COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Huff and Senior Judge Haley

DEREK JENKINS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1829-13-1 PER CURIAM FEBRUARY 11, 2014 NORFOLK DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Mary Jane Hall, Judge (Tanya L. Lomax, on brief), for appellant. (Erikka M. Massie, Assistant C ity Attorney; Cynthia D. Garris, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.
Derek Jenkins appeals an order terminating his pa rental rights to his child. Jenkins argues that the trial court erred by finding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate his parental rights. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the partie s, we conclude that th is appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). The Norfolk Department of Human Services (the Department) had worked with the family since October 2010. The child was born in November 2010. At the time of the child’s

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - birth, the mother, Joyce Buie, was sixteen years old. Buie identified Jenkins as the father. Jenkins was thirty-three years old at the time of the child’s birth. After the child’s birth, Buie and the child live d with relatives and Bu ie ran away with the child for a period of time. Buie violated he r probation and was incar cerated in the Norfolk Juvenile Detention Center. 1 In May 2011, the Department obt ained custody of the child and placed her in foster care. Jenkins requested a paternity test, and in October 2011, Jenkins was determined to be the father. Jenkins filed petitions for custody and visitation. The Norfolk Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) dismi ssed the petitions, and Jenkins appealed to the circuit court. The ci rcuit court dismissed the custody pe tition and continued the visitation petition so that Jenkins could co mply with the psychosexual eval uation. Jenkins did not appear at the next hearing, so the circuit co urt dismissed the vi sitation petition. While the child was in foster care, the Department required Jenkins to complete a parenting capacity assessment, a psychologi cal evaluation, a psychosexual evaluation, a substance abuse assessment, and any necessary treatment. Jenkins also had to obtain and maintain housing and employment. Furthermore, the Department expected Jenkins to refrain from illegal activity, be alcohol and drug free, pay child support, and participate in anger management. In April 2012, Jenkins participated in the pa renting capacity assessment. Dr. Julia Hislop concluded that Jenkins had a ps ychotic disorder. In her report, she recommended that Jenkins

1 Once Buie was released, she was placed in foster care; however, she repeatedly ran away from the foster homes. The Department o ffered her services. Buie did not complete the Department’s requirements, and her parental ri ghts were subsequently terminated by the JDR court and the circuit court.- 3 - return to mental and psychiat ric treatment, have his psychi atric medications reassessed, and participate in a substance abuse asse ssment and a psychosexual assessment. The Department made several referrals for Jenkins to complete the psychosexual evaluation, but he refused to cooperate. In Febr uary 2013, the Department informed Jenkins that funding was no longer available for the psychosexual evaluation. The Department referred Jenkins to othe r agencies to complete the remaining requirements. However, Jenkins complete d only the parenting capacity assessment and participated in supervised visi tations with the child. He kept in frequent contact with the Department, but on several occasions, he threat ened the Department and made inappropriate comments to the social worker. The JDR court terminated Jenkins’ parental righ ts, and he appealed to the circuit court. On August 22, 2013, the circuit court heard evidence and argument fr om the parties. Evidence was presented that the child was doing well in fo ster care and in an adoptive placement. The circuit court terminated Jenkins’ parental rights pursuant to C ode § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (C)(2). This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted). When considering te rmination of parental rights, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interest s.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
at 463. Jenkins argues that the evidence was insuffici ent to terminate his parental rights. He claims that the Department knew he had limite d resources, and did not provide him with the- 4 - necessary services to complete the Department’s requirements. He contends the Department required him to complete the psychosexual evalua tion, but then withdrew the funding. However, the Department made numerous referrals for se rvices on Jenkins’ beha lf and provided funding for the psychosexual evaluation for one year. Je nkins, however, refused to participate in the psychosexual evaluation and other services, including substance a buse assessment, mental health treatment, and anger management. He comp leted only the parenti ng capacity assessment. “The Department is not re quired ‘to force its services upon an unwilling or disinterested parent.’” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 130, 409 S.E .2d at 463-64 (quoting Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 670, 347 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1986)). The Department made the referrals and provided the funding for one year, but Jenkins did not participate in the services. A court may terminate parental rights if [t]he parent or parent s, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Jenkins failed to remedy the situation which led to and required the child to continue in foster care. The circuit court not ed that Jenkins’ denial of pa ternity prevented the Department from providing him services as soon as the child en tered foster care. However, Jenkins still had “plenty of time” to meet the Department’s re quirements once paternity was established, but Jenkins did not do so. At the time of the circuit court hearin g, the child had been in foster care for approximately twenty-two months. She was doi ng well in foster care and in an adoptive placement. “It is clearly not in the best intere sts of a child to spend a lengthy period of time- 5 - waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Based on the record, the circuit court did not err in terminating Jenkins’ parental rights. 2
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ru ling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.

2 When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court, and if so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Cour t affirmed termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and held that it did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in terminating Jenkins’ parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1).