J-A18024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF GEORGE 

PORUPSKI

APPEAL OF: JOSEPH M. PORUPSKI

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1201 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 9, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County

Orphans’ Court at 541 OC 1979

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2022

Joseph M. Porupski (Appellant) appeals from trial court’s decree of 

distribution, awarding to participant Margaret Gunnoe (Gunnoe) a one-quarter 

(1/4) interest in the Estate of George Porupski (Decedent), comprised of 

certain real property in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. After careful review, 

we affirm.

In a prior appeal, this Court summarized the case history as follows:

The pleadings and notes of testimony to the January 14, 

2021, hearing indicate the following. ... [Decedent] died testate 

in 1979. He owned 61 acres of real property in Nicholson 

Township, Fayette County, which included a residence. 

Decedent’s will devised a life estate in the residence to his 

daughter, [Gunnoe], subject to her upkeep of the house and 

payment of taxes and insurance. Decedent further bequeathed 

the rest and residue of his Estate in equal shares to his four 

children: [Gunnoe]; Joseph R. Porupski[, the Estate’s executor 

and Appellant’s father] (Executor) ... ; and two additional children.

Appellant, who was 57 years old in 2021, is Decedent’s grandson 

and Executor’s son. Appellant is also [Gunnoe’s] nephew.
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In 1992, the house was destroyed by a fire. Subsequently, 

[Gunnoe] lived in a mobile home, and then a modular home, on 

the property. Appellant alleged that in 1994, [Gunnoe] agreed to 

relinquish her one-fourth interest in the residual estate, in 

exchange for Executor purchasing the $36,022.50 modular home 

for her. N.T., 1/14/21, at 35, 39. [Gunnoe], however, denied 

that she ever waived her interest. Id. at 18. 

The other two siblings transferred their one-fourth interests 

in the Estate to Executor in 19831 and 1993.2 Appellant alleged 

that until 2006, Executor solely paid the real estate taxes, 

insurance, and maintenance costs for the property. N.T. at 32-

33. Executor eventually borrowed money from his son —

Appellant — to pay these expenditures. Id. at 40. In 2006, 

Executor, acting in his individual capacity and as Executor, 

transferred the deed to the property to Appellant, as 

satisfaction of the loan.3 Id. at 40, 57. Appellant testified that 

in 2006, Executor informed [Gunnoe] of this transfer. Id. at 41.

[Gunnoe], on the other hand, testified that she did not learn about 

the transfer until 2018, when she consulted an attorney about 

transferring her share of the estate to her sons. Id. at 18. 

Appellant also averred that since 2006, he has solely paid 

the insurance, real estate taxes, and maintenance costs for the 

property. N.T. at 30, 33, 44. Meanwhile, [Gunnoe] testified her 

modular home was assessed separately from the land, and she 

has paid the taxes on the home since 1994. Id. at 48-49.

____________________________________________

1 The 1983 Deed from Frank Porupski to Joseph Porupski states consideration 

for the conveyance in the amount of one dollar ($1.00). Record Book (BK)

1324 page 762. However, the Deed later states: “The true and actual 

consideration for this conveyance is $4,000. BK 1324, page 763. 

2 The 1994 Deed from George Porupski, Jr., to Joseph Porupski states 

consideration for the conveyance in the amount of seven thousand, six 

hundred fifty dollars ($7,650.00). BK 1178, page 97. No additional 

statement of consideration is included in the deed.

3 This conveyance was made by means of a “Corrective Deed” from Joseph 

Porupski, Executor, to Joseph Porupski (Appellant), for consideration of one 

dollar ($1.00). BK 3002, page 1238. No additional statement of consideration 

is included in the deed. 
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Executor died in 2010, without having filed any 

accounting of the Estate. The two other siblings are also 

deceased. 

On February 12, 2019, [Gunnoe] filed the underlying 

counseled motion to appoint a substitute administrator for the 

Estate. Appellant filed an answer. On May 22, 2019, the orphans’

court appointed Simon John, Esquire (Administrator). On January 

14, 2021, the court heard oral argument on various issues, as well 

as testimony from Appellant, [Gunnoe], and [Gunnoe’s] daughterin-law. The court did not enter any rulings on the record at this 

time. See N.T. at 77-78. 

On February 5, 2021, the orphans’ court issued an order, 

which, inter alia: (1) stated [Gunnoe] “did not execute a valid 

release to her interest in the [E]state;” (2) rejected Appellant’s 

claim of laches because [Gunnoe’s] interest in the residual estate 

“vested as of the date of death;” and (3) directed the parties to 

provide Administrator with any information necessary to file an 

inventory of the Estate. Order, 2/5/21, at 1-2. This order did not 

include any discussion of the court’s conclusions.

On August 10, 2021, Administrator filed a first accounting 

of the Estate, listing only one asset, the real property. The 

accounting did not include any expenses. Administrator also filed 

a proposed distribution, recommending that: (1) Appellant receive 

a three-fourths interest in the property and [Gunnoe] receive a 

one-fourth interest; (2) Appellant transfer a one-fourth interest in 

the property to [Gunnoe]; and (3) [Gunnoe] was liable to the 

residuary heirs for real estate taxes paid from Decedent’s death 

to the fire that destroyed the house.

In Re: Estate of Porupski, 2022 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 697, at *1-5 (Pa. 

Super. Mar. 18, 2022) (emphasis and footnotes added). 

In addition to the first accounting, the Administrator filed a proposed 

decree of distribution. On August 15, 2021, Appellant filed exceptions to the 

first accounting and proposed decree of distribution. On September 9, 2021, 

the trial court entered its decree of distribution. Appellant filed both a notice 
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of appeal and motion for reconsideration on October 7, 2021. Thereafter, 

Appellant filed a court ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. The 

orphans’ court filed a statement in lieu of opinion on November 3, 2021. 

On March 18, 2022, this Court remanded the case for the orphans’ court 

to file an opinion addressing Appellant’s issues. In Re: Estate of Porupski, 

2022 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 697, at *6. The orphans’ court filed its opinion 

on March 28, 2022. The matter is now before us for review.

Appellant presents five issues for our review:

1. Whether the [orphans’] court had subject matter jurisdiction 

and did the [orphans’] court err in awarding an interest in real 

estate when the executor transferred the real estate for 

valuable consideration?

2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred when it did not rule on the 

issue that [Gunnoe] was guilty of laches?

3. Did the [orphans’] court err when it failed to conduct a hearing 

on the exceptions filed to the proposed decree?

4. Did the [orphans’] court err in failing to address [the] unjust 

enrichment of [Gunnoe]?

5. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in directing [] Appellant to 

pay fiduciary fees in an estate that Appellant was not an heir, 

legatee or devisee?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; number 

designations added). 

When we review an orphans’ court decree, we employ a deferential 

standard of review, and “determine whether the record is free from legal error 

and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence.” In re
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Fiedler, 132 A.3d 1010, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Because the orphans’ court sits as the factfinder, we will not reverse credibility 

determinations absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “However, we are not 

constrained to give the same deference to any resulting legal 

conclusions.” Id. (citation omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant purports to challenge the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the orphans’ court. See Appellant’s Brief at 14; see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors, 10/20/21, at ¶ 1 (challenging 

jurisdiction of the court). In the argument section of his brief, Appellant 

defines “jurisdiction” but offers no argument supporting his claim that the 

orphans’ court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, Appellant argues 

the Executor had the authority to sell real estate that was not specifically 

devised by the Decedent. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant asserts: “The 

issue now before this Court is whether the Lower Court can invalidate a deed 

made in 2006 by the Executor of an Estate when valuable consideration has 

been made.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. 

Appellant claims that although Decedent devised his residuary estate, 

including the real estate, to his four children, “[D]ecedent did not specifically 

devise his farm to any of his heirs.” Id. at 17. Appellant maintains the

Executor sold the real estate to satisfy an “outstanding debt for paying real 

estate taxes, insurance and maintenance.” Id. at 21. Appellant asserts that

Gunnoe “has not paid anything towards these items for over forty years after 
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the decedent passed on.” Id. According to Appellant, Executor had the 

authority to sell the real estate to pay the costs for administration and 

maintenance of the real estate. Id. at 21. 

Thus, while Appellant baldly challenges the orphans’ court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction, he fails to develop a supporting argument. He instead

argues the propriety of the Executor’s actions. “The Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure require that each question an appellant raises be 

supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority, and failure to do 

so constitutes waiver of the claim.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 

A.3d 1247, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2014). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b). Because 

Appellant failed to develop his issue regarding jurisdiction, it is waived.4 

Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1262.

In his second issue, Appellant argues the orphans’ court erred “when it 

did not rule on the issue that [Gunnoe] was guilty of laches[.]” Appellant’s 

Brief at 22. Appellant states,

[Gunnoe] waited from September 2006 until February [] 2019 to 

assert a claim of ownership of a one-fourth interest after the real 

estate had been transferred for an outstanding debt for payment 

of real estate taxes, insurance and maintenance. 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant offers no legal authority to support a claim that the orphans’ court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the administration of a will where the 

former executor failed to administer the estate. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(1) 

(conferring mandatory jurisdiction on the orphans’ court for the

“administration and distribution of real and personal property of decedents’ 

estates”). 
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Id. at 23-24. Appellant points out that the Executor died on December 16, 

2010, and is not available to testify. Id. at 24. Further, Appellant claims 

Gunnoe “herself cannot remember details about what happened years ago.” 

Id. Appellant emphasizes Gunnoe’s 25-year delay in asserting her claim. Id. 

According to Appellant, he has expended substantial funds for the taxes and 

improvements on the property. Id. at 24-25. 

This Court has summarized the principles applicable to a laches defense 

as follows:

The question of whether laches applies is a question of law; thus, 

we are not bound by the trial court’s decision on the issue.

Laches bars relief when the complaining party is guilty of 

want of due diligence in failing to promptly institute the action 

to the prejudice of another. Thus, in order to prevail on an 

assertion of laches, respondents must establish: a) a delay 

arising from petitioner’s failure to exercise due diligence; 

and, b) prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay.

The question of laches itself, however, is factual and is determined 

by examining the circumstances of each case. Laches arises when 

a party’s position or rights are so prejudiced by length of time and 

inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it 

would be an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim 

against him.

Unlike the application of the statute of limitations, exercise of 

the doctrine of laches does not depend on a mechanical 

passage of time. Indeed, the doctrine of laches may bar a 

suit in equity where a comparable suit at law would not be 

barred by an analogous statute of limitations. Moreover,

the party asserting laches as a defense must present 

evidence demonstrating prejudice from the lapse of 

time. Such evidence may include establishing that a 

witness has died or become unavailable, that 

substantiating records were lost or destroyed, or that 
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the defendant has changed his position in anticipation 

that the opposing party has waived his claims.

In the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the

doctrine will not be applied. In other words, prejudice to the

defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application

of laches.

In re Estate of Moskowitz, 115 A.3d 372, 380 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). 

Our review of the record reveals no error in the orphans’ court’s

determination that laches does not apply. Laches is an equitable doctrine. 

See id. “[H]e who seeks equity must do equity.” In re Estate of Aiello, 

993 A.2d 283, 288 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). That is, a party

seeking equitable relief must come before the court with clean hands. Id. “A

court may deprive a party of equitable relief where, to the detriment of the

other party, the party applying for such relief is guilty of bad conduct relating

to the matter at issue.” Id.

Instantly, the orphans’ court declined to find laches to be applicable,

based in part on the actions of the Executor and Appellant. The court

explained:

In [the court’s] Order dated February 5

th

, 2021, [the court]

rejected Appellant’s claim of laches, because [Gunnoe’s] interest

in the residual estate vested as of the date of death, meaning that

her one fourth (1/4) interest is secured and does not require her

to institute any other action or prosecute any other claim to be

valid. To even suggest [Gunnoe] failed to exercise due diligence

in a case where the Executor filed no accounting, no inheritance

tax, and transferred real estate from the estate to his family

members who were not beneficiaries set forth in the Will, defies

all notions of logic and common sense. It is the Executor’s duty
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to gather the assets, pay the bills, file the necessary tax returns,

prepare an account and make distribution to the beneficiaries. 

None of that was done by this Executor. “An Executor is a

fiduciary no less than is a trustee and as such primarily owes a

duty of loyalty to a beneficiary of his trust.” In Re: Noonan’s

Estate, 361 Pa. 26 (1949). Executors, as well as other fiduciaries,

are under an obligation to make a full disclosure to beneficiaries

respecting their rights and to deal with them with the utmost

fairness. Id. at 29.

... [T]he failure of the Executor to responsibly perform his duties,

as defined by our Supreme Court, is the primary cause for the

delay in administering this estate. Further, we find no credible

evidence that there is any prejudice to Appellant resulting from

this delay, as he and/or the Executor received and have been

dealing with this property as their own to the detriment of

[Gunnoe]. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish either of

the two requirements necessary to prevail on a laches claim[.] 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/28/22, at 3-4. Upon review, we agree with the

orphans’ court and adopt its reasoning with regard to Appellant’s second issue. 

See id.

In his third issue, Appellant challenges the orphans’ court’s failure to

conduct a hearing on his exceptions to the proposed decree. Appellant’s Brief

at 25. Appellant asserts he filed substantial documentation of his

expenditures for maintenance and improvements to the real estate. Id. 

Appellant challenges the Administrator’s listing the real estate as an asset on

the Inventory, “although [it] had been in the Appellant’s name since 2006.” 

Id. Appellant points out the Administrator listed no values or credit for

Appellant’s expenditures. Id. at 25-26. According to Appellant, the trial court 

also erred in directing Appellant to pay one-half of the fiduciary fees, without 

reimbursement for his expenditures. Id. at 26-27.
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In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant preserved the following 

claim: “The trial court failed to hold a hearing on the Exceptions filed by 

[Appellant].” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors, 10/20/21, ¶ 2. Orphans’

Court Rule 8.1 specifically provides: “Except as provided in Rule 8.2, no 

exceptions or post-trial motions may be filed to any order or decree of the 

court.” Pa.R.O.C.P. 8.1. Rule 8.2 allows a party to request “reconsideration”

of any order, but does not require a hearing on a motion for reconsideration. 

Pa.R.O.C.P. 8.2. Thus, Appellant’s claim based on the lack of hearing on his 

“Exceptions” does not warrant relief.5 

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the orphans’ court erred by “failing 

to address the unjust enrichment” of Gunnoe. Appellant’s Brief at 27. 

Appellant asserts Gunnoe was unjustly enriched by (1) the Executor’s

payment of real estate taxes for the entire property; (2) the Executor’s 

purchase of a mobile home for Gunnoe; and (3) the Executor’s advance of 

$35,022.00 for the purchase of another mobile home Gunnoe titled in the 

name of her sons. Id. at 28. According to Appellant, Gunnoe received an 

amount in excess of what was devised to her. Id. at 29. 

____________________________________________

5 Notably, the orphans’ court observed Appellant “raised no specific factual 

dispute that would require any testimony or evidence, nor any authority which 

requires [the court] to conduct a hearing on the exceptions.” Orphans Court 

Opinion, 3/28/22, at 4. For the reasons set forth in our discussion of 

Appellant’s fourth issue, we agree. 
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To succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) 

benefits [were] conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such 

benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefits 

under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain 

the benefit without payment of value. Wilson v. Parker, 227 A.3d 343, 353 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “In determining if the doctrine applies, 

our focus is not on the intention of the parties, but rather on whether the 

defendant has been unjustly enriched.” Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). 

“Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, defined as ‘the retention of 

a benefit conferred by another, without offering compensation, in 

circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected, and for which the 

beneficiary must make restitution.’” Commonwealth v. Golden Gate Nat’l

Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010, 1034 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Roethlein v.

Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 81 A.3d 816, 825 n.8 (Pa. 2013)). 

The orphans’ court addressed Appellant’s unjust enrichment claim as 

follows:

Any payments made were voluntary and we are unable to 

ascertain how [Gunnoe] was unjustly enriched when Appellant 

and/or Executor had the benefit of the use of one hundred percent 

(100%) of the property for the last forty (40) years or more. The 

Appellant and the Executor dealt with this property as their own 

despite the clear language set forth in the Will, and now want 

reimbursement for these voluntary payments. Contrary to the 

assertion that [Gunnoe] would be unjustly enriched, this [c]ourt 

believes that the real injustice would be if [Gunnoe] was stripped 

of her interest in the estate. The Executor and his heir would 

benefit from their self-dealing activities over the last forty (40) 
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years and they would be unjustly enriched to the detriment of the 

named beneficiary in the Will of her one quarter (1/4) interest.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/28/22, at 4-5. Again, we agree with and adopt the 

reasoning of the orphans’ court. See id.; In re Estate of Aiello, 993 A.2d 

at 288 (recognizing a party seeking equitable relief must come before the

court with clean hands). See also 72 P.S. § 5511.12 (providing a tenant in 

common may pay protect his interest in the property by paying his 

proportionate share of the taxes owed); Bednar v. Bednar, 688 A.2d 1200, 

1204 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“In light of section 5511.12, it becomes eviden[t]

that a cotenant who assumes the tax obligations of his fellow tenant does so 

as a volunteer.”); Gallagher, Magner & Solomento, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. &

Sur. Co., 252 A.2d 206, 207 (Pa. Super. 1969) (recognizing “a tenant in 

common who paid more than his proportionate share of the real estate taxes 

charged against the land held in common, is not entitled to contribution from 

his co-tenants in common for his excess tax payments.” (citing Lohr’s Estate, 

200 A. 135 (Pa. Super.1938)). 

Finally, in Appellant’s fifth issue, he claims the orphans’ court erred in 

directing him to pay fiduciary fees to the Administrator “in an estate that 

Appellant was not an heir, legatee or devisee.” Appellant’s Brief at 30 (some 

capitalization omitted). Appellant asserts the orphans’ court had no legal basis 

for charging him fiduciary fees. Id. According to Appellant, the result, where 

he has paid the property’s taxes and maintenance, “is unjust and inequitable.” 

Id. at 32. 
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In his Rule 1925(b) statement of errors, Appellant averred the orphans’

court lacked “jurisdiction over [him] to order him to pay any expenses 

involving the decedent’s estate,” because he “was never named in the Will of 

George Porupski.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors, 10/20/21, ¶ 6

(emphasis added). We address this claim, as it is the claim Appellant 

preserved for review.

Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction can be 

established by consent of the parties[.]” Frontier Leasing Corp. v. Shah, 

931 A.2d 676, 680 (Pa. Super. 2007). A “party may expressly or impliedly 

consent to a court’s personal jurisdiction.” McCullough v. Clark, 784 A.2d 

156, 157 (Pa. Super. 2001). A defendant manifests an intent to submit to the 

court’s jurisdiction when the defendant takes “some action (beyond merely 

entering a written appearance) going to the merits of the case, which 

evidences an intent to forego objection to the defective service.” Fleehr v.

Mummert, 857 A.2d 683, 685 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

Our review discloses that Appellant appeared in this case, and on March 

8, 2019, filed an “Answer to Motion to Appoint Fiduciary,” in which he 

challenged ownership of the real estate. Appellant also filed objections to the 

First Account and Proposed Decree of the Administrator. Objections to First 

Account, 8/16/21. Thus, the record reflects Appellant consented to the 

personal jurisdiction of the orphans’ court. See Frontier Leasing Corp., 931

A.2d at 680. 
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Additionally, it is well settled that a fiduciary, in the instant matter the 

Administrator, is entitled to “reasonable and just” compensation for the 

services he provides. In re Estate of Sonovick, 541 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. 

Super. 1988). “[W]hen reviewing the judgment of the Orphans’ Court 

regarding the allowance or disallowance of a fiduciary’s fees and commissions, 

we will not interfere with the lower court’s decision absent an abuse of 

discretion or a ‘palpable error’.” Id.

Appellant presents no support for his claim that the fees awarded to the 

Administrator were unreasonable, or constituted a palpable abuse of the 

orphans’ court’s discretion. Further, our review discloses no abuse of 

discretion by the orphans’ court in awarding the fees. See Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 3/28/22, at 5-6 (discussing equities of the case and the executor’s 

inaction over decades, and determining that division of fees between Appellant 

and Gunnoe was proper).

Decree affirmed.

Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.

Judge Stabile files a concurring/dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2022