May 5, 2023 

[Attorney] 

[Title] 

[Entity] 

[Address] 

[Address] 

[Address]

Re: Appeal 2022-[xxxx] [Appellant]; Case No. 199224; United Airlines Ground 

Employees’ Retirement Plan (the “UAL Ground Employees’ Plan” or the “Plan”) 

Dear [Attorney]: 

I. INTRODUCTION

The Appeals Board is responding to your appeal of PBGC’s determination dated March 9, 

2022, on behalf of your client, [Appellant]. Under California law, [Appellant] was the domestic 

partner of [Participant], a participant under the UAL Ground Employees’ Plan. PBGC had 

previously determined that [Participant] was entitled to a monthly benefit of $1,001.51 in the 

form of a Straight Life Annuity with No Survivor Benefits. [Participant] died on December 12, 

2019, before retiring, and [Appellant] claimed a survivor benefit as [Participant’s] domestic 

partner. 

PBGC determined [Appellant] is not entitled to a PBGC-guaranteed Qualified Preretirement 

Survivor Annuity (“QPSA”) benefit under the UAL Ground Employees’ Plan. PBGC explained 

that PBGC guarantees QPSA benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 

1974, as amended (“ERISA”) only for the surviving spouses of married participants. Because a 

domestic partnership is not a marriage, [Appellant] is not eligible for a QPSA. 

PBGC further determined that the UAL Ground Employees’ Plan also provided a nonguaranteed pre-retirement survivor annuity to non-spouse beneficiaries. Because there were 

insufficient assets on Plan termination and from subsequent recoveries to fund this benefit, 

PBGC informed [Appellant] that it could not pay her the non-guaranteed pre-retirement survivor 

benefit. 

In your appeal dated June 24, 2022, you claim that [Appellant] is eligible, as the surviving 

domestic partner of [Participant], for a PBGC-guaranteed QPSA benefit and that PBGC’s denial 
2

of the benefit is contrary to California law and other authorities.

1 The PBGC Participant and Plan 

Sponsor Advocate has also submitted a Memorandum of Support of your appeal dated June 30, 

2022. 2 The Advocate similarly claims that [Appellant] is entitled to a PBGC-guaranteed QPSA 

benefit, contending that domestic partnerships and marriages “are the same under California 

law.” 3 

A. Summary of Decision

We find that [Appellant] was the registered domestic partner of [Participant] in a domestic 

partnership under California law. Because PBGC guarantees QPSA benefits under ERISA for 

the surviving spouses of married participants in PBGC-insured pension plans only, [Appellant] is 

not eligible for a PBGC-guaranteed surviving spouse’s benefit. We must therefore deny your 

appeal. 

B. Background 

PBGC is the United States government agency that insures pensions in accordance with 

Title IV of ERISA. If a plan sponsor is unable to support its defined benefit pension plan and the 

plan terminates, PBGC becomes the statutory trustee of the plan and pays guaranteed pension 

benefits according to the plan provisions, subject to legal limits set by Congress under ERISA. 

When the UAL Ground Employees’ Plan terminated on March 11, 2005, it did not have 

sufficient assets to pay all benefits provided under the Plan, and PBGC became the Plan’s 

statutory trustee on May 23, 2005. PBGC pays benefits based on the terms of the Plan, the 

provisions of ERISA, and PBGC’s regulations and policies. 

When PBGC becomes statutory trustee of a terminated plan, PBGC collects participant 

information and copies of the plan’s governing documents from the plan’s administrator and 

audits that data. PBGC relies on the information it receives from a plan administrator unless 

PBGC’s audit of that information shows that it is incorrect, or a participant supplies PBGC with 

documents showing that the information is incorrect. 

PBGC records contain the following information relevant to your appeal: 

• [Appellant] was born on [date of birth]; 

• Beginning [date of hire], [Participant] was an employee of UAL and a participant in 

the UAL Ground Employees’ Plan; 

1 A copy of the appeal by [Entity] (“Appeal”) dated June 24, 2022, is provided as Enclosure 1.

2 The PBGC Participant and Plan Sponsor Advocate, among other duties, “advocate[s] for the full attainment of the 

rights of participants in plans trusteed by [PBGC].” See ERISA § 4004(b)(2). 

3 Memorandum of Support in the Matter of [Appellant’s] Benefit Appeal (“Advocate’s Memo of Support”), dated 

June 30, 2022, submitted by Constance Donovan, PBGC Participant and Plan Sponsor Advocate, at 8, Enclosure 2. 
3

• [Participant] was actively employed with UAL when the Plan terminated on March 

11, 2005; 

• [Appellant] entered into a domestic partnership with [Participant] under the California

Family Code on [date of domestic partnership]; and 

• [Participant] died on [date of death], before retiring.

C. Issue Presented by Your Appeal of PBGC’s Determination

According to its benefit determination letter of March 9, 2022, PBGC determined that 

[Appellant] is not entitled to a PBGC-guaranteed QPSA benefit under the Plan. PBGC explained 

that PBGC guarantees QPSA benefits only for spouses of married participants. Because 

[Participant] and [Appellant] had entered into a domestic partnership, not a marriage, PBGC

determined that [Appellant] was not eligible for a PBGC-guaranteed QPSA benefit consistent 

with guidance issued by the Treasury and Labor Departments.

PBGC also discussed the Plan’s “non-QPSA pre-retirement survivor annuity” for nonspouse beneficiaries. PBGC determined that this benefit was a non-guaranteed benefit under 

ERISA and that the Plan’s assets and recoveries were insufficient to pay this category of benefit

under the asset allocation scheme of Title IV of ERISA. PBGC did not, however, expressly 

determine that [Appellant] was eligible for this benefit under the Plan. 

After receiving PBGC’s determination, you submitted two Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”) requests, seeking copies of PBGC’s operating policies and information regarding 

PBGC’s receipt of “domestic partnership cases.” You also requested extensions of time to file an 

appeal pending your receipt and review of relevant documents from PBGC’s Disclosure 

Division. The Appeals Division granted an extension for filing an appeal through June 30, 2022.

You filed a timely appeal of PBGC’s determination on behalf of [Appellant] in a letter dated 

June 24, 2022. The appeal claims that PBGC’s determination is “inconsistent with California 

law, established caselaw, and PBGC’s policies” and states in relevant part:

Under PBGC Policy 5.7-4, PBGC will “recognize as marriages 

only those arrangements specifically denominated as marriages by 

state law – PBGC will not recognize other arrangements such as 

civil unions, domestic partnerships, etc., as marriages unless they 

are explicitly denominated as marriages by state law.” [Appellant]

and [Participant], as registered domestic partners in California, are 

considered spouses under California Family Code § 297.5(a). 

PBGC failed to address California state law in its decision, despite 

PBGC policy stating it will recognize arrangements other than 

marriage if they are considered marriages by state law. 

California law clearly states that domestic partners have the same 

rights, protections, and benefits as spouses. California case law . . . 

demonstrate[s] the intent of the legislature to grant domestic 
4

partners the same rights, protections, and benefits as those granted 

to married persons.

As PBGC records note, [Participant’s] death certificate lists him 

as married to [Appellant]. PBGC’s policy recognizes marriages 

under state law. California state law recognizes [Participant's] and 

[Appellant’s] rights as spouses equal to that of married individuals. 

California went to great lengths to equate Domestic Partnerships 

with marriage to provide all spouses with the same protections

under the law. PBGC’s decision to deny [Appellant] a qualified

pre-retirement survivor annuity as the surviving domestic partner 

of United Airlines Ground Employees’ Retirement Plan participant 

[Participant] undermines California law.

* * *

It is unclear from the letter what provisions PBGC relied on in

issuing its determination. PBGC did not cite to or appear to include

PBGC’s internal policies, specifically PBGC Policy 5.7-4, in 

rendering its denial. It is further unclear why PBGC has relied on 

guidance from the Departments of Treasury and Labor, rather than 

the laws of California, in which the Domestic Partnership was

entered into. . . . 

(Emphasis in original.)

Your appeal also claims that PBGC’s determination of March 9, 2022, does not constitute 

“an adequate denial of benefits” because the determination did not “include citations upon which 

it relied to issue its decision.” As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that PBGC 

regulations address the form and content of initial determinations. Under section 4003.21 of 

PBGC regulations, initial determinations “will be in writing, will state the reason for the 

determination,” “contain notice of the right to request review of the initial determination” and “a 

brief description of the procedures for requesting review.” 4 The Board finds that PBGC’s 

determination complied with the applicable regulation regarding its content, even though it did 

not include citations to the authorities upon which it relied. 

As stated in your appeal, you included copies of the following documents: PBGC’s January 

31, 2020 letter to [Appellant]; a Continental Retirement Plan Beneficiary Pension Election 

Authorization Form; PBGC’s FOIA letters dated April 25, 2022, and May 16, 2022; and a letter 

dated August 7, 2020, from the Social Security Administration to [Appellant].

5

 

4 29 Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) § 4003.21.

5 The letter states: “You do not qualify for widow’s benefits because you are entitled to an equal or larger benefit on 

another Social Security record.” See Exhibit E to the Appeal, Enclosure 1. 
5

The issue presented by your appeal is whether PBGC guarantees, under section 4022(a) of 

Title IV of ERISA, a QPSA benefit under section 205(e) of ERISA for the surviving registered 

domestic partner of a participant in a PBGC-insured defined benefit pension plan. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Law 

1. The Respect for Marriage Act 

On December 13, 2022, President Biden signed into law the Respect for Marriage Act 

(“RMA”).

6

 By enacting the RMA, Congress repealed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) 

and amended the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, to define “marriage” as follows: 

(a) For the purposes of any Federal law, rule, or regulation in 

which marital status is a factor, an individual shall be 

considered married if that individual’s marriage is between 

2 individuals and is valid in the State where the marriage 

was entered into * * * 

(b) * * * 

(c) For purposes of subsection (a), in determining whether a 

marriage is valid in a State or the place where entered into, 

if outside of any State, only the law of the jurisdiction 

applicable at the time the marriage was entered into may be 

considered. 

Thus, the Dictionary Act, as amended by the RMA, now defines “marriage” for purposes of 

federal law according to the law of the state in which the marriage was entered. 

The RMA also declares, under section 7(a), that there is no impact on “status and benefits 

not arising from a marriage,” as follows:

Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, shall be 

construed to deny or alter any benefit, status, or right of an 

otherwise eligible entity or person which does not arise from a 

marriage, including tax-exempt status, tax treatment, educational 

funding, or a grant, contract, agreement, guarantee, loan, 

scholarship, license, certification, accreditation, claim or defense.

As a historical matter, Section 3 of the DOMA had previously amended the definition of 

“marriage” and the definition of “spouse” under the Dictionary Act. Section 3 of DOMA defined 

6 Pub. L. No. 117-228, § 5, 136 Stat. 2305 (Dec. 13, 2022), provided at Enclosure 3. Under the RMA, Congress 

made the following finding: “(1) No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of 

love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.” Id. at § 2, 136 Stat. 2305.
6

marriage as a union between one man and one woman. 7 In 2013, the Supreme Court in United 

States v. Windsor held that DOMA was an unconstitutional deprivation of the liberty of persons 

in lawful same-sex marriages protected by the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment of 

the Constitution.

8

 The Court reasoned that DOMA had the effect of depriving same-sex couples 

the right to marry under state law, which traditionally established the definition of marriage for 

purposes of federal law. 

2. ERISA and Relevant Administrative Guidance

PBGC guarantees benefits under the terms of a PBGC-insured pension plan, subject to the 

provisions of ERISA and PBGC’s regulations. Under section 4022(a) of ERISA, PBGC 

guarantees the payment of nonforfeitable benefits under terminated PBGC-insured pension 

plans, subject to limitations under Title IV of ERISA. 9 A “nonforfeitable benefit” is defined 

generally as a benefit for which a participant has satisfied the conditions of entitlement under the 

plan and the requirements of ERISA. 10 

In general, ERISA requires all defined benefit pension plans to provide the accrued benefit 

of a vested participant who does not die before the annuity starting date in the form of a qualified 

joint and survivor annuity (“QJSA”). 11 It further requires all defined benefit pension plans to 

provide the surviving spouse of a participant who dies before the annuity starting date with a 

QPSA. 12 If, however, the participant and spouse are not married throughout the one-year period 

ending on the earlier of the participant’s annuity starting date or the participant’s death, a plan is 

not required under ERISA to provide either the QJSA or the QPSA. 13 

A QJSA is an annuity for the life of the participant and a survivor annuity for “the life of the 

[participant’s] spouse” that is at least 50 percent of the amount of the annuity payable for the 

joint lives of the participant and spouse. 14 A QPSA is a survivor annuity for the life of the 

7 The DOMA defined the term “marriage” and referred to the term “spouse” as follows: “In determining the 

meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus 

and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman 

as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 

8 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013). 

9 ERISA §§ 4022(a) and (b), 4001(a)(8) (defining “nonforfeitable benefit”) and 4061 (amounts payable by PBGC); 

29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1301(a)(8), and 1361. For convenience, the Board will hereinafter cite to ERISA but not the 

United States Code.

10 ERISA § 4001(a)(8).

11 ERISA §§ 205(a)(1) and 205(d)(1). ERISA defines “annuity starting date” for benefits payable as an annuity as 

“the first day of the first period for which an amount is payable as an annuity.” ERISA § 205(h)(2)(A)(i).

12 ERISA § 205(a)(2). “If the participant is not alive on the annuity starting date, the surviving spouse must receive a 

QPSA.” See 26 CFR § 1.401(a)-20 Q&A 10(a).

13 ERISA § 205(f)(1) (“. . . a plan may provide that a . . . [QPSA] will not be provided unless the participant and 

spouse had been married throughout the 1-year period ending on the earlier of—(A) the participant’s annuity 

starting date, or (B) the date of the participant’s death.”) (Emphasis added); see also Internal Revenue Code 

§ 417(d)(1). 

14 ERISA § 205(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
7

participant’s surviving spouse in an amount not less than the QJSA depending on whether the 

participant dies on, before, or after, the participant attained the earliest retirement age. 15 

A QPSA under section 205(e)(1) of ERISA Title I is not forfeitable under section 4022(a) of 

ERISA Title IV solely because the participant has not died as of the plan’s termination date. 16 In 

other words, a participant’s death before pension plan termination is not a condition of 

entitlement for a PBGC-guaranteed QPSA benefit under Title IV of ERISA. 

After the Court issued its opinion in United States v. Windsor, both the IRS and the 

Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued guidance interpreting the terms “marriage” and “spouse” 

under the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) and ERISA, limiting “marriage” to its definition 

under applicable state law, and limiting “spouse” to persons in a “marriage.” For example, IRS 

regulations state the following: 17 

(a) In general. For federal tax purposes, the terms “spouse,” 

“husband,” and “wife” mean an individual lawfully married to 

another individual. The term “husband and wife” means two 

individuals lawfully married to each other.

(b) Persons who are lawfully married for federal tax purposes— 

(1) In general. * * * a marriage of two individuals is 

recognized for federal tax purposes if the marriage is 

recognized by the state . . . in which the marriage is entered 

into, regardless of domicile. 

(2) * * * 

(Emphasis added.) 

Similarly, the DOL’s guidance states that to the extent of its authority in its regulations, 

rulings, and opinions, and exemptions in Title I of ERISA and the Code, including Chapter XXV 

of Title 29 of the CFR: 18 

 

[T]he term ‘spouse’ will be read to refer to any individuals who are 

lawfully married under any state law . . . Similarly, the term 

‘marriage’ will be read to include a same-sex marriage that is 

legally recognized as a marriage under any state law. 

15 See ERISA § 205(e)(1); 26 CFR § 1.401(a)-20 Q&A 18. Under ERISA, “earliest retirement age” means “the 

earliest date on which, under the plan, the participant could elect to receive retirement benefits.” See ERISA 

§ 205(h)(3).

16 See ERISA § 4022(e)(5). 

17 See 26 CFR § 301.7701-18(a) and (b). 

18 See DOL Technical Release 2013-04 (September 18, 2013) (Guidance to Employee Benefit Plans on Definition of 

“Spouse” and “Marriage” under ERISA and the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor). 
8

(Emphasis added.) 

Under both the DOL’s and IRS’s administrative guidance, the terms “spouse” and 

“marriage” do not include a domestic partner or a domestic partnership that is not denominated 

as marriage under state law. For example, DOL guidance states: 19

The terms ‘spouse’ and ‘marriage,’ however do not include 

individuals in a formal relationship recognized by a state that is not 

denominated a marriage under state law, such as a domestic 

partnership or a civil union regardless of whether the individuals 

who are in these relationships have the same rights and 

responsibilities as those individuals who are married under state 

law.

(Emphasis added.) 

3. Marriage and Domestic Partnership under the California Family Code

The California Family Code defines “marriage” as follows: 20 

Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract 

between two persons, to which the consent of the parties capable of 

making that contract is necessary. Consent alone does not 

constitute marriage. Consent must be followed by the issuance of a 

license and solemnization as authorized by this division. . . . 

A marriage license is defined as “the document issued by the county clerk until it is 

registered with the county recorder, at which time the license becomes a marriage certificate.” 21

Solemnization occurs as the parties declare in the “physical presence of the person solemnizing 

the marriage and necessary witnesses, that they take each other as spouses.” 22 No specific form 

of ceremony is required.

By contrast, the California Family Code defines “domestic partners” and “domestic 

partnership” as “two adults who have chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate and 

committed relationship of mutual caring.” 23 A domestic partnership is established in California 

19 See Id.; see also IRS Notice 2014-19, 2014-1 C.B. 979 (April 4, 2014): “For Federal tax purposes, the terms 

‘spouse,’ ‘husband and wife,’ ‘husband,’ and ‘wife’ do not include individuals (whether of the opposite sex or the 

same sex) who have entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil union, or other similar formal relationship 

recognized under state law that is not denominated as a marriage under the laws of that state, and the term 

‘marriage’ does not include such formal relationships.” See also 26 CFR § 301.7701-18(c). 

20 See California Family Code at § 300(a).

21 See California Family Code at § 300(b). 

22 See California Family Code § 420.

23 See California Family Code § 297(a). 
9

when both partners file a notarized Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the California 

Secretary of State and satisfy four statutory requirements. 24 

Under the California Family Code, “registered domestic partners” are granted the “same 

rights, protections, and benefits,” as those “granted to . . . spouses.” 25 What’s more, effective 

January 1, 2017, the California Family Code declared that the term “‘spouse’ includes ‘registered 

domestic partner,’ as required by Section 297.5 [of the California Family Code].” 26 

California created its domestic partnership statute in 1999, for same-sex couples where both 

persons were at least 18 years old and for opposite-sex couples, where both persons were age 62 

or older and eligible for Social Security benefits. 27 Effective in 2002, California expanded the 

class of eligible couples to those who are either same sex or where “one or both of the persons 

are over 62 years of age . . . and one or both . . . meet the eligibility criteria” for Social Security 

benefits. 28 Thus, California law “authorized domestic partnerships on the part of couples whose 

Social Security or Supplemental Social Security Income benefits might be reduced or eliminated 

if they were to marry. 29 Effective in 2020, California eliminated the age 62 and eligibility for 

Social Security requirements for opposite sex couples, expanding domestic partnership 

registration to all couples in which both individuals are at least 18 years of age, with some 

restrictions. 30 

B. Relevant Plan Provisions

The Appeals Board reviewed the provisions of the Plan in effect on March 11, 2005, when 

the Plan terminated. The United Airlines Ground Employees’ Retirement Plan effective January 

1, 2001, as amended and restated, was in effect at this time. 31 The UAL Ground Employees’ 

Plan consists of two parts—an administrative part and a separate benefits part for different 

24 See California Family Code § 297(b)(1)-(4), § 298(a)(1), § 298.5(a). To meet the requirements of establishing a 

domestic partnership, a domestic partner must not be married to someone else or be a member of another domestic 

partnership, not be related by blood, be at least 18 years of age, and be capable of consenting to the domestic 

partnership.

25 See California Family Code § 297.5(a). 

26 See California Family Code § 143.

27 See Burnham v. Cal. Pub. Empl. Ret. Sys., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 610-611 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 

28 See California Family Code § 297 (2018) (emphasis added) and 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 893 (A.B. 25). 

29 See Holguin v. Flores, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 749, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Burnham v. Public Employees’ Retirement 

System, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 610-611 (California legislature made eligible for domestic partnerships elderly 

opposite-sex couples because “‘many would not, or could not, marry due to restrictions on social security or other 

pension benefits that would affect their incomes.’”) (Citation omitted); see generally Brady, Heidi and Wilson, 

Robin Fretwell, The Precarious Status of Domestic Partnerships for the Elderly in a Post-Obergefell World, 24 Elder 

Law Journal 49 (2016). 

30 See California Family Code § 297, amended by Stats. 2019, Ch. 135, Sec. 1 (SB 30), effective Jan. 1, 2020. 

31 Relevant excerpts of the United Airlines Ground Employees’ Retirement Plan are provided at Enclosure 4. Under 

Section 1, subsection 1.1 (History, Purpose and Interpretation), the Plan states the following: “[T]he Plan is intended 

to conform to the requirements of Code Secs. 401(a) and 501(a) of ERISA and must be interpreted in furtherance of 

that intent.”
10

classifications of employees. 32 The Plan has three subplans based on employment classification. 

[Participant] was part of the mechanic employee group; thus his subplan is the United Airlines 

Mechanic and Ramp, Stores, Food Service and Related Employee Defined Benefit Plan 

(“Mechanic DB Subplan”). 

Section 9 of the Mechanic DB Subplan provides a Pre-Retirement Survivor Benefit to a 

Participant’s “Eligible Spouse.” Consistent with section 205(e)(1) of ERISA, previously 

discussed, Section 9.1 provides an “eligible spouse” the pre-retirement survivor benefit based on 

the amount payable under the Plan’s QJSA as of the day preceding the participant’s death: 

The Pre-Retirement Survivor Benefit is an annuity paid to the 

Participant’s Eligible Spouse, as provided in this Section 9, in a 

monthly amount equal to the monthly payment to the Participant’s 

Spouse under a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity. . . . 

(Emphasis added.) 

“QPSA” is defined under section 1.4 of the Mechanic DB Subplan as “the survivor annuity 

for the life of the Participant’s surviving Eligible Spouse required under Code Section 417(c)” 

and consistent with section 205(e)(1) of ERISA. Accordingly, the Board finds that this is the 

survivor benefit that PBGC guarantees under section 4022(a) of Title IV. 33

“Eligible spouse” is defined under section 1.4 as the spouse to whom the Participant had 

been legally married throughout the one-year period ending on the date of the Participant’s 

death. “Spouse” is defined under section 1.4 as an individual to whom the Participant is legally 

married under the Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA. 34

Domestic partners are separately referred to and defined in Supplement E of the UAL 

Ground Employees’ Plan. 35 Section E-1 recites that the purpose of Supplement E “is to modify, 

supersede and supplement the provisions of the Plan, as applied to certain Participants who have 

filed Proof of Domestic Partnership with the Company.” 36 It applies to “any Participant who is 

an Active Participant on or after May 1, 2000, or (b) is an Inactive participant who is eligible to 

32 See Enclosure 4. 

33 The Appeal claims that UAL, as the administrator of the Continental Airlines Retirement Plan, is paying 

[Appellant] “survivor benefits” as [Participant’s] “surviving domestic partner.” See Appeal at 6 and Exhibit B, 

Enclosure 1. PBGC is not, however, the statutory trustee of the Continental Plan, and the Appeals Board cannot 

determine without the relevant plan provisions whether Exhibit B evidences a one-time death benefit of $70.42 or a 

monthly benefit of $70.42 payable to a non-spousal beneficiary. For the reasons discussed below, the Board finds 

that the Plan’s pre-retirement survivor benefit for unmarried couples is not a QPSA benefit under ERISA. 

34 As discussed above, in 2013, after the Plan terminated, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Windsor 

that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.

35 See Enclosure 4, Supplement E. 

36 See Id. at Section E-1, Enclosure 4. 
11

commence receiving an Early, Normal or Late Retirement Benefit and has an Annuity Starting 

Date on or after May 1, 2000.” 37 

Supplement E provides for a Pre-Retirement Survivor Benefit under section E-6 for 

“eligible domestic partners.” Section E-2(b) defines “Eligible Domestic Partner” as the 

“Individual who has been the Participant’s Qualified Domestic Partner throughout the one-year 

period beginning on the relationship beginning date and ending on the date of the Participant’s 

death.” 38 Section E-6 provides: 

With respect to a Participant who has elected Pre-Retirement 

Survivor Benefit coverage on behalf of his or her Eligible 

Domestic Partner, the provisions of Section 9 of the Plan will not 

apply and the provisions of this Section E-6 will govern the 

eligibility for and payment of a Pre-Retirement Survivor Benefit.

Thus, the Mechanic DB Subplan provides that qualified domestic partners are not eligible 

for QPSAs under section 9 but are otherwise eligible for pre-retirement survivor benefits. 

Supplement E defines “Qualified domestic partner” as the Participant’s Domestic Partner whose 

gender is the same as the Participant’s. Thus, the Mechanic DB Subplan appears to have 

expressly excluded participants in domestic partnerships with opposite sex partners from being 

eligible for pre-retirement survivor benefits. 39 

C. Analysis of the Appeal 

1. PBGC cannot interpret “marriage” under ERISA to include a California 

“domestic partnership” because such an interpretation would be contrary to 

California law.

As discussed above, in 2013, the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor held that 

section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 

Constitution. In so ruling, the Court discussed “the extent of state power and authority over 

marriage as a matter of history and tradition.” 40 The Court noted that “the definition of marriage 

is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations” 

37 See Section E-1 of Supplement E, Enclosure 4. 

38 The Plan’s definition of “Eligible Domestic Partner” is undoubtedly designed to mimic the one-year marriage 

requirement under section 205(f) of ERISA, even if the undefined term “relationship beginning date” might extend 

the period beyond one year under certain circumstances. 

39 Solely for purposes of this decision, the Appeals Board presumes that the Plan administrator (or PBGC) would 

have extended eligibility for the Pre-Retirement Survivor Benefit to [Appellant], even though the Plan limited the 

benefit to same-sex couples. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1742-1743 (2019) (discrimination based 

on an individual’s sex violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). PBGC determined that the Plan’s assets 

and PBGC recoveries were insufficient to fund this category of benefit under ERISA § 4044(a). Neither the Appeal 

nor the Advocate challenges this aspect of the determination of March 9, 2022. 

40 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 766.
12

and that the “State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance.” 41 The Court 

observed that DOMA “depart[ed] from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to 

define marriage” to deprive same-sex couples the recognition of valid state law marriages for 

purposes of federal law. 42 

In contrast with DOMA, the recently enacted RMA expressly recognizes that State law 

defines “marriage” for purposes of federal statutes like ERISA. Under the RMA’s amendment to 

the Dictionary Act, for the purpose of any federal law in which “marital status is a factor,” an 

individual is deemed to be married if that individual’s marriage is valid in the State where the 

marriage was entered. Marital status is a factor under ERISA because ERISA provides QJSA and 

QPSA benefits solely for the surviving spouses of married participants. It is these benefits that 

PBGC guarantees. 

As the Court stated in United States v. Windsor: “By history and tradition the definition . . . 

of marriage . . . is treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States.” 43 The 

Court’s statement in United States v. Windsor is thus consistent with the recently enacted RMA 

under which individuals are deemed married for purposes of federal law if the marriage is valid 

in the State in which the marriage occurred. Thus, the Appeals Board cannot interpret “marriage” 

under ERISA to include “domestic partnership” because a domestic partnership is not a valid 

marriage under California law. A decision by the Appeals Board that interprets “marriage” under 

ERISA to include domestic partnership would be contrary to California law.

There is no question that, under the California Family Code, [Appellant] was not married to 

[Participant] before he died in December 2019. According to the Declaration of Domestic 

Partnership filed January 11, 2017, with the California Secretary of State, [Appellant] and 

[Participant] entered into a domestic partnership, as evidenced by their notarized signatures, and 

were registered domestic partners under California law. 44 The Appeal has not asserted that 

[Appellant] and [Participant] were married when he died. 45 Accordingly, the Appeals Board 

finds that [Appellant] was not married to [Participant]. 

The Appeal asserts that “California [l]aw [c]onsiders Marriage and Domestic Partnerships to 

be [e]qual,” making [Appellant] “[e]ligible for a [s]urvivor [b]enefit [u]nder PBGC’s Policies.” 46

41 Id.

42 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768. 

43 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added). 

44 We provide a copy of the Declaration of Domestic Partnership, File No. [File Number], filed with the Secretary of 

State of California, [date], at Enclosure 5. 

45 The Appeal (at page 5) refers to [Participant’s] death certificate, issued [date], which lists [Participant’s] status 

at time of death as “Married,” and [Appellant] as “Surviving Spouse/Civil Union Partner’s Maiden Name.” See 

Enclosure 1. Because the Appeal does not provide any evidence of a subsequent marriage of [Appellant] and 

[Participant] or contend that they married under California law, the Appeals Board presumes that the notation on 

[Participant’s] death certificate was a clerical error.

46 See Appeal at 5, Enclosure 1. Cf. In re Domestic P’ship of Ellis, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 404-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 

(“To summarize, the Domestic Partner Act provides: (1) it must be construed liberally to give registered domestic 

partners the same rights and obligations as married couples, to the extent permissible by law; and (2) the same rights, 
13

But even though California has attempted to equalize the rights of domestic partners and 

spouses, marriages and domestic partnerships are not “one and the same.” 47 As one California 

court has noted, “the [California] legislature has not created a ‘marriage’ by another name or 

granted domestic partners a status equivalent to married spouses.” 48 Thus, while California law 

provides many of the same rights and privileges to domestic partners in domestic partnerships as 

are enjoyed by spouses in a marriage, “the language of other provisions of the California Family 

Code nevertheless reinforce[] the point that domestic partners and spouses, or domestic 

partnerships and marriages, are distinguishable concepts.” 49 In other words, “[a] domestic 

partnership is not a marriage.” 50

Moreover, as quoted above, the RMA prevents the conflation of marriage with other 

relationships such as domestic partnerships. It specifically protects “any benefit, status, or right 

of an otherwise eligible entity or person which does not arise from a marriage, including taxexempt status, tax treatment, educational funding, or a grant, contract, agreement, guarantee, 

loan, scholarship, license, certification, accreditation, claim or defense.” 51 The RMA thus 

protects the status of individuals and the concomitant benefits arising under non-marital 

relationships such as domestic partnerships in which individuals have legitimate expectations of 

preserving such benefits, e.g., Social Security benefits, and the status of those other 

arrangements. PBGC cannot therefore treat a non-marital relationship under California law as a 

marriage under ERISA. 

As the Appeal recognizes, PBGC’s Policy 5.7-4 states that PBGC will “recognize as 

marriages only those arrangements specifically denominated as marriages by state law.” As 

shown above, the California Family Code defines “marriage” differently than it defines a 

“domestic partnership.” Whether registered domestic partners are considered “spouses” under 

California law or have the same rights and privileges as spouses under California law,

solemnizing a marriage and filing a domestic partnership are two separate and distinct legal 

protections, and benefits are to be granted to registered partners dissolving their domestic partnership as are granted 

to spouses dissolving their marriage.” (Emphasis added)).

47 See In re Villaverde, 540 B.R. 431, 435 (Bankr., C.D. Cal. 2015); see also Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078

(9th Cir. 2012). 

48 See Knight v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 4th 14, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see also Velez v. Smith, 142 Cal. 

App. 4th 1154, 1173 (Cal Ct. App. 2006), review denied, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 14191 (Cal. 2006). 

49 In re Villaverde, 540 B.R. at 435. 

50 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th

Cir. 2012). Contrary to the Advocate’s memo (and the Appeal), In re Rabin, 336 B.R. 459 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005), 

does not support a claim that a “domestic partnership is a marriage for federal bankruptcy purposes” or that 

California law “denominates domestic partnerships as marriages.” See Advocate’s Memo of Support at 11, and at 7, 

note 14; Appeal at 4. Rather, the court held that, under California law, registered domestic partners are entitled to a 

single homestead exemption, rather than two such exemptions, consistent with the Domestic Partners Act of 2003.

See 326 B.R. at 460-461 (noting existing differences in treatment of registered domestic partners and spouses under 

state law.). 

51 Respect for Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 117-228, § 7(a), 136 Stat. 2306 (Dec. 13, 2022), Enclosure 3. 
14

acts. 52 The issue on appeal is whether the California Family Code denominates a domestic 

partnership as a marriage. We find that it does not. To find that [Appellant] had a valid 

“marriage” to [Participant] for purposes of section 205 of ERISA would be contrary to 

California law. 53 

The Advocate spends considerable effort in questioning and analyzing the meaning of the 

term “denominate” under PBGC Policy 5.7-4, yet seems to overlook the very definition of 

“denominate” that she herself provides under Black’s Law Dictionary, i.e., “To formally give a 

name or epithet to.” 54 As shown above, the California Family Code names a personal relation 

arising out of civil contract between two consenting persons with the capacity to consent who 

fulfill the state’s licensing and solemnization requirements a “marriage.” The California Family 

Code names an arrangement consisting of two adults who have chosen to share one another’s 

lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring and who file a Declaration of 

Domestic Partnership with the California Secretary of State and meet the four statutory 

requirements a “domestic partnership.” Contrary to the Advocate’s claim, the two arrangements 

are not “the same under California law.” 55

2. PBGC must interpret the relevant provisions of Titles I and II of ERISA in 

accordance with IRS and DOL guidance.

In general, the DOL administers Title I of ERISA. But under Title III of ERISA and the 

Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, the IRS has interpretive authority over most provisions of 

Part 2 of Subtitle B of Title I of ERISA, which includes section 205(e) of ERISA, as well as 

section 417(c) of the Code. 56 Even so, the Department of Labor continues to have some authority 

over certain provisions. Under section 205(l) of ERISA, Congress expressly directed the 

Secretary of the Treasury to consult with the Secretary of Labor in prescribing regulations under 

section 205 of ERISA. 

52 Burnham v. Cal. Pub. Empl. Ret. Sys., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“. . . it is the necessary step of 

solemnizing a marriage or filing in the case of a domestic partnership that makes each of these unions valid. What 

these acts have in common is they symbolize the irrevocable decision to go through with the union.”). 

53 Whether registered domestic partners are considered spouses under the Social Security Act is beside the point. See 

Appeal at 6 (“In addition, the Social Security Administration (SSA) recognizes [Appellant] as [Participant’s]

surviving spouse.”) and Exhibit E, Enclosure 1. The Advocate similarly opines that the SSA “conducts a state-bystate analysis to determine whether it can provide those [persons] in a non-marital legal relationship, such as a 

domestic partnership, with the same rights as those in a marriage.” Advocate’s Memo of Support at 5, note 7, 

Enclosure 2. The Appeals Board has no authority to interpret the provisions of Title 42, Chapter 7 of the United 

States Code regarding SSA benefits or decide that SSA policies or rules should apply under ERISA, an unrelated 

and separate federal statute.

54 See Advocate’s Memo of Support at 4-6, Enclosure 2. 

55 See Advocate’s Memo of Support at 8, Enclosure 2. 

56 ERISA § 3004(a); Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 44713, 92 Stat. 3790 (“Except as otherwise 

provided . . . all authority of the Secretary of Labor to issue the following described documents pursuant to the 

statutes hereinafter specified is hereby transferred to the Secretary of Treasury: (a) regulations, rulings, opinions, 

variances and waivers under Parts 2 [29 U.S.C.A. § 1051 et seq.] . . . .”) 
15

PBGC administers Title IV of ERISA. Section 4002(b) of ERISA limits PBGC’s 

interpretive authority to issuing “bylaws, rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out 

the purposes of [Title IV].” PBGC has issued regulations under 29 CFR Chapter XL that

interpret certain statutory provisions under Title IV of ERISA. 

To be sure, PBGC issues policies on benefits administration in the PBGC Operating Policy 

Manual (“OPM”). PBGC follows its policies in the OPM “in performing its mission and 

responsibilities, primarily in its calculation, valuation, determination, and payment of pension 

benefits.” 57 The OPM states that the policies in the OPM “reflect the provisions of ERISA, the 

IRC, PBGC regulations in 29 CFR, and other pension-related legislation and regulations. . . . ” 58

Hence PBGC’s policies under the OPM are intended to be consistent with Title I of ERISA and 

the Code and the regulations duly promulgated thereunder. 

Neither ERISA nor the Code defines “marriage” or “spouse.” Before the Supreme Court 

decided United States v. Windsor, DOMA defined “marriage” and “spouse” for purposes of 

federal law to exclude same-sex couples. After the Supreme Court decided United States v. 

Windsor holding DOMA to be unconstitutional, both the IRS and the DOL issued administrative 

guidance interpreting the terms “marriage” and “spouse” under the relevant provisions of the 

Code and ERISA. 

On December 13, 2022, the RMA became law, as previously discussed. Neither the IRS nor 

the DOL has issued any statement regarding whether each agency’s post-Windsor guidance will 

be modified or affirmed. The RMA states that for the purposes of any federal law in which 

“marital status is a factor,” such as ERISA, an individual will be deemed married if the 

individual’s marriage is valid in the State in which the marriage occurred. Both the IRS and DOL 

guidance discussed above similarly hold that, as used in the Code and ERISA, the term 

“marriage” means a marriage recognized as such under state law, and the term “spouse” refers to 

a married individual. 59 The Appeals Board finds that the IRS and DOL guidance discussed 

above is consistent with the RMA for purposes of this appeal. 60

57 PBGC OPM, Chapter 1, Section 1.1-1 A. (4th Ed. March 10, 2022) (Benefits Administration Policy Governance 

and Review), provided as Enclosure 6. 

58 Id., Enclosure 6. 

59 See 26 CFR § 301.7701-18; IRS Notice 2014-19; DOL Technical Release 2013-04. Because the RMA establishes 

that the meaning of “marriage” under ERISA is governed by state law, and because “marriage” and “domestic 

partnership” are distinct statutory relationships under the California Family Code, the Appeals Board finds that the 

close association of the terms “marriage” and “spouse” in section 205 of ERISA, e.g., section 205(f)(1), means that 

“spouse” must be interpreted to be a married individual, consistent with IRS and DOL guidance. See Yates v. United 

States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (The Supreme Court relies “on the principle of noscitur a sociis—a word is known 

by the company it keeps—to ‘avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its 

accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’”) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 

513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008) (“a word is given more 

precise content by neighboring words with which it is associated”). 

60 Both the Appeal and the Advocate cite the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Reed v. KRON/IBEW Local 45 Pension 

Plan, 770 Fed. Appx. 374 (9th Cir. 2019), as support for [Appellant’s] claim that domestic partners under California 

law should be treated as spouses under ERISA. In this non-precedential decision, the court ruled that the plan’s 
16

PBGC’s existing policy of recognizing as marriages only those arrangements that are 

specifically denominated as marriages under state law is consistent with IRS and DOL guidance.

Under IRS and DOL guidance and its own internal policies, PBGC must interpret ERISA’s 

guarantee of QPSA benefits under sections 4022(a) and 4022(e)(5) to apply only to the surviving 

spouses of participants to whom they were married. PBGC does not therefore guarantee QPSA 

benefits to registered domestic partners of California domestic partnerships. 

The Appeal asserts that “PBGC’s adherence to guidance from [IRS and DOL] is unfounded 

and inaccurate” because the terminated Plan was not a qualified plan. 61 The Advocate similarly 

notes that the “Plan in this case is not a tax qualified plan as it is terminated and has been 

trusteed by PBGC for years.” 62 The Advocate further observes that IRS’s guidance “applies only 

‘for federal tax purposes,’” concluding that the “external guidance does not seem relevant, 

particularly since PBGC has its own policies which include similar language to the IRS and DOL 

guidance.” 63 

Both the Appeal and the Advocate are mistaken. Title IV of ERISA covers only plans that 

have been determined to meet the requirements under section 401(a) of the Code or plans that, in 

practice, have met such requirements for the five preceding years. 64 Under section 4042(a) of 

ERISA, PBGC is “authorized to pool assets of terminated plans for purposes of administration, 

investment, payment of liabilities of all such terminated plans, and such other purposes as it 

determines to be appropriate in the administration of this title.” In 1986, PBGC asked the IRS 

whether it could invest the assets of terminated plans in a group trust without causing the group 

trust to lose its tax-exempt status under section 501(a) of the Code. 65 

administrator abused its discretion by denying a same-sex domestic partner a surviving spouse’s benefit based on the 

pension plan’s choice of law provision, which required the plan’s provisions to be interpreted in accordance with 

California law but “consistent with the requirements of the [Code] and ERISA.” Id. at 375. While registered 

domestic partners are treated as spouses under California law, the court erroneously concluded that “neither ERISA 

nor the Code provided binding guidance inconsistent with” that treatment in 2009 and 2016, but the court 

overlooked: (1) DOMA, which applied to federal laws like ERISA in 2009; (2) DOL’s post-Windsor Technical 

Release 2013-04; (3) IRS Notice 2014-19 (citing IRS Commissioner’s authority to prescribe the extent of retroactive 

treatment of judicial decisions like Windsor under 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b)(8) and permitting amendment of plans to 

recognize same-sex marriages before June 26, 2013, for purposes of QJSAs and QPSAs, but which the pension plan 

in Reed did not do); and (4) Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-18, 80 Fed. Reg. 64378 (Oct. 23, 2015). Moreover, 

contrary to the Advocate’s claim, the court did not determine that “registered domestic partners were ‘married’ 

under California and federal law.” Advocate’s Memo of Support at 11. The Board finds therefore that the Ninth 

Circuit opinion is both distinguishable based on the Plan’s provisions and inconsistent with ERISA and the Code. 

61 See Appeal at 6, Enclosure 1. 

62 See Advocate’s Memo of Support at 3, note 5, Enclosure 2. Both the Appeal and the Advocate are referring to a 

“qualified trust” under section 401(a) of the Code that forms part of a pension plan for the exclusive benefit of an 

employer’s employees. 

63 See Id. at 3-4, Enclosure 2. 

64 See section 4021(a) of ERISA. 

65 See Formal Request from PBGC Concerning New Investments in a Group Trust, IRS Gen. Couns. Mem.

(“GCM”) 39712 (June 17, 1986). 
17

In resolving PBGC’s request, the IRS determined that “[i]f a plan is terminated in a manner 

that does not adversely affect its qualified status, and if former plan assets are held in the two 

PBGC commingled trust funds, these assets are subject to the statutory and regulatory constraints 

equivalent in all relevant respects to those applicable to assets of ongoing plans.” 66 After 

considering the requirements for tax-exempt group trusts and the constraints on the assets held 

by PBGC, the IRS concluded that the “unique statutory and regulatory framework governing the 

operations of and payments of benefits under the PBGC commingled trust funds makes the 

PBGC commingled trust funds equivalent to the qualified plans considered in Rev. Rul. 81-100” 

that may invest in a group trust without endangering the tax-exempt status of the group trust 

under section 501(a) of the Code. 67 Thus, contrary to the Appeal and the Advocate, PBGC 

payments to participants are “tax qualified.” 

In administering terminated defined benefit plans under Title IV of ERISA, PBGC, as the 

statutory trustee, must comply with ERISA Title I, the Code, and the regulations and 

administrative guidance promulgated under both statutes. As shown above, Title III of ERISA 

and the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 vest the IRS with the interpretive jurisdiction over 

section 205 of ERISA. PBGC does not issue interpretive regulations under provisions of either 

ERISA or the Code; but PBGC’s benefits administration policies under the OPM are consistent 

with the provisions of Title I, the Code, and the associated regulations. Thus, the so-called 

“external guidance” referenced by the Advocate is incorporated into and made part of the OPM’s 

policies governing PBGC’s benefits administration. 

The Advocate also expresses confusion regarding why PBGC’s benefit determination of 

March 9, 2022, did not reflect a review of OPM sections 5.7-4 (Marriage Requirements) and 5.7-

2 (Payment of QPSAs in Plans Terminating on or after August 23, 1984). 68 The Advocate does 

not explain why she believes that PBGC did not consider these policies in issuing [Appellant’s]

determination. As discussed above, PBGC regulations require PBGC to state the reason for a 

determination. PBGC determined that the agency guarantees QPSAs “only for the spouse of a 

married participant.” The Appeals Board finds that PBGC’s determination is consistent with

relevant law and regulations, as well as consistent with PBGC OPM sections 5.7-4 and 5.7-2. 

III. CONCLUSION

The Appeals Board upholds PBGC’s determination of March 9, 2022, and denies the appeal. 

This is the agency’s final decision on this matter, and the appellant has exhausted her 

administrative remedies. Appellant may now, if she wishes, seek review of this decision in an 

appropriate United States District Court. 

66 See Id.; see also GCM 39873 (April 15, 1992). The Board notes that PBGC’s Trusteeship Working Group 

determines in advance of any PBGC-initiated plan termination under section 4042 of ERISA that the plan is taxqualified under section 401(a) of the Code and therefore covered under Title IV of ERISA.

67 See GCM 39712 (noting that participation in such group trusts “must be limited to qualified plans.”); GCM

39873; see also Rev. Rul. 2011-1, 2011-1 CB 251 (establishing the conditions under which assets of qualified plans 

may be pooled in groups trusts without affecting any participant’s tax status and holding that such group trusts may 

hold assets from PBGC commingled trust funds). 

68 See Advocate’s Memo of Support at 4, Enclosure 2. Copies of OPM, Chapter 5, sections 5.7-4 and 5.7-2 are 

provided in Enclosure 6. 
18

If you have questions, please call PBGC’s Customer Contact Center at 1-800-400-7242.

Sincerely,

James L. Eggeman

Member, Appeals Board

Enclosures (6):

1. Appeal by [Entity] dated June 24, 2022, redacted for privacy (16 pages)

2. Memorandum of Support in the Matter of [Appellant’s] Benefit Appeal, dated June 30, 

2022, submitted by Constance Donovan, PBGC Participant and Plan Sponsor Advocate

(11 pages)

3. Respect for Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 117-228, § 5, 136 Stat. 2306 (Dec. 13, 2022) (3

pages)

4. Excerpts of the United Airlines Ground Employees’ Retirement Plan, including 

Mechanic and Ramp, Stores, Food Service and Related Employee Defined Benefit (Sub) 

Plan (19 pages)

5. Declaration of Domestic Partnership, File No. [File Number], filed with the Secretary of 

State of California, [date] (2 pages)

6. Excerpts from PBGC’s Operating Policy Manual (16 pages).