alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Runau *v.*Wheeler.

[No. 12,055.

Filed February 19, 1925.]

Dismissal op *Action.—Plaintiff may dismiss action before finding of court is*announced.—Under the express provisions of §338 Burns 1914, §333 R. S. 1881, in a trial by the court, the plaintiff may dismiss his action at any time before the finding of the court is announced, and it is reversible error for the court to deny plaintiff’s motion to dismiss made before all the evidence is heard.

From Vanderburgh Superior Court; *Edgar Durre,*Judge.

Action by Charles Runau against Amelia Wheeler. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

*Reversed.*

*Oscar Birch,*for appellant.

*490Nichols, J.

Appellee has not favored us with a brief. It appears by appellant’s brief that on March 6, 1924, at the trial of the cause, and before all the evidence was heard, appellant filed his motion to dismiss his action, which motion the court overruled, and thereafter, to wit: on March 7, 1924, found for appellee on appellant’s complaint, and for appellant on appellee’s counter-claim, and rendered judgment accordingly.

Error of the court in overruling appellant’s motion to dismiss his action is the only error assigned.

Section 338 Burns 1914, §333 R. S. 1881, expressly provides that the plaintiff may dismiss his action, when the trial is before the court, at any before the finding of the court is announced. Authorities in harmony with this statute are *Board*v. *Becker*(1880), 69 Ind. 468; *Cohn*v. *Rumely*(1881), 74 Ind. 120; *Wainwright*v. *Roots Co.*(1912), 176 Ind. 682, 97 N. E. 8; 1 Watson’s Revision Works’ Practice p. 792.

The judgment is reversed, with instructions to the court tó set aside the judgment, and to sustain appellant’s motion to dismiss his action.
§ 41.39 What reports does the Tribal college or university need to provide? ( a ) The Tribal college or university must provide the BIE, on or before December 1 of each year, a report that includes: ( 1 ) An accounting of the amounts and purposes for which the Tribal college or university spent assistance received under this part during the preceding academic year;
( 2 ) An accounting of the annual cost of the Tribal college's or university's education programs from all sources for the academic year; and
( 3 ) A final performance report based upon the criteria the Tribal college's or university's goals, philosophy, or plan of operation.
( b ) The Tribal college or university must report to the BIE their FTE Indian student enrollment for each academic term of the academic year within three (3) weeks of the date the Tribal college or university makes the FTE calculation.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-27-1998
<CASH>                                           6,006
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   49,039
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (27,535)
<INVENTORY>                                     11,983
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                61,264
<PP&E>                                          11,002
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (5,943)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  75,658
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           75,605
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            11
<OTHER-SE>                                          42
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    75,658
<SALES>                                        102,742
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               106,208
<CGS>                                           55,688
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   91,271
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,937
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,125
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              8,812
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     8,812
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.79
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.63
        

</TABLE>
#### IVAN CEPEDA *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

Decided July 13, 2004

*Michael Stone,*special public defender, in support of the petition.

*Leon F. Dalbec, Jr.,*senior assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.

The petitioner Ivan Cepeda’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 82 Conn. App. 902 (AC 23754), is denied.
# C_2006178EN.01003202.xml

| 29.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 178/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 178/32

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 17 May 2006 — Marcuccio v Commission

(Case T-241/03) (1)

1

(Officials - Reassignment - Accommodation provided by employer - Decision to remove the applicant's personal effects - Action for annulment - Action for damages - Act adversely affecting an official - Inadmissibility)

(2006/C 178/59)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Luigi Marcuccio (Tricase, Italy) (represented by: L. Garofalo, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: E. de March and C. Berardis-Kayser, acting as Agents, assisted by A. Dal Ferro, lawyer)

Defendant:

Re:

First, an application for annulment of the note of 15 October 2002 concerning the removal of the applicant's personal effects from his former accommodation provided by his employer in Angola and, second, an application for damages for the harm allegedly caused the applicant by the contents of that note

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible; |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible;

| 2. | The applicant is to bear his own costs and pay those of the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The applicant is to bear his own costs and pay those of the Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 200, 23.8.2003.

1

---
#### AMPLICON, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DIRECTOR, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division

Argued February 23, 2000

Decided March 10, 2000.

Before Judges LANDAU and CIANCIA.

*Robert C. Hess,*for appellant, *(Harold Leib & Associates,*attorneys; *Harold Leib,*on the brief).

*Carol Johnston,*for respondent, Deputy Attorney General, *(,John J. Fanner,*Attorney General, attorney; *Many C. Jacobson,*Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; *Ms. Johnston,*on the brief).

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from a Tax Court order dismissing its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, *R.*4:6—2(a), appellant Amplicon, Inc., contends that the Court misinterpreted and improperly applied statutory provisions respecting refund of sales and use tax payments. It contends, too, that equitable principles should have been applied to toll statutory limitation periods enabling it to request relief from asserted sales tax overpayments made following an audit conducted under the authority of respondent, the Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation.

*46Upon review of the record and consideration of the briefs and oral arguments, we are satisfied that the order under review should be affirmed, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Small in his comprehensive .written opinion dated September 18, 1998, as supplemented, following our limited remand, by his letter opinion of March 11,1999.

Affirmed.
# C_2006326EN.01006801.xml

| 30.12.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/68 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.12.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/68

---

Action brought on 17 November 2006 — Ercros v OHIM — Degussa (TAI CROS)

(Case T-315/06)

(2006/C 326/142)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Ercros, SA (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: R. Thierie, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Degussa AG (Düsseldorf, Germany)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | ‘purely and simply’ alter the contested decision (decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 20 September 2006 in appeal proceedings R 29/2006-1); |
| --- | --- |

—

‘purely and simply’ alter the contested decision (decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 20 September 2006 in appeal proceedings R 29/2006-1);

| — | grant the opposition and reject the application for figurative mark No 2 768 851‘TAICROS’; |
| --- | --- |

—

grant the opposition and reject the application for figurative mark No 2 768 851‘TAICROS’;

| — | order OHIM to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order OHIM to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: Degussa AG.

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The figurative mark ‘TAI CROS’ for goods in Class 1 (Application No 2 768 851).

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The applicant.

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: Spanish word marks ‘CROS’, Spanish word mark ‘SOCIEDAD ANONIMA CROS’, Spanish figurative marks ‘CROS’ and Spanish word mark ‘ERCROS’ for goods in Class 1.

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Rejection of the opposition.

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1), since there is a likelihood of confusion between the two opposing marks.

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

---
H. Res. 3

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

January 6, 1999.

Resolved, That a committee of two Members be appointed by the Speaker on the part of the House of Representatives to join with a committee on the part of the Senate to notify the President of the United States that a

quorum of each House has assembled and Congress is ready

to receive any communication that he may be pleased to

make.

Attest:

Clerk.
### §725. Disposition of certain property

After the commencement of a case under this chapter, but before final distribution of property of the estate under section 726 of this title, the trustee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not been disposed of under another section of this title.

(Pub. L. 95–598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2607; Pub. L. 98–353, title III, §478, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 381.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

#### legislative statements

Section 725 of the House amendment adopts the substance contained in both the House bill and Senate amendment but transfers an administrative function to the trustee in accordance with the general thrust of this legislation to separate the administrative and the judicial functions where appropriate.

#### senate report no. 95–989

This section requires the court to determine the appropriate disposition of property in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest. It would apply, for example, to property subject to a lien or property co-owned by the estate and another entity. The court must make the determination with respect to property that is not disposed of under another section of the bankruptcy code, such as by abandonment under section 554, by sale or distribution under 363, or by allowing foreclosure by a secured creditor by lifting the stay under section 362. The purpose of the section is to give the court appropriate authority to ensure that collateral or its proceeds is returned to the proper secured creditor, that consigned or bailed goods are returned to the consignor or bailor and so on. Current law is curiously silent on this point, though case law has grown to fill the void. The section is in lieu of a section that would direct a certain distribution to secured creditors. It gives the court greater flexibility to meet the circumstances, and it is broader, permitting disposition of property subject to a co-ownership interest.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1984—Pub. L. 98–353 substituted "distribution of property of the estate" for "distribution".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984, see section 552(a) of Pub. L. 98–353, set out as a note under section 101 of this title.
### [§2304b. Renumbered §3405]
#### § 18.112 May a tribe appeal the approval or disapproval of a probate code?

No. There is no right of appeal within the Department from a decision to approve or disapprove a tribal probate code.
§ 36.95 What sanitary standards must homeliving programs meet? Each homeliving program must meet all of the following standards: ( a ) Restrooms, showers, and common areas must be cleaned daily;
( b ) Rooms must be cleaned daily;
( c ) Linens must be changed and cleaned weekly;
( d ) Linens are to be provided;
( e ) Basic Toiletries must be provided; and
( f ) Functional washing machines and dryers must be provided.
### [§2323. Repealed. Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title VIII, §812(a)(2)(A), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 1846]

Section, added and amended Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title VIII, §§801(a)(1), (b)–(f), 802, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2442–2444, 2446; Pub. L. 103–35, title II, §202(a)(6), May 31, 1993, 107 Stat. 101; Pub. L. 103–160, div. A, title VIII, §811(a)–(c), (e), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1702; Pub. L. 103–355, title VII, §7105, Oct. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 3369; Pub. L. 104–106, div. D, title XLIII, §4321(b)(8), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 672; Pub. L. 105–135, title VI, §604(a), Dec. 2, 1997, 111 Stat. 2632; Pub. L. 105–261, div. A, title VIII, §801, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2080; Pub. L. 106–65, div. A, title VIII, §808, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 705; Pub. L. 107–107, div. A, title X, §1048(a)(17), Dec. 28, 2001, 115 Stat. 1223; Pub. L. 107–296, title XVII, §1704(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2314; Pub. L. 107–314, div. A, title VIII, §816, Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2610; Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title X, §1031(a)(15), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1597; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title VIII, §842, Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3389; Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title VIII, §858, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2349; Pub. L. 110–181, div. A, title VIII, §891, Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 270; Pub. L. 111–383, div. A, title X, §1075(b)(31), Jan. 7, 2011, 124 Stat. 4370; Pub. L. 115–91, div. A, title XVII, §1701(a)(4)(B), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1796, related to contract goals for small disadvantaged businesses and certain institutions of higher education.

A prior section 2323, added Pub. L. 98–525, title XII, §1216(a), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2598; amended Pub. L. 99–500, §101(c) [title X, §926(a)(1)], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783–82, 1783–153, and Pub. L. 99–591, §101(c) [title X, §926(a)(1)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341–82, 3341–153; Pub. L. 99–661, div. A, title IX, formerly title IV, §926(a)(1), Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3933, renumbered title IX, Pub. L. 100–26, §3(5), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 273, related to commercial pricing for spare or repair parts, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 101–510, div. A, title VIII, §804(a), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1591.
Form of Limited Power of Attorney



 Exhibit 10.24.1 
 Each of the non-employee directors who are signatories to the Post-Effective Amendment No. 2 to the Registration Statement on Form S-8 have executed a limited power of attorney in the form set forth below: 

FORM OF LIMITED POWER OF ATTORNEY 
 KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, the undersigned, a member of the Board of Directors of Callaway Golf Company, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), with its principal executive offices in Carlsbad, California, do
hereby constitute, designate and appoint each of Steven C. McCracken and Bradley J. Holiday, each of whom are executive officers of the Company, as my true and lawful attorneys-in-fact, each with power of substitution, with full power to act without
the other and on behalf of and as attorney for me, for the purpose of executing and filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission Post Effective Amendments to Registration Statements filed under the Securities Act of 1933 that will have the
sole effect of deregistering shares of Company capital stock registered under such Registration Statements as are set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto, and to do all such other acts and execute all such other instruments which said attorney
may deem necessary or desirable in connection therewith. 
 I have executed this Limited Power of Attorney effective as of May 20, 2008.


	
	
	  
	[Name of Director]









 EXHIBIT A 
 Registration Statements to be De-Registered 
  

	 	1.	33-98750 


	 	2.	33-92302 


	 	3.	333-27091 


	 	4.	333-05721
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

SALVADOR DE JESUS SANCHEZ

MIRANDA, a.k.a. Salvador Jesus

Sanchez,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-50225

D.C. No. 3:10-cr-07000-AJB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 20, 2016** 

Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Salvador De Jesus Sanchez Miranda appeals from the revocation of

supervised release and the time-served sentence imposed upon revocation. 

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Sanchez Miranda’s counsel

FILED

JAN 25 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to

withdraw as counsel of record. 

Because Sanchez Miranda has fully served his sentence and is not subject to

a term of supervised released, we dismiss this appeal as moot. See Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14 (1998); United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th

Cir. 1999).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED. 

DISMISSED.

2 15-50225
# C_2006286EN.01000701.xml

| 23.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 286/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 286/7

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4135 — Lactalis/Galbani)

(2006/C 286/05)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 24 April 2006, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4135. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://ec.europa.eu/eur-lex/lex) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4135. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://ec.europa.eu/eur-lex/lex)

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50393

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PRAJEDIX DAVILA-ORTEGA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-99-CR-1044-1-H

--------------------

December 14, 2000

Before DAVIS, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Prajedix Davila-Ortega argues that a prior felony conviction

must be included in an indictment charging an illegal reentry

following deportation and proven at trial if the defendant is

subject to an enhanced sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). He

argues that because the element of a prior felony conviction was

not included in his indictment and no evidence was presented at

trial, his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for

imposition of a sentence not to exceed a maximum term of two

years’ imprisonment. 
No. 00-50393

-2-

Davila-Ortega acknowledges that in Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court held that a

prior felony conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) was merely a

sentencing factor and, thus, need not be included in the

indictment. He argues, however, that in its subsequent decision

in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362 (2000), the

Supreme Court stated that it was arguable that Almendarez-Torres

was decided incorrectly. 

Davila-Ortega concedes that he failed to raise this

challenge in the district court. Davila-Ortega’s challenge to

the length of the sentence imposed is reviewed for plain error. 

See United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575 (5th Cir. 2000).

In light of the clear precedent of Almendarez-Torres,

Davila-Ortega has failed to show that the district court

committed error, plain or otherwise, in imposing his sentence. 

See United States v. Dabeit, F.3d (5th Cir., Oct. 30, 2000,

No. 00-10065) 2000 WL 1634264 at *4; United States v. Doggett,

230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 2000). The judgment of the district

court is thus AFFIRMED.
### Application of Amortization and Interest Payments