COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Willis 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ANTHONY CORDELL PRICE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1345-96-3 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JUNE 3, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

James F. Ingram, Judge 

 Phyllis Marie Mosby, Assistant Public 

Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Monica S. McElyea, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Anthony Cordell Price was convicted on three charges of 

distributing cocaine. On appeal, he contends that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictments on 

the ground that he was denied a speedy trial.1 For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 I. 

 On June 19, 1991, Price was indicted on three charges of 

distributing cocaine. Because he was a fugitive, the cases were 

removed from the trial docket. They were reinstated on September 

26, 1995. 

 

 1Price also contends that the Commonwealth failed to abide by 

Code § 53.1-212, which provides for cooperation in the enforcement 

of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Because this issue was 

not raised before the trial court, we will not consider it for the 

first time on appeal. Rule 5A:18. 
- 2 - 

 On May 23, 1995, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers (IAD), the Commonwealth lodged a detainer against 

Price, who was incarcerated in Nevada. On June 26, 1995, the 

Commonwealth received notification and forms from Price 

requesting speedy disposition of the pending charges, pursuant to 

Code § 53.1-210, Article III. 

 On July 14, 1995, the Commonwealth notified Nevada 

authorities that it wished to assume temporary custody of Price 

on October 2, 1995. Price was subsequently transported from 

Nevada to Virginia. On October 4, 1995, he was arraigned and the 

public defender was appointed to represent him. 

 On October 26, 1995, the trial court conducted an informal 

pre-docket call meeting to set cases involving the public 

defender's office for trial at the November term. Lawrence Gott, 

Danville Public Defender, stated that he did not want to try 

Price's case until the following term. Under a local Danville 

rule, an attorney is entitled to a continuance to the next term 

of court if he or she has not had the case for thirty days. The 

Commonwealth's attorney reminded Mr. Gott that Price's case had 

to be tried within 180 days under the IAD. 

 On October 31, 1995, the trial court conducted a formal 

docket call. When Price's case was called, Mr. Gott requested 

that it be passed to the January term of court. The trial court 

continued the case to the January term by order entered October 

31, 1995, which Mr. Gott endorsed as seen. 
- 3 - 

 On January 18, 1996, Price moved to dismiss the indictments 

on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to provide him a 

speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion. 

 II. 

 Price contends that he was denied his right to a speedy 

trial in violation of the IAD and the Virginia and federal 

constitutions. Specifically, he argues that the October 31 

continuance did not toll the 180 day speedy trial period required 

by the IAD because it failed to conform to the IAD requirements 

for a continuance. 

 Codified at Code §§ 53.1-210 to -215, the IAD is a 

congressionally sanctioned compact providing for the speedy 

disposition of criminal charges pending against a person who is 

incarcerated in another jurisdiction. To that end, Article 

III(a) provides in pertinent part that: 

 [A prisoner] shall be brought to trial within 

180 days after he shall have caused to be 

delivered to the prosecuting officer and the 

appropriate court of the prosecuting 

officer's jurisdiction written notice of the 

place of his imprisonment and his request for 

a final disposition to be made of the 

indictment, information or complaint . . . . 

Code § 53.1-210, Art. III(a). 

 The detainer based upon Price's indictments was lodged in 

Nevada on May 23, 1995. Price's June 26, 1995 request for speedy 

disposition of the indictments commenced the running of the 180 

day period set forth in Article III(a). Thus, Price should have 

been brought to trial by December 26, 1995. 
- 4 - 

 Generally, the grant or denial of a continuance lies within 

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed 

on appeal absent an abuse of discretion and demonstrated 

prejudice to the complainant. Lowery v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 

304, 307, 387 S.E.2d 508, 509 (1990). However, the granting of a 

continuance must comply with Code § 53.1-210, Article III(a) in 

order to toll the speedy trial provision of the IAD. 

 Article III(a) requires for a continuance that: (1) the 

trial court must have competent jurisdiction, (2) the continuance 

must be granted in open court, (3) the defendant or his attorney 

must be present, (4) the movant must show good cause, and (5) the 

length of the continuance must be reasonable or necessary.2

 Code 

§ 53.1-210, Art. III(a). See Delgado v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. 

App. 50, 59, 428 S.E.2d 27, 32 (1993). 

 The trial court had jurisdiction over the case. It granted 

the continuance in open court, in the presence of Price's 

attorney, and on his motion. The order granting the continuance 

was endorsed by Price's attorney and stated that it was based 

upon good cause shown. The record supports this assertion. The 

continuance was brief. Under these circumstances, we find that 

the continuance was necessary to provide Price adequate time to 

prepare for trial. Price makes no argument contesting the trial 

 

 2Code § 53.1-210, Article III(a) states that: "for good cause 

shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, 

the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 

necessary or reasonable continuance." 
- 5 - 

court's adherence to the procedures for granting a continuance, 

and we find no error in the trial court's granting of the 

continuance. Thus, the 180 day period was tolled until the 

commencement of trial on January 23, 1996. See Delgado, 16 Va. 

App. at 59, 428 S.E.2d at 32. Cf. Code § 19.2-243(4). 

 III. 

 Price also contends that he was denied his right to a speedy 

trial guaranteed by Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia 

Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the 

Supreme Court set forth factors to be utilized in determining 

whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, 

including: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the 

delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) 

whether prejudice to the defendant resulted. See Holliday v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 612, 352 S.E.2d 362 (1987). In 

examining the first factor: 

 [I]f the delay in bringing a defendant to 

trial is not sufficient to raise at least an 

inference of injustice, further exploration 

is unnecessary . . . . [Thus, a] defendant 

must be able to at least raise the 

presumption that, in his particular case and 

in his particular circumstances, the delay 

involved was so detrimental as to have 

endangered his right to a fair trial. 

Beachem v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 124, 131, 390 S.E.2d 517, 

519 (1990). The trial was conducted less than one month after 

the expiration of the 180 day period. The delay resulted from 
- 6 - 

defense counsel's request for a continuance. Nothing in the 

record suggests that the delay prejudiced Price's right to a fair 

trial. Thus, even assuming that the delay was of sufficient 

magnitude to require further analysis, the factors identified in 

Barker preponderate clearly in favor of the Commonwealth and do 

not establish a constitutional violation. We find no denial of 

Price's constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial.3

 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.

 

 3Price contends that the Commonwealth's decision to accept 

custody of Price in October, 1995, amounted to a de facto delay of 

three months attributable to the prosecution. This argument was 

not presented to the trial court and we will not address it for 

the first time on appeal. Rule 5A:18.