Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A03-1507-JC-842 | March 24, 2016 Page 1 of 6

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

P. Jeffrey Schlesinger

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy’s Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of:

D.W. (Minor Child),

 and,

T.W. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

March 24, 2016

Court of Appeals Cause No.

45A03-1507-JC-842

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable John M. Sedia, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45D06-1112-JC-1023

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A03-1507-JC-842 | March 24, 2016 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] T.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her visitation with 

D.W. and denying her motion to modify the permanency plan in a CHINS 

action. We dismiss.

Issue

[2] We address one dispositive issue, which we restate as whether the trial court’s 

order is a final judgment.

Facts

[3] D.W. was born to Mother in August 2008. In December 2011, the Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that D.W. was a child in 

need of services (“CHINS”) because Mother was arrested and charged with 

“four felony counts of criminal confinement; 2 felony counts of battery and 6 

felony counts of neglect of a dependent.”1 App. p. 26. The charges apparently 

related to another of Mother’s children. D.W. was placed in foster care. In 

February 2012, the trial court found that D.W. was a CHINS.

[4] Visitation between Mother and D.W. was suspended in November 2012. In 

February 2013, the trial court changed the permanency plan to termination of 

 

1 DCS also filed a petition alleging that J.G., D.W.’s older sibling, was a CHINS. This appeal concerns only 

D.W.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A03-1507-JC-842 | March 24, 2016 Page 3 of 6

parental rights. In December 2013, the trial court held a permanency review 

hearing, and the plan remained termination of Mother’s parental rights to D.W. 

[5] In January 2014, Mother filed a motion for modification of the permanency 

plan, for reinstatement of her visitation, and for a bonding assessment. After 

multiple hearings on pending issues, including Mother’s motion for 

modification, the trial court entered an order in June 2015 denying Mother’s 

motion to modify the permanency plan, granting DCS’s motion to discontinue 

visitation, ordering that all parenting time between Mother and D.W. cease, 

and ordering counsel to coordinate with the trial court regarding a hearing on 

DCS’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.2 

[6] In July 2015, Mother filed a notice of appeal and indicated that the appeal was 

interlocutory pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B)(3). Mother amended 

her notice of appeal in September 2015 and indicated that she was appealing a 

final judgment. 

Analysis

[7] Mother appeals the trial court’s order, charactering it as a final, appealable 

order. In response, DCS argues that we should dismiss this appeal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. This court’s authority to exercise appellate 

jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals from final judgments, certain 

 

2

In April 2013, the trial court authorized DCS to file a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. DCS 

apparently filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but we were not provided with information 

on that filing.
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interlocutory orders, and agency decisions. In re K.F., 797 N.E.2d 310, 314 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Ind. Appellate Rule 5. Mother makes no argument that 

the trial court’s order qualifies as an appealable interlocutory order pursuant to 

Indiana Appellate Rule 14 or that this is an agency decision. Rather, Mother 

argues that the trial court’s order was a final judgment. 

[8] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H), 

A judgment is a final judgment if:

(1) it disposes of all claims as to all parties;

(2) the trial court in writing expressly determines under Trial 

Rule 54(B) or Trial Rule 56(C) that there is no just reason 

for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of 

judgment (i) under Trial Rule 54(B) as to fewer than all the 

claims or parties, or (ii) under Trial Rule 56(C) as to fewer 

than all the issues, claims or parties;

(3) it is deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C);

(4) it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion 

to Correct Error which was timely filed under Trial Rule 

59 or Criminal Rule 16; or

(5) it is otherwise deemed final by law.

The trial court’s order, however, does not meet any of these qualifications. In 

fact, we have held under similar circumstances that such orders are not final 

appealable judgments. See In re K.F., 797 N.E.2d 310, 314-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A03-1507-JC-842 | March 24, 2016 Page 5 of 6

2003) (holding that a permanency plan in a CHINS action is not a final 

judgment). 

[9] Despite the lack of a final, appealable judgment, Mother argues that we should 

address her appeal based on In re E.W., 26 N.E.3d 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

There, a mother appealed the trial court’s order ceasing all visitation between 

her and her child in a CHINS action. We addressed mother’s appeal even 

though the trial court’s order did not seem to qualify as a final judgment. The 

teenaged child’s permanency plan had been changed to “another planned 

permanent living arrangement” (“APPLA”). E.W., 26 N.E.3d at 1008. We 

noted:

The practical effect of a change of plan to APPLA is that Child 

will remain a ward of the State until she reaches the age of 

majority. She will either remain in foster care or live in a facility 

or group home, and she will continue to receive the treatment 

and services she needs. Her CHINS case will remain open until 

she turns eighteen

Id. at 1009. We concluded that, “[b]y ordering that all contact between Mother 

and Child cease, the trial court is effectively ending that relationship until Child 

is a legal adult, at which time it will be her choice to resume contact with 

Mother.” Id. Consequently, we determined that “[w]hether or not this is 

technically a final judgment, it certainly operates as one.” Id. As a result, we 

addressed the mother’s arguments. 

[10] E.W. is distinguishable from this case. As the State points out, “E.W. was a 

case where termination of parental rights was not likely to ever be raised 
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because the permanency plan for that child was APPLA.” Appellee’s Br. p. 25. 

D.W. is much younger than the child in E.W., and APPLA was not part of the 

permanency plan here. Consequently, we conclude that E.W. is inapplicable. 

Because the trial court’s order is not a final judgment, we lack subject matter 

jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal. See Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 253-54 

(Ind. 2012) (holding that our supreme court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

where the appealed order was not a final judgment). We dismiss this appeal.

Conclusion

[11] We dismiss Mother’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

[12] Dismissed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.