IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80154-6-I

)

Respondent, )

)

v. )

)

MICHELE LYNN HUNTLEY, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION

)

Appellant. ) 

)

VERELLEN, J. — No particular amount of time is required for a court’s 

consideration of sentencing materials when the record shows it reviewed them. 

Because the record shows the court considered all sentencing materials presented 

to it before sentencing Michele Huntley, it did not err. But because the record 

shows the court intended to strike all discretionary legal financial obligations (LFO) 

from the judgment and sentence and did not do so, a limited remand for a 

ministerial hearing is appropriate. And because it is unclear whether the court 

made a scrivener’s error regarding how long Huntley had to pay restitution and for 

the sake of judicial economy, clarification of this issue is also appropriate on 

remand. 

Therefore, we affirm in part and remand for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 
No. 80154-6-I/2

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FACTS

Huntley pleaded guilty to eight criminal charges from her theft of almost 

$2,000,000 from her employer. Several days before sentencing, defense counsel 

delivered her sentencing memorandum to the State and courthouse, but the judge 

did not receive it until the hearing had begun. The judge called a recess and 

reviewed the entire memorandum. After argument from the State and defense 

counsel, a statement from Huntley’s former employer, and an allocution with 

Huntley, the court sentenced her to 57 months incarceration at the high end of the 

standard range. The court imposed this sentence “mostly because of the 

sophisticated nature and long-term time period that the crime spanned.”1 The 

court required that Huntley pay restitution to her victim and pay mandatory LFOs 

only.

Huntley appeals.

ANALYSIS

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not allow appeal of the length of 

any sentence within the standard range, but a defendant can appeal the 

procedures followed when the court imposed a standard-range sentence.2 

Huntley argues the court erred by not giving sufficient consideration to the 33-page 

 

1 Report of Proceedings (Jan. 22, 2019) at 21.

2 State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 182-83, 713 P.2d 719 (1986); 

RCW 9.94A.585(1).
No. 80154-6-I/3

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defense sentencing memorandum because the judge took a recess of 19 minutes 

to review it.3 

The court reported reviewing the entire sentencing memorandum. This is 

sufficient to rebut Huntley’s argument, and the court’s questions during sentencing 

provide additional support. For example, the court considered when to set 

Huntley’s prison report date by asking if her father’s last cancer treatment was on 

February 21, 2019, which was in appendix C on page 18 of the sentencing 

memorandum. And the court clearly considered Huntley’s request from page 15 of 

the memorandum “to please grant me to be able to finish treatment with my father” 

by setting February 25, 2019 as her report date. Because the record shows the 

court considered all materials presented for sentencing, it did not err.

Huntley argues the court erred by imposing mandatory LFOs when she is 

indigent. Specifically, she contends any supervision fees imposed by the 

Department of Corrections constitute a mandatory LFO prohibited by 

 

3 Huntley also argues the court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to base the 

length of punishment on an individual’s particular circumstances.” Appellant’s Br.

at 6 (citing Brunson v. Pierce County, 149 Wn. App. 855, 861, 205 P.3d 963 

(2009); State v. Landsiedel, 165 Wn. App. 886, 889, 269 P.3d 347 (2012)). 

Neither case is apt. In Brunson, the court considered whether a hearing officer 

erred when she suspended three women of their professional licensures and 

refused to consider a suspension of less than one year. 149 Wn. App. at 858-60. 

And the proposition Huntley cites from Brunson was based on State v. Pettitt, 93 

Wn.2d 288, 294-96, 609 P.2d 1364 (1980), a case considering whether a 

prosecutor abused his discretion by filing charges without considering mitigating 

factors. Landsiedel analyzed whether a court’s failure to consider a proposed 

sentencing alternative required resentencing. 165 Wn. App. at 886. Neither case 

is germane to the circumstances here.
No. 80154-6-I/4

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RCW 10.101.010. Because supervision fees are discretionary,4 we accept the 

State’s concession that remand is appropriate for a ministerial hearing regarding 

these fees.

Huntley argues the court made a scrivener’s error when it wrote she had 

five years to repay her LFOs and restitution after saying during sentencing that 

she would have 10 years to do so. On this record, it is inconclusive whether the 

court made a scrivener’s error or changed its decision. But because remand is 

necessary and for the sake of judicial economy, clarification on this issue is 

appropriate on remand.

Therefore, we affirm Huntley’s sentence and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

 

4 State v. Dillon, 12 Wn. App. 2d 133, 152, 456 P.3d 1199, review denied, 

195 Wn.2d 1022 (2020).