J-S09045-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

LAKRESHA JOHNSON 

 v. 

JONATHAN KING 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2267 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered July 25, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at 

No(s): C-48-PF-2023-00352 

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2024 

 Appellant, Johnathan King (“King”), appeals pro se from the order 

entered July 25, 2023, by the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas 

(“trial court”) granting the petition filed by his former intimate partner, 

Lakresha Johnson (“Johnson”), pursuant to the Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.1 Finding no abuse of discretion or error of law 

by the trial court, we affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 King filed one notice of appeal indicating he was appealing from two separate 

orders: (1) the trial court’s July 25, 2023 final PFA order and (2) the trial 

court’s August 4, 2023 order, which denied his motions for reconsideration, 

dismissal, and recusal. See Notice of Appeal, 8/23/2023. “Generally, when 

a party seeks to appeal from two separate decisions entered on the same 

docket, the party must file two separate notices of appeal.” In re Adoption 

of A.M.W., 289 A.3d 109, 111 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). 

However, King’s appeal does not lie from the August 4, 2023 order denying 

his motion for reconsideration. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.7(b) Note, 1930.2(b); 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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 The record reflects that on April 21, 2023, Johnson filed a PFA petition 

against King. At that time, Johnson was engaged to Jacob Stettler (“Stettler”). 

The petition alleged that King posted an old photograph of Johnson on 

Stettler’s vehicle, had a prior physical altercation with Johnson, and had a 

history of showing up at Johnson’s apartment unannounced, harassing 

Johnson over text messages, leaving copies of fake text messages purporting 

to be between King and Johnson on Stettler’s vehicle, creating fake pages of 

Johnson on social media, threatening to get Johnson fired from her place of 

employment, sending Johnson screenshots of postal inspection forms filled out 

in Johnson’s name, threatening to beat up anyone Johnson was dating, and 

contacting Stettler’s family members. 

 That same date, the trial court entered a temporary PFA order in favor 

of Johnson and against King. The order prohibited King from contacting, 

abusing, harassing, stalking, threatening, or attempting to threaten to use 

physical force against Johnson, and from possessing or acquiring firearms. 

The order also prohibited King from stalking or harassing Stettler. The trial 

____________________________________________ 

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3); Karschner v. Karschner, 703 A.2d 61, 62 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (stating an appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion for 

reconsideration) (citation omitted). With respect to the portions of the August 

4, 2023 order denying his motions for dismissal and recusal, we decline to 

quash King’s appeal from these portions of the order because Johnson did not 

object to King’s failure to file two appeals and the appeal period has expired. 

See A.M.W., 289 A.3d at 111 n.1 (citing Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Aetna 

Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 A.2d 448, 453 (Pa. 1970)) (declining to quash appeal 

where appellant filed one notice of appeal indicating he was appealing two 

decrees where appellees did not object and appeal period had expired). 
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court initially scheduled a hearing on May 3, 2023, but continued it pending 

service of the PFA petition on King. Following a hearing on May 17, 2023, the 

trial court entered a three-year final PFA order against King.2 Thereafter, King 

filed a timely motion for reconsideration, alleging that there was insufficient 

evidence to support a finding of abuse and that the trial court abused its 

discretion in crediting Johnson’s testimony and not allowing King a full 

opportunity to testify and present evidence at the hearing. The trial court 

granted reconsideration and scheduled a hearing on July 25, 2023.3 

The trial court summarized the evidence from the July 25, 2023 hearing 

as follows: 

Johnson testified that she and King had previously dated, and that 

at the time of filing her [PFA p]etition, Johnson believed King was 

“stalking” her. Johnson testified that King had been previously 

physically and verbally abusive to her during the course of their 

prior relationship. King admitted to a prior “altercation” in March 

[] 2022. Following the parties’ last in-person interaction on or 

about March 15, 2023, Johnson testified that King began 

questioning her about who she was dating and if she had become 

engaged. Johnson stated that she had gotten engaged to another 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Although the trial court initially denied the PFA petition, it subsequently 

vacated its decision and granted the petition. N.T., 5/17/2023, at 17, 19-20. 

3

 In a May 30, 2023 order, the trial court scheduled a hearing on King’s motion 

for reconsideration for July 25, 2023, and ordered the May 17, 2023 final PFA 

order to remain in effect until the hearing date. On June 14, 2023, King timely 

filed a notice of appeal with this Court, which was docketed at 1590 EDA 2023. 

On June 15, 2023, the trial court entered an amended order—clarifying its 

May 30 order—to expressly grant reconsideration, reiterate the July 25th

hearing date, and reinstate the April 21, 2023 temporary PFA order. 

Accordingly, this Court sua sponte quashed the appeal. See Order, 1590 EDA 

2023, 8/7/2023 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3)(ii); Cheathem v. Temple 

University Hosp., 743 A.2d 518 (Pa. Super. 1999)). 
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individual in April 2023. Upon Johnson confirming that she had a 

fiancé, Johnson testified that King began requesting Johnson 

repay him for things he had purchased during their previous 

relationship. Immediately thereafter, Johnson’s fiancé’s car was 

vandalized, the tires were slashed, and placed on the car was a 

photo of Johnson depicting a tattoo on her body that King had paid 

for while they had been together. Johnson testified that the tattoo 

was private, only something a limited number of people had 

knowledge of, and only two people besides King had access to the 

particular photo that was placed on the car. King was provided 

with an opportunity to cross-examine Johnson about her 

allegations[. H]owever, King’s questioning focused on items he 

purchased for Johnson in November 2022 and January 2023. 

King’s testimony further focused on his anger that Johnson did not 

disclose to him that she had entered into a new relationship, e.g., 

“I don’t do things for other dude’s girl” and “she never mentioned 

her fiancé.” When the [trial c]ourt directed King to focus on the 

relevant time frame regarding the allegations of Johnson’s 

petition, and declined to accept hearsay evidence in the form of 

text messages between King and other individuals not present in 

court, King began objecting and speaking over the [trial c]ourt. 

When the [trial c]ourt stated that it found Johnson’s testimony 

that she was in reasonable fear for her personal safety as a result 

of King’s conduct to be credible, King became belligerent to the 

extent that the courtroom deputies needed to intervene. Both the 

testimony and demeanor of the parties were appropriately 

considered by the [trial c]ourt in the entry of the [July 25, 2023 

final PFA o]rder. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/2023, at 1-2 (record citations omitted; parties’ 

names supplied). 

Following the hearing, the trial court entered a final PFA order, effective 

for the three-year period from July 25, 2023, to July 25, 2026. The order 

prohibited King from contacting, abusing, harassing, stalking, threatening, or 

attempting to threaten to use physical force against her Johnson, possessing 

or acquiring firearms, and stalking or harassing Stettler. On August 2, 2023, 

King filed timely motions for reconsideration, dismissal, and recusal, all of 
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which the trial court denied on August 4, 2023. This timely filed appeal 

followed. King and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 On appeal, King raises the following issues: 

1. Was the final hearing, on [July 25, 2023], held in a timely 

manner pursuant to the Pennsylvania Code, Title 23, Chapter 

61, Sec. 6107(a)? 

2. Did the [trial c]ourt violate [King’s] 14th [A]mendment rights 

to due process multiple times during the process of determining 

the order in question? 

3. Did [Johnson] prove the abuse by the preponderance of the 

evidence and did the [trial c]ourt err in a matter of law and 

abuse its discretion when ruling that she did? 

4. Did the [trial] court show bias towards [King] throughout this 

process and when determining the order in question? 

King’s Brief at 11-12 (unnecessary punctuation omitted).4

“In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 

A.3d 123, 127 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion 

is more than just an error in judgment, and, on appeal, the trial court will not 

be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the 

judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 925 (Pa. Super. 

2013). 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Johnson did not file a brief in response. 
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In his first issue, King argues that the July 25, 2023 hearing was not 

held in a timely manner under section 6107(a) of the PFA Act. King’s Brief at 

17. According to King, when the trial court expressly granted reconsideration 

on June 15, 2023, the hearing date had to be held within ten business days 

thereof. Id. at 17-18. He acknowledges that the trial judge was on leave 

during this time, but claims the same judge did not have to preside over the 

hearing and that the trial court held other PFA hearings on dates that were 

within the ten-day timeframe. Id. at 18. 

Section 6107(a) requires, in pertinent part, that the trial court hold a 

hearing within ten business days of the filing of a PFA petition. 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6107(a). The ten-day period, however, is not unyielding. Section 6107(c) 

permits the trial court to continue a hearing under subsection (a) and may 

enter temporary ex parte orders in the interim. Id. § 6107(c). Trial courts 

have discretion to continue hearings pursuant to section 6107 even where 

they have already issued a temporary PFA order. Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 926 

(stating the trial court’s ability to grant a continuance is not dependent upon 

the absence of a previously entered ex parte order). 

The record reflects that Johnson filed her petition on April 21, 2023, and 

the trial court promptly scheduled a hearing on May 3, 2023, which was within 

ten business days of the filing and comported with section 6107(a). The trial 

court continued the hearing to May 17, 2023—ten business days after the 

original hearing date—after the sheriff was unable to serve King with the 
J-S09045-24 

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notice of hearing, temporary PFA order, and petition. As this Court has held 

that continuances for the protection of the parties’ rights are allowable in other 

contexts, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court with respect to 

this brief continuance to allow service on King. See id. (holding trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in continuing hearing beyond ten days provided in PFA 

Act where continuance allowed plaintiff to retain counsel, who she had tried 

to retain earlier in the proceedings). 

Following a hearing on May 17, 2023, the trial court entered a final PFA 

order against King. The trial court then granted King’s timely motion for 

reconsideration on May 30, 2023, as clarified by the amended order entered 

June 15, 2023, and the trial court scheduled a second hearing for July 25, 

2023. The trial court explained that this date was its first available hearing 

date following the trial judge’s medical leave. Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/2023, 

at 1 n.1. The trial court also reinstated the April 21, 2023 temporary PFA 

order pending the hearing. 

We find no abuse of discretion in the scheduling of the reconsideration 

hearing at the trial court’s first available date upon return from leave. See

Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 926. Indeed, the very reason there was a second 

hearing at all was because the trial court granted King’s motion for 

reconsideration. The trial court did not enter a final PFA order against King 

until after it held an evidentiary hearing, which provided King and Johnson 
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with the due process safeguards provided under section 6107. Accordingly, 

King’s first issue merits no relief. 

In his second issue, King argues that the trial court violated his due 

process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution. King’s Brief at 19. According to King, his due process 

rights were violated by trial court’s: (1) rescission of its denial of Johnson’s 

PFA petition at the May 17, 2023 hearing; (2) entry of its June 15, 2023 order 

expressly granting King’s request for reconsideration; and (3) disparate 

treatment of the parties during the proceedings. Id. at 20-27. 

We begin with the trial court’s decision to rescind its denial of Johnson’s 

petition. At the outset, we note that the trial court granted King’s motion for 

reconsideration, vacating its May 17 decision. As such, the trial court’s May 

17 decision was a nullity. See D'Elia v. Folino, 933 A.2d 117, 123 n.3 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (stating trial court’s grant of reconsideration served to vacate 

prior order, rending prior order a legal nullity). 

Regardless, King’s claimed due process violation stemming from that 

proceeding is meritless. The record reflects that at the original hearing on 

May 17, 2023, Johnson presented her own testimony and rested her case. 

N.T., 5/17/2023, at 2-10. King was then given an opportunity to present his 

side of the story. Id. at 10-14. After King stated, “[s]he’s lying essentially,” 

the trial court responded, “I’m going to stop you right now.” Id. at 13-14. 

King did not stop, instead repeating, “[s]he’s lying.” Id. at 14. King continued 
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to repeatedly interrupt the trial court and disregarded its directives for him to 

stop. Id. at 14. Nonetheless, the trial court, while noting that King was 

“worked up,” ruled against Johnson. Id. 15-16. Johnson attempted to 

present further evidence, but the trial court rejected it because she had 

already rested, and stated that its order was “without prejudice to come back 

here and re-file this.” Id. at 16-17. King began to interrupt the trial court 

again, prompting a directive from the deputy sheriff for him to “[b]e quiet.” 

Id. at 17. The trial court warned King, "I’m watching your behavior right now, 

and there seems to be a nervousness that’s got me concerned.” Id. at 17-

18. King still did not stop talking. Id. at 18. At that point, the trial court 

stated, “I’m starting to second guess myself here as to whether or not maybe 

I’m reading wrong what’s going on here. Your reaction to this is starting to 

make me think that maybe there was something that’s not credible about 

what you’re saying.” Id. at 19. King continued to talk and interrupt the trial 

court, at which point the trial court held: 

I am vacating what I just ruled upon, and I am going to grant the 

PFA. I have serious concerns about the manner in which [] King 

has been handling himself here, and his behavior is starting to 

become ... indicative that perhaps he is the one responsible for 

these ongoing messages in this context. 

So I am going to grant the PFA now. I’m going to grant the costs. 

As I’ve stated, I vacated my initial decision to deny the PFA based 

upon what’s been observed today in [c]ourt. I find [Johnson] 

credible. I find that she does have reason to be in fear of [King], 

that he is a threat to her. 

Id. at 19-20. 
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Trial courts are permitted to modify or rescind any order within thirty 

days after its entry, subject to limitations not relevant here. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5505. “The [trial] court’s exercise of its power under [s]ection 5505 of the 

Judicial Code is almost entirely discretionary; this power may be exercised sua 

sponte, or may be invoked by a request for reconsideration filed by the 

parties.” Anderson v. Anderson, 544 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa. Super. 1988). 

Here, the trial court’s ability to view firsthand the parties’ demeanor and 

behavior during the hearing was critical to its credibility determinations. As 

the hearing proceeded, King’s disruptive behavior and disregard for the trial 

court’s directives influenced the trial court’s opinion and affected its decision. 

Because the trial court was well within its discretionary powers to rescind its 

decision and grant the PFA petition, King’s due process rights were not 

violated. See id.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. 

King next claims a due process violation based upon the trial court’s 

entry of its June 15, 2023 order expressly granting King’s request for 

reconsideration. King’s Brief at 23. Without citation to authority, King claims 

that the trial court’s grant of reconsideration “means the [trial c]ourt agreed 

and acknowledged that it violated [King’s] due process rights.” Id. at 22. 

King takes issue with the fact that the first order granting reconsideration kept 

the May 17 final PFA order in effect, while the amended reconsideration order 

kept the April 21 temporary PFA order in effect. Id. at 25. King baldly asserts 
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the amended order “was only filed in response to [King’s] filing a notice of 

appeal and “only to keep [King’s] appeal from being heard.” Id. at 24-25. 

We reject King’s claim. The trial court exercised its discretion when it 

granted his request for reconsideration within thirty days of its May 17 final 

PFA order. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Once again, it was within the trial court’s 

discretion to modify its order, which it also did within the thirty-day timeframe. 

See id. 

In his final due process claim, King asserts that the trial court allowed 

Johnson to “testify fully and present evidence” while it did not allow him the 

same. King’s Brief at 25. King asserts he was “cut off, denied the opportunity 

for the [trial] court to review his evidence[,] and required to have witnesses 

to corroborate anything he said.” Id. at 26. He also complains that Johnson 

was allowed to testify at both the May 17 and July 25, 2023 hearings, while 

King “was only given one opportunity to testify” on July 25, 2023. Id. at 26. 

Our review of the record belies King’s claim, as the trial court provided 

King the opportunity at both hearings to cross-examine witnesses (Johnson) 

and present evidence in his defense. See N.T., 7/25/2023, at 10-28; N.T., 

5/17/2023, at 9-20. To the extent the trial court curtailed King’s ability to 

present his defense, it was of his own making through his disruptive and 

defiant behavior at both hearings. See, e.g., N.T., 7/25/2023, at 32 (sheriff’s 

deputy directing King, “[s]ir, don’t talk when the Judge is talking” and King 
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responding, “I’m allowed to. It’s the rules of court. I’m allowed to. It’s the 

rules of court.”). Accordingly, none of King’s due process claims merit relief. 

In his third issue, King argues that Johnson did not prove abuse by a 

preponderance of the evidence warranting the entry of a final PFA order. 

King’s Brief at 27. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding Johnson credible because she “did not present any evidence at all” and 

failed to present corroborating witnesses or evidence of photographs, text 

messages, social media posts, or police reports. Id. at 27-28, 31. King 

repeatedly states that Johnson lied to the trial court, pointing to her testimony 

regarding the last time she was with King. Id. at 29-30, 32. He argues that 

Johnson’s testimony was “very vague,” did “not allege any violence or threats 

of violence,” and differed from the first hearing. Id. at 30. In contrast, 

according to King, “his story never changed and he presented credible 

evidence.” Id. at 33. 

When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence was not 

sufficient to support an order of protection from abuse, we review 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and 

granting her all reasonable inferences, determine whether the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 

B.K.P. v. J.R.B., 303 A.3d 456, 459 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). 

“This Court defers to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to 

witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, we are 

not entitled to reweigh the evidence. K.B., 208 A.3d at 130 (citation omitted). 
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“The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence 

from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance 

prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In relevant part, 

the PFA Act defines abuse as a sexual or intimate partner knowingly engaging 

in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, 

including following the person, without proper authority, under circumstances 

which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6102(a)(5). The Act does not seek to determine criminal culpability; a 

petitioner need not establish that abuse occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, 

only by a preponderance of the evidence. K.B., 208 A.3d at 128 (citation 

omitted); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a). The preponderance of the evidence 

standard “is defined as the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale 

slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” 

K.B., 208 A.3d at 128 (citation omitted). “A PFA petitioner’s testimony alone, 

if believed by the trial court, may constitute sufficient evidence of abuse.” 

E.K., 237 A.3d at 523. 

The record reflects that Johnson believed King was stalking her and King 

had a history of being verbally and physically abusive toward her. N.T., 

7/25/2023, at 3, 5, 10. Johnson described King as “malicious” when he gets 

upset, and King admitted to a prior physical altercation with Johnson in March 

2022, following which he received anger management treatment. Id. at 5, 
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27. In March 2023, King faced possible incarceration and Johnson “was trying 

to be there for him,” but when King saw an engagement ring on her finger, it 

“triggered” him. Id. at 5-6. Thereafter, King wanted Johnson to repay her 

for things he had bought when they were dating. Id. at 6. Within a “couple 

days” of learning of Johnson’s engagement, Stettler’s car tires were slashed. 

Id. In addition, a photograph of a tattoo that Johnson had gotten—and King 

had paid for—while they were dating was placed on Stettler’s car. Id. at 6-7, 

18. The tattoo was private and only two individuals, besides Johnson and 

King, had access to the photograph. Id. at 6. King also had a history of 

threatening to “beat up,” “punch,” and “break” the face of another person 

Johnson had dated. Id. at 9-10. Further, the record confirms the trial court’s 

account, detailed above, of King’s cross-examination of Johnson and his 

insolent behavior during the July 25, 2023 hearing. See id. at 13-14, 16-18, 

23-24, 30-32; see also Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/2023, at 2. 

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, and 

granting her all reasonable inferences, we conclude the evidence was 

sufficient to sustain the trial court’s grant of her PFA petition by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See B.K.P., 303 A.3d at 459; see also T.K. 

v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding evidence of abuse was 

sufficient under section 6102(a)(5) of the PFA Act where respondent-appellant 

had a history of harassing and stalking petitioner-appellee; followed her in his 

vehicle, in the grocery store, at sporting events, and in other locations; 
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repeatedly honked his car horn as he passed her house; circumvented a 

custody order to communicate with her via a court-monitored app by having 

children and others scream into the phone at her; and petitioner-appellee was 

concerned for her safety and feared escalation of his behavior). The trial court 

found Johnson’s testimony to be credible. See N.T., 7/25/2023, at 30 (trial 

court stating, “I’ve considered the testimony, and I do find that [] Johnson’s 

testimony is credible”); see also E.K., 237 A.3d at 523. In repetitively 

arguing in his brief that Johnson was lying, King is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence and believe his version of events over Johnson’s, which 

we may not do. See K.B., 208 A.3d at 128. Further, we reject King’s 

assertion that Johnson failed to present any evidence. Her testimony alone, 

which was believed by the trial court, was sufficient evidence of abuse. E.K., 

237 A.3d at 523. Accordingly, King’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fails. 

Finally, King argues that the trial court was biased against him 

throughout the proceedings. King’s Brief at 33-34. According to King, this 

bias is evident because the trial court lied “to cover [its] tracks,” used King’s 

“alleged behavior” at the hearing as evidence, and failed to hold a hearing 

within ten days. Id. at 34. King further bases his claim on the trial court’s 

decision to vacate its denial of the PFA petition and its “blatant lie” about 

King’s behavior at the May 17 hearing, and its subsequent decision to 

expressly grant reconsideration one day after he filed an appeal. Id. at 36-

38. King also makes reference to an anecdote that he believes establishes 
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the trial judge’s bias. He states that after the May 17 hearing, he went to the 

district attorney’s office to report a crime, and while in the waiting area, he 

observed the trial judge enter and go to the back. Id. at 35. Shortly after, 

King claims, a detective came out to speak with King but “refused to even look 

at” his “evidence.” Id. at 35. King finds this behavior “extremely suspicious.” 

Id. at 35.5 

While unclear in his brief, to the extent King is appealing the denial of 

his motion to recuse, our scope and standard of review are as follows. 

The denial of a motion to recuse is preserved as an assignment of 

error that can be raised on appeal following the conclusion of the 

case. We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to recuse 

for an abuse of discretion. Indeed, our review of a trial court’s 

denial of a motion to recuse is exceptionally deferential. We 

extend extreme deference to a trial court’s decision not to recuse. 

We recognize that our trial judges are honorable, fair and 

competent, and although we employ an abuse of discretion 

standard, we do so recognizing that the judge himself is best 

qualified to gauge his ability to preside impartially. Hence, a trial 

judge should grant the motion to recuse only if a doubt exists as 

to his or her ability to preside impartially or if impartiality can be 

reasonably questioned. 

____________________________________________ 

5

 King additionally takes issue with the trial court’s consideration of Johnson’s 

testimony at the May 17 hearing regarding a comment to a post on Stettler’s 

grandmother’s Facebook account. King’s Brief at 39. King claims the trial 

court improperly considered this testimony where the grandmother was not 

present as a witness, but refused to let him present similar hearsay evidence 

at the July 25 hearing, and then lied when it said it was not considering the 

Facebook testimony. Id. at 39-40. As stated above, the May 17 decision is 

a nullity following the grant of reconsideration. See D'Elia, 933 A.2d at 123 

n.3. Furthermore, at the July 25 hearing, the trial court expressly stated that 

it was not considering Johnson’s testimony regarding the Facebook post. N.T., 

7/25/2023, at 24, 28. 
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V.L.-P. v. S.R.D., 288 A.3d 502, 523 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). 

“A party seeking recusal must assert specific grounds in support of the 

recusal motion before the trial judge has issued a ruling on the substantive 

matter before him or her.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“Recusal is required whenever there is a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s 

ability to preside impartially.” Id. “However, opinions formed by the judge 

on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current 

proceedings do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless 

they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 

judgment impossible.” Id.

We reject King’s bias claim as wholly without foundation. Initially, the 

record reflects that King did not assert his “suspicion” involving the district 

attorney’s office before the trial court entered its July 25, 2023 final PFA order. 

See id. Even if he had, King’s bald, unsupported hunch—wherein he 

admittedly “does not know why”6 the trial judge entered the district attorney’s 

office—does not reveal any compromise of the integrity, fairness, or 

impartiality of the proceedings. Further, as discussed above, we reject the 

complaints King lodged against the trial court regarding the timeliness of the 

hearing, recission of its denial of the PFA petition, and amended 

reconsideration order. The record does not disclose any indication of actual 

____________________________________________ 

6

 King’s Brief at 35. 
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bias, nor the appearance of impropriety, by the trial court. Simply because 

King was dissatisfied with the outcome of the proceedings does not mean that 

the trial court showed bias. See V.L.-P., 288 A.3d at 525 (affirming denial of 

recusal motion and stating “[s]imply because the court ultimately disagreed 

with [a]ppellant’s position following the hearing, does not mean the court 

showed bias”). Discerning no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we 

conclude King’s fourth claim merits no relief. 

Order affirmed. 

Date: 6/20/2024