Pursuant to Feder al Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 43(c) (2), Attorne y General Mic hael B. 1 Muka sey is a uto m ati cal ly s ub sti tut ed

fo r f orm er A tto rne y G en era l A lbe rto R. Go nz ale s as res po nd en t in

thi s ca se. 06- 3189- ag, 07- 0110

- ag M el ni t se nko v. M ukas ey 1 UNITED STA TES COU RT OF AP PEALS 2 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 3

_______________ 4 5 August Term, 2007 6 7 (Argued: October23, 2007 Decided: February 6, 2008) 8 9 Docket Nos. 06-3189-ag (L) , 07-0110

- ag (Con) 10

_______________ 11 12 13 M ARI A M EL NI TS EN KO , 14 Pe tit ion er , 15 16 —v.— 17 18 M I CHAEL B. M UKA SE Y , U NI TE D S TA TES A TT ORNE Y G EN ER AL , 1 19 Respondent

. 20

_______________ 21 22 B e f o r e : 23 F EI NBERG , W I NTER , and S TR AUB , 24 Ci rcu it J ud ges . 25

_______________ 26 Petitione r Maria Melnits enko petiti ons for review of (1) an orde r of the Board of 27 Imm igr ati on

Ap pe als (“B IA ”) a ff

irm inganImm igr ati on

Ju dg e’s de cis ion

de ny ingMel nit senko ’s 28 m oti on

to s up pre ss e vid en ce and ord eri ng Mel nit senko rem ov ed ; an d (2 ) an ord er o f t he BI A 29 denying Melt nitsenko’s motion to reopen her removal proceedi ngs. Because we find that t he 30 BIA abused its dis cretion i n denying the motion to reopen ba sed solely on t he fact that t he 31 De partm en t of

Ho m eland

Se curity o pp os ed

the m oti on , th e p eti tio n f or r ev iewis G RA

NT ED in 32 part and

DENI ED in p art

. 33

_________________________________ 34 352 1 J ON E. J ES SE N (Stuart Goldbe rg, on thebr ief ), Law Offices of Jon E. Jessen, LLC, 2 Stamf

ord, CT, for

Pe tit ion er . 3 4 P AUL F I ORI NO , T ria l A tto rne y (P ete r D . K eis ler , A ssi stant A tto rne y G en era l, Rich ard M. 5 Evans, AssistantDirector, on thebr ief ), Office of Immigration Litigat ion, U.S. 6 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent

. 7

_________________________________ 8 STRAUB , Circuit Judge : 9 Petitione r Maria Melnits enko petiti ons for review of (1) a June 7, 2006 or der of the 10 Bo ard

of Imm igr ati on

Ap pe als (“B IA ”) a ff

irm ingImm igr ati on

Ju dg e (“ IJ” ) Matth ewJ. 11 D’Angelo’s January 7, 2005 decision denyi ng Melnits enko’s motion to suppress e vidence and 12 ordering Me lnitsenko r emoved, In re Ma ria Mel nit sen ko , No. A 98 322 554 (B.I.A. June 7, 13 2006), aff

’g No. A 98 322 554 (Imm ig. Ct. Hartford Jan. 7, 2005); and (2) a December 29, 2006 14 order of the BIA denying Mel nitsenko’s motion to reopen, In re Ma ria Mel nit sen ko , No. A 98 15 32 2 5 54 (B .I. A. De c. 29 , 2 00 6). Fo r th e f oll ow ingrea so ns , w e g rant th e p eti tio n f or r ev iewas t o 16 the denial of the motion to reopen. 17 FACTU AL AND PROCEDU RAL BA CKGROUND 18 A. Initial O rder of Removal 19 Mel nit senko is a cit ize n o f E sto nia

wh o e nte red

the Un ite d S tat es o n M arc h 3 0, 20 02 as a 20 non-imm igrant vi sitor wit h authoriza tion to re main in the United States for one year. She did not 21 leave the Unit ed States afterthe year had e lapsed. 22 On

Au gu st 1 9, 20 04 , M eln its enko wa s tr av eli ng fr om Ve rm ont to he r ho m e in 23 Connecticut wit h her then boyfriend ( now husband) Stanley Demakos, a United State s citiz en, 24 when she was stopped at a border patr ol checkpointat White River Junction, Ver mont (the 25 “Checkpoint”). Upon bei ng detained and i nterrogat ed by border pat rol agents , Melnits enkoSe cti on 23 7(a )(1 )(B ) of

the IN A p rov ide s th at “ [a ]ny a lie n who is p res ent in the Un ite d 2 St ate s in vio lat ion of thi s ch ap ter

or anyoth er l awof

the Un ite d S tat es . . . is d ep ort ab le. ” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). 3 1 adm itt ed

that sh e w as a

cit ize n o f E sto nia

an d h ad ov ers tay ed

he r vi sa. Th at s am e d ay , th e b ord er 2 patro l ag en ts i ssu ed Mel nit senko a N oti ce t o App ear ch arg inghe r w ithrem ov ab ili ty u nd er 3 Imm igr ati on

an d N ati on ali ty A ct ( “IN A” ) § 2 37 (a) (1) (B ). 2 4 At

Mel nit senko ’s r em ov al h ear ing , th e g ov ernm ent intro du ced int o e vid en ce a

“R eco rd 5 of Deportable/Ina dmissible Alien” (“For m I-213”). The Form I-213 indicates tha t Melnit senko 6 wa s st op pe d at th e C he ck po int on Au gu st 1 9, 2 00 4, an d th at s he adm itt ed that sh e w as a

cit ize n 7 of Es ton ia and

ha d o ve rst ay ed

he r vi sa. Mel nit senko , who wa s re pre sented byco un sel , a

pp lie d 8 fo r no rel ief

fr om rem ov al, but m ov ed

to s up pre ss t

he Fo rm I-2 13 on the ba sis that it s co nte nts 9 we re “ ill eg all y o bta ine d. ” In su pp ort of thi s m oti on , M eln its enko su bm itt ed a sw orn af fi davit 10 de tai lin g h er d ete nti on bythe bo rde r patro l. I n th e af fi davit , M eln its enko stated that sh e w as 11 stopped by the bor der patrol while drivi ng home f rom a weekend in Verm ont, was taken int o a 12 tra ile r w ithab out f our or fi ve oth er b ord er p atr ol o ff ice rs, an d w as d eta ine d f

or t hre e h ours 13 be fo re b ein g re lea sed . M eln its enko pro vid ed no oth er e vid en ce i n o pp os iti on to t he ch arg es o r in 14 support of any ground of reli ef. Moreover, Mel nitsenko re fused to testi fy at the heari ng beyond 15 admitting her name and date of birth on the ground that pr oviding more information “m ight 16 inc rim inate” he r. 17 On

Jan uary 7 , 2 00 5, the IJ f

ound Mel nit sen

ko rem ov ab le a s ch arg ed . T he IJ n ote d th at 18 the on ly e vid en ce o ff ere d b y M eln its enko wa s h er s wo rn a ff idavit , whic h w as i ns uf

fi cie nt “ to 19 indicate that the Borde r Patrol a cted improperly, much less egregi ously.” The IJ also r ejected a ny 20 all eg ati on

that th e ro ad

blo ck ch eck po int set up bythe bo rde r patro l w as i lle ga l. T he IJSubject to ce rtain exc eptions, a motion to reope n “must be filed no later t han 90 days 3 after the dat e on which the final administr ative deci sion was render ed in the proc eeding sought to b e re op en ed .” 8 C .F .R . § 10 03 .2 (c) (2)

. 4 1 acc ord ing ly a dm itt ed the Fo rm I-2 13 int o e vid en ce. Ba sed on Mel nit senko ’s a dm iss ion s as to h er 2 name and date of birth, records showing that a per son with Melni tsenko’s exa ct name and date of 3 bir th e nte red the Un ite d S tat es o n a

J-1 vis a as anau

pa ir, an d c ontents o f t

he Fo rm I-2 13 , th e IJ 4 found Melnitsenko r emovable as charged. 5 On appeal to the BIA, Mel nitsenko ar gued that the “manner of the search and seiz ure by 6 the border pa trol officer” atthe Checkpoint, which was l ocated “appr oximately 100 miles from 7 the [Canadian] border,” const ituted “s ufficiently egregi ous” conduct to warrant suppre ssion of 8 the Fo rm

I-2 13 . M eln its enko , c iti ng to INA§ 2 87 (a) (3) , whic h g ive s im m igr ati on of fi cer s 9 authorit y to search ve hicles for al iens within a “reasonabl e distance ” from the border, 8 U.S.C. § 10 1357(a)(3) , also chall enged the const itutiona lity of, inter a lia , 8 C. F. R. § 2 87 .1 (a) (2) , whic h 11 de fi ne s “r eas on ab le d ist an ce” as “ wi thi n 1 00 air m ile s f rom any e xte rna l bo un dary o f t he Un ite d 12 States.” On June 7, 2006, t he BIA affirm ed the IJ’ s decision de nying the motion to suppress and 13 ord eri ng Mel nit senko rem ov ed . T he BI A r eje cte d M eln its enko ’s argum ent th at s he ha d s uf fe red 14 aneg reg iou s co ns tit uti on al v iol ati on

an d n ote d th at s top pin g v eh icl es w ith out a w arr ant at a 15 fi xe d c he ck

po int is e xp res sly

autho riz ed

byIN A § 28 7(a )(3 ). T he BI A d ecl ine d to ad dre ss 16 Melnits enko’s argument regardi ng the consti tutional ity of 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) due to a lack of 17 “autho rity to enter tai n f aci al c ha lle ng es t o th e co ns tit uti on ali ty o f t

he law s o r re gu lat ion s th at [ it] 18 adm ini ste r[ s] .” 19 B. Mo tio n t o R eo pe n 20 On

Au gu st 2 9, 20 06 , w ith in 9 0 d ay s o f t he BI A’ s o rde r, Mel nit senko fi led a m oti on to 3De m ak os fi led a P eti tio n f

or A lie n R elativ e (“ Fo rm I-1 30 ”) a lon g w ithanAp pli cat ion to 4 Register Per manent Residence or Adjust Status (“Form I-485”) with the Department of Hom eland Securi ty on behalf of Melnits enko. Those applica tions are pending. 5 1 reo pe n h er r em ov al p roc eed ing s w iththe BI A in ord er t o a dju st h er s tat

us to t hat of a le ga l 2 pe rm an en t re sid ent ba sed up on he r Apri l 20 , 2 00 5 m arr iag e to De m ak os , w ithwh om sh e h ad 3 lived sinc e October 2002. The Department of Hom eland Securi ty (“DHS”) opposed thi s motion 4 4 on the ground that , at her re moval hearing, Melnit senko “refused to pr ovide any argument or 5 evidence to s upport her cl aim and refused to answer any questi ons.” Accordingly, t he DHS 6 reasoned, “[t]he displ ay of audacity by [Melnit senko] in now asking the BIA and ult imately the 7 imm igr ati on

jud ge fo r a f

av ora ble ex erc ise of

dis cre tio n and

[t o] reo pe n h er c ase fo r po ssi ble 8 relief is a stonishing.” 9 On

De cem be r 29 , 2 00 6, the BI A d en ied the m oti on

to r eo pe n. Th e B IAstated that, u nd er 10 its deci sion in Mat ter of V ela rd e-Pac he co , 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc ), any 11 motion to reopen to adjuststatus bas ed upon an unapproved pet ition with r espect to a marriage 12 occurring a fter the ini tiati on of removal proceedings requir es, inter a lia , th at the DH S n ot o pp os e 13 the m oti on . T he BI A c on clu de d th at the m oti on “m us t be de nie d” ba sed

so lel y o n th e f

act that 14 the DH S o pp os ed it. 15 DISCUSSION 16 A. Initial O rder of Removal 17 Melnits enko first chal lenges the i nitial order of removal, arguing thatthe Form I-213 18 should have been suppr essed in herremoval proceedings beca use it was obta ined in viol ation of 19 he r F ourthAm en dm ent ri gh ts. To that en d, sh e ar gu es t hat th e C he ck

po int wa s lo cat ed 20 ap pro xim ate ly 1 07 m ile s aw ayfr om the Cana dian b ord er, in e xc ess of the 10 0-m ile “re aso na

bleMelnits enko does not now rais e any argument with respectto the const itutiona lity of 8 5 C. F. R. § 2 87 .1 (a) (2)

. 6 1 dis tan ce” fr om

the bo rde r de fi ne d b y 8 C. F. R. § 2 87 .1 (a) (2)

. Mel nit senko fu rth er argu es t

hat 5 2 ev enif

the Ch eck

po int is w ith in 1 00 “ai r m ile s” o f t he bo rde r, i t st ill do es n ot q ua lif y a s a 3 “f un cti on al e qu iva lent of

the bo rde r” f

or F ourthAm en dm ent pu rpo ses , b eca

us e it “is loc ate d 4 clo ser

to f our ot he r st ate s, in a

fa irl y d en sel y p op ulated

are a, wi th m any inter co nn ect ed 5 secondary and t ertiar y roads, and . . . ther e is no indic ation thatthe nature of the traffic passing 6 thr ou ghthe [C he ck po int ] w as i nte rnatio na l in ch ara cte r.” Fo r su

pp ort , M eln its enko cit es Un ite d 7 States v. Jac kson , 825 F.2d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 1987) ( en banc), which hel d that “[t]o justi fy 8 search es at ch eck

po int s la be led the fu nc tio na l eq

uiv ale nt o f t

he bo rde r th e g ov ernm ent m us t 9 de m on str ate wi th ‘ rea so na ble cer tai nty ’ th at the tra ff

ic p ass ingthr ou ghthe ch eck po int is 10 ‘inter

natio na l’ i n c harac ter .” Ac co rdi ng ly, Mel nit senko arg ue s th at the cas e sh ou ld b e re m an de d 11 fo r an

ev ide nti ary

he ari ng as t o (a ) ex act ly h owfar f rom the bo rde r th e C he ck

po int wa s lo cat ed 12 an d (b ) w he the r th e tr af fi c p ass ingthr ou ghthe Ch eck po int wa s inter natio na l in

ch ara cte r. 13 W e n eed

no t de cid e whe the r us e o f t he Ch eck po int vio lat ed Mel nit senko ’s F ourth 14 Am endment rights, nor remand for the agency to de cide this issue, becaus e, as explai ned below, 15 we find that even if it di d, suppression of the For m I-213 would not be required. 16 Th e U nit ed St ate s S up rem e C ourt h as h eld that a F ourthAm en dm ent vi olatio n d oe s n ot, 17 by itself, requi re suppress ion of evidence in t he course of a removal proceedi ng. Se e IN S v

. 18 Lo

pe z-M en doza , 4 68 U. S. 10 32 , 1 04 6 (1 98 4) ( “Im po rtant a s it

is t o p rot ect

the Fo urt h 19 Am endment rights of all pers ons, there i s no convincing i ndication t hat applic ation of the 20 ex clu sio nary r

ule in c ivi l de po rtatio n p roc eed ing s w ill co ntr ibute m ate ria llyto t hat en d. ”).W e h av e st ate d th at e xh au sti on of iss ue s, as o pp os ed

to c ate go rie s o f r eli ef

, is a 6 mandatory, as opposed to juri sdictiona l, requir ement. Se e L in Z ho ng v. U. S. De

p’t of J us tic e , 480 F. 3d 10 4, 11 9-2 0 (2 d C ir. 20 07 ). N ev ert he les s, we de cli ne to e xe rci se anyautho rity to rev iew thi s une xh au ste d is su e in

thi s ca se g ive n th at w e b eli ev e it co nc ern s a f

act ua l de ter m inatio n th at sh ou ld h av e b een

m ad e b y th e ag en cyin t

he fi rst ins tan ce. W e f

urt he r no te that Me lni tse nk o h as not provided any e vidence thatFourth Amendm ent violat ions such as t he ones she all eges she experience d are widespre ad. 7 1 However, as we have recogni zed, 2 [t]he [Suprem e] Court [in Lo pe z-M en doza ] qualified this ruling in two si gnificant 3 ways. First, itstated t hat its “ conclusions c oncerning the exclusionary rule’s va lue 4 might change, if there develope d good reason to bel ieve thatFourth Amendm ent 5 vio lat ion s b y [ imm igr ati on ] o ff ice rs w ere wi de sp rea d. ” A nd , s eco nd , it expla ine d 6 that it s holding did notnecessari ly pertai n to circumstances i nvolving “egre gious 7 violati ons of Fourth Am endment or other liber ties tha t might transgress notions of 8 fu

nd am ental fa irn ess an d und erm ine the pro bativ e v alu e o f t he ev ide nc e 9 obtained.” 10 11 Al

me ida -A ma ra l v. Go nz ale s , 4 61 F. 3d

23 1, 23 4 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ) (i nte rna l ci tat ion s o m itt ed ). 12 Be fo re the BI A, Mel nit senko arg ue d o nly that th e al leg ed

Fo urt h A m en dm ent vi olatio n w as s o 13 eg reg iou s as to s urv ive Lo pe z-M en doza . A cco rdi ng ly, any argum ent th at the all eg ed vio lat ion is 14 widespread is unexhausted. Se e 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (d) (1)

. 6 15 In Almeida-Amaral , we stated tha t under the e gregiousness prong of Lo pe z-M en doza , 16 exclusion of evidenc e is appropr iate “i f record evidence establi shed either(a) thatan egregious 17 vio lat ion

that w as f

un dam ental ly u

nf air ha d o ccu rre d, or ( b) t

hat th e v iol ati on

—re gardl ess of

its 18 eg reg iou sn ess or u nf air ne ss— un de rm ine d th e rel iab ili ty o f t he ev ide nc e in

dis pute. ” 4 61 F. 3d

at 19 235. As in Almeida-Amaral , “ [n ]o thi ng be fo re u s ra ise s d ou bts ab out th e v era city o f t he ev ide nc e 20 ob tai ne d a s a r esu lt o f t he sei zure. ” Id . T hu s, we ne ed on ly d ete rm ine wh eth er the search 21 “tr an sg res s[ ed ] n oti on s o f f un dam ental fa irn ess .” Id . (alternation in or iginal) (internal quotati on 22 marks om itted) . In making this determination, t wo principles apply:8 1 First, the egregiousnes s of a constitut ional viol ation cannotbe gauged solel y on 2 the basis of the va lidity ( or invali dity) of the st op, but must also be based on the 3 ch ara cte ris tic s an d s ev eri ty o f t he of fe nd ingco nd

uc t. T hu s, if

anind ivi du al i s 4 su

bje cte d to a se izure f

or no rea so n at al l, t

hat by its elf m ayco ns tit

ute an 5 eg reg iou s v iol ati on , b ut o nly if the sei zure i s su ff

ici entlysev ere . S eco nd , e ve n 6 wh ere the sei zure i s n ot e sp eci all y s ev ere , it m ayne ve rth ele ss q

ua lif y a s an 7 eg reg iou s v iol ati on if the sto p w as b ase d o n ra ce ( or s om e o the r gr os sly im pro pe r 8 co ns ide rat ion ). 9 10 Id . M eln its enko ha s n ot a lle ge d th at h er s top wa s b ase d o n ra ce o r “s om e o the r gr os sly im pro pe r 11 co ns ide rat ion ”; a cco rdi ng ly, the on ly d ete rm inatio n w e m us t m ak e is wh eth er the sto p and search 12 we re “ su ff

ici entlysev ere ” to be de em ed “eg reg iou s” F ourthAm en dm ent vi olatio ns . If the y w ere 13 not, then the I J properly de clined to s uppress the For m I-213. 14 W ithres pe ct t o th e se ve rity o f t he search , M eln its enko arg ue s th at “ [o ]n ce [ sh e] wa s 15 stopped, she was esc orted to a t railerby four or five uniformed off icers and i nterrogat ed, 16 fingerprinte d and photographed, for thr ee hours withoutany evidence of any Miranda or o the r 17 warnings given.” W e find that thes e actions by t he border pat rol agents , even assuming the 18 Checkpoint its elf was illegal , fall short of the t ype of Fourth Am endment violation thatcould be 19 co ns ide red

“eg reg iou s” u

nd er Lo pe z-M en doza . 20 In Lo

pe z-M en doza , o ne of

the pe tit ion ers wa s ar

res ted in v iol ati on

of his Fo urt h 21 Am endment rights as partof a raid on a potat o processing pl ant, briefly det ained, taken t o the 22 co unty j ail , and

qu est ion ed

—a ll w ith out be ingwarne d o f h is r ight to rem ain sil ent. 4 68 U. S. at 23 1037. Nevertheles s, the Supreme Court found that this c onduct was not an “egr egious viola tion[] 24 of

Fo urt h A m en dm ent or

oth er l ibe rti es. ” Id . at 10 50 . T he act ion s at iss ue he re w ere les s 25 “severe” t han those in Lo pe z-M en doza , a s Me lni tse nk o w as n eithe r ar res ted no r take n to jai l. 26 See, e.g. , Na va rro -C ha lan v. As hc ro

ft , 359 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) ( “Navarro’s l ist of 27 co m

pla int s, [i nc lud ingbe ingtak enup sta irs to an inter rog ati on roo m ,] do es n ot r ise to t

hat le ve lTh is c on clu sio n is als o s up po rte d b y o ur c ase lawrel ati ng to whe the r bo rde r se arc he s ar e 7 “routine” for purposes of Fourth Amendm ent analysi s. Se e , e.g. , Ta bb aa v. Ch ertoff , No. 06 -01 19 -cv , —

F. 3d —, 20 07 W L 4 15 02 99 , at *6 –9 (2d Ci r. N ov . 2 6, 20 07 ) (h old ingthat bo rde r search es whe re r eturni ng att en de es o f an Is lam ic c on fe ren ce i n C an ad a w ere de tai ne d f or f our to sixho urs , inter

rog ate d, patte d d own, fi ng erp rinted , and ph oto gra ph ed we re “ routin e” f

or F ourth Am en dm en t pu

rpo ses ); United States v. Irving , 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Routi ne search es i nc lud e th os e se arc he s o f o ute r cl oth ing , lu gg ag e, a p urs e, wa lle t, p oc ke ts, or s ho es wh ich , unli ke str ip s ear ch es, do no t su bs tantia llyinf

rin ge on a tr av ele r’s pri va cyrig hts .” ); Un ite d Sta tes v. Sil

va , 715 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1983) (not ing that ques tions about “ citize nship, the length and purpos e of [an applicant’s] tr ip to Canada, [and] what items she had acquire d or bo ug ht i n C an ad a” are a ll r outin e); see also Unite d States v. Flor es-Montano , 541 U.S. 149, 155 n.3 (2004) (“We think it cl ear thatdelays of one to two hours a t international bor ders are t o be expe cte d. ”). 9 1 of egregiousness.”) . Accordingly, Mel nitsenko cannotbe said to have experience d an egregious 2 Fourth Amendm ent violat ion, if she experi enced a Fourth Amendm ent violat ion at all , and so the 3 IJ d id n ot e rr i n re fu sin g to su pp res s th e F orm

I-2 13 or i n o rde rin g M eln its enko rem ov ed

. Th is 7 4 portion of the pet ition for revi ew m ust there fore be denied. 5 B. Mo tio n t o R eo pe n 6 Next, Melnit senko challe nges the BIA’s deni al of her motion to reopen as an abuse of 7 discret ion. In denying t he motion, the BIA stated thatits deci sion in Mat ter of V ela rd e-Pac he co , 8 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc ) holds, inter a lia , th at s ho uld the DH S o pp os e a 9 motion to reopen to adjuststatus bas ed upon an unapproved pet ition per taining t o a marriage 10 occurring a fter the ini tiati on of removal proceedings, the motion may not be granted. As the 11 DHS opposed Melnitsenko’ s motion to reopen, the BIA conclude d that the motion “must be 12 denied.” For the reasons setforth below, we find that the BIA exce eded its al lowable discr etion 13 in denying Mel nitsenko’s motion to reopen, and we accordi ngly remand.10 1 1. Ma tte r o f V ela rd e-P ac he co 2 In 1986, in an effort to pre vent alie ns from receiving imm igrati on benefits based on 3 fr au du lent m arr iag es, Co ng res s am en de d th e IN A t o b ar anyali enfr om ad jus tin g s tat

us ba sed 4 upon marriage if that ali en had entere d into the marriage a fter the comm encement of deportation 5 or exclusi on proceedings. Se e Imm igrati on Marria ge Fraud Amendm ents of 1986, Pub. L. No. 6 99-639, § 5(a), 100 Sta t. 3537, 3543 (codified as amended at section 245(e) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 7 § 1255(e)(1) –(2) (2006)) . “However, this same broad sweep als o excluded from adjustment 8 many [ aliens], incl uding those with Unit ed States ci tizen chi ldren, whose marital r elations hips 9 were bona fide, with obvious r esulting ha rdship to ci tizens and l awful permanent residents of 10 thi s co untry .” Ve lar de -Pac he co , 2 3 I. & N . D ec. at 2 58 (H olm es, Bo ard Mem be r, c on curri ng ). 11 Co ng res s su

bs eq ue ntl y am en de d th e A ct i n 1 99 0 to ex clu de fr om the bar any a lie n who co uld 12 establi sh “by clearand convincing evi dence to the s atisfacti on of the Attorney General that the 13 marriage was entered i nto in good faith and . . . was notentered i nto for the purpose of procur ing 14 the alie n’s entry a s an imm igrant.” I mm igrati on Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 702(a), 104 15 Stat. 4978, 5086 (codi fied as amended at section 245( e)(3) of the I NA, 8 U.S.C . § 1255(e)(3) 16 (20 06 )). 17 Initia lly, in Matter of Arthur , 2 0 I. & N . D ec. 47 5 (B .I. A. 19 92 ), t he BI A h eld

that it 18 would “decline t o grant motions to reopen for cons iderati on of applications for adjustment of 19 status ba sed

up on un ad jud icated vis a p eti tio ns ” p ert ain ingto m arr iag es e nte red int o a ft er 20 removal proceedings had commenced. Id . at 47 9. Th e B IArea so ne d th at “ [a ]n inq uir y into 21 whether the evi dence submitted . . . is sufficient. . . to demonstrate prima facie eligi bility . . . 22 wo uld

ne ces sar ily

inv olv e an

in- de pth ex am inatio n into t

he m eri ts o f t

he pe tit ion . S uc hMatter of Shaar , 2 1 I. & N . D ec. 54 1 (B .I. A. 19 96 ) pe rta ins to a lie ns wh o f ail to d ep art 8 durin g th eir

vo luntar y d ep art ure pe rio d, an d is the ref

ore no t im

pli cat ed he re. The reasonable ness of the BIA’s inte rpretat ion of the statut e has not been cha llenged. 9 11 1 ex am inatio n w ou ld .

. . co ns tit ute a su bs tantia l an d unw arr anted int rus ion int o th e d ist

ric t 2 dir ect or’ s autho rity o ve r th e ad jud icatio n o f v isa

pe tit ion s. ” Id

. 3 However, in 2002, the BIA concluded: 4 The effect of [the] policy in Matter of Arthur , [] coupled with the 5 regulati on limiting respondent s to one motion to reopen filed wit hin 90 days of a 6 final administrati ve decision a nd the Service ’s inabil ity to adj udicate many I-130 7 visa peti tions withi n that ti me f rame, ha[d] been to depri ve a small class of 8 respondents, who [we]re otherwise prima facie eligible for adjustment, of the 9 opportunity t o have theiradjustment applicat ions revie wed by an Imm igrati on 10 Ju dg e. 11 12 Ve lar

de -Pac he co , 2 3 I. & N . D ec. at 2 55 . A cco rdi ng ly, the BI A, enbanc , m od if ied the Arthur 13 rul e as fo llo ws : 14 [A] properly filed motion to reopen may be granted, in the e xercise of disc retion, 15 to p rov ide anali enanop po rtunit y to pursu e an

ap pli cat ion

fo r ad jus tm ent whe re 16 the fo llo wi ng fa cto rs are p res ent: ( 1) t he m oti on

is t im ely fi led ; (2 ) th e m oti on

is 17 not numerically barr ed by the regul ations; ( 3) the motion is not barred by Mat ter 18 of Shaar , 2 1 I. & N . D ec. 54 1 (B .I. A. 19 96 ), o r on any o the r pr oc ed

ura l gr ound s; 19 (4) the motion present s clear a nd convincing evi dence indica ting a str ong 20 lik eli ho od that th e re sp on de nt’ s m arr iag e is bo na fi de ; an d (5 ) th e S erv ice eithe r 21 does not oppose the motion or bases its opposi tion solel y on Matter of Arthur []. 22 23 Id . at 256. Relying on the le gislati ve history of the 1990 a mendm ent, the BIA reas oned: 8 24 A prima facie showing of eligibilit y merely affords respondents who present 25 sufficient evidence a single oppor tunity to ha ve their a djustment applicat ions 26 ad

jud icated . S uc h an o pp ort un ityis c on sis tent w ithCo ng res s’ l eg isl ati ve int ent in 27 amending the m arriage fraud provisions: that ali ens who marry after proceedings 28 have been init iated, and who seek a djustment of status, should be a fforded one 29 opportunity t o present cl ear and convinc ing evidence t hat theirmarriage is bona 30 fi de

. 31 32 Id . at 257. 9Re lyi ng on the fi ft h f act or, the BI A d id n ot a sse ss t he oth er f our f act ors in t his cas e. 10 Ac co rdi ng ly, on

rem an d, the BI A i s f

ree to c on sid er the oth er f act ors . The DHS also m ade a separa te object ion based on Matter of Arthur ; ho we ve r, a s st ate d 11 ab ov e, thi s o bje cti on

wo uld no t f ore clo se r eo pe nin g und er Ve lar de -Pac he co . 12 1 2. Mel ni tse nko ’s M oti on to R eo pe n 2 W e review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of disc retion. Se e 3 Mag

hrad ze v . G onza les , 4 62 F. 3d

15 0, 15 2 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ). T he BI A e xc eed s it s al low ab le 4 discret ion if its deci sion “(1) pr ovides no rat ional expla nation, (2) inexplicably departs from 5 est ab lis he d p oli cie s, (3) is d ev oid of any re aso nin g, or ( 4) c ontai ns on ly s um m ary or c on clu so ry 6 statem en ts. ” Id . at 15 3 (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ). T he BI A a lso ex cee ds its all ow ab le 7 discret ion when it fails t o consider t he facts of record re levant to t he motion. Se e L op es v . 8 Go nz ale

s , 468 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2006). 9 Here, Melnit senko filed a ti mely m otion to re open to adjusther status based on a pending 10 vis a p eti tio n p ert ain ingto h er m arr iag e to a Unit ed St ate s ci tiz en . S he su

bm itt ed , a lon g w ithhe r 11 m oti on , e vid en ce o f t he bo na fi de s o f h er m arr iag e. Th ere ap pe ars to b e n o d isp ute that 12 Mel nit senko sat isf ied the fi rst fo ur Ve lar

de -Pac he co factors before the BIA. However, the 10 13 DH S o pp os ed

he r m oti on

to r eo pe n, rel yin g o n a

gro un d unre lat ed

to t he bo na fi de s— or l ack 14 thereof—of her marriage: herrefusal to answerany questions a t her removal heari ng. 11 15 Mel nit senko arg ue s th at the BI A a bu sed its dis cre tio n in

fi nd ingthat he r m oti on

to r eo pe n “ m

us t 16 be denied” base d only on the fact tha t the DHS objected and wit h no regard to t he merits of the 17 DH S’ s o bje cti on . F or t he rea so ns that f

oll ow , w e ag ree . 18 As an initia l matter, the quest ion of whether the majority i n Ve lar de -Pac he co int en de d 19 th e fi fth fa ct orto be di sp os it iv e r at he r t ha n adi sc re ti on ary c on si de ra ti onis subj ec t t o s ome13 1 dispute. Co mp ar e S arr v. Go nz ale

s , 485 F.3d 354, 363 (6th Cir. 2007) ( “Our reading of Velarde 2 leads us to c onclude thatalthough a motion ma y b e g ra nte d when certain fact ors are pr esent, the 3 Board’s ruli ng does not necess arily mean that such a motion mu st b e d en ied when any one of the 4 identified factor s is absent , especial ly when the only factormilitating agai nst a grantof the 5 m oti on

is the sim

ple fa ct that th e g ov ernm ent op po ses the m oti on . . . . Th e g ov ernm ent’s 6 op po sit ion

in t his cas e is , th ere fo re, no t co ntr oll ingon the qu est ion

of a re m an d to pe rm it S arr

to 7 see k re op en ingof

his cas e in

anef fo rt t o e sta

bli shthat hi s st atu s sh ou ld b e ad jus ted on the ba sis 8 of his valid marriage . . . , but i s instead s imply one factor to be consider ed.”), and 9 Ve lar

de -Pac he co , 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256 (“Every applicat ion necessar ily requi res examination of 10 the rele vant factors and a determination of the weight s uch factors should be accorded in t he 11 exercise of discretion, wit h respect bot h to reopening a nd to the ult imate determination on the 12 applicat ion for relie f.”), wi th id . at 268–69 (Pauley, Boar d Member, dissenting) ( “As I read the 13 [m ajo rity] op ini on . . . if the [D HS ] w ish es t o p res erv e th e st atu s q uo ante, it n eed

on ly a do pt a 14 policy of filing a one- sentence ‘ Opposition’ t o motions to reopen that pr eviously would have 15 be enbarre d und er Matter of Arthur

. . . in all cas es i n whic h th e [ DH S] ha d n ot y et c om ple ted its 16 investiga tion of the bona fides of the al ien’s marriage.”) , and id . at 26 4 (R os en be rg, Bo ard 17 Member, concurring) (“I do no t be lie ve that [ DH S] op po sit ion is an a pp rop riate ‘ co nd iti on ’ th at, 18 as a rule, s hould resultin denial of a motion to reopen. . . . [S]uch objecti ons should not 19 co ns tit

ute anins urm ounta

ble barri er t o g rantin g a

m oti on to r eo pe n. ”). Ne ve rth ele ss, it i s cl ear 20 that in

thi s ca se, the BI A a

pp lie d th e f

if th f act or a s d isp os iti ve , h old ingthat th e f act of the DH S’ s 21 objection was i n itself sufficient t o doom Melnitsenko’s motion to reopen. 22 Ho we ve r, t he BI A’ s d eci sio n in

the pre sent ca se p rov ide d n o e xp lan ati on , le t al on e aMo reo ve r, t he go ve rnm ent, i n d ef

en din g th e B IA ’s a cti on s in thi s ca se, als o f

ail ed to 12 provide any re asoning, otherthan a cit e to Ve lar de -Pac he co , f

or whythe fa ct o f t

he DH S’ s objection, i n and of itself, is sufficientto defeat a motion to reopen. 14 1 “rationa l” one, for why the fact of DHS’s objection j ustified denying t he motion to reopen. 2 Mag

hrad ze , 462 F.3d at 153. Instea d, the BIA relie d solely on Ve lar de -Pac he co , which, in turn, 3 pro vid es n o ratio na l explanatio n f or whythe fa ct o f t

he DH S’ s o pp os iti on

alo ne is s uf

fi cie nt t o 4 deny a motion to reopen. Significantly, t he BIA in Ve lar de -Pac he co wa s n ot e ve n c all ed on to 12 5 provide such an e xplanation be cause the government in that case had onl y objected on Matter of 6 Arthur

grounds; accor dingly, the BIA grant ed Velarde-Pac heco’s motion to reopen. 23 I . & N. 7 Dec. at 254–57. Indeed, t he only justi fication the BIA gave i n Ve lar de -Pac he co for imposing 8 su cha d isp os iti ve fa cto r is that th e D HS is “ in a be tte r po sit ion

to a sce rta in whe the r ad dit ion al 9 fa cto rs, wh ich

m ayno t be rea dil y a

pp are nt, m ili tat e ag ain st r eo pe nin g. ” Id . at 25 7. Whil e th is 10 statement supports a n argument that the BIA ought to be able to co ns ide r any objecti on by the 11 DH S, it d oe s n ot j us tif y th e im po sit ion of a m ech an ism

bywh ich the DH S, anadve rsaria l party 12 in the proce eding, may unilateral ly block a motion to reopen for any orno reason, with no 13 effective review by the BIA. Se e Sa rr , 4 85 F. 3d at 3 63 (“O bv iou sly , a ff

ord ingsu chim

po rtanc e 14 to [ the sim

ple fa ct that th e g ov ernm ent op po ses the m oti on ] w ou ld e ff ect ive ly r em ov e al l 15 authorit y over the gra nting or deni al of such motions by the Board and place it solel y within the 16 hand s o f o ne of

the adve rsaria l parti es t o th e p roc eed ing s. ”); seeals o Ve lar de -Pac he co , 23 I. & 17 N. Dec. at 269 (Pauley, Board Me mber, dissenting) (“ The majority decision, far from remedying 18 the pe rce ive d in

jus tic e o n whic h it

is p red icated , m ay. . . p rov e to be no thi ng m ore than a so urc e 19 of

us ele ss a dd iti on al p ap erw ork .” ); id . at 264 (Rosenberg, Boar d Member, concurring) ( “Our 20 rol e is to e ng ag e in im parti al and

ind ep en de nt a dju dic ati on s, no t to rub be rst am p th e p ref ere nc es15 1 of the [D HS ]. ”). Mo reo ve r, a llo wi ng the DH S t o d ef eat a m oti on to r eo pe n f

or n o re aso n at al l is 2 certai nly contrary to the purpose of the amendm ent identi fied by the BIA—that al iens who 3 entered i nto marriages after t he comm encement of rem oval proceedi ngs should be given “ one 4 opportunity” to presentclear and c onvincing evide nce of the bona fides of the marriage. Cf

. Li 5 Ch en Zh en g v . A sh cro ft , 3 32 F. 3d

11 86 , 1 19 6 (9 th C ir. 20 03 ) (“ To int erp ret the ter m 6 acquiescenc e as the BIA did, however, misconstrues and ignores the clearCongressional i ntent 7 qu ote d b y th e B IAm ere ly a parag rap h a

bo ve its res tri cti ve ho ldi ng .” ); Sil va -R engif o v . A tt’ y 8 Gen. , 4 73 F. 3d

58 , 6 9 (3 d C ir. 20 07 ) (q

uo tin g w ithap pro va l Li Chen Zheng). Accordingly, we 9 hold that t he BIA exceeded its allowable di screti on in treat ing the fifth Ve lar de -Pac he co factor 10 as disposit ive and in denyi ng Melnits enko’s motion to reopen base d solely on the fact that the 11 DHS opposed the motion. 12 In s o h old ing , w e d o n ot i nte nd to s ug ge st that th e B IAm ayno t co ns ide r objections made 13 bythe DH S. As the BI A n ote d, the DH S m ayind eed be “in a b ett er p os iti on ” th anthe BI A t o 14 ide nti fy

ad dit ion al f

act ors that “m ili tat e ag ain st r eo pe nin g. ” Ve lar de -Pac he co , 2 3 I. & N . D ec. at 15 257. However, the BIA must, in accordance with i ts duties in adjudica ting motions to reopen, 16 provide sufficient e xplanation for i ts decisi ons in order t o provide thi s Court a meaningful 17 opportunity t o review those de cisions. Se e P orad iso va v. Go nz ale

s , 4 20 F. 3d

70 , 7 7 (2 d C ir. 18 20 05 ) (“ De sp ite our ge ne ral ly d ef ere nti al r ev iew

of IJ and BI A o pin ion s, we req

uir e a c ert ain 19 m ini m

um lev el o f ana lys is f

rom the IJ and

BI A o pin ion s . . . , and

ind eed m us t re qu ire su chif 20 judicial review is t o be meaningful.”). 21 Thus, we now hold that when the DHS opposes a motion to reopen, t he BIA m ay not 22 de nythe m oti on

ba sed so lel y o n th e fac t of

the DH S’ s o bje cti on . M ore ov er, if the BI A d en ies a16 1 m oti on

to r eo pe n b ase d o n th e me rit s of the DH S’ s o bje cti on , th e B IAm us t pr ov ide ad eq

uate 2 reasoning as to why the object ion calls for denial of the motion to reopen i n the exerci se of 3 discret ion, in orderto provide a meaningful opportuni ty for judicia l review. Se e Ma gh ra dz e , 462 4 F. 3d

at 1 52 –5 3; Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77. 5 Ac co rdi ng ly, thi s ca se m us t be rem an de d to the BI A f or r eco ns ide rat ion

of Mel nit senko ’s 6 motion to reopen. Should the BIA decide on remand to deny the motion to reopen based on t he 7 m eri ts o f t

he DH S’ s o bje cti on , it

m us t pr ov ide ad eq

uate r eas on s f

or d oin g s o to pro vid e th is 8 Co urt

wi th a m ean ing fu l op po rtunit

y to rev iewany s uc h d en ial

. 9 CO NC LU SI ON 10 Fo r th e f

ore go ingrea so ns , th e p eti tio n f or r ev iewis G RA

NT ED in p art

an d D EN IE D i n 11 part. Th e D ece m

be r 29 , 2 00 6 d eci sio n o f t he BI A d enyin g M eln its enko ’s m oti on to r eo pe n is 12 VA CA TE D, an d th e ca se i s REM AN DE D t o th e B IAfo r pr oc eed ing s co ns ist ent w iththi s 13 op ini on . A s w e h av e co m ple ted our re vie w, the stay o f r em ov al p rev iou sly grante d in

thi s ca se i s 14 VA CA TE D, an d th e p en din g m oti on fo r st ayof

rem ov al i s D EN IE D a s m oo t.