THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

KENT JOSEPH BECKMAN, 

Respondent. 

No. 57928 

FILED 

JUL 1 1 2013 

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129 Nev., Advance Opinion 51 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

TRACE K. LINDEMAN CLEFMICaThiCeRT 

BY ' DEPUTY CLERK 

Appeal from a district court order granting a motion to 

suppress evidence. Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko County; J. 

Michael Memeo, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Mark Torvinen, 

District Attorney, and Robert J. Lowe, Deputy District Attorney, Elko 

County, 

for Appellant. 

Frederick B. Lee, Jr., Public Defender, and Alina M. Kilpatrick and 

Andrew M. Mierins, Deputy Public Defenders, Elko County, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 1 

OPINION 

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.: 

Respondent Kent Beckman was stopped for speeding. The 

highway patrol officer verified Beckman's license and registration, told 

him "everything checks good," and issued a warning. As Beckman began 

'This matter was transferred from panel to en banc following oral 

argument pursuant to TOP Rule 13(b). 
to leave, the officer ordered him to remain until a drug-sniffing dog and 

handler team could arrive. When the dog arrived, it alerted for the 

presence of drugs, which was confirmed by the warrantless search that 

followed. Beckman was arrested and charged with trafficking, possession 

for sale, and possession of Schedule I and II controlled substances. 

Beckman moved to suppress the evidence of contraband 

because the highway patrol officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, 

unlawfully "seizing" him, and because exigent circumstances did not 

justify the warrantless search. The district court granted the motion 

based on the warrantless search. Because the seizure presents a 

threshold issue that requires affirmance as a matter of law irrespective of 

the warrantless search analysis, we focus on it. See Picetti v. State, 124 

Nev. 782, 790, 192 P.3d 704, 709 (2008) (district court decision will be 

affirmed on appeal where court reached correct result). 

A traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes 

illegitimate when the officer detains the car and driver beyond the time 

required to process the traffic offense, unless the extended detention is 

consensual, de minimis, or justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion 

of criminal activity. The prolonged stop in this case met none of these 

exceptions and violated the United States and Nevada Constitutions. The 

constitutional violation warrants exclusion of the subsequently discovered 

evidence. 

I. 

The essential facts of this case were recorded by videotape and 

are not disputed. At 7:10 a.m. on a Sunday morning, Trooper Richard 

Pickers of the Nevada Highway Patrol stopped Beckman on Interstate 80 

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in Elko, Nevada, for speeding. 2Trooper Pickers asked for Beckman's 

license and registration, which Beckman produced. Trooper Pickers 

questioned Beckman about his travels, and Beckman answered that he 

had been driving since 10 p.m. and was on his way to Omaha, Nebraska, 

to visit his son. At 7:13 a.m., Trooper Pickers told Beckman that he would 

verify Beckman's documents and issue a warning. 

When Trooper Pickers returned to his patrol car, he told his 

passenger, a new dispatch employee in training, that he suspected 

criminal activity because of fingerprints on the trunk of Beckman's car. 

He added that Beckman seemed "overly nervous" and that he, Trooper 

Pickers, would not drive continuously through the night. When Trooper 

Pickers radioed dispatch to check Beckman's documents, he asked 

dispatch to send a drug-sniffing dog/handler team to the scene of the stop. 

At 7:18 a.m., Beckman asked for permission to get out of his 

car to stretch. Trooper Pickers assented and in turn asked for permission 

to pat Beckman down for weapons. Beckman consented. Beckman and 

Trooper Pickers then engaged in friendly conversation, largely about 

Beckman's job as a wine salesperson. A minute later, Trooper Pickers 

returned Beckman's license and registration and told him "everything 

checks good. . . be careful." Beckman handed Trooper Pickers a business 

card and walked back toward his vehicle to leave. 

Pickers then asked if he could ask Beckman "a couple of 

questions," to which Beckman responded "yes, sir." Trooper Pickers asked 

if Beckman had anything illegal in his car and if he could perform a 

2There are two additional cases before this court that involve similar 

stops by Trooper Pickers—State v. Lloyd (Docket No. 56706), and Tucker 

v. State (Docket No. 58690). 

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vehicle search. Beckman denied having anything illegal but refused 

consent to the search. At this point, approximately 7:21 a.m., Trooper 

Pickers told Beckman that he was no longer free to leave and would have 

to wait for the canine unit to arrive and perform a sniff search. A minute 

later, Trooper Pickers gave Beckman a modified version of his Miranda 

rights. 3While waiting for the canine unit, Trooper Pickers and Beckman 

continued to talk. 

Officer Lowry and his drug-sniffing dog, Duchess, arrived at 

7:29 a.m. Two minutes later, Duchess signaled the presence of drugs near 

the driver's side door of Beckman's vehicle. Trooper Pickers informed 

dispatch that the dog alerted positively, and he would perform a vehicle 

search. Trooper Pickers then began a search of the vehicle, and found 

what he determined to be cocaine in the center console. Thereafter, at 

7:40 a.m., Trooper Pickers informed Beckman that he was under arrest, 

placed him in handcuffs, and secured him in the back of the patrol vehicle. 

An additional officer arrived as backup, followed by a tow 

truck at 8:02 a.m. The three officers, with the tow truck driver's 

assistance, continued the search until 8:58 a.m. and found additional 

quantities of cocaine, as well as methamphetamine. During the search, 

Trooper Pickers was asked about a cut on his hand, and he responded, 

"That's me getting jazzed up. I don't even feel it. I'm on the search. I'm 

feeling like there's going to be more." After the search ended, Trooper 

Pickers drove Beckman to the sheriffs station. 

The State charged Beckman with several drug-related 

offenses. Beckman filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that 

3Trooper Pickers did not read the warning from a card. Instead, he 

explained the rights in approximate terms. 

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Trooper Pickers unlawfully seized him by unnecessarily extending the 

stop and that the officers further violated his rights by performing a 

warrantless search. In opposition to the motion, the State argued that 

Trooper Pickers had reasonable suspicion for the de minimus continued 

detention and that extenuating circumstances justified the warrantless 

search. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion 

in a detailed order focusing on the legality of the warrantless search. The 

State appeals. 

"Suppression issues present mixed questions of law and fact." 

Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 794, 59 P.3d 450, 455 (2002), overruled on 

other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. , , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 

(2011). This court reviews findings of fact for clear error, but the legal 

consequences of those facts involve questions of law that we review de 

novo. Cortes v. State, 127 Nev. , , 260 P.3d 184, 187 (2011); State v. 

Lisenbee, 116 Nev. 1124, 1127, 13 P.3d 947, 949 (2000). The 

reasonableness of a seizure is a matter of law reviewed de novo. Id.; 

United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2008). 

A. 

1. 

Using virtually identical words, the United States and Nevada 

Constitutions both guarantee "Mlle right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Nev. Const. art. 1, § 18; Cortes, 127 

Nev. at , 260 P.3d at 190-91. Temporary detention of individuals 

during a traffic stop constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the 

meaning of these constitutional provisions. Whren v. United States, 517 

U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); see Cortes, 127 Nev. at , n.7, 260 P.3d at 

5 
188-89, 191 n.7. "An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional 

imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Whren, 

517 U.S. at 810. Trooper Pickers had probable cause to believe that 

Beckman had violated a traffic law by driving 72 miles per hour in a 65- 

mile-per-hour zone. Thus, the initial stop was reasonable. Id. ("As a 

general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the 

police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 

occurred."). 

During the course of a lawful traffic stop, officers may 

complete a number of routine tasks. For example, they may ask for a 

driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a 

ticket. See United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 2012). 

Officers may also inquire about the occupants' destination, route, and 

purpose. United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2005). And 

if necessary, law enforcement may conduct a brief, limited investigation 

for safety purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Dixon v. State, 

103 Nev. 272, 273, 737 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (1987). 

Here, Trooper Pickers correctly tailored the initial 

investigation to the circumstances justifying the stop. See 68 Am. Jur. 2d 

Searches and Seizures § 90 (2010) ("[T]he scope of the detention must be 

carefully tailored to its underlying justification."). As with most traffic 

stops, Trooper Pickers asked for Beckman's driver's license and vehicle 

registration, which he had dispatch check by computer search. Although 

Trooper Pickers asked Beckman questions about his travels, this inquiry 

was within the scope of the lawful traffic stop and did not improperly 

extend the duration of that stop. Thus, the first phase of Trooper Pickers' 

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investigation, which lasted from approximately 7:10 to 7:19, satisfied the 

Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. 

2. 

But a "seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the 

Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes 

interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 

407 (2005); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. „ 133 S. Ct. 1409, 

1416 (2013) (explaining that the scope of an officer's investigation is 

limited by the purpose of the investigation). In Caballes, a police officer 

stopped Caballes for speeding, and one of the officer's colleagues on the 

canine unit immediately headed for the scene. Id. at 406. A few minutes 

later, while the officer was still writing out a warning ticket, the dog and 

handler walked around Caballes's car, where the dog alerted to the 

presence of drugs. After Caballes challenged the constitutionality of the 

sniff, the Court explained that a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop does 

not violate the Constitution so long as the sniff does not prolong the length 

of the stop. Id. at 408-09 (emphasis added). The Court continued that the 

inverse is also true—if a traffic stop is unreasonably prolonged before a 

canine is employed, the use of the canine and subsequently discovered 

evidence are products of an unconstitutional seizure. Id. at 407-08. 

Because the canine unit in Caballes arrived while the initial officer was 

still processing the initial reason for the stop, the canine sniff did not run 

afoul of the Constitution. 

Similarly, in Gama v. State, 112 Nev. 833, 837-38, 920 P.2d 

1010, 1013 (1996), this court upheld a dog sniff that occurred during a 

traffic stop. There, police initiated the stop because Gama was speeding 

and nearly rear-ended another vehicle. Id. at 835, 920 P.2d at 1012. A 

narcotics unit arrived with a drug-sniffing dog before the officer completed 

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a written citation. Id. at 837-38, 920 P.2d at 1013. Since the sniff did not 

extend the length of the traffic stop, we held that Gama had not been 

unlawfully seized. Id. at 838, 920 P.2d at 1013-14. 

Here, unlike the officers in Caballes and Gama, Trooper 

Pickers extended the length of the traffic stop to await a canine unit. 4The 

initial stop for the speeding violation ended around 7:19 a.m. when 

Trooper Pickers informed Beckman "everything checks [out]" and both 

parties started walking toward their cars. After Beckman consensually 

answered a few questions regarding controlled substances, Trooper 

Pickers seized Beckman again by informing Beckman that he was no 

longer free to leave and would need to wait for the canine unit to arrive 

and perform a sniff search. Trooper Pickers also read Beckman his 

Miranda rights. This show of authority restrained Beckman's liberty, 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (explaining that when an officer uses his 

authority to detain a citizen, a seizure has occurred), and in view of these 

circumstances, a reasonable person in Beckman's position would believe 

that he was not free to leave. See State v. Stinnett, 104 Nev. 398, 401, 760 

P.2d 124, 127 (1988) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 

(1988)) (explaining that a person is seized if he does not believe he is free 

to leave). The question then becomes whether the prolonged traffic stop 

was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

B. 

"[A] traffic stop [that] extends beyond the time necessary to 

effectuate its purpose does not necessarily render it unreasonable." 

4Per the State, "There is going to be a little bit of time when you're 

going to have to get the dog out there, especially in a large county like 

Elko." 

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United States v. Bueno, 703 F.3d 1053, 1060 (7th Cir.), vacated as to 

codefendant's sentencing determination sub nom. Gonzalez-Zavala v. 

United States, 569 U.S. , S. Ct. , 81 U.S.L.W. 3689 (2013). A 

prolonged stop may be reasonable in three limited circumstances: when 

the extension of the stop was consensual, the delay was de minimis, or the 

officer lawfully receives information during the traffic stop that creates a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Id. at 1060-62. "The ultimate 

determination of reasonableness . . . is a question of law reviewable de 

novo." United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 

2006); United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2010) 

("[w]hether a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a 

question of law that we review de novo."). 

First, a prolonged traffic stop is not unreasonable if the 

encounter becomes consensual. After all, a consensual encounter is not a 

seizure, and thus, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. United States 

v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 

Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2007). Here, Beckman 

consensually responded to Trooper Pickers' initial questions about 

contraband from 7:20 until 7:21, but if consent existed, it vanished around 

7:21 when Beckman asked, "can I please go," and Trooper Pickers 

responded, "absolutely not." The continued detention therefore cannot be 

justified based on consent. 

Second, a modest delay may be reasonable, depending on the 

circumstances surrounding the stop. For example, other jurisdictions 

have permitted a two-minute delay, United States v. McBride, 635 F.3d 

879, 883 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chaney, 584 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 

2009), and a four-minute delay, United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 

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1017 (8th Cir. 2006), as de minimis intrusions on a driver's liberty. Here, 

the State argued during oral argument that the continued detention was 

de minimus and "not a very long period out of Mr. Beckman's life." It 

further stated that the "obvious seizure" did not unreasonably extend the 

stop because Trooper Pickers "throughout the whole period act[ed] 

expeditiously to get the dog there." We disagree. The delay was not de 

minimis because Trooper Pickers detained Beckman for an additional nine 

minutes, doubling the length of the stop. Accordingly, the additional delay 

was not permissible as de minimus. 

Third, a prolonged stop is permissible if the results of the 

initial stop provide an officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal 

conduct, thereby creating a new Fourth Amendment event. See, e.g., State 

v. Perez, 435 A.2d 334, 338 (Conn. 1980) (when "a police officer's 

suspicions upon a lawful stop are further aroused, the stop may be 

prolonged and the scope enlarged as required by the circumstances"), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Altrui, 448 A.2d 837, 846 n.6 (1982); 

Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (recognizing that 

information gathered during a traffic stop may provide reasonable 

suspicion of criminal conduct that will justify extending the stop). 

Whether the officer's articulated reasons for extending the seizure were 

reasonable "must be determined with an objective eye in light of the 

totality of the circumstances." Lisenbee, 116 Nev. at 1128, 13 P.3d at 950. 

Here, the State contended that the continued detention was 

justified by the suspicions that Trooper Pickers related, to wit: Beckman's 

nervousness, the handprints on the car's trunk lid, and Beckman's request 

to get out of his vehicle and stretch. But these are all occurrences Trooper 

Pickers observed before he decided to issue a warning and send Beckman 

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on his way. The only noteworthy event that occurred after Trooper 

Pickers released Beckman was Beckman's offer of a business card. 

Although an officer's training and experiences enable him to 

draw inferences that "might well elude an untrained person," United 

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), the totality of the circumstances 

here would not cause a prudent person to have an honest or strong 

suspicion that Beckman had committed a crime. Deutscher v. State, 95 

Nev. 669, 681, 601 P.2d 407, 415 (1979). Factors such as nervousness are 

part of a reasonable suspicion analysis but, standing alone, carry little 

weight because many citizens become nervous during a traffic stop, even 

when they have nothing to hide. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 

275 (2002); United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 

2004). Jurisdictions are divided on the value of handprints on a vehicle. 

Some have recognized reasonable suspicion where handprints were one of 

many factors, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 408 F.3d 994, 995-96 (8th 

Cir. 2005), but others have not. United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 

394-95 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no reasonable suspicion where officers 

observed handprints on the trunk of an automobile). Although criminals 

may frequently check contraband in their trunks, many law-abiding 

citizens also routinely utilize their trunks for non-suspect reasons, such as 

hauling groceries (or in Beckman's case, wine). Next, even if Beckman's 

request to stand and stretch was unusual compared to other citizens, it 

made sense given the fact that Beckman had been driving for hours. And 

when Beckman sought to exit his vehicle, he requested permission from, 

and fully cooperated with, Trooper Pickers. Lastly, the business card 

made sense given that Beckman is a salesperson, and if anything, would 

likely have tended to make a reasonable person think that Beckman had 

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1-1"7.(149,4<941.4412Z7'.<;1:,111f-.1,114' 9:14 
nothing to hide. Thus, the events that occurred during the traffic stop did 

not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that made the 

continued detention reasonable. 

For these reasons we conclude as a matter of law that Trooper 

Pickers unreasonably seized Beckman's person in violation of the United 

States and Nevada Constitutions before the canine sniff and warrantless 

search ever occurred. Although law enforcement does not need reasonable 

suspicion before conducting a dog sniff, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 

696, 707 (1983) (concluding that a dog sniff is not a "search" for purposes 

of the Fourth Amendment), the sniff was the "product of an 

unconstitutional seizure" during a "traffic stop [that was] unreasonably 

prolonged before the dog [wa]s deployed." Alexander, 448 F.3d at 1016 

(8th Cir. 2006); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFaye, Treatise on Search and 

Seizure § 9.3(b) (5th ed. 2012) ("A traffic stop that has been turned into a 

drug investigation via. . . questioning about drugs, grilling about the 

minute details of travel plans, seeking consent for a full roadside 

exploration of the motorist's car, or parading a drug dog around the 

vehicle [] is a far cry from a straightforward and unadorned traffic 

stop. ."). And when the extended seizure "enable[s] the dog sniff to 

occur,' suppression may properly follow. United States v. Peralez, 526 

F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). 

In these circumstances suppression is appropriate because 

Trooper Pickers' conduct raises "concern [s] about the inclination of the 

Government toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how 

innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity." United States v. Digiovanni, 

650 F.3d 498, 512 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Foster, 634 

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F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011)). 5Suppression is not only appropriate 

because the extended seizure enabled the dog sniff, but also because of the 

continued seizure and intrusive search that Beckman endured. Even 

though the subsequent search revealed contraband in Beckman's vehicle, 

"no subsequent events or circumstances can retroactively justify the 

seizure." Lisenbee, 116 Nev. at 1129, 13 P.3d at 951 (quoting State v. 

Stinnett, 104 Nev. 398, 401, 760 P.2d 124, 126 (1988)). And the 

government cannot benefit from evidence that officers obtained through a 

clear violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. See Jardines, 

569 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (affirming suppression of 

evidence where officers gathered the evidence by intruding on an 

individual's Fourth Amendment rights); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 

796, 815 (1984) (Suppression is justified when the challenged evidence is 

"the product of illegal governmental activity." (quoting United States v. 

Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980))). 

Accordingly, the district court appropriately suppressed the 

evidence. Although the court based its decision on the warrantless search, 

its conclusion is far more compelling based on the illegal seizure. Unlike 

the warrantless search that the district court addressed, which involves 

complex areas of law, the law prohibiting illegal seizures is plain and 

easily understood. There is no justification for the unconstitutional 

5Our concerns are further heightened by the State's candid 

disclosure that "Trooper Pickers made statements that were misleading 

and or dishonest in his application" to an agency in Idaho. The dishonesty 

was severe enough "that [it] would have been enough to result in his 

termination" had he not left the police force on his own accord. 

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, C.J. 

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Douglas 

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Cherry 

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ENIBE 

seizure and its aftermath, including the search that ultimately yielded 

contraband. 

We therefore affirm.