alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-35.1
ANNUAL COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

CERTIFICATION

J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-C6
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Series 2012-C6 (the "Trust")

I, David M. Croskery, on behalf of Holliday Fenoglio Fowler, L.P., as sub-
servicer under that Sub-Servicing Agreement dated as of April 1, 2012, between
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as master servicer (the "Master
Servicer"), and Holliday Fenoglio Fowler, L.P., as sub-servicer' (the
"Certifying Servicer"), relating to the above referenced Certificates (the
"Sub-Servicing Agreement"), certify to J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial Mortgage
Securities Corp., the Master Servicer and their respective officers, directors
and affiliates, and with the knowledge and intent that they will rely upon this
certification, that:

I (or Servicing Officers under my supervision) have reviewed the Certifying
Servicer's activities during the period from January 1, 2013 through December
31, 2013 (the "Reporting Period") and the Certifying Servicer's performance
under the Sub-Servicing Agreement; and

To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Certifying Servicer has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Sub-Servicing Agreement in all
material respects throughout such Reporting Period.


Date: Effective as of February 7, 2014

Holliday Fenoglio Fowler, L.P.

By: Holliday GP Corp., its general partner
    /s/ David M. Croskery
    David M. Croskery
    Vice President/Senior Managing Director
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-1245
JORGE EDUARDO VAZQUEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MARYLAND STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT; MARYLAND PORT ADMINISTRATION, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 95-1356
JORGE EDUARDO VAZQUEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MARYLAND STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT; MARYLAND PORT ADMINISTRATION, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. M. J. Garbis, District Judge. (CA-93-479- MJG) Submitted: November 15, 1995 Decided: January 11, 199623 Before WILKINSON and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. No. 95-1245 dismissed and No. 95-1356 affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jorge Eduardo Vazquez, Appellant Pro Se. Betty Stemley Sconion, Assistant Attorney General, Pikesville, Maryland; Donald Arnold Krach, MARYLAND PORT ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland; John Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).1 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). 2 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 3 Robinson v. Parke-Davis and Co. , 685 F.2d 912, 913 (4th Cir. 1982). 4 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from two separate district court ordersgranting summary judgment to the Defendants in a Title VII discrimination case. The first order appealed, No. 95-1245, was the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Maryland Port Authority; the claims against the Maryland State Police were still pending when Appellant appealed this order. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 1 and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. 2 The order here appealedis neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. 3 The next order appealed, No. 95-1356, was the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Maryland State Police. Because this notice of appeal was filed after the district court's final order, it is sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction over the Appellant's claims against both Appellees. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Vazquez v. Maryland State Police Dep't, No. CA-93-479-MJG (D. Md. Jan. 10 & Feb. 3, 1995). We dispense with oral argument5 because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

No. 95-1245 - DISMISSED No. 95-1356 - AFFIRMED
### [§686. Renumbered §12318]

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 686, acts Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 32; Apr. 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94–273, §11(2), 90 Stat. 378, provided for an annual officer grade distribution report, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 96–107, title III, §303(a)(1), Nov. 9, 1979, 93 Stat. 806.
IV

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 56

Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on Commerce in the

One Hundred Sixth Congress.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 11, 1999

Mr. BLILEY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on House Administration

RESOLUTION

Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on

Commerce in the One Hundred Sixth Congress.

1 Resolved,

2 SECTION 1. AMOUNTS FOR COMMITTEE EXPENSES.

3 For the expenses of the Committee on Commerce

4 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ‘‘Commit5 tee’’), including the expenses of all staff salaries, there

6 shall be paid, out of the applicable accounts of the House

7 of Representatives for committee salaries and expenses,

8 not more than $15,537,415 for the One Hundred Sixth

9 Congress.
2

•HRES 56 IH

1 SEC. 2. SESSION LIMITATIONS.

2 Of the amount specified in section 1—

3 (1) not more than $7,597,758 shall be available

4 for expenses incurred during the period beginning at

5 noon on January 3, 1999, and ending immediately

6 before noon on January 3, 2000; and

7 (2) not more than $7,939,657 shall be available

8 for expenses incurred during the period beginning at

9 noon on January 3, 2000, and ending immediately

10 before noon on January 3, 2001.

11 SEC. 3. VOUCHERS.

12 Payments under this resolution shall be made on

13 vouchers authorized by the Committee, signed by the

14 Chairman of the Committee, and approved in the manner

15 directed by the Committee on House Administration.

16 SEC. 4. REGULATIONS.

17 Amounts made available under this resolution shall

18 be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by

19 the Committee on House Administration.

Æ
§ 175.230 Why are changes to purchased power costs not included in the procedure for adjusting electric power rates? Changes to purchased power costs are not included in the procedure for adjusting electric power rates because unforeseen increases in the cost of purchased power are: ( a ) Not under our control;
( b ) Determined by current market rates; and
( c ) Subject to market fluctuations that can occur at an undetermined time and frequency.
IV

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 558

Expressing the condolences of the House of Representatives on the death

of the Honorable Paul Coverdell, a Senator from the State of Georgia.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 19, 2000

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia submitted the following resolution; which was

considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Expressing the condolences of the House of Representatives

on the death of the Honorable Paul Coverdell, a Senator

from the State of Georgia.

1 Resolved, That the House has heard with profound

2 sorrow of the death of the Honorable Paul Coverdell, a

3 Senator from the State of Georgia.

4 Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolu5 tions to the Senate and transmit a copy thereof to the

6 family of the deceased.

7 Resolved, That a committee be appointed on the part

8 of the House to join a committee appointed on the part

9 of the Senate to attend the funeral.
2

•HRES 558 ATH

1 Resolved, That when the House adjourns today, it ad2 journ as a further mark of respect to the memory of the

3 deceased Senator.

Æ
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   (12,116,000)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      32,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (7,163,000)
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (7,163,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                              0
<CHANGES>                                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (7,163,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                            (0.37)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            (0.37)



</TABLE>
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WILLIAM OSCAR HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-5005

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:13-cv-00069-VJW, Judge Victor J. Wolski.

______________________ 

ON MOTION

______________________ 

PER CURIAM.

O R D E R

William Oscar Harris moves for reconsideration of 

this court’s June 4, 2014 order denying his motion for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The United States 

opposes. 

Upon consideration thereof, 

 IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

Case: 14-5005 Document: 24 Page: 1 Filed: 08/07/2014
2 HARRIS v. US

The motion for reconsideration is denied. If Harris 

does not pay the filing fee within 21 days of the date of 

this order, his appeal will be dismissed. 

 FOR THE COURT

 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole 

Daniel E. O’Toole 

Clerk of Court

s24

Case: 14-5005 Document: 24 Page: 2 Filed: 08/07/2014
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

April 23, 2012 

d0416 

Order 

 

April 23, 2012 

143457(26) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 143457 

 COA: 300485 

OMAR ODALE BROCKMAN, Oakland CC: 2005-203785-FH 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s December 28, 

2011 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
§ 26.13 How long may I be in training and how long can I receive other assistance? ( a ) Your training at any approved institution, apprenticeship, and/or OJT must not exceed 24 months of full-time actual training hours.
( b ) Registered nurse training must not exceed 36 months of full actual training hours.
( c ) You may receive other financial assistance under this program determined by your ISP that you have developed with your tribal service provider.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7075

OSCAR A. VILLARREAL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LEON DIXON, MD, Nottoway Correctional Center Physician; DAVID CALL, 

Warden, Nottoway Correctional Center; ORTHO VIRGINIA, Contract Practitioner,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, District Judge. (3:19-cv-00447-MHL-EWH)

Submitted: December 21, 2021 Decided: December 27, 2021

Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Oscar Alejandro Villarreal, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Oscar A. Villarreal appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the informal 

brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Villarreal’s informal brief does not challenge the 

basis for the district court’s disposition, he has forfeited appellate review of the court’s 

orders. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is 

an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues 

preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
§ 227.5 Terms of leases, procedure for renewal and execution. ( a ) Leases shall be for a period of twenty years with the preferential right in the lessee to renew the same for successive periods of ten years each upon such reasonable terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative, unless otherwise provided by law at the expiration of any such period. Applications for renewal of leases shall be filed with the superintendent within ninety days prior to the date of expiration of the lease. One copy of the application for renewal shall be filed by the applicant with the Joint Business Council of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes and no lease shall be renewed unless the Joint Business Council or its authorized representative is afforded an opportunity to present the Council's views to the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative.
( b ) The Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative may execute oil and gas leases with the consent of the Joint Business Council or its authorized representative, and may execute renewals of leases after consultation with the Joint Business Council or its authorized representative.
[25 FR 7185, July 29, 1960. Redesignated at 47 FR 13327, Mar. 30, 1982]
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<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM HUDSON
RESPIRATORY CARE INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

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<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000             SEP-30-2000
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<RECEIVABLES>                                        0                  37,221
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                   1,281
<INVENTORY>                                          0                  35,139
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<PP&E>                                               0                  46,242
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                (38,644)
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<SALES>                                       (41,111)               (113,729)
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              (41,111)               (113,729)
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<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
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</TABLE>
§ 37.121 Who establishes geographic attendance boundaries under this part? ( a ) If there is only one day school, on-reservation boarding school, or peripheral dorm within a reservation's boundaries, the Secretary will establish the reservation boundary as the geographic attendance boundary;
( b ) When there is more than one day school, on-reservation boarding school, or peripheral dorm within a reservation boundary, the Tribe may choose to establish boundaries for each;
( c ) If a Tribe does not establish boundaries under paragraph (b) of this section, the Secretary will do so.
#### Bertha Steudle, by her next friend, *v.*Jacob Rentchler.

*Action—injury from horses running away.*Where horses driven in a team become frightened and run away, without any carelessness or improper management on the part of the driver, the owner will not he liable in an action to recover for personal injuries received by another in consequence of the accident.

Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county j the Hon. Joseph Gillespie, Judge, presiding.

This was an action of trespass on the case, brought in the court below in the name of Bertha Steudle, by Regine Steudle, her next friend, against Jacob Rentchler, to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff, occasioned by horses of the defendant, which, while driven by bis servant, and through the careless and reckless management,of the latter, as is alleged, became detached from the buggy, and ran away and over the person of the plaintiff.

A trial below resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff thereupon ‘sued out this writ of error. The principal question is, whether the facts showed a liability on the part of defendant for injury resulting from the accident.

Messrs. G. & G. A. Koerner, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. W. H. Underwood, for the defendant in error.

Per Curiam:

The verdict and judgment in this case are clearly right, and if there is an error in the instructions, it is no reason for reversal. A different verdict should have been *162set aside by the court. The defendant is in no way responsible for the injury to the plaintiff. Admitting the driver to have been in his employment at the time the horses ran away, there is still nothing upon which to found the action. A boy hit one of the horses with some missile. He began to kick, and frightened the other horse. The driver jumped from the vehicle and seized them by the head. They overpowered him and ran away, and the plaintiff was injured. The evidence shows the driver was considered a good driver. He was guilty of no carelessness, so far as the facts are disclosed by this record.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*
#### Yahyak Kalimi Yousian et al., Appellants, v Eisenberg, Margolis, Friedman & Moses, et al., Respondents.

[822 NYS2d 710]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Jane Goodman, J.), entered October 6, 2005, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint alleging legal malpractice, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The evidence was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether, but for the alleged legal malpractice, i.e., causing the underlying action for medical malpractice to be struck from the trial calendar and thereafter failing to restore the action, plaintiffs would have been successful in the underlying action. The affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert was inadequate to support inculpatory inferences that the complained-of surgery was, as plaintiffs contended, unnecessary and negligently performed. Nor was the affidavit sufficient to support an inference that the surgery was the proximate cause of the alleged injuries *(see Russo v Feder, Kaszovitz, Isaacson, Weber, Skala & Bass,*301 AD2d 63, 67 [2002]). Concur—Tom, J.E, Mazzarelli, Andrias, Sweeny and Malone, JJ.
# C_2006249EN.01000805.xml

| 14.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 249/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 249/8

---

Order of the President of the Court of 27 April 2006 — Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

(Case C-22/06) (1)

1

(2006/C 249/21)

Language of the case: French

Language of the case: French

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 60, 11.03.2006.

1

---