U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

79–010 

" ! SENATE 115TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2018

115–210 

Calendar No. 336 

REPORTING EFFICIENTLY TO PROPER 

OFFICIALS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 

ACT OF 2017 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 1884 

TO PROVIDE FOR JOINT REPORTS BY RELEVANT FEDERAL 

AGENCIES TO CONGRESS REGARDING INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM, 

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

FEBRUARY 26, 2018.—Ordered to be printed 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARINGcongress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

KAMALA D. HARRIS, California 

DOUG JONES, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

ELIZABETH E. MCWHORTER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

MARGARET E. DAUM, Minority Staff Director 

STACIA M. CARDILLE, Minority Chief Counsel 

CHARLES A. MOSKOWITZ, Minority Senior Legislative Counsel 

JULIE G. KLEIN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
Calendar No. 336 

115TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 2d Session 115–210 

REPORTING EFFICIENTLY TO PROPER OFFICIALS IN 

RESPONSE TO TERRORISM ACT OF 2017 

FEBRUARY 26, 2018.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 1884] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 1884) to provide for joint reports 

by relevant Federal agencies to Congress regarding incidents of terrorism, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 

favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the 

bill, as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 4 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 5 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 5 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 6 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 7 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of S. 1884, the Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials in Response to Terrorism Act of 2017, or REPORT Act, is to 

require that an unclassified report on each act of terrorism that occurs in the United States be provided to Congress not later than 

one year after a Federal investigation of such act concludes. The 

Federal agency investigating the act of terrorism shall coordinate 

with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department 

of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and as 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
2 

1Overclassification and Pseudo-classification: The Impact on Information Sharing: Hearing 

Before the Subcomm. On Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, H. 

Comm. On Homeland Sec., 110th Cong., at 3 (Mar. 22, 2007) (https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 

CHRG-110hhrg35279/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35279.pdf). 2Frontline Response to Terrorism in America: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. 

& Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) (testimony of Mark S. Ghilarducci, Director, California Office of Emergency Services and the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor) [hereinafter 

Frontline Hearing]. 3Frontline Hearing, supra note 2, (testimony of Edward F. Davis III, Former Commissioner, 

Boston Police Department). 4Dep’t of Def., Indep. Review Related to Fort Hood, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort 

Hood (2010), available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DODProtectingTheForce-Web_Security_HR_13Jan10.pdf. 5The Inspectors Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., Cent. Intelligence Agency, Dep’t of Justice, 

and Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior 

to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings (2014), available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2014/s1404.pdf. 6 Rick Braziel, Frank Straub, George Watson & Rod Hoops, Bringing Calm to Chaos: A critical 

incident review of the San Bernardi no public safety response to the December 2, 2015, terrorist 

shooting incident at the Inland Regional Center (2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/file/ 

891996/download. 

appropriate, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) on such 

a report. The report must include the facts of the act of terrorism, 

identification of national security gaps that require redress to prevent similar future acts of terrorism, and recommendations for new 

measures law enforcement could implement or changes in law that 

could strengthen homeland security and prevent future acts of terrorism. A public summary of the report must also accompany the 

more detailed report for Congress. This reporting requirement can 

be waived by the DHS Secretary, the Attorney General, the FBI Director, or the NCTC Director if that individual determines that the 

report could jeopardize an ongoing investigation or prosecution. In 

such instances, Congress must be notified of the waiver before the 

reporting requirement deadline. 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

After-action reviews of terrorist incidents help policymakers develop evidence-based terrorism prevention policies and procedures. 

Reviews of the September 11th attacks, for example, found ‘‘excessive secrecy interfered with the detection and prevention of the attacks.’’ 1 In 2016, first responders testified to the Committee during 

a hearing titled Frontline Response to Terrorism in America that 

‘‘the information gap still remains,’’ which leaves important partners with an incomplete representation of the threat.2 Also during 

the hearing, former Boston Police Commissioner Edward Davis 

suggested that the Federal Government conduct a regular audit of 

‘‘the transfer of information’’ that occurs before terrorist attacks.3

Although agencies typically provide public reports after an act of 

terrorism, decisions to conduct such reports are ad hoc and the timing of their release is not standardized. Agency reporting timelines 

after a terrorism incident vary: two months after Nidal Hasan 

killed thirteen people at Fort Hood, the Department of Defense 

published an independent review; 4 it took a year after the 2013 

Boston Bombing for the Intelligence Community Inspectors General (ICIG) to report on the pre-attack performance of intelligence 

and information sharing entities; 5 it took nine months after the 

2015 San Bernardino attack for the DOJ to report on law enforcement lessons learned; and it took 18 months after the Orlando 

Pulse Nightclub shooting in June 2016 for the DOJ to publish its 

review.6


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
3 

7Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice to Conduct After-Action Review of Police Response to Orlando Nightclub Mass Shooting (July 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 

pr/department-justice-conduct-after-action-review-police-response-orlando-nightclub-mass. 8Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Department 

of Justice Releases Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the 

Pulse Nightclub (December 18, 2017), https://cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=2952. 9Dep’t of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the 

Pulse Nightclub (December 18, 2017), https://ric-zai-inc.com/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPSW0857; see also Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik & Ben Gorban, Lessons Learned from the Police 

Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks, CTC Sentinel (Volume 10, Issue 

5), Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point (May 2017), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/ 

uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss517.pdf. 10Press Release, United States Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman Johnson Seeks Independent 

Review of Why Orlando Terrorist Was Taken Off Terror Watchlist (July 27, 2016), https:// 

www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/chairman-johnson-seeks-independent-review-ofwhy-orlando-terrorist-was-taken-off-terror-watchlist. 11Letter from The Honorable Michael Horowitz, Inspector General, Dep’t of Justice, to The 

Honorable Ron Johnson, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate (February 22, 2017). 12Tom Coburn, A Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Missions and Performance 22 (2015), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=B92B8382-DBCE-403C-A08A727F89C2BC9B. 13 Id. at 20. 

The Federal Government’s investigation into the Orlando Pulse 

Nightclub shooting in June 2016 is illustrative of an increasing 

focus on response rather than prevention. The DOJ announced an 

investigation into the police response one month after the attack.7

The completed review was published only recently, 18 months after 

the incident occurred.8 The report focused on the response of the 

Orlando police department and suggested changes in police protocol 

and improvements in counterterrorism training for local law enforcement.9 In addition, Chairman Johnson requested ‘‘a thorough, 

independent review’’ of the FBI’s decision to remove the shooter, 

Omar Mateen, from the Terrorist Screening Database.10 In response, the DOJ Inspector General began an audit of broader FBI 

management, policies, and processes relevant to homegrown violent 

extremist threats, including how the FBI identifies and assesses 

these threats.11 The Committee is still awaiting the results of that 

audit. 

Additionally, after-action reviews should identify or make recommendations to address national security gaps, including actions 

that can be taken to prevent future attacks. Some past reviews 

have focused on improved response, but have not included recommendations to improve the DHS stated mission of terrorism prevention. In the case of the ICIG review of the Boston Bombing to 

assess the pre-attack performance of intelligence and information 

sharing entities, the Committee’s analysis of the ICIG review found 

no ‘‘recommendations about how DHS’s grant funding or intelligence and information sharing programs could have played a role 

in preventing the bombing.’’ 12 A DHS report about the same attack, and released in the same month as the ICIG report, focused 

on the good preparation of first responders but similarly made no 

recommendations for how the Department could have prevented 

the attack.13

S. 1884 requires the primary Government agency investigating 

an act of terrorism to collaborate with the Secretary of DHS, the 

Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and, as appropriate, the 

Director of NCTC to submit a public report to Congress within one 

year after such investigation concludes. The Committee understands that Federal investigators must carefully sift through a sigVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:19 Feb 28, 2018 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR210.XXX SR210

dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
4 

14 Controlled Unclassified Information, 32 C.F.R. § 2002.1 (2017). 15Frontline Hearing, supra note 2; see also Examining the Costs of Overclassification on 

Transparency and Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th 

Cong. (2016) (testimony of Scott Amey, General Counsel, Project On Government Oversight); 

The Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee, supra note 1. 

nificant amount of information, often information that is sensitive 

or classified and which could affect an ongoing prosecution. This 

lengthy process is necessary and must be balanced against the 

need for both Congress and the public to know the details of these 

incidents in a timely manner. The one-year waiting period in S. 

1884 acknowledges the importance of protecting the details of an 

ongoing investigation. 

S. 1884 exempts Federal investigators from this reporting requirement if disclosure could disrupt an ongoing case. This exemption should be used sparingly and every effort should be made to 

produce the required information. 

The reports required by S. 1884 should include facts about the 

act of terrorism and identify any relevant gaps in national security. 

These facts include any domestic or international terrorism movement or foreign terrorist organization implicated by evidence uncovered in the investigation or by homeland security information. 

Facts about the perpetrator may include any biographical or criminal information relevant to the act of terrorism and the report 

should identify any relevant government programs that may have 

ineffectively vetted for or reported potential indicator behaviors of 

terrorist threats. The Committee recognizes that inspectors general 

may be best-placed to make recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of any such government programs. Agencies may defer to inspectors general to submit reports on these 

issues, since it is not the intent of this legislation to burden Federal investigators with responsibilities that detract from their mission of preventing terrorism. 

This legislation also balances the need for transparency with the 

need for Federal authorities to protect classified information. The 

bill requires an unclassified report that can be complemented by a 

classified annex. The unclassified report should be deliverable as a 

separate document from such annex and available in unclassified 

office space, meaning it should not contain markings that would 

limit dissemination. Even transparency efforts to inform the public 

by requiring an unclassified report can be undermined by the inclusion of controlled unclassified information, which requires safeguarding or dissemination controls.14 Dissemination controls are 

designed to protect sensitive information. They can also deter sharing with partners who would benefit from transparency and inhibit 

legitimate public deliberation on counterterrorism policy.15 In the 

event the unclassified report does require dissemination controls, 

this legislation also requires a public summary. Every effort should 

be made to include as much information in the public summary 

and unclassified report with as few dissemination controls as possible. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Senators Claire McCaskill (D–MO) and Mike Lee (R–UT) introduced S. 1884 on September 28, 2017. The bill was referred to the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
5 

The Committee considered S. 1884 at a business meeting on October 4, 2017. Chairman Ron Johnson offered an amendment that 

clarified that the primary agency investigating the act of terrorism 

is the lead agency responsible for coordinating with other agencies 

to produce the joint unclassified report on that act of terrorism. 

The amendment also clarified that responsibility for notifying Congress if an agency believes the reporting requirement jeopardizes 

an investigation or prosecution falls on the primary agency in 

charge of such investigation or prosecution. The Chairman’s 

amendment gave agencies the option to combine several reports 

into quarterly reports and clarified that a summary for public distribution must be provided to inform the public about homeland 

threats. The Committee adopted the amendment and ordered the 

bill, as amended, reported favorably, both by voice vote. Senators 

present for both the vote on the amendment and the vote on the 

bill were: Johnson, Lankford, Daines, McCaskill, Tester, Heitkamp, 

Hassan, and Harris. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides the bill’s short title, the ‘‘REPORT Act.’’ 

Section 2. Duty to report 

This section imposes a Congressional reporting requirement on 

the primary Government agency investigating an act of terrorism 

that occurs in the United States. It requires that the report to Congress is unclassified and coordinated with the DHS Secretary, the 

Attorney General, the FBI Director, and as appropriate the NCTC 

Director. 

Subsection (a) establishes the requirement, a deadline for submitting such reports to Congress, and allows reports on several individual acts of terrorism to be combined into quarterly reports. It 

specifies the report should be unclassified, and can be accompanied 

by a classified annex. 

Subsection (b) requires the report to include the facts of the act 

of terrorism, security vulnerabilities identified after the investigation, and recommendations for changes to policy and law enforcement practices that could help prevent future acts of terrorism. A 

public summary of the report shall also be included in the report. 

Subsection (c) acknowledges that related investigations and prosecutions may be jeopardized by this reporting requirement. The 

Government agency responsible for an investigation or prosecution 

that could be jeopardized can waive the reporting requirement by 

notifying Congress before the deadline established in subsection 

(a). 

Subsection (d) defines ‘‘act of terrorism.’’ 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill and determined that the bill will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 

Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
6 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, October 12, 2017. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1884, the Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials in Response to Terrorism Act of 2017. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, Director. 

Enclosure. 

S. 1884—Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials in Response to 

Terrorism Act of 2017 

S. 1884 would require the primary government agency investigating an act of terrorism that occurs in the United States to report to the Congress not later than one year after completing the 

investigation. That agency would have to collaborate with the Department of Homeland Security and other federal bodies as appropriate. The report would identify weaknesses in national security 

and recommend additional measures to improve homeland security 

and prevent terrorist acts. 

In recent years there have been few incidents of domestic terrorism, so CBO expects that implementing S. 1884 would require 

a small number of reports each year, on average. Based on the cost 

of similar activities, CBO estimates that providing the reports 

would cost less than $500,000 annually; such spending would be 

subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

Enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that enacting S. 1884 would not increase net direct spending 

or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods 

beginning in 2028. 

S. 1884 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

On May 30, 2017, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 625, 

the Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials in Response to Terrorism Act of 2017, as ordered reported by the House Committee 

on Homeland Security on May 3, 2017. The two bills are similar 

and CBO’s estimates of the budgetary effects are the same. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING
7 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Because this legislation would not repeal or amend any provision 

of current law, it would make no changes in existing law within the 

meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 

Standing Rules of the Senate. 

Æ 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with HEARING