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CONFRONTING THE FULL RANGE OF IRANIAN

THREATS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 11, 2017

Serial No. 115–80

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz distinguished visiting fellow, 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Former U.S. Ambassador 

to Iraq, Turkey, and Albania) ............................................................................. 5

General Charles F. Wald, USAF, Retired, distinguished fellow and co-chair, 

The Gemunder Center Iran Task Force, The Jewish Institute for National 

Security of America (Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command) .................................................................................................................... 13

Mr. David Albright, founder and president, Institute for Science and International Security .................................................................................................. 19

Mr. Jake Sullivan, senior fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Former National Security Adviser to the Vice President; Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State) ................................................................................................ 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James F. Jeffrey: Prepared statement ......................................... 7

General Charles F. Wald, USAF, Retired: Prepared statement .......................... 15

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 21

Mr. Jake Sullivan: Prepared statement ................................................................. 28

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 74

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 75

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 77

Written response from Mr. Jake Sullivan to question submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 79

Written responses from the Honorable James F. Jeffrey, Mr. David Albright, 

and Mr. Jake Sullivan to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Bradley S. Schneider, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois ............................................................................................................... 80

(1)

CONFRONTING THE FULL RANGE OF IRANIAN 

THREATS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. We will ask 

all members to take their seats at this time. 

And today we consider how the United States should confront 

the full range of threats that Iran poses to our national security 

and poses to the security of our regional allies and partners. And 

I will give you my view of this. 

I believe that President Obama’s flawed nuclear deal was a gamble that Iran would choose to become a responsible actor, a country 

focused on prosperity for its people and security along its borders. 

And unfortunately, and predictably, the Tehran regime clearly sees 

itself as a movement, one that uses ideology and violence to destabilize its neighbors, to threaten others, mainly the United States 

and Israel. That is why we still hear ‘‘death to Israel,’’ ‘‘death to 

the United States,’’ ‘‘Israel is a one-bomb country.’’ That is why we 

hear this. 

In Iraq and Syria, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have taken advantage of the fight against ISIS, and they are using their shock 

troops and Shia militia to brutalize Syrians and to seize much of 

the territory. As ISIS loses ground, the risk is real that one version 

of radical Islamist terror, ISIS, is simply replaced by another. 

Meanwhile, Hezbollah, ascendent in Lebanon, has thousands of 

fighters in Syria. It is well positioning itself to intensify its original 

mission: The destruction of Israel. This terrorist organization is 

building a deadly rocket arsenal ready to rain terror on the Jewish 

state. I was in Israel during the 2006 Hezbollah rocket campaign. 

Its capabilities then, quite substantial, are far more concerning 

today. This is a powder keg. 

This makes it all the more critical that we stop Iran from completing a ‘‘land bridge’’ from Iran to Iraq to Syria to Lebanon. This 

would be an unacceptable risk and, frankly, a strategic defeat. It 

is not just Israel’s security on the line. I feel that if Iran secures 

this transit route, it will mark the end of the decades-long U.S. effort to support an independent Lebanon. Jordan’s security, too, 

would be imperiled. 

2

This threat grows infinitely worse if Iran develops a nuclear 

weapons capability. In this regard, Iran’s continued pursuit of 

intercontinental ballistic missiles funded by the cash bonanza it received when sanctions were lifted, is telling. No country has run 

such an expensive program without also seeking nuclear warheads 

to go on top. These missiles are designed to hit us. 

While the nuclear deal may have constrained Iran’s ability to 

produce fissile material, these restrictions begin to sunset in less 

than a decade, leaving Iran with an industrial enrichment capability. The reluctance of international inspectors today to demand 

access to military bases means that we don’t know to what extent 

Iran is engaged in the complex—but more easily hidden—work of 

designing a nuclear warhead. 

And that is why clear majorities on this committee and in the 

House opposed the nuclear deal. Ultimately, however, the Obama 

administration rammed it through anyway. And as a result, roughly $100 billion was handed over to Iran. Much of this is now in the 

hands of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—an incredible 

amount of leverage lost. 

As flawed as the deal is, I believe we must now enforce the hell 

out of it. Let’s work with allies to make certain that international 

inspectors have better access to possible nuclear sites, and we 

should address the fundamental sunset shortcoming, as our allies 

have recognized. This committee will do its part tomorrow by 

marking up the Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement Act. 

We must also respond to Iran’s efforts to destabilize the region. 

This includes using our allies in Europe to designate Hezbollah in 

its entirety as a terrorist organization and providing the administration with additional tools to go after this Iranian proxy, as we 

voted to do this last week in this committee. 

Finally, we should be supporting the Iranian people who want a 

better life, who want more freedom, instead of suffering under the 

brutal repression of an ideologically inspired, hateful regime. We 

have no ill will toward the Iranian people. It is their government 

that gravely threatens us and threatens our allies. This is the approach that I believe the United States must take for our national 

security. 

Later this week, the President will make a legislatively mandated decision on certification of the nuclear deal. Whatever he decides, it is critical that the President lay out the facts. He should 

explain what his decision means. He should explain what it doesn’t 

mean. And then I hope, as I have tried to do here today, the President will define a responsible path forward to confront the full 

range of threats posed by Iran. 

I now will go to the ranking member for his remarks. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling 

this hearing. 

To our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Thank you all for your history of service to our country. It is very 

much appreciated. 

There is no doubt whatsoever that Iran poses a grave threat to 

security in its neighborhood and around the globe. In Iran, we find 

3

the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism, a government 

developing illegal and dangerous ballistic missiles that could deliver a devastating weapon, a critical lifeline to the barbarous 

Assad dynasty in Syria, and a regime that flouts international 

human rights norms, brutally suppresses its own people, and unlawfully detains foreign citizens, including Americans. 

How to grapple with this challenge is one of the most important 

questions for our foreign policy and for us as lawmakers. 

I have long advocated tougher sanctions that go after Iran’s 

harmful activities. Earlier this year, with the chairman’s support, 

we passed into law new sanctions on Iran’s destabilizing activities, 

including its ballistic missile program, its support for terrorism, 

and its conventional arms transfers. 

This week especially, we cannot talk about how to deal with Iran 

without talking about the nuclear deal, whether staying in the deal 

will make it easier or harder to meet this challenge. I opposed the 

deal. I voted against the deal. 

Mr. Sullivan, I say this with respect and gratitude for your hard 

work to bring Iran to the negotiating table, but I felt the sunset 

provisions left too short a time before Iran could become a legitimate nuclear power. I also felt that Iran, being the number one 

state sponsor of terrorism, would reap a windfall in money from 

this agreement and therefore could use it and would use it to carry 

out its terrorist activities to an even greater state than they have 

been in the past. 

But I was on the losing side of that debate. Since the deal was 

reached, like the chairman, I have called for it to be strictly enforced while we look for other ways to address the range of nonnuclear challenges coming out of Iran. 

So today the administration seems poised to take the first step 

in withdrawing from the JCPOA. I must say that I view that 

course as a grave mistake. We in the United States have to live 

up to our word. If we withdraw from the deal now, Iran would be 

free today from the constraints on their program and the intrusive 

inspections that the JCPOA puts into place. They could race headlong toward a nuclear bomb, hold all the benefits of sanctions relief, and continue fomenting instability across the region. 

We need to work with allies and partners on a shared agenda 

that holds the regime in Tehran accountable, not dividing America 

from our closest friends across the globe. If we pull out of the deal, 

I believe we lose whatever leverage we have to drive that agenda. 

At the same time, walking away from the JCPOA would announce to the world, to our friends and adversaries alike, that the 

United States cannot be counted on to keep its word. 

In North Korea, we are staring down a rogue regime that already 

has nuclear weapons. If we pull out of the Iran deal, we would lose 

all credibility as we try to negotiate with the regime in Pyongyang 

on nuclear disarmament. 

One of the arguments I have heard in the last week is that the 

administration should withhold certification but that we should 

stay in the deal anyway. I think that is trying to have it both ways. 

It doesn’t work. I think it is a political cover for opponents of the 

deal who have been saying for years that we should withdraw and 

who are now having second thoughts. I think it is a distraction 

4

from the real issues involving Iran that demand our attention. And 

I think it is playing with fire. 

Failing to certify the deal is the first step toward ending it. That 

is how governments around the world will perceive it, possibly including Iran, which could spark a second nuclear crisis on top of 

North Korea. 

We need to be tough on Iran. We need tough sanctions and multilateral actions to make clear that the regime will face consequences for its dangerous activities. We need to reclaim the mantle of leadership, bring countries together, and hold Tehran accountable. 

Saying we are going to tear up the deal sounds like tough talk, 

but I believe it won’t help us meet this challenge. It would merely 

hamper our ability to make progress, to get tougher in the areas 

where we can. It would be cutting off our nose to spite our face. 

So I hope the President heeds the advice of Secretary Mattis and 

others. I hope he understands the importance of the United States 

keeping its commitments. If we are serious about cracking down on 

Iran, the best path forward is to stick with the deal, despite what 

I view as its flaws, and hold Iran strictly to its obligations. That 

will put us in a far better position to address all the other problems 

Iran is stirring up. 

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on these questions. 

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This morning we are joined by a distinguished panel. We have 

Ambassador James Jeffrey with us. He is the Philip Solondz distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

Previously, the Ambassador served as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to 

Turkey, and to Albania. 

We have General Charles Wald. He is a distinguished fellow and 

co-chair of the Gemunder Center Iran Task Force at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America. Previously, General Wald 

served as the former Deputy Commander of the U.S. European 

Command. 

We have Mr. David Albright, founder and president of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. Albright 

has written numerous assessments on nuclear weapons, secret nuclear weapon programs, throughout the world. And we appreciate 

him being with us as well. 

Mr. Jake Sullivan is a senior fellow at the Geoeconomics and 

Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace. Previously, Mr. Sullivan served as a National Security Adviser to former Vice President Joe Biden and as the Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record today, and members here will have 5 calendar days to submit any statements, questions, or extraneous material that they want to put into the record for today’s hearing. 

So I would just ask Ambassador Jeffrey, if you would like to 

summarize your statement. And then after each of you have presented, we will have the questions from the members of the committee. 

5

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP 

SOLONDZ DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (FORMER U.S. 

AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ, TURKEY, AND ALBANIA) 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking 

Member, members of the committee, my distinguished colleagues 

here on the table. It is an honor to be here today to discuss something of such extraordinary importance just before the President 

will talk to the American people about Iran policy. 

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that in certain circles, in Washington and elsewhere, there was a belief that this Iran deal could 

do more than constrain Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, the preamble to the agreement expressed the hope, and I quote, that full 

implementation of this JCPOA, the agreement, will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. 

Just last night I heard the EU Foreign Minister, who is basically 

the spokesperson of the P5+1, echo a very similar line back when 

she announced the agreement in 2015. 

And I think that is one of the core flaws of this agreement. And 

one of my arguments that I will make in a second, that we have 

to look at this agreement in more detail and where it fits, is that 

people think that if they are okay with the agreement, the Iranians 

are adhering to it, then we don’t have a problem with them. We 

have many problems with them inside and outside the agreement. 

Right now the greatest danger facing the U.S. and its allies in 

the Middle East is Iran allied with various surrogate forces and to 

some degree Russia. The U.S., as yet, does not have a comprehensive policy to confront Iran that should include both containing 

Iran in the region and, as you both mentioned, looking at the 

JCPOA. 

The stakes here are high. If America does not stop the Iranians, 

they will soon emerge with their allies as a dominant force in the 

region. 

Such a policy, however, has to consider some key elements that 

any such policy needs to look at. I will give you my views on them. 

But more important than my views are that the administration 

and that this body look at each of these elements. 

First, Iran must be the first U.S. priority in the region, it must 

be number one, apart from terrorist attacks on the homeland. Specifically, we need to shift our attention and resources now from the 

almost-finished ISIS campaign to Iran. That is critical because 

right now the administration is still focused on ISIS. 

Second, we need to know what our basic purpose is in confronting Iran. Is it to push back on Iran’s specific regional moves, 

or is it to affect significantly Iran’s overall goals and role in the region, or is it regime change? There are voices on all three here in 

Washington. 

In view of the need for as broad as possible an international coalition, as both you, Mr. Royce, and you, Mr. Engel, noted, I think 

we should limit this to pushing back on Iran-specific actions, particularly military and paramilitary in the region. That will allow us 

the biggest and strongest coalition. 

Next, as we have discussed, the JCPOA cannot be sacrosanct in 

our approach. Given, however, the absence of an international conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
6

sensus for a new better agreement and our need for such a broad 

coalition to contain Iran successfully, we should not abandon the 

agreement. Rather we should use our problems with it to push, at 

least diplomatically, for a potential new agreement, raise our problems with missiles, challenge the commitments we have made, I 

think foolishly, in the agreement to support Iran’s economic development, and basically make it more difficult for businesses to work 

with Iran. 

The central fronts to contain Iran are Iraq and Syria. Iran’s intent is to create, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, vassal states, 

as we have seen or are seeing in Lebanon, in that region. If it succeeds, it will threaten, again, as you have mentioned, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and eventually the Gulf. 

But the U.S., focused on ISIS, appears to be leaving the day after 

in both Syria and Iraq to, in Syria, the Russians—I was just there 

for a week with them, and believe me, they don’t want to and won’t 

help us—and in Iraq, to the Abadi government. 

I know him and the people around him. They would like to help 

us. They are not strong enough without a strong American presence. That presence includes not only diplomacy and economic help, 

it includes a military presence on the ground in both countries over 

time, ostensibly to contain ISIS, but focused on Iran. 

Finally, we need to know: Do we talk to Iran? Do we need a diplomatic plan? Do we talk to Iran? Under which circumstances? How 

do we signal to it? 

Equally important, we need to reunify this alliance. The Saudis, 

the Turks, the Egyptians are going in all directions. 

Finally, to the members of the committee, as I and many others 

have experienced, if you push back on Iran, they will come at you. 

They will come at you real hard. We need to know what we will 

do in advance, and that includes potentially striking them in their 

homeland. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:]

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HEARING, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OCTOBER 112017 

CONFRONTING THE FULL RANGE OF IRANIAN THREATS 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE 

AMBASSADOR JAMES FRANKLIN JEFFREY 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

SUMMARY 

The greatest danger facing the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East today is Iran, allied with 

various surrogate forces and to some degree Russia. The U.S. as yet does not have a 

comprehensive policy to confront Iran. Any such policy cannot hold the joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear Agreement with Iran sacrosanct. Options 

concerning that agreement must be considered but as part of a larger strategy. Focusing 

only on the JCPOA to the exclusion of Iran's destabilizing actions through the Middle East 

would be a fundamental mistake. To deal with those actions, the first priority is the Levant, 

from Iran to Lebanon. The U.S. must convince the international community, the Russians, 

and indirectly Iran, that the internal situation in both Iraq and, especially, Syria, and the 

presence of foreign forces there including Iranian, Iranian surrogate, and Russian, is a 

major security concern for the U.S and an existential threat to our allies and partners 

beginning with Israel, Turkey, jordan and the GCC states. The stakes here are high: if 

America does not stop the Iranians on this front, they will soon emerge with their allies as 

the dominant force in the region. 

INTRODUCTION 

The United States in negotiating the JCPOA bet implicitly on that diplomatic approach not 

only as a means to constrain temporarily Iran's nuclear weapons program, but to engender 

a transformation of Iran from an anti-status quo, in some respects revolutionary Islamic 

movement, into a 'stakeholder' for regional stability. As the JCPOA Preface states, "full 

implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace 

and security." 

The reality in the region since the Summer of 2015 when those words were agreed could 

not be more at odds with that hope. Iran, after indirectly triggering ISIS's expansion by 

empowering anti -Sunni Arab policies through its allies PM Maliki in Iraq and President 

Assad in Syria, forged an alliance that brought major Russian military forces into the 

region, and with them accelerated a genocidal campaign that has cost almost half a million 

deaths, to end the Syrian civil war on Assad's maxima list terms, symbolized by the carpet 
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bombing of Aleppo. It has also intervened ever more in Yemen, arming both the Hauth is 

there and Hizbollah in Lebanon with offensive missile systems that threaten respectively 

the Bab a! Mandeb Straits and the Israeli homeland. Consequently every Middle Eastern 

friendly leader I have spoken to in the past 24 months has emphasized that Iran, not ISIS or 

a! Qaeda, is the major security threat. Apart from the )CPO A, the last Administration did 

little to counter it. The Trump Administration has taken a more active position, at least 

rhetorically. During his May meetings with Arab leaders in Riyadh, President Trump 

signed up to a joint Communique which accused Iran of"malign interference," branded its 

activities as "terrorist," and committed signatories to act collectively against it. The 

President heard similar concerns from Turkish President Erdogan and Israeli PM 

Netanyahu. Nevertheless, while a new Presidential policy on Iran is about to be 

announced, it is not yet clear whether the U.S. is ready to deal with all the implications of a 

serious containment policy against a foe that has seen nothing but success in recent years, 

executing a carefully thought out and resourced regional strategy. The U.S. must have an 

equally thoughtful, resourced response. 

Any such response should focus on the 'haws' and 'whys' of containment strategy, as 

discussed below. 

THE ULTIMATE MISSION WITH IRAN 

To succeed with any policy toward Iran, the United States must set clear final goals. Does it 

want to push back on Tehran's regional aggression, as it did with Slobodan Milosevic in the 

1990s? Or does it seek a long-term containment policy to effect fundamental policy changes 

in Iran (i.e., George Kennan's initial prescription for the Cold War), or even regime change? 

If so, how would this policy be carried out in practice? Iran experts in the United States are 

divided on goals and means, from toppling the regime to continuing Obama's policy of 

outreach as the best way to contain Iran; Washington's potential international allies are 

split on this issue as well. In view of the need for as broad an international coalition as 

possible, the mission should focus on containing Iran's illegitimate influence in the region, 

with emphasis on its military and para-military initiatives, rather than more ambitious 

internal transformation which the U.S. has seldom achieved anywhere. Finally, it is crucial 

that the U.S. make its goals clear to all including Iran, to win adherents at home and abroad. 

IRAN AS FIRST PRIORITY 

To succeed, any containment plan against Iran must be the first U.S. priority in the region 

short of aborting terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. Specifically, U.S. military and 

diplomatic resources now should be prioritized away from ISIS and towards Iran. 
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WHO IS THE ENEMY 

Some of America's partners in the region see Iran not only as a state, but as a "malign" Shia 

movement in a largely Sunni Middle East. But the more that this formulation is adopted, 

the more absolute the contest becomes, with less potential "give" from Iran (which cannot 

simply surrender its religious essence) and the more some of America's allies would balk. 

Thus to maximize common policy ground within the international community on Iran, 

given widely variant threat perceptions, the Trump Administration should focus on Iran as 

a nation state to be deterred, not a cause to be destroyed. 

THEJCPOA 

Since taking office, the president has been ever more critical about the JCPOA, and has 

signaled that next week when he is required to again certify a series of questions related to 

the Agreement, as per the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) of 2015, that he will 

not so certify. This certification process regardless of what he decides does not directly 

impact the Agreement or U.S. commitments within it, but any Presidential refusal to certify 

would raise the question whether the U.S. should continue adhering to the agreement, pull 

out of it, or attempt to negotiate a better one. 

It is easy to visualize a 'improved' version of this JCPOA-longer time periods, ability of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency to more easily inspect all suspect sites including 

military, more clarity on the "possible military dimensions" of the Iranian program, 

inclusion of certain missile systems and research. But Iran's technical compliance with the 

Agreement and refusal to countenance new negotiations, and the reluctance of other key 

international partners, especially the P5+ 1 States, to entertain new negotiations, argue for 

a policy of 'constructive ambivalence' concerning. and scrutiny of, the Agreement, with 

options for improving it held for later. The short term goals should include stripping the 

agreement of its psychological value as a 'seal of good approval' for a state that does not 

deserve it, and undercutting the willingness of the international business community to 

fund Iran's economy. which will inevitably increase its power projection capabilities to the 

detriment of regional security. 

Obtaining a fundamentally new agreement, e.g., Iran foreswearing all enrichment activities, 

would require, short of war. international sanctions far stronger than those in the period 

2010-15. And those sanctions, especially the most effective-the Iranian oil import 

sanctions under the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act--were controversial with 

America's European allies and Asian trading partners at the time despite clear Iranian 

violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. inflammatory rhetoric by then President 

Ahmadinejad, and risk of war over the Iranian program. None of those conditions is 

present today. Furthermore, any U.S. strategy to call iran to account for the gamut of its 
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activities requires a reasonably supportive international community, and too aggressive a 

U.S. campaign against the JCPOA would undermine such support. 

DEALING WITH IRAN IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 

Although Iran is challenging regional security from Yemen to Afghanistan, the key front is 

Syria and Iraq, the core of the Levan tine Middle East, where Tehran has long influenced 

Bashar al-Assad's regime and the Shia-centric government in Baghdad. Following the 2011 

"Arab Spring," Iranian leaders pushed these surrogates to exert greater control, but such 

efforts also exacerbated the catastrophic developments unfolding in each country, namely, 

the mass uprising against Assad and the emergence of ISIS. 

Iran has since undertaken an all-out campaign to keep Assad in power and expand its 

influence in Iraq-- aided, ironically, by the U.S.-led war against ISIS. As ISIS forces are 

ground down in their last redoubts, Tehran's surrogates are scurrying to establish a land 

corridor between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The geostrategic shift this 

portends is extraordinary. As the Bipartisan Policy Center recently pointed out, this could 

leave 20 million Sunni Arabs in Syria and Iraq under de facto Shia rule, likely incubating a 

new Sunni extremist movement to replace ISIS. 

Such a corridor is destabilizing for other reasons as well. The United States and its allies 

have established footholds in northern Syria, along the Jordanian border, and in Iraq, 

primarily to fight ISIS. Once the group is defeated, these positions will either have to be 

abandoned or held against inevitable Iranian-orchestrated (and possibly Russiansupported) political, terrorist, or military, pressure intended to push U.S. forces out. 

Remaining in Syria indefinitely would require complicated political arrangements with 

Turkey, jordan, Israel, Iraq, and various sub-national Kurdish and Sunni Arab factions--

and with Russia as well. 

The U.S. must convince the international community, the Russians, and indirectly Iran, that 

the internal constitution of both Iraq and especially Syria, and the presence of foreign 

forces including Iranian, Iranian surrogate, and Russian, on the territory of those states, is 

a major security concern for the U.S., including stirring up Sunni extremist movements as 

was the case with ISIS, and an existential threat for our allies and partners beginning with 

Israel, Turkey, jordan and the GCC states. 

The U.S. thus must recognize the stakes: if America does not stop the Iranians on this front, 

they will soon emerge as the dominant force in the region, deeply inimical to the United 

States and its partners, and allied with Putin's Russia. 

To that end U.S. forces should remain in a train and equip capacity in Iraq, as well as in 

Syria, ostensibly to protect enclaves and U.S. partners from a resurgence of terrorism, but 
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also, implicitly, to put military pressure on Syria and Iran to negotiate seriously in the 

Geneva process in accordance with UN Security Council 2254 on the future political 

situation in Syria. 

RESPONDING WHEN IRAN STRIKES BACK 

Any U.S. effort to confront Tehran could generate attacks on U.S. interests. Since 1979, the 

regime has struck at U.S. targets directly or through surrogates on multiple occasions, from 

Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen to a thwarted plot in Washington, D.C. In 

response, Washington has either eschewed obvious retaliation against Iranian forces or 

territory (with the exception of the "Tanker War" thirty years ago), or taken action against 

surrogates outside Iran with mixed results. U.S. officials need to determine in advance how 

the U.S. will react in response to Iranian retaliation, and in particular if the U.S. will or will 

not strike back at Iran directly. And Iran needs to know that decision. 

COMMUNICATING WITH TEHRAN 

Limited U.S. technical communications with Iran continue (e.g., between forces in the 

Persian Gulf). But Washington needs to consider whether, and if so, under what conditions, 

and for what purpose, it should communicate "politically" with Iran, bearing in mind that 

both the Obama and (in Iraq) the Bush Administration did so. And if so, with whom: 

Foreign Minister Mohammad javad Zarif or the shadowy Qods Force commander Qasem 

Soleimani, who is largely responsible for carrying out Iran's regional policies? Would such 

contacts be open or secret (as they were initially with the Obama administration)? If 

brokered by a third party, whom? Will Iran even be willing to engage in such dialogue, and 

at what price? Finally, what end would these talks serve? 

However the Administration answers this question specifically, it must ensure that its 

overall goals and specific intentions are made known in some way to the Iranian 

leadership. The risks of misunderstanding and resulting escalation will remain high in U.S.-

Iranian relations. 

KEEPING THE ANTI-IRAN ALLIANCE STRONG 

The military, economic and diplomatic power of the potential anti-Iran alliance which the 

U.S. can forge with European and Middle Eastern partners is extraordinary, and far greater 

than Iran's capabilities even including Russian military forces in the region. But this 

alliance is more theoretical than real, thus the U.S. should prioritize its strengthening. With 

European allies and the UN, that means clarity on what the U.S. wants to achieve with Iran, 

and a certain respect for international agreements and protocols which are taken much 

more seriously outside than inside the U.S. With regional partners the main risk is 

diversion of effort into internecine spats. The Saudi-Emirati-Egyptian political campaign 
12


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against Qatar, Iraqi Kurdistan leader Barzani's push for independence, and the dispute 

between the U.S. and Turkey over the Syrian Kurdish PYD, are examples of such disunity 

and disagreements. 
13

Chairman ROYCE. General Wald. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES F. WALD, USAF, RETIRED, 

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW AND CO-CHAIR, THE GEMUNDER 

CENTER IRAN TASK FORCE, THE JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY OF AMERICA (FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND) 

General WALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Engel, and members of the committee. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss responses to the 

full range of threats posed by Iran. 

I have followed Iran closely throughout my career, including in 

my current capacity as the co-chair of the Iran Task Force at the 

JINSA Gemunder Center. 

This summer, our task force issued a report on the need to restore U.S. leverage to confront the full spectrum of Iran’s menacing 

behaviors. Understandably, current debate is focused on the 

JCPOA and whether continued adherence to the deal serves our 

national interests. 

Our JINSA task force has been an outspoken critic of this agreement, which gives Tehran great financial, military, and geopolitical 

benefits while robbing the United States of our previous leverage 

against Iran. 

An effective strategy against Iran must prioritize restoring our 

lost leverage, and I applaud this committee’s effort to examine the 

range of options available to us and our allies. 

This is urgent because the deal places Iran on a trajectory to become as intractable a challenge as North Korea is today and very 

possibly worse. Sanctions relief is bringing renewed foreign investment to Iran, and with it the capital and technology for increased 

spending on ballistic missiles and IRGC operations in places like 

Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. 

The deal also legalizes Iran’s ambitious military buildup. U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 2231 gives Iran, and specifically the 

IRGC, a major opportunity to advance its nuclear-capable ballistic 

missile and intimidate our regional allies. That same resolution 

will lift the conventional arms embargo on Iran, allowing the IRGC 

to become an international arms dealer. 

The IRGC’s ability to inflict heavy costs on our forces and possibly deny our access to the region will grow significantly as it augments its air defenses, attack craft, submarines, unmanned vehicles, mines, radars, and missiles. 

Finally, the U.N. resolution also eventually permits the IRGC to 

access highly advanced missile technology and materials from 

abroad. This will aid its development of a more sophisticated nuclear delivery vehicle, including intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of targeting the heart of Europe 

and the U.S. homeland. 

It is important to note that Tehran can push for ICBMs around 

the same time as it approaches nuclear weapons capability, effectively giving it a direct nuclear deterrent against the United States 

before the JCPOA ends. 

Already, Iran is moving more aggressively against us and our allies. Since day one of the deal, it has been testing more accurate 

14

and mobile multistage stage ballistic missiles with reentry vehicles 

that are harder to intercept and are better suited for nuclear warheads. 

Meanwhile, its proxy in Yemen uses IRGC assistance to lob dozens of ballistic missiles at Saudi bases and cities, not to mention 

targeting U.S. Navy ships. I was told yesterday that the Houthis 

in Yemen have shot 63 scuds in Saudi Arabia over the last days—

which, by the way, because of the PAC-3 missiles, the Saudi Arabians have been able to defend against, but it is growing. 

Overall, if Iran does not materially breach the JCPOA, the deal 

already is a boon to its dangerous ambitions and a strategic disaster for us. We need a coherent set of responses to reverse this 

untenable strategic imbalance before it continues from bad to 

worse. 

I applaud this committee for its tireless efforts to pressure Iran 

and Hezbollah through sanctions. Such measures are necessary, 

but their message and impact must be reinforced with military leverage. 

First, American officials should make clear they are preparing 

contingency plans to defend against further Iranian tests of nuclear-capable missiles. This must include unequivocal threats to 

shoot down future tests if necessary. 

Second, we must undertake concrete military preparations, including forward deploying part of Aegis-equipped missile defense 

fleet to the Persian Gulf. Congress should consider requiring the 

Pentagon adopt their use and other changes as part of the broader 

reassessment of U.S. force posture and contingency planning for 

the region. 

Third, we need a post-ISIS strategy and a force presence in Syria 

to prevent Iran from dictating the country’s future and consolidating its land bridge. 

Fourth, we need to augment the new MOU on defense aid to 

Israel by removing artificial caps on missile defense, especially 

given Iran and Hezbollah’s growing presence in the Israeli northern borders. 

And fifth, we need to work with Saudi Arabia and UAE on robust 

theater missile defense and potentially help transfer Israeli missile 

defense systems to the country. 

Finally, we need to ensure the interoperability of air and maritime defenses between the United States and Gulf allies to counter 

Iran’s growing capability thanks to the nuclear deal. 

Regardless of the JCPOA’s future, these measures will demonstrate resolve to roll back Iranian aggression and dissuade the 

regime from advancing toward nuclear weapons capability. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for my time, and I look forward to 

the committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wald follows:]

15


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JI N SA 

Statement of General Charles F. Wald, USAF (ret.) 

Co-Chair, JINSA Gemunder Center Iran Task Force 

Hearing on Confronting the Full Range of Iranian Threats 

United States House Foreign Affairs Committee 

October 11, 2017 

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss responses to the full range of threats 

posed by Iran. I have followed Iran closely throughout my career, including in my 

current capacity as co-chair of the Iran Task Force at JINSA's Gem under Center for 

Defense and Strategy. This summer, on the two-year anniversary of the announcement 

ofthe Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), our Task Force issued a 

comprehensive renm:1 on the need to restore U.S. credibility and leverage for 

confronting the gamut of Iran's menacing behaviors.' However, I want to stress that my 

views expressed here today are my own. 

Understandably, much of the current debate focuses on Iran's dubious compliance with 

the JCPOA, and whether continued adherence to the deal serves our national interests. 

Our JINSA Task Force has been an outspoken critic of this agreement. It creates a 

dangerous strategic imbalance by giving Tehran great financial, military and geopolitical 

benefits, while robbing the United States of the pressures we had built previously 

against Iran. Any coherent strategy against Iran must prioritize restoring our lost 

leverage, and I applaud this committee's efforts to examine the range of options 

available to us and our allies. 

Iran's Growing Military Threat 

The shortcomings of the JCPOA are numerous and well-known. Suffice to say, the deal 

places Iran on a trajectory to become as intractable a challenge as North Korea is today 

- and very possibly worse. Indeed, while Pyongyang's relentless pursuit of nuclear 

weapons has only deepened its isolation and driven it toward bankruptcy, the JCPOA is 

doing the opposite for Iran. 

Iran," .July 2017, 
16


27160b-2.eps

This committee is well aware of the JCPOA's literal costs: an estimated $115 billion in 

unfrozen assets back under Tehran's control since day one, plus an additional SL7 

billion ransom for U.S. hostages." Since then, the added dividends of sanctions relief 

have flowed directly to the lucrative economic sectors controlled by the regime and its 

hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The capital and technology from 

renewed foreign investment is already translating to increased spending on ballistic 

missiles and IRGC operations in places like Syria, Iraq and Yemen.3 

Beyond providing more funds, the JCPOA also effectively legalizes Iran's ambitious 

military buildup in coming years. Even before the deal, Tehran already possessed the 

region's largest arsenals of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. By removing the 

previous legally-binding ban on test launches, U.N. Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 2231 gives Iran, and specifically the IRGC, a major opportunity to advance 

these capabilities and intimidate our regional allies. 

No more than three years from now, the U.N. conventional arms embargo on Iran will 

also disappear, opening the country's defense-industrial base to the international 

market and enriching the IRGC as an arms dealer. Tehran is already tipping the scales 

in conflicts across the region with largely outdated military equipment. The IRGC's 

ability to inflict heavy costs on U.S. and allied forces, and possibly deny our access to the 

region altogether, will grow significantly as it augments its air defenses, fast attack craft, 

missile boat, submarines, unmanned vehicles, mines, radars and short-range missiles. 

No more than three years after that, the same U.N. resolution will permit the IRGC to 

access highly-advanced missile technology, materials and financing from abroad. This 

will aid its development of more sophisticated and accurate delivery vehicles, including 

intermediate-range (IRBM) and intercontinental (ICBM) ballistic missiles capable of 

targeting the heart of Europe and the U.S. homeland. Because this will occur shortly 

before the JCPOA allows Iran to ramp up its enrichment capacity, Tehran could push for 

ICBMs around the same it approaches nuclear weapons capability- effectively giving it 

a direct nuclear deterrent against the United States before the agreement even sunsets. 

Rising Iranian Aggression Under JCPOA 

Iran is already moving more directly and brazenly against U.S. interests and our allies. 

This stems in part from what the JCPOA does: it removes the aforementioned 

restrictions on Tehran's power projection resources. Yet this also results from what the 

JCPOA represents: the weakening of U.S. credibility to push back as Iran aggravates the 

grmving security vacuum in the Middle East. 

"U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Center, "Written Testimony of Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under 

SecretaryofTreasuryforTerrorism and Financiallnte11igence to U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs, August 5, 2015 . 

. 1 Thomas Erdbrink, ·'Iranian Parliament, Facing U.S. sanctions, Votes to Raise Military Spending," New 

York Times August 13, 2017. 

2 
17


27160b-3.eps

Since day one of the deal, this has been evident in Iran's defiant upsurge in ballistic 

missile tests, including more accurate and mobile multi-stage missiles with reentry 

vehicles better suited for nuclear warheads - and more difficult to intercept than older 

Iranian versions. In June, Tehran even fired ballistic missiles in combat for the first time 

since the Iran-Iraq War, when the IRGC launched a salvo from Iranian soil into Syria.4 

Also for the first time in decades, Iran is at daggers drawn with U.S. ships in the Persian 

Gulf. It is assisting its Houthi proxy in Yemen v.-ith attacks on U.S. ships and our alliesincluding a steady hail of ballistic missiles targeting Saudi cities and bases. Flush v.-ith 

rising revenues from sanctions relief, Iran is also consolidating control over the heart of 

the Middle East and directly undermining U.S. efforts to stabilize Syria and Iraq. 

Throughout these conflicts, both the IRGC - which enjoys an increasingly central role in 

Iranian policymaking - and its terrorist proxy Hezbollah are transforming themselves 

into more professional, expeditionary combined-arms forces. Consequently, Iran can 

now intervene decisively to alter the course of conflicts across the region and establish 

new beachheads to threaten U.S. allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. 

Simply put, even if Iran does not materially breach the JCPOA, the deal already is a 

boon to its destabilizing regional ambitions, and a strategic disaster for the United 

States. 

Rebuilding Leverage Against Iran 

American policymakers must now develop a coherent set of responses to reverse this 

untenable strategic imbalance, before it continues from bad to worse. As we laid out in 

our recent Iran Task Force report, this calls for a comprehensive strategy, utilizing every 

element of American power, to rebuild and apply counter-pressure against the full 

spectrum of Iran's destabilizing behaviors. Time is of the essence, especially since any 

nuclear-related sanctions that Congress might snap back or enact would require time as 

much as anything else - time that Iran could otherwise spend breaking out or retaliating 

outside the nuclear program." 

Our Task Force articulated recommendations to begin imposing costs on Iran's most 

threatening behaviors, and to restore U.S. credibility damaged by the JCPOA: 

1. Develop Credible U.S. Military Leverage 

I applaud this committee for its years of tireless effort to increase pressure on 

Iran and Hezbollah through sanctions. Such measures are necessary, but their 

message and their impact must be reinforced v.-ith military leverage. 

4 CSIS Missile Defense Project, available at: lttt:ps://ln1ssi1Pthreat.csis.org/llii~sile/em3d/ (accessed 

October 5, 2017). 

·' .JINSA Gem under Center Iran Task Force, "Strategy to Restore U.S. Leverage Against Iran,'' .July 2017, 

pp. 25-32. 

3 
18


27160b-4.eps

• American officials should prepare- and make clear they are preparing -

contingency plans to defend the United States and its allies from further Iranian 

tests of nuclear-capable missiles. This must include unequivocal threats to shoot 

do'>'<TI future tests if necessary. 

• Undertake concrete military preparations for responding to these and other 

Iranian military challenges, including forward-deploying part of our Aegisequipped missile defense fleet to the Persian Gulf (like we already do in Europe 

and East Asia). vVhether Iran adheres to the JCPOA or not, Congress should 

consider requiring the Pentagon adopt these changes as part of a broader 

reassessment of U.S. force posture and contingency planning for the region. 

Leverage international law in defending our forces and maritime traffic against 

Iran's increasingly aggressive and illegal behavior at sea. Existing rules of 

engagement (ROE) permit much more forceful responses to IRGC naval forces' 

demonstrated hostile intent than our current restraint suggests. 

• Ensure the United States has a post-ISIS strategy and force presence in Syria. 

This is crucial to prevent Iran, Hezbollah and their proxies from dictating that 

country's future. It will also impose obstacles to their evolving land bridge that 

would run directly from Iran to the Mediterranean and Lebanon. 

2. Assemble a Regional Coalition Against Iran 

• Augment the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defense aid to 

Israel by removing artificial Obama-era caps on missile defense assistance. The 

new Mo U must be treated as the floor, not the ceiling, for bilateral cooperation 

against Iran's and Hezbollah's growing presence and capabilities on Israel's 

northern borders. 

• Work with our Gulf allies Saudi Arabia and U.A.E. to develop a robust, multilayered theater missile defense architecture, and potentially help facilitate the 

transfer of advanced Israeli missile defense systems to these countries - both of 

which confront Iran on their front and back doorsteps. American policymakers 

should also seriously consider explicit military backing for these two countries to 

defend against further Iranian encroachment. 

• Ensure interoperability of U.S. and Gulf air and maritime defenses to counter 

Iran's growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threat under the JCPOA. 

Regardless of the JCPOA's future, these measures will demonstrate American resolveboth to Tehran and our concerned allies - that we will roll back Iranian aggression and 

deter or deny the hardline regime from advancing toward nuclear weapons capability. 

I thank you Mr. Chairman for my time, and I look forward to the Committee's questions. 

4 
19

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, General Wald. 

Mr. David Albright. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel, and other esteemed members of this committee. 

We are 1 week away from the 2-year anniversary of Adoption 

Day, the day when the Iran nuclear deal came into effect. It is 

clear now that Iran is no South Africa, which should serve as a 

benchmark to evaluate any country giving up a nuclear weapons 

program coming into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and building a peaceful relationship with its neighbors. 

In contrast, Iran has only temporally frozen its most threatening 

nuclear weapons capabilities. It has maintained since Implementation Day, as a matter of policy, that it will not allow IAEA inspections of its military sites. 

Finally, Iran has continued its threats against U.S. national interests and has conducted a range of malign behaviors. 

Few believe anymore that Iran will change enough over the next 

several years that it will no longer seek nuclear weapons once the 

JCPOA nuclear limitations begin to sunset, the first nuclear sunset 

of notice 8 years after Adoption Day, or 6 years from now, when 

Iran can scale up advanced centrifuge manufacturing. 

But there are two non-nuclear sunsets that lend urgency to acting now. U.N. Security Council restrictions on arms-related transfers to and from Iran end in 3 years. Restrictions on any activity 

related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons end in 6 years. And those dates could be moved up 

if the IAEA reaches what is called a broader conclusion and signs 

off on Iran’s nuclear program. 

By the time the nuclear sunsets start to occur 6 years from now, 

Iran is expected to be conventionally armed to the teeth and poised 

to develop nuclear-capable missiles able to strike Europe and eventually the United States. By that time, it will have a powerful economy immunized against sanctions pressure. 

So waiting to undo these sunsets means waiting until the United 

States would face a well-armed, well-funded Iranian military on 

the cusp of putting nuclear weapons on long-range ballistic missiles. This future is not acceptable, and this dire future occurs by 

Iran simply following the letter of the nuclear deal and Resolution 

2231. 

However, Iran has neither fully complied with the nuclear deal 

and Resolution 2231, nor fully implemented the nuclear deal. With 

regards to the nuclear deal, Iran has violated the deal on many occasions, exploited loopholes, pushed the envelope of allowed behavior, and avoided critical verification requirements. 

The Trump administration is committed to robust enforcement of 

the nuclear deal. So far this approach has reduced the number of 

violations, although it has not eliminated all of them. 

Then, of course, there are the ongoing, well-known problems of 

the IAEA gaining access to military sites. The Parchin issue remains unresolved, Section T remains unimplemented, which covers 

20

bans on nuclear weapons development, and the non-implementation of Section T was recently confirmed by the Director General 

of the IAEA. 

Chairman ROYCE. Could you just clarify that in your testimony? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I am sorry. 

Chairman ROYCE. Just repeat that and just clarify a little bit. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Recently the Director General of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Section T remains 

unimplemented and has actually asked for guidance on how to 

treat this, because Russia opposes the inspectors visiting military 

sites. 

The justification and need to better enforce and fix the nuclear 

deal and associated agreements is clear. But what to do? We are 

all awaiting President Trump’s decision regarding the 90-day certification under INARA and the administration’s rollout of its Iran 

policy more generally. 

If the administration does decertify, I believe it would be fully 

justified under INARA criteria. Even setting aside what are called 

uncured material breach issues, which I agree are debatable, the 

President has a solid case to decertify based on another criterion, 

namely whether the suspension of sanctions remains vital to U.S. 

national security interests and proportionate to Iran’s efforts to terminate its illicit nuclear programs. 

By decertifying, the President would send a powerful signal that 

the nuclear deal has a fundamentally flawed architecture which 

cannot be fixed by better enforcement alone. 

My colleague Mark Dubowitz and I have recommended a middle 

course of decertifying but not reimposing nuclear sanctions. Instead, the number of non-nuclear sanctions should be increased 

and INARA and JCPOA fixed in congressional legislation. 

The outline of this approach includes rewriting U.S. policy to 

eliminate the sunsets in a nuclear deal and Resolution 2231 and 

tighten inspections. 

Congress, and in particular this committee, has already done significant legislative work on repairing the 5-year arms and 8-year 

ballistic missile sunsets in Resolution 2231, and I believe the legislation that is being put together or sent for markup will improve 

this even further. However, the President has not announced that 

this is U.S. policy or how this policy affects sunsets in Resolution 

2231 and how this policy will be enforced. 

In cooperation with the administration, Congress should fix the 

nuclear deal legislatively, focusing on the nuclear sunsets and inspections. 

And let me stop here, since I am over, and happy to add to this 

during the questioning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

21


27160c-1.eps

Testimony of David Albright, 

President of the 

Institute for Science and International Security, 

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Hearing Title: "Confronting the Full Range of Iranian Threats" 

October 11, 2017 

The Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), does not exist in a 

vacuum. It must be considered in association with United Nations Security Council resolution 

2231 and US. national security more broadly. The deal's potential for success cannot be 

separated tram Iran's aggressive regional behavior, as detailed for example in Secretary of State 

Rex Tillerson's July 2017 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of2015 (INARA) certification 

letter to Congress. 

We are one week away from the two-year anniversary of Adoption Day, the day when the 

JCPOA came into effect and its implementation started. It is clear now that Iran is no South 

Atrica, which gave up its nuclear weapons program, accepted robust inspections of both civil and 

military sites far beyond what Iran allows, fully cooperated with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) inspectors in a manner that Iran has not, and truly sought to rejoin the 

international community and build a new peaceful relationship with its neighbors. 

Iran has merely temporarily frozen its most threatening nuclear weapons capabilities. It has 

stated as a matter of policy that it will not allow inspections of its military sites, even though 

some are known to have been the site of secret gas centrifuge manufacturing and nuclear 

weapons development work. Other military sites that are otT-limits require routine IAEA 

inspections of JCPOA bans on nuclear weapons development etl'orts and controls on equipment 

and activities associated with such etl'orts. Finally, Iran has continued its threats against US. 

national interests and has conducted a range of malign behaviors. 

The JCPOA, unless fixed, is a prelude to a Middle Eastern version of the North Korean mess. 

Few believe anymore that Iran, the region, or both will change so much over the next several 

years that Iran will no longer seek nuclear weapons. Given Iran's current trajectory, the risk is 

great that Iran will seek nuclear weapons once the nuclear limitations start to end, or these 

JCPOA limitations begin to sunset. The first nuclear sunset of note is eight years after Adoption 

Day, or six years tram now, when Iran can scale up advanced centrifuge manufacturing. 

One could are,>ue that six years is a long time tram now. Why worry today? One answer is that 

t!xing a deal as complicated as the JCPOA takes time. But there are more urgent reasons to start 

now, namely the fact that there are looming sunsets of the conventional military and missile 

embargoes embodied in UNSC resolution 2231, which bear directly on the prospects of fixing 

the nuclear deal. 
22


27160c-2.eps

The first sunset in resolution 2231 occurs in three years, with the end of UN Security Council 

restrictions on arms-related transfers to and from Iran. It could happen earlier if the IAEA 

submits a report confirming it has reached a Broader Conclusion for Iran under the 

Comprehensive Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol. At this point, Iran would be free 

of this embargo and can import heavy armaments for its own use and can also export them to 

adversaries of the United States and its allies. Although Iran is violating this part of resolution 

2231 by providing major arms to its allies in the Middle East and perhaps receiving banned arms 

or services from North Korea, major arms suppliers in Russia, China, and elsewhere are not 

exporting banned heavy armaments to Iran. But in anticipation of the end of this embargo, Iran 

is reportedly lining up arms contracts with Russia and likely others. 

Six years from now, or earlier if the IAEA reaches a Broader Conclusion, the UN Security 

Council restrictions end on any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of 

delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. At that 

point, Iran can be expected to accelerate is work to develop and deploy nuclear capable 

intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles. 

Those who argue that somehow the JCPOA deals only with nuclear matters and should be 

judged separate from the restrictions in resolution 2231 fail to explain that a nuclear weapon is a 

warhead and a delivery system. Today, the delivery vehicle of choice is a ballistic missile. The 

North Korean case makes crystal clear that it is both together-a warhead and ballistic missilethat creates a nuclear weapon that is the most threatening to the United States and its allies. 

By the time nuclear sunsets start to occur at year 8, Iran is expected to be conventionally armed 

to the teeth and poised to develop nuclear capable missiles able to strike Europe and eventually 

the United States. By that time, it will have a powerful economy immunized against sanctions 

pressure. So, waiting to undo these sunsets, as some have proposed, means waiting until the 

United States would face a well-armed, well-funded Iranian military on the cusp of putting 

nuclear weapons on long range missiles. 

This future is not what the United States should have signed up for, and it would be irresponsible 

for any president to continue to accept it. And this dire future occurs by Iran simply following 

the letter of the JCPOA and resolution 2231. 

However, Iran has neither tully complied with the JCPOA and resolution 2231 nor fully 

implemented the JCPOA With regards to the JCPOA, Iran has violated the deal on many 

occasions, exploited loopholes, pushed the envelope of allowed behavior, and avoided critical 

verification requirements. 1 It has twice exceeded limits on heavy water and benefited from a 

misguided interpretation of the JCPOA to store its heavy water excess of the cap overseas. 2 Iran 

has continued to refuse the testing of carbon fiber acquired before Implementation Day. It has 

1 David Albright. "Update on Iran's Compliance with the JCPOA Nuclear Lilllits- Iran's Centrifuge Breakage 

Problem: Accidental Compliance.'' Institute for Science and lntemational Security. September 21, 2017. 

9Iilil1}2.QIJi!~Q.IL~ti.~lJ:li!Lulliirrtr;;::i:!t:iF.ru.l2:;;QJ!JQl iau_~:f.-j_lilh:1l!~:1~1hlg-nu5;)~£tr::1!m.HEioA 2 More information about the heavy \Vater issue can be found in. ·'Heavy \Vater Loophole in the Tmn Deal," by 

Andrea Stricker, Institute for Science and International Security. December 21. 20 lG. llttp:i/isis2 
23


27160c-3.eps

operated more than "roughly 10" IR-6 centrifuges in a cascade. It has also built and operated 

more advanced centrifuges than it is allowed, and it has misused quality assurance limitations to 

conduct banned mechanical testing of advanced centrifuges. 

The Trump administration is committed to robust enforcement of the JCPOA. So far, this 

approach has reduced the number of violations, although not eliminated all of them In addition, 

Iran's overreach on developing advanced centrifuges has led to the bulk of its excess centrifuges 

breaking. But inadvertent compliance is not enough, and Iranian centrifuge manufacturing needs 

careful on-going scrutiny. Iran could be building excessive numbers of centrifuges as we speak.1 

Then of course, there are the problems of the IAEA gaining access to military sites. The Parchin 

issue, where inspectors found particles of enriched uranium at a former nuclear weapons-related 

high explosive test site, remains unresolved. 4 The arrangement made with Iran did not permit 

them to return for additional investigation. The issues involving Iran's past nuclear weapons 

work were never resolved, merely swept under the rug in the rush to implement the JCPOA. 

A new development, pointed out by my Institute, involves the non-implementation of Section T, 

Annex I of the JCPOA5 The IAEA Director General recently asked for clarification on 

implementing Section T, particularly in light of reported Russian opposition to the IAEA 

accessing Iranian military sites 6 

Moreover, Iran is likely violating some of the conditions of Section T with regards to certain 

dual-use equipment suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device and multi-point 

high explosive testing activities suitable for a nuclear explosive. The nature of the Section T 

conditions is analogous to verifying that allowed activities and equipment are not misused in a 

manner similar to verifying declared nuclear activities, such as uranium enrichment Moreover, 

certain activities and equipment are subject to Joint Commission approval. Veritlcation of 

Section Twill undoubtedly require IAEA access to military sites. 

Overall, Iran has shown a willingness to cooperate with the IAEA at declared sites, even 

allowing unprecedented monitoring, but it has demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with 

regards to military sites. This type of behavior is all too familiar to those of us who have 

followed the agreements with North Korea closely7 

'David Albright and Olli Hcinoner~ "Is Iran Mass Producing Advanced Gas Centrifuge Components" Can we even 

knmv '\Vith the way the Tmn den I has been stmctured and implemented so fnrT' Institute for Science nnd International 

Security, May 30. 2017. lli:U:1:1/isis -onlin:~ o~·g/isis-rcpons/detail/is--iran-rn::Jss-produciug -ad·;,;anc~d-ccntrifut!cs/8 -c-) 

4 David Albright, Sarah Burkhard_ Olli Heinonen, Allison Lacil and Frank Pabian, -'Revisiting Parchin: With plenty 

of evidence of past Iranian nuclear weapons activity at Parchin, the lAEA needs to revisilthe site," Institute for 

Science and International Security_ August 2L 2017_ http://isis-{)nline.org/isis-reports/detail!revisiting-parchin/8 5 David Albright and Olli Heinonen_ "VerifYing Section T of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Iranian Military Site Access 

Essential to JCPOA Section T Verification:· Institute for Science and Tntemational August 31, 

2017. lltffic@:l\:.Q'!l!.li:!."'Q[Wi.L2:1illQ:cL'ii'd\'1DJl::"QI!tll.rui::!iili;t!Q:!J±Il1::!11""lGIQ·:J1JE:Jce1!1c:<l?i1lili 

See for example David Albright and Kevin 0 'NeilL eds., Solving the Xorth Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington_ 

D.C.: Institute for Science and lntcmational Security Press, 2000). 

3 
24


27160c-4.eps

My Institute has cataloged violations of the JCPOA. We use that term because our intent is to 

obtain robust enforcement where no violation is too small to challenge and correct and 

limitations are strictly interpreted. However, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 

uses a somewhat more complicated definition of a violation. It does so principally because this 

act is focused on determining a basis for Congress to re-impose nuclear sanctions under an 

expedited procedure. Under INARA, there are material breaches and noncompliance, where a 

material breach is defined as any failure on the part oflran to perform its commitments that 

substantially benefits Iran's nuclear programs, decreases the amount of time required by Iran to 

achieve a nuclear weapon, or deviates from or undermines the purposes of the JCPOA 

Noncompliance is anything that departs from the terms of the JCPOA that is not a material 

breach. Under the 90-day certification requirement in INARA, the President must certify that 

Iran has not committed a material breach, or if it has, that it has "cured" such a breach. 

Noncompliance cases are required to be submitted to Congress every 120 days in a report. These 

reports have never been made public. 

The violations above, including the ones involving heavy water overage, more than ten 

centrifuges operating in a IR-6 cascade, and carbon tiber, appear to be examples of 

noncompliance. The one involving excess numbers of centrifuges would be a material breach 

that has been inadvertently cured as of several weeks ago. The potential violations of Section T, 

namely the unauthorized utilization of dual-use equipment suitable for the development of a 

nuclear explosive device and multi-point high explosive testing activities suitable for a nuclear 

explosive, could be material breaches under the INARA detinition. Thus, resolving the Section 

Tissues should be a priority. 

The justification and need to better enforce and tix the JCPOA and associated agreements is 

clear. But what to do? We are all awaiting President Donald Trump's decision regarding the 90-

day certification under INARA and the administration's rollout of its Iran policy more generally. 

If the administration decertifies, it would be fully justified under the INARA criteria. Even 

setting aside uncured material breach issues, which I agree are debatable, the President has a 

solid case to decertify based on another criterion, namely whether the suspension of sanctions 

remains vital to U.S. national security interests and proportionate to Iran's efforts to terminate its 

illicit nuclear programs. By decertifying, the President would send a powerful signal that the 

nuclear deal has a fundamentally t1awed architecture, which cannot be fixed by better 

enforcement alone. 

My colleat,'lle Mark Dubowitz and I have recommended a middle course of decertifying but not 

re-imposing nuclear sanctions.s Instead, the number of non-nuclear sanctions should be 

increased and INARA and the JCPOA fixed in Congressional legislation. The outline of this 

approach includes lengthening the certification period beyond 90 days, and rewriting U.S. policy 

to eliminate the sunsets in the JCPOA and UNSC resolution 2231, tighten inspections, and 

implement fully Section T. Congress has already done significant legislative work on repairing 

the five-year arms and eight-year ballistic missile sunsets in resolution 2231 but the president has 

not announced that this is U.S. policy or how this policy affects sunsets in resolution 2231 and 

will be enforced. In cooperation with the administration, Congress should tix the nuclear deal 

8 David Albright and Mark Dubowitz. How Tmmp Cau Improve the lrdll Deal,'" The Wall Street Journal, September 

25. 20 17. hUQ?..:iLv· v \~ . "{2iS.2.m/artick:.&JM?_:,_y:JI.!11J11t~t;:m!:l!UPI9JS_-tb..:-ln.l:J1:..d.sal:l2.96 '~X 1~~)-

4 
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27160c-5.eps

legislatively, focusing on the nuclear sunsets and inspections. The president needs to announce 

and explain his Iran policies. 

It should be pointed out that this approach does not violate the JCPOA. Nuclear sanctions would 

not be re-imposed. 

This approach has an advantage of allowing the administration to focus on implementing its new 

Iran policy. Under this policy, the JCPOA is but one aspect of many aimed at confronting Iran's 

malign behaviors. 

The Trump administration should continue seeking consensus with European allies on ways to 

fix the nuclear deaL A goal should be to outline conditions under which transatlantic sanctions 

would be re-imposed if Iran is unwilling to accept new conditions on sunsets and inspections. 

Under this approach, it is unlikely that Iran would walk away from the deal and restart its 

sensitive nuclear activities. It would not want to be blamed for collapsing the JCPOA and to risk 

the full reinstatement of US. and European nuclear-related sanctions. I believe it is more likely 

Iran will seek negotiations rather than a confrontation. It makes sense at some point to re-engage 

with Iran on negotiating fixes to the deals, including establishing permanent limitations on Iran's 

arms, ballistic missile, and nuclear programs. 

However, if it does renege on the nuclear deal, the United States can focus on repairing and 

strengthening its relationship with its European allies and pushing back against Iranian behavior 

and activities with a free hand. 

5 
26

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Albright. 

We go now to Jake Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAKE SULLIVAN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

GEOECONOMICS AND STRATEGY PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT; 

FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to appear before you today alongside my distinguished panelists to discuss the full range of Iranian threats that 

are the subject of this hearing. 

I would like to make four points at the outset. 

First, the Iran nuclear deal is working as intended. It has put 

a lid on Iran’s nuclear program and it is blocking Iran’s pathways 

to a bomb. Of course, it is not a perfect agreement. Diplomacy requires compromise. But we got what we need to achieve the purposes of the deal. Thousands of centrifuges have been dismantled. 

Iran’s plutonium reactor has been neutralized. Ninety-eight percent 

of Iran’s enriched uranium has been shipped out of the country. 

International inspectors have new and unprecedented access to 

verified compliance. 

And all of this was achieved by diplomacy backed by pressure, 

pressure that was implemented to a certain extent by this committee, without the United States having to fire a single shot. 

Today, the IAEA, the U.S. intelligence community, and the 

Israeli security establishment have all assessed that Iran is complying with the deal. Secretary Mattis has testified that it is in 

America’s national security interest. So it makes no sense for President Trump to decline to certify. The deal does not solve all problems with Iran for all time, but it solves the key problem at this 

time. 

This brings me to the second point, which is the nuclear deal 

does not preclude the United States from taking decisive steps to 

confront and counter Iran’s malign activities in the region. 

The fact that the JCPOA does not address Iran’s sponsorship of 

terrorism or its regional aggression is no concession to Iran. This 

was an arms control agreement, not a treaty of goodwill, and we 

specifically designed the deal to preserve our right and our capacity 

to counter Iran on all of these fronts. 

Today, we maintain the means to pursue a multidimensional, 

whole-of-government strategy to counter Iran’s malign activities 

across the board. We can impose costs for their continued pursuit 

of ballistic missiles, deter and disrupt their financing of terrorism, 

work with our allies and partners to curb their regional aggression, 

and support the aspirations of the Iranian people. We can also take 

steps to address the continued detention of American citizens in 

Iran. And we can do this while relentlessly enforcing the Iran nuclear deal. 

This brings me to my third point. The best strategy to counter 

the full range of Iranian threats is to commit to the deal and, to 

27

borrow a phrase from the chairman, enforce the hell out of it, not 

cast it into doubt and raise questions about America’s credibility. 

We want our partners around the world to ramp up pressure on 

Iran’s malign activities in the region. We want our European partners to stop making the artificial distinction between Hezbollah’s 

political and military wings. 

But it is a lot harder to get them to focus on these broader Iranian threats, the threats that are the subject of this hearing today, 

when all of their attention is on the question of will we or won’t 

we walk away from the deal. 

To put it simply, it is a lot harder to get cooperation from our 

partners to counter Iran when they are thinking more about the 

risk that Washington poses than they are about the risk Tehran 

poses. 

Committing to the deal rather than playing games with it will 

not only help us marshal pressure on Iran for its regional activities, it will help us more effectively implement the deal itself. 

The deal does provide the IAEA access to military sites in Iran. 

If all partners trust in our good faith, they will be more likely to 

join us in adopting a more assertive approach to enforcement and 

our entreaties to the IAEA to enforce these aspects of the deal will 

not be met with suspicion about what we are really up to. 

Experience has taught us that when Iran is isolated and the 

world trusts America, we can rally the world to hold Iran to account. Let’s get back to that. 

Fourth, walking away from the nuclear deal would be a disaster 

for the United States. Iran would resume its march toward a nuclear capability and the rest of the world would be deeply skeptical 

about joining us in rebuilding the global sanctions regime. 

Without a deal, we would be quickly faced with the very same 

painful choices we are currently facing with North Korea. These 

are choices we don’t currently have to confront with Iran precisely 

because this agreement is in place. 

We already have to grapple with one nuclear crisis right now, as 

this committee knows well. Why would the administration want to 

create a second one? This defies not only sound strategic thinking, 

but also simple common sense. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:]

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27160d-1.eps

Written Testimony of Jake Sullivan 

Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

Former National Security Adviser to the Vice President and Director of Policy Planning, 

U.S. Department of State 

United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Hearing: "Confronting the Full Range of Iranian Threats 

October 11, 2017 

Good morning. 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank 

you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss US policy toward Iran. I am pleased 

to join a panel with General Wald, Ambassador Jetlfey, and David Albright I have had the 

privilege oflearning from each of them over the years, and while we do not agree on everything, 

I have the deepest respect for their intellect and their service to this country. Likewise, I have the 

utmost respect for the bipartisan work this committee has done to help build the global campaign 

of economic pressure that brought Iran to the negotiating table and paved the way for a 

negotiated solution on the nuclear issue. 

The subject of today' s hearing is ·'confronting the full range of Iranian threats." Over the course 

of this hearing, I expect we will touch on Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its destabilizing 

regional activities, its ballistic missile program, and its human rights abuses at home, including 

the unjustified and inhumane detention of American citizens. We will also cover the Iranian 

nuclear program, a subject that President Trump will address in a speech this week and on which 

he has an important decision to make by October 15. 

There are a great many things to say on each of these subjects, and on the ways in which they 

interact to make Iran the complex, continuing threat to regional peace and security we confront 

today. To help ±l-ame the discussion, I would like to make four points at the outset 

First, the Iran nuclear deal is working as intended. It is blocking Iran's pathways to a bomb, 

and it has put the Iranian nuclear program in a box. Of course, it is not a perfect agreement 

Diplomacy requires compromise, and compromise means giving up more than you would like 

and getting less than you would like. The key question is, did we get what we need? And the 

answer, I believe, is yes. 

Thousands of centrifuges have been dismantled. So even if the Iranians walked away from the 

deal today, their breakout time has been extended to the point where it would take them more 

than a year to produce one weapon's worth of weapons grade uranium. Without the deal, it 

would have been a matter of weeks. Iran's plutonium reactor at Arak has been neutralized. 

Without the deal, that reactor could have become a bomb factory, producing enough weaponsgrade plutonium for one to two bombs per year. Ninety-eight percent of Iran's enriched uranium 

has been shipped out of the country. Without the deal, they would have enough low enriched 

uranium to make a dozen bombs. International inspectors have unprecedented access to verify 

Iran's compliance. Without the deal, we would have had very limited insight into the program. 
29


27160d-2.eps

Diplomacy backed by pressure achieved all of this, without the United States have to fire a single 

shot 

Today, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the US intelligence community, and the 

Israeli security establishment have all assessed that Iran is currently complying with its 

obligations under the JCPOA. Israel's national security leaders have reported that the threat of a 

nuclear Iran has abated to the point where it is no longer Israel's primary security concern. 

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has testified that the deal is in America's national security 

interest So it makes no sense for President Trump to decline to make the certification called for 

in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 

Second, the nnclear deal does not preclnde the United States from taking decisive steps to 

confront and counter Iran's malign activities in the region. The fact that the JCPOA does not 

address Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its support for Hizbollah, or its regional aggression is no 

concession to Iran. The deal otiers no quarter on these issues. Indeed, we specit!cally designed 

the deal to preserve our right and our capacity to counter Iran on all of these tronts. The 

Congress understands this: thanks to the work of this committee, you passed sanctions this year 

aimed at Iran's non-nuclear activities that were fully consistent with the JCPOA Now it is 

incumbent on the administration to enforce them, and I am at a loss as to why they have been 

slow in doing so. 

There are also turther steps the United States can take, including additional sanctions measures, 

intelligence-led operations, interdictions, law-enforcement and military cooperation with our 

allies, and further diplomatic pressure. I hope we will hear a more specific set of proposals tram 

the administration in each of these areas. 

Critics warned that the nuclear deal would give a massive financial windfall to Iran, allowing it 

to tund its regional ambitions. But the Treasury Department's former top sanctions otlicial, 

Adam Szubin, has written persuasively that sanctions relief has no/transformed Iran into a far 

more dangerous threat Contrary to the rhetoric of some critics, we did not "pay" Iran for the 

nuclear deal; we mere! y pennitted Iran to recover its own assets that were trozen overseas. And 

the Trump administration's own Defense Intelligence Agency chief has said the lion's share of 

those recovered assets went to domestic, not military, budget items. 

This is not to deny the reality that Iran has been aggressive across the region, it is only to 

underscore that they were aggressive before nuclear sanctions, during sanctions, and now after 

the deal. Money has never been the limiting factor. A key reason they are on the march now is 

their ability to cheaply exploit regional chaos- in the absence of clear pushback in Iraq, Syria, 

and elsewhere. 

The bottom line is that we maintain the means to pursue a multi-dimensional, whole-ofgovernment strategy to counter Iran's malign activities across the board. We can impose costs 

for the continued pursuit of ballistic missiles, deter and disrupt their financing of terrorism, and 

work with our allies and partners to curb their regional aggression. We can also bring 

considerable pressure to bear on their continued detention of American citizens. All of this is 

consistent with continuing to enforce the Iran nuclear deal. Which brings me to my third point. 
30


27160d-3.eps

Third, the best strategy to counter the full range of Iranian threats is to commit to the deal 

and enforce it relentlessly, not cast it into doubt and raise questions about America's 

credibility. We want our European partners and others to join us in increasing the pressure on 

Iran for its revisionism and expansionism. That including convincing Europe to stop making the 

artificial distinction between Hizbollah' s political and military wings. But it is a lot harder to get 

them to focus on these broader Iranian threats when their attention is on the nuclear deal and its 

uncertain future. It is a lot harder to induce their cooperation when they are thinking more about 

the risk Washington poses than they are about the risk Tehran poses. 

Instead of asking, "what can we do together to address Iran's ballistic missile program and its 

sponsorship of terrorism," our partners are asking, "will the United States keep its word on the 

deal or not?" The ambassadors of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were recently 

making the rounds on the Hill to argue for staying in the deal Even former Israeli security 

officials have come to Washington to underscore that it would be "folly" to walk away. If they 

had confidence in the deal's future, our partners could have used that time to work with 

American officials on a coordinated strategy to deal with the broader range oflranian threats. 

Our past success in rallying the international community against Iran rested on our partners' 

view that Tehran was the problem, not Washington. We need to get back to that as we work to 

confront Iran across the region. 

The dance around decertification has not just distracted our allies, it has also distracted the 

American national security community. Because this administration has spent so much time 

focused on the "will-he-or-won't-he-certify" debate, they appear to have taken their eye otl'the 

ball of the broader Iranian threat. Consider Syria, for example. It is a central theater in Iran's 

expanding regional ambitions. The administration's current ISIS-only strategy has created open 

running room for Iran, its client Assad, and its proxy Hizbollah to assert greater control over 

Syria, including areas adjacent to the border with Israel Current policy has been casual about 

allowing Iran and Hizbollah to exploit de-escalation zones to their advantage, creating the very 

real risk that Iran and its proxies set up a pennanent presence on Israel's border with Syria. This 

committee should be pressing the administration for a Syria strategy that goes beyond ISIS and 

addressing these emerging threats. 

Committing to the deal, rather than playing games with it, will not only help us marshal pressure 

on Iran for its regional activities- it will help us more etl'ectively implement the deal itself If 

our partners trust in our good faith and our good word, they will be more likely to adopt a more 

assertive approach to enforcement. 

The issue of inspections at military sites is a case in point. The JCPOA provides for IAEA 

access to any site in Iran, including military sites, where there is a bona fide reason to believe 

Iran may be pursuing illicit nuclear activities. As long as the United States is publicly signaling 

that we intend to use this issue as an excuse to pull out of the deal, it is no wonder that the IAEA 

and our European allies resist our etl'orts to gain access to military sites. They see it as a ruse, 

not as a legitimate concern. If we commit to the deal, I believe that we would have a much better 
31


27160d-4.eps

chance of getting the Europeans and the IAEA to join us in an even more robust set of 

inspections that go beyond the declared facilities 

The same goes for the provisions of the JCPOA that expire in 10 to 25 years. Contrary to what 

critics have suggested, the JCPOA does not permit Iran to get a nuclear weapon after some of the 

nuclear restraints come off in the out years. Under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which 

Iran reaffirmed in the JCPOA, it is forever forbidden tram acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

Similarly, there is no "sunset" in the deal on the restrictions on weapons-related nuclear 

activities; Iran is permanently barred tram pursuing those activities. And there is no "sunset" in 

the deal on Iran's obligation to permit reasonable access to its nuclear facilities; Iran is 

permanently required to abide by the Additional ProtocoL Moreover, if the United States 

believes in good faith that Iran is trying to advance its program in threatening ways in the years 

ahead, nothing prevents us tram taking action- diplomatic, economic, or othenvise- to 

prevent that tram occurring. And a future president- as a result of the agreement and its 

transparency requirements- will have greater insight than we have ever had into the people, 

places, and technology involved in Iran's nuclear program, as well as the benefit of more than a 

decade to further perfect our means of disrupting it if necessary. 

Even so, we will want to work with our partners on a long-term strategy to manage the Iranian 

nuclear threat after some of the JCPOA' s provisions expire. The best way to maintain 

international unity and to hold Iran accountable down the road is not to threaten to crater the deal 

today; it is to keep the burden of proof on Iran, rather than on the United States. The president's 

impending decision to decertify the deal may actually take some of the pressure oil' of Iran with 

respect to its long-term compliance, by making them seem like the more responsible party in the 

eyes of the international community. 

All of this raises the question, why would the administration insist on decertification when it 

comes with a number of significant risks and no obvious benefits? The administration seems to 

be arguing that in declining to certify the deal, they can set up an etl'ective renegotiation with 

Iran. But a closer look at their concept of renegotiation reveals that it is a fantasy in which Iran 

gives up everything and we give nothing. In order to buy into this logic, you would have to 

believe that we could fully restore the global sanctions we had in place tram 2011 to 2015, which 

we could not do because our partners have made clear they would not go along with it You 

would also have to believe that Iran would capitulate to a series of demands they steadfastly 

rejected before, which they would not do because there are certain lines they are simply 

unwilling to cross. 

All of this raises the risk that the purported search for a "better deal'' is really a predicate for 

abandoning the deal at some point down the road- which leads me to my tina! point 

Fourth, walking away from the nuclear deal would be a disaster for the United States. 

Whether we left by design or by accident, because this decertification gambit set off a chain of 

events that led to the collapse of the deal, we would be strategically worse off Iran would return 

to racing forward on its nuclear capability and we would not be able to rally the international 

community to stop them through sanctions. Some critics of the deal argue that Iran would not 

dare to move forward because of the credible threat of military force. But if all that is required to 
32


27160d-5.eps

keep Iran in check is the credible threat of military force, then why are the deal's opponents 

worried about the precise provisions of the JCPOA? It's because they know that severe nuclear 

restraints and verification measures are a much better and more stable solution than relying on 

the military option. 

As more Iranian centrifuges spin, with fewer or no inspectors on the ground, we would quickly 

be faced with the same painful choices we are facing with North Korea, choices we do not 

currently have to confront with respect to Iran- precisely because this deal is in place. We 

already have to grapple with one nuclear crisis. Why would the administration want to create a 

second one? This defies not only sound strategic thinking, but also simple common sense. 

Ambassador Bill Burns and I recently wrote an op-ed piece laying out what we thought was the 

smart way to get tough with Iran. I would like to close by quoting the key section here 

"The smatt way to proceed would be to keep the world's powers united and the burden of proof 

on Iran. That means working with partners on relentless enforcement; enhancing sanctions that 

punish Iran's non-nuclear misbehavior, including its missile program and sponsorship of 

terrorism; working closely with Arab partners to deter Iran's meddling in their internal affairs; 

and making plain our concerns with Iran's domestic human rights abuses. It means using the 

diplomatic channel we opened with Iran, after 35 years without such contact, to avoid 

inadvertent escalation. And it means making it clear that after some restrictions in the deal 

expire, the United States and the world will still not allow Iran to advance its nuclear program in 

threatening ways." 

Thank you again for inviting me here today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 
33

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Sullivan. 

Let me say that in August, I was in the Middle East. And I 

wanted to ask Ambassador Jeffrey a question here, because you 

made it very clear that allowing Iran to complete the land bridge 

or the corridor across Iraq and Syria to Lebanon would risk, in 

your words, a strategic defeat. 

And I wondered if you could explain to us what you presume the 

impact will be on Lebanon, on Israel, and on Jordan. How could we 

work with our partners on the ground to block this effort? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, people have—including some in this administration—

have pooh-poohed the idea of a land bridge: Well, it is long and it 

is a desert. I have been out there. You have been out there. A lot 

of us have been out there. TIR trucks roll around the Middle East 

deserts all of the time. 

The Iranians, for good reason, fear—because we have done it, we 

did it with Turkey a few years ago, we have done it in other 

areas—they fear our ability to intercept and force down aircraft if 

we really get upset with Iran. We control the air in the Middle 

East. 

We don’t control the sand. That is what they want to do. It is 

a lot easier to move things by semi-trailer than it is by even jumbo 

jet, and the Iranians don’t have many of them. The things they 

want to move are weapon systems, particularly, as you said, even 

more advanced rockets, missile systems, and components, so that 

Hezbollah can build such systems—we are seeing that now in 

Israel and Syria—to threaten Israel and threaten other allies. We 

see how upset Jordan is at Hezbollah moving close to its border. 

Turkey is very concerned about not just the PYD, but they are 

concerned about Assad trying to wreak revenge for Turkey’s support for the opposition. Turkey thinks it can cut a deal with Russia. 

It can in the short run. In the long run, Turkey’s turn to be invited 

back out of Syria will come, believe me, just like Israel will be told 

no longer to operate in the air there. That is, I think, what is going 

to happen. 

We see this with Lebanon, particularly the control, de facto, of 

the government by Hezbollah and thus of Iran. We saw that recently with the Lebanese Government’s agreeing to ISIS fighters 

being transferred to the Iraqi front, basically, to the shock of the 

American administration. 

And the idea that Syria and ultimately Iraq will be dominated 

by these alternative forces, political, military, like Hezbollah, like 

the militias in Iraq, who are loyal to Tehran and will ensure that 

Tehran’s interests are met. 

Chairman ROYCE. And that brings me to sort of the follow-up to 

that to General Wald. 

In 2006, I watched those rockets come down in Haifa. I went 

down to the Rambam Trauma Hospital. There were 600 victims. 

They had at that time, in Hezbollah’s arsenal, about 10,000 of 

these left. Today they probably have, let’s say, 120,000. 

General Wald, the fact that Iran is building in southern Lebanon 

and in Syria, across from Israel, factories to make additional rockets, when I was there, each one had 90,000 ball bearings in it, so 

you can imagine the damage it did when it came in on a civilian 

34

area. What can we do to help Israel respond to this obvious threat 

since they keep telegraphing the punch that they intend to deliver? 

General WALD. Yeah, Mr. Chairman, I think that is the real 

issue long-term. 

Just up front, I would say one of the problems I have with the 

current, at least, declared strategy in the Middle East is it is kind 

of incremental and not synergistic from an overall standpoint. I go 

back to the bottom line, which will be just what you pointed out, 

there is the threat to Israel, and Saudi Arabia, for that matter. 

And I think there is actually a new world kind of evolving in the 

Middle East that we need to start taking advantage, and that is 

this commonality of enemy with Saudi Arabia and Israel, for one 

thing. 

Two is, I think we need to look closely at our equipment transfer 

to both Saudi Arabia, but Israel as well, the number, as I mentioned in my testimony, that I think we ought to beef up the foreign aid to Israel from that standpoint. I was in Israel not long ago. 

We did a study on the 2015 conflict. And Iron Dome is fantastic. 

David’s Sling will be fantastic. Arrow is really good. PAC-3 is outstanding. The problem is they don’t have enough of it because of 

120,000 missiles. 

So they also have to have kind of a left-of-the-attack capability, 

which might be a cyber-type capability, which we can’t talk about 

here. 

But I think our U.S. policy and strategy, I would go along with 

what has been broadly commented here, is to let the JCPOA as it 

is, but enforce the sanctions, as you point out. I totally agree with 

you. I heard you on TV about a week ago saying this, and it is exactly what we ought to do. 

But then number two is I think we need to really look strongly 

at building a stronger, maybe a unique, if you will, or different 

anyway, Middle East coalition that would include favorable GCC 

countries, as well Jordan and Egypt, and really start beefing up 

our capabilities to deter both Iran and Hezbollah. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, General Wald. 

I go now to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first of all say that, since a number of questions have 

been raised by witnesses about Iran’s compliance, or lack of it, with 

the JCPOA, and the IAEA’s ability or inability to verify, I want to 

encourage members of this committee on both sides of the aisle to 

attend our classified briefing tomorrow at 2:30 with the intelligence 

community to learn more about this in a classified setting. So it is 

2:30 tomorrow, talk about the IAEA’s ability or inability to verify 

and Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. 

Let me ask Mr. Sullivan, how would President Trump’s failure 

to certify Iranian compliance under the nuclear deal affect the likelihood that our partners would be willing to work with us on confronting Iran’s malign activities, such as their support for terrorism 

and advancing their ballistic missile program? That is a concern I 

have. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think it will have a negative impact, for a couple 

of different reasons. The first is that it will put all of the focus of 

diplomatic discussions between the United States and our EuroVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
35

pean partners on what to do about the deal and whether the President is going to stay in it and on what conditions he will stay in 

it and whether he likes it today and doesn’t like it tomorrow. 

And this ‘‘will he or won’t he’’ dance around decertification and 

what follows from that will distract the international community, 

the United States and our partners, from actually taking on Iran 

in Syria and across the region. And we have heard from other witnesses on this panel about how, as things stand today, United 

States policy toward Syria is permissive in respect to Iran’s capacity to gain strength and gain territory. And we need to be working 

with our partners and focused on that as job number one right 

now. 

The second thing that I think it will do with respect to our partners is make them worried that if they actually worked hard with 

us on a broader strategy against Iran, whether or not we would 

have the staying power, the credibility to go with it. Because we 

have looked them in the eye and told them that we would be with 

them in enforcing this deal, sticking with and enforcing this deal, 

and casting that into more broadly casts American credibility into 

doubt. 

So from my perspective, the best way to achieve the objectives 

that I think both the Republicans and Democrats on this committee 

want to achieve with respect to Iran, we should commit to this 

deal. We should make clear that America’s word is good, that 

America’s faith is good, that we are going to enforce this deal to 

the utmost, and then we are going to rally the world to deal with 

all of these other challenges. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you. 

Let me talk a bit about my trepidation about the relationship 

that Syria is building with Russia. 

Iran has begun to develop a permanent foothold in Syria, seeking 

a corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean. You speak with all 

the top elected Israeli officials from the Prime Minister on down, 

they all watch this. They don’t like the cease-fire in Syria. They are 

all concerned about it, that it brings Iran too close to the Israeli 

border. 

Iran’s relationship with Russia, which is cemented in the battlefield defending the Assad regime, has made it possible, in my opinion, for Iran to make inroads in Syria, putting Israel’s security at 

risk and threatening to further destabilize Lebanon and Iraq. 

So anyone who cares to answer this, I have three questions. Is 

the United States relying on Russia to influence Iran? Would Russia agree to keep Iran contained? And what motivation does Russia 

have in keeping Iran in check? It seems to be falling in right with 

their principles. 

Ambassador Jeffrey. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I will start with my conversations in Moscow 2 weeks ago. I can’t get into the details of who we talked with, 

because it was track two. But we met both officials and—how can 

I put it—former officials with close ties to the government. 

They basically felt that they were able to operate in Syria and 

that, as far as they were concerned, this whole process in the U.N., 

under U.N. Resolution 2254, the Geneva process for a political soluVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
36

tion, they just give it lip service. They were pressing us to agree 

for a Marshall Plan for Assad’s Syria, to build it up. 

And as far as this current administration, as I mentioned a few 

minutes ago on the land bridge, when I pressed them and said, 

‘‘Look, what happens inside Syria and what happens out of Syria 

is a security concern for our allies and for us,’’ their answer was, 

‘‘But the administration doesn’t tell us that. They say they are just 

in Syria to fight ISIS,’’ which is why I said we have to shift our 

priorities. 

Russia, it does not have the same interest as Iran in Syria. For 

example, Russia wants to build up the Syrian Government and the 

regular Syrian military forces. Iran wants to at least implicitly undercut them by creating alternative power centers politically and 

particularly militarily. The model is Hezbollah. So there is some 

strain between the two. 

Russia also realizes that Israel and other countries are looking 

to Russia to constrain Iran. And it may be that Russia will be playing that mediator role. But that isn’t good for us either, for Syria 

to be a threat to the region that is mediated only by Russia and 

not by us, because the way this place has worked for the last 30 

years is we have been the country that has come in and kept 

things under wraps. 

So I do not think that Russia is fundamentally at odds with Iran 

and Syria. I don’t think the differences are that big. I think that 

we as a government, if we have a specific policy, which we don’t 

have yet, we might be able to use Russia on the margins but not 

too much, because they are basically an anti-status quo power, as 

is Iran in the region, and we and our allies are status quo powers. 

It is that simple. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce. 

It is abundantly clear that at this point this fanciful notion that 

if only we come to a nuclear agreement with Iran first, then Iran 

would be willing to engage on the rest of its illicit activity has proven to be just that, fanciful. 

And, Mr. Albright, you raised the possibility of the issue of nonimplementation of Section T and that verification of this section 

would undoubtedly require IAEA access to military sites. Has Iran 

been granting the IAEA access to military sites, yes or no? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Not since Implementation Day. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Now, paragraph 27 of Section E in the August 2017 IAEA Board 

of Governors report on verification and monitoring of Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA states, ‘‘The Agency’s verification and monitoring of Iran and other JCPOA nuclear-related commitments continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, S, and T of Annex 

I of the JCPOA.’’

If the IAEA is not getting access to military sites to verify Section T, how is verification and monitoring of this section taking 

place, and how is Iran in compliance? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think the IAEA leaves out many things 

from its reports. I mean, I have spent a lot of time talking to governments in Europe, people associated with the IAEA, to try to 

37

learn things. And it is just a decision that the Director General 

made that he is not going to be very transparent. 

And one of the reasons I looked into Section T was because it 

just seemed to be a clear contradiction between what he was saying, the Director General was saying, and what was actually happening on the ground. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. I don’t think I will have time 

for responses in this setting, but we will talk afterwards, and I 

know we will have an opportunity. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, you discussed the need to strip the so-called 

seal of approval bestowed upon Iran by the JCPOA and undercutting the willingness of the international business community to 

fund Iran’s economy. And you also talk about strengthening the 

U.S.-EU anti-Iran alliance. 

But the reality, as we know, is that EU nations have been unwilling to take any anti-Iran action, partly for fear that Iran will 

leave the JCPOA, but also in large part because they have concluded billions upon billions of dollars in deals with Iran. 

And I would ask you—we will talk later—to your knowledge, has 

the EU imposed any new non-nuclear-related sanction or designation against Iran since the JCPOA? And how do we get the EU on 

board when its member states have given their seal of approval 

and opened up Tehran for business? 

And then for General Wald, you mentioned Iranian regional aggression under the JCPOA undermining efforts in Iraq and in 

Syria, support for Hezbollah, support for the Houthis in Yemen. 

And there are also concerns that Qatar’s restoration of ties with 

Iran, with Zarif having visited the emir just last week. 

So I would ask just how bad the consequences are for the region 

if Iran continues to support the Houthis and now draws closer to 

the Qataris. How would we be addressing that? 

And, Mr. Chairman, a note for the committee, as we are discussing the Iran nonproliferation threat, I would like to report to 

the committee that our very own Yleem Poblete was nominated 

today for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for 

Verification and Compliance. And as many of you know, Yleem 

served as the chief of staff and the staff director for this committee, 

and we congratulate Dr. Poblete on this nomination. 

So I won’t have time for answers, but I will chat with the gentlemen afterward. So I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentlelady for yielding back. 

Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I could imagine buying a flawed 

automobile and deciding it is a bad deal. And in some jurisdictions, 

you can just take the car back to the dealer and you get back all 

your money. But imagine if you lived in a jurisdiction where, if you 

take the car back to the dealer, the dealer keeps the car and your 

money. 

Iran is going to keep our money. We unfroze $100 billion of their 

money. People argue about whether it is larger or smaller than 

that amount. We delivered over $1 billion in currency. We can renounce this deal. Iran keeps the money and is then liberated from 

all of the restrictions on their nuclear program. 

38

Now, I opposed this deal because the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programs were temporary but U.S. obligations under the deal 

are permanent. What we should be trying to do is extend and enforce the nuclear sanctions. If we renounce this deal, we don’t extend and enforce the nuclear sanctions and restrictions on Iran, we 

end them. 

Now, there are two methods by which we can get to that bad result. The first is on our minds now because it could be triggered—

the first stop could be on October 15. And that is the President 

could fail to issue the certification under the Iranian Nuclear Review Act. 

I think if he did that the press might overplay it, but all it does 

is change Senate rules. It says that there could be a bill that would 

get immediate—or 60-day attention—it would get expedited attention in the Senate to reimpose one or more of the sanctions that 

we agreed to get rid of as part of the JCPOA. And they would need 

50 votes instead of 60. 

I don’t think the Senate will use that, I don’t think that they will 

impose the sanctions, because I don’t think they want to take back 

the car and let the dealer keep our money too. 

The other way that we could reach the same bad results would 

be in January of next year, because the only way the JCPOA works 

is for the President to issue waivers under four different—at least 

four different sanctions bills, and all of those sanctions waivers expire in the middle of next January. 

Now, if the President were to fail to issue those waivers, then, 

regardless of the wisdom of Congress, we would get the bad result. 

So my hope is, if the President has to do something based on his 

need to repudiate anything that Mr. Obama is associated with, that 

he would take the action that just kicks the matter to Congress, 

and then Congress could wisely refuse to make a bad decision. 

If he instead waits till January and refuses to issue these waivers, not as a result of congressional action but just as a result of 

his own action, then there will be celebrations in the Islamic Republic. 

What we need is more sanctions with European support. The 

way we get those is, as Mr. Sullivan points out, we are free to impose sanctions for their other evils. 

And a number of us asked John Kerry about this in July 2015 

when he came before us. I specifically asked about the Central 

Bank sanctions. And I said, ‘‘Is Congress and the United States 

free, under this agreement, to adopt new sanctions legislation that 

will remain in force as long as Iran holds our hostages or supports 

Assad?’’ I could have added ‘‘or supports the Houthi or engages in 

terrorism.’’

His response was, ‘‘We are free to adopt additional sanctions as 

long as they are not a phony excuse for just taking the whole pot 

of past ones and putting them back.’’

So we have to convince the world that we are sanctioning Iran 

in a different way for different reasons. The more we say we hate 

the deal and we are in the process of repudiating the deal, the 

more the sanctions of 2017 begin to look like a phony excuse for 

taking the whole pot of past ones and putting them on, and letting 

Iran argue that they are liberated from the nuclear restrictions. 

39

The more we say that we are going to live with this deal, that 

we respect the deal, and that we are imposing new sanctions because of Iran’s other evils. And here I want to thank the Islamic 

Republic because they have committed such incredible evils, such 

mass murder in Yemen and in Syria, that they will more than justify any sanctions any of us can come up with. 

I have used my time. I would ask the witnesses to respond for 

the record, and particularly, I would like Mr. Sullivan to outline 

what are the toughest sanctions we can impose that meet Kerry’s 

standard. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chris Smith of 

New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sullivan, 

let me ask you. During the debate over the Iran agreement, the 

Obama administration repeatedly charged that opponents of the 

egregiously flawed deal somehow were pushing for war. And nothing could have ever been further from the truth in that false allegation. 

Let me ask you this. Is Iran’s behavior, its increased aggressiveness, its build-out on ballistic missiles, what you expected from the 

deal? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you for the opportunity to actually——

Mr. SMITH. Make it quick because I don’t have much time. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. To clarify this point. I never believed in negotiating this deal from the beginning that producing a nuclear agreement with Iran and arms control agreement with Iran that we 

would fix Iran’s larger——

Mr. SMITH. Okay. You said that. Let me ask you this and the 

others, too. Secretary of State John Kerry said on CNN or it was 

reported by CNN, January 21 of 2016, that money from the deal 

that the Iranians were getting would go to terrorists. To whom has 

that gone? Who are the terrorists and how much? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I understand it, the Trump administration’s 

DIA chief has said, the bulk of that money has gone to domestic 

purposes, not to the IRGC. But, of course, the IRGC and its affiliates——

Mr. SMITH. But do you know how much is gone? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. I think it would behoove the committee to get 

a briefing from the DIA chief who has laid out where he thinks the 

assessment——

Mr. SMITH. Let me just say something. We had numerous hearings and the chairman was stellar in ensuring that we had multiple hearings on the Iran deal before, during, and now after. Even 

before the deal was signed, Khomeini said that he will never permit inspectors to inspect Iran’s military bases. 

The Iranian Minister of Defense said, ‘‘Tehran will not allow any 

foreigner to discover Iran’s defensive and missile capabilities by inspecting the country’s military sites.’’ And Under Secretary of 

State, Wendy Sherman, and others, continually talked about any 

time, anywhere types of inspections. 

General, you might want to speak to this. She then went on to 

say, absent the deal that was signed, that was merely rhetorical. 

Ronald Reagan used to say, on-sight verification was key. Any 

time, anywhere, and you brought up, and Mr. Albright, this Section 

40

T problem, you might want to elaborate on that, if you would, for 

the committee. General. 

General WALD. Congressman, thank you. First of all, on the 

money issue, I would just say from my perspective, I am not a 

treasury expert, but $100 billion to Iran may not necessarily have 

gone directly to the IRGC, but it freed up the money that they 

would have given the IRGC had they had it in their own coffers. 

Maybe it didn’t go directly to them, I think it is a nuance that——

Mr. SMITH. The money is fungible, in other words. 

General WALD. Money is money, it is fungible. On the inspection 

issue, I don’t think any of us should be naive to think Iran is not 

cheating on what we considered the deal with the military installations. That to me, is almost flabbergasting that we would think 

that was going to be an acceptable issue where we have, you 

know—frankly, underground facilities could be built almost anyplace. We don’t have perfect intelligence. We have some pretty darn 

good intelligence. We don’t have perfect. I would venture to say 

that I would be 99.9 percent sure Iran is cheating on the deal, and 

that portion of it needs to be looked at closely. 

And I am very disturbed that we are basically void of a real 

broad strategy in the Middle East that would both defend our interests and Israel’s. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think one of the unfortunate mistakes that the 

Obama administration made was to downplay the importance and 

of getting demonstrated access to military sites in Iran, and solving 

what are called these possible military dimension issues prior to 

implementation day. It set up a very unworkable dynamic for the 

inspectors. 

There is a mechanism in the deal to really press Iran to accept 

inspections, but it happens to have a huge risk of bringing down 

the deal. And the international inspectors don’t want to be put in 

that position. And I think that has been part of their timidity to 

push this issue. I think that one of the things that if the President 

does decertify, and in fact if he doesn’t, there is a need for Congress 

to start thinking through legislation to fix this deal. 

And I think there is many ways to do that, but I think it is a 

priority to focus on how to ensure that the inspectors get in there. 

And I would add, that most of this new talk of wanting to enforce 

the deal better among our allies, willing to look at fixes, is only because President Trump said he would walk away. Before that, 

there were big problems in getting the Europeans to take any of 

these problems seriously. 

So I think that President Trump has done a service, while we 

could all argue about how it is played out, but he has done a basic 

service to try to get people to focus on the inadequacies in this deal 

and fix them. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask, in my final second. Iran/North Korea 

collaboration, does it exist? Has it in the past? What is the status 

of it now? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Certainly there is a belief there is collaboration 

on missiles. On nuclear, it is much more uncertain, but it is a concern for the future. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Greg Meeks of New York. 

41

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I just got to make 

a comment, General Wald, that your last statement is clearly speculation—is 99 percent pure speculation. And speculation without 

facts, sir, is very dangerous. So I just have to make that comment. 

I don’t need an answer, but I just need to make that statement because——

General WALD. Well, I would just say one thing. There is .01 percent it isn’t—and number 2 is,——

Mr. MEEKS. Well, I have limited time. I am reclaiming my time. 

Mr. Sullivan, number one, listening to your testimony earlier, I 

go to church on Sunday. I would have said amen. It seems to me 

that it made logical sense. I think people forget how we got to the 

table into the first place. It wasn’t a bilateral agreement between 

us and Iran, it wasn’t even the bilateral sanctions that we had on 

Iran. 

It is the fact that we did lead that was able to get the other countries to work with us, and for them to also apply the sanctions multilaterally that brought them to the table so that we can discuss 

what issue, which our focus was, to prevent them from having a 

nuclear weapon, as you appropriately said. 

And that there was nothing to prevent this, because I think we 

are all united on the fact that we are not sitting back and trusting 

Iran and saying that we are not going to do anything—other than 

nefarious activity, we got to stop them. And we got to use, you 

know, other sanctions. We have got to try to unite and bring our 

allies together, as we did, on this agreement to prevent Iran from 

having nuclear weapons. 

And I think that we all agree, too, I don’t know any bill ever 

passed the United States Congress, or anyplace else, that is perfect. There is no bill that is perfect. We always negotiate and no 

one gets their way 100 percent. That being said, I would be interested to know, Ambassador Jeffrey, you heard the testimony of Mr. 

Sullivan, is there anything that you disagreed with that Mr. Sullivan said? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I was both hoping and fearing that that 

question would come up, Congressman, because Jake and I have 

both worked a lot in the diplomatic world, and when we disagree, 

this is a disagreement of opinion, we can’t prove it. 

Here is the problem with this agreement and our allies. First of 

all, our allies in the region are happy if we not walk away from 

the agreement, but we can certainly do quite a bit on it. We are 

really talking about our allies in Europe. And they have an almost 

rabid embrace of this agreement because of their philosophy, which 

is that international agreements and the U.N. are the way to deal 

with all problems. 

The problem with this is, they also have a rabid reluctance to engage or even to support us in engaging doing the hard work of containing Iran. I don’t think that us behaving well with this agreement is going to get them to sign up to more joint action in Syria 

and Iraq against Iran. I think, rather, as Mr. Albright said, if we 

question that agreement, and say, look, to the degree we are going 

to hold to much of it will depend on how successful we are regionally, and that requires your help. I think that is the way to go forward. 

42

Mr. MEEKS. Go ahead, Mr. Sullivan. I see you wanted to say 

something. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think this military inspection issue is a great 

case in point. The deal provides the IAEA the opportunity to get 

access to Iran’s military sites, and Iran is not allowed to simply say 

no. However, it also requires our allies to work with us, our European partners to work with us to make that happen. 

When Ambassador Haley goes to Vienna to raise the issue of access to military sites, and there are reports in the press here that 

say the reason the Trump administration is raising this is they 

wanted an excuse to walk away from the deal. It is no surprise the 

Europeans and the IAEA are reluctant to engage with United 

States on that issue. 

From my perspective, the way we were able to build a campaign 

of pressure against Iran to get to this nuclear deal in the first 

place, which the Europeans did not want to go along with because 

they were allergic to the really biting sanctions, it was by making 

clear that the United States was going to act in good faith, and 

that all of the burden of proof was on Iran. 

What the Trump administration has done is created real questions about where that burden of proof should lie, and that is why 

I think we have such a challenge. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Could I add one thing. I think Ambassador Haley 

went to Vienna for very good reasons, to raise issues and learn 

things. Using false statements in the press to try to impugn what 

she did, I think is unfair. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not impugning Ambassador Haley, what I 

am saying that is the Trump administration’s approach, they are 

putting out publicly that one of the ways in which they may want 

to ultimately walk away from the deal is to point to this provision. 

And to make that part of the public theater around this, I think 

it is a challenge. That has nothing to do with Ambassador Haley 

herself. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. They never said that——

Chairman ROYCE. Well, time has expired, regardless. And we 

have to go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California next. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

again thank you and Representative Engel, for your leadership on 

this particular issue, which is of vital importance to the security of 

our country. Let me just see if I can ask a yes or no question. 

Is Iran in compliance with the treaty? Just yes or no, down the 

line. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Treaty yes; 2231 Resolution, no. 

General WALD. No. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Not in full compliance. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we have two of our witnesses are 

saying that they—it was their decision that basically Iran is not in 

compliance, and we have one that is sort of both ways, but in the 

end that was a no, as far as I am concerned. 

General, let me just note, we have to push buttons here, yes or 

no, when we go to vote. And when you got 99 percent of something, 

you feel something is right 99 percent. That is a really easy vote 

for us to make. Maybe I am just talking for myself, because you 

43

do realize there is always a couple percentage points on the side 

of the argument. 

So let’s just say already we have the majority at least of this—

of our witnesses today saying that Iran is not in compliance. And 

is there a question then, should the President of the United States 

lie about it? We gave him the responsibility of determining where 

there was compliance. Of course not. And we have people who are 

responsible people throughout our country telling us they are not 

in compliance. And it may mean something really bad for our country in the future if we simply ignore it, as we have found out in 

Korea. 

And I was right here when we were told about how North Korea deserved to have the treaty, and we gave them $5 billion, and now 

where are we at—on the edge of a catastrophe. No, it does not—

kicking the can down the road, asking the President not to recognize reality is not the answer here. 

And, again, I agree that we owe the President a debt of gratitude 

for bringing some reality to decision-makings like this, rather than 

trying to have what I call irrational optimism about the future, 

which always leads us to situations where—like we face in North 

Korea today. 

One thing that we—this is not just an alternative, however, of 

facing the mullahs down on this particular issue or dealing with 

them in some way militarily. We have other ways of ratcheting up 

pressure on the mullah regime. 

We have some friends here dressed in yellow today to remind us 

that the people of Iran don’t like the mullah oppressors who murdered their own people. We have people, Baloch in Iran. We have 

Azeris in Iran. We have Kurds in Iran, all of whom feel they are 

opposed. We haven’t even ratcheted up any of the pressure on 

them, even as Iran, the mullah dictators, thumb their nose at us 

and take the money, but don’t comply fully with the expectations 

of that treaty. 

We need leadership here. We can’t wait for more than 99 percent 

certainty before we act. And there are avenues that are non-military confrontational. So I would hope that we act. And I wish our 

President well. Our chairman, Ed Royce, in his opening statement, 

Chairman Royce mentioned the fact that there are people in Iran 

who are not our enemies. The people of Iran are not our enemies. 

It is the mullah regime. Just like the people of North Korea are 

not our enemies. We have got to be realistic in our approach and 

not try to ignore realities, if we are going to have a better and more 

peaceful future. 

I will give—I have 20 seconds more. If anyone can—Mr. Sullivan, 

go ahead and disagree with me. Go right ahead. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I ask unanimous consent to give him additional 

time, disagree with Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh my gosh. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would say, first, I wouldn’t substitute the judgment—as much as I believe in myself and respect my colleagues 

here on this panel, I would not substitute the judgment of any of 

us for the combination of the IAEA, the United States intelligence 

community, and the Israeli security establishment, all of whom 

have said Iran is complying with the deal. 

44

And then secondly, as respects the reality of Iran’s malign activities in the region, I laid out my own views about the threat that 

it poses, and the steps, the decisive steps the United States needs 

to take to do it. I think we do that better by committing to the deal 

than playing games with it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And thank you, witnesses, and Mr. Sullivan. 

Does that include a comment from one of our other guests as well. 

Yes. Go right ahead. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Very quickly, Congressman Rohrabacher, 

the legislation that you gave to the President that he is acting on 

with this certification, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, has 

him certify things beyond just whether Iran is in compliance, including, is Iran doing things outside, this is number three. Is Iran 

doing things outside of the agreement, covert or others, for its nuclear weapons program? Arguably its missiles would put it in that 

category. And number four is, is it in our vital national interest? 

I think that the President has room to take step one of several 

positions here without necessarily challenging Mr. Sullivan’s view 

that technically Iran is in compliance with the agreement, not the 

U.N. resolution. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We go now to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and the 

ranking member. Thanks to our really esteemed group of witnesses 

here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I opposed the JCPOA back in 2015. But like you, 

I said from the beginning that we have to vigorously enforce this 

international agreement to ensure that we hold Iran accountable 

where we can. And while I continue to have some concerns, I believe the President’s own Secretary of Defense and his own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the opinions that we have heard 

today, that walking away from the deal is simply not in our interest. 

Mr. Albright, you presented some of the dangers of the deal sunset provisions. Beyond the ability of Iran in 8 to 13 years to ramp 

up centrifuge design of construction, increase enrichment activity, 

and pursue heavy water. There are conventional weapon sunsets 

coming even sooner. In just 3 years, U.N. restrictions on conventional weapons transfers expire, in 5 years the sanctions of the 

missile program expires, and the EU arms embargo expires. And 

I think people are right to focus on the implications of these provisions lapsing. 

But if we walked away from the agreement tomorrow, if the 

President pulled us out of the JCPOA, those sunsets would effectively drop from a decade to a day, since Iran would be freed of its 

obligations under the deal. That is the implication of what happens 

if the President chooses to pull us out of this deal. 

Mr. Albright, in your testimony you recommend a policy whereby 

the JCPOA is but one aspect of many in confronting Iran’s malign 

activity. I could not agree more. And that is precisely why Congress 

passed targeted Iran sanctions earlier this year, which includes a 

host of new authorities for the President to combat Iran support for 

terror groups like, Hezbollah, IRGC’s regional meddling, ballistic 

missile development, and their appalling human rights record. 

45

Like Mr. Sullivan noted earlier, I too am at a loss for why the 

administration has been slow to enforce these sanctions. And so, 

Mr. Sullivan, I would ask you, as we engage in a replay of so many 

of the discussions that took place surrounding the JCPOA, Iran 

continues its dangerous activities. We have provided tools now to 

do something about it. What should we be doing? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am afraid that for reasons I can’t fully explain, 

there is a significant gap between the rhetoric from this administration on Iran and their policy on the ground. I think one of the 

reasons is because they have had an ISIS only focus in Syria. And 

Syria is a crucible—it is a critical theater for Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in the region. 

I believe that the administration should come forward with a 

comprehensive strategy for how we are going to deal with the future of Syria that is not just about ISIS, but that is about denying 

space and capacity for Iran and Hezbollah to threaten the rest of 

the region. And even, as Chairman Royce was talking about, set up 

rocket factories right near the border with Israel. I think they have 

to show us how they are going do that. 

Beyond that, the House and Senate produced a set of non-nuclear 

sanctions around ballistic missiles and other malign activities. And 

to my knowledge, to date, those various sanctions have not been 

enforced yet by this administration, certainly have not been enforced fully. I would ask the administration, why not? And I would 

get to work doing that. 

Part of the reason I suspect that they haven’t been fully enforced 

is the administration is putting all of its time, at the moment, into 

figuring out how to resolve this completely unnecessary debate 

around certification, and taking their eye off the ball of these other 

issues. 

My argument would be, because you can and should certify, do 

so, and then move on to focus on the immediate threats that we 

face in the region. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And you had said in your testimony that the deal 

is not a perfect agreement. I agree. I just believe that—and I also 

think it is okay to acknowledge that. And I think that we have an 

opportunity to try to address the short-falls of the JCPOA through 

diplomatic channels, which will be made exceedingly more difficult 

if we isolate ourselves from our international partners and cut off 

the diplomatic channel that we need to do something else, which 

is to finally bring home the Americans who are held there, including my constituent, Bob Levinson. 

Mr. Sullivan, you noted that we can bring considerable pressure 

to bear on Iran’s continued detention of American citizens. Bob, as 

you know, we have talked about multiple times, is the longest held 

American hostage. His family has been missing him for more than 

10 years now. What more can and should the administration be 

doing to secure his release and the release of other Americans who 

are being held? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. First, I think that senior officials in the White 

House should meet with the families of all of these detained Americans. Should talk to them about what they are going through and 

how they are suffering. When I was in government, I dealt with the 

46

families of the brothers and the parents of detained Americans in 

Iran, who we ultimately, thankfully, were able to bring home. 

And then I think that the administration should be making clear 

to the Iranians that the United States has a number of tools at its 

disposal to be able to bring pressure on Iran, as long as they continue this unjustified and inhumane detention. And we should do 

so. We should put this up to the top of the diplomatic priority list 

because these are our citizens and these are our people and we 

should get them home. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ted Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned a 

word, rhetoric. Rhetoric. When the Iranians say, ‘‘The Ayatollah 

says he wants to eliminate and destroy Israel,’’ do you believe that 

is rhetoric or do you believe that that is the policy of Iran? Which 

is it? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe that the Iranians were trying to acquire 

a nuclear——

Mr. POE. Pick one. Excuse me. It is my time. Just answer the 

question. Is it rhetoric or do they mean it? Take your choice. Don’t 

explain the answer. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think they would like to see the end of the State 

of Israel. 

Mr. POE. How about the United States? Number one, wipe out 

Israel. Number two, wipe out the United States. Is that rhetoric or 

does the Ayatollah mean it? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not familiar with him saying wipe out the 

United States. 

Mr. POE. Well, you are not reading his press releases. Ambassador Jeffrey, what do you think, is it rhetoric or does he mean it? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. On America it is rhetoric. On Israel it is 

more serious. 

Mr. POE. So he doesn’t mean it when he says he wants to eliminate the United States from the face of the Earth? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I don’t believe so. I believe he does want 

to take that position, vis-a-vis, Israel, and he is taking actions that 

will allow him to possibly do it. 

Mr. POE. So you think that the United States can afford to believe that, oh, it is just rhetoric, they don’t mean it, they love us. 

You want us to take that position with nuclear weapons at stake, 

intercontinental ballistic missiles at stake, working with the North 

Koreans. They don’t need intercontinental ballistic missiles to destroy Israel, they have missiles to destroy Israel. They want those 

missiles for us, maybe the Europeans. So you just want us to take 

the chance that, oh, it is rhetoric, even though he has said that 

since the day he has been anointed as the Supreme Leader of Iran. 

He wants to eliminate the United States. You want us to take that 

chance? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. This is based upon 40 years of dealing 

with the cultural and religious and historical——

Mr. POE. So you want us to take the chance? Mr. Ambassador, 

I am sorry, I have 5 minutes. Don’t ramble. You want us to take 

the chance that it is rhetoric? 

47

Ambassador JEFFREY. It is not rhetoric, he wants to drive us 

from the Middle East and will use every means possible to do 

so——

Mr. POE. Including destroying us. Excuse me. I am reclaiming 

my time. I just have a few minutes. I don’t want to be combative 

in the sense that we are not dealing in the real world. I think Mr. 

Rohrabacher said, irrational optimism is a good phrase. We are 

dealing with irrational optimism if we can trust the Iranian Government. They have done everything they can to move to a place 

where they can destroy the United States. 

The human rights abuses against their own people, we don’t 

spend a lot of time talking about that. You got a group of people 

here, they have got families and friends that have been tortured, 

disappeared, locked up in prison over the years because of the regime that wants to destroy the United States. I commend them for 

being here. Talk to these people and find out how their families 

were tortured in Iran, and continued to be tortured by this guy, 

who uses rhetoric, to say he is going to destroy the United States. 

Everywhere in the Middle East you find Iran mischief-making. 

We had a hearing in our terrorism subcommittee last week, we 

used this map to talk about the fact that the Iranians are using 

terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, West Bank, 

the Gaza Strip, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Everywhere there is the 

turmoil in the Middle East, there is the Iranian Government doing 

what they can through the IRGC or terrorist organizations. 

We need to take these people serious when they say that they 

want to eliminate Israel and they want to eliminate the United 

States. I think we are dealing in, like I said, irrational optimism 

if we think anything different. So without using Trump rhetoric, I 

think the President is being a realist about the world’s situation. 

We over here, and the Europeans especially, who have a history of 

not dealing with actual facts, especially when it comes to countries 

that want to take over the rest of us. So we do what we can to stop 

what they are doing. 

Now, maybe it is the deal, maybe it is—I would like a refund on 

that $150 billion we gave to them. Maybe it is to stop the intercontinental ballistic missiles, because that is not rhetoric, they are 

actually developing those, in my opinion, with the North Koreans. 

And you got these two rogue states in the world who keep talking 

about how they want to destroy the United States. 

Maybe we should say, okay, we are going to be prepared rather 

than say, well, you really don’t mean it. So, I know I have gone 

over, Mr. Chairman, I apologize. And thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Judge. Well, unfortunately, General Wald had to leave us for a previous commitment, but we appreciate his time and willingness to continue the conversation, as 

he has indicated to us with the members here. 

We now go to Congresswoman Karen Bass of California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, as always, for 

holding this hearing. I wanted to get at a couple of things in my 

questions. One is the differences between you when—I think it was 

two of you said Iran was not complying. And you, Ambassador, said 

that Iran was complying, but not with the resolution. And then Mr. 

Sullivan said there was compliance. And I wanted to understand 

48

what the differences were. Where you think Iran is not complying, 

and what is the difference between Mr. Albright and Mr. Sullivan. 

And then I also wanted to ask a couple of questions related to 

the consequences of us walking away, if we did. So maybe Mr. 

Albright and Mr. Sullivan can begin. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah. One is—in my testimony I gave several examples of where they have—they have been violating the deal, and 

I can go through them——

Ms. BASS. Well, just give me one, and then I would like ask Mr. 

Sullivan to respond to that. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Accepts numbers of centrifuges that they were operating. They have exceeded on the heavy water cap. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And I can name 5 or 6 others. 

Ms. BASS. That is fine. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I want to make another point. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Quickly. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Quick clarification. The International Atomic Energy Agency does not rule on whether Iran is in compliance. It is 

a misstatement to say that their reports or the statements of the 

Director General are saying that Iran is in——

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Sullivan, can you please respond? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. I think Mr. Albright would agree that these 

two examples he just gave, both of which have been cured, were 

not material breaches of the agreement. In fact, that is why, in his 

public writings, Mr. Albright has tended to rely on the—it is not 

in our interest prong of the certification rather than the compliance 

prong. 

I would also say that what Ambassador Jeffrey said in terms of 

the distinction between the U.N. resolution and the deal is correct. 

The U.N. resolution bars Iran from testing ballistic missiles, they 

are doing so. So it is in fact the case that Iran is not in compliance 

with the U.N. Security Council Resolution, which is why steps by 

this committee on issues like ballistic missiles are not only justified 

but necessary. 

Ms. BASS. So being not——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And I——

Ms. BASS. No. Being not in compliance with the U.N. resolution, 

what is the implication of that for the deal? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I have talked to the Iranians on that, and 

they say, well, we didn’t agree to that. But it turns out that the 

U.N. resolution is under chapter seven, which has the force of 

international law. And it is not just the missiles, it is also arms 

transfers. In fact, that is stronger language in the resolution. 

What it does is, again, it casts into doubt what Iran is trying to 

do in the region. Why it doesn’t adhere to those resolutions, that 

resolution—and again, it raises questions about the political environment in which this deal was done. This is not a country coming 

in from the cold. This is not a country giving up its—as the Congressman had said—its rhetorical threats to Israel—and real 

threats to Israel and rhetorical threats to us. This is a problem. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. So in terms of consequences of walking away 

from the deal, that part is difficult for me to understand, considVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
49

ering, as my other colleagues have said, this was not a bilateral 

agreement. So one of the consequences for snapback sanctions 

would be sanctioning Chinese companies for doing business with 

Iran. How then would this impact U.S. strategy on North Korea? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Again, we have different opinions here. I 

am not for walking away from the deal. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I think that the deal is flawed and I think 

that there are things we can do. I would—frankly, I would be in 

violation, if I could, of the two articles that call for us to help Iran 

economically, and I would push for a new agreement. I would pressure Iran, through financial constraints on companies and such, 

and I would raise the possibility that we are going to do more 

against the deal because this deal is part of a larger context. 

Walking away from the deal is, as everybody has said, is not 

going to get a new and better deal. The Europeans, the Russian, 

and the Chinese are neither going to negotiate a new deal, nor will 

Iran. And, furthermore, they will not apply the U.S. sanctions multilaterally against Iranian oil. 

Ms. BASS. Mr. Albright, consequences of walking away? I am assuming that you think we should walk away from the deal. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I didn’t say that. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. What I said is, I separate the certification process. There are some real problems in INARA. 

Ms. BASS. Do you think we should walk away from the deal? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. I think we should fix it——

Ms. BASS. How do we fix it unilaterally without all the other——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think we should wait and see what President 

Trump says, and rewrite the conditions of the deal. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. In, my last 30 seconds. Could you respond, Mr. 

Sullivan, in terms of if the snapback sanctions in China—what I 

was saying? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. Both with respect to China and with respect 

to any efforts in negotiating with North Korea, going to them, and 

saying, hey, work a deal with us on the nuclear issue, you can 

count on us to actually enforce it. That would be a laughable proposition if we just walked away from the Iranian nuclear deal. 

And by the way, we do not have the bandwidth to take on two 

nuclear crises in two different regions of the world at the same 

time, so let’s not create a second one. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Bass. We go to 

Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here today, I appreciate it. I think one of the things that has 

probably been mentioned, but it bears repeating, is there are a lot 

of dead American soldiers as a result of Iran’s intervention in Iraq. 

And when I was in Iraq, I mean, there were operations against 

these—whether it is the EFPs or intelligence assets, et cetera. So 

I think that is something we should never forget. 

The big picture, this deal, I think, whether Iran is violating the 

technical letter of the deal, there is no doubt they are violating the 

spirit of the deal. And I found it interesting that Foreign Minister 

50

Zarif blamed the U.S. for instability in the region when in fact it 

is their support for Bashar al-Assad with the Russians in brutalizing and in murdering plenty of innocent people in Syria is one of 

the most destabilizing forces in the Middle East in a very long 

time. And our inaction there is actually shameful. 

Mr. Sullivan, just a couple of questions, respectfully, for you. 

Based on your role in the negotiations, why was it so important for 

the administration to separate the terrorism support and the missile development from the JCPOA? And let me ask you more specifically. In the opening salvo of our negotiations, was missile development on the table and then was it taken off? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We made a strong push to curb Iran’s ballistic 

missile activity as part of the deal. It was clear to us that we were 

not going to get to deal on the fissile material, the nuclear material, with missiles as a part of it. And we made a decision that not 

allowing Iran to get a nuclear bomb was worth doing, even though 

we have to pursue the missile issue separately. 

With respect to terrorism, there are two reasons. The first is that 

that requires a regional negotiation that goes way beyond what the 

P5+1 can do, because that implicates all the countries of the region. 

But secondly, trading off what Iran can do in the region against 

particular constrains in its nuclear program is a very strange way 

to conduct a negotiation. It is better, from my perspective, to do an 

arms control agreement with a country that is an adversary of 

ours, like we did with the Soviet Union, and then retain our capabilities to go after them for all of their malign activities in the region, including, as you say, the killing of American troops in Iraq. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I think the broader thing is, as one of you all 

mentioned just a few minutes ago, let’s wait to see what the President unfolds when he talks about this. There is a lot of speculation 

about what the President is going to do. I know some of the strategy and some of my discussion, I actually think it is well thought 

out. But we need a broader engagement of Iran. I think the nuclear 

deal is a small part of the bigger piece of the pie. 

I do want to make the point, though, that developing the delivery 

mechanisms for nuclear weapons is an extremely, in my mind, important part of the nuclear weapon question. And so I think that 

is something I hope we can address. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, we have talked extensively about Syria in 

the past, and as we mentioned, Iran continues its support of 

Bashar al-Assad and instability. On numerous occasion, Iranianbacked Shia militia have threatened our special forces that are 

working with the moderate Syrian opposition on the ground. And 

every time Iran has tried to poke the bear, we have responded with 

force, which I commend. However, if we continue to allow Iran to 

gain more of a foothold in Syria, there is going to be no stopping 

them from achieving their land bridge of control from Tehran to 

the Mediterranean. 

What do you think a permanent Iranian presence in Syria would 

look like? And what actions do we need to do to prevent them from 

establishing this presence? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It would look a lot like what we have at 

present, Congressman, that is, it would have Iranian advisers, it 

would have essentially the Quds Force, foreign legion of militias 

51

from as far afield as Afghanistan, obviously, Hezbollah present 

there. It would have weapons systems such as medium and longer 

range missiles, focused on Israel initially, but also on Turkey and 

Jordan potentially. 

And it will sooner or later use those forces to roll up our, as you 

said, moderate friends and allies, such as the PYD, such as the 

Free Syrian Army element that we are still working with in the 

south of the country. 

The goal of Iran and Assad is to totally retake all territory in 

Syria and put it under Assad’s brutal rule. Iran will support that. 

Russia has some doubts, but in the end will support it unless they 

fear that they will face a military push back from us, and so far 

they have seen no sign of that. In fact, we haven’t always pushed 

back from the Iranians. We abandoned several sites where we were 

present on the ground with our troops and some of our allies close 

to the Iraqi border a few weeks ago. 

Mr. KINZINGER. All right. Thank you. At risk of going over my 

time, I will just yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Bill Keating of Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is important 

to note that of the three witnesses we have in front of us now, selected from both sides of the aisle, all three say we should not walk 

away from the plan. I think that is important to emphasize right 

now. There are areas of agreement where we go from here. 

There is a political narrative I am concerned about right now, 

and that is the fact that if the President fails to certify the plan, 

and then Congress doesn’t do anything for that period, then no 

harm, no foul. Well, evidently, a lot of people don’t agree with that, 

including the Secretary of Defense. 

I would like to ask, Mr. Sullivan, what is the impact of that? 

This idea that there is no harm in this? It sends a message. It is 

a political message. You know, I don’t think it is only dangerous, 

it is foolhardy. I would like your comments on this. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I agree with you that it is dangerous. It is dangerous because it is destabilizing, because it creates doubt, and it 

creates uncertainty as we go forward. And it makes all of our partners think you know what, the United States isn’t actually committed to seeing this thing through. And from my perspective, 

working to address issues not dealt within the deal, whether it is 

ballistic missiles, or working on what happens after some of these 

provisions expire in the out years is much easier to do with a set 

of partners who have confidence in your good faith and your willingness to hold true to your word, where Iran is the one with the 

burden of proof, then where they are sitting there constantly worried that at any moment you could walk away. 

Mr. KEATING. And you are playing with fire, if I may, because 

in that period there could either be a coincidence of a major incident in that area, or it could be orchestrated to occur, and that 

could affect the way Congress deals with that 60-day period. And 

that is dangerous as well. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I mean, there is a huge amount of—a range of unpredictability here. Let’s imagine that we have a circumstance in 

which the President declines to certify, it goes to Congress, Congress doesn’t act, the President is unsatisfied with the state of play, 

52

and now all of a sudden he is thinking, okay, what is my next 

move? And then that next move could be a further unraveling, and 

so forth on down the line. 

Or for that matter, he decides, as I think some suggested, I am 

going to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the deal myself. And I 

think that would be a way of—a sure way to end up collapsing the 

deal over time without the rest of the world joining us and then 

reimposing pressure. 

So I agree with you that it is—playing with fire is a very good 

term. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. And I want to commend the witnesses, 

too, because, I think—the ones that remain here, in their testimony, at least they are offering alternatives. They are saying, you 

know, I don’t want us to walk away, but there are things we should 

do. And that is the precise discussion that we should be having. 

And that is my concern. 

Now, so many other people have commented, even with some of 

the questions, criticizing the situation, even outside the agreement, 

which isn’t what we are here about today. But, also, it is a very 

narrow agreement. But, also, not offering where do we go from 

here, which invariably goes two ways when you unpeel the onion. 

It either says, we are going to use our sanctions by ourselves, 

unilaterally, trying to influence our European allies on this that 

would walk away or there is military intervention. Those are the 

two main alternatives that are left. 

I would like Mr. Sullivan to comment on 1996 with the ISA. 

What happened when the U.S. was left with that alternative of 

saying, we don’t want Iran to grow its energy program the way it 

is now, so we are adopting these strong financial sanctions in place. 

Explain to us what happened then when we tried that as one of 

the two major alternatives left? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So in 1996 when the United States passed the 

Iran Sanctions Act, the Europeans—and part of that was about trying to stop European companies from investing in Iran or doing 

deals with Iran. The Europeans passed protective measures, basically telling their companies, don’t worry about U.S. sanctions, we 

will have your back, you go ahead. And, in fact, over the course of 

both Democratic and Republican administrations, the ISA was 

never really effectively enforced against Europeans companies. 

We developed an entirely different strategy over the course of the 

past several years with help from this committee, but that strategy 

relied on a simple predicate, which was that the world could trust 

the United States. That the United States was going to be the constant source of predictability and strength, and that Iran was the 

one that had the spotlight shown on it. And we have reversed that 

right now in a way that is making the Iranians walk around with 

a smile, and is making Europeans think, we don’t necessarily have 

to listen to Washington. 

Mr. KEATING. I want to thank you for mentioning the committee, 

because I do think we have played a role in developing a strategy. 

And as I have listened to all of our witnesses here, I would say 

this. We are looking at one of the real problems here. It is not in 

the confines of this deal, it is the lack of an overall strategy and 

resolve going forward that we can work on and be strong on, have 

53

resolve on as a country, working with our allies, that is the problem we have now. That is what we will work forward in a bipartisan way in this committee, and that is what is lacking right now 

with the administration. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thanks, Mr. Keating. We go to Mr. Lee Zeldin 

of New York. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Earlier, Mr. Sullivan, 

you said this deal is working as intended. You spoke of how this 

deal is providing the IAEA access to Iran’s military sites. I would 

agree that is an important part of the deal to provide the IAEA access to Iran’s military sites. Is Iran allowing the IAEA access to its 

military sites? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. So far under the deal, Iran has——

Mr. ZELDIN. Your answer is no. Thank you. So there is I—don’t 

know what exactly you meant by this deal is working as intended. 

I think we would both agree that it is important for the IAEA to 

have access to Iran’s military sites. And I appreciate you admitting 

to the fact that the IAEA—that Iran has not allowed the IAEA access to its military sites. But then later on in your testimony——

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am happy to answer that, if you would like. 

Mr. ZELDIN. You did by saying no. So later on in your testimony 

you are then going after President Trump. You are saying—you actually said, it is President Trump’s fault that IAEA is not allowed 

to have access to Iran’s military sites, when the IAEA has never 

had access to Iran’s military sites. But you are here, sir, blaming 

President Trump for not having access to something we never had 

access to. 

President Obama said this deal is not built on trust, it is built 

on verification. Have you read the verification agreement between 

the IAEA and Iran? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have not read it. No. I have read the deal, 

though, which says very clearly——

Mr. ZELDIN. You have not read the verification agreement between the IAEA and Iran. And when Secretary Kerry was here, he 

admitted that he hadn’t read the verification agreement between 

the IAEA and Iran either. So a deal that is built on—not on trust, 

but built on verification, the leaders of our government never read 

what the verification agreement was. An entire deal was built on 

verification. 

What we have learned is that——

Mr. SULLIVAN. I wasn’t——

Mr. ZELDIN. My time, not yours. We have learned that Iran is 

inspecting some of their own nuclear sites. We have learned that 

they are collecting some of their own soil samples. You said earlier 

that 98 percent of Iran’s enriched uranium was shipped out of the 

country, correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I did. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Where is the uranium? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The uranium is in Russia. 

Mr. ZELDIN. How do you know that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Because there is a supply and accountancy procedure to ensure where the uranium is collected in Iran, moved, and 

then stored. 

54

Mr. ZELDIN. Where in Russia is it? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sitting here today, I couldn’t tell you. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Because in my conversations with the people 

who are in charge of knowing that, I don’t know where in our government we have anyone who has any idea where the uranium is, 

but I appreciate the fact that you, sir, you know where the uranium is today. 

For my colleagues who opposed the deal very strongly, and are 

now indicating that we should uphold it because it is not perfect. 

I was here witnessing all of the statements, the testimony about 

why my colleagues on the other side of the aisle were opposing the 

Iran nuclear deal, and they were not opposing it because it was not 

perfect, they were opposing it because it is deeply flawed. 

Mr. Smith earlier asked you, Mr. Sullivan, how much money 

went to terrorism, and you responded that the bulk goes to domestic purposes. I would offer that when you provide $100-$150 billion 

worth of sanctions relief, and we ask you a very specific question, 

how much goes to terrorism. We are not asking for where 60 percent or whatever the other number is, a bulk of gets defined as, 

going to domestic purposes. The question is, how much is going to 

terrorism? 

And the question was one that was worthy of an answer. And 

standing here and calling for an improved Syria strategy to combat 

Iranian aggression. I would offer that if you, sir, and the Obama 

administration was that serious about combatting Iranian aggression, we should not have been providing $150 billion of sanctions 

relief to the Iranians to be able to conduct all of their bad activities. 

Their bad activities—by the way, this is a deal we are talking 

about, we never even asked for a signature. Put that aside. When 

10 of our Navy sailors are held hostage, they are embarrassed. 

When they are released, Secretary Kerry says, thank you. And he 

says, it is because of the Iran deal that this went so smoothly. 

With Iran financing terror, over-throwing foreign governments, 

illegally test-firing intercontinental ballistic missiles, chanting, 

death to America, calling Israel the little Satan, America the great 

Satan. I would say that it was the wrong answer for us to be propping up the wrong regime with a jackpot of sanctions relief, and 

that we should be doing our part as Congress and as the United 

States, as the leaders of the free world, leading and fixing this, and 

turning this into a reasonable deal, not one that is very one-sided, 

and one where we got ridiculously played at the table. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. David Cicilline of Rhode Island is next. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to give Mr. 

Sullivan an opportunity to answer the question he wasn’t permitted to answer to Mr. Zeldin on the military site. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. So the deal expressly states that the IAEA, 

if they have a basis to believe that there is illicit nuclear activity 

occurring at any military—any site in Iran, including any military 

site in Iran, that they can get access and that Iran cannot stop 

them. That if the United States and the Europeans and the IAEA 

come forward and decide, we need access to this site, Iran can’t say 

no. 

55

Now, in the last 2 years, the United States actually hasn’t gone 

to the IAEA and presented a particular military site, and said, I 

want to get access to that. But what Nikki Haley did was go and 

generally have a conversation with the IAEA about how to do this. 

I believe that American policy and American strategy could yield 

access to Iran’s military sites under this deal. And I have no reason 

to believe, based on what has happened in the last 2 years, that 

that is not the case. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Mr. Sullivan you also say in your 

written testimony, that because the administration has spent so 

much time focused on the—will he or wouldn’t we certify debate—

and I will add something in this sort of reality TV show sort of 

way, that it has resulted in the administration and key components 

of the intelligence and security communities taking their eye off 

the ball on the larger questions, or the broader Iranian threat. 

And so I would really like you to focus on that point. We can all 

sit here and posture about what we think would be a better provision, and if it were just up to us as individual Member of Congress, 

I would put this provision or that, but that is not what an international agreement with five or six other countries produces. 

So I think it is really fruitful to think, what should we be doing 

going forward to respond in a serious way to Iranian aggression in 

the region. Secretary Kerry, in fact, when he testified before this 

committee said, one of the advantages of this agreement is we can 

put an end to the nuclear threat of Iran so that we will be in a 

stronger position to push back aggressively in a variety of other 

contexts. 

What specifically can we or should this administration be doing 

with respect to that? And, secondly, is it not the case that this 

agreement permanently forecloses Iran from having a nuclear 

weapon, by its own terms? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. There is a permanent ban on Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. In the deal, there is a permanent ban on weaponsrelated nuclear activity in the deal. And there is a permanent provision for an inspections regime to monitor that in the deal. There 

are expiring nuclear restraints. Those are things we can work to 

deal with, but we should work the deal with them by committing 

to the deal and moving forward with our allies. 

On the issue of the region more generally. I think Syria, for me, 

looms largest because it looms largest in the Iranian strategic calculus, and because it is a moral and humanitarian catastrophe to 

boot. And what we have seen over the course of the past several 

months is effective action against ISIS building on the Obama administration strategy, but no meaningful thought given to what 

comes next. And as a result, as Ambassador Jeffrey and others on 

this panel have made clear, the Iranians are on the march in Syria 

today to a much more significant degree than they even were 1 

year ago. 

And Israeli concern about that is reaching new heights, to the 

point where Israeli leaders are publicly warning about how this 

threat is metastasizing. So I think that we need to be sitting with 

our partners across the region, including Israel, as well as our European allies and others, and thinking about a broad multi-dimensional strategy that includes everything from further economic 

56

pressure to how we are postured in the region, to intelligence led 

operations, interdictions of weapon shipments, on down to line. 

And I would simply submit that having put a lid on Iran’s nuclear program so that today we do not have to worry about them 

racing for a bomb because of this deal, we do have the opportunity 

to focus on this, and that is where we should turn our focus. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And to follow-up. And do all of that work, the 

word of United States, our credibility in terms of honoring international agreements and continuing relationship with our allies in 

the region will be key to that. And so I think the point you made 

earlier is an important one. 

Mr. Albright, you said that there is legislation that could be imposed unilaterally by the United States that would fix the deal, as 

you suggested. I would like to know what you think Congress could 

do unilaterally to an international agreement that would fix the 

deal? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, let me answer that in a different way. I 

think you have a problem with INARA. INARA does not certify 

compliance with this deal. 

Mr. CICILLINE. With all due respect, sir, I only have a limited 

time. You made the statement in this hearing that Congress could 

unilaterally take an action to fix the deal. I am asking you—you 

are testifying before this hearing. What in fact could Congress do 

unilaterally that would fix international agreement? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The same way it created INARA, it can fix this 

deal. And I think that the purpose of that is to straighten out one 

fundamental problem that is tough for this administration, is 

that—the INARA makes it look like President Trump is certifying 

compliance with this deal. INARA doesn’t actually do that. But it 

is putting it in a position to defend an intractable position. And 

that Congress needs to fix the 90-day certification requirement. 

It needs to define what a material breach is. We use violation because we feel any—no violation is too small to correct. The language of material breach and noncompliance defined in INARA is 

unworkable. I would argue, actually, that the excess centrifuge 

numbers——

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Albright, do you think that the Congress of 

the United States has the ability to unilaterally change the terms 

or meaning of terms in an international agreement? You don’t need 

to answer that question. The answer is, of course not. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. First of all, this is not an international agreement. The nuclear deal was never signed. It is more of—you can’t 

call that an international agreement, first of all. The other thing 

is, if you look at what——

Mr. CICILLINE. What would you call it? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. On the conventional arms, and on the ballistic 

missiles, the Congress is actually redefining U.S. policy on the 

bans, the 5-year and the 8-year ban in 2031. They are setting up 

a situation where, if the ban ends, let’s take the conventional arms 

transfer restrictions end at 5 years in the U.N. Security Council 

Resolution, a country A and goes and sells heavy armaments to 

Iran, they will be sanctioned. 

So the United States is already under Congressional leadership 

rewriting the bans on conventional and ballistic missiles. 

57

Chairman ROYCE. Time is expiring. I think we had better go to 

Ann Wagner of Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

As North Korea captures the world’s attention, we must, I would 

make the point here, remain vigilant in responding to Iranian aggression throughout the Middle East. General Wald, who, I am 

sorry, has left, I know that he wrote that the Iran deal positioned 

Iran on a trajectory to become possibly more challenging than 

North Korea. Ambassador Jeffrey put it well in his written statement: The U.S. must set clear final goals for our Iran policy and 

make those evident and persuasive to all those at home and 

abroad. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, there may be as many as 60,000 Iranianbacked troops in Syria. It is no secret that the IRGC Quds Force 

and affiliated militias are taking over areas from ISIS on behalf of 

the Assad regime. Such activities are not in the interests of the 

United States of America. 

How should U.S. policy change to counter the growing role of Iranian-backed forces that target Syrian civilians, undermine regional 

stability, and threaten U.S. security interests? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Well, first of all, Congresswoman, we have 

a U.N. Security Council resolution, 2254, and a process to deal with 

the internal situation in Syria, because when that was put together 

by the last administration, I think 2012, there was an understanding by everyone, including even Russia and Iran, which are 

a part of this process, that that internal situation is a concern for 

people in the region and for the international community, not just 

for Mr. Assad and the people of Syria. 

So we need to build on that and restore the centrality of that 

process, and it needs to be backed with an American presence in 

Syria. The problem is, under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that has to be to be fighting terrorists. 

But we are never going to completely wipe out ISIS and al-Qaeda 

there. And there is a good argument to be made to keep limited 

forces to protect those Syrian opposition in the north and in the 

south while we try to sort this thing out politically. That is 

pushback against Iran. 

Mrs. WAGNER. General Wald also raised an important military 

recommendation, and I would offer this question to anyone who 

would like to speak on his behalf or about it. 

Would you suggest forward deploying our Aegis-equipped missile 

defense fleet to our existing bases in Gulf countries? And how can 

the U.S. better coordinate with Israel and the Gulf countries to establish a comprehensive missile defense system? 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. We have four Aegis ships already in the 

Mediterranean, one of which is on station all of the time off of 

Israel. We have THAAD systems and our allies have THAAD systems and Patriots and phased array radars in the Gulf and in 

Israel. There is a phased array radar in Turkey, and there are SM3 missiles designed to intercept Iranian rockets in Romania and in 

Poland. So there is already a very robust——

58

Mrs. WAGNER. You feel confident in our coordination with Israel 

and our others? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I think on that particular matter, at this 

point, yes. But I yield to General Wald’s military advice. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would just add one point, which is I think this 

is one of those areas, and maybe there aren’t as many as there 

used to be, where there is actually real bipartisan cooperation on 

the ballistic missile issue and missile defense generally in the region. I think the Obama administration and the Trump administration have taken very similar lines on this, one building on the last. 

It is a constantly evolving threat, so our posture and our cooperation with our partners has to constantly evolve. But I actually 

think we are on a pretty decent track on this issue. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Ambassador Jeffrey, you wrote that U.S. military 

and diplomatic resources should be shifted away from ISIS and toward Iran. Paying more attention to Iran necessitates paying more 

attention to Iran’s activities in Iraq and Syria. 

Why do you think the administration hasn’t designated proxy 

forces backed by Iran and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I think one reason is force protection. It 

fears that, particularly in Iraq but also in Syria, that the Quds 

Force, as I mentioned in my testimony, will respond, and they will 

respond. It is just that we shouldn’t be in the Middle East if we 

are worried about people shooting at us. We have had a lot of experience with Iran shooting at us, and the answer to that is to shoot 

back. 

But I think that is part of it. The other thing is there really is 

almost an obsession with the ISIS fight. When the Kurds declared 

their independence, the statement out of the U.S. was they should 

stop doing that because this interferes with the fight against ISIS. 

That fight is almost over right now. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. I am out of time. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Dr. Ami Bera of California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sullivan, you were integral in negotiating the Iran nuclear 

deal. Is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Part of. I always hate to say ‘‘integral.’’

Mr. BERA. Part of the team. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I was part of team. I was part of the team that 

began the negotiations that arrived at the interim deal and then 

that worked toward the final agreement. Yes, I am a proud member of that team. 

Mr. BERA. Great. You would state that the ultimate goal of the 

deal was to reduce the Iran nuclear threat? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Correct. 

Mr. BERA. Would you say that the deal has reduced the nuclear 

threat given what was prior to the deal? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think there is no doubt about that. And, indeed, 

if you ask the chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, he would 

say that the nuclear issue has gone down the list of strategic 

threats to Israel today compared to where it was before the deal. 

59

Mr. BERA. Ambassador Jeffrey, would you agree with that, just 

on the nuclear issue? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. For a temporary period of time. And there 

I would disagree with Mr. Sullivan. For a 10-year period, yes. But 

no less an authority than Barack Obama said after 10 years, in offthe-cuff comments, they are going to be on their way to, if they 

want to, a nuclear capability. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. But at today’s point in time, the threat is lower. 

At the time the deal was being negotiated, Mr. Sullivan, what 

would, in open source estimates, what would breakout capacity be? 

How close was Iran to breakout capacity? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The time for Iran to acquire one weapon’s worth 

of weapons grade uranium before the deal was done was a matter 

of weeks, at the most 2 to 3 months, but probably a matter of 

weeks, and shrinking. 

Mr. BERA. So would walking away from this deal, do you think 

that would reduce or increase the nuclear threat to Iran? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, let’s say if we walked away from the deal—

right now we have put Iran in a position where we have extended 

that breakout time out beyond a year. If we walked away from the 

deal and they began reinstalling the centrifuges that have been dismantled, working again to build that plutonium reactor that we 

have disabled and neutralized, that over the course of the next couple of years they would be in a position incredibly rapidly to move 

to a nuclear capability. 

And our capacity to stop them from doing so by reimposing the 

sanctions that were on before, if we are the ones who walk away 

from the deal, would be very limited, because the rest of the international community would say: ‘‘What the heck are we coming 

along with you for on sanctions? The whole point of doing this was 

to get the very deal you just walked away from.’’

Mr. BERA. And in your assessment, with our hands full currently 

on the Korean Peninsula, it would be a pretty unwise time diplomatically to try to engage with two nuclear threats, correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, what is interesting about what North 

Korea presents as an example today is what happens when you 

don’t have good choices, when you don’t have an opportunity to 

produce the kind of deal that we did with respect to Iran. And so 

today we are faced with a rapidly accelerating North Korean capability and a completely unstable situation. 

We walk away from the deal, we produce a very similar dynamic 

in the Middle East, and all of a sudden you are dealing a nuclear 

crisis in the heart of East Asia and a nuclear crisis in the heart 

of the Middle East, both of which the United States needs to manage. 

The crisis in North Korea is one that has been generated by Kim 

Jong-un. If we walk away from this deal, we would be largely responsible for the creation of that nuclear crisis today in the heart 

of the Middle East. 

Mr. BERA. And given our strategy on the Korean Peninsula is 

one of increasing pressure, increasing isolation, in the hopes of getting to engagement and reducing tensions with North Korea, would 

decertifying this deal make it easier to get a North Korean agreeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
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ment or would it reduce our ability to find a diplomatic solution to 

the Korean Peninsula? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think any fair reading would say it would make 

it harder for us to get a deal in the North Korean context. How 

much harder is a question that we can debate. But the idea that 

the Chinese would say, ‘‘Oh, you know what? The fact that you are 

decertifying this deal and potentially walking away from it, that 

makes us more confident that we should join you in something we 

haven’t wanted to do, which is sanctioning North Korea, because 

we trust that you are going to end up agreeing to something in 

North Korea,’’ the same thing goes for the North Koreans themselves. 

So I think the notion that if the United States walks away from 

the Iran deal that it would be easier to get a deal with North Korea 

is not based on either logic or fact. 

Mr. BERA. I would agree with that. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Can I add something real quick? I don’t think it 

will affect our North Korea deal at all if President Trump decertifies. 

Mr. BERA. I think it will affect the reliability of our word. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And people shouldn’t conflate decertification with 

walking away from the deal. They are two different things. And I 

think Ambassador Haley laid out in a speech several weeks ago 

that there are various pillars that need to be addressed and considered. And I think thinking that decertification would affect the 

North Korea deal, I think, is lunacy. 

Mr. BERA. But on the issue of reducing the nuclear threat, the 

deal has accomplished that. Now, we can speculate where we are 

going to be 10 years from now. 

The concern here is we have given the administration the tools 

to address what we are really concerned about, the ballistic missile 

issue, cracking down on Hezbollah. We, through this committee, 

have given the administration some tools that they are not currently using. I would ask the administration to use those tools. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And I would add too, there is a lot of agreement 

on this panel, at least I hear. The sunsets are a real problem. I 

hear it in the committee. They are a real problem. What I am saying, and I think there is support in the Trump administration, is 

that we can’t wait to deal with those sunsets when Iran is a strong, 

well-armed, powerful regional force. We need to deal with it now. 

Chairman ROYCE. We need to go to Tom Garrett right now from 

Virginia. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. GARRETT. Those who do not know history are condemned to 

repeat it, and this has all played out before almost analogously. I 

will start with a little bit of a soliloquy, because I am so disgusted. 

The talk of, number one, the United States credibility on the 

global stage as it relates to one with whom an entity can engage 

in deals, I think that the Iranian credibility is certainly far more 

in question than the United States credibility insofar as the stability of our Nation and its reliability internationally is well demonstrated over centuries, whereas this regime has a record that 

61

hasn’t been touched in this room but spoken to by the people who 

sit here. 

In 1979 and 1982 and 1996 and 2009 in the Green Revolution, 

people stood up against this regime, and on most occasions, the 

United States sat back and did nothing while they were murdered 

by the Quds Forces, who are their very cousins and brothers and 

sisters, in the streets in Iran, and we did nothing. 

And with all due respect, Mr. Sullivan, as Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said: You are entitled to your own opinions, but you are 

not entitled to your own facts. Don’t talk about how there is bipartisan agreement on the antiballistic missile defenses in Europe, 

and particularly Poland, when the previous administration’s first 

action as it relates to foreign policy was to withdraw from a commitment to defend Europe and the Poles from the very Iranian 

missiles that we contemplate today. That happened. 

Now, let’s go back in history. I heard Mr. Sullivan state, Mr. 

Chairman, that if the IAEA has indications that there are violations, that they have a right to inspect. Really? Worcester v. Georgia. When Andrew Jackson was President, he anecdotally is credited with saying that Justice Marshall has made his ruling, let’s 

see him enforce it. The IAEA and what army will go in and verify 

when there have been violations? 

You know where the uranium is? That is news, that is newsworthy, because nobody else does. And ironically, if we credit the 

uranium with being in Russia, it would be an interesting departure 

from the individuals who don’t trust Russia on anything except, apparently, where the uranium fissile material might be. And I guess 

that is convenient. 

But as it results to presuming to operate in a world where individuals keep their word, understand that the current regime of 

Iran has burned the effigy of every single President of the United 

States since Carter and literally depicted a lynching of our first African-American President in 2015 while this deal was being finalized. And they reference the Great Satan, and they reference the 

Little Satan, and they chant, ‘‘Death to America,’’ and they talk 

about the death to the devil’s triangle, the United States, the U.K., 

and Israel. 

And if that is not bad enough, if we adjust for population, the 

murder of Iranian citizens by the current regime would be tantamount and comparable to the deaths experienced by the United 

States during the entire Second World War. 

So I am very curious, in fact, I am delighted to have someone 

here who claims credit for having negotiated the JCPOA, I am 

sorry—how it is that we talk about the international community 

not being willing to agree to harsher sanctions as it relates to ballistic missile development when U.N. Security Council Resolution 

1929 of 2010 read, and I quote, ‘‘Iran shall not undertake activity 

related to ballistic missiles’’—I think at least Mr. Sullivan went to 

a pretty prestigious law school—and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which mirrors the JCPOA, reads, ‘‘Iran is called 

upon not to undertake activity as it relates to the development of 

ballistic missiles.’’

It strikes me that if the U.N. Security Council agreed on Resolution 1929, which said, ‘‘shall not,’’ that we have evidence the interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
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national community will agree to stronger sanctions, which will 

prohibit the delivery systems of nuclear weapons from being developed by the Iranians, and it has already been done, and the 

JCPOA quite literally, in moving from ‘‘shall not undertake’’ to ‘‘is 

called upon not to undertake,’’ created more latitude. 

Next, everyone that knows about this issue knows that the long 

pole in the Iranian tent is the IRGC, that the IRGC controls the 

bulk of the black economy in Iran, probably over 90 percent, and, 

in fact, funnels a vast, vast quantity of the real economy in Iran 

through its own coffers. 

And so I heard someone state that the ISA was never fully enforced. And I have created a paradigm, because I am not that 

smart, but this seems to make sense to me, that I would wager 

that if we said to our allies in particular—and I will call out some 

European nations if anybody wants to ask for specificity—that they 

can choose between doing business with Iran, and specifically the 

IRGC, or us, and we put some teeth in the sanctions, that we can 

watch this monstrous, murderous regime, which has repeatedly 

called for the destruction of everyone in entire nations, whither on 

a vine, and the millions of Iranians who have been displaced 

against their will and the hundreds of thousands who have been 

murdered might then be justified, and then we can know that there 

is hope for peace and no nuclear exchange with a radical, defiant 

Iranian regime. 

I apologize for running over. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 

We now go to Robin Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I, too, agree walking away from the JCPOA would weaken the 

United States position to increase pressure in the future while endangering any future nonproliferation agreements that the U.S. 

might seek to make. 

As you know, this committee recently passed legislation that 

cracked down on Iran’s nefarious actions. Mr. Sullivan, how should 

the U.S. continue to put pressure on Iran while adhering to the 

JCPOA? And is there a red line for Iran where certain sanctions 

would push them out of the agreement? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just on the second point, on the question of red 

line, to respond to what Mr. Garrett said, the IAEA and what 

army, the fact is that if Iran violates the access provisions of the 

JCPOA, that would be a violation that would trigger the reimposition of sanctions, and the United States would have the capacity 

then to marshal the international community, because it would be 

Iran who was violating the deal, not the United States. 

So from my perspective, we retain tools under this agreement to 

make sure that Iran stays in compliance. And if they violate those 

terms, I will be the first one to say the United States should snap 

back sanctions, and the deal creates the capability for the United 

States to effectively do that. It maintains the sanctions architecture. 

With respect to how we go about dealing with Iran in the region, 

I really do believe this needs to be a whole-of-government approach. It needs to be multidimensional. It needs every aspect of 

our power, our economic power, military power, intelligence, et 

63

cetera, working with allies and partners in the region, to put increasing pressure on Iran and to raise the cost for their destabilizing behavior and their sponsorship of terrorism in the region. 

It also means that we need to invest in the defensive capabilities 

of our allies and partners, as the previous discussion about ballistic 

missile defense indicated. I have a different view on the issue of 

Poland, but my answer to Mrs. Wagner earlier was about ballistic 

missile defense in the Middle East, where I actually do believe that 

there has been strong bipartisan cooperation, and we should continue that. 

So that is just some of what I think the United States should be 

working on as part of a multidimensional, multilateral strategy to 

push back against Iranian aggression in the region. 

Thank you. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, in your testimony you talked about communicating with Iran. Do you believe the President’s tweets and treating certification like a reality TV show cliffhanger are productive 

ways to communicate? Do you think this is helping? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I think that, when I talk about communicating with Iran, I am talking mainly about doing it quietly, as 

we did between Ambassador Crocker and the Iranians during the 

Bush administration and Baghdad. 

The tweets are unique to President Trump. I think that the 

world recognizes that he does it. I don’t think they are a major 

problem. I don’t think they are a major plus. I think they are just 

there. But they are not a substitute for diplomatic communication. 

I will answer your question that way. 

Ms. KELLY. Very diplomatically. Do either of the two witnesses——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. If I could go back to another question you asked. 

I think the Director General of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency is asking for guidance because he does not feel he has the 

resources or the authorities to go and implement Section T, which 

would involve going to military sites. It is different than saying we 

have a suspicion of going and we need to go. This has to do with 

more routine verification of bans on nuclear weapons development. 

And so I would say there is already a big problem in implementing the JCPOA inspection architecture, and the United States 

is going to be called upon to deal with this. Russia has already 

made its opinion clear. It said the IAEA cannot go to military sites, 

should not go to military sites. So we already have a problem. And 

it is beyond what was envisioned in the language of the JCPOA. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just to respond to that. First of all, we anticipated the possibility that maybe Russia would say, ‘‘Hey, you 

know, we are not that interested in having the United States get 

into Iranian nuclear sites.’’ They don’t get a veto over that. In fact, 

if the Europeans and the Americans and the IAEA agree that access needs to be granted, the Russians can’t stop it, nor can the 

Iranians. That is point one. 

Point two is, the fact that the IAEA Director General is seeking 

guidance from the United States and from the other members of 

the P5+1 on this issue is not in and of itself a problem. 

64

What is a problem is if the United States, rather than bringing 

our partners together and saying, ‘‘Let’s work this out and enforce 

the deal, including through military sites,’’ says, ‘‘We don’t really 

like this deal, this deal stinks, you know, screw it.’’ That is just 

going to make it much harder to actually effectively enforce this 

critical provision. And I agree with Mr. Albright that access to military sites is an important part of the long-term enforcement of the 

JCPOA. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But the structure of the JCPOA puts an unfair 

burden on the IAEA. If they demand to go to military sites and 

they invoke this clause, then it brings down the entire deal. 

And so I think that it is incumbent upon the P5+1, and I would 

say the United States is leading that, to straighten out this issue 

and actually strengthen the deal’s conditions on access to military 

sites. But it isn’t put on the IAEA to have to ask the question: If 

we ask to go, do we have to—are we really risking bringing down 

the entire deal? 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. My time is way up. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you, Congresswoman Kelly. 

We now go to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, panel, for being here. I appreciate you giving us 

great information on this. 

The era of strategic patience as far as the diplomatic and negotiating policy or foreign diplomacy I think was a mistake of the last 

administration. It led us to pulling out of support of Poland with 

a missile defense system, led to the Russia unnamed army to invade Ukraine, even though we were supposed to protect them, and 

allowed them to annex Crimea. It allowed China’s aggressive encroachment to the South China Sea as we stood by with strategic 

patience hoping it would go away. 

I am a veterinarian by trade, and when you have benign neglect, 

that is strategic impatience—or patience. Benign neglect is when 

you look at something knowing it will probably get better on its 

own. These things aren’t going to get better on their own, so we 

can’t have strategic patience. 

My question to you, Ambassador Jeffrey, is the JCPOA, as Mr. 

Sullivan stated, says that the IAEA can inspect any time, anyplace. 

Does that happen? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. As we have discussed at some length, not 

military sites. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. But the military site Parchin in particular 

said—it gave Iran the ability to pick up the soil and have it tested. 

Is that correct? Is that the way I understood that? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. On the one IAEA intervention on inspection in Parchin, that was what the IAEA negotiated with the Iranians. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. The IAEA claims that they were monitoring that with cameras and all of that. But, of course, it raises 

a really—it looks strange, let’s face it. 

Mr. YOHO. It would be analogous to a drug addict bringing in a 

urine sample that he collected himself in private and saying, ‘‘Here 

is my sample.’’

65

Ambassador JEFFREY. It is not quite that bad. I will stand with 

it was a strange formulation. 

Mr. YOHO. It is a stretch. 

Mr. Albright, is the overproduction of heavy water allowed under 

the JCPOA? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. There is a cap of 130 tons. 

Mr. YOHO. And they have bypassed that twice. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah. And there is also—Iran has exploited a—

what I guess you would call a loophole, that they have been able 

to take overage of heavy water and deposit it under their control 

overseas. And so that is another problem in the deal, is that Iran 

has exploited loopholes. 

Mr. YOHO. So we should talk to somebody that negotiated that 

deal, how that loophole got here. 

Mr. Sullivan, do you want to explain how that happened? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. How what happened? 

Mr. YOHO. That there was a loophole that allowed Iran to overproduce heavy water and that they could store it and monitor it on 

their own. Is that what, Mr. Albright——

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is under accountancy and monitoring by the 

IAEA, meaning that they do not have the——

Mr. YOHO. In Russia, right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not sure where the heavy water is stored. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. In Oman. 

Mr. YOHO. But they have overdone that twice, and that is in disagreement with the JCPOA. Is that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think if you had a strict interpretation terms of 

it, I think yes. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Has Iran built and operated more advanced 

centrifuges than allowed? And has it misused the quality assurance 

limitations to conduct banned mechanical testing of advanced centrifuges? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. And that is in violation of the JCPOA, 

right? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. And then, you know, I can remember the 

past administration, and John Kerry sitting right here, that no 

deal would be better than a bad deal. And they are already in violation of so many things on this. This is a bad deal. And we are 

talking about if we don’t stand up to this. 

You know, we are used to a strategic patience from the last administration. What we have now is a Commander in Chief that 

says what he means, and he is going to stand up. And the world 

isn’t used to this, the world community. But we have to have somebody willing to do that, because this will strengthen our negotiation 

with North Korea. 

Ambassador Jeffrey, do you think so? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I don’t think we have a negotiation with 

North Korea. I think we have a military confrontation with North 

Korea. I think these two issues are totally separate. I don’t 

think——

Mr. YOHO. I agree. But I hope we don’t have a—you know, our 

goal is not to have a conflict. But if we come to the table weak and 

66

we don’t show resolve, we have a weakened hand, and we won’t get 

anywhere in negotiations. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Very quickly, because I have wanted to 

say this at several points. Walking out of an agreement is a perfectly legitimate diplomatic activity. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. It doesn’t mean that we are a bad person 

or that nobody trusts us anymore. 

Violating an agreement that you claim you are adhering to is 

very different. We walked away from the ABM Treaty and international relations survived. 

I think that North Korea will judge us on the basis of how strong 

we are deterring Iran across the board, period. 

Mr. YOHO. And you got out exactly what I wanted to hear. Thank 

you all for your time. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. 

We go now to Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

having this meeting. 

To the witnesses, thank you for sharing your perspectives, but 

also the endurance of staying here for all this. I greatly appreciate 

it. 

Let me echo the earlier remarks of the chairman and ranking 

member in saying that while I opposed the JCPOA, now that it is 

in place I believe we have to aggressively and rigorously enforce it. 

But as we enforce it, it is vital that we acknowledge that the 

JCPOA, like any agreement, has inherent risk, but that this deal 

in particular has serious shortcomings and gaps, including but not 

limited to the sunset provision. 

The urgent responsibility of our government, in conjunction with 

our European partners and our regional allies, is to develop the 

comprehensive strategies and commit the necessary resources to 

work to close the gaps and reduce the risk. I believe we must clearly and fully articulate as a matter of national policy that the 

United States will never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon and 

that we will aggressively work to confront Iran’s malign activities 

in the region and around the world. 

These are clearly topics for a much longer exchange than we 

have time for with the 5 minutes today. I only have a few minutes, 

so let me turn to a couple of very focused questions. 

First, in the context of the JCPOA, do you believe Iran has 

changed its ambitions to have a nuclear weapon, Ambassador Jeffrey? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I believe it has always had that option 

open. They were very close to a weaponization program until they 

stopped it in 2003. They are ready to turn that on again when they 

deem it necessary or useful. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think they are, under the current conditions, extended. Yes, I think they will seek nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think the way that Ambassador Jeffrey put it 

is right. They have wanted to maintain the capability. They still 

67

want to maintain the capability. And part of what a diplomatic solution has to do is to deny them the opportunity to exercise it. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We will go the other way. Has Iran moderated 

its regional goals in the context of the JCPOA? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, it has not, although I would like to say something that I have wanted to say for much of the hearing. 

Iran was aggressive before the JCPOA. You guys held multiple 

hearings on that before 2015. It was aggressive during the negotiation of the JCPOA, and it remains aggressive. I do not believe that 

money has been the major limiting factor to Iran’s aggression, it 

has been opportunity, and they see more opportunity in the region 

now than they did before. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I don’t think their behavior has moderated. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador Jeffrey. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I think it has gotten worse. I can’t do a 

cause-and-effect specifically with the agreement, but it has definitely gotten worse. They feel more liberated to do what they want. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. So the broad question is, will the United 

States withdrawing from the JCPOA at this time help or hurt our 

goals of stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and thwarting Iran’s malign designs and regional goals? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it is an interesting and important question, and certainly the administration has been wrestling with this, 

that let’s say you just abrogate the deal. I personally believe that 

is not the best way forward. But there is an argument for those 

who say abrogate the deal that you can actually deal with this situation again. You can repair relations with the Europeans after you 

have reimposed all the nuclear sanctions and put them in a dilemma: Do you want to do business with Iran or the United States? 

And then you would have a free hand to do whatever you want 

with Iran. 

So I think there is an argument to abrogate. I personally don’t 

want to go down that path, but I think it is something the administration has certainly been considering. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Very quickly. I agree with Mr. Albright. 

We are using imprecise terms both in the certification and in walking out of the agreement. You can walk out of the agreement and, 

frankly, I think the Iranians and the Europeans and Russia and 

China would continue with it. 

If you walk out of the agreement, try to impose the NDAA oil import sanctions on the rest of the world against Iran, or you use the 

snapback provision and bring back all the U.N. resolutions, then 

Iran would move toward that 3 or 4 weeks away from a nuclear 

device very quickly, and that is the risk. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think it would, as I have said over the course 

of this hearing, put us in a materially worse position with respect 

to the Iranian nuclear capability. 

And I would just reinforce that anyone who casually says we can 

just tell the Europeans and the Chinese and the rest of the global 

economy, ‘‘Either trade with us or trade with Iran,’’ they should 

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ington Post, because, as he says in that piece, nobody who is making that argument has sat in his seat to build and execute these 

sanctions regimes. And I think it is not nearly as simple as that. 

And I don’t think the sanctions architecture would come back. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I am out of time. 

Let me leave one last question for the record to follow up in writing. Part of the JCPOA is this additional protocol under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. How important is the additional 

protocol to making sure Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon during 

the terms of the agreement and afterwards? And would withdrawing from the agreement put the additional protocol at risk? 

And I will leave that for the record. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, what was Iran’s original claim regarding their nuclear ambitions? Was their original claim they wanted to have a 

nuclear weapons program or it was for domestic emergency production and domestic purposes, medicine, et cetera? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They have consistently claimed that they want 

this for peaceful purposes, and we believe that that is a false claim. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. Right. So does anybody on the panel disagree 

with that? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I have heard senior Iranian officials informally say: Okay, we did certain studies on weaponization, but it 

wasn’t a weaponization program, so they stopped at that level. But, 

I mean, they know we have them dead to rights on the 

weaponization information. 

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Albright, you might as well. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. They have always claimed it is a civil non-nuclear 

weapons program. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. Right. So, I mean, the point to the whole exercise of the question is that Iran, at least for the rest of us in the 

world, they are known liars. They are liars. They lie about things. 

They are liars, cheaters, and stealers. And if you don’t believe me, 

just ask all these folks back here. 

I am sure, you know, Stalin told the Poles that they didn’t kill 

the Poles in the Katyn Forest massacre either. And the Poles 

couldn’t prove it, but it doesn’t mean it didn’t happen, right? These 

folks know what we are dealing with. All of us know what we are 

dealing with. 

Let me ask you this. How many Iranian individuals have been 

sanctioned by our European partners regarding their forays or 

breach of U.N. resolutions regarding ballistic missiles? How many 

individuals have our European allies sanctioned for those breaches? 

Any? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I know of none. The Europeans did sign a 

joint statement with us stating that the missile activity was not essentially in compliance. 

Mr. PERRY. But no sanctions, right, no punishment? I mean——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. You are exactly right. 

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Sullivan. 

69

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am not aware of it, but I am also not read into 

the strategy to get them to. And part of my argument is that 

should be our focus, not the certification. 

Mr. PERRY. Yeah, the strategy. Let me ask you this. How many 

American members are on the IAEA inspection team in Iran inspecting these sites? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. None. 

Mr. PERRY. Zero, right? Well, I have spent some time in the military. And to me, you don’t look for military nuclear weapons down 

at the power plant. That is probably not where they are going to 

be. They are going to be on the military sites. But, unfortunately, 

we can’t inspect the military sites. 

Now, I don’t know if it was our genius or Iran’s genius, but for 

someone who says that it is a peaceful program dealing with medicine and power and so on and so forth, but really, in reality, it is 

a military program, the last place you are going to put them is 

where we are going to find them. 

And with all due respect, Mr. Sullivan, I appreciate your good 

charity and your goodwill to these other people and these other nations. But the reality is that Iran wants to be a nuclear power, just 

like North Korea wanted to be a nuclear power. And they are going 

to tell us whatever they want to tell us, whatever we are going to 

believe, whatever the rest of the world is going to believe as long 

as they get there. 

And it strikes me as curious if not just downright scary that we 

seem to be willing to trade security now at some level—or stability 

now at some level—by saying, well, they are not going to have it 

for 10 or 15 years. Everybody in this room knows what is going to 

happen in 10 or 15 years. 

And it also strikes me that maybe that plays right into Iran’s 

bigger strategy while they are in Yemen, while they are in Syrian, 

while they are in Lebanon, while they are supporting Hezbollah, to 

coalesce all that territory and all that power so that at that time 

they will be able to spend more money on their nuclear weapons. 

Who develops a ballistic missile? Are they going to drop leaflets 

on the United States with that? Everybody knows where this is 

headed. Everybody knows. And for, I don’t know, 30 years, since 

the Shah was deposed and they took our Americans hostage, we 

have been playing this game of, ‘‘Well, we are going to do this, and 

we hope they will do that. And we will sign this agreement. We 

will have this negotiation.’’

Let me ask you this, Mr. Sullivan. Who signed this agreement? 

It is not a treaty. Who signed this agreement? Did Iran sign it? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. As David Albright said before, this isn’t a 

treaty. It is not a signed document. It is an agreement——

Mr. PERRY. Right. We know it is not a treaty. It is some kind of 

an agreement between somebody here in the United States. Who 

from the United States signed it? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Nobody signed the agreement. The administration, the executive branch of the United States, signed the United 

States up the commitments under the deal. 

Mr. PERRY. And who from Iran? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Foreign Minister of Iran and the Secretary of 

State of the United States were the ones in the room, along with 

70

the Foreign Ministers of the P5+1 nations, who reached the agreement. 

Mr. PERRY. They signed it. Iran signed it. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. As I have said couple times now——

Mr. PERRY. What kind of agreement? We don’t have any agreement. We can’t walk away from an agreement we don’t have, because they have not agreed to it. They haven’t signed it. 

I mean, these people have been lied to over and over again. Their 

families have. We are in agreement on nuclear weapons with a 

lying, cheating nation who wants to kill us and has said so. There 

is no agreement, sir. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The issue wasn’t their signature. It was ours. We 

didn’t want to have sign it because we wanted to maintain maximum flexibility. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, General Perry. 

We now go to Tom Suozzi of New York. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is so good to have 

spent this time with you. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses so much for their attention 

today and their preparation, the good work that they do. 

Let’s assume that the JCPOA deal has flaws and inadequacies. 

Let’s assume that we will not walk away from the deal, especially 

after we have already given so much benefit to Iran in the form 

of monetary payments. 

Let’s assume that the IAEA hasn’t done the inspections that they 

need to do. Let’s assume that Iran is purveying evil and instability 

and terror throughout the region with their Tehran-backed militias 

in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza, and elsewhere. Let’s assume 

all these things for argument’s sake. 

I would like each of you to just please tell me what is the number 

one thing we can do to, one, enforce compliance of the treaty—not 

the treaty, of the agreement. And number two, what is the number 

one thing we can do, the number one toughest sanction we can impose without violating the deal? 

Ambassador. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Number one, enforce the agreement. Number two, tougher sanctions without violating it. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Use the joint committee process to start 

challenging Iran on all of these issues that we have talked about 

today, the militarization—rather, the access to the military bases, 

the issues that have been raised by Mr. Albright, and some of the 

other actions that are in 2231, the U.N. resolution, and press the 

Iranians through that process. Because at the end of that process 

there are steps we can take, short of walking out of the agreement, 

that could limit some of our commitments, for example, to provide 

them technical economic trade——

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. So what is the number one thing we should 

do, is use joint committee to——

Ambassador JEFFREY. Use the Joint Commission to challenge 

Iran’s violations and behavior. That is on the agreement on the——

Mr. SUOZZI. What would you say the number one violation is? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I would say it is the missile program. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. 

71

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The U.S. should change its policy that it no longer 

accepts the sunsets and then work with its European allies to try 

to create a joint position on how to——

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. So that wouldn’t be enforcing the existing 

deal, that would be to change the deal. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, that is right, to change the deal. To enforce 

it, certainly, what the Ambassador said about using the Joint Commission to try to give access to military sites. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Get access. So you are saying ballistic missiles. You 

are saying military sites. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But in terms of U.S. actions, I think that——

Mr. SUOZZI. Toughest sanction we can do without violating the 

agreement. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think we do need to step up non-nuclear sanctions on Iran, and we need to have a broader——

Mr. SUOZZI. So what would the number one sanction we could be, 

non-nuclear sanction we could do? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I am not an expert on sanctions. I look to 

what this committee is working on, and I see many possibilities 

and think that those are very sound things to do. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Including the ones in the bill to be marked up tomorrow. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you. 

Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think we should work with the IAEA and with 

our European partners on how to interpret and enforce Section T 

and Section Q of the agreement, which go to these military-related 

nuclear—potential military-related nuclear activities of Iran. 

And in terms of additional sanctions that we can impose that are 

compliant with the JCPOA, I think that our key two areas of focus 

should be economic pressure around Tehran’s proxies, meaning trying to disrupt the financial flows and the means of payment from 

Hezbollah to its proxies in Syria——

Mr. SUOZZI. Through the State Department and the Treasury Department? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Through the Treasury Department chiefly. I 

mean, I believe that our Treasury Department is the gold standard 

when it comes to disrupting illicit financial flows if they have the 

resources and the authorities they need to go do it. And I think we 

should give that to them. 

And then I also believe that we should be thinking about how 

you tighten the screws on the supply chain for ballistic missiles. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Suozzi. 

And I also want to thank the members of our panel here today. 

We very much appreciate these informative exchanges that you 

have had with the members, including the ability to get into some 

clarification of some issues that I think are very helpful. 

I think there is a broad and bipartisan agreement that Iran is, 

in fact, a threat, a deadly threat to the United States and to our 

allies. And I think our intent here is to continue our oversight 

work, but then to drive policy with respect to countering this radVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:00 Dec 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_FULL\101117\27160 SHIRL
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ical regime. And I think that the ideas that come out of this hearing can be very helpful in terms of how exactly we do that. 

The hearing is adjourned. Thank you again. 

[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNES 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

October II, 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign A!Iairs, to be held 

in Room 2172 of the Raybum House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

httJ~:ibYY('Y~F:Qr~U:mAtJlliJl),l_lP!l_~Q_._go,-): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. October 11.2017 

!O:OOa.m. 

Confronting the Full Range oflranian Threats 

The Honorable James F. Jeffrey 

Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow 

The Washington Institute for Ncar East Policy 

(Former U.S. Ambassador lo Iraq, h<rkey, and Albania) 

General Charles F. Wald. USAF. Retired 

Distinguished Fellow and Co-Chair 

The Gemunder Center Iran Task Force 

The Jewish Institute for National Security of America 

(Former Deputy Commander. US'. Ruropean Command) 

Mr. David Albright 

Founder and President 

Institute for Science and International Security 

Mr. Jake Sullivan 

Senior Fellow 

Geoeconomics and Strategy Program 

Carnegie End0\\1ncnt for Intcmational Peace 

(Former National Security Adviser to the Vice President; Former Director qjPolic.J.' 

/)Lanning, liS J)epartment (~(.)'tate) 

By Direction of the Chairman 

1'he Cumnnttee on Foreign A._[kars seeks to make ItsfiJcibtws acces:nble to persons wuh chsabiiUJes. Jfyou are m 

need C?f speczal accommodations. please call 20}'225-502 1 at least .fOur business days in advance of the event, 

vrhenever practicable. Questums with regard to special accommodations m general (including availahihty qf 

Committee matenals m alternative formats and assistive hstemng device~) may be directed to the Committee. 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINliTES OF FULL COMMITTEE JIEARING 

Day Wednesday Date __ ---"cl:::IJII=l/2=0co1_:_7 ___ Room ___ .:_21=72:___ __ _ 

Starting Time IIJ:l2AM _Ending Time 12:50PM 

Recesses I .. . o_J L_to__JL_to 

Presiding Member(s) 

Ch4frman Ht:hi,ard 8. Hoyce 

Cluck all nfthe [nllm•i11g that apply: 

)( to )( to )( to 

Open Session I.ZI Executive (closed) Session D Televised I.ZI Elec!ronically Record~ taped) [Z] 

Stenographic Record lL.I 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Confronting lite Fu{[ Range of Iranian Threals 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESE"'T: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE Y!El\U!ERS PRESENT: 

N/4 

HEARING WIT"'ESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes[!] NoD 

(If ''no'', please lis! helmv and incluJ~ Iitle, agency, Jeparlmeni, or mgonizufirm.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor the record.) 

SFR- Representative Connol~v 

QFR- Representatives Titus, Schneider 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TillE ADJOLR"'ED 12:51JPM 

)( to 
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PRESENT 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

MEMBER l'RESDcT MEMBER 

Edward R. Rovce, CA X Eliot L. Engel, NY 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ X Brad Sherman. CA 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, FL X Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Dana Rohrabacher, CA X Albia Sires. NJ 

Steve Chabot. OH Gerald E. Connolly. VA 

Joe Wilson, SC X Theodore E. Deutch. FL 

1\![jchael T. McCaul, TX X Karen Bass, CA 

Ted Poe. TX X William Keating. MA 

Darrell Issa. CA X David Cicilline, Rl 

Tom Marino. PA X Ami Bera. CA 

Jeff Duncan. SC Lois FrankeL FL 

Mo Brooks. AL Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

Paul Cook. CA X Joaquin Castro, TX 

Scott Perrv. PA X Robin Kelly. IL 

Ron DeSantis. FL X Brendan Boyle. PA 

Mark Meadows, NC Dina Titus, NV 

Ted Yoho. FL Norma Torres. CA 

Adam Kinzinger,IL X Brad Schneider. TL 

Lee Zeldin. NY X Tom Suozzi. NY 

Dan Donovan, NY X Adriano Espaillat. NY 

James F. Sensenbrenner. Jr .. WI X Ted Lieu. CA 

Ann Wagner. MO 

Brian J. Mast. FL 

Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Francis Rooney, FL 

Thomas A. Garrett, Jr.. VA 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connofly of Virginiu 

In less than five days, President Trump must certify to Congress whether or not Iran is complying with 

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The President has reportedly already decided to 

decertify, despite lacking evidence of Iranian violations of the agreement. While the United States 

faces a range of threats from Iran, none is more dangerous than the prospect of a nuclear-armed 

Tehran. That is why the PS+ 1 countries that negotiated the agreement focused exclusively on nuclear 

issues. Rather than abrogating the agreement, the Trump Administration should look to the nuclear 

deal as a model for addressing Iran's other threatening behavior 

By all accounts, Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA, and the deal is accomplishing a critical 

national security priority -preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Pursuant to the terms of 

the agreement, Iran has poured concrete into its plutonium reactor, reduced its centrifuges from 19,000 

to 6,1 04, reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium to no more than 300 kilograms enriched no higher 

than 3.67 percent, and submitted to continuous monitoring and inspections at its key nuclear facilities. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency has released nine verification and monitoring reports 

indicating that Iran has not violated the agreement, and the President has certified to Congress six 

times that Iran is in compliance. 

Critics of the JCPOA charge that it is not an all-encompassing agreement addressing all ofTran's 

malign behavior. Iran's repeated testing of ballistic missiles runs contrary to the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 2231. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to 

bankroll and arm regional terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and Hamas, that threaten our 

greatest ally in the Middle East, Israel. Iran further acts as a destabilizing force in the region by 

supporting the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. And on the home ±ron!, the 

Iranian regime engages in significant human rights abuses to maintain its brutal stranglehold on the 

Iranian people. 

Each of these behaviors constitutes a threat to the United States and therefore demands an appropriate 

response. That is precisely why we recently enacted the Countering America's Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act (PL. 115-44), which is the most robust sanctions regime ever passed by Congress. If 

President Trump shares my concern for Iran's other destabilizing behavior, then he should employ the 

authorities granted him under that law, which the administration has failed to implement. Trump has 

no overarching strategy to counter Iran's behavior and his administration's unilateral retreat has left a 

vacuum in Syria There are serious concerns that the Syrian de-escalation zones, negotiated by the 

Trump Administration and Russia, have allowed Iran to operate freely on Israel's border 

If Trump proceeds with decertification, he will enable that which we all can agree is an unacceptable 

outcome- a nuclear-armed Iran. Withdrawing from the JCPOA allows Iran to immediately restart its 

nuclear program, and leaves the United States with only military options to combat Iranian nuclear 

proliferation. The last thing the world needs right now is an additional nuclear front. In order to 

1 
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prevent such a dire result, Congress must work in concert with the Administration to ensure that the 

nuclear agreement is fully implemented and strictly enforced. 

To this end, l have reintroduced bipartisan legislation with my Republican colleat,'l!e Rep. Francis 

Rooney to establish a Congressional-Executive Commission to verify Iran's compliance with its 

obligations under the deal. The Commission to Verify Trani an Nuclear Compliance Act (H.R. 381 0) 

would ensure close and enduring Congressional oversight of the JCPOA as well as coordination 

between Congress and the Administration regarding implementation of the deal. Congress should act 

immediately to advance one of the rare proposals on Capitol Hill that has garnered support from both 

sides of the heated JCPOA debate. 

Withdrawing from the deal would damage U.S. credibility in the eyes of our allies and adversaries and 

weaken our leverage to negotiate future agreements with Iran or other states. The leaders of all parties 

to the deal, including many members of Trump's own administration, maintain that Iran is in 

compliance. Just last week, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford reiterated 

that "Iran is not in material breach of the agreement, and I do believe the agreement to date has delayed 

the development of a nuclear capability by Iran." Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis added that he 

believes it is in the U.S. national security interest to remain in the JCPOA. Furthermore, our partners 

are unwilling to return to the negotiating table. We should always endeavor to improve the deal and 

further constrain the Iranian nuclear program, but not in a unilateral fashion and not at the expense of 

the broader agreement. 

lfthe President decertifies, not only will the United States eliminate its diplomatic options to avert a 

nuclear-armed Iran, but it would also weaken its leverage to curb Iran's other abhorrent behavior. I 

regret the absence of Administration witnesses at today' shearing to explain President Trump's 

comprehensive Iran strategy. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding how 

we can ensure strict enforcement and transparency of the JCPOA and how we may apply lessons 

learned from that etTort to the myriad threats posed by the Iranian regime. 

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Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Mr. Jake Sullivan 

By Representative Dina Titus 

October 11, 2017 

Mr. Sullivan, thank you for joining us today. I share many of the concerns that you outlined in 

your written statement, especially the President is turning the decision to certify Iran's 

compliance with the J-C-P-0-A into a bad reality TV show. During the campaign, the President 

was very clear that he was opposed to the Iran Deal, calling it one of the worst agreements in 

history. Now, rather than providing a stable voice to lead the world community on this issue, he 

is refusing to work with our allies or even tell them if he will certify compliance. 

It was reported that during the UN General Assembly, the President refused to tell Teresa May 

his decision regarding certification, despite claiming he had already made up his mind. Our 

European allies have made it very clear that they want the U.S. to stay in the deal. 

I agree with my colleagues that there are issues with the current Iran deal that we should closely 

examine and work to improve. Meanwhile, we continue watch as the President blunders through 

his diplomatic efforts, including insulting long terrn allies. Do you believe this approach 

encourages our allies to work with us to strengthen the Iran deal or address other Iranian 

malfeasance, including their missile program? 

Response: 

I believe the President's persistent efforts to cast doubt on America's commitment to the JCPOA 

has made it harder for us to secure the cooperation of our partners in addressing the security 

challenges posed by Iran that are not addressed in the deal. It has distracted us and the 

Europeans from focusing on issues like ballistic missiles and Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. It 

has made the Europeans worry more about the risk Washington poses than the risk Tehran 

poses. The right approach is to commit to the deal, enforce it vigorously, and then turn our 

attention --along with our partners-- to these pressing issues. 
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Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Ambassador Jeffrey, Mr. Albright, and Mr. Sullivan 

By Representative Brad Schneider 

October 11, 2017 

Iran agreed, in the JCPOA, to implement an Additional Protocol agreement and this will continue in 

perpetuity for as long as Iran remains part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPn. How important 

is the additional protocol in making sure Iran docs not acquire a nuclear ;veapon during the tenus of the 

JCPOA and beyond0 

Ambassador Jeffrey's Response: 

Iran did agree to implement au additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for the Iran nuclear issue, specifically in paragraphs I and 13 of 

the basic JCPOA Agreement. 

Commitment to and fulfillment of the terms of au additional protocol to the NPT is important to ensure that 

Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon, both during the tem1s of the JCPOA. and especially, beyond. 

Each additional protocol is unique. and well over 100 countries have signed such agreements with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additional protocols generally give the IAEA and thus the 

international community more transparency over all aspects of a country· s nuclear program than the terms 

of the NPT. In particular. countries that sign such agreements have to accept provision of considerably 

more data to the IAEA and inspections at least in principle anywhere in a country if the IAEA can raise a 

concern. 

While the JCPOA contains certain data provision and inspection modalities similar to an additional 

protocol, the JCPOA and the various modalities are time limited. Iran· s commitments under its additional 

protocol arc not and it thus is a more confidence-building document. 

Iran in paragraphs I and 13 of the basic JCPOA has committed that its government will provisionally apply 

its additional protocol. (Iran did so 2003-6): but it is not required to have its parliament ratify it (which 

would provide far greater assurance that it is a 'pennanent' agreement) untiL as stipulated in Article 34 (iv) 

of the basic Agreement at ''Transition Day'' in the Agreement (8 years after the Agreement enters into 

force, or when the IAEA issues its 'Broader Finding' that Iran's progran1 is free of any concern of a nuclear 

weapons component whichever comes first), the U.S. complies with its commitment in Article 21 of 

JCPOA Annex V. (That commitment is for the U.S. to make permanent by legislative action the President's 

or Executive's waiving oflegislative sanctions against Iran related to the nuclear program required by the 

JCPOA, i.e., repealing those Iran sanctions.) 

If the U.S. (specifically, the Congress) were not to do so, then Iran under the terms of Article 34 would not 

be required to ratify the agreement (i.e., the JCPOA links the two sets of actions explicitly). 

Mr. Albright's Response: 

The Additional Protocol (AP) is an important, but by no means sufficient, piece of the package of measures 

to make sure Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons during and after the period of nuclear limitations of the 

JCPOA. To ensure Iran docs not acquire nuclear weapons. Iran's adherence to the NPT plus tl1e Additional 
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Protocol was not enough in 2013-2015 when the JCPOA was negotiated. T11e nuclear limitations were 

viewed as the critical piece of this deaL Atlcr these nuclear limitations start to sunset, particularly given 

the expected trajectory of the Iranian regime, the NPT plus the AP will not be enough either. 

Mr, Snllivan's Response: The Additional Protocol (AP) is vitally important. It provides the lntemational 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with critic<1l tools, including <1ccess to infonnation and loc<1tions, producing 

a much more detailed picture of a State· s nuclear program so as to provide confidence that a State docs not 

have any undeclared nuclear material or facilities. These AP tools are the foundation of JCPOA monitoring 

and inspection, though the JCPOA also adds additional access requirements specific to Iran. Tran·s full 

ratification of the AP (required 8 years into the deal) will be one element of ensuring that they meet their 

commitment in perpetuity '"that Lmder no circumstances ·will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire an:-' nuclear 

·weapons. 

Question: 

Would withdrawing from the JCPOA put Iran· s Additional Protocol agreement at risk? 

Ambassador Jeffrey's Response: 

At any point if the U.S. were to cease in part or totally its commitments under the JCPOA (which as per the 

question would include ''withdrawing from the J CPOA ''),then, in accordance with the procedures of Article 

36 of the basic JCPOA Agreement. Iran could. to quote that Article "cease perfonning its commitments 

under this JCPOA in whole or in part." That would thus allow Iran, consistent with the Agreement, for 

example to cancel its provisional application of its additional protocol, with the resulting erosion of IAEA 

and intemational oversight of its nuclear programs. (It could also continue provisional adherence to the 

additional protocol but take other measures to modify or reduce its compliance with the Agreement in 

response to U.S. action that ends or modifies U.S. adherence.) 

Mr. Albright's Response: 

I would expect Iran to stop implementing the Additional Protocol if the deal collapsed. 

Mr. Sullivan's Response: 

lr<1n is almost cert<1in to cease <1pplic<1tion of the AP quickly upon U.S. f<1ilure to <!bide by its own JCPOA 

commitments. It is hard to sec a circumstance in which Iran would ratify the AP outside of the context of 

the JCPOA.