In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JOSEPH D. JONES and EDWARD SCHIMENTI,

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cr-236 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 1, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 18, 2023 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Joseph Jones and 

Edward Schimenti of providing material support to the terrorist organization ISIS. In returning guilty verdicts, the jury 

rejected an entrapment defense advanced by Jones. The district court, in denying a post-trial motion for acquittal, likewise rejected his contention that the evidence showed that the 

government overstepped and induced his commission of the 
2 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

offense. Because the district court properly instructed the jury 

on the elements of entrapment, we owe the jury’s ultimate determination meaningful deference and in the end agree with 

the district court’s denial of Jones’s motion for acquittal. 

We likewise agree with the district court’s denial of Jones 

and Schimenti’s motion for a new trial based on a revelation 

that emerged after trial regarding a substantial payment the 

government made to a confidential source shortly after the 

jury convicted both defendants. What happened raises many 

questions, but, like the district court, we cannot conclude an 

earlier disclosure of a planned or contemplated post-trial payment would have resulted in the jury acquitting Jones or 

Schimenti. All of this leads us to affirm. 

I

A 

The trial evidence supplies the operative facts, which we 

set forth (as we must) in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262, 267 (7th Cir. 

2023). 

Joseph Jones and Ed Schimenti are childhood friends who 

lived near Chicago. Both men are practicing Muslims and 

members of the same mosque. In early 2015 the FBI began surveilling Jones and Schimenti based on their pro-ISIS social 

media posts that praised the organization, threatened nonbelievers of Islam, and glorified violent recruitment videos. 

Jones interacted on Google Plus with videos depicting violent 

beheadings and fatal stabbings. On his personal page, he 

wrote the “Islamic State wants a world ruled by the law of 

Allah. ... Jihad for the kufar [non-believers] with blind corrupt hearts.” Schimenti, too, posted on Google Plus to convey 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 3

his desire for Islamic rule, writing, “May Allah reward this 

fierce mujahideen [jihad fighter] who uses his life, body, and 

earthly might to make Allah’s law govern all. May Allah reward him for striking fear in the hearts of the taghut [nonbelievers].”

After several months of physical and online surveillance, 

the FBI found no evidence of criminal activity but remained 

concerned about the pro-ISIS content in Jones’s and 

Schimenti’s ongoing posts. So in September 2015, the Bureau 

launched a full-scale investigation using undercover agents 

and a confidential human source.

The FBI began by initiating contact between Jones and an 

undercover agent going by the name “Omar.” The contact 

arose in staged circumstances. The Bureau instructed local 

law enforcement to bring Jones to a police station under the 

guise of asking him questions about the recent death of his 

friend. Omar then initiated conversation with Jones in the station’s waiting room by expressing his frustration at being profiled because he was a Black Muslim, an identity Jones shared. 

The FBI instructed Omar neither to discuss ISIS nor to ask for 

Jones’s contact information, but only to open the door to a 

conversation to “identify [Jones’s] true intent and understand 

what [he] truly want[s] to do.” After discussing their shared 

identity, Jones asked Omar for his phone number and the two 

began a friendship.

B 

Jones pursued a relationship with Omar and then with 

other undercover agents that unfolded over the next 18 

months. Although the government kept in contact with Jones 

over that period using its multiple agents, it was Jones—and 
4 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

not the agents—who drove the relationship forward. Following the meeting at the police station in September 2015, Jones 

and Omar continued to communicate by text message. Their 

early conversations began with general discussions about Islam.

At Jones’s initiation, the communications eventually 

turned to radical Islam. He shared ISIS propaganda videos 

with Omar, to which Omar responded by thanking him and 

asking if he had more. After establishing their mutual support 

for ISIS—and repeatedly referring to Omar as his “brother”—

Jones continued sending videos, including the violent ISIS recruitment video “Flames of War,” which he had previously 

watched with Ed Schimenti in 2014. Seeing an opportunity to 

get more information about Jones’s intent to commit a material support offense, Omar asked Jones whether he ever 

thought about traveling to Syria. Jones texted back: “Every 

night and day.”

As their relationship progressed, Jones asked Omar 

whether he knew other “brothers” that he could “learn and 

build with”—a request to meet other ISIS supporters. Omar 

responded by introducing Jones to “Bilal,” another undercover FBI agent posing as an ISIS travel facilitator. Omar indicated that Bilal could help people travel to Syria, something 

Omar said he planned to do. Bilal told Jones that he could help 

fund Jones’s trip to Syria to support ISIS, but Jones never took 

him up on that offer.

Jones continued his friendships with the undercover 

agents, and on October 30, 2015, Omar and Bilal met Jones in 

person at a restaurant in Waukegan. Jones invited his close 

friend Schimenti to join them, and the four shared a meal.
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 5

Communications continued and two months later Omar, 

Bilal, Jones, and Schimenti met again in a hotel room in 

Gurnee, near Chicago. During that meeting Bilal showed 

Jones and Schimenti a video of Omar completing firearms 

training in a desert. Bilal then offered to help Jones and 

Schimenti perform a violent act, ostensibly on behalf of ISIS, 

telling them: “If you want to rock out right now, we gonna 

rock out right now.” Neither of them accepted the offer, but 

Jones expressed his interest in the training video and recognized that Omar was actively preparing to become an ISIS 

fighter.

At that same December 2015 hotel meeting, Bilal put a 

question to Jones and Schimenti: “When we say who you 

with, you guys are on the same page right?” The two responded “alhumdulillah,” meaning “all praises to Allah”—

an enthusiastically strong “yes” indicating their support of 

ISIS’s mission. But the meeting soured when Bilal followed 

up by asking Jones and Schimenti whether they had pledged 

“bay’ah,” or allegiance to ISIS. Schimenti was upset by the 

question and left the room without responding, prompting 

Jones to explain that Schimenti worried that Bilal and Omar 

were federal agents. For his part, Jones did not answer Omar’s 

question about swearing loyalty to ISIS, but more generally 

told Omar and Bilal that he wanted to keep in touch.

While Schimenti discontinued his relationship with Omar 

and Bilal following this meeting at the hotel, Jones kept his 

word and stayed in touch. Indeed, Jones continued to initiate 

communications and exchange pro-ISIS messages with both 

Omar and Bilal. In February 2016 Omar told Jones that he 

planned with Bilal’s help to travel to Syria, to which Jones responded, “Brother, I wish I was going with you.” Omar asked 
6 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

Jones whether he wanted an ISIS flag to show his support. 

Jones readily accepted the flag and displayed it within his 

home while also sharing photos of himself with the flag on 

social media. After Omar departed, Jones contacted Bilal to 

ask for updates and pictures of Omar in Syria. He thanked 

Bilal for his help, writing, “May Allah reward you also.”

During this time Jones additionally continued to seek and 

build ISIS connections on his own, independent of Omar and 

Bilal. In August 2016 Jones met a person on a pro-ISIS website 

also using the name “Omar.” Unbeknownst to Jones, this second Omar, who we will call Omar 2, was an undercover FBI 

agent. During their online chat, Jones told Omar 2 that there 

was a “ferry getting brothers to the land of truth near us” and 

that “[s]ome brothers made hijra in May,” referring to Bilal’s 

facilitation of Omar’s travel. In response to Omar 2’s interest 

in traveling to Syria, Jones then took the step of introducing 

him to Bilal. When Bilal asked Jones for more information 

about Omar 2, Jones assured Bilal that Omar 2 was a “trustworthy brother” who “understands the religion the way we 

do.” Jones eventually organized an in-person meeting in 

Gurnee between himself, Bilal, and Omar 2, after which Omar 

2 purportedly traveled to Syria with Bilal’s help.

In the ensuing months Jones and Schimenti continued to 

publicly and privately express pro-ISIS sentiments, including 

to peers at their mosque, that concerned the FBI. Given 

Schimenti’s distrust of Bilal and Omar, the FBI devised a plan 

to introduce yet another player into the mix to reestablish contact with Schimenti through a new, more trusted source. The 

Bureau did so by introducing a confidential informant named 

“Muhamed” to Schimenti. In November 2016 Muhamed, a 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 7

native of Iraq, started working at the same company as 

Schimenti, and he and Schimenti soon became friends.

A few weeks into their friendship, Muhamed told 

Schimenti that he had a brother who lived in Syria and fought 

for ISIS. To assess Schimenti’s own interest in providing material support, Muhamed expressed his desire to one day join 

his brother in the ISIS army. Schimenti responded positively 

and offered to help Muhamed, and the two began lifting 

weights together at Schimenti’s gym to prepare Muhamed for 

battle in ISIS ranks. Muhamed also told Schimenti that he 

could provide help by giving him cell phones, explaining that 

ISIS used cell phones to create improvised explosive devices, 

or IEDs, as weapons and, in some instances, as defense mechanisms to avoid drone strikes.

Early the next year, in February 2017, Schimenti introduced Muhamed to Jones. Schimenti described Jones as a 

“trusted brother” who had “helped two other brothers travel 

overseas,” referring to Jones’s connection with Bilal, the FBI 

agent posing as a travel facilitator, and Jones’s role in sending 

Omar and Omar 2 to Syria. Muhamed responded to the introduction by reiterating not only his desire to travel to Syria, but 

also his need for cell phones, again offering an opportunity to 

provide material support to ISIS based on the demonstrated 

interest displayed by Jones and Schimenti.

Jones and Schimenti readily accepted that offer. In March 

2017 Jones gave Muhamed three phones, and Schimenti gave 

him six. Jones later testified before the grand jury that at the 

time he gave the cell phones to Muhamed, he did so of his 

own “free will” with the “hope it kills many of them” or 

“eight people.” When Muhamed offered to reimburse the cost 

of the phones, Jones declined, stating he was excited enough 
8 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

to receive the “ajr,” or heavenly reward in Islam, for his acts. 

As part of his support for Muhamed’s travel, Jones introduced him to Bilal, like he had previously done with Omar 2, 

and the three worked together to coordinate his departure. 

A month later, in April 2017, Jones, Schimenti, and Muhamed met one last time. After sharing a meal, Jones and 

Schimenti drove Muhamed to O’Hare airport, where they believed he would be traveling to Syria with the nine cell phones 

they had given him to use as makeshift bombs in his role as 

an ISIS fighter. Before saying goodbye, Schimenti asked Muhamed to send a video of him killing someone when he arrived in Syria. 

The FBI arrested Jones and Schimenti five days later.

C 

A federal indictment followed, focusing on the provision 

of cell phones for use as IEDs by ISIS fighters and charging 

Jones and Schimenti with providing material support to a terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The 

indictment also charged Schimenti with making materially 

false statements to the FBI during his post-arrest interview in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 

Jones and Schimenti moved before trial to introduce an entrapment defense against the terrorism charges, and the district court allowed the defense to proceed to the jury. At trial, 

then, it became the government’s burden to show beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the elements of the defense were not 

met. See United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 439 (7th Cir. 

2014) (en banc) (explaining that once the defense of entrapment is at issue, “established entrapment doctrine places the 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 9

burden squarely on the government to disprove the defense 

beyond a reasonable doubt”).

Trial began in May 2019 and continued for almost three 

weeks. The jury heard testimony from 15 witnesses, including 

terrorism experts, the undercover agent Bilal, the confidential 

human source Muhamed, FBI Agent Cassandra Carnright 

(who coordinated Muhamed’s role), a member of Jones and 

Schimenti’s mosque, and both their family and friends. Jones 

also testified in his own defense to explain why he believed 

the government had entrapped him. The jury received more 

than 100 exhibits, which were primarily recorded conversations and text messages between the defendants and the government’s confidential informant, Muhamed, and the undercover agents Omar and Bilal.

The judge instructed the jury on the elements of the 

charges and the entrapment defense. Two days later the jury 

returned a guilty verdict on all counts.

D 

A few pieces of evidence came to light after trial regarding 

the FBI’s payments to Muhamed, the confidential human 

source who befriended Schimenti and who Schimenti later introduced to Jones. At trial Muhamed had testified to receiving 

some reimbursements for living expenses. And he stated that 

he did not expect to receive any additional compensation for 

his work. But the government later disclosed that the FBI, 

within approximately one month of the trial concluding, paid 

Muhamed an extra $50,000—effectively a bonus—for his role 

in the case. Jones and Schimenti reacted with alarm and suspicion to learning this information in the immediate wake of 

trial. The district court reacted with similar surprise, 
10 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

promptly ordering discovery and an evidentiary hearing to 

get to the bottom of what led to this post-trial payment.

The case agent, Cassandra Carnright, filed an affidavit and 

testified at the hearing, with Jones and Schimenti cross-examining her. The FBI later supplied additional records showing 

the breakdown of its living-expense payments to Muhamed 

that revealed some discrepancies with the government’s previous disclosures about the payments.

Jones and Schimenti invoked Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 29 and sought a judgment of acquittal on the basis 

that they were entrapped as a matter of law. In the alternative, 

they moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 33 based on the newly discovered evidence related 

to the FBI’s payments to Muhamed. They also argued that a 

new trial was warranted because the district court limited the 

cross examination of certain FBI witnesses.

The district court denied the motions and affirmed the 

convictions of both defendants. Sentencing then followed, 

with Jones receiving 144 months’ imprisonment and 

Schimenti 162 months.

II

Jones challenges the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 

motion for acquittal of his material support conviction under 

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). He contends that the government fell 

short of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not entrap him. Schimenti does not challenge his conviction on this 

ground.
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 11

A 

“Entrapment is a defense to criminal liability when the defendant was not predisposed to commit the charged crime before the intervention of the government’s agents and the government’s conduct induced him to commit it.” Mayfield, 771 

F.3d at 420. These two elements of the entrapment defense—

predisposition and inducement—are “conceptually related 

but formally and temporally distinct.” Id. To meet its burden 

of proving that the defendant was not entrapped, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt “either that 

the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime or that 

there was no government inducement.” Id. at 440 (emphasis 

in original).

Inducement occurs when a government agent’s conduct 

“creates a risk that a person who otherwise would not commit 

the crime if left alone will do so in response to the government’s persuasion.” Id. at 434. This element entails more than 

the government’s mere solicitation, suggestion, or offer of an 

“ordinary” opportunity to commit the crime. Id. Rather, “inducement means government solicitation of the crime plus 

some other government conduct.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Such “plus” factors include “repeated attempts at persuasion, 

fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward beyond that inherent in the customary execution of the crime, [and] pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship.” Id. at 435. The presence or absence of any 

one factor is not conclusive. The proper inquiry requires consideration of all facts and circumstances, with the ultimate 

question being whether an “otherwise law-abiding person 

would take the bait.” Id. at 434. 
12 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

Predisposition “refers to the likelihood that the defendant 

would have committed the crime without the government’s 

intervention, or actively wanted to but hadn’t yet found the 

means.” Id. at 436. This element stems directly from the principles animating the entrapment doctrine: “A legitimate sting 

takes an actual criminal off the streets” rather than “deflect[ing] law enforcement into the sterile channel of causing 

criminal activity and then prosecuting the same activity.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

By its very nature the predisposition inquiry “is chiefly 

probabilistic, not psychological.” Id. at 428. Several factors inform a defendant’s likelihood of committing the charged offense:

• the defendant’s character or reputation;

• whether the government initially suggested the criminal activity;

• whether the defendant engaged in the criminal activity 

for profit;

• the nature of the inducement or persuasion by the government; and

• whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the offense that was overcome by government persuasion.

United States v. Anderson, 55 F.4th 545, 552 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 435). A defendant’s reluctance to 

commit the offense is the most important consideration. See 

Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 437. Notice the relationship of this factor 

to the element of inducement: “Reluctance can prompt further 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 13

efforts at government persuasion that can rise to the level of 

inducement.” Anderson, 55 F.4th at 553. 

Predisposition also has a temporal dimension. “The defendant’s predisposition is measured at the time the government first proposed the crime.” Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 438. But 

that limitation does not mean that evidence arising after a defendant meets a government agent cannot be considered. 

“Other evidence of the defendant’s conduct after the initial 

contact by the government’s agents,” we have explained, 

“may be relevant to the determination of predisposition,” 

particularly because law enforcement often has little evidence 

predating contact. Id. at 437. Given the relationship between 

predisposition and inducement, we have cautioned that such 

“evidence must be considered with care” because “the defendant’s later actions may have been shaped by the government’s conduct.” Id. But where the government has proven 

that a defendant’s “predisposition was independent and not 

the product of the attention that the Government had directed” toward him, post-contact evidence can support a conclusion that the defendant would have likely committed the 

crime on his own and was therefore predisposed. Jacobson v. 

United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992). 

B 

Entrapment was Jones’s primary defense from the beginning. He raised it early in the case, and the district court 

agreed to instruct the jury on the elements of the defense at 

trial. Neither Jones nor Schimenti challenge any aspect of that 

instruction on appeal. The issue before us is whether the district court committed legal error in denying Jones’s post-trial 

motion for acquittal under Rule 29.
14 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

In doing so, the district court emphasized the heavy burden Jones faced in overturning the jury’s verdict. From there 

the district court took great care reviewing the trial evidence, 

determining that, while some evidence supported Jones’s position, a reasonable jury could have found both that he was 

predisposed to support ISIS and not induced by the government to commit the material support offense. The court 

pointed to evidence on which the jury could have relied to 

find that Jones voluntarily—without undue pressure from the 

government—bought and gave the cell phones to Muhamed 

intending them to be used as IEDs to further ISIS’s ongoing 

fighting in Syria. The district court therefore concluded that 

Jones had not been entrapped as a matter of law and denied 

his motion for acquittal.

C 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 requires a district 

court, on a defendant’s motion, to “enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to 

sustain a conviction.” While we owe no deference to the district court’s assessment of the trial evidence, we do owe deference to the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 

616, 622 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Garcia, 37 F.4th 1294, 

1302 (7th Cir. 2022). 

Indeed, our review proceeds as it would in an appeal in 

which a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

government’s trial evidence. See Leal, 72 F.4th at 267. We must 

“evaluate whether, when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Government, the record evidence is ‘sufficient ... to permit a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant was not entrapped.’” Garcia, 37 F.4th at 1302 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Barta, 776 F.3d 931, 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 15

936–37 (7th Cir. 2015)). We will set aside Jones’s conviction 

“only where the record is devoid of evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” 

a standard we have described as “nearly insurmountable.” 

Leal, 72 F.4th at 267 (citations omitted).

Having taken our own fresh look at the trial evidence, we 

conclude that the district court was right to reject Jones’s motion for acquittal.

1 

We begin with inducement. Some evidence introduced at 

trial supports Jones’s argument that he was induced—but it 

is not our role to reweigh the evidence. See Garcia, 37 F.4th at 

1302. When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we see a sufficient basis to support the jury’s finding 

that the government agents did not induce Jones to provide 

material support to Muhamed on behalf of ISIS.

Start with the evidence of the FBI agents’ interactions with 

Jones. Several of the government’s witnesses testified to taking care to maintain a responsive, and not affirmative, stance 

in their interactions with Jones. Agent Carnright used the 

term “mirroring” in her testimony to describe this behavior. 

The approach, as the term mirroring implies, allowed Jones to 

shape and advance his relationships and next steps with the 

government agents—all to make it less likely that their interactions amounted to repeated persuasion or undue pressure. 

The jury’s ability to see the recorded conversations and text 

messages further enabled them to determine whether the 

agents’ accounts were, in fact, credible.

We can put the point in more concrete terms. A reasonable 

jury could have interpreted the dynamic between Omar and 
16 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

Jones, for instance, as one where Omar followed Jones’s lead 

and not the other way around. Omar let Jones bring up ISIS 

in their early text conversations, asking Jones for more violent 

videos only after Jones sent the first pro-ISIS link. Similarly, 

Omar introduced Jones to a new undercover agent, Bilal, only 

after Jones asked Omar if he could meet other “brothers” to 

“learn and build with”—a clear request to meet other ISIS 

sympathizers. Omar also offered to give Jones an ISIS flag in 

response to Jones’s demonstrated interest in Omar’s travel 

abroad, an offer Jones readily accepted.

Muhamed likewise testified that he followed the FBI’s instruction not to directly ask Jones to do anything, but instead 

to more passively offer the opportunity to provide support if 

Jones seemed receptive. Indeed, the FBI did not even introduce Muhamed to Jones—Schimenti did. And Schimenti, as 

Jones’s close friend, took this step because he knew that Muhamed wanted to travel to Syria and that Jones, through Bilal, 

would be willing and able to help him do so. That is exactly 

what Jones did, and a reasonable jury could have relied on 

this evidence to conclude Jones had a desire to materially support ISIS that arose untainted by the government’s involvement.

The trial evidence also permitted a finding that Jones took 

many acts on his own, without undue influence or pressure 

from government agents. Consider foremost his testimony to

the grand jury. Jones told the grand jury under oath that he 

gave Muhamed the cell phones of his own “free will” in hopes 

that “it kills many of them” or “eight people.” In no way did 

he suggest during his grand jury testimony that he did so to 

submit to pressure exacted by Muhamed or anyone else. The 

trial evidence also showed that Jones, of his own volition, 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 17

contacted his former girlfriend with a request to supply the 

cell phones after receiving the initial invitation from Muhamed to procure them for ISIS. The jury had ample evidence 

showing that the government agents did not do anything 

other than offer Jones a chance to provide support to ISIS in 

response to Jones’s own representations to that effect.

Jones urges a different analysis by focusing on the duration of the government’s investigation, seeing it as an 18-

month campaign designed to wear him down by persistently 

nudging him toward the commission of a crime. By Jones’s 

account, the FBI was not willing to stop pressing him until he 

relented and took a step to provide material support to ISIS. 

He views the government’s conduct as analogous to the entrapment the Supreme Court determined occurred in Jacobson 

v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). While Jones’s counsel has 

advanced these arguments with great clarity and rigor, we see 

no infirmity in the jury’s rejection of the entrapment defense.

Yes, the FBI pursued Jones and Schimenti for a meaningful 

length of time. But the length of the investigation does not, on 

its own, lead to the conclusion that no reasonable jury could 

have rejected Jones’s entrapment defense. “[T]here is no per 

se rule regarding the number of contacts or length of relationship it takes to constitute inducement. Each case, and each entrapment defense, must be judged on its own facts.” Barta, 776 

F.3d at 937–38. This is why “entrapment is a question for the 

jury, not the court”—because the jury is best suited to make 

such findings of fact. Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 439. 

The jury here could have found that the FBI’s investigation 

took substantial time for good reason. Agent Carnright testified that the Bureau opened its investigation upon seeing 

clear indicators on social media sites that Jones and Schimenti 
18 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

were avid ISIS sympathizers—with both defendants expressing approval of the violence the terrorist organization employed to advance its mission. The FBI reasonably wanted to 

know more about Jones and Schimenti: Did their sympathies 

with ISIS extend beyond a personal viewpoint and evince any 

present intent or risk of them supporting the group, either by 

providing resources or traveling to Syria to join the fight? The 

only way to glean that answer was to take proactive steps to 

discern Jones and Schimenti’s intentions, hence the Bureau’s 

use of informants to befriend and communicate with both defendants. The trial evidence showed—and a reasonable jury 

could have found—that all of this occurred in steps that took 

time, with the FBI taking sufficient care all along the way to 

ensure their informants were acquiring information, not aggressively pressing either defendant to commit a crime.

A more distinct disconnect warrants emphasis. Jones sees 

the trial evidence as showing a campaign of persistent pressure being imposed by the FBI to commit a crime. It is possible 

to read aspects of the evidence that way. For example, Jones 

repeatedly expressed his reluctance to travel to Syria himself, 

and he declined to join Omar and Bilal in “rock[ing] it out” in 

a violent attack on behalf of ISIS. And at trial Jones testified 

that he supplied the cell phones because “there had been four 

or five people that came into [his] life trying to get [him] to 

provide some form of material support to ISIS,” so that when 

Muhamed finally asked him for cell phones in March 2017, he 

delivered them because he believed “God has got to be putting all these people in [his] life for a reason.”

But it is equally possible to view the trial evidence another 

way—that Jones voluntarily made his own choice to move beyond sympathy and agreement with ISIS to affirmatively 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 19

supporting the organization by supplying cell phones for use 

as IEDs in Syria, all despite some episodic pressure imposed 

by the FBI. And that evidentiary reality—of the trial evidence 

being amenable to different findings—is what precludes us 

from being persuaded that the government failed to prove 

that Jones was not induced to provide material support to

ISIS.

Nor do we see Jacobson as lending much support to Jones. 

Though the government conceded inducement in Jacobson, 

the facts provide important instruction. Keith Jacobson received persistent mailings from six fake entities, almost all of 

which expressly encouraged him to engage in illegal conduct. 

When he finally accepted an offer to buy illicit child pornography two and a half years after the government started its 

campaign, he was arrested. See 503 U.S. at 543–47. The Supreme Court observed that Jacobson’s predisposition to commit the crime was not independent from the government’s inducement, and so concluded that he had been entrapped. See 

id. at 550. 

The FBI’s conduct here is much less intrusive than that in 

Jacobson, or at least the jury could have so concluded. The government provided sufficient evidence illustrating a patient 

and prolonged investigation. A jury could conclude that Jones 

made willing and voluntary decisions to accept the government’s overtures, though they occurred over a long period of 

time. So we cannot conclude that Jones was induced as a matter of law.

2 

That brings us to predisposition. Much like inducement, it 

is not enough for Jones to argue that his version of events is 
20 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

possible. That is the central teaching of Mayfield. See 771 F.3d 

at 439 (“[T]he subjective basis of the defense makes entrapment a fact question for the jury to decide ‘as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.’” 

(quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958))). To 

be acquitted of his material support conviction, Jones must 

show no rational jury could have concluded that the government carried its burden. See Leal, 72 F.4th at 267. We cannot 

get there.

Return to the beginning—to Jones’s pro-ISIS social media 

posts that led to the government’s investigation in the first 

place. Jones regularly shared ISIS propaganda, including the 

violent Flames of War recruitment video. Jones and Schimenti 

watched this video together well before any contact by government informants. Jones also made comments praising ISIS, 

speculating about ISIS’s plans to attack different cities, and 

expressing distrust of any nonbelievers in Islam. The jury did 

not have to reach far to view Jones’s statements as supporting 

a finding that he was likely to take affirmative steps to support ISIS if given the opportunity.

Jones urges us to see his social media posts as speech protected by the First Amendment and thus beyond any consideration in a criminal prosecution. Not so. That the First 

Amendment allowed Jones to express agreement with ISIS’s 

messaging, mission, and means of accomplishing its objectives does not mean the speech was off limits for what it reveals about his predisposition to commit crime. In Jacobson, 

the Supreme Court held that “[e]vidence of predisposition to 

do what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show 

predisposition to do what is now illegal.” 503 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added). That observation explains why Keith 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 21

Jacobson’s legal purchase of child pornography before Congress made the acquisition of such material a crime did not, 

alone, prove that he was predisposed to later buy it illegally. 

But we know of no authority—and Jones has identified 

none—supporting Jones’s view that the First Amendment 

shields from consideration statements he made that shine 

substantial light on his intent and predisposition to commit 

the crime, especially given the other evidence giving import 

to that intent. 

Indeed, evidence arising after Jones’s initial government 

contact with Omar at the police station in September 2015 is 

consistent with Jones’s views before that date, thereby further 

allowing a jury to find predisposition. As a legal matter, we 

have clarified that, while predisposition is measured at the 

time the government first offers the opportunity to commit 

the offense, “evidence of the defendant’s conduct after the initial contact by the government’s agents ... may be relevant to 

the determination of predisposition” so long as that evidence 

is “considered with care” given the risk that “the defendant’s 

later actions may have been shaped by the government’s conduct.” Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 437. The consistency we see in the 

evidence is important to that care we must take in our assessment. Jones’s consistent statements and actions across time

make the case for predisposition, untainted by government 

involvement, much stronger.

Consider the post-2015 evidence of Jones’s character and 

reputation. At trial Jones chose to take the witness stand and 

testify in his own defense. He told the jury that he had 

thought about moving to Syria to live under the Islamic state 

before he met any government informants. In response to 

Omar’s offer of the ISIS flag, Jones testified that he “willingly 
22 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

took the ISIS flag,” “was excited to have the flag,” and shared 

photos of himself with it on social media because he wanted 

“other people to see [him] with the flag” as a show of support 

for ISIS. Jones’s ex-girlfriend and a member of his mosque testified that he shared pro-ISIS materials with them separately 

from any interactions with Omar, Bilal, or Muhamed.

Evidence of Jones’s motivations to commit the offense further show his pro-ISIS enthusiasm. No better example than 

the sworn, counseled testimony Jones conveyed to the grand 

jury. In no uncertain terms, he told the grand jurors that he 

gave Muhamed the cell phones of his own “free will” in hopes 

that “it kills many of them” or “eight people.” Jones also declined reimbursement for the phones when Muhamed offered 

it because he was instead excited to receive the “ajr,” or heavenly reward in Islam, for his acts. The jury reasonably could 

have viewed these statements as evidence of Jones’s independent predisposition to commit the material offense.

Notice, too, that the trial evidence shows no meaningful 

reluctance by Jones to support ISIS. See Garcia, 37 F.4th at 1304 

(explaining that prior reluctance to engage in the offense of 

conviction heavily informs the predisposition inquiry). To the 

contrary, Jones consistently demonstrated his independent 

interest in ISIS, including the violent means employed by the 

organization to advance its mission. Jones never cut off communication with Omar and Bilal or affirmatively disavowed 

support for ISIS. When Jones did decline to respond to Bilal’s

invitation to formally pledge allegiance to ISIS in December 

2015, he nevertheless made plain his support of the organization’s mission and told Omar and Bilal that he wanted to keep 

in touch. He followed through with that promise by 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 23

continuing to communicate with them despite Schimenti’s 

(correct) instincts that they were government agents. 

In no way did Jones’s views of ISIS change at the end of 

2015. He maintained an active social media presence, including by affirmatively seeking interactions with members of the 

ISIS community online. This is exactly how he found and befriended the undercover agent Omar 2. When Omar 2 expressed an interest in traveling to Syria, Jones not only connected him with Bilal, but vouched for him as a “trustworthy 

brother” that Bilal should help. And Bilal did facilitate Omar 

2’s travel, as far as Jones knew, after Jones arranged for them 

to meet in person and create a plan. Jones’s later decision to 

connect Muhamed with Bilal, after supplying him with cell 

phones, further reinforces Jones’s ongoing commitment to advancing ISIS’s mission. 

Considered collectively and viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence before and during 

the investigation was sufficient for a jury to conclude that 

Jones was independently predisposed to provide material 

support to ISIS. 

* * * 

What makes a case like this challenging is that it is easy to 

see a jury going either way on entrapment. But that reality is 

precisely why the law empowers the jury to decide, placing 

the burden on the government to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that it did not entrap Jones. Our role on appeal is to ask 

whether any rational jury could have found that the government carried this burden. Like the district court, we believe 

the answer is yes: evidence in the record supports the jury’s 
24 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

conclusion that Jones was not entrapped, so his material-support conviction stands.

III

Jones and Schimenti both appeal the district court’s denial 

of their motion for a new trial under Rule 33 in light of the 

government’s post-trial disclosures that, within three weeks 

of the trial concluding, the FBI paid Muhamed a $50,000 cash 

bonus for his assistance as a confidential informant.

A 

Here is what happened. At trial the government called 

Muhamed to testify about his interactions with Jones and 

Schimenti. He began with some personal background, explaining that he was born in Iraq and moved to the United 

States in 2014 after working five years for the United States 

Department of Defense in Iraq. Muhamed stated that his first 

contact with the FBI came in 2016, when agents interviewed 

him after learning that he displayed an ISIS flag on his car. 

That encounter led in time to Muhamed agreeing to assist the 

FBI’s counterterrorism efforts by serving as an informant on 

national security matters. 

Turning to the events that culminated in Jones’s and 

Schimenti’s arrests in April 2017, Muhamed testified that he 

pressured neither defendant to buy cell phones for use as 

IEDs by ISIS in Syria. To the contrary, Muhamed emphasized 

that he sought only to adhere to the FBI’s direction to limit his 

interactions to what the Bureau calls “mirroring”—the practice of echoing messaging advanced in the first instance by 

Jones and Schimenti, avoiding any affirmative steering, and 

thereby allowing each defendant to make his own choices 

about any next steps in the relationship. By Muhamed’s 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 25

account, this approach culminated in both defendants affirmatively choosing to supply cell phones for use as IEDs.

On direct and cross examination, Muhamed acknowledged his potential biases, testifying that the FBI paid him living expenses for fuel, a cheap car, parking, and moving costs, 

with the Bureau also assisting him with his green card application. He insisted that he neither expected nor sought further

compensation from the FBI for his cooperation, however. 

Agent Carnright offered consistent testimony and estimated 

these expense payments to Muhamed totaled $16,000. 

What transpired after trial is what most concerns Jones 

and Schimenti. About one month after the jury returned 

guilty verdicts, the FBI paid Muhamed a $50,000 bonus. More 

than three months later, in October 2019, the government disclosed this payment to Jones and Schimenti—a revelation that 

took them, and the district court, by surprise.

Recognizing the gravity of the government’s post-trial disclosure, the district court granted Jones and Schimenti’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and ordered discovery. Agent 

Carnright supplied an affidavit and testified at the hearing. 

She stated that the FBI had contemplated making a bonus 

payment before the arrests in 2017 but decided based upon a 

pretrial discussion she had with an Assistant United States 

Attorney to postpone any payment until after trial. Agent 

Carnright insisted that she shared none of this information, 

including the prospect of a future payment, with Muhamed.

Following the hearing, the FBI also supplied defense counsel new records showing a more detailed breakdown of the 

$16,000 in payments it made before trial to Muhamed. These 

itemized records revealed that the government’s pretrial 
26 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

disclosures were neither complete nor accurate. Recall that 

Agent Carnright testified at trial that the FBI paid Muhamed 

$16,000 to cover “any costs incurred to him throughout the 

course of the investigation.” Muhamed testified similarly at 

trial, stating that the FBI reimbursed him “only for fuel, car—

I mean, not fancy car, just cheap car—for parking, for moving 

out from my old apartment after the case.” But the new report 

showed that the $16,000 stipend included, among other 

things, a $1,200 down payment on a car, three car payments 

of $400 each, a $925 security deposit, payments for three 

months of rent totaling $2,775, and nonspecific “per diem” expenses totaling $2,130. And perhaps most concerning to Jones 

and Schimenti, the FBI’s post-trial report also showed $5,575 

paid for what it called an “amount service”—an undefined 

description connoting some sort of bonus, as the Bureau used 

the same words to describe the $50,000 post-trial payment to 

Muhamed.

At no point has the government explained why it did not 

take more care before trial to ensure a complete and accurate 

disclosure of the financial support provided to Muhamed. 

The best explanation, though hardly acceptable, seems to be 

oversight and sloppiness.

B 

Invoking Rule 33, Jones and Schimenti requested a new 

trial, arguing that the government’s failure to fully and accurately disclose these actual and planned payments limited 

and impaired their defense efforts at trial. They contended the 

jury may have reached a different outcome had they known 

the government had already paid Muhamed one bonus of 

$5,575 and had plans to pay him another bonus ten times 

larger in the immediate wake of trial. Both defendants 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 27

believed they could have used this information to undermine 

Muhamed’s and the government’s credibility and thereby advance their entrapment defense by exposing everyone’s true 

incentive of doing everything possible to coerce them into 

committing a material support offense.

The district court did not mince its words in describing its 

reaction to learning of these post-trial developments, making 

plain that it found “the Government’s belated and at times 

contradictory disclosures regarding the FBI’s payments to 

Muhamed troubling.” In the end, however, the district court 

determined that any disclosure shortcomings did not rise to 

the level of meeting Rule 33’s demanding standard for a new 

trial. What mattered most to the district court was the 

strength of the government’s case against Jones and 

Schimenti. Seeing no likelihood of acquittal, the district court 

denied the motion for a new trial.

C 

Rule 33 authorizes district courts to “vacate any judgment 

and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Our 

review is limited to assessing whether the district court’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Foy, 50 F.4th at 622.

To receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Jones and Schimenti must show “that the evidence 

‘came to their knowledge only after trial; could not have been 

discovered sooner had due diligence been exercised; is material and not merely impeaching or cumulative; and would 

probably lead to an acquittal in the event of a retrial.’” United 

States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769, 780 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting United 

States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
28 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

Recognize at the outset, just as the district court did, that 

“the $50,000 payment itself does not constitute newly discovered evidence because it had not occurred at the time of trial.” 

So we could not order a new trial based on the bonus payment 

alone. The primary hurdle for Jones and Schimenti, then, is 

showing that they likely would have been acquitted had they 

known about the potential for Muhamed’s post-trial bonus 

and had they received a more complete and accurate accounting of the $16,000 living-expense payments. See id.

We have a difficult time seeing how a pretrial disclosure 

from the government that the FBI planned to pay Muhamed 

a $50,000 bonus after trial would have created a likelihood of 

a different outcome. Foremost, the district court found no evidence in the government’s post-trial disclosures of “an express agreement between Muhamed and the FBI that he 

would be paid.” Even more, the district court found “the most 

likely scenario to have been that Agent Carnright intentionally avoided any mention of a potential post-trial payment to 

Muhamed so that it would not have to be disclosed to defense 

counsel.” Nothing Jones and Schimenti have presented on appeal calls these findings into question.

On this record, and in full alignment with the district 

court, we find it unlikely that any pretrial disclosure about a 

planned or contemplated payment of a $50,000 bonus to Muhamed would have changed the jury’s ultimate guilt determinations.

The post-trial disclosure of the itemized expense report 

falls short for similar reasons. No doubt the evidence is impeaching, at least to some degree. But, as the district court observed, this was not a case hinging on credibility determinations, as much of the evidence presented to the jury consisted 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 29

of recorded conversations and statements Jones and 

Schimenti posted online. The single unrecorded conversation 

that Jones and Schimenti raise, where they contend that Muhamed appealed to Schimenti’s emotions to encourage him to 

help Muhamed travel to Syria, is not enough on its own to 

show that acquittal would have been likely had the disclosures been made earlier. And Jones and Schimenti had a full 

and fair opportunity to, and did, cross-examine Muhamed 

about this conversation at trial.

To the extent Muhamed’s credibility was at issue, we 

agree with the district court that the itemized report is cumulative. The government had already disclosed that Muhamed 

received $16,000 for his services, a total that is not called into 

question by the new report disclosed after trial. And the jury 

heard Agent Carnright’s testimony that Muhamed received 

immigration assistance in exchange for his work, including 

substantial help with his green card application. In our view, 

it is unlikely that the new, more detailed evidence of the FBI’s 

payments to Muhamed would have tipped the scales in favor 

of acquittal. The jury already considered substantial evidence 

tending to impeach Muhamed’s motives in returning the 

guilty verdicts. We agree with the district court’s denial of the 

Rule 33 motion.

IV

One brief issue remains. Jones contends that the district 

court improperly entered a protective order restricting his 

cross-examination of government witnesses while also 

wrongly denying his Rule 33 motion challenging that decision. We see no abuse of discretion.
30 Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 

At trial the government moved for a protective order to 

prevent the disclosure of certain witnesses’ true identities—

all to protect the witnesses and their families and to preserve 

the integrity of the FBI’s ongoing counterterrorism efforts. 

The district court entered the requested order, explaining that 

given the protected information’s low probative value, the 

FBI’s national security concerns justified the restriction.

The district court denied Jones’s later Rule 33 motion challenging the protective order, explaining that the information 

was not material to Jones’s case and that he was therefore not 

prejudiced by its exclusion. On appeal Jones insists that the 

suppressed information is material to his entrapment defense 

because the agent he wanted to question had expressed in an 

email that the lengthy investigation into Jones was like “beating a dead horse” given the many months that passed without 

evidence of a crime. Jones would have liked to cross-examine

this witness to learn more about the witness’s view of the investigation and any persuasive tactics the FBI may have used.

We review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See Foy, 

50 F.4th at 622. The law affords district courts broad authority 

to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to prevent 

“harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ 

safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally 

relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The 

FBI sought to protect its witnesses and the integrity of its investigative processes in a widely publicized terrorism trial. 

Jones has failed to show that, contrary to the district court’s 

finding, cross-examination would have yielded material evidence or that the evidence was otherwise unavailable to him 

from other witnesses. Indeed, a centerpiece of Jones’s entrapment defense was that the FBI persisted in its investigation for 
Nos. 21-1482 & 21-1672 31

18 months and that he did not relent until it succeeded in 

pushing him into the commission of a crime. With that position already presented to the jury, we cannot conclude the district court’s ruling had any impact on the trial’s outcome.

For these reasons we AFFIRM.