[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12644

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL RICHARDSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHERIFF DAVID DAVIS,

Individually and in his official capacity as 

Sheriff of Macon-Bibb County,

MACON-BIBB COUNTY,

A Government entity of the State of Georgia, 

MAYOR ROBERT REICHERT,

Mayor and Chairman of Macon Bibb County 

Board of Commissioners, 

DEPUTY DERRICK STOKES, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12644

DEPUTY LAWRENCE PRICHARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00320-MTT

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Richardson appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of several Defendants from the Bibb 

County Sheriff’s Office1 (collectively, “BCSO Defendants”).2 

Richardson argues that the district court erred by granting

summary judgment on the merits of his deliberate indifference

claims despite the BCSO Defendants only moving for summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity. Richardson also argues 

1 While the county is “Macon-Bibb County,” the sheriff’s office is simply 

referred to as the “Bibb County Sheriff’s Office.”

2 The “BCSO Defendants” include Macon-Bibb County Sheriff David Davis as 

well as Macon-Bibb County Deputy Sheriffs Derrick Stokes, Lawrence 

Prichard, Anthony Sims, Devin Keith, Robert Perry, Adam Butcher, Elson 

Odle, Richard McClendon, Gregory Mays, and Derick Vickery.

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22-12644 Opinion of the Court 3

that the BCSO Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment 

on the merits of his deliberate indifference claims. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

I . Background

A. Facts

The Bibb County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”) operates the 

Bibb County Law Enforcement Center (“LEC”), which serves as

the county jail and houses more than 900 individuals charged or 

convicted of misdemeanor or felony offenses. CorrectHealth Bibb 

(“CorrectHealth”) is a private corporation that is contracted to 

provide inmate healthcare services at the LEC. As such, BCSO 

employees do not treat inmates, operate the infirmary at the LEC, 

nor make medical decisions. However, BCSO employees do 

transport inmates to off-site medical appointments scheduled by 

CorrectHealth. BCSO employees can postpone these 

appointments when a staffing shortage prevents off-site 

transportation. If an off-site appointment needs to be cancelled, 

BSCO employees notify CorrectHealth, who reschedules the 

appointment.

On July 18, 2019, Richardson was arrested by the BCSO for 

making terroristic threats and was booked into the LEC, where he 

remained until March 10, 2020. A few weeks before he was 

arrested, Richardson injured his pinky finger in an altercation. He 

arrived to the LEC with this injury, and it was identified by a 

CorrectHealth nurse during Richardson’s initial medical screening. 

While the injury was identified during Richardson’s medical 

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screening, there is no evidence that he complained of ongoing pain 

from his injury at that time.

Richardson first complained about his finger on August 5, 

2019, when he informed CorrectHealth employees that his finger 

was “aching and throbbing [in] pain.” Two days later, an x-ray 

revealed “displaced chip fractures” in his finger. On August 13, 

Richardson’s CorrectHealth doctor referred Richardson to an 

orthopedic surgeon. On August 21, a CorrectHealth 

representative scheduled an appointment for Richardson to be 

evaluated on August 27 at OrthoGeorgia, an offsite orthopedic 

provider. However, Richardson was not seen at OrthoGeorgia

until September 9. This delay in his appointment is the basis of this 

appeal.

On September 23 OrthoGeorgia scheduled Richardson for 

surgery. On October 21, Richardson underwent surgery on his left 

pinkie finger; he returned to the LEC with a cast on his arm and no 

complaints of pain.

B. Procedural History

Richardson initiated suit on August 14, 2020. On October 7, 

2020, Richardson amended his complaint and alleged various 

violations of his constitutional and civil rights, as well as tort claims 

under Georgia law against numerous entities and individuals, 

including the BCSO Defendants.3 As relevant to this appeal, 

3 Richardson also alleged various claims against Macon-Bibb County and 

Robert Reichert, the Mayor and Chairman of the Macon-Bibb County Board 

of Commissioners. Macon-Bibb County and Mayor Reichert filed a motion 

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Richardson claimed that the BCSO Defendants violated the 

Fourteenth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs.4 He sought damages against the BCSO 

Defendants in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On February 4, 2022, the BCSO Defendants moved for 

summary judgment. As for Richardson’s deliberate indifference 

claims, the BCSO Defendants moved for summary judgment on 

the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that Richardson failed to 

present evidence that satisfied the first prong of the qualified 

immunity analysis—whether there was a constitutional violation. 

On July 7, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for 

the BCSO Defendants on all claims. As for the deliberate 

indifference claims, the district court declined to grant summary 

judgment on the BCSO Defendants’ requested grounds of qualified 

immunity, instead granting summary judgment in favor of the 

BCSO Defendants on the merits of Richardson’s underlying 

constitutional claims. Richardson timely appealed.

for summary judgment, arguing that they were not the proper parties and 

would otherwise be entitled to immunity. Richardson did not challenge this 

motion and “concede[d] his claims against [these] Defendants.” The claims 

against Macon-Bibb County and Mayor Reichert are not part of this appeal. 

4 As a pretrial detainee, deliberate indifference claims are brought under the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth 

Amendment. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 985–86 (11th Cir. 2003). 

However, such claims are analyzed under the same standard. Marsh v. Butler 

Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001).

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II. Discussion

We review de novo an appeal of a district court’s grant of 

summary judgment. Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 

1310 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We must view all evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party and draw “all justifiable 

inferences” in that party’s favor, but “inferences based upon 

speculation are not reasonable.” Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 

1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). 

Richardson presents two primary arguments on appeal. 

First, he argues that the district court procedurally erred when it 

sua sponte granted summary judgment for the BCSO Defendants 

on the merits of their § 1983 deliberate indifference claims. 

Richardson also argues that he presented sufficient evidence of a 

Fourteenth Amendment violation to survive summary judgment. 

We address each argument in turn.

A. Procedural Argument

Richardson first argues that it was error for the district court 

to grant summary judgment for the BCSO Defendants on the 

merits of his deliberate indifference claims, as the BCSO 

Defendants only moved for summary judgment on qualified 

immunity grounds. We disagree.

“A district court possesses the power to enter summary 

judgment sua sponte provided the losing party ‘was on notice that 

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she had to come forward with all of her evidence.’” Burton v. City 

of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1203 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)). Importantly, however, 

formal notice is not required as long as “a legal issue has been fully 

developed, and the evidentiary record is complete.” Artistic Ent., 

Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 331 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2003).

In Burton, a voting rights case, we considered whether it was 

error for the district court to sua sponte grant summary judgment 

on a plaintiff’s § 1983 constitutional claims even though the 

defendant only moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s 

Title VI claims. 178 F.3d at 1186. While we acknowledged that the 

claims were technically different, we noted that, because both 

claims required the plaintiffs to establish the requisite 

discriminatory intent to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs 

had “more than the reasonable opportunity to marshal the same 

evidence of intent [that they did for their § 1983 claims] in support 

of their Title VI claim as well.” Id. at 1204.

Here, the district court did not err in sua sponte granting 

summary judgment in favor of the BCSO Defendants. While the 

BCSO Defendants only moved for summary judgment on the 

grounds of qualified immunity, their argument focused entirely on 

the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis5—whether or not 

5 A plaintiff can demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply by 

showing (1) that a defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) that the 

constitutional “right at issue was clearly established at the time” of the alleged 

violation. Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2018).

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a constitutional violation occurred. In other words, the BCSO 

Defendants argued that they had not been deliberately indifferent 

to Richardson’s serious medical needs. And while the first prong 

of the qualified immunity analysis is technically different than the 

underlying merits determination, it requires the same thing—for 

the plaintiff to prove that a constitutional violation occurred. 

Thus, like in Burton, because Richardson was “on notice” that he

had to come forward with all of his evidence to combat the 

constitutional prong of the qualified immunity argument—which, 

again, is the very same evidence required to prove the merits of his 

deliberate indifference claims—the district court did not err in sua 

sponte granting summary judgment for the BCSO Defendants. 178 

F.3d at 1186, 1204. 

B. Substantive Argument

Richardson also argues that it was error for the district court 

to grant summary judgment on the merits of his deliberate 

indifference claims. We disagree.

A detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right against cruel and 

unusual punishment includes the right to be free from “deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs” by jail officials. Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “To show that a prison official 

acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a 

plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” 

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the 

objective inquiry, a detainee must show an “objectively serious 

medical need” that “poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” 

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Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations 

omitted and alterations adopted). And, under the subjective 

inquiry, a detainee can only survive summary judgment if he 

produces evidence of, among other things, “(1) subjective 

knowledge of a risk of serious harm” and “(2) disregard of that 

risk.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).

Here, Richardson argues that the BCSO Defendants were 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he argues that the BCSO 

defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs when they allegedly ignored the injury to his pinky finger 

and then delayed providing him with transportation to his original 

OrthoGeorgia appointment, thereby causing his medical treatment 

to be delayed even further.

Even assuming that Richardson has satisfied the objective 

prong and established that the injury to his pinkie finger was an 

“objectively serious medical need” that “pose[d] a substantial risk 

of serious harm” to him, Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258, he has not 

presented the requisite evidence to avoid summary judgment on 

the subjective prong. First, Richardson presents no evidence that 

the BCSO Defendants were subjectively aware of his serious 

medical needs. While Richardson points to the medical records 

which documented the pain he incurred during his medical 

appointments, the existence of these records is not evidence that 

the BCSO Defendants, the individuals subjected to his § 1983 suit, 

had any personal knowledge of Richardson’s injury, as the BCSO 

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Defendants were not the same individuals who diagnosed, 

evaluated, and eventually treated his injury. In fact, Richardson 

does not argue and does not present any evidence that any of the 

BCSO Defendants had knowledge of his finger injury, as the 

subjective prong requires. 

Further, Richardson also presents no evidence that the 

BCSO Defendants even engaged in the conduct he is now accusing 

them of—cancelling Richardson’s August 27 OrthoGeorgia

appointment. While two BCSO representatives testified that the 

BCSO would have the ability to reschedule an inmate’s medical 

appointment in the instance of a staffing shortage or safety issue, 

Richardson presents no evidence that the BCSO Defendants did so 

in this case. Instead, he simply points to the medical records 

indicating that “CorrectHealth scheduled an appointment for 

Richardson with OrthoGeorgia for August 27, 2019” before noting 

that “Richardson’s appointment was then rescheduled for 

September 9, 2019.” In order to complete his argument, it would 

be logical for Richardson to bring forward some evidence that the 

BCSO Defendants rescheduled his August 27 appointment for 

September 9. Richardson does not do so, and instead chooses to 

simply point to the fact that the appointment was rescheduled. We 

note that while we must draw justifiable inferences in Richardson’s 

favor at this stage, we need not draw unreasonable inferences based 

on pure speculation. Kernel Recs. Oy, 694 F.3d at 1301.

To the extent that Richardson is alleging that the district 

court mischaracterized certain pieces of evidence, his arguments 

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are unsupported by the record evidence. First, Richardson takes 

issue with the district court’s finding that he “raised no complaints 

[during initial medical screening at the LEC] about his finger.” But 

the medical records showed that while Richardson identified his 

finger injury during his LEC intake screening, he did not complain 

about any ongoing pain until his August 5 appointment. Next, 

Richardson asserts that, “[w]hile the underlying reasons may [be] 

unclear, it was evident that Richardson missed his appointment 

because Defendants failed to transport him there.” As explained 

above, this is pure speculation. Richardson does not point to any 

evidence that backs up this naked assertion. Finally, Richardson 

asserts that the district court was incorrect in asserting that the 

delay in medical treatment was only thirteen days. It appears that 

Richardson is basing this assertion on his initial intake screening, 

which occurred on July 18, 2019. Again, however, there is no 

evidence that Richardson complained about any pain in his finger 

during this screening. Once Richardson did alert CorrectHealth 

officials to his ongoing pain, he was able to schedule a consultation 

for August 27 at OrthoGeorgia, which was then delayed to 

September 9, thirteen days later.

Ultimately, Richardson’s entire deliberate indifference claim 

is based on the naked assertion that: “by failing to ensure that 

Richardson got the medical attention that he needed . . . , 

Defendants should be liable for their deliberate indifference to Mr. 

Richardson’s medi[c]al needs.” Unfortunately for Richardson, 

without any evidence that the BCSO Defendants (1) had subjective 

knowledge of his serious medical need, and (2) actually engaged in 

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conduct that disregarded his serious medical need, his deliberate 

indifference claims cannot survive summary judgment.6

III. Conclusion

Because the BCSO Defendants moved for summary 

judgment and presented arguments on the constitutional prong of 

the qualified immunity analysis, and because that prong requires 

Richardson to present the same evidence as he would be required 

to present to avoid summary judgment on the merits, the district 

court did not err in sua sponte granting summary judgment on the 

merits of Richardson’s deliberate indifference claims. And because 

Richardson does not present the requisite evidence necessary to 

avoid summary judgment on the merits of his deliberate 

indifference claims, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment.

AFFIRMED.

6 Richardson also spends part of his initial brief appearing to argue that Sheriff 

Davis, one of the BCSO Defendants, had supervisory liability over the alleged 

constitutional violations of other BCSO employees due to his “failure to 

supervise, and his failure to train with regard to[] Richardson’s claim for 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” We need not evaluate 

this claim, as Richardson is unable to present any evidence to avoid summary 

judgment on the merits of his underlying Fourteenth Amendment claim. See 

Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1264 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We need not 

address the Appellant’s claims of . . . supervisory liability since we conclude no 

constitutional violation occurred.)

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