OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

January 28, 2009

.

SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS’

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PROCESS HAS 

IMPROVED

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-013 

Why SIGIR Did This Audit 

Since October 2006 SIGIR has issued three 

reports examining the status, expansion, and 

effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRT) and embedded Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) throughout 

Iraq. Those reports recommended that the 

U.S Mission - Iraq and Multi-National ForcesIraq (MNF-I) establish a performance 

measurement system with clear objectives, 

performance measures, and milestones for the 

PRTs in Iraq. 

SIGIR’s objectives for this audit were to 

review the PRT program and answer these 

general questions: 1) Have program 

objectives and performance measures or 

metrics been established? (2) What is the 

status of future program plans in relation to 

the reduction in U.S. military forces? (3) Are 

lessons learned being captured that could be 

useful in other contingencies? (4) What 

actions have been taken based SIGIR’s prior 

recommendations? 

What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador 

to Iraq direct the Director of the Office of 

Provincial Affairs (OPA) to update the 

Planning and Assessment User Guide to 

include a clarification of the roles and 

responsibilities of OPA’s Plans and 

Assessments Cell; and a process for the desk 

officers to account for all required PRT or 

ePRT submissions each quarter. We also 

recommend that the Ambassador work jointly 

with the Commander, Multi-National ForcesIraq to update the PRT close out strategy to 

take into account the impact of U.S. troop 

reduction plans 

What SIGIR Found 

OPA has developed a performance assessment system for evaluating 

provincial capabilities; however, OPA has not consistently required the PRTs 

and ePRTs to develop and submit work plans that identify planned activities to 

address areas of weakness identified by the assessment system. This limits 

OPA’s oversight of PRT activities and whether the PRT activities effectively 

address identified weaknesses at some locations. During the course of this 

review, OPA improved its procedures for preparing, submitting, and reviewing 

work plans. 

In September 2008, OPA submitted a report to the U.S. Congress outlining the 

strategy for the eventual drawdown and close out of the PRTs. To detail how 

the drawdown process would be conducted, OPA issued another document on 

October 1, 2008, titled “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams Transition 

Strategy – A Roadmap.” SIGIR’s analysis shows these plans are condition 

based; that is the transition strategy identifies key events that will trigger the 

drawdown and close out of PRTs rather than a specific timeline for close out. 

SIGIR believes that given the recently signed security agreement and the 

deadlines for withdrawal, it is uncertain whether military resources will be 

available to support PRTs until all conditions for close out are met. Further, 

the relationship between the U.S. government and the Iraqi government 

continues to evolve raising additional questions about the future role of PRTs 

in terms of the assistance that may be desired by the Government of Iraq and 

how it will be provided. 

The PRTs and their supporting agencies have put effective processes in place 

to capture lessons learned. These include weekly situation reports, U.S. State 

Department cables, the Center for Army Lessons Learned playbook, and 

quarterly meetings of PRT team leaders in Baghdad. Additionally, DoS is 

developing a database to compile PRT lessons learned in Iraq. 

In prior reports SIGIR has made 12 recommendations to improve PRT 

program effectiveness. Prior to this review, SIGIR closed eight 

recommendations based on management action. Our current review found 

management action sufficient to recommend closing three of the four 

remaining open SIGIR recommendations. A recommendation to require PRTs 

to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives within established 

In commenting on a draft of this report, OPA milestones remains open pending further action. 

concurred with the recommendations to 

clarify the roles and responsibilities of OPA’s 

Plans and Assessments Cell, and to establish 

and a process for the desk officers to account 

for all required PRT or ePRT submissions 

each quarter. OPA did not concur with our 

draft recommendation to synchronize the PRT 

close-out strategy with U.S. troop reduction 

plans. SIGIR agreed and modified the 

recommendation to say that the close-out 

strategy should take into account the impact of 

U.S. troop reductions. MNF-I provided 

comments and concurred that the PRT 

program should recognize the reduction in 

U.S. troops in its transition plans.
January 28, 2009 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

SUBJECT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Performance Measurement Process Has 

Improved (SIGIR 09-013) 

This report is provided for your information and use. It discusses the results of our review of the 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ use of performance measures in Iraq. This review was 

conducted as SIGIR project 8036. The audit was conducted by the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) as project 8017 under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as 

amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the 

Inspector General Act of 1978. It is also in response to a requirement in Section 842 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 2008 (Public Law 110-181) that SIGIR develop, in 

consultation with other audit agencies, a comprehensive plan for audits of private security 

functions in Iraq. 

We considered written comments on a draft of this report from the Office of Provincial Affairs 

and the Multi-National Force-Iraq, when finalizing this report. The comments on the 

recommendations are included in Appendix F. Technical comments were also provided and are 

addressed in the report where appropriate. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Glenn Furbish (glenn.furbish@sigir.mil / 703-428-1058); or Ms. Nancee 

Needham at (nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil) / 1-240-553-0581-3793. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1 

Performance Management Has Improved 4 

Drawdown and Closeout of PTRs Is Condition Based, 

Leaving Timing Uncertain 10 

Lessons Learned Are Being Captured 13 

Prior Recommendations Have Been Largely Addressed 14 

Conclusion and Recommendations 15 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 17 

B. Example of an Assessment Summary 20 

C. Status of Prior Recommendations 23 

D. Acronyms 26 

E. Audit Team Members 27 

F. Management Comments 28 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Performance 

Measurement Process Has Improved 

SIGIR-09-013 January 28, 2009 

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

Since October 2006 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has issued 

three reports examining the status, expansion, and effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRTs) and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) throughout Iraq. The 

PRT initiative is a civilian-military interagency effort that is the primary U.S. government 

interface between U.S., coalition partners, and provincial and local governments throughout 

Iraq’s 18 provinces. The PRT program was established in October 2005, to assist Iraq’s 

provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to 

promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and 

to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic population needs. The ePRT 

program was established in 2007 as part of the surge of U.S. troops into Iraq. Under the program 

PRT members were embedded directly into brigade combat teams that were part of the surge. 

The ePRTs deploy in neighborhoods and work at the district and municipal levels. The goal is to 

create areas where moderates will have political space to operate and to bring anti-Iraqi forces 

under control. 

Our objectives for this audit were to review the PRT program and answer these general 

questions: 

• Have program objectives and performance measures or metrics been established? 

• What is the status of future program plans in relation to the reduction in U.S. military 

forces? 

• Are lessons learned being captured that could be useful in other contingencies? 

• What actions have been taken based on SIGIR’s prior recommendations? 

Results in Brief 

Performance Measurement Has Improved 

The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) has developed a performance assessment system for 

evaluating provincial capabilities; however, OPA has not consistently required the PRTs to 

develop and submit written work plans that identify planned activities to address areas of 

weakness identified by the assessment system. This limits OPA’s oversight of PRT activities 

and its knowledge of whether the PRT activities effectively address identified weaknesses in 

i 
some provinces. During the course of this review, OPA improved its procedures for preparing, 

submitting, and reviewing work plans. 

OPA’s performance assessment system─the Maturity Model assessment process─requires each 

PRT to submit a quarterly assessment of its province’s capacity based on five lines of activity: 

governance, political development, economic development, political reconciliation, and rule of 

law. According to OPA’s Planning and Assessment User Guide, the assessments then serve as 

the basis for preparing work plans to address activities identified as needing attention. SIGIR 

analyzed the PRT assessments and work plans for the quarter ending in August 2008 and found 

that about 86% of the PRTs completed their assessments, but only about 25% prepared updated 

supporting work plans. Most of the instances in which plans were not prepared occurred in the 

ePRTs. Table 1 shows the results of the SIGIR analysis. 

Table 1—Number of PRTs and ePRTs with Assessment and Work Plans, 

August 2008 

PRTs ePRTs Total 

Number 16 12 28 

Prepared a province 

assessment 

15 (94%) 9 (75%) 24 (86%) 

Prepared an updated work 

plan 

5 (31%) 2 (17%) 7 (25%) 

Source: SIGIR analysis of OPA data. 

SIGIR identified a number of reasons why work plans were not prepared, including weaknesses 

in guidance and a lack of adherence to requirements. For example, SIGIR found that OPA’s 

Planning and Assessment User Guide requires OPA desk officers, who are responsible for 

coordination with PRTs, to review and understand the PRT work plans. PRT team leaders 

approve all section work plans and consolidate them into one PRT work plan. Desk officers then 

“ensure the work plan accurately reflects the Maturity Model assessments and the categories 

within them.” However, the guidelines do not identify the actions that desk officers should take 

when work plans are not submitted or when the plans are not aligned with the assessment 

categories. Additionally, some OPA desk officers failed to follow the guide and did not 

consistently ask for quarterly updates of work plans. 

During the SIGIR review, OPA revised its Planning and Assessment User Guide to address these 

issues. SIGIR’s review of the new guide showed significant improvement. For example: 

• Desk officers are now clearly responsible for the quality control of the PRT 

assessments. 

• Desk officers are responsible for ensuring that PRTs complete and turn in their work 

plans within the reporting timelines. 

• Desk officers are directed to report PRTs that do not submit work plans to the Deputy 

Director, OPA. 

ii 
• Desk officers are required to ensure that the work plans’ focus and priorities address 

problems identified by the performance assessment. 

• These changes, if properly implemented, should improve OPA’s internal controls 

over the process of reporting PRT assessments and work plans. 

One additional area in the guide that could be further improved relates to clarifying the role of 

the Plans and Assessments Cell in reviewing assessments. The new guide does not identify the 

Cell’s roles and responsibilities such as factors to be assessed and processes for providing review 

feedback. 

Drawdown and Close Out of PRTs Is Condition Based, Leaving Timing Uncertain 

In September 2008, OPA submitted a report to the Congress outlining the strategy for the 

eventual drawdown and close-out of the PRTs. To detail how the drawdown process would be 

conducted, OPA issued another document on October 1, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

Transition Strategy – a Roadmap.” SIGIR’s analysis shows that these plans are condition-based: 

the transition strategy identifies key events that will trigger the drawdown rather than a specific 

close-out timeline. SIGIR believes that given the recently signed security agreement and the 

deadlines for withdrawal, it is uncertain whether military resources will be available to support 

PRTs until all conditions for close out are met. Further, the relationship between the U.S. 

government and the Iraqi government continues to evolve raising additional questions about the 

future role of PRTs in terms of the assistance that may be desired by the Government of Iraq and 

how it will be provided. 

Lessons Learned Are Being Captured 

PRTs and their supporting agencies have put effective processes in place to capture lessons 

learned including weekly situation reports, DoS cables, quarterly PRT team leader meetings, and 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned’s Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook. 

Additionally, DoS is developing a database to compile PRT lessons learned in Iraq. When 

completed, the DoS database is planned to be accessible to all participating agencies, and will 

focus on best practices that could be applied to other contingency environments. 

SIGIR’s Prior Recommendations Have Largely Been Addressed 

In prior reports on the PRT program, SIGIR made 12 recommendations to improve program 

effectiveness.1

 Prior to this audit, SIGIR closed eight of the recommendations, based on 

management action. The current audit noted additional management action that supported 

closing three of the four open recommendations. As discussed earlier, a prior SIGIR 

recommendation to require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives within 

established milestones remains open awaiting further action. 

 

1

 SIGIR 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq”, October 29, 2006; SIGIR 07-

014, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq”, July 25, 2007; SIGIR 07-015, 

“Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq”, October 18, 2007. 

iii 
iv 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq take these actions: 

1. Direct the Director of OPA to update the Planning and Assessment User Guide to include the 

following: 

a. a clarification of the roles and responsibilities of OPA’s Plans and Assessments Cell; 

b. a process for the desk officers to account for all required PRT and ePRT submissions 

each quarter, including work plans for all five lines of action, and to provide feedback to 

the PRT or ePRT regarding missing or deficient items. 

2. SIGIR also recommends that the Ambassador work jointly with the Commander, MultiNational Forces-Iraq to update the PRT close out strategy so that it takes into account the 

impact of U.S. troop reductions on PRT operational activities. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

SIGIR received written comments on a draft of this report from OPA and MNF-I. Both sets of 

comments are included in Appendix F. OPA stated that it considers the report to be 

comprehensive, fair, and accurate. However, it did not agree with our draft recommendation to 

synchronize the PRT close-out strategy with U.S. troop reduction plans. According to OPA, the 

U.S. government aid and assistance plan should not be locked into the hard timelines for the 

military withdrawal from Iraq. SIGIR agreed and modified its recommendation to say that the 

close-out strategy should take into account the impact of U.S. troop reductions on PRT 

operational activities. 

MNF-I concurred with our comment that PRT transition is conditions based and that the U.S. 

troop reduction is a condition the PRT program should accommodate or at least recognize in its 

transition plans. 
Introduction 

Since October, 2006 the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has issued 

three audit reports examining the status, expansion, and effectiveness of Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRT) throughout Iraq.2

 This report is our fourth on PRT operations and 

effectiveness and examines the PRT program’s use of performance measures. In addition, the 

report discusses the future of PRTs, the process for capturing lesson learned, and actions taken to 

address SIGIR recommendations from prior reports on PRTs. 

Background 

In October 2005, the PRTs were established by Cable 4045, issued jointly by the U.S. EmbassyIraq and Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). The PRT program is a U.S.-led, civil-military 

effort to improve the capabilities of Iraqi provincial and local governments to govern effectively 

and deliver essential services. The PRT program provides integrated and multidisciplinary teams 

of U.S. and coalition personnel to teach, coach, and mentor provincial and local government 

officials in core competencies of governance and economic development. Cable 4045 was 

replaced by a joint U.S. Department of State (DoS) and MNF-I strategic framework, dated 

August 19, 2008. 

The PRTs and embedded PRTs (ePRTs) comprise personnel from the DoS, United States 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and other Departments of the U.S. government; 

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I); Iraqi-born expatriates, contractors, and Iraqi local 

nationals. Three PRTs are led by coalition partners, one each by Korea, Italy, and the United 

Kingdom. Integrated and multidisciplinary teams train, coach, and mentor provincial 

governments in core competencies of governance, economic development, rule of law, and 

infrastructure development. PRT staffing is dependent on the needs and circumstances of the 

individual province. 

The ePRTs are embedded with Brigade Combat Teams and are responsible for providing advice, 

expertise, and program management to support the local counterinsurgency strategy devised with 

their Brigade Combat Team. In addition, ePRTs carry out program and policy guidance at the 

district and municipal level. On April 27, 2008 the Director of OPA issued a memo directing 

that the ePRTs report directly to the PRTs within their provinces. 

The U.S. Embassy-Iraq’s Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) was established in May 2007 under 

the leadership of an ambassador-level coordinator. OPA’s mission is to assist in the 

synchronization of governance, reconstruction, security and economic development assistance to 

the PRTs, and to provide coordination and de-confliction of PRT efforts with the efforts of the 

U.S. Mission-Iraq, coalition partners, and the Iraqi Government. MNF-I coordinates with the 

Embassy to provide strategic guidance to the PRT program. MNC-I, currently staffed by the 

 

2

 SIGIR 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq”, October 29, 2006; SIGIR 07-

014, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq”, July 25, 2007; SIGIR 07-015, 

“Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq”, October 18, 2007. 

1 
U.S. Army’s 18th Airborne Corps, provides support to the PRTs such as movement teams and 

other logistical assets, along with military personnel who serve as deputy team leaders and 

liaison officers with the major subordinate commands in the field. 

On April 29, 2008, the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad and the MNF-I established the Joint Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Steering Group to provide guidance, coordination, and oversight for the 

development of a joint strategy for PRT programs and operations. The Steering Group is chaired 

by the Director of OPA. Its membership includes senior directors and commanders from the 

DoS, USAID, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, Iraq Transition Assistance 

Office, MNF-I, and MNC-I. Members of the Steering Group appointed representatives to a Joint 

Provincial Reconstruction Team Working Group. 

As of November, 2008 there were 14 PRTs (this total includes coalition PRTs) and four 

Provincial Support Teams representing the 18 provinces in Iraq. Since Erbil, Dohuk and 

Sulaymaniyah provinces report as one PRT, the total number of PRT and PSTs reporting is 16. 

The Provincial Support Teams are similar in function to PRTs but due to security considerations 

or other factors they do not reside within their provinces. Instead, the Provincial Support Teams 

reside on military forward operating bases and travel into their areas of responsibility as needed. 

Map 1—PRT footprint, November 2008 

PRTs

Ninewa

Kirkuk

Babil

Baghdad

Anbar

Basrah (UK)

Dhi Qar (IT)

Salah ad Din

Diyala

Erbil (ROK)

Wasit

Najaf

Karbala

Diwaniyah

ePRTs

N. Babil (1)

Baghdad (6)

Anbar (3)

S. Diyala (1)

PSTs 

(Total PSTs: 4)

Muthanna

Maysan

Dohuk

Sulaymaniyah

US PRT

ePRT

PST

Coalition PRT

PRT FOOTPRINT – NOVEMBER 2008

Anbar

Ninewa

Najaf

Salah ad

Din

Muthanna

Basrah

Diyala

Kirkuk

Karbala

Wasit

Maysan

Dhi Qar

Diwaniyah

Babil

Baghdad

Sulaymaniyah

Erbil

≈

US PRT     11

Coalition   3

ePRT             11

PST 4

_____________

Total PRT     29

PRT Updates

• 23‐24 November – Second OPA‐organized Budget

Execution workshop occurs at Embassy.  

• Total BOG for DoS Managed personnel is currently at

444.

• Staffing for positionsidentified in OPA’s Bottom Up

Assessmentis underway.  

Dohuk

Source: OPA 

The PRT footprint is constantly changing and OPA’s projections for July 2009 are shown in Map 

2. 

2 
Map 2—Possible PRT footprint changes 

PRTs

Ninewa

Kirkuk

Babil

Baghdad

Anbar

Basrah (UK)

Dhi Qar (IT)

Salah ad Din

Diyala

Erbil (ROK)

Wasit

Najaf

Karbala

Diwaniyah

ePRTs

Baghdad (6)

Anbar (2)

PSTs 

(Total PSTs: 4)

Muthanna

Maysan

Dohuk

Sulaymaniyah

US PRT

ePRT

PST

Coalition PRT

POSSIBLE PRT FOOTPRINT CHANGES – Jul 2009

Anbar

Ninewa

Najaf

Salah ad

Din

Muthanna

Basrah

Diyala

Kirkuk

Karbala

Wasit

Maysan

Dhi Qar

Diwaniyah

Babil

Baghdad

Sulaymaniyah

Erbil

≈

US PRT     13

Coalition   1

ePRT             8

PST 4

_____________

Total PRT     26 Dohuk

1. ROK PRT in Erbil replaced with US‐led effort by 2nd QTR,

FY09.  

2. PRT Diyala and ePRT South Diyala merge by June 2009.

3. PST Maysan having extended stays at CP Garry Owen.

4. Reviewing options for Muthanna transition pending

approval of Provincial Governor.

5. Probable transition of PRT Basrah to US lead.

6. Ramadi ePRT folding in with Anbar PRT – Jun 09.

7. Kalsu ePRT folding in with Babil PRT end 08; agriculture

satellite remains into 09.

PRT/ePRT merge

PST essentially in

Province

Source: OPA 

The Map 2 illustration shows a reduction of three ePRTs and a transition of two coalition PRTs 

into U.S. control. Both the British PRT in Basrah and the Korean PRT in Erbil are scheduled to 

transition to U.S. lead while the Italian PRT at Dhi Qar is expected to remain a coalition PRT. 

The total PRT/ePRT count from Map 1 at twenty nine reduced to Map 2 at twenty six shows 

progress in the PRT goal for drawdown. At the height of the surge activities the total number of 

PRTs and ePRTs had reached thirty two. 

Objectives 

Our objectives for this audit were to review the PRT program to determine 

• Whether objectives and performance measures or metrics have been established. 

• The status of future program plans in relation to reduction in U.S. military forces. 

• Whether lessons learned are being captured that could be useful in other 

contingencies. 

• The actions taken on SIGIR’s prior recommendations. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For an overview of the 

maturity model, see Appendix B. For a listing of the status of open recommendations from prior 

SIGIR audit reports, see Appendix C. For a listing of the acronyms, see Appendix D. For a 

listing of the audit team members, see Appendix E. 

3 
Performance Measurement Has Improved 

OPA has developed a performance assessment system for evaluating provincial capabilities, 

however, it had not consistently required the PRTs and ePRTs to develop and submit work plans 

that identify activities planned to address areas of weakness identified by the assessment system. 

For example, our analysis of the August 2008 quarterly reporting period found that about 86% of 

the PRTs and ePRTs completed their assessments, but only about 32% prepared supporting work 

plans. This limits OPA’s knowledge of whether the activities being conducted at the PRTs are 

appropriate and address the needs of the provinces. During the course of this review, OPA 

improved its procedures for preparing, submitting, and reviewing work plans. 

Provincial Assessments 

In May 2008, OPA issued an updated Planning and Assessment User Guide that identifies a 

process for assessing the capabilities of the provinces. The guide requires each PRT and ePRT 

to submit an assessment quarterly. In provinces that have both PRTs and ePRTs assigned, each 

was expected to provide an assessment. In November, 2008, OPA changed its guide, and PRTs 

and ePRTs within a province now submit one combined assessment. 

PRTs complete the assessments by considering generic statements provided by the guidelines 

and making subjective assessments of where the PRT best fits the descriptions. Each PRT 

assesses its province in five areas (referred to as lines of activity); governance, political 

development, economic development, political reconciliation, and rule of law. Table 1 is an 

example of the maturity model for one of the lines of activity, political reconciliation. 

4 
Table 1—Maturity Model (Political Reconciliation Section) 

24

POLITICAL

RECONCILIATION

Maturity Model Provincial Assessment

Beginning Developing Sustainable Performing Self-Reliance

Political 

Reconciliation

Resolve 

Differences 

between 

conflicting parties

Establish the view that 

reconciliation with friends 

is not what Iraqis need to 

do, they need to 

reconcile with their 

enemies

Ensure GoI seen as 

representative of both 

sides, despite Sunni 

boycott of election

GoI take (and make) 

decisions and policies 

that cross the sectarian 

divide, and IO emphasize 

this.

Sunni engage fully in 

governance of Iraq

Differences are not seen 

as sunni vs shia.

Establish a 

genuine desire to 

reconcile through 

peaceful dialogue

Create, through current 

and emerging examples, 

a desire to establish 

security and economic 

sustainability via 

reconciliation

Generate discussion 

forums amongst Key 

Actors (Tribal Sheiks) 

that give rise to formation 

of combined shia/sunni 

tribal councils

Combined Tribal councils 

work together to put 

interests of the local Iraqi 

above the interest of the 

local shia or sunni

Combined Tribal 

Councils provide nonsectarian governance at 

sub-provincial (local) level

Establish long-term 

security and economic 

sustainability 

Sectarian enclave 

communities 

move toward truly 

mixed, and 

reconciled intrashia/sunni 

communities

Create a desire to live in 

harmony

Facilitate methods of 

returning IDPs to original 

neighborhoods

Produce strong IO on 

small successes of 

returned IDPs 

emphasizing the security 

and economic benefits

Desire to return to own 

neighborhood and ability 

to return, so strong that 

inertia and momentum 

create own initiatives 

without GoI/CF 

involvement

Establish an 

environment that allows 

Suni and shia to live 

side by side, thus 

replacing Sectarian 

enclaves with mixed 

communities

Source: OPA 101 Slide Presentation 

After a PRT assesses its provinces for all five lines of activity, it summarizes the results in an 

overview chart called the behavior statement (See Table 2). Assessments for both the maturity 

model and the behavior statement fall within five capacity levels: 

• Beginning 

• Developing 

• Sustainable 

• Performing 

• Self-Reliant 

5 
Table 2—Overall Assessment Work Sheet 

Beginning Developing Sustainable Performing Self-Reliant 

Governance X 

Political 

Development 

X 

Political 

Reconciliation 

X 

Economic 

Development 

X 

Rule of Law X 

Source: OPA Planning and Assessment User Guide, May 2008. 

The OPA guide requires PRTs to provide statements of evidence about each line of activity that 

supports the capacity rating designated for the province. If necessary, the statements also 

highlight any resource issues that would enable the objective to move towards self-reliance or 

that are major blockers to achieving an upward trend. An example of an assessment is in 

appendix B. 

The assessments and comments are also used as one of the inputs to the Provincial Overviews, 

documents prepared by the OPA Plans and Assessments Cell. The cell obtains and reviews the 

assessments and develops provincial overviews to brief senior officials. The briefings summarize 

information from multiple sources to present an overall picture of each province to the Joint PRT 

Working Group. The provincial overviews are used to brief the Ambassador and Commanding 

General, MNF-I and are described as an essential document for Chief of Mission decision 

making. The working group is to consider the performance of the province and, if necessary, to 

note issues that require higher direction and guidance from the Joint PRT Steering Group. That 

group sets new objectives and target dates to give direction and guidance to the PRTs as 

required. This direction is to be based upon the Mission and Joint Campaign Plans to maintain 

synchronization across all other agencies. 

To determine how these performance measures contribute to PRT performance, we analyzed the 

assessments provided by the PRTs to OPA for the quarter ending August 31, 2008. Our analysis 

showed that 15 of the 16 PRTs completed and submitted the assessment. For the ePRTs, our 

analysis showed that 9 of the 12 completed the assessments. We found that the assessments 

were generally thorough. 

One area that could be improved is to clarify the role and responsibilities of OPA’s Plans and 

Assessments Cell in reviewing the assessments. Based on our interviews with cell officials, it is 

responsible for analyzing the assessments and performing quality control. However, its 

responsibilities, such as assessment factors and review feedback procedures are not identified in 

the Planning and Assessment User Guide. 

Work Plans 

According to OPA’s Planning and Assessment User Guide, the next step after completing the 

assessment is for the PRT to update work plans to target efforts and resources toward improving 

6 
those lines of activity identified by the assessment as needing attention and setting priorities 

against Joint Campaign Plan objectives. The guide states, “The Assessment process will 

identify areas that are weak or need extra attention within the province. The PRT will then, in 

turn, focus on the weak areas and prioritize the work plan in order to improve the area. If an area 

is not improved within a defined amount of time (usually quarterly), then the tasks surrounding 

that area within the work plan may need to be revisited or additional resources allocated.” The 

guide states that work plans can be complicated or simple lists. In any event the aim must 

always be to obtain a positive trend upwards from the original base line assessment. 

In SIGIR’s July 2007 report on PRTs,3

 we noted that only 2 of 10 PRTs (Baghdad and Ninewa) 

submitted work plans to OPA, and recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the 

Commanding General, MNF-I require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives 

within established milestones. We followed up on this recommendation during this review and 

found that OPA had developed a Planning and Assessment User Guide that required work plans. 

However, while there has been some improvement many PRTs and ePRTs are still not updating 

the required plans. For example, for the quarter ending August 31, 2008, OPA had received 

updated work plans for only 5 of the 16 PRTs, and only 2 of the 12 ePRTs. 

OPA’s guide is flexible as to the format and depth of PRT work plans, and our review of the 

plans that were submitted found that most submitted work plans were substantive. However, not 

all activities identified in some plans could be directly linked to a line of activity. We also noted 

work plans for activities such as Agriculture, Health, and Archeology that are not identified as 

authorized lines of activity. This is significant because progress in improving a province’s 

capabilities in the identified lines of activity is part of the criteria for PRT drawdown. Without 

the links, OPA may not be able to effectively determine if the work plans are consistent with 

OPA objectives. 

We also noted that OPA’s guide states that desk officers are to ensure the work plan accurately 

reflects the Maturity Model assessments and the categories within them. However, some PRTs 

submitted work plans that did not support all five lines of activity. Without a plan to increase 

capacity in all activities areas needing improvement, the phase out of the PRT may be delayed. 

For example, the Ninewa PRT’s work plan for the August 2008 quarter identified activities in 

seven areas including: 

1. Rule of Law 

2. Governance 

3. Economics 

4. Reconstruction 

5. Health and Education 

6. USAID 

7. Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

 

3

 SIGIR 07-014, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq”, July 25, 2007. 

7 
Activities addressing needs for the rule of law, governance, and economic development lines of 

activity are identified in the plan. However, activities for the political development and political 

reconciliation lines of activity are not identified. Additionally, reconstruction, health and 

education, and USAID are not identified lines of activity. While activities in these areas may be 

beneficial to the province, they may result in costs that do not advance provincial capacity and 

lead to PRT drawdown. 

Oversight of Work Plans 

SIGIR identified a number of opportunities to improve the oversight of the work plans, and 

during the course of our review OPA reissued its Planning and Assessment User Guide. The 

reissued guide now identifies a clear process for submitting and reviewing work plans. 

During our review the PRTs were using the May 2008 version of OPA’s Planning and 

Assessment User Guide, however, while the guide required the submission of written work plans 

and requires desk officers to review and understand the plans, it did not prescribe a specific 

response when PRTs fail to submit plans or submit plans that do not align with the lines of 

activity. The guide provided instructions to PRTs for developing and reporting the assessments, 

as well as for producing the work plans. PRT team leaders facilitate the plans’ development, 

approve the plans, and consolidate them into one PRT work plan. The guide states that 

assessments and work plans should then be reviewed and understood by desk officers in 

Baghdad, who are assigned to specific PRTs. Desk officers are responsible for interacting with 

the OPA Plans and Assessment Officer and the PRTs, and should be “intimately familiar with 

their respective PRT/ePRT work plan.” The guide also directed the desk officers to: 

• read the work plan and understand how it relates to the maturity model assessment; 

• know the work plan and understand its focus and priorities; 

• understand the current provincial overview for their province; 

• ensure the work plan falls within the objectives as defined by OPA. 

Although some PRT officials and desk officers were aware of the requirements, others were not. 

One PRT section leader stated that her position was going to turn over, so it didn’t make sense to 

create a plan to be implemented by a successor. One ePRT team leader stated that the ePRT had 

never prepared a written work plan in its existence, nor had the desk officer requested the work 

plan. Still another desk officer stated that the work plan did not have to submitted every quarter 

and that a submission every six months was acceptable because the plans don’t change that 

much. 

Senior OPA officials also seemed to be aware that the work plans were not being submitted or 

did not fully align with the lines of activity. For example, in OPA’s August 2008 provincial 

overview report it noted that the Najaf PRT had not submitted an updated work-plan for the 

quarter, and that the Ninewa work plan was aligned with the organization of the PRT sections 

rather than the Maturity Model. Additionally, the report noted that Ninewa’s work plan 

identifies tasks and objectives but does not prioritize the tasks in accordance with Maturity 

Model Lines of Activity or findings. Similarly, the Kirkuk overview states, “The work plan 

submitted for this cycle is comprehensive, identifies areas of focus, tasks and objective. The 

8 
work plan is not well nested (sic) with the Maturity Model nor does it follow the functions of the 

[Maturity Model] annexes.” 

On November 30, 2008, OPA issued an updated version of its guide, renaming it the Maturity 

Model Handbook. The new guide provides several significant changes and addresses the areas 

of concern cited above: 

• Desk officers are now clearly responsible for the quality control of the PRT 

assessments. 

• Desk officers are responsible for ensuring that PRTs complete and turn in their work 

plans within the reporting timelines. 

• Desk officers are directed to report PRTs that do not submit work plans to the Deputy 

Director, OPA 

• Desk officers are required to ensure the work plan’s focus and priorities address 

problems identified by the performance assessment. 

These changes, if properly implemented should improve OPA’s internal controls over the 

process of reporting assessments and work plans. The handbook is now much more specific in 

its direction to the desk officers. However, improvement in the guide will not be enough unless 

OPA management improves the organization’s overall control environment. 

In addition, a senior OPA official stated that OPA has established a Joint Common Plan 

Assessment Team that is working to improve the quality of the assessments. One idea is to use 

Iraqi input as a data source for the assessments through the use of surveys. Also, a senior OPA 

official stated that two more people were hired to fill slots in the Plans and Assessments Office. 

9 
Drawdown and Closeout of PRTs Is Condition Based, 

Leaving Timing Uncertain 

In September 2008, OPA submitted a report to the U.S. Congress outlining the strategy for the 

eventual drawdown and close out of the PRTs. To detail how the drawdown process would be 

conducted, OPA issued another document on October 1, 2008, titled, The Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams Transition Strategy – A Roadmap. SIGIR’s analysis shows these plans 

are condition based; that is the transition strategy identifies key events that will trigger the 

drawdown and close out of PRTs rather than a specific timeline for close out. SIGIR believes 

that given the recently signed security agreement and the deadlines for withdrawal, it is uncertain 

whether military resources will be available to support PRTs until all conditions for close out are 

met. Further, the relationship between the U.S. government and the Iraqi government continues 

to evolve raising additional questions about the future role of PRTs in terms of the assistance that 

may be desired by the Government of Iraq and how it will be provided. 

OPA’s strategy states that before making plans towards transition and drawdown, it is essential 

that a baseline of Iraqi Provincial Government capacity is established. As discussed earlier, OPA 

assesses provincial capacity using a maturity model that assesses five lines of activity. Each 

PRT prepares a subjective assessment of its province in these five areas every quarter. 

According to OPA’s strategy, for drawdown in a particular province to be considered, the 

province must achieve three indicators of capacity; first, the maturity model must assess the 

province’s capability as “sustaining” in all but the Economic Development line of activity, that 

is, four out of the five lines of activity; second, provincial elections must be complete; and, third, 

there must be freedom of movement for the Iraqi people. Once these three indicators have been 

achieved then drawdown of a PRT can be considered. 

The next step in the consideration process is presenting an analysis to the U.S. Ambassador 

supporting the case for a PRT to commence drawdown. As noted on August 19, 2008, DoS and 

MNF-I issued a joint strategy titled Strategic Framework to Build Capacity and Sustainability in 

Iraq’s Provincial Governments. The document replaced the original cable which established the 

PRT program. The framework identifies, at the PRT level, three separate elements that are 

linked in the coordinated assessment and planning process: the quarterly maturity modeling 

assessments, the Unified Common Plans which are developed in partnership by PRTs and their 

partnered military units, and actionable PRT work plans linked to the Unified Common Plans 

and assessments. These three documents are critical to achieving the events that will trigger the 

drawdown and close out of PRTs. 

OPA’s strategy emphasizes the importance of not being overly cautious and wasting resources, 

but also not withdrawing PRT support too soon and adversely impacting stability in the province. 

The transition strategy paper states, “It is, therefore, essential that OPA maintains a dynamic 

management overview of the PRTs and focuses the effort to arrive at the conditions required for 

drawdown as soon as possible.” In provinces where a particular line of activity continually 

meets the sustainable level, team members with special skills could be moved to other PRTs. 

10 
Continuing military support is also important to the future of the PRTs. Senior MNC-I and 

MNF-I officials stated that the U.S. military is committed to supporting the PRTs and does not 

plan to withdraw resources from the program until it becomes necessary. An MNC-I official 

stated that the U.S. military wants to achieve security throughout Iraq with reliable power, 

potable water, health care, and the rule of law. The U.S. military leadership in Iraq believes 

these objectives are best achieved through support of the PRT program and have used the term 

“PRT primacy.” To achieve the goal, MNC-I is planning to apportion force structure as needed 

so that PRT security, movement, and logistical support are assured. A senior MNF-I official 

stated that there is a commitment that there will be no degradation of support. The official stated 

that if a PRT was making three movements per day, then the associated brigade has been 

directed to continue to support that rate. 

MNF-I and MNC-I are also committed to maintaining the current level of civil affairs personnel 

of ten per PRT. A senior MNF-I official stated that more civil affairs specialists, which would 

include engineers and lawyers, are being deployed as the U.S. military is working jointly to tap 

specialists from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and other resources. 

Notwithstanding these statements, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq signed a Security Agreement 

with the Iraqi Government on November 17, 2008. This agreement establishes the provisions 

and requirements that regulate the presence, activities, and withdrawal of the United States 

Forces from Iraq. According to the agreement, all U.S. troops must be withdrawn by December 

31, 2011. SIGIR believes that a reduction in U.S. military support to the PRTs will certainly 

have a significant impact on their operations. While all PRTs and ePRTs are led by the State 

Department and consist primarily of civilian personnel, the teams rely heavily on U.S. military 

forces for their security, food, housing, and other support.4

 OPA provides political and 

economic direction to the PRTs, but the local military commander has authority over the sec

and movement of ePRTs; and many others provide security for PRTs that are collocated with 

U.S. military units. Consequently, a gap appears to exist between the PRT closeout strategy and

the future availability of military resources needed to accomplish that strateg

urity 

y. 

 

Another uncertainty for PRTs is the desires of the Iraqi government. Provincial elections are 

scheduled to take place in late January 2009, and after that date there will be changes in 

leadership in the provinces. As a result, the relationship between the U.S. government and the 

Iraqi government will continue to evolve raising additional questions about the future of the 

PRTs. The new Iraqi officials may decide they want PRTs to provide different services or go 

away altogether. The U.S. government will need to determine what assistance may be desired by 

the Government of Iraq and how it will be provided. 

In its written comments on a draft of this report, OPA did not agree with SIGIR’s draft 

recommendation that it should synchronize its transition plan with the U.S. troop reduction. 

According to OPA, the U.S. government aid and assistance program is not and should not 

become a function of the military presence in Iraq and, therefore, the PRT transition plan should 

not be locked into the hard timelines for the military withdrawal from Iraq. SIGIR agrees and 

4

 GAO 09-86R; Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, Oct. 1, 2008. 

11 
modified the recommendation to say that the close-out strategy should take into account the 

impact of the U.S. troop reduction plans on PRT operational activities. 

12 
Lessons Learned Are Being Captured 

OPA and DoD have put in place processes for capturing and sharing the lessons learned from 

their PRT experience. 

SIGIR’s review identified a number of processes for capturing lessons learned. For example, 

PRTs compile weekly situation reports that describe PRT and U.S. government agency activities 

in the province and the results. PRT team leaders also meet quarterly in Baghdad to discuss PRT 

activity. Several team leaders described those meetings as a great opportunity to exchange ideas. 

The Center for Army Lessons Learned publishes the Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, 

which provides information on PRTs and suggested approaches when PRTs confront challenging 

issues. The playbook states that it is a living document and it is posted on the internet where 

individuals may join in a discussion of PRT-related topics and make recommended changes to 

the document. The playbook further states that when appropriate, the discussion topics and 

changes will be reflected in the next iteration of the publication. 

In 2008, DoS began to develop a database of PRT lessons learned, based on information gleaned 

from interviews with redeploying PRT team members. The information is used to provide 

training for new incoming PRT team members. An OPA official stated that he is focusing on 

establishing a system of gathering the data. The system will be accessible to all participating 

agencies, including U.S. military, and information gathered over the years could be input into the 

database. The official stated that a focus of the system is to find best practices that would apply 

to other contingency environments. 

13 
Prior Recommendation Have Been Largely Addressed 

SIGIR made 12 recommendations in prior audit reports relating to PRTs. Prior to this audit, 

eight of those recommendations were closed. Our current audit indicates OPA management 

action sufficient to recommend closing three of the four remaining open recommendations. One 

recommendation, to require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives within 

established milestones, remains open awaiting further action. As noted earlier OPA has actions 

underway to address this issue. For a summary of the prior recommendations and management 

actions, see Appendix C. 

14 
Conclusions and Recommendations 

OPA has taken action to develop a performance monitoring system to assess provincial capacity 

and the outcomes of PRT activities. The PRTs are preparing the assessments on a quarterly 

basis, but OPA has not consistently required PRTs to submit work plans properly aligned with 

program objectives. Until recently, OPA management had not developed effective guidelines 

and has not maintained a strong control environment that assures PRTs will develop and execute 

the work plans. Without effective work plans, achievement of PRT objectives may be delayed, 

resulting in higher costs to complete the program and delays in drawdown and closure of the 

PRTs. 

Recent OPA management action has resulted in significant improvements to the OPA guidelines, 

by providing more specific direction to key personnel. However, the guidelines do not identify 

roles and responsibilities for OPA’s Plans and Assessments cell. 

Senior MNF-I and MNC-I officials stated that the U.S. military is committed to supporting the 

PRT program in Iraq, and OPA and MNC-I are close to completing a Unified Common Plan to 

enhance unity of effort between the two organizations. Additionally, OPA has developed a 

strategy for the eventual drawdown and close out of the PRTs. The strategy is based on a 

province achieving sustainability in four areas. Given different conditions across Iraq, some 

provinces will complete drawdown before many others. It is possible that some provinces may 

not complete transition prior to the departure of American troops. 

DoS is developing a database for lesson learned from the Iraq PRTs that would be accessible by 

all participating agencies, including the U.S. military. The database would have a focus on best 

practices that could be broadly applied to other contingency environments. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq take these actions: 

1. Direct the Director of OPA to update the Planning and Assessment User Guide to include the 

following: 

a. a clarification of the roles and responsibilities of OPA’s Plans and Assessments Cell; 

b. a process for the desk officers to account for all required PRT and ePRT submissions 

each quarter, including work plans for all five lines of action, and to provide feedback to 

the PRT or ePRT regarding missing or deficient items. 

2. SIGIR also recommends that the Ambassador work jointly with the Commander, MultiNational Forces-Iraq to update the PRT close out strategy so that it takes into account the 

impact of U.S. troop reductions on PRT operational activities. 

15 
Management Comments and Audit Response 

SIGIR received written comments on a draft of this report from OPA and MNF-I. Both sets of 

comments are included in Appendix F. OPA stated that it considers the report to be 

comprehensive, fair, and accurate. However, it did not agree with the draft recommendation to 

synchronize the PRT close-out strategy with U.S. troop reduction plans. According to OPA, the 

U.S. government aid and assistance plan should not be locked into the hard timelines for the 

military withdrawal from Iraq. SIGIR agrees and modified the recommendation to say that the 

close-out strategy should be updated to take into account the impact of U.S. troop reductions on 

PRT operational activities. 

MNF-I concurred with our comment that PRT transition should be conditions based and stated 

that the U.S. troop reduction is a condition the PRTs should accommodate or at least recognize in 

their plans for transition. 

16 
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

This audit was performed by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction under the 

authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. It was completed 

during the period of October 1, 2008, through December 28, 2008. It addresses OPA’s 

methodology and controls over their PRT performance monitoring system and the associated 

work plans. The audit also addressed OPA’s and MNC-I’s efforts to develop a UCP at the OPAMNC-I level to address future planning for PRTs. The audit also addressed capturing of lessons 

learned on PRT activities. 

To determine what objectives have been defined and what performance measures or metrics have 

been established to evaluate PRT effectiveness, SIGIR interviewed officials at OPA, the PRTs, 

the ePRTs, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, and USAID. Additionally, 

we obtained and reviewed the applicable guidelines including: 

• Strategic Framework to Build Capacity and Sustainability in Iraq’s Provincial 

Governments; 

• The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Transition Strategy – A Roadmap; 

• OPA Directive 001; 

• The U.S. Department of State Planning and Assessment User Guide (later updated 

and re-titled “Maturity Model Handbook”). 

To determine how the established performance measures are used, and to what extent they help 

to provide credible oversight of PRT operations and accomplishments, SIGIR obtained and 

reviewed provincial overviews, maturity model assessments, and work plans for all PRTs and 

ePRTs. Using these assessments, we then interviewed officials at OPA, PRTs, ePRTs, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, and USAID to discuss our analyses and obtain 

their perspectives on how the tools are used. We also conducted site visits to six PRTs, 

including Anbar, Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, Najaf, and Kirkuk. We judgmentally selected the sites 

we visited, based on selecting at least one site from each region that was accessible: central, east, 

west, north, and south central. 

To determine the status of future planning for PRTs in Iraq in relation to any significant 

reduction in U.S., military forces, we obtained and reviewed the applicable guidelines including: 

• Strategic Framework to Build Capacity and Sustainability in Iraq’s Provincial 

Governments; 

• The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Transition Strategy – A Roadmap; 

• OPA Directive 001; 

• Report to the Committees on Appropriations on the Strategy and Costs of Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams and Consulates in Iraq. 

17 
Using the guidelines, we then interviewed officials at OPA, the PRTs, the ePRTs, MNC-I and 

MNF-I, to determine how they used the documents. We also attended meetings between DoD 

and DoS, including the following: 

• Joint PRT Working Group (JPWG) 

• Joint PRT Steering Group (JPSG) 

• Ambassador PRT Core 

To determine the processes established to capture lessons learned on the work of the PRTs that 

could be useful in planning for other contingencies, we obtained and reviewed relevant 

documentation including: 

• Weekly situation reports (SITREPS); 

• U.S. State Department cables; 

• The Center for Army Lessons Learned PRT Playbook 

Using these documents we then interviewed officials at OPA, the PRTs, the ePRTs, GRD, and 

USAID. 

To determine actions taken by U.S. government officials on recommendations made in previous 

reports relating to PRTs, we reviewed OPA responses to the prior recommendations, and 

conducted interviews with ITAO and DoS officials responsible for tracking SIGIR 

recommendations. We also reviewed relevant documentation including the U.S. Department of 

State Planning and Assessment User Guide and the PRT assessments and work plans to 

determine how they had been changed. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We did not use computer-processed data for any aspect of the audit. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit objectives 

with respect to OPA oversight of PRT and ePRT assessments and work plans. Specifically, we 

identified and assessed internal or management controls including: 

• Procedures for monitoring and evaluating the maturity model assessment process and 

the assessments; 

• Procedures for obtaining and reviewing PRT and ePRT work plans. 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

18 
Prior Coverage 

In conducting this audit, we reviewed applicable reports issued by SIGIR, USAID/Iraq – 

Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, and the United States Institute for 

Peace. 

SIGIR Audit Reports 

Report No. SIGIR-07-015, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

Program in Iraq, October 18, 2007 

Report No. SIGIR-07-014, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion In 

Iraq, July 25, 2007 

Report No. SIGIR-06-034, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,

October 29, 2006 

USAID/Iraq – Inspector General Reports 

Report No. E-267-08-001-P, Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program, March 

18, 2008 

Government Accountability Office 

Report GAO-09-086R, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, October 1, 

2008 

United States Institute for Peace 

Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown Looms: A USIP Trip 

Report, December, 2008 

19 
Appendix B—Example of an Assessment Summary 

The following tables show how the PRTs assessed their provinces in each of the 5 lines of 

activity for the four quarters ending in August 2008: 

Table 1—Governance 

Governance

 Beginning

2

3

4

 Self-Reliant

6

Baghdad Central North South East West

Team

30-Nov

29-Feb

31-May

31-Aug

Developing

Sustaining

Performing

Self-Reliance

Beginning

Source: OPA 

20 
Table 2—Political Development 

Political Development

 Beginning

2

3

4

 Self-Reliant

6

Baghdad

Babil

Karbala

Najaf

Qadisiyah

(Diwaniyah)

Wassit

Diyala

Erbil (Irbil)

Kirkuk

Ninewa

Salah Ah

Din

Basrah

Dhi Qar

Maysan

Muthana

Anbar

Baghdad Central North South East West

Team

30-Nov

29-Feb

31-May

31-Aug

Developing

Sustaining

Performing

Self-Reliance

Beginning

Source: OPA 

Table 3—Economic Development 

Economic Development

 Beginning

2

3

4

 Self-Reliant

6

Baghdad

Babil

Karbala

Najaf

Qadisiyah

(Diwaniyah)

Wassit

Diyala

Erbil (Irbil)

Kirkuk

Ninewa

Salah Ah

Din

Basrah

Dhi Qar

Maysan

Muthana

Anbar

Baghdad Central North South East West

Team

30-Nov

29-Feb

31-May

31-Aug

Developing

Sustaining

Performing

Self-Reliance

Beginning

Source: OPA 

21 
Table 4—Rule of Law 

Rule of Law

 Beginning

2

3

4

 Self-Reliant

6

Baghdad

Babil

Karbala

Najaf

Qadisiyah

(Diwaniyah)

Wassit

Diyala

Erbil (Irbil)

Kirkuk

Ninewa

Salah Ah Din

Basrah

Dhi Qar

Maysan

Muthana

Anbar

Baghdad Central North South East West

Team

30-Nov

29-Feb

31-May

31-Aug

Developing

Sustaining

Performing

Self-Reliance

Beginning

Source: OPA 

Table 5—Political Reconciliation 

Reconciliation

 Beginning

2

3

4

 Self-Reliant

6

Baghdad

Babil

Karbala

Najaf

Qadisiyah

(Diwaniyah)

Wassit

Diyala

Erbil (Irbil)

Kirkuk

Ninewa

Salah Ah

Din

Basrah

Dhi Qar

Maysan

Muthana

Anbar

Baghdad Central North South East West

Team

30-Nov

29-Feb

31-May

31-Aug

Developing

Sustaining

Performing

Self-Reliance

Beginning

Source: OPA 

22 
Appendix C—Status of Prior Recommendations 

An objective of this audit was to follow up on open recommendations made in prior SIGIR 

reports on the PRTs. In those reports SIGIR made 12 recommendations addressing management 

of PRTs. DoS and DoD had taken action to close eight of the recommendations prior to this 

review. As summarized below, this report discusses action taken on the remaining four 

recommendations issued jointly to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General 

MNF-I. 

Table 1—Summary of Status of Recommendations 

Report No. Total Open Closed 

06-034 7 0 7 

07-014 3 1 2 

07-015 2 0 2 

Total 12 1 11 

Status of Four Open Recommendations 

Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq (SIGIR 07-014, 

July 25, 2007) 

This audit report discussed the expansion of the PRT program. In May 2007, the Chief of 

Mission established OPA at the minister-counselor level to support the PRT program. Under the 

leadership of an ambassador-level coordinator, OPA is charged with synchronizing governance, 

reconstruction, security, and economic development assistance to the PRTs. The audit found 

that despite the creation of OPA, the Embassy had not been able to fill critical staff vacancies to 

establish continuity of leadership and experience in managing the PRT program. OPA and 

MNF-I had not clearly defined PRT objectives and performance measures; therefore we could 

not report on what the PRTs and ePRTs are accomplishing, individually or collectively. 

(1) Recommendation 07-014 (1): Develop a performance monitoring system to determine 

what is being accomplished by the PRTs, including clearly defined objectives and 

performance measures, and milestones for achieving stated objectives. 

Action taken: OPA responded by developing the maturity model assessment process with a set 

of objectives and metrics. The objectives and metrics focus on five key areas: Political 

Development, Political Reconciliation, Economic Development, Governance and Rule of Law. 

The metrics are organized along a maturity model depicting progress from initial stages of 

development to final stages of development. The U.S. Department of State has issued a Plans 

and Assessments User Guide to identify the process, as well as roles and responsibilities at the 

PRTs and OPA. Assessments were completed and submitted by the PRTs and ePRTs in the May 

and August 2008 quarters. The assessments do not have milestones, although the work plan 

23 
template cited in the guide does provide for milestones. This action is responsive to our 

recommendation and SIGIR is closing this recommendation: Closed.

(2) Recommendation 07-014: Require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing 

objectives within established milestones. 

Action Taken: The U.S. State Department issued the Plans and Assessment User Guide which 

requires the PRTs to produce work plans. However, we observed that for the period ending in 

August, 2008 OPA could only produce work plans for nine of sixteen PRTs and two of twelve 

ePRTs for the quarter. The written work plans have not been consistently obtained and reviewed 

by OPA. SIGIR is leaving this recommendation open for further follow-up on planned OPA 

activities: Open. 

(3) Recommendation 07-014: Develop a workforce plan for the Office of Provincial 

Affairs to fill critical staff vacancies and ensure continuity in leadership and experience 

managing the PRT Program. 

Action Taken: In January, 2008 OPA responded via e-mail, stating “As of this reporting date, 

personnel have been hired against all surge positions. As of December 31, 2007, 298 of the 323 

PRT surge team members are on the ground in Iraq. Seven DOD team members were on the 

ground, but recently redeployed home due to medical reasons. Seven team members are en 

route, and eleven Diyala team members are in training and preparing for deployment. In the 

future, team leaders will assess their staff needs on a quarterly basis and provide 

recommendations to OPA regarding needed positions as well as those positions which can be 

phased out. Those positions, which were vacant at the time of SIGIR’s October 2007 report, 

were filled by a combination of DoS contractors, DoS Foreign Service Officers, 3161s, and 

personnel from partnering agencies (USAID, DoJ [Department of Justice], USDA [U.S. 

Department of Agriculture], DoC [Department of Commerce]).” During our current audit, we 

observed that the PRTs were well staffed. These actions are responsive to our recommendation 

and SIGIR is closing this recommendation: Closed.

Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq (SIGIR 

07-015, October 18, 2007) 

This audit report discusses progress in developing the nation’s provincial and local government 

capacity to effectively govern and manage its own reconstruction, despite continuing political 

and ethnic conflicts. We found that the development of clearly defined objectives and 

performance measures to guide the PRTs and determine their accomplishments was still 

appropriate. We also found frequent instances in which the military’s use of CERP to perform 

tasks that properly belonged to local and provincial government’s conflicts with the PRT’s 

capacity development mission. 

(4) Recommendation 07-015: In an expeditious manner, jointly establish a comprehensive 

plan for the PRTs (including ePRTs), with elements tailored for each PRT. At a 

minimum, the plan should : (a) clearly define objectives and performance measures, (b) 

clearly define milestones for achieving stated objectives, (c) be linked to funding 

requirements, and (d) identify the organization(s) within each agency that are accountable 

for the plan’s implementation. To provide senior level attention to this issue, the plan 

24 
should be approved by the Office of the Chief of Mission and the MNF-I Commander to 

demonstrate each agency’s commitment to this effort. 

Action Taken: The Embassy Baghdad Deputy Chief of Mission and MNF-I Chief of Staff 

signed a Strategic Framework, which provides guidance to PRTs and defines the roles and 

responsibilities of the various stakeholders. On September 8, 2008, as a precondition to PRT 

program funding, an overarching strategy for conditions-based drawdown of PRTs was presented 

to the House Appropriations Committee. The milestones to achieving the end state and 

drawdown have been established: successful provincial elections; freedom of movement for 

Iraqis; and a protracted assessment of ‘sustaining’ in Governance, Rule of Law, Reconciliation, 

and Political Development. An inter-agency executive group, the JPSG, was established to 

approve strategies and plans for the PRT program. These actions are responsive to our 

recommendation and SIGIR is closing this recommendation: Closed.

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Appendix D—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

DoS United States Department of State 

ePRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

MNF-I Multi-National Forces - Iraq 

OPA Office of Provincial Affairs 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

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Appendix E—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Meredith Baumeister 

Nancee Needham 

William Shimp 

27 
Appendix F—Management Comments – U.S.Embassy 

28 
29 
Management Comments – Multi-National Force-Iraq 

30 
31 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting suspicious 

or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil