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COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 27, 2017 

Serial No. 115–37 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina 

Blake Farenthold, Texas 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA General Counsel 

MIKE HOWELL, Senior Counsel 

KILEY BIDELMAN, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron DESANTIS, Florida, Chairman 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

Vacancy 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 27, 2017 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Kerry Sleeper, Assistant Director, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Mr. George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships, Department 

of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Ms. Raheel Raza, President, Muslims Facing Tomorrow 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Mr. Adnan Kifayat, Director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

Mr. Seamus Hughes, Deputy Director, Program on Extremism, George Washington University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 39 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 41 

APPENDIX 

Opening Statement of Chairman Ron DeSantis ................................................... 64 

April 2017 GAO report titled, ‘‘Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts,’’ submitted 

for the record by Chairman DeSantis ................................................................ 70 

July 26, 2017, letter from the Muslim Justice League of Boston, submitted 

for the record by Ranking Member Lynch ......................................................... 71 

July 27, 2017, letter from the Brennan Center for Justice, submitted for 

the record by Ranking Member Lynch ............................................................... 79 

DHS response to GAO report, submitted for the record by Mr. Selim ............... 80 

July 28, 2017, letter from the Anti-Defamation League, submitted for the 

record by Ranking Member Lynch ..................................................................... 84 


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COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM 

Thursday, July 27, 2017 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:42 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Gosar, Hice, Comer, 

Lynch, Welch, Demings, and DeSaulnier. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. 

In the words of DHS Secretary John Kelly, the United States is 

experiencing a, quote, ‘‘unprecedented spike in homegrown terrorism.’’ Currently, the FBI has open terrorism investigations in all 

50 States. As of June 2017, the U.S. Government has charged 128 

individuals with offenses related to the Islamic State over the last 

three years. Radical Islamic extremism is the primary driver of this 

problem and deserves the government’s immediate attention. 

In recent years, the Federal Government has sought to combat 

this problem under the guise of a program called Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE. Three cities were used to conduct pilot 

programs: Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis. Minneapolis is a 

particularly troublesome area, as it is a major center of Islamic terrorist activity. The region is home to the largest concentration of 

Somali refugees and has been the epicenter for domestic 

radicalization. 

From 2007 to 2015, over 20 Somali-Americans are known to have 

left Minnesota to join the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia. Over the last three years, Federal prosecutors have charged 

13 individuals from Minnesota for connections to the Islamic State. 

Minnesota is second only to New York, which has four times as 

many residents, in number of ISIS terrorists charged. The terrorist 

problem in Minnesota led former U.S. Senator Norm Coleman to 

warn that the State is in danger of becoming, quote, ‘‘the land of 

10,000 terrorists.’’ 

Now, as the chairman of this subcommittee, I visited Minneapolis last December to meet with Federal and local law enforcement officials and community groups who were involved in the 

Countering Violent Extremism program. The area is obviously a 

ground zero for recruitment. 


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Now, I invited Richard Thornton, the FBI’s special agent in 

charge of the Minneapolis Division, to testify today about the problems our country is facing in that part of the country, but he is not 

here. Instead, the Bureau has sent Assistant Director Kerry Sleeper from headquarters with the expectation he can speak to Thornton’s specific experience and interactions in Minneapolis. I look forward to hearing specifics about FBI’s efforts in Minneapolis so the 

committee can evaluate the effectiveness of this CVE approach. 

Our law enforcement and intelligence community have their 

hands full with preventing radicalization and interdicting terrorists 

before they commit acts in the name of their ideology. The Department of Homeland Security leads the government’s Countering Violent Extremism efforts. CVE refers to ‘‘proactive actions to counter 

efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to 

violence.’’ 

Currently, the Department still follows the Obama-era policies 

related to CVE. And guidance developed during the Obama administration specifically limits any intelligence or law enforcement investigative activity through CVE. By leaving this information on 

the table, CVE efforts are potentially missing opportunities to identify and disrupt terrorist plots. Obama-era guidance also fails to 

properly identify the threat of radical Islamic ideology. The nearly 

4,000-word October 2016 CVE strategy does not even mention radical Islamic terrorism at all. The Obama administration’s strategy 

also relied heavily on non-governmental organizations with vague 

and immeasurable goals. 

One week before President Trump’s inauguration, former DHS 

Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the grant recipients of $10 million appropriated by Congress for CVE efforts. The selections reflect a preference for working through community-based organizations, some with questionable programs and immeasurable goals. 

For example, the Obama administration selected for funding an organization who suggested countering violent extremism through, 

quote, ‘‘collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and performance.’’ 

Another suggested hiring college students to make video games. 

This was not a serious attempt to stop the flow of foreign fighters 

to ISIS. 

After President Trump took office, DHS froze the $10 million in 

grants, reviewed the organizations, and announced they were removing 11 Obama-era grant recipients but adding six new ones. A 

committee review of the organizations indicates a preference for 

law enforcement organizations over community-based organizations. 

Now, despite this step, some of the law enforcement organizations designated for funding have questionable agendas. For example, the city of Houston’s application relied on so-called community 

experts with vocally partisan and anti-Israel agendas. The city of 

Denver submitted an application that prioritized an agenda unrelated to CVE, suggesting working through organizations such as 

Black Lives Matter. 

The Committee requested the applications of all grant recipients 

to determine what taxpayer dollars were funding, but DHS has 

still not produced these applications. The committee requested a 


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briefing on the rationale for the selection of the grant recipients, 

but DHS refused. 

Today, the subcommittee seeks to understand what this administration’s policy is for countering violent extremism. According to 

DHS, this policy is currently under review, and DHS has declined 

to share any details about this process, including when this review 

is supposed to be complete and which organizations are participating. For Congress’ immediate purposes, we must determine 

what is driving DHS’s agenda: the assumptions of the Obama era 

about countering this threat or the President’s pledge to put political correctness aside and defeat the Islamic State at home and 

abroad. 

We will question witnesses on whether the FBI and DHS are 

properly vetting organizations and individuals who participate in 

the program. We will also hear from non-governmental witnesses 

on the role of the private sector in CVE efforts and the scope of violent extremism problem facing the United States. 

I thank the witnesses for their attendance and look forward to 

their testimony. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I now recognize the ranking member of the 

subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to, in advance, 

thank the witnesses for their willingness to help this committee 

with its work. 

I would like to thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman, to reexamine our efforts to address violent extremism and 

terrorist radicalization. I would also like to again thank the witnesses here involved, DHS and FBI especially. I know that there 

was some back and forth about getting witnesses to come forward. 

I am glad that we were able to resolve that. 

The recapture of the city of Mosul by Iraqi forces earlier this 

month marked a significant development in the U.S.-led global coalition effort to degrade and destroy ISIS. The loss of Iraq’s secondlargest city, coupled with ongoing advances by coalition-backed Syrian rebels in the self-declared ISIS capital of Raqqa in eastern 

Syria are the most recent indicators of the continuing loss of geographic territory by the terrorist organization. 

According to global data monitoring company IHS Market, ISIS 

currently controls an estimated 14,000 square miles, an area 

roughly the size of Maryland. That is a 60 percent decrease from 

January of 2015. The terrorist group has also experienced a corresponding loss in annual revenue by about 50 percent. 

However, battlefield losses on the ground in Iraq and Syria do 

not signify the complete degradation or destruction of ISIS, as recently underscored by Lieutenant General Mike Nagata at the National Counterterrorism Center. ISIS’ ability to absorb this damage 

and continue to direct, enable, or inspire terrorist attacks worldwide indicate that, and I quote, ‘‘We do not fully appreciate the 

scale or strength of this phenomenon,’’ close quote. 

In the midst of the coalition-backed defense in Raqqa, the New 

York Times reports that top ISIS operatives have already relocated 

to the town of Mayadin, Syria, about 100 miles away, along with 

the recruitment, financing, propaganda, and external operations 


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functions necessary to facilitate and motivate attacks here in the 

West. 

Regrettably, we have already witnessed the devastation caused 

by ISIS-inspired ideology and the influence of extremist social 

media content here at home with the 2015 terrorist attack in San 

Bernardino, California, that resulted in 14 deaths, and the 2016 

terrorist attacks in Orlando, Florida, that killed 49 people. The program on Extremism at the George Washington University has 

identified at least 16 successful attacks perpetrated in the United 

States alone since ISIS announced the so-called caliphate in 2014. 

The majority of the attackers, including Orlando shooter Omar 

Mateen, openly pledged their allegiance to ISIS. 

In light of the continuing national security threat posed by terrorist-related attacks, we must work on a bipartisan basis to conduct robust oversight of Federal efforts to combat violent extremism and maximize our ability to mitigate the threat of 

radicalization based on fact. 

As highlighted by the Independent Government Accounting Office just this month in its report on ‘‘Countering ISIS and its effect,’’ and I again quote, ‘‘The Federal Government does not have 

a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the countering violent 

extremism effort,’’ close quote. Moreover, programs designed to 

counter violent extremism at the Federal level have lacked a clear 

mission and objective, receiving insecure or inadequate funding and 

have failed to reflect meaningful and collaborative Muslim community engagement and input. 

In 2014, the Obama administration announced the establishment 

of key pilot programs in Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and my own city 

of Boston designed by the Department of Justice, the Department 

of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center 

to counter violent extremism and stop radicalization through community-based outreach and education. The greater Boston region 

was selected as a pilot area as a result of a preexisting collaboration between law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and 

local communities, including the Muslim community. In fact, President Obama recognized Boston as one of the 10 cities where local 

elected officials, law enforcement, faith organizations, youth 

groups, and others have already worked together to achieve 

marked improvement in community policing. 

In the New England area, local Muslim community leaders and 

organizations occupy a strategic role to prevent online 

radicalization and other forms of terrorist recruitment and promote 

community engagement. The Islamic Center of New England, 

which is in my district in the city of Quincy, has sought to develop 

a faith-based curriculum for young people that educates them on 

the prevalence of misinformation on the internet and particularly 

social media, while reinforcing positive Islamic values. 

In addition, Imam Khalid Nasr of the Quincy Mosque has sought 

to increase community outreach and interaction through open 

houses designed to afford all members of the community the opportunity to visit the mosque and meet with their Muslim neighbors, 

especially during Muslim holidays. 

Since the inception of the regional pilot program, the Federal 

Countering Violent Extremism program has expanded to include a 


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grant program authorized by Congress to assist States, localities, 

and nonprofit organizations in preventing terrorist recruitment and 

radicalization. As announced by Secretary of Homeland Security 

General John Kelly in June of 2017, the agency awarded 26 grants 

totaling $10 million to organizations dedicated to securing our communities and preventing terrorism—the list of grants, including an 

approximate $485,000 to the Boston Police Foundation, a nonprofit 

organization that works with the Boston Police to implement innovative youth outreach programs. Unfortunately, the current administration has frozen this $10 million in funding in its fiscal year 

2018 budget, proposing zeroing out the $50 million for Countering 

Violent Extremism program altogether. 

Rather than weakening our effort to combat violent extremism, 

we have to work together to identify what works and what additional steps we must take to improve collaboration and cultivate a 

solid relationship of mutual respect and deeper understanding between law enforcement and local communities based on a shared 

commitment, and that includes the Muslim communities—that is 

based on a shared commitment to preventing radicalization and recruitment. 

To this end, I look forward to today’s hearing, and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

I will hold the record open for five legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. 

We will now recognize our panel of witnesses. 

I am pleased to welcome Mr. Kerry Sleeper, assistant director, 

Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation; 

Mr. George Selim, director of the Office of Community Partnerships, Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Raheel Raza, president of Muslims Facing Tomorrow; Mr. Adnan Kifayat, director, 

Global Security Ventures, Gen Next Foundation; and Mr. Seamus 

Hughes, deputy director of the Program on Extremism from the 

George Washington University. 

Welcome to you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify, so if you can please rise and raise your right 

hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. Thank you. Please be seated. All witnesses 

answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

to five minutes. Your entire written statement will be made part 

of the record. 

And with that, Mr. Sleeper, you are up for five minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF KERRY SLEEPER 

Mr. SLEEPER. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking 

Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the threat of 

homegrown violent extremism. My name is Kerry Sleeper. I’m asVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:30 Jan 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\27741.TXT APRIL

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sistant director with the FBI in charge of our Office of Partner Engagement. 

The FBI utilizes a comprehensive violence reduction strategy, 

which focuses on all pathways to violence but is not limited to this 

sole focus of homegrown violent extremism. Our violence reduction 

strategy is primarily composed of prevention and intervention lines 

of effort. 

In the area of prevention, the FBI has a long history of engagement in outreach and education initiatives and continues this effort 

as we identify and adapt to current trends and threats. In collaboration with our State and local partners, the FBI has historically 

been very successful in outreach programs designed to reach certain communities who are at a greater risk for radicalization. For 

example, FBI Minneapolis served as a pilot program for the Bureau 

immediately after 9/11 when their executive management regularly 

hosted focus group meetings with specific audiences such as Somali 

elders in order to address their concerns and needs. 

Some of our popular outreach programs that have a positive impact on our community relationships are the Campus Liaison Initiative, the Private Sector Liaison, the Correction Initiative, the 

FBI Citizens Academy, and the Junior G Man program. These efforts are managed by our division outreach coordinators in conjunction with our JTTFs and local partners. 

Additionally, the vision outreach coordinators assess the needs of 

their individual community groups and develop specific programming tailed to integrated community and law enforcement goals to 

mitigate local risk factors for violence. 

The FBI also focuses on education for different catalysts for 

radicalization designed to help the public increase an awareness of 

that radicalization. These public—these products are widely disseminated to the law enforcement and community partners for further engagement with the public and demand continues to increase 

for additional products. 

The FBI created a website ‘‘Don’t be a puppet; pull back the curtain on violent extremism’’ specifically designed for the public and 

for use by educators and community leaders and organizations for 

school-age children. Visits to this website average nearly 7,400 visits a month. 

Also, in reaching out to communities, the FBI has produced other 

media-based products, including preventing violent extremism in 

school, recognizing pathways to violent extremism, campus attacks, 

targeted violence affecting institutions of higher education, and 

workplace violence issues and response. We have also produced and 

distributed documentaries A Revolutionary Act, Redemption, and 

Active Shooter: Managing the Mass Casualty Threat. 

I left with the members to be distributed a copy of A Revolutionary Act. This was a video that we created for State and local 

law enforcement. It documented the murder of two Las Vegas 

Metro PD officers by domestic terrorists two years ago. The reception by the State and local law enforcement community has been 

very, very strong. It’s an example of the type of work we do for the 

law enforcement agencies to then engage with their communities 

and have discussions. 


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In our intervention area, the FBI is closely coordinating with our 

State and local partners to best meet the needs of their communities. The FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement identified as a best 

practice used by police departments, the crisis intervention teams, 

and their partner multidisciplinary teams composed of community 

mental health and social welfare providers. 

The FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement is currently initiating 

closer coordination with police department crisis intervention 

teams in order to develop a coordinated strategy to identify potential individuals appropriate for intervention. 

The FBI also conducted a pilot program to assess the viability of 

off-ramping. The idea behind off-ramping subjects is to take them 

off the path of violence before they commit a crime. This process 

must be completed with the utmost attention to detail, sensitivity 

to law enforcement and community partners, and a forward-leaning 

approach. The FBI’s pilot program indicated the best results would 

be achieved by close collaboration with our State and local law enforcement and government partners. The FBI continues to work 

with these partners to form a cohesive and beneficial plan to implement off-ramping efforts and to better serve our communities. 

In conclusion, I am pleased to be here today to talk to you about 

the FBI’s work with our State and local partners in combating 

homegrown violent extremism. Thank you for this opportunity to 

testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Kerry Sleeper follows:] 


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ilepadment of Ju~tite 

STATEMENT OF 

KERRY SLEEPER 

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

OFFICE OF PARTNER ENGAGEMENT 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FOR A HEARING ENTITLED 

"COMBATTING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM" 

PRESENTED 

JULY 27,2017 
9 


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Statement of 

Kerry Sleeper 

Assistant Director 

Office of Partner Engagement 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Before the 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

United States House of Representatives 

At a Hearing Entitled 

"Combatting Homegrown Terrorism" 

July 27,2017 

Good afternoon Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the threat of 

Homegrown Violent Extremism. 

The FBI utilizes a comprehensive Violence Reduction Strategy, which focuses on all 

pathways to violence but is not limited to the sole focus of Homegrown Violent Extremism. Our 

Violence Reduction strategy is primarily composed of prevention and intervention lines of effort. 

In the area of prevention, the FBI has a long history of engagement in outreach and 

education initiatives, and continues this effort as we identify and adapt to current trends. 

In collaboration with our State and local partners, the FBI has historically been very 

successful in outreach programs designed to reach certain communities who are at greater risk for 

radicalization. For example, FBI Minneapolis served as a pilot program for the Bureau 

immediately after 9/11/2001 when their Executive Management regularly hosted focus group 

meetings with specific audiences, such as the Somali elders, in order to address their concerns and 

needs. 

Some of our popular outreach programs that have had a positive impact on the community 

are the Campus Liaison Initiative, the Private Sector Liaison, the Corrections Initiative, the FBI 

Citizens Academy, and the Junior G-Man Program. These efforts are managed by our Division 

Outreach Coordinators, in conjunction with the JTTF and local partners. Additionally, the 

Division Outreach Coordinators assess the needs of their individual community groups and 

develop specific programming tailored to integrate community and law enforcement goals to 

mitigate local risk factors for violence. 
10 


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The FBI also focuses on education for different catalysts for radicalization designed to help 

the public increase awareness of radicalization. These products are widely disseminated to the law 

enforcement and community partners for further engagement with the public, and demand 

continues to increase for additional products. The FBI has a website, "Don't Be a Puppet Pull 

Back the Curtain on Violent Extremism" specifically designed for the public, and for use by 

educators and community leaders and organizations for school age children. Visits to the site 

average nearly 7,400 a month. Also in reaching out to communities, the FBI has produced other 

media-based products, including "Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools", "Recognizing 

Pathways to Violent Extremism", "Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 

Higher Education" and "Workplace Violence Issues and Response". We have also produced 

and distributed documentaries "A Revolutionary Act", "Redemption", and "Active Shooter -

Managing the Mass Casualty Threat''. 

In our area of intervention, the FBI is closely coordinating with our State and local partners 

to best meet the needs of communities .. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement identified a best 

practice used by police departments, the Crisis Intervention Teams ("CITs") and their partner 

Multi-Discipline Teams ("MDTs"), composed of community mental health and social welfare 

providers. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement is currently initiating closer coordination with 

Police Department Crisis Intervention Teams in order to develop a coordinated strategy to identify 

potential individuals appropriate for intervention. The FBI also conducted a pilot program to 

assess the viability of"off-ramping". The idea behind "off-ramping" subjects is to take them off 

the path to violence before they commit a crime. This process must be completed with the utmost 

attention to detail, sensitivity to law enforcement and community partners, and a forward-leaning 

approach. The FBI's pilot program indicated the best results would be achieved by close 

collaboration with our State and local law enforcement and government partners.. The FBI 

continues to work with these partners to form a cohesive and beneficial plan to implement "offramping" efforts and better serve our communities. 

In conclusion, I am pleased to be here today to talk to you about the FBI's work with our 

State and local partners in combatting homegrown extremism. Thank you for this opportunity to 

testify, and !look forward to your questions. 

-2-
11 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Selim, you are up for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE SELIM 

Mr. SELIM. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, other members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. My name is George Selim, and I lead 

the Office for Community Partnerships at the Department of 

Homeland Security, and I also serve as the director of the Interagency Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, which is tasked 

to manage the synchronization and integration of a whole-of-government effort to empower local partners to prevent violent extremism here in the United States. 

I have built on my nearly 12 years of homeland security-related 

work experience in the executive branch, including the Department 

of Justice, most recently DHS headquarters, as well as the National Security Council to further the Department’s and the Interagency’s key priorities on fostering relationships, promoting trust, 

and finding innovative ways to expand the toolbox for both law enforcement officials and civil leaders to prevent and intervene in the 

process of radicalization. 

Terrorism prevention programs complement traditional counterterrorism investigative and prosecutorial processes. Prevention focuses on disrupting the beliefs of violent extremists and their will 

to act on those beliefs through criminal or other violent actions. 

Community-driven prevention programs are designed to mitigate 

recruitment and interdict individuals radicalizing to violence earlier in the process, and that way, thus contributing to our collective 

homeland security. 

Historically, my office, the Office of Community Partnerships, 

has pursued a number of activities to advance the terrorism prevention mission. We educate our communities, working with departments and agencies to provide community awareness briefings 

that demonstrably increase the understanding of how terrorist 

groups recruit and radicalize and thus incite to violence. 

We have engaged with community stakeholders around the 

United States to open doors to dialogue and build trust. My office 

has deployed field staff to more than a dozen cities nationwide to 

bolster engagement with and between governmental organizations, 

nongovernmental organizations, not the least of which are our 

State and local law enforcement partners, as well as community 

and civic groups. 

Additionally, we have engaged young people through the internationally recognized public-private partnership titled the Peer-toPeer Challenging Extremism Competition, which was featured last 

week in the New York Times, which its aim is to challenge teams 

of students from colleges and universities both across the United 

States and abroad to develop and implement social media programs 

targeting the narratives and online recruiters of violent extremism. 

In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security worked with Congress to secure a first-of-its-kind funding for the CVE grant program, which the chairman referred to earlier, that supports communities seeking to do more to combat the ongoing threat of terrorism here in the homeland. Six months later, the Department of 


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Homeland Security released our Notice of Funding Opportunity for 

this grant program. The application period closed last September, 

and almost 200 applications received were reviewed by a combination of experts to evaluate the strengths and merits of each individual application. 

After a leadership review panel reviewed the scoring results in 

the five focus areas and ensured important programmatic soundness was met such as the optimized use of funds to avoid duplication and other similar projects. After a deliberate process, then-Secretary Johnson made a determination on funding options presented 

to him and publicly announced grants on January 13 of 2017. My 

office anticipated approximately 30 days later from the announcement to make the formal award offers and allow time to finalize 

many of the administrative tasks associated with the grants. 

After the inauguration of President Trump on January 20, the 

new DHS leadership asked to put a pause on the program, reviewing the entire effort, alongside numerous other efforts at the Department of Homeland Security. What I can tell you today is that 

the review was comprehensive. New DHS leadership imagined—examined the goals of the program, the processes, and how the grant 

program would measure its own efficacy. 

As a result of the review, and consistent with the authorizes 

granted to the Secretary and as outlined in the Notice of Funding, 

the Department considered three additional factors among the pool 

of applicants, including the applicant or proposal’s level of engagement with law enforcement and the community, the proposal’s likelihood for it to be highly effective, and the proposal’s level of resource dedication or long-term sustainability. In the end, the application of these factors resulted in some changes in the list of intended awardees. 

Moving forward, the 26 projects funded by the Countering Violent Extremism grant program are designed to establish a solid 

foundation for prevention of terrorism in our American communities. The grants support a full range of terrorism prevention activities, including awareness campaigns, engagement, trust-building, intervention efforts, and direct opposition of terrorism narratives these days. The awards span communities across the country and focus on all forms of violent extremism. 

In conclusion, our team recognizes that now comes the hard part. 

We are working with all 26 project teams to ensure that the awardees detail their progress towards their goals through ongoing and 

rigorous monitoring. In doing so, my office will identify promising 

practices and tools to keep extremists from luring more impressionable people towards terrorism. We will add to the dataset on existing terrorism prevention programs, and we will share the result 

from these grants publicly so that other communities and the public and you, the committee, can learn firsthand what works and 

what does not in the field of terrorism prevention. We are grateful 

for bipartisan support from Congress on this program to date and 

look forward to keeping you informed on our progress and ensure 

that it lives up to the Congress’ standards. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of George Selim follows:] 


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U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on National Security of the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

"Combating Homegrown Terrorism" 

July 27, 2017 

Remarks by George Selim, Director, DHS Office for Community Partnerships 

Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. My name is 

George Selim, and I lead the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) for the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). We are focused on terrorism prevention efforts, also known as 

countering violent extremism (CVE). 

In my ten-plus years of working in the terrorism prevention space in the Executive Branch 

-including at the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National 

Security Council staff- I have seen how important our communities are to accomplishing this 

mission. I have personally worked with civic leaders and local agencies and citizens who have 

raised concerns about individuals in their neighborhoods - tips and insights we may not have 

received otherwise and with many patriotic community leaders who have sought to stand up and 

be part of the solution in countering terrorist recruitment and radicalization to violence in their 

communities. I have worked with leaders from a variety oflocalities across the United States, such 

as Chicago, Illinois; Dearborn, Michigan; and Columbus, Ohio, as well as many other cities, and 

I have engaged with a range of international stakeholders, such as from Somalia, Jordan, and 

Indonesia- and the most common question I get from local leaders no matter from where they 

originate is, "How can I help?" 

Terrorism prevention efforts complement traditional counterterrorism investigative and 

prosecutorial processes, focusing on the disruption of the beliefs of violent extremists (e.g., violent 

ideology) and their will to act on those beliefs by taking criminal or violent actions (i.e., 

mobilization). Community-based training and engagement programs can be used to mitigate 

recruitment and interdict individuals radicalizing to violence earlier in the process - in that way 

contributing to the safety of the homeland. It must be a priority to reduce recruiters' ability to 

influence vulnerable individuals, and we must work to increase the likelihood that communities 

are inhospitable to terrorist recruitment. 

Historically, OCP has pursued a number of activities to advance the terrorism prevention 

mission. We have engaged with stakeholders around the United States to open the doors to 

dialogue and build trust. We work with other departments and agencies to provide Community 

Awareness Briefings that demonstrably increase the understanding of how terrorist groups recruit 

and inspire violence. My office has deployed field staff to more than a dozen cities nationwide to 

bolster engagement with and between governmental organizations, not least of which are state and 

local law enforcement agencies, as well as community and civic organizations. Additionally, we 

have engaged young people through the internationally recognized public-private partnership 

titled, "Peer to Peer: Countering Extremism." "Peer to Peer," featured in last week's New York 
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Times, 1 challenges teams of students from colleges and universities to develop and implement 

social media programs targeting the narratives and online recruiters of violent extremism. 

In 2015, DHS worked with Congress to secure first-of-its kind funding for a CVE Grant 

Program (CVEGP) that supports communities seeking to do more to combat the ongoing threat of 

terrorism. My office developed the CVEGP following the FY20 16 Omnibus Appropriations bill, 

signed in December 2015. We became the program office for administering this funding in 

conjunction with FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate (GPD). OCP reviewed other grant 

programs both within and outside DHS for best practices to emulate in creating the CVEGP. We 

consulted closely with FEMA, DHS Financial Assistance Program Office (FAPO), the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress to ensure the program adhered to programmatic 

standards and met Congressional intent. DHS released the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) 

for the CVEGP on July 6, 2016, less than six months from the original appropriation. DHS is not 

aware of any other grant program that has more expeditiously opened the application period for a 

new grant program, and indeed the program has been recognized for its quality, leading other grant 

programs to consult my office for best practices. 

The application period closed on September 6, 2016. Of the 212 complete applications we 

received by the deadline, my office deemed 197 applications as eligible to proceed for 

consideration. 2 The 197 applications requested more than $100 million in funds and represented 

42 states, territories and the District of Columbia, across five focus areas. 3 Each individual 

application received a review and scoring by a panel comprised of four subject matter experts, 

including an external (i.e. non-federal) expert. The review and scoring process took several weeks. 

The NOFO instructed the review panel to consider seven criteria to evaluate the strength and merits 

of each individual application. 

Once all the scores were finalized and tabulated into a total score for each application, OCP 

convened a senior leadership review panel that reviewed the scoring results in each of the five 

focus areas. The senior leadership review panel also considered optimizing the use of funds, 

ensuring diversity of applicant type, achieving geographic diversity, avoiding duplication of 

similar projects, and meeting funding targets by focus area. While preparing a final 

recommendation memo for consideration by both the Assistant Administrator of FEMA's GPD 

and my office, FEMA staff with experience working with previous DHS Secretaries on other grant 

programs recommended that OCP present the Secretary ofHomeland Security with several options 

on how best to allocate the grant funding across the five focus areas. These options were rooted in 

the recommendations from the senior leadership review. 

1 Nixon, Ron. "Students Arc the Newest U.S. Weapon Against Terrorist Recruitment." New York 7/mes. 18 July 

2017. 

2 Projects were ruled ineligible if they did not purport to conduct activities eligible under the funding opportunity, 

such as projects exclusively hosted overseas, or projects that were exclusively research proposals, and projects 

without a nexus to preventing or intervening into radicalization to violence or recruitment to violent extremism. 3 The FY 2016 CVE Grant Program organizes eligible activities into five focus areas that current research has shown 

are likely to be most effective in countering violent extremism: (1) developing resilience, (2) training and engaging 

with community members, (3) managing intervention activities, ( 4) challenging the narrative, and (5) building 

capacity of community-level non-profit organizations active in CVE. 

2 
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Some procedural delays arose before the Secretary made final selections, including the 

need to conduct security reviews before final selection. OCP established such a process using DHS 

resources, including those available from the DHS Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) and Customs 

and Border Protection's National Targeting Center. The DHS vetted application data of potential 

grantees against the Terrorist Screening Database and other crimina! databases based on 

information provided in the grant applications. While not legally required, the Acting Chief 

Privacy Officer also ordered a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on the security review process. 

While the PIA provided transparency, it created a delay in providing recommendations to the 

Secretary. Only applications from non-profit organizations included in recommendations to the 

Secretary were run through the security review process. Government agencies and institutions of 

higher education were not included, due to their existing institutional controls that prohibit the 

misuse of grant funds for the purposes of criminal activity or terrorism. 

Ultimately, then-Secretary Johnson made a determination on funding that was a 

combination of the options presented to him, which was in line with the NOFO and within the 

Secretary's grant making authority in Section 102(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 4 

Secretary Johnson publicly announced the selection of intended awardees on January 13, 2017. 

My office anticipated at least 30 days from the announcement to make all of the formal award 

offers to allow time for finalizing budgets and other administrative tasks. 5 Within a few days of 

the start of the Administration, OCP and FEMA were instructed to continue certain administrative 

tasks associated with the CVEGP process, but not to make final award offers until the new DHS 

leadership could review the CVEGP. This was consistent with guidance given to other ongoing 

grant programs. 

The review was comprehensive. New DHS leadership examined the goals of the program, 

the process, and how the grant program would measure its own efficacy. As a result of the review, 

and consistent with the authorities granted to the Secretary and outlined in the NOFO, the 

Department considered three additional factors among the applicant pool, including the applicant 

or proposal's level of engagement with law enforcement in the community, the proposal's 

likelihood of effectiveness, and the proposal's level of resource dedication or long-term 

sustainability. In the end, the application of these factors resulted in some changes to the list of 

intended awardees. In total, 12 applications announced in January were not offered an award, 7 

new applications were offered an award, and 7 applications received increased funding amounts 

from what was announced in January. 

Combined, the 26 projects funded in the CVEGP are designed to make our communities 

more resistant to terrorist recruitment and radicalization to violence. The Department looks 

forward to assessing the projects on an ongoing basis to identify best practices and effective tools 

4 Speciflcally, the NOFO states that "[t]he results ofthe senior leadership review will be presented to the Director, 

Office for Community Partnerships and the Assistant Administrator, FEMA GPD, who will recommend the 

selection of recipients for this program to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Final funding determinations will be 

made by the Secretary of Homeland Security. through the FEMA Administrator. The Secretary retains the discretion 

to consider other factors and information in addition to those included in the recommendations." 5 Notice of Funding Opportunity DHS-16-0CP-132-00..01 Page 5 "Anticipated Funding Selection Datc:I0/30/2016 

Anticipated Award Date; No later than December I, 2016'' 

3 
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to keep extremists from luring more impressionable people toward violence. The grants support a 

range of activities, including awareness campaigns, engagement and trust-building, intervention 

efforts, and direct opposition of terrorist narratives. The awardees span communities across the 

United States and focus on all forms of violent extremism. 

In conclusion, our team recognizes that now comes the hard part. We are excited to see 

these awards move from application to action, to use proven methods that protect law enforcement 

and the communities they serve, including sustainable methods to provide benefits, well beyond 

the grants' end dates. As these programs commence next month, my team is working with all 26 

project teams to ensure that the awardees detail their progress towards their goals. The robust 

performance measures incorporated in these grant projects by the terms of their awards will add to 

the data on existing programs to help us continually assess which projects have the most success 

and show the most measurable outcomes. We will share the results from these grants publically so 

that other communities, the public, and Congress can learn first-hand what works and what does 

not in terms of terrorism prevention. 

4 
17 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Ms. Raza, you are up for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RAHEEL RAZA 

Ms. RAZA. [Speaking foreign language.] I begin in the name of 

God, most beneficial, most merciful. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to deliver this testimony. 

My name is Raheel Raza. I’m a practicing Muslim, president of 

Muslims Facing Tomorrow, founding member of the Muslim Reform Movement, and advisory board member of the Clarion Project. 

I’ve engaged in dialogue about these issues in the U.S., at the U.N., 

and in the Canadian and U.K. Parliaments for over two decades. 

I have four main recommendations: 

1. Shift government focus and efforts to tackle the Islamist ideology. 

2. Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an entity that aids and 

abets terrorism. 

3. Prevent funding of U.S. educational institutions and mosques 

by foreign extremist sources. 

4. Invite voices of reform-minded Muslims to also be heard in 

these esteemed chambers. 

Firstly, there is a serious error at the heart of the countering violent extremism policy. We must confront radicals before they become violent. Before World War II, Nazism was an ideology expressed in Mein Kampf. Before two million Chinese died in the 

Cultural Revolution, ideas were written down in a Little Red Book. 

And in 1928, another ideology appeared with the founding of the 

Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks a totalitarian system of government and forced implementation of Sharia law, the trickling effects 

of which we don’t want to see in the United States. 

This ideology fuels ISIS and al-Qaida, subjugates women, executes homosexuals, kills Christians, and inspires some American 

Muslims to commit acts of terror. The Clarion Project’s short film 

By the Numbers puts numbers to these assertions based on Pew 

research. Twenty-seven percent or 237 million Muslims believe 

nonbelievers should be executed, and 26 percent of young American 

Muslims believe suicide bombings against non-Muslims can be justified. Fortunately, most Muslims don’t hold this radical ideology, 

but hundreds of millions do. 

Some claim ideology is not a clear predictor of terrorism. They 

are dead-wrong. A 2016 study traced the path of 100 violent 

jihadists. Fifty-one percent of them began their journey in nonviolent Islamist movements. By the time an extremist becomes violent, it’s too late. As such, the U.S. must defeat, humiliate, destroy, 

and discredit this poisonous radical ideology of Islamism stemming 

from the Wahhabi Salafi ideology, Khomeinism, and the Muslim 

Brotherhood, which brings me to recommendation number two, 

designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids 

and abets terrorism. 

As I’ve already explained, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish a worldwide Islamic State and build a new world civilization based on Sharia law. In fact, Russia, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have all listed the 


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Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The U.S. must follow suit. 

Next, number three, remove foreign extremist funding from 

American campuses and mosques. Saudi Arabia is thought to have 

spent $70–100 billion to disseminate their intolerant version of 

Islam worldwide. Saudi Arabia gave $20 million to Georgetown and 

$20 million to Harvard. A Saudi billionaire named as a defendant 

in a 9/11 lawsuit donated $10 million to establish a Center of Islamic Law and Civilization at Yale. Iran is also complicit in funding Shia mosques, Islamic schools, and organizations. We should 

not have Iran or Saudi Arabia teaching their version of Islam to 

our youth. 

Final recommendation number four, a seat at the table; listen to 

martyred Muslims. Mohamed Elibiary helped craft the Countering 

Violent Extremism, the CVE program, yet he called for the political 

integration of mainstream Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Also, CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, is a radical 

group which claims to speak for American Muslims. CAIR does not 

speak for me or most Muslims. CAIR was designated as a terrorist 

group by the United Arab Emirates, and its L.A. director called the 

work of this committee a myth. 

CAIR’s recommendation to the House Committee on Homeland 

Security was to refuse a legitimizing platform to organizations and 

individuals they deem ‘‘Islamophobic.’’ Let me clarify that antiMuslim bigotry is real, but that’s not a permission slip to call every 

dissenting voice an Islamophobe. I’ve raised two sons with Muslim 

values while keeping them from radical views and will do the same 

for my four grandchildren. Does educating youth about the dangers 

of radicalization make one an Islamophobe? Of course not. These 

labels keep us from critical debate such as the one we are having 

now and stops the Muslim communities from becoming pluralistic, 

tolerant, embracing of democracy, freedoms, and liberties, and accepting of all paths and people. 

On behalf of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, reform-minded Muslims, 

and the Clarion Project, thank you for letting our voices be heard. 

[Prepared statement of Raheel Raza follows:] 


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TESTIMONY TO CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

"Combating Homegrown Terrorism" 

Written testimony by Raheel Raza -July 27,2017 

What the US Can Do to Counter Threat of Violent Extremism Within Domestic 

Communities 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of Congress, thank you for the opportunity to deliver 

testimony before you today. My name is Raheel Raza and I am here on behalf of Muslims Facing 

Tomorrow and Clarion Project to testify on the vital issue of violent extremism within US 

domestic communities and what the United States government can do. 

Violent extremism poses a clear and present threat to the security of the United States, both 

domestically and internationally. It does so in a number of different forms. This testimony 

focuses on extremism domestically, which is the scope of the hearing and from within my own 

Islamic community, since it is my area of expertise. I fully support the work of others who 

counter different forms of extremism within their communities. I would also like to condemn 

those who seek to use the problem of Islamic extremism as an excuse to target all Muslims. AntiMuslim bigotry is a real and serious problem. It is never an acceptable response to the problem of 

Islamic extremism. It must be condemned and opposed. 

I commend the panel for recognizing that a growing number of Americans are increasingly 

cognizant of this problem. From 201 I to 2015 the number of Americans who were very 

concerned about Islamic extremism rose from 36% to 53%. 1 

Therefore you have asked me what can the US do to counter the threat of violent extremism 

within domestic communities, within the context of the strengths and weaknesses of existing 

CVE programs. I have four main recommendations, which I humbly submit and will expand on in 

this testimony. 

These are as follows: 

• Shift government efforts to tackle the ideology driving extremism. This is a political 

ideology which seeks to impose the religion oflslam onto others and implement sharia as 

state law, thereby enabling a proper discussion of the issue without tarring the religion of 

Islam with the same brush. In this spirit we support the addition of Countering NonViolent Extremism (CNVE) to the existing structure of Countering Violent Extremism 

1

http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/16/extremism-concerns-growing-in-west-and-predominantlymuslim-countries/ 

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(CVE). 

• Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism. 

• Take steps to prevent funding of US educational institutions and mosques by foreign 

extremist sources. 

• Start listening to moderates such as the Muslim Reform Movement. We would be happy 

to provide a list of recommended figures from across the Muslim community spectrum. 

I will address these in tum. Prior to that I will assess as requested the strengths and weaknesses of 

current CVE programs, as requested. 

Strengths and Weaknesses of Current Countering Violent Extremism Programs 

Creating a federal CVE strategy was an excellent decision. The conversation has matured 

considerably since 2ol5 when the initial CVE strategy was unveiled at President Obama's White 

House Summit,2 building on the previous work of the previous Prevent Violent Extremism 

strategy of2011.3 

Current US CVE policy has several areas of strength. Domestically and internationally the US 

has recognized the importance of partnerships and combining government action with supporting 

civil society organizations which conduct on the ground work. 

Connecting 25 local city governments around the world to coordinate on CVE from a law 

enforcement perspective, as in the Strong Cities Initiative and connecting 30 member states in the 

Global Counter Terrorism forum to tackle terrorism at a state level are both very encouraging 

transnational initiatives which showcase the effectiveness of US leadership. 45 

It is also to the government's credit that USAID is involved in promoting on the ground 

development projects in places like Mali, Niger, Pakistan and Somalia to counter-act the "push" 

factors which drive people to extremism.6 To ignore other related factors such a poverty and 

alienation which can help fuel radicalization would be dishonest so it is to the US government's 

credit that these programs exist. A nuanced strategy which acknowledges how other issues 

interrelate without whitewashing the ideological element is essential. 

It is of course important to ensure that proper oversight of these programs is maintained, since 

there is an ongoing risk of corruption. For example in May 2016 USAID shut down 14 programs 

it was funding providing cross-border aid from Turkey in Syria. 7 If development and aid is to be 

an effective part of CVE transparency and oversight are essential to ensuring that the programs 

help rather than hinder. This is especially true since opposition to corruption is a recruiting 

2

https:ljobamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summitcountering-violent-extremism 

3 https:!fwww.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering local partners.pdf 4

http:!fwww.gcerf.org/wp-content/uploads/3Dec2015 GCSP-Morocco-USA-Remarks-by-KKl.pdf 5

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/launch-strong-cities-network-strengthen-community-resilience-againstviolent-extremism 

6 https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism 

7

https:l/oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/statement 05062016 usaid oig syria aid.pdf 

2 
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tactic for Islamist groups. 

Domestically there are some gaps. In a recent case of a Somali-American who was arrested on 

terror charges and sent to a CVE program in a half-way house, the state did not have a worked out 

deradicalization program for terror suspects and sent him on an experimental deradicalization 

program instead. Judge Michael Davis told the defendant Abdullahi Yusuf"I don't have a 

program, So we are working together to make you well, and ifthere is a misstep, my only 

alternative is to send you to prison."8 

So the first weakness ofCVE programs is a lack of having them, or at least a lack of having 

deradicalization programs. This program, introduced in 2015 on which Yusufwas enrolled, was 

the first "disengagement and deradicalization" program in the U.S., which is very late considering 

the length of time this issue has been a problem. 

Once the Terrorism Disengagement and Deradicalization Program in Minnesota has been tested 

and fine tuned I would want to see such programs in place across the country. Though they are 

not appropriate in many instances, they need to be set up so that they can be implemented in the 

cases where they are needed. Further research is also required to ensure that these programs 

function effectively, perhaps, as the RAND Institute has done, drawing from other academic 

disciplines since the field of CVE is so new.9 

As of February 2017, the Director of The Prevention Project: Organizing Against Violent 

Extremism said "the Bureau of Prisons can be faulted for not doing enough," noting "Despite the 

growing number of people sent to federal prison for non-violent terrorism charges (over 300 since 

9/11, with more than 90 individuals charged with mostly non-violent ISIS-related offenses, and 

40 or so to be released in the next two to four years), the United States, unlike many countries in 

Europe (and increasingly beyond), has yet to put in place tailored plans for their rehabilitation 

inside jail or reintegration once they are released."10 

Furthermore, there have been suggestions to change the name of the CVE program to Countering 

Radical Islamic Extremism. 11 Clarion applauds the correct labeling of the main threat as being 

radical Islamic extremism, in contrast to previous practice. However, despite our support for 

correctly identifying Islamic extremism as the principal ideology driving global terrorism, we 

disagree with the policy to change the name and exclude other ideologies the program of CVE. 

We have three objections to such a shift. 

I) Neo-nazi, far-left and other non-Islamist extremist groups exist in the United States and 

they also need to be countered. 

2) The growth of such groups makes Islamist extremism worse, because it fuels the 

grievance narrative used by recruiters. 

3) Changing the name and publicly sending the message that the only problem of extremism 

8

http://www.startribune.com/after-watching-a-cnn-documentary-twin-cities-isis-defendant-finds-himselfback-in-custody/420939083/ 

9 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research reports/RR2120.html 10httos://www. brookings. edu/blog/ order-from-ch aos/2017/02/16/fixi ng-cve-in-the-un ited-statesrequires-more-than-just-a-name-change/ 

11http:/lwww.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-cut-white-supremacismcountering-violent-extremism-programme-neo-nazi-counter-extremism-a7558796.html 

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comes from within the Muslim community sends a very alienating message to the 

Muslim community and chills community relations. This is negative for social cohesion, 

as well as being untrue. 

Having outlined what I consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of the existing program, I 

will no go on to elucidate my four recommendations that will enable the US government to better 

counter extremism in the United States. 

Naming the problem 

Our first recommendation is to stop treating this as exclusively a law enforcement problem and 

start treating it as an ideological and political problem. 

Non-violent lslamists and violent Islamists share the same core political ideology, namely a 

political understanding of faith that seeks to create a totalitarian, supremacist system of 

government with a theocratic monarch (caliph) at its head and implement their interpretation of 

sharia, Islamic law, as state law. 1213 This ideology, where it takes over, implements horrific 

human rights abuses totally antithetical to the values of the U.S. Constitution and international 

standards of human rights. Like any ideological framework Islamism contains a large amount of 

intellectual diversity resulting in divergent political movements ranging from the Islamic State to 

the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Nevertheless the broad principles remain constant: a fusion of religion and state. 

It is vital that we correctly name the ideology. Not doing so creates an atmosphere of confusion 

which enables people to draw incorrect conclusions, something Quilliam Foundation co-founder 

Maajid Nawaz has termed the "Voldemort Effect," after the villain of the Harry Potter book series 

whom the protagonists fear to name, thus increasing fear ofVoldemort. 14 

We see the impact of this confusion in the debate surrounding extremism. Some erroneously 

deduce that there is no such thing as radical Islam and there is thus no problem beyond mental 

health or the occasional aberrant bout of criminal violence. This hampers the ability of law 

enforcement and the government to tackle the problem effectively. Others, faced with the 

undeniable fact of global Islamic terrorism conclude Islam itself is at fault and that my religion is 

evil. 

Confusion only increases anti-Muslim bigotry, which we also must face up to as a real and 

dangerous problem which damages the fabric of society. According to the most recently available 

FBI hate crime statistics (for 2015), Muslims made up 21.9% of the l ,402 people targeted in the 

United States in incidents of anti-religious bias. 15 Yet despite a string of high profile anti-Muslim 

12http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22326292/What is lslamism Totalitarian Movements article.pdf 13http://www.danielpipes.org/954/distinguishing-between-islam-and-islamism 

14http://bigthink.com/videos/maajid-nawaz-on-the-voldemort-effect 

15httos:// ucr. fbi .gov /h ate-cri me/20 15/topic -pages/victims fin a I 

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incidents widely reported in the media, perceptions of Muslims are actually improving in 

America. In a 20!4 survey by Pew Research, Americans gave Muslims an average of 40 degree 

favorability (with I 00 as the highest and 0 as the lowest), while a 2017 survey saw Muslims 

receive a favorability rating of 48. 16 We must of course remain vigilant against the threat of antiMuslim bigotry. 

By correctly labeling the issue as an ideological political issue grounded in an interpretation of 

religious scripture we will be much better equipped to counter its message and prevent the 

radicalization of American citizens and terror attacks on American soil. It will also calm the 

debate and facilitate a more nuanced and practical assessment of the situation instead of framing 

the discussion as one of being pro or anti Islam. This will hopefully lead to a reduction of 

complaints that CVE is a "guise for deputizing well-intentioned Muslim leaders to gather 

intelligence on their constituents that places their civil liberties at risk," as Texas A&M Professor 

SaharAziz put itY 

Islamists have also been able to hijack the discourse surrounding other issues and draw in people 

who for whatever reason are already predisposed towards either violent criminality or mistrust of 

the state. Most obviously, this manifests itself in the attempt to "racialize" the struggle against 

radical Islam and draw a connection between issues of policing and community relations and the 

war on terror, painting both issues as part of the same broader problem of"white supremacy." 18 

Groups like the Nation oflslam peddle this rhetoric, conflating the issue of race in America with 

Islamist ideology. 19 In the Ferguson riots ISIS tweeted support for the rioters, urging people of 

color in America to fight the police and convert to Islam in exchange for soldiers from ISIS who 

would come to wage war on their behalf against police officers.20 

United States' CVE has to take into account how separate issues are exploited by extremists and 

move to sever attempts by extremists to capitalize on other areas of discontent. 

So far the government has not correctly labelled the ideology. In the Department of Homeland 

Security's Countering Violent Extremism Guide, on p!O, it currently reads "DHS will engage 

directly with diverse communities to promote these fundamental values and reject the premise 

that violent extremism is linked to particular ideological perspectives.'m 

Yet on the very next page the guide posits an objective to "Challenge violent extremist messaging 

that supports ideologically motivated violence." This directly contradicts what was written on the 

previous page, since it acknowledges that terrorism is at least partly inspired by ideology. 

Correctly naming and tackling the ideology will also enable the United States to better address 

the transnational nature of the threat. Despite being geographically removed from the epicenter of 

16http ://www. pew research .erg/fact-tan k/2017 /02/2 7 I m us I ims-a nd-is lam-key-findings-in -the-u-s-a ndaround-the-world/ 

17 https://www. jacob in mag.com/2017 /06 /isla mophobia-cou nteri ng-violent -extremism -m us I i m-lead ers 18 https://islamophobiaisracism.wordpress.com/ 

19https://clarionproject.org/nation-islam/ 

20https://clarionproject.org/islamists-exploit-ferguson-violence-promote-resistance-2/ 

21https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/16 1028 51 CVE strategy.pdf 

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globaljihadism,22 Americans are by no means immune from radicalization, thanks in part to the 

superb communications technologies, ironically developed primarily by American companiesY 

From mid-20 15 to February 2016 alone, Twitter disabled over 125,000 accounts for threatening 

or promoting terrorist acts.24 The late editor ofthe Islamic State's Dabiq magazine was formerly a 

student of computer science at the University of Massachusetts, as attested to in his obituary put 

out by ISIS in the eighth issue of their propaganda magazine Rumiyah.25 

The Islamic extremist ideology - Islamism- is transnational in nature, in that it is ideologically 

committed to the overthrow of all governments it views as un-Islamic and their replacement with 

a global theocratic monarchy termed a caliphate. It is also transnational in form, in that it exploits 

emerging technologies to spread its message and recruit supporters regardless of borders. 

Therefore, to successfully tackle extremism domestically, the government's approach has to go 

beyond countering violent extremism or CVE and must counter non-violent extremism as well -

CNVE- since that is the root cause of the problem. During the cold war the US government 

expended considerable resources in combating the ideology of communism in order to discredit 

it, using methods such as Radio Liberty which promoted the ideals of democracy and freedom 

abroad. 26 Such an approach can be useful today. Unless the ideology itself is discredited, any lawenforcement based approaches focusing on domestic groups of individuals will ultimately treat 

the symptoms rather than the cause. 

Recommendation: Shift focus to fight Islamism on ideological grounds. Creating Countering 

Non-Violent Extremism (CNVE) initiatives to counter this ideology in addition to existing CVE 

programs. 

Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood Agenda 

Our second recommendation is for the United States to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a 

organization that aids and abets terrorism. 

This will empower the U.S. government to crackdown on the networks which enable and 

empower extremist groups. According to the Immigration and Nationality Act 219 (1 )B, the 

Secretary of State has the power to designate a foreign organization as a terrorist organization if it 

engages in terrorism or "retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or 

22 We regard the lands ruled by the terrorist group Daesh as being the epicenter of global jihadism at this 

time, although the footloose nature of the ideology means the epicenter can and does shift. 23 ISIS communicate using the deep web as well as encrypted messaging apps such as Telegram and 

Whatsapp. Their ability to communicate has exceeded the ability of tech companies to hinder their 

communications. https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/TechForJihad.pdf 24https:Ublog.twitter.com/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism 

2

shttps://gb5cc3pam3y2ad0tmlzxuhho-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017 /05/romemagazine-8.pdf 

26 https:!/pressroom.rferl.org/p/6092.html 

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terrorism."27 

Firstly, Muslim Brotherhood affiliates have engaged in terrorism and paramilitary activity around 

the world, most particularly in Egypt/8 Gaza29 and Syria. 30 Muslim Brotherhood affiliated 

organizations in the United States have been linked to funding Hamas. The U.S. shut down the 

Holy Land Foundation in 2008 for exactly that.31 Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, both 

American allies, have already designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. 

Egypt urged the U.S. to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as recently as April this year. 32 

In Egypt, a Muslim Brotherhood cell was recently disrupted by the state which had weapons 

caches on two farms. The arrests took place over four provinces.33 

The terrorist group Hamas has long been an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood and although it 

officially broke with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian newspaper report found that in the 

announcement of congratulations to new Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, the MB still referred to 

Hamas as part of the organization.34 

An April 2016 study by the Centre of Religion and Geopolitics which assessed the trajectories of 

100 jihadists from a representative spectrum of backgrounds. Of those analyzed 51% of those 

analyzed had ties to non-violent Islamist movements while 25% had ties to the Muslim 

Brotherhood or its affiliates specifically.35The data thus shows the connections between 

nonviolent and violent Islamism. 

Although Muslim Brotherhood linked groups in America have not committed acts of terrorism on 

American soil, the ideology is such that it predisposes people towards violent acts of terrorism 

and fosters the grievance narrative that radicalization feeds on. Leaders who established the early 

Muslim Brotherhood linked organizations have direct documented ties to the international 

Muslim Brotherhood.36 

Some journalists and self-appointed community leaders have argued that banning the Muslim 

Brotherhood will negatively impact the Muslim community. This is not the case. It will 

negatively impact those leaders within the community who are affiliated with the Muslim 

27https:/!www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-5017.html 

28http:ljwww.jpost.com/Middle-East/Muslim-Brotherhood-becoming-more-violent-and-radical-experttells-Post-403774 

29 https:ljwww.counterextremism.com/content/muslim-brotherhood-palestinian-territories 

30 http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48370?1ang-en 

31https:ljclarionproject.org/cair-leader-tweets-support-convicted-terror-financiers/ 

32https:ljwww .algemeiner.com/2017/04/06/ egyptia ns-urge-us-lawmakers-to-designate-m us! i mbrotherhood-a-terrorist-organization/ 

33https://clarionproject.org/egypt-rounded-up-13-muslim-brotherhood-terrorists/ 

34https://clarionproject.org/muslim-brotherhood-insists-hamas-still-part-movement/ 

35 Centre of Religion and Geopolitics is run by the Tony Blair Faith Foundation. The report was endorsed 

by the government's independent reviewer of terrorism legislation David Anderson QC. 

http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/sites/default/files/Milestones-to-Militancy.pdf 

36https://www.globalmbresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/20090411 merley.usbrotherhood.pdf 

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Brotherhood, a supremacist political group. It will benefit the Muslim community since it will 

restrict the activities of the Brotherhood, thus reducing their influence as well as lessening the 

spectre of suspicion from other community organizations. 

However, we cannot simply ban the expression of all views we do not like. The right to free 

speech is embedded in the U.S. constitution for a reason and we don't want to set a chilling 

precedent for those who would critique established power structures. Therefore, we are careful 

not to erode the constitutional protections of free speech for all Americans. 

Recommendation: Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets 

terrorism and take legal action against those who are members of and finance the group. 

Remove Radicalization From American Education 

Our third recommendation is to overhaul funding systems to get extremist foreign funding out of 

American schools, campuses and mosques. 

In his inaugural address, President Trump said the United States will "unite the civilized world 

against radical Islamic terrorism which we will eradicate completely from the face of the earth."37 

Eliminating the ideology driving radical Islamic terrorism is the only way to eradicate it 

completely from the face of the earth. 

Eradicating it from the earth is the only way to ensure that it does not continue to germinate in a 

U.S. domestic context. 

Extremist foreign funding promotes ideas which do not directly promote terrorism but which 

promulgate regressive attitudes towards women, sexual minorities, non-Muslims and nonOrthodox Muslims. These ideas can lead people to become aligned with more radical positions 

gradually. 

Many individuals and groups that support the lslamist ideology or concepts within the Islamist 

ideology fluctuate between supporting violence and pursuing more peaceful approaches over 

time, or share the same overarching ideology as terrorists but don't act. This might be through 

fear of repercussions, laziness or they doubt terrorism can achieve the goal of establishing a 

global Islamic caliphate. It is almost impossible to tell exactly when such a person would make 

the shift from non-violent radicalization to violent radicalization and decide to carry out a terrorist 

attack. The trajectory is different for each person and many may never make the shift. There is no 

"conveyer belt" to radicalization and support for non-violent lslamism serves more as "mood 

music." 

Funding of US education imports hateful ideologies into this country. An effective way to tackle 

this "mood music" is to pull the plug on the money behind it. 

It is not just groups like the Muslim Brotherhood which are responsible for radicalization but also 

37https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address 

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states, in particular the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This is one of the rare points of bipartisan unity where both President Trump and former Democratic presidential nominee Hillary 

Clinton agreed. He called Saudi Arabia "the world's biggest funders of terrorism" while she 

called out their support for "radical schools and mosques around the world that have set too many 

young people on a path towards extremism."38 In the batch of emails released to Wikileaks, 

Hillary Clinton's campaign manager John Podesta wrote "We need to use our diplomatic and 

more traditional intelligence assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi 

Arabia, which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical 

Sunni groups in the region."39 Clinton said "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most 

significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide."40 

A senior Saudi official admitted to former U.S. official Zalmay Khalilzad in September 2016 that 

the Saudis have deliberately funded extremism worldwide. He told Khalilzad "we misled you" 

and "We did not own up to it after 9/11 because we feared you would abandon or treat us as the 

enemy. And we were in denial"41 

Saudi Arabia is thought to have spent between $70 to $100 billion funding their intolerant version 

of Islam worldwide.42 These state actors provide the ideological backdrop on which non-state 

extremist organizations are able to operate. 

Saudi Arabia has funded extremism right here in the United States. Through generous grants to 

Georgetown University they have established the Bridge Initiative, which ostensibly aims to 

bring East and West together but in reality acts as an organization dedicated to shutting down 

discussion of the problem of radicalization with accusations of Islamophobia. 43 

Saudi Arabia gave $20 million to Georgetown and $20 million to Harvard.44 A Saudi billionaire 

named as a defendant in a 9/11 lawsuit recently donated $10 million to establish a Center of 

Islamic Law and Civilization. 45.;

6 

In 2005 Freedom House analyzed some 200 extremists documents connected to Saudi Arabia in 

American mosques. These documents promoted supremacist attitudes, hatred of Jews and 

Christians, ultra-conservative gender positions and the murder of those who dare to leave Islam.47 

These books mirror those that are used in Saudi Arabia itself. 

In 2012 a group of former and current heads of American publishing houses were so concerned 

38https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam.html 

39https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-qa-is-saudi-arabia-funding-isis 

40https:l/www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-saudi-terrorist-funding 

41http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/saudi-arabia-terrorism-funding-214241 

42http ://www .lati mes .com/opinion/ op-ed/1 a-oe-wenar -saudi-arms-deal-2 01705 22 -storv. htm I 43http://bridge.georgetown.edu/ 

44http://abcnews.go.com/lnternational/story?id-1402008 

45http://www.huffingtonpost.com/omer-aziz/wahhabism-saudi-arabia-an b 8131838.html 

46https://clarionproject.org/omer-aziz-why-i-am-offended-saudi-arabias-funding-yale/ 

47https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline images/Saudi%20Publications%20on%20Hate%201d 

eology%201nvade%20American%20Mosques.pdf 

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by the extremism in Saudi textbooks that they called on Saudi Arabia to stop printing the hatred. 48 

The US Committee on International Religious Freedom is so worried about Saudi Arabia 

promoting extremism in 2017 they called on the US government to "Press the Saudi government 

to denounce pub! icly the continued use around the world of older versions of Saudi textbooks and 

other materials that promote hatred and intolerance, and to make every attempt to retrieve, or buy 

back, previously distributed materials that contain intolerance."49 

Saudi Arabia may be susceptible to pressure on this score, according to Brookings Institute 

scholar William McCants. McCants quotes unnamed foreign Muslim diplomats as saying that 

Saudi Arabia is more inclined to listen to American pressure to curtail its international missionary 

work than it has been in the past. 5° 

We can see how these hateful ideas foster an environment that encourages violent extremism. For 

example, a report by the UK's Henry Jackson Society found 44% of convicted terrorists were 

directly linked to proscribed organizations with an additional 28% being demonstrably inspired 

by the rhetoric of a proscribed terrorist organization. 51 Former radical turned counter-extremism 

activist Maajid Nawaz commented on the report that "This lone wolves myth needs to be 

debunked. The vast, overwhelming majority of terrorists are linked to networks that exist within 

our communities."52 

Every lone wolf is radicalized somehow, whether online, in a mosque, in prison or in person. 

Take the case of Mohammed Merah, who in 2012 murdered seven people in a series of attacks 

over nine days in France. Originally he was described by Bernard Squarcini, head of French 

Intelligence, as a "lone wolf' but was later shown to have travelled to Pakistan and briefly trained 

there with a jihadi group linked to al-Qaeda. Later on the French Interior Minister, Bernard 

Cazeneuve described Merah a "lone wolf' as a mistake.53 

These networks are incubated in a hostile environment created by importing the supremacist 

ideology of hate as taught by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 

They were instrumental in 9/11. When 28 pages of the 9/11 commission report, which had 

previously been hidden from the public were finally revealed, they show worrying links between 

Saudi Arabia and the 9.11 hijackers, fifteen of whom were Saudi citizens. Although there was no 

definitive link proven, numerous reports from FBI agents say that two people who may have been 

in contact with the hijackers may have been Saudi intelligence agents, among other troubling 

connections. 54 Additionally these 28 pages were suppressed for years rather than reveal 

connections to Saudi Arabia. 

48http://www.thedailybeast.com/saudi-textbooks-incite-hate-say-leaders-in-american-publishing 

49http ://www. usci rf.gov I sites/ d efa u lt/fi les/SaudiAra bia .2017 .pdf 

sohttps://www. brookings .edu/blog/markaz/2017 /05/1 0/tru m p-shou ld-push-th e-sa udis-to-sca le-backproselytizing-they-may-be-more-responsive-than-you-think/ 

s

1

http://henryjacksonsoci ety .org/wp-content/uploads/2017 /03/lsla mist-Terrorism-! nfographic. pdf 

s

2

http:l/www.lbc.eo.uk/radio/presenters/maajid-nawaz/maajid-on-whats-really-causing-radicalisation/ 

53https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017 /mar/30/myth-lone-wolf-terrorist 

s

4http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/287947-congress-publishes-redacted-28-pages-from-9-11-report 

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At the current time, British Prime Minister Theresa May is under fire for her refusal to publish a 

government report into foreign funding of extremism, which is thought to focus on Saudi Arabia. 

55 The Home Office said it may never be published, terming its contents "very sensitive." She is 

being accused of selling out British security and values in exchange for financial gain in the light 

of recent British arms sales to Saudi Arabia. 5657 

The United States must not similarly put its national security at risk purely to avoid risking 

ruffling the feathers of a foreign power which is funding the importation of a dangerous, 

totalitarian, political ideology into our borders. 

If the ideology is being imported from abroad, the United States should not use federal funds to 

support institutions which promulgate hatred within this country. Many institutions which receive 

funding from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to teach "Islamic Civilization" also receive money from the 

federal government as regulated under Title IX. 

According to the US Justice Department, "The principal objective of Title IX is to avoid the use 

of federal money to support sex discrimination in education programs. " 58 How can this objective 

be upheld while supporting institutions which are in part funded by the only country in the world 

that operates a system of legalized gender apartheid? What message does this send to female 

students studying in colleges partially funded by the House of Saud? 

I call upon this august body not to allow the misuse of congressionally allocated funds to support 

institutions that take money from theocratic governments. President of the Foundation for the 

Defense of Democracies Clifford May explained that "Departments on Middle Eastern studies 

tend to be dominated by professors tuned to the concerns of Arab and Muslim rulers. It's very 

difficult for scholars who don't follow this line to get jobs and tenure on college campuses."59 We 

look to these iconic universities to prepare a next generation of leaders who will be attuned to the 

complexities of the world and America's place in it in a way that supports human rights values. 

How can we do so if those who are educating them about the Middle East and bought and paid 

for by some of the most repressive and extreme regimes in the world? 

Recommendation: An overhaul offederal funding systems to ensure money from theocratic 

states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar is not allowed into the United States to promote 

extremist ideas. 

Include the Voices of Moderate Muslims 

Our fourth and final recommendation is for the government to liaise with the appropriate parties 

55https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017 /jun/05/theresa-may-urged-not-to-suppress-report-intofunding-of-iihadi-groups 

56http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-saudi-arabia-theresa-may-allies-liam-fox-trades-dealseurope-beware-a766474l.html 

57 https ://www. th eguardia n .com/world/20 17 /feb/05/ most -britons-believe-selling-arms-to-saud is-isunacceptable 

58https://www.justice.gov/crt/overview-title-ix-education-amendments-1972-20-usc-1681-et-seq 

59http://www.meforum.org/6205/foreign-muslim-funding-western-universities 

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when addressing this issue. 

A diverse sets of sources is the bedrock of effective policy. I call upon Congress to empower 

those Muslims who are leading the fight against radical Islam to have a seat at the table. By 

contrast, Mohammed Elibiary, a former DHS agent helped draft CVE guidelines that advised not 

working with reformist Muslims on the grounds of considering us an "interest group" that will be 

biased, not considering the biased nature of Muslim Brotherhood connections.60Elibiary is openly 

pro Muslim Brotherhood and was mentored by Shukri Abu Baker, who is now in prison for 

funding Hamas as a result of the Holy Land Foundation Trial.61 In a 2013 interview with 

Professor Ryan Mauro of the Clarion Project, Elibiary said "Our government needs to deepen our 

strategic engagement with MB."62 

Yet despite the manifest extremist connections, individuals like Elibiary were able to gain access 

to the higher echelons of power and shape policy in a way that actively covered for extremists. 

This influence has helped to tar many reformists and counter-Islamists as bigots when in fact 

what they are doing is taking on the extremist ideology supported by groups like the Muslim 

Brotherhood. 

As recently as May 4, the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Egyptian Americans For Freedom And 

Justice lobbied on Capitol Hill to oppose the delegation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 

organization. The assembled company included Ayat Oraby who has said she finds the killing of 

Egyptian soldiers by terrorists "funny." Last year she released a shockingly bigoted anti-Copt rant 

in which she said "The Crescent Must Always Be on Top of the Cross."63 

Other groups have opposed the implementation ofCVE altogether. The United States Council of 

Muslim Organizations (USCMO), an umbrella organization of many different Muslim 

organizations, issued a statement in 20 15 which concluded (among other things) that "Given the 

low-level of confidence in government-led CVE, the USCMO believes it is best to identify and 

support community-driven best practices."64 

The Muslim Brotherhood-linked Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) was invited to 

the White House 20 times between 2008 and 2012.65 Not only that, but according to a 20 II 

Gallup poll, only 12% of American men and II% of American women feel that CAlR represents 

them. 66 

According to its website, "CAIR believes that government led-CVE is not an effective use of 

public resources." Instead, CAIR argues "The Department of Justice should issue guidelines, 

similar to Good Samaritan laws, to protect those who act in good faith to prevent violent 

extremism by engaging with those considering it in order to dissuade them," effectively 

subcontracting CVE work to self-styled Muslim community organizations. 

60https://clarionproject.org/us-govt-radical-muslims-approved-moderates-shunned/ 

61https://clarionoroject.org/brotherhood-promoter-resigns-dhs-focus-gop-party/ 

62https:Uclarionproject.org/disturbing-facts-about-senior-homeland-security-adviser/ 

63https://www.memri.org/tv/ny-based-egyptian-american-activist-ayat-oraby-calls-economic-boycottcopts-crescent-must-always 

64http://www.shuracouncil.org/Shura/USCMO On CVE Statement.pdf 

65https:/lwww. i nvestigativeproject.org/3 777/ a-red-carpet-for-radicals-at-the-white-house# 66https://www.commentarymagazine.com/culture-civilization/religion/islam/poll-american-muslims-cair/ 

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CAIR has submitted testimony to congress many times, including in 2015 on the issue of"the 

constitutional and counter-terrorism implications of targeted killing."67 Whilst it is important that 

the state acts within the bounds of morality and law when carrying out targeted assassinations of 

terrorists abroad, we question the wisdom of relying for testimony on an organization with whom 

the FBI refuses to work because of evidence linking them to Hamas. 68 

Other organizations such as the ACLU have pushed communities to reject all CVE initiatives.69 

Clarion Project and the Muslim Reform movement have a lot more faith in the United States 

government than in CAIR and want to see robust and effective CVE and CNVE programs run by 

the government. 

Clarion Project has, behind the scenes, been educating law enforcement for years on the threat of 

radical Islam and how to correctly identifY it. These kinds of training sessions are essential if 

staffers working at government agencies are to have the proper tools to be able to identify and 

counter extremism when they encounter it. 

Clarion believes this type of training should be expanded to include sector-appropriate CVE and 

CVNE training for nurses, teachers, city hall staff, social workers and other public sector 

employees who are in positions where they work with the public and will be interacting with 

individuals at risk of radicalization. We firmly believe that prevention is better than cure. When 

on the ground staff are sufficiently trained to respond appropriately, problems can be dealt with 

before they fester and without necessarily involving the resources of law enforcement. 

Your invitation to me to speak to you today is clear evidence that the United States government is 

clearly interested in turning over a new chapter in its countering extremism policy and has 

already begun to implement this recommendation of speaking with the right people on this issue. 

If the United States wishes to be serious about countering extremism the government would do 

well to listen to a wide variety of voices who represent the true spectrum of Muslim thought 

rather than a narrow coterie of conservative activists. 

Recommendation: Ensure that a diverse spectrum of Muslim figures, including academics, 

activists and theologians, are invited to give evidence and to advise on the policy formation 

process, rather than leaving the field to self-styled community representatives, many of whom 

have links to the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Identify Potential Strategic Improvements 

To conclude, we have four key policy proposals. 

• Clearly and accurately name the ideology as a political ideology which seeks to impose 

the religion of Islam onto others and implement sharia as state law, thereby enabling a 

67https://www.cair.com/government-affairs/11869-drone-wars-the-constitutional-and-counterterrorismimplications-of-targeted-killing.html 

68https://www.investigativeproject.org/3777 /a-red-carpet-for-radicals-at-the-white-house# 69https://aclum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/cve-flyer.pdf 

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proper discussion of the issue without tarring the religion of Islam with the same brush. 

We believe this necessitates the inclusion of Countering Non-Violent Extremism (CNVE) 

in addition to the government's existing policies of Countering Violent Extremism 

(CVE). 

• Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism. 

• Take steps to prevent funding of U.S. educational institutions and mosques by foreign 

extremist sources. 

• Start listening to moderates such as the Muslim Reform Movement and we would be 

happy to provide a list of recommended figures from across the Muslim community 

spectrum. 

14 
33 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

I now recognize Mr. Adnan Kifayat for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ADNAN KIFAYAT 

Mr. KIFAYAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to 

speak before you on behalf of Gen Next. My name is Adnan 

Kifayat. I’m the head of global security for Gen Next Ventures. 

Gen Next Foundation leverages a venture philanthropy model to 

help private sector individuals use their talents, knowledge, and resources to solve big challenges, and countering violent extremism 

in the homeland is one of our core areas of focus. 

I come here before you as a private citizen, but before I became 

a private citizen again, I served in government in a number of roles 

at the Treasury Department, the State Department, and the White 

House for both Democratic and Republican administrations. I first 

became involved in countering violent extremism work when I was 

at the National Security Council under President Bush. Back then, 

we used to call it the ‘‘War of Ideas.’’It is now commonly referred 

to as countering violent extremism, but we must always recognize 

that in the 15 years since 9/11, we have learned a great deal about 

the enemy, about what the enemy uses, and how the enemy 

radicalizes, recruits, and activates would-be terrorists. 

When I served in government, I had always hoped and sometimes daydreamt that there would be outside entities in the private 

sector that were keeping pace with the threat that we’re finding 

real-world solutions to this menace. These entities could do what 

government alone was not equipped to do. They could innovate, 

they could keep pace with the internet, they could use new and sophisticated technologies, and they could take risks that sometimes 

government is unable to take. 

Today, there are small but committed groups of people, including 

Gen Next, who are finding ways to rally American ingenuity and 

creativity to counter homegrown terrorism. There are strong and 

powerful growing voices in the private sector that are echoing 

across our country, and I urge you to listen to those voices and the 

solutions that they are finding. 

Five years ago, Gen Next Foundation, Google Ideas, and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue launched the first-ever global network of former extremists called the Against Violent Extremism 

network. AVE, which now numbers 470 members, uses the voices 

of former extremists both online and offline to dissuade youth all 

over the world from being radicalized and recruited by groups like 

ISIS and al-Qaida. Almost 1,000 online interventions have taken 

place and hundreds of deradicalizations through person-to-person 

engagement have occurred. 

Since our initial investment, multinational corporations, international institutions, and foundations have all helped scale AVE’s 

footprint because it works. Last year, Gen Next helped launch the 

first-even online effort to redirect at-risk youth searching for in 

that terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaida put out there towards 

content that is nonviolent and non-extremist. By using marketing 

and advertising techniques, our partnership with Google Jigsaw, 

and experts at Moonshot CVE, known as the Redirect Method, is 


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leveling the playing field online and challenging the narrative of 

the terrorists. 

There are many other examples of the private sector organizing, 

Mr. Chairman. I have submitted those in the written testimony for 

additional study. Last year, I co-chaired the Department of Homeland Security’s Advisory Subcommittee report on countering violent 

extremism, which had strong bipartisan support. It detailed a national blueprint for partnering with city leaders, mayors, local leaders, as well as the private sector. 

In today’s complex maze of networks, we can’t just pay lip service 

to partnering with people outside of Washington. We have to find 

concrete ways to do so. Some of these efforts will require resources 

like money, talent, and access to technology or just convening. 

While Gen Next Foundation serves as a convener and incubator of 

new solutions in the private sector, this space is by no means saturated. As an example, the government has done with the defense 

and intelligence communities through organizations like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and In-Q–Tel 

to bridge the divide between public and private sectors, provide 

risk capital, eliminate some unnecessary and slow processes, develop key performance indicators and measurements that work, 

and potentially reduce some of the fierce politicization of this issue 

so that we can get to finding solutions. 

We know today that to be lured by Islamist or jihadist ideologist, 

one can be rich or poor, boy or girl, religiously observant or not. 

The threat is varied, and we have to find varied solutions to this 

threat. 

The examples I’ve shared with you, AVE and Redirect are just 

two examples. We must work together and welcome innovation and 

risk-taking in the private sector if we are to truly find solutions to 

counter homegrown extremism that leads to terrorism. 

Mr. Chairman and ranking member and members of the subcommittee, today, we must fight the War of Ideas radically different than we did 15 years ago. There are solutions out there 

today, and there are solutions waiting to be found. Thank you very 

much. 

[Prepared statement of Adnan Kifayat follows:] 


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U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on National Security ofthe 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

"Combating Homegrown Terrorism" 

July 27, 2017 

Remarks by Adnan Kifayat 

Head of Global Security Ventures, Gen Next Foundation 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee on National Security, thank you 

for this opportunity to testify before you on "Combating Homegrown Terrorism." 

My name is Adnan Kifayat and I am honored to be here on behalf of the Gen Next 

Foundation, a community of private sector leaders who are passionate about finding 

solutions to some of the greatest challenges our country faces today. 

In the tradition of John D. Rockefeller, III, the Gen Next Foundation leverages 

a venture philanthropy model to help private sector individuals use their talents, 

knowledge, and resources to solve big challenges. Countering violent extremism in 

the homeland is one of our core areas of focus. 

I come here before you today as a private citizen. Before I became, again, a 

private citizen, I served in a number of senior roles, under both Republican and 

Democratic Administrations, for four secretaries of state, and five secretaries of the 

treasury. 

I first became involved in countering violent extremism while coordinating 

counter terrorism policy at the National Security Council in 2007. Back then, it was 

known as the "war of ideas"- a battle of narratives. Since then, as we have learned 

more about the enemy, the "war of ideas" has evolved into what is commonly 

referred to as "countering violent extremism." Indeed, there has been an evolution 

in our understanding of the tactics terrorist organizations use to radicalize, recruit, 

and activate would-be terrorists. As our enemy evolves and grows more 

sophisticated, we must find ways to cull the private sector for the best solutions, and 

ensure that we stay several steps ahead of those who would do us harm. 

When I had the honor of serving at the White House for President Bushand later at the State Department under Secretaries Rice, Clinton and Kerry - I had 

always hoped that there were nimble and innovative private sector entities out 

there to evolve with the threat, finding real-world solutions to this menace. These 

entities could do what government alone is not equipped to do. What we Jacked in 

funding at the federal level, we made up for with an abundance of faith in the power 

of the private sector. 

Today, there are small but committed groups of people, including Gen Next, 

who are finding ways to rally American ingenuity to counter homegrown terrorism. 

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From big companies to small start-ups, we all realize that violent extremism is 

dangerous and destructive we must also realize that it's everyone's responsibility 

to confront it. There are strong, powerful and growing voices in the private sector 

that are echoing across our country, and we must listen to what they are saying. 

Five years ago, the Gen Next Foundation, Google Ideas and the Institute for 

Strategic Dialogue (ISD) launched the Against Violent Extremism Network (AVE). 

AVE was the first global network of former extremists who provide their powerful 

and authentic voices to the world - both online and offline -to dissuade youth all 

over the world from being radicalized and recruited by groups like ISIS and AI Qaida 

(AQ). Today there are 4 70 members in that network. Almost a thousand online 

interventions have taken place and hundreds of deradicalizations, through personto-person engagement, have occurred. For example, a member of AVE successfully 

helped prevent a young girl in Washington state, a Sunday school teacher named 

Alex, from getting on a plane to become an ISIS bride. Governments across the globe 

have adopted the model of utilizing former extremists and survivors of terrorism. 

Since our initial investment, multinational corporations, international institutions 

and foundations have all taken note and expanded AVE's footprint- because it 

works. 

Last year, Gen Next helped launched the first online effort to redirect at-risk 

youth, searching for information about terrorist groups like ISIS and AQ, toward 

content that is nonviolent and non-extremist. By using marketing and advertising 

techniques, our partnership with Google Jigsaw and experts at MoonshotCVE, 

known as the Redirect Method, is leveling the playing field online. We are plugging 

the hole in the communications gap and standing up to violent extremist content. 

This venture was inspired by national security and entirely driven, tested and 

launched by the private sector: technologists, engineers, subject matter experts and 

venture philanthropists finding a solution. 

There are other examples of the private sector organizing itself in this space. 

From passionate filmmakers, writers and producers in Hollywood, to world-class 

talent in our universities and research institutions, to business and community 

leaders who are positive role models - many private sector leaders want to find 

antidotes to homegrown terrorism. When Government finds ways to support and 

encourage more of these efforts, everyone wins- except for the violent extremists, 

of course. 

For example, a peer-to-peer effort, the Global Digital Challenge, is leveraging 

university students to develop anti-extremist campaigns and tools across the globe. 

Lessons learned from deradicalizing neo-Nazis in Europe are being used to 

deradicalize Jihadists. Cartoons like Average Mohamed and Abdullah-X are reaching 

at-risk audiences with positive messages in Minneapolis, London and beyond. 

Technology used to remove child pornography from the internet is being adapted to 

detect and remove the worst of online terrorist content. Simply put, there are many 

promising examples of the private sector using technology and creativity to fight 

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homegrown terrorism that we should encourage and strengthen. Inaction is simply 

not an option and we can't say there aren't examples out there. 

We must do everything we can to encourage the development of these 

campaigns, tools and platforms that will challenge and defeat violent extremism 

now and far into the future because the threat is continually evolving: After AQ 

there was ISIS, and after ISIS we will be met with its more insidious offspring. 

Despite our advances on the battlefield, the war of hateful ideology will long persist. 

Last year, I co-chaired the Department of Homeland Security's Advisory Sub 

Committee Report on Countering Violent Extremism which had strong bipartisan 

support. It detailed a national blueprint for partnership and action across aliSO 

states. It called on mayors and city leaders to take the lead, and it called on the 

federal government to do more to engage local leaders. In today's maze of complex 

networks, we can't just pay lip service to partnering with people outside 

Washington, we must find concrete ways to do so. 

Partnering with the private sector can not be, should not be and does not 

need to be an antagonistic undertaking. There are many good people in many 

organizations across the country who want to help - they only need an extended 

hand, not a wagging finger. The challenge for government is not a lack of such 

energy but finding effective mechanisms to channel and unleash it. Good old 

fashioned diplomacy should be government's first line of engagement with the 

private sector. Cooperation and collaboration should be the shared goal. 

Some of these efforts will also require resources like money, talent or access 

to technology. While Gen Next Foundation serves as a convener and incubator of 

new solutions, driven entirely by the private sector, this space is by no means 

saturated. As we have done with the defense and intelligence communities - both 

of which are innovative, sophisticated, and the envy of the world- a dedicated 

quasi government entity such as DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency) or a non profit venture capital firm like In-Q-Tel (IQT) can help bridge the 

divide between public and private, provide risk capital, eliminate some unnecessary 

and slow processes and outdated measurements, and potentially reduce the fierce 

politicization of this issue. 

We have moved beyond asking ourselves the simplistic question of "Why do 

they hate us?" and measuring ourselves against a yardstick of popularity and 

assuming that "if they just knew us better, they would like us, and if they liked us, 

they won't kill us." We have moved beyond just "winning hearts and minds." The 

basic narrative the enemy employs is based on "us versus them." It's a strategy of 

divide and conquer. We know today that to be lured by Islamist or Jihadist ideology, 

one can be rich or poor, a boy or girl, religiously observant or not. The 

demographics we are dealing with are varied, and they require varied solutions. 

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We know more about behavioral psychology, sociological drivers, and mental 

health than ever before. While there are still gaps in our understanding, we know 

that the narratives terrorist recruiters use to radicalize and activate are far more 

basic to human nature than a simple religious text, foreign policy argument, or 

ethnic or cultural excuse. 

We also know that the vast majority of radicalization- at least the inception 

of the process - is happening online. The same internet that helps shape our 

society for good is the same that can be darkly manipulated to seed hatred and 

destruction from within. 

The last two Administrations understood that giant tectonic plates of culture, 

identity and civilization are colliding against each other: young people are not just 

observing these collisions, but they are also a part of the conversations shaping 

them. The last two Administrations also realized that we will never, ever get ahead 

of this problem without unleashing the power of our people, the private sector and 

institutions across the country to take control of the conversation- to take control 

away from groups like ISIS and AI Qaida. 

Those conversations, I can tell you, are not happening enough here in 

Washington, D.C. They are happening in your states, in your districts, at the 

community and city level. Through one of our ventures, for example, we are learning 

about some of the geographies in the US where online searches for violent extremist 

content is taking place places like California, Texas, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. 

These conversations are happening incredibly fast, and, all too often the bad guys' 

propaganda is at the ready, shaping that conversation. Homegrown violent 

extremism is a common threat that manifests itself locally and rapidly. 

While we have grown smarter about how to organize and what tools to use, 

our enemy has also grown more sophisticated in their techniques. Not because they 

are better or smarter- most certainly not- but because they are committed, 

organized and learning. They run a 24/7 radicalizing and recruitment machine 

sustained by a well-funded, complex network of supporters around the world. It is 

highly nimble, and it evolves with the internet, using hidden networks of content 

production, distribution, amplification, and of course financing. 

The examples I have shared with you, AVE and Redirect, are just two 

examples of the private sector innovating in this space. We must work together and 

welcome innovation if we want to counter violent extremism that leads to terrorism. 

We must fight the "war of ideas" today radically differently than we did 15 years 

ago. There are solutions out there now, and there are solutions waiting to be found. 

We just need to get it done. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee. 

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Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Hughes, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SEAMUS HUGHES 

Mr. HUGHES. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to be invited to speak here 

on the threat of homegrown terrorism and efforts to prevent it. 

As the chairman noted, homegrown terrorism inspired by groups 

like ISIS has been a persistent threat in the U.S. The FBI has reported some thousand active investigations in all 50 States. Since 

March 2014, 120 individuals have been charged with terrorism-related activities in connection to ISIS. A near majority were accused 

of attempting to travel or successfully traveling to the so-called caliphate. Nearly 30 percent were accused of domestic plotting. 

These individuals represent a very diverse group. Their backgrounds vary. There’s not a typical profile of an ISIS recruit. 

They’re old, they’re young, they’re rich, they’re poor. It runs the 

spectrum. 

A careful review of the cases points to a mobilization of individuals and not necessarily a widespread community-level phenomenon. It is homegrown terroism in the truest form of the word. 

They are born and raised here. The vast majority are U.S. citizens 

or legal permanent residents. 

While considerably smaller than other Western countries, ISIS 

mobilization in the United States is unprecedented. The backbone 

of the response has been through traditional counterterrorism approaches. However, they must be augmented with other non-law 

enforcement efforts. As such, the U.S. must develop a more robust, 

transparent, and effective domestic prevention program. 

The U.S.’s domestic Countering Violent Extremism or CVE program efforts can best be understood in a series of fits and starts. 

In 2011, the U.S. Government released their first domestic CVE 

strategy. It was broken up in three parts: first, enhanced engagement with communities; second, build expertise with State and 

local officials; and three, counter extremist propaganda. The strategy was explicit in acknowledging that no new resources would be 

devoted to the issue. Local officials, particularly U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, were directed to use existing funding. The Federal Government provided guidance where needed. This new approach was introduced to hesitant local officials and community partners, which 

struggled to understand the intricacies of radicalization and recruitment. 

As a result of a lack of an explicit definition of CVE and direction 

for CVE, it became a catchall phrase for programming from broadbased engagement on non-terrorism-related programming to more 

direct one-on-one intervention of radicalized individuals. Lacking 

dedicated funding and a focused resource, government officials 

struggled to complete the strategy’s goals and objectives. 

It is with that backdrop that the previous administration refocused their efforts on three pilot cities. Minneapolis focused largely on societal-level issues or what they saw as societal-level issues, 

Boston on individualized intervention programs, and Los Angeles 

primarily on community engagement. 


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Following the completion of the pilot program, the U.S. Government created a CVE Task Force. This interagency group, with a rotating leadership from DHS and DOJ, would be comprised of 

detailees from various different agencies, a hub of CVE activity. 

There are a few challenges to quickly note. Radicalization is not 

a linear process. Humans by their very nature are complex. We 

float in and out of our extreme. There’s not a step-by-step guide for 

why individuals join terrorist organizations, while others with similar experiences do not. Conversely, the radicalization disengagement does not adhere to a straight-line path. Developing CVE programs must not fall in a trap of one-size-fits-all. 

The administration’s proposed budget significantly curtails CVE 

funding. While the continuation of DHS grants or more focused 

continuation of DHS grants is a step in the right direction, the 

ability to scale up these projects without an influx of new grant 

funding is doubtful. Moreover, the proposed budget cuts to reduce 

the number of employees at DHS and other agencies that serve the 

CVE task force may limit our innovation in the future. 

CVE efforts in the previous administration and the current one 

has largely focused on one form of extremism. The previous administration, while not explicit in its public messaging but clearly in 

its implementation, focused nearly entirely on countering ISIS-inspired terrorism. By nearly all outward accounts, the current administration also indicates this singular focus. Of course, there 

should be a prioritization of resources, but CVE programs would do 

well to concentrate not only on the threat posed by individuals like 

Omar Mateen but also those by the Dylann Roofs of the world. 

Domestic CVE is in a tenuous state. Decisions by government 

and community partners in the coming months will determine 

whether CVE is truly a viable option. CVE is a delicate tool, if 

properly implemented, can help sway young men and women away 

from radicalization and violence. And families that I met with in 

Minneapolis, in Boston, individuals who have dealt with loved ones 

who’ve joined terrorist organizations and are grappling with these 

questions, we haven’t provided them any form of support from the 

Federal Government or local effort. We need to step up and provide 

this. And by the way, it’s also an important goal to help adjust resources for the Federal Government so the FBI can focus on more 

immediate threats, while communities and non-governmental partners can focus on other things. 

Thank you, and I welcome your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Seamus Hughes follows:] 


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Program on Extremism 

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Combating Homegrown Terrorism 

Written testimony of: 

Seamus Hughes 

Deputy Director, Program on Extremism 

The George Washington University 

Before the U.S. House of Representatives Oversight and Government Reform 

July27,2017 
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Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to be 

invited to speak on the threat of homegrown terrorism in the United States and efforts to prevent 

it. 

The Islamic State's American Adherents 

Homegrown extremism inspired by groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) has been 

a persistent threat for the United States. The FBI reportedly has over 1,000 active terrorism 

investigations in all 50 states.1 At least 250 U.S. persons have attempted to or have traveled to 

join extremist groups in Syria or Iraq.2 Since March 2014, 128 individuals have been charged 

with terrorism-related activities in connection with IS. A near majority were accused of 

attempting to travel or successfully traveled abroad to Syria or Iraq. Nearly 30% were accused of 

being involved in plots to carry out attacks on U.S. soil. 3 

These individuals are quite a diverse group. Their backgrounds vary, from a minor from South 

Carolina to interested in traveling to the so-called Caliphate, to a 31-year-old man coordinating 

Syrian extremist organizations' pledges of allegiance to IS from a New York pizza shop. A 

careful review of the cases points to a mobilization of individuals, not a widespread communitylevel phenomenon. 

It is a 'homegrown' phenomenon in the truest sense of the word. The vast majority are U.S. 

citizens or legal permanent residents. 

Individuals in America were drawn to the Islamic State for a variety of reasons. By in large, 

early cases appear to indicate a sense of moral responsibility to fight against the atrocities 

committed by Bashar al-Assad. Shortly after the announcement of the Caliphate in June 2014, 

the motivations of Americans inspired by the IS largely shifted towards perceived religious 

obligations and the hope to live in what they saw as a perfect society. This call was reinforced by 

a sustained online campaign by IS and its supporters to encourage Westerns to travel to Syria and 

Iraq. 

Other Western countries have experienced much larger IS-related mobilizations than the United 

States. Though, in the American context, the current mobilization has been unprecedented. 

Traditional counterterrorism approaches form the backbone of the US response. However, this 

strategy must be augmented and complemented by initiatives that extend beyond law 

enforcement efforts. In this regard, the U.S. must develop a more robust, transparent, and 

effective domestic prevention program. 

1 Mali, Meghashyam. 2015. "FBI Investigating ISIS Suspects in All 50 States." The Hill. February 25. 

http:/ /thehi!l.comjblogs/blog-briefing-room/233832-fbi-investigating-isis-suspects-in-all-SO·states. 2 Schmitt, Eric, and Somini Sengupta. 2015. "Thousands Enter Syria to join ISIS Despite Global Efforts." The 

New York Times, September 26, sec. Middle East. 

https:/ jwww.nytimes.com/2015/09/27 jworld/middleeast/thousands-enter-syria-to-join-isis-despiteglobal-efforts.html. 

3 "GW Extremism Tracker- June 201 7". Program on Extremism, 

https: I I extremism.gwu.ed u /sites I extrem ism.gwu.edu/files /)une%2 02 017%2 0 Update.pdf 
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Countering Violent Extremism 

The United States' domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts can best be understood 

as a series of fits and starts. In August 20 ll, the U.S. Government released their first domestic 

CVE strategy, entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism.4 The strategy 

contained three elements: l) enhancing engagement with communities 2) building state and local 

expertise on CVE and 3) countering violent extremist messaging. The strategy directed efforts 

away from federal programs and placed the onus on local governments and partners to 

implement its goals. A few months later, the strategy was accompanied by a Strategic 

Implementation Plan (SIP) which outlined the roles and responsibilities of four primary agencies, 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, the Department of 

Justice, and the National Counterterrorism Center ("The Group ofFour").5 The SIP, like the 

strategy, was explicit in acknowledging that no new resources would be devoted to the issue. 

Local officials, specifically, U.S. Attorney offices in the field, were directed to use existing 

funding. The federal government would provide guidance where needed. 

This new approach was introduced to hesitant local officials and community partners, who 

struggled to understand the intricacies of radicalization and prevention of terrorism. Due to the 

lack of an explicit definition of and direction for CVE, it became a catch all phrase for a large 

swath of programming, from broad-based community engagement on non-terrorism related 

issues to more direct one-on-one intervention programs for radicalized individuals. Civil rights 

and civil liberties organizations rallied to stymie CVE efforts, which they saw as, among other 

concerns, government overreach.6 Some CVE opponents have very legitimate concerns; others 

simply used the beleaguered issue as an opportunity to attack a larger counterterrorism approach 

(primarily unconnected to CVE) that they disagreed with. Lacking dedicated funding and 

personnel, government officials struggled to complete the Strategy's goals and objectives. 

Under this backdrop, the previous Administration refocused domestic CVE efforts on three pilot 

cities. Boston, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Los Angeles became the incubators of the national 

strategy. Each city took a decidedly different approach to implementation. Minneapolis-St. Paul 

focused on societal-level concerns, Boston on interventions for radicalized individuals, and Los 

Angeles primarily on community engagement. 

Following the completion of the pilot program, the Group of Four, with support from the White 

House, created a CVE taskforce. This interagency group, with rotating leadership from DHS and 

DOJ, would be comprised ofdetailees from various agencies, complimented by a cadre ofDHS 

employees. In October of 2016, the Department of Homeland Security issued its Strategy for 

Countering Violent Extremism. The stated aim of the strategy is to ensure that "communities 

possess the information, resources, and tools to effectively counter radicalization and recruitment 

4 "Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States". The White House, August 

2011. https:ffwww.dhs.gov /sites/ default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf 5 "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 

States'". The White House, December 2011. https:f/obamawhitehouse.archives.govfsitesfdefault/files/sipfinal.pdf 

6 "Coalition Letter to Obama Administration on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Program". ACLU, 

December 8, 2014. https:/ jwww.aclu.org/otherjcoalition-letter-obama-administration-countering-violentextremism-cve-program 
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to violence" by the year 2019.7 Under the scope of this strategy, DHS seeks to achieve several 

objectives, including: I) broadening the research base of the department on violent extremism, 

radicalization, and CVE programs; 2) disseminating findings to community partners in order to 

sufficiently prepare them to participate in CVE; 3) providing support to community 

organizations undertaking CVE projects; and 4) clearly defining measurements and benchmarks 

for what constitutes a "successful" CVE program.8 

Congress approved funding for DHS to award grants for CVE initiatives nationwide as part of 

the CVE Grant Program in 2015.9 DHS issued its first call for CVE grant applications in July of 

2016, and sought to provide over $10 million to 60 local organizations nationwide. 10 For 

community organizations, the program's areas of focus within CVE were resilience-building, 

training and engaging with community members to pursue CVE projects, and building capacities 

for intervention programs; applicants from the non-profit sector and academia were challenged to 

develop counter-narrative programs and assisting community organizations in designing 

programs. 11 In June 2017, DHS Secretary Kelly announced the results of the application 

process: 26 organizations, spanning the five target areas, received funding. 12 The current 

Administration's proposed budget significantly curtails CVE funding. While the continuation of 

current DHS grants for community-based CVE programs is a step in the right direction, the 

ability to "scale up" these projects without an influx of additional grant funding is doubtful. 

Moreover, the proposed budget cuts reduce the number of employees at DHS and other agencies 

that can serve on the CVE taskforce, limiting the possibility that interagency cooperation will 

result in innovative program design and management in the future. 

Unfortunately, there are very few built-in advocates ofCVE efforts in the United States. On one 

side of the political spectrum, CVE is seen as thought policing and stigmatizing. On the other 

side, it is considered too soft of an approach for a problem as serious as terrorism. I share many 

of my colleagues' concerns on both sides. There is little to no benefit for advocating for CVE. 

However, my views are shaped by years of traveling around the country meeting with American 

Muslim community members, with various backgrounds and personal concerns, who want to 

engage on these issues in a thoughtful and productive way. The views are also guided by 

interviews of family members of those who joined terrorist organizations, or were arrested prior 

to committing a violent act: these families had no tools available to intervene and potentially 

their loved ones from a violent path. I believe it is morally binding on government and civil 

society to provide avenues for prevention. Furthermore, there is a public policy benefit to get 

prevention right, so that law enforcement has the bandwidth to tackle more immediate threats. 

Domestic CVE efforts should largely focus on deradicalization and disengagement programs 

aimed at radicalized individuals. Those programs have the best chance for measures of 

7 Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, October 28, 2016. 

https: I jwww.dhs.gov I sites I default/files jpu blications /16 _1 0 2 8 _S 1_ CVE_strategy.pdf 8 Ibid. 

9 Fact Sheet: FY 2016 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grants. July 6, 2016. 

https:/ /www.dhs.gov /news/2016/07 /06/fy-2016-countering-violent-extremism-cve-grants 

1o Ibid. 

11 1bid. 

12 DHS Countering Violent Extremism Grants. June 23, 2017. https:/ jwww.dhs.gov jcvegrants 
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effectiveness and limiting some of the civil liberties concerns that arise from broad based 

community engagement. 

Additional challenges: 

• Radicalization is not a linear process. There is not a step by step guide to why some 

individuals join terrorist organizations, while others with similar experiences do not. 

Conversely, deradicalization and disengagement also does not adhere to a straight-line 

path. Developing countering violent extremism programs must not fall into the trap of 

one-size fits all approach. 

• Current federal CVE initiatives show a preference for broad-based messaging programs 

over one-on-one interventions. In our review ofislamic State-related cases in the United 

States, many exhibited warning signs. Without targeted intervention programs, some 

outside the scope of law enforcement, individuals concerned by the radicalization of 

someone close to them must either report them to the FBI, which may result in decadeslong prison sentences, or keep the information to themselves and hope for the best. In this 

case, families must have access to a "third way", based on one-on-one deradicalization or 

disengagement programs that have been tried and tested in various European countries, 

that allow the individual to disembark from the path of radicalization while providing an 

alternative to arrests and lengthy prison sentences. 

• CVE efforts in both the previous Administration and the current one appeared to 

considerably target only one form of extremism. The previous Administration, while not 

explicit in its public messaging, but clearly in its implementation, focused almost entirely 

on countering Islamic State-inspired terrorism. The current Administration's withdrawing 

of a grant award to an organization that counters white supremacist-inspired terrorism 

indicates a similar, singular focus. CVE programs would do well to concentrate not only 

on the threat posed by individuals such as Omar Mateen, but also others like Dylan Roof. 

• As territory held by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq contracts, the United States is 

faced with the prospect of returning foreign fighters. This threat is substantially less 

pressing in the U.S. than it is for other Western countries, due to the smaller number of 

successful American "travelers". Arguably, the United States justice system is more 

prepared than other Western countries to address returnees. The recent case of Mohamed 

Khweis is a striking example. A Virginia native, Khweis left the US and joined the 

Islamic State, was arrested by Kurdish forces, and was subsequently extradited, tried, and 

convicted in a US criminal court. Despite these advantages in numbers and legal 

frameworks, the threat from returnees is less about quantity and more about quality- the 

select few fighters that manage to return to the United States will possess concerning new 

skills. In this regard, efforts by our intelligence services to identifY and track potential 

returnees, as well as share intelligence with allies facing similar threats, are of paramount 

importance. 

• A significant number of individuals imprisoned for terrorist charges are scheduled for 

release in the coming years. For some, they will move on with their lives and hopefully 
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become productive members of society. For others, a more systematic approach for 

reintegration may be warranted to prevent regression into past criminal activities. In 

American IS cases, where the average prison sentence is 13.7 years, the risk of recidivism 

is slightly more long-term. However, one of the roots of the problem is a lack of relevant 

disengagement programs within the U.S. prison system, giving inmates who were 

initially arrested for terrorism little incentive or opportunity to reject their former 

ideology, and thus creating the possibility that they may continue to be involved in 

extremism post-release. 13 

Domestic CVE efforts are in a tenuous state. Decisions by the government and community 

partners in the coming months will help determine whether CVE is a truly viable option in the 

current fight against extremism. As we have written at the Program on Extremism, CVE is a 

delicate tool that, if properly implemented, can help sway young people away from radicalizing. 

Apart from saving lives, prevention programs outside law enforcement allow law enforcement 

and intelligence agencies to better concentrate their resources on those who have made the leap 

into violent militancy. 14 The Administration would do well to develop a CVE program with 

clear strategic goals, transparent in its implementation, with a focus away from broad-based 

community engagement to more measurable one-on-one intervention programming. 

13 For a deeper discussion on and an acknowledgement of the lack of disengagement programs in U.S. prison 

systems, see the sentencing court transcript of U.S. v. Natsheh 14 For a longer historical review of U.S. and European CVE programs, see Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus 

Hughes. 2015. "Countering Violent Extremism in America." Program on Extremism. 

https:j jextremism.gwu.edu/sitesjextremism.gwu.edu/filesjdownloads/CVE%20in%20America.pdf. 
47 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, thanks for the witnesses. The chair now recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Mr. Selim, we have looked at some of these pilot programs, specifically Minnesota. How do you at the Department evaluate the effectiveness of the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis? 

Mr. SELIM. Chairman DeSantis, thanks for the question, and 

again, thanks for having us here today. 

I think there have been a number of ways that we can assess the 

pilot program in Minneapolis. Overall, I would assess that it has 

been successful in a number of different categories. It’s validated 

the assumptions that at the local level solutions to CVE programs 

need to be constructed. 

Second, it’s validated that working by, with, and through State 

and local law enforcement, municipal officials, and councilmembers 

and individuals that hold some type of position, having them act 

as some type of facilitator or convener is a positive step forward 

and brings communities closer together. 

And three, a number of both governmental and nongovernmental 

organizations have validated that they want to participate in these 

efforts, that they would like to participate in programming related 

to preventing and intervening in the process of radicalization but 

lack the resources to do so. And in the volume of applications that 

we received for the grant program, we’ve seen an overwhelming response from the Twin Cities area, and fortunately, we’ve been able 

to act on a number of those very strong applications and make 

some awards in that place. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I would note for the record, and I ask unanimous 

consent to submit a GAO report. GAO disagrees with that. They 

say there is no cohesive process for measuring outcomes. So, I ask 

unanimous consent that this be added to the record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So, let me ask you this. There was a major trial 

in Minnesota, I think 13 guys for material support to ISIS, and the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office did a good job, FBI, but is that a success of 

CVE or is that a failure of CVE when something like that happens? 

Mr. SELIM. I think that’s serve—that’s not CVE. A counterterrorism investigation and arrest and a prosecution —— 

Mr. DESANTIS. So, then, basically, that would mean that the 

CVE community-based programs were obviously not successful at 

steering those individuals away from a violent ideology, correct? 

Mr. SELIM. I would say that the CVE-related programs and the 

small amount that are being implemented across the country are 

just one facet of the broader counterterrorism approach. So, to the 

extent that a CVE program in one city can help bring in a tip, can 

help contribute to an intervention for an individual, that’s a positive contribution, but it’s not a catchall. It’s just one piece in our 

broader homeland security strategy. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Let me ask Mr. Sleeper in terms of the Minnesota—we were able to meet with the folks at the FBI down there 

on the ground. I will ask you. The effectiveness of the communitybased programs, has that been a gamechanger? It seemed to me 

when we were there, there were still significant threats that they 

were monitoring. 

Mr. SLEEPER. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I spoke with SAC Thornton last evening prior to coming here. The challenge remains. The 


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SAC would indicate that communication has improved between 

government authorities and the community, but it’s still not what 

it should be in order to ensure an effective exchange of information 

to prevent individuals from either harming other people or harming 

themselves by traveling overseas. This is going to be a long-term 

commitment to ensuring that the community develops enough confidence to be able to keep the information flow going. 

Mr. DESANTIS. One of the things that was a little surprising is 

the community there, the Somalis, is primarily a refugee community, but yet they are—particularly some of the problem people 

would travel back and forth. And so if they are coming as refugees, 

then why are they just going back and forth? It was a little odd 

to me that that would be something that would be okay. You would 

think if you are fleeing an area, you wouldn’t want to just keep 

going back, but that seemed to be—I mean, I know a lot of these 

guys who were convicted, they were going back. They had government money they were using. I mean, it was really, really 

dispiriting to see. 

Mr. SLEEPER. There are some examples, sir, of individuals that 

have traveled back, yes, sir, and returned. 

Mr. DESANTIS. All right. The use of funds, let me ask Mr. Selim. 

I mean, we looked at some of these grants. For example, there was 

$160,000 to a group called Music in Common whose task was ‘‘empowering diverse cultures and faiths to discover common ground 

through collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and performance.’’ 

So, in terms of effectiveness, collaborative songwriting, is that an 

effective approach to warding off terrorism? 

Mr. SELIM. Mr. Chairman, what I could say about that application in particular is that was not one of the ones that was awarded 

in June of 2017. I think you’re referring to one of the earlier —— 

Mr. DESANTIS. Right. 

Mr. SELIM.—awards from January of 2017. What I can say conclusively—and I think I would echo some of the comments that Mr. 

Hughes made earlier—is radicalization is not a linear process. 

There are multiple ways that individuals in the United States and 

across the globe have been radicalized, and thus, the solution sets 

to preventing and intervening in the process of radicalization are 

equally diverse and multidisciplinary. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I think that that is true, but I just—is this a good 

use of tax funds for this particular group? Was there any measurable success as a result of awarding this grant? Are there other 

groups which I would say are more fuzzy in terms of their approach—has there been documented success from there? Because 

we looked for it. It was hard for us to find it, and it is a concern. 

Mr. SELIM. I understand your concern, Mr. Chairman. Here’s the 

best way I can try to answer that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But, I guess—I mean, the fact that this group got 

dropped is probably an indication that it had not been having a lot 

of success, correct? 

Mr. SELIM. Part of the reason that group and a number of others 

were dropped is because of the additional factors that Secretary 

Kelly and DHS leadership infused into the grant program and to— 

sorry. 

Mr. DESANTIS. No, finish your thought. 


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Mr. SELIM. And to address your point on measurement and evaluation, looking at each and—each individual grant—grantee and 

program that we will be funding, overall, I guess I would summarize we’re looking at readiness overall, and we’re looking at readiness of preventing radicalization here in a couple different facets. 

The first is in this grant program are we raising awareness on the 

threat of radicalization and recruitment? Are we creating willingness within communities to engage with State, local, and municipal 

law enforcement? And third, are we demonstrating an increased 

level of capabilities for State, local, and nongovernmental actors to 

do something if radicalization and recruitment is detected? 

Overall, what this grant program is trying to do is up our readiness game and factors that we need to work on moving forward. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Let me ask Ms. Raza. When you see something 

like the collaborative songwriting, you have been very clear about 

going after the ideology. I mean, is that the approach you think 

would be successful or are you arguing for more of a direct acknowledgement of what the threat is? 

Ms. RAZA. Thank you for having me here, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for that question. Yes, I would say that the time has 

come to definitely have a more direct approach. With due respect 

to the songwriting project, I mean, ‘‘fluff stuff’’ and interfaith dialogue really hasn’t led to much deradicalization and hasn’t led to 

countering violent extremism. There need to be specific policies put 

into place that tackle the ideology, as I have mentioned in both my 

oral and written testimony. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So in terms of the ideology, I notice the government manuals recently, they will not mention radical Islam or they 

don’t use anything associated with the word Islam, but then when 

I look at people in the Middle East who are fighting this like General President el-Sisi of Egypt, I mean, he gave a speech in front 

of all those Islamic clerics, and he said, look, he is like, you know, 

I am a devout Muslim but we can’t use the faith to be at war with 

other people. So, he seemed to view it as really a debate within 

Islam, and he wanted the nonviolent—which I think is the majority 

for sure—to really carry the day, whereas I think the government 

view has been to just say this has nothing to do with Islam; all violent extremism is the same. It just seems like Sisi is confronting 

the ideological a little more directly. It seems like some of the government manuals, you know, they kind of dance around the core 

ideological point. Is that a fair description of the difference? 

Ms. RAZA. Yes, it is, and thank you for bringing that up because 

this point has come up more than once that the word Islam is— 

radical ideology should not be used. As a practicing Muslim, let me 

point out that to separate Islamist ideology from the spiritual message of Islam is a very pro-Islamic thing to do. It’s not about political correctness. There are people here in the West who are afraid 

to use the word Islamist ideology because they think that it is antiMuslim. It is actually very pro-Muslim because it makes the ordinary masses of people understand the difference between the faith 

of Islam and an ideology, which is political in nature and which is 

evil in its agenda. And in order to fight that ideology, we have to 

name it. We have a mandate in our organization where we say you 


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have to use the three E’s, expose the problem, educate the masses, 

and then erase the problem. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So, you mentioned designating the Brotherhood 

as a terrorist-supporting organization. If the U.S. Government did 

that and that preventing money from flowing to some of the domestic groups, do you think that that would help neuter some of the 

economic fuel for the extremist ideology? 

Ms. RAZA. Yes, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism definitely would be a step 

in the right direction, especially when other Muslim countries have 

already done this. And the—they fuel and feed the radical ideology 

that eventually leads to terrorism. 

Mr. DESANTIS. For Adnan Kifayat, the good thing about the private sector what you are trying to do is you are not really burdened 

by some of the bureaucratic scriptures and you guys can kind of see 

things and react. So, you mention some of these online interventions that have been successful, so can you describe, what does that 

entail and how some of those have worked? 

Mr. KIFAYAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, so some of our online work right now is focused on really understanding the narratives and the content that groups like ISIS, al-Qaida, others put 

out there and the kinds of messages that they use to basically get 

people to go down those pathways. And what we’re learning is geography, so where those searches are taking place, where that content is being consumed, potentially deploying some off-ramping, as 

has been talked about, some off-ramping programs, hotlines in 

those geographies. 

Two, we’ve learned about—more about the complexity of the messaging, so it’s everything from religious argument, as has been 

noted a number of times, to things like seeking adventure, things 

like protecting one’s culture, protecting one’s community. And understanding what those message points are is very helpful to us as 

we create content and repurpose content to push back against 

those messages. 

We’ve also learned, Mr. Chairman, that terrorists are not—they 

don’t start off by viewing beheading videos or the bloodiest or the 

most gruesome of the content. They actually start off by consuming 

what might appear to be mild content but has tinges of hate, tinges 

of hate, intolerance, and so forth. And so nipping it in the bud has 

been one lesson that we’ve learned. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. I am over my time. 

I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just for a threshold matter, I have a couple of documents that 

I would like to submit with unanimous consent. I have a letter here 

from the Muslim Justice League of Boston, and I have a letter as 

well from the Brennan Center for Justice addressed to you and I. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And you would ask unanimous consent that they 

—— 

Mr. LYNCH. I do. 

Mr. DESANTIS.—be entered into the record. Without objection. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LYNCH. One of the difficulties here that I know my colleagues are struggling with is really identifying the metrics for sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:30 Jan 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\27741.TXT APRIL

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cess. So, we have got these—we are expending these resources, and 

we are trying to—it is difficult, I have to admit, to measure or 

count an attack that doesn’t occur, right? If we are putting people 

out there and trying to reduce radicalization, you know, the strongest evidence is a lack of attacks, and that is, you know, that’s a 

proven negative. 

But, Director Sleeper and Mr. Hughes, you have been out there, 

sort of law enforcement capacity, and we have talked about or 

heard a lot about trust today from a number of witnesses. There 

seems to be almost an organic friction between law enforcement 

coming in and investigating and a faith a mosque—any faith or a 

church for that matter in which constituents are coming there to 

practice their religion confidentially, and there is that trust between the imam and the Oma, just as there are, you know, in my 

faith there is a relationship, a confidential relationship between the 

priest and Catholics. 

So, I am struggling with how do we balance in a way—balance 

our need to intervene here and at the same time do it in a respectful way that doesn’t isolate some of these mosques? Because I have 

heard in various parts of my community, in the Muslim community 

that those who accept money, CVE money, are tainted. There is almost a collaborator label among some that say, oh, that mosque is 

accepting CVE money. They are cooperating with the FBI or with 

the Boston Police, and so for some, they get a black mark and are 

seen as less worthy. And others that refuse to take the CVE seek 

to take on this role of legitimacy in the Muslim community. How 

do we deal with that, Mr. Hughes? 

Mr. HUGHES. I spent a lot of time, about 3–1/2 years, working 

for the National Counterterrorism Center on this exact issue and 

a lot of time actually in your district. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. HUGHES. And so my biggest takeaway from kind of traveling 

around the country and meeting with Muslim American community 

leaders throughout the country was you just got to be honest and 

talk about it in human stories. So instead of 128 people have been 

arrested for terrorism charges, it’s my name is Seamus Hughes, I’m 

a father, and I’m worried about these kids. And I tell the story of 

a young man from Minneapolis who disappears on election day and 

doesn’t—and his mother’s worried about him, goes to Somalia, realizes it’s his bill of goods and is killed there for his doubts. And at 

some point in his radicalization he was reachable. My name is 

Seamus Hughes and I want to save that young kid because I never 

want to sit in a room like I used to in a basement of an apartment 

building talking to mothers of—grieving sons. 

And so if you frame the issue in terms of human aspect, I think 

you’d get a lot farther than you would. And I think you also need 

to have a bright line between counterterrorism operations and CVE 

efforts. 

So, my engagement with community partners I didn’t share my 

notes with the local FBI office because I needed to let—build levels 

of trust, and that doesn’t happen overnight. So, going to Boston 

every couple weeks, talking to folks, knowing who their kids are, 

where they play soccer, things like that, those things matter in 


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order to actually build this level of trust. It’s not just a one-anddone thing. 

Mr. LYNCH. That is great. 

Director Sleeper? 

Mr. SLEEPER. Thank you for the question, sir. I have been a police officer for four decades, the first three decades in State and 

local law enforcement. Outreach to communities is the cornerstone 

of law enforcement. It’s the essence of how local government communicates with its citizens in order to prevent violence in the communities, all violence. It’s an effort to prevent violence from happening, to encourage dialogue between families, community groups, 

religious organizations, and to open up dialogue so that if someone 

see something, if they’re concerned about a friend or a family member that may be going in the wrong direction, that that’s communicated and that violence is prevented. That’s really what this program is about is preventing violence. The FBI looks at it from a 

very broad perspective of looking at all potential avenues of extremism and violence that may be dealt with in a community. 

We’re very cognizant that all cities and communities are different, and it’s the citizens of the community that are best to identify the level of engagement, the type of engagement, and allow 

them to dictate back to the law enforcement community what they 

need and what they would like in order to exchange and open up 

that dialogue, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. So, it just so happens that Mr. Russell 

and I have spent a fair amount of time in refugee camps on the 

Syrian border, Syria and Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, Syria and 

Amman, Jordan, and on one of my visits we actually had an opportunity to bring in six of these so-called moderate rebel groups, the 

leaders of these groups. They came up out of Aleppo and met with 

us. And one of my conversations I asked each one of them as they 

came in separately, I said, how do you communicate? And they are 

all on WhatsApp, okay? So, not surprisingly, a lot of the radical 

content that we are seeing on our end here in the United States 

is also coming through WhatsApp. And I don’t want to single them 

out. There are a few others. 

But one of the folks that I deal with on this issue, who is Dr. 

Nabeel Khudairi, he is the former chairperson of the Islamic Council of New England, he had a great quote. He said, ‘‘If we are going 

to do battle against extremists, we have to bring something in the 

same genre of the social media to balance a young person’s opinion 

of what to do.’’ So, what are we doing in terms of—and now, I am 

talking about the social media aspect of it that is oftentimes the 

point of contact between efforts of others to radicalize our sons and 

daughters here at home? What is the counterpoint that we are 

using to sort of push back on that? And has anything that you have 

been doing so far been successful, Mr. Sleeper or Mr. Hughes, I 

guess? Or Mr. Selim actually, yes. 

Mr. SLEEPER. There’s a number of areas, sir, that are being pursued. Some of those fall into the true counterterrorism effort in the 

sense of identifying and eliminating individuals that are responsible for creating and sending those messages. There’s significant 

work that’s being done with the private sector, and there’s been 

significant success with the private sector recognizing that their 


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applications are being leveraged by people, so there are successes 

there. And I know George is working a number of initiatives at a 

different level. 

Mr. SELIM. Seamus, do you want to —— 

Mr. HUGHES. Yes, if you don’t mind. I interviewed an American 

ISIS supporter who spent about four months in ISIS last month, 

and he was using WhatsApp to communicate with other friends 

when he crossed the border. So, absolutely, the online environment 

does matter for these folks, and in many ways, it’s a logistical support and a level of connectivity they wouldn’t normally have. 

Mr. LYNCH. Just to be clear, it is the level of encryption there 

that —— 

Mr. HUGHES. It’s —— 

Mr. LYNCH.—allows that, right? 

Mr. HUGHES. It’s the debate that the FBI would talk about, the 

—— 

Mr. LYNCH. And it is owned by Facebook, right? 

Mr. HUGHES. I believe so, yes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. 

Mr. HUGHES. So, in terms of what we’re doing domestically, not 

a whole lot. So, we have a few programs. We have peer-to-peer program which the U.S. Government and Facebook have stepped up 

in form and encouraged the university students to create countermessaging. But I think there’s a few low-hanging policy questions 

I think we can solve pretty quickly. One is community partners like 

the one you mentioned, giving them some level of a legal understanding of what’s right and left latitudes online, so they’re not 

crossing against material support to terrorism clauses if they’re engaging with a would-be jihadist, right, so letting them know what 

the latitudes are. 

The second one is informing them of how ISIS and other groups 

use the online environment. So, it’s not Twitter anymore. It’s largely concentrated on Telegram. And what do those channels look like 

and how do you get involved and what are the messages that are 

there? We’re not doing enough of that type of work. 

And the last part, and I think Adnan would have a point to raise 

on this is, you know, the Federal Government’s not really going to 

step up in this spot. It’s uncomfortable there. It raises a whole host 

of kind of legal issues and the ability for the Federal Government 

to move and shift in the online space is very little, right? So, this 

is where foundations like Gen Next can step up. Other foundations, 

family foundations and things like that can say, okay, community 

partner in Boston who has a great idea, you need X amount of 

money. It’s a small amount of funding. Let’s try this out, and if it 

works, let’s take it to L.A. or let’s take it to Seattle and get the 

Federal Government out of this process and help kind of do that 

connective tissue. 

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Selim, Mr. Kifayat? 

Mr. SELIM. Yes, thank you, Ranking Member Lynch, and please 

feel free to jump in on this. I guess I would only amplify and add 

one or two points from what my colleagues mentioned. In the past 

number of years that I’ve been working on this issue, I’ve seen a 

fair bit of progress from industry, from the technology companies, 

from the social media companies, from the internet service proVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:30 Jan 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\27741.TXT APRIL

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viders in this space. Next week, in northern California for the first 

time ever, a number of these companies are convening a forum to 

talk about this issue with Federal, State, and local officials. 

Facebook, Google, Twitter, and a whole host of others are convening officials. I think the public-private aspect of this that Mr. 

Hughes alluded to earlier is critical to two parts of the question 

that you asked. One is the content and the encryption—how do you 

remove it or take it down—but then there’s another important part 

of that issue, which is how do you amplify other non-extremist content? How do you amplify the voices of individuals that are in refugee camps, American Muslims or other civic leaders in the United 

States to help drown out those voices that are online that are trying to recruit and radicalize? And I think a stronger partnership 

with industry on these issues can help address both those issues, 

and I think we need to do it sooner rather than later. 

Mr. LYNCH. Right. Mr. Kifayat and Ms. Raza, if you have anything to add. 

Mr. KIFAYAT. Just to amplify one point, sir, the—there are huge 

conversations taking—huge tectonic plates of young—Americans 

having conversations about culture and identity and what civilization means and talked about what religion means, and the problem 

we’ve seen online, social media, is that there is an ample amount 

of really bad information out there that tells you how to act and 

what adventure means and what a call to action means and what 

living in a community of nonbelievers means. And what we have 

been doing in our partnerships with the technology sector is to, 

as—to pick along what George said, is to drown those out, right, 

to relegate those to make them impotent online. And so we’re putting out narratives that counter those concepts, counter those ideas 

at the nip so when they begin. And that, I think is where the future is if we are to save the internet and save the online space, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Ms. Raza? 

Ms. RAZA. Thank you so much for having us here. 

The question of social media is extremely important, and our organization has been approached to create an alternate narrative. 

And with regards to the conversation that you had brought up before as well, NGOs, nongovernment organizations, need to be part 

of this movement and to create an alternate narrative on the internet, on social media so that it can drown out, as Mr. Kifayat said, 

the extremist voices. 

And one of the measures that we have looked upon, which has 

been very successful in terms of community relationships, and you 

had mentioned your concern, along with Mr. Russell, is to empower 

the Muslim communities themselves to take responsibility to bring 

about some of the change so it doesn’t seem that it’s just law enforcement or CVE or someone else who is telling them to. 

And the best example of that I can give you is what happened 

last week at a mosque in Davis, California, where the imam 

Ammar Shahin who is at the Islamic Center of Davis called for 

Muslims to fight the Jews and annihilate them. This was following 

the troubles at Temple Mount. And it was the Muslim communities 

that actually took upon this challenge and started an online petition to actually have him fired and hire another imam. And this 

is something new and different, which is what we need to focus on 


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is while we want to counter violent extremism through government, we also want to do it from within the communities themselves. 

Mr. LYNCH. That is great. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your extreme courtesy. I appreciate that. I yield back. 

Mr. RUSSELL. [Presiding] And I thank the gentleman, the ranking member. 

We have certainly seen firsthand a lot of these issues as we have 

tried to address them. I am going to yield myself some time for 

questions here. 

I think that there is really a responsibility in messaging that 

goes just beyond the Islamic communities. I think it goes even nationwide with our media. For example, when you see a story reported about ISIS, the B-roll in the background is, you know, these 

people sneaking around with tennis shoes and AK’s riding on 

tanks, you know, looking like they are some heroic figure rather 

than the barbarians that have committed atrocities that have not 

been seen since the Dark Ages. I think we bear some responsibility 

when our own media will not engage in the betrayal. If all you 

show is this positive, glorious image, then that can be extended 

through social media, and then we see a lot of those issues there. 

It is just a false characterization also of our military targeting 

where somehow the military, which our military is the most accurate and the most human-rights-conscious. When we have to 

unsheathe the sword, we try to make sure that it is accurate to the 

point of enormous expenditures to have our weaponry to be accurate so that we don’t cause undue suffering. And yet the opponents, 

you know, don’t abide by any of these rules, and then our media 

will somehow attack our country, our soldiers, our warriors instead 

of those that are sawing people’s heads off, setting them on fire in 

cages causing untold human suffering, displacing hundreds of thousands and millions of people, leveling cities. Other than that, they 

are all pretty nice guys. 

What is interesting is that we have large Muslim communities 

in this country, and a lot of them have lived quite peacefully for 

decades. And, you know, I think of, you know, little Baghdad in 

San Diego. You know, not only do they contribute to the economy, 

not only have we seen very little radicalization from these areas— 

you know, I think of my own hometown in Oklahoma City. We 

have got folks that have come from both an Arab, Sunni Arab, Persian Shia background due to different things that have happened 

in the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, ’80s, ’90s, you know, 2000s, live quite peacefully in the community with very little radicalization. 

And then we get to other areas where we have just an outrageous proportionate level of radicalization. For example, Minnesota has produced 26 percent of young foreign fighters recruited 

in the United States, and more terrorist suspects charged in connection with ISIS than any other State besides New York, and 

when you compare the population of Minnesota and New York, 

well, my goodness, you know, you—and so I guess my question to 

you, Mr. Sleeper, would be why is Minnesota such a significant 

center of terrorist activity and recruitment? 


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Mr. SLEEPER. It’s difficult for us to articulate the reason why 

that’s happening, sir. Obviously, there’s a large Somali population, 

100,000-plus, in that —— 

Mr. RUSSELL. There is a large Somali population in D.C. —— 

Mr. SLEEPER. Geographic —— 

Mr. RUSSELL.—but we don’t see a recruitment from that. I mean, 

there has got to be a reason. I mean, one thing I learned as a warrior, you know, fighting—I have lived in these cultures. I have gone 

to weddings, wakes, you know, done the land grab and the bulls, 

everything and have made great friends. But when you have enemies that percolate in an area, there is a reason. And so, you 

know, let’s see if we can get some ideas to this. Mr. Hughes, you 

are raising your hand. I will come back to you, Mr. Sleeper. 

Mr. HUGHES. Sure. Looking at the Minneapolis cases, I think we 

talked a lot about the online environment, this idea of online 

radicalization, online recruitment. Minneapolis is much more of a 

peer-to-peer recruitment. So, the reason why you had a number of 

guys try to join ISIS later is because their brother joined alShabaab a few years before that or their roommate before that. 

And there was—and there’s a connectivity there that I don’t think 

we fully understood. So, Abdi Nur goes over to Syria and then 

FaceTimes with his buddies back in Minneapolis and says it’s time 

to join the so-called caliphate. So, that human interaction actually 

matters quite a bit. It’s the reason why Minneapolis had a higher 

number with a very—with a large Somali population and Lewiston, 

Maine, or San Diego doesn’t. That peer-to-peer network does matter. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And, Mr. Sleeper, what would be the profile of 

these terrorist suspects or recruits that are coming out of Minnesota, you know, to speak to what Mr. Hughes is—what would 

that profile look like? 

Mr. SLEEPER. There really is no profile. We spent a tremendous 

amount of time, research, and analysis looking into individuals 

that are becoming radicalized so that we can get ahead of the 

curve, behaviors, indicators —— 

Mr. RUSSELL. But, see, we got to do better than that. And look, 

you know, when I was thrust in combat environments, you know, 

one of the first things I said is three questions: What does the 

enemy look like? How can he hurt us? And how can we hurt him? 

Now, we have the most incredible, phenomenal intelligence services 

in the United States. We have millions of Muslim Americans that 

are willing to help and serve their country. How do I know? Because I served with quite a few of them. So just to say, well, we 

can’t identify what they look like, we can’t make a profile, you really think that is true? I mean, you represent the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. I mean, boy, if that is true—because if we can’t identify the problem, we can never solve it. 

Mr. SLEEPER. It is difficult to identify any commonality —— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Life’s tough, but it is tough if we don’t identify the 

problem. I mean, so, help me out here. What —— 

Mr. SLEEPER. So, if you look at the number of investigations we 

have open right now, several hundred investigations in this country 

right now, I’d say the FBI is very effective at identifying individVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:30 Jan 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\27741.TXT APRIL

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uals that articulate a desire and we determine there’s predicated 

information that they’re prepared to act on it. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And to your point —— 

Mr. SLEEPER. Prior to that, it’s a very difficult process to do in 

consideration with First Amendment rights, freedom of speech. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Sure. And to your point on the good job that the 

FBI does, I don’t want you to think I’m picking on you; I have great 

respect for the Bureau. And ISIS self-turned air traffic controller 

just caught two weeks ago, charged, indicted in Honolulu, I mean, 

imagine the destruction and damage he could have done if our Bureau had not been Johnny-on-the-spot. And so, you know, we do appreciate the work that our military and the Bureau does every day. 

But I refuse to accept that we can’t identify a profile. Anyone 

else want to take on what that might—Mr. Selim? 

Mr. SELIM. Sir, if I may just add one note to this. Part of the 

group of folks who work for me is there are a group of folks dedicated to working with the latest and greatest, both analytical and 

social science community on this. Going back to your earlier question on why—in Minneapolis, why is the spike so high, what a 

number of studies and what a lot of research has shown is that individuals who come to this country that have a higher exposure to 

violence from wherever they came from may possess a higher propensity to radicalization and recruitment. 

Mr. RUSSELL. But, gosh, do you think that is true when you look 

at like what happened with Beirut? We have had a lot of people 

come from Lebanon, and we have not seen this problem. We have 

had civil wars and destruction of all kinds of things before where 

we see a migration of population and we don’t see radicalization. 

So, do you get my point? 

Mr. SELIM. I do. I think it’s just—it’s one of the factors that we’ve 

seen particularly differentiating in the Twin Cities with some of 

the Somali community attacks that we’ve seen in Ohio and other 

places. It’s one of the factors, in addition to a whole host of others. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. Thank you. And I am consuming some time 

here, and I have some very patient colleagues I have great respect 

for. And I will come back on some other things, but I want now to 

recognize Ms. Demings from Florida. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and believe 

me, this topic, this conversation deserves all of the time necessary 

because it is a very important issue. I want to thank our witnesses 

for being here, thank our ranking member as well, Mr. Lynch. 

The FBI has confirmed that there are active ISIS-related investigations in all 50 States. To date, 26 States and the District of Columbia have had at least one charge with offenses related to the 

Islamic State within their borders. 

So, Mr. Selim, I would like to start with you. What is the Trump 

administration’s justification for proposing that the CVE grant 

funds be eliminated? And what would the impact be if those funds 

are eliminated? 

Mr. SELIM. Ma’am, thank you for that question. I can answer it 

a few different ways. The first is that the program that we recently 

announced, these awards that we announced in June, this is a— 

that award was not a one-year award. That award was a two-year 

award. So, that $10 million in awards that we’ve administered will 


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last for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019, and we’re about to 

start that period of performance and that cycle now. 

So, I’m aware that the presidential budget request did not reflect 

the CVE grant program in fiscal year 2018. However, there’s—it’s 

not that there’s zero dollars being spent in ’18; it’s that this is a 

two-year period of performance in which I’m very confident, as the 

director of the office and the program manager here, that we’ll be 

able to demonstrate a high degree of excellence on these 26 awardees. And hopefully, by fiscal year 2019, we’ll be able to have the 

best practices and lessons learned to be able to make the case to 

the Congress for more funds in this area. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Do you agree—and I would also like to hear from 

Director Sleeper as well on this. Do you agree with the GAO that 

the Federal Government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort? And we will start with 

you, Mr. Selim? 

Mr. SELIM. So, I am aware of the GAO response on that issue, 

and there is a DHS response to the GAO report, which, if the committee allows, I’d be happy to submit that for the record as well. 

Mr. SELIM. I do not agree with that view that there is no measurement and evaluation of any of the programs. 

Specifically on the CVE grant program, we have robust measurement put in place for all 26 of the grantees, both qualitative and 

quantitative. To give you an example of some of the qualitative 

measure that we’re looking at, in the CVE grant program, there 

are five focus areas overall. So one of the questions that the committee and you may be wondering is how do you measure the ability to do training on countering violent extremism or radicalization 

and recruitment? And we’re really looking at a number of different 

factors. When we’re looking at training the space, we’re looking at 

both the number and type of people being trained. Are they State 

and local law enforcement professionals, are they civic leaders, are 

they spiritual leaders, and so on? 

And we’re also conducting pre- and post-survey assessments on 

the level of knowledge acquisition. Historically, in any law enforcement or military training, the nature and scope of the training, the 

level of knowledge acquisition that’s attained, so we’re taking into 

consideration a very broad swath of data that we’ll be collecting, 

and we’ll use that to implement and hone our own training in the 

Federal Government moving forward. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Director Sleeper? 

Mr. SLEEPER. This is an incredibly complicated issue. We’re not 

the only country dealing with it. Virtually every Western country 

is currently wrestling with this. We can always be better, coordinate more effectively. We need to if we expect to meet the challenges facing us. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. And I have to agree with our chairman’s statement earlier that we do have to do better. This is an ever-critical 

issue. Do you agree that the evaluation process that is in place is 

adequate? 

Mr. SLEEPER. I have not actually reviewed the report, ma’am. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Very efficient on your time. I thank the gentlelady. 


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And I would like to recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. 

Welch. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to acknowledge the presence of Kerry Sleeper, who 

served, Mr. Chairman, as our commissioner of public safety in 

Vermont, and we are pretty proud of him. 

And I want to ask you, Director, in your new job one of the 

things you did so well in Vermont was walk this tightrope that I 

think folks in law enforcement have to walk between being all-in, 

very aggressive, very vigilant to protect our safety on the one hand 

and also create positive relationships with the community, whose 

support you need in order to effectively do your job. And I would 

think that in this mission that all of you now are engaged in of 

countering violent extremism, that community support continues to 

be important, but the threat probably that you are all dealing with 

is even greater than what you have faced on a day-to-day basis 

when you were the commission of public safety. 

Congress tends, I think, to focus understandably on the potential 

violence that we want to give you the tools to control, but, as you 

did in your job in Vermont, you also displayed some ability to see 

the importance of maintaining that community support that is intentioned sometimes with aggressive actions that have to be taken 

to contain violence. And I wonder if you could just speak a little 

bit about that and how the FBI managed that. 

Mr. SLEEPER. I believe the FBI does an outstanding job, sir, at 

reaching out to communities, particularly communities at risk. The 

communities most at risk are those that need the most outreach 

and communication. We see all across our country right now a 

number of cities that are struggling with relationships between 

their police departments and their communities, and violence is resulting as a consequence of that. 

This specific threat that we’re discussing today requires that the 

FBI and the communities engage in dialogue with very specific segments of those communities, and the threat requires that there be 

open, trusted dialogue. The members of those communities recognize the first most fundamental role of the FBI is to protect the 

citizens of this country and to uphold the law. There’s no doubt 

about that. That’s the tough part. The fair part is that we engage 

in dialogue with those communities so they understand why we 

need to enforce those laws, why we need to protect those communities. 

And if we think particularly of the Somali community members 

who are leaving Minneapolis, they’re going to fight in a far-distant 

war. The vast majority of them are going to come home in a body 

bag. So what we’re trying to do is protect those people, communicate. And as most of the Americans that have traveled to fight 

for ISIS, they will eventually end up in a body bag, so we’re trying 

to communicate to their friends and families that there’s consequences to this type of behavior. That’s the type of dialogue and 

communication that we want to have with those communities so 

they understand clearly our role and the likely consequences of 

their actions. 

Mr. WELCH. When we have that kind of trust, does it also lead 

to you being able to get actionable information? 


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Mr. SLEEPER. It is, and again, we are seeing in the communities 

where we engage the communities do respond and recognize—we 

have been thanked by parents of children who we caught before 

they traveled for saving their children’s lives, and that’s the message and the dialogue that we want to put out there that we’re 

about not only protecting the communities and the citizens but the 

individuals themselves that are making decisions regarding travel. 

But there is no doubt we are here to investigate and to uphold —— 

Mr. WELCH. Right. 

Mr. SLEEPER.—the safety of the citizens of the United States first 

and foremost. 

Mr. WELCH. Yes. Well, I really appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, you probably—in your own work serving our 

country probably had similar tension between the need to use force 

in appropriate circumstances but try to get the trust of the folks 

in the country where you were serving, a hard job. 

Well, I thank you. Thank you, Director. 

Mr. RUSSELL. And I thank the gentleman, and I would agree 

with those comments and associate with Mr. Sleeper’s earlier comments that community type of interaction is essential. One of the 

things that made it even harder is when you are not even from the 

country, you don’t have the language, you are automatically hated, 

you are occupying the territory, and you are trying to earn trust. 

But guess what? It can be done, even those tall-order things. And 

we are not facing that. Although maybe in reverse as they come 

back we see some of those factors play in. 

And I would like us, before we close, a couple of additional questions if I may to Mr. Sleeper. You had made mention that there 

is a number of open investigations earlier in your comments. About 

how many is that? 

Mr. SLEEPER. We’ve publicly acknowledged in several environments that there’s over 1,000 open investigations across the country right now. I can’t be specific, but there’s over 1,000. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. Thank you for that. And how many individuals approximately have left the United States to fight for ISIS or 

other associated terror groups like al-Shabaab, et cetera? 

Mr. SLEEPER. I don’t have that number readily available, but we 

can ensure that you’re provided with that. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Sure. And if we have to provide it in a secure setting, you know, we can also arrange that. And can you get with us 

so that we can nail that down? 

Mr. SLEEPER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you for that, sir. 

And then to Mr. Selim, you know, this morphing grants and, you 

know, we are going to add this many, we are going to subtract this 

many, and all of that, can we get full, complete without redaction 

examples of what those grants are and their parameters? Is that 

possible to provide to the committee? 

Mr. SELIM. Mr. Chairman, I believe so. Currently, just to give 

you an accurate sense of where it is, I believe in a full and high 

degree of transparency with this and any other of our overseers, 

the stack of paper that we’re looking at that’s currently underneath 

review with our general counsel and so on is over 500 pages. And 

we’re looking to make sure that there’s no PII and whatnot, and 


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that’s the type of redaction. In addition to supplying that information on the grant applications to this committee, we want to make 

as much of that as publicly available and transparent as possible 

—— Mr. RUSSELL. Sure. 

Mr. SELIM.—so I’m committed —— 

Mr. RUSSELL. Personal —— 

Mr. SELIM.—to doing so. I need to circle back with our counsel 

and just ensure what the parameters of delivering that to the committee are. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, personal identifiers, Socials, like that, I don’t 

think—let me check with my legal counsel. I don’t think that that 

is an issue, but we don’t want, you know, oh, you know, here are 

the two sentences on page 1, so —— 

Mr. SELIM. No, I can assure you we’re not looking to reduce any 

of the substance but just the appropriate things for scoring and so 

on. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. And I appreciate that. And then I thank the 

committee today not only for the broad bipartisan concern and interest but, you know, for the excellent witnesses on both sides. And 

I want to thank the ranking member for his tireless work on national security. You know, not only have we developed a friendship; 

we have traveled large portions of the globe together. 

And I also want to thank all of you today that have come before 

us. And I know it wasn’t a convenience to, oh, sure, you know, let 

me—but I really appreciate the work that you do and the unique 

perspective that you provide, and I hope that we can work with you 

more in the future. 

And with that, I would like to thank all of our witnesses that are 

before us today. 

If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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Opening Statement - Chairman Ron DeSantis 

Subcommittee on National Security 

''Combating Homegrown Extremism" 

Thursday, July 27, 2017 

In the words of Department of Homeland Security Secretary 

John Kelly, the U.S. is experiencing an "unprecedented spike in 

homegrown terrorism." 

Currently, the FBI has open terrorism investigations in all 50 

states. 

As of June 2017, the U.S. government has charged 128 

individuals with offenses related to ISIS over the last 3 years. 

Radical Islamic extremism is the primary driver of this problem 

and deserves the government's immediate attention. 

In recent years the federal government has sought to combat this 

problem under the guise of a program called "countering violent 

extremism," or CVE. 

Three cities were used to conduct pilot programs: Los Angeles, 

Boston and Minneapolis. 

Minneapolis is a particularly troublesome area, as it is a major 

center of Islamic terrorist activity. 

The region is home to the largest concentration of Somali 

refugees and is the epicenter for domestic radicalization. 
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From 2007 to 2015, over 20 Somali-Americans are known to 

have left Minnesota to join the al-Shabaab terrorist organization 

in Somalia. 

Over the last three years, federal prosecutors have charged 13 

individuals from Minnesota for connections to the Islamic State. 

Minnesota is second only to New York, which has four times as 

many residents, in number of ISIS terrorists charged. 

The terrorist problem in Minnesota led former U.S. Senator 

Norm Coleman to warn the state is in danger of becoming "the 

Land of 10,000 Terrorists." 

I visited Minneapolis in December oflast year to meet with 

federal and local law enforcement and community groups. The 

area truly is ground zero for terrorist recruitment. 

I invited Richard Thornton, the FBI's Special Agent in Charge 

of the Minneapolis Division, testify today about the problems 

our country is facing there. 

Instead, the Bureau has sent Assistant Director Kerry Sleeper 

from Headquarters with the expectation that he can speak to 

Thornton's specific experience and interactions in Minneapolis. 

I look forward to hearing specifics about FBI's efforts in 

Minneapolis so the Committee can evaluate the effectiveness of 

the CVE approach. 
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Our law enforcement and intelligence community have their 

hands full with preventing radicalization and interdicting 

terrorists before they commit heinous acts in the name of 

religion. 

The Department of Homeland Security leads the governments 

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. 

CVE refers to "proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists 

to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence." 

Currently, the Department still promotes Obama-era policies 

related to CVE. 

Guidance developed under the Obama Administration 

specifically limits any intelligence or law enforcement 

investigative activity through CVE. 

By leaving this information on the table, CVE efforts are 

missing opportunities to identify and disrupt terrorist plots. 

Obama-era guidance also fails to properly identify the 

immediate threat of radical Islamic extremism. 

The nearly 4,000 word October 2016 CVE strategy does not 

mention radical Islamic terrorism at all. 

The Obama Administration's CVE strategy also relied heavily 

on non-governmental organizations with vague and 

immeasurable goals. 
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One week before President Trump's inauguration, former DHS 

Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the grant recipients of$10 

million appropriated by Congress for CVE efforts. 

Their selections reflect a preference for working through 

community-based organizations, some with questionable 

programs and immeasurable goals. 

For example, the Obama Administration selected for funding an 

organization who suggested countering violent extremism 

through "collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and 

performance." 

Another suggested hiring college students to make video games. 

This was not a serious attempt to stop the flow of foreign 

fighters to ISIS. 

After President Trump took office, DHS froze the $10 million in 

grants, reviewed the organizations, and announced they were 

removing 11 Obama grant recipients and adding 6 new ones. 

A Committee review of the organizations indicates a preference 

for law enforcement organizations over community based 

organizations. 

Despite this positive step, some of the law enforcement 

organizations designated for funding have problematic agendas. 
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For example, the City of Houston's application relied on socalled community experts with vocally partisan and anti-Israel 

agendas. 

The City of Denver submitted an application that prioritized an 

agenda unrelated to CVE, suggesting working through 

organizations such as Black Lives Matter. 

The Committee requested the applications of all grant recipients 

to determine what taxpayer dollars were funding. But DHS has 

still not produced these applications. 

The Committee requested a briefing on the rationale for the 

selections of the grant recipients. But DHS refused. 

Today, the Subcommittee seeks to understand what this 

Administration's policy is for countering violent extremism. 

According to DHS this policy is currently under review, and 

DHS has declined to share any details about this process, 

including when this review is supposed to be complete and 

which organizations are participating. 

For Congress' immediate purposes, we must determine what is 

driving DHS's agenda: Obama-era assumptions or the 

President's pledge to put political correctness aside and defeat 

ISIS at home and abroad. 

We will question witnesses on whether the FBI and DHS are 

properly vetting organizations and individuals who participate in 

the CVE program. 
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We will also hear from non-governmental witnesses on the role 

of the private sector in CVE efforts and the scope of violent 

extremism problem facing the United States. 

I thank the witnesses for their attendance and look forward to 

their testimony. 
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The April 2017 GAO report titled, "Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define 

Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts" can be found at 

https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf. 
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July 26, 2017 

Muslim Justice League 

51 Melcher Street 

Boston MA 02210 

National Security Subcommittee Chair Ron DeSantis 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

1524 Longworth House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Steve Russell 

128 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative John Duncan 

2207 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Justin Amash 

114 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Paul Gosar 

2057 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Virginia Foxx 

2262 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Jody Hice 

324 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative James Comer 

1513 Longworth House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Stephen Lynch 

2268 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Peter Welch 

2303 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Val Butler Demings 

238 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Mark DeSaulnier 

115 Cannon House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 
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Representative John Sarbanes 

2444 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Representative Jimmy Gomez 

1226 Longworth House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

Re: National Security Subcommittee Hearing on Combatting Homegrown Terrorism 

Honorable Chair DeSantis and Members of the National Security Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to share input ahead of the National Security Subconunittee Hearing on 

Combatting Homegrown Terrorism. My name is Shannon AI-Wakeel. I am Executive Director of the 

Muslim Justice League (MJL), a non-profit organization in Boston, Massachusetts, advocating for protection of human and civil rights that are at risk of erosion by certain national security-themed initiatives. 

MJL's has serious concerns about "countering violent extremism" ("CVE") campaigns due to (1) the 

highly subjective nature of the problems CVE ostensibly seeks to combat specifically "radicalization" 

or "extremism," as opposed to violent actions 1 giving rise to the danger that CVE could criminalize or 

chill disfavored political or religious expression, (2) the absence of sound research to support theories that 

there are identifiable signs of "radicalization" or "extremism" (exacerbated, again, by the highly subjective nature of these concepts)2 and (3) CVE's track record of violating human rights including rights to 

1 We additionally note that, in the U.S., political violence represents a relatively very small proportion of 

total violence. While preventing all types of violence to the degree possible is an important objective, an 

outsized focus on political violence may have the counterproductive effect of falsely glamorizing it. 

2 See, e.g., Faiza Patel (Brennan Center for Justice) Rethinking Radicalization. March 8, 20111. Accessed 

July 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/rethinking-radicalization; Arun 

Kundnani (Claystone), A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism, January 2015. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http://www.claystone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/0l/Claystonerethinking-radicalisation.pdf; Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: The Journey of' a Concept, Race & Class 

Vol. 54, issue 2, 3-25, September 18, 2012. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http://journa1s.sagepub.-

com/doi/abs/l 0.1177/0306396812454984; Asim Quereshi (CAGE), The 'Science· of Pre-Crime: TheSecret 'Radicalisation 'Study Underpinning Prevent, 2016. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https:// 

cage.ngo/wp-content/uploads/20 16/09/CAGE-Scicnce-Pre-Crime-Report.pdf 
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education and health, and freedoms of speech, worship, and association without advancing public safety.l 

Since MJL's founding in 2014, many individuals in the Massachusetts communities MJL serves have experienced early impacts of CVE deployment. Below I describe some of these impacts, including chilled 

access to mental health services and increased polarization and fear within Muslim communities. 

CVE's Impacts on Massachusetts Communities 

Chilled Use of Mental Health Services 

In 2015, the U.S. Attorneys Office for the District of Massachusetts ("USAO-MA") produced a Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies Incorporating Violent Extremism Into Violence Prevention Efforts which cites "Enhanced Communication among Law Enforcement/Mental Health/Social Services Agencies" as one planned focus of the USAO-MA's Massachusetts CVE Collaborative.4 Based on 

MJL's observations and information shared by members of the community, this objective has in fact been 

prioritized by law enforcement agencies deploying CVE in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the U.S. 

Examples of law enforcement efforts to recruit mental health providers to assist in deployment of CVE 

have included, for example, the Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warning Signs ("RENEW") program in Los Angeles involving the Los Angeles Police Department, Federal Burean of Investigations 

("FBI"), Los Angeles Department of Mental Health and Los Angeles County Sheriff;5 as well as outreach 

by the FBI and U.S. Attorneys Offices, respectively, to mental health providers attending an American 

3 Information about impacts of the U.K.'s PREVENT program (on which the U.S. CVE campaign is in 

many respects modeled- for example, both focus on the ill-defined concepts of"extremism" or "radicalization," both recruit social services providers to identify and refer individuals deemed "at-risk" of "radicalization" or "extremism," both have relied on funding incentives to secure community participation, and 

both incorporate "interventions" as a means of changing political or religious views of those labeled potential extremists) is highly relevant to understanding CVE's likely impacts in the U.S. Because CVE, 

through PREVENT, has been operational in the U.K. for many years longer than in the US, more information about its impacts is available. See, e.g., Rights Watch UK; Preventing Education? Human Rights 

and UK Counter-terrorism Policy in Schools, July, 2016. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http:// 

rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/20 16/07/preventing-education-final-to-print-3 .compressed-l.pdf; Dr. Derek 

Summerfield, Mandating Doctors to Attend Counterterrorism Workshops is Medically Unethical, 

BJPsych Bulletin (2016), 40, 87-88, February 11, 2016. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http://pb.rcpsych.org/content/40/2/87.full-tcxt.pdf+html; Amn Kundnani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, 2009. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http://www.kundnani.org/\\'j)-content/uploads/ 

spooked. pdf; Arun Kundnani (Claystone), A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism, January 2015. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http://www.claystone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 

2015/0 l/Claystone-rethinking-radicalisation.pdf. See also Jane Kinninmont (The Guardian) Britain s 

Loose Definition of Extremism is Stoking a Global Crackdown on Dissent, September 23, 2016. Accessed 

July 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commcntisfree/20 16/sep/23/britain-extremismg1obal-cffccts. 

4 U.S. Attorneys Office for the District of Massachusetts (USAO-MA), A Framework for Prevention and 

Intervention Strategies Incorporating Violent Extremism Into Violence Prevention Efforts, February 2015, 

at 15. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/20 15/02/18/framework.pdf 

5 See The RENEW Program: A New Approach to IdentifYing Early Warnings of Potential Violent Behavior (slide presentation). Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/defanlt/ 

filesllntervention%20model%20%282%29.pdf 
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Psychological Association 2016 Annual Conference6 and the 2016 Annual Muslim Mental Health Conference.7 

Additionally, in Massachusetts, the USAO-MA tapped the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and 

Hnman Services ("EOHHS") as a conduit for Department of Justice CVE grant monies,8 and hosted a 

session at Suffolk Law School promoting CVE interventions (citing British and German models) for mental health and other social services providers and law enforcement? among other outreach activities. The 

routing of Department of Justice CVE monies through EOHHS appears to have been intended to rebrand 

CVE as a public health- as opposed to law enforcement or surveillance- campaign. 10 

6 See conference agenda listing Symposium: Countering Violent Extremism-Psychologists Partnering 

With Law Enforcement with representatives of the Chicago School of Professional 

Psychology and the FBI. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https:/lbiblio.ugent.be/publication! 

8511353/file/8511360.pdf 

7 See conference agenda listing March 18, 2016 presentation titled Resilience to Violent Extremism: Engaging Behavioral Health Experts in the Discussion, with representatives of the U.S. Attorneys Offices of 

Michigan and Massachusetts. Accessed July 25,2017. Available at: http://www.psychiatry.msu.edu/_files/ 

docs/MMH-Conference-Agenda-20 l6.pdf 

8 See Cooperative Agreement Between United States Attorneys Office for the District of Massachusetts 

and Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services for Implementation of Strategies to 

Enhance Resilience to Violent Extremism, September 30, 2015. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: 

https://www.scribd.com/ document/321906162/CVE-Cooperative-Agreement -of-USA 0-for-Massachusetts-with-Massachusetts-EOHHS 

9 Sec USAO-MA invitation to Resilience to Violent Extremism: Effective Intervention Approaches, November I 0, 2015 ("Who Should Attend: Public health and mental health service providers, non-profit organizations engaged in intervention, school administrators and counselors, faith-based organizations, 

mental health clinicians, law enforcement and crisis support and crisis intervention team members ... The 

goal of the presentation is to increase knowledge about effective ways to provide support and services to 

those who have demonstrated concerning behavior that is inspired by violent extremist ideology. Participants will increase knowledge of specific methods of intervention and better understand the role that they 

can play. Presentation provided courtesy of Program on Extremism, George Washington University and 

the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts"). Email invitation (forwarded by a 

third party) on file with Muslim Justice League. 

10 See, e.g., email of Brandy Donini-Mclanson (Strategic Engagement and Law Enforcement Coordinator 

for USAO-MA) of AprilS, 2016, asking EOHHS staff to speak with press in order to counter a petition of 

1000 Massachusetts residents requesting EOHHS disengage from CVE, and explaining, "EOHHS 's engagement [in CVE] is key so that this can be framed as a public health issue." (Emphasis added.) Obtained via Freedom of Information Act request by Waqas Mirza (MuckRock). Accessed July 26, 2017. 

Available at: https://cdn.muckrock.com!foia _ files/20 16/09/27/Pnblic _Record_ Request_ CVE _-

PEACE.pdf#page=63. 
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MJL and many other human and civil rights organizations, as well as mental health clinicians," have expressed alarm at CVE's potential to encourage use of implicit bias in ways that harm patients and to erode 

confidentiality norms; both such outcomes are likely to chill recourse to mental health services. 

Mental health and other health and social services providers are legally permitted, and in some cases 

mandated, to breach confidentiality where there is imminent risk of harm to a patient/client or another 

individual. CVE does not propose improvements to existing confidentiality standards; instead CVE recruitment efforts have promoted the idea, without sound empirical support, that vague "concerning behaviors" may predict violence. Explicit guidance about such warning signs is rarely shared publicly, but 

available guidance cites factors that are extremely broad and common, often particularly common among 

Muslims (such as "increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or cause").l2 Encouraging the mental 

health sector to be alert to vague and discredited 13 signs of "vulnerability" to "extremism" - in contrast 

to clear indications of plans for imminent violence- invites use of implicit bias and may also spur invasive or patronizing questioning about clients' and patients' religious or political views. 

Many Muslims, like members of all communities, must overcome shame and misunderstanding surrounding mental illness in order to access mental health services. Unfortunately, some CVE proponents have 

suggested that investments in mental health and other social services can prevent or counter "extremism" 

-at least among Muslims, who are the focus of most CVE-related conversations about "extremism." 

This unfounded assertion serves to further stigmatize, degrade and discourage would-be consumers of 

mental health and other social services. 

MJL does not provide mental health counseling or social services of any kind. Yet individuals with whom 

we work- including those experiencing distress as a result of discrimination- occasionally share with 

us that they are suffering from a mental health problem and would like to seek counseling or treatment but 

feel unsafe doing so given an inability to know which providers may now or in future be collaborating in 

CVE. MJL believes mental health services benefit many individuals invaluably, and we would like to 

offer unqualified assurances that seeking help is safe. However, given known instances of CVE recruitment of mental health providers, and the reality that CVE is being deployed in a non-transparent manner, 

we cannot ethically, and do not, give such assurances. 

In contrast to political dissent or religious conservatism (which arc not public health issues), many genuine public health challenges- from addiction to violence-induced trauma to suicide- can be ameliorated through access to confidential and dignified mental health services. In MJL's experience, Massachusetts residents generally view public health issues (such as addiction and violence) as far more harmful and relevant to their lives than the ostensible threats of a neighbor's foreign policy views or choice to 

worship in ways that seem more rigid than one's own practices. This reality may of course explain why 

some CVE proponents have sought to rcbrand CVE a public health campaign. However, attempts to reduce CVE's stigma through such a rebrand unfairly transfers the justified mistrust of a surveillance campaign to the public health sector. Recruitment of mental health and other social services providers for 

11 See, e.g., Dr. Wesley Boyd M.D., Ph.D. and Dr. Alice LoCierco Ph.D., The Dangers of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs, July 19, 2016 ("As mental health professionals, we are obligated to take 

action if we know that someone is imminently at risk of harming him/herself or others ... But taking action along these lines is very different from what is being advocated by CVE programs."). Accessed July 

25, 2017. Available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/almost-addicted/201607/the-dangerscountering-vio1ent-extremism-cve-programs 

12 See, e.g., "Table I. Terrorism Indicators Identified by Government Agencies and Programs" in Faiza 

Patel and Meghan Konshik (Brennan Center for Justice) Countering Violent Extremism, 2017, at 15. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/countering-violent-extremism 

13 See note 2. 
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CVE implementation threatens public confidence in these sectors broadly, and can discourage recourse 

even to programs which are uninvolved in CVE. 

Any campaign that chills use of mental health services interferes with residents' rights to health and inflicts real damage to individuals and communities. Because CVE entangles social services provision with 

bias-based profiling and intelligence gathering, it has precisely this chilling effect. 

MJL believes it is dangerous to tie investments in mental health other social services to national securityrelated campaigns, even if funding for those initiatives were directed solely through health and human 

services agencies. Investments in health and human services should be made equitably for all communities, with the goal of promoting health, and completely divorced from any explicit or implicit objectives 

related to national security, intelligence gathering or discouraging certain political or religious views. 

Community Polarization 

Nearly immediately upon federal announcements of CVE pilot programs in Boston, Minneapolis and Los 

Angeles, the CVE campaign increased fear and mistrust within Muslim communities and undermined 

collaboration among organizations that took different positions regarding CVE. While Muslim communities, like all communities, have always been heterogeneous politically, religiously and across multiple 

other dimensions, differences need not generally lead to mistrust. However, when individuals and entities 

arc incentivized to propose and/or watch for pseudoscientific "concerning behaviors" of fellow community members, mistrust and fear are virtually guaranteed. Non-profit organizations face constant funding 

pressures to sustain important pre-existing services, and CVE grants encourage organizations to fit such 

services within a counterterrorism agenda. Given that CVE operates by offering funding and other opportunities to collaborating entities, and yet has threatened the rights and well-being of marginalized communities, its polarization of those who collaborate and those who do not was entirely foreseeable. 

We are aware that if a population is viewed as a potential fifth column by some law enforcement entities, 

divisions within that population- such as divisions along lines of support for or opposition to CVE'4 -

may be perceived by those entities not as a harm but as an aid to intelligence gathering and management 

of dissent. We hope and believe this Subcommittee, however, would agree that such mistrust and fear is 

at odds with important public policy objectives, such as that individuals feel safe to practice their religion 

in community, debate controversial views in public as opposed to underground, participate in organizations that advocate to solve societal problems, and partake in services offered by community-based programs, without fearing such actions could cause them to be falsely labeled a threat. 

Anticipated Additional Harms ifCVE Deployment Persists 

While Boston was named a pilot city for the CVE campaign by federal officials in 2014, funded deployment of CVE in Massachusetts has been relatively recent. Federal Department of Justice grants, routed 

through Massachusetts's Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS), were not awarded in 

14 It is highly troubling that some law enforcement materials have deemed a choice not to engage in a law 

enforcement "community outreach" program a sign of being "radicalized." See Michael Price (Brennan 

Center for Justice), Community Outreach or Intelligence Gathering? A Closer Look at "Countering Violent Extremism" Programs, January 29,2015, at 5 (excerpting a grant proposal for the "African Immigrant Muslim Coordinated Outreach Program" (AIM COP) which explains, "The [St. Paul Police Department] ... in partnership with the FBI and US Attorney's Office, ... will first seek to gain the tmst of the 

Somali immigrants ... [by] attend[ing] community meetings in the targeted areas and refer[ing] you to the 

[Police Athletic League] and YWCA programs .... During this period, the team will also identifY radicalized individuals ... who refUse to cooperate with our efforts . ... "Emphasis added.) Accessed July 25, 

2017. Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Community _Outreach_ or_ Intelligence_ Gathering.pdf 
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Boston until December, 201615 Department of Homeland Security CVE grants to the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security and, via the Police Foundation, to a project involving the 

Boston Police Department and two Massachusetts-based nonprofit organizations, 16 were awarded only 

this summer. 17 Prior to any known operation of a CVE program in Massachusetts, however, the community impacts described above became apparent following promotion of CVE by law enforcement entities 

and recognition within local communities that CVE treats Muslim populations as a problem to be monitored and refonned. 

It is highly likely that additional harms similar to those experienced in the U.K. under PREVENT will 

become evident in the U.S. ifCVE deployment persists. In the U.K., for example, Muslim students have 

been subjected to referrals or threatened referrals for de-radicalizing "interventions" following completely 

innocuous behavior, ranging from participating in a middle school French class discussion about ceo-activism 18 to-in the case of a four-year-old- mispronouncing the word "cucumber." 19 

The treatment of Ahmed Mohamed- subjected to police interrogation, arrest and school suspension after 

bringing a clock to school in Irving, Texas; and the prosecution of Mahin Khan an autistic and developmentally delayed youth the FBI monitored for years after coordinating his mental health treatment, 20 

are emblematic of the types of criminalization which may become more frequent if U.S. agencies continue pursuing CVE. Far from promoting "off-ramps" from prosecution for misguided youth who once contemplated violence, we believe CVE is well-designed to "on-ramp" youth who-for reasons of mental 

health, intellectual disabilities, or outspoken political views- provide low-hanging fruit for inchoate 

prosecutions in spite of posing no real threat of committing or facilitating violence. 

CVE Programs Would Be Troubling Regardless of which Communities or Viewpoints were Targeted. 

Finally, we wish to be clear that, in MJL's view, CVE programs would be deeply troubling regardless of 

which communities or viewpoints they were to target. MJL believes expanding CVE's targets would ex15 See Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services, Three Boston-based Organizations 

Chosen for 210K in PEACE Project Grants, December I, 2016. Accessed July 25,2017. Available at: 

http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/newsroom/press-releases/eohhs/three-boston-based-orgs-chosenfor-21 Ok-in-peace-grants.html 

16 See Boston Police Department response to MJL public records request, RePublic Record Request DHS 

"Countering Violent Extremism" Grant, Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.muslimjustice1eague.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/BPD-CVE-grant-public-records-response.pdf 

17 Sec Department of Homeland Security, DHS Countering Violent Extremism Grants, June 23, 2017. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants 

18 See Vikram Dodd (The Guardian), School Questioned Muslim Pupil about Isis after Discussion onEcoactivism, December 22,2015. Accessed July 25,2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/education/20 15/sep/22/ school-questioned-muslim-pupil-about-isis-after -discussion-on-eco-activism 

19 See Ben Quinn (The Guardian), Nursery Raised Fears Of Radicalization Over Boys Cucumber Drawing, March 11,2016. Accessed July 25,2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/ 

mar/11/nursery-radicalisation-fears-boys-cucumber-drawing-cooker-bomb 

20 See, e.g., Beau Hodai (The Progressive), Arizona s Manufactured Terrorism Threat, May 23, 2017. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http://progressive.org/magazine/arizona%E2%80%99s-manufacturedterrorism-threat/; Mike Truelson (KVOA.com), Parents of Tucson Terrorism Suspect Mahin Khan Release 

Statement; Ask for 'Understanding, 'July 21, 2016. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: http:// 

www.kvoa.com/story/32501286/parents-of-tucson-terrorism-suspect-mahin-khan-release-statement-askfor-understanding 
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pand, not reduce, its harms to communities and societal freedoms. Therefore, we would continue to harbor strong concerns if CVE were to expand its focus beyond the communities currently targeted (i.e. Muslims, especially Somali Americans; Black Lives Matter organizers, refugees and LGBTQ communities 21 ) 

to also target white supremacists, white Christians, or even all U.S. civilians. MJL does not advocate for, 

nor could we support, "ecumenical" or "equal opportunity" CVE. 

Alternatives to CVE 

We believe the solution to CVE's extensive problems is to end the campaign before it can further damage 

intracommunity and community-law enforcement relations or further chill use of needed social services 

and First Amendment freedoms. We do not believe CVE can be resuscitated in a way that avoids the consequences of its central problems: namely, that it is founded on unsound theories about "radicalization" 

and that it frames disfavored political or religious views, as opposed to planned or actual violence, as appropriate problems to be countered. Moreover, these central obstacles, combined with years of demonstrated harms in the U.K. and more recently the U.S., make it unlikely CVE could be sufficiently reformed even to be benign. Instead of CVE -or any rebranded campaign that incorporates the false 

premise that certain viewpoints can predict violence- we believe evidence-based law enforcement 

methods22 that (1) uphold the clear distinction between viewpoints and actions and avoid criminalizing 

viewpoint expression, (2) refrain from surveilling civilians based on viewpoints or immutable characteristics, and (3) fully respect the ethical obligations of social services providers, would best promote the interrelated objectives of protecting human rights and promoting safety and security of all communities. 

Thank you once again for the opportunity to share MJL's observations regarding CVE's impacts on Massachusetts communities. For questions or further information, please contact me at swakeel@muslimjusticeleague.org. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

Shannon AI-Wakeel 

Executive Director, Muslim Justice League 

cc: 

Ranking Member Elijah Cummings 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Refonn 

2163 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

21 See, e.g., Waqas Mirza (MuckRock), Denver s Counterterror Program Sets Sights on Black Lives Matter, LGBTQ Groups, and Refugees, March 9, 2017. Accessed July 25, 2017. Available at: https:!/www.-

muckrock. com/news/archives/20 17 /mar/09/ denvers-counterterror-BLM/ 

22 We encourage reference to resources published by the Rethinking Intelligence project of the Brennan 

Center for Justice for expert analysis of law enforcement, intelligence and national security tactics and 

recommendations about reforms to increase effectiveness. Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/ 

rethinking-intelligence-enterprise 
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The July 27, 2017, Brennan Center for Justice letter addressed to Chairman DeSantis and 

Ranking Member Lynch can be found at https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/lettersubcornrni ttee-national-security. 
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March 10,2017 

Diana Maurer 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20548 

U.S. Department of Homeland Securi~' 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

Re: Management's Response to Draft Report GA0-17-300, "COUNTERING VIOLENT 

EXTREMISM: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal 

Efforts" 

Dear Ms. Maurer: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. The U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 

work in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's positive recognition ofDHS' countering violent 

extremist (CVE) efforts, particularly the threat posed by a range of violent ideologies in the 

United States, including white supremacists, militia extremists, and ISIL-inspired violent 

extremists, among others. In particular, GAO found that the Department's initiatives to partner 

with the social media industry and efforts to improve community outreach and law enforcement 

CVE-focused training were on track to meet the aims of the national CVE strategy and 

domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for CVE 

in the United States. 

In partnership with the Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS guides domestic CVE efforts for the 

Federal Government to implement the overall national strategy goal to prevent violent extremists 

and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in 

the United States to commit acts of violence. The updated Strategic Implementation Plan for 

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, released in 

October 2016, responds to the current dynamics of violent extremism and reflects experience and 

knowledge acquired since publication of the national strategy. GAO notes that, as of December 

2016, involved agencies have implemented tasks focused on expanding CVE efforts in local 

communities and identifying ways to increase funding for CVE activities. DHS has led or 

participated in thirty-seven of the forty-four 2011domestic-focused CVE tasks. Both DHS and 

DOJ identified funding within existing appropriations to incorporate CVE into eligible public 

safety and community resilience grants. 

In accordance with the 2016 Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent 

Extremism, DHS remains committed to ensuring communities possess the information, 
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resources, and tools to effectively counter radicalization and recruitment to violence, without 

regard to motivation; and will continue to partner with DOJ in leading non-security federal 

partners to build CVE programs across the nation. 

The draft report contained two recommendations with which the Department concurs. Attached 

find our detailed response to each recommendation. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical 

comments were provided under separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 

questions. We look forward to working with you again in the future. 

(~~A~c~m \Etor 

Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office 

Attachment 

2 
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Attachment: DHS Management Response to Recommendations 

Contained in GA0-17-300 

GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General- as 

heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts- should direct the CVE 

Task Force to: 

Recommendation 1: Develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for CVE 

activities. 

Response: Concur. DHS, in partnership with the DOJ, leads domestic CVE efforts across the 

Federal Government through the CVE Task Force. In October 2016, the White House issued an 

updated SIP that responds to the current dynamics of violent extremism and reflects experiences 

and knowledge acquired since the 2011 release of the national strategy and corresponding SIP. 

The 2016 SIP provides specific objectives and the multi-tiered actions of Federal departments 

and agencies to synchronize and integrate whole-of-govermnent CVE programs and activities. 

The CVE Task Force and DHS recognize that additional strategic-level performance 

documentation will improve coordination and collaboration tasks among partner agencies; define 

how cross-cutting tasks will be implemented, and how they will measurably contribute to 

achieving the federal CVE goals. The CVE Task Force is currently developing measurable 

outcomes to support and guide the development of performance, effectiveness, and benchmarks 

for federally sponsored CVE efforts. 

The CVE Task Force plans to report on the implementation progress of the 2016 SIP to the 

White House Homeland Security Advisor in January 2018. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 

January 31,2018. 

Recommendation 2: Establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, 

including its effectiveness. 

Response: Concur. The CVE Task Force and DHS recognize that establishing a process for 

assessing overall strategy success will drive an understanding of the contributions of individual 

activities in the federal CVE effort. While the Task Force will not be engaged in specific 

evaluation projects of its members or partners, the Task Force will support and guide the 

development of measures of performance, effectiveness, and benchmarks for federally sponsored 

CVE efforts. To develop a set of standard guidelines for CVE measurement and evaluation, the 

Task Force will consult with departments and agencies that have already invested in CVE 

program assessment, namely the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, the DOJ National Institute of Justice, and the DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate. Some of the CVE evaluation efforts undertaken by these agencies are still 

underway, but interim findings have been shared with the CVE Task Force regarding 

methodology and general areas of measurement. Based on this information, the CVE Task Force 

Research and Analysis team will develop and distribute summaries and resource guides to our 

federal and non-govermnent partners. Overall, the long-term goal of the Task Force's 

engagement on CVE metrics is to develop an evidence based system in order to provide a meta3 
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assessment of CVE programs, similar to other rigorous federal efforts to evaluate gang 

prevention programs or community policing initiatives. 

As the current agency lead for the CVE Task Force, DHS is working with DOJ to synchronize 

and integrate CVE programs and activities to ensure successful implementation of this multiagency collaborative effort. 

The CVE Task Force plans to report on the implementation progress of the 2016 SIP to the 

White House Homeland Security Advisor in January 2018. ECD: January 31, 2018. 

4 
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July 28, 2017 

The Honorable Ron DeSantis 

Chair 

National Security Subcommittee 

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Stephen Lynch 

Ranking Member 

National Security Subcommittee 

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Chairman DeSantis and Ranking Member Lynch: 

We write to provide the views of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) for the House Oversight and 

Government Reform National Security Subcommittee hearings on "Combating Homegrown Terrorism." 

We ask that this statement be included as part of the official hearings record. 

The Anti-Defamation League 

Since 1913, the mission of the Anti-Defamation League has been to "stop the defamation of the Jewish 

people and to secure justice and fair treatment for all." For decades, the League has fought against 

bigotry and anti-Semitism by exposing and reporting on extremist groups who spread hate and incite 

violence. 

ADL is now the foremost non-governmental authority on domestic terrorism, extremism, organized hate 

groups, and hate crimes. Through our Center on Extremism, whose experts monitor a variety of extremist 

and terrorist movements, ADL plays a leading role in exposing extremist movements and activities, while 

helping communities and government agencies alike in combatting them. ADL's team of expertsanalysts, investigators, researchers, and linguists use cutting-edge technology to monitor, track, and 

disrupt extremists and terrorists worldwide. The League provides law enforcement officials and the 

public with extensive resources, such as its analytic reports on extremist trends and its Hate Symbols 1 

and Terror Symbols databases. 

Assisting Law Enforcement 

ADL is the largest non-governmental provider in the United States for law enforcement training on hate 

crimes, extremism, and terrorism. Each year, ADL experts deliver customized, in-depth training on these 

subjects to over 10,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers. ADL arms law enforcement with 

the information it needs to respond to those extremists who cross the line from espousing hateful 

ideologies to committing violent or criminal acts, thus protecting the Jewish community and all Americans. 

Support for Properly-Crafted CVE Programs 

ADL strongly supports properly-crafted CVE programs. We believe an "all hands on deck" holistic 

approach is required to confront the sophisticated recruitment efforts employed by domestic extremist 

groups and by ISIS and other terror groups. Through the CVE program launched under President 

Obama, the Department of Homeland Security had administered federal grants to nongovernmental 

organizations and higher-education institutions to carry out programs that counter the potential for 

violence from domestic terrorists and homegrown violent extremists. 

1 https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols 
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ADL professionals were directly involved in the February, 2015 White House Summit on Countering 

Violent Extremism.2 Convened by President Obama, the three-day program involved experts from 

around the world working to develop an action plan to address violent domestic and international 

extremism. Oren Segal, Director of ADL's Center on Extremism, participated and provided insights into 

the nature of violent extremist movements in the U.S., as well as how Americans of all religions, races, 

and backgrounds are being recruited by international terrorist organizations online. 

The Summit also provided a showcase for pilot programs in three cities, which had developed 

ccllaborative networks of government and non-governmental stakeholders. ADL served as a partner in 

the Boston area pilot program, which developed a framework for prevention and intervention strategies in 

the wake of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. The Framework developed by the Boston collaborative 

(including the League's New England Regional Director, Robert Trestan), takes a multi-disciplinary and 

community-wide approach to addressing the threat posed by violent extremists. 3 

Identifying the Threat 

In the United States, adherents of a variety of extremist movements -from white supremacists to violent 

left-wing ideologues, to Islamic extremists - perceive Jews as their enemy and target the Jewish 

community with both propaganda and violence. Extremists also target other communities or minorities, 

as well as the democratic foundations of government that protect everybody's rights. Understanding the 

diverse list of perpetrators that threaten the Jewish and other minority communities is the first step to 

protecting them from violent extremism. 

Right Wing Extremism 

Over the past 10 years (2007-2016), domestic extremists of all kinds have killed at least 372 people in the 

United States. Of those deaths, approximately 74% were at the hands of right-wing extremists such as 

white supremacists, sovereign citizens, and militia adherents.• Right-wing extremists have been 

responsible for plotting at least 150 acts of terror in the United States over the past 25 years. 5 

Right-wing extremists choose many targets for their anger, most frequently government, law enforcement, 

and racial and religious targets. The most common religious targets are Jews and Muslims, while the 

most common racial targets were African-Americans, including multi-racial targets. 

The White supremacists who target minority communities for acts of terror and violence include adherents 

of every major segment of their movement, including neo-Nazis, racist skinheads, the religious sect 

Christian Identity, and the All Right. The militia movement has specially embraced a particular type of 

bigotry: anti-Muslim hatred. This lslamophobia has taken numerous forms, from armed protests in front of 

mosques to a major terrorist plot in October 2016 in Garden City, Kansas, where three militia members 

were arrested in connection with an alleged plot to blow up an apartment complex that primarily housed 

Muslim Somali-American residents. We should be concerned that the militia movement could produce 

similar terror attempts aimed at Muslims in the future6 

The social networking revolution from 2006-2009 made it easier for extremist ideas and tactics to spread 

very far, very quickly. This facilitated the emergence of new extremist movements, such as the white 

supremacist All Right, to quickly gain followers, and helped established movements, such as the 

sovereign citizen movement, to rapidly resurge. Social networking has also provided opportunities for 

extremists to meet each other and even to plot online. The October 2008 school attack plot in Tennessee 

2 https://www.adl.org/newslpress-releases/white-house-invites-adl-to-present-at-summit-on-counterinq-violentextremism 

~www.justice.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/usao-ma/pageslattachmentsl2015102/18/framework.pdf 4 https://www.adl.org/education/resourceslreportslmurder-and-extremism-in-the-united-states-in-2016 5 https://www.adl.om/news/press-releases/adl-report-exposes-right-wing-terrorism-threat-in-the-us 

6 https://www.adl.org/education/resourceslreportsldark-constant-rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-unitedstates 

2 
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and the Georgia militia plot of February 2014 are two examples where extremists who connected online 

later met in person to plot terrorist acts. 7 

Left Wing and Black Nationalist Violence 

On Wednesday, June 14, a congressional baseball team in the midst of a morning practice was attacked 

by a lone gunman. The U.S. House Majority Whip, Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), was seriously injured, and 

several others were also shot. 

In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, the ADL has been tracking growing anger within the 

American left, directed at President Trump, his administration, and political allies. In recent months, the 

ADL has been warning law enforcement personnel about the possibility of an increase in left-wing 

violence as a result of the growing anger. The shootings in Alexandria appear to be an example of this. 8 

While from the 1960s through the 1980s extreme Black Nationalist groups like the Black Panther Party 

and the Black Liberation Army killed dozens of people, including many police officers, violent Black 

Nationalism decreased sharply after that. Over the course of the past year, however, Black Nationalist 

violence has taken a deadly toll, responsible for the deaths of eight police officers in Dallas and Baton 

Rouge in 2016. In July 2016, Micah Xavier Johnson, who had ties to black nationalist groups such as the 

New Black Panther Party, killed five police officers (and injured nine others) in Dallas, Texas, in an 

ambush attack aimed at police who were maintaining public order at a Black Lives Matter protest. That 

same month, Gavin Eugene Long ambushed and shot six police officers, three of them fatally, in Baton 

Rouge. Long was also an adherent of Black Nationalism as well as the anti-government sovereign citizen 

movement. Both incidents were acts of "retaliation" against police officers in response to controversial 

police shootings of African-American men9 

Extremism Sparked by Radical Interpretations of Islam 

Over the past 1 0 years, about 24% of victims killed by domestic terrorists were at the hands of domestic 

Islamic extremists. One of the most striking elements of today's domestic threat picture is the role that a 

growing number of American citizens and residents motivated by radical interpretations of Islam have 

played in criminal plots to attack Americans in the U.S. and abroad. Last year, in the worst mass shooting 

in American history, Omar Mateen opened fire inside Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, killing 49 people. 

During the shooting, Mateen, an American citizen born in New York, declared his allegiance to the Islamic 

State (ISIS). As demonstrated by this horrific shooting, it is clear that there are deliberate attempts by 

international terrorist groups that justify and sanction violence to appeal to and engage sympathizers in 

the U.S. A. A disturbing number of cases also demonstrate the degree to which hatred of Jews and Israel 

play a part in radicalization process of homegrown extremists. However, efforts to explore these 

legitimate security concerns should not be overwhelmed by the kind of unfair stereotyping and prejudice 

that has too-frequently accompanied recent public debates. This is especially true now, given the ADL 

has tracked an objectionable, intensified level of anti-Muslim bigotry in a variety of public forums, as 

discussed below. 

Terrorist Exploitation of Social Media 

As Internet proficiency and the use of social media grow ever-more universal, so too do the efforts of 

terrorist groups to exploit new technology in order to make materials that justify and sanction violence 

more accessible and impactful. Terrorist groups are not only using various online and mobile platforms to 

spread their messages, but also to actively recruit adherents who live in the communities they seek to 

target. 

While the fundamental ideological content of terrorist propaganda has remained consistent for two 

decades replete with militant condemnations of perceived transgressions against Muslims worldwide, 

7 https:/lwww.adl.org/education/resources/reportsldark-constant-rage-25-years-of-right-wing-terrorism-in-united-

~tates 

https:l/news.vice.comlstorv/extremism-experts-are-starting-to-worry-about-the-left 9 https:llwww.adl.org/bloglfresno-shootinqs-latest-incident-in-rise-of-black-nationalist-violence 

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and appeals for violence and anti-Semitism terrorists groups are now able to reach, recruit and motivate 

extremists more quickly and effectively than ever before by adapting their messages to new technology. 

In the past, plots were directed by foreign terrorist organizations or their affiliates and recruitment and 

planning generally required some direct, face-to-face interaction with terrorist operatives. Indoctrination 

came directly from extremist peers, teachers or clerics. Individuals would then advance through the 

radicalization process through constant interaction with likeminded sympathizers or, as the 2007 New 

York Police Department (NYPD) report on radicalization described, with a "spiritual sanctioner'' who gave 

credence to those beliefs. Today, individuals can find analogous social networks, inspiration, and 

encouragement online, often packaged neatly together with bomb-making instructions. This enables 

adherents to self-radicalize without face-to-face contact with an established terrorist group or ceiL 

Individual extremists, or lone wolves, are also increasingly self-radicalizing online with no physical 

interactions with established terrorist groups or cells - a development that can make it more difficult for 

law enforcement to detect plots in their earliest stages. Approximately half of the 150 terrorist incidents 

described in a 2017 ADL report on 25 years of right-wing terrorism were perpetrated by lone wolf 

offenders. 10 Today, thanks to the Internet, it is easier than ever for someone to become steeped in 

extremist ideologies, even to the point of being willing to commit acts of great violence, without ever being 

involved in an organized extremist group. The overwhelming majority of American citizens and residents 

linked to terrorist activity motivated by Islamic extremism in the past several years - including at least 63 

U.S. residents in 2015- actively used the Internet to access propaganda or otherwise facilitate their 

extremist activity. 

Funding CVE - and the Need for a Holistic Approach 

In May, the League expressed concerns about press reports that the administration was proposing to cut 

funding for its CVE programs entirely. 11 And last month, ADL expressed concerns as DHS announced 

their 2017 two-year CVE funding grantees.12 Funding for Life After Hate, a successful and in-demand 

program to de-radicalize neo-Nazis and white supremacists, was not renewed. Politico reported that, 

since Election Day, Life After Hate has seen a twenty-fold increase in requests for help "from people 

looking to disengage or bystanders/family members looking for help from someone they know."13 At a 

time when right-wing extremist groups are experiencing rising membership and expanding influence, DHS 

must invest in community-based organizations that work to counter these groups. 

In addition, the 20171ist of CVE grantees14 indicates a shift in funding focus away from community-based 

civil society organizations and toward law enforcement agencies. Police play a critical role, but we cannot 

enforce our way out of this problem. Community-based organizations must help lead this work. These 

groups are much more likely to have credibility and trust needed to reach the targets of extremists, which 

include many disaffected or vulnerable youth. The League called on DHS to clarify its funding criteria 

and demonstrate that it is committed to funding the full range of programs - domestic and international -

designed to counter all forms of violent extremism. 15 

Importantly, ADL has also strongly advised the administration against focusing its CVE program solely on 

extremism motivated by radical interpretation of Islam. We responded to press reports 16 that the 

administration wanted to change the name of the government initiative from "Countering Violent 

10 https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-raqe-25-years-of-riqht-wing-terrorism-in-un~edstates 

"tiiiis://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-concerned-over-reports-of-trump=administration-proposing-to-cutentire 

rztiiiPs://www.adLorg/news/press-releases/adl-welcomes-homeland-securitv-grants-to-counter-terrorist-recruitmentand 

nti'ttp://www.politico.com/tipsheets/playbook/2017/06/23/what-mcconnell-is-thinking-winners-losers-in-gop-healthcare-bill-obama-speaks-dawsey-download-wapo-trump-talks-russia-everv-morning-pelosis-future-220996 

14 https://www.dhs.gov/cveqrants 15 https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-welcomes-homeland-security-grants-to-counter-terrorist-recruitmentand 

'rnhttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv-idUSKBN15G5VO 

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Extremism" to "Countering Islamic Extremism" or "Countering Radical Islamic Extremism" by stating that 

such a change would be damaging to the American Muslim community and dangerously narrowH 

Singling out Muslims and the American Muslim community for special scrutiny or suspicion is 

discriminatory, offensive, ineffective, and counterproductive. In fact, one essential focus of our nation's 

CVE programs should be to build trust within American Muslim communities to reduce radicalism, not to 

further foster mistrust. 

This is especially true now, because over the past few months, ADL and others have documented an 

objectionable, intensified level of anti-Muslim bigotry in a variety of public forums. For example, according 

to a recent Pew Research Center publication on Muslim Americans place in society released this week,18 

nearly half of Muslims (48%) say they have experienced at least one form of discrimination over the past 

year. Of those whose appearance is identifiably Muslim, nearly two-thirds (64%) say they have 

experienced at least one of the specific types of discrimination asked about in the survey. Three-quarters 

(75%) of Muslim respondents say there is "a lot" of discrimination against Muslims in the U.S., with 

Muslim women more likely than Muslim men to hold this view (83% versus 68%). These findings 

reinforce an ADL survey on anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim discrimination published this past year. 19 Our 

survey revealed that 89 percent of Muslim Americans are concerned about violence directed at them and 

Islamic institutions in the U.S., and 64 percent said that they do not believe the government is doing 

enough to ensure their safety. While most Muslims don't feel the need to hide their faith, 66 percent said 

they feel less safe in America since President Trump was elected. 

Limiting CVE programs to only focus on Islamic extremism would not only isolate the Muslim American 

community,. but would also exacerbate the problem of how little scrutiny right-wing extremists are 

receiving. 0 At a time when our research indicates that right wing extremists are more visible and 

emboldened, 21 the government should focus on all types of extremism whether it comes from terrorists 

motivated by extreme interpretations of Islam or white supremacists. 

Relationship with Tech Industry 

As modern technology has provided new fuel for extremists, including using "cyberhate" to attack 

minorities on social media and coordinate terror attacks more easily, a well-funded CVE program is vital 

to combat the diverse options extremists have to perpetuate their violence against the American people. 

Over the past decade, the League has worked closely with the Internet industry and they have been very 

responsive to information regarding terrorist and extremist exploitation of their platforms. Our relationship 

has led to increased successes in mitigating the exploitation of platforms by groups such as ISIS. In 

addition, working with industry officials, the League developed the ADL Cyber-Safety Action Guide,22 a 

user-friendly online platform where consumers can learn how and where to report bigoted, bullying, or 

hateful speech to the major Internet providers and social media platforms. 

The League has also convened a Working Group on Cyberhate to develop recommendations for the most 

effective responses to manifestations of hate and bigotry online.23 The Working Group includes 

representatives of the Internet industry, civil society, the legal community, and academia. The Working 

Group input and guidance has been invaluable, and is reflected in a set of Best Practices24 which provide 

17 https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-limiting-scope-of-countering-violent-extremism-programs-placesnation-at 

"titti):i/www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/ 

19 https://www.adl.oro/news/press-releases/in-first-new-adl-poll-finds-majoritv-of-americans-concerned-about-violence 20 http://time.com/4671901 /donald-trumo-extremism-terrorism-muslims/ 21 https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-report-exposes-right-wing-terrorism-threat-in-the-us 22 http://www.adl.org/press-center/press-releases/discrimination-racism-biqotry/new-adl-platform-helps-consumerstake-action-aqainst-internet-hate-speech.htmi#.Vi58MX6rTct 

23 For a comprehensive review of the League's work addressing the scourge of online anti-Semitism since preInternet days -- when dial-up bulletin boards were a prominent communications tool -see Report of the AntiDefamation League on Confronting Cyberhate to the 5th Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism, May, 2015, 

http://www.adl.org/assetslpdf/combating-hate/ICCA-report-2015-With-hyperlinks-May-8-20 15 final.pdf 24 http://www.adl.org/combatinq-hate/cyber-safety/best-practices/#.Vi58F36rTcs 

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useful and important guideposts for all those willing to join in the effort to address the challenge of 

cyberhate. 

Conclusion 

We very much hope that these hearings - and any that come after them - will acknowledge and highlight 

the extraordinary, successful efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to prevent and 

deter terrorism on our shores since September 11, 2001. But police and counterterrorism officials do not 

work in a vacuum; they cannot do their job without community relationships, trust, community 

cooperation, and a shared sense of responsibility for public safety. 

The administration and Congress should do all in its power to promote trust and encourage stronger 

relationships to counter attempts by international terrorist organizations to recruit disaffected or alienated 

Americans. 

As the Subcommittee and Congress continue to examine the nature of the current threat to our nation, 

the Anti-Defamation League hopes to play an ongoing, helpful, and constructive role by offering its 

expertise in documenting the domestic and international terror threats from across the ideological 

spectrum, while urging members of Congress and other public officials to make every effort to explore this 

serious issue without creating an atmosphere of blame and suspicion. And ADL will continue to advocate 

in Congress and in the courts for law enforcement officials to have investigative tools sufficient to 

deter and prevent terrorism, while appropriately balancing national security and individual rights. 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our views on this issue of high priority to our organization. 

Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can provide additional information or if we can be of assistance 

to you in any way. 

Deborah M. Lauter 

Senior Vice President 

Policy and Programs 

Sincerely 

Oren Segal 

Director 

Center on Extremism 

6 

Michael Lieberman 

Washington Counsel 
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ADl 

Ar•t.·DefiiMiltion League" 

Selected ADL Resources on Hate Groups, Terrorism and Extremism 

MAJOR REPORTS: 

Alt Right to Alt Lite: Naming the Hate (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/educationlresourceslbackgrounderslfrom-alt-riqht-to-alt-lite-naming-the-hate 

Despite Internal Turmoil, Klan Groups Persist (June 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/educationlresources/reportsldespite-internal-turmoil-klan-qroups-persist 

A Dark and Constant Rage: 25 Years of Right Wing Terrorism in the United States (May 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/dark-constant-rage-25-years-of-riqht-winq-terrorism-inunited-states 

Defining Extremism: Glossary of Anti-Government Extremism (June 2017) 

https:/lwww.adl.org/educationlresources/qlossary-terms/defining-extremism-anti-government 

Defining Extremism: Glossary of White Supremacist Terms, Movements and Philosophies (May 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/qlossary-terms/defining-extremism-white-supremacy 

Domestic Islamic Extremism Report (March 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/CR 5062 Domestic%201slamic%20Extremism%20Repo 

rt vF1.pdf 

White Supremacists on Campus: Unprecedented Recruitment Efforts Underway (March 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloq/white-supremacists-on-campus-unprecedented-recruitment-efforts-underway 

Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2016 (February 2017) 

https:l/www.adl.org/education/resourceslreports/murder-and-extremism-in-the-united-states-in-2016 

US Residents Linked to Activity Motivated by Islamic Extremist Ideology in 2016 (November 2016) 

https://www.adl.org/news/article/us-residents-linked-to-activity-motivated-by-islamic-extremist-ideology-in2016 

White Supremacist Prison Gangs in the US (April2016) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/white-supremacist-prison-aangs-in-the-united-states 

The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 

(March 2016) 

https://www.adl.orc/education/resources/reports/the-isis-impact-on-the-domestic-islamic-extremist-threathomegrown 

2015 Sees a Dramatic Spike in Islamic Extremism Arrests (March 2016) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resourceslreports/2015-sees-dramatic-spike-in-islamic-extremism-arrests 

Anatomy of a Standoff: The Malheur Refuge Occupation (February 2016) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/anatomy-of-a-standoff 

Oath Keepers and Three Percenters Part of Growing Anti-Govt Movement (September 2015) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backqrounders/oath-keepers-and-three-ers-part-of-growing-antigovernment 

With Hate in Their Hearts: The State of White Supremacy in the U.S. (July 2015) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/state-of-white-supremacy 

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Farrakhan: In His Own Words (March 2015) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/nation-of-islam-farrakhan-in-his-own-words 

Homegrown Islamic Extremism in 2014 (February 2015) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/new-adl-report-homegrown-islamic-extremism-in-2014 

Hashtag Terror: How ISIS Manipulates Social Media (August 2014) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/reports/isis-islamic-state-social-media 

Homegrown Islamic Extremism in 2013 (March 2014) 

https://www.adl.org/news/article/homegrown-islamic-extremism-in-2013 

BACKGROUNDERS: 

Backgrounder: Vanguard America (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/vanquard-america 

Backgrounder: ACT for America (June 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/act-for-america 

Backgrounder: All Right: A Primer About the New White Supremacy (2016) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backqrounders/alt-right-a-primer-about-the-new-whitesupremacy 

Backgrounder: Frank Gaffney and the Center for Security Policy (2016) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/frank-gaffney-jr-and-the-center-for-securitv-policy 

Backgrounder: Traditionalist Youth Network (Heimbach/Perrott) (2014) 

https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/traditionalist-youth-network 

2017 BLOG POSTS: 

Sovereign Citizen Funny Money Not So Humorous for Victims (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloq/sovereign-citizen-funny-money-not-so-humorous-for-victims 

Jewish Voice for Peace: Increasing Anti-Jewish Radicalism (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloq/jewish-voice-for-peace-increasinq-anti-israel-radicalism 

AI-Aqsa Aftermath: Analyzing post-Attack Extremist Rhetoric (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloq/al-aqsa-aftermath-analyzinq-post-attack-extremist-rhetoric 

Colorado White Supremacist Latest to Be Arrested for Attacks on Jewish Institutions (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/colorado-white-supremacist-latest-to-be-arrested-for-attacks-on-jewishinstitutions 

Analysis of Reddit User Claiming Responsibility for President Trump's CNN Video (July 2017) 

https://www.adl.orglblog/analysis-of-reddit-user-claiming-responsibilitv-for-president-trumps-cnn-video 

Virginia Shooting Underscores Risk of Domestic Terror from Across Ideological Spectrum (June 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/virginia-shooting-underscores-risk-of-domestic-terror-from-across-ideologicalspectrum 

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White Supremacists Adopt New Slogan: You Will Not Replace Us (June 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-adopt-new-slogan-you-will-not-replace-us 

White Supremacists on Campus: Unprecedented Recruitment Efforts Underway (June 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/white-suoremacists-on-campus-unprecedented-recruitment-efforts-underway 

White Supremacists Targeting High Schools with Fliers (March 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-tarqetinq-high-schools-with-fliers 

White Supremacists Praise Rep. Steve King's Racist Tweet (March 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloglwhite-supremacists-praise-rep-steve-kings-racist-tweet 

Fourth Arrest Connected to Washington-based Hakenkreuz Skinheads (March 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloq/fourth-arrest-connected-to-washinqton-based-hakenkreuz-skinheads 

Extremists Blame Jews for Anti-Semitic Bomb Threats, Cemetery Desecration (March 2017) 

https:/lwww.adl.org/bloq/extremists-blame-jews-for-anti-semitic-bomb-threats-cemetery-desecration 

Anti-Trump Rallies Give Voice to Longstanding Anti-Israel Narrative (February 2017) 

https:/lwww.adl.orglblog/anti-trump-rallies-give-voice-to-longstandinq-anti-israel-narrative 

Anti-Semites Celebrate When Jews Are Targeted (February 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/anti-semites-celebrate-when-jews-are-taroeted 

Google Deletes White Supremacist App from Play Store (February 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloglgoogle-deletes-white-supremacist-app-from-play-store 

Convicted Terrorist to Address Jewish Voice for Peace Conference in Chicago (February 2017) 

https:/lwww.adl.org/blog/convicted-terrorist-to-address-jewish-voice-for-peace-conference-in-chicago 

Anti-Defamation League Reveals Extremist Background on Alleged Plotter (February 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/anti-defamation-league-reveals-extremist-background-of-alleged-plotter 

All-Right Moving from Online to Real-World Activity (February 2017) 

https:/lwww.adl.org/bloq/alt-right-movinq-from-online-to-real-world-activity 

Ricin Found in Car of Georgia White Supremacist (February 2017) 

https:l/www.adl.org/bloq/ricin-found-in-car-of-georgia-white-supremacist 

Milo and Freedom Center Launch New Campaign Against Campuses (February 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloqlmilo-and-freedom-center-launch-new-campaiqn-aqainst-campuses 

White Supremacists Launch Racist Poster Campaign (January 2017) 

https:/lwww.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-launch-racist-poster-campaign 

Group of Klan Members Charged with Robbery (January 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloglgroup-of-klan-members-charoed-with-robbery 

Extremists Exploit Unintentional Swastikas (January 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/bloq/extremists-exploit-unintentional-swastikas 

White Supremacists Demonstrate in Front of Menorah at Chicago's Daley Plaza (January 2017) 

https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-demonstrate-in-front-of-the-menorah-at-chicagos-daleyplaza 

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ISIS's New Focus: Incendiary Attacks (January 2017) 

https:llwww.adl.org/bloqlisiss-new-focus-incendiarv-attacks 

White Supremacists Try to Turn Martin Luther King Jr Day Into James Earl Ray Day (January 2017) 

https·l!www adl.orolbloglwhite-supremacists-trv-to-turn-martin-luther-king-jr-day-into-james-earl-ray-day 

COMBATING CYBERHATE: 

Online Harassment: Extremists Ramp Up Trolling. Doxxing Efforts (March 2017) 

https:llwww.adl.orglbloqlonline-harassment-extremists-ramp-up-trollinq-doxxing-efforts 

ADL Best Practices for Responding to Cyberhate 

https:llwww.adl.org/cyberhate-response 

Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo. YouTube and other companies have adopted ADL's 

standards for responding to hate online. 

Cyber-Safety Action Guide 

https:llwww.adl.org/cyber-safetv-action-guide 

To empower any consumer to take action against Internet hate speech, ADL created the guide and an 

online portal to rnake it easy for any member of the public to register complaints with the most frequented 

websites and major social media channels. including AT&T, eBay, Facebook, Google, lnstagram. 

Linked In, Pinterest, Twitter. Yahoo and You Tube. 

ADL's Work Combating Cyberhate and Countering Violent Extremists Online 

https:llwww.adl.org/news/article/about-adls-work-combating-cyberhate-and-countering-violent-extremistsonline 

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