was his view that the 

future role of the teams should be extended past that established in the existing 

ARSST concept of operations. Under Major Jensen’s vision of the future, the 

ARSSTs would provide multi-faceted space support to the Army, extending from 

operational support and space analysis to force development and education. On an 

operational level, the ARSSTs would continue to provide a rapidly deployable 

space support capability and would be responsible for helping supported units 

develop and execute operations plans. ARSST personnel and equipment would be 

available to augment Army units during exercises as needed. The ARSSTs would 

also serve as the space liaison to the supported unit, providing a “‘home’ for all 

steady state capabilities assigned to ARSPACE.” ARSSTs would support the 

entire Army, providing “direct space support liaison to selected Brigades, all 

Divisions and Corps.” The ARSST would also participate in Army force 

development efforts. As the Army restructured itself to take advantage of new 

technologies under the Louisiana Maneuvers process, the ARSSTs would “test and 

evaluate Force Development employment and organizational concepts.” 

Furthermore, the ARSST would play a leading role in the space education of the 

Army by providing technology demonstrations and equipment training. However, 

this role would be extended through a “‘Green Suit’ education program to 

TRADOC schools.”34
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 68 

Space Demonstration Program Planning, January 1996 

Major Jensen’s emphasis on acquiring new technologies and capabilities was 

shared by personnel involved with the ASEDP process. On 8 January 1996, 

ASEDP conducted the first in a series of reviews of the program. During the first 

meeting, the need for close cooperation between ARSST and the demonstration 

program was stressed. A three-pronged ARSST approach was envisioned, under 

which the “ARSST must be prepared to assist demo personnel train, deploy with 

limited assets when requested, [and] assist Division Commanders buy more 

capability quantity when that is possible.”35

On 12 January 1996, a second meeting on the ASEDP process was conducted. 

During this meeting, the need to provide new systems and capabilities to the 

ARSST was established as a key priority. One week later, a third ASEDP meeting 

was conducted. During this meeting, a series of impediments to the ASEDP 

process were discussed, to include problems in identifying exercise opportunities, 

a declining level of participation by both field units and industry, and management 

difficulties arising from the diffusion of ASEDP funding sources and approval 

authority.36

During the 19 January 1996 ASEDP meeting, participants also discussed a longrange vision for the future. The ASEDP vision consisted of five primary elements. 

First, ASEDP would demonstrate new technologies and identify systems for 

possible further development. Second, ASEDP would educate tactical 

commanders on the use of space-based assets. Third, ASEDP would be 

responsible for identifying and defining space system requirements for materiel 

development. Fourth, ASEDP would be involved in the design and development 

of future space systems. Finally, the ASEDP would provide a rapid prototyping 

capability to support Army contingency operations.37 Clearly, some overlap 

existed between the ASEDP and ARSST visions of their future roles and missions. 

Most important, however, was the fact that general agreement existed between the 

two programs on the need to supply the ARSST with the latest systems and 

technologies. ASEDP understood this requirement and continued to discuss 

possible solutions in 1996. 

ARSST Field Deployments, 1996 

The most significant ARSST deployment in 1996 was the deployment to Tuzla to 

support the 1st Infantry Division in Bosnia. This deployment marked the first time 

that an ARSST deployed in support of an actual contingency mission rather than a 

training exercise. 

The Bosnia deployment began in October 1996 with the deployment of an ARSST 

team led by Captain Cuthbertson. The team traveled to Vicenza, Italy where an 

Air Force Space Support Team was supporting air operations in the region.38 Here, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 69

the ARSST team received software upgrades for some of its equipment and trained 

its personnel on the new capabilities. The ARSST team then deployed to Tuzla on 

22 October 1996 and began testing its equipment.39 

After deployment in-theater, the ARSST provided imagery, weather and Mission 

Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS) support to the 1st Infantry Division, with 

primary focus on the 11th Aviation Regiment. Hardware and software difficulties 

were experienced with the Space Support Platform and High Resolution Weather 

Satellite Receiver (HRSWR), detracting from the level of support the ARSST was 

able to provide. The ARSST continued to work those issues, while 

“experimenting with imagery merge combinations of Landsat TM, SPOT, 

IFSARE, and national imagery in order to provide new products which may be of 

higher value to the Division.” The ARSST also provided training to 1st Infantry 

Division soldiers on weather systems and the Mission Planning Rehearsal System 

(which was retained in theater).40 On 8 December 1996, the ARSST was 

redeployed to Colorado Springs, with a mission to provide continued support to 

the 1st Infantry Division and OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR as required. 

A number of key lessons were learned during the deployment to Bosnia. First, 

when the ARSST concept of operations was developed in 1995, it had been 

assumed that deployment taskings would originate from HQDA. During the 

Bosnia deployment, the tasking order was issued instead by the Joint Staff. Due to 

confusion regarding tasking responsibility during an actual contingency mission, 

Captain Cuthbertson did not receive the tasking order until after he had been 

deployed in Bosnia for approximately 30 days.41 

Captain Cuthbertson also found during the Bosnia deployment that the ability of 

his team to provide support 

to the 1st Infantry Division 

was hindered by a lack of 

involvement in the predeployment phase. Captain 

Cuthbertson would later 

observe: “I took a mission 

planning system to an 

Apache battalion in Bosnia. 

Unfortunately, by the time 

we got there they already 

knew the terrain and they 

were in a stagnant situation, 

so they were happy to have 

it, but it could have been 

more effective in predeployment than after 

deployment.”42 

During the Bosnia 

deployment, the Air Force 

Staff Weather Officer made 

Lessons Learned — the ARSST deployment to 

Bosnia. 

• Tasking for the deployment originated with the 

Joint Staff rather than HQDA. 

• The ability of an ARSST to support field units 

successfully is largely contingent upon the level 

of preplanning conducted. 

• The HRWSR was not used to support operations 

due to an Air Force decision not to cooperate 

with the deployed ARSST. 

• INMARSATs were widely used in Bosnia, 

compensating for the rudimentary 

communications infrastructure in-theater. 

• Repeated technical problems with the Space 

Support Platform were experienced. The 

ARSST team was never able to overcome all of 

these problems while deployed. 

• Captain Cuthbertson returned from Bosnia 

convinced that a self-sustainment capability 

needed to be developed for the ARSST teams. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 70 

no use of the High 

Resolution Weather 

Satellite Receiver brought 

by the ARSST. In the view 

of ARSST personnel 

deployed to Bosnia, that 

decision was the result of 

Air Force objections to the 

Army’s involvement in 

weather support, which had 

traditionally been an Air 

Force mission.43 Because 

the ARSSTs did not have 

the capability to analyze 

meteorological data on 

their own, the HRWSR was of little use in Bosnia. The lack of USARSPACE 

support to the ARSST team was cited as another area of concern by soldiers 

deployed to support the Bosnia mission.44

Repeated technical difficulties were experienced by the Space Support Platform. 

The ARSST team was never able to fix all of these problems while deployed in 

theater. On the other hand, the INMARSAT terminals that the ARSST team 

brought to Bosnia were widely used. Given the rudimentary communications 

infrastructure in Bosnia, field units took advantage of INMARSAT to fulfill a 

number of communications requirements.45

In addition to the deployment to Bosnia, ARSST teams supported a broad range of 

Army exercises in 1996. Perhaps the most significant exercise supported was 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96. ULCHI FOCUS LENS is an annual, theater-wide 

command post exercise that simulates a North Korean People’s Army offensive 

into South Korea. The Combined Forces Command in Korea uses ULCHI 

FOCUS LENS as its keystone exercise, enabling commanders and staffs to 

conduct warfighting training and exercise their operations plans. ARSST support 

to ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96 was significant for two reasons. First, ULCHI 

FOCUS LENS simulates combat in the Korean peninsula, where the Army faced 

an immediate and real-world threat from an enemy force designed and equipped to 

fight a full-scale conventional war. Few other exercises provided the ARSST with 

a more significant opportunity to demonstrate the value of space in fighting and 

winning a major war. Second, high-level emphasis was placed on supporting the 

annual ULCHI FOCUS LENS exercises by USARSPACE. The Command 

typically made ULCHI FOCUS LENS one of its highest priorities and 

experimented with new techniques for providing space support during these 

exercises. 

For ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96, ARSST Team 1 deployed on 6 August 1996 in 

support of the CJTF Korea staff and the Force Projection Tactical Operations 

Center. Major Cimino and Staff Sergeant Smith were integrated into the 

Combined Terrain Analyst Team (CTAT), which supported planning by the Future 

Lessons Learned – ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96. 

• ARSST support helped lead to a reexamination of 

OPLAN 5027 timelines. 

• The requirement for the ARSST team chief to man 

equipment interfered with his ability to perform 

the space liaison function. 

• A requirement to provide personnel to support the 

FP TOC was seen as interfering with ARSST 

operations. 

• The ARSST experienced difficulty in arranging 

demonstrations of its capabilities to the 2nd

Infantry Division, 17th Aviation Brigade, and 6th

Cavalry. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 71

Plans Cell and the Future Operations/Deep Operations Coordination Cell. In the 

meantime, Staff Sergeant Finley was assigned initially to conduct training with 

soldiers from the 33rd Engineer Detachment. When the exercise began, Staff 

Sergeant Finley redeployed to support the FP TOC. 

After the exercise, a number of lessons learned were reported by the ARSST team. 

The most significant event of the ARSST deployment occurred when the team’s 

mission planning work prompted a review of OPLAN 5027. Major Cimino later 

reported: 

“We were able to complete approximately 8 routes that covered almost all 

of the identified avenues of approach for the NKPA invasion of South 

Korea. We also worked on two routes that were to be used as a part of 

OPLAN 5027. This work and some work by the 33rd ENG DET (TOPO) 

helped the planner identify [that] the timeline in 5027 was somewhat 

‘optimistic’ and caused them to relook the OPLAN. When we left, they 

were planning to change OPLAN 5027.”46 

Major Cimino believed that his ability to perform space liaison duties was 

impaired by a lack of personnel and resources deployed during ULCHI FOCUS 

LENS, coupled with the requirement to provide support to the FP TOC. Major 

Cimino stated: 

“I spent 11 hours of my twelve hour shift in front of the computer trying 

to complete a project I knew would be briefed to the CINC and his staff. 

There was no time for me to coordinate issues with the staff, the rear 

(ARSPACE) or the JSSTs. I had to make the decision between one or the 

other.” Major Cimino added: “If we are to truly support the warfighter, 

we need to get more personnel assigned to ARSST/ASEDP and quit 

pulling operators from ARSST/ASEDP to support the TOC.”47

Major Cimino also cited problems in getting field units interested in obtaining 

ARSST support. During ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96, the 33rd Engineer Detachment 

(TOPO) had been receptive to receiving ARSST support. However, Major Cimino 

noted that the 2nd Infantry Division had “a Powerscene system from Loral at their 

location ... and probably won’t request our support”; the 17th Aviation Brigade 

had “only a handful of staff members” who had been exposed to ARSST systems; 

and the 6th Cavalry Brigade refused even to send a representative to receive 

ARSST training. Major Cimino concluded that a major space education effort 

needed to be conducted in the Korean theater of operations.48

In addition to the support provided by the ARSST during the Army’s deployment 

in Bosnia and the ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96 exercise, teams continued to deploy 

in support of Corps, Division, and Special Forces Group training throughout the 

year. ARSST teams were integrated into warfighter exercises conducted by the 1st

Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 10th Mountain 

Division (Light), and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). A team also 

supported the Corps-level warfighter exercise conducted by the XVIII Airborne 

Corps Headquarters. Significant levels of ARSST support were provided 

throughout the year to each of the four Corps Headquarters and their subordinate 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 72 

units. The ARSST also supported exercises conducted by elements of the 1st, 5th, 

and 7th Special Forces Groups, experimenting with new techniques to support 

airborne and ground insertion, long range reconnaissance, and direct action 

missions. 

ARSST Forward Deployment At Ft. Bragg 

On 5 March 1996, the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between XVIII 

Airborne Corps, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and USARSPACE 

(Forward) was signed. This MOA formalized lines of coordination for the ARSST 

team stationed at Ft. Bragg, established administrative and resource support 

requirements for the team, and outlined procedures for the team’s operational 

deployment.49

Mission. The stated mission of the forward-deployed team was to “Provide 

general support of space based products to Fort Bragg assigned units.” 50

Command and Control. Lines of coordination were established between the 

XVIII Airborne Corps G-2, USASOC Chief of Staff, USARSPACE (Forward) 

Commander, and 319th Military Intelligence Battalion Commander. Tasking 

authority remained a formal responsibility of HQDA. The MOA also established 

“in the event that both XVIII Airborne Corps and/or USASOC have need for the 

ARSST in a contingency situation, either or both headquarters must send their 

request to Headquarters Department of the Army, DCSOPS-ODO. HQDA will set 

the priority and inform all of the units involved of their decision.”51

Personnel and Training. Under the MOA the Commander of USARSPACE 

(Forward) remained responsible for assigning ARSST personnel for duty at Ft. 

Bragg. USARSPACE (Forward) committed to maintaining at least 3 soldiers at 

Ft. Bragg, unless total ARSST strength dropped below 80%. The rotation of 

ARSST personnel at Ft. Bragg was left to the discretion of the USARSPACE 

(Forward) Commander, but a tour stabilization objective of 24 months was set. 

Personnel evaluation would remain a USARSPACE (Forward) responsibility, as 

would training on space systems and space- based support. To meet Army-wide 

training requirements, ARSST personnel would participate in training programs 

scheduled by the 319th MI Battalion. USARSPACE (Forward) would ensure that 

ARSST personnel had attended requisite schools, such as the Primary Leadership 

Development Course and Airborne School. 

Operations. The 319th MI Battalion was assigned responsibility for integrating 

the ARSST Team into XVIII Airborne Corps operations plans and deployments. 

This responsibility extended to Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) and 

air flow planning, airborne support, and other deployment planning considerations. 

For USASOC deployments, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations was assigned 

responsibility for handling these functions on behalf of the ARSST team. 

Administrative Requirements and Support. USASOC was given responsibility 

for providing office space, classified materials storage, telephone communications 

support, and medical/dental support to the ARSST team. The 319th MI Battalion 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 73

was assigned responsibility for providing barracks space to the ARSST. Other 

administrative requirements would be satisfied by USARSPACE (Forward), such 

as personnel evaluations, promotions, awards, finance, unit status reporting, 

command inspections, and assignment of additional duties.52

 July-August 1996: ARSST Division Long Range Planning 

On 12 July 1996 ARSST operations were assessed again as part of the 

USARSPACE Program Management Review. During this review, seven key 

issues of concern were identified by the ARSST Division. First, the ARSST 

Division again emphasized the need to expand beyond the four systems acquired 

as part of the Commercial Space Package. Instead of merely manning equipment, 

the ARSST teams “must be brokers for space force enhancement.” Second, the 

ARSSTs needed a better mechanism for coordination with other space support 

elements. The ARSST should have the capability to communicate with the Joint 

Space Support Team, the Air Force Space Support Team, and the Naval Space 

Support Team. Third, the proper balance between ARSST operational support, 

exercises, and demonstration support needed to be reached. Fourth, the ARSST 

might need to expand the levels and types of units supported. Fifth, there were 

some concerns about the ability of the ARSST to deploy on a contingency mission. 

Sixth, the ARSST Division saw a pressing need for integration into the 

contingency plans of supported units. Finally, the ARSST Division expressed 

some concern about Force Projection Tactical Operations Center operations, the 

relationship between the FP TOC and the ARSST, and the impact of the need to 

man the FP TOC upon the ability of the ARSST to accomplish its mission.53

Many of the issues identified during the July 1996 Program Management Review 

reflected concerns identified by Major Jensen in January. The ARSST continued 

to grapple with the need to expand its role beyond that of manning the CSP 

systems. The question of which types and levels of units the ARSST should 

support remained unanswered. Coordination with other space support 

organizations was still an area of weakness. Concerns lingered regarding ARSST 

deployment and sustainment capabilities. 

Looking into the future, a continued role for the ARSST was anticipated. “The 

Army probably intends to keep space support teams well into the next century with 

minimal deviation from their current mission and OPTEMPO. The Army will 

continue to routinize space-based technologies, however, the SSTs [space support 

teams] will continue to serve as an operational exploitation/demonstration platform 

introducing and supporting the warfighter with new technology.”54 Given this long 

range forecast, the ARSST Division saw a need to meet five interrelated 

objectives. First, the ARSST should be engaged in the planning and execution of 

major Corps-level exercises and contingency missions. Second, the ARSST teams 

should educate Corps staffs on Army space-based force enhancement capabilities. 

Third, the ARSST teams should be incorporated into the TPFDD listings for 

imporant Corps missions. Fourth, the ARSST should be integrated into the Corps 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 74 

battle staff. Finally, the ARSSTs should “integrate current and future ARSPACE 

space force enhancement capabilities at Corps level and below.”55

Figure 11: Key ARSST Deployments, 1996. 

Support Quarter Exercise 

CASCADE PEAK 1st Quarter 1996 FOAL EAGLE (1st SFG) 

2nd Quarter 1996 PACOM EXERCISE 

COBRA GOLD 3rd Quarter 1996 COBRA GOLD (1st SFG) 

I Corps 

4th Quarter 1996 ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

PHANTOM SABER 

1st Quarter 1996 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

2nd Quarter 1996 UNIFIED ENDEAVOR (Phase 

1 and 2) 

3rd Quarter 1996 UNIFIED ENDEAVOR (Phase 

3 and 4) 

III Corps 

4th Quarter 1996 ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

VIGILANT LION (SETAF) 

1st Quarter 1996 COMBINED CRUSADE (1st 

Infantry Division) 

2nd Quarter 1996 1st INFANTRY DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

3rd Quarter 1996 

OPERATION JOINT 

ENDEAVOR 

V Corps 

4th Quarter 1996 

MOUNTAIN EAGLE 

10th MOUNTAIN DIVISION 

1 WARFIGHTER st Quarter 1996 

JRTC – 7th SFG 

3rd INFANTRY DIVSION 

2 WARFIGHTER nd Quarter 1996 

JRTC – 7th SFG 

CORPS WARFIGHTER 3rd Quarter 1996 NTC – 5th SFG 

UNITED ENDEAVOR 

10th MOUNTAIN DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps 

4th Quarter 1996 

JRTC – 7th SFG 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 75

 Three key measures of success were established to gauge ARSST progress 

towards accomplishing these objectives. The first measure of success would be 

whether or not ARSSTs participated in the planning and execution of major Corps 

exercises/contingencies. The second measure of success was whether or not the 

ARSST teams were included in the Time Phased Force Deployment Lists 

established for major contingency operations. The third measure of success was 

whether the ARSSTs became the recognized space experts by the Corps 

headquarters in the field.56 

ARSST concerns about joint interoperability and the integration of Army space 

support capabilities with those of USSPACECOM and the other Services were 

reiterated by Major Wayne Brainerd (new ARSST Division Chief) on 29 July 

1996. In response to a Joint Staff inquiry, Major Brainerd wrote: “There is really 

no relationship between ARSSTs and the other SSTs, including the JSSTs. In past 

operations the teams normally worked independent of each other, however, in the 

future we would like to coordinate our operations with the other deployed teams to 

maximize the overall 

support we provide to the 

theater.”57 Major Brainerd 

also noted, “ARSSTs have 

provided support to units 

deployed for DESERT 

STORM, PROVIDE 

COMFORT, Zaire NEO, 

hurricane relief (Iniki and 

Andrew), Somalia, 

Bosnia, Macedonia, 

Rwanda, and Haiti. 

ARSSTs are deployed 

approximately 140 days a 

year supporting unit 

training exercises.”58

Technically, many of the operations cited by Major Brainerd in his response had 

actually been supported by ad hoc teams dispatched by the Army Space Institute 

or USARSPACE, rather than a deployable ARSST team named as such. The 

significant element of the memorandum, however, was Major Brainerd’s reference 

to an ARSST average of 140 deployment days per year. This reference marks the 

first time in the historical documentation that this 140-day figure was cited by the 

ARSST. The idea that the ARSSTs were deploying for 140 days per year would 

drive a number of subsequent decisions made by USARSPACE. 

During the planning process for ARSST FY97 operations, the ARSST Division 

noted that the USARSPACE Chief of Staff had issued guidance that ARSST 

personnel should not deploy for more than 140 days per soldier. Given the 

planned schedule of ARSST support in FY97, which included plans to support 

twelve Corps exercises, five Division exercises, 2 Army Major Command 

(MACOM) missions, and 8 other deployments, ARSST personnel would average 

July 1996 USARSPACE Program Management Review: 

ARSST Objectives. 

• Participate in the planning and execution of major 

Corps exercises/contingencies. 

• Educate the Corps staffs on current and future 

ARSPACE space force enhancement programs. 

• Insert teams into selected Corps TPFDDs. 

• Establish the ARSST as a member of the Corps 

battle staff. 

• Integrate current and future ARSPACE space force 

enhancement capabilities at Corps level and below. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 76 

201 days on deployment per soldier. The ARSST Division emphasized that the 

taskings to support the FP TOC would impose additional burdens on ARSST 

personnel.59

To address this problem, the ARSST Division presented four options. First, the 

ARSST could provide equipment training to operators in supported units, 

eliminating the need to deploy a full ARSST team to the field. Second, the 

ARSST could deploy smaller teams when it deployed to the field, resulting in a 

reduced level of support during each mission. Third, the ARSST could reduce the 

number of Army exercises and deployments it would support, allowing a full team 

to support a smaller total number of missions. Finally, a new Table of Distribution 

and Allowances could be developed to ensure that the ARSST was capable of 

properly providing the full range of space support to all Army units in need. The 

ARSST Division recommended that the fourth option be adopted, with the TDA 

being expanded to activate five teams, each composed of five personnel.60

A number of other topics were discussed as the ARSST began planning to support 

FY97 operations. The ARSST examined a series of changes in the TDA that 

would give the teams a limited self-sustainment capability. Under one proposal, 

the ARSST would be provided 5 modular command posts, 2 shelters, 2 M1097 

trucks, and 4 cargo trailers. This equipment would provide “a mobile, hard-sided, 

environmentally controlled, self-powered facility to support one team and hook 

into supported unit TOCs.”61 The ARSST also stressed the need for a closer 

relationship with the ASEDP program. Five specific ASEDP items were requested 

by the ARSST: the Laptop Visualization Device (LVD), Direct PC, Blue Force 

Tracking devices, Low Earth Orbit Communications (LEOCOMM), and Global 

Broadcast System (GBS). The ARSST also recommended that classified ("black") 

and unclassified civilian and commercial ("white") space capabilities be integrated 

in the future.62 Each of these issues would be revisited in 1997. 

Changes to the ARSST TDA, July 1996 

The activation of an ARSST team at Ft. Bragg, coupled with the heavy 

deployment schedule imposed upon ARSST personnel, prompted USARSPACE to 

revamp its Table of Distributions and Allowances in July 1996. The previous 

TDA, effective on 30 May 1995, had established a total ARSST requirement for 

11 personnel and had authorized 11 personnel.63 The new TDA, effective as of 26 

July 1996, established a total ARSST requirement for 27 personnel and included 

an authorization for 16.64 The primary reason for this change was the activation of 

a new ARSST team designed to suppport XVIII Airborne Corps, raising the total 

number of ARSST teams from three to four. 

No changes were made in the ARSST headquarters element, under which three 

personnel were both required and authorized under the two versions of the TDA. 

However, the strength and organization of each of the ARSST teams was modified 

under the July 1996 TDA update. The USCENTCOM support team’s required 

personnel level was increased from three to four soldiers under the July 1996 

TDA, but the authorized level for the team actually declined from three to two 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 77

slots. The USEUCOM team, which had both a requirement and an authorization 

for two personnel in May 1995, was increased to a required strength of eight and 

an authorized strength of four in July 1996. For the USPACOM team, three 

personnel had been required and authorized; this number was similarly increased 

to eight required and four authorized personnel under the new TDA. Although 

these changes in the ARSST TDA were significant, the change of the greatest 

significance under the July 1996 TDA was the activation of thee XVIII Airborne 

Corps support team, with a required strength of four and an authorized strength of 

three personnel. The assignment of personnel to the XVIII Airborne Corps 

support team represented a key step in developing a forward deployed capability at 

Ft. Bragg and paved the way for a reorganization of the way all ARSST teams 

were aligned with warfighting headquarters. In the future, each of the ARSSTs 

would be directly aligned with a Corps headquarters, rather than a Combatant 

Command. 

1996 ARSST Lessons Learned 

For 1996, no records exist of a formal year-end review of operations and lessons 

learned, as was conducted after 1995. Few after-action reports from the 1996 

timeframe are available. As a result, most of the lessons learned cited below were 

gathered from oral history interviews conducted in October and November 1998. 

First, the ARSST soldiers learned that the mechanism for deploying an ARSST 

team under the CONOPS was unrealistic. For example, during the deployment to 

Bosnia it was discovered that the Joint Staff was actually responsible for ARSST 

taskings. The ARSST needed to 

develop a systematic mechanism 

for integration into a 

contingency operation, to 

include the integration of the 

ARSST teams into the TPFDDs 

of supported units. Second, 

ARSST operations in 1996 

confirmed the earlier 1995 

finding that the teams must have 

a limited self-sustainment 

capability. Third, the ARSST 

teams identified a number of 

lessons involving space support 

equipment. For example, in 

Bosnia the INMARSAT had 

fulfilled an important role due to 

the rudimentary communications 

infrastructure. However, 

technical problems had a major 

impact upon the level of 

Element REQ AUTH 

ARSST HQ 

Section 

No 

change 

No 

change 

CENTCOM Team +1 -1 

EUCOM Team +6 +2 

PACOM Team +5 +1 

XVIII Airborne 

Corps Team +4 +3 

TOTAL +16 +5 

Figure 12: Revisions to the ARSST TDA, 

May 1995 to July 1996. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 78 

HRWSR and SSP support provided in Bosnia. The ARSST remained unable to 

provide interpretative analysis of HRWSR products. During the Bosnia 

deployment, the Air Force Staff Weather Officer did not employ the HRWSR. In 

addition, ARSST communication and interface with other deployed support teams 

remained weak. 

The ARSST experience in 1996 highlighted the importance of preplanning of 

space support prior to a field deployment was necessary if greatest use was to be 

made of ARSST capabilities. If such advance planning was accomplished, the 

ARSST could have a major impact upon Army capabilities, even in times of peace. 

A good example of this was provided during ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96, during 

which ARSST support prompted a reexamination of OPLAN 5027 timelines. 

While the ARSST continued to focus upon supporting Corps Headquarters in 

1996, increasing emphasis was placed on providing space support to Divisions, 

Brigades, and Special Forces Groups. This represented a significant expansion of 

ARSST support. 

ARSST soldiers concluded that attempts to balance operational support to field 

units with demonstrations and training would fail in the absence of concerted 

USARSPACE emphasis. Some field units did not view ARSST capabilities as 

value-added and would not send representatives to ARSST training and 

demonstration sessions. Furthermore, ARSST team members, rightly or wrongly, 

viewed requirements to support the FP TOC, and the strong emphasis placed upon 

the FP TOC within USARSPACE, as having a major impact on team operations. 

Of great importance was the high number of annual deployment days for the 

ARSST teams (estimated at 140 days per year). By 1996, this level of operational 

deployment was having a significant impact on the ability of the ARSST to 

support units in the field. 

Throughout 1996, the ARSST teams continued to refine the tactics, techniques, 

and procedures used to provide space support to field units. Lessons learned 

during ARSST field exercises and operational deployments would be used as the 

basis for a number of ARSST reorganization initiatives in 1997. 

Arsst Operations and Evolution, 1997 

ARSST operations in 1997 were conducted under a new organizational construct, 

with five teams prepared to support each of the four Army Corps Headquarters and 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The ARSST continued to explore ways 

to improve the level of space support, however, to include the forward deployment 

of ARSST teams and liaison personnel, the rotational deployment of teams, and 

the establishment of a self-sustainment capability. Additionally, USARSPACE 

experimented with the new Army Space Support Cell concept 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 79

1997 Concept of Operations 

A series of changes were made to the ARSST organizational structure and concept 

of operations over the course of 1996. The ARSST Division had been restructured 

so that one ARSST team was aligned with each of the Army’s four Corps 

headquarters. To ensure that the ARSST teams could provide the full spectrum of 

space support, a revised Table of Distribution and Allowances had been developed 

in July 1996. The forward deployment of an ARSST team at Ft. Bragg had been 

formalized and ARSST personnel were incorporated into the planning cycles of 

both the XVIII Airborne Corps and USASOC headquarters. In addition, in 

response to the heavy demands for ARSST space support made by the special 

operations community, a fifth ARSST team was organized specifically to support 

USASOC and its subordinate units. 

ARSST Field Deployments, 1997 

The ARSST maintained a busy schedule of field deployments in 1997. Teams 

deployed to support each of the five Army Corps Headquarters repeatedly. In 

1997 CONOPS 1997 CONOPS 

HQ 1 ARSST Chief

1 NCOIC

TM 1 TM 2 TM 3

III Corps

Tm Chief

1 NCO

V Corps

Tm Chief 

1 NCO

I Corps

Tm Chief

1 NCO

• Expanded number of teams.

• Teams affiliated with each Army

 corps headquarters (XVIII Airbone

 Corps team is forward-deployed).

• New team to support special ops.

• Teams prepared to deploy within

 48 hours.

• Expanded number of teams.

• Teams affiliated with each Army

 corps headquarters (XVIII Airbone

 Corps team is forward-deployed).

• New team to support special ops.

• Teams prepared to deploy within

 48 hours.

TM 4

XVIII ABC

Tm Chief

1 NCO

TM 5

Sp Ops

Tm Chief

ARSST Team ARSST Team

V Corps V Corps

XVIII ABC XVIII ABC

I Corps I Corps

III Corps III Corps

U.S. Army 

Special

Operations

Command

U.S. Army 

Special

Operations

Command

Figure 13: The ARSST Concept of Operations, 1997 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 80 

addition, a significant level of support was provided to the special operations 

community, with ARSST teams deploying in support of a number of field 

exercises. 

The first major exercise supported by the ARSST in 1997 was YAMA SAKURA 

97. This exercise is conducted annually by the U.S. Army Japan and the Japan 

Self-Defense Force (JSDF) as a test of their ability to fight together. Captain 

Gerry Skaw and ARSST Team 1 deployed to YAMA SAKURA 97 to provide 

continuous support to I Corps. The team provided imagery, satellite weather, and 

mission planning support to the Corps staff throughout the exercise. In addition, 

the team provided demonstrations of space system capabilities to a number of U.S. 

flag officers, including Lieutenant General Crocker (I Corps) and Major General 

Hicks (US Army Japan). Demonstrations of ARSST capabilities were also 

provided to senior officers of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force, including 

Chief of Staff General Watanabe and Major General Tomooka (9th Japanese 

Division). The ARSST redeployed to Colorado Springs on 2 February 1997. 

ARSST Team 1 learned a number of valuable lessons during YAMA SAKURA 

97. First, advanced planning by the team prior to the exercise paid tremendous 

dividends after the ARSST deployed. Captain Skaw later reported: “A majority of 

the planning, for this exercise, had been completed prior to STARTEX. As a 

result, Team 1 was able to push high quality and timely imagery products into the 

nightly Deep Attack decision briefings.”65 Second, the ARSST team’s ability to 

provide satellite weather products “became very important due to severe weather 

encountered during the exercise.”66 Captain Skaw noted that the Staff Weather 

Officer assigned to I Corps subsequently recommended that real weather be 

incorporated into future exercises as a result of his experience with the ARSST. 

Third, Captain Skaw observed that his team had established its credibility with the 

Corps Commander and Corps staff during YAMA SAKURA 97. He 

recommended that the ARSST team next take steps to fully integrate itself into I 

Corps staff operations. Finally, Captain Skaw recommended that a non-deployed 

space support system be set up at the ARSST home station “to allow all ARSST 

personnel to train on updated current and future systems, while the deployable 

systems are recovered, upgraded, and prepared for deployment.”67

Another key exercise supported by Captain Skaw and the personnel of ARSST 

Team 1 was the 25th Infantry Division Warfighter. This exercise was significant 

because the ARSST was able to tie their Space Support Platform into the 

supported unit’s Local Area Network (LAN). This permitted the ARSST to 

upload imagery files onto the network directly, allowing personnel to select and 

use relevant imagery to plan operations.68

As in 1996, the ARSST provided support to two high-priority Army efforts in 

1997: the deployment of troops to Bosnia and the annual ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

exercise in Korea. For the Bosnia deployment, the ARSST provided predeployment training and preparation. For example, ARSST Team 2 traveled to Ft. 

Bragg to conduct training with the 229th Aviation Regiment (Attack) on the 

Mission Planning Rehearsal System. While supporting Bosnia operations in 1996, 

the ARSST had learned that support should be provided to an aviation unit prior to 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 81

its deployment in a theater of operations, when it would be forced to learn the 

terrain through flight experience. In April 1997, the 229th Aviation began 

deploying to Bosnia as part of Operation JOINT GUARD.69 The ARSST also 

provided direct support to U.S. elements operating in Bosnia, deploying ARSST 

Team 2 to Bosnia on 12 May 1997.70

For ULCHI FOCUS LENS 97, the ARSST deployed a four-man team, consisting 

of Major Caesar Jaime, Captain Gerry Skaw, Staff Sergeant Brad Bricker, and 

Sergeant First Class Howard Smith. During the exercise, Captain Skaw integrated 

ARSST Team 1 into the Eighth U.S. Army Deep Operation Coordination Cell 

while Major Jaime (ARSST Team 5) supported the 3rd Marine Air Wing. A 

variety of ARSST imagery, weather, and space information products were 

provided to U.S. units during the exercise, including the Eighth Army G-2 and G-3 

sections, the U.S. Forces Korea Chief of Staff, the 6th Cavalry Brigade, and the 3rd

Marine Air Wing.71

After ULCHI FOCUS LENS 97 concluded, the ARSST team members made a 

series of recommendations for enhancing ARSST support. Captain Skaw and 

Major Jaime emphasized that warfighting units were requesting imagery with a 

resolution of 5 meters (or better) that could be downloaded in real-time. This 

capability was needed for intelligence preparation of the battlefield, operational 

planning, and battle damage assessment. 

The two officers recommended that USARSPACE continue to track the Eagle 

Vision II and the Lewis and Clark initiatives. They further recommended that the 

Multi-Source Tactical System (MSTS) be further integrated into the ARSST teams 

and that the ARSST should develop closer ties with the USARSPACE Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). As part of this relationship, the 

DCSINT should take the lead in helping the ARSST teams acquire national 

imagery products. Furthermore, a systematic process should be developed for 

acquiring national imagery for both actual contingency operations and for exercise 

play.72

Another critical warfighting need identified during ULCHI FOCUS LENS 97 was 

the integration of ARSST systems and products into the supported unit’s command 

and control network. In addition, the ARSST team emphasized that they needed a 

secure internet connection to communicate with USARSPACE and other space 

support organizations. Major Jaime and Captain Skaw noted a continued 

requirement for ARSST involvement in exercise planning. Other key issues that 

needed to be addressed by the ARSST included inclusion in the Time Phased 

Force Deployment List, communications planning, and space support education.73
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 82 

Figure 14: Key ARSST Deployments, 1997 

Support Quarter Exercise 

1st Quarter 1997 YAMA SAKURA 

2nd Quarter 1997 

3rd Quarter 1997 ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

I Corps 

4th Quarter 1997 25th INFANTRY DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

1st Quarter 1997 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

UNITED ENDEAVOR 97-2 2nd Quarter 1997 DIVISION XXI, SIMEX I 

3rd Quarter 1997 ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

III Corps 

4th Quarter 1997 

COMBINEDCRUSADE 

1 JOINT ENDEAVOR st Quarter 1997 

1st INFANTRY DIVISION CPX 

VIGILANT LION 

2 JOINT ENDEAVOR nd Quarter 1997 

ATLANTIC RESOLVE 

1st INFANTRY DIVISION 

3 WARFIGHTER rd Quarter 1997 

CENTRAL GUARDIAN 

V Corps 

4th Quarter 1997 

3rd INFANTRY DIVISION 

1 WARFIGHTER st Quarter 1997 

229th AVIATION REGIMENT 

2nd Quarter 1997 

3rd Quarter 1997 

82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps 

4th Quarter 1997 

CORPS TOCEX 

1st Quarter 1997 5th SFG TF XXI (NTC Rotation 

97-06) 

2nd Quarter 1997 1st SFG JRTC (Rotation 97-05) 

3rd Quarter 1997 7th SFG JRTC (Rotation 97-10) 

Echelons 

Above 

Corps/Other 

4th Quarter 1997 FOAL EAGLE 97 (1st SFG) 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 83

ARSST Recommendations – ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

97 After Action Review. 

• Warfighters have a critical need for imagery with 

5 meter resolution that can be downloaded in realtime or near real-time. 

• The MSTS should be further integrated into the 

ARSST teams. 

• Closer ties should be developed between the 

ARSST and the USARSPACE DCSINT. 

• The DCSINT should take the lead in acquiring 

national imagery for the ARSST. 

• A systematic process should be developed for 

acquiring national imagery. 

• The ARSST must be integrated into the C2 

network of supported units. 

• The ARSST needs SIPRNET connectivity to 

communicate with USARSPACE and other space 

support organizations. 

• The ARSST should be involved in planning at an 

early point to address issues such as the TPFDL, 

communications needs, and space education. 

• The SSP should be upgraded with EDGE software 

and the latest version of TSOC. All 3 MPRS 

should be upgraded to SSP. 

• Early warning information should be integrated 

as an ARSST capability. 

• ARSST printers crashed repeatedly; more reliable 

and faster systems were required. 

• Longer antenna cables were needed for the 

HRWSR. 

• KG-144 encryption devices were needed as soon 

as possible for HRWSR operations. 

 

For the equipment deployed for ULCHI FOCUS 97, Major Jaime and Captain 

Skaw recommended a series of upgrades. First, all Space Support Platforms 

should be upgraded with 

newly available software. 

Second, all three of the 

ARSST’s MPRS systems 

should be upgraded to 

SSPs. Third, more reliable 

printer equipment was 

required. Fourth, longer 

antenna cables were need so 

that the HRWSR could be 

used in bunkers. 

Furthermore, KG-144 

encryption devices were 

needed for the HRWSR as 

soon as possible. 

ARSST SelfSustainment Capability 

Throughout 1997 ARSST 

team leaders continued to 

cite the lack of a selfsustainment capability as a 

key shortcoming in the 

Army’s space support 

organization. Perhaps the 

strongest advocate for 

creating an ARSST selfsustainment capability was 

Captain Cuthbertson 

(ARSST Team Chief). 

Captain Cuthbertson had 

led the ARSST deployment 

to Bosnia in 1996 and was 

convinced that a major 

overhaul of the ARSST 

support concept was 

required.74
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 84 

ARSST future efforts, as summarized in the briefing to the Commanding 

General. 

• Increase joint interoperability. 

• Provide seamless support from the CINC down to the Division. 

• ‘One stop shop’ with weather, imagery, missile defense, space expertise, and 

communications. 

• Integrate GMF planners with ARSST. 

• Merge state of art technology (ASEDP and material developers). 

• Continue to enhance black/white space integration. 

• Space education. 

In July 1997, Captain Cuthbertson began coordinating with equipment vendors and 

collecting cost data for integrating ARSST equipment and systems into a selfcontained vehicle. On 28 July 1997, Captain Cuthbertson received a quote from 

Gichner Shelter Systems on the cost for a shelter system mounted on the back of a 

tactical vehicle, complete with environmental control, workstations, and a power 

generator. Gichner Shelter Systems offered to sell such a shelter to the command 

for $28,000, with an additional $24,400 for the environmental control unit, $8,500 

for two workstation units, and $20,000 for a 10 kilowatt power generator.75 The 

expense of this equipment, coupled with the difficulties involved with maintaining 

and deploying a dedicated space support vehicle, prompted the Command to 

pursue other options for self-sustainment. One approach to this problem that the 

Command would later experiment with was the Army Space Support Cell. 

ARSST Reorganization – The Commanding General’s Briefing 

The ARSST Division grappled with the problem of structuring the teams to 

provide the greatest value to supported units throughout 1997. One of the defining 

moments of this intellectual process was the development of a briefing for the 

USASSDC Commanding General on a variety of concepts for ARSST 

reorganization and future operations. This briefing merits special historical 

consideration because it provided a snapshot of the long-range objectives of the 

ARSST Division, established six alternatives for organizing the ARSST to meet 

those goals, and analyzed each option in turn. 

In the briefing for the Commanding General, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Brisson of 

USARSPACE identified eight areas where he believed the ARSST offered valueadded to a supported unit. Two of these areas were specifically related to the 

manning of commercial space systems. First, the ARSST teams offered spacederived information, such as multi-spectral imagery, to a supported headquarters 

through off-the-shelf technologies and systems. Second, the ARSST was prepared 

to use these systems to develop tailored products in response to warfighter 

taskings. The ARSST Division also emphasized the demonstration and materiel 

development services that it provided to the Army. The ARSST had been 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 85

involved in a series of demonstrations and, moreover, had provided operational 

support with new space systems and initiatives. 

TheARSST also played a role in the cultivation of warfighter needs and 

requirements, which could subsequently be used by the ASEDP to develop new 

systems. Space expertise analysis was cited as another area where the ARSST 

added value for the Army. The ARSST, it was explained, offered “rapidly 

deployable space operational & technical expertise.” Finally, two liaison functions 

were cited as areas where the ARSST provided a value-added. The ARSST could 

serve as a liaison back to USARSPACE, providing “reach back” support and 

maintenance to a unit in the field using space systems or requiring analytical 

support. Moreover, the ARSST was involved in the integration of “black” and 

“white” space technologies.76 

Looking to the future, the ARSST saw seven areas where it could increase its 

current level of support to the Army. First, the ARSST would increase the level of 

interoperability with the Joint Space Support Team structure. This would enable 

the ARSST to tap into the resources of the entire space support team structure, 

thereby offering opportunities to provide enhanced support to Army units. 

Secondly, the ARSST Division saw a need to provide simultaneous support at a 

number of levels of command, ranging from the Combatant Command level to the 

Division headquarters. This idea would later be integrated into the Army Space 

Support Cell concept and tested during ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98. Third, the 

ARSST Division saw a need to provide “a ‘one stop shop’ with weather, imagery, 

missile defense, space expertise, and communications.” Fourth, the ARSST 

Division wanted to integrate Ground Mobile Force (GMF) planners with the 

ARSST. Fifth, the ARSST sought to bring the latest technology to the field, 

whether it was acquired through ASEDP or a materiel developer. Examples of the 

The S-788 shelter, also known as the Lightweight, Multipurpose 

Shelter (LMS) is a lightweight, high strength enclosure designed 

specifically for use on the HMMWV. The S-788 provides 

approximately 295 cubic feet of useable interior space and weighs 

only 608 pounds, allowing it to be transported easily on C-130. 

The U.S. Army uses the S-788 as its primary electronics platform 

for wheeled tactical vehicles. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 86 

systems sought by the ARSST included Direct PC, LEOCOMM, GBS, Mobile 

GCCS, BLUFOR Tracking, and LVD. The ARSST also was interested in 

acquiring systems capable of faster data transfer, direct downlink of imagery, and 

enhanced communications. Sixth, the ARSST saw a need to continue the process 

of “black” and “white” space integration. Seventh, the ARSST believed that it 

could play a key role in the space education of the Army.77

To better meet current and future objectives, the ARSST presented a series of 

concepts for reorganization. Each of those options was evaluated using the 

following criteria: Space Education and Literacy, Maintain Technical Base and 

Proficiency, Tailored Support, Planning Response, Execution Response, 

Command and Control, and OPTEMPO. 

Concept One: Maintain the Status Quo. The first concept developed for 

ARSST organization was a strawman in which the status quo would be 

maintained. Under this concept, the ARSST would continue to be organized in 

five teams, with four teams stationed at Colorado Springs and one team stationed 

at Ft. Bragg. There would be no changes in the level of personnel or equipment 

authorized for the ARSST. The annual estimated budget for the ARSST Division 

was estimated at $286,000, with $226,000 earmarked for travel expenses and 

$60,000 for supplies and equipment. Continued maintenance of the status quo was 

expected to yield a series of benefits. With most of the ARSST personnel 

stationed at Colorado Springs, a better space education program could be 

developed and training would be easier to conduct. It would be easier to maintain 

the ARSST technical base, to include the acquisition of remotely sensed imagery. 

Furthermore, the ARSST would continue to concentrate most of its personnel and 

equipment at Colorado Springs, allowing it to task-organize teams for deployment 

to the field. The ability to task-organize ARSST teams would enable 

USARSPACE to manage the number of deployment days for each of the members 

of the ARSST Division. 

Finally, under the status quo organization for the ARSST Division the command 

and control for each of the teams would remain centralized in Colorado Springs. 

On the other hand, the planning and execution response times for the ARSST 

teams was viewed as low due to the stationing of most equipment and personnel in 

Colorado Springs. 

Concept Two: All Teams Forward Deployed. The second concept for ARSST 

reorganization was based upon the forward deployment of an ARSST team with 

each of the four supported Corps headquarters as well as U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command. The ARSST Division would maintain a headquarters 

element of eight personnel, while 18 personnel would be required for forward 

deployment with the team elements. To meet this requirement, the ARSST TDA 

would have to be increased to a total of 27 personnel. Furthermore, new 

equipment would be required, to include one Space Support Platform, three KG44 

encryption devices, one plotter, and one printer. The annual costs under this 

concept were estimated to be $190,000. An initial $220,000 would be required to 

procure additional ARSST equipment. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 87

CONOPS 2: ALL TEAMS FORWARD DEPLOYED CONOPS 2: ALL TEAMS FORWARD DEPLOYED 

ARSPACE

I Corps

III Corps

Special 

Operations

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps

V Corps

ARSST HQ

Personnel: 8

CONOPS 1: MAINTAIN STATUS QUO CONOPS 1: MAINTAIN STATUS QUO 

ARSPACE

I Corps

III Corps

Special Operations

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps

V Corps
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 88 

The advantages and disadvantages expected to stem from this concept of 

reorganization were the diametric opposite of those existing under the existing 

ARSST organization. Under the status quo, planning and execution response 

times were low due to the stationing of most personnel and equipment at Colorado 

Springs. This problem would be solved by the forward deployment of teams with 

each supported headquarters. 

On the other hand, USARSPACE was expected to experience significant problems 

in providing space education and training, equipment maintenance, and technical 

support. In addition, USARSPACE would no longer be able to task-organize 

ARSST teams from Colorado Springs. Command and control of the ARSST 

teams would be less centralized and the level of OPTEMPO would be highest. 

Concept Three: Liaison Officers Forward Deployed. The third concept for 

ARSST reorganization represented a middle ground between the forward 

deployment of all ARSST teams and the maintenance of the status quo. Under this 

concept, ARSST liaison officers would be stationed with each of the four Corps 

headquarters and the U.S. Special Operations Command. These liaison officers 

would be responsible for integrating space support into the planning process of 

their supported units. During a contingency operation or a field exercise, the 

liaison officer (LNO) could be reinforced by a full ARSST team. 

CONOPS 3: LNOs FORWARD DEPLOYED CONOPS 3: LNOs FORWARD DEPLOYED 

ARSPACE

I Corps

III Corps

Special 

Operations

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps

V Corps

**

**

**

**

**
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 89

The ARSST Division did not foresee any need for an increase in space support 

equipment or personnel authorized under the TDA. Of 21 personnel authorized for 

the ARSST Division, 16 would remain at Colorado Springs while five liaison 

officers would be forward deployed. An annual budget of $250,000 would be 

needed, with $190,000 in travel and $60,000 for supplies and equipment. 

A number of advantages were expected to result from this concept for ARSST 

reorganization. With a liaison officer at each supported headquarters, planning 

response times would be greatly reduced. However, since the majority of the 

ARSST Division personnel would remain at Colorado Springs, a thorough space 

education and training program could still be easily conducted. 

The maintenance of the ARSST technical base would be simplified. Furthermore, 

since the ARSST would continue to concentrate most of its personnel and 

equipment at Colorado Springs it would still be able to task-organize teams for 

deployment to the field. The command and control for each of the teams would 

remain centralized in Colorado Springs and OPTEMPO would be manageable. On 

the other hand, the execution response times for the ARSST teams were still 

expected to be somewhat slow due to the continued requirement to move 

equipment and personnel from Colorado Springs. 

Concept Four: Rotational Deployment of all Teams. The fourth concept for 

ARSST reorganization envisioned a rotational deployment for the ARSST teams. 

A rotational cycle would be established in which each of the ARSST teams would 

CONOPS 4: ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF ALL TEAMS CONOPS 4: ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF ALL TEAMS 

I Corps

III Corps

Special 

Operations

V Corps

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps

ARSPACE
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 90 

deploy on 90 day rotations. Equipment would remain at Colorado Springs for 

movement to support a field unit as required. When teams were not on 

deployment, they would rotate through a USARSPACE space education 

sustainment program. 

The ARSST Division forecasted that it would require significantly higher levels of 

equipment and funding to implement the concept of a rotational team 

deployments. A new Space Support Platform, three KG-44 encryption devices, a 

new plotter, and a new printer would be required, at an estimated cost of $220,000. 

In addition, the annual travel budget for the ARSST would have to be increased to 

$420,000. 

Although the concept for rotational deployment of the ARSST teams would be 

more expensive than maintaining the status quo, the ARSST Division expected it 

would yield a number of advantages. With the rotation of all teams through an 

ARSST space education and training support program, USARSPACE would easily 

be able to maintain a high level of proficiency. When not on deployment, most 

equipment and personnel would remain in Colorado Springs, providing a high 

degree of flexibility in task-organizing teams for deployment to the field. 

Command and control would also be enhanced. In the meantime, the rotational 

deployment of each of the ARSST teams to the field would ensure that responsive 

planning and execution support was provided to supported headquarters. The only 

disadvantages anticipated under this concept of ARSST operations stemmed from 

a higher OPTEMPO level and difficulties in maintaining the technical base. 

Concept Five: Forward Deployment of Teams to Support V Corps and XVIII 

Airborne Corps. The fifth concept for reorganizing the ARSST Division 

represented a compromise between the existing status quo and the alternative idea 

that each ARSST team should be forward deployed with its supported warfighting 

headquarters. Under this concept, the ARSST team deployed at Ft. Bragg would 

remain while a second ARSST team would be forwarded deployed in Europe. 

Eleven ARSST personnel would remain at Colorado Springs while ten personnel 

would be forward deployed. 

To implement this concept, the ARSST Division would have to acquire a set of 

new equipment (one Space Support Platform, two KG-44 encryption devices, one 

plotter, and one printer). Costs for the new equipment were estimated to be 

$222,000. Once the new equipment was purchased, annual costs for the ARSST 

Division would be stabilized at $210,000, with $150,000 earmarked for travel and 

$60,000 for supplies and equipment. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 91

After evaluating this concept of ARSST organization, the ARSST Division 

concluded that it would improve planning and response support to V Corps and 

XVIII Airborne Corps while undermining support to the rest of the Army. 

USARSPACE would have difficulty in maintaining its technical base and the 

training levels of ARSST personnel, command and control would be decentralized, 

and the OPTEMPO for the ARSST teams would be high. 

Concept Six: Rotational Deployment of Liaison Officers. The last concept for 

ARSST reorganization envisioned a rotational deployment of liaison officers to 

supported warfighting headquarters while the remaining ARSST personnel would 

be prepared to deploy as needed. The ARSST Division anticipated that such an 

organizational construct would result in a number of advantages. The rotational 

deployment of liaison officers would ensure that space support planning was 

integrated into the operations of supported units. Because the majority of ARSST 

personnel would remain in Colorado Springs and deploy only as required, space 

education and training could be easily organized. The concentration of personnel 

in Colorado Springs would ensure that ARSST command and control remained 

centralized while allowing USARSPACE to task-organize teams. With most of 

the ARSST equipment also remaining at home station, equipment and technical 

maintenance would be simplified. The only identified drawback to the concept of 

rotational LNO deployments was that the execution response times for a full 

ARSST team would be low. 

CONOPS 5: XVIII AND V CORPS TEAMS DEPLOYED CONOPS 5: XVIII AND V CORPS TEAMS DEPLOYED

ARSPACE

I Corps

III Corps

Special 

Operations

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps

V Corps
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 92 

Using the criteria established for assessing ARSST reorganization, Option 3 and 

Option 6 received the highest overall evaluations. Both options relied on the use 

of liaison officers to integrate space support into the planning process of 

warfighting units. Because the majority of the equipment and personnel assigned 

to the ARSST would remain in Colorado Springs, it was anticipated that space 

education would be enhanced, equipment and technical maintenance would be 

simplified, and command and control would remain centralized directly under 

USARSPACE. The major difference between the two options was the cost to 

USARSPACE; the rotational deployment of ARSST liaison officers would cost 

$125,000 more than the permanent assignment of LNOs. 

Changes to the MOA with the XVIII Airborne Corps 

At the same time the ARSST was evaluating options for reorganization, a revised 

agreement for support to the XVIII Airborne Corps was developed. Three changes 

were proposed to the Memorandum of Agreement between XVIII Airborne Corps, 

USASOC, and USARSPACE (Forward). First, USARSPACE would be 

committed to the assignment of only two personnel to the ARSST team at Ft. 

Bragg, rather than the three soldiers agreed upon in the initial MOA. Second, the 

Commander, USARSPACE (Forward) would be responsible for ensuring that the 

team was prepared for worldwide deployment. If invited, the ARRST team at Ft. 

Bragg would participate in unit Soldier Readiness Checks and Emergency 

Readiness Deployment Exercises. Finally, the funding for ARSST travel was 

made the responsibility of “the headquarters requesting the support.” The new 

CONOPS 6: ROTATIONAL LNO DEPLOYMENT CONOPS 6: ROTATIONAL LNO DEPLOYMENT

ARSPACE

I Corps

III Corps

Special 

Operations

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps

V Corps

**

**

**

**
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 93

MOA was approved by Colonel Bowman, then-USARSPACE Chief of Staff, on 

15 August 1997.78

The Army Space Support Cell (ARSST Plus) Concept 

The six options for ARSST reorganization that had been developed for the 

USASSDC Commanding General were soon superceded by the decision to 

activate an Army Space Support Cell. The ASSC was intended to provide a broad 

spectrum of space support services, addressing many of the weaknesses that had 

been discovered during ARSST operations in the field. As originally conceived, 

the ASSC would fulfill space analysis, training, command and control, and force 

development roles for USARSPACE. Most importantly, the ASSC would serve as 

a “focal point for space 

support expertise and 

knowledge.”79

USARSPACE planners 

initially developed two 

approaches for the activation 

of the ASSC. The first 

approach was based upon an 

upgrade of existing 

USARSPACE capabilities. 

Under this approach, referred 

to as the “constrained” option, 

USARSPACE would activate 

an Army Space Support Cell 

of approximately 12 

personnel. During a sustained 

major theater contingency, the 

ASSC could be expanded to a 

level of 40-100 personnel. By 

adopting this approach, 

USARSPACE would be able 

to form the ASSC quickly, 

employing proven 

technologies and equipment. 

Furthermore, there would be 

minimal risk of making “false promises” to the Army. 

USARSPACE also discussed a second approach to ASSC activation, under which 

an objective space support organization would be developed without reference to 

the existing structure. It was anticipated that this approach, dubbed the 

“unconstrained” option, would allow more comprehensive space support to be 

provided to a theater of operations. On the other hand, the unconstrained option 

would “require [a] greater degree of research and analysis” and would likely 

“exceed current USARSPACE capabilities.”80 Consequently, USARSPACE 

Army Space Support Cell -- Roles: 

• Focal point for space support expertise and 

knowledge. 

• Provide training on space capabilities and 

limitations. 

• Provide linkage and coordination with other 

space support teams. 

• Provide assistance developing and refining the 

supporting space annexes and appendices to 

planning. 

• Provide knowledge of future support 

capabilities. 

• Provide space force enhancement capabilities 

to ground forces. 

• Warning of ballistic missile activity. 

• Provide satellite availability and GPS satellite 

predictions. 

• Provide analytical products, including mission 

planning and rehearsal. 

• Integrate space-based products. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 94 

instead employed the “constrained” option as the basis for activating the ASSC in 

the near-term. 

As with the ARSSTs, the concept of operations for the ASSC envisioned that 

USARSPACE would “deploy to a Joint Task Force (JTF), Corps/Division 

TOC/CP or Warfighting CINC within forty-eight hours” to provide space support 

in the field.81 To accomplish this mission, the ASSC would deploy a five person 

team, consisting of a Team Chief (O-5), Operations Officer (O-4 or O-5), 

Intelligence Officer (O-3 or O-4), Communications Officer (O-3) and Operations 

NCO (E-7 or E-8). It was expected that additional intelligence personnel would 

join the ASSC during a deployment. In addition, it was expected that the ASSC 

would deploy in conjunction with one or more ARSST teams, which would 

function as “the production element of the ASSC.”82

In the draft concept of operations developed for the ASSC, it was explained that 

USARSPACE would receive a deployment order from either USSPACECOM or 

the HQDA/Component Commander. Once this deployment order was received by 

USARSPACE, the ASSC would then begin task-organizing for the mission. 

One of the key functions of the ASSC in the field would be to serve as a 

CONTINGENCY

UNIT DEPLOYMENT

INITIAL

PLANNING

&

COOPERATION

USSPACE

SPOC

MISSION

PLANNING

ASSC

PLANNING

&

COORDINATION

ADVANCED PARTY

RECOMMENDATION

&

INFORMATION

ARSPACE

BATTLE STAFF RECOMMENDATION

ASSC ADLOG

SUPPORT TEAM

REQUESTS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDERSTAND

INSTRUCTION

ASSIST

DEPLOYMENT

INFORMATION

AND

DIRECTION

ASSC

PREPARE

FOR 

DEPLOYMENT

ASSC

EXECUTION

COMMANDERS

DECISION

DIRECTION

MISSION SUPORT

TEAM TAILORING

ALERT TEAM

 DEPLOYED

FOLLOW ON

ELEMENTS

DEPLOYED

ARSPCC ARSPCC

STAFF

DEPLO

Y

MENT

 ASPLO deploys as advance party to support

Unit. Coordinates ARSPACE support and

deployment.

 Deploying ASSC may join supported unit at

Home Station, enroute or in Area of Operations.

DIRECTION

INFORMATION

 ALERT

ASPLO

TEAM LEADER

CRISIS CRISIS

Figure 15: ASSC deployment process (as presented in the draft CONOPS). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 95

centralized node for command and control. The ASSC would provide connectivity 

for deployed ARSST teams to USARSPACE assets in Colorado Springs, to 

include arrangements for logistical support. In addition, the ASSC would be 

responsible for coordinating with the joint and component communities. Unlike 

the original concept developed for deploying the ARSST teams, in which the 

tasking for deployment would originate from HQDA, “for Army space support 

during actual contingencies or crisis response, the ASSC is tasked by JCS through 

USCINCSPACE.”83

Two separate types of ASSC support in the field were outlined. Under the first 

type of support, designed for joint exercises, 

“an ARSST supports each level of command with the ASSC staff and an 

ARSST collocating with the LCC [Land Component Commander]. In 

this deployment the ASSC coordinates closely with JSST, other 

component SSTs and national SSTs in the AOR [area of responsibility] to 

provide a unified space picture.”84

Under the second type of support, designed for Corps and Division level exercises, 

“the ASSC integrates into the Corps or Division staff and provides an ARSST. 

The ASSC integrates space analysis into the supported decision making process 

providing value-added products and services.”85

The draft Army Space Support Cell concept of operations also establshed a sevenphased planning process, as outlined below: 

Pre-Crisis. During the first phase (pre-crisis) of the ASSC planning process, the 

ASSC and ARSST teams train with supported warfighting headquarters, 

establishing habitual relationships through periodic training sessions and exercises. 

The ASSC enters the planning process of a supported unit when some specific 

event occurs, such as an exercise directive, pre-deployment guidance, the issuance 

of an operations order or warning order, or a tasker. 

Analyze Requirements. Once an event occurred that required initiation of the 

ASSC planning process, the ASSC begins breaking the mission down into 

specified and implied tasks. These tasks form the basis for the development of 

ASSC requirements, based upon the Space Force Enhancement missions listed in 

the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 

Identify Solution. During this ASSC planning phase, a series of potential 

solutions to the mission are developed. If the ASSC does not have the ability to 

provide a solution, assistance is requested from USARSPSACE or another space 

support team. 

Identify Source. During this phase, the ASSC identifies sources that have the 

capability to fulfill mission requirements. Sources may include an ARSST team 

in-theater, USARSPACE, or another space support team. 

Prioritize Solution Set. After identifying sources capable of performing the 

required mission, the ASSC schedules and prioritizes the work needed to 

accomplish the mission. Frequent feedback is obtained from all involved units to 

improve and modify this process. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 96 

Execute. During this phase, the ASSC supervises and/or performs the work 

required to accomplish the mission. 

Deliver Products. The ASSC delivers required support or products to the support 

unit, employing an undertandable and easy-to-use format. 

In 1998, USARSPACE would begin implementing the Army Space Support Cell 

concept. Training was scheduled for January 1998, to be followed by tests of the 

concept during the 1st Infantry Division's Battle Command Training Program 

(BCTP) and ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98.

1997 ARSST Lessons Learned 

In 1997, its third year of providing support to units in the field, the ARSST 

continued to emphasize lessons that had been learned during the early years of 

ARSST activation while identifying new issues and techniques for space support. 

The ARSST teams received a number of requests from field units for enhanced 

imagery support. They concluded that there was a critical warfighting need for 

imagery at a resolution of 10 meters, or less, that could be downloaded in real-time 

or near real-time to support intelligence preparation of the battlefield, tactical 

planning, and battle damage assessment. Supported units made repeated requests 

for such imagery. For example, during ULCHI FOCUS LENS, imagery with a 

resolution of 5 meters was requested. The XVIII Airborne Corps requested livefeed, 1-meter resolution imagery while preparing for JTFEX 98-1 in November 

1997. When an ARSST team supported the 5th Special Forces Group Task Force 

XXI exercise, national imagery was provided by the team. This imagery was well 

received by the supported unit and provided a potential model for the future use of 

national imagery products. 

The ARSST teams also highlighted the need to be involved in the pre-deployment 

phase of all major contingency operations and exercises. Such prior coordination 

allowed the ARSST to take a proactive role in supporting a unit. Furthermore, it 

provided time for the ARSST to address issues such as incorporation into the 

supported unit’s command and control network, inclusion in the Time Phased 

Force Deployment List, and time to conduct space training. 

The ARSST teams also highlighted a continued need to bring new space systems 

and technologies to the field. However, they concluded that there was a 

requirement to expand the level of support provided to include space analytic 

products to the warfighter, as well as new services such as processed missile early 

warning data. 

The ARSST experience in 1997 demonstrated the importance of being integrated 

into the command and control network of a supported unit. In addition, the 

ARSST teams began requesting secure internet connectivity to enhance 

coordination with other organizations, such as USARSPACE and other space 

support teams. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 97

Other lessons learned addressed the need for improved coordination measures. 

For example, ARSST soldiers argued that closer ties should be established 

between the ARSST and the USARSPACE DCSINT. Furthermore, the 

USARSPACE DCSINT should take the lead in acquiring national imagery 

products for the ARSST. The ARSST teams further began work to develop a 

systematic process so that national imagery products could be used for exercise 

play and actual contingency missions, as well as a process for quickly sending 

classified information to an ARSST in the field via electronic means or courier. 

The ARSST teams identified a series of areas in which space support equipment 

could be improved or enhanced. For example, they concluded that the unit's Space 

Support Platforms and the Mission Planning Rehearsal Systems should be 

upgraded with new software. The ARSST experienced repeated problems with its 

printers in 1997. ARSST team members recommended that faster and more 

reliable printers be purchased by USARSPACE. The HRWSR also provided 

valuable support during YAMA SAKURA 97. However, its utility in ULCHI 

FOCUS LENS was impaired because long antenna cables and KG-144 encryption 

devices were not available. The HRWSR suffered from frequent systems crashes 

when used on deployments in 1997. 

The ARSST experience in 1997 highlighted the need for the teams to continue 

evolving to support warfighter requirements. A number of steps were taken during 

the year to upgrade ARSST capabilities, allowing the teams to provide 

commanders and staffs with full-gamut space analytic support. Those efforts 

continued in 1998. 

Arsst Operations and Evolution, 1998 

In 1998, the Army Space Support Cell concept was exercised and tested by U.S. 

Army Space Command. As part of this process, the Command took steps to 

develop a more formalized training program for ARSST personnel. In another key 

development, the only forward-deployed ARSST team was reassigned from Ft. 

Bragg to Colorado Springs. 

1998 Concept of Operations 

The ARSST concept of operations underwent significant revision and evolution in 

1998 with continued experimentation of the Army Space Support Cell (ARSST 

Plus) concept. The ASSC was designed, in large part, to provide support to a 

series of deployed ARSST teams by establishing command, control, and 

communications networks, conducting liaison with other space support 

organizations, and fulfilling logistical requirements. During an operational 

deployment, it was anticipated that the ASSC would deploy within 48 hours in 

conjunction with one or more ARSST teams. ARSST teams would maintain the 

capability to deploy independently. When operating in conjunction with an ASSC, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 98 

however, the primary role of the ARSST teams would be to serve as “production 

elements” for the Army Space Support Cell. 

 Two different methods of ASSC employment were experimented with in 1998. In 

the early part of the year, the ASSC deployed to support a divisional Battle 

Command Training Program exercise with one ARSST team. During this 

exercise, the ASSC was integrated into the Division headquarters to provide space 

support in conjuction with the ARSST. The second concept for ASSC 

employment, exercised in Korea during ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, involved the 

deployment of four ARSST teams to support units at multiple levels. 

ARSST Field Deployments, 1998 

Even while spending significant amounts of time and intellectual effort in 

developing and experimenting with the new ASSC concept, the ARSST continued 

1998 CONOPS 1998 CONOPS 

HQ 1 ARSST Chief

1 NCOIC

TM 1 TM 2 TM 3

III Corps

Tm Chief

1 NCO

V Corps

Tm Chief 

1 NCO

I Corps

Tm Chief

1 NCO

• New Army Space Support Cell.

• Multiple teams deploy under ASSC. 

• Teams remain affiliated with each 

 Army corps headquarters and Army

 Special Operations Command.

• Teams remain prepared to deploy 

 within 48 hours.

• New Army Space Support Cell.

• Multiple teams deploy under ASSC. 

• Teams remain affiliated with each 

 Army corps headquarters and Army

 Special Operations Command.

• Teams remain prepared to deploy 

 within 48 hours.

TM 4

XVIII ABC

Tm Chief

1 NCO

TM 5

Sp Ops

Tm Chief

ARSST Team ARSST Team

V Corps V Corps

XVIII ABC XVIII ABC

I Corps I Corps

III Corps III Corps

U.S. Army 

Special

Operations

Command

U.S. Army 

Special

Operations

Command

Application of the new ASSC Concept:

Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98

Application of the new ASSC Concept:

Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98

CP Tango CP Tango

ASSC ASSC

III Corps III Corps

MEF MEF

6th Cav 6th Cav

Figure 16: The ARSST Concept of Operations, 1998 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 99

to maintain a full schedule of field deployments in 1998. ARSST field support for 

the year began in January 1998 with a deployment to YAMA SAKURA 98 and 

continued through the end of the year with the III Corps Warfighter in December 

1998. 

Throughout the year, ARSST teams continued to deploy independently to the field, 

providing support to warfighting units without assistance from an ASSC. ARSST 

Team 1, for instance, deployed to YAMA SAKURA 98 (January-February 1998) 

with Major Frankie Moore, Staff Sergeant Bricker, Staff Sergeant Stroup, and 1LT 

Mayfield. The team supported the exercise with the Space Support Platform, 

Laptop Visualization Device, INMARSAT, and satellite weather terminal. 86 

Similarly, ARSST support to XVIII Airborne Corps units was repeatedly provided 

by an independent ARSST team. For example, during the JTFEX 98-1 (Exercise 

Purple Dragon), Major Burke and Staff Sergeant Hallam developed the space 

annex for the operations order and provided imagery and mission planning support 

to the Corps Headquarters (January-February 1998).87 Major Burke and Staff 

Sergeant Hallam, again operating independently, also supported the 82nd Airborne 

Division Warfighter Ramp-Up (February 1998) and Warfighter exercise (April 

1998), and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Warfighter Ramp-Up (May 

1998) and Warfighter exercise (May-June 1998). 

While ARSST teams continued to be deployed to the field as independent units, 

significant effort was placed in 1998 on developing the ability to deploy ARSST 

teams in conjunction with an ASSC. Early tests of this concept were conducted 

during the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) BCTP exercises from January to 

March 1998. For these exercises, Lieutenant Colonel Brisson led the Army Space 

Support Cell, accompanied by Major Woods, Captain Cuthbertson, Captain 

McFarland, Captain Personius, Sergeant First Class Roberson, Sergeant First Class 

Smith, and Sergeant Wise.88 The ASSC/ARSST team was integrated into the 

Division Headquarters, responding to 48 taskings or anticipated requirements. 

Most of the support consisted of multi-spectral imagery products, with the 

ASSC/ARSST team augmenting the capabilities of its own deployed equipment by 

acquiring imagery files via the Global Broadcast System (GBS) and the SIPRNET. 

During the exercise, the ASSC/ARSST team integrated its imagery into the 

Division’s planning process, supporting areas where the Division G-2 was not able 

to devote resources.89 For example, after the Division suffered heavy losses of 

helicopters in the initial stages of the exercise, the ASSC/ARSST team used its 

Multi-Source Tactical System to track the anti-air threat. After this capability was 

demonstrated to Division planners, no further helicopters were lost during the 

BCTP.90
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 100 

A number of lessons were learned during the 1st ID BCTP. First, the 

ASSC/ARSST team demonstrated the ability to receive products and support from 

USARSPACE and other military agencies using the GBS and the SIPRNET. 

Similar experiments had been conducted by the ARSST during ULCHI FOCUS 

LENS 97. During both exercises, difficulties with the transmission of data were 

experienced, thus demonstrating a continued requirement for a reliable and easily 

operated system that would allow space support capabilities anywhere in the world 

to be leveraged on behalf of a Land Component Commander. Second, the imagery 

files acquired by the ASSC/ARSST team from the National Ground Intelligence 

Center (NGIC) Training and Contingency Directorate were well received by the 1st

ID staff. Although the archived imagery available for training had some value, the 

Division staff was far more impressed by the more recent NGIC imagery that had 

a resolution of one meter. Third, many of the personnel deployed with the 

Figure 17: Key ARSST Deployments, 1998. 

Support Quarter Exercise 

1st Quarter 1998 YAMA SAKURA 

2nd Quarter 1998 COBRA GOLD 

3rd Quarter 1998 ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

I Corps 

4th Quarter 1998 

1st Quarter 1998 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 

RAMP-UP 

2nd Quarter 1998 

3rd Quarter 1998 

III Corps 

4th Quarter 1998 CORPS WARFIGHTER 

1st INFANTRY DIVISION 

BCTP 1st Quarter 1998 1st INFANTRY DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 

2nd Quarte

 1998 

3rd Quarter 1998 

V Corps 

4th Quarter 1998 

1st Quarter 1998 JTFEX 98-1 (EXERCISE 

PURPLE DRAGON) 

82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION 

WARFIGHTER 2nd Quarter 1998 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION 

(AIR ASSLT) WARFIGHTER 

3rd Quarter 1998 

XVIII 

Airborne 

Corps 

4th Quarter 1998 FUERTAS DEFENSAS 

1st Quarter 1998 

2nd Quarter 1998 SFOB CPX (7th SFG) 

3rd Quarter 1998 ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

Echelons 

Above 

Corps/Other 

4th Quarter 1998 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 101

ASSC/ARSST team had not previously served on a division or higher staff and, 

therefore, had no experience in tactical planning at this level. This lack of 

experience was seen as a limiting factor in their ability to understand the supported 

unit’s operational flow and provide the right space support products at the right 

time. Fourth, no space-related events were incorporated into the BCTP and space 

was not accepted as part of the exercise’s free play. As a consequence, no spacespecific analytic tasks could exercised by the ASSC/ARSST team and the Division 

Headquarters. Fifth, the Division Headquarters did not have room for the 

ASSC/ARSST team to be located in the Main Tactical Operations Center. As a 

consequence, the ASSC/ARSST team was located approximately two miles away, 

impairing its integration into the supported staff. In addition, the Division did not 

provide any facilities to house or provide logistical support. Afterwards, it was 

again recommended that a self-sustainment capability be developed for the ASSC 

and ARSST.91

The 1st Infantry Division BCTP provided an early opportunity to exercise the 

ASSC with a collocated ARSST team. During ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, an even 

more ambitious test of the Army Space Support Cell concept would be conducted 

with the deployment of multiple ARSST teams across theater. Four ARSST teams 

deployed from Colorado Springs for the exercise in August 1998, supporting the 

Eighth U.S. Army, the 6th Cavalry Brigade, III Corps Headquarters, and the 

Combined Marine Expeditionary Force. The ASSC was located at Command 

Post Tango with Eighth U.S. Army, where it provided command and control for 

the ARSST teams located in–theater. 

The annual ULCHI FOCUS LENS exercise had traditionally been used by 

USARSPACE as a key yardstick for testing ARSST capabilities. Even more 

emphasis was placed upon ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98 because it served as the first 

major test of the ASSC concept. When the ASSC and ARSST returned from 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98 in September, a thorough review of operations was 

conducted, with Captain Gerry Skaw producing a comprehensive evaluation of 

ARSST operations from pre-deployment training through re-deployment after 

conclusion of the exercise. Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer (ARSST Branch 

Chief) prioritized the top six lessons from Captain Skaw’s evaluation and initiated 

action to address each of them. First, the experience highlighted the need for 

ARSST teams to undergo a period of formal space education before they can 

effectively support warfighting units. Lieutenant Colonel Maurer noted that, 

“personnel are assigned to ARSPACE and within 30 days may be on an exercise 

deployment without any formal space training.”92 Second, the ARSST teams 

experienced difficulty in maintaining secure internet connectivity throughout the 

exercise. The ARSST teams were unable to troubleshoot these technical problems, 

instead relying on an expert from the J-6. Lieutenant Colonel Maurer 

recommended that the ARSST teams receive training to allow them to overcome 

similar problems in the future. Third, ARSST personnel were not integrated into 

the pre-deployment planning conferences for ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98. As a 

result, the teams were unfamiliar with the units they supported, hindering 

operations in the field. To prevent similar problems in the future, Lieutenant 

Colonel Maurer recommended that both ARSST and ASSC personnel be included 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 102 

in exercise planning conferences. Fourth, coordination problems were experienced 

in the ASSC-ARSST chain of command during the early portion of the exercise, 

resulting in conflicting priorities and guidance for the ARSST teams. Lieutenant 

Colonel Maurer emphasized the need to “have only one clearly defined chain of 

command.”93 Fifth, the need for an ASSC to deploy in-theater to provide 

command and control, logistics, and other support was questioned. Lieutenant 

Colonel Maurer reported: 

“The teams proved in the past and proved during UFL-98 that they can 

achieve successful mission accomplishment independently and there is no 

need for a dedicated Command and Control cell for deployed ARSST 

teams.” Therefore, “When a team deploys to support a unit it should be 

under the tactical control (TACON) of that unit. . . . the ASSC/Battlestaff 

[should] work from home station with the forward deployed ARSST(s) 

with perhaps one OIC (Lieutenant Colonel) in country to direct support 

staff and help resolve issues regarding logistics and life support.”94

Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Maurer noted that the ARSST teams received new 

equipment only 12 days before shipment for ULCHI FOCUS LENS, resulting in 

problems during the exercise. Lieutenant Colonel Maurer recommended that “a 

cut-off date of 30 days should be set to properly evaluate new equipment and 

software upgrades.”95 

After digesting lessons learned during ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, the ARSST 

teams prepared for another test of the new Army Space Support Cell concept 

during the III Corps Warfighter exercises. During the ramp-up exercise in 

November 1998, ARSST teams were co-located with the III Corps Headquarters 

and the 6th Cavalry Brigade. For the actual III Corps Warfighter exercise in 

December, the ASSC and one ARSST team were deployed in direct support of III 

Corps Headquarters, while other ARSST teams deployed to support the 10th

Mountain Division (Light), the 6th Cavalry Brigade, and the BCTP White Cell 

Opposition Force (WCOPFOR).96 During these exercises, the ARSST again 

experimented with methods for conducting coordinated operations with multiple 

teams and an ASSC element. 

1998 ARSST Training 

In conjunction with the decision in 1997 to exercise the ASSC concept, a formal 

training plan was established by USARSPACE to provide individual and 

collective training. This training plan was significant because it marked the first 

time that a full-fledged space analysis training program had been developed for the 

ARSST. In the past, the training for ARSST personnel had largely consisted of 

individual attendance at the Interservice Space Fundamentals Course, the 

Remotely Sensed Imagery Course at Ft. Belvoir, and hands-on training with 

ARSST equipment. In fact, some personnel had deployed within 30 days of 

assignment to USARSPACE without any space education, a problem that had been 

cited repeatedly in the past. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 103

For the 1998 training program, a three-phased approach was developed. Under 

this approach, individual training was scheduled for January 1998. Battle staff 

training, space liaison, and Army-Navy interoperability training was conducted in 

April. Finally, deployment, systems integration, and joint operations 

interoperability training was planned for June 1998. ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98 

was intended to serve as the capstone exercise for the overall training effort.97

The first ASSC/ARSST training session was conducted from 5-9 January 1998. 

This training began with each ARSST team describing weak areas in their 

operations. Sergeant First Class Smith, speaking for ARSST Team 1, began by 

describing problems with the dissemination of information, maintaining secure 

internet connections, and the movement of large data files. Major Jaime (ARSST 

Team 5) also described connectivity problems. Captain Cuthbertson (ARSST 

Team 2) cited weaknesses in the planning process and space education program. 

Major Kirt Woods (ARSST Team 3) emphasized the absence of space events that 

influenced exercise and simulation play. Finally, Major Tim Burke (ARSST 

Team 4) cited a number of issues stemming from his team's forward-deployment at 

Ft. Bragg, to include 

problems in obtaining 

support from USARSPACE 

and keeping team members 

trained to standard. 

After being asked to 

summarize weak areas in 

existing ARSST operations, 

the ARSST soldiers were 

released into small groups 

to conduct training on the 

MPRS and SSP. This 

training continued on 6 

January 1998 with sessions 

on the MSTS, SSP, and HRWSR and on 7 January with training on TSOC 

provided by Rhoda Danforth of Decision Source Application.98 On 8 January, 

Naval Space Support Team (NAVSST) personnel joined the training session and a 

comparison of ARSST and NAVSST operations was conducted. Additional 

training on ARSST equipment was conducted on 9 January. At the conclusion of 

the training session, Colonel Ferguson (USARSPACE Commander) gathered the 

participants to describe ongoing USARSPACE Command Group initiatives.99 

During the April 1998 training session, ASSC and ARSST personnel focused on 

battle staff training and space liaison functions. Topics covered during the training 

session included staff organization, the military decision-making process, and 

mission analysis techniques.100 The final ASSC/ARSST training session was 

conducted in June 1998 and was intended to serve as a ramp-up for the ULCHI 

FOCUS LENS deployment. During the training session, systems checkout and 

integration tasks were covered and combined operations under OPLAN 5027 were 

rehearsed. 

5 January 1998: Summary of Weak Areas Cited by 

Team Chiefs during Training. 

• Connectivity problems. 

• SIPRNET hcok up. 

• Mission planning process. 

• Space education and analysis. 

• Absence of space events that influence exercise 

and simulation play. 

• USARSPACE support for forward-deployed team 

at Ft. Bragg. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 104 

USARSPACE Long Range Planning 

In February 1998, USARSPACE elements were tasked to provide input for the 

Command’s Long Range Plan. Both ARSST and ASSC personnel evaluated space 

support roles, missions, and capabilities required in the near-, mid-, and long-term 

and began to develop options to position the Command to address those needs. 

Underlying the long range planning response provided by the ARSST were four 

key assumptions regarding future space capabilities: First, it was assumed that the 

potential space capabilities of threat forces would continue to increase; Second, 

the reliance of the U.S. and its potential coalition partners upon space based 

capabilities would continue to rise, particularly for intelligence, navigation, 

targeting, munitions guidance, and communications; Third, commercial imagery 

capabilities would continue to increase and potential adversaries might be able to 

employ these capabilities to obtain relatively high-resolution imagery products; 

Finally, commercial satellite communications systems would improve, providing 

new options for both friendly and adversary forces. 

Although the four assumptions regarding future space capabilities were significant, 

the ARSST anticipated no significant change in mission over either the mid-term 

(1-5 years in the future) and long-term (5-12 years in the future). It was expected 

that the ARSST would “continue to maintain the capability to rapidly deploy 

worldwide to provide space force enhancement to Army units during contingency 

operations and exercises. ARSST will also be ARSPACE (Fwd) and SMDC’s 

primary link to the warfighters.”101

 While no changes in the 

ARSST mission were 

anticipated, it was expected 

that the evolution of space 

systems would influence the 

type of support provided by 

the ARSST. Specifically, 

ARSST capabilities were 

expected to become 

increasingly focused on 

space analysis tasks. In the 

meantime, ARSST 

equipment would become 

smaller and easier to 

integrate into the command 

and control networks of 

supported units. Finally, many functions currently performed by the ARSST, such 

as high quality multi-spectral imagery production, would likely be integrated into 

supported units as an internal capability. 

In May 1998, an in-process review of the USARSPACE Long Range Plan was 

conducted. During this review, a series of planning thrusts were presented for both 

the ASSC and the ARSST. For the ASSC, seven key thrusts were identified. First, 

Long Range Thrusts: ARSSTs. 

• Integrate ARSST teams into selected BCTP and 

CTC rotations. 

• Provide new ARSST equipment and space 

products to supported units. 

• Develop and conduct individual and collective 

initial and sustainment training. 

• Develop an ARSST Homepage. 

• Exploit USSPACECOM’s and other Space 

Support Team’s capabilities. 

• Provide feedback to the ARSPACE staff on 

warfighter operational requirements. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 105

it was recommended that one ASSC be stationed at Korea, with a second ASSC 

forward-deployed in Europe. The forward-deployment of the ASSCs was intended 

to ensure that optimum use of space support resources for warfighters in-theater. 

The second ASSC thrust was the designation of the ASSC as the focal point for 

injecting USARSPACE input into the theater planning process. The ASSC would 

function as a liaison for all space and missile defense support. The third long 

range planning thrust was integration of the ASSC into the Theater Crisis Action 

Team, ensuring that space capabilities were integrated into all elements of a 

warfighter’s planning process, both deliberate and ad hoc. The fourth 

recommendation was that the ASSC be assigned the mission of providing logistics 

support for all SMDC assets in theater. The fifth long range planning thrust was 

ASSC coordination with in-theater staffs to provide training and ensure that space 

events and considerations were incorporated into exercises. Sixth, the need for 

ASSCs to participate in theater exercises was emphasized. Such participation 

would ensure that space events were properly simulated. Finally, the ASSC 

recommended that a USARSPACE Battle Staff be established to support military 

operations. This staff was intended to function as a cohesive planning and 

coordinating element, with the capability to support all levels of conflict, 

contingency missions, crises, and exercises.102

During the May 1998 review meeting, the ARSST teams also identified a number 

of key planning thrusts. The first thrust presented was the integration of the 

ARSST teams into BCTP exercises and combat training center rotations. The 

objective of this thrust would be to provide full spectrum space support and to 

introduce space capabilities to Army units. Second, it was recommended that the 

ARSST teams be used to introduce new equipment and space products to 

supported units through close coordination with the Space and Missile Defense 

Battle Laboratory. This would ensure that USARSPACE continued to provide 

cutting-edge technology to the field. Third, the Army Space Support Team cited a 

need to develop and conduct additional training for ARSST personnel, to include 

individual and collective training tasks. Training was needed to educate newly 

assigned personnel on essential ARSST functions and to maintain the proficiency 

of experienced personnel. In addition, training programs would need to be 

updated as new hardware and software were acquired. The fourth long range 

planning thrust discussed at the review was the development of internet homepage 

reference material to provide information on ARSST capabilities. The fifth 

planning thrust presented during the review was the need to exploit the capabilities 

of USSPACECOM and the other Services. The intent of this thrust was to 

leverage all of these capabilities on behalf of land forces. The final ARSST long 

range planning thrust was the use of the ARSST teams to provide feedback on 

warfighter operational requirements. This data would be integrated by 

USARSPACE into the Army’s formal requirements process.103 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 106 

The Redeployment of ARSST Team 4 to Colorado Springs 

One of the numerous changes in the organization of the ARSST in 1998 was the 

decision to relocate ARSST Team 4 to Colorado Springs. This team had originally 

been forward-deployed at Ft. Bragg in 1995 in response to a request by the XVIII 

Airborne Corps. The forward-deployment of this team was significant because it 

had served as a demonstration of how space support personnel might be integrated 

into the daily operations of a supported headquarters. Additionally, the forward 

deployment of this team had been cited as a model for the other teams in a number 

of ARSST reorganization concepts. 

The decision in 1998 to relocate ARSST Team 4 from Ft. Bragg to Colorado 

Springs was influenced by three major factors: First, the team’s OPTEMPO had 

been extremely high as the result of a requirement to support a Corps 

Headquarters, four Divisions, and USASOC. Second, it was felt that better 

maintenance support for the team's equipment could be provided at home station in 

Colorado Springs. Finally, a stronger basis for space education and institutional 

knowledge existed at Colorado Springs, enabling better training to be provided to 

team personnel if they were permanently stationed there. 

The proposal to relocate ARSST Team 4 was staffed within USARSPACE by 

Major Burke (ARSST Team 4), Lieutenant Colonel Brisson (USARSPACE 

Operations), and Colonel Jackson (USARSPACE DCSOPS). Prior to 

implementation of the idea, their proposal was briefed to both the XVIII Airborne 

Corps G-2 and the Corps Chief of Staff, who concurred.104

1998 ARSST Lessons Learned 

A number of lessons learned were reported by USARSPACE personnel while 

experimenting with the ASSC concept in 1998. Additionally, ARSST teams 

operating independently continued to experiment with new tactics and techniques. 

Many of the key lessons learned during the course of operations in 1998 reflected 

long-standing issues. For example, the ARSST teams reported a strong demand by 

field units for imagery at a resolution of 10 meters (or less) that could be 

downloaded in real-time or near real-time for IPB, planning, and BDA. During the 

1st Infantry Division BCTP, the Division staff was impressed with imagery that 

had a resolution of 1 meters and was only 1-2 days old. 

Additional experience in providing space analytic support in 1998 yielded a 

number of interesting insights. During ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, a daily space 

analysis summary was developed by the Army Space Support Cell, with 

information on satellite systems, space weather effects, and GPS accuracy. This 

information was presented to planning staffs to support decision-making and 

course of action development, with great success. 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98 reinforced the need, identified in 1997, for the ARSST 

teams to be involved in the pre-deployment phase of all major contingency 

operations and exercises. Such prior coordination allowed the ARSST to take a 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 107

proactive role in supporting a unit. Unfortunately, a recurring theme in 1998 was 

that very little space play was incorporated into Army or joint exercises. As a 

consequence, supported units did not have to face the consequences of failing to 

cope with space events. Furthermore, ARSST and ASSC personnel were unable to 

exercise space analytic tasks. ARSST soldiers worried that, until space was 

routinely incorporated into exercises and wargames, supported units would remain 

focused only on the production of imagery products. 

The ARSST teams emphasized the importance of a period of formal space 

education before they could effectively support warfighting units. For example, 

after ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, Lieutenant Colonel Maurer noted that “personnel 

are assigned to ARSPACE and within 30 days may be on an exercise deployment 

without any formal space training.” USARSPACE further discovered that, when 

reserve augmentees were incorporated into an ARSST team, this should occur well 

enough in advance to enable pre-deployment training to be conducted at both the 

individual and unit level. 

The ARSST teams continued to experience problems stemming from insufficient 

coordination and uncertain command and control procedures. ARSST soldiers 

emphasized the need to establish a clear ASSC-ARSST chain of command prior to 

deployment to avoid conflicting priorities and guidance. Similarly, better 

coordination could be effected with the Joint Space Support Team and the other 

Service space support organizations.

The ARSST teams highlighted continued need exists for the ARSST to bring new 

space systems and technologies to the field, particularly technologies such as the 

direct tasking and downlink of high resolution commercial imagery. They also 

learned that, by conducting a mission analysis of the supported theater of 

operations in advance of a deployment, they could prepackage a series of space 

support products. For example, advance mission analysis prior to ULCHI FOCUS 

LENS allowed the teams to provide proactive support for analyzing mobility 

routes and key terrain. With proper use of systems like GBS and secure internet 

connections, the ASSC and ARSST teams also found that they could leverage 

space support capabilities anywhere in the world. However, to overcome 

connectivity problems experienced during the course of exercise support, the 

ARSST personnel required additional network training.

During ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, the ARSST teams discovered that a significant 

amount of classified space information could not be released to South Korean 

personnel. This posed a problem because the III Corps worked with the 3rd ROK 

Army during that exercise.105 Finally, the ARSST experience in 1998 highlighted 

the need to thoroughly test new hardware systems and software upgrades prior to 

use on a deployment. The ARSST leadership concluded that team members 

require at least two weeks of training if they are to be effective in using new 

technical systems and equipment. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 108 

Summary 

Since the ARSST began dispatching teams to the field in January 1995, there have 

been a significant number of changes in Army Space Support Team organization 

and operations. The number of ARSST teams has been changed and their 

affiliation with supported headquarters has evolved. A number of modifications 

have been made to the ARSST TDA. There have been frequent proposals for 

restructuring the ARSST teams, for using the ARSST to accomplish new missions 

and responsibilities, and for developing an ARSST self-sustainment capability. 

The ARSST have grappled with a number of space support issues, such as the 

deployment of personnel on an average of 140 days per year, the need to provide 

on-the-job training due to the absence of a structured space education process, and 

the development of mechanisms to leverage capabilities at USSPACECOM and 

other military organizations. The ARSST has proposed a number of new space 

support concepts, to include integration of “black” and “white” space capabilities 

and experimentation with the Army Space Support Cell concept. 

The evolution of the ARSST and the experimentation with the ASSC have 

revealed one constant – the need for a unit of space experts able to deploy to a 

theater of operations and translate space capabilities into ‘tools’ for the ground 

commander. The form of the team may have evolved over time but the 

requirement for space expertise and analytic support remains. 

 

1

 Memorandum, Major James H. Minnon, U.S. Army Space Command, to 

Commander, USARSPACE (FWD), Subject: Revised ARSST CONOPS. 12 April 

1995. 

2

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 10 April 1995. 

3

 Ibid. See also, Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, 

“Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 10 April 1995. 

6

 Major Foeller [Meeting POC], “Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 

11 January 1996. 

7

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 22 May 1995. Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army 

Space Command, “Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 

1996. 

8

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 8 May 1995. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 109

 

9

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 10 April 1995. Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army 

Space Command, “Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 

1996. 

10 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 19 June 1995. Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army 

Space Command, “Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 

1996. 

11 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 10 April 1995. Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army 

Space Command, “Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 

1996. 

12 Ibid. 

13 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 22 May 1995. Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army 

Space Command, “Army Space Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 

1996. 

14 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 10 April 1995. 

15 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

16 Ibid. 

17 Memorandum, Major Robert E. Toupin, ARSST Team Chief, to Commander, 

ARSPACE (FORWARD), Subject: Trip Report of Major Toupin. 26 April 1995. 

18 Memorandum, Brigadier General Frank H. Akers, Jr., XVIII Airborne Corps 

Chief of Staff, to Commander, U.S. Army Space Command (Fwd), Subject: 

Attachment of an Army Space Support Team (ARSST) to HQ XVIII Airborne 

Corps. Undated. 

19 Draft Memorandum, Colonel E. Paul Semmens, Commander U.S. Army Space 

Command, to Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Subject: 

Attachment of an Army Space Support Team (ARSST) to the XVIII Airborne 

Corps G2. Undated. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Memorandum, Major(P) Armando R. Macias, ARSPACE Director, Operations 

to Commander, ARSPACE (Forward), Subject: ARSST Support for XVIII 

Airborne Corps. 17 July 1995. 

23 Ibid. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 110 

 

24 Memorandum, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command to Commander, 

ARSPACE (Forward), Subject: ARSST Support for XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft. 

Bragg, NC. 26 July 1995. 

25 Memorandum, Major Robert E. Toupin, ARSST Team Chief, to DIROPS, 

DIREX, Subject: Coordination of ARSST Equipment for the Fort Bragg Team. 1 

August 1995. 

26 Draft Memorandum, Colonel E. Paul Semmens, Commander U.S. Army Space 

Command, to Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Subject: 

Attachment of an Army Space Support Team (ARSST) to the XVIII Airborne 

Corps G2. Undated. 

27 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

28 USCINCSPACE, UMD38-2: SPACE SUPPORT TEAM OPERATIONS. 

(Colorado Springs, Colorado: Headquarters, United States Space Command, 2 

January 1996.). 

29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Approved Document Print (TDA) 

Table of Distribution and Allowances: DOCNO SCW4XQAA." 26 July 1996. 

30 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

31 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Put Space Capabilities in the Hands of 

Warfighters Today,” 8 January 1996. 

32 Memorandum, Colonel James W. Kulbacki, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 

U.S. Army Space Command, to HQ USSPACECOM, ATTN: SPJ33Z, Subject: 

Joint After Action Reporting for Operations Uphold Democracy/Maintain 

Democracy. Undated. 

33 Electronic Mail Message, Major Mike Jensen, ARSST Division Chief, “Future 

ARSST Issues.” 8 January 1996. 

34 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

35 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Put Space Capabilities in the Hands of 

Warfighters Today,” 8 January 1996. 

36 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Planning Tiger Team: Army Space 

Exploitation Demonstration Program,” 9 January 1996. 

37 Ibid. 

38 James Hooper, “Major Scott Cuthbertson Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 29 October 1998. 

39 Colonel Otis B. Ferguson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Space Command, 

"USARSPACE Weekly Activities Report (7-13 Oct 96)." 16 October 1996. 

Colonel Otis B. Ferguson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Space Command, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 111

 

"USARSPACE Weekly Activities Report (14-20 Oct 96)." 21 October 1996. 

Colonel Otis B. Ferguson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Space Command, 

"USARSPACE Weekly Activities Report (21-27 Oct 96)." 29 October 1996. 

40 Colonel Otis B. Ferguson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Space Command, 

"USARSPACE Weekly Activities Report (28 Oct – 3 Nov 96)." 1 November 

1996. Colonel Otis B. Ferguson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Space Command, 

"USARSPACE Weekly Activities Report (11-17 Nov 96)." 15 November 1996. 

Colonel Otis B. Ferguson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Space Command, 

"USARSPACE Weekly Activities Report (2-8 Dec 96)." 6 December 1996. 

41 James Hooper, “Major Scott Cuthbertson Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 29 October 1998. 

42 Ibid. 

43 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Captain David Strombeck and Staff 

Sergeant William Bates Oral History Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons 

Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. 

44 James Hooper, “Major Scott Cuthbertson Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 29 October 1998. 

45 Ibid. 

46 Major Cimino, U.S. Army Space Command, After Action Report, Exercise 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 96. 11 September 1996. 

47 Ibid. 

48 Ibid. 

49 Memorandum of Agreement between CG, XVIII Airborne Corps and CG, US 

Army Special Operations Command and Commander, U.S. Army Space 

Command (Forward). 5 March 1996. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Ibid. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, "Army Space Support Team 

Briefing at the HQ USARSPACE (Forward) Program Management Review." 12 

July 1996. 

54 Memorandum, U.S. Army Space Command, MOSC-OO-C, to TSOC PAT, 

ATTN: Mr. Jim Taylor, SPJTSOC, Subject: ARSPACE ARSST Information. 17 

July 1996. 

55 Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, "Army Space Support Team 

Briefing at the HQ USARSPACE (Forward) Program Management Review." 12 

July 1996. 

56 Ibid. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 112 

 

57 Memorandum, Major Wayne M. Brainerd, U.S. Army Space Command to 

Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8), Sea, Air, and 

Space Superiority Division, Subject: Info on Army Space Support Teams. 29 July 

1996. 

58 Ibid. 

59 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Army Space Support Division,” 

Undated. 

60 Ibid. 

61 Ibid. 

62 Ibid. 

63 Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Approved Document Print (TDA) 

Table of Distribution and Allowances: DOCNO SCW4XQAA." 30 May 1995. 

64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, "Approved Document Print (TDA) 

Table of Distribution and Allowances: DOCNO SCW4XQAA." 26 July 1996. 

65 Captain Gerald R. Skaw, U.S. Army Space Command, After Action Report, 

YAMA SAKURA XXXI. 25 February 1997. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Ibid. 

68 Editorial comments made by Major Caesar Jaime, USARSPACE, on 11 

December 1998. 

69 Major Brainerd, U.S. Army Space Command, Input for U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command Chief of Staff Notes for 28 February 1997, p. 37. 

U.S. Army Chief of Public Affairs, "U.S. Army Training and Operations Update." 

8 April 1997. 

70 Dr. James Walker, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, 

"3QFY97 USASSDC Command Achievements and Initiatives Report," p. 20. 

71 Captain Gerald R. Skaw, U.S. Army Space Command, ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

97 After Action Review, 25 September 1997. Ed White, U.S. Army Space and 

Strategic Defense Command, “Space Support is Current Revolution in How Army 

Fights and Wins Land Conflicts,” The Eagle (Sep/Oct 1997, Vol. 3, No. 5), p. 6. 

For a brief description of Joint Space Support Team (JSST) activities during this 

exercise, see General John H. Tilelli, “Ulchi-Focus Lens ’97: Putting JV 2010 into 

Practice.” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1997-98), pp. 76-80. 

72 Captain Gerald R. Skaw, U.S. Army Space Command, ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

97 After Action Review, 25 September 1997. 

73 Ibid. 

74 James Hooper, “Major Scott Cuthbertson Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 29 October 1998. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 113

 

75 Facsimile Transmission, Joe Walker, Gichner Shelter Systems to Captain 

Cuthbertson, U.S. Army Space Command, "Rough Order of Magnitude Cost." 28 

July 1997. 

76 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Forward Deployment of ARSST: A One 

Stop Shop is Our Goal,” Undated. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Draft Revised Memorandum of Agreement between CG, XVIII Airborne Corps 

and CG, US Army Special Operations Command and Commander, U.S. Army 

Space Command (Forward). Undated. 

79 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “ASSC: Army Space Support Cell,” 

January 1998. (NOTE: The development of the Army Space Support Cell concept 

began in 1997 and carried over into 1998. For simplicity’s sake, the concept for 

ASSC operations is presented in 1997 while ASSC training and exercise support 

are described in this chapter’s subsection on 1998 operations). 

80 Ibid. 

81 Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 

82 Ibid. 

83 Ibid. 

84 Ibid. 

85 Ibid. 

86 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, "US Army Space Command.” 13 January 

1998. 

87 Major Tim Burke, U.S. Army Space Command, “Weekly Activities Report for 

10-14 November 1997,” Undated. 

88 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, "US Army Space Command.” 13 January 

1998. 

89 Jim Williamson and Ken H. Dryden, SY Technologies, “Trip Report: Battle 

Command Training Program (BCTP), 1st ID Warfighter Exercise,” 18 March 

1998. 

90 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “James Williamson Oral History 

Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 22 October 1998. 

91 Jim Williamson and Ken H. Dryden, SY Technologies, “Trip Report: Battle 

Command Training Program (BCTP), 1st ID Warfighter Exercise,” 18 March 

1998. 

92 Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer III, U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space 

Support Teams After Action Review (AAR) for UFL 98. 22 September 1998. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 114 

 

93 Ibid. 

94 Ibid. 

95 Ibid. 

96 Warning Order, U.S. Army Space Command, "III Corps Warfighter Exercise 

(WFX)," 22October 1998. Warning Order, U.S. Army Space Command, "III 

Corps Ramp-Up Exercise," 22 October 1998. 

97 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “ARSST Training,” 16 December 1997. 

98 Ken H. Dryden, SY Technologies, “AAR Notes for Monday 5 January thru 

Friday 9 January ARSST/ASSC Training.” Undated. 

99 Ibid. 

100 U.S. Army Space Command, “Supporting the Supported Commander: ASSC 

April Training.” Undated. 

101 U.S. Army Space Command, "ARSST Long Range Planning Input," February 

1998. A copy of this document in electronic format was found on a floppy disk in 

the ARSST program files at Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

102 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, "Long Range Plan," May 1998. 

103 Ibid. 

104 James Hooper, “Major Gwynne T. Burke Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 5 November 1998. 

105 The relationship between the U.S. III Corps and the 3rd ROK Army was 

described in an article published in the Korea Times. See Korea Times, “Joint 

ROK, US Military Exercise Due in Texas,” 6 December 1998. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 115

CHAPTER FOUR: 

KEY TRENDS AND ISSUES 

“ARSSTs are truly a force multiplier and bring a wealth of space systems support.” 

 — I Corps, G-2 Staff Officer 

Although the ARSST has only been active since October 1994, the Army now has 

twelve years of experience in thinking about and addressing the space support 

requirements of tactical commanders and staffs. This chapter addresses a number 

of key trends and issues that were identified through an examination of this twelve 

year historical record, as well as through oral history interviews conducted with 

current and former ARSST personnel. 

This chapter does not represent a comprehensive evaluation of every issue of 

significance over the past four years of ARSST operations. Instead, it addresses 

certain key issues that have been raised repeatedly in the past and which seem 

likely to exert a continued influence on the future development of the teams, to 

include: 

• The evolution of the Army space support structure over the past twelve years, 

to include organizational development and key intellectual trends. 

• The impact of resource constraints, which in the past forced the ARSST 

leadership to make a tradeoff between deployment support functions (such as 

unit exercise support, demonstrations, space liaison, and operational missions) 

and institutional development activities (such as space education and training, 

experimentation with new DTLOMS initiatives, participation in Force XXI 

initiatives, and involvement in black-white space integration efforts).

• The importance and value of ARSST operations, as perceived by supported 

units and demonstrated through field survey collection, discussions, and the 

unit after-action reports maintained by the Army. 

• The process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating space support lessons 

learned throughout the Army. 

• The Army’s space education process and the implications for the ARSST. 

• The role of the ARSST in providing demonstrations of advanced space systems 

and technologies to the warfighter. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 116 

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY SPACE SUPPORT STRUCTURE 

Organization and Programs 

In the twelve-year period spanning from 1986 to 1998, the Army made significant 

strides in applying space systems and technologies to support tactical commanders. 

This period was marked by six key milestones: [1] The activation of the Army 

Space Institute in 1986. As the coordinating body for the development of Army 

space concepts, doctrine, training, and equipment, ASI served a pivotal role in first 

introducing the Army to the potential benefits offered by space; [2] The decision in 

1987 to implement the Army Space Demonstration Program as a vehicle for 

bringing new space systems to the field. The demonstration program provided an 

education to many tactical commanders on methods of using space technologies to 

support planning and operations. 

Although this program was not 

designed, organized, or funded to 

provide support to tactical units, 

the demonstration program also 

deployed in support of Army 

operations in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 

Haiti, and Bosnia; [3] The growth 

of USARSPACE from a four-man 

liaison element at Colorado 

Springs into the key organization 

for providing operational space 

support to the Army. This 

evolutionary process was capped 

by the transfer of many ASI 

functions to USARSPACE in 

1990, to include the Army Space 

Exploitation Demonstration 

Program; [4] The DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM experience, where the 

value of multi-spectral imagery, GPS position/navigation, satellite weather, 

ballistic missile warning, and satellite communications were clearly demonstrated. 

This experience also demonstrated the need for the Army to activate a dedicated 

space support organization, capable of providing training and operational support 

to units deployed in a theater of operations; [5] The Army’s decision in 1994 to 

equip and man a deployable space support team (COPS) at Colorado Springs. The 

COPS team was the first Army organization explicitly designed to provide 

sustained operational support for units in the field; [6] The evolution and growth of 

the Army Space Support Team from 1994 to 1998. The ARSST represented an 

extension of the original COPS idea for a deployable space support organization. 

Equally as important, ARSST support for Army operations worldwide served as a 

bridge between the USARSPACE and the ‘rank-and-file’ Army. 

Key Milestones: Applying Space for the 

Tactical Commander. 

1986: Activation of the Army Space Institute. 

1987: Approval granted by the senior Army 

leadership for the Army Space Demonstration 

Program. 

1990: Establishment of USARSPACE as an 

operational command. 

1990-1991: Space served as a significant, 

multi-dimensional force multiplier in DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM. 

1994: The senior Army leadership decided to 

activate deployable COPS teams. 

1995-1998: Growth and evolution of the Army 

Space Support Team. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 117 

Army Space Support: Intellectual Evolution 

In the period from 1986 to 1998, the Army grappled with the question of where 

and how space can best be applied in support of warfighting units. As with the 

changes made in the Army’s organizational structure for providing space support 

to field units, there were a number of significant shifts in how the Army responded 

to that question. 

In 1986, the Army focused upon developing systems that could directly support 

tactical operations at the maneuver battalion and company levels. The Army 

Space Institute experimented with concepts under which spaceborne intelligence 

and weather data would be integrated into a battalion’s planning process, 

position/navigation systems would be used to control tactical movements, and 

satellite communications would be employed to support battalion-level command 

and control. 

With the activation of the Army Space Demonstration Program, the Army’s 

approach to space evolved to include support for higher-echelon headquarters 

involved in campaign planning and other operational-level aspects of warfighting. 

The LIGHTSAT program and the WRAASE weather satellite receiver 

demonstrations were both geared to supporting commanders at the operational 

level. However, the Army continued to experiment with systems, such as the GPS, 

that could support tactical operations by small units. This dual approach would 

carry through Operation DESERT SHIELD, where Army space systems played a 

role at both the tactical and the operational levels of war. 

When the Army decided to procure systems under the Commercial Space Package 

for contingency use under the COPS program, the Corps Headquarters was 

designated as the focal point for support. Nevertheless, USARSPACE 

contingency support planning continued to span the operational and tactical levels 

of war. In addition, USARSPACE grappled with the issue of providing space 

support across the entire spectrum of military activities. For example, in one early 

draft of the USARSPACE concept of operations for the COPS program, the 

Command stated that its teams would be prepared to support a variety of units and 

agencies: 

 “CONUS based non-contingency Corps assets, National Guard units, 

FORSCOM Army Reserve units, and other government agencies (Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Bureau of Land Management, Drug 

Enforcement Agency, State and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, 

State Adjutants General, etc.).”1

After 1995, the ARSST grappled with the same intellectual questions. ARSSTs 

were deployed to support units from the battalion to the Joint Task Force level. 

Although the Corps Headquarters was traditionally the focal point for ARSST 

support, two of the most enthusiastic consumers of ARSST support were Aviation 

brigades and Special Forces battalions. As a consequence, ARSST support from 

1995 to 1997 was characterized by support to higher-level headquarters, including 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 118 

Corps and Echelons Above Corps, as well as tactical support for units at the 

brigade level and below. 

The Army Space Support Cell concept introduced a new element, in which 

multiple ARSST teams were deployed to provide simultaneous support to units 

from brigade to theater level. During ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, which served as 

the first key test of the ASSC concept of split-level support, four ARSST teams 

deployed from Colorado Springs to support Eighth U.S. Army, the 6th Cavalry 

Brigade, III Corps Headquarters, and the Combined Marine Expeditionary Force. 

In the meantime, an ASSC was located at Command Post Tango with Eighth U.S. 

Army, where it provided command and control for the ARSST teams located in–

theater. The ASSC concept represented a new approach to the recurring question 

of where the Army should focus its contingency space support efforts; rather than 

selecting a single echelon to support or making a trade-off between operational 

and tactical warfighting, multiple ARSST teams would now be prepared to deploy 

simultaneously to support all types of operations, conducted by Army units at a 

number of echelons. 

The Bottom Line: The Army Has a Demonstrated Need for a 

Deployable Space Support Organization 

One constant requirement emerged from the Army’s early experience in bringing 

space to tactical commander, the use of space systems and technologies in 

DESERT STORM and subsequent operations, and the activation and subsequent 

evolution of the ARSST – the need for a unit of space experts able to deploy to a 

theater of operations and translate space capabilities into ‘tools’ for the ground 

commander. The form of the ARSST evolved over time but the requirement for 

sustained space expertise and analytic support, integrated seamlessly into a 

supported unit in-theater, remained constant.

Arsst Resource Constraints and Tradeoffs 

Resources available for ARSST operations were tightly constrained in the five 

years since the organization was activated. The result was a situation in which the 

deployment support functions of the ARSST were often conducted at the expense 

of longer-term ARSST institutional development. 

The ARSST historically faced a zero-sum tradeoff between the need to conduct 

deployment support activities (such as unit exercise support, equipment 

demonstrations, space liaison, and operational mission support) and the need to 

support continued institutional growth and development (through activities such as 

internal space education and training programs, experimentation with new 

DTLOMS initiatives, participation in the Army’s Force XXI and Army After Next 

process, involvement in “black” and “white” space integration initiatives, etc.). 

Both elements were essential to the long-term success of the ARSST. Field units 

have an immediate need for space support, which could only be satisfied by the 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 119 

ARSST teams. ARSST teams served as the primary link between USARSPACE 

and the warfighter. On the other hand, space technologies and capabilities 

continued to evolve rapidly, the Army was engaged in a process of conceptual and 

organizational experimentation under the Force XXI process, and Army materiel 

developers were introducing new space-related systems to the field. If the ARSST 

failed to adapt and grow, its members feared they would eventually be 

overwhelmed by those larger trends and ARSST teams would provide a capability 

to the field that was either redundant or obsolete. 

From 1995-1997, USARSPACE made a deliberate decision to emphasize ARSST 

deployment support to field units, even if institutional development activities were 

curtailed as a result. ARSST personnel were conscious of the importance of 

introducing the warfighter to space and ARSST teams were deployed to support 

exercises and unit training as often as possible. Due to the limited personnel and 

budget resources available to the ARSST, however, institutional development 

activities had to be conducted in an ad hoc fashion, whenever the pace of field 

deployments slackened. As a consequence, ARSST personnel could only 

sporadically support institutional development activities such as attending 

TRADOC Force XXI planning sessions, developing coordinating mechanisms for 

operating in a joint environment, exploring new systems and technologies that 

might be of use for an ARSST, sharing lessons learned with personnel from the 

Joint Space Support Teams, developing a self-sustainment capability for the 

ARSST teams, and engaging in self-guided space education. Although the 

ARSST leadership recognized the need to invest in the future, the highest priority 

remained introducing space and providing operational support to units in the field. 

With an average of 140 deployment days per man per year, the ARSST found the 

sustained pursuit of any institutional development initiative to be extremely 

difficult. 

The ad hoc approach to ARSST institutional development from 1995-1997 did not 

stem from a lack of interest by USARSPACE or the ARSST leadership. To the 

contrary, ARSST personnel emphasized the need for continued institutional 

growth even before the teams were officially activated. USARSPACE personnel 

began reporting that they were providing a redundant capability to supported units 

as early as August 1994, when the Contingency Operations – Space (COPS) 

program was being implemented. After a deployment to support Joint Task Force 

Support Hope in Rwanda, Major Cafaro reported: 

“[W]e must remember that there is no present ARSPACE augmentation 

capability which does not exist elsewhere. INMARSAT is widely used 

by all services and many Army Agencies, as well as the Diplomatic 

Corps. The capability to provide satellite weather images exists in the Air 

Force, and they also have the forecasters, which we do not. Image maps 

are available through TEC and unit terrain teams, and for this operation 

the Air Force was quicker to obtain raw data than we were. . . . Also, our 

mission planning and rehearsal system is dependent on digital terrain 

elevation data, which we do not produce and was not available for the 

area of this operation. There are other mission planning systems besides 

ours as well.”2
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 120 

Given the redundancy of the systems deployed by USARSPACE, Major Cafaro 

concluded that the COPS teams would have to “concentrate on applying them 

better to truly make a difference in supporting Army units.”3

 

By 1996, officers assigned to the ARSST were stressing the need for the team to 

evolve into an organization that focused on space analysis. For example, the first 

lesson learned reported at the year-end review of ARSST operations for 1995 was 

that the “ARSST must be able to provide all types of space support – not just four 

pieces of equipment.”4 On 8 January 1996 Major Mike Jensen (ARSST Division 

Chief) stressed that it was necessary to “concentrate on expanding [the] ARSST 

role as a space advisory/liaison capability. Instead of just operating systems 

ARSST must be able to support [the] warfighter on all space systems and issues.”5

 

At the HQ USARSPACE Program Management Review conducted six months 

later, the leading issue briefed was that the “ARSST must go beyond the CSP 

concept; [they] must be brokers for space force enhancement.”6

Nevertheless, a heavy schedule of operational deployments to the field and a lack 

of resources prevented the ARSST from taking those steps in the institutional 

development process that would be necessary if the teams were to focus on space 

analytic support rather than the manning of space-related equipment. This 

situation began to change during the 1997-1998 time frame with the development 

of the ASSC concept. To implement this initiative, USARSPACE provided an 

influx of additional resources to the ARSST. These resources were used to 

develop a new concept of operations, establish a unit training program, and 

support the evolution of the ARSST into a full-fledged space analysis team. While 

much work remains to be done, by 1998 the ARSST leadership had identified 

Army key space support requirements, established priorities for ARSST near-term 

evolution, and developed a plan for implementation. As a consequence, the 

ARSST had a firm foundation for evolving into a more robust team that would be 

capable of supporting the full range of warfighter requirements. 

However, while the additional resources provided by USARSPACE largely freed 

the ARSST from the tradeoff between providing deployment support or engaging 

in longer-term ARSST institutional development, longer-term issues remaiedn. 

For example, the ARSST TDA established a requirement for 34 soldiers, but only 

21 were authorized in 1998. If not addressed, ARSST team members feared that 

the personnel shortfall could inhibit the future evolution of the ARSST and the 

ASSC. As described earlier, the ASSC concept represented a new approach to the 

recurring question of where the Army should focus its contingency space support 

efforts. Under that concept, ARSST teams had to be prepared to deploy 

simultaneously to support all types of operations, conducted by Army units at a 

number of echelons. If the ARSST was to successfully deploy multiple teams 

simultaneously and support units in operations ranging from theater campaign 

planning to special operations reconnaissance, it might require more resources than 

were needed when a single ARSST team deployed independently. Resource 

requirements could also be expected to increase as the ARSST and ASSC develop 

new capabilities to provide space analytical support to field units. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 121 

The Bottom Line: A Requirement for Resources 

If the ARSST was to remain a valuable asset for the Army in both the near- and 

the long-term, Army decision makers concluded that sufficient resources had to be 

provided to avert a situation in which a tradeoff would be made between 

deployment support to the field and longer-term ARSST institutional development. 

The additional resources provided in the 1997-1998 time period allowed the 

ARSST to break out of the former cycle in which longer-term institutional 

development were often sacrificed for the sake of deploying teams to the field. In 

the meantime, however, the ARSST adopted a more aggressive concept of 

operations in which multiple teams would deploy simultaneously and new types of 

space analytic support would be provided to the field. These initiatives promised 

to yield great benefits to the Army. 

The View from the Field: How Supported Units Rate Arsst Support 

Units that received support from an ARSST in the past consistently rated the 

quality of ARSST support highly. In a field survey sent to officers who had 

trained with the ARSST, every respondent answered “yes” to the question, “If 

your unit deployed to war, would you request assistance from an Army Space 

Support Team?” Typical comments from the field include: “I still firmly believe 

that ARSSTs are truly a FORCE MULTIPLIER and bring a wealth of SPACE 

SYSTEMS support” and “I am a believer in the capabilities made available by the 

ARSST.” On the other hand, the ARSST had little exposure across the Army as a 

whole. For example, in the Army’s database of unit after-action reports and 

observations from exercises and CTC rotations, there were no references made to 

the ARSST. Similarly, while the ARSST was described in FM 100-18: Space 

Support to Army Operations, in 1998 there were no coordinating mechanisms or 

procedures for using an ARSST team or integrating space support into unit 

operations contained in other key Army manuals, such as FM 101-5: Staff 

Organization and Operations.

After-Action Reports and Observations From The Field 

In discussions with Army officers with experience at the Corps and Division level, 

a strong dichotomy was observed between those personnel who had trained with 

an ARSST and those who had not. Those personnel who had experience working 

with an ARSST team were invariably strong supporters of the concept. They also 

had a better understanding of how space contributes to Army operations than their 

counterparts who had not trained with an ARSST. Military officers who had not 

worked with the Army Space Support Team generally believed that space support 

capabilities were limited to GPS position/navigation systems and theater-level 

satellite communications. 

To gain a better understanding of how the “rank-and-file” Army viewed both 

space support and ARSST operations, a systematic search was conducted through 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 122 

the Army’s database of unit after-action reports and observations from exercises 

and CTC rotations. This database was maintained by the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned (CALL) at Ft. Leavenworth on a restricted basis and could only be 

accessed by military personnel, DoD civilians, and others with a demonstrated 

requirement for access. The purpose of that database search was twofold: The 

first objective was to learn what units had written about space support in their 

after-action reports; the second objective was to gain an understanding of what 

space support materials would be accessible through established Army channels to 

the typical officer during an operational deployment or exercise, in a school 

setting, or while providing staff support for force development, doctrinal writing, 

or related efforts. 

The most significant finding of the systematic database search was that there are 

no documents that directly mention or describe the ARSST. A search for 

information on the ARSST revealed 10 ‘hits’ – none of which was applicable. 

Each of the hits resulted from the scanning in of poor quality documents into the 

Center for Army Lessons Learned, causing the computer search engine to return 

hits on material unrelated to the ARSST. As a result, an individual searching for 

data on the ARSST would instead receive information on TASOC facilities, 

bibliographical citations from a study of the efforts of continuous operations on 

both soldier and unit performance, a roster for the pre-combat inspection team 

during the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s BOLD DRAGOON III Exercise 

“BEARHUNTER”, and a standardized form for the servicing of clothes dryers, 

washing machines, and other appliances.7

Similarly, there was no information on systems used by the ARSST in the Center 

for Army Lessons Learned system, such as the SSP (Space Support Platform) and 

OMEGA (a GPS accuracy prediction tool). A search under SSP revealed resulted 

in 16 hits, none of which were applicable to the Army Space Support Team or its 

operations.8 A search on OMEGA resulted in 30 hits, including one file describing 

the ARN-148 OMEGA GPS receiver mounted in a CH-47 helicopter, but no 

information on GPS accuracy.9

 

While no data on ARSST operations or systems was available in the Center for 

Army Lessons files, large quantities of information were uncovered on established 

space support systems, such as INMARSAT and GPS. Under INMARSAT, for 

example, 102 hits were registered.10 This included a number of lessons learned 

from Army operations throughout the world. A military officer looking for 

background information on the use of INMARSAT terminals would find that 

during ABLE SENTRY in Macedonia, INMARSAT had proved to be “an ideal 

product for contingency operations” and had been used to support brigade task 

force operations, intelligence, and maintenance.11 Furthermore, experiments were 

conducted with the Force Tracking System, designed to track logistical shipments 

with GPS positioning data and INMARSAT communications. Although this 

system had been designed to track shipments at sea, in Macedonia it was mounted 

on vehicles.12 In Haiti, INMARSAT had been used extensively throughout the JTF 

190 Headquarters, the 10th Mountain Division, and the United Nations forces. 

INMARSAT was considered so useful that it was recommended future 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 123 

communications packages for entry operations include INMARSAT terminals.13 

In addition, USARSPACE supported the Haiti deployment with INMARSAT, 

Mission Planning Rehearsal System, Terrain Reconnaissance Tool, and MultiSpectral Imagery Processor. An observer from the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned concluded: 

“The availability of new technologies from ARSPACE improved the 

capability of the CJTF/MNF to accomplish its operational mission. This 

equipment allowed the SWO to more easily provide weather support, and 

its use by the terrain team allowed terrain products for operations to be 

prepared more easily, faster, and with accurate data.”14

The military officer looking for background data on INMARSAT would also 

learn, among other things, that INMARSAT terminals had been used in Somalia 

for hospital operations, casualty reporting, equipment maintenance, and liaison 

with elements at Ft. Drum.15 For early entry operations in Somalia, INMARSAT 

was viewed as a “critical asset” but one that also was “expensive, lacked incountry maintenance” and required “strong centralized control.”16 For U.S. 

support to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, it was found that 

“The UN communications system could not be relied upon until very well into the 

mission . . . [but that] national rear link communications, via INMARSAT, were 

adequate for Contingent requirements up to the SECRET level.”17 During 

GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL, the Joint Operations Center “relied heavily on 

telephone comms (INMARSAT, DSN, MSE) for information flow and 

coordination.”18 However, the Joint Task Force J-2 had difficulty transmitting 

large graphics files via INMARSAT and it was recommended that the SIPRNET 

be used instead. Furthermore, it was recommended after GUARDIAN 

RETRIEVAL that the SETAF J2 acquire an INMARSAT to help “provide 

immediate SCI intelligence conductivity to the JTF.”19 For U.S. operations in 

Albania, INMARSAT had proven to be so useful that it was recommended that 

“INMARSAT link capability should be included on the first aircraft arriving in 

country.”20

As the examples above illustrate, there is a large quantity of information on 

INMARSAT usage in the unit after-action reports and external observations 

collected by the Army. Only rarely, however, are the benefits of systems such as 

the INMARSAT and GPS attributed to USARSPACE. Furthermore, data 

regarding current ARSST operations and equipment is noticeably absent. 

The Bottom Line: Officers Who Have Trained With An ARSST Are 

Impressed With The Value Of Space Support. 

Officers who trained with an ARSST in the past consistently rated the value of that 

support highly. Unfortunately, the ARSST had little exposure across the Army as 

a whole. For the long-term, ARSST soldiers emphasized that space support must 

be incorporated into existing Army systems and processes for training, doctrine, 

and force development. In the near-term, leaders in the USARSPACE needed to 

continue “selling” the ARSST to the rank-and-file Army. A variety of initiatives 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 124 

were being pursued by the USARSPACE leadership in 1998 to accomplish this 

objective. 

Space Support and Lessons Learned Analysis 

As noted in the previous section, in 1998 little information on ARSST operations 

and capabilities was available in the Army’s database of unit after-action reports, 

CTC observations, and exercise reports. This situation stemmed in large part form 

the lack of a formalized mechanism for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating 

lessons learned by the ARSST. 

The Original ARSST Reporting and Collection Process 

The original concept of operations for the ARSST (dated December 1994) 

included extensive reporting and collection requirements. Under that system, the 

following reporting requirements were established, with copies to be provided to 

both U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (now U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command) and HQDA: 

1. Monthly reports by USARSPACE on the operational status and 

availability of each ARSST system, the status and location of ARSST 

personnel, and the readiness and availability of the ARSST teams. 

2. Spot reports detailing personnel or equipment losses, equipment 

failures, impacting personnel actions, and mission conflicts. 

3. “HOTWASH” reports within 2 hours of the completion of an ARSST 

mission. 

4. Formatted after-action reports on all operational missions.21

Oral history interviews conducted with former and current ARSST Team Chiefs 

revealed that this process was never implemented. Although the ARSST teams 

produced written after-action reports for exercises that they supported, no evidence 

exists to suggest that these reports were indeed forwarded to USASSDC or 

HQDA. ARSST after-action reports were staffed through USARSPACE and 

approved by the USARSPACE Commander. However, there was no central 

repository for the retention and storage of ARSST after-action reports. In fact, 

when research was initiated for this history, each of the ARSST team members 

searched their personal files for copies of old after-action reports. Only seven 

were found.22 In addition, there is no evidence that ARSST after-action reports 

were incorporated into the Army-wide lessons learned system. Simply stated, 

there has not been a concerted effort over the past five years to disseminate space 

support lessons learned. In fact, some of the ARSST Team Chiefs interviewed for 

this history stated that, at one point in time, a senior USARSPACE officer 

provided specific guidance to stop documenting lessons learned. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 125 

Implications of the Failure to Capture ARSST Lessons Learned 

The results of the lack of a consistent and systematic process to capture, analyze, 

and disseminate lessons learned over the past five years of ARSST operations are 

as follows: 

Army Space Support Team Personnel. The ARSST was a tight-knit 

organization in which lessons learned were quickly disseminated among team 

members by word of mouth. However, the personnel turnover rate among the 

teams tended to be high. This fact, coupled with the lack of a systematic training 

program for new ARSST personnel, resulted in the loss of many lessons learned 

over time. 

U.S. Army Space Command. The ARSST served as the primary link between 

ARSPACE and the various warfighting headquarters. The USARSPACE Long 

Range Plan, as briefed during the May 98 IPR, identified the ARSST as the 

organization that provides “feedback to the ARSPACE staff on warfighting 

operational requirements to interject into the formal Army requirements process.” 

Such input from the ARSST was also valuable for force development and training 

efforts involving space. However, without a systematic lessons learned process, 

ARSST soldiers feared that it might be difficult for the ARSST to fulfill this key 

role. 

Army Training and Doctrine. The ARSST did not incorporate lessons learned 

on space (from the warfighter’s perspective) into either the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned process or the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

school system. The only space support lessons learned analysis that was prepared 

for Army-wide dissemination is The Ultimate High Ground! Space Support to the 

Army: Lessons from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM, which was 

written in 1991. As noted earlier, an officer searching the Army’s database of unit 

after-action reports in 1998 under the term “ARSST” would not find a single 

applicable reference. Instead, a series of unrelated documents and reports would 

be returned by the computer system. Furthermore, USARSPACE personnel 

interviewed noted that there was no systematic process whereby information 

gathered during ARSST deployments was provided directly to the TRADOC 

school system or incorporated into the space electives taught at the Army War 

College or Command and General Staff College. In short, the lessons learned 

during the prior five years of ARSST operations were not distributed throughout 

the “rank-and-file” Army. 

The Bottom Line: A Systematic Process Should Be Established to 

Disseminate Space Support Lessons Learned Throughout the Total 

Army. 

The Army employs a six-phase lessons learned process consisting of planning, 

collection, analysis, publication, distribution, and archiving. In 1998, the ARSST 

was collecting lessons learned and reporting them throughout Army Space 

Command after every mission. However, these lessons learned were not being 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 126 

developed for publication outside the Command, distributed to appropriate Army 

units, and archived for future use. Nor was a structured collection plan used by the 

ARSST to ensure that key issues were addressed and specified data was collected 

during an ARSST team deployment. 

The Arsst and Space Education 

All personnel interviewed for this history in 1998 stated their belief that the Army 

school system did not adequately prepare ARSST members to perform space 

analytic missions, nor did it sensitize warfighters to the importance and impact of 

space operations. ARSST personnel considered the development of Functional 

Area 40 as a key step toward solving these problems in the long-term. In addition, 

however, they saw a critical need for the Army to incorporate space into the 

professional education and development process for all leaders. 

Current Space Education 

The TRADOC space education program in 1998 consisted of two elective courses 

at Command and General Staff College, leading to the award of Additional Skill 

Identifier 3Y, and one elective course at the Army War College. There was no 

space instruction for company-grade officers and non-commissioned officers in the 

TRADOC school system. As a consequence, unless an officer had a particular 

interest in military space and opted to take the elective courses, he or she would 

not receive space training in a formal, school environment. A number of Army 

leaders were exposed to space when they receive support from an ARSST in the 

field. Unfortunately, the officers who take the CGSC and Army War College 

electives, or who have experience training with an ARSST, represented a tiny 

fraction of the total force. 

For ARSST team members, there was little space training and education in the 

period from 1994 to 1997. Many ARSST team members noted that they had been 

deployed to the field within two to three weeks of assignment to USARSPACE. 

ARSST team chiefs were typically sent to the Joint Space Fundamentals Course 

and received some training on ARSST equipment and systems. However, all team 

chiefs interviewed in 1998 strongly emphasized that this level of education was 

inadequate to perform space analytical duties in the field. Non-commissioned 

officers focused on the manning of space support systems and were trained largely 

through an on-the-job process. ARSST NCOs tended to view this process as 

satisfactory for operating ARSST equipment, but insufficient for space analysis 

support duties. 

The initiative that began in 1998 to provide training to ARSST personnel in a 

formal, systematic manner was seen as a positive step by all ARSST team chiefs 

interviewed during this history. They stated that the ARSST’s continued 

evolution, as envisioned under the ASSC concept, remained dependent on the 

establishment of a good training and professional development program. The 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 127 

value of the training itself, however, was questioned by many ARSST team 

members. They argued that significant revisions and upgrades to the curriculum 

were required. Because both the ASSC concept and the supporting training 

process were still relatively new, it was not surprising that many ARSST team 

members argued for revisions to the training program. It should also be noted that 

the ARSST Branch Chief in 1998, Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer, had already 

taken steps to adapt the current training program in response to identified 

shortcomings and anticipated requirements. 

Future Army Space Education 

In 1998 the Army explored a number of initiatives for future space education, 

literacy, and training programs, such as the development of a Master of Military 

Arts and Sciences program with a focus on space operations. A full consideration 

of these initiatives lies beyond the scope of this history. However, it should be 

noted that ARSST soldiers interviewed for this history tended to share the 

following perspective. First, space education programs must be incorporated 

throughout the TRADOC school system, to include CAS3, Officer Advanced and 

Basic Courses, and advanced NCO courses. One former ARSST team chief added 

that space education should even be extended to the pre-commissioning process 

for officers. Second, there was a significant level of interest in Functional Area 40 

activation and development. ARSST team chiefs often argued that their current 

duties were closely related to what an FA40 officer will do in the future when 

assigned to a Corps or Division staff. In addition, ARSST team chiefs felt that 

lessons learned during ARSST operations should be used to help guide the 

development of Functional Area 40. Third, as noted above, ARSST leaders in 

1998 strongly believed that the education process for ARSST team chiefs required 

further development and expansion. Finally, many ARSST personnel argued that 

the ARSST teams could fulfill an important role in providing space education and 

training to soldiers in the field, if properly trained and resourced. 

The Bottom Line: Continued Emphasis Should Be Placed Upon the 

Development of Space Education and Training Programs 

Training and education programs in 1998 did not adequately prepare the Army to 

cope with space. In the long-term, the activation of the new Functional Area 40 

was expected to help address that problem. In the short-term, ARSST leaders 

expected that the ARSST teams would continue to fill an indispensable role by 

helping to translate space capabilities into ‘tools’ for a supported unit. However, if 

the Army was to achieve the maximum value from space systems and capabilities 

in the future while minimizing the impact of adversary space usage, continued 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 128 

space education and training efforts would be essential. Initiatives within 

USARSPACE to enhance the quality of space training — not only for ARSST 

personnel but throughout the Army — were emphasized in 1998 as key priorities 

for the Command that should be adequately resourced by the Army. 

Figure 18: Space Education in the Army’s School System, 1998.23

School Military Space Instruction 

U.S. Army War College 1 Space Elective. 

School of Advanced Military Studies 1⁄2 Day Familiarization Session, 

Periodically Conducted by 

USARSPACE. 

Command and General Staff College 2 Space Electives. 

CAS3 None. 

Advanced Officer Courses None known. 

Basic Officer Courses None known. 

NCO Development System None known. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 129 

The Arsst and Space Demonstration 

All ARSST team members interviewed for this history believed that a primary role 

for the Army Space Support Team should be to provide field demonstrations of 

new space technologies and systems. However, as a general rule, ARSST team 

members did not believe that this function was being performed very well and 

noted that an improved process should be developed. In addition, they saw a need 

for a close relationship between the ARSST and the Space and Missile Defense 

Battle Laboratory. 

The ARSST and Space System Demonstration Missions 

From the standpoint of former and current ARSST team chiefs, the Army Space 

Exploitation Demonstration Program was not successfully equipping the teams 

with new systems and technologies in 1998. As early as January 1996, ARSST 

leaders were expressing concerns that the ASEDP process was not furnishing new 

systems for the teams to take with them to the field. Major Mike Jensen, the 

ARSST Division Chief at the time, noted that it was important to “[e]mphasize to 

the command that the Demo program must be providing ARSST new technology 

yearly to stay viable (LEOCOMM, GBS are good examples).”24 ARSST personnel 

interviewed for this history were in agreement on three central points. First, they 

believed that the ARSST should serve as a conduit between the space 

demonstration effort conducted at the Space and Missile Defense Battle 

Laboratory (SMDBL) and the warfighter. Second, they agreed that the present 

space demonstration system had not fully satisfied the requirement to introduce 

new systems and technologies. Third, most believed that serious efforts to address 

this issue were being made at the SMDBL and were very hesitant to criticize the 

personnel involved in the program. 

One typical ARSST team assessment of the space demonstration program was that 

 “the idea was clearly a sound idea – that things would go through 

ASEDP and come through the ARSST teams. There were a couple of 

systems that went directly from ASEDP to fielding and there were other 

systems that just died. Priorities shifted, concepts changed, and we 

actually got left holding the bag with ’94 equipment until very recently. 

We sort of lost a little bit of faith in the ASEDP system.” He added, 

“There’s clearly a need for it. There needs to be conduit between what is 

now the Battle Lab and the space support teams. One of the things I 

would have liked to have seen is the ASEDP folks and industry come to 

us and say: ‘What do you need?’ What we found is that nobody ever 

asked us what we thought we needed. Very rarely did anybody ever ask 

the guys out in the units what they needed. More often than not they 

came to us and said: ‘Hey, you need this.’”25
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 130 

From an historical standpoint, the initial level of interaction between the ASEDP 

and the ARSST was very high. The four original systems acquired for the COPS 

teams in 1994 had previously been demonstrated under ASEDP. Existing ASEDP 

training plans were adapted for COPS deployment purposes.26 Furthermore, the 

concept of operations envisioned that teams would routinely be augmented by 

ASEDP equipment and personnel prior to deployment.27

In the period from 1995 to 1998, the level of interaction between the ARSST and 

the demonstration program declined. The ASEDP continued to provide new 

systems to the ARSST teams for demonstration in the field, such as the Laptop 

Visualization Device (LVD), Low-Earth Orbit Mobile Data Communications 

Capability (LEOCOMM), Global Broadcast Service (GBS), Direct PC, the 

Vehicular Data Communications and Positional Awareness Demonstration 

(VDCPAD), and the Attitude Determination Device (ADD). However, with the 

exception of ADD (which was demonstrated by Captain Cuthbertson and later 

selected for adoption into the next generation fire support vehicle28), in 1998 no 

ARSST team chief cited an example of a systematic transition of an ASEDP 

system through the ARSST to the field. This might have reflected the difficulties 

in measuring and quantifying the relationship between space demonstration efforts 

and subsequent adoption of the systems by the Army as a whole. A number of 

USARSPACE personnel argued that there has been a direct correlation between 

space demonstration efforts and unit demand for (and acquisition of) space 

systems, such as satellite weather receivers and satellite communications 

terminals. Others cautioned that no hard evidence had been developed that 

demonstrates a clear cause-and-effect relationship. In other words, other factors 

could be influencing the Army’s interest in space systems and efforts to acquire 

them. 

A full examination of the process of space demonstration to the field – and the 

correlation between this activity and subsequent Army decision making – lies 

beyond the scope of this history. It should be noted, however, that anecdotal 

evidence in the historical record suggested that there was a relatively strong

correlation between the demonstration of new technologies by USARSPACE 

personnel and the subsequent adoption of space systems by warfighters. In the 

absence of evidence to the contrary, it is safe to assume that such a correlation 

indeed existed and that ARSST personnel performed an important duty when they 

brought new systems to the field. Furthermore, ARSST team members saw a clear 

benefit stemming from the ability of warfighters to experiment with new 

technologies and systems in an operational setting, suggest improvements, and 

even reject them outright before the Army had devoted a significant level of 

resources to acquiring the system. 

The Bottom Line: The ARSST Should Continue To Demonstrate New 

Space Systems 

The ARSST leadership in 1998 concluded that they could play a significant role 

for the Army as a conduit for bringing new technologies to warfighters. Although 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 131 

ARSST personnel identified a number of weaknesses in program implementation 

and the value of the demonstration effort was somewhat difficult to quantify, the 

idea of using ARSST teams to demonstrate equipment was fundamentally sound. 

The Army needed to experiment with next-generation technologies and 

capabilities; the ARSST had the ability to bring these systems to the field 

effectively and at the lowest cost. 

Summary 

Army initiatives over the past twelve years to bring space technologies to field 

units clearly demonstrated the requirement for a deployable team of space experts 

capable of supporting tactical and operational missions. This team must be able to 

deploy directly into a theater of operations, integrate itself into the staff process 

and battle rhythm of the supported unit, and provide space analytic products and 

advice to the commander. In other words, the Army had a clear need for a team 

that could translate space capabilities into warfighting tools and ensure that space 

considerations were professionally addressed throughout all aspects of mission 

planning and execution. 

The decision to activate an ARSST in 1994 marked a crucial step in the process of 

bringing space support to the warfighter. Over the next five years, ARSST teams 

deployed to support Army operations and exercises around the world, in the 

process incorporating space into the activities of units ranging from battalion to 

theater level. During this period, a number of recurring themes and issues were 

identified. First, the ARSST must be adequately resourced to support both 

deployment missions and longer-term institutional development activities. When 

resources were insufficient to accomplish both functions in the period between 

1995 and 1997, the ARSST leadership was forced to focus on near-term 

deployment support missions while sacrificing longer-term institutional 

development. As USARSPACE implemented the Army Space Support Cell 

concept in 1998 — which promises to yield tremendous benefits for the Army — 

ARSST leaders emphasized the importance of sufficient personnel, funding, and 

equipment. 

Second, units that received support from an ARSST consistently rated the value 

and importance of space support highly. However, only a small number of officers 

had an opportunity to train closely with ARSST personnel. USARSPACE, with 

assistance from senior leaders throughout USASMDC, continued to take steps to 

sensitize and teach the rest of the Army about the value of space. The ARSST 

represented a success story and provides an example of what can be accomplished 

for the rest of the Army. Closely related to this issue was a third key point — the 

fact that the five years of ARSST space support lessons learned had not been 

disseminated throughout the Army and, thus, were not available to inform Army 

training, doctrine, and force development efforts. This failure stemmed from the 

lack of a systematic process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating lessons 

learned. Existing mechanisms within the USASMDC were examined for their 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 132 

relevance in addressing this issue, to include a systematic process for planning, 

collection, analysis, publication, distribution, and archiving lessons learned. 

The fourth recurring issue in the history of ARSST operations was the lack of 

formalized spaced education and training for both the ARSST and the ‘rank-andfile’ Army. In the long-term, the activation of the new Functional Area 40 was 

expected to help address this problem. In the short-term, the ARSST would 

continue to fill an indispensable role by helping to translate space capabilities into 

‘tools’ for a supported unit. However, if the Army was to achieve the maximum 

value from space systems and capabilities in the future while minimizing the 

impact of adversary space usage, continued space education and training efforts 

would be essential. Ongoing initiatives within USARSPACE to enhance the 

quality of space training — not only for ARSST personnel but throughout the 

Army — were identified as key priorities for the Command that should be 

adequately resourced by the Army. 

Another key issue that had risen repeatedly since the activation of the teams in 

1994 was the relationship between the ARSST and the space demonstration 

program. Although the ARSST originated as an offshoot of the Army Space 

Exploitation Demonstration Program, the level of interaction between the teams 

and the demonstration program diminished over the years. In 1998, the ARSST 

leadership repeatedly expressed concerns that the teams were not equipped with 

the latest space systems and technologies. Although there were a number of 

ongoing initiatives to address this issue in 1998 and the relationship between the 

ARSST and the demonstration program was expected to continue to evolve in the 

future, one point was clear — the ARSST teams were uniquely qualified to serve 

as a conduit for warfighter experimentation with new space capabilities. 

 

1

 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Draft Contingency 

Operations (Space) Concept of Operations (September 1994 Draft). Electronic 

copy of document on floppy diskette. Diskette found in ARSST Division files. 

2

 Major Cafaro, U.S. Army Space Command, “Trip Report – Joint Task Force 

Support Hope, 29 July to 13 August 1994.” 18 August 1994. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

5

 Electronic Mail Message, Major Mike Jensen, ARSST Division Chief, “Future 

ARSST Issues.” 8 January 1996. 

6

 Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, "Army Space Support Team 

Briefing at the HQ USARSPACE (Forward) Program Management Review." 12 

July 1996. 

7

 Unlimited content search conducted by James Hooper through the restricted 

Center for Army Lessons Learned database on 3 December 1998 under the term 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 133 

 

“ARSST.” A search under the term “Army Space Support Team” and “Space 

Support Team” proved to be overly broad. While these searches yielded a number 

of hits, none was applicable to the ARSST. 

8

 Unlimited content search conducted by James Hooper through the restricted 

Center for Army Lessons Learned database on 3 December 1998 under the term 

“SSP.” A search under the term “Space Support Platform” uncovered many more 

files but none of them appeared to be applicable to ARSST operations. 

9

 Unlimited content search conducted by James Hooper through the restricted 

Center for Army Lessons Learned database on 3 December 1998 under the term 

“OMEGA” and “GPS.” 

10 Unlimited content search conducted by James Hooper through the restricted 

Center for Army Lessons Learned database on 3 December 1998 under the term 

“INMARSAT.” For GPS, literally hundreds of hits were registered. 

11 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “EXERCISE ABLE SENTRY 

AAR 930625-940106.” Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “CALL 

LESSONS LEARNED: OPN ABLE SENTRY, OOTW -- 9410.” 

12 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “CALL LESSONS LEARNED: 

OPN ABLE SENTRY, OOTW -- 9410.” 

13 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “HAITI IIR VOL 1 941201.” 

14 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “HAITI OBSN AIRSPACE [sic] 

EQUIP USED BY THE CJTF-MNF.” Captain Williams, Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, "OPERATION MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY: ARSPACE 

Equipment Used by CJTF/MNF HQs Staffs." Undated. 

15 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “SOMALIA TF MTN AAR 

930213.” Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “CALL SOMALIA-LL9112-9305.” 

16 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “CALL SOMALIA-LL-9112-

9305.” 

17 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “PEACE UN PEACEKEEPING 

OPNS IN CAMBODIA 930622.” 

18 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL AAR03, OPS.” 

19 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL AAR07, INTEL, WEATHER.” 

20 Center for Army Lessons Learned Database, “CALL IIR ALBANIA, NOMAD 

VIGIL.” 

21 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command: 12 December 1994.).. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 134 

 

22 After-action reports were found for ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98; 1st Infantry 

Division Warfighter Exercise; 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group JRTC 

Rotation 97-7; 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group AWE TF XXI exercise; 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 97; YAMA SAKURA XXXI; and ULCHI FOCUS LENS 

96. 

23 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. This chart was developed 

by Lieutenant Colonel Simmons during the course of the oral history interview as 

he described the state of space education in the Army. 

24 Electronic Mail Message, Major Mike Jensen, ARSST Division Chief, “Future 

ARSST Issues.” 8 January 1996. 

25 James Hooper, “Major Scott Cuthbertson Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 29 October 1998. 

26 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Task Order Plan 

95-08: Contingency Operations (Space) / COPS Documentation Development. 26 

September 1994. 

27 Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group, Task Order Plan 

94-08: Contingency Operations (Space) / COPS Documentation Development. 7 

July 1994. 

28 James Hooper, “Major Scott Cuthbertson Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 29 October 1998. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 135

CHAPTER FIVE: 

FUTURE ARSST EVOLUTION 

“The role of the Army in space is already evident – it has no role.” 

 — B. Bruce-Briggs, 1986.1

“Assuming settlements on the moon, Mars, or wherever, would it not be 

appropriate for the Army to maintain a space version of its current Earth 

missions?” 

 — Major Sherwood C. Spring, U.S. Army, 1983.2

If decision-makers are to make informed choices, they must possess a clear 

understanding of the past. The primary goal of this analysis of the Army Space 

Support Team has been to support decision-making—both present and future—

by outlining the organizational and intellectual evolution of the ARSST, 

identifying trends and issues of significance, and explaining how important 

problems were approached and why key decisions were made. 

As the quotes at the top of this page illustrate, a number of wild predictions 

have been made about the Army’s role in space in the past. No such 

predictions will be made in this chapter. Instead, the following questions will 

be addressed: 

• In the past, what has the ARSST long range vision been? How have 

ARSST personnel looked at future space support operations? 

• What are the major assumptions underlying current ARSST long range 

planning?

• What concepts for future ARSST organization and operations are currently 

being discussed and explored? 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 136 

THE ARSST LONG RANGE VISION, 1996-1998 

In the period from 1986-1998, the Army actively experimented with tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for exploiting space systems and technologies. 

Members of the Army Space Support Team played a key role in this process since 

1994. Throughout, ARSST personnel were cognizant of two significant facts. 

First, space technology and capabilities were rapidly evolving. Second, to keep 

pace with this evolution the ARSST must continue to adapt and grow. As a 

consequence, the officers and NCOs assigned to the ARSST spent a tremendous 

amount of time thinking about the future. 

ARSST Long Range Vision: January 1996 

The first far-reaching vision of future ARSST roles, missions, and operations was 

presented by Major Jensen (ARSST Division Chief) after the teams had completed 

their first year of field operations. In Major Jensen’s vision, the future role of the 

ARSST would be to provide multi-dimensional space support to the Army, to 

include operational support, space analysis, force development, and training. On 

an operational level, the ARSSTs would continue to provide rapidly deployable 

space support for the Army and would be responsible for helping supported units 

develop and execute operations plans. ARSSTs would support Army units from 

Brigade to Corps level. The ARSST would also participate in Army force 

development efforts, helping to “test and evaluate Force Development 

employment and organizational concepts.” Finally, the ARSST would play a 

leading role in the space education of the Army by providing technology 

demonstrations and equipment training, to include a “‘Green Suit’ education 

program at TRADOC schools.”3

ARSST Long Range Vision: July 1996 

The need for the ARSST to continue to evolve to perform new roles and missions, 

which was identified by Major Jensen in January 1996, was reemphasized during a 

Program Management Review conducted by USARSPACE in July. During this 

review session, the ARSST discussed the need for the teams to evolve so that they 

could “be brokers for space force enhancement.”4

 It was also expected that the 

ARSST teams would “continue to serve as an operational 

exploitation/demonstration platform introducing and supporting the warfighter 

with new technology.”5

 Given this long range forecast, the ARSST Division saw a 

need to be integrated into the planning and process for major Corps-level exercises 

and contingency missions. In addition, the ARSST teams would be responsible for 

educating Corps staffs on Army space-based force enhancement capabilities. 

Finally, the ARSSTs would need to take steps to “integrate current and future 

ARSPACE space force enhancement capabilities at Corps level and below.”6
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 137 

ARSST Long Range Vision: 1997 

The ARSST continued to evaluate future possibilities for the evolution of the 

teams in 1997. A number of areas for future expansion of the ARSST role were 

foreseen. First, USARSPACE envisioned an evolution of the ARSST into “a ‘one 

stop shop’ with weather, imagery, missile defense, space expertise, and 

communications.” Second, the ARSST would have to develop an improved ability 

to conduct joint operations, to include mechanisms for coordinating with the Joint 

Space Support Teams and other space support assets. Third, the ARSST Division 

saw a need to support units in the field from Combatant Command to Division 

level. Fourth, the ARSST would continue to bring the latest technology to the 

field, whether it was acquired through ASEDP or a materiel developer. These 

technology demonstrations were expected to include systems capable of faster data 

transfer, direct downlink of imagery, and enhanced communications. In addition, 

the ARSST would experiment with techniques to integrate “black” and “white” 

space capabilities. Finally, the ARSST would seek to play a key role in the space 

education of the Army.7

ARSST Long Range Vision and Planning Thrusts: 1998 

In 1998, the ARSST participated in the development of the USARSPACE Long 

Range Plan. While developing input for this plan, the ARSST assumed that no 

significant changes in the mission would take place in either the mid-term (1-5 

years in the future) or the long-term (5-12 years in the future). It was expected that 

the ARSST would “continue to maintain the capability to rapidly deploy 

worldwide to provide space force enhancement to Army units during contingency 

operations and exercises.”8 While no major changes in the ARSST mission were 

anticipated, it was expected that the continued evolution of space systems would 

influence the type of support provided by the ARSST. Specifically, ARSST 

capabilities were expected to focus increasingly on space analysis missions. In the 

meantime, ARSST equipment would become smaller and easier to integrate into 

the command and control networks of supported units. Finally, many functions 

currently performed by the ARSST, such as production of high quality multispectral imagery, would likely be integrated into supported units as an internal 

capability. 

In May 1998, an in-process review of the USARSPACE Long Range Plan was 

conducted. During this review, a series of long range planning thrusts were 

presented. For the ASSC, seven key thrusts were identified: First, it was 

recommended that two ASSCs be forward-deployed, with one stationed in Korea 

and a second ASSC in Europe. The second ASSC thrust was the designation of 

the Army Space Support Cell as the focal point for injecting USARSPACE input 

into the theater planning process. As such, the ASSC would function as a liaison 

element for all space and missile defense support. The third long range planning 

thrust was the integration of the ASSC into the Theater Crisis Action Team, 

ensuring that space capabilities were integrated into all elements of a theater 

headquarters planning process. The fourth recommendation was that the ASSC be 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 138 

assigned the mission of providing logistics support for all SMDC assets in theater. 

The fifth long range planning thrust was ASSC coordination with in-theater staffs 

to provide training and ensure that space events and considerations were 

incorporated into exercises. Sixth, the need for ASSCs to participate in theater 

exercises was emphasized. Such participation would ensure that space events 

were properly simulated. Finally, the ASSC recommended that a USARSPACE 

Battle Staff be established to support military operations. This staff was intended 

to function as a cohesive planning and coordinating element, with the capability to 

support all levels of conflict, 

contingency missions, crises, 

and exercises.9

During the May 1998 inprocess review, a number of 

key long range planning 

thrusts were also identified for 

the ARSST. The first thrust 

presented was the need to 

integrate the ARSST teams 

into BCTP and CTC rotations. 

Second, it was recommended 

that the ARSST teams be used 

to introduce new equipment 

and space products to 

supported units. This would 

ensure that USARSPACE continued to provide cutting-edge technology to the 

field. Third, the ARSST cited a need to develop and conduct advanced training 

for ARSST personnel, to include both individual and collective training tasks. 

Training was needed to educate newly assigned personnel on essential ARSST 

functions and to maintain the proficiency of experienced personnel. In addition, 

training programs needed to be updated as new hardware and software were 

acquired. The fourth long range planning thrust discussed at the review was the 

development of an internet homepage to provide information on ARSST 

capabilities. The fifth planning thrust presented during the review was the need to 

exploit the capabilities of USSPACECOM and the other Services. The intent of 

this thrust was to leverage all of these capabilities on behalf of ground forces. The 

final ARSST long range planning thrust was the use of the ARSST teams to 

provide feedback on warfighter operational requirements. This data would be 

integrated by USARSPACE into the Army’s formal requirements process.10 

The ARSST Long Range Vision: Common Themes (1996-1998) 

A number of visions for future ARSST roles, missions, and operations were 

considered by the ARSST from 1996 to 1998. Although there was significant 

evolution in the manner in which this vision has been presented, three common 

elements were present in each iteration: First, each of these visions assumed that 

1998 Long Range Planning Assumptions. 

• The space capabilities of United States 

adversaries will increase. 

• The dependence of the United States on space 

systems will increase (RISTA, navigation, 

targeting, communications, etc.) 

• Highly capable space systems will be available 

commercially, and might be available to an 

adversary during hostilities. 

• Commercial satellite communications 

capabilities will continue to improve. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 139 

the primary ARSST mission would continue to be deploying to the field to provide 

operational space support. Second, each of these visions assumed that the ARSST 

role should not be limited to manning equipment. Instead, the ARSST must be 

capable of conducting space planning and analysis. Third, it was anticipated that 

the ARSST teams would continue to serve a key role in providing equipment 

demonstrations and space education to the Army. 

ARSST Long Range Planning Assumptions, 1998 

In developing input for the USARSPACE Long Range Plan in February 1998, the 

ARSST assumed that it would have to react to four significant trends in the 

military space environment. First, it was assumed that the potential space 

capabilities of adversary forces would continue to increase. Second, the reliance 

of the U.S. and its potential coalition partners upon space-based capabilities would 

also continue to rise, particularly for intelligence, navigation, targeting, munitions 

guidance, and communications support. Third, commercial space capabilities 

would continue to evolve and expand. Potential adversaries might be able to 

employ commercial systems and capabilities to influence the course of events on a 

battlefield. Finally, it was assumed that satellite communications systems would 

continue to improve, providing new command and control options for both 

friendly and adversary forces. 

Each of the four assumptions used as a basis for ARSST long range planning 

reflected a reasonable extension of current and ongoing trends in the military space 

environment. The list of foreign countries that owned and operated space systems 

in 1998 included Russia, China, India, France, Israel, Japan – and continues to 

grow. In addition, a number of other countries had demonstrated an interest in 

similarly acquiring space systems and capabilities. As a result, the Defense 

Intelligence Agency expected that nearly forty countries will have their own 

satellite systems by the year 2018.11

The second key long range planning assumption – a continued increase in the 

reliance of the United States on space systems and capabilities – also represented 

an ongoing trend in the military space environment. The United States had 

historically led the world in the development and use of military space technology. 

As the U.S. military embraced the future espoused in Joint Vision 2010, the role of 

space in delivering Information Superiority was expected to become even more 

critical. Command and control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and indicators and warning systems would all be heavily spacedependent. Furthermore, potential adversaries had noted the U.S. dependence on 

space. During the Cold War, the Soviet military incorporated space denial 

operations into its strategic doctrine; emerging military powers, such have China, 

had similarly begun thinking about vulnerabilities stemming from U.S. 

dependence on space. For example, military analysts in China in 1998 contended 

that the neutralization of U.S. satellite systems offers one asymmetrical approach 

to warfare that “could cripple the United States at a low cost to China.”12
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 140 

The third long range planning assumption identified by the ARSST – an increase 

in the capabilities of commercial space systems and the consequent potential for an 

adversary to employ those capabilities to influence the course of events on a 

battlefield – represented another continuation of the current trend lines. While the 

commercial space industry in the United States had taken a leading role in 

developing multi-spectral imagery systems, a number of foreign countries had also 

developed or were in the process of developing commercial imaging satellites 

(e.g., the French SPOT 4 and 5, the Indian IRS-1C and IRS-1D, the Korean 

KOMSAT, and the Japanese ADEOS).13 The Defense Intelligence Agency 

expected that, by the year 2018, twelve commercial consortia would offer products 

and service with significant potential for battlefield application.14 Some military 

space analysts further predicted that the capabilities of commercial imaging 

satellites would evolve within 10 years to the point where they could offer a 

customer imagery at a resolution of one meter or better, possibly available through 

direct tasking and downlink.15

The fourth ARSST long range planning assumption – that the capabilities of 

satellite communications systems would continue to improve, providing new 

options for both friendly and adversary forces – was tied to long-term, structural 

changes presently taking place in the global telecommunications industry. A 

number of satellite communications initiatives in 1998, such as Iridium, 

GlobalStart, Odyssey, and Teledesic, offered low-cost data and voice connections 

to commercial customers. The United States military had already made heavy use 

of existing commercial satellite communications systems, such as INMARSAT, to 

support deployments in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and other locations. 

Adversary forces, who could expect their military command and control systems 

to be heavily targeted by the United States in any conflict, might decide to 

similarly exploit commercial satellite communication systems. 

Visions for Long Term Space Support Evolution 

In 1998 the Army was deeply engaged in a number of DTLOMS initiatives 

designed to exploit the capabilities offered by existing and future space 

technologies. These initiatives, when considered in tandem, represented a 

significant expansion of the role that space-borne systems were expected to play in 

Army operations in the future. 

From a doctrinal standpoint, TRADOC planners assumed that space systems 

would play a magnified role as the Army evolves into Force XXI and the Army 

After Next. It was anticipated that the Army would place increased reliance on 

space-based capabilities (including civilian systems) to support command and 

control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and weapons targeting. 

Furthermore, TRADOC emphasized the need for the Army to cope with the use of 

advanced space capabilities, both military and civilian, that might be exploited by 

an adversary in the future.16 From a leadership development and training 

perspective, the Army took steps to activate the new FA40 functional area (Space 

Operations Officer) to deal with the warfighting implications of space operations. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 141 

From the standpoint of materiel development, the Army began to explore the 

potential for integrating space capabilities into larger warfighting systems. For 

example, the Army explored the development of a “tactical internet” that would 

link each soldier on the battlefield and permit data to be shared instantaneously. 

As part of the tactical internet concept, GPS systems would be used to track the 

position of all U.S. units automatically. In the meantime, satellite systems would 

operate in conjunction with unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance aircraft, and 

special operations forces to identify enemy movements. After advanced sensor 

systems detected enemy units, the enemy would be attacked at long range by 

precision-guided artillery (possibly enhanced with GPS guidance support). In the 

meantime, an advanced digital communications system would permit soldiers on 

the ground to share information, giving U.S. forces the agility required to 

outmaneuver an enemy force, and allow logistics support units to track the fuel 

and ammunition usage of maneuver forces automatically.17

In 1998, the ‘tactical internet’ was viewed as the potential next wave in providing 

space support to the Army, offering the seamless integration of space capabilities, 

such as GPS, into larger warfighting systems. This trend was also evident in a 

number of ongoing materiel development programs. For example, the Joint 

Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN), designed to detect chemical and 

biological attacks, integrated handheld detectors, GPS receivers, and modeling and 

simulation software. JWARN was intended to distribute reports on the location 

and type of a biological or chemical attack automatically, forecast how the agent 

might be affected by weather conditions, and track any movement.18 The 

ATACMS Block II system would use GPS for enhanced accuracy.19 It was even 

proposed that individual soldiers be equipped with space systems. Under one 

concept for space support to infantry units, 

“each rifleman would have a GPS terminal, a radio and computer built 

into his backpack and a monocle eyepiece attached to his helmet through 

which he could see a digital battlefield map or the view through the nightvision telescopic sight mounted on his rifle. By aiming the rifle with the 

eyepiece, he would be able to shoot around a corner while exposing only 

his forearms.”20

These initiatives and ideas represented a significant expansion of the role that 

space-borne systems were expected to play in supporting Army operations in the 

future. They also highlighted the Army’s need for space experts able to translate 

space capabilities into ‘tools’ for the ground commander. 

The Long Term View from the ARSST: Areas of Consensus 

Personnel assigned to the ARSST, interviewed in 1998, had thought deeply about 

tactics, techniques, and procedures for applying space in support of future Army 

operations. In addition, ARSST personnel considered a number of roles and 

organizational constructs that might be used by the ARSST to help supported units 

accomplish their missions. There was a strong degree of consensus among 

ARSST personnel on key aspects of the future evolution of the teams, as revealed 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 142 

in oral history interviews conducted with the current ARSST Branch Chief, all 

current ARSST team chiefs, many of the non-commissioned officers assigned to 

the ARSST, military officers formerly assigned to the ARSST, and civilian 

personnel who were involved in the development of the team from 1994-1998. 

First, all ARSST personnel saw a need for the Army to be involved in space. 

Everyone who was interviewed as part of this history believed that the Army 

received clear benefits from the use of space-based technologies and systems. 

Second, there was a strong consensus among ARSST personnel that the role of the 

teams must be expanded beyond manning equipment and that the capability to 

conduct space analytic support must be developed. For example, Lieutenant 

Colonel Bob Simmons of U.S. Army Space Command suggested that one long 

term space analytical role for the ARSST would be to develop a “space estimate” 

for the supported commander as part of a formal staff process.21 Other personnel 

assigned to the ARSST referred to this process as ‘space intelligence preparation 

of the battlefield.’22 Despite the differences in the terminology that was used, 

however, all ARSST personnel viewed this capability as a key to the Army of the 

future. 

As part of the ARSST’s evolution into a space analysis-oriented organization, 

ARSST personnel also saw the need to develop new capabilities to support field 

unit. Examples cited included the need to provide a supported commander with 

information on the specific capabilities of U.S., adversary, and neutral satellite 

systems, the effects of space weather on friendly operations, and GPS accuracy 

impacts. ARSST personnel asserted that these analytic tools could be used to 

enhance the operations of a supported unit, particularly in the future as 

increasingly capable space systems were introduced. 

As one example of a space analysis capability that currently does not exist in the 

Army, Lieutenant Colonel Simmons noted that USARSPACE did not know in 

1998 which specific military systems and staff processes were related to a space 

capability. As a consequence, the ARSST teams were unable to provide specific 

analytic support to a unit on how, for instance, variations in GPS accuracy might 

affect the accuracy of an ATACMS strike. Lieutenant Colonel Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer of USARSPACE suggested that one analytic 

role for the ARSST would be to develop the capability to advise a supported 

commander on which of his systems were reliant on space and how changes in the 

space environment or satellite infrastructure (either as the result of natural 

phenomena, enemy action, or U.S. decisions) would affect those systems.23 

All ARSST personnel interviewed, without exception, anticipated a continued 

need for the ARSST to provide equipment demonstrations and space education to 

the Army. Lieutenant Colonel Maurer noted: “The technology is going to change 

and until it’s folded into the Army – if it’s a prototype and it has merit – I think the 

ARSST is exactly the right place to put it. We can do the proof of principle and 

see what the merit is.”24 Other ARSST personnel reiterated the same theme. For 

example, Captain David Strombeck emphasized: “The Battle Lab should be 

getting the unique capabilities and the ARSST should be demonstrating it.”25
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 143 

One critical warfighting need 

emphasized by ARSST 

personnel was the ability to 

provide unclassified direct 

tasking/direct downlink 

imagery at resolutions of 10 

meters or better. A number of 

ARSST personnel talked at 

great length about the 

importance of acquiring such a 

capability for the Army. 

Lieutenant Colonel Maurer 

noted: “Eagle Vision II is a 

prime example. I would like to 

take that under the ARSST 

team. It gives me direct 

downlink capability. What a 

great asset if the balloon goes 

up for a space team to have 

that and to be able to produce a 

real-time space product for a 

tactical commander.”26 

One issue that all current 

ARSST team chiefs 

emphasized repeatedly and 

unequivocally was the need for 

the Army Space Support Team to move away from the focus on production of 

multi-spectral imagery maps for supported units. The ARSST team chiefs viewed 

this support as a redundant capability that is largely duplicative of the work 

performed by engineer topographic analysts already assigned to Corps and 

Division headquarters. Even though supported units use ARSST-produced 

imagery and the ARSST teams can often provide a somewhat superior multispectral imagery product to the supported unit, ARSST personnel emphasized the 

need for the teams to evolve beyond producing topographic imagery into a focus 

on providing space analytic support. 

The Long Term View from the ARSST: Unresolved Issues 

Although there was a remarkable degree of consensus among ARSST team 

members regarding the future evolution of the teams, some issues of disagreement 

remained. First, a number of concepts for the integration of “black” (classified) 

and “white” (unclassified) space products had been discussed by the ARSST. 

Many ARSST personnel viewed this as an initiative that offers significant potential 

for the Army. They believed that black-white space integration should be pursued 

and implemented by the ARSST as soon as possible. On the other hand, other 

ARSST Future Evolution: Areas of Consensus 

among Current Personnel. 

• The Army needs to be involved in space. 

• The ARSST must evolve into a space analysisfocused organization, capable of providing a 

‘space estimate’ or ‘space IPB.’ 

• The ARSST must be able to provide analysis 

of friendly, neutral, and adversary satellite 

systems. 

• The ARSST must be able to assess space 

weather impacts and GPS accuracy impacts. 

• The ARSST must be able to advise a 

commander on how space might influence all 

aspects of his operations, both positively and 

negatively. 

• The ARSST should be used to conduct 

demonstrations of cutting-edge technologies 

and systems. Of particular importance is the 

acquisition of high-resolution, real time (or 

near-real time) unclassified imagery. 

• The current ARSST capability to produce 

multi-spectral imagery products essentially 

duplicates a capability that already exists in 

supported units. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 144 

ARSST personnel argued that, 

while classified military space 

systems were acquired by the 

USARSPACE Office, the 

operators were Military 

Intelligence analysts. As a 

consequence, before blackwhite space integration could 

proceed, agreement must be 

reached not only with the National Reconnaissance Office but also within the 

Army. With ARSST personnel deploying on an average of 140 days per year, it 

was also argued that the ARSST could not serve as the focal point for developing 

an approach for black-white space integration. The bottom line on black-white 

space integration was that the ARSST leadership had identified this as an area 

meriting continued development but had not been able to pursue it as a top priority 

for the teams by 1998. 

There was also some disagreement within the ARSST regarding the need to 

develop a self-sustainment capability for the teams. Difficulties in obtaining 

support while deployed to the field were repeatedly cited by the ARSST, 

particularly regarding the transmission of large imagery files. In the past, ARSST 

leaders conducted research into the costs and benefits of integrating all ARSST 

systems into a self-sustained tactical vehicle. During ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, 

there was also some experimentation in using the ASSC as a coordinating 

mechanism for logistical support. Some ARSST team members in 1998 expressed 

a lukewarm attitude toward this issue, however. In the after-action review from 

ULCHI FOCUS LENS 98, the ARSST Branch Chief noted that the teams had 

demonstrated the ability to operate independently and, therefore, support from the 

ASSC was largely unneeded. In the period from 1995 to 1998, a number of factors 

prevented the integration of ARSST systems into a self-sustained tactical vehicle. 

These included the high cost of purchasing an equipment shelter, maintaining the 

vehicle, and deploying the tactical vehicle overseas. In addition, it was argued that 

space analysis support, unlike the production of hard products, does not require a 

large team of personnel equipped with large amounts of equipment. Instead, an 

Army space analyst would be able to deploy to support a unit carrying only a 

laptop computer. 

A third area of disagreement regarding the future evolution of the ARSST 

stemmed from the level at which an ARSST team should focus its support. In the 

past, the ARSST teams had been affiliated with a Corps Headquarters and the 

Corps staff served as the focal point for space support. ARSST team members in 

1998 generally believed that Corps-level support should remain the focus of 

ARSST doctrine. With the development of the Army Space Support Cell, 

however, it was argued that the focal point for ARSST support might be changed 

to the Division Headquarters. Experience during the 1st Infantry Division BCTP 

was cited as a justification for restructuring the ARSST to focus on division-level 

missions. 

ARSST Future Evolution: Three Long Term 

Organizational Constructs. 

• Vision 1: A self-contained, deployable force 

package. 

• Vision 2: One man deploys with a laptop. 

• Vision 3: A space-smart Army makes the 

ARSST unnecessary. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 145 

Finally, some analysts outside USARSPACE suggested that the ARSST may be 

able to fulfill a long term role as a space liaison capability that could be deployed 

in support of U.S. allies and coalition partners. A possible model for developing 

such a capability was provided by the U.S. Air Force experience in providing air 

support planning to coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM. In 1990, 

U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) were assigned to Arab 

coalition forces – the 20th Saudi Mechanized Brigade and 4th Armored Brigade, the 

Kuwaiti Liberation Brigade and 35th Martyr Armored Brigade, the Syrian 9th

Armored Division, and the Egyptian 3rd Mechanized Division and 4th Armored 

Division. The TACPs were assigned three primary missions: [1] advise the 

supported commander and staff on the uses of air power, [2] control Allied close 

air support missions; and [3] train supported forces to develop “a long-term, 

forward air control capability.”27 Throughout the ground offensive, the TACPs 

coordinated air support and aerial reconnaissance missions and also provided 

communications links to other coalition forces.28 A similar space support role for 

coalition forces might be supported by an ARSST team in the future. However, 

before such a role could be assumed by the ARSST, procedures would have to be 

developed for the release of information that is currently restricted to U.S. 

personnel only. In addition, the ARSST would likely require a significant infusion 

of resources to accomplish such a mission. ARSST personnel, who were operating 

in 1998 with limited resources, generally did not view the addition of such a new 

mission with favor. 

Future Organizational Constructs 

In discussions with ARSST personnel in 1998, a number of visions for future 

Army space support were described. These visions of future space support, 

although geared towards the long term (5-12 years), were significant because they 

reflect what the few officers in the United States Army with operational space 

support experience viewed to be the optimal end-states for ARSST organization 

and operations. These long term visions were also important because they added a 

broader context to contemporary decisions which, through design or by accident, 

were anticipated to set the parameters for continued evolution of the ARSST. 

For convenience, the long term ideas discussed by ARSST personnel have been 

grouped into three categories, each of which will be discussed separately. The first 

long term vision saw the ARSST providing a deployable unit of space support 

personnel equipped with a full suite of equipment that is mounted in a tactical 

vehicle. ARSST equipment would consist of state-of-the-art space systems that 

had not been provided to field units, either because of its high cost or the fact that 

the technology had only been recently developed. An example of the type of 

equipment that would be manned by the ARSST would be a satellite system 

capable of direct tasking and direct downlink of high-resolution, unclassified 

imagery. The tactical vehicle used by the ARSST would be designed to act as a 

tactical operations center for performing space analytic functions on a battlefield, 

to include the development of a ‘space estimate’ for the supported commander, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 146 

and would be capable of immediate integration into the command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems of the supported unit. 

In addition, the deployed ARSST team would be integrated into the C4I network at 

U.S. Army Space Command and would be capable of leveraging space support 

tools throughout USSPACECOM. One model cited by some individuals for this 

long term vision was the Army Space Command’s development of a Force 

Projection Tactical Operations Center to support theater missile defense operations 

in the field. 

Under a second long term vision for ARSST operations, a space liaison officer 

would deploy to a supported unit rather than a full ARSST team. The primary 

function of this liaison officer would be to provide planning and space analytic 

support to the supported commander and his staff. All production functions would 

remain at the U.S. Army Space Command in Colorado Springs, where they could 

be easily accessed by the space liaison officer over established communications 

ARSPACE ARSPACE

The ARSST deploys

with a full suite of space

support equipment,

integrated into a tactical

vehicle.

ARSST

communications allow

it to leverage assets/

capabilities back at

ARSPACE in real time.

The ARSST has

direct satellite

downlink/ tasking

capability.

The ARSST deploys with

the ability to generate its

own power.

VISION 1: SELF-CONTAINED,

DEPLOYABLE FORCE PACKAGE

VISION 1: SELF-CONTAINED,

DEPLOYABLE FORCE PACKAGE

The ARSST is co-located with supported

unit and fully integrated into its C4I

systems.

Figure 19: Future ARSST Organizational Construct – Self-Contained 

Deployable Force Package. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 147 

networks. In essence, the space liaison officer would serve as the space advisor to 

a supported unit and would coordinate with other organizations to provide any 

additional space support or products that might be required. 

Under the third long term vision for ARSST evolution, structural changes in the 

Army would necessitate a redirection of the ARSST role away from operational 

support. This shift would result from the activation of the FA40 functional area, 

the assignment of Space Operations officers to Corps and/or Division staffs, and 

the incorporation of space education programs throughout the Army’s training and 

career development process. With a Space Operations officer permanently 

assigned to the staff, a Corps or Division headquarters would no longer require 

operational support from an ARSST. Instead, ARSST teams would be used only 

to demonstrate new systems and technologies to the field and provide advanced 

training to units and soldiers. USARSPACE would not have a direct operational 

presence at Corps and Division headquarters but would be available to provide 

additional space production support if requested by a unit’s Space Operations 

officer. 

VISION 2: ONE MAN WITH A LAPTOP VISION 2: ONE MAN WITH A LAPTOP

ARSPACE ARSPACE

A space liaison officer

deploys with a laptop,

loaded with all relevant

space analysis systems.

Through the supported

unit, the deployed space

liaison officer can

leverage all

assets/capabilities at

ARSPACE.

The space liaison officer 

co-located with the

supported unit and

integrated into its C4I

systems. The supported

unit handles all supply,

transportation, and other

logistic requirements.

ARSPACE has direct

satellite downlink/tasking

capability, accessible via

comm links to the space

liaison officer in the field.

FUTURE VARIATION: Rather than a space liaison officer

deployed from ARSPACE, an FA40 staff officer is

permanently integrated into the unit staff

Figure 20: Future ARSST Organizational Construct – One Man with 

a Laptop. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 148 

Technological Trends. The evolution of government and commercial space 

technologies would continue to be a determining factor in the continued evolution 

of the ARSST. If space systems and capabilities continued to evolve at a rapid 

pace, the ARSST would likely fill a long term critical warfighting need by 

interjecting new and advanced capabilities into a commander’s planning cycle and 

operations. Eagle Vision II was repeatedly cited as the type of capability that 

might be brought to the field by an ARSST team in the future. As a general rule, it 

was expected that there would be a greater need for space support from an ARSST 

in the long term if advanced and new space technologies continued to be rapidly 

introduced on the commercial market; if the costs of these new technologies and 

systems remained high; if the systems were technically complex; if special training 

and expertise was needed to understand and employ these systems; and if the 

systems had applications that extended across a number of functional areas, rather 

than supporting just a small niche requirement. If the converse situation was true, 

there would be a reduced requirement for ARSST support in the long term. 

Each of the three visions for long term ARSST evolution offered a useful glimpse 

into how the Army might be provided space support in the future. When 

considered within the context of the Army’s experience in applying space systems 

and technologies over the period from 1986 to 1998, the ongoing experimentation 

with the ASSC concept, and continuing trends in the military space environment, 

all three of the long term visions appeared to offer a reasonable approach to the 

Army’s long term need to address the warfighting implications of space. 

Ultimately, however, the manner in which the ARSST would evolve was expected 

to be driven by four key factors, each of which lie beyond the complete control of 

USARSPACE. 

Threat Trends. The amount of emphasis that the Army placed on space analytic 

support in the long term was expected to be driven in large part by the threat posed 

in the future. If adversaries developed a demonstrated capability to destroy, 

degrade, or disrupt space systems used by the Army for important tactical and 

operational warfighting purposes, commanders would demand more space support 

from USARSPACE. Similarly, if an adversary gained the capability, for example, 

to download high-resolution imagery in a timely manner, provide this data to its 

tactical and operational commanders, and use it on the battlefield, the Army would 

place increased emphasis on space analysis and support. On the other hand, if the 

threat posed by an adversary was perceived to be hypothetical or unimportant, it 

was unlikely that commanders would devote the resources required to implement 

some of the long-term visions discussed by ARSST personnel. 

The New FA40 and the Role of the Space Operations Officer. The third key 

driver of ARSST evolution in the long term was defined as the manner in which 

the new FA40 functional area was implemented by the Army and the reception 

that the Space Operations officer received when assigned to a unit. If a Space 

Operations officer was able to fulfill all of the operational needs of his unit, the 

requirement for an ARSST to provide operational support might be significantly 

reduced. However, if there were certain operational requirements that the assigned 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 149 

Space Operations officer was unable to address, the ARSSTs would need to evolve 

to satisfy those requirements. Finally, if the Army was unable or unwilling to 

assign Space Operations officers to all units requiring space analytical support, the 

need for USARSPACE to maintain a deployable ARSST capability would remain. 

Resources. In an environment of tight Army budgets and limited personnel, 

perhaps the most significant factor governing the long term evolution of the 

ARSST would be the level of resources available. As in the past, resource levels 

would continue to exert a decisive influence on how many personnel the Army 

assigns to space support functions (either on the ARSST or as Space Operations 

officers at the Corps and Division level); the quantities and types of space systems 

that could be procured; whether enough space systems would be available to equip 

all field units or if only a few systems could be purchased to support the entire 

Army; how many and what types of field deployments USARSPACE could 

support; and whether or not space support equipment was integrated into a tactical 

vehicle or not. 

Summary 

As the ARSST conducted long range planning in the 1995 to 1998 period, a 

number of common themes were stressed. Most importantly, the ARSST 

anticipated a continued warfighting requirement for operational space support. In 

addition, ARSST long range planning emphasized the need to conduct space 

systems demonstrations, support Army space education, and explore new force 

development and technological concepts. 

ARSST long range planning in 1998 was based upon four key assumptions. First, 

the space capabilities of U.S. adversaries would continue to increase. Second, the 

dependence of the United States upon space systems—both commercial and 

military— would also rise. Third, commercial space capabilities would expand, 

with a number of implications for military operations. Finally, satellite 

communication systems and capabilities would be revolutionized, introducing a 

number of new factors for military command and control. Given these trends, 

ARSST personnel in 1998 believed that the Army needed to be closely involved in 

exploiting space systems and capabilities in the future. To support that 

requirement, the ARSST must evolve into a space analysis-focused organization, 

capable not only of translating space capabilities into tools for the supported 

commander but also of understanding the threat from neutral and adversary space 

systems, fully exploiting the capabilities of U.S. and commercial space systems, 

anticipating space environmental impacts, proactively identifying and addressing 

U.S. vulnerabilities and opportunities, and developing a ‘space estimate’ for 

incorporation into the warfighter’s planning process. 

 Looking at the long term trends in the military space environment and the Army’s 

requirements for space support, personnel assigned to the ARSST described three 

future organizational constructs for the teams. Under the first concept, the ARSST 

would continue to deploy as a task-organized team of space personnel, but would 

have self-contained and integrated equipment, mounted in a tactical vehicle. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 150 

Under the second concept, technology would evolve to the point where a single 

soldier would be capable of providing the full spectrum of space support through a 

small laptop computer. Under a third vision of long term ARSST evolution, the 

successful implementation of space education throughout the Army coupled with 

the assignment of space operations officers on Corps and Division staffs would 

render the ARSST unnecessary. In other words, space analysis would be part of 

every Division and Corps Headquarters’ integral capabilities. 

Each of the visions for future evolution of the ARSST was dependent upon a 

number of variables—the future threat, the evolution of space technology, the 

development of Functional Area 40 and the introduction of a space operations 

officer to the field, and the level of resources allocated to space support and space 

operations by the Army. No matter how the military space environment evolves in 

the future or how the Army organizes the ARSST to address it, however, one fact 

remained unchanged: The Army Space Support Team experience established a 

firm foundation for the application of space on behalf of the warfighter. For years 

to come, this experience will guide how the Army addresses space at the tactical 

and operational levels of war. 

VISION 3: A SPACE-SMART ARMY

MAKES THE ARSST UNNECESSARY

VISION 3: A SPACE-SMART ARMY

MAKES THE ARSST UNNECESSARY

ARSPACE ARSPACE

USARSPACE supports space

systems demonstrations and

space training programs for

warfighters.

The FA40 staff officer can access

capabilities at ARSPACE via

communications lines, if required.

Space-smart battle staffs understand how

to incorporate space into their operations.

The FA40 staff officer may

be able to directly task and

downlink satellite systems.

An FA40 staff officer is

part of the staff of each

warfighting headquarters.

Figure 21: Future ARSST Organizational Construct – A Space-Smart 

Army Makes the ARSST Unnecessary. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 151 

 

1

 B. Bruce-Briggs, “The Army in Space: New High Ground or Hot-Air Balloon?” 

Military Review (December 1986), p. 48. 

2

 Major Sherwood C. Springs, "The Army in Space." [Undated article provided to 

Brigadier General(P) Colin L. Powell on 15 June 1983 by Lieutenant Colonel 

James W. Labounty]. 

3

 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

4

 Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, "Army Space Support Team 

Briefing at the HQ USARSPACE (Forward) Program Management Review." 12 

July 1996. 

5

 Memorandum, U.S. Army Space Command, MOSC-OO-C, to TSOC PAT, 

ATTN: Mr. Jim Taylor, SPJTSOC, Subject: ARSPACE ARSST Information. 17 

July 1996. 

6

 Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, "Army Space Support Team 

Briefing at the HQ USARSPACE (Forward) Program Management Review." 12 

July 1996. 

7

 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “Forward Deployment of ARSST: A One 

Stop Shop is Our Goal,” Undated. 

8

 U.S. Army Space Command, "ARSST Long Range Planning Input," February 

1998. A copy of this document in electronic format was found on a floppy disk in 

the ARSST program files at Colorado Springs, Colorado. 

9

 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, "Long Range Plan," May 1998. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Reuters, “China, Others Spot U.S. Computer Weaknesses: CIA.” 26 June 1998. 

13 U.S. Army Space Command (Forward), Space Support Reference Book, 20 

August 1997, p. MSI-48. 

14 Armed Forces Newswire, “DIA Says Days of U.S. Hegemony in Space Are 

Numbered.” 2 February 1998. 

15 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “James H. Williamson Oral History 

Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 22 October 1998. 

16 Bob Brewin, “Army Views Space As Ultimate ‘High Ground.’” Federal 

Computer Week. 24 March 1998. 

17 CQ Washington Alert, “Modern Army Prepares for War on Two Fronts: Present, 

Future.” 8 August 1998. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 152 

 

18 Daniel M. Verton, “Interagency Office to Respond to WMD; Marines Also 

Launch System to Detect Biological, Chemical Agents.” Federal Computer Week. 

6 April 1998. 

19 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. 

20 CQ Washington Alert, “Modern Army Prepares for War on Two Fronts: Present, 

Future.” 8 August 1998. 

21 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. 

22 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Captain Gerry Skaw and Sergeant First 

Class Howard Smith Oral History Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons Learned 

Study,” 22 October 1998. 

23 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. 

24 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. 

25 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Captain David Strombeck and Staff 

Sergeant William Bates Oral History Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons 

Learned Study,” 23 October 1998 

26 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and 

Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer Oral History Interview, ARSST 

Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 23 October 1998. 

27 Aviation Week & Space Technology, “U.S. Close Air Support Teams to Aid 

Arab Coalition Forces.” (Vol. 134, No. 7, 18 February 1991), p. 63. 

28 David A. Fulghum, “Allied Air Power, Forward Controllers Back Arabs to Make 

Their Drive Succeed,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (Vol. 134, No. 16, 22 

April 1991), pp. 70-73. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 153 

CHAPTER SIX: 

CONCLUSIONS 

When this history was initially written, a number of observations and conclusions 

were put forward regarding the Army space support experience from 1986 to 1998. 

Much has changed since that time and, in the new military environment of 2003, it 

is useful to reexamine some of the original observations in light of subsequent 

developments in Army space support. This is particularly important given the 

context of ongoing efforts to transform the Army for the future as well as the 

rapidly evolving requirements of the current national security environment, both of 

which generate new demands for Army space capabilities. 

The establishment of the Army Space Institute in 1986 proved to be the critical 

first step in a long, systematic Army effort to leverage space systems and 

technologies to support tactical operations more effectively. The activation of the 

Army Space Demonstration Program in 1987, later designated the Army Space 

Exploitation Demonstration Program, proved invaluable because it allowed 

soldiers to experience first-hand the potential benefits offered by space 

capabilities. The activation of Army Space Command (ARSPACE) in 1988 

marked a third crucial step in the evolution of the Army space support 

organization. Taken together, these early initiatives established a firm foundation 

for the later application and expansion of Army space support capabilities. 

The first Gulf War represented a watershed event in the history of Army space 

support by demonstrating to both soldiers and commanders the benefits of space 

capabilities on an actual battlefield. The Army leveraged space in Operation 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM on a number of levels, to include GPS 

position/navigation support, satellite weather data, satellite communications, 

multi-spectral terrain imagery, and a ballistic missile warning capability to tactical 

commanders. During this conflict, however, it also became apparent that few 

tactical commanders understood the full potential and limitations of space support 

capabilities, or knew how to employ space assets in the most effective manner. 

The first Gulf War made clear the requirement to normalize space in the Army. 

After the first Gulf War, the Army space support program experienced a period of 

energetic development. In these formative stages, the leadership provided by 

certain key individuals shaped Army space support efforts and established a 

foundation for the long-term success of the program. For example, U.S. Army 

Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan incorporated space support systems and 

capabilities into the Army’s “Louisiana Maneuvers” experiments of the early 

1990s. Similarly, the direction and management provided by then-BG Edward G. 

Anderson III (Combined Arms Center, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command) and 

then-Major General Jay Garner (Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

and Plans, Force Development) proved instrumental. Their leadership helped 

shape the Army’s decision to field a Commercial Space Package (CSP) and 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 154 

subsequently activate a contingency space support capability at ARSPACE. In 

1994, thanks to the proactive efforts of such Army leaders, the Army activated a 

deployable space support team (COPS) at Colorado Springs. The COPS team was 

the Army’s first dedicated space support organization and the predecessor of the 

ARSST. 

ARSST teams deployed in support of field units for the first time on 1 January 

1995. Over the course of that year, the ARSST supported six Corps and Joint 

Task Force-level exercises, three Division-level exercises, and three Special 

Operations exercises. In addition, the ARSST conducted an estimated 13 

equipment demonstrations and sent personnel to support three Force Projection 

Tactical Operations Center (FP TOC) exercises. The frequency and length of 

ARSST deployments resulted in a high level of unit operations tempo, in which 

the soldiers of the ARSST averaged more than 140 deployment days per year. 

Furthermore, the ARSST’s intense level of deployment support continued in 

subsequent years, including a 1996 deployment to Bosnia to support the 1st

Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Tuzla, Bosnia, marking the first time that an 

ARSST deployed in support of an actual contingency mission rather than a 

training exercise. The demand for ARSST support was generally greatest from the 

XVIII Airborne Corps and Army special operations forces. Every deployment 

brought with it new lessons in terms of ARSST capabilities and configuration and, 

from 1995 to 1998, the concept of operations for ARSST employment evolved 

significantly. 

In these early years, the Army’s space support concept was repeatedly refined, 

reshaped, and reconfigured. This evolution was guided by the contributions of 

several leaders, to include Lieutenant General Don Lionetti, Lieutenant General 

Jay Garner, and Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III in their roles as 

Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command 

(USASSDC). Their legacy has been carried forth since USASSDC was 

transformed in 1997 to become today’s U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command (USASMDC). Under the leadership of Lieutenant General John 

Costello and Lieutenant General John M. Cosumano, USASMDC has continued to 

provide the leadership and direction necessary to refine the Army’s space support 

capabilities and to integrate them into the process of Army Transformation. 

An issue of particular importance for the Army has been the process of 

“normalizing space.” The Army Space Policy of 1994 emphasized the importance 

of seamlessly integrating space capabilities into Army operations and established a 

number of goals to support that objective. In 1998, this history of the ARSST 

emphasized the significant progress that had been made by the Army towards 

deploying a variety of new space capabilities and integrating them into the 

operations of units at the tactical level. Importantly, in the five years since the 

original publication of the history, the Army has largely accomplished its goal of 

normalizing space. This progress has been achieved in large part as a result of 

Army Space Support Team operations and experience. As the Army of 2003 

transforms itself for the future, however, the integration of advanced space-based 

capabilities into land force operations will assume even larger importance. The 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 155 

Objective Force envisioned under the Army Transformation Campaign Plan is a 

fully space-enabled land force that will routinely exploit an overhead constellation 

of military and civilian space platforms. The Army’s Objective Force will rely 

upon these platforms to provide a range of capabilities, to include intelligence, 

surveillance, and area reconnaissance, long haul communications, positioning and 

navigation, targeting, and missile defense early warning support. 

If space systems and services are to satisfy the needs of the Army’s Objective 

Force, they must be responsive, accurate, timely, and capable of dynamic 

interaction with other battlefield systems. The Army is currently pursuing and 

advocating a number of space-based capabilities to meet these military demands. 

These include space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors 

(ISR) capable of in-theater tasking, processing, and exploitation by Army forces; 

dynamic bandwidth satellite communications systems that are seamlessly 

integrated; tactically relevant space control capabilities to ensure continued access 

to space-based systems while, if necessary, negating enemy space capabilities; 

advanced missile warning and tracking systems; precise and jam-resistant position, 

navigation, and timing services; and new sensor systems to provide advanced 

weather, terrain, and environmental monitoring to Army forces. 

As part of the Army’s effort to transform itself for the future, the space 

requirements of the future Objective Force are being developed with reference to 

the six critical operational goals for defense transformation outlined in the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review, to include the goal of “Enhancing the capability and 

survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure.” The Army is also 

working to integrate space capabilities across all thirteen Lines of Operation (LOs) 

outlined in its Transformation Campaign Plan. Importantly, the U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command has been designated the Army’s “vertical 

integrator” for Space, responsible for ensuring that each of the thirteen 

“horizontal” LOs properly address space-specific issues and requirements. 

In addition to these changes, there have been several other important developments 

in the organization and employment of Army space support capabilities since the 

original 1998 publication of this history. For example, in October 1999 Congress 

chartered a Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 

Management and Organization. The Commission, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld 

and commonly referred to as the Rumsfeld Space Commission, was tasked to 

undertake a comprehensive examination of the future impact of space on the U.S. 

military and recommend improvements in the organization and management of 

DoD space activities. In January 2001, the Commission reported that the 

Department of Defense lacked the senior-level focus and accountability required to 

provide oversight and guidance over national security space operations. It also 

proffered a series of recommendations for reorganizing and realigning 

management responsibilities within Department of Defense, the Services, and the 

intelligence community. In response to these recommendations, the DoD 

announced a series of initiatives, ranging from the designation of the Department 

of the Air Force as the DoD Executive Agent for space to the establishment of a 

new Major Force Program (MFP) for Space.*
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 156 

Also included in the Rumsfeld Space Commission report was an emphasis on the 

need for a cadre of space-qualified officers capable of integrating space activities 

into military operations. That finding reinforced the importance of ongoing efforts 

within the Army to establish a new officer functional area for space operations, 

classified as Functional Area 40 (FA40). Today, FA 40 space operations officers 

serve as the primary focal point for the integration of space capabilities in the 

military decision making process of Corps and Division headquarters. The 

presence of FA40 officers on warfighting staffs provides commanders with the 

familiarity and the expertise to fully exploit space-based assets and space products, 

significantly enhancing the command’s warfighting capabilities. Additionally, FA 

40 officers are assigned to key billets at the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, various multi-service space organizations, 

and the National Reconnaissance Office, where they provide invaluable expertise 

for decision-making while ensuring that Army requirements and operating 

capabilities are integrated throughout the national security space community. 

Moving beyond the first units established by U.S. Army Space Command in the 

mid-1990s, the Army has since established a robust force structure that includes 

three space battalions. In 1999, the Army activated the 1st Space Battalion, 

consisting of an Army Space Support Company (ARSSC), a Theater Missile 

Warning Company, and an electronic warfare detachment. The ARSSC included 

five Army Space Support Teams, each of which continued their historical mission 

of supporting warfighting units by providing space capabilities, expertise and 

products. The new Theater Missile Warning Company was assigned responsibility 

for operating the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), operated by the Army 

and the Navy to provide in-theater early warning of missile launches. The 1st

Space Battalion also developed a Space Control and Electronic Warfare 

Detachment (SEWD), responsible for conducting space control missions. 

Another key milestone in the development of Army space support force structure 

was achieved in 2001 with the activation of the 193rd Space Battalion, Colorado 

Army National Guard. The 193rd Space Battalion provides Army Space Support 

Teams and Space Operations officers to support Army and joint operations. The 

1st and 193rd Space Battalions joined the Army’s longest serving space battalion, 

the 1st Satellite Control Battalion, which remained responsible for operating 

Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) Ground Stations in support of 

U.S. military forces deployed around the world. In April 2003, all three battalions 

were placed under the command of the new 1st Space Brigade (Provisional). This 

provisional brigade was charged with the mission to “conduct continuous, global 

space support, space control and space force enhancement operations in support of 

U.S. Strategic Command and Supported Combatant Commanders, enabling the 

delivery of decisive combat power.” The formation of the 1st Space Brigade was 

important not only because it represented another step in the evolution of Army 

space capabilities; it also provided a basis for the potential establishment of a 

composite combat organization in the future that integrates space, missile defense, 

and information operations formations. Such a development may also include the 

creation of new Army space control units that provide space electronic warfare 

support and conduct space counter surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 157 

Changes in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) also promised to impact the Army’s 

space mission in the future. In 2002, a significant realignment of the U.S. military 

command structure was made to accommodate the establishment of a new 

Combatant Command, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). This 

command was assigned responsibility for the continental defense of the United 

States and for providing military assistance to civilian authorities. Geographical 

areas of responsibility were realigned between U.S. Joint Forces Command 

(USJFCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and USNORTHCOM. 

Most importantly from the standpoint of the Army space support operations, U.S. 

Space Command (USSPACECOM) and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 

were merged into a single command to eliminate redundancies in the command 

structure and streamline the decision making process. As a result of this merger, 

USSTRATCOM was tasked with a variety of new responsibilities, to include 

military space operations, information operations, computer network operations, 

and strategic defense and attack missions. Another consequence of the 

USSPACECOM merger with USSTRATCOM was that U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense Command was designed to serve as the Army Service Component 

Command to USSTRATCOM. 

These organizational developments have been accompanied by a number of Joint 

and Army doctrinal changes since this history was originally written in 1998. For 

example, a number of long-standing operational issues between the Services were 

resolved and Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations was 

published in August 2002. This doctrinal publication highlighted the dependence 

of joint warfighters on space capabilities and established guidelines for joint 

military operations in four space mission areas: force enhancement, space control, 

space support, and force application. Concurrent with these joint efforts, the Army 

strove to update and revise its doctrine for space operations, as reflected by the 

publication of new field manuals such as FM 40-1, Joint Tactical Ground Station 

Operations and the development of FM 3-14, Space Support to Army Operations

and FM 3-14.6, Army Space Support to Corps and Divisions. The Army also 

integrated space capabilities and considerations in a number of its key doctrinal 

publications, to include FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; FM 6-0, 

Command and Control; and FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List. 

All of the innovations outlined in the preceding paragraphs were shaped by the 

early work of the ARSST teams. In addition to influencing changes in Army space 

doctrine, organization, training, and capabilities, however, the ARSST teams 

continued to make concrete contributions on the ground, and have deployed in 

support of every contingency operation since Operation DESERT STORM. 

ARSST soldiers from both the 1st Space Battalion and the 193rd Space Support 

Battalion have deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. During these conflicts, ARSST soldiers provided a 

range of products and services to combat units, ranging from multi-spectral 

imagery and mapping products and GPS jamming support to providing technical 

advice and training for the operation of commercial Blue Force Tracking devices 

and submitting satellite tasking requests to help units identify minefields and 

navigate on the battlefield. In addition, the ARSST teams have continued to 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Teams 158 

provide exercise and training support to Army and joint units, ranging from 

deployments to Southwest Asia in support of the INTERNAL LOOK and LUCKY 

SENTINEL exercises, to Poland in support of exercise VICTORY STRIKE. More 

recently, the MILLENIUM CHALLENGE 02 exercise demonstrated the validity 

of several SMDC initiatives, including the Tactical Space (TACSPACE) initiative 

evaluating space support to the military decision making process provided by a 

six-man space support element (SSE). 

When this history was first published, the authors suggested several possible 

scenarios for the future evolution of the ARSST. The first of these suggested that 

the ARSST might deploy as a self-contained force, with a full suite of space 

support equipment, its own power source, and a direct satellite link capability, all 

integrated into a tactical vehicle. In this scenario the ARSST would be co-located 

with the supporting unit and would be capable of serving as a “one stop shop” for 

space support capabilities. In the second scenario, the ARSST would be replaced 

by a single space liaison officer (SLO) equipped with a laptop loaded with relevant 

space analysis systems. In this scenario, the SLO would be co-located with the 

supported unit, which would be responsible for providing all supply, 

transportation, and other logistic support. The SLO would request assistance from 

U.S. Army Space Command to provide any additional support that he could not 

personally furnish. The final scenario envisioned placing FA40 staff officers in 

each warfighting headquarters, rendering the staffs “space-smart” and making the 

ARSSTs largely unnecessary. As events turned out, the configuration of space 

support in 2003 represented a combination of some of the above scenarios: 

ARSSTs deploy as a team to provide space support in response to specific 

contingencies and augmentation requirements while FA40 space operations 

officers maintain a permanent presence on headquarters staffs, ensuring that 

commanders understand and are able to take full advantage of space assets and 

fulfilling liaison roles when appropriate. 

The pace of change and innovation in Army space support has been particularly 

dramatic in recent years. The establishment of the FA40 Space Operations Officer 

functional area, the continued development and implementation of Army space 

doctrine, and numerous real-world experiences with Army space tactical and 

operational integration, suggest that the desired goal of space normalization has 

been largely achieved. As a result, the ARSST teams have now largely 

transitioned from a posture of providing training and demonstration support to one 

of active participation in operational missions. One chapter has ended in the 

history of Army space and the ARSST teams, but another is well underway. 

 

*

 Major Force Programs aggregate a series of related DoD budget items. MFPs 

track the resources employed to support a macro-level DoD mission, such as 

special operations. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 159

BIBLIOGRAPHY*

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Siegel, Major Steven C., “Army Space Institute.” Army Trainer (Summery 1987). 

Shepherd, Marquis. “Army Unit To Bring Technology Of Space Down To Earth 

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Moore, Captain George M., Colonel Vic Budura, Joan Johnson-Freese. “Joint 

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1994). 

Allard, C. Kenneth. “Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine.” Joint 

Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1995). 

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Quarterly (Winter 1995-96). 

White, Ed. “Space Support is Current Revolution in How Army Fights and Wins 

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Computer Week (24 March 1998). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 160 

Verton, Daniel M. “Interagency Office to Respond to WMD; Marines Also 

Launch System to Detect Biological, Chemical Agents.” Federal Computer 

Week (6 April 1998). 

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Washington Alert (8 August 1998). 

“Joint ROK, US Military Exercise Due in Texas.” Korea Times (6 December 

1998). 

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USASMDC Historical Office) 

10th Mountain Division (Light), US Army Forces, Somalia: After Action Report 

Summary (2 January 1993). 

Army Space Institute/TPIO Space. Historical Review 1990. Ft. Leavenworth, 

Kansas: Army Space Institute (1990). 

Battle Command Battle Laboratory. Louisiana Maneuver General Officer 

Working Group Briefing (9 September 1993). 

Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 

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the Army: Lessons Learned from Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM. 

Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, no. 91-

3 (October 1991). 

Femme Comp Incorporated, Satellite Communications Group. Task Order Plan 

94-08: Contingency Operations (Space) / COPS Documentation Development 

(7 July 1994). 

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Operations – Space (COPS) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) Initial 

Draft. (16 August 1994). 

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95-08: Contingency Operations (Space) / COPS Documentation Development

(26 September 1994). 

French, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel(P) John R. U.S. Army Space Institute Semiannual 

Historical Report 1 July – 31 December 1986. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army 

Space Institute (26 January 1987). 

Headquarters, United States European Command, Operation Support Hope 1994 

After Action Report. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (1994). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 161

Headquarters, Department of the Army. HQDA Program Release Worksheet for 

Input into the Program Budget Accounting System to SAFM-BUI-I from 

SARD-RR (30 March 1994). 

Hooper, James, Joe Kupsky, and James Walker. The Data Collection Exercise: 

Army Leadership at the Cutting Edge of Space Control. Huntsville, Alabama: 

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (July 1999). 

Hooper, James, Todd Clark, and James Walker. The Joint Tactical Ground 

Station: Fielding and Operational Lessons Learned. Huntsville, Alabama: U.S. 

Army Space and Missile Defense Command (April 2000). 

Kelly, Ricky B. Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces by a Joint 

Force Commander. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies (22 September 1994). 

Kiker, Ed. Informal Thoughts on the Status of the Army Space Institute (1992). 

Korpsel. Major and Mr. Freeman, Input to LAMP: Space Support for Desert 

Shield. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute (September 1990). 

McIlnay J.G., W.T. Brandon, and D.F. Collette. Communications Alternatives for 

U.S. Army Space Command Space Support Teams. Bedford, Massachusetts: 

MITRE Center for Air Force C3 Systems (February 1998). 

Minnon, Major. Information Paper – Manpower Requirements for Contingency 

Space Capabilities and Commercial Space Package (18 February 94). 

Proctor, Colonel Jerry V. All Source Analysis System Information Briefing. ASAS 

User’s Conference (6 August 1998). 

SD/CWN Headquarters Space Division (AFSC), Los Angeles Air Force Base. 

Multiservice Test and Evaluation Master Plan for the NAVSTAR Global 

Positioning System User Equipment. Los Angeles Air Force Base, California: 

SD/CWN Headquarters (November 1987). 

 SD/YEA Headquarters Space Division, Los Angeles Air Force Station. 

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Coordinated Test Program – II: Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan Army Annex. Los Angeles Air Force Station, 

California: SD/YEA Headquarters (July 1982). 

Skaw, Captain Gerald R. U.S. Army Space Command. After Action Report, YAMA 

SAKURA XXXI (25 February 1997). 

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Report on U.S. Space Command Joint Space Support Teams. Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama: Air War College Air University (April 1997). 

Springer, Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Independent Operational Assessment of 

the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Army User Equipment (AUE) 

Operational Test II, November 1985/January 1986. Falls Church, Virginia: 

U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Agency (3 April 1986). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 162 

Stahl, Lieutenant Colonel David T. 10th Mountain Division Operations in Haiti: 

Planning/ Preparation/Execution; August 1994 Thru January 1995. 

Tovar, Wencis R. Combined Arms Center Annual Historical Review: Army Space 

Institute Input. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Army Space Institute (4 August 

1989). 

U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity. The Army Position 

and Navigation Master Plan. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms 

Combat Development Activity (May 1986). 

United States Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon. Operational Issues and 

Criteria for the Operational Test IOTE of the NAVSTAR Global Positioning 

System (GPS) Army User Equipment (AUE) Manpack/Vehicular Set. Final 

draft. Ft. Gordon, Georgia. (9 August 1987). 

United States Army Space Command. Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Space Command. 

Directorate of Public Affairs (7 April 1988). 

United States Army Space Command. USARSPACE Information Paper. Peterson 

AFB, Colorado: U.S. Army Space Command (31 July 1989). 

United States Army Space Command. Army Space Support Team (ARSST) 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Draft. Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. 

Army Space Command (12 December 1994). 

U.S. Army Space Command. Army Space Support Team Division. ARSST 

Deployment Schedule (10 April 1995). 

 U.S. Army Space Command. Army Space Support Team Division. ARSST 

Deployment Schedule (8 May 1995). 

U.S. Army Space Command. Army Space Support Team Division. ARSST 

Deployment Schedule (22 May 1995). 

United States Army Space Command. Army Space Exploitation Demonstration 

Program. Public Affairs brochure. Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command (6 October 1995). 

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team Division, "ARSST 

Deployment Schedule." 19 June 1995. 

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to the Space Support Platform Plus. Undated. 

U.S. Army Space Command. Final Training Support Package for the High 

Resolution Satellite Receiver (27 February 1995). 

U.S. Army Space Command. Tactical Weather System (TWS) Program of 

Instruction (POI) (12 September 1996). 

U.S. Army Space Command, Revised Draft: Training Support Package for 

Mission Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS) (2 December 1994). 

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(20 August 1997). 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 163

U.S. Army Space Command (Forward). The Army Tactical Missile Defense 

Element Handbook. Undated. 

U.S. Army Space Institute, Unit and Sustainment Training Support Package for 

the Small Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (SLGR). Ft. 

Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Space Institute (28 September 1990). 

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to Theater Operations Management Program. Peterson Air Force Base, 

Colorado: Headquarters United States Space Command (14 April 1993). 

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OPERATIONS (Colorado Springs, Colorado: Headquarters, United States Space 

Command) (2 January 1996). 

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Walker, Dr. James. U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command. 3QFY97 

USASSDC Command Achievements and Initiatives Report (1997). 

Oral History Interviews: 

Mr. James H. Williamson (by Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, 22 October 

1998). 

Major Michael McFarland, Sergeant Eric Herrmann, and Staff Sergeant Mark 

Stroup (by Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, 22 October 1998). 

Captain Gerry Skaw and Sergeant First Class Howard Smith (by Dr. James Walker 

and James Hooper, 22 October 1998). 

Captain David Strombeck and Staff Sergeant William Bates (by Dr. James Walker 

and James Hooper, 23 October 1998). 

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Simmons and Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy Maurer (by Dr. 

James Walker and James Hooper, 23 October 1998). 

Lieutenant Colonel Frankie D. Moore (by Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, 23 

October 1998). 

Mr. Gary Baumann (by Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, 23 October 1998). 

Major Scott Cuthbertson (by James Hooper, 29 October 1998). 

Major Gwynne T. Burke (by James Hooper, 5 November 1998) 

 

Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 165

APPENDIX ONE: ARSST EQUIPMENT 

The Commercial Space Package 

The Army Space Support Team was equipped in 1994 with four space systems 

that had been acquired as part of the Army’s Commercial Space Package (CSP) 

initiative. As described in pages 2-4 to 2-14 of this study, the CSP used 

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems to provide a near-term, but limited, 

space support capability for Army operations and deployments. 

The four CSP systems provided to the ARSST were designed to fulfill key 

weather, imaging, communications, and topographic support requirements 

identified by the Army during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and 

subsequent deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Zaire, and Bosnia. First, the ARSST 

was equipped with two satellite weather receivers, allowing it to downlink weather 

information directly. With this capability, the ARSST could support operations in 

remote locations with day-to-day weather information. Second, 5 Mission 

Planning Rehearsal Systems (MPRS) were provided to the ARSST, allowing 

supported commanders and staffs to review terrain in areas of future operations. 

With the MPRS, an ARSST could provide three-dimensional imagery maps or 

conduct terrain ‘fly-throughs’ for the supported unit. Third, a critical need for 

This annex provides a summary of the key equipment and systems used by the 

Army Space Support Team. The annex is divided into three major sections, as 

described below: 

• The first section provides a summary of the systems acquired as part of the 

Commercial Space Package, to include the High Resolution Weather 

Satellite Receiver, the Mission Planning Rehearsal System, INMARSAT 

communications terminals, and the Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor. 

• The second section provides a brief description of key equipment upgrades 

and new space support systems used to equip the ARSST in the period 

from 1996 to 1998, to include the Space Support Platform, the Space 

Support Platform Plus, the Multi-Source Tactical System, the Laptop 

Visualization Device, and the All Source Analysis System—Warlord. 

• The last section of this annex provides a summary of Army Space Support 

Team communication architectures and approaches. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 166 

The CSP: USARSPACE Deployment 

Package Equipment 

• 2 weather receivers. 

• 5 Mission Planning Rehearsal 

Systems. 

• 12 INMARSAT terminals. 

• 2 Multi-Spectral Imagery 

Processors. 

Artist’s Rendition of a DMSP Satellite in Orbit. 

Background: DMSP. 

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

(DMSP) was designed to gather weather data from 

around the world and transmit it to ground stations 

supporting U.S. military operations. DMSP has 

been collecting weather data for U.S. military

operations for more than two decades. DMSP 

satellites typically operate in two-satellite 

constellations in sun-synchronous, circular polar 

orbits. The design life of a DMSP satellite is 

approximately three to four years. 

additional satellite communications 

support had been identified during 

previous Army deployments. To address 

this requirement, the ARSST was 

equipped with twelve INMARSAT manportable terminals, providing near-global 

communications using secure voice, 

data, or fax transmissions. Finally, the 

ARSST was equipped with two Multispectral Imagery Processors, allowing it 

to transform imagery from commercial 

satellite systems into digital and paper maps, complete with a military grid 

reference system.1

The High Resolution Weather Satellite Receiver (HRWSR) 

The HRWSR was designed to acquire data from existing military (Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program, or DMSP) and civilian (Television Infrared 

Orbital Satellite, or TIROS) weather-sensing space platforms. Those satellites 

were designed to provide images of earth in five regions of the visible and infrared 

electromagnetic spectrum, 

with a ground resolution of 

.06 kilometers. Additional 

instruments on these satellites 

could sense critical weather 

elements such as atmospheric 

winds, surface and upper-air 

temperatures, pressure fields, 

and humidity. Using this 

satellite weather data, the 

HRWSR terminal could 

process and display weather 

imagery (to include threedimensional cloud 

formations), present the 

spatial location of soil 

moisture, and provide a 

database for use in the 

planning of future operations.2

The basic HRWSR system 

processing unit included a 

SUN Sparc 10 processing unit 

with 64 Megabytes of 

Random Access Memory 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 167

(RAM) and a SeaSpace frame synchronizer card with TeraScan Version 2.X 

software. For storage and data retrieval, the system included three disk drives (424 

Megabyte internal, two 1 Gigabyte external), an archive tape system (4mm tape 

drive with 2.6 Gigabyte capacity), and a CD-ROM drive for master software or 

database retrieval. As initially configured, the HRWSR system included a 1 meter 

antenna dish with 56” radome, an antenna base, a receiver, and quick disconnect 

antenna cables. Removable camouflaged antenna covers (1 desert, 1 woodland) 

were included with the receiver package.3 The HRWSR receiver was also 

deployed with a GPS antenna to permit rapid deployment and an Uninterruptable 

Power Source (UPS) line filter to allow graceful degradation with loss of power.4 

Other elements of the HRWSR included a monitor, a color printer, and a KG-44 

encryption device (required to access DMSP satellite transmissions). 

Prior to the deployment of ARSST personnel in early 1995, a training support 

package was developed for the HRWSR. The training package, promulgated in 

February 1995, contained eleven key training blocs and a test section. The first 

training bloc provided an overview of the HRWSR. Subsequent training blocs 

provided additional information on the operation of the system, including 

procedures for setting up and initializing the HRWSR, entering orbital elements, 

and scheduling satellite passes. Additional training blocs addressed data 

processing, troubleshooting and file management, tape operations, and printing 

Figure A-1: Components of the High Resolution Weather 

Satellite Receiver (as presented in the February 1995 HRWSR 

Training Support Package).
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 168 

output.5

 As the Army Space Support Team gained experience during deployments 

to the field, the HRWSR training program continued to evolve. By 1996, a three 

day program of instruction had been developed for soldiers assigned to the 

ARSST. During the first day, the students received instruction on weather satellite 

characteristics, HRWSR set-up, decryption equipment handling, UNIX commands, 

entering orbital elements, and scheduling satellite passes. During day two, the 

students learned how to process and view satellite weather imagery, enhance 

imagery and develop overlays, and perform advanced system processing. Training 

on advanced processing techniques continued on the third day, followed by 

instruction on HRWSR enhancements and legends and techniques for exporting 

imagery files.6

The Mission Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS) 

The second major system acquired for the ARSST as part of the Army’s 

Commercial Space Package was the Mission Planning Rehearsal System. The 

MPRS was designed as a situational awareness tool, using imagery and data from 

multiple sources to allow a supported commander to visualize operations on the 

actual terrain before being committed to action.7

 

The MPRS used space-derived imagery from multiple sources, including the 

civilian Landsat and SPOT satellites, to develop three-dimensional interactive 

terrain perspectives of an area of operations. With software such as Autometric’s 

Wings Mission Rehearsal, the Mission Planning Rehearsal System could then be 

used by the supported unit to ‘fly through’ the terrain model. The MPRS also 

allowed the commander and staff to rotate and manipulate the terrain model, 

providing multiple perspectives for planning and allowing various topographical 

features to be analyzed as part of the tactical decision making process. Terrain 

models and ‘fly-throughs’ developed by the MPRS could also be saved to VHS 

videotape for display on a remote color television set.8

Although not organically equipped, the ARSST Mission Planning Rehearsal 

System was also configured for connectivity with a UHF satellite communications 

radio, allowing input to be provided from the Tactical Data Delivery 

System/Tactical Data Intelligence Exchange System-B (TDDS/TADIXS-B), the 

Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS), National Imagery, Tactical Digital 

Link A and B (TADIL-A/B), and commercial Standard Positioning System (SPS) 

Global Positioning System sources. 

The MPRS processing unit was originally based on a Silicon Graphics IRIS 

INDIGO station, with 96 Megabytes RAM. For storage and data retrieval, the 

system was equipped with two disk drives (1.3 Gigabytes internal and 3.5 

Gigabytes external), an 8mm tape drive, and a CD-ROM drive. Products 

developed by the MPRS could be stored on a video tape, viewed on the system’s 

color monitor, or delivered in hard copy format using a Tektronix color printer.9

 

A training package for the operation of the MPRS was developed by the Army 

Space Support Team in December 1994. This training package included twelve 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 169

training blocs and a test section. Under the program of instruction, students 

learned how to prepare the MPRS for operation, import imagery and elevation data 

files, create MPRS projects, conduct analysis, and produce videotapes of the 

rehearsal.10

INMARSAT Communications Terminals 

The third system provided to the ARSST as part of the Commercial Space Package 

was the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) 

communications terminal. During Army deployments to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 

Turkey, Somalia, Zaire, and Haiti, INMARSAT terminals had been used to 

augment the military communications system and, in many cases, had been used 

when military systems were unavailable or proved to be unresponsive. The 

ARSST was equipped with INMARSAT terminals to provide a responsive and 

easily deployable early-entry communications system for future Army operations. 

Two types of INMARSAT communications terminals were provided to the 

ARSST. The first, a Standard B terminal, was designed to support ARSST 

deployments to a Corps headquarters. This suitcase-sized terminal was capable of 

full duplex data transmission at speeds of up to 64 Kbps.11 ARSST personnel were 

trained to set up and operate a Standard B terminal within 5 minutes. 

The second type of INMARSAT terminal, the Standard M, was a much lighter 

system and was intended for deployment in support of both Corps and Division 

headquarters. The Standard M was capable of 2.4 Kbps voice and data 

transmission.12 As with the Standard B, ARSST personnel were trained to setup 

and operate the Standard M terminal within 5 minutes.13

The ARSST was equipped with both INMARSAT Standard B and M terminals 

because the two types of terminals offered a tradeoff between system weight and 

speed of transmission (See Figure A2-2, below). While the Standard M was 

lighter than the Standard B (30 pounds versus 66 pounds), its transmission speeds 

were far inferior (2.4 Kbps secure/unsecure data and fax versus 64 Kbps unsecure 

data or 9.6 Kbps secure voice/data/fax). Moreover, the Standard M terminal’s 

slower transmission speeds translated into airtime costs that were up to six times 

higher than for the Standard B. 

An issue that has repeatedly impacted upon the Army’s ability to use INMARSAT 

is the use of the system for military operations. This issue was identified in 

September 1993 during the Louisiana Maneuvers General Officer Working Group 

when the Commercial Space Package was initially reviewed.14 In a 25 July 1994 

memorandum, the Army Spectrum Manager promulgated an Army-wide policy 

clarifying the use of INMARSAT terminals. Under this policy, it was noted that 

the INMARSAT system was designed for low-volume communications that are 

dedicated “exclusively for peaceful purposes.” Section 3b of this policy delineated 

the three acceptable uses of INMARSAT by Army units in the field: [1] 

Emergency communications; [2] Communications in support of peacekeeping 

missions; and [3] Other non-aggressive general purpose communications.15
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 170 

The Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor (MSIP) 

The fourth major system acquired for the ARSST as part of the Army’s 

Commercial Space Package was the Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor. The MSIP 

was designed to provide a supported unit with the capability to acquire, process, 

deliver, and use multi-spectral imagery from space systems. 

The most common sources of multi-spectral imagery products for the MSIP were 

Landsat Thematic Mapper (TM) and French SPOT satellite data. In addition, the 

MSIP was capable of processing imaging radar data and national imagery files. 

Sensors onboard these satellites were capable of receiving and measuring various 

wavelengths and frequencies associated with natural and man-made objects on the 

ground. By selectively filtering the wavelengths and sampling over a broad range 

of frequencies, the satellites could group the samplings into various bands and 

transmit images. An analyst could then combine this data to produce descriptive 

colors, or “signatures,” which correlate to various entities on the ground and which 

can be used to enhance certain features. For example, “True Color” combinations 

(bands 1, 2, and 3) approximate the way the human eye perceives this image from 

the position of the satellite. The combination of bands 4, 3, and 2 is known as 

“False Color,” in which the vegetation band (band 4) is assigned to the red color 

gun. In this combination, vegetation appears red with the brighter red color 

indicating thicker, denser vegetation than the darker red. These colors also 

indicate differences between deciduous and coniferous forests, which is important 

information when doing a trafficability analysis. 

The Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor system also had the capability to merge 

different data types. For example, the multi-spectral resolution of the Landsat 

Thematic Mapper is 30 meters per pixel while the black and white spatial 

resolution of imagery from SPOT is much higher at 10 meters per pixel. By 

combining the two data types, the MSIP could produce imagery that had the 

spatial resolution of SPOT and the multi-spectral characteristics of Landsat. 

Another MSIP capability was spatial modeling, in which two or more products are 

integrated into a new product. For example, combining overhead satellite imagery 

with DMA Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) produced three-dimensional 

perspective views. Essentially the process “draped” the satellite imagery over the 

wire-frame map of the DTED to lend a realistic feel for the terrain.16

As initially procured by the Army, the Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor was 

composed of a SUN Sparc station 10 (or equivalent) with 64 Megabytes RAM, 

two disk drives (424 Megabyte internal, 2.6 Gigabyte external), a CD-ROM drive, 

and an 8mm tape drive. Imagery output was displayed on standard color monitors, 

with two hardcopy printing options available: a Linotronics printer for lithographic 

reproduction (for use at Corps level only) and a Tektronix Phaser II (for use at 

both Corps and Division level).17

A training support package for the MSIP was developed by the ARSST in 

December 1994. This training program included eleven primary training blocs and 

a test section. During the first part of the training course, the principles of multispectral imagery collection and processing were reviewed by the students. Then, 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 171

students were taught how to prepare the MSIP for operation, initialize the MSIP, 

load and convert data, and rectify, enhance, and classify images. Training on the 

system culminated with a series of modeling and terrain analysis exercises.18

Upgraded and New ARSST Equipment 

In January 1996, the Army Space Support Team conducted a formal review of 

lessons learned during its first year of operations. At this review, a number of 

recommendations were made regarding the need for new equipment and systems. 

First, ARSST personnel expressed a need for the capability to receive large data 

files in remote locations. Second, they emphasized the requirement for better 

communications and interface capabilities with other deployed space support 

teams. Third, they agreed that all communications security equipment assigned to 

the ARSST had to be MIL-Standard. Fourth, they noted a need for a streamlined 

equipment maintenance process. Finally, ARSST personnel emphasized that a 

balance had to be struck to ensure that the cost of equipment did not outweigh its 

benefits to the warfighter.19

In the time period from 1996 to 1998, the Army Space Support Team would seek 

to meet these objectives by upgrading the original Commercial Space Package 

systems, acquiring enhanced systems and capabilities, and experimenting with new 

software and hardware. Key ARSST systems are described below. 

The Space Support Platform (SSP) 

The Space Support Platform was one of the key hardware and software upgrade 

efforts initiated by the ARSST. The SSP sought to integrate the capabilities of the 

Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor and the Mission Planning Rehearsal System 

and, in the process, create a much more powerful tool. By linking the MSIP and 

the MPRS into a single system, the ARSST hoped to reduce the time required to 

transform imagery files into mission planning tools, incorporate a commercial 

Geographic Information System (GIS) capability into the existing MPRS tool, and 

allow a supported unit’s graphics and planning information to be integrated into 

the SSP. With the resulting system, the ARSST would be able to display 

operational graphics and tables in discernible layers, validate topographic 

rectification, allow the interaction and compatibility of various overlays and plans 

to be assessed, and provide a tool for assessing terrain effects on alternative 

courses of action.20 

The Space Support Platform itself was originally based on an SGI Max Impact 

workstation with 40 Gigabytes of retrievable memory, a 250 MHz processor, 384 

Megabytes of RAM, a CD-ROM drive, and 8mm and 4mm tape drives. Software 

mounted on the Space Support Platform included IMAGINE, EDGE, WINGS, 

OMNI, and TSOC.

 21 IMAGINE software was integrated into the SSP to provide a 

terrain analysis capability. IMAGINE was used to convert raw aerial photographs 

and overhead imagery into formatted maps. In addition, the software could 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 172 

integrate imagery with Digital Terrain Elevation Data to develop threedimensional terrain models. EDGE provided the ARSST with the ability to model 

and simulate both space and ground assets. With EDGE, ARSST personnel could 

develop three-dimensional ‘fly-throughs’ of a potential area of operation for a 

supported unit. In addition, EDGE allowed additional information (such as 

electronic intelligence data) to be superimposed on the three-dimensional terrain 

model.22 A similar three-dimensional terrain modeling and fly-through capability 

was provided by WINGS. TSOC was designed to provide satellite tracking 

analysis and to permit space support team elements deployed in-theater to work 

together. OMNI was developed as a GPS accuracy planning tool. 

The Space Support Platform Plus (SSP+) 

As technology continued to evolve rapidly, offering improved commercial off-theshelf space products, the ARSST continued to upgrade the original Space Support 

Platform. The new Space Support Platform Plus (SSP+) built upon the lessons 

learned by the ARSST in the field — while taking advantage of new technologies 

and software — to provide an improved space support system. 

In upgrading the original SSP to the new SSP+, the ARSST established a series of 

system requirements. Specifications developed for the new SSP+ included an 

upgrade to a Silicon Graphics Octane Dual CPU system (R10000, 250 MHz), a 

minimum of 512 Megabytes RAM (1 Gigabyte preferred), 4 Megabyte-texture 

memory, and VHS video output option. Storage on the system was to be based on 

two 9-Gigabyte internal drives and an external 128 Gigabyte drive. The system 

was also to include one internal and two external UltraWide SCSI chains. As for 

peripherals, the SSP+ was to be equipped with a 8mm external tape drive and a 

Read/(Re)Write external CD-ROM. The system was to have a minimum 

complement of IRIX operating system software, an Internet browser, EDGE 3.3 or 

greater, ERDAS IMAGINE 8.3 or greater, and TSOC 3.2 or greater. In addition, 

the SSP+ would also benefit from a larger color monitor.23

Both the SSP and the SSP+ provide a number of common space support 

capabilities. First, both systems can be used to develop two-dimensional maps, to 

include grid overlays. Second, both systems can be used to produce two- and 

three-dimensional snapshots and montages. Third, the two systems can generate 

image maps and topographical blowups. Fourth, both the SSP and the SSP+ can 

be used to conduct three-dimensional fly-throughs of an area of operations. Fifth, 

the two systems can be used to generate GPS satellite availability and coverage 

information. Finally, both of the systems can display the orbits and earth coverage 

of satellites. 

The Multi-Source Tactical System (MSTS) 

The Multi-Source Tactical System was designed as a tool for processing battlefield 

information and providing situational awareness to the supported commander. The 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 173

MSTS allows a three-dimensional view of the battlefield to be developed, with 

applicable intelligence and operational data overlaid on the terrain.24 Sources of 

information for the MSTS include unclassified and classified imagery (from 

commercial satellites, airborne sensors, or national assets) and intelligence data 

from TIBS and TRAP.25

The ARSST has used the MSTS to track missile events for supported units.26 In 

addition, the ARSST has had some success in using the MSTS to support unit 

planning and operations. For example, during the 1st Infantry Division BCTP in 

1998, the Division suffered heavy losses of helicopters in the initial stages of the 

exercise. With the Multi-Source Tactical System, the anti-air threat could be 

accurately tracked. After this capability was demonstrated to Division planners, 

no further helicopters were ‘destroyed’ during the BCTP.27 

The Laptop Visualization Device (LVD) 

The Laptop Visualization Device was designed to provide advanced terrain 

analysis and mission planning support through a commercial off-the-shelf laptop 

computer. The LVD is based upon three software modules. The Route Planner 

Module is used to develop a terrain model and a fly-through of the requested 

terrain. The Route Builder Module converts this information into a movie that can 

be played on the LVD system. The Route Viewer Module is used to view the 

output and, ultimately, help supported units develop and evaluate tactical courses 

of action.28 

The LVD itself is based upon a laptop computer system, with 24 Megabtyes of 

RAM and a 540 Megabyte hard drive. For connectivity, the LVD is equipped with 

a 14.4 baud modem and an Ethernet connection. The LVD has been used by the 

ARSST in a number of exercises and deployments, to include ULCHI FOCUS 

LENS 97 and a 5th Special Forces Group Army Warfighter Exercise conducted 

from February to March 1997. 

The All Source Analysis System—Warlord (ASAS Warlord) 

The All Source Analysis System was developed as an all-source intelligence 

fusion tool to support tactical decision making. The ASAS is based upon a series 

of hardware and software modules, providing message and graphics input, 

intelligence processing and reporting, target identification and nomination, and 

communications processing and interfacing capabilities. These modules allow 

intelligence input to be received from a number of sources, to include unit 

reconnaissance elements, electronic intelligence systems, airborne sensors, human 

intelligence and counterintelligence sources, and national intelligence assets. The 

ASAS can process, correlate, and fuse hundreds of reports per hour, ensuring that 

information is provided in a timely fashion to supported commanders and staffs. 

ASAS systems have been fielded to separate brigades and regiments, Division 

Headquarters, Corps Headquarters, and Military Intelligence Brigades.29 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 174 

The ASAS Warlord system is a rapid-prototype system intended to provide All 

Source Analysis System capabilities in a lighter and more mobile platform. The 

ARSST uses the ASAS Warlord to provide information to a supported unit’s 

intelligence staff. 30

ARSST Communications 

A key space support requirement that has been repeatedly emphasized by ARSST 

personnel is the need for a communications capability that permits a team in the 

field to acquire large data files rapidly and access the full spectrum of 

USARSPACE (Forward) capabilities while deployed in the field. The Army 

Space Support Team has conducted a series of experiments to address this issue, 

using systems ranging from INMARSAT terminals, the Secret Internet Protocol 

Router Network (SIPRNET), the Global Broadcast System (GBS), and cellular 

phones. 

In 1997, U.S. Army Space Command commissioned an independent study of 

ARSST communications connectivity options and approaches. This study, 

delivered in February 1998, identified four categories of communications 

requirements for the Army Space Support Team: [1] Messaging or low data rate 

communications; [2] Voice communications; [3] SIPRNET web browsing; and [4] 

Downloading of large digital files (such as imagery data). A variety of 

commercial and military systems were evaluated against these ARSST 

requirements on the basis of system availability, performance, and operational 

factors. 

The authors of this independent study made four recommendations for addressing 

ARSST communications requirements. First, they concluded that the only way to 

meet current ARSST high data rate communications requirements at the present 

time was to use organic military assets. For this reason, it was recommended that 

planning to obtain access to these capabilities be made a top priority prior to 

ARSST deployment. Second, they noted that the Iridium system would provide a 

“limited, but secure, voice connectivity worldwide in an easily carried package” 

once deployed. For this reason, it was recommended that the ARSST obtain the 

military version of the Iridium handset as soon as it becomes available. Third, it 

was recommended that the likelihood of an ARSST deployment to a remote 

location (not serviced by organic communications) be conducted to determine if an 

interim communications solution using GBS might be required. Finally, it was 

recommended that U.S. Army Space Command continue to monitor the 

commercial market to determine what systems might best fulfill long-term 

requirements.31

In the 1998 draft Concept of Operations for the Army Space Support Cell and the 

Army Space Support Team, three different communications architectures were 

described. The first architecture presented was based upon a deployment in 

support of the annual ULCHI FOCUS LENS exercise in Korea. This architecture 

employed the ARCTIC BOX as the central communications node. Under this 

approach, Theater Automated Command and Control Information Management 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 175

System (TACCIMS) information would be routed through the SIPRNET and the 

Network Encryption System (NES). The Army Space Support Cell would process 

information through each of the deployed ARSST teams in theater and would 

provide connectivity back to other U.S. Army Space Command elements in 

Colorado Springs.32

The second architecture presented was based upon ARSST support requirements 

in Europe. Under this approach, the Joint Broadcast Service (JBS) or the Global 

Broadcast Service (GBS) would be used to transmit data overseas to V Corps. 

Once in theater, information would be transmitted from the JBS/GBS terminal to 

units in the field via the SIPRNET. If JBS or GBS were not available, a 

communications set-up would be established instead like that developed for III 

Corps.33

The third architecture described in the ASSC concept of operations was based 

upon a direct SIPRNET connection. This approach was designed for ARSST 

deployments in support of III Corps exercises. During these missions, an ASSC 

and an ARSST would be collocated with the Corps Headquarters, while ARSST 

teams would be stationed with subordinate Divisions and Brigades.34

 

1

 Major Jensen, Call the COPS. (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space 

Command, undated.). 

2

 U.S. Army Space Command, Final Training Support Package for the High 

Resolution Satellite Receiver. 27 February 1995. 

3

 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ATTN: DAMOFD, Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 18 March 1994. 

4

 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command: 12 December 1994.). 

5

 U.S. Army Space Command, Final Training Support Package for the High 

Resolution Satellite Receiver. 27 February 1995. 

6

 U.S. Army Space Command, Tactical Weather System (TWS) Program of 

Instruction (POI). 12 September 1996. 

7

 U.S. Army Space Command, Revised Draft: Training Support Package for 

Mission Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS). 2 December 1994. 

8

 Ibid. 

9

 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ATTN: DAMOFD, Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 18 March 1994. U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 176 

 

Support Team (ARSST) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado 

Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army Space Command: 12 December 1994.). 

10 U.S. Army Space Command, Revised Draft: Training Support Package for 

Mission Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS). 2 December 1994. 

11 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ATTN: DAMOFD, Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 18 March 1994. 

12 Ibid. 

13 U.S. Army Space Command, Army Space Support Team (ARSST) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS) (DRAFT). (Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Army 

Space Command: 12 December 1994.). 

14 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ATTN: DAMOFD, Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 18 March 1994. 

15 Memorandum, Earl J. Holliman, Army Spectrum Manager, Subject: Use of 

International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT). 25 January 1994. 

16 U.S. Army Space Command, Revised Draft: Training Support Package for 

Mission Planning Rehearsal System (MPRS). 2 December 1994. 

17 Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. Anderson III, U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, ATTN: DAMOFD, Subject: Operational Needs Statement (ONS) for the Commercial Space 

Package (CSP). 18 March 1994. 

18 U.S. Army Space Command, Revised Draft: Training Support Package for the 

Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor (MSIP). 2 December 1994. 

19 Meeting Notes, Major Foeller, U.S. Army Space Command, “Army Space 

Support to the Warfighter Review,” 11 January 1996. 

20 ARINC, Task Execution Plan: Army Space Support Team (ARSST) MPRSMPIS Integration. 1996. 

21 Major Wayne Brainerd, “Space Support Platform.” 1997. 

22 Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 

23 U.S. Army Space Command, “Description/Specification/Work Statement: 

Upgrade to the Space Support Platform Plus.” Undated. 

24 Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 177

 

25 U.S. Army Space Command (Forward), The Army Tactical Missile Defense 

Element Handbook. Undated. 

26 U.S. Army Space Command Briefing, “ARSST Systems,” Undated. 

27 Dr. James Walker and James Hooper, “James Williamson Oral History 

Interview, ARSST Historical/Lessons Learned Study,” 22 October 1998. 

28 Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 

29 Colonel Jerry V. Proctor, “All Source Analysis System Information Briefing” 

ASAS User’s Conference. 6 August 1998. 

30 Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 

31 Ibid., p. viii. 

32 Brown International, "Draft Army Space Support Cell Concept of Operations." 

Undated. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid. 

Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 179

APPENDIX TWO: ACRONYMS 

ABC Airborne Corps 

ADRG ARC Digitized RasterGraphics 

AFSPACECOM Air Force Space Command 

AFSST Air Force Space Support Team 

ALERT Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater 

AOR Area of Operations 

ARSPACE Army Space Command 

ARSST Army Space Support Team 

ASA Army Space Agency 

ASAS All Source Analysis System 

ASDP Army Space Demonstration Program 

ASEDP Army Space Exploitation Demonstration Program 

ASI Army Space Institute 

ASIOE Associated Support Items of Equipment 

ASPLO Army Space Liaison Officer 

ASSC Army Space Support Cell 

ASTAC Army Space Tactical Demonstration program 

ATCCS Army Tactical Command & Control System 

AUEL Automated Unit Equipment List 

BCBL Battle Command Battle Laboratory 

BCTP Battle Command Training Program 

BDA Battle Damage Assessment 

BLUFOR Blue Force 

BOD Board of Directors 

C2 Command and Control 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 180

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 

 Intelligence 

CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command 

CCB Configuration Control Board 

CCI Controlled Communications and Intelligence 

CEL Civilian Employment Level 

CENTCOM United States Central Command 

CG Commanding General 

CINC Commander in Chief 

CINCSPACE Commander in Chief, United States Space Command 

CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force 

COMSEC Communications Security 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

CONUS Continental United States 

COP Contingency Operations Package 

COPS Contingency Operations (Space) 

COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 

CP Command Post 

CPX Command Post Exercise 

CSH Common Software/Hardware 

CSP Commercial Space Package 

CSS Combat Service Support 

CTAT Combined Terrain Analysis Team 

CTT-H Commander’s Tactical Terminal-Hybrid 

CY Current Year 

DAMO-FD Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 

Force Development 

DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 181

DISN Defense Integrated Switched Network 

DIV Division 

DMS Defense Mapping School 

DMSP Defense Meteorological and Surveillance Program 

DoD Department of Defense 

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System 

DSP Defense Support Program 

DTED Digital Terrain Elevation Data 

DTLOMS Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, 

Material Development, Soldiers 

DTSS Digital Topographic Support System 

EAC Echelons Above Corps 

EUCOM European Command 

FAD Funding Authorization Document 

FOC Full operational capability 

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command 

FP Force Projection 

FSST Forward Space Support in Theater 

FY Fiscal Year 

GBS Global Broadcast System 

GCCS Global Command and Control System 

GMF Ground Mobile Forces 

GOWG General Officer Working Group 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HDRSAT High Data Rate Tactical Satellite Terminal 

HSIC Hardware Software Integration Center 

HQ Headquarters 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 182

HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army 

HRWSR High Resolution Weather Satellite Receiver 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IDP Issue Decision Package 

IFSARE Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar for Elevations 

ILS Integrated Logistics Support 

IMETS Integrated Meteorological System 

INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization 

INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 

IOC Interim Operational Capability (for GPS) 

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 

JBS Joint Broadcast Service 

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSDF Japan Self-Defense Force 

JSST Joint Space Support Team 

JTAGS Joint Tactical Ground Station 

JTF Joint Task Force 

LAM Louisiana Maneuvers 

LAM TF Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force 

LCC Land Component Commander 

LEOCOMM Low-Earth Orbit Communications 

LES Land Earth Station 

LIGHTSAT Light satellite 

LMS Lightweight, Multipurpose Shelter 

LNO Liaison Officer 

LVD Laptop Visualization Device 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 183

MACOM Major Command 

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force 

METEOSAT Meteorological Satellite 

METT-T Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time 

MDEP Management Decision Package 

MI Military Intelligence 

MILSATCOM Military Satellite Communications 

MOA Memorandum of Agreement 

MPRS Mission Planning Rehearsal System 

MRC Major Regional Conflict 

MSI Multi-Spectral Imagery 

MSIP Multi-Spectral Imagery Processor 

MSTS(A) Multi-Source Tactical System, Army 

NAVSST Navy Space Support Team 

NAVSTAR Navigation System Using Timing and Ranging 

NCA National Command Authority 

NCO Noncommissioned Officer 

NES Network Encryption System 

NET New Equipment Training 

NKPA North Korean People’s Army 

NOAA National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NTC National Training Center 

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States 

OCR Operational Capability Requirements 

ODA Operational Detachment Alpha 

ODP Officer Distribution Plan 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 184

OMA Operations and Maintenance, Army 

ONS Operational Needs Statement 

OPA Other Procurement, Army 

OPCON Operational Control 

OPLAN Operations Plan 

OPTEMPO Operations Tempo 

P3I Planned, Process and Product Improvement 

PACOM Pacific Command 

PC Personal Computer 

PE Program Element 

PEO-CCS Program Executive Office, Command and Control Systems 

PLDC Primary Leadership Development Course 

POM Program Objective Memorandum 

POS/NAV Position/Navigation 

RSI Remotely Sensed Imagery 

SA Selective Availability (GPS) 

SATCOM Satellite Communications 

SCP Standardized Command Post 

SFG Special Forces Group 

SHF Super High Frequency 

SIDS Secondary Imagery Dissemination System 

SIPRNET Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles 

SLGR Small Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver 

SMDC Space and Missile Defense Command (U.S. Army) 

SMDBL Space and Missile Defense Battle Laboratory 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 185

SOUTHCOM Southern Command 

SPOT Satellite Pour l’Observation de la Terre 

SSDC Space and Strategic Defense Command (U.S. Army) 

SSP Space Support Platform 

SSP+ Space Support Platform Plus 

STARTEX Start Exercise 

STOMP Support to Theater Operations Management Plan 

SWO Staff Weather Officer 

SWS Small Weather System 

TACDAR Tactical Detection and Reporting system 

TACCIMS Theater Automated Command and Control Information 

Management System 

TDA Table of Distribution and Allowances 

TEC Topographic Engineering Center 

TES Tactical Events System 

TERS Tactical Events Reporting System 

TF Task Force 

TIIP Topographic Imagery Integration Program 

TIROS Television Infra-Red Observation Satellite 

TM Team 

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

TPFDD Time Phased Force Deployment Data 

TPFDL Time Phased Force Deployment List 

TPIO-SPACE TRADOC Program Integration Office for Space 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 

TRAP Tactical and Related Applications 

TSOC Theater Support Operations Cell 

TTEC Topographic Technology Exploitation Cell 

UCMJ Universal Code of Military Justice 
Space Warriors: The Army Space Support Team 186

UFR Unfunded Requirement 

UJTL Universal Joint Task List 

USACOM United States Atlantic Command 

USAF United States Air Force 

USAFISA U.S. Army Force Integration Support Activity 

USAREUR United States Army Europe 

USARSPACE United States Army Space Command 

USASMDC United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command 

USASSDC United States Army Space and Strategic Defense Command 

USCINCSPACE See CINCSPACE 

USSPACECOM United States Space Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

VSP Volume Subscription Program (INMARSAT) 

VTC Video Teleconference 

WFX Warfighting Exercise 

WRAASE Corporate Name For A German Manufacturer Of Satellite 

 Equipment And Electronics