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"Lucky War"

Third Army in

Desert Storm

Richard M. Swain

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Swain, Richard M. (Richard Moody) 1943-

"Lucky war": Third Army in Desert Storm / Richard M. Swain.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991--United States. 2. United States.

Army. Army, 3rd--History--Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Title.

DS79.724.U6S9 1994

956.7044'2373--dc20 94-30290

CIP

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official

policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Note: The figures found in this work are adapted from Headquarters, Third Army,

Command Group, briefing slides held in the Third Army Collection in the Gulf War

Archive at the CAC History Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (unless otherwise noted).
TO THE SOLDIERS OF THIRD ARMY

Contents

Illustrations ............................................ . vii

Preface .................................................... xi

Acknowledgments ......................................... xix

Introduction ............................................... xxiii

1. Prologue to Operation Desert Shield ...................... 1

2. Executing a Contingency ................................ 17

3. Planning a Ground Offensive I: The CINC's Study Group ... 71

4. Planning a Ground Offensive II: The ARCENT Process ..... 103

5. Build-up to Attack ...................................... 139

6. Desert Storm: Air Power and Final Issues ....... .......... 175

7. Desert Storm: Battle . ................................... 225

8. Battle's End . .. ......... ... .................. .......... 279

9. Conclusions: "A Famous Victory?" ..... .............. 319

Appendixes

A. Command and Control, ARCENT, February 1991 ....... 349

B. Task Organization, Operation Desert Shield,

5 March 1991 ........................................ 350

C. Warfighting Command and Control, ..................

XVIII Airborne Corps ................................ 351

D. The XVIII Airborne Corps' Task Organization,

5 M arch 1991 ........................................ 352

E. Warfighting Command and Control, VII Corps ......... 353

F. The VII Corps' Task Organization, 5 March 1991 ....... 354

G. Current Combat Capability, 24 February 1991 ......... 355

H. Chronology ......................................... 356

v
Glossary ................................................... 361

Bibliography ............................................... 365

vi

- e ·r I I I
Illustrations

Figures

Figure 1. Third Army is three armies ..................... 26

Figure 2. CENTCOM command and control ............... 28

Figure 3. One-corps concept of operations ................. 30

Figure 4. ARCENT's headquarter's capabilities ............ 34

Figure 5. Third Army force generation rate ............... 36

Figure 6. Force generation-Desert Shield versus Vietnam . 38

Figure 7. Minimum essential force development ........... 41

Figure 8. Reserve Component support to ARCENT HQ ..... 44

Figure 9. Operation Desert Shield, command and control ... 47

Figure 10. ARCENT Support Command,

Operation Desert Shield ........................ 48

Figure 11. Coalition coordination structure in Operation

Desert Shield ................................. 57

Figure 12. The status of deployment D-l, 16 January 1991 ... 107

Figure 13. G-day logistics posture ......................... 109

Figure 14. Asset availability versus commitments .......... 111

Figure 15. Routes and distances between major locations .... 119

Figure 16. The plan and timing of the attack ................ 122

Figure 17. Force generation in relation to the air campaign .. 125

Figure 18. The commander's assessment, 9 February 1991 ... 126

Figure 19. Attack positions ............................... 130

Figure 20. Phase II: Developing the offensive option,

9 November (C +94)-16 January (C + 162) ....... 141

Figure 21. Liaison teams ................................. 148
Figure 22. A comparison of Europe and Kuwait theater

of operations .................. .......... . 158

Figure 23. Allied deployments the day prior to start

of air operations ............................... 166

Figure 24. Movement of two corps ......................... 178

Figure 25. Patriot air defense ............................. 179

Figure 26. G-9,15 February 1991 .......................... 200

Figure 27. G-8,16 February 1991 .......................... 202

Figure 28. G-7,17 February 1991 .......................... 203

Figure 29. Threat locations ........... .................... 212

Figure 30. Battle damage assessment, 24 February 1991 ..... 226

Figure 31. Timing of the attack execution .................. 231

Figure 32. Third Army's final synchronization matrix ....... 233

Figure 33. Another comparison (concerning size of operational

area) ............... .. ......... ............. 249

Figure 34. Demarcation line .............................. 320

Figure 35. Planning is not fighting ........................ 339

Maps

M ap 1. Saudi Arabia ..................................... 5

Map 2. KTO: Comparison to Eastern United States ......... 24

Map 3. Desert Dragon III-September 1990: CENTCOM

defends in sector .................................. 51

Map 4. One-corps concept of operations .................... 80

Map 5. AO Eagle (and the hunt for Scuds) .................. 86

Map 6. Two-corps concept of operations .................... 94

Map 7. G-day, Sunday, 24 February 1991: Opening

situation ........................ ................ 208

Map 8. Ground operations--G +1, Monday, 25 February,

0800 ............... ........... ............ 235

viii * *

V1ll
Map 9. Ground operations-G + 1, Monday, 25 February,

2400 ............................................. 242

Map 10. Ground operations--G + 2, Tuesday, 26 February,

2400 ............................................. 251

Map 11. Ground operations-G + 3, Wednesday, 27 February,

2400 ............................................ 253

Map 12. The 101st Airborne move to FOB Viper and attack on

EA Thomas ................... ................... 257

Map 13. Ground operations- + 4, Thursday,

28 February, 2000 ................................ 283

Map 14. Basrah ............................................ 294

Note: A photo essay appears after page 223.

ix

-·I I II
I
Preface

There is a crossroads near Safwan in southeastern Iraq. Nearby,

there is a small hill and an airstrip. After the Gulf War, Safwan

became a gathering point for refugees fleeing the Iraqi Army as it

reestablished control of Basrah. Prior to that, the airstrip was the site

of the dictation of armistice terms to that army by the victorious

coalition's military high command. Still earlier, at the end of the

coalition attack, the absence of American forces on the airstrip and at

the road junction was the source of the most serious command crisis of

the U.S. expeditionary forces. Its resolution put at risk American

soldiers and threatened the reputations of the very commanders who

had just conducted the greatest offensive of concentrated armored

forces in the history of the United States Army. In many ways, events

at Safwan in late February and early March are emblematic of the

Gulf War. It is to explain how U.S. forces arrived at Safwan, what they

did and did not do there, and what this all meant, that this book is

written.

The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of

clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an

obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on

much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present

danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a

clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness

in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community

against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was

seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable

sort-good against evil, a wrong to be righted-a crusade.

It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge

for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly

out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still

deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the

continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before

Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there

was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a

long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February

in 1991.

The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of

view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf

War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition

forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is

xi
written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it

is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's

observations as the Third Army historian. Much evidence remains

unavailable. The Army is very bad at collecting the documentary

record of its activities in any sort of systematic way. It certainly is not

expeditious about it. The principal actors are only beginning to tell

their stories. General Schwarzkopfs account, flawed by much

unsupported special pleading, remains to be answered by those he

indicts. Moreover, we know very little of the enemy's intentions and

the reasons and details surrounding Saddam Hussein's actions.

Perhaps we may never know much more.

So in many ways this history, like all history, is necessarily

imperfect. Yet it must be written to form a part of what shall

eventually become the historic view of these events. This work also

offers an accounting to the American people for the employment of

their resources and the conscious imperiling of their sons and

daughters in the cause of liberating Kuwait. It is hoped that it will also

provide a useful institutional record that can be called upon in the

future when policy makes similar demands upon the Army. Most

important, this work reminds the reader that the decisions and actions

that took place in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm occurred

in a larger and quite specific context, one often beyond the influence of

the people on the ground who so often were portrayed as able to control

events and their own destinies far more than was the case. In the end,

no completely free agents existed in Saudi Arabia. The story of this

and all wars depends on how commanders adapted to circumstances as

they found them and how they turned existing conditions to their

benefit.

This book's focus is on the Army's part in this war, particularly

the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces

Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of

the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater

ground force schwerpunkt-General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel."

The book is titled "Lucky War" after the affectation of Third Army,

whose telephone switch, as far back as General George Patton's World

War II headquarters, has been named "Lucky." In the same fashion,

the Third Army's tactical operations center in Desert Storm was

referred to as "Lucky TOC." Its forward command post was "Lucky

Wheels," and so on. "Lucky" is a talisman to Third Army as,

incidentally, are "Jay Hawk" to VII Corps, and "Danger" to the 1st

Infantry Division. It is for that reason alone that "Lucky" is

incorporated in the title.

xii
The author has made only limited use of oral interviews

concerning tactical operations. Others in the field have more than

adequately tapped the memories of participants at the ground level as

well as in the high command. This work is based primarily on

documentary evidence, clarified by interviews with participants, rather than the other way around.

This book does not presume to be an official history. The author

speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments and evaluations

based upon available evidence. Thus, this is public history, written at

public expense for public purposes: the education of Army officers and

an accounting to the public of its Army in the operations in Southwest

Asia as viewed from a military technical point of view.

The distinction between public and official history was laid down

by Immanuel Kant almost two hundred years ago when he

distinguished between the public and private use of reason. Kant

allowed that those employed in the government's business might often

be required to support the government's actions contrary to their own

views. "One certainly must not argue," Kant says, "instead one must

obey."l Such obedience is a hallmark of military discipline,

particularly during a war.

Yet the Army has an institutional need for honesty and frankness

in order to learn from its experiences. This requires not just a

recording of events and actions but a critique that sets decisions and

actions in context and evaluates them in light of available

alternatives. Kant pointed out that, notwithstanding their official

status, officials did not cease to surrender their membership in the

wider community. He argued that in this broader persona, the official

might address the public "in the role of the scholar . .. , without

harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible."2 One of Kant's examples of someone divided in personal

responsibility, interestingly enough, was a soldier, who, he noted,

must obey any order he receives. "But as a scholar," Kant maintains,

"he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors

in military service, or from placing them before the public for its

judgment."3 This spirit animates this book.

This work was written against a deadline-or what the Army calls a "suspense." That constraint imposed limits on mastering even

the incomplete materials available. But while this limitation will

offend historical purists, haste was both necessary and justifiable. It

was necessary because the information is perishable. Sometimes by the time an entirely "scientific history" is written, the practical need

xiii
for it may be past. One is reminded that the Israeli Army's history of

its 1967 war was not in the hands of that army when the 1973 war

broke out. But facts alone are not the only interest of historians, who

deal in interpretations of evidence that are, to a degree, merely

approximations or imperfect representations of past reality. The

reader can judge whether or not the evidence cited here is adequate to

support the conclusions drawn.

In his magisterial work Peace and War: A Theory of International

Relations, Raymond Aron chose three lines of inquiry-theoretical,

sociological, and historical-as a way of understanding international

relations. This book will attempt to take the same approach, though

perhaps applying Aron's method in different proportions. This work is

first of all a history, a narrative account disciplined by evidence. But

war is essentially a social activity, not only because it occurs within

political societies but because armies are themselves social

organizations. To understand why and how decisions were made and

actions were taken, one must understand the social milieu in which

the actors existed. The story that follows does not ignore interpersonal

relations in telling what really happened, for the history of the war

would be distorted by the omission of discussion of this very human

problem. That would be wrong indeed. As for theory, it will be used

from time to time for its explanatory value.

Some judgments are necessary on the performance of the leaders

who directed the successful effort to eject Saddam Hussein from

Kuwait. This is done not from any mean-spirited belief that the author

himself could have done it better had he the opportunity. There is a

wide difference between knowing and doing, and commanders depend

far more on the latter than the former. Clausewitz pointed out years

ago that flanking maneuvers and concentration and maintenance of

aim are not complex ideas, but their achievement is very difficult,

indeed. "... let a general try to imitate Frederick!" he wrote, and that

requires great reserves of "boldness, resolution and strength of will."4

One prejudice and two criteria undergird the judgments found in

this book. The prejudice is simple: that killing in war is a means to an

end, not an end in itself. What distinguishes the U.S. Army from many

others is its recognition that there is a point, defined by diminishing

utility to attainment of the goal sought, where simply killing the

enemy ceases to be acceptable. Though one could not claim that this

prejudice is a universal value in the Army, the capstone document for

American armed forces doctrine, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1,

xiv
Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, carries with it a categorical

imperative and a warning that seems to underscore the point:

We also must have the courage to wield military power in a scrupulously

moral fashion. We respect human rights. We observe the Geneva

Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience. This

behavior is integral to our status as American fighting men and women.

Acting with conscience reinforces the links among the Services and between

the U.S. Armed forces and the American people, and these linkages are basic

sources of our strength. 5

The repeated willingness of American soldiers to comfort their

captured adversaries in the field and the concern of the entire chain of

command to avoid unnecessary loss of life or destruction would seem to

indicate that this view of moral conduct is widespread in the U.S.

Army.

One of my criteria for judgment came from the vice chief of staff of

the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, on a trip to Saudi Arabia shortly

after the war. Sullivan spoke to a Third Army staff, perhaps too full of

themselves after their still recent success, and he took any tendency

for swagger out of them with a simple observation. 'The American

people," he said, "expect only one thing from us: That we will win!

What you have done is no more than they expect. You have won." We

must now ask, therefore, whether the actions in question contributed

to the ultimate success of the war. And to this, I would add, whether

the accomplishment of the goals set by the coalition and national

political executive were economical.

The second criterion was set by General Schwarzkopf himself, and

it has to do with character. As Schwarzkopf told television interviewer

David Frost: "I admire men of character and I judge character not by

how men deal with their superiors, but mostly how they deal with

their subordinates. And that, to me, is where you find out what the

character of the man is."6 The author will leave judgments of character

to the reader, but he will not ignore events that seem to reflect upon

this aspect of the American high command. The U.S. Army claims to

invest great effort in the development and evaluation of this human

attribute. To ignore its influence would be to suppress a vital part of

the story of Operation Desert Storm.

Finally, a number of themes are evident in the account of Third

Army's part in the Gulf War. The first is the success of the U.S.

Central Command in anticipating the contingency that occurred.

When Iraq occupied Kuwait, Central Command had planned for just

xv
such a contingency and was, therefore, able to respond much more

promptly than would have been possible otherwise.

Central Command's anticipation notwithstanding, the threat

posed by Iraq was not the one the U.S. Army of 1990 had been

fashioned to meet. The Army had been organized, trained, and

equipped to meet a Soviet invasion of Europe. A number of

consequences for the Gulf War grew out of that salient fact. The Army

and, indeed, the entire military panoply were equipped with the finest

fighting equipment in the world. It lacked, however, the means for

offensive operational maneuver because the European mission did not

require them. Further, the Army had no doctrine and only a skeletal

organization for echelons of command above the corps, like Third

Army. The mobilization of an army-level headquarters and support

structure had to be effected as events unfolded. How this was done is

the second major theme of this book, and the story contains lessons

about force building and deployment that should be useful for an Army

that must increasingly respond to global contingencies in distant

locales.

A third theme has to do with the corporate nature of the

operational planning for Operation Desert Storm. Military doctrine

and most historical accounts would suggest that military operations

normally take place in response to a sequential and hierarchical

planning sequence-from top to bottom. In Desert Storm, the process

was multilevel, interactive, and simultaneous-as well as horizontal

and vertical. The story of how the plan took form over a period of

months and the assumptions that fashioned and shaped it in the

theater of war are a central part of the story told in these pages.

The central role of logistics in operational war fighting, the power

of personality in war, the unchanging features of war-friction,

chance, and contingency-all are subordinate themes in the story of

Third Army in Operation Desert Storm. The practice of command

itself, the ability of a leader to make decisions and cause other men to

both understand and obey him-in short, the role of the commander at

the theater, operational, and tactical levels of war in an era of global

tactical satellite communications-is the ultimate theme of this

account. At the end of the day, it is the author's hope that the story told

here will not be totally unfamiliar to those named in these pages.

xvi

I - - -
Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment," in

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals,

trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 42-43.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1984), 179-80.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 11

November 1991,9.

6. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, quoted in transcript "... talking with David

Frost," 22 March 1991, 28. Transcript in possession of the author.

- I L -- ·-I -I- I----I I
I
Acknowledgments

During the Gulf War, I had the matchless opportunity to be

assigned as theater army historian on the staff of the Third Army in

Saudi Arabia. Though one would not necessarily draw such a

conclusion from most published accounts of the Gulf War, Third Army

was the senior operational headquarters of the United States Army in

the Persian Gulf. Third Army was commanded by Lieutenant General

John Yeosock, who was on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

from the start. Indeed, the Desert Storm army was largely his creation.

But Yeosock had earlier served in an Army whose attitudes had been

formed over the years by NATO scenarios in which the largest

national formation was to be a corps. The U.S. Army had not foreseen a

requirement to deploy a multicorps army. The interposition of an army

headquarters between the corps and the theater commander was not

without difficulties and gave rise to a certain cognitive dissonance at

times. Yeosock himself is a man who shies from public exposure and

who does not do particularly well before the camera. Criticism of the

conduct of the war has tended to ignore the intervening headquarters

between the two Army corps commanders and the very visible

commander in chief, H. ("Stormin"') Norman Schwarzkopf. This

picture is very wrong, and among other reasons, it is to correct this

impression that this account is written.

This book would never have been completed without the material

assistance of a number of people to whom the author owes a

considerable debt. First, there is Bill Stacy, the historian of U.S. Army

Forces Command, who made it possible for the author to go to Saudi

Arabia as Third Army historian. Bill also has been a source of

assistance and encouragement since then. He is everything an Army

historian must be and so few are. His principal assistant, Mrs. Tammy

C. Howle, must also be acknowledged for her assistance while the

author was assigned to Fort McPherson, Georgia. I should also express

appreciation to Lieutenant General Leonard Wishart, commandant of

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and thenBrigadier General John Miller; the deputy commandant in 1990-91,

for permitting me to go.

The commander and staff officers of Third Army made it possible

for me to watch much of what took place and to collect the documents

necessary to write this account. The army staff officers, busy with the

conduct of the war, accepted the historian as a fellow professional,

even though they often failed to understand why the headquarters

needed a historian. Nonetheless, they always took the time to answer

xix
questions and to explain why various perceptions might be incomplete.

Lieutenant Colonels Dave Mock, Mike Kendall, and the G3 planners

were particularly helpful and supportive. The 44th Military History

Detachment, commanded by Major Larry Heysteck, laid the

foundation for the army history office, and Sergeant Bonnie Gray and

Major Guy Sanderson helped run it. All were enthusiastic and great

professionals, and the successes I enjoyed in Saudi Arabia are largely

due to their efforts. The chief of military history, Brigadier General

Hal Nelson, provided me with the opportunity to spend a year

researching the records and writing the first draft of this account,

sometimes in the face of opposition from his organization. Hal provided

me with the time and resources to set up a research office in the

Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth.

There, I was assisted by three great confederates who, in truth, did

most of the hard work. These were Dr. Pat Swann and Captains Russel

Santala and Mark Traylor. Without them, nothing would have been

accomplished. Pat is a geographer whom the Staff College could not

figure out how to employ properly. She has now left the college for

other government work. Russ Santala and Mark Traylor, both

exceptionally gifted officers and veterans of the war, were invaluable

in tracking down records, finding evidence, and criticizing the author's

flights of fancy. Mrs. Elaine Hoinacki, the team typist, spent many

long days listening to recorded interviews and transcribed faithfully

all that was intelligible therein. Thanks are also owed the librarians of

CARL's third floor, who made room and welcomed three intruders and

their various file cabinets and safes into an already overcrowded attic.

I enjoyed the advice, too, of an excellent board of editors: Dr. Pete

Maslowski, Dr. Larry Yates, Colonels Jim McDonough and Greg

Fontinot, Major Mark Blum, and Don Gilmore. Professor Edward M.

("Mac") Coffman also read the draft and provided wise counsel. Their

advice was always thoughtful, and I followed most of it. I likely should

have followed it all, but old colonels are fixed in their views. The errors

that remain are, thus, entirely my own. Mrs. Sharon Torres, my

secretary and administrative assistant during my years in the Combat

Studies Institute at CGSC, has been a great help, particularly in

mediating between my Luddite ignorance and the world of computers

and word processors. I also wish to thank D. M. Giangreco, design

editor of the Military Review, and Byron G. McCary, visual

information specialist at the Training Support Center (TSC), for their

generous offer of photos to be used in this work. I am also indebted to

Edward J. Carr and Robin Inojos, visual information specialists, and

Alfred Dulin, graphics supervisor, for their coordination and layout of

the manuscript. In addition, Carolyn D. Conway, editorial assistant,

xx
Combat Studies Institute, deserves credit for her diligence and skill in

inputting, correcting, and formatting the manuscript.

Finally, this book would have died in the hold box of the Center of

Military History (CMH) but for the determination of the George C.

Marshall Professor of Military History at CGSC, Dr. Roger Spiller,

that it be published. Dr. Spiller recovered it from CMH, set up an

editorial board, and encouraged, prodded, and otherwise motivated the

author to take it up again and push it through to completion. Spiller

has been chief editor and principal source of energy for seeing the

project through to publication. Whatever errors remain are simply

indications that no editor can do everything to correct the accumulated

flaws of an author. Roger Spiller has been my intellectual mentor for

seven years, and I owe him a great debt. That I am all too aware of the

price he has paid, in terms of much time he might otherwise have

turned to far more valuable projects of his own, only increases my

sense of obligation.

xxi

--- -- I II I --- - 41- ----- -· --  L · e b -------
I
Introduction

For a description of the human and material wreckage left in the

aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, Richard Swain reaches back to the

classical world. It was, he writes, "'a hecatomb'-a gruesome sacrifice

of hapless victims on a terrifying scale, meant to propitiate the ancient

gods."l

Hapless, note, not helpless. Saddam Hussein's soldiers did not

begin their war meaning to be victims. That role was meant for the

people of Kuwait. Saddam's soldiers were made that way by their own

leaders and by the combined forces of an international military

expedition.

But the outcome of this war was not inevitable. The human and

mechanical scale of the war, its geographical scope, its technical

complexities, and its highly lethal effects posed choices for all the

combatants that only rarely were self-evident or obvious. If the allied

victory was not foreordained, neither was the process by which that

victory was achieved. That depended upon a war fought as

professionally and precisely as possible, with as strict attention to

military and technical detail as the allies could muster. How this

professional and technical process unfolded, as it was viewed from the

United States Third Army headquarters and in the military

formations whose operations that headquarters controlled, is the

subject of Richard Swain's book, "Lucky War."

History may never be able to learn just why Saddam Hussein

decided to invade Kuwait in the summer of 1990. Seeing only a future

that he preferred to see, Saddam may have been encouraged by the

West's compliant policies toward Iraq during its long war with Iran.

Perhaps he believed he had stored up credits of favor with the West by

spending so much in that war. Or he may have misled himself with a

spurious view of Iraq's brief national history; once in possession of

Kuwait, supposedly a former Iraqi province, he may have planned to

create a new pan-Islamic union in the region. Or, perhaps, there was

only the oil: emboldened by the prospect of controlling a major part of

the world's supply, he may have convinced himself that the rest of the

world would countenance his fait accompli.2

But for any or all of Saddam's imaginings to yield success, it was

imperative that he be allowed to keep what he had taken. This, he was

not allowed to do. Once in Kuwait, Saddam's army could not leave, and

the United Nations could not leave it there.

xxiii
Modern military history records few examples of such a grossly

miscalculated adventure as this one. It was a gamble, foolishly taken,

badly played from the outset. The revolution in the Soviet Union had

relaxed superpower tensions, but not so much that Western armies

had irrevocably demobilized. Large, highly trained, and well-equipped

standing armies were still in place in Europe and America and not

lately used. If he thought about such matters at all, Saddam may have

believed that, after so many years of cold war, the major powers would

not so soon recommit themselves to a serious military enterprise.

In this, as in so much else, Saddam was mistaken. As a superpower

and leader of the free world during the cold war, the United States

looked forward to exercising its leadership in an atmosphere free of

long-standing international antagonisms. The invasion of Kuwait

challenged America's still optimistic ambitions for a post-cold war

peace, a "new world order." When President Bush announced, shortly

after the invasion, "This will not stand," his fervor seemed to arise at

least partly from disappointment that there would be no respite from

the demands of international leadership. The president's

announcement marked the effective beginning of the Persian Gulf

War.

As we now know, the president's decision was all his.3 Some

months were to pass, however, before the true dimensions of the

military commitment by the United States and its allies would reveal

themselves, and that was chiefly the business of the military

professionals and the military policy makers. As Swain shows here,

that business was marked by decisions taken, as usual, in an

ambiguous and contingent atmosphere: the allied effort looked far

different in late October than a month later, when it was finally

agreed that only a military offensive against occupying Iraqi forces

would suffice to meet the policy objectives set forth in United Nations

Resolution 678.

Although some military pedants still dream of planning and

conducting a war immune from the intrusions of policy, the course of

military planning from Operation Desert Shield to the execution of

Operation Desert Storm that Swain describes was a thoroughly

modern war, bounded on all sides and shaped daily by the demands of

policy. In recent years, presidents and their commanders have

indulged in the conceit that they have not gotten in each other's way,

but the history of recent military operations tells a different story

entirely. Nearly instantaneous global and public telecommunications

make certain that modern wars can no longer be fought as though

they are quarantined from public view. Analysts now use the term

xxiv
"crisis transparency" to describe a diplomatic environment in which

statesmen communicate with one another more by public than official

means. 4 The effects of these technical advancements meant that policy

could reach deeply into the allies' military machinery, affecting timehonored professional habits and behavior. When a field commander

can tune in to his commander in chiefs latest news conference, and

then watch as his immediate superiors translate that news into

military intent, we can see that, while the game may be the same in its

essentials, the playing field has been dramatically changed. 5 If it has

ever been so, it is no longer so that policy falls silent when the first

guns are fired. It was not so in the Persian Gulf War.

The success of coalition-making in war depends upon all parties

finding agreement on the war's purposes, shapes, and ends. The

sturdiest coalition is one that does not bind its members too tightly to

precise objectives that may be dear to one party but not to another.

What is more important is that all parties to a coalition can agree in

like measure and commitment, even if the resources each invests are

disproportionate. These principles were followed in this war, and they

manifested themselves as limitations on national operations.

For the Americans, this meant that there would be no overt

campaign to dethrone Saddam, although, perhaps, accidents of war

would not have been unwelcome. This meant, further, that no ground

forces would cross the Euphrates River and make for Baghdad. The air

war did not suffer this particular constraint, but allied airmen worked

under their own unique limitations all the same. No terror bombings

this time; no Dresdens or Tokyos were ever in the offing.

Those limitations extended not only to actions against the enemy

but to the way in which allied operations were framed and conducted.

Allied military objectives were to be met by commanders who

husbanded the lives of their soldiers more strictly than in any other

major conflict. And as the time drew closer for the ground offensive to

begin, these commanders subordinated their operational plans and

established tactical measures of control to prevent casualties from

"friendly fire." One brigade commander has been frank to admit that

the threat of friendly fire in tactical zones dense with soldiers and

weapons, not the enemy, governed his tactical dispositions, and

higher-ranking officers have not been reluctant to express the depth of

their concern over this age-old problem of military operations.

These concerns, it must be said, did not arise so much from highminded humanitarianism. American commanders were willing to

surrender certain tactical advantages because of the possibility that

XXV
casualties by misadventure might somehow erode popular confidence

back home. Indeed, a curious agreement existed on this issue between

Saddam and the commanders who fought against him. Paul Wolfowitz,

who served as the undersecretary of defense for policy during the war,

has written that Saddam "seemed to have concluded, from observing

both the Vietnam war and the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut, that the

United States lacked staying power ... . "6 The human costs of the

coming war on the ground, whether by friendly or enemy fire, posed a

dramatic and unresolved question that, for the Americans especially,

reached back to those earlier conflicts.

From the president downward through the chain of command, the

ghost of the Vietnam War hovered over every proceeding.7 All that

was necessary to ignite calls for U.S. withdrawal, Saddam seemed to

have thought, was the prospect of high casualties, and these he bluntly

forecasted on several occasions. If Saddam had been watching

carefully, however, he would have seen that the tempo and pace of the

allied build-up showed no signs of slacking, even after American

casualty forecasts as high as 30,000 were made in public.8 No evidence

has yet come to light suggesting that casualty projections impeded the

operations of the allied expedition in any way.

All of which is not to say that these anxieties had no effect on

official views or behavior. Instead of shrinking from the prospect of the

war, those anxieties seem to have moved the Americans in precisely

the opposite way, toward an unstinting commitment of force of arms.

Policy might dictate operational limitations, but there were to be no

half-measures. Having himself thoroughly imbibed the "lessons" of

Vietnam, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin

Powell, told the Saudi Prince Bandar in the early days of the crisis, "If

we have to [fight], I'll do it, but we're going to do it with everything we

have."9

In this sense, the Persian Gulf War was to be a redemptive war:

commanders were intent on avoiding what they regarded as the

mistakes of the past. Quite apart from immediate policy objectives,

this war had institutional goals as well: it would be fought so as to

reclaim for the U.S. Army preeminence in the world of professional

soldiering. The actions of the American commanders suggested that

they were not about to design another war so susceptible to the

uncertainties of an American national will they viewed as fragile.

They would design a war that would not, insofar as possible, again test

the strength of that will. This war was to be planned from the outset as

a short, violent, massive, and decisive victory whose conduct

capitalized upon material abundance and professional and

xxvi
technological acumen as the means of reducing the human costs of the

war. This war would be everything the Vietnam War had not been.

And when the war was over, it would be the president himself who

framed its larger significance. The victory celebrations were an

opportunity for the nation to "kick the Vietnam syndrome" by

affording returning troops a proper welcome of thanks.10

Within the shifting context of domestic experience and reaction,

international diplomacy and strategy, there remained the fact of the

war itself: the necessity that armed force was required to decide the

issues at hand. The distance between conceiving and executing this

decision entailed the mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and

direction of a huge multinational force toward politically and

militarily achievable goals thousands of miles from its points of origin.

The result, as we now know, was by no means the "near-run thing"

so dear to the hearts of military romantics. It was a victory as complete

as was wanted or could reasonably be had. In its fundamental

character, it was a thoroughly American kind of war. Russell Weigley,

the dean of American military historians, has written of the

"American way of war," a national style of warfare, defined by its

attritional impulse even in those instances when a more strictly

modulated application of violence may have been more appropriate. 11

Erstwhile strategists will find no exquisite, stylish innovations in this

conflict. Perhaps the most arresting, and telling, of Richard Swain's

images in the pages that follow is his depiction of the coalition's

ground attack as that of a "drill bit," boring remorselessly into a rock

face. In its design, in its conduct, and perhaps even in it ending, the

Persian Gulf War bore an unmistakably American stamp.

If materiel could be made to fight this war, then materiel could win

it by sheer mountainous weight. The character of the American side of

the war was, as Swain's metaphor suggests, relentlessly industrial.

The humblest subjects-ones that do not ordinarily arrest the

attention of strategists, "operational artists," or even tacticiansplayed critical parts in the war's design. That design required above

all moving what amounted to a small city thousands of miles around

the world and keeping it in good running order until the time came to

close the assembly line and shut down the factory once more. No

shortages of soldiers beset the generals, and because the work of most

soldiers in this war had to do with the servicing of machines in one way

or another, the older problem of numbers in war was replaced by one of

distribution. Witness Swain's discussion of HETs, the heavy

equipment transporters whose shortage occupied the time and energy

of the Third Army's commanding general as did few other subjects.

xxvii
HETs, how many available, where and when, the strength and state of

their crews-indeed, where to get more? These were questions of

substance, the assembling and organizing of assets, that called upon

the true metier of the Americans-organization.

And organized the war certainly was, so thoroughly organized that

the actual fighting seemed almost anticlimactic-except, of course as

always, for those who actually had to fight. At one point, the force-tospace ratio very nearly squeezed an entire division between two

others. No adroit maneuvering permitted or desired here: any

dispersion or movements that would have elicited sighs of approval

from the audience would have dissipated the concentrated power of the

attack that had been planned from the beginning.

The Persian Gulf War was a professionals' war, and so Swain's

book is by and large a professionals' book. "Lucky War" was conceived

and written for military officers and other serious students of the

military art. It is particularly meant to illuminate and explain the

technical complexities of the war, matters that general war literature

so often takes for granted or merely ignores. As an operational history

of the war, it does not neglect to show how even the finest details of

military planning and violent execution are subjected to the dynamic

interactions of an event with so many moving parts. It is written from

the vantage point of the U.S. Third Army, the headquarters placed

between the fighting corps and the unified command of the war. From

this vantage point, a clear view of both the highest and lowliest aspects

of the war was available. From this position, Swain scouted in all

directions for the sources of this history, from briefing rooms in Riyadh

to the front-line traces. "Lucky War" is thus a book by both an

informed observer and a participant.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Richard Swain was a colonel, serving

on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as

the director of the Combat Studies Institute. A graduate of West Point,

a field artillery officer, and veteran of Vietnam, Swain had also won a

doctorate in history from Duke University. Between command and

staff assignments, he had taught at West Point and at the Staff

College's School of Advanced Military Studies. Along the way, he had

made of himself one of the Army's most disciplined and productive

students of the history of the military art.

Shortly after the invasion, Swain was asked for a forecast of the

strategic end state of the crisis, whose barest outlines were only

beginning to be revealed. He was not confident that the United States

would intervene militarily, and he hoped that economic sanctions

xxviii
would resolve the trouble. But as the crisis grew more serious, Swain

was quick to see that the U.S. Army was on the verge of another

limited war, and one of significant proportions. A historic event of

some magnitude was in the making. As the Army mobilized for the

conflict, Swain was convinced that history should mobilize with it.

Armies preparing for war are rarely if ever sympathetic to the

presence of historians. Historians and their work have to do with

matters that seem remote to commanders and staff officers consumed

by events at hand. The work of history seems all too easily postponed.

Once the war is concluded, however, the reverse seems to be true.

Armies at once become interested in commemorating and celebrating

their victories, if indeed a victory has been recorded. They want to

know, too, what lessons may be learned from their recent experience,

the theory being that those lessons might be applied in future

operations. In practice, however, these efforts seldom produce insights

that alter professional behavior. Soon enough, armies revert to the

routines of the garrison.

Swain was fully aware of these problems. He knew that armies in

the past had paid for ignoring their own experience. He knew as well

that commemorating an experience was no substitute for

understanding it. And he knew that the discipline and patience

demanded by close historical study would not permit the instant

production of a book. If the war was serious enough to be fought, he

believed, its history deserved a serious and deliberate effort.

Finally, Swain was moved by concerns that transcended his

professional interest in the war and its history. As an American

soldier, Swain believed that his nation deserved an accounting of its

army's performance, that his fellow citizens had a right to demand a

means of understanding how the energy of their sons and daughters

and the fruits of their labors had been spent in a war that had been

fought in their interests. Swain meant his history as a contribution to

that understanding.

In late November 1991, Swain was finally notified of his

appointment as the theater army historian. He was ordered to deploy

to Third Army headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, there to oversee

the operations of several official military history detachments then

operating with major unit formations and to record and eventually to

write the history of the war. He arrived in Saudi Arabia in January

1991, just before the beginning of the ground offensive. He returned to

the United States in May and for the next two years continued his

research and writing.

xxix
"Lucky War" is Swain's fulfillment of his assignment. It is "official

military history," a variety of history that the British military

historian, B. H. Liddell Hart, once condemned as a contradiction in

terms. Jaundiced by his relations with the British Army's official

historians from World War I, Liddell Hart denied that serving officers,

or anyone with intimate official relations, could produce a military

history that a reader might approach with confidence. The shadow of

Liddell Hart's opinion has darkened official history for decades. Swain

was guided in his own research and writing by the ambition to prove

Liddell Hart wrong once again. This, he has done in full measure.

ROGER J. SPILLER

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

XXX

I -- ' ' - I --- I---I I -I
Notes

1. See, for instance, Michael Kelly's description of the "highway of death" in Martyrs'

Day: Chronicle of a Small War (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 233-44.

2. For a discussion of the effect of modern telecommunications upon crisis diplomacy,

see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War

in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), xxxiiixxxiv, 78,260.

3. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 260.

4. See Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War in the New World

Order, 42-50.

5. For all the complications inherent in the technical improvements in global public

communications, an equally complex set of problems inheres in modern military

communications. One indicator of the scope of these problems combined can be found

in what might be called the "electronic history" of the Persian Gulf War, where

public communications consumed twice as much communications satellite band

width reporting the war as the military did in fighting it. See Alan D. Campen,

"Information, Truth and War," in The First Information War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA

International Press, 1992), 87.

6. Paul Wolfowitz, "Victory Came Too Easily," The National Interest, n. 35 (Spring

1994): 91.

7. The ghost warned against the dangers of confused national purpose, the corrosive

effects of military gradualism upon popular support for a limited war, and of

surrendering initiative to the enemy. Above all, the ghost insisted upon the prompt

achievement of decisive victory by virtue of highly concentrated, overwhelming

force. These precepts had already been codified by Caspar Weinberger while

secretary of defense. The so-called Weinberger Doctrine set conditions for the

employment of American force in future expeditions. Notwithstanding the dubious

constitutionality of the exercise-American armed forces are instruments, not

arbiters, of policy-the doctrine did resonate within the defense establishment: it

conformed wonderfully to dearly held prejudices about the use of American military

power that had been formed since the Vietnam War. See Caspar Weinberger's

Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books,

1990), 400-402 and 433-45, for the secretary's discussion of the context in which his

ideas were conceived, as well as the text of his speech before the National Press Club

in which he first publicly enunciated his doctrine.

8. See James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the

Persian Gulf War (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 106-7.

9. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, 324.

10. President George Bush, "Remarks at a Meeting of Veterans Service Organizations,"

4 March 1991, reprinted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 27, nos.

1-14 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 248. Virtually every

serious study of the Persian Gulf War employs the Vietnam War as an invidious

comparison. Indeed, the story of the U.S. Army's recovery from defeat in Vietnam

xxxi
forms the theme of the opening chapter in the Army's own first attempt to capture

the history of the Persian Gulf War. See Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., et

al., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office of the

Chief of Staff of the Army, 1993), 1-38.

11. See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States

Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), ix-xv and passim, for a

complete exposition of this idea.

xxxii

L - I IP - L- -- -- II I -Y -- I-" --
1

Prologue to Operation

Desert Shield

In the first two months of 1991, the armed forces of an

unprecedented global coalition attacked and destroyed the core of

Iraq's military forces, thus freeing the small but oil-rich state of

Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Although the United States contributed

almost half the friendly military forces engaged, the coalition based its

international authority on a large majority vote of the United Nations

Security Council.1 Military contributions came from thirty-seven

separate states and financial and material donations from others.2 The

regional legitimacy conferred on the endeavor by the U.S. partnership

with the Saudi government and the participation, under Saudi

sponsorship, of other Gulf States and major Arab powers was equally important.

Because the Gulf War was a coalition war, it remained a war of

limited objectives. At no time was the destruction of Iraq a serious

consideration. The strategists seem always to have had a keen eye on

what the postwar regional balance of power would look like, not

wishing to exchange one destabilizing imbalance for another.

The war occurred in a "new world" context. The old post-World

War II framework of Soviet-American confrontation had been

supplanted by a multipolar global community. Within this new global

political environment, former members of the Warsaw Pact

contributed contingents and materiel to serve in a variety of symbolic

ways.

The fundamental causes of this war reach back a thousand years

or more to the birth of Islam and its spread throughout the world.

Certainly they extend to the breakup of the last great Islamic empire

at the end of World War I. And they include the stresses operating

since that time throughout the developing world as traditional

societies have coped with the twin pressures of modernization and

competing foreign (Western) ideologies. These causes, however, are

largely beyond the scope of this study. Iraq's violation of the

sovereignty of a weak brother Arab state was the sufficient cause of

the 1990-91 Gulf War. This action alone-which threatened Saudi

Arabia, the minor Gulf States, and the regional and global economic

balance of power-called the anti-Iraq coalition into existence. With

the collapse of the old world order, a clear precedent was called for in

the form of united military action that would punish this wanton act

1
2

by a mighty nation against a weak one and place it beyond the pale of

legitimate international behavior. These are the circumstances that

led to war.

Since World War II, the United States Department of Defense has

divided the world into a number of geographic regions. Joint service

military headquarters have been assigned responsibility for these

regions, and they are responsible for conducting necessary military

operations and forestalling trouble. Following the fiasco of Operation

Desert One, the aborted attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in

revolutionary Iran, a new theater, U.S. Central Command

(CENTCOM), was carved out in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and

eastern Indian Ocean area. CENTCOM's headquarters were located

at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The commander in chief

of CENTCOM in 1990, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, directed all

U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. His headquarters and those

of his subordinate service components, Army, Navy, Marine Corps,

and Air Force, actually began to prepare for hostilities with Iraq long

before fighting broke out.

Army units participated in the operations in Southwest Asia as

part of a joint military response to Iraqi aggression. The contributions

of other U.S. military services were at least as vital to the outcome as

those of the Army. Each service contributed its own unique

capabilities. Indeed, the Air Force can claim, with some justification,

to have been the predominant service in this desert war. While this

book will focus on the Army's contribution-particularly those of

Third Army, its two assigned corps, and support command-the Army

was but one service among five (counting the Coast Guard) in a

coalition in which the armed services of many nations contributed to

the final outcome, each in accordance with its own capabilities.

The military actions of August 1990 to January 1991 (Operation

Desert Shield) and those of January and February 1991 (Operation

Desert Storm) were only a part of the strategic response by the United

States, Saudi Arabia, and their coalition allies to the Iraqi aggression.

The total effort against Iraq combined economic, political, and military

instruments of interstate power. Establishing the necessary political

framework for military action often set the pace at which military

preparations could be made. Many opportunities were available for

any of the parties to have gone another way-except, perhaps, the

government-in-exile of Kuwait. None of what actually happened was

preordained.
3

Only the choices of the various players led to the resolution that

came to pass. For many weeks, it appeared that a military standoff of

undetermined duration had developed and that, behind the scenes,

economic and political forces would have to be given time to impose a

resolution. Only that prospect accounts for the discussion concerning

transition of Third Army from a contingency headquarters to the

status of a more permanent major army command and the

simultaneous planning for the rotation of ground forces in and out of

theater. These discussions went on in the fall of 1990 even as planning

went forward for possible offensive actions in Southwest Asia.3 Each

succeeding step toward war was contingent on earlier measures, and

nothing was very certain-except the determination of Saddam

Hussein to remain in Kuwait and the equal determination of the

coalition to have him out, one way or the other.

President George Bush did not announce development of an

offensive military option, until 8 November. Not until early January

did the United States Congress-and not by an overwhelming

mandate-follow the United Nations Security Council in authorizing

the use of military force to break the deadlock in the desert.4 The

importance of the president's political strategy to the final outcome

cannot be overstated, nor the skill with which he and his secretary of

state, James Baker, orchestrated their actions. The secretary of state's

ability to challenge the United States Senate on 5 December 1990-to

demonstrate the same resolve already shown by the United Nations

Security Council on 29 November-is indicative of the Bush

administration's political skill.5

Finally, it is vitally important to understand that the ability to

complete various military actions during the war's offensive phase,

Desert Storm, was contingent on the need to compensate for earlier

decisions made in response to a quite different set of assigned tasks

and assumptions in effect during the earlier protective (defensive)

phase, Operation Desert Shield. Decisions taken for good reasons in

August and September, both at the political and theater level, had

significant implications for how business could be done in December

and January, as military forces in Saudi Arabia prepared for an

offensive. Simply put, a force built for attack has different

communications, logistics, intelligence, and force structure

requirements than one created for deterrence and defense and under

political guidance to deploy only "minimum essential forces." Over and

above all these short-term influences lay another reality: the armed

forces committed to the Arabian Peninsula had been designed and

structured originally for a very different war-a forward defense of
4

NATO on the Central Front in Europe. This accounts for such

anomalies as the Army's shortage of line-haul trucks, particularly

heavy equipment transporters (HETs), the large flat-bed trucks used

to transport heavy armored vehicles to the front.6

Strictly speaking, Operation Desert Shield began on C-day, 7

August 1990, when the president ordered U.S. military forces to the

Arabian Peninsula to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from the

threat of Iraqi aggression following Saddam Hussein's 2 August

(0140Z) invasion of Kuwait.7 (See map 1.) In fact, the operation was

anticipated by several months of Central Command planning actions

that placed Army forces, particularly Third Army and XVIII Airborne

Corps, in an especially favorable position for the accomplishment of

their assigned missions. Any account of this operation, then, must

start by considering events that began in November 1989, when some

critics considered Iraqi aggression against Kuwait scarcely creditable.

In the fall of 1989, the postwar global power structure had broken

down. The Soviet Union was undergoing dramatic internal stresses,

while its European empire was falling away rapidly. As Soviet interest

turned inward, military planners everywhere responded by

considering the emerging multipolar world as the strategic

environment of the 1990s. U.S. estimates examined the restructuring

of the American military in light of new threat assessments.

For Central Command, that meant shifting its focus from

opposing a Soviet attack through Iran, the principal threat envisioned

from 1983 to 1989, to a more regional threat, a hypothetical Iraqi

attack against its weak but oil rich neighbors to the south. In

November 1989, General Schwarzkopf directed that the theater

operations plan that addressed an Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia

(Operations Plan [OPLAN] 1002-90) be made the priority for Central

Command planning and that the plan be revised as quickly as

possible.8 In December, Schwarzkopf requested and was granted

permission to shift the focus of a forthcoming Joint Chiefs of Staff war

game from the disappearing Soviet threat (OPLAN 1021) to the

defense of the Arabian Peninsula. In January 1990, Central Command

called for the preparation of war plans against an Iraqi threat to the

Arabian Peninsula. These were to be the basis of the exercise, Internal

Look, scheduled for July 1990.9

Baghdad emerged from its eight-year war with Iran still strong

enough to attack Saudi Arabia. Indeed, while recommending that the

United States "continue to develop its contacts with Iraq by building

selectively on existing political and economic relationships," General
5

Map 1. Saudi Arabia

Schwarzkopf told the Senate Armed Forces Committee in January

1990 that "Iraq is now the preeminent military power in the Gulf, and

It is assuming a broader leadership role throughout the Arab world.

Iraq has the capability to militarily coerce its neighboring states

should diplomatic efforts fail to produce the desired results."10 Critics

of this view argued that Iraq lacked the intent or economic capability

to move against its neighbors. Some suggested the CENTCOM

analysis was no more than an attempt to justify the command's

existence. 11

As Saddam Hussein increased tensions in the region throughout

the spring, U.S. assistance to Iraq (which dated back to the Iran-Iraq

War) would become a political issue. In April, CENTCOM planners

were directed to drop the country's identifications in their planning
6

documents and to substitute the less politically sensitive color codes of

RED (Iraq), ORANGE (Iran), and YELLOW (People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen).12

Third Army, as the Central Command's Army component, was

also reevaluating the regional threat. The principal Army war plan in

the fall of 1989 assumed a Soviet attack through Iran to the Persian

Gulf. The plan called for five and two-thirds U.S. divisions in the

defense, mostly light and heavy forces at something less than full

strength (apportioned to it by the Joint Strategic Capability Plan

[JSCAP]). Less than two divisions were apportioned to the separate

plan then in place for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula.13

Even before Schwarzkopf changed Central Command's planning

priorities, ARCENT began adjusting to the idea that Iraq constituted

the major regional threat. Third Army also held that any U.S.

response to the potential danger would require a significantly larger

and heavier force than had been anticipated. As early as March 1989,

Third Army began to coordinate with the Army Concepts and Analysis

Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a war game

simulation of the existing war plan for the Arabian Peninsula to

examine this hypothesis.

CAA ran Wargame Persian Tiger 89 in February 1990, as

planning for a revised defensive concept got under way. Persian Tiger

posited a defensive force of three Army light brigades (one airborne,

two airmobile), a battalion of the Ranger regiment, an air defense

artillery brigade, corps aviation, and artillery. Two Marine

expeditionary brigades and aviation forces allocated under the

existing plan were also portrayed. The findings of the game, which

began to emerge in February but which were not published until

August 1990, were that U.S. forces could not arrive in theater in time

to resist an Iraqi invasion if deployment were ordered only upon

outbreak of hostilities. It was learned also that the allocated U.S. force

structure was too light to do what was required of it, in any event. 14

By the time the results of Persian Tiger were published, Central

Command's own planners had arrived at many of the same

conclusions. The exercise provided a mechanism that supported

ongoing Third Army planning in the spring of 1990 and offered an

opportunity for Third Army and subordinate XVIII Corps planners to

begin gaining practical experience in the problems they would

actually face in August.

Between January and July 1990, Central Command, Third Army,

and XVIII Corps planners prepared draft operation plans for the new
7

contingency, and in July, United States Forces Command

(FORSCOM), the headquarters commanding all continental U.S.

Army combat forces, began selecting units to meet Army Forces

Central Command's requirements. 15 The deputy commanding general

of Third Army, Major General William Riley, began visiting various

headquarters with a briefing on Third Army's view of the changing

regional threat.16 Back at Fort McPherson, Georgia, Riley and the

Third Army staff conducted a functional analysis of the forces required

for the new plan. This was the first step toward development of Desert

Shield time-phased force development data (TPFDD), a troop list to

support the new plan.

A number of features of the draft Third Army plan (1002-90),

published in July 1990, show how prewar planning guided Third

Army's actions during Operation Desert Shield. The plan was intended

to direct the Army's contribution to Central Command's broaderobjective regional plan "designed to counter an intraregional conflict

on the ARABIAN PENINSULA to protect UNITED STATES (U.S.)

and allied access to ARABIAN PENINSULA oil."17 Central

Command's strategy for a regional contingency spelled out its strategy

this way:

.The USCENTCOM regional contingency strategy to counter an

intraregional threat initially seeks to [secure] U.S. and allied interests

through deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy

additional U.S. combat forces to assist friendly states in defending critical

ports and oil facilities on the ARABIAN PENINSULA. Once sufficient

combat power has been generated and the enemy has been sufficiently

attrited, the strategy is to mass forces and conduct a counteroffensive to

recapture critical port and oil facilities which may have been seized by

enemy forces in earlier stages of conflict.

Notably, as a precondition of execution, the plan indicated that "the

scope of operations requires that this plan be executed independently

of other major contingencies."1 8

The plan portrayed an Iraqi attack through Kuwait and into

Saudi Arabia. The attack force consisted of sixty brigades, supported

by 640 fighter/ground-attack aircraft and a minimum of 3,200 tanks.

The plan assumed four days would be needed to take Kuwait and

another five to reach the port of Al Jubayl. It credited Iraq with an

operational reach no longer than Al Hufuf-enough grasp to occupy

the main Persian Gulf ports and key oil facilities. The plan also

assumed three to six months' increased regional tension and up to

thirty days' strategic warning.
8

The corresponding Third Army plan assumed a deployment

decision at least nineteen days prior to hostilities, an immediate

200,000-man selected Reserve call-up, and availability of assigned

National Guard roundout brigades and necessary combat service

support units.19 In the pre-Desert Storm Army force structure,

roundout brigades were National Guard formations that were

expected to fill out incomplete Regular Army divisions and deploy with

them to war. In the event, Third Army would enjoy neither the

advanced warning nor have the benefit of an early selected Reserve

call-up. The absence of both would influence significantly how Third

Army went to war.

The Third Army plan was designed for the defense of critical port

and oil facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl and Abqaiq, the operation

of common-user seaports, and the provision of combat support and

combat service support (logistics) to Central Command forces in

theater.20 The concept of operations called for a three-phase

deployment.21 Phase one addressed the introduction of "deterrent

forces," the Third Army and XVIII Corps' forward headquarters, an

aviation brigade task force, and troops from the 82d Airborne Division.

These forces, along with Marine units, were to establish a deterrent

force north of Al Jubayl to secure the points of debarkation at Jubayl,

Ad Dammam, and Dhahran and, upon arrival of the Marines, to

establish a defense of the Abqaiq oil facilities. The deterrent effect of

ground forces would be greatly enhanced, of course, by the

simultaneous arrival of air and naval forces. Indeed, in the first month

of any deployment, the U.S. and Saudi air threat to extended Iraqi

lines of communication was the deterrent.

Phase two of the Third Army deployment was to involve the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division

(Mechanized) and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with their

reserve component "roundout" brigades, a brigade of the 9th Infantry

Division (Motorized) (then undergoing deactivation), and the 197th

Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Arrival of these heavier

forces would permit the establishment of a defense in depth behind

Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces to the north along the

Saudi border and forward of the ports and oil facilities. Should the

enemy attack at this point, the Air Force component (principally

Central Command Air Forces [CENTAF]) was assigned to contest the

offensive. The Army aviation task force of attack helicopters would

link the ground forces with the theater air interdiction program. The

brigade of the 9th Division (Motorized) was to be held in theater

reserve. Phase three called for a coordinated counteroffensive
9

involving Saudi, U.S. Army, and Marine forces to restore lost territory

and facilities.22

In mid-July, Third Army and the other CENTCOM component

planners went to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, to test their plans in

Exercise Internal Look.23 Third Army's Internal Look concept of

operations also called for a three-phased operation: building up a

corps-sized force, defense of critical facilities, and a counteroffensive.

Tactical command was to be the province of the commander, XVIII

Airborne Corps. Third Army would assemble and sustain the force as

the Army component of Central Command. A key assumption was that

sustainment in an environment with no developed or prepositioned

United States military forces would require maximum host-nation

support to succeed. Country RED was portrayed as possessing

significant armored forces (around 4,000 tanks), theater ballistic

missiles, a strong air force, and a chemical and biological capability.24

Like the Third Army plan, the Internal Look scenario called for

an Army force consisting of an attack helicopter brigade task force, the

82d Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, the 24th

Infantry Division (Mechanized) (two brigades), the 197th Separate

Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the brigade from the 9th Division

(Motorized), and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (two

brigades). It also assumed the presence, late in the sequence of

arriving units, of the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) and the

256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)-both National Guard roundout

brigades-to complete the 24th and 5th Divisions. This was a total of

seven light brigades (three airborne, three air assault, one motorized)

and seven heavy brigades. The scenario assumed prior warning. Dday, the date of attack, was C-day plus 18 (C-day is the date upon

which the force would be ordered to deploy). This assumption, in turn,

permitted a further assumption, perhaps more tenuous, of the presence

in theater on D-day of the corps headquarters, the aviation brigade

task force, the airborne division, the 11th Air Defense Brigade,

elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and the ARCENT

headquarters.25

The Marine Corps forces of Central Command were expected to

land and move into a defensive sector along the coast protecting the

port of Al Jubayl. Third Army was to defend inland, forward of Ad

Dammam, Dhahran, and Abqaiq. The component boundary was

located east of An Nuayriyah. The scenario, like the earlier plans,

assumed participation of Gulf Cooperation Council members and

Royal Saudi Land Forces in their own defense.
10

During planning, it had become clear to Third Army staff officers

that their force was inadequate. The Third Army commander,

Lieutenant General John Yeosock, used Exercise Internal Look as an

opportunity to make a case with General Schwarzkopf that additional

heavy forces and Patriot air defense systems were required to execute

the assigned missions. Third Army believed that, although the

currently assumed force could get to the theater rapidly and thus

provide a credible deterrent (depending on the depth of the intent of

the aggressor), it had inadequate armor to deal with the anticipated

threat, an inappropriate covering force, and a lack of a

counteroffensive capability required to restore any territory lost. Third

Army also believed the motorized brigade provided was an inadequate

theater reserve.26

While Internal Look took place, General Yeosock had his staff

prepare alternative force lists. Option 1 called for a force of ten heavy

brigades (three and one-third divisions). It eliminated the airborne

and air assault divisions and the separate brigades and portrayed a

force of an armored cavalry regiment, three heavy divisions (two

mechanized and one armored), and included reserve component

roundout brigades. The helicopter brigade task force, now the 6th

Cavalry (Air Combat) Brigade, and the air defense brigade were the

only Army units in the C+12 force. Such a force would double the

armor capability. It would provide an armored cavalry regiment for

the covering force and a counteroffensive capability. But it would not

allow for rapid deployment and thus would not, by itself, form a strong

deterrent in the early days of any crisis.27

A second alternative retained the air assault division as a C + 12

force, along with the air defense brigade, to accomplish the deterrence

mission. This called for a C + 50 force of an armored cavalry regiment,

two mechanized divisions, and one armored division-that is, ten

heavy and three light brigades. This was the favored option, although

it was recognized that sealift would be exceeded at C+40.28 In

addition, the Third Army commander used Internal Look to argue for

the addition of more Patriot missile units.29 All options required

additional fast sealift to accommodate the heavier forces. 30 For

Schwarzkopf, who was faced with a fixed resource in strategic

transport, any increase in the Army's requirements would have to be

met by a reduction in some other force's arrival time or a longer period

of deployment. In the early hours of a crisis, the premium on the

combat potential of tactical air forces would militate against any shift

in priorities. Third Army briefers took the results of this exercise to
11

the Department of the Army and briefed the plan only hours before

Iraq invaded Kuwait.31

All this effort was not so much evidence of prescience as it was of

professional military planners doing their job. It is the business of

planning headquarters to anticipate possible threats to national

security within their areas of responsibility and to plan to deal with

them. Iraq was the greatest potential threat in the region once the

Soviets were eliminated as a possible attacker. U.S. interests were

genuine and of long standing. It can be argued that the threat of Iraq

was always present and had just been countenanced because of the

overriding global nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and residual U.S.

hostility with Iran.

For six months prior to commitment, the Third Army and XVIII

Airborne Corps staffs had thought through the problems involved in

the operation they were about to undertake. As a consequence, the

Third Army commander had succeeded in convincing the chief of

Central Command and the Department of the Army of the

requirement for heavier, more lethal, forces and the need to employ

the Patriot missile as a theater antitactical ballistic missile system.

These decisions were to be justified in the following weeks and months.

The studies also pointed out, as the deployment itself would confirm,

that available strategic sealift was a significant weakness in the

security of the United States' vital interests in the Persian Gulf area.

--- -L-l , L- I-

Notes

1. United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 678, 29 November 1990. The

resolution demanded Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January

1991 and authorized the use of all necessary means by UN members to bring about

Iraqi withdrawal thereafter. The Security Council vote was twelve for, two against

(Yemen and Cuba). China abstained. "UN Resolutions," Military Review 71

(September 1991): 79. The text of the resolution is in "Text of U.N. Resolution on

Using Force in the Gulf," The New York Times, 30 November 1990, A10; and

"Resolution Sets Jan. 15 Deadline For Withdrawal," The Washington Post, 30

November 1990, A23.

2. United States Central Command, Executive Summary, Operations Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look '90 After-Action Reports, 17 July 1991,

1.

3. HQ, Forces Command, FCJ5-PP, Memorandum for Commander, ARCENT Rear,

AFRD-XO (Colonel Edwards), Subject: ARCENT Organization and Functions to

Support Operation Desert Shield, dated 8 November 1990. HQ, ARCENT,

Command Group, ARCENT Update Briefing C + 61, given to Chief of Staff, Army,

on 7 October, slide titled, "Force Rotation Tour Considerations." This briefing is

scripted, which makes it particularly useful as a status report.

4. "Congressional Resolution," Military Review, 91-92. The resolution was passed on

12 January by a vote of 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House.

5. Baker testimony in, United States Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on

Foreign Relations, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, 4 and 5 December

1990, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (S. Hrg. 101-1128, Pr. 1), 140. Speaking to

Senator Dodd, Secretary Baker said: "But Senator, surely you are not suggesting

that we go over there [Iraq] and negotiate something short of the U.N. resolutions?"

6. See the comments in Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, USMC, Retired, "Desert

Shield: From the Gulf," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117, no. 1 (January 1991):

77-80.

7. U.S. Army, Center of Military History, Draft Chronology: Operation Desert

Shield/Storm, 2. (Attributed to Iraq-Kuwait Chronology, by AP [1990].)

8. United States Central Command, Executive Summary, Operations Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look '90 After-Action Reports, 17 July 1991,

2. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group,

Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June

1991, 1-6. This memorandum was prepared by Major Steve Holley, the planning

officer most involved with 1002-90, and signed by Colonel Harold E. Holloway,

ARCENT chief of plans. It is the most comprehensive document available on the

pre-August planning process. General Schwarzkopf fixes his decision to shift the

focus on CENTCOM planning in July 1989, noting it was a decision that had

evolved over a period of time. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman

Schwarzkopf, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Linda Grey

Bantam Books, 1992), 273-87 (hereafter referred to as Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a

Hero).

13
14

9. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group,

Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June

1991,4.

10. "Statement of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, United

States Central Command," in United States Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, 12 December

1989; 23, 24, 25, 26, 30 January; 2, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22 February; 7 March 1990 (S. Hrg.

101-70), 608, 626.

11. U.S. Army, Center of Military History, "Interview with General G. Sullivan, USA,

Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, 4 February 1991," 25. Major Steven Holley,

the ARCENT planner for OPLAN 1001-90, told the author that the same point was raised by Department of State planners during the planning process at CENTCOM.

12. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group,

Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June

1991,3.

13. Ibid., 1. See also HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Command Briefing;

Preliminary Phase (Internal Look '90).

14. U.S. Army, Concepts and Analysis Agency, Wargame Persian Tiger 89, Study

Report CAA-SR-90-5, August 1990.

15. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group,

Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June

1991, 3.

16. Major General William Riley, "New Realities Briefing."

17. HQ, ARCENT, COMUSARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft), 16 July 1990,4.

18. Ibid., 5.

19. Ibid., 27-28.

20. Ibid., 20-21.

21. Ibid., 30-34.

22. Ibid., 34.

23. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group,

Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June

1991, 3. United States Central Command, Executive Summary, Operations Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, Exercise Internal Look '90 After-Action Reports, 17 July 1991.

24. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Command Briefing: Preliminary Phase

(Internal Look '90). HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT

OPLAN 1002-90 Force Structure," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept

of Support," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990.
15

25. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90

Force Structure," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990. Base Case. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 Concept of Support," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990.

26. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90

Force Structure," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990.

27. Ibid., Option 1.

28. Ibid., Option 2.

29. HQ, 11th ADA Brigade, briefing titled, "Initial Patriot Battalion Incremental

ATBM Capability," Internal Look '90, undated. HQ, 11th ADA Brigade, briefing titled, "Initial Assessment of USCINCCENT Patriot Requirement," Internal Look

'90, dated July 1990. See also the remarks of General Charles Horner, USAF,

"Offensive Air Operations: Lessons for the Future," RUSI Journal 138, No. 6

(December 1993): 22.

30. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90

Concept of Support," presented to USCINCCENT, 27 July 1990. HQ, ARCENT,

Command Group, briefing titled, "ARCENT Update," presented to the 1990 Army

Leadership Seminar on 6 August 1990. The latter briefing showed the preferred

force would take seventy-five deployment days vice fifty-five for base case. The

requirement for either was fifty days. The ARCENT conclusion-"Need 6 more fast

sealift ships."

31. HQ; ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 1002-90

Concept of Operations," presented to the vice chief of staff and Army Staff on 1

August 1990.

II-- I Y·l I ·- --

2

Executing a Contingency

Neither Central Command nor Third Army had operational forces

assigned to them during normal times. Both operated on reduced

establishment, which meant that both were confronted with the need

to create expanded headquarters at the same time major forces were

being deployed to the theater of operations under their command.

Because of the distance from American and European bases and limits

on strategic lift, U.S. forces were dependent upon host-nation support

from the outset. Arrangements for provision of such support had to be

made as troops flowed in. On top of this, because no doctrine existed for

Third Army's role, much of what was done had to be made up as the

process unfolded. The focus of this chapter is on the actions taken by

Third Army to establish itself in theater in the late summer of 1990-

the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, the defense of the Arabian

Peninsula.

This chapter also assesses the personalities of the men selected to

lead the Army's land effort. If the unwritten cultural values or

prejudices of the Army are correct, the highly successful war in

Southwest Asia was directed by the wrong generals. For the Army, the

Gulf War was a tanker's war. Although he had commanded a

mechanized division in the United States, General Norman

Schwarzkopf was not ordinarily thought of as an authority on armored

warfare. 1 The commander in chief (CINC) was a light infantryman,

respected as an aggressive, indeed, combative leader. He was also

known as a boss who "shot messengers," a big man whose leadership

style was that of a classic bully, a commander who employed his size as

a weapon of intimidation and tolerated neither fools nor honest

disagreement gladly. Yet Schwarzkopf was also a leader known for the

genuine affection he felt for his soldiers, and there are those who

maintain that, in spite of his sometimes brutal treatment of

subordinates, in the long run he rarely followed through on threats

made in bad temper.

Schwarzkopf was said by retired Air Force General Charles E.

("Chuck") Yeager to have admitted to being put out to pasture when he

was sent to CENTCOM as commander in chief.2 That is not an entirely

inapt assessment, for whatever planning was done in the 1980s for

Persian Gulf contingencies, it would have been hard to find many

Army officers who believed a major land war in that area likely.

Deployment time for heavy forces was considered an insurmountable

17
18

problem, although significant efforts were made to address this

shortcoming. 3 The Army's premier tanker, General Crosbie Saint, a

former commander of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, had been sent to

Europe to command U.S. Army Europe and NATO's Central Army

Group in the event of mechanized war breaking out across the Iron

Curtain. But that was before the sudden arrival of a "new world

order."

Schwarzkopf had been an assistant division commander of the 8th

Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Europe and had commanded the

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Georgia, but he had never

commanded a large armored force in the field. In 1985, he became the

deputy chief of staff for operations (DCSOPS) at the Department of the

Army and, thereafter, the commander of I Corps at Fort Lewis. The

position of DCSOPS doubtless prepared him for his role as a jointservice commander, but it would have contributed nothing to his

practical knowledge of mechanized warfare on a large scale. The I

Corps commander commanded a headquarters and various light and

Reserve Component forces focused largely on Korea and other Pacific

theater contingencies. While commanding the 24th Division,

Schwarzkopf had been appointed deputy to the Commander in Chief,

Atlantic, during Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 U.S. invasion of

Grenada. No doubt his experiences in that operation instructed many

of his decisions as Commander in Chief, Central Command.

In his memoir, Schwarzkopf portrays himself as something of a

regional expert at the time he assumed command because he had lived

in the region as a boy. It must be remembered, however, that he had

last seen the Middle East as a 14-year-old on holidays from school.

While he seems to have retained an emotional attraction to the region,

one suspects whatever expertise he possessed in 1990 came from hard

work done as commander in chief far more than from any earlier

practical experience in the area. 4

Lieutenant General John Yeosock, the Third Army commander,

brought to his job a number of experiences that would be directly

relevant to the tasks he would have to perform during the Gulf War.

Yeosock was a career armored cavalryman. 5 He commanded a

squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry at Fort Bliss, Texas, and the

194th Armored Brigade at Fort Knox. Later, he had been chief of staff,

assistant division commander (ADC), and commander of the 1st

Cavalry Division at Fort Hood. The division participated in Reforger

(Return of Forces to Europe) exercises while he was both ADC and

division commander. Yeosock commanded the division at the time

General Saint was III Corps commander, and he took part in one of the
19

most ambitious of the Reforger exercises, one in which the III Corps exercised its role as a reinforcing corps to Allied Forces Central

Europe. Yeosock's association with Major General William G. Pagonis,

Forces Command's J4, whom he would select to be his support

command commander, went back to a Reforger exercise in which both

officers moved the 1st Cavalry Division to Europe and back. Pagonis

was then deputy commander of the 21st Support Command in U.S.

Army Europe.

Equally important, Yeosock had served as assistant deputy chief

of staff for operations when Schwarzkopf was the DCSOPS. He

understood the commander in chiefs personality and guided his

behavior accordingly. More to the point, he was generally able to

interpret the CINC's temperamental outbursts and able to extract

from them the necessary information to get on with the business at

hand.

Yeosock, in fact, was an uneasy complement to Schwarzkopf.

Where Schwarzkopf was mercurial, forceful, and dynamic, Yeosock

was thoughtful, thorough, and circumspect. The commander in chief

was sensitive to his prerogatives, a characteristic that assumes clear

definition of responsibility and a positivist view of bureaucracy.

Yeosock thrived on ambiguity and the indirect approach. He was

laconic by nature and his guidance could sometimes be cryptic.

However, by not concerning himself with gaining credit, which might

have appeared as an infringement on the CINC's business, Yeosock

often succeeded in influencing or expanding his operating

environment. He also seems to have made it a cardinal rule to disagree

with Schwarzkopf only in private and to use his staff officers as

stalking horses (what he called, 'recon by fire") to feel out the theater

commander's views on sensitive issues. This method of dealing with

the theater commander was generally successful, perhaps even

necessary, given the personalities involved. It may have sometimes

disappointed subordinate commanders and staff officers, who would

have preferred a more confrontational advocate with the CINCespecially since they would not have to carry the hod.

Although Yeosock, as a lieutenant general, was selected to be

deputy Forces Command's commander and commander of Third Army,

rather than being given command of a corps, he had other

qualifications that especially suited him to his Desert Shield-Desert

Storm responsibilities. As a former program manager for the Saudi

Arabian National Guard (PMSANG), he knew the country, he knew

the Saudi armed forces, and, most important, he knew the Saudi

civilian and military leadership. Yeosock had experience in desert
20

operations, not just from his tour in Saudi Arabia but also from his

period as a squadron commander in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment

at Fort Bliss; as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, learning from

unit experience at the National Training Center; and as the Third

Army commander taking part in various exercises and consultations

with regional leaders.6 As deputy commander in chief of Forces

Command, Yeosock had a thorough grasp of the capabilities of the

Reserve Components and their place in contingency plans, and he

knew how the FORSCOM staff itself would respond to the mission to

deploy his forces. Finally, Yeosock had conducted the Army's analysis

of the Department of Defense plan to downsize the armed forces (The

Defense Management Review). Consequently, he probably had more

knowledge about Army force structure than most of his peers,

knowledge that would be vital to creating a theater-level command

and support structure in Saudi Arabia.

Interestingly enough, Yeosock was almost entirely innocent of

Army professional schooling. He had attended the Marine Corps

Amphibious Warfare School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the

National War College. But if he had missed the Army's institutional

fascination with abstract theory and doctrine during the 1980s, he had

mastered thoroughly two traditional doctrinal concepts: the

commander's estimate by evaluation of METT-T (mission, enemy,

terrain and weather, and troops and time available) and the

application of the complementary principles of war-mass

(concentration) and economy of force. He would use the estimate

process throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm to balance shortand long-term risks involved in the various trade-offs required by

political circumstances, changing missions, and the exigencies

involved in operating at the end of a long strategic line of

communications. He would employ the principle of mass to focus

combat power against the enemy's most vital forces. These simple

theoretical guides, combined with his practical experience in moving

heavy forces, would be more than adequate to the task at hand.

For all that, the cultural value system of the Army held that the

plum assignments for lieutenant generals were the two heavy corps in

Europe (V and VII), and the III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. For light

soldiers, there were the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg and the I

Corps at Fort Lewis. Moreover, in 1990, the U.S. Army had no

coherent doctrine addressing the roles and missions of an army-level of

command. Since Vietnam, the Army had been structured physically

and intellectually to go to war as part of a NATO organization in

which member nations would contribute national corps to coalition
21

army groups. The corps was the largest national tactical organization.

The irony that the Third Army commander had never commanded at

the corps level did not escape his principal tactical subordinates, fellow

Lieutenant Generals Gary Luck of XVIII Corps and Frederick Franks

of VII Corps.

These cultural norms were not eased at all by the nature of Third

Army. Third Army, in normal circumstances, was a small planning

headquarters of 222 active-duty officers. It was located at Fort

McPherson, Georgia, and assigned responsibility for performing the

Army planning and exercise duties pertaining to Central Command. 7

Sixty-five percent of Third Army's go-to-war logistics structure was in

the Reserve Component. A significant part of its internal staff

manning consisted of Army Reservists assigned to a local Army

Reserve Troop Program Unit located in Atlanta. In fact, of the

anticipated wartime headquarters strength of 894 officers and enlisted

spaces (it actually reached over 1,000), 376 were Reserve Component,

and 167 were not even provided for prior to mobilization.8

The detailed work of running Third Army fell upon the deputy

commander, a major general. A colonel served as chief of staff, and

fellow colonels as division chiefs. In many cases these were officers at

the end of their careers. This contrasted sharply with the staff of XVIII

Airborne Corps, which tended to attract hard chargers on their way

up.9 Staff officers at XVIII Corps, not infrequently and with no little

arrogance, were accustomed to looking down on Third Army as "sleepy

hollow," a view that did not facilitate interstaff coordination for going

to war.

Third Army often appeared to be an appendix to the larger Forces

Command headquarters. Indeed, the army commander served as the

deputy commander of Forces Command, and the duties associated with

the latter title often took precedence over those of the former. In fact,

General Yeosock maintained .two offices, and he spent more time in

that associated with Forces Command than he did in the one down the

street associated with Third Army. FORSCOM commands all

continental-U.S.-based tactical forces, including XVIII Airborne Corps

and all Reserve Component units. The XVIII Airborne Corps, which

quite properly considered itself the Army's premier intervention force,

ordinarily dealt directly with Forces Command, and only the

preceding December, the corps had acted as a joint task force (JTF)

and, for a time, as the JTF's Army Forces headquarters as well during

Operation Just Cause in Panama.
22

On 2 August 1990, what had been a speculative exercise two

weeks before became a real-life contingency. Saddam Hussein invaded

Kuwait. That same day, the United Nations Security Council passed

Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and calling for the

immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

That day, President George Bush delivered a speech to the Aspen

Institute in Colorado. 10 His address concerned the need to restructure

U.S. military forces in response to changes in the global environment,

specifically the rapid decline of Soviet power. The president's proposal

called for an orderly reduction of U.S. military forces over five years.

That plan was about to suffer a temporary interruption. On the 2d, the

United States imposed an embargo on Iraq, and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff issued an order for deployment of Air Force tanker squadrons and

the movement of the USS Independence Carrier Battle Group into the

North Arabian Sea. 11

On the evening of 4 August, around 1900, John Yeosock was

eating dinner at a neighbor's home when he received a telephone call

from General Schwarzkopf at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 12

Schwarzkopf, who had briefed the president at Camp David earlier

that day, instructed Yeosock to report to MacDill immediately and

indicated that if there were no flights, a plane would be dispatched to

pick him up. Yeosock had a few words with General Edwin Burba,

commander in chief of Forces Command, followed by a brief meeting

with his immediate staff. He then flew to MacDill. He took General

Pagonis in tow to help him identify logistic requirements, especially

for host-nation support. 13 Yeosock expected his absence from Atlanta

to be brief. Instead, it would last almost a year and involve assembling

an army and fighting a war half the world away. That same day, the

European community imposed a trade embargo on Iraq.

The following morning, Schwarzkopf; his J4 (joint logistics staff

officer), Major General Dane Starling; J5 (joint operations officer),

Rear Admiral Grant A. Sharp; Yeosock; and Lieutenant Colonel Larry

Gresham, chief of Third Army's G4 plans, flew to Washington, D.C.14

There, they joined Lieutenant General Charles A. Homer, commander

of Central Command Air Forces, CENTAF, and Colonel William

Rider, his deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG). Horner had

been called to Washington the previous day to participate in

Schwarzkopfs briefing to the president at Camp David.15 Following

quick meetings in the Pentagon, these seven officers flew to Saudi

Arabia with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. They were to be the

first contingent of Operation Desert Shield.
23

On the 5th, global reaction to the invasion of Kuwait continued to

grow. Japan suspended oil imports from Iraq. The same day, Forces

Command ordered the Army Reserve's 1185th Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU) to the Port of Savannah, where, for the 1185th's

annual active duty training exercise, the unit would outload the 24th

Infantry Division. It was to be a longer than normal summer camp for

members of the 1185th and many other Reserve Component soldiers.16

The secretary of defense and his party arrived in the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia on 6 August. Following historic nighttime meetings with

the Saudi king in Jedda, during which King Faid requested U.S.

assistance in the defense of Saudi Arabia, the secretary and CINC

returned to the United States. The six military officers who had

accompanied them traveled to Riyadh to begin Operation Desert

Shield. That day, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661,

calling for an international embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait.

On 7 August, responding to the king's request, President Bush

directed the commitment of U.S. military forces to the defense of Saudi

Arabia (see map 2). The Joint Staff issued the initial deployment orders for operation Desert Shield. The president announced his

decision to the public the following day.17

Conducting a military operation in Saudi Arabia is no simple task. The Arabian Peninsula is a large area, approximately the size of

the United States east of the Mississippi. It has almost no modern road

or rail network. The countryside consists almost entirely of a variety of

desert terrains. There are no continuous rivers. Climatic conditions

are extreme, especially in the high summer months during which the

Kuwait crisis developed. On the other hand, the country's few urban

areas possess a modern commercial infrastructure from which U.S.

forces could and would draw support. There were a large number of

modern airfields around the country, modern port facilities, especially

at Dammam and Jubayl, and a developed system of basic services.

Food, fuel, water, a modern (if limited) phone system, and shelter were

all available if they could be tapped. Notwithstanding the absence of a

developed road network, buses and trucks-particularly line-haul

(long-distance tractor-trailer) trucks-were present in abundance.

Because of the heavy investment of oil revenues in modernization and

the annual need to accommodate the influx of pilgrims to the Islamic

holy sites, the Saudi commercial structure was already heavily dependent upon contracting as a way of doing business. This would

facilitate the acquisition of large-scale support to sustain U.S. and

coalition forces.
24

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The U.S. military, however, possessed no operational

infrastructure in the peninsula other than a Military Training Mission

(USMTM) and the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian

National Guard, both of which normally trained various parts of the

Saudi military. These two groups, at least, provided some additional

hands with which the Army and Air Force commanders could begin to

build a U.S. military force in theater. As a former program manager

for the Saudi National Guard, Yeosock leaned heavily on that office,

using Brigadier General James B. Taylor, the incumbent program

manager, as his initial interim chief of staff.

Yeosock's concept of Third Army, once deployed, was summed up

in his idea that 'Third Army is three armies."18 (See figure 1.) As

ARCENT (Army, Central Command), it was a service component

headquarters for a unified commander. As such, it accomplished

coordination with sister services and allied ground forces as the

principal U.S. land force. The ARCENT commander exercised

command over all Army forces assigned (less operational command for

certain specified special operations forces) and advised the theater

commander on Army matters. As Third Army, it was a "theater army,"

the major Department of the Army headquarters in theater. The

theater army developed an echeloned force structure to support army

and theater requirements for various technical capabilities in

accordance with Department of Defense directives and the CINC's

guidance. Among these were intelligence, communications,

transportation, air defense, logistics, civil affairs, military police, and

engineering. Finally, the theater army provided the linkage between

Army units in the field, other major Army commands, and the

Department of the Army.

The duties of service component and theater army are implicit,

that is, they always obtain. In addition, the headquarters had to be

able to assume a third role, that of a numbered field army. As a field

army, Third Army planned operations, allocated combat power and

sustainment resources, synchronized theater-level operating systems,

and directed execution within the operational span of control assigned

by the theater commander.

This division of these three complementary responsibilities is

essentially heuristic; that is, it provides a means to address the various

duties assigned to the army commander in such a way as to reflect the

differing lines of accountability in terms of the army's several

functions. It is important to note, however, that all functions were

performed by the same staff under the authority of the army

commander, often without any clear idea which "army" was
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performing at a given time. The army headquarters structure had to

be flexible enough to reconfigure according to the functions it was

expected to perform. In the case of Third Army, a major staff

restructuring took place in November and December 1990 when the

headquarters' functions were expanded consequent to the president's

decision to create an offensive option.

The tripartite scheme reflected the division of responsibility

within the Department of Defense. 19 The various defense

reorganization acts since 1947 have retained separate service

departments within a unified Defense Department. Service

departments have been assigned responsibility for providing organized

and equipped forces to theater commanders, whose operational chain

of command runs directly to the secretary of defense.20 Service

departments have been responsible for the sustainment of their forces

in theater, except where otherwise provided for. Service chiefs of staff

answer to a service secretary on departmental matters and

simultaneously sit as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a collective

body headed by a chairman who is subordinate to the secretary of

defense and president.21

The Goldwater-Nichols Act (Defense Reorganization Act of 1986)

transferred to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility

and authority formerly vested in the corporate Joint Chiefs. It also

provided for a greater role by theater commanders in determining the

adequacy and direction of departmental budgeting and wartime

theater sustainment. It left intact the departmental structure within

the Department of Defense, however, and provided that any disputes

that might arise between a theater commander and service

departments would be forwarded by the CINC, through the chairman,

for resolution by the secretary of defense.22

A major purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to provide

theater commanders full latitude to organize their commands to

achieve assigned national objectives. One method that has been used

since World War II to respond, to small contingencies with limited

purposes has been the formation of a joint task force, generally

commanded by an officer of the predominant service within a unified

command and charged with the conduct of necessary operations. The

Just Cause, XVIII Airborne Corps example has already been

mentioned. General Schwarzkopf, however, chose to organize his

forces generally as service components (see figure 2). That is, his major

subordinate commands were Army Central Command, Central

Command Air Forces, Marine Central Command (MARCENT), and

Navy Central Command (NAVCENT). The exception to this
Figure 2.

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organization was a fifth component, Special Operations Command,

Central Command (SOCCENT), which held operational command of

selected special operations forces from the separate services.

Within this general structure, the theater commander might

assign executive agency or authority to a single component

commander for performance of particular tasks. In this way, the

commander of CENTAF was appointed Joint Forces Air Component

commander to provide centralized direction to the theater air

campaign. 23 The Army commander was given responsibility, among

other things, to operate common-user seaports during Desert Shield

and to exercise directive authority over rear-area terrain management

and main supply route (MSR) priorities in the combat zone during

Desert Storm.24 The Army commander, in turn, assigned these

responsibilities to one of his major subordinate commands, the 22d

Support Command. Various grants of authority, or limits thereto,

ordinarily went along with this sort of joint service responsibility.

Also, within the general framework, forces from one component might

be placed under the command of another, as the "Tiger Brigade" (the

1st Brigade of the 2d Armored Division deployed as the third ground

maneuver brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division) was placed under

operational command of the MARCENT commander for Operation

Desert Storm.

The first phase of Operation Desert Shield, which lasted from 7

August 1990 until 8 November, consisted of the deployment of a joint

military force to defend American and allied interests against Iraqi

aggression, a force of sufficient strength adequate to enforce UN

sanctions while defending the Arabian base (see figure 3). The Army's

role consisted of building a viable ground combat force and a support

structure sufficient to sustain, to various degrees, committed forces of

all services. Both the Army combat contingent and theater support

structure had to be built from scratch using forces from halfway

around the world.

Schwarzkopf returned to Tampa in order to supervise personally

the joint deployment. Such actions, however, are inherently

decentralized. Senior officers managing each service's deployment are

used to acting on their own, and Schwarzkopf found himself losing

control. The Air Force, for example, deployed twice the number of F-15

and F-16 squadrons expected at the end of the first week. Thus, wrote

Schwarzkopf, the requirements to bring in related support forces "tied

up dozens of flights we had allocated for other units."25 The XVIII

Airborne Corps, to Schwarzkopf's irritation, led its deployment with
Figure 3.

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an advance corps headquarters at the expense of paratroopers from the

corps' 82d Airborne Division.

Army forces had to be deployed and sustained in a hostile and

comparatively undeveloped environment. They were to deter

aggression and to defend and restore Saudi territory should the Iraqis

attack. This entailed, at the start, creating a crisis action time-phased

force deployment list (TPFDL)-a list of units prioritized for

movement-to ship the XVIII Airborne Corps' force of four and twothirds division-force equivalents: 82d Airborne Division; 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault) plus the 12th Aviation Brigade from

Europe; 24th Infantry Division (2 brigades) plus the 197th Infantry

Brigade (Separate); 1st Cavalry Division (2 brigades) plus the 1st

Brigade, 2d Armored Division (the "Tiger Brigade"); and the 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment, with supporting corps combat support

and combat service support elements.26 The commitment of forces also

involved designing and deploying an army echelon-above-corps

headquarters and the theater support structure appropriate for the

conditions obtaining in Southwest Asia.

To complicate the task further, the deployed force in the

beginning would have to be built solely from available units of the

Regular Army. It would take some time for the president to mobilize

the necessary political support to call up and retain the Reserve forces

that had always been assumed to make up a major part of Third Army

and XVIII Airborne Corps. This political mobilization, which is a

remarkable story in itself, took place simultaneously with the initial

deployment of Army forces. Yet even when Reserve units were fully

manned and equipped, they still required time to be brought into

active federal service and prepared for overseas deployment. This

further delayed getting them into the theater.

Meanwhile, the force build-up had to proceed. Some deployment

requirements could be and were met by Reserve Component units that

volunteered or were assigned annual training in support of the active

force deployment (like the 1185th TTU). Some Reservists even

deployed as individual volunteers to Saudi Arabia. As a consequence,

the governing assumptions for the Third Army staff were in a constant

state of flux for some time, and essential personnel arrived in theater

under a wide variety of legal provisions and service obligations.27

One very positive characteristic of the U.S. military operations in

Southwest Asia was the extent to which the Bush administration

consistently maintained a clear understanding of both political and

military objectives. On 8 August, the president announced the initial
32

deployment of U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf. At that time, he declared

four national objectives: (1) to achieve the withdrawal of Iraqi forces

from Kuwait, (2) to restore the legitimate government of Kuwait, (3) to

defend Saudi Arabia, and (4) to protect American citizens abroad. 28

These political goals were translated that same day into three more

limited military objectives by Secretary of Defense Cheney and by the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. These

were (1) to deter further Iraqi aggression, (2) to improve Saudi

Arabian military and defensive capabilities, and (3) to defend Saudi

Arabia.29 The difference between the two lists reflected the initial

reliance on a variety of nonmilitary means to achieve the declared

national goals. This pattern of formulating military objectives on the

basis of policy announcements was maintained consistently through

February 1991. Because such announcements were covered live by

television's Cable News Network (CNN), the senior military chain of

command could receive the commander in chiefs guidance from the

president himself, thus enhancing the coherence of the vision shared

by all major commanders in the field.

By the time the initial policy directives had been issued, Yeosock

and his small band of Army officers in Saudi Arabia had identified

three immediate tasks for Third Army. 30 These were (1) to arrange for

reception and onward movement of Army, Air Force, and Marine

Corps forces (as yet without a host-nation agreement or plan), (2) to get

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to change its traditional way of doing

business in order to respond to the urgency of the moment, and (3) to

this end, to establish a national-level, integrated warfighting

command and staff.31 The first task involved preparing to receive

Army and Marine forces and Air Force heavy equipment through sea

and aerial ports at Al Jubayl, Dhahran, and Ad Dammam. The last

two tasks led Yeosock to create the Coalition Coordination

Communication and Integration Center (C3IC) (to be discussed

hereafter).

On 8 August, the ARCENT staff was practically doubled, to fiftytwo, with the arrival of an advanced command and control element.

ARCENT established itself in the Royal Saudi Land Forces Building,

while the CENTCOM staff moved into the Saudi Ministry of Defense.

Four more key figures arrived on the 11th: the deputy commanding

generals, Brigadier General (later Major General) Robert Frix

(Operations) and Major General (later Lieutenant General) William G.

("Gus") Pagonis (Support); Brigadier General James W. Monroe, Army

G4; and Colonel Gene Holloway, the G3 plans. Like Pagonis, Frix and

Monroe had previous connections with Yeosock. Frix had been
33

Yeosock's chief of staff in the 1st Cavalry Division. Monroe, who like

Yeosock had served in Saudi Arabia before (with USMTM), had been

G4 of the Third Army before his promotion to brigadier general.

Indeed, his family had not yet moved to his new post in Detroit. He

simply moved back into his old job at a higher grade.

Jim Monroe, the Third Army logistic staff officer, presented an

interesting contrast to Pagonis, the army's logistic executive. Pagonis

is short, peripatetic, dynamic, a Greek fighting cock, albeit with a

sense of humor that can remind an onlooker of the antihero on the

television series "M*A*S*H," Corporal Klinger. Monroe, on the other

hand, was a tall, handsome African-American, sober and deliberate,

patient and soft-spoken-an excellent counterbalance to his more

dynamic opposite number.

Another key member arrived at army headquarters on the 11th,

Major General Paul Schwartz. Schwartz, then serving as deputy

commander of I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, was another former

PMSANG. He had been brought in to build the U.S. side of the C3IC,

which he would direct, first, for Third Army, then, for Central

Command.32 He, like Pagonis, Monroe, and Frix, had been selected by

Yeosock almost immediately upon receipt of his own alert. Yeosock

knew Schwartz from Fort Hood, where both had been chiefs of staff for

neighboring heavy divisions. Schwartz was also the officer who had

become PMSANG when, within months of Yeosock's departure from

the desert kingdom, his immediate successor did not work out with the

Saudis. Schwartz, a tanker, was by disposition and sympathies an

ideal choice to work the interalliance staff. He was a patient, low-key

and humane man with a perpetual sheepish grin and the patience of

Solomon. Most important, he had long experience working in Saudi

Arabia and a great respect for Saudi culture. Frix, Pagonis, and

Schwartz were Yeosock's principal deputies from the early days of

Desert Shield.

The Third Army's forward CP arrived in two echelons on 14 and

23 August, bringing the headquarters to 266 officers and men (see

figure 4). These men and women would undertake the twin tasks of

creating the instrumentalities of coalition cooperation, organization,

procedures, and host-nation support agreements, while performing

more traditional echelon-above-corps functions of force generation,

sustainment, and coordination with higher and adjacent headquarters.

A new Third Army G3, Brigadier General (later Major General)

Steven Arnold, arrived on 7 September direct from Korea where he

had been assistant division commander of the 2d Infantry Division. A
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general officer G2, Brigadier General John Stewart, was assigned in

December. 33 These two key officers were not known to Yeosock before

their arrival, though each, in his own field, would be essential to the

success ultimately enjoyed by ARCENT. The fact that Yeosock was

prepared to allow the Army to assign him a G3 and G2 while he took

particular care who would serve his logistics and coalition needs

probably says a good deal about where the army commander saw the

headquarters' immediate problems and how he saw his own role in the

developing theater command structure. In the end, he was most

fortunate all around in his command team.

In August and September, the immediate tasks at hand included

developing an Army component force capable of achieving the

assigned military objectives in concert with sister services and alliance

forces. Third Army would have to build and deploy a force that could

fight on arrival and sustain long-term operations in an environment of

strategic lift constraints, as yet limited host-nation support, changing

requirements, and acceptance of prudent risk.

The first and obvious decision, given the immediacy of the threat,

was to bow to necessity and deploy combat forces early-especially

critical combat multipliers such as aviation units, air defense systems,

and antiarmor weapons-in order to buy time should hostilities

commence. The experience of Internal Look was useful if not

completely satisfying. Internal Look had addressed only combat force

requirements. Much of the postexercise work of designing the

necessary support structure and identifying specific forces remained to

be done. Furthermore, much of the work had to be accomplished

manually, as predeployment data had not been entered into the

necessary computer data bases. 34

The decision to bring in combat forces first was not without cost. It

meant that forces in theater would have to maintain themselves under

austere conditions for some time and that host-nation support, both

donated and contracted, was a sine qua non to sustain the force for the

immediate future. This decision was only possible because of the

availability of supplies-particularly tentage, food, and ammunitionprepositioned on ships in the Indian Ocean. These prepositioned assets

bought the time required to begin the flow of supplies from the host

nation and the United States. 35 (See figure 5.)

The overall concept for the deployment of U.S. armed forces, of

which Army forces were but a part, was characterized by General

Powell on 11 September as consisting of three phases.36 The phasing

was designed to integrate the complementary capabilities of each arm,
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balancing great strategic mobility with staying power. Phase one,

intended to provide an immediate deterrent force, consisted of the

concentration of deployed naval forces organized around two carrier

battle groups, the USS Eisenhower and USS Independence groups, off

the Arabian Peninsula; deployment of Air Force air-superiority forces

from the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing in the United States; and dispatch

of light ground forces.37 As early as 12 August, on the strength of these

forces, President Bush directed the Navy to enforce an embargo on

Iraqi oil shipments and most imports. On 25 August, the UN Security

Council approved the use of force to enforce UN sanctions (Resolution

665). The first U.S. shots had been fired enforcing the naval blockade

on 18 August.38 It is important to remember that, throughout Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, indeed long after, a naval conflict, separate

but related to actions on the ground, was going on in the Persian Gulf

and the Red Sea approaches to Iraq and Jordan.

The second phase of the U.S. deployment, which commenced

within days, brought in ground-attack aircraft, additional airsuperiority fighters, and various maritime forces, specifically the 7th

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and, later, the 1st MEB, for

which maritime prepositioning ships (MPS), with their heavy

equipment and thirty days' supplies, were available in Diego Garcia

and Guam.39 The Marines prepositioned M60 main battle tanks-old

but still highly effective models-provided the first true U.S. armored

ground capability.

The two Marine Corps MPS completed off-loading on 2 and 5

September. The 82d Airborne finished its deployment on 9 September.

It was joined by elements of the lead brigade task force of the 101st

Airborne Division with its attack helicopters and elements of the 12th

Aviation Brigade from Europe. The 101st Aviation Task Force arrived

by strategic airlift, notwithstanding the high cost in airframes. This

added the potent antiarmor combat power of the AH-64 attack

helicopters to the deployed light forces. About the same time, the USS

Saratoga Carrier Battle Group replaced the USS Eisenhower, and the

USS Kennedy deployed to the Mediterranean with a third carrier

battle group to support Central Command operations as required.

Finally, in phase three, the heavy ground, air, maritime, and

sustainment forces required to ensure a successful defense of Saudi

Arabia followed. Fast sealift ships (FSS) carrying the 24th Infantry

Division (Mechanized), the Army's first heavy division to deploy,

departed Savannah, Georgia, starting on 13 August, a week after the

U.S. commitment. The first ship arrived in theater on the 27th.40 (For

a comparison between force generation in Desert Shield versus that in
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Figure 6.

38
39

Vietnam, see figure 6.) The 4th MEB deployed from Camp Lejeune as a

self-contained amphibious force the same day the 24th left Savannah.

It arrived by 16 September and presented a continuous amphibious

threat to the Iraqi seaward flank. The 24th Division completed its

deployment on 25 September with the arrival of the attached 197th

Infantry Brigade (Separate). 41 The 101st Airborne Division (Air

Assault) completed its movement on 7 October; the 3d Armored

Cavalry Regiment, on 14 October; and the 1st Cavalry Division closed

on 25 October.42 These heavy forces provided the theater commander

with the capability not only to defend but to counterattack in the

increasingly less likely event of an Iraqi offensive against Saudi

Arabia.

The Army's deployment actions had been begun upon President

Bush's decision to commit U.S. forces. Staff officers used the Draft

ARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 TPFDD (time-phased force and deployment

data) created in conjunction with the Internal Look exercise as a

starting point (four and two-thirds division force equivalents [DFE] or

253,000 personnel). The task of developing a revised force list was

assumed by the Forces Command staff headed by its chief of staff,

Major General Pete Taylor. Taylor was the pivotal figure in the force

deployment "negotiations," acting as deputy commander in chief of

Forces Command when dealing with Central Command, and as

ARCENT's deputy commander (Rear) when responding to Third

Army.43 As Forces Command's chief of staff, he had visibility over all

available U.S. Army active and Reserve Component units. He drove

the Forces Command staff and the U.S. Transportation Command

(TRANSCOM) to draft various force design alternatives against

available transportation assets in order to achieve a reasonably

balanced, if austere, C + 90 deployed force.44

The assumptions that governed the force design process initially

were that the force would have to be capable of fighting on arrival and

also of conducting long-term sustained operations. 45 This meant the

Army package would contain not only combat elements addressed in

Internal Look but also a supporting force capable of meeting the

specific needs of a mature theater in Southwest Asia. These

assumptions had to be modified almost immediately to accommodate

delays and limitations on Reserve Component mobilization, limits in

strategic lift, and guidance that only minimum-essential forces were to

be deployed.

General Powell was quoted as stating, with regard to Reserve

Component mobilization, that the principle of minimum-essential

force would be exceeded when one soldier got on CNN to complain of
40

not being usefully employed. 46 (See figure 7.) This Army concern for

the public perception of the legitimacy of any need to mobilize was

indicative of the tentative nature of the initial U.S. commitment to

military action. It also was clear evidence of the pervasive presence of

Ted Turner's revolutionary all-news network. Meanwhile, the

political leadership worked to build a positive response on the part of

the American people.

Third Army had long based its war plans on the assumption that

Reserve Component forces would be available immediately for any

large-scale deployment. This was the basis of the Total Force Concept,

a plan, attributed to General Creighton Abrams following the

Vietnam War, to avoid commitment of active forces without some sort

of mobilization of the public.4 7 The concept was politically attractive,

not just to the post-Vietnam-era Army but to a Congress concerned

about "Imperial Presidencies." What the plan failed to take into

account was the likely delay in mobilization in any case short of

outright attack on American forces or territory. Such a delay would be

the result of policy makers' proper concern with the full consideration

of the available alternatives and public response, as well as the

variable readiness of various Reserve (and Regular) Component units.

The flaw in the concept was that events might not wait upon the

convenience of defense decision makers.

Such was the case in August 1990. Deployment of Regular units

was well under way before the president called up the first increment

of Reserve Component forces. Had it been politically desirable,

deployment of the two affected roundout brigades for the 24th Division

and 1st Cavalry Division might have been delayed to the end of the

XVIII Corps deployment as anticipated in the Internal Look planning.

However, the Department of Defense decided to forgo calling any

Army combat units in the first increment of Reserve Component

activations. 48 It was decided, instead, to use two Regular units more

immediately available, and not subject to loss in 90 days (or 180 with

an extension), to roundout the two two-brigade divisions. Even in the

case of combat support and combat service support units that were

called, the need for immediate deployment also affected how Third

Army structured its own echelon-above-corps forces, particularly the

army headquarters and its theater support organization.

On 15 August, the secretary of defense requested that the

president employ his authority to call up the selected Reserves. 49 The

following day, Pentagon planners prepared advice for the president

about the exercise of his authority to activate Reserve forces. Internal

Look assumptions had presumed immediate use of the full 200,000-
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man presidential call-up authority under Title 10, United States Code,

Section 673b. The Department of the Army estimated a requirement

for 33,772 Reservists by 31 August, assuming combat operations had

not begun, and 88,000 if hostilities commenced. 50 On 22 August, the

president informed the leaders of Congress that he had authorized the

secretary of defense to exercise his authority under 673b. On the 23d,

Secretary Cheney authorized the Army to order to active duty no more

than 25,000 members of the Army Selected Reserve for the purpose of

providing combat support and combat service support.51 The other

services were also limited in their authority, although these limits

may have had as much to do with the rate at which the active services

could absorb Reserve soldiers as with any reluctance to mobilize the

Reserves in the long term.

In October, concern about "minimum essential force" was

ultimately translated into a requirement that theater-deployed force

levels not exceed 250,000 (a limit abandoned with introduction of the

offensive capability of a second corps in November).52 This limit was

borne primarily by the Army, first, because it was the most manpowerintensive service; and second, because it was the largest, last, and

slowest deploying component. Thus, the Army offered more

opportunities for modification within the deployment sequence. The

Army- also benefited more from host-nation support, since it was

responsible otherwise for providing much of the theater support for all

deployed forces.

Initial Army deployment efforts focused on getting the XVIII

Corps forces lined up to come into theater. Once that seemed to be on

track in early September, attention turned to the echelon-above-corps

structure. Some decisions had already been made by that date, among

them the decision to form a provisional theater support command

rather than to bring in the theater army area command (TAAC) called

for in prewar plans. To begin with, there was a lack of sufficient

strategic lift to transport the total doctrinal force. 53 Starting on 15

August and reporting out on the 26th, Headquarters, Forces

Command, produced a revised force structure for a 151,000-man Army

force. This was still too large an increment to arrive by C+90, so a

second force structure design was forwarded to Saudi Arabia on 4

September. This force called for a ceiling of 142,000, down from

220,000. The creation of this force rested upon a number of

assumptions, one being that the new numbers represented "a

minimum essential force that hedges toward combat multipliers and

accepts risk in selected support functions." 54 Heavy combat

multipliers, field artillery, air defense artillery, chemical, and combat
43

engineers were retained because of the time involved in their

deployment. It was assumed lighter elements, for example intelligence

units, could be called forward with dispatch. The corps support

command was reduced in this plan to 12,500 from 20,000 and the

theater support command to 10,400 from 25,000. Much of the balance

was to be made up by host-nation support, the remainder by risk and a

less than desirable sustainment and transportation capability. Troops

would bear part of the cost involved in an austere desert environment.

General Edwin Burba's personal assessment was that this

structure was "a prudent course with acceptable risk." "All must

understand though," he continued, "at the first major indicator of an

enemy offensive, we must quickly pile on combat service support with

air and fast sealift."55 In his reply, General Schwarzkopf seemed to

agree. He pointed to the theater's dependence on host-nation support

that permitted economies during the deterrent phase but noted that

these economies might rapidly disappear should hostilities break

out-especially given the Saudi dependence on third nation workers

and contractors. 56

Whatever his fears, Schwarzkopf in early October established a

ceiling on Army end strength at 140,000.57 Certain shortcomings,

which became evident after the November build-up decision, and

which were criticized after the fact, are understandable only when

considered under the terms of reference in which the original tradeoffs were made. In August and September, the mission assigned Third

Army was to create a force capable of deterrence and defense and to do

so with the minimum essential forces under a ceiling fixed largely by limits on strategic transport capability. A defensive force requires a

comparatively small logistic base and, in particular, shorter logistic

land legs than a mechanized and aerial force designed for offensive

operations. It also requires a less robust intelligence structure, since

most of the ground to be fought over is in one's own hands.

In early October, General Yeosock reported to General Carl

Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, and Michael Stone, Secretary of the Army,

that Third Army headquarters had only 346 of the anticipated 825

officers and enlisted personnel called for by the table of organization

and equipment. (See figure 8.) The Army force had been reduced to

141,000 troops to be deployed, with 49,000 on call against

contingencies. The formations-above-division to division force ratio

was 1:1, compared to a design ratio of 2:1 in a mature theater. All this

had been done by a combination of accepting prudent risk, by trading

off housekeeping and base support activities (thus increasing soldier

austerity), and by using direct and contracted host-nation support-
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particularly for water, fuel, and transportation-and other "work

arounds" like reliance on out-of-theater depot maintenance support. 58

Among the limitations thus accepted was a force that was essentially

not deployable out of its coastal sector-a condition acceptable so long

as the mission was deterrence and defense but one that would defer a

transportation and infrastructure cost if higher powers wanted to use

the forces already deployed to do something else.

In November, Third Army would be called upon not only to bring

on a second corps but to make up for legitimate economies accepted in

the fall for quite understandable reasons. Third Army also had to

create a significantly different type of echelon-above-corps structure,

one for which the Army as a whole had not had to prepare when the

principal design contingency was a NATO or Korean defense. It had to

re-create itself into an army designed for an operational and strategic

offensive.

Meanwhile, the army-level logistic organization designed to back

up the corps support command and sustain echelon-above-corps units

could be, and was, reduced to some extent by charging many of its

duties to the already austere corps support command. 59 Some theater

support structure was still required to operate ports of debarkation

and to perform the theater army functions of operating the theater

communications zone, integrating host-nation support, and supporting

other services according to various Department of Defense directives.

Third Army headquarters bore much of the burden of coordinating

directly with the host government for host-nation support. The idea

that XVIII Corps could have simply picked up the echelon-above-corps

functions and dispensed with the army-level headquarters while

giving full attention to operational matters does not seem realistic,

even in the circumstances of Desert Shield.60

Most of the structural cuts accepted in the fall were borne in the

sustainment area by limitations on the introduction of intermediate

headquarters for echelons-above-corps functional commands and by

combining theater-level and corps functions where possible.6 1 From 15

August until 9 October, the ARCENT force structure was in a constant

state of flux as guidance on minimum essential force deployment,

authority to mobilize Reserve Components, and strategic lift

constraints were all balanced against a notional C + 90 force.

It was known at the outset that much of the absent support

structure could be compensated for by host-nation support, but the

ability of the host nation to supply support, or perhaps more

important, the limits on this ability, was by no means immediately
46

apparent to either Third Army planners or the host-nation

government. No structure existed to tap it. This meant that such

assumptions, cast into the force design process, carried a certain

amount of risk, particularly given lead times required to acquire and

deploy various specialist units.

General Yeosock designed his own echelon of command according

to some basic principles.62 First, he recognized the need to emphasize

the early introduction of combat forces. Accepting implicitly the risk of

diminished capacity, he brought in army-level units only at the last

minute in order to ensure they were present when he absolutely

required them and not a minute sooner. Second, he decided to

minimize the creation of army-level functional commands (with their

resultant layering of staffs) by providing that, so long as possible,

army-level units would be commanded by his deputy commanding

generals, using the Third Army staff. Functional commands would be

established only when the task at hand exceeded in complexity the

ability of the DCGs to perform this function. Even then, Yeosock would

resist introducing general officer commanders and their associated

staffs unless absolutely necessary. He recognized that those functions

that were for the most part internal to the army echelon could often be

performed adequately by incumbents already on the ground. For

example, Colonel Chuck Sutten, commander of the 11th Signal

Brigade, was given a much reduced functional command staff-part of

the normal 6th Signal Command-and made its commander. A similar

arrangement was made with the Medical Command (MEDCOM), with

Colonel (Dr.) D. G. Tsoulos serving as both ARCENT surgeon and

MEDCOM commander. (See figure 9.)

General Pagonis, as deputy commanding general (logistics),

established an ARCENT forward headquarters at Dhahran. Initially,

the executive functions of theater sustainment were performed under

Pagonis' direction by the 7th Transportation Group, commanded by

Colonel Dave Whaley, and a Provisional Area Support Group

established in Dhahran.63 Pagonis remained a deputy commanding

general and assumed command of a provisional, later, the 22d Support

Command, on 19 August, when the logistic structure grew beyond that

capable of direction by the combined organization. Upon giving up

command of his group, Whaley moved to the Support Command

(Provisional) staff as an assistant commander, there to perform the

role doctrinally assigned to a commander of a theater transportation

command. (See figure 10.)

There was another reason to operate this way. In the absence of a

Status of Forces Agreement and facilities utilization agreements,
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numerous individual understandings had to be achieved immediately

with the host-nation authorities and local contractors just to introduce

U.S. forces. Most agreements were made on-site and as personal

undertakings. It was not until 17 October that the Department of

Defense dispatched a team to negotiate a variety of host-nation

support agreements, principally for fuel, water, food, transportation,

and shelter. 64 Officers of the Support Command had been making

agreements and receiving extensive support almost since arrival.

Meanwhile, it was essential that personnel changes be kept to a

minimum to ensure the continuity of these agreements. A theatersupport agency had been necessary as soon as forces began to enter the

theater, and one was put together on an ad hoc basis under the

pressures of the moment. By the time limited authority existed to call

up Reservists, a nascent theater support structure was already in

place. 65

The first Central Command operations order was issued on 10

August. 66 The order identified a ground threat of five Iraqi divisions in

Kuwait. The mission statement provided that "USCENTCOM forces

will deploy to the area of operations and take actions in concert with

host-nation forces, friendly regional forces, and other allies to defend

against an Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia and be prepared to conduct

other operations as directed." 6 7 The plan called for a three-phase

operation. Phase I called for deployment to deter an Iraqi attack, the

conduct of combined training, preparations for defense, and exercises

with allied forces in theater. Phase II, which would occur if deterrence

failed, involved the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against Iraqi

attack, with particular regard to the critical air and sea ports at Al

Jubayl, Ad Dammam, and Dhahran. Phase III provided for a

counterattack to restore the integrity of the Saudi border. The order

indicated that Central Command forces would remain organized as

components, the single major exception being SOCCENT, under whose

operational control the service components would place certain of their

special warfare forces. This reservation of operational command of

special operations forces (SOF) to theater level was a normal doctrinal

practice reflecting the strategic nature of many SOF actions.

The Central Command Army component was to deploy designated

subordinate forces in order to support or implement deterrent

measures as required, to be prepared to defend the critical oil and port

facilities in the vicinity of Dhahran, to attrit and delay advanced

enemy forces as far forward as possible, and when directed, to redeploy

and defend in sector to protect the critical petroleum facilities in the

vicinity of Abqaiq.68 Other selected taskings involved commanding
50

(less operational control) selected Army special operations forces

(psychological operations and civil affairs forces excepted); conducting

psychological and civil affairs operations; acting as Central Command

executive agent for civil affairs and as coordinating authority for

military psychological operations to include joint planning; operating

common user seaports; providing combat support and combat service

support in accordance with interservice agreements; conducting

enemy prisoner of war operations; and supporting noncombatant

evacuation operations as required. ARCENT was also to provide a

brigade-sized theater reserve by C + 55 and be prepared to conduct

counteroffensive operations to restore the integrity of Saudi Arabian

territory.

ARCENT Operations Order (OPORD) 001 was issued on 22

August and generally followed the CENTCOM order and the Internal

Look concept of operations.69 Two more Desert Shield operations

orders would be issued by ARCENT: 002 in October and 003 in

December.7 0 Each reflected a new stage in the development of U.S.

capabilities. The first was directed at covering the initial force

deployment and reflected the paucity of forces that would exist for

some time. The October order reflected a more robust force after the

deployment of the XVIII Airborne Corps. OPORD 003 incorporated VII

Corps. into the defensive scheme following the president's 8 November

announcement of the corps deployment.

OPORD 001 envisioned an enclave defense behind the Saudi and

Gulf Cooperation Council forces that were securing key port facilities.

The main purpose of the defense was deterrence. OPORD 002 provided

for a defense-in-depth as heavy forces arrived. ARCENT would assume

a zone alongside a MARCENT force, in a position behind the ArabIslamic Forces and forward of the ports and oil facilities at Abqaiq. The

XVIII Airborne Corps was to screen forward with the 101st Air

Assault Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and defend

in-depth with the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Divisions

abreast, while the 82d Airborne Division secured the port and oil

facilities.71 (See map 3.) Contingency plans for the defense of Riyadh

were added to the base plan. The VII Corps Desert Shield Order (003)

called for a defense by two corps abreast and referred only vaguely to

follow-on operations. (Desert Storm planning was taking place

separately but simultaneously.)

All the while, the U.S. build-up had progressed steadily. Army

forces had begun to deploy to Saudi Arabia on 8 August. The first

troops to arrive had been the forward command post of the XVIII

Airborne Corps, which arrived at Dhahran on the 9th, with troops
51

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from the division ready brigade of the 82d Airborne Division.72 The

rapid deployment of these lightly armed troops, while risky in terms of

effective fighting power against a heavily armored force, enabled the

United States to make a clear demonstration of national intent in the

hope that Iraq would be deterred from any further advance to the

south. The first plane was guided to its parking slot by the ARCENT

commander himself, as there was no existing base structure to receive

them. These Army ground forces were accompanied and followed by

significant air, naval, and Marine forces.

In August, all Third Army efforts had been directed toward the

build-up of a viable combat force under command of the XVIII

Airborne Corps. The Third Army commander saw his principal task as

the generation and sustainment of forces with which the corps would

fight any subsequent battle. The 82d Airborne Division continued to

deploy forces through Dhahran and, on 12 August, established a

forward operational base at Al Jubayl, the port through which the

Marine forces would enter the theater. Army-level units also began to

arrive.

On 14 August, the 2d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division (the

division ready brigade) completed its deployment. It was accompanied

by one battalion of AH-64 attack helicopters from the 82d Aviation

Brigade, which had become operational the day before. The same day,

the commander of the 11th Signal Brigade entered the theater and

began to establish a theater army communications network utilizing

both Saudi commercial nets and Army systems. The 11th Air Defense

Brigade began to introduce the Patriot batteries that would prove so

vital to theater air defense or at least to a sense of security in the face

of Iraqi missile attacks. The first two batteries arrived on 17 August,

the same day the first elements of a 101st Airborne Division Aviation

Task Force and the 24th Infantry Division's advanced elements came

into theater.

Although the build-up seemed slow at the time, apparently it was

not without effect. On 19 August, intelligence sources remarked that

the Iraqis had begun building barriers across the Saudi-Kuwait

border.73 In retrospect, this was probably the first clear indication that

Iraq's intention was to hold what it had seized rather than continue to

the south. (A less-clear indicator would have been the Iraqi

preoccupation with securing Kuwait City in early August rather than

proceeding directly into Saudi Arabia.) On the 22d, President Bush

authorized a call-up of Reserves. On 24 August, the Third Army's

nightly situation report (SITREP) contained its most optimistic

assessment to date, reporting: "ARCENT NOW HAS A POTENT
53

COMBAT FORCE WITH ALMOST A FULL ABN DIV, TWO BNS OF

ATK AND THEIR SLICE OF CS AND CSS.... SITUATION

IMPROVES SLIGHTLY EACH DAY.... AS OF TODAY, WE ARE

CONFIDENT IN OUR ABILITY TO DETECT AND PUNISH A

MAJOR ARMORED ATTACK."74

The following day, MARCENT was able to assume the security

mission for Al Jubayl. By 28 August, the first heavy equipment of the

24th Infantry Division had begun to arrive. (The sea voyage could last

from fourteen to twenty-five days.) On the 30th, the commander's

SITREP reported, as it would more or less until the beginning of

Desert Storm: "COMMANDER'S INTENT IS TO BE PREPARED TO

FIGHT A COMBINED/JOINT BATTLE AT NIGHT WITH GIVEN

FORCES, TRANSITION FROM ENCLAVE DEFENSE TO

DEFENSE IN SECTOR, BUILD COMBAT POWER, IDENTIFY,

SECURE, AND ESTABLISH BASES AND MSRS TO SUPPORT

FUTURE OPERATIONS AND MAXIMIZE SECURITY AND

SAFETY OF THE FORCE."75

By 31 August (C + 24), the Iraqi force was estimated to be fifteen

heavy and nine light brigades. 76 These forces were confronted along

the Saudi border by a growing Arab force backed up by an American

force of three infantry brigades, two attack helicopter battalions,

elements of a Sheridan battalion (Sheridans are tracked, lightarmored vehicles, not considered to be tanks), and division artillery.

Two M1 tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion were

in-country but not yet ready for action. When the Marine forces were

included, 602 (land) antiarmor systems were available to Schwarzkopf.

U.S. aircraft strength in theater was 106 air-to-air, 204 air-to-ground,

and 214 dual-role aircraft, for a total of 524 combat aircraft. 77 These

air assets obviously formed the main deterrent against land attack

until the arrival of substantial heavy land forces.

It would be 30 October before XVIII Corps could report its entire

force list assembled in theater, but the intervening time was busy. In

early September, Schwarzkopf issued guidance for combined training

with Saudi allies. 78 On 10 September, the Third Army commander

acknowledged three missions: force generation, defense, and training.

As a consequence, on the 13th, ARCENT began to look at expansion of

its headquarters staff to an organization more closely resembling a

major army command, which it was rapidly becoming in light of

administrative and training tasks not envisioned by the peacetime

TOE. These discussions were highly academic in light of force ceilings

then being developed.
54

On 14 September, Schwarzkopf instructed Third Army, whose

defensive sector had heretofore run east of Riyadh, to develop a

contingency plan for the capital's defense. On the 24th, the 24th

Infantry Division's equipment had all arrived, followed soon after by

the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment's. The First Cavalry Division's

equipment began to arrive on 5 October.

Divisions moved through the ports and began to take up positions

in the army defensive zone. They were confronted with the triple tasks

of acclimatization-learning to live in 120 degree (or hotter)

temperatures in the harsh desert environment, building a base

structure, albeit austere, and training for the coming clash, be it

defensive or offensive. In so doing, they had to confront a number of

challenges, not all environmental. Early on, there was little or no

training ammunition, and it would not do to fire up the basic load. As a

sea line of communication was established, it was possible to get

training ammunition, but units found that in recent years,

ammunition sections of unit staffs had become part of the installation

structure in the United States. The positions had been civilianized to

save military force structure, as had range activities. Consequently,

units had to learn not only how to obtain range areas in Saudi Arabia

but how to run them.79

-Simultaneously with creating the Army component of a viable

deterrent, then defensive force, it was necessary to develop the

instrumentalities of a coalition command, both to achieve unity of

effort in any ground combat and, of more immediate importance, to

provide points of access through which to address issues such as hostnation support. Doing this, largely without instructions or authority,

may well constitute General Yeosock's principal contribution to Desert

Shield, along with his detailed work creating the Army force

structure. 8 0 Yeosock undertook the task almost at once, creating the

Coalition Coordination Communication Integration Center (C3IC).

Why did the Army create the C3IC rather than headquarters

Central Command? It did so largely because Yeosock realized that

during operations in an allied state, ground forces bear a unique

burden. They must occupy, train, and operate on land that belongs to

another nation. They must do so without undermining the legitimacy

of the host government whose continued security is the reason for their

presence in the first place. For that reason and because ground forces

are the most socially and culturally intrusive, the predominant land

force commander, normally the Army component commander, must

expect to be responsible for much of the practical U.S.-host-nation
55

military intercourse. This is especially true where no system of allied

agreements preexists at the onset of military operations.

Yeosock did not believe the Army component was relieved of this

inherent responsibility by the presence of a theater commander. The

problem is simply overwhelming in its detail and magnitude and must

be accomplished within general theater guidelines by those executive

agents who know the scope and detail of what must be done. In early

August, Schwarzkopf was in Tampa. Yeosock was on the ground trying

to get his forces established in the peninsula, as was General Horner

who, incidently, was the deputy commander in chief, forward. Yeosock

could not wait for the CENTCOM staff to begin building a coalition

command structure when he had troops in the air almost immediately.

He saw what needed doing, he did it, and it worked. Schwarzkopf

underwrote it, once it was done, and ultimately took the organization

into his own headquarters.

Unlike NATO or even Korea, this new coalition was starting from

scratch to develop those organizations and procedures, not to mention

provision for essential host-nation logistic support, that would

guarantee unity of effort. As an old Saudi hand, Yeosock was aware of

the difficulties involved in obtaining a quick decision in a society

governed by a monarch, where the power of decision was highly

centralized and family-based, and inaction was often the key to

political survival. Yeosock was aware that U.S. forces would be

heavily dependent on a responsive host-nation support system just to

get ashore and survive and that the traditional methods would not be

responsive enough to meet the demands soon to be placed upon them.

However, whatever instrumentalities were established, it was

essential that Saudi authority not be undermined by an appearance of

U.S. domination. Respect for the authority of the host nation had to

remain a central element of any solution.

In the same way, as a former PMSANG, Yeosock was aware of the

professional strengths and limitations of the Saudi land forces, a dual

military (the Royal Saudi Land Forces and Saudi National Guard)

consisting of brigade-sized units distributed geographically. He

recognized the need to improve the Saudis' professional competence

without slighting their political and cultural sensitivities. To this end,

he devoted considerable effort to the development of the C3IC. This

combined body was established on 13 August under the authority of

the Joint Military Committee, the organ created to achieve unity of

effort between the Saudi and American militaries while maintaining

the independence of both.8l (See figure 11.)
56

On the Saudi side, the C3IC was headed by Lieutenant General

Khalid, the son of the minister of defense and a member of the royal

family. Each of the Saudi and American principals had a deputy. The

first Saudi deputy was Major General Abdul Aziz Al Sheik, who played

a particularly important role in negotiating host-nation support. As

the responsibilities of these officers increased with the growth of the

Arab-Islamic Coalition Joint Forces Command, the Saudis appointed a

succession of general officers to represent the Joint Forces Command

in the C3IC. As indicated previously, Yeosock's deputy in C3IC was

Major General Paul Schwartz. Schwartz was appointed vice deputy

commanding general of Third Army, a title selected by Yeosock so

that, on the one hand, no one on the American side would be quite sure

what he did and, on the other, because the Saudis particularly

respected the title qualifier "Vice."82

The C3IC was the principal interface organization between the

Americans and Saudis. In December, Central Command assumed

direct control of C3IC, taking Schwartz along with it. The C3IC was

successful in becoming a forum through which the U.S. side could work

a variety of coalition issues more rapidly than they could have done

otherwise. By placing the Third Army planning staff in the C3IC (until

its transfer in December), it also served as a model, by example, for the

Saudi staff officers and, through "leadership by question," got the

Saudis to do a sort of combined planning they might not have done

otherwise. For Schwartz, the most important function of the C3IC was

to act as a "reduction gear," to prevent "type A" American hard

chargers from overwhelming the less compulsive Saudis. 83

The location of the Third Army plans section in the Ministry of

Defense building with the C3IC organization had mixed results. Aside

from facilitating communication and coordination among coalition

ground forces and stimulating and guiding much of the Saudi

planning, it also permitted close coordination with the Central

Command planners who were likewise located in the Ministry of

Defense. 84 On the negative side, it separated the G3 Plans Section

from the Third Army G3, who was located with the army headquarters

in the Royal Saudi Land Forces headquarters some distance away.

Since the G3, General Arnold, was new and had not learned to look for

Colonel Gene Holloway as his principal planner, and since Holloway

was effectively General Schwartz's chief of staff at C3IC, some internal

stresses and delays in decision making resulted.

C3IC did not become an integrated headquarters as, perhaps, the

U.S. side would have preferred, but it did allow combined staffing of

issues of mutual interest, most particularly combined fire support and
57

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58

joint recognition procedures. It also provided a point of entry to develop

host-nation support agreements.

In November 1990, Schwartz summarized the C3IC's

accomplishments. 8 5 As its greatest achievement, he singled out

orienting the Saudi staff to the operational processes used by U.S.

forces. He noted that U.S. members brought to the task at hand a

knowledge of multicorps operations. The Saudis could provide

information about local terrain and operating constraints. Moreover,

he observed that the process of professional interaction had a value in

itself, referring to the C3IC as a "24 hour a day model classroom on

how to establish and maintain an operations center." 86 The C3IC

served as a conduit to the Saudi Joint Staff and spawned such vital

forums as the Joint Forces Support Committee, where the army G4,

Brigadier General James Monroe, could address host-nation support

issues. If the organization did not meet staff college principles for unity

of command, it was particularly well adapted to dealing with the

complexity of Saudi politics and society.

Also among the most important activities undertaken early in

Desert Shield was the force modernization of selected units. This

complex procedure, involving replacement of older, less capable

equipment with more moder, improved models, or introducing wholly

new equipment into the force, could not be done without ensuring its

costs did not exceed its benefits. Force modernization normally

requires that soldiers be retrained to use new equipment; thus, it

demands some time during which the unit is less than fully combat

ready. More important in this case was the requirement for

transportation, both intertheater and intratheater, a cost that could be

very high in circumstances where transportation assets were always

at a premium. In a theater where every HET was precious, as many as

forty-four could be required each day to transfer modernization

equipment. The whole process had to be managed closely. The

commander's intent was to "field fully employable systems that

contribute substantially to combat capabilities and require a minimal

train-up."87

Interestingly enough, the first system brought in proved to be one

of the least difficult to move or assimilate, and its contribution was

decisive. Indeed, Yeosock was to call its introduction one of three keys

to success. 88 The system was the small lightweight global positioning

system receiver, a hand-held or vehicular-mounted device that tells

the user where he is in the featureless desert. It was these devices and

other comparable global positioning systems (GPSs) that made

possible the decisive and simultaneous maneuver in formation of five
59

armored divisions and an armored cavalry regiment during Desert

Storm. Global positioning systems were also absolutely essential to

maintaining accurate indirect fire in the fast-moving mechanized

attack.

SLUGR and similar but less expensive (and less capable) longrange, very-low-frequency navigation systems (LORAN) were

purchased "off the shelf." Introduction of SLUGR was requested by

Lieutenant General Gary Luck, the commander of XVIII Airborne

Corps, who had used the devices during Operation Just Cause. 8 9

Purchase of a limited supply of GPSs for contingency operations had

been discussed at the Department of the Army as recently as 1 August.

The first Desert Shield-Desert Storm purchase was authorized by

Major General Jerome Granrud, the ADCSOPS for force development,

as early as 24 August 1990. Consequently, 7,509 GPSs were issued in

theater, down to maneuver platoons and artillery batteries.

In addition to GPSs, by the beginning of the ground attack in

February, seventeen battalions/squadrons had been reequipped with

new M1A1 tanks, the first taken from European stocks on 24 October

for delivery to XVIII Corps units in November. The first major item of

equipment issued in theater was the AH-1F helicopter, which arrived

for the 3d ACR on 22 October. Prior to Desert Storm, thirteen battalion

sets of countermine equipment were issued along with forty-three

combat engineer vehicles (CEVs) mine rakes (eight were loaned to the

Egyptians). Eleven battalions/squadrons received M2A2/M3A2

Bradley fighting vehicles. Ninty-nine M9 Armored Engineer vehicles

also were issued. In addition, 1,802 M939A2 five-ton trucks, 2,642

HMMWVs (including 50 or so "borrowed" by the Marines at Dhahran),

sixty-one AH-lFs, and thirty-two UH-60Ls were brought into the

force. 90

Aside from improving troop confidence and effectiveness, force

modernization also introduced greater mechanical reliability, a major

contributor to operational success. That these systems came from

throughout the Army, from all theaters, indicates the support the

entire Army gave to Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm.

Sometimes, the introduction of new systems also contributed to

global efforts not immediately associated with actions in the Persian

Gulf. Introduction of the M1A1 tanks is a case in point. The

introduction of MlAls involved Army Materiel Command project

managers, Europe's 7th Army Training Command New Equipment

Training Teams, and much departmental and ARCENT staff

coordination.91 Since the tanks came from Europe, their arrival
60

enhanced the rate of mutual disarmament on the NATO Central Front

while contributing to combat effectiveness in Saudi Arabia. The

ARCENT commander's ability to tap into Army equipment stocks

around the world is perhaps the most vivid example of what a

component commander can do for the theater commander in his

"departmental" as opposed to "joint" role.

As C+90 approached, Army forces in Saudi Arabia were

completing their deployment. The naval embargo was in place, and

Saddam Hussein was digging in in Kuwait. Toward the end of October,

unmistakable signs appeared that the American administration had

no intention of allowing a long-term stalemate to take hold.

I -·I -I I-- · 1 ' '- -
Notes

1. HQ, Department of the Army, Army Public Affairs, Department of the Army

Pamphlet 360-11, Army General Officer Resumes (18 March 1991), "Resume of

Service Career of H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General." Schwarzkopf considers

himself an experienced commander of both mechanized and light forces. He

acknowledges, however, that his first experience with heavy forces came as a

brigadier general. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 223,240.

2. David Lamb, "Schwarzkopf Tries Not to Wear Out Hero's Welcome," Los Angeles

Times, 20 October 1991, 1. Schwarzkopfs memoir indicates he saw the posting as

one where he could "make history," but he acknowledges it was not viewed that way

by his sponsor, Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero,

270-72.

3. Efforts are summarized in Andrew E. Gibson and Commander Jacob L. Shuford,

"Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift," The Naval War College Review (Spring 1991):

6-11. Ronald O'Rourke, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield (Washington, D.C.:

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 17 September 1990), CRS 9-

10.

4. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 273-74, 277-80.

5. HQ, Department of the Army, Army Public Affairs, Department of the Army

Pamphlet 360-11, Army General Officer Resumes (18 March 1991), "Resume of

Service Career of John Yeosock, Lieutenant General." Yeosock considered his

former associations with Saudi political leaders his greatest strength in light of the

magnitude of the host-nation support problem. In negotiating Saudi support for

arriving American units, it was necessary to know who to ask, who had authority to

decide, and develop a personal relationship of mutual trust.

6. Lieutenant General Yeosock to author.

7. HQ, Third Army, slide titled, "Third US Army HQ," New Realities Briefing, given

by Major General Riley to the commander in chief, Forces Command, in July 1990.

8. Ibid.

9. For example, the corps chief of staff and G3 were both promotable colonels; none of

the ARCENT staff were.

10. President George Bush, "Reshaping our Forces," a speech delivered at the Aspen

Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990, reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day 56,

no. 22 (1 September 1990): 676-79.

11. "Chronology of Events, 1 August 1990 to 27 March 1991," Annex E to U.S. Army,

Concepts and Analysis Agency Study Report, CAA-SR-91-18, Headquarters,

Department of the Army Desert Shield/Desert Storm After-Action Report, vol. 1,

Main Report (September 1991), E-Chronology-1. In late July, responding to

concerns of the United Arab Emirates about Saddam's threatening position, the

United States deployed aerial tankers and established a naval radar picket across

the Persian Gulf to provide warning of air attack. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero,

292-93.

61
62

12. Interview with Lieutenant General John Yeosock at the Royal Saudi Land Forces

Building, 26 September 1990,7.

13. Chronology-22d Support Command, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, HQ,

22d Support Command (TAA) Memorandum, Subject: Update Desert Storm, dated 6

June 1991. This report is part of the Desert Storm after-action report collection

process. According to General Yeosock, the first request he made to General Burba,

following the summons to go to MacDill AFB, on 4 August 1990, was for the services

of General Pagonis to be his DCG logistics. Schwarzkopf had been involved in hectic

activity to inform the president and his inner circle of available U.S. military

responses since the detection of the Iraqi deployment. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a

Hero, 294-302. General Pagonis describes the predeployment atmosphere at Fort

McPherson in Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis with Jeffery L. Cruishank,

Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics for the Gulf War (Boston:

Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 63-72. According to Pagonis, his initial

contract extended only to host-nation support and expanded under the pressures of

the deployment. Ibid., 90.

14. Interview with Lieutenant General John Yeosock at the Royal Saudi Land Forces

Building, 26 September 1990, 8. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Larry

Gresham, n.d.

15. Horner, "Offensive Air Operations: Lessons for the Future," 19.

16. "Chronology of Events, 1 August 1990 to 27 March 1991," Annex E to U.S. Army,

Concepts and Analysis Agency Study Report, CAA-SR-91-18, Headquarters,

Department of the Army Desert Shield/Desert Storm After-Action Report, vol. 1,

Main Report (September 1991), E-Chronology-2, 8.

17. President George Bush, "The Defense of Saudi Arabia," delivered at the White

House, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1990, reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol.

56 (1 September 1990): 674-75. The president's statement is followed by that of

King Fahd Bin Abdel Aziz. The New York Times reported the deployments on 7

August, The New York Times, 8 August 1990, Al. Schwarzkopf describes

negotiations with the king in Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 304-5.

18. Yeosock, "Army Operations in the Gulf Theater," Military Review 71 (September

1991): 2-15. "H + 100: An Army Comes of Age in the Persian Gulf," Army 41, no. 10

(October 1991): 44-58. Slide titled, "Third Army Is Three Armies," from the Third

Army Operation Desert Storm command briefing dated 15 August 1991.

19. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces Staff College, Armed

Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1991, paragraph

201, "Organization for National Security," 2-2 to 2-7.

20. Ibid., paragraph 204e, "The Joint Chiefs Today, Chairman," 2-11 to 2-12.

21. Ibid., paragraph 204, "The Joint Chiefs Today," 2-9 et seq.

22. Ibid., paragraph 206d, "Unified and Specified Commands, Authority," 2-21 to 2-22.

23. Message, 101100Z August 90, FM USCINCCENT, MACDILL AFB FL,

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT, NARR/ THIS OPORD FORMS USCINCCENT

ORDER FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, 32.

24. Ibid., 31. HQ, USCENTCOM, USCINCCENT OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm,

16 December 1990. The term "communications zone" seems to have been avoided
63

throughout. To all intents and purposes, ARCENT, through the 22d Support

Command, operated the theater communications zone.

25. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, 311-12.

26. There is a difference in the way division force equivalents were counted by ARCENT

in Internal Look and Desert Shield. In Desert Shield, to arrive at four and two-thirds

division force equivalents, you have to count the aviation brigade as a one-third

division force equivalent. This was not done in the case of Internal Look, where only

ground maneuver units (brigades and regiments) were counted. The continued use

of four and two-thirds probably reflects the force of habit on the part of the slide

makers. See HQ, Third Army, ARCENT Update briefing, C + 52 (presented to the

Secretary of the Army) 28 September 1990, slide titled, "Minimum Essential Force

Development," dated 28 September 1990.

27. Ibid., slide titled, "Reserve Component Support to ARCENT HQ," dated 28

September 1990, shows the headquarters had 226 Active Component personnel

against the authorization of 222; 120 Reserve Component personnel, the bulk of

whom were TTAD (temporary tour of active duty UP AR 135-210), the remainder

Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers, for a total of 346 against the wartime

MTOE requirement of 825.

28. President George Bush, "The Defense of Saudi Arabia," delivered at the White

House, Washington, D.C., 8 August 1990, reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day 56

(1 September 1990): 674. The ARCENT "Phase I" Command Briefing listed as its

fourth objective "Protect the Persian Gulf' in lieu of "Protect American Citizens

Abroad." That objective was stated in the president's speech as well as the four

enumerated.

29. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),

DOD New Briefing, Tuesday, 8 August 1990, 1:00 P.M. Secretary of Defense

Richard Cheney, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, USA, 1-8.

30. HQ, Third Army, ARCENT Update briefing, C + 19, 26 August 1990, slide titled,

"ARCENT HQ's Capability" shows twenty: Yeosock, Gresham, five from PMSANG,

and thirteen from USMTM. This slide was corrected by C + 27 (3 September) to show

nine from PMSANG for a total of twenty-four.

31. HQ, Third Army, ARCENT Update briefing, C + 19, 26 August 1990, slide titled,

"ARCENT Major Tasks, First 72 Hours (6-8 August)." This was among the longerlived slides in the army command briefing.

32. Interview with Major General Paul Schwartz at Fort Lewis, Washington, 18 April

1991,5-7.

33. Interview with General Steven Arnold, Eskan Village, Riyadh, S.A., 15 March 1991,

2. Interview with Brigadier General John Stewart, Eskan Village, Riyadh, Saudi

Arabia, 30 March 1990,2.

34. HQ, Third Army (AFRD-DTP), Memorandum for Desert Storm Study Group,

Subject: OPLAN 1002, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Planning, dated 4 June

1991, paragraph 3a, 5-6. The memorandum was prepared for Colonel Holloway,

chief of plans for ARCENT by Major Steve Holley, the 1002 plans officer. HQ, Third

Army (AFRD-DT), Memorandum thru Chief, G3 Program Division, Subject: Joint

Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Branch Historical Report

Input, dated 21 February 1991. This memorandum, prepared for the army historian,
64

points out that the normal joint planning cycle lasts from eighteen to twenty-four

months. In this case, 1002-90 was seven months into that cycle. Schwarzkopf,

Doesn't Take a Hero, 310-11.

35. The conclusion is taken from the logistics overview briefing given by ARCENT to

the Secretary of the Army on 14 March 1990. There were two kinds of preposition

ships in the CENTCOM area of interest. MPS ships (Maritime Prepositioning Ships)

carry Marine Corps expeditionary brigade sets, to include fighting systems, the

concept being that Marines are flown into theater and join their equipment in the

port, much like POMCUS stocks in Europe. The Army and Air Force have APS

(Afloat Prepositioned Ships) that carry sustainment (ammunition, food, fuel, water,

tentage) and port-operating supplies-the assumption being that fighting systems

will come by air or ship. O'Rourke, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield

(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 17

September 1990), CRS 15-18. United States Congress, House of Representatives,

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Our Nation's Capabilities to Meet Sealift

Requirements Caused by American Deployment to the Persian Gulf, September 18 &

25, 1990, Serial No. 101-120, Statement of Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, USN,

Commander Military Sealift Command before the House Merchant Marine and

Fisheries Committee Subcommittee on Merchant Marine Oversight Hearing on Sealift Requirements for the Persian Gulf Crisis, 18 September 1990, 103-5. For an account of what this looked like on the receiving end, see Pagonis, Moving

Mountains, 84-130. On prepositioned shipping, see Ibid., 70.

36. Statement of General Colin L. Powell, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

the Senate Armed Services Committee, 11 September 1990, reprinted in U.S.

Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),

American Forces Information Service, Defense Issues 5, no. 39. The chairman did not

match the deployments with the phases. The phases given obviously overlapped. For

the discussion of force deployments against these phases identified by the chairman,

the author has drawn heavily upon the explanation given by Colonel Paul Tiberi

and James C. Wendt in Gathering the Storm: Contingency Planning and Force

Projection, Association of the United States Army, The Institute of Land Warfare,

The Land Warfare Papers, no. 7 (September 1991). This author has diverged in

small details from the Tiberi and Wendt explanation. (I place the deployment of the

7th MEB in Phase II rather than Phase I, and I disagree somewhat with their

characterization of phases. By titling the third phase "coercion," the authors of this

paper read rather more into the third phase than the chairman said or the force

structure seemed to warrant in October 1990 when laid down against the

simultaneous Iraqi deployment into Kuwait. During Desert Shield, coercion came first from the sea and then in the air but not on the land. That must be understood to

understand the import of the 8 November creation of an offensive option. Those

issues aside, the study is an excellent overview of the Desert Shield deployment.)

37. Tiberi and Wendt, Gathering the Storm, 9; and Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero,

321-23.

38. Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraq's Oil and

Almost All Its Imports: Some Food to Pass, Word 'Blockade' Avoided to Sidestep

Question of New U.N. Vote," The New York Times, 13 August 1990, Al and A8;

"U.S. Ships Fire in Warning When Iraqis Refuse to Halt," The New York Times, 19

August 1990, All.
65

39. Tiberi and Wendt, Gathering the Storm, 9-12. U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct

of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of The Persian

Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public

Law 102-25)(April 1992), Appendix E, "Deployment," E-20.

40. Ibid. Arrival is confirmed by the ARCENT SITREP, C +21 (28 AUG 90), AFRD-CS

(282330 AUG 90), Memorandum for All Major Subordinate Commands and Staff,

Subject: ARCENT Command SITREP #12 as of COB 28 August (C + 21). (During

the early days of the deployment, ARCENT headquarters sent out two SITREPS

each day-one a message, one a memorandum. By the end of the month, both were

combined into a single message.) The fast sealift ships carry about one brigade in

two ships, a mechanized division in eight, or two divisions' equipment sets in eight.

O'Rourke, Sealift and Operation Desert Shield, CRS 18-19.

41. Tiberi and Wendt, Gathering the Storm, 9-12.

42. The ARCENT SITREP reports closure of the 101st on 7 October, Message,

072359ZOCT 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRD-DCG//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN G3//; Tiberi and Wendt, the 4th. The 3d ACR is

reported closing 14 October by ARCENT, Message, 142359 OCT 90, FM

COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRD-DCG//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN G31/,

by Tiberi and Wendt, the 13th. The difference probably depends on what is counted

for arrival and whether U.S. or Saudi time is used.

43. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Force Generation Briefing (as of 7 November

1990), slide titled, "DS 90 TPFDD Chronology." HQ, ARCENT, Command Group,

ARCENT Update C + 52 (28 September 1990), slide titled, "Command and Control."

HQ, Third Army (AFRD-DT), Memorandum thru Chief, G3 Program Division,

Subject: Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Branch

Historical Report Input, dated 21 February 1991.

44. See EYES ONLY Message, 051830Z SEP 90, FROM SSO FORSCOM TO SSO

CINCCENT (FOR MAJ GEN JOHNSTON, C/S, CENTCOM, MAIN DHAHRAN,

FROM MG TAYLOR, DCINCFOR), Subject: Minimum Essential Support for Desert

Shield, which summarizes process to date and indicates principal constraint was

transportation.

45. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update C + 52 (28 September 1990),

slides titled, "Minimum Essential Force Development."

46. Crisis Action Team (CAT) Tasking Form, CAT No. 8302, Suspense: 171000 August

1990, Subject: Minimum Selective Reserve Call-Up Requirements.

47. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New

York: Dell Books, 1992), 72-73.

48. General Schwarzkopf found himself at loggerheads with his mentor, General Carl

Vuono, the army chief of staff, over the issue of the roundout brigades. Vuono

wanted to deploy the units; Schwarzkopf did not because of the 180-day limit on

their mobilizations. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 323.

49. CAT Tasking Form, CAT No. 8241, Suspense: 161100 August, Subject: Service

Estimates for Selective Reserve Call-up. Attached to the form is a memo from J4 of

the Joint Staff that indicates the 15 August date.
66

50. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JS Form 137L Feb 90, Joint Action Processing

Form, Subject: Selective Reserve Call-up Requirements by Service.

51. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the

Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Subject: Call of Selected Reserve Units and Personnel to Active Duty, dated 23

August 1990.

52. Message, 041700C OCT 90, FM USCINCCENT TO RHIUFAA/USCENTAF FWD

HQS ELEMENT, et al., PERSONAL FOR GENERALS HORNER, YEOSOCK,

BOOMER, ADMIRAL MAUZ AND COLONEL JOHNSON FROM GENERAL

SCHWARZKOPF, Subject: Force End-Strength Ceiling. The British forces deployed

in the fall of 1990 also operated under strict minimum-essential force guidance,

called more colorfully the "arm in the mangle" policy, after Margaret Thatchers'

comment that, "The Government was anxious 'not to get its arm caught in the

mangle'-not to be dragged into a conflict which would demand ever-increasing

commitment of men and resources." General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Storm

Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 17,

77, 129.

53. EYES ONLY Message, 051830Z SEP 90, FROM SSO FORSCOM TO SSO

CINCCENT (FOR MAJ GEN JOHNSTON, C/S, CENTCOM, MAIN DHAHRAN,

FROM MG TAYLOR, DCINCFOR), Subject: Minimum Essential Support for Desert

Shield.

54. Ibid.

55. Message, 060111Z SEP 90, FM SSO USCINCCENT REAR TO USCINCCENT

0511800Z SEP 90 ZYH, FROM SSO FORSCOM TO SSO CINCCENT, EYES ONLY

FOR GEN SCHWARZKOPF, CINCCENT, FROM GEN BURBA, CINCFOR,

Subject: Minimum Essential Face [sic] for Desert Shield, 2.

56. EYES ONLY Message, 190500Z SEP 90, FROM GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF TO

GENERAL BURBA, Subject: Minimum Essential Force for Desert Shield.

57. Message, 091501Z OCT 90 FROM USCINCCENT TO RHIPAAA/COMUSARCENT

MAIN, PERSONAL FOR LTG YEOSOCK FROM GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF,

MSGID/SYS.RMM/USCINCCENT/CCCC//RMKS 1. The message approved an

ARCENT CAP of 140,000.

58. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT UPDATE Briefing C + 52 (presented to

Secretary of the Army) and, HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update

Briefing C + 61 (presented to the chief of staff, Army).

59. For example, the XVIII Finance. Group assumed responsibility for EAC finance

support as well as that of the corps. HQ, Third Army, AFRD-RM, Memorandum for

ARCENT History Office (Colonel Swain), Subject: Command Report Operation

Desert Shield, dated 8 March 1991, 3.

60. At a seminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Lieutenant General Luck, Commander

XVIII Corps, and Major General Funk, Desert Storm commander of the 3d Armored

Division, were paraphrased as having taken the position that Third Army was an

unnecessary headquarters. HQ, Combined Arms Command and Fort Leavenworth,

ATZL-CG, Memorandum for Record, Subject: AirLand Operations Seminar with
67

Desert Storm Commanders, dated 27 June 1991, 2. The note taker was Lieutenant

General Leonard Wishart, the Combined Arms Command commander.

61. HQ, Third Army, Command Group, Force Generation Briefing. Briefing titled,

"SWA Force Comparison," located in Lieutenant General Yeosock's AAR files.

62. Notes from interview with Lieutenant General Yeosock on 31 May 1991. HQ,

ARCENT, briefing titled, "SWA Force Comparison." This briefing, found in the

commander's papers, its origins unknown, compares ARCENT force structure to

that called for by Army of excellence (AOE) requirements. See also, HQ, ARCENT,

Command Group, ARCENT Update C + 52 (28 September 1990), slides titled,

"Reserve Component Support to ARCENT HQ" and "Minimum Essential Force

Development (2)."

63. Notes from interview with Lieutenant General Yeosock on 31 May 1991. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT UPDATE C + 52 (28 September 1990), slides

titled, "Theater Logistics Chain of Command" and "ARCENT Support Command

(Provisional)." HQ, 22d Support Command, AFSC-MHD, Memorandum for

Commanding General, ARCENT, Attn: AFRD-CS-MH, Subject: Command Report

Operation Desert Shield, 22d Support Command, dated 23 March 1991. To those

who had to execute, it looked much more drastic. Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 89-95,

97-104.

64. The agreement, effective 1 November 1990, is reproduced as Annex F to HQ, 22d

Support Command, AFSC-RM, Memorandum for ARCENT Historian, Subject:

Command Report for Operation Desert Shield, dated 23 February 1991. Pagonis,

Moving Mountains, 107-18.

65. Notes from interview with Lieutenant General Yeosock on 31 May 1991. See also

note by General Robert Frix, ARCENT chief of staff, on cover sheet to ARCENT

Command SITREP, C+26 (2 SEP 90), Memorandum for Major General Taylor,

ARCENT Rear; Info Major General Riley, Subject: ARCENT Command SITREP

#16 as of COB 2 SEP (C+26). The memorandum gives the position of

COMUSARCENT on 377th TAACOM. See also HQ, 22d Support Command, AFSCMHD, Memorandum for Commanding General, ARCENT, Attn: AFRD-CS-MH,

Subject: Command Report Operation Desert Shield, 22d Support Command, dated

23 March 1991.

66. Message, 101100Z August 90, FM USCINCCENT, MACDILL AFB FL,

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT, NARR/ THIS OPORD FORMS USCINCCENT

ORDER FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

67. Ibid., 13.

68. Ibid., 30-32.

69. Message, 220900Z August 90, FROM CDRUSARCENT RIYADH SA, Subject:

Desert Shield Operations.

70. HQ, ARCENT, G3 AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel

Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield,

Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment. This

memorandum, prepared by Major Steve Holley for signature by Colonel Harold E.

Holloway, summarizes the role of the ARCENT G3 plans in Desert Shield-Desert

Storm. It is the most comprehensive historical document prepared by the ARCENT

staff for the Gulf War. Because the plans shop was central to Yeosock's way of doing
68

business, this twenty-three-volume documentary set is invaluable to anyone who

would understand what ARCENT did during the war. All ARCENT orders are

included in the set.

71. Enclosure 2 to HQ, ARCENT, G3 AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT

Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical

Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and

Redeployment. These concept slides appear in the daily ARCENT Update briefings

for August as well.

72. HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, Initial After-Action Report Operation Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Desert Shield Chronology, 1-2.

73. Message, 192300Z AUG 90, FROM COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON

GA//AFRD-DSO//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT AFRO-DTD//PERID/182400Z/ TO:

192400Z/ AS OF: 192400Z, 6-8.

74. Message, 242300Z AUG 90, FROM COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON

GA//AFRD-DSO//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT AFRD-DSO//PERID/232400Z/ TO:

242400Z// AS OF: 242400Z, 7.

75. Message, 302359Z AUG 90, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN RIYADH SA//AFRDDCG, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN G3, 9.

76. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update Briefing C + 24 (31 August

1990), slides titled, "Current Situation 31 Aug" and "Threat Summary 31 Aug."

These early estimates were highly subjective. The ARCENT situation report for 31

August listed eight to ten Iraqi divisions with eleven heavy and nine light brigades.

Whatever the count, the Iraqis were vastly superior in heavy ground combat forces.

77. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update Briefing C+24 (31 August

1990), slide titled, "If We Have to Fight Tonight." Message, 012115Z SEP 90, FM

USCINCCENT, MSGID/SITREP/USCINCCENT/023/SEP//, 8.

78. Message, 062359Z SEP 90, FM COMUSARCENT//AFRD-DCG,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN G3, 12-13.

79. HQ, ARCENT, G3 Training (AFRD-DT), Memorandum for COMUSARCENT, Attn:

History Office, Subject: Training, Command Report Operation Desert Shield, dated

25 February 1991. Notes from interview with Lieutenant Colonel Pat Lamar, G3,

24th ID.

80. Schwarzkopfs memoir would seem to indicate he discussed the general principles

for combined command with Horner and Yeosock around the 8th. Schwarzkopf,

Doesn't Take a Hero, 313. C3IC was the embodiment of that guidance.

81. HQ, USCENTCOM, C3IC, Memorandum for Deputy CINC, USCENTCOM, Subject:

C3IC Support to the Saudi Military Staff, dated 26 November 1990. This

memorandum, prepared by Major General Paul Schwartz, summarizes C3IC while

under ARCENT. General Schwartz has contributed a lengthy interview on the role

of C3IC as well.

82. Stories provided to author by Yeosock and Schwartz. See also interview with

Lieutenant General John Yeosock, Royal Saudi Land Forces Building, Riyadh, S.A.,

26 September 1990, 11. Interview with Major General Paul Schwartz at Fort Lewis,

Washington, 2 May 1991, 3.
69

83. Comment about "reduction gear" was made by General Schwartz to author. See also

interview with Major General Paul Schwartz at Fort Lewis, Washington, 2 May

1991,57-58.

84. HQ, ARCENT, G3 AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel

Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield,

Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, 2.

85. HQ, USCENTCOM, C3IC, Memorandum for Deputy CINC, USCENTCOM, Subject:

C3IC Support to the Saudi Military Staff, dated 26 November 1990.

86. Ibid.

87. The mission is taken from ARCENT Force Modernization Briefing given the

Secretary of the Army on 14 March 1991 at Riyadh, slide titled, "Commander's

Intent." More contemporary slides are two briefings given by ARCENT G3 to CG on

10 and 11 October 1990 concerning Ml upgrade program.

88. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update Briefing for Chief of Staff,

Army, 20 April 1991, slide titled, "Commander's Keys to Success."

89. HQ, Department of the Army, DAMO-FDC, Memorandum for Chief, Center of

Military History, Washington, D.C., Subject: Procurement of Small Lightweight

Global Positioning System Receivers (SLUGR) for Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

90. ARCENT Force Modernization Briefing given the secretary of the Army on 14

March 1991.

91. A complete report of materiel fielding efforts is to be found in Program Executive

Office, Armored Systems Modernization, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

(Saudi Arabia) Material Fielding Team Historical Report, 2 July 1991.

I Ill - - - II I - II

3

Planning a Ground Offensive I:

The CINC's Study Group

The popular view of the Persian Gulf War, at least in the Army, is

that it was a war of maneuver. It was nothing of the sort, at least not if

"maneuver" is viewed as the psychological undermining of an enemy

by movement alone. Viewed from the theater level, Desert Storm was

a war of attrition based upon air power. Coalition air forces disrupted

the Iraqi national command and control structure, won air supremacy

(unopposed freedom of action in the air) early, and then prepared the

theater of operations through a program of continuous bombing. Some

still believe air power worked so well that the ground operation only

reaped the effects achieved from the air, effects which, given a week or

two more, would have led to an Iraqi withdrawal without a ground

attack at all.1

The ground attack was ultimately a necessary but clearly

dependent and contingent part of the theater campaign plan. Time was

running out. As the holy month of Ramadan approached (starting 15

March), to be followed by the end of the cool season and the heat of the

Arabian summer, the impasse with Iraq had to be broken.2 Looking

ahead, it was becoming increasingly impossible to gamble that air

power would compel Saddam's withdrawal without ground action to

force the pace.

Nonetheless, the ground offensive was seen to depend absolutely

upon the air arm's success in achieving air supremacy. This dominance

would free the ground forces to reposition to the west, build up the

massive supply bases required for mechanized warfare, and

concentrate for attack without interference. Ground commanders from

General Schwarzkopf to the lowest armored battalion commander

believed that success on the ground depended on the Air Force

inflicting significant destruction upon enemy ground forces,

particularly the artillery and armored reserves who were believed to

outnumber coalition forces greatly and to be well armed and capable of

tough resistance. Most analysts assumed Iraq would employ chemical

weapons, particularly once threatened with defeat.

Army commanders did not doubt that the execution of a ground

attack would be necessary at some point, first, to drive dug-in enemy

formations above ground so that they would be subject to destruction

by both ground and air attack; second, because liberation of Kuwait

71
72

ultimately required taking possession of territory-Kuwait itself, as

the primary mission, and southeastern Iraq, to ensure negotiations.

The ground offensive was planned and conducted in accordance with

the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. Developed during the decade

following the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, AirLand Battle doctrine is an

application of classic twentieth-century maneuver theory for

mechanized forces.

Since the attack on the Somme in World War I, ground maneuver

commanders have tended to discount the disruptive effects of fire, even

though it forms the basis of any army's minor tactics. They prefer to

think of operational maneuver, in which fire plays a subordinate and

supporting role as the key to unlocking enemy defenses. Indeed, two

competing views of modern mechanized warfare might be

characterized loosely as the romantic and the realist. The romantic

view is often associated with B. H. Liddell Hart and his concept of the

indirect approach. This view emphasizes dislocation of the enemy as

the objective of maneuver. Indirection and speed of execution are the

means. These hold out the ideal of so upsetting the enemy by

operational movement that no tactical engagement at all is required to

bring about the foe's destruction.3 For Liddell Hart, the characteristic

maneuver of the indirect approach in ground warfare was the turning

movement, with the hope that seizure of position alone might cause

the enemy to surrender or at least force him to battle where the

operational attacker had the advantage of the tactical defense.

The realist's view of armored warfare was based upon the more

Jominian tradition of achieving victory by the successive destruction

of fractions of the enemy's force by masses of one's own. Best

articulated in the works of J. F. C. Fuller, the benefit of mechanization

had to do largely with the ability of mechanical transport to

concentrate forces rapidly against more vulnerable and more decisive

rear areas before an enemy could react to the traditional rear attack. 4

For Fuller, battle, albeit on favorable terms, was the necessary end of

maneuver; dislocation was but a means to a tactical end. In Fuller's

view, speed of execution is a more relational concept because it is

measured against the enemy's ability to respond before decision is

reached, rather than on the psychological effect achieved. For Fuller,

the envelopment was the more productive maneuver.

The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, as articulated in FM 100-5,

Operations (May 1986), reflected both views. The defining passage

maintained that
73

The object of all operations is to impose our will upon the enemy.... To do

this we must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an

unexpected direction, follow-up rapidly to prevent his recovery and

continue operations aggressively to achieve the higher commander's goals.

The best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against

critical units or areas whose loss will degrade the coherence of enemy

operations in depth. 5

AirLand Battle doctrine assumed the synergistic employment of

Air Force ground-attack systems both in support of the close (directfire) battle and in depth, interdicting enemy forces not yet engaged by

ground forces or withdrawing beyond their reach. The doctrine

assumed, implicitly, possession of air superiority.

These ideas formed the theoretical context within which plans

were drawn up for the ground portion of Operation Desert Storm.

Although the aerial isolation of the operational area south of the

Euphrates, and the deep envelopment of the Iraqi front-line forces

through the Iraqi desert, employed elements of indirection,

Schwarzkopf placed himself ultimately in the realist camp by his

selection of the Iraqi operational reserves, particularly the Republican

Guard, as the focus of his attentions. Destruction of the Iraqi armored

forces was part of his strategic and operational program. In fact, his

analysis of his mission required it.6 His hopes for the success of the

attrition-ground preparation phase of the air campaign-to "open the

window for initiating ground offensive operations by confusing and

terrorizing Iraqi forces in the KTO and shifting combat force ratios in

favor of friendly forces"7-indicate he was also no stranger to the value

of dislocation, though his faith rested in fire more than maneuver.

A most important feature of planning for Desert Storm ground

operations was the extent to which commanders themselves were

involved in all key decisions. The plan itself had a hundred fathers, but

no decision of consequence was taken except by the senior

commanders. Therefore, some key events in the evolution of the plan

must be set forth at the outset. The first was the theater commander's

briefing to his commanders on 14 November. From that time on, what

had been a closely controlled planning process grew horizontally and

vertically in an environment in which each commander, from division

level and above, had heard the general concept of operations from

Schwarzkopf himself.

From the November briefing to early January, there were a

number of key back-briefings-from the corps to Third Army, from

Third Army to the theater commander, and on 20 December, to the
74

secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-on the

status of theater preparations for offensive action.

During the last week of December, Third Army held a map exercise (MAPEX) in Eskan Village, near Riyadh, attended by senior

Army commanders and representatives of the other U.S. service

components. This event provided the opportunity for the senior Army commanders and their staffs to work out the details of their plans. The

staffs addressed those details that could be resolved and identified

those that could not. After the formal sessions, the two corps commanders, the Support Command commander, and the Third Army commander retired to a conference room alone. There, closing discussions took place on the ARCENT concept of operations.

The MAPEX was followed by briefings to Schwarzkopf on 4 and 8

January. Schwarzkopf seemed to have misgivings but then renewed

his confidence in the plan of attack. A final "commanders' huddle" was

held by the Third Army commander on 1 February, then the secretary of defense and chairman were briefed again on the 9th. Subsequently,

only decisions involving matters of detail and execution remained to

be made, most contingent on the outcome of initial combat actions.

These conferences and briefings constituted the major turning points in the planning process. Each marked a new advance in the evolution

of the plan that led to the victory in Desert Storm.

The planning process for ground operations began in midSeptember 1990. Central Command campaign planning had begun

even earlier while the deployment of U.S. forces was still in its first

days. Because the allied air forces (reinforced by U.S. Navy and

Marine air wings) provided the first offensive capability available to

the alliance high command, an offensive air campaign was planned

almost at once and largely independent of consideration of any specific

ground operations that might follow. Much of this planning was done

by the U.S. Air Force staff in Washington and then adapted by CENTAF.8 The theater campaign plan ultimately grafted a ground operation plan onto the existing air plan because the latter continued

to be an appropriate-indeed necessary-way to proceed with the

employment of available coalition air power. Targeting in the Kuwaiti

Theater of Operations (KTO), to be sure, would be affected at some

point by the details of the ground operation, but the air component's "major muscle movements" remained constant.

According to his memoir, Schwarzkopf came under pressure from

Washington to develop a concept for a ground offensive to free Kuwait

almost upon initiation of the Desert Shield defensive deployment.9 He
75

resisted the pressure because he was convinced that the force he had

just begun to deploy was both inadequate to the task and configured

only for defense. The pressure continued intermittently, though

Schwarzkopf seems to have done nothing substantive until he

relocated to the theater of operations in late August.

To develop a ground offensive plan, the CINC requested and was

assigned four recent graduates of the Army's bastion of the operational

art, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), located in the

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The

officers were reassigned from joint posts and other duties in Army

units not yet alerted for movement to the Gulf. They were Lieutenant

Colonel (later colonel) Joe Purvis, at the time assigned to the U.S.

Pacific Command staff in Hawaii; Major Greg Eckert, G3 training, 4th

Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, Colorado; Major Dan Roh, executive

officer, 708th Main Support Battalion, 8th Infantry Division, in

Germany; and Major Bill Pennypacker, executive officer, 1st Brigade,

1st Infantry Division, at Fort Riley, Kansas.

However these officers were chosen, fortune favored Schwarzkopf

in the choice of team chief. Purvis was an officer of medium height,

slender, and quiet in demeanor, but he concealed in his taciturn nature

a highly disciplined and most perceptive intellect not easily swayed by

bluster and bravado. When he said something was so, you could bank

on it, for the simple reason that Purvis would not say he knew until he

was sure he did. He also had a wry sense of humor and the ability to

laugh at his own discomfort, no small talent in the high-pressure world

he entered in September 1990.

These officers formed a small planning cell for consideration of

ground operations. They would be at the center of planning for

Operation Desert Storm. The life of this group was instructive about

how Central Command and Third Army worked together, how

Schwarzkopf exercised his command, and about the role played by

General Yeosock and ARCENT in achieving U.S. and coalition goals

in Southwest Asia.

Planning was evolutionary. 10 While the Third Army staff focused

on deploying its forces and developing the defensive plans for

Operation Desert Shield, Purvis and his planners began to explore the

possibility of a U.S. ground offensive by examining what could be done

with forces available in the fall of 1990. Planning soon expanded to

look at options that would be feasible only with the addition of more

U.S. forces, forces that were allocated in November. All of this went on

while the XVIII Airborne Corps was still arriving and during a period
76

when there was no commitment to remove Saddam Hussein from

Kuwait by force of arms-when, in fact, decisions were being made

that were contrary to the needs of a major operational offensive.

Responsibility for planning, although limited at first to a small

group at theater headquarters, eventually involved both Yeosock and

his G3, General Arnold. Once Schwarzkopf was satisfied he knew what

he wanted his components to do, planning for Army operations was

transferred to the Third Army staff and transformed over several

weeks into a process of simultaneous and iterative dialogue between

commanders and staffs from division to theater, with each command

echelon having a part in the process in accordance with its immediate

and legitimate interests. These officers were assisted in their

adaptation to the new requirements by the knowledge they had

acquired exploring various counterattack options.

ARCENT offensive planning continued until 8 January, when

Schwarzkopf approved the ground operational plan in its essentials.

Incremental adjustments were made up to the eve of the attack. The

principal linkage between Third Army's planning and Schwarzkopfs

work at Central Command was the CENTCOM planning cell itself.

Once Schwarzkopfs concept was formulated, Purvis and his team

continued to work in the Central Command headquarters in the

basement of the Saudi Ministry of Defense Building. However, they

were placed under the supervision of Yeosock and Arnold, who were

given responsibility for further development of a theater ground

attack plan. The Central Command operational concept was gradually

worked into a more detailed, all-component and coalition ground

offensive plan. Eventually, as planning spread outward to encompass

all participating units, the Purvis Group planners resumed duties as a

cell within the theater staff dealing with all components alike. 1l

Ground operational planning involved a process of iterative

negotiation from bottom to top. This established a single concept in the

minds of all commanders, an essential element of successful

synchronization of their disparate activities. However, it is now clear

that certain divergences of view and philosophy also began to appear,

particularly about Iraqi abilities to absorb the Air Force preparation

fires. Though little remarked at the time, these divergences would lead

to painful misunderstandings during and after the offensive.

The "gang of four," as the Purvis Group became known, reported

to Headquarters, Central Command, in Riyadh on 16 September

1990.12 On the 18th, Schwarzkopf charged them to plan an offensive

ground campaign using the forces available in theater at the time-
77

one corps of two heavy, one light (airborne), and one medium (air

assault) divisions; an armored cavalry regiment; a combat aviation

brigade; a Marine amphibious force of one division; and the various

coalition forces then arriving. 13 The CINC's initial comments made

clear that he was looking for an indirect approach, not a frontal attack

into enemy strength.

At the outset, only ten or so CENTCOM personnel were to have

knowledge of the Purvis Group's activities and plans. For the group,

that meant that getting information was often difficult, as it was not

possible to tell the source exactly why a piece of information was

required. In this, the network of SAMS graduates assigned throughout

the theater proved most useful. Many occupied key operational and

planning positions at all levels of Army command. These officers knew

each other and were willing to study questions and respond to their

caller without spending a great deal of time asking why he needed to

know. 14 Within Central Command headquarters, on the other hand,

inquiries often required a great deal of creativity to make the request

plausible without giving away the game.

The Purvis Group was enlarged by the addition of a naval rating,

Petty Officer First Class (IS1) Michael Archer, who would be the

team's intelligence specialist. In early November, Brigadier Tim

Sullivan, a British Guards officer, joined as well. From time to time,

experts from various agencies were called in as semipermanent

members or for consultation. Among these were Major James Mudd

from the Central Command Combat Analysis Office and Lieutenant

Colonel (later colonel) John Carr from the ARCENT Provisional (later

22d) Support Command. As the concept took form, the Commander,

MARCENT, whose headquarters was not located in Riyadh (as were

Headquarters, ARCENT and CENTAF), was kept informed through

briefings to his liaison officer to CENTCOM.

The planning group developed and refined various concepts in

light of the CINC's guidance, briefed the CINC periodically, received

new guidance based on whatever the commander's current concerns

happened to be, then went back to the drawing board for another

iteration. In a real sense, the group served as Schwarzkopfs alter ego

as he clarified his own thinking. Their product was a broad, general

outline that would have to be filled in, in ever greater detail, by the

components and their major commands. The process, best

characterized as a series of "negotiations," was more important than

the written products, for it was the process that ultimately produced

not just direction but the detailed understanding at every level of how

the battle would be fought. The written orders, like interstate treaties,
78

simply provided a reference to the resolution of issues already decided.

There certainly were flaws in the understanding achieved, but these

had to do with style, not substance.

By 25 September, Purvis and his group had developed a set of

operational considerations for review by the CENTCOM J5, Rear

Admiral Grant A. Sharp. 15 First for consideration was the principle

that CENTCOM forces should seek to fight only a minimum number of

the enemy's formations; they would bypass others. The second and

perhaps key assumption was that the air offensive would have to

reduce enemy forces about 50 percent in aggregate if acceptable

friendly-to-enemy force ratios were to be realized prior to beginning

any ground attack. This assumption, which quickly became an article

of faith at all levels of the Desert Shield-Desert Storm command, made

the acceptability of ground offensive operations explicitly dependent

on the success of air operations in the Kuwait theater of operations.

Third, with mechanized trafficability in the theater being what it was,

it was apparent that rapid intelligence acquisition, reporting, and

targeting would be essential to success.

Finally, the whole issue of sustainability became an early and

long-lived concern. 16 Operational reach of mechanized ground forces is

bought by wheeled vehicles. The Army, which had been designed for

defensive war in Europe, was short of wheeled vehicles in general and

heavy equipment transporters (HETs) in particular. It was also short

of line-haul fuel trucks, especially fuel trucks capable of long-distance

off-road movement. HETs provide the ability to concentrate armored

forces operationally without undue wear and tear on tracks and power

trains. Fuel trucks make it possible to keep the armored columns

moving forward in the attack. These shortages of wheeled vehicles had

been aggravated by decisions having to do with achieving minimum

essential forces for the Desert Shield deployment. A great deal would

depend upon the ability of the host nation and allied nations to make

up the deficit in all categories.

In addition to stated U.S. national goals, Central Command

planners assumed as implied objectives the destruction of an Iraqi

offensive capability and a consequent restoration of a regional balance

of military power.17 They assumed that the allied coalition would

support a combined offensive to free Kuwait, that Iraq would use

chemical weapons in its defense, and that alliance forces would not

employ nuclear weapons. It was assumed that any offensive operation

must ensure, in its movements, the continued security of ports and

critical oil facilities. Obviously, any plan should minimize friendly

casualties and collateral damage to civilian populations. The primary
79

risks recognized at the outset were the dependence of any attack on

extended lines of communication over unimproved roads, the

possibility of terrorist attacks in the coalition's rear areas, and the

difficulty of judging with any accuracy residual Iraqi capabilities as

enemy forces came under sustained air attack. The theater planning

mission was simply stated: "On order, friendly forces conduct offensive

operations to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait; be prepared to secure and

defend Kuwait."18

By mid-September, intelligence analysts knew the Iraqis in

Kuwait were laying out a multiechelon, deliberate defense in depth.19

Regular Iraqi infantry and growing numbers of conscript units

occupied fixed positions facing south and east (to sea) in increasingly

better-prepared defensive belts. Mobile tactical and operational

reserves and regular army mechanized forces were positioned to react

to any allied penetration. The Republican Guard Forces Command,

pulled back from Kuwait to southeastern Iraq, constituted a theater

reserve to conduct the decisive counterattack once the coalition forces

were tied down in the forward defenses.

It became clear from their open western flank that the Iraqis

believed their defensive array was secured by the empty, featureless

Iraqi desert beyond the Wadi al Batin. Aside from some token forces

securing the few roads in that area, Saddam continued to pour his

defensive forces into Kuwait, trying to build a defensive "nut" too

tough to crack. The Iraqi leader failed to consider several things that

would negate his assumptions: the cumulative effect on his soldiers of

a coordinated air campaign by the world's leading air power; the

aggregate technological advantages enjoyed by his enemy, not to

mention the skill of the men and women employing them; the specific

navigational capability that inexpensive global positioning systems

(devices for which civilian analogs exist in any Radio Shack store)

might give allied ground forces; the immediate and hostile response of

the Arab world to his initial incursion into Kuwait; and the

determination of President George Herbert Walker Bush to have him

out of that country.

The planning cell briefed their recommended courses of action to

Schwarzkopf and selected members of his primary staff on 6 October.

In response, Schwarzkopf directed the development of a concept of

operations that would place the coalition main ground attack west of

the elbow or panhandle of Kuwait, penetrate the Iraqi defenses,

exploit to seize an objective cutting the north-south line of

communication (the Basrah-Kuwait City highway) sixty kilometers

north of Kuwait City, and, on order, continue the attack to seize the
Map 4.

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(see map 4). It was Schwarzkopfs judgment that, although such an

attack risked failure in light of the unfavorable force ratios, the force

itself would not be at risk of catastrophic loss. 20

This plan and the air offensive plan were taken to Washington on

9 October by Major General Robert B. Johnston, the CENTCOM chief

of staff, Brigadier General Buster C. Glossen, a CENTAF planner,

Lieutenant Colonel Joe Purvis, and Major Richard F. Francona from

the CENTCOM intelligence staff (J2). The plan was presented to the

Joint Staff and then, on the 11th, to the president and his advisers.21

Concerns were expressed that the ground offensive plan attacked into

the enemy strength and that barrier-breaching operations would be

extremely difficult. Schwarzkopfs view was that, while this might be

true, the command lacked sufficient forces and logistics support,

particularly cross-country tankers, to attack farther west, avoiding

enemy strength entirely.

Schwarzkopf told David Frost in March 1991 that he had told the

president the Saturday after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that, if the

national policy were to escalate to require a ground offensive to

remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, he (Schwarzkopf) would require a

force larger than that allocated for Desert Shield.22 At an October

briefing, he had General Johnston state that the plan for the one-corps

offensive was submitted under some duress; indeed, the briefing itself

was followed by the disclaimer: 'That is not what the Commander in

Chief of Central Command is recommending. It is a weak plan and it is

not the plan that we are recommending. ... if we are serious about

ejecting them [Iraq] from Kuwait what we need is more forces to be

able to execute a proper campaign."23

Colonel Purvis, who was present in Washington during the

October discussions, made some important observations about these

exchanges. He believed the real value of the meetings was that they

established a dialogue between the nation's civilian political leaders,

the Joint Staff, and the theater commander. Whatever disagreement

existed was, in his view, by no means arbitrary. The president's

civilian advisers apparently believed Schwarzkopf had not considered

adequately an "Inchon-like" envelopment. Central Command did not

agree, and the dialogue continued.24

Following the Washington briefing, Schwarzkopf, who had

remained in Riyadh, directed that the planning group examine some

new questions. What could he do with a new corps? What should it look

like? When would it be available? Still, the group's focus remained on
82

the one-corps option. The J2 was asked to identify Iraqi logistical

vulnerabilities that the allied forces might exploit. The real chore,

however, was to try and project a future threat, since Saddam had

already begun what was to be a long-term process of reinforcement of

the occupation forces in Kuwait, an action that proved to be his

undoing.25

On 17 October, the United Kingdom's theater commander and

General Yeosock were brought into the planning process in two

separate briefings. Sir Peter de la Billiere, the British commander in

chief, had arrived in Saudi Arabia on 6 October. Like Yeosock, Sir

Peter had a long association with desert operations, in his case with

the British Special Air Services, the famous SAS. At this time, the

British land commitment was a single armored brigade, the 7th. This

was increased to a balanced two-brigade division shortly after the

United States announced its commitment of a second heavy corps in

November.

During the briefings they received, Yeosock and de la Billiere

raised a number of issues. Among these were questions of allied

capabilities and the willingness to participate in an offensive, the need

to keep forces concentrated in the face of unfavorable force ratios, the

trafficability of terrain north of the Saudi border, the desirability of a

deception plan, the difficulty of staging adequate logistic support in a

timely fashion given the distances involved and the lack of good supply

routes, and the need to keep the east covered adequately while forces

were concentrated for an attack in the west.26

Yeosock also received a briefing from the Third Army's Support

Command concerning sustainment issues associated with a one-corps

offensive plan. The plan at issue provided for the movement of the

XVIII Airborne Corps' heavy forces (3 ACR, 24th Infantry Division,

1st Cavalry) to the Saudi border area with western Kuwait, east of

Hafar al Batin. Support Command's planners calculated that it would

take nine to thirteen days to complete the movement at night. The

principal constraint was the number of trucks available. The briefing

noted that by 25 November there would be no more than 112 U.S.

military HETs in theater (on 10 October there were none) and that it

would take up to nineteen days, using all military and known hostnation capabilities, to move the one-corps force to attack east of Wadi

al Batin.27 Prestockage of forward logistic bases would take from three

to sixteen days depending on when the execution date came and

whether or not both day and night movement could be used.28 It was

quite evident that, for any offensive concentration inland, the force

would have to use a combination of commercial, host-nation, and
83

military HETs. Consequently, the acquisition and allocation of HETs

would be the Third Army commander's biggest concern in December

and January.

On the 18th, Admiral Sharp was briefed on three courses of action

for a two (U.S.) corps attack. The favored alternative called for two

corps to attack abreast west of the Kuwaiti border, with a follow-on

mission to destroy the Republican Guard Forces Command. Later that

same day, the group briefed Brigadier General James Monroe, the

Third Army G4. Monroe was perceived to be very receptive and

helpful, which was important, as he would play a key role in the

sustainment of any operation. At this time, logistic prepositioning and

unit repositioning to forward assembly areas were the major

conundrums involved in any two-corps plan.

Schwarzkopf was briefed on 21 October. He approved the idea of a

ground offensive plan with a main effort consisting of two U.S. Army

corps attacking west of the Kuwaiti border to get behind the principal

Iraqi forces. He personally set the operational objective of the attack as

the physical destruction of the Republican Guard, which he recognized

as a strategic center of gravity in the KTO.29 Pointing to a map, he

said,

With these two corps there [pointing at the US corps]...

rve got forces here [pointing into Kuwait].

I sit on Highway 8.

rve defeated him in his mind.

rve threatened his Republican Guard;

Now, I'll destroy it.30

Schwarzkopf identified as issues outstanding the question of

trafficability and supportability (Yeosock estimated that the concept

was supportable), the proper role for coalition forces given their varied

capabilities and the absolute political as well as military necessity for

their active participation, and the need to find a proper role for

MARCENT in light of the corps' short logistic legs, sea-based close air

support, and proximity to forces afloat. 31

The following two days, the Central Command staff in Riyadh

briefed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on both the one- and

two-corps options, with emphasis on the possibilities of the former.

Powell apparently believed that a one-corps offensive could succeed. It

took two and one-half hours on Friday, 22 October, and two more on

Saturday, to convince him that a one-corps attack was a gamble, not

just a risk. The chairman's guidance to Schwarzkopf was

straightforward and entirely supportive: "Tell me what you need for
84

assets. We will not do this halfway. The United States military is

available to support this operation." 32

The conclusion was that a second U.S. Army corps (at that time,

two divisions and an armored cavalry regiment; later, a third division

was added at the request of the Third Army commander) would

provide the necessary forces to permit maneuver to the west, around

the Iraqi main deployments. Air Force resources would increase

proportionally, as would deployed naval forces. Obviously, Third Army

would have to build a substantial theater and host-nation logistic

support structure simultaneously with arrival of the new corps if there

were to be sufficient means to project the offensive force the distances

required to bring it into contact with the Republican Guard troops and

to sustain it in battle once joined. Most of the theater logistic forces

would have to be drawn from the Reserve Components.

Through the vicissitudes of international politics, Southwest

Asia, heretofore a secondary theater where the rule had always been

one of economy of force, was now within days of becoming the main

effort for the United States' armed forces. The chairman took the twocorps graphics back to Washington with him. 33

On 24 October, the planning cell was placed under operational

control of the Third Army commander to develop further the concepts

for ground operations. The group continued to be located at Central

Command to maintain its security. Yeosock and Arnold would work to

flesh out the theater ground offensive plan and, at the same time,

begin preparing for the main ground effort within that plan.

For the time being, however, focus remained on one-corps options,

the principal case at this time, with a U.S. Army corps west of the

Kuwait border (considered to be possible, if risky, with the thencurrent threat), the MARCENT and United Kingdom (U.K.) brigade

just inside the border protecting the XVIII Corps' eastern flank, and

the Egyptian and Syrian corps farther to the east by the "elbow" of

Kuwait. Amphibious operations were planned only as demonstrations

and feints. No Inchons seemed likely. 34

Colonel Purvis observed that, the one-corps focus

notwithstanding, his group believed the two-corps option would be

selected because of the chairman's reaction. Schwarzkopf, however,

was not yet ready to allow them to brief the two-corps option to the

components. ARCENT and the Department of the Army were still

discussing rotation policies for forces already in theater. But

confirmation of the Purvis Group's hunch was not hard to find. On 25

October, immediately following the chairman's return to the United
85

States, the secretary of defense appeared on the morning news

programs of all four major TV networks and announced a pending

increase of U.S. ground forces. He hinted broadly that the number

could reach 100,000 and involve units from Europe. 35

As planners anticipated approval of the two-corps option, a

question was raised on 27 October about U.S. attacks on airfields and

surrounding SCUD sites located in western Iraq within missile range

of Israel. Concern about Iraq's ability to disrupt the U.S.-Arab

coalition by prompting an Israeli intervention had begun to grow in

Washington. In response, ARCENT set up another special planning

group staffed with representatives of the ARCENT and XVIII

Airborne Corps. Its members were Lieutenant Colonel Bob Butto, from

the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade; Lieutenant Colonels Bob

Westholm and Matt Kriwanek, from the commanding general's

personal staff; Major Bob Dement, ARCENT's G4 plans; and

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Huntoon and Major Teri Peck from XVIII

Airborne Corps' G3. Major Matt Smith, the 1st Cavalry Division

liaison officer to ARCENT, rounded out the group and looked out for

the interests of III Corps' headquarters should it be deployed. 36

The ARCENT and corps planners evaluated options for attacking

these targets, particularly the airfields, called H2 and H3, but saw

such efforts by conventional ground forces as both a significant

logistical risk and an unproductive diversion of forces from the main

effort.37 Further inquiries elicited the same response. Ultimately,

special operations forces from the United States and Special Air

Service forces from the United Kingdom were committed to the SCUD

hunt in western Iraq (see map 5). SCUD hunting also caused a

significant diversion of air support during the conduct of air operations

after 16 January.

On 6 November, two days prior to the president's announcement

of further deployments, Secretary of State James Baker and King

Fahd agreed to an allied command plan that essentially blessed the

existing structure of dual command, with Saudi preeminence in

decisions involving defense of the kingdom itself and American

freedom of action for U.S. forces for contingencies beyond the Saudi

borders, with the caveat that offensive action would require advance

agreement by both heads of state. Baker was quoted as saying that" 'a

new phase' had begun in the Persian Gulf crisis in which the global

community is prepared to 'resort to force' if a peaceful solution is not

found." 38 By the end of the month, there would be agreement in the

United Nations Security Council to just that. The agreement on
86

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coalition command, it was reported, did not bind other nations, who

would be brought in by separate bilateral agreements.

For a time, the focus of the planning process remained in the

Ministry of Defense basement. Lieutenant Colonels Westholm and

Kriwanek acted as Third Army points of contact as required, as did

Lieutenant Colonel Huntoon and Major Peck at XVIII Airborne Corps.

The ad hoc solution at Third Army was called for, not only because of

security considerations, but because, as previously noted, the regular

Third Army planners had been used to set up the C3IC organization in

August. They simply were not readily available, and presumably there

would have been concern about possible compromise of the plan to the

Saudis before the proper diplomatic preparation had been

accomplished.

Planning continued on the one- and two-corps options and the H2-

H3 airfield excursion. Schwarzkopf was briefed on H2-H3. He objected

to the operation as being too risky because of the distance the airfield

attack force would be from any sustaining base and the main effort.

His guidance was to focus planning on the two-corps concept. On 31

October, forces available for planning included five U.S. heavy

divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, the airborne and air assault

divisions, six field artillery brigades, two aviation brigades, the

French light armored division(-), a British armored division(-), four

Saudi heavy brigades, a Kuwaiti heavy brigade, two Egyptian heavy

divisions, a Syrian heavy division(-), two U.S. Marine divisions, and

two Marine expeditionary brigades. Objectives as far west as

Samawah on the Euphrates were considered for a secondary attack.

Although Baghdad was mentioned, the conclusion was that it was too

far away to hold even if it could be captured and, more to the point,

that its capture would exceed the UN charter for coalition forces,

which limited their objective to the liberation of Kuwait.3 9

On 1 November, a number of sustainment issues were raised by a

representative from 22d Support Command, Colonel John B. Trier.

Trier followed the earlier work done by Colonel Carr and became the

point of linkage with the support command for development of the

sustainment concept for Desert Storm. Concerns identified in

November generally involved the burden of introducing a new corps

package. Given the existing strains already accepted in the theater

logistics structure and recognizing that the overriding need for haste

that had governed the August deployment no longer obtained, the new

corps' logistic elements would have to precede tactical units to provide

necessary life support and transport. Because the ports lacked the

infrastructure to support linkup and marshaling, incoming forces
88

would have to pass through the ports rapidly and transition to the

assembly areas to "stand up."40

A recommendation was made that the area around King Khalid

Military City (KKMC), southwest of Hafar al Batin, serve as the

logistics center for the concentration of the incoming corps. In

December and January, VII Corps would concentrate in the desert,

east and south of KKMC and west of XVIII Airborne Corps. This would

require that the new corps pass through the area defended by XVIII

Airborne Corps. Subsequently, this would also require XVIII Airborne

Corps to pass in front of VII Corps for deployment for the attack.

Though this sounds inconvenient, it allowed XVIII Airborne Corps to

continue to perform its Desert Shield defensive mission while VII

Corps deployed and formed in the desert. It became a major part of the

deception operation for Operation Desert Storm. Third Army

established KKMC as a major forward operating and logistics base,

the pivot for the redeployment to attack positions west of Wadi al

Batin that began on 17 January.

The planners were beginning to deal with the fact that the

existing and anticipated operational areas between KKMC and the

port of Ad Dammam were limited to a road net consisting of an

irregular polygon of roads, mostly two lanes wide, often unimproved

and full of Saudi civil traffic in ubiquitous white Toyota pickups. If one

went on out to Rafha (as ARCENT would), that added another 168

miles of adequate-to-bad two-lane road. This created an extraordinary

transportation problem, compounding the general shortage of HETs

and line-haul trucks. The distances involved far exceeded those of the

famous Red Ball Express of World War II.

On 2 November, the planners briefed Yeosock on their two-corps

concept: an attack west of Wadi al Batin by a notional heavy corps that

would drive north to the Euphrates, turn the Iraqi defenses, and

destroy the Republican Guard in the area of Iraq just north and west of

the Kuwaiti border. 41 At that time, it was envisioned that the Marines

would attack and penetrate defenses just inside the Kuwaiti border.

Two Royal Saudi Land Force brigades would attack on the Marines'

left, up the Wadi some limited distance. The XVIII Corps would follow

the Marines in sector, pass through and conduct a supporting attack

eastward across northern Kuwait. The bulk of the Arab Islamic forces

would attack and penetrate into Kuwait from the south. A variant

showed XVIII Corps attacking toward An Nasiriyah to the northwest,

while the notional heavy corps advanced on an axis of advance

approximating the Kuwaiti border, northeast then east.
89

On 6 November, Schwarzkopf was briefed along with his principal

staff and, finally, his component commanders. Schwarzkopf

emphasized the need for a deception plan to avoid giving away the

scheme of maneuver. The deception was intended to portray the threat

of attack only through the Kuwaiti southern border area, with no

intent to enter via Iraqi territory. No U.S. force or logistic

prepositioning was to be allowed west of Wadi al Batin prior to the

start of the air offensive. That, it was hoped, would blind the Iraqi

defenders. American units, which would make the main attack, were

to be kept behind Arab-Islamic forces and off the border until just before the attack itself.42

The deception plan had several implications. It meant that the

massive logistic preparations for an offensive would have to take place

simultaneously with the operational repositioning of maneuver forces,

both using a very limited road net and a limited number of wheeled

vehicles. It meant, as well, that intelligence collection and,

consequently, air preparation of the battlefield would have to be from

the top down, from theater and army level to corps and division,

because of the resulting blindness of attacking tactical units. Tactical

commanders and some ARCENT staff members found these

considerations to be increasingly discomforting. The deception plan

also meant that air preparations of the KTO would have to be

conducted in such a way that those targets most important to Army

commanders in the main attack would be attacked last, a consequence

that tried the patience of all.

Schwarzkopf found the concept as briefed too detailed and

indicated component commanders should be given greater flexibility

in development of their own concepts. In fact, he also seems to have

warned the component commanders to allow their subordinates to do

their business without overcentralization at component level.43

Schwarzkopf directed the Marines to be employed in the east, both

for reasons of logistic sustainment and in order to maintain the cover

story of an attack through Kuwait. (As late as 20 February, Iraq

continued to push forces into the "heel" of Kuwait, no doubt in part due

to the highly visible Marine Corps presence ashore and afloat.)

Schwarzkopf also set out his priorities for the air attack in support of

ground operations, the disruption of command and control facilities

and the logistics supporting the KTO, and the attrition of the

Republican Guard. The operational goal remained the cutting off and

destruction of the Republican Guard.44 Finally, the theater

commander identified three major issues for resolution: the shape of

the new U.S. Army forces and the time needed to get them in position
90

ready for use, the logistical supportability of the concept, and the

matter of trafficability. Regarding the last issue, XVIII Corps was to

do a good deal of desert driving on terrain similar to that in

southeastern Iraq in order to develop some empirical data.

On 8 November, President Bush announced the deployment of the

European-based VII Corps to Central Command in order to establish

an offensive option for the resolution of the Kuwait crisis. 45 Talk of

troop rotation plans were set aside and preparation for a possible

offensive were taken in hand. Component plans continued to be fleshed

out and back-briefed to Schwarzkopf until he was comfortable with

them. The secretary of defense and chairman would make two trips to

the theater, in December and in February, before they would be

convinced that the details were sufficiently in hand for them to

recommend to the president a date for the ground attack. Meanwhile,

there was now a theater concept within which the components could

begin their own considerable hard work.

On 14 November, Schwarzkopf held what was probably his most

important briefing of the war from the standpoint of transmitting the

commander's intent: he briefed his ground commanders, division level

and above, in Dhahran. The commanders from deploying units were

brought to Saudi Arabia from their U.S. and European bases for the

meeting. Schwarzkopf laid down the primary objective: "to destroy the

Republican Guard." 46 He also enjoined absolute security concerning

the scheme of maneuver and indicated he expected the Iraqis to

employ chemical weapons, though he seems to have drawn no

particular operational conclusion from that fact. The one discordant

note Schwarzkopf would later record was an observation by

Lieutenant General Fred Franks, the commander of the VII Corps,

Schwarzkopfs major maneuver force, that he would need additional

forces, specifically the 1st Cavalry Division, to carry out his

assignment. 47 In retrospect, this seems to have been the first of a

series of events that would lead to various postwar recriminations. At

the time, it did not seem a major issue.

Major General Tom Rhame, the commander of the 1st Infantry

Division (Mechanized) from Fort Riley, Kansas, emphasized the

importance of this briefing in an interview later televised by one of the

cable TV networks. 48 Rhame pointed particularly to the CINC's clear

articulation of the task at hand, "to destroy the Republican Guard," as

a mission that even privates could understand and upon which they

could concentrate their efforts. This briefing and subsequent

conferences and briefings ensured an extraordinary degree of unity of

effort in the U.S. offensive. The selection and clear articulation of the
91

command's military objective may well have been Schwarzkopfs

greatest contribution as theater commander, for it produced a

harmony of action rare in complex operations. The harmony was, in

part, enforced, as in the period following the briefing, the CINC would

make it quite clear, sometimes with implicit threats, that tactical

(corps and division) commanders would do well not to spend time

second guessing his offensive concept,4 9 a message that would prove to

be counterproductive in the long run. Nonetheless, from the 14

November briefing onward, planning for the offensive proceeded at all

levels with continuous discussion and negotiation.

Third Army and coalition planning continued for a while to be

concentrated in the Purvis Group, working under Yeosock's guidance.

After the commander's conference, there was additional guidance from

Schwarzkopf that had to be accommodated. 50 The CINC demanded a

heavy division as theater reserve. For obvious reasons, the division

would have to come from ARCENT. The 1st Cavalry Division, less the

"Tiger Brigade" (1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division), would ultimately

fill this role. The XVIII Corps would be committed in the west in the

area from As Salman to As Samawah. The U.K. forces, which were to

be increased to a division, were to remain with the U.S. Marines.

(Ultimately the British forces were reassigned to ARCENT in

exchange for the "Tiger Brigade.")

The time from 15 to 23 November was a period of adjustment and

revision. Schwarzkopf wanted a placement of coalition forces that

would best utilize the different capabilities represented and that would

take into account regional animosities and suspicions. Concern

remained about the off-road trafficability of the area in which XVIII

Corps would operate and about casualties at the breach site. These

concerns would remain active to the point of execution.

On 23 November, Schwarzkopf was briefed again. He gave

qualified approval to Third Army's draft plan, which was issued to the

Army major subordinate commanders the following day.51 The plan

called for a four-stage operation: logistical build-up, prepositioning,

ground offensive, and consolidation. It set a stockage level for forward

bases of five days of supply in class III (fuel) and class V (ammunition),

plus the necessary stocks to support the forces in their tactical

assembly areas. The entire ground operation was expected to take up

to eight weeks.

The plan called for VII Corps to be in a defensive position west of

XVIII Corps no later than twenty-five days prior to the ground attack.

Northern Area Command would pull its forces east of Wadi al Batin,
92

and the French 6th Light Armored Division, which drew its support

from the Red Sea, would screen the area west of the wadi.

Redeployment of the two corps to their preattack tactical assembly

areas was expected to take two weeks. The XVIII Corps was to be on

the left, VII Corps on the right, both west of Hafar al Batin.

Repositioning was to take place in conjunction with the initiation of

air operations. The destruction of the Iraqi Air Force, together with

any ground sensors likely to detect allied movement in time for the

Iraqis to react, was essential if the ground attack was to achieve

surprise and the ability to concentrate.

The ground attack itself was expected to take up to two weeks.

The plan assumed that coalition fixing attacks would go in at daylight

on D-day (later G-day to differentiate ground from theater [air]

attack), with the main attack following twelve hours later (H + 12), to

"maneuver deep West of Kuwait to destroy the RGFC and cut off LOCs

to Iraqi forces in the KTO."52 For reasons that will be addressed later,

this delay ultimately grew to twenty-four hours. The initial offensive

was to be followed by a consolidation phase anticipated to last up to

four more weeks during which Iraqi forces remaining in Kuwait would

be defeated.

The four major coalition commands from east to west would be,

starting on the right, the Eastern Area Command (Joint Forces

Command East), which was to attack north along the Kuwaiti coast to

deceive the enemy and fix his reserves, and MARCENT. MARCENT,

then including the U.K. armored division, was to attack near the

elbow of Kuwait to penetrate forward Iraqi defenses, fix tactical

reserves south of the As Salem airfield, occupy a blocking position,

link up with the Northern Area Command on the left, then, in

conjunction with the Northern Area Command, isolate Kuwait City

and conduct consolidation operations. In the center, the Northern Area

Command (later Joint Forces Command North) containing the

Egyptian and Syrian combat units, as well as Royal Saudi Land Forces

and a SANG brigade, was to penetrate the enemy defenses, drive to the

north of the As Salem airfield, join with Third Army, and occupy a

blocking position north of Kuwait City on the north-south Kuwait

City-Basrah highway. The two Arab-Islamic commands would liberate

Kuwait City.

The VII Corps was to conduct the Third Army's main attack. It

was to penetrate the enemy's forward defenses and attack in zone to

defeat the Republican Guard. On the left of the ARCENT sector, the

XVIII Corps would conduct a supporting attack to block the Highway 8

valley. The corps would be prepared to continue the attack to the east
93

down the valley in order to assist VII Corps in destruction of the

Republican Guard. Both corps would prepare plans for consolidation

and occupation of sectors in western and northern Kuwait.

Schwarzkopf approved this outline for planning. He charged

Yeosock to guarantee supportability of the concept or to modify it.53

On 24 November, the Third Army commander briefed his subordinate

commanders. On the 28th, there was a logistics conference at Dhahran

to work out a concept of support. The next day, the regular ARCENT

planning staff was brought into the process, and planning at Third

Army gradually flowed back into normal component channels. The

special planning group reverted to CENTCOM control on 18

December. The C3IC passed to Central Command at about the same

time. This released the ARCENT planners back to the Third Army's

G3. Major General Schwartz, who would have become Yeosock's

principal deputy had he returned to Third Army, was retained as chief

of the C3IC, working directly for Schwarzkopf.

On 30 November and 7 December, the XVIII Corps and the VII

Corps, respectively, gave their initial briefings to the Third Army

commander, at times offering significant modifications to the

conceptual plan. For example, VII Corps proposed, among other

alternatives, either moving the XVIII Corps to VII Corps' eastern

flank (very much like the old two-corps option) in order to extend the

maneuver area for Schwarzkopfs "Great Wheel," or having XVIII

Corps penetrate and VII Corps pass through into the attack. The effect

in either case would have been to force the lighter XVIII Corps troops

into the breaching operations required ultimately of the 1st Infantry

Division, a move neither Yeosock nor Schwarzkopf was likely to

contemplate. The corps' passage of lines would have been prohibitively

time consuming. In any event, General Rhame had volunteered his 1st

Infantry Division to do the breaching operation because of the training

it had completed prior to alert for Desert Shield. VII Corps thus

remained the inner (U.S.) corps. 54

Another point of contention concerned the proper employment of

the French 6th Light Armored Division (ultimately placed under

Tactical Control of the XVIII Corps on the far left flank) and the 1st

U.K. Armored Division. Two different issues were involved. In the case

of the French, the issue was political. In its simplest terms, French

Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevenement opposed subordination

of the French to the U.S. commander. (The defense minister very likely

opposed U.S. policy altogether.) This situation changed when

Chevenement resigned in December and was replaced by Pierre Joxe.

The British commander, General de la Billiere, was for his part
94

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concerned about casualties if the British remained with the Marines in

the fixing attack and wanted his force employed in the sort of open

maneuver warfare for which it was trained. Schwarzkopf, with some

misgivings, acceded to de la Billiere's request and replaced the British

two-brigade division with the "Tiger Brigade." By the time Secretary

of Defense Cheney was briefed on 20 December, ARCENT had already

planned for the employment of the French division with the XVIII

Corps on the extreme left and the British with the VII Corps.55 (See

map 6.)

As boundaries changed east or west, it became increasingly

evident that there was going to be a significant transportation problem

to be solved, one that involved both the general shortage of some types

of critical vehicles and the rate at which transportation units could be

brought into theater. The influx of transportation units had not only to

respond to the needs of the new corps, but it also had to remedy cuts

accepted when the force structure guidance had been based upon the

concept of"minimum essential forces." 56

The concept paper or draft plan passed by the CENTCOM

planning group to the ARCENT G3 planners (and briefed to the

commander in chief on 23 November) was neither a normal joint

headquarters directive nor a coordinated operations plan, though it

was formatted generally as the operations portion of the latter. The

details of the actual actions of the two corps on the ground remained to

be worked out, although the general parameters had been established

and would be retained: the VII Corps would attack on the ARCENT

right, west of Wadi al Batin, driving north and east and destroying the

Republican Guard Forces Command; the XVIII Corps would conduct a

secondary effort designed to distract the Iraqi high command with a

putative or apparent threat to Baghdad. Meanwhile, the light corps

would attack to As Samawah and, more important, cut the major axis

of withdrawal along Highway 8 south of the Euphrates River.

Ultimately, the corps could advance southeast along the river to secure

the northern fringe of the pocket of southeastern Iraq, which the allied

high command wished to hold at the end of the operations, and,

simultaneously, assist VII Corps in the destruction of the Republican

Guard.57

A Third Army planner, Major Steve Holley, was detailed from the

plans section in the C3IC organization and, with Lieutenant Colonel

George H. Del Carlo, another Third Army G3 staff member,

established an office in a small room on the fifth floor of the Royal

Saudi Land Forces headquarters (the location of ARCENT's

headquarters in December) to prepare the draft Third Army
96

operations plan for Desert Storm in conjunction with the Purvis Group

in the Ministry of Defense. In mid-December, these two officers were

joined by Major Dan Gilbert, a SAMS graduate assigned, like most

new staff members, from a unit not identified for deployment to Desert

Shield. Gilbert developed the ARCENT MAPEX that provided the

formal venue for the major commands and commanders to discuss

their concepts and begin hammering out the comprehensive plan for

the Desert Storm main attack.

·e1 p re Ir - -r I - - I -- I I
97

Notes

1. Richard Saltus, "Air Force Says It Might Have Won the War in 2 More Weeks," The

Boston Globe, 5 April 1991, 10.

2. De la Billiere, Storm Command, 53.

3. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Decisive Wars of History (London: G. Bell & Son, Ltd., 1929),

141-58. Reprinted in a number of editions under the title Strategy. Colonel Boyd

owes his fame to a briefing given widely but never to the author's knowledge

disciplined by being produced in print. The key insight of Colonel Boyd's

presentation has to do with "getting inside the enemy's decision cycle." For a

summary of Liddell Hart's theories, see Brian Bond, Liddell Hart and the Weight of

History (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1977); and Brian Bond, British Military Policy

Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980). See also John

Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1988). For a discussion of Boyd, see William S. Lind, Maneuver

Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 4-8.

4. Jomini maintains that "Employment of the forces should be regulated by two

fundamental principles: The first being to obtain by free and rapid movements the

advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy; the

second, to strike in the most decisive direction." Baron de Jomini, The Art of War,

trans. Captain G. H. Mendeil and Lieutenant W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: J.

B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; Greenwood Press Reprint, n.d.), 299. Fuller says: "Grant's

object was consistent; strategically it was to threaten his enemy's base of operations,

and tactically to strike at the rear, or, failing the rear, at a flank of his enemy's

army. This being so, the pivotal idea in his generalship was absolutely sound, and

firmly based on economy of force." Major General J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of

Ulysses S. Grant (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1977), 194. For Fuller's thought,

see Anthony John Trythall, "Boney" Fuller: The Intellectual General (London:

Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1977); and Brian Holden Reid, J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker

(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

5. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (May 1986), 14.

6. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 386-87. Note refers to draft strategic guidance

Schwarzkopf submitted to JCS as evidence of how he analyzed his strategic mission.

7. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, USCINCCENT OPLAN Desert

Storm, dated 16 December 1990, 13.

8. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 313, 318-21. The most comprehensive account of

the air campaign planning available for the public at this time is in Department of

Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final

Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personal Benefits Act of 1991" (Public Law 102-25), chapter 6,

83-92. An account for the general reader is presented by James P. Coyne, "Plan of

Attack," Air Force Magazine 75, no. 4 (April 1992): 40-46. HQ, U.S. Central

Command, Commander, Memorandum, Subject: Operations Desert Shield/Desert

Storm, Exercise Internal Look 90 After-Action Report, dated 11 July 1991, 9.
98

9. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 314-15, 320-21,326-27.

10. The primary document for the activities of the Purvis Group (planning) is a log kept

by Major Eckert for the group. Unless otherwise noted, this is the source for the

narrative of the planning cell actions that follows, hereinafter referred to as Purvis

Group Diary.

11. Note from Colonel Purvis to author on manuscript draft.

12. Purvis Group Diary, 1.

13. These were the Desert Shield forces.

14. Comment by Colonel Purvis to author. See also interview with Major General

Steven Arnold, Eskan Village, 15 March 1991, 15-16.

15. Purvis Group Diary, 1.

16. Note from Colonel Purvis to author on manuscript draft.

17. Briefing received from Colonel Purvis, Purpose: Provide a Briefing on the

Development and Execution of Operation Desert Storm, slide titled, "NCA

Objectives."

18. Ibid., slide titled, "Mission."

19. The Threat Summary on the ARCENT Update Briefing for 15 September, under

"Major Trends," reads: Iraqi Forces continue to improve their defense in depth.

Divisions in forward positions [sic] are deployed with infantry forward. Mech and

armored units are deployed to permit rapid reinforcement and counterattack. Iraqi

forces retain the capability to conduct offensive operations. HQ, ARCENT,

Command Group, ARCENT Update Briefing, dated 15 September 1990, slide titled,

"Threat Summary."

20. This appears to incorporate the concept Schwarzkopf sketched out for Chairman

Powell in Washington in August. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 315, 356.

Schwarzkopfs judgments are taken from the Purvis Group Diary, 1-2.

21. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 359-60.

22. Transcript of Frost interview dated 22 March 1991, in possession of author, 6.

Schwarzkopf reiterates the same point in his memoir. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 301.

23. Transcript of Frost interview dated 22 March 1991, 8. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 359-60, reproduces CINC's assessment.

24. Notes from Colonel Purvis to author on manuscript draft. Purvis subsequently

concluded that had the October briefing contained an indication that a second corps

would be used in an envelopment west of Wadi al Batin, it might have assuaged some concerns in Washington, D.C., that Schwarzkopf was committed to a frontal

attack.

25. Purvis Group Diary, 3. On 9 October 1990, ARCENTs Update Briefing reflected an Iraqi presence in the KTO of twenty-five divisions (thirty-six heavy, 3,700 tanks,
99

and forty-three light brigades). On 15 January 1991, the Update Briefing showed

forty-five divisions (forty-five heavy, 4,280 tanks, and eighty-three light brigades).

26. Ibid., 3-4..

27. HQ, ARCENT Support Command (Prov), briefing titled, "CSS Sustainment"; slides

titled, "Move the Force HETS (As of 10 October)" and "Move the Force, Number of

Days." Briefing dated 17 October on General Yeosock's briefings-slide index.

Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 118-25. General Pagonis writes that his planning

effort reflected anticipation of future possibilities rather than an effort growing out

of Schwarzkopf's planning cell.

28. Ibid., slide titled, "Prestockage Time Requirement."

29. Purvis Group Diary, 4.

30. Quoted by Major Dan Roh in interview of Purvis Group conducted by the author and

Major Larry Heystek, commander, 44th Military History Detachment, at Riyadh on

7 March 1991, 33.

31. Note from Colonel Purvis to author on manuscript draft.

32. Quoted in Purvis Group Diary, 5. Notes from Colonel Purvis to author on

manuscript draft. Schwarzkopf's account is in Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero,

366-67.

33. Note from Colonel Purvis to author on manuscript draft.

34. Purvis Group Diary, 5. Note from Colonel Purvis to author on draft.

35. R. Jeffrey Smith and Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Considers Sending More Forces to Gulf:

Goal Is to Maintain 'Credible' Offensive Power, "The Washington Post, 25 October

1990, Al. Patrick E. Tyler and Molly Moore, "U.S. Strength in Gulf May Rise by

100,000: Many Troops Would Be Shifted From Europe, "The Washington Post, 26

October 1990, Al, A32. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Decides to Add as Many as 100,000

to Its Gulf Forces; Cheney Statement; No Date for Deployment-Some Troops May

Come From Europe," The New York Times, 26 October 1991, Al.

36. Lieutenant Colonel Matt Kriwanek provided membership of group to author and a

note from Colonel Purvis to the author on the manuscript draft addressed concern

that m Corps might rotate in and have to execute the plan. ARCENT had explored

the possibility of m Corps replacing the XVIH Corps as early as August.

37. Purvis Group Diary, 6; and HQ, ARCENT (CENTCOM Planning Group), briefing

titled, "ARCENT Contingency Operations (H2-H3 Brief)," dated 30 October on

General Yeosock's briefings-slide index. Schwarzkopf is scathing about the "western

excursion," which he sees as unwarranted interference in professional matters by

civilian political leaders. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take A Hero, 368-69. See also de la

Billiere, The Storm Command, 103.

38. David Hoffman, "Baker, Fahd Set Command Plan: Accord Helps Prepare for

Possible Attack, "The Washington Post, 6 November 1990, Al, and A16.

39. Purvis Group Diary, 6.
100

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 7. General Yeosock's briefing files hold a briefing dated 5 November, titled, "2

Corps Option Packet by ARCENT Staff to CG." Either date is possible given CG's

schedule but 2d looks more likely since CG went to visit 24th ID during day of 5th.

Slides dated 5th may have been prepared after briefing to CG for presentation to the

CINC.

42. Purvis Group Diary, 7. A complete history of the deception plan was prepared by

Major Louis J. Ovnic, the ARCENT G3 planner who took responsibility for

ARCENT deception planning. HQ, ARCENT, G3 AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: Command Report Operation Desert Storm-Deception Operations,

dated 14 March 1991.

43. Purvis Group Diary, 7. Handwritten notes by General Yeosock of CINC's briefing,

copy in possession of author.

44. Purvis Group Diary, 7-8. Copy of handwritten notes taken by General Yeosock.

45. George Bush, "The Need for an Offensive Military Option," in The Gulf War Reader:

History, Documents, Opinions, Michael L. Sifty and Christopher Cerf, eds. (New

York: Times Books, 1991), 228-29. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Briefing, Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, DOD News

Briefing, Thursday, November 8, 1990-4:45 P.M. Ann Devroy, "Bush Orders

200,000 More Troops to Gulf," The Washington Post, 9 November 1990, Al, A32.

Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Sends New Units to Gulf to Provide Offensive Option;

U.S. Force Could Reach 380,000; Tank Buildup a Key; President Suggests New

Troops May Persuade Iraq to Back Down, " The New York Times, 9 November 1990,

Al and A12.

46. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 380-84, describes 14 November briefing from

CINC's perspective.

47. Ibid., 383.

48. Journals of War, a VHS tape produced by Kurtis Productions, Ltd., in Association

with Arts & Entertainment Network (1991). Tape in possession of author.

49. Both General Peay and General Luck had occasion to be reprimanded by the CINC

for presuming to make suggestions concerning operational planning. General Peay

told the author of his experience himself. General Luck's experience was related by one of his senior staff officers. In all likelihood, Schwarzkopf was touchy about

people getting into his planning business because of all the help he was receiving

from Washington.

50. Purvis Group Diary, 9-10.

51. Ibid., 10. Document titled, "COMUSARCENT Desert Shield Operations Plan 003,

Operation to Conduct Offensive Operations Against Iraqi Forces," dated 1200 23

November 1990, enclosure 13 to HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans) AFRD-DTP,

Memorandum thru Colonel Holloway, Chief, G3 Plans, for Colonel Swain,

USARCENT Historian, Subject: Command Report on Operations Desert Shield and
101

Desert Storm, dated 20 March 1991. Following description of late November concept

is taken from this document.

52. Ibid., 11.

53. Purvis Group Diary, 10.

54. Ibid., 11-13. For VII Corps alternative, see briefing, HQ, VII Corps, titled,

"Planning Update," dated 5 December 1990, presented to General Yeosock. On

General Rhame volunteering for mission of breach, see interview with Major

General Thomas Rhame, Fort Riley, Kansas, 26 July 1991, 57-58; and interview

with Colonel Stan Cherrie, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 29 August 1991, 3.

55. Purvis Group Diary, 12-13. The CENTCOM Desert Storm OPLAN, dated 16

December, allocated the two allied units for planning. For French, see awardwinning staff of U.S. News and World Reports, Triumph Without Victory: The

Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War, 314; de la Billiere, Storm Command,

50-51, 159-60; Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 390. For British, see de la

Billiere, Storm Command, 48, 92-95, 132-39, 150-52; and Schwarzkopf, Doesn't

Take a Hero, 385-86.

56. Ibid. See also HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans), AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for

USARCENT Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans,

Historical Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of

Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated 6 April 1991, 20-24.

57. HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans) AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian,

Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 plans, Historical Narrative of Desert

Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated

6 April 1991, 7-9.

L - I - --- I L I C - --s I,
I
4

Planning a Ground Offensive II:

The ARCENT Process

The Third Army planning process was marked by continuous

dialogue. Discussion took place horizontally, within the ARCENT

staff, and vertically, between Central Command above and

subordinate corps and support command staffs below. Major decisions

were made, or in some cases deferred, at commanders' conferences. 1

Similar processes were going on in each corps. This sort of activity

lasted into late January and up to the "commander's huddle," when

the army commander and his principal subordinates gathered at King

Khalid Military City on 1 February for a final meeting.

By the time General Schwarzkopf and his component, corps, and

support command commanders briefed Secretary of Defense Cheney

and General Powell in mid-December, the Third Army plan had taken

a fairly clear form. The concept called for a two-corps attack on a broad

front that would block the Iraqi routes of escape and destroy the

Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC).2 The Air Force

component was responsible for isolating the theater of operations

south of the Euphrates River by keeping bridges down. The army

commander's intent was to penetrate and envelop the defensive forces,

fix and block forward-deployed heavy forces in order to secure the

flanks and lines of communication, and continue the attack deep to

destroy the Republican Guard. 3

The VII Corps would be the coalition mass of maneuver. It would

carry out the decisive part of the theater commander's ground attack

plan as the Third Army's main effort. The 1st U.K. Armored Division,

after December under tactical control of VII Corps, would pass through

a 1st Infantry Division breach, turn east, and defeat the Iraqi tactical

reserves. It would secure, thereby, the deep movement of the U.S.

heavy "fist." The fist itself was to consist of the 2d Armored Cavalry

Regiment, the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, the 1st Infantry Division

(once the breach was secure), and the 1st Cavalry Division(-), should

the latter be released to Third Army by the theater commander. While

VII Corps' mission was oriented toward force rather than terrain, it

was assigned a zone of action within which to maneuver. The corps

zone did not include the highway running northwest from Basrah

south of the Euphrates River. That corridor belonged to the XVIII

Airborne Corps and, ultimately, to the 24th Infantry Division.

103
104

Initially, the VII Corps plan called for the entire corps to pass

through a breach to be made by the 1st Infantry Division in the Iraqi

defensive line. As the corps grew familiar with the ground and

identified the end of the Iraqi defenses-which terminated "in the air"

(or simply petered out) about forty kilometers from an escarpment that

dominated the right flank of XVIII Corps' zone-plans for the two

armored divisions and armored cavalry regiment were gradually

modified to move the core of the iron fist around the end of the Iraqi

positions but still east of the escarpment. This idea was tested in a

simulation conducted in January at King Khalid Military City by the

team from the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). In

consultation with his division commanders and in the face of his staffs

continuing doubts, Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.,

revised his plan. The modified version called for a maneuver around

the enemy defenses by the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions (behind the

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment), with only the 1st U.K. Armored

Division following the 1st Infantry Division through the breach. 4 The

end run was to be a tight squeeze. It required the 3d Armored Division

to move in a column of brigades with a fifteen-kilometer front. The 1st

Armored Division, with a frontage of twenty-five kilometers on its left,

was only marginally better off, but this maneuver avoided the

necessity of passing successive divisions deployed in column through

an obstacle belt.

Once beyond the breach, the corps' armored fist was to move north

to the vicinity of Phase Line (PL) Smash, a lateral road about halfway

to the Euphrates. It would then turn gradually to the right, looking for

the RGFC, which it expected to encounter in Objective Collins, a large

open expanse of desert just northeast of the point where the corps

would turn eastward across PL Smash. In effect, the corps plan called

for two successive, deliberate attacks: first, the breaching operations

by the 1st Infantry Division and, second, the movement to contact by

the armored fist. The weight of the corps' supporting forces, principally

its artillery, would have to be shifted from right to left, from one effort

to the other, while the corps moved north. Maintaining balance and

concentration would require a good deal of the corps' energy as it

moved to the battle.

XVIII Corps, on the extreme left of the coalition line, was to

launch the 101st Airborne Division toward As Samawah, on the

Euphrates, in the far northwestern corner of the corps sector, to block

the Iraqi escape route down Highway 8. The 24th Infantry Division

was to launch its three brigades into the empty desert to link up with

the 101st and then turn down the same highway to attack enemy
105

concentrations along the river. The French 6th Light Armored

Division, under tactical control of the XVIII Airborne Corps and with

the 82d Airborne Division in support, was to attack north on the Third

Army's left flank toward the settlement and airfield at As Salman. The

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment was to attack on the corps' right flank,

parallel to the VII Corps boundary (the plan called for the regiment to

maintain contact with its neighbor).5

Planning was based on the assumption that forces and supplies, both of which depended upon a fixed and fairly predictable rate of

arrival in theater, would be prepositioned in tactical assembly areas

(TAAs) east of Wadi al Batin by 31 January and that the corps would

have two weeks, during the preliminary air campaign, to move into

attack positions west of the wadi. These assessments are important precisely because they were fixed. VII Corps' 3d Armored Division

could not complete its arrival in Saudi Arabia until 31 January (in

fact, it was late due to shipping delays and did not close in the TAA

until 12 February).6 The fact that the air attack began on 17 January in no way influenced the ground forces' arrival schedule. Indeed,

ARCENT's principal task throughout the planning effort seems to

have been to find ways, using computer graphics, to display the

progressive build-up so that the higher decision makers could

understand what forces they had to work with at any given moment. In

resolving this problem, the Third Army commander was often his own

action officer, supported by his small personal staff with their desk-top

graphics. The success, or lack thereof, of any briefing to Schwarzkopf

depended on the clarity of the display of information, thus making a

staff officer's facility with computer graphics an essential skill at

higher levels of command.

The critical constraint was strategic sealift, particularly roll-on

and roll-off ships that carried unit equipment sets (soldiers were

usually moved by air). There were not enough ships to establish a

continuous arrival rate equal to the capability of available ports to

receive units. The ground operation was subject, first of all, to the

arrival of heavy forces and was constrained by limits on strategic

sealift. Second, it was limited by capacity for operational ground

movement, which was plagued by shortages in heavy wheeled

vehicles, HETs, heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs),

fuelers, and so forth. The quantity of these unglamorous vehicles

fluctuated, depending on the Army's ability to bring in, or even find,

long-haul trucks of various types. The December briefing to Secretary of Defense Cheney showed a theater requirement for 1,295 HETs and a

projected strength of on>-? 788 available from all sources. Only 250
106

HETs were expected to arrive in the peninsula by 15 January.7 These

wheeled vehicles established the port throughput rate, which never

equaled unloading capacity.

G-day, the date of the ground attack, depended on the ability of

planners to get coalition forces to the start line. If VII Corps were to

participate, that would not be possible at all before 31 January. Even

then, the forces would still be incomplete. This was the real

significance of the famous December interview with the newly arrived

deputy commander in chief, General Calvin Waller. Waller told the

press covering Cheney's December briefing that the Army would not

be ready to attack by the UN deadline in January (see figure 12). This

was correct, although there was certainly sufficient combat power in

the peninsula to conduct an air offensive, a fact that appears to have

escaped the journalists. 8

The other key operational issue was the likely ratio of opposition

to friendly forces. This calculation was, by necessity, purely Jominian.

It was presented as such on a briefing slide that projected 50 percent

attrition of the enemy by the air campaign. Given this assumption, VII

Corps would have an advantage of 11.5:1 at the breach site, 3.8:1 en

route to the Republican Guard, and 2:1 at the decisive point.9 These

figures are important because the overall force ratio expected in the

VII Corps' sector (counting friendly and enemy brigades as roughly

equivalent) was assumed to be no better than 1.3:1, far below any

acceptable theoretical rule of thumb. VII Corps was seeking, in

Jomini's words, "to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage

of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy."10

That these calculations may have been proved pessimistic by

subsequent events in no way detracts from their influence on the

planners and fighters who believed them at the time.

Between 23 and 28 December, a group directed by General

Pagonis conducted a planning exercise in Dhahran to develop a final

movement plan for repositioning Third Army west of Wadi al Batin.

Pagonis and his staff had been developing movement plans to support

various offensive options since September. The purpose of the

December exercise was to fill in details for the execution of

Schwarzkopf's concept, with particular regard to logistics-the

provisioning of food, fuel, ammunition, medical support, and, always

the critical issue, transportation. All this had to be laid out against a

schedule. 11 Major Steve Holley from the Third Army G3 (plans) and

Colonel Robert Kleimon, the ARCENT transportation officer,

represented the ARCENT G3 and G4. The result was publication of a
107

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transportation annex for the attack plan and a briefing for the

commander in chief that was given on 28 December.12

Schwarzkopfs strict guidance in support of the deception effort

was that no preparations for Desert Storm were to be made west of

Wadi al Batin prior to initiation of the air campaign. Because of the

distances involved in the operational redeployment and those

anticipated during the offensive, it would be necessary to create two

forward logistic bases (one for each corps) west of the wadi. This could

not begin before D-day. The movement briefing assumed a D-day (air

attack day) of 16 January and a G-day (ground attack day) of 1

February. Based upon these dates, the logistics plan provided for

creation of two theater army logistic bases, Charlie and Echo, west of

the wadi. Three intermediate bases-Alpha, Bravo, and Delta-were

to be established in the east (see figure 13). These could be filled prior

to D-day. They were essential, in any event, to support the forces

deploying into tactical assembly areas, as well as serving as

intermediate depots thereafter. Log Base Alpha, around which VII

Corps was to form in the desert, was located on Tapline Road at the

forward end of the corps' defensive (Desert Shield) zone. As early as

October, Pagonis and his staff had planned to begin building up

supplies forward in the Desert Shield zone to facilitate future offensive

options.13

The two corps would plan subsequently to open corps forward

bases (Oscar, Romeo, and "Nellingen") along Main Supply Route

(MSR) Virginia, the lateral oiled road (also PL Smash) through the

desert about halfway to the Euphrates. These bases would be one day's

round trip along the Tapline Road from the theater bases to the south.

A day's round trip beyond MSR Virginia, the division support

commands would establish their forward bases, and the fighting units

would operate about a day's drive beyond them. In short, the army

would reach its operational (logistic) limit at about the point it ran out

of terrain to clear. 14

Based upon projected transportation resources and anticipated

arrival dates, Pagonis and his group estimated Log Bases Charlie and

Echo would reach their desired stockage levels (five-day supply of

rations, 3.4 million gallons of fuel, and 15,000 to 45,000 short tons of

ammunition for XVIII and VII Corps respectively) no sooner than 11

February. 15 The build-up of Army medical capacity, 11,280 beds (in

Saudi Arabia or loaded on vehicles for movement), would be finished

no sooner than 13 February. 16 Units were expected to be in attack

positions by 7 February. 1 7
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Each briefing chart told the CINC where he would be on the road

to completion on any possible G-day. Three large flow charts

displaying transportation availability were created. These showed the

daily requirement for line-haul trucks and a forecast of the number

available. Interestingly enough, the transportation estimates showed

a deficit of vehicles, which would have to be made up from some source

if time lines were to be met (see figure 14). In short, success required

significant acquisition of transport vehicles and movement of them on

schedule. The CINC told Pagonis that these projections were his

"contract."18

From 27 to 30 December, while the logistics study was being

completed, the Third Army commanders and their staffs met at the

new army headquarters for the MAPEX. Originally, General Arnold's

intention was that this should be a war-gamed exercise, but this seems

to have run afoul of the commanders' sense of their prerogatives or just

the number of people involved.19 Instead of a war game, this meeting

was, in fact, a mutual briefing session in which questions could be

asked by the commanders and principal staff officers (and the staffs

then turned loose to resolve the issues raised) and issues requiring

further work or decisions could be identified. The results were briefed

back to the commanders on the 30th. Representatives from

CENTCOM, CENTAF, MARCENT, and SOCCENT attended, and,

indeed, one of the major long-term issues carried out of the exercise

was a concern about the extent to which the Army would be able to

influence the air preparation of the battlefield. Another issue involved

the distribution of resources. This was generally accomplished to the

detriment of the XVIII Airborne Corps, now a supporting actor rather

than the only show in town. The evolving plan called for the corps to

attack into an area that just did not have many enemy forces to

overcome. General Luck appeared to find this experience somewhat

frustrating.20

On 4 January, Yeosock and Arnold went again to Central

Command headquarters to brief the theater commander on the

ARCENT concept of operations. The object of the briefing was

somewhat confused. Information had arrived that Syria would not

agree to its troops participating in the offensive. At best, this required

some readjustment of missions along the coalition front lines. At

worst, it sowed suspicions that Syrian forces might go over to the

Iraqis if the attack itself seemed unlikely to succeed. 21 Moreover, the

Egyptians used the event to request substantial support from the

United States as insurance against failure. Among other things, Egypt

requested reinforcement by an American division and attachment of
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U.S. attack helicopters. Yeosock was challenged to find alternatives to

present to Schwarzkopf that would reassure the Egyptians without

weakening the theater main effort.

The briefing seems to have been intended originally to address

the adjustments that the Syrian decision might demand, but Yeosock

also had another agenda. He had to "smoke out" from Schwarzkopf,

now rather late in the day, clear indications of the limits of his own

freedom of action as field army commander. Somewhat typically, he

would do this by indirection, to no little discomfort on the part of

Arnold, his G3, who in such cases served as the stationary target for

the CINC. Schwarzkopfs patience was probably not improved by the

frustrations that had led to the need for such a briefing: four days of

high-level squabbling with his Arab allies, a report that a British staff

officer in London might have compromised the plan, and the fact that

he had spent the day of the briefing in the north, attending a grand

review for the Saudi king.22

Yeosock and Arnold went to brief Schwarzkopf with a set of

options rather than a single ARCENT concept of operations. This

method frustrated Schwarzkopf, who dismissed his subordinates with

some heat and ordered them to come back in four days with a new

briefing.23 Arnold was clearly crestfallen by this experience, but

Yeosock left believing he now knew the rules of the game, albeit at

some cost to his G3's self-esteem.24

Schwarzkopf had attacked his subordinates' plan on three main

points.25 The first was the decision to send the XVIII Airborne Corps'

101st and 24th Divisions northwest to As Samawah. The second was

his belief that ARCENT and VII Corps were greatly overestimating

the practical strength of the Iraqis, particularly following the

anticipated 50 percent attrition of them by the air interdiction

program. Finally, Schwarzkopf was extremely discomfited by the idea

that, as the plan was presented to him, VII Corps intended to observe

an operational pause, once the corps was through to the enemy tactical

depths, to rearm and refuel in the vicinity of Objective Collins.

According to the one non-general officer present (the "slide turner" at

the briefing), Schwarzkopf expressed the view that if VII Corps halted

along Phase Line Smash to rearm and refuel, it would miss the war

that he predicted would be over in twenty-four to forty-eight hours.26

Notably, in light of later developments, General Franks was not

present at this briefing.

Schwarzkopfs "guidance" addressed a number of other issues for

reexamination: the role of the 82d Airborne Division (as a follow-on
113

force and in support of the French 6th Armored Division), the location

of boundaries, the timing of attacks (synchronization of the corps), and

the location of the XVIII Airborne Corps attack. Schwarzkopf directed

that forces stay out of built-up areas and towns and that no force be put

at risk to block Highway 8. Logistic support remained a further

concern. 27

There were substantive issues about which Schwarzkopf had good

reason to be concerned. Leaving aside for the moment his objection to

the XVIII Corps plan, the CINC's optimism about the Iraqis' powers of

resistance seems to have been borne out by the events that followed.

There is no evidence, however, that he ever convinced his subordinates

that he was correct in this view, and ARCENT's assessments remained

sober through G-day. Schwarzkopf seems to have been unwilling to

impose his views on his Army commanders and unable to convince

them. His concerns about the threat and the importance of

maintaining momentum are important in light of subsequent events.

The idea of an operational pause was a concept that seems to have

originated with staff planners. It was an idea that senior commanders

were never able to kill. It was compounded by a confusion over the

precise meaning of this quasi-doctrinal term. General Franks had

decided as early as a pre-Desert Shield Battle Command Training

Program exercise in Germany that accepting an operational pause, if

by that one meant stopping the entire corps, would be to surrender the

initiative.28 At the MAPEX in December, he spoke of the importance

of relentless attack. 29

The ARCENT staff, nonetheless, had discussed such a pause

along Phase Line Smash, the one east-west line of communications

(MSR Virginia) in southeastern Iraq running through As Salman. But

Yeosock ultimately rejected the idea for the same reason Franks did.

Indeed, in a postwar discussion, Yeosock indicated that above the

brigade level, the corps was always in motion. The reconnaissance

line, he noted, advances at about five kilometers an hour, slow enough

that the armored brigades, which are the fighting formations of a

corps, can stop periodically to rest and refuel and still catch up by

employing their power of acceleration, since they are traveling

through a zone already cleared. 30 In Yeosock's mind, a pause was no

more than an intellectual stocktaking. He clearly believed such

stocktaking would be necessary before closing with the Republican

Guard. The Guard was bound to react to VII Corps' initial penetration,

and the final attack plan had to account for whatever the enemy did. It

also appears that he intended to meet with the corps commanders to

review the situation when the troops crossed PL Smash, but that
114

would not, in itself, require stopping divisions, which advance pretty

much on their own.31 Interestingly enough, given some of the postwar

criticism, Franks remembered later that General Waller raised the

matter of a pause with him just prior to G-day, at a time when Waller

was acting as Third Army commander in Yeosock's absence.32 The

idea of a "pause" seems to have been on a lot of minds.

Whatever the commanders thought, the staffs knew that the

maneuver brigades (and divisions) would run out of fuel about the time

they got to PL Smash, and they continued to address among

themselves the necessary refueling halt in terms of a pause. The 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment assumed the need to stop for fuel on PL

Smash in a late December staff exercise. The 1st Armored Division

plan allowed for time to refuel and regain balance before attacking

across PL Smash.33 In the XVIII Corps area, the 24th Infantry

Division foresaw a pause-refueling halt before advancing beyond PL

Smash and again before its last attack southeast along Highway 8.

The fuel problem did not go away. The question boiled down to

how much of the force would stop, at any time, to refuel and rearm

before getting on with the war. Could refueling be accommodated by

rippling it along the front, a brigade at a time? Because large units,

divisions and corps, rarely exercise as complete units in the field, the

problem of refueling a division, much less a corps on the move, is

seldom confronted. Moreover, refueling in an offensive posture is

harder to accomplish, than while in a delay or retrograde movement,

because of the need to carry fuel forward to the moving forces rather

than being able to preposition it along the way. It seems apparent that

the term "pause" had different connotations for different officers

depending on their immediate concerns and that much of the

discussion that seemed to settle on the issue only sowed further

confusion.

There remained the problems of the XVIII Corps plan to attack

toward As Samawah on the Euphrates, in the northwest corner of the

corps' sector, and Schwarzkopfs belief that the ARCENT commanders

overestimated the enemy. Aside from the distance over which

sustainment would have to be accomplished-down the road to Rafha

and up to As Samawah-this objective would take the 24th Infantry

Division and the 101st Airborne Division away from the main attack

before they turned down the Euphrates valley along Highway 8. The

force, attacking into a great empty area, would not be in supporting

distance of VII Corps.
115

Why had the army commander not pulled the 24th Infantry

Division in toward the main attack to begin with? Perhaps the first

explanation to suggest itself is that the idea of going to As Samawah

had originated with Schwarzkopf himself, and he had shown himself

ready to react violently to any attempt to question his concept by providing alternatives. Indeed, at the MAPEX, General Luck stated

quite clearly that the principal argument for the move was its origin.34

The CINC said to do it that way! Second, Yeosock would seem to have

been reluctant to interfere with the corps commander's judgment of

how to do his business, perhaps as a result of an ambiguity still

existing about the army commander's authority over operational

questions between the CINC and the corps commanders. Luck had

been given a mission and forces to accomplish it, and Yeosock was not

disposed to interfere with his subordinates unless he perceived a risk

to the whole operation.

Third, XVIII Corps had a real practical problem with the

alternative to its planned route. A large area in the center of the corps'

sector consisted of very rough, rocky terrain. If the corps sent its

mobile forces east, they would have to move across this area, perhaps

against resistance; they might also be pushed into a narrow sector of

advance in order not to interfere with the VII Corps' maneuver space,

essential for it in the main attack when it would send as large a force

as possible around the enemy fortifications.35 If there was resistance,

the 24th Division might not arrive at the Euphrates in time to achieve

its mission of blocking the enemy route of withdrawal.

Fourth, there were few potential lines of support available to

XVIII Corps, but one ran from Rafha, through As Salman, to As

Samawah. The 24th Division probably could have gotten to that point

to link up with the 101st, but it would have become increasingly

attenuated as it advanced down the Highway 8 corridor toward

Basrah. Indeed, the plan provided only for a ground advance to Tallil

(with a possible follow-on assault by the 101st toward An Nasiriyah).

On the other hand, if the corps' heavy forces were to advance in the

eastern sector, as they ultimately did, initial support would have to

come through As Salman and turn east until a more direct route was

created by engineers in the rear of the advancing heavy forces. Then,

VII Corps would have to open a line of communication for them

through its own rear area once they turned southeast. The VII Corps

could not do that, however, until after its own maneuver forces had

turned east, and no commander likes his MSR in someone else's

territory. This, in fact, is what was done. XVIII Corps did try and fail

to gain possession of the necessary strip of terrain by requesting a
116

boundary change, a request pursued into Desert Storm. Consideration

was given to attaching the 24th Division to VII Corps for that part of

the operation, but the idea never gained support with either General

Waller during his interregnum as Third Army commander or General

Yeosock. 3 6

In short, these questions came down to a subjective appreciation

of relative risk and comparative gain. If the Third Army and XVIII

Corps commanders elected to move the 24th Infantry and 101st

Divisions east, there was the risk of the enemy reacting to the initial

attack and confronting the turning force3 7 in compartmented and

generally rough terrain. There was also a risk inherent in a more

complex sustainment problem and, perhaps most important, the risk of

appearing to challenge Schwarzkopf in an area of command he felt was

peculiarly his own. Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue with

Schwarzkopfs final conclusion. If VII Corps required the assistance of

XVIII Corps' heavy forces to destroy the Republican Guard, the

"Victory Division" would have been too far away under the original

XVIII Corps plan. If it turned out that they were not required for the

destruction mission, any slowdown in their northward progress as a

consequence of eastern sustainment problems would not matter much.

The CINC might always call on air power to block the Highway 8 line

of retreat until the ground forces could establish a blocking position.

The 101st Airborne Division made it to the river first in any event! The

advance to the Euphrates by the 24th Division was almost unimpeded

except for the difficulties of terrain, and the division was on the river

on G+2. The advance of the Victory Division demonstrated again B.

H. Liddell Hart's assertion: "Natural hazards, however formidable, are

less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards. All

conditions are more calculable, all obstacles more surmountable, than

those of human resistance. By reasoned calculation and preparation

they can be over-come almost to time-table." 38

All this seems to have been Yeosock and Luck's conclusion as

well, because when Schwarzkopf was briefed again on 8 January, the

axis of advance for the 24th Division was moved to the general

direction of An Nasiriyah to the northeast, with the 24th Division and

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in effect, becoming the outer wing of

Schwarzkopfs great wheel.3 9 At this briefing, the slides depicting the

build-up were far clearer and more definitive. Not surprisingly,

Schwarzkopf approved the plan. What should have been far more

unsettling for the army commander was the theater commander's very

optimistic views about the likely effect of the air effort on the Iraqis'
117

ability to resist on the ground and the idea that ARCENT commanders

were greatly overestimating the strength of the enemy.

Those who would actually be called upon to lead ground forces

into battle would remain far less sanguine about the effect of the air

campaign on enemy capabilities than the theater commander, and

therein lay much mischief. Schwarzkopf may appear to have been

vindicated by events, though the clear technological advantages

enjoyed by ground forces in direct-fire engagements and artillery

counterbattery fire may lead one to underestimate the resistance still

remaining in the Republican Guard forces and the Iraqis' better

regular army units.40

Before 28 February, none of that could be known for sure. General

Franks, who would lead the coalition's main attack, argued

consistently for what he believed were three essentials for success.

These were relentless attack (no pauses once the operation was under

way), maintenance of concentration-hitting with a closed fist rather

than open fingers-and the absolute need for three heavy divisions at

the point of impact with the RGFC, this based upon various means of

analysis and simulation and, no less, on professional judgment.41

The need for concentration meant a tightly controlled advance

and a corps attack that moved deliberately in a particular sequence.

The fist, the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions and the 2d Armored

Cavalry Regiment, would have to move under corps control to begin

with, just to avoid having the units separated or intermingledsomething to be avoided, not only to maintain concentration but also to

avoid fratricide. The rate of march, like that of a fleet at sea (which the

divisions so closely resembled on the desert floor), could not exceed the

speed of the slowest vehicle, very likely the M109 howitzer, which

moved no faster than fifteen miles per hour. Moreover, the whole body

could not get so far ahead of the 1st U.K. Armored Division as to

expose the "fist's" eastern flank to interruption by Iraqi tactical

reserves. Moreover, since the 1st Cavalry Division(-) did not appear

likely to be released in time to get into the VII Corps fight with the

RGFC (as the division's release was increasingly tied to the success of

the Egyptian attack), the 1st Infantry Division would have to be the

third heavy division upon which the VII Corps commander believed

success rested. That meant, again, that the wheeling divisions would

have to retard their movement long enough for the 1st Infantry to

breach the enemy line, pass the 1st U.K. through, then fall in on the

"fist's" right or rear. This, too, called for a highly disciplined, closely

controlled maneuver, not the "devil-take-the-hindmost" charge-of-the-
118

light brigade rash and gallant dash the more romantic critics would

seem to have anticipated. 42

The difference in opinions about the situation comes back to

differing degrees of confidence in the ability of the air operations to

break the spirit of the only forces in the theater that mattered-the

heavy forces of the Republican Guard and the regular Iraqi Army. Also

worthy of much discussion were the implications of concentrating and

maneuvering twenty-five armored battalions, sixteen mechanized

battalions, and three regimental cavalry squadrons (8,508 tracked

vehicles, 27,652 wheels) in a confined space. After 8 January, however,

the broad outline of the ARCENT Desert Storm plan was set, and

internal planning and negotiation turned to matters of force allocation

and details of execution.

On 1 February, General Yeosock held his final commander's

planning meeting at King Khalid Military City, site of his mobile

command post and the support command forward headquarters.

Attending were the corps and support command commanders, the

ARCENT's primary staff, and the commander of the theater reserve,

Major General John Tilelli, Jr. By 1 February, air operations were in

their sixteenth day. Most of VII Corps had closed into the tactical

assembly areas around King Khalid Military City, and XVIII Corps

was well into its displacement to the west. G-day was approaching, but

as yet, the estimated attrition of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait was

disappointing to the Army commanders. 43

The logistic build-up continued, and anyone driving south on

either of the MSRs would have been overwhelmed by the number of

heavy trucks of all sorts on the road north. The most important service

member in theater was probably the military policeman at the

intersection of the main highways at Hafar al Batin, who fed the

traffic from east and south into the combined westward flow (see figure

15 for distances between major locations). No one driving south or east

in the face of the endless convoys-containing everything from

armored vehicles on carriers to fuel trucks, ammunition trucks, and

flat-beds full of mail or, alternatively, prefab privies-could doubt a

major attack was imminent.

The "commander's huddle" was held in the aftermath of the battle

of Khafji. Khafji was the single Iraqi attempt, on 29 January, to

conduct a spoiling attack against the Saudi Joint Forces Command

East and the U.S. Marine forces. The defeat of this probe seems to have

reinforced Schwarzkopfs confidence that the Iraqis would not be able

to mount a coherent defense. If anything, Khafji had the opposite effect
119

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on the ARCENT commanders.44 This was no meeting of men confident

that the enemy would not stand. These were men seriously intent on

seeing to it that when they closed with an enemy, whom they fully expected to fight and fight hard, they would have every available

means at hand. Emphasis was on achieving simultaneous employment of the total ARCENT heavy force (from both corps) when it came time

to fight the Republican Guard. Concern was expressed about the

potential use of gas by the Iraqis, a capability that was taken quite seriously by all concerned, through G-day and through the four-day battle that followed.

The G2, Major General John Stewart, laid out three major possibilities for employment of the Republican Guard. The first of

these was to counterattack if the Iraqis sensed a possibility for success.

The second was to fall back and defend Basrah and Kuwait City to

drag out the war. A third possibility was another drive south to seize a

bargaining chip in case of a stalemate.45 General Yeosock estimated

the Republican Guard would either "hunker down" at Basrah and give

up Kuwait, or it would defend and stand fast. In any event he was not

prepared, now or even on G-day, to decide before it was necessary on

the particular plan for the destruction of the Republican Guard. Like

the Elder Moltke, he would wait and see how the plan survived the

first contact. 46 In response to a question from General Franks, Yeosock

said the corps would likely receive its first order from him the first

night, but it would be for execution seventy-two to ninety-six hours

later.47 In the event, however, the war would move much faster than

anyone anticipated on 1 February.

By the time of the "commander's huddle," the Third Army attack

had been thought through in extraordinary detail. Multivariate

matrices plotted battlefield preparation actions for the eight days preceding the attack, and the ARCENT staff produced a twenty-threepage written scenario that examined various enemy responses to

ARCENT's actions and possible reactions. A detailed planning time

line anticipated closing with the Republican Guard Forces Command

at H + 74 in a scenario in which VII Corps did not begin its attack until

H+26.48

What the "huddle" did not do was produce a decision on the

preferred option for the destruction of the RGFC or for the actual

timing of the attack across the front. In part, these issues may have

been deferred because they were not subject to final resolution at that

time. That more was not accomplished may also have been because the

meeting got badly off schedule and the anticipated executive session
121

could not be held after the staff briefings because General Luck had to

leave for another engagement. 49

The split timing of the various attacks, particularly the

synchronization of the attacks of the two corps, had been a point of

contention with Schwarzkopf and continued to be a matter of

discussion at the "commander's huddle" and after. According to the

plan, the Marines and Joint Forces Command East were to attack on

G-day. The VII Corps and Joint Forces Command North were to attack

on the following day, on G + 1, after Iraqi attention and reserves, it was

hoped, had been fixed by the G-day attacks. The reasons for this were

complex (see figure 16).

Because the engineers would have to establish a direct line of

communication behind the 24th Infantry Division and 3d Armored

Cavalry Regiment, and the road for this would not be immediately

available on G-day, XVIII Corps wanted to attack with the French 6th

Light Armored Division and 82d Airborne Division on the corps' left at

least twenty-four hours (twice as long as originally planned) before the

heavy forces in order to open an initial main supply route through As

Salman. The 101st Airborne was to conduct an early morning air

assault on G-day as well, to a forward operating base midway to the

Euphrates River. Intending to synchronize the coalition's logistics flow

with its maneuver, planners also argued that these attacks would pose

a threat fixing Iraqi forces not yet deployed to the south. Of course, the

attacks might also have drawn Iraqi mobile forces west, before the

coalition's heavy forces attacked. That was not necessarily bad, since it

would pull the Iraqis into the open for attack from the air and perhaps

jeopardize their flank. By seizing As Salman, the corps would not only

protect ARCENT's left flank but would allow supplies to flow north,

then east, on the lateral oiled road (MSR Virginia). The corps would

also build the coalition's first intermediate logistic base to the east of

As Salman. 50

For the most part, the ARCENT's planning effort was completed

at the "commander's huddle;" Questions of the roles of the two

headquarters echelons (corps and army) also seem to have been

resolved. On 9 February, the secretary of defense and chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff returned to Riyadh to receive a briefing from

General Schwarzkopf and his commanders on preparations (and

presumably the need) for a ground offensive. General Yeosock;

General Franks; the commander of the 24th Infantry Division, Major

General Barry McCaffrey; and the commander of the 1st Armored
Figure 16.

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Division, Major General Ronald H. Griffith, briefed their respective

plans.

Prior to the briefing, Schwarzkopf expressed his concerns to

Yeosock that the VII Corps attack might be overly cautious in light of

the extent of the aerial preparation. "I want VII Corps to slam into the

Republican Guard," he said, and warned against any pause for

rearming and refueling in light of the chemical threat.51 Yeosock

explained Franks' concerns to the theater commander. Beyond that, it

is not clear what else he was to do. First of all, he seems to have shared

the general skepticism of the other ground commanders that the aerial

preparation would be as effective as advertised. 52 Then, he was as

aware as his corps commander that the initial challenge for the heavy

corps would be winning the necessary maneuver room. This challenge

would require, on the one hand, squeezing two heavy divisions into a

narrow opening between the Iraqi defensive line and the escarpment

to the west and, on the other, a deliberate breaching operation by the

1st Infantry Division. The breaching operation would be followed by a

passage of lines by the 1st U.K. Armored Division (reinforced by the

U.S. 142d Artillery Brigade, Army National Guard). The British were

to turn to the east and attack the Iraqi tactical reserves in order to

protect the corps' flank and to relieve the pressure on the Egyptian

Corps, thus freeing the theater reserve for the main attack. To Yeosock

and Franks, these deliberate preliminaries were essential if the Third

Army and VII Corps' mass of maneuver-three armored divisions and

an armored cavalry regiment-were to "slam into the Republican

Guard," which had to be located and fixed. Having explained Franks'

tactical concerns to Schwarzkopf and having acknowledged the CINC's

operational intent, Yeosock kept his own counsel when discussing the

issues with Franks, who continued to believe his plan had

Schwarzkopfs confidence.

The ARCENT briefing on the 9th addressed the attrition of the

enemy force, noting that it had not reached the 50 percent desired;

moreover, it was proceeding at a rate one-half that required. General

Stewart displayed a chart showing that, given an increase of 1 percent

a day (to 2 percent) in the rate of attrition, the 50 percent point could

be reached in two weeks. 53 This, of course, implied an increased

investment of air assets in preparation for the ground attack.

Based upon this estimate, a graph was shown indicating to

Secretary Cheney and General Powell that, if the decision were taken

to begin the necessary preparation of the battlefield for the ground

attack (G-13), movement into attack positions could begin in six days

(G-7) as attrition mounted, and preparation for attack would follow
124

from G-5 to G-day.54 (See figure 17.) No dates appeared on the slide,

but as the date of the briefing was the 9th, the earliest date that would

meet the schedule for the attack was the 23d. This chart was followed

by a depiction of final ground preparations (G-8 to G-day), the timing

of attack, and alternatives for achieving destruction of the Republican

Guard based upon the enemy's response. Other charts demonstrated

that after 21 February, the sustainment resources (particularly

trucks) necessary for the operation would be in-country. Based upon a

continuous monitoring of Iraqi maneuvers, or rather the complete

failure to detect any in the Kuwait theater of operations, the ARCENT

commander concluded that the enemy would not maneuver but that he

would fight, that the corps were ready, and that there was sufficient

fuel and ammunition on hand to support the plan.55 (See figure 18.)

General Franks briefed the ARCENT main attack. He was

followed by General McCaffrey and General Griffith, who seemed to

have been present to show the chairman that the tactical details of

communications, movement, and sustainment had been worked to the

last detail, as well as to give the high command a sense of the

confidence of the leaders who would actually direct the coming battle.

In his memoirs, Schwarzkopf adds gratuitously to his account of these

briefings: "All very impressive, I thought, except Franks, whose plan

was still too deliberate and who insisted on telling the secretary and

the chairman that he was to need the reserves."56 If the theater

commander felt that way at the time, there is no evidence he allowed

his frustration to find voice, either in the presence of his superiors or

after their departure.

At the end of the rehearsal briefing at ARCENT on the 8th, in

response to an inquiry from Yeosock if anything else was on their

minds, Franks observed that, while it was above his pay grade, he

hoped someone had thought about how it all was supposed to look on

the ground when it was over. He hoped someone had thought about a

"war stopper."57 Later, Franks would observe that at the end of his

briefing on the 9th, the secretary of defense raised the same question

and asked how Franks thought the end of the ground battle would

look.58 In the event, the complex problem of war termination would be

the one detail not well thought out by the strategic leadership before

the secretary's question was posed. Events on 28 February raised the

question of whether it was adequately studied thereafter. Franks and

McCaffrey would find themselves in no small difficulty as a

consequence.

A World War I general, perhaps French Marshal Joffre or Field

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It is said that he thought for a moment and replied: "I don't know who

was responsible for the victory. But I know who would have been

blamed for the defeat." The commander is always responsible,

particularly for defeat. Victory, according to an old proverb, has many

fathers; defeat is an orphan. Among the several things that stand out

in the Desert Storm planning process, perhaps the most important is

that the Desert Storm plan was the result of a process, not an event,

not one man's brilliant or clever insight.

Perhaps all successful military operations are the product of the

corporate skills of the institution, but this was particularly the case of

Desert Storm. Colonel Joe Purvis and his team started the process

with a good deal of personal direction (and sometimes abuse) from

General Schwarzkopf. Certainly Schwarzkopfs forensic abilities

counted heavily, both in convincing Colin Powell that two corps were

required for an offensive and in articulating to his subordinates a clear

vision of what they were about. General Steve Arnold's role was

decisive in linking the efforts of ARCENT and the two corps with those

of CENTCOM. Tireless and good humored, even under what at times

was severe hammering from Schwarzkopf over issues like planning for

the employment of the theater reserve, Arnold was the heart and soul

of the ARCENT staff planning effort. His ability to draw in and

combine harmoniously the efforts of multiple, independent, and often

competing agencies and powerful personalities was matchless.

General Pagonis was everywhere on the MSR in his command van

with cellular phone in hand, but he was still able to oversee planning

of the most difficult and dynamic logistic build-up since Korea, and he

saw to it that the operators' goals were made possible. Many

supporting agencies not addressed here, the CENTCOM Analysis

Agency and BCTP representatives particularly, provided simulation

analysis to support the commander's judgments and provide many

bright ideas as well. Finally, the ability of the Third Army

commanders to bury their differences and strong personalities to

produce a comprehensive plan like that for Desert Storm is a tribute to

the character of the men who have risen to command the Army of the

nineties.

The plan itself had several points of interest. First of all, although

the CENTCOM OPLAN spoke of a campaign of four phases (strategic

air campaign, air supremacy in the KTO, battlefield preparation, and

ground offensive plan), the coalition offensive would consist of two

separable and distinct parts: (1) an air offensive of three parts (attacks

to achieve air supremacy, strategic bombing in Iraq north of the KTO,

and air operations in the KTO designed to reduce the Iraqi forces in
128

occupation) and (2) an air-ground offensive should it prove necessaryall carried on within the ongoing naval interdiction effort. The logic of

the strategic situation would not require a follow-on ground operation

if Saddam Hussein bowed to the logic of his situation and agreed to

withdraw and comply with the pertinent UN resolutions. Certainly,

the air operations provided significant persuasion to that end. It is

equally certain that the air operations were unsuccessful in convincing

Saddam to retreat under circumstances acceptable to the president

and the coalition leadership.

The requirement for subsequent political permission to undertake

ground operations shows that the ground offensive was conceived to be

an escalation, separable from the air attacks. The ground attack was

contingent, not concomitant, to the air campaign, notwithstanding

Schwarzkopf's complaints in his memoir that he was repeatedly

pressured to initiate a ground attack before he was ready. Ultimately,

the plan fit neither of the two patterns posited at the start of the last

chapter: destruction by maneuver-induced psychological dislocation or

rear attack. Rather, it was an amalgam, perhaps best characterized as

pragmatic. The plan clearly hoped for psychological dislocation (albeit

one achieved by aerial fires as well as maneuver). But the plan

ultimately provided for physical destruction at all levels should that be

required. 59 Indeed, the physical destruction of Iraqi armored forces

became an important, if collateral, objective to ensure future regional

stability-a strategic goal. At the end of the day, there is little so

psychologically dislocating as daily subjection to a battering from

which there is no relief and for which there is no reply.

This understanding of the theater campaign plan is important,

because it accounts for the fact that commitment of air resources to

prepare the ground specifically in support of the Army ground

operation (as opposed to achieving attrition of the forces in the KTO as

a part of the air campaign) was delayed until eight or nine days before

the start of the ground attack. The campaign of attrition (the first part

of Phase III) was directed by the joint forces Air component

commander in accordance with the theater commander's guidance and

priorities-a fact many Army ground tactical commanders found hard

to accept, though it was entirely consistent with the nature of the

campaign plan. Once the decision was taken to launch the ground

attack (and final approval undoubtedly followed the visit of the

secretary of defense and chairman on 9 February), air resources began

to be employed to prepare for ground operations. At the same time, the

Air Force continued the general process of air-ground attrition,

strategic bombing, and maintenance of air superiority.
129

The allied ground forces were employed in ways that accorded

with their capabilities and the needs of the coalition. The "piano key"

deployment of the forces across the front-Joint Forces Command

East, MARCENT, Joint Forces Command North, and ARCENTensured that the two Arab-Islamic commands could call on U.S.

components for assistance, particularly for help obtaining and

controlling air support (see figure 19). It also ensured that Arab forces

were properly positioned to liberate Kuwait City. The Egyptian Corps,

part of Joint Forces Command North but a force with which the U.S.

Army had some experience through periodic Bright Star exercises, was

aligned with VII Corps' eastern flank. The U.S. Army provided support

on a bilateral basis to bolster the Egyptian effort, to include the loan of

some required breaching equipment, positioning of the theater

reserve, and the provision for on-call AH-64 support. Third Army sent

a special liaison team to the Egyptian Corps as well as to Joint Forces

Command North.

MARCENT was positioned near the coast in light of the short

operational reach of Marine forces and appeared to be the landward

part of an amphibious envelopment. The Marines were highly visible

on CNN and in press reports, an unwitting contribution by the news

media, to misleading the Iraqis. The 1st U.K. Armored Division was

employed with the NATO-based U.S. corps in accordance with the

British desire to take part in more open, less costly maneuver

operations. The French, whose thoroughly professional but light force

was based on the Red Sea to the west, were placed on the ARCENT's

left to seize As Salman and open the limited road net behind XVIII

Corps, a task they accomplished in exemplary fashion in the time

deemed necessary by the XVIII Corps before the fact.

The burden of the planned ground attack rested firmly on the VII

Corps. All else could come a cropper and yet, if VII Corps succeeded in

destroying the Republican Guard and Iraqi operational reserves, come

right in the end. If VII Corps failed and the Republican Guard was able

to counterattack, the offensive through the Iraqi defenses could

become very bloody indeed, although the success of U.S. air power

against the Iraqi armored forces at Khafji probably indicated that

coalition success was inevitable once the Iraqi forces had to come above

ground and concentrate to resist the attacking ground forces. That was

not yet as clear in February 1991 as it is today. What was clear was

that air supremacy was a sine qua non for the entire ground effort, as

was the preattack concentration west of Wadi al Batin.

Ultimately, the ARCENT plan was Lieutenant General John

Yeosock's. Not because he can be seen working any particular part of
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131

it. Indeed, he seemed to have spent the greatest part of his time in the

introduction of Army forces into the theater, provisioning of hostnation support, creation of an echelon-above-corps intelligence

capability, and obtaining whatever he could beg, borrow, or steal from

other major Army commands to make Desert Storm work. But it was

Yeosock who married what was possible, largely General Pagonis'

business, with what was thought to be required by his two corps. His

life from November to February was a series of trade-offs and work

arounds. He evaluated what was required and more often decided what

could be done with what was available. At the same time, he balanced

risks and generally strove to unencumber the corps so they could

concentrate on the immediate problems of training,

deploying/redeploying, and preparing for the anticipated offensive.

I II I I I I
I
Notes

1. The CENTCOM OPLAN Desert Storm was published on 16 December. The

ARCENT Plan, Desert Storm OPLAN 001, was published on 5 January. As the

narrative will show, significant details remained to be resolved at each publication

date. Their resolution would be documented by contingency plans and annexes

published at dates later than the basic orders.

2. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing for the Secretary of Defense, dated 15

December 1990, slide titled, "ARCENT Concept of Operations." There are two

briefings in the ARCENT Command Briefing set for the December visit of the

secretary of defense. The first set, dated 15 December, appears to be the ARCENT

set, the second dated 20 December, the date of the briefing itself, appears to be the

CENTCOM set less the ARCENT and corps briefings.

3. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing for the Secretary of Defense, dated 15

December 1990, slide titled, "Commander's Intent."

4. HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans), AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian,

Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert

Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated

6 April 1991, 15-16. Interview with General Frederick Franks at the Pentagon, by

the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, on 31 October 1991, 19. Interview with Colonel Stan Cherrie, G3 VII

Corps, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 29 August 1991, 7-9 on staff resistance to CG's

plan.

5. HQ,.ARCENT, G3 (Plans) AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian,

Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert

Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated

6 April 1991,14-15.

6. Message, 120300Z FEB 91, COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSIG

ID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+26/FEB, 9. ARCENT did have a contingency plan for

an early attack by available forces after 31 January should it be required.

7. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing for the Secretary of Defense, dated 15

December 1990, slide titled, "HET Status." The fact the slide is present in the

packet, of course, does not necessarily indicate the slide was briefed to the secretary

or chairman. It is taken to indicate what the ARCENT commander believed to be

the case on the date indicated. There were only 897 HETs in the Army inventory.

8. Eric Schmitt, "Forces Not Ready for January War, U.S. General Says: Candid

Assessment: Gulf Deputy Commander Seen as Undermining Bush's Diplomacy,"

The New York Times, 20 December 1990, Al, A20. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a

Hero, 394-95.

9. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing for the Secretary of Defense, dated 15

December 1990, slide titled, "Ground Force Correlation (Assuming 50% Iraqi

Attrition by Air)."

133
134

10. Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Captain G. H. Mendell and Lieutenant W.

P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862, Greenwood Press

Reprint, n.d.), 299.

11. HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans) AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian,

Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert

Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated

6 April 1991, 6-7.

12. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Memorandum for Commander, 22d SUPCOM; Commander, VII

Corps; Commander, XVII Corps, Subject: Theater Movements Plan, dated 11

January 1991, and HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, untitled briefing, dated 27

December 1990. Documents are tabs 14 and 15 to vol. 2 of HQ, USARCENT, G3

Plans, Operation Desert Shield/Storm Historical Narrative and Input into

Command Report.

13. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "USARCENT OPLAN 001 Desert

Storm," dated 27 December 1990, section titled, "Theater Logistics Concept."

General Pagonis' account in Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 118-22.

14. Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 135.

15. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, untitled briefing, dated 27 December 1990, slides

titled, "Log Base Alpha, Bravo, etc."

16. Ibid., slide titled, "Medical Beds."

17. Ibid., slide titled, "Unit Moves."

18. As to a contract comment, a story was told to author by Lieutenant Colonel Mike

Kendall. Briefing slides (3) in Ibid., titled, "Asset Availability Versus

Commitments." Pagonis' version in Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 136-40.

Schwarzkopfs version is in Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 400-401.

19. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum thru Colonel Holloway, Chief, G3 Plans,

for Colonel Swain, USARCENT Historian, Subject: Command Report Operation

Desert Storm, dated 16 March 1991, prepared by Major Daniel J. Gilbert, Tabs 1, 2,

and 3. Interview with General Steven Arnold (in progress).

20. Note from Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall to author on early draft of the

manuscript. See comments by General Luck in transcript of MAPEX, Eskan Village

School House, Tape C (27 December 1990), 8. See also Tape A, 27.

21. The whole question of the Syrian adherence to the plan of attack has become

controversial. Schwarzkopf is clear that the Syrians balked at participation in the

offensive, for whatever reason. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 401-3. De la

Billiere confirms this view, de la Billiere, Storm Command, 178. Prince Khalid

disputes this, pointing out that the Syrians followed the Arab attack in support

when the offensive took place. Khalid, of course, is correct but does not contradict

directly Schwarzkopf or de la Billiere's versions, which was one understood at

ARCENT. Khalid bin Sultan,"Schwarzkopf Falls Short in Writing History," Army

Times, 2 November 1992, 21.
135

22. Comments made to author by General Yeosock after review of draft manuscript.

General Yeosock indicated that this "recon by fire" was a technique he felt bound to use with the CINC. Similar comments were made by his executive officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Kendall, in notes returned on a draft manuscript in possession

of the author. See also the interview with Lieutenant General John Yeosock, Fort

McPherson, Georgia, 29 June 1991, 5-6. For interalliance bickering, see Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 401-5. De la Billiere addresses security lapse and

data (4 January) of the Alliance Grand Review, de la Billiere, Storm Command,

179-81,183.

23. Major Dan Gilbert was the slide turner for the 4 January briefing and described the

"atmospherics" to the author. Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert has provided the author

with some notes and recollections of the contretemps in response to reviewing an early draft of this chapter.

24. Lieutenant Colonel Kendall's handwritten comments on draft manuscript, 143-45.

General Yeosock to author.

25. Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert's contemporary note reads: "Briefed CinC-Changed all.

Said plan stinks/not doable. Ranted/raved. Now I understand 'Storming Norman'

nickname." HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans) AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT

Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 (Plans), Historical

Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and

Redeployment, dated 6 April 1991, 15-16.

26. Letter to author from Lieutenant Colonel Dan Gilbert, dated 4 March 1992, with

notes of 4 January briefing to CINC.

27. Ibid.; and Purvis Group Diary, 16.

28. Interview with Colonel Stan Cherrie, VII Corps G3, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

29 August 1991, 21-22.

29. Transcript of the ARCENT MAPEX, Tape A, 27 December 1990 and Tape E, 27

December 1990.

30. Comments made to author by General Yeosock after review of draft manuscript.

31. Lieutenant Colonel Kendall's handwritten comments on draft manuscript, 155.

32. Interview with General Frederick Franks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 March

1992,40.

33. HQ, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, AETSAC-AT, Memorandum, Subject: 2ACR

Staff Exercise After-Action Report, dated 27 December 1990, attached briefing

shows a twelve to twenty-four-hour pause on PL Smash. HQ, 1st Armored Division,

TAA Thompson (KTO) 141200C February 1991, Operations Order #6-91m

(attack/movement to contact). Para 3B(C) reads: "Units will pause at Atk Python to

consolidate, tactically rearm, refit, refuel, and posture for future operations."

34. Transcript of the ARCENT MAPEX, Tape B, 30 December 1990.

35. As indicated above, the trend was for the VII Corps to push its main attack as far

west as possible.
136

36. General Waller turned down such a request while he was ARCENT commander

from 13-23 February, and General Franks indicates that he thought of requesting such attachment the night of 27 February but felt the question would only lead to an argument with XVIII Corps and did not pursue it. Interview with General Calvin

Waller by General Timothy J. Groggin, et al., on 2 May 1991, 93. Interview with

General Frederick Franks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 March 1992, 38-39. One can only speculate that there was resistance to taking the one heavy force assigned

to XVIII Corps and attaching it to VII Corps at the climax of the battle, largely reducing the XVIII Airborne Corps to a mopping-up force with the exception of the

plentiful AH-64 units that were conducting the ARCENTs deep battle.

37. The term "turning force" is used advisedly. The attack down the Euphrates valley to

assist in destruction of the Republican Guard seems always to have been somewhat

tentative; it remained an on-order mission. On the other hand, cutting Highway 8 is a clear initial mission. Cutting the LOC is a turning movement.

38. B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), 63-64.

39. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "Purpose: To Back Brief ARCENT

Scheme of Maneuver for Operation Desert Storm," dated 8 January 1991. Of great interest is the note that the plan was to be executable by 15 February with a contingency plan capable of execution by 25 January. HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Plans),

AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ,

USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm,

Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated 6 April 1991, 15-16.

40. This difference of view about the anticipated enemy resistance continued through the briefing to the secretary of defense. The pessimistic view was generally agreed to

in the author's hearing at the rehearsal briefing by ARCENT commanders at HQ,

ARCENT, prior to the final briefing for the secretary of defense. Also, see Lieutenant Colonel Kendall's handwritten comments on draft manuscript, 158-59.

Kendall notes that at a prebrief for the CINC that he attended with General

Yeosock prior to the secretary of defense briefing, the CINC again blew up, first

because General Arnold addressed an ARCENT employment of the 1st Cavalry Division(-), which by then was tied to the success of the Egyptian attack, and he

(Arnold) used the words "operational pause." Kendall writes: "Again CinC signaled he didn't expect heavy opposition to the ground assault. It was obvious his

commanders didn't agree but they were not about to raise the issue at the Sec Def

brief."

41. The author heard General Franks make these points at briefings in Saudi Arabia

and discusses them in interview with General Frederick Franks at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 March 1992.

42. After writing this chapter, one of the author's research assistants discovered a memorandum from Colonel Don Holder to General Franks that raised concerns about the complexity of coordinating the corps' advance in light of the sequential

nature of the tasks to be accomplished in the breach. Colonel Holder was commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. He is as sober a tactician as the

Army owns and a former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies and

principal author of the Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine. HQ, 2d Armored Cavalry
137

Regiment, AETSAC, Memorandum for VII Corps TAC (Attn: G3), Subject:

Comments on VII Corps FRAGPLAN #7, dated 230900 February 1991.

43. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "Commander's Huddle," dated

Friday, 1 February 1991 (D + 15).

44. Transcript of Frost interview dated 22 March 1991 in possession of author, 16. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Notes from Huddle

Meeting, 1 February 1991, dated 1 February 1991.

45. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Notes from

Huddle Meeting, 1 February 1991, dated 1 February 1991.

46. Ibid. The ARCENT Desert Storm operation order did not contain a plan for

destruction of the Republican Guard. That annex was not published, rather the G3

Plans section prepared a number of contingency plans one of which would be

selected at some appropriate point for implementation to achieve the ARCENT

mission in accordance with circumstances then obtaining. This will be discussed at some length hereafter. See HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum thru Colonel

Holloway, Chief, G3 Plans, for Colonel Swain, USARCENT Historian, Subject:

Command Report Operation Desert Storm, dated 16 March 1991, prepared by Major

Daniel J. Gilbert, 4-6.

47. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Notes from

Huddle Meeting, 1 February 1991, dated 1 February 1991.

48. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "Commander's Huddle," dated

Friday, 1 February 1991 (D + 15).

49. Lieutenant Colonel Kendall's handwritten comments on draft manuscript, 158-59.

50. The issue of the timing of the attack is discussed in HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP,

Memorandum thru Colonel Holloway, Chief, G3 Plans, for Colonel Swain,

USARCENT Historian, Subject: Command Report Operation Desert Storm, dated

16 March 1991, prepared by Major Daniel J. Gilbert, 5, and enclosure 29. It was a matter of discussion at the "commander's huddle." HQ, ARCENT, Command Group,

Memorandum for Record, Subject: Notes from Huddle Meeting, 1 February 1991,

dated 1 February 1991. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled,

"Commander's Huddle," dated Friday, 1 February 1991 (D + 15).

51. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 433-34.

52. Sir Peter de la Billiere expresses the ambiguity felt by many, noting on the one hand

anticipation of a costly battle and, on the other, a private optimism that the Iraqi

Army would collapse under air attack before the ground attack went in. De la

Billiere, Storm Command, 277.

53. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update, dated 8 February 1991, slide

titled, "Battle Damage Estimate." The slide showed a BDA assessment of only 23

percent on 9 February.

54. Ibid., slide titled, "Force Generation/Air Campaign."
138

55. General Yeosock told the author that among the first things he told his G2 to track

was the matter of whether or not the Iraqis in the KTO were conducting unit

training. Absent evidence of such training for the period of occupation, Yeosock

concluded, rightly it turned out, that the Iraqi armored forces were incapable of

tactical maneuver as opposed to tactical movement. Assessments are in, HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT Update, dated 8 February 1991, slide titled,

"Commander's Assessment."

56. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 434.

57. The author was present at the briefing.

58. General Franks to the author.

59. This third category was suggested to me by Professor Jim Schneider, SAMS,

USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

I- C - -·I 1 113P4lill- ---- III_ --Ce-- II -
5

Build-up to Attack

The president's 8 November announcement did not change

General Yeosock's conception of his command. Third Army would

continue to be three armies: service component, theater, and numbered

field. It would expand its heretofore limited operational

responsibilities. The new circumstances, with two assigned corps

conducting an operational offensive instead of one corps defending in

depth, required a dramatic restructuring of the headquarters and the

army-level force structure. This had to be done while bringing VII

Corps on line and seeing to it that the logistic build-up and operational

redeployment were properly executed. New units arriving from

Europe and the continental United States (CONUS) had to be fitted

into the transportation sequence, so they did not arrive a day before

they were required, but just in time to participate in the offensive.

Some environmental acclimation was desirable for combat units,

though this was not always possible. Much of the 3d Armored Division

became acclimated on the way to the line of departure. However,

February weather in Saudi Arabia is nothing like the heat of the

summer; rain can be heavy as a monsoon and accompanied,

notwithstanding, by blowing sand. Temperatures range well into the

thirties during the night while remaining cool throughout the day. (It

was reported one morning at the ARCENT command briefing that,

during the night, temperatures had reached 27 degrees Fahrenheit in

the area occupied by the 24th Infantry Division.)l Adapting to desert

conditions, of course, requires a good deal more than becoming

accustomed to temperature. The sheer emptiness and unlimited vistas

make orientation difficult and distort estimates of time and distance.

For those more used to houses and trees, the desert can contribute to a

sort of melancholy.

The process of concentrating an expanded Third Army in the

Arabian Peninsula was not easy to manage. An unavoidable delay

occurred between identification of a need and mobilization, shipment,

arrival, and deployment in theater. Anything required in February

had to be identified by the end of the previous November. The deficits

left by the ceiling on the size of the initial army and corps

organizations had to be corrected and a new corps force structure built.

This was made easier after ARCENT's various force structure

excursions, both to hold down the size of the force (minimum essential

force guidance) and to examine the requirements involved in making

139
140

Third Army an Army MACOM (major army command). Much of the

design work, too, had been ongoing in Europe for some time. The VII

Corps and U.S. Army Europe had long anticipated possible calls for

forces to reinforce the Persian Gulf army.

The new deployments involved bringing together in the theater of

war, at the proper time, units from Europe and the United States. The

new units had to be introduced quicker and in larger numbers than

during the initial XVIII Corps deployment.2 (See figure 20.) This, of

course, implied the acquisition, through call-up or contract, of

additional strategic transportation resources by the joint service

transportation command. Often there were no good answers. Choices

involved trade-offs, each possessing attendant risks.

The U.S. Army was not structured or trained for an operational

offensive in open desert terrain such as that now confronting its

commanders. Because it had been designed for war in Europe, it was

seriously suboptimized and required significant augmentation. The

operation required tactical and operational movement of large units

that rarely had assembled in one place for training, let alone

maneuvered tactically in formation. The means of operational

transport, both vehicles and drivers, were not readily available and

could not be assembled in time. A number of expedients had to be

formulated in December and January, then coordinated with the

Department of the Army as well as the host nation, to make up for the

deficiencies.

Yeosock continued to define his task as "unencumbering" the two

corps so that they could concentrate on training and fighting. In

addition to bringing the VII Corps into the theater, it was also his job

to project the gathering forces to the west and deploy them with all the

means necessary to launch and sustain both corps for up to two weeks

of intense combat. For the most part, accomplishing this would be the

task of General Pagonis and the 22d Support Command. The ARCENT

commander focused most of his efforts on solving problems, while his

staff concentrated on planning and coordination. Meanwhile,

subordinate maneuver units prepared for battle.

Before 8 November, Third Army's responsibilities for operational

oversight of its single corps were minimal. It is probable that, had the

Desert Shield defensive plan ever been executed, General Schwarzkopf

would have taken direct operational command of the 1st Marine

Expeditionary Force and XVIII Corps. Moreover, the defensive plan,

which was limited in geographic scope, did not require a large echelonabove-corps structure. Logically, then, Third Army headquarters had
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141

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142

been one of the biggest bill payers for the minimum essential force

ceiling, retaining only, with limited exceptions, its peacetime

premobilization size and structure and even providing the personnel to

man the U.S.-Saudi C3IC staff.

Now that ARCENT would command two corps operationally and

a substantially larger echelon-above-corps force, the headquarters

structure, and even its way of thinking about itself, had to be changed

in very short order. To assist in this change of orientation, the army

commander developed a system of liaison teams, "directed telescopes,"

that were to be located in all key headquarters across the front and

offer, not just to ARCENT but to CENTCOM, a quick, extrabureaucratic source of immediate information on the situation of

friendly forces. These teams provided one more vital bridge to cover

the gaps in the allied command structure to compensate for the

coalition's lack of true unity of command. Third Army also created an

advanced mobile command post (CP) called "Lucky TAC," or "Lucky

Wheels," since it was housed in wheeled expando-vans.

How all this was done and why provides insights into the nature

of operational command and coalition and joint warfare. It is also a

story that is only complete when various human aspects of what was

done are examined; for the headquarters restructuring had social as

well as organizational consequences that had to be dealt with on a

daily basis.

In the fall of 1990, Colonel John Jorgenson, the ARCENT deputy

chief of staff, expressed the view to General Yeosock that the army

headquarters was, to its detriment, dominated by light infantrymen

and field artillery officers, particularly in the operations staff.3 The

observation was partially correct. General Arnold, the G3, had been a

brigade commander in the 82d Airborne Division, then an assistant

division commander in the 2d Division in Korea. Colonel Bob

Beddingfield, the deputy G3 (and displaced premobilization G3), and

Colonel Glenn Lackey, the G3 operations chief, were field artillery

officers. Colonel Gene Holloway, the G3 plans, was an aviator. Major

Steve Holley, the principal staff planner for Desert Storm, was an air

defense officer-and so on!

The Army, like any large organization, has its unofficial unions

and organizational shibboleths. The issue raised by Jorgenson, that

only heavy maneuver arms officers could understand large-unit

heavy-force operations, is typical of these and, in the main, perhaps,

quite valid-if not in the specific case of all the officers named above. It

is worth pointing out that, although Arnold had commanded a light
143

(airborne) infantry brigade, he had held a number of posts in the 8th

Infantry Division in Germany, to include battalion command, so heavy

forces were not entirely foreign to him. These general beliefs, however,

are not unimportant. To the extent they are honored, they affect the

legitimacy of an organization's members to do their business. It is also

true that experience, if not the best, is ordinarily the most effective

teacher.

So an effort was made to infuse the staff with what were called

"long ball hitters." These were up-and-coming officers, drawn by the

Army Personnel Command from throughout the Army on the basis of

training, education, and experience to fill specific requirements in the

Third Army headquarters. Their arrival supplemented and sometimes

displaced the proprietary Third Army staff officers, while bringing in a

good bit of talent. Among those selected were Lieutenant Colonel Dave

Mock, Major Paul Hughes, Major Dan Gilbert, Major Rick Halblieb,

and Major Clay Newman.

Dave Mock is a quiet, firm, and rock-solid cavalryman. He was

the balance wheel in the army's forward operations cell, maintaining a

modicum of order and rationality in an environment that could, on

occasion, resemble a futures market. Paul Hughes is a tall, shy, but

extraordinarily competent communicator. He played a vital role in

establishing the communications network, linking the forward

headquarters with army units in the forward area of operations. Dan

Gilbert, a bright and studious infantryman, became a principal Desert

Storm planner, while Rick Halblieb, an aggressive, articulate, and

sometimes obsessive intelligence officer, became the principal

targeting-battle damage assessment officer in General Stewart's G2

section. Indeed, when Stewart arrived to be G2 in late December, his

"long ball hitters" all but marginalized the existing G2 organization.

Clay Newman, a persistent logistician, served as a logistics expediter

for the army staff, helping to locate lost or misdirected equipment

during the build-up and redeployment. All but Newman were SAMS

graduates.

Obviously, this rapid expansion produced some strains in the

headquarters organization. Colonel Jorgenson himself was a victim of

the process. Jorgenson was one of the most talented senior staff officers

in Third Army. He was a former heavy maneuver brigade commander

who had, in a previous assignment, served as Yeosock's squadron

executive officer in the Third Armored Cavalry. Professionally

frustrated by nonselection for general, Jorgenson was looking toward

retirement when Desert Shield broke out. Faced with the need to fill

his primary staff positions with general officer principals, Yeosock also
144

had to find a general officer chief of staff. This was particularly the

case since the G4, Brigadier General Jim Monroe, had served on the

Third Army staff, under Jorgenson as "chief."4 Yeosock appointed his

deputy commander, General Bob Frix, ARCENT chief of staff as well

as deputy commanding general. Jorgenson became his deputy.

Had General Schwartz returned to ARCENT in December, when

C3IC was absorbed by CENTCOM, he would have become Yeosock's

principal deputy for operations, leaving Frix to act as a traditional

chief of staff. But Schwartz did not return. Frix, as deputy commanding general, continued to work primarily as Yeosock's main

troubleshooter and "outside man," ultimately moving forward in

January with the advanced command post and then heading Task

Force Freedom to reconstruct Kuwait after the war. Jorgenson did the

work of running the staff through the staff section deputies (colonels) and acted as the principal mediator between the field grade staff and

the commander. But he did not attend the daily general officer

meetings where major decisions were made and command guidance

was provided. Once General Frix moved forward, the chief of staff

functions were picked up by the commander himself, his G3 General

Arnold, Colonel Jorgenson, and the commander's executive officer,

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Kendall.

Restructuring the army headquarters had to accord with a

fundamental belief on the part of Yeosock that, as an army commander, he commanded two corps commanders, not two corps. He

believed his principal role was ensuring the sustainment of the force

and the allocation of force multipliers not otherwise accessible to the

corps-especially logistics, air power, and intelligence. He was also

charged with organization of such necessary but generally neglected functions as postal services, graves registration, enemy prisoner of war

(EPW) operations, and medical support and evacuation. Yeosock

recognized that corps commanders were men largely capable of

synchronizing their own battles and that, in any event, corps were

large organizations whose response to new orders was bound to take

some time, given the number of echelons of command between the

army and the level where orders are carried out, i.e., the platoon and

squad. Yeosock was determined to deal only in major issues and only with large units. Moreover, he was disposed to take a somewhat

Jeffersonian view of high command as something done best when done

least. This view was probably necessary because of the compulsive- activist behavior of the CINC, not to mention a sense of lingering ambiguity about the extent to which Schwarzkopf might intend to deal
145

directly with his corps commanders and their restiveness under a peer

who had not commanded at their level.

So as long as ARCENT, as the operational headquarters, could

assign missions, allocate forces, set objectives and boundaries, conduct

deep fires, and monitor progress, it was, in Yeosock's view,

synchronizing the operations of the two corps. That could be done from

wherever the army commander had communications and a picture of

what was going on in an operational level of detail. Unstated was a

realization that there were two geographic and two "environmental"

conditions requiring, in Yeosock's view, his presence in Riyadh.

The geographic considerations were the location of the theater

intelligence apparatus and the proximity of General Pagonis in

Dhahran, or at least his headquarters. Pagonis himself seemed to be in

continuous motion all over the theater. Operational intelligence was

critical to decision making, and the immediate linkages with strategic

and operational systems were at Riyadh. Proximity to Support

Command (SUPCOM) was important to the demands of keeping the

movement process from the ports to the corps in order, a process in

which Yeosock took a personal daily interest from December through

February.

The first "environmental" condition was the need to stay close to

the commander in chief. This was a consequence of the personality of

the CINC himself. Schwarzkopf, an active, mercurial, highly

emotional, and often impatient man, was best dealt with face to face

and one on one.5 In many ways, Schwarzkopf used Yeosock as Grant

used Meade. In both cases, higher duties no doubt mandated such a

solution, but such working relationships are seldom comfortable for

either partner. Yeosock believed proximity was vital.

The second "environmental" requirement was the need to be able

to work face to face with major coordinating commands, especially the

Saudis and the CENTAF commander, General Homer, with whom

Yeosock shared quarters. Yeosock knew from his experience as

PMSANG that proximity to principal Saudi decision makers, often

civilians, was essential to coordinate the fight and to address vital

issues of host-nation support, particularly transportation, fuel supply,

and prisoner of war support.6 Circumventing the bureaucratic ArmyAir Force interface by direct discussions with Horner permitted

Yeosock to understand Schwarzkopf s view of the Air Force as a

distinct operational instrument. Thus, Yeosock could work on a

personal level for Army needs within the broader theater-strategic

vision.
146

Yeosock was confident that army communications could give him

a picture of the battlefield adequate to provide his forces the

appropriate guidance and coordination while he remained in the

capital. He had his communication system designed accordingly, and

his G2 built a massive intelligence structure next door to his

headquarters. In November and December, Yeosock also created two

additional elements of the headquarters to ensure his concept could be

realized-a mobile CP and seven liaison teams designed to be "shadow

staffs," or "directed telescopes." The commander's intentions for the

mobile CP seem always to have been largely misunderstood by key

subordinates. Yeosock would call the liaison teams one of the three

chief reasons for success in Operation Desert Storm. 7

As early as 27 October, General Frix, as ARCENT chief of staff

and deputy commanding general, alerted General Taylor at Forces

Command (and deputy commander, ARCENT rear) that a great deal of

attention was being given to the headquarters' ability to act as a field

army, an operational headquarters. Taylor was told to expect requests

for both "senior officers with experience in Armored/Mechanized

Operations and Communications Equipment and signal personnel

capable of communication over great distances."8 About the same

time, Colonel Glenn Lackey, G3 operations officer at ARCENT, was to

build an Operations and Intelligence Center (war room) in the Eskan

Village school house, from which the commander and his G3 could

monitor operations and communicate with higher, lower, and adjacent

headquarters. He was to create six, later seven, liaison teams to send

to adjacent and subordinate headquarters. And he was to develop a

mobile command post.

Lackey received his guidance from both Yeosock and Arnold.

Colonel Chuck Sutten, the G6 (communications electronics and

information management staff officer), provided technical advice and

designed the communications system. Assistance in obtaining the

equipment and manpower for the mobile CP and liaison teams was

provided by Major General Jerry Granrud's Force Development Office

at the DCSOPS in the Pentagon, and the two projects were tied

together under the titles of Project 5 and 5A (liaison parties and mobile

CP respectively). A related project to obtain a mobile armored CP for

the XVIII Corps was undertaken at the same time.

Yeosock had a clear vision of what he wanted from the liaison

parties. Arnold observed that his own first idea was simply provision of

traditional two- or three-man teams whose purpose would have been

limited largely to communications. Yeosock was thinking bigger,

especially in the case of those teams assigned to the Arab-Islamic
147

coalition's two commands. He wanted an organization "that could be a

minicorps headquarters if it had to be."9

The broad concept was similar to that of the C3IC organization.

The liaison party was not just to be a means of communication but an

instrumentality to influence how the allies did business, even to assist

them in complex staff work if necessary. This put a premium on the

quality and seniority of the officers and men assigned. Team chiefs,

with one exception, were colonels who were War College graduates.

The one exception, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Gutwald, was a talented

staff officer who became team chief when the colonel originally

assigned clashed with corps staff and was reassigned to another team

to promote harmony. Gutwald's team was assigned to XVIII Airborne

Corps.

In the case of the Arab-Islamic allies, the liaison parties provided

an ARCENT linkage with Special Operations Forces (SOF) assigned

by Central Command to Arab tactical units to provide advice and

training.10 By cooperating and combining ARCENT efforts with the

SOF liaison parties, the U.S. command, in fact, had a communications

and command information net in the Arab forces more reliable than

that possessed by the Northern and Eastern Area Commands

themselves. The ARCENT liaison teams assisted in planning and

obtaining deep targeting support for the Arab forces from CENTAF,

offered Arab tactical commanders intelligence not otherwise available,

provided immediate "ground truth" to the ARCENT commander and,

during the ground campaign, to the CENTCOM commander as well. A

team was also provided to the Egyptian Corps, which was subordinate

to Joint Forces Command North but closely associated diplomatically

and militarily with the Americans. The presence of this team ensured

both close cooperation with VII Corps' eastern neighbor and often

ensured communication between the Egyptians and their own higher

operational commander at Joint Forces Command North. (See figure

21.)

The liaison parties with U.S. coordinating forces facilitated the

army commander's provision of various types of support to

MARCENT. It allowed him to influence positioning of the CENTCOM

reserve division, 1st Cavalry Division(-), prior to commitment, as well

as to keep the reserve division commander informed about Third

Army's current intentions. For principal subordinate forces (VII and

XVIII Corps), the mission was more conventional but more substantial

in light of the caliber of officers assigned and their ability to achieve

immediate access to the army commander when necessary. On one

occasion after the cease-fire, for example, a liaison team was able to
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148
149

report to the Third Army commander the premature withdrawal of

occupation forces from Iraq by a senior subordinate commander

understandably interested in getting his forces home. 11 Another team,

in what must have been the loneliest job in the theater, acted as the

permanent point of contact with Iraqi representatives after the ceasefire agreement in March.

These parties were to be large-up to thirty or so officers and

enlisted soldiers-and multifaceted, to cover all staff functions. They

were to have several vehicles and redundant robust communications,

particularly multichannel TACSAT (tactical satellite) equipment.12

Liaison officers (LNOs) were not just to pass on information but to

evaluate it from the point of view of the army commander. They were,

in fact, to provide information that distances and circumstances

prevented the army commander from obtaining firsthand. The chief

LNOs were to be "directed telescopes"-the eyes and ears of the

commander. In Yeosock's words after the war, the key was "to bridge"

the command and control functions of the land component commander

(in the absence of such a figure). The solution was to use LNO teams

that had capabilities in command, operations, logistics, plans, and

communication. "For U.S. forces it was overkill, but for Arab-Islamic

forces it became in many respects a shadow staff to make up for their

inability to deal with planning at the level required." 13

While these parties were created by ARCENT, those teams

assigned to duty with the Marines and Joint Command East were

virtually taken over by CENTCOM once operations were under way.

Particularly with the Arab forces, the teams became a means of

addressing a variety of coalition problems whose resolution was

required to ensure the success of Desert Storm. During the conduct of

the battle, the two parties with the American corps and those with the

Egyptians and the Joint Forces Command North acted as an extension

of the army commander's personal staff and reported not through the

G3, though they kept him informed, but through the commander's

executive officer. This allowed Yeosock to circumvent the bureaucratic

delay imposed by a large general staff structure. All seven team chiefs

reported to the army commander's executive officer at least twice daily

to update the commander on the situation where they were located.

If the idea of large liaison staffs was the commanding general's,

the mobile CP seems to have been General Arnold's. Arnold was

thinking in terms of a division or corps tactical CP.14 Indeed, he took

the idea from his experiences as G3 in the 9th Division and, later, I

Corps. For Yeosock, the facility was never to be more than an

alternative command post that he could use if the main CP were
150

destroyed or interfered with.15 In either case, the facility had to be

mobile (the Department of the Army provided nine expando vans),

have a sophisticated communications package approximating that of

the main CP, and be manned with a talented staff to monitor ongoing

operations.

After 12 January, Yeosock used the mobile CP as a base for his

deputy, General Frix, and Frix's de facto deputy (actually a deputy G3

who had arrived in theater as director of the Army's Training and

Doctrine Command [TRADOC] Battle Command Training Program),

Colonel Carl Ernst. They could act as ARCENT expediters-that is, as

informed representatives of the commander, who could go and see

what was happening, interpret guidance, synchronize ongoing

operations, and provide feedback to the commander. This was done in a

situation where the corps headquarters maintained communications

with the main CP and the army commander. Subordinate commanders

could refer to either when the interpretation of the expediters did not

fit their own notions. 16

Third Army was working out its command and control structure

and processes as it deployed two corps and re-created itself from a basic

shell. The mobile CP was an entirely new creation with a scratch team,

like the rest of ARCENT, and its place in the command and control

structure was unclear. It had to be developed even as it coordinated a

major operational redeployment. The difference of creative vision

between the tactical CP and the mobile alternate, as well as the

presence of so much talent forward, sometimes produced a sort of

schizophrenia in the headquarters. Moreover, both Arnold and

Stewart, back at the main CP, seemed to be convinced that army

command should be conducted forward. Yeosock, however, had always

maintained he needed to be in the capital.

The principals at the forward CP clearly did perform as the field

army "tactical" headquarters-that is, the operational center of the

command and control apparatus for near-term actions during the

assembly of the army around King Khalid Military City and for its

redeployment to the west. The forward CP, "Lucky TAC" (after

Patton's forward headquarters in World War II), included cells from

the Support Command's 318th Movement Control Agency and the

89th Military Police Brigade, which had responsibility for ensuring

the one east-west MSR operated efficiently. A small plans element

headed by Major Kevin Reynolds developed contingency plans and

served as something of an alter ego to the Plans Cell at "Lucky Main"

in Riyadh. The G3 argued that the tactical CPs (TACs) should talk to

corps TACs, the main CP to the corps' main CP, that fragmentary
151

orders (FRAGOs) should be issued by the TAC (this was granted, but

approval still came from the main CP and, when time was scarce, was

not always observed anyway), and that contingency planning should

be the sole province of the TAC, while long-term plans would be drawn

up in the main CP.17

What all this "structure" failed to comprehend was that command

takes place where the commander is. Throughout, Yeosock, who did

not believe operational command and tactical command are analogous,

maintained limits on the initiative of the mobile CP, which frustrated

its aspirations to operational control. In the end, the army's war was

run largely by the commander, through his personal staff at Eskan

Village and his liaison teams (with key subordinate and adjacent

headquarters), while using his general staff for detail and longer-term

work. The mobile CP, as Yeosock always intended, was an alternate

command post, a base for expediters who could untangle immediate

problems and a headquarters to oversee the operations of the various

echelon-above-corps troops. It did oversee important actions leading up

to the initiation of the ground attack, not only redeployment but

prisoner of war camp construction, development of echelon-abovecorps communications systems, the conduct of mass casualty drills (in

anticipation of chemical warfare), and replacement system

operations-thereby freeing the army commander and his G3 to focus

on future operational issues. The mobile CP also served as an

aggressive seeker of information, supplementing the work of the

liaison officers and main CP. One mark of its capabilities was that

General Waller, who served as interim commander from 17-23

February while Yeosock underwent surgery in Germany, indicated

that he intended to command from the mobile CP rather than the main

CP.18

Whether Waller's solution would have been more or less

successful than Yeosock's is speculative. The communication net at the

mobile CP was not as robust as that at the main CP, which had been

designed as the center of a communications web. Moreover, selection of

the commander's location depended upon the respective officer's

assessment of his relationships, not just with subordinates but with his

superior and coordinate commanders. To have made the mobile CP a

TAC was more congenial with most officers' cultural values, but it

seems to have implied a great deal more direct control of tactical

events than Yeosock intended or thought necessary. Waller's view also

reflected greater confidence in his personal ties to Schwarzkopf and

less concern with maintenance of personal contact with the joint air
152

component commander and Arab officials once the ground attack

began.

The third of Colonel Lackey's projects, the war room, was the least

novel, though perhaps the most important one, since it was from here

and the commander's office adjacent to it that the ARCENT war was

run. The war room, a large bay-like facility, was built in the courtyard

of the Eskan Village school house. Staff officers and liaison officers

were placed in parallel banks of desks, with secure phones, in front of a

large operational map. It was a sort of field expedient version of the

NASA operations rooms. The war room had an extraordinary

communication network that allowed the commander or G3 to speak to

anyone from the JCS to the divisional CPs. G2 and G3 operations were

integrated. This was underpinned by Generals Arnold and Stewart

having held corresponding positions in the 9th Division earlier in their

careers. Thus, the physical layout was backed up on the more personal

level.

One external influence on the expansion of the army staff (and

those of the corps and Support Command) should be addressed. This

had to do with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), of

which Colonel Carl F. Ernst was the director prior to his seconding to

Third Army. BCTP is important because its multilevel involvement in

planning and organizational activities is indicative of the extent to

which the entire Army immediately focused its energies on supporting

the forces in theater, sometimes overwhelming the actors with good

ideas but generally making a large and positive contribution.

The BCTP is an organization designed to exercise and stretch the

capabilities of senior staffs by providing an evaluated, interactive,

computer-based war game to division and corps headquarters. It is the

headquarters' combat training center. The BCTP evaluators are a

group of bright, skilled, and often aggressive staff officers who critique

in detail the staff processes and applications of doctrine by the units

that are required to contend with their unforgiving opponent. To the

extent that Colonel Purvis and his colleagues from SAMS represent

the intellectual legacy of General William E. DePuy's organization of

TRADOC, BCTP represents the countervailing tendency to a technical

and positivist view of war reflected in the Army Training and

Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and the national training centers. Its

creed is tough, evaluated, realistic training to standard. 19

Upon the initiation of Desert Shield, Colonel Ernst immediately

offered his services and those of his organization to XVIII Airborne

Corps, and as the crisis developed, he supported both the corps and the
153

army headquarters by running staff exercises, developing simulations

to test different planning options and, perhaps most important,

seeding the various staffs with BCTP evaluators who became full

working members of the organization (while retaining their contact

with Ernst). 20 Two of these, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Schmidt and

Major Kevin Reynolds, played key roles in writing operations plans for

both corps and ARCENT.

BCTP members also set the standards for staffs coming together

under pressure, as a large number of new members flowed in,

particularly at ARCENT but also at VII Corps. This was not always

without friction with the proprietary staff members, but most of the

BCTP people were able to provide instruction without appearing to be

Field Marshal Montgomery coming to "save" the Americans at the

Bulge.

Ernst was ultimately retained as deputy G3 at ARCENT. Colonel

Mike Hawk, one of his team chiefs, was deputy chief of staff at VII

Corps. Ernst kept three BCTP members, among them Major Reynolds,

with him in the mobile CP as a sort of alternate plans cell. Lieutenant

Colonel Schmidt became chief of plans at VII Corps. The BCTP

network, whatever else it did, provided another channel for

information to flow between headquarters, sometimes to get

previously rejected ideas reconsidered, often to get new ideas on the

table. It is a measure of the trust vested in Ernst and his team that

XVIII Corps took liberties with security surrounding the war plan to

allow the colonel to test various offensive options against simulation,

thereby widening significantly the circle of those privy to the ground

attack plan, to include stations in CONUS.21 The secret was held and

useful insights were developed that subsequently assisted the

command in preparing for Operation Desert Storm.

With the late December-early January forward deployment of the

liaison teams and mobile CP and the development of the war room,

ARCENT-Third Army had become a warfighting headquarters. At the

same time, ARCENT continued to be a theater army, the

departmental command in theater. In addition to, and simultaneous

with, introducing a new corps, ARCENT had to expand its echelonabove-corps force structure to provide for a significantly greater

demand for operational (theater) transportation, intelligence

information, and such practical functions as engineer construction,

graves registration, enemy prisoner of war operations, and civil

affairs-matters generally not addressed in Army schools or on

peacetime exercises. The 416th Engineer Command, 352d Civil Affairs

Command, and the 800th Military Police Brigade were Reserve
154

Component units. ARCENT also formed an echelon-above-corps

personnel command.

At the same time, ARCENT had to continue, indeed expand, the

force modernization programs already under way, work out a scheme

for replacement operations in anticipation of heavy combat losses, and

organize a vast medical support structure built almost entirely on

Reserve Component hospitals.

The expansion of the intelligence capabilities was extraordinary.

When the ARCENT mission had called for a defense fought only by a

single corps, that corps' intelligence organization had been deemed

adequate. The intermediate army intelligence structure had been

limited, and the ARCENT G2, unlike the G3 and G4, was a colonel,

Beauford W. Tuton. Tuton had planned for expansion of the

intelligence structure but had not been able to bring the desired

augmentees forward under the minimum essential force guidance.

Then, in November, the mission changed.

On 1 November, the echelon-above-corps intelligence brigade (the

513th Military Intelligence Brigade) had only 453 personnel in

country; by 1 December, only 647. On 21 December, General Stewart

was appointed Third Army G2 upon the medical evacuation of Colonel

Tuton. Stewart had been commander of the Army Intelligence Agency.

On 15 January, 1,546 members of the 513th had arrived in theater,

and by 14 February, there were 1,792.22

Stewart was not responsible for calling forward the remainder of

the 513th, but he did bring to the problem of establishing a theater

army intelligence structure the rank and authority of a general officer,

a great deal of dynamic energy (he was a tireless promoter of

intelligence systems), and a fund of personal knowledge of the wider

Army intelligence community that allowed him to bring in a number

of talented assistants and several developmental systems for

managing and distributing intelligence information. He thoroughly

integrated the 513th into the G2 organization until, to all intents and

purposes, he headed a staff section of almost 2,000, housed in a highrise apartment complex next to the "School House," surrounded by

barbed wire, and marked by a large number of satellite antenna

dishes, communication vans, people in civilian clothes, and other

attributes of a little "Langley." In essence, Stewart assembled and

energized the theater ground intelligence structure in the month prior

to D-day.

Stewart has provided a massive classified history of intelligence

in the desert war and a personal executive summary.23 The major
155

issues from the standpoint of Army operations would seem to be these.

Intelligence, prior to G(day)-8, was, by virtue of the deception plan and

the nature of tactical intelligence systems, largely top-down. Because

the echelon-above-corps intelligence structure arrived only late in the

day, a good deal of operational and necessary tactical intelligence was

not available when VII Corps arrived. Indeed, General Franks has

noted that he could get little intelligence upon which to base his

offensive plans when he began responding to the CINC's initial

briefing in November.24

The lack of photographic support was particularly troublesome for

forces that would have to breach the enemy defenses. Engineer

diagrams on maps did not give breaching units the same confidence

that overhead photography might have. Photographic imagery would

be a continuous and emotional issue with tactical commanders, a

consequence of paying for sophisticated strategic satellite systems by

retiring older, but more numerous, operational and tactical aviation

and Air Force systems without adequate replacements. Satellite

imagery was excellent in quality, but its capability was limited in the

number of targets it could handle at any given time. Because priorities

for strategic systems were set elsewhere and because system design

has been based largely on strategic needs, there was a clear loss of the

capability that most division and brigade commanders had known in

Vietnam. They were not happy about it.

On the other hand, in December Schwarzkopf had decided to bring

in joint surveillance target attack radar system (J-STARS), a joint

Army-Air Force system that was clearly the greatest operational

intelligence success of the war. J-STARS are sets of down-looking

airborne radars carried in old Boeing 707s that are capable of tracking

moving targets on the ground. It lets operational commanders look on

the other side of the hill, both for purposes of targeting and responding

to operational initiatives by the enemy. In the uncharacteristically

bad weather that marked Desert Storm, J-STARS was essential both

to read the battlefield and interdict retreating Iraqi units.

Stewart was also successful in linking the ARCENT intelligence

community with other departmental and extradepartmental sources

and in introducing new intelligence information distribution systems

still in the developmental stage.25 The support and direct involvement

of the Army Intelligence Agency seems to have been exceptional.

Some problems could not be solved. A shortage of Arabic linguists

was overcome partially by the use of Kuwaiti student volunteers, but

there were never enough. Stewart was forced to create a special
156

intelligence distribution communications network from

developmental systems, and VII Corps had to borrow an unmanned

aerial vehicle (UAV), while the Navy was using drones to adjust naval

gunfire from its battleships. Investment in tactical and operational

intelligence had not kept pace, or else maneuver commanders had not

been prepared for the economies of scale with which they were forced

to contend.

In light of the comparatively late arrival of intelligence units and

a general officer G2, the potential contribution of intelligence was

underestimated, particularly in view of the implications of the theater

deception plan and the key role battle damage assessment (BDA)

played in the synchronization of ground and air operations. On the

other hand, delay in bringing in the 513th Military Intelligence (MI)

Brigade was consistent with policy on minimum essential forces that

obtained until November and the ARCENT commander's decision to

delay introduction of echelon-above-corps units until the last minute

to give priority to combat forces and, after December, essential

logistics support. It would be hard to find something brought in that

could have been left out of the flow in order to introduce the remainder

of the 513th MI Brigade any sooner than was done. As it was, artillery

units were still flowing in country on G-day, and a large number of

HETs arrived only in time to evacuate units from Iraq.

Unquestionably, the 513th did arrive in time, if only just.

There was no G2 present at the ARCENT commander's daily

general officer meetings prior to Stewart's arrival to argue army issues

from the standpoint of likely Iraqi responses and to represent the

intelligence field for a place on the priority list. However, Yeosock

believed that he benefited from the council of Brigadier General Jack

Leide, the CENTCOM J2, whom he believed to be one of the best

intelligence professionals in the business. 26 In short, Yeosock did not

feel that he was short of good intelligence for the major decisions

required of him under the circumstances. After December, Stewart

was the right man in the right place to deal with the problems of the

"unforgiving minute."

More characteristic of the role of ARCENT were the actions

undertaken to wrestle with the problem of operational transport. Once

the two corps were in theater, the Third Army had to oversee and

harmonize their movement to operational assembly areas and the

build-up of their respective logistic bases. Although General Pagonis,

as 22d Support Command commander and deputy commander for

logistics, was responsible for the executive effort, the anticipation of

requirements and oversight of the execution remained Yeosock's
157

responsibilities. When need be, he acted as a referee between

consumers (the two corps commanders) and supplier (the SUPCOM

commander).

As has been said before, operational art is conducted in the

offensive by trucks, HETs, lowboys (another form of heavy equipment

transport vehicle), other line-haul vehicles, and cargo and fuel carriers

that are able to accompany fighting vehicles into an enemy's

operational depths. In Europe, where the Army was designed to fight,

an extensive highway infrastructure permitted heavy dependence on

commercial line-haul vehicles and the superb German rail system. In

the Iraqi desert, there was no road net to speak of, and rough terrain

vehicles capable of carrying ammunition and fuel had to be found to

make the large units employed capable of continuous movement to the

enemy's operational depth (about 300-400 kilometers).

To deploy VII Corps to its assembly area east of King Khalid

Military City (274 or 334 miles away, depending on the arrival port)

and to redeploy the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division,

and 3d Armored Cavalry of XVIII Corps to the west of Wadi al Batin

(330 to 375 miles away, depending on the unit), heavy equipment

transporters and lowboys had to be found. (See figure 22.)

Furthermore, none of these initiatives would be of any use at all if

drivers could not be located for the vehicle trains. Yeosock invested his

time and energies in December and January resolving these problems.

The nature of the solutions, again, is instructive for those who would

understand the role of the theater army.

The most sensitive problem had to do with the HETs required to

move tanks (and the lowboys, which move only smaller-tracked

vehicles). Based upon the arrival dates of tanks from Europe, the

intention to complete the movements within two weeks of the onset of

air operations, and various force modernization initiatives, ARCENT

planners arrived at a requirement for 1,295 HETs against a supply of

only 897 in the entire Army inventory. 27

In late November and throughout December and January,

Yeosock and his chief supplier, General Gordon Sullivan, the Army

vice chief of staff, began the great HET hunt. Pagonis networked the

logistics community, and CENTCOM approached the European allies

through U.S. European Command. 28 On 14 January, there were only

461 HETs in theater, 335 from the host nation, 126 from U.S. sources.

On 29 January, there were 653 including 100 Egyptian HETs. On 14

February, there were 759 HETs, including U.S. commercial and

Italian models, compared to an expectation in December that 788
158

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159

would be in theater by 15 January.29 The 1,295 requirement would be

met only after Desert Storm, when a total of 1,404 HETs had been

acquired from various sources. 30

HETs were of sufficient importance that they gradually moved up

the priority list in the ARCENT situation report until, on 7 December,

they became the number-one equipment issue. Material-handling

equipment was also considered a "war stopper."31 The goal was to

complete the movement to the tactical assembly areas and stock the

two eastern logistic bases by 31 January. In December, it was clear

that this was to take an extraordinary effort given the shortfall in

trucks, the limitations in the road net, the distances involved, and the

sheer scale of the problem.

Use of various line-haul assets became the ARCENT

commander's principal command issue in December and January.

Each day, following his morning operational update and general

officers meeting, Yeosock would retreat to his office, where he would

figure the progress on land movement to date. During the night,

Colonel Bob Kliemon, the transportation officer in the ARCENT G4

office, provided information on vehicle availability. Colonel Dave

Whaley, the commander of the 7th Transportation Group, would

provide information about what was in the port requiring movement

forward. In this way, Yeosock could manipulate the limited resources

in hand and ensure that various problems-a poor run of HET tires,

the need for repair parts, whatever it took to keep the flow goingwere addressed at the highest levels of the Army. 32 Ultimately (12

January), he dispatched General Frix and the mobile CP to King

Khalid Military City to provide overwatch of the various pieces for the

great trek west. Yeosock's problem was far different from that of the

planner who figures the requirements to do a job. His task was to take

the "glass half-full" and make sure it met the demands of the situation

at hand. And, of course, the people who had to live up to the

expectations were the transportation managers of the 22d Support

Command.

Besides centralized management of all aspects of the movement,

Yeosock and Pagonis used what the former referred to as "work

arounds," temporary expedients to compensate for shortages. The 1st

Cavalry Division began moving to King Khalid Military City in late

December in anticipation of the shift west. This move also reduced the

surge load anticipated for mid-January when the VII Corps was to

arrive at the same time the XVIII Corps was to begin its movement

westward and the Support Command was to initiate the army logistics

build-up west of the wadi. When the "Tiger Brigade" shifted north to
160

join MARCENT in January (to replace the 1st U.K. Armored Division

that came to VII Corps), it was sent overland rather than mounted on

wheeled carriers. Repair parts were surged behind the brigade from

the base at Dhahran to compensate for wear and tear on the vehicles.

In similar fashion, two Bradley battalions of the 1st Armored Division

self-deployed to the VII Corps assembly area.33 Still, out on the MSR, a

wheeled vehicle passed the MP at Hafar al Batin intersection about

every fifteen seconds.

The forces in Saudi Arabia were heavily dependent upon hostnation vehicles and donated equipment from many nations to meet

line-haul transportation needs. These vehicles were of limited use

without American drivers or, in the case of vehicles driven by thirdcountry nationals, "assistant drivers." 34 On 22 December, ARCENT

laid out its requirements for drivers, and the 10th Personnel

Command, the newly formed echelon-above-corps personnel manager,

addressed itself to the task of obtaining no fewer than 7,444 soldiers to

drive buses and trucks and to serve as "supercargoes" and back-up

drivers on third country vehicles in case the civilian drivers decided

not to come to the war.35 To fill these requirements, the Army called

up Reserve Component units and deployed them without vehicles. The

Army accelerated training for new soldiers and even converted an air

defense battalion (3/2d Air Defense Artillery) wholesale.36 A number

of highly trained light infantrymen went to war in the cab of a thirdcountry line-haul truck.

The measure of the success was in the doing. By 9 February, the

date of the briefing to the secretary of defense, SUPCOM had moved

the two corps to their new assembly areas. It had stocked logistic bases

that had not existed thirty days before with more than five days'

rations-close to 100 percent of the forward fuel stockage objective

(VII Corps' Log Base E was at 100 percent; XVIII Corps' Log Base C

was at 73 percent) and ammunition (60 percent or better in the

forward bases). 37

The time required to complete the build-up past the 31st was a

consequence of continued shortages in line-haul trucks, delays in ship

arrivals, and the general constraints in the system. In the event, a

line-haul truck took three days for a round trip-a day going, a day

returning, and a day for maintenance and crew rest. Sometimes, the

average was more like four days. That meant that two-thirds of the

fleet was not productively engaged at any one time. Efficiency could be

further reduced when maintenance availability declined. (The original

SUPCOM plan had assumed only a 60 percent operational rate.) The

delay in build-up was compensated for by the additional time involved
161

in arriving at the 50 percent attrition of the Iraqi forces in the KTO.

That, as it happened, was achieved as the troop build-up and force

redeployment was coming to an end.

In addition to finding thousands of drivers, Personnel Command

(PERSCOM) also established a replacement system that would provide

trained squads, teams, and crews (with their combat systems) as unit

replacements. PERSCOM also oversaw the normal individual

replacement flow as well. Designated replacement battalion

commanders were collected in theater against potential losses. 38 The

scale of the medical system that backed up the combat forces and the

investment in the replacement systems is indicative of an Army

prepared for significant combat losses and another indication that,

before 24 February, no one in authority expected an easy victory.

About 13,580 beds were available in the ARCENT area of operations

on G-day, backed up by facilities in Europe and CONUS.39 The Army

located a training team from the 7th Army Training Command in

Europe at King Khalid Military City. This detachment set up a

training program for the replacement squads, crews, and teams. 40 The

presence of these basic combat units in Saudi Arabia represented a

great cost to the total Army but reflected the corporate effort invested

in victory.

The force modernization (the replacement of older systems with

newer models) of Bradley and Abrams units that had begun before the

dispatch of VII Corps continued. All units were not modernized before

the offensive, however. Two armored battalions of the 1st Infantry

were not upgunned (the 3d and 4th Battalions of the 37th Armor). And

the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate) in the 24th

Infantry Division attacked with infantry still in M113 armored

personnel carriers rather than Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. In

addition to combat vehicles, units swapped old commercial four-wheeldrive trucks for the ubiquitous high-mobility multipurpose wheeled

vehicles (HMMWVs), the successor to World War II Jeeps. 41 Perhaps

most important, by 23 February, in order to improve divisional offroad logistic mobility, 203 heavy expanded mobility tactical truck

(HEMTT) fuelers and 435 HEMTT cargo trucks had been issued to

ARCENT units, including the 1st Cavalry Division and "Tiger

Brigade."4 2 HEMTT fuelers were so important that significant air

transport was dedicated to bringing in 269. Without the 100 HEMTT

fuelers issued to the 24th Division, it is unlikely that the "Victory

Division" would have made it to the Euphrates valley.

The principal addition to the Third Army was the VII Corps,

designated to be the striking force for the coalition ground offensive.
162

The VII Corps started its preparation for Desert Storm in August 1990,

although no one knew it at the time. Almost at once, following the

Iraqi invasion, General Franks convened a small planning group in his

headquarters "to get our heads in the game a little bit."43

Franks would command the largest armored force concentrated in

a single attack in U.S. military history. He is not a typical cavalryman

in appearance or demeanor. He is short, circumspect, and deliberate. A

lot of U.S. service members are very likely alive today because of that

circumspection. Franks is one of the few generals in the Army who

wears a mustache, and he holds a Master of Philosophy degree in

literature from Columbia University. He is a gentleman, a man of

quiet firmness, extraordinary character, and self-discipline. Franks

lost a leg in Vietnam (as did his G3, Colonel Stan Cherrie) while a staff

officer in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. He remained in the

service, rising to command of the 11th Cavalry, the 1st Armored

Division, and the VII Corps. He served between command tours as

deputy commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College at Fort Leavenworth. In Desert Storm, he would move five

heavy divisions against the Iraqi flank, maneuvering two of them and

an armored cavalry regiment north, then east, in formation while

retaining concentration-a maneuver reminiscent of another

Frederick at a place called Leuthen.

At first, VII Corps' problem was to deploy various small

formations and individuals from Europe to reinforce XVIII Corps, but

Franks and his staff also speculated on the possibility of having to send

larger elements, for example an armored division. Later, Franks

would say he had been reminded, by the end of the cold war and the

drawdown then in progress, of the transfer of European divisions to the

Pacific in World War II following VE-Day. In addition, Franks had

recognized the operational implications of the collapse of the Soviet

bloc and had reoriented corps training to focus on movement to contact

and attack from the march, in contrast with the European General

Defense Plan scenario of linear forward defense that had dominated

Army thinking since the fall of South Vietnam. 44

When ordered to deploy the corps, Franks' earlier exploratory

work proved invaluable. General Crosbie Saint, the commander of

U.S. Army Europe, met with Franks on 4 November, even before the

presidential deployment announcement, to decide on what units to

deploy. Saint assumed responsibility for the deployment itself, thus

freeing Franks and VII Corps to concentrate on their responsibilities

in Saudi Arabia. 45
163

It was decided that two armored divisions would be sent with the

corps, as well as the corps troop package that included its armored

cavalry regiment (the 2d Armored Cavalry). The decision was made,

too, to take only units already modernized in favor of those still

requiring new MlA1 tanks and M2 or M3 Bradleys. The 3d Armored

Division from V Corps, the other U.S. Europe-based corps, was to be

one of the divisions. VII Corps' own 1st Armored Division was the

second. The 3d Armored Division was commanded by Major General

Paul Funk. Coincidentally, Funk's son, who served as a captain in the

Persian Gulf, was married to General Yeosock's daughter. The 1st

Armored was commanded by Major General Ron Griffith. Later, the

1st Infantry Division, a Reforger unit from Fort Riley, Kansas, was

added at Yeosock's request. 46 The 1st Infantry was commanded by

Major General Tom Rhame.

Accommodation had to be made for units already in the process of

deactivation and for certain NATO political sensitivities concerning

reversion of U.S.-operated facilities to German control. 47 Saint and

Franks elected to send a brigade package of the 3d Infantry Division

(built around the 3d Brigade of the 3d Infantry) in lieu of one brigade

of the 1st Armored. They also decided to replace the 1st Infantry

Division (Forward), a brigade group of the 1st Infantry Division based

in Germany, with V Corps' 2d Armored Division (Forward), another

Europe-based brigade group of the U.S.-based 2d Armored Division. 48

The 1st Infantry Division (Forward), whose connection with its parent

division was limited, was in an advanced stage of deactivation.

Moreover, sending the 2d Armored Division (Forward) configured the

1st Infantry Division as an armored division, title notwithstanding.

An armored battalion and air defense battalion of the 8th Infantry

Division rounded out the 3d Armored Division. 4

9

The 1st Infantry Division (Forward) went to Saudi Arabia to

operate the ports that received the VII Corps, thus speeding the corps

to the front. The men of the brigade were retained through the ground

war as part of the potential replacement pool. 50

In addition to forming the combat force, another task required

coordination between U.S. European Command (USAREUR), Forces

Command, and CENTCOM. The VII Corps support command had to be

raised to a wartime strength suitable for an out-of-theater deployment.

This involved an expansion of about 300 percent, largely by Reserve

Component soldiers deployed by Forces Command from the United

States. The VII Corps added 19,908 Reserve Component soldiers to its

force structure. 51
164

Deployment, of course, had to be in consonance with the Third

Army plan. General Franks went to Saudi Arabia almost at once to

meet with General Yeosock to discuss deployment and to conduct a

reconnaissance. Before departing, Franks had received a call from

Yeosock and General Pagonis to provide general guidance on

preparing for the transfer of forces. Unlike XVIII Corps, which was

involved in rapidly building a deterrent combat force, VII Corps could

front-load sufficient engineers, command and control, and

sustainment elements to prepare the corps assembly area for the

inbound combat forces. Not surprisingly, Pagonis told Franks to bring all the HETs he could get his hands on.52 An additional advantage enjoyed by VII Corps was the ability to talk to commanders already on

the ground in advance of deployment. The corps made up a draft timephased force deployment list, and Franks took it to Saudi Arabia for

Yeosock's approval.53

Just as the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) was dispatched to

handle inbound port operations for the corps, the 3d Infantry Division,

one of the Army's proudest combat units, took responsibility for

supporting port operations in the three ports used to depart Europe. The 3d also provided weapons and support personnel so the corps could

conduct final predeployment training at the 7th Army Training Area

at Grafenwohr, Germany.54 An Army that had prepared for reception of state-side Reforger units for war in NATO now reversed the process and moved divisions, regiments, brigades, and groups to the ports of

Antwerp, Bremerhaven, and Rotterdam by train, barge, and road.55

Some aviation units simply flew to ports in Italy. One of the unique features of Desert Shield-Desert Storm was that units in both CONUS

and Europe moved to deployment ports on inland waterways by barge,

not a normal way of doing business in either theater.

On 30 November, the ARCENT SITREP contained an entry concerning VII Corps that read: ". .. INITIALLY, THE CORPS WILL

ESTABLISH A STRONG C2 AND LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY,

DEPLOY A REINFORCED CAV REGT, AND PREPARE TO

RECEIVE THE REMAINDER OF THE CORPS."56

By then, fifteen ships were en route to the ports. Of the corps equipment, 40 percent had departed the home station. XVIII Corps continued to modernize tanks and infantry units, and the 24th

Division was conducting joint training with Saudi units.57 XVIII

Corps' 1st Corps Support Command (1st COSCOM) was completing its

deployment, still playing catch-up from the earlier minimum essential
165

force guidance. Meanwhile, the strength of Iraqi forces was estimated

to have reached 3,790 tanks and 2,390 armored personnel carriers. 58

By 15 December, as CENTCOM prepared to brief the secretary of

defense, VII Corps could report forty-eight ships en route to the

theater, four unloading, and two more due that day. Two days later,

the 24th Division conducted a combined-arms live-fire exercise with a

combined U.S.-Saudi force, the culmination of the corps' efforts at

combined training.5 9

By the end of the year, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment,

reinforced by the 210th Field Artillery Brigade, was screening the

corps' assembly area west of the XVIII Corps, while the divisions

prepared to receive their combat battalions. The 1st Cavalry Division

was en route to assembly area Wendy, southwest of King Khalid

Military City. At that time, 27 January, the last of VII Corps'

equipment was expected. 60

The new deployment was not without difficulties. To speed VII

Corps to the theater, ships were loaded without regard to unit

integrity. That meant a good bit of confusion existed, and sorting was

necessary at the reception ports. The shortage of HETs led to clogged

ports and concentrations of soldiers, who arrived by plane, then waited

for up to three weeks for their equipment. 61 As late as 14 January,

General Arnold observed to General Taylor at Forces Command that

"Early deployment of combat units over CSS units and equipment

continues to haunt us. MHE [materiel handling equipment] shipped

and enroute will solve many of our problems. HETS, Low Boys &

S.&Ps. continue to be well short of requirements. Backlog at the ports

is considerable and growing."62

On 16 January, HET tires were identified as one of the highestpriority items, with 3,000 required immediately.6 3 The estimate of

Iraqi strength had reached 4,280 tanks and 2,880 armored personnel

carriers. The next night the war began. (See figure 23.)
Figure 23. Allied deployments the day prior to the start of air operations

166

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Notes

1. The British SAS had a good bit of trouble with winter weather conditions in Iraq and

lost one soldier to hypothermia. See de la Billiere, Storm Command, 225, 239.

2. HQ, 22d Support Command, briefing titled, "Theater Logistics Concept," dated 27

December 1990, slide titled, "ARCENT Strength Projection," shows that the

ARCENT target for 15 December to 15 January was 4,265 soldiers per day compared

to 1,168 from 7 August to 6 December. General Pagonis compared the effort to

Reforger in which only about 10,000 total soldiers were moved to the theater after a year's preparation. A transcript of General Pagonis' 27 December briefing prepared

by 44th MHD, 4. A 27 December briefing was presented at the ARCENT MAPEX.

The transcript reflects what General Pagonis said as he presented briefing slides.

Hereafter, both documents will be referred to as HQ, 2d Support Command, briefing

titled, "Theater Logistics Concept," dated 27 December 1990, with the transcript or slides indicated thereafter.

3. Interview with Colonel Jorgenson at HQ, ARCENT, 9 March 1991, 31. In fact,

General Arnold had attended the armor school officer advanced course, had been a battalion and division staff officer, and a battalion commander in the 8th Infantry

Division in Europe. He was not entirely innocent of heavy experience.

4. Colonel Jorgenson attributed this "demotion" to the CINC's refusal to talk to

colonels. Interview with Colonel Jorgenson at HQ, ARCENT, 9 March 1991, 18. The

explanation in the text was given the author by General Yeosock and is a more

reasonable account.

5. De la Billiere, Storm Command, 42, 148-49.

6. Logistic support for enemy prisoners of war was largely provided by a Saudi

contractor. Construction of facilities was done by the 416th Engineers, and custody

and administration was in the hands of the 800th Military Police Command, which

also had to do a good deal of the building.

7. The other two were global positioning systems and the 22d Support Command. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, command briefing titled, "Theater Operations Desert

Shield/Desert Storm," slide titled, "Commander's Keys to Success," dated 15 August

1991.

8. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT

Rear, Subject: ARCENT Command SITREP as of COB 27 Oct (C + 81), signed R. S.

Frix, BG, USA.

9. Interview with Major General Steve Arnold, Eskan Village, 15 March 1991, 19.

Description of parties as minicorps headquarters was a common metaphor in

General Yeosock's explanations of his liaison parties.

10. On the special forces teams, see Dr. Richard W. Stewart, USASOC Command

Historian, Roles and Missions of Special Operations in Desert Storm: An Initial

Historical Summary. There are a number of after-action reports from ARCENT

liaison parties. The quality of each is largely dependent upon the time remaining

from redeployment to Riyadh and departure for CONUS. Interest was not always

high. The best account concerning working with the Arab forces is that by Colonel

167
168

Daniel M. Ferezan, who was in charge of the team with the Egyptian Corps,

Memorandum for Commander, Third U.S. Army, Attn: G3, APO NY 09772, Subject:

Project 5/Liaison Team Golf After-Action Report, dated 31 March 1991. A testier

report was prepared by Colonel Joseph D. Molinari, team chief to Joint Forces

Command North, Subject: After-Action Report for the United States Liaison [sic],

Advisory and Assistance Team to Joint Forces Command North during Operation

Desert Shield-Storm, n.d. The teams were, by necessity, thrown together hurriedly

at Fort Bragg, deployed to Saudi Arabia, and then sent almost at once to the field.

Some seem to have taken being "jerked around" in this fashion better than others.

The author attended the liaison officer after-action review in Kuwait City at Task

Force Freedom in March 1991.

11. The author was in the ARCENT main CP when the matter was reported and

discussed by CG and ARCENT staff. The unit was XVIII Corps.

12. Equipment is listed on a series of messages between ARCENT and CONUS (see for

example, Message, 272015Z NOV 90, FM CDR XVIIIABNCORPS FT BRAGG

NC//AFZQ-MS//, Subject: ARCENT Projects 5, 5A, and 9) and in a briefing titled,

"ARCENT Communications Laydown," n.d.; and slide titled, "Field Army Liaison

Team Commo Package (6 Required)." This briefing was prepared early in the

planning process from notes on final sheet. See also liaison officer after-action

reports.

13. Quoted in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, undated memorandum written by

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall, titled, "CG Comments on the Context of

ARCENT Operations." Memorandum will be retired with General Yeosock's

personal papers to the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

14. Interview with Major General Steven Arnold, Eskan Village, 15 March 1991, 21-22.

15. Ibid. General Yeosock was entirely consistent in his view of the mobile CP and in

the instructions he gave his staff and G6, Colonel Sutten. He intended to command

from the main CP. Guidance is given in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group,

Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, dated 2

January 1991, paragraph 4; and HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, dated 29 January 1991,

paragraph 5 (filed with General Yeosock's personal records at the Army Military

History Institute); and interview with Colonel Jorgensen, 6, 16. Both General

Yeosock and Colonel Sutten indicated to the author that command could have been

shifted first to the Royal Saudi Land Forces Building within Riyadh had that been

necessary before moving to the mobile CP.

16. Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch was a German General Staff officer who visited the

front in August 1914 and is sometimes blamed for causing the Schlieffen Plan to be

halted by way of his interpretation of the wishes of the High Command.

17. A briefing was prepared to align the relative responsibilities of both CPs by the G3

for presentation at the MAPEX in late December. Slides are titled, "USARCENT

OPLAN 001-Desert Storm, Command and Control-Fwd," and "USARCENT

OPLAN 001-Desert Storm, Command and Control-Main," all marked 122735D.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Kendall, the CG's XO, General Yeosock did not

allow the presentation. At the mobile CP, General Frix instructed the members,

while the author was present, that there was only one "integrated staff" and the
169

mobile CP should think of itself in that way, each section as part of its parent

division in the main CP.

18. Interview with Major General Steven Arnold, Eskan Village, 15 March 1991, 22-23.

The author was in the mobile CP when General Frix announced General Waller's

intent.

19. If General (Ret.) Donn Starry was the intellectual father of AirLand Battle-first as

commandant of the Armor Center then as TRADOC commander following General

DePuy-General (Ret.) Paul Gorman was the founder of the Army training system

as a brigadier general of DePuy's TRADOC staff in the seventies. For the

organization of TRADOC and the background on the two threads of TRADOC's

approach to preparing for war, see Major Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be

Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations,

Leavenworth Paper No. 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988).

20. See interview with Colonel Carl F. Ernst, director, Battle Command Training

Program, by W. Glenn Robertson in U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, 1990

Annual Command History, CAC History Office (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), 297, et

seq. Much of what follows is based on the author's observations as well as Colonel

Ernst's interview.

21. Ernst interview, 335.

22. Message, 012359Z NOV 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRD-CS//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAING3//PERID/312400Z/TO:012400Z/

ASOF:012400Z, 8. Message, 012359Z DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//

AFRD-CS//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAING3//PERID/302400Z/TO:

0102400Z/ASOF:012400Z, 11. Message, 152359Z JAN 91, FM

COMUSARCENTMAIN//AFRD-DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAING3//

PERID/142400Z/TO:1502400Z/ASOF:152400Z, 10. HQ, ARCENT, G3, ARCENT

Morning Brief, Friday, 15 February 1991 (D+29), slide titled, "ARCENT Personnel

Strength."

23. A complete report was returned to the Intelligence School for further analysis. The

executive summary is by Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr., Operation Desert

Storm: The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G2, 3d U.S. Army (April

1991).

24. Interview with General Frederick Franks, by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, at the Pentagon on 31 October

1991, 22. The author was present.

25. Stewart, Operation DESERT STORM, 12 et seq.

26. General Yeosock to author.

27. For the total number of Army HETs, Appendix R to Department of Defense, Office of

the Secretary of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: A Final Report to

Congress Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), January

1992 Final Coordinating Draft, R-G-64. For 1,295 figure, see HQ, 22d Support

Command, briefing titled, "Theater Logistics Concept," dated 27 December 1990,

slide titled, "Theater Heavy Lift Capability, Requirement to Move XVIII Corps."
170

Transcript of briefing makes it clear 1,295 was total figure for two corps

notwithstanding title of slide. Ibid., 13-18.

28. General Pagonis in ibid. General Yeosock to author. ARCENT SITREP for 4

December requests CENTCOM intervention with EUCOM. Author's assumption is

that ARCENT would not have asked were CENTCOM and EUCOM not dealing

with the issue. Message, 042359Z DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRDCS//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN G3/PERID/032400Z/TO:

04204 2400 :042400, 11-12.

29. HQ, ARCENT, SUPCOM (Prov) LOGSITREP #163, 152300CJAN91, 1. HQ,

ARCENT, SUPCOM (Prov) LOGSITREP D+14 day 302300JAN91, 1. HQ,

ARCENT, SUPCOM LOGSITREP D+30 152300FEB91, 1. Projection in December

is in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, briefing titled, "Sec Def Brief" (handwritten,

no title slide), 15 December 1990, slide titled, "HET Status." These appear to be

slides prepared for the commanding general to use during briefing the secretary of

defense and chairman on 20 December. Numbers were soft as reference to December

SITREPS will show.

30. Appendix R to Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Conduct of

the Persian Gulf Conflict; A Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of the

Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of

1991 (Public Law 102-25), January 1992 Final Coordinating Draft, R-G-64, lists

total shipped. On 24 February, there were only 761 reported in theater. HQ,

ARCENT, SUPCOM LOGSITREP D+ 39, 242300FEB91, 1.

31. Message, 072359Z DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRD-CS//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN G3// PERID/062400/

TO:072400Z/ASOF:072400Z, 13. Paragraph 7 read: Our greatest need is

transportation to move armored/mechanized forces great distances. HETs and like

transportation is considered an integral and vital part of the force to be moved. It is

not an add on. If adequate transportation is not shipped with the force, then the force

will not be able to get to their tactical assembly areas on time. On Materiel

Handling Equipment, see HQ, 22d Support Command, briefing titled, "Theater

Logistics Concept," dated 27 December 1990, transcript, 4-5.

32. Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall, General Yeosock's XO, to author. HQ, ARCENT,

Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: (XO's) Daily Memo, 5 January

1991, dated 5 January 1991 and HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: (XO's) Daily Memo, 16 January 1991, dated 16 January 1991. Daily

Memos will be retired to the Army Military History Institute with General

Yeosock's personal papers.

33. Message, 260300Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DTI/,

MSGID/SITREP/USARC E N T/D + 9/JAN//,

PERID/250300Z/TO:260300Z/ASOF:260300Z, 9.

34. The drivers issue was raised in 2 December ARCENT SITREP, Message, 022359Z

DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRD-CS//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT

MAIN G3//PERID/302400Z/TO:012400Z/ASOF:012400Z, 13-14. See also, HQ, 22d

Support Command, briefing titled, "Theater Logistics Concept," dated 27 December

1990, transcript, 17-18. HQ, 10th Personnel Command Command Report, Operation

Desert Shield, 23 August 1990 to 16 January 1991, 19-20. General Yeosock tracked
171

influx of drivers in his morning briefings in late January and February, not without

some confusion as to whether requirement was for 3,444, 4,000, or 7,444. The

problem resulted from the fact that the second increment (4,000) was worked

directly by COMUSARCENT and the vice chief to the bewilderment of their

respective staff bookkeepers who finally ended up keeping two sets of books on both

increments until the first was completely filled.

35. There were in fact two separate requests, one for 3,444 and one for 4,000, the latter

made by General Yeosock in conversation with General Sullivan. It would appear

that the first increment of 3,444 was received by 7 February and that 2,052 of the

second increment of 4,000 would have arrived by 24 February to total 5,496. See

slides titled, "Drivers Update in HQ, ARCENT, G3, ARCENT Morning Briefing,

Saturday, 2 February 1991 (D+16)" and "HQ, ARCENT, G3, ARCENT Morning

Briefing, Saturday, 23 February 1991 (D+37)." On 12 January, as the 15 January

UN deadline approached, General Frix noted to General Taylor that host-nation

drivers were starting to quit in large numbers. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DCG

(122359Z January 1991), Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear,

Subject: ARCENT Command SITREP as of COB 12 Jan (C + 158). After it became

apparent that dire predictions about indiscriminate use of chemicals were not likely

to prove correct, drivers came back, and, in some cases, even took their trucks into

Iraq with the invasion forces.

36. HQ, 3d Battalion, 2d Air Defense Artillery Regiment, Memorandum for Major

General Thomas H. Tait, Director Desert Storm Study Project, Subject: Study

Project Team Visit. HQ, 702d Transportation Battalion (Provisional), Battalion

Operations Diary, Saudi Arabia, 1990-91. The 702d was the Support Command unit

responsible for direction of host-nation transportation.

37. HQ, ARCENT G4, ARCENT Morning Briefing Logistics Status slides for 9

February 1991. The stockage objective for the forward bases was five days' food and

fuel.

38. HQ, 10th Personnel Command Command Report, Operation Desert Shield, 23

August 1990 to 16 January 1991, 17-29. After-action report implies issue only arose

at MAPEX. When Army chief of staff was briefed on 24 December, he was asked for

116 tank crews, 120 Bradley crews, 18 AH-64 crews, and 24 UH-60 crews. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, Chief of Staff U.S. Army Briefing, Monday, 24

December 1990 (C + 139). The author flew to Saudi Arabia with a group of

commanders being "prepositioned."

39. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, command briefing titled, 'Theater Operations

Desert Shield/Desert Storm," dated 15 August 1991, slide titled, "Medical Force

Structure-15 Feb 91."

40. HQ, 10th Personnel Command Command Report, Operation Desert Shield, 23

August 1990 to 16 January 1991, 29-1 to 31-7, contains relevant message traffic

between chief of staff Army, DCSOPS, and Army MACOMS. Ibid., 17-18, addresses

concept in broad terms.

41. In fact, the secretary of the Army was briefed on 14 March that of twenty-one MiA1

battalions requiring force modernization, seventeen had been completed. Eleven of

thirteen M2A2/M3A2 Bradley battalions/squadrons were complete. HQ, ARCENT,

G3 Force Modernization Branch, briefing titled, "ARCENT Force Modernization,"
172

dated 13 March 1991, slides titled, "MiA1" and "M2A2/M3A2." Briefing was given

to Secretary of the Army Michael Stone on 14 April.

42. According to the final Title V Report, 1,343 HEMTTs were issued in excess of

normal unit allowances. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of

the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act

of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, Appendix T, Performance of Selected

Weapon Systems, T-159. Numbers come from the ARCENT G3 files briefing slide

titled, "Plus-Up HEMTT Distribution (as of 23 February 1991)."

43. Interview with General Frederick Franks at the Pentagon by the Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, on 31 October

1991,2.

44. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and

Preparation for Desert Storm," Military Review 72 [sic] (January 1992), 4.

Lieutenant Colonel Kindsvatter was VII Corps' historian during Operation Desert

Storm.

45. Interview with General Frederick Franks at the Pentagon by the Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, on 31 October

1991, 5-6, 8. Interview with Colonel Stan Cherrie at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

19 August 1991,15.

46. Ibid. Reforger units were units committed to NATO's General Defense Plan but

located in the United States. Each year during the cold war there was an annual

exercise to rehearse the return of forces to Germany (Reforger).

47. Interview with Colonel Stan Cherrie at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 August 1991,

12-13. Interview of General Franks conducted in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.,

by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, on 31 October 1991, 5-7.

48. Two brigades of the 2d Armored served in the Persian Gulf, the 2d Armored Division

(Forward) and the "Tiger Brigade." The division itself was in the process of

deactivation at Fort Hood, Texas.

49. Interview of General Franks conducted in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., by the

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, on 31 October 1991, 5-7. The 1st Infantry Division was configured

with three mechanized infantry battalions and six armored battalions. The 24th

Infantry Division had five mechanized battalions and four armored battalions; the

two U.S. armored divisions had four mechanized battalions and six armored

battalions each. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, command briefing titled,

"Theater Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm," dated 15 August 1991, slides

titled, "Warfighting Command and Control VII Corps and XVIII Corps."

50. HQ, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), Desert Shield/Desert Storm After-Action

Report: VII Corps Debarkation and Onward Movement, 30 May 1991.
173

51. Interview of General Franks conducted in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., by the

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, on 31 October 1991, 7.

52. Ibid., 10-11. Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 127.

53. Interview of General Franks, conducted in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., by the

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, on 31 October 1991, 7.

54. Ibid., 9.

55. Ports listed by Colonel Cherrie in interview with Colonel Stan Cherrie at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, 19 August 1991, 22.

56. HQ, ARCENT, Message, 302359Z NOV 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRDCS//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN

G3//PERID/292400Z/TO:302400Z/ASOF:302400Z, 3-4.

57. Ibid., 4.

58. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, ARCENT UPDATE, C + 115 (30 November 1990),

slide titled, "Threat Summary, 30 Nov 90."

59. HQ, ARCENT, Message, 152359Z DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRDCS//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN

G3//PERID/142400Z/T0:15240Z/ASOF:152400Z, 4. HQ, ARCENT, Message,

172359Z DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRDCS//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN

G3//PERID/162400Z/TO:172400Z/ASOF:172400Z, 3,5.

60. HQ, ARCENT, Message, 312359Z DEC 90, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRDCS//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN

G3//PERID/302400Z/TO:312400Z/ASOF:312400Z, 14. HQ, ARCENT, Command

Group, ARCENT UPDATE, C + 146 (31 December 1990), slide titled, "Current

Situation, 31 Dec 90."

61. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and Preparation for Desert

Storm," 9-11.

62. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT (142359Z Jan 91), Memorandum for Major General

Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT Command SITREP AS OF COB 14 Jan

(C + 160).

63. HQ, ARCENT, Message, 16312359Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//AFRDDT//MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT MAIN

G3//PERID/152400Z/TO:162400Z/ASOF:162400Z, 9.

-- ·I --- --- --- ·--- s- ----- e ,,,

192

Marine forces involved in the attack on the As-Zabr police post

suffered seven fatalities when a Maverick missile struck a Marine

Corps light armored vehicle (LAV) (a wheeled armored fighting

vehicle). According to a story published in the military history

magazine, Command, from a first person account, the Marines lost a

second LAV (with four more fatalities) to friendly ground fire. The

highly publicized press account of fratricide was not lost on ARCENT

decision makers and heightened concern about measures that would

help lessen the possibility of repetition.57

Finally, as a footnote, the war's first U.S. female prisoner of war

(POW) was captured at Khafji. Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, a

truckdriver, and her male companion, Specialist David Lockett,

missed their turn, drove north from the MSR into the fight at Khafji,

and were captured by the occupying Iraqis.

After the battle of Khafji, while the air operations in the KTO

approached their point of diminishing return politically and militarily,

ARCENT planning polished off the remaining issues about the

structure of the ground effort against the Republican Guard. Among

the matters that had been deferred were the timing (sequence) of

attack by Third Army units, the commitment of the theater reserve,

and the preferred contingency plan for destruction of the Republican

Guard. Two additional issues were threaded through the operational

discussion of the closing weeks of preparation. The first was a proposal

to shift the XVIII Corps' heavy force attack east to include the mission

to capture the Al Busayyah base area (called Objective Purple), along

with the derivative question of then transferring command of XVIII

Corps' heavy forces to VII Corps for the final phase of the Third Army

attack. The second matter involved a continued discussion of the

necessity or desirability of an operational pause.

As mentioned earlier, the, issue of the timing of the attack was

driven by two considerations. The-first was the desirability of initially

fixing the Iraqi tactical reserves in Kuwait by attacking in the east,

then following the second day with the main attack in the west. The

driving issue within ARCENT, however, seems to have been the XVIII

Corps' insistence that it was necessary to attack toward As Salman at

least twenty-four hours prior to attacking with the 24th Infantry

Division and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. This was argued in order

to synchronize the flow of logistics through As Salman, to MSR

Virginia, and then eastward to the armored forces on the corps' right

flank. This would remain necessary until the engineers could create a

direct supply route from south to north. Ultimately, a compromise was

arrived at: the XVIII Corps' light forces-the 6th French Light
193

Armored Division, 82d Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne

Division-would attack with Joint Forces Command East and

MARCENT on G-day; and the XVIII Corps' heavy forces, VII Corps,

and Joint Forces Command North would attack on G+ 1. This timing

scheme also allowed Schwarzkopf to focus air support on MARCENT

for G-day and then shift it to the heavy force attack on G+ 1.58

The value of this timing seems somewhat contradictory from the

standpoint of deception. The attack in the east certainly supported the

deception plan and reinforced particularly the idea of a main attack

that sought to re-create an Inchon-like landing and double

envelopment. On the other hand, the simultaneous attack in the far

west would seem to have exerted a sort of counterforce on the Iraqi

theater commander, at least with regard to the commitment of

operational reserves. That would appear to support the thesis that the

major consideration in timing the attack of the XVIII Corps was

logistical necessity rather than operational cleverness, although the

benefit with regard to employment of close air support should not be

underestimated.

At the same time, the timing of the attack of XVIII Corps' heavy

forces to coincide with VII Corps' and JFC North's offensive reflects

the extent to which the logic of the situation had made the XVIII

Corps' right wing a part of the ARCENT main effort as well as

constituting a separate secondary attack blocking the Highway 8

avenue of escape. This same logic led to the discussion of alternatives

to bring the 24th and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment more closely into

the main attack. The discussion turned on assigning the task of

capturing the Iraqi logistics base at Al Busayyah to the 24th

Division.59 From the standpoint of XVIII Corps, this would open up

maneuver room to its east (at the expense of VII Corps) and provide a

line of communications behind the 24th Division once it turned down

Highway 8. Because of the impact on VII Corps' maneuver room, the

question that logically followed was whether it did not make equal

sense, then, to attach the 24th to the VII Corps from that point forward

in the attack-that is, give VII Corps responsibility for the entire

wheel to the east from the Saudi border north to the Euphrates River

and east to Basrah.60

Discussion of that question seems always to have run aground on

the corps packaging that existed as a matter of the history of the

deployment. The XVIII Corps had lived in the desert for some seven

months already. It was certainly politically impossible to rotate them

home just when the war looked like it was reaching its climax, so there

was some need to find them something useful to do. Had the 24th
194

Division been attached to VII Corps, the XVIII Corps commander

would have retained only the attack helicopters of the 101st Airborne

Division capable of participation in the theater main effort. That

would have been galling indeed for the XVIII Corps commander and

his staff. Moreover, the VII Corps span of control was already large,

four divisions, with the possibility of a fifth if the CINC released his

theater reserve to ARCENT in time to get in the battle. So XVIII Corps

continued to fight for more of the action, and the left flank unit of the

great wheel remained in XVIII Corps, with its orientation principally

to the north. Meanwhile, the bulk of the heavy forces and the mission

of destroying the heart of the Republican Guard Forces Command

went to VII Corps. Both General Yeosock and General Waller declined

proposals to attach the 24th to the heavy corps (VII Corps), and XVIII

Corps retained a sector of attack on the northern edge of the theater of

operations, from the Euphrates southeast toward Basrah, in the final

phase of the ground offensive. 61 Responsibility for coordinating the

advance of XVIII Corps' heavy forces down the corridor, with the

eastward movement of VII Corps, remained implicitly with the

common higher headquarters-Third Army.

A second and related issue concerned the availability of the 1st

Cavalry Division for the decisive battle with the Republican Guard.

General Schwarzkopf had determined to retain a division reserve early

on, and pressures from the members of the Joint Forces Command

North for some assurance of support, if need be, tied the theater

reserve division between the ARCENT effort and the ability to support

the Egyptian Corps in Joint Forces Command North, should it run into

difficulties. This had profound implications.

Yeosock's planners calculated that, if the 1st Cavalry Division

was to arrive in time to take part in the anticipated battle,

Schwarzkopf would have to release it by H-hour plus thirty-seven

hours, given estimations of the flow of the attack and fixed factors of

time and space.62 Schwarzkopf brutally refused suggestions, which

General Arnold persisted in making long after it would seem to have

been politically wise, that he commit to such an action in advance.

Without this assurance and convinced of the need for three heavy

divisions at the decisive point, General Franks fell back on counting on

General Rhame's 1st Infantry Division to be the third.63 That meant

that General Rhame would have to conduct the breach, pass the 1st

U.K. Armored Division through, disentangle his unit from the breach

site, and catch up with the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions and 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment before the armored "fist" closed on the

RGFC. To do that, the 1st Infantry Division's breach operation would
195

have to be conducted quickly and the 1st U.K. passed through rapidly;

otherwise, ensuring the arrival of the third division would be the

principal brake on VII Corps' attack.

Attachment of the 24th Infantry Division to VII Corps, at some

point, might have solved this problem but, first, the division had to

link up with the 101st Airborne Division and ensure the security of the

Highway 8 roadblock. There were significant Republican Guard forces

already located along Highway 8, particularly the three Republican

Guard infantry divisions (Nebuchadnessar, Al Faw, and Adnan).

These might be reinforced by various heavy divisions, either from the

north (outside the KTO) or east. Two active airfields, Tallil and

Jalibah, also had to be dealt with. To have transferred the 24th a priori

to VII Corps would have left the 101st Airborne Division alone on

Highway 8 (or perhaps the 101st joined at some point by the 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment). General J. H. Binford Peay III, the

commander of the 101st Airborne Division, was confident in his

division's ability to execute this mission, but Schwarzkopf's initial

objections to the As Samawah operations, as well as limits the distance

of the initial air assault insertion placed on the operations, would seem

to indicate that, elsewhere, such confidence in the division's abilities to

sustain itself without heavy force reinforcement was lacking. 64

For reasons addressed in earlier chapters, the Desert Storm order

had not included a plan for the actual destruction of the Republican

Guard Forces Command, perhaps because of the difficulty of predicting

in advance where the RGFC might be located on the day of battle.

Now, in conjunction with VII Corps, Third Army developed a set of

contingency plans for destruction of the RGFC-plans that were

contingent on the Iraqi reaction to the Third Army attack. 6 5 It is

doubtful that Yeosock would have been inclined to select one plan over

the other before he was able to observe how well the initial phase of the

operation actually succeeded, as well as how the Iraqis behaved.

General Waller, however, was not so disinclined. When he stepped in

for Yeosock the week before the ground offensive, Waller selected a

contingency plan that called for a coordinated attack on the

Republican Guard and associated Iraqi heavy divisions by VII Corps

and XVIII Corps, with XVIII Corps responsible for the destruction of

the Hammurabi Armored Division, the RGFC unit closest to Basrah.66

When Yeosock returned on 23 February, he picked up just where

he had been when he departed. He deferred the final decision on a

destruction plan, making his decision contingent upon future

battlefield conditions. On the 24th, he approved a revised contingency

plan that provided for the VII Corps to destroy all Republican Guard
196

heavy divisions (an entirely force-oriented mission), with XVIII Corps

limited to conducting a supporting attack to cut Highway 8, fixing

reinforcing divisions outside the KTO, and destroying the RGFC

infantry divisions. The XVIII Corps was to be ready to continue the

attack, on order, to seize Objective Anvil south of Basrah in order to

block the retreat of the Hammurabi Division and to attack and destroy

it.67 At that time, the Hammurabi Division was still located in the VII

Corps zone. The order to execute the revised contingency plan would

not be issued until late afternoon on the 26th.68

This difference in view between Yeosock and Waller, again,

reflects a difference between a Moltkean approach to operational

command and the idea that the commander decides what he is going to

do and forces the enemy to comply with his every intention. The more

positivist view represented by Waller is perhaps more congenial to

American Army officers, but Yeosock's Moktkean approach allows for

the active independence of the enemy. The negative side of this style of

leadership is that it often makes it difficult to resume positive control

when immediate exploitation of an opportunity is called for.

The immediate cost of the Yeosock approach was that it left a

certain ambiguity concerning the subdivision of the principal

ARCENT mission-destruction of the Republican Guard Forces

Command. Destruction of the RGFC was General Franks' explicit

mission, but only within an assigned zone of attack,69 a significant fact

overlooked in postwar criticism of VII Corps by General

Schwarzkopf. 7 0 Retention of the Highway 8 corridor as part of the

XVIII Corps zone left responsibility for ensuring destruction of the

RGFC with Third Army. Yeosock assigned the Hammurabi Division to

XVIII Corps should that be required by the Hammurabi's withdrawal

on Basrah. This is precisely what would happen.

At the same time, Franks, who was assigned the force-oriented

mission of destruction of the RGFC in zone, was left with the assurance

that he would have the three heavy divisions he believed he required

for this task only if he succeeded in pulling the 1st Infantry Division

out of the breach and getting it into the fight. He could count on

neither the 1st Cavalry Division, which Schwarzkopf held, nor the

24th Infantry Division, which belonged to the other corps. He would

behave accordingly. That would take time. Although ARCENT

maintained no formal reserve, the XVIII Corps' heavy and airmobile

forces were, by the nature of the operation, the reserve of last resort for

the Third Army commander.
197

Yeosock's decentralized view of operational execution reflected

his belief that large units, like corps, were not likely to be as

responsive to rapid changes in direction or focus as were smaller

tactical formations, divisions and below. This belief implied a more

decentralized execution at the operational level, based upon seeking

harmony in the long term. The more centralized approach anticipated

by Waller demanded a closer and more active coordination of the

actions of subordinate formations, which the more forceful and

dynamic Waller clearly intended.

Yeosock outlined his vision of the battle the day before he was

hospitalized. According to his executive officer's notes, the commander

saw four stages for the offensive. These were to

Cross the LD [line of departure] as fast as we can with as much as we can carry.

Take on the RGFC a bn [battalion] or a bde [brigade] at a time; a war of

attrition to deliberately destroy it.

Operational pause to determine what is where and ignore that which does

not matter.

If he offers surrender, increase OPTEMPO and let NCA [national command

authorities] decide.n

On 13 February, Yeosock directed that ARCENT units begin

moving to their forward assembly areas the following day. General

Arnold's daily memorandum reflected the start of cross-border

operations. 7 2 These, however, were not the first hostile actions west of

the wadi.

Most deliberate attacks are preceded by what is known as a

reconnaissance-counterreconnaissance battle. This is a struggle

carried on by the two opponents' reconnaissance elements for

dominance of the intermediate zone between the main lines. Its

purpose is to gain information for one's own side and to deny it to the

enemy without bringing on a major engagement. Throughout

February, at the level of tactical units (corps and below), there was

such a contest between ARCENT and Iraqi forces in the area west of

Wadi al Batin.

On 1 February, following the Iraqi attack at Khafji, XVIII Corps

was building up its forces in the west of the ARCENT zone with its left

flank in the vicinity of Rafah. VII Corps was forming around Hafar al

Batin, with two armored divisions south of the Tapline Road and the

2d Armored Cavalry, 1st U.K. Armored Division, 1st Infantry

Division, and 1st Cavalry Division(-) to the north of the MSR. As a
198

further deception, a gap had been left between the two U.S. corps

beyond the Iraqi western flank unit (the 48th Infantry Division),

where Franks would send his enveloping attack. This area was

patrolled only by aviation units. The "Tiger Brigade" was located in

the east with MARCENT.

As units closed, they honed the specific skills they would need for

their part of the attack. The 1st Infantry Division and 1st U.K.

Armored Division practiced the critical breaching and passage of lines

portion of the attack plan on which the VII Corps attack increasingly

depended. Although there had been various small actions involving

minor collisions (on 1 February, the ARCENT Provost Marshal Office

(PMO) reported handling 154 prisoners of war to date), the Battle of

Khafji changed the level of violence, and the two sides began to contest

the no man's land between them. U.S. commanders feared an Iraqi

spoiling attack, similar to Khafji, down Wadi al Batin. Such an attack

would have threatened the most vulnerable and critical nodes of the

U.S. concentration. Elsewhere in the Third Army sector, however,

intelligence continued to report that most of the barren desert area in

front of ARCENT, particularly that in front of XVIII Corps, was held

only by scattered forces.

On 3 February, the 1st Infantry Division reported destroying an

Iraqi armored bulldozer cutting a gap in the border berm that marked

the boundary between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Further reconnaissance

revealed two more gaps. As a consequence, General Rhame reinforced

the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, which was his security force on the

border, with a balanced (armor and mechanized infantry) task force

and an artillery battalion, all under the command of Brigadier

General Bill Carter, the assistant division commander. That same

day, the French 6th Light Armored Division within XVIII Corps

exchanged fire with an Iraqi patrol. 73

On the 4th, VII Corps took responsibility for the Saudi border

posts in its sector. The 1st Infantry Division destroyed an Iraqi radar

on a transporter, and the U.S. Air Force destroyed a 1st Cavalry

Division AN/TPS 25 radar with a Harm missile ten kilometers behind

the fire support coordination line. Two U.S. soldiers were wounded.7 4

Four Iraqis surrendered to the 1st Cavalry in what would become

something of a daily farce-miserable enemy soldiers giving up to

reporters, helicopter crews, or anyone else they could find.

On 8 February, with the final closure of XVIII Corps in their

assembly areas in the west and 3d Armored Division in the port,

Yeosock told his staff he considered his army now closed. 75 XVIII
199

Corps indicated it was ready to begin cross-border operations and

reconnaissance in depth on order.

On the 10th, the 1st Infantry Division reported the Iraqis were

infiltrating reconnaissance elements into the division's sector during

darkness and conducting limited indirect fire-to no particular effect,

it might be added. By the 11th, VII Corps reported taking a total of 113

prisoners. 76 On the 14th, cross-border operations were authorized by

ARCENT Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 036.77 Instructions were

generally permissive, requiring that ARCENT be notified twenty-four

hours before operations were executed.

Three days later, VII Corps began moving into its forward

assembly areas. Franks organized the movement of the two armored

divisions and his cavalry regiment so these units would rehearse their

movement to contact; that is, they would march west in tactical

formation, then turn north to their forward assembly areas behind the

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR).78 This movement actually

began on the 15th with the forward (western) movement of the 2d

Armored Cavalry followed by the 1st Armored Division, which had to

cross in front of the 3d Armored to take its place on the outer flank of

the corps. (See figure 26.) Both divisions had to cross the Saudi

highway that ran from Riyadh to Hafar al Batin, an exercise that tried

the diplomatic patience of both American and Saudi drivers. The 1st

Infantry Division moved from the east of Hafar al Batin to the

northwest toward its breaching zone.

On the 16th, the 3d Armored Division moved on line with the 1st

Armored, and the 1st U.K. Armored Division moved to a forward

assembly area between Hafar al Batin and the 1st Infantry Division

(ID). (See figure 27.) On the 17th, the VII Corps "fist" maneuvered for

the first time in formation to forward assembly areas north of the

Tapline Road. (See figure 28.) The VII Corps was set. As a matter of

reference, the 1st Brigade of the 3d Armored Division (AD) formed an

armored oval twenty kilometers long from scouts to trains and ten

kilometers wide from Vulcan to Vulcan. 79 Both divisions consisted of

three brigades. One division in column (3d AD), one in a wedge-one

up, two back (1st AD). Moving units of such size in formation across a

barren plain was something no leader present had done, much less

seen before. It was by no means as easy to do in the desert as it was to

contemplate in the CINC's bunker in the Saudi capital, where

individual vehicles, even units of hundreds or more, were subsumed in

single counters on a map sheet. There was, in short, a wide gap

between what the CINC had only to contemplate and what Franks and

his commanders, Colonel Don Holder (2d ACR), Major General Ron
200

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201

Griffith (1st AD), and Major General Paul Funk (3d AD) had to do just

to get to the Republican Guard.

On 15 February, Arnold had warned that "As we start cross

border operations the greatest danger to our troops may well end up

being safety."80 A day later, two platoons of the 1st Infantry Division

engaged each other leaving three soldiers wounded.81

On the 17th, the first fatal incident of fratricide among Army

forces took place at 0110 when an AH-64 attack helicopter of the 1st

Infantry Division, flown by the aviation battalion commander,

misidentified two of the division's armored vehicles, killed two

soldiers, and wounded six others.

The AH-64s had been responding to requests for fire from a unit

on the ground that had been observing what it believed to be enemy

vehicles. Earlier that night, a unit of the neighboring 1st Cavalry

Division had also observed vehicles to their front, but because they

could not positively identify them were denied permission to engage.

About 2354 on the 16th, the 1st Cavalry unit (on the right) reported

receiving two rounds in their direction about the same time that the

1st Division unit (on the left) reported firing on the vehicles they had

observed. The operations officers of these adjacent units attempted to

sort out the situation without success. The fatal incident followed

shortly afterwards (170110), observed by the 1st Cavalry Division

unit, which then withdrew behind the berm to avoid the possibility of

further fratricide.82

The VII Corps' artillery and the 1st Infantry Division's artillery

began heavy programs of artillery raids to attrit the Iraqi artillery in

range of the breach site and to destroy enemy observation posts. The

XVIII Corps did the same, although the desert in the west did not

provide many worthwhile targets for the corps' guns. The heavy-light

corps also began an aggressive program of armed aerial

reconnaissances by its various aviation units. These proved to be

lucrative prisoner hunts. Indeed, the corps would report on the 21st

that one lesson learned was that the combination of psychological

operations and attack helicopters had a great effect against Iraqi

soldiers in sector. The most successful Army pre-G-day prisoner catch

occurred on the 20th, when the 101st Aviation Brigade flew out to

reconnoiter the site of the division's G-day air assault, engaged enemy

bunkers, followed up with a PSYOP loudspeaker team, and took the

mass surrender of 406 Iraqis.83 An infantry battalion had to be

brought into Iraq to accommodate all those wishing to surrender.
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It was not always that easy, however. As part of the ARCENT

deception effort to lead the enemy to believe the ARCENT main attack

would follow the Wadi al Batin approach along Kuwait's western

border with Iraq, the 1st Cavalry Division (minus the Tiger Brigade),

under the operational control of VII Corps prior to G-day, carried on an

aggressive series of feints and demonstrations immediately to the west

of the wadi in what the division called "The Battle of the Ruqi Pocket"

(after a nearby Saudi border town). 84 On 20 February, during one of its

reconnaissances in force, a unit of the 1st Cavalry Division (1st

Battalion, 5th Cavalry) found itself under fire from dug-in Iraqis. Two

Bradley's and one Vulcan air defense gun were lost, eight men were

wounded, and two were killed.85

The following day, 21 February, ARCENT issued new, more

restrictive guidance on the conduct of cross-border operations,

requiring the corps to obtain authority of the ARCENT commander for

operations of company size or larger.86 Units were to be prepared for

G-day at any time thereafter.

By the 23d, ARCENT had handled 972 enemy prisoners of war, 87

mostly from Iraqi front-line units whose function in the defensive

scheme was to provide warning and die in place while buying time for

the riposte of the Iraqi tactical reserves. The intelligence estimate in

the ARCENT SITREP for the 20th noted that "Numerous reports

indicate a serious morale problem as a direct result of coalition air

attacks.... inadequate supply, disassociation with the Iraqi regime's

policy toward Kuwait, poor training, and war weariness."8 8 On the

21st, it reported, "The ability of the RGFC to conduct a theater

counterattack is degraded," 89 and as the ground war began, the

ARCENT G2 assessed that "in the ARCENT/NAC sector, Iraq has lost

approximately 53 percent of their artillery and 42 percent of their

armor."90

These final preparations were played out against a political

situation that seemed to some to offer the hope of avoiding a ground

attack. On 11 February, Soviet envoy Yevgeni M. Primakov undertook

a peace initiative to Baghdad that marked the beginning of an intense

Soviet effort to broker a solution favorable to their former client.9 1 On

the 15th, Iraq made a qualified offer to withdraw from Kuwait that

President Bush characterized as "a cruel hoax."9 2 The Russians did not

give up, however, and on the 17th, Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz

went to Moscow to meet with President Mikhail Gorbachev. The next

day, Bush announced the military campaign would continue on

schedule, and on the 20th, he told Gorbachev the Iraqi Army had four

days to withdraw and accept UN sanctions. 93 On the 22d, the Soviet
205

president announced a new peace proposal that Aziz accepted in

Moscow. Bush and the coalition rejected the offer and ordered the

Iraqis to begin an unconditional withdrawal in twenty-four hours or

accept the consequences. 9 4 On the 23d, Iraq rejected the ultimatum,

and the scene was set for the final acts of the war.

None of this diplomatic activity seems to have had any effect on

the preparations for the ground attack, though the date for G-day

oscilated (at G-3) from the 18th to the 21st, and some care was taken to

ensure that prebattle activities were not irreversible. Selection of Gday was a matter of negotiation at echelons above ARCENT.95

General Waller commanded Third Army for the final week prior

to G-day. At that time, there was no assurance that General Yeosock's

health would permit his return to command and, as a result, there was

some instability in concept. Waller, deputy theater commander since

November, was a large man, as big as Schwarzkopf, with whom he had

served in a number of earlier assignments. Waller was also as forceful

as Schwarzkopf, but he lacked the hectoring tone or personal edge that

so often accompanied the theater commander's impatience with

subordinates. Waller was charismatic and firmly self-confident. As a

lieutenant general and lately I Corps commander back in the United

States; Waller was one of the Army's senior black general officers.

Waller's vision of the coming fight was somewhat different from

Yeosock's. On the 18th, Waller shared his vision with his staff (as he

did with the two corps commanders at their headquarters). The

PERSCOM (Personnel Command) commander had estimated 20,000

casualties in the first five days. Waller observed that he expected a

quick move to two key points, called Objective Collins (an area in the

desert that served as the VII Corps pivot point east of al Busayyah)

and Objective Gold (the Jalibah airfield), a principal 24th Infantry

Division objective on Highway 8. Here, Waller expected the corps to

rearm and refit while attracting enemy forces, then to turn east with

the coordinated attack described earlier. He warned the staff that

units should focus on safety and avoidance of fratricide (it was the day

after the 1st Infantry Division's AH-64 incident).9 6

On the 19th, General Arnold anticipated a three- to four-week

operation with three to four days to reach Orange and Collins, followed

by a pause; three days of battle with the RGFC, again followed by

another pause; and a deliberate mopping-up operation. The resilient

and always pleasant G3 anticipated a commanders' huddle during

each pause. That same night, Waller, who had been visiting the corps,

directed his staff to caution his subordinate commanders not to
206

conduct large-unit operations or take any irreversible actions,

basically telling commanders: "Don't start a ground war."9 7 All the

renewed discussion of operational pauses seems to have taken hold. On

the 20th, the VII Corps liaison officer informed the ARCENT

commander's executive officer that, whereas VII Corps had not been

planning a substantial pause, it now appeared they would conduct one

(presumably on Objective Collins) to assess the enemy.98

In all this discussion of pauses, it is hard not to see the grey hand

of the "SAMS Jedi Knights" and their often-scholastic approach to

operations. Operational pauses, which are designed to avoid the sin of

culmination, are one of the tricks of the trade that have received no

small attention in the SAMS education, a sort of unwritten doctrinal

construct. In theory, however, such pauses are spaced to follow

achievements of major objectives-for much the same reasons infantry

squads reorganize and redistribute ammunition after taking a tactical

objective to compensate for the disorganizing effect of victory. In this

sense, Yeosock's anticipation of a pause after the destruction of the

Republican Guard would seem most appropriate.

After the fact, the intermediate halts otherwise proposed seem

more like excessive caution, a desire to be safe and balanced at every

step, a safety that would have its price in lost momentum. This must

be judged, however, in light of the ARCENT commanders' preattack

assessment of the enemy that remained highly pessimistic down to the

launching of the ground attack-a pessimism encouraged, no doubt, by

the various simulations run in the theater and in the United States

that forecast heavy losses throughout. 99

In the same way, the intricate maneuvers that called upon the 1st

Infantry Division to breach, pass the 1st U.K. Armored Division to the

east (not unlike a blocking back in football), then move into the slot

behind the two armored divisions would also seem to bear the

hallmark of the SAMS "red stripe"10 0 fraternity, particularly when

laid against expectations that the 1st ID could take severe losses in its

first task. Yet if it took three heavy divisions to succeed in the main

effort, as General Franks believed, where else was the third division to

come from? There were no easy answers. 101

On the 22d, the 2d Armored Cavalry reported its long-range

surveillance teams in place to support the attack.1 0 2 Waller's

executive officer reported that the general had warned: "ARCENT

must be able to stop the preparation for G-day for Iraq to demonstrate

their good faith to comply with the UN resolutions and start again if

they fail to comply. Must be able to still execute G-day of 24

February."1 03
207

On the night of the 23d, the 2d Armored Cavalry deployed two

squadrons fifteen kilometers into Iraq to secure the engineers cutting

the border berm. The 1st U.K. Armored Division located its

reconnaissance elements with the 1st Infantry Division to mark lanes

to the breach-site staging area, and the 101st Airborne Division

inserted its long-range surveillance detachments and began final

preattack aerial reconnaissance. 10 4 The preliminaries were over and

the ground war was about to begin.

The ground offensive would be conducted more or less in

accordance with the mission assigned by CENTCOM to ARCENT in

January, as modified in the month following the publication of the

Central Command order. Third Army was to conduct two corps

attacks, "a supporting attack to block east-west LOCs along Highway

8 to isolate Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operation" (with an

on order mission to assist the main attack) and "the main attack with

one U.S. corps attacking north in zone along the western Kuwait

border to destroy Republican Guard forces."105 As discussed above, the

plan had been modified progressively, with increasing importance

given the continuation of the attack by XVIII Corps beyond its initial

rush to the Euphrates. (See map 7.)

The two corps were significantly different in composition, and

their missions were fundamentally different in character. VII Corps, a

homogeneous (though combined U.S.-U.K.) heavy corps, was assigned

a "force oriented" mission, destruction of the RGFC in zone. The

primary mission of XVIII Corps, a mixed medium-heavy-light force

(U.S.-French), was terrain oriented and designed to block the Iraqi

routes of withdrawal or reinforcement, then to fall in with its heavy

forces on VII Corps' left and drive east toward Basrah. These tasks

were fundamentally different, as were the formations to which they

were assigned. The latter would require decentralized execution, the

former something quite different indeed.

A force-oriented mission in the Iraqi desert implied battle as a

process, a rolling fight, rather than as a discrete event. In light of

anticipated force ratios, it demanded that the VII Corps commander

conduct a highly controlled, carefully sequenced, and articulated

attack by a force, at the outset, of eleven ground maneuver brigades

(not counting the 1st Cavalry Division[-]), an armored cavalry

regiment, seven attack helicopter battalions, and four supporting

artillery brigades-all organized in four divisions with an armored

cavalry regiment and aviation brigade under corps control. 106
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209

The XVIII Corps divisions, with more space in which to

maneuver, would not require nearly the same control or coordination.

To a great extent, each division would pursue a separate mission. The

French 6th Light Armored would take As Salman, free MSR Virginia, and protect the ARCENT left flank. The 101st would launch its forces

midway to the Euphrates the first day and form the first of several

staging bases for its striking force of AH-64s and then follow up, as

soon as possible, with another brigade of TOW (tactically tubelaunched, optically tracked, wire-guided [missiles])-equipped air

assault infantry to block Highway 8 until the 24th Infantry could cross

the intervening desert and assume that task. Then, the 101st was to

concentrate on advancing its AH-64 line to deep interdiction areas

across the Euphrates to cut off escaping Iraqi forces that might flee

north of the river on improvised or undamaged bridges. The 24th

Division was to attack across an empty waste, day and night, to be the

second division on the Euphrates, disrupting the enemy rear and,

circumstances and time permitting, attacking down the highway to

the southeast to assist in closing the KTO south of Basrah. The 82d

Airborne Division would support the French and then clean up by- passed pockets of Iraqi soldiers left in/the wake of the airborne

division's more mobile sister units. The other heavy force, the 3d

Armored Cavalry, would begin by maintaining contact with the VII

Corps on the east and ultimately falling in as the fourth heavy brigade of the 24th Infantry Division. XVIII Corps' execution would be highly decentralized, and the corps headquarters would be involved primarily in sustaining the respective advances of its disparate forces.

Equally important to the corps commanders was the Third Army

concept of operation. The order reads:

As VII Corps finds and fixes the RGFC, COMUSARCENT will request from

USCINCCENT the release of 1st CAV Division (-) as the theater reserve and attach 1st CAV Division (-) to VII Corps. VII Corps will be prepared to

receive OPCON of the 24th Mech Division. VII Corps will then attack to

destroy RGFC in zone. XVIII Corps will be prepared to attack RGFC in zone. 107

The primary operational-level issue was going to be whether the

1st Cavalry Division(-) could be secured from the CINC's control in

time to join the main battle, and if not, how the heavy forces of the

XVIII Corps, whose first mission was to cut the Highway 8 escape

route, would be brought into the decisive battle with the Republican Guard. The key element in attaining the 1st Cavalry's release was to

gauge the reaction of the Iraqi tactical reserves, believed at that time

to be the 12th Armored Division (later identified as the 52d Armored
210

Division),10 8 to the ARCENT and Joint Forces Command North

attacks. Whatever its number, that Iraqi unit's ability to resist the

flanking movement of the 1st U.K. Armored Division was of particular

concern. The Third Army assessment was that, once the 1st U.K.

engaged the tactical reserve, it would, in effect, become the guarantee

for the Egyptian Corps, toward which the British attack would

converge. Third Army hoped that would trigger release of the 1st

Cavalry Division, thus building the necessary "mass of maneuver" to

close with and destroy the RGFC.109 Schwarzkopf assigned CENTAF

the responsibility for isolating the KTO by cutting lines of withdrawal

across the Euphrates, thus denying the Iraqis exit or

reinforcements. 11 0

The Third Army's Schwerpunkt, its offensive center of gravity,

was the VII Corps attack, scheduled for the morning of 25 February

(G+ 1). Initially, the main effort of that attack, which in fact went in

on the 24th and 25th, was the breaching operation conducted by the

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) on the corps' eastern flank. As

explained above, the penetration and breakout to be conducted by the

1st Infantry Division and the 1st U.K. Armored Division would set the

pace of the entire VII Corps operation. After the British passed out of

the breachhead to protect the corps' right flank (and at the same time

relieved pressure in front of the Egyptian Corps), the focus and

concentration of forces conducting the corps attack would shift west, to

the iron fist of 2d ACR, 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, and whatever

third heavy division ultimately became available.

General Franks envisioned conducting the phases of his operation

using two very different operational styles. Indeed, he was to conduct

two main attacks. With regard to the breach, his order said:

The first phases of our operation will be maximum forces moving toward

the RGFC with minimum casualties in minimum time. These phases will

be deliberate and rehearsed....

The deliberate breach will be done with precision and synchronization

resulting from precise targeting and continuous rehearsals.

The VII Corps order recognized explicitly that the second phase of

the attack, the advance to defeat the RGFC, would be "METT-T

[mission, enemy, terrain and weather and troops and time available]

dependent and . . . [include] battles of movement and depth." "Once

through the breach," the order continued,

we will defeat forces to the east rapidly with an economy of force, and pass

the point of main effort to the west of that action to destroy the Republican

Guard Forces Command in a fast moving battle with zones of action and
211

agile forces attacking by fire, maneuver, and air. Combat service support

must keep up because there will be no pause. 111

Within the initial tactical operations, there were certain pacing

events that had to be accomplished by the 1st Infantry Division's

soldiers in fairly strict order. These were an advance to the main line

of resistance, which included positioning five brigade equivalents of

artillery forward to support the breaching operation; 11 2 the conduct of

an artillery preparation; the breaching operation itself conducted by

two maneuver brigades abreast; the clearing of an intermediate

breachhead area to the range of direct fire systems (to Phase Line

Colorado); the passage of the division's third brigade (in this case the

2d Armored Division Forward) while the breaching brigades rolled

outward, so the sixty-kilometer final breachhead line (Phase Line New

Jersey) would be held by three brigades abreast; then the passage of

the British division with its supporting vehicles and its breakout into

the Iraqi tactical depths to protect the corps' eastern flank and destroy

if possible the enemy's principal tactical reserve, the Iraqi 12th (52d)

Armored Division. Within all this, the advance of the gun line (five

artillery brigades made up of thirteen field artillery cannon battalions

and ten batteries of multiple launch rocket systems [MLRS]) through

the breach had to be arranged in order that the artillery could range

beyond the final breachhead line for the breakout and so that the

general support artillery brigades would be repositioned to assume

their new attachments as the corps shifted its center of gravity to the

northwest. Speed in such a complex operation is relative, and, no

doubt, it looked much easier to do from the confines of the Ministry of

Defense basement, perhaps even from the offices of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in Washington, than it did in the desert on 24-25 February.

The VII Corps attack had been scheduled for G+ 1 in the original

plan. Under that schedule, the 1st Infantry Division planned to

accomplish on the 24th only the first part of its deliberate breachclosing the barrier belt. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment would

screen forward on the western, flank, while the 1st and 3d Armored

Divisions positioned themselves to launch their enveloping maneuver

the following day, simultaneously and in line with the 1st Infantry

Division attack. In the dark desert night, punctuated by driving rain

and blowing sand, soldiers awaited the dawn. (See figure 29.)
Figure 29.

212

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Notes

1. "Escalation, 1990 Style," The New York Times, 27 October 1990,22.

2. George Gallup, Jr., and Dr. Frank Newport, "Approval Ratings of Bush and

Congress at New Lows," The Gallup Poll Monthly (October 1990): 34-35.

3. Theodore Draper, "The True History of the Gulf War," New York Review of Books

39, no. 3 (30 January 1992): 38-45. The Award-Winning Staff of U.S. News & World

Report [Brian Duffey et al.], Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of

the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1992), viii, 414-15.

4. "U.N. Gives Iraq Until Jan. 15 to Retreat or Face Force: Hussein Says He Will Fight

[headline]." Paul Lewis, "Warning by Council: Foreign Ministers Vote 12 to 2 for

Resolution-China Abstains," The New York Times, 30 November 1990, 1.

5. U.S. News & World Report, Triumph Without Victory, 182, 184,199 et seq.

6. "Authorization for Use of Military Force (Joint Congressional Resolution of January

12, 1991)," in Sifry and Cerf, The Gulf War Reader, 287-89.

7. Andrew Rosenthal, "Americans Don't Expect Short War," The New York Times, 15

January 1991, All.

8. Sean D. Naylor, "Flight of Eagles," The Army Times, 22 July 1991,12.

9. Concepts and Analysis Agency Document CAA-SR-91-18, HQDA After-Action

Report (Desert Shield/Desert Storm), Appendix E: Chronology of Events, EChronology-52.

10. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Message, 180300Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT

MAIN//DT/ MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/001/JAN, PERID/170300Z/TO:

180300Z/ASOF:180300Z, 7-8.

11. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's daily) Memorandum for

Record, Subject: Daily Memo, 16 January 1991, dated 16 January 1991. (Executive

Officer's memoranda will be retired with General Yeosock's private papers to the

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

12. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 416-21. Schwarzkopf states one-third of the

strategic air was diverted to Scud hunt. Figures vary.

13. De la Billiere, Storm Command, 156, 191-92, 221-27,235-49.

14. Comment based upon discussion in an ARCENT morning briefing at which the

author was present and frequent mention in ARCENT SITREPs and executive

officer daily memoranda during the period of the move. See report from 1st Cavalry

Division on 22 January, for example, in HQ, ARCENT, G3, Message, 230300Z JAN

91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT// MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/006/JAN,

PERID/220300Z/TO:230300Z/ASOF:230300Z, 8.

15. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Message, 230300Z JAN 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/006/JAN,PERID/22 03 00Z/TO: 2303 00Z/A

213
214

SOF:230300Z, 10.

16. C. D. B. Bryan, Friendly Fire (New York: Bantam Books, 1977). Although

Schwarzkopfs battalion was the unit involved, Schwarzkopf himself was not blamed

for the incident that involved an artillery error. Indeed, the author of the book

dealing with the incident clearly had nothing but the highest respect for thenLieutenant Colonel Schwarzkopf and defends him at some length from charges

made by the victim's parents.

17. Dr. Roger Spiller, Professor of Combined Arms Warfare, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, to author.

18. For history of fratricide, see Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader, Amicicide: The

Problem of Friendly Fire in Moder War, Research Survey No. 1 (Fort Leavenworth,

KS: Combat Studies Institute, December 1982).

19. Comment by General John Yeosock, quoted in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group,

Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 18 January

1991, dated 18 January 1991. (Executive Officer's memoranda will be retired with

General Yeosock's private papers to the Military History Institute, Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

20. The Army report is summarized in Sean D. Naylor, "Friendly Fire: The Reckoning,"

Army Times, 26 August 1991, 4 and 6.

21. Statistical roll-up taken from ibid. Two incidents involved battalion commanders

fighting their systems, as well as commanding their units. See Robert Johnson and

Rick Wartzman, "Inquiry Sought on Army Account of Soldier's Death," The Wall

Street Journal, 8 November 1991, A7; and Barton Gellman, "Felled by Friendly

Fire," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 11-17 November 1991, 9-11.

22. See interview with Lieutenant General Calvin A. H. Waller by Brigadier General

Timothy J. Groggin, et al., dated May 1991, 49-50, 60. General Waller's interview

must be used with some care as he does not lack confidence speaking about some

actions in theater about which he was obviously ill-informed, not the least the

planning process prior to his arrival in November and the ARCENT order of battle

during Desert Storm. He is, obviously, the best source on his own activities as

deputy CINC. Interview with Brigadier General Steven Arnold at Eskan Village on

15 March 1991, 29-31. In the end, General Glossen was probably the victim of being

a salesman prevented by conditions beyond his control (the CINC's desire to

centralize control) from living up to his promises. The transcript of his briefing at

the school house shows his remarks to be highly optimistic about air power available

to ground commanders in light of what followed. Transcript of ARCENT MAPEX,

tapes D and E in author's files.

23. A judgment by the author based upon comments made to him when discussing the

friction over control of air support. Interestingly enough, General Yeosock is

conspicuous by the extent of his confidence in the good intentions of the Air Force

leaders, no doubt a consequence of his close association with General Horner.

Author's discussions with General Yeosock and undated memorandum, Subject: CG

Comments on the Context of ARCENT Operations, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel

Mike Kendall. Memorandum will be retired with General Yeosock's personal

papers. Memorandum reflects views expressed to author.
215

24. Colonel Joe Purvis to author.

25. Transcribed from film San Pietro by author.

26. Major Mark B. ("Buck") Rogers, USAF, Desert Storm Planner, CENTAF, quoted in

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, 11 November 1991, 68.

27. Generally the Air Force divides air support of the land battle in two categories: close

air support (CAS), which is targeted and controlled by the Army, and air

interdiction (AI), which is targeted and controlled by the Air Force. The Army

argues for a subcategory called battlefield air interdiction (BAD, targeted by the

Army and controlled by the Air Force. One of the best discussions is Lieutenant

General Merrill A. McPeak, "TAC Air Missions and the Fire Support Coordination

Line," Air University Review 36, no. 6 (September-October 1985): 65-72. McPeak

was Air Force chief of staff during Desert Storm.

28. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, USCINCCENT OPLAN for

Operation Desert Storm, dated 16 December 1990. The OPLAN provided for four

phases, strategic air campaign, air supremacy in the KTO, battlefield preparation,

and ground offensive. The issue, of course, was who would control the fires in Phase

Im, battlefield preparation. The ground commanders assumed they would. They

were wrong, as it turned out. Until about G-8 (assumed), the CINC fought the airattrition operation in the KTO with air alone. The order is silent about the need to

refer to the secretary of defense and president for permission to initiate the ground

offensive. It was this that constituted the major breakwater subdividing the third

phase.

29. Waller interview, 2 May 1991, 51-53. General Schwarzkopfs centralization of the

early air operations in the KTO is itself the best indication that this was the case.

30. Undated memorandum, Subject: CG Comments on the Context of ARCENT

Operations, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall. Memorandum will be

retired with General Yeosock's personal papers. Colonel Daniel M. Ferezan,

Memorandum for Commander, Third U.S. Army, Attn: G3, APO NY 09772, Subject:

Project 5/Liaison Team Gulf After-Action Report, dated 31 March 1991. Colonel

Ferezan describes the role of LNO parties.

31. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Notes from

Huddle Meeting, 1 February 1991. Memorandum will be retired with General

Yeosock's personal papers.

32. Waller interview, 2 May 1991, 58.

33. HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, AFZA-GT-P (G3 Plans), Memorandum for Record,

Subject: After-Action Brief for Operation Desert Storm, dated 8 July 1991,

paragraph 12: "During the Air Campaign, we had great success in striking our

priority targets. Although XVIII Airborne Corps was a supporting attack, we were

able to keep our nominations visible to the Army and Air Force Targeteers. We took

advantage of the SCUD-hunting effort and diverted air missions to achieve attacks

against our targets."

34. HQ, ARCENT, G3, Deep Operations and Targeting Cell, After-Action Report, n.d.,

2.
216

35. See interview with Lieutenant Colonel Bart J. Engram, ARCENT, G3 Deep Operations Cell, 27 March 1991, 2-3. Lieutenant Colonel Engram took a great deal

of time at the end of the war to walk the air war down to the execution level with the

Air Force wings that had supported ARCENT. His interview should be one of the

primary sources in addressing Army-Air Force coordination.

36. HQ, VII Corps, Memorandum from AETSFA-FSE, Subject: Corps Fires After-Action

Report, dated 15 March 1991, 5. Report states: "With hindsight, it appears that

targets key to Corps plan were ultimately hit (222 targets)-over time-but not as fast as Corps expected.... Bottom line is that the effect of air delivered fires did

clearly set the stage for minimum exploitation." Document is in VII Corps Archive,

Corps Artillery Notebook, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas.

37. The author attended ARCENT command briefings and observed the periodic revision of the formula for BDA to fit the existing cumulative estimate of strength

remaining, which was derived from a variety of sources. This is good Kantian

deductive reasoning (deciding what process must exist to produce the observable

outcome), but it is bad science, failing to account for other possible hypotheses. In

the end, the process in fact consisted of making a cumulative estimate and finding a way to explain how it got that way. That, of course, is probably the best that can be

done, and if there is an error in the process, it is in the demand of maneuver commanders for something that cannot be delivered.

38. General Yeosock to author. The Air Force began using radar-equipped planes called

"pointers" to scout forward and verify targets or locate alternatives for lesssophisticated A10s.

39. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 5 February

1991. CG comment: "Key issue is to have the air campaign start west of the Wadi.

My mission. G3: Receiving a max of 20% of requested sorties." Assumed date for Gday (unofficial) was 21 February. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group (Executive

Officer's) Daily Memo for 8 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be

filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

40. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+25 (11 February 1991),

Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT

SITREP. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+27 (13

February 1991), Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject:

ARCENT SITREP. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 13 February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with

General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.)

41. Message, 140300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+ 27/FEB//,

PERID/130300Z/TO:140300Z/ASOF:140300Z, GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S

EVALUATION/, 14.
217

42. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 16 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

43. Message, 170300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D + 31/FEB//,

PERID/160300Z/TO:170300Z/ASOF:170300Z, GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S

EVALUATION/, 19,43.

44. Message, 180300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D +32/FEB//,

PERID/170300Z/TO:180300Z/ASOF:180300Z, GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S

EVALUATION/, 17.

45. HQ, ARCENT, ARCENT Command SITREP D + 37 (23 February 1991), AFRD-DT,

Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT

SITREP. Another source for reading ARCENT G3's frustration is series of

COMUSARCENT Planning Guidance messages that were dispatched daily to

various addressees.

46. Letter to author from Office of the Program Manager (AMCPM-NGT-O), U.S. Army

Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization, dated 6 October

1991. The letter provided the author with an account of the battle, maps, and roster

of OPMSANG members as well as other supporting documents.

47. "The Terrible Toll," Newsweek, Commemorative Edition: America at War (SpringSummer 1991): 81-82. Typically, perhaps, the Marine Corps observers were

interviewed on CNN upon linkup with relieving forces.

48. Letter to author from the Office of the Program Manager (AMCPM-NGT-O), U.S.

Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization, dated 6

October 1991.

49. Letter from Major Joe Pencoast (with PMSANG Support Group) to Dr. Roger

Spiller, dated 21 February 1991.

50. CENTCOM reported Khafii was declared liberated at 311100Z. Message, 312115Z

JAN 91, FM USCINCCENT, MSGID/SITREPIUSCINCENT/175/JAN//, section 4 of

7, 2 (paragraph 2C(2)(A)). OPMSANG chronology gives end date/time as 011900 (C)

February 1991: Letter to author from Office of the Program Manager (AMCPMNGT-O), U.S. Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard

Modernization, dated 6 October 1991. Related missions would go on for some time.

51. Message,012115Z FEB 91, FM USCINCCENT, MSGID/SITR EP/

USCINCENT/176/FEB//, GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION, FINAL

SECTION OF 7, 3-4. Schwarzkopf's postwar comments on the conclusions he drew

were in the transcript of the interview with David Frost, dated 22 March 1991, 16

(in possession of author). The ARCENT G2 estimate at the time was that the events

indicated "that the Iraqi force is a disciplined one. It understands basic military

maneuvers and can execute some relatively complex operations. However, we

question the forces capability to control multiple division operations (perhaps with

the exception of the RGFC) or to maintain momentum under well-executed fire."
218

Message, 010300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/

USARCENT/D + 15/FEB, 2. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 424-27.

52. Some Saudi detachments did fight in the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1973. See

Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New

York: Vintage Books, 1984), 23, 48, 94, 302; and Mohamed Heikal, The Road to

Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), 227.

53. Pancoast letter.

54. Quoted in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 1

February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.)

55. HQ, U.S. Army Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization

AMCPM-NGT-O, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army Central Command,

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Subject: Recommendation for the Valorous Unit Award,

dated 30 April 1991. Proposed citation. Numbers are much larger than CENTCOM

report for 1 February. The question probably involves a variation in the period

covered and the normal difficulty with precision in such matters.

56. Message, 012115Z FEB 91, FM USCINCCENT, MSGID/ SITREP/

USCINCENT/176/FEB//, GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION, FINAL

SECTION OF 7,3-4.

57. From the author's own observations as well as comments reflected in Executive

Officer's Daily Memos throughout this period.

58. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 7 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

Observation by Major General Arnold in HQ, CAC-T, Center for Army Lessons

Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Commander's Observations at the ARCENT

AAR, DSSN112, 6.

59. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group (Executive Officer's) Daily Memos, 7 and 13

February 1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.)

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid. Interview with Lieutenant General Calvin Waller by Brigadier General

Timothy J. Groggin, et al., on 2 May 1991, 93. General Waller believed he had made

the initial decision on this question. In fact, the issue was one of many revisits that were presented to him during his period of command in ARCENT. In an Army

where commanders change with some frequency, no issue ever gets a final answer.

62. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel

Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield,

Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated 6 April

1991,20-23.
219

63. Interview with General Frederick Franks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 March

1992, 15-19. General Yeosock had expressed his intention to commit the 1st Cav to

VII Corps if released by the CINC. The question for General Franks was when and

where.

64. General Peay discussed this issue with the author when the latter visited the

headquarters of the 101st Airborne in the field prior to G-day. Assessment of his

confidence is author's own judgment based on this and other discussions.

65. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DTP, Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel

Swain, Subject: HQ USARCENT, G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield,

Desert Storm, Defense and Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, dated 6 April

1991, 16-17.

66. Ibid. Appendix 8 to Annex N to COMUSARCENT OPLAN Desert Storm 001,

181300ZFEB91, Contingency Plan 1A: Destruction of RGFC (Phase IIID);

Positional Defense in Place Template, and Change 1 to Appendix 8 to Annex N to

COMUSARCENT OPLAN Desert Storm 001, 241900ZFEB91, Contingency Plan:

Destruction of RGFC (Phase HID); Positional Defense in Place Template COA6.

This contingency plan is a metaphor for the way planning was done. The plan had a

number of fathers in ARCENT and VII Corps, principally Major Kevin Reynolds, a

BCTP augmentee to ARCENT G3, Major Dan Gilbert, an augmentee to G3 Plans at

ARCENT, and Major Tom Goedkoop, VII Corps G3 Plans.

67. Change 1 to Appendix 8 to Annex N to COMUSARCENT OPLAN Desert Storm 001,

241900ZFEB91, Contingency Plan: Destruction of RGFC (Phase IIID); Positional

Defense in Place Template COA6.

68. Message, 261500Z, FM CDRUSARCENT, Subject: FRAGO 058 to ARCENT

OPORD 001 (Desert Storm) Destruction of the RGFC.

69. For the nonspecialist: The assignment of a zone of operations is a restrictive

technique to prevent adjacent units from shooting or otherwise interfering with

each other. Assignment of a zone of action to a commander gives him freedom of

action within the area so designated but denies him attack or movement across the

boundary without coordination and permission. Daring commanders have achieved

notable success by ignoring boundaries, notably Rommel in World War I, but on

other occasions, ignoring boundaries has led to incidents of fratricide and confusion.

Coordination of action by adjacent units is the responsibility of their common higher

headquarters.

70. Schwarzkopfs notorious criticism of Franks rests upon the premise that VII Corps

had sole responsibility for destruction of the RGFC. This criticism ignores the

territorial limits within which Franks operated, the role of Third Army and,

coincidentally, his own responsibility for trying air interdiction into the ground

offensive. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 450-78.

71. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 13 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

72. Ibid.
220

73. Message, 030300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/

SITREPUSARCENT/D+ 17/FEB//PERID/020300Z/TO:030300Z/ASOF:030300Z,9,

12.

74. Message, 040300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D + 18/FEB//PERID/0030300Z/TO:040300Z/ASOF:040

300Z, 10.

75. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 8 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

76. Message, 100300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D +24/FEB//PERID/090300Z/TO:100300ZASOF:100

300Z, 9. Message, 110300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D +24/FEB//PERID/100300Z/TO:110300Z/ASOF: 110

300Z, 9.

77. Message, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//G3//, Subject: FRAGO 036 to OPLAN

Desert Storm 001: Cross Border Operations.

78. Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment

and Preparation for Desert Storm," Military Review 72, no. 1 (January 1992): 15.

HQ, ARCENT, Unclassified Desert Storm Command Briefing, dated 5 August 1991,

shows movements on 15, 16, and 17 February.

79. HQ, 3d Armored Division, Overlay, Appendix 2 (Division Standard Movement to

Contact Formation) to Annex C to 3AD OPORD 91-1 (Operation Desert Spear

(Draft)), dated 22 January 1991. See also command briefing titled, "Vanguard

Brigade (2d Brigade) 24th Infantry Division, Operation Desert Shield/Storm"

(briefing has no date but about half the slides show 14 March date), slide titled,

"Brigade Formation." The second brigade showed a formation of seventy kilometers

in depth from reconnaissance line to support battalion and ten kilometers in width.

The VII Corps G2/G3 log for 21-22 February indicates that the 1st Cavalry

Division(-) (2 Brigades) was eighteen kilometers wide by twenty kilometers deep.

HQ, VII Corps, G2-G3 Daily Staff Journal, 23 February, item 29 (1715). The 1st

Armored Division's postwar briefing showed a division formation (division wedge)

fifty to eighty kilometers deep by twenty to twenty-five kilometers wide. None of

these are precise figures, but they do give an order of magnitude.

80. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, ARCENT Command SITREP D+29 (15 February 1991),

Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear.

81. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 16 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

82. Message, 180300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D + 24/FEB//PERID/170300Z/TO:180300Z/ASOF:180

300Z, 12. Robert Johnson and Rick Wartzman, "Inquiry Sought on Army Account of

Soldier's Deaths," The Wall Street Journal, 8 November 1991, A7. Robert Johnson

and Caleb Solomon, "Gulf War Casualty: 'Friendly Fire' Downs the Soaring Career

of a Gung-Ho Colonel," The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1991, Al and A8. On

1st Cavalry Division, see HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, Battle of the Ruqi Pocket, 7.
221

HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, DTAC, Daily StaffJournal, 16 and 17 February 1991, 10-

12 (16th), 1-3 (17th). To imagine the sort of confusion that could exist in this

situation, one should remember that, in conditions of darkness, there were elements

of at least five separate units operating in a relatively small area and trying to

control the situation-troops from two battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division (2-8 and 2-5 Cavalry) and three battalions of the 1st Infantry Division (1-4 Cavalry, 1-41

Infantry, and the 1st Aviation Battalion). The problem was compounded by occurring on a boundary between two divisions.

83. Message, 210300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+35/FEB//PERID/200300Z/TO:210300Z/ASOF:210

300Z,12-13.

84. HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, paper and briefing titled, "1st Cavalry Division in the

Battle of the Ruqi Pocket" (hereafter referred to as HQ, "1st Cavalry Division, Battle of the Ruqi Pocket").

85. Message, 210300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D +35/FEB//PERID/200300Z/TO:210300Z/ASOF:210

300Z, 11. (ARCENT SITREP has a typo that indicates the incident took place on the

21st after issue of SITREP. The 1st Cavalry Division's records indicate the 20th.) "HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, Battle of the Ruqi Pocket," 9.

86. Message, 210500Z FEB 91, FM CDRARCENTMCP//G3//, Subject: FRAGO 043 to

OPORD 001 (Desert Storm).

87. HQ, ARCENT, ARCENT Morning Brief, 23 February 1991 (D+37), slide titled, "EPW/CI Status and Location." Slide was prepared by ARCENT PMO Office for the

daily briefing as of 222400Z February 1991.

88. Message, 200300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D + 34/FEB//PERID/190300Z/TO:200300Z/ASOF:200

300Z, 4.

89. Message, 210300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D+35/FEB//PERID/200300Z/TO:210300Z/ASOF:210

300Z, 4-5.

90. Message, 240300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MS G I D / S I T R E P / U S A R C E N T / G

DAY/FEB//PERID/230300Z/TO:240300Z/ASOF:240300Z, 4.

91. Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker and Dole Disagreeing On Warning by Gorbachev,"

The New York Times, 11 February 1991, A13.

92. Rick Atkinson and Dan Balz, "Iraq Offers Conditional Withdrawal: Bush Rejects Proposal as 'Cruel Hoax,"' The Washington Post, 16 February 1991, Al, A12.

93. Serge Schmemann, "Gorbachev Gives Iraqi a Peace Proposal: Seeks a Pullout,

Pledging Help Afterward," The New York Times, 19 February 1991, Al; and Paul

Lewis, "U.S. and Britain Fault Soviet Plan: Allies Tell Moscow Iraq Must Agree to

Pullout Deadline," The New York Times, 21 February 1991, Al.
222

94. Serge Schmemann, "7-Point Initiative: Moscow Proposal Omits Mention of Mideast

Peace Conference," The New York Times, 22 February 1991, Al. Maureen Dowd,

"Pressing Demands: U.S. Says New Proposal Fails to Meet Crucial U.N.

Resolutions," The New York Times, 22 February 1991, Al. Andrew Rosenthal,

"Ground War Vowed: Iraqis Say Ultimatum Is Shameful, but Show Signs of

Wavering," The New York Times, 23 February 1991, Al.

95. Schwarzkopfs account is that he came under increasing pressure to advance the

date of attack lest the Soviets should broker an Iraqi withdrawal that would allow

Saddam's army to escape unpunished. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 440-45.

De la Billiere, Storm Command, 278.

96. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 18 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

97. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 19 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

98. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 20 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

99. Aside from the PERSCOM commander's prediction of losses noted above, see James

Blackwell's Thunder in the Desert (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 106; and an

exchange of letters from Colonel Trevor Depuy and Theodore C. Taylor in

Parameters 22, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 96-98, for what civilian simulators were

predicting. Certainly the prewar forecasting by attrition-based models, no less the

military's uncritical fascination for such, should be shaken by this experience.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy's estimate in the Senate debate of January 1991 was

for 3,000 American casualties a week with 700 deaths. Kennedy's estimates are

extrapolations from the Arab-Israeli wars and were not unreasonable. U.S.

Congress, Senate, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts speaking against war in the

Persian Gulf, 102d Congress, 1st Sess., Congressional Record (10 January 1991),

vol. 137, no. L, S127.

100. The red stripe on the trousers was the mark of the members of the German General

Staff whose ideal SAMS presumes to emulate.

101. In a letter to the author, General Rhame wrote that corps estimates of losses for his

division in the breaching operation were from 25 percent to 40 percent. Nonetheless,

Rhame had sought the follow-on mission, sometimes in spite of reluctance by the

corps to count on a division they expected to be seriously hurt penetrating the

enemy defenses.

102.Message, 220300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/D + 36/FEB//PERID/210300Z/TO:220300Z/ASOF:220

300Z, 10.

103. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo for 22 February

1991. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers

at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)
223

104.Message, 240300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//,

M S G I D / S I T R E P / U S A R C E N T / GDAY/FEB//PERID/230300Z/TO:240300Z/ASOF:240300Z, 10-12.

105. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, APO NY 09852, 16 December

1990, USCINCCENT OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm, 14 and 18.

106. HQ, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, APO NY 09852, 5

January 1991, COMUSARCENT Operations Plan Desert Storm 001, 8, C-3, C-4.

107. Ibid., C-4.

108. The identification of Iraqi brigades was fairly accurate. There was less agreement

on their divisional assignments. In this case, ARCENT continued to associate the

armored brigades in tactical reserve behind the Iraqi front line with the 12th

Armored Division. The VII Corps' postbattle analysis identifies it as the 52d. At this

time, the VII Corps' analysis seems more convincing. For that reason, the author

has adopted the device of using the VII Corps' reconstruction of the battlefield as the

authoritative assessment. Where ARCENT addresses units under other identities,

the ARCENT identification is followed by the VII Corps' assessment in parentheses

(e.g., "... the 12th (52d) Armored Division" in the text refers to the brigades of the

tactical reserve identified in ARCENT documents as the 12th Armored Division but

found by VII Corps to be the 52d Armored Division). This device does not affect the

content of the actions described, as the Iraqi brigade clusters fought as brigades, not

coordinated divisions. The document accepted as authoritative is, HQ, VII Corps,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AETSCB memorandum, Subject: The 100 Hour

Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20 April 1991.

109. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 23 February

1991, 3. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 24

February 1991, 2. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.)

110. HQ, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, APO NY 09852, 16 December

1990, USCINCCENT OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm, 15.

111. HQ, VII Corps, OPLAN 1990-2, Operation Desert Saber, 13 January 1991, 5-6.

112. There were actually two division artilleries, the 1st Infantry Division's and the 1st

U.K. Armored and three artillery brigades, the 42d, 75th, and 142d (National

Guard).

IIII IL = - I re , - --- -I----
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"Long ball hitters" at Fort McPherson awaiting movement to Saudi Arabia, December 1990.

Kneeling are Maj. Clay Newman, Maj. Larry Pippin, Maj. Rich Halbleib, (unknown), Maj.

Dan Gilbert, and (unknown). Standing are Maj. John Combs, Maj. Brad Smith, Maj. Bob

Wegman, Maj. Tom Polmateen, Lt. Col. David Mock, Maj. Mark Wagner, Maj. Paul

Hughes, (behind Wagner), and (rest unknown)

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Russia foreign minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, addressing the UN Security Council in

the debate on the use of "all necessary means" to ensure Iraq's compliance with the UN

resolution ordering it to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1990

M1 tanks driving in column in the Saudi desert
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Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, commander of VII Corps, and his senior

commanders: seated from left, Major General John Tilelli, Jr., 1st Cavalry Division; Major

General Ronald H. Griffith, 1st Armored Division; Franks; Major General Tom Rhame, 1st

Infantry Division; Major General Paul E. Funk, 3d Armored Division; and Major General

Rupert Smith, U.K. 1st Armoured Division.

A 5th Special Forces trainer instructing Qatari soldiers

before the ground phase of Desert Storm
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Saudi heavy-equipment transporters carrying self-propelled artillery to tactical

assembly area

Tanks being unloaded from HETs during the Gulf War
Tanks being unloaded from (HETs) during the Gulf War

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Tankers from the 3d Infantry Division that supported the VII Corp on 27 February
General Schwarzkopf (center) with Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan (right),

commander of the Arab forces during the war. General Calvin Waller, deputy CINC, is on

Schwarzkopf's right, with Major General Robert Johnston, CENTCOM chief of staff, looking

to the rear.

A G-day briefing in "Lucky Main" operations room at the

school house on 24 February 1991
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in Iraq, 0745 27 February 1991
7

Desert Storm: Battle

Two metaphors are suggested by the four days of concentrated

ground attack that destroyed the forces of Saddam Hussein in

southeastern Iraq and freed Kuwait. The first is that of J. F. C. Fuller's

"Sea Warfare on Land": 1 the grand fleet maneuvering at sea, a picture

of the disciplined movement in formation of great armored

dreadnoughts (M1 Abrams tanks) and lethal but lightly armored

battle cruisers (Bradley fighting vehicles) from which, as necessary,

debouch B. H. Liddell Hart's "land-marines"2 to clear trenches and

built-up areas. Like destroyers and torpedo boats, Army attack

helicopters concentrate rapidly and strike with deadly precision.

Overhead, the skies, often dark and forbidding during the four-day

ground operation, are clear of enemy planes and full of those of the

coalition, striking both enemy concentrations and, increasingly, the

retreating columns that clog the few routes out of the Kuwaitsoutheastern Iraq deathtrap. Behind the combat fleet toil the sea

trains that carry the fuel and ammunition, in hundreds of thousands of

tons, required to sustain the fighting fleet at range and to link it to its

bases in the south.

The second metaphor is the relentless movement of the drill bit

through the coal face. For though some of the first-line Iraqi forces did

stand and fight, the Iraqi Army found itself no more effective in

resistance than the coal vein that succumbs to the remorseless

advance of the drill. Even when the Iraqis fought back, it did not

matter in the context of the whole operation, and in the end, the

American armed forces lost far fewer soldiers in the four-day ground

battle than the Marine Corps did to a single terrorist bomb in Beirut in

October 1983.

The enemy forces in the target area of the ground attack had been

pounded by a sustained bombing effort that began within days of the

initiation of hostilities on 17 January. At the same time, the theater of

operations had been isolated by the attack of bridges over the

Euphrates. A systematic attack of air defense systems in the KTO had

rendered the Iraqi forces on the ground vulnerable to attack at will.

Thus freed from interference and under the direction of General

Schwarzkopf himself, coalition air forces had conducted an aerial

campaign of attrition against Iraqi forces south of the Euphrates

capable of interfering with planned operations. 3 (See figure 30.)

225
Figure 30.

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One major element of AirLand Battle proved to be beyond the

abilities of the Army and Air Forces engaged in Desert Storm. That

was the execution of close interdiction by the Air Force in support of

the Army's major operations, in particular the VII Corps' attack. The

problems with this form of joint integration of forces had always been

apparent. Indeed, the Air Force chief of staff, General Merrill McPeak,

had addressed those problems years before. 4 Peacetime exercises,

however, tended to gloss over them in the name of interservice comity.

Two structural issues were inherent in the problem of air-ground

coordination. The first had to do with control. Air interdiction is

controlled by the Air Force commander because it takes place beyond

the range of ground systems. The Army talked of a category of aerial

interdiction, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), that was to be flown to

support the ground commander's scheme of maneuver. During the

1980s, the Air Force recognized BAI as a term addressing a

subcategory of air interdiction but made no commitment to its place in

the blue-suit hierarchy of targets. Air assets are allocated according to

primary categories, and the air component commander decides what

will be flown according to his priorities as a theater component

commander. Because Air Force officers are not particularly

knowledgeable about the conduct of ground operations, they are not

inclined to allocate air assets to support ground maneuvers.

At the same time, the conduct of battlefield air interdiction

assumes the ground commanders can locate their front line trace so

their own forces are not attacked. The Army has long had a fire control

measure, the fire support coordination line (FSCL), to accomplish this.

The FSCL was intended to be a permissive fire measure; that is, the

FSCL was supposed to be a line beyond which any force could fire

without danger of hitting friendly maneuver forces. In Desert Storm,

there were two problems with the FSCL concept. With the Army

tactical missile system (ATACMS), the Army had a weapons system

whose range permitted ground forces to fire beyond the FSCL,

something the Air Force worried about given the density of planes in

the airspace. And since ground forces were advancing, not

withdrawing, the FSCL had to move with them. Senior ground

commanders, who were dependent upon forward unit reporting

through multiple command headquarters to stay informed, proved

utterly incapable of reporting a reliable front line trace in a timely

fashion. And, since the two services are, in fact, hierarchies joined at

the top, which execute at the bottom, the information had to penetrate

an Air Force operational information chain that took additional time
228

for it to reach shooters thus causing systemic delays. The attack on

British armored vehicles by U.S. Air Force planes was a consequence

of the information chain's inability to relay this kind of data rapidly. 5

Ultimately, CENTCOM took over the setting of the FSCL and

used it as a boundary, assigning all terrain on one side to the ground

commanders and all terrain and airspace on the other to the air

component commander. In the words of the Third Army deep fires

after-action report: "The end result, ironically, was that the high level

of success attained on the ground frequently led to a loss of air support,

since bombers could no longer execute their mission, and because the

mission manager didn't have the necessary lead time to successfully

divert the mission to another target."6

The result was that there was an area beyond the forward line of

troops in which only Army aviation could operate and into which Air

Force planes could operate only while under Army control (close air

support). There, the decentralized organization of Army aviation may

have prevented full use of this asset by preventing operational

concentration of ARCENT's aviation assets in front of VII Corps when

it closed with the Republican Guard. It was not possible to shift XVIII

Corps' attack helicopter assets to VII Corps for the very practical

reason that the helicopters' operating range was limited and tied to

fuel pods on the ground in their rear. Army aviation units were not

provided with the logistic redundance that permits flexible basing to

allow response to fleeting opportunities. Ultimately, XVIII Corps'

aviation brigades were committed to the control of the 101st Airborne

Division northwest of Basrah. Even then, the 101st had difficulty

accommodating the additional fuel requirements this entailed. The

VII Corps would have been unable to sustain the XVIII Corps' attack

helicopters without a major shifting of its resources across the Iraqi

desert, and there is little reason to assume that this could have been

accomplished easily or rapidly even if XVIII Corps had been willing to

give up a major part of its combat power. That too was unlikely. In

retrospect, the commitment of Army aviation beyond Basrah, where

distinct water lines constituted the best available line of separation

between the ground and air interdiction, was a poor solution. The Air

Force capabilities, combining J-STARS observation with sophisticated

attack tools, would seem likely to have been much more effective. VII

Corps was unable to employ Air Force battlefield air interdiction as a

blocking force in support of its maneuver units or maintain continuous

interdiction with its own aviation brigade (the 11th). Indeed, because

of its lack of control over the FSCL, it could not always interdict

targets within range. 7
229

The VII Corps attack on 24 February was less like the deep rapier

thrusts of Guderian or Rommel and more like the "integral operations"

dreamed of by the great von Schlieffen, in which the importance of

individual battles was subordinated to the logic of "an integrated and

continuous movement, war as uninterrupted forward motion," 8 an

inexorable advance of irresistible destructive power.

H-hour was 0400, 24 February. The weather on the border was

mostly cloudy with rain showers of some violence in the early morning.

Due to blowing sand, visibility decreased from crystal clarity at dawn

to as little as 200 meters during the day. Patches of fog were also

reported, and winds were from the southeast, gusting to twenty-five

knots.9 BMNT (beginning morning nautical twilight) was at 0531 the

24th; BENT (beginning evening nautical twilight) at 1824.10

The French 6th Light Armored Division, reinforced by a brigade

of the 82d Airborne Division, was the main attack of the XVIII Corps.

The French advanced at 0400 the morning of the 24th to "open the

ball." Prior to the attack, the French had seized the lip of the

escarpment that lies just across the Saudi border in Iraq. Their

objective was to advance to As Salman (Objective White) to free the

east-west lateral road, MSR Virginia, upon which the corps intended

to accomplish the movement of the fuel and ammunition necessary to

sustain the larger 24th Infantry Division (Mech) and the adjacent 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment attacks to the Euphrates valley

(anticipated for G+1). This would be accomplished while the

engineers opened more direct combat trails to the rear. The French

confronted the largest enemy concentration in the southern half of the

XVIII Corps sector and captured over 300 prisoners on G-day.

The elite 82d Airborne Division, perhaps the best light infantry in

the U.S. Army and the first vital commitment of American prestige in

August the previous year, was relegated, by the nature of desert

warfare, to providing the French with additional infantry forces and

then following its more mobile sister units, cleaning up and securing

by-passed pockets of enemy resistance. This role was not particularly

glamorous, and it did not get a lot of interest from CNN, but it was

essential, and the soldiers of the 82d performed their tasks with

characteristic discipline and good humor. 1l

Midway between the two flanks, the 101st Airborne Division,

using its unique air mobility, inserted two brigades by air on the 24th

and built up a forward operating base (FOB) Cobra halfway to the

Euphrates. From there, the Euphrates River valley and Highway 8

could be interdicted the first night of the ground war by the division's
230

attack helicopters. The air assault was unopposed, but an Iraqi

battalion was located by troops of the 327th Infantry of the 1st

Brigade. The Iraqi battalion, an element of the 49th Infantry Division,

surrendered after coming under air and ground preparation fires.12

FOB Cobra permitted the launching of division and corps attack

helicopters into the Euphrates valley eighty-five miles farther north.

These movements were followed the next day (the 25th) by the

division's third maneuver brigade. This cut that Iraqi line of

withdrawal until a slower heavy ground force could cross the empty

desert between the Saudi-Iraqi border and the enemy's principal line

of retreat or reinforcement. The troopers of the 101st were on the river

a full day before the arrival of the 24th Infantry Division and 3d

Armored Cavalry. The range of their attack helicopters put enemy

forces north and south of the river in jeopardy and, once the Iraqis

broke, they could interdict Iraqis who escaped west out of Basrah.

The G-day air assault by the 101st to establish FOB Cobra was

scheduled to begin simultaneously with the attack of the French 6th.

The assault had to be delayed, however, until 0730 because of a fierce

rainstorm followed by ground fog in the objective area. 13 A ground

column, organized by the 1st Brigade under the command of the

brigade executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jim McCarity, moved

forward at 0700 and began arriving at FOB Cobra that afternoon. The

combat element of the column consisted of thirty HMMWVs with

TOWs, two artillery batteries, one infantry company, and two

helicopter scout-attack teams. The column contained 2,000 soldiers in

700 vehicles and carried, among other things, 100,000 gallons of

aviation fuel across a desert track called the Darb al Haj. 14 It was

unopposed on its march to Cobra and was slowed only by the abysmal

weather, which muddied the desert track.

The attack all across the theater front was enormously successful

that morning, as the Iraqi infantry divisions, whose principal function

had been to identify the location of the coalition main attack and to

delay it until successively larger mobile reserves might be committed,

declined the role of cannon fodder and surrendered in large numbersnot just to the forces of XVIII Corps but to the Marines breaching Iraqi

defenses in the east and the attack by the Arab-Islamic Joint Forces

Command East on the coast.

By 0840 on the 24th, Schwarzkopf, spurred by reports of Iraqi

demolitions in Kuwait City, called Yeosock and asked his views on

scrapping the plan's time schedule and attacking early with the heavy

forces. 15 (See figure 31.) Yeosock first called his corps commanders and
231

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232

then replied to Schwarzkopf that it was possible. The artillery of the

1st Infantry Division would be in position to begin VII Corps'

breaching operation at 1230.16 General Rhame wanted to begin the

attack at 1300.17 Schwarzkopf delayed the heavy force attack until

1500 so that the Arab-Islamic Joint Forces Command North could

attack simultaneously with the Third Army's heavy forces. At 1430,

the 1st Infantry Division fired its preparation, using the division

artilleries of two divisions and three reinforcing brigades. At 1500, the

breaching operation began. The "Great Wheel" was under way.

At Third Army, the G3 Plans section made up a final time line to

project the battle now being joined through to the time of anticipated

contact with the Republican Guard Forces Command. The chart is

indicative of how the army commander saw the battle developing. It

forecast the 24th Division seizing Objectives Brown, Gray, and Red

and dominating MSR Virginia-Phase Line Smash by around H+35

(1500 on the 25th); the 1st U.K. Armored Division defeating a brigade

of the Iraqi 12th (actually the 52d) Armored Division between H + 35

and H+41 (1500-2100 on the 25th); and the 2d Armored Cavalry

moving forward of Phase Line Smash at the same time. Based upon

this success, Third Army anticipated Schwarzkopf releasing the 1st

Cavalry Division in time to move by H + 41. Yeosock expected the VII

Corps to be prepared to close with the Republican Guard about 1500 on

the 26th, with the 24th Division attacking a logistics complex at

Juwarin at the same time. Based on this schedule, the 1st Cavalry

Division would close into an assembly area north of the barrier belt

(Lee) by 1900 that night (the 25th).18 Using this measure of progress

and a knowledge of events on the ground, Yeosock would feel the army

was ahead of schedule for most of the attack. 19 Schwarzkopf, perhaps

with urging from his superiors, would not share this view.20 (See

figure 32.)

The 1st Division scouts crossed the border at 0507 on the 24th,

with the division's 1st and 2d Brigades crossing their lines of

departure at 0545 en route to' their final assault positions. 21 The

brigades collected many Iraqi prisoners on the way, as did all forces for

the remainder of the war and even thereafter. The division fired its

artillery preparation at 1430 and began to breach at 1500.

The Iraqis had apparently slipped their 26th Infantry Division to

the southwest to extend their defensive lines farther to the west than

expected, but even so, the Iraqi forces were widely dispersed, and the

barrier system proved inadequate. According to VII Corps' battlefield

reconstruction (based largely on enemy prisoner of war [EPW]

interviews), the brigades of the Iraqi division were stretched along the
Figure 32. Third Army's final synchronization matrix

233

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front and out of supporting distance from their reserve to the rear. The

26th was now to be overrun by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and

enveloped by the corps' iron fist. The corps' G2 report goes on to say of

the adjacent (eastward) 48th Division's 807th Brigade (in front of the

1st ID) that "It is probably the unluckiest unit in the Iraqi army. Its

soldiers have been under air attack for 39 straight days."22 The 48th

was reduced to about 50 percent from desertion, and its artillery was

effectively silenced by the 1st Infantry Division's preparation and

counterbattery fires. Nonetheless, the troops of the U.S. 1st Division

did receive some scattered and ineffective artillery fire while passing

the enemy barriers.

Both the Iraqis' (regular army) 12th and 52d Armored Divisions

would begin repositioning the night of 24 February. The 12th moved to

positions south of Al Busayyah, and the 52d shifted to shore up the

first defensive echelon. The 52d (identified by ARCENT as the 12th)

had suffered severe losses from the air and artillery preparation of the

battlefield prior to G-day. Indeed, General Franks had directed that

his staff make the 52d Armored Brigade "go away" and, consequently,

it became known as the "go-away brigade." On G-day, it had only

fifteen T-55 tanks and fifteen Russian-design infantry fighting

vehicles (BMPs) remaining, the complement of two American

companies.23 One of the 52d Division's battalions would be destroyed

with the 48th Infantry Division, which it supported. The remainder of

its brigades would be attacked successively by the 1st U.K. Armored

Division as it moved eastward through the Iraqi front-line rear

areas.24 (See map 8.)

By 1600, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division reported sixteen passage

lanes clear at the breach site. By 1654, there were twenty-four. By

nightfall, the division had secured its intermediate objective, Phase

Line Colorado, a two-brigade semicircle that denied the enemy direct

fire on the breachhead line. Franks met with the commanders of his

leading formations, Rhame and Holder, to discuss options for the first

night.25 The 1st Infantry Division was now split by the enemy's

defensive barriers. Its two lead brigades had cleared a number of lanes

through the zone, but these still had to be proofed and marked, and

exits and assembly areas within the breachhead, now in the dark, had

to be organized. The division's third brigade, the 2d Armored Division

(Forward) (a brigade-sized force) was still south of the defensive zone,

as was the supporting artillery, four brigades worth (considering here

the British division artillery as part of the parent division). The plan

called for the third brigade to pass through the breach and attack

straight ahead simultaneously as the two organic brigades rolled
235
236

outward to clear the final breachhead line, New Jersey. Once set there,

beyond indirect fire range, the 1st U.K. Armored Division would pass

through the breach and out of the breachhead line to attack the Iraqi

tactical reserves. But a great many vehicles, almost three division

equivalents when one considers the artillery brigades, would have to

move through the passage points before that could happen.

For his part, Rhame had serious reservations about committing

the 2d Armored Division (Forward) into the passage of the breachhead

area and executing the attack to Phase Line New Jersey in the dark.

The risks of fratricide-caused by compressing three brigades into the

small area and executing a rapid attack in the dark-were high.

Further, the brigade's ability to conduct night operations was

unknown. The 2d Armored Division (Forward) was a Europe-based

brigade that had joined the U.S.-based 1st Infantry Division only

recently and had not had the opportunity to train in night breaching at

the National Training Center as had the other divisional brigades. The

leading brigades, although set on PL Colorado, were still receiving

sporadic fire that would continue through the night. There was also a

question of whether the 1st U.K. Armored Division would be ready to

pass through the breach before noon the following day. Colonel Holder,

leading the flanking force, expressed concern that the left wing would

become vulnerable to counterattack if it advanced into the open while

the right wing remained in place.

The consensus of the three commanders was that, at this point,

with the enemy's response not yet clear, it was better to hold the 1st

Infantry in place, set on PL Colorado, and complete the opening of the

breachhead area the following morning rather than accepting the risk

of being caught disorganized by an enemy counterattack in the dark.

General Rhame has written that this decision was made in light of an

offer made by him that morning that the U.S. 1st Division should

conduct its attack even earlier (at 1300) and then push straight ahead,

with the British following, making their turn east without conducting

a deliberate passage of lines out of a set bridgehead line. The

additional hours of daylight thus gained could have permitted the

movement of all three maneuver brigades of the U.S. 1st Division into

the breachhead. That option had been rejected, however, leading

Rhame, at least, to conclude that his superiors were satisfied with the

progress made to date and that there was no pressure to accept

additional risks this early in the offensive. The attack was, after all,

fifteen hours ahead of schedule.26

That being the case and as the Egyptian Corps on VII Corps' right

had not begun to breach the enemy positions to their front, Franks
237

made the decision to keep the corps' scheme of maneuver synchronized.

He had over 8,000 tracked vehicles and more than three times that

many wheeled vehicles to move through the breach and the fortykilometer gap beyond. He intended to do so without offering the enemy

an opportunity to catch his force strung out and disorganized. He

would not advance his left, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and two

armored divisions, until the British division, which would protect his

right flank, was through the breach and into the attack. The 2d

Armored Cavalry would hold its position roughly on line with PL

Colorado and the two armored divisions north of the Iraqi-Saudi

border, some thirty kilometers behind. Local actions to identify enemy

elements and keep them off balance would continue through the night.

Franks also wanted the breachhead area cleared in daylight to

provide for security for the fleet of vulnerable support vehicles.

Besides, all three commanders knew the time would not be wasted in

any event. There was plenty to do to prepare to continue the attack the

next day. Four brigade equivalents of artillery would be passed into

the breachhead before advancing the breachhead line or passing

through the 1st U.K. Armored Division and various support forces for

the forward brigades. The emphasis in the field that first night was on

maintaining the concentration and balance of the attacking force and

preparing for a deliberate passage of lines by the two-brigade British

division on the following day. Even if the forward line of troops

remained stationary, the passage lanes were active all night, as more

and more combat power was moved north of the barrier belt. Attack

helicopters worked forward of the ground maneuver forces all along

the corps front throughout the night. Still, for all his earlier insistence,

a pause had been imposed upon Franks by circumstances and by the

decision to perform the breach job "with precision and

synchronization," with an eye on the objective of hitting the RGFC

with a "massed closed fist."

There was another indication, too, of the high sensitivity to the

possibility of fratricide that night. As the 3d Armored Division

advanced, it discovered an enemy unit between it and the 1st Infantry

Division. Rather than risk an incident where the flank units of the two

divisions might shoot at each other, Franks imposed a five-kilometer

buffer zone between the units, notwithstanding the enemy within, and

required the troops of the 3d Armored Division to withdraw from

contact.27

On VII Corps' left, the 3d Armored Cavalry and the 24th Division,

kept on their steady and generally unopposed advance to the

Euphrates. The division was commanded by Major General Barry
238

McCaffrey, Third Army's most driven and perhaps most aggressive

commander. McCaffrey was a genuine war hero who had been severely

wounded in Vietnam. Now, his division, with its attachments,

contained no less than 1,800 tracked vehicles, including 249 M-1A1

tanks, 218 Bradley fighting vehicles, and 843 older M-113 armored

personnel carriers. It also had about 6,500 wheeled vehicles and ninety

helicopters, eighteen of which were AH-64 Apaches. The division was

supported by ninety 155-mm howitzers, twenty-four 8-inch howitzers,

and thirty-six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).28 The 24th

stopped for fuel in early evening and then resumed the advance in

order to be in position to launch attacks on its objectives along MSR

Virginia-Phase Line Smash early the following morning.29 In the

center of the XVIII Corps zone, by the end of the day, the 101st

Airborne had the bulk of two brigades, their direct support artillery,

and a good bit of the support command at FOB Cobra.

The 1st Cavalry Division continued to conduct demonstrations in

the Ruqi pocket during the 24th and 25th. These maneuvers appear to

have been successful. The Iraqi concentration of forces in front of Wadi

al Batin was substantial in contrast to the forces deployed farther

west.

'By the night of 24 February, both Schwarzkopf and Yeosock were

well satisfied with the events of the day. At Third Army, Yeosock

acquiesced in VII Corps' decision, reported by the ARCENT liaison

officer, to hold the advance and concentrate on getting the 1st U.K.

through. Looking toward the decisive battle with the RGFC, Yeosock

instructed Arnold to examine using XVIII Corps to fix the Hammurabi

Division before VII Corps attacked the Tawakalna and Medina

Divisions; he also instructed Arnold to destroy the artillery of the

RGFC infantry divisions (in the XVIII Corps' zone) by fire. Yeosock's

executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall, a laconic and

unusually circumspect and precise infantry officer, recorded Yeosock's

closing comment: "The intent, is to have XVIII Corps fix forces to allow

VII Corps to maneuver against the RGFC divisions." 30 In his memoir,

Schwarzkopf recollects: "That night, about twenty hours into the

ground war, I went to bed contented." 31

He did not remain so. A gap had begun to open between the

tactical operations Franks was fighting in the field and the operation

Schwarzkopf envisioned in the basement of the Ministry of Defense.

The commander in chief had gone to bed anticipating continuous

movement of the forward line of troops in VII Corps throughout the

night-particularly of the armored fist. When he went to his map in

the morning and found them still in place, he blew up and called
239

Yeosock.32 Yeosock, it seems, weathered the storm, explained the

intentions for the day, and very likely-sympathetic with Franks'

practical problems-underestimated the depth of the CINC's

frustration. In the morning general officer meeting at Third Army,

General Arnold reported to Yeosock that Schwarzkopf had imposed a

limit of advance on the 24th Infantry Division (which would keep it

from descending into the Euphrates valley). Arnold expected VII Corps

to close on Objective Collins that day and continue with a hasty attack

on the RGFC.33

Yeosock instructed Arnold to tell VII Corps that the CINC's

intent was "continuous progress, no lulls." 34 Otherwise, Franks was

not made aware of Schwarzkopfs displeasure. Both Franks and

Yeosock continued to believe that all was well as the VII Corps

advance resumed at 0530 that morning, and reports of increasing

contact came in through the day. Unfortunately, at the same time, a

gap continued to exist between success reported (or anticipated) and

that achieved as reflected on Schwarzkopfs briefing map. Another gap

would open between the progress of the 24th Division, as it advanced

relentlessly over extremely rough but largely empty terrain, and the

supposedly slower progress of VII Corps' armored forces. This

discrepancy would also become a source of irritation. During the 25th,

while the CINC remained restless about the rate of operational

success, Franks wrestled at the front with tactical possibilities in the

sort of weather described most aptly by the British as "very dirty,

indeed."

The ARCENT SITREP reported that morning (250300Z-0600

local) that the Iraqi 48th and 45th Infantry Divisions had been

destroyed and that the VII and XVIII Corps had captured 3,000

prisoners. The G2 still expected the Iraqis, in extremis, to employ

chemical weapons. Meanwhile, the anticipated time of passage for the

1st U.K. was given by Third Army as 0500Z (0800 local), with a

completion time of 0900Z (1200 local). This proved to be very

optimistic both as to start and completion times and, ultimately, quite

wrong. 35

The error was introduced when the army liaison officer at the VII

Corps tactical command post and a corps staff officer at the VII Corps

main CP reported to the ARCENT mobile and main CPs respectively

that passage would be completed by noon. Although the main CP was

in receipt of a copy of the VII Corps FRAGO 138-91, which gave a start

time of no later than 1200 local (which in fact was met) and a

completion prior to the end of evening nautical twilight (which was not

met), the duty officer at ARCENT seems to have continued to operate
240

on the original misimpression-which was duly reported as indicated

to CENTCOM.36 This sort of confusion should not be surprising in a

scratch staff thrown together on short notice (both the VII Corps' staff

officer and ARCENT LNO were augmentees); indeed, it is a

characteristic example of the fog of war which, for all the Army's

emphasis on training staff officers to value precise and correct

information, has still not been removed. The problem of inaccurate

staff reporting would later have painful consequences for both

ARCENT and VII Corps.

The ARCENT SITREP also indicated that the French 6th Light

Armored had taken its intermediate objective on the 24th (Objective

Rochambeau) and would advance to As Salman on the 25th. The 101st

reported that it had seized its forward operating base by 1039 on the

24th and had captured a battalion commander and his troops shortly

thereafter. The division reported conducting limited air interdiction of

Highway 8 during the night.37 Arnold's cover note on the ARCENT

SITREP the morning of the 25th observed: "FOCUS today at Army HQ

is on gaining early release of 1st CAV and on delivering a modified

version of CONPLAN 6 (Destruction of the RGFC) to the Corps."38

On G-day, over to the right of the Arab-Islamic Joint Forces

Command North, MARCENT had enjoyed significant success

breaching what was supposed to have been an extraordinarily difficult

barrier belt. At the last minute, MARCENT had decided to attack two

divisions abreast. 39 The Army's "Tiger Brigade," commanded by

Colonel John B. Sylvester, under tactical command of the 2d Marine

Division for Operation Desert Storm, followed the 6th Marines

through the left-hand breach starting at 1530 and entered the surreal

landscape of Kuwait, where the burning oil fires and darkness at noon

seem to have reminded every observer of hell itself. On G-day, the

"Tiger Brigade" suffered one man killed when a light Military Police

vehicle struck a mine after dark. One M1 tank struck a mine in the

breach and lost some road wheels. No one in the tank was injured, and

the tank was back in action within a day.40

The Marines achieved their first day's objectives; in particular,

the 1st Marine Division secured the Al Jabber airfield. The Marines

would also repulse an attack by Iraqi armored forces advancing out of

the smoke and haze of the Al Burgan oil fields on G + 1 and then secure

the Kuwait City International Airport and, with the "Tiger Brigade,"

cut the main Kuwait City-Basrah highway, thus completing an inner

encirclement of Iraqi forces in southeastern Kuwait. Like the VII

Corps, the Marine advance stopped at night on G-day.4 1
241

Finally, on G-day, the Joint Forces Command East attacked and

advanced along the coast according to schedule.

The next day, 25 February (G+ 1), proved to be the most deadly

single day of the war for U.S. forces. (See map 9.) The war's costliest

incident took place far from the direct-fire battles of the Iraqi desert. It

occurred in Dhahran. At 2036 (local time), the only Scud missile to do

significant damage in the Arabian Peninsula fell on the warehouse

sheltering, among others, the 14th Quartermaster Detachment, a

Reserve Component unit from Pennsylvania, only recently arrived in

country.4 2 Twenty-eight soldiers were killed, and about one hundred

were wounded. These losses were greater than those suffered by any

combat division in the four days of ground battle.

Earlier on the 25th, however, successes had continued to pile up.

The 101st Airborne Division inserted its 3d Brigade, commanded by

Colonel Robert T. Clark, from its pre-G-day assembly area, all the way

to the Euphrates valley, a distance of 155 miles (about 250 kilometers),

thus cutting an Iraqi main line of withdrawal or reinforcement

(though there was no evidence that the Iraqis intended to use it for

either at this point). The 3d Brigade posed a threat just 145 miles from

Baghdad.43

The 3d Brigade accelerated its insertion to try and beat the

weather, which was worse on G+ 1 than it had been the day before.

The operation actually began on G-day with a program of

reconnaissance to ensure the insertion would be unopposed. Scouts

looked over the landing zones and vicinity, first from the air, then with

forces on the ground, including motorcycle scouts. The weather was so

bad that even motorcycle troops were mired. The assault itself took

place on the 25th.

About noon, the 3d Brigade placed its heavy equipment (two

artillery batteries, three antitank companies [forty-eight TOWs], two

mounted rifle companies, and some engineer troops) on the ground in

an area short of the river called Landing Zone (LZ) Sand, then moved

the column overland to Area of Operations (AO) Eagle along Highway

8, arriving in spite of all but impassable muddy desert tracks early on

the 26th. An intermediate landing site had to be used for heavy

equipment due to weight-distance limits on helicopters.

At 1508, the first light infantry troops moved into AO Eagle using

sixty-six UH-60 Blackhawks. A second lift was grounded by weather

at FOB Cobra until the following morning. However, at 1640 on the

25th, "Screaming Eagles" of the 101st were in the Euphrates valley,

while the 24th Infantry Division was reforming to the south along
242

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Map 9.
243

Phase Line Smash (MSR Virginia) to continue its advance to a linkup.

By 2300, the highway was cut. Weather delayed the remainder of the

personnel lifts until the following day. 44

The 24th Division had crossed the line of departure on the 24th

with three brigades abreast and then shifted into a "V" formation with

the 197th Brigade on the left, the 2d Brigade on the right, and the 1st

Brigade following the 2d. The division began its attacks on positions

dominating MSR Virginia (Phase Line Smash) at 0300 on the 25th,

when Colonel Ted Reid's 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)

(Separate), from Fort Benning, Georgia (deployed as the 24th

Division's third brigade), attacked Objective Brown. The brigade

objective, apparently an air defense site, was secured by 1004. At 0848,

the 197th had linked up with the 101st Airborne Division on the heavy

brigade's left flank.45

The other divisional units seized their objectives soon after. The

2d Brigade took Objective Grey on the MSR, and by 2150, the 1st

Brigade, passing through the 2d, had seized Objective Red to protect

the MSR to the north. The division then pulled its logistics tail in

behind and began almost immediately to press on to the Euphrates.

The 197th Brigade prepared to continue the attack toward the

Euphrates by 1600. By nightfall, engulfed in heavy rain, the 197th

was 231 kilometers inside Iraq. After a second night's move,

challenged by evil terrain and harsh weather, the 197th arrived in

position to advance into the Euphrates valley the following day. 46 The

limit of advance on the 24th Infantry Division had been lifted at 1800

the 25th.47

The French 6th Light Armored Division on the left flank attacked

at first light (0530) on 25 February and secured the airfield at As

Salman, thus opening MSR Virginia in the west. It would require

another day to obtain the surrender of forces blockaded in the nearby

town.

The success enjoyed in XVIII Corps and the speed with which the

engineers laid down their combat trails behind the 24th Division led to

the corps' decision not to establish its first intermediate logistics base

(Oscar) in the vicinity of As Salman but to jump directly to Log Base

Romeo farther east.4 8 Meanwhile, the 24th Division, for the most part

refueled and reorganized, again took up its relentless advance now

oriented on Objective Gold, the enemy logistics complex at Juwarin in

the Euphrates valley.4 9 Its drive across empty but difficult terrain, in

the face of abysmal weather and pitch darkness, opened a gap between
244

XVIII Corps and VII Corps that would be painfully apparent on

briefing charts at CENTCOM and JCS.

On 25 February, the VII Corps "Wheel" moved inexorably

onward. The Iraqis began to react to the U.S. attack by forming a

defensive line, consisting of a brigade of the RGFC Adnan Infantry

Division, the Tawakalna Mechanized Division, two brigades of the

12th Armored Division, the 37th and 50th Brigades-assembled from

southwest to northeast to confront the VII Corps envelopment. 50

Although the defenders seem to have grasped what was happening

operationally, to the extent they took counteractions against it, they lacked the means of intelligence acquisition to detect the "drill bit"

before they found themselves confronted tactically with overwhelming

armored killing power. In addition, forced to move about above ground,

mobile reserves found themselves exposed anew to attack from the air

by rotary and fixed-wing aircraft; they were thus subjected to further

losses before they came into position to fight the direct-fire battle.

As Yeosock had predicted, the Iraqis could move, but they could

not maneuver. U.S. divisions, too, did little actual battle maneuver, if

by that one means the execution of complex positioning of brigades and

battalions for relative advantage on the battlefield. In the U.S. case,

the low level of maneuver reflected a lack of need rather than a lack of

training. Divisions moved forward with two or three heavy brigades on

line and simply overwhelmed the hapless Iraqis by superiority of

combat power at each successive point. U.S. brigades might be relieved

from the rear, but they tended to be employed straight ahead.

Because of the density of forces presented at any point of conflict

and the skill with which U.S. commanders prepared their battlefields

with fires, there is to date but one story of a unit, even as small as a

company, that was repulsed by the resistance it confronted.51 In the

main, the Iraqis surrendered, or fought and were ground up. The Iraqi

infantry surrendered in such numbers that prisoners proved to be an

impediment to the advance, and many stories are told of Iraqis who

were disarmed, provided with food and water, and waved on

unaccompanied to the oncoming logistics elements in the rear.

On the VII Corps left, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment began

its shift to an eastward track and uncovered the 1st Armored Division,

which advanced north toward Objective Purple (Al Busayyah), an

occupied logistics complex on the corps' left flank that constituted the

outer corner of its multidivision turn.

The 1st AD was commanded by Major General Ron Griffith, quiet and systematic, perhaps the quintessential tanker, whose boxer's
245

visage reminds one of another premier tanker, the late General

Creighton Abrams. Griffith clearly believed in balance and

concentration. The 1st Armored Division, "Old Ironsides," began its

advance at 0630 the morning of the 25th from a position twenty-nine kilometers inside Iraq. That day, the division advanced behind its own

cavalry (1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry) screen on a two-brigade front of

about twenty to thirty kilometers. Helicopters screened forward of the

ground troops and detected enemy positions.

The division destroyed the reserve brigade of the Iraqi 26th

Division between 1300 and 1700 and continued on to Objective Purple. It advanced 144 kilometers in sixteen hours of maneuver and combat,

a cumulative rate of 9 kilometers an hour.52 While the ground elements fought with the Iraqi infantry and armored forces in front of

them, the division's AH-64s went deep to begin attacking the forces to

be fought in the next battle-the troops occupying Al Busayyah, a

small desert town whose importance came from the Iraqi logistics site

located there as well as from the XVIII Corps' desire for a track as an

MSR to support follow-on actions of the 24th Infantry Division.

Because Al Busayyah was known to be an occupied, built-up area,

Griffith decided to conduct a deliberate attack, preparing the objective by fire during the night of the 25th and 26th and then assaulting the

next day rather than accepting the risk of heavy losses in a

dismounted infantry attack in the dark. Griffith believed the logistics site was occupied by an Iraqi special forces battalion, an infantry battalion, and a tank company.53 Al Busayyah had to be taken and

cleared because its availability as an MSR would be compromised if

occupying forces were left in place. Objective Purple would be taken

the morning of the 26th during a continuous movement that would

reorient the 1st Armored to the east as the left flank division of the

corps' three-division maneuver mass.

The 2d Armored Cavalry, now in a movement to contact, oriented

increasingly to the east in front of the 3d Armored Division and made

its first contact with the Iraqi operational reserves at 0841 on the 25th.

The 2d destroyed the defending brigade (the 50th Brigade of the 12th

Armored Division) and moved on to the east until dark. The regiment, particularly the 3d Squadron, was in contact with enemy heavy forces,

often in abysmal weather, from 0841 until 2100.54 The regimental S2

estimated that the RGFC Tawakalna Division was located along the

65 Easting (a line of longitude), with a security zone of eight kilometers. The corps commander, visiting the regimental tactical

operations center at 1530, ordered the regiment to maintain contact
246

and fix the RGFC, locate their flanks, and be prepared to pass the 1st

Infantry Division through. The decisive ground battle had begun. 55

The 3d Armored Division followed the 2d Armored Cavalry and

destroyed the various Iraqi units by-passed by the cavalry screen. At

1645 on the 25th, Franks visited the division command post and

imparted his intentions for the attack against the RGFC shaping up

for the 26th. According to notes from the 3d Armored Division

commander's operational assistant, Major John Rosenberger, Franks

called Yeosock to report on his situation and intentions and "stressed

the importance of continuing the attack without pause given the lack

of resistance encountered by 1st AD and 3d AD in zone." Franks

indicated his intention was for the 1st AD to close with the RGFC

Medina Armored Division, with the 3d AD to destroy the Tawakalna,

then follow on by attacking what were believed to be the 52d and 17th

Armored Divisions (actually the 12th and 10th). The U.S. 1st Infantry

would pass through the 2d Armored Cavalry, and the corps would

attack with three divisions abreast. The focus would be on the 1st and

3d Armored Divisions, which were clearly directed against the center

of gravity of the RGFC, with the 1st ID on the right attacking parallel

with the 1st and 3d Divisions toward Objective Norfolk and perhaps

becoming an enveloping force if an opening developed.

These were instructions on a map. The manner of implementation

became the subject of some disagreement between Major General Paul

Funk, the 3d Armored Division commander, and the VII Corps staff

once implementing orders began to be issued during the night.

Specifically, Funk wanted more room to maneuver so he might attack

with one brigade through a gap between the Medina and Tawakalna

Divisions in front of him and then turn the brigade southeast behind

the Iraqi line.56 In short, he wanted to maneuver within his zone

rather than participate as part of a corps phalanx rolling east shoulder

to shoulder. The pressure of time and the density of corps forces

precluded the change. The 3d Armored Division responded and was

attacking by 0755 with two brigades abreast and the third in reserve.

Later, the reserve brigade would pass through the left-hand brigade,

break through and, in conjunction with the division attack helicopters,

destroy the forces in the Iraqi rear.

The 1st Infantry Division completed exploitation of its breach by

1100 on the 25th and passed the 1st U.K. Armored Division through,

starting at 1200. The British would break out of the breachhead at

1500 and begin to fight their way through the Iraqi infantry divisions

to the east almost at once.5 7 The passage of the British division,

however, lasted until about 0200 into the morning of the 26th.
247

Thereafter, the 1st Infantry Division began to move north to fall in

behind the 2d Armored Cavalry. After dark, the 1st Infantry Division

passed through the regimental line and came abreast of the 1st and 3d

Armored Divisions (the 3d had been uncovered by the regiment the

night before) as they moved east in the great VII Corps three-division

phalanx.

The notes and accounts within VII Corps and at Third Army make

it clear that the gap was widening between Schwarzkopfs perception

of what was necessary and his understanding of what was occurring in

VII Corps. Much of the misunderstanding would seem to have been the

result of imprecise use of language as the corps' intentions were passed

through army to the theater headquarters; it was also the result of the

inevitable tension between those who view war at the operational level

and those whose primary focus is tactical. Franks was forward all day,

everyday, visiting his commanders on the ground, taking the pulse of

his forces, experiencing the weather and blowing dust or rain. Often

the texture of the battle seems not to have worked its way to the

theater commander far to the rear. Moreover, far from the battlefield,

progress seems to have been equated only with movement.

Franks had talked about continuing without pause, yet, again, by

2100 on the 25th, the 1st Armored Division and 2d Armored Cavalry

Regiment had stopped for the night, the former to prepare for a

deliberate attack, the latter in a hasty defense to allow the corps to

rebalance for the decisive attack the next day. From the tactical

perspective, action continued. Combat did not stop. The 1st Armored

Division attacked by air and artillery all night, enabling it to overrun

its objective in the morning and continue on to its place on the left of

the corps' wall of iron. For its part, 2d Cavalry was involved in

repelling Iraqi attacks for much of the night. 58

The picture being painted in the Ministry of Defense and, through

there, to the Pentagon and perhaps the National Security Council

seems to have been something else again. Operational-level warfare is

largely perceived to be a matter of space and time. There were already

reports of Iraqis fleeing the encirclement. Moreover, the Iraqi flight

was quite visible to Schwarzkopf (and Yeosock for that matter)

through the agency of J-STARS. J-STARS could indicate the build-up

of a steady stream of vehicles up the road toward Basrah and beyond.

It could not discriminate between a truck or a tank, of course, but the

growing flight behind a deliberate blocking force was apparent.

Whatever the Air Force had done to seal the KTO by cutting its

bridges, it had not been enough to stop the Iraqi flight north out of

Basrah entirely-nor would it be, as the ground attack progressed.
248

Schwarzkopf seems to have feared that the encirclement would not be

fast enough to prevent the Iraqis from drawing off significant forces

behind their covering line, and that the continuous attack from the air

on fleeing units was not going to be destructive enough to do what

needed to be done.

What Schwarzkopf did not seem to have considered was the

logistic limits of the encircling forces, the U.S. 1st Armored Division

and, ultimately, the 24th Infantry Division. (See figure 33.) Moreover,

Schwarzkopf did not seem to be aware of the rather stark fact that

increased speed, say at Objective Purple on the night of the 25th,

would have been paid for in soldiers' blood-a cost Third Army

commanders, from division through army, seemed to have been more

reluctant to pay. Schwarzkopf either did not share this awareness, or

else it was a price he found acceptable.

Yeosock and Arnold were aware of Schwarzkopf's general

expectations; indeed, they had repeated them at their morning general

officer conference. Arnold had then anticipated three battles for the

25th, one at Phase Line Smash (XVIII Corps), a second at Objective

Purple (lst AD), and a third consequent to the reaction of the Iraqi

12th (really 52d Armored Division), the tactical reserve. Yeosock's

guidance had been clear. The two corps were to continue as a

movement to contact. "The CinC's intent," Yeosock said, "is

continuous pressure, no lulls."59 Clearly, in Yeosock's view, that was

just what Franks was delivering.

In his memoir, Schwarzkopf writes that at about 2100 on the 25th,

"Yeosock reported that while VII Corps columns were still unopposed,

rain and sandstorms were slowing them down, and they were twenty

miles short of Collins."60 Schwarzkopf, who had just spoken directly to

the president, indicates his disappointment at the report and the great

frustration of General Waller, once more his deputy. Yet when

Yeosock returned to his headquarters from the evening briefing at

CENTCOM that night, he observed that Schwarzkopf was satisfied

with the army's operational style, although he, Schwarzkopf, had

expressed concern about the separation developing between the 24th

Infantry Division and VII Corps (the 24th, whose Objective Grey was

adjacent to Objective Purple, was dashing on by that night toward the

Euphrates, while the 1st Armored Division waited until morning to

cross Purple) and the fact that the weather for the 26th looked to be

worse than it had been on the 24th or 25th.61 The Third Army

commander tried once more to obtain release of the theater reserve

(1st Cavalry Division) that night and failed to do so. One can only

observe that the effect of the rain and sandstorms, as well as enemy
249

=I,/1

I

03o

t l

Figure 33.

.Aq
250

resistance (for the corps was not unopposed), were more obscured when

viewed from the Ministry of Defense basement than they were in the

field. The CENTCOM commander was falling victim to the disease of

"chateau generalship."

Yeosock's concerns for 26 February involved obtaining release of

the 1st Cavalry Division, which the CINC continued to hold as

reassurance for Joint Forces Command North and the Egyptians until

the latter could complete their breach and breakout; setting a proper

boundary to establish the terms for the two Army corps to destroy the

RGFC; and bringing the two corps more or less on line by their

securing of Objectives Orange and Collins (XVIII and VII Corps

respectively) by early afternoon of the 26th.62 From Yeosock's

perspective, these actions were within what he understood to be the

CINC's intent and within his own projected time lines. By morning, it

would be clear that was not good enough for Schwarzkopf.

At 0135 on the 26th, Baghdad radio announced an Iraqi

withdrawal from Kuwait.63 President Bush responded quickly, first,

through Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater at 0630 on the 26th (local

time was still 2230, the 25th in Washington) and then, later, on the

morning of the 26th in Washington, with a brief (three-minute)

personal statement. The thrust of the response was that Saddam's

withdrawal was unsatisfactory without his corresponding acceptance

of the various UN resolutions about abandoning any claim to Kuwait,

payment of reparations, and release of prisoners. 64 Early morning

intelligence reports indicated that, indeed, the Iraqi Army had begun a

mass exodus led by III Corps in the east beginning at 2230 (local) on

the 25th. There had been initial indications of withdrawal via JSTARS images as early as 0300 the 25th.65

At 0830 on the 26th, while the ARCENT staff was preparing for

its routine morning update briefing, Yeosock was called to the phone

for an urgent call from Schwarzkopf. (See map 10.) There are various

colorful accounts in the press of the tenor of this call, most of which are

supported by the circumstantial evidence and memories of staff

officers in the vicinity. 66 The thrust of the business was that

Schwarzkopf was dissatisfied with what he saw as the overly cautious

and slow VII Corps offensive. This concern was shared by General

Powell, far off in Washington, who compared VII Corps' progress

unfavorably with that of the (as yet largely unopposed) 24th

Division. 67 Lieutenant Colonel Kendall merely observed in his notes:

"0840C: CINC called to prepare for more rapid OPTEMPO; 24 ID

released from the limit of advance (PL Viking)." 68 Elsewhere he noted:
251

Map 1u.

1)

F)

F)
252

"CinC's guidance has changed from deliberate operations to a

pursuit." 69

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Iraqi III and IV Corps in

the east, Iraqi operational reserves, much of the RGFC, and regular

Iraqi Army armored and mechanized divisions were clearly under

control and, as the Marines and 2d Armored Cavalry had learned on

the 25th, prepared to fight to provide cover for the retreating forces.

For the VII Corps and Third Army commanders, the bitter irony

in Schwarzkopfs call was that the 26th was the day when it was all

coming together-the CINC's display of temper notwithstanding.

During the previous night, Yeosock had set the battlefield for the

destruction of the Republican Guard by issuing the boundaries for the

advance eastward.7 0 (See map 11.) Meanwhile, Franks had brought his

three heavy divisions on line. Incidentally, Yeosock had decided not to

turn over part of VII Corps' area of operations to XVIII Corps in the

vicinity of Objective Purple. Rather, he required VII Corps to provide

XVIII Corps an MSR through that area on order.71

The 24th Division would run wild in the Iraqi rear starting at

midafternoon on 26 February and extending through the 27th. The

"Victory" Division attacked down the Euphrates valley in two

directions, overrunning the theater logistics site at Juwarin (Objective

Gold) and, in an exercise not unlike the Federal Cavalry's 1863 raid on

Brandy Station,72 destroyed Iraqi aircraft on the ground at the air

bases at Tallil in the west and Jalibah in the east.

On the morning of 27 February, the 101st Airborne Division

showed its inherent flexibility by establishing a new forward

operations base on the ground to the east, taking over a site secured by

the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment as the regiment came up to become

the right flank of the 24th Division's advance. That afternoon, the

101st, reinforced by the 12th Aviation Brigade from XVIII Corps,

would send four Apache battalions in rotation across the Haer al

Hammar to interdict the Iraqis, who managed to escape northwest

from Basrah. That evening, the 24th Infantry Division, now with the

operational command of the 3d Armored Cavalry and formed with two

heavy brigades and an armored cavalry regiment abreast, was poised

to begin a descent down Highway 8 toward a line approximating the

Rumayulah oil fields (and possibly beyond)-an advance foreshortened

only by the political decision to cease offensive operations.

As for VII Corps, Franks had completed the shifting of his

offensive center of gravity to his left on the 25th in spite of the foul

weather. The corps had found the Republican Guard Forces Command
253

Map 11.
254

and, with or without the spur from the basement of the Ministry of

Defense building, had begun execution of the second phase of its attack

plan that evening. The plan would change in detail throughout the

26th, first, because of the sudden if late availability of the 1st Cavalry Division and, second, as the corps accommodated the changes inherent

in the two-sided game of war.73 The day would see the corps' "fist" roll

east in what is known somewhat prosaically as a 'relentless attack"-

an eighteen-hour, continuous, disciplined, and unforgiving progress through the Iraqi defensive barrier by thousands of armored fighting

systems. At 1354 that day, the CINC moved the ARCENT-Joint Forces

Command North boundary south to provide additional maneuver room

for VII Corps in northern Kuwait.74 On the 27th, the 1st Infantry Division would break through on the corps' right, and Franks would be

preparing for a final encirclement when the events associated with the

cessation of offensive actions intervened on the night of the 27th-28th.

Franks called Schwarzkopf during the afternoon of the 26th and

explained his true situation.75 By the time he spoke to Schwarzkopf, Franks' troops were in battle with the RGFC, the 1st Cavalry Division

had been released, and the pique of the morning seemed to have been

assuaged. It seems, however, that Schwarzkopf continued to harbor

uncertainty about the aggressiveness of the attack. In his memoir,

Schwarzkopf asserts that Franks (whose forces were already engaging the RGFC) indicated an intention to turn his force south to clear his

flank before beginning the main attack. Franks (to whom the assertion

is a mystery) may have referred to using the terrain in northern

Kuwait opened up for him by the earlier decision, and the CINC

misunderstood the remark in consonance with the false picture he

already entertained. While Franks quite rightly directed his energies

to the business at hand, he now had a new flank to protect, the one in

Riyadh. Schwarzkopf continued to fume in the bunker.76

Elsewhere in the theater, the Marines captured the Kuwait

International Airport, repelled a second armored counterattack, and

thus cleared the way for the Joint Forces Command North and Joint

Forces Command East to liberate the despoiled capital. At about 1030

on the 26th, the CINC extended the MARCENT sector to include the

Al Jahara-Mutla Ridge bottleneck outside of Kuwait City en route to

Basrah.77 The 'Tiger Brigade" would cut the "highway of death" on

the ground between Kuwait City and Basrah, as would the 1-4th

Cavalry of the 1st Infantry Division, farther north, soon after.

Schwarzkopf finally released his theater reserve, the 1st Cavalry Division(-), at H+53 (at 0920 on the 26th), after the call to Yeosock

and twelve hours later than ARCENT had estimated was necessary
255

(based on time and distance) for the division to be available for the

decisive attack. 78 The division passed through the 1st Infantry

Division breach and raced north, arriving in time for a final attack on

the 28th, which never occurred. Certainly, Schwarzkopfs reluctance to

commit his own reserve until so late in the battle undermines any

pretense of his to a superior vision or aggressiveness in anticipating

the Iraqi collapse. Rather, his frustration seems to reflect both the

consequences of being unable to keep up with a rapidly developing

situation as well as he felt was necessary, and a new and largely

political anxiety that Saddam might be able to save some face from the

disaster that now confronted him. Yeosock's comments that day,

reflected in Kendall's notes, indicate that Schwarzkopf was under

pressure from Washington to destroy the RGFC more rapidly as

pressure was growing at the United Nations to end the war. The New

York Times attributed similar concerns to unnamed Bush

administration officials. 79

That night, presumably to reassure various higher authorities

and perhaps educate them about the difficulty of the task being

accomplished, the ARCENT SITREP went into some detail about

conditions in the area of operations. The VII Corps' commander stated

as his intent: "TO CONTINUE UNRELENTING ATTACK TO

DESTROY THE RGFC AND CUT ESCAPE ROUTES." He noted the

number of heavy brigades destroyed to date and the number of

prisoners captured, pointing out that this had been done at an

incredibly low cost in U.S. casualties. "CURRENT CONCERNS," the

report continued, "ARE CENTERED ON WEATHER AND THE

EFFECT HEAVY RAINS HAVE HAD ON THE SUPPLY ROUTES."

The report indicated some of the measures required to keep the corps

advance going, to include airlift of critical supplies of food, fuel, and

ammunition.8 0 The ARCENT commander noted as well:

IMPRESSIVE SUCCESSES BY VII CORPS AND XVIII CORPS HAVE

ALSO BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY THE CHALLENGES OF AN

EXTREMELY RAPID OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND POOR WEATHER.

RAIN, LOW CEILINGS, AND DENSE MORNING FOG HAVE LIMITED

CAS AGAINST ENEMY ARTY AND ARMOR.

RAIN HAS ALSO DEGRADED TRAFFICABILITY OF MSR'S AT A TIME

WHEN RAPID TACTICAL ADVANCES HAVE EXTENDED SUPPLY

LINES AND INCREASED SUSTAINMENT DEMANDS.81

Elsewhere, while the decisive action was taking place in VII

Corps' area, high theater was occurring on the banks of the Euphrates

in XVIII Corps' area of responsibility, and it was chiefly the doing of

General McCaffrey's 24th Infantry Division. The XVIII Corps' FRAGO
256

66, issued at 1817 on the 25th, had directed the 24th Division to attack

and seize Objective Gold, the theater logistics base at Juwarin. The

division began its attack at 1400 on the 26th to seize battle positions in

the river valley. The 1st and 2d Brigades fought their way to positions

facing east toward Juwarin, while the 197th moved to a position facing

Tallil (to the northwest). The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment was

placed under the operational control of the 24th Infantry Division at

noon on the 26th and attacked on the right to seize Objective Tim,

which was to become a new FOB Viper for the 101st Airborne

Division's aviation units the following morning. The division fought

through the night with the RGFC Nebuchadnessar Infantry Division

and 26th Commando Brigade and reported seizure of Objectives Gold

and Tim by 0330 on the 27th.82

At 2230 on the 26th, the 1st Brigade of the 24th Division,

commanded by Colonel John LeMoyne, reported engaging tanks on

HETs trying to move to the northwest. According to the ARCENT

SITREP, fifty-four tanks on HETs were destroyed. 8 3 (For

understandable reasons the destruction of anyone's HETs was the

subject of some wry comments at ARCENT.) The following morning,

the attack rolled on as the two organic brigades of the 24th conducted a

deliberate attack on Jalibah airfield, which was reported secure by

1300. That afternoon, the 197th drove through the main gate of Tallil

Air Base and down the strip destroying aircraft and various defensive

installations before withdrawing.84 The ARCENT LNO with XVIII

Corps reported six helicopters and four fighters destroyed at Tallil and

eight helicopters and ten fighters at Jalibah.85 By early evening, the

division was concentrated and refueling in anticipation of launching

an attack down the Euphrates at 0400 the next morning.86 The cost in

friendly casualties to the division of over 26,000 (considering

attachments) for Desert Storm was eight killed and thirty-six wounded

in action, well below the permissible planning figure for CENTCOM of

three companies per coalition brigade. 87 Over 5,000 prisoners were

captured; over 360 armored fighting vehicles were destroyed.8 8

By 0730 on the 27th, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment had

secured Objective Tim, and the 101st airlifted its 2d Brigade into the

site to establish a new FOB Viper in the vicinity of Al Busayyah

(north) airfield. 89 By 1400, Apaches from the 101st Aviation Brigade

and the 12th Aviation Brigade were operating out of FOB Viper,

attacking targets along the highway east of the 24th Division and in

Engagement Area Thomas northwest of Basrah.90 (See map 12.) This

was an unanticipated mission, and it left the 101st interdicting

Highway 8 in AO Eagle with one air assault infantry brigade, securing
257

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258

FOB Cobra with another (due to displace to Viper on the 28th), and the

third providing a launching point for four attack helicopter battalions

to interdict forces fleeing the KTO by two escape holes the Air Force

had not been able to cut. The principal difficulty for the 101st involved

aviation fuel, particularly since the corps did not immediately provide

fuel for the long-range interdiction required of the 12th Aviation

Brigade. The 101st provided fuel to get the immediate job done, and

the corps replenished the division's stocks.91

The interdiction missions took place from 1430 to 1830 when the

combination of night, bad weather, and smoke from the Kuwait oil

fields forced the units to curtail their mission. The 12th Aviation

Brigade reported destruction of fifteen Iraqi trucks, nine armored

vehicles (significantly, no tanks), an SA-6 air defense system, and two

air defense guns. The 101st Aviation Brigade reported destruction of

three armored vehicles (again, no tanks), two ammunition trucks, and

two air defense guns but noted that the Air Force had already

destroyed many vehicles on the causeway escape route upon which the

brigade focused its attention.9 2 Bad weather and the cessation of

offensive operations the following morning would preclude further

efforts in AO Thomas.

By 27 February, concern was beginning to be raised at home and

in the field about the morality of killing fleeing Iraqi soldiers. 93

Aviators from the 101st and 12th Aviation Brigades expressed concern

that they were having problems discriminating between armed and

unarmed soldiers in the fleeing mass, a point General Peay, the

commander of the 101st Airborne Division, raised with General Luck,

the XVIH Corps commander, but one which was not resolved before

weather and darkness intervened to make the issue moot. 94 The

general sense of commanders was that U.S. soldiers went to unusual

lengths to avoid the unnecessary killing of Iraqi soldiers, who clearly

had had enough of the fight and who often seemed more abused by

their own leaders than their presumptive enemies. Moreover, most

senior commanders, veterans of Vietnam, went to great lengths to

ensure that Desert Storm soldiers understood the standards of

behavior that were expected of them. Peay, a graduate of the Virginia

Military Institute, a soft-spoken Virginian of extraordinary ethical

sensitivity, had seen to it that his soldiers were well briefed on the

legal and moral imperatives limiting the conduct of military

operations.

But the face of war is cruel, and in Desert Storm, it was presented

in real time and living color on national and international television.

The vivid images carried in reports of the effects of U.S. bombing in
259

Baghdad, the Scud damage in Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as the

nature of the Iraqi flight, would lead to increased pressure on

President Bush to find a way to stop the killing.9 5

The main attack was taking place in VII Corps. It began with the

advance of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and Third Armored

Division the morning of the 26th and continued almost without pause

until the evening of the 27th. The 1st Armored Division overran

Objective Purple and continued east to fall in on the left of the 3d

Armored Division on the afternoon of the 26th. The 1st Infantry

Division passed through the 2d Armored Cavalry Division, fought

through the Iraqis, and broke out on the corps' right center. The 1st

U.K. continued its progress eastward and across Wadi al Batin,

protecting the corps' right flank and opening the way for the Joint

Forces Command North to attack toward Kuwait City.

In front of VII Corps, the enemy's heavy brigades were laid out in

width and depth. The enemy front was such that the three heavy

brigades of the much-abused RGFC Tawakalna Mechanized Division

would face an armored division each. The Tawakalna was truly the

most abused Iraqi formation. Schwarzkopf seems to have taken a

special dislike to the Tawakalna and spent a good bit of his air effort on

its attrition. Prebattle BDA (to the extent it can be relied upon)

reported it one of the most reduced of enemy formations.9 6 Now, it

would fight the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions, the 2d Armored Cavalry

Regiment, and the 1st Infantry Division-just about simultaneously.

The 1st Armored Division, on the corps' left, would also fight the

RGFC Medina Armored Division, a brigade of the RGFC Adnan

Infantry Division, and the remains of several regular Iraqi units. The

U.S. 3d Armored Division would fight a brigade of the Tawakalna, the

10th Armored Division, and part of the 12th Armored Division. The

U.S. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, which had already destroyed a

brigade of the 12th Armored Division, would fight part of the

Tawakalna and more of the 12th and be relieved the night of the 26th

by the 1st Infantry Division, which would take over destruction of the

Tawakalna, the 12th, and parts of the 10th Armored Divisions.

Because the Iraqi battle array was breaking down, various units

appeared at odd places on the battlefield, and reconstruction of the

actions can only be approximate. 97

The advance on the 26th was picked up first by the 2d Armored

Cavalry Regiment, which had been in battle both the previous day and

through much of the night of the 25th-26th. The regiment received the

order from VII Corps implementing the contingency plan for
260

destruction of the RGFC at 0522 that morning. The order directed the

2d ACR to advance to the east and fix the Tawakalna Mechanized

Division, then to pass the 1st Infantry Division through to continue

the attack. 98 First, the regiment had to uncover the 3d Armored

Division to allow it to advance in the center of the corps' fist.

By 0620, the regiment was moving east. At 0713, it had its first

confirmed contact with the covering force of the Tawakalna Division,

which was apparently moving north. 9 9 By 0915, the weather had

deteriorated severely. By afternoon, the 2d Armored Cavalry

Regiment and most of VII Corps advanced toward the Republican

Guard through a Shamal, a perverse mix of rain and blowing sand that

can reduce visibility to next to nothing. VII Corps' battle with the

RGFC was conditioned and, in some respects, favored by attacking out

of this storm. For the most part, superior U.S. weapon optics allowed

VII Corps' systems to see the enemy while remaining concealed from

them.

After dealing with the covering force, the regiment had to be

resupplied with ammunition by C-130 airdrops and with fuel and

ammunition by CH-47 airdrops. 100 Franks, on his daily round forward,

came to the regimental CP at 1250. He consulted with Colonel Holder

and ordered the regiment east to fix the main body of the Tawakalna,

then prepare to pass the 1st Infantry Division. About 1500, the

regiment passed the line of departure with three squadrons abreast,

made contact with the Tawakalna Division, and fought the six-hour

battle named by the press as the "Battle of 73 Easting." At 2200 on the

26th, the 1st Infantry Division began passing through the regiment

and picked up the fight within twenty minutes. The 2d ACR passed

into the corps' reserve-for the remainder of the ground war as it

happened. The regiment's fuel status was Red.101

The 3d Armored Division on the regiment's left began passing

around the regiment at 0918 on the 26th. The division advanced with

two brigades abreast, 2d Brigade on the north, adjacent to the 1st

Armored Division, and 1st Brigade in the south, adjacent to the 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment. On the morning of the 27th, the 3d

Brigade was passed through the 2d and continued the attack alongside

the 1st until the division sector was pinched out during the evening of

the 27th.

The 3d Armored Division fight was similar to that of the 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Infantry Division. After

following the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment north for two days,

cleaning up the by-passed units left in the regiment's wake, the
261

division began its turn east, then southeast, on the morning of the

26th. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Bill Nash, had been

joined by the 2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, on the 25th as part of

the corps' shifting of its center of gravity to the left. Throughout the

25th, the brigade moved north in a diamond formation at an

approximate rate of advance of twelve mph. The 2d Battalion, 29th

Field Artillery, had joined the brigade on the move. Two batteries of

multiple launch rocket systems would join the column on the morning

of the 26th, reinforcing further the fires available to the direct support

artillery battalion (2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery), already part of

the brigade task force.102 During the evening of the 25th, the brigade

commander had received his warning order for the battle with the

RGFC. It rained all night and visibility was poor the morning of the

26th when the brigade crossed the line of departure at 0530.103

The brigade drove east looking for the Tawakalna Division. It

found one of its brigades about 1702, generally on the 72 Easting. The

3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry (a mechanized infantry task force, title

notwithstanding), immediately moved three of its company teams online and, supported by artillery and A-10 close support aircraft, fought

through a prepared defensive position. Task Force 4-32 Armor, in the

north, also fought an engagement with enemy mechanized infantry

from about 1920 until about 2000. The 4th Battalion, 34th Armor, in

the south, engaged some miscellaneous enemy troops. Only the 3d

Battalion, 5th Cavalry, remained in contact in the early morning

hours. 104 At 0145 on the 27th, the 1st Brigade was told to change its

direction more to the southeast and narrow the brigade front. At 0630,

the brigade began moving forward by bounds. Prisoners surrendered

in some numbers. At 0700, the 4th Battalion, 32d Armor, found a

second defensive line and began to reduce it. By 0800, the task force

had destroyed thirteen enemy tanks, sixteen BMPs, and fourteen other

armored infantry carriers. Some 230 prisoners were taken.

The brigade continued on in this way throughout the day,

attacking defensive areas, advancing between them with small

meeting engagements along the way, and, when they were not

actually attacking, taking prisoners in large numbers. The night of the

27th, the brigade passed into Kuwait, closing on its final objective in

the early morning hours of the 28th.l05

The 2d Brigade, in the north, had moved out at 0600 on the 26th

and, like its southernmost peer, had advanced through indifferent

resistance until about 1600. At that time, the brigade was preparing to

refuel when it was ordered to continue the advance to maintain

pressure on the RGFC. It engaged the same brigade of the Tawakalna
262

Division as its right-hand neighbor about 1630 and fought with it

throughout the night until 1045 on the 27th. Then, the 3d Brigade

passed through, while in contact with the enemy, and continued the

divisional attack to the southeast alongside and beyond the 1st

Brigade. The brigade crossed into Kuwait at 1658 on the 27th. The 2d

Brigade estimated that it had destroyed twenty-seven enemy tanks

and fourteen BMPs at the cost of two American soldiers killed and six

others wounded. One of the killed was the victim of a misdirected U.S.

dual-purpose ICM (improved conventional munition-an artillery

round that disperses small, armor-penetrating bomblets above a

target). 10 6 The division had advanced 225 kilometers in seventy-eight

hours. It had fought and destroyed forces of the 29th Infantry Brigade

and 9th Armored Brigade of the Tawakalna Division and elements of

the 52d and 17th Armored Divisions. One Iraqi prisoner remarked to

his captors: "You were like the wind. You come, blow and go away. You

cannot shoot the wind."107

In one incident, where attacking through the Shamal had not

worked to the U.S. advantage, A Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, of

the 3d Armored Division-which was screening adjacent to the 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment on the south during the evening of the

26th-ran into an enemy position backed up with tanks and lost two

killed, twelve wounded, and four Bradley fighting vehicles destroyed.

The troop commander, believing because of the limited visibility that

he was facing a force without tanks (unlike a regimental squadron, a

divisional cavalry squadron has no organic heavy armor), he pressed

his attack when first engaged. Perhaps because he deployed his

platoons from column to line by splitting the following platoon sections

around the forward platoon, left and right, the squadron's commander

found disengagement unexpectedly complicated and confused. The

troop was relieved by the tanks of the armored battalion task force

following it, and the attack proceeded. For A Troop, the experience was

both costly and traumatic. For the division, it was but a blip on the

screen during a relentless advance.l 08

On the left of the 3d Armored Division and on the extreme left of

the corps, the 1st Armored Division began its attack at 0630 the

morning of the 26th-at Objective Purple. The attack passed through

the objective and wheeled 90 degrees to the east, deploying three

brigades abreast and attacking. "Old Ironsides" fought, in succession,

a brigade of the ubiquitous Tawakalna Division, a brigade of the

RGFC Adnan Infantry Division, and the RGFC Medina Division.109

The division was in almost continuous combat over forty-eight hours

and covered 115 kilometers from start to finish. Logistics, inhibited by
263

the bad weather over roadless terrain, were beginning to restrict the

wheeling corps. The 1st Armored Division required an infusion of fuel

from the 3d Armored Division to maintain its advance. 110

The 1st Armored Division's 3d Brigade (on the right) fought the northernmost brigade of the Tawakalna Division. The Tawakalna had

been spotted first by an Air Force A-10 and attacked at 1624. The air

attack was followed by division air scouts, who identified elements of the Tawakalna and 52d Armored Division. Ground scouts counted a total of fifty-two tanks. Thirty of these were then destroyed by artillery and AH-64 fire, after which, the 3d Brigade attacked through and destroyed the remaining twenty-two. At the same time, MLRS fire

effectively neutralized a brigade of the Adnan Division, which

apparently was the anchor of the Iraqi defensive line in the center of the division sector.1ll

During the night of the 26th-27th, a U.S. engineer unit that had

been left behind during the division's advance was fired upon by a unit

of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment coming up on the XVIII Corps right. A 1st Armored Division engineer was killed when misidentified

by a cavalry squadron commander, who apparently ordered his gunner to fire across the corps boundary at what he took to be Iraqi infantry.112 This incident is particularly important because it

illustrates the difficulty of maintaining contact across unit

boundaries, a problem that is even more difficult the higher the

headquarters involved and the faster the forward units advance. In

this case, the engineers, members of an attached unit, were far behind

the advancing forward line of 1st Armored Division troops. It was

night in the open desert, which by then was full of intermingled U.S.

and Iraqi troops, some of the latter with hostile intent, some simply trying to escape. The squadron could not tell who was on its flank

when they spotted the engineers.

While the 1st Armored Division disposed of the Tawakalna

Division, its aviation elements and dedicated air support began to

locate and fix the Medina Division. By 0810 on the 27th, the 1st and 2d

Brigades of "Old Ironsides" would be engaging the Medina Armored

Division in a battle that would last late into the night. The 3d Brigade would also join the battle within thirty minutes.

The ground maneuver battle was accompanied by a counterfire

battle that engaged Iraqi artillery in both the VII and XVIII Corps sectors with Army tactical missiles and multiple launch rocket

systems in combination with fire finder radar. The fight between the

2d Brigade of the 1st Armored Division and the 2d Brigade of the
264

Medina was the largest single armored engagement of the war. Sixtyone Iraqi tanks, thirty-four armored personnel carriers, and five air

defense systems were destroyed in a single hour.113 One hundred

eighty-six Iraqi tanks, 127 armored personnel carriers, and thirty- eight artillery pieces were destroyed during the 27th at the cost of a

single U.S. soldier. The 2d Brigade was commanded by Colonel

Montgomery Meigs, namesake and direct descendant of the Union

Army quartermaster general in the American Civil War.

In addition to the two RGFC divisions engaged, the 1st Armored

Division overran elements of ten Iraqi regular army divisions,

including the 12th, 17th, and 20th Armored Divisions-a measure of

the confusion that existed in the Iraqi array by that time. During the

27th, the 1st Armored Division employed fifty-one air interdiction

missions beyond the ground maneuver forces, six separate Apache

company strikes, and significant artillery fire in support of the ground maneuver.114

For the entire four-day operation, the division claimed 418 tanks

destroyed, 447 armored personnel carriers, 116 artillery pieces, 1,211

trucks, and 110 air defense systems. In addition, 2,234 prisoners were

captured. The division lost only four killed-the two already mentioned and two others who were lost to enemy ordnance after the

cessation of offensive actions. 115

On the corps right, beginning at 2200 on the 26th, the 1st Infantry Division conducted an unrehearsed night passage of lines with the 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment then in contact with the enemy. A night

passage of lines, dangerous enough under any circumstances, requires the following unit to approach the forward line in the dark, then to

pass through its elements without being shot in the process. Passages of lines require a great deal of coordination even on a quiet sector.

With troops in contact, they are very risky indeed, as soldiers'

adrenalin is up, and men are prone to shoot first when unrecognized fighting vehicles come into view.

The 1st Infantry Division passed through the lines and carried on

the fight with the Tawakalna's southern-most brigade and a brigade of

the Iraqi 12th Armored Division. The division drove through the

enemy's rear and into the open by 0430 the morning of the 27th. The

1st then refueled and began an exploitation by 1000 that would end

that night with the division's cavalry squadron across the Kuwait

City-Basrah highway and the division positioned for an envelopment of the RGFC's southern flank.l16 The 1st U.K. Armored Division, as it

crossed into Kuwait and met the Joint Forces Command North and
265

MARCENT troops to the east, was also coming into position to

cooperate in such a move, should circumstances require it.117

The "Tiger Brigade," on the MARCENT left flank, had advanced

on 26 February to the Mutla Ridge, the only terrain feature astride the

principal escape route from Kuwait City. The Iraqis had mined and

fortified this ridge line, and the "Tiger Brigade" now attacked down

the ridge, becoming the stopper in the bottle and finally closing off on the ground what was already known as the "Highway of Death"

following an intense air interdiction. The 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Doug Tystad, had to breach an Iraqi minefield to block the road, then seize an Iraqi-occupied Kuwaiti

police post.11

8 This attack was assigned to the task force's attached

infantry company, C Company, 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, commanded by Captain Mike Kershaw. The infantry dismounted and

captured the police post after a room-to-room assault. During this

fight, the task force's master gunner, Sergeant First Class Harold

Witzke, became the second and final fatality suffered by the "Tiger Brigade" in its three-day adventure with the 2d Marine Division.

From the Mutla Ridge, the Fort Hood soldiers, remnants of a division being deactivated as part of the post-cold war reduction in

force, blocked the retreat of numerous Iraqi units fleeing from

southeastern Kuwait. Overall, the brigade reported destroying about

180 tanks, 135 APCs, thirty-six artillery pieces, and capturing 4,050 prisoners. 119

The 1st Cavalry Division was up behind the 1st Armored Division

by the close of the 27th, after a run north through the 1st Infantry Division breach and a race north and east. By evening on the 27th, it

was ready to relieve the 1st Armored in the north to become part of a

northern pincers in a double envelopment of the forces still outside

Basrah in the VII Corps sector. The 24th Division was refueling during the early evening hours in anticipation of a final day's work that could

lead to the outskirts of Basrah.120 But events elsewhere were about to

bring the "Great Wheel" to its conclusion.

L ·
I

I
Notes

1. Bvt, Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, "The Development of Sea Warfare on Land and Its

Influence on Future Naval Operations," Journal of the Royal United Service

Institution 65, no. 458 (May 1920): 281-98.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris: Or the Future of War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,

Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1925), 88. Liddell Hart used the term to differentiate mounted

foot soldiers from the traditional infantry. According to his book Thoughts on War

(London: Faber & Faber, 1944), 165, the term was coined in 1921.

3. See "Excerpts From Report by Schwarzkopf on the Fighting in the Persian Gulf,"

The New York Times, 31 January 1991, A12.

4. Lieutenant General Merrill A. McPeak, "TAC Air Missions and the Fire Support

Coordination Line," Air University Review 36, no. 6 (September-October 1985): 65-

72.

5. On 26 February, planes from the U.S. Air Force bombed two British Warrior

vehicles, killing nine British soldiers and injuring eleven. According to General de

la Billiere, reference to the need for a later inquiry into the circumstances of the

incident led to a blowup by General Homer, whose pilots were responsible for the

deaths. HQ, VII Corps, Corps Artillery, VII Corps Artillery memorandum, Subject:

VII Corps Artillery Commander's Report, Operation Desert Storm, n.d., 3. Volume

at Combined Arms Research Library, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. De la

Billiere, Storm Command, 291-96.

6. HQ, ARCENT, G3 (Deep Operations) (After-Action Report), March-April 1991, 10-

11. Joint Lessons Learned Observation by Major Coombs, G3, Deep Operations, 1

March 1991 (JULLS Number 13265-29400 [00003]). Both documents are in

possession of the author.

7. General Franks to author.

8. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (New York: Bing

Publishing, 1991), 308. See, also, Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of

Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," chapter 19 of Makers of Modern Strategy from

Machiavelli to the NuclearAge, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1986), 532. That is not to say that commanders never had to dismount

infantry. As will be indicated below, the 1st Armored Division conducted a

deliberate attack on Objective Purple. The commander of the 7th U.K. Infantry

Brigade writes that his brigade conducted six formal attacks the first thirty-six

hours, in which infantry "debused" on four occasions, two at night. Brigadier P. A. J.

Cordingley, "The Gulf War: Operating with Allies," Journal of the Royal United

Services Institute for Defence Studies 137, no. 2 (April 1992): 19.

9. Except as otherwise noted, basic weather data is taken from HQ, VII Corps, G2

memorandum, Subject: The 100-Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20

April 1991, 90 and annex G-1-1. Various observations are taken from unit diaries.

The nature of the weather in the battle area is not always apparent from official Air

Force staff weather officer forecasts, though they are used for BMNT and EENT

times. The weather in the battle area was different than that in Riyadh and even in

267
268

King Khalid Military City. On G-day, the author was in a helicopter flying over the

forward area from 0300-0900. The pilot was forced to land during hours of darkness

due to blinding rain showers. Early morning hours, from 0600, on the border were bright and clear, though intermittent showers could be severe locally and winds

heavy enough to raise blinding dust. By 1500, the area had clouded over, and bad

weather followed. Desert Storm was conducted in some of the worst weather

experienced in southeastern Iraq for years.

10. Memorandum from G2/SWO, Subject: USARCENT Weather Forecast, dated 23

February 1991 (valid 23/1700-24/1700).

11. Comment made by Brigadier General Frank Akers to the author. The author's

observation of troops in vicinity of Riyadh were the same.

12. Message, 241800C FEB 91, FROM: CDR 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT) [SITREP-no

subject line used], Sequence Number: 200,1. Untitled narrative prepared by Colonel

James T. Hill, commanding 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, on 2 March 1991.

The 1st Brigade also prepared a detailed narrative, HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne

Division (Air Assault), Memorandum for Division Historical Officer, Subject: TF 1-

101, 327th Infantry Regiment, Historical Summary of Desert Rendezvous II:

Offensive Operations Against Iraqi Forces, dated 14 June 1991.

13. HQ, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Memorandum for Division

Historical Officer, Subject: TF 1-101, 327th Infantry Regiment, Historical Summary of Desert Rendezvous IL Offensive Operations Against Iraqi Forces, dated 14 June

1991,4.

14. Untitled narrative prepared by Colonel James T. Hill, commanding 1st Brigade,

101st Airborne Division on 2 March 1991,1.

15. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 24 February 1991 (1315C), 4. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.) Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 451-53.

16. Interview with Major General Thomas Rhame, 26 July 1991, 4.

17. Ibid.

18. Slide titled, "Operation Desert Storm: Phase m (As of 24 Feb)," Operation Desert

Storm Phase III Time Lines, Enclosure 24 to HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DPT

Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ, USARCENT

G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and

Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment, vol. 3.

19. General Yeosock's expression to author later was "On schedule, under cost."

20. Tom Donnelly, "The General's War," The Army Times, 52d Year, no. 30, 24

February 1992,8,16-18.

21. HQ, 1st Infantry Division, Main Command Post, Daily Staff Journal dated 24

February 1991, items 15 and 17.
269

22 HQ, VII Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AETSCB Memorandum, Subject: The

100-Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20 April 1992,93.

23. Ibid., 96.

24. The Iraqi concept governing employment of the Republican Guard on the 24th is not clear, though there was some movement picked up by J-STARS.

25. Rhame interview, 6. Letter to author from General Rhame, dated 5 October 1992.

For the 1st U.K. Armored Division's perspective, see Major General Rupert Smith, "The Gulf War: The Land Battle," in the Journal of the Royal United Services

Institute for Defence Studies 137, no. 1: 1-5. See, also, Brigadier I. G. C. Durie, CBE, "lst Armored Division Artillery on Operation Granby," Journal of the Royal Artillery 18, no. 2 (September 1991): 16-29.

26. Letter from General Rhame to author, 5 October 1992.

27. HQ, VII Corps, Tactical Command Post, Daily Staff Journal for 24 February 1991, item 54. See, also, interview with Colonel Stan Cherrie, VII Corps G3, 29 August 1991,36-37.

28. Major Jason K. Kamiya, A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division

Combat Team During Operation Desert Storm, "The Attack to Free Kuwait"

(January through March 1991) (Fort Stewart, Georgia, n.d.), 7. This is a division

summary of actions in the Persian Gulf. These numbers represent the organic division plus attachments provided by XVIII Corps from corps and echelon-abovecorps troops.

29. See, for example, HQ, 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), AFVE-IN, Memorandum for Members of the Sledgehammer Brigade, Subject: Chronology of

the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) Participation in the Gulf War, dated 24 April 1991, 2-3. The 197th was the third brigade of the 24th Division for Desert ShieldDesert Storm.

30. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 24 February 1991 (242330C), 2. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

31. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 455.

32. Ibid., 455-56.

33. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 25 February 1991 (1430C), 3. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's paper at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.) According to Lieutenant General Luck and the ARCENT AAR, the

CINC called him directly about the limit of advance on the 24th and by-passed ARCENT. HQ, CAC-T, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Center for Army Lessons

Learned, Commander's Observations at the ARCENT AAR, DSSN112, 7.

34. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 25 February 1991 (1430C), 3. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,
270

Pennsylvania.)

35. HQ, ARCENT, Message, 250300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/SITREP/USARCENT/G+1/FEB//,PERID/240300Z/ TO :250300Z/ ASOF:

250300Z, 11.

36. Message, 250300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN/ /DT//MSGID/

SITREP/USARCENT//G+ 1/FEB, PERID/240300Z/TO:250300Z/ASOF:250300Z, 1-

2, 10-11. Message FROM: CDR VII CORPS//CG//, Subject: Commander's SITREP

(Combat) #38, Reporting Period: 232100Z to 242100Z FEB 91. HQ, VII Corps, TAC

CP, FRAGO 138-91, DTG 24200C. ARCENT SPOT Report (from Mobile CP Logs), received by Major Ward, DTG242327C (note: three hours after FRAGO 138-91). Daily Staff Journal for 24 February, ARCENT Main CP, VII Corps Desk, item 29, 2330C, from Major Hanna (VII Corps). The ARCENT TAC had informed the main

CP at 2220 that the 1st U.K. would be through the breach by 1200C, to begin possibly at 0800C.

37. Message, 250300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN/ /DT// MSGID/

SITREP/USARCENT/G+ 1/FEB, PERID/240300Z/TO: 250300Z/ASOF :250300Z, 12-14.

38. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-DT, Memorandum for Major General Taylor, ARCENT Rear, Subject: ARCENT SITREP, 25 February 1992.

39. Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, USMC, "Special Trust and Confidence

Among the Trail-Breakers," The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 117, no. 11

(November 1991): 49.

40. Colonel John Sylvester, "Report," as told on 6 March 1991 (provided to author by Colonel Sylvester), 2. The report is a transcript of an interview with Colonel

Sylvester by a Marine Corps historical detachment, interview with Lieutenant

Colonel Matthew S. Klimow, S3, 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 17 March 1992 (Tape 2), 14.

41. Klimow interview, 32.

42. Although losses to the 14th Quartermaster Detachment got most of the publicity due to its Reserve Component, community-based character, only thirteen of the

twenty-eight dead were from the detachment. Nonetheless, the 14th suffered a 75

percent casualty rate. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 418-19.

43. Narration of Rakkasan (3d Brigade, 187th Infantry Regiment) Deployment and

Participation in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (unsigned), 2-3. Narrative

collection of 101st's historical officer.

44. Message, 251800C FEB 91, FROM: CDR 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT) [SITREP-no

subject line used], Sequence Number: 201, 2. Narration of Rakkasan (3d Brigade, 187th Infantry Regiment) Deployment and Participation in Desert Shield and

Desert Storm (unsigned), 3-4.
271

45. HQ, 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), AFVE-IN, Memorandum for

Members of the Sledgehammer Brigade, Subject: Chronology of the 197th Infantry

Brigade (M) Participation in the Gulf War, dated 24 April 1991, 3.

46. Ibid. See, also, HQ, 24th Infantry Division, briefing titled, "Operation Desert Storm

Post-Attack Summary," dated 22 March 1991.

47. Message, 251517Z, FM CDR XVIII ABN CORPS//G3//, Subject: FRAGO 66 to

OPLAN Desert Storm, 1.

48. Message, 270300Z FEB 91, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/

SITREP/USARCENT/G+ 3/FEB/,PERID/260300Z/TO:270300Z/ASOF:270300Z, 13-

14. HQ, 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), AFVE-IN, Memorandum

for Members of the Sledgehammer Brigade, Subject: Chronology of the 197th

Infantry Brigade (M) Participation in the Gulf War, dated 24 April 1991, 3-5. See,

also, HQ, 24th Infantry Division, briefing titled, "Operation Desert Storm PostAttack Summary," dated 22 March 1991.

49. Message, 252200Z, FROM CDRXVIIIABNCORPSFWD//G-3//, MSGID/

SITREP/XVIII ABN CORPS/025/FEB 91, PERID/FROM 242100Z FEB/TO 252100Z

FEB/AS OF 251200Z FEB 91/, 4-5.

50. HQ, VII Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AETSCB, Memorandum, Subject: The

100-Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20 April 1991, 109-10. See,

also, Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offensive," 16-37. This essay

contains diagrams that portray the enemy deployment throughout the ground war

as VII Corps assessed it afterwards.

51. See "Stalking the Janus-Faced God of War: Two Small Units and the Different

Battles They Fought," U.S. News and World Report, 20 January 1992, 52-54.

52. HQ, 1st Armored Division, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for Record, Subject: 1st

Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, dated 19 April 1992, 5-6.

Memorandum contains graphics describing division actions.

53. Ibid., 6. See, also, 1st Armored Division Operations Briefing, slides titled, "Battle for

Al Busayyah." ARCENT Commander's (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo indicates

ARCENT was aware of the VII Corps' decision to conduct a deliberate vice hasty

attack on Al Busayyah. At the VII Corps after-action review, discussion focused on

the abysmal weather the night of the 25th-26th and the stiff resistance put up on

the 26th following a night of preparation by fire. Some 451 EPWs were taken.

ARCENT historian's Notes from Corps Commander's After-Action Review, 11

March 1991, 5. The VII Corps G2 battlefield reconstruction assesses the holding

force as elements of the 806th Brigade, to include a commando unit. The post was

site of the Iraqi VII Corps' rear command post. HQ, VII Corps, G2 memorandum,

Subject: The 100-Hour Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20 April 1992,

115-16.

54. Message, 260300 FEB 91, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DTI/,

MSGID/SITREP/U SARCENT/G + 2/FEB//,

PERID/250300Z/TO:260300Z/ASOF:260300Z, 10. HQ, 2ACR, Operation Desert

Storm, 2ACR Operations Summary, 23 February-1 March 1991, 5-7.
272

55. HQ, 2ACR, Operation Desert Storm, 2ACR Operations Summary, 23 February-1

March 1991,7.

56. Memorandum for Commanding General, 3d Armored Division, Subject: Battle

Report: Operation Desert Spear, 24-28 February 1991, dated 2 March 1991,

prepared by Major (P) John D. Rosenberger, Deputy G3, Operational Assistant to

Major General Funk, 8-12. As for disagreement with VII Corps' staff, see interview

with General Paul Funk, CG, Third Armored Division, by VII Corps historian at 3

AD Main, 4 April 1991, 21 and 23.

57. I. G. C. Durie, CBE, "1st Armored Division Artillery On Operation Granby,"

Journal of the Royal Artillery 118, no. 2 (September 1991): 25. At the VII Corps'

AAR, the division commander, Major General Rupert Smith, noted that the

defending divisions were organized in much greater depth than he had anticipated,

hence he found himself having to sort out defending infantry before arriving at the

tactical reserves. ARCENT historian's Notes from Corps Commander's After-Action

Review, 11 March 1991, 3. This tended to slow the British clearance of the

breachhead and delay by some hours the departure of the 1st Infantry Division for

the next phase of the operation. See Rhame interview, 6-7.

58. The 2d Armored Cavalry battle has been written about in some detail. It first drew

public attention through an extraordinary piece of journalism by Vince Crawley in

Stars and Stripes, "Minute by Minute, Death by Death: One Unit's Battle Against

the Republican Guard," Stars and Stripes 49, issue 327, 9 March 1991,14-16. It has

been further examined by a team headed by Colonel Michael D. Krause from the

Center of Military History and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in a paper titled, "The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991: A Historical Introduction

to a Simulation" (hereafter referred to as Krause, "Battle of 73 Easting"). See, also,

Steve Vogel, "A Swift Kick: 2d ACR's Taming of the Guard," in Army Times, 5

August 1991, 10-61.

59. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive

Officer's) Daily Memo, 25 February 1991 as of 251430C February 1991, 3.

(Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the

Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

60. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 460.

61. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 25 February

1991 (2335C), 2. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General

Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.)

62. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive

Officer's) Daily Memo, 25 February 1991, as of 252335 February 1991, 5. (Executive

Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

63. Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq Orders Troops to Leave Kuwait but U.S. Pursues Battlefield

Gains: Heavy American Toll in Scud Attack: Administration Says Hussein Must

Declare Pullout Himself," The New York Times, 26 February 1991, Al, A12.

64. Ibid.
273

65. Message, 260200Z (4 A.M. the 26th) FEB 91, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN//CMO

ARCENT//, [MSGID] ARCENT INTREP 70-91 AS OF 260200Z FEB 91. Message

lists indicators "read" throughout the night. A paper prepared by the ARCENT G2,

General John Stewart, on J-STARS performance, indicates that as early as 0300

local on the 25th, there were indications of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait City.

Appendix H to Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS),

Operation Desert Storm (ODS), Operational Evaluation Command (OEC) Summary

Report, H-10. Appendix H is an extract from a book put together for Brigadier

General Stewart, ARCENT G2, at the close of the ground campaign by members of

the Army J-STARS operational detachment.

66. The source document seems to have been an article by Tom Donnelly of the Army

Times, "The Generals' War: How Commanders Fought the Iraqis ... and Among

Themselves," Army Times, 2 March 1992, 8, 16, 18, and an editorial on page 27 of

Peter Martin's TV coverage of the story appeared on CBS Evening News on 24

February 1992. Martin seems to have used Donnelly's article, then checked it

against his sources. Schwarzkopfs own account is in Doesn't Take a Hero, 462-63.

67. Donnelly, "The Generals' War," 16. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 463.

68. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive

Officer's) Daily Memo, 26 February 1991, 6. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will

be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute,

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

69. Ibid., 5. In VII Corps G3 Ops log for 26 February, 1005 hours, item 19, "Re: ARCENT

G3 [General Arnold] - CINC WANTS VII CORPS TO CONDUCT COORDINATED

ATTACK TO DESTROY RGFC TONIGHT NLT BMNT 27 FEB."

70. Message, 251800Z FEB 91, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN, SUBJECT: FRAGO

055 TO OPORD 001 DESERT STORM 001; BOUNDARY CHANGE BETWEEN VII

CORPS AND XVIII ABN CORPS. The actual execute order would not be issued

until the 26th at 1500Z (1800 local), but once boundaries were issued and objectives

were clear to corps commanders, the FRAGO was an afterthought. Schwarzkopf

flattered himself that his early morning tirade "had already galvanized Franks." In

fact, like Schwarzkopfs knowledge of what was taking place on the battlefield, his

tantrum was far behind events in the field.

71. Message, 251942Z FEB 91, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN, SUBJECT: FRAGO

056 TO OPORD 001 DESERT STORM 001; BOUNDARY CHANGE BETWEEN VII

CORPS AND XVIII ABN CORPS.

72. In 1863, just prior to the start of Lee's Gettysburg campaign, the Union Cavalry

conducted a raid into the South that involved a raid on the heretofore markedly

dominant Confederate Cavalry's encampment at Brandy Station. The raid was

highly embarrassing to Confederate Cavalry commander, J. E. B. Stuart. Its effect

was political and psychological.

73. See, for example, instructions issued by General Franks at 260725 in HQ, VII Corps,

G3 OPS, Daily Staff Journal, 26 February 1991, item 13. Arrival of 1st Infantry

Division and 1st Cavalry Division in battle zone as well as detailed management of

the battle throughout the 26th and 27th would change the precise maneuvers

employed.
274

74. Significant activities in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record,

Subject: (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 26 February 1991, 6. (Executive Officer's

Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.) According to Lieutenant

Colonel Kendall in a letter to the author (29 October 1992), the CINC's call

concerning the boundary change was highly professional in tone, leading Yeosock to

conclude the storm had blown over.

75. General Yeosock and General Franks have both told the author that General

Yeosock concealed from General Franks the precise nature of General

Schwarzkopfs ire, thus leading General Franks to say that he was not aware of

General Schwarzkopfs comments until they appeared in the press. General Franks'

public response appeared in the Reading, Pennsylvania, Eagle Times, 1 March 1992.

The column was reprinted in the Department of Defense American Forces

Information Services, Current News Early Bird for Tuesday, 3 March 1992, 2. The

time of General Franks' call has been variously given as the evening of the 25th and

morning of the 26th. Reference to General Franks' aide, Major Toby Martinez,

confirms a time of 1600 the 26th, which would satisfy the requirement that it follow

Schwarzkopfs call to Yeosock the morning of the 26th.

76. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 463. General Franks has been unable to account

for the CINC's perception in discussions with the author. Another possible

explanation has to do with a concept discussed at ARCENT that would have had the

1st U.K. open a line of communication by turning south and clearing Wadi al Batin,

rather than continuing eastward as they ultimately did. See Brigadier I. G. C.

Durie, CBE, "lst Armored Division Artillery on Operation Granby," Journal of the

Road Artillery 118, no. 2 (September 1991): 27-28. This contingency was never

executed.

77. Report from ARCENT LNO to JFC North in HQ, ARCENT, Command Group,

Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 26 February

1991, 3. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will be filed with General Yeosock's

papers at the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

78. HQ, 1st Cavalry Division, DTAC, Daily Staff Journal, 26 February 1991, items 17

and 18, indicate General Waller called direct to the 1st Cavalry Division and

instructed them to move. Lieutenant Colonel Kendall's (Executive Officer's) Daily

Memo indicates the 0920 time.

79. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Rout Bush Wants: A Disorderly, Humiliating Iraqi

Surrender Will End Hussein's Power, Officials Believe," The New York Times, 27

February 1991, Al, A21.

80. Message, FROM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/ SITREP/ USARCENT/G

+3/FEB//, PERID/260300Z/TO:270300Z/ASOF:270300, 8,13,14.

81. Ibid., 15-16.

82. HQ, 24th Infantry Division (Mech), briefing titled, "Operation Desert Storm PostAttack Summary," dated 22 March 1991.

83. Many of the divisional records for the period of the ground war were not made

available to the author because they have been separated for the various

investigations concerning the 24th Division that followed the cease-fire. Many of the
275

incidents therefore can only be tracked in reports recorded in higher headquarters.

This incident was reflected in the ARCENT and XVIII Corps duty logs, the former on an ARCENT Spot Report form dated 262230C February 1991 (Mobile CP Journal

Entry 99), the latter in XVII Corps TAC Journal Sheet (FB Form 2768), dated

262205C February, Entry 23.

84. HQ, 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), AFVE-IN, Memorandum for

Members of the Sledgehammer Brigade, Subject: Chronology of the 197th Infantry

Brigade (M) Participation in the Gulf War, dated 24 April 1991, 8.

85. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, Memorandum for Record, Subject: (Executive

Officer's) Daily Memo, 27 February 1991, 5-6. (Executive Officer's Daily Memos will

be filed with General Yeosock's papers at the Army Military History Institute,

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

86. Message, 272200Z FEB 91, FROM CDRXVIIIABNCORPSFWD//G3//,

MSGID/SITREP/XVIII ABN CORPS/027/FEB 91/, 4,6.

87. HQ, 24th Infantry Division (Mech), briefing titled, "Operation Desert Storm PostAttack Summary," dated 22 March 1991. CENTCOM planning limit is given in

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress

Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and

Personal Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), April 1992, 90.

88. HQ, 24th Infantry Division (Mech), briefing titled, "Operation Desert Storm PostAttack Summary," dated 22 March 1991.

89. Message, FROM CDR 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT) (situation report), DTG 271800C

FEB 91.

90. Ibid. HQ, 101st Aviation Brigade, AFZB-KF-CO, Memorandum for Commander,

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Subject: Executive Summary-Operation

Desert Shield/Storm, dated 10 June 1991,11.

91. HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, TAC CP, Daily Staff Journal, 26 February 1991, Journal

Entries 81, 82, 94. HQ, XVIII Airborne Corps, TAC CP, Daily Staff Journal, 27

February 1991, Journal Entries 6, 8, 12.

92. HQ, 101st Aviation Brigade, AFZB-KF-CO, Memorandum for Commander, 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault), Subject: Executive Summary-Operation Desert

Shield/Storm, dated 10 June 1991,11.

93. John H. Cushman, Jr., "War in the Gulf: A Defeat by Any Other Name: The Rules:

Experts Back U.S. On Rules of War," 27 February 1991, Al. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't

Take a Hero, 468.

94. General Peay to the author. The same issue was raised by pilots in the 3d AD.

General Funk instructed them to concentrate on destruction of materiel and to allow

the enemy soldiers to escape as they might. General Funk to author.

95. The question of the effect of such pressure and the administration's efforts to counter

it remains to be written. See Steve Coll and William Branigin, "U.S. Scrambled to

Shape View of 'Highway of Death,"' The Washington Post, 11 March 1991, A-1.

Related articles are Randall Richard, "'Like Fish in a Barrel,' U.S. Pilots Say," The
276

Washington Post, 27 February 1991, A-28. R. W. Apple, "American and British

Troops Gird for an Iraqi Last Stand," The New York Times, 27 February 1991, Al;

and the editorial that day, "Beyond Fury, Cool Calculation" in The New York Times,

27 February 1991, A26, which seems to favor the approach the president ultimately

took. On the 27th, the date the story of what came to be called the "Highway of

Death" broke, The New York Times ran an article asserting the right to destroy

retreating Iraqi formations. John H. Cushman, Jr., "Experts Back U.S. on Rules of

War," The New York Times, 27 February 1991, A21.

96. HQ, ARCENT, briefing for Secretary of the Army Michael Stone, section titled,

"Summary of the Battle," dated 13 March 1991. Briefing contains G2 slides, as of 1

February (D + 15), that show the Tawakalna at 50-74 percent effectiveness, another

for 14 February (D + 23) showing Tawakalna at 50 percent or less, and a third for Gday showing it restored to 50-74 percent. Battle damage assessment was not the

most precise business going on in the G2 world.

97. Principal reference is the VII Corps G2 Engagement Matrix, Tab F to HQ, VII

Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, AETSCB, Memorandum, Subject: The 100-Hour

Ground War: The Failed Iraqi Plan, dated 20 April 1991. See also Lieutenant

Colonel Peter Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offensive," Military

Review 72 (February 1992): 26,29,34.

98. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operation Desert Storm, 2ACR Operations

Summary, 23 February-1 March 1991,8. The written VII Corps FRAGO 141-91 had

a date/time group of 261400C February 1991. By the time the FRAGO was issued,

the attack was ongoing. The same is true of the ARCENT FRAGO 058, issued at

261500Z February 1991. Written orders tend to confirm the business was done

electronically.

99. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operation Desert Storm, 2ACR Operations

Summary, 23 February-1 March 1991, 9. Krause, "Battle of 73 Easting," 7.

100.2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operation Desert Storm, 2ACR Operations

Summary, 23 February-1 March 1991,10.

101. Ibid., 11. Vince Crawley, "Minute by Minute, Death by Death: One Unit's Battle

Against the Republican Guard," Stars and Stripes 49, issue 327, 9 March 1991, 14-

16. Steve Vogel, "A Swift Kick: 2d ACR's Taming of the Guard," in Army Times, 5

August 1991,10-61.

102. (Historical Overview, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, in Operation Desert

Storm) Activity/Event: Movement from Approximately 10 Kilometers North of the

Line of Departure to Vicinity of Phase Line Saigon, Date/Time: 250001CFEB91 to

260630CFEB91, and Activity/Event: Movement from Vicinity Phase Line Saigon to

Enemy Contact Approximately 262631CFEB91 PU 659104, Vicinity of Phase Line

Tangerine, Date/Time: 260630CFEB91 to 270259CFEB91.

103.(Historical Overview, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, in Operation Desert

Storm) Activity/Event: Movement from Vicinity Phase Line Saigon to Enemy

Contact Approximately 262631CFEB91 PU 659104, Vicinity of Phase Line

Tangerine, Date/Time: 260630CFEB91 to 270259CFEB91.

104. Ibid.
277

105.(Historical Overview, 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, in Operation Desert

Storm) Activity/Event: The RFCT (Ready First Combat Team) Continues the

Attack Vicinity PL Bullet to Objective Minden, Date/Time: 270300CFEB91 to

280800CFEB91.

106.2d Brigade, 3d Armored Division History (lst Edition), Operation Desert Shield,

December 1990 through 27 February 1991 (262200C February 1992).

107. Quoted in 3d Armored Division, Task Force 5-5 Cav Summary of Events, Report

Author: Captain Steven B. Wyman, Unit: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, Third Armored

Division, Activity/Event: Enemy contact of Task Force, Date/Time of

Activity/Event: 271900CFEB91 to 272030CFEB91.

106.3d Armored Division, Historical Report Format, Report/Author: Captain E. Allen

Chandler, Jr., Unit: A Troop, 4/7th Cavalry, Activity/Event: Contact with Iraqi

Tanks, Date/Time of Activity/Event: 26 February 1991. This same incident was

described in "Stalking the Janus-Faced God of War: Two Small Units and the

Different Battles They Fought," U.S. News and World Report, 20 January 1992, 52-

54.

109. HQ, 1st Armored Division, Operation Desert Storm, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, 19 April 1991,

paragraphs 8 and 9. Memorandum contains 1st Armored Division after-action

briefing, as well as written narrative of operations.

110. Memorandum for Commander, 3d Armored Division, Attn: ACofS G3, Subject:

Chronological History/Significant Events 16 March 1991, 19. HQ, 1st Armored

Division, Operation Desert Storm, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for Record, Subject:

1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, 19 April 1991, paragraph 9.

111. HQ, 1st Armored Division, Operation Desert Storm, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, 19 April 1991,

paragraph 8. See, also, Kindsvatter, 31.

112. HQ, 1st Armored Division, Operation Desert Storm, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, 19 April 1991,

paragraph 9. Barton Ballman, "Felled by Friendly Fire: But for Months, the Truth

About an Army Corporal's Death Remained Buried," The Washington Post National

Weekly Edition, 11-17 November 1991, 9-11, provides details of the incident.

Ultimately the regimental, squadron, and troop commanders of the 3d Armored

Cavalry Regiment units involved in this incident were censured by the commander,

U.S. Forces Command, for the incident. Barton Gellman, "Army Reprimands 3 for

Combat Death Despite Exoneration by Investigators, Officers Held Responsible for

Error in 'Friendly Fire' Case in Iraq," The Washington Post, 4 June 1992, A5.

113. HQ, 1st Armored Division, Operation Desert Storm, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, 19 April 1991,

paragraph 9. See, also, Erica E. Goode, "The Battle of Medina Ridge: A Desert

Showdown Between the World's Mightiest Tanks," in U.S. News and World Report,

20 January 1992, 55-56. The Award-Winning Staff of U.S. News and World Report,

Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New

York: Times Books, a division of Random House, Inc., 1991), 380-86.
278

114.1st Armored Division Operations Briefing, slide titled, "Destruction of Madinah

[sic] Armored Division (26-28 February 1991)."

115. HQ, 1st Armored Division, Operation Desert Storm, AETS-KGC, Memorandum for

Record, Subject: 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm, 19 April 1991,

paragraph 11.

116. HQ, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), King Khalid Military City, Saudi Arabia,

AFZN-CG, Subject: Memorandum for CG, VII (US) Corps, Subject: Operation

Desert Shield and Desert Storm Command Report, 19 April 1991, 5.

117.Brigadier L G. C. Durie, CBE, "1st Armored Division Artillery on Operation

Granby," Journal of the Royal Artillery 118, no. 2 (September 1991), 25-28.

118. HQ, 1st "Tiger Brigade," 2d Armored Division, Actions of the 1st "Tiger Brigade,"

2d Armored Division During Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm, 10

August 1990-1 March 1991, "Narrative," 6. Interview with Colonel John Sylvester

titled, "Colonel John Sylvester Report," 6 March 1991 (provided to the author by

Colonel Sylvester), 5-9.

119. The brigade after-action report lists different figures: 181/172 tanks, 148/126 APCs,

40/32 artillery pieces. HQ, 1st '"iger" Brigade, 2d Armored Division, Actions of the

1st "Tiger Brigade," 2d Armored Division During Operation Desert

Shield/Operation Desert Storm, 10 August 1990-1 March 1991, "Statistical Data."

120.HQ, 24th Infantry Division (M), 262230C February 1991, FRAGO 46 to 24th

Infantry Division (M) OPLAN Desert Storm 91-3, PH VI. This document is the order

for attack at 0535C (BMNT) the 27th. The order has an on-order mission to advance

to Objective Anvil outside of Basrah.

r · II= P--l ·
8

Battle's End

Instead of a final, climactic battle on 28 February, offensive

military operations came unraveled in the early morning hours. Based

upon glowing reports of success from the field, President Bush stopped

the relentless killing of Iraqi soldiers and called for cease-fire talks.

The conclusion was not a clean fade to peace, either on the battlefield

or in the headquarters. In spite of almost unprecedented success in the

field, seeds of postwar controversy were planted in the high command

and in American public opinion. The events at Safwan and later near a

causeway across the Euphrates marshes are instructive about the

difficulties of ending a war.

The conduct of military affairs in Southwest Asia was marked by

the particularly smooth integration of political and military actions

almost from the outset. Although the United States military response

to Iraq's aggression suffered some initial growing pains, the more

typical thread that ran throughout Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm was the habit of following each key presidential

announcement of political intention with a press conference by the

secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which

political goals were translated into clear military objectives.

With the ubiquity of CNN, operational commanders in theater

could receive this guidance immediately and react to it at once. That

the Iraqis could also receive it probably added more to the desired

effect of coercion (or was discounted by Saddam's paranoia as mere

deception) than it exposed U.S. forces to any increased risk. The

technique can also be seen as a means of reassuring allies and neutrals

by letting them know publicly just what the United States was about.

The practice was, therefore, instrumental in maintaining both the

cohesion of the alliance and ensuring that forces in the field were

aware of the national command authority's intentions.

All this broke down the night of 27 February. The result was

confusion and disharmony and a major killing of Iraqi forces that had

tried to flee the partial U.S. encirclement during the two days after the

announcement of a "suspension of offensive combat actions." At that

precise time, U.S. and Iraqi military leaders were supposed to have

been discussing terms for a military cease-fire in the field. Iraqi forces

in the Basrah pocket were permitted to depart to the north, through

Basrah, and continued to do so with their equipment after the

279
280

implementation of the cease-fire. This provided cause for postwar

speculation, particularly since the forces escaping into Basrah later

took part in suppressing local unrest there against Saddam's regime. 1

What was absent was a clear and common vision of how U.S.

forces should be distributed on the ground to facilitate the inevitable

transfer of the conflict's focus and energies back to the political arena.

Also lacking was a common concept of what action to take regarding

those Iraqi forces, including elements of the Republican Guard, that

had been driven back into Basrah and its environs. All this was

missing, in part, no doubt, because the end of offensive actions came

sooner than anticipated. It also reflects a fundamental weakness in a

traditional U.S. view that the military and political conduct of war are

separable at all but the highest levels. In this concept of civil-military

relations, the soldier is given a mission and fights the war according to

what is militarily correct-albeit within boundaries established by

policy. He expects to be left alone to do his technical business of

fighting until he has accomplished some gross military end that will

enable the diplomats to arrive speedily at a resolution of the basic

issues causing the war. The soldier then turns the conflict back to his

political masters. Such a view in an age of instantaneous

communications is, of course, not only misguided but dangerous in an

army of a democracy.

The difficulty on 28 February was that it was not enough to ask if

the president's military objectives had been accomplished. It also

mattered politically how U.S. forces were postured when they stopped

their offensive actions and what U.S. expectations were for the

behavior of the Iraqi forces south of the Euphrates and Shatt al Arab,

now effectively in the power of U.S. forces. The disposition of U.S.

forces on the ground and their behavior toward the Iraqis with whom

they were now intermingled were political more than military

questions. Yet, in this case, clear military guidance did not follow the

political declaration.

So events on the ground drifted, with field headquarters

inventing their own interpretations of the situation. While most units

drew in their lines and began to clear the area to their rear, the 24th

Infantry Division, apparently on the initiative of its commander,

continued to advance its main line of resistance slowly and

deliberately until a major, one-sided killing took place two days after

the "suspension" was announced by the president. Before that

occurred, a clash took place between Schwarzkopf and the senior army

commanders over selection and occupation of a site for cease-fire talks,

a blowup that was occasioned by the confusion of the moment but
281

which was rooted in the frustrations borne of military-philosophical

differences that had become evident in the conduct of the ground war.

At 1800 on 27 February, the senior commanders in Third Army

believed they had about one more day's war before them.2 Although

the 101st Airborne Division had a plan to land a brigade on Iraqi lines

of retreat along the Shatt al Arab northwest of Basrah (Engagement

Area Thomas) on the 28th, there had never been a serious plan at

theater level to send ground forces north of the Euphrates River, nor

was there any intent to get U.S. forces tied down in fighting in the

built-up areas of Basrah. With the Iraqis broken and the armored fist

of VII Corps moving forward, there would be no more terrain to cover

after another day's fighting. The major Iraqi lines of retreat beyond

the Euphrates appeared to be within the grasp of U.S. forces, and these

were the focus of attention. Because Basrah, on the south side of the

Euphrates and Shatt al Arab, provided a natural haven of sorts, the

decision not to fight there was a potential problem. But as the day-andnight interdiction of various choke points by both the Air Force and

101st Airborne Division attack helicopters had already shown, the

problem was not beyond solution.

How to transition from offensive operations to war termination

was another problem. There was concern, at least in Third Army, that

Saddam, driven north of the Euphrates, still might not yield.

Meantime, there was the problem of destroying the remaining

Republican Guard Forces Command heavy division still believed to be

in the field, the Hammurabi Division, and those other remnants of the

Iraqi armored forces still on the coalition side of Basrah. 3

In VII Corps, General Franks and his G3, Colonel Stan Cherrie,

had to adjust the corps' deployment to the diminishing maneuver

space. The 3d Armored Division, in the left center of the corps, was

being pinched out of the attack. The two men also wanted to get the 1st

Cavalry Division, the one fresh division left, into the fight to relieve

the now tiring 1st Armored. The 1st Cavalry Division was now

following the 1st Armored Division but was unable to pass through

because of the intensity of combat in which "Old Ironsides" was

involved with the RGFC Medina Division. Both the 1st Armored

Division and 1st Cavalry were up against the boundary with XVIII

Corps in the north, so the relieving division had insufficient maneuver

space to go around the corps' left. Franks considered requesting

attachment of the 24th Division to VII Corps so that he could envelop

the remaining Iraqi forces, particularly the Hammurabi Division. But

he knew such a request would merely occasion an argument with the
282

XVIII Corps, so he dismissed the idea and requested additional

maneuver space to the north instead. 4

The friendly fire incident that claimed the life of the 1st Armored

Division's engineer had already demonstrated that intercorps

boundaries were difficult enough to deal with even when they were

fairly clear in advance. They were not easily changed. So VII Corps'

request for more maneuver room was not likely to be promptly

answered. From the standpoint of the army commander, the advance

of the 24th Division down the river valley, already scheduled to begin

at 0400 the following morning, was going to solve the problem of the

Hammurabi Division anyway-unless it withdrew into Basrah. Before

a decision was made on the VII Corps request, however, other matters

intervened.

In order to arrange the battlefield for a final attack on the

morning of the 28th, Franks called his major subordinate commanders

at 1800 on the 27th to fix their positions long enough to reorder the

corps. 5 The 1st Infantry Division, which by now had broken through

the Republican Guard mass of maneuver, was moving almost due east.

The division was in a classic exploitation and pursuit aimed at

Objective Denver, whose seizure would block the Kuwait City-Basrah

highway. The 1st Division's cavalry squadron, the 1st Squadron, 4th

Cavalry, was already astride that road south of Safwan, at the

intersection with Highway 8 and the Basrah-Kuwait City highway,

already blocked farther to the south by the "Tiger Brigade."6 (See map

13.)

Pursuit at night was not so easy as clever critics would imagine.

The division's 1st Brigade had entered a patch of broken groundcalled by veterans "the Valley of the Boogers"-infested with Iraqi

infantry. There, units became intermingled and the risk of fratricide

rose in the dark. The division's 2d Brigade, on the left, missed the

valley and sped on by. In the 1st Brigade, the soft-skin support vehicles

of the 2d Battalion of the 34th Armor actually passed the unit's combat

vehicles in the dark and found themselves on the battalion's objective

when the sun rose-surrounded by Iraqi tanks and alone. 7 The men

who passed through the "Valley of the Boogers," including the

combative Tom Rhame, will not be convinced that pursuit through

occupied broken ground in the dark is an easy task, even in the face of

a broken enemy.

The corps commander's intent was that the 1st Division would

resume the attack at 0500 the morning of the 28th and, on order, turn

to the north to attack toward Basrah, either alone or in conjunction
283

Map 13.
284

with the 1st U.K. Armored Division.8 Though the VII Corps' staff

journals record a call to that effect at about 2300 from the corps' G3,

Colonel Cherrie, to the 1st Division's main CP, neither the division G3

nor division chief of staff have any memory of such a conversation.

There is also no evidence of it in the available division staff journals.

The division main CP had been left behind in the division's rapid

advance and did not catch up until after the cessation of offensive

actions. Its records for the period are incomplete. There is,

consequently, insufficient documentary evidence to draw any firm

conclusion about the fate of this message that, at 2300, was only an

"on-order" mission that would require a subsequent execution order

for implementation in any event.

The division's leaders were still looking eastward, toward the

Basrah-Kuwait City highway and the coastal road beyond, as they

quite properly would have in the absence of any order to the contrary.

It is clear that Franks' intent for possible future actions had not been

transmitted effectively to ensure it reached the one person whose full

understanding was to be essential to the desired results, General

Rhame. The division commander continued to focus his division's

energies on execution of the last orders received.

Meanwhile, at 2100 (1300 Eastern Standard Time), General

Schwarzkopf had conducted 'The Mother of All Briefings."9 It was, in

fact, a declaration of victory. Although the CINC did indicate that

armored battles were ongoing and that useful work remained to be

done, he indicated in response to one question that he would be glad to

stop the fighting when so ordered.lO Interestingly enough, the

Washington Post reported that the president "had seen only snippets of

the televised briefing. .. ." According to the Post, General Powell

recounted Schwarzkopfs briefing for the president. That led to the

decision to halt the offensive. 11

At 2230 (local), Schwarzkopf received a call from Powell speaking

from the Oval Office of the White House. After indicating the

president's wish to stop the offensive as soon as possible, Powell asked

if there were any military reasons not to stop the attack now? 12

Schwarzkopf called his component commanders to poll them on

the same question. He called General Yeosock at 2300 and indicated

that the "national command authority" (a euphemism for the

president and secretary of defense) were considering a cease-fire at

0200Z (or 0500 local) the following morning, the 28th. He asked if that

left sufficient time to get the word out to the troops on the cutting
285

edge. 13 Yeosock informed the corps commanders and instructed the G3

to prepare an order to that effect.

Yeosock called Franks at VII Corps at 2310, the 27th, and

indicated that the order was a warning order only, that the corps was

authorized to use fires until 0500, that it should conduct no deep operations, and that the corps should be prepared to resume offensive

operations on order. The emphasis was clearly on stopping the

attacking forces in the field without exposing them, thereby, to enemy counterattack. The VII Corps wrote specific instructions for a ceasefire at 0500. By 0130 on the 28th, VII Corps forces had assumed

postures of local security with an immediate mission of force

protection.14 Around 0200, ARCENT FRAGO 67 was published. Although it was titled "POTENTIAL TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE,"

the content clearly seems to be an order for an 0500 temporary ceasefire. It was taken as such by both corps. 15

Sometime between 2300 on the 27th and 0300 on the 28th, Powell

called Schwarzkopf back and told the theater commander that the

president intended to order the "cessation of offensive operations" for

midnight Eastern Standard Time, 0800 local in Saudi Arabia: a 100-

hour ground war. Negotiating a cease-fire would be left to the United

Nations under whose authority the United States and the coalition

acted. According to Schwarzkopf, Powell said that the conditions the

president intended to set were to contain the stipulation that "Iraqis in

the war zone must leave their equipment and walk north."16

Schwarzkopf, at the urging of his chief of staff, Marine Corps Major General Robert Johnston, pointed out to the chairman that this would

be impossible to enforce. "If we call this cease-fire," Schwarzkopf said,

"we're going to see Republican Guard T-72s driving across pontoon

bridges."17 The decision in Washington was to accept that.

At 0300, Schwarzkopf called Yeosock to set the effective time for

suspension of hostilities to 0800 local, three hours later than that

noted earlier and announced to the corps in the ARCENT order.18 The

whole tone of the discussion at 0300 was in sharp contrast to that of

Schwarzkopfs 2300 call. At 2300, the emphasis had been on force

protection and separation of forces. Now, there seemed to be a frantic

concern for inflicting the maximum possible damage on remaining

enemy forces prior to the announced cessation of offensive actions five

hours hence.19 The goal was maximum destruction of enemy

equipment. In addition, in discussing the arrangement of the

battlefield at the "cessation," Schwarzkopf and Yeosock agreed to the
286

assignment of a mission to secure a road junction just north of the

Kuwaiti-Iraqi border near the town of Safwan.

At 0330, ARCENT published FRAGO 68, titled, "CONTINUE

WITH OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS." This message changed the ceasefire time to 0800 and instructed subordinate commands to resume the

offensive. The VII Corps was ordered to "attack in zone to destroy

enemy armored vehicles and to seize the road junction vic. QU 622368

[north of Safwan]." The road junction was the sole terrain objective

assigned by Third Army to VII Corps (though VII Corps had assigned

terrain objectives to its divisions, e.g., Objective Denver). 20 Possession

of the road junction would acquire wholly unanticipated importance

within the next forty-eight hours. In light of later developments, and

the importance Schwarzkopf places on the distinction, it is important

to note as well that FRAGO 68 referred throughout to a cease-firefour times in the coordinating instructions-specifically stating in the

first subparagraph, "cease-fire commences 280500Z FEB 91 [emphasis

added]."21 Diplomatic distinctions did not carry very far from

CENTCOM that night.

Franks' orders came by phone. The corps commander does not

remember, and there is no evidence currently available to indicate

whether he personally saw a copy of the written order before the

"cessation of offensive actions," though it did get to the corps sometime

that morning. The ARCENT liaison officer at the corps' main CP had a

copy by 0455. He had received telephonic notice of its contents at 0350.

The corps' TAC CP file contains a copy of the message without the

dispatch time indicated. The corps' TAC CP file contains no cover sheet

or date-time of receipt.22

Franks' actions that morning indicate that he did not fully

understand that his mission with regard to the road junction in

question was seizure rather than attack. In fact, the word most often

used by VII Corps to address its actions later was "to interdict," not

seize. 23 In light of the fact that VII Corps had been involved to this

point in a force-oriented, rather than terrain-oriented, operation (no

less that the 1st Infantry's Objective Denver would come close to

accomplishing the same goal albeit fifteen or so miles to the south),

such a misunderstanding is not surprising. This is particularly the

case given the pressures of the moment (to restart a multidivision

corps attack just believed halted). Viewed through the exhaustion of

the leaders in the field, now beginning their fifth day of ground combat

in abysmal weather, the orders themselves, to start again only to stop

in five (or less) hours, must have been difficult to understand. By this

point, Schwarzkopf seems like a man trying to drive an eighteen-
287

wheeler truck with expectations of the responsiveness of a sports car.

Not surprisingly, he did not get it-from either corps.

General Franks and Colonel Cherrie did try to move forces toward

Safwan. Although the town would naturally have been in the sector of

the 1st Armored Division, that division had just finished a long fight

with two RGFC divisions and was still distant from the road junction.

The 1st Infantry Division was closer, although a move to Safwan

would require changing that division's boundary with the 1st Armored

Division and changing the 1st Infantry Division's direction of attack

(at least for some part of the division) by 90 degrees. By that time in

the fight, the friction in the machine was simply too great to overcome

in the time available.

At 0406, the VII Corps commander ordered his divisions to

execute the missions assigned the night of the 27th with a line of

departure time of 0600.24 For the 1st Infantry Division, operating in

ignorance of any instructions to the contrary, that meant continuing to

attack to the east. The 11th Aviation Brigade was instructed to

consider attacking the designated road junction with AH-64s. The

choice of an aviation unit is consistent with the view that the mission

was understood to be interdiction as opposed to seizure. The intention

to launch the 11th Aviation Brigade against the road junction was

reported to the 1st Infantry Division at 0502. In response, the 1st

Infantry reported the location of their northernmost unit to corps at

0507 to avoid the possibility that the corps aviation unit would

mistake them for retreating Iraqis. This concern led to cancellation of

the 11th Brigade mission.25

At 0515, the corps added a new sector to the 1st Infantry Division

zone. The intent was to form a small box, perpendicular to the current

division orientation, that included the road junction and the northern

extension of the Basrah-Kuwait City highway to the southern

boundary of XVIII Corps, in which the 1st Infantry Division could take

action against the road junction. This, too, seems to have been subject

to confusion. The corps' journal records the instruction: "Danger 7

[General William Carter, the assistant division commander] given a

sector 50 N/S grid line as western limit and 50 E/W grid line as their

northern limit. Will go west of 50 N/S grid line [?]." The division staff

journal reads, "Jayhawk 3 [Colonel Cherrie] told us to go out to 50 N/S

grid line (Stay East of 50 N/S grid line)."2 6 In the division journal, this

message follows immediately an entry indicating that the division

aviation unit had just been ordered to reconnoiter to the east of the

division objective, to the coastal highway that intersected the BasrahKuwait City highway at the road junction in question to a point just
288

short of the road junction itself.27 General Carter has written that "the

guidance from corps was to check the box east of the highway and

interdict any escaping enemy-we found none-also to go north and

look for enemy.... no mention was ever made in any order to seize the

RJ [road junction] north of Safwan."28 At 0520, the division was given priority in close air support.

While the 1st Infantry continued to report progress in their

eastward movement, the corps evidently believed they were now

oriented to the north. At 0533, the ARCENT mobile CP received a

report from the VII Corps TAC that indicated that the 1st Infantry Division would be moving at 0530 to the road junction in question to

establish a blocking position. This would not occur.29 At 0555, the

corps informed the 1st Armored Division on the left that the 1st

Infantry Division was going to attack to interdict the highway and

instructed the 1st Armored to clear all fires forward of Phase Line

Kiwi (to the east) through the corps headquarters. 30

The 1st Infantry Division reported crossing its line of departure at

0545 and by 0615 reported closing on Objective Denver-its primary

objective cutting the Basrah-Kuwait highway in the original sector. At

0626, the division declined additional aviation support (presumably

from the 11th Aviation Brigade), believing, no doubt, that its own

aviation brigade was equal to the reconnaissance-interdiction

mission.31 There is no mention of the Safwan road junction as a

specific terrain objective in messages to the 1st Division recorded in

the corps' operations logs.

While all this was going on, the division commander was out of

direct communications with his higher headquarters. General Rhame,

who had been conducting an exploitation since breaking through the

RGFC, commanded his division from a small command group built

around two M1 tanks, in which he and his G3 were located with the

forward brigades. Orders from the corps commander to the division

commander had to be relayed through the division tactical command

post.32 That is not to say that any error was introduced by the division

TAC, rather to point out that conducting the sort of clarifying

discussion that ensures fullness of understanding between

commanders was not possible the morning of the 28th. Whatever was

intended by ARCENT and the corps, the division focus remained to the

east, getting across the Basrah-Kuwait highway south of Safwan

(Objective Denver) in accordance with existing orders.

At 0500 on 28 February, Saudi time (2100, the 27th in

Washington), while the commanders in the field attempted to restart
289

their offensive, the president announced the "suspension of offensive

combat operations" would occur at midnight Eastern Standard Time,

0800 in Baghdad.33 In the desert, the ground offensive, once halted,

was proving difficult to restart everywhere.

At 0723, a reported incident of fratricide (incorrectly reported it

turned out) brought the action to a halt. The road to the designated

road junction had been cut by troops of the 1st Infantry Division. The

road junction, however, had not been occupied by ground forces, nor

had Objective Anvil, an XVIII Corps objective dominating the same

road complex farther north, been taken. The 24th Division only

succeeded in firing an artillery preparation and launching attack

helicopters toward the Basrah escape hatch. Initial reports to

CENTCOM indicated the junction was secured when in fact it was not.

The evidence of where the reports became garbled is inconclusive but

would seem to have their origin in staff officers at corps or army failing

to distinguish between an attack by aviation rather than an attack by

ground troops, a significant difference.3 4

Immediate concern on the morning of the 28th, at all levels, was

for locating all friendly forces and protecting the force from further

losses. The status of the Safwan road junction at that point was a

matter of detail, at least in ARCENT. Moreover, although it was clear

by the morning of 1 March that the RGFC Hammurabi Division was in

the Basrah pocket, 35 no move was made to prevent its withdrawal

north of the river, something the coalition leadership could have

ordered as a condition for continued suspension of offensive actions (in

other words, a mutual freeze in place), and something the aviation

assets of the CENTAF air armada, or even the 101st, could have

enforced, as the latter had on the 27th when it interdicted area of

operations (AO) Thomas.

Without such instructions, it was increasingly unlikely that the

remaining Iraqi heavy forces would be destroyed, short of a

willingness for the ground forces to engage in battle in the urban area

of Basrah. And there is no evidence to date that the high command was

willing to contemplate that at this point in the war. The fact was that,

by the night of the 27th, the ARCENT attack was pushing the Iraqi

heavy forces back on their remaining line of retreat as opposed to

cutting them off from it. Of the forces on the ground, it appears that

the 24th Division in the north (in XVIII Corps) was in the best position

to cut the Iraqis off from Basrah. But the division had to negotiate the

Rumayulah oil fields, which were then believed to be a greater

obstacle than they turned out to be. In any event, the 24th had already

slowed for refueling before resuming the attack-an attack not
290

delivered due to the actions described above. The "Victory" Division

had not intended to resume its advance until 0400 the following morning.36 It did fire counterbattery fires throughout the night. The

XVIII Corps, too, found getting off the mark difficult when the revised

instructions arrived early on the morning of the 28th.

The VII Corps ground forces were effectively stopped in place by 0130 on the 28th. Although, strictly speaking, this anticipated the

execution order from CENTCOM, the action must be viewed in light of

the context in which these events occurred. The CINC's questions at

2300 indicated that the concern at the political level was for stopping the offensive and safeguarding U.S. forces. Schwarzkopfs speech made

clear that the military objectives had largely been accomplished. Indeed, he would say as much in an interview with David Frost in

March.37 The Iraqi Army in Kuwait was clearly destroyed as a

coherent force, whatever elements succeeded in withdrawing. The

RGFC, if not annihilated, had suffered severe losses in manpower, equipment, and no doubt pride, and what remained intact was in full

retreat and trapped between a water obstacle and a superior force, like

Napoleon on the Berezina.

More Iraqis might have been killed, but it seems unlikely that

any major formations would have been cut off. The destruction of an

enemy army does not require killing every enemy soldier. This

achievement is a moral as well as physical act and involves the

imposition of will on a resisting opponent. That within days U.S. forces

were able freely to impose an occupation of northern Iraq should be

some evidence that the Iraqis knew themselves to be defeated and

recognized the ability of the coalition forces to go where they pleased, at least on the Iraqi periphery. The hulks littering the battlefield were

mute testament to the extent of their army's destruction. Indeed, VII

Corps would destroy abandoned Iraqi equipment for the next eight weeks.38

The general objection, later, that some of the forces that did

escape were used to defeat local insurrections, though correct, is

another matter. The objection assumes significantly more could have

been done to destroy those forces, but given the U.S. reluctance to fight inside Basrah, the case remains to be made. The argument mistakes

the forces in the Kuwait theater of operations for the entire Iraqi Army. According to Schwarzkopf, much of the Republican Guard

(presumably infantry divisions) had already fled north of the

Euphrates.39 Moreover, it is by no means clear that all the fleeing Iraqi soldiers took part on the government side of the insurrectionary activities. One cannot posit with assurance that, had the forces in the
291

Basrah pocket been destroyed, Saddam would not have triumphed

against his domestic enemies anyway.

What Schwarzkopf seemed to be complaining about to Frost was

being denied a few more hours to slaughter the fleeing Iraqis north of

the Euphrates River, as if the hecatombs of southeastern Iraq were not

adequate evidence of his victory.40 Moreover, there seems to have been

no impediment, if it had been felt necessary, to have ordered a freeze in

place as the cost of the cessation and then to have placed the onus for

its violation upon the enemy. In any event, such actions were the

responsibility of Schwarzkopf and his superiors, not the men on the

ground who were trying to figure out what a "suspension of offensive

action," as opposed to a cease-fire, really meant.

The overthrow of the Iraqi government was never a coalition goal

and, whatever its emotional preference, the United States was a

partner in the coalition and supported the legitimacy of its

endeavors. 41 The coalition goal, the liberation of Kuwait, had been

achieved. There was no apparent or obvious successor to Saddam. It

also seemed that little more was required to consolidate Saddam's

Sunni power base in Baghdad than simultaneous risings of the

Kurdish and Shiite minorities in northern and southern Iraq. Nor was

anything more likely to discomfort America's Turkish and Saudi allies

than the rebels' long-term success on their international borders. 42

Moreover, if U.S. forces were to be free to depart the theater soon, it

was not in anyone's long-term interest to create a power vacuum in

Baghdad that might require a prolonged U.S. presence. Unfortunately,

the forces required to maintain a viable Iraqi state were also capable of

continuing that state's more despicable methods of dealing with

domestic political opponents. Debate over the consequences of the

escape of some Iraqi units would follow later. During the night of 27-

28 February, the chief consideration of commanders in the field was

the safety of U.S. forces.

From the outset, U.S. operations were marked by a concern for

casualties. Prewar simulations had indicated losses would be heavy,

and for a variety of reasons, the military leadership did not look on

that prospect with equanimity. Certainly commanders were conscious

that they were responsible for the lives of their soldiers, who were not

just cannon fodder but fellow citizens, the sons and daughters of the

American people. They were also conscious that, in the volunteer

Army built up over fifteen years, losses in men and materiel were

largely irreplaceable. And as veterans of the Vietnam War and

witnesses to the U.S. reaction to the losses in smaller incidents, like

the Beirut bombing, U.S. leaders believed there was little tolerance for
292

casualty reports on the home front, American or even Iraqi civilian

ones. The public reaction to the bombing of the Baghdad bunker filled

with civilians and the Scud attack on the U.S. billet in Dhahran only

heightened this concern. In short, the Iraqi and American leaders were

in some agreement as to the location of the U.S. moral center of

gravity, and American political concern for avoiding unnecessary

casualties was always present.

Throughout the war, concern for avoiding fratricide was

especially high, increasingly so after Khafji and losses suffered during

the counterreconnaissance battle prior to G-day. As the density of U.S.

armored systems increased with the shrinkage of maneuver space,

concern about the potential for fratricide became particularly acute.

When the initial instructions on the suspension of offensive

operations went out at 2300 the night of the 27th, these emphasized

the separation of forces and the protection of friendly units. Yeosock

was conscious that orders to stop offensive operations would have to

penetrate nine levels of command to be effective: from the CINC to

ARCENT, the corps, divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, and

finally to the men who issue all effective orders, the platoon leaders

and sergeants on the firing line. That is rarely done quickly or cleanly,

and now the soldiers and their leaders were at the end of four days of

continuous advance and intermittent combat. It was likely recognition

of these facts of military organization and human endurance that led

the ARCENT and VII Corps commanders to assume, in the absence of

other instructions, that the cease-fire would take effect at 0500 local,

as originally indicated, and to issue orders for its execution early when

no word came from CENTCOM. The alternative would have risked

trying to get the word down the chain of command within a

diminishing time period. Restarting an army halted after four days of

battle was not likely to be accomplished in short order under any

circumstances. Whatever the reason for the extension, the ground

operations ended at 0800 on 28 February with Iraqi heavy forces still

in the Basrah pocket undestroyed. The road junction in the vicinity of

Safwan was unoccupied.

On the morning of the 28th, after the suspension of offensive

actions, the first priority was organization of the battlefield. This was

a particularly complex task, as armored warfare, especially in the

desert, involves by-passing pockets of enemy forces. Armed forces of

both armies were extensively intermingled, and because the

communications systems of the Iraqi Army had been disrupted, it was
293

not at all clear that the by-passed enemy would know of the new

situation.

On the allied side, there were equal concerns for force protection

and for establishing the continuity of coalition lines. Obtaining

guidance on rules of engagement that squad leaders and soldiers could

understand became an important issue. Initial guidance from the

ARCENT commander was that continuity of friendly lines should be

established. "If the Iraqis do not cooperate," he directed: "lay siege to

them. Destroy them if they fire on us."43 In a call to the commander of

VII Corps at about 1200, Yeosock satisfied himself that this was being done. Following the daily component commanders meeting with

Schwarzkopf at 1900, Yeosock instructed the G3 that the top priority

was safety and security of the force.44 (See map 14.)

At 2100, Yeosock received a call from Major General Robert B.

Johnston, the CENTCOM chief of staff, who requested

recommendations for a meeting site where the coalition commanders

could hold cease-fire talks with the Iraqi military commanders. The

ARCENT commander's desire was to hold such talks in Iraq and as far

north as possible. He nominated three sites: Shaibah, near Basrah;

Jalibah, on the Euphrates; and some point near the causeway across

Lake Hammar and the Euphrates, one of the two remaining lines of

retreat for the Iraqi forces (the other being the Basrah pocket).

Shaibah was in Iraqi hands; Jalibah, occupied by U.S. forces; and the

ground around the causeway, a no man's land that would be the site of

a major engagement by the 24th Division on 2 March. Following these

discussions, Yeosock believed the site would likely be Jalibah, and

instructions were issued to the XVIII Corps to prepare the site. 45 He

then left his office for his quarters. At 2345 (1545 Eastern Standard

Time), the president announced the Iraqis had accepted the proposal to

hold talks and the conditions required to do so. The time and place

were not announced. 46

Meanwhile, Schwarzkopf was trying to prepare a message for the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining his intentions for the

cease-fire talks. The site was a key element and time was of the

essence. Sometime after Yeosock arrived at his quarters, he called

Schwarzkopf to inform him that Jalibah was not a good site because of

the amount of unexploded ordnance spread around it. At that point,

Safwan became the site of choice. This required recalling the message

to the chairman and did not leave Schwarzkopf in the best humor. His

temper would soon get worse. 4 7 Thus began, perhaps, the most painful

and least creditable period for the Desert Storm high command, one
294

Map 14. Basrah
295

which, like most errors of the high command, would be redeemed by the soldiers on the ground.

Sometime thereafter but prior to midnight, ARCENT was

informed that the meetings would be held at 0500Z (0800 local) on 2

March, near Safwan just north of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. ARCENT

sent a warning order to VII Corps concerning the talks. The sites

proposed included the road intersection that had been the sole terrain

objective assigned VII Corps at the resumption of hostilities the night before; the airfield; and the old Iraqi custom post located nearby.48 VII

Corps was told to recommend a better site if they had one. The site was

to be in Iraq, preferably with a large open building or series of

buildings. Administrative requirements for the conduct of the meeting

were also included.

Sometime after 0125 and prior to 0300, Yeosock called Franks

and asked if the 1st Infantry Division could determine if the airfield

near Safwan was secure for use as the conference site. This was the

first time that the airfield itself had assumed any particular

importance for the corps, and the duty log of the tactical command post reported that the "lst ID has not had eyes on airfield. Area in vicinity

has extensive damage to personnel & equipment." 49 This report made

its way up the chain of command and led to an explosion at

CENTCOM.

Meanwhile, at 0308, Franks ordered the division to reconnoiter

the site and not to become decisively engaged. This order was almost

immediately modified (at 0320) in accordance with guidance from

Yeosock, who ordered the search at first light. Yeosock had called

General Rhame and General Carter direct, as he would regularly

throughout the following day, to check on the status of what was being

done. At 0430, Franks called Rhame and stated his intent. The tactical

command post log records: "Intent is do not take any casualties.

Unopposed move. No casualties. If you run into enemy forces, then stop and report to CG VII Corps." Interestingly enough, the VII Corps log indicates that Schwarzkopfs permission would be required to initiate

hostilities. 50

The tenor of the discussion among the senior officers is evident

from the question posed Rhame by the corps commander. Franks asked

Rhame "if the mission ever got to him to interdict road junction at QU

622370? If not, why not? Was there any traffic through that road

junction? Did you have any eyes north of the northern limit from 1-4

Cav?" 51 Rhame had just gotten to sleep after 100 continuous hours of

battle. His division had conducted the corps' main attack on G-day,
296

advanced as corps reserve, passed through the 2d Armored Cavalry

Regiment at night on the 26th while in contact, battled through the

Iraqi armored screen, and finished as the eastern-most U.S. unit in

Schwarzkopfs great wheel, situated across the major south-north line

of retreat. He was now caught in a "Who shot John?" (meaningless

blame fixing) exercise to appease an irate theater commander. Rhame

was understandably nonplused.

At the other end of the chain of command, Schwarzkopfs dark

side was in full control as he raged at Yeosock that his orders had been

willfully disobeyed. In his memoir, Schwarzkopf complains not only

about the misinformation that he unquestionably received but also

about the importance of the entire complex to his control of by-passed

Iraqi forces as well as a cache of Scuds nearby. Apparently, when he

spoke to Yeosock (or perhaps because he did so at 0300) the morning of

the 28th, a number of his concerns had not then been clear to the army

commander. Schwarzkopf now required from the two commanders who

had delivered the victory on the ground at an unbelievably low cost a

written account of their actions with regard to failing to secure an

obscure road junction in southeastern Iraq, the importance of which

had apparently only become vital after offensive operations were

halted by the CINC's commander in chief.52

In judging the conduct of events for the next fifteen hours, it is

necessary to remember that the principals were all exhausted after the

events of the preceding four days. Moreover, Yeosock, just returned,

perhaps prematurely, from surgery in Germany, was visibly operating

at less than his full physical powers. All three commanders were

powerful men with heavy responsibilities. They now found themselves

confronting the friction and fog of war in a most sensitive problem that

seemed, at the time, to threaten the accomplishments of the past four

days, achievements toward which they had invested the greatest part

of their professional life and for which they had risked, and in some

cases lost, the lives of their men. There was understandable fear that

what seemed to be the success that would redeem the Army's postVietnam War reputation might now be compromised by a

postoperational embarrassment sure to be blown up in the media.

Implicit in Schwarzkopfs response was the threat of unwarranted

public disgrace, a threat that weighed heavily on all concerned.

The units of the 1st Division upon which the task of securing the

airfield and road junction fell were the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wilson, and the 2d Brigade,

1st Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Anthony A. Moreno.

Wilson received his mission from Rhame at 0240 the morning of 1
297

March at his position on the Basrah-Kuwait City road. The actual line

of departure time was finally 0615. The squadron occupied the airfield

unopposed but, while pushing north to secure the area, ran into an

Iraqi unit, apparently an armored brigade of the Republican Guard

Forces Command, in defensive positions.

About 0900, an Iraqi colonel arrived on the scene to ask why the

Americans were in Iraq. The squadron officers-first, the troop

commander of A Troop, Captain Ken Pope, then, the squadron

commander-told the colonel he and his troops would have to leave the

site. The colonel responded he could not do so without orders and

departed to consult with his commanders. He returned at 1020 and

stated that he still did not have orders to leave. He was told that either

he had to leave or he would be attacked by coalition air forces. When

General Carter arrived by helicopter at 1100 to see what was going on,

the Iraqis had still not departed. The Iraqi commander finally relented

and ordered his troops out of the area. By 1200, most of the Iraqis in

the squadron sector were withdrawing toward Basrah. 53

The division had ordered the 2d Brigade to join the cavalrymen at

the airfield. That meant moving up the road to Basrah, through

Safwan, a movement that proved more difficult than the clearing of

the airfield. The brigade commander notified his task force

commanders to prepare to move north to assist in securing the airfield

and city of Safwan at about 0630 the morning of 1 March. Units

started moving within thirty minutes. While most of the brigade

moved overland, as had the cavalry squadron, the 4th Battalion, 5th

Artillery, moved north up the road. At Safwan, they found their way

blocked by an Iraqi infantry company from Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's

home town. The Iraqis had no intention of moving and, indeed,

indicated they would resist if the U.S. forces tried to move farther

north. 54

Colonel Moreno arrived at the site at 1100 and asked for a senior

Iraqi officer to come speak to him. Two Iraqi generals and a civilian

official arrived at about 1230 and read a prepared statement to Colonel

Moreno. The statement indicated that Iraq wanted to meet in Geneva

and asked who the United States would send as a representative.

Moreno explained his mission was to secure the town and airfield for

the negotiations. The Iraqis responded that they needed instructions

from Baghdad and departed. 55 During the day, both General Carter

and General Rhame would arrive to oversee what was being done, but

Colonel Moreno would conduct all discussions with the Iraqis, largely
298

to avoid requiring further delay should the Iraqis feel obliged to raise

the rank of their "front man." 56

While the contretemps took place in the vicinity of Safwan, the

pressure continued on Third Army. Schwarzkopf had ordered Yeosock

to destroy radars on a hill overlooking the airfield but, cognizant of the

sensitivity of the situation on the ground, Yeosock decided to disobey

that order. At 1045, he reported the situation as he knew it to General

Waller, the deputy commander in chief, and requested new

instructions. Waller also had orders from Schwarzkopf, who was

sleeping, that he (Schwarzkopf) not be disturbed. Waller declined to

disobey these orders.57 At 1105, Yeosock called the CENTCOM chief of

staff and repeated his request.

At 1115, Yeosock was informed that Brigadier General William

Carter, the assistant division commander of the 1st Division, was en

route to the airfield. Meanwhile, the Iraqis were observing the

cessation of hostilities. At 1215, the ARCENT commander provided an

update to the CINC. Schwarzkopf directed that the Iraqis were to

withdraw from the area and instructed Yeosock to look for an

alternative site in Iraq, in the XVIII Corps area. This was done soon

after.58

At 1336, the CINC and ARCENT commanders again discussed

the situation. Schwarzkopf's guidance was that, if the Iraqi brigade

would not withdraw as requested, ARCENT was "to commit

overwhelming force to surround him, use attack helicopters, talk to

him, capture him if he refuses to withdraw. If he attacks you, then

return fire is permitted." 59 Schwarzkopf indicated to Yeosock that this

was ordered by General Powell, who was upset that the road junction

had not been taken, because the contrary had been reported to the

White House. Moving the talks to an alternate site now was out of the

question.

Schwarzkopf acknowledged the situation was delicate but

insisted that the Iraqis had to be moved and, indeed, said he would

move them himself if necessary. He reiterated that all this was to be

done without firing a shot. Yeosock restated his mission to the CINC

as he understood it: "My mission is to go into the Sawarah [sic] Airfield

with overwhelming combat power; to surround the Iraqi forces and to

have the Iraqi forces withdraw or be captured and to do so without the

use of offensive operations." 60

Yeosock passed the mission to Rhame, largely as indicated above.

Rhame has indicated that, in discussing the mission, he was told to

give the Iraqis an ultimatum to move or die by 1600. There was no
299

doubt in his mind that the ultimatum was genuine.61 At 1415, he

instructed Colonel Moreno to tell the Iraqis that he would attack at

1600 if they had not moved.62 Moreno repositioned his forces to

constitute a visible threat and delivered the ultimatum when the Iraqi

officials returned at 1500. The Iraqi commander requested a twentyminute extension, which Moreno granted. At 1620, the 2d Brigade

forces moved forward from two directions and occupied the town

behind the withdrawing Iraqis.63

At 1650, Rhame reported to Yeosock that the airfield was secure

with a five kilometer zone cleared around it. A cordon was being

established along the access road, and the route from Kuwait was

being cleared. Efforts now turned to setting up the negotiation site in

accordance with the CINC's guidance.64 The meeting was ultimately

delayed until 3 March due to undisclosed "technical difficulties."65

The incident at Safwan that Yeosock referred to later as his

greatest challenge in the war was essentially over by 1847 the night of

1 March. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and 2d Brigade had achieved

their mission by pluck and face, without losing lives, U.S. or Iraqi.

Only the humiliation of defending their earlier actions in writing

against the charge of willful disobedience remained for the corps and

army commanders. This was done that night. Franks' response was

delivered the following day.66

That night, after the evening CINC's conference, Yeosock brought

back a list of tasks ARCENT would have to accomplish to support the

cease-fire conference. He assembled his staff and personally worked

through the night to see that the assigned and implied tasks were

done. Among these was the drawing of a line of demarkation along

which the forces could be separated. Yeosock established the line

himself on a 1:50,000 map sheet that filled a wall in the ARCENT

headquarters. He sent the proposed line to CENTCOM the following

morning for use in the cease-fire talks. It would not take effect until

after the meeting on 3 March, too late to avoid one more battle,

brought on largely by the fog inherent in stopping armored warfare

short.67

The incident at Safwan was the result not of willful disobedience

but of bad reporting and the difficulty that higher headquarters had in

determining just what "ground truth" looked like in detail even hours

after the cessation of the offensive. Ironically, Schwarzkopfs

scrupulous use of the chain of command, rather than calling division

commanders directly (as he could have) to see what was really

happening on the ground, probably added to the confusion and
300

subsequent frustration. In the end, like the French soldiers in the

novel Paths of Glory, the 1st Division was sent "to take with bayonets

what a G.H.Q. ink-slinger already inadvertently captured at the point

of his pen!"68

Events were indicative of the larger problem of friction in war.

The heat of Schwarzkopfs response must be viewed not only in light of

the immediate pressure on him to work out the details of the cease-fire

talks-all of which required clearance from Washington-but also in

the context of an estrangement between Central Command and

ARCENT and VII Corps, at the root of which lay differing visions of

armored warfare. The road junction near Safwan was not captured

because at each echelon of command, from theater to division, the

situation on the night of the 27th was understood differently. Because

each commander understood the context differently, orders were

misunderstood. And since orders were frequently passed orally, rather

than in writing, execution depended on the understanding achieved,

not necessarily on what was intended.

What was not getting transmitted was the commander's intent.

At ARCENT, the commander had seen the CINC's press conference on

CNN and understood the explanation of the chairman's questions in

that light. At VII Corps, operations were slowed anyway as the corps

prepared for the next day's attack, and given the apparent intent to

stop the offensive, there seemed no immediate reason to begin new

operations that were unlikely to be completed by 0500. The 1st

Division was "in the clear," headed east, and the commander, in his

tank near the lead brigades, was looking eastward not north to

Basrah. That he received his instructions through a relay seems to

have filtered out much of the commander's intent as well. Once halted

and told to protect the force after four days of attack, the fighting units

were unlikely to be postured, physically or psychologically, for

immediate resumption of the offensive. Furthermore, the distinction

between a cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire, which is so

important at theater and national level, did not mean much at the

level of company and platoon, where such things must ultimately be

sorted out. Moreover, the requirement to obtain the CINC's permission

before engaging Iraqis at Safwan only confirmed the view already

spreading that there was a cease-fire, albeit a temporary one.

In an interesting commentary on fatigue that seems relevant to

this experience, Douglas Southall Freeman notes that, during the

American Civil War, "in the Army of Northern Virginia the men could

stand almost anything for four days, but the fifth day in almost every

instance they would crack." When judging the apparent unraveling of
301

tight control on the night of 27-28 February by men who had had little

rest for four days of movement and combat, one may well remember

Freeman's warning: "Beware of the fifth day. .. ."69 Interestingly

enough, Major General Rupert Smith of the 1st U.K. Armored Division

began issuing written, rather than oral, orders to avoid confusion due

to fatigue on the part of sender and receiver. 7 0

At higher headquarters in the early morning hours of the 28th,

the road junction must have appeared very close. However, to reorient

the thinking of the tactical commanders, especially given the fatigue

of the moment, some indication of the value of holding that point

should have been transmitted along with the mission. This does not

seem to have been done. The obvious value of holding the point on the

night of the 27th was that the road junction cut the Basrah-Kuwait

highway and the coastal highway. But the first highway had already

been cut, and as no large enemy presence on either road was evident

when aviation forces were finally sent east and north, the tactical

commander might have believed he had accomplished the ARCENT's

intent. Moreover, had another site been selected for the cease-fire

talks, in all probability no one would have given a second thought to

the road junction, which had been assigned to VII Corps as an

objective, or to the airfield and town, which never had.

The cessation of offensive actions lasted from 0800 (Saudi time)

on 28 February until the morning of 3 March when the two sides met

to establish the terms of a military cease-fire. The ambiguity of this

situation also led to a major incident in the zone of the 24th Division on

2 March, an engagement in which the division, on the authority of the

division commander, and in the name of force protection, advanced to

close one of the Iraqi lines of withdrawal to the north side of the

Euphrates River and, in the process, destroyed an Iraqi armored force

moving to safety across the division's front.

At the declared cessation of offensive operations, the 24th

Division reported it was deployed along Phase Line Axe, some twenty

to thirty kilometers east of a causeway across Lake Hammar, which

served as one of five Iraqi lines of withdrawal out of the ARCENT

encirclement. 71 During the 28th, the division reported pushing out a

security zone to Phase Line Knife, ten or so additional kilometers to

the east of the division but still west of the causeway. The move was

apparently made to secure the site of a downed 1st Division UH-60

helicopter in which ten U.S. service members had died. 72 That put the

division's security element within ten kilometers of the causeway.
302

The Iraqi behavior at Safwan, treating with, rather than

engaging, U.S. forces, demonstrated that some Iraqi forces in the north

were aware of President Bush's declaration of a cessation of offensive

operations. While waiting for the convening of cease-fire talks, the

Iraqis continued to withdraw their forces in that area, where they were

not cut off by coalition forces. 7 3

Until the meeting at Safwan on the 3d, there was no agreed on

line of separation between the forces nor any agreed on principles to

prevent one side or the other from running into its enemy. Because the

24th Division sat astride Highway 8, which runs from Basrah to the

northeast, south of the Euphrates, it blocked the only major alternate

line of withdrawal available to the Iraqi forces in the Basrah pocket.

Rules of engagement passed to the division by XVIII Corps on 1 March

directed that

Enemy personnel will not be allowed to depart KTO.

They will be collected and processed as EPW.

Commanders are authorized to take any measure necessary to protect

installations, aircraft, units or personnel from enemy attack or imminent

attack. Iraqi forces are still considered hostile. Wartime ROE are still in

effect with the following exceptions.

No offensive actions will be executed without prior approval of CDR

XVIII ABN Corps

If an enemy vehicle approaches with its turret turned opposite the

direction of travel, the enemy vehicle will be considered indicating a non- hostile intent. If these conditions are not present, the vehicle will be

considered having a hostile intent. In either case, all attempts will be made

to allow the occupants of the vehicle to surrender before U.S. Forces will

take hostile measures.

Roadblocks are authorized to prevent the escape of enemy personnel and

vehicles. 74

The limitation on offensive actions would seem to imply that the

prevention of escape was to be limited to those areas under friendly

control. What constituted friendly control, however, was itself

ambiguous.

Forces under command of the 24th Division had reported some

minor incidents of combat after the announced cessation of offensive

operations on the 28th. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, acting

under division command on the 28th, had been forced to fight its way

forward to secure the site of the downed 1st Division helicopter. The

regimental fight against an Iraqi tank company and artillery battery
303

lasted from about 0930 to 1530 on the 28th. In another incident the

same day, two bus loads of Iraqi soldiers drove into a roadblock

established by the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry. Soldiers in the first bus

surrendered. Those in the second opened fire. U.S. soldiers returned

the fire, killing six Iraqis, wounding seven, and taking nine

prisoners. 75

These actions were typical of events throughout the ARCENT

sector, where isolated Iraqi forces ran into U.S. forces or resisted

capture by U.S. units imposing order on the areas by-passed in the

coalition advance. In many cases, captured Iraqis expressed surprise

that coalition forces were even in southeastern Iraq. Still, CENTCOM

expressed concern about the report that the two buses had been

destroyed, asking if all occupants were male and why, and if only

passengers in one bus had fired, why were the two destroyed. 76 The

tenor of the questions indicates someone at higher headquarters

expected greater than normal discrimination in the use of force in such

matters. Against this, of course, was the guidance quoted above, not to

let Iraqis get away.

The incident on 2 March was somewhat different, certainly in

scale and also in the questions it appeared to raise about the extent to

which the president's guidance to cease offensive operations was being

observed by forces in the field. At 012207, the 24th Division reported to

the corps' tactical operations center (TOC) that it was "moving forward

in zone" to a line (QU15 N.S. line) short of the causeway road complex

"looking for abandoned equipment." According to the entry in the

corps' main log, the troops were to adhere to General Luck's guidance,

which was to "Remind them not to get into a fight."77 According to the

division G3, Lieutenant Colonel Pat Lamar, the division believed it

was adhering to guidance about clearing the division zone to the line of

advance at the cease-fire because the division had reconnaissance

elements beyond the causeway. 78 But 1st Brigade logs suggest, to the

contrary, that division and brigade reconnaissance elements were

moving into the causeway area the morning of the 2d. The order to the

battalions of the 24th Division's 1st Brigade the morning of the 2d

indicated that the brigade was to occupy the fifteen north-south grid

line (west of the causeway) with platoon-size elements from each

battalion task force, then pass the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, screen

line forward. The order addressed only the clearing of the area west of

the fifteen north-south grid line. The order stressed safety and directed

that "Approaching enemy who refuse to surrender will be killed." It

also relayed the division commander's intent: "CG's INTENT:

PROTECT FORCE, AWAIT RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS,
304

MAINTAIN CBT PWR, DO NOT DRAW FIRE IF WE RESPOND TO

FIRE DO SO WITH OVERWHELMING VIOLENCE [emphasis added]."79 As events developed it would prove difficult to advance

(move east) and not draw fire.

At ARCENT, attention seems to have been focused on the location

of the main line of resistance some distance to the west. ARCENT

FRAGO 68 addressed destruction of "by-passed enemy equipment," and General Arnold had clarified the order to XVIII Corps, speaking of

"going back" to destroy everything in the zone until 0800.80

According to the division's reports, the incident itself began at

about 0720 when the 1st Brigade, 24th Division, on the left side of the

division zone across Highway 8, observed forty Iraqi vehicles moving

west into the division security zone.81 Later, General McCaffrey would

speculate that the column missed its right turn to bring it onto the

causeway and blundered into the division there to the west.8 2 The 1st

Brigade's duty log indicates that the causeway was blocked and that

the enemy column tried to turn back on itself, producing an apparently aimless milling around in front of the U.S. forces.83

At 0725, the divisional air cavalry was ordered to engage the Iraqi forces if the vehicles continued into the 24th's sector. At about 0800,

the brigade attempted to "encourage the Iraqi forces to change direction and surrender. When U.S. troops were engaged by sagger and other direct fire weapons from trail enemy forces ... ," the brigade returned the fire. According to a report submitted to ARCENT by Brigadier General Scott, the assistant division commander of the 24th,

the action had opened at 0809 when the brigade reported that Iraqis had fired an RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) at them. At 0815, there

were reports of T-72s moving west on heavy equipment transporters.

At 0817, Task Force 2-7 Infantry reported receiving direct fire and, at

0821, destroying two T-72s.84 At 0855, XVIII Corps reported to

ARCENT that six T-72s, two T-55s, four BMPs, and two BRDMs had

been destroyed by C Company, 2-7 Infantry.8 5 The enemy was reported

to have turned north.

After the first engagement, about 0925, McCaffrey concluded that

the enemy intended to regain contact with division forces and, at 0940,

ordered an AH-64 attack helicopter company to attack the enemy force. Later, a second attack helicopter company was committed. Using

two infantry battalion task forces to block enemy forces moving west,

an armored battalion task force, the 4-64th Armor, was maneuvered to

the south (the rear of the enemy column moving north across the

causeway) then swept north.86 At 1407, a final damage assessment
305

was received by ARCENT. It listed destruction of eighty-one Iraqi tanks, ninety-five armored personnel carriers, eight BRDMs, five

artillery tubes, two BM21s, eleven FROG launchers, and twenty-three

trucks. 8 7 The division moved its security zone forward another ten

kilometers, far enough to control the causeway line of withdrawal.

The picture at company level was understandably a little

different. C Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was the company of

the 24th Division, 1st Brigade, that was advancing down Highway 8

on 27 February on the division's left (northern) flank. The company commander, Captain Richard Averna, has indicated that he did not

receive notice of revised rules of engagement until early the morning of 2 March.88 From the morning of the 28th until around noon on 1

March, Captain Averna's company occupied a road block on Highway 8

around fifteen to twenty kilometers from the causeway exit. Around

noon on 1 March, his battalion was ordered to advance and clear to

their front. C Company advanced around noon and, from 1200 to 2100,

fought a series of minor skirmishes in which they captured two tanks

and destroyed a platoon of air defense 37-mm guns. The following

morning (2 March), they were ordered to advance again. The rules of

engagement now (for the first time, according to Averna) were that C

Company was not to fire unless fired upon.89

C Company's advance began at 0530. Almost at once, one of the C

Company platoons captured two T-72s and a BMP (Russian-design

infantry fighting vehicle) parked along the road. Around 0615, the 3d

Battalion, 7th Infantry, to the north reported a large number of

vehicles moving along the road to the north across the causeway. The

same movement was reported by C Company and D Company, 2d

Battalion. The response by the commander of the 2d Battalion was to

move forward to make contact but not to fire unless fired upon. Once

the enemy was identified, the battalion commander denied a request to

open fire. Then he permitted fire by artillery only, reportedly as a

means to cause the Iraqis to surrender.90

While C Company waited for the artillery fire, the 3d Platoon ran

into a squad-sized element of a BMP and a BMD in a defensive position

with seven dismounted infantry. The Iraqis' dismounted infantry

engaged with RPGs, and their armored carriers moved out to engage

with SAGGER antitank weapons. With that, the 3d Platoon engaged

and sent dismounted troops to seize the trench line. Two T-72 tanks,

probably attracted by the developing engagement approached from the

east rather than turning north along the causeway road. C Company

massed its fires on the road junction of Highway 8 and the causeway

access road. The artillery requested earlier finally arrived, and at the
306

end often minutes, six T-72s, two T-55s, and ten BMPs were destroyed,

principally by direct fire. Simultaneously, the companies to the north

engaged the forces retreating over the causeway, and then attack

helicopter units began to work the highway. At around 0930, C

Company was ordered to capture the road junction and, supported by D

Company, it did. Thereafter, the 64th Armor passed through and

continued the attack to the north, killing whatever was left on the

access road to the causeway. No U.S. losses were recorded in C

Company that day.

The destruction of over 200 enemy vehicles, with a loss of only one

U.S. tank (when an enemy tank next to it exploded) and one U.S.

soldier wounded, was no small affair, and from the description given from the various reports, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the

local division commander had done more than limit himself to

defensive actions in the engagements in question. The facts are,

however, that the rules of engagement passed to commanders for the

period of cessation of offensive operations did not anticipate the

situation that confronted the 24th Division-a threat of a collision

with major enemy forces. There seems little question that the initial

response by C Company was warranted, and the results of the C

Company fight were not disproportional. The company was directly

threatened, was fired upon, and took appropriate action.

It is the subsequent brigade attack on forces moving to the north

that seems somewhat disproportional, but here one must keep in mind

the position in which the commander on the ground found himself. He

was confronted by a major enemy formation moving close enough to

his own lines that, by its size and proximity, it represented a clear

potential threat. Moreover, he had been fired upon by one force

already, and he could only guess at the intentions of the main body in

front of him. The choice he had to make was to await events and risk

subjecting his force to a coordinated attack or preempt the threat by

using his superior mobility and tactical vision of the battlefield. Once

begun, the attack was bound to run its course. The disproportional

effects were not markedly different from those in every other

engagement in Desert Storm and, once battle was joined, were

probably inevitable unless extraordinary restraint was practiced.

In judging the choice made, it is well to remember the guidance

provided by the ARCENT commander, guidance that presumably

reflected that of the theater commander. The guidance from Yeosock

was that "War is not over; we have suspended offensive operations

pending talks. This is not a cease fire. Must be prepared to resume

offensive operations. COMUSARCENT's first priority is the safety and
307

security of the force."91 By that standard, the choice made by General

McCaffrey at the causeway seems capable of justification.

The remaining question, then, involves the justification for the

24th Infantry Division's presence on the causeway at all. Was this a

defensive or offensive action? In fact, it was both. From the standpoint

of the Iraqis firing at Captain Averna's Bradleys, it was the Iraqis who

were defending themselves against an immediate threat; Captain

Averna's troops, by their advance, were being offensive. On the other

hand, to protect a force on a mechanized battlefield, it is essential to

maintain contact with the enemy or to restore contact if it has been

lost. In that light, McCaffrey's action that led to the offensive against

the Iraqi troops at the crossroad was defensive and the Iraqi advance to

the west inherently hostile. Such questions on the battlefield are pure

sophistry. This engagement was the consequence of the inherent

difficulty of separating intermingled forces where no terms of

reference have as yet been agreed upon or dictated. The situation was

highly unstable, and the weaker side paid the price for the ambiguity.

In his magisterial work on Clausewitz' treatise, On War, the late

Professor Raymond Aron conducted a lengthy discourse on the

identification by Hans Delbrick of two forms of strategy in Clausewitz'

writings. These are (1) a strategy of annihilation

(Vernichtungsstrategie) or overthrow (Niederwerfesstrategie) and (2) a

strategy of attrition (or exhaustion) (Ermattungsstrategie).9 2 These

strategies differ not only in the nature of the military objectives each

requires but also in the kind of process that provides for the resolution

of the political issues that caused the conflicts to begin with. In the

first case, resolution comes about as a result of the acceptance, by one

side, of the dictated terms of the other-because the former has no

other recourse. In the latter, resolution is produced by negotiations

based upon an economic calculation that the cost of doing otherwise

would be excessive. 93

In the Gulf War, the national strategy was one of attrition or

exhaustion carried out by political and economic means. Within this

comprehensive strategy, military operations played a significant part

and, in so far as freeing Kuwait, they were decisive. The military

overthrow of Iraq was never contemplated by the coalition, although

Saddam's conduct of the war left his country extraordinarily

dependent on the coalition's lack of extreme intent for its continued

survival after 28 February. By locating most of his army in Kuwait,

Saddam made it his stake in the contest, and no doubt to his surprise,

he lost his wager to a military operational strategy of annihilation.

Nonetheless, because of the nature of the national and coalition
308

strategy, the final resolution of the conflict did not come with the

destruction of the Iraqi Army. Indeed, as of this writing, the economic

blockade continues, and Iraqi compliance with the United Nations'

resolutions is negotiated in council chambers, on CNN, and in parking lots outside Iraqi nuclear facilities.

Of the two events that have been the subject of this chapter, the

first, the incidents at Safwan, are simply indicative of confusion and

haste. The Iraqis appeared to have had better control over their forces

around Safwan than the allies expected and, with that control, the

possibility of unintended conflict was probably less than it appeared. Of course, there was no way for the combatants to know that, and as

the issue was made highly personal by Schwarzkopf, Safwan probably remains the more painful of the two.

The paradox is that the events of 2 March at the causeway seem to

have raised so little concern at the time, locally or politically. Later,

someone was concerned enough about them that an investigation was

conducted by the Army, but nothing visible seems to have come of it,

perhaps because the ambiguity of the instructions to the forces on the

ground would have made any disciplinary action highly dubious. In

retrospect, the act may well have added to the pressure on the Iraqis to

comply with the proffered cease-fire terms. In short, the destruction of

the Iraqi column may have met the coalition needs of the moment.

It is reasonable to believe that the information about the

initiation of the action on 2 March, which came to the division

commander by radio from troops in contact, may not have been precise in addressing the circumstances under which the combat began or was

effectively ended before the sweep north of the 64th Armored.

Experience tells one it probably was not. Moreover, a judgment by Captain Averna that most of the killing was done by the two-battalion

fixing force in a very short time may also be correct. One can continue

to be troubled, however, with the fact that most of the Iraqis killed

seem to have been headed north or simply milling around-and not

into the defender's lines, notwithstanding that some of their number

quite clearly seem to have initiated the combat by opening fire when

U.S. forces approached their position. Given that the Iraqi position had

been fifteen or so kilometers beyond the 24th Division's front lines

(taken as the main line of resistance, at any rate) at 0800 on the 28th

when the president announced cessation of offensive operations and

that only a small number of Iraqis seem to have acted with hostility that morning, the outcome remains somewhat disturbing. The above

situation, however, may be irrelevant from the perspective of the men
309

on the ground. With the events described, the conduct of the war

passed from the battlefield to the council chambers.

- Ia, -- -- - --------
I
Notes

1. "The Award Winning Staff of U.S. News and World Report," Triumph Without

Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, a

division of Random House, 1992), 399-406. The precise term used by the president

was "suspension of offensive combat operations." Text is in "Kuwait Is Liberated:

Military Objectives Are Met, Bush Says," from the Associated Press in The

Washington Post, 28 February 1991, A27, A34. The president was clear that the

"suspension was not yet a cease-fire."

2. Yeosock told Schwarzkopf he needed twenty-four hours to finish the RGFC in

response to a question from the CINC on the afternoon of the 27th. Schwarzkopf,

Doesn't Take a Hero, 467.

3. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 27 February

1991. On the issue of concern for a mechanism for war termination, the author was

present at a meeting between General Yeosock and Generals Franks, McCaffrey,

and Griffith in early February when General Franks raised this issue. Lieutenant

Colonel Mike Kendall, General Yeosock's executive officer, indicated this was an

issue the night of the 27th in comments to the author upon review of this chapter.

4. Interview with General Frederick Franks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 March

1992,26-39.

5. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, 27 February 1991, entry 51 (an attachment

with corps commander's instructions to divisions). Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps

Main CP, at 1846 on 27 February 1991, item 38. Handwritten note, "VII Corps

Update," 271940C, February 1991, note is account of VII Corps LNO Report to

ARCENT Main CP. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily

Memo, 27 February 1991, 4. HQ, VII Corps TAC CP, Fact Sheet, Issue: To Provide

Information on ARCENT Mission to Interdict Basrah-Kuwait City Highway and

Seize Road Junction at QU 662368 Prior to 280800C February 1991.

6. Rhame interview, 26 July 1991, 15. Diagram 8, HQ, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry,

Narrative History, 7 March 1991. Diagram 14 to HQ, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry,

Memorandum for Record, Subject: 1-4 Cavalry History for Operation Desert Storm,

dated 27 March 1991, an enclosure to HQ, ARCENT, Memorandum thru Awards

Board, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Subject: Recommendation for Award of

Valorous Unit Award for 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, n.d.

7. Colonel Greg Fontenot to the author. Fontenot commanded the 2d Battalion of the

34th Armor. His vehicles became intermingled with those of Lieutenant Colonel Pat

Ritter's 1/34th in the "valley." Fontenot asked for permission to halt long enough to

sort out the confusion about the time the whole allied offensive was closed down at

about 2200 by the events described below.

8. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps Main CP, at 2300 on 27 February 1991, item 52.

Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, at 2316 on 27 February 1991, item 48. Both

journals, kept in two locations, reflect this conversation. HQ, VII Corps TAC CP,

Fact Sheet. Discussion of possible combined 1st ID-lst U.K. attack to the north

along Basrah-Kuwait City highway, Colonel Stan Cherrie to author.

311
312

9. CENTCOM news briefing, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, Riyadh, Saudi

Arabia, Wednesday, 27 February 1991-1:00 P.M. EST.

10. Ibid., 16.

11. Ann Devroy and Dan Balz, "Bush Relaxes Effort to Abase Saddam," The

Washington Post, 28 February 1991, A27 et seq.

12. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 468-71. Colonel Joseph Purvis to the author.

Colonel Purvis was in the CENTCOM Operations Center when the call came in from

General Powell to General Schwarzkopf. According to The Washington Post

chronology, the presidents briefing was at 1430 Washington time, 2230 in Saudi

Arabia.

13. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 27 February 1991, 7. The precise timing anticipated remains an issue (see below).

14. Ibid. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, 27 February 1991, item 51 and

attachment. HQ, VII Corps TAC CP, Fact Sheet.

15. Message, 270920Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MCP//G3 OPS//, Subject: FRAGO

67 to ARCENT OPORD (Desert Storm 001), Potential Temporary Cease-Fire. Datetime group is incorrect. Dispatch time appears from various logs to have been

around 2300-2400 local.

16. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 470-72.

17. Ibid., 472.

18. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 28 February 1991,5.

19. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Kendall to author. This change of tone was also

remarked on by Colonel Cherrie with regard to instructions from ARCENT to VII

Corps.

20. Message, 280030Z FEB 91, FROM COMUSARCENT, Subject: FRAGO 068 to

ARCENT OPORD (Desert Storm 001), Continue with Offensive Operations.

21. Message, 280030Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENTMAIN, Subject: FRAGO 068 to

ARCENT OPORD (Desert Storm 001), Continue with Offensive Operations.

22. VII Corps TAC CP Logs are held at the USACGSC Combined Arms Research

Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

23. HQ, VII Corps TAC CP, Fact Sheet, Issue: To Provide Information on ARCENT

Mission to Interdict Basrah-Kuwait City Highway. This is also the word used in the

VII Corps Daily Staff Journal in a message to the 1st Armored Division at 0555 the

morning of the 28th, and it is consistent with the actions taken by VII Corps to

conclude that the mission as understood was interdiction, not seizure.

24. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps Main CP, at 0406 on 28 February 1991, item 6.

25. HQ, 11th Aviation Brigade, Memorandum for Commander VII (U.S.) Corps, Subject: Executive Summary to After-Action Report, 11th Aviation Brigade, Operation
313

Desert Storm, dated 18 March 1991, 2. Daily Staff Journal, 1st Infantry Division

TAC CP, at 0502 and 0510 on 28 February 1991, items 18 and 20.

26. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, at 0515 on 28 February, item 11. Daily Staff

Journal, 1st Infantry Division TAC CP, at 0511 on 28 February, item 20. See

comments by Colonel Terry Bullington, 1st ID G3, on confusion in order,

transmission in Rhame interview, 26 July 1991, 27-28, 37.

27. Ibid., 0510, item 19.

28. Note on draft manuscript written by Brigadier General Bill Carter.

29. Message Form #18, 28 February 1991, attached to Daily Staff Journal, ARCENT

Mobile CP, 28 February 1991. Message was logged in at 0858.

30. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, at 0520 and 0555 on 28 February 1991,

items 14 and 16.

31. Ibid., 0602, 0615, and 0626, items 17, 20, and 22.

32. Rhame interview, 26 July 1991, 31, 36. Daily Staff Journal, 1st Infantry Division

TAC CP, at 0510 on 28 February 1991, item 20, reflects the mission to the aviation

unit to reconnoiter the road to the north. At 0645, item 34 reflects execution of the

mission.

33. Andrew Rosenthal, "Military Aims Met: Firing Ending After 100 Hours of Ground

War, President Declares," The New York Times, 28 February 1991, Al.

34. Reported friendly fire incident is in Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, at 0724

and 0741 on 28 February 1991, items 29 and 34. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group,

(Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 28 February 1991, 1, indicates that on the

morning of the 28th, the ARCENT Main CP believed the road junction had been

occupied. The VII Corps Main CP, Message file, Unit Locations, 281000C February

1991, does not indicate any ground unit near the road junction. HQ, ARCENT,

briefing slides, "ARCENT Update, G+5 (28 February)," slide titled, "Combat Unit

Locations," as of 281200C February 1991 shows the 1st ID well south of the junction.

These slides were prepared daily in the ARCENT Command Group for the CINC's

daily component commanders' briefing. That same morning, the author asked at the

mobile CP if the road complex in question had been occupied by either corps and was told it had not. Rather, both corps had sent aviation units only into the area in

question. The incorrect report is reproduced in Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero,

473, as a chapter header. The report in fact relates the final objectives, that of XVIII

Corps, far beyond the 24th's capabilities from a standing start (which never took

place) the morning of the 28th, given cessation at 0800.

35. Message, 010300Z MAR 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID/ SITREP/

USARCENT/G + 5/MARI/,PERID/280300Z/TO:010300Z/ASOF:010300Z,1-2.

36. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 27 February

1991, 6. HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 28

February 1991, 3.

37. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 469-70. Transcript of Schwarzkopf interview

with David Frost, dated 22 March 1991, 22. The text of the transcript reads: "... he
314

and I discussed have we accomplished our military objectives. The campaign

objectives. And the answer was yes. There was no question about the fact that the

campaign objectives that we established for ourselves were accomplished. The

enemy was being kicked out of Kuwait, was going to be gone from Kuwait, that we

had destroyed the Republican guard [sic] as a militarily effective force." It was

Schwarzkopfs discussion of what constituted destruction (which generally followed

the line above) that led to the controversy in the press. Ibid. "General's Account of

Gulf War's End Disputed by Bush," The New York Times, 28 March 1991, 1.

38. The VII Corps formed a special headquarters to document destruction of enemy

materiel to include plotting hulks on map. TF Demo reported 619 tanks, 685 APCs,

865 artillery and air defense weapons, and over 4,000 other vehicles destroyed prior

to the corps' withdrawal into Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. HQ, 7th Engineer Brigade,

AETS-EB (840), Memorandum for Commander, VII Corps, Attn: Military History,

Subject: Command Report-Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 9 April 1991,

paragraph 10, page 3.

39. Schwarzkopf in Frost interview, 23.

40. Ibid. Colonel Doug Craft who worked in the CENTCOM Operations Center has

related, however, that according to his memory of the events of that night, the*CINC

and the NCA were both concerned about "wanton destruction" of the fleeing forces.

Interview with Colonel Douglas Craft at the Army War College, 19 April 1991, 19.

Provided to the author by Colonel Craft.

41. This is made clear by the UN resolution providing a basis for the cease-fire talks

passed on 2 March. The resolution affirms "the commitment of all member states to

the territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait" and the intention "of the member states

cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) to bring

their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with

achieving the objective of the resolution." "Text of Measure Approved by the Council

in 11-1 Vote," The New York Times, 3 March 1991.

42. A well-informed, contrary view is in Laurie Mylroie, "How We Helped Saddam

Survive," Commentary 92, no. 1 (July 1991): 15-18.

43. Lieutenant Colonel John M. Kendall, Memorandum for Colonel Swain, Subject:

Chronology for 27 February-1 March 1991, dated 19 September 1991, 3. Lieutenant

Colonel Kendall was General Yeosock's executive officer. He kept notes of all CG's

meetings and at request of the author reviewed his notes for the dates in question

and provided a summary in this memorandum. Guidance from ARCENT Main CP to

XVIII Corps was: ". .. if Iraqi units enter our area then we are authorized to attempt

to get them to surrender. If they don't we are authorized to use force to stop them

and force them to surrender. We were specifically concerned with Highway 8. Same

applies since it is in our sector." HQ, XVIII Corps, G3, FM Form 2768, CTOC

Journal Sheet, DTG received 2045 28 February 1991, journal entry no. 70. The

question which remains is what exactly constitutes "our area."

44. Kendall, Memorandum for Colonel Swain, Subject: Chronology for 27 February-1

March 1991, dated 19 September 1991, 3.

45. Ibid., 3-4. The XVIII Corps logs show that from 010045 March to 010400 March, the

corps was involved in preparing to host the cease-fire talks at Jalibah. At 0400, they
315

were told to stand down on that. From noon on the 1st until the end of the meeting on the 3d, the 24th ID was on standby with a site on Highway 8, well inside the

division sector west of the causeway.

46. Andrew Rosenthal, "Allied Generals and Iraqis to Meet Soon on Cease-Fire: Bush

Stresses P.O.W. Return," The New York Times, 2 March 1991, 1. "The Persian Gulf

War: Excerpts of the President's News Conference," The Washington Post, 2 March

1991, A12.

47. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Colonel Doug Craft's Memory of the Period

271800C to 281800C at CENTCOM HQ, prepared by author based on phone conversation. Interview with Colonel Douglas Craft at the Army War College, 19

April 1991,10-12. Provided to the author by Colonel Craft. The public story is in the

Army Times, "The General's War: How Commanders Fought the Iraqis . . . and

Among Themselves," by Tom Donnelly, 8, 16-17. Schwarzkopfs account in

Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 473-78.

48. Message, 010010Z, FROM COMUSARCENT, SUBJECT: WARNORD

NEGOTIATION SUPPORT. Message, 010315Z, FROM COMUSARCENT, Subject:

FRAGO 070 to OPORD Desert Storm 001, Negotiation Support.

49. Daily Staff Journal, VII Corps TAC CP, no time given, 1 March 1991, item 3; 0125,

item 2. Within item 3 is a note concerning a message from General Franks at 0308.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Testimony as to General Schwarzkopf's frame of mind has come largely from

discussions by the author with staff officers who were witness, in one way or the

other, to the events in question. There has been a marked reluctance by direct

participants to discuss these events. However, given knowledge of the witnesses and

General Schwarzkopf's reputation in the Army, as well as having personal knowledge of his temper when crossed, the author feels no compunction in accepting

these accounts on face value. The content of the discussion is reproduced from notes

in a Memorandum for Record, Subject: Situation at the Safwan Airfield, dated 1

March 1991, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel John M. Kendall at General Yeosock's

direction. This memorandum will be retired with General Yeosock's personal files at

the Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania.

53. An account of the actions of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, is in HQ, 1st Squadron,

4th Cavalry, Memorandum for Record, Subject: 1-4 Cav, 1st ID(M) Narrative

History of Operation Desert Storm, 24 January-1 March 1991, dated 7 March 1991.

See also Steve Coll, 'Talks, Site Remind Iraqis Who Won," The Washington Post, 4

March 1991, A-i, et seq. Note from Brigadier General Bill Carter on draft

manuscript.

54. HQ, 3-37 Armor, History of Task Force 3-37 Armor, Operation Desert Storm, 8.

55. Copy of handwritten note by Colonel Moreno. Jim Tice, "Taking a Town by Shooting the Breeze," Army Times, 26 August 1991, 18.
316

56. Rhame interview, 26 July 1991, 45. Note from General Carter.

57. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Situation at the Safwan Airfield, dated 10 March

1991, 1.

58. Ibid., 2-3.

59. Ibid.,4.

60. Ibid.

61. Rhame interview, 26 July 1991, 25-27.

62. Note by Colonel Moreno. Tice, "Taking a Town by Shooting the Breeze."

63. Ibid. HQ, 3-37 Armor, History of Task Force 3-37 Armor, Operation Desert Storm.

Memorandum for Record, Subject: Situation at the Safwan Airfield, dated 10 March

1991,3-6.

64. Memorandum for Record, Subject: Situation at the Safwan Airfield, dated 10 March

1991, 6.

65. Ann Devroy and Guy Gugliotta, "Cease-Fire Talks Delayed by Technical Details,"'

The Washington Post, 2 March 1991, Al.

66. Interview with Colonel Cherrie. Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kendall to

author.

67. HQ, ARCENT, AFRD-XO, Subject: Taskers in Support of Negotiations Meeting,

dated 1 March 1991, and comments by Lieutenant Colonel Kendall, the author.

There were twenty items to be accomplished.

68. Humphrey Cobb, Paths of Glory (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 21.

69. Douglas Southall Freeman, "Morale in the Army of Northern Virginia," in Douglas

Southall Freeman on Leadership, ed. Stuart W. Smith (Newport, RI: Naval War

College Press, 1990), 71.

70. De la Billiere, Storm Command, 297-98.

71. Message, 281800C, FROM COMMANDER 24TH INF DIV, TO COMMANDER

XVIII ABN CORPS, Subject: Combat Operation Summary, Period, 271800C FEB

91-281800 CFEB 91, 2.

72. Message, 1100Z [sic, actually 011800Z], FROM COMMANDER 24TH INF DIV, TO

COMMANDER XVIII ABN CORPS, Subject: Combat Operation Summary, 2. HQ,

ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 28 February 1991, 1.

Routes of withdrawal are listed in the intelligence portion of Message, 020300Z

MARCH 1991, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN, TO AIG1173, MSGID, SITREP,

USARCENT, G+6 MAR, 1-2. A report at 1400 to ARCENT LNO with XVIII Corps indicates the same dispositions in the north along the causeway. HQ, ARCENT, G3

Main CP, ARCENT Spot Report No. 06015,journal entry F-15.
317

73. Message, 020300 MARCH 1991, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN, TO AIG1173,

MSGID, SITREP, USARCENT, G+6 MAR, 1-2.

74. Message, 011120Z, FM CDRXVIIIABNCORPS, Subject: FRAGO #79 to XVI Abn

Corps OPORD Desert Storm, 4.

75. Message, 282330C FEB 91, FM CDR, 3RD ACR, TO CDR, XVIII ABN CORPS,

Subject: Commander Daily SITREP (As of 282315C FEB 91), 1. HQ, ARCENT,

Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 28 February 1991, 4 (LNO

report of 3 ACR fight). Message, 281800, FROM COMMANDER 24TH INF DIV, TO

COMMANDER XVIII ABN CORPS, Subject: Combat Operation Summary, 2 (2-7 Inf affair).

76. HQ, XVIII Corps TAC CP, FB Form 2768, Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet, DTG

010455C FEB 91, journal entry no. 50. Form passes question from corps main CP to

corps TAC. Message indicates CENTCOM called direct to corps main CP.

77. HQ, XVIII Corps TAC CP, FB Form 2768, Message Form/CTOC Journal Sheet, DTG

012207 MAR 91, journal entry no. 16.

78. Memorandum of interview with Lieutenant Colonel Pat Lamar at Fort McPherson, Georgia, 16 December 1991.

79. HQ, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, Spot Report File, specifically FRAGO DTG

020011C March 1991, VOCO Bde Cdr to All Units, journal entry no. 15, 16, and

various other early morning spot reports for the 2d. Quotation is taken from VOCO.

80. HQ, ARCENT, Message, 280300Z FEB 91, FROM HQ ARCENT MAIN//, Subject: FRAGO 068 to ARCENT OPORD (Desert Storm 001), Continue with Offensive

Operations. HQ, XVIII Corps TAC CP, FB Form 2768, Message Form/CTOC

Journal Sheet, DTG 280320C FEB 91, journal entry no. 39. This sheet records

guidance from General Luck to the TAC CP. It is offered only to demonstrate that

ARCENT and XVIII Corps seem to have been thinking mainly in terms of moving backwards in zone, not forwards.

81. There are a number of accounts of the 24th Division fight on 2 March. The ARCENT

commander's executive officer wrote a memorandum providing an account of the

incident as it was reported to ARCENT, Memorandum for Record, Subject: 24 ID

Engagement, 2 March 1991, an attachment to HQ, ARCENT, Command Group, (Executive Officer's) Daily Memo, 2 March 1991. The incident is laid out briefly in

Message, 021800Z MAR 91, FM COMMANDER 24TH INF DIV (M) TO

COMMANDER XVIII ABN CORPS; Subject: Combat Operation Summary, Period,

011800C MAR 91-021800 MAR 91, 2-3; and in Message, 030300Z MAR 91, FM

COMUSARCENT MAIN, TO AIG 11743, MSGID, SITREP, USARCENT, G+7

MAR, 15-16. General McCaffrey testified before Senator Nunn's Senate Armed

Services Committee on 9 May 1991. Draft transcript of a briefing from Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division

(Mechanized), and Members of the 24th Infantry Division on the Conduct of Ground

Operations in Their Tactical Area of Responsibility During Operation Desert

Shield/Storm, 42-44.

82. Testimony of General McCaffrey before the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 9

May 1991,42.
318

83. HQ, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, Duty Summary (notes by duty officer)

(012029-021722 Mar 91), entries for 0802-0807.

84. Message, 021800Z MAR 91, FM COMMANDER 24TH INF DIV (M) TO

COMMANDER XVIII ABN CORPS, Subject: Combat Operations Summary, Period,

011800C MAR 91-021800C MAR 91, 2. General Scott's reports are summarized in

Memorandum for Record, Subject: 24th ID Engagement, 2 March 1991, 1-2. The

numbers of tanks destroyed vary, no doubt friction in the reporting system.

85. Memorandum for Record, Subject: 24th ID Engagement, 2 March 1991, 2.

86. Ibid., 1-2. Message, 021800Z MAR 91, FM COMMANDER 24TH INF DIV (M) TO

COMMANDER XVIII ABN CORPS, Subject: Combat Operation Summary, Period,

011800C MAR 91-021800C MAR 91, 2-3.

87. Memorandum for Record, Subject: 24th ID Engagement, 2 March 1991, 2. The 24th

Division operational report lists, only thirty-one tanks destroyed. This is

inconsistent with all other accounts.

88. Interview with Captain Richard B. Averna, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 27

November 1991. Captain Averna was a student in the Combined Arms and Services

Staff School at the time of the interview. The following account comes from that

interview except where noted.

89. Ibid., 8.

90. See command account above, HQ, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, Spot Report

File, and HQ, 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, Duty Summary (notes by duty

officer) (012029-021722 Mar 91).

91. Message, 020300Z MAR 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN, TO AIG 11743, MSGID,

SITREP, USARCENT, G+6 MAR, 14.

92. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. Christine Booker and

Norman Stone (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 70.

93. Ibid., 76.

--- gr_---cC II 0-------- I --- ----· P--·3·*-
9

Conclusions: "A Famous Victory?"

Following Iraqi acceptance of the military cease-fire in the field

on 3 March, Third Army and its assigned forces became responsible for

three different and often conflicting missions: to occupy southeastern

Iraq until a United Nations permanent cease-fire was effected; to

provide emergency support to Kuwait until relieved by a Department

of Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office; and to begin

redeployment of U.S. Army forces immediately, in keeping with the

commitment Secretary of Defense Cheney made to the king of Saudi

Arabia on 6 August 1990. As General Yeosock observed, these

missions required ARCENT to go in three different directions at once,

and they were complicated even further when civil unrest produced

massive numbers of displaced persons in northern Iraq along the

Turkish border and around Basrah. These refugees had to be

supported, at least with the means of life, and arrangements had to be

made to turn them over to a protecting power. (See figure 34.)

The United States committed relief forces to northern Iraq under

control of the U.S. European Command. Third Army was tasked to

support this effort, Operation Provide Comfort, by providing resources

and even redirecting the movement of some units from the Desert

Storm redeployment to Turkey and northern Iraq. Meanwhile, U.S.

troop strength in Saudi Arabia dropped rapidly each day. Upon the

departure of General Schwarzkopf in April, Yeosock became

CENTCOM's deputy commander in chief until his own departure on 12

May. General Pagonis then remained in Saudi Arabia to see to the

evacuation of remaining U.S. personnel and equipment. Iraqi forces in

the Basrah pocket were allowed to withdraw north of the Euphrates

River following the cease-fire. U.S. forces did not become involved in

the popular uprising against the Baghdad regime that raged in Basrah

in early March.

President Bush laid down U.S. objectives for the postwar

settlement in his address to the joint session of Congress on 7 March.l

These provided for a shared responsibility for regional security, the

control of Iraq's access to weapons of mass destruction, a commitment

to leave no residual ground force in the area, but to conduct joint

military exercises, the maintenance of a naval presence, and a search

for new opportunities for peace. Related to this were seven military

objectives: (1) defend and rebuild Kuwait; (2) orient, support, and hand

off a demilitarized zone to a United Nations Command; (3) protect and

319
Figure 34.

320

Icr

rr w

33p9

a
321

support displaced civilians, ultimately to turn their care over to our

regional allies; (4) leave some residual force in Kuwait temporarily; (5) conduct redeployment; (6) prepare equipment left behind in the region; and (7) capture the experience of Desert Shield-Desert Storm.2

To provide for emergency aid to Kuwait, Yeosock established an

army task force, Task Force Freedom, under command of his deputy, Major General Bob Frix, using the mobile CP, "Lucky Wheels," as task

force headquarters. The mobile CP left King Khalid Military City almost immediately after the cessation of offensive actions and moved

to Kuwait City, first, to the international airport, then, to some

Kuwaiti administrative offices. Task Force Freedom was a command

and control element whose mission was to "ensure unity of effort in the

restoration and reconstruction of Kuwait and provide for the

transition of responsibility to the Secretary of the Army."3 For

Kuwaiti reconstruction, the Army secretary was to act as the

executive agent of the secretary of defense. The secretary formed a

special office, the U.S. Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, to

accomplish that effort under direction of Major General Patrick Kelly,

an Army engineer.

Task Force Freedom saw to the process of damage assessment,

provision of emergency services, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

(necessary to clear mines and booby traps), disposition of civil affairs

support, and contracting required to get the reconstruction effort on its

feet. Its mission was short-term-to provide emergency support only. The principal elements of the task force were the 352d Civil Affairs

Command,4 a forward element of the 22d Support Command, and

various specialist organizations: EOD detachments; military police; and medical, signal, and intelligence units. In occupied Iraq, VII and

XVIII Corps were responsible for the requisite civil affairs duties and

the destruction of war materiel left in place by the retreating Iraqi Army.5 Third Army was also responsible for the repatriation of Iraqi prisoners in U.S. hands. This was done through the Saudi military.

The United States ultimately transferred 20,989 Iraqi refugees to

the Saudis for long-term care and protection. Yeosock turned over the

mission in the demilitarized zone to the United Nations Command on 6

May and removed the last U.S. soldier from southeastern Iraq on 9

May. The redeployment was conducted as rapidly as possible by bringing heavy equipment to central maintenance areas, cleaning and

securing it, and turning it over to the 22d Support Command for

movement based upon availability of shipping. Personnel were

redeployed much faster by air, beginning on 10 March when Third

Army stood at a strength of 298,293 soldiers. On 8 June, ARCENT had
322

reached a state of 24,000 soldiers and dropped to 15,300 by 1 August, a

year from the start of the crisis.

Yeosock and his headquarters departed for Fort McPherson,

Georgia, on 12 May, after a somewhat longer absence than the general had expected when called by Schwarzkopf the previous August. A

residual American presence was retained for a time in Kuwait and

Saudi Arabia, principally to evacuate the American equipment and

guarantee the security of the emirate. Some additional air defense

units were deployed later to protect various Saudi sites when Iraq tried

to stonewall UN cease-fire monitors. A year later, no end had been

declared to Operation Desert Storm, and the naval and economic

isolation of Iraq continued.

The commanders of Desert Storm dispersed back to the Army. Schwarzkopf was welcomed back to Florida by Mickey Mouse and to

the United States by a joint session of Congress. He attended parades, signed a multimillion dollar book contract, retired, and went on the

high-dollar speaking circuit-seldom, it seems, feeling obliged to

recognize the assistance he may have received from his senior

assistants in obtaining his triumph. Lieutenant General Yeosock

returned to his duties as Deputy Commander in Chief, Forces

Command, and Commander, Third Army. He retired from the Army in

July 1992 and remained in the Atlanta area. Lieutenant General Gary Luck returned to Fort Bragg and continued as commander of XVIII

Airborne Corps. He was later promoted to full general and appointed U.S. commander in chief in Korea.

The VII Corps returned to Germany. The "Jay Hawk" corps was

deactivated in the spring of 1992 but not before Lieutenant General

Frederick Franks was given a fourth star and appointed Commander,

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. As TRADOC

commander, Franks paid particular attention to incorporating the

lessons of Desert Storm into Army doctrine and focusing attention on

what he called "battle command" and "battle space," the essential

tasks and horizons of tactical commanders.

Lieutenant General William ("Gus") Pagonis, who had received

his third star in theater in recognition of his accomplishments, remained in Saudi Arabia commanding ARCENT Forward. He

subsequently was appointed to command the 21st Support Command

in Europe. From there, he retired from the Army to direct logistic operations for Sears Roebuck, and Company. Lieutenant General

Calvin Waller, the deputy commander in chief, and Major General

Paul Schwartz, the chief of C3IC, both returned to Fort Lewis,
323

Washington, from whence they had been called to the Middle East,

Waller as I Corps commander, Schwartz as his deputy. Both retired

within the year.

Major Generals J. H. Binford Peay III, commander of the 101st

Airborne Division; Ron Griffith, commander of the 1st Armored

Division; and Barry McCaffrey, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, were promoted to lieutenant general, McCaffrey after an

additional year as commander of the 24th Division. Peay became

Army deputy chief of staff for operations and, then, after being promoted to full general, vice chief of staff of the Army. Griffith was

appointed the Army inspector general. McCaffrey was first the special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then J3

(operations), after which he, like Peay, received his fourth star and

was sent to Panama as Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

Major General Paul Funk, who had commanded the 3d Armored

Division, was posted to the Joint Staff for a year and then to the Armor

Center as commandant.

Major General Tom Rhame took his 1st Infantry Division back to

the United States. He soon quickly returned to Saudi Arabia to the

U.S. Military Training Mission. After a year, he was joined by his old

G3, Colonel Terry Bullington. Rhame was later promoted to lieutenant

general and assigned to the Department of Defense to administer

security assistance programs. The 1st Division's assistant division

commander, Brigadier General Bill Carter, was first given command

of the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin; after promotion

to major general, he succeeded to command of the 1st Armored

Division in Germany. Colonel Don Holder, commander of the 2d

Armored Cavalry Regiment in VII Corps, was promoted to brigadier general and posted to a NATO staff. He was later promoted to major general and command of the 3d Infantry Division. Major General

Johnnie Johnson, who commanded the first division deployed, the 82d

Airborne, was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of

First Army. Major General John Tilelli returned to Fort Hood, Texas,

with his 1st Cavalry Division and then became first assistant deputy chief of staff for operations at Department of the Army, then, as

lieutenant general, the deputy chief of staff of operations. Major General Pete Taylor, the multihatted chief of staff of Forces Command,

was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of III Corps at

Fort Hood. He was succeeded at III Corps by General Funk.

The Third Army headquarters returned almost immediately to its

prewar strength, notwithstanding the need to man a cell in General

Pagonis' Saudi establishment. Major General Frix remained as deputy
324

commander. Later, he was transferred to Sixth Army in the same role.

Major General Steve Arnold received a well-deserved appointment as

commander of the Army's 10th Mountain Division. In the next two

years, he would take his division to Miami, Florida, to provide

hurricane relief, and to Somalia to participate in the peace-keeping

operation, Restore Hope. In 1994, after a tour at Department of the

Army, Arnold assumed command of Third Army.

Brigadier General John Stewart was promoted to major general

and became deputy chief of staff for intelligence for U.S. Army,

Europe, and then commandant of the Intelligence School. Brigadier

General Jim Monroe, the stalwart ARCENT G4, finally was able to

take up the appointment at Tank Automotive Command in Detroit, to

which he had been on his way in August 1990. He, too, would be

promoted to major general, become deputy commander of Tank

Automotive Command, then, commandant of the Ordnance Center and

its school.

Within a year, Third Army would turn over almost all of its

"proprietary" colonels and lieutenant colonels. Most would retire.

Colonel Joe Purvis, who had headed Schwarzkopfs "Jedi Knights,"

returned to his assignment in Hawaii, no longer an anonymous

colonel. He retired within two years to build houses in Florida.

General Gordon Sullivan who, as vice chief of staff, was the

constant presence with the senior officers in Desert Storm, became

chief of staff of the Army following the retirement of General Carl

Vuono in the summer of 1991. Sullivan, whose daily phone calls to

Army general officers in the desert were frequent and always

encouraging, took as his task the maintenance of the service's core

values and purposes during a period of dramatic reduction. A deeply

sensitive and patriotic soldier, Sullivan sought during his tenure as

chief to infuse the nation's senior service with his optimism and sense

of the obligations of service in "America's Army."

General Crosbie Saint, the Army's premier tanker, had missed

the biggest armored war of his career and retired as commander in

chief of USAREUR in July 1992. Fate is not always kind.

Reflections on Desert Storm

Wars, particularly limited and coalition wars, are seldom entirely

satisfactory to any one participant. As a member of a coalition, a state

is not a free agent but must be willing to give way to the sensitivities of

its allies, not just for reasons of noblesse oblige but for pragmatic

considerations. In a coalition, one has goals of one's own, the
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accomplishment of which depend upon the cooperation of others whose

own purposes may be compatible but by no means identical. Limited

wars, in their turn, rarely make the enemy disappear, and though

some behavior or status may be changed, the underlying issues that

caused the war in the first place are generally submerged rather than

resolved by the outcome. Great battles and campaigns have a way of

being disappointing in their aftermath, hence little Peterkin's

question: "But what good came of it at last?" To which Robert Southey has Old Kaspar reply: "Why that I cannot tell.... But 'twas a famous

victory."6 This seems to be the current fate of the victory of Desert

Storm after the debris of the parades have been cleared up and the

thousands of citizen-soldiers who answered the nation's call in 1990

have returned to their workaday lives.

But one ought not to let defeat be torn from the jaws of victory simply because that victory took place in a world where success is

rarely complete or perfect. Desert Shield-Desert Storm was a famous

victory, and if, like the Battle of Blenheim of which Southey wrote, it

failed to return perpetual peace to the region in which it occurred, it is

difficult not to believe the world is better off because there was a rapid and effective response to Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait.

Desert Storm prevented Iraq's potential seizure of a

disproportionate amount of the developed world's oil supply. Also,

Saddam Hussein's Iraq does not stand at the brink of becoming a

nuclear power, and Iraq's sustained defiance in the face of continued

diplomatic and economic isolation surely vitiates any remaining faith

that military action could have been dispensed with. In short, the

region, if not the world, seems a safer place because Desert Storm was

successful.

Still, new and dangerous problems have replaced the old. These,

most sadly, have proved less susceptible to the Desert Storm solution.

At least one, that in Somalia, was in a single armed engagement about

as costly as the four-day Desert Storm ground offensive. The battle in

Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 produced two Congressional Medals of

Honor and ended in a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces. The experience in Somalia underlines a suspicion about the limited value of

conventional military forces in circumstances of civic collapse. The

case of North Korea has been no less resistant to the Desert Storm

solution. The world's last Stalinist regime has replaced Iraq as the

principal pathologically hostile power threatening the strategic balance in a region deemed vital to U.S. interests. But the risks

involved with miscalculation are greater than they were in the

Persian Gulf, and to date, the U.S. response has been measured to say
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the least. U.S. memories of the Korean War are not such as to

encourage hasty action in any event, Desert Storm notwithstanding.

One could draw any number of insights from the experience of the

Gulf War. Here, I shall offer those having to do with the structure of

war, the implications of technology, the significance of generalship,

and the apparent implications for concepts of war in whatever new

world order emerges. Many of these insights are based upon a

supposition, quite possibly to be proven wrong in the end, that the

"new world order" will not be an era of global superpowers but a global

system of regions. In some regions, there may be dominant but not

hegemonic powers, where, if local allies can be had, an external power

or an alliance capable of projecting military power may play a

balancing role to further or protect national interests. Without a new

ideological divide, such alliances will be ad hoc. Wars will seldom

involve the overthrow of a contending power, because the intervening

powers or alliances will seldom have the will to reorder the region once

the immediate problem is solved or to accept the consequences of

leaving a power vacuum that might be filled by an even worse

successor. If this set of assumptions is true, then Desert Shield-Desert

Storm will serve as a significant signpost. If, instead, a new cold war

emerges or if the United States is forced to become involved in

inchoate communal wars such as those in the Balkans, these lessons

will have no more utility than those of the Franco-Prussian War had

for the men of 1914.

The structure of war discussed in this book has involved

principally four levels of activity: (1) what B. H. Liddell Hart called

grand strategy; (2) what might be called theater strategy; (3)

operational art as defined in the Army's FM 100-5, Operations (1986);

and (4) J. F. C. Fuller's (or Jomini's) grand tactics. These levels

encompass the activities of the executive branch of government, the

theater commander, the component or army headquarters, and the

operations of the major ground maneuver forces, the corps. In the

actions of each, there are classic theoretical principles or concepts that

found reconfirmation in the world in 1990-91.

Perhaps no more complete success was achieved in the Persian

Gulf War than that in the field of grand strategy. Liddell Hart wrote

that the role of grand strategy is "to coordinate and direct all the

resources of a nation towards the attainment of the political object of

the war-the goal defined by national policy."7 It is grand strategy

that provides the context and sets the limits within which the military

must operate, and in this, President George Bush, Secretary of State

James Baker, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney proved
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themselves masters of their trade. It is hard to think of a war in which

diplomatic and military actions have been better harmonized. The

administration was able to simplify greatly the ambiguity within

which the soldier operated. It did so by isolating Iraq and branding it

as an outlaw state, by calling into existence a global and regional

alliance in which, nonetheless, there were only two dominant

members, and by achieving the mandate of the United Nations

without tying military actions to that body.

The president allocated more than sufficient means and provided

clear guidance as to what he wanted done militarily. It was he who

decided when military operations would begin and when they would

end, consistent with the requirements of policy, coalition politics, and

the safety of the forces involved. Ultimately, it was the balance

maintained between the military and diplomatic fields that ensured

the conditions at the end of the war would be significantly better than

those that might have obtained had it never been fought. That is the

true measure of acceptability for the decision to commit political

questions to resolution by the sword.

Within this general proposition, there are a number of

observations that might be made. First of all, there is the revalidation

of Clausewitz' critical distinction between real war and, for want of a

better term, "ideal" war. The Army had always tended to

underestimate the possibility of a land war in the Persian Gulf because

it was clear that major land forces could not be dispatched there in

time to stop an aggressor already on the spot. This reasoning was

sound. It took almost three months before the Army had a significant

force capable of undertaking sustained operations should they be

required. By then, Kuwait was lost, and indeed, in August 1990, the

operation, viewed in strictly military terms, seemed highly risky if

Saddam did have designs on Saudi oil fields.

But Clausewitz pointed out over a century ago that enemies were

not unknown to each other. "From the enemy's character, from his

intentions, the state of his affairs and his general situation, each side,

using the laws of probability, forms an estimate of its opponent's likely

course and acts accordingly."s In August 1990, the problem was no

longer abstract but practical, an estimate could be made, the risk

gauged, and action taken based upon that assessment. "When war is

no longer a theoretical affair, but a series of actions obeying its own

peculiar laws," wrote Clausewitz, "reality supplies the data from

which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead."9
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Saddam, driven by economic, historical, and geographical

imperatives, likely set out merely to seize a province. 10 Whatever his

intentions, which were only subject to informed supposition or

judgment, he then posed a threat to global economics, the regional balance of power, and the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. There

was risk in the short term for President Bush if he intervened, but its

dimensions were knowable or at least calculable. Similarly, there were

risks for Saddam Hussein in the long run, and his loss, no less than the

American president's success, reminds us that in any probability of

success, there is a possibility of failure. To rephrase Bernard Brodie

only slightly, nations do not go to war because they think war is safe.

They go to war because they think they will win. In this, they are often

mistaken.ll

The second grand strategic observation one might make of the

Persian Gulf War lies in the recognition by the Bush administration

that there are significant limits on the utility of a state's military

power as a means to resolve international problems, even when one is

the world's only remaining superpower. Unmatched military might is

not useful if it cannot be brought to bear and if its use is deemed to be

illegitimate by the rest of the world. In short, a sole superpower has an

inherent obligation not to bring against itself the combined opposition

of the rest of the world, rather as democratic Athens did in the

Peloponnesian War.12

The willing participation of Saudi Arabia in any U.S. military actions was absolutely essential to the achievement of U.S. goals. First

of all, Saudi Arabia provided the base from which a land and aerial

attack could be launched. Second, and no less vital, the participation of

the Saudi king, with his religious as well as political stature in the

Arab world, went far, indeed, toward legitimizing the U.S. coalition

efforts against a major leader in the Arab world. One need only look at

the position in which the king of Jordan found himself, with the

support for Saddam in his streets, to recognize the importance of this

Saudi contribution and of the concomitant obligation of U.S. forces not

to take any action that would rebound on their hosts, either by exceeding the UN mandate or remaining in the peninsula beyond their

welcome.

These were matters of high policy in which Schwarzkopf, as well

as the Third Army commander, found themselves involved

continuously. Even the commander of the 7th U.K. Armored Brigade,

the first British commitment to Desert Shield, wrote of his own

diplomatic burden upon arriving in the peninsula.13 Judgments about

the decision to end the war when the president did, to stop military
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action short of requiring the removal of Saddam Hussein, to

accommodate Saudi cultural norms, and to depart rapidly without

complaint can be made only in light of these limits. The lesson for the

future is that even sole superpowers cannot have things their own way

in a world they can influence but not dominate. Saudi Arabia is still a

long way from the port of Savannah.

An effective U.S. theater strategy was indispensable in the Gulf

War. By theater strategy is meant the purposeful integration of

military resources in the theater of war to achieve the military

objectives set by the president and his secretary of defense. This

integration is achieved largely by concept, structure, and process:

concept in providing a clear design for the combined actions of the

forces deployed; structure by establishment of a command and control

organization capable of achieving the concept; and process in

development of a common plan for all forces to serve as the basis of all

subsequent actions. In this, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf gets very

high marks indeed.

As commander in chief, Schwarzkopf had two essential tasks, one

political, one military. The political task was to create, where none

existed, a reasonably effective military coalition, first to defend Saudi

Arabia, then to free Kuwait. His military task as U.S. unified

commander was to harmonize the activities of U.S. forces in such a

way that each contributed its own unique form of power to a

synergistic whole. He also had to develop a unified plan of operations

and see to a reasonably harmonious execution of that plan to achieve

the assigned military objectives at the least cost to the American

people. It is clear that Schwarzkopf succeeded in both roles. While he

was aided greatly by his component commanders, each in their own

sphere, there is no question that it was the CINC himself upon whom

the greatest burden for allied and joint service cooperation ultimately

fell. Given his normal lack of patience, the coalition task, carried out

over many months of intense pressure, clearly called for expenditure of

vast reserves of self-discipline that seem never to have failed him

when dealing with allies.

The theater strategy varied as the mission evolved. Initially, U.S.

military action consisted of a naval blockade to isolate Iraq from

external support by sea, with overland commerce also closed off by the

diplomatic encirclement achieved through the United NationsJordan excepted. To back up this blockade and to increase pressure on

Iraq to depart Kuwait voluntarily, air and ground forces were sent to

Saudi Arabia, lest the desert kingdom's role as a principal coalition

member provoke Iraq into extending its offensive farther south. The
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dynamic process of introducing various types of U.S. forces in the force

deployment process was the practical manifestation of this part of

theater strategy. What often looked at the corps level as interference

in their deployment was, in fact, Schwarzkopf and his component

commanders manipulating the deployment flow as they became aware

of new requirements or local capabilities that permitted substitution of

one capability for another.

As part of the deterrent strategy in the peninsula, Schwarzkopf

quickly built up an unanswerable offensive air plan that required change only in scale and detail once an air-ground offensive option was

developed to free Kuwait. For the defensive phase of the Gulf War

(Desert Shield), a defensive ground force was constructed and placed into positions behind the Gulf Cooperation Council forces already facing the Iraqis. Required to develop an offensive strategy to free

Kuwait, Schwarzkopf was able to build on his original air concept to

add an offensive ground component and to harmonize the two while

the naval blockade continued. The CINC's ability to rise above his own

service biases and to adopt a theater offensive plan centered on an

aerial campaign of attrition-upon which ground operations were

contingent and to which they were clearly secondary-indicates a

technical grasp of the military art.

The organization of the command by departmental components,

instead of creating a unified or joint ground component command

comparable to the joint air component, does not appear to have had a

significant effect on the outcome. It was unlikely that a single unified

high command was politically desirable, given very legitimate Saudi

sensitivities. In that case, forming a joint task force headquarters to

provide a single ground component for U.S. land forces (over Army and

Marine Corps elements), separated by the Joint Forces Command

North into two simultaneous but largely distinct operations, does not

seem likely to have added much but an additional senior headquarters

between the CINC and his troops.

Schwarzkopf is said by General Waller, his deputy, to have

referred to him (Waller) as his "Bradley," and Waller speaks of his role

as ground component commander as deputy commander in chief.14

The analogy is both historically and organizationally inapt. In North

Africa, Bradley went forward to be Eisenhower's eyes and ears and

was quickly coopted by Patton. In France, Bradley was a major

subordinate commander, and Eisenhower, like Schwarzkopf, was

ground component commander with other components and Allied

forces subordinated to his command. Schwarzkopf was ground

component commander by default and that seems to have been no
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more inappropriate in his case than it was in Eisenhower's.

Schwarzkopf was already unable to exercise close executive

supervision over forces in the field through his unified headquartersand unable by temperament to leave execution entirely to his senior

subordinates. The utility of another organizational model is

questionable under the circumstances as they obtained in Saudi

Arabia, though some second order adjustments, such as an earlier

appointment of a joint targeting board under the deputy CINC to assist

the CINC in coordinating air and ground offensives, might have been

useful.

The process of conducting theater strategy consists of the

practical combination of immediate decisions and long-term campaign

planning, both carried out over time, which gives shape and substance

to the theater commander's strategic concepts. Because of the lack of

technical depth in a joint headquarters, the planning process became

centered in the components very early on. Viewed in the large, the

entire process evolved very much as JCS Publication 1, Joint Warfare

of the U.S. Armed Forces, anticipates: "Campaign planning is done in

crisis or conflict (once the actual threat, national guidance, and

available resources become evident), but the basis and framework for

successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning and

exercises." 15

Internal Look was the culmination of peacetime analysis,

planning, and exercise. Desert Shield was an initial response to one

set of practical circumstances and missions that built upon Internal

Look. Desert Storm was another response to yet another set of

circumstances and missions, which, in turn, built upon Desert Shield.

At the end of the day, the coalition high command had integrated the

forces of a very disparate set of allies into a potent, indeed, irresistible

offensive force.

Planning for the final offensive was a multimonth, multiechelon,

iterative process-not a series of events where a higher plan was

received, and then the next lower plan written, and so on down to the

lowest platoon. Indeed, such a process would have been unrealistic

given the need to balance and rebalance the desirable against the

possible. That the best way to attack the Iraqi array was through the

Iraqi desert was obvious. The real issue was to figure out how far west

forces could go and how they were going to get there, as well as how

that movement was to relate to the air operations upon which any

ground offensive was seen to be dependent. The planning process was

punctuated by a series of events, guidance given, planning sessions,

discussions, and back-briefings in which the entire command structure
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worked out their understanding of Schwarzkopfs concept, then filled

in the details appropriate to each level.

From theater strategy, one descends in planning to operational

art. Operational art is "the employment of military forces to attain

strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the

design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."16 The last major action of the CINC in the realm of

theater strategy was the assignment of theater objectives, the

identification of decisive objectives, and their assignment to

components. Campaign planning then consisted of working out the

ways and means for the accomplishment of these objectives.

In campaign planning, it is not the final document that is

important. It is the process itself that matters. In the television

program, Gwynne Dwyer's War: A Commentary, prepared by the

National Film Board of Canada, Israeli General Dan Lanner

responded to a question from Dwyer in this way:

"Well, in my opinion, a battle never works. It never works according to

plan.... the plan is only a common base for changes. Everybody should

know the plan so you can change easily. But the moder battle is very fluid

and you have to make your decisions very fast and mostly not according to

the original plan."

"But," Dwyer replied, "at least everybody knows where you're coming from."

"And," Lanner shot back, "where you're going to, more or less." 17

It is this idea of a plan as a point of reference rather than a

blueprint for execution that is often lost sight of in the training of

American officers-this, and the idea of planning as a process rather

than an event. In Desert Storm it was both. The joint and component

plans for Desert Storm were published at about the same time.

The great lesson of the operational art for Desert Storm has

nothing to do with the metaphysics of selecting "centers of gravity"-

so popular a concept with graduates of the School of Advanced Military

Studies-nor with the insight that it was better for ground forces to go around than through the Iraqi array, which was obvious (although, in

the event, the Air Force may have rendered the distinction moot).

Rather, it is in the extent to which logistics dominates the operational

offensive. The U.S. Army has been spared this inconvenience by forty

years of sitting on the inter-German border. J. F. C. Fuller had pointed

out this reality in his biography of U.S. Grant, written in the 1930s.

According to Fuller, Grant "realized that as tactics are based on
333

strategy, in its turn strategy is based on administration; that is, if

action depends on movement, movement depends on supply."18

The issue for the operational commanders was never whether to

go around. The question was to determine how far one could go around

with sizable forces dependent on a sea of fuel and a mountain of

supplies to sustain any type of offensive. The operational artist was not

the philosopher of war who recognized what needed to be done; he was

the technician of war who knew how to do it with what was available.

In the end, the theater campaign design did produce the disruption of

the enemy land force before the launching of the ground attack, but it

did so principally by attrition from the air, not maneuver on the

ground-though the flank attack by VII Corps certainly added to the

dislocation of the enemy. Like Schlieffen's great plan, the ground attack was "a rolling offensive once begun, a series of loosely related

but independent battles" that, in their aggregate, destroyed the Iraqi Army in the KTO.19

The most serious breakdown in the smooth functioning of the

chain of command occurred between the theater commander and one of

his tactical subordinates, that is, between General Schwarzkopf and

Lieutenant General Franks. As General Bernard Trainor has pointed

out most perceptively, 20 Franks, the tactical commander, was fully involved in the conduct of an approach to contact at a time when the

theater commander began to demand a pursuit. Operational demand

and tactical reality were at odds. Franks was on the battlefield. He was

absorbed in the messy business of combat, which was accompanied as

always by confusion, incomplete information, danger, and abysmal weather. Schwarzkopf could watch hundreds of enemy vehicles fleeing north in real time, as though on a TV screen, and talk to the Pentagon

as if it were around the corer. It was Yeosock's task, however, at

Third Army to reconcile the conflicting views, either to get Franks to

move faster or to explain tactical realities to the CINC. (And, finally, Yeosock could have pointed out that, in the joint air component, Schwarzkopf had a splendid tool for interdicting the enemy's withdrawal.)

Yeosock might have prevailed upon Franks to accept the risk of

keeping the two armored divisions and armored cavalry regiment in

motion the night of 24-25 February, although it is unlikely that the

speed of the 1st Division's breaching operation and the subsequent 1st

U.K.'s passage of lines could have been increased materially. That

might have brought the 1st Armored Division to Al Busayyah in time

to take the town in daylight, thus obviating the need for the second

pause. If it did not, Yeosock might have insisted that the division carry
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the town in the dark. That, almost certainly, would have risked more

casualties from friendly fire and might not have saved any time since

forces making dismounted night attacks ordinarily require a good bit

of reorganization when daylight comes. The division could have

continued the advance a brigade short, of course, but that would have

hurt it when it met the Republican Guard soon after. The first action

would have entailed a risk that was more uncertain the night of the

24th than it is today, and the latter might have produced no gain at all.

Yeosock did none of these things. Indeed, his concept of command

and his relationship with Schwarzkopf had much to do with his

actions. Yeosock was unlikely to second-guess the tactical commander

on the ground. His whole understanding of operational command was

evident in his phrase about "unencumbering" the corps commanders.

Schwarzkopfs rages, which Yeosock took for granted as irrational

rather than specific, were simply one more distraction from which he

could "unencumber" General Franks. That he did not convince the

CINC that his intentions were being implemented as rapidly as

possible does not seem to have been clear to Yeosock until the morning

of the 26th. Rather, he seems throughout to have been confident that,

in the end, it was all going to work itself out. Implicit in all this was a

difference of view about how many lives this marginal gain was worth.

Yeosock's Moltkean approach to operational command and his

dependence on his corps commanders also contributed to the gap that

developed between the 24th Division and the eastward movement of

the VII Corps. In retrospect, Yeosock might have intervened to get

General Luck to swing the 24th Infantry Division eastward earlier.

Instead of allowing the "Victory" Division brigades to run up and down

airfields, he might have prevailed upon the XVIII Corps commander to

advance the division attack east on Highway 8 by as much as twelve

hours. Whether the logistics system (particularly fuel resupply) could

have responded had that been ordered, remains to be proven. In any

event, Luck seems to have been as disinterested in stopping General

McCaffrey's moment of high theater as was Yeosock. It was difficult at

the time not to see the airfield attacks as highly productive.

It cannot be disputed, however, that there was a breakdown

between perceived operational imperatives and tactical realities. It is

equally indisputable that it was Yeosock's place to mediate between

the two. This was a human as well as a technical problem, and it is at

least clear that the human part was unsuccessful, whatever the

technical choices of the moment.
335

The major criticism of the conduct of the campaign, in retrospect,

has a great deal to do with aesthetics and little to do with practical

matters. One senior officer at Third Army put the matter this way: "It

was my only chance to take part in a battle of Cannae and we failed to

bring it off."21 What he referred to was the failure to close the

encirclement outside of Basrah because of the cessation of offensive

operations the morning of 28 February. The details of this question

have already been examined. It is appropriate here to add only two

additional observations. The first is that even Cannae was not so

perfect a victory as mythology would indicate.22 More to the point,

Cannae did not end the Punic War. In the end, Hannibal and Carthage

were defeated.

Kuwait is free. The Iraqis in the Basrah pocket were allowed to go

by default, or on purpose, not through any efforts of their own but

because the coalition's goals were deemed to have been achieved. To

decide, after the fact, that this "release" was a mistake is interesting,

but not particularly practical, given that the efficiency of the operation

can only be judged correctly in light of the goals and knowledge of

circumstances that existed at the time. To close the pocket on the

ground would have required that the 24th Infantry Division move

even faster than it did, not likely given that it was commanded by a

driven man to begin with (and that Basrah was far from the line of

departure). It would have required also a willingness to accept the

casualties likely to result if infantry were put into Basrah. Landing an

air assault brigade in AO Thomas also looks good in retrospect, but at

the time, it involved a good bit of risk because of uncommitted and

escaping Iraqi forces. Finally, it is hard to envision a defeat more

nearly total than that imposed south of the Euphrates. Such yearning

after the perfect is simply moonshine!

That is not to say that the execution of the campaign might not

have been done with more speed and more aggressiveness, and that

gets to the heart of the conflict between Schwarzkopf and his Army

commanders. This, in turn, involves what Jomini and Fuller refer to as

grand tactics, essentially the employment of large forces on the

battlefield.23

The VII Corps' attack was, by design, deliberate and cautious

during its first two days, clearly designed for evading risk of any early

disorganization while the corps won maneuver room. The cost of that

care was obviously paid in time. The reason for this has to do with the

state of mind of the Army commanders themselves. To a man, they

expected high casualties from the ground operation. They had been

assured of as much by various simulations and pundits since August
336

1990, and disposed to believe computer printouts, they prepared

accordingly. Only Schwarzkopf seems to have anticipated the

disorganizing effect of massive attrition and technological overmatch,

and he too showed caution at the outset and later retained for too long

a theater reserve of two heavy brigades and worried about the huge

24th Infantry Division getting out on a limb on the Euphrates. The

Army needs to reconsider the credibility of simulations that depend

principally on Mr. Lanchester's equations and neglect the moral

factors of war, even though they are far less predictable.

Far more worrying is the idea that has taken hold in the late

twentieth century that one can make war without suffering losses

from enemy action or fratricide. There can be no question that concern

for fratricide constituted a major operational obstacle-slowing the

operations in the breach, delaying the attack on Objective Purple, and

stopping the renewed VII Corps attack entirely the morning of the

28th. Congressman Les Aspin's Committee on Armed Services

reported after the war that, "In planning Operation Desert Storm,

minimizing allied and civilian casualties was the highest priority

[emphasis added]."24

While minimizing casualties is certainly an important human

concern, it can produce a terrible inhibiting effect when it becomes the

most important consideration. As British historian Cyril Falls

observes, "It is remarkable how many people exert themselves and go

through contortions to prove that battles and wars are won by any

means except that by which they are most commonly won, which is by

fighting."25 Fighting inevitably carries with it loss of life and limb,

and American commanders seemed extraordinarily sensitive to that

fact.

Napoleon wrote that the "first object which a general who gives

battle should consider is the glory and honor of his arms; the safety

and conservation of his men is but secondary; but it is also true that in

audacity and obstinacy will be found the safety and conservation of his

men."26 But, of course, Napoleon ruined his army and his state and

ended on a distant island. Sir Michael Howard, in the midst of the Gulf

coalition's air campaign, warned that

However skillful may be American statesmanship, however successful the

allied armed forces in the field, if American public opinion is so horrified by

the sight of slaughter that it ceases to be supportive of the whole enterprise,

Saddam Hussein might still not lose the war. In this, as in so much else, the

Clausewitzian analysis remains starkly relevant.27
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In the Gulf War, this unwillingness to recognize the connection

between risk and battle losses probably had little practical effect on an

outcome that was, in retrospect, fairly certain. Yet it is an

unwillingness deeply ingrained in our Army and trained by peacetime

safety measures (valid in their own context) and no doubt by the

memory among many officers of the effect of Walter Cronkite's weekly

loss reports during the war in Vietnam. The fear this concern raises

remains as a significant American weakness, and this fact must not be

overlooked in the satisfaction with the results of this war. An

imperative for low losses is a very weak reed upon which to build a

combat doctrine, as weak perhaps as a total disregard for casualties.

George Patton wrote to his son in August 1944, "I have used one

principle in these operations . . . and that is to-'fill the unforgiving

minute with sixty seconds worth of distance run.' That is the whole art

of war, and when you get to be a general, remember it!"28 This is a

much different approach from being "ahead of schedule and under

budget." But Patton was fighting a total war (and not the first battle)

and enjoyed strong public backing and involvement. Desert Storm, as

Sir Michael seems to warn, for all its vocal public support, lacked-or

was perceived to lack-that depth of public feeling necessary to bear

heavy losses. Rightly or wrongly, the ground attack of Operation

Desert Storm reflected more Montgomery-like concern for a tidy

battlefield and balanced attack than pursuit of the "unforgiving

minute." A major cause of the friction between the CINC and his field

commanders was his greater willingness to risk a higher butcher's bill

for greater speed in attack. Such judgments are highly subjective,

largely individual, and very contingent in their effect. (Section 28 of

the first chapter of Book I of Clausewitz' On War, with its reference to

a "remarkable trinity," remains a good theoretical guide in relation to

this problem. It provides, however, no easy answers.)29

Schwarzkopf's postwar obloquy of Franks was highly

overstated.30 Franks' mission may have been destruction of the

Republican Guard, but Yeosock and Waller, with the CINC's

knowledge and implicit approval, kept VII Corps within boundaries

that limited its mission to "destruction in zone." If any Republican

Guard troops in that zone escaped destruction, they did so by moving

out of it, something it is not at all clear Franks could have influenced

given his inability to affect deep-air interdiction. The partial escape of

the Hammurabi Division would seem to be the responsibility of Third

Army, which controlled the entire Army zone, and the CINC himself,

since Schwarzkopf reserved responsibility for integration of the Army

and joint Air Force components. Moreover, the escape of the greater
338

part of Iraqi heavy forces from the Basrah pocket occurred either in the

face of J-STARS observation and Air Force interdiction beyond the fire

support coordination line or after the truce talks with the Iraqis on 2

March, in which Schwarzkopf played a far more active role than the

commanders of Third Army or VII Corps. Both of the above were a

theater responsibility (Schwarzkopfs). Bridges out of Basrah, not road

junctions at Safwan, were the route to a safe haven.

Two years after the Gulf War. in a talk at Fort Leavenworth,

Franks listed the principles he believes should govern a commander in

battle: getting the entire organization in the fight, maintaining a

"balanced stance," dealing face-to-face with subordinates, paying

attention to logistics, and reinforcing success. 31 (See figure 35.) These

same principles guided the actions of VII Corps during Operation

Desert Storm.

There is certainly a lesson from this war about technology, and it

is that a clear technological advantage is a very nice thing to have.

One U.S. division commander has observed that "we could have beat

them with their equipment," and perhaps he is correct. The fact is, the

U.S. military did not have to, and the war, no doubt, has given many

the idea that technology is the answer to everything. Indeed, a

dangerous consequence of the war may be that it seems to have

reversed Michael Howard's contention that "technology may have

made war more terrible, or any rate, more terrible for more people, but

it has for this very reason made it less attractive and less likely .. ."32

It was, of course, the very one-sided nature of the technologies in

question that made this difference. Looked at from the other side, it

has since become clear that the "surgical air strikes" in Baghdad were

surgical only if one's standard is a comparison to the effect of the

ordnance dropped by a flight of B-17s over Germany in World War II.

As George Ball observed before the air war, ". .. if the medical

profession adopted the standards of the Air Force, any patient seeking

an appendectomy might well have his heart and brain removed, while

his appendix remained intact." 33 At least, with precision munitions,

the patient's appendix would now be gone, too. The New York Review

of Books quotes one postwar survey: "Baghdad, . . . where some four

million people lived, is a city essentially unmarked, a body with its

skin basically intact, with every main bone broken and with its joints

and tendons cut .... The health system is collapsing. There are no

phones and no electricity and no petrol and only a people reduced to

daily improvisations and scroungings." 34
Figure 35.

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A United Nations' report of 22 March 1991 states that "The recent

conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the infrastructure

of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and

mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have

been destroyed or rendered tenuous."35 In short, war is still war, and

technological advantage looks to cheapen war only for the side that

has it.

The extraordinarily low casualty figures for attacking American

ground forces were also the result of an advantage purchased by

sustained investment in technology and training-an investment that

seems to have been a wise one. A ground war today, without that

advantage, could be something different, indeed-especially if the

enemy's materiel was on a par with our own.

Generalship was also a significant facet of the Gulf War. As

Napoleon said:

The personality of the general is indispensable; he is the head, he is the all,

of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions, but by

Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to

tremble, but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which

penetrated to India, but Alexander. It was not the French Army which

reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended

'for seven years against the three most formidable European Powers by the

Prussian soldiers, but by Frederick the Great.36

Undoubtedly the theater of war in the Arabian Peninsula was

dominated by the personality of General Schwarzkopf. No act taken

had meaning except in reference to his mercurial and unforgiving

personality. But the habit of killing messengers has a cost. Messengers

stop telling the king what he ought to hear. The unwillingness of

senior Army commanders to question the sending of the 24th Division

away from the main attack is but one example. The lack of a common

view between the Third Army commanders and the CINC on the likely

enemy resistance, along with the need for haste in exploitation, are

others.

To a great extent, communication had broken down because of

Schwarzkopf s arbitrary treatment of those he relied upon to act as an

extension of his will. The high command of Desert Storm was no

Nelsonian band of brothers who could be advised only that "no man

will do too far wrong who lays his ship beside that of the enemy" and

then be left to execute the commander in chiefs plan.

Schwarzkopfs great shortcoming was his inability to take an

elevated view of the battlefield, to recognize and accept the presence of
341

friction in execution and "noise" in the information system.37

Increasingly behind events, he could neither influence nor understand

the limitations on the maneuver of massive armored forces in the field.

Nor was he willing to leave the tactical execution to the man on the

spot, who was capable of seeing and feeling the forces present in the

iron fist of VII Corps. "Iron will power," Clausewitz says, "can

overcome this friction; it pulverizes every obstacle, but of course it

wears down the machine as well."38

The net effect of the theater commander's personality on the force

he commanded was largely negative. General Waller's position was,

therefore, essential, precisely because he was not afraid of the CINC,

and he was willing to be the messenger. Because Waller was

approachable, he also became the mediator between Schwarzkopf and

his subordinates. But then, while critiquing Schwarzkopfs method,

one must remember that, to paraphrase the other "great helmsman,"

war is not a tea party.

General officers, and Schwarzkopf had a handful of them, are

powerful men who have risen in a competitive bureaucracy, seldom

entirely by selfless service. Many are not unaccustomed, when their

proposals are not accepted, to going around their boss to sponsors in

their service departments. If Schwarzkopf was to be master in his own

house, he needed to preserve a certain distance. Eisenhower, after all,

did not have to maintain his position in an environment where every

division commander (no less countless staff officers) could telephone

friends in the Pentagon or around the Army daily, or where other

commanders in chief with good ideas could simply pick up the phone

and call "to help out." There was a good deal of networking, not always

to the detriment of the effort, for it meant that the collective minds of

an institution were brought to bear in a way not heretofore possible. At

the same time, for all the mutual kind words immediately after the

war, Schwarzkopf was the recipient of a good deal more "help" from the

national security adviser and the chairman of the JCS-or those who

claimed to speak in their names-than he might have wished.39 Still,

one must note the difference between Schwarzkopfs treatment of his

subordinates and the way Eisenhower and Marshall treated Bradley

after the miscalculation of the Ardennes. The contrast is especially

significant given Schwarzkopfs own definition of character.

Army generals in Southwest Asia stand out by virtue of their

executive abilities, their determination to succeed with the resources

made available to them, and their ability to find expedients to get
342

around shortfalls and difficulties. They were not all gentlemen, but

they were all determined and effective.

Operation Desert Storm was a transitional war in which forces

raised and trained to fight on the Central Front in Europe against a

great power were, instead, deployed to the open desert to fight a local

tyrant with more technology than he knew how to use. What does this

war have to say to the Army of the twenty-first century?

First of all, it suggests that operational command and control is

not analogous to tactical command and control. This conclusion was at

the core of Yeosock's frequent observations that nine echelons

separated him and the fighting platoons. Indeed, his whole method of

command was a matter of"direction" rather than control. It is because

of the distance from the fighting line and the difficulty of getting precise and accurate information that operational command requires

more anticipation. Fewer decisions are better. Planning horizons are

more distant. At the same time, it is clear that the means exist today for jumping the chain of command in order to obtain information

needed immediately to exploit an opportunity rapidly. The Army, however, has not figured out how best to utilize this means while

respecting the chain of command necessary for articulated operation. It is also clear that even with clear transmission of words across the

ether, miscommunication can and will still take place between the

operators of two telephone handsets.

Strategically, Desert Shield showed the importance to the United

States of air and maritime superiority and the ability to exploit them.

Without air and maritime superiority, the Army would not have

gotten to the war. Because of the shortage of roll-on, roll-off ships, the

deployment of armored forces took longer than the distance alone

warranted.

At the theater-strategic level, at least in the desert, air forces

have become the arm of rapid maneuver and deep attack, armies the

fixing force. However, if air power proved vital, indeed decisive, in this

war-operationally and tactically-the enemy was not defeated until

his depleted army was destroyed by men on the ground and until air

power was provided with exposed ground targets by its terrestrial

"beaters." Massive air power was necessary, even critical to success. It

was not sufficient alone.

Aside from the positive (offensive) contribution of air supremacy, ARCENT could not have made war in the way that it did without it.

The concentrations of armored formations and the vast accumulations

of fuel, parts, and ammunition required to project a force into the
343

enemy depths, represent a significant vulnerability if they cannot be

protected from enemy attack from the air. All the talk about nonlinear

warfare, war with discontinuous fronts, does not affect the simple fact

that mechanized armies rely more than ever on materiel to stay in the

field, and an armored Army must be based, and to a great extent

tethered somewhere. It cannot operate like a fleet at sea.

Desert Storm showed that a different kind of Army is required for

operational offensives from that required for forward defense in

Europe. Operational warfare is made with wheeled vehicles, and the

U.S. Army simply did not have enough of them, at least in theater.

Desert Storm also showed that in mechanized warfare, the large

manpower-intensive army has not gone away, it has simply moved its

personnel from the battle line into shops and dumps and into

specialties that make the machines more effective. Finally, the Gulf

War demonstrated again that prewar investment in people, training,

and good equipment pays off in blood saved on the battlefield.

Finally, this war was marked by three important, even decisive,

conditions that may not repeat themselves in future contingencies.

First, this part of the Persian Gulf was well endowed with exactly the

sort of infrastructure that could compensate for the allies' own

shortcomings in the strategic projection of heavy forces. In this regard,

at least, Saudi Arabia was a "mature" theater of operations. Second,

the global balance was such that there were no other strategic

distractions; the theater of operations could enjoy the full support of

the entire American military. Finally, as Count Alfred von Schlieffen

wrote in his classic Cannae, "A complete battle of Cannae is rarely met

in history. For its achievement, a Hannibal is needed on one side, and

a Terrentius Varro, on the other, both cooperating for the attainment

of the great objective." Whether or not there was a Hannibal on the

allied side, there was certainly a Terrentius Varro in Baghdad.40

PBIEIBBIP·.slri·--o---c--·- L-p -·-·--
I
Notes

1. "Transcript of President Bush's Address on End of the Gulf War," The New York

Times, 7 March 1991, A8.

2. HQ, ARCENT, Command Briefing Operation Desert Storm, dated 15 August 1991,

slide titled, "Military Objectives."

3. Ibid. Slides titled, "Task Force Freedom" and "TF Freedom Mission."

4. HQ, 352d Civil Affairs Command, AFKA-ACDM-CG, Memorandum for

COMUSARCENT, Subject: Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) AfterAction Report (AAR), Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The report is an excellent

overview of civil affairs problems from the standpoint of the civil affairs specialists.

A slightly different point of view is in HQ, ARCENT, G3 (AFRD-DTP),

Memorandum for USARCENT Historian, Colonel Swain, Subject: HQ USARCENT

G3 Plans, Historical Narrative of Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Defense and

Restoration of Kuwait, and Redeployment.

5. Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Post CeaseFire Operations," Military Review 72 (June 1992): 2-19.

6. Robert Southey, "The Battle of Blenheim," in The Oxford Book of War Poetry, ed.

Jon Stallworthy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.

7. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Decisive Wars of History (London: G. Bell & Son, Ltd., 1929),

150-51. This is the operative consequence of Clausewitz' observation that "war itself

does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.

In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs." Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605. Similarly, Raymond Aron wrote: "The

distinction between diplomacy and [military] strategy is an entirely relative one. These two terms are complementary aspects of the single act of policy-the act of

conducting relations with other states so as to further the 'national interests.' " Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard

Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 24.

8. Clausewitz, On War, 80.

9. Ibid.

10. Saddam's behavior seems to indicate as much, particularly his involvement in

Kuwait City, which delayed any move farther south had that been his intention.

Some have called this an error on his part. It is, of course, an error only if he

intended to move south. The stockage of great quantities of materiel in southeast

Iraq does not indicate intention either. Military men, in general, overensure when

they can. U.S. forces set a sixty-day stockage level for munitions for a war they

expected to last no more than two weeks.

11. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1965), 224.

345
346

12. Aron, Peace and War, 25; and Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex

Warner (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972), 49.

13. Brigadier P. A. J. Cordingley, '"The Gulf War: Operating with Allies," Journal of the

Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 137, no. 2 (April 1992): 18.

14. Interview with Lieutenant General Calvin Waller by Brigadier General Timothy

Grogan at Fort Lewis, Washington, 2 May 1991, 126-27.

15. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 11 November 1991, 46.

16. FM 100-5, Operations, May 1986, 10.

17. In Gwynne Dwyer, War: A Commentary by Gwynne Dwyer, Episode 1, "The Road to

Total War," National Film Board of Canada, 1985.

18. J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1977), 214.

19. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (New York: Bing

Publishing, 1991), 242. Quotation refers, of course, to Schlieffen's ideas, not the Gulf

War.

20. Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, "Schwarzkopf

and His Generals," in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 20, no. 6 (June 1994): 47.

21. To the author.

22. Livy, The War with Hannibal, Book XXI-XXX of The History of Rome From Its

Foundation, trans. Aubrey De Selincourt (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin

Books, 1965), 149; and Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. Ian ScottKilvert (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979), 274.

23. Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Captain G. H. Mendell and Lieutenant W. P.

Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862-Greenwood Press reprint,

n.d.), 62; and J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London:

Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1925), 107. Liddell Hart attributes the term to Guibert in

The Ghost of Napoleon (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1933), 81.

24. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C., 30

March 1992, Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf, 88-89.

25. Cyril Falls, quoted in T. Harry Williams, '"he Military Leadership of North and

South," in Why the North Won the Civil War, ed. David Donald (New York: Collier

Books, 1960), 34.

26. Napoleon, Maxim No. XV, in The Military Maxims of Napoleon, trans. Lieutenant

General Sir George C. D. Auguilar (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987).

27. Sir Michael Howard, "Clausewitz: Man of the Year," The New York Times, 28

January 1991, A23.

28. Letter George S. Patton, Jr., to son George, 21 August 1944, ed. Martin Blumenson,

The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 523.
347

29. Section 28 addresses Clausewitz' "remarkable trinity."

30. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 383,433,455-56,461-63,475-76.

31. Slide in possession of author.

32. Michael Howard, "War and Technology," Journal of the Royal United Services

Institute for Defence Studies 132 (December 1987): 21.

33. George W. Ball, "The Gulf Crisis," The New York Review of Books (6 December

1990): 12.

34. Richard Reed of UN Children's Fund, quoted by Samir al-Khahl, "Iraq and Its

Future," The New York Review of Books 38, no. 7 (11 April 1991): 10.

35. "Excerpts from U.N. Report on Need for Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq," The

New York Times, 23 March 1991, A5.

36. Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War, 127.

37. See Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,"

International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992-93): 59-90.

38. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 119.

39. Schwarzkopf, Doesn't Take a Hero, 315, 321-28, 326-27, 359-62, 368, 386-87, 418,

440-45. See comment by de la Billiere, Storm Command, 103.

40. General Field Marshal, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Cannae (Fort Leavenworth,

KS: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1936), 238. The final conclusions are repeated from the operational narrative the author prepared for the commander,

ARCENT, in July 1991. At this writing, the author continues to believe they are

appropriate.

-1 - I - -LI-- - I -I
I

I
Appendix A

Command and Control, ARCENT, February 1991

349
350

Appendix B

Task Organization, Operation Desert Shield,

5 March 1991

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Warfighting Command and Control,

XVIII Airborne Corps
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Appendix D

The XVIII Airborne Corps' Task Organization,

5 March 1991

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The VII Corps' Task Organization, 5 March 1991

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Current Combat Capability, 24 February 1991

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Appendix H

Chronology

16Jul90 ARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (draft) (Defense of Saudi

Arabia) published

2 Aug 90 Iraq invades Kuwait (0140Z)

UN Security Council Resolution 660 condemns

invasion and calls for withdrawal of Iraqi troops

United States imposes an embargo on Iraq, deploys

USAF tanker squadrons, moves USS Independence

battle group toward Persian Gulf

4 Aug90 General John Yeosock, commander, Third Army, is

summoned to MacDill Air Force Base by General

Schwarzkopf

5 Aug 90 Secretary of defense party flies to Saudi Arabia meeting

with King Fahd

6 Aug 90 Saudi king requests U.S. forces in defense of kingdom

7 Aug 90 President Bush orders deployment of military forces

and Operation Desert Shield begins

8 Aug90 President announces deployment and U.S. national

objectives

ARCENT advanced command and control element

arrives in Saudi Arabia

9 Aug 90 The XVIII Corps advanced CP and first units of 82d

Airborne Division arrive in theater

10 Aug 90 CENTCOM OPORD issued

12 Aug 90 The 82d Airborne Division establishes advanced base at

Al Jubayl

President orders Navy to enforce embargo

13 Aug 90 First ships carrying the 24th Infantry Division depart

from Savannah

14Aug90 Division-ready brigade of 82d Airborne Division

completes deployment
357

Secretary of defense requests president to call selected

Reserve forces to active duty

U.S. Navy fires first shots enforcing the blockade

Iraqis observed building barriers on Saudi border with

Kuwait

President informs Congress that he is invoking his

authority to call-up selected Reserves

ARCENT OPORD 1 Desert Shield published

UN Security Council Resolution 665 authorizes use of

force to enforce sanctions on Iraq

First ship carrying 24th Infantry Division arrives in

theater

MARCENT assumes security of Al Jubayl

Brigadier General Steven Arnold arrives to be G3,

Third Army

Schwarzkopf orders Third Army to plan for defense of

Riyadh

"Jedi Knights" arrive at CENTCOM

The 24th Infantry Division closes

The 1st Cavalry Division begins to arrive

The 101st Airborne Division completes deployment

CENTCOM chief of staff and party brief President Bush

on one-corps plan

The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment completes

deployment

The Third Army commander and British theater

commander (General de Billiere) briefed for first time

on offensive planning

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed on oneand two-corps options

CINC's planning group placed under Third Army's

supervision

1st Cavalry Division completes deployment

5 Aug 90

18 Aug 90

19 Aug 90

22 Aug 90

25 Aug 90

27 Aug 90

28 Aug 90

7 Sep 90

14 Sep 90

16 Sep 90

25 Sep 90

5 Oct 90

7 Oct 90

11 Oct 90

14Oct90

17 Oct 90

22-23 Oct 90

24 Oct 90

25 Oct 90
358

Secretary of defense begins talking about additional

force build-up in Saudi Arabia

30 Oct 90 The XVm Corps reports closure in Saudi Arabia

4 Nov 90 General Saint and General Franks select Europe-based

brigades for deployment with VII Corps

6 Nov 90 Saudi king and U.S. secretary of state agree to coalition

command plan

8 Nov 90 President Bush announces offensive option and

doubling of forces in peninsula

14 Nov 90 Schwarzkopf briefs subordinate commanders on his

campaign plan

29 Nov 90 UN Security Council sets deadline for Iraqi withdrawal

30 Nov 90 The XVIII Corps briefs corps plan to ARCENT

commander

7 Dec 90 The VII Corps commander briefs corps plan to

ARCENT commander

20. Dec 90 Secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff briefed on offensive plans

23-28 Dec 90 Movement exercise at Support Command in Dhahran

27-30 Dec 90 Third Army MAPEX at Eskan Village

28 Dec 90 Movement briefing for CINC. General Pagonis "signs

his contract"

30 Dec 90 Syrians announce they are unwilling to attack Iraq

8 Jan 91 Schwarzkopf approves Third Army plan

12 Jan 91 "Lucky Wheels" deploys to KKMC

17 Jan 91 Air operations begin against Iraq

18Jan 91 First Scud missiles fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia by

Iraq

29 Jan 91 Iraqi attack at Khafji (counterattack lasts to 1 Feb)

1 Feb 91 Commander's huddle at KKMC

4 Feb 91 The VII Corps takes responsibilty for border in attack

sector
359

8 Feb 91 Third Army commander reports force closed

9 Feb 91 Final briefing to secretary of defense and chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff

13 Feb 91 Third Army directs movement into forward assembly

areas

14 Feb 91 General Yeosock hospitalized

Cross-border operations authorized

15 Feb 91 The VII Corps begins movement into attack positions

20 Feb 91 Battle of Ruqi pocket

President Bush gives Iraqis four days to withdraw from

Kuwait

22 Feb 91 President Gorbachev announces final Soviet peace

proposal; Iraq accepts; United States does not

United States gives Iraq twenty-four hours to begin

withdrawal or accept consequences

23 Feb 91 Iraq rejects U.S.-Coalition ultimatum

General Yeosock resumes command of Third Army

24 Feb 91 Ground attack begins

28 Feb 91 Cessation of offensive actions

2 Mar 91 The 24th Division's "Battle of the Causeway"

3 Mar 91 Cease-fire talks at Safwan

15 Mar 91 Ramadan begins

- I I I - I II I - I
I
Glossary

-AACCB air cavalry combat brigade

ACR armored cavalry regiment

AD armored division

ANGLICO air and naval gunfire liaison company

AO area of operations

ARCENT Army Central Command

ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program

ATACMS Army tactical missiles

ATO air tasking order

-BBAI battlefield air interdiction

BCE battlefield control element

BCTP Battle Command Training Program

BDA battle damage assessment

BENT beginning evening nautical twilight

BMD Russian-design infantry fighting vehicle

BMNT beginning morning tactical twilight

-CCAA Concepts and Analysis Agency (Army)

CAB combined arms battalion

C-day force deployment date

CENTAF Central Command Air Force

CENTAG Central Army Group (NATO)

CENTCOM Central Command

CEV combat engineer vehicles

CINC commander in chief

CONUS continental United States

CONUSAs stateside Army-level headquarters

CP command post

C3IC Coalition Coordination Communication

Integration Center

-DDCG deputy commanding general

DCSLOG deputy chief of staff for logistics

DCSOPS deputy chief of staff for operations

DFE division force equivalent

DRAO Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office

361
362

-EEPW enemy prisoner of war

EST Eastern Standard Time

EUCOM European Command (U.S.)

Exercise Internal A 1990 exercise based on an Iraqi threat to the

Look Arabian peninsula

-FFOB forward operating base

FORSCOM Forces Command

FRAGO fragmentary orders

FSCL fire support coordination line

FSS fast sealift ships

-GG-day 24 February, the beginning of the ground phase

of the campaign

GPS global positioning system

-HHEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck

HETs heavy equipment transporters

HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

-IICM improved conventional munition

ID infantry division

-JJFACC joint force air component commander

J5 joint operations officer

J4 joint logistics staff officer

JSCAP Joint Strategic Capability Plan

J-STARS joint surveillance target attack radar system

Just Cause U.S. military operations in Panama

-KKKMC King Khalid Military City

KTO Kuwaiti theater of operations

-LLAV light armored vehicle

LNO liaison officer

LORAN long-range very-low-frequency navigation systems

LZ landing zone
-Mmajor Army command

map exercise

Marine Central Command

Marine expeditionary brigade

medical command

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, and troops

and time available

military intelligence

multiple launch rocket system

maritime prepositioning ships

main supply route

-NNavy Central Command

national command authorities

Operation Urgent Fury

OPLAN

OPMSANG

OPORD

PERSCOM

PL

PMO

PMSANG

POW

REFORGER Exercises

RGFC

RPG

SANG

SAMS

SCUD

SITREP

SLUGR

SOCCENT

SOF

SOFA

SUPCOM

-0-

1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada

operations plan

Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Army

National Guard

operations order

.PPersonnel Command

phase line

provost marshal office

Program Manager, Saudi Army National Guard

prisoner of war

-Rreturn of forces to Europe exercises

Republican Guard Forces Command

rocket-propelled grenade

-SSaudi Army National Guard

School of Advanced Military Studies

ballistic missile (enemy variety)

situation report

small lightweight global positioning system

Special Operations Command, Central

special operations forces

Status of Forces Agreement

Support Command

363

MACOM

MAPEX

MARCENT

MEB

MEDCOM

METT-T

MI

MLRS

MPS

MSR

NAVCENT

NCA
364

TAA

TAACOM

TAC (or tac)

TACSAT

"Tiger Brigade"

TOC

TOE

TOW

TPFDD

TPFDL

TRADOC

TRANSCOM

UAV

USAREUR

USMTM

tactical assembly area

theater army area command

tactical

tactical satellite

1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division

tactical operations center

table of organization

tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided

(missile)

time-phased force development data

time-phased force deployment list

Training and Doctrine Command

U.S. Transportation Command

-Uunmanned aerial vehicle

U.S. Army Europe

U.S. Military Training Mission

I ----i-·ds I-P I- - ,
Bibliography

Notes on Sources

This study is not accompanied by a bibliography because, though

the author has consulted them, for the most part this book has not been

written from published sources. It has been written based upon

personal observation, the study of documentary evidence, and personal

interviews (where such have been useful to clarify points upon which

other documents have been silent). The decision of the author not to

become overly involved in published sources was more a consequence

of the period in which he undertook his study than from any other

factor. There has been no shortage of published accounts of the Gulf

War, but there has been very much a lack of documented accounts

upon which one might rely. Indeed, a sign of the maturing of the field

will be the first history that does not depend on Bob Woodwards'

instant narrative of the strategic direction of the war as a primary

source (as found in The Commanders [New York: Simon and Schuster,

1991]).

The early accounts are not without value, but they suffer as a

class from the haste in which they were written. Among these are

James Blackwell's Thunder in the Desert (New York: Bantam Books,

1991) and James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay's From Shield to Storm

(New York: William Morrow, 1992). Colonel (Retired) Harry

Summers' On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New

York: Dell Paperback, 1992) was more opportunistic and had as much

to say about the author's well-known views on the Vietnam War as it

did the war in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, Summers' book reflected no

research base whatever. Among the better early books was the U.S.

News and World Reports, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreputed

History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Random House-Times

Books, 1992). This work went a long way toward explaining the

complexity of the air war to those innocent of the problems associated

with it. Its account of the ground war suffered from the proximity of

that magazine's "War Horse," Joe Galloway, to the 24th Division

commander; Galloway misread the organization of the theater

command structure. Triumph Without Victory, nonetheless, began the

worthwhile task of portraying the war from the perspective of those

who fought Desert Storm. It also started the ill-considered debate

about whether or not the apparent success had been suitably complete.

This theme was taken up by others, like Jeffrey Record, in Hollow

Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brasseys

[U.S.], 1993). Record's book, however, was at least internally

365
366

consistent, whereas the U.S. News' conclusions seems an afterthought by an editor who had not read his own account before drawing sensational conclusions meant to hype his sales.

Among the best of the first wave of Gulf War books is Lawrence

Freedman and Efraim Karsh's, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991:

Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1991). Freedman and Karsh still rely heavily upon Woodward, but they benefited from their experience of working on a

television documentary that brought them together with a number of

knowledgeable second-level governmental officials from the Bush

administration. They also profited from their knowledge of Middle

East regional newspapers and Soviet affairs, which permitted them to

form a more global vision of the events leading up to the war, no less

the problems of maintaining the coalition.

General Schwarzkopfs autobiographical account (with Peter

Petre), It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Linda Grey, Bantam, 1992), appeared after a year. This highly tendentious and self-serving

account may be true to the theater commander's view of the events of

the war (and his earlier career), but it certainly lacks the virtues of

statesmanship or objectivity. A much better firsthand account was

written by General Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command (London:

Harper Collins, 1992), an account not generally available in the

United States. De la Billiere, by contrast with Schwarzkopf, is

disarmingly candid and his evaluation of the theater commander is

both admiring and critical. It remains the best firsthand account of the

operation of the high command. Lieutenant General William ("Gus") Pagonis, the Army Support Command commander (and the only battlefield elevation-to Lieutenant General-among the senior Army officers in theater), provides a short account of the significant logistic challenges of the war. Coauthored with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving

Mountains (Boston, 1992) was published, interestingly enough, by the

Harvard Business School Press. Only about half the book actually deals with the war, and that is none too informative-except that there

is nothing else on the subject.

To date, the best journalistic account is Rick Atkinson's Crusade:

The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1993). Crusade is exciting to read but suffers from its narrowness of

focus. It begins with the start of the air combat and ignores for the

most part the five and one-half month build-up that preceded it. Like

most of its predecessors, it misses entirely the structure of the theater

command by component. For those interested in war at the eyeball level, however, Atkinson is a splendid storyteller, and he was the first
367

(de la Billiere aside) to really address the influence of personality on

the events of the conflict. The U.S. Army put a team together at Fort

Monroe, Virginia, to place the Army's institutional view of the war on

the record, with particular attention to the efforts of those who

actually did the fighting. Led by Brigadier General Bob Scales, the

team produced a splendid book with excellent graphics and

photographs titled Certain Victory (Washington, D.C.: Office of the

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993). Finally, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense assembled a massive and multivolume compendia in a report

to Congress: The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to

Congress Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental

Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25),

issued in April 1993. To date, these books represent the field, with a

number of other accounts addressing the role of air power and,

particularly, the military relations, or lack of them, with the press.

For the most part, this present account has been based upon

documentary sources assembled in the theater or upon return to the

United States. The sources used are, with one exception, now housed in

an archive run by the Combined Arms Command historian at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. The New York Times, The Washington Post,

and Army Times served as the newspapers of record. The one exception

noted is the notes written for General Yeosock by Lieutenant Colonel

Mike Kendall. These are deposited in Yeosock's papers at the Military

History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Documentary sources consisted, first of all, of documents

produced at the time of the events they have been used to explain or,

second, they were deliberately created memoirs drawn up after the fact

as part of the Army's own effort to document how it accomplished what

it did in the Persian Gulf. In the latter case, as my great and respected

friend Lieutenant Colonel Dave Mock has reminded me pointedly, the

planning organizations are better represented than the operators.

Planners have more time after combat begins to reflect and record

their views than do the operators, who continue to work up to the date

of final departure. There is, thus, an undeniable tilt toward crediting

the planning actions and a corresponding neglect of the minutia

associated with the conduct of daily operations without which no plans

achieve life.

Two categories of contemporary (as opposed to retrospective)

records have been used widely. These are the daily situation reports,

through which the Third Army commander (or normally his staff

officers) told various higher headquarters how they saw the world on

any given day, and the collection of briefing slides the commander
368

used to explain himself to his boss, the theater commander, both daily

and for a variety of ad hoc purposes. The outsider can easily overlook

the importance of briefing slides in an Army organization. They are

the coin of dialog. Briefing slides summarize the affairs and arguments

surrounding any issue. Staff officers spend a good bit of time finding

the information they contain in a timely manner and, though one can

sometimes doubt where the last significant digit may be on any

particular slide, the information contained therein becomes reality for

those who must decide. General Yeosock's personal staff maintained

the slides he used in a disciplined and orderly fashion throughout the

war and provided a complete set of the slides to the author. These have

been of inestimable value, and their authors (especially Lieutenant

Colonel Mat Kriwanek) are owed a large debt for their efforts.

The daily memoranda of the meetings the Army commander

attended, prepared by Yeosock's executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel

Mike Kendall, have also been an extraordinary source of information,

particularly of the period after December 1990. Unit staff journals

were generally indifferently kept and badly preserved. Most units

made some effort to collect their operational records after the war, but

initial consolidation efforts lacked energy. Many key records remain to

be located. To energize the effort when it became clear that routine

procedures were inadequate, General Frederick Franks, now Training

and Doctrine Command commander, established a Gulf War Archive

at Fort Leavenworth. Through his personal intervention and great

effort, the VII Corps' after-action reports, including copies of key

records, were sent to the archive to start the collection. Other record

sets arrive daily, and the collection at Leavenworth is the most

accessible and complete archive available to researchers who can meet

clearance requirements or identify the records desired for

declassification. The Combined Arms Command historian, Dr. Roddler

Morris, and his staff have assembled and continue to build a number of

finding aids to help in the identification of records for outside

researchers.

Finally, a word about postwar accounts is called for. One of the

primary sources for anyone interested in the actions of Third Army in

the Gulf War is a set of narratives written and placed in large binders

by the officers of the Third Army G3 Plans shop in the days after the

war while they waited in Saudi Arabia for the return of the

headquarters to the United States and their own dispersal back to the

posts from which most had been drawn. This multivolume account

covers all aspects of the planning process from the point of view of the

majors and lieutenant colonels who did the spade work. They are
369

clearly written and accompanied, in most cases, by the documents

necessary to understand their subject matter.

The VII Corps' unit after-action reports represent the largest

volume of records in the Gulf War Archive, and many such reports are

quite good (though some are less informative). There is a large archive

at Fort Bragg of XVIII Corps' records that remains to be fully culled

and organized. Anyone who believed in 1990 that electronic media

would replace paper records was overly optimistic, for the Army in the

Persian Gulf moved on its paper and xeroxed or reprinted the most

routine documents in hundreds of copies. Record copies may never be

properly established, and much that remains on computer disks may

ultimately be lost, but there will be, nonetheless, a mountain of

documentary evidence to support the various services' official histories

whenever they are begun. Hopefully, this account, which is inevitably

part memoir and part documented narrative, will help them

understand what they find.

,U.S. GOVERMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994-655-001/2117

- I- I -L
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF

COLLEGE PRESS

In September 1991, the commandant of the U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth authorized the

establishment of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC)

Press. The CGSC Press has the following missions:

* To provide an outlet for the professional publication of

monographs and book-length works on all subjects of interest to

professional officers.

* To aid in professional military education at all levels of the

U.S. Army and other military services, foreign as well as domestic.

* To promote and support the advanced study of the theory,

history, and practice of the military art by professional officers and

other military experts.

* To promote and support the professional development of the

CGSC faculty and faculties of other institutions of higher military

education in the United States and abroad.

I -- ---I II-I