U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

32–439 PDF 2007

YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT,

BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN PROJECT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE

AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 25, 2006

Serial No. 109–206

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Deputy Staff Director

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

EX OFFICIO

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA

RON MARTINSON, Staff Director

SHANNON MEADE, Professional Staff Member

ALEX COOPER, Clerk

TANIA SHAND, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 25, 2006 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Gregory Friedman, Inspector General, U.S.

Department of Energy; Margaret Federline, Deputy Director, Office

of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission; and Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy ........................... 9

Federline, Margaret .................................................................................. 42

Friedman, Gregory .................................................................................... 33

Golan, Paul ................................................................................................ 52

Wells, Jim .................................................................................................. 9

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Davis, Hon. Danny K., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Illinois, prepared statement of ................................................................ 76

Federline, Margaret, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 44

Friedman, Gregory, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 36

Golan, Paul, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of .................. 55

Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Nevada, prepared statement of .................................................................... 4

Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .................................... 11

(1)

YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT,

BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN

PROJECT

TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY

ORGANIZATION,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Porter, Issa, and Norton.

Also present: Representative Gibbons.

Staff present: Ronald Martinson, staff director; Chad Bungard,

deputy staff director/chief counsel; Shannon Meade, professional

staff member; Alex Cooper, legislative assistant; Michelle

Triestman, GAO detailee; Tania Shand, minority professional staff

Member; and Teresa Coufal, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. PORTER. Good afternoon everyone. Welcome. I appreciate you

all being here today.

I would like to bring the meeting to order, this meeting of the

Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization.

Today marks the third hearing the subcommittee has held with

regard to its investigation of the Yucca Mountain Project. Today’s

hearing is about mismanagement and the problems that flow from

it.

Last year, when the USGS e-mails surfaced indicating quality assurance deficiencies, I requested the Government Accountability

Office to conduct a followup study of the Department of Energy’s

quality assurance program. GAO recently completed the study and

released its report entitled Quality Assurance at DOE’s Planned

Nuclear Waste Repository Needs Increased Management Attention.

Today’s hearing will examine these findings in more detail.

The GAO study examined, No. 1, the history of the Project’s

quality assurance problems; No. 2, DOE’s tracking of these problems and efforts to address them; and, No. 3, challenges facing

DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the

Project.

First, GAO found that DOE has had a long history of quality assurance problems at Yucca Mountain. In the late 1980’s and 1990’s,

DOE had problems assuring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

that it had developed adequate plans and procedures related to

2

quality assurance. More recently, as it prepares to submit a license

application to the NRC, DOE has been relying on costly and timeconsuming rework to resolve lingering quality assurance problems

uncovered during audits and after-the-fact evaluations.

The subcommittee’s investigation sheds some light on these findings. Subcommittee investigators have interviewed current and

former high-level quality assurance personnel. There is a consensus

among those interviewed professionals that the type of audits conducted by the program today are ineffective at addressing quality

assurance problems. Specifically, QA Management has shifted from

conducting performance-based audits to compliance audits, which

look at adherence to general procedures only. The ability to identify

substantive issues and technical weaknesses makes performancebased audits more effective in correcting problems head on. This

shift to compliance audits restrict’s DOE’s ability to identify and

correct problems, which was a poor management decision.

Second, GAO found that DOE cannot be certain its efforts to improve quality assurance have been effective because of ineffective

management tools.

For example, in 2004, DOE announced it was making a commitment to continuous quality assurance improvement and that its efforts would be tracked by performance indicators that would enable

it to assess progress and direct management attention as needed.

However, GAO found that the Project’s performance indicators and

other management tools were not effective for this purpose. Specifically, the management tools did not target existing areas of concern

and did not track progress in addressing them. The tools also had

weaknesses in detecting and highlighting significant problems for

management attention.

Finally, GAO found that DOE continues to face a number of

quality assurance and other challenges.

First, DOE is engaged in extensive efforts to restore confidence

in scientific documents because of the quality assurance problems

raised in the USGS e-mails. At the recommendation of the DOE Inspector General, the Department has about 14 million more project

e-mails to review.

Second, DOE faces quality assurance challenges in resolving design control problems associated with its requirements management process. The process for ensuring the high-level plans and

regulatory requirements are incorporated in specific engineering

details. In fact, problems with this process lead to the recent December 2005, work suspension of certain project work.

And, third, DOE is challenged by management continuity. In just

the last year, the Project lost its program director, licensing manager and quality assurance director in all key managerial positions—pardon me—all key managerial position.

GAO findings in this report present real concerns that the Department is running an ineffective program that has not implemented quality as a top priority and DOE’s management of this

project is to blame.

The importance of a rigorous quality assurance program is paramount to a project of this magnitude. All of the scientific data and

engineering design submitted to support a license for Yucca Mountain should be credible, have to be credible, have to be reliable,

3

have to be traceable, have to be transparent. In short, if quality assurance is not in place, the NRC could and should reject the license

application on that ground alone. Moreover, already $9 billion has been spent. $9 billion has been

spent on this project. Rather than appropriating more money and

pushing legislation through to expedite the Project, these serious

problems should be fixed.

This is clearly a project that is consistently failing under the

weight of its own mismanagement and ineptitude at correcting reoccurring quality assurance deficiencies. In fact, in recent weeks,

Secretary Bodman himself conceded the Yucca Mountain Project

has been poorly managed and labeled the Project—and this is his

own word—‘‘broken.’’

Mr. Bodman is preceded by Energy Secretaries who did not provide the necessary quality assurance and oversight, including Secretary Richardson of the Clinton administration under whose

watch two USGS scientists e-mailed accounts of fabricating quality

assurance data to multiple recipients.

Despite a clear record of mismanagement, however, it is important to recognize that the vast majority of Federal employees are

reliable and hard-working individuals. It is unfortunate that management structure and the procedures at the Yucca Mountain

Project have impaired their ability to perform. Therefore, I want to

take a moment to recognize those Federal employees who have

worked and continue to work very hard on this project.

If this were NASA and this were a space shuttle, the space shuttle would not fly. We have a program that is broken, and the reason we are here today is to continue our investigation in looking

at the Department of Energy and its management.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]

4

5

6

7

Mr. PORTER. I would like to thank, of course, our witnesses who

are here today; and I would like to first really recognize my colleague to my immediate left, and that is Congressman Gibbons

from Nevada. Welcome.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank

you for your leadership on this issue and thank you for what this

committee is doing in terms of highlighting the very sincere problems that all of us feel this issue has; and I want to also thank you

for inviting me to participate with the committee today in hearing

this issue.

Before I allow for you to continue, Mr. Chairman, I would hope

that my full and written statement can be entered into the record

on this issue.

But since the proposed Yucca Mountain Project has begun, and

it was started over two decades ago, Nevadans have opposed this

ill-advised project for many, many reasons. I only hope that someday Nevadans will have an opportunity to see and celebrate the demise of this disastrous proposal, and only then will Nevadans no

longer need to worry about living next to the most dangerous substance on Earth.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, today is not that day.

I do agree with many of the panel that we must find solutions

to the escalating nuclear waste problem in this country. However,

simply digging a hole in the Nevada desert and burying the waste

is not that answer.

One only needs to look at the recent history of the Yucca Mountain Project to get a sense of the DOE’s motivations. Unfortunately,

it is extremely disturbing to me to see that, since the birth of this

project, that the Department of Energy has consistently failed to

use sound science as their guide and has instead been blinded by

its obsession to do anything to rubber stamp this project in order

to rush it to completion.

While this might be OK to the bureaucrats at DOE headquarters

2,500 miles away, it is completely inadequate to the people of Nevada and throughout this country who have to live with the reality

of this substance, the deadliest substance known to man, contaminating perhaps our water supply, traveling through our communities and along our roads and perhaps endangering our communities.

Last year, under Chairman Porter’s leadership, this committee

held a hearing which shed a very revealing light on the recent

scandal plaguing this problem; and since that time, it seems clear

that every month a new revelation about Yucca Mountain is revealed that continues to disturb but should not surprise Nevadans.

First, the EPA comes out with an arbitrary and grossly inaccurate guideline to help them push this project forward. Then there

are accounts that Yucca Mountain Project is falling apart from inside and will require millions of dollars to repair. Next, on April

4th, DOE sent its Yucca Mountain bill to Congress. Since Yucca

fails the test of science and cannot satisfy traditional safety regulations for nuclear projects, the bill would unabashedly do an end

run around those obstacles, constituting DOE’s last-ditch attempt

to salvage a repository that has failed nearly every test that it has

been put through.

8

And today, Mr. Chairman, you are holding a hearing on the Government Accountability’s Office’s assessment of the effectiveness of

DOE’s quality assurance program; and this report, may I say, is

alarming, to say the least. It reinforces what many have been saying for years, that the Yucca Mountain Project is fatally flawed and

should be stopped immediately, without delay.

Chairman Porter, I applaud your ongoing efforts to try to investigate the alleged falsifications of scientific data on the Yucca

Mountain Project through the House Government Reform Committee; and I look forward to hearing today from the witnesses who

will try to explain the need to continue forward with this project

despite the mounting evidence that points to the need to look for

an alternative.

I want to thank you again for the opportunity and inviting me

to join you today, and I look forward to the opportunity as well to

hear from our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Congressman.

I will note for the record that Members will be coming and going

today, and we have also received or will be receiving statements

from other members of the Nevada delegation who are also invited

to be on the dais today but because of schedules weren’t able to be

here but will be submitting their own documents.

At this point, I would like to ask that the witnesses today recognize that there may be additional questions that will be addressed

later from members of the committee, and I would like to ask that

you all stand at this point, and we will do the customary swearing

in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. PORTER. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered in the

affirmative.

Please be seated. Thank you.

Our first witness today will be Mr. Jim Wells, who is Director

of Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office; followed by Gregory Friedman, Inspector General,

U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret Federline—did I pronounce

that correctly—Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and Mr.

Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste

Management, U.S. Department of Energy.

So, first, Mr. Wells, we appreciate your testimony. Keep it approximately 5 minutes.

9

STATEMENTS OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MARGARET

FEDERLINE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; AND PAUL GOLAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work concerning

the quality assurance challenges facing DOE as it tries to obtain

a license to construct a geological repository at the Yucca Mountain

site. Our most recent March 2006, report, Quality Assurance Needs

Attention, and in our earlier 2004 report, Persistent Quality Assurance Problems, continued the description of a troubled QA program.

As a Nation, we are 25 years into a process to deal with geological burial of 50,000 metric tons and growing nuclear waste. Most

in the room today are well aware of the twists and turns this program has taken over the years.

Today, after continuing delays, DOE still must prepare a license

request for approval from the NRC to begin construction. NRC requires that a quality program—quality assurance program must

exist to ensure that the work and the technical information is supporting a license that is deemed accurate and defensible. DOE is

not there yet.

While we were doing our most recent audit, DOE announced the

‘‘new path forward’’ initiative, but it has not yet established a new

date when they will be ready to ask for a license.

I want to start and finish my statement today saying that resolving the QA problem we and others have found is essential to proceeding with construction.

In 2004, we reported recurring QA problems could delay the licensing of the repository. 2006, 2 years later, we still don’t have

the request for a license.

DOE tried to make changes to improve. In 2005, DOE reported

that it had discovered a series of e-mail messages written in the

late 1990’s by USGS Geological Survey employees that appeared to

imply that workers had falsified records for scientific work. Several

of these messages appear to show disdain for the Project’s quality

assurance program and its requirements; and in December 2005

and again in February 2006, some project work has been stopped

due to continuing QA problems.

Our most recent report once again found problems.

Over the years, NRC, the DOE IG and DOE’s own management

team were finding inadequate QA procedures, ineffective fixes to

earlier problems, and continuing weaknesses in data, software, and

modeling information.

Mr. Chairman, of particular concern to us was DOE’s reliance on

costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering quality asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:50 Feb 08, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32439.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
10

surance concerns, as opposed to building quality assurance in at

the beginning.

Second, we found significant problems with the management

tools, as you have mentioned in your opening statement, that DOE

was using to target, to track, to report, and document successful

fixes to past QA problems.

I guess the best way to describe by findings was that, due to the

numerous technical design flaws, what management tools DOE

management was using to fix the problems was not adequately describing the problem or sufficiently drawing management’s attention to the best solutions.

In our report, we recommended that DOE needed to strengthen

its management tools, and we offered suggestions as to ways to improve. DOE agreed with our recommendations.

Third, DOE’s aggressive new path forward faces substantial QA

challenges going forward. They are not out of the woods yet.

The e-mails suggesting the possible falsification of quality assurance records had resulted in extensive, again, rework efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents. DOE is conducting a review of 14 million additional e-mails to determine whether they

raise additional QA problems. I suspect we will hear today about

where the status of that is.

DOE also has two stop-work orders in place as they continue to

resolve new-found QA problems.

As they announce new organizational changes, including bringing in new players to fix the problems, they will face potential for

further confusion of their accountability as roles and responsibilities change. This will impose over an organization that is experiencing high managerial turnover and existing vacancies in various

senior management positions. For example, 9 of the 17 key management positions at the Project level have turned over since 2001,

and 3 different directors have served in Washington recently.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members, I would like to say

that, clearly, DOE was assigned a task with a very complex and

changing requirement to build something which has never been

done before.

Our GAO audit team continually met with and discussed the

Project with some really smart DOE people, very talented people

that are doing many things right. Our audits, however, we do

have—this is where we find things that can be done better. We

have made recommendations to DOE which they agree with. It is

too early for us to conclude today whether its new path forward effort will resolve these tremendous challenges.

I will end with what I started with: Resolving the QA problems

we and others have found is essential to proceeding with this construction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Wells. Again, we appreciate your

being here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department

of Energy, welcome.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY FRIEDMAN

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased

to be here today at your request to testify on matters related to

quality assurance procedures and general management at the U.S.

Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain Project.

My office has conducted a number of reviews involving Yucca

Mountain Project over the last several years. In today’s testimony,

I would like to highlight three recent reviews relating to quality assurance and general project management.

First, my office, in coordination with the Department of Interior

Office of Inspector General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, initiated a criminal investigation focusing on potential falsification of research data and quality assurance requirements pertaining to computer modeling of net water infiltration at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.

As part of the investigation, we conducted numerous interviews

of current and former employees of the Department of Energy,

Yucca Mountain Project contractors, and employees of the U.S. Geological Survey. We analyzed about 150,000 e-mails directly and

also obtained and examined numerous documents that included

various reports on internal and external reviews of the Yucca

Mountain Project operations. The objective of the investigation was

to identify the facts and circumstances surrounding a series of emails that discussed the potential fabrication of data and compromise of quality assurance requirements.

The extensive factual record developed was provided to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office in December 2005 at the conclusion of our field

work.

Just last evening, on April 24th, the U.S. Attorney’s Office notified the OIG they had declined to pursue criminal prosecution in

this matter. Among the reasons given by the Department of Justice

were that they could not show intent and the action did not rise

to the level of criminality.

My written testimony, Mr. Chairman, does not include this information because it was submitted prior to our being notified by the

Department of Justice; and my verbal testimony will have to do in

this regard.

During the investigation, we observed internal control deficiencies that warrant the attention of Department of Energy program managers. A memorandum highlighting these issues has

been issued to the Secretary of Energy. We understand the Department of Interior’s Office of Inspector General was planning to issue

a separate report to the Department of Interior Management regarding issues specific to the geological survey.

With respect to the Department of Energy, we identified the following internal control deficiencies: First, a nearly 6-year delay in

surfacing and appropriately dealing with the controversial e-mails,

for which, frankly, we could find no satisfactory explanation; second, the compromise of scientific notebook requirements for an

analysis and model report, an AMR report, on simulation of net inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:50 Feb 08, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32439.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
34

filtration for modern potential future climates; and, three, a failure

to properly maintain critical control files relating to that same

AMR in accordance with data management system requirements

established by the project managers.

Although criminal prosecution will not be pursued based on the

Department of Justice’s declaration, observers have pointed out

that the authors of the e-mails demonstrated irresponsible and

reckless behavior and their actions have had the effect of undermining public confidence in the quality of science associated with

the Yucca Mountain Project. This incident has forced the Department of Energy to spend millions in actions to address the quality

assurance issues raised in the e-mails.

The second matter I would like to address is an IG report issued

in November 2005.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission procedures for granting a license for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository require the Department publicly disclose on a Web site all documents, including e-mails, relative to the licensing process. In 2004,

the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management took action

to review approximately 10 million archived e-mails associated

with Yucca Mountain for relevancy to the licensing process.

Internal to the Yucca Mountain Project, an administrative procedure required that throughout the course of all project activities—

and I stress all project activities—there be a conscious effort to

identify and resolve any and all conditions adverse to quality. As

a result of our inspection, we concluded that the Department’s review of the archived e-mails had not been structured so as to ensure the quality assurance issues were identified and addressed.

We were informed that, as a result of our report, Waste Management is developing a corrective action plan to expand its qualityassurance-related search effort to include a more comprehensive review of the approximately 10 million or more archived e-mails.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss an IG report

issued in December 2005. We found the Department had paid approximately $4 million in incentive fees to Bechtel SAIC, Yucca

Mountain’s prime contractor, even though the firm did not meet

contract performance expectations. We concluded that Waste Management had not established an adequate process to monitor and

evaluate the contractor’s work products and services.

As a result of management weaknesses, the contractor was rewarded for projects and services integral to the Yucca Mountain

project for services that did not meet the requirements of the contract, including matters related to ensuring project quality. As a result of our report, Waste Management agreed to establish a performance incentive plan with clearly defined standards and document its rationale for fee payments.

The efforts to determine whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable

site for disposal of the Nation’s high-level nuclear waste and spent

nuclear fuel is a complex challenge. Of paramount concern is that

this evaluation be objective and that it be based on sound and unbiased scientific analysis consistent with the highest possible quality assurance standards. Thus, it is vital the Department intensify

its efforts in the quality assurance arena.

35

We are committed to performing independent reviews to assist in

this effort. In fact, in late 2005, at the request of the Acting Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Mr.

Golan, we initiated a review of the completeness and effectiveness

of the corrective action program to address quality assurance problems. This review is in process.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes

my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you

might have.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Friedman. I appreciate

all your efforts and your staff.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:]

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

Mr. PORTER. Next, we have Margaret Federline, Deputy Director

of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Welcome, Margaret. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF MARGARET FEDERLINE

Ms. FEDERLINE. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to share with you

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s perspective on the role of

quality assurance in the Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain

program.

Since I will be presenting an abbreviated version of my testimony, I would ask that my entire written statement be made part

of the hearing record. Thank you very much.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act assigns NRC the role of regulator

for the proposed high-level waste repository. In addition to reviewing DOE’s license application, the NRC observes and comments on

DOE’s quality assurance program as part of NRC’s prelicensing activity. Implementation of an effective QA program during the

prelicensing, licensing and operational periods will ensure that repository activities are consistent with safety requirements.

The purpose of our observing DOE activities during the

prelicense application phase is to verify that DOE clearly understands our requirements. We review the implementation and effectiveness of DOE’s quality assurance program by performing independent reviews, observing audits and surveillances performed by

DOE and its contractors and monitoring significant quality effecting activities.

While no regulatory conclusions are made during our reviews, we

do provide feedback to DOE for consideration.

For example, we performed an independent review of important

DOE model reports. Through independent technical work, NRC had

identified that the information in these model reports was significant to a safety demonstration. During the review, NRC staff identified concerns with some aspects of the technical basis and information in the model reports. Also, NRC staff identified concerns

with the effectiveness of some of DOE’s corrective actions.

NRC staff members also observe DOE audits of QA program implementation to determine their effectiveness in identifying issues

that pertain to safety in their design for the proposed repository.

Of the audits that we have observed, we have noted that the auditors are generally qualified, trained and independent of the areas

being audited, and most audits were adequate in assessing the activities being audited.

For example, NRC observers of a DOE audit of design engineering products related to the fuel handling and canister handling facilities determined that the audit was effective in assessing the

adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of technical products

and processes.

On the other hand, NRC staff has identified other concerns during these observations. One such observation noted that NRC did

not agree with the DOE auditors’ conclusion that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories effectively implemented certain aspects

related to control of measurement and test equipment and correcVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:50 Feb 08, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32439.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
43

tive action. As a result of our observations, DOE is performing additional reviews in this area.

During the current year, NRC staff reviews have noted that DOE

has made significant changes to its corrective action and trending

process as a result of Yucca Mountain Project internal audit findings as well as the result of NRC comments.

NRC staff will continue to observe DOE activities in areas of

science as well as design work to ensure that DOE’s QA program

is appropriately applied in developing the safety case for licensing.

Some current QA program implementation issues are of concern

to us. These issues include those identified at the U.S. Geologic

Survey, DOE’s design controls and requirements flow-down and the

calibration of test equipment at Lawrence Livermore Labs. These

issues concern us because they raise questions about the systematic and effective implementation of DOE’s QA program, which is

an integral part of a high-quality license application. NRC staff will

continue to review DOE’s technical approaches, findings and conclusions regarding QA issues. We will closely observe DOE’s corrective actions and will continue to bring any issues to DOE’s attention.

At the most recent quarterly management meeting, QA program

implementation issues were discussed, and DOE presented its

plans for resolving the issues.

Our recent observations of Yucca Mountain Project activities

have noted that DOE’s plans for addressing current QA program

issues with design control and requirements flow-down appear to

be directed at the right problems and to be using good approaches

for correcting the root causes.

Recent Yucca Mountain Project staff additions have brought in

management personnel with previous experience in implementing

quality assurance programs for NRC-regulated activities.

In March 2006, as we have heard, the Government Accountability Office issued its report on Yucca Mountain quality assurance.

NRC staff had reviewed the GAO report and found that these conclusions are consistent with what we have observed, some of which

I have discussed today.

In conclusion, the NRC staff has noticed improvements in effectiveness of DOE’s quality assurance program implementation. We

will, however, continue to fulfill our responsibilities to ensure the

adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment.

Thank you very much.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you. Appreciate your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Federline follows:]

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

Mr. PORTER. Next, Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. DOE.

Welcome.

STATEMENT OF PAUL GOLAN

Mr. GOLAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.

My name is Paul Golan, and I am Acting Director of the Office

of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management since May 2005. Previously, I served in the Department of Energy’s environment cleanup program; and prior to that I had the privilege of serving in the

U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.

In order for my testimony to be more productive today, I would

like to provide the subcommittee my perspective of quality.

When most people speak of QA, they envision an organization of

auditors armed with checklists and pencil stubs counting beans

and making sure all the boxes are checked and putting an ‘‘inspected by’’ label on the box with your product. That is not quality

assurance. Rather, that is an audit or assessment. While a necessary component of a QA program, by all means not the most important aspect.

When I speak of quality today, quality assurance, I am referring

to an organizational culture, a culture that is a collection of the organization’s standards, actions, behaviors, and ultimately its performance. People and organizations that set high standards act

professionally, behave responsibly and perform in accordance with

the requirements, embody good quality.

These characteristics are critical to an organization’s ability to

function effectively in a regulated environment.

Quality is an organizational trait earned by an organization’s living up to its standards and is demonstrated by its performance.

Over the years, the Yucca Mountain QA program has been reviewed by many of the organizations at the table today. The set of

documents here is a compilation of the reports by these organizations, some of which go back to the 1980’s. They addressed deficiencies in the Yucca Mountain QA program and found that, despite the development of corrective action plans, deficiencies have

not been completely corrected and the same deficiencies tend to reoccur.

Again, these findings were consistent with the findings of the latest review by the GAO in March 2006. In nearly all these reviews,

the Department concurred with the findings and instituted corrective actions to address these deficiencies. I have read the reports

and agree with the findings.

The QA program and, more importantly, the culture of this organization needs to improve. In order for us to improve, there are two

components of this program and this culture that I would like to

focus on. The first is focus, and the second is accountability.

With respect to the first component, we need to consider whether

we are focusing on the symptoms or we are addressing the root

cause. It is like taking an aspirin for a headache. If the headache

keeps on coming back, then perhaps, maybe, the aspirin wasn’t the

right medicine. We need to focus on the true cause of the issue and

53

ensure that the effectiveness of our corrective actions can be objectively measured through improvements in performance.

The second aspect is accountability. Some call accountability follow through. Accountability is critical for any organization or any

program to be successful.

Employees are trained on the requirements and understand the

requirements. Managers and leaders need to mentor their staff and

make sure these requirements are met. Then if employees or managers are either unwilling or unable to meet those requirements,

they need to be held accountable for their actions. On one level,

that may call for additional training. In more egregious cases, it

may also mean consequences ranging from counseling to letters of

reprimand, from potentially being removed from having the privilege to work on this project depending on the severity of the situation.

At the Yucca Mountain Project, it is important to recognize that

the vast majority of the nearly 2,000 people who work on the

Project—most of them citizens of Nevada—have high standards,

behave professionally and perform good work, day in and day out.

At the same time, though, we need to recognize that the actions of

a few or the actions of the one can dramatically undermine the confidence and damage the reputation of hundreds of credible, honest

and trustworthy people who have worked very long and hard on

this project. Managers and leaders of this organization need to

monitor their ongoing activities and address quality issues realtime. They need to know what is going on in their work spaces and

correct issues on the spot.

In order to be effective, managers and leaders need to be visible,

they need to be engaged, and they need to actively listen. Managers and leaders need to communicate issues up the chain of command quickly and effectively as well as be responsible for developing solutions.

Managers and leaders need to do this today, and they need to do

it again tomorrow and the day after that until it becomes habit.

Habits, good or bad, help define who we are as individuals and who

we are as organizations. Habits over time become our culture.

If I may take a couple of minutes to talk briefly on some of the

work stoppages that my office has ordered, I would appreciate 2

more minutes.

Mr. PORTER. No problem.

Mr. GOLAN. First, I would like to talk about the USGS work performed by the Department, which were discussed in our technical

report issued in February 2006.

Our independent technical evaluation noninfiltration estimates

developed by the U.S. Geologic Survey were found to be consistent

with the conclusions that were completed by scientists independent

of this project under future predicted climate conditions. Nevertheless, our quality assurance requirements were not met; and, consequently, we are expending time and resources to replace that

work.

We have directed that Sandia National Laboratories redevelop

computer codes that will generate new infiltration rate estimates

in accordance with our QA requirements and then replace those inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:50 Feb 08, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32439.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
54

filtration rate estimates after the work has been independently reviewed.

I take full accountability for that decision, sir.

In other matters, more recently, we suspended the authority of

our contractor to approve quality documents in the area of facility

design because the flow-down of design requirement was not documented in accordance with our procedures. While our QA procedures did not require us to suspend work in this case, we nonetheless did to address any potential issues before moving forward with

our new design to support the clean canistered approach to waste

handling operations.

In January of this year, we issued a stop-work order at the site

when a cable being laid in the exploratory tunnel did not meet established code requirements. Workers at the site brought this to

our attention, and we appreciate and applaud their actions. We

have taken steps to address this issue.

In April, we issued a stop-work order for work associated with

the use of certain chemical standards because we found procedures

used to procure those standards did not meet our specifications. We

are taking steps to address this issue.

Additionally, we are continuing our investigation on the calibration and use of humidity and temperature probes by one of our national laboratories.

In all these cases, after we understand the facts, we will in a

very deliberate way take actions necessary to ensure the quality of

our work and hold managers and employees accountable for their

actions as well as recognize those individuals who identified issues

and took the right action.

We are taking aggressive actions and measures to find quality

assurance issues as well as take actions to address them. However,

as everyone on the panel has pointed out today, these corrective actions in my mind amount to rework and a defect. While we will do

what is necessary to ensure our work products meet our quality assurance requirements, I have a management goal where we do all

our work right the first time, every time.

Let me digress for a moment. I do not want to give the impression that a good QA program or good QA is defined by the absence

of issues. We will find those situations that do not meet our requirements that will necessitate action. We believe, however, that

with a good QA program we will find these situations early, within

hours or days, and correct issues while they are small. Early detection and prompt action is our goal.

Secretary Bodman a year ago asked this team to focus on working to make this project safer, simpler and more reliable and to improve the quality and culture of this organization as our No. 1 priority. We have worked diligently on this task, and the Department

will seek to demonstrate good quality, good science, and good processes in our license application and across our entire organization

through our performance.

Thank you very much.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Golan follows:]

55

56

57

58

59

60

Mr. PORTER. At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent

that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record, and answers to written

questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

I would also like to ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents and other materials referred to by Members and witnesses

may be included in the hearing record and that all Members be

permitted to revise and extend remarks. Without objection.

Let the record reflect a quorum is now present. Thank you.

I would like to now open it up for some questions for the panel.

I would like to really begin myself and, since we are two Members—Congressmen—will be informal with questions. I would like

to begin.

Mr. Golan, I wear two hats, one as a Member of Congress from

Nevada, one as chairman of this subcommittee. And whether—of

course, my position is very clear on the Project, because I represent

the State of Nevada and am very concerned about Yucca Mountain

and its impact on our community and State. But let me put on my

hat for one moment as chairman.

It appears to me that no one is in charge of the Yucca Mountain

Project. And I appreciate that you have been there about a year.

But whether this is a design of a space shuttle or whether this is

a design of an airplane, I personally would be afraid to fly it. And

I know that a lot of DOE folks mean well and are working hard

and a lot of great employees that mean well, but I am not sure any

of them are responsible or taking full responsibility. And I am not

sure whether you would let one of your children fly on an airplane

that DOE is building right now, referring to Yucca Mountain.

Time and time again, there has been questions of the safety and

quality assurance. And, again, whether it is Wall Street or the private sector, with this much turnover in management, Wall Street

would shut you down, the private sector or local government would

shut you down, with 9 of 17 key management positions gone, 3 of

the directors gone.

Time and time again, testimony by experts that are saying that

there are serious, serious safety problems—forget the word quality

assurance. This is safety about men, women, and children around

this country and in the State of Nevada.

But my biggest concern, whether I was for or against the

Project—and you know I am opposed to the Project—I would not

trust my child to fly on your airplane. I would not trust my child’s

safety to be in your hands, because I don’t believe anybody is in

charge.

My staff has done hours and hours of testimony with employees.

I have spent time talking to employees, again, find hard-working

individuals, but I have yet to find anyone that says that this

project to date will be safe, other than management personnel.

They are all very concerned. Employees are concerned. There’s a

morale problem. They are concerned about the turnover in management. They are concerned about the change in design of your airplane every other week. So I, too, share that concern.

I know today is about some questions, but I will tell you that I

am very, very troubled as a Member of this Congress. And I know

61

other Members of Congress, all they want to do is find—not all but

many just want to find a place for the storage of nuclear waste.

And out of sight out of mind. But for the folks living in Nevada,

it is not out of sight, out of mind; and I am very concerned.

Again, we have document after document after document stating

that there is serious problems from management of the contract,

with your subcontractors, there has been safety of employees because of different things through the years. I state that I question

if anybody is in charge.

Mr. GOLAN. Well, sir, I am in charge; and I take responsibility

for this operation. Over the last year, I have spent a lot of time on

various aspects of the Project, from the total systems performance

assessment [TSPA], through the seismic analysis, through the design analysis of the facilities, all the way down to the layout of the

facility at the site.

Secretary Bodman asked—he gave us direction a year ago, very

clear direction. He said, make it simpler and make it safer; and

over the last year, we focused on that, sir.

We talked about the redesign of the surface facilities. That is the

first time we have done the redesign of the surface facilities since

the site recommendation was basically made. And we took the approach with the clean canistered approach to make it safer, simpler

and more reliable. Rather than handling bare spent fuel at the site,

we are going to predominantly handle canister fuel. That is safer

for the workers. That is safer for the State. That is simpler and

more reliable.

Second, we designated Sandia National Laboratory to coordinate

all our scientific work. We are taking advantage of truly one of the

gems of the national laboratory system in Sandia, and Sandia

earned the right as our lead laboratory because of the good work

they did at the waste isolation pilot plant. We want to establish a

trust but verify culture.

A couple of weeks back, we designated the Oak Ridge Institute

for Science and Education [ORISE], as our independent review of

our technical work. When we issued our technical report on the

USGS infiltration work, we had that work independently verified,

but we had to put together a team of individuals from the University of Arizona, Colorado School of Mines and the Department of

Agriculture. Now we have access to nearly 100 universities to do

the independent work.

We have established our safety conscious work environment

across the entire organization. Before, it was just set up in the

Yucca Mountain Project office out in Las Vegas. I have the employee concerns manager and the director of quality assurance reporting to my office. We recently reorganized our staff to focus on

line management accountability; and we have project offices, from

chief scientist to chief engineer, regulatory authority, all assigned

line management responsibilities, reporting to the director to clarify roles and responsibilities.

These are just a few actions that we have taken to focus on making it safer, simpler, and more reliable. As I said, I have looked at

aspects of this project from the infiltration down to the transport

of the water as it leaves the waste package here. I think our

science is sound, our engineering is sound and conservative, and

62

the path forward that we intend to put this project on will make

it safer, simpler and more reliable than it was before.

Mr. PORTER. Do you agree with the Secretary’s comments that

our Yucca Mountain Project is broken?

Mr. GOLAN. I want to put that into context. The Yucca Mountain

was supposed to start accepting waste in 1998. We are 8 years beyond that schedule. Clearly, there were things not going right for

us not to meet that deadline. So I can understand the Secretary’s

frustration, and I can understand that classification of the Project

as being broken.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Congressman Gibbons.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Golan, I think you can agree with GAO’s study, can you not,

that there has been a serious quality control problem over years.

Do you agree with that?

Mr. GOLAN. I agree. I have read the reports by the general of the

Government Accountability Office over the years; and I agree with

the conclusions of their reports, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. And, as you heard today, in their testimony it does

tell of a long history of quality assurance problems. You heard their

testimony as they sat here today.

Mr. GOLAN. I did. But the reports also include, sir, the recognition over the years that the quality assurance program has been

improving since the 1980’s.

Mr. GIBBONS. I will buy that. You say you are making improvements; you are making steps forward.

Let me ask you a question, because you just testified that you

want to make it safer. The legislative bill that you are supporting,

that you are pushing, that is coming before this Congress eliminates any applicability of our Nation’s hazardous waste disposable

laws, preempts State and local air quality regulations and usurps

a State’s traditional authority to administer the waters within its

regions. How do you believe that makes it safer?

Mr. GOLAN. Sir, if I may, in regards to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provision, the requirements for shallow land

disposal of hazardous waste compared to the disposal requirements

of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste proposed for Yucca

Mountain, Yucca Mountain has orders of magnitude, more safeguards and more protection than what you would find in a standard hazardous waste disposal cell.

Mr. GIBBONS. So you’re saying that DOE’s high-level waste management protection would preempt and actually be on an order of

magnitude greater maybe than the State laws that have air and

water quality assurances in them?

Mr. GOLAN. Sir, I am talking about the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act provision——

Mr. GIBBONS. I am talking about the bill that is before Congress

today that your organization—your Department supports.

Mr. GOLAN. I would like to go through the other two aspects of

the bill that you mentioned, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. I just want your statement. Do you believe that

DOE, by supporting this piece of legislation, will make Yucca

Mountain safer?

63

Mr. GOLAN. If I might just add the air provision, sir——

Mr. GIBBONS. It is a yes or no question.

Mr. GOLAN. I would like just to go through the three provisions

that you mentioned.

Mr. GIBBONS. You can go through the provisions. Just give me

a yes or no answer to it.

Mr. GOLAN. With regard to the air provision, we still are required to get air permits; and the environmental protection agency

would be the issues of those air permits.

Mr. GIBBONS. But this legislation is going to take State standards out of it.

Mr. GOLAN. It puts authority to issue air permits with the Environmental Protection Agency, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Yes, the government, Federal Government.

Mr. GOLAN. Yes, sir.

And, last, with regard to water, the only thing the Department

is asking for is to be treated by like any other entity. Most of the

water we are using is for worker safety. It is for dust suppression.

It gets very dry and dusty. Most of the water is being used for dust

suppression.

Over the course of 5 years we intend to use the equivalent of 4

days worth of water that is used in Las Vegas, so over the course

of 5 years we are just asking to be treated as any other person or

any other entity asking for a State water permit. We would not be

using the water that Las Vegas typically uses the aquifers for, and

all we are asking for is to be treated equally under that provision.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, that doesn’t require a law change.

Mr. GOLAN. We find it very difficult, sir, to get water permits

issued for simple things such as dust suppression at the site.

Mr. GIBBONS. Is that because you don’t have access or you don’t

have title to the water?

Mr. GOLAN. It is because we have a difficult time getting permits

from the State and to get access to the water, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. There are courts to deal with that if the State

doesn’t give you a permit.

But let me ask you a question, because you are the expert and

you are the person sitting here talking to me about quality assurance. I am a scientist. I come out of the mining industry. Let me

ask you a question.

Do you feel that the quality assurance standards for the rock

bolts that are in the mine that are applied today meet the quality

assurance for a long-term assessment for those rock bolts that are

in there? I mean——

Mr. GOLAN. Are we talking about the rocks bolts that are currently installed, sir?

Mr. GIBBONS. Yes.

Mr. GOLAN. For the—when—if we get construction authorization

from the NRC, our intent is to change the nature of the support

structures inside the Yucca Mountain facility.

Mr. GIBBONS. Why do you need to do that?

Mr. GOLAN. Because we have a provision that has—the waste

has to be retrievable for a period of time from 50 to up to 300 years

after emplacement. So we are going to change the nature of the

ground support.

64

Mr. GIBBONS. In other words, the rock bolt quality assurance

today doesn’t meet those standards?

Mr. GOLAN. Again, this is an exploratory tunnel, sir; and when

we go into actual mining excavation and preparation for the tunnel

for actual waste disposal, there will be a different set of standards

and a different set of requirements that will be implemented.

Mr. GIBBONS. But the standards today don’t meet what your expectations are, do they?

Mr. GOLAN. We don’t intend to dispose of the waste in the exploratory tunnels.

Mr. GIBBONS. You have a wonderful way of articulating a nonanswer to my question.

Mr. GOLAN. I just said we are going to use a different set of

standards when we actually——

Mr. GIBBONS. We will move on.

You anticipate removing about 147,000 acres, withdrawing that

land——

Mr. GOLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS [continuing]. In the State of Nevada. Where is that

land located today?

Mr. GOLAN. It is located around the Yucca Mountain site; and I

can provide a map for the record, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Would you please?

Mr. GOLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Is it within the Air Force training area?

Mr. GOLAN. Part of the land is within Nellis Air Force Base, yes,

sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. How much of it?

Mr. GOLAN. About a quarter, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. You anticipate restricting overflight and training

from Nellis Air Force Base in that area.

Mr. GOLAN. We anticipate there will be some flight restrictions

that may be required during the waste in place and the waste handling operations.

Mr. GIBBONS. So about 30,000 acres is going to be removed from

the Air Force training capability, a little more?

Mr. GOLAN. About, a little more, somewhere around that, yes,

sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Somewhere around 37. Nellis is one of the principal pilot training areas that we have in this country, one of the

few remaining where those of us who have trained there are able

to get the skills and the ability to defend this country; and because

of your now urgency of withdrawing 147,000 acres, taking part of

that away from the Air Force, we are going to restrict those pilots

from being able to get that training, to be able to protect this country, to be able to learn themselves how to better do their jobs. How

do you justify national security concerns?

Mr. GOLAN. Because, sir, this project has been approved by the

President and both Houses of Congress.

Mr. GIBBONS. There is a lot of things we approved in this Congress, a lot of things that are signed by the President of United

States and a lot of things that don’t jeopardize the national security of this country.

65

Your removal of that land, your removal of restricting that area,

in my view, takes away a measurable part of the training area that

these pilots train on; and, in addition to that, you are going to restrict them because of the railroad access, the highway accesses

that you are going to have to build in there. So it is more than just

that small fragment. You are going to set aside a large part of true

training area that is the PhD for our men and women who fly these

airplanes and defend this country because you want a larger and

restricted area for this waste management area.

You know, I am not opposed to nuclear energy. I am opposed to

the poorly thought-out provision of Yucca Mountain.

Mr. GOLAN. Sir, I am a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; and

I appreciate your concern. But when the site recommendation was

approved by Congress, it was always the intent to remove the

147,000 acres permanently as part——

Mr. GIBBONS. Whose intent? I have been here for 10 years.

Mr. GULAN. That was—in order for us to receive a construction

authorization from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission require

permanent land withdrawal.

Mr. GIBBONS. Congress hasn’t said we are going to permanently

withdraw 147,000——

Mr. GULAN. No, that’s in front of Congress to decide, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Exactly. It’s your decision to bring it before us

today.

We’ll have another round, Mr. Chairman. I’m sorry to keep dominating the questions here.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Congressman.

Question. Margaret, explain the process of the licensing application. Once it’s provided to you, then your team investigates all the

information of the provider? How does that work?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Yes, sir. Once the license application is submitted to the NRC we have a 90-day acceptance period where we will

conduct an acceptance review before we decide if it will be docketed. At that point all the information needs to be complete. Once

the application is docketed, we will conduct a detailed rigorous

independent review based on our staff’s independent knowledge of

Yucca Mountain. Once that is complete, we will develop a safety

evaluation report and it will go to the licensing board for decision.

Mr. PORTER. How do you do that in 90 days?

Ms. FEDERLINE. We have established a prelicensing—Congress,

in its wisdom, established a prelicensing consultation. And when I

say consultation, I don’t mean—it is a process by which we interact

with DOE so that we can identify issues which would be essential

to address to ensure a complete license application. We have referred to these as key technical issues, and we’ve identified over

290 of these issues which we believe would be important to address

in order to have adequate information to conduct a licensing review.

Mr. PORTER. So in other words, you’re periodically doing audits

of your own and working with DOE and giving advice, although

they don’t have to follow it at this point. Will you give some direction as to some of the things they need to do prior to the application being submitted?

66

Ms. FEDERLINE. We want to make sure that DOE understands

our licensing requirement, so we feel it’s very important for them

in developing a license application to be clear as to what our licensing requirements require. And so the prelicensing period is for us

to interact with DOE and to provide information and guidance

similar to what we do with other—licensing other nuclear facilities.

Mr. PORTER. So are we technically in the prelicensing stage at

this point?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Yes, we are.

Mr. PORTER. So the last 20 years technically has been

prelicensing period?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Yes, it has.

Mr. PORTER. So you have found close to 290 areas of concern; is

that what you’re saying?

Ms. FEDERLINE. No. We identified a framework of issues which

need to be addressed to thoroughly characterize or thoroughly

make a safety case which answers the requirements in our regulations.

Mr. PORTER. So it’s like questions that you have that they need

to answer?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Well, they’re actually part of the demonstration

of the safety case, pieces of the safety case that would need to be

demonstrated to provide adequate information for us to conduct a

safety review.

Mr. PORTER. So do they, then, give you preliminary prelicensing

information that may be a test prior to the final application being

submitted?

Ms. FEDERLINE. No, they don’t. We have interactions in which we

identify the types of information that would be necessary, and we

do provide guidance back to them if we feel that they don’t understand our requirements. It’s not—it would be—as a regulator, we

could not make a predecision before the license application comes

in. And so it’s strictly intended to establish a framework which explains our regulations and what would be required.

Mr. PORTER. So throughout this process there has been communication between NRC and DOE which is normal in whether it be

a nuclear reactor or Department of Energy, sort of following the

guidelines that are consistent throughout the industry, correct?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Yes. As part of design certification we do do

precertification reviews where we do a similar type of thing, identify issues which need to be addressed as part of the design certification.

Mr. PORTER. Would the USNRC have a problem with Congress

being able to see a draft license application from DOE regarding

this project?

Ms. FEDERLINE. We have not seen a draft license application.

And when one became available to us when it was submitted, if

DOE had not made it publically available, obviously we would

make it publically available.

Mr. PORTER. Would you have a problem with Congress seeing

one today if one were—or I guess let me ask this question a little

differently. We have asked numerous times for a copy of a draft license application, and Department of Energy has consistently refused to provide it to the American public. Would you have a probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:50 Feb 08, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\32439.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
67

lem with us asking for a copy of that from the Department of Energy?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Well, my sense is that at the time the license application is submitted it would contain the necessary and complete

information. You know, we would not get involved between Congress and DOE in terms of what you require from DOE.

Mr. PORTER. So you wouldn’t have a problem, then, with us requesting that information, it’s between us and DOE?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Congressman.

Mr. GIBBONS. Let me followup with some of my questioning that

I started before. And Director Federline, if the proposal that’s before Congress today, the legislation which, if I may describe radically undercuts the traditional requirements by demonstrating nuclear safety by allowing unlimited changes in the repository with

no right to a formal or informal oral hearing and only 18 months

for environmental review, do you feel that is sufficient to give the

American public confidence in the proposals as they move forward?

Ms. FEDERLINE. I’m sorry, sir, but the Commission has not completed its review of the legislation; we have not completed development of comments.

Mr. GIBBONS. OK. Without having a formal opinion of the—about

the condition, what’s your personal opinion of language that completely undercuts and removes the, as I said, removes the right to

a formal or informal oral hearing and restricts it to 18 months for

environmental review?

Ms. FEDERLINE. With all due respect, sir, it would be inappropriate for me as a regulator to comment on standards that could be

the subject of a licensing proceeding.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, let me go back to Mr. Gulan. What’s your

opinion of having no right to a formal or informal oral hearing on

changes to Yucca Mountain?

Mr. GULAN. Well, first, sir, after we submit the license application the NRC, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, is

3 years, with the possible exception they can request an additional

4th year before they make a decision on whether to grant the Department construction authorization.

What we are asking for in the legislative package is, in the second phase of that—in other words, the licensing amendment to receive and possess—that the NRC basically have 12 months, with

the possible extension of 6 months, to review that process, which

I don’t think is inconsistent with—because they’ll have had 4 years

to review the license before—inconsistent with potentially how they

would review an action in a nuclear reactor licensing arena.

Mr. GIBBONS. But in demonstrating nuclear safety there’s a lot

of people outside of DOE would have concerns, and you’re now restricting or limiting to any formal or informal oral statements or

position——

Mr. GULAN. I don’t believe the proposed legislation restricts the

interactions as you’re talking through here, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, the way I read it for those unlimited changes

that DOE wants to make to Yucca Mountain, and that means expanding from 70,000 to whatever number you plan to propose in

68

the future, that you are going to restrict the informal and formal

oral hearings.

Mr. GULAN. Sir, that provision in the legislative proposal refers

to the second step in the licensing process. When we submit our license application to the NRC, they’ll have a period up to 4 years

to review and to grant the Department the license——

Mr. GIBBONS. But that’s for the original 70,000 tons?

Mr. GULAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. And now I’m talking about the unlimited changes

that you want to make. Why would it be good, why should we permit you to restrict informal or formal hearings and restrict it to 18

months, for example, if you wanted to double the size?

Mr. GULAN. Sir, that provision, I’d just like to go back to, that’s

after receiving construction authorization, the 18-month provision

would be a license to receive and possess. So the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would still have up to 4 years to review the license application and go through the hearing process, the formal

hearing process in that 4-year period.

Mr. GIBBONS. Including the unlimited extensions and expansions

that you want to put on Yucca Mountain after you get the original

70,000-ton determination?

Mr. GULAN. Sir, again, the second part of the license application

is the license amendment to receive and possess. And again, I don’t

have a copy of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in front of me here,

and I’d be glad to take that question for the record, but the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act is clear on the amount of time the Regulatory

Commission has to review and issue a judgment on construction

authorization. What the Nuclear Waste Policy Act didn’t have

when it was written or amended was a timeframe in which the

NRC would then grant the second part of that license for receive

and possess.

Mr. GIBBONS. One of the things that troubles me about the bill

that your organization is proposing to Congress is the authority to

limit the exercise of jurisdictional power by States, tribal governments, etc., over the transportation requirements through their

communities, through their reservations, along their highways and

byways. Why do you want to take away local government’s authority to review transportation routes?

Mr. GULAN. Sir, I’d like to offer a briefing to your office and to

you on the full scope of the legislative package. I didn’t come prepared to necessarily talk in detail on that today; however, I do

want to point to the transportation aspect.

The Department has been transporting nuclear materials and

nuclear waste over the last 50 years and it has a very good safety

record. Our intention, with the transportation provision in our legislative proposal, was to extend all the work, all the interactions

that we currently do when we ship special nuclear materials, when

we ship low level waste and when we ship transuranic waste. And

it was meant to extend those types of provisions to how we transport waste to Yucca Mountain, sir.

Mr. GIBBONS. If those provisions, as you say, have resulted in

such a historic safety record, why do you want to exclude local government from having a say in either the routes, which roads or

69

which train lines or over what bridges or along what schools or

along which communities that this material travels?

Mr. GULAN. Sir, again, I’d offer again that we would come and

provide you a briefing on the legislative package; but again, the intent of that provision was basically to extend the type of activities

and the type of provisions that we have with the other nuclear materials that we ship and extend that over into the shipment of

spent nuclear fuel——

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, I understand the idea and the intent, but I

don’t understand the idea to exclude and cut out of the picture

those people which are charged with overseeing the safety in some

of these communities, including their first responders, which would

have to respond if there was an incident or an accident, from you

giving them or bringing them into the picture. That’s what I don’t

understand.

Mr. GULAN. Again, I would offer that our office could come and

provide you a briefing on this and walk through that specific provision.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Mr. Friedman, thank you for your hard work for probably 8 or

9 months—I didn’t add up the time, but I appreciate it very much.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. In the report that we received today you point out

some key areas, and I appreciate you addressing them in your

opening comments. But more specifically, you talked about the

compromise of scientific notebook requirements. Now I’m not a scientist, but it’s my understanding from your information that a scientific notebook is a standard protocol in the science community—

I’m quoting from your statement—that document research approaches and outcomes, and in doing so they aid an individual

other than the original author in reproducing and tracing the effort. And according to your report as of today, an area of concern

is there was the lack of a scientific notebook—or at least that they

weren’t following the requirements; and you—if I read it properly,

and correct me if I’m wrong, it’s like this—it appears that this

notebook requirement was stopped once they found problems. Is

that what you’re saying in this report?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, what we—on the particular—first

of all, you have, of course, correctly characterized the importance

of lab notebooks. They’re essential in the science field. It allows recording of information that’s generated during current analyses

and allows others to buildupon that. So you have characterized it

correctly.

What we found in the incident in question is the lab notebook

had not been maintained from the outset, which violated good

science principles, and this is a 6-year old problem. And it was

compounded from our perspective by the fact that once it was determined that the lab notebook had never been maintained from

the outset, the contractor and the USGS and the Department decided to compromise the requirement using an alternate document,

which in our view was an unacceptable remedy to the problem.

70

Mr. PORTER. So how do you define the difference between intentional negligence and something that’s criminal; how do you define

the difference?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, there are questions of intent, Mr. Chairman, there are questions of materiality that are key, and those are

the essence of the items that I would identify to you.

Mr. PORTER. It appears to me there was intentional behavior to

not keep track of this science so no one would be able to check it

in the future, and it appears to me that’s intentional, is that what

you’re saying, that it’s intentional?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I could not reach the conclusion that there was

an intent to not participate in the lab notebook requirement for

some nefarious reason as to the future ability to track the work.

I can’t reach that conclusion, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Also, you mention the 6-year delay in servicing is

and dealing with the controversial e-mails, those are inconsistent

with sound quality assurance protocols. You go on to say we could

not find a satisfactory explanation as to why the e-mails had not

been recognized as problematic years earlier. This would allow the

Department to address the concerns raised by the contents of the

e-mails in a timely manner.

Despite this, the comments—and I’m paraphrasing and moving

ahead on your comments because you know them better than I do,

but despite this the comments and e-mails appears to have gone

unchallenged. Additionally, internal quality assurance reviews over

the years failed to identify the questionable e-mails.

Again, can you explain to me a little bit more about what you’re

saying here?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. Six years obviously has passed, Mr. Chairman, since the original offending e-mails were written. And in that

6-year period you referred earlier, or Mr. Gibbons did, to the turnover in personnel—maybe it was you, Mr. Chairman—people have

minds, memories have faded, people have moved on, documentation

is no longer available. And the point that we are trying to make

is that if these offending e-mails had been identified contemporaneously or very close to the time that they were in fact written,

minds would have been fresh, memories could have been fresh, the

Department could have addressed the issues very promptly and

saved a great deal of turmoil that has occurred as a result. So our

point is that there was reason to believe—we had testimony to suggest that quality assurance people had in fact seen the e-mails, and

yet for some reason the light bulb did not go on or they did not

bring those to anybody’s attention until a 6-year period had

elapsed.

Mr. PORTER. The genesis of the project is that Yucca Mountain

was chosen because the mountain may provide some natural barrier to prevent filtration—or infiltration of moisture into the storage which could then contaminate ground water. And the genesis

of the science is that the mountain is safe, and that there is minimal, if any, infiltration of moisture. Again, in your report you mention that control files relating to the simulation of net infiltration

from modern and potential future climates, AMR was not maintained in accordance with Data Management System’s requirements, and that during the evaluation of AMR for the simulation

71

of net infiltration from modern and potential future climates the

team wasn’t able to reproduce the model due to the absence of certain control files. Can you explain your findings under that No. 3?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I can, Mr. Chairman. In recent years there was

an attempt made to reconstruct that model, to evaluate it further

and to see whether it withstood the test of time. When they tried

to recreate it, they found that there were certain control documents

which they could not find in the master control file. And of course

in a $9 billion project overall you would anticipate that would be

absolutely essential. Ultimately the files were located in the residence of one of the participants—or at least part of the files were

found there.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I’m a bit taken aback by some of

the answers we’ve gotten today because I expected a little more of

being able to bridge between the problems of the quality assurance

issues that have been described by either DOE or the GAO in their

development of the program and the policy here at Yucca Mountain. But I’m more troubled by the fact that we are here in Congress and we are trying to bridge and overcome these quality assurance issues, and you know, it seems to me right now that we’ve

kind of got the cart before the horse. You know, we’ve seen a lot

of problems with the scientific analysis coming up, maybe they

weren’t intentionally changed or fraudulently put out there, and

that did not give rise to a criminal action, but it does give rise to

some serious concerns, concerns as a scientist myself, as a geologist, as a mining geologist, it gives rise of concern to me that perhaps those that were in charge of doing the science work and those

who actually performed that science didn’t have in their bag of

work ethics the right motivation to be doing what they should have

been doing on this project and simply took shortcuts. If that’s the

case, we’ve obviously got some serious problems here, or if they just

simply said if they want more quality assurance I’ll go write more

quality assurance. Nonetheless, there’s some real serious quality

assurance problems here that haven’t been answered adequately in

my mind.

There is also this question about the new piece of legislation

which DOE is supporting before this Congress in an effort to overcome some problems that they can’t meet today. And I think unfortunately I’m still of the opinion that this project that’s fatally

flawed, that no matter how much you move the goalpost to make

it work, no matter how many times you change the standard to

make something fit, no matter how many times you get a bigger

hammer to fit a square peg in a round hole, it’s still going to be

a square peg in a round hole. And I think the bill that’s before us

is an unconstitutional usurpation of the States’ sovereign prerogatives, whether it’s in Nevada, but it sets a horrible precedence

across this country because you’re forcing communities, you’re forcing States to give up traditional jurisdiction under the Constitution

of areas that they normally had authority to regulate. It circumvents the scientific flaws that these people here have already

said have existed and have a history of existing. It deprives the

States, as I said, and localities nationwide for the role in waste

72

transport. It exonerates the Department of Energy from traditional

regulations for nuclear projects.

I think what we are doing here is getting the bigger hammer out

and we are trying to make everything fit. As a geologist, I can’t accept it. First of all, to build Yucca Mountain in a safe place or build

a project at Yucca Mountain that is supposed to be geologically stable should at first raise the flags automatically when it was a

mountain. You know, it didn’t get there, it didn’t get to be a mountain by some placid tectonic activity. It’s got serious geologic problems, and we don’t have the vision to look down the road and say

when those are going to reoccur. We are hoping that the blindness—with blinders on that we will somehow get past this, wash

our hands of it and say out of sight, out of mind, we are done, and

oh, by the way, let’s make it bigger so we can take in everything.

What’s happening here today is that, because of the NIMBY syndrome—and I have to admit, it’s in Nevada, we don’t want it in our

back yard, no other State wants it in their back yard, but we’ve

failed to meet, I think, this country’s expectations of how to deal

with nuclear energy, and it will result in the end of nuclear energy

in this country if the Department of Energy is allowed to complete

Yucca Mountain.

So my view, Mr. Chairman, is that the bill is fatally flawed, the

project is fatally flawed, the concepts of how to deal with nuclear

waste are fatally flawed. It has for 30 years had blinders on to just

go forward with this, to make sure the deep geologic burial, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, accommodates all of those

power plants that want to close down or are closed down, but it

doesn’t meet the safety requirements that this country and this

public expect. And I’m sad, saddened by the day that we sit here

in here and talk about changing the standards, eliminating the

oversight, giving unlimited jurisdiction to a department who’s got

sole responsibility for this type of occurrence. And it’s worse than

the chicken watching the fox—or the hen—excuse me, the fox

watching the chicken house—I’ll get that yet.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for your leadership. I have no more questions about this. I haven’t heard anything that allows me to get a better feeling for what’s going on, but

I do appreciate the fact that you’ve invited me here today, and I

appreciate the fact that you have allowed me to participate in this

hearing.

With that, I want to thank all of our witnesses. I know you have

tough jobs ahead of you, just as we have tough decisions to make,

and I appreciate the fact that you have been here before us and

responded to our questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Congressman. I’d like to ask just a couple more questions.

And Mr. Wells, again, thank you for being here. I did not want

you to feel like we left you out of this debate——

Mr. WELLS. No problem.

Mr. PORTER. But I know that you and your staff spent a lot of

time and we greatly appreciate it, and on behalf of the American

people we appreciate it.

73

GAO has investigated quality assurance in Yucca Mountain for

20 something years. And the title of the 1988 report was Repository

Work Should Not Proceed Until Quality Assurance Is Adequate.

Now this is 1988. In light of the GAO’s extensive work, why do you

think DOE is still experiencing these same problems, since 1988,

the same problems?

Mr. WELLS. You know, I think it goes back to—it was encouraging, everyone in the room probably picked up on Mr. Gulan’s statement that their goal was to have early detection of these problems;

and we have—since 1988 people have gone in and looked and found

problems that seemed to—quality assurance problems that seemed

to fester under the surface for a lot of years and under the radar

screen, and all of a sudden they accumulate and they explode, and

then the Department of Energy jumps to some type of fix, and it’s

rework and it’s expensive. And you have to ask yourself why does

that happen. And you know, consistently talking to the audit teams

that have looked at the Yucca Mountain project and the quality assurance program, consistently we hear things with the culture, the

importance of QA not being as high as the importance of meeting

a schedule, or the ability to think that if it’s wrong somebody else

will find it and fix it later. And I think Mr. Gulan’s commitment

to change the culture is on the right track, to elevate the importance of quality assurance to keep these problems from festering so

long. It shouldn’t take 6 year e-mails to discover that they occurred; it shouldn’t take the NRC to observe an audit and point out

that the equipment they’re using hasn’t been calibrated in years.

It’s that culture that’s unacceptable and it has to be changed.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Wells. And I find it truly amazing

that we are talking about high level nuclear waste, and again,

whether you’re for or against Yucca Mountain, the fact that these

questions of safety keeps coming up, it’s nuclear waste, it’s not

about a bicycle plant someplace in Des Moines, we are talking

about high level nuclear waste, a science that’s untested, and continually questions of safety. And again, I appreciate your comments, Mr. Wells.

Ms. Federline, another question for you, please. Is this turnover

of management, 9 of 17 key positions and 3 directors in a short period of time, is that a concern for the NRC?

Ms. FEDERLINE. Well, I think overall the NRC feels that the perspective of QA at DOE is very important; in other words, finding

problems is not the problem; a good QA program will normally find

problems. The issue with us is those problems need to be quickly

fixed and they need to be prevented from recurrence. And those are

two aspects that we want to emphasize to DOE. And they need to

put in place an organizational structure which they feel will be effective in making those corrections and seeing that the problems

don’t reoccur.

Mr. PORTER. I see Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes has left. I’d

like to just ask a couple of additional questions.

Mr. Gulan, regarding the turnover of staff, 9 of 17, were any of

those individuals asked to leave?

Mr. GULAN. No. We did not renew a limited term SES appointment, but the people that you talk about left on their own volition.

74

Mr. PORTER. So there was no encouragement on the part of DOE

for any of these individuals, it was just purely attrition and retirement?

Mr. GULAN. Basically, sir.

Mr. PORTER. So then who has been held accountable for information that’s been provided today? Has anyone been held accountable?

Mr. GULAN. Yes, they have. And there are people who are no

longer working on this project.

Mr. PORTER. You just moved them to another project, somewhere

in the nuclear industry?

Mr. GULAN. No. There’s been folks in the contract or organization

who are no longer part of this project, sir.

Mr. PORTER. And they’re still working for the Federal Government?

Mr. GULAN. I don’t know, sir. They don’t work on this project.

Mr. PORTER. OK. Is there a way that we can find out?

Mr. GULAN. Sure. We’ll take that question for the record.

Mr. PORTER. I appreciate that. Thank you.

I guess in closing, Mr. Gulan, I’ll ask you a question. Based on

the findings of GAO and the Inspector General’s office, in discussions today and in prior discussions, how can you say that we can

assure the American public that Yucca Mountain is and will be

safe?

Mr. GULAN. Sir, that’s our—the burden is on us to demonstrate

to you and to the American public that we can operate Yucca

Mountain safely. There is an established process through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, through the licensing process that will be

a very public process, the regulator being the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. So there is a formal process. But before we get to that

formal process there is a process within the Department. Before we

submit a license application it has to pass our standards. And one

of the things that we didn’t talk about today is the fact that we

have not talked about a schedule of when the license application

will be submitted.

I mentioned earlier in my testimony, Secretary Bodman gave me

clear instructions, make it simpler, make it safer, and improve the

quality and culture of this organization. Those were his marching

orders to me, sir, and we are following that.

After we review everything from the model down through the design basis for the facilities, the safety analysis, the seismic analysis

and develop our license application, it’s our intent to conduct our

internal reviews, our internal independent reviews to ensure that

our standards have been met, to ensure that our quality standards

have been met. And only after our standards have been met will

we be in a position to submit our licensing application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for them to adjudicate the licensing

process here. So there are standards that have to be met in this

organization, and the bar is set high, before we send our application request in to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Mr. PORTER. So once the application is submitted, is it the NRC’s

responsibility to determine if it’s safe or is it DOE’s?

Mr. GULAN. It’s the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s responsibility to adjudicate that process, it’s not ours.

75

Mr. PORTER. So you don’t accept responsibility if it’s safe——

Mr. GULAN. No. I accept responsibility. It is my responsibility

that we submit a high quality license application that our standards have been met. It’s the NRC’s job then to evaluate on whether

or not they issue us a license to construct, and then subsequently

a license to receive and possess; but it’s our responsibility to meet

our standards first.

Mr. PORTER. You know, I can remember growing up many, many

years ago—and I’m not sure if this cartoon is still around, it was

Family Circle. Steve, is it still in the paper, the Family Circle?

Mr. CASTOR. Yes, it’s in the Washington Post, sir.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you. I haven’t had a chance to look at the

cartoon pages as much as I’d like to, but there was this cartoon,

the Family Circle, and these kids were around saying not me, not

me, not me, not my fault, not my fault, not my fault. And my biggest concern—again, whether you’re for or against Yucca Mountain—is that someday we are going to wake up and 2000 DOE employees are going to say it wasn’t my job, NRC may wake up and

say it wasn’t our job, even though there was a major catastrophe

or major accident, and everyone is going to go, not me. And I sense

that time and time again, as I hear the facts that are presented,

that so far your decisions have not been based upon sound science

at the Department of Energy. The White House, multiple administrations, have based decisions on what they believe is sound

science, this Congress is basing decisions that are based upon what

they feel are sound science, and I have yet to hear the Department

of Energy is using sound science. It appears to me that there is a

rush—20 years, but there’s a rush to appease the nuclear industry,

there’s a rush to appease certain Members of Congress and certain

administrations, and there’s a rush to get the job done. And Mr.

Gulan, I would just hope that someday Department of Energy officials don’t wake up and say not me, because I’m very, very concerned.

Mr. GULAN. You won’t hear those words from my mouth, sir.

Mr. PORTER. Again, I want to thank you all for being here. We

will continue our investigation. We still have numerous documents

to review.

I appreciate Mr. Wells, Mr. Friedman, Ms. Federline and Mr.

Gulan for being here today, and look forward to continued testimony in the future. We will be forwarding additional questions

that we’d like to have answers for the record. So with that, we’ll

adjourn the meeting. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Danny K. Davis follows:]

76

Æ