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TARAWA
BEFORE THE MARINES CAME. Airfield and main pier on Betio Island.
9 tP P

THE BATTLE FOR

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TARAWA

HISTORICAL SECTION

DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. MARINE CORPS.

Capt. James R. Stockman, usmc

1947
II

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Foreword

'TARAWA was the first in a series of amphibious operations which carried United

States forces across the Central Pacific to the homeland of Japan. When the 2d

Marine Division landed on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll on 20 November 1943,

twenty years of Marine Corps study and work, already tested at Guadalcanal and

at Bougainville, was put to an acid test.

Tarawa was the first example in history of a sea-borne assault against a heavily

defended coral atoll. Marine preparations for this operation were thorough; its

plans were executed in a noteworthy manner. In the final analysis, however, success

at Tarawa depended upon the discipline, courage, and fighting ability of the

individual Marine. Seldom has anyone been called upon to fight a battle under

more difficult circumstances.

In capturing Tarawa, the 2d Marine Division accomplished a difficult mission

in an expeditious manner. Seventy-six hours after the assault troops landed in the

face of heavy resistance, the battle was over and an important base secured with

the annihilation of its defending garrison.

Of even greater importance, however, was the fact that this successful operation underlined the soundness of our doctrines of amphibious assault. The lessons

learned and confirmed at Tarawa paid great dividends in every subsequent

operations from the Marshalls to the shores of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT

GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

769,369

.051V1t

Copy 2

000 5G

JUL (.1 19;9
THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Preface

THIS operational monograph is one of a series prepared by the Historical Section,

Division of Public Information, Headquarters United States Marine Corps,

concerning Marine Corps operations in World War II.

The first narrative was sent out for criticism and comment to officers who

were present at Tarawa in principal -positions. Upon receipt of their replies, a final

revision, along with further editing, was undertaken.

"Tarawa" is as factually accurate as the sources from which its subject matter

was obtained. In the first six chapters there is no surmise; the facts are presented

as they were recorded or obtained through interview. The last chapter sets forth,

briefly, the importance and success of the battle for Tarawa, and mentions some of

the lessons learned.

It is believed, however, that it is too early to attempt a full critical analysis or

detailed evaluation of the importance of the Tarawa operation in the Pacific war,

of the lessons learned in that operation, or their effect upon subsequent operations.

Maps used in this monograph were prepared by the Reproduction Department, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. Only official Marine Corps and Navy

Photographs are used.

All statements contained in this monograph have been thoroughly documented, although, in the interests of textual smoothness and appearance, no

citations have been made. A documented master copy of the entire monograph

is on file in the Marine Corps archives and may be consulted at any time, subject

to security regulations. Specific information as to documentation or source material will be furnished upon request.

W. E. RILEY,

BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS,

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION.

III
THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 

Strategic Situation, p. 1.

Importance of the Gilberts, p. 1.

Plans for Operation Galvanic, p. 2.

Task Organization, p. 2.

Tarawa Planning, p. 3.

Tarawa, p. 5.

Japanese Occupation of Tarawa, p.

Japanese Defenses on Betio, p. 7.

Enemy Situation, p. 8.

Rehearsal and Movement to Target, p. 9.

Final Approach, Task Force 53, p. 11.

THE FIRST DAY, 20 NOVEMBER 1943 

Preparations Prior to H-Hour, p. 12.

The Landings, p. 15.

3d Battalion, 8th Marines, is Committed,

p. 18.

Situation on Beach Red 1, p. 21.

Tanks on D-Day, p. 24.

Hermle's Mission, p. 25.

Landing the Artillery, p. 27.

Evening D-Day, p. 28.

THE SECOND DAY, 21 NOVEMBER 1943 

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, Lands, p. 29.

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, p. 30.

2d Battalion, 2d Marines, p. 32.

Green Beach is Secured, p. 33.

Crowe's Battalion, p. 33.

Supply Situation, p. 34.

The Pack Howitzers, p. 37.

The 6th Marines, p. 38.

The Light Tanks, p. 39.

Bairiki, p. 40.

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Lands, p. 40.

Situation Ashore, Second Afternoon, p. 40.

IV

PAGE

1

12

THE THIRD DAY, 22 NOVEMBER 1943 

Plans for the Day, p. 43.

Artillery on Bairiki, p. 44.

Attack of Hay's Battalion, p. 45.

Attack of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

p. 45.

Attack of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines.

p. 46.

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, Lands, p. 48.

Plans for the Afternoon, p. 49.

Afternoon Attack of 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, p. 50.

General Situation, p. 50.

The Counterattack, p. 52.

Nuisance Air Raids, p. 54.

THE ISLAND IS SECURED 

The Fourth Day, p. 56.

Attack of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, p. 57.

Enemy Pocket Red 1-Red 2 Area Destroyed, p. 58.

29 End of Battle, p. 59.

MISSION COMPLETED 

2d. Battalion, 6th Marines, Mops Up the

Atoll, p. 62.

Apamama: Corps Scouts, p. 63.

Apamama: 2d Marine Division, p. 64.

Abaiang, Marakei, and Maiana Atolls, p. 65.

The Division Leaves Tarawa, p. 65.

CONCLUSION 

Appendix, p. 70 through 86.

P Ad

4
CHAPTER I

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Introduction

STRATEGIC SITUATION

THE strategic situation in the Pacific in the fall of

1943 was this: The Japanese had been driven out

of the Aleutians in the North Pacific; with the landing of the 3d Marine Division on Bougainville, the

conquest of the Solomons in the South Pacific neared

completion; General MacArthur, in the Southwest

Pacific, had secured eastern New Guinea and was

preparing to invade the Bismarcks.

Since the beginning of the war, it had been the

opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff that

Japan "could best be defeated by a series of amphibious attacks across the far reaches of the Pacific."

In 1942 and early 1943, the attacks were few and

widely scattered and the land fighting was done on

the edge of the enemy's island defensive perimeter,

ranging from Guadalcanal to Attu. That there were

few amphibious attacks in the Pacific during the

first year and a half of the war, and that these were

limited in scale, may be traced to the global strategy

to which the United States was committed: To defeat Germany first; to maintain increasing pressure

on Japan; and to keep China in the war. So long

as the war in the Pacific had a second priority, increasing pressure on Japan, in the form of amphibious attacks, had to be limited to the means at

hand.

IMPORTANCE OF THE GILBERTS

."The Gilbert Islands are a group of coral atolls

'g M athwart the equator. They had been held by

the British up to the outbreak of the war in December 1941, when they were seized by the Japanese.

Their location is of great strategic significance because they are north and west of other islands in our

possession and immediately south and east of important bases in the Carolines and Marshalls. The

capture of the Gilberts was, therefore, a necessary

part of any serious thrust at the Japanese Empire." 1

At the Quadrant Conference in Quebec, August

1943, the specific routes of the advance on Japan

were laid out and operations in the Gilberts, the

Marshalls, and the Marianas were agreed to. Before the Quadrant Conference, however, Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific

and Pacific Ocean areas, had been alerted to begin

planning for operations in the Central Pacific. On

20 July, 1943, a directive was sent by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff instructing Nimitz to plan and prepare for operations in the Ellice and Gilbert Island

groups.'

United States plans for the Central Pacific operations called for the capture of a succession of Japanese positions from which attacks could be launched

against Japanese strong points such as Truk and the

Marianas and also against essential lines of communication. The several directives issued for these operations defined the purposes as to gain control of the

Gilbert Islands and the Marshall Islands, to secure

_ a base area for the attack on the Carolines, to improve

the security of our lines of communication and to support other operations in the Pacific Ocean and the

Indian Ocean by extending pressure on the Japanese.

From U. S. Navy at War, Official Reports by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, p. 71.

a Joint Chiefs of Staff Dispatch, 20 July 1943.
PLANS FOR OPERATION GALVANIC

Operation Plan 13-43

On the basis of the directives from the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Nimitz began to organize

and prepare his forces for the forthcoming operations. Planning studies and directives were sent out

to the various units earmarked to participate in the

Gilberts operation. Early planning envisaged the

seizure of Nauru, Bititu (Betio) Island of the Tarawa Atoll, and airfield sites on Apamama as the

primary objectives in the Gilberts operation. As

planning progressed, certain intelligence information, not previously available, indicated that Nauru

was heavily defended and offered extremely poor

landing beaches. As a result, it was decided to substitute Makin for Nauru.

While planning and preparations were in full

swing, Admiral Nimitz ordered carrier-based strikes

on Marcus, Tarawa, Apamama, and Wake to take

place during the months of August, September, and

October. The purpose of these strikes was to soften

Japanese installations and keep the enemy guessing

as to where our next full-scale attack would be delivered. The strikes were eminently successful.

Planning for OPERATION GALVANIC (the

capture of the Gilbert Islands) crystallized when

Admiral Nimitz issued Operation Plan 13-43 on 5

October 1943. By this plan Vice Admiral R. A.

Spruance, Commander Central Pacific Force, was

assigned the following mission:

Capture, occupy, defend, and develop Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama and vigorously deny Nauru, in

order to:

(a) Gain control of the Gilbert Islands;

(b) Prepare to gain control of the Marshall

Islands;

(c) Improve the security of lines of communication;

(d) Support the operations in the South-Southwest

Pacific and Burma areas by extending pressure on the

Japanese.

In addition Spruance's Fifth Fleet was to prevent enemy interference by destroying or repelling

enemy forces and by attacks on enemy airfields in

the Gilberts and Marshalls, and to provide naval

gunfire and air support of the landings.

2

TASK ORGANIZATION 1.

In October, Admiral Nimitz placed various unit

of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice A(

miral R. A. Spruance, designating the new organ

zation Central Pacific Force.' It consisted of thn

major groups:

(a) Carrier Force (Task Force 50), Rear Adn

C. A. Pownall;

(b) Assault Force (Task Force 54), Rear Ad

R. K. Turner;

(c) Defense Forces and Shore-based Air (T

Force 57), Rear Adm. J. H. Hoover.

Admiral Turner's Task Force 54 (Fifth Amplu

ous Force) was subdivided into two major uni

Task Force 52 (also commanded by Turner)

capture Makin; and Task Force 53 (Rear Adol

Harry Hill) to capture .Tarawa and Apamama,

that order.

Admiral Pownall's Task Force 50 had an arr

bitious program. In addition to establishing ao

maintaining air superiority in the area, this forc

was to neutralize enemy defenses, support the al

sault, conduct medium searches ahead of the al

sault forces, provide fighter protection, maintai

antisubmarine patrol, provide gunfire spotting an

maintain continuous observations and reports ovc

the objectives, Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama.

In an effort to establish air and sea control of th

Gilbert Islands the land-based aircraft of Admin

Hoover's Tisk Force 57, operating from the Ellid

Phoenix, and Samoan Islands, were directed to coil

duct photographic reconnaissance missions, attael'

against enemy bases within range to the westward

and long-range searches.

Assigned to Fifth Amphibious Force was V Aro

phibious Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Hollao

M. Smith, USMC. The function of this corps vig

to exercise full and continuing operational con

mand of the amphibious training and operations

all troops in the Central Pacific Areas assigned 1(

the amphibious attack. The 2d Marine Divisio

commanded by Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith, USM

mounted at Wellington, New Zealand, and assigne

to V Amphibious Corps, was to furnish the assau

forces for the capture of Tarawa and Apamarri

The 27th Infantry Division, mounted at Pearl Hal

bor, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smiti

USA, was to furnish a regimental combat team fc

the capture of Makin. Other V Amphibious Cori

For task organization diagram, see appendix E.
forces to be involved were: 2d Defense Battalion

(Marine) , mounted at Wallis, to garrison Apamama

following the attack; and 7th Defense Battalion

(Anily), mounted at Pearl Harbor, to garrison

Makin.

TARAWA PLANNING

Task Force 53

The capture of Tarawa Atoll was the mission assigned to Task Force 53. The Task Force Commander, Rear Adm. Harry Hill, was assigned the

following task groups: Rear Adm. H. F. Kingman's

Support Group, comprising five fire support sections; Southern Landing Force (2d Marine Division, less RCT 6 ) ; Transport Group ( Capt. H. B.

Knowles) ; Minesweeper Group; and Rear Adm. V.

H. Ragsdale's Carrier Group (five CVE's) . To lend

support, there was Rear Adm. A. E. Montgomery's

Southern Carrier Group ( a part of TF 50, Rear

Adm. C. A. Pownall) , to screen the operation and

furnish air interception and support ashore when

needed.

Intelligence reports indicated that of the islands of Tarawa Atoll, Bititu (Betio) Island was strongly held and fortified; on it the Japanese had built an

airfield. In order to destroy the enemy forces on

Tarawa Atoll, and to capture and use the airfield, the main attack by the landing force of Task Force 53 was to be made on Bititu

2d Marine Division

Early in August 1943, Vice Admiral R. A.

Spruance came to Wellington to acquaint Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith with plans for the Gilberts opera- tion. No formal orders were issued but Admiral

Spruance assigned the capture of Tarawa Atoll ver- bally to the 2d Marine Division at this time. During this conference the question of the reef that fringed

Betio Island was discussed and the decision was

made by the 2d Marine Division to use amphibian

tractors to carry its first three waves over the reef,

pending further experiments with the tractors.

Following this conference, planning directives

and studies, based on a projected plan which called

for the capture of Nauru, Tarawa, and Apamama,

This Army battalion was organized on Oahu specifically for duty at Makin.

'For names of ships comprising these groups, see appen- dix E.

Hereafter, the island will be referred to as Betio.

were received by the division. The latter objectives

were tentatively assigned to the 2d Marine Division.

On 15 September, the division was attached to

V Amphibious Corps and on 2 October, Maj. Gen.

Julian C. Smith and his staff reported to Maj. Gen.

Holland M. Smith, the corps commander, at Pearl

Harbor, to obtain the corps plan and secure approval

of the preferred plan of the 2d Marine Division in

the attack of objectives not yet definitely assigned.

Gen. Julian C. Smith was informed that the enemy

was capable of making a combined air and submarine attack within 3 days of the beginning of

action on Tarawa. No plan for landing artillery on

the other islands of the atoll for the preliminary

bombardment of Betio would be approved because

of the time element involved. The initial attack had

to be made on strongly defended Betio. Gen. Julian

C. Smith orally requested that he be given definite

orders to that effect. This request was granted and

the mission was thus assigned.

In the meantime, the division continued its training and in September, when transports were made

available, the battalion landing teams went aboard

ship and participated in amphibious landing maneuvers. Concurrently, schools were in progress,

training personnel for specialized duty. The division had lost many men who were invalided home

after the campaign on Guadalcanal because of

chronic malaria attacks.' However, the arrival of

replacements and intradivisional transfer of personnel soon brought the division up to strength.

The- mission assigned the 2d Marine Division in

OPERATION GALVANIC was (1) to land at

H-hour of D-day 8on Betio Island, on the southwest

corner of Tarawa Atoll, in order to seize and occupy

the island; ( 2) to prepare for further operations

ashore on Tarawa Atoll. The code name for Tarawa

was LONGSUIT. Operations to capture Apamama

Atoll ( code name: BOXCLOTH) were to follow

those on Tarawa.

The division operation order, completed 25 October 1943, called for Combat Team 2 (2d Marines,

reinforced, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, attached) to

make the assault landings. The remaining two battalion landing teams of the 8th Marines, along with

combat team headquarters, were to constitute the

As late as 10 October, the division had 1,387 ineffectives.

Daily admissions for malaria at that time averaged 40.

Preliminary planning was done without reference to a

specific target date (D-day) or landing hour (H-hour). For

higher echelon planning purposes, a tentative target date

was set, well in advance of the projected operation. H—hour

was left to the discretion of the task force commander.

3
2d Marine Division's reserve.' The 6th Marines

was held in reserve by V Amphibious Corps.

The operation order of the 2d Marines called for

three battalion landing teams to land on Beaches

Red 1, Red 2, and Red 3, on the north, or lagoon

side of Betio Island." Since the 6th Marines was not

under division control, initially, Gen. Julian C.

Smith, Commanding General, 2d Marine Division,

could plan on having a two-to-one numerical superiority over the Japanese defenders of Betio, provided

that intelligence estimates of enemy strength on

Betio were correct.

Division planning was done on the basis of intelligence information furnished by Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean areas, relayed via V

Amphibious Corps. According to this information,

Tarawa was believed to be held by a defending force

composed entirely of naval personnel. Naval units

of this type are usually more highly trained and have

greater tenacity and fighting spirit than the average

Japanese Army unit. Most of the Japanese in Tarawa Atoll were believed to be on Betio and the estimated strength of the garrison on that island was

placed at 2,500 to 2,700 men. This was later revised to not less than 2,700 men and not more than

3,100. (Actually there were 2,619 first-rate troops.

See appendix F.)

Through aerial photographs, especially those obtained during the United States raids on Tarawa on

18 and 19 September 1943, planning agencies of

Central Pacific Force, V Amphibious Corps, and

2d Marine Division estimated the numbers arid types

of weapons on Betio, and located their emplacements. A post-operation survey proved that the

estimates were unusually accurate."

Information on the tides and on the reef that

fringed Tarawa Atoll, both on the exterior and interior, was equally complete. To reach Betio Island

from the sea or from the waters of the lagoon, regardless of the direction of approach, meant crossing

the reef. "The ideal defensive barrier has always

been tne one that could not be demolished, which

held up assaulting forces under the unobstructed fire

of the defenders and past which it was impossible to

run, crawl, dig, climb, or sail. The barrier reef fulfills these conditions to the letter, except when suffiFor Division Task Organization, see appendix E.

" See map 1.

"For a comparison of estimated against actual weapons on

Betio, see appendix I.

4

cient amphibious tanks and similar vehicles art

available to the attackers" ( CincPac Op. Report

November 1943 ) . To land its assault waves on Betio

the 2d Marine Division had decided to use amphi'

bian tractors (LVTs) and had conducted success,

ful experiments with them. Later waves would havc

to go in boats ( LCMs and LCVPs ) .

It was necessary that the last of the tractor wave5

cross the reef as the tide approached the flood so that

there would be enough water to float the boats °vet

when they arrived at the reef. To get information

on Gilbert tides, the division turned to some men

who probably knew more about them than anyone

else. Since available charts of the Tarawa waters

were known to be inaccurate, Fifth Amphibious

Force obtained the services of several British who

had lived in the various islands of the Gilbert group;

or had been shipmasters operating small steamers

and schooners among these islands. A part of

this group was sent to the 2d Marine Division to

assist in its planning; it consisted of Maj. F. L. G.

Holland, who had lived on Bairiki ( the island adjacent to Betio) for 15 years, a Captain Warnham

who had been in the atoll for about 5 years, and

several small craft skippers who had sailed the waters

of the Gilbert and Fiji Islands. During the early •

planning, Gen. Julian C. Smith learned from the

tide tables furnished by these men that he could

expect 5 feet of water on the reef at high neap tide,i

enough to get the boats in to the beaches." However,

General Smith also learned that these tides were not

always dependable; that there were frequent dodging tides.

Early in the planning stage, when it became apparent that amphibian tractors would have to be

used to get its first waves ashore, the 2d Marine Division requested that additional tractors be furnished.

The division had about 100 tractors, 75 of which

" As late as the rehearsals at Efate, Major Holland announced, during a division staff meeting, that his earlier

estimate of the height of the water over the reef had been

based on flood tide. He stated that he "never dreamed that

anyone would try to land on the neap tide." The latter, he

said, would provide not over 3 feet of water on the reef.

Major Holland stated that the tide tables were not dependable during neap tide periods; that there might be as

little as 3 feet of water over the reef at extreme high tide.

Since amphibian tractors had been secured for landing the

first three waves of troops, this information affected only the

landing of support and reserve troops; these were to be carried in LCVP's and LCM's.

This caused another meeting of the pilots to be held and

the consensus of this group was that there would be enough

water over the reef at high neap tide to float the LCVP's

and LCM's over the reef.
r; were thought to be in suitable condition for the

operation. According to Colonel M. A. Edson, 100

INT (2) 's were assigned the division but they were

still in San Diego and could not be shipped out in

time to reach the division at Wellington, nor could

,c the Navy furnish sufficient LST's to transport them.

However, 50 could be sent to Samoa in time, and

,5 this was done. Trained personnel from the 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion were sent to Samoa to

r form a new company, with the LVT ( 2 ) 's, which

I would join the division at Tarawa on D-day.

Also during the planning phase, the division requested Task Force 53 to use the ships carrying the

6th Marines ( Corps Reserve ) , with a suitable destroyer escort, to make a diversionary feint off the

south shore of Betio, while the main force was preparing to land on the north side, in order to confuse the Japanese on the island, but the request was

denied. To do this, about 50 percent of the destroyer fire support strength would have to be

diverted from the main landing to screen and protect the simulated transport area set up in the feint,

leaving the main transport area unprotected.

The northern beaches of Betio were chosen as the

Preferred landing beaches because they vouchsafed

better opportunities for securing a foothold than the

others.

The presence of underwater antiboat mines was

also considered. Since the Japs were still working

over the north beaches, it was believed there would

be less chance of encountering mines in that sector.

This proved to be correct. Although mines were

located there, they were not armed; mines on the

Other beaches were fully armed.

In addition, it was believed that water conditions

desired by the division would be available inside the

lagoon. The other beaches on the island were rejected for several reasons: The eastern end of the

island was too narrow to be of any use; the south

side had the heaviest boat obstacles and fairly

bristled with gun emplacements; the west end had

numerous boat obstacles, a heavily fortified beach,

and led into a bottleneck where the island narrowed a short distance east of the beach. The south

coast formed a re-entrant facilitating the use of

flanking fire; the north beach offered a salient.

The naval gunfire support plan called for the firing to be done in three separate phases. The first

phase was to begin at a time to be announced by the

commander of Task Force 53; this time was to be

823769-49---2

called W-hour. During the first phase, lasting from

W-hour to H minus 60, the support ships were to fire

on designated target areas; this was to insure that all

important parts of the island would receive adequate

attention. Phase II was to begin at 60 minutes before H-hour and would last until H-hour. During

this period the ships would continue to fire at designated target areas, starting at the water's edge of

each of the landing beaches and extending a short

distance inland. In the last phase, the ships were to

fire neutralization fires and provide call fires for the

assault units ashore.

The air support plan called for bombing and

strafing missions from 0545, D-day, until 0615.

Then 5 minutes before H-hour, fighter planes were

to strafe from the water's edge inland for about 100

yards on each of the landing beaches. Upon completion of this strafing, bombers were to attack secondary defensive positions behind the beaches.

In addition to this bombing and strafing, Col.

D. M. Shoup had requested that Seventh Air Force

planes drop 2,000-pound "daisy-cutters" on the

beach along the landing beaches, and inland, to kill

as many of the enemy as possible and to level the

many buildings that would otherwise provide cover

and concealment for snipers. This request, approved

by division, was never fulfilled.

Briefly, the approach plan 13.called for a part of

the fire support ships to move out from the main

fleet group as the transports neared the transport

area, and take up positions in .predesignated areas

to the south, west, and northwest of Betio. Two

minesweepers were to enter the lagoon ahead of the

screening destroyers, which were to be followed by

the LSD from Noumea carrying the medium tanks

of the 2d Tank Battalion, and the landing craft comprising the initial waves of the landing force.

TARAWA

The Atoll

Tarawa is one of the coral atolls which comprise

the Gilbert Islands, an archipelago that sprawls

across the equator between 1740 and 178° east longitude. Roughly triangular in shape, the atoll is

about 18 miles long on the east side, 12 miles long on

the south side and 12/1 2 miles long on the west side.

A continuous reef, the atoll consists of a narrow

string of coral sand islands whose altitude varies

" Prepared by Task Force 53.

5
JAPANESE PRACTICE GUNNERY from the southwest tip of Betio. This captured photograph shows the eastern gun of the 8-inch battery.

from 8 to 10 feet. Coconut trees, pandanus, and

dense shrubs make up the vegetation found on the islands. On the east side of the atoll there are 42 little

islands, and on the south side 5; across the western

side, connecting the two open ends of the reversed

L-shaped atoll, lies the lee barrier reef which guards

the lagoon enclosed by the atoll. Entrance to the

lagoon may be gained at a point where a break occurs about 3/1 2 miles north of the west part of Betio

Island, the southwesternmost one of the atoll. The

lagoon is thickly studded by coral patches and reefs;

navigation depends upon good light. Depths from

5 to 8 fathoms may be found in places.

Tarawa lies in the easterly wind belt, with a westerly season appearing along about November. Normal wind velocity for the year averages 7 knots.

Rainfall is comparatively light, averaging around

35 inches annually. There are no clearly marked

seasons.

6

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF TARAWA

Tarawa Atoll was raided by the Japanese Navy

on 10 December 1941,' and was proclaimed occupied by the Imperial Navy, although the real occupation of the atoll did not occur until September

of 1942. As a result of the United States Marine

raid on Makin, 16 August 1942, action was taken

immediately by the Japanese to reinforce positions

in the Gilberts. On 15 September 1942, the Yokosuka 6th Special Navy Landing Force (SNLF )

landed on Betio, Tarawa Atoll, for garrison duty.

In December the 111th Pioneers arrived to begin

the construction of the islands defenses. In February 1943, the Yokosuka 6th SNLF was redesignated

the 3d Special Base Force. During that same month

Rear Admiral Tomanari Saichiro, arrived at Betio

to take command of Japanese forces in the Gilberts.

14 Makin was occupied the same day.
On 17 March 1943, the Sasebo 7th SNLF reached

Betio and joined the 3d Special Base Force as garrison troops. Then in May another unit arrived, the

4th Construction Unit. There was a change in command in August when Rear Admiral Shibasaki,

Meichi, relieved Tomonari. Shibasaki remained in

command of all Japanese forces in the Gilberts until

his death on 21 November 1943, the second day of

the fighting on Betio. At the time of the landing

of the 2d Marine Division, Shibasaki had 2,619

first-rate troops.'

JAPANESE DEFENSES ON BETIO

The Japanese concentrated their strength in

Tarawa Atoll on one island—Betio. The basic over-

_ 1G For a break-down of Japanese strength on Betio on

D-day, see appendix F.

all tactical defense planned for Betio provided for a

series of strong points organized with intervening

distances covered by fire. The plan called for the

destruction of American forces at the water's edge;

if this failed, the garrison would immediately counterattack any beachhead that might be established.

The principles contemplated in the defense of Betio

were defined early. The Yokosuka 6th SNLF directed its personnel, in an order published in October 1942, to "wait until the enemy is within effective

range ( when assembling for landing) and direct

your fire on the enemy transport group and destroy

it. If the enemy starts a landing, knock out the landing boats with mountain gunfire, tank guns and infantry guns, then concentrate all fires on the enemy's

landing point and destroy him at the water's edge."

CAMOUFLAGED 8-INCH GUNS in concrete emplacement on southwest point of Betio. This emplacement was overrun by the 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines, after naval gunfire neutralized the guns.
The. weapons to provide the backbone of the Japanese defense were coast-defense guns (ranging

from 80 mm. to 8 inch) , antiaircraft guns (13 mm.

to 127 mm. ) , antiboat guns (13 mm. to 75 mm.) ,

and light and heavy machine guns.

The basic beach defense weapon was the 13-mm.

machine gun, supplemented by the 7.7-mm. machine gun. These were sited to cover most likely approaches to the beach with frontal fire, and to cover

the forward side of the diagonally placed barriers

on the reef with flanking fires, these fires interlocking in front of, and protecting, other beach defense

weapon installations. Carefully built rifle and light

machine-gun emplacements were positioned in the

log beach barricade and immediately behind it to

provide local protection for automatic-fire weapons.

On the beach, the Japanese placed antipersonnel

mines and out on the fringing reef there were antivehicle mines; these were to complement the basic

weapons ashore. Out in the water from the beaches

there were antiboat obstacles, the purpose of which

was twofold: (1) To slow down and otherwise impede the movements of landing craft; (2) to force

approaching landing craft into prearranged fire

lanes where concentrated fires from all types of

weapons could be employed most advantageously.

The obstacles were of several types. There was a

double apron barbed wire fence, located 50 to 100

yards out, which virtually encircled the island. On

the south side of Betio there was a coconut log barrier and scattered through the water were concrete

tetfahadrons. On the beaches proper, the Japanese

built log barriers, which in effect were retaining

walls, and these were constructed to contain posidons for machine guns and antiboat guns.

Defenses inland were haphazard. Command

posts, ammunition dumps, and communication centers were made of reinforced concrete and were virtually bombproof. They were not purposely constructed as positions from which active resistance

could be offered.

ENEMY SITUATION

Japanese Plans, Summer, 1943

In May 1943, there was a conference at Truk between the Commander in Chief of the Southeast

Area, Vice Admiral Kusaka, and the Commander

8

in Chief Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Kondo. At

this conference it was decided: first, to bring out as

many reinforcements as possible from Japan; and

second, to hold the Solomons and Dampier Strait

area in the Bismarcks. The emphasis on aircraft

reinforcements was in the Solomons and reinforcements to the Marshalls-Gilberts were to be principally in the form of troops. The possibility of United

States attack in any of the Marshalls-Gilberts, Solomons, and Eastern New Guinea Areas was realized;

therefore, the Second Fleet was to be concentrated

at Truk to meet any eventuality. Japanese aircraft

were concentrated in the Solomons, but there were

relatively few in the Central Pacific due to the shortage caused by attrition in the Solomons.

The specific plan to counter an American invasion of the Gilberts was as follows: Long-range aircraft from the Bismarcks would attack the United

States invasion forces and then land at fields in the

Marshalls-Gilberts. Short-range aircraft would start

from or stage through Truk and proceed to Marshalls-Gilberts fields and from there attack United

States forces. It was expected to require 4 days for

the short-range aircraft to reach the attack position

from the Bismarcks. Warships at Truk would sortie

and move to the Gilbert Islands where they would

attack American surface and invasion forces. Six or

seven submarines, which were employed in supply

services in the Bismarcks, also would be ordered to

assist in repelling the invasion.

This plan, a part of the larger one called the Z

plan, designed to defend the outer line in the event of

an American attack on the Gilbert-Marshalls area,

depended on the fleet, based at Truk to assist landbased aircraft and garrison troops on the islands.

The Japanese were never given a chance to place

the Z plan into effect.

Situation, November 1943

The landing of the 3d Marine Division on Bougainville on 1 November 1943, and the United

States carrier-based plane raid on Rabaul on 5 November had the Japanese in a bad spot. Pouring reinforcements into the Solomons had got to be like

pouring sand down a rat hole. United States forces

had thrust their way up the Soloinons chain from

Guadalcanal, through the Russells, to New Georgia,

bypassing Kolumbangara, on to Vella Lavella and
from there to Bougainville, posing a dangerous

threat to the Japanese strong point at Rabaul. To

keep their air strength effective in the northern Solomons, the Japanese, after suffering heavy losses, were

forced to draw reinforcements from the Marshalls,

Truk, Marianas, and Celebes areas. The situation

was critical. If Bougainville fell, Rabaul would be

virtually useless. The successful United States

landing on Bougainville Island, 1 November 1943,

convinced the Japanese High Command that the

threat in this section was greater than that of attack

in the Central Pacific. A number of the naval vessels which had been held at Truk in conformity with

the general plan for the defense of the Pacific perimeter were sent via Rabaul to assist in checking the

United States advance toward Rabaul.

At the same time, a United States task force under Rear Adm. F. C. Sherman, built around aircraft carriers, was moving toward Rabaul. At sunrise on 5 November 1943, the Japanese force, consisting of cruisers and destroyers of the Japanese

Second and Third Fleets, arrived at Rabaul from

Truk and began to make preparations for fueling.

Within an hour Admiral Sherman's planes came

diving in on the helpless Japanese ships, attacking

with bombs and torpedoes. Immediately the attack

began, the Japanese ships left the harbor to gain

room to maneuver. Of nine cruisers, seven were

damaged badly enough to make it necessary to send

them to Japan for repairs. A week later Rear Admiral Sherman and Rear Adm. A. E. Montgomery,

each with a carrier task force, again attacked Rabaul

and inflicted heavy damage on enemy destroyers

outside the harbor as well as on cruisers, destroyers

and other shipping within the harbor.

Thus it was that the Japanese found that the

Rabaul attacks, the Bougainville landing, and the

intensified air war in the Solomons (which had absorbed air forces already in the area, as well as required the employment of the short-range planes

Which were being held at Truk for the defense of

the Marshalls-Gilberts), made it necessary to alter

previous plans for the defense of the Central Pacific

Islands. The Fourth Fleet, in the Marshalls, was

too small to strike American invasion forces. The

22d Air Flotilla, also based in the Marshalls, was

badly understrength. It would be up to the island

garrisons to resist as best they could, aided in a small

measure by harassing submarine action.

REHEARSAL AND MOVEMENT TO TARGET

Task Force 53 Assembles

On 7 November most 16 of the elements of Task

Force 53 (Southern Attack Force) , commanded by .

Rear Adm. Harry Hill, assembled at Efate in the

New Hebrides for rehearsal exercises before setting

out for Tarawa. Rear Adm. H. F. Kingman had

brought his battleships, cruisers, and destroyers

down from Pearl Harbor. From Wellington, New

Zealand, came the 2d Marine Division, loaded in

Transport Group 4.

The departure of the 2d Marine Division from

New Zealand was ostensibly for the purpose of effecting practice landings in the vicinity of Hawkes

Bay. Few officers in the division knew that there

would be no such landings; that this was merely a

ruse.

Operations orders for the practice landings were

issued; arrangements for moving division equipm ent from Hawkes Bay back to Wellington afterward were made; the New Zealand Air Force was

briefed on air coverage for the practice landings; and

it was intended for the word to get out that the ships

would return to Wellington in about a week. Not

until the day of departure from Wellington was the

Governor General of New Zealand notified that the

division was leaving the country and would not return.

Company C, from 1st MAC, arrived at Efate with

its medium tanks aboard an LSD, the Ashland, from

Noumea, New CaledoniA. The arrival of the transports was timed so that the first rehearsal could be

held on the same day that they reached Efate.

During the first rehearsal Mele Bay was used for

the landing of troops and Pango Point for simulated'

fire support targets. Following the landing exercise,

the transport group entered Havannah Harbor and

remained overnight. The second rehearsal was held

on 9 November with the troops again landing in

Mele Bay while fire-support ships held bombardment practice on Erradaka Island. Conferences and

critiques were held on both the second and fourth

day of the stay at Efate. Communication equipment was tested during this period and exercises were

held to check the communication plan. On 13

" Cruiser Division 13 and Destroyer Division 49 were on

duty with the Third Fleet and did not join TF 53 until 16

November. Carrier Division 22 did not participate in the

first rehearsal at Efate.

9
November, Task Force 53 left Efate and sailed for

Tarawa.

It was during the rehearsals at Efate that the regimental commander of the assault regiment, Col.

William McN. Marshall, became ill. General Smith

named ,Col. David M. Shoup, the division operations officer, to take Marshall's place.

Thus, Shoup was placed in the unusual position

of now being called upon to execute orders based

upon planning in which he had had a major part.

Movement to Target

The first 3 days en route to Tarawa passed without unusual event. On the second day out, Task

Force Commander Rear Adm. Harry Hill sent the

following message to the ships of his force:

Give all hands the general picture of the projected

operation and further details to all who should have

this in execution of duties. This is the first American

assault of a strongly defended atoll and with northern

attack and covering forces the largest Pacific operation

to date.

Now for the first time, the troops of the 2d Marine

Division learned the name of the island they were

about to assault. All data withheld previously was

made available. Troop officers gathered their men

together in small groups and told them all they knew

about the forthcoming operation. On 16 November

the task force slowed down to permit the refueling of

some of the ships. Early in the morning of 18 Nov.

ember, an observation plane from the Colorado re'

ported sighting Task Force 52 to the north. Dur'

ing the afternoon a plane from the carrier Chenango

sighted an enemy plane far in the distance.

Air and Surface Strikes

While Admiral Turner's Fifth Amphibious Force

was en route to Makin and Tarawa, aircraft of Ta4

Force 57 (Rear Adm. J. H. Hoover) were bus)

"softening up" the target islands, as well as othe0

adjacent. Hoover's land-based planes flew from the

Ellice, Phoenix, and Samoan groups, and froro

Baker Island. The planes, totaling between 350 and

400, made daily strikes on the Japanese bases in the

Gilberts and Marshalls through 1:3-19 November,

In addition, they conducted searches and photo'

graphic missions.

During the same period that Seventh Air Force

B-24's ( operating under Task Force 57 as striking

group, Maj. Gen. Willis A. Hale, USA, command'

ing) were bombing Tarawa, carrier planes frool

Rear Adm. A. E. Montgomery's Southern Carrier

LOOKING EAST DOWN THE AIRFIELD before the Marines landed. Trees had been cut in order to lengthen the field but the Japanese

were interrupted by United States invasion of Tarawa. This area was overrun by the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines.

10
Group moved in to add their bombs. Commencing

at daylight on 18 November, the carrier-based

Planes dropped a total of 115 tons and next day

again attacked Betio, this time with 69 tons. The

attack on the latter day was coordinated with a surface bombardment from Cruiser Division 5, consisting of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers;

the ships fired roughly 250 tons of high capacity

Projectiles, mostly 8-inch.

Elsewhere, other strikes were in progress. On 16

November Admiral Sherman's Relief Carrier Group

came up from Espiritu Santo to attack Nauru and

dropped 90 tons of bombs to neutralize the airfield. On 19 November, Admiral Pownall's Carrier

Interceptor Group made 10 attacks, 1 on Jaluit and

9 against Milli, dropping a total of 130 tons of

bombs.

Final Approach Task Force 53

During the morning of 19 November an enemy

Plane was picked up by radar about 60 miles west

of Task Force 53. It was a "Mavis" and was soon

shot down by the Suwanee's combat air patrol. In

the early afternoon Task Force 53 turned from its

northerly course and began the last leg of its voyage

to Tarawa, heading to the west. Out ahead of the

main body of ships the destroyer Ringgold was on

the lookout for Maiana Atoll, the last guiding mark

for the force in its approach to the target. At 2033

Maiana was picked up and the force began its final

approach toward Tarawa. Shortly after midnight

the fire-support sections began to move to their assigned stations.

The transports were reported to be in position at

0320. It was found, however, that they had stopped

in Transport Area Baker instead of Able, farther

north. As soon as this was ascertained, Admiral Hill

ordered the transports to move north to the proper

area in order to unmask his fire-support ships so that

they could place enfilade fire down Betio from west

to east. '

When the transports finally got to their proper

area, with their small boats trailing along beside

them as they moved, there was some confusion, since

some boats got separated from their mother ships.

This helped to delay unloading, thus changing the

time table, and contributed to a delay in H-hour

later on.

At 0507; on 20 November, shore batteries on

Betio opened fire on the ships nearest the island.

The battle for Betio had begun.

DESOLATE AND BARE. The area at the west end of the airfield as it looked after the battle for Betio.

11
CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

The First Day, 20 November 1943

PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO H-HOUR

*AT 0441 on the morning of D-day, 20 November

1943, the Japanese on Betio fired a red star cluster.

Less than a half hour later enemy shore batteries

opened fire and U. S. S. Colorado and U. S. S.

Maryland swung their main batteries into action to

reply to the challenge. With this action the battle

for Betio got underway. At the same time the shore

batteries began to fire, two of the fire-support sections of Task Force 53 were in position and were able

to deliver counterbattery fire at once. Within a few

minutes, another section had reached its station and

could add its fires to those of the other ships. Shell

splashes were observed all around the firing ships but

none caused any damage.

Combat Team 2 (i. e., the 2d Marines, reinforced) had breakfasted early and at 0320 the assault

waves began to debark from the transports of

TRANSDIV 4 (temporary) into LCVP's for fur-

• ther transfer to the LVT's. From the beginning there

was a certain amount of confusion, for the transports

were too far south of their proper stations and found

themselves within range of the enemy guns ashore

•on Betio. There was difficulty, too, in getting the

first waves of the LVTs organized, and with the

transports shifting positions even more delay and

confusion was caused.

Until 0542 the fire-support ships delivered fire intermittently in an effort to reduce the shore batteries

and to neutralize enemy positions on the island as

much as possible. At this time an order was given

by the task force commander to cease firing so that

the planes could make their air strike scheduled for

30 minutes prior to W-hour. It was believed that

the air strike and naval gunfire bombardment should

not be carried on simultaneously for two reasons:

12

(1) Because the smoke and dust caused by naval

gunfire would make it impossible for the dive bombers to see their targets; (2) Because naval projectiles

in flight would constitute a menace to aircraft oper-,

ating in the vicinity. The planes did not come in for

their strike on time.

With the cessation of naval gunfire, the Japanese

defenders of Betio had almost 30 minutes to fire on

the transport area without being molested. At 0605

the order was given for the battleships, the cruisers,

and the destroyers to resume their firing in order to

counter the shore battery fire. Finally, at 0615, the

planes came in for the air strike. Plenty of good targets remained for them to destroy. The 2d Division

had asked that all buildings on the island be burned

or destroyed by the plane strikes in the preliminaryto-D-day "softening up" strikes. Some were burned

or demolished; many still remained standing. Some

of these buildings were constructed of reinforced concrete and were so well built that the bombs and neutralizing naval gunfire had little effect upon them.

The air strike lasted for about 10 minutes and while

it was in progress W-hour was announced, at 0620.

and the naval shelling began again. The island was

almost completely covered with smoke by now and

the ships could not see any point targets; however,

the prearranged fires to begin at W-hour were to

obliterate marked areas and the smoke only hampered the ships in making their adjustments.

Sunrise was at 0612 and a few minutes later the

minesweeper Pursuit started to sweep the channel

leading into the lagoon. On board to guide the ship

was a pilot thoroughly familiar with these waters, a

Lieutenant Forbes, of the New Zealand Navy. Behind the Pursuit was the Requisite, another minesweeper. Waiting to enter as soon as the entrance
TRANSPORT AREA ABLE 

-1"20-'

ASHLAND TRANS 111DIV 6

6

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FINAL POSITION

R 5900

11 THUBAN LEE RIDDLE 

INITIAL' POSITION

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AREA I 

ROES FORMED HERE

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BUARIKI

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TEARINIBA VILLAGE

NUATABU VILLAGE

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ABAOKORO VILLAS

TRADING STATION

TARATAI VILLAGE

TARAWA ATOLL

SHOWING TRANSPORT AREA, LINE OF DEPARTURE

AND LANDING BEACHES

20 NOV 43

MAP I

TABARIOIMISSION STATION)

NOTO VILLAGE

ARAOKORO ISLAND HOSPITAL

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STATION

MARANENUKA VILLAGE

42.4.

ENTRANCE TO LAGOON

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TRADING STATION

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LAGOONS

7495430-47 (Face p. 12)
was clear were two destroyers, the Ringgold and the

Dashiell. Immediately the minesweepers entered

the lagoon they were taken under fire by two shore

batteries, located about 200 yards east of the long

pier, and the Pursuit requested the destroyers to lend

their assistance. Both destroyers engaged the shore

batteries at once and their fire was very effective;

temporarily, at least, the shore batteries firing at the

minesweepers were silenced. Small boats had accompanied the Pursuit, carrying smoke pots. It had

been planned to use this smoke to conceal the movement of the first waves of LVT's as they neared the

line of departure. The use of the smoke boats was

not altogether successful, although the smoke did

make it difficult for the Japanese to observe the fires

of their batteries and to adjust them.

At 0715 the Pursuit took station on the line of

departure and turned its searchlight on in the direction of the approaching LVT's in order to provide

them with a guide. Meanwhile, the enemy opened

fire again with his shore batteries and a number of

Splashes were observed in the water near the line of

departure. At 0706 the Ringgold entered the channel leading into the lagoon, piloted by Lt. Gordon J.

Webster, an officer of the Royal New Zealand Navy.

Five minutes later the ship was hit by an enemy

shell, believed to be a 5-inch shell, on the starboard

Side in the after engine room; fortunately, the shell

did not explode. Seconds later, another enemy shell

hit the barrel of a forward torpedo mount and

glanced off to pass through the.destroyer's sick bay

and the emergency radio room. Again, this shell

failed to explode. Through the smoke and dust, the

Ringgold could see the flashes of the shore battery

believed to be doing the firing. The guns of the

ship were trained on the enemy battery and fired.

There was a big explosion in the area where the

flashes had been seen. Apparently, the ammunition

dump of this battery was hit; the battery was

Silenced.

Meanwhile, the Pursuit was tracking the leading

waves of the amphibian tractors with radar, and

when they were within 5,000 yards of the line of

departure, the ship reported them 25 minutes behind schedule. The tractors were moving against a

head wind and could not make up the lost time.

In the half-light preceding sunrise, the U. S. S.

Maryland, the flagship of Task Force 53, had

launched her two float planes. In one was Lt. ( jg)

F. C. Whaley, and piloting the other was Lt. Comdr.

R. A. MacPherson. Whaley was to observe gunnery

and MacPherson was instructed to observe the

movement of the landing craft toward the beach

and to control the use of the screening smoke.

By 0730 reports from MacPherson and from

the control vessels at the line of departure indicated

that the first wave of tractors was behind schedule

and would be unable to reach the beach at 0830,

the time set for H-Hour. Changing H-hour was

necessary, not as a guide for the first waves of the

assault landing teams, since they were already on

their way and could move only so fast, but as a

measure to coordinate naval gunfire and the air

strikes. At 0803, Admiral Hill, after consultation

with General Smith, announced that H-hour would

be at 0845.

Within 10 minutes it became apparent that 0845

was too early; the amphibian tractors were still behind schedule and were well short of the line of departure. At 0824 the first wave crossed the line of

departure and headed in toward the beach. Again

H-hour was delayed, this time until 0900. It was

believed now that the first wave would reach the

beach at 0900. Planes began to strafe the landing

beaches at 0830 while naval gunfire continued to

send salvo after salvo into the smoky burning island

of Betio. At 0854 the order was given by Admiral

Hill to cease all naval gunfire except for the destroyers inside the lagoon and they were instructed to keep

firing until the troops were endangered. Twentythree minutes were to elapse during which the amphibian tractors moved slowly toward the beaches

without a covering barrage of naval gunfire except

from the two destroyers mentioned before. The

strafing of the planes had stopped temporarily.

There was a good reason, of course, for the ceasefire order. Admiral Hill and General Smith, on the

Maryland, could see neither the island nor the leading wave of tractors due to the heavy blanket of

smoke that hung between the ship and the island. It

would have been to invite disaster had the naval

gunfire continued without exact knowledge of the

position of the first wave of assault troops. The

planes made one more strafing run when the tractors

were about halfway in to the beach from the line of

departure. This strafing run and the fire from the

two destroyers in the lagoon was the last support

given the assault waves on their way to their respective beaches.

The firing of the support ships prior to H-hour

was excellent, as far as it went. The coast defense

guns on Betio were silent, the guns destroyed or their

13
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE 8-INCH GUN EMPLACEMENT overrun by Maj. "Mike" Ryan's men. Palm fronds were used to camoufla

these guns, brought from Singapore to strengthen Betio's defenses.

crews killed. Most of the dual purpose antiaircraft

guns were neutralized. Many of the antiboat guns

were out of action. Unfortunately, however, few

of the smaller beach defense guns or pillboxes

were destroyed. The machine guns, some of the 37-

mm antiboat guns, and the emplacements holding

riflemen were still operative and constituted a serious

menace to the approaching waves of landing craft.

Another item of major importance that could be

credited tO naval gunfire was the destruction of the

enemy's means of communication. The communication system on Betio was completely disrupted. According to some of the prisoners taken later, the Whour bombardment had broken down the island's

communications and control was lost. The Japanese then resorted to the use of runners but the heavy

naval gunfire kept them from getting through.

The order for landing issued by Col. David Shoup

called for the employment of three of the landing

teams under his control in the assault and one team

in reserve. Attached to the 2d Marines was the 2d

14

Battalion 8th Marines, commanded by Maj. Henry

P. Crowe and this reinforced battalion was assigned

the mission of landing on Beach Red 3; to the left, of

east, of the long pier which extended from the north

side of the island for some 500 yards. On the right

of Crowe's battalion was that of Lt. Col. Herbert

Amey, the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. Amey was to

land his battalion on Beach Red 2, on the right, or

west, of the long pier. This beach was about 500

yards wide and its right flank rested on that part of

the western portion of the northern side of the island

where the shoreline makes a deep indentation. OD

Amey's right was the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines ( Lt.

3/2), commanded by Maj. John F. Schoettel. This

battalion was to land on Beach Red 1 on the western

end of the north side of Betio. The beach was about

500 yards wide with a shoreline shaped like a crescent. In reserve for the regiment was the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, commanded by Maj. Wood B.

Kyle.

All three of the assault battalions were delayed
while debarking from their transports, due to the

movement of the ships from the area where they had

first stopped to an area farther north. After the first

waves were away from the transports in LCVP's,

they had to transfer to the LVTs which would carry

them to the beach. Finally, after a great deal of

confusion, the troops were loaded in the amphibian

tractors and reached the rendezvous area to the

northwest of the entrance to the lagoon. There the

waves were formed and the tractors were guided to

the line of departure marked by the Pursuit. At

0824 the first wave crossed the line and headed toward the beach. Three minutes later the second

wave of tractors crossed the line, and at 0830 the

thud wave was dispatched by the control vessel.

The fourth wave was still boated in small boats

(LCVP's and LCM's) . It waited at the line for

orders to go in.

Between the line of departure and the fringing

reef which guarded the north side of Betio, the

waves began to receive fire from the beach. About

3,000 yards from the beach the tractors came under

air bursts, but these were not effective, due to the

heavy charge in the shells which broke the cases into

shrapnel almost as small as sand. Then came longrange machine-gun fire but still the tractors moved

on -toward the reef and the island. So far none of

the tractors had been hit.

THE LANDINGS

The first unit to reach its beach was the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. At 0910 the tractors of this team

crawled up on the coral sand of Red 1, located at

the west end of the north side of the island. The

first three waves were hit hard by machine gun and

antiboat fire, damaging most of the tractors. Company I, upon climbing out of its LVTs, clambered

up over the log barricade and began to advance inland on the right half of the beach. At the dividing

line between Red 1 and Red 2 there was a Japanese

strongpoint and the fire from it was raking the flank

of the 3d Battalion. Company K was hit before it

AFTER THE BATTLE. This is how the same emplacement, pictured before, looked.

15
could reach the temporary protection of the log barricade. During the next 2 hours the two companies

were to lose over half of their men. Meanwhile L

Company and the mortar platoon came in as far as

they could in their boats. About 500 yards from the

beach, the boats ran aground on the reef ands the

troops were forced to get out and start wading toward the beach. While in the water, this company

was hit hard by machine gun and antiboat fire,

which caused casualties amounting to over 35 percent.

The next battalion to reach its beach was the 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, on Red 3. Its leading tractors climbed out of the water at 0917. From 3,000

yards out until the leading waves had crossed the

reef and were within 200 yards of the beach, the air

was filled with bursts from enemy 3-inch shells. In

the assault were E Company and F Company, with

one platoon of G Company close behind. Two of the

amphibian tractors, upon reaching the beach, found

a break in the sea wall and crawled through with

their troops still aboard and got as far as the south

side of the northwest taxiways and the main strip. All

the rest of the tractors were stopped by the barricade

and the troops were forced to dismount there. Out

of 522 men, fewer than 25 became .casualties on the

way in to the beach and during the time the troops

were climbing out of the amphibian tractors. Five of

the six officers in Company E were wounded or killed

as they hit the beach. Company E landed on the right

portion of Red 3 on a 200-foot front. On the left,

and with its left flank extending to the Burns-Philp

pier, was Company F. The platoon from Company G

came in behind E and began cleaning out snipers left

behind by that company; E moved rapidly across

the taxiway and on toward the main air strip in its

zone of action. It is possible that one reason why

Maj. "Jim" Crowe was able to get his first waves

ashore with very light casualties, was because the

two destroyers in the lagoon, the Ringgold and the

Dashiell, continued to fire after the other support

ships had ceased firing, and these two ships laid

down a blanket of destruction on a large part of

Crowe's beach until about 7 minutes before the

troops actually landed.

At 0922 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, reached Beach

Red 2. From the reef on in, the assault companies

were under heavy antiboat-gun and machine-gun

fire. Company E, less one platoon, managed to reach

the right half of Red 2 but enemy fire-was so intense

that only a shallow foothold on the western part of

16

the beach could be established. The 1st Platoon of

Company was driven off its course on the way in and

became separated from the rest of the company. Till`

platoon landed over on Beach Red 1 under hea

fire and took refuge in a large bomb crater. From tfl

crater, the platoon engaged nearby enemy strong'i

points but could not move from its position to join

parent company or elements of the 3d Battalion, 26

Marines, to its right. Company F landed on the ease'

ern half of Beach Red 2 after suffering heavy casual'

ties in reaching the beach. At first, it was, impossible

for this company to contact E Company over to the

west; a small beachhead, about 50 yards in deptn

was gained but further attempts to move forward

failed due to the intense fire delivered by enenn

machine guns and riflemen in front of the coo'

pany. Between the two assault companies of the 2ti

Battalion, Company G, the reserve company, les'

one platoon, made its way ashore and organized 3

small foothold, joining contact on the left with Coin'

pany E.

Behind the first three waves of the landing

teams—the waves loaded in amphibian tractors--

were the other waves boated in LCVP's. At the

time when the first waves crossed the fringing reef,

it was discovered that the reef was partly exposed.

covered in some places with 2 or 3 feet of water;

other places the water over the reef could be meas'

ured in inches. In effect, the reef acted as a bar'

rier, excluding all craft except the amphibian frac'

tors, and the waves of troops loaded in small boaf$

had no way to reach the beach except to transfee

to the tractors when they returned from their initial

trips to the beach, or to wade ashore. Some of tin

later waves transferred some units to the tractors:

others, and in some cases as much as an entire land'

ing team was involved, waded the 400 or 500 yards

of fire-swept water. As a result, there was• a great

deal of confusion at the reef and in the space

between the reef and the shore. Units became sepa'

rated, troops were mixed, officers lost contact with

their units, and there was a serious break-down in

control. Few reserve units landed on the beach as

a fighting team; platoons and sections lost sight of

their parent units and intermingled with other units.

Much of the efficiency normally associated with a

battalion landing team was lost as a result of this

unfortunate situation.

Lt. Col. Herbert Amey was in command of the

2d Battalion, 2d Marines. When his first three

waves in amphibian tractors left the line of depar-
ture, Amey was in an LCM with the forward echelon

of his command post group. Among those with him

was Lt. Col. Walter I. Jordan, an observer from the

4th Marine Division. After the third wave left the

line of departure, Amey followed with his group in

the LCM. Upon reaching the reef, it was found that

the boat could not go any farther; there was not

enough water over the reef to float the LCM clear.

Lieutenant Colonel Amey then secured two LVT's

and transferred his group to the tractors. At this time

the immediate area was under heavy enemy fire and

the two LVT's were soon separated. The amphibian

tractor, with Arney, Jordan, and about 13 other officers and men aboard, then headed in toward Beach

Red 2. About 200 yards out from the beach the

tractor was forced to stop because of a barbed wire

entanglement ahead, and the group climbed over

the side of the LVT and started to wade on in. Just

before the group reached the barbed wire, it was hit

by heavy machine gunfire from its right front. Lieutenant Colonel Amey was killed instantly and three

others were casualties. The remainder of the group

waded and swam to the protective lee of an abandoned boat. There was no other officer present to

take over the command of the landing team; the

executive officer of the team was with another wave

and was deflected to Beach Red 1. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan announced at this time that he, the senior

officer present, would assume command until such

time as Maj. Howard Rice, the executive officer,

could get ashore. Then the little group started to

Wade on in to the beach and at about 1000 set up a

command post in a shell hole on Red 2. There was no

way to communicate with other units. The radios

were inoperative, either from immersion in the salt

water, or because they were riddled with machinegun bullets. Shortly after the command post began

to operate, runners reported from the three companies. Their reports were gloomy. The three companies were pinned down by enemy machine-gun

fire from their front and flanks and sniper fire from

the trees in the area. The depth of the beachhead of

the landing team was about 75 yards and its width

was roughly 300 yards.

Behind the assault landing teams of the 2d Marines, and in radio communication with his battalion

commanders initially, Col. David Shoup and his staff

watched the waves move ashore. At this time Colonel Shoup's party was boated in an LCVP, and upon

reaching the reef, found that the boat could not go

on in to the shore. A nearby amphibian tractor

carrying a load of wounded men out from the beach

was hailed and Colonel Shoup had the wounded

transferred to an LCVP to be taken on out to a ship.

Then he, Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, an observer,

Maj. T. A. Culhane, Commander Nelson, the regimental surgeon, and Lt. Col. Presley M. Rixey,

artillery commander, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

climbed into the amphibian tractor and headed in

toward the left half of Beach Red 2. Before the

tractor had gone far, it came under heavy machinegun cross-fire and intermittent antiboat gun fire and

was forced to withdraw to the end of the pier. Next

the tractor went around the east end of the pier and

joined a wave of LCM's carrying medium tanks toward Beach Red 3. When this wave was within

100 yards of the shore, the enemy opened fire with

two 77-mm. guns scoring direct hits on 2 of the boats

of the tank wave. One boat sank and the other was

forced to withdraw in sinking condition. Obviously,

this was no place to attempt to land the regimental

command post group, so the tractor turned around

and went back to the end of the pier to try another

landing on Red 2. About halfway along toward the

beach, at about 1030, the engine stopped and the

group was forced to dismount and wade over to the

shelter of the pier.

As early as 1000 Colonel Shoup began to worry

about the 3d Battalion over on Red 1. The assault

companies were in partial communication with their

landing team commander, Maj. John F. Schoettel.

He was with his fourth wave which was boated in

LCVP's and LCM's. At 0959 Colonel Shoup received this message from Schoettel:

Receiving heavy fire all along beach. Unable to land

all. Issue in doubt.

Eight minutes later Schoettel again radioed

Shoup:

Boats held up on reef of right flank Red 1. Troops

receiving heavy fire in water.

To this, Shoup replied:

Land Beach Red 2 and work west.

Schoettel's reply was extremely disheartening:

We have nothing left to land.

All reports from the landing teams ashore mentioned heavy casualties and although it was difficult

at first to decide where the first of the reserve teams

should be landed, the fragmentary reports indicated

that things were going better on Crowe's beach than

11
the other two. At 0958, Colonel Shoup ordered his

combat team reserve, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

commanded by Maj. Wood B. Kyle, to land on

Beach Red 2 and work its way to the west to assist

the 3d Battalion. Kyle left the line of departure and

got as far as the reef with his waves loaded in boats.

At the reef Kyle was informed by the boat flotilla

commander that the troops would have to transfer to

LVT's. There were enough of the amphibian tractors to take Company A and Company B, but C

Company had to wait until noon for transportation.

The first two waves of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

were hit while landing at about 1130 by heavy enemy fire from the right portion of Beach Red 2 and

part of the tractors veered off to the west where they

landed on the west part of Red 1 and joined the

Marines fighting there. This group from the 1st Battalion which landed on Red 1 consisted of 1 officer

and about 110 men. The rest of the landing team

landed on the left half of Red 2 and suffered heavy

casualties while landing.

3D BATTALION, 8TH MARINES

IS COMMITTED

Gen. Julian C. Smith, at his command post out

on the U. S. S. Maryland, kept abreast of the situation through the radio messages. From the reports

received aboard the ship, it appeared that a fairly

good toe-hold had been secured on the beach and

that it was time to think about committing more

troops. At 1018 the division radioed Col. Elmer E.

Hall, the commanding officer of the 8th Marines, to

send his 3d Battalion to the line of departure where

it would pass to the control of Colonel Shoup.

At 1103 the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, at the

line of departure and in contact with Colonel Shoup,

who had been notified that the landing team was

now under his command, received orders from

Colonel Shoup to land on Beach Red 3 and support

the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines.

The first waves of the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines,

started in toward Beach Red 3 in their boats but

were stopped by the reef and the troops were forced

to leave the boats. As soon as the boats grounded on

the reef, the coxswains lowered the ramps and the

men rushed out over the end to begin wading ashore.

Unfortunately, the water was deep, well over a man's

head in places, and some of the Marines, loaded

with equipment, drowned. The men scattered upon

leaving the boats and deployed in a wide formation.

18

Then the enemy opened up with 40-mm., machinegun and mortar fire, causing heavy casualties and

scattering the formation. Out of the first wave about

100 got ashore and paused to reorganize.

Over on the pier, Colonel Shoup and Colond

Carlson could see what was happening to the 3d

Battalion, 8th Marines. By waving to the men of

the second wave and attracting their attention,

Shoup, Carlson, and Rixey directed the remainder

of the landing team to come over to the protection

of the pier and follow it in to the beach. Considerable time was lost, for the pier was under fire and the

men had to wade along its sides, utilizing what little

protection was offered. Many of the officers of the

companies of the 3d Battalion and a great many of

the noncommissioned officers, were either killed or

wounded. As a result, the battalion was badly disorganized and shaken by its experience.

The commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, Maj. R. H. Ruud, tried to get his fourth

wave in on the west side of the pier on Red 2. The

boats got hung up on the reef and began to receive

machine-gun fire, so they were withdrawn and

joined the fifth and sixth waves to reorganize.

After giving the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, acsistance, Colonel Shoup and his party worked theit

way to Red 2 and found Lieutenant Colonel Jordan

who reported that his troops (2d Battalion, 2d Ma.

rines ), were about 125 yards south of the beach with

snipers and cross-fire from blockhouses making prog.

ress very difficult.

The operations during the morning had taken 2

heavy toll of the amphibian tractors. Until the firs1

waves crossed the line of departure everything had

gone smoothly. In the first wave were 42 tractors; ir

the second, 24; and in the third wave there were 21

Near the line of departure, the tractors began to re.

ceive fire from shore guns but there were no hits

About 700 yards from the beach, the tractors cam(

under machine-gun fire, but none of the machine

was stopped. Then, about 200 yards out from th(

beach the LVT's received fire from all types o;

weapons. At least eight tractors were hit and failec

to reach the beach. Most of the .50-caliber machin(

gunners were killed. After discharging their troops

the LVT's backed off the beach before turnirq

around in order to get full benefit from their armo]

protection. A few more tractors were put out of ac.

tion at this time; the rest backed off into the wate]

and returned to the reef. Upon reaching deep watel

an undetermined number ( estimated to be abou
15) sank, due to holes in the hulls caused by rifle,

machine-gun, antiboat-gun, and mortar fire. It appeared at this time that there was only one route to the shore that was safe to use, and this route was only

relatively safe. It was the boat passage along the west

side of the long pier. The amphibious tractors were

used thereafter to transport troops and supplies from the end of the pier and from the small boats off the

end of the pier to the beach, the inland dumps, and

to the front lines.

When the naval gunfire bombardment and the

bombing and strafing attacks of the planes were lifted

as the first waves approached the beaches, the enemy

seemed to recover from his demoralizing shock and

began to use every weapon at his disposal. The immediate area of the landing beaches was raked with

small-arms, machine-gun, mortar, and grenade fire.

From the reef on in to the shore, except for the boat

Passage next to the west side of the pier, the approach

to the beach resembled a trip across a veritable no

man's land.

At 1036 Gen. Julian C. Smith radioed to V

Amphibious Corps:

Successful landing on Beaches Red 2 and 3. Toe hold

on Red 1. Am committing one LT from division re--

Serve. Still encountering strong resistance throughout.

Due to the reef and the murderous hail of fire that

blanketed the approaches to the landing beaches,

there developed a slowness about the operation that

was maddening to the officers and men alike. The

attention was unique. In order to defeat the enemy

and to seize the island, General Smith had to achieve

the numerical superiority ashore demanded by this

type of operation.' The front lines were only a matter

of a few feet inland from the water's edge, so close

to the beach in fact that the troops began to fight

immediately they walked out of the water and set

foot ashore. As the initial waves dismounted from

the amphibian tractors they were joined in action

With the enemy at once. Then as the first thin lines

Pushed inland men began to drop out, wounded or

dying. The later waves were forced to leave their

boats at the reef and wade from there to the beach,

a long trip through water suddenly dotted by the

Spurts kicked up by machine-gun fire. Most of the

men stayed as low in the water as possible, offering

limited targets to the enemy. Holding their weapons

above their heads when they could, the men waded

At least 3 to 1.

slowly in, sometimes stumbling in the pot holes in

the coral.

This state of affairs resulted in disorganization

among the units and control was virtually impossible.

To compensate for this lack of control, there was a

certain unity of purpose in the minds of the troops.

Committed to the danger from enemy fire from the

reef on in, the men moved forward anxiously to gain

the beach where they could begin to fight back.

Many were hit in the water; others kept up the relentless struggle, staggering through the waist-toshoulder deep water, moving doggedly to join their

comrades.

There were no covered routes of approach to the

beach. There was no way to get a battalion landing

team into the fire fight ashore without running the

risk of casualties in the space between the reef and

the beach. There was the problem of units scattering

and becoming disorganized, or drifting too far to the

right or left. These problems offered no easy means

of solution.

By noon the situation ashore began to clear up as

some measure of order appeared in what had seemed

chaos. Colonel Shoup was in partial communication

with his landing team commanders. Forward progress was slow, a matter of a few feet at a time, for the

enemy kept the Marines pinned down. It was worth

a man's life to raise his head a few inches to try to

gain a view of the situation to his front. Still, there

was no way to employ the firepower of his weapon

unless the man did expose himself, however briefly.

From the beach the division command post

aboard the U. S. S. Maryland received urgent calls.

There were requests for bombing and strafing missions; calls for blood plasma and medical supplies;

calls for ammunition.

During the early morning of D-day, the situation

on Betio was literally cloudy, for the shells from the

battleships, the cruisers, and the destroyers, as well

as the bombs from the planes, had raised a high

column of smoke and dust from the island. As the

morning wore on, the smoke from burning emplacements and buildings continued to mask portions of

the island so that it was impossible, even from the

air, to see much of the island at one time. Neither

Colonel Shoup ashore, nor General 'Smith out on

the Maryland, could see what was actually going on

Shoup's vision was limited due to the fact that he was

pinned down most of the time. General Smith was

too far out from the beach to see the fighting, but as

regards communications facilities, he was in the right

19
place to control his division, his prime responsibility.

Fortunately, the general could rely on another man

to act as his eyes. Lt. Comdr. Robert A. MacPherson,

Admiral Hill's Kingfisher pilot, spent most of the

day flying back and forth over the smoldering little

island, sometimes accompanied by a representative

from the division staff. MacPherson radioed back to

the Maryland what he saw on the ground and made

appropriate recommendations. Lieutenant ( jg)

Whaley, in the other plane from the Maryland, was

accompanied by Lt. Col. A. F. Johnston in a flight

at 1447, during which the progress of the attack was

observed.

From the plane, Colonel Johnston watched for

signs of the enemy on Betio, as Whaley flew at treetop height, but although detail could be observed

easily ( Johnston could read the license numbers on

two Japanese civilian cars) , no enemy troops were to

be seen except for a few moving laterally behind the

sea wall at the west end of Black Beach. It was evident that the Japanese, on the whole, were taking

full advantage of cover and concealment.

Later Lt. Col. Jesse Cook, from the division staff,

went up with Ensign G. K. French to have a look at

the situation.

Besides the landing teams, there was one other

unit that landed early in the morning of D-day; in

fact, this unit landed prior to the landing teams. In

the Headquarters and Service Company of CT 2,

there was a small and select group of specially trained

riflemen called the Scout-Sniper Platoon, commanded by Lt. William D. Hawkins. In the landing

plan for his combat team, Colonel Shoup proposed

to use the Scout-Sniper Platoon to clear out machine

guns and enemy riflemen on the long pier. Unless

this were done, the two landing teams assigned to

assault the beaches on either side of the pier would

run the chance of being hit in their interior flanks as

they moved toward the beach.

Fifteen minutes before any troops reached the

shore on Betio, Hawkins and his platoon arrived at

the end of the pier and began their hazardous work.

With Hawkins' group was Lt. A. G. Leslie with a

squad of engineers. Under the covering fire of the

scout-snipers, Leslie brought his flamethrower into

action against the first of the Japanese positions on

the pier. While burning out the Japanese, Leslie set

the pier afire. It burned for several hours, resulting

in a breach for a distance of 30 to 50 feet being

burned completely to the water line. This damage

20

later complicated the using of the pier as a transfer

point for unloading supplies en route from ship t°

shore.

Not only did the scout-snipers under Hawkins

clean up the pier but they then reported to Colonel

Shoup ashore and were used many times during the

next three days to knock out pillboxes, blockhouses,

and bunkers.

At about 1530, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston re'

ported back to the division command post aboard

the Maryland after an aerial flight over Betio during

which he had an opportunity to observe the ground

action. The picture ashore was as follows:

Along Beach Red I it looked as though Marines

were inland about 150 yards but not moving. On

Beach Red 2 there were few Marines visible except

on the left ( east ) side, where they were packed

closely against the first line of enemy revetments and

in the shelter of the west side of the pier. On Beach

Red 3 the troops seemed packed along the water

line. The eastern end of the island seemed desolate;

there was no sign of life there. It appeared that about

15 amphibian tractors were abandoned on the beach

and the reef; also on the reef were a few landing

boats, apparently not in running condition. There

was little activity between the line of departure and

the beach. Four tanks could be seen near Red 1, but

none were moving. So appeared the action on Betio

when observed from the air midafternoon on D-day,

Colonel Shoup, at his command post on Red 2,

was in communication with Crowe ( 2d Battalion,

8th Marines), with Jordan (2d Battalion, 2d

Marines ) , Kyle (1st Battalion, 2d Marines) , Ruud

(3d Battalion, 8th Marines), and with Schoettel (3r1

Battalion, 2d Marines) , but the trouble was that

Schoettel was not ashore with his troops and Shoup

had no means of knowing how that part of the 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines which had landed on Red I

was getting along. Shoettel could not get his fourth

wave ashore on Red 1 and at 1458 had radioed to

Shoup:

"CP located on back of Red Beach 1. Situation w

before. Have lost contact with assault elements."

The answer to this came not from Shoup, but from

General Smith:

"Direct you land at any cost, regain control your

battalion and continue the attack."

Earlier Colonel Shoup had called division requesting information on the situation on Red 1 and suggested that a reconnaissance plane be sent over that
end of the island. Ensign French and Lieutenant

Colonel Cook left immediately in one of the observa- tion planes from the U. S. S. Maryland.

SITUATION ON BEACH RED 1

Although isolated from the other Marines on

Betio, those on Beach Red 1 were better off than

was suspected. The two assault companies of the 3d

Battalion, 2d Marines, were separated for a while after landing on Red 1. Enemy fire from the strong point over on the little point of beach on the boundary line between Red 1 and Red 2 had caused heavy

casualties in the leading waves and had forced the

tractors to scatter. In addition, fire was coming from

one or two guns on Green Beach; this fire swept

across the western end of Red 1. The Japanese held their fire well while the first waves were approaching, opening up when the LVT's were in very close.

Some of the tractors were hit before they got all the

way up to the beach barricade just in from the water's edge; others unloaded their troops and backed

away to return to the reef before they were hit. Still

Others, miraculously, were able to get back out to the

reef without being hit, but these were few. Command

of the scattered elements ashore on Red 1 fell to Maj.

Michael P. Ryan. He organized, as best he could, the

remnants of K and I Companies and went about the

business of clearing out a foothold on the western

Part of Red 1. Assisting Maj. "Mike" Ryan were

Captain O'Brien and Capt. James W. Crain of K

Company, and First Lt. Samuel C. Turner of I

Company.

For a while K Company was in communication

With Major Schoettel who was in a boat out at the

reef. Schoettel was behind his fourth wave and was

un his way to the beach when he observed the boats

carrying the medium tanks, which were to land on

Red 1, turning out to sea as though to leave the area.

He immediately went to this group and ordered the

tanks to go on in to the beach. Out of the six medium

tanks that started for the beach, only two got ashore.

The tanks had to leave their LCM's at the reef and

cross the intervening distance of some 1,200 yards

under their own power.

Guiding the tanks were tank reconnaissance men

carrying flags to mark potholes in the coral. As one

of these men was shot by Japanese on the island, another would take his place. Upon reaching the beach,

the tanks found the area from the water's edge to the

base of the log barricade littered with wounded and

dead Marines. Accurate enemy fire had the men

down behind the barricade; any attempt to crawl

over the barricade resulted in a heavy burst of enemy

fire on that particular area. The tank men were

faced with making the decision of running their

heavy tanks over the bodies of the dead and wounded

to reach a gap blown in the barricade by the engineers, or going around through the water to reach

that gap. They decided on the latter. In moving

through the water around the dead and wounded,

four tanks were lost in potholes. Only two tanks got

up on the island proper.

These two tanks, with the Marines under Major

Ryan, began to work over the pockets of resistance

on the western half of Red 1 and a part of the northern end of Green Beach. After his trip over to the

tank boats, Schoettel returned to the reef and started

to go in, but his group came under fire as soon as the

boat grounded on the reef.

A part of L Company and a platoon from M Company followed the assault waves in and landed on

the right, or west, part of Red 1, being driven to the

right on the way in by the fire from the Japanese

pillboxes on the boundary of Beaches Red 1 and 2.

Major Ryan, in command of all the troops on Red

1, had a mixed group. The heavy and disastrous fire

from the above-mentioned strong point split the assault waves of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and

later those of the 1st Battalion. By midafternoon

Ryan had what was left of K and I Companies, part

of L Company, and a platoon of ,M Company, all

from his own battalion, i. e., 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines. In addition there were the following units

from the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines: 1st Platoon, E

Company; 1st Platoon, G Company; 2d and 3d

Platoons, H Company; Battalion Executive Officer

and his command group; part of Headquarters

Group.

Besides these troops, there was about 110 men and

3 officers from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines who were

driven off their course on the way into the beach

and landed on Red 1.

The battalion executive officer of the 2d Battalion,

2d Marines, Maj. Howard Rice, was forced by intense Japanese fire to drift to the right as he and his

group attempted to land on Red 2 13 minutes after

H-hour. Lieutenant Colonel Amey, the commanding

officer of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, had divided

his command post personnel into two tactical groups,

21
one under himself and the other under Major Rice.

Both of these groups were fairly complete and each

had its own radio. Upon landing on Red 1, Major

Rice joined Major Ryan and it was through Rice's

radio that Ryan was able to contact Colonel Shoup

and advise him of the situation on Beach Red 1.

The mixed group under Ryan worked through

the afternoon of D-day to expand the perimeter on

the western end of the island. With the medium

tanks to lend their fire power, the Marines drove to

the south and by late afternoon had cleared an area

500 yards deep and about 150 yards wide.

The farthest point reached during the drive was

the antitank ditch, about 300 yards from the south

shore. By this time enemy fire from the south and

east had become intense. Ryan had no flamethrowers or demolitions. His men could overrun the pillboxes ( and did) but had no means with which to

destroy the enemy therein. After the ground was

overrun, Japanese popped back up to harass troops

from their rear and to prey on stretcher bearers who

were carrying the numerous casualties to the northwest point of Betio to be evacuated by tractor.

During the afternoon's drive the two tanks had

been invaluable. As a matter of fact, they constituted

the only supporting weapons Ryan had. Beyond the

tanks, his men had only their individual weapons.

Late in the day, Ryan decided to pull his line back

in to enclose a smaller area which he believed he

had a better chance to hold through the night.

At 1800 Ryan received a message from Colonel

Shoup's command post asking him to report his

situation. Ryan called back and reported that the

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and other troops were

holding a defensive perimeter along some Japanese

trenches about 300 yards in from the northwest tip

of Betio.

Almost 600 yards of enemy-held ground lay between the Marines on the west end of the island and

the nearest troops on Beach 2.

When the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, was ordered

ashore, Gen. Julian C.. Smith had one landing team

left as his reserve out of the six landing teams under

his command for the operation. Early in the afternoon, it appeared that it might be necessary to send

in the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, the last of the landing teams, to help those already committed. If this

were done, General Smith would be left with no reserve except those troops in what was called the support group. This group consisted of the following:

22

(1) 10th Marines, less detachments: H&S Bat'

tery, less detachments, 4th Battalion.

(2) 18th Marines, less detachments: Detachment

H&S Company, H Company, I Company.

(3) Special Troops, less detachments: Divisid

Headquarters, less detachments; Signal Compan)

less detachments; Military Police Company, less de

tachments; H&S 2d Tank Battalion, less detach

ments; D Company (Scout ) , 2d Tank Battaliol

Detachment 3d Band Section; One Argus Air Warh

ing Unit.

(4) Service Troops, less detachments: Detach

ment H&S Co., 2d Medical Battalion; E Comparr)

2d Medical Battalion; A Company, 2d Motel

Transport Battalion; Detachments, Service and SUP

ply Company, 2d Service Battalion; Detachmenri

Ordnance Company, 2d Service Battalion.

It may be seen, then, that General Smith worlh

have an assortment of artillerymen, engineers, a0

other specialists, as his last reserve element. If a crisi

arose where the difference between victory and fail

ure might depend upon the troops of the suppor

group, the general would have no choice except h

commit them. In the meantime, there was anodic]

combat team from the 2d Marine Division stil

aboard its ships in the transport area off Betio. Thi

was the 6th Marines, the reserve element for V Aro

phibious Corps, and it was to be committed only 01

corps order.

At 1331, General Smith radioed Maj. Gen. Hol

land M. Smith, V Amphibious Corps Commander

at Makin, requesting that CT6 be released to till

control of the 2d Marine Division.

Then he turned to plan for organizing his suppor

group into provisional battalions. Unless his radii

request, concurred in by Admiral Hill, was approve(

and the 6th Marines released to him, General Smit]

planned on leading his last reserves into the battle

In his mind, the critical period of the battle was fas

approaching, with success or failure hanging in til'

balance.

Within an hour, a message was received from Mal

Gen. Holland M. Smith granting the request. Col

Maurice G. Holmes, commanding officer of the 6t1

Marines, was notified of the change in status of hi

regimental combat team.

Now General Smith could send the 1st Battalioa

8th Marines, ashore without worrying about a lad

of reserve strength. Col. Elmer E. Hall, command

ing officer of CT8, began to boat his headquarter
LEAVING COVER offered by the log beach barricade Marines advance across fire-swept open ground.

23
personnel and his remaining landing team, the 1st

Battalion, commanded by Maj. Lawrence C. Hays,

Jr., long before noon. At 1343 Hall's group and the

1st Battalion were ordered to the line of departure

to await further orders. An hour later this message

was sent from division to Colonel Shoup:

Do you consider a night landing by LT 1/8 suitable

and practicable on Beach Green? If not, can reinforcements land on Beaches Red 2 and 3 after dark?

Apparently, this message never reached Colonel

Shoup. There is no record that it was answered. This

was due, probably, to the frequent break-downs in

communication. Many of the radios ashore had received rough treatment during the landing. Some of

the sets were wet and had to be dried out thoroughly

before they would work; some remained inoperative

during the remainder of the operation. Other radios

fell victim to shrapnel fragments or rifle bullets. By

cannibalizing one set, sometimes another could be

made to work. At best, the radios were not altogether

dependable. The SCR 300's and 610's, so common

in later operations were not available to the 2d

Marine Division in time for Tarawa. The division

was using the TBX and the TBY; the latter was

cursed by radio operators and battalion commanders

alike.

The boats of Col. Elmer E. Hall, commander of

the 8th Marines, and those of the 1st Battalion,

idled at the line of departure during the early afternoon. Finally, at 1625, General Smith sent a message

to Colonel Hall directing him to land his remaining

elements (i. e., the regiment, less its 2d and 3d Battalions) , on the north shore of the extreme eastern

end of Betio. The landing beach designated was

about 2,500 feet wide at a place where the island

narrowed to a distance of from 200 to 500 feet

across. The time of the landing was set at 1745.

Upon reaching the shore, the scheme of maneuver

called for Hall to attack to the northwest. The message never reached Colonel Hall. The message was

acknowledged on the Monrovia but Hall was not on

the ship; he was in a boat at the line of departure,

waiting near the Pursuit for orders to land. These

he believed would come to him via the Pursuit. His

radio did not pick up division's message.

At 1548 the U. S. S. Maryland catapulted its No.

1 observation plane, piloted by Ensign French, accompanied by Lt. Col. Jesse S. Cook, division supply officer; the mission of the flight was to observe

the progress of the assault. Col. Merritt A. Edson,

24

chief of staff of the division, and Lt. Col. A. F. Johv

ston, the plans and operations officer, contacted th

observation plane and requested that French

Cook watch the line of departure and report ail!

movement of boats from that area. It was believe(

that Hall had received the message from divisiol

ordering him to land on the eastern end of the

land; division wanted to be kept abreast of the prog

ress of Hall's movement to the beach. It so happene(

that at this precise moment, a battery of the 1st Bat

talion, 10th Marines, left the line of departure an(

headed toward Beach Red 2, the beach where t11(

artillerymen were ordered to land. The report cad(

into the division command post on the Mary/a0

from the air observers that the wave was not goin

toward the east end of the island, but was moving,

toward Red 2. Considerable consternation result

at the command post but nothing could be done

about it. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston accordingl)

plotted the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, on his situ 

tion map as being on Beach Red 2. It wasn't until

midnight that division learned that Hall and

troops were still at the line of departure awai

orders.

TANKS ON D-DAY

Company C, Corps Tank Battalion, 1st Marine

Amphibious Corps, arrived at Betio iri the U. S. 5

Ashland (LSD-1 ) . (This company was attached

to the 2d Tank Battalion and after Tarawa became

an organic part of it. Hereafter in the monograph

will be referred to as being a part of the 2d Tall

Battalion, since it was operationally.) The tanks had

been loaded at Noumea, New Caledonia, on 3 No'

vember. The company joined the 2d Division at

Efate. The medium tanks of Company C ran into

considerable trouble during D-day. Over on Red

Beach 1, the 1st Platoon finally got two tanks on the

beach at about 1130. These two tanks, supported b)

infantry, started an advance to the south which gol

as far as the antitank ditch about 300 yards from the

south side of the western end of the island. During the

advance one of the tanks was hit by antiboat gunfire,

disabling the turret traverse mechanism. While the

tank moved in to destroy the gun, it was hit again

this time on the tube of its 75-mm. gun, and wa`,

forced to retire. The enemy fire that immobilized the

75-mm. gun on the tank came from a Japanese tan],

which was promptly put out of action by the othd

medium tank. Shortly after, the one tank remaining
in action was hit by enemy fire and burned. The disabled tank was used for flank protection on Red 1

for the night; its bow machine gun was still working.

The 2d Platoon landed on Beach Red 3 and found

a break in the seawall where the tanks could get up off the beach and move inland. The platoon, with

three tanks, moved over to Beach Red 2 to a previously designated assembly area. At 1130 Colonel

Shoup directed the tanks to move to the right flank

of the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. As they moved to the west, the tanks were waved back by infantry.

Finally, the platoon gave its support to a part of the

2d BaAtalion, 2d Marines, and helped the advance

over to the west runway of the airfield. While working on pillboxes and shelling enemy positions, one tank dropped into a shell hole and could not be retrieved until next morning. Another tank was put

out of action by what was believed to be a magnetic

mine.

The 3d Platoon of Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, landed on Red 3 without losing a tank. Upon

reaching the beach, the platoon commander reported to Major Crowe of the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, and was ordered to attack to the south and

knock out all enemy positions encountered. During

the first hour's operation, one of the tanks was lost

When hit by a friendly dive bomber. Shortly afterwards two more tanks were hit, this time by enemy

gunfire. One of these tanks dropped into an excavation holding an enemy fuel dump. The dump was set

on fire by the dive bombers and the tank was burned.

The other tank hit by enemy fire caught on fire and

had to be abandoned. Another tank caught on fire

and returned to the beach where the fire was extinguished ; this tank remained in action throughout

the operation. At the end of the day only one of the

four tanks of the platoon remained operative.

With Colonel Shoup all during D-day was Lt.

Col. Evans F. Carlson, detailed for the Tarawa operation as an observer. Carlson came ashore in the

morning in Shoup's LVT and accompanied Shoup

to Red 2 where the command post of the 2d Marines

was installed. At 1230 Colonel Shoup asked Carlson

to make a trip out to the Maryland to see General

Smith and present to the general and staff a verbal

Picture of the situation on Betio. Shoup considered

this liaison mission necessary to supplement the regular means of communication. Shoup asked Carlson

to tell General Smith that he ( Shoup ) intended to

stick and fight it out regardless of how tough the situation became, and that Red 2 was the beach to use to

send reserves ashore. Shoup said that his plan was to

expand the beachhead to the south and to link up

all the landing teams on all of the beaches. Carlson

requested permission to use an amphibian tractor to

bring in some of the elements of Ruud's battalion

from where they were clinging to the pier. Shoup

agreed to this and Carlson left immediately. After

carrying in several loads of troops from the end and

sides of the long pier, Carlson left his tractor at the

reef and took a boat out to the Pursuit; there he

transferred to a boat going to the Zeilin and finally

caught another boat which took him over to the

Maryland. Upon his arrival on the command ship,

Carlson then presented his information to General

Smith and Colonel Edson.

HERMLE'S MISSION

Early in the afternoon the Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Leo D. Hermle, was ordered by

General Smith to assemble boats and prepare to land

his group on order. General Hermle was embarked

aboard the U. S. S. Monrovia, where he maintained

a command post with his own staff. At 1343 General Hermle received the orders which stated that he

was to proceed to the end of the pier, form an estimate of the present situation, and report his findings

to division. He was instructed that Maj. Rathvon

McC. Tompkins was en route to the pier and-that he

was to contact Tompkins. On .the way to the pier,

General Hermle radioed to Colonel Shoup, requesting the location of Shoup's command post, but received no answer. At 1740 division received a message from Hermle saying that he had arrived at the

end of the pier and was under fire. He had picked up

Tompkins on the way. Seventeen minutes later, General Hermle attempted to get a message through to

division, but because of communication difficulties

was unable to do so. He and his staff were still under

fire at the end of the pier and were with elements of

the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines. Being unable to aprise division of his situation, Hermle sent his information by messenger out to one of the ships so that it

could be radioed on to division.

Upon reaching the end of the pier, General

Hermle contacted Maj. Stanley E. Larsen, executive

officer, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, who was pinned

down under the end of the pier with remnants of

his headquarters company and two other companies

of the battalion. Larsen stated that Major Ruud had

25
gone forward with Colonel Shoup and the rest of the

battalion and that he had been out of communication with Ruud for several hours.

Through intermittent radio communication with

Shoup and Crowe, General Hermle learned that

their immediate need was ammunition and water.

Many casualties were under the pier and in the

water. With General Hermle was the assistant division surgeon Capt. French Moore ( MC ) , USN.

Under Moore's direction casualties were collected,

given first aid, and then evacuated in boats as supplies were unloaded on the pier. Captain Moore later

returned to a transport with a boat load of seriously

wounded Marines.

Hermle directed Larsen to form carrying parties

from his troops and, as they moved along the pier

toward the beach, they were to carry ammunition

and water. Throughout the night, supplies arriving

at the end of the pier were sent forward along the

pier as far as the boats could go and then unloaded

by the carrying parties and manhandled to the beach.

The Marines in the carrying parties had to wade

along the pier through a fire-swept area about 50

yards wide as they approached the beach.

Radio contact with Shoup and Crowe, intermittent thus far, failed completely at about 1930, so

General Hermle sent Major Tompkins and Capt.

Thomas C. Dutton to find Shoup's command post.

They were to find out from Shoup which beaches he

thought were best for landing reserve units, and

when he wanted the reserves landed.

The distance from the end of the pier to Shoup's

position was slightly more than 600 yards, but because the pier and adjacent areas were under Japanese machine-gun and antiboat-gun fire, the trip involved was, of necessity, slow and laborious. Tompkins and Dutton accomplished their mission, but did

not return until 0345. Hermle now had his information, but had no means of communicating it to division. Consequently, he and his party moved out in

the lagoon to the U. S. S. Ringgold and went aboard

to use the ship's communication facilities. At 0445

Hermle sent a message to division recommending

that the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, land on Beach

Red 2 close to the pier; the message never reached

division. He also informed division that he was on

the Ringgold awaiting further instructions. At 0510

General Hermle radioed Colonel Shoup and told

him of his recommendation to division. A few

minutes later he received a message from General

26

Smith which instructed him to remain on the Ring'

gold and to come aboard the U. S. S. Maryland

when the Ringgold came alongside.

What General Hermle did not know was that at

1750 General Smith had sent a message to him in'

structing him to take command of the troops ashore

and to report when a command post had been estab'

lished on the island. This message, because of corm

munication difficulties, never reached Hermle. Thc

command ashore was to remain the responsibility of

Colonel Shoup for another day.

When General Hermle left the Monrovia, he left

behind the ADC-4 group under Lt. Col. Cliff Atkin'

son, Jr., whose mission it was to coordinate the shiP'

to-shore movement of supplies under Capt. H. 5

Knowles, USN, the transport group commander.

When, following the dispatch from General Smith

directing General Hermle to land on Betio and as'

sume command, subsequent dispatches from forces

ashore still continued to bear Colonel Shoup's sigua'

ture, concern was felt on the Monrovia for the safety

of General Hermle and his staff.
I Shoup's dispatches repeated earlier requests for

, ammunition, water, plasma, etc., and since such

material was being sent continuously from the transPorts with no report of its receipt on the beach,

Captain Knowles directed Maj. Ben K. Weatherwax, Assistant D-4, to proceed to the beach, locate

General Hermle or Colonel Shoup, and determine

the status of supplies ashore.

At 2100, Weatherwax left the Monrovia and went to the Pursuit where he obtained directions for landmg. From the control ship, he then went on in to the Pier, landing along its side on the beach side of the

gap burned by Lieutenant Leslie early in the day.

Weatherwax did not know that General Hermle was

at the end of the pier, the part that was separated by the burned-out section from the rest of the main Pier. Upon reaching the side of the pier, Weatherwax

worked his way to Colonel Shoup's command post

and obtained the required information about supplies, desired by Captain Knowles. He made two attempts to get this information through to the Man10 vza by radio, but had no success. He then made his

way back out on the pier to the landing boat and

arrived on the Monrovia shortly before dawn.

Weatherwax's reconnaissance was duplicated by

Tompkins and Dutton who went ashore from

Hermle's boat, as mentioned before.

LANDING THE ARTILLERY

It had been planned to land artillery in support of

the 2d Marines as soon as a sufficient beachhead had

been established by the assault units. The artillery

annex to the operation order of the 2d Marines called

for the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, to land on Beach

Red 1, since this area seemed the only feasible position area from which the artillery could give full support. In command of the battalion, which was a 75-

mm. pack howitzer unit, was Lt. Col. P. M. Rixey.

As a member of Colonel Shoup's command post

group, Colonel Rixey had landed before noon. In the

meantime, the batteries of his battalion assembled at

the line of departure where they waited for further

orders. During the afternoon, it became apparent to

WITH FIXED BAYONETS Marines pause in the cover of the beach barricade before

moving out into the open. Wrecked amphibian tractors lie in the water to the left.
both Shoup and Rixey that it would be impracticable to land the artillery on Red 1, and it was finally

decided later in the afternoon to bring it ashore on

Red 2. Since boats could not cross the reef, it was

necessary to procure LVT's. Two gun sections, one

from A Battery and one from B Battery, were transferred and ordered in at dusk. Through a misunderstanding that three sections of C Battery were in

LVT's, they were also ordered to land. Actually, the

C Battery sections were still in boats, but they went

to the end of the pier anyway, and the men carried

the pieces of their guns along the pier through waistdeep water in to the beach. The A and B sections

landed in LVT's on Red 2. At the close of D-day,

then, there were five sections of artillery ashore and

they were ready to go into position at dawn.

Due to the fact that all the approaches to Betio

were under enemy fire, the logistical problem was a

difficult one all through D-day. Since small boats

could reach the end of the pier, supplies were landed

there and some ammunition and water reached the

shore through manhandling. A few of the LVT's

were still in operation during the afternoon and some

supplies were sent directly to the beach in them.

The transports unloaded as quickly as possible all

through the day. As a result, the area around the

Pursuit was filled with loaded boats unable to reach

the beach where their cargo could be discharged.

There were too few LVT's, still operative, to relieve

this congested situation.

EVENING D-DAY

As darkness fell on Betio, the situation of the

Marines of the 2d Marine Division ashore was precarious. On the left of the beachhead (looking

south) was the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, whose left

flank was anchored on the beach just short of the

Burns-Philp pier. A part of the battalion landing

team was in the eastern portion of the triangular

area enclosed by the air strip and its taxiways. Helping to hold the line with the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, was that part of the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines which had reached the shore during the

afternoon. Next on the beachhead line, and on the

riglit of Crowe's battalion, were the troops of the

1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines. There was no

continuous lin; the defensive perimeter was held by

small groups of men who occupied shell holes and

covered positions in the western part of the beforementioned triangular area. The positions continued

28

in a northerly direction from the west taxiway over toabout the center of Red 2. The ground west of the

positions remained in Japanese hands, except for di

foothold on the northwestern tip where Maj. "Mike'

Ryan and the mixed troops under his command we

dug in for the night. Most of the work done durin

the afternoon had been directed toward expandin

the initial positions of the assault troops and in a

tempting to join contact in order to form a defensi

perimeter by sundown. Most of the Marines pr

pared for the night with the feeling that a Japan

counterattack was inevitable. Even out on the co

trol vessels and on the ships in the transport are

there was a restless feeling that any moment duni

•the night, reports would come in saying that t

Japanese were attempting to force the Marines ba

into the sea. Despite the universal apprehensio

there was no counterattack. The first night ashore o

Betio saw remarkable fire discipline. There was

promiscuous shooting. What little firing was don

happended only when a wandering Japanese stu

bled near the fox holes of the Marines. Out on t

Maryland the staff of the division listened for r

ports of rifle fire announcing an enemy count

attack. They were relieved when the night pass

quietly.

According to Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith, Jap

nese General Shibasaki made his greatest mistake b

not counterattacking the slim Marine beachhe

during this night. Never again was it so vulnerabl

Shibasaki's failure to counterattack may be trace

probably, to a break-down in control. Naval gunfl

had disrupted his communications so that he w

never able to control his units after early mornin

of D-day. He was killed on the second day of fightin

on Betio.

Colonel Shoup's Japanese language officer, Cap

Eugene P. Boardman noted that: "Strange

enough, the naval troops on Tarawa used no fiel

message blanks. In previous operations, as o

Guadalcanal, field message blanks constituted

prominent part of the 'take' of captured japaneS

documents. This total absence of message bla

surprised us. It showed, I believe, the complete do

trinal reliance of the defenders of Betio upon wir

•communication and indicated a lack of training

using runners. The effectiveness of the prelimin

naval bombardment in breaking up the Japanes

wire communication system was possibly all th

more fateful on this account."
. ..... ... ADVANCES DURING DAY

POSITIONS AT SUNSET

INTELLIGENCE MAP BIT1TU (BETIO) ISLAND

TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

SITUATION 1800 D- DAY

500 400 300 200 100 0 1000 YDS

MAP 2

RD 5890

TAKEN FROM 20 MAR DIV

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

NOTE LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY.

GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUPS

AND BY FIRE. SECONDARY LINES WERE

ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIND

FRONT LINES.

749543 0-47 (Face p. 28)
THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

CHAPTER III The Second Day, 21 November 1943

1ST BATTALION, 8TH MARINES, LANDS

COL. ELMER E. HALL, commanding officer of the 8th Marines, with his headquarters group and the lst Battalion, 8th Marines, spent the night near the control vessel at the line of departure. As had been related, Hall did not receive the message from

'

division sent during the afternoon of D-day instruct- ing CT 8 and LT 1/8 to land on the eastern end of Betio. After waiting for several hours at the line of

departure, Hall finally received a message from divi- sion at 0200 on the morning of 21 November re- jquesting information as to the whereabouts of the lst Battalion, 8th Marines, and the condition of the

troops. Hall replied that the battalion landing team

was resting easy in its boats near the Pursuit. Two and one-half hours later Hall received another message from division, this time ordering the same land- ing on the eastern end of the island planned the day before. The landing was to be made at 0900, and Hall was to make arrangements with the control ves- sel at the line of departure to mark a new line from Which the boats would depart, well to the east of the

Present line. While Hall was making preparations to

carry out this order, division received a message from the assistant division commander, Brigadier General

Hermle, now on the Ringgold. With Hermle were

'Tompkins and Dutton; it will be recalled that these

two officers had talked with Colonel Shoup at his

command post ashore the night before. On the basis

of what Shoup had told Tompkins, Hermle radioed

division:

"Shoup desires 1/8 to land on Beach Red 2." This message was sent at 0513. A few minutes la- er, Colonel Hall received new instructions from diision. CT 8 and LT 1/8 were to land on Red 2 at

823769-49---3

once. When ashore, LT 1/8 was to attack to the west.

At 0615 the first wave of the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines, climbed out of its boats at the reef, about

500 yards out from the beach, and started to wade

in to Red 2. The first four waves of the landing team

came in in normal landing formation and came

directly into the fire-swept zone north of the strongpoint on the boundary line of Red 1 and Red 2.

Casualties were very heavy. From the reef in, each

wave was hit by machine gun fire from both flanks

and the troops that reached the beach were badly

disorganized. As the first wave arrived on the beach,

Colonel Shoup sent the men over to reinforce the

units holding the right portion of the beachhead. By

0800, Maj. L. C. Hayes, Jr., the battalion commander, had over half of his team ashore and under

cover; he then reported to Shoup for orders. Shoup

instructed Hays to feed his landing team into the line

on the west part of Red 2, and when in the line and

fully reorganized, to attack to the west to establish

contact with the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. The rest

of the morning was spent getting the troops moved

up into position for the forthcoming attack. All

flamethrowers, demolitions, and other heavy equipment were lost en route to the beach.

With the coming of dawn on the second day of the

fight for Betio, sharp bursts of small arms fire served

notice that the bitter action of the day before was

to continue with unabated vigor. Aware that his best

chance for success lay in splitting the enemy forces

and expanding the beachhead as quickly as possible,

Colonel Shoup directed the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d

Marines, to attack to the south with the mission of

seizing the south coast of the island.

There was little opportunity for any of the units

on Betio to do any tactical maneuvering. There were

29
ADVANCING AROUND THE END of a barbed-wire entanglement, these Marines are rushing to the next cover available.

no ground forms large enough to provide cover for

forming up an attack. The only cover or concealment

offered the Marines was that afforded by shell holes,

destroyed enemy emplacements, fallen cocoanut

trees, and the scattered piles of battle detritus littering the scant beachhead. Often the advance of a unit

was occasioned by two or three men working their

way forward by fire and movement to where they

could throw grenades into an enemy bunker, or deliver a sudden burst of automatic fire into an enemy

position. Engineer personnel, attached to the rifle

companies, tied blocks of TNT together and hurled

them into blockhouses and pillboxes. The men handling the flamethrowers would work their way up

near an enemy position and, while covered by riflemen, then suddenly jump up and run to the entrance, spray the area with flame, and drop back to

the nearest position of safety while the riflemen

30

mopped up. If these attempts were successful, i. e.

the Marines attacking the positions lived long enoil

to complete their task, then sometimes a whole p

toon would be able to move forward a few more fc

1ST BATTALION, 20 MARINES

On the morning of the second day on Betio, M

Wood B. Kyle, of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, h

about 300 men of his landing team on the weste

part of the beachhead inland from Red 2. Two

Kyle's companies were over in the triangle formed b

the airfield; another joined with them on their right

and extending over to the beach, and his weapoo

company was in reserve. Early in the morning, OE

machine gun platoon was sent up to Company C

north of the west taxiway, and from advanced poS1

tions brought fire to bear on a number of Japanese
1(

JAPANESE COMMAND POST with enemy tank in foreground. Shells

and bombs had little effect on this reinforced concrete structure.

31
machine guns to the west which denied the open

ground caused by the taxiway. The enemy had set up

these guns during the night to sweep the taxi strip,

and by so doing, isolated Companies A and B over in

the triangle. With the enemy machine guns silenced,

contact was reestablished with the two companies

and then C Company was ordered to start a drive to

the south. Mixed in with the troops of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, were men from units of the 8th

Marines, from the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and

other organizations. During the morning carrierbased planes came in to bomb and strafe the area

south of the main air strip. Early in the afternoon,

Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

and most of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines (i. e., what

was left of the waves that had reached the shore on

D-day), crossed the main runway and occupied the

empty defensive positions along the south shore.

Later, the remainder of the 1st Battalion moved over

to join the troops south of the air strip.

20 BATTALION, 20 MARINES

Around noon on this day, Lt. Col. Walter I. Jol

dan, in command of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marine

reported to Colonel Shoup that he had sent out 1.1-11

ners to contact his elements over in the triangle a11

that none of the runners had reported back. Jor&

was not in contact with the above elements by radt

Colonel Shoup directed Jordan to move his co

mand post over to the south side of the island all

regain control. At 1600 Jordan arrived over south(

the main strip and found the following units,

which he immediately assumed command:

Captain Williams ( Company B), with about 6

men.

Captain Clanahan ( Company C ) , with about?

men.

Captain Tynes (Company E ) , with about 1

men.

A unit of Regimental Weapons, with about 1

men.

PRIZE ON BETIO was the airfield, crossed on the second day of the battle by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines. Naval gunfire

purposely controlled to avoid hitting the airfield so_as not to destroy it.
One platoon of machine guns from Company H.

About 10 men from Company F.

The troops named above arrived on the south

coast with little ammunition, no water, and no rations. There were strong Japanese positions to the

east and to the west of the defensive perimeter set up

by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines. Soon after

reaching the south side of the island, the Japanese

counterattacked from the east, causing heavy casualties. After Lieutenant Colonel Jordan joined the

group, a phone wire was laid to connect the two

landing teams with Colonel Shoup's command post.

Before Jordan crossed the island, Colonel Shoup instructed him to try to advance on the left in order to

join forces with Major "Jim" Crowe's battalion. Immediately upon reaching the troops on the south

Side, Jordan contacted Williams and Clanahan and

discussed the planned attack with them. Due to the

lack of ammunition and the heavy enemy resistance

from the east, it was agreed that the attack was not

feasible at this time. Jordan then called Shoup on his

Phone and told him of the situation, and Shoup

granted permission to delay the attack until the following morning. Then Shoup sent amphibian tractors across the island with ammunition, food, and

water; on their return trip the tractors evacuated

about 30 wounded men. At 1800 Major Kyle joined

Jordan at the latter's command post over on the

south side and, since most of the troops in the area

were from the 1st • Battalion, 2d Marines, Jordan

turned over command to Kyle after explaining the

Present situation and the proposed plan for next

morning. At this time, contact with Shoup was

broken. There was no radio in working order at

Jordan's command post and the telephone wire had

been severed. Jordan, after turning over the command to Kyle, left with two wiremen and worked

over to Shoup's command post, laying a new wire.

tiPon arriving at the command post of Colonel

Shoup, Jordan reported what had happened to

Shoup and Col. Merritt A. Edson, the division chief

of staff, who was now at Shoup's headquarters.

GREEN BEACH IS SECURED

Over on Beach Red 1, Major "Mike" Ryan prepared, on the morning of the second day, to drive to

the south in order to secure Green Beach, the entire

west end of the island,. On the southwest corner of

the island the Japanese had emplaced. 12 antiboat

guns and 2 naval -turret guns of 5-inch caliber. Protecting these positions were numerous machine-gun

positions and rifle pits. Enclosing the whole area was

an antitank ditch which reached from Green Beach

over to the south shore. The naval gunfire preliminary to the landing on Betio had neutralized or destroyed the 5-inch guns and most of the antiboat

guns. However, Ryan felt that before attacking the

Japanese remaining in the area, more naval gunfire

should be placed on the positions. With Ryan was

Second Lt. Thomas N. Greene, a naval gunfire spotter, and Greene had his radio with him. While Ryan

explained his plan to attack to the south in order to

secure the whole of Green Beach to the officers and

many of the men from the different units now under

his control, Greene made preparations to call fires in

on the southwestern part of the island. Finally at

1110, Ryan and his men attacked, effectively supported by two medium tanks. Greene had contacted

a destroyer and called her fires directly on the enemy

positions. Shortly afterward another destroyer added

her fires to those of the first. Greene observed and

conducted the fire of the ships from a Japanese concrete emplacement that still remained standing on

the northern part of Green Beach. When enough of

a naval gunfire preparation had been placed to satisfy Ryan, Greene gave the order to cease fire, and

Ryan and his troops moved out in attack. Little resistance was offered, and within an hour all of Beach

Green was secured. Over on the south shore, Ryan

could look east along the beach and see the Japanese

positions that were still occupied by the enemy. The

elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines,

were not visible. Ryan now turned to building up a

defensive line across the west end of the island about

200 yards inland from Green Beach.

CROWE'S BATTALION

On the east end of the beachhead, Major Crowe

was unable to take much ground during the second

day of. the battle for Betio. Crowe's battalion, the

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was deployed with Company F on the left, facing almost due east. This company had its left flank on the beach (Red 3) just

short of the Burns-Philp pier and to its front were

several partially destroyed buildings, a reinforced

steel emplacement on past the pier, and a large

bombproof shelter inland and to its front. Over to

the right (south) of F Company was a small group

of shore party personnel and some stray Marines

33
from different units, organized into a provisional

unit by First Lt. Orlando A. Palopoli. Then on to the

south and within the triangle of the airfield was

Company E, and the remnants of Companies I and

K of LT 3/8.

When the 2d Platoon of Company F attempted

to move up and destroy the steel emplacement on

D-day, the enemy laid down such a withering fire

that the group was almost wiped out. E Company

had been successful in penetrating the triangle and

had moved over to the north side of the main air

strip only to withdraw late in the day in order to tie

in its lines with adjacent units for the night. On

D-plus- 1-day, Company F again tried to advance

but had little success. The company was exposed to

enemy fires in its positions along the beach and

Major Crowe finally ordered it to withdraw to better

positions and placed a 37-mm. gun on the beach to

provide protection against enemy tanks or personnel.

No advance was made in the triangle on the second

day and at dusk the units there still had no contact

on their right with friendly troops. During the day

the remainder of Company G reported and was

divided to support Company K and Company F. At

dusk a 12-man patrol was sent _forward on the left

flank to deny the enemy the opportunity of reoccupying the Burns-Philp pier. During the night this

group killed 15 of the enemy at the expense of 2

casualties to itself. The best that the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, could do during the second day was to

strengthen its positions and prepare for the next

day's attack.

SUPPLY SITUATION

Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, an observer for this

operation, had acted as Colonel Shoup's liaison officer with division on D-day. In the afternoon, as

described before, Carlson left Shoup's command post

on Red 2 and made his way out to the Maryland,

where he talked with General Smith and the division

staff about the situation ashore. Early in the morning of the second day, Carlson made the trip back to

the beach to find Shoup again. Reaching the area off

Red 2 at daylight, Carlson saw the 1st Battalion,

8th Marines, go in on Red 2 with heavy casualties.

Carlson joined Colonel Hall until he could get an

PREPARING TO RUSH THE NEXT PILLBOX. Men

of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, take cover

while Betio smolders in the background.

34

INT to take him the rest of the way in to the beach.

When an LVT had been secured and Carlson was

on his way, he noticed a large amount of supplies on

the end of the long pier. Enemy fire from east of the

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, on Red 3, was hitting the

pier and the area around it, pinning down a large

group of men who, apparently, were trying to move

the supplies ashore. Shoup was found at his command post, about 30 yards inland on Red 2. The

command post was built against the side of a Japanese air-raid shelter which still contained about 25

of the enemy. Sentries posted at the entrances prevented these Japanese from escaping. Shoup told

Carlson that all positions had been held through the

night of D-day by each landing team providing itsown security. Colonel Rixey now had five sections

of his artillery battalion ashore and was already firing his pack howitzers. Shoup said that his greatest

need at this time was for water and ammunition.

The situation had changed little since Carlson had

left the island the day before. Flamethrowers and

bundles of TNT were being used successfully to

destroy some of the enemy strong points.

Shoup asked Carlson to act again in a liaison capacity in the afternoon and to report to General

Smith out on the Maryland. Carlson reached tilt

end of the pier about noon and found Lt. Col. C.

Salazar, the shore party commander, waiting in

boat to get ashore.

A plan was then worked out to assemble all L\IP

still in working condition and establish a shuttl(

service from the end of the pier to the beach.

After unloading supplies on the beach, the

phibian tractors would carry a load of wounded

out to the end of the pier where they could be tr

ferred to LCVP's to be taken on out to the ship

Boats from the ships would operate as far as the end

of the pier, which they could reach without ground

ing on the reef. In effect, what this plan propose(

was to set up a false beach as a transfer area. To coy

trol the flow of supplies so that items of critical irn

portance would be sent in first, priorities would b

established by the man in command of the troop

ashore, Col. David Shoup. Other supplies would 1,

accumulated on the pier to await calls from th'

beach.

Maj. Ben Weatherwax, assistant to Lt. Col. Jess

Cook, D4, had made a trip to Beach Red 2 at 2201

on D-day to find out what he could about the suppl

situation and what supplies were needed most. Tb'

STOPPED AT THE BEACH BARRICADE. This LVT was put out of action by enemy fire on Beach Red 1.

26
SUPPLIES STACKED ON PIER were manhandled to dumps on Beach Red 2 from which they were distributed to the battalions.

was done on the orders of Capt. H. B. Knowles,

-USN, transport group commander, to whom Weatherwax was attached.

Capt. J. B. McGovern, USN, commander of

Transport Group 4, had been sent to the Pursuit to

take charge of the ship-to-shore situation and obtain

Control where it was needed most. McGovern

rounded up 18 amphibian tractors with which to

begin the shuttle service, mentioned previously.

It was through the efforts of Salazar, McGovern,

Carlson, Weatherwax, and Maj. George L. H.

Cooper, that the supply situation gradually began to

clear up as control was established.

On the Maryland, Carlson talked with Colonel

Edson, chief of staff, and Edson told him that the

situation on Betio was beginning to progress very

favorably. Edson said that Ryan had secured Green

Beach, that troops in the center of the island had

crossed to the southern side and that the island west

of Red 3 was now in the hands of the Marines. He

also stated that the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, would

land on Green Beach that evening and that another

landing team from the 6th Marines would land on the adjacent island of Bairiki, to the east of Betio.

Edson also said that the division command post

would move ashore that evening and that he ( Edson ) would join Shoup at the command post of

CT 2 for a conference.

823769-49-4

At 1158 the following message was received on

the Maryland from the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Hermle, on the U. S. S,

Ringgold:

Supply summary about as follows: Captain

McGovern has been on the Pursuit all morning making every effort to forward ammunition, water, rations

to Beach Red 1 and 2. These supplies boated and are

in the lagoon area. Division quartermaster sent in with

working party to gather supplies from various boats in

lagoon and deliver Red 1 and 2. Three (3) LVT's dispatched 1145 with 75-mm. gun ammunition for Beach

Red 2. Division quartermaster and McGovern are

working together to land all working parties and supplies now in lagoon area.

THE PACK HOWITZERS

Two of Lt. Col. P. M. Rixey's pack howitzers had

gone into action early in the morning of the second

day. While the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was moving in from the reef to Beach Red 2, the Japanese

began to deliver devastating fire into the approaching troops from two blockhouses located on the beach

at the dividing line between Red 1 and Red 2; this

was the same strong point that had given the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, so much trouble on the previous

day. Two of the pack howitzers which had been

37
landed during the night were laid to place direct fire

on the blockhouses where the Japanese were using

machine guns on the wading troops of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. These guns were silenced by

the howitzers which used fuse delay in order to penetrate the coral and log structures. By 0800 the whole

composite battery of the 75-mm. pack howitzers was

in position facing to the east with the guns laid to

support the troops in the triangle. Because of a mask

to the left front of the battery, close support could not

be given to the left flank elements of the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, on Red 3. The total frontage of the

battery was about 50 yards and the right flank gun

was well out in enemy territory. The entire battery

was exposed to enemy rifle fire. By using rubber

boats and life rafts, and by manhandling some of the

guns the length of the pier, all of the artillery battalion got ashore during the day. For its first night

ashore, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, placed one

section to cover the beach junction of Red 1 and

Two more sections were put into positions to cover

grounded Japanese vessel which lay off Red 2;1

was believed that this ship was occupied by moll

snipers on the second day and several bombing all

strafing attacks had been called on the vessel duri

the day. These two sections were also to cover di'

abled American craft in the event they were

cupied by Japanese snipers. The rest of the

were laid to provide fire on the eastern part of

island.

THE 6TH MARINES

Although V Amphibious Corps had released dl

6th Marines to the control of the 2d Marine Dir'

sion, General Smith had not seen fit to commit all

part of it until he had more definite information 01

the progress of the situation ashore on Betio. At 11

BATTLE JETSAM on Beach Red 2. The tractor on the log wall was hit while attempting to carry its load of Marines up on the isla

'rwmp

38
IC

time during the morning of the second day was there

any reason for any optimism on the part of division

or Colonel Shoup. In anticipation of several possible

missions that might be assigned the 6th Marines,

General Smith called for a conference on the Maryland at 0900, to be attended by the commanding

Officer of the 6th, Col. Maurice G. Holmes, and a

part of his staff. At this conference, the several missions upon which the 6th Marines might be emPloyed were discussed. Holmes left the conference

With the understanding that he was to prepare to accomplish any of the missions discussed and await

further orders from division. Holmes then returned

to.his ship and called his battalion commanders to

Join him so that he could brief them on the subjects

discussed at the earlier conference. While Holmes

Was talking to his battalion commanders, he received

a message from division directing Holmes to land

one of his teams in rubber boats on Green Beach

South immediately. It was suggested by division that

the landing team land in a column of companies

and, after reaching the shore, to pass through the

troops of the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and attack

to the east. In addition, Holmes was directed to boat

another landing team which was to be prepared to

land in close support of the first team. The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, under Maj. W. K. Jones, was

chosen by Holmes to make the rubber boat landing

and LT 2/6, to be prepared to land behind Jones.

At 1303 a message reached division that a few

Japanese were trying to cross the long, partially submerged, sand spit which ran from Betio to Bairiki,

the next island to the east. This message came via

TBS, and the originator is unknown. Thirty minutes

later, division received a message from Colonel

Shoup's command post saying that a report had

been received that enemy troops were leaving the

island via the eastern tip. Shoup requested naval

gunfire on that end of the island to forestall the possibility of any considerable number of Japanese

escaping from Betio to Bairiki, where they might

resist a landing on that island. In the meantime,

division had ordered Colonel Holmes to send his

second landing team over to Bairiki where it was to

land on Beach Blue 1 or Blue 2 to prevent the withdrawal of hostile forces from Betio.

.Prior to noon, Colonel Holmes held a conference

with his battalion commanders on board his ship, the

Ormsby. At that time Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray

received orders to boat and land his battalion on

Green Beach, following the 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines. Murray's first wave of troops had hardly

got into their boats when Murray received a message

from division to "boat and land LT 2/6 on Beach

Blue immediately."

Calling his company commanders together, Murray issued the new orders to land on Bairiki. Maj.

Leroy P. Hunt, Jr., was left aboard ship initially, and

Murray directed him to query division as to whether

it was intended for him to land his entire landing

team, i. e., tanks, artillery battery, shore party, etc.

It was later found that division wanted only the battalion to go ashore, less its attached units.

Now Colonel Holmes had one team preparing to

land on Betio and one on Bairiki ; the other team, the

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, commanded by Lt. Col.

Kenneth F. McLeod, was boating up, prepared to

land on either of the islands in support.

THE LIGHT TANKS

At 1408 division directed that Company B, 2d

Tank Battalion ( Capt. Frank R. Stewart, Jr.), land

with all its tanks to support LT 1/6. Because of mines

and obstacles on Green South, Company B was instructed to land on Beach Green North. Unfortunately, B Company had all its platoons loaded in the

bottom of the hold in three ships: The 1st Platoon

was aboard the U. S. S. Ormsby; the 2d Platoon

aboard the U. S. S. Bell; and the 3d Platoon was

aboard the U. S. S. Harris. These three ships were a

part of TRANSDIV 6. Immediately the order from

division regarding the employment of Company B

was received, the commander of TRANSDIV 6 ordered all the ships in his division to send their LCM's

to the three ships carrying the tank company in order

to facilitate their movement ashore. Before the tanks

could be unloaded, however, the gear and supplies

loaded above the tanks in the bottom holds had to

be moved and several hours were lost before the

tanks were actually lowered over the side into the

waiting LCM's.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

was preparing to land in rubber boats on Green

Beach. At first, it was believed that the landing team

would start landing at about 1500. At 1420 Jones

radioed the 6th Marines: "We are going into the

boats now. Will call as soon as we clear the ship." At

1525, Colonel Shoup called division asking when the

6th Marines would land. Colonel Holmes answered

this question in a message to division which said that

the 1st Battalion would land at about 1700.

39
At the time that the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

was ordered to land in rubber boats, the battalion's

transport—the U. S. S. Feland—was fairly close to

the beach. The estimate of the probable hour of

landing was based on that position of the Feland.

Just as Jones started to lower his rubber boats, the

Feland was ordered to get away from the reef into

deeper water. Later the ship was ordered back in

and Jones then was able to debark his troops.

Through no fault of Jones much valuable time had

been lost.

Colonel Shoup sent a message to division at 1748

asking if Jones' battalion had landed on Green

Beach. Shoup asked division to instruct Jones to

merely hold a beachhead after getting ashore until

daylight, when an attack could be started. This word

was passed to Holmes, who passed if on to Jones, instructing him further to consult Major Ryan about

where to deploy the landing team when it got ashore.

BAIRIKI

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Murray landed

the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, on Bairiki at 1655.

Division had received word from Murray on the

way in to Blue Beach on Bairiki that his assault

waves were getting some machine-gun fire. There

were about 15 Japanese on Bairiki and this group

had built a pillbox which contained 2 machine guns.

Before Murray's battalion started to land, division

called for naval gunfire and aerial bombardment

and strafing to cover the landing. When division received the message about the machine-gun fire,

planes were requested to come in low and try to

locate the machine-gun positions and take them out.

For some strange reason, the Japanese in the pillbox

had a can of gasoline with them, and one of the

planes, in strafing the position, put a .50-caliber

bullet through the gasoline can; the Japs were

burned and the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, landed

against no resistance. After landing, the team scoured

the little island but found no enemy.

1ST BATTALION, 6TH MARINES, LANDS

At 1840, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, landed on

Beach Green North and went into position behind

the mixed troops of the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines.

Maj. William K. Jones lost one of his two supply

amphibian tractors when it hit a Japanese "teapot"

40

mine. This vehicle was blown apart and turned oN

killing all hands except one man. Jones found BY

and made a reconnaissance of the lines prior to a

tacking. Jones planned at this time to attack at 20

that night. The message being relayed from Sho

by division through Holmes to Jones did not re

Jones until 1920. Upon receipt of the message, Jo

organized his companies for the night, prepare

effect a passage of lines next morning when he wo

attack to the east.

The 3d Platoon of Company B, 2d Tank 13

talion, had considerable difficulty in negotiating

reef off Green Beach and did not get ashore u

1830. The platoon then reported to Major Jones

prepared to support the attack of his battalion

morning. In the meantime, the commander of

Company, having noted the poor hydrographic CO

ditions off Green Beach, requested permission I

land the remainder of his tanks on Beach Red

Division granted this request, instructing the ta.14

to follow the west side of the pier, where the be

avenue of approach to the beach lay. It was not u111

early in the morning of the third day that the 2

Platoon and the 1st Platoon were able to rea

Red 2.

SITUATION ASHORE, SECOND AFTERNOON

Late in the afternoon of the second day of

battle for Betio, Colonel Shoup sent a message

division, reporting the situation ashore. This messg

received by Division at 1706, stated:

Situation at 1600; Our line runs generally from ti

Burns-Philp pier across the east end of the triansj

formed by the airfield to the south coast and along tb

coast intermittently to a place opposite the west end t

the triangle; then from the revetments north of tli

west end of the main air strip on to the north; anothi

line from west of the center of Red 1 across the el'

of the island to the south coast west of the end of tb

main strip. Some troops in 227 (gunnery target-are

designation) dishing out hell and catching hell. Pa

howitzers in position and registered for shooting 0

tail ( of Betio) . Casualties many; percentage dead 11

known; combat efficiency: We are winning. Shoup.

Every battle has its turning point, that time whe

the balance of things seems to tip almost imp

ceptibly in one direction. It is not always possible

the mind, during heated combat action, to gr

this point for it is so difficult to perceive that it elu
RD 5890

-- - -. INITIAL LANDING

H111111111 POSITIONS AT SUNSET

INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAND

TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

SITUATION 1800 D+ I

500 400 300 200 100 0 1000 YDS

I••■I I■I

MAP 3

TAKEN FROM 20 MAR DIV

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

NOTE: LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY.

GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUPS

AND BY FIRE. SECONDARY LINES WERE

ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIND

FRONT LINES.

749543 0-47 (Face p. 40)
even the practiced eye of the professional. After the

battle is over, it is easier to establish the time when

the high point was reached: That time when momentum accelerates and planning tends to materialize into fact. On Betio there were few who were

Willing to go on record and say that the crisis was

Past until late in the afternoon of the second day:

Lt. Col. P. M. Rixey, in command of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, observed at dusk that, "I

thought up until 1 o'clock today that it was touch

and go. Then I knew we would win."

Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, upon returning to

Colonel Shoup's command post at midnight of the

second day, found that the situation ashore had

changed little during his absence through the afternoon except that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines, had pushed across the island to the south coast,

and the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was now ashore

on the west end of Betio. The areas separating the

landing teams on the western half of Betio were far

from being under control and many points of resistance .had been bypassed. However, Carlson felt

sure that the turning point of the battle had passed.

The messages exchanged between the command

Post of Colonel Shoup on Betio and that of Gen.

Julian C. Smith out on the U. S. S. Maryland tell a

story in which the rise and fall of the tide of battle

are readily apparent. At 1022 division sent a message to Shoup asking if he had sufficient troops on

Betio to complete its occupation; this information

was requested in order to plan for the employment

of the 6th Marines elsewhere if the situation warranted it.

Shoup replied to this saying that the situation did

not look good ashore; in addition, he asked if division had any instructions for him. At 1140 division

radioed Shoup again, this time to request immediate clarification of the situation ashore. Thirty-four

minutes later Shoup replied:

Situation ashore uncertain. Colonel Carlson en route

to division with picture of situation.

At noon division learned that the 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, under Maj. "Mike" Ryan, had cleared

Green Beach so that a landing could be made by a

reserve landing team on that end of the island without enemy opposition. This prompted division to

direct Colonel Holmes to send the 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, ashore on Green Beach as quickly as possible. Then division learned that some of the enemy

were trying to escape from Betio over to Bairiki. To

counter this, division instructed Colonel Holmes to

send one landing—team over to Bairiki.

By 1345 Colonel Shoup had received word that

the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was to land on Green

Beach and, at that time, Shoup sent a message to

Jones:

Bring in flamethrowers if possible. We are on the

southern part of Red 2 and Red 1 zone. Doing our

best.

Early afternoon saw the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d

Marines, reach the south coast; the Japanese forces

on Betio were now split into two groups. Supplies

were getting ashore. Reinforcements were on the

way. The picture had brightened perceptibly. Then,

at 1706, Shoup sent his message to division which

ended with these words:

* * * Combat efficiency: We are winning.

The chief of staff of the 2d Marine Division, Col.

Merritt A. Edson, left the U. S. S. Maryland at 1750

in the afternoon of the second day of the fight for

Betio and went to the end of the pier, where he left

' his boat and made his way on in to Colonel Shoup's

command post on Red Beach 2, arriving there at

2030. Shoup acquainted Edson with the situation

ashore and then the two officers began to make their

plans for the following day. The arrival of Colonel

Edson meant some measure of relief for Colonel

Shoup who had borne the responsibility of command

of the troops on Betio thus far. Separated from division by distance as well as communication difficulties,

Shoup had been faced with the problem of trying to

coordinate the attacks of the landing teams during

the first 2 days when control was almost impossible.

With his landing teams badly disorganized and with

their troops scattered and mixed with other units,

Shoup had no opportunity to maneuver, tactically,

component elements of his combat team whose fighting integrity was unimpaired. He had faced, and

overcome, the difficulty of fusing the efforts of his

badly scattered and demoralized units toward one

common end; this was done in the face of intense

and bitter enemy opposition from prepared defensive

positions and in spite of the obstacles thrown in his

path by numerous break-downs in communication

and in supply. Edson, division chief of staff, immediately assumed the burden of command of all the

forces involved in the action on Betio, leaving Shoup

to concentrate on his own combat team, which now

consisted of seven landing teams.

41
CASUALTIES BEING EVACUATED by rubber boat.. Floated out to the reef, the

wounded were then transferred to boats and removed to the transports

42
CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

The Third Day, 22 November 1943

PLANS FOR THE DAY

Immediately upon arriving at the command post of

Colonel Shoup, Colonel Edson began to make plans

for the next day's attack. The two colonels first took

up the problem of naval gunfire support and air support. They requested naval gunfire to work over the

eastern end of Betio, starting on a line across the

island east of the turning circle at the east end of the

11lam air strip and including the rest of the eastern

Part of Betio. The heavier fires, i. e., the 14- and 16-

inch shells, were to be placed only on the eastern one-

:third of the island, 500 yards from the nearest

lendly troops. The air support was to bomb and

strafe the same general areas assigned to naval gunfire. At 0700, the ships and planes were to bombard

the assigned target areas for a period of 20 minutes.

Then at 0830, the same fires on the same areas were

to be repeated for another 20-minute period; this

was to be followed by another 20-minute bombardment at 0930 and another at 1030.

Next, Edson turned to the reserve landing team

waiting for orders to land. Lt. Col. Kenneth

McLeod had boated his team, the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, at 1600 on the day before and was still

Waiting near the control vessel at the line of departure. Shoup's command post was in radio communication with division, but neither division nor

Shoup were in contact with either McLeod or Jones.

To reach either landing team, it was necessary first

to contact the 6th Marines and have the message

relayed. Edson set to work to have Jones come up

on the command net of the 2d Division. Until such

time that more troops of the 6th Marines were

landed, it seemed best for the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, to be controlled by Shoup. It was well after

dawn before communication between Shoup and

Jones was established. Acting on Edson's recommendation, division sent a message to McLeod at

0319, ordering him to land on Green Beach North

at 0800 on the morning of 22 November and to be

prepared to attack on order from division. Relative

to this, Edson sent a message to division at 0359 to

have the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, rendezvous off

Green Beach South at 0800 and to wait for further

orders to land. Finally, division sent a message to

the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, at 0641, directing

McLeod to wait off Green Beach next morning prepared to land on either half of the beach when so

ordered by Colonel Shoup.

After consultation with Colonel Shoup, Edson

issued verbal orders at 0400 to Shoup and Col.

Elmer E. Hall regarding the attack to take place at

daylight on the morning of 22 November, the third

day of the battle. To make sure that Maj. W. K.

Jones, commanding the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

received his orders, Colonel Edson directed Maj.

R. McC. Tompkins, an assistant to Colonel Risely,

the operations officer of the division, personally to

carry the message to Jones over on Green Beach.

At the time that Edson issued his attack orders he

was not in communication with Jones.

The attack order for the morning of 22 November called for the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, to pass

through the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and attack

to the east along the south coast of Betio to establish

contact with the troops of the 1st and 2d Battalions,

2d Marines. At daylight, Hays was to attack with

his team, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, to the west

along the north beach to eliminate the pocket of

resistance still holding out on the border line between Beach Red 2 and Beach Red 1. Colonel Hall,

43
LOOKING EAST ON SOUTH SHORE along the airfield where the attack of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines began.

with the 8th Marines (less his 1st Battalion, which

was attached to the 2d Marines ) , was to continue

his attack to the east.

Besides the air and naval gunfire support ordered

for the morning of 22 November, the division prepared to augment the fires- of its artillery ashore on

Betio by placing two batteries over on Bairiki. As

soon as the report from Murray, of the 2d Battalion,

6th Marines, was received that his landing on

Bairiki had been made against no opposition, division instructed Colonel Holmes of the 6th Marines

to send the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, less Battery

D, ashore on Bairiki the first thing next morning.

Holmes then notified the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, to boat up at 0330, 22 November and to land

on Beach Blue 2.

44

ARTILLERY ON BAIRIKI

At 0300, the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, began it

load its men and equipment in boats. An air ale

interrupted the loading operations, the transport

moving out to sea in accordance with orders froli

Task Force 53. At the time, Battery E was coil 

pletely loaded, and a part of the battalion's head

quarters and service battery was boated. Leavirl

Battery F and the remainder of H & S to come ashor

when the transports returned after the alert, Batter

E and a part of of H & S Battery went on over t‘

Bairiki, arriving there at about 0630. Immediatel

after landing, Battery E went into position and, witi

its fires controlled by the fire direction center of th(

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, on Betio, registered 11
on the tail of Betio, adding its firepower to that on

the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. The transports returned to their unloading area at 0700 and it was

not until noon that Battery F and the rest of H & S

Battery reached Bairiki. Battery D, originally ordered to land on Green Beach on Betio, found that

the hydrographic conditions off that beach were not

favorable to landing artillery and was then ordered

to go to Bairiki instead, there to rejoin its parent

organization.

ATTACK OF HAYS' BATTALION

At 0700 in the morning of the third day on Betio,

the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, attacked to the west

in an attempt to clear the strong Japanese positions

on the boundary between Beaches Red 1 and Red 2.

On the right of the battalion front and next to the

north shore was Company B. In the center of the

line was Company A, and over on the left Company

C reached over to the enemy revetments along the

north side of the west end of the airfield. During

the morning the attack was supported by three light

tanks from Company C, 2d Tank Battalion. The

tanks, covered by infantry, moved up to several pillboxes which were halting the advance of the 1st

Battalion, 8th Marines, and maneuvered so that the

Muzzles of their 37-mm. guns were almost pointing

directly into the openings of the pillboxes before

firing. The construction of the pillboxes and the

manner in which they were reinforced made it impossible for the 37-mm. guns to do much damage.

Strong points of resistance were ultimately reduced

by a combination of bangalore torpedoes and shape

charges placed under most hazardous conditions.

One tank was put out of action during the morning by what was believed to be a magnetic mine. At

1130 the tanks were ordered -to report back to the

command post of the 2d Marines and a section of

75-mm. self-propelled guns from Weapons ComPally, 2d Marines, under Maj. Frederic R. Smith,

were sent up in their place. One of these half-tracks

immediately received small arms fire which damaged its radiator, forcing it to retire.

During the afternoon Companies A and C of the

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, made good progress, but

Company B, over against the beach, was held by

intense enemy fire from its front.

Although little ground was gained, as far as area

is concerned, several strong points of resistance were

destroyed by Hays' landing team during the day.

At least, the Japanese core of resistance in the Red

1—Red 2 region was contained. Late in the afternoon the enemy in this compact area tried one small

counterattack against the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, but gained no success.

ATTACK OF THE 1ST BATTALION,

6TH MARINES

As late as 0505, 22 November, Colonel Edson had

no contact with Maj. W. K. Jones of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. An hour had elapsed since Edson had issued his attack orders and he was anxious

for Jones to learn of his mission in plenty of time to

make the necessary preparations. At that time, Edson sent a message to division asking that Jones be

notified of the plan. It was learned a little later that

the 6th Marines was not in 'contact with its 1st Battalion. However, on the way over from the command

post of Colonel Shoup, Major Tompkins was slowly

making his way to Jones' position. Finally at 0653

Edson received a message at Shoup's headquarters

that division was in communication with Jones.

Then at 0735, Tompkins got a message through to

Edson and Shoup, telling them that he had contacted Jones and had acquainted him with the operation plan for the attack.

After a delay necessitated by refueling tanks,

Shoup ordered Jones to attack at 0800 with the mission of clearing the south side of the island as he

attacked east until he reached the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines. When the troops of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines, were reached; Jones was to pass

on through them, prepared to continue the attack

on order. With three tanks from the 3d Platoon of

Company B, 2d Tank Battalion in the lead, Jones

attacked at 0815. The zone of action assigned the

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was little more than a

hundred yards wide and Jones attacked on a oneplatoon front with Company C in the assault. The

three tanks, out about fifty yards in front of the infantry, were instructed to destroy any enemy strongpoints that might be encountered. The troops behind the tanks were always close enough to give protection against enemy personnel bent on the suicidal

mission of placing a magnetic mine against a tank.

Resistance was light initially and Jones reached the

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, at 1100. During the

attack along the south coast, Jones' men had killed

about two hundred and fifty of the enemy at the expense of only light casualties to themselves.

45
COL. DAVID M. SHOUP (map case on hip) confers at his command post with one of his officers during the battle. Helmeted

figure with hands on hips (second to left of Shoup) is Col.

Merritt A. Edson.

Just before the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines was

reached, Jones received orders to report to Colonel

Shoup at Shoup's command post. From Shoup,

Jones then received instructions to continue the attack to the east at 1300. With the exception of the

pocket of resistance that still held out on the boundary between Red 1 and Red 2, the western half of

Betio was now held by the 2d Marine Division. That

pocket was being reduced by Hays from the east

46

while Ryan held on the west; it no longer consti.

tuted a serious threat to the capture of the island

For his attack in the afternoon, Jones was to 1)1

provided with all available tanks, naval gunfire ea

the eastern part of Betio, and support from the two

battalions of artillery on Betio and Bairiki. At the

same time, the 8th Marines, less Hays' landing team,

would attack to the east in conjunction with Jones

attack. Colonel Hall had pointed out that the condi'

tion of his troops was such that he felt that the)r

could make probably one more attack and after that

would have to be relieved. The 2d Battalion, 86

Marines, with elements of the 3d Battalion attached.

had worked for 2 days on the strong Japanese positions northeast of the east taxiway and the resistance

had been so heavy as to deny much in the way Of

progress. Edson told Hall that as soon as the 8th

Marines finished cleaning up the strong Japanese

pocket near the east end of the airfield, the attack of

the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, with the fresh troops

of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines close behind, would

make it possible for the 8th Marines to get some rest.

ATTACK OF 2D BATTALION

8TH MARINES

Early in the morning of the third day, Maj. "Jim.'

Crowe reorganized his troops in preparation for the

day's attack. Three strong points of enemy resistance

had to be reduced before the attack could make

much progress. One was a steel pillbox to the left

front, near the Burns-Philp pier. This pillbox was in

Company F's zone of action. To the front of Company K ( a 3d Battalion, 8th Marines Company, but

operating under the direction of Maj. W. C. Chainberlin, Crowes's executive officer ) , was a coconut

log emplacement; from it the Japanese kept machine-gun fire aimed on Company K, and most of

the time had that company pretty well pinned down,

The third enemy position that had to be reduced

was a large bombproof shelter, inland to the south

from the steel pillbox.

These three enemy positions were mutually supporting. One could not be reduced without the assaulting troops coming under the fire from the other

two. The attack on this day was to be a battalion

attack, starting with Company F on the left. As

Company F assaulted the steel pillbox, the next

company in line was to move forward, and thus the

advance would be taken up across the entire front

of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines
At 0930 the mortars supporting Company K,

1 hieh was on the right of Company F, got a direct

,it 

v 

on the top of the coconut log emplacement to the

front of the company. The mortar round that hit

the emplacement caused an ammunition dump to

explode and this completely destroyed the enemy

Position. In the meantime, a medium tank maneuvered into position west of the steel pillbox and got

several direct hits on that pillbox. This enabled

(-'ornpany F to begin to move to the east.

Now the large bombproof remained to be taken

and the next attack was launched in its direction.

Attached to the battalions were assault engineers

from the 18th Marines. These men had the flamethrowers and demolitions. Under the covering fire of

riflemen, the engineers worked their way up to the

bombproof and after a hot fight that lasted for an

hour, the top of the shelter was taken.

Immediately the Marines had overrun the top of

the bombproof, the Japanese counterattacked in a

\ am effort to regain it. The enemy counterattack

was broken largely through the efforts of one man,

First Lt. Alexander Bonnyman, who met the chargmg Japanese with his flamethrower and drove back

those who were not burned to death. Bonnyman lost

Ins life in this actiori, but his work helped to insure

the successful advance of the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines.

With the failure of the counterattack, the Japanese began to evacuate the bombproof, running out

both the east and south entrances. Those running

out the east entrance were literally mowed down by

Machine gun and rifle fire, and hand grenades. The

Japanese who attempted to escape from the south

entrance ran right into Marine machine-gun fire and

the 37-mm. cannister from the Regimental Weapons

Company guns.

As the attack progressed, Companies E and G

moved around the north end of the bombproof and

Company K moved up on the right, stopping long

enough to send engineers over to blast the south

entrance of the bombproof. Then Company K advanced to make contact with Company E east of

the shelter. For the time being, riflemen were left to

guard the entrances to the bombproof, and shortly

afterward a bulldozer was dispatched to push dirt

and sand into the entrances until they were completely covered, sealing the doom of any Japanese

remaining within the shelter.

The forward impetus of the attack of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, carried the companies through

the buildings and over the dug-outs until a point was

reached, at the east end of the airfield, where there

was danger of running into the fire coming across

the front at an angle from the men of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, over on the south coast. The

front lines were then withdrawn about 150 yards. In

the area recently overrun Japanese buildings were

burned and blasted and the dug-outs were cleaned

out. Crowe estimated later that nearly 100 of the

enemy committed suicide in this area when it was

overrun. Companies I and L, over on the east end

of the triangle formed by the airfield, remained in

position there for the night, although the advance of

the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, had carried past that

point. At dusk, Company C of Jones' battalion came

up to take over the front-line positions on the north

shore at the east end of the airfield, and Company

K was withdrawn to build a .secondary defensive

line slightly to the rear.

HIT BY ENEMY FIRE. This tank was put out of action on the

beach.

41
THE 3D BATTALION, 6TH MARINES, LANDS

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines ( Lt. Col. K. F.

McLeod), spent the night of 21-22 November in

its boats near the control vessel at the line of departure. Its orders had been changed twice during

the early morning hours. First, McLeod was instructed to land his landing team on Green Beach

at 0800, prepared to attack on division order. Later

he received word to rendezvous off Green Beach at

0800 and to await further instructions there. By

0730 on the morning of the third day, 22 November,

the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was in position off

Green Beach awaiting orders from division to land.

At 0850 the orders were issued; McLeod was to lag

his team on the north part of Green Beach, reorg

ize on the beach and be prepared to attack to

east on division order. Due to difficulties caused b

the reef, the 3d Battalion was delayed in landing an

it was 1100 before the entire landing team w

ashore. Upon arrival ashore, McLeod placed t

companies in the line, with Company L on the 1

and Company I on the right, facing east. This te

porary line reached from the shore on Beach Red

at a point near the westernmost of three Japan

latrines built out over the water, to the bend of t

antitank ditch on the southwestern part of the islan

Company K remained in reserve behind the othe

ASSAULTING THE TOP of a Japanese bombproof shelter, these Marines wrest a little more ground from the enemy.

48
MAIN PIER

ApGm'cl■A 

BURNS—PI ILP WHARF

LEGEND:

ill Weapon, side notes describe type

D Covered emplacements

A Observation tower

e- Searchlight

15- Radar

Open dispersed stores

crrm Fire 8 Communication trench-built above surface

Fire & Communication trench-cut below surface

MI Building

Damaged Building

Earth covered structure

0 Tent

CZ, Excavation

Tank trap

Wooded area (Palms)

1800, 22 Nov.

. • .

1800,22 Nov.

Beach Black 4e2 (COVERED MGi

(COVERED AB GUN I

14-AAI

I COVERED AB GUN

BETIO

TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

ATTACK OF THE 2d BN., 8th MARINES

100

NOV6 22, p43 300 400 Yds.

MAP 4

RD 5890

TAKEN FROM 2d BN 81•11 MARINES

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT.

I COVERED MG

749543 0-47 (Face p48)
0 NC R ET E TETRAHEDRONS and barbed wire off the west end of Betio

two companies. The landing team remained in this

Position until late in the afternoon. At 1700, McLeod

°loved east along the south coast, following the same

Path taken by Jones early in the morning, until he

reached a position about 600 yards to the rear of the

lst Battalion, 6th Marines. There he was ordered to

remain in close support of Jones.

In the morning of the third day, the commanding

general of the 2d Marine Division, Maj. Gen. Julian

C. Smith, decided to go ashore and operate from a

Command post there. With General Smith was

Eng. Gen. J. L. Underhill, an observer from V AmPhibious Corps, and Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Bourke.

Also accompanying the general was a party of 10

officers and men from the division command post

group. General Smith and his party went from the

S. S. Maryland to Green Beach, arriving on the

beach at 1155. After inspecting units in the beach

area, General Smith decided that he could best operate ashore from a command post on Beach Red 2

and, by so doing, would not need to set up a comPlete command post ashore, since the facilities of

Colonel Shoup's command post were already available. The best route to Beach Red 2, from the general's position on Green Beach, was by water via

amphibian tractor. The Japanese defenders of the

strong point, still holding out on the boundary be-

'

. 6th Marines can be seen wading toward shore in distance.

tween Red 1 and Red 2, fired on General Smith's

tractor as it moved around toward Red 2, wounding

the driver, disabling the tractor, and forcing the

general and his party to transfer to another tractor

to complete the trip. At 1355 General Smith arrived

at Colonel Shoup's command post and joined Shoup

and Edson, who briefed him on the progress of the

battle at that time.

PLANS FOR THE AFTERNOON

While General Smith was en route to Beach

Green, Colonel Edson called a meeting of unit commanders at Shoup's command post to issue the attack orders for the afternoon. Present were Colonel

Shoup, Col. Elmer E. Hall, Maj. W. K. Jones, Lt.

Col. P. M. Rixey of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

and Maj. C. W. McCoy, commanding the 2d Tank

Battalion. McCoy had succeeded to command when

the battalion commander, Lt. Col. A. B. Swenceski,

was wounded in the morning of the first day of action

on Betio. Major Jories crossed the island from the

south coast, where his battalion was attacking to the

east, to attend this conference.

Edson gave hi§, orders for the afternoon's attack

verbally: The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, with all

available tanks attached, was to pass through the 1st

and 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, on the south coast

49
and attack to the east at 1330. The initial objective

assigned Jones was the tank trap at the eastern edge

of the air strip. Colonel Hall was directed to attack

with his combat team, less Hays' battalion, to the

east from the present position of the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines. Hall was instructed to try to capture

the ground north of the east taxiway in the vicinity

of the Burns-Philp pier; if this could not be done,

the area was to be encircled from his right and contained. The 8th Marines was to maintain contact on

the right with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. The

2d Marines, with the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

attached, was ordered to attack and destroy the

Japanese pocket of resistance which still held out on

the boundary between Red 1 and Red 2. Rixey was

directed to place his artillery battalion in direct support of Jones. Edson would arrange for naval gunfire

and air support prior to the attack. This bombardment would cease at 1330.

AFTERNOON ATTACK OF THE

1ST BATTALION, 6TH MARINES

When Maj. W. K. Jones received word to report

to Colonel Shoup's command post for attack orders

for the afternoon of the third day, he left his landing

team in charge of one of his officers, Maj. F. X.

Beamer. The 1st Battalion, 6th, was now in contact

with Kyle's battalion on the south side of the island.

Reorganizing the battalion in Jones' absence, Beamer moved Company A through Company C. The

advance of the morning, roughly 800 yards, had

been made against heavy opposition. The men were

tired and hot and their supply of water was virtually

nonexistent. There had been several cases of heat

prostration during the morning and Beamer made

every effort to obtain water for the .men before the

afternoon's attack began. Since there was no readily

available supply of water, only a small portion of the

assault company was able to replenish its water supply before moving out.

At 1230 Company A, with one medium tank and

seven light tanks attached, began to pass through

LT 1/2 in order to be in position to attack in compliance with Colonel Edson's orders at 1330. Seventy-five yards behind Company A was Company

B in close support; in reserve and following B was

Company C, the company that had led the attack

through the morning. Immediately Company A attacked to the east from the positions of the 1st and

2d Battalions, 2d Marines, it came under fire from

50

strongly organized Japanese weapons. Part of th

fire came from weapons mounted in a turret-tYr

emplacement near the beach. The light tanks were

unable to destroy the emplacement with their

37-mm. guns and it was necessary to call up th'

medium tank before the position was finally neutral'

ized. This one position held up the attack for neail l

an hour and a half. At 1500 water was brought LIP'

and distributed to the entire battalion. Company li

was issued water and salt tablets and at 1600 moved

up to pass through Company A to continue the

attack.

At 1530 Jones received an order from division

directing that one company be sent over to relieve

the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, in the sector north

of the air strip. Jones selected Company C for this

mission and, at 1600, after issuing water and salt,

the company moved over to relieve the 2d Battalion,)

8th Marines, about 300 yards east of the Burns-Ph/111

I

pier on the north side of the island. In the meantime.

Company B passed through Cbmpany A and at

tacked toward the tank trap at the east end of the air!

strip; Company A followed about 75 yards behind '

the rear troops of Company B. Bitter enemy resist'

ance slowed the attack to a halt at about 1830, and

the landing team commenced to dig in for the night,

Company A moved up on the left of B until it was

abreast and in visual contact with Company C on

the other side of the round turntable at the east end

of the air strip. While his two companies on the

south side of-the island reorganized and consolidated

their positions for the night, Jones ordered an outpost line forward about 50 yards ahead of his main

line of defense. This line was withdrawn later. At

dark the TBY radio of Company C failed to function and the battalion lost contact with that company. The open ground between C and A was coY

ered by machine guns. Now Jones turned to amphibian tractors to evacuate his wounded. Over 200

of the enemy were estimated killed during the afternoon attack.

GENERAL SITUATION

As has been related before, while the 1st Battalion,

6th Marines, was attacking along the south coast,

making excellent gains, the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, had finally overrun the strong enemy positions

in the area north of the east taxiway. Up on the

western end of the island, the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines, had made small but important gains
I AB GUNS 

LT 1/6 landed north of center

of Green Beach at 1800, Nov.21.

114 cm RIFLES I

MAIN PIER

AB GUNS]

1 I LIGHT AA 

Beach Red #2

each Red4.3

URNS-PHILP WHARF

AB GUNS 

k,

LEGEND:

do Weapon, side notes describe type

cc Covered emplacements

A Observation tower

e- Searchlight

-e- Radar

Open dispersed stores

esixs Fire 8 Communication trench-built above surface

Fire &Communication trench-cut below surface

Building

Damaged Building

Earth covered structure

Tent

Excavation

Tank trap

Wooded area (Palms)

C Co. tied in with LT 2/8

night of Nov.22.

Beach Green

ra8 GUNS 

LIGHT AA]

AB GUN I

REVETMENTS

I HEAVY AA 

5m CLI ED M

(AB GUNS MEDIUM AAI

HEAVY AA1 Beach Black #2 AB GUNS 

1/6 occupied this line

night of Nov. 21-22.

I AB GUNS t

, 

I AB GUNS I

Beach Black I

1 AB GUNS 

BETIO

TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

ATTACK OF THE 1st BN.,6th MARINES (LI 1/6)

NOV. 22,1943

MO 0 100 200 300 400 Yds.

MAP 5 RD 5890

TAKEN FROM 6th MARINES

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT.

1/6 Attacked east along south

shore on front of one platoon

0815 morning Nov.22. A Co.

in assault.

(b)

(a)At 1100 Nov.22 contact was

made with LT 1/2 in this area

1/6 reorganized-(b) and at 1230

passed thru 1/2 to attack eastward. A Co. executed passage of

lines thru C a became the assault

Co.

Line held by LT 1/6 night

of Nov. 22-23 during which

time 1/6 repulsed Jap counterattacks.

I AB GUNS r

I AB GUN I

I AB GUNS!

749543 0-47 (Face p. 50)
MAJ. GEN. JULIAN C. SMITH, commanding general of the 2d Marine Division (on the right); Col. Merritt A. Edson, chief of staff

(center); and Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Bourke, commanding general of the 10th Marines, after the battle.

against the enemy stronghold on the Red 1-Red 2

boundary line. At sundown of this day, the third day

of the action, the enemy, with the exception of the

group in front of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, was

compressed into the long tail of Betio east of the air

'trip. If the Japanese ever intended to launch a

counterattack, this was the night to do it. Each night

the Marines had dug in with the uneasy feeling that

before morning the Japanese would stage a "banZai." So far, the mad, suicidal, headlong rush had

not come. Jones made every preparation to repel

Such an attack when his companies organized their

positions at dusk on 22 November.

There was little about the events of the early afternoon to cause any optimism on the part of General

Smith or Colonel Edson. The progress made thus far

in the day was about as good as could be expected,

Judging by the gains of the previous days. The slowness of the operation was maddening and yet the

reduction of well-prepared and heavily fortified

enemy positions required time. At 1601, General

Smith sent a message to General Hermle, now on

the Maryland, since General Smith had gone ashore,

presenting.the picture of the situation ashore at that

tirne :

Situation not favorable for rapid clean-up of Betio.

Heavy casualties among officers make leadership problem difficult. Still strong organized resistance areas

212, 213, 214, 237, 210, 209, 208. (These target areas

were all in the vicinity of the east end of the airfield.)

Many emplacements intact on eastern end of the island. Present front line approximately on the western

edge of 214, 236, and 212. In addition, many Japanese

strong points to westward of our front lines within our

position that have not been reduced. Progress slow and

extremely costly. Complete occupation will take at

least 5 days more. Naval and air bombardment a great

help but does not take out emplacements.

What General Smith did not know, or anyone

else except the Japanese for that matter, was that the

events about to transpire during the night, the third

night ashore, would cast a different light on the situation and create more optimism next mqrning than

had been felt thus far through the whole battle.

Late in the afternoon Col. Maurice G. Holmes

and his command group came ashore to establish

the 6th Marine's command post. A little later Holmes

was called to a conference at Shoup's command post.

There, General Smith, having assumed tactical command ashore, discussed the plans for operations to

51
PRISONERS HUDDLE ON END OF PIER as shore party personnel manhandles supplies out of water.

begin the following morning. Holmes learned that

all elements of his regiment would revert to his control at about 2100, 22 November. The situation at

the time of the division conference was as follows:

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was receiving a

Japanese counterattack. Rixey's artillery was delivering fire into the area where the Japanese were

forming up their counterattack. McLeod had been

ordered to move up behind Jones to support the latter. The 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, was to be relieved of its assignment over on Bairiki and was to

move over to Betio and land on Green Beach.

Holmes then received orders to continue the attack to the east on the following morning, passing

the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, through the 1st Battalion in order to put fresh troops into the assault.

All available tanks were to support the attack of the

3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, when

ashore on Betio, would follow the assault of the 3d

Battalion, prepared to support the attack. Before

leaving the conference, Holmes made arrangements

for artillery, naval gunfire, and air support for the

attack.

52

THE COUNTERATTACK

While the conference was going on, the 1st Bat'

talion, 6th Marines, was busy repelling a counter'

attack which began at about 1930. The attacking

force of Japanese was small, being about 50 men

Infiltrating through the outpost line, the enennY

opened a small gap between Companies A and B.

Jones had all three of his rifle companies corn'

mitted and his reserve consisted of his 81-mph

mortar platoon and a handful of men from Head'

quarters Company and Weapons Company. Jones

instructed the executive officer of his weapons' cony,

pany to take the battalion reserve to clean up an)1

Japanese who had infiltrated, close the gap betwed

Companies A and B, and assist the commander ol

Company A in reorganizing and further consolidav

ing the front lines. The mission was accomplished

by 2030. Then Jones asked Maj. W. B. Kyle, of the

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, to place a company about

100 yards to the rear of the front lines in order to

'establish a secondary line.
RD 5890

-- - INITIAL LANDING

ILLLI.Lulu- POSITIONS AT SUNSET

INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BE T10) ISLAND

TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

SITUATION 1800 D+2

500 400 300 200 100 0

1 1-1 I-4-

1000 YDS

--I

MAP 6

TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DIV

SPECIAL ACTION RE PORT

NOTE: LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY.

GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUPS

AND BY FIRE. SECONDARY LINES WERE

ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIND

FRONT LINES.

749543 0-47 (Face p. 52)
Apparently the Japanese made this small show of

attacking as a preliminary to a main attack in force.

There are three good reasons why the main attack

did not follow in quick succession: (1) The excellent artillery fire support of the 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines, reinforced by the fires of the 2d Battalion,

10th Marines, firing from positions on Bairiki; this

formed a cross-fire which was very effective; (2) the

siecessful elimination of the enemy from the front

lines; and (3) the limited use of Marine automatic

weapons. During this initial "feeling out" attack,

Jones called for artillery fire to fall within 75 yards

of the front lines. He hoped that the bulk of the

artillery fire would land in the midst of the counterattacking force. Actually, this was not the case, but

the artillery fire served to form a screen which prevented the main body of Japanese from following

ND its initial infiltration. In repelling this first coun- t

erattack, the men of Companies A and B held the

hre from their automatic weapons to a minimum,

rd the fighting consisted mainly of close-in fighting,

"a-Yonet work, and the prolific use of hand grenades.

During the 2 hours which followed this attack, the

Japanese who had infiltrated into the lines and had

caused a gap between the two companies were

mopped up by the battalion reserve and this work

also consisted of close-in fighting and bayonet

engagements. As a result, the enemy was unable to

discover the exact location of the front lines or the

positions of the automatic weapons.

Perhaps it was the failure of their first attack to

gain information which caused the enemy to attempt

another counterattack at 2300. Again, about 50 of

the enemy attempted to create a diversion in the

sector of Company A by firing small arms, throwing

grenades, calling out, and moving around. At the

same time, another 50 Japanese attacked Company

B. Using machine guns, 60-mm. mortars, and grenades, Company B had little difficulty repulsing the

attack. This time it appeared that the Japanese were

trying to secure the information about the Marine

positions and strength that the first attack had failed

to obtain.

PACK HOWITZER FIRING in support of advancing troops. These guns played an important part in stopping the Japanese counterattack

during the last night of the battle for Betio.

53
Between the first and second attacks, Company I

of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, moved up to replace the troops of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in

the secondary line, 75 yards to the rear of the front

lines. A medium tank brought up water, small-arms

ammunition, and grenades to a dump 50 yards behind Company A. From about 500 yards east of his

lines to the extreme eastern tip of the island, Jones

requested that naval gunfire be placed. This was

designed to. disrupt enemy communications, disorganize any group bent on reinforcing the attacking

forces, and to keep the enemy down within his emplacements. In the area between the zone assigned

to naval gunfire and his own front lines, Jones calle I

for, and received, continuous harassing artillery fire.

The attack at 2300 on the right side of the line evidently served its purpose, for it was in this sector that

the Japanese launched their heaviest, and final,

attack at 0400, 23 November.

About 1 hour before the final counterattack, the

enemy began to fire heavy and light machine guns

into the Marine lines from positions set up in some

wrecked trucks about 50 yards in front of the lines.

Some of the enemy guns were destroyed by fire

from Marine heavy machine guns; three enemy

guns were destroyed by Marine noncommissioned

officers who voluntarily crawled out in front of the

lines to use hand grenades on them.

The enemy was to attack one more time. At 0400,

about 300 Japanese moved forward to hit all of

HALF-SUBMERGED BULLDOZER starts in toward Beach Red 2.

Company B's front and the right front of "Comp

A. At the same time, several of the enemy In

noises to divert the attention of the men on the

(north) side of Company A's line. Lt. N. E. M.

1st Battalion, 10th Marines, forward observer.

front-line observation post with the 1st Battal

6th Marines, called his artillery fire to within

yards of the front lines. By 0500, 23 November,

counterattacking Japanese were repelled. In

front lines of the two companies, and along

front to a distance of 50 yards, lay the bodies

more than 200 enemy dead. Out beyond that we'

the patterns made by the artillery concentration'

this area was littered with the broken and battele

bodies of approximately 125 Japanese, destroyed b

the artillery. Firing out beyond the artillery pattell

and helping to keep the enemy from moving fred

the U. S. S. Schroeder, and later the U. S. S. Sig

bee, did excellent work.

NUISANCE AIR RAIDS

During the first night that Marines were asho

on Betio, the night of 20-21 November, it is

ported that there was an air attack; that it had littl

more than nuisance value.

It will be recalled that the Maryland launched a

observation plane at 1548 on D,day piloted by

sign French, with Lt. Col. Jesse S. Cook, Jr., aboaf

as an observer for the 2d Marine Division. At also

54
WADING ASHORE ON GREEN BEACH, these men of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, met no enemy fire in the morning of the third

day of battle.

1830, French requested permission to be taken back

aboard the ship. Permission was refused since at

t

hat time the fleet was expecting an air attack.

rench and Cook then flew north for a few miles and

then returned toward the fleet at about 300 feet

altitude. According to Colonel Cook, the fleet, apParently thinking the approach of this plane was the

;I eginning of the air attack, opened fire. Fortunately,

the gunnery was a bit off, and French landed his

Plane as quickly as possible, feeling that the water

was safer than the air at that time. After floating all

1,light, French brought the plane back to the Maryland next morning.

Just before dawn on the morning of the second

day, the U. S. S. Maryland reported unidentified

aircraft approaching. Admiral Harry Hill directed his northern picket ships to fire at random, acting

as decoys. The enemy planes paid little attention to

the firing of the picket ships and came on in to drop at least three sticks of bombs on the island, causing

tires to blaze up momentarily, but resulting in practicallY no damage to the troops ashore. The planes,

estimated to be eight, did not press home the attack

and left the area at once.

Again on the morning of the third day, at 0340,

Ilnidentified aircraft were reported coming in from

the northwest. Four enemy planes arrived to bomb

the island but did not molest the ships.

These enemy air attacks were anticipated, although every effort had been made to neutralize all

airfields on closely adjacent island groups. Admiral

Hill received intelligence reports on 21 November,

early in the day, that the Japanese might attempt to

stage large air attacks through Milli or Taroa. In

addition, it was reported that the enemy was massing submarine strength in the area of Tarawa and

that the expected time of arrival of the submarines

would probably be on 23 November.

At noon on 22 .November, the U. S. S. Gansevoort

reported a submarine contact to the west of the

transport area. An investigation of the contact failed

to obtain further results. Less than an hour later the

L'. S. S. Meade reported a submarine contact in the

same area. Still the enemy craft could not be definitely located, and the destroyers continued to cruise

around in the area, hoping to destroy the Japanese

submarine. Again at 1530, and later at 1627, contacts were made and the U. S. S. Frazier went out to

join the other two destroyers in their grim game.

After several depth charges were dropped, the enemy

submarine was forced to surface. ,The periscope

broke water between the Meade and the Frazier and

as the hull appeared, the two destroyers opened fire.

Not content with the results of the fire, the Frazier

then moved directly 'toward the enemy craft and

rammed it. Three prisoners were rescued from the

submarine, which was identified as the RC-35. The

Frazier received damage to her bow as a result of the

ramming and was forced to reduce her speed in

order to prevent taking in too much water.

55
CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

The Island Is Secured

THE FOURTH DAY

During the night 22-23 November, the landing

team of Lt. Col. K. F. McLeod moved up in close

support of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. While the

1st Battalion was repelling the Japanese counterattacks, the 3d Battalion formed a secondary line,

ready to prevent a major break through the lines.

Early next morning McLeod received orders from

Col. M. G. Holmes, 6th Marines commander, to be

prepared to relieve the 1st Battalion after daylight

and continue the attack to the east at 0800. Planes

from the carriers came in to bomb and strafe the

eastern end of the island from 0700 to 0730. Then

the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, shelled the same

area until 0745, at which time naval gunfire was

called in for the last 15 minutes before the attack

hour. While all this preliminary bombardment was

being carried out, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

moved two of its companies through the position

of the 1st Battalion. On the right, facing east, was

Company L; on the left, Company I. The line

formed by the two companies extended from one

side of Betio to the other; behind the skirmish line,

Company K waited in reserve, ready to support

either company.

The eastern part of the island, the 2,000-yard

stretch in front of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, yet

to be taken, was a shambles. It had received almost

as much attention on D-day as the western half, and

had been pulverized daily on each of the three succeeding days. Still, in the midst of all the death and

destruction caused by the planes, the naval gunfire,

and the shells of the pack howitzers of the 10th

Marines, roughly 500 Japanese held out in dugouts,

blockhouses, log and dirt emplacements, and rifle

56

pits. Five hundred of the enemy were still alive

the eastern part of Betio, despite the terrific 10

sustained in the counterattacks against Jones' bfj

talion the night before.

At 1930, 22 November, General Smith called

regimental commanders together and at that ti

issued verbal orders for the next day's operatio

Present at the meeting were Colonel Shoup, Colond

Edson, Colonel Hall, Colonel Holmes, Gene01

Bourke,' commanding general of the 10th Marina

and Major McCoy of the 2d Tank Battalion. In°

this group, General Smith read the following:

LT 2/6 has been ordered to move from Bairiki t°

the west beach of Betio tonight. CT 6 will attack

0800 tomorrow morning to secure the southeast eld

of Betio. All available tanks attached. CT 2 with

1/8 attached, will continue mopping up operations

western end of Betio and in particular elin'iinate Jai)

nese resistance in the vicinity of the boundary betwe

Beaches Red 1 and Red 2. CT 8, less LT 1/8, prep

to move to Bairiki when boats become availabl

Tenth Marines in direct support of CT 6. Air boll'

bardment on southeast end of Betio from 0700 to 07311

Naval gunfire support from 0730 to 0745. All ba

talion of 6th Marines will revert to the control of

6th Marines at 0600, but necessary orders preparato

to launching attack may be issued by the command'

officer of the 6th Marines prior to that time to

battalion commanders; 10th Marines will maint

harassing fires on Japanese positions on southeast e

of Betio throughout the night.

There had been no replacement colonel available for ,

artillery regiment when Bourke was promoted to brigacu,

general; hence he remained in command for the Tara

operation.
\r1 L*MT 

ALIGHT A Beach Red 3

BURNS-PHILP WHARF

DEFINITE COVERED POSITION

Company I moves by

circutlous route to execute

passage of lines on morning

f 23 Nov.

•.

Company I held up by

Jap strongpoint —Is

left to contain and

destroy enemy.

ft

Japanese

StrongpoInt

/ (comics vo')\

'COVERED 110 500 I

Beach Black ar 2

3d Bn, 6th Marines ordered

to rendezvous in this area,

prepared to support 1st Bn, 6th

in resisting Jap counter attack

2000, Nov 22.

3d Bn, 6th Marines moved from

this area to execute passage of

lines through Ist Bn, 6th morning

Nov 23.

...

COVERED AS CURS'

LEGEND: 6 Weapon, side notes describe type

• Covered emplacements

A Observation tower

• 

Searchlight

Radar 

Open dispersed stores

ear Fire 8 Communication trench- built above surface

+W. Fire a Communication trench-cut below surface

OM Building -

M• Damaged Building

Clo TEarth covered structure

CZ) Excavation

Tank trap

Wooded area (Palms)

I COVEREO Al RUN 

\ f,

I COVERED MO 

3d Bn, 6th Marines

execute passage of lines

at 0800, 23 Nov. Attacks

east with two companies

In assault Company K In

reserve.

BETIO

TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS

ATTACK OF THE 3d BN., 6th MARINES

NOV. 23,1943 IQ 90 290 390 400140.

MAP 7 WEILFRATOP AWRY

RD 5890

I COVERED AS SONS 

3d Bn, 6th Marines

continues attack on front

of one company when

Company I is held up by

Jap strongpoint.

!COVERED AS OURS

3d Bn, 6th Marines

reaches this point at 1310,

23 Nov, marking the complete

seizure of Betio Island.

n;PAEJTSAA"O EAVT AA I

user AA I

ReSOLE C NAVAL

TURRET GU

T AA1/

'COVERED AR OURS 

COVERED Al DUNS'

749543 0-47 (Face p. 56)
On the morning of the fourth day, Colonel

Holmes was to attack with his regiment in a column

of battalions. Division had hoped that the 2d Battalion would be able to move over from Bairiki in

tirne to support the 3d, the attacking landing team.

The 1st had sustained fairly heavy casualties during the counterattacks of the night before, and the

clay of fighting previous to that. It was planned that

the 1st Battalion would remain in reserve for the

6th Marines on 23 November.

The way things turned out, however, the first elements of the 2d Battalion did not reach Betio until

the island was almost secured. There had been a misunderstanding about boats to transport the team

ever to Betio, and to carry the 8th Marines to Bairiki.

For one thing there were too few boats available,

'ince the unloading of the transports had been carried out without due regard to the need for certain

supplies ashore at a given time, and too many boats

were loaded and waiting out in the water with no

Place to unload and no personnel ready to unload

them. There had been no opportunity for the shoreParty organizations of the combat teams to operate

according to previous planning. The break-down in

the logistical phase of the operation began when

shore-party personnel attached to the landing teams

Were used, of necessity, to fight for the initial beachfurther deterioration was experienced when

!he landing teams began to call for supplies directly

imm their own transports, without regard to any

sYstematic plan for coordinating the ship-to-shore

Movements of the boats carrying badly needed ammunition, water, and rations.

ATTACK ON THE THIRD BATTALION,

6TH MARINES

At 0800, 23 November, McLeod's battalion

Moved through the positions of the 1st Battalion

toward two tank-trap ditches about 150 yards to

the front. Supporting the advance of the landing team 

were two medium tanks and seven light tanks.

Merl with flamethrowers were in the front lines of

the advancing infantry. The tank traps were reached

111 a matter of only a few minutes; McLeod had

P.1anned to stop there and reorganize before contlnumg. With only feeble token resistance being

offered thus far there was no need to halt; nor was it

even necessary to pause while additional artillery

°re was called in to the immediate front of the advancing troops. The infantry and tanks pushed on,

blasting out dugouts, burning positions, and another

200 yards was gained before the first enemy strong

point offered resistance over in the path of Company

I. Here the Japanese were emplaced in several large

bombproof dugouts and pillboxes with good fields of

fire covering the open ground to the immediate west,

the ground between the Marines and the Japanese

positions. McLeod saw that the zone of action in

front of Company L offered some cover, and by

pushing that company around to the south the Japanese positions could be bypassed. This was done.

Company L, now past the enemy obstacle, assumed

responsibility for the whole front, a width of about

200 yards. Company I was left to contain and reduce

the enemy pocket of resistance. Company K moved

up behind Company L and the drive to the southeast

continued.

It seemed that most of the Japanese with any will

to fight had been killed in the counterattacks of the

night before. Most of those who remained in the

path of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, concentrated

in any place that offered shelter and few attempted

to resist in the same fashion as previously encountered. There were no prepared lines of defensive positions to resist the attack of Company L. The troops

found that they could destroy the fortified emplacements on a piecemeal basis without worrying too

much about coming under fire from what normally

would be supporting positions. The tanks and flamethrowers were kept busy all through the morning.

Just before the end of the island was reached, naval

gunfire was called in on the extreme southeastern tip

to pin down those of the enemy who still remained

and to prevent any of them from trying to escape

across the sand spit that led over to Bairiki. The

rapid advance of Company L denied the enemy the

opportunity of reorganizing as positions were overrun. Shortly after 1300 the end of the island was

reached and declared secure. During the morning's

attack, McLeod lost 9 men killed and 25 wounded.

Fourteen prisoners were taken during the period,

and 475 of the enemy were killed. The prisoners were

mostly Korean laborers.

• After the 3d Battalion passed through its lines to

carry the attack at 0800, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, turned to reorganization and supply. All the

tanks and flamethrowers were turned over to the 3d

Battalion. Since the 2d Battalion had not arrived

from Bairiki, Holmes had to plan on using the 1st

Battalion in case the 3d ran into difficulty. By 1945,

57
DIRECT HIT BY 16-INCH SHELL knocked out this gun and killed its crew.

Jones was able to report that his team was ready for

action again. During the previous night and afternoon he had lost 1 officer killed and 5 wounded; 14

enlisted men were killed and 123 wounded.

ENEMY POCKET RED 1-RED 2

AREA DESTROYED

While the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was attacking on the southeastern end of the island, the

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines, were compressing the pocket of enemy resistance which still held out on the boundary between

Beaches Red 1 and Red 2. This Japanese strongpoint

had decimated the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and

the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, on D-day. It had resisted all attempts toward its reduction since then.

From the east, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, attacked with all three of its companies in a semicircular line. The 75-mm. self-propelled guns,

flamethrowers, and a demolitions crew from Company C, 18th Marines, lent their support to the

58

infantry. Initially the main effort was made on til

right.

Two 75-mm. self-propelled guns and a platoon

infantry under the direction of Maj. Hewitt

Adams went on the reef and attacked the stro

point at the junction of Beaches Red 1 and RedI

from close range. Elimination of this pocket enabl

the attack to move slowly; physical contact with

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, was made on the I

flank at about 1000.

Meanwhile, Maj. John Schoettel, who by no'

had regained control and command of his battalini

(3d Battalion, 2d Marines), attacked from the vves

swinging the right (south) flank of his line aroull

across the pot-hole area west of the main air stril

until the revetments on the north side were reached

Here contact was made with 1st Battalion, 8th Nfil

rines, and the enemy pocket was completely ell

circled. The reduction of the Japanese position

made from its rear. After a large concrete pillV

had been destroyed, the action was little more than
BETIO

TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS

ATTACK OF 1st BN, 8th MARINES and

3d BN, 2d MARINES

MORNING OF NOV. 23,1943

100 100 200 300 400 YDS

MAP 8

RD 5890

TAKEN FROM 2d MARINES

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

AL12_.1NS1

\

J.liEAVY AM

Beach Red lt 2

•96,

004

4) Oce .4 oriV....1

it*

/ 

re °411140

4?& 0^

\7),

0 N ITIFign 

W. a6g

r

41 + AV 44r

' 410;1;".-'''■ 0,- 4:&0 44$g ail

Ate,T cr.:

104dr - 4:4114i

A6 P.0,4fifrveaeil* 4ftr‘r#

Isat4 

:7111.0iiill

44-40

-IV 

e

• 

t 'O. 

• .4,

•

---,...0.

..PAP

•

#

", 

--:-....z....-4. 40." ........qp.,...- — - -:=41. ,

40„olows.-..- - II 1

LI eifY0TVII SU

Strongpoint

1AS GUNS t"

• 811

Is ° •

AS 811

,

AS GUNS Beach Black 01

\ 

I HEAVY AA I I AB GUN 

/

1AD GUNS 

Beach Block#2

LEGEND:

Weapon, side notes describe type

Covered emplacements

Observation tower

Searchlight

Radar

Open dispersed stores

irsze Fire 8 Communication trench-built above surface

Fire & Communication trench-cut below surface

NMI Building

MEI Damaged Building

Earth covered structure

0 Tent

CZ) Excavation

== Tank trap

Wooded area (Palms)

749543 0-47 (Face p.58)
een Overrun and the 1st Battalion, 8th, and the 3d

uPPing-up exercise. By 1300 the entire area had

attahon, 2d, were in contact on the site of the

heavily defended strong point. Emplacements, dug-

"ts, and pillboxes were blasted and burned all

afternoon. A few prisoners were taken.

END OF THE BATTLE

Late in the morning of the fourth day of the action

("1 Betio, Gen. Julian C. Smith sent a message to

druiral Harry Hill, summing up the situation

dqlore as of 1150:

Decisive defeat heavy enemy counterattack last

night destroyed bulk of hostile resistance. Expect cornlete annihiliation of enemy on Betio this date. Strongly 

recommend that you and your chief of staff

c°1/1e ashore this date to get information about the

tYPe of hostile resistance which will be encountered

u future operations.

At noon, troops were surprised to see the arrival of the first friendly aircraft to land on Betio,2 a carrier-based plane, and the pilot of the plane soon was

su,rrrounded by Marines, anxious to tell him about

rue battle and to find out what the world at large

aought of it.

At 1245 Admiral Hill and some of his officers

hot 

ashore to inspect the devastated island. In the

'lot sun of early afternoon the little island was quiet

except for sporadic rifle fire from small patrols,

Which were combing captured enemy positions. Oc-

,erasionally the ground would shake when a charge of

t,NT was set off in a pillbox or heavy emplacement.

gineer personnel with flamethrowers were still

itusY burning out dugouts and emplacements where

.was believed that a few of the Japanese might be hiding. After 75 hours of violent writhing under the hot equatorial sun, Betio apppeared almost inert. At

Gen. Julian C. Smith announced that all or-

!anized resistance on Betio had ceased. This did not mean, 

however, that all the enemy were dead or cap- tured. 

Every day for many of the succeeding days

J. aPanese would be killed. There Were still snipers hiding underground who took an occasional shot at

Pas8i0g Marines.

1)2111ring the afternoon Col. Elmer Hall moved 8th

arines, less Hays' battalion, over to Bairiki, arry.ing there at 1615. In the meantime, the 2d Battall°11, 6th Marines, moved over to Betio from

rnain 2.Ensineers and Seabees had worked under fire to repair the strip.

Bairiki and bivouacked for the night. Lieutenant

Colonel Murray learned that his landing team would

operate under division control and would leave next

day to start a long march up the islands of the atoll.

This landing team was the freshest in the division,

had seen less action, and was in excellent shape for

its assignment.

Before nightfall General Smith planned to have

every battalion on Betio placed in position to defend

the island in case the enemy attempted a counterlanding. Through the afternoon the battalions

moved into their assigned positions, set up their

machine guns, their antitank weapons from the regimental weapons companies, and dug their foxholes.

Tanks were moved up to areas offering good fields

of -fire out over the water. The same held true for the

half-tracks, the self-propelled 75-mm. guns. On the

east side of the main pier, the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, moved into position with its men deployed

all the way to the southeastern tip of the island.

' West of the pier, covering Beaches Red 1 and Red 2,

the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, prepared its positions

for the night.

Across the western end of the island, on Green

Beach, were the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and 2d

Battalion, 6th Marines. Then around on the south

side of the island, extending about one-third the way

down from the west end, was the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines. Next came the men of the 2d Marines'

Regimental Weapons Company. To the east, for

about 400 yards, were the men of the 2d Battalion,

2d Marines, reaching to connect with the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which covered the remainder

of the island, joining with the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, at the southeastern tip.

Back from the beaches, each landing team kept a

part of its force as a mobile reserve, ready to move to

any threatened sector. Ready to fire in any direction,

the batteries of the 10th Marines stood silent after

2/1 2 days crowded with action. It might appear that

the defensive measures taken by the 2d Marine Division at the close of the fight for Betio were unnecessary. The ships of the task force still stood off shore.

There were the battleships, the cruisers, carriers, and

tinging them, the destroyers, now mute and still, but

nonetheless ready with radar screens working continuously lest the enemy achieve some measure of

surprise. It was, of course, simply sound military

practice, and if any attempt were made to take away

this little piece of ground so recently wrested from

59
the enemy—and then only after one of the bitterest

fights yet seen—the division would not be caught by

surprise.

All through the afternoon men were busy burying

the dead, evacuating the remaining wounded, and

moving supplies into dumps or distributing them

to the many units ashore. The division chaplain and

his assistants were in charge of interring the remains

of the Marines who were killed in the terrific struggle, and funeral services went on all through the day.

Each battalion landing team made every effort to

retrieve its own dead, to identify them, and carry

them to the burying places.

The island, though quiet and peaceful looking,

was nothing but a dirty, demolished, stinking battlefield, whose residue remained to be cleaned up and

straightened away. Although every effort was made

all through the action to take care of the Marine

dead when possible, little or nothing could be done

for the enemy dead. Somewhere between 4,000 and

5,000 Japanese and Koreans were on Betio when the

2d Division arrived on 20 November. Only 146 allowed themselves to be captured. The rest lay where

they had fallen and, at the close of the fourth day

ashore on Betio, the air was heavy and foul to smell.

This did not seem to bother many of the Marines

who proceeded to eat with a gusto hard to achieve

during the tension of combat. For once everyone had

enough food and water. There was opportunity to

dig a fairly comfortable foxhole for the night with

none of the discomforts connected with being under

enemy fire. The men dug their holes deep; every

night had seen an air raid so far and there was every

indication that this night would bring another one.

However, the night was far from quiet. At approximately 1800, a Marine threw a thermite grenade after a hold-out Japanese in what the Marine

thought was a dugout. Actually this "dugout" was

a Japanese 5-inch gun magazine. The grenade

started the projectiles in the magazine exploding;

the explosions continued all through the night, pinning Marines in their foxholes over a large part of

the eastern end of the island.

Under the cover of explosion of the magazine,

several Japanese, hidden in the battle debris on the

eastern tail of Betio, emerged from their hiding

places to strike a final blow at the Marines.

In sporadic individual engagements during the

night, two enlisted Marines were bayoneted to death

60

and the intelligence officer of the 1st Battalion, 01

Marines, was killed. Approximately 14 Japao6i

were killed in the center of the area occupied by

6th Marines.

Two of the regimental combat teams of the

Marine Division embarked in transports and

Tarawa for the Division's new base camp at

muela, Hawaii, T. H., on 24 November 1943. Aftf'

spending the night of 23-24 November on BainV

Colonel Hall's regiment, the 8th Marines, loade'

aboard its ships all through the morning of 24

vember, and Colonel Shoup's regiment, the 2d

rines, began to reembark at 0900 that morn

Late that afternoon the ships left Tarawa.

During the same day, Maj. Gen. Holland

Smith, Commanding General of V Amphibi

Corps, arrived at Betio from Makin, by plane.

company with Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith, G

H. M. Smith made a tour of the battle-wrec

island and inspected the captured fortified empla

ments and gun positions so recently manned by

Japanese. The fight for Makin had been easier th

that for Betio. One reinforced regimental cons

team of the 27th Infantry Division, under the o

all command of Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, ti

landed on Makin on D-day, 20 November, an

the afternoon of 22 November, it was announ

that all organized resistance on the atoll had end

The regimental combat team, the 165th Infan

lost 56 men killed in action and 131 wounded

action.

On 24 November 1943 a flag-raising ceremo

took place on Betio. Since Tarawa had belonged

the British before it was captured by the Japan&

it was only proper that the Union Jack should )I

raised simultaneously with the Stars and Stripe

After a great deal of difficulty a small British

was found and then the Ceremony was held. Tss

battle-scarred palms served as masts. A Marine fiel

music sounded colors on a battered bugle

troops came to attention. First the American fl

was raised, joined a moment later by the British fli

to flutter in the breeze over the island so recoil'

wrested from the enemy. The flag raising seemed'

mark the official capture of the island. Assault troo}

then marched off to the pier to go aboard ship

leave the island. Defense troops carried on with tli

work of converting the island into an American W'

The chaplains and their helpers went on with the'

work of identifying and burying the dead.
RD 5890

RED

0. i

RED

><><'

POSITIONS AT SUNSET

No.

o.

azo

rm vs is

g52

•

(.0

I ; •

'

-'BLACK NO. I

BLACK NO. 2

INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAND

TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

SITUATION 1800 D+3

500 400 300 200 100 0 1000 YDS

MAP 9

TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DIV

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

NOTE: LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY.

GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUPS.

AND BY FIRE. SECONDARY LINES WERE

ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEH IND

FRONT LINES.

749543 0-47 (Face p. 60)
bNITED STATES COLORS FLYING OVER BETIO marks the end of the battle, another step along the road to Tokyo.

823769- 49 61
CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Mission Completed

WITH the capture of Betio, three things remained to

be done: (1) The capture of the rest of the islands

in Tarawa atoll; (2) the capture of Apamama atoll;

and (3) the capture of Abaiang, Marakei, and

Maiana atolls.

The first of these was assigned to the 2d Battalion,

6th Marines, commanded by Lt. Col. Raymond L.

Murray. This battalion started its long march up

the atoll from Buota on 24 November.

Even before that, however, some preliminary reconnaissance work had been done on the little islets

east of Betio, in the area af the base of the long axis

of the L-shaped atoll, by Company D, 2d Tank Battalion. This company, commanded by Capt. John

R. Nelson, was the division's scout company, and

while the battle raged on Betio, it was assigned the

mission of reconnoitering Eita, Buota, and the little

unnamed islets to the north of those two.

On 21 November the 3d Platoon landed on Eita,

where it found fuel dumps, bomb and mine dumps,

but no Japanese. The 2d Platoon landed on Buota,

the islet that makes the bend at the elbow of the atoll,

and located a Japanese position, estimated to contain 100 of the enemy, and a radio station at the

corner of the bend. The 1st Platoon landed about 4

miles farther up the atoll to the northwest near

Tabiteuea village, where it captured one Japanese

laborer and several natives.

The 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, was sent to Eita

on 23 November, and the 3d Platoon, Company D,

was attached to the artillery battalion. The platoon

had captured one Japanese prisoner.

Just after dark of that same day the Japanese force

on Buota moved north through the positions of the

1st Platoon, Company D. Next day, the 1st and 4th

Platoons scouted as far north as the island called

62

Ida, about halfway up the long side of the atn'

In the meantime, Nelson met the 2d Battalion, 6,

Marines, on Buota and guided the battalion as f°

north as Julia. On the following day the scouts

recalled to Eita to prepare for reconnaissance 0

sions on the atolls adjacent to Tarawa—Abaiel,

Marakei, and Maiana.

2D BATTALION, 6TH MARINES,

MOPS UP THE ATOLL

As mentioned before, the 2d Battalion, 6th 10

fines, was assigned the mission of cleaning up

rest of Tarawa atoll. This battalion had seen btu

action during the fight for Betio and had suffer

fewer casualties than any of the other battal0

Murray's battalion embarked in boats from Betio

0500, 24 November, and moved over to Buota I

begin the trek to the north. By nightfall the battall

had advanced to Buoti,' passing through seve

native villages recently evacuated; no enemy 0

was contacted.

The march was resumed on 25 November and

the end of the day the battalion was well up the at°

Still no contact with the enemy had been made

late afternoon of 26 November, the 2d Battall°

6th Marines, had reached the south end of the I

large island at the northwest end of Tarawa atoll

Buariki. Before bivouacking for the night, Mur

sent out Company E to the northwest to maintain

position as an advance covering force. Murray 101

from information received from the scouts that

where north of him there were at least 100 ja

nese; the enemy group had to be on Buariki.

This was verified when patrols from CompanY

" Not to be confused with Buota, a separate island.
RD 6890

SHIP PASSAGE

(.1

0

TEARINIBA VILLAGE

NUATABLI

TRADING STATION

TARATAI VILLAGE

TARAWA ATOLL

MOVEMENTS OF PLATOONS, Go D ,(SCOUTS) 2DTANK BN

2D MARINE DIVISION

21-26 NOV 1943

MAP 10

TABORI0( MISSION STATION)

NOTO VILLAGE

ABAOKORO ISLAND HOSPITAL

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STATION

MARNENUKA VILLAGE

1st AND 4th

PLATOONS MOVED TO

HERE 25 NOV.

0

0

BIKEMAN ISLET 0

lot PLATOON LANDED

HERE 22 NOV. JOINED

BY REST OF COMPANY

25 NOV.

.1 4

1000 YDS

BEINA VILLAGE

0

BITITU I.

3rd PLATOON

LANDED HERE

21 NOV.

TEAORA REND

NAAN1K A MISSION S

2d _PLATOON

LANDED HERE

21140V- WITHDREW

0430 22nd NOV

LANDED AGAIN

24 NOV.

1,7

,

TRADiN Cr STATION

4th PLATOON 0

MOVED TO HERE

24 NOV.

Tt.i".1,R.Or..Ti8. :AVOW'

BUOTA VILLAGE

ITA VILLAGE

BONRIK1 VILLAGE

BAIRIKI I.

BANRAEABA VILLAGE BIKE BIDE

V1LL AGE

AGO ONS

749543 0-47 (Face p. 62)
RD 5890

SHIP PASSAGE

0

1-4

0

SiTITU L

(BETIO LI

ATOLL SECURED

0900, 28 NOV 41'

BUARIK1

VILLAGE

ti

lik NUATABU VILLAGE

TRADING STATION

.

1800.20 NOV

BIKEMAN ISLET

NAA

1800,27 NOV

CO E

1800 26 NOV

TEARINIBA VILLAGE

a

)4BAOKORO

VILLAGE

TABORIONISSION STATION/

TARATAI VILLAGE

NOTO VILLAGE

MAP II

ABAOKORO ISLAND HOSPITAL

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STATION

MARANENUKA VILLAGE

TARAWA ATOLL

MOVEMENTS 2D BN,6TH MAR

24-28N0V 1943

0 2 3 • 5

1-9. (-9 P-4 I

1000 YDS

1800 25 NOV

NABEINA VILLAGE

rtC(aa

8 

it‘ TA*81TEUEA 0 

VILLAGE

0

a

TEAORAEREKE

MISSION

NAANIKA STATIO

„,

TAKER FROM 20 MAR Div

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

CT TRADING STATION

41 BUOTA VILLAGE

o 

*.;

foviipo BONRIKI VILLAGE

EITA VILLAGE 

LAGOONS

a

BANRAEABA

24 NOVEMBER

MORNING

BIKENIBEU

VILLAGE

1800 24 NOV
ran into a Japanese patrol at sunset. A brief fire

fight ensued, in which two Marines were wounded,

auci it was believed that two or three Japanese were

killed. After dark, Company E's patrols returned

aId the company remained in its defensive position

uring the night. Occasional harassing enemy rifle

lire was received, but the Marines held their fire and

Hw.aited for daylight. There were no additional

narine casualties.

Next morning Murray advanced with two comPailies in assault and one in reserve, to clear the

area between his position of the night before and

Place where the island narrows northeast of

'uariki village. Shortly after moving out the companies found the enemy position. Although the JapaneSe had no organized line, it was difficult to destroy

hetri. Broken into small groups, each of which was

a pit or behind coconut logs, the enemy held their

until the Marines were almost on top of them.

egetation was dense and the fighting was at close l ange.

. Cmlapany E was hit hard and paused to reorgan-

'e. Murray then moved Company F through ComPcany E to continue the attack. In the meantime

°u1Pany G was coming in on the enemy's east flank,

attacking to the northwest. Murray had with him

?fle artillery battery, Battery G, 10th Marines, but

e action was at such close range as to make it

Possible to use the howitzers except for one concentration which was fired when Company F passed

through Company E.

After several hours of typical jungle fighting, the

tliain enemy resistance was overcome, and Murray

urnecl to mopping-up and patrolling. The day's

°

rtion cost 3 officers killed and 1 wounded; enlisted

,sses amounted to 29 killed and 58 wounded. One

tunnclred and seventy-five Japanese were killed and

Ivo Korean laborers captured.

°tie tiny islet remained to be taken, Naa, or Lone

W

ee islet, which lay a hundred yards northwest of

mtlariki. Early in the morning of 28 November,

t iirraY sent troops over to Naa, which was found

contain no Japanese, and by 0800 the capture of

marawa atoll was complete. The 2d Battalion, 6th

ariries, then returned to Eita to rest and reorganize

er the long march up the atoll.

4PAIVIAMA: CORPS SCOUTS

On 22 October 1943, Maj. Gen. Holland M. truth commanding the V Amphibious Corps, ordered Capt. James- L. Jones, commanding V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company, to land

his company (less one platoon) on Apamama during

the night 19-20 November with the mission of

reconnoitering the atoll in order to determine

whether there was any sizable Japanese force ashore,

and to select and mark suitable beaches and channels to be used later by other forces. If any large

hostile force was present on Apamama, Jones was to •

withdraw and avoid an engagement. Jones' company was to be lifted to Apamama on the submarine

Nautilus.

Apamama atoll ( also called Hopper atoll, Abemama, and Apemama) lies 76 miles south of

Tarawa. Elliptical Apamama has its lagoon almost

entirely enclosed by Abemama Island, a long island

that is broken in five places so that it appears that

there are six islands closely joined together. Across

the southwestern side of the atoll there is a reef,

through which are two passages suitable for small

ships. The southwestern side of the atoll is guarded

by two islands separate from Abemama, called Abatiku and Entrance Islands. To avoid confusion, the

six portions of Abemama were given code names

( as were the islands of Tarawa atoll) . The north

segment was named Steve; next Oscar, then Otto,

Orson, John, and finally Joe. Entrance Island was

named Nick and Abatiku w,as called Matt.

The whole atoll is about 12 miles long and 5 miles

wide. Surrounding it, broken only by South Passage

and Western Passage, is a continuous reef. Inside the

lagoon there is considerable foul ground and coral

heads. Coconut palms and tropical vegetation are

found in abundance on all islands of the atoll.

In addition to her mission of carrying the corps

scouts to Apamama, Nautilus had another mission

to execute first. From Pearl Harbor the ship was to

go to Tarawa, to cruise in that area prior to the

landing on Betio in order to observe Japanese movements and positions, and to be available to rescue

pilots of the attacking planes if any were shot

down during the pre-D-day "softening-up" process.

Nautilus was to leave Tarawa on 19 November in

order to land the scouts on Apamama.

The submarine, with the corps scouts aboard, carried out her first mission off Betio according to plan.

In the afternoon of 19 November, Nautilus left Betio

for Apamama. A strong current held the pace of

the submerged craft—at best a slow ship—to a minimum. Shortly after 1930 she surfaced and began

63
to make better time. A few minutes after 2100, 19

November, a destroyer from Task Force 53, now

approaching Tarawa, opened fire on Nautilus under

the impression that the submarine was an enemy

craft. One direct hit with a 5-inch shell was scored

on the main induction tube. Immediate emergency

measures righted the ship after she had dived to a

depth of about 300 feet, and several hours later she

was able to surface and effect temporary repairs to

the damage. All next day the ship had to remain

submerged, arriving off Apamama at about 1400.

After sundown a run was made to the south to provide an opportunity to charge batteries; then the

submarine returned to Apamama to discharge the

corps scouts in their rubber boats.

Long before dawn in the morning of 21 November, Jones' company left the submarine and headed

toward John Island. A strong current caused the

boats to drift off course and the company landed on

Joe instead of John. Once ashore, the scouts began

patroling and had one minor brush with the enemy

when a three-man patrol was encountered. One

Japanese was killed. The company then moved to

the next islet, Orson. Here natives reported that

there were 25 Japanese on Apamama and that their

positions were just across from the north end of

Orson on the south end of Otto.

Attempts to cross the sandspit connecting Orson

and Otto were unsuccessful; the Japanese, strongly

entrenched in fortified positions, laid down a heavy

volume of fire from light machine gun and rifles.

Since it was now late in the day, Jones broke off the

action and withdrew to plan for the next day's attack. It appeared that without mortars, it would be

impossible to dislodge the Japanese from their

positions.

On the morning of 24 November, Jones moved

his platoons to the north end of Orson and called in

70 rounds of fire from Nautilus on the Japanese

positions. The enemy continued to fire while the submarine was firing and Jones was unable to use rubber boats to outflank the Japanese. Late in the day

a destroyer offered her services and fired a few

rounds as it grew dark.

Next morning a native arrived at Jones' camp

with the news that the Japanese were all dead. This

information was corroborated by another native who

had given reliable information before. The 1st and

3d Platoons were sent to investigate and found that

the story was true. A few of the enemy had been

64

killed by the shelling and the rest, about 18, Iv'

committed hari-kari.

On the following morning a landing force colb

manded by Brig. Gen. Leo D. Hermle arrived

occupy Apamama. With the arrival of the 3d 1331,,

talion, 6th Marines, Jones received orders to emb3,11

his company aboard the Harris and depart the atoll

The V Amphibious Corps scouts had lost few 110

One man was killed in action, one wounded in ae,

tion, and one was injured. The enemy loss 1"

complete: 23 dead.

APAMAMA: 20 MARINE DIVISION

On 24 November 1943, Gen. Julian C. Snlid

directed Brig. Gen. Leo D. Hermle to seize and Of

cupy Apamama atoll. Hermle was to be in chart

of a landing force built around the 3d Battalion,6

Marines, commanded by Lt. Col. K. F. McLe

Hermle was instructed that V Amphibious Co ,

Reconnaissance Company had secured two islaa'

of the atoll and that there were about 25 Japan 

holding out from fortified positions. Rear AO

Harry Hill was to provide the naval task force nee'

sary to lift Hermle's landing force to Apamama,

At 1500, 25 November, General Hermle, aboar

the Maryland with Admiral Hill, and the 3d

talion, 6th Marines, on the Harris, left for A?

mama. During the uneventful voyage to the tar

Admiral Hill received word from corps scouts til

all the Japanese on Apamama were dead. Ne'

morning the force arrived at Apamama and L0

tenant Colonel McLeod sent two of his rifle CO

panies ashore, Company I on John Island, al

Company K on Steve Island.

General Hermle went ashore the morning of tl'

same day to organize the atoll's defenses and'

arrange for a meeting with native chiefs, dur0

which he would acquaint them with his plans f'

occupying the atoll.

On 1 December, Gen. Julian C. Smith arrive

to inspect the progress of unloading supplies ail

equipment, and the atoll's defenses. In the mOIL

time the 8th Defense Battalion had arrived and 11''1

emplaced its weapons. Also ashore was the air

commander. On 4 December, General Hermle

ceived orders from Admiral Hill to pass the corfr

mand of Apamama atoll to the base commander

Capt. W. P. Cogswell, USN. Hermle left the at

that same day to rejoin the division.
ABATIKU I.

WESTERN PASSAGE

t oCZ?

TABIAN VILLAGE

BINOINANO VILLAGE—

BARETOA VILLAGE

\\:\

TABONUA VILLAGE

TEBANA VILLAGE

r.nsive

SOUTH PASSAGE

V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS RECONNAISSANCE CO

21-26 NOV 1943

APAMAMA ATOLL

MAP 12

RD 5890

0 2 3

NHH I

1000 YDS

TAKEN FROM

VAG RCN CO OVERLAYS

ENTRANCE I.

First Contact With

Japanese Made

Afternoon, 21 Nov.

VAC Reco nno issanc e Company

Landed Here 0445, 21Nov1943

141

■kt,a1 ,0\

\

KABANAK VILLAGE

Proposed Landing Beach

VAC Reconnnicsance Co

USS NAUTILUS

749543 0-47 (Face p. 64) No. 1
29 NOV- 4 DEC l<

XX

)0( 2

ill% 2

7..• ADC

tr 26-28 NOVI943

WESTERN PASSAGE

ABATIKU I.

AOC'

00 ISLAND COMMAND

8th DEFENSE BN

TABIAN VILLAGE

0

0

t.0)

• (2 BARETOA VILLAGE

BINOINANO VILLAGE

TABONUA VILLAGE

TEBANA VILLAGE

LOCATION OF OCCUPATION UNITS

26 NOV -4 DEC 1943

APAMAMA ATOLL

MAP 13

RD 5890

0 I 2 3 4 5

1000 YDS

TAKEN FROM ADC'S SPECIAL

ACTION REPORT, APAMAMA

SOUTH PASSAGE

11811w/148

KABANAK VILLAGE
1700 171° 172° 173° :74° 175° 176°

_o 4°—

—3°

2°

0°

OCEAN I.

_I0

RCT 165 (USA)

LANDED 20 NOV. 1943

SECURED 22 NOV.

20 DIV SCOUTS

LANDED 30 NOV. 1943ABAIANG MARAKEI 

2 DIV SCOUTS

30 NOV. 1943

°Landings, Gilbert Islands

20 NOV - I DEC, 1943

SCALE

I 4,947,500

50 0 50 100 MILES

_30

MAP 14

RD 5890 171

0° 171° 172°

1

TARAWA 20 DIVISION

LANDED 20 NOV.

ATOLL SECURED 28 NOV 1943

'N. 2 DIV SCOUTS

MAIANA I DEC. 1943

ABEMAMAI VAC SCOUTS LANDED

21 NOV. 1943

(4‘ K UR I A .14:: ,,4 SECURED 25 NOV. 1943

ARANUKA

"15

4 NONUTI

k.

TAPETEUE A ,.,

<

BERU

NUKUNAU

ONOTOA 4.1

TAMAN A

ARORAI

173° 174° 175° 176°

I I 1 1

3°

2°—

1°-

0°

1°-

2°

3°—

749543 0-47 (Face p. 64) No. 2
ABAIANG, MARAKEI, AND MAIANA ATOLLS

Cin 29 November, Company D, 2d Tank Battal1°11, embarked aboard the minesweeper Pursuit

with the mission of reconnoitering three island atolls

adjacent to Tarawa—Abaiang, Marakei, and

Majana. There was the possibility that Japanese

coast watchers might still be on these islands. Before

dawn on 30 November, Company D landed two

nibbber boatloads of men above and below the vilIa, ge of Koinawa in Abaiang atoll. Five Japanese on

the island left immediately in a native boat and last

were seen sailing across the lagoon. Natives were

contacted ashore and arrangements were made with

them to take care of the Japanese should they return.

Next atoll to be reconnoitered was Marakei. Here

the Pursuit was greeted by several boats filled with

natives; from them came information that there

,Were Japanese on the atoll. To make sure, four

boatloads of scouts went ashore; there were no Japanese. After leaving food and medical supplies for the

natives, the Pursuit turned back to Abaiang to pick

,111) the scouts who had landed there earlier in the day. Bad surf conditions had prevented taking them

off sooner.

,Next morning, 1 December, the scouts landed on

Ilaiana, near the village of Bickerel. No Japanese

the 

on Maiana and after a brief reconnaissance,

e scouts returned to the Pursuit and were back in Lo

Tarawa lagoon by noon.

THE DIVISION LEAVES TARAWA

AbWith the completion of the reconnaissance of

ri Marakei, and Maiana atolls, and the ar- rival of defense battalions and other troops to garrison Tarawa and Apamama, the 2d Marine Division

prepared to leave-the Gilberts. The 2d and 8th Marines had left soon after the battle on Betio and

were now in the division's new base camp at Kamuela, Hawaii. During the last week in November

most of the remaining units of the division, except

the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, which stayed for two

more months, embarked aboard ship and sailed for

Hawaii. On 4 December, Gen. Julian C. Smith

turned over the command of the Tarawa area to

Commander, Advanced Base, Tarawa, Capt. Jackson R. Tate, USN.

The cost of capturing Tarawa raised a storm of

criticism in the United States when it was learned

that the casualty figure amounted to roughly 3,000

killed, wounded, or missing in action. (See appendix C for complete casualty break-down.) Too far

removed from the realism of war, the American

people were caught between shock and surprise;

there was nothing to prepare them for the cost involved in making amphibious operations against a

tenacious, fanatical foe who was willing to die to the

last man for emperor and empire. For a while the

hue and cry raised by the press almost obscured the

facts.

Subsequent amphibious operations in the Marianas, at Peleliu, and at Iwo Jima helped to give

perspective to Tarawa, but by then the bloody, violent struggle was half-forgotten. Succeeding operations did much to dim the memory of Tarawa, but

none ever obscured it; nothing could ever obscure

such a battle where perseverance dominated over

adversity, where individual courage and collective

know-how defeated a strong Japanese garrison on

its own ground and in its own positions.

In the words of a contemporary national magazine:

Last week some 2,000 or 3,000 United States Marines, most of

them now dead or wounded, gave the nation a name to stand beside

those of Concord Bridge, the Bon Homme Richard, the Alamo,

Little Big Horn, and Belleau Wood. The name was Tarawa.'

Time Magazine, 6 December 1943.

65
CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Conclusion

This operation ( Gilberts ) is considered to have been highly successful. Island bases essential

to our advance across the Pacific were captured from the enemy with the complete loss

of all his defending forces.—CinCPac Operation Report, November 1943, annex F, page 10.

UNIQUE among all the operations in the war in the

Pacific, and with implications so broad and farreaching as to affect all subsequent amphibious operations, Tarawa was much more than a successful

battle. It was, in many ways, a departure from anything that had been done before.

For the first time in history, a sea-borne assault

was launched against a heavily defended coral atoll,

thus beginning an operation that was assault in nature from start to finish, that never once lost its

amphibious flavor, and that depended for success

upon the closest control and coordination of land,

sea, and air forces.

Here was no large, or even limited, land mass

where the attacker had merely to seize a beachhead

in order to taste the first fruits of success. At Tarawa,

success could only come when the island under

attack was taken in entirety, for Betio was so small as

to preclude the possibility of seizing a beachhead, in

the classical sense of that term.

The small foothold held by the Marines on Betio

on D-day, and the day following, could scarcely be

called a beachhead. It had few of the characteristics

normally associated with a beachhead; there was no

fairly secure area on the hostile shore in which to

reorganize; where it was possible to strengthen positions by moving intact units into the threatened

zones. There was no beach free from enemy fire

where reinforcements could be landed safely, where

supporting weapons could be brought ashore and

emplaced to support the attack. There was no op66

portunity to land supplies and equipment in the 0)

ventional manner.

Until the close of the second day of the figh

entry to the island was no easier for reserve units th

it had been for the initial assault waves, and io

meantime the sole vehicle capable of crossing

reef with troops was diminishing in numbers to

point of vanishing.

There was no weakly defended, or undefend

beach on Betio upon which to land. There was

jungle to screen or conceal a landing or subsequ

operations ashore. Neither were there any gro

forms to shield the attacker. From the reef all

way to the beach the enemy denied all approachforcing the Marines to ride their vehicles ashor

or wade in—without being able to fight back. 00

ashore, the assault waves found themselves Oil

down by withering enemy fire that came from e

fully prepared emplacements, from almost 01

direction.

For two full days the defenders of Betio had

the advantages accruing to the defender. The

tackers had to come to them, across fire-swept wate

over a coral reef that barred the progress of evcr)

thing but amphibian tractors, and these were f6

The defenders had the protection of undergro

emplacements and positions; bombs and shells ll

little effect upon them. The attacking Marines,

the other hand, were forced to move in the op

with no protection, no cover, and no concealni

They came down fire-lanes covered by presit

enemy guns.
Chief ally to the Japanese in this battle was the

reef that fringed Betio. The reef prevented the continuous movement of troops, supplies, and equipment from ship to shore. Despite the reef, and intense and bitter resistance from the enemy, the 2d

Marine Division fought and worked until it got

enough men, supplies, and equipment ashore to

carrY the fight into the Japanese positions, and in the

end annihilated all but 146 of the enemy's 4,836 inen.

In just 76 hours, the 2d Marine Division had

completed the capture of Betio, key island—and the

°MY one with an airfield—in Tarawa atoll, and this,

coupled with the capture of Makin by a regimental

combat team of the 27th Infantry Division, gave the

'United States control of the entire Gilberts Islands

archipelago, bases from which an attack could be

launched against the highly strategic Marshalls.

m Appraised in terms of the combined United States

';,.avY, Marine, and Army forces employed in the

uilberts operation, losses in ships and personnel were

relatively light. Tarawa, however, appeared ex- tbr ea*.

y costly, on the basis of casualties sustained, because of two things: the casualties were sustained

one organization, the 2d Marine Division; and,

heY occurred within the scant space of 76 hours.

. 0a people hungry for war news and word of

victories, the announcement of casualties in United

6tates papers following Tarawa came as a blow. Few

P. e°Ple were prepared for the cost involved in press111g an amphibious assault against a strongly held

1.1ettlY island. The initial public reaction which folWed in the wake of Tarawa tended for some time

ha 

obscure the fact that here was an important, if

rd-won victory; an operation which was planned

ell the basis of exceptionally good intelligence inforrriati°u, with an unusually accurate and full estiate of the situation, and which was executed

aCCOrding to plan. When evaluated in terms of later

°Perations, Tarawa finally achieved its proper

Perspective.

Actu

y

ath,,

casualties to the assaulting troops at

arawa amounted to approximately 20 percent, a

bgure Well within the calculated amount that can

e sustained in a successful amphibious assault

atgainst a strongly defended enemy island, and acItallY less than those sustained during corresponding

13.eriods of initial assault in several succeeding operas in which the Corps would participate.

Tarawa served-two important purposes: It demonstrated clearly the soundness of our doctrines of

amphibious assault; it pointed out inevitable weaknesses in technique. If Tarawa was not the finished

product that many later operations were, it had a

greater importance in that it paved the way for those

operations.

Never before in the history of war had ships and

planes been called upon to attempt the destruction

of the enemy on a fortified coral atoll as a preliminary to landing troops. Betio offered a concentrated

target which ordinarily would tend to multiply the

effectiveness of air and surface bombardment, thus

simplifying the destruction of the target.

For this to be absolutely true there would have to

be a foreknowledge of the exact capabilities and

limitations of air and ssurf ace bombardment as applied to a target of this precise nature, and equally

important, a fully evolved technique in applying

these weapons against such a target—something that

could come only from actual experience.

Tarawa served to reduce to proportion the exaggerated concept of what surface and air bombardment could do to a heavily fortified, concentrated

target. The results came as no surprise to the landing

force.

One of the great lessons learned about naval gunfire, as used against a target such as Betio, was the

need for destruction rather than neutralization.

There had not been enough preliminary preparation

by naval gunfire and air bombardment. Those who

believed, before Tarawa, that planes and ships could

destroy completely the enemy fortifications and personnel on a small coral island were quick to perceive

their error.

It was concluded that the preparatory bombing

and shelling to be delivered on enemy-defended

islands similar to Betio would have to be increased

in duration and weight, all of this with an eye toward

the total destruction of accurately located weapons

and fortifications.

Tarawa highlighted the necessity that timing of

naval gunfire and air bombardment be made to conform with the movement of the landing craft of the

first waves of assault troops. Until the landing force

can get ashore and establish its own base of supporting fire, it has to rely heavily upon naval gunfire and

air bombardment to render the support normally

provided by organic weapons.

61
This is important because an amphibious assault

is not a simple ferrying operation; it is a tactical

movement, an integral and vital part of the attack

itself. Therefore, the landing force must be landed

properly and with full support during its approach

to the beach, a time when its effectiveness is potential, rather than kinetic.

Once ashore, the landing force depends upon a

continuous ship-to-shore movement, the life line of

the amphibious assault. Normally, troops, equipment, and supplies are boated according to prearranged plans which envisage a successful landing on

selected beaches. This causes a tendency toward

rigidity in executing the ship-to-shore movement.

At Tarawa the reef, and the volume and accuracy

of hostile fire resulted in the flow of troops and supplies (subsequent to the initial landing) being

stopped short of the beach. Furthermore, the order

of equipment and supplies moving toward the beach

was not the order in which they were required. In

this case, the loaded landing craft were committed

by the forces afloat to a movement which did not

conform to the tactical situation ashore.

It is difficult to change the ship-to-shore movement plan when the assault is pinned down at the

beach. Then, if ever, there has to be a great flexibility to offset the inherent rigidity. Tarawa showed

that better regulation and control could help to provide this flexibility; that the landing force must be

able to exert control over the movement of supply

and reinforcements in accordance with the situation

on the beaches.

At Tarawa, the amphibian tractor—the LVT—

came into its own as an assault troop carrier. In the

words of Admiral Nimitz :

The ideal defensive barrier has always been the one

that could not be demolished, which held up assaulting

forces under the unobstructed fire of the defenders and

past which it was impossible to run, crawl, dig, climb,

or sail. The barrier reef fulfills these conditions to the

letter, except when sufficient amphibious tanks and

similar vehicles are available to the attackers.

In the field of the LVT's, the main lesson learned

at Tarawa was the need for having enough of the

tractors available in future operations to carry ashore

not only the first three assault waves, but the reserve

waves to follow; in addition to these, there needed

to be spares to take the places of those tractors destroyed by enemy fire or mines, or which became

68

inoperative due to mechanical failures. Also red

nized was the need for amphibian tanks and If

gunboats, not available in time for Tarawa.

The 2d Marine Division (which had

realized the need for LVT's in the assault (

Tarawa) had available to it in all only 125 35,

phibian tractors, too few to carry ashore more t1i2

the first 3 assault waves of troops, and even then t°

many for the 3 LST's provided to transport the tO

tors to the target. It was necessary that the divisic

deck-load 50 tractors on troop transports in ord'

to bring them along for the operation.

It is interesting to speculate as to what might ha'

happened at Tarawa had the landing force bef

provided with more tractors and with the shipPiv

to launch them. Their successful use in ever-inctea

ing numbers in later operations serves to point 'as

beacon toward Tarawa.

There were many other lessons learned at Tara

Reports submitted at the close of the operation 51

filled with them. Constructive criticism, commelli

suggestions, and ideas provided a wealth of mato*"

that was quickly disseminated so that others nligf

benefit.

There had to be a Tarawa. This was the inevitabl

point at which untried doctrine was at length tried'

the crucible of battle. The lessons learned at Tara 

had to be learned somewhere in the course of 0

war, and it now seems providential that they v41

learned as early and at no greater cost than s'

involved.

Had there been no Tarawa to point the way, tha

lessons would have remained unlearned until th'

were driven home with even greater force in tl

Marshalls, in the Marianas, at Peleliu, or on

Jima. The last operation, which occurred I

months after Tarawa, parallels more closely than 51

other battle of the war the bitter fight at Betio, gl!

it was there, if ever, that the experience of Tara

sustained and facilitated victory.

Tarawa was the key to the Gilberts, which in Of

was one of the keys that unlocked the Marshalls.

key to victory at Tarawa, however, in the last

ysis, was the individual, Marine. His discip10

fighting ability and courage came into sharper fo,cilf

perhaps, than ever before in World War II.

strength, however important as an individual, RI

real effectiveness in the over-all collective effort, t

effort of the task force.
For Tarawa was more than a battle of individuals

and their strengths and frailties; it was a battle of

inachines, of equipment, of plans, of ships, of sand

and water and coral reefs. It was a battle of what the

Marine Corps and Navy knew and had, as opposed

to what the Japanese knew and had; and in the end,

it was the Japanese who were more than defeated—

they were literally exterminated.

SIMPLE CROSS WAS ERECTED at the western tip of Betio as a monument in memory of 2nd Division Marines who were

killed in the battle for Tarawa.

69
APPENDIX A

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Bibliography

1. U. S. Navy at War, Official Reports by Fleet

Admiral Ernest J. King, USN.

2. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army 1943 to 1945, to the Secretary of War.

3. Special Action Report (Tarawa), Task Force

53.

4. Enclosure (A) to 3.

5. Action Report (Tarawa), Task Group 53.1.

6. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 2d Marine

Division.

7. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 2d Marines.

8. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 1st Battalion,

2d Marines.

9. Special Action Report (Tarawa) , 2d Battalion,

2d Marines.

10. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 3d Battalion,

2d Marines.

11. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 8th Marines.

12. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 1st Battalion,

8th Marines.

13. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 2d Battalion,

8th Marines.

14. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 3d Battalion,

8th Marines.

15. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 6th Marines.

16. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 1st Battalion,

6th Marines.

17. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 2d Battalion,

6th Marines.

18. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 3d Battalion,

6th Marines.

19. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 10th Marines.

20. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

10

21. Special Action Report (Tarawa), 2d Tank 11

talion.

22. Operation Order No. 14, 2d Marine Div1si°1

23. Annex D to 20, intelligence.

24. V Amphibious Corps G-2 Report (Tara0

25. Interrogations of Japanese Officials, V.

Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) 17.01'

26. Vol. 2 of Document No. 25.

27. Tarawa (Duell, Sloan and Pierce) by RO

Sherrod.

28. Headquarters V Amphibious Corps, Report

Special Observers on Galvanic.

A. Report by Brig. Gen. J. L. Underbt

USMC.

B. Report by Capt. R. F. Whiteli0

USN.

C. Report by Lt. Col. E. F. Carl,

USMCR.

D. Report by Lt. _ Col. D. D. Robell

USMCR.

E. Report by Lt. Col. W. I. Jord

USMC.

F. Report by Maj. C. A. Wood,

USMCR.

29. Notes on Talk by Col. Merritt A. Edson to 01

cers, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,

30. Notes from Interview of Lt. Col. R. It

Tompkins, USMC, November 1946, by P

torical Section, HQMC.

31. Notes from interview of Capt. T. N. Gre

USMC, January 1947, by Historical Se

HQMC.

32. Article "Artillery at Tarawa," by Col. P.

Rixey, USMC, and Maj. Wendell H. 13,1

USMC, Marine Corps Gazette, Nove'l

1944.
33.

Letter from Col. Merritt A. Edson, USMC, to

Ciiil. Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC, dated 12

March 1944. 34. Letter from Col. D. M. Shoup, USMC, to Col.

Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC, dated 12 April

1944.

35. BETIO BEACHHEAD (G. P. Putnam's

Sons), by Five Marine Corps Combat Correspondents.

38. War Diary, Second Marine Division, September

1943.

37. War Diary Second Marine Division, October

1943.

38. War Diary, Second Marine Division, November

1943.

Fifth Amphibious Force Report, Galvanic.

V Amphibious Corps Action Report (Galvanic).

JICP0A Bulletin No. 8-44.

Study of Japanese Defenses of Betio Island, Part

I, prepared by Intelligence Section, 2d Marine Division, and JICPOA.

V Amphibious Corps Operation Plan 1-43.

M-2 Information Bulletin No. 193, Division of

Plans and Policies, Headquarters U. S.

Marine Corps. 45. Action Report, U. S. S. Maryland 20 November

1943. 46. A

A.0 Lion Report U. S. S. Requisite, 20-28 November 1943.

47. Action Report U. S. S. Pursuit, 20-22, November 48. 1943.

Action Report, U. S. S. Ringgold, 21 October2 December 1943.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44

49. D-3 Journal, 2d Marine Division, 19-21 November 1943.

50. ADC Journal, 2d Marine Division, 19-21 November 1943.

51. D-3 Journal, 2d Marine Division, 21-22 November 1943.

52. D-3 Journal, 2d Marine Division, 22-23 November 1943.

53. Recommendations Based on Tarawa, 2d Marine Division.

54. Letter from CG V Amphibious Corps to CO V

Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company, dated 22 October 1943.

55. ADC Journal, 2d Marine Division, Apamama.

56. Special Action Report, V Amphibious Corps

Reconnaissance Company, Apamama.

57. D-2 Study, Apamama, 2d Marine Division.

58. Operation Order 15-43,2d Marine Division.

59. Action Report, USS Pursuit, Abaiang, Marakei,

Maiana Atolls.

60. Special Action Report, Company D. 2d Tank

Battalion, Tarawa.

61. G-1 Report Galvanic, V Amphibious Corps.

62. D-2 General Study, 2d Marine Division,

Tarawa.

63. "The Navy's Air War: Mission Completed," by

Aviation Unit Operation 519B, DCNO

(air).

64. "The Campaigns of the Pacific War," U. S.

Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) .

65. Operation Plan 13-43 GALVANIC CinCPac,

5 October 1943.

66. Operation Report, November 1943, CinCPac.

67. "The Island War" (Lippincott), by Maj. Frank

0. Hough, USMCR.

11
APPENDIX B

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Marine Casualties

Killed in action 

Wounded—killed 

Died of wounds 

Missing, presumed dead 

Wounded, missing dead 

Wounded in action 

Combat fatigue 

Subtotal 

Grand total 

supplied by Casualty Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 5 Mar. 1947.

12

168

3,301
APPENDIX C

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Japanese Casualties

Strength of Japanese Garrison, 20 Nov. 19,13 4,836

Prisoners of War ( Japanese) taken 17

Prisoners of War (Korean laborers) taken 129

Escaped 0

146 146

Total number enemy killed on Tarawa 4,690

Strength of Japanese Garrison, Apamama, 20 Nov 23

Enemy dead, Apamama 23

0

13
APPENDIX D

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Chronology

1941

10 Dec Makin seized by Japanese landing

force; Tarawa raided by Japanese

landing party.

1942

2 Feb United States Naval Forces attack Japanese bases in Marshalls and Gilberts; Japanese bases, shipping, and

installations damaged.

17 Aug U S. Marines raid Makin Atoll.

1943

January Airfield on Betio first observed by

American planes.

21 Feb American planes fly reconnaissance

mission over Tarawa.

August 2d Marine Division first learns of plans

for Gilberts Operation.

4 Sept V Amphibious Corps becomes a part of

Fifth Amphibious Force.

7 Sept 2d Marine Division starts amphibious

training with transports.

16 Sept 2d Marine Division reports for operational control to V Amphibious

Corps.

18, 19 Sept U. S. Naval and Army aircraft bomb

and photograph Tarawa.

2 Oct Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith and staff

representatives report to V Amphibious Corps, Pearl Harbor, for conference regarding Tarawa operation.

14

12 Oct Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith holds CO

ference with regimental comm 

ers and staff at Wellington,

Zealand, to discuss Tarawa plansl

30 Oct 2d Marine Division completes loacli

aboard ship for Tarawa.

1 Nov 2d Marine Division leaves Welling°

for Efate, New Hebrides.

7 Nov Task Force 53 assembles at Efate

rehearsal; first rehearsal excr

takes place.

9 Nov Second rehearsal exercise held.

13 Nov Southern Attack Force (Task F

53) , leaves Efate for Tarawa.

16-19 Nov__. Preliminary bombardment and shell

of Tarawa in progress.

20 Nov 2d Marine Division lands on Betio',

Battalion, 8th Marines, 2d aria

Battalions, 2d Marines in assa

1st Battalion, 2d Marines and

Battalion, 8th Marines land it'.

serve. Small beachhead establis

by sundown.

21 Nov 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, lands

Red 2. 2d Battalion, 6th Marin

sent to Bairiki. 1st Battalion, 6th

rines, lands on Green Beach. Bea

head expanded slightly during

day.
22 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, lands on

Green Beach. 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, attacks along south side of

2

island.

N

During night 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, repels 3 vicious counterattacks.

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, attacks to

clean up east end of island. Betio

declared secured 1330.

24 

Nov-- -- 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, mopping up

rest of Tarawa. 2d and 8th Marines

leave Tarawa for Hawaii. Maj.

Gen. H. M. Smith arrives to inspect

Betio.

25 Nov Apamama Attack Force leaves Tarawa

for Apamama.

26 Nov Apamama occupied.

Admiral Nimitz and Vice Admiral

Spruance arrive to inspect Betio.

28 Nov Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith announces

"Remaining enemy forces on Tarawa wiped out."

29 Nov 2d Division Scout Company leaves to

reconnoiter Abaiang, Marakei, and

Maiana Atolls.

4 Dec Command of Tarawa turned over to

Advance Base Commander.

15
APPENDIX E

16

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

United States Task Organizations

DIAGRAM, TASK ORGANIZATION, CENTRAL PACIFIC FORCE, NOVEMBER 1943

TG 51.1

FLEET FLAG

USS INDIANAPOLIS

Vice Adm. R.4.Spruonce

GILBERT ISLANDS

TASK FORCE 50

Carrier Force

R.Adm. C.A.Pownall

TASK FORCE 54

Assault Force

R.Adm R.K.Turner

TASK FORCE 57

Defense Forces

and Shore Based

Air

R. Adm. J.H.Hoover

Ng Phib Corps

MajGen H.M. Smith,

USMC

Hg Support Aircraft

Col. W.O.

Eareckson, USA

M AKIN

TASK FORCE 52

Northern Attack Force

R.Adm R K Turner

TARAWA

TASK FORCE 53

Southern Attack Force

R.Adm H.W.Hill
DIAGRAM, TASK FORCE 50

TASK FORCE 50

CARRIER FORGE

Rear Admiral C A Pownall

Task Group 50.1

Carrier Interceptor

Group

Task Group 502

Northern Carrie'r

Group

Task Group 503

Southern Carrier

Group

Task Group 50.4

Relief Carrier

Group

R.Adm C. A.Pownall R.Adm. A. W. Radford R.Adm, A. E R.Adm. F. C. Sherman

Montgomery

3 BBs 3 BBs 2 CVs I CV

2 CVs 1 CV I CVL I CVL

CVL 2 CVLs 3 CAs 2 CLs

6 DDs 6 DDs 5 DDs 4 DDs

TASK ORGANIZATION, TASK FORCE 53

Task Force 53

Southern Attack

Force

R. Adm.H.L. Hill

TG 53.1

T

ransport

Group

Capt. H.8.

Knowles, USN

la APAs

3AKAs

1 AP

1 LSD

823766_46 6

TG 53.2

Minesweeper

Group

REQUISITE

PURSUIT

TG 53.4 TG 53.5 TG 53.6

Support Southern Carrier Group

Group Landing

F orce

Rear Adm.H.F Maj.Gen.J.C. R.Adm. V. H.

Kingman Smith,USMC Ragsdale

Five Fire 2d Marine Five CVEs

Support Division

Sections

3 BBs

3 CLs

2 CAs

9 DDs

Tarawa Groups

LST Gp

(TG 54.5)

LST Gp 2

(TG 54.7)

Garrison Gp

(TG 54.9)

2d Defence Bn.

Apa mama Groups

Garrison Gp.1

(TG 54.10)

Garrison Gp. 2

(TG 54.11

8th Defense Bn.

77
APPENDIX E (Continued)

DIAGRAM, TASK FORCE 57

TASK FORCE 57

Defense Forces and

Shore Based Air

Rear. Adm. J. H. HOOVER

TASK GROUP 57.1

Force Flag

CURTISS (AV-4)

TASK GROUP 57.2

Striking Group

Maj.Gen. W. A. HALE,USA

TASK GROUP 57.3

Search and Reconnaissance

Group

Rear Adm.J.H. HOOVER

TASK GROUP 57.4

Ellice Defence and

Utility Group

Brig.Gen. L.G. MERRITT, USMC

18
TASK FORCE 53

TRANSPORT GROUP 41

Capt. H. B. Knowles, USN

7'ransDi, 4

CT 2 (2d Marines)

TASK GROUP 53.4

SUPPORT GROUP

Rear Adm. H. F. Kingman

Fire Support Section 1:

ZEILIN LT 2/2 (2d Bn., 2d Marines) TENNESSEE BB 43

A HEY WOOD A? LT 2/8 (2d Bn., 8th Marines) MOBILE CL 63

A MIDDLETON LT 3/2 (3d Bn., 2d Marines) BIRMINGHAM CL 62

A BIDDLE LT Hq/2d Marines BAILEY DD 492

A LEE LT 1/2 (1st Bn., 2d Marines) FRAZER DD 607

TRUBAN Detachments CT 8 Fire Support Section 2:

Trans

MARYLAND BB 46

Div 18 CT 8 (8th Maines) SANTA FE CL 60

4yA t'k MONROVIA LT 3/8 (3d Bn., 8th Marines) GANSEVOORT • DD 608

SnERIDAN OA LT 1/8 (1st Bn., 8th Marines) MEADE DD 602

LA SALLE

?A

Division Troops Fire Support Section 3:

DOYEN

kA

Division Troops COLORADO BB 45

VIRGO

LSI)

Detachments CT 8 PORTLAND CA 33

ASHLAND 2 Medium Tanks ANDERSON DD 411

7'ransDiv 6

CT 6 (6th Marides)

RUSSELL 

Fire Support Section 4:

DD 414

,APA 

AAA HARRIS tELL

IAPA ORMSBY

APA PELAND

AICA

LT 3/6 (3d Bn., 6th Marines)

LT 2/6 (2d Bn., 6th Marines)

LT Hq/6th Marines

LT 1/6 (1st Bn., 6th Marines)

RINGGOLD 

DASHIELL 

Fire Support Section 5:

INDIANAPOLIS 

DD 500

DD 659

CA 35

BELLATRIX Detachments CT 6 SCHROEDER DD 501

11.11.°41. 2d Marine Division Special Action Report, Tarawa,

'Joined the transport group at Vila Harbor, Efate.

19
APPENDIX F

80

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Japanese Garrison Force

Organization Tarawa, 20 November

7th Sasebo Special

Naval Landing Force

(1,497 Men)

Gilbert Islands Garrison

Force Headquarters. (BETIO)

3d Special Base Force

(1,122 Men)

Formerly known as the

6th Yokosuka Special

Naval Landing Force.

111th Pioneers

(1,247 Men)

4th Construction Unit

(970 Men)
THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Brief History Of The Gilbert

APPENDIX G Islands Before The Japanese Invasion

1 , The first record of the discovery of the islands of

tl,'e group which came to be known as the Gilberts

uates back to 1765 when Commander Byron in the

■ ') Dophin discovered the island of Nikunau. In

\ 7„.88 Captain Gilbert in the Charlotte and Captain

ic`'arshall in the Scarborough discovered Apamama,

\P ria, Aranuka, Tarawa, Abaiang, Butaritari, and

' 'akin. In the years that followed, many ships ran , across the little islands and atolls of the Gilberts in

' h.e course of their travels in the central Pacific. Two

, shiPs of the United States Exploring Expedition, the

1

Pceacock and the Flying Fish, under the direction of

C°1111nodore Wilkes, and under the command of

Ptain Hudson, visited many of the Gilbert Islands.

t e in the Gilberts, considerable time was devoted

aPPing and charting reefs and anchorages.

the ritish protectorate was first proclaimed over

Giberts by Captain Davis of H. M. S. Royalist

27lMay 1892. In 1915 the Gilbert and Ellice Ist,nds were proclaimed a colony of the British

'ITIPire.

la'rile natives of the Gilberts are Micronesian, simitill' ill many respects to the natives of the Marshalls,

je Carolines, and the Marianas. At the time of the

wa.Piallese invasion they were a self-governing people,

13 1.tn. their tribal consciousness undisturbed by the

tr ltish : system of colony government and adminis-

‘7i°11. Loyal to the British, the Gilbertese looked

, 1 leth dissatisfaction upon the prospects of coming un-

'b.riLtile rule of the Japanese. During their stay in the

0 1,uerts, the Japanese did nothing to change the

,1)111jun of the Gilbertese on this score.

th,,ihie principal industry found in the Gilberts was

i oc production of phosphate from the deposits on

'i ll'eau Island and Fanning Island. In addition, cocolaubtoPralms were cultivated on some of the islands. All

\,‘„ was supervised by the British and every effort

's made to see that the wages and living conditions

were fair and adequate. Sanitary inspections by the

British did much to improve the general living conditions on most of the islands.

Native diet prior to World War II consisted mainly of fish, coconuts, pandanus fruit, babai, chicken,

and some pork. Accommodations for Europeans employed in the islands were simple. Their houses were

constructed of both European and native materials

and were generally of the bungalow type. There were

no hotels or accommodations for tourists.

At the outbreak of the war, about 78 percent of

the native population were said to be Christians.

This group was divided mainly into two denominations: Congregationalists (43 percent) ; and Roman

Catholics (35 percent) . The rest of the population

were largely semipagan agnostics; they did not adhere to the Christian faith, nor did they retain much

of their beliefs in their own ancient gods.

Judged to be about 84 percent literate, the Gilbertese responded readily to the colony's educational

efforts. All education in the islands came under the

supervision of the Colonial Education Department

whose aims were to educate native boys for employment in government and commercial work, and to

standardize the level of education throughout the

colony. The bulk of the education was provided by

the missions, which maintained all the village schools.,

and trained the native school teachers.

When war came in December 1941, the Japanese

occupied Makin Atoll immediately and raided

Tarawa. In February the British evacuated most of

their people from Tarawa, except for missionaries

who elected to remain, and coast watchers. Tarawa

and Apamama were occupied in force by the Japanese in September 1942 and during the next year

garrisons were built up on Betio (Tarawa Atoll ) ,

and Butaritari ( Makin Atoll) . Only nominal forces

were placed on other islands in the Gilberts.

81
THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Command and Staff—V Amphibious Corl)(

APPENDIX H and 2d Marine Division 20 November 1911

V Amphibious Corps

Commanding general__ Maj. Gen. H. M. Smith.

Chief of staff Brig. Gen. G. B. Erskine.

G-1 Lt. Col. Albert F. Metze.

G-2 Lt. Col. St. Julien R. Marshall.

G-3 Col. Peter P. Schrider.

G-4 Col. Raymond E. Knapp.

2d Battalion, 2d Marines

Commanding officer___ Lt. Col. Herbert R. Ay

(KIA, 20 Nov. 1943).

Executive officer Maj. Howard J. Rice.

Bn-3 Capt. Benjamin T. Owe°

3d Battalion, 2d Marines

2d Marine Division

Commanding general__ Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith.

Assistant division corn- Brig. Gen. Leo D. Hermle.

mander.

Chief of staff Col. Merritt A. Edson.

D-1 Lt. Col. C. P. Van Ness.

D-2 Lt. Col. T. J. Colley.

D-3 Lt. Col. J. P. Risely.

D-4 Lt. Col. Jesse S. Cook.

2d Marines

Commanding officer__ Maj. John F. Schoettel.

Executive officer Maj. Samuel D. Mande'

Bn-3 Capt. Richard Phillippl.

6th Marines

Commanding officer Col. Maurice G. Holro

Executive officer Lt. Col. Russell Lloyd.

R-1 First Lt. P. J. Costello.

R-2 Capt. Donald Jackson.

R-3 Maj. Loren E. Haffner.

R-4 Maj. Cyril C. Sheehan.

Commanding officer__ Col. David M. Shoup.

Executive officer Lt. Col. Dixon Goen.

R-1 Capt. James E. Herbold.

R-2 Capt. John L. Schwabe.

R-3 Maj. Thomas A. Culhane, Jr.

R-4 Capt. Vernon L. Bartram.

1st Battalion, 2d Marines

Commanding officer__ Maj. Wood B. Kyle.

Executive officer Maj. William S. Vasconcellos.

Bn-3 Capt. Harold R. Thorpe.

82

1st Battalion, 6th Marines

Commanding officer___ Maj. W. K. Jones.

Executive officer Maj. John E. Semmes,

Bn-3 Capt. Charles H. Triplett

2d Battalion, 6th Marines

Commanding officer__ Lt. Col. Raymond L. 0,

ray.

Executive officer Maj. Richard C. Nutting

Bn-3 

'

Capt. Joseph E. Rowland
3d Battalion, 6th Marines

011-ananding officer__ Lt. Col. Kenneth F. McLeod.

Irecutive officer Maj. John E. Rentsch.

Capt. William W. McKinley.

8th

131"x1manding officer_ _- Executive officer R-1_ 

Marines

Col. Elmer E. Hall.

Lt. Col. Paul D. Sherman.

Capt. Cleland E. Early.

Capt: Wilmot J. Spires.

Maj. Hewitt D. Adams.

Capt. Alfred E. Holland.

1st Battalion, 8th Marines

te°41 , mandingofficer Maj. Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.

ecutive officer Maj. Robert J. Oddy.

Capt. Danlel V. McWethy,

Jr.

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

,C°11Irnanding officer___. Maj. Henry P. Crowe. rAec .

utive officer Maj. W. C. Chamberlin.

First Lt. K. C. Fagan.

3d Battalion, 8th Marines

Co411nanding officer_ __

tnx_ecnutive officer 

10th

eon-in-landing general_-.

Executive officer 

Maj. Robert H. Ruud.

Maj. Stanley E. Larsen.

Capt. Scott S. Corbett.

Marines

Brig. Gen. T. E. Bourke.

Lt. Col. Ralph E. Forsyth.

Capt. Ralph D. Pillsbury.

First Lt. David J. Lubin.

Lt. Col. Marvin H. Floom.

Capt. Marshall R. Breedlove.

1st Battalion, 10th Marines

Commanding officer__ Lt. Col. Presley M. Rixey.

Executive officer Maj. James E. Mills.

Bn-3 Maj. Wendell H. Best.

2d Battalion, 10th Marines

Commanding officer. Lt. Col. George R. E. Shell.

Executive officer Maj. Richard B. Church.

Bn-3_ Maj. Kenneth C. Houston.

3d Battalion, 10th Marines

Commanding officer Lt. Col. Manly L. Curry.

Executive officer Maj. Gene N. Schraeder.

Bn-3 Maj. Earl J. Rowse.

4th Battalion, 10th Marines

Commanding officer . Lt. Col. Kenneth A. Jorgensen.

Maj. Harry N. Shea.

Maj. James 0. Appleyard.

Executive officer 

Bn-3 

5th Battalion, 10th Marines

Commanding officer. Maj. Howard V. Hiett.

Executive officer Maj. William L. Crouch.

Bn-3 Maj. Wade H. Hitt.

18th Marines

Commanding officer_ Col. Cyril W. Martyr.

Executive officer Lt. Col. Ewart S. Laue.

First Lt. Haldon E. Lindfelt.

Maj. James F. Geary.

Lt. Col. Kenneth P. Corson.

Capt. Robert F. Ruan.

R-1 

R-2_

R-3 

R-4

83
1st Battalion, 18th Marines

Commanding officer__ Maj. George L. H. Cooper.

Executive officer Maj. Joseph S. Reynaud.

Bn-3 (1)

2d Battalion, 18th Marines

Commanding officer___ Lt. Col. Chester J. Salazar.

Executive officer Maj. Robert L. Smith.

Bn-3 Capt. Jerome R. Walters.

3d Battalion, 18th Marines

Commanding officer___ Commander Lawrence E.

Tull.

Executive officer Lt. Comdr. Edwin E. Gibson.

Bn-3 Lt. Robert Cleghorn.

I Not shown on muster rolls.

84

2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Commanding officer_ _ _ Maj. Henry C. Drev'c'i

(KIA, 20 Nov. 1943)

Executive officer Capt. Henry G. Lawre0

Jr.

Capt. William H. Housman Bn-3 

2d Tank Battalion

Commanding officer___ Lt. Col. Alexander B. Swell

ceski (WIA, 20 PI

1943) .

Maj. Charles W. McCoY.

First Lt. Edward C. W'I

nessey (KIA, 20 No

1943) .

Executive officer

Bn -3
APPENDIX I

Coast defe

Arltiaircra

leach defe

V2)11.1 es

3 .°rn study of Jap Defenses of Betio Island, Part I, JICP0A and 2d Marine Division.

0 many destroyed for accurate postoperation count.

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Estimated Against Actual Enemy Weapon

Emplacements, Betio Island, Tarawa'

Type Weapons by

document

Weapons emplacements

(actual count)

Size

ase 

't 

rise and antiboat 

4

4

6

4

8

12

4

6

5

6

14

16

17

4

4

6

4

8

27

4

10

6

9

14

31

, 

8-inch.

14-cm.

80-mm.

127-mm. (twin mount, DP).

7-cm. (75-mm. actual, DP).

13-mm. (single mount).

13-mm. (twin mount).

75 (mountain gun, type 41).

70-mm. (battalion gun, type 92).

37-mm. (field gun).

37-mm. (in light tank).

13-mm. MG (single and twin, AA DP).

7.7-mm. MG.'

85
APPENDIX

86

THE BATTLE FOR TARAWA

Message from Major General Julian C. Smith

to Officers and Men, 2nd Marine Division

Read to all hands on 19 November 1943, D-minus-I-day:

A great offensive to destroy the enemy in the central Pacific has begun. American air, sea, and

land forces, of which this division is a part, initiate this offensive by seizing Japanese-held atolls in the

Gilbert Islands, which will be used as bases for future operations. The task assigned to us is to capture the atolls of Tarawa and Abemema. Army units of our Fifth Amphibious Corps are simultaneously attacking Makin, 150 miles north 'of Tarawa.

For the past 3 days Army, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft have been carrying out bombardment attacks on our objectives. They are neutralizing, and will continue to neutralize, other Japanese

air bases adjacent to the Gilbert Islands.

Early this morning combatant ships of our Navy bombarded Tarawa. Our Navy screens our

operations and will support our attack tomorrow morning with the greatest concentration of aerial

bombardment and naval gunfire in the history of warfare.

It will remain with us until our objective is secured and our defenses are established. Garrison forces are already enroute to relieve us as soon as we have completed our job of clearing our

objective of Japanese forces.

This division was especially chosen by the high command for the assault on Tarawa because of

its battle experience and its combat efficiency. Their confidence will not be betrayed. We are the first

American troops to attack a defended atoll. What we do here will set a standard for all future operations in the central Pacific area. Observers from other Marine divisions and from other branches of

our armed services, as well as those of our allies, have been detailed to witness our operations. Representatives of the press are present. Our people back home are eagerly awaiting news of our victories.

I know that you are well-trained and fit for the tasks assigned to you. You will quickly overrun

the Japanese forces; you will decisively defeat and destroy the treacherous enemies of our country;

your success will add new laurels to the glorious tradition of our corps.

Good luck and God bless you all.

N. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING Of FICE: 19,,
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749543 0-47 (Face p. 86)

TABLE OF DISTANCES FROM TARAWA

IN NAUTICAL MILES

Apamama 76

Auckland . 2292

Bougainville 1165

Guadalcanal 1831

Johnston 1087

Kwajalein Island 1632

Makin 452

Nauru 1455

Pearl Harbor 2085

Saipan 1849
PROPERTY OF

.HISTORICA .3RANCH, C-3

HEADall,:dii.:as MAINE CORPS

PLEASE RETURN TO ROOMc49:27
I

PROPERTY OF

HIST&:11C11.1. r..-...''.,;7:1, G-3 -•

CGRPS

• PLEAZE REPAN TO RE.15114°-9/2'
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in

presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

SECOND MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

consisting of Division Headquarters, Special Troops (including

Company C, 1st Corps Medium Tank Battalion), Service Troops,

2nd, 6th, 8th, 10th and 18th Marine Regiments in the Battle of

Tarawa, as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For outstanding performance in combat during

the seizure and occupation of the Japanese-held Atoll of

Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, November 20 to 24,1943. Forced

by treacherous coral reefs to disembark from their landing

craft hundreds of yards off the beach, the Second Marine

Division (Reinforced) became a highly vulnerable target

for devastating Japanese fire. Dauntlessly advancing in

spite of rapidly mounting losses, the Marines fought a

gallant battle against crushing odds, clearing the limited

beachheads of snipers and machine guns, reducing

powerfully fortified enemy positions and completely

annihilating the fanatically determined and strongly

entrenched Japanese forces. By the successful occupation

of Tarawa, the Second Marine Division (Reinforced) has

provided our forces with highly strategic and important

air and land bases from which to continue future operations against the enemy; by the valiant fighting spirit

of these men, their heroic fortitude under punishing fire

and their relentless perseverance in waging this epic

battle in the Central Pacific, they have upheld the finest

traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

ting

Secretary of the Navy
Property of

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL LIBRARY

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