Filed 4/18/24; Modified & Certified for Publication 5/6/24 (order attached)

(Unmodified opinion following transfer from Supreme Court)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re KIERAN S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B318672

 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00321A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AMBER C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Susan Ser, Judge. Affirmed.

Jonathan Grossman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Amber C., mother of then two-year-old Kieran S., appeals

from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition 

orders after the court sustained a petition by the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). In our 

prior opinion we affirmed the juvenile court’s findings and orders. 

The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back 

to us with directions to vacate our prior opinion and reconsider 

our decision in light of In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, which 

held, among other things, substance abuse is not prima facie 

evidence of a parent’s inability to provide regular care to a child 

of tender years (six years old or younger). Because under In re 

N.R. Amber’s substance abuse still put Kieran at a substantial 

risk of serious physical harm, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Department Investigates the Family, Amber 

Absconds with Kieran, and the Juvenile Court 

Sustains a Petition Under Section 300

Kieran’s parents are Amber and Victor S. (not a party to 

this appeal). In April 2019, when Kieran was two months old, 

the Department received a referral stating the parents used 
3

drugs in the child’s presence. Victor admitted he used marijuana; 

Amber tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and 

morphine. An investigation found Amber was living with Kieran 

in a home where other individuals were abusing drugs. Despite 

her positive test results, Amber denied using methamphetamine, 

insisted her positive test results were falsified, and claimed she 

did not use any drugs “while with [Kieran].” After failing to 

cooperate with welfare checks and evading the Department, 

Amber absconded with Kieran. The Department filed a petition 

alleging her substance abuse posed a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm to Kieran.

For nearly two years, Amber had no communication with 

the Department and could not be found. In October 2021 a 

detective from the Anderson Police Department found Amber and 

Kieran in Shasta County, and Amber admitted she had recently 

used methamphetamine and had a “problem with meth.” Though 

Amber’s home in Shasta County was clean and Kieran appeared

well, law enforcement found a methamphetamine pipe in an 

unattached room of the house, although at the time of the 

inspection the room “appeared to be secured from access from 

Kieran.” The detective reported that, because “there was a lot of 

traffic in and out of the home,” there was a suspicion it was a 

“drug home.” Amber admitted to the detective that she had been 

addicted to opiates for 10 years and that she used

methamphetamine recreationally. Victor confirmed Amber used

drugs. On December 1, 2021 the Department filed an amended 

petition in Los Angeles County (where Amber had returned and 

Kieran had been placed in foster care) that included allegations 

Amber exposed Kieran to risk of harm by absconding with him.
4

At the January 28, 2022 jurisdiction hearing on the 

amended petition the juvenile court sustained counts under 

section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Amber abused substances, 

failed to protect Kieran from Victor’s mental and emotional 

issues, and absconded with Kieran. At the February 17, 2022 

disposition hearing the juvenile court declared Kieran a 

dependent child of the court, removed him from his parents, 

ordered Amber to attend a drug treatment program, and ordered

reunification services. 

B. We Affirm the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction Findings 

and Disposition Orders 

Amber appealed from the jurisdiction findings and 

disposition orders.1 Amber argued that there was no evidence 

she was under the influence of drugs when Kieran was detained 

and that there was no evidence of neglect or risk of harm to 

Kieran in her care. We held substantial evidence supported the 

juvenile court’s finding Amber’s drug abuse created a substantial 

risk of physical harm to Kieran. We explained that, under In re 

Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, disapproved in In re N.R., 

supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 560, footnote 18, because Kieran was a 

child under the age of six, the juvenile court’s finding Amber was 

abusing substances created a rebuttable presumption of a 

substantial risk of physical harm to Kieran. We also concluded

Amber did not rebut this presumption. 

1 Amber challenged the disposition orders only to the extent 

substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction findings.
5

C. The Supreme Court Grants Review and Transfers the 

Cause

The Supreme Court granted Amber’s petition for review 

and transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our 

decision and reconsider Amber’s appeal in light of In re N.R., 

supra, 15 Cal.5th 520. In that case the Supreme Court held that 

a finding of substance abuse under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1)(D), requires neither “a diagnosis by a medical 

professional” nor “satisfaction of the prevailing criteria for a 

substance use disorder as specified within the Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” and that a parent’s

substance abuse, without more, is not “prima facie evidence of

. . . an inability to provide regular care for a child” or of a 

“substantial risk of serious physical harm when the child is of 

‘tender years . . . .’” (Id. at pp. 531, 554, 560-561.) The Supreme 

Court also held that, though the “tender years presumption” was 

“inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent,” the “age of a child 

may bear upon whether substance abuse renders a parent or 

guardian unable to provide that child with regular care, and 

whether the child is thereby placed at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm or illness.” (Id. at pp. 531-532.)

The parties filed supplemental briefs pursuant to 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b). In her supplemental 

brief, Amber contends her drug use was not excessive, an 

argument she had not previously made. She also argues her 

drug use and conduct in absconding with Kieran did not expose

Kieran to risk of physical harm. The Department contends that

Amber’s ongoing drug use compromised her ability to care for 

and protect Kieran and that the court should not allow Amber to 

capitalize on the fact she was a fugitive for two years by arguing
6

the Department submitted insufficient evidence of risk of harm 

to Kieran.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The purpose of section 300 “‘“is to provide maximum safety 

and protection for children who are currently being physically, 

sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being 

exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and 

emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.”’” 

(In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 537; see § 300.2, subd. (a).) 

“Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the 

defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing

[citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously 

abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary 

to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past 

events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s 

protection.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601-602.) 

Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), “allows a child to be 

adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court when ‘[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or 

inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise 

or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the 

child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the 

child from the conduct of a custodian with whom the child has 

been left.’ A jurisdiction finding under section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), requires the Department to prove three 

elements: (1) the parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or 
7

failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and 

(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)2 

“‘“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, 

we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, 

we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support 

the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the 

record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; 

and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of 

the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or 

exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” 

[Citations.] However, “[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous 

with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence 

must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable 

in nature, credible, and of solid value.”’” (In re S.F. (2023)

91 Cal.App.5th 696, 713.)

Finally, “[a]pplication of the doctrine of justiciability in the 

dependency context leads to the conclusion that ‘[w]hen a 

dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion 

that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a 

reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of 

2 The Legislature amended section 300, effective January 1, 

2023, in part by revising subdivision (b)(1) to specify in separate 

subparagraphs ways in which a child may come within the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court due to the failure or inability of 

the child’s parent to adequately supervise or care for the child. 
8

jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for 

jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by 

substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need 

not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory 

grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ 

[Citation.] This is true because no effective relief could be 

granted in such a situation, as jurisdiction would be established 

regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any

such additional jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329.) As the Supreme Court explained, 

“the principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, 

not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that “‘[a]s long as there 

is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that 

another might be inappropriate,’”” so that “where there are 

multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one finding 

may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” 

(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s 

Jurisdiction Findings Based on Amber’s Substance 

Abuse

1. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile 

Court’s Finding Amber Abused Drugs

Amber argues substantial evidence did not support the 

juvenile court’s finding she abused drugs. But it did. Amber’s 

2019 drug test result confirmed she used amphetamine, 
9

methamphetamine, and morphine.3 When law enforcement 

finally found Amber and Kieran after they had been missing for 

two years, Amber admitted that she had used methamphetamine 

within the previous two days and that she had a long-standing

substance abuse issue.4 A pipe for smoking methamphetamine

was discovered on the premises. And, as Amber admits, “[h]er 

absence in the two year gap” while she was a hiding from child 

protective agencies and avoiding law enforcement, “could give 

rise [to] an inference she used during that period.” 

Amber’s repeated denials of drug use, despite evidence to 

the contrary, further supported the juvenile court’s finding of 

drug abuse. Initially, she refused a drug test and denied using 

drugs, even though she tested positive for amphetamine, 

methamphetamine, and morphine. She also disputed the 

accuracy of her positive test result, claiming that it was falsified 

and that there was no proof she used drugs around Kieran. By 

October 2021, despite admitting she had recently used 

methamphetamine, Amber claimed she had been drug-free for 

five years. These denials and inconsistent statements were 

further evidence of drug abuse. (See In re K.B. (2021) 

59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601 [juvenile court could reasonably infer 

from the mother’s “dissembling about . . . drug use” she was

“trying to hide [an] ongoing drug addiction”]; In re A.F. (2016) 

3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to 

determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior 

3 Amber said she had a prescription for morphine. She 

promised to show it to the Department, but she never did. 

4 Amber also acknowledged she was arrested in 2017 for 

possessing a controlled substance for sale. 
10

in the future without court supervision.’”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a [drug] problem 

one fails to acknowledge”].)

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile 

Court’s Finding Amber’s Drug Abuse Created a 

Substantial Risk of Physical Harm

As discussed, in In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th 520 the 

Supreme Court held substance abuse, without more, is not prima 

facie evidence of a parent’s inability to provide regular care that 

results in a substantial risk of physical harm to a child of tender 

years. (Id. at pp. 556-558.) Instead, the Supreme Court held, “an 

inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm or illness must be established on the facts of each 

case, without relying on a categorical rule providing that a 

‘finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability 

of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a 

substantial risk of physical harm’ to a child of ‘“tender years.”’” 

(Id. at p. 559) 

Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding 

Amber’s drug use placed Kieran at substantial risk of physical 

harm. Amber tested positive for amphetamine, 

methamphetamine, and morphine when Kieran was only two 

months old and in need of constant care and supervision. (See 

In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [“a child’s youth and 

maturity level can bear upon the care that the child may require 

and whether a parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm”]; id. at 558 [“It is 

reasonable for courts to infer that very young children require a 

substantial degree of close supervision.”].) In addition, because 
11

at two and a half years old Kieran was probably walking, the 

presence of a methamphetamine pipe nearby (albeit in a room the 

police found was secure at the time) and in a house suspected of 

drug use posed a risk to his safety. Amber’s denial she used 

methamphetamine only increased the risk of harm to Kieran. 

(See In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 213 [parent’s refusal to 

acknowledge responsibility for the conduct giving rise to the 

dependency proceedings supports a finding the faces a current 

risk of harm]; In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 

[“[a] parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future 

behavior”].)

Amber argues “there was no evidence of the child suffering 

or at risk of suffering physical harm. There were no referrals for 

two years. There were no medical records of injuries or signs of 

neglect over time.” The juvenile court, however, properly 

considered the risks and implications of Amber’s conduct in 

absconding with her young child during those two years.

Absconding with a child not only frustrates the purpose of 

dependency proceedings, it increases the likelihood of harm to the 

child. (See In re E.M. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 467, 469 [mother, 

by absconding from the jurisdiction for two years, “undermined 

and frustrated the juvenile court’s ability to implement the 

dependency law procedures intended to protect and benefit the 

interests of her children”]; In re Kamelia S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 

1224, 1229 [parent’s “secluding the minor child undermines and 

frustrates the entire purpose of the dependency law” and makes

it “impossible for the court to extend its protection” to the child].)

By removing Kieran from the jurisdiction and oversight of the 

court, refusing to cooperate with the Department, and remaining 

a fugitive for two years, Amber placed her and her young son in a 
12

situation that limited their access to medical care and services 

they needed. (See In re Trebor UU (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) 

279 A.D.2d 735, 737 [mother’s “choice to take flight with her two 

children to a foreign country in an effort to evade legal process 

instead of attending to such matters and, if necessary, 

immediately seeking out governmental officials to arrange for the 

proper placement of her children in foster care, cannot be said to 

be ‘reasonable’ or proper parental supervision or guardianship”].)

Moreover, the absence of (known) referrals or medical 

records indicating harm or neglect during the two-year period 

Amber was on the run from child protective agencies and law 

enforcement was not evidence Kieran was not at risk of harm,

but a consequence of Amber’s decision to abscond, a decision that 

only increased the risk of harm to her child. (See In re J.M.

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 913, 923 [“[t]he reason . . . there was not 

more recent evidence” of risk of harm was that the mother 

“absconded with the children so the dependency proceedings 

could not continue”].) By fleeing with Kieran, Amber deprived 

the Department of the ability to complete its investigation 

whether Kiernan faced a risk of harm and whether it was 

necessary for the Department to intervene and provide the family 

services. (See id. at p. 923 [mother’s positive drug tests, 

admission of drug use, and decision to abscond with the child

“was an unrebutted basis to infer [m]other’s drug use was 

continuing, inhibiting her judgment, and interfering with her 

ability to care for and protect the [child]”].) Thus, while Amber 

asserts that the absence of harm during the two years she was 

hiding with Kieran in Shasta County (or somewhere) negated the 
13

risk to Kieran, the very act of absconding with him contributed to

the substantial risk of harm her conduct created.5

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition 

orders are affirmed. 

SEGAL, Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

FEUER, J.

MARTINEZ, J.

5 Because substantial evidence supported at least one of the 

juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings, that is enough. (In re 

Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 328-329; see In re A.F., 

supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 290 [“if one of the three jurisdictional 

bases relative to mother’s conduct is supported by substantial 

evidence, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding must be 

affirmed regardless of whether either of the other alleged 

grounds for jurisdiction is supported by the evidence”].)
Filed 5/6/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re KIERAN S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B318672

 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00321A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AMBER C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 ORDER MODIFYING AND 

 CERTIFYING OPINION FOR 

 PUBLICATION; NO CHANGE IN 

 APPELLATE JUDGMENT

THE COURT: 

The opinion filed on April 18, 2024 and not certified for 

publication is modified as follows:

On page 9, line 8, delete the comma between “avoiding law 

enforcement” and “could give rise” so that the sentence reads: 
2

And, as Amber admits, “[h]er absence in the two year 

gap” while she was a hiding from child protective 

agencies and avoiding law enforcement “could give rise 

[to] an inference she used during that period.” 

On page 11, line 8, in the parenthetical for In re E.E. (2020) 

49 Cal.App.5th 195, 213, add the word “child” between “the” and 

“faces” so that the parenthetical reads:

parent’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the 

conduct giving rise to the dependency proceedings supports 

a finding the child faces a current risk of harm

The opinion in this case filed April 18, 2024 was not 

certified for publication. Because the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c), respondent’s request for publication under 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), is granted.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c); and

ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the 

Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted 

and the opinion be published in the Official Reports.

SEGAL, Acting P. J. FEUER, J. MARTINEZ, J.