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26–223PDF 2017

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN

HEMISPHERE: THE FY 2018 BUDGET REQUEST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 12, 2017

Serial No. 115–81

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Francisco Palmieri, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 14

Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin 

America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ..... 14

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement ................................................................................ 2

The Honorable Albio Sires, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey: Prepared statement .................................................................... 5

Mr. Francisco Palmieri: Prepared statement ........................................................ 7

Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch: Prepared statement .......................................................... 9

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 32

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Jeff Duncan: Material submitted for the record ......................... 34

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, the Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State of New 

York, and the Honorable Norma J. Torres, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California ................................................................................ 38

(1)

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE: THE FY 2018

BUDGET REQUEST 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:08 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will come to order. 

We are going to go ahead with an abbreviated agenda today just 

due to time of our witnesses and be respectful, because we are delayed. We are delayed by votes on the House floor, and our witnesses have a hard stop departure this afternoon. And the ranking 

member, our witnesses, and I have agreed to forego our opening 

statements so we can proceed immediately to member questions 

and answers. 

Statements will be provided for the record, if anybody would like 

to read the witnesses’ statements, opening statements of the members. I want to thank everyone for their cooperation and patience. 

This is the way the schedule goes sometimes. 

So, without objection, everyone’s opening statements will be entered in the record, and we will now proceed to questions. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman Jeff Duncan 

Opening Remarks 

rage 1 (As l)reparedfur Deliver.vJ 

Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

''Advancing U.S. interests in the Western Hemi.sphere: lhe FY2018 Budget Request" 

Wednesday, July 12, 2017 at 2:00p.m. in Rayburn Room 2172 

Today, we meet to review the Trump Administration's FY 2018 budget request, which 

includes more than $1.1 billion in foreign assistance to countries in the Western Hemisphere. Let 

me be very clear: the U.S. has significant interests in this region of the world, and we care about 

seeing our neighbors achieve greater security and economic prosperity. President Trump has 

affirmed that Latin America is a priority, he has held five meetings and 14 phone calls with 

leaders from the region, and Vice President Pence has asserted that "our partnerships and 

alliances through the region are critical to our national interests." Gone are the days of U.S. 

disengagement from the region. Today is a new day, and I am excited about the tremendous 

opportunities we have to exert leadership and affirm strong U.S. reengagement with Latin 

America and the Caribbean. In particular, I applaud the Administration's priorities reflected in 

this budget to work with our neighbors to deter illegal immigration and combat the growing 

threat from transnational criminal organizations. These actions are especially important as drug 

cultivation and trafficking are once again on the rise in the region. 

However, U.S. assistance to the region- and around the world frankly- must be better 

balanced with the realization that our country is nearly $20 trillion in debt. Gone are the days 

where we support programs without achievable, sustainable objectives and political will from 

countries to sufficiently address the corruption and impunity that threaten these programs' 

effectiveness. Today, U.S. foreign assistance in the region must advance U.S. national interests, 
3


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rage 2 (As l)reparedfur Deliver.vJ 

demand results, and protect taxpayers to prevent fraud, waste, abuse, or duplication of funding. 

Oversight is essential, and this budget hearing is part of that transparent process. At a time when 

drug tratlicking is growing, transnational criminals and terrorist operate across borders, and 

China, Iran, and Russia are expanding their influence in the region, we have strategic priorities 

close to home that require U.S. attention. Our support for the Western Hemisphere is but a 

fraction of what we spend globally -it was less than 10 percent in 2015. Yet, 1 believe we 

receive a far greater return on investment in our own hemisphere in tenns of jobs, security, and 

prosperity than elsewhere in the world due to our proximity. 

The Administration's FY 2018 budget reflects a security-oriented approach, which I 

believe complements last month's inaugural Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central 

America with the Northern Triangle nations. I commend the Administration's continued focus on 

Central America, Colombia, Mexico, Haiti, and the Caribbean. I also believe the increase for 

nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and demining programs in the region by 167 percent is critical to 

helping our neighbors, especially Colombia, to deal with these security vulnerabilities inhibiting 

economic growth. Significantly, Colombia and Mexico would continue to be among the top 

recipients of U.S. foreign assistance under the FY 2018 budget request. As Colombia begins 

implementing its peace deal with the F ARC and as Mexico seeks to address its ongoing security 

situation, U.S. collaboration and cooperation is vital. Given the long-tenn U.S. financial 

investment in Colombia, the U.S. maintains a considerable stake in its peace and stability. 

Funding for Mexico should also continue to support the Merida Initiative to strengthen the rule 

of law, strengthen judicial institutions, and combat criminal groups. 

In addition, this budget request would also continue assistance to Haiti as the secondlargest recipient in the region. The U.S. has a vital interest in strengthening Haiti's stability and 
4


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rage 3 (As l)reparedfur Deliver.vJ 

economic growth; however, multiple GAO reports have shown problems of U.S. aid without 

adequate oversight, accountability, and transparency. The anticipated upcoming end of the U.N. 

peacekeeping mission in Haiti also provides a new layer of challenges for the country. It is my 

view that while we should continue our focus on Haiti, we cannot forget the rest of the 

Caribbean. Given the balloon effect of the drug flow to the Caribbean from U.S. and regional 

efforts in South and Central America, we have clear security interests in the Caribbean. 

commend the Administration's continued support for the Caribbean Basin Security lnitiati ve. 

Finally, we would be remiss if we ignored the importance of democracy and good 

governance programs in the region. Given the new U.S. policy toward Cuba and President 

Trump and Vice President Pence's earlier meetings with former Cuban political prisoner, Dr. 

Oscar Biscet, and the wife of Venezuelan political prisoner Leopoldo Lopez, Lilian Tintori, 1 

know that the Administration has affirmed repeatedly that "America cares deeply for the plight 

of the Venezuelan people and the Cuban people." I could not agree more. Cuts in democracy and 

governance programs are harmful to achieving freedom in countries under oppressive 

governments. We should instead do more to support freedom in countries like Cuba, Venezuela, 

Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In conclusion, I appreciate the Administration's commitment 

to review the effectiveness of our contributions to Inter-American organizations and its 

determination to enact quota reform in the OAS. I look forward to hearing the results of that 

review. With that I tum to Ranking Member Sires for his opening statement. 

### 
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House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere 

Congressman Albio Sires (D-NJ) 

Ranking Member 

Opening Statement- Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere: The FY 2018 Budget Request 

Wednesday, July 12th, 2017 at 2:00PM in 2172 Rayburn 

Mr. Chairman- thank you for holding this hearing. I am glad to see us address this budget and its effects 

on our engagement in the Western Hemisphere 

It is worrisome to see that this current budget proposal supports such disengagement in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

From cuts to democracy programs and food security projects to the elimination of support for the Inter 

American Foundation and the OAS, this budget shows a stark image to our hemispheric partners that we 

do not plan to create a constructive dialogue and produce solutions to international problems that atfect 

us all. 

The Administration should ask itself how the U-S will achieve our goals by defunding the means to 

them. 

How will the U-S decrease the forced migration of displaced persons and refugees to the U-S by cutting 

the budget for the Migration and Refugee Assistance program? 

How will the U-S stand for democracy through political representation by eliminating support for civil 

societies in countries such as Venezuela and Cuba? 

The means to a successful engagement with U-S partners includes a comprehensive whole of 

government approach 

With these draconian budget cuts, we take diplomacy out of our international affairs and allow for U-S 

engagement to be replaced by nefarious actors like Russia and China who do not share our values or our 

goals 

I think I speak for us all here on the committee when I say there are bipartisan concerns on this budget 

Page 1 of 2 
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Tam hopeful that our witnesses will address our concerns and give us confidence that our 

Administration understands that we have gained too much from our engagement in the Western 

Hemisphere to allow for these nonsensical cuts that dismantle our past successes 

T thank the witnesses for being here and look forward to your testimony 

Page 2 of 2 
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FY 2018 U.S. ASSISTANCE REQUEST FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

TESTlMONY OF 

FRANCISCO L. PALMIERI 

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE 

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FORElGN AFFAIRS 

July 12, 2017 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal Year 2018 foreign assistance 

request for the Western Hemisphere. 

The FY 2018 $1.09 billion request for the Western Hemisphere prioritizes programs that 

directly support U.S. national security by addressing illicit pathways, while creating an 

environment for increased U.S. trade and investment in the hemisphere. Security and prosperity 

in the region benefits our interests directly, and creates opportunities for U.S. companies. 

The request supports programming that disrupts transnational criminal organizations 

(TCOs), strengthens border security, combats corruption and impunity, and reduces the flow of 

irregular migration, illicit drugs, and illegal goods across our southern border. The request 

reflects the President's commitment to rebuild our nation's military within fiscal constraints, 

while working on behalf of the American people to advance our national security objectives and 

foreign policy goals. The request for the Western Hemisphere includes six primary components: 

Tn Central America, the request includes $460 million to address the economic, security, 

and governance drivers of irregular migration and drug trafficking to the United States. The June 

15-16 Conference on Prosperity and Security in Central America, which the U.S. government cohosted with the Government of Mexico, was attended by Vice President Pence, Secretaries 

Tillerson, Kelly, and Mnuchin, senior-level Central American government officials, 

representatives from other partner countries, and leaders from the private sector and international 

financial institutions. Participants discussed investment promotion, sustainable growth, 

opportunities for U.S. firms, and cooperation to combat organized crime, promote security, and 

advance the rule of law The conference also affirmed U.S support for the Plan of the Alliance 

for Prosperity, the reform initiative of the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, 

Guatemala, and Honduras. 

Security cooperation with Mexico under the Merida Initiative combats I COs, narcotics, 

and other illicit trafficking, overcomes shared migration challenges, improves border controls, 

and strengthens Mexico's capacity to end impunity. The FY 2018 request for the Merida 

Initiative is $85 million. The request supports Mexico's efforts to combat illicit poppy 

cultivation, heroin production, and fentanyl trafficking; advance the rule oflaw; protect human 
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rights; and reduce violence that poses a risk to the United States, consistent with the U.S.-Mexico 

Strategic Dialogue on Disrupting TCOs hosted by Secretary Tillerson in May. 

For Colombia, the request includes $251.4 million for assistance focusing on reducing the 

production and trafficking of cocaine to the United States, while helping to secure a just and 

lasting peace, thereby strengthening a strategic security partner. The President reaffinned the 

U.S. partnership with Colombia during President Santos' visit to Washington in May. 

The $157.5 million request for Haiti promotes good governance; fights poverty; advances 

economic growth initiatives, improves food security and nutrition; supports transparent and 

accountable government institutions; provides critical support to the Haitian National Police; and 

supports assistance to reduce the prevalence ofHlV/AIDS. 

For Peru, the $49.7 million request supports efforts to combat the illicit drug trade and 

TCOs through tightly paired eradication and alternative development. The request also supports 

anti-money laundering and asset-forfeiture; counternarcotics and justice sector efforts; customs 

and port security; and includes private sector-led alternative development programs. 

Tn the Caribbean, the $36.2 million Caribbean Basin Security Initiative request addresses 

crime, violence, and illicit pathways threatening the United States by focusing on maritime 

border controls, illicit trafficking, and the root causes of transnational crime. Programs included 

in the request will increase public safety and security; strengthen law enforcement; improve 

justice institutions; and support anti-connption and alternatives for at-risk youth. 

I look forward to your questions. 
9


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Prepared Testimony of Sarah-Ann Lynch 

Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

Before the House Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Wednesday, July 12,2017,2:00 p.m. 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 

invitation to testify today. I am grateful for the Committee's support for the United States 

Agency for International Development's work in Latin America and the Caribbean, and am 

pleased to have this opportunity to present our plans outlined in the fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget 

request. 

Introduction 

The FY 2018 request of $541 million for the Western Hemisphere through the Economic 

Support and Development Fund and USA !D's Global Health Programs includes support for 

USAID' s programs in the region that recognizes the need for greater security, prosperity, and 

good governance throughout Latin America and the Caribbean to bring greater security and 

opportunity to the United States. We are focusing our efforts on programs that stem the flow of 

illegal migration by addressing root causes, disrupt the activities of transnational criminal 

organizations, and advance security and prosperity in our neighbors to the south and here at 

home. 

USAID programs in Latin America and the Caribbean play a critical role in our national security. 

Our etl'orts in the region promote security and prosperity in the United States and the Western 

Hemisphere by providing alternatives to youth at risk for violence and illegal migration; giving 

rural farmers an alternative to coca cultivation; strengthening governments' ability to combat 

crime and disrupt transnational criminal organizations that traffic in drugs, weapons, and people; 

supporting transparent and accountable governance and anti-corruption efforts; and creating an 

economic environment in which the private sector can flourish, create jobs, and open markets for 

American businesses. 

Central America 

Central America, particularly the Northern Triangle countries ofEl Salvador, Guatemala, and 

Honduras, is USA !D's highest priority in the hemisphere. lllegal migration, including that of 

unaccompanied children, is largely a result of poverty and a lack of opportunity, instability 

marked by crime and violence, and weak governance, including high levels of corruption and 

impunity. USAID is working with the governments of the region, the private sector, and civil 

society to address the drivers of migration and instability. Of the total Department of State and 

USAID $460 million FY 2018 request for Central America, USAID proposes to implement 

approximately $294 million for our integrated strategy, which tailors programs to address the 

challenges unique to each country. These investments complement the Northern Triangle 

countries' Alliance for Prosperity Plan and their commitment to provide more than $5.4 billion 

of their own resources in 2016 and 2017 combined to stimulate development in the region. 
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Prosperity, Security, and Governance 

Deep-seated issues of social and economic inequity and lack of economic opportunity for vast 

segments of society stymie economic growth in Central America. ln the Northern Triangle, lack 

of economic opportunity drives people to migrate in search of a better life and contributes to 

insecurity as people tum to illicit means of income generation. ln the FY 2018 request, USAID 

builds upon programs that are already having a transformative impact and prioritizes prosperity 

programs that focus on improving small and medium-sized business development, vocational 

education, and workforce training that offers licit employment opportunities to out-of-school 

youth who are at risk for gang recruitment, crime, violence, and migration. We are targeting the 

geographic regions and populations most likely to migrate, particularly the rural poor in 

Guatemala and urban youth in El Salvador and Honduras. For example, in El Salvador, USAID 

prosperity programs assisted 11,000 small and medium-sized enterprises, generating more than 

22,000 jobs and $153 million in sales during the last five years. 

Despite recent improvements in the security situation, the countries of the Northern Triangle 

remain among the most violent in the world, ranking in the top five in the hemisphere in murder 

rates. USAID's FY 2018 request is confronting the drivers of violence to make communities 

safer, promote the rule of law, and defend human rights, particularly among vulnerable 

populations and victims of violence Under the Central America Regional Security Initiative 

(CARS I), we are taking a data-driven approach to violence reduction that targets those at the 

highest risk of gang violence perpetration and/or victimization. We support individual- and 

community-level interventions, such as youth outreach centers and municipal violence 

prevention committees, paired with targeted institutional refonn that improves the quality and 

legitimacy of police and justice systems. In many of these communities, we are working under 

the "Place-based Strategy" with our colleagues at the Department of State to use our comparative 

advantages in specitic geographic locations characterized by high levels of crime and violence. 

For example, thanks to a concerted effort by USAID and the Department of State and leadership 

from the Government of Honduras, there was a 62 percent decrease in homicides between 2013 

and 2015 in the Rivera Hernandez neighborhood of San Pedro Sula, Honduras, the most violent 

neighborhood in the most violent city in one of the world's most violent countries. 

Growth in prosperity and improved security in the region are hampered by systemic challenges 

across local and national governments. Corruption enables transnational criminal organizations 

to operate more freely and turns public sentiment against the state. For FY 2018, USAID is 

prioritizing governance e±Iorts that work with government institutions to reduce impunity, 

combat corruption, and build citizen trust We are working with courts, attorneys general, and 

civil society watchdog organizations to build cases against corrupt officials and improve the 

judicial systems that prosecute them. Programs also help the governments to increase revenue 

collection and manage expenditures in order to fund development efforts. For example, in 

Guatemala, USAID supported an integrated 24-hour court system that helped courts meet a 

constitutional requirement that evidence be presented within 24 hours of arrest As a result, the 

percentage of criminal cases dismissed without merit dropped from 70 percent to 15 percent 

2 
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South America 

USA !D's FY 2018 request for South America prioritizes Colombia and Peru. Despite growing 

economies, both are plagued by high levels of coca cultivation and related illicit activity that 

strengthens transnational criminal organizations and furthers instability in the region. USAID's 

FY 2018 request focuses on rural economic development as a way to build licit alternatives that 

will allow poor, rural farmers to participate in their nations' economic progress. 

Colomhht 

Tn Colombia, dynamic, sophisticated urban centers like Bogota and Medellin thrive alongside a 

rural countryside that is suffering the effects of the 52-year conflict between the Government of 

Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia, FARC). Thanks to the Peace Accords signed in 2016, rural populations isolated by 

conflict will have access to government services for the first time in more than a half-century, 

but transnational criminal organizations remain a threat. 

The lack of state presence and limited licit economic options for those living in areas fonnerly 

controlled by the FARC are serious challenges with effects that extend beyond Colombia's 

borders. One of the most troubling of these challenges for the United States is the increasing 

flow of cocaine across our border. The FY 2018 request includes $105 million for US AID to 

continue to help solidify the hard-won peace, prioritizing programs that encourage a diversified 

rural economy and alternatives to coca production; support the reintegration and inclusion 

process; and further Government of Colombia efforts to increase institutional presence, protect 

human rights, promote access to justice, and provide services to historically underserved areas. 

USAID's efforts are having a positive impact. For example, our rural economic development 

programs have helped to develop both the domestic and international markets for high-value 

crops of cacao, specialty coffee, rubber, and dairy products. In Tumaco, one of the most 

impacted regions of the country, these programs benefited more than 5,200 families and created 

more than 2,000 jobs in 2016. 

Peru 

Peru has proven to be a vital partner to the United States in a polarized region, and has developed 

into a more responsive democracy that pursues equitable economic growth. Despite its growing 

economy, Peru's financial success has yet to reach many Peruvians, particularly those who live 

outside the coastal urban areas. The country was the second-largest producer of cocaine and 

cultivator of coca in 20 15l 

In light of these challenges, USAID is focusing its FY 2018 request of$22 million on alternative 

development programs. We work in underdeveloped areas to help rural fanners produce highvalue crops and connect them to markets, particularly specialty chocolate (cacao) and coffee, that 

give them a safe, stable, lucrative alternative to illicit activity and help the country participate in 

international markets. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, coca 

1

United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; International Narcotics Control 

Strategy Report 2017; March 2017; h1tps://wvvw.state gov/documents/organization/268025.pdf; accessed 07/2017 

3 
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cultivation in Peru decreased by nearly 90 percent from 2011-2015 in places where alternative 

development was paired with forced eradication2 This effort helps to take funding out of the 

hands of dangerous cartels that affect U.S. security. 

FY 2018 funds will continue programs that are already seeing success in the provinces of San 

Martin, Ucayali, and Huanuco, areas once overwhelmed by narco-trafficking and violence. In FY 

2016, in collaboration with the Peruvian government, we reached more than 37,500 families with 

our alternative development programs. Sales of legal farm and non-farm products from these 

areas totaled $41 million and created 20,500 full-time-equivalent jobs. 

Caribbean 

The majority ofUSAID's FY 2018 request for the Caribbean is dedicated to two primary areas 

continued development in Haiti and citizen security interventions across the region under the 

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. 

Haiti 

As is the case elsewhere in the region, poverty and lack of opportunity are key drivers of illegal 

migration from Haiti to the United States and elsewhere. The FY 2018 budget request includes 

$64 million for US AID work in Haiti, where we are prioritizing programs that fight poverty and 

promote good governance. Our work will focus on providing economic opportunity through 

agriculture development and micro-, small, and medium-sized business development; improving 

food security and nutrition; fighting infectious disease and improving primary healthcare 

services; improving access to water and sanitation; and advancing transparent and accountable 

government institutions. 

USATD programs have produced measurable results in Haiti, especially in agricultural 

production and job creation. For example, USAID has introduced improved seeds, fertilizer, and 

other innovative technologies to more than 70,000 farmers, helping to increase crop yields. And 

our work in economic growth has leveraged $12 million of private sector funds and created more 

than 13,000 jobs. 

Caribbean Basin Security Tnitiatil'e 

According to the Inter-American Development Bank, spending on policing, corrections, pri vale 

sector security, and lost income from victims and incarcerated youth costs the Caribbean 

between 2.41 percent and 3.55 percent of gross domestic product, among the highest costs in the 

region3 Youth unemployment in the region is high, averaging between 20 and 40 percent, 

exposing young people to increased risk of migration and criminal activity, including gang 

affiliation and drug traffi eking. 

In FY 2018, USAID is requesting $20 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative to 

reduce illicit trafficking, increase citizen security, and address the root causes of crime and 

2

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: PerU Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2015: https://www.unodc.org/documents/ cropmonitoring/Peru/Peru_ monitoreo _coca_ 2016. pdf 3

inter-American Development Bank; The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the 

Caribbean, 02/2017; https://publications.ladb.org/handle/11319/8133; accessed 06/2017 

4 
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violence across the Caribbean. USAID's work with governments and civil society in the region 

includes programs to reduce corruption; reform justice systems; increase transparency, 

professionalism, and trust between police and communities; and provide social and economic 

opportunities to at-risk youth. Together, these programs help to reduce the likelihood that young 

people will engage in criminal activity or migrate in search of security or opportunity. 

USATD programming has helped Caribbean countries to achieve success. For example, in 2016 

in the Dominican Republic, nearly 4,000 youth obtained new or better jobs. And great strides 

have been made in enacting legislation in three member states in the Eastern Caribbean, with 

passage of a child justice law guiding treatment of youth in conflict with the law. 

USA ID Efficiency and Effectiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean 

Success in these endeavors will require other actors to play a more robust role. To this end, 

USAID is engaging the private sector, including American businesses, in partnerships that 

benefit all involved. For example, since 2012, USAID has leveraged approximately $146 million 

in private sector and non-USG resources for public-private partnerships in Central America 

alone. Through Development Credit Authority guarantees, nearly $34 million has been lent to 

over 20,000 micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises across former coca-producing regions 

in Peru since 2003, promoting legal livelihoods. 

We have a responsibility to the United States taxpayer to design and implement programs that 

contribute to broader national security goals and to maximize results of these programs. To do 

this, we integrate performance monitoring, evaluation, and other accountability tools into all our 

programs. We use the evidence generated by these tools to make course corrections as needed 

and to inform design of new programs, all in support of accountability, transparency, and 

meaningful oversight of all our programs. 

Conclusion 

USA !D's FY 2018 request for Latin America and the Caribbean prioritizes the challenges that 

most directly affect the United States. Our work will help to stem the flow of illegal migration by 

addressing the root causes that drive people from their homelands in search of a better life. 

Supporting efforts to reduce these root causes protects our homeland and our citizens. We would 

like to thank this Committee for its interest in and support for our work, and look forward to 

collaborating with you to address the challenges and opportunities in the region. 

Thank you for your time; I look forward to your questions. 

5 
14

Mr. DUNCAN. I guess I am first. 

The ranking member is on his way. 

In Cuba, in recent years, attacks against dissidents and violations of human rights in Cuba have increased. As of May 8, the 

Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation 

reported that there were at least 1,867 short-term detentions for 

political reasons in the first 4 months of 2017. Today, Cuba has at 

least 140 political prisoners. Despite the June rollout of new policy 

with emphasis on protecting the human rights of Cubans, democratic assistance to Cuba was cut from the 2018 request down from 

$20 million in democracy assistance in the 2016 that was used to 

support human rights groups and civil society on the island. 

So how does the administration reconcile the public support for 

human rights on one hand and freedom in Cuba with the elimination of funding that provides capacity-building and support to 

local groups and organizations that are promoting these rights on 

the island? 

Mr. Palmieri. 

Mr. PALMIERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. Foreign assistance was reduced globally, sir. And we believe we have 

a number of other tools that will permit us to continue to engage 

and press Cuba on the human rights front. We will continue to use 

our Embassy in Havana to do outreach to human rights and civil 

society groups. We will engage in multilateral fora, such as the 

OAS and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. We 

will work with international partners, the EU, and other countries 

of the Western Hemisphere to apply pressure. We will continue—

through direct bilateral talks, such as the Human Rights Dialogue—to press Cuba on that specific issue, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Lynch? 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you, sir. 

We have an existing appropriation that does get to the humanitarian assistance issues that you mentioned, whereby we are providing a package of goods to political dissidents, political prisoners, 

and their families, and we will continue to program that appropriation with existing funding. 

Mr. PALMIERI. Sir, I was also——

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PALMIERI. I was also remiss in not mentioning the President’s new National Security Presidential Memorandum makes it 

clear that engagement on human rights and democracy issues in 

Cuba will be at the forefront of everything we do in the new policy. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Thank you for that. 

Focus on Venezuela. We have a letter going to President Trump 

on Venezuela. Current signers are myself, the ranking member, 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and Francis Rooney. I am going to ask unanimous consent to put this in the record, but I also would like to pass 

this around if anyone would like to sign it. 

But Venezuela and some of the actions there by Maduro creating 

a Constituent Assembly as they call it, and, basically, undermining 

the Venezuelan Constitution. Can you talk with me a little bit 

about what the focus is in this budget with Venezuela, with regard 

to what the United States is doing with Venezuela, and how it may 

positively or negatively impact the Maduro regime? 

15

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir. We continue to be focused on the four 

commitments that the Venezuelan Government made in the dialogue and mediation efforts led by the Vatican last fall. That is to 

immediately release all political prisoners, to schedule the elections 

that have been postponed, to address the humanitarian needs, and, 

most importantly, sir, to respect the Venezuelan Constitution and 

the role of the duly elected National Assembly to allow it to be a 

part of the democratic process more fully and to provide solutions 

to the crises in the country. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Lynch? 

Ms. LYNCH. Yes. We have existing activities in Venezuela working with civil society organizations with four U.S.-based NGOs here 

and then 30 to 35 NGOs in Venezuela, and we will continue to be 

working with those civil society organizations to increase awareness of what is happening on the ground and to increase the ability 

to report on human rights abuses, corruption, things of that nature. We are also working with the National Assembly to increase 

their ability to be legislators, doing training and capacity building 

there. 

In addition, we are doing assessments, to the extent we can, on 

the situation on the ground in the food area, in the economic area, 

in the financial area, and putting together those assessments so, 

should there be an opportunity to do more, we will be prepared to 

have a good response. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Does the Department of State think that democracy and governance support is necessary in the Western Hemisphere? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. You think that is broad—let’s broaden it beyond. You are from the Western Hemisphere sector, so maybe that 

is not fair. But do you think that is a policy of the State Department in general, to support democracy and governance? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Would you agree that foreign aid is a tremendous foreign policy 

tool? 

Mr. PALMIERI. It is a critical and important part of our national 

power, yes, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So influencing foreign policy in a positive way with 

foreign aid is one thing. Withholding of foreign aid or limiting foreign aid could have a very impactful effort as well, I guess. Right? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I would say, sir, there are many tools that we 

have at our disposal. In a constrained budget environment, we 

have to determine which priorities and which tools we can use to 

their greatest effect based on each individual’s circumstance, yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me just state for the record: There are a number of countries that receive a tremendous amount of U.S. foreign 

aid that don’t support U.S. efforts sometimes, whether it is votes 

at the U.N. or the OAS. I am not going to ask you to comment on 

that. That is my opinion. 

I am going to now turn to the ranking member. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for holding this 

meeting. 

16

First of all, I thank you for coming before the committee. And I 

have certain concerns regarding this budget, especially some of the 

cuts. I was in Honduras and Guatemala with my colleague, Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen. And one of the things that we saw there is how we 

are helping these countries, especially the Attorneys General of 

those countries, keeping up under a lot of pressure. I was wondering if some of the cuts are going to impact those Attorneys General and their offices? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I would agree, sir, that the work of the three Attorneys General in the Northern Triangle countries specifically 

have produced some important results over the last few years. 

There is a renewed commitment by all three of those individuals 

to attacking impunity, and the support that we can provide them 

is money well spent. 

Ms. LYNCH. Yes. I totally agree with my colleague. Under this 

budget request, we do suggest continued support for the Attorneys 

General as well as other national institutions that get to issues of 

impunity and corruption, such as MACCIH in Honduras. 

Mr. SIRES. There is also the elimination of the Food for Peace 

programming in the budget. I was wondering how you feel about 

that? 

Ms. LYNCH. We will continue with some agriculture funding particularly in the three countries of the Northern Triangle of Central 

America, as well as in Haiti. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Palmieri? 

Mr. PALMIERI. The Food for Peace program? 

Mr. SIRES. Yeah, programming. 

Mr. PALMIERI. I would defer to my USAID colleague’s answer, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Who will speak on funding global health? You 

will also? 

Ms. LYNCH. Sure. 

Mr. SIRES. I know there is a 62 percent cut there also. So I was 

wondering how you feel about that. 

Ms. LYNCH. Right. We do seek to continue funding global health 

in certain areas. In maternal and child health, for example, in 

Haiti, where we want to build on the important work that we have 

already done there, as well as in Guatemala, where we are looking 

to shift much of that funding to nutrition, which is key to some of 

the important and most problematic issues in Guatemala, which 

are stunting. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Palmieri, what kind of a message do you think 

we are sending to this part of the world when we have these cuts? 

Mr. PALMIERI. In Central America, I think what we are trying to 

do is build on the efforts that have been made in previous budgets. 

In Fiscal Year 2015, Fiscal Year 2016, and Fiscal Year 2017, we 

have a combined $2 billion that we are directing to Central America. 

And so Secretary Tillerson, with Secretary Kelly and Secretary 

Mnuchin, hosted a conference last month on Central America 

where the President of Honduras, the President of Guatemala, and 

the Vice President attended, and we began to look at ways that we 

can involve the private sector, multilateral development banks, and 

so that we can deepen the economic investments in the region. And 

17

through both our previous assistance and the additional money in 

the Fiscal Year 2018 budget, we can begin to address some of the 

underlying conditions there. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. I don’t want you to think this is the only 

administration I said this about. I was also concerned the previous 

administration that we were not focusing enough attention on the 

Western Hemisphere. Because I really feel that it is one of those 

places where we have neglected due to the fact that, you know, the 

world is at war, basically, and in the Middle East, and the focus, 

the attention, is there. But I think we would be shortsighted if we 

don’t pay attention to our backyard. 

It is critical that we continue to support some of these programs 

and continue to harbor a relationship like we always had. 

Mr. PALMIERI. Yes, sir. I agree. And I think Secretary Tillerson 

has made the Western Hemisphere a priority at the start of his 

work here, the Central America conference, his first trip was to 

Mexico. I think we are working hard at both the issues of national 

security and economic prosperity, because we do believe what is 

good for the United States is also good for the region. And working 

together, we can continue a positive path, as you just outlined. 

Mr. SIRES. I am concerned about the security, because some of 

the players that are going to South America are not our friends. 

So security is very important. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I agree with you. I hope that is Tillerson’s focus 

and opinion. I haven’t asked him. I hope that’s correct. I applaud 

him for that, because that is what we are going to focus on. 

I will now go to the gentlelady from Florida, the former chairwoman, and the current chairwoman of Middle East and North Africa. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome to you both. 

As Mr. Sires pointed out, he and I traveled to Guatemala and 

Honduras in March. It was a wonderful visit to great countries who 

are solid allies of the U.S. 

And while we were there in Honduras, I asked our Ambassador 

to please look into the visa restrictions that we placed—previous 

administration—in 2009. And after nearly a decade, boy, we really 

need to return the visas to the Hondurans impacted. 

Could I receive your assurances, Mr. Palmieri, that you will look 

into this matter and that you would please get back to me on this? 

Mr. PALMIERI. We will absolutely get back to you on that issue, 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

They have been so singled out and punished for adhering to the 

constitution. And they were proven correct. But, still, they are 

there, unable to leave their country. So thank you so much. 

Furthermore, Mr. Palmieri, the Cuban directive, as we know, 

was issued on June 16th. And that directive states that the 

changes shall not prohibit the support for democracy programs in 

Cuba. And that is so important. But the budget proposal zeroed out 

budget programs in Cuba. And I know that the chairman and the 

ranking member have pointed that out, how these cuts just seem 

to be maybe penny wise, pound foolish. 

18

Can civil society groups in Cuba survive without this much needed U.S. assistance? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I believe that the President’s new National Security Policy Memorandum makes it a focus of the U.S. Government’s 

effort to engage on human rights and democracy in Cuba. And I believe we have tools that will be available to us through our Embassy on the island with multilateral partners, with other regional 

partners, to continue to engage with human rights activists on the 

island and civil society groups. And I believe the new policy will 

enable us to continue that engagement effectively. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good. And we welcome the arrival of the new 

chief of that section or intersection or Embassy or whatever it is 

we are calling it these days. 

In Nicaragua, as we know, the Ortega regime continues to use 

his cronies to threaten and undermine civil society members, 

human rights organizations. Yet, again, the budget proposal zeros 

out democracy programs in Nicaragua as well. 

What is the justification for doing that in Nicaragua, sir? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Again, I think foreign assistance was reduced 

globally. And in an era of constrained budgets, we had to make 

some difficult priority decisions. Again, in a place like Nicaragua, 

we have a fully staffed Embassy. I think we can be effective and 

efficient with some of the other resources we will have at our disposal there to engage with the civil society and human rights activists, and to try to continue to advance our national interests in 

Nicaragua. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And lastly—Mr. Chairman, thank you—we get to Venezuela. And 

I think that the programs in Venezuela have been transformational, have played a substantial and important role in helping the people of Venezuela. Would you both agree with that assessment? 

And I know that you are agreeing, but what is the justification 

of zeroing out funds for Venezuela when it is one of the most important programs with bicameral and bipartisan support on the 

Hill? It has become a great investment to advance U.S. interests 

in the region. 

Mr. PALMIERI. We absolutely need to continue to support the 

Venezuelan people in their effort to reestablish and restore their 

democratic institutions, and we will use all the tools available to 

us in that effort. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And speaking of the tools, before 

the committee adjourns, I would kindly give you a list of more 

human rights violators of Venezuela whom we would like the administration to place on the sanctions list so that they are not able 

to come and visit Mickey Mouse in Disney World and shop at Bal 

Harbour and enjoy all the wonderful freedoms that we have here, 

while they beat the heads and shoot at demonstrators in Venezuela. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to show a short 

video on the latest violence orchestrated by Maduro and his cronies 

against the people of Venezuela. And I would like to thank the 

brave Venezuelan civil society groups on the ground for doing an 

19

amazing job of monitoring the situation, putting this video together 

for our subcommittee. 

Thank you. 

[Video shown.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I will thank the gentlelady for her continued focus 

in helping keep this subcommittee focused on Venezuela and the 

human rights abuses going there and, hopefully, future regime 

change there that we all are hoping for. 

The Chair will now go to Mrs. Torres. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our guests for being here. It is great to see you. 

As the founder of the Central America Caucus, I have been a 

strong supporter of U.S. strategy for engagement in Central America. I have a firm commitment to continuing to work in the region 

in the Northern Triangle. 

And as we continue to make the argument for aid in Central 

America, we need to be able to account for where this aid is going. 

We need to effectively measure their progress and measure its impact. The first $750 million that we appropriated in Fiscal Year 2016, 

just to make sure, none of that money has gone to the government 

of any of these countries. Is that correct? Directly into the coffers 

of the government. 

Mr. PALMIERI. That’s correct. It is not our policy to deliver that 

money directly to the government. 

Mrs. TORRES. I just wanted that for the record. There has been 

a lot of questions within groups around how that money is being 

spent. 

Can you account for how much has been spent in each country, 

and how much is going through contractors versus NGOs, and how 

the money is balanced between the three main pillars: The rule of 

law, development, and security? I just want to make sure and get 

a basic sense of where that money is going. 

Ms. LYNCH. With all that detail, we may have to get back to you 

on some of those numbers. But I would say that it is not a cookiecutter approach to each of the countries. So the sectors might vary 

from one country to another, and it depends on the emphasis of our 

programming. 

Mrs. TORRES. Okay. 

Mr. PALMIERI. In general, they go to three central pillars of our 

effort in Central America that get at the drivers of irregular migration. We are trying to improve all three country’s ability to address 

the security conditions in the country. We are trying to help them 

improve their governance programs, like improving their ability to 

collect taxes so that their institutions have the ability to provide 

social services. 

Mrs. TORRES. And all of that is important, as well as education. 

And I want to make sure that the bulk of the money isn’t just 

going for security or to build up more borders. I want to make sure 

that we are actually spending money to address the root causes 

that bring children to have to flee their country. 

How are you measuring progress in the Northern Triangle? What 

are the main indicators that you are using in order to ensure that 

20

what we are doing, the work that we are doing, is actually making 

a difference? 

Ms. LYNCH. Some of the indicators that we have are that the governments are taking an interest in investing their own resources 

in many of the things that we are doing. So, for example, in Guatemala, we helped stand up the 24-hour courts, which help them respond to the legislation that says a detainee has to report to a 

judge within 24 hours. We helped stand up these courts. The Guatemalans have now taken them over. 

Another measure of success is private sector engagement. We 

now have a great number of private sector efforts there, public-private partnerships, if you will. Microsoft, in El Salvador, is a good 

example, where they are working with at-risk youth to educate 

them in various areas, including in computers. And then, finally, 

civil society, keeping an eye on the government. 

Mrs. TORRES. I want to thank you both for recognizing the efforts 

of CICIG and MACCIH, and the efforts of the Attorneys General 

leading those causes, and the impact that their work has had on 

their personal lives and their family and the number of threats. 

Are you aware that four members of the Guatemalan Congress 

have hired and are paying $80,000 a month for a lobbying firm to 

come here? And I am assuming that they are lobbying against 

CICIG. 

Mr. PALMIERI. I have seen those press reports that there are 

press reports of these four individuals engaging a lobbying effort. 

I do not have specific factual information about what they are 

funding or not funding. 

Mrs. TORRES. At some point I would like for you to report back 

to this committee if that is true. Because I think that we are 

spending a significant amount of money, amount of effort, our own 

time, to focus on that. And as far as I am concerned, my commitment to the Northern Triangle is contingent on the work of CICIG 

and the work of MACCIH. 

Mr. PALMIERI. Thank you. We will do that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair will now go to Mr. Rooney from Florida. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There are 85 countries that don’t take our deportees. ICE considers 23 of them recalcitrant countries. They consider 62 of them 

noncooperators. There are 243,000 people, illegal, under deportation orders that their home country won’t accept; 57,000 of them 

have been convicted of a crime. Cuba is number two in the people 

that they won’t accept, that is 40,000. Haiti is number three, 

35,000. And Brazil is number four at 30,000. 

We had a fellow named Jean Jacques, you may know about him, 

an illegal Haitian, who was—three times ICE tried to return him 

to Haiti, and they wouldn’t take him. And within 6 months of the 

third time, in mid-2016, he brutally murdered a 25-year-old lady in 

Connecticut. 

In 2015, we gave Haiti $1⁄2 billion. And right now you are pro- posing giving Haiti $157.5 million. So my question—and one more 

thing. In addition to countries that don’t accept our deportees, we 

gave, in 2016, Ecuador, under Rafael Correa—where I don’t even 

think we had an ambassador at the time—$10 million. We gave ArVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:59 Dec 13, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\26223 SHIRL
21

gentina $21⁄2 million. And in Bolivia, under Evo Morales, in 2015—

where I am not sure we had an ambassador back down there by 

that time—we gave them $56.5 million. 

So my question is: Why should we support USAID when you are 

giving money to countries that won’t accept our deportees and that 

are supporting countries where we can’t even position an ambassador and are run by authoritarian dictators? 

Ms. LYNCH. Sir, we have had a lot of very good investments both 

in Haiti, in particular, and Ecuador, in the past. We actually have 

not had a very extensive program in Ecuador in the recent past. 

For USAID’s part, we have about a $2 million project that has been 

funding civil society organizations, not the government at all. 

Those organizations actually draw attention to some of the issues 

that you raise. So they are there to raise awareness of things like 

human rights abuses, lack of governance, corruption, impunity, and 

things of that nature. 

In Haiti, similarly, we do have an effort at civil society, building 

the capacity for organizations to do the same. At the same time, 

we are working, again, primarily with the NGO community and 

private sector, to build up private sector competitiveness. But also, 

on the health side of things, post-earthquake, there were many, 

many issues, of course, I am sure you are aware of. We have moved 

out of some of the those, the infrastructure, into things like housing, finance, and whatnot. But, basically, to create a situation of 

stability in order to reduce the possibility of illegal immigrants 

coming from a place like Haiti, same in Central America. 

Mr. PALMIERI. In addition, sir, we are working closely with the 

Department of Homeland Security on a new initiative in this administration to address the problem of recalcitrant countries and 

their unwillingness to accept the repatriation of duly deported—individuals who are ready for deportation. 

Mr. ROONEY. I am really glad to hear that you are supportive of 

the move of the DHS to take over consular deportation activities 

and get it out of the State Department. That is the proposal. The 

proposal is to move it to the Department of Homeland Security, 

right? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I am not aware of any proposal at this time. But 

what I was referencing, sir, was the effort that the State Department, with the Department of Homeland Security, is looking at 

ways that we can enhance the repatriation of individuals who are 

identified for deportation to recalcitrant countries that have not 

taken——

Mr. ROONEY. So is there any thought about cutting off their 

money, or are we going to continue to fund programs while they 

won’t do it? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Depending on the country, we have a lot of different interests that are in play. But it is very clear under this administration that we are addressing the problem of recalcitrant 

countries, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you. 

I yield. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I now go to Mr. Espaillat. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

22

Welcome. 

The Inspector General for the Department of State and Justice 

released a report recently that says that State Department employees were involved in a coverup of a 2012 incident where a drug raid 

in Honduras went wrong and four civilians were killed. The report 

finds that the State Department employees failed to comply with 

and undermined the Ambassador’s Chief of Mission authority. 

How is the State Department holding accountable these employees cited in the IG’s report? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Thank you for the question, Mr. Espaillat. The 

IG’s report is being handled at the Department and we are preparing our response to those recommendations. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. How are we doing with so far as the nominations 

of potential ambassadors in Latin America and the Caribbean? 

Where are we now? Because many of these countries are in instability or right in the middle of a crisis. Do we have any progress 

with regards to nomination and appointments? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Yeah. I believe the administration is making significant process on the appointment of ambassadors in the Western 

Hemisphere. We have nominees for Canada, the Bahamas, Guatemala, Peru, and Costa Rica, and are working on their nominations, 

sir. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Okay. TPS is about to expire for the triangle 

countries of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. What is the 

State Department’s position of continuing TPS for several hundred 

thousand people in the U.S. that are under that status? 

Mr. PALMIERI. A temporary protective status, TPS, is a Department of Homeland Security authority, and we will wait for them 

to consult with us at an appropriate time ahead of that decision, 

sir. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Last year, President Obama signed into law a bipartisan U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, authored by 

both Representatives Engel and Ros-Lehtinen. The administration 

recently released its new strategy for engaging with the subregion, 

which was mandated by the bill. Writing a strategy is one thing, 

but implementing one is another. What are you planning to do to 

implement this particular initiative? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, we began last week. Under Secretary Tom 

Shannon and I attended the Summit of CARICOM Heads of Government in Grenada. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Grenada. 

Mr. PALMIERI. We had extensive meetings during the 2 days that 

we were there with different heads of government to talk about the 

strategy that we prepared in response to the legislation and to consult with them on the priorities that we have listed in that report. 

We will continue to consult stakeholders here in the United States, 

continue conversations with the Congress, and develop that proposed strategy and implement it as quickly and as effectively as we 

can. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you. 

Now, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is another important initiative for a geopolitical region that is very important to us. 

And there is currently an economic meltdown in Puerto Rico, Cuba 

still very unstable, Dominican Republic, Haiti are also facing great 

23

challenges, opening the door there for perhaps increasing crime, 

drug trafficking, human trafficking. We have seen a reduction in 

the budget for that region from $57.7 million to 36.2, and a 36 percent reduction altogether. 

So how are we going to be able to respond to the emerging need 

of that important region for the United States, given the fact that 

there has been such a dramatic cut in aid for that particular region 

of the world? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Foreign assistance was reduced globally. In the 

Caribbean, earlier aspects of the Caribbean Security Initiative focused on bigger ticket items, like maritime vessels. And, now, as 

we move forward in the CBSI, our programs are more focused toward capacity building, training, and maintenance. And so we believe we can continue to use the level of funding that is available 

to us to advance our national interests there, sir. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you for your answers. Thank you so much. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will now go down to Mr. DeSantis from Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses. I appreciate your service. 

I would like to start seeing some of the folks who are going to 

be the actual appointees nominated and confirmed. I think that is 

important, particularly for the Western Hemisphere. I have been 

supportive, and I know the chairman has, of Mauricio ClaverCarone. I think he would do a great job. But bottom line is, we 

would love to see these decisions made so that these folks can get 

in place. But I appreciate what you are doing. 

Let me ask just you, just to follow up with my friend from Florida, why hasn’t the State Department ever halted visas when some 

of these countries will not take back, particularly the criminal illegal aliens? Under the law, if they are not doing it, State Department shuts off visas until they start to do it. But we have never 

done that, and I just don’t know why. 

Mr. PALMIERI. I think that is a very good question. And I would 

want to consult closely with our Bureau of Consular Affairs. I know 

the decision to cease visa processing is a very serious one that also 

has impacts on the U.S. economy in terms of people being able to 

travel back and forth who might not fall——

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, without question. But I think if you use it, 

then I think that a lot of the countries are going to change their 

ways. Because it has a lot of effects on their economies too. And 

as I understand the law, once DHS says, hey, these countries are 

recalcitrant—it used to be the Attorney General before DHS, because this law predated DHS—then I think the State Department 

has to do it. And we have been trying to figure out, is it DHS that 

is just not providing this to the State Department or is the State 

Department dragging its feet? And it may be the former as well. 

But I think if we can get in a situation where these countries are 

respecting this, where particularly these criminal illegals, bringing 

them back, they are accepting that—I don’t even think you would 

need to use it then. But I think at some point you have got to do 

something, because they have figured out they are just not going 

to play ball with us. And I think the tragedy has been that has 

24

harmed some of our citizens here, when these people are released 

into American society. 

Let me ask you about Cuba. We had a big policy change in Cuba 

announced in the winter of 2015. Have human rights on the island 

improved since that policy change in December 2015? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I think President Trump’s new policy review of 

our Cuba policy focuses exactly on that question: How can we ensure that U.S. engagement promotes human rights and democracy 

on the island? 

Mr. DESANTIS. But is it fair to say that there has not really been 

an improvement? Because as I watched it, people said, hey, the policy hasn’t worked, we got to change. Then you changed the policy, 

and you actually had political arrests go up, and you had even 

more repression in some respects. And so I don’t think you can 

say—I know I appreciate the President’s review of this and 

changes. I think those are positive steps. But, man, for those 2 

years, or 11⁄2 years, I didn’t see very much progress. Am I wrong? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I think the policy review clearly reflects that we 

need to work to ensure that U.S. engagement in Cuba produces the 

kind of progress you are talking about. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Venezuela. It has just been an absolute disgrace 

what is going on there. We have been engaged on this committee 

for now—I mean, a long time. Since you have really been chairman. And I would like to see us do more to empower the people 

that are being oppressed. 

What is the State Department doing? Is there more Congress can 

do to help the people that are suffering under the yoke of the 

Maduro dictatorship? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I think we share the same exact view, that we 

need to find ways to better assist the Venezuelan people in the face 

of crises, of political, economic, and humanitarian nature. 

The State Department continues to press the Venezuelan Government to honor its commitments to the Vatican-led dialogue last 

fall, specifically to address the humanitarian needs of the Venezuelan people, to respect the role of the National Assembly, to——

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, we have obviously seen—those would all be 

great. The question is: Is it feasible that this regime will actually 

ever do any of that or do we really just need to hope that this regime crumbles and that we can have a new regime take its place. 

I mean, I don’t see how Maduro will ever go in the direction that 

we want. I mean, you just look at how failed the society is. They 

are sitting on the number one amount of oil reserves in the world, 

and yet they have gas shortages. You have people that are losing 

15, 20 pounds a year because they have food shortages. It is an absolute failure. But I think what he has shown is, any time the people suffer, he always errs on just trying to cling to his own power, 

and he has not been open to reform. Am I wrong? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I think the record in Venezuela is very clear, as 

you outlined. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Now I will go down to Ms. Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding a hearing 

today on advancing U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. 

25

The Trump administration has made it a priority to deter illegal 

migration and combat transnational criminal organizations. However, the President’s budget significantly cuts assistance to every 

country and regional program in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Many of these cuts will affect programs that directly work on 

issues related to immigration and crime. 

For example, the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which addresses underlying conditions that affect migration, 

will receive a 39 percent funding cut. The budget has shifted the 

remaining aid toward security efforts and away from governance 

and economic growth programs. 

However, our country’s economic and political circumstances affect this ability to provide national security and stability. Economic 

prosperity and good governance directly affect the country’s ability 

to combat crime. That is why it is vital that the United States continues to provide assistance. 

With such dramatic cuts in aid, would the United States be able 

to continue to play a meaningful role in the economic and political 

development of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean? And 

how does cutting these programs endanger U.S. interest in the region? For both of you. 

Mr. PALMIERI. You know, as Secretary Tillerson said in his testimony before the full committee’s hearing in Congress, the level of 

funding devoted to a particular goal is not the most important factor in achieving it. We believe the budget request prioritizes programs that directly support national security imperatives in the region, including stopping transnational criminal organizations and 

reducing the flow of illegal migrants and illicit goods. And we will 

use all of the resources that we do have at our disposal to advance 

U.S. national security and economic prosperity in this region. 

Ms. LYNCH. Yes. Likewise, and in a constrained budget environment, I think what the budget reflects is doubling down on the 

areas that you mentioned. As my colleague mentioned also, illegal 

migration and the production and transit of illegal drugs north. 

In addition, we are building on the programming that we have 

already done and increasing efforts to leverage resources from the 

private sector to get more engaged in these efforts as well. Also, we 

are encouraging other donors to get involved. My colleague mentioned the Central America Conference, which besides the member 

states from those countries, we had participation from Canada, 

from, you know, Spain, the EU has expressed interest in this region, as well as Japan. So it is a holistic approach to the region. 

Ms. KELLY. So you are trying to find others to supplement where 

those huge cuts are? 

Ms. LYNCH. It is an opportunity for others to participate in these 

efforts. I mean, I think the environment—a secure and stable hemisphere is important to those donors that I mentioned as well as the 

private sector. 

Ms. KELLY. And have you been successful thus far in finding private or other countries? 

Ms. LYNCH. Yes. We have leveraged several million dollars. I will 

throw out El Salvador as an example, where we have something 

like 11 or 12 small micro enterprises that have created over 20,000 

26

jobs for Salvadorans and increased sales in the industries by $150 

million. And that is with the help of the private sector. 

We also have experience with Microsoft in El Salvador that I 

mentioned previously, and then a consortium of private sector organizations—Hanes company, Wal-Mart, Citi, et cetera—that are involved in educational opportunities for at-risk youth. 

Ms. KELLY. There is a lot of countries to cover. So I hope you are 

successful. 

Following up on the Honduras investigation, are adequate reparations or other compensations contemplated for the Honduran 

victims of the Ahaus incident detailed in the report? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I believe in previous appropriations there has 

been an effort to make some assistance to the group in that area, 

but we would want to get back a more fuller answer for the record. 

Ms. KELLY. I would appreciate that. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

I recognize myself for another round of questions, just because of 

where we are in the hearing. 

Colombia, largest producer of coca. Largest supplier of cocaine 

seized here in America. Santos dramatically reduced the eradication during the FARC negotiations as a concession. So eradication went down, coca production went up, cocaine supply is at 

a—maybe an all-time high. 

How will the terms of the peace process, as it relates to coca 

eradication, affect the ability of the U.S. to support Colombian 

eradication efforts? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I think moving forward with peace process implementation, the Colombian Government has developed a strategy to 

deal with this increase in coca leaf cultivation and the subsequent 

increase in cocaine production. 

We are working, our assistance programs on the counternarcotics 

side, to complement and support that effort. And I think it will be 

imperative that our effort and their efforts show immediate results 

as quickly as we can, given the increase in coca cultivation that 

you have singled. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. So the FARC and people that were involved in the FARC are now going to have to find other employment. 

The concern is for the Colombians and what these people are 

going to do. Is there anything in the budget USAID-wise, what is 

the number, if there are any, to assist the Colombians? Have the 

Colombians asked us to help them with that through USAID? 

Mr. PALMIERI. There is definitely a component to the peace plan 

implementation and to our assistance program that envisions enhancing the state of Colombia’s presence in these regions and promoting alternative developments. 

I don’t know if you want to add anything. 

Ms. LYNCH. Yes. The $105 million, I think, that we have requested in Fiscal Year 2018 will go toward three areas: Extending 

state presence where it hasn’t been seen in a while in Colombia, 

improving rural economies there, and then reintegration and inclusive programming. USAID is working right now in 40 of the 58 

most insecure areas of Colombia trying to transform those into 

27

areas that—where there will be licit possibilities for the farmers. 

Tumaco is a great example, where we have already helped about 

5,000 families and created 2,000 jobs. 

So we are supporting the Colombians to make further progress 

in those areas. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And I think if the peace process is going to be successful in the long run, you are going to have to find other employment. They are going to have to retrain. They are going to have 

to build schools and roads. The Colombians have got a challenge 

ahead of them. I think Santos knows that, based on our conversations. 

Ranking Member, do you have another question? 

Mr. SIRES. Yes. I want to get back to Nicaragua. 

Is there any money in the budget to counteract the influence of 

Russia in Nicaragua? I know they sold 50 tanks and they are opening up a listening post. And I was wondering, how are we focusing 

on that? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Well, we do provide some funding for international 

military education and training that allows us to maintain U.S. 

military engagement with elements of the security forces in Nicaragua. We also do some counternarcotics cooperation with Nicaraguan security forces as well. 

The Russian presence there is focused on a counternarcotics 

training facility that they have created. 

Mr. SIRES. And as far as Costa Rica is concerned, I think they 

are one of our best friends that we have there in terms of dealing 

with this narcotraffic issue. 

Are we cutting any of their money? 

Mr. PALMIERI. With respect to Costa Rica, I agree, sir, they are 

one of our best friends and allies in the entire hemisphere, not just 

in the fight against counter narcotics, but on a whole range of political issues. 

We will be looking at ways that we can use current year funding 

to assist them. In the outyear, they will benefit from the Central 

America Regional Security Initiative, and they will receive funding. 

Mr. SIRES. Didn’t we just turn a boat over to them or help them 

buy a boat? 

Mr. PALMIERI. I have to confess, I do know that there is an effort 

underway, and I will have to get the specifics on the—the desire 

to——

Mr. SIRES. I am not talking about a speedboat. You know, the 

deal with the——

Mr. PALMIERI. Yeah, yeah. I am sorry, sir. I will get you a fuller 

answer on that. I don’t know, off the top of my head. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Chair will now recognize and welcome to the 

hearing Mr. Meeks. Five minutes. 

Mr. MEEKS. Just when you thought you could go home early. 

Mr. PALMIERI. It is good to see you, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Good to see you. 

Let me start out—I had some questions and, really, I guess they 

probably were more appropriate—one is more appropriate for Secretary Tillerson than you, Mr. Palmieri, or Ms. Lynch, because it 

goes into conflicts of interest or potentially conflicts of interest on 

28

dealing with the President’s businesses and what he is doing. I 

started to ask that question, but I think I am not going to ask either one of you that. I don’t want to put you on the spot. I know 

you are there acting. I do not want you—there is only a few people 

there now. We don’t need anybody to lose anybody. So I will hold 

off on asking those questions. 

But I will ask you questions that I asked the Secretary when he 

appeared here, and I was waiting to get an answer back, and I 

have not received one yet. And maybe you can give me an answer. 

And one of them deals with—the State Department led a U.S.-

Brazil Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality and the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on 

Racial and Ethnic Equality have been important ways to corroborate and coordinate efforts to address systemic racial discrimination. 

What resources—this is my question—within the State Department are dedicated to continue the support of these important 

mechanisms for the advancement of the marginalized and underserved communities in Brazil and Colombia? 

Mr. PALMIERI. Thank you for that question, Mr. Meeks. And the 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is very proud of the work 

we have done to promote social inclusion—race, ethnicity, and social inclusion programming into our efforts in the hemisphere. The 

two agreements that you—or initiatives you have pointed out with 

Brazil and Colombia will continue. We continue to have a staff who 

will work on that. And we will use different pots of available funding for exchange programs and other programs to continue to spotlight the need for progress in those two programs, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. USAID, Ms. Lynch? 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Yes. We consider this a core value of USAID and all the programming that we do. In this region, we have made it a top priority to have inclusivity in all of our programming. In Colombia, I 

mentioned earlier that we are in 40 of the 58 most difficult parts 

of the country. Those are largely populated by Afro-Colombians, indigenous people. Our inclusivity programming includes women and 

others that do not have traditional access to either services by the 

state or economic opportunities. So it is very important to us, and 

we will continue to address that issue. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

And, likewise—and I go back to Mr. Palmieri—the indigenous 

and Afro-Colombian communities in Colombia have been some of 

the hardest hit by the decades of conflict in that nation. And the 

peace agreement has the potential, at least, to bring advancements. 

But the post-conflict period of time has increased the vulnerability 

of many that are in that area. And when you look at the violence 

in the remote areas of Colombia, which is home to many of these 

African-Colombian indigenous communities and where a lot of the 

FARC is coming back into, how do you envision, with the Fiscal 

Year 2018 budget request, where there is 44 percent drop in assistance affecting the Afro-Colombian and indigenous population in Colombia? And to what extent could the State Department prepare to 

assist these communities and USAID in this post-conflict phase? 

29

Mr. PALMIERI. I think as part of the Colombia peace process, 

working with these communities is a significant part of the peace 

plan implementation program of the Colombian Government. And 

I think as USAID has indicated, and I will let Sarah-Ann give 

more details, this continues to be a core value. And, obviously, any 

peace plan implementation process to be successful, it will need to 

address and incorporate these communities into the development 

efforts. 

Ms. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Yes. Our programming in Colombia has been preparing for peace 

for some time. So we have included the indigenous, Afro-Colombians, and other marginalized populations in our programming already. So what we plan to do is build on that programming and 

improve it and double-down on it and make sure that these populations are a priority. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time, but I just want to—that 

is why I didn’t and I will not ask either of these witnesses questions about my concerns and the conflicts of interest within the 

Trump administration. I just want to note for the record that I do 

have concerns. And I know some of my colleagues have concerns 

also. But I am not going to do that to these individuals, or to you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. You are going to wait for Secretary Tillerson, I 

guess. 

Mr. MEEKS. That is right. But I want the record to be noted any 

time I speak. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentleman yields back. And I know we are all 

looking forward to Secretary Tillerson coming to the committee on 

the budget, which will happen in full committee. 

I do have a letter to President Trump about Venezuela, which I 

would like to include in the record. 

I am going to leave the record open for 5 days for members to 

add additional statements, possible other questions, including that 

letter. 

So, without objection, that will remain open for 5 days. 

And there being no further business of the subcommittee, we will 

stand adjourned. And I thank the witnesses very much for being 

here. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(31)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

Jeff Duncan (R-SC), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. to be held by 

the Subcommittee on the \\/estern Hemisphere in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live 

on the Committee \vcbsitc at JrUp://w,,,-,Y.For...:ilmAr'tJ.irs.ltousc.!2m') 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

W cdncsday. July 12. 2017 

2:00p.m. 

Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western Hemisphere: The FY 201R Budget Request 

Mr. Francisco Palmieri 

Acting Assistant Secretary 

Bureau ofWestem Hemisphere Affairs 

U S. Department of State 

Ms. Sarah-Ann Ly11Ch 

Acting Assistant Administrator 

Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean 

U.S. Agenc~ for International Development 

By Direction of the Chairman 
33

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUIJCOMMJTTEE ON ________ ,_re_.,_1"_"'_1_

1'_"'_i':__t'1_"_'re _______ HEARING 

D•y Wednes1/ay Date __ c:·"-="::,IJ'-->1"'2:::'c:2:..:0c:Jc:.7 __ Room 2172RHOB 

Starting Time 3:08pm Ending Time 4:05pm 

Recesses :~! L_to ____) L_to ____) L_to ____) L_to __ )( __ to 

Prc.siding 1\iemi.Jt'r(s) 

CJraimum Jeff D11m:an 

Check a/f nftlte[alfowhtt; that apply: 

Opt'n Session 0 Executive ££!<>sed) Session D Televised U 

TfTLE OF HEARING: 

Ele<ti'Ollic~Uy Rccot•dlli.(taped) 0 

Stenographic Record LLJ 

_)L_to_) 

"Advancing U.S. Interests in tile Westem Hemi.1phere: The FY 2018 Budget Request" 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Chairman Duncmt, R((Ttking 1l1embm· Sires, Rep. RosnLelrlineuJ Rep. DeSantis, Rep. Rnn~rey, Rep. Castro, 

Rep. Torres, Rep. Kelly, Rep. Espail/at, Rep. Meek< 

NON-SUllCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are nolmemhers of fi•ll committee.) 

NIA 

IIEARlNG \VlTNESSES: Same as IDecting notice attached? Yes 0 NoD 

(Jf "no", please list below and include Iitle, ageney, department, or organization) 

STATJ£MENTS FOR TilE RECORD: (Lis/ any statements suhmilledfor 1he record.) 

Rep. D11m·cm LetleJ'fm· the Record 

Rep. Dtmnm Opening Statemelltjor tire Record 

Rep. Siu!s Opening Statemelttj-Or the Record 

Rep. Drmam Question For the ReeoJ'tf 

Rep. En~el Qttestion For tire Reconl 

Rep. Torres QuC!.~tinn fin· the Record 

TiME SCHEDULED TO RECONVIJ:NE ___ _ 

01" 

TIME ADJOURNIW __ 4_:0_5:_p_l/_l _ 
34

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JEFF DUNCAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE


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l,elfer to President 1hunp 

Julrd8, 2017 

PaJ[c2 

partners betore July 30'" to pressure the Madum regime to suspend it, consistent with the InterAmerican Democratic Chartc.~r 1 to which Venezuela i::; a party. 

Further, if tl1c Maduro regime moves lorward whh the Assembly or takes other antidemuGratic actions that disrupt peace and stability, we urg!;" you to work -w.ith our international 

part11ers to take additional meaningful actions commensurate with the dismption or democratic 

principles., \Vc also urge you to leverage our relationships with neighborlng cm.mtries to support 

clcmocmcy m1d humah rights in Venezuela in order to advance U.S. interests in the region end 

uphold the Inter-American Democratic Charter at the OAS. We reiterate our ca11 to the Mnduro 

r·cgimc that it should hold free and f.1ir elections as soon as possible, release all political 

prisoners, release U.S. citizens, adhere to demoaatic principles, permit !lm delivery of 

humanitarian food and medicine, and cease ties to dnrg lra!11cking activities. 

Thank you for the attention and SUJlport on these mailers. We welcome opportunities to 

work with yon to strengthen U.S. engagement on Venezuela to ensure a better fhture fm the 

Venezuelan pe~e. 

f \ 
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Member of Congress 

Member or Congress 

Leiter to Frt?sfdenf Trump 

Ju(v II!, 2tll7 

i'ageJ 

Memher of Congress 

Adriano Espaillat (NY-13) 

Member of Congress 

M1:mbcr of Congress 
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leller to Pre.'lident Trump 

.!u(v 18, 2017 

Page 4 

Member of Congress 

Member of Congress 

CC: The llonm·able Rex W. Tillerson, U.S. Secretary orSlak 
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26223f-1.eps

Questions for the Record 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Hearing 

''Advancmg U.S interests 1nthe Western Hemisphere: The i'Y2018 Budget Request'' 

July 12,2017 <1t 2:00p.m. in R<1ybum Room 2172 

Chairman Jeff Duncan 

TO ALL WITNESSES 

I. Hezbolbh I TBA: The Tri-border Area (TBA) continues to be a main source of revenue for 

Hezbollah. 

Are you satisfied that the three governments in the area are doing all they can to combat 

Hezbollah terror finance in the TBA? 

Are Hezbollah revenues in the TBA growing or shrinking, both in absolute tem1s and 

relative to Hezbollah 's total budget? Can you quantify those revenues and tell us what 

percentage of Hezbollah' s budget do they represent'~ 

Is it a priority of the Tnunp admin to disrupt Hezbollah financial flows from the TBA? 

What tools may the Administration need from Congress to make the executive branch 

more effective in tackling Hezbollah? 

2. Colombia I Coca: How much does the U.S. plan to spend in FY 2017 and FY 2018 to support 

Colombia· s efforts to reduce coca cultivation, whether through forced eradication or through 

volLmtary eradication/crop substitution? 

TO: MR. PALMIERI 

I. Paraguav I Sanctions: You recently traveled to Paraguay. Are you satisfied that the government of 

Paraguay is doing its best to support the implementation of U.S. sanctions against Hezbollah's 

Specially Designated Global Terrorists in the Tri-border Area? 

2. HIFPA: li12015 Congress passed HlFPA, in order to empower the Executive branch in its global 

tight against Hezbollah's terror finance. To date, HIFPA measures were not adopted against 

financial institntions in Latin America. especially in the Tri-border Area of Argentina Brazil and 

Paraguay, despite a robust presence of a Lebanese Shia community there with proven ties to 

Hezbollah and despite ongoing trade based money laundering activities by its members. 

Could you tell Congress why the Obama administration never activated HIFPA measures 

against Hezbollah in Latin America'~ Is it because there are no activities worth targeting 

or because HIFPA provides the executive branch insufficient tools'1 

3. Paraguav /Narcotics: In March the State Department released its annual International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report. T11e section on Paraguay indicates the Paraguayan authorities may have 

intentionally misshaped an investigation about a $1.2 billion money laundering scheme 

implicating a suspected Hezbollal1 iinm1cier. It is my undcrstm1ding that the bm1k implicated in 

the scheme is Banco Ammnbay, a financial institution linked to the president of Paraguay. 

Are you satisfied that the Government ofParah'llay is doing what's required to 

successfully prosecute those involved? 

Did that money, or part thereof. go through the financial system ofthe U.S.? 

4. Venezuela I Sanctions: The Venezuclm1 state oil compm1y. PDVSA, is guilty of collusion with 

Madura's regime's systematic repression ofVenezuelans. It is also enmeshed in large conuption 
39


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schemes. The Obama administration lifted sanctions against PDVSA in January 2016. as part of 

the Iran Deal or JCPOA. 

Can the executive branch re sanction PDVSA_ given its current status as beneficial) of 

the JCPOA 0 Should it be re sanctioned, in yonr opinion? 

Rep. Elliot L. Engel 

TO: ALL WITNESSES 

1. In the May 24, 2017 report by the Inspectors General of the Departments of State and Justice on 

Responses by DEA and the State Department to Three Deadly Force Inc1dents in Honduras, we 

learn that DEA and State Department officials referred to a U.S.-vetted Honduran police unit as 

"highly trained and ;etted" and described joint operations involving the unit and DEA FAST as 

being "Honduran led." However, the IGs found that officials were aware that these descriptions 

were inaccurate and that in fact the unit was "not capable of leading such operations." Moreover, 

the IG review found that agents from the ;etted unit manipulated evidence and produced 

erroneous testimonies. 

Meanwhile, a recent Pro Publica investigation has revealed that members of another U.S.-vetted 

police unit in Mexico are believed to have leaked extremely sensitive infom1ation about the Zetas 

drug cartel which resulted in the killing of more than 50 people in Allende, Mexico in 2011. 

These findings raise serious concen1s regarding our vetted unit programs in Latin America as well 

as regarding how our government deals with - or fails to deal with - deficiencies and shortfalls in 

the preparedness and professionalism of US-vetted foreign security units. 

What corrective measures arc being taken to ensure that going forward, U.S.-vcttcd units meet 

minimal standards that allow them to lead law enforcement operations effectively and 

professionally? What measures are being taken to ensure that serious problems that emerge 

within vetted units are promptly investigated and dealt with and to ensure that Congress is 

provided accurate also infonnation regarding the capacity, competence and integrity of vetted 

units? 

Rep. Norma J. Torres 

TO: ALL WITNESSES 

Of the $750.000,000 appropriated for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America in 

Fiscal Year 2016 and the $655.000,000 for Fiscal Year 2017. what is the approximate value of 

the total assistance assigned to each Central American country, including both bilateral assistance 

and assistance through the Central America Regional Security Initiative and any other regional 

programs? 

2. Of the $750.000,000 appropriated for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America in 

Fiscal Year 2016 and the $655,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2017, what is the approximate value of 

the total assistance assigned to support each of the three main pillars of the U.S. Strategy for 

Engagement in Centra] America: prosperity~ security, and governance? 
40

[Note: Responses to the previous questions were not received prior to printing.]

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