1

Filed 10/29/20 Novaresi v. County of Placer CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

PAUL NOVARESI et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
COUNTY OF PLACER et al.,

Defendants and Respondents ; SIERRA COLLEGE PARTNERS,

Real Parties in Interest and Respondent. C086209 (Super. Ct. No. SCV0038667)



### S UMMARY OF THE 

### A PPEAL Appellants Paul and Carla Novaresi appeal the trial court’s denial of the Petition
for Writ of Mandate they filed against Respondents County of Placer and the County of Placer Board of Supervisors (togethe r, the C ounty)

. Appellants argue the County erred in taking actions to approve Real Party in Interest Sierra College Partner s ’s proposed2

project, the Park at Granite Bay ( the p roject). Appellants ’ arguments fall into four categories. First, they argue the County violate d the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. ; unless otherwise stated, statutory
section references that follow are to the Public Resources Code ) when it certified the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the p ro j ect. S econd, appellants argue the County
violated state planning and zoning laws (Gov. Code, § 65000 et seq.) and the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.) wh en it approved the project and took actions to allow the pro

ject to move forward . Third, appellants argue the County abused its
discretion and violat ed Government Code section 65906 and Placer County Code section
16.04.130 when it approved a variance for some of the lots in the p roject. Fourth, appellants argue t hat the p roj ect violates County fire codes and provisions of California
Fire Cod e applicable to fire access roads. We decide th e appellants contentions are
without merit and affirm the trial court judgment

. 

### F ACTS AND 

### P ROCEEDINGS The Proposed Project The p roject is the development and construction of “a residential subdivision of 56 single

- family residential units on a 16.3

- acre project site in the community of Granite Bay in Placer County, California.” The project includes a 0.81

- acre community park that would be open to the public. “Ingress/egress to the project site would be provided by a single gated access at the project’s midpoint along Sierra College Boulevard,” which runs along the eastern edge of the project site. A secondary gated access point t o and from Eckerman Road, a private road which runs along a portion of the project site’s western edge, “would be available for use only by emergency vehicles or by area residents during an emergency.” The residential units would be a mix of one

- and two

- story homes on lot sizes ranging from 7,150 to 17,196 square feet. Fourteen of the lots within the project would be deed restricted to allow only single

- story homes . Project construction will3

“include installation of a water quality detention basin on th e northwest side of the project to regulate peak stormwater flows from the project site.” The proposed project site is located in an “island of unincorporated area” in the County of Placer, on the western edge of Granite Bay, adjacent to City of Rosevil le Streets and land. Other portions of land within the island are used for houses on large lots, homes on smaller lots, scattered outbuildings, and a Montessori school; or remain “vacant, undeveloped open space with trees and natural drainage areas.”
P rior to project approval, the project site was “zoned Residential

- Single

- Family within an Agriculture combining district and Building Site combining district with a minimum lot size of 40,000 square feet.” The project site was comprised of seven parcels, with one parcel containing “ a house, barn, and septic system and the remaining parcels [were] undeveloped.” The existing buildings “would be removed as part of project construction.”
Administrative Approval and Proceedings Below

“ A Notice of Preparatio n and Initial Study (NOP/IS) for the EIR was filed with the State Clearinghouse on February 6, 2015, ” providing “responsible agencies and interested persons with .

. . information describing the proposed project and its potential environmental effects” and the opportunity to make comments “as to the scope and content of the information to be included in the EIR.” The comment period for the NOP/IS ended on March 9, 2015. The County filed the Draft EIR with the State Clearinghouse on December 30, 2015, an d the State Clearinghouse set an official 45

- day public review period for the
D raft EIR to end on February 16, 2016. The County Planning Commission received oral testimony regarding the D raft EIR in late January 2016. On June 30, 2016, the County
release d the F inal EIR.4

On August 25, 2016, the County Planning Commission held a public hearing regarding the proposed project and recommended the Board of Supervisors take the following actions: 1. Certify the F inal EIR and adopt a Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting Program regarding measures identified in the F inal EIR as capable of mitigating possible environmental impacts the project might cause ; 2. Adopt a resolution to amend the Granite Bay Community Plan to change the site’s land use designation from Rural Low Density Residential to Medium Density
Residential ; 3. Adopt an ordinance to rezone the parcels in the project site from r esidential

s ingle

- f amily within an a griculture combining district and b uilding s ite combining district with a minimum lot size of 40,000 square fee t to residential

- single

- family, combining a minimum building site of 7,000 square feet ; 4. Approve a vesting tentative subdivision map; and 5. Approve a variance to increase the maximum building coverage al lowed per single

- story residential units on lots that are 8,000 sq uare f ee t or less from 40 percent to 50 percent

. The Board of Supervisors adopted the Planning Commission recommendations on October 11, 2016. Appellants filed their p etition on November 10, 2016. After considering briefs and oral arguments by the parties, the superior court issued a judgment denying the petition on November 17, 2017. Appellants filed a notice of appeal on December 26,
2017.5 

### D ISCUSSION

I The County Did Not Violate CEQ A When I t Approved the EIR Appellants challenge the EIR analysis and findings in three areas: hydrology, traffic, and consideration of consistency with land use plans. The County acted in good faith, and it identified and analyzed a reasonable scope of data in reaching its conclusions on these topics. Moreover, t he EIR’s findings regarding hydrology, traffic , and plan compliance are supported by substantial evidence

. A. CEQA and Judicial Review of CEQA Determinations
In revie win g CEQA cases, we look at both the CEQA statute and CEQA Guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.) , which are entitled to great weight. ( In re Bay

–

Delta (2008) 4 3 Cal. 4th 1143, 1163, fn. 7 ( Bay

- Delta )

. ) “CEQA was enacted to advance four related purposes : to ( 1) inform the government and public about a proposed activity ’ s potential environmental impacts; (2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, environmental damage; (3) prevent environmental damage by requiring project changes via alternatives or mitigatio n measu res when feasible; and (4) disclose to the public the rationale for governmental approval of a project that may significantly impact the environment.” ( Cal

. Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management
Dist. (2015) 62 Cal. 4th 369, 382.) T he Legislature intended CEQA “ to be interpreted in
such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language. ” ( Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ ersity of Cal ifornia (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 376, 390 ( Laurel Heights ).)
When a proposed project triggers CEQA requirements, CEQA review is undertaken by a lead agency, defined as “ the public agency which has the principal responsibility for carrying out or approving a project whi ch may have a significant effect upon the environment. ” ( § 21067 ; see also Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast6

Railroad Authority (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 677, 712

- 713. ) “The EIR has been aptly described as the ‘heart of CEQA.’ [Citations.] Its purpo se is to inform the public and its responsible officials of the environmental consequences of their decision s before they are made.” ( Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd

. of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 553, 564 , italics
omitted ( Goleta ) .) It “ is the primary means of achieving the Legislature’s considered
declaration that it is t he policy of this state to ‘take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.’ [Citation.]

. . . An EIR is an ‘environme ntal “alarm bell” whose purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no return.’ [Citations.] The EIR is also intended ‘to demonstrate to an apprehensive citizenry that the agency has, in fact, analyzed and considered the ecological implications of its action.’ [Citations.] Because the EIR must be certified or rejected by public officials, it is a document of accountability. If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the
p ublic will know the basis on which its r esponsible officials either approve or reject environmentally significant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees. [Citations.] The EIR process protect s not only the environment but also informed self

- government.” ( Laurel Heights , supra , 47 Cal. 3d at p. 392.)

“ Whe re an EIR is challenged as being legally inadequate, a court presumes a public agency’s decision to certify the EIR is correct, thereby imposing on a party challenging it the burden of establishing otherwise.” ( Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal. Ap p.4th 523, 530 ( Sierra Club ) .) “ S ection 21168.5 provides that a court’s inquiry in an action to set aside an agency’s decision under CEQA ‘shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is
established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by l aw or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.’ As a result of this standard, ‘[t]he court does not pass upon the correctness of the EIR’s environmental7

conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency as an informative document.’ [Citation.]” ( Laurel Heights , supra , 47 Cal. 3d at p. 39 2.) We will not set aside an agency’s approval of an EIR on the ground that a differe nt conclusion would have been equally or more
reasonable. ( Goleta , supra , 52 Cal. 3d at p. 564.) Our review in a CEQA case, as in other mandamus actions, is the same as that of the trial court. We review the agency’s decision, not that of the trial court. ( Bay

– Delta , supra , 43 Cal. 4th at p. 1162.) Such review differs according to the type of error claimed. ( Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007)
40 Cal. 4th 412, 435.) “Whether an ‘agency has employed the correct procedures,’ is reviewed ‘de novo

. . . “scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements” [citation]

. . . . ’ [Citation.] But an ‘agency ’ s substantive factual
conclusions ’ are ‘accord[ed] greater deference.’ [Citation.] ‘In reviewing for substantial evidence, the review ing court “may not set aside an agency ’ s approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable,” for, on factual questions, our task “is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has
the better ar gument.” [Citation.]’ ” ( Sierra Club , supra , 163 Cal. App.4th at p. 531.)

B. The EIR’s Hydrology Analysis i s Reasonable and the Hydrology Conclusions Are Supported by Substantial Evidence

1. Additional Facts Re lated to the Hydrology Analysis

a. Site Design Before, During , and After Construction “The project site consists o f open undeveloped grassland with rolling terrain and the topography forms a valley in the center of the proposed development boundary, with a natural drainage outfall to the northwest,” where the property abuts Eckerman Road. “The northwesternmost portio n of the project site and the parcels adjacent to the project
site and along Eckerman Road experience localized flooding during storm eve nts.”8

Undeveloped, s tormwater runoff from the project site flows into an “outfall [pipe] at the northern boundary of t he project site. This pipe directs flows under the adjacent property and into a manmade ditch along the eastern side of Eckerman Road. The flows travel

nort h in the ditch alon g Eckerman Road until another pipe that directs the flows under
Eckerman Road a nd into another drainage ditch along the western side of Eckerman
Road

. . . . From there, drainage flows run across the property located at the southwest corner of Eckerman Road and Annabelle Avenue. There are two minor tributary drainage sheds where ru noff flows from adjacent parcels to the north and south of the project area onto the site.” T hough construction of the project would involv e some grading and excavation of the land, “the general slope and landform of the site would be
similar to that unde r existing conditions and the project would retain the existing drainage patterns so that runoff would enter and exit the site at the same l ocation.” In addition to developing drainage systems for the benefit of the new units on the project site, one of the stated objectives of the project is to “[i]mprove an existing, localized flooding problem in the Eckerman Road area with in frastructure improvements/storm drainage improvemen ts.” As described in the EIR, the project plans call for low impact develo pment (LID) best management practice measures (BMP) including disconnected roof drains, “two above

- ground open space/d rainage swales [,].

. . and a landscaped detention basin” with a weir “in the northwest corner of the project site. The drainage swales w ould accommodate stormwater flows entering the project site at the northern and southern project boundaries. The swales would be vegetated and designed to provide pre

- treatment before the water flows to the detention basin for
detention and sediment settl ing. From the detention basin, stormwater would flow out” through a 24

- inch outfall pipe “to the existing drainage hea dwall site along the northern boundary of the project site.” According to the EIR, “the proposed drainage system also
includes an additi onal BMP that is not considered a n LID. This additional BMP is a
permanent underground water quality treatment vault, such as a Continuous Deflection9

System (CDS) unit, which is proposed to be located in the northwestern portion of the
site. .

. . The wa ter quality treatment vault would separate and trap debris, sediment, and oil and grease from stormwater runoff before it is discharged into the receiving system. This water quality treatment vault would be the main form of runoff treatment and is anticip ated to capture a very wide range of organic and inorganic solids and pollutants that typically result in large volumes of captured solids each year, such as: total suspended solids (TSS), oil and greases, trash, and other debris (including floatables,

neu trally buoyant, and negatively buoyant debris). The LID BMPs such as the grass lined swales and vegetated detention basin provide additional levels of runoff water quality treatment.”

b. A Drainage Study Found the Proposed Design Would Reduce Flooding and Exceed County Water Quality Standards In May 2015, prior to the release of the draft EIR, Wood Rodgers, an engineering consulting firm, prepared a preliminary drainage study to “evaluate and confirm sizing of

on

- site drainage facilities” that would su pport the proje ct. In so doing, Wood Rodgers calculated the approximate level of impervious surfaces for the various forms of lot usage in the proposed pro

ject . It developed these percentages based on “actual post project
build out conditions witnessed on other projects in the surrounding greater Placer County area,” and considered the “1.8 acres of park, landscape buffer, and o pen space” along
with road ways and residential lots . For lots Wood Rodgers labeled as “low density residential” it es timated the impervious surface percentage would be approximately 50 percent

. For lots it deemed low density residential on a large lot, it estimated impervious
surfaces at 30 percent

. The study also considered the various sizes of pipes the system woul d use to drain water through and from the site ; the impact of a CDS system on water quality ; soil
conditions ; Placer County requirements for representing storm rainfall ; and various10

formulas, models, and computer software programs that help model existing and proposed drainage routing through the site that can be used to make determinations about “pipe sizing, volume detention, and outlet sizing” as well as “treatment flow rates” in the proposed CDS system. Local design standards in place at the time of th e study were looked at in determining the impact of the project’s drainage system design features and sizing. Based on preliminary designs, the drainage study determined flows from the existing site would be reduced by 0.5, 6.7, 5.7, and 9.1 cubic feet per second during 2

- , 10

- , 25

- , and 100

- year storm events, respectively. With respect to water quality, the hydrology study indicated the CDS unit would be desi gned “for the entire site [ ’ s] untreated flows” and the swales would provide “another level of t reatment that exceeds
C ounty requirements” and are “technically unnecessary.”

c. EIR Findings and Mitigation Measures
The EIR considered the Wood Rodger s preliminary h ydrology report and other sources when making its significance assessment which was “developed based on project

- specific construction and operational features.” Though appellants do not specifically identify which hydrology finding they find fault in, the y appear to take issue with findings made and mitigation measures proposed with respect to surface water quality and runoff quantity during project operation

-- i.e., after project construction is complete. The EIR analyzes water quality and runoff quantity under impacts numbered
3.7

- 1 and 3.7

- 4 respectiv ely. With respect to water quality during operation, the EIR states: “ In addition, surface water runoff from the residential, park, and open space uses could result in pollutants conveyed in surface water flows. The proposed LID BMPs as well as the water quality treatment vault would reduce surface water pollution exiting the project
site. Therefore, implementation of the proposed project would result in less than significant long

- term water quality impa cts. ”11

“Although [the EIR finds that] water quality impacts during long

- term operational activities would be less than significant with the implementation of the proposed project including the water quality BMPs ,” the EIR includes mitigations measures “to further reduce less than significant water quality impacts during operational activities.” Those measures include, but are not limited to , a requirement that all BMPs for the project be designed “in accordance with the West Placer Stormwater Quality Desi gn Manual or other County approved methodology.” Relying on the p reliminary hydrology study with respect to surface water flows , once the project is constructed and an operational residential community, the EIR concludes, “the proposed drainage system w ould be ade quate, and no downstream flooding would occur as a result of project implementation. The existing localized flooding that occurs along Eckerman Road would not be exacerbated with the implementation of the proposed project. The project could reduce localized flooding. As the proposed draina ge system would detain flows onsite and meter the release of water offsite, and peak discharge from the site would be less under proposed conditions, impacts would be less than significan t.” Despite this conclusion, the EIR includes mitigation measures to “further reduce the project’s less than significant impact during operational activities.” The additional mitigation measures involve a one

- time drainage improvement and flood control f ee of $143 per residence and further annual f ees of $20 per residen ce

.

d. Approval of the West Placer Storm Water Quality Design Manual On June 21, 2016, days before the Final EIR was released, the Board of Sup ervisors approved the West Placer Storm Wa ter Quality Design Manual. “The post

construction storm water control requirements described” in the manual “apply to new development an d redevelopment projects approved after July 1, 2015.” (See West Placer Storm Water Quality Design Manual at p. 2

- 1 ( W ater Quality Manual ).)12

The manual “presents LID design standards to reduce runoff, treat storm water, and provide baseline hydromodification management.” ( Water Quality Manual at p. 1

- 3.) The manual serves as “a regulatory compliance tool that addresses the requirements of” various local hydrology control requirements

. ( Water Quality Manual at p. 1

- 3.) The manual calls on new project applicants to create and provide a template for a Storm Water Quality Plan (SWQP). ( Water Quality Manual at p. 1

- 3.) “ The SWQP documents a project’s compliance with the Phase II MS4 Permit and provides a standardized format for complete and accurate analyses which will result in more efficient design, review, and project approval.” ( Water Quality Manual at p. 1

- 3.) The manual also highlights the need to implement stormwater treatment and hydro

- modification measures that use bioretention based facilities as part of a system to remove water pollutants and reduce water volume. ( Water Quality Manual at p. 4

- 3.)

e. Comments Received a

fter Publication of the EIR and Updated Hydrology Analysis Using the SWQP On August 23, 2016, two days before the Planning Commission met to formulate recommendations to the Board of Supervisors regarding the project, a ppellants sent an analysis prepared by Edward Ballman of Balance Hydrology Inc. to the Planning
Commission. Ballman raised two arguments that a ppellants raise here: (1) a “CDS mechanical separator system .

. . is clearly not a bioretention system” as required by
certain regulatory requirements; and (2) the diagrams in the hydrology study do not “include a depiction of the anticipated post

- project impervious cover (building footprints, driveways, etc .) that would allow for confirmation that the assumed 50% impervious

cover val ue is indeed appropriate. Recent development plans I have reviewed of like density often have impervious cover approaching 60% or more.” Similarly, in late September and early October 2016, Sharon Musgrove, a former member of the Planning Commissio n and a former senior resource analyst for the California State Department of Water Resources communicated with the County, and13

expressed concerns regarding the hydrology analysis contained in the EIR. Musgrove noted that the proportion of impervious surf aces identified in an appendix of the initial hydrology study never rise over 50 percent , and she postulate d that these figures do not consider impervious surfaces due to things like sidewalks, roads, and swimming pools.
She believe d the 50 percent figure cannot be correct. Musgrove also argue d that the proposed CDS unit would not be a sufficient means of treating water for pollutants. In
response to Musgrove’s concerns , the County indicate d that “with the adoption of the” Water Quality Manual the project will no lo nger include a CDS unit, but instead “ a bioretention / infiltration basin

. . . i s now proposed .” The Co unty also indicated a final hydrology study would “reflect a value of 65%” for the lots characterized as low density
resid ential. Many of Musgrove’s stated concerns stem med from requirements in the Water Quality Manual and her belief that the applicant never completed a SWQ P. However, in roughly the same time period that the County received Ballman’s letter and engaged in communications with Musgrove

-- in the fall of 2016

-- the project applicant prepared and submitted a SWQP using the form linked to in the Water Quality
Manual . The SWQP identifie d a bioretention basin as the means for filtering out likely pollutants. Additionally, according to C ounty staff, the SWQP calculate d impervious drainage levels assuming lots Wood Rodgers labeled low density residential ha d impervious surface areas of 65 percent . The SWQP conclude d that water quality volumes and water quality flo ws would be managed onsite. It also conclude d post

construction total peak runoff v olumes would be less than or equal to pre

- construction total peak runoff. The County provided Musgrove with a cop y of the SWQP on
October 5, 2016, four days before the Board of Supervisors met and approved the project
and the EIR.
2. The EIR’s Hydrology Conclusions Are Supported by Substantial Evidence Appellants raise various arguments as to why they believe the EIR’s conclusions regarding the water pollution or runoff quantity generated by the project were14

unsupported . T hree are at the crux of appellants’ position. We address each of those arguments, then address the arguments appellants’ make to buttress thei r position on these three arguments

.

a. Impervious Su rface Issue Citing the Ballman and Musgrove letters, appellants argue that the preliminary hydrology study, and therefore the EIR relies on faulty assumptions regarding impervious surfaces of the property. Appellants quote Ballman’s letter for the proposition that “[ r]ecent development plans

. . . of like density often have impervious cover approaching 60% or more.” They cite Musgrove’s letter in support of their argument that the “EIR and Study omit[] key data regarding pervious and impervious runoff areas” wit hout elaborating on the specific nature of the missing data and how it might have altered the
results. They also refer to the Musgrove letter to allege fault with the Hydrology Study
because it lab els the residential lots as “low density” instead of “medium de nsity.” As a preliminary matter, in advancing this argument, appellants are asking the

cour t to replace the assessment of one possible expert with that of another. But “a difference of opinion among experts .

. . does not provide grounds for rejecting [an]
EIR. ” ( Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. Dep t. of Health Services (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1574, 1600.) Indeed, the court, cannot select “among conflicting expert opinion and substitute[] its own judgment for that of the County.” ( National Parks & Conserva tion Assn. v. County of Riverside (1999) 71 Cal. App.4th 1341, 1365.) Moreover, appellants fail to demonstrate why the County ought not have accepted
Wood Ro d gers’s statements that in estimating impervious surfaces levels they looked at

“ actual post proj ect build out conditions witnessed on other projects in the surrounding greater Placer County area,” and considered the “1.8 acres of park, landscape buffer, and open space” along with lots for residences and roadw ays. As was pointed out by ESA, an environmental consulting firm that provided the County with a response to the Ballman letter, “ [a] 50% impervious coverage factor for the proposed project is reasonable for the15

proposed lot sizes and was reviewed by County staff. Assuming 4,000 square fee t of impervious surfaces per lot for each of the 56 proposed lots, approximately 48% of the site would be developed with impervious surfaces.” I n essence, the record demonstrates that in relying on t he preliminary study, the County acted reasonably and in good faith, and that study provided substantial evidence to support the EIR’s si gnificance findings. Appellants attempt to minimize the import of the ESA letter by characterizing it as “speculation o r unsubstantiated opinion” that cannot meet the substant ial evidence standards of CEQA “especially in light of Mr. Ballard’s [ sic ] comments.” T his argument (1) is based on a ppellants’ position that we must accept Ballman’s estimations as s uperior to Wood Rodgers’s or ESA’s, though the County was not bound to r ely on the word o f the expert of a ppellants’ choosing ; and (2) assumes a difference of expert opinion means one of those opinions cannot serve as “substantial evidence

. ” But section 21080, subdivision (e), indicates substantial evidence includes, “fact, a reasonable assumption predicated upon fact, or expert opinion supported by fact.” The ESA letter demonstrates
that the 50 percent impervious coverage factor applied to lots labeled “ low density ” in the preliminary hydrology study was both a reasonable assumption predicated upon a fact and an expert opinion supported by a fact. Perhaps most importantly, to the extent appellants’ arg u ment hinges on their position that the preliminary hydrology study and EIR failed to take into ac count proper data variables, as evidenced by the fact that the applicant did not provide all the
calculations to be included in a SWQP, this purported defect was cured before the County approved the project because the applicant did submit a SWQ P. T he app licant used a SWQP template recommended by the Water Quality Manual and, in refining its assessment, assumed the lots it labeled “low density residential” were covered by 65 percent impervious surfaces. Even with the increased estimate in impervious surfa ce

area , the SWQP pr edicts post

- construction total peak runoff volumes will be less than or equal to pre

- construction total peak runoff. Contrary to appellants ’ assertion, this16

inc rease to 65 percent does not indicate that the County “essentially acknowle dges the flaws” in the preliminary stud y after hearing from Ballman and Musgrove. R ather , this change simply reflects that with additional time and information, and a new calculation framework, the applicant opted to use a larger factor in its analysis

. In short, the County did not err in allowing the preliminary study to serve as a
basis to reach its hydrology conclusions regarding surface water quality and runoff quantity . Furthermore, a refined study using variables that more closel y match the variables appellants argue should have applied was conducted before the EIR was approved and supports the EIR’s conclusion s

. Appellants try to minimize the value of the SWQP by indicating the study was never given to the public and the record does not indicate it was provided to the decision
makers. This is effectively an argument that boils down to appellants taking the position that the EIR is faulty because it was not amended and recirculated once t he SWQP was prepared. But that is not how CEQA works. “The CEQA reporting process is not designed to freeze the ultimate proposal in the precise mold of the initial project; indeed, new and unforeseen insights may emerge during investigation, evoking rev ision of the original propo sal.” ( County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 185, 199.) Consistent with this, CEQA guidelines only require an agency to recirculate an EIR when changes to the project will cause or new information reveals an adverse impact on the environment. CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5 states : “A lead agency is required to recirculate an EIR when significant new information is added to the EIR after public notice is given of the availability of the draft EIR for public review under Section 15087 but before certification. As used in this section, the term ‘information’ can include changes in the project or environm ental setting as well as
additional data or other information. New information added to an EIR is not ‘significant’ unless the EIR is changed in a way that deprives the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment upon a substantial adverse environmental effect of the project or17

a feasible way to mitigate or avoid such an effect (including a feasible project alternative) that the project ’ s propone nts have declined to implement.” Here, the refinement in the calculations regarding water quality and surface runoff amounts as contained in the SWQP do not reveal a substantial adverse environmental effect on the project. Therefore, the updated analysis does not represent a “significant” change to the EIR under CEQA guidelines. Because this change was not significant, the County was not obligated to re circulate the EIR or the SWQP.

b. CDS Vault Issue Appellants argue the EIR is deficient because the p roposed CDS vault is not compliant with local water treatment standards. However, after the publication of the Water Quality Manual , the project switched from using a CDS vault for pollution control measures to using a bioretention basin. Using the Water Quality Manual

- proposed template, the SWQP concludes that water quality volumes and water quality flows would be managed onsite. Appellants’ argument regarding the CDS v ault is moot.
Like with the revised analysis contained in the SWQP, the County was not obligated to redraft and recirculate the EIR when it switched the pollution

- control measure from a CDS vault to a bioretention system, because the change did not have a “substantial adverse env ironmental effect of the project.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15088.5.)

c. Easement Issue Appellants argue the EIR’s conclusion that the project will not result in significant impacts to the volume of surface water runoff is “dependent up on upsizing the culver t on Eckerman Road which requires approval of the lan downers on Eckerman Road” and the County is unlikely to obtain that approval . They suggest the EIR is flawed because it “does not address the impacts of stormwater run

- off if the Real Parties do not rec eive approval to modify the culvert on Eckerman Road.” This argument fails because the record does not demonstrate the culvert must be expanded

.18

To support their position, a ppellants point to two documents. One document is a
June 2015 memorandum from the County Engineering and Surveying Division to the Planning Services Division, in which the author indicates that tentative maps for the project should:

“ Show the extent of offsite improvements, including the widening for Eckerman Road, drainage, sewer, water and any other offsite improvements to demonstrate that these improvements can be built within easements. Clearly show where offsite
easements must be acquired by the developer. Please provide a Preliminary Title Report showing rights over the existing easements in Eckerman Road. Improvements to Eckerman are still required (see [below] ). A private road easement appurtenant to the
subdivided property to construct

. . . necessary drainage

. . . over Eckerman out to Annabelle will be required.”
The cross

- referenced language in the memorandum provides: “Offsite right of entry for construction, as well as drainage and maintenance easements shall be requi red where necessary and the applicant should contact adjacent property owners about the likelihood of obtaining these easements. Alternatively, the walls and drainage facilities could be moved onsite, eliminating the need for right of
entries or offsite e asements.”
While the paragraph about tentative maps that appellants choose to quote uses language that suggests an easement will be required, the paragraph regarding “possible grading impacts”

-- i.e., the paragraph more concerned with showing actual possible physical condi tions as opposed to the paragraph concerned about capturing those conditions on a map

-- is less definitive as to whether a drainage easement will be required. It states, “maintenance easements shall be required where necessary ,” (italics added) but concede s there is at least one possible drainage plan that would “eliminat[e]
the need for .

. . offsite easements.”19

The second document appellants cite is an e

- mail in which a County employee responds to the memorandum’s comments by indicating: “we will need to discuss the specifics, because they have no rights to [ upsize ] the culvert on Eckerman, and due to neighbor sentiments, it’s unlikely they will get any agreement to do so.” In the e

- mail exchange, one employee suggests it would not be practical to add a mitigation measure that requires upsizing the culvert “as needed” because the neighbors would not approve. This exchange does not indicate that a culvert expansio n will actually be needed. Tellingly, in making the easement argument, appellants do not point to any language in the project design, the preliminary hydrology study, or the SWQP to suggest that the project’s hydrology plans will, in fact, require an upsizing o f the culvert on Eckerman Road. Indeed, it is possible no improvements to Eckerman Road will be needed because the project is designed such that “total post

- project peak runoff” is “equal to or less that the total pre

- project peak runoff[.]” In other words, the SWQP shows that the project will not increase runoff to Eckerman Road during the storm events that caused
pre

- project flooding, and there will be no need to expand the culvert to manage water flow during storm events

.

d. Miscellaneo us Other Arguments
In an e ffort to advance their position that the EIR’s hydrology findings are not
suppo rted or based on sufficient information, appellants raise various other arguments, none of which we find persuasive

. First, appellants argue that the EIR’s hydrology impact findings cannot stand because, “[t]he generic description o f the proposed drainage system does not definitively
demonstrate that these facilities will be sufficient to avoid increases in peak flow.” This misstates both the requirements for an EIR and the standard of review applied by the court. CEQA does not req uire an EIR or its supporting documentation to provide highly detailed information and specifications regarding proposed plans that will have an
environment al impact . Instead, it requires, “[a] general description of the project ’ s20

technical, economic, and environmental characteristics, considering the principal engineering proposals if any and supporting public service facilities.” ( CEQA Guidelines, § 15124, italics added

. ) As the Fifth District Court of Appeal found in Dry Creek Citizens Coalition v. Co unty of Tulare (1999) 70 Cal. App.4th 20, 28, “[t]he ‘general description’ requirement for the technical attributes of a project is consistent
with othe r CEQA mandates to make the EIR a user

- friendly document. For example, [CEQA] Guidelines section 15140 s tates that EIR’s must be written in plain language so that decisionmakers and the public can rapidly understand them.” A general descript ion “also fosters the principle that EIR’s should be prepared early enough in the planning stages of a project to enab le environmental concerns to influence the project’s design. ( [CEQA] Guidelines, § 15004[)]” because it “can be provided earlier in the process than a detailed engineering plan and is more amenable to modification to reflect environmental concerns.” ( Ibi d. ) The drainage plan description provided in the EIR satisfies this requirement. As for appellants ’ statement that the description does not “definitively demonstrate” that the proposed facilities are sufficient, we do not review administrative CEQA findings for evidence that the conclusions are definitively demonstrated. We revi ew them to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Subst antial evidence supports the hydrology findings. ( Laurel Heights , s upra , 47 Cal. 3d at p. 392.) Next, a ppellant s argue that the mitigation measures adopted to further minimize potential negative water quality impacts are insufficient because the County does “ not require compliance with the West Placer Stormwater Quality D esign Manual.” This is a misleading argument and lacks merit. Mitigation measure 3.7

- 1(d) states that “BMPs shall be designed in accordance with the West Placer Stormwater Quality Design Manual or other County approved methodology.” Though this language may not “require” compliance with the Water Quality Manual , it allows for some flexibility as to which standards to use in evaluating BPM designs both at the outset and going forward. That21

flexibility can serve to allow the project to later adopt more st ringent standards and
methods than those provided for in the Water Quality Manual . This flexible language is not a basis for finding fault with the EIR. Additionally, a ppellants argue the EIR’s co nclusion regarding surface water drainage is unsupported because the proposed drainage facilities are not mandatory design features or part of bin ding mitigation measures for the project. They imply that because mitigation measures require the developer to submit final drainage plans for dealing with runoff du ring construction a requirement to submit drainage plans for the operational project ought to have been identified as a mitig ation measure . This argument lacks merit. The drainage system is an integral part of the project, which has result ed in (1) the creation of subdivision maps that designate specific plots of land that are dedicated to drainage needs ; (2) a CEQA Findings of Fact that identifies the “in stallation of a water quality detention basin” in the project description; and (3) a F indings of Fact that identifies “ [i] mprove an existing, localized flooding problem in the Eckerman Road area with infrastructure improvements/storm drainage improvements ” as one of t he project objective s. Because the drainage facilities are an integral pa rt of the project, the EIR was allowed to evaluate the project and develop mitigation measures assuming those drainage improvements will be implemented. (See Village Laguna of Laguna Beach, Inc.
v. B oar d of Supervisors (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1029

- 103 0.) In contrast mitigation measures to deal with surface runoff during construction were appropriate because, to state the obvious, the permanent drainage facilities that are being added as part of the
construction will not be available until that constru ction has begun , and interim measures may be nee ded to prevent environmental harm during construct ion

. Finally, a ppellants argue that the project’s “failure to demonstrat e the proposed project design will maintain surface water runoff at or below existing flows violates [ the ] Placer County Code section 16.08.040(D)(2)” renders the EIR deficient

.22

County Code section 16.08.040(D)(2) states that design improvements for a
pr oject, “shall be such that water occurring within the subdivision will be carried off such subdivision without injury t o any improvements, residential sites, or residences to be installed on sites within the subdivision, or to adjoining areas or cause eros ion of siltation
that would be detrimental to the environment of the are a.” To begin with, much like appellants ’ argum ent that the project description is too generic to demonstrably show the project will not have significant hydrology impacts, this positi on incorrectly suggests that the standard of proof we apply here is one of certainty. But that is not the standard. The standard is substantial evidence. Because substantial evidence supports the EIR’s findings regarding surface water runoff, substantia l evidence supports a conclusion that the project will not violate County Code section 16.08.040(D)(2).

C. The Traffic Ana lysis and Findings Comply With CEQA Appellants argue that the EIR’s conclusions related to the impact of the project on traffic flows around the project are not supported by substantial evidence and are based on incomplete analysis. We again disagree.

1. Additional Facts Related to the Traffic Analysis

a. Roadways Surr ounding the Project Though the project site is located within an unincorporated part of Placer County, “it is surrounded by lands and roadways that fall within the incorporated limits of the City of Roseville, including Si erra College Boulevar d.” The main ingress and egress to the property would be through a single gated access driveway at the project midpoint along Sierra College Boulevard. Sierra Colle ge Boulevard is a four

- lane divided arterial roadway with a 36

- foot median. In the future, Sierra College Boulevard may be widened to six lanes, with the additional two la nes resulting from conversion of an outside portion of the median to travel lanes. The project proposes that vehicles traveling north on Sierra Colleg e Boulevard will be able to turn23

left into the project site at the access point, but that vehicles exiting the project will only be able to turn right. The City of Roseville has jurisdiction over the portion of Sierra College Boulevard that is adjacent to the project site.
Annabelle Avenue i s about a half mile long, and runs east from Annabelle Court to Sierra College Boulevard approximately 500 feet from the project site’s northern edge.
It is a two

- lane residential street that is two

- way stop control led at its intersection wi th Sierra College Boulevard. That intersection is within the City of Roseville’s jurisdiction.
A pproximately 1,000 feet south from the project site, Sierra College Boulevard intersects with Old Auburn Road, a two

- lane minor ar terial that runs in a northeast

southwest direction . That intersection is within the City of Roseville’s jurisdiction.

b. Data and Regulations Considered by Traffic Impact Study in Evaluating Traffic Volume
In order to assist in the eva lua tion of traffic impacts to the surrounding area caused by the project both by itself in the present day and as part of cumulative impacts on traffic in the year 2035 (Cumulative Plus) , Wood Rodgers performed a t raffic i mpact

s tudy in which it ana lyzed existing and projected traffic volumes at three points on Sierra College Boulevard: at the two

- way stop sign controlled intersection with Annabelle Avenue, at the project’s proposed entrance point, and at the intersection with Old Auburn
Road. As a starting point fo r making their calculations, Wood Rodgers conducted existing traffic counts during peak weekday a.m. and p.m. traffic hours

-- the highest consecutive hour of traffic between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., and 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. respectively

-- at Sierra Colleg e Boulevard’s intersections with Old Auburn Road and
Annabelle Avenue. Wood Rodgers then calculated the Level of Service (LOS) for each interse ction.
The LOS scale characterize s the amount of delay traffic flows are likely to experience at any given in tersection, with LOS A rated intersections experiencing the least delay (less24

than or equal to 10 seconds) and LOS F rated intersections experiencing the most delay (more than 80 seconds at signal ized intersections and more than 50 seconds at two

- or all

w ay stop sign contr olled intersections). At signalized intersections, like the one at Sierra College Boulevard and Old Auburn Boulevard, the LOS value reflects the average delay experienced by all traffic that goes through the intersection. At two

- way sto p intersections, like the one at Sierra College Boulevard and Annabelle Avenue, the LOS value reflects the “ ‘worst case’ movement ” delays experienced at the intersection, e.g. at Annabelle Avenue the LOS calculation captured the delays “caused by vehicles on the
Annabelle Avenue side

- street approach experiencing long waiting times while attempting to find acceptable ‘gaps’ to turn left (‘worst

- case’ movement) onto northbound Sierra College Boulevard.” The LOS for an intersection during a.m. and p.m. peak hours is
expresse d as LOS [ a.m. value ]/ [p.m. value ]. For example, an intersection with a peak

a.m. LOS of C and peak p.m. LOS of D wo uld be denoted as having a LOS C/D. Due to the projects location and the jurisdiction of the roadways, Wood Rodge rs and the EIR considered three sets of regulations and goals that relate to traffic: The Placer County General Plan T ransportation and Circulation Element (the Placer Circulation Element), the Granite Bay Community Plan Circulation Element (the Granite
B ay Circulation Element), and The City of Roseville General Plan (2025) Circulation Element (the Roseville Circulation Element). Notably, while the other local standards apply LOS standards to unsignalized intersections, t he Roseville Circulation Element
f ocuses on signalized intersections, and states that 70 percent or more of all signalized
intersections should maintain a minimum LOS C standard during peak traffic hours.
B ecause the City of Roseville does not have policies regarding LOS levels at unsig nalized intersections, to assist in evaluating the “ ‘significance’ ” of traffic delays at the unsignalized intersections

-- i.e. at Sierra College Boulevard’s intersections with the project site and Annabelle Avenue

-- Wood Rodgers completed a traffic signal warrant analysis, based on crit eria described in the January 21, 2010, supplement to the25

California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

. “The term ‘signal warrants’ refers to the list of established criteria used by Caltrans and other public agencie s to quantitatively justify or ascertain the need for installation of a traffic signal at an unsignalized intersection location.” Several factors interact in establishing signal warrant criteria. “Based on [ a ] posted 45 mph speed limit on Sierra College Boulevard” Wood Rodgers “conservatively evaluated” the potential justification for a signal warrant at the subject intersections us ing a “Peak

- Hour

- Volume

- based Warrant 3 (Rural Areas)” signal warrant analysis a s a “representative type of warrant analysis.” Using methods documented in the Transportation Research Board’s Highway Capacity Manual, Fifth Edition (2010) and specialized software , and assuming the project would generate rates of traffic described in the Institute of Tran sportation Engineers Trip Generation Manual, 9th Edition Wood Rodgers made the following findings with respect to the thre e intersections:

• Under current conditions, the Sierra College and Annabelle Avenue intersection operates at an a. m. peak de lay of 31.3 seconds, and a p.m. peak delay of 56.8 seconds, giving it a LOS D/F. The intersection does not meet the criteria for a signal warr ant. Wood Rodgers estimated that adding projected traffic to existing conditions would change it so th e intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of 31.5 seconds and a p.m. peak delay of 59.1 seconds, giving it a LOS D/F, reflecting an increased delay in the a.m. peak hour of 0.2 seconds and in the p.m. peak delay of 2.3 seconds and no ch ange to the LO S. T he intersection would still not meet the criteria for a signal warrant. Assuming the project is not built, Wood Rodgers concluded that by 2035, the intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of over 80 s econds and a p.m. peak delay of over 8 0 seconds, giving it a
LOS F/F. The intersection would still not meet the criteria for a signal warrant. Assuming the project is built, Wood Rodgers concluded that by 2035, the intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of over 80 seconds and a p.m

.26

peak delay of over 80 seconds, giving it a LOS F/F, representing no LOS change over cumulative changes without the project. The intersection would still not meet
the crite ria for a signal warrant.

• Under current conditions, the Sierra College and Old A uburn Road intersection operates at an a.m. peak delay of 28.8 seconds, and a p.m. peak delay of 23.4 seconds, giving it a LOS C/C. The intersection already has a signal; so, the warrant analysi s was not app lied. Wood Rodgers estimated that adding projec ted traffic to existing conditions would change it so the intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of 29.8 seconds and a p.m. peak delay of 23.9 seconds, giving it a LOS C/C, reflecting an increased delay in the a.m. peak hour of 1 second and
in th e p.m. peak delay of 0.5 seconds and no change to the LOS. Assuming the project is not built, Wood Rodgers concluded that by 2035, the intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of 60.5 seconds and a p.m. peak delay of 44.2 seconds, giving it a LOS E/D. Assuming the project is built, Wood Rodgers concluded that by 2035, the intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of
65. 2 seconds and a p.m. peak delay of 49.4 seconds, giving it a LOS E/D, representing an increase of 4.7 seconds over the a.m. peak and 5.2 seconds over the p.m. peak, with no LOS change over cumulative changes without the project.

• The intersection of Sierra College wit h the project site driveway is not yet operational; so, it does not have current LOS val ues. Wood Rodgers estimated that under current conditions, the new driveway intersection would operate at an a.m. peak delay of 15.3 seconds and a p.m. peak delay of 19.2 seconds, giving it a
LOS C/C. Th e intersection would not qualify for a signal warra nt. Ass uming the project is built, with other cumulative traffic changes, Wood Rogers estimated the project would have a 49.2 peak a.m. hour delay and an over 80 second peak p.m. delay, for a LOS E/F by the year 2035. Wood Rodgers pre d i c ted the intersect ion will still not qualify for a signal warrant in 2035.27

c. Wood Rodgers’s Evaluation of the Data Regarding Traffic Volume Wood Rodgers examined its data and concluded the project would have a

“ ‘significant’ ” impact on the following existing Sierra Co llege intersections in the
indicated time frames: at Annabelle Avenue under both current conditions and
cumulative conditions for 2035 , and at Old Auburn Road under cumulative conditions for
2035 . In each case, Wood Rodgers reasoned the impact was signif icant because, though
the project

- generated traffic would not change the LOS designation of the intersection, (1) the project would increase average intersection delay; (2) the intersection is currently
or would in 203 5 operate at a standard below LOS C wi thout the additional project

generated traffic; and (3) “[b]ased on City of Roseville policy, the minimum acceptable standard for this intersection is LOS ‘C

. ’ ” In short, in instanc es in which Wood Rodgers
det ermined an intersection does now or will in 2 035 operate below LOS C, Wood Rogers treated any increase in calculated delays as significant. Wood Rodgers looked at measures to alter the subject intersections that could feasibly reduce traffic delays, but

n oted there are not currently identified fun ding programs or ti metables in the City’s Capital Improvement Program with which to implement those changes. Wood Rodgers thus concluded that, after looking at the potential mitigation measures, the project impacts in the above scenarios wou ld be “ ‘significant and unavo i dable

. ’ ” With respect to the proposed new intersection at the entry to the project site, Wood Rodgers concluded that under current conditions, and assuming the project proceeded with the proposed no

- left

- turn egress, the intersection would operate at a LOS C/C, and, therefore the impact would be “ ‘less than significant

. ’ ” Under all scenarios, Wood
Ro d gers concluded that in 2035, the driveway’s LOS would be LOS D/D “or worse” and that this impact was “ ‘significant and u navoidable

. ’ ”28 d. EIR Analysis of the Data Regarding Traffic Volume
The EIR identified specific measure ments it used to ascertain the impact project

generated traffic would have on the traffic near the project area. In light of the City of Roseville’s policy that establishe s a goal of 70 percent or more of the City’s signalized intersections operating at LOS C or better , the EIR state s that the project’s impact on
traffic at signalized intersections would be significant if: (1) it caused the downgradin g of the LOS at a signalized intersection operating at or above LOS C to below LOS C, or the downgrading of a signalized intersection operating at below LOS C to an even lower designation (e.g., if a LOS D was downgraded to a LOS E); (2) the “downgrade in LOS designations at City signalized intersections, directly attributable to delay from the proposed project, would decrease the percentage of City signalized intersections performing at or above LOS ‘ C ’ from 70 percent or greater to les s than 70 p ercent” or; (3) “ [ i ] f , under existing or cumulative .

. . conditions” without project

- generated traffic, “less than 70 percent of City Signalized intersections are performing at LOS C or better, and the addition of project traffic would downgrade the LOS designati ons of additional intersections from LOS C or better to below LOS C.” Because the City of Roseville “does not apply LOS policies to unsignalized intersections, ” the EIR indicates that project

- generated traffic would be deemed to have a significant impac t on traffic at an unsignalized intersection if, based on the warrant criteria applied by Wood Rodger s , “the addition of the proposed project to existing conditions caused the satisfaction of a traffic signal warrant.” Using the above framework, the EIR conclude s that because , under existing conditions, the signalized intersection at Sierra College Boulevard and Old Auburn Road would continue to operate at a LOS C/C, the impact of the project on existing conditions
at the intersection would be less than significant. Similarly, because the LOS for the intersection in 2035 was projected to be LOS E/D with or without the additional traffic29

generated by the project site, the EIR conclude s the project’s impact on the intersection would be “less th an cumulativ ely considerable.” As for the unsignalized intersections, though the EIR discusses the LOS projections at the two unsignalized intersections

-- the one at Annabelle Avenue and the one at the driveway for the project site, it applie s the signal warrant analysis to determine significance of traffic impacts at both in tersections . Consistent with its stated criteria that “the proposed project would be determined to have a significant impact at unsignalized
intersections i f the addition of the proposed project to e xisting conditions caused the satisfaction of a traffic signal warrant in the absence of a specific policy for LOS” the EIR determined that the project would have “less than significant ” impact at the two
intersections under exi sting conditions, and a “less than cumulatively c onsiderable” impact in 2035

.

e. Weaving Analysis In September 2015, Wood Rodgers provided a supplement to the traffic study in which it provided the results of an an alysis it had prepared “of the weaving movement

. . . that would result from project vehicles turning right onto southbound Sierra College Boulevard and merging left to the left

- turn pocket lane at Old Auburn Road intersection

. . . in order to make a U

- turn onto

. . . Sierra College Bo ulevard.” “Due to the relatively low volumes of project traffic m erging into the left

- turn lane,” Wood Rogers concluded the traffic movement would “not have any significant impacts on traffic operations” on that segment of Sierra College Boulevard under e xisting or cumulative plus conditions.
Bas ed on the Wood Rodger s analysis, the EIR finds that “the distance between the project driveway and old Auburn Road would b e sufficient to allow safe weaving movements. Further, the impact to the segment of Sierra College Bouleva rd from weaving movement originating from the project site would not alter the existing LOS
des ignation

. ” On this basis, the EIR concludes the “potential impacts to the roadway30

segment of Sierra College Boulevard to the south of the projec t site from weaving movements would be considered less than significant.” Wood Rodgers did not perform an additional weaving analysis for other segments
of traffic flow . However, in response to comments regarding safety concerns stemming
from additiona l traffic weaving generated by the project, the Final EIR indicates, “[t]he distance between Annabelle Avenue and the proposed project driveway would be approximately 750 feet, which represents ample distance for vehicles turning from
Annabelle Avenue to s outhbound Sierra College Boulevard to accelerate and not conflict with southbound Sierra College Boulevard traffic that would turn westbound into the project s ite. Typically, vehicles would not decelerate 750 feet prior to making a turn. Therefore, there would be adequate distance to allow the acceleration of vehicles turning onto southbound Sierra College Boulevard and the deceleration of vehicles turning right into the project site without creating a vehicula r conflict. The proposed deceleration lane

a long southbound Sierra College Boulevard approaching the project driveway would allow vehicles room to adjust speed for turning, providing increased safety over a roadway configuration without a deceleration lane.”
2. The County Did Not Abuse Its Discre tion in Making Traffic Significance
Findi ngs Based on the above set of facts, substantial evidence supports the EIR’s conclusion that the traffic impacts by the project at the three studied intersections would be less than significant u nder present condit ions and less than cumulatively considerable by 2035. Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that the potential impacts to the roadway segment of Sierra College Boulevard to the south of the project site from weaving movements would be consider ed less than significant. The analysis took into
consi deration expert calculation of traffic flows in addition to guidelines and standards applicable to Sierra College Boulevard

.31

Appellants challenge these conclusions on four grounds. First, appellants contend there is a “major and unexplained” c onflict between the “data and conclusions” in the traffic study and in the EIR, given that the traffic study concluded traffic impacts at some
of the intersections would be significant a nd the EIR did not. Appellan ts argue this
conflict is exacerbated by the fact that the expert applied a “rural” framework to the signal warrant analysis when the County maintains the project site is not rural. Second, they argue the EIR analysis is faulty because it do es not include a weavin g analysis for southbound traffic between Annabelle Avenue and the entrance to the project site. Third, they argue the EIR is lacking because it fails to account for changes in elevation along Sierra College Boulevard that “make it dif ficult to see vehicles entering and exitin g the roadway.” Fourth, they argue that the EIR fails to consider how the proposed expansion of Sierra College Boulevard will impact improvements to the roadway that are designed to mitigate potential traffic i mpacts. None of the se arguments succeeds

. As to the first argument, appellants mischaracterize the conflict. While the traffic study and EIR may reach different qualitative conclusions about th e import of the data, they do not conflict in terms of what that data says about quantitative traffic levels. To the extent they interpret the import of the data differently, that difference is the result of a difference in the selection and application of local guidelines governing traffic. “CEQA grants agencies discretion to develop their own thresholds of signi ficance.” ( Save Cuyama Valley v. County of Santa Barbara , (2013) 213 Cal. App.4th 1 059, 1068; see also CEQA Guidelines, § 15064 , subd. (b)(1) [“The determination of whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment calls for careful judgment on the part of the public age ncy involved, based to the extent possible on scien tific and factual data”].)
“T here is no ‘gold standard’ for determining whether a given impact may be significant.” ( Protect the H istoric Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency (2004)
116 Cal. App.4th 1099, 11 07.) This is so because, “ [a] n ironclad defi nition of significant effect is not always possible because the significance of an activity may vary with the32

setting.” (Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (b)(1).) The import of a lead agency’s role in making qualitative determinations regarding the signifi canc e of quantitative data is further reflected by the requirement that the “decisionmaking ; body of a public agency shall not delegate .

. . [¶] [r]eviewing and considering a fina l EIR.” ( CEQA Guidelines, § 15025, subd. (b)(1 ).) Here, the County properly exercised its authority to determine that a warrant analysis should be applied to the unsignalized intersections rather than a LOS analysis, because the intersections are in a jurisdiction where LOS standards do not control unsignalized intersect ions. T his particular difference between the EIR and traffic study conclusions exemplifies why lead agencies need to make their own final significance determinations: Wood Rogers’s interpretation of the Roseville policy is an understandable misreading, b ut a misreading nonetheless. As indicated, the Roseville policy is that 70 percent of all signalized intersections must operate at a LOS C

-- the plain meaning of this policy is not all intersections need to operate at LOS C

. This standard
allows that even some signalized intersections will operate below LOS C, and unsignalized intersections are not evaluated using the LOS scale. Thus , when Wood
Ro d gers reasons that “[b]ased on City of Roseville LOS policy, the minimum acceptable
standard for this [un signalized] intersection is LOS ‘C’ ” it misinterpret s the local
standard. With an understanding that local policies using LOS values are applied by looking

a t signalized intersections , the EIR looks to whether the unsignalized intersections would
b ecome eligible for a signal, thereby bring ing them into the pool of intersections to be counted when determining if 70 percent or more of signalized intersections operate at
LOS C or below

. When the data showed the change in traffic flows would not make t he intersections eligible for a signal warrant , the EIR appropriately found the change in
traffic volumes at the intersection would be less than significant based on the County’s chosen significance threshold . As for appellants ’ argument that the signal warrant analysis is faulty because the expert applied a “rural” framework and this project is not33

zoned rural, the appellants exaggerate the significance of the chosen frame work

. Wood Rodgers does not say the area is rural

. Rath er, based on a variety of considerations they selected and appl ied the framework as a “representative type of warrant analysis.” Appellants argue the EIR is deficient because it does not include a weaving analysis for traffic traveling southbound on Sie rra College Boulevard from Annabelle Avenue to the project entry site , or account for changes in elevation along Sierra College Boulevard that might impact the ability to see ve hicles entering and exiting the project
site . ESA, an environmental consultant , responded to both of these concerns when appellants raised them with the County . As to the first topic, ESA notes “[a]ccording to the traffic consultants, weaving analysis for this roadway segment is not required because
the distance .

. . is approximat ely 770 feet. This is enough distance for vehicles turning right from Annabelle Avenue onto southbound Sierra College Boulevard to integrate with vehicles preparing to turn right into the project driveway. Additionally, the project will
have a decelerati on lane on southbound Sierra College Boulevard, allowing s lowing and turning vehicles to segregate themselves from through traffic.” As to the second issue ESA indicates, “[t]here is a 3% vertical slope on Sierra College Boulevard, and the roadway slopes downward north to south. The project does not propose to alter the vertical topography of the roadway and sight lines would be maintained. The project driveway would be approximately 1,200 feet downhill from the crest of Sierra College
Boulevard. Vehicles traveling south on Sierra College would be visible bo th to drivers exiting the project site and turning right and to drivers turning left into the project site from northbound Sierra College Boulevard.” These statements suggest the analysis
appe llants indicate is missing on both topics is missing because the issues appellants raise are really non

- issues. Appellants argue that to the extent ESA’s response regarding weaving relies on information it obtained from the expert, it “does not constitute substantial evidence as it is not from the traffic consultant and only purports to state what the traffic consultant stated about weaving.”34

But this misses the import of the explanation

. We are being asked to determine
whether the EIR is deficient when it does not address every topic appellants raise in opposition to the project. Here, we start with the standard that, “CEQA does not require a lead agency to conduct every test or perform all research, study, and experimentation
recommended or demanded b y commenters. When responding to comments, lead agencies need only respond to significant environmental issues and do not need to provide all information requested by reviewers, as long as a good faith effort at full disclosure is made in the EIR.” ( CEQA Guidelines, § 15204, subd. (a)

. ) “A pro ject opponent or reviewing court can always imagine some additional study or analysis that might provide helpful information. It is not for them to design the EIR. That further study

. . . might be helpful does no t make it necessary.” ( Laurel Heights , supra , 47 Cal. 3d at p. 415.) Here, the ESA response shows that the County acted in good faith
and made a rea sonable inquiry into possible traffic impacts

. Finally, appellants take issue with the fact that the EIR relies on the future expansion of Sierra College Boulevard in reaching its findings regarding cumulative impacts without assessing how “th is future expansion will im p act the mitigation
measures propo sed to address the Project’s direct traffic impacts. For instance, the Project includes” a deceleration lane and a left

- turn ingress only lane at the entrance of Sierra College Boulevard

. A ppellants state the expansion “will require additional land,
either i n the median or on the shoulders . Yet the EIR Co mpletely fails to assess whether these proj ect

- specific improvements can remain once the expansion is in place .” As the trial court indicated in rejecting this argument, ESA responded to this argument when the appellants raised it after the close of the EIR comment period by stating, “[t]he future roadway expansion will occur in the existing median and will accommodate one northbound lane, one southbound lane, and a turn lane into the project site. No outside widening of Sierra College Boulevard would oc cur within the project vicinity; thus, project driveway acceleration/deceleration lanes would not change under cumulative35

conditions.” ESA ’s representation is supported by the Tentative Subdivision Ma p. In short, as has been pointed out to appellants rep eatedly, the EIR did not consider what would happen if the City removes project improvements when it widens Sierra College Boulevard, because the City’s plans do not include the removal of the deceleration or turn
lanes. There was no error.

D. The EIR Su

fficiently Addresses Land Use Plans CEQA requires EIRs to address, “any inconsistencies between the proposed project and applicable general plans.” ( CEQA Guidelines, § 15125 , subd. (d).) Appellants argue that the EIR failed to comply with this guideline because it did not consider the project’s inconsistency with policies numbered 1.A.3 and 4.E.7 of the Placer Countywide General Plan. This argument fails, because, as discussed in more detail in
section II.C. below, the project is not inconsistent with t hose two policies.

II The Project Does Not Violate State Planning and Zoning Law s and the Subdivision Map
Act Appel lants argue that the County violated California p lanning and z oning l aw s and
the Subdivision Map Act and abused its discretion w hen it approved the project. Specifically, appellants argue the project conflicts with one policy contained in the Granite Bay Community Plan , the land use p olicy number 5 applicable to subdivisions (Land Use Policy 5) , and two policies in the Placer County Countywide General Plan , policies 1.A.3 and 4.E.7. W e disagree. While the approved project may not be consistent
with Land Use Policy 5, th at policy is not fundamental to the Granite Bay Community
Plan

. T he County’s approval of the project is not inconsistent with either policy 1.A.3 or policy 4.E.7

.36

A. Additional Facts Related to Land Use Policies

“ The Placer County General Plan consists of two types of documents: [the] Countywide General Plan (which consists of a policy document and land use diagram) and a set of more detailed community plans (including one ‘area’ plan) covering specific areas of the unincorporated county.” “The Countywide General Plan provides an overall
framework for develo pment of the county and protection of its natural and cultural resources. The goals and policies contained in the Countywide General Plan are applicable throughout the county, except t o the extent that County authority is preempted by cities within their corporate limits.” Community plans, which are “adopted in the
same manner as the Countywide General Plan , provide a more detailed focus on specific geographic areas within the unincorporated county. The goals and policies contained in
the commun ity plans supplement and elaborate upon, but do not supersede, the goals and policies of the Countywide General Plan .” Given the location of the project site, it is covered by both the Countywide General Plan ( General Plan ) and the Granite Bay Community Plan ( Gran ite Bay Plan ).
In a section regarding land use policies, the General Plan states, “[t]he land use designations used in this General Plan are intended to generally portray overall land use patterns throughout the unincorporated areas of the county rather than precisely define the specific land uses a ppropriate on each parcel of land. The land use policies and
standards of the General Plan are implemented on a day

- to

- day basis through zoning, which imposes specific development standards on any proposed land use.” Similarly, and reflecting its role as a supplement to the General Plan , the Granite Bay Plan indicates, “[t]he County depends on the Community Plan to not only guide land use
decision

- making but to also provide flexibility that is essential for mature neighborhoods to adapt in the face of changing social, economic, physical and environmental considerations.”37

The EIR evaluated 17 goals and policies of the General Plan that it deemed were relevant, and determined that the project was consistent with each of them. This
evaluation did not include a discussion regarding policies 1.A.3 and 4.E .7. Policy 1.A.3. supports Goal 1.A. regar ding general land use in Placer County. Goal 1.A. is to “promote the wise, efficient, and environmentally

- sensitive use of Placer County lands to meet the present and future needs of Placer County residents and busine sses.” Policy 1.A.3. states “[t]he Co unty shall distinguish among urban/suburban and rural areas to identify where development will be accommodated and where public infrastructure and services will be provided. This pattern shall promote the maintenance of separate and distinct communities.” Go al 4.E. is “[t]o manage rainwater and stormwater at the source in a sustainable manner that least inconveniences the public, reduces potential water

- related damage, augments wate r supply, mitigates storm water pollution, and enhances the environment.” Policy 4.E.7. states, “[t]he County shall prohibit the use of underground storm drain systems in rural and agricultural areas, unless no other feasible alternatives
are availab le for conveyance of stormwater from new development or when necessary to mitig ate flood hazards.” The EIR evaluated the project to determine if it was consistent with 20 of the goals and policies contained in the Granite Bay Plan . It determined the project was consistent with each identified policy except for Land Use Policy 5, which states in residential
subdivisions:

“ Lots shall be adequate in size and shape to accommodate those primary

and accessory uses which are in keeping with the particular residential characteristics of the specific location without:

“ a) Creating a feelin g of overcrowding.

“ b) Creating measurable negative environmental impacts which cannot be adequately mitigated.

“ c) C reating the need f

or variances.’38

The EIR noted that “the project seeks a Variance for maximum lot coverage on single

- story lots of less than 8,000 square feet, the 14 deed restricted single

- story units on the perimeter of the project have been proposed specifically to reduce any feeling o f overcrowding that could be perceived by the adjacent properties.”
B. Standards for Evaluating Consistency w ith Community Plans Government Code section 65300 states that within each county its “planning agency shall prepare and [its] legislative body

. . . shall adopt a comprehensive, long

- term general plan for the physical development of the county .

. . , and of any land outside its boundaries which in the planning agency’s judgm ent bears relation to its planning.” The plan “shall consist of a state ment of development policies and shall include a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals. The plan shall include .

. . [¶] [a] land use element that designates the proposed general
distribution an d general location and extent of the uses of the land .” (Gov. Code, § 65302.) “The general plan has been aptly des cribed as the ‘constitution for all future developments’ within the city or county. [Citations.] ‘[T]he propriety of virtually any
local d ecision affecting land use and development depends upon consistency with the applicable general plan and its elements.’ [Citations.] ” ( Goleta , supra , 52 Cal. 3d at
p p. 570

- 571 ; see also Gov. Code, § 66 474, subd. (a) [“A legislative body of a city or county shall deny approval of a tentative map, or a parcel map for which a tentative map was not required, if it makes any of the following findings: (a) That the proposed map is not consistent with applicab le general and specif ic plans ”]. )
Yet, “no project is entirely consistent with a general plan ‘ “ ‘[b]ecause policies in a general plan reflect a range of competing interests.’ ” ’ ( Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville (2007) 154 Cal. App.4th 8 07, 816 [65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251].) For this

reason, ‘ [s]tate law does not require perfect conformity between a proposed project and the applicable general plan. ’ ( Id. at p. 817[.] ) ” ( Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation39

v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal. 5th 141, 157.) “A project is consistent with the general plan ‘ “ if, considering all its aspects, it will further the objectives and policies of the general plan and not obstruct their attainment .” ’ [Citations]

. . . To be consistent, a subdivision development must be ‘ compatible with ’ the objectives, policies, general land uses and programs specified in the general plan. [Citations.]” ( Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural etc. County v. Board of S upervisors (1998) 62 Cal. App.4th 1332, 1336.) When addressing whether a decision impacting land use is consistent with an overall general plan, we ask if the element of the general plan the decision seemingly conflicts
with is “fundamental, mandatory and specific.” ( Id. at p p. 1341

- 1342.)
When courts address a claim of inconsistency between a project and a general plan, “it is important to keep in mind the deferential nature of our review. It is not for us to substitute our judgment for that of a local agency in making a determination of consistency; rather, the agency ’ s determination ‘comes to this court with a strong presumption of regularity.’ ( Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal. App.4th 704, 717 [29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182].)” ( Californ ia Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cor dova (2009) 172 Cal. App.4th 603, 638.) When a general plan is in place, it “is the province” of local officials “to examine the specifics of a proposed project to determine whether it would be ‘in harmony’ with the policies stated in the plan. [Citations ] It is, emphatically, not the role of the courts to micromanage
th ese development decisions. Our function is simply to decide whether the [local] officials considered the applicable policies and the extent to which the proposed project
conforms with tho se policies, whether the [local] officials made appropriate findings on this issue, and whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence.” ( Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland , supra, 23 Cal. App.4th at p p. 719

- 720.)
“Because an appellate court’s task in review of a mandate proceeding is essentially t he same as that of the trial court, we review the agency ’ s actions directly and are not bound40

by the trial court ’ s conclusions.” ( Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville , supra, 154 Cal. A pp.4th at p. 8 16 .) C. The County’s Approval of the Project is Not Inconsistent w ith The General Plan

1. Polic y 1.A.3. Appellants argue that when the County adopted a resolution to amend the Granite Bay Community Plan to change the project site’s land use designation from r ural l ow d ensity r esidential to m edium d ensity r esidential , it impermissibly acted in conflict with Policy 1.A.3. Appellants reason that the modification of the plan is “in direct conflict with Policy 1.A.3,” because it “converted” an area previously set aside for “rural low

density residential” to “ suburban uses.” This r eads to o much into the require ments of polic y 1.A.3. While the policy does require the County to distinguish between rural and urban/suburban areas to identify where development will be accommodated, it does not dictate that the County will never be allowed to change how and where it draws those
di stinctions. Additionally , (1) the goal the policy is intended to support anticipates the policy will be applied to “meet the present and future needs of Placer County residents ” ; (2) “[t]he land use designations used i n this General Plan are intended to generally portray overall land use patterns .

. . rather than precisely define the specific land uses appropriate on each parcel of land” ; and (3) “[t]he land use policies and sta ndards of the
General Plan a re implemented on a day

- to

- day basis through zoning, which imposes specific development standards on any proposed land use

. ”
A ppellants interpretation of policy 1.A.3. is counter to all three of those mandates
in that i t rende rs the policy a straight jacket that prohibits the County from reevaluat ing and chang ing the land use designations within Granite Bay . A far more reasonable reading of 1.A. 3 is that i t requires the County to go through a variety of levels of carefully considered steps

-- i ncluding reviewing and possibly amending the generally defined use of a parcel of land

-- before it can change how a specific area is being used.41

The County did make thes e careful considerations, and it acted well within its discretion
to work within its Gen eral Plan when it did so

. 2. Policy 4.E.7 Appellants argue the project is in conflict with policy 4.E.7

. To make this argument, appellants try to characterize the pr oject land as rural in nature, citing portions of the EIR that note that pre

- development the land was “rural residential” and that Granite Bay overall is “a scenic, tranquil, family

- oriented rural/residential community , ” and noting the pre

- project land use design ation and zoning were agricultural and rural in nature. But the general mix of land uses in Granite Bay and how the project cite was designated and zoned before project approval does not determine how this specific s ite is
zoned after project appro val. With project approval this specific land was rezoned and designated as medium

- density residential. As such, the restrictions in 4.E.7. do not apply, and there can be no conflict.

D. Land Use Policy 5 is Not Fundamental to the Granite Bay Plan In arguing that the County’s approval of the project violates the p lanning and zoning laws and the Subdivision Map Act due to an inconsistency with Land Use Policy 5, appellants focus on language in th e policy which states subdivision lots “ shall be adequate in size and shape to accommodate those primary and accessory uses which are in keeping with the particular residential characteristics of the specific location without

. . . [¶] [c]reating the need for variances.” Appellants reason that the use of the word “shall” makes the requirement mandatory, and, because part of the project approval process involved provi ding some lots with a variance, the project is inconsistent with the polic y. Indeed, the EIR notes that the project is inconsistent with the policy. However, an inquiry as to whether a p articular action v iolates p lanning and z oning
l aw s and the Subdivision Map Act does not end when we determine that a project is
inconsistent with one particular policy of a plan. Rather, recognizing that projects can42

rarely be consistent with all of the competing interests contained in a general plan ( Friends of Lagoon Valley v. City of Vacaville , supra, 154 Cal. App.4th at p. 816), we ask
instead wheth er a decision is consistent with an overall general plan, and focus on if the specific policy with which an action conflicts is “fundamenta l, mandatory and specific.” ( Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural etc. County v. Board of Supervisors , supra, 62 Cal. Ap p. 4th at p p. 1341

- 1342, italics added.) The EIR notes that, “the Granite Bay Community Plan recognizes the need for a mix of housing densities and m ore sustainable, efficient use of land while preserving the rural character of the Community.” Looking at the nature of the project and its proposed use of building materials and plants, it concludes, “the proposed project would support Community Goal 1 and Goal 3.1.1, which state the County should ‘maintain the identity of Granite Bay as a scenic, tranquil, f amily

- oriented rural/residential community compatible with the area’s physical constraints and natural features’ and ‘preserve the unique character of the Granite Bay area which is exemplified by the general rur al environment, oak woodlands, mix of land us es and densities, and high quality of development.’ ” The EIR also observes that project would feature “lot sizes ranging from 7,150 square feet to 17,196 square feet with a mix of one

- and two

- story homes; therefore, the project would support General Com munity Goal 13 to ‘provide a diversity of housing choices that can support a full range of lifestyles in the commun ity.’ ” With respect to the variance for the proposed project, the EIR indicates “the impetus for requesting the Variance is to help allev iate the perceived massing of the project from the perspective of the immedi ate neighbors, while allowing for larger single

story homes.” At the same time, the variance allows the homes to be, “of a size and scale conducive to the character of” the homes to the north and east of the project, co nsistent with policy 3.2.9 of the Granite Bay Plan . Thus, rather than running counter to the overall goals and nature of the Granite Bay Plan , allowing the variance actually “furthers the general plan’s policies” regarding how development should be accomplished in43

Granite Bay. (See Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklin (2011) 197 Cal. App.4th 200, 239.) As such, the projects inconsistenc y with Subdivision Policy 5 is not fundamental. (See ibid. [“any inconsistency that exists here is not fundamental

. . . . A reasonable person, seeking to implement the general plan’s policies of preserving habitat, open space, and scenic vistas, clearly would have concluded the deviation from the buffer

zon e requirement in this instance better fulfills the general plan’s objectives and requiremen ts ”].) The County did not abuse its discretion in approving the project.

III The County Did Not Abuse Its Di scretion i n Allowing a Variance f or the Project

A. Additional F

acts As part of the steps it took to allow the project to move forward, the County changed the zoning classification of the project site to RS

- B

- X 7,000. The new
classification permits single

- fa mily residences on lots with minimum sizes of 7,000
sq uare feet. (See Pla cer County Code , § § 17.50.010 & 17.52.040.C.1. , available at https://perma.cc/7LNL

- YAK9 as of October 28, 2020. ) Absent exceptions not at issue here, Placer County zoning provi sions limit site coverage by one

- story homes on parcels zoned for single

- family resident ial use to a maximum of 40 percent. (Placer County
Code , § 17.50.010.E.) Fourteen “deed restricted single

- story units on the perimeter of the project” were included i n the project proposal “to reduce any feeling of overcrowding that could be perceived by the adjacent properties.” Some of those deed restricted lots are less than 8,000 square feet in area. The applicant request ed a variance to allow single

- family homes on lots under 8,000 square feet to cover up to 50 percent of the lot to
allow those deed

- restricted residences to “build houses that are similar to the rest of the
dev elopment” on those lots. T he applicant considered other options to develop the property

-- including maintaining the existing lot sizes and zoning, and building only 40

-44

single family homes

-- but determined the options that would have resulted in fewer but larger lots were not financially feasible. In approving the variance, the County found that a “strict application” of the 40 percent maximum coverage requirement on the subject lots would “deprive the property of privileges enjoyed by other property owners in the vicinity and under identical classification.” It noted that the “[l]arger single

- story homes” the variance would permit would also “be consistent with the size and scale of many homes in the Granite Bay
island area.” T he County also found that granting the variance did not (1) “constitute a grant of special privileges inconsistent with limitations upon other properties” in the area or zoning district; (2) authorize a use of the parcels “that is not otherwise authorized in the zone district; ” (3) “advers ely affect the public health or safety ” ; (4) serv e as a material detriment to the public welfare; or (5) injure nearby property or improvemen ts. On the contrary, the County found that by allowing for more variety in housing
condition s of the pr oject site, including more single

- story residences, and ther eby reducing “any visual impacts and perceptions of increased density on the project site” the variance “will be beneficial to the health, safety, peace and welfare of the property not only in the vicinity of the project [but] of the County generally.”

B

. The Variance Was Permissibl e Government Code section 65906 only permits variances from the terms of zoning ordinances “when, because of special circumstances applicable to the proper ty, including size, shape, topography, location or surroundings, the s trict application of the zoning ordinance deprives such property of privileges enjoyed by other property in the vicinity and under identical zoning classification.” Any variance “shall be subject to such conditions as will assure that” it does “not consti tute a grant of special privileges
inconsistent with the limitations u pon other properties in the vicinity and zone in which such property is situated.” (Gov. Code, § 65906

. ) Additionally, a variance cannot45

authorize, “a use or activity which is not othe rwise expressly authorized by the zone regulation governing the parcel of property.” ( Ibid. ) Similarly, Placer County Ordinance Number 16.04.130 provides, “a variance shall be granted o nly when, because of special circumstances applicable to the property, including size, proposed population, density, shape, topography, location or surroundings, a nd criteria of the land development manual, a deviation from the provisions of this section w ould beneficial to the health, safety, peace or welfare of property in the vicinity or of the county generally.” “The granting or denial of a variance rests larg ely in the discretion of the body designated by the zo ning ordinance for that purpose.” ( Flagstad v. San Mateo (1957)
156 Cal. App.2d 138, 140

. ) When a County approves a variance, “it is presumed that official duty was performed in the making of the requi red investigation, and that the existence of the necessary facts was found.” ( Ibid. ) The courts will not disturb the decision of a local body to grant or deny a variance, “in the absence of a clear and convincing showing of an abuse of discretion.” ( Id. at p. 141.) Additionally, we will defer to the County’s interpretation of its own ordinances, which “will be accorded great respect by the courts and will be followed if not clearly erroneous.” ( Eskeland v. City of
Del Mar (2014) 224 Cal. App.4th 936, 94 6, citations and quotatio ns marks removed.) Here, the County made appropriate findings to support the variance: given the size and deed restrictions of these lots, strict application of the coverage requirements would deprive the owners of the ability to build homes of a similar size and scale of the homes of their neighbors; and the single

- story deed restriction that gives rise to the need
for the variance is beneficial to public because it reduces a sense of massing and overcrowding in the area. Appe llants challenge the County’s determination by arguing the existence of lot
sizes that

-- if no variance were granted

-- would restrict single

- story home sizes to homes that are not commensurate in size with other area homes is a hardship “created

. . . throug h the design of the project” and that, as such, a variance was not really required.46

The appellants point out that “the need for a variance is the result of the developer’s actions in dividing the property,” suggesting that developer cannot now seek and th e County cannot now approve a varian ce when they could have created larger lots on the project site. Citing Town of Atherton v. Templeton (1961) 198 Cal. App.2d 146 ( Atherton ), appellants argue a “self

- induced hardship does not constitute grounds for grantin g a variance.” Yet, as the trial court aptly observed, the instant case is readily distinguishable from Ath erton

. In Atherton property owners sought a variance that would allow them to construct a tennis court in their front yard. ( Atherton , su

pra , 198 Cal. App.2d at p. 149.) At the time the owners sought the variance, they owned sufficient land to construct the tennis court on an area of the property that was not their front yard, and therefore where
construction would not run afoul of the ordi nance. ( Id. at p. 154

. ) However, after they applied for the variance, they sold some of the land, thereby creating the situation where they would only have sufficient room for a tennis c ourt in their front yard. ( Ibid. ) Afte r the city denied their requ est for a variance, the property owners built the tennis court anyway, “in willful disregard of the ruling.” ( Id. at p. 149. ) The Town of Atherton then sought and was granted a judgment permanently enjoining the owner s from maintaining
the tennis court a nd ordering them to remo ve the structure. ( Id. at p. 148

. ) On appeal, the owners argued the Town of Atherton improperly denied the requested variance, b ut the court disagreed, reasoning, “[s]ince the facts in the inst ant case clearly reveal that any hardship suffered by appellants is the result of their own actions in deliberately disposing of land on which the tennis court could properly have been built, there can be no question that the planning commiss ion acted properly in denying them a variance.” ( Id. at p. 154. )
In contrast to the facts at issue in Atherton , this case is not in a posture where the variance applicant openly disobeyed an ordinance. Moreover, in Atherton the court was considering if a local entity correctly denied a variance, h ere we are considering if a local entity correctly granted a variance. Based on these two significant factual differences, it47

is simply too far a stretch to say that Atherton compels the conclusion that the County improperly allowed a variance here simply because it is conceivable that the developer could have drawn property lines so that all of the deed restricted parcels could have been
deed restricted and still allowed for the construction of single story homes that are both of
a similar size as other h ome s in the area and within the 40 percent cap on lot coverage. Additionally, the fact it was in theory possible for the lots to be drawn in a way that obviates the need for the variance does not mean, as appellants suggest, that substantial evidence does not support the granting of the variance. In Eskeland v. City o f
Del Mar , supra, 224 Cal. App.4th at pages 939, 953

- 954 , the court upheld a city’s granting of a variance related to property setbacks to an owner building a home, even though, technically speaking, the owner could have b uilt the home without the varianc e. The court reasoned, “we also understand the Eskelands to be advancing the position that because it was physically possible for Scurlock to build a house that complied with the front yard setback requirement, Scurlock should have been required to do so, d espite the degree of difficulty or expense involved and despite any other negative consequences of such a design. That i s not the law. For one thing, the increased expense involved in developing a lot that poses topographical challenges is properly con si dered when deciding whether a variance is warranted.” ( Eskeland v. City of Del Mar , supra, 224 Cal. App.4th at p p. 953

- 954.) Here too the County and the trial court properly
considered the financial infeasibility of dividing the lots in a manner that woul d avoid the

nee d for a variance. Appellants also argue the County impermissibly granted the variance due to its inconsistency with Land Use Policy 5. As we concluded above, Land Use Policy 5 is not a fundamental policy of the Granite Bay Plan and this inconsistency is allowed.48 IV The Project Does Not Violate the California Fire Code The only regular ingress and egress to the project site will be provided by “a single gated access at the project’s midpoint along Sierr a College Boulevard,” which runs along the east side of the project site. Yet section D107.1 of Appendix D to the California Fire Code, requires all “[d]evelopments of one

- or two

- family dwellings where the numb er of dwelling units exceeds 30” to have “tw o separate and approved fire apparatus access roads.” Placer County has adopted the California Fire Code and its appendices through Placer County Code secti on 15.04.510. To satisfy the requirement for two fire a ccess roads, the project site would have, “a gated secondary access point to Eckerman Road that would be available for use only by emergency vehicles or by ar ea residents during an emergency.” E ckerman Road, which runs along the western edge of the proper ty, is a private road that has been dev eloped as a residential roadway varying in width from approximately 13 feet to 20 feet, and it ends in
a cul

- de

- sac near the midpoint of the western edge of the project site. Appellants argue that the proposed emerg ency access point does not satisfy the requirements of the California Fire Code. Appellants argue Eckerman Road cannot serve
as a fire access road because it is too n arrow, citing table D103.4 of Appendix D of the
California Fire Code. Table D103. 4 dictate s fire apparatus access roads that are dead

- end
roads must be at least 20 feet wide. But in the event of an emergency that requires Eckerman Road to be used for fire access, the gated entrance would be open, leading traffic into the project site wh ere it could flow through the project site and out to Sierr a College Boulevard. T he requirements of table D103.4 do not apply because the
emergency access road would not be a dead

- end road. App ellants also argue that Eckerman Road cann ot be used as an em ergency access road for the project, because the project site lacks an easement that contemplates49

emergency access use for a community of 56 reside nces. Bu t the project proposal specifically circumscribes the use of Eckerman Road to emergency situations. That is, project residents and emergency service providers will only be using Eckerman Road when it is necessary to preserve life or property. Common law recognizes that “[n]ecessity often justifies an action which would otherwise constitute a trespass, as where the act is prompted by the motive of preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.” ( People v. Roberts (1956)
47 Cal. 2d 374, 377; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 197.) Because emergency vehicles and project residents would only use Eckerman Road out of necessity in the case of an emergency, we need not consider the scope of any easements to use Eckerman Road that might run with the project site.



### D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ROBIE, J.

MURRAY, J.