UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JASON GOOLSBY , Plaintiff,

v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. , Defendants. Case No. 16-cv-2029 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION It is a sad reality of American life that a white citizen of Wa shington, D.C. would feel a need to report an African Ameri can teenager and his friends to the police for simply congregating in a public e stablishment. It is also lamentable (but thankfully nottragic in this instance) that the young man, having committed no crime, would feel the urge to run when the police arrived to investigate . Both actions are born of fear o n either side of the country’s racial divide. But while those fears may animate this case, they do n ot decide it. This case instead turns on a m iscommunication between the 911 d ispatchers who took the citizen’s complaint and the patr ol officers to whom it was rela yed. That the officers received erroneous information about the na ture of the complaint immuniz es their use of force to detain the young man. And if the miscommunication was simply negligen t, which seems likely, then the dispatchers, too, would be imm une from suit. The present r ecord, however, does not allow for a definitive determination of the dispatchers’ mental state . The Court will therefore await further briefing after limited d iscovery before reaching that i ssue.

I. Factual Background Before the Court are motions t o dismiss, and on one issue an al ternative motion for summary judgment, filed by the ind ividual police officers and d ispatchers who are named as2 defendants in this case. The Di strict of Columbia joins both s ets of motions. Because the defendants have predominantly m oved for dismissal, the Court dr aws the following factual background from Plaintiff Jason G oolsby’s Amended Complaint. S ee, e.g., Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). On October 12, 2015, Goolsby and two ot her young African-Americ an men walked into the vestibule of a Citibank i n the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Washington, D.C. to use an ATM. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14. A Caucasian family of three—a mother, fa ther, and baby in a stroller— approached. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. Gools by held the door open for the family to enter. Id. ¶ 17. He then overheard the mother say she ha d left something in the car, and the family left the bank without using the ATM. Id. ¶ 18. After leaving, the woman called 911. Id. ¶ 20. She reported t o the dispatcher that she felt uneasy about Goolsby and the ot her two young men standing in th e vestibule. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23, 51. The dispatcher then “relayed f alse and/or misleading informatio n” to several District police officers, informing them that t hey were responding to “an immin ent or already attempted robbery.” Id. ¶¶ 26–27, 29–34. When the responding officers arri ved, they observed Goolsby and his friends walking down the street near the b ank. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. They then “conv erged on the teenagers as if they were apprehending a dangerous f elon.” Id. ¶ 40. One of the of ficers drove his SUV directly toward Goolsby “at a very high rat e of speed” before exiting th e car and yelling at Goolsby to get down on the ground or he would peppe r spray him. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. Goolsby instead fled. Id. ¶ 42. Following a “short pursuit ,” the officers caught Goolsby and “violently slamm[ed] [him] to the ground,” “twist[ed] [his] arm to a gut-wrenching degree whi le [he] screamed in pain,” and handcuffed him. Id. ¶¶ 44–45, 47.3 While Goolsby was handcuffed, the o fficers contacted the woman who had placed the 911 call. Id. ¶ 48. The woman inf ormed the officers that ther e had been no robbery, but that she had been alarmed by the young men’ s presence and thought the po lice should investigate. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. After speaking to the wom an, the officers informed G oolsby that he had been detained because of the 911 call and released him. Id. ¶¶ 53–5 4. Goolsby alleges that he suffered unspecified “severe injuries to his face, left arm, ne ck, back, and thighs” at the hands of the officers. Id. ¶ 57. Goolsby subsequently brought suit against the District of Colum bia as well as the individual officers and dispatche rs involved in the incident. He alleged violations of his constitutional rights under t he Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth A mendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, premised on claims of illegal arrest or seizure, use of excessive force, and deprivation of his due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 78–95. He also raised parallel D.C. law claims for negligence, false imprisonment, assault a nd battery, and intentional inflic tion of emotional distress against the individual defendants as well as against the District of Co lumbia under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Id. ¶¶ 60–77, 96–104. Goolsby’s original complaint w as served on the District alone, since he did not know the identities of the individual o fficers and dispatchers. The Dis trict subsequently moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary j udgment on the D.C. law claims; because the individual defendants had not yet been serve d, the District’s motion did n ot address any of the section 1983 constitutional claims. On J une 8, 2017, the Court held a heari ng on the motion to dismiss. It then denied the motion without pr ejudice, directing the Distric t to identify t he individual defendants so as to allow Gools by to effectuate service. See M inute Order (June 9, 2017). The4 Court deferred resolution of the D.C. common law claims pending the individual defendants’ responses. See id. Goolsby has now filed an amended com plaint and effectuated serv ice on the individual defendants. The individual defe ndants and the District have ag ain moved to dismiss the case, filing two separate motions: one by the police officer defendan ts (the “Officers”) and one by the dispatcher defendants (the “Disp atchers”), with the District jo ining both motions as to the respective respondeat superior cl aims against it. The Dispatch ers have also moved for summary judgment on Goolsby’s Fourth Ame ndment claim. The Court held afurther hearing on May 22, 2018. It will now grant both motions in part, deny both motion s in part, and again reserve ruling on Goolsby’s D.C. law claims.

II. Legal Standard
A. Motion to Dismiss The District and all individual de fendants have primarily moved to dismiss Goolsby’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To w ithstand such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as t rue, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). When resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, the C ourt must treat as true the f actual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferen ces in the non-moving party’s fa vor. See, e.g., Lee v. District of Columbia, 733 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D.D.C. 2010). However, the Court need not accept legal conclusions in the complaint. See, e.g., id.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment The Dispatchers have additionally moved for summary judgement o n Goolsby’s section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims agai nst them. A party will be gra nted summary judgment if it5 can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and th at it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P 56(a). A factual dispute is “material” if the resolution “might affect the outcome of the su it under the governing law” and “ge nuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could r eturn a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “‘examine the facts in the record an d all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to’ the nonmoving party.” Robinson v. Pez zat, 818 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
C. Qualified Immunity The individual defendants have a lso moved to dismiss the consti tutional claims against them on the ground that their actions are protected by qualifie d immunity. Public officials will have immunity from suit under section 1983 unless th eir conductviolated “clearly established statutory or constituti onal rights of whic h a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (citation omitted ). The unlawfulness of the official’s actions must have b een “clearly established at the t ime” of the official’s conduct. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (citation omitted). The burden is on the plaintiff “to show that the particular right in question—narrowly described to f it the factual pattern confronting the [official ]—was clearly established.” D ukore v. District of Columbia, 799 F.3d 1137, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). To violate a clearly established right, “existi ng law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct ‘beyond debate.’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. a t 589. Moreover, “the clearly established law must be ‘particul arized’ to the facts of the ca se.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam). The Supr eme Court has cautioned that this specificity and particularity6 is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where . . . [i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how t he relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mulle nix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (alteratio n in original); see also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. While this does notrequire “‘a case directly o n point,’” “‘a body of relevant case law’ is usually necessary to ‘clear ly establish the answer’” inthe Fourth Amendment context. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Supr eme Court has “stressed the need to ‘identify a case where an o fficer acting under similar circu mstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (alter ation in original); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam). Cases es tablishing genera l principles of law “do not by themselves create clearly established law outsid e ‘an obvious case.’” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (ci tation omitted). In determining whether qualified immunity will protect the offi cials in any particular case, the Court applies a two-pa rt test: (1) whether the offici als “violated a federal statutory or constitutional right” and (2) wh ether “the unlawfulness of thei r conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (citation omitted). T he Court has the discretion to determine which of the two pr ongs to proceed on first. Aschcro ft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).

III. Analysis The Court’s opinion will focus on t he constitutional claims rai sed against the individual defendants. Both sets of individu al defendants ha ve argued tha t their actions are protected by qualified immunity. As to the O fficers, the Court agrees in fu ll and will dismiss the section 1983 claims against them. But as t o the Dispatchers, the Court conc ludes that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summar y judgment on the Fourth Amendmen t claims and that Goolsby7 has pled an alternative Fifth A mendment theory. The Court will thus deny the Dispatchers’ motion without prejudice so as t o allow limited discovery on th eir mental state. It will again reserve on Goolsby’s D.C. law claims until it has resolved the remaining constitutional claims against the Dispatchers following limited discovery.
A. Goolsby’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims The Officers and Dispatchers fir st move to dismiss Goolsby’s Fo urteenth Amendment claims under section 1983. Gools by does not contest that the F ourteenth Amendment is inapplicable to the District because it is not a state. See, e .g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Consequently, the Cour t will grant the defendants’ motions and dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claims.
B. Goolsby’s Fifth Amendment Claims Next, the Officers and Dispatche rs move to dismiss Goolsby’s Fi fth Amendment claims under section 1983. They argue that the Fourth Amendment is th e proper constitutional framework to apply here and Goolsby’ s Fifth Amendment claims sh ould thus be dismissed. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs. Albright , Chagnon, McCreary, Brown, We rshable & the District’s Mot. Dismiss (“Officers’ MTD”) at 7–8; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs. Banks, Collins & the District’s Mot. Dismiss (“Disp atchers’ MTD”) at 8–9. In respon se, Goolsby argues that he has pled a Fifth Amendment claim as an alternative theory “in the e vent that it is determined that no seizure occurred under the facts of this case.” Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Officers’ MTD (“Pl.’s Opp’n Officers’ MTD”) at 28; see also Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Dispatchers’ MTD (“Pl.’s Opp’n Dispatchers’ MTD”) at 36. With respect to section 1983 claim s asserted under the Due Proc ess Clause in the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment, the S upreme Court has recognized tha t if “a particular Amendment8 provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protectio n against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amend ment, not the more generalized n otion of substantive due process, must be the guide for a nalyzing these claims.” Countyof Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (citation omitte d). As relevant here, the Fourth Amendment typically governs allegations related to unlaw ful detention or excessive force. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843. However, not ev ery “constitutional claim[] relating to physically abusive government conduct must arise un der . . . the Fourth . . . Amendment[].” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843 (citation omitted). For instance, the Fourth Amendment does not govern “objectionable cond uct [that] occur[s] outside of a criminal investigation or other form of governmental inve stigation or activity.” Poe v. Leonhart, 282 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2002). Nor does the Fourth A mendment apply if the governm ent never carries out a search or seizure of an individual . See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844

. As to the Officers, Goolsby’s prim ary contention is that the la tter situation applies and he has plead an alternative Fifth A mendment claim in case no seizure is found to have occurred. But the facts as alleged here undeniably describe a seizure: G oolsby claims that he was chased by police officers responding to a ( misreported) attempted robb ery, thrown to the ground, and handcuffed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–34, 44–45, 47; see, e.g., Califor nia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“[A] seizure occurs ‘ when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrai ned the liberty of a citizen. ’” (citation omitted)). That is, Goolsby alleges a series of fact s that fit the prototypical Fou rth Amendment case: an unlawful seizure and the use of excessive force during that seizure. No r has he shown that the first exception might apply. Gools by pleads only facts indicating th e Officers acted with a law enforcement purpose—in response t o a call reporting suspicious behavior, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–9 34. Because Goolsby does not present an alternative set of fac tual allegations that would fall outside the Fourth Amendment, his Fifth Amendment claims agains t the Officers must be dismissed. As to the Dispatchers, however, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss because the first of the two exceptions appl ies. Goolsby alleges that the Dispatchers “relayed false and/or misleading information” to the Officers. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. At this juncture, it is unclear whether the Dispatchers acted wit h a law enforcement motivation or for alternative reasons—as the Court will discuss more belo w in the Fourth Amendment secti on, questions remain as to the Dispatchers’ precise intent. T hus, Goolsby has stated a plausi ble (albeit unlikely) alternative Fifth Amendment theory, namely that the Dispatchers acted for n on-law enforcement motives. The Court will thus decline to di smiss the Fifth Amendment clai ms against the Dispatchers at this juncture.
C. Goolsby’s Fourth Amendment Claims Finally, the Officers and Dispat chers have moved to dismiss Goo lsby’s Fourth Amendment claims on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court will first address the Officers’ arguments with respect to Goolsby’ s false arrest and excessive force claims. It will then turn to the Dispatchers’ arguments on both claims.
1. Officers’ Motion to Dismiss Goolsby raises a false arrest a nd an excessive force claim agai nst the Officers, both of which they argue should be dismissed due to qualified immunity. 1 The Court agrees and will dismiss Goolsby’s Fourth Amendme nt claims against the Officers.

1 As the courts of appeals have r ecognized, Goolsby’s unlawful a rrest claim and excessive force claim require dis tinct inquiries. The fact tha t an officer may have lacked10 a. False Arrest The Officers are entitled t o qualified immunity on Goolsby’s f alse arrest claim unless (1) their actions violated a constitutional right that (2) was clearly established at the time of their actions. See, e.g., Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The Court will exercise its discretion to start with the second prong of this test: wh ether a reasonable officer cou ld have believed the Officers’ actions were constitutional under the circumstances. See Ashcr oft, 563 U.S. at 735. First, some relevant constituti onal principles. The Fourth Ame ndment ensures the “right of the people to be secure i n their persons, houses, papers, an d effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The S upreme Court has recognized two d ifferent kinds of seizures: arrests and more temporary dete ntions for investigative purpose s known as “ Terry stops” after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Ord inarily, an officer must have a warrant supported by probable cause to make an a rrest. See, e.g., Peyton v. New Yor k, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). In contrast, to make a Terry stop an officer needs only “a reasonable suspicion supported b y articulable facts that crimina l activity ‘may be afoot.’” Unit ed States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted). The distinction between a Terry stop and an arrest “is not marked with a bright line.” Hall v. D istrict of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138, 15 3 (D.C. Cir. 2017). However, a Terry stop “that is unduly prolonged or i ntrusive transforms . . . in to an arrest requ iring probable cause.” Id. Goolsby contends that his seizur e was an arrest that required p robable cause, while the Officers argue it was simply a Terry stop supported by reasonable susp icion. But the Court need

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain an individual does not necessari ly mean that any force used to effectuate that de tention was per se excessive. See, e.g., Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1024–26 (9th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases ).11 not resolve this dispute. Gool sby alleges the following facts: the officers believed they were responding to a 911 call of an atte mpted robbery or other crime in progress, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29– 34; approached Goolsby and ordere d him to get on the ground, id . ¶¶ 40, 42; in response to which Goolsby fled, id. ¶ 42; the o fficers pursued him, slammed him to the ground, and handcuffed him, id. ¶¶ 44–45, 47; an d then kept him handcuffed while they investigated before releasing him after talking t o the 911 caller, id. ¶¶ 48–49, 54 . Based on this series of events, any constitutional violation comm itted by the Officers was not clea rly established. As an initial matter, Goolsby has not “identified a single prec edent—much less a controlling case or robust consen sus of cases—finding a Fourth Amendment violation ‘under similar circumstances.’” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591. 2 Rather, he cites only to general principles of law—such as the fact that indi viduals cannot be “detained wi thout reasonable suspicion or arrested without probable cause,” Pl.’s Opp’n Officers’ MTD at 26—in arguing that any violation here was clearly est ablished. In light of the Suprem e Court’s insistence on the importance of the “specificity” of the rule in the Fourth Amend ment context, citations to such general principles are insuffi cient to show that no reasonable officer would have believed the officers’ actions in stopping G oolsby were constitutional. Wes by, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152–53. If anything, existing case law at t he time of the incident woul d have suggested to a reasonable officer that the acti ons taken were permissible. St arting with Goolsby’s seizure, a

2 Goolsby does cite to a recent D.C. Circuit case finding that t he plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation on argua bly similar facts, Hall v. Dis trict of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But that case wa s decided in 2017, several y ears after the events in question. It thus cannot show that any cons titutional norms were clearly established at the time of the Officers’ conduct. See, e .g., Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1154.12 reasonable officer could have be lieved that she had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative Terry stop. For one, the officers believ ed that they were respondin g to a 911 call reporting an attempted robbery. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–34. The Supr eme Court has held that a 911 call, even an anonymous one, can f urnish reasonable suspicion t o detain someone for investigative purposes. Navare tte v. California, 134 S. Ct. 16 83, 1692 (2014). And it is perfectly reasonable for offi cers to rely on the information fu rnished to them by a dispatcher in the ordinary course, even if t hat information turns out to be i ncorrect. See United States v. Hick, 531 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2008) (examin ing whether the office r had reasonable suspicion based on what the officer knew despite miscommunications from the 911 operator); Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 851 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[E]fficient law enforcement requires—at least for purposes of determining the civil liability of individual officers—that police be permitted to rely on information provided by the dispat cher.”); cf. Heien v. North C arolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (“[A] search or seizure may be permissible even though t he justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake.”). Next, when the officers asked Gool sby—who matched the descripti on given by the 911 caller—to stop, he fled. Am. Compl. ¶ 42. The Supreme Court h as also recognized that fleeing from the police can further suppor t reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000); s ee also United States v. Dykes, 406 F.3d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that polic e officers had reasonable s uspicion to stop defendant in known high crime area who fled upon s eeing the officers). In s um, case law suggests that, at the very least, a reasonable officer c ould have believed that he co uld permissibly temporarily detain Goolsby since he matched the sus pect from a 911 call seeming to report criminal activity and fled when ordered to stop by the police. See, e.g., United Sta tes v. Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 48213 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding officers had reasonable suspicion to detain suspect when, following 911 call about a blue Buick “dr iving crazy” in a “high drug tra nsaction area,” they observed the defendant drive by in such a car , park, cross the street, get i nto another car, and then attempt to “dart out of the car” upon seeing the police). Finally, a reasonable officer, h aving observed Goolsby flee, co uld have believed that he could place Goolsby in handcuffs during the detention without turning the Terry stop into a fullblown arrest requiring probable cau se. The D.C. Circuit has re peatedly recognized that “[a] Terry stop does not turn into a full arrest merely because the offic ers use handcuffs and force the suspect to lie down to prevent f light, so long as the police co nduct is reasonable.” United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1992). For instance, in Dykes, the D.C. Circuit held that police officers tackling a fleei ng suspect and then placing him in handcuffs did not turn a Terry stop into an arrest gi ven that the defendant had been “in full flight” and continue d resisting while on the ground and that the officer s could reasonab ly fear that the defendant had a weapon on his person. 406 F.3d at 720. Given the s everity of the crime the officers believed was involved (an attempted robbery or other violen t crime, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29– 34) and Goolsby’s flight, under case law at the time a reasonable officer could have believed t ackling and handcuffing Goolsby was permissible without turning a Terry stop into an arrest. As such, t he Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Goolsby’ s false arrest charges. b. Excessive Force Goolsby also raises excessive f orce claims, which the Officers again argue should be dismissed because their actions are accorded qualified immunity . The Court will once more exercise its discretion to begin with the second prong of the q ualified immunity test: whether any constitutional violation he re was clearly established.14 Again, some background Fourth Ame ndment principles. As the Sup reme Court has recognized, “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coe rcion or threat thereof to ef fect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). However, the f orce used must be reasonab le under the circumstances. Id. To so determine, the Court looks a t “the facts and circumstance s of [the] particular case, including the severity of the cri me at issue, whether the suspe ct poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others , and whether he is actively re sisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. As with the false arrest clai ms, Goolsby points to no specific cases with similar facts to rebut the Officers’ assertion of qualified immunity. Rather, h is primary argument is that “a reasonable officer would have know n that applying any force wou ld be excessive because there was not even a reasonable suspici on to justify an investigatory stop.” Pl.’s Opp’n Officers’ MTD at 27. But as noted, Goolsby ha s pled that the Officers re asonably believed they were responding to an attempted robbe ry. As a result, they could ha ve reasonably believed they could temporarily detain Goolsby. And eve n if that conclusion were e rroneous, the simple fact that a detention was impermissible does n ot automatically make the use of force to effectuate that detention excessive. See, e.g., V elazquez v. City of Long Beac h, 793 F.3d 1010, 1024 n.13 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Like this court, all ot her circuits that have addr essed the question prohibit a finding of excessive force predicated only on the fact of unlawfu l arrest.”). As to the level of force itself, t he Court takes a s true the fa cts as pled by Goolsby. According to his complaint, the officers “violently slamm[ed] [ him] to the ground and twist[ed] [his] arm to a gut-wrenching degr ee while [he] screamed in pain .” Am. Compl. ¶ 45. Though not spelled out expressly, the f acts as pled suggest that any a rm-twisting was intended to15 effectuate Goolsby’s handcuffi ng, since Goolsby later pleads he was in handcuffs. See id. ¶ 47 (noting that Goolsby “found himsel f shackled in handcuffs”). W hile this issue presents a somewhat closer question than in the false arrest claims, the C ourt ultimately concludes that qualified immunity is appropriate here, too. For one, Goolsby nowhere points to a case with similar facts ho lding the officers used excessive force. This disregards the Supreme Court’s counsel t hat in the context of excessive force claims, “police officer s are entitled to qualified immuni ty unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue .” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (emphasis added). And this omission is particularly pr oblematic since the level of fo rce, as pled, does not rise to the level that the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit has clearly es tablished as aconstitutional violation, namely the use of force after an individual has alrea dy been placed in handcuffs or otherwise subdued. See, e.g., Johns on v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 975–77 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding police officer used e xcessive force when he repe atedly kicked the groin of a man already handcuffed and subdued). The case law instead suggests th at the Officers’ use of force w as constitutionally reasonable. The D.C. Circuit ha s, in prior cases, sanctioned p olice officers “slamm[ing] to the ground, handcuff[ing], and forcibl y ke[eping] on the ground” anindividual who had been reported for loitering or usi ng drugs and whose non-compliance and belligerence “suggested he might try to resist or escape,” Cromartie v. District of Columb ia, 479 F. App’x 355, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam); “shov[ing] ” an individual “against a p illar, and violen tly twisting her arm” when she refused to compl y with orders to stop dancing at the Jefferson Memorial and officers reasonably felt the nee d to take decisive action in a crowded setting at night, Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 548–49, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2011); pai nfully pressing a non-resisting16 man’s arm behind him after he w as stopped for w alking his dog w ithout a leash since his prior disobedience “suggested that he m ight try to resist or escape,” Wasserman v. Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2009); and “slamm[ing]” an individual “to the ground,” “putting [the officers’] knees on his neck, bac k, and lower legs,” and handcu ffing him after the police arrested him for a DUI, he disobeyed poli ce orders, and he was reasonabl y perceived of as a flight risk, Scott v. District of Col umbia, 101 F.3d 748, 759 (D.C. Cir. 199 6). All of these cases endorsed the use of force that, if anyt hing, was more constitutionally s uspect than here: a non-cooperative, potential flight risk who is perm issibly slammed to the ground and violently or painfully handcuffed where the suspected crime was only a minor one. Admittedly, in finding that no exc essive force had been used inthese cases, the D.C. Circuit partially relied on the f act that no serious injury res ulted from the encounter. See Oberwetter, 639 F.3d at 555; Wa sserman, 557 F.3d at 641; Scott, 101 F.3d at 760. In contrast, Goolsby alleges that he suffere d unspecified “severe injuries t o his face, left arm, neck, back, and thighs for which he sought medi cal treatment at Washington Hosp ital Center.” Am. Compl. ¶ 57. This factual distin ction, however, is s till not enough to rende r any constitutional violation here clearly established. See J ackson v. District of Columbia, 83 F. Supp. 3d 158, 171 (D.D.C. 2015) (according officers qualifie d immunity on similar facts d espite the fact that the officers broke the plaintiff’s arm whe n handcuffing her). The D.C. Circ uit has made clear that any injury to the plaintiff is not dispositive but rather only a factor to consider in determining whether the level of force used was reasona ble. See, e.g., Wardlaw v. Pick ett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1304 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, Goolsby poi nts to no case from the D. C. Circuit or the Supreme Court, and the Court is aware of none, i ndicating that a severe injuryalone suffices to make the degree17 of force used here, under these circumstances, unreasonable. A fter all, one could argue that the facts alleged point towards a gr eater degree of permissible for ce than in the prior D.C. Circuit cases: Goolsby was in actual fli ght whereas the plaintiffs in the previous cases only posed a risk of flight, and he was suspected of amore serious offense (atte mpted robbery) than the plaintiffs in the prior cases ( e.g. , walking a dog without a leash or dancing at the Jefferson Mem orial). Nor does Goolsby point to cases from other courts of appeals that w ould suggest any injury here clearly rendered the use of for ce excessive. Given this absenc e of cases with similar facts indicating force similar to that used here resulting in “severe injuries” was excessive, any constitutional violation wa s not clearly established. To conclude, the Officers’ conduct alleged here falls within a gray area between clearlysanctioned uses of force from cases such as Wasserman, Oberwett er, and Scott and clearlyexcessive uses of force from cases such as Johnson. As such, a nd given the similarity of these facts to those in Wasserman a nd Scott, a reasonable officer cou ld have concluded the use of force alleged here was reasonable . The Court therefore must ac cord the Officers qualified immunity for their alleged conduct. 3

3 Goolsby’s complaint alleges th at all of the officers on the sc ene committed the allegedly unlawful detention and used exces sive force. It does not seem p lausible that all of the officers were simultaneously involved in the detention and use of force. In any case, as to those officers personally involved, the Court ha s concluded that they should r eceive qualified immunity. As to the other officers—against w hom Goolsby would have only a bysta nder liability claim at most— the Court reaches the same conclusion. A bystander liability c laim only lies if the bystander officer knows that the other officer is violating constitutiona l rights. See, e.g., Matthews v. District of Columbia , 924 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (D.D.C. 2013). If it was not clearly established that the principal officer was vi olating constitutional rights, it follows that it is not clearly established that the bystande r officer should know the officer was violating constitutional rights. Consequently, it would not be cl early established that the byst ander officer would be liable for a failure to intervene.18 2. Dispatchers’ Motion to Dismiss Goolsby also asserts Fourth Ame ndment unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims against the Dispatchers. He contends that section 1983 encompa sses liability for any government actor who “was direc tly responsible for the constitu tional deprivation” or who “gave authorization or approval of suc h misconduct.” Pl.’s Opp’n Dis patchers’ MTD at 20. Since the Dispatchers are not alleged to ha ve authorized the Officers’ co nduct or approved of it—indeed, they were not physically presen t during any of the events that occurred and have no supervisory or other authority over the Offi cers—the argument is simply tha t the Dispatchers’ affirmative act of providing false or misleadi ng information to the Officers se t in effect a chain of events leading to Goolsby being unlawfully arr ested and subjected to excessive force. Pl.’s Opp’n Dispatchers’
MTD at 20–21. The Dispatchers respond that th ey should be granted summary jud gment because their actions are protected by qualifie d immunity. Dispatchers’ MTD at 13–14. In their view, no cases put them on notice that “in pr oviding incorrect informati on to police officers [they] could be held liable for the constitutional torts of the officers.” Id. at 14. The Court ultimately concludes that qualified immunity is appropriate as to Goolsby’ s excessive force claims against the Dispatchers, but that a genui ne issue of material fact prec ludes summary judgment as to his false arrest claims.

a. False Arrest Beginning with the false arrest claims, the Court will again st art with the second prong of the qualified immunity analysi s: whether any violation by the D ispatchers was clearly established. Goolsby once more cites no relevant cases, here o nes involving dispatchers held liable for false arrest under section 1983. The only relevant court of appeals decisions the Court19 is aware of—all of which revie wed summary judgment grants to di spatchers—held the dispatcher not liable because he acted negligently or within th e scope of his discretion. For instance, a Sixth Circuit opini on held that in t he absence of “ deliberate indifference or recklessness” by two dispatchers, t he plaintiff lacked “a basis to hold the . . . dispatchers accountable for a seizure in w hich they did not directly partic ipate” under section 1983. Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 785 (6th Cir. 2006) ; see also Fettes v. Hendershot, 375 F. App’x 528, 532 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming su mmary judgment on section 1983 cla im against dispatcher because the dispatcher’s actions were only negligent); Drakeford v. Cou nty of Orange, 213 F. App’x 542, 544–45 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming gr ant of qualified immunity t o dispatchers in light of the discretion accorded them in exe rcising their official duties). That said, though neither side point s to it, there is a common law tradition—albeit one that does not specifically involve dispatchers—that suggests a scenario under which a violation might be clearly established. The Supreme Court has recognized that when section 1983 was passed, “the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause.” M alley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340–4 1 (1986); see also Kallina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 n.14 (1997) ( quoting the preceding language from Malley). This is in line with the general tort law principle that one who instig ates a false arrest, such as by directing a police officer to a rrest someone without any suspic ion of wrongdoing, is also liable for false arrest or imprisonment. See, e.g., Restatement (Seco nd) of Torts § 45A (“One who instigates or participates in t he unlawful confinement of anoth er is subject to liability to the other for false imprisonment.”). Combined, these rules would seem to put any reasonable dispatcher on notice that certain ki nds of false reports might violate the Fourth Amendment, namely20 maliciously misleading police o fficers without suspicion of wro ngdoing in a manner that leads to another’s detention. 4 In light of this legal backgr ound, the Court concludes that a g enuine issue of m aterial fact precludes summary judgment at thi s juncture. The current recor d reveals that the dispatchers did, in fact, make incorrect fact ual statements to the Officers . For instance, the 911 call transcript shows that the caller stated that she “felt like if [she and her husband] had taken money out [they] might’ve gotten robbed,” Dispatchers’ MTD Ex. 1, at 1, but a dispatcher later told an officer that the caller “state[d] that [Goolsby and his compani on] were trying to rob him” and “that these subjects were trying to rob people at the ATM,” Pl. ’s Opp’n Dispatchers’ MTD Ex. 1,
at 2:13–16. 5 Other officers in their stateme nts described the dispatcher’s report as a “radio run for a possible robbery,” Pl.’s O pp’n Dispatchers’ MTD Ex. 3, at 6, “a call for a[n] attempted robbery,” id. at 7, or “a radio r un for a possible attempt robb ery,” id. at 9. All of this suggests that misinformation was given to the police. The most natural explanation f or the erroneous information pass ed along is simply negligence or confusion on the pa rt of the dispatcher. But it could also be the case that the dispatcher intentionally misdir ected the patrol officers for so me nefarious purpose. The current record is devoid of any direct evi dence speaking to the Dispatc hers’ mental state; there are no depositions or sworn affidavits that explain why they apparentl y misrepresented the citizen’s

4 The Court is cognizant that neit her party discussed Malley or Kallina. As such, it invites the parties in future briefing to address what specific violations of law are clearly established given the case law a nd general tort law principles referenced in this Memorandum Opinion.

5 Which particular dispatcher and which particular officer is no t clear on the transcript. See Pl.’s Opp’n Dispatchers’ MTD Ex. 1.21 complaint to the officers. While the record evidence is certai nly consistent with negligence—it is not a difficult to imagine a di spatcher inadvertently turnin g “thought I might be robbed” to “attempting to rob,” particularlyin a fast-moving situation—it does not foreclose the possibility of intentional conduct. Since the dispatcher’s mental state is relevant to whether a section 1983 claim has been stated or a cle arly established violation occurr ed, the current fact ual record yields a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgmen t at this juncture. The Court appreciates its obliga tion to “exercise its discretio n in a way that protects the substance of the qualified imm unity defense” and to ensure that “officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.” Cr awford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1998). Therefore, while the Court will deny witho ut prejudice the Dispatchers’ motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claims, it will not allow the parties to begin full merits discovery. Instead, it will allow only limited discover y into the Dispatchers’ mental state since such discovery is necessar y to resolve the qualified immu nity question. Following this limited discovery, the parties will be free to re-brief summary judgment as to the constitutional claims remaining against the Dis patchers—including the Fifth Am endment claim discussed above and the issue of whether the Dispatchers violated any cle arly established Fourth Amendment principles—before progr essing further into discovery and the merits of the case. b. Excessive Force Goolsby also raises excessive for ce claims against the Dispatch ers. As with the false arrest claim, Goolsby cites no case law that has ever found a d ispatcher liable for a police officer’s use of force. Nor is the Court aware of any. While the cases discussed above might support possible false arrest claims against the Dispatcher s, they provide no indication tha t the Dispatchers might be liable for excessive force claims. In the absence of any case law suggesting22 that a dispatcher can be held l iable for a police officer’s use of excessive force, the Court concludes that any constitutiona l violation here is not clearlyestablished. Dismissal of the excessive force claims against t he Dispatchers is thus appropri ate on the basis of qualified immunity. 6
D. Goolsby’s D.C. Law Claims The defendants have, again, raise d arguments for the dismissal of Goolsby’s D.C. law claims. Because the Court has not yet resolved the Dispatchers ’ qualified immunity defense— and, indeed, retains doubts as t o whether the remaining claims will survive qualified immunity following limited discovery and su mmary judgment briefing—it wi ll again reserve on the arguments that remain on Goolsby’s D.C. law claims pending the outcome of summary judgment on qualified immunity.
* * * For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and de ny in part both motions to dismiss as detailed above. A separate Order shall accompany th is Memorandum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: July 13, 2018

6 The dismissal of the excessive force claim does not necessaril y preclude Goolsby’s ability to recover damages rela ted to the use of force. As cou rts of appeals have recognized, damages awarded on a false arrestclaim can potentially include damages related to the use of force to effectuate the arres t. See Velazquez, 793 F.3d at 102 4 n.13; Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006); Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3 d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1995).