Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Unmanned Aerial Systems:

A Historical Perspective

John David Blom

Occasional Paper 37
Cover photo: A US Soldier from the 2nd Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, prepares to launch a 

“Raven” unmanned aerial vehicle to help conduct a cache search 

in the rural region of Zobam Iraq on October 4, 2006. The site has 

been historically known to hold countless hidden weapons caches. 

US Army photo by Specialist Daniel Herrera.
Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

John David Blom

Occasional Paper 37

Unmanned Aerial Systems: 

A Historical Perspective
ii

First Printing: September 2010

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Blom, John David.

 Unmanned Aerial Systems : a historical perspective / John David Blom.

 p. cm. -- (Occasional paper ; 37)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 ISBN 978-0-9823283-0-9

 1. Aerial reconnaissance, American--History. 2. Drone aircraft--United States--

History. I. Title. II. Series.

 UG763.B567 2009

 358.4’50973--dc22

 2009005812
iii

Foreword

In the Long War, formerly called the Global War on Terror, the armed 

forces of the United States have utilized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 

extensively to support combat, security, and stability operations. The concept of unmanned flight is nothing new to the military. Experiments with 

pilotless aircraft began at the end of World War I. The historical development of these aircraft and the Army’s long use of aerial platforms for 

reconnaissance provide valuable insight into the future possibilities and 

potential pitfalls of UAVs.

Mr. John Blom’s study describes the way that aircraft have been integrated into ground units since World War I. Mr. Blom traces this integration through World War II and the creation of an independent Air Force. 

In the ninety years since World War I, the quantity of aircraft organic to 

ground units has constantly expanded. In this period, many of the same 

debates between the Army and Air Force that continue today over UAVs 

first appeared.

This study addresses past and current systems, and does not address 

systems under development. The technological development of UAVs 

possesses as deep a history as the Army’s use of aircraft for aerial reconnaissance. Mr. Blom details the long development of UAVs that has led 

the military to where it is today. Understanding this past may provide clues 

into where this technology may be going, and what problems could lie 

ahead.

We at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) believe in our mission to 

support the warfighter with historical research relevant to their current 

tasks. Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective continues this 

long tradition in providing insight to a vital asset on the modern battlefield and assists commanders and staffs in its employment. Nothing is 

more important than protecting the lives of those who willingly risk them. 

Achieving a better understanding of the past can only assist in the execution of present and future missions. CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Dr. William G. Robertson

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Acknowledgements

Numerous individuals assisted me in this project, and for that I am 

extremely grateful. Retired Specialist Dave Hall provided first-hand details 

of UAV operations in the Army during the 1950s. Major John Gossart 

took the time, while deployed in Iraq, to respond to numerous questions 

regarding the use of UAVs in Sadr City. Rusty Rafferty at the Combined 

Arms Research Library helped track down old field manuals, without 

which many details might have been missed. Robert Ramsey gave me 

excellent guidance for my first study. My colleague Robert Davis listened 

without complaint to what probably seemed like endless descriptions of 

various government UAV programs. Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, Kendall Gott, and the rest of the staff at CSI made 

me feel very welcome here at Fort Leavenworth. Without the aid of all of 

those individuals, this project never could have been completed. I give 

each of them my deepest thanks.

I also want to thank my family for their endless support. Most of all, I 

thank my wonderful wife Deborah, for following me across the country in 

pursuit of my dreams and supporting me in all things.

vii

Contents

Foreword..................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements................................................................................... v

Introduction............................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1. Aerial Reconnaissance in the Army, 1917-1991 ..................... 5

World War I .......................................................................... 5

Interwar Years ..................................................................... 12

World War II ....................................................................... 13

Korean War ......................................................................... 22

Airmobility and Centralization of Aviation ....................... .27

Vietnam .............................................................................. 31

Post Vietnam and the 1980s ............................................... 38

Chapter 2. Development of Unmanned Flight in the United States ...... 45

Early Experiments............................................................... 45

Unmanned Flight in World War II ...................................... 47

Early Cold War Tests .......................................................... 49

UAVs During the Vietnam Era ........................................... 58

UAV Development After Vietnam ...................................... 66

Chapter 3. UAVs in the 1990s ................................................................ 81

The Joint Program Office ................................................... 81

UAVs in DESERT STORM ................................................ 88

The Birth of the Predator .................................................... 91

The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office ................... 92

Page
viii

Chapter 4. UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan ............................................ 105

UAV Sytems Deployed in Support of the Long War......... 106

UAV Systems in Afghanistan and Iraq Operations ..........114

The Future of UAVs ..........................................................119

Chapter 5. Conclusion........................................................................... 127

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 133

Page
ix

Figures Page

Figure 1. Airplanes Received from All Sources.........................................7

Figure 2. Orders and Intelligence for World War I Squadrons.................11

Figure 3. L-4 Piper Grasshopper..............................................................17

Figure 4. Requests and Orders for Army Air Force Reconnaissance......19

Figure 5. Army Air Force Reconnaissance Mission Results ...................20

Figure 6. Major Army and Air Force Aviation Agreements.....................23

Figure 7. Cessna L-19..............................................................................25

Figure 8. Results of Reconnaissance Missions by Army Air Forces.......28

Figure 9. OV-1 Mohawk...........................................................................32

Figure 10. AH-1 Cobra.............................................................................33

Figure 11. OH-13 Sioux...........................................................................35

Figure 12. OH-6 Cayuse...........................................................................36

Figure 13. OH-5832 Kiowa......................................................................36

Figure 14. UH-1 Iroquois.........................................................................37

Figure 15. RP-71 from Radioplane..........................................................49

Figure 16. Early Army Reconnaissance Drones......................................51

Figure 17. Navy QH-50 “DASH” UAV...................................................53

Figure 18. Model 147s in Vietnam..........................................................57

Figure 19. Ryan 147B “Lightning Bug.”.................................................59
x

Page

Figure 20. Reconnaissance Drones Shot Down over China on Display..60

Figure 21. Beechcraft Bonanza QU-22B.................................................62

Figure 22. SR-71 Air-launching a D-21 Drone........................................63

Figure 23. Models of Sky Eye.................................................................67

Figure 24. Aquila.....................................................................................68

Figure 25. Pioneer UAV...........................................................................71

Figure 26. Five Components of UAV Systems (with Requirements)......75

Figure 27. Hunter UAV............................................................................84

Figure 28. UAV Program Requests and Allowances................................89

Figure 29. Predator UAV..........................................................................92

Figure 30. DarkStar UAV.........................................................................96

Figure 31. Categories of UAVs..............................................................106

Figure 32. Global Hawk UAV................................................................107

Figure 33. Predator and its Successors...................................................108

Figure 34. Shadow UAV Being Prepared for Flight..............................111

Figure 35. Hand Launched Raven UAV.................................................112

Figure 36. Micro-UAV TACMAV..........................................................113
1

Introduction

The King was sat a loss about how to deal with this impasse, but just then Ephialtes of Malis, son of Eurydemos, 

came to speak with him, expecting to win some great reward for telling the King of the path that led through the 

mountain to Thermopylae. By so doing, he caused the destruction of the Hellenes stationed there. 

–Herodotus, The Histories 7.213.1 [Book 

7. Paragraph 213, Verse 1] N

Of the various aspects of war, none is more critical than knowledge of 

the enemy. Over 2000 years ago, Xerxes’ superior numbers proved incapable of defeating the entrenched Greeks at Thermopylae until a traitorous shepherd told the Persian King about a path through the mountains 

that allowed the Persians to outflank Leonidas and his men. In Europe, 

during the medieval period, castle towers provided elevated observation 

posts, from which an attacking army could be detected. The position of 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on the bluffs of the Missouri River was a key 

factor in the construction of the post. One of the advantages of having the 

high ground was the ability to better observe the enemy. Once man found 

a way to ascend to the sky, it was inevitable that this ability would eventually be used in battle. During the French Revolution, the French Army 

formed balloon companies to provide reconnsaissance of enemy forces. 

Because of technical limitations of the era, balloon units mustered by both 

sides during the American Civil War experienced little success. Beginning 

in World War I, however, the United States Army utilized aerial reconnaissance in every conflict. What began as simple balloons floating above 

trenches in France evolved into a wide range of technologically advanced 

machines. The experience of manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance 

vehicles (UAV) in the last 80 years provides insight into many of the questions about the current and future application of UAVs.

The story begins with those first units. Although lighter-than-air 

balloons seem far removed from the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used 

today, the missions performed over the Western Front in 1917 and 1918 

are almost identical to those conducted by UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Both provided adjustment for indirect fires, information regarding enemy 

movements, battle damage assessment, and target acquisition.
2

Since the early 1920s, advocates of airpower have disputed its proper 

role in war. Initially, this debate focused on whether it should be applied 

tactically or strategically. In the terminology of the time, tactical airpower 

existed to support the ground forces through reconnaissance, supply, and 

communications. Eventually, close aerial fire support would be added to 

the list. Supporters of this line of thinking operated under the precept that 

only “boots on the ground” could decisively win a war. Those supporting 

strategic airpower believed that airpower possessed the potential to deliver 

victory through heavy bombing of cities and industrial centers. Naturally, 

the US Army Air Corps, and later the independent Air Force, embraced 

the latter of these ideas and developed their reconnaissance aircraft accordingly, leading to the creation of organic aircraft under the control of 

ground commanders. This organic, aerial reconnaissance capability continued to grow and evolve until the 1980s. With the emergence of aviation 

as its own branch and the creation of aviation brigades in each division, 

Army aviation reached essentially the same organization as it has today. 

This organic aviation capability laid the framework for the Army’s use of 

UAVs.

The application of UAVs for a variety of missions in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 

represents the culmination of over 60 years of technological development. The radio controlled target drones that originated as experiments 

of a Hollywood actor now provide real-time battlefield surveillance and 

strike capability. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of the basic concepts of 

today’s UAVs began to emerge. The Navy experimented with arming a 

remotely piloted helicopter, while the Army deployed a UAV to Eastern 

Europe similar in size and mission to the Shadow system used today. During the Vietnam War, the Air Force used UAVs for gathering signals data, 

electronic warfare information, and photo/video reconnaissance.

The war in Europe from 1914 to 1919 demonstrated the potential 

of aerial reconnaissance, which came to maturity 20 years later in the 

same theater of operations. Similarly, Operations DESERT SHIELD and 

DESERT STORM provided the first glimpse of a UAV fleet spanning all 

services and operating at various levels—an idea that became reality a 

decade later in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This work generally avoids the complex, technical details and development of UAVs, except basic specifications and characteristics which 

affect the operational capability of a vehicle. Two terms that may require 

clarification are “unmanned aerial vehicle” (UAV) and “unmanned aeri-
3

al system” (UAS). An unmanned aerial system includes one or multiple 

unmanned aerial vehicles (usually the same model, but not always), the 

ground control system, the datalink and sensory array on board the vehicle, and the terminal that receives data from the vehicle. Often, the greatest 

challenge and highest cost of a unmanned aerial system is not the vehicle 

itself, but the sensor array and datalink. Specific names, such as Predator, 

Shadow, or Raven, refer not only to the vehicle but to the system as well.

Throughout the time period discussed, unmanned aerial vehicles went 

through a number of name changes. From the 1940s through the 1970s, 

the military most often referred to UAVs as drones. Another term that became popular from the 1960s to the 1980s was remotely piloted vehicles. 

This term was problematic when aircraft flew pre-programmed missions, 

during which they were not actually remotely piloted. Unmanned aerial 

vehicles became the most common term in the late 1980s, although “remotely piloted vehicles” remained in usage in the 1990s as well. In an 

attempt at political correctness during the Clinton administration, the 

terms “unpiloted aerial vehicle” and “uninhabited aerial vehicle” briefly 

replaced the previously accepted “unmanned aerial vehicle” term, while 

keeping the acronym. The former ceased to be used since many vehicles 

were piloted, albeit remotely. The latter disappeared as well. Although the 

term UAV is used throughout, nomenclature from the source material for 

each period is used accordingly.1

Notes

1 Bill Yenne, Attack of the Drones (St. Paul: Zenith, 2004), 13.

5

Chapter 1

Aerial Reconnaissance in the Army, 1917-1991

To understand fully the role and mission of Army Aviation 

today and why it is best served by aircraft organic to the 

Army is to trace its history, underlining, with the benefit 

of historical perspective, the mistakes. The story roots 

itself in the requirements for battlefield reconnaissance: 

the need to know more information about the enemy and 

the terrain.

–D.F. Harrison

Although written nearly four decades ago, the preceding quote holds 

as much relevance today as it did when it was first written. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a reconnaissance role by the US Army 

provides enormous potential for improved battlefield intelligence with no 

risk to American soldiers. Utilizing this potential is not without its challenges. Potential issues over the future application of UAVs include interservice disputes over their control, debates over how to organize and integrate them with other forces, as well as the problem of how to distribute 

the intelligence material they provide to commanders who need it. While 

the topic of UAVs may be new, these questions are not. Since the Army 

Air Service became a separate corps in 1926 (and its own service in 1947), 

ground and air force commanders have disputed the best use of air power. 

Investigating how the military has approached similar questions in the past 

provides a foundation for approaching the questions regarding UAVs today and in the future.

World War I

During the First World War military aviation finally realized some of 

its potential. All of the belligerents experimented with new technology 

on the Western Front. Two of the more important developments included 

fixed-wing aviation and wireless telegraphy. Although two-way radios 

small enough to deploy on aircraft were unavailable, wireless telegraphy 

allowed pilots to transmit small amounts of information to ground commanders. In September 1914, the British first employed aerial observation 
6

to direct artillery fire. Records of the No. 4 Squadron from 25 September 

detailed the pilot-observer adjustment of artillery fire, which led to the destruction of two German artillery batteries. The final message sent before 

the plane landed identified the location of three more batteries.1

The US Army entered World War I without a significant air force. 

Despite the pioneering efforts of the Wright brothers in Ohio and North 

Carolina in 1903 and 1904, the Army did not display interest in their aircraft until 1908. A year later, the Signal Corps purchased a single aircraft 

for the US Army. Army aviation grew slowly over the next eight years. 

In 1912, Congress approved $125,000 for research and development of 

aircraft, funds which were split between airplanes and balloons (that same 

year the French Chamber of Deputies allocated over $1 million for the 

same purpose). During a discussion of military aviation, one congressman 

allegedly asked, “Why all this fuss about airplanes for the Army–I thought 

we already had one.” To the extent they showed any interest at all, decision 

makers in the War Department favored balloons over airplanes, possibly 

because of their familiarity due to their limited application in the Civil War 

and Spanish American War.2

The War Department believed the only use of aviation in war would 

be to improve communication in the field. Field tests in 1911 proved the 

adeptness of aircraft in this role. Using a plane rented for $1 a month from 

the owner of Collier’s magazine, two officers flew 106 miles in two hours 

and ten minutes, dropping messages to various units enroute. Unfortunately, on the return flight two days later they crashed into the Rio Grande 

River and had to be rescued. Luckily for the Army, Congress had already 

approved the aviation budget for 1912. That same year, the Army opened 

its first aviation school in College Park, Maryland. Here, the Army first 

experimented with and recognized the potential of aerial photography.3

While the War Department slowly realized the potential of the airplane as an observation tool, the balloon remained the primary method 

of aerial observation before and during World War I. Balloons provided 

93 per cent of aerial observation over the trenches. The Army operated a 

balloon school at Fort Omaha, Nebraska from 1908-1913. However, the 

moving of the Signal Corps from Fort Omaha to Fort Leavenworth in 1916 

halted the development of lighter-than-air aircraft.4

Although outbreak of war on the Continent and the operational demonstrations of aerial observation provided some stimulation to both lighter-than and heavier-than air craft, when the United States declared war 
7

in 1917 the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, the home to all Army 

aircraft, remained cripplingly small. It possessed around 200 aircraft, all 

of which were classified as trainers, none of which capable for combat. 

Furthermore, not a single manufacturer in the United States even produced 

such an airplane. This forced the United States to rely heavily on its wartime allies for both doctrinal and material assistance.5

 In August, the United States signed an agreement with France in which the French promised 

to provide 5,000 planes to the US Army by the following June. Although 

French demand for airplanes made it impossible to transfer that many 

planes so quickly, the French provided the majority of planes flown by 

the Army in World War I (see Figure 1). The following month the French 

agreed to provide the Americans with balloons as well.6

Figure 1. Airplanes Received from All Sources.

The nature of trench warfare made observation balloons an ideal 

method for observing the battle and directing artillery fire. Both the Germans and French possessed balloons prior to the outbreak of war which 

they used from the start of hostilities. Since 1913, the British Admiralty controlled all lighter-than-air craft, leaving the British Expeditionary 

Force (BEF) without any balloons when they deployed to France. After 

seeing the Germans and French demonstrate their effectiveness, they immediately requested balloons from the Admiralty. The Admiralty supplied 

several balloons and the necessary support, while the Royal Flying Corps 

(RFC) operated the airships. Although functional, this relationship was 

not without its problems. In a preview of the next 80 years of US Army/

Air Force relations, inter-service rivalry complicated the transfer of aerial 
8

observation to the BEF on the western front as the RFC, the Admiralty, 

and the Army General Staff bickered about under whose domain the balloons should operate. In July 1916, the War Office finally placed orders 

for their own balloons, to be fully under the control of the RFC.7

In addition to aviation procurement, the Army looked to the allies to 

train its pilots, observers, and mechanics. The British and French accepted 

some Americans into their own training schools for observers, pilots, and 

mechanics, but they were unable to absorb enough to meet the needs of the 

American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Effective training required combat 

capable equipment, none of which existed in the United States. This led to 

the establishment of an American training facility in Issoudun, France. Although the Commander of AEF General John P. Pershing believed the facility at Issoudun could solve the training issue, this proved incorrect. Training 

for all aspects of military aviation remained a significant problem for the 

Army throughout World War I. The AEF did the best with what it had, and 

by the signing of the armistice the Aviation Section had grown from 65 officers and 1,100 men at the start of the war, to 7,738 officers and 70,769 men.8

The Aviation Section of the AEF focused predominantly on observation 

and reconnaissance missions. The emphasis is evidenced by the inventory 

of planes in the Air Service. In April 1918, they possessed 8,000 observation aircraft, compared with 2,000 pursuit and 1,050 bomber types.9

 Army 

doctrine defined two major roles for aviation: tactical and strategic. Tactical operations provided support for ground forces by means of observation 

missions; strategic operations targeted the enemy’s air force (air superiority 

missions) and bombing attacks deep in enemy territory. In its tactical role, 

THREE different observation and reconnaissance missions existed for AEF 

aircraft: visual and photo reconnaissance, adjustment of artillery fire, and 

contact missions.

The Air Service conducted more visual observation missions than any 

other task, with balloon companies the primary operators. While ascended, 

the observers watched for activity of enemy artillery and balloons, movement of supplies, and new fortification construction. Action within any of 

these spheres might precede an enemy attack. They transmitted their observations via the direct telephone connection to units on the ground. The 

balloon company field manual, which had been translated from the French 

version, instructed observers to report “only what is actually seen . . . to the 

exclusion of all personal interpretation.” Commanders wanted the men in 

the balloons to be their eyes in the sky, providing raw intelligence data to 

analysts on the ground.10
9

Aerial photography missions represented the second most common 

mission of the Air Service. Like most other aspects of the war, the United 

States entered World War I with little experience in aerial photography. 

The AEF again looked to the British and the French for assistance in 

developing their military intelligence capabilities. The Signal Corps, the 

section within AEF responsible for aerial photography, went on a purchasing spree of civilian motion and still cameras immediately after American 

entry into the war. They found this equipment to be inadequate, and yet 

again the US looked to the British and French for suitable instruments. 

For doctrine, the Signal Corps translated the French field manual on aerial 

photography. Aircraft took two types of aerial photographs: oblique and 

mosaic. Oblique photos presented a horizontal line-of-sight image and 

could be taken from either a balloon or an airplane behind friendly lines. 

Mosaic photos were taken from directly above the target. These proved 

incredibly useful for map-making and damage assessment. Another concept borrowed from the French was to use aerial photography to validate 

intelligence gathered through other sources.11

The Air Service also adjusted artillery fire. Air observation complemented other developments in sound ranging and flash spotting to increase 

counter-battery operations. Aerial observation and photographs provided 

field artillery with targets deep behind enemy lines, such as supply areas 

or troop build-ups. After firing toward a specific target, an airborne spotter gave the necessary corrections to the battery. Although unknown at 

the time, this function of the Air Service proved critical in future decades 

for convincing decision-makers of the Army’s need for airplanes separate 

from the future Air Corps and later Air Force.12

During a contact mission, the final task of the Air Service, the aircraft monitored the progress of friendly units during offensive maneuvers. 

Their reports allowed commanders in the rear to react more rapidly to 

unexpected successes or difficulties. Particularly in this mission, Army 

aviation began to fill a void created by the ineffectiveness of cavalry during World War I.13

Because the AEF did not possess a separate air service, each army 

corps included an organic tactical air unit. Pursuit and bombing aircraft, 

the strategic component of the Air Service, were assigned to an army, although pursuit aircraft often supported a specific corps. Each corps had an 

observation group consisting of three squadrons with 24 planes each, for a 

total of 72 aircraft. The corps also possessed a balloon wing compriseing 

of five companies, each with a single balloon. These corps assets nearly 
10

always operated under a specific division within the corps, although they 

might be transferred from one division to another depending on need. At 

the next higher level each army was supposed to have another 3 balloon 

wings for a total of 15 balloons and 2 observation wings, which consisted 

of 3 groups for a total of 220 planes. The actual assignment of squadrons 

often fell short of this standard. French squadrons were used to provide 

aerial support when insufficient numbers of American squadrons were 

available. Of primary importance, however, is that aircraft were utilized 

by units of division strength or greater. During World War I, the scale of 

the fighting made employment of aerial observation at any level below the 

division unnecessary.14

The intelligence section of the army, corps, or divisional general staff 

(G2) determined which areas were to be observed from the air. The G2 

transmitted these orders via the branch intelligence officer of the air service to the commanding officer of the observation group. From there, the 

squadron operations officer assigned the missions to individual pilots and 

observers. When the squadron returned, the branch intelligence officer 

(BIO) disseminated newly gathered information among the observation 

group and to the corps intelligence staff. The system for tasking balloons 

followed an identical pattern, with the exception that missions were assigned to a specific company based on their sector of operations, eliminating the role of the group operations officer. If the mission included aerial 

photographs, they would be processed by the photo section of the corps 

observation group and distributed by the BIO to the corps or army G2 for 

analysis. The photo section was expected to develop the photos from the 

mission within six hours. AEF had copied this system of intelligence distribution from the British. The BIO represented the key component, acting 

as the liaison between the G2 and the air service. Tasking for artillery observation missions came from the commanding officer of either the army 

artillery or divisional artillery (see Figure 2).15

Despite the tremendous progress made in military aviation and aeronautics, numerous problems remained. Balloon companies created a tremendous logistical strain. They required a constant supply of hydrogen 

and material for rigging the balloons, as the strain of prolonged observation tended to wear down the rigging. Although balloons provided a 

constant eye on the enemy, adverse weather conditions could limit their 

use. Under normal conditions, they could not ascend if the wind exceeded 

33 miles per hour, although during an attack they would tolerate wind 

speeds of 40 miles per hour. Rain could add as much as 220 pounds to the 

balloon, decreasing its ascension force. Thunderstorms created an even 
11

greater risk, as lightning could ignite the hydrogen/air mix around the 

valve of the balloon. Balloons also made a tempting target for enemy 

pursuit planes. Each company included a spotter, whose task it was to 

watch for enemy planes. If a balloon was destroyed by enemy fire, the 

observers had a parachute attached to the basket they could use to bail 

out. Traditionally airmen defined an ‘ace’ based on the number of enemy 

planes shot down; in the balloon companies, this status related to number 

of jumps survived from a balloon.16

A final drawback of balloons was their visibility to the enemy. Just 

as balloon observers received instructions to watch for increased enemy 

balloon activity as an indication of an attack, enemy observers watched 

for the same signs. In preparation for an attack, the balloon companies 

had to be careful not to suddenly increase their activity, or they risked 

giving away the location of an impending attack.

Figure 2. Orders and Intelligence Processing for World War I Squadrons.
12

Observation planes provide more flexibility than balloons because of 

their greater range. From an air park behind friendly lines, they possessed 

a much greater potential area of operations, although they could not loiter in an area anywhere nearly as long as balloons. They possessed the 

capability for mosaic photography, whereas balloons could only acquire 

oblique images. However, the amount of training required for pilots and 

the difficulty in producing a sufficient number of qualified pilots represented a significant obstacle and without a doubt contributed to the reliance by AEF on balloon companies for observation and reconnaissance.

Despite the deficiencies of the Army Air Service entering the war and 

the persistent logistical and training problems, the Air Service performed 

well in the AEF offensives. During the St. Mihiel offensive, Major General Mason Patrick, Chief of the Air Service, ordered the creation of mobile 

air parks to provide logistical support for the air units participating in the 

offensive. This helped alleviate many of the previous problems caused by 

stationary air parks. In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the air service of 

the 1st Corps developed 16,000 photos in a single day. Weather hampered 

aerial operations during both of these offensives, however, when air operations could be conducted they provided substantial intelligence information to AEF forces, particularly during the latter offensive.17

World War I demonstrated the potential of military aviation and aeronautics. Although heavier-than-air crafts have dominated military flight 

since 1919, balloons played an important role in the early development 

of aerial observation. Tethered balloons using a sophisticated sensor array 

continue to be used in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, since they lack a 

propulsion system, the Department of Defense does not classify them as 

UAVs.

Interwar Years

After World War I, the debate over air power as either a tactical or 

strategic tool emerged with greater force. In 1919 and 1920, several bills 

came before Congress which would have created an independent air force, 

all of which failed. During the early 1920s, Brigadier General William 

“Billy” Mitchell became the leading advocate for strategic air doctrine. 

The American counterpart to Britain’s Hugh Trenchard and Italy’s Guilio 

Douhet, General Mitchell fought for an independent air force whose role 

would be the destruction of an enemy nation’s ability to make war. Despite 

being court-martialed in 1925, he had tremendous impact on the future of 

American air power.18
13

Despite the efforts of Mitchell and other air-power advocates, many 

of whom were less radical than he, Army aviation declined rapidly after 

the war. Only 220 officers (of over 7,000 at the time of the Armistice) 

remained in the Air Service by mid-1919 and 90 percent of the nation’s 

aircraft industry, built to satisfy the needs of the Army during the war, was 

no longer operating. Bureaucratic opposition within the War Department 

and stingy Congressmen stifled the development of air doctrine in the early 1920s. At the end of Calvin Coolidge’s first term, the government had 

reduced the spending of the War Department by $750 million. In 1926, 

however, the Air Service took a small step toward independence when 

Congress approved a proposal for a separate Air Corps. Although aircraft 

would still be attached to divisions, corps, and armies, these units would 

not be organic to the division.19

Observation aircraft changed direction in 1929 with the formation of 

the Air Corps Technical Committee. Following its investigation into the 

needs of the Army, the committee recommended observation aircraft be 

divided into two types: strategic, which operated no closer than 25 miles 

from the front and were coordinated at the army level, and tactical, to 

support the divisions and corps. Although the Air Corps theoretically emphasized tactical observation, it continually pursued high speed planes to 

fulfill this role, believing only these could survive in combat. Despite their 

good intentions, the focus on survivability led to a decline in capability, 

as high speed aircraft were unsuitable for tactical reconnaissance and artillery adjustment due to their limited time on target. The emphasis on 

building faster planes led to larger engines, which increased the weight 

of the planes. Heavier planes required more runway space to take off than 

was available at the front. The divisional and corps observation planes 

operated from an airfield far behind their assigned division, meaning they 

rarely interacted with the ground forces they were assigned to assist. Some 

of the planes developed for divisional support ended up better suited for 

corps or army support.20

World War II

From 1926 to 1939, the Air Corps continually increased its emphasis 

on strategic doctrine. The Air Corps Staff designed the observation squadrons accordingly, with long-range, strategic reconnaissance missions in 

mind. The arms and technical services of the Air Corps believed the divisional and corps airplanes had to be high-speed, maneuverable planes in 

order to survive on the battlefield. These two factors meant no light planes 

existed in the Army at the start of World War II.21
14

As war began in Europe, officers from all branches of the Army started 

calling for organic aviation to be assigned to their units. In 1939, the Field 

Artillery Journal translated and printed an article by Lieutenant Colonel 

Verdurand of the French Army which outlined the need and the capability 

of light aviation in support of artillery. Verdurand argued that light planes 

flying behind the lines could still observe light artillery at a range of 4 to 

5 kilometers, and the larger pieces at 7 or 8 kilometers. Light planes also 

required far less training, eliminating any strain on the Air Corps’ training capability. The author claimed that only allowing trained pilots to fly 

would be like only letting professional drivers operate vehicles.22

Not to be outdone by the artillery, in 1940 the Infantry Journal published an article calling for aviation to be assigned to infantry divisions. 

With biting sarcasm, the author, Lieutenant Colonel E.D. Cooke, argued:

To be a big leaguer, our infantryman needs everything–including 

wings. Not the kind that depend on the cooperation of six staff 

officers, three headquarters and a liaison agent, but something 

of his very own. Something that sticks with him–like cooties, 

second lieutenants, and corned bill.23

The article stated that infantry did not need highly trained fighter 

or bomber pilots and expensive aircraft, just some “wild-eyed kids who 

would rather fly than do K.P.” along with “something that could land in a 

cow pasture, hide in a smoke house, and take off from the General’s pansy 

wagon when necessary.” The small liaison planes eventually given to artillery were not far off his description.24

In 1939, the standard plane assigned to the corps and division was the 

O-47. Although slower than pursuit planes, it still travelled too quickly for 

effective observation, and certainly too fast for artillery adjustment. It also 

required 1,200 feet to take off, so it could only operate from an airfield far 

behind the lines. After seeing the destruction of British and French planes 

with similar capabilities of the O-47 by the Germans, the Air Corps decided not to use it in combat. The head of the Field Artillery, Major General 

Robert M. Danford, continued to push for organic aviation to be assigned 

to artillery units. During the Camp Beauregard maneuvers in 1940, several 

small planes manufactured and provided by the Piper Aircraft Corporation demonstrated the potential for small planes to adjust artillery fire. 

The following year, maneuvers in Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas, and the 

Carolinas confirmed the capability of small, light airplanes for artillery 

adjustment. During these tests, civilian pilots flew 11 planes loaned by 

aircraft manufacturers to the Army on 3,000 missions, totaling 400,000 
15

miles, the equivalent of 16 trips around the equator. Unlike the divisional 

observation group, the civilian pilots could land their planes near the front. 

They regularly shared meals with the ground forces and slept under their 

planes, using the wings for cover. In addition to increasing their effectiveness through a better understanding of the troops on the ground, this 

endeared them to the officers and enlisted men alike.25

The Air Corps resisted any assignment of airplanes to the Field Artillery on matters of both principal and economy. First, aerial observation 

was clearly an Air Corps responsibility. After the bureaucratic battles they 

fought in the early 1920s to obtain marginal independence, any change 

which might render them unnecessary was unacceptable. Second, they 

argued that if the Field Artillery received aircraft, their missions would 

overlap and result in unnecessary waste. In theory, the leaders of the Air 

Corps presented sound arguments. In practice, they refused to adapt their 

mission to the desires of the ground forces. Air Corps leaders consistently 

opposed the development of light aircraft for ground support missions 

while making little effort to improve the training and capability of its tactical reconnaissance pilots. Pilots in the Air Corps saw observation flight 

as a path to nowhere and generally avoided it. Those forced into this role 

generally took the assignment grudgingly, and spent little time training for 

observation missions.26

The success of light planes in the 1940 and 1941 maneuvers convinced 

the War Department to allow General Danford to proceed with further testing. The following January, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Ford began 

training the first group of artillery aviators at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In what 

became known as the Class Before One, 12 officers and 15 enlisted men 

volunteered for joint pilot-mechanic training. Ford divided the class into 

two groups, Flight A and Flight B. An additional six enlisted men volunteered for purely mechanical training. The pilot/mechanic training focused on general flying abilities and basic maintenance, as well as the art 

of artillery observation. In addition to their basic training, the mechanics 

participated in several hands-on programs, including working in the Piper 

Aircraft manufacturing plant and later at the local airport, providing free 

labor to pilots there. The training lasted only until the end of February, at 

which point the two flights were separated and sent to Florida and Texas 

for field tests with artillery units, in which they performed very well.27

On 6 June 1942, the War Department approved General Danford’s 

request to make light aircraft organic to field artillery organizations. The 

Field Artillery created the Department of Air Training and expanded the 
16

facilities at Fort Sill to begin training pilots and mechanics (all pilots 

would continue to receive basic mechanical training as well). The Army 

Air Forces (AAF), as the Air Corps became in 20 June 1941, gave control of Post Field, an air field near Fort Sill, to the Field Artillery as well. 

Although established on paper, the Department of Air Training nearly collapsed in the first six months due to disputes between the Army Ground 

Forces (AGF) and Army Air Forces. One of the arguments revolved 

around the use of enlisted men as pilots. Lieutenant General Henry ‘Hap’ 

Arnold, the head of the AAF, argued that enlisted men should be trained 

to fly the liaison planes for the artillery. He believed that the requirements 

of flying any plane were too demanding to perform while observing, yet 

simple enough they did not require an officer. Artillery Brigadier General 

Leslie J. McNair believed only officers should be allowed to fly, since if 

an enlisted man flew the plane an artillery officer would have to be pulled 

off the line to serve as his observer, since only an officer could direct artillery fire. He instead wanted an officer to be trained to observe and fly 

simultaneously. The War Department ruled in favor of Brigadier General 

McNair and requiring all liaison pilots to be commissioned officers. The 

first training classes began in Fort Sill in November 1942 and by the end 

of 1943, 1,694 pilots had graduated from the program.28

The Army’s first use of light aviation in combat during Operation 

TORCH ended badly. To begin with, the pilots assigned to the invasion 

forces had no opportunity to train with the ground units they would be 

supporting. Most of the planes had been packed in crates for the trip across 

the Atlantic, so the pilots could not train in the planes that would take 

them into battle. Four pilots assigned to the 3d Infantry Division saw their 

planes on the deck of the USS Ranger (CV-4), which were in such poor 

condition they spent the trip across the Atlantic repairing them. The pilots 

completed the repairs in time to support the initial landing force. After taking off from the Ranger and heading for shore, they began taking fire from 

the USS Brooklyn (CL-40), whose gunnery officer did not recognize their 

silhouette as that of a friendly plane. The pilots dropped their planes down 

to 20 feet and skimmed the waves for the duration of the flight over the 

ocean. Their fortunes did not improve once they reached land. The ground 

forces they intended to support had never trained with organic aerial support, and immediately fired on the three planes. One of the planes crashed 

and the pilot, who had been shot with 5 bullets in his leg, crawled to safety. 

Another went down behind enemy lines and was captured. After this, organic aviation had nowhere to go but up, which it soon did. With the assistance of the British, whose artillery aerial observation program was further 

along, the aerial observers quickly became a vital part of the war effort.29
17

During the invasion of Italy, L-4 Piper Grasshoppers (see Figure 3) 

directed artillery fire and offshore naval fire (sometimes at night, using 

hand-held flashlights to illuminate the instrument panels), laid wire, performed transport operations, and performed aerial photography and reconnaissance missions. By this time, the AAF had recognized the capability of 

light airplanes and created liaison squadrons to be deployed with the AGF. 

These squadrons first went to South Asia as part of a combined American-Chinese offensive against the Japanese. Originally intended to serve 

as couriers, these liaison squadrons performed a wide range of missions. 

Small bombs were attached to the wings or belly of a plane and dropped 

from a low-altitude. At least once, members of the liaison squadron threw 

hand grenades from their plane to flush out Japanese troops hiding beneath a bridge. At other times, they used smoke grenades to mark targets 

for heavy bombers. Other missions included the evacuation of wounded 

soldiers, aerial supply, transport of personnel, reconnaissance, and emergency rescue. Although not an organic army unit, these liaison squadrons 

demonstrated additional uses for light aviation that eventually became key 

components of Army aviation.30

Hoping these new liaison squadrons might demonstrate the AAF’s ability to provide the necessary reconnaissance and artillery adjustment missions, General Arnold sent a memorandum in January 1944, to the chief of 

staff for the Army calling for the removal of organic aviation. In addition to 

the accusations of waste and inefficiency, General Arnold correctly argued 

that the AGF planes exceeded their orders by performing missions beyond 

Figure 3. L-4 Piper Grasshopper.

National Museum of the US Air Force photo.
18

artillery adjustment. The ground forces attempt to acquire higher performance aircraft for their division seemed to justify his claim. Although the 

War Department refused to abolish the organic aviation, it promised General Arnold he could raise the objections again if the AGF aviation continued its mission-creep.31

The following year, the AGF again asked for more organic aviation. 

Although the War Department denied the request, they indicated an interest 

in a study of the liaison work being performed by the AAF. The study, conducted by a colonel and a lieutenant colonel who had served in both the AGF 

and the AAF, found the liaison pilots of the AAF did not possess the required 

knowledge or ability to sufficiently support the troops on the ground. Their 

findings revived the AGF request, and with the support of Army Chief of 

Staff General George C. Marshall, they finally received approval to expand 

organic aviation. An agreement reached in August 1945, provided six planes 

for infantry, airborne, and mountain divisions; nine for armored divisions; 

seven to cavalry divisions; one for each engineer battalion, and two for cavalry and tank destroyer groups. Although this decision came after the surrender of Germany and only shortly before the surrender of Japan, it established 

the precedent for organic aviation outside the artillery.32

By the time of the German surrender, the number of light planes operating in the European Theater numbered 1,380. Every division was assigned 

10 planes, with additional planes at the corps and army level. Although the 

airplanes were part of an individual artillery unit within the division, the 

various artillery units pooled their aircraft. The planes operated on a divisional schedule to provide dawn-to-dusk aerial observation for all artillery 

within the division. The aircraft assigned to armored division artillery also 

assisted in the direction of columns. It became common for these planes to 

land alongside the advancing column and take the commanding officer up 

for a brief survey of the area, a practice that became common in later wars.33

Light aircraft flew nearly a quarter of a million missions in Europe, 

throughout the course of the war. The final report of the General Board listed 

the following missions as all being performed by light aviation:

. . . selecting traffic routes, traffic control, selecting forward command post locations, observation of specific enemy attacks or 

retreats, observation of all types of bridges and roads, personnel 

of general staff sections observing front line terrain and installations, scheduled patrols along entire corps front, directing flights 

of fighter-bombers on close-in targets, photographic missions, 

adjusting naval gun fire.34
19

Even the enemy recognized the effectiveness of the liaison planes. In 

a letter written in December 1944, a German soldier wrote: “We all would 

be happy to see a few of our fighter planes which would bring an end to 

the . . . [aerial] artillery observers. Without any interference these dogs 

fly around all day . . . against that one can only hide like a little mouse.”35

As the General Board study indicated, ground commanders used their 

organic aviation for much more than its intended mission of artillery adjustment. This was because of the convoluted process to request aerial 

reconnaissance from the air force. The exact procedure varied slightly, depending on the army, however the following example from the 12th Army 

Group provides a general idea of the process. If a division commander 

desired aerial reconnaissance, he sent the request to corps headquarters. 

If approved, they sent it to the army G2 staff, which had a separate air 

section. They designed the aerial reconnaissance plan to best fulfill all the 

requests they received. They passed this plan to the reconnaissance section 

of the Air Force, who gave the orders to the reconnaissance group. The 

orders then filtered down through the operations officers to the squadrons 

who would actually fly the missions (see Figure 4). Once gathered, the intelligence information filtered back through a similar path (see Figure 5).36

Figure 4. Requests and Orders for Army Air Forces Reconnaissance.
20

Early in the war, the AGF commanders experienced frequent dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of the tactical air support provided 

by the AAF. They believed the AAF focused on strategic air power at the 

expense of the tactical components. The 1943 field manual for the command and employment of air power described tactical air support in way 

that made it appear more like strategic operations. According to the field 

manual, the first priority of tactical air power was the establishment of air 

superiority through attacks on enemy airfields. Isolation of the battlefield 

by targeting lines of communication and support appeared next on the list. 

Close support for ground forces ranked third and last. Much of the AAF’s 

tactical reconnaissance that did occur related to aerial operations. During the campaign in North Africa, one AGF observer noted that despite a 

lack of photo reconnaissance for ground operations, aerial pictures of destroyed bomb targets plastered the walls of Air Force headquarters. When 

they did get the photos they requested, it generally took 24 hours from the 

time of the request until the photos were delivered.37

Figure 5. Army Air Force Reconnaissance Mission Results.
21

Some improvements were made by the 1943 landings in Italy. Gradual 

reorganization of the system for air-ground coordination which resulted in 

the creation of a G2 and G3 Air Subsection at the army level contributed 

to this progress. In operations in the Mediterranean Theater, staff officers 

generally used the color red to mark information from aerial photography 

in red and everything else was in purple. One officer estimated that nearly 

80 percent of the information was annotated in red. During the landing at 

Salerno in September information from aerial photography proved invaluable to the 45th Infantry Division. A series of photographs spanning the 

previous eight months provided evidence of fortification of the town of 

Villa Literno. When he received this intelligence the division commander, 

Major General Troy H. Middleton, made the decision to bypass the town, 

and the enemy garrison eventually surrendered without a fight. In this 

example, information from aerial photography directly assisted a commanding officer in making a decision which saved lives. One of the major 

obstacles in regard to aerial photography was not flying the missions, but 

processing and distributing the results.38

The tremendous potential of aerial photography led some in the army 

to see it as the “silver bullet” of battlefield intelligence. An article in the 

August 1953 issue of Military Review illustrated the logistical strain if 

commanders received all the photographs they wanted, not just the ones 

they needed. When the Air Force became an independent service in 1947, 

it arranged a deal with the Army that divided responsibility for aerial photographic reconnaissance. The Air Force would perform the actual missions, but the Army assumed control of the reproduction, distribution, and 

interpretation of photographs. Based on the standard doctrine for frontline cover, an army sized force attacking on a 60 mile front would need 

over 4,000 negatives daily, which would be produced into nearly 20,000 

prints. This would create “650 pounds of photographs having a volume 

of 16 cubic feet, or a stack of photographs 18 feet high.”39 Although the 

production unit possessed the ability to process these quantities at peak 

capacity, there was a further logistical strain in supplying them with the 

chemicals and water they needed to process the prints (over one ton per 

day), distributing the photos to the corps (214 pounds per corps), and finally evaluating the photos.40

The Army’s final report on the AAF tactical reconnaissance work for 

the ground forces contained a mix of positive and negative findings. Aerial 

reconnaissance proved to be a tremendous aid during the planning phase 

of an operation. Once the operation began, the AAF continued to acquire 

quality intelligence, but due to the communication and logistical prob-
22

lems, much of this information never filtered down to the divisional commanders who needed it. While army level commanders generally felt satisfied with the intelligence they received, divisional and corps commanders 

often lacked sufficient close-in aerial reconnaissance. They attempted to 

use their artillery liaison planes for this purpose; however the vulnerability 

of these aircraft to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire limited their success.41

The experience of World War II solidified in the mind of the AGF 

the utility of organic aviation for reconnaissance missions. Simultaneously, the effectiveness of strategic bombing in disrupting German industry convinced the AAF that future wars could be won from the air. 

The nuclear bomb added weight to the latter of these arguments. During 

the five years between the end of World War II and the outbreak of war 

on the Korean peninsula, the Army underwent a number of adjustments. 

In 1946, the commands of the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces 

were eliminated and responsibilities reassigned between numerous new 

organizations. One of these new organizations, the Air Material Command, received responsibility for the development of new aircraft. This 

institution played an important role in military aviation for two decades. 

The National Security Act of 1947 further changed the military’s organization by making the Air Force an independent branch of service, equal 

to the Army and Navy.42

Korean War

After the creation of the Air Force as an independent service, the 

Army continued to use organic aviation to support ground forces. The 

Key West Agreement, approved by President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in 1948, gave the Air Force responsibility for providing “close combat and logistical support to the Army, to 

include airlift, support, and resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power 

and communications.” The following year, a new agreement between 

the Army and the Air Force solidified the Army’ss organic aviation. Under Joint Army and Air Force Adjustment Regulation 5-10-1, the Army 

could operate fixed wing aircraft weighing less than 2,500 pounds and 

rotary wing aircraft weighing less than 4,000 pounds. Missions for these 

aircraft included artillery adjustment, route reconnaissance, control of 

march columns, camouflage inspections, local courier service, emergency evacuation, wire laying, limited resupply, and limited front line 

aerial photography. The role of Army aviation continued to evolve and 
23

numerous changes were made to this agreement. However, short-range 

aerial reconnaissance missions remained the responsibility of the Army 

(see Figure 6).43

A significant change that occurred between the end of World War II 

and the beginning of the Korean War was the addition of considerable 

numbers of helicopters to Army aviation. The Army experimented with 

rotary-wing aircraft prior to World War II, including the possibility of 

using them for the artillery’s aerial observation posts. In 1939, an article 

in Field Artillery Journal argued the autogiro provided an ideal platform 

from which to perform artillery spotting. Like the balloons of World War 

I, the autogiro could loiter behind friendly lines at an altitude between 

1,000 and 2,500 feet and direct fire. The threat of anti-aircraft fire from 

the ground made it an unfavorable target for enemy pursuit craft, and it 

could operate effectively far enough behind the front to avoid enemy antiaircraft fire. Had war been delayed for another few years, rotary-wing aircraft might have been more involved in World War II. Autogiros did not 

attain the level of performance necessary to justify further development 

and the War Department scrapped further procurement. After cancelling 

Figure 6. Major Army and Air Force Aviation Agreements.
24

autogiro development, the War Department proceeded with experiments 

on a different form of rotary-wing: the helicopter. By the time the first 

helicopters capable of performing in a combat situation were developed, 

the light airplane had been found to be a suitable observation craft and 

become the primary focus of the AGF aviation, although helicopters flew 

several missions during World War II. During the Korean War, helicopters supported the Army mostly through evacuation or supply missions. 

Although helicopters occasionally provided aerial reconnaissance, this 

remained primarily the task of light planes.44

Army aviation remained spread throughout the division, rather than 

being centralized into a single aviation unit. Each of the three infantry 

regiments included a fixed wing aircraft and a utility helicopter. The field 

artillery had two fixed wing aircraft for each of the four battalions. Additional fixed- and rotary- wing aircraft were spread among the division 

headquarters, the division signal company, the combat engineer battalion, 

and the divisional artillery headquarters battery for a total of 26 aircraft 

in an infantry division. Assignment of aircraft in armored divisions varied 

slightly, but followed the same general form. This system of dispersing 

aircraft to various units went directly against the recommendations of the 

Army General Board. The Army Field Forces Board No. 1, convened in 

November 1950, examined the possibility of centralizing all organic aircraft into a single aviation company. As previously discussed, the Board 

found that most divisions in Europe pooled their aircraft and concluded 

this to be a more effective method of utilizing aviation assets. This proposal failed to gain a majority, and aviation would continue, at least on 

paper, to be assigned to units within the division. Once in theater, however, almost every division pooled their air assets. In May 1952, the 7th 

Infantry Division tested the effectiveness of an Aviation Company, an experiment which proved so successful it spread throughout the 8th Army.45

Pilot training during the Korean War operated as it had during World 

War II. After completing the Air Force liaison course, future pilots would 

go to Fort Sill and complete their operational training. Pilot shortages 

during the Korean War inspired the Army to seek complete control of liaison pilot training from the Air Force. In 1953, the Army established the 

Army Aviation School at Fort Sill. Although the Army intended to train 

all of its pilots by the start of 1954, the Air Force opposed this move and 

the Army continued to rely on the Air Force to train many of its pilots. By 

the summer of 1954, the Army Aviation School outgrew its facilities and 

in September the entire program transferred to Camp Rucker, Alabama, 
25

which remains the home of Army aviation today. The interservice argument over who could train pilots continued throughout the rest of the 

1950s.46

During World War II, the majority of Army aircraft were L-4 Piper 

Cubs. The additional missions being flown by the Army’s liaison planes 

required a slightly higher performance aircraft. In the immediate aftermath 

of the war, the L-5 Sentinel, manufactured by Stinson, began replacing 

the L-4. Although slightly better performing than its predecessor, the L-5 

was considered obsolete by most people in the Army at the start of the 

Korean War. The Army intended to replace the L-4s and L-5s with L-16 

Grasshoppers and L-17 Navions, built by Aeronica and Ryan respectively, 

but budget restraints prevented them from doing so. Some pilots found 

the newer models, despite their better performance capabilities, still inadequate. Although the L-16 could fly faster than the L-4, the higher speed 

did not improve its capability in observation missions. In addition, it took 

the same amount of runway to land and takeoff, provided similar visibility for the pilot and observer, possessed a shorter operational time before 

requiring refueling, and demanded more attention to fly. A pilot of the era 

wrote that if anyone asked him what planes he wanted for World War III, 

Figure 7. Cessna L-19.

DOD photo.
26

he would reply, “Eight [L-4] Cubs and two L-5’s.” Because of the dissatisfaction with the L-16, the Army held a competition in 1950 for a replacement of the L-16. The Cessna Model 305 won the contest and received the 

designation L-19 (see Figure 7).47

Until the arrival of the L-19 in theater, the older aircraft continued to 

operate. Army aviation performed similar missions to those flown during 

World War II. During the initial invasion by North Korea, Army aircraft 

provided invaluable information about the advancing North Korean tank 

columns. As had been done during World War II, aerial observation missions were organized to ensure that at least one plane was airborne from 

dawn to dusk. This constant observation provided information critical to 

the units responsible for delaying the North Korean advance. Prior to the 

landing of the X Corps, Major General Edward Almond went up almost 

daily in search of a better landing site for the 7th Infantry Division.48

Fire adjustment also continued to be a key task for Army aviation. 

Aerial observation adjusted as much as 90 percent of all artillery fire during the Korean War. In addition to directing ground-based artillery fire, 

Army pilots assisted Air Force fighter-bombers in close air support missions and provided adjustment for naval gunfire. In one instance, a pilot 

of an L-17 used his landing lights to direct an Air Force P-51 to a North 

Korean tank.49

During the Korean War, the Army tested the expansion of organic aviation in command and control operations, specifically for armored units. 

Most of the planes had two-channel radios, one of which was tuned to the 

combat command channel, the other of which was tuned to an Air/Ground 

channel. While flying an observation mission, the aircraft would normally 

be tuned to the combat command channel, allowing the commander on 

the ground to receive constant updates on enemy movement or position. 

Intelligence staff from subordinate units could also tune to this channel, to 

instantly receive the same information. If a subordinate unit required more 

detailed aerial support from the observation plane, the pilot would switch 

to the Air/Ground channel to provide direct support to that unit. Upon completing that mission, the pilot would switch back to the combat command 

channel. It is difficult to ascertain how extensively this command and control system was used during combat in Korea. However, it represented an 

attempt to improve the way intelligence was spread throughout a division, 

by making it possible for lower echelon commanders to receive real time 

intelligence information, as it was being sent to combat command.50
27

Helicopters provided another means for improved command and control. During combat, it became possible for commanders to easily see for 

themselves how the battle was progressing. In early October 1952, Lieutenant General Reuben Jenkins, commander of IX Corps, utilized the command helicopter assigned to him to observe the battle for White Horse 

Mountain. He used his observations to plan and coordinate a counterattack by the ROK (Republic of Korea) 9th Division. In another case, Major General Samuel T. Williams received conflicting intelligence reports 

from various sources. He decided to observe the enemy front for himself. 

Following his flight, he organized a very successful defensive plan. The 

ability of helicopters to land virtually anywhere made them even more 

effective for providing commanders a personal view of the battle, as well 

as increased contact with subordinate units. One soldier commented that 

in 500 days of combat in World War II, he saw only three general officers 

visiting with the infantry. This was not the case in Korea, where the helicopter made it possible for high-ranking officers to have far more contact 

with all levels of the division.51

In terms of tactics and organization, the Army’s use of aerial observation in the Korean War remained remarkably similar to World War II. 

Aircraft remained divided amongst different units within the division, 

although the movement toward a centralized aviation company gained 

momentum. The Air Force continued to provide strategic aerial reconnaissance, while Army pilots conducted tactical observation missions. Although not without some risk, helicopters in particular made it possible for 

commanders to view the battlefield for themselves and plan their action 

accordingly. The greatest advances for Army aviation during the Korean 

War did not come in observation and reconnaissance, but in transportation. 

The possibility of aerial transportation to increase the maneuverability of 

units became a focus of Army for the next decade. The development of 

airmobility and its employment in Vietnam instigated a number of changes 

for Army aerial reconnaissance.

Airmobility and Centralization of Aviation

After the Korean War, American defense policy underwent a major 

change which had significant impact on Army aviation. A speech given 

by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 1954 outlined this 

new approach. Described as the “new look,” this new strategy focused 

on nuclear deterrent and limited the role of conventional warfare.52 This 

new strategy created a significant challenge for the Army. Adapting in a 
28

manner that would allow the Army to retain its relevance would be an 

expensive endeavor, at a time when it was becoming difficult to maintain 

the level of funding needing to operate in the current fashion. The Chief of 

Staff of the Army, General Matthew B. Ridgway, began working on a plan 

for a more mobile Army, which could continue to play a role on a nuclear 

battlefield. His plan included a large increase in Army aviation. General 

Ridgway failed to implement his proposed changes; however his successor, General Maxwell Taylor picked up where General Ridgway left off. 

Their work resulted in the formation of the Pentomic Divisions, designated Reorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD), Reorganization of 

the Combat Infantry Division (ROCID), and Reorganization of the Combat Armored Division (ROCAD). Each of these divisions contained five 

battlegroups which could be deployed in a checkerboard pattern so as not 

to provide the Soviets with a single target for a tactical nuclear bomb. The 

amount of aircraft assigned to these new divisions nearly doubled, despite 

a decrease in the overall number of soldiers in each division (see Figure 8). 

The new infantry division had 36 airplanes and helicopters designed for 

observation and reconnaissance, armored divisions had 31, and airborne 

divisions had 27. Each of these divisions also received a number of utility 

airplanes and helicopters. The Pentomic Division also centralized control 

of aviation assets in a newly formed Aviation Company, a decade after 

such an organization had first been recommended by the General Board. 

Three platoons comprised the company: the direct support platoon, the 

general support platoon, and the service platoon.53

In addition to the organizational changes, the Army began to explore 

the possibility of increasing aerial transportation to provide greater speed 

and mobility for ground forces. In April 1954, Major General James M. 

Gavin published an article in Harper’s Magazine that outlined the value 

of an airborne force utilized in a traditional cavalry role. The Army first 

tested this concept in Exercise SAGEBRUSH, a joint Air Force and Army 

exercise. The unit tested was the provisional 82d Airborne Reconnaissance 

Troop, which consisted of an airborne reconnaissance unit, an air-transFigure 8. Results of Reconnaissance Missions Flown by Army Air Forces.
29

portable heavy unit that could be used as a blocking force, an artillery and 

anti-tank force, and finally an aviation company, made up of transportation helicopters.54

In 1956, the Aviation Center at Fort Rucker formed a new unit, known 

as the Aerial Combat Reconnaissance (ACR) Company. While the reconnaissance troop unit tested in SAGEBRUSH integrated ground and 

aerial reconnaissance vehicles, this new unit exclusively focused on airborne operations.55 The possibility of armed reconnaissance represented a 

fundamental change in the Army’s use of aerial observation. With a few 

exceptions, during the two World Wars and in Korea Army aviation performed passive observation missions, in which they did not engage with 

enemy ground forces. In theory, the new ACR Company would be able 

to perform active reconnaissance missions, in which they sought out the 

enemy with the intention of engaging. Like the Airborne Reconnaissance 

Troop, the Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company was not adopted by 

the Army, but served as a model for yet another experimental unit. The 

Army tested this third concept, the Aerial Reconnaissance and Security 

Troop, in 1960.56

In 1960, the Army commissioned a board to study the future of Army 

aviation. Although officially the “Army Aircraft Requirements Board,” 

it was more commonly referred to as the Rogers Board, in honor of the 

Board Chair, Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers. After reviewing 119 

proposals from 45 companies, the board made a variety of recommendations with long-term ramifications for Army aviation. Regarding observation aircraft, the board recommended the development of a new observation helicopter. Additionally, it called for more research into electronic 

reconnaissance tools. The board also concluded that further investigation 

should be done into the “concept of air fighting units.” This recommendation paved the way for the Howze Board in 1962, from which the Airmobility concept emerged.57

In 1961, Army Chief of Staff General George Decker approved the 

“Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) 1965.” This structure abandoned the five battlegroups in favor of a three brigade structure. 

The ROAD structure doubled the number of aircraft within each division. In the new divisions, the aviation company was elevated to battalion level. In theory, three companies comprised this battalion: headquarters, aviation general support, and airmobile (light). However, this 

organization changed dramatically once units began deploying to Viet-
30

nam. Within the general support company, the aerial surveillance and 

target acquisition platoon performed all aerial reconnaissance missions 

for the division. In addition to the fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in the 

aviation battalion, the initial Field Manual included a drone section as 

part of the general support company. Although the Army did not utilize 

drones in Vietnam, they were used in Eastern Europe for photographic 

surveillance missions.58

In April 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara requested 

that the Army reevaluate its needs for aviation, after finding a previous report too conservative in its estimation of requirements. The Army 

created the US Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board and placed 

Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze in charge. The study began in 

May and finished in less than 90 days. Despite the limited time given to 

them, the Howze Board conducted 40 tests, including a three-week-long 

exercise. The Board recommended the formation of a complete Airmobile Division. It followed ROAD organization with three brigade headquarters. For transportation, it used a total for 459 aircraft and decreased 

the number of ground vehicles from 3,452 to 1,000. One-third of the 

assault elements could be airlifted simultaneously. Although the amount 

of traditional artillery in the division decreased, each division included 

35 UH-1 helicopters equipped with 2.75-inch rockets. The conclusions 

of the Howze Board survived criticism from the Air Force, members of 

Congress, and conservative elements of the Army and provided the blueprint for the 11th Air Assault Division, first tested in 1963.59

The instructions to proceed with the testing of an Airmobile Division 

came down from Secretary of Defense McNamara. The Army Chief of 

Staff placed Brigadier General Harry W.O. Kinnard in charge of testing 

the division. General Kinnard overcame numerous challenges in piecing 

together the 11th Air Assault Division, and successfully demonstrated 

the potential of his division in maneuvers against red forces comprising of the 82d Airborne Division in October 1964. The following June, 

Secretary McNamara announced the 11th Air Assault Division would 

be merged with the 2d Infantry Division, which would then switch designations with the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea. The new 1st Cavalry 

Division (Airmobile) was then deployed to Vietnam by the end of July 

1965.60
31

Vietnam

The massive expansion of organic Aviation within the Army during 

the Vietnam War, in terms of quantity and missions, presents a far more 

complicated story than was the case in Korea or World War II. Before the 

Vietnam War, the majority of aviation missions revolved around aerial observation and reconnaissance. During Korea, the Army used helicopters in 

evacuating casualties from battle, but in Vietnam the use of aerial transportation grew to include movement into and out of battles. Another mission 

which assumed a major role was aerial fire support. Aerial transportation 

and fire support joined with aerial reconnaissance in two hybrid missions: long-range reconnaissance patrol and aero-scout missions. Aerial 

reconnaissance came from a variety of sources during the Vietnam War, 

each of which is briefly summarized below. In addition to performing 

new types of missions, the Army deployed a greater variety of aerial 

vehicles to Vietnam than any previous war.

Although the amount of Army aircraft assigned to ground forces exceeded any previous war, there still was not enough to fully supply every 

division. This led to the formation of the 1st Aviation Brigade in 1966 as a 

separate entity from ground units. Initially, many feared this might create 

the same operational friction and lack of support that the AGF dealt with 

during World War II. The commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade avoided 

this problem by handing over control of aviation assets to the ground commander who required them. Hence, the Army gained the advantages of 

centralized control (standardization and training), while avoiding the pitfalls (inadequate operational control for ground commanders). At its peak, 

the 1st Aviation Brigade contained 641 fixed-wing aircraft, 441 AH-1 Cobras, 311 CH-47 cargo helicopters, 635 OH-6A observation helicopters, 

and 2,202 UH-1 utility helicopters. The rapid increase of Army aviation in 

Vietnam led to a shortage of pilots in the early stages, a problem fixed by 

increasing the number of Warrant Officer aviators.61

The 1st Aviation Brigade was divided into groups, battalions, and 

companies. These units received assignments to geographic regions, in 

which they supported the corresponding ground forces. The new types of 

aircraft and equipment available to the Army during Vietnam led to the 

creation of a variety of specialized companies. Two types of companies 

performed the majority of fixed wing observation flights: the reconnaissance aviation companies and the surveillance aviation companies.
32

The reconnaissance airplane companies (RAC), initially called surveillance airplane light, directed artillery fire, flew convoy cover, provided radio relay, and at times transported personnel. However, 75 percent 

of the time they performed visual reconnaissance missions. RACs flew 

in L-19s although in the interim between Korea and Vietnam the Army 

changed the designation to the O-1. The companies were divided into 

four platoons and a company headquarters. The TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) allotted 32 aircraft for each company, although the 

units often functioned with fewer. Most platoons supported a specific US 

Army or Republic of Vietnam Army Division. The number of planes per 

platoon varied from as few as four to as many as nine. When supporting a 

division, three aircraft were assigned to provide direct support to the division, while the others received a performed observation within a specific 

area of division’s operations. The ground forces had operational control, 

and the G2 and G3 coordinated the platoon’s missions. While flying a 

visual reconnaissance mission, the pilot usually flew low to the ground, 

looking for signs of enemy forces. A pilot from the 219th RAC claimed 

he flew so low he “could peer under the eaves of jungle huts.” If the pilot 

observed enemy units or received fire, they marked the area with a smoke 

rocket and called in supporting fire, which could come from a gunship, 

artillery, mortars, or infantry assault troops. As the war progressed, the 

Figure 9. OV-1 Mohawk.

DOD photo.
33

amount of fire taken by the O-1s decreased as enemy troops realized taking a few shots at an unarmed plane was not worth the trouble that usually 

followed.62

The surveillance airplane companies (SAC) of the 1st Aviation Brigade supported higher level units than the RACs. The SACs, equipped 

with OV-1 Mohawks (see Figure 9), divided its aircraft into two (and later 

three) platoons, each with a specific mission and unique modifications to 

their Mohawks. The visual and photographic platoon provided aerial photography. It also performed visual reconnaissance of coastal areas and the 

borders of Vietnam. The second platoon, known as the “exotic” or SLAR 

and IR platoon, flew Mohawks equipped with slide-looking airborne radar or infrared detection equipment. In 1966, the Army divided the exotic platoon into individual SLAR and IR platoons. The SACs supported 

Corps areas or the US Military Assistance Command. In the example of 

the latter, they received their missions from the J2, who processed mission requests from lower echelon commanders. Because they did not rely 

on good visibility to perform their missions, the aircraft of the SLAR 

and IR platoons could fly day or night, regardless of the weather conditions. The electronic detection equipment proved particularly effective in 

tracking the movement of enemy forces at night, their most active time. 

Figure 10. AH-1 Cobra.

DOD photo.
34

Requests for visual or photographic reconnaissance came from Corps 

area headquarters. The visual reconnaissance and photo platoon also performed hunter-killer missions, in which they teamed up with AH-1 Cobras (see Figure 10) or aircraft from either the Navy or Air Force. Like 

the visual surveillance missions of the RACs, they would seek out enemy 

forces and mark the target. The RACs and SACs generally operated as 

part of a Combat or Combat Support Aviation Battalion. For example, 

in early 1968 the 223d Combat Support Aviation Battalion included the 

183d, 219th, and 185th, and the 203d RACs and the 225th SAC. This battalion provided approximately 80 percent the intelligence for the II Corps 

Area, while half of the missions performed in that zone originated from 

information gathered by the 223d.63

The 1st Aviation Brigade also included a number of air cavalry squadrons, similar to those found within the ground based divisions. Operationally, these units generally were assigned to one of the Field Force headquarters, who would send them in support of a division or brigade within 

the Field Forces area of operations. Some of the platoons in these squadrons also performed “fire fly” missions, a night-time patrol designed to 

seek-and-destroy enemy sampans. The mission consisted of three helicopters: one flying high above armed with a .50 caliber machine gun, an observation aircraft equipped with seven C-130 landing lights, and another 

gunship flying low. The high flying ship provided cover for the two low 

flyers. The observer used the makeshift spotlight to search out the enemy. 

Upon discovery, the “invisible” gunships trailing both swept in to destroy 

the target with a combination of rockets and mini-gun fire. In just one of 

the missions, the fire fly team destroyed a convoy of 47 sampans carrying 

war material to Vietnam from Cambodia.64

As US forces began to withdraw from Vietnam, the Army Aviation 

continued to operate at nearly the same capacity as it had since 1965. In 

December 1970, ground forces declined to half of what they had been at 

their maximum. Army aviation reached its highest point in the same year. 

However, over the next two years the Army withdrew much of its aircraft. 

The 1st Aviation Brigade declined from 24,000 personnel in July 1971 to 

5000 in July 1972. In March 1973, the last Army air unit departed. Over 

the course of the Vietnam War, the 1st Aviation Brigade flew 30 million 

sorties.65

The Aviation battalion field manuals published in 1965 and 1967 assigned the task of reconnaissance to the general support company. However, only two general support companies deployed to Vietnam: the 11th 
35

and the 163d. The 11th provided support to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) while the 163d served under the 164th Aviation Group in the IV 

Corps Tactical Zone. The aviation battalions assigned to the infantry divisions comprised two airmobile companies and an air cavalry troop, with 

other companies assigned to the battalion from the 1st Aviation Brigade 

as needed. The air cavalry troop provided the primary source for organic 

aerial reconnaissance within the division.66

Although considered a part of the armored cavalry squadron, the air 

cavalry troops worked closely with the aviation battalion. The primary 

responsibility of the troop was the aero-scout mission. Three main elements comprised the troop: a section of light observation helicopters, a 

squadron of air transportable rifles, and a section of armed helicopters for 

fire support. On an aero-scout mission, the observation helicopters would 

fly low to draw enemy fire. Upon contact with the enemy, the pilot of 

the observation helicopter would call for support. Small groups of enemy 

forces (squad or less) would be engaged by the aero-rifle platoon. Prisoners captured in this manner often provided valuable intelligence. If the 

enemy force was platoon size or larger, the observer would drop smoke 

grenades to mark the target, then hover nearby to help direct fire from the 

Cobras. It took only seconds from the time the observer marked the target 

for the Cobras to engage.67

DOD photo.

Figure 11. OH-13 Sioux.
36

Figure 12. OH-6 Cayuse.

DOD photo.

Figure 13. OH-5832 Kiowa.

DOD photo.
37

Accomplishment of the aero-scout mission relied on the diversity of 

aircraft available to the Army. The initial light observation helicopter used 

by the Army was the OH-13 (see Figure 11), which had been in service 

since the start of the Korean War. By 1966, the Army needed a new observation helicopter, and they wanted something small and cheap, since most 

did not survive long on the battlefield. In the competition to find a suitable replacement for the OH-13, the Hughes OH-6 Cayuse (see Figure 12) 

won. Nicknamed the “Loach,” the OH-6A first arrived in 1967. The Loach 

was smaller, lighter, and faster than its predecessor, the OH-13 Sioux. It 

could fly beneath the jungle canopy along trails to seek out enemy forces. 

Hughes increased the price on the OH-6, forcing the Army to switch to the 

Bell OH-58 (see Figure 13) for observation.68

The second aero-scout component was the UH-1 Iroquois (see Figure 

14). Better known as the Huey, the various models of the UH-1 performed 

the majority of transportation and MEDEVAC missions during the Vietnam 

War. Development for the Huey began in 1955 by Bell Aircraft Corporation and the first tests took place in 1958. In 1960, Bell delivered the first 

UH-1A’s to the Army. The following year the UH-1B came into service. 

Although a number of other variants saw action in Vietnam, the UH-1B 

Figure 14. UH-1 Iroquois.

DOD photo.
38

was the most common. The Hueys in the aero-scout mission transported the 

aero-rifle squads. If the Loach pilot or observer made contact with a small 

group of enemy forces, the aero-rifle squad would be inserted to engage. 

Before the development of helicopters capable of transporting units and 

keeping up with observation craft, the only way the Army could perform 

reconnaissance in force missions was by using their observation aircraft as 

forward air controllers for the Air Force. With the aero-scout mission, aerial 

reconnaissance in force could be performed entirely with organic units.69

Armed helicopters comprised the final aero-scout element. Army 

aviators had rigged their observation and liaison aircraft with armaments 

since World War II. These modifications were never official, due to a prohibition on weaponizing Army aviation in the AGF/AAF (and later Army/

Air Force) agreements. Despite this ban, in the 1950s the Army began secret experiments at Fort Rucker, designed to test the feasibility of mounting machine guns and rockets on their utility helicopters. Initial concern 

existed as to the exact effect firing a weapon from an airborne vehicle 

would have. They performed the first weapons tests with the helicopter 

mounted on a wooden platform. Only when these tests showed that no 

structural damage occurred to the helicopter while firing the machine guns 

and rockets did they actually try firing weapons from the air. These tests 

demonstrated that rotary-wing craft could be used for fire support; however, not until the mid-1960s would the concept be fully refined. The first 

combat helicopters in Vietnam were utility helicopters modified to carry 

M-60 machine guns. Because of the limitations of these modified aircraft, 

in 1966 the Army ordered the AH-1 Cobra from Bell, the first dedicated 

attack helicopter in the Army. The Cobra made it possible to perform reconnaissance in force missions against enemy units too large for the aerorifle squad.70

Post Vietnam and the 1980s

After Vietnam, the Army would not fight a large-scale war until Operation DESERT STORM. However, aviation within the Army continued 

to evolve. Helicopters proved themselves to be highly effective during 

the war in Southeast Asia, but opposing forces never possessed a specialized anti-air system until the end. This would not be the case, should a 

war break out with the Soviets in Europe. In the 1980s, this led to an increased emphasis on joint-operations between Army aviation and the Air 

Force. The Army could assist the Air Force in achieving air superiority 

by using its new AH-64 Apache helicopters to engage and destroy enemy 
39

air-defense radars, and laser-mark targets for Air Force A-10s and F-16s. 

AirLand Battle doctrine solidified the role of Army aviation with the national defense strategy. The ability of the Apaches to perform deep attacks 

fit exceptionally well within the AirLand Battle concept.71

In 1983, aviation became a separate branch within the Army, putting 

it on the same level as infantry, artillery, and armor. Prior to this, aviation officers divided their time between aviation and one of the other 

branches.The creation of divisional aviation brigades greatly increased 

the command opportunities for aviation officers. The 1980s were a period of almost continuous reorganization within the Army, during which 

multiple division types were tested and adapted, only to be changed yet 

again. Although the organization of organic aviation changed depending 

on the type of the unit supported, the basic responsibilities and types of 

units employed did not. All of the divisions contained an aviation brigade, 

which included a reconnaissance squadron. This squadron continued to 

perform the reconnaissance in force, aero-scout missions first conducted 

in Vietnam. Despite the numerous changes, the missions performed by 

air cavalry remained an important part of Army strategy. In an interview 

conducted by Army Aviation Digest, General Donn A. Starry stated, “Air 

Cavalry is essential to the battle in Europe.”72

Control of electronic surveillance assets, specifically the EH-60 Blackhawks (a UH-60 with electronic surveillance sensors), went back and forth 

between the aviation brigade and the military intelligence battalion. The 

military intelligence battalion processed the results of the electronic surveillance missions; but lacked the required maintenance and logistical 

support. In the mid-1970s, the Army began experimenting with equipping 

UH-1s with a transmitter capable of sending real-time video back to the 

unit. This feed could be recorded and used by military intelligence in its 

briefing. The ability to provide real-time intelligence achieved the objective first set out by the Army in World War I, to see the battlefield as it 

truly was, not as the pilot or observer interpreted it. This allowed soldiers 

trained in interpretation to provide the analysis. This technological innovation was critical for the development of UASs. The OV-1 Mohawks 

also continued to provide electronic surveillance. In April 1978, the 15th 

Military Intelligence Aerial Exploitation Battalion was created to test the 

concept of bringing all these units together to support the Corps. This unit 

included both the aviation and military intelligence assets needed to perform the mission.73
40

Despite these and other changes, the role of Army aviation in the reconnaissance role changed very little after Vietnam. Aero-scout missions 

performed by Air Cavalry remained critical. Light observation helicopters provided visual reconnaissance of the immediate battlefield as well 

as command and control, while larger, utility aircraft like the Huey and 

Blackhawk were modified to perform electronic surveillance. These units 

operated organically within their assigned division, with the exception of 

fixed-wing electronic surveillance aircraft that could cover such a broad 

area it was better suited to be a corps asset. The Air Force accepted the 

necessity and benefits of the Army possessing its own air assets, including 

aerial fire-support.

From 1917 until 1990, the most significant changes in aerial reconnaissance occurred in the technological, not tactical, realm. In World War I 

and DESERT STORM, ground commanders wanted aircraft to provide 

information regarding the location and activities of the enemy. The type of 

aircraft used for reconnaissance mattered little, compared with the necessity of quick response and availability. Improvements in flight speed and 

endurance were irrelevant if they reduced either of these two critical areas.
41

Notes

1. Robert Jackson, Army Wings (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2006), 22.

2. James J. Cooke, The US Air Service in the Great War, 1917–1919 

(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 2-5.

3. Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to 

April 1917 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1958), 40-53.

4. Cooke, 6, 25; D.F. Harrison, “A History of Army Aviation,” (Draft, Center of Military History, 1971), 6.

5. Maurer Maurer, ed., The US Air Service in World War I, vol. I (Washington, 

DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978), 51. For a detailed history of Army Aviation in 

1915 and 1916 see Hennessy, chapters 7 and 8 and Maurer, vol. II, part 1.

6. Mauer, vol. I, 54, 70.

7. Jackson, 26; John Christopher, Balloons at War: Gasbags, Flying Bombs 

& Cold War Secrets (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, Ltd., 2004), 65; Hennessy, 40.

8. Cooke, 19-21; Maurer, vol. I, 51.

9. Irving B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial 

Weapon by the United States During World War I (Washington, DC: Office of Air 

Force History, 1983), 49.

10. US Army, Field Manual for Balloon Service Companies, Translation of 

a French Document from Aviation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), 22-25.

11. Colonel Terrence J. Finnegan (R), Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation on the Western Front—World War 

I (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006), 221-225.

12. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army 

Weapons and Theories of War, 1904–1905 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 

1982), 104; Cooke, 24.

13. John J. McGrath, Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units 

in Modern Armies (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 

42.

14. The tables of organization and equipment are printed in United States 

Army in the World War, 1917–1919, vol. I (Washington, DC: Center of Military 

History, 1988). The assignments of squadrons to army, corps, and division forces 

are printed in Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, 

vols. I and II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988).

15. Maurer, vol. I, 176-77; Finnegan, 225-26.

16. Field Service Manual for Balloon Companies, 12; Christopher, 68.

17. Cooke, 64, 122; Maurer, vol. I, 255. Maurer, all volumes, provides the 

most complete operational history of the AEF Air Service during World War I.

18. Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the US Army, 1919–1939 (Washington, DC: 

Office of Air Force History, 1987), 41; Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air 
42

Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 

History, 1985), 17.

19. James P. Tate, The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy toward Aviation, 

1919–1941 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1998), 7; Tate, 29.

20. Harrison, 14-16.

21. Irving B. Holley, Jr., Evolution of the Liaison-Type Airplane, 1917–1944 

(AAF Historical Office, 1946), 5, 52-53.

22. A. Verdurand, “Flying Observation Posts for Artillery,” trans. by J.S.W., 

Field Artillery Journal 29 (May 1939): 198-99.

23. Lieutenant Colonel E.D. Cooke, “All God’s Chillun Got Wings,” Infantry Journal 47 (November 1940): 603.

24. Cooke, 603.

25. Edgar F. Raines, Jr. Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern US Army 

Aviation in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 

19-20, 38-39; John W. Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II: Part 1, 

1940–1943,” US Army Aviation Digest (June 1992), 12; Harrison, 39.

26. Harrison, 19-20, 43.

27. Raines, 68.

28. Harrison, II-6-7; Kitchens, “Part 1,” 14.

29. Raines, 148-51.

30. Kitchens, “Part 1,” 15; Andrew Ten Eyck, Jeeps in the Sky: The Story of 

the Light Plane (New York: Commonwealth Books, Inc., 1946), 87-89.

31. John W. Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II, part 2: 

1944–1946,” US Army Aviation Digest (July 1992), 17.

32. Kitchens, “Part 2,” 22.

33. General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, “Study of Organic Field Artillery Air Observation,” 2-5.

34. General Board, 7-9.

35. James A. Huston, “Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II: The Army 

Experience,” Military Review 32, no. 4 (July 1952): 45.

36. General Board, United States Force, European Theater, “The Utilization 

of Tactical Air Force Reconnaissance Units of the Army Air Forces to Secure 

Information for Ground Forces in the European Theater,” 1-4.

37. Huston, 33-35, 44, 81-83.

38. For more on the development of ground-liaison officers, see General 

Board, European Theater of Operations, “Organization, Operations, and Equipment of Air-Ground Liaison in all Echelons from Divisions Upward”; and Major 

James J. Lauer, “Army Ground Liaison Teams” (MMAS Thesis, Command and 

General Staff College, 1996); Major William J. Montgomery, “Ground Forces 

Uses of Aerial Photography,” Military Review 24, no. 10 (January, 1945): 24. 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, “Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle 

Team,” (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948), 92-93; Lieutenant Colo-
43

nel Ernest Samusson, Jr., “Aerial Photography: An Army Problem,” Military Review 33, no. 5 (August 1953): 48.

39. Samusson, 51.

40. Samusson, 50-54.

41. “The Utilization of Tactical Air Force Reconnaissance Units of the Army Air 

Forces to Secure Information for Ground Forces in the European Theater,” 9-11.

42. James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From its Beginnings to 

the War on Terror (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), 48; For a detailed description 

of creation of the Air Force as a separate service, see Herman S. Wolk, “The Quest 

for Independence,” in Winged Shield, Winged Sword vol. I, ed. Bernard C. Nalty 

(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 371-98.

43. “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 21 April 

1948, 729; http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll11 (accessed 5 August 2008); 

Richard P. Weinert, Jr., A History of Army Aviation, 1950–1962 (Fort Monroe: Office of the Command Historian, 1991), 10.

44. Captain Louis B. Ely, “The Autogiro–an Observation Post,” Field Artillery Journal 20, no. 3 (May 1939): 202-205; Harrison, 25, 28, 98-101. See also, 

Ten Eyck, 89-90,

45. “The Structure of Army Aviation,” Aviation Week, 4 April 1952, 83; 

Weinert, 18; Harrison, 153.

46. Weinert, 97-100.

47. Captain Morris G. Rawlings, “Artillery’s Aviation,” Combat Forces 

Journal 1, no. 5 (December 1950): 17; Weinert, 48; and Harrison, 136.

48. Harrison, 131.

49. Harrison, 132-33.

50. Captain James C. Smith, “Tactical Employment of Light Aviation with 

the Armored Division” Armor 61, no. 5 (September 1952): 8.

51. “Helicopters in Korea, 1 July 1951–31 August 1953,” Army Unit Military History Detachment, 98, 101.

52. Weinert, 103.

53. Christopher C.S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine 

(Westport: Praeger, 1994), 62-63.

54. Williams, 70-71.

55. Cheng, 136.

56. Cheng, 137.

57. Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, Airmobility: 1961–1971 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), 9.

58. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions 

and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC; Center of Military History, 1998), 296; 

FM 1-15, Aviation Company (1961); and FM 1-15, Aviation Company, (1965).

59. Tolson, 20-24; J.A. Stockfisch, The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 22.
44

60. John R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare 

(New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969), 285-87.

61. Tolson, 102-04; Shelby L. Stanton, US Army and Allied Ground Forces in Vietnam: Order of Battle (Washington, DC: US News Books, 1981), 109; 

Williams, 137.

62. “Annual Supplement History of the 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1), January 1967–31 December 1967,” 6, 44; http://www.221st.org/history.htm (accessed 4 September 2008); Unit History, 221st Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane Light) 24 March 1965–31 December 1965,” 10-12; all articles 

from Hawk available from http://www.221st.org/history.htm (accessed 4 September 

2008); David R. Wood, “74th Reconnaissance Airplane Company,” Hawk 2, no. 11 

(July 1969): 15; Richard M. Emerson, “Headhunters: 219th Seeks Hiding Enemy,” 

Hawk 3, no. 7 (March 1970): 6-7. Another unit history has only 24 aircraft per 

RAC. Regardless of this discrepancy, the organization and operation remained the 

same. “Annual Supplement History of the 21st Aviation Company (Surveillance 

Airplane Light) 1 January 1967–31 December 1967,” 2-3, http://www.geocities.

com/davidwchandles/1967history.htm?20084 (accessed 5 August 2008); Victor B. 

Lackey, “Wings of Freedom . . . 212th CSAB,” Hawk 2, no. 7 (March 1969): 13.

63. “History of the 73d Aviation Company (Aerial Surveillance) 1 January 

1966–31 December 1966,” http://www.ov-1.com/73rd_SAC/73rd_History-66.

html (accessed 3 September 2008); “History of the 244th Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane) 29 July 1967–15 July 1970,” http://www.ov-1.com/244th_

AVN/244th-history70.html (accessed 4 September 2008); “223rd Combat Support 

Aviation Battalion,” Hawk 1, no. 6 (February 1968): 6.

64. David R. Wood, “Looking for Trouble . . . 3/17 Air Cavalry Squadron,” 

Hawk, (August 1969), 2-5; Jay G. Goldsberry, “Hunting Charlie by Night: Fire Fly,” 

Hawk, December, 1968, 4-5.

65. Williams, 162, 167, 170.

66. FM 1-15 (1965) and FM 1-15 (1967); Stanton, Order of Battle, 110-11.

67. McGrath, 152; Captain Matthew M. Serletic, “Aero-Scout . . . What’s it 

All About?” United States Army Aviation Digest, February, 1971, 31.

68. Williams, 133-34.

69. Weinert, 203-04.

70. Weinert, 162; Williams, 74, 120-22.

71. Williams, 212-217.

72. “General Starry on Army Aviation,” US Army Aviation Digest, November, 

1978, 6.

73. Captain Domenic R. Sette, “Intensified Aerial Intelligence Collection,” 

US Army Aviation Digest, (October 1974), 16; Richard P. Fulton, “15th Military Intelligence Aerial Exploitation Battalion (15th MI AEB),” US Army Aviation Digest, 

(October 1980), 42-43.
45

Chapter 2

Development of Unmanned Flight in the United States

In a test that took place several years ago, a small, pilotless biplane took off from Cook Field in Dayton, Ohio. 

A team led by the inventor Charles Kettering had developed the airborne contraption, conceived as a top-secret 

weapon to deliver explosives against enemy troops. That 

was 1918, toward the end of World War I. The craft was 

the first practical unmanned airplane.

–John DeGespari, “look, Ma, no pilot!” Mechanical Engineering, November 2003

Early Experiments

While the rapid growth of UAVs during the Long War could create 

the illusion that unmanned flight only recently became of interest, experiments with unmanned flight date to the early 20th century. Nikola Tesla, 

whose promotion of using alternating current for electrical distribution 

supplanted Thomas Edison’s direct current system, first hypothesized 

about the possibility of unmanned flight in the 1890s. Although Tesla 

had more success in his experiments with remote-controlled torpedoes, 

he shared his ideas about remotely-piloted aircraft with Elmer Sperry. In 

1917, Sperry received the first military contract for an unmanned flight 

system to develop an aerial torpedo for the US Navy.1

In most technological developments, inventors improve or add 

to the components designed by their predecessors, and the history of 

UAVs is no different. The Wright Brothers demonstrated the ability of a 

heavier-than-air craft to remain aloft. Operating such a vehicle without 

human control required a method of stabilizing the aircraft. Elmer Sperry, 

together with Glenn Hammond Curtiss, designed a gyroscope capable of 

keeping a plane level during flight. In an airplane safety competition in 

June 1914, Sperry displayed his work. While flying by the crowd, he took 

his hands off the controls and raised them up out of the cockpit while his 

mechanic walked out onto the wing. Sperry’s gyroscope made it possible 

for an aircraft to remain stable in flight without constant human control. 
46

The device also included a mechanism for causing the plane to dive 

after traveling a specific distance. Getting the plane into the air in the 

first place proved the next major challenge. After receiving the Navy 

contract in October 1917, Sperry delivered a total of six test aircraft to 

the Navy. After a dozen test flights, which tested different launch methods, Sperry found that a fly-wheel catapult worked best for getting the 

planes airborne; however, the fragile structure of the test planes caused 

them to crash before achieving flight. The flywheel catapult eventually succeeded in launching a new airframe model. Although the model 

launched properly, the device responsible for making the aircraft dive 

at a specific distance malfunctioned and the plane flew beyond its designated “crash site” and disappeared over the horizon into the Atlantic. 

After the war, the Navy continued some research into a “flying bomb” 

but cancelled the program in 1922.2

The Army became involved in unmanned flight research in 1918. In 

January, Charles Kettering, famous for his invention of the self-starting 

automobile engine, buuilt a prototype UAV for the Army. Known as the 

“Bug,” Kettering’s aircraft had a counter that measured the number of 

rotations made by the propeller. Upon reaching a preset number, the 

device cut power to the engine, sending the Bug toward the earth and, 

hopefully, toward its target. The Army ordered around 100 Bugs. However the war ended before they could be used in combat. In what became a trend for unmanned flight, the cessation of battle decreased the 

military interest in wartime programs. Accompanying this wane, came a 

decline in funding for research. Limited research into “aerial torpedoes” 

did continue until 1926, under Sperry. But it was not until the late 1930s 

that the military would again take a serious interest in UAVs.3

Elsewhere, the British constructed a number of UAVs during the 

interwar period, to be used both as flying bombs and as practice for 

targets anti-aircraft artillery. One of these craft, the Larynx successfully 

flew 112 miles in 1927, but still landed 5 miles away from its target. 

Although the British performed the initial tests over water, in late 1929 

they began testing the aircraft in the deserts of Iraq. There 75 years later 

UAVs would become a critical tool of the US military. In 1933, a new 

British model, known as the Fairley Queen, successfully evaded naval 

gunfire for two hours, proving both the need for more gunnery training 

within the Royal Navy and the ability of remote-controlled aircraft to 

provide realistic training.4
47

Unmanned Flight in World War II

The British program led to great improvement in the skill of their naval gunners. When United States Navy Admiral William H. Standley observed the Fairley Queen in action, he recommended that the US Navy 

pursue a similar program. Research began on the project in 1936 and two 

years later the Navy successfully used a radio controlled aircraft to test the 

gunners of the USS Ranger (CV-4). In 1942, the Navy conducted the first 

experiments adding weapons to a UAV. They attached a television camera 

and transmitter to the aircraft, along with a torpedo. Upon making contact 

with an enemy ship, the operator would use a small TV monitor to guide 

the UAV on an attack run and release the torpedo. Maintenance problems 

with the UAVs and the success of manned carrier aviation against the Japanese fleet made many naval commanders, including Commander of the 

Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, skeptical of the program. In a series of combat tests in September and October of 1944, the Navy tested 46 

of the drones in which 29 hit their target. The program’s critics eventually 

triumphed, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King cancelled 

the program even before the tests were completed.5

The Army pursued UAVs for anti-aircraft target practice at the same 

time as the Navy. Reginald Denny, an actor and inventor, became interested 

in a military application for unmanned flight after successfully marketing 

a remote control toy plane. Flying enthusiasts could purchase the frame 

for Denny’s toy aircraft for $10, the engine for $17.50, and the propeller 

for $2; or, they could purchase the whole kit for $25. He first approached 

the Army about producing a remote controlled plane for the military in 

1935, but his proposal failed to generate any interest. In 1938, however, 

the Artillery Branch asked for a demonstration of one of his models. The 

subsequent show so impressed the observers that they purchased the prototype and Denney signed a contract to produce three more aircraft to be 

used for further testing. In 1940, he received a contract to produce the 

RP-4, based on his latest model, which the Army redesignated the OQ-1. 

Denny and his team continued to refine their product. Throughout the war, 

his radio plane company produced and sold 50 OQ-1s, 600 newer models 

OQ-2s, 5,822 OQ-3s, and 2,084 OQ-14s to the Army and the Navy. The 

performance capabilities of these UAVs increased dramatically over time. 

While the OQ-2 was powered only by a 6.5-horsepower engine capable 

of reaching speeds of 85 miles per hour, the OQ-14 had a 22-horsepower 

engine and could fly at 140 miles per hour. The various models possessed 
48

a wingspan of between 12 feet 3 inches to 11 feet 6 inches, and a length of 

between 8 feet 8 inches and 9 feet 3 inches. During the war Denny’s planes 

only operated as target drones. However, after the war the Army adapted 

the RP-4 into its first reconnaissance drone.6

The most famous use of unmanned flight in World War II was Germany’s deployment of V-1 and V-2 rockets. Not particularly effective, only 

one-fourth of the V-1s launched at London actually hit the city. However, 

they made the Allies spend far more resources and effort in defending 

against the attacks than it cost to launch them. In 1944, engineers in the 

US built an American rocket based on pieces of V-1s. Logistical problems 

kept the US version, the JB-2, from being widely used in the European 

Theater of Operation. American engineers spent considerable effort improving the guidance systems of the JB-2 and subsequent models.7

Two other American experiments in unmanned flight, Operation 

APHRODITE and Project Anvil, constituted part of the Allied effort to 

eliminate the menace of the V-1s. In Operation APHRODITE, a twoman crew flew old B-17 bombers with explosives toward a V-1 launch 

site. With 25,000 pounds of explosives onboard, these remote controlled 

bombers held the largest nonnuclear payload in history. Before crossing 

the channel, the crew bailed out and another B-17 controlled the aircraft 

via radio controls. Known as the BQ-7, the aircraft never succeeded in 

destroying their targets. Some suddenly turned around half-way across 

the Channel and had to be destroyed. German anti-aircraft fire shot down 

the others. The US Navy attempted similar tests, known as Project Anvil, using B-24s instead of B-17s. The older brother of President John F. 

Kennedy, Joseph Kennedy, died when his BQ-8, the nomenclature for 

the explosive filled B-24, exploded before he and his co-pilot could bail 

out. Project Anvil did achieve a minor success, when a BQ-8 damaged a 

German sub pen.8

In spite of the shortcomings in operational use, World War II represented a milestone for UAV development. The Army and the Navy 

purchased UAVs in mass for target practice. Now that the concept of 

unmanned flight had been validated, researchers could begin experimenting with them in other roles. The beginning of the Cold War assured that 

defense spending would continue to be a priority in the Federal budget. 

Although many UAV projects withered during the Cold War due to budgetary constraints, there would never be another gap as there had been 

during the late 1920s and early 1930s in which no research into unmanned 

flight was conducted.
49

Early Cold War Tests

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Army, Navy, and Air Force developed 

new missions and new UAVs to perform them. The majority of UAVs 

tested after World War II based their design on previous aerial targets or 

existing manned aircraft. Most of the programs of the era never became 

operational as a result of technological and budgetary limitations. Despite 

enormous differences in technology between then and now, many of the 

concepts developed into the 1950s and 1960s remain the same. The Army 

tested small, tactical UAVs, similar to the Shadow being used today and 

the Navy experimented with mounting weapons on a remotely controlled 

helicopter. Some military leaders worried that the growth of UAVs might 

eventually make pilots obsolete. Research into unmanned flight during the 

1950s began to take on some of the characteristics still present today. A 

survey organized by branch of service follows.

Army

In tests representing the first attempt to use a drone to replace a 

manned aircraft, the Signal Corps conducted a number of experiments 

with unmanned flight for the Army. One of the first projects examined 

the feasibility of using a remotely controlled drone to lay communication 

wire along the battle front. A catapult launched the aircraft with wire attached. Once airborne, a controller on the ground guided the drone to its 

Figure 15. RP-71 from Radioplane.

Photo by Frederick I. Ordway III and Ronald C. Wakeford.
50

destination, at which point the engine cut out and a parachute deployed. 

The drone was then recovered and reused. As discussed in the first chapter, the Army had used liaison planes for a similar mission in World War 

II.9

In 1955 the Army began experiments with using UAVs to perform 

reconnaissance missions. The Signal Corps tested the RP-71 (see Figure 

15) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The design of the RP-71 was based on 

Denney’s RP-4 target drone. It had an identical wingspan and length of 

12 feet. The RP-71 could ascend at over 3,000 feet per minute and reach 

a top cruising speed of between 185 and 224 miles per hour (different sources record varying top speeds). It operated at altitudes between 

several hundred feet and four miles high and could stay in the air for 

around 30 minutes. The drone could be launched with only five minutes 

of preparation, and its catapult launch system allowed it to operate from 

the front lines, under the direct control of a ground commander. An operator on the ground used a stick box and an onboard camera to control 

the aircraft. After performing its mission, the controller flew the RP-71 

back over friendly lines, cut the engine and deployed a parachute for 

recovery. Aerial photographs taken by the drone were processed and in 

the hands of the commander in under an hour. Even in its earliest form, 

the RP-71 solved many of the traditional problems Army ground commanders had with aerial reconnaissance support. It was stationed with 

his forces, it could fly in weather that would ground other aircraft, and 

the intelligence it gathered could be processed by the unit’s staff and be 

available for use in a timely manner.10

Although the RP-71 never deployed in a combat environment, the 

Army used them in limited capacity until at least 1970. It operated under numerous designations, including SD-1 (SD for surveillance drone, 

also AN/USD-1), MQM-57A, and “Falconer.” During the 1960s the 

Army deployed the drones to Germany as part of the divisional aviation unit. A drone section functioned as part of the aerial surveillance 

and target acquisition platoon. During a mission, the controller sat in 

the mobile radar and tracking cabin to guide the RP-71 to its target. 

While in the cabin, the radar tracked the flight on a map overlay. Other 

instruments in the cabin provided the operator with the altitude, speed, 

and distance from the cabin. Once the drone reached the target, the 

controller activated the camera. The use of the radar allowed the RP-71 

to function beyond the visual range of the controller, greatly increasing 

its value. In 1961, the British military purchased 35 of the RP-71s from 

Radioplane.11
51

Four other models received the SD designation. The units that followed became progressively larger and heavier, while achieving higher 

flight and faster speeds that made them more suited to strategic reconnaissance than tactical missions. The SD-2 first performed tests for the 

Army in 1958. Initially designed to be a reconnaissance drone, Aerojet weaponized the initial design, adding the capability to distribute a 

chemical or bacteriological agent. It could also be equipped with sidelooking airborne radar. The Army awarded Aerojet several contracts for 

this model. The mobility of the SD-2 system represented one of its key 

aspects, as only two standard 6x6 trucks with trailers were needed to 

transport the drone, its launcher, and control system. Aerojet built a total 

of 35 SD-2s, however they never entered active service for the Army. 

The Army Combat Surveillance Agency, formed in 1957, managed the 

development of the SD-2, as well as the SD-4 and -5. They cancelled the 

SD-2 program in 1966 due to problems with the navigations system.12

The SD-3, -4, and -5 went through only limited testing before being 

cancelled by the Army. The SD-3 possessed a twin-boom structure with 

push propellers, similar to the Pioneer and Shadow UAVs used today. The 

SD-3 system included different sensor arrays built into interchangeable 

nose units. Capable of film, infrared, and radar, these nose units could be 

changed quickly and easily to correspond to its mission. Both the SD-4 

and -5 received their power from jet engines. This made them substantially 

heavier (3,500 and 8,500 pounds respectively), but capable of flying at almost the speed of sound. Like the SD-3, the SD-4 possessed interchangeable noses with different sensor arrays. High costs led the Army to cancel 

the SD-4 in 1961, before it could be test flown. The SD-5 was designed 

Figure 16. Early Army Reconnaissance Drones.

Designation

Years in

Operation

(including

development)

Weight

(lbs) Length Wingspan TopSpeed

Maximum

Altitude Engine Type Endurance

SD‐1

(RP‐71,

MQM‐57A,

'Falconer')

1955‐1970 430 184 mph 15000 ft Piston Engine 40 min.

SD‐2

(MQM‐58A,

'Overseer')

1958‐1966 1135 16'1" 13'4" 345 mph 20000 ft Piston Engine, 2

Booster Rockets 45 min.

SD‐3

('Sky Spy') 1958‐1963          

SD‐4

('Swallow') 1959‐1961 3500 32'0" 11'0" 800 mph 60000 ft Jet Engine, 2Booster Rockets

SD‐5

('Osprey') 1960‐1963 8500 36'0" 24'0" Mach 0.9 Jet Engine, 1Booster Rocket

3 hr 55

min

Information 

 Not Available

Information Not Available 
52

to perform electronic reconnaissance, and could be equipped with sidelooking airborne radar, infrared, or various cameras. It first flew in 1960 in 

Yuma, Arizona. Like the SD-4, however, the Army believed it too expensive to be worth pursuing and cancelled the program in 1963 (see Figure 

16).13

Although a project of the Marine Corps, the “Bikini” produced by Republic deserves a mention with the Army UAVs because of its similarity to 

the current Shadow UAV. The Bikini went against the trend of larger and 

faster drones. It weighed only 60 pounds and could be carried in a single 

trailer and launched from the back of a jeep. For takeoff, it used compressed air cylinders that were recharged by the flame-thrower compressor 

already within an infantry battalion. The operator had to maintain visual 

contact with the drone, limiting its 30 minute flight time to a range of 

2,000 meters. However, the photographs captured by the Bikini could be 

processed and printed within minutes of its return. At the time, the Commandant of the Marine Corps defined the Bikini as “a small item that covers large areas of interest.” The Corps intended to assign a drone platoon 

to each infantry battalion and one more for the regimental commander. 

However, technical problems led to the project’s termination in 1967.14

During this period, the Army made significant progress in developing 

a key component of reconnaissance UAVs: photo transmission systems. 

Military Review reported the development of one such system in 1959 that 

was scheduled for testing by the end of the year. Although no follow-up 

article reported on the test results, by 1964 the Fairchild Corporation had 

developed a system capable of transmitting photographs from an airborne 

camera to a ground station. The system took two minutes to display the 

initial picture, with subsequent pictures becoming available every eight 

seconds. Traditional film continued to be used in the camera, so after landing it could be developed for further scrutiny. The airborne component 

weighed 125 pounds, a significant payload for all but the larger, jet-propelled UAVs. As this technology progressed, however, it greatly increased 

the potential of UAVs in the reconnaissance role.15

Navy

The Navy pioneered the use of UAVs as a weapons platform with experiments during World War II, and it continued to pursue this application in the 

1950s. Apart from target drones, the Navy continued development of two 

UAVs in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1953, Kaman modified the HTK-1, initial-
53

ly designed as a pilot trainer aircraft for the Navy, to be controlled remotely. 

During the initial tests, a safety pilot rode in the cockpit, in case something 

went wrong with the remote control. After nearly 100 hours of flying time, 

the Navy ordered three more of the drones for further testing in June 1955. 

The controls for the rotary wing Kaman Drone functioned similarly to the 

controls for other UAVs of the era. It required a slightly more complicated 

system because of the ability of a helicopter to fly straight up and down, as 

well as backward. Despite the more complicated controls, the drone could 

be controlled by someone without pilot training after only a few hours of instruction. In 1957, it flew its first mission without a safety pilot onboard. The 

Navy experimented with arming the Kaman Drone, research that laid the 

groundwork for their next project. Other missions envisioned for the UAV 

included surveillance, laying communication cable, and transporting cargo. 

Utimately a new UAV, the DSN-1, replaced the Kaman Drone. The DSN-1 

was part of the Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH) program.16

In 1960, the Navy acquired the DSN-1 from Gyrodyne. Like the Kaman 

Drone, the DSN-1 evolved from a previously developed manned helicopter. 

The DSN-1 successfully landed onboard a destroyer at sea in July 1960. 

Figure 17. Navy QH-50 “DASH” UAV.

 US Navy photo.
54

The Navy envisioned using UAVs to increase the strike capability of older 

destroyers against submarines. In World War II, once a destroyer made sonar 

contact with an enemy submarine, the ship would have to maneuver toward 

the target and close the distance between sonar range and weapons range. 

During this time, the submarine had time to escape or launch its own attack. 

The DASH program, part of the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization 

(FRAM) Project, sought to give the destroyer an improved anti-submarine 

weapon. Launching a torpedo from an unmanned helicopter greatly extended the strike range of a destroyer.17

The DSN-3 used a turbine powered engine that provided nearly four 

times the horsepower of the DSN-1 and became the standard UAV for the 

DASH program in 1963 (see Figure 17). The designation changed to QH50C shortly after this. Unlike the Kaman Drone, the QH-50C could operate beyond visual range of the destroyer. It still used line-of-sight controls 

for takeoff, landing, and while flying near the ship. Once the drone closed 

on the target, control passed to the ship’s combat information center. From 

there, the new controller used sonar and radar to guide the drone to the 

target. In 1965, the QH-50D entered production with a more powerful 

engine. Although the Navy initially intended to only outfit older destroyers with DASH, the success of the program led to its expansion to newer 

destroyers as well.18

Despite the initial promise of the DASH system, the program literally and figuratively crashed in 1969. The Journal of the Armed Forces 

had published an article the year before which claimed that of the 800 

DSN-3s built, only 375 remained in service. The average DSN-3 lasted 

only 80 hours before crashing. This represented a very poor return on the 

over $236 million invested in DASH through fiscal year 1966. The control 

system, based on a 20-year-old-design, held a significant responsibility for 

the high attrition rate. Adding a new control system would have increased 

the cost from $125,000 per unit to $200,000. The Navy found itself in 

a situation in which it could not afford the continued failure, nor could 

it afford to fix the problem. A report by the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) in 1970 found that the concurrent development of the destroyers 

and the UAVs led to some of the problems encountered by the Navy. Some 

of the destroyers being rehabilitated to be equipped with the DSN-3 finished undergoing the updates three years before Gyrodyne finished the 

first aircraft. As a result, Gyrodyne rushed the testing of the drones before 

delivering the initial models to the Navy. The Navy amplified the problem 

by ordering the drones in large quantity before they completed their own 

testing of the initial delivery. As a result, Gyrodyne came under heavy 
55

pressure to put the DSN-3 into production before it was adequately tested. 

The GAO warned that in the future, concurrent development and production of military systems should be avoided.19

The DASH proved so problematic that when Sea Power featured an 

article on naval applications of remotely piloted vehicles in 1973, the article did not mention the Navy’s earlier tests. Despite this “selective amnesia,” the article lays out several of the possible benefits of UAVs which 

continue to be echoed by UAV advocates today: lower cost and less risk 

for pilots. Although proponents of UAVs have consistently touted their 

economic advantages, the majority of UAV programs that failed during 

the Cold War did so because of high development costs. The Army’s SD-2, 

-3, -4, and -5, as well as the Navy’s DASH drones all fell victim to budgetary constraints. The article also addresses a concern that UAVs might 

eliminate the need for pilots, both of which linger to this day. The author’s 

response is just as true then as it is now. He argued that the development 

of cruise missiles did not eliminate the need for manned bombers, and neither would unmanned reconnaissance or utility UAVs remove the need for 

manned reconnaissance flights. Second, UAVs will always require some 

form of human guidance, either via in-flight controls or preprogrammed 

missions.20

Air Force

Of the three armed services, the Air Force’s experiments with unmanned flight in the early Cold War proved to be enduring. Like the other 

services, the initial interest in unmanned flight revolved around aerial targets. In 1948, Ryan Aeronautical Company sold the Q-2, a jet-propelled 

target drone, to the Air Force. Known as the Firebee, its reconnaissance 

derivatives continued to serve in a modified role as recently as Operation 

DESERT SHIELD. However, it took over 10 years for the Firebee to make 

the transition from target to reconnaissance missions. In 1958, Ryan began 

production of the Q-2C, the first model to be modified for reconnaissance 

missions. It could travel just below the speed of sound at heights of up to 

60,000 feet and with a range of 800 miles.21

Ryan Aeronautical started experimenting with adapting the Firebee to 

function as a reconnaissance drone in late 1959. The development team 

faced two initial problems. First, the range of the Q-2C limited its ability 

to perform strategic reconnaissance over the heart of the Soviet Union. To 

provide full coverage, an aircraft required a range of over 2000 miles. For 
56

the Q-2C to achieve this kind of range, it required a larger wing to support 

a newer engine and increased fuel capacity. The second major problem 

was related to the radar signature of the drone. If the Q-2C was to fly 

across the Soviet Union, it had to be nearly invisible to radar. The developers reduced radar reflectivity by covering the engine air intake with a mesh 

cover, using non-conductive paint on the nose, and by adding a cover of 

radar absorbing material on the sides. Although the service picked Ryan’s 

design over a Boeing model, many in the Air Force believed the manned 

SR-71 supersonic reconnaissance aircraft better suited the service’s needs. 

Support for the SR-71 continued even after Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 was 

shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, an event which showed the risk 

of manned reconnaissance flights. The Air Force proposed $1 million for 

the development of a reconnaissance UAV and sent it to the Secretary of 

Defense. He did not sign the request, but instead left a note which read, “I 

thought we weren’t going in this direction.” Shortly after, John F. Kennedy 

won the Presidential election and all new projects were put on hold until 

the new administration took office.22

The team at Ryan Aeronautical labored two more years in search of a 

contract, but every time they got close, someone in the Air Force turned 

them down. In 1962, the Air Force finally awarded the company a small 

contract to produce four reconnaissance drones for testing. The contract 

was part of the “Big Safari” program, a procurement method designed to 

streamline the contract process. Big Safari allocated money for the alteration of existing aircraft, exactly what the Ryan team intended to do with 

the Q-2C. The first test flights of the Ryan 147A Fire Fly occurred only 

two months from the time Ryan received the contract. On April 27, the 

first test was performed with a camera on board. Both the performance 

of the drone and the quality of the pictures taken achieved the required 

standards. The only remaining question related to the survivability of the 

modified drone in hostile airspace. In May, the Air Force conducted a 

live-fire exercise using the modified 147A as a target. Although the pilots 

regularly flew against the Q-2C, the 147A proved a far greater challenge. 

The Air Force scrambled five F-106s against the Fire Fly, each of which 

fired four air-to-air missiles, none of which succeed in bringing down the 

resilient drone.23

Convinced that the concept of a reconnaissance drone could work, the 

Air Force gave Ryan a contract to build nine more aircraft from scratch. 

The new model, the 147B, was four feet longer than the 147A and had 

a wingspan of 27 feet, double that of its predecessor. Contracts for other 
57

models with various adjustments followed soon after. By 1964, models 

B, C, D, and E were all in various stages of testing. In July 1963, the first 

drone reconnaissance unit in the Air Force became operational, as part of 

the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Despite the progress being 

Figure 18. Model 147s in Vietnam.

Ryan  

Model

Military

Model Length WingSpan

Thrust

(lbs.) Mission OperationalPeriod

Number

Launched

%

Return

A 27' 13' 1700 Fire Fly ‐ first demo drone Apr 62‐Aug 62

B 27' 27' 1700

Lightning Bug ‐ first big‐

wing high‐altitude day

photo bird

Aug 64‐Dec 65 78 61.5%

C 27' 15' 1700 Training, low altitude

tests Oct 65    

D 27' 15' 1700 From C, electronic intel Aug 65 2

E 27' 27' 1700 From B, high‐altitude

electronic intel Oct 65‐Feb 66 4

F 27' 27' 1700 From B, high‐altitude

electronic intel Jul 66    

G 29' 27' 1920 Longer B with larger

engine Oct 65‐Aug 67 83 54.2%

H AQM‐

34N 30' 32' 1920 High‐altitude photo;more range Mar 67‐Jul 71 138 63.8%

J 29' 27' 1920 First low‐altitude day

photo Mar 66‐Nov 67 94 64.9%

N 23' 13' 1700 Expendable decoy Mar 66‐Jun 66 9 0.0%

NX 23' 13' Decoy and medium‐

altitude day photo Nov 66‐Jun 67 13 46.2%

NP 28' 15' 1700 Interim low‐altitude day

photo Jun 67‐Sep 67 19 63.2%

NRE 28' 13' 1700 From NP, first night photo May 67‐Sep 67 7 42.9%

NQ 23' 13' 1700 Low‐altitude NX, hand‐

controlled May 68‐Dec 68 66 86.4%

NA/NC AQM‐

34G 26' 15' 1700 Chaff and electronic‐countermeasures Aug 68‐Sep 71    

NC AQM‐

34H 26' 15' 1700 Leaflet dropping Jul 72‐Dec 72 29 89.7%

NC(M1) AQM‐34J 26' 15' 1700 Interim low‐altitude day

photo and training    

S/SA 29' 13' 1920 Low‐altitude day photo Dec 67‐May 68 90 63.3%

SB 29' 13' 1920 Improved SA low‐altitude Mar 68‐Jan 69 159 76.1%

SRE AQM‐34K 29' 13' 1920 From SB, night photo Nov 68‐Oct 69 44 72.7%

SC AQM‐34L 29' 13' 1920 Low‐altitude workhourse Jan 69‐Jun 73 1651 87.2%

SC/TV AQM‐

34L/TV 29' 13' 1920 From SC, with real‐timeTV Jun 72‐  121 93.4%

SD AQM‐

34M 29' 13' 1920 Low‐altitude photo, real‐time data Jun 74‐Apr 75 183 97.3%

SDL AQM‐

34M(L) 29' 13' 1920 From SD, with Lorannavigation Aug 72 121 90.9%

SK 29' 15' Navy operation from

aircraft carrier Nov 69‐Jun 70    

T AQM‐34P 30' 32' 2800 Larger engine; high‐

altitude day photo Apr 69‐Sep 70 28 78.6%

TE AQM‐

34Q 30' 32' 2800 High‐altitude; real timecommunications intel Feb 70‐Jun 73 268 91.4%

TF AQM‐34R 30' 32' 2800 Improved long‐lange TE Feb 73‐Jun 75 216 96.8%
58

made, the Air Force continued to resist the development of unmanned 

reconnaissance drones. Some Airmen resisted out of a lack of confidence 

in the technology; others out of fear of being replaced.24

UAVs during the Vietnam Era

Operational Use

Reconnaissance UAVs made their first combat appearance during the 

Vietnam War. Although the Army did not deploy its SD-1 drones in Southeast Asia, both the Air Force and the Navy sent in the UAVs developed 

in the late 1950s and early 1960s. From 1965 and 1975, Lightning Bugs 

(the new name given to the Firebees) performed 3,425 reconnaissance 

missions. Depending on the model, they flew both high and low altitude 

flights, as well as visual and electronic signal intelligence missions (see 

Figure 18). The Air Force also experimented with an ultra-fast reconnaissance UAV, capable of reaching Mach-3. The Navy modified some DSN-3 

drones to provide live video feed back to the ship, which they used to 

direct naval gunfire.

The Lightning Bugs arrived in Southeast Asia and performed their first 

operational mission on 20 August 1964 (see Figure 19). Two 147Bs were 

attached to wing pylons of a GC-130 and flown from Kadena Air Force 

Base on Okinawa toward Vietnam, although their targets lay in mainland 

China. Ideally, once they reached the drop point (all the Lightning Bugs 

were air-launched), the GC-130 released the drones which flew a pre-programmed route over the coast of mainland China and back toward Taiwan, 

their recovery point. All of the initial missions followed a pre-programmed 

route. The operators, who were Ryan employees, programmed the flight 

plans up to two weeks in advance of the mission, making adjustments 

for the estimated wind. Very few of the early missions went according to 

plan. Some crashed, some made mysterious turns while in flight and never 

returned, one failed to switch to remote control for landing and flew past 

the recovery zone before running out of fuel, and even when everything 

did go right the Lightning Bugs often sustained considerable damage on 

the landings. After some modifications in late September, the controllers 

could take control of errant drones, which reduced the number of missions 

that failed due to navigational errors. The drones also began operating out 

of Bien Hoa in South Vietnam and by the end of 1964 the number of successful missions greatly increased. In mid-1965, new models of the 147 
59

began replacing the 147B. The 147Bs flew a total of 78 missions, 48 of 

which ended successfully. The average B model flew 2.6 missions before 

crashing.25

In mid-November, the United States Air Force lost a 147B to enemy 

action for the first time. While flying a mission over China, the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army Air Force shot down the drone. Some speculated the Air Force used the drone to provoke the Chinese Air Defense, 

while manned electronic intelligence aircraft recorded the radar activity 

on the ground. The US government neither confirmed nor denied flying 

drones over China. One week after, a New York Times article described the 

possibility of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft being used in Southeast 

Asia. The development of the Army’s SD series had been mentioned in 

Military Review in the 1950s, so the existence of reconnaissance drone 

projects was not classified. It was not known, however, to what extent they 

were operational, if at all. The author of the Times article speculated that 

the Air Force likely used drones for some reconnaissance, but questioned 

whether unmanned flight could provide as good intelligence as traditional 

manned reconnaissance planes because of limitations on the flight time 

 Vectorsite.net photo.

Figure 19. Ryan 147B “Lightning Bug.”
60

and range of drones. Unlike the Soviet U-2 incident, the loss of a 147B did 

not deter the US from future unmanned flights over China. By May 1965, 

the Chinese had shot down eight of the drones, but they continued to fly 

and provide valuable intelligence (see Figure 20).26

By early 1965, the 147Bs proved the viability of reconnaissance UAVs. 

With a market established, Ryan began developing new models of the 147 

for the Air Force. Some of the new models increased the capability of the B 

New China News Agency photo. by Xuan 

Figure 20. Reconnaissance Drones Shot Down Over China on Display.
61

model, while others possessed unique characteristics. During the monsoon 

season, cloud cover limited the coverage the high altitude B model could 

provide. The first step in overcoming these challenges was to find a way 

to get the drones to fly at a lower altitude. Ryan installed a newly developed barometric low altitude control system (BLACS) on several 147Cs to 

test its capability. Although the BLACS worked effectively, the developers 

believed a better airframe was necessary to carry the system. This led to 

the development of the 147J, which entered service in 1966. In 1969, the 

147SC entered service. This low-altitude model flew more missions than 

any other.27

Enemy action, specifically the newly deployed SA-2 anti-aircraft 

missiles, created an opportunity and a challenge for the Lightning Bugs. 

After observing an SA-2 shoot down a Lightning Bug over Hanoi, a U-2 

pilot told the drone operators they could have the high-risk missions 

from now on. This pilot’s sentiment soon became Air Force policy. The 

danger created by these new missiles led to more and more reconnaissance missions being tasked to the drones than to manned reconnaissance. Although they did not risk the life of a pilot, the Lightning Bugs 

were useless if they could not survive their flights over North Vietnam. 

To counteract the SA-2, Ryan developed the 147E model using electronic intelligence sensors from the 147D and the frame of the 147B. Their 

objective was to get the 147E shot down by an SA-2 missile, so sensors 

could record and transmit important information about the SA-2s fuse 

and guidance system. After a number of failed attempts, on 12 February 

1966, a 147E provided all of the necessary data to the Air Force. This 

information allowed for the development of electronic counter measures 

to the SA-2 which helped protect American pilots for the next six years. 

The 147F tested the ALQ-51, a counter-missile package, for the Navy in 

1966. One of the missiles flew 10 missions in high danger areas without 

being hit. Unmanned aerial vehicles provided a way of gathering technological capabilities of enemy weapons and testing counter-measures, 

all without risking the life of a pilot.28

In 1966, Ryan developed another component that increased the effectiveness of drone reconnaissance. The 147H (lighter than the 147B, 

but with a longer range) became the first model to test a mid-air retrieval 

system (MARS), which eventually was used on the 147J. In theater, the 

MARS worked 97 percent of the time, eliminating damage to the drone 

and the on-board film which was sometimes sustained during chute landings.30
62

Contractors from Ryan played a large role in the operations of the Lightning Bugs. In the early stages, they worked side-by-side with Air Force 

personnel, training them how to program and maintain the drones. The Air 

Force struggled to staff the drone units, and Ryan contractors filled this 

void, even flying on the C-130 launch aircraft to control the drones. One 

employee, Dale Weaver, served as a launch control operator for the drones 

on more missions than any military personnel. Another, Ed Christian, volunteered to be lowered from a helicopter into dense jungle, to recover the 

film from a drone that failed to be retrieved using MARS. The role played 

by contractors illustrates two issues that reemerged during the Long War. 

First, hostilities in Vietnam decreased the time between development and 

deployment. As a result, Ryan personnel were needed to troubleshoot the 

drones in theater to fix problems that would normally be solved in the development phase. Additionally, because the reconnaissance drones entered 

production so close to the escalation of the war, the Air Force had limited 

time to train personnel before placing them in theater. The second problem 

had to do with the outlook of Air Force personnel. Many believed, perhaps 

correctly, that working in a drone unit (as opposed to a U-2 unit) could stall 

their career. In an attempt to rectify this, the Air Force eventually created an 

airborne missile maintenance squadron, which put the Lightning Bug units 

on the same organizational level as the U-2s.31

During the Vietnam War, Ryan Aeronautical’s Lightning Bugs performed many of the same missions, with similar problems, as the UAVs 

used in the Long War. They flew both high- and low-altitude missions, 

Figure 21. Beechcraft Bonanza QU-22B.

US Air Force National Museum photo.
63

gathered electronic signal intelligence, provided real-time data, launched 

from air, land and sea, provided targeting information for missiles, and 

used photographic, infrared, and radar to acquire information on enemy 

forces. In the early 1970s, Ryan tested the 147 for use as an unmanned 

combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), attaching a Maverick missile to the bottom 

of a Lightning Bug that could be fired on command. The low-cost of the 

various 147 models, when compared with the expense of a plane like the 

SR-71, the high-speed, high-altitude replacement for the U-2, caused some 

pilots to fear for their budget. In 1971, Ryan sold a number of Lightning 

Bugs to Israel, which fueled that nation’s interest in UAV development.32

Photographic intelligence gathered from UAVs helped the Air Force 

disprove propaganda regarding the extent of bombing in Hanoi and Hai 

Phong. Communists accused the Air Force of carpet bombing these cities 

and causing tremendous damage to civilian areas. Although not released 

until 1973, long after the bombing campaign, reconnaissance drones had 

taken over 600 pictures of the actual objectives and the effects of the bombing. 

In addition to the various Ryan 147 Models, the Air Force modified 

a Beechcraft Bonanza Model A36 for unmanned flight. Under the designation QU-22B, these converted utility aircraft served as communication 

Figure 22. SR-71 Air-launching a D-21 Drone.

CIA photo.
64

relays. Despite being able to fly without a pilot onboard, one usually flew 

with the plane to insure successful takeoff and landing. The QU-22Bs first 

entered operation in 1971 as part of the Pave Eagle program (see Figure 

21). High losses led to the withdrawal of them from active service late in 

1972.33

The Navy revived the DASH program during the Vietnam War to provide an unmanned reconnaissance capability for its ships. Under Project 

Snoopy converted the DASH drones were related to provide real-time video images to destroyers off the coast. Equipped with a television camera 

and transmitter instead of a torpedo, the UAV flew over the coast to assist 

in the acquisition of targets and adjustment of fire for the ship’s 5-inch 

guns. In 1968, the Marine Corps tested three of these modified QH-50s for 

use in ground operations. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency further modified the drone to carry a moving target indicator (MTI) 

radar and various weapons systems. These systems never reached combat 

operations. Ryan’s Lightning Bugs flew the majority of successful UAV 

missions during the Vietnam War, with the Navy’s ship-launched QH-50 

reconnaissance drones a distant second. During this time, however, the 

military intelligence community tested several other systems.34

Research and Development

The D-21 represented the most extraordinary of these systems. Designed with the objective of photographing China’s Lop Nor nuclear development facility near the Mongolian border, Lockheed’s secret “Skunk 

Works” lab built a drone capable of being air-launched from an SR-71 (see 

Figure 22), which could fly at Mach 3 at an altitude of 100,000 feet, take 

pictures of the Chinese facility, then return to international waters and drop 

its film to a waiting destroyer. Lockheed pitched the idea to both the CIA 

and the Air Force in the early 1960s. Although the CIA initially showed 

little interest, they reversed their position once the Air Force decided to 

invest in the project. The D-21 project, codenamed Tagboard, showed potential, although it never fully worked. During its tests in 1965, it successfully launched from the SR-71 on the first three tries. On the fourth 

try, however, the drone collided with the SR-71 “mother-ship,” leading to 

the death of the copilot and the loss of the SR-71. Following this tragedy, 

the Skunk Works developers changed the launch vehicle to a B-52. After numerous successful tests (and a few unsuccessful), President Richard 

Nixon approved the first operational mission for the D-21 in 1969. The 

drone launched successfully and flew to its target, Lop Nor, but instead 

of turning around, went on to the Soviet Union and eventually crashed in 
65

Siberia. Everything went fine on the next mission, until the chute on the 

film failed to open and the package crashed into the ocean. Finally, on the 

third mission all aspects of the flight and drop went according to plan, but 

rough seas prevented Navy destroyer from retrieving the package. On the 

fourth and final attempt, the D-21 disappeared over Chinese air space. The 

Defense Department cancelled the program in July 1971.35

Ryan Aeronautical also developed a reconnaissance UAV capable of 

penetrating deep into Chinese airspace: the Model 154, (also known as 

the Compass Arrow, or Fire Fly). Instead of flying extremely high-speeds 

like the D-21, the Fire Fly possessed a unique design that made it nearly 

impossible to pick up on radar. Despite its top secret classification, the 

drone made headlines when it descended prematurely and landed near 

the perimeter of the Atomic Energy Commission complex at Los Alamos, 

close enough to the fence to be within view of the public. After undergoing extensive testing by Ryan and the Air Force, President Nixon’s efforts 

at reconciliation with China in the early 1970s prevented the Model 154 

from being used over China. Despite never reaching operational status, 

knowledge gained from the project was applied to stealth aircraft and UAV 

development.36

Another line of development followed by the Air Force focused on 

high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) aerial vehicles in 1968. The initial 

program, Compass Dwell, experimented with both manned and unmanned 

variants. A later program, Compass Cope, exclusively worked on developing a HALE-UAV. LTV Electrosystems upgraded the design of a sailplane 

to construct a manned aircraft. The company performed three tests with 

a pilot onboard, before testing the unmanned version, the XQM-93. In 

January 1972, the XQM-93 set an endurance record by remaining aloft 

for 22 hours. Martin Marietta also submitted a prototype for the Compass 

Dwell program, the 845A. Similar in design to the XQM-93, it bested the 

endurance record by flying for 27 hours and 55 minutes in July 1972. The 

prototypes designed for the Compass Dwell program demonstrated the 

potential for HALE-UAVs. However, budgetary priorities prevented the 

Air Force from purchasing either craft for operational use.37

In 1970, the Air Force joined with the National Security Agency for 

Project Compass Cope. The NSA wanted a HALE-UAV with electronic 

signals intelligence capability. Sharing the project made it more affordable for the Air Force. The program gave out two contracts, one to Boeing 

and one to Ryan. Boeing’s prototype, the YQM-94A or Compass Cope-B 

(“B” for Boeing), flew one successful mission in June 1973 but crashed 
66

during the next flight. A second YQM-94A performed better, remaining 

aloft for 17 hours in one flight. The YQM-98A (Compass Cope-R, for 

Ryan) first flew in August 1974. It surpassed the endurance records set by 

the Compass Dwell program with one flight lasting over 28 hours, without 

refueling. That record remained for 26 years until another Ryan UAV, the 

RQ-4 Global Hawk, flew for over 30 hours without landing or refueling. Although the tests demonstrated the potential for HALE-UAVs, many 

people still believed all the needs for intelligence gathering could still be 

accomplished by more reliable, manned flights. The program was cancelled soon after setting the endurance record.38

UAV Development After Vietnam

Despite high expectations for UAV development after Vietnam, another decade passed before the military seriously pursued new systems 

again. The armed forces continued to use target drones, while some 

research persisted into the development of reconnaissance UAVs. Although spending on research and development of UAVs did increase in 

the 1980s, most notably on the Aquila program, costs tended to overrun 

the budget and raised questions about whether UAVs actually could save 

money.

Sky Eye

The largest program during the 1970s was Developmental Sciences 

Incorporated’s (DSI) Sky Eye program. The prototypes developed dramatically throughout the course of the program, which lasted over a decade. The RPA-12, its official designation, initially possessed a sweptwing, tailless design with a rear propeller. It had a wingspan of 11 feet 

6 inches, but an overall length of only 5 feet 7 inches. DSI started development in February 1973 with the first successful flight less than two 

months later. The Sky Eye I-A, the original model, took off and landed 

from a runway. In a second model, the Sky Eye I-B, DSI made minor 

adjustments to the design and changed to a launch takeoff and parachute 

recovery. The I-B could fly at speeds of up to 138 miles per hour for up 

to nine hours, whereas the I-A could only reach 105 miles per hour and 

stay aloft for six hours. By the mid-1970s, DSI began producing the 

Sky Eye II, which the Army purchased in small numbers. The Sky Eye 

II was essentially the same as the earlier models, but constructed with 

different materials. In 1975, the Sky Eye program went in two different 

directions. DSI continued using the name Sky Eye for many of its UAVs, 
67

although the vehicles grew significantly in size from the original Sky 

Eye I and IIs. In 1975, DSI received a contract from the Army to develop 

a small-UAV similar to the Sky Eye II. This was the start of the Aquila 

program, and DSI subcontracted this out to Lockheed Missile and Space 

Company.39

By 1979, the primary version of the Sky Eye in operation was the 

R4D. The model contained only minor changes from the previous designs. The following year, DSI began production of the R4E series. The 

different models of the R4E varied in design from the R4D, and ranged 

greatly in size and mission capability. Each of the models possessed a 

twin-boom design, similar to the Hunter system still used today. The 

smallest model, the R4E-5, served as a trainer for the rest of the series. 

The slightly larger R4E-10 provided a tactical reconnaissance capability. 

It could be transported in the back of a truck, and a crew of three men 

could launch and operate it, while receiving real-time video transmission. The next model, the R4E-30, designed as a UCAV, was evaluated 

but never ordered by the Army. It could carry and fire 2.75 inch rockets, 

Viper rockets, and potentially even “smart” munitions. The R4E-40 possessed the same frame as the 30 model, but had a larger fuel tank and 

carried reconnaissance equipment instead of weapons. The final model, 

the R4E-70 was the largest and was designed for longer range reconnaissance missions. The Royal Thai Air Force purchased a squadron of R4E30s in 1982, two years before the US Army first purchased a squadron 

of R4E-40s for testing. This squadron later deployed for operations in 

Figure 23. Models of Sky Eye.

Wingspan Length Weight Top Speed

Altitude

Limit

Endurance

I‐A 11'6" 5'7" 55 lbs 105 mph 13,000 ft 6 hr

I‐B 11'6" 5'7" 60 lbs 138 mph 15,000 ft 9 hr

R4D 12'4" 6'11" 100 lbs 150 mph 20,000 ft 6 hr

R4E‐5 8'9" 6'1" 81 mph 5,000 ft 30 min

R4E‐10 11' 7'1" 115 mph 10,000 ft 3 hr

R4E‐30 17'7" 12'2" 263 lbs 144 mph 15,000 ft 8 hr

R4E‐40 17'7" 13'10" 155 mph 15,000 ft 9 hr

R4E‐70 20'10" 18'11" 184 mph 20,000 ft
68

Central America. In 1985, the Army purchased a second squadron for 

$8.2 million. Acquisition of the Sky Eye remained limited, as the Army 

remained focused on the development of the Aquila system (see Figure 

23).40

The normal crew for a Sky Eye consisted of six people: a team 

commander, mission planner, RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) operator, 

payload operator, electronics technician, and mechanic. The Sky Eye 

could be flown in one of three ways: direct control, auto-pilot control, 

or pre-programmed missions. In auto-pilot control, the RPV operator set 

a course and altitude, and the auto-pilot maintained those settings. On a 

pre-programmed mission, the RPV followed a course of up to 256 waypoints. Altitude, heading, and airspeed could be adjusted at each waypoint. The mission planner programmed these missions, and the RPV 

operator controlled the Sky Eye on direct control and auto-pilot missions, 

using two monitors (one for instrumentation and one for the video feed 

from the on-board camera), a pair of joysticks, and several other controls. 

The payload operator had responsibility for controlling whatever sensors 

(or weapons) the RPV carried on a mission. Possible payloads included 

daylight television, low-light-level television, forward-looking infrared, 

infrared line scanner or a 35-mm panoramic camera. He viewed the incoming information on a monitor, which also recorded the data.41

Figure 24. Aquila.

Redstone Arsenal photo..
69

Aquila

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) began development 

of Aquila (Latin for “eagle”) in 1975, after receiving a subcontract from 

DSI (see Figure 24). The Army wanted a UAV that could provide laser 

designation for the Copperhead precision munitions being developed at 

the same time. DSI provided LMSC with 23 Sky Eye units to assist in 

development. The first test flight occurred in December 1975. After three 

years and almost 200 flights, Aquila demonstrated its ability to mark a 

target using its onboard laser, guiding a Copperhead round to a stationary 

tank. The Copperhead was fired from nearly seven miles away. The initial 

stage of the program, which ended in 1978, appeared promising enough 

for the Army to grant a $123 million dollar contract to LMSC in 1979 

to enter full scale development, with $440 million for acquisition of 780 

RPVs and other equipment.42

While in development, Aquila experienced several significant problems. In 1982, the GAO commissioned a study of the Aquila program. By 

this point, the expected costs had risen to $1.6 billion. The data link and 

the mission payload represented the two greatest obstacles. The size of 

these components remained too large to fit inside the vehicle. Lockheed 

experimented with using a different data link that met the specifications 

regarding size, however this alternate component was not as sophisticated 

as the original. The simultaneous development of multiple components 

of the UAV led to problems similar to those encountered by the Navy’s 

DASH program two decades earlier. The developers sacrificed performance in an effort to meet development and production timelines. Simultaneous development allowed Lockheed and the Army to perform tests on 

individual components, without waiting for another component to be completed. For example, in 1981 they tested an interim data link in a manned 

aircraft. Even if the individual components worked, the matter of integrating all of them into a design that met performance specifications remained 

difficult. The initial development contract contained a 43-month timeline 

for development; however, the technical challenges set this timeline back 

significantly.43

In 1985, Congress refused to allocate the funds requested by the Army 

for Aquila to enter production, as they felt the system had not been adequately tested. The year before, the Army tested seven other UAVs as possible replacements for the Aquila. They found that despite the problems in 
70

development, to achieve the desired performance Aquila would still cost 

less and could be ready faster than any alternative. The Army based this 

decision mainly on the original mission intended for the program: target 

acquisition. Although other UAVs could perform the additional reconnaissance tasks for which they intended to use Aquila, to add the targeting capability to a UAV already in operations would be too expensive. In 

response to rising projection for production costs, the Army reduced the 

number of systems it planned to purchase from 995 to 548 in 1984. The 

budget for procurement remained at $1.1 billion, only slightly less than 

the previous amount allocated for almost double the number of vehicles. 

The Army reduced the number planned for purchase again the following 

year, dropping to only 376 systems. The Army halted development tests 

in 1985, due to continued problems with several components. In an effort to keep the Army or Congress from ending the program, Lockheed 

promised to pay over $30 million to supplement development costs in 

1986 and 1987. Congress agreed to continue the program, but Lockheed 

was not able to overcome the problems in the system.44

The GAO published another report on the Aquila system in October 

1987. By 1987, development costs had risen from the initial budget of 

$123 million to $868 million. The report contained by far the most critical assessment of the UAV to date. The report focused on the Army’s series of operational tests conducted from November 1986 to March 1987. 

A completed mission included successful launch and flight operations, 

detecting enemy targets and directing artillery to them, and finally recovery. Out of 105 test flights, the Aquila fulfilled the requirements on 

only seven missions. The GAO also found that an enemy with a good 

aerial defense system would likely be able to detect the Aquila and engage it with anti-air weapons. During the operational testing, the Army 

did not include enemy air defenses, which would have further decreased 

the number of successful flights. In addition to survivability, the GAO 

judged launch, detection, recognition, and location of enemy targets, reliability and maintenance, and human engineering to be areas of “major 

problems.” The problem of human engineering came from the complicated system used to control the UAV. Before widely deploying the Aquila, the Army realized it needed to either simplify the controls or spend 

a significant amount of time training its operators. The GAO found minor problems in artillery adjustment and questioned its growth potential. 

On a positive note, the report deemed Aquila’s flight, recovery, mobility, 

and electromagnetic compatibility successful (although the electromagnetic compatibility testing was not fully completed at the time of the 

review, and the use of radios during the tests was banned during flight 
71

testing for fear they might interfere with the control system). The GAO 

recommended that much further testing needed to be done before a decision on whether or not to begin production of Aquila could be made, a 

decision slated for 1988. The Department of Defense believed the GAO 

finding to be overly pessimistic and argued that despite its problems, the 

Aquila provided the best possible option for UAV development. Despite 

these objections, the Army decided in 1987 to end the program, before it 

ever entered production.45

The Aquila’s expensive sensor and data-link package represented a 

growing trend in UAV development. The majority of costs of many UAV 

programs in the 1980s were not for the vehicle itself, but for its sensor 

payload. In 1986, before the program underwent further complications, 

the Army estimated the production cost of the Aquila to be around $1 

million for each UAV (not including its support system). Of this $1 million, only $240,000 went toward the basic air vehicle. Between 1982 

and 1986, the Army spent $91.9 million to develop the data link and $38 

million on the FLIR package. While the cost of building unmanned vehicles capable of remote control remained steady, the cost of the onboard 

electronics grew higher and higher.46

Figure 25. Pioneer UAV.

US Navy photo, 2nd Class Daniel J. McLain.
72

Pioneer

The Navy acquired the Pioneer UAV (see Figure 25) system from Israel in 1986. The Israelis first developed an interest in using UAVs for reconnaissance in the mid-1960s. They visited with people from Ryan Aeronautical in 1967 and 1969, but no purchases came from these early visits. 

After Egypt shot down two Israeli F-4 Phantom reconnaissance jets, the 

Israeli Air Force began to look seriously for a reconnaissance UAV. They 

met with representatives from Ryan again in the spring of 1970 in Israel. 

A short time later, Israel agreed to buy a dozen of Ryan’s model 124 target 

drones, modified to be nearly identical to the 147SD. After taking delivery 

in the middle of 1971, they used these UAVs to patrol the Suez Canal zone, 

sometimes even daring to send them over Cairo for photo reconnaissance. 

During the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force used the Ryan model 

and another reconnaissance drone, known as the Chucker, for intelligence 

missions over both Syria and Egypt.47

In 1978, Israel tested its first domestically produced UAV: the Mastiff Mk I. The Mastiff was part of a new generation of what were called 

mini-UAVs, although compared with some of the UAVs in service today 

as part of the Long War, the Mastiff was hardly “mini.” It measured 8 feet 

6 inches long, with a wingspan of 13 feet 9 inches, around half the size of 

the Ryan’s 147. A new model, the Mk II entered service in 1980, as did 

Scout, another domestically built mini-UAV. The Mastiff Mk II and the 

Scout possessed a somewhat limited range, but they could provide intelligence from Lebanon and southern parts of Syria. Before the invasion of 

Lebanon in 1982, the Israelis sent some decoy UAVs coupled with RF-4Es 

aircraft to map the deployment of Syrian SA-6 anti-aircraft missile batteries. Although never confirmed by the Israelis, they likely recorded fire 

control and electronic counter-measure data during these flights. As part 

of Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, the Israelis deployed two decoy 

UAVs, named Samson and Delilah, to trick the Syrians into activating 

their radar. Once the Syrians responded, the Israelis used the intelligence 

gathered before the war to destroy 17 of the 19 SA-6 batteries in Lebanon. 

The following day the Israelis eliminated the final two batteries.48

After the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beruit, Lebanon, October 1983, officers from the Navy had the opportunity to observe the 

Israelis use of UAVs for artillery fire adjustment. Their recommendation 

of a similar system led the Navy to acquire a Mastiff for testing. A group 

of Marines who flew remote control planes as a hobby formed the basis 

of the 1st RPV Platoon. They performed tests onboard the USS Tarawa 
73

in 1985, and in 1986 the Navy purchased Israel’s newest UAV, the Pioneer. After taking delivery, the Navy discovered some adjustments were 

required to give the Pioneer the capability of taking off and landing from 

a ship. Research and development of these modifications cost an addition 

$50 million and caused much frustration within Congress, which believed 

the Pioneer to be operationally ready upon delivery. Once modified, the 

Pioneers served with the Navy until 2002, including operations in Operation DESERT STORM and SHIELD. The Marine Corps continued to use 

Pioneers throughout the Long War.49

Inter-service Cooperation and the UAV Master Plan

From 1986 to 1988, the House and Senate Armed Services Committee 

and the Senate Appropriations Committee called into question the effectiveness of each service maintaining their own UAV program. The House 

Armed Services Committee requested the Department of Defense compose a report outlining how it planned to minimize the waste within UAV 

development. In the budget for Fiscal Year 1988, Congress transferred the 

funds from each service’s UAV program into a joint program managed 

by the Secretary of Defense. In 1988, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

published the first of what became an annual Master Plan for UAV Development. This report outlined the types of UAVs needed by each service 

and the process which would be employed to reduce overlap and increase 

interoperability. Although it can hardly be considered a blueprint for what 

actually happened, the Master Plan represented one of the first comprehensive policy statements by DOD regarding UAV development. Many of 

the concepts detailed within the report eventually emerged as operational 

vehicles over the next two decades.50

After outlining the committee responsible for authoring the report and 

defining some important terms, the Master Plan proceeded to describe the 

types of missions in which DOD hoped to employ UAVs. These included 

reconnaissance and surveillance, target acquisition (RSTA), target spotting, command and control (C2

), meteorological data collection, nuclear 

biological and chemical (NBC) detections, and lastly, disruption and deception. Not every UAV needed to be able to perform all of these missions; 

these simply comprised the range of missions that various UAV systems 

might perform. Next, the plan went into detail as to the various types of 

UAVs, in terms of range, endurance, and specific mission, each service 

required.51
74

The Army divided their UAVs requirements into the battalion, brigade, 

division, and corps echelons of command. Battalion commanders needed 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) for the area directly in front of them, up to a depth of 15 km. At the next higher level, brigade commanders possessed similar mission needs but with a greater range: 

30 km beyond the front line. Divisional and corps commanders required far 

more than either of the two lower echelons. The description of their needs 

included every type of mission described above and an endurance of 6 to 

12 hours. The depth of coverage represented the only difference between 

the two. Divisional commanders needed coverage 90 km past the front line, 

compared with 300 km for a corps commander. The concept of UAV division based on range and echelon of command became a standard the remains in use today.52

The Marine Corps articulated a need for two types of UAVs: a small 

system that could be used at the company or battalion level for real-time 

video, and a larger system to provide RSTA and C2

 for the task force commander. The Corps also expressed an interest in using UAVs for electronic 

combat operations for signals intelligence gathering and jamming of enemy 

communications. The task force commander was responsibile for these missions. Although the plan did not clearly state whether these missions should 

use the same vehicle as the task force RSTA/C2

 with a modified payload, or 

a completely separate vehicle, it implied the use of a single vehicle.53

The Navy outlined three separate UAV groups to support the fleet. 

Battleship Battle Groups required a vehicle for RSTA both at sea and on 

land in support of amphibious operations. They also desired this vehicle to 

be able to provide long-range communications relay. The Battleship Battle 

Group UAV needed a range of 100 nautical miles (the weapons range of the 

battleship in the 1980s) and an endurance period of five to seven hours. The 

Navy required a second UAV for target acquisition in support of the Carrier 

Battle Groups. The description for this vehicle did not include an endurance 

requirement; however the larger strike range of the carrier necessitated an 

operational limit of 350-400 nautical miles. The last UAV was to support 

smaller ships (destroyer or fast frigate), providing RSTA and electronic warfare capabilities. The Navy envisioned a vehicle similar to the one supporting Battleship Battle Groups, but smaller and with a more limited range.54

The section on Air Force UAVs began by emphasizing that UAVs 

were “viewed as complementary to existing manned systems.” This theme 

emerged several times throughout the Air Force’s paragraphs and seems 
75

to illustrate the ongoing conflict in the Air Force. While UAVs protected a 

pilot’s life by flying a particularly dangerous mission, they potentially endangered his livelihood if they ever became “too” effective. The Air Force 

wanted its UAVs to be air-launchable, and capable of performing RSTA (including bombing damage assessment), C2

, meteorological data collection, 

and nuclear, biological, and chemical detection. Their needs closely paralleled that of Army corps commanders, with the exception of the expected 

range, which went beyond 300 km.55

The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined the requirements of each service 

and concluded that DOD needed, at minimum, four different UAV systems. The primary difference between each system was the operational 

range. However, the unique demands of each service meant it was highly 

unlikely that only four vehicles could perform the necessary tasks efficiently. Five major components comprised a UAV system (see Figure 26). 

Altering components to fit the need of an individual service increased 

the price of the vehicle. Each of the four UAV systems required multiple 

launch and recovery systems, which would likely necessitate expensive 

changes to the air vehicle structure itself (as mentioned previously, modifying the Pioneer to be able to launch from sea cost $50 million). The 

Aquila program proved the difficulties and expense of developing a complex payload and data link, and making such a system interoperable between services could only add to the cost. Finally, several of the proposed 

UAVs required both ground and ship-based control system. It is impossible to determine whether the DOD Master Plan would save money, or 

5 Components of UAV Systems

(with requirements)

Air Vehicle

Speed

Ground Stations

Air Vehicle and Mission

(with requirements)

Speed

Altitude

Payload (Weight and Size)

Operational Radius

Payload

Air Vehicle and Mission

Control

Interoperability/Commonality

Mobility

Launch and Recovery

Endurance

Survivability

Image Intelligence

Communications Intelligence

Electronic Intelligence

Communications Relay

Processing

Timeliness

y Data Link

Ground

Ship

Air

Communications Relay

Target Designation

Jammer Range

Frequency

Air Bandwidth

ECM Protection

Interoperability

Timeliness

Figure 26. Five Components of UAV Systems (with Requirements).
76

even whether such interoperable systems were even technically possible 

at the time. The DOD did not even propose spending money on these four 

joint programs until FY 1990. Instead, they requested that money continue 

to go to individual service programs, with the idea that the components 

developed by the services could later provide the foundation for the joint 

UAV programs.56

When the GAO reported back to the House Subcommittee for Defense 

Appropriations regarding the DOD Master Plan, it criticized the proposal 

on a number of points. First, the plan did not eliminate single service UAV 

programs for another two years. Second, by limiting the plan to nonlethal 

and recoverable UAVs (excluding armed UAVs and target drones), the potential for overlap continued. The GAO recommended that future Master 

Plans include these programs as well. Next, the plan failed to adequately 

address payload commonality. Since a large portion of the cost of a UAV 

system was a result of the payload, more attention needs to be given to this 

aspect of DOD programs.57

The DOD, the JCS, and the individual services formulated the original 

UAV Master Plan within the context of the Cold War. In 1988, the most 

probable scenario for future war was against the Soviets in Europe. The 

collapse of the Soviet Union led to changes in defense policy in the 1990s. 

At the same time, technological progress allowed UAVs to finally start 

achieving their long anticipated potential. During Operations DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM, UAVs provided direct support to ground 

forces in combat for the first time. Albeit in a very limited fashion, the 

invasion of Iraq in 1991 first brought together the long history of aerial 

reconnaissance in support of ground forces and unmanned flight.
77

Notes

1. Laurence R. Newcome, Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Sword and Pen, 2007), 12, 18.

2. Newcome, 18-21; Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1985), 8-12.

3. Newcome, 31-36; Werrell, 12-15

4. Werrell, 18-20.

5. Werrell, 24-26.

6. Advertisement in Model Airplane News (December 1936), http://www.

ctie.monash.edu.au/hargrave/denny_advertising.html (accessed 11 September 

2008); Bill Yenne, Attack of the Drones: A History of Unmanned Aerial Combat 

(St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004), 16-17; For a detailed history of Radioplane’s (later 

Ventura division of Northrop), see Richard A. Botzum, 50 Years of Target Drone 

Aircraft (Newbury Park: Northrop, 1985).

7. For a thorough discussion of both the German and American programs, 

see Werrell, 60-69.

8. Albert L. Weeks, “In Operation APHRODITE, Explosive-Laden Aircraft 

Were to Be Flown Against German Targets,” World War II, May 2000, in Academic Search Complete [database online] (accessed 11 September 2008); Yenne, 

20.

9. “Military Notes around the World,” Military Review 31, no. 7 (October 

1951): 65; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1970–71.

10. “Photo Drone Flies Aerial Combat Mission,” Army-Navy-Air Force Register, 29 October 1955, 6.

11. SP5 (R) David Hall, personal correspondence with the author, 3 September 2008; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1961–62.

12. “Target and Reconnaissance Drones,” Interavia, May 1961, 670; Military Review 38, no. 9 (December 1958): 65; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1964–

65; Newcome, 72-74.

13. Newcome, 74-75; Military Review 37, no.11 (February 1958); Military 

Review 38, no. 9 (December 1958); Military Review 38, no. 12 (March 1959): 

82; Military Review 39, no. 2 (May 1959): 79; Military Review 40, no. 5 (August 

1960): 67; Military Review 40, no. 7 (October 1960): 67; Military Review 40, no. 

2 (February 1961): 96; Military Review 42, no. 3 (February 1963): 96.

14. Major L.P. Charon, “Front-Line Photo Drone Ready for Robot Recon,” 

Marine Corps Gazette, August 1966, 38-39; Newcome, 75-76.

15. “The Fairchild Photo Transmission System,” Interavia, February 1964, 

191.

16. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1964-65; “Drone Helicopter Drops Torpedoes on Radio Command,” Missiles and Rockets 6, no. 25 (20 June 1960): 42.
78

17. Jane’s All the World Aircraft, 1966–67; Lieutenant Edward A. Morgan 

(Navy), “The Dash Weapons System,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 89, no. 1 

(January 1963): 150-51.

18. Jane’s All the World Aircraft, 1966–67.

19. General Accounting Office, “Adverse Effects of Producing Drone AntiSubmarine Helicopters Before Completion of Development and Tests (B-160877), 

31 December 1970, 2-3, http://archive.gao.gov/otherpdf1/087461.pdf (accessed 

17 November 2008); “DASH-Crashes Strain ASW Aerial Capability,” Journal 

of the Armed Forces (29 June 1968): 3, 12; “Dash Continues to Crash,” Journal 

of the Armed Forces (27 December 1969): 13; “GAO Hits Navy DASH Concurrency Problems,” Journal of the Armed Forces (1 February 1971): 10-11.

20. James D. Hessman, “RPVs for the Navy,” Sea Power, August, 1973, 32-35.

21. Yenne, 23.

22. William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones 

(Fallbrook: Armed Forces Journal International, 1981), 14-18. William Wagner 

worked for Ryan Aeronautical in public relations. His story of the development 

and early use of the Lightning Bugs, based on interviews with key Ryan employees, far surpasses any other work on the subject.

23. Wagner, 23, 27,32.

24. Wagner, 44-50.

25. Wagner, 52-73, 93.

26. Jack Raymond, “Pilotless Planes–Are They Effective Spies?” New York 

Times, 22 November 1964, sec. IV, p. 10E; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1970–71.

27. Wagner, 92-94, 104, 137.

28. Wagner, 99-102.

29. Wagner, 213.

30. Wagner, 108-09.

31. Wagner, 109, 113, 126-27.

32. Newcome, 83-86, 93-94.

33. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1973-74.

34. Newcome, 87; Sidney G. Reed, Richard H. Van Atta, and Seymour J. 

Deitchman, DARPA Technical Accomplishments: A Historical Review of Selected DARPA Projects, Volume I (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1990): 

28-33

35. Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal memoir of My 

Years at Lockheed (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 262-70.

36. William Wagner, Fireflies and other UAVs (Arlington: Aerofax, 1992), 

27-47; John L. McLucas, Kenneth J. Alnwick, and Lawrence R. Benson, Reflections of a Technocrat: Managing Defense, Air, and Space Programs During the 

Cold War (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2006), 138.

37. Newcome, 101-02; McLucas, 139.
79

38. Newcome, 102; McLucas, 141; US Air Force Fact Sheet, “Northrop 

Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk,” http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/

factsheet_print.asp?fsID=347&page=1 (accessed 22 September 2008).

39. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, the technical details of the SkyEye systems are spread throughout various years of Jane’s, from 1973–1985.

40. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft; “Developmental Sciences Prepares Skyeye for Army Competition,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 April 1986, 

81.

41. Michael A. Dornheim, “Skyeye RPV Modifications Follow Operational Evaluation by Army,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 September 1985, 87-89.

42. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft; General Accounting Office, Louis J. Rodrigues, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts, GAO/T-NSIAD97-138, 1997, 2; http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97138t.pdf (accessed 26 

September 2008).

43. Comptroller General, The Army’s Remotely Piloted Vehicle Shows Good 

Potential But Faces a Lengthy Development Program, 26 February 1982, 1-3, 

http://archive.gao.gov/d41t14/117728.pdf (accessed 26 September 2008).

44. General Accounting Office, Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Recent 

Developments and Alternatives, GAO/NSIAD-86-41BR, 4 January 1986, http://

archive.gao.gov/d12t3/129099.pdf (accessed 25 September 2008); House Appropriations Committee, Army R&D Fiscal Year 1987, 264-307; House Appropriations Committee, Army R&D Fiscal Year 1987, 172-211.

45. General Accounting Office, Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, GAO/NSIAD-88-19, 26 October 

1987, http://archive.gao.gov/d29t5/134220.pdf (accessed 25 September 2008); 

UAVs: DODs Acquisition Efforts, 2.

46. House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1986.

47. Wagner, Fireflies, 48-63; Newcome, 93.

48. John F. Kreis, “Unmanned Aircraft in Israeli Air Operations,” Air Power 

History 37, no. 1 (Winter, 1990): 46-48; Yossi Melman, “An Israeli Lesson in 

Electronic Warfare,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October, 1985, 741.

49. Newcome, 96-97; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Systems 

Roadmap, 2007–2032, 10 December 2007, http://www.acq.osd.mil/usd/Unmanne

d%20Systems%20Roadmap.2007-2032.pdf (accessed 29 September 2008); General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-93, 30 August 1999, 

http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99033.pdf (accessed 29 September 2008).

50. General Accounting Office, Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Master Plan, B-229489, 9 December 1988, 1-2, http://archive.gao.gov/

d17t6/137560.pdf (accessed 30 September 2008).

51. Department of Defense, DOD Joint UAV Program Master Plan, 26 July 1988, 
80

10-14, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA197751 (accessed 29 September 2008).

52. Department of Defense, 14-17.

53. Department of Defense, 18-20.

54. Department of Defense, 20-21.

55. Department of Defense, 22.

56. Department of Defense, 23-46.

57. General Accounting Office, Assessment of DOD’s Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Master Plan, B-229489, 9 December 1988, http://archive.gao.gov/

d17t6/137560.pdf (accessed 30 September 2008).
81

Chapter 3

UAVs in the 1990s

Airborne reconnaissance is enduring, but it is not unchanging. As we look to the future, we see our mix of airborne reconnaissance assets evolving in response to new 

technologies as well as joint strategies, doctrine, and a 

more diverse threat. . . . we see unmanned aerial vehicles 

playing an ever-increasing role, not only in the intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance world (ISR), but in 

other mission areas as well.

–Major General Kenneth R. Israel, UAV Annual Report, 

FY 1997, Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

The Joint Program Office

In the late 1980s, in an effort to eliminate waste in the Department of 

Defense’s various UAV programs, Congress mandated that all research 

and development be centralized. This resulted in the creation of the Joint 

Remotely Piloted Vehicle Program. The Joint Program Office (JPO) managed all research, development, and procurement of UAVs for each of the 

services. Congress also required that the JPO provide an annual report 

detailing their activity. Major Congressional and JPO concerns, were the 

concepts of interoperability and commonality. Interoperability meant that 

all UAV systems possess the capability of integrating with the various 

other command, control, communication, and intelligence systems used 

by the services. Commonality referred to the ability of components from 

one system to be used with another. For example, the ground control station for one vehicle should be able to control a vehicle from a different 

system. Fuel type represented another part of the push for commonality.1

The JPO oversaw the development of new UAV systems and managed existing systems from 1988 to 1994. None of the JPO’s development 

programs entered full production before the JPO was absorbed into the 
82

Defense Aerial Reconnaissance Office in 1995. Although the developmental programs within the JPO never reached maturityduring its tenure, 

it successfully deployed multiple UAVs with US forces during Operations 

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Before describing the various programs, it is necessary to explain the 

JPO development process steps through which a UAV system advances. 

After determining the requirements for a UAV system, the JPO issued a 

request for proposals to the defense contractor industry. From these proposals, the JPO gave out multiple contracts to develop a prototype for 

technical evaluation testing. Through technical evaluation testing the JPO 

evaluated the feasibility of a system and its potential for success. Successful prototypes moved on to limited-user testing. This testing proceeded, in 

theory, to discover any major problems not previously detected. Limiteduser testing also represented the first chance for military personnel to use 

the system for themselves. If major problems emerged, the program could 

be scrapped. The program could also move forward into operational testing. The final option was for the program to enter low-rate initial production (LRIP). Low-rate initial production could be used to acquire additional systems for operational testing, or to begin delivering systems to the end 

user. Upon the completion of operational testing, the JPO and DOD would 

make the final go or no-go decision on whether to enter full production.

The JPO formed the plan for a family of UAV systems which maximized their common interoperability and fulfilled the identified requirements from the initial 1988 report, as discussed in the previous chapter. 

The JPO classified the systems as close-range, short-range, and endurance. Within the family, the short-range system served as the centerpiece 

of the concept and was the focus of the JPOs efforts. The close-range program received some attention, and the endurance vehicle never amounted 

to anything more than a concept. DOD continued development of a medium-range system, also described in the 1988 Master Plan, although the 

JPO excluded this system from the family classification.2

Short Range UAV Program (Hunter)

The JPO focused first on the short-range (SR) system. DOD’s initial design proposal called for a ground-launched UAV system capable 

of providing near real-time intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance 

to the Army at corps and higher units and to a Marine Air-Ground Task 
83

Force (MAGTF). Later, the concept of fielding expanded to include Army 

divisions. After acquiring a base model, the JPO developed a number of 

upgrades to expand the capabilities of the system. The Block I upgrade 

added the means to launch the system from a ship. In Block II, the basic 

engine size increased and the payload capability was expanded. When the 

Navy decided to decommission two of its four battleships, the USS Iowa 

and the USS New Jersey, the JPO realized that any maritime UAV would 

likely require a smaller vehicle than the one intended for the Army and 

the Marines. Although it continued to seek interoperable components, the 

JPO began looking for alternate vehicles, specifically a vehicle capable of 

vertical take-off and landing (VTOL), to fulfill the Block I upgrade to the 

SR UAV. The JPO hoped that by fielding a basic system and planning systematic upgrades, it could avoid the high cost incurred by programs like 

the Aquila, whose development cost increased heavily as the Army sought 

to add more capabilities to the basic model.3

The JPO granted contracts for prototype development in September 

1989 to McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems and Israeli Aircraft Industries. The contracts gave each company 18 months to deliver a system for 

evaluation and testing by the JPO. During the first technical evaluation 

testing of McDonnell Douglas’s Sky Owl and Israeli Aircraft Industries 

“Hunter” systems, neither proved ready to move forward. After a few 

modifications, in 1992 the JPO picked the Hunter system (see Figure 27) 

as the SR UAV. The following year, the Defense Acquisition Board approved the start of the LRIP process. Further testing of the Hunter system 

continued simultaneously as the LRIP, during which numerous problems 

with the system began to emerge.4

Even before commencing LRIP, the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) warned that the Hunter system possessed numerous problems and 

advised against any production before further testing. The practice of concurrent development had led to problems in the Navy’s DASH program 

in the 1960s, and more recently with DOD’s electronic warfare systems. 

The GAO warned that history had shown that once a program entered production, flaws discovered in testing were ignored in order to maintain the 

production timeline. The GAO raised concerns about the conditions under 

which the JPO tested the Hunter system. Although in theory it had strict 

requirements for the testing of its UAV systems, the investigation of the 

program found that in practice the JPO routinely ignored its own criteria. 

The GAO report discovered numerous examples of this practice in the first 

limited-user tests of the Hunter system, which were conducted in 1992.
84

One of the required capabilities for the SR-UAV was the ability to takeoff from an unimproved surface. During Operation DESERT STORM, the 

lack of this capability limited the operational use of the Pioneer system. 

There was not enough engineering equipment available to build adequate 

runways. During the initial limited-user testing of the Hunter, the vehicle 

took-off from improved surfaces. The JPO program manager argued that 

in an operational environment, engineer battalions could construct a surface similar to the one used in the tests, despite contrasting evidence from 

Operation DESERT STORM.

There were several other operational problems with the UAVs used in 

DESERT STORM. Another problem was electromagnetic compatibility. 

According to the JPO, two of the Pioneer vehicles that were lost during the 

war were the result of electromagnetic interference. Rather than account 

for this during user tests, the JPO made an effort to eliminate any possible 

interference from the test zone. The JPO also failed to evaluate the survivability of UAVs in combat situations, which was considered a critical system requirement. However there was no real way to measure survivability. 

While the JPO did gather some information as to the Hunter’s survivability on the battlefield, this evidence was not considered when deciding 

whether or not to enter LRIP.

Figure 27. Hunter UAV.

US Air Force photo, SSGT Jocelyn M. Broussard.
85

Finally, throughout the limited-user testing, contractor personnel continued to conduct the majority of UAV system maintenance which raised 

concerns about whether the military could provide the necessary logistical 

support for the system. Logistical support conducted by the military was 

yet another of the JPO’s own paper requirements which was ignored in 

practice. Congress, however, had already approved funds for LRIP of the 

Hunter system, and the DOD and the JPO ignored the findings of the GAO 

and moved forward with production.5

A second set of limited-user tests in 1993 confirmed the concerns 

raised by the GAO. The JPO continued to ignore its own requirements 

throughout these tests. When directed from a ground control station, the 

Hunter system had a very limited range since its datalink operated via 

line of sight. To compensate for this, the concept of operations for the 

system planned for a second vehicle to be operated in close proximity to 

the ground control station, to relay the commands from the ground and 

imagery data from to the operational UAV and the imagery data back to 

the ground terminal. JPO requirements stated that the system should operate in this manner 84 percent of the time. With two vehicles airborne, 

the chances for mechanical failure doubled. During the tests, the JPO encountered numerous problems with the relay component. As a result, only 

20 percent of the flight time during the second set of limited-user tests 

utilized a relay vehicle. When it was used, the relay system functioned 

correctly in only 4 of 11 tests. The system also demonstrated problems in 

target acquisition, transportability, engine durability, and self diagnostic 

equipment. These new problems came in addition to the issues found in 

the 1992 tests, which the GAO reiterated in a December 1993 report. In response to the system failures during limited-user testing, the DOD delayed 

operational testing for 18 months. However, the go/no-go decision for fullrate production was only delayed three months, meaning full production 

would start before the completion of operational testing.6

Further problems in 1995 led to three more negative reports from the 

GAO. One of the contract provisions stated that the developer was responsible for providing the logistical information to DOD, including training 

manuals, maintenance requirements, and a description of the functions of 

the support team for the system. At the end of 1994, the contractor provided training for some military personnel. After the training provided, 

however, the military personnel completed only 56 maintenance tasks correctly the first time, out of 3,107 total tasks. Further training significantly 

improved this number, but military personnel could still only perform 
86

about half of the total prescribed tasks. The system itself continued to experience difficulties with the air vehicle, the relay system, and artillery 

fire-adjustment.7

In September 1995, the GAO again criticized the DOD plan to move 

forward with full production before the completion of operational testing. 

They used the Pioneer system as an example of a system being purchased 

without being fully tested. DOD submitted an official response to this report, in which it disagreed with the GAO regarding the extent of problems 

with the Pioneer system. The response also argued that limited-user testing 

could be substituted for operational testing, although they still planned to 

perform the operational testing. DOD partially concurred on several other 

points, including the need to adequately test all systems before entering 

full production. Three months later, the GAO released its final critique of 

the Hunter program. This final paper stated that the Naval Commanders of 

the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet of Naval Forces in Europe, opposed Hunter. DOD agreed that the acquisition of Hunter systems for shipboard use 

should be curtailed. Once the goal of a common vehicle for Army, Marine 

and Navy use disappeared, the Hunter program lost much of its support. In 

January 1996, DOD allowed the LRIP contract to expire without renewal, 

although it continued to search for a vehicle similar in size and capability.8

It is possible that in its zeal to cut costs, the GAO acted unfairly in its 

evaluation of the Hunter program. However, the JPO’s annual reports from 

1992-1994 contain no information that contradicts the GAO’s findings. 

Additionally, in testimony before Congress in 1997, a high-ranking DOD 

official, the same official who authored the response to GAO’s critiques, 

confirmed that the Hunter program experienced all of the problems detailed in the GAO reports. Hunter was not a total loss, however. Through 

the low-rate initial production, the DOD acquired seven Hunter systems, 

each with multiple air vehicles. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance 

Office revived the Hunter program. Hunter systems deployed to the Balkans in 1999 and to Iraq in 2003 in support of the Long War.9

Close Range UAV Program

The second priority of the JPO was the close-range (CR) UAV program. This program called for a small, aerial vehicle that could integrate 

with the control systems developed for the SR vehicle. This approach was 

intended to insure interoperability between the two systems. The JPO selected six contractors to develop a vehicle for testing. One of the key as-
87

pects of the contract was a maximum weight of 200 pounds. In addition to 

vehicle design, the program was responsible for reducing the size of the 

ground components for CR UAV deployment at the battalion level and 

developing a light weight forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) system. 

In January 1992, three companies presented a FLIR system weighing less 

than 50 pounds, the weight requirement set by the JPO. Six months later, 

all six contractors presented acceptable vehicle concepts. In 1993, the JPO 

merged the CR and SR programs and created the Joint Tactical Project 

Office. The maneuver variant, as the CR vehicles were now called, progressed slowly as the Hunter system encountered one problem after another. No vehicles entered development before DOD disbanded the JPO, 

effectively ending maneuver variant development.10

Another offshoot of the SR UAV program was the maritime vertical 

take off and landing (VTOL) system. As discussed before, the JPO initially intended to modify the vehicle used by the Army and Marines to fulfill 

the Navy’s short range reconnaissance needs at sea. Once the Navy’s interest in the Hunter waned the JPO began to pursue a different vehicle. The 

maritime VTOL program worked with the Canadian military and the primary vehicle tested under the program was the Canadair CL-227 Sentinel. 

The Sentinel conducted numerous test flights in 1993 and 1994. Although 

the Navy did install a system on the frigate USS Vandegrift in 1994, the 

Sentintel was never widely deployed.11

Medium Range UAV Program

The JPO also worked on a medium-range (MR) UAV system, a program which predated the estalishment of JPO by several years. The MR 

UAV program began as a Navy project in 1985. When Congress mandated 

all funds for UAVs be spent on joint programs, the other services agreed to 

join the Navy. In June 1989, Teledyne Ryan received a contract to modify 

the Teledyne 324 system, which they had sold to the Egyptian government, to fit the JPO’s MR UAV needs. The JPO expected the BQM-145A, 

the military designation of the Teledyne 324, to possess a range of 350 

km and reach speeds of Mach 0.9. It was to be launchable from either 

the ground or the air, via an F/A-18 or an F-16. In 1991, the MR UAV 

program ran into problems when the GAO reported that the Advanced 

Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS), the sensor payload that 

the DOD intended to use as the standard payload for future manned and 

unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles, did not fit into the BQM-145A. 
88

DOD concurred with the GAO on this and a number of other technical 

problems, but believed the issues could be resolved. Development continued until it became clear that the problems with the payload could not 

be solved. DOD stopped work on both the MR UAV program and the 

ATARS in 1993, in response to both projects exceeding their budget.12

In the years the JPO oversaw DOD development of UAVs, not a single 

system moved from development to full production. This failure cannot be 

blamed on a lack of funding from Congress. From fiscal years 1989-1994, 

the DOD received its full budget request for research and development 

in all but one year. In three of those years the final Congressional budget 

included more money for UAV research than the JPO’s own budget submission. The only year in which the Congressional budget for research 

and development came short was FY 1994, the final year of the JPO. This 

deficit came mostly from Congress cutting the $72 million requested for 

further research on the MR UAV program. JPO received less in procurement funding in two of those years, including one year in which Congress 

withheld all procurement because it felt JPO was not complying with their 

guidelines regarding joint programs; for only one year was their procurement funding higher than their request. The shortage in procurement funds 

resulted from the JPO requesting funds for the SR UAV. Although Congress approved the first LRIP contract, it subsequently withheld money 

for SR UAV procurement, likely under the advice of the GAO (see Figure 

28).13

UAVs in DESERT STORM

The JPO managed a number of existing UAV programs, several of 

which deployed with US Forces to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91. The most 

expensive of these was the Pioneer system. As discussed in the previous 

chapter, the Navy purchased a number of Pioneer systems from Israel in 

1986. The JPO intended to use Pioneer as an interim system until the SR 

UAV entered service, originally scheduled to be in the late 1990s. Pioneer 

saw extensive service in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. In addition to 

its active duty, the services also used the Pioneers to evaluate what would 

be needed from future UAV systems.14

The Navy deployed two Pioneer detachments to the Persian Gulf, one 

on board the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin. On 3 February 

1991, the Navy first used the UAV to direct naval gunfire onto the shore. 

In this barrage, over 18,000 pounds of explosives were launched against 
89

Iraqi targets with the help of the Pioneer. Throughout the rest of the month, 

it acquired targets on land and sea. On various missions, Marine ground 

forces, Navy attack aircraft, and naval gun fire were used to destroy targets acquired via the Pioneer. During DESERT STORM, the Missouri sent 

over one million pounds of ordnance against Iraqi targets with the assistance of a UAV. While supporting a Marine assault on Faylaka Island, a 

group of Iraqi soldiers waved white flags toward an approaching Pioneer. 

Figure 28. UAV Program Requests and Allowances.
90

For the first time in history, enemy units surrendered to an unmanned vehicle. The Navy subsequently released the video feed from this mission to 

the media, which resulted in a spectacular public affairs success. In addition to target acquisition, Pioneer provided intelligence as to Iraqi Army 

movements. After a Pioneer spotted a group of Iraqi tanks moving toward 

a Marine position, air support was dispatched and destroyed the Iraqi 

forces before they could reach the Marines. Even after the cease-fire, the 

UAVs continued to provide reconnaissance data to the Navy. In February 

1990, Navy Pioneers alone flew over 177 hours in support of Operation 

DESERT STORM.15

Ground forces from both the Marines and the Army also used Pioneer in DESERT STORM. The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade used 

the UAV to direct artillery fire and close air support. The Army’s Pioneer 

platoon deployed in support of VII Corps operations. It flew 43 missions 

in February. On one especially productive mission, a single vehicle discovered three Iraqi artillery battalions, three free-rocket-over-the-ground 

sites, and an antitank battalion. Despite this univeersal use of the Pioneer, 

each service had a different video format. This hindered any effort to share 

footage between the services. Only one vehicle was left to enemy action 

during operations in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, there were no significant problems with air space management. The successful deployment of 

the Pioneer system in DESERT STORM proved the value of UAVs in 

combat operations.16

Another program operated by the JPO was the aptly described “very 

low cost” program, which focused on developing inexpensive UAV systems to support smaller units (originally company and below, later expanded to include battalions). Two UAVs within this program also supported US forces in Kuwait and Iraq. The low-cost program searched for 

systems that in addition to being inexpensive, could easily be transported, 

operated, and maintained with minimal training. The JPO examined two 

different systems as part of this program: the FQM-151A Pointer and the 

BQM-147A Exdrone. The hand-launched Pointer vehicle traveled in a 

backpack and weighed only 45 pounds. Two soldiers put the vehicle together and launch it in under five minutes. Once assembled, it measures 

six feet long with a nine foot wingspan and weighs only nine pounds. DOD 

acquired six systems in 1990, which underwent testing with the 2d Infantry Division (ID), 25th ID, 7th ID, 82d Airborne, 8th Marine Regiment, 

7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. 

During DESERT STORM, it deployed with the 82d Airborne, 1st Ma-
91

rine Expeditionary Force, and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The 

system underwent various operational tests throughout the early 1990s. 

In 1993, a Pointer vehicle assisted the Oregon Army National Guard and 

local law enforcement in a dozen raids. The Pointer later supported US 

forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Long War.17

The other system was the Exdrone, originally designed as an expendable unmanned platform for communication jamming, it was later modified to be recoverable and carry a reconnaissance payload. At almost 90 

pounds, the vehicle weighed significantly more than the Pointer vehicle. 

Its lower cost, however, made it possible for the vehicle to be used in support of smaller units with less concern about losses. Once launched, it generally flew a preset course, loitering over a target for over two hours and 

transmitting live video back to a monitoring terminal. It also possessed 

the capability to be controlled remotely while on mission. The Exdrone 

provided support to the Marines in DESERT STORM and provided useful 

information that allowed Marine forces to enter Kuwait City sooner than 

expected. A total of 500 Exdrones were built and deployed. Thirty-eight of 

these underwent modifications beginning in 1997 and were redesignated 

as Dragon Drones. Dragons deployed with Marine expeditionary units on 

multiple occasions between 1997 and 2000. Through their experience with 

Pointer and Exdrone, the services gained insights which helped in the development of various hand-launched UAVs during OEF and OIF.18

The Birth of the Predator

The most successful program began during the final year of the 

JPO. After cancelling the MR UAV system, the JPO began working on 

a medium-range endurance system known as Predator (see Figure 29). 

Rather than follow the previous process of competition, various stages of 

testing and later production, the new program used a new process known 

as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD). ACTDs were 

a way for DOD to acquire new technology more quickly and at a lower 

cost than the traditional developmental process. In an ACTD program, a 

developer was given a contract to take a mature piece of technology and 

improve its deployment for the intended user. After applying the technology, the user then identified what modifications were required for the 

system to be useful and determined if it justified further development. In 

January 1994, the DOD awaited a contract to General Atomics for three 

systems with a total of ten aircraft based on the GNAT 750, a UAV which 

had been previously developed and sold to the CIA. Predator was the first 
92

medium-altitude endurance UAV developed by the US military. Previous 

experiments with endurance UAVs, such as the Compass Cope program, 

focused exclusively on high-altitude long-endurance vehicles. The Predator flew within 3,000 and 25,000 feet and could remain aloft for over 20 

hours. Although founded under the JPO, the Predator would demonstrate 

its full potential under the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, the 

organization which assumed control of UAV programs in 1994.19

The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

In November 1993, DOD consolidated its reconnaissance program 

into the the Defense Airborne Reconnaisance Office (DARO), however, 

the JPO did not completely dissolve. It continued to exist as a part of 

DARO and remained responsible for the Joint Tactical UAV program. 

Like its predecessor, DARO was short-lived. In 1998, the office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance, (C4

ISR) replaced it as the overseer of UAV development. Never the less, in its four years, DARO enjoyed slightly more success than its predecessor agency. The ACTD process made failure far less 

expensive. When DARO cancelled the Outrider and Dark Star programs, 

the loss to DOD was substantially less than what had been incurred as 

a result of Hunter or Aquila UAVs. DARO also made substantial gains 

with the Predator system, initiated by the JPO, and the Global Hawk highaltitude endurance UAV.20

Figure 29. Predator UAV.

DoD photo, PH3 Jeff Viano.
93

UAVs in Bosnia

The first operational use of UAVs after the formation of DARO came 

in 1995. The USAF deployed its first Predator unit, designated the 11th 

Reconnaissance Squadron, to Bosnia in July 1995. The squadron provided 

critical aerial reconnaissance data until November. Although two vehicles 

were lost in this period, one to enemy action and another to an engine malfunction, the remaining Predator provided vital support to NATO forces. 

The Predators in this first deployment to Bosnia communicated with the 

operators on the ground via a UHF satellite connection. This connection 

allowed for real-time still images to be transmitted back to the ground 

terminals. Intelligence acquired via the Predator flights confirmed that 

several of the belligerents violated arms-removal agreements and assisted 

in providing targets for the subsequent bombing campaign. This bombing 

campaign succeeded in bringing the warring factions back to negotiations, 

which resulted in the signature of the Dayton Accords in 1995.21

Although the Predator’s first deployment was generally successful, a 

number of shortcomings emerged. General Atomics addressed several issues in the next generation of Predator vehicles, which deployed to Taszar, 

Hungary in March 1996. The new Predators possessed a synthetic aperture 

radar, which could “see through” cloud cover. This allowed the Predator 

vehicles to fly above low-level clouds, decreasing the risk of targeting by 

anti-aircraft fire. The installation of de-icing equipment made it possible 

to fly in weather that previously would have grounded the system. Most 

importantly, the installation of a Ku-band satellite link provided enough 

bandwidth for real-time full-motion video to be sent from Predator to the 

terminals on the ground. This also facilitated Predator’s integration with 

the Joint Broadcast System, which allowed multiple users to view incoming video simultaneously, a first for UAV reconnaissance. This capability 

further increased its ability to assist in command and control operations 

by making it possible to re-task a Predator in-flight to respond directly to 

the needs of a commander all the way down to the divisional level. During this second deployment, Predator systems monitored polling stations 

during the September elections and helped with security during VIP visits, 

including a visit by Pope John Paul II in April and Secretary of State Madeline Albright in October.22

Two other UAV systems supported the NATO effort in Bosnia. One 

of these was operated by the CIA and not the military. Early in 1993, two 

years before the first Predator deployed, the CIA sent two GNAT-750s, 

a predecessor of Predator built by General Atomics, to Bosnia. During 
94

this deployment, the GNAT 750, also known as Lofty View, followed UN 

convoys and took pictures of artillery and surface-to-air missile sites. CIA 

UAVs also deployed in July 1994 for another tour of duty. Although relatively inexpensive, the GNAT 750 lacked some of the capability that made 

the Predator so effective. Because it possessed only a line-of-site data-link, 

there was a manned aerial vehicle to transfer data back and forth between 

the ground control system and video terminals. This limitaion reduced its 

ability to stay aloft for only two hours. It also meant the GNAT 750 could 

not integrate with the Joint Broadcast System, which limited its ability to 

share intelligence data.23

The success of Pioneer in DESERT STORM led to the acquisition of 

several new systems. In late 1993, Pioneers were successfully deployed to 

support military action in Somalia. The Pioneer first deployed to Bosnia 

with the USS Shreveport (LPD-12) in 1995. The following year, a Marine Expeditionary Unit brought several more Pioneer systems into theater 

and the USS Austin (LPD-4) employed another ship-based Pioneer system. 

However, despite its strong showing in Iraq and Kuwait, the Pioneer system struggled in Bosnia. While it successfully provided tactical level intelligence, including over 30 missions with the 1st Marine UAV Squadron, 

and it proved adept at quick retasking, the systems experienced numerous 

mechanical failures. Five vehicles crashed as a result of engine, generator, 

rocket-assisted takeoff, or computer failure. Additionally, the mountainous terrain proved to be a major hindrance to the Pioneers data link. This 

link which depended on line-of-sight guidance. Like the GNAT 750, video-feeds from the Pioneer could not be distributed via the Joint Broadcast 

System. Despite some shortcomings in application, Pioneer systems further 

demonstrated the potential of the tactical UAV concept.24

Development under DARO

In the midst of these deployments, DARO continued to develop new 

UAV systems. All new development followed the ACTD process. Although 

several of these systems never fully matured, the ACTD process reduced 

the cost of failure and made it easier to cancel programs. DARO did develop three vehicles, two as part of the high-altitude endurance system, and 

a third as tactical system intended to replace the Pioneer and Hunter.

The tactical system known as Outrider first came under DOD contract 

in May 1996. It performed its first flight in March 1997, four months behind schedule. The system made a total of 17 flights between March and 
95

November, including participating in the Army’s Force Exercise XXI and 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment at Fort Hood, Texas. During these tests, 

Outrider provided real-time tactical intelligence to battle commanders. Despite the new acquisition process, the Outrider program suffered some of 

the same problems which had previously affected the Hunter. None of the 

DOD conducted tests evaluated whether the vehicle could be controlled 

and monitored via the same system which controlled Predator, a key aspect 

of interoperability and commonality. Additionally, the data-link was analog as opposed to digital, which reduced its range and capability. Despite 

these problems, DARO intended to move forward with an LRIP contract to 

acquire more Outrider systems. However, after objections from the GAO, 

DARO and DOD did not award an LRIP following the expiration of the 

initial ACTD.25

DARO’s high-altitude endurance (HAE) system integrated two different vehicles designed to complement each other. The DarkStar (see Figure 

30), or low observable HAE, was designed to perform broad sweeping 

aerial reconnaissance in defended airspace. It carried a simpler payload, 

remained airborne for a lesser period of time than the Predator or Global 

Hawk (the other HAE under development), and possessed a more limited 

range. It compensated for these features with its minimal radar signature. 

The director of DARPA described the potential of DarkStar as similar to 

the U-2 or SR-71 in terms of performing aerial reconnaissance in heavily 

defended airspace. The DarkStar part of the HAE program experienced a 

major setback when its first and only operational vehicle crashed in April 

1996. A new vehicle resumed testing in 1997. However, in January 1999, 

DOD and C4

I (the program that followed DARO) cancelled the DarkStar 

program and focused the HAE program entirely on the Global Hawk vehicle.26

The Global Hawk system, manufactured by Teledyne Ryan, possessed 

far superior flight capabilities than DarkStar. It had a range of over 3,000 

nautical miles and an endurance of greater than 40 hours. However, vehicle testing of the Global Hawk system followed that of DarkStar by several years. The first Global Hawk flew in February 1998. The program advanced throughout that year, with multiple vehicles completing numerous 

flight tests. The Global Hawk experienced its first major setback in March 

1999, when one of its air vehicles crashed with only a complete sensor 

payload on board. During this test flight, the vehicle flew from Edwards 

Air Force Base over the China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station. Unaware 

of the flight test, developers at nearby Nellis Air Force Base were working 

on the flight-termination system. When they tested the flight-termination 
96

code, the Global Hawk picked up the signal, terminated flight operations, 

and crashed. DARPA estimated the value of the lost vehicle and payload 

at $45 million.27

The common ground between the systems constituted one of the core 

concepts of the HAE program. This system included the launch and recovery element as well as mission control. It was intended to be able to control 

three UAVs simultaneously, allowing for contimuous coverage. Like the 

Predator, it would use line-of-sight and satellite communication links, so 

that images from DarkStar or Global Hawk were easily disseminated via 

the Joint Broadcast System. The designers of the common ground segment adapted DarkStar for use with the system. The DarkStar program 

never progressed far enough for the vehicle to be tested with the common 

system, and following the cancellation of DarkStar the control system 

reverted to controlling just the Global Hawk. Another element of commonality incorporated within the HAE UAV program was the common 

imagery ground/surface system. This system integrated images from both 

manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles into a common file 

format to ease the process of sharing intelligence data. Although the common ground segment never actually operated as a multiple vehicle control 

system due to the cancellation of DarkStar, this system and the common 

imagery system represented significant progress in the area of commonality and interoperability of UAV systems.28

In 1998, DOD began transition in the way it managed UAV programs. 

The C4

I office assumed oversight of UAV programs. However it did not 

control funding to the extent that the JPO and DARO had. Beginning in 

Figure 30. DarkStar UAV.

National War College photo.
97

FY 1998, appropriations for UAVs returned to the individual services, 

while the C4

I worked to coordinate programs as much as possible. Although not always under the office for C4

I, this has remained the basic 

approach of DOD for the next ten years, with generally positive results. 

In September 1998, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) entered the 

fray by publishing a report which supported the creation of service-driven 

UAV development. The CBO studied ways to make DOD UAV spending more efficient. The report marks a stark contrast from previous GAO 

reports, which criticized existing programs with minimal suggestions for 

recommended improvements. The CBO presented five options. The first 

two favored increasing the number of UAV systems to better fit the needs 

of the individual services.29

The first option dealt with the tactical UAV program, and proposed 

two possible choices. The attempt to develop a single, tactical UAV, to 

support both the Navy and the Army greatly increased the development 

costs of the system. The CBO recommended either cancelling the Outrider 

system and reviving the Hunter program for the Army, or making the Outrider program funded exclusively on Army assets for all of the services. 

In both options the Navy and Marine Corps would continue to field the 

Pioneer until a better UAV was developed for them. “Mission creep” or 

the continually growing concept of the operation, had consistently interrupted the UAV program. The pursuit of a single UAV capable of a broad 

range of missions seemed more cost-efficient than the development of 

multiple systems. However, the cost and complexity of building such a 

system became prohibitively expensive. The DOD cancelled Outrider in 

1999, and later that year began development of the Shadow UAV for its 

tactical needs.30

The second option suggested using the Hunter system to support the 

Army’s need for corps and divisional UAVs. The Army planned to rely on 

the Air Force Predators for reconnaissance at those command levels. The 

CBO worried that the limited number of Predator systems currently in the 

Air Force would restrict the amount of coverage the Army might receive. 

The CBO admitted this would create additional logistical demands on the 

Army and increase the Army’s spending on UAVs. This approach was less 

costly than if the Army later determined that Air Force’s Predators could 

not provide adequate support and tried to purchase their own Predators.31

From 1988 to 1998 all funding for UAV development was channeled 

through either the Joint Program Office or the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office. This maximized the interoperability and commonality of 
98

the developed systems. The approach proved effective only in theory. The 

design of a minimal number of unmanned vehicles and systems to perform a maximum number of missions led to technical problems and high 

costs. Even after spending large amounts of money, performance often 

failed to meet the initial criteria. Almost all of the UAV programs failed 

to meet minimal requirements. Their criticism, however, was usually accurate. Both the JPO and DARO often failed to adequately test UAV systems before moving forward in their development process. However, the 

operational potential for UAV systems could only be fulfilled by actually 

deploying the systems in the field. The Congressional requirement that all 

programs needed to be interservice compatible made the fielding of any 

UAV systems much more difficult. In 1998, the individual services again 

began to run their own UAV development programs, although joint programs continued to be encouraged and facilitated through various DOD 

offices.

UAVs in Kosovo

UAVs from all services played an important role during the 78 days 

of Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999. The Army had embraced the recommendations of the CBO and deployed Hunter as a corps asset. During its time as a residual program from 1996 to 1999, the Army resolved 

a number of the problems that had earlier led to the cancellation of the 

Hunter program. The mountainous terrain in Kosovo required two Hunter 

vehicles to be airborne for each mission, one to perform the actual mission and one to relay signals back and forth from the mission vehicle to 

the ground control element. Despite earlier problems experienced with the 

relay system, only two vehicles were lost as a result of mechanical or 

system failures. The Army also developed a system to solve the problem 

of disseminating data transmitted via a line-of-sight link. After receiving 

the video feed, the ground station digitized the signal and transmitted it 

over the Joint Broadcast System. This allowed multiple users to view the 

feed in near real-time. Although still not as efficient as the Predator feeds, 

which were instantly transmitted via satellites, this process increased the 

usefulness of the Hunter system.32

It addition to its standard surveillance and reconnaissance missions, 

the Predator proved to be very capable at monitoring cell-phone and portable-radio transmissions of enemy forces. Additionally, the Air Force 

developed a new technique for marking targets in which two Predators 

identified a target using electro-optical and infrared sensors, while a third 
99

Predator used mapping software to direct its laser designator on the target. 

An F-16 or A-10 plane would then engage and destroy the target. The rules 

of engagement for Operation ALLIED FORCE created new limitations for 

both the Predator and Hunter. Before engaging any target, the mission had 

to be verified as a legitimate target by two sources. Both vehicles served 

as the second intelligence source for targets spotted by forward air controllers.33

Although UAVs demonstrated several new capabilities during Operation ALLIED FORCE, a number of problems emerged. The integration 

of UAVs with other aircraft in air control environments represented one 

of these challenges. NATO limited the number of UAV flights to certain 

areas in order to reduce the risk of collisions. The predictable flight path 

increased the risk on each mission. Throughout the course of the air campaign, the Army lost four Hunter vehicles to enemy action, and four more 

to mechanical failure. Additionally, four of the Air Force’s Predators and 

four of the Navy’s Pioneers were lost.34

UAVs at the end of the 20th Century

Before DESERT STORM, UAVs possessed far more potential than 

immediately practical. Under thecontrol of the JPO and DARO, this began to change. Despite numerous failures, by the time DOD dissolved 

DARO in 1998 the services possessed a more sophisticated arsenal of 

UAVs than they had 10 years before. Changes in the acquisition process 

made failures less costly. Technological progress and necessity coupled 

to revive previously failed programs such as Hunter. Some Hunter systems underwent further modification during the Long War and continue 

to serve today. The Predator and Global Hawk, both still operational at 

the time of this writing, originated during this time period. Changes within the Army also fostered further development of UAVs. The Force XXI 

concept emphasized the potential of digital communications and information sharing, an area particularly well suited for UAVs. Experimental vehicles like the hand-launched Exdrone demonstrated a concept that today 

is widely deployed. Some of this technology did not fully mature until 

the Long War. However the technological progress of the 1990s laid the 

foundation for the rapid growth of the early twenty-first century.

Before DESERT STORM, the United States had only used a few 

UAV systems in support of combat operations. Technological progress 

and the nature of the United States’ military engagement during the 1990s 
100

provided the opportunities for numerous deployments. In this decade, 

Pioneer, Hunter, Pointer, Exdrone, and Predator all operated in combat 

situations. Experience gathered from these deployments proved vital during the Long War.
101

Notes

1. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, 1 March 

1991, 5-6, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA321290 (accessed 9 October 2008).

2. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, 11.

3. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, 15-16.

4. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 1994 Master Plan, 

1 January 1994, 3.2-3.6, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA291628 (accessed 

14 October 2008).

5. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing 

Needed Before Production of Short-Range System, 4 September 1992, 5-9, http://

archive.gao.gov/d35t11/147689.pdf (accessed 14 October 2008).

6. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of 

Short-Range System Still in Question, GAO/NSIAD-94-65, 4-9, http://www.gao.

gov/archive/1995/ns95052.pdf (accessed 15 October 2008).

7. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: No More Hunter Systems Should Be Bought Until Problems Are Fixed, GAO/NSIAD-95-52, 

1 March 1995, 4-10, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ns95052.pdf (accessed 15 

October 2008).

8. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Maneuver System Schedule Includes Unnecessary Risk, GAO/NSIAD-95-161, 15 September 

1995, 3-12, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ns95161.pdf (accessed 15 October 

2008); General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System in 

Not Appropriate For Naval Fleet Use, GAO/NSIAD-96-2, 1 December 1995, 2-9, 

http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ns95052.pdf (accessed 15 October 2008).

9. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts (Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Military Research and Development and Military Procurement, Committee on National Security, House of 

Representatives: Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisitions 

Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division), GAO/T-NSIAD-97-

138, 9 April 1997, 3-4; http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97138t.pdf (accessed 

15 October 2008); Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 2007-

2032, 10 December 2007, 70, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA475002 (accessed 

15 October 2008).

10. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, 1991, 12-13; Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Master Plan, 1992, 22; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Master Plan, 1993,

26-30; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 1994 Master Plan, 3.1-3.9.

11. Ibid., 3.23-3.35.

12. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, 1991, 16-17; Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Master Plan, 1992, 38-39; General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit, GAO/NSIAD-91-2, 
102

25 March 1991, 2, 20-28, http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/143530.pdf (accessed 16 

October 2008); DOD’s Acquisition Efforts, 3.

13. US Congress. House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense. 100th Congress, 2d session, 1988, H. Rep. 100-1002, 92; US Congress. 

House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense. 101st Congress, 

2d Session, 1989; US Congress. House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense. 101st Congress, 2d session, 1990, H. Rep. 100-938, 116; US 

Congress. House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the 

Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1993, and for Other Purposes. 102d Congress, 

2d session, 1992, H. Rep. 10-1015, 143; US Congress. House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense. 103d Congress, 1st session, 1988, H. Rep. 

103-339, 138-142. In Fiscal Year 1992, the House and Senate Appropriations 

Committees agreed on the R&D budget for the JPO, so the budget was not discussed in the conference committee report. The budget for that year can be found 

in either of those committees. See US Congress. House. Department of Defense 

Appropriations Bill, 1992 102d Congress, 1st session, 1991, H. Rep. 102-95, 215; 

and US Congress. Senate. Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1992. 102d 

Congress, 1st session, 1991, S. Rep. 102-154, 333-334, 347.

14. UAV Master Plan 1991, 18-19.

15. Department of the Navy, Fleet Composite Squadron Six, Command History of Calendar Year 91, 2 April 1992, http://www.history.navy.mil/sqdhist/vc/

vc-6/1991.pdf (accessed 16 October 2008).

16. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992,

395-96, 806, http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf (accessed 17 October 

2008).

17. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan 1991,12; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan 1992, 44-45; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 1994 Master Plan, 3.18-

3.21.

18. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan 1992, 47-48; Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2025, April 2001, 6, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA391358 (accessed 17 October 2008); “Persian Gulf War 

Shows Off UAVs,” Armed Forces Journal International, July 1991, 32.

19. UAV 1994 Master Plan, 3.15-3.16.

20. J.R. Wilson, “Finding a Niche: US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Finally 

Get Some Respect,” Armed Forces Journal International, July 1995, 34-35; Bill 

Sweetman, “US UAVs Stick to Their Guns,” Interavia, July 1998, 36.

21. Department of Defense, UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, 6 November 

1996, 7, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA321302 (accessed 21 October 2008); 

Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Flying High: Air Force Finally Embraces Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles,” Armed Forces Journal International, October, 1995, 18.

22. UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, 7-8; Department of Defense, UAV An-
103

nual Report, FY 1997, 6 November 1997, 4-5, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/

ADA336710 (accessed 21 October 2008); Department of Defense Command and 

Control Research Program, Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, Larry 

Wentz, ed., 1998, 103, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/wentz_bosnia.

pdf (accessed 17 October 2008).

23. Lessons from Bosnia, 103; David A. Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, 

“CIA to Deploy UAVs in Albania,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 31 January 1994, 20; David A. Fulgham, “CIA to Fly Missions from Inside Croatia,” 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 July 1995, 20-21.

24. Lessons from Bosnia, 104; UAVs: DODs Acquisition Effort, 3; UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, 9.

25. UAV Annual Report, FY 1997, 26-27; General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will be Inadequate to Justify 

Further Production, GAO/NSIAD-97-153, 23 September 1997, 5-7, http://www.

gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97153.pdf (accessed 22 October 2008); General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DODs Demonstration Approach has 

Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-23, 30 August 1999, 4-5, http://

www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99033.pdf (accessed 22 October 2008).

26. UAV Annual Report, FY 1996, 22-23; “DoD Kills Lockheed Martin’s 

DarkStar UAV Effort,” C4I News 11 February 1999, 1.

27. Jeffrey A. Drezner and Robert S. Leonard, Global Hawk and DarkStar: 

Flight Test in the HAE UAV ACTD Program, vol. 2 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 

23.

28. Drezner, 15-17.

29. US Congress. House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense. 105th Congress, 1st session, 1997, H. Rep. 105-265. This budget assigned 

funds for UAVs to the individual services. Congressional Budget Office, Options 

for Enhancing the Department of Defense’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs, 

September 1998.

30. Options for Enhancing the DOD UAV Programs, 36-45; UAV Systems 

Roadmap 2000, 5.

31. Options for Enhancing the DOD UAV Programs, 45-48.

32. Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience, Larry Wentz, ed., 2002, 457, http://

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/kosovo_section_5.pdf (accessed 27 October 

2008).

33. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (RAND, 2001), 96.

34. Lambeth, 97.

105

Chapter 4

UAV Systems in Iraq and Afghanistan

Unmanned systems cost much less and offer greater 

loiter times than their manned counterparts, making 

them ideal for many of today’s tasks. Today, we now 

have more than 5,000 UAVs, a 25-fold increase since 

2001. But in my view, we can do—and we should do—

more to meet the needs of men and women fighting in 

the current conflicts while their outcome may still be 

in doubt.

–Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,speech 

to Air War College, 21 April 2008

The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 marked the beginning of the Long War. In March 2003, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

opened a second front in this war. During these two wars, UAVs performed far more missions, in type and quantity, and received far more 

attention than any previous conflict. Procurement of existing and development of new systems expanded exponentially. The limited wars 

in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated that UAVs had finally reached 

their potential. The Long War provided the stimulus to fully exploit 

these new tools. Existing systems such as the Predator and Hunter, underwent further modifications to expand their capabilities and prolong 

their operational life. New systems, such as the Raven and Shadow, 

moved quickly from initial development to large-scale production in 

a relatively short period of time. The growth of UAVs has provided 

commanders at all echelons with a better understanding of battle space 

and improved command and control. However, the rapid pace of the 

expansion raised several issues about the future of UAVs, including the 

long-term costs for logistical support and maintenance, concerns about 

the bandwidth required to support current and future UAV operations, 

and the proper balance of manned and unmanned vehicles within the 

services.
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UAV Systems Deployed in Support of the Long War

A complete, narrative history of UAV operations in the Long War far 

exceeds the scope of this manuscript. In compensation, this chapter describes the development of the key systems, provides a few operational 

examples, and summarizes discussions of UAV roles today.

Although each service categorized UAVs differently, the vehicles and 

systems are generally are divided into five categories: strategic, operational, short-range, small and micro. Figure 31 outlines these categories, 

their specific systems, and the Army echelon that is supported. This classification is inexact, but it provides a framework for the discussion of UAVs 

used in support of the Long War.

UAV Category System Echelon Supported

Strategic Global Hawk Corps/Joint Command

Operational Predator, Reaper, Sky Warrior

Division

Brigade

Short Range Hunter, Pioneer, Shadow

Battalion

Small UAV Raven, Dragon Eye, EagleScan

Company and Lower

Micro UAV

Note:  Vehicles in italics are designated as multi‐purpose vehicles (potentially armed)

Figure 31. Categories of UAVs.

Global Hawk

The Air Force’s Global Hawk UAV flew at the strategic level providing ISR missions for an extended period high above that achieved by 

the Predators, Reapers, and Sky Warriors. The Global Hawk (see Figure 

32) transitioned from an ACTD production to an operational program in 

2001. The first operational production model was deployed to Central 

Command in 2006. Prior to this period, residual aircraft from the ACTD 

program flew missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. By March 2005, the 

new system had flown over 4,000 hours of combat operations. A more 

advanced ‘B’ model performed its first flight in March 2007. Like the 
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Predator, operators in Europe and the United States usually controlled 

Global Hawk while in theater. Because Global Hawk is a relatively new 

system, control from the United States has allowed for more rapid adjustments and improvements to the control system than was possible if 

the vehicle had been controlled in theater. If an operator experienced a 

problem or simply could not develop a target, he could call a developer 

on his cell phone and talk to him about how to fix the system. In one case 

a hard drive in the control system overheated. The intelligence operator 

assumed the mission was not recoverable and started to leave the control 

center. An engineer diagnosed the problem, and the mission commander 

sent someone to the post exchange to buy a fan. This $15 fix cooled the 

drive and allowed the mission to continue successfully.1

Predator and Variants

Of all the UAVs supporting American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

none received as much attention as the Predator system. During the 1990s, 

the USAF designated the Predator as the RQ-1. The Air Force had used 

‘Q’ to designate unmanned aircraft as early as World War II. The ‘R’ stood 

for reconnaissance. As early as 2001, the Air Force used a Predator aircraft 

to launch a Hellfire air-to-ground missile against an enemy target. This 

Figure 32. Global Hawk UAV.

US Air Force photo by Bobbi Zapka.
108

new capability prompted a change in designation from RQ-1 to MQ-1, the 

‘M’ represented the Predator’s new multi-mission capability. As discussed 

in the previous chapter, in Kosovo Predators flew equipped with laser designators. The armed models used this designator to mark targets for their 

onboard Hellfire missiles. Both the CIA and the Air Force operated Predators using this new capability in the first six months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.2

In September 2008, the Air Force had an inventory of 110 Predators. 

During the surge that year in Iraq, Predators provided over 13,000 hours 

of video to the troops on the ground each month. At one point, the Air 

Force conducted 24 simultaneous combat air patrol missions, with each 

one providing coverage around the clock. This operation intensity was 

possible through the development of “split remote control.” In this model, 

take-off and landing was directed by line-of-sight control in theater. Once 

airborne, operators in the continental US assumed control of the vehicle. 

This method, which increased the number of operators available, nearly 

tripled the number of operational Air Force’s Predators at any given time, 

from 30 percent to 85 percent of the inventory.3 

Simultaneously with the expansion of the Air Force’s Predator, operational availablility was the Army’s purpose for its own endurance UAV 

(see Figure 33). Army efforts focused on the General Atomics Sky Warrior, initially known as the Improved GNAT–Extended Range (I-GNATER). The vehicle itself closely resembled the Predator, but powered a 

diesel (instead of aviation gasoline) engine. The first Warriors were deployed to Iraq in 2004. A newer version, known as Sky Warrior, entered 

service in 2008. Sky Warrior possessed a superior weapons payload to the 

Figure 33. Predator and Its Successors.

Weight Length Wingspan Endurance Operation

Radius

Payload

Capacity

Fuel

Type

Predator (MQ‐1) 2250 lb 27' 55' 24 hr 500 nm 450 lb AVGAS

Warrior Alpha

(I‐GNAT‐ER)

2300 lb 27' 49' 30 hr 150 nm 450 lb AVGAS

Sky Warrior

(MQ‐1C) 3200 lb 28' 56' 40 hr* 648 nm 800 lb JP‐8

Reaper (MQ‐9) 10,500 lb 36' 66' 24 hr 1655 nm 3750 lb JP

*w/ 250 lb payload   
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Predator or Warrior, and was capable of carrying four Hellfire missiles. 

Initial plans called for a system of 12 vehicles to be assigned to each divisional aviation brigade, further divided into 3 platoons. Each deployed 

system also included five ground control stations. In addition to its own 

lethal payload, the Warrior (and later Sky Warrior) acquired targets for 

the hunter-killer teams of OH-58 and AH-64 helicopters. Before Warrior, these teams functioned basically as they had in Vietnam: the OH-58 

sought out targets and the helicopter gunship engaged it. Now, manned 

helicopters remained on strip alert until Warrior acquired a target. Also, 

because it was organic within the division, the operation team was in sync 

with the operations and activities of the ground forces that the vehicle 

supported. In one case, a Warrior imagery analyst detected insurgents 

placing an IED on a road several miles ahead of an approaching convoy. 

Because the operator knew where the convoy was headed, he warned the 

convoy commander. The commander stopped his vehicles, the Warrior 

lased the target, and a team of Apache and Kiowa helicopters engaged 

both the IED and the insurgents. An operator and analyst working from 

the continental United States would have identified the IED being set and 

directed other units to destroy it, but the analyst might not have known to 

warn the approaching convoy and save US Soldiers lives.4

The Air Force and Navy also pursued a succession to the Predator system. Initially known as the Predator-B, the name later changed to the MQ-9 

Reaper. Similar to the Warrior and Sky Warrior systems, the Reaper was a 

response to increased needs and greater funding resulting from the initiation of the Long War. The Air Force’s Air Combat Command approved the 

Reaper’s concept of operations in 2003. The following year, the Air Force 

set up the 42nd Attack Squadron as the Reaper organization, first received 

in March 2007. The Reapers possess a greater capacity operational radius 

and payload capability than the Predator and they first operated in combat 

in Afghanistan in the fall of 2007.5

Short Range Systems—Hunter, Pioneer, and Shadow

During the Long War, three UAV systems performed the short range 

ISR mission. Two of these programs possessed operational experience in 

previous conflicts: Hunter and Pioneer. The third system, Shadow, debuted during the Long War. Hunter systems were deployed to Iraq in January 2003 in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. During the first 30 

days, Hunter vehicles were not in service due to the fact they had not been 
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assigned an operational frequency, but by January 2004, Hunters had flown 

over 3,100 hours in theater. In October 2003, the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned published an article praising the Hunter’s role in high-intensity operations, but the article criticized the system’s effectiveness in support and 

stability operations. The vehicle’s limited vision made it difficult to find 

small groups of enemy forces over large geographical areas. For example, 

even when the vehicle operator received intelligence from other sources that 

located enemy forces, by the time Hunter reached the target the enemy had 

usually left the area.6

Despite these initial problems, the Army decided to purchase upgraded 

Hunters in FY 2004. The new Hunters, designated MQ-5B, were powered 

wih a heavy fuel engine and modified to be able to carry Viper Strike munitions. The laser-guided Viper Strike munitions caused little collateral damage, which enabled them to be used in tight situations when a Hellfire or 

other aerial fire munition could produce unwanted collateral damage. These 

second-generation Hunters entered service sometime in late 2005 or early 

2006. Over a year later, in September 2007, a Hunter system recorded its 

first kill. A scout team from the 25th Aviation Brigade spotted two enemy 

combatants setting up a roadside bomb. They called in a Hunter, which eliminated both bombers. Upon publication of the DOD’s 2007 Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the Army’s UAV inventory contained 54 Hunter vehicles.7

The second SR UAV in the military’s inventory, the Pioneer, began the 

Long War as a Navy system, but soon showed its value with the Marine 

Corps. Pioneer continued to perform its basic ISR mission, with virtually 

no changes to the system. The only significant change was the addition of 

the MRS-2000 video receiver and terminal. Because of its compact size, the 

MRS-2000 added mobility to the Marines UAV capability. Previously, the 

video terminal for the Pioneer required a Humvee and three crew members 

to operate. Instead, the new receiver fit in a Soldier backpack. Initially there 

were only four video terminals. High demand led the Marines to order two 

more in July 2003. By the end of 2005, Pioneers had flown a total of 7,500 

hours in Iraq. The Marine Corps continued to use the Pioneer, although the 

Shadow started replacing it in 2007.8

Following the cancellation of the Outrider system in 1999, the Army 

looked for a new replacement to provide tactical ISR at the brigade level. In 

December 1999, the Army selected the Shadow system, manufactured by 

AAI as its new UAV. About half the size of Hunter, the Shadow vehicle had 

a range of around 68 nautical miles and could stay aloft for up to six hours. 

The Shadow could be launched either from a runway, or via a catapult sys-
111

tem (see Figure 34). In 2002, the Shadow entered full production. Each system contained four vehicles and two ground control stations. The Shadow 

deployed with the Army at the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

and quickly proved its worth. By June 2006, Shadow vehicles had flown a 

total of 84,000 hours, including 50,000 hours between August 2005 and the 

following June, an average of seven vehicles in the air around the clock. The 

Shadow was deployed at brigade level, with one in each Stryker brigade 

combat team and modular brigade.9

The Army used the One System Ground Control Station (GCS), designed by AAI for the Shadow system. Interoperability and commonality. 

increased due to its ability to work with multiple platfroms. From 2001 

through 2005, the GCS was able to control modified Pioneer, Warrior, and 

Hunter UAVs, each of which had previously used its own GCS. The One 

System GCS met a DOD objective for a ground control station capable of 

controlling various UAVs in existence since the early 1990s.10. In 2004, 

the Marine Corps standardized the Shadow’s GCS for use with the Pioneer. The following year, AAI received a contract from General Atomics 

to provide the GCS for the Army’s Warrior UAV. As more units received 

the One System GCS, it was easier for an Army unit working adjacent to 

a Marine unit to “borrow” a Marine UAV and vice versa. In addition to 

providing a rapid response to quickly developing situations, this interoperFigure 34. Shadow UAV Being Prepared for Flight.

DOD photo, PFC Bradley J. Clark.
112

ability also decreased the amount of mission overlap that occurred when 

each service needed to deploy its own UAV.

Small UAVs

The growth of UAVs during the Long War was not limited to brigade 

and higher organizations. Small UAVs, such as AeroVironment’s Raven 

and Dragon Eye, and Boeing’s ScanEagle provided UAV support at battalion level or lower. The RQ-11 Raven (see Figure 35) evolved from the 

FQM-151A Pointer, described in the previous chapter. Briefly part of a 

program called Flashlite and later Pathfinder, the Raven entered LRIP in 

2002. The system measured three feet long, with a wingspan of four and a 

half feet. The Raven fit into a suitcase and was hand launched. Once airborne, it transmited color video in real-time over a range of seven miles. 

Within four years the Army had used the Raven for 15,000 missions, under 

the operational control of company commanders. Its proven success led 

the Marine Corps to adopt the system in 2006.11

Slightly smaller than the Raven, the Dragon Eye first flew in 2000. 

The Marines acquired 40 systems in 2001. The Dragon Eye supported Marines at the company level and below. Even after acquiring Raven, the MaFigure 35. Hand Launched Raven UAV.

US Army photo by SSG James Selesnick.
113

rines still retained the Dragon Eye as part of a new system, named Swift. 

Another small UAV tested by the Marine Corps was the ScanEagle. The 

ScanEagle’s endurance far exceeded the Raven and Dragon Eye, both of 

which could only remain airborne for less than two hours. The ScanEagle 

could officially operate for up to 15 hours, although one system functioned 

for over 28 hours. The Navy also purchased several ScanEagle systems to 

assist in oil platform security. The Air Force also tested the system in 2007 

for possible acquisition.12

Micro-UAVs

Although no micro-UAVs (sometimes called mini-UAVs) have entered 

full production, several systems were acquired via LRIP and deployed in 

support of the Long War. In 2004, the Army purchased 84 Tactical MiniUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (TACMAV), which were developed by Applied Research Associates, for operation testing in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Each system cost only $36,000. The TACMAV (see Figure 36) weighed 

less than a pound, measured just under 20 inches long, and had a 20-inch 

wingspan. It could fly for up to 25 minutes at a range of one-and-a-half 

nautical miles. The Army tested the TACMAV at the platoon and squad 

level. However, the results were not promising. Many units complained 

about the picture quality, lack of infrared capability, and the absence of 

grid coordinates on the terminal. After the initial tests, the Army rejected 

acquisition of the system.13

Figure 36. Micro-UAV TACMAV.

US Marine Corps photo.
114

AeroVironment, the producer of the Raven and the Dragon Eye, manufactured a more successful micro-UAV known as the Wasp. Smaller than 

the TACMAV at 11 inches long with a 16 inch wingspan, the Wasp possessed a similar range but had greater endurance and was able to stay aloft 

for up to an hour. The Wasp also used the same GCS that controlled the 

Raven and the Pointer. The Marines, Air Force, and Navy all demonstrated 

interest in the system. 

UAV Systems in Afghanistan and Iraq Operations

Afghanistan

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda’s haven in the 

mountains of Afghanistan became the first target in the War on Terrorism. In the ensuing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the United States 

relied heavily on Special Forces and precision aerial strikes to defeat the 

Taliban. Despite flying an average of only 200 sorties a day, Air Force 

crews engaged as many targets each day as it had when flying 3,000 daily 

missions during DESERT STORM. Among the factors that led to this increased efficiency, was the use of UAVs for target acquisition. Special 

Forces troops worked in conjunction with UAVs to monitor Taliban and 

al-Qaeda forces and decrease the sensor-to-shooter loop. Such integration 

of air and ground-based intelligence sources had a long history, going back 

to World War II when battle commanders regularly went aloft in liaison 

planes assigned to their units to confirm or verify intelligence reports. The 

live-video feeds of the Predator and Global Hawk gave the same capability to unit commanders without having to leave the ground. After a target 

was identified and engaged, UAVs performed battle damage assessments 

(BDA) to ascertain any requirement for additional strikes.14

Predators also played a vital role in ANACONDA the first unconventional American operation on Afghanistan. Predators performed two 

primary tasks: force protection and killer-scout operations. In a force 

protection mission, the UAV patrolled ahead of advancing forces and 

provided information about the enemy’s location. In the killer-scout role, 

the Predator served as an airborne forward air controller (FAC). If necessary, force protection missions could change into killer-scout missions and 

provide targets for other aircraft or field artillery. Initially, some ground 

forward air controllers resisted coordinating with the UAV operators. But 

the Predator quickly proved its worth, and soon many ground FACs did 

not want to operate without UAV support. At Takur Ghar the tactical air 
115

control party (TACP) from the 1st Battalion 187th Infantry, of the 101st 

Airborne Division, received intelligence from higher level headquarters 

that enemy forces were gathering within his area of responsibility. Some 

hills obstructed the TACP’s view and made it impossible for him to call 

for fire. An airborne FAC aboard an A-10 initially helped direct fire. Later, 

a Predator arrived on the scene and coordinated with the TACP, a pair of 

A-10s, and an AC-130. Fires were detected so well that the entire enemy 

force was destroyed before it could mount an attack on the infantry battalion.15

The Predator’s ability to rapidly locate and identify targets made it 

possible to hit targets that previously would have escaped because of the 

delay in sensor-to-shooter. At times, however, this ability distracted from 

more important missions. One Predator operator described an incident in 

which a division commander, after viewing a Predator feed, ordered his 

air liaison officer to send aircraft to destroy a single truck seen delivering 

men and supplies on a battlefield, but the F-16s were unable to locate the 

truck. The air liaison officer wanted the planes to return to their close air 

support mission, but the ground commander wanted the truck destroyed. 

The F-16s continued to search for this one truck, reducing the close air 

support available to troops currently engaged with enemy forces. Videofeeds from UAVs have been described as seeing the world through a straw. 

Although the images acquired were remarkable, in this situation and in 

others it was easy to lose sight of the bigger picture in response to specific, 

yet limited, intelligence.16

When searching for a high-value target, however, this narrow focus 

can be extremely useful, particularly when hunting down Taliban and 

al-Qaeda leaders. Predator strikes routinely went after rich targets, sometimes engaging them even in the tribal regions of Pakistan. The number 

of attacks into Pakistan increased dramatically in the latter half of 2008. 

From January through the end of July, Predators fired five missiles at targets in Pakistan. In the three following months, they launched at least 18 

missiles. Several attacks resulted in civilian casualties and a wave of negative publicity. One major success, however, was the elimination of Khalid 

Habib, a senior al-Qaeda operative, on 16 October. Additionally, analysts 

in the United States believed the Predator attacks forced the insurgents to 

retreat further from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, complicating their 

insurgents’ command and control. Although the Pakistani government regularly objects to the strikes as a violation of their sovereignty, American 

officials defended them as a matter of self-defense, since many attacks on 

US forces originated in Pakistan.17
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Predator systems were also used to confirm and complement intelligence gathered from other sources. In early January 2007, elements of the 

10th Mountain Division gathered signal intelligence indicating a pending 

attack on a newly established border post. As a result, UAVs were directed 

to observe areas within Pakistan where the attack was likely to originate. 

On 10 January, a Predator observed the assembly of enemy forces. A group 

of students was being armed and trained at a facility just inside Pakistan. 

The Predator continued to watch the enemy as they began to move toward 

the border post. Once they had moved far enough into Afghanistan where 

their location could not be disputed by the Pakistanis, the American forces 

fired on the raiding party. Using a variety of aerial and ground munitions, 

virtually the entire force was eliminated.18

Iraq

Despite a year of operational experience with the newest UAVs in Afghanistan and over a decade of research and development of interoperable 

systems, during the initial invasion of Iraq it remained difficult to share 

UAV gathered intelligence between the services. During the initial drive 

on Bagdad, the Global Broadcast System (GBS) distributed video from 

Air Force Predators and the Army Hunter systems. The Marines could 

view video over the GBS, but could not broadcast their own UAV intelligence from Pointer or Pioneer over the system. The Combined Forces 

Land Component Command (CFLCC) intelligence staff, headed by the 

C2, General James A. Marks, controlled UAV operations during the invasion. This overall direction facilitated the integration of UAV capabilities 

with other intelligence sources. At one point during the invasion, a human 

intelligence source reported a gathering of Fedayeen forces at a soccer stadium. CFLCC deployed a Hunter to verify the report. After confirming the 

report, field artillery and aerial fires eliminated the threat. Over the course 

of the next several years the services found ways to improve interoperability. However, it was often a case of working around problems rather 

than actually solving them, even then the situation was far from perfect.19

One example of this came in the lead-up to Operation AL FAJR, the 

joint Marine and Army operation to clear out Fallujah in November 2004. 

On 8 November, Camp Fallujah, which contained the command center 

for the Marine Expeditionary Force, began receiving mortar rounds which 

had been fired from inside a mosque courtyard. A Marine Pioneer located 

the target and the operator transferred the coordinates to the supporting 

field artillery unit. After making several adjustments, the artillery hit the 
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courtyard but failed to suppress the mortar. At this point, the Marines received word that an armed Predator was in route. The Marine and Air 

Force operators still could not share images, so they used e-mail chat to 

transfer information. This approach took longer for the Predator to get on 

target, while mortar rounds continued to explode inside Camp Fallujah. 

The Marines finally got tired of waiting, and changed the mission from the 

Predator to a Marine AV-8B close support aircraft. The Pioneer operator 

gave targeting information via a voice link to the pilot, who then took out 

the insurgents and the mortar tube with a guided bomb. Fortunately in the 

end, the delay caused by inadequate communication capabilities between 

the Air Force and Marines was not detrimental to the mission. Had the AV8B not been available ,however, the delay in getting the Predator on target 

could have resulted in serious consequences if the mortar gunner had been 

more proficient.20

Another incident from the same battle demonstrated that serious problems still remained with using UAVs in joint operations. Lieutenant General John F. Sattler requested that several mechanized units from the Army 

be sent to Fallujah to provide direct support to the Marines. In response, he 

received Task Force 2-2 from the 1st Infantry Division, and Task Force 2-7

from the 1st Cavalry Division. During the opening minutes of the attack, 

two of the Ravens from Task Force 2-2 crashed inside the city. Because 

of the timing, the unit had no other choice but to continue. Later, they 

discovered that the most likely cause of the crash was radio conflict from 

the adjacent Marine unit. In theory, standard frequency deconfliction conducted prior to the assault would have prevented this from happening. In 

this case, however, the deconfliction process never occurred and it resulted 

in the loss of two UAVs at the most inopportune time.21

From 2003 to 2008, proficiency with UAVs continued to improve. 

The battle for Sadr City in the spring of 2008 demonstrated how skilled 

the military had become at utilizing UAVs. Sadr City had long been used 

by Shia militia to launch rockets at the Green Zone, the government hub 

in downtown Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Novri al-Maliki resisted attacking the area for over a year. Once he finally approved an operation to 

clear out insurgents from the district, UAVs played a critical role during 

the fight. The 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division, had 

a Shadow platoon (comprising four Shadow systems), and each of its committed companys used a Raven UAV. However, in this fight the Predator 

played the most significant role. For the first time, a Predator was assigned 

to provide direct support to a BCT.
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During the battle the brigade controlled all Shadow and Predator operations. Battalion commanders could request UAV support for a specific 

mission, which would generally be performed by a Shadow. UAV missions were generally assigned 24 to 48 hours in advance, although these 

could be adjusted. For example, following a rocket attack from inside the 

city, a Shadow would locate the insurgents responsible, often within 20-

30 seconds. It would then follow the insurgents and eventually pass off 

the mission to an armed Predator, which could eliminate the target. This 

forced the insurgents to reorganize into smaller, less effective groups. If 

a company commander wanted to use his Raven, he requested a limited 

operational zone from the BCT, to eliminate air space conflicts.

The BCT’s UAV fleet complemented manned aerial reconnaissance 

and ground reconnaissance missions. During the planning phase of a mission, UAVs provided critical intelligence information regarding the battlespace. As units prepared to engage the enemy, the tactical operations 

center could give them specific details in real-time, such as the location 

of insurgents, even before they made contact. The persistent stare of the 

Predator allowed the Army to develop a better understanding of the enemy’s tactics. Rather than engage a single, small group of insurgents, the 

Predator could follow them and observe how they operated and moved. At 

one point after a rocket attack, a Predator trailed a group of insurgents all 

the way back to a building where the insurgent unit joined several other 

units for an after-action review. Sometimes, a Predator might follow a 

single enemy element for as long as 10 hours before engaging.22

The importance of the UAV operators and image analysts cannot be 

stressed enough. After the fight in Sadr City, the XO of the 3d BCT, Major 

John Gossart, praised their work:

Seeing the ground from that vantage point, especially at night, 

takes training and practice to know what a cigarette or a weapon 

looks like. Knowing what to look for, what to cue off of, what is 

normal and what is not [is not easy]. When to move the bird and 

how to jump where the activity will happen, [and] not staying 

fixed on what the ground element can already see; our soldiers 

and leaders have become very good at this.23

The Challenges of UAV Operations in the Long War

The expansion of UAV use has sometimes led to heated discussions 

between the Army and Air Force personnel over who should control the 
119

unmanned aircraft. In 2007, the Air Force requested that the Secretary of 

Defense be the executive agent for military UAVs. The Pentagon denied 

the Air Force request and instead created a task force to manage all DOD 

UAVs. Despite such disputes, operationally the services continued to work 

together to support the nation’s warfighters and doctrine writers from the 

Army and Air Force came together in 2008 to design a concept of operations for UAV employment in joint operations.24

The main item of contention was the Predator. Both services agreed 

that tactical-level UAVs, like the Raven, should be controlled by the Army 

(or Marine Corps) and strategic UAVs, such as Global Hawk, should be 

an Air Force asset. However, less clearcut was who should control the 

extended-range multi-purpose vehicles such as the Predator, that fall between the strategic and the tactical. In order to reduce costs and increase 

commonality and operability, the Pentagon instructed the Army and Air 

Force to merge these separate programs into a single program. Merging 

the development and acquisition programs might make the program more 

economically efficient, but it failed to answer the question of who controls 

the assets in theater.25

A second major challenge was a cronic shortage of pilots. In 2008, the 

Air Force created a new UAV pilot training program that took officers immediately out of initial pilot training. Previously, most Predator operators 

had other flight experience before entering the training program. These officers typically flew UAVs for approximately four years and then returned 

to their original career track. In addition to these temporary operators, the 

Air Force announced plans to develop a new career track focused entirely 

on unmanned flight operations. In the past some pilots had resisted UAV 

assignments because of the limited potential for promotion. This new track 

aimed to eliminate that problem. In addition to training more officers, the 

Air Force also used enlisted airmen to operate the sensors on board the 

Predator.26

The Future of UAVs

Despite the success of UAVs in Sadr City and elsewhere, their future remains unclear. The record levels of defense spending from 2003-

2008 will nearly certainly decline in the years ahead. In the Army, the 

establishment in 2009 of the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization 

Program will likely shape how UAVs are employed in that service. The 

proper balance between manned and unmanned aerial vehicles continues 

to be debated within the DOD and elsewhere. Questions about the effec-
120

tiveness of UAVs against a technologically sophisticated opponent remain 

unanswered. The operational use of UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq grew 

so rapidly that the long term costs of operating them is only beginning to 

become clear.

The Future Combat System

In 1999, Chief of Staff of the Army Eric Shinseki announced one of 

the largest transformation plans in the Army’s history. His proposal aimed 

to make the Army more rapidly deployable. The Future Combat System 

(FCS) represented a major component of this plan. Over a period of 30 

years, the FCS would replace a variety of major warfighting tools, including the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley, with an integrated system of 

UAVs, manned and unmanned ground vehicles, remote sensors, and an 

advanced network to manage battle space information. The FCS focused 

heavily on situational awareness, maneuverability, and information management, which its advocates argued would allow a smaller force to defeat 

a much larger enemy.27

The initial FCS design included four UAVs, each supporting a different element. The class I UAV provided RSTA at the platoon level. Classes 

II, III, and IV supported the company, battalion, and brigade level respectively. Each FCS equipped brigade would possess 200 UAVs. Critics of 

the FCS argued this would create an enormous airspace management problem. When General Peter Schoomaker replaced General Shinseki in 2003, 

he altered some aspects of the FCS program to get technology developed 

as part of the system into the hands of American forces fighting the Long 

War. The Army planned for three “spin-outs,” each of which would deploy 

parts of the FCS alongside active brigades, the second of which included 

UAVs. Also in 2003, the Army selected Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8 Fire 

Scout VTOL UAV as the class IV vehicle. The Fire Scout’s vertical takeoffs and landings allowed to it operate from an unimproved runway. It 

lacked the endurance described by the FCS outline with only six hours 

over a target. The Navy also selected the Fire Scout to provide UAV support for surface ships, fulfilling a desire for a VTOL UAV that dated to the 

DASH program of the 1960s.28

In 2006, the Army selected the second UAV to become part of the 

FCS. They chose the Honeywell RQ-16 to be the class I vehicle. The RQ16 micro air vehicle possessed a rather unique design. It generated lift via 

a propeller housed inside a duct. The vehicle weighs only sixteen pounds, 
121

possesses a range of six nautical miles, and flies for up to forty minutes per 

mission. Initially developed as part of a micro air vehicle ACTD, the Army 

purchased several systems to test with the 25th ID in 2004. The vehicle’s 

performance in these tests helped insure its selection as part of the FCS.29

Because of budgetary concerns, the Army restructured the FCS program in 2007 and eliminated the class II and III UAVs. This decision also 

limited the potential air space management problems that the previous 

plan might have created by having so many UAVs operating. The elimination also reduced the amount of bandwidth required to transfer sensor data 

and vehicle control between ground stations and UAVs. Boeing, the lead 

contractor for the FCS, studied the bandwidth demands of the original 

plans for the FCS. Prior to the reduction of UAVs, the bandwidth required 

by the FCS was 10 times greater than what was expected to be available. 

Sensor data from the class III and IV UAVs alone comprised two-thirds 

of the FCS’s bandwidth demand. Even after the elimination of the class II 

and III vehicles, concerns remained about the strain the FCS would put on 

the Army’s information network.30

In may 2009 Army officials announced the cancelation of the FCS. 

However certain aspects of the program were to be incorporated into a 

new program, the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program. 

Although at the time of this writing, the parameters of the BCT modernization program are still under development, it is clear that UAVs will be 

an important part of the program. 

Challenges of the Future

The use of UAV supplied full-motion video has generated concern 

in some quarters that commanders have become addicted to it. One Air 

Force officer described this phenomenon as “Predator crack.” A study by 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) found that commanders in 

Iraq were occasionally hesitant to authorize a fire mission without fullmotion video coverage of the target. Requiring a live video feed may help 

prevent the accidental targeting of civilian or friendly forces, a critical task 

in Iraq’s operational environment. However, it does so at the expense of 

traditional methods of calling for fire. In a future conflict against a more 

technologically sophisticated opponent, constant full-motion video might 

not be as readily available. The constant use of full-motion video also 

puts tremendous strain on digital communications services. One of the 
122

key findings of the CALL study was the need to prioritize the use of fullmotion video and only use it when necessary.31

In a report from 2005, the Congressional Research Service posed several questions about future UAV development. One of these, related to 

the growing dependence on UAVs, dealt with the effect of unmanned aircraft production on traditional aircraft production. The report questioned 

whether industry focus on unmanned vehicles would lead to a decline in 

manned aircraft development expertise, an area in which the United States 

traditionally holds a strong competitive advantage. During the Long War, 

many aircraft manufacturers have increased their research and development of UAVs at the expense of manned aircraft. A major question driving this debate is how soon UAVs can fill the role of combat aircraft, or 

whether they ever could. Proponents of UAVs argue that the Joint Strike 

Fighter is likely to be the last, manned fighter jet. Manned flight advocates 

believe that UAV technology is still too immature to completely replace 

manned fighters. While UAVs proved their capabilities against insurgents, 

who lacked sophisticated jamming and electronic warfare weapons, it remains unclear how effective they would be against an adversary with more 

advanced capabilities.32

Another potential problem is uncertainty over UAV long term operating costs. The rapid development and deployment of UAV systems precluded the examination of the logistical cost that normally happens whenever the military acquires a new system. Both Predator and Global Hawk 

skipped the system development and demonstration phase of acquisition, 

the series of tests which provide information regarding the maintenance 

requirements of new systems. The need to deploy UAVs to the field in 

order to support troops trumped the need for further testing. At one point, 

the Air Force offered to delay further Predator acquisition to perform these 

tests. However Congress rejected this offer. As a result of the rushed development, DOD is still determining the cost of maintaining UAV systems 

over an extended period of time.33
123

Notes

1. “Global Hawk Reaches GWOT Milestone,” Defense Daily, 7 April 2005, 

1; “Long Range UAV Reachback Advantages Demonstrated in OEF and OIF,” Defense Daily, 26 September 2003, 1; Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 2007–2032, 64.

2. Yenne, 19; Brendan P. Rivers and Michael Puttre, “Predator Unleashes Hellfire,” Journal of Electronic Defense 24, no. 11 (November 2001): 

28-29; “News Transcript: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on Meet the 

Press,” 24 February 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.

aspx?transcriptid=2769 (accessed 28 October 2008); Marc Strass, “Air Force 

Stands up First Armed Predator Squadron,” Defense Daily, 11 March 2002, 1.

3. “Predator CAPs Double in One Year,” Air Force Link, 6 May 2008, 

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123097490 (accessed 28 October 2008).

4. Scott R. Gourley, “Sky Warrior,” Army, November 2007, 73-74; “Army 

Sky Warrior Makes Its Deput,” Defense Daily, 10 April 2008, 1. Department of 

Defense, Unmanned Aerial Systems Roadmap, 2007–2032, 10 December 2007, 

66, 76.

5. Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 2007-2032, p. 73; Julios Delos Reyes, 

“New Reaper UAV Undergoes Tests in SWA,” US Fed News Service, 5 November 

2007; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1377872221&sid=2&Fmt=3&client

Id=5094&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 29 October 2008).

6. US Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Newsletter No. 3-27,” 

(October 2003), 2-4.

7. Ann Roosevelt, “Army Prepares for Armed UAV Operations,” Defense 

Daily 224, no. 23 (17 November 2004), 1; “Coalition, Iraqi Forces Capture Terrorism Suspect, DefenseLink, (8 September 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47357 (accessed 29 October 2008); Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 2007–2032, 70.

8. B.C. Kessnar, “OIF Marines Will Get Additional Israeli UAV Man-Pack 

Receiving Systems,” Defense Daily International, 25 July 2003, 1; Congressional 

Research Service, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, Harlan Green, 21 November 2005, 43; “Marine Corps Begins Training on 

Shadow UAS,” Defense Daily 235, no. 17 (25 July 2007), 1.

9. Unmanned Vehicle Roadmap, 2007–2032, 71; Ann Roosevelt, “Army 

Shadow UAS Passes 100,000 Flight Hours,” Defense Daily, 23 June 2006, 1.

10. “United Industry Subsidiary AAI Corporation Wins Contract for One 

System (TM) Ground Control Station for New U.S. Army UAV System,” PR 

Newswire, 3 October 2005, 1; B.C. Kessnar, “Pioneer UAV Upgrades Targeting 

More than ‘Obsolescence Avoidance’,” Defense Daily, 23 April 2004, 1.

11. Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 2007–2032, 88; Jane’s Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles and Targets, 251-53.
124

12. Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 2007–2032, 85, 90; Jane’s Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles and Targets, 265-66; Geoff Fein, “Boeing’s ScanEagle UAV Surpasses 3,000 Flight Hours in Iraq,” C4I News, 23 June 2005, 1.

13. Unmanned Systems Roadmap, 96.

14. Global Security, “Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—Operations: The 

Air War,” Global Security , http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduringfreedom-ops-air.htm (accessed 3 November 2008); Major Craig J. Werenskjold, 

“The Effect of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on Precision Engagement” (master’s 

thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 23; http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/

ADA406036 (accessed 3 November 2008).

15. CPT Russell Parker, “The Predator’s War,” Airman, December 2002, 30; 

Steve Call, Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 77-78.

16. Call, 72-73.

17. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “United States Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, 27 October 2008.

18. Douglas R. Cubbison, The Crossed Sword Tribe of Afghanistan: The 

10th Mountain Division and Counterinsurgency Excellence in Afghanistan, 2006, 

10th Division Command History, 144.

19. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, LTC E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 417; General 

James A. Marks, interview by Colonel Gregory Fontenot, 17 November 2003, 

transcript, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

20. Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 2005), 265.

21. Matt M. Matthews, Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine 

Corps Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2006), 13, 39.

22. 60 Minutes, “The Battle of Sadr City,” (originally aired 13 October 2008).

23. Major John Gossart, correspondence with author, 5 November 2008.

24. Ann Roosevelt, “Army, Air Force to Complete UAV Concept of Operations,” Defense Daily, 26 September 2008, 1.

25. Ann Roosevelt, “Pentagon Nixes Air Force as UAS Executive Agent,” 

Defense Daily, 17 September 2007, 1.

26. Marina Malenic, “Air Force Announces UAV Pilot Training Plan to Begin Meeting ‘Insatiable’ Demand,” Defense Daily, 17 September 2008, 1.

27. Congressional Research Service, The Army’s Future Combat System: 

Background and Issues for Congress, Andrew Feickert, 28 April 2005, 2-8.

28. The Army Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress, 

2005, 3; Brendan P. Rivers, “ US Army FCS Spin-Out Plan Detailed, Journal of 
125

Electronic Defense 29, no. 3 (March 2006): 14; Unmanned Aerial System Roadmap, 2007, 72.

29. Ann Roosevelt, “Honeywell MAV to Transition to FCS Class I UAV,” 

Defense Daily, 25 May 2006, 1.

30. Leland Joe and Isaac Porche, III, Future Army Bandwidth Needs and Capabilities (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004), 27-29; Congressional Research Service, 

The Army’s Future Combat System: Background and Issues for Congress, Andrew 

Feickert, 12 May 2008, 11, 18.

31. Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Joint Fires CAAT Outbrief” (briefing, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 November 2008).

32. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, 2005, 

35-36.

33. John G. Drew et al., Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, End-to-End Support 

Considerations (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 2, 19-23.

127

Conclusion

So these systems [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] have become very, very important. Now, it’s a lot more complex 

than that because you have bandwidth issues. You have 

frequency issues. There is a limit to how many you can 

put in a certain airspace . . . again, because of communications issues and so forth. But, again, ISR is almost a 

pacing item for some of our units that are downrange. In 

other words, the key enabler for certain of our units that 

are downrange.

–General David Petraeus, Pentagon interview, 16 April 2008

Unmanned aerial vehicles represent one of the most significant weapons to emerge from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. No one can 

doubt the importance of UAVs in protecting the lives of US Soldiers. 

However, UAVs like the Predator, Shadow, and Raven did not emerge ex 

nihilo in 2001. Experiments with unmanned flight date to World War I. 

The Army used aerial reconnaissance separately from the Air Force dating 

to World War II, which predates the actual institutional separation of the 

Army and Air Force by several years. The last 90 years of manned aerial 

reconnaissance operations was a prelude to the organization and doctrine 

for the deployment of UAVs today. Knowledge of the history of both aerial 

reconnaissance and unmanned flight is helpful in determining the most effective employment of future UAVs.

Should UAVs continue to be spread throughout the services or consolidated under the Air Force? During World War II, the Army Air Force 

continually opposed the Army’s liaison aircraft program. Recently, the air 

service has tried to gain complete control of UAV development and acquisition. In the past, the fiscal logic of research centralization has appealed 

to Congress. However, under the JPO the search for a few vehicles capable of performing all missions for all services proved far more expensive 

than allowing the individual services to develop their own UAVs. This 

latter approach has proved to be effective in facilitating interoperability 

and commonality. For example, after witnessing the effectiveness of the 

Army’s Raven UAV, the Marines have begun to acquire it as well. The One 
128

System Ground Control Station is also being used by the Marines after 

initially being an Army project.

Regardless of which service controls the DOD UAV program, it remains likely that the Army will continue to possess tactical UAVs in its 

organization. But how to most effectively organize these assets? In the 

extreme, two possibilities exist. Individual UAVs can either be assigned to 

individual units (company, battalion, brigade, division, corps), or pooled 

at a higher level and tasked out based on mission requirements. In the 

former model, each battalion might get a Shadow vehicle. In the latter, the 

brigade would have three or four vehicles which it could task as needed. 

Historically, the latter approach has proven more effective as it optimized and prioritized the use of a limited number of systems. During 

World War II, even though each liaison plane received an assignment to 

a specific battalion, the division usually pooled these aircraft to ensure 

dawn-to-dusk coverage. Both Shadow and Predator have been used in this 

manner to provide continuous aerial reconnaissance. Assigning aircraft 

permanently to a single unit guarantees that the commander will always 

have an asset when he needs it, but it also increases the overall logistical 

burden on the unit and the Army as whole. 

A slight variation to this approach was the organization of the 1st Aviation Brigade in Vietnam. The 1st Aviation Brigade functioned as a completely independent unit, providing logistical and maintenance support to 

numerous aviation groups, battalions, and squadrons. Its subordinate units 

were attached for various periods of time to ground units, with the brigade 

providing only administrative and logistical support. 

Each of these models contains advantages and disadvantages, and 

the most effective solution is likely a combination of these approaches. 

During the fight for Sadr City each company had a Raven organic to its 

organization, although the units had to request airspace from the brigade 

to prevent collisions. The four available Shadow systems were pooled at 

the brigade level. Because of the importance of the fight, the 4th Infantry 

Division assigned Predator UAVs to the brigade as well. This mix of direct 

control, pooled assets, and tasked vehicles proved effective in the ensuing 

operation.

It is not good enough to simply acquire intelligence information. That 

information also has to be distributed to the users who need it. The netcentric approach makes it easy to simply broadcast full-motion video, but 
129

puts a tremendous strain on network resources. The Army needs to develop a way to ascertain who needs full-motion video, or when other methods 

could be used. Artillery observers are being underutilized as commanders 

prefer to use UAVs for targeting. A more traditional use of these forward 

observers and manned reconnaissance assets would place less strain on the 

network. The employment of UAVs and full-motion video should be needdriven, not capability-driven. Just because it is available does not mean it 

is always the proper tool to use. More effective application will guarantee 

that bandwidth and UAVs will continue to be available as required.

One challenge that has spanned the era of manned and unmanned 

aerial reconnaissance aircraft has been the difficulty in training pilots/operators and maintenance personnel. The suddenness of the United States’ 

entry into World War I forced the American Expeditionary Force to rely 

on British and French trainers. The Army Air Force possessed a far greater 

training capacity at the start of World War II. However this did not necessarily translate into the ground forces receiving enough pilots to fly artillery liaison aircraft. Additionally, air and ground commanders disputed 

what the basic requirements should be for these pilots. The rapid increase 

of UAVs during the Long War resurrected similar issues. The number of 

UAV systems deployed increased so rapidly that none of the services had 

enough operators or mechanics. In this case, the military looked not to its 

allies but to private contractors to supplement service personnel. While 

this method provided a temporary fix it did not address the long-term 

problem. Operatonal requirements caused the expansion of training programs which added more cost to the expense of the short-term, contractorbased solution.

Historically the development of UAVs can be divided into three stages. During the first stage, which began in World War I and ended with 

Operation DESERT SHIELD, the military experimented and tested UAVs 

in a mostly theoretical fashion. The Lightning Bug’s activity during the 

Vietnam War was a notable exception. The rest of the systems developed 

in this period helped formulate conceptions about the future of UAVs, but 

did little to provide any practical applications. The next phase, which lasted from DESERT STORM to the invasion of Afghanistan, may be categorized as “field testing,” although some of these tests took place under actual combat situations. American military engagements in Iraq, Somalia, 

Bosnia, and Kosovo provided opportunities to augment the concepts developed over the previous six decades with actual battlefield experience. 

The performance of UAVs in this period varied greatly, not only from 

system to system, but also from conflict to conflict. Pioneers excelled in 
130

Iraq, but struggled in Bosnia and Kosovo. During the Long War, the final 

stage of UAV development, the concepts and lessons of the earlier periods came to maturity. Although still being refined operationally, UAVs in 

Afghanistan and Iraq have proved decisive in their support of offensive, 

defensive, and stability operations. 

Another theme is the ongoing contrast between specialization and 

efficiency and economy. In terms of mission performance, each service 

and branch possesses different requirements for its aerial observation platforms, manned or unmanned. During World War II, the Army Air Force 

needed fast, maneuverable planes to perform reconnaissance and conduct 

battle damage assessment deep in enemy territory. But, these planes flew 

too fast to effectively support the ground forces because they operated 

from far behind the front, a disconnect developed between the pilots and 

the ground forces. The Army Air Force was theoretically correct that using its aircraft for tactical reconnaissance and artillery adjustment would 

be more efficient and affordable. However, the slower less maneuverable 

liaison planes assigned to the ground units proved to be more adept at 

providing close range ISR.

The challenge of balancing mission performance with budgetary concerns is even more complicated in the era of the UAV. In theory, several 

UAVs could be developed to perform all the missions required by the services at every level of command. The JPO pursued this approach during 

the early 1990s. The hope was that by increasing interoperability and commonality there would be a reduction in the number of systems aircraft purchased, thereby saving money. However, the cost per unit of these aircraft 

became so expensive that it proved to be a less effective plan. On the other 

hand, acquiring low-cost specialized UAVs capable of performing only a 

few basic missions or supporting only a specific echelon would require 

a high inventory of vehicles. In addition to acquisition costs, the more 

varied systems that are purchased, the greater the logistical requirement. 

The challenge for DOD is finding the most efficient balance between these 

extremes.

The final question raised in this study is the proper balance between 

manned and unmanned aircraft. Critics of UAVs contend that against a 

more capable, conventional opponent, they will not be able to perform as 

effectively as they have in Afghanistan and Iraq. Proponents, on the other 

hand, think that the current operational environment will be the most likely type of conflict in the future. History cannot be used to determine how 

the next war will be fought. If anything, it shows that peacetime research 
131

and development never provides anything more than a base for war mobilization. The balloons of World War I, the liaison planes of World War 

II, and the aero-scout teams of Vietnam were all relatively undeveloped 

at the start of their respective conflicts. Moving forward, a broad research 

approach encompassing manned and unmanned aircraft will provide the 

best base to begin the next major conflict.

Over the last 90 years, the Army used a variety of vehicles to provide 

aerial reconnaissance. Technologically, a Raven flying around Sadr City 

appears worlds apart from a balloon floating over St. Mihiel. Their tasks, 

however, are remarkably similar. The field manual for balloon companies 

instructs observers to describe what they saw, without interpretation. Fullmotion video now provides commanders exactly the same thing 92 years 

later. Determining intelligence requirements, gathering it and distributing 

the results to the field has been a consistent challenge for the Army’s aerial reconnaissance program since the First World War. Although historical 

analysis cannot provide a clearcut template for the proper role and mix of 

UAVs and aerial reconnaissance, it does provide valuable insight for the 

way ahead.

133

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