THEA~TORNEYGENERAI. 

OF -XAS 

Aus- II.TEXAS 

September 6, 1960 

Dr. J. W. Edgar 

Commissioner of Education 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Dr. Edgar: 

Opinion No. WW-931 

Re: Application of Article 

2900a to the Houston 

Independent School 

District under the 

stated facts. 

You have asked for the' opinion of this office on the 

following recitation: 

"On or about the 26th day of December, 1956, 

several plaintiffs filed an original complaint in 

the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Texas against the Houston Independent 

School District on the authority of Brown v. Board 

of Education, to speed the process of desegregation 

of the Houston Independent School District. The 

Defendant District duly answered the complaint and 

the case was called to trial on Ray 20, 1957, after 

which the Court entered its order on the 15th day 

of October, 1957, that the Houston Independent School 

'District commence desegregation on a non-discrlminatory basis from and after such time as necessary 

arrangements could be made. 

"Article 2900a, Texas Civil Statutes, was 

passed by the Texas Legislature. This Statute became effective August 23, 1957, after which the 

Houston Independent School District has made 

efforts to comply therewith. In order to comply 

with Article 2900a, the Houston Independent School 

District caused petitions to be executed by some 

87;OOO qualified electors residing in the district, 

ivhich was far in excess of the 20$ required by the 

Statute. Thereafter an election was held in which 

the majority of the qualified electors voted not 

to abolish the dual public school system. In short, 
Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 2 (WW-931) 

the Houston Independent School District has done 

everything possible to comply with both State and 

Federal law. 

“Thereafter, on the 12th day of August, 1960, 

the Federal District Court issued Its order requiring desegregation in the Houston Independent School 

District commencing in the first grade. A copy of 

said order is attached. 

“Obviously, the Houston Independent School 

District is confronted with the dilemma of losing 

its accreditation and its Foundation Program Funds 

and complying with the mandate of the Federal Dlstrict Court. It should be observed that the dual 

public school system as such has not been abolished 

In that there will remain segregated systems except 

for the first grade in this present scholastic year. 

Moreover, the Board of Trustees has not abolished 

the dual public sohool system nor has the Board of 

Trustees abolished allowance for transfer out of 

the district. In short, the Federal District Court 

rather than the Board of Trustees has brought about 

the noncompliance of the Houston Independent School 

District with Article 2900a.” 

You state that: “The dual public school system as 

such has not been abolished . . .’ It is unnecessary to pass 

upon that question in the present opinion. 

The answer to your question hinges upon the construction to be accorded Section 1 of Article 2900a, which provides 

as follows: 

“That no board of trustees nor any other 

school authority shall have the right to abolish 

the dual public school system . . . unless by a 

prior vote of the qualified electors residing in 

such district the dual school system is abolished.” 

Prior to the enactment of Article 2900a, the Supreme 

Court of the United States had held that racial discrimination 

in public education was violative of the Constitution of the 

United States. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 349 

U.S. 294. However, as the Supreme Court of Texas pointed out 

in McKinney v. Blankenship, 282 S.W.2d 691, the Court In the 

Brown case did not direct Immediate and complete integration 

in all schools. The Court recognized, and has since recognized, 
Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 3 (W-931) 

by a long line of decisions, that time would be required, the 

length of which would be largely dependent upon local conditions, for the full accomplishment of Its decree. 

We believe that a careful reading of Article 2900a 

evidences recognition by the Legislature of Texas that hasty 

and precipitate action by the school districts of the State 

in making the transition from racially segregated to integrated schools could conceivably Impede the effectiveness of 

our schools. The language of the Act furnishes ample justification for the conclusion that it was designed to legally 

achieve the maximum time for making the transition. 

It is significant that Section 1, above quoted, 

provides that "no school board or other school authority" 

shall have the right to abolish the dual system of oublic 

schools. The pains and penalties of the Act are evidently 

ap 

(17 

licable only if the dual s stem is abolished by either: 

the school board, or (27 other school authority. The 

Act provides no penalty where the dual system is abolished 

by judicial decree. This leads us to the question: By what 

authority has the dual system of public schools been abolished 

in the Houston Independent School District? The school board 

has entered no order calling for abolition of the dual system. 

In fact, the board felt impelled, for reasons it deemed sufficient, to offer legal resistance to the entry of the order 

which was in fact entered and Is now in the process of perfecting an appeal from that order. In this connection, It 

Is significant that Article 2900a provides no penalty where 

the dual system of public schools Is abolished by judicial 

decree. Such Is the case here, and hence we must conclude 

that the dual system of public schools for the Houston Independent School District has not been abolished by the "board 

of trustees or other school authority," as prescribed by Article 2900a. 

'Ihis Article provides in substance that any person 

who violates the Act will be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall 

be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1000. Should we 

construe the Act as prohibiting abolishment of the dual school 

system by judicial decree, such as we have here, it would be 

tantamount to placing the local school board in a legal dllemma, with their prosecution assured by either State or 

Federal authority, and from which there could be no extracation. If they sought to impede or obstruct the execution of 

the Federal Court decree the members of the school board 

would thereby render themselves subject to contempt by the 

Federal courts. On the other hand, If they did not prevent 

execution of the decree they would subject themselves to a 
Dr. J. W. Edgar, page 4 (WW-931) 

possible fine of not to exceed $1000 under the State law. It 

has been said that a court will never adopt a construction 

that . . . will lead to absurd conclusions or consequences 

if the language of the enactment is susceptible of any other 

meaning. 39 Tex.Jur., Statutes, Section 118, Staples v. State, 

112 Tex. 61, 245 S.W. 639; Fenet v. McCuistion, 105 Tex. 299 

147 S.W. 867; Shipley v. Floydada Independent School District 

(Comm.App.), 250 S.W. 159. 

We believe that the construction which we have accorded to the statute is not only in keeping with the actual 

language employed but is calculated to achieve the evident 

purpose of the enactment as well. This conclusion la in accordance with the argument advanced by the Houston School 

Board. 

SUMMARY 

Under the facts as stated, the Board of 

Trustees of the Houston Independent School District, or other school authority, has not 

abolished the dual system of public schools 

within the meaning of Artlale 2900a, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes, and hence neither the school 

district nor its trustees are subject to the 

penalties of said Article. 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

LP:dhs 

By Leonard Passmore 

First Assistant 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Gordon Cass 

Houghton Brownlee, Jr. 

John Reeves 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: Henry Braswell