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i 

24–683 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–11] 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR 

DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 8, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .................. 5 

Moran, ADM William F., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations ......................... 6 

Selva, Gen Paul J., USAF, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ........................ 3 

Wilson, Gen Stephen W., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force ................. 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hyten, Gen John E. .......................................................................................... 59 

Moran, ADM William F. .................................................................................. 68 

Selva, Gen Paul J. ............................................................................................ 52 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 49 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 47 

Wilson, Gen Stephen W. .................................................................................. 74 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 92 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 100 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 93 

Ms. Rosen .......................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 91 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 99 

Dr. Wenstrup .................................................................................................... 101 

(1) 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 

REQUIREMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 8, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

The Nation’s strategic deterrent is the foundation upon which all 

our defense efforts are built. We simply cannot allow it to weaken 

or to crack, and yet we have neglected it for some time while other 

nations have not only invested in their nuclear systems but advanced their capability. 

Our strategic deterrent consists of the delivery systems, the 

three legs of the triad, and also the nuclear weapons themselves 

and the command and control over those systems. 

Our Minuteman III missiles were first fielded in 1970; our B–52 

and B–2 bombers were first deployed in the 1950s and the 1980s; 

our ballistic missile submarines began entering service in 1981 

and, like the other legs of the triad, have a limited lifespan. The 

warheads themselves were largely designed and built in the 1970s 

or before, and the last time a warhead was fully tested was 1991. 

And so, for some years some of our most brilliant scientists and 

engineers have been working to keep these complex machines safe, 

secure, reliable, and credible without being able to test the entire 

weapon. They have done so in aging, neglected facilities with an 

aging workforce. 

Similarly, the command and control systems for our deterrent 

have not received the attention something so vital should have received. And meanwhile, our potential adversaries develop and field 

new delivery systems and they develop and field new weapons. And 

confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent erodes. 

I am sure all of you have noticed articles over the last few days 

which reported that Europe was considering developing their own 

nuclear deterrent if they can no longer count on ours. The same 

may well be true in Asia, as well. 

Some say we cannot afford to update this part of our defenses, 

but depending on how one allocates the cost of the new bomber, operating, sustaining, and updating our strategic deterrent never requires more than 6 to 7 percent of our defense budget. 
2 

As former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and others have 

pointed out, this is affordable because it is our highest priority defense mission. Contemplating a world without a reliable strategic 

deterrent is a nightmare the modern world has never had to face, 

and I hope it never does. 

The committee has a number of events over the course of this 

week focusing on this topic of strategic deterrence. Today we are 

grateful to have several of our top military leaders to help us consider what our strategic deterrent means for American national security. 

Now, it may well be that members have some policy questions 

which uniformed military members are not able to answer. As you 

know we are—do not yet have people in place in the new administration to answer some of those questions. But they are here to talk 

about the military implications of our strategic deterrent. 

This hearing and the committee’s broader series on nuclear deterrence will remind us, the American people, our allies, and potential adversaries that the U.S. strategic deterrent must always be 

credible and must always be ready. 

Before turning to our witnesses, I would yield to the ranking 

member for any comments that he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having 

this hearing. I appreciate the focus on our nuclear weapons deterrent for this week. I think it is incredibly important. 

And the chairman is correct, it is a series of aging systems that 

need to be replaced, and we need to think about what our longterm nuclear strategy is. 

The concern that I have, we absolutely have to have a nuclear 

deterrent because, unfortunately, there other countries—and hostile countries like Russia, North Korea—that have nuclear weapons. We have to have enough of a deterrent to make sure that they 

never use them because they know that it would lead to their own 

destruction because of the size of our deterrent. 

My questions as we go forward is whether or not we need as 

many nuclear weapons as we have had to present that deterrent. 

I have always pointed out that China has a very straightforward 

deterrent. They don’t have anywhere near as many nuclear weapons as we do, but they have got enough. And if anybody challenges 

them, they have enough weapons to obliterate that person if they 

were to use nuclear weapons. 

So I hope that as we go forward and try to figure out what the 

new nuclear deterrent needs to look like we don’t imagine that we 

have to have absolutely everything, that we really look at it. What 

is a credible deterrent force? 

We are coming down, but at the peak here a year or so ago— 

it wasn’t the peak—but we had well over 5,000 nuclear warheads 

and, you know, plenty of delivery systems. Is there a way that we 

can do this in a more cost-effective manner? 
3 

And I say that because while I agree with the chairman that we 

have to have a nuclear deterrent, no question about it, we also 

have to have it fit within a budget because we have a lot of other 

priorities. When you look at what President Trump has said he 

wants, in terms of the size of the force—you know, the size of the 

Army, the size of the Marine Corps, the way we want to build out 

the Navy—at a certain point the numbers don’t add up. 

So if there is a way to do this in a more cost-effective manner, 

I think that is something we should look at. I don’t think we should 

simply say, ‘‘Well, it is important so we are going to spend whatever it takes.’’ I don’t think we can afford that, and I don’t think 

it is a credible deterrent. 

And I also want to make sure that our policy going forward continues to be just that, that it is a deterrent force against any other 

adversary using nuclear weapons, that we don’t dive into some of 

the conversations that have happened in our military circles over 

the course of the last 30 years that somehow we can use, quote, 

‘‘tactical’’ nuclear weapons on a first-use basis. I think we should 

maintain our policy of not using them first and using them as a 

credible deterrent. And I worry that some of the discussions have 

moved us in that direction. 

Now, I am aware that Russia has changed its tone on that and 

there is cause for worry about how they view the use of nuclear 

weapons. And that is the last point I will make: Credible deterrent 

is not just about how many nuclear weapons you have, but it is 

also about maintaining an open dialogue with as many of those adversaries as possible to make sure that they know about that credible deterrent and that discourages them. 

This is not just a military issue; it is diplomatic as well, to make 

sure that we keep open those channels so there are not misunderstandings about what our nuclear deterrent is and what we are 

prepared to do with it. We certainly don’t want a country like Russia to start thinking that they can do a first-use nuclear weapon 

attack and get away with it. 

So with that, I look forward to testimony and the questions, and 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me welcome our distinguished witnesses 

today. 

We have the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 

Paul Selva; we have the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, 

General John Hyten; Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bill 

Moran; and Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Stephen Wilson. 

Without objection, your full written statements will be made part 

of the record. Again, thank each of you for being here. 

General Selva, the floor is yours for any comments you would 

like to make. 

STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. SELVA, USAF, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General SELVA. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and Ranking 

Member Smith and members of the committee. 
4 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify on the continuing relevance 

of our U.S. nuclear forces for our national security, the considerations that are influencing the size and shape of those forces, and 

the steps the joint force is taking to modernize or replace them. 

Given the gravity of these issues, I deeply appreciate the committee’s interest, attention, and oversight. 

With the President’s recently directed Nuclear Posture Review to 

assess the existing nuclear policy, and through many details regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and employment concepts, these 

are all highly sensitive. Although they are, I look forward to your 

questions in this public forum and my ability to answer them as 

appropriate. 

As you know, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to 

deter nuclear use against the United States, its allies, and partners. Simply put, nuclear weapons pose the only existential threat 

to the United States and there is no substitute for the prospect of 

a devastating nuclear response to deter that threat. 

Our nuclear forces play important roles as well, to include reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and contributing to the deterrence of large-scale conventional war. 

These are longstanding objectives that have served U.S. national 

interests, but our ability to achieve them cannot be taken for granted. No one should doubt that our weapons, our delivery systems, 

the infrastructure that supports them, and the personnel who operate, monitor, and maintain them, are prepared to respond to any 

contingency. 

Our current challenge, however, is to maintain this high level of 

readiness and capability as long as the policy and strategy of this 

Nation depends in part on nuclear weapons for its security. This 

hearing comes at a critical moment in meeting that challenge. 

For more than two decades, the joint force has implemented a 

U.S. policy that calls for the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons and forces and our strategies and plans to decrease the number 

and types of those nuclear forces in our inventory. Yet a number 

of nations, including potential nuclear adversaries, have not followed our example. 

They instead are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons, 

improving their nuclear capabilities, and in some cases expanding 

their nuclear arsenals. 

Our nuclear deterrent, as has already been stated, is nearing a 

crossroads. To date, we have preserved this deterrent by extending 

the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and infrastructure, in many 

cases for decades beyond what was originally intended. But these 

systems will not remain viable forever. 

In fact, we are now at a point where we must concurrently recapitalize each component of our nuclear deterrent: the nuclear 

weapons themselves, the triad of strategic delivery platforms, the 

indications and warning systems that support our decision processes, the command-and-control networks that connect the President to our fielded forces, and our dual-capable tactical aircraft 

that can be equipped with nonstrategic nuclear weapons. 

Our joint force’s ability to preserve these capabilities beyond 

their intended lifespan is indeed a technical achievement. However, 

nuclear modernization can no longer be deferred. 
5 

Any disruption in the current program of record for future acquisition plans will introduce the risk—significant risk to our deterrent. As a result of previous delays and deferrals, all well considered, we are currently depending on just-in-time modernization and 

replacement of many of the components of our nuclear triad. 

The cost of these efforts is substantial. Even at their peak, however, they will still represent less than 1 percent of anticipated 

Federal spending and approximately 6 percent of the defense budget. 

Moreover, there is no higher priority for the joint force than fielding all of the components of an effective nuclear deterrent, and we 

are emphasizing the nuclear mission over all other modernization 

programs when faced with that choice. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate accepting my written statement into 

the record and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Selva can be found in the 

Appendix on page 52.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Hyten. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General HYTEN. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking 

Member Smith, members of the committee. 

On behalf of the men and women of United States Strategic 

Command [STRATCOM], I would like to echo the thanks of the 

vice chairman and express our appreciation for the committee’s 

continued support for the nuclear mission. I look forward to build 

upon this relationship on our shared objective of protecting the Nation. 

Our mission at United States Strategic Command is to employ 

tailored nuclear, space, cyberspace, global strike, joint electronic 

warfare, missile defense, and intelligence capabilities. We deter aggression, decisively respond if deterrence fails, assure allies, shape 

adversary behavior, defeat terror, and define the force of the future. 

Let there be no doubt, we have a safe, secure, reliable nuclear 

enterprise today, and our nuclear forces are ready to meet any 

challenge. 

Nonetheless, much work is needed to make sure that this is the 

case as we look out into the coming decades. At STRATCOM peace 

is our profession, and one of the ways it is achieved is through strategic deterrence. That mission has been the bedrock of our national 

security for decades now. It is foundational. 

As such, I have three priorities in my command. 

My number one priority is to provide that strategic deterrence 

against any potential adversary. Our operations are ceaseless, deliberate, and enabled by a commitment to execute and modernize 

our C2 [command and control] and nuclear enterprise, which will 

enable us to meet the demands of the current and future strategic 

environment. 

My second priority is to account for a deterrence failure, in which 

this Nation will count on us for a decisive response. That response 
6 

must defeat any adversary with our nuclear, space, cyberspace, 

missile defense, and other strategic capabilities. 

Neither strategic deterrence nor decisive response will function, 

however, without a resilient, equipped, trained, and combat-ready 

force, which is my final priority. 

Our fight is continuous, each and every day, across and around 

the globe. This requires our forces to have depth in capability and 

breadth in capacity. 

We cannot do it alone. We must constantly challenge ourselves 

to integrate with allies, partners, the interagencies, the Department, the Joint Staff, and other commands to ensure we capitalize 

on the unique capabilities that STRATCOM can bring to bear. 

Today’s deterrent force remains safe, secure, reliable, and ready. 

However, the United States faces significant future challenges in 

sustaining the required capabilities to meet our enduring national 

security objectives and the extended deterrence commitments we 

have around the world. 

At a time when others continue to modernize and upgrade their 

nuclear forces, nearly all elements of the nuclear weapon stockpile, 

our delivery systems, our other critical infrastructure are operating 

well beyond their designed service life. 

Maintaining strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation control capabilities requires a multifaceted long-term investment approach and a sustained commitment to maintain a credible nuclear 

deterrent. That nuclear deterrent is only as effective as the command and control that enables it to function. Therefore, our nuclear command and control communication systems, NC3, must be 

assured, reliable, and resilient across the full spectrum of conflict. 

Maintaining a credible deterrent requires sustainment and modernizations of key systems and capabilities throughout the architecture. The unpredictable challenges posed by today’s multi-domain, 

multi-threat security environment make it increasingly important 

to optimize our legacy NC3 systems and leverage new technologies 

and capabilities. Through continuing funding for NC3 modernization we can ensure effective command and control for these forces 

well into the future. 

So I look forward to participating in the hearing today and the 

administration’s recently announced Nuclear Posture Review, which 

will address many of the issues we will discuss. 

And I thank the committee again for your support. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Moran. 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, VICE CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Admiral MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning, and I echo the comments by 

both General Selva and General Hyten. 

And I am extremely proud to represent the men and women who 

man, operate, and maintain our strategic ballistic submarine force. 

And I look forward to your questions, thank you. 
7 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Moran can be found in the 

Appendix on page 68.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Wilson. 

STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE 

General WILSON. Chairman, the same. I look forward to any 

questions from the members here today. I represent the United 

States Air Force, that provides two-thirds of the Nation’s triad and 

three-fourths of the nuclear command and control communications. 

We stand ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 74.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all. 

General Selva, yesterday I had the opportunity to tour Fort 

Campbell. It just reminds me that we have a lot of needs in this 

military, and—but did I hear you correctly, that there is no higher 

priority for the joint force than modernizing this part of our defense effort, our strategic deterrence? 

General SELVA. Mr. Chairman, we in the joint force put our nuclear deterrent as the number one priority for modernization and 

recapitalization. 

I would make two quick points. 

One, we have made several—and I have referred to them as considered decisions over the last decade to defer some of the modernization of that force in order to address urgent needs while still 

maintaining a safe, reliable, and secure arsenal and delivery capability. But in making those decisions we have squeezed about all 

the life we can out of the systems we currently possess, and so that 

places an extra premium on a very deliberate long-term investment 

strategy to replace those systems as the existing systems age out 

of the inventory. 

And that is the reason we use the terminology we place it as our 

number one priority. There is an urgency in terms of time and in 

terms of stable long-term investment in order to be able to deliver 

this capability. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Let me just ask one other question for either you or General Hyten to comment on. 

A couple weeks there—ago there was an article by Peter Huessy, 

who is president of GeoStrategic Analysis and guest lecturer at the 

U.S. Naval Academy. Among other things he writes in this letter 

is that early in the next decade, around 2020 or 2021, Russia will 

have modernized close to 100 percent of its bombers, land-based 

missiles, and submarines. 

And China will, by the end of the next decade, have a fully modernized and expanded nuclear deterrent with mobile ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], a new missile-armed submarine, and 

long-range cruise missiles. New data now indicates that China can 

build a thousand new nuclear warheads quite rapidly. If the U.S. 

stays on its current projected course we will, at best, fully modernize our nuclear deterrent by the mid-2030s, some two decades 

hence. 
8 

He then goes on to say we are at about 10 percent of a number 

of warheads where we were at one time and talks about Russia’s 

tactical nuclear weapons. 

I am not asking you all to comment on the accuracy of information that may be, and probably is, classified. But I am asking relative to other nations, are they gaining in capability faster than we 

are? Where is the momentum here? Because if you—if he is in the 

ballpark of being right, that Russia will have modernized everything in a handful of years and at best we are two decades after 

that, it looks to me like we are behind in this race. 

General SELVA. Chairman, thanks for the question. 

There are two dynamics that are at play here. One is Russia has 

been and continues to modernize their nuclear force, and China 

continues to modernize and grow their nuclear force. Those are 

facts. We don’t have to go to intelligence to determine those. 

Having said that, the path that we have chosen to modernize and 

replace our existing nuclear arsenal, particularly the delivery systems, the indications and warning, and command and control, potentially puts us in a position not only to keep up—because we do 

have a qualitative advantage at this point—but to capitalize on 

that advantage over time by continuing to have a triad that gives 

us a ballistic missile force that confounds Russian and Chinese targeting; a bomber force that is resilient enough and capable enough 

to penetrate enemy air defenses and respond to a nuclear attack; 

and a survivable portion of that triad, in the case of our strategic 

ballistic missile submarines, that gives us an ability to respond 

even if an adversary were to believe that they could execute a decapitating attack on our nuclear capability. 

So it is our strategy going forward to continue to modernize all 

three legs of the triad in order to continue to pose unsurvivable targeting challenges to adversaries that match us in number and very 

close to match us in quality to the delivery systems themselves. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. General Hyten, you want to add anything? 

General HYTEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the only thing I will add is that the key to a nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, reliable, and ready. It has to be able to 

work. 

Now, I think the vice chairman used the term ‘‘just-in-time delivery,’’ so if you look at all of the elements, each element, leg of the 

triad—our nuclear weapon system, our nuclear command—and you 

put them all on a table, they all deliver in just in time. And that 

is the risks that we have to make sure we monitor. 

Because the forces that we have, the forces that we are projected 

to have in our budget, will provide that nuclear deterrent without 

a doubt as long as we can modernize according to that schedule. 

If those schedules slip, though, that is when we put risk in the system. 

The CHAIRMAN. So back to what General Selva said at the beginning, we have no room for error here in getting this done because 

we have stretched things as far as we can. 

General HYTEN. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
9 

For General Selva, I would like you to talk a little bit about the 

long-range standoff capability for which you advocate. Talk about 

where it is in your priorities, what it gains the United States. And 

I would also like you to address some of the concerns raised about 

unintended consequences and, you know, things that we may want 

to know in terms of the total cost of ownership of these strategically, in terms of what our adversaries or potential adversaries will 

interpret by that and what that may invite from them. 

General SELVA. Thank you, sir. 

Several quick points. First of all, the long-range strike system is 

integral to extending the life and utility of our current bomber 

fleet, and it also increases the number of options for the use of our 

future bomber fleet. 

In this respect, the missile itself imposes a cost on any potential 

nuclear adversary because in addition to modernizing their nuclear 

arsenal, they also have to modernize their air defense arsenals. 

This is a strategy that we used in the 1980s when we widely deployed the air-launched cruise missiles into our B–52 inventory. 

We believe that over the course of time, to keep the B–52 viable 

and buy us enough time to deploy the B–21, we have to have a 

long-range standoff weapon in our inventory that poses a challenge 

to increasingly sophisticated air defense systems in any one of the 

potential adversary nations that we might face. And so in that respect, the missile itself is an integral part of our modernization and 

replacement strategy. 

There are those who say that long-range standoff strike capabilities are inherently destabilizing. I disagree with that particular 

point for two reasons. 

One, it ignores the fact of deployment of those same systems by 

our adversaries. If you look at Russian deployments in their bomber force, they are largely composed of long-range standoff airlaunched cruise missiles launched from what we would consider 

relatively old legacy bomber platforms. That is a challenge we are 

going to have to face and they are going to have to face. 

The second reason I think it is something we must introduce into 

our arsenal is if we don’t have that capability in our arsenal, negotiating it out as a type and class of weapon over time becomes increasingly unlikely. So the places we have had success in negotiating types and classes of weapons out of adversary nuclear arsenals in our strategic arms reductions talks has been when we possess a similar capability that poses a tactical, operational, and strategic problems for our adversaries. 

So I am very concerned that the open debate about abandoning 

the system in the interest of cost actually puts us at a strategic disadvantage over the length of time. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So there is the argument on cost. You referenced 

the argument that it may destabilize or introduce some ambiguity 

that could be—that could turn out badly for both sides. And your 

response to that seems to be that our adversaries have this capability, and it wouldn’t be responsible for us not to match that. 

Would you then say if our adversaries did not have this capability the United States would not seek to introduce it? 

General SELVA. I think I would say that we should take that to 

the table and negotiate it in a bilateral, verifiable way so that we 
10 

don’t give up the option and the strategic leverage that we have in 

the existence of the system a priori. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Couple of administrative notes. 

We have obviously a lot of member interest. We need to try to 

just stay within the 5 minutes. 

Secondly, if—when you all answer questions, if you would talk 

directly into the microphone. Sometimes it is hard to hear back 

here and that would help us. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here today. 

I am very grateful to represent the Savannah River Site, where 

multiple generations have been dedicated to promoting peace 

through strength by building our nuclear weapons capability. In 

fact, the staff and workers there have made, I think, a positive difference, as General Hyten has cited, protecting the Nation. 

And so it really is very meaningful to me that you are here today 

and your success that we want to continue. 

General Selva, over the course of the past 8 years the military 

has contributed to detailed efforts to examine various options for 

changing the structure of the U.S. nuclear forces. We know from 

a GAO [Government Accountability Office] study and review of 

these efforts that the Obama administration examined big changes, 

like eliminating one or more of the legs of the triad. After these reviews, President Obama ultimately concluded to retain the triad 

and continue pursuing the nuclear modernization plans laid out by 

his administration. 

Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services recommend and 

support the decision to retain the triad, and what was the reasoning? 

General SELVA. Congressman, in advance of the consultations 

with President Obama’s administration on the status and potential 

options for how to manage the triad the Joint Chiefs did meet. We 

did affirm the necessity to maintain a triad, largely for the reasons 

that I have already pointed out about managing the strategic risk 

not only with Russia as a potential adversary, but China as a potential nuclear adversary, with an increasingly aggressive North 

Korea and his pursuit of nuclear weapons, and based on the fact 

of JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], that we have forestalled an Iranian entry into the nuclear arena but have not completely stopped it for the future. 

So based on the collection of potential threats and adversaries 

that exist in the world, the Joint Chiefs affirmed—pardon me—the 

necessity to maintain a triad and to modernize the weapon systems, the indications of warning, and the command and control associated with that triad. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And I am grateful for President Obama’s decision, although you referenced Iran, and I am so 

concerned about the continuing development of missile capability, 

ICBMs. Sadly, that can only be used for the purpose of, in my view, 

delivery of a nuclear weapon and a threat to the American people. 

General Hyten, we sometimes hear arguments that the triad has 

too much redundancy, that it will not intentionally—it is not inten-
11 

tionally designed, it is more by accident and grew up into what it 

is today. Do you believe we should retain and modernize the full 

triad? And additionally, what reasoning do you have on this? 

General HYTEN. So, I believe we should retain and modernize the 

triad, Congressman, absolutely. I believe that is fundamental to deterrence. 

In order to deter you have to have a capability that provides the 

adversary a calculus that he looks at and decides that his options 

will fail. If the adversary has capabilities to operate from the sea, 

from the land, from the air, then we have to be able to deter in 

all those elements. That is how the triad was developed and that 

is how we need to go. 

And I will just end with the fundamental statement that I am 

fundamentally opposed to unilateral disarmament because that 

fundamentally changes the deterrent equation. In deterrence, parity—rough parity—is actually a good thing, not a bad thing, because that causes the adversary to pause when they are about to 

make a decision. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And I agree with your analysis 

just there of peace through strength. Thank you very much. 

And, both General Selva and General Hyten, what are your view 

of the concerns that we are launching a new nuclear arms race 

with Russia by pursuing the nuclear modernization program? 

General SELVA. Congressman, I would suggest that we are not 

entering an arms race because we bilaterally have a verifiable inspection regime for the weapons that are deployed; we have capped 

the number of weapons that are available. What we are doing in 

this modernization program—and I very bluntly try to call it a replacement program—we have to replace the systems that exist. We 

should replace them with systems that are viable. 

The Russians understand that is what we are doing. They know 

it is a path we are on. 

So we have a bilateral, mutually verifiable treaty cap at this 

point in our relationship, and I think that keeps us from entering 

an arms race. 

General HYTEN. Congressman, I agree with the vice chairman. 

We have numbers of our force: 400 ICBMs, 240 SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], 60 bombers, 1,550 accountable 

warheads. Those are defined numbers that we have to meet. 

So we are not racing to increase that number; we are not racing 

to beat that number. We are working hard to make sure we can 

maintain that. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

very much for joining us here today. 

General, I was wondering—General Selva, I was wondering if 

you could talk about the Russian compliance with the Intermediate 

[Range] Nuclear Forces Treaty. There have been some concerns expressed in the press that they have not been complying. I would 

like to know what your view is on that situation. 

General SELVA. We believe that the Russians have deployed— 

pardon me—a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and 

intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. We have con-
12 

ferred with the Russians in a bilateral consultation committee that 

exists underneath the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] 

Treaty in order to confront them on that deployment, and we will 

continue to do so. 

The system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities in Europe, and we believe that the Russians have deliberately deployed 

it in order to pose a threat to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to facilities within the NATO area of responsibility. 

Mr. MOULTON. If those discussions do not bear fruit, what is the 

next step? What is the administration’s plan to deal with what 

seems like a flagrant violation of a treaty? 

General SELVA. We have been asked to incorporate a set of options into the Nuclear Posture Review, so it would be premature 

for me to comment on what the potential options might be for the 

administration to respond. 

Mr. MOULTON. Okay. It seems that this is part of a broader move 

of Russian aggression throughout Europe and against NATO. One 

of things that concerns me is that as Russia continues to threaten 

the Baltic States, may not be deterred from further action in places 

like Ukraine, that a conventional conflict could escalate to the 

point where it becomes nuclear. 

What is the U.S. doing to make sure that that doesn’t happen, 

that Russia never crosses a threshold into using tactical nuclear 

weapons in a theater like Eastern Europe? 

General SELVA. Congressman, never is a fairly absolute word, 

but our strategy in Europe is to maintain an inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are in the hands of both the United 

States and our NATO allies. They are operated on a category of 

aircraft we call dual-capable aircraft, where the aircraft are designed to actually accommodate the use of nuclear weapons. 

Those aircraft are distributed in a very deliberate readiness process between U.S. forces and our NATO allies, and we believe that 

that capability poses a significant risk to Russia and, therefore, it 

helps deter Russia from employing nuclear weapons on the European continent. 

Mr. MOULTON. General, I would hazard to say that using the 

word ‘‘never’’ is not going too far when we are talking about the 

existential threat of—— 

General SELVA. No, sir, I am not—— 

Mr. MOULTON [continuing]. Nuclear weapons. 

General SELVA [continuing]. Not suggesting it is too far. It is just 

such an absolute word I avoid it. 

Mr. MOULTON. Fair enough. What kinds of doctrine changes are 

we contemplating in the face of what appear to be doctrine changes 

on the side of the Soviet—of the Russians? 

General SELVA. Sir, we have begun an investigation of a series 

of potential strategy changes, many of which will have to be incorporated into the Nuclear Posture Review. As you recall, in the prior 

administration we looked to limit the potential use and utility of 

nuclear weapons in any scenario with an eye towards reducing the 

numbers to a much smaller inventory than we have today—a noble 

goal, to be sure. 

One of the things that happened in the context of that conversation is our adversaries started to articulate a doctrine of escalation 
13 

to deescalate. And we have to account for in our nuclear doctrine 

what that means and what the ladder of strategic stability implies 

as we look at an adversary that expresses in their rhetoric a willingness to use nuclear weapons where they may or may not actually be exercising the operational capability to do so. 

So we are going to have to get to the bottom of what that means. 

We have done several war games and exercises over the last couple 

of years. We are not done with that process but this will be part 

of the Nuclear Posture Review. 

Mr. MOULTON. General, I think you will find bipartisan support 

in this committee for making sure that we have an effective nuclear deterrent. But at the end of the day, I think you would also 

find bipartisan support for working towards strategic arms reductions. 

What is the most effective thing we can do today to head down 

that path, because obviously those talks seem to be stalled? 

General SELVA. Sir, I think there are two things we can do from 

a military perspective. 

The first is maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and ready nuclear 

arsenal and project to the public and to our adversaries that we 

take this incredibly seriously. It is why it is our top priority. 

The second is also emphasize that the existence of that arsenal 

need not be absolute, that we are open to negotiations but they 

must be bilateral, they must be verifiable, and we have to go into 

this completely open to the idea that there are now more than just 

two nuclear players at a strategic level in the world. We must accommodate in our bilateral relationships with any adversary the 

existence of other adversaries. 

And so the inventory today grows. Russia and China present 

strategic threats to the United States if they chose to use their 

weapons, and our deterrent must be able to address both. If new 

nuclear adversaries enter the population of potential threats, we 

need to be ready to address them. 

I think if we can balance those two things in our discussion both 

publicly and privately of what the implications are for maintenance 

of an arsenal and reduction of that arsenal in a measured and prudent way, we can be successful. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I appreciate 

you talking today to us about what you have described, General 

Selva, as the top priority. 

General Selva and General Hyten, I would like to talk to you for 

a moment about the nuclear command and control system component of that top priority. The PowerPoint we have been given describes the command and control as enabling national command 

conferencing, attack detection, strike planning, and dissemination 

of execution messages—all incredibly important. It also allows the 

President to have uninterrupted connectivity with nuclear forces. 

Admiral Moran says maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent for 

the long term requires recapitalization of these key systems, so we 

know that it is essential for our concept of a credible deterrent. 

General Hyten, in your written testimony you say that our command and control system is increasingly unreliable and in desper-
14 

ate need of modernization. ‘‘Unreliable’’ and ‘‘desperate’’ are words 

that are in contrast to ‘‘credible.’’ 

General Selva, you say that the ability to preserve these capabilities beyond their intended lifespan is a technical achievement, acknowledging they are already past their lifespan. However, nuclear 

modernization can no longer be deferred. 

Well, as we talk about the issue of deterrence I would like for 

you to describe to me some of the risks that we are facing by doing 

this, because it is not just that these might not work or that we 

can’t respond if we are attacked. Doesn’t it go right to the calculation of our adversaries as to whether or not we have a credible deterrent, as we have here what is an open hearing and we are hearing words such as ‘‘unreliable’’ and ‘‘desperate’’? And we also don’t 

have an ability to fix this tomorrow, right? 

General Selva, General Hyten, could you describe the risk that 

we are taking and the situation we are in? 

General HYTEN. Congressman, I will go first. 

The nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is 

my biggest concern when I look out towards the future. When I put 

all the modernization plans on the table I see the modernization 

plan for the submarine, for the bomber, for the long-range standoff 

munition, for the GBSD [ground-based strategic deterrent], I see— 

the new missile—I see all those coming together. 

When I look out at the NC3, although everything we have today 

works very effectively, but it is very resilient, robust, and ancient. 

Ancient is the concern I have because an ancient command and 

control system in today’s world is very, very hard to recapitalize. 

Mr. TURNER. And, General, doesn’t that mean that our adversaries know that and if they are taking a calculation as to whether 

or not we can credibly respond, don’t they look at those issues as 

to our decaying infrastructure? 

General HYTEN. I am sure they do. I am sure they look at those. 

We look at those very hard. 

That is why it is my number one priority now inside the modernization piece to make sure we have a plan to modernize the nuclear 

command and control capability. 

Mr. TURNER. In order to fix this—again, we can’t just fix it tomorrow. You can’t go down to Home Depot and buy a bunch of stuff 

and just plug it in and make this thing work. Let’s talk about some 

of those components on the entire system. 

Could you speak about the ITW/AA system, and what if it doesn’t 

do its job of providing an early warning of attack? 

General HYTEN. So the integrated tactical warning and attack 

assessment system, ITW/AA, is the—it is the integrated architecture that basically goes all the way from indications and warning 

from our space-based constellations to our ground-based radars into 

the command and control system and provides the picture of any 

threat that would come at the United States of America. 

So it is exercised every time there is a launch on the planet, as 

recently as last Sunday night. We were up most of the night watching the North Korean launches of Scuds. Even though that did not 

present a threat to North America, we still exercised those same 

pieces. 
15 

The satellites see the threats. If it comes into the radar fans the 

radars will see it, and then the command and control system 

works. 

But as we look at that structure and we look at it 10 years from 

now, when you have a 20th-century architecture that you are trying to maintain 10 years from now, 10 years from now is when my 

concern really is. It is not 2035 in the NC3 architecture. It is much 

more fragile than that. That is why we have to take a hard 

look—— 

Mr. TURNER. If it doesn’t work or if there are deficiencies in it, 

does our adversaries, again, understand that that relates to our 

ability to respond? 

General HYTEN. Congressman it works. It works every time we 

pull it together. 

My concern is that we are creating fragility in the future, and 

that fragility in the future has to be addressed and it has to be addressed in the near term across the enterprise—that is in the Navy 

and in the Air Force. 

Mr. TURNER. And can you talk about the assent system? And 

there are delays in this system that apparently we were not informed of, and how do we address that? 

General SELVA. Congressman, all of the national command and 

control leadership communication systems have now been brought, 

with the help of this committee and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, under the oversight of a single council in the Pentagon. 

I co-chair that council with the director of acquisition, technology, 

and logistics. It is—— 

Mr. TURNER. Do you believe that the services and DISA [Defense 

Information Systems Agency] should have to provide everything 

they know about delays in the system? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. And that is precisely what that oversight council does is it pulls all of the community of interest together so that we don’t run the risk of looking at the process in 

‘‘eaches’’; we actually look at it as an entire end-to-end set of programs that are critical to providing nuclear command and control 

and connectivity to our most senior leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for your testimony today, and most especially of your 

service to the Nation. 

Gentlemen, as you know, our nuclear enterprise is aging, and we 

have spoken about that several times this morning, obviously. And 

like the previous member, I had the privilege of chairing the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a few Congresses ago, and so I was able 

to do a deep dive on this aging nuclear enterprise. 

One of the things that I certainly find concerning is the work 

that our adversaries are doing in their nuclear programs, particularly China and Russia. And they are designing new delivery systems and warheads. 

And I wanted to touch on a, you know, somewhat sensitive but 

important topic, and that is our nuclear warheads that we have in 

our arsenal. 

I know we are going through the refurbishment program. I mean 

some of the components of our warheads don’t even exist anymore. 
16 

It is not easy to replace them. And some of the materials are not 

easily obtainable. 

So the question is obviously I—we are not interested in at all setting off an arms race, but does it make sense to continue to try to 

refurbish and make things work, or does it make more sense to design a more modern weapon? 

And the question, if so, what does that do in terms of does that 

endanger us of setting off an arms race? And could we design a 

new warhead without testing? 

General SELVA. Sir, one of the first priorities I engaged in when 

I took this job was to partner with Frank Klotz at the National Nuclear Security Agency, which is the arm of DOE [Department of 

Energy] that builds and does the actual physical maintenance of 

the warheads themselves. I took a trip to both Livermore and 

Sandia and talked to the scientists who are doing the work of design and prototyping of those—I will use the words ‘‘modernized 

repurposed warheads.’’ 

And their belief, and all of the information that they could 

present to me, is that there is sufficient life and resiliency left in 

the warheads that we currently possess that we can very deliberately modernize them with new technologies without building new 

warheads and essentially replicate the capability we have today in 

a safer, more secure, more reliable, and more resilient set of weapons without going into the detail of what that strategy looks like. 

So the scientists themselves—and I spent a day at each location 

quizzing them and having them demonstrate their beliefs, not just 

in showing me their conclusions but actually showing me the 

math—they are convinced, as am I, that the path we are on is actually a reasonable path into the near future. 

That doesn’t ignore the fact that sometime in the future of these 

weapon systems we are actually going to have to replace the core 

components that still have lifetime left in them. 

General HYTEN. And, Congressman, I will just add on that tomorrow we will have a classified session with this committee where 

we will actually bring in Frank Klotz and Charlie McMillan and 

myself, and we will sit down and we will walk through that entire 

nuclear weapons piece with you, as well as the threat information 

that we can’t share in this hearing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, thank you. 

Admiral Moran, being from Rhode Island and as co-chair of the 

Submarine Caucus with my good friends Congressman Courtney 

and Congressman Wittman, I understand the critical importance 

placed on our SSBN force in conjunction with our nuclear deterrence. Showing as the most survivable leg of the triad, the maritime force shoulders a significant burden and the Ohio-class submarines has primarily borne it. 

The existing modernization projects that the Columbia-class submarines won’t enter service until 2029 and that the Navy will only 

operate 10 SSBNs during the 2030s, reaching a full fleet of 12 

SSBNs in 2041. 

So, Admiral, how will we sustain our nuclear deterrence requirements while transitioning to the Columbia-class submarine, and 

what can Congress do to ensure the future requirements of the 

Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet are met? 
17 

Admiral MORAN. Congressman, thanks for the question. We have 

worked out the requirements in the 2030s with STRATCOM and 

the joint force. Clearly, what will be done with re-cores of Ohio 

here in the not too distant future, so that is a major draw on our 

total force structure, if you will. 

Then, as you indicated, in the late 2020s and early 2030s we 

start replacing Ohio with Columbia class. So we think we can accept that and we are going to have to maintain a ready status of 

fewer submarines during the 2030s, but working that through 

STRATCOM we believe we have enough to satisfy the requirement. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

General Selva, for you I wanted to ask, what are the risks of 

launch on warning and what can be done to increase Presidential 

decision-making time in the midst of a crisis? 

General SELVA. Thank you, Congressman. 

As you are aware, the launch-on-warning criteria basically are 

driven by physics. The amount of time the President has to make 

a decision is based on when we can detect a launch, what it takes 

to physically characterize the launch, and the entire scenario is 

predicated on an adversary that believes they can attack us and 

decapitate our intercontinental ballistic missile fleet without us responding. 

And so the only ways physically to buy more time for the President to make that decision are to increase the fidelity and the distribution of our radar and on-orbit detection systems. 

But even those criteria face the facts of physics, which say while 

you may detect the launch, it—the weapon itself must cross 

through some sort of radar detection capability in order to characterize the launch as an attack on the United States. 

The short answer to your question is, I don’t believe the physics 

let us give him much more time. And so what we owe the President 

is a set of options ahead of time that he or she can consider and 

determine whether or not they are willing to take that shot, because they are not going to have the benefit of a long period of time 

to make that decision. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

And in addition to that, obviously I have always been a big believer that good intelligence is always the very pointy tip of the 

spear, and the better our intelligence is the more standoff warning 

time we may have, as well. It adds to what we already have in 

place. 

So, I want to be respectful of other people’s time, so with that 

I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the witnesses for 

being here, for your service to our country. 

In April of 2016 the State Department released its most recent 

Arms Control Compliance Report, and it found in there that Russia 

remains in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty, or the INF Treaty. 

General Selva, in your professional military view, do you believe 

that Russia intends to return to compliance with this treaty? 
18 

General SELVA. Congressman, I don’t have enough information 

on their intent to conclude other than that they do not intend to 

return to compliance absent some pressure from the international 

community and the United States, as a cosigner of the same agreement. There is no trajectory in what they are doing that would indicate otherwise. 

Mr. ROGERS. And did I hear you say earlier in this hearing that 

Russia is now deployed? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the military’s assessment of the impacts of 

this violation? 

General SELVA. Sir, our assessment of the impact is that it more 

threatens NATO and infrastructure within the European continent 

than any other part of—area of the world that we have national 

interests in or alliance interests in. 

And our intent is to factor that into the NPR [Nuclear Posture 

Review] and look for leverage points to attempt to get the Russians 

to come back into compliance. I don’t know what those points are 

at this point in time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Witnesses from the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy testified several times in the past several years 

that the U.S. was considering various responses, including active 

defense; two, counterforce; three, countervailing capabilities. What 

actions have been taken in each of these three to implement such 

capabilities? 

General SELVA. Sir, I would like to give you a more fulsome answer in a classified environment, but basically it is the assessment 

of where the Russians are deploying and how they are deploying 

that system that provide for the latter option, which is a countervalue or counterforce option against the actual weapon system 

itself. But the balance of the capabilities I would have to talk to 

you about in a classified environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General Hyten and General Selva, would you please provide this 

committee before the end of the month your recommendation on 

military options based on your best professional military advice for 

options that policy makers like this committee can choose to support? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask General—all the generals that are here today 

about the F–35’s Block 4 dual-capability platform, and with it 

being a—strictly a tactical complement to the strategic bomber 

fleet. And I was wondering, in your opinion, can this platform actually supplant some functions that the bomber fleet performs in the 

future, in conjunction with the new B–21, as our strategy evolves? 

General SELVA. Congressman, I think it is possible they can 

work together. But given the relatively small numbers of dualcapable aircraft and the fact of that commitment only to our NATO 

allies, that we have not extended our dual-capable aircraft outside 

of the European area of responsibility in more than a decade, our 

capacity to provide for an extended nuclear deterrent umbrella over 
19 

other allies, partners, and friends principally comes from our capacity to deploy weapons from the United States to those locations. 

So I am cautious that we not build the connotation that because 

the airplanes can operate together they would necessarily at a strategic level be built into the same plan. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Anyone else? Okay. 

My next question is to General Selva and Hyten. Each element 

of the nuclear triad requires significant investment and modernization. Of the three, how would you rank order with them, in terms 

of priority, to undergo modernization efforts? 

General HYTEN. I will take that first, General. Thank you, Vice 

Chairman. 

It is choosing among your children. It is impossible. It depends 

on your perspective. 

You can come at from a perspective of which is the oldest. Which 

is the oldest? You probably go to the bomber. The bomber is the 

oldest. We need a modernized, penetrating bomber. 

But then you look at the ICBM and the ICBM has a problem. 

You look at the submarine, the submarine—at some point in time 

the Ohio class will not be able to go under the surface of the water, 

and a submarine that can’t go under the surface of the water does 

not have a significant use to the United States of America. 

So as you walk through each of those you realize that under the 

current construct of what deterrence is, I can’t give up any element 

of the triad. And that is why all three have to be modernized and 

all three have to be monitored as you go through that. 

I think it is important that we look at it as each of these programs goes on and we make prudent decisions concerning where 

we are spending our money to make sure that they deliver in time, 

but I can’t make a determination of which one today would be the 

most important. 

General SELVA. Congressman, the way I would phrase it is not 

unlike my colleague, and that is: If you believe the triad is important, if you believe the existence of all three legs of the triad are 

necessary in order to deter an adversary from openly attacking the 

United States and denying them the capacity to be able to do that, 

then you have to put all three of them as a—as priorities and not 

pick and choose among the three. 

There are schedule realities within the triad that drive us to pay 

particular attention to the modernization of each leg. The Ohio- class submarine is on a design and construction schedule that has 

almost no slack in it because of the dynamic that was just pointed 

out a few moments ago about the Ohio class reaching end of life 

and Columbia class having to be ready to replace her. And so that 

puts a premium on that design and construction schedule. 

The B–52 fleet, as the chairman pointed out, that is the bulk of 

our air leg of the triad; that fleet was built in the 1950s and 1960s. 

The weapons that they employ, the air-launched cruise missile and 

the gravity bombs that they carry, were designed and built in the 

1970s with a 10-year lifespan. We know today they remain relevant, but we can’t continue to maintain them. 

A decade from now those weapons will not be able to penetrate 

Russian air defenses. And therefore, there is an urgency to their 

replacement. 
20 

And finally, the Minuteman III missile system was put into silos 

in the 1970s with an expected 10-year lifespan. We have extended 

its lifespan and believe we can continue to do so for about another 

decade. 

When we did the analysis of alternatives on what would be 

best—extending life again or replacing—the cost of extending life 

actually almost matches the cost of replacement. So that means all 

three of them must be addressed at the same time. 

What we have to do, and what we owe you, is our considered 

judgment on where we put resources to make sure that all three 

of those replacement programs stay on a schedule for design and 

deployment that matches the time span that the weapons themselves will age out of the fleet. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of 

you gentlemen for your lifetime commitment to human freedom. 

Let me begin by suggesting that the comments you have made 

here today as to the importance of our nuclear deterrent, I so deeply agree with, given that I think it has kept us out of involvement 

in a world war for 70 years. I mean, it is almost impossible to overstate its significance. 

And with that, I will probably go ahead and bias my question 

deeply and suggest to you that I think that the long-range standoff 

capability is one of the strongest—one of the strong components for 

rationale and for leverage to keep the bomber leg of our triad. 

And I know that the argument is made that somehow this is a 

destabilizing weapon—and, General Selva, you had mentioned earlier, and I thought you addressed it well, but I would like to kind 

of expand on it slightly because I think that this is one of those 

things that is in play. 

And with that, you know, I have asked the Air Force many times 

now how many times—and, General Wilson, this is addressed to 

you too, sir, and General Hyten—how many times the ALCMs [airlaunched cruise missiles], you know, has been fired and how many 

times that—in combat, and how many times it has been taken as 

a potential nuclear strike. And, of course, the answer was none. 

And if, indeed, the LRSO [long-range standoff weapon] is destabilizing then so are dual-capable bombers. I mean, all of these 

things just don’t make sense in my mind. 

And so the questions I have for you—first—I am going to make 

a series of them because I don’t want to run out of time here—what 

do you think of LRSO? Do you support the program? What is the 

military requirement for this program? Do you think it is destabilizing? 

And, General Selva, I will point over to you specifically: Do the 

Joints Chiefs of Staff support the program? And do you believe 

LRSO is a good part of cost-imposing strategy on our adversaries? 

That is a lot of questions. I am sorry to throw it all at the same 

time. 

General SELVA. Congressman, the Joint Chiefs did consider the 

commitment to the LRSO and the development program when we 

looked at our recommendation to President Obama last year on 

whether or not to adjust the modernization and recapitalization 
21 

program and committed to the fielding and deployment of the 

LRSO. We do believe that it is a significant tool for imposing costs 

on our potential adversaries. 

The requirements state in short that it be able to fly a specific 

range, which I won’t talk about in this forum; that it be able to 

penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of an opponent; and deliver 

a nuclear weapon. And those are the three baseline requirements 

for the system that I can talk about in this room. 

Mr. FRANKS. And you would reject again the notion that it is destabilizing? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. And what emphasis do you put on the significance 

of that capability and maintaining in the future an effective rationale for keeping our bomber leg of our triad? 

General SELVA. I think it does two things for us. We have already talked about the cost imposition on any potential adversary. 

That is a critical piece of keeping the bomber leg of the triad viable. 

It is also critical to keeping the B–52 viable, as the airframe 

itself cannot penetrate Russian air defenses—or Chinese air defenses, for that matter—and, as a consequence, must have a standoff weapon that is capable of contributing to its leg of the deterrent. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. Congressman, I will bring to the classified session tomorrow a detailed explanation. There is actually an integrated story when you put the bomber together with the LRSO 

that we can only talk about in a classified forum that actually explains the military requirement very specifically and why we need 

that. 

There are a lot of policy discussions we have had today but I 

think the military requirement is actually the most powerful, and 

we can share that tomorrow. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, and I look forward to that. General Wilson, did you have anything to add? 

General WILSON. Congressman, I would say the LRSO is the 

most flexible leg because when I match a weapon with all the 

bombers—in the future it will go on not only the B–52, the B–2, 

or the B–21—it provides lots of flexibility. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. 

General WILSON. When you put numbers on them, again, just as 

the other generals have said, it is a cost-imposing strategy against 

our adversaries. I think it is a very effective deterrent capability 

and will do so in the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I think that 

last point was very important: It gives our command capability the 

opportunity to make some additional decisions if they have to rather than having the bombers over enemy territory. 

And finally, I think we should reject this notion of destabilization 

because Russia certainly has this capability and they continue to 

build on it and expand it. 

So I appreciate you all being here today. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa. 
22 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

One of the things that concerned me as I was reading through 

everything: Yes, there is an emphasis by all of you of the need for 

modernization and for replacement, and there is this concept of the 

triad. And I have heard the testimony before, and you seem to be 

just assuming that the triad is the way we must go. And I have 

heard your explanations and I, quite honestly, I am not necessarily 

convinced that that is the way that we must go. 

For example, the warheads you talked about, 1971, I think, was 

when they were put together. You all realize that it took 10 years 

after that before you all graduated college. 

So when we are talking about modernization, right, how or why 

are you all assuming that the triad system is like the essential 

threshold to modernization? And that is other than—if you will respond in this way—other than your respective jurisdictional areas. 

General SELVA. Thank you, ma’am, for the question. 

First of all, it is not that the triad is foundational to modernization. We believe the triad is foundational to deterrence. It is not 

about how we view the triad; it is how our potential adversaries 

view the triad. 

So three times in the last 5 years the Joint Staff has been asked 

this question: Could we go to a dyad? Could we eliminate a leg of 

the triad? If you were to eliminate a leg, which leg would you eliminate? 

The sum total of all of that analysis has resulted in a commitment on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain the triad 

because of its value in deterring our opponents. 

It does several things for us. We have talked about the operational parts, where no single leg can be taken out at one time and 

that presents a targeting and strategic problem to an adversary. 

The other thing it brings us is the ability, strategically, to hedge 

between legs of the triad, so if someone were to figure out how to 

completely defeat our bomber force we have a fallback position. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But, General, you have all basically said that 

everything that we have in the triad needs to be modernized. And 

I believe General Wilson, in his testimony, said that, you know, the 

really peer that we have is Russia. There is China and North 

Korea who are coming on board, but our real peer in terms of this 

area is Russia. 

So, I guess my issue is this: If we are looking at how we are 

going to battle into the, quote, ‘‘the modern era,’’ or modernizing, 

shouldn’t we be focusing on how they—our quote, ‘‘potential adversaries’’ and the ones that we anticipate are coming on board—how 

they will arm and what we must do to combat that? 

Because it seems like we are sort of in this mode of, well, we— 

not necessarily that the triad is the essence of modernization but 

somehow it is sacrosanct right now, and this is what we think 

works best. 

But we are talking about modernizing; we are talking about a 

new series of adversaries. And so how is it that you have thought 

about that potential and in then assuming that the triad is necessary and the way that you are all choosing to modernize within 

the triad is what is going to be the best way? 
23 

I understand the Columbia class coming on board. I do understand that. And I understand the essence of the—then the quote 

what we call the ‘‘deep blue sea’’ and what they need to do. However, I am wondering about the ICBMs, where we place them, and 

this bomber capacity. 

General HYTEN. Congresswoman, we start from the adversary. 

That is where all the analysis starts. 

We start looking at Russia. That is where the nuclear analysis 

starts. 

Then we look at China, we look at North Korea, look at Iran. But 

we start from what they are doing, because the adversary gets a 

vote. They get a vote, and we don’t get the vote on what they are 

going to do. So we have to look at what they are doing and figure 

out how to respond. 

And if you look at the role of deterrence, the primary role of deterrence is to deter the use of nuclear weapons anywhere else on 

the planet. And if you eliminate one element of the triad, the challenge that creates for us as military officers is that now we are one 

failure, we are one problem away, we are one challenge away, we 

are one breach in intelligence away from an adversary thinking 

that they can possibly attack the United States with a nuclear 

weapon. 

That fundamentally changes deterrence. 

Ms. HANABUSA. General, I am going to run out of time, and what 

I would like is to have you respond to me in writing if you can. 

I understand that. However, when your basic essentials, which 

is the weaponry that we have and all of that, may not be the proper deterrent, or the bombers may be something that can be detected, those are the issues that I would like to have you respond 

as to how that fits into modernization. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank 

you so much for joining us, and thanks so much for your service. 

General Hyten, I would like to discuss the military requirement 

for the long-range standoff cruise missile in a little more detail. I 

want to focus on the platforms. 

And we have penetrating platforms like the B–2 and upcoming 

the B–21. Tell me why those platforms, with their capability and 

them going in to deliver a gravity nuclear weapon like the B–61 

would not meet the standards or the requirements that have been 

set by LRSO. 

General HYTEN. Sir, I can’t talk about the specifics in an open 

hearing. I will bring those specifics into the closed classified session 

tomorrow so I can give you the number. 

But in general, let me just describe that it is a mix of ranges. 

What is the range of the long-range standoff weapon? What is the 

range of the bomber? What is the target that we have to do? 

And if you look at the globe and you look at Russia and China 

in particular, they are very large countries, and it is about an access issue. And so when we combine all those military requirements together and we meet the requirements that are in the air 

leg of the triad for what we have to do, that is how it comes together. 
24 

And I will show you the details tomorrow in the classified session. 

General SELVA. Congressman, if you would let me add one more 

point to that—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, General Selva, yes. 

General SELVA [continuing]. And this is something that is missed 

quite often in the LRSO conversation. In order for a bomber to deliver gravity—to deliver a gravity bomb it must fly over or approximate to the target. And it has to do that one target at a time. 

If we find ourselves in a position where we have to strike multiple targets with relative simultaneity, the lack of existence of a 

long-range standoff munition means we have to dedicate more force 

to that same problem set. 

And so part of the advantage in the LRSO—and it is one of the 

requirements—is that it be shot from some distance and that it can 

be released from the bomber in relative short order so that you can 

get that degree of simultaneity that you cannot get with the laydown of gravity bombs. 

And again, until or unless we negotiate cruise missiles out of everyone’s nuclear arsenal, the capacity to be able to do that adds 

value, brings flexibility, and it confounds the enemy’s belief that 

they might be able to attack us and get away with it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. Thank you. Great point. 

General Wilson, I wanted to go to you and get your perspective. 

We had heard some comments earlier about the aging inventory of 

our air-launched cruise missiles, and we know where they are 

today with their age, what they were planned for originally. 

But tell me, what happens with the current age of these missiles 

and our ability to perform the mission if LRSO is not delivered on 

time, and do we have the same element of deterrence as that inventory of air-launched cruise missiles ages and if we don’t get 

LRSO? 

General WILSON. Yes, thank you for the question. 

As you remarked earlier, our current cruise missiles were built 

in the early 1980s, designed to last 10 years. We are now on their 

fifth SLEP [service life extension program], their service life extension for those missiles. To meet General Hyten’s requirements we 

talk about being safe, secure, effective, and ready. 

As these missiles continue to age out they will become potentially 

unreliable and—on one piece and not able to reach their target. So 

there is an effectiveness piece and there is a reliability piece. 

They are currently safe, secure, effective, and reliable. But looking 10 years in the future, we don’t have much slack. Again, right 

now we are on our fifth service life extension and we need a new 

replacement for that ALCM missile, the LRSO. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Admiral Moran, I wanted to talk to you about that extraordinarily important part of the nuclear triad, our Ohio-class submarines. We are today in the process of replacing those submarines 

with the Columbia class. 

Give me your perspective. I know that we are pushed with having the proper number of 12 submarines, which is the projection, 

and being, for a period of time, as you spoke of earlier, at 11 submarines. Give me your perspective on what we will do to accommo-
25 

date for that lower number of submarines through that period of 

time. 

Is it longer deployments at sea? What do we do to make sure we 

have the proper presence there? Because as we know, we need 11 

submarines to have a presence, I believe, at any one time of 6 submarines at sea. 

Can you give us perspective about how you create that balance 

and why 11 is going to be sufficient for the mission through that 

timeframe? 

Admiral MORAN. Thank you sir. 

You captured it quite well there in terms of the length of deployments and how much longer we would be able to sustain a crew 

at sea or turn around a crew at sea, shorter durations. So there 

are several aspects of what you described that we can do to make 

up that delta. 

The biggest one is the maintenance of those existing Ohio as 

they reach the end of their life and the new Columbia as they come 

in in the 2030s. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

coming here today. 

The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] estimates the cost of 

modernizing U.S. nuclear deterrent will cost about $400 billion 

over the next decade. Reports also indicate U.S. will spend $1 trillion over the next 30 years in order to modernize and maintain our 

nuclear triad. 

All our witnesses have expressed the importance of modernizing 

our nuclear capabilities and the risks of continuing to use systems 

that are operating beyond their service life. To this end, I believe 

it is imperative for this committee to be informed of the long-term 

plans, timelines, and cost projections of implementing such a costly 

and extensive modernization program. 

This is the National Nuclear Security Administration’s annual 

report that covers DOE’s costs and plans for nuclear warheads and 

related infrastructure over the next 25 years. 

General Selva, can DOD [Department of Defense] provide this 

committee with its 25-year plan, timelines, and cost estimates in 

regards to its nuclear modernization efforts? If yes, when? And if 

no, why not? 

General SELVA. Congressman, my understanding is we communicated those requirements in our President’s budget in 2017. They 

will be re-communicated as part of our program. 

But I will be happy to work with our team back in the Pentagon 

and come back to you with a more fulsome answer to your question 

over the next decade to decade and a half. Our numbers are slightly different than CBO’s for a couple of reasons, but we will work 

through that with you and make sure you have the numbers. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Great. Thank you very much. I yield, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
26 

General Wilson, there are large differences in the opinion of the 

Air Force and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation [CAPE] at the Secretary of Defense. 

Why are there such large differences on the assessment of the 

ground-based strategic deterrent? Does the Air Force stand behind 

its service cost position? And when will the Air Force and CAPE 

have enough data to revisit and revise their cost estimates and 

narrow the range that we are seeing? 

General WILSON. Congressman Scott, we certainly stand behind 

our projections. Quite frankly, the projections differ because we use 

different sources. We haven’t built a new missile in many years, so 

we used Minuteman III and Peacekeeper data; CAPE used D5 [Trident II] data as well as MDA [Missile Defense Agency] data. Therefore, the differences in the two service cost positions. 

We expect to have—we got our proposals in now and about a 

year from now, this March of 2018, we should have further data 

to be able to refine that and provide that forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

General Hyten, would you please describe the military requirements driving the need for GBSD? What are the military effectiveness and cost implications of choosing to life-extend the current 

Minuteman III missile fleet and related ground infrastructure rather than pursue GBSD? 

General HYTEN. So, the detailed military requirements are classified, sir. We can provide you with those in a separate forum. We 

would be glad to do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

General HYTEN. In general, the requirement for the land-based 

element of the triad is to be able to provide a survivable, responsive capability to any threat attack that is coming from any adversary around the globe. We have to be able to do that inside the 

timelines of what that adversary missile—and if you just do the 

math, the public math is it is about 30 minutes from Russia to the 

United States. 

So that drives the timelines that we have to respond. That not 

only drives the missile capabilities, but it describes the infrastructure it has to be put into as well as the command and control with 

it. 

Mr. SCOTT. General Selva, if you can’t speak to it in this forum, 

perhaps tomorrow: What is the collective judgment of the Joint 

Chiefs on whether we should pursue the GBSD program and retain 

the land-based leg of the triad? 

General SELVA. The Joint Chiefs have endorsed moving forward 

with the ground-based strategic deterrent program based in large 

part on an analysis of alternatives that was done for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council that incorporated in one of its excursions life extension of the Minuteman III versus deployment of a 

new missile, and the costs were seen to be equivalent if not prohibitive for the continued life extension of the Minuteman III. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

General Hyten, we have seen a lot of GBSD acquisition details 

loaded into unclassified acquisition databases and run by the Air 

Force. We all know that Russia, China, and others scoop all this 

stuff up to the best of their abilities and analyze it intensively. 
27 

Why is all of this put out in the open? Should we reassess what 

is unclassified in these acquisition documents? 

And could you speak to also the greatest cost and technical risk 

in the GBSD the program? For example, what is your view of the 

priority of possible mobile command-and-control concepts being 

considered? 

General HYTEN. I hate the stuff that shows up in the press. I 

think we should reassess that. 

Just to complete that thought, I hate the fact that cost estimates 

show up in the press as well. Because if you put a cost estimate 

out in the press it is not only our adversaries that are looking at 

it, but the people that are going to build the system are looking at 

that, and if that is what our cost estimates say, if we say it is going 

to cost $80 billion it is probably going to end up costing $80 billion. 

I hate that we go down that path. 

Mr. SCOTT. And then some. 

General HYTEN. And then some. So I would really like to figure 

out a different way to do business than that. I hate seeing that 

kind of information in the newspaper. 

Now, as for the complications in the GBSD program, I think 

the—you know, we spend all our time talking about the missile. 

The missile, to me, is the easiest part of the structure. Everybody 

thinks about the missile and how much is the missile going to cost. 

How much is that? 

At the last, just a couple weeks ago I was at F.E. Warren in Wyoming. I went down in one of the missile holes and the sign as you 

came in said, you know, this was created in 1963. That structure 

was created in 1963. 

The command-and-control assets that go around with it were 

started in the 1960s, modernized in the 1970s. They have gone 

through multiple life extension programs. It is the infrastructure 

that is around the missile that will be the challenge of the program, not the missile itself. 

Mr. SCOTT. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. My time is 

about expire so, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the 8 seconds. 

The CHAIRMAN. And we will take it. 

Mr. O’Halleran. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 

you for being here today. 

General Selva, you had mentioned in your written comments 

about the 6.5 percent projection moving forward. How do we know 

that that is going to be enough money to be able to deal with the 

multitude of issues we have here, whether it is command and control or new systems coming onboard? 

General SELVA. Sir, all I can tell you is that that is our best judgment of what resources we are going to need to do the modernization on the schedule that we have laid it out. So that 6.5 percent 

estimate is actually based on taking all of the design and build programs and projecting them forward as a percentage of our base 

budget. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Admiral Moran, the Columbia class, the minimum are—the minimum that we need are 10 at a time—are 10. 

Two are going to be down because of reactors replacement at 

times? 
28 

Admiral MORAN. No, sir. The Columbia class has a reactor core 

that it will last for 40-plus years, so we will not have to re-core 

those unless we extend the life—— 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Okay. 

Admiral MORAN [continuing]. Beyond 42 years. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. I misread that then. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you—— 

Admiral MORAN. The other two, the reduction from 14 to 12 is 

to account for the fact that the core lasts that long, and there is 

other maintenance that has to be done on any ship, and that is 

why we are able to do it with the 12 instead of the 14. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Okay. Thank you. 

And, General Hyten, the cyber warfare aspects of all this, command and control and the—how does that—has that factored into 

your cost estimates? 

General HYTEN. So I will just say that, you know, we were having a conversation with Congressman Turner a while ago about the 

concerns about the NC3 capabilities that we have today. The good 

news about the nuclear command and control capability we have 

today is it is very cyber secure. When you build a system in the 

1960s, before anybody knew what the term ‘‘cyber’’ was, you have 

inherently built in an amazing amount of cybersecurity. 

The challenge that we have as we go into the future is that you 

can’t build that again. We have to fundamentally build it now in 

a 21st-century architecture, which will have the cyber threat that 

we have to work through. 

That is a significant element of our risk assessment as we go 

through and part of the design criteria as we look at how we are 

going to do this nuclear command and control in the future. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. And, General, you—I had mentioned cost, also. 

How does that factor in as far as being able to fund the other systems, which all require cyber issues, also? 

General HYTEN. It is a significant element of the cost estimates. 

You would have to ask the services for the details that are in those 

cost estimates, but I have talked to the DOD CIO [Chief Information Officer] in particular about that capability. I have sat in on the 

panels that General Selva was talking about a while ago. 

We look at those very close and that cybersecurity, cyber-resilience, cyber-defense architecture is involved in every one of the 

plans that we come up with, as well as the cost estimates. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. DesJarlais. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Selva, you spoke with a bunch of us yesterday regarding 

the aging of our nuclear forces and, you know, we have talked 

about a lot of the slippage issues that we want to avoid. 

General Hyten, what are the impacts to the credibility of our nuclear deterrent if we see major schedule slips to any of these programs? 

General HYTEN. Congressman, that is the risk in the program 

right now. I have been involved in this business long enough to 

know that if you have five different programs that all deliver just 

in time you have inherently put a risk in the program that is very 
29 

significant because, sadly, one of those programs, two of those programs, three of those programs, they won’t all deliver on time. 

Therefore, that is why we have to manage it very closely. And 

that is why stable budgets, stable planning, stable structure is so 

important to the entire Department of Defense, but in this area in 

particular, because without that stability we really do insert risk 

into the systems in the future. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Chairman Thornberry mentioned earlier 

that—this—the cost for this deterrence program is usually about 6 

to 7 percent of the budget. Considering that this has been called 

the Nation’s highest priority defense mission, do you agree with 

CBO that roughly 6 percent is a proper amount? 

General SELVA. Congressman, we have looked at the numbers for 

the better of the 18 months or so I have been in this job and have 

scrubbed them really hard. Part of the debate about how much is 

enough came from how much is it going to cost? So we scrubbed 

every program to take any excess cost out of it; 6.5 percent is 

where we land. 

On any given day we spend almost 3.5 percent of our defense 

base budget on maintaining the existing strategic deterrent. So 

what we are talking about is a period of time, roughly a decade and 

change, where we have to double that investment to continue to 

maintain the existing deterrent and field its replacement, and that 

is the consequence of where those numbers came from. 

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Well, I would like to thank all you gentlemen for being here today, and I yield back my time. 

General SELVA. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service and for the questions that you have answered. I look forward 

to the classified hearing. Hope we can get into this in much more 

depth. 

But, General Hyten, a question for you. Last week Lieutenant 

General Jack Weinstein stated that the New START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty] has huge value for the United States and 

that the agreement has been good for us. He noted that the reason 

you do a treaty is not to cut forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers, and the New START Treaty allows us 

to maintain that stability. Those are his quotes. 

If the United States—and the question for you—if the United 

States withdrew from the New START or took steps which called 

into question our treaty obligation, what would be the effect on 

strategic stability? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, I have stated for the record in 

the past and I will state again that I am a big supporter of the 

New START agreement. I believe that, especially when it comes to 

nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities, that bilateral, verifiable 

arms control agreements are essential to our ability to provide an 

effective deterrent. 

If you remove that effective deterrent structure, which is the 

New START Treaty, it makes it very difficult for us to know the 

levels. The risk would be an arms race. 

We are not in an arms race now, to go back to a previous question. The concern would be what do we have to do in order to stay 
30 

at the same level as our adversaries, and that could be a very risky 

proposition. That is why I continue to support the New START levels that we are under right now. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, General. General Selva, are you of 

the same mind? 

General SELVA. I am, sir. When the New START Treaty was 

brought to the Congress for ratification the Joint Chiefs reviewed 

the components of the treaty and endorsed it. It is a bilateral, 

verifiable agreement that gives us some degree of predictability on 

what our potential adversaries look like. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Now, keeping that in mind, there has been discussion about new tactical or new low-yield strategic weapons. 

Maybe they are both tactical as well as strategic. 

The Defense Science Board, in their seven defense priorities for 

the new administration, recommended expanding our nuclear options, including deploying low-yield weapons on strategic delivery 

systems. Is there a military requirement for these new weapons? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, that is a great conversation 

for tomorrow when I can tell you the details. But from a big picture 

perspective in a public hearing, I can tell you that our force structure now actually has a number of capabilities that provide the 

President of the United States a variety of options to respond to 

any numbers of threats. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And—— 

General HYTEN. I will also say that I don’t agree with the term 

‘‘tactical nuclear weapon.’’ I just fundamentally disagree that there 

is such a thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. I believe that anybody 

that employs a nuclear weapon in the world has created a strategic 

effect and all nuclear weapons are strategic. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you for that statement. I think it is accurate. And that goes to escalate to deescalate; that also goes to 

our deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. 

General Selva, you spoke to this earlier about the dual-capable 

aircraft that we have in Europe. And the purpose of those apparently is to cause Russia not to invade, so that is an escalation to 

deescalate, or could be. 

General SELVA. Congressman, not to be argumentative, the stated purpose of those weapons is to deter the Russians from escalating to nuclear warfare in order to prevent a conventional attack 

from going nuclear. They are—I use the NATO nomenclature—nonstrategic nuclear weapons, accepting what General Hyten just said. 

But I take your point. 

The stated intended purpose of those weapons is to deter the 

Russians from using nuclear weapons if they were to attempt to escalate a conventional war. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. All of which creates a conundrum. Thank you 

very much, gentlemen. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to zoom back out, if we could, to the strategic level. 

The last Nuclear Posture Review was published 7 years ago. The 

world, obviously, is very different today than it was in 2010, particularly when talking about countries like Russia. 
31 

Today, at least for my perspective, it is hard to see Russia as a 

partner and a friend, like the 2010 NPR envisioned. For instance, 

Russia continues to make dangerous and aggressive nuclear 

threats and exercises directed against the U.S., NATO allies, and 

neighbors. Russia has declared an openly discussed doctrine to use 

a Russian nuclear weapon early in a conflict to deescalate and get 

the United States to back down. 

Russia continues to brazenly violate the INF Treaty, and a recent media report indicates its INF-violating cruise missile is now 

operational and deployed. Russia intentionally broadcast plans for 

its so-called Status-6 nuclear weapon, which is a high-speed unmanned underwater vehicle that would carry a megaton-class nuclear weapon into a U.S. harbor and detonate. Not to mention the 

invasion, occupation, and annexation of the sovereign territory of 

its neighbors. 

Would you please, this is a question really for the entire panel 

starting with General Selva: Would you please provide, in your professional military views, what has changed in the world, in your 

professional opinion, since the 2010 NPR? And why, from a military perspective, does that matter? 

General SELVA. Yes, sir. I would make two points. 

One, I have been public with the notion that Russia and China 

are the two nations of the world that potentially pose an existential 

threat to the United States. I am on the record in my confirmation 

hearing as the vice chairman saying the same. 

What has changed in the last 10 years is the—is a continuing realization that Russia intends to assert themselves as a great power 

and in doing so has changed the relationship in terms of our military-to-military qualitative and quantitative match. And we have 

to address that. 

And so as we enter this first—the first NPR of this administration—Nuclear Posture Review of the Trump administration—one of 

the very key questions that will have to be asked as we start the 

process from the intelligence community is a definitive answer to 

what has changed since the last time we did this work. 

To be fair to the Obama administration, there was a 2010 NPR. 

There were two major nuclear strategy reviews in 2012 and 2014 

as well, but they didn’t raise to the status of an NPR because the 

President didn’t believe we needed to do one. So a lot has changed, 

Congressman, to your point. 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, the vice chairman hit pretty 

much all the points I wanted to make with the exception of one 

broad issue that has changed significantly since 2010. 

Since 2010 our potential adversaries, particularly China and 

Russia, have not just looked at the nuclear enterprise; they have 

looked at space and cyber. And strategic deterrence in the 21st century is much bigger than nuclear deterrence was in the 20th century. 

We have adversaries that are building weapons and capabilities 

to counter our advantages in space and in cyber. We have to look 

at the entire strategic landscape and make sure we consider all 

that action. The nuclear capabilities that we have is the backstop 

for all of that, but it is a much broader issue that has become very 

apparent since 2010. 
32 

Admiral MORAN. Congressman, I don’t have much to add there 

except that when we look just navy-to-navy, and the capabilities 

that the Russians have deployed since the last Nuclear Posture Review are significantly better than what we saw leading up to that 

review. So we have to account for that in this next step. 

General WILSON. Congressman, the only thing I would add on to 

tag onto General Hyten’s comment is when we talk about the nuclear triad we have to realize it is bigger than just the bombers, 

the ICBMs, and the submarines. It is the command and control; it 

is space; it is tankers. It is a much bigger enterprise than just the 

three legs of the triad that we have got to be thinking about. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the rest of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McEachin. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Mr. Chairman, my question has been asked and 

answered, and I have enjoyed listening and learning today, so I 

yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, gentlemen. 

Good discussion today about the importance of investing in recapitalization of the triad. 

I want to talk about an important element of that, which is the 

human capital and specifically, General Wilson, the missileers in 

the ICBM force. I mean, we have seen over the last year some challenges there. 

You know, we are in a new time and we are with a different generation. I don’t like to make generalizations, but the old SAC [Strategic Air Command] warriors that we all know and love are very 

different from the mindset of millennials coming into this role. 

There are real challenges. They are going to—no insult to my colleagues from these States—but challenging geographic locations. 

F.E. Warren was our sister squadron when I was at the Academy. For many years, you know, often no deployment, and they see 

that they are working with old technology too, so that shows, I 

think, that, you know, hey, this isn’t a priority for us to be further 

investing in that. 

We have addressed some of these shortfalls very much in, I 

think, a punitive way. I mean, obviously it is appropriate to have 

zero-fail, but that doesn’t help with morale, culture, motivation, 

and all the important things that we need for people to be motivated to do this important mission. 

So as we are looking at modernizing parts of the infrastructure 

and the force, are we looking at modernizing the workforce? So are 

we thinking outside the box? 

Does it need to be a dedicated career field anymore? Are there 

ways for them to become the deterrent experts for our military, not 

just in nuclear deterrence? 

Is there a thought of how to do some innovative things for their 

leadership development while they are in these assignments that 

is not fake but actually very real and shows that value? 

So I am just wondering, are we willing to shake up and look at 

some fresh ideas to modernize the workforce? It is very important. 

General WILSON. The short answer is absolutely. And that is a 

key part of what you are hitting is this human weapon system. 
33 

So coming out of the Force Improvement Program, both the internal and external reviews hit upon this piece of culture. And I 

would say the culture had gone to a culture of micromanagement. 

And so today’s workforce we are focusing on this, how do I empower our airmen? And how do they see themselves in a future of 

which they believe what they are doing is important? 

So for a long time our Nation didn’t, I would argue, didn’t value 

the nuclear force. We have to change that at all levels. 

And so how do we then develop and grow airmen that realize 

that what they are doing is important and then they can do something about it? We have certainly lots of opportunities that we develop our missileers, and empowering them earlier, whether they 

become an expert in their weapon system, we make them flight 

commanders in our weapon system, we send them to weapon 

schools, we are sending them to very prestigious universities, to 

Stanfords to Harvards for training. 

We stood up the School for Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies 

there at Kirtland Air Force Base, which is focused on how do I 

build a person who can understand and articulate what deterrence 

means in the 21st century? 

So the short answer is yes. We think that this is a really important part of changing the culture, and you are hitting on a big 

piece of it. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. General Hyten or General Selva, you 

got any other comments on that? 

General HYTEN. I would like to add something, ma’am. 

One of the things I do on holidays is I just pick up the phone, 

and I punch the number for the folks that are in the missile fields, 

because when I left the enterprise really in 2009 the morale was 

really bad. Really bad. And I saw that you couldn’t miss it. 

And now I—when I talk to lieutenants—and it is mostly lieutenants that are there—their morale is high. They are all excited 

about what they do. They understand the importance; they understand it is the most important thing. 

But I think one of the things that you mentioned is that that can 

be a temporary issue. That is the power of leadership. And leadership is good, but we need to follow it up with real capabilities 

where they are operating on 21st-century equipment, they are operating those kind of pieces. And if we don’t follow through on that 

I am afraid that the morale could go back the other direction. 

But right now, through the power of leadership and focused effort, I am very pleased at how high the morale is in the missile 

fields. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So you think the punitive culture that I am talking about is behind us? We need to hold people accountable, don’t 

get me wrong; but when you feel like I am going to be punished 

for all the little things, that’s a morale—— 

General HYTEN. So the change it’s made is really good. It is because the no-fail is now a no-fail mission. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yes. 

General HYTEN. It is not a no-fail person; it is a no-fail mission. 

And when you realize it is the entire team that has to come together, and if there is a glitch on one person in the team, whether 

that is a security forces or wherever it is, and the rest of the team 
34 

can overcome that and have a no-fail mission, that is what we are 

trying to get after. And that is the conversation I hear now with 

the lieutenants in particular. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. General Selva, anything? 

General SELVA. I think I would make two points very quickly. 

One is a path to leadership and a continuing real emphasis on 

relevance and the importance of the mission. And what I see when 

I go out to missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine bases is a 

group of very motivated, very dedicated and disciplined sailors and 

airmen who see both of those right now. 

That has not always been the case, particularly in some of the 

incidents that we saw inside the ballistic missile force and in a 

small element of the bomber force. 

So I am optimistic—and I am generally not an optimistic person—that we have put in place a pathway that attends to the professional development and the future of the officers and the young 

airmen in the Air Force that we are asking to do this mission, and 

in the case of the Navy, the sailors and the officers who are manning our strategic ballistic missile submarines and the infrastructure that supports them. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thanks. I am over my time. I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee is going to have 

a hearing next week on infrastructure problems at the Department 

of Energy’s nuclear weapons enterprise. They have an almost $4 

billion backlog in deferred maintenance and are operating facilities 

that date back to the Manhattan Project. 

Now, I realize that the facilities still comply with nuclear safety 

requirements, but I am not sure how long that will last. 

And so, General Selva and General Hyten, I know that you have 

both had the opportunity to visit some of these important DOE facilities. Can you tell us about the state of their infrastructure, any 

views that you have on the need to rebuild NNSA’s [National Nuclear Security Administration’s] facilities so that they can deliver 

on their mission to support the military? 

General SELVA. Ma’am, I think it is really important that we get 

at the infrastructure shortfalls inside of DOE. 

To that end, inside the Department we host every other month 

a group we call the Nuclear Weapons Council that looks at the 

safety, security, and reliability of the arsenal itself and then attends to the issues in partnership between the National Nuclear 

Security Agency, DOE, and DOD to the emerging infrastructure 

needs and human capital needs inside of that workforce that assembles and maintains the core parts of our nuclear arsenal, and 

those are the weapons themselves. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. Ma’am, the Department of Energy has taken 

that on pretty seriously, but it has been about a year since I was 

at the three national labs, in particular Livermore, Sandia, and Los 

Alamos. And there are really two issues that you have to look at, 

and two issues that I look at when I go there. One is the people, 

and number two is the infrastructure. 
35 

And each of the labs has done a very interesting recruitment 

process on the people. And now they have this young set of physicists and engineers that have been brought onboard that are some 

of the best and brightest in the country that really set up for that 

structure. 

But it goes back to the same conversation I was just having with 

Congresswoman McSally, is that it is—if you don’t follow up with 

the infrastructure and all the other pieces that come with that, you 

put that at risk because people that are that bright have choices 

in this country today, and we want them to be able to do that. 

So the infrastructure is a significant issue and we need to go 

after that as an enterprise. That is a national security issue. That 

is why the Department of Defense is interested. 

General SELVA. Ma’am, if you would allow me to make a followup point—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. 

General SELVA [continuing]. And that is we tend to be focused on 

the physicists, the scientists, and the designers that do the work 

of designing and analyzing the weapons that we employ. 

In point of fact, the infrastructure has a huge impact on the 

young mechanics and machinists who are the people that are 

touching the weapons and actually assembling them. And to see 

the discipline that they put into the work that they do to disassemble and reassemble nuclear weapons—and they know precisely 

what that means—and to have them working in infrastructure 

some of which dates back to the Manhattan Project, and they have 

to deal with not only the safety and security of the weapons but 

the physical environment that they work in, my worry is for that 

part of the workforce because they can come and go as they please. 

And we have to address their capacity to do the work we are asking them to do, which is a fairly major process of remanufacturing 

weapons to meet the requirements for the future. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I really appreciate those comments. And those 

will help build into what we are going to look at next week, so 

thank you for sharing your views on that. 

Let’s talk about nonstrategic nuclear weapons because there is a 

gross disparity on that front between United States and Russia and 

they are not covered by any treaty. 

So, General Hyten, would you please compare and contrast the 

U.S. stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons versus that of Russia? And in general unclassified terms, would you describe our respective stockpiles as equal in size and capabilities? 

General HYTEN. I believe our stockpile allows us to provide an 

effective strategic deterrent. Again, I have a unique perspective as 

the commander of Strategic Command, but I look at every nuclear 

weapon as having a strategic impact. 

So as I look at what Russia is doing, I am very concerned about 

that. That is why I agree with the vice chairman in his discussions 

earlier about the need for future bilateral, verifiable arms control 

discussions with Russia, China, all of the players in—so that we 

can look at exactly where we are going in the future. And all of 

those things should be discussed. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So what about the numbers? 
36 

General HYTEN. The Russian numbers are huge and our numbers are small. We will show you the specific numbers tomorrow. 

But that is because we have—our nuclear weapons are a strategic 

deterrent. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Fifteen seconds, where are we in our modernization compared to Russian modernization of the weapons? 

General HYTEN. The modernization of the weapons? I don’t have 

a detailed insight into the nuclear weapon modernization in Russia 

or China, but I can tell you that they are, across the nuclear enterprise, ahead of us in some areas of modernization, behind in other 

areas. 

But in general we can still provide the effective strategic deterrent we have to in this Nation, but we have to step forward quickly 

into the modernization realm. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all four of you for being here. We respect 

the leadership that you are giving your organizations and grateful. 

I wanted to ask a question about unmanned aerial vehicles and 

protecting our strategic installations. We are seeing a growing 

threat, whether it is other countries or even terrorists buying commercial drones or whatever it may be, and it is the threat to our 

installations. 

So in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National Defense Authorization 

Act] the Secretary of Defense was given authority to field and 

equip, train forces to defend our installations. So I had two questions, really. 

One to the force providers, Admiral Moran and General Wilson: 

Are we starting the process of fielding and equipping this capability to defend our bases? 

And then I wanted to ask General Hyten if he could comment 

about is he seeing the results? Do we need to do more? And how 

can we help? 

Admiral Moran. 

Admiral MORAN. Sir, thanks for the question. 

As you know we have seen this issue around our submarine 

bases and it is very concerning. There is a lot of technical work 

going on to address the issue. I think the more important aspects 

of this discussion, though, are the policy and authorities to deal 

with them. So not only here in the U.S., but as well as overseas 

on the unmanned aerial threats that are developing worldwide. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Wilson. 

General WILSON. Yes. Congressman Bacon, there is a big team 

looking at this from across the Joint Staff and interagency to be 

able to get at those questions that you just asked. 

Are we fielding capability? I would say right now we are giving— 

delivering on the first initial tranche of capability, but there is a 

lot of work to do. This is a very complicated threat, and we are 

learning more every day. 

So we have a bunch of projects under work with a bunch of different agencies, but in terms of actually delivering capability to the 

field, we are not there yet. 
37 

Mr. BACON. Yes. The threat is there and it is growing. 

General WILSON. Right. 

Mr. BACON. General Hyten, how are we doing and what can we 

do to help? 

General HYTEN. We are going too slow. We are going too slow 

both on the material solution side as well as the policy and authority side. 

The NDAA was enormously helpful in starting us down the policy and authority side. But, holy cow, the number of lawyers that 

are involved in this discussion right now are just—well, it is significant. 

We have to get the right policy and authorities out so our defenders know exactly what to do. Then we have to give them the material solutions, allow them to react when they see a threat and identify that it is a threat so they do the right things. We are just going 

way too slow and we need to accelerate that process across policies, 

authorities, and material solutions. 

Mr. BACON. Well, thank you, General Hyten. Hopefully this committee will help give a nudge on that, as well. 

I wanted to ask one follow-up question or—on the command and 

control. I used to fly in the ABM CAP [Air Battle Management 

Combat Air Patrol], as you may know. I was one of the flag officers 

on there. It was really old technology. 

And I wanted to get your opinion, General Hyten. Should we be 

recapitalizing that entire fleet? Do we have enough numbers to do 

24-hour operations if you wanted to go to that again? 

And how does this work with the alert force, doing it at Offut but 

based in another base? Do we need to relook at that? Thank you. 

General HYTEN. So I believe that our airborne command and control across the board, including the ABM CAP and the TACAMO 

[take charge and move out], which is the same aircraft right now, 

both have a recapitalization initiative that is out in the future too, 

and we need to start looking at that right now. So I have asked 

the Navy to start looking at that. 

I will ask Admiral Moran to talk about those kind of pieces, but 

I know they are going through an analysis right now to determine 

what the right way is to get after those. But that is really in the 

service line. 

Mr. BACON. Just a quick follow-up: Do we have the right number, 

too, if you wanted to go back to 24-hour operations, God forbid, if 

the world deteriorates? 

General HYTEN. So that is a good theoretical question because a 

theoretical question when you actually put it out on a whiteboard 

it works, but when you have an airplane that is that old, how long 

you can actually keep that going is the question. 

There is no doubt that we could exercise it right now. We could 

go to 24/7 ops. But when you are operating in an aircraft that old, 

how long will they fly? And since we haven’t done 24/7 ops for a 

while that is a risk issue. 

Now when we look at it really hard, we believe that we can do 

that. We know we can execute it for a significant period of time but 

we don’t know if it is a month, 2 months, 3 months, 4 months, because they are old airplanes. 
38 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. And, Admiral Moran, appreciate your follow-up. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. We are jointly working on figuring out 

a common airframe to satisfy the missions of both services. We currently have a plan in place to extend the service life for A–6s out 

to 2038, which will make them 49 years old, so you know what that 

is all about. 

That cannot be the final solution here. So we are looking, as the 

general indicated, at a way to get at a joint program or at least a 

common airframe to satisfy both missions. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you. And, Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Selva, thank you for hosting us—some of us yesterday 

on the—aboard the National Airborne Operations Center. It was 

instructional, educational, and it certainly highlighted how important it is to maintain and modernize the triad, that the dyad is not 

enough and we need all three legs of the stool to keep America 

safe. So thank you again for that. 

I am going to ask some rapid-fire questions. A lot of these have 

been answered. I want to put them in one-question format so we 

can refer back when we talk to our colleagues and educate them 

of how important it is to fund these issues. 

General Wilson, how old is the B–52? 

General WILSON. B–52s were built, most of them, in 1960. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. And how old will it be when we plan to retire it? 

General WILSON. We are planning to fly it through 2050, so it 

will be 90 years old. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Wow. How old are the B–2s and how old will they 

be when they retire? 

General WILSON. B–2s today are 24 years old. We are scheduled 

to fly them through 2058, so they will be in the mid-60s. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. How old is the Minuteman III? 

General WILSON. Built in 1970, but it is really built with Minuteman I parts, which are 1960. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. How old will it be when it is retired in 2030? 

General WILSON. Really old. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Okay. Sixty. What was it designed to do? What 

was its lifetime design—— 

General WILSON. Design life was 10 years. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Wow. Admiral Moran, how old will the Ohio-class 

submarines be when they are retired? 

Admiral MORAN. They will be 42 years. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. It is unusual for a submarine to—— 

Admiral MORAN. It was designed for 30 years, so we got a 40 percent increase in the service life through engineering. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. And that brings risk, I am sure. 

Admiral MORAN. Yes, sir. We can’t go beyond 42. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. I got you. General Hyten, what is the average age 

of our nuclear warheads? 

General HYTEN. The average age of our nuclear warheads is 26 

years old right now. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Okay. 
39 

And one more for you, General Wilson. On the nuclear weapons 

storage facility, I know most of them—or a lot of them are so outdated that we can’t store there so we are having to store warheads 

in one place and Barksdale in Louisiana has to go pick those warheads up if they need to fly an operational mission. What does that 

do with readiness? 

General WILSON. Well, it just puts a stress on the force. And we 

have got to—when we consolidate to one place it provides for vulnerabilities. We have a plan to get after that, to re-modernize all 

of our weapon storage facilities. 

We will start here with the first one here at F.E. Warren. After 

that will become Barksdale and Malmstrom. And over the next 13 

years we have a plan to replace all of our weapon storage facilities. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Okay. Thank you for your service, gentlemen. Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Wilson, I don’t think anybody asked you 

directly today the status of the new bomber program. Is it on time, 

on schedule, moving ahead as it should? 

General WILSON. Chairman, the chief of staff, the Secretary of 

the Air Force and I receive regular updates on it. They just finished a preliminary design review recently. It is making great progress, and we are pleased with the way it is headed. 

The CHAIRMAN. And so it is where it should be at this point? 

General WILSON. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. And Admiral Moran, let me ask you about 

the Columbia class. We have heard there is no slack. Today is it 

on time, on schedule? Are you satisfied with where it is today? 

Admiral MORAN. We are on time and on schedule. I am not satisfied with how much margin we have and obvious impacts and risk 

to delivering on time. But I am very comfortable with where we are 

on the schedule and the costing today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

General Hyten, a few moments ago you made an interesting 

point. We tend to think of strategic deterrence as nuclear deterrence, but it is broader than that. There are other implications. 

There are press reports, and actually I think some of this has been 

confirmed, that other nations are trying to deny our ability to operate in space and from space. 

That has implications for the broader sense of strategic deterrence. I would ask you or General Selva, what should potential adversaries understand about attacks on our space system and how 

we would view such attacks? 

General HYTEN. So attacks in space in general are bad—bad for 

the United States, bad for the world. Anything that creates debris 

in space lessens our ability to explore. 

I think all nations of the world have the desire to explore the 

heavens, and if we contaminate the space environment then we can 

never do that. So it is important for us to protect that environment 

as we go forward. 

When you look at what adversaries are doing, they are clearly 

building capabilities to deny us. Some of those capabilities could go 

after our strategic early warning systems. If there is an attack on 

our strategic early warning systems, our adversaries need to realize that they have just crossed a threshold that puts our under-
40 

standing of what their actions are at risk and creates a potential 

issue that we may have to respond to in the broader strategic deterrent construct. Everything is integrated. 

An attack against an overhead satellite of a tactical variety has 

one impact; of strategic variety had another impact. But they are 

all bad. 

So our desire is to deter bad behavior in space, to deter any kind 

of activity in space that would harm the space environment. 

And so the message to our adversaries that you ask is that they 

should know that we are watching very, very closely. And we are 

developing capabilities to allow us to continue to fight through and 

respond to any attack that would come in the space domain now 

and in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Selva, you have anything? 

General SELVA. Chairman, just quite briefly, specific to the conversation we have been having today, the delineation between the 

indications-and-warning and command-and-control satellites is a 

signal we should send to our potential adversaries, that crossing 

that line in space denies us visibility into their actions and intentions and therefore creates ambiguity that is not helpful in terms 

of nuclear deterrence on both sides of the equation. I think that is 

a clear message we have to send every single day. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

General Hyten, on nuclear command and control, as you were 

talking about that being the thing you are most concerned about, 

it goes through my mind about what I describe as a ghost fleet phenomena. Are we better off to have 1960s technology that cannot be 

hacked into and have more reliability with that ancient sort of approach than if we were to update it? 

General HYTEN. So, sir, I have asked that question myself, and 

there are two pieces to the answer. 

Answer number one is that if you have the ability to provide the 

President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense better 

situational awareness because they can make better decisions, you 

should do that. You can’t do that with the legacy infrastructure; we 

can do that with a new infrastructure. 

And the second piece—and it sounds a little bit trite but it is actually true—is that with today’s technology you really can’t build 

what we built in the 1960s. The information technology today is 

fundamentally different. 

If you try to go back and—you can’t build 8-inch floppy disk 

drives. You can’t buy those things anymore. 

So you really don’t have a choice. You have to modernize and you 

have to do it in a secure environment. 

But what you can do and what you can learn from the 1960s is 

you can segment things off so that people can’t get into it. There 

is no such thing as a fully closed network because there is always 

a human in the loop, but you can create as closed a system as possible to improve your cybersecurity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. One comment, and then I have one additional question. 

My comment is having been—watching these issues for a long 

time, I have seen the interest of the Department of Defense wax 

and wane in the DOE’s activities on the weapons. 
41 

You know, General Selva, you were just talking about visiting 

the labs, about the Nuclear Weapons Council meeting and those 

other things. For what it is worth, I would just encourage both you 

and General Hyten to keep the attention on this issue. It is not a 

situation where you can say, ‘‘Oh, that is their job, and I am not 

going to worry about it.’’ And you talked about the infrastructure 

and the other challenges that are facing the NNSA mission. 

So for what it is worth, I just want to encourage you both to stay 

on top of this because when DOD does not stay on top of it usually 

we degrade our capability and it is not a good thing. And we have 

seen this up and down over the last 20 years, so I would just mention that. 

Last question I would like to ask each of you is just the state of 

our thinking on deterrence, because there is concern that after the 

fall of the Cold War we decided we didn’t really have to worry 

about strategic deterrence as much, that, yes we had China but 

they weren’t really a threat, and that we have put a lot of intellectual capital into counterterrorism and other problems but these 

issues have been neglected. And we were talking about that a little 

bit with the Air Force, about the importance that was put on these. 

But talk about, if you will, your comfort level with the intellectual effort that is being put on what is deterrence and how do we 

know whether it is credible? And if something we think will deter 

Russia, do we automatically assume that will deter North Korea, 

or is that a different kind of deterrence that we—that is not a lesser included case. 

I am just interested in y’all’s perspectives on how much we have 

caught up in our thinking about these problems. 

General SELVA. Sir, I won’t say we have caught up. We are catching up. 

The impact of the attacks on 9/11 on the focus of our intellectual 

capital going after CT [counterterrorism], I would argue right and 

appropriate. But we took our eye off of the strategic nuclear deterrence intellectual capital of the Nation in a way that may not have 

been healthy. 

What I am encouraged by—and this is why I say we are making 

progress but we are not there yet—is the number of young men 

and women who are pursuing degrees in both physics and political 

science that are now beginning to study the components of nuclear 

deterrence and debate and seek graduate and post-graduate degrees. I have a young man working for me now who got his Ph.D. 

in political science and wrote about strategic stability in his dissertation. 

Those are the kinds of young men and women we are going to 

have to seek out, bring into the circle of policymakers so they can 

benefit from the experience of some of our more senior policymakers who have been doing this for decades, and build that cadre 

of people that are going to carry us into the future. 

General HYTEN. Chairman, I will—I think catching up is the 

proper characterization. We are in a good place catching up. 

Where I think we have caught up is that inside the military we 

are having a very robust discussion now. We are talking about how 

do we integrate all of the plans between the various combatant 
42 

commanders, including Strategic Command, and with European 

Command and Pacific Command. 

We are having a robust discussion of what deterrence means in 

Russia, in China, in space, in—but where we haven’t caught up 

yet—and if you remember when we were all younger, when we 

were lieutenants and ensigns in the Air Force and the Navy, there 

was a robust academic discussion of what deterrence really meant. 

There were books written, there was debate. Even though we didn’t 

have nearly as broad-based of a national media infrastructure, 

there was still this huge discussion in the academic community. 

That is just really starting back up right now. 

In STRATCOM we have now formed an academic alliance with 

35 different universities and think tanks to basically try to reenergize that broader discussion because it is a national discussion; it 

is not just a military discussion. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I just think that is very important. And 

there have been some articles written about whether you can analogize cyber deterrence with strategic nuclear deterrence. And I am 

not making a point for or against that. 

But the key kind of skills about thinking about what will deter 

an adversary in whatever realm you are talking about is something 

I think we have neglected. And it is encouraging to me to hear y’all 

think that that is getting going again and that, as you say, we are 

catching up. 

Thank you, each of you, for being here today. I think this has 

been helpful. 

And we will thank you ahead of time for the further discussions 

we will have this week and beyond. 

Hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 8, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 8, 2017 

(47) 

OPENING STATEMENT- CHAIRMAN THORNBERRY 

8 March 2017 

HASC hearing on "Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence 

Requirements" 

The nation's strategic deterrent is the foundation upon which the rest of 

our defense efforts are built. We simply cannot allow it to weaken or crack. 

And yet we have neglected it for some time while others have not only 

invested in their nuclear systems, but advanced their capability. 

Our strategic deterrent consists of the delivery systems-the three legs 

of the triad-and also the nuclear weapons themselves and the command and 

control systems. 

Our Minuteman III missiles were first fielded in 1970. Our B-52 and B2 bombers were first deployed in the 1950s and the 1980s. Our ballistic 

missile submarines began entering service in 1981, and like the other legs 

have a limited life span. 

The warheads themselves were largely designed and built in the 1970s 

or before-and the last time a warhead was fully tested was 1991. 

And so, for years some of our most brilliant scientists and engineers 

have been working to keep these complex machines safe, secure, reliable, and 

credible without being able to test the entire weapon. They have done so in 

aging, neglected facilities with an aging workforce. 

Similarly, the command and control system for our deterrent has not 

received the attention something so vital should have. 

Meanwhile, our potential adversaries develop and field new delivery 

systems, and they develop and field new warheads. And confidence in the 

U.S. strategic deterrent erodes. I am sure all of you noticed the articles over 

the last few days which reported that Europe was considering developing its 

own nuclear deterrent if they can no longer count on ours. The same may well 

be true in Asia. 

Some say we cannot afford to update this part of our defenses. But, 

depending on how one allocates the cost of the new bomber, operating, 

sustaining, and updating our strategic deterrent never requires more than 

roughly 6 to 7 percent of our defense budget. As former Secretary of Defense 

Carter and others have pointed out, this is affordable because it is our highest 

priority defense mission. 

Contemplating a world without a reliable American strategic deterrent 

is a nightmare the modern world has never had to face, and I hope it never 

does. 

The Committee has a number of events this week focusing on this 

topic. Today we are grateful to have several of our top military leaders to help 

us consider what our strategic deterrent means for American national security. 
48 

This hearing and the Committee's broader series on nuclear deterrence 

will remind us, the American people, our allies, and our potential adversaries 

that the U.S. strategic deterrent must always be credible and must always 

ready. 

### 
49 

Ranking Member Smith Opening Remarks 

"Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements" 

Full Committee Hearing- March 8, 2017 

Strong nuclear deterrence is a cornerstone of national security. We are 

at a key decision point for investments that will shape U.S. nuclear forces for 

the next fifty years. 

The first mission of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is prevention of a nuclear 

war. Achieving this goal requires strength, but in the last generation we have 

learned that it can also be advanced through diplomacy and innovation. Even 

massive nuclear superiority cannot prevent miscalculation, miscommunication, or accidents, while each ofthese dangers coupled with nuclear weapons 

threatens all of humanity. The truth is that deterrence does not occur on the 

battlefield; it occurs in the mind of the adversary. Robust deterrence, 

therefore, requires that we understand and communicate with our adversaries 

so that threats of nuclear destruction play an appropriately limited role in 

these crucial relationships. Reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons 

and avoiding nuclear proliferation remain an equally high priority. 

I am increasingly concerned that we are moving in the wrong direction 

and that instead of enhancing U.S. security, we are taking unnecessary and 

dangerous risks with decisions where we cannot afford to make mistakes. 

When it comes to nuclear weapons policy, civilization hangs in the balance. 

I am disappointed that, although several hearings and classified 

briefings are planned as part of the committee's focus on nuclear deterrence 

this and next week, not one witness has been invited to offer an alternative 

perspective to the need for full modernization of the nuclear triad and its 

associated enterprise. The weapons and production facilities we authorize 

today will shape our relationships with our adversaries and allies for two 

generations. I reluctantly concede that for the time being these must include 

massively destructive nuclear weapons capabilities, but I insist that our 

decisions must be infonned by the possibility of negotiated stability through 

the proven tool of cooperative threat reduction. 

While there is bipartisan agreement on modernizing the most 

survivable and reliable legs of the triad, several aspects of the nuclear 

weapons modernization plan are unwise and dangerous. For nearly a decade, 

we have improved our conventional forces and reduced reliance on nuclear 

weapons. The 20 I 0 nuclear posture review stated the objectives of "reducing 

the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy," 

"maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force 

levels," and it stated that "the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons ... is 

to deter nuclear attack." 

However, lowering the yield on new nuclear bombs for example and 

envisioning nuclear weapons as war-fighting weapons, particularly in the 
50 

context of Russia's doctrine embracing limited use of nuclear weapons in a 

situation where Russia's vital interests are at stake to "deescalate" a cont1ict, 

risk reversing the trend to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Using nuclear 

weapons for any other purpose than to deter the use of nuclear weapons by 

others and creating the chance of miscalculation is an excessively risky 

approach and rests on the hubristic assumption that nuclear escalation can be 

controlled. This is one of the main reasons I have opposed the new LongRange Stand-Otl'weapon. Similarly retaining a launch-on-warning posture 

increases the risks of hasty decisions to use nuclear weapons in response to 

false alarms. Increasing, rather than decreasing, ambiguity and the potential 

for miscalculation in a crisis amounts to playing with fire in a gas station. 

In this context, I hope to hear your military advice on how we might be 

able to effectively sanction Russia for its violation of the Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces Treaty, and how we can ensure that we lock in legally-binding 

and verifiable Russian obligations to cap their number of deployed strategic 

weapons under the New START Treaty. Threat reduction and verifiable arms 

control are also relevant not only to strategic stability but also to cost: If 

negotiation can safely lower the price of deterrence, then it must be 

considered. 

Second, I am deeply concerned that we have insufficient information 

on the full cost and plan for nuclear modernization. As we plan to spend over 

a trillion dollars sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces and related 

infrastructure, which the Department of Defense has consistently described as 

our highest priority, there is no long-term Department plan or cost estimate 

for this modernization. 

Several senior Defense officials, including Undersecretary Frank 

Kendall, the top acquisition chief, have publicly referred to an aftordability 

problem and a former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has 

referred to the lack of planning and accountability for these future 

investments. This lack ofboth long-term planning and understanding of the 

full-scope ofthe required investments cripples DOD's and Congress's ability 

to make informed decisions on which investments to prioritize and to start 

funding now. This is especially problematic when a number of these 

investments require allocating tens of billions of dollars in the near-term. That 

is why I have asked the Congressional Budget Office to provide an 

independent and comprehensive cost estimate of the effort to sustain and 

modernize U.S. nuclear forces. 

Third, aspects of the nuclear modernization plan are redundant and 

unnecessarily expensive. What's more, we are seeing already significant cost 

increases. For example, as recently reported, the Department of Defense's 

independent cost estimating arm assessed the cost of the Ground-Based 

Nuclear Deterrent as between $85 billion and nearly $150 billion. That is a 

50%-75% cost increase over the Air Force's earlier estimate of$62 billion. In 

another concerning example, the 10-year cost estimate report for nuclear 
51 

modernization contained-for the second year in a row-a cost estimating 

error. If nuclear modernization is supposed to be one of our top defense 

spending priorities, then shouldn't we care enough to get the math right? 

The nuclear modernization plan also calls for significantly expanding, 

by a factor of about 8, the capacity to make additional nuclear weapons. This 

proposal would be costly, not to mention the potential environmental impacts 

and safety risks associated with expanding the fabrication of nuclear weapon 

components. Additionally, the plan envisions building new types of nuclear 

weapons without any analysis of the cost; of the military requirements for 

such programs; of feasible alternatives; or of whether these programs might 

exacerbate a nuclear arms race or risk requiring a resumption of nuclear 

explosive testing. 

Nuclear modernization should not be about expanding our nuclear 

capabilities when we already have over 4,000 nuclear weapons, enough to 

destroy the world several times over. It should not feed an unaffordable 

nuclear arms race and increase risks of unintentional nuclear war. It is not 

something that should be decided on in 140-charactertweets. Rather, it 

requires rigorous analysis, a clear understanding of what the highest priorities 

are, how we can enhance strategic stability-especially at a time of high 

tensions with Russia-and how we can reliably and credibly deter the use of 

nuclear weapons against the United States and our allies by our adversaries. I 

hope we can get to some of this information and analysis today. I thank the 

witnesses for being with us today. 
52 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL PAUL SELVA, USAF 

VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

BEFORE THE llSTH CONGRESS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS 

8 MARCH 2017 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
53 

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter a strategic attack against the United States, 

its allies, and its partners. Simply put, nuclear weapons pose the only existential threat to the 

United States and there is no substitute for the prospect of a devastating nuclear response to deter 

that threat. 

Our nuclear forces play other important roles as well, to include reducing the risk of nuclear 

proliferation, allowing us to maintain escalation control during a crisis and contributing to 

deterring large scale conventional war. By extending a nuclear umbrella over allies and partners, 

many of which confront significant threats to their security, the United States decreases the 

likelihood that they might one day pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And by convincing 

adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failing conventional military campaigns, the 

United States can deter such conflicts in the first place or, failing that, keep them from escalating 

beyond the conventional level. 

Deterrence, assurance, and escalation control are longstanding objectives that have served U.S. 

national security interests. But our ability to achieve these objectives cannot be taken for granted. 

No one should doubt that our weapons, delivery systems, the infrastructure that supports them, 

and the personnel who operate, monitor, and maintain them are prepared today to respond to 

any contingency. Our current challenge, however, is to maintain this high level of readiness and 

capability as long as the policy and strategy of this nation depends in part on nuclear weapons for 

its security. This hearing comes at a critical moment for meeting that challenge. 

For more than two decades, the Joint Force has implemented U.S. policy to reduce the role of 

nuclear forces in our strategies and plans and decrease the number and types of nuclear forces in 

our inventory. Yet a number of other nations, including potential adversaries, have not followed 
54 

our example. They are instead increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons, improving their 

nuclear capabilities, and, in some cases, expanding their nuclear arsenals. 

Russia, for example, is not only modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new 

nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but remains in violation of its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty obligations and has threatened nuclear use against U.S. forces and allies in Europe. China 

continues to improve and increase its nuclear arsenal. North Korea has not relented in its drive to 

field a deliverable nuclear weapon that can reach the United States. And Iran's ballistic missile 

program, which is not covered under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), still 

presents a danger to U.S. forces and partners across the Middle East and beyond. 

Our nuclear deterrent is nearing a crossroads. To date, we have preserved this deterrent by 

extending the lifespan of legacy nuclear forces and infrastructure-in many cases for decades 

beyond what was originally intended. But these systems will not remain viable indefinitely. In 

fact, we are now at a point where we must concurrently modernize the entire nuclear triad and 

the infrastructure that enables its effectiveness. 

To understand the scope and scale of this effort, it is necessary to appreciate all of the capabilities 

that comprise our nuclear deterrent. Two in particular often receive the most attention. 

The first is nuclear weapons themselves, including the warheads that are carried by missiles and 

the cruise missiles and gravity bombs that are delivered by aircraft. Preserving the safety, security, 

and reliability of these weapons is crucial, and we work closely with our partners in the 

Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Agency toward that end. 
55 

The second well-known element is the triad of strategic delivery platforms, including nuclear 

ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 

nuclear-capable bombers. Each of these systems provides unique and complementary attributes 

that enhance deterrence. SSBNs at sea are highly survivable and guarantee that the United States 

will be able to respond to any nuclear attack. ICBMs on alert are highly responsive and, thanks to 

their numbers and dispersed locations, make a disarming strike extraordinarily difficult and 

extremely costly for any adversary. And bombers are highly visible, forward deployable, 

survivable once generated to alert, and have the flexibility to provide credible response options 

across a wide range of scenarios. Collectively, the three legs of the triad also provide a hedge 

against unforeseen technical problems or adverse changes in the security environment. 

In addition to nuclear weapons and strategic delivery platforms, our nuclear deterrent also 

depends on three other capabilities: the indications and warning systems that provide early notice 

of a threat and give political leaders the opportunity to decide on an appropriate response; the 

command-and-control networks that ensure nuclear weapons will always be available if they are 

needed and that their use can only be directed by the President of the United States; and the dualcapable tactical aircraft that can be equipped with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which enable 

the United States to credibly extend its nuclear umbrella to many of its closest allies. 

The ability to preserve these capabilities beyond their intended lifespan is a technical 

achievement. However, nuclear modernization can no longer be deferred. Previous decisions to 

defer modernization have resulted in overlapping acquisition programs today, which present two 

major consequences. 

First, any disruption to the current program of record or future acquisition plans will introduce 

risk to our strategic deterrent. In recent years we have used delays and deferrals to stretch our 
56 

original program of record until all remaining schedule slack has been removed. In other words, 

we are currently depending on "just-in-time" modernization and replacement of the nuclear 

enterprise. 

Second, the cost of funding modernization and replacement of the entire nuclear enterprise all at 

once is substantial. According to current projections, the Department of Defense will increase 

spending on the nuclear deterrent from 3.2% of its FY 2016 budget to 6.5% of its annual budget 

in the late 2020s (based on the FY 2017 Future Years Defense Program), although this still 

represents less than one percent of total anticipated federal spending. 

Despite these risks and costs, there is no higher priority for the Joint Force than fielding all 

components of an effective nuclear deterrent, including weapons, infrastructure, and personnel. 

Perhaps the clearest indicator of this prioritization is how we have chosen to spend our resources 

and the tradeoffs we have been willing to accept. Although our current nuclear strategy and 

program of record were developed before the Budget Control Act imposed strict caps on defense 

spending, we are emphasizing the nuclear mission over other modernization programs when 

faced with that choice. 
57 

GENERAL PAUL J. SELVA 

Gen. Paul J. Selva serves as the 1Oth Viee Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ln this 

capacity, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the nation's second highestranking military officer. 

General Selva graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1980, and completed 

undergraduate pilot training at Reese AFB, Texas. He has held numerous staff positions 

and has commanded at the squadron, group, wing and headquarter levels. Prior to his 

cunent assignment General Selva was the commander of U.S. Transportation Command, 

Scott AFB, Illinois. 

General Selva is a command pilot with more than 3,100 hours in the C-5, C-17A, C-141 B, 

C-37, KC-10, KC-l35A and T-37. 

EDUCATION 

1980 Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy. Colorado 

Springs, Colo. 

1983 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1984 Master of Science in Management and Human Relations, Abilene Christian University, 

Abilene, Texas 

1992 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., distinguished graduate 

1992 Master of Science in Political Science, Auburn University, Montgomery, Ala. 

1996 National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, Rosslyn, Va. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

I. June 1980 -July 1981, student, undergraduate pilot training, Reese AFB, Texas 

2. July 1981 -December 1984, co-pilot and aircraft commander, 917th Air Refueling Squadron, 

Dyess AFB, Texas 

3. January 1984- December 1988, co-pilot, aircraft commander, instructor pilot, and flight 

commander, 32nd Air Refueling Squadron, Barksdale AFB, La. 

4. January 1989- July 1991, company grade adviser to Commander, Strategic Air Command, later, 

manager of offensive aircraft systems and executive officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and 

Resources, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

5. August 1991 -July 1992, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

6. July 1992- June 1994, instructor pilot and flight commander, 9th Air Refucliug Squadron, later, 

Commander, 722nd Operations Support Squadron, March AFB, Calif 

7. June 1994- June 1995, Commander, 9th Air Refueling Squadron, later, Deputy Commander, 

60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, Calif. 

8. July 1995 -June 1996, National Defense Fellow, Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group, 

Rosslyn, Va. 

9. July 1996- August 1998, assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net 

Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

I 0. August 1998 -July 2000, Commander, 60th Operations Group, Travis AFB, Calif. 

II. July 2000- June 2002, Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB, Wash. 

12. June 2002 ·June 2003, Vice Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill. 

13. June 2003- November 2004, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Scott AFB, Ill. 

14. December 2004- August 2006, Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott 

AFB,lll. 

15. August 2006- June 2007, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy ChiefofStafffor 

Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

16. June 2007 - October 2008, Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, and Director, Air Force QDR, Office 

of the Vice Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

!7. October 2008 ·October 20 II, Assistant to the Chairman of the .Joint Chiefs of Staff~ 
58 

Washington, D.C. 

18. October 2011 -November 2012, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint-Base Pearl 

Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii 

19. November 2012 -May 2014, Commander, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill. 

20. May 2014- July 2015, Commander U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill. 

21. July 2015- present, Vice Chairman of the .Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

l. September 1996 - August 1998, Assistant to the Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense tor 

Net Assessment, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel 

2. November 2004- July 2006, Director of Operations and Logistics, U.S. Transpmtation 

Command, Scott AFB, Ill., as a brigadier general 

3. October 2008- October 2011, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff~ 

Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general 

4. May 2014- July 2015, Commander U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill. 

5. July 2015- present, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: command pilot 

Hours flown: more than 3,100 

Aircraft flown: C-5, C-17A, C-141B, C-37, KC-10, KC-135A and T-37 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal 

Distinguished Service Medal 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

Joint Meritorious Unit Award 

Combat Readiness Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star 

Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze stars 

Southwest Asia Service Medal with bronze star 

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal 

Armed Forces Service Medal 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant May 28, 1980 

First Lieutenant May 28, 1982 

Captain May 28, 1984 

Major Jan. I, !990 

Lieutenant Colonel Mareh l, 1994 

Colonel Sept. l, 1998 

Brigadier General Jan. I, 2004 

Major General June 2, 2007 

Lieutenant General Oct. 8, 2008 

General Nov. 29,2012 

(Current as of August 2015) 
59 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS 

STATEMENT OF 

JOHN E. HYTEN 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS 

8MARCH20l7 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS 
60 

INTRODUCTION 

U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRA TCOM) counters diverse and evolving threats through the 

successful execution of its primary mission: detect and deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and our 

allies, and provide the President responsive military forces and flexible response options if deterrence 

fails. The three legs of the U.S. Nuclear Triad, our nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) 

systems, and the supporting nuclear enterprise infrastructure are critical components of a strategic 

deterrence force that provides the necessary capabilities to deter adversaries and assure our allies and 

partners. USSTRATCOM's number one job is to present our adversaries an intractable strategic problem 

and ensure they fully understand they cannot prevail in a strategic attack against the U.S., our allies or 

partners. 

Today's deterrence forces remain safe, secure, effective, and ready, however the U.S. faces 

significant near- and long-term challenges in sustaining the required capabilities to meet our enduring 

national security objectives and strategic stability. At a time when others continue to modernize and 

expand strategic capabilities, nearly all elements of the U.S. nuclear delivery systems, weapons stockpile, 

NC3, and other critical infrastructure are operating well beyond their expected service life. Maintaining 

strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation control capabilities requires a multi-faceted, long-term 

approach and sustained commitment to maintain a credible strategic deterrent. 

We have made great strides in positively shaping the future by making critical investments in our 

forces and these investments must continue. Planned sustainment and modernization activities must be 

completed on schedule as any delay will impact the execution of our strategic deterrence mission and 

unacceptably degrade our ability- and ultimately our credibility- to deter and assure. Sustained 

Congressional support, combined with the hard work of the exceptional men and women who support 

USSTRATCOM, will ensure that we remain ready, agile, and effective in deterring strategic attack, 

assure our Allies and partners, and respond to both current and future threats. 

NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS 

All three elements of our nuclear Triad delivery system are essential to the Nation's security as 

they provide our leadership the flexibility to appropriately respond to strategic attack. Our 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (!CBMs), Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capahle 

heavy bombers provide unique and complementary attributes that underpin strategic deterrence and 

stability. The Triad's synergistic capabilities present adversaries with a complex, multi-prong strategic 

2 
61 

challenge that changes their decision calculus, and together it provides a hedge against unforeseen 

technical problems or changes in the global security environment. 

Today, our ICBM force provides the President with a highly reliable, secure, prompt response 

option and, with smart and consistent investment, will continue to provide an effective deterrent force for 

many decades. The Minuteman ICBM weapon system is decades past its intended lifespan and is facing 

aging, obsolescence, and asset depletion issues. To maintain Minuteman viability and effectiveness 

through 2030, USSTRATCOM supports ongoing Air Force weapon system sustainment efforts spanning 

warhead fuze modernization, the Airborne Launch Control System replacement, missile transportererector replacement, and a Launch Control Center Block Upgrade. 

It is imperative we recapitalize the ICBM force through the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 

(GBSD) program, which will begin initial deployment in 2028. The GBSD program is progressing as an 

integrated, weapon system solution, including the flight system, weapon system command and control, 

ground launch systems, and support facilities that will ensure we maintain an effective land-based strategic 

deterrence force. GBSD achieved a significant acquisition milestone last year and I continue to support the 

Air Force's efforts to leverage investments through cooperation with the Navy and industry to reduce 

technical development risk and cost. 

The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine and its Trident II D5 strategic weapon system 

represent the most survivable Triad leg and provide the Nation with the survivable nuclear response 

capability that underpins our ability to strike at any time, across myriad scenarios. USSTRATCOM 

continues to strongly support and work with the Navy as it sustains and modernizes the SSBN force. 

While the Navy's robust maintenance and sustainment programs has allowed the Ohio-class 

SSBN to be life-extended from 30 to 42 years, there is no margin left to extend these submarines fmihcr. 

When they begin retiring at the end of the next decade, we must have a capable replacement SSBN ready 

to deploy. Ensuring the Columbia-class SSBN remains on schedule and fully funded thronghout the next 

decade is vital to preventing capability gaps. Any further delay will put the continuity of our sea-based 

nuclear deterrent at unacceptable risk. 

We have successfully fielded the Trident II DS missile for more than 25 years and the Navy is 

taking the necessary steps to address aging and technology obsolescence to effectively extend the missile's 

3 
62 

life. This life extension is absolutely critical as the Trident Il 05 will transition from the Ohio-class SSBN 

to the Columbia-class SSBN as well as support our UK partners as they deploy their new Dreadnoughtclass SSBN. 

Nuclear Capable Bombers 

Our nuclear-capable bomber force represents the most f1exible and adaptable leg of the nuclear 

Triad. They arc critical to visibly demonstrating U.S. commitment and resolve across a wide range of 

crisis scenarios. The bomber force also provides a means to rapidly hedge against operational or 

technical challenges in other legs of the Triad. To ensure our bombers, and their associated weapons, 

provide a credible deterrence and assurance capability, ongoing sustainment and planned modernization 

activities must remain on track. The combination of greatly exceeding system design life, declining 

sustainability, and degraded snrvivabil ity requires modern replacement systems. 

The Air Force continues to execute modernization and life extension activities to ensure both 

bombers provide a viable long-range bomber presence to meet nuclear and conventional mission 

requirements while also preserving the ability to adapt to future challenges. For the B-2, these upgrades 

include the Defense Management System, which is critical to its survivability against advanced adversary 

air defenses. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite will provide mission-critical 

anti-jam stealth-compatible beyond-line-ot~sight communications for both nuclear and conventional 

missions. For the B-52, modernization programs include replacing the 1960s-era radar with a modern 

off-the-shelf capability to improve navigation, targeting, and weapons delivery. I also support the Air 

Force's studies to ensure that the B-52 remains a viable component of the bomber force in the face of 

technologically advanced threats. 

As adversaries deploy increasingly sophisticated, integrated air defense systems, I fully support 

development and fielding of the dual-capable B-21 bomber. With its long range and enhanced 

penetration capabilities, the B-21 will directly support U.S. policy, strategy goals, and multiple combatant 

commander requirements by maintaining U.S. effectiveness in increasingly challenging anti-access/area 

denial environments. 

The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile and the B6l-12 gravity bomb are critical to 

maintaining our current strategic capabilities, and extended deterrence and assurance commitments. The 

aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is several decades past its planned end-of-service life and 

facing increasing reliability and survivability challenges. The LRSO cruise missile will ensure no gap in 

air-delivered deterrence capabilities as it ensures bomber force effectiveness by providing credible 

4 
63 

standoff attack options and holding heavily defended targets at risk. The LRSO is the tirst missile system 

developed in unison with a nuclear warhead in mind for many decades. Limiting resources or funding of 

either component will disrupt its entire concept-to-capability time line. 

The B61-12 gravity nuclear bomb consolidates several legacy B61 bomb variants and allows the 

retirement of the B83-l, reducing the size of the U.S. arsenal while still supporting both strategic and 

extended deterrence objectives. 

Nuclear Security 

Protecting our nuclear forces and facilities remains a top priority and we are continually assessing 

threats to ensure our security apparatus is capable of denying unauthorized access or use of nuclear 

weapons. I fully support the Air Force's efforts to replace the aged UH-1 N Helicopter- which has become 

a capability gap- and ICBM Payload Transporter to ensure our weapons remain secure as threats evolve. 

Of recent concern have been the unauthorized flights of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) over Navy and 

Air Force installations. These intrusions represent a growing threat to the safety and security of nuclear 

weapons and personnel. Both the Navy and Air Force are working to field counter-liAS capabilities that 

can effectively detect, track, and, if necessary, engage small liAS vehicles. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

Tn concert with our delivery platforms, our nuclear weapon stockpile, and the unique facilities 

that sustain the stockpile, must be modernized to ensure our deterrent remains effective and credible. The 

Nuclear Weapons Council-approved Strategic Plan outlines the approach to sustain the stockpile, aligns 

warhead and platform modernization efforts, and identities the essential NNSA industrial capacity 

required to maintain our deterrence capabilities. A key element of the stockpile plan is the '3+2' strategy 

that transitions the current stockpile of 11 distinct warheads to three common nuclear explosive packages 

on all Air Force and Navy ballistic missile reentry systems, and two air-delivered warheads. This strategy 

is fully consistent with U.S. strategic deterrence policies and non-proliferation objectives. Full realization 

of '3+2' requires sustained commitment to the modernization and recapitalization ofNNSA's 

infrastructure, as well as continued development of the human capital and science-based stewardship tools 

needed to assess and certify the stockpile. 

5 
64 

NC3 SYSTEMS 

Commensurate with the U.S. Triad, stockpile, and infrastructure, the Nation's Nuclear Command, 

Control, and Communications (NC3) systems are facing obsolescence and component age-out challenges. 

These systems are not only essential for providing early warning and time critical information to the 

National Command Authority for decision making, hut also to eiTectively direct Triad forces in response 

to a strategic crisis. A 21" century architecture is needed to address potential adversary's increasingly 

complex and capable threats. For example, current legacy communication systems, which are critical in 

providing assured I secure communications to our heavy bombers and command & control aircraft 

through all phases of conflict, are increasingly unreliable and in desperate need of modernization. The 

Nation's Milstar constellation has exceeded its design life by over I 0 years and requires modernization to 

provide for early warning of a strategic attack. Any delay, deferment, or cancellation ofNC3 

modernization will create a capability gap potentially degrading the President's ability to respond 

appropriately to a strategic threat. 

CONCLUSION 

Our Nation is faced with capable, diverse, and evolving adversaries that have the ability to 

threaten the U.S. and its allies and partners. Our adversaries are watching and taking note of our resolve 

and commitment towards the nuclear enterprise. Continued Congressional support is paramount as we 

transition from an aged to a more modern and flexible deterrence force capable of meeting today's as well 

as tomorrow's strategic challenges. 

6 
65 

GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN 

Commander of U.S. Strategic Command 

Gen. John E. Hyten is Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), one of 

nine UniJied Commands under the Department of Defense. USSTRA TCOM is responsible 

for the global command and control of U.S. strategic forces to meet decisive national 

security objectives, providing a broad range of strategic capabilities and options for the 

President and Secretary of Defense. 

General Hyten attended Harvard University on an Air Force Reserve Officer Training 

Corps scholarship, graduated in 1981 with a bachelor's degree in engineering and applied 

sciences and was commissioned a second lieutenant. General Hyten's career includes 

assignments in a variety of space acquisition and operations positions. He served in senior 

engineering positions on both Air Force and Army anti-satellite weapon system programs. 

The general's staff assignments include tours with the Air Force Secretariat, the Air Staff, 

the Joint Staff and the Commander's Action Group at Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command as Director. He served as mission director in Cheyenne Mountain and was the 

last active-duty commander of the 6th Space Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB, 

Nebraska. In 2006, he deployed to Southwest Asia as Director of Space Forces for 

operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. General 1-Iyten commanded the 595th 

Space Group and the 50th Space Wing at Schriever AFB, Colo. Prior to assuming 

command of Air Force Space Command, he served as the Vice Commander, Air Force 

Space Command. 

EDUCATION 

1981 Bachelor's degree in engineering and applied sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, 

Mass. 

1985 Master of Business Administration degree, Auburn University, Montgomery, Ala. 

1985 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1994 Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1999 National Defense Fellow, University of Illinois, Champaign 

2011 Senior Managers in Government Course, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 

ASSIGNMENTS 

1. November 1981 - December 1985, Configuration Management Officer and Chief, Con figuration 

Management Division, Automated Systems Program Office, Gunter AFB, Ala. 

2. December 1985 -July 1989, Chief, Software Development Branch; and Chief, Engineering and 

Acquisition Division, Space Defense Programs Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 

3. August 1989- July 1990, Special Adviser to the U.S. Army, Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite 

Program Of11ce, U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, Huntsville, Ala. 

4. July 1990- August 1991, Deputy for Engineering, Strategic Defense Initiatives Program Office, 

Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 

5. August 1991 -May 1992, Executive Speechwriter and Systems Analyst, Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force (Acquisition), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

6. May 1992- July 1993, Program Element Monitor, Advanced Technology Programs, Assistant 

Secretary of the Air force (Acquisition), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

7. July 1993 -]nne 1994, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

8. July 1994- June 1996, Mission Director, Space Operations Officer, and Chief, Command Center 

Training, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colo. 

9. August 1996- August 1998, Commander, 6th Space Operations Squadron, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

10. Angust 1998- Jnne 1999, National Defense Fellow, University of lllinois, Champaign 

ll. June 1999- June 200 l, Operations Oftlcer, and Chief, Space Branch, Defense and Space 

Operations Division, Deputy Director tor Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities), J3, 
66 

Joint Stall the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

12. June 2001 ·June 2003, Chief, Space Control Division, Directorate for Space Operations and 

Integration, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, D.C. 

13. June 2003- July 2004, Director, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

14. July 2004- April2005, Commander, 595th Space Group, Schriever AFB, Colo. 

15. April2005- May 2007, Commander, 50th Space Wing, Schriever AFB, Colo. (May 2006-

October 2006, Director of Space Forces, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Southwest Asia) 

16. May 2007- September 2009, Director of Requirements, Headquarters Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

17. September 2009- February 2010. Director. Cybcr and Space Operations, Directorate of 

Operations. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air 

Force, Washington, D.C. 

18. February 2010- August 2010, Director, Space Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretmy of the 

Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

19. September 2010- May 2012, Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C. 

20. May 2012- Aug 2014, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

21. Aug 2014- Oct 2016, Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo. 

22. Nov 2016- present, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

SUMMARY OF .JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1994 ·June 1996, Mission Director, Space Operations Officer, and Chief, Command Center 

Training, U.S. Space Command, Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, CO., as a major 

2. June 1999- June 2001, Operations Officer, and Chief, Space Branch, Defense and Space 

Operations Division, Deputy Director for Operations (Current Readiness and Capabilities), 13. 

Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant colonel 

BADGES 

Master Space Operations Badge 

Master Cyberspace Operator Badge 

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORA TJONS 

Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Force Commendation Medal 

Army Commendation Medal 

Joint Service Achievement Medal 

Air Force Achievement Medal 

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 

1991 Recipient of the William Jump Award for Excellence within the Federal Government 

1998 Recipient of a Laurels Award, Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine 

2009 Gen. Jerome F. O'Malley Distinguished Space Leadership Award 

PUBLICATIONS 

"A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space," The Program 

in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Jnternational Security Occasional Paper, University of Illinois, 

2000 

"A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War," Air and Space Power Journal, Air University Press, 2002 

"Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare," with Dr. Robert Uy, Air and Space 

Power Journal, Air University Press, 2004 
67 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant Aug. 23, 1981 

First Lieutenant Aug. 23, 1983 

Captain Aug. 23, 1985 

Major May 1, 1993 

Lieutenant Colonel Jan. 1, 1997 

Colonel June I, 2002 

Brigadier General Oct I, 2007 

Major General Nov. I 0, 2010 

Lieutenant General May 18, 2012 

General Aug. 15,2014 

(Current as of November 2016) 
68 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL 

RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED 

SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. MORAN 

U.S. NAVY 

VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

NUCLEAR FORCES 

MARCH 8, 2017 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL 

RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED 

SERVICES COMMITTEE 
69 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the undersea leg of the 

strategic deterrent triad. 

The nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, 

and submarine launched ballistic missiles is essential to our nation's well-being and will 

remain a necessary deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Sea-based strategic 

deterrence is the Navy's #1 investment priority. It is the bedrock of our ability to deter 

aggression by major adversaries and to assure our friends and allies. In order to 

execute this mission, particularly as military competition continues to increase worldwide, we view maintaining and modernizing the undersea leg of the triad - our 

submarines, our missiles, and the command and control network that supports them as 

a national priority. This capability remains foundational to our survival as a nation. 

Always Ready and On-call 

The OHIO Class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and the Trident II (05) 

strategic weapon system are the centerpiece of today's sea based strategic deterrence 

mission. We currently have 14 OHIO Class submarines executing this mission. Our 

oldest SSBN, USS HENRY M. JACKSON, was commissioned on October 6, 1984, 

completed her first patrol in 1985 and has executed over 90 patrols. She still has 10 

more years of service until her mission is complete. As the OHIO Class ages, we 

remain vigilant in maintaining the same continuous coverage our nation has relied upon 

for over 5 decades. 

All SSBNs are equipped with an accurate and reliable Trident II (05) Strategic 

Weapons System. First deployed in the early 1990s, this system achieved its 1651

h 

successful test launch earlier this year. We are modernizing and extending the life of the 

05 missile from 25 years to 50 years through sound engineering analysis and 

investment, and also modernizing the strategic weapons system that will be carried on 

the next generation SSBN, the COLUMBIA class. Just last month, Navy reached a 

significant milestone in this life extension program-the first two life-extended 05 

missiles were loaded on an OHIO Class SSBN. It is critical that this program remains 

on track and aligned with the COLUMBIA Class acquisition program. 

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70 

Building an Efficient Future Force 

Our current platforms and life extension efforts will sustain a credible strategic 

weapon system until the 2040s. The COLUMBIA Class will be in service an additional 

40 years, until well into the 2080s. With OHIO Class SSBNs starting to reach their end 

of life in the late 2020s, the COLUMBIA Class must be ready to start patrols early in 

fiscal year 2031. The Navy has already extended the OHIO Class service life from 30 

years to 42 years. There is no engineering margin remaining for further extensions. 

Recapitalizing our ballistic missile submarines is a significant investment and something 

that happens only every other generation, making it critically important that we do it 

correctly. To meet COLUMBIA's first patrol in 2031, construction must begin in fiscal 

year 2021 - any further delay in the program will mean that for the first time in over 50 

years, the U.S. would not have adequate ballistic missile submarines ready to meet 

Presidential requirements. 

The COLUMBIA Class program will sustain the same level of at-sea presence we 

have today with the OHIO Class. To meet strategic requirements, the Navy must 

maintain a force of at least 10 ready-to-deploy SSBNs. Today we meet this requirement 

with 14 OHIO Class SSBNs. With the COLUMBIA Class SSBN's life-of-ship reactor 

core (which precludes a lengthy mid-life refueling overhaul) the Navy will be able to 

meet all at-sea requirements with only 12 submarines. This force of 12 submarines, 

each with 16 missile tubes, will provide sufficient flexibility and capacity to satisfy 

national strategic deterrent requirements in a cost efficient manner. 

The Navy is taking aggressive steps to reduce procurement and life-cycle costs, 

while not compromising our investment in capabilities to stay ahead of the threat 

Stealth is key among them. Stealth, largely built into the SSBN during construction and 

inherent in modern submarine design, ensures the submarine nuclear force is not 

detectable by our adversaries, and thus survivable. We are staying at the cutting edge 

of capabilities by leveraging technology from previous submarine classes, and by 

investing in new technologies specifically for the COLUMBIA Class. 

In addition to reducing cost, we remain focused on the industrial base to ensure 

our partners are ready to support the delivery of COLUMBIA on time. As the program 

3 
71 

matures, we continue to evaluate opportunities to stabilize the work force at private 

shipyards as well as the vendor base. The COLUMBIA Class is our #1 acquisition 

priority and we know our shipbuilding team and its infrastructure need to be prepared 

and stable in order to ensure success. 

Finally, in addition to the submarine and missile aspects of the Navy's nuclear 

deterrent, the Nuclear Command Control and Communications (NC3) architecture 

provides the critical connection between the President and our nuclear forces. NC3 is a 

large and complex system comprised of numerous land-, air-, and space-based 

components. It provides survivable, secure, and enduring communications to our 

nuclear and conventional operations in all threat environments. Maintaining a credible 

nuclear deterrent for the long term requires recapitalization of key systems and 

capabilities throughout the NC3 architecture. 

We've outlined some of the incredible technology we need to meet our strategic 

deterrent mission, but it is important to emphasize that all of this is at risk without an 

exceptional military and civilian workforce. From our industry partners and civil servants 

who design, build, and test our ships, to our shipyard workers who maintain them, to our 

Sailors who operate these ships day in and day out; our people -from all corners of the 

country- are what makes us the finest Navy in the world. They count on us to provide 

the tools, training, and resources to succeed. 

Summary 

Modernization of our triad and nuclear infrastructure are important to deter 

potential adversaries and to reassure allies of our continuing commitment to our 

extended deterrence. The Navy's top investment priority is to maintain and modernize 

the undersea leg of the triad. Our ballistic missile submarines and the weapon system 

they carry ensure no adversary can threaten the United States with nuclear attack 

without certain retaliation. A survivable, competent and professional deterrent 

underpins all other U.S. military operations around the globe and provides unique, 

invaluable assurance to our allies and partners. 

The COLUMBIA Class acquisition program and the weapon system life extension 

efforts must remain on schedule to ensure an uninterrupted at-sea presence. We will 

4 
72 

continue to work with industry and Congress to drive down costs while maintaining a 

credible, survivable nuclear deterrent capability. I cannot emphasize enough how these 

programs are fundamental to our survival as a nation. On behalf of our Sailors and 

civilians, thank you for your commitment and continued support, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

5 
73 

5/31/2016- Present 

ADMIRAL BILL MORAN 

Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

Adm. Bill Moran is a native of New York and graduated with a Bachelor of Science from 

the United States Naval Academy in 1981 and a master's degree from the National War 

College in 2006. 

As a flag officer, he has served as commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group; director, 

Air Warfare (N98) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations; and most recently as the 

57th chief of naval personnel. 

His operational tours spanned both coasts, commanding Patrol Squadron (VP) 46 and 

Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 2. He served as an instructor pilot in two tours with VP30 and as a staff member for Commander, Carrier Group 6 aboard USS Forrestal (CV A 

59). 

Ashore, he served as executive assistant to the chief of naval operations; executive 

assistant to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; deputy director, Navy staff; and assistant 

Washington placement officer and assistant tlag officer detailer in the Bureau ofNaval 

Personnel. 

Moran assumed duties as the Navy's 39th vice chief of naval operations, May 31, 2016. He 

is a senior naval advisor to the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations. 

He is entitled to wear the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, 

Legion of Merit (five awards) and other various personal, unit and service awards. 

Updated: 31 May 2016 
74 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE 

ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF 

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS 

STATEMENT OF: GENERAL STEPHEN W. WILSON 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED 

BY THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Page 1 of12 

MARCH 8, 2017 
75 

INTRODUCTION 

Credible and effective nuclear deterrence capabilities remain foundational to 

US national security. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must deter 

attacks against the homeland and assure our allies and partners, and maintain 

strategic stability. In support of this vital mission, your United States Air Force is 

responsible for: two-thirds of the nation's nuclear Triad, including more than 400 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and 66 nuclear-capable bombers; 

approximately 75% of the nation's nuclear command, control, and communications 

(NC3) systems, and a force of dual capable aircraft (DCA)-fighter aircraft capable of 

carrying nuclear weapons. Most importantly, nearly 30,000 Airmen across the nuclear 

enterprise work tirelessly ensuring our nuclear capabilities remain safe, secure, 

effective, and ready. While our Airmen are standing watch to defend our Nation and 

deter potential adversaries today, Air Force nuclear capabilities must be modernized 

to ensure future strategic deterrence. 

Today, the Air Force stands at a critical junction with regard to our ability to 

continue providing effective nuclear deterrence to the Nation and our allies and 

partners. The majority of our vital capabilities in this area-delivery platforms and 

weapons, NC3 systems, and the supporting infrastructure required to operate themwere last recapitalized in the 1980s and are now decades beyond their projected 

service lives. We are rapidly approaching a point where the series of costly and 

complex life extension programs we have relied on to sustain these systems will no 

longer be sufficient to maintain required mission capabilities. Therefore, nuclear 

enterprise modernization efforts are vitally important. In other words, the stark 

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choice the US faces today is not between modernizing these systems or 

continued life extension programs ... the choice is between modernization or 

losing these foundational capabilities starting in as early as the late-2020s. 

Air Force nuclear capabilities are vital elements of strategic deterrence. Our 

ICBMs, bombers, dual capable aircraft, and NC3 systems provide unique and 

complementary effects to deter potential adversaries and assure our allies. Our ICBM 

force is responsive, cost-effective, and provides stability by creating an extraordinarily 

high threshold and cost-imposing challenge for a large-scale conventional or nuclear 

attack on the US based on the size and dispersed nature of the ICBM forces. Our 

bomber fleet provides visible, flexible deterrent options to the President while 

remaining central to our long-range strike capability of holding any global target at risk 

within hours. Our dual-capable, forward-deployed fighter aircraft augment the 

strategic deterrent capability of the Triad, reassure allies, and are a core component 

of our NATO Alliance. Linking the nuclear enterprise together, Air Force NC3 

architecture is critical to connecting the President with his senior advisors and nuclear 

forces. 

While the Budget Control Act (BCA) and Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 and 

2015, respectively provided some relief to continue modernization efforts, the Air 

Force needs continued Congressional support to provide and maintain a credible 

nuclear deterrent well into the future, especially as we face significant modernization 

costs in the coming fiscal years. Providing necessary funding to maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear force is a national obligation. Three Congressional 

actions will support our efforts: 1) Congressional support to pass an appropriation, 2) 

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supporting a budget amendment, and 3) in FY18, repealing BCA while providing 

predictable future funding. 

Finally, we need Congressional support to prevent a year-long continuing 

resolution (CR). Under a year-long CR, future NC3 manpower would receive $500 

million less than our FY 2017 request. Further, five critical nuclear modernization 

programs would be delayed; including necessary upgrades to B-2 and B-52 bombers, 

ICBM life-extension efforts, and delays to our Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) 

and Ground-based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) contract process, risking that 

replacement weapons will not be ready prior to Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) 

and ICBM age outs. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

Today, the United States faces an extraordinarily complex and dynamic 

geopolitical landscape, one that requires the nation to maintain strategic stability with 

both existing and emerging nuclear powers. Nuclear forces play an increasingly 

important role in the security strategies of other state actors, such as Russia and 

China, who continue to develop new systems, and modernize existing arsenals. 

Today, in terms of nuclear capabilities, Russia is our only peer, and will likely remain 

so in the coming decades. Although not nuclear peers, China and North Korea 

continue to significantly enhance their nuclear weapons capabilities. 

Russia's continued aggression and provocations, its demonstrated willingness 

to violate the sovereignty of its neighbors, and its disregard for its international 

commitments, poses a clear threat to global stability. Russia's robust nuclear 

modernization programs place strong emphasis on their ICBM forces, ballistic missile 

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submarines, nuclear-capable strategic bombers, and nuclear cruise missiles. 

Meanwhile, China continues to challenge international norms with the militarization of 

the South China Sea, while investing in enhanced nuclear capabilities, to include 

mobile ICBM systems and counter-US ballistic missile defense technology. Finally, 

North Korea's efforts to expand its nuclear stockpile and develop advanced ballistic 

missiles capable of threatening US and Allied interests, is deeply concerning. 

Potential adversary technological advances pose a credible and growing threat to US 

nuclear effectiveness. These nations continue to prioritize investment and progression 

of their own nuclear enterprises. To maintain strategic stability with Russia and China, 

and address the growing threat from North Korea, the US must accordingly invest in 

its foundational and critical nuclear capabilities. 

MODERNIZATION IMPERATIVE 

We cannot afford to wait until tomorrow. Today, the nation must preserve our 

foundational nuclear capabilities vital to a credible deterrent against any future threat. 

Significant obsolescence and asset attrition across our nuclear weapons systems 

threatens operational readiness and poses a growing challenge to our ability to 

sustain our capabilities. Across the board, current service-life extension programs 

(SLEPs) will not be able to preserve required mission capabilities indefinitely. 

The Air Force requires additional resources to invest in our nuclear capabilities 

and infrastructure. Currently, all of our weapons storage areas are operating with 

waivers and deviations from our high standards. Although these storage areas are 

safe and secure, they are decades old and the infrastructure is failing. Furthermore, 

their locations do not meet operational bomber requirements. We must recapitalize to 

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address the recommendations identified in the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews for 

facility and weapons sustainment. 

The Minuteman ICBM force was initially fielded in the early 1960s and 

upgraded with the Minuteman Ill missile in the early 1970s. The aging Minuteman 

infrastructure, command and control, and flight systems must be replaced with the 

GBSD. While the Minuteman will be sustained beyond 2030 as the GBSD capability is 

deployed, it is important to realize that it cannot be sustained beyond 2036. Current 

Air Force plans are to field GBSD starting in 2027 and continuing through 2035; once 

operational, the system will provide a low risk and affordable integrated weapon 

system through 2075. 

Meanwhile, we must continue to invest in modernization of our air-based 

nuclear weapons systems. On average, our bombers are 45 years old and our nuclear 

weapons facilities are now over 40 years old, with many facility systems operating well 

past their designed service life. Our flexible dual-capable bomber fleet is the most 

visible leg of the nuclear triad. The B-2 and B-52 require upgrades, and we must 

ensure one of our main acquisitions priorities, the B-21 bomber, proceeds on 

schedule. Accordingly, NC3 must be modernized to support accompanying nuclear 

capabilities, as it underpins our national nuclear employment option. 

We must also make the needed investments to support our weapons, 

specifically the B61-12 and the Long-Range Standoff programs in conjunction with the 

Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Both programs are 

vital to provide necessary options to the President in a range of scenarios, to deter our 

adversaries, and assure our allies. Though we are grateful for modest relief of 

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80 

spending limitations that allowed us to address a scrutinized priority list of nuclear 

modernization efforts, we require additional resources to invest in foundational nuclear 

capabilities and infrastructure. 

NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AFFORDABILITY AND PRIORITIZATION 

DoD nuclear programs account for a relatively small percentage of current and 

projected defense spending. The DoD nuclear enterprise requires significant 

investment for critical modernization and recapitalization efforts: $3508 - $4508 over 

the next two decades for both Air Force and Navy systems. Based on OSD estimates, 

Triad programs (Air Force and Navy) account for an average of 3. 7% of the 

Department of Defense budget over the approximate 20-year recapitalization 

timeframe. However, modernization costs represent a significant challenge to the Air 

Force budget under current constraints. Effective 21st Century deterrence demands 

properly balanced nuclear and conventional forces and current Air Force Total 

Obligation Authority is insufficient to accomplish both. Nuclear deterrence and 

conventional capabilities are both vital to national security requirements. The Air 

Force will continue to prioritize investment across our nuclear enterprise, investing in: 

ICBMs/GBSD, our bomber fleet (8-52, 8-2, and 8-21), weapons (861-12 and LRSO), 

and NC3. 

GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES 

We must invest in GBSD as the next major improvement to the land-based 

portion of our nuclear Triad. The GBSD program will reach initial capability in 2029, 

planned full capability by 2036, and continue to meet operational requirements 

through 2075. The program is comprised of three major efforts: missile flight systems, 

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81 

weapon system command and control, and launch systems and will provide 400 

operationally deployed missiles. Meanwhile, we are committed to investing in our 

aging ICBM Minuteman Ill systems, ensuring reliability and supportability through 

2036, or until GBSD is fully operational. The Air Force is confident in its cost estimate 

analysis and is continually seeking innovative methods to reduce production costs 

throughout GBSD design and development. Ultimately, Minuteman Ill life-extension 

programs are costly-more costly than replacement-and will not meet combatant 

commander and national security requirements. 

AIRBORNE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES 

The Air Force nuclear bomber fleet, consisting of the B-52 and B-2, remains 

the most flexible leg of the nuclear Triad. Our 19 B-2 bombers, providing the nation's 

only low-observable, penetrating, multi-role capability, need multiple upgrades to 

remain viable into the late 2020s. Major modification programs include: an updated 

defensive management and threat warning system, survivable and high-bandwidth 

communications, weapons stores management, and logistics and maintenance 

improvements. 

An enduring icon of American airpower, the B-52 remains a workhorse for the 

joint force, providing robust nuclear and conventional capability. We plan to invest in 

multiple B-52 major modernization programs to bring our aging technology up to par. 

From avionics and weapons upgrades to datalink and radar modernization, the B-52 

requires significant investment, including five new-start programs in FY17. We must 

also explore options to replace the B-52's inefficient legacy engine. If we are to rely 

on the B-52 until at least 2050, these upgrades are essential. 

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Technology gaps between the US and potential adversaries are closing. The 

B-21 will support the nuclear Triad by providing an advanced and flexible deterrent 

capability, with the ability to penetrate modern and future air defenses. Further, the 

B-21 will provide flexibility across a wide range of joint military operations using long 

range, large mixed payloads, and survivability. Agile acquisition processes have been 

built into the B-21 development and procurement efforts, ensuring we deliver system 

capabilities for the best value, while integrating open architecture for ease of upgrade 

to future technology requirements. 

The Air Force remains committed to B-21 affordability, with the average 

procurement cost of $564 million in base year 2016 dollars. We require a fleet size 

that will ensure sustained dominance well into this century and intend to procure a 

minimum of 100 B-21s. Procuring at least 100 B-21s will also reduce lifecycle 

ownership costs. Further, we are continuing to study the right size of the total future 

bomber force. Deterrence and demonstrated combat capability remain vital 

instruments of power, especially as our enemies are committed to denying our 

attacks from the air. Only 12% of our current bomber fleet is survivable in such an 

environment. Therefore, the B-21 remains an absolute national defense priority and 

we are grateful for your continued support of this critical program going forward. 

Fielded in the 1980s, the AGM-868 ALCM is over 25 years beyond its life 

expectancy and is involved in its third life extension program. While the ALCM 

remains effective today, its aging subsystems, advances in enemy defenses, and a 

simple lack of numbers mandate we replace it. The Air Force plans to sustain ALCMs 

until our Long-range Stand Off (LRSO) weapon reaches operational capability in 

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2030. We plan to invest in continued life-extension programs including critical 

telemetry, encryption, and flight termination components. Meanwhile, we continue to 

invest in developing and fielding the LRSO. This weapon will retain nuclear 

penetrating cruise missile capabilities through 2060. To meet operational, testing, and 

logistics requirements, the Air Force plans to acquire approximately 1,000 LRSO 

cruise missile bodies. This quantity will both provide spares and supply sufficient nonnuclear missile bodies throughout ongoing flight and ground testing. The number of 

nuclear-armed LRSO cruise missiles (i.e., mated to a nuclear warhead), is expected 

to be equivalent to the current ALCM nuclear force . 

. Finally, the 861 family of gravity nuclear weapons support the airborne leg of 

the Triad and is the primary weapon supporting our NATO allies under extended 

deterrence. Legacy B61s require service-life extensions. The 861-12 life-extension 

provides required digital weapons interfaces and adds a guided tail kit assembly. This 

warhead life-extension, through the Department of Energy's National Nuclear 

Security Administration, improves reliability, safety, and security, while reducing life 

cycle costs and enabling us to reduce the stockpile by consolidating four weapons 

versions into one. 

UH-1N 

The Air Force is committed to replacing the UH-1 N fleet, which supports two 

critical national missions: nuclear security in support of the ICBM force and the 

Continuity of Operations mission in the National Capital Region. The UH-1 N platform 

falls short of missile field operational needs-notably with speed, range, endurance, 

payload, and survivability. The Air Force is pursuing a full-and-open competition to 

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84 

procure 84 replacement helicopters. We plan to release the final request for proposal 

in summer 2017, with delivery of the first operational helicopters anticipated in FY20 

to 21. 

NC3 

Air Force NC3 systems connect the President to his senior advisors and 

nuclear forces. Many of our NC3 systems are well past their lifespans. Therefore, we 

are investing in several programs to support this connective architecture, ranging from 

communications systems improvements to upgraded digital processing and display 

improvements. NC3 also includes the modernization of our E-4B aircraft, providing 

airborne nuclear command and control capability. We need support to upgrade E-4B 

communications and surveillance systems. 

NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION 

In 2014, the DoD Nuclear Enterprise Reviews (NERs), along with internal Air 

Force assessments, served as a catalyst for major improvements within the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise. Since 2014, the Air Force has applied deliberate and sustained 

focus towards addressing the identified shortfalls. Our ongoing efforts-spanning the 

full-range of personnel, management, oversight, mission performance, training, testing, 

and investment issues-continue to produce tangible and lasting improvements 

throughout the nuclear enterprise. Over time, Air Force follow-on efforts have 

transitioned from addressing urgent mission deficiencies to loner-term initiatives. As 

part of this evolution, the Air Force is placing renewed emphasis on establishing 

effective processes to continuously assess and oversee the health of the nuclear 

enterprise. 

Page 11 of12 
85 

CONCLUSION 

The technology and capability gaps between our nation and its adversaries are 

closing dangerously fast...and in some cases, have closed completely. Fighting a 

nuclear war is an unthinkable proposition, and has been for the last 70 years, precisely 

because the nation has been prepared to fight one. The best way to avoid unthinkable 

conflict is to be prepared to fight with modern and reliable forces. To do otherwise, by 

delaying modernization once more, is irresponsible and invites strategic instability, 

potential miscalculation, and the risk of a devastating nuclear exchange. We stand at a 

pivotal point in history where the American people and our allies are counting on 

Congressional action to fund our nuclear enterprise modernization. 

We remain committed to innovative and cost-saving measures to ensure 

weapons system and acquisitions efficiency. However, we need your support to first, 

pass an appropriation in FY17 and support a budget amendment. Second, we must 

repeal BCA in FY18 and provide predictable funding for the future. This allows us to 

proceed with a strategy-driven budget and not the compromising budget-driven 

strategy consistent with BCA. Thank you for your continued support of our Air Force 

and our outstanding 660,000 Total Force Airmen, who relentlessly and professionally 

serve our great nation by providing two-thirds of the nation's nuclear capability. 

Page 12 of 12 
86 

GENERAL STEPHEN W. "SEVE" WILSON 

Gen. Stephen W. "Seve" Wilson is Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, 

Washington, D.C. As Vice Chiet~ he presides over the Air Staff and serves as a member 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory 

Working Group. He assists the Chief of Staff with organizing, training, and equipping 

of660,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian forces serving in the United States 

and overseas. 

Gen. Wilson received his commission from Texas A&M University in 1981. He's had 

multiple flying tours, and led bomber; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; 

mobility; aeromedical evacuation; and airbome command and control operations 

supporting Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of 

Africa. Gen. Wilson has also held numerous command positions, including the Joint 

Functional Component Commander for Global Strike and Air Force Global Strike 

Command. Gen. Wilson is a command pilot with more than 4,500 flying hours and 680 

combat hours. Prior to his current assignment, the general was Deputy Commander, 

U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. 

EDUCATION 

1981 Bachelor of Science, Aerospace Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station 

1985 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1989 Master of Science degree, Engineering Management, South Dakota School of Mines & 

Technology 

1993 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

1997U.S. Air Foree Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev. 

2000 Master's degree in strategic studies, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2005 Leadership f(lr a Democratic Society, Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Va. 

2007 Joint Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2009 Joint Flag Officer W arfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

2010 Leadership Decision Making Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

2013 Pinnacle Course, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 

ASSIGNMENTS 

l. June 1981 -May 1982, student, undergraduate pilot training, Laughlin AFB, Texas 

2. May I 982- September 1986, T-38 Instructor Pilot, evaluator pilot and flight commander, 86th 

Flying Training Squadron, Laughlin AFB, Texas 

3. September 1986- May 1987, B-1 Student, 338th Combat Training Squadron, Dyess AFB, 

Texas 

4. May 1987- July 1991, B-1 Instructor Pilot and Flight Commander, 77th Bomb Squadron, 

Ellsworth AFB, S.D. 

5. July 1991- July 1992, Chief of Weapons and Tactics, 28th Operations Support Squadron, 

Ellsworth AFB, S.D. 

6. July 1992- July 1993, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

7. July 1993 -September 1995, Joint Stati Officer, Doctrine, Concepts and Initiatives Division, 

Plans and Policy (J5), Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany 

8. September 1995 -June 1997, Chief of Safety, 28th Bomb Wing, later, operations officer, 

37th Bomb Squadron, Ellsworth AFB, S.D. 

9. June 1997- June 1999, Commander, B-1 Division, and Instructor Pilot, Weapons Instructor 

Course, USAF Weapons School, Ellsworth AFB, S.D. 

10. August 1999- June 2000, Student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

11. June 2000 -June 2002, Deputy Commander, 366th Operations Group, Mountain Home AFB, 

Idaho 
87 

12. J Lily 2002 - March 2004, Commander, 608th Air Operations Group, Barksdale AFB, La. 

13. March 2004- June 2006, Commander, 14th Flying Training Wing, Columbus AFB, Miss. 

14. June 2006- July 2007, Deputy Director of Air, Space and Information Operations (A2/3), 

Headquarters Air Education and Training Command, Randolph AFB, Texas 

15. July 2007- July 2009, Deputy Commander, Canadian Notih American Aerospace 

Defense Region, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada 

16. July 2009- July 2010, Commander, 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, Southwest Asia 

17. July 2010- June 2011, Director for Joint Integration, Directorate of Operational Capability 

Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. 

Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

18. June 2011 -October 2013, Commander, Eighth Air Force (Air Forces Strategic), Barksdale 

AFB, La., and Joint Functional Component Commander for Global Strike, U.S. Strategic 

Command, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

19. October 2013- July 2015, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale AFB, 

La. 

20. July 2015- July 2016, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb. 

21. July 2016- present, Vice Chief ofStaffoflhe U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS 

1. July 1993 - September 1995, Joint Staff officer, Doctrine, Concepts and Initiatives Division, 

Plans and Policy (JS), Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, as a major 

2. July 2007- July 2009, Deputy Commander, Canadian North American Aerospace Defense 

Region, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, as a colonel and brigadier general 

3. June 2011 -October 2013, Joint Functional Component Commander for Global Strike, U.S. 

Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a brigadier general and major general 

4. July 2015 July 2016, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt, AFB, Neb., as a 

lieutenant general 

FLIGHT INFORMATION 

Rating: Command pilot 

Flight hours: More than 4,600, and 680 combat hours 

Aircraft ilown: T-37, T-38, B-1 and B-52 

MAJOR A WARDS AND DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Defense Superior Service Medal 

Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster 

Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Defense Meritorious Service Medal 

Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters 

Air Medal with oak leaf cluster 

Aerial Achievement Medal 

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster 

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION 

Second Lieutenant June 2, 1981 

First Lieutenant June 2, 1983 

Captain June 2, 1985 

Major June I, 1993 

Lieutenant Colonel Jan. I, 1997 

Colonel June I, 2002 

Brigadier General Dec. 3, 2007 

Major General Sept. I, 2011 

Lieutenant General Oct. 23, 2013 

General July 22,2016 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 8, 2017 

(91) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. You stated during the hearing that we ‘‘were not entering an arms 

race because we bilaterally have a verifiable inspection regime for the weapons that 

are deployed. We have capped the number of weapons that are available.’’ However, 

is there a risk that a nuclear arms race could still occur because the New START 

Treaty, while it imposes caps on launchers, does not impose any limits on the number of non-deployed or reserve nuclear weapons? Why/why not? 

General SELVA. The New START Treaty caps the number of deployed warheads 

and deployed and non-deployed launchers both sides can possess. Thus compliance 

with New START is preventing either side from ‘‘racing.’’ There is always risk that 

a nuclear arms race may occur, but not because the New START Treaty does not 

impose any limits on the number of non-deployed warheads. For example, Russia 

could decide to breakout from New START limits and continue its ongoing modernization program beyond what is allowed under the Treaty. In fact, one of the purposes of the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed warheads is to deter such a breakout by 

enabling us to increase our forces as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Work stated before our committee in June 2015, ‘‘Anyone 

who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire’’ and ‘‘Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the 

ultimate escalation.’’ Do you agree, and do you think escalation can be reliably controlled? What are the risks that using a lower-yield nuclear weapon would lead to 

a massive nuclear exchange? 

General SELVA. As there has thankfully never been a limited nuclear exchange, 

we do not know whether such escalation can be controlled, and we cannot know for 

certain how reliable an effort to control escalation might be. The use of any nuclear 

weapon could lead to a large-scale exchange and the prospect of such uncontrolled 

escalation arguably enhances the deterrence of nuclear first use. However, just because we do not know for certain whether we can control escalation does not mean 

we should not attempt it if an adversary uses a nuclear weapon in a conflict. Were 

deterrence to fail in a limited way, it would be better for the President to have a 

full range of response options, including options to attempt to control further escalation and reestablish deterrence. 

Mr. SMITH. Given the increasing costs for nuclear weapons modernization and the 

conventional capabilities requirements, could you provide a chart to the Committee 

showing the costs of nuclear weapons modernization/recapitalization as a percentage 

of the DOD acquisition budget over the next 10 years and next 25 years? 

General SELVA. [See table below.] 

Program FYDP (2017–2021) 

Estimate ($B) 

10-Year (2017–2026) 

Estimate ($B) 

COLUMBIA-Class 13.2 43.7 

Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 3.4 13.2 

Long Range Stand Off 2.2 5.6 

B–211 0.6 1.9 

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Investment 2 10.7 20.4 

Notes 

1. These amounts represent the nuclear-related costs for the B–21 program which are estimated at 

5%. 

2. Includes procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation costs. 

The Department is still compiling 10-year estimates based on the FY18 budget and cannot offer a 25 

year plan. 
92 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Work stated before our committee in June 2015, ‘‘Anyone 

who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire’’ and ‘‘Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the 

ultimate escalation.’’ Do you agree, and do you think escalation can be reliably controlled? What are the risks that using a lower-yield nuclear weapon would lead to 

a massive nuclear exchange? 

General HYTEN. I agree with Secretary Work in that escalation management is 

a complex concept. In the scenario described, nuclear employment has occurred and, 

as an international community, we are in uncharted waters. That is one of the reasons I do not like to use the term ‘‘tactical nuclear weapons.’’ In my opinion, the 

employment of any nuclear weapon is a strategic decision and will demand a strategic response. Although considerable thought has been paid to the theory of limited 

war over more than half a century, there remain considerable risks of misperception 

and misunderstanding leading to miscalculation; which is one reason why dialogue 

with foreign actors, arms control agreements, and other mechanisms are so important Again, regardless of the yield, any use of a nuclear weapon will have strategic 

implications 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. Are you concerned about the shift in Russian nuclear doctrine and 

potential consequences as a result of such a shift that could lower the threshold of 

using nuclear weapons? How can we increase strategic and regional stability, especially in the context of nuclear proliferation, modernization, and evolving nuclear 

doctrines? 

General SELVA. Yes, I am concerned about Russian nuclear doctrine and the potential it creates for uncontrolled escalation in a crisis. A fully modernized U.S. nuclear triad and nonstrategic nuclear forces raise Russia’s threshold for using nuclear 

weapons because it ensures our ability to respond should Russia seek to escalate 

its way out of a failed conventional conflict. Therefore one way for us to increase 

strategic and regional stability is to continue the nuclear modernization program of 

record to avoid capability gaps that might threaten the credibility and effectiveness 

of our nuclear deterrent. Another complementary way would be dialogue with Russia regarding strategic stability to reduce the likelihood of misperception and miscalculation. 

Mr. COOPER. Should nuclear threat reduction and nuclear nonproliferation be considered as part of the discussions related to the nuclear posture review? Why/why 

not? 

General SELVA. Yes, I believe the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) should consider 

aspects of nuclear threat reduction and non-proliferation because they are important 

and related national security interests. I believe our nuclear deterrence policies, 

strategies and capabilities provide added insurance to achieve U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and are key enablers to reducing threats to the United 

States and our allies from nuclear and WMD-armed adversaries. 

Mr. COOPER. Should nuclear threat reduction and nuclear nonproliferation be considered as part of the discussions related to the nuclear posture review? Why/why 

not? 

General HYTEN. Yes, reducing the threat of nuclear weapon use and proliferation 

are essential elements to determining the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces’ ability 

to deter nuclear attack against the U.S., our allies, and our partners Beyond the 

nuclear posture review, the U.S. regularly participates in dialogue with other ‘‘P– 

5’’ members and the broader international community to improve understanding of 

nuclear capabilities and reduce the potential for miscalculation Similarly, consistent 

with our treaty obligations, the U.S., along with our allies and partners, continue 

to pursue nuclear non-proliferation policies and strategies to reduce escalatory risks 

and maintain strategic and regional stability. 

Mr. COOPER. How could the Department increase the incentives for commonality 

between the Navy and the Air Force while minimizing risks, in order to reduce longterm costs for the planned nuclear modernization? 

Admiral MORAN. The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the challenges 

of sustaining aging strategic weapon systems in a fiscally constrained environment, 

and are working collaboratively to ensure these capabilities are retained in the longterm. We are seeking opportunities to leverage technologies and make the best use 

of scarce resources. The Navy and the Air Force assessed whether increasing commonality between the GBSD program and the Trident II (D5) life extension program 

could improve affordability while ensuring a safe, secure, effective and credible nuclear deterrent, as well as retain essential diversity to hedge due to unforeseen tech-
93 

nical problems or vulnerabilities. The assessment identified some impediments to 

full commonality of major subsystems, like solid rocket motors; however, it also 

identified several D5 life extension candidate processes and components that showed 

promise for application in GBSD development. The Navy also expects to leverage, 

where possible and feasible, Air Force ICBM technologies in the longer-term for its 

own follow-on strategic weapon system capability. 

Mr. COOPER. Four years ago, you were faced with bad morale and poor leadership 

in the ICBM missileer ranks and were called on to address this problem. What 

caused the breakdown in leadership? What are the milestones for improved morale 

and leadership? 

General WILSON. In 2014, various internal and external assessments identified a 

number of factors within the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force that 

had contributed to culture and morale issues. Some of the most frequently cited included a culture of perfection and micromanagement that had developed, manning 

and resource constraints that led to workarounds outside of accepted procedures, 

and excessive administrative requirements. 

Since 2014, the Air Force has applied deliberate and sustained focus to strengthen 

the ICBM mission as well as the broader nuclear enterprise. Our ongoing efforts— 

spanning the full-range of personnel, management, oversight, mission performance, 

training, testing, and investment issues—continue to produce tangible and lasting 

improvements. We have institutionalized a culture of continuous improvement and 

have placed renewed emphasis on establishing effective processes to assess and 

oversee the health of the nuclear enterprise. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that we’re planning 

to spend ‘‘roughly 6 percent’’ of the total defense budget on the nuclear deterrence 

mission over the next 10 years. In your professional military judgment, is 6 percent 

of our defense budget an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence 

mission—for what you termed in the hearing the nation’s highest priority defense 

mission? 

General SELVA. I will re-emphasize that the nuclear deterrent is the nation’s highest priority defense mission and, as such, needs to be funded appropriately. The past 

sequestration and budget caps have negatively impacted the modernization of our 

nuclear weapon systems and infrastructure. We have delayed making investments 

in modernization which has driven our current systems to the end of their service 

lives. Further delays will cause gaps in our capabilities and jeopardize the nuclear 

deterrence mission as well as increase costs later. It is imperative that we fund the 

nuclear deterrence mission now to assure it is safe, secure, and effective for years 

to come. 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise missiles. Please describe how 

LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/strategy on our adversaries? 

General SELVA. LRSO complicates a potential adversary’s air defense problem by 

presenting many more small and low-observable penetrators than a single bomber 

with gravity weapons can present on its own. In combination with a penetrating 

bomber, LRSO will significantly reduce a potential adversary’s ability to achieve 

sanctuary within his borders. 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-launched cruise 

missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy such dual-capable ALCMs? 

How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in combat and did any adversary ever 

mistake one of those conventional ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO 

would be destabilizing—why or why not? 

General SELVA. Russia currently has multiple types of dual-capable ALCMs. Russia has Kh-101 (conventional) and Kh-102 (nuclear) subsonic cruise missiles that are 

comparable to U.S. CALCMs and ALCMs. Russia also has Kh-32, a dual-capable airlaunched supersonic cruise missile for which the U.S. has nothing comparable. Of 

note, the Kh-101 and Kh-102 have significantly greater range than their U.S. counterparts, and Russian press has reported that Kh-101 was launched from Russian 

strategic bombers (Tu-95 and Tu-160) into Syria over the past 6 months. The United 

States has employed over 300 CALCMs in various conflicts since 1991, most recently in 2003 in Iraqi Freedom. None have been mistaken as nuclear variants. I 

do not believe LRSO is destabilizing because, like the ALCM it is replacing, it does 

not provide a disarming first strike capability. 
94 

Mr. ROGERS. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff examine eliminating LRSO during the 

review of nuclear deterrence last year? Did the Joint Chiefs ultimately recommend 

continuing to pursue LRSO? Why? 

General SELVA. As part of the previous Administration’s review of its nuclear policy last year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated a proposal to defer the current 

LRSO acquisition program. The Joint Chiefs recommended continuing the current 

program to ensure a replacement for the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is 

available before the ALCM ages out. When fielded, LRSO will sustain a nuclear 

standoff capability that the ALCM has provided for decades, and it is a critical element of our ability to enhance deterrence by enabling credible response options to 

an adversary’s limited or large-scale nuclear attack. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are there military requirements that the U.S. military cannot currently satisfy because we adhere to INF? What are they? 

General SELVA. There are no military requirements we cannot currently satisfy 

due to our compliance with the INF Treaty. While there is a military requirement 

to prosecute targets at ranges covered by the INF Treaty, those fires do not have 

to be ground-based. However, ground-based systems would increase both the operational flexibility and the scale of our intermediate-range strike capabilities. We are 

continually monitoring emerging needs in the face of a rapidly changing security environment. If major shifts in the geopolitical landscape drive a specific requirement 

for a ground-based intermediate-range strike capability, our compliance with the 

INF Treaty would restrict our ability to field such systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any compelling need to extend the New START treaty 

today? The treaty currently goes to 2021. What are some of the considerations that 

you, in your professional military opinion, believe must be addressed in any decision 

by policymakers to extend this treaty? 

General SELVA. No, there is no need to extend New START today. It is too early 

to consider extending the Treaty. We are focused this year on completing our reductions under the Treaty and ensuring Russia meets its obligations by February 2018 

when the Treaty’s limits go into effect. Russia remains in compliance with New 

START, and I support continued implementation. New START continues to provide 

predictability of and transparency into Russia’s strategic forces. However, I anticipate Russia’s violation of its international commitments such as the INF Treaty will 

be a consideration in any future arms control discussions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Nuclear disarmament advocates are attempting to build support for 

a treaty that would ban nuclear weapons around the world. What are the military 

ramifications if U.S. allies sign such a treaty? How might that affect our military, 

including alliance commitments to NATO and the ability to deter and assure in Europe? 

General SELVA. If allies sign a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, it would undermine 

long-standing security relationships that have underpinned the international security structure in place since the end of World War II. Efforts to negotiate such a 

treaty also seek to delegitimize nuclear deterrence, which would be at fundamental 

odds with the extended deterrence guarantees that we provide to allies in Europe 

and Asia. Therefore, if NATO Allies were to sign such a treaty, it would undermine 

longstanding U.S. extended deterrence commitments, which are a core element of 

NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe we should pause or defer development of LRSO to 

wait to see if we can successfully negotiate a treaty banning on cruise missiles? In 

your professional military judgment, do you see indications that Russia would negotiate, agree to, and abide by such a treaty, given their ongoing violation of the INF 

Treaty? 

General SELVA. No, I do not believe we should pause or defer development of 

LRSO to wait for a successful negotiation of a treaty banning cruise missiles. As 

I stated in my testimony, we are currently depending on ‘‘just-in-time’’ modernization and replacement of our nuclear forces, and that is certainly true of LRSO replacing the aging Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). In my view, there is no 

chance Russia or any of the numerous countries who possess cruise missiles would 

negotiate or agree to such a treaty if the United States did not also have a credible 

and effective cruise missile capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that we’re planning 

to spend ‘‘roughly 6 percent’’ of the total defense budget on the nuclear deterrence 

mission over the next 10 years. In your professional military judgment, is 6 percent 

of our defense budget an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence 

mission—for what you termed in the hearing the nation’s highest priority defense 

mission? 

General HYTEN. Yes. Modernization underpins national security and will enable 

the U.S. to defend itself and Allies against existing and emerging existential 
95 

threats. Any further modernization delays will result in the loss of deterrent capability. Recapitalization last occurred in the 1980s and accounted for ∼12% of defense 

spending. 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise missiles. Please describe how 

LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/strategy on our adversaries? 

General HYTEN. The combination of LRSO attributes (ability to launch beyond 

range of adversary defenses, hold large geographical area at risk, low observable 

signature, multi-axis routing, large attack packages) severely challenges the effectiveness of even the most advanced Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Huge investments and technological advancements in detection, tracking, command and 

control, and area/point defenses are required to challenge LRSO viability. 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-launched cruise 

missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy such dual-capable ALCMs? 

How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in combat and did any adversary ever 

mistake one of those conventional ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO 

would be destabilizing—why or why not? 

General HYTEN. Yes, Russia deploys dual capable cruise missiles. The United 

States has launched a total of 369 Conventional Air Launch Cruise Missiles 

(CALCMs) and over 2,000 Tactical Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) in combat since 

1987. None have been mischaracterized by an adversary as a nuclear ALCM/TLAM– 

N. I do not believe LRSO is destabilizing—nuclear cruise missiles have existed for 

decades. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you please describe the military requirements driving the 

need for GBSD? What are the military effectiveness and cost implications of choosing to life extend the current Minuteman III missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue GBSD? 

General HYTEN. Minuteman availability and effectiveness is increasingly challenged due to system and component age-out, asset attrition, and facility degradation issues. As Minuteman III has done for over 40 years, GBSD will continue to 

provide a responsive, highly reliable, cost effective force as part of a credible strategic deterrent capability. GBSD enhances strategic stability by forcing potential adversaries to commit a large number of highly accurate ballistic missiles and warheads in order to defeat the force. This ‘‘barrier to entry’’ encourages restraint as 

no adversary could defeat GBSD without considering the consequences of a U.S. retaliatory response. 2014 GBSD Analysis of Alternatives determined the entire Minuteman weapon system, to include the C2 infrastructure, requires modernization beginning in 2028 and concluded executing the GBSD program is more cost effective 

than an additional Minuteman life extension. 

Mr. ROGERS. Where do you see the greatest cost and technical risks in the GBSD 

program? For example, what is your view on the priority of possible mobile command and control concepts being considered for GBSD? 

General HYTEN. From USSTRATCOM’s perspective, the greatest cost and technical risk is executing a modernization program that goes beyond replacing the missile. GBSD must be a fully integrated weapon system spanning flight systems, 

weapon system command and control, missile facilities, and the supporting equipment. The U.S. has not conducted this level of work in the ICBM force for several 

decades and it will require years of dedicated work and consistent investment to 

execute the program successfully. USSTRATCOM supports the Air Force’s integrated weapon system approach which focuses low technical risk solutions to deliver 

the required capabilities as the Minuteman force retires. The Technical Maturation 

and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase’s objective is to investigate technologies which 

reduce development and production risk while meeting strategic deterrence requirements. As part of this process, the TMRR will examine a full range of options, including mobile command and control concepts, to meet our requirements. 

Mr. ROGERS. We’ve seen a lot of GBSD acquisition details loaded into unclassified 

acquisition databases run by the Air Force. We all know that Russia, China, and 

others scoop all of that stuff up and analyze it intensively. Why is all of this put 

out in the open? Should we reassess what is unclassified in these acquisition documents? 

General HYTEN. We share your concerns regarding the amount of program information that is available. We need to assess our acquisition processes to strike a balance between protecting our national security and providing industry the information they need to develop our weapon systems while preventing the release of sensitive information. We will continue assessing the information we must provide to 

industry while safeguarding our classified information through DOD security procedures and safeguards. 
96 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain why we must replace Vietnam-era UH–1N ‘‘Huey’’ 

helicopters that are currently used to help protect our ICBM fields? Is it the case 

that one of the two security requirements can’t be met without new helicopters? 

Should this replacement be pursued with all possible speed? Why? When you rescinded your request for forces, what was your understanding of the date for 

issuance of the RFP for this program? Has that date shifted? 

General HYTEN. The 1960’s era UH–1N fleet does not have the required speed, 

range, endurance, payload or survivability to fully execute the emergency response 

mission. USSTRATCOM’s rescinding the Request For Forces (RFF) was not intended to diminish the need for a replacement helicopter, but to support a focused 

effort on fielding a replacement aircraft as soon as possible. At the time of the RFF 

rescission it was my understanding that the Final Request For Proposal (RFP) release was to be February 2017. Due to industry feedback a second draft RFP was 

required and a final RFP is expected in summer 2017. The Air Force plans to award 

a contract in FY18 that will result in delivery of the first operational helicopter in 

the FY21 timeframe. I was very unhappy when the Air Force notified me of the 

need to reissue the RFP. This should be a simple and straight forward acquisition. 

I rescinded the RFF to ensure that the entire community was focused on the new 

helicopter. I will continue to monitor this closely. 

Mr. ROGERS. At the hearing, you said that ‘‘rough parity is actually a good thing’’ 

in deterrence. I agree. In broad terms, how does Russia’s ability to produce nuclear 

weapons compare to the U.S. capability at this time? Is this disparity in production 

capacity a risk to the United States? 

General HYTEN. Russia is assessed to have a significantly greater production capacity than the U.S. due to the preservation of a large, modernized infrastructure 

(roughly comparable to Cold War era Soviet Union capability). This infrastructure 

has enabled the continuous modernization, expansion, and diversification of Russia’s 

nuclear arsenal. The U.S. has moved to a much smaller infrastructure with a manufacturing capacity that limits our ability to address, within a relevant time-frame 

component age-out and advancing adversary capabilities. Although our nuclear 

stockpile is safe and secure, the disparity in manufacturing capability puts the U.S. 

at a possible future disadvantage from technical risks associated with an aging 

stockpile and geopolitical risks, if Russia were to abandon parity and seek to achieve 

supremacy. 

Mr. ROGERS. At the hearing, you said that ‘‘rough parity is actually a good thing’’ 

in deterrence. You also said that for non-strategic nuclear weapons, ‘‘the Russian 

numbers are huge and our numbers are small.’’ We also know that Russia operates 

many different types of non-strategic nuclear weapons while the U.S. operates essentially one. Is this disparity a risk to the United States? 

General HYTEN. The distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons 

is nebulous—anybody that employs a nuclear weapon in the world has created a 

strategic effect—all nuclear weapons are strategic. Our current force structure, i.e. 

the Triad, is sufficient to maintain strategic stability and manage the risk you are 

referring to. The disparity between U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear systems 

only becomes an issue if our nuclear modernization program is not implemented. I 

am, however, concerned with the recent Russia deployment of a ground-launched 

cruise missile (GLCM) in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 

We will need to decide, as a nation, how to respond. I expect this will be addressed 

in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the impacts to the credibility of our nuclear deterrent if 

we see major schedule slips to any of these programs? How will such slips be seen 

by both our allies and our potential adversaries? 

General HYTEN. All three legs of our TRIAD are serving well beyond their 

planned service life, experiencing age related degradation, with replacements characterized as just in time. There is no schedule margin remaining for any program 

slips. Any further delays and/or cancellations will result in the loss of deterrent capabilities and failure to meet our strategic objectives and extended deterrent commitments causing adversaries, allies and partners to doubt the credibility of the 

U.S. deterrent. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you agree with the characterization that we hear that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ‘‘hair trigger alert’’? Please tell us what 

open-ocean targeting is and why it is important? 

General HYTEN. No, our nuclear forces are not on ‘‘hair trigger alert.’’ Comprehensive and redundant personnel, technical, and procedural safeguards preclude the unauthorized use of TRIAD nuclear forces. U.S. nuclear forces proactively strive for 

the utmost safety and security standards, to include the practice of ‘‘open-ocean targeting.’’ Our nuclear command and control system is constantly exercised to ensure 

that only the President, after consultations with his senior advisors and military 
97 

leaders, can authorize any employment of our nuclear forces. ‘‘Open-ocean targeting,’’ is the practice of loading our ICBMs/SLBMs with target coordinates located 

in open ocean areas. The practice of ‘‘Open-ocean targeting,’’ was implemented as 

part of the 1994 Moscow declaration with the stated purpose to protect the U.S. and 

Russia from an accidental or unauthorized nuclear strike by the other. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that we’re planning 

to spend ‘‘roughly 6 percent’’ of the total defense budget on the nuclear deterrence 

mission over the next 10 years. In your professional military judgment, is 6 percent 

of our defense budget an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence 

mission—for what you termed in the hearing the nation’s highest priority defense 

mission? 

Admiral MORAN. Yes. The 1–2% of the national defense budget for the sea based 

strategic deterrent is appropriate and consistent with what our nation previously invested to build both the ‘‘41 for Freedom’’ in the 1960s and the first nuclear modernization with the OHIO Class in the 1980s. Beyond deterring the threat of massive attack on the United States, having credible nuclear forces is essential to assuring our allies of our extended deterrence commitments, thereby convincing them 

that they don’t need to pursue their own nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Congressional Budget Office recently said that we’re planning 

to spend ‘‘roughly 6 percent’’ of the total defense budget on the nuclear deterrence 

mission over the next 10 years. In your professional military judgment, is 6 percent 

of our defense budget an appropriate level of spending for the nuclear deterrence 

mission—for what you termed in the hearing the nation’s highest priority defense 

mission? 

General WILSON. Making the necessary investments in modernization to ensure 

our nuclear forces remain credible and effective in the years ahead is of paramount 

importance. The level of investment is commensurate with the priority the Department of Defense places on this mission and its foundational role in our National defense. 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing touched on how cruise missiles are cost-imposing capabilities. We know how hard it is defend against cruise missiles. Please describe how 

LRSO is a cost-imposing capability/strategy on our adversaries? 

General WILSON. Developing and deploying defensive systems capable of detecting, tracking, and defeating the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon would require 

a potential adversary to expend significant technical and financial resources. This 

investment in defensive systems diminishes the amount of resources a potential adversary can expend on the development and fielding of offensive capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. The hearing touched on whether dual-capable air-launched cruise 

missiles (ALCM) are destabilizing. Does Russia deploy such dual-capable ALCMs? 

How many times has the U.S. fired an ALCM in combat and did any adversary ever 

mistake one of those conventional ALCMs for a nuclear one? Do you believe LRSO 

would be destabilizing—why or why not? 

General WILSON. The Russian Federation possess dual-capable air-launched 

cruise missiles. 

Since its first use during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, more than 350 conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM) have been employed by the Air Force 

in combat. The Air Force is not aware of any of these CALCM launches being mistaken for nuclear-armed air launched cruise missiles. 

I do not believe the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon would be destabilizing. 

The U.S. has employed CALCMs in combat for more than 25 years without strategic 

miscalculation. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the military effectiveness and cost implications of choosing 

to life extend the current Minuteman III missile fleet and related ground infrastructure, rather than pursue GBSD? 

General WILSON. Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is the only cost-effective solution that will fully meet Combatant Commander requirements through 

2075. The GBSD program addresses the challenges of the future strategic environment that a life-extended Minuteman III (MM III) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

cannot and will do so for approximately the same cost. MM III was designed and 

fielded to counter 1970s-era threats; in the decades since, advancements in adversary capabilities have created a significant and growing threat to MM III’s effectiveness. 

Life extending MM III would not provide combat capability to 2075 and would 

also require multiple sub-system recapitalization programs, including the flight system (i.e. boosters, propulsion system rocket engine, and guidance and control), weapon system command and control, and associated physical infrastructure. In some 

areas, integration of remanufactured legacy components would create new and complex compatibility issues, lead to higher costs, and fail to provide critical capability 
98 

upgrades. These and other challenges—such as obsolescence and age-out of critical 

subsystems, asset depletion, and diminishing manufacturing sources—make GBSD 

the only cost-effective option that will deliver credible and effective combat capability through 2075. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the process the Air Force used during the analysis 

of alternatives (AOA) for the GBSD program. Did it thoroughly examine all options? 

Did it rigorously follow DOD and CAPE guidance on how to conduct an AOA? 

General WILSON. Yes, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of 

Alternatives (AOA) rigorously followed Department of Defense processes, was structured in accordance with the Office of Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation 

(CAPE) study guidance and included direct Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

oversight through a Study Advisory Group (SAG) chaired by Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and CAPE senior leadership. The GBSD AOA study team complied with all CAPE/DOD guidance as part of the assessment. The GBSD study 

team conducted the AOA based upon CAPE’s GBSD AOA Guidance, dated August 

28, 2013. Furthermore, CAPE provided sufficiency review and concurrence for the 

GBSD AOA on November 10, 2015. 

The AOA explored trade space in performance, schedule, and cost across the full 

range of strategic options to include the impacts of not meeting validated GBSD Initial Capability Document requirements. The AOA was conducted in two parts: Part 

one was a basing mode analysis with a primary focus on survivability; Part two analyzed the Minuteman III (MM III) delivery system and focused on MM III recapitalization or replacement. Additionally, Part two assessed the entire range of validated 

gaps against several combinations of missile subsystems, to include propulsion 

(boost and post boost), guidance, navigation and control, re-entry systems, including 

existing and new technologies and associated industrial base. 

While the aforementioned options thoroughly examined basing modes and delivery 

systems, the compression of the AOA timeline and funding (from 18-months to 10- 

months) did require additional post-AOA assessment of the Nuclear Command and 

Control (NC2) system to include detailed NC2 architecture definition and an industrial base interface analysis. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the Air Force looking at pursuing putting new engines on the B– 

52 fleet and leverage third party financing to do this? This seems like a smart way 

to get this done in the near-term while making the B–52 much more efficient and 

military effective for the long-term. 

General WILSON. The Air Force is assessing options to re-engine the B–52 should 

it become a funded program. 

Additionally, the Air Force is assessing the potential use of third party financing 

options for the production phase of a re-engine program. The initial B–52 re-engine 

Business Case Analysis (BCA) indicates significant benefits with lifetime savings exceeding program costs. Payback comes from a variety of engine related expenses; 

fuel only provides 23% of the savings. Several factors contribute to the BCA include: 

escalating engine overhaul and related costs; diminishing sources of supply; engine 

related repair costs; fuel costs; increased electrical power needs. New engines would 

also increase the B–52’s electrical power generation, which would support future 

modernization efforts. 

The Air Force requested $10 million in the Fiscal Year 2017 President’s Budget 

(FY17PB) Amendment that was not received. The funds were to be used to continue 

more detailed analysis and pre-acquisition planning and preparation for a potential 

re-engine program. Efforts include, but not limited to, analysis of engine data to determine best value engines, scoping aircraft integration requirements for engines 

(avionics, structural, electrical), and initial program documentation preparation and 

support. The FY18PB requests $10 million for these efforts. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you agree with the characterization that we hear that our nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ‘‘hair trigger alert’’? Please tell us what 

open-ocean targeting is and why it is important? 

General WILSON. The assertion that the Nation’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are on ‘‘hair trigger alert’’ is incorrect. The Minuteman III ICBM relies 

on extremely robust and secure command and control that ensures only the President can authorize a launch. 

All U.S. ICBMs are targeted day-to-day against areas in the open ocean. Prior to 

launch, ICBMs must to be retargeted from the ocean to their land-based targets. 

The U.S. and Russia agreed to implement this confidence building practice in 1994. 
99 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. The President has called publicly for a ‘‘build-up’’ in our nuclear arsenal, claiming we’ve been ‘‘falling behind’’ our adversaries. I don’t understand what 

metric he’s using to make that assessment, and your statements mention nothing 

about an expansion being needed to meet our warfighting and deterrence requirements. Are you able to corroborate the President’s claim that there’s a valid requirement for new warheads? Do you have any idea on what he’s basing his claim? 

General SELVA. We are initiating a Nuclear Posture Review at the direction of the 

President. I anticipate this review will consider the changes in the global security 

environment since the previous NPR (2010) and assess U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, 

and capabilities against the current and future threat environment. Once the 2017 

NPR is completed, we will have higher confidence in any recommendations that may 

result in changes to U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities. 

Ms. SPEIER. The President has derided the New START Treaty as ‘‘one-sided’’ and 

a ‘‘bad deal.’’ This is in stark contrast to comments made last week by Lieutenant 

General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration. General Weinstein said that the agreement has been 

‘‘good for us.’’ He further explained that ‘‘The reason you do a treaty is not to cut 

forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers . . . I think there is 

a huge value with what the New START treaty has provided.’’ General Selva: Do 

you agree with General Weinstein? Is the Chairman prepared to offer his best military advice on this question to the President? 

General SELVA. I believe the New START Treaty remains in the national security 

interest of the United States as long as Russia complies with its terms. Russia is 

currently in compliance with New START, and I support continued implementation. 

The Treaty has provided transparency, predictability, and stability over the past six 

years since the Treaty entered into force and has helped increase mutual confidence. 

The Chairman is prepared to offer his best military advice on this question to the 

President. 

Ms. SPEIER. President Obama declared that the greatest threat to international 

security is a terrorist with a nuclear weapon—not a state program. From what we 

can tell so far, President Trump also seems to be prioritizing the terrorist threat. 

Yet we’re talking here about spending—according to independent estimates—up to 

a trillion dollars over the next several decades on programs that have effectively 

zero value against terrorists. At the same time, I’m concerned that, following an intensive international effort during the Obama administration to lock down nuclear 

material that could fall into the hands of terrorists, our nuclear nonproliferation and 

nuclear threat reduction programs at the Departments of Energy and Defense will 

be getting short shrift under this administration. Are you prepared to recommend 

to the Secretary and the President a sustained—or even increased—level of funding 

for U.S. Government nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction programs? 

General SELVA. I support a continued multifaceted approach to countering nuclear 

proliferation, including adequate funding for the nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction programs at the Departments of Energy and Defense. 

Ms. SPEIER. The string of problems that led to the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review are a stunning example of how the Department can spend billions on bombers, 

missiles, and subs—and then have military readiness degraded by something incredibly stupid like mass cheating on competency examinations, or failing to properly maintain the equipment we already have. Can you please provide more details 

on how you will ensure that the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management don’t get lost in the push to modernize? 

Admiral MORAN. The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review in 2014 included an 

internal and external review and resulting in the establishment of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) by the Secretary of Defense. The 

NDERG codified senior leader accountability and brought together all the elements 

of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. The efforts following the review 

strengthened the oversight and regulatory elements to ensure the fundamentals of 

maintenance, morale, and management are fully supported and integrated as we 

move forward with modernization. 

In addition, the Department of the Navy took the following actions to further 

strengthen the actions we were already taking in oversight and management of the 

Navy’s top mission. 

– The Navy expanded the Nuclear Deterrence Mission Oversight Council 

(NNDMOC) to include support commands and nuclear command, control and 

communications (NC3). The council coordinates Navy nuclear weapon activities 

and provides oversight, operations, personnel, policy, and material support. The 
100 

council meets every two months and is updated on various aspects of the Navy’s 

Nuclear Weapons Enterprise. 

– Strategic Systems Program (SSP) was assigned the responsibility as regulatory 

lead, reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for the Navy nuclear deterrence mission. SSP performs a continuous independent end-to-end assessment, reporting annually to the CNO. 

– Biennially the Navy continues to conduct a comprehensive Navy Nuclear Weapons Assessment (NNWA) and reports the results to the Chief of Naval Operations. The assessment includes specific site visits and inspections to assess 

compliance with higher level guidance and also the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management, as well as security, safety, operations and facilities. 

Ms. SPEIER. The President has derided the New START Treaty as ‘‘one-sided’’ and 

a ‘‘bad deal.’’ This is in stark contrast to comments made last week by Lieutenant 

General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration. General Weinstein said that the agreement has been 

‘‘good for us.’’ He further explained that ‘‘The reason you do a treaty is not to cut 

forces but to maintain strategic stability among world powers . . . I think there is 

a huge value with what the New START treaty has provided.’’ General Wilson: Do 

you side with the comments made by your Deputy Chief of Staff, or with those by 

the President? 

General WILSON. The United States has consistently maintained its obligations 

under the New START Treaty. It is a bilateral, verifiable agreement that provides 

the U.S. with some degree of predictability on Russia’s capabilities and intentions 

concerning their strategic forces. The President recently directed a bottom-up review 

of the U.S.’s nuclear posture, an effort that may include a review of existing treaties 

and agreements. 

Ms. SPEIER. The string of problems that led to the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review are a stunning example of how the Department can spend billions on bombers, 

missiles, and subs—and then have military readiness degraded by something incredibly stupid like mass cheating on competency examinations, or failing to properly maintain the equipment we already have. Can you please provide more details 

on how you will ensure that the fundamentals of maintenance, morale, and management don’t get lost in the push to modernize? 

General WILSON. The Air Force continues to apply deliberate and sustained focus 

towards strengthening the nuclear enterprise. In recent years we have implemented 

major organizational changes and streamlined authorities to ensure the nuclear 

mission receives the focus it deserves. We have institutionalized a culture of continuous improvement and are developing a comprehensive assessment tool to monitor 

and evaluate the health of the nuclear enterprise. Our goal is for this process to 

enable early identification of issues and elevate them to senior leadership before 

they escalate into problems. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

Ms. HANABUSA. Given the significant modernization needs of the Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber fleet, how or why do you 

assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad system is the threshold we need to 

meet? If we are figuring out the best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn’t 

we focus on how our adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and 

develop and how we can best counter them? 

General SELVA. We work closely with our partners in the intelligence community 

to ensure that the decisions we make on the future of our nuclear deterrent are informed by the current and projected threat environment. In fact, it is this very uncertainty regarding the future, particularly with respect to adversary capabilities, 

that a triad of nuclear forces hedges against. Numerous reviews conducted over 

multiple Administrations have considered whether the United States still needs a 

triad of nuclear forces. Each one determined that a nuclear triad of intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles provides the most effective deterrent against the only existential threat to our Nation, 

and is therefore essential to our national security. I have participated in some of 

these reviews, and I agree with this conclusion. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Given the significant modernization needs of the Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber fleet, how or why do you 

assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad system is the threshold we need to 

meet? If we are figuring out the best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn’t 
101 

we focus on how our adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and 

develop and how we can best counter them? 

General HYTEN. Our nuclear modernization program has taken into account a 

range of factors with respect to potential adversary developments, not just offensive 

systems but defensive capabilities as well, to ensure the continued effectiveness of 

our deterrent forces. Moreover, because we cannot predict with absolute certainty 

the direction potential adversaries might choose to invest in their nuclear weapons 

programs; we maintain a flexible, responsive, and survivable force that can meet a 

diverse range of threats. Collectively, the comprehensive nuclear modernization program ensures an appropriate range of options for the President to deter and achieve 

his objectives if deterrence fails. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Given the significant modernization needs of the Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber fleet, how or why do you 

assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad system is the threshold we need to 

meet? If we are figuring out the best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn’t 

we focus on how our adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and 

develop and how we can best counter them? 

Admiral MORAN. Our nation’s nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

strategic bombers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles are essential to our nation’s security because they have been proven over time and we assess they will remain a necessary deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Sea-based strategic 

deterrence is the Navy’s #1 investment priority and is the bedrock of our ability to 

deter aggression by major adversaries and to assure our partners and allies. Maintaining our ability to deter threats against the U.S., our allies, and partners is critical to our national security and strategy. Recommendations for adjustments to the 

U.S. nuclear force structure and stockpile should be addressed after careful consideration of the current security environment and potential threats in the pending 

Nuclear Posture Review. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Given the significant modernization needs of the Triad, particularly the deterrent abilities of our ICBMs and our bomber fleet, how or why do you 

assume that fully modernizing the entire Triad system is the threshold we need to 

meet? If we are figuring out the best way to modernize our capabilities, shouldn’t 

we focus on how our adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea will arm and 

develop and how we can best counter them? 

General WILSON. Sustaining the Triad will best maintain the U.S.’s ability to preserve strategic stability, deter major conventional and nuclear attack against the 

homeland or our allies and partners in the 21st century security environment. Combined, the distinct attributes and capabilities of each of the Triad’s legs creates valuable synergistic deterrence effects that provide superior risk-mitigation against geopolitical uncertainty and technical surprise. Multiple studies conducted by multiple 

administrations have shown that the triad is the best way to provide an effective 

nuclear deterrent and assurance to our allies. Accordingly, this structure has allowed the U.S. to make significant reductions in nuclear force posture over the decades while preserving confidence in the reliability, credibility and effectiveness of 

the nuclear force. 

We are not modernizing the Triad to keep parity with modernization efforts of 

other nuclear weapon states. We are modernizing because it is long overdue and our 

capabilities must remain credible and effective in the eyes of potential adversaries. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP 

Dr. WENSTRUP. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs, or 

other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your recommendations and military 

assessments on the future of our nuclear deterrent? Specifically: 

a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign nations concern 

you, and how does that factor into your planning and programs for the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent? 

b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain credible if we don’t also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities? 

General SELVA. In recent years, Russia has rejected our overtures to take the next 

step in arms control and is in the midst of modernizing its entire strategic triad, 

along with developing new nonstrategic nuclear systems and weapons. Russia is 

also violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and has threatened to use nuclear weapons against our NATO Allies. Nuclear weapons have been 

assigned increased prominence in Russian strategy and doctrine. Meanwhile, China 

continues to modernize and increase its nuclear forces, and North Korea continues 
102 

its drive towards a nuclear weapon capability that can reach the United States. 

These threats underscore the urgency behind our nuclear modernization program of 

record, and the need to avoid further delays that would have severe impacts on the 

credibility and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs, or 

other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your recommendations and military 

assessments on the future of our nuclear deterrent? Specifically: 

a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign nations concern 

you, and how does that factor into your planning and programs for the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent? 

b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain credible if we don’t also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities? 

General HYTEN. a) The pursuit of offensive cross-domain and/or asymmetric capabilities (cyber, hypersonic, counterspace. . .) designed to challenge U.S. national security strategy drive the need to continuously evaluate and re-prioritize assumptions 

within existing plans and programs, to include the nuclear deterrent. 

b) The U.S. nuclear deterrent will remain credible if we ensure sufficient flexibility, responsiveness, and survivability in the force structure. The current, Congressionally-funded modernization program is designed to achieve these ends. I anticipate the upcoming NPR will provide additional clarity and guidance on this subject. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs, or 

other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your recommendations and military 

assessments on the future of our nuclear deterrent? Specifically: 

a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign nations concern 

you, and how does that factor into your planning and programs for the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent? 

b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain credible if we don’t also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities? 

Admiral MORAN. The assumptions of Russia and other potential adversaries now 

and in the future on nuclear force structures, capability developments, and doctrines 

play a major role in our assessments of the current and future threat environment. 

Our assessments directly contribute to the strategy and force structure decisions of 

the future. Maintaining our ability to deter and, if deterrence fails, respond to future threats underpins our national strategy and is critical to this nation, our allies, 

and partners security. The results of the Nuclear Posture Review will inform any 

recommendations to the existing nuclear TRIAD program of record that will ensure 

our deterrent forces remain credible. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. How do developments in foreign nuclear weapon programs, or 

other strategic weapon capabilities, factor into your recommendations and military 

assessments on the future of our nuclear deterrent? Specifically: 

a) What developments in foreign programs or actions of foreign nations concern 

you, and how does that factor into your planning and programs for the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent? 

b) Over the long term, when other countries continue to build new military nuclear capabilities, will our nuclear deterrent remain credible if we don’t also continue to improve our nuclear capabilities? 

General WILSON. I am concerned about Russian, Chinese, and North Korean military modernization efforts, continued aggression seeking to annex international borders or waters, and the increase in ballistic missile development from regional actors such as Iran. To maintain a credible deterrent against this ever-evolving threat, 

our planning and programs must provide flexible options for the President across 

the entire spectrum of conflict. 

The credibility of our nuclear deterrent relies on the capability of our nuclear 

weapons; our Nation’s will to use them; and also the perception of potential adversaries regarding our capabilities and will. 

Foregoing modernization would send a strong message to potential adversaries 

that we are not serious about maintaining any strategic advantage or technological 

superiority. This will weaken our credibility and may incentivize other nations to 

challenge U.S. influence and the ability to operate around the globe. Furthermore, 

any changes in U.S. nuclear force structure directly impacts U.S. commitment to our 

allies. 
103 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN 

Ms. ROSEN. Given Russia’s threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and the United 

States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to 

‘‘de-escalate’’ and get the United States to back down, its use of ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ 

against neighbors and potentially against NATO member states—what are the risks 

of a conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of such 

a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has Russia adopted such 

a doctrine? 

General SELVA. The risk of a conflict in Europe involving NATO and Russia is 

a function of the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture. U.S. and U.K. extended 

nuclear deterrence guarantees are critically important elements of that posture. 

This posture is designed to help convince the Russian leadership that they cannot 

escalate their way out of a failed conventional conflict. Exactly why Russia is pursuing its current defense doctrine is uncertain, but I believe it reflects a desire to 

compensate for Russia’s perceived conventional inferiority vis-a-vis the United 

States and NATO. The President has directed a Nuclear Posture Review to ensure 

our nuclear policies, strategies, and capabilities continue to address an increasingly 

complex security environment. 

Ms. ROSEN. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia in terms of 

numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why? What are the differences 

between U.S. and Russian nuclear force structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they 

compare to those of other nuclear powers? 

General SELVA. I believe maintaining rough parity with Russia in terms of nuclear capability is the surest way to maintain strategic stability. The United States 

and Russia have each designed their nuclear force structure and doctrine to meet 

their own perceived security needs. The Russians tend to rely more heavily on intercontinental ballistic missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons, while the United 

States relies more heavily on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The nuclear 

forces of the United States and Russia remain far larger than those of other nuclear 

powers. 

Ms. ROSEN. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture Review that 

President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out? What threats, risks, or 

opportunities have changed since the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010? 

General SELVA. I anticipate the review will consider the changes in the global security environment since the previous NPR (2010), and assess U.S. nuclear policy, 

strategy, and capabilities against the current and future current threat environment. Once we complete this NPR, we will provide informed recommendations on 

U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and capabilities for the Secretary to present to the 

President for consideration. There have been significant changes in the security environment since 2010. Russia has been found in violation of the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; invaded its neighbor, Ukraine; and publicly threatened 

nuclear use against our NATO Allies—all while continuing a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear forces. Additionally, China has become increasingly assertive in the South China Sea and is also modernizing and expanding its nuclear 

forces. North Korea continues its drive towards a nuclear weapon that can reach 

the United States, and the Iranian ballistic missile program, which is not covered 

under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, continues to make progress on weapon systems that threaten our allies and partners in the region. 

Ms. ROSEN. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further reduce U.S. 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third—to around 1,000. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it would support these reductions if they 

are bilateral and verifiable. Do you believe we should pursue such reductions while 

Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other 

arms control obligations? 

General SELVA. We are conducting a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which will 

include a review of our nuclear arms control policy. Even if the results of the NPR 

indicate that further reductions are desirable, we need to consider Russia’s current 

non-compliance with several arms control agreements as well its disregard for other 

international obligations before pursuing new negotiations with Russia. Additionally, I would only support an effort to pursue further reductions if the resulting 

agreement was verifiable. 

Ms. ROSEN. Given Russia’s threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and the United 

States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to 

‘‘de-escalate’’ and get the United States to back down, its use of ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ 

against neighbors and potentially against NATO member states—what are the risks 

of a conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of such 
104 

a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has Russia adopted such 

a doctrine? 

General HYTEN. Russia’s aggressive actions towards its neighbors and confrontational posture towards NATO have heightened the risk of conflict in Europe. U.S. 

and NATO actions are meant to deter further destabilizing Russian behavior and 

reduce the risk of conflict in Europe. Russia’s ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’ doctrine is 

based on a belief that increasing the costs to an adversary, to include use of nuclear 

weapons, will induce termination of a conflict. Russia’s assessment of American resolve in such a scenario and Russia’s belief in its ability to manage escalation dynamics following any nuclear employment are deeply flawed. 

Ms. ROSEN. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia in terms of 

numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why? What are the differences 

between U.S. and Russian nuclear force structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they 

compare to those of other nuclear powers? 

General HYTEN. I believe there is no distinction between the use of tactical and 

strategic nuclear weapons—anybody who employs a nuclear weapon in the world 

has created a strategic effect. While I acknowledge Russia maintains significantly 

more tactical nuclear weapons, I believe we have strategic parity and our current 

force structure is sufficient to maintain strategic stability and manage risk. Russian 

doctrine incorporates a broader range of nuclear employment scenarios, which is 

also expressed through its acquisition of non-strategic and novel nuclear weapons— 

this is the main difference in our doctrine and capabilities. Both Russia and the 

U.S. employ a nuclear Triad. However, Russia fields mobile ICBMs and configures 

their ICBM and SLBM forces with multiple warheads. Rough parity exists in the 

size of strategic forces as outlined by New START. Both Russian and U.S. nuclear 

stockpiles are larger than those of other nuclear armed nations 

Ms. ROSEN. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and Air Force 

are making to implement the New START Treaty. 

General HYTEN. The Air Force is reducing 450 ICBM silos with missile bodies to 

400, retaining the 50 empty silos. The Air Force reduced the number of nuclear-capable heavy bombers to 60, with 6 additional bombers for training and maintenance 

considerations. Each SSBN originally configured with 24 SLBM launch tubes now 

has 20 with 4 tubes sealed and inoperable. 

Ms. ROSEN. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture Review that 

President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out? What threats, risks, or 

opportunities have changed since the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010? 

General HYTEN. NPR assumptions and analysis should encompass the full range 

of variables associated with the external threat environment, Administration guidance, policy and strategy, the nation’s industrial might, defense priorities and budget considerations to ensure the nation is properly positioned to address any future 

threat. Since 2010, potential adversaries have pursued qualitative advancements, 

quantitative, or both; while also broadening the range of scenarios with which they 

might consider nuclear employment. 

Ms. ROSEN. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further reduce U.S. 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third—to around 1,000. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it would support these reductions if they 

are bilateral and verifiable. Do you believe we should pursue such reductions while 

Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other 

arms control obligations? 

General HYTEN. Any reductions must be bilateral and fully verifiable under transparent treaty inspection regimes. These violations are very concerning and must be 

fully accounted for in any future arms control discussions. We will also address 

them in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A full and deliberative process is required to determine whether future strategic arms control agreements are 

in the best interests of the United States 

Ms. ROSEN. Given Russia’s threats towards its neighbors, NATO, and the United 

States, its openly discussed doctrine to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to 

‘‘de-escalate’’ and get the United States to back down, its use of ‘‘hybrid warfare’’ 

against neighbors and potentially against NATO member states—what are the risks 

of a conflict in Europe involving the U.S. and Russia? What are the risks of such 

a conflict escalating to the use of nuclear weapons? Why has Russia adopted such 

a doctrine? 

Admiral MORAN. With the recent actions and rhetoric by Russia, the potential risk 

of conflict arguably is at its highest since the end of the Cold War. Maintaining our 

ability to deter this threat and, if deterrence fails, respond to Russian action is critical to NATO and the U.S. So the assumptions of Russian doctrine, the risks associated with their doctrine, and our intelligence assessments of the current and future 
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threat environment will be central to a proper understanding of the security environment for the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. The results of the NPR will inform a strategy and future force structure decisions along with recommendations on 

how to best address the future threat environment. 

Ms. ROSEN. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia in terms of 

numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why? What are the differences 

between U.S. and Russian nuclear force structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they 

compare to those of other nuclear powers? 

Admiral MORAN. Russian nuclear forces represent an existential threat to the 

United States. Maintaining the capacity of our nuclear arsenal provides the ability 

to deter this threat against the U.S., our allies, and partners is critical to our national security and strategy. Therefore, an analysis of Russian or other nuclear powers’ force structures, capabilities, and doctrines will be a key to understanding the 

threat environment and informing the nuclear force needs in the upcoming Nuclear 

Posture Review. 

Ms. ROSEN. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and Air Force 

are making to implement the New START Treaty. 

Admiral MORAN. In accordance with the nuclear force structure announced by the 

Secretary of Defense on April 8, 2014, the Navy has been reducing the number of 

SLBM launchers on SSBNs and warheads on deployed SLBMs in order to support 

U.S. security requirements and New START Treaty central limits. 

The number of submarine launched ballistic missile launchers will be reduced 

from 24 to 20 launchers per SSBN, with no more than 240 deployed SLBMs and 

280 deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers total at any time. In addition, the 

Navy will reduce the overall number of deployed SLBM warheads on the OHIO 

class SSBNs to comply with New START Treaty central limits. The Navy is converting launchers pursuant to the Treaty so that they are incapable of launching 

an SLBM. 

The Navy is aligning conversion efforts with the existing OHIO Class SSBN operational schedule to minimize the impact to the fleet. As of March 2017, conversions 

have been completed on eleven out of 14 SSBNs (a total of 44 converted SLBM 

launchers), and the Navy remains on track to complete conversions prior to the February 2018 Treaty deadline. Once the New START Treaty limits are achieved in 

2018, the Navy will responsible for approximately 70% of the U.S. nuclear warheads 

deployed under the New START Treaty. 

Ms. ROSEN. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture Review that 

President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out? What threats, risks, or 

opportunities have changed since the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010? 

Admiral MORAN. The advice I would offer to the Nuclear Posture Review is to ensure a fresh review of the threats and assumptions made in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and how they have changed. The assumptions of adversary force structure, intents, and doctrines should be reviewed and if need, adjusted to match the 

current security environment. The review of changes in the underlying security environment will be a central aspect of how the next NPR will be performed and the 

conclusions that will be made. 

Ms. ROSEN. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further reduce U.S. 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third—to around 1,000. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it would support these reductions if they 

are bilateral and verifiable. Do you believe we should pursue such reductions while 

Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other 

arms control obligations? 

Admiral MORAN. Potential continued reductions of nuclear forces should only be 

undertaken after a complete assessment of the current security environment, particularly in regards to our nuclear armed adversaries. Any future force adjustments 

based on arms control regimes should take into account prior actions, verifiability, 

and the arms control agreements contribution to maintaining strategic stability. 

These things, along with a full intelligence assessment of the present and future 

threat environment will be central to the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. The 

results of the NPR will inform any decisions on adjustments to strategy, force structure, and recommendations on how to best address the future threat environment. 

Ms. ROSEN. Do you believe the U.S. should have parity with Russia in terms of 

numbers or capabilities regarding nuclear weapons? Why? What are the differences 

between U.S. and Russian nuclear force structures, sizes, and doctrine? How do they 

compare to those of other nuclear powers? 

General WILSON. The size and capabilities of U.S. strategic forces are a function 

of National policy and combatant commander requirements. Historically, the Air 
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Force has pursued technological advancements to win wars and maintain dominance 

in air, space, and cyber domains. 

The United States and Russia both rely on a nuclear Triad consisting of strategic 

bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Strategic warheads are limited to 1,550 operationally deployed warheads 

under the New START Treaty. However, Russia maintains a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons that is an order of magnitude larger than that of the U.S. and NATO. 

These numbers are troubling—especially considered in light of Russia’s continued 

non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 

Ms. ROSEN. Please describe the force structure changes the Navy and Air Force 

are making to implement the New START Treaty. 

General WILSON. To comply with New START Treaty requirements, the Air Force 

converted 29 operational and 12 non-operational B–52H strategic bombers to conventional only. In addition, the Air Force transitioned 50 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos to operational non-deployed status, a process 

that involves removing the missile and maintaining the silo in a configuration that 

allows a missile to be reinstalled. Another 103 ICBM silos that were in ‘‘caretaker’’ 

or inactive test status were also destroyed. The Air Force is on track to meet its 

obligations well in advance of the February 5, 2018 Treaty deadline. 

Ms. ROSEN. What advice would you offer to the Nuclear Posture Review that 

President Trump has tasked Secretary Mattis to carry out? What threats, risks, or 

opportunities have changed since the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review was written in 2010? 

General WILSON. The Air Force remains actively engaged and ready to support 

the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) directed by the President. Since the 2010 NPR 

release, the strategic environment has evolved as a result of rapidly advancing technology, geopolitical instability, constrained resources, challenges to global commons, 

and hybrid warfare. I believe the U.S. nuclear posture must account for these 

changes to the strategic environment to safeguard the security of our Nation now 

and in the future. 

Ms. ROSEN. President Obama indicated that he was willing to further reduce U.S. 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third—to around 1,000. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff indicated at that time that it would support these reductions if they 

are bilateral and verifiable. Do you believe we should pursue such reductions while 

Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and other 

arms control obligations? 

General WILSON. The President has called for a comprehensive review of our entire nuclear posture which should take into account the totality of current and future threats, strategy, policy, programs, readiness postures, infrastructure, nonproliferation and counter proliferation objectives, arms control goals, implementation and compliance, technology opportunities and the like. I fully support this review. The overall assessment of all these considerations should form the basis by 

which we judge the advisability of future strategic nuclear weapon reductions with 

Russia. Thus, I believe it is wise to await the results of this review before rendering 

a decision. 

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