IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

CHRISTOPHER VAN LEUVEN, No. 81566 

Appellant, 

VS. 

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT 

SYSTEM OF NEVADA; AND TOWN OF 

PAHRUMP, AN UNINCORPORATED 

TOWN AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISION 

OF NYE COUNTY, STATE OF 

NEVADA, 

Res ondents. 

FILED 

DEC 3 2021 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a 

petition for a writ of mandamus in an employment matter. Eighth Judicial 

District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge. 

Appellant Christopher Van Leuven worked as a firefighter 

paramedic for respondent Town of Pahrump (the Town). In January 2012, 

the Town terminated Van Leuven's employment as discipline for his 

involvement in an ambulance accident. Following an arbitration award 

that required the parties to agree to a lesser disciplinary punishment than 

termination, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Under that 

agreement, Van Leuven was rehired in April 2016 and provided back wages 

from January 2012, when he was terminated, to March 2016. 

In 2017, Van Leuven filed a grievance against the Town after 

noticing that it had not made contributions to respondent Public Employees' 

Retirement System (PERS) on his behalf during the time his employment 

was allegedly wrongfully terminated. The case again went to arbitration, 

A. BROWN 

PREME COURT 

CLERK 
and the arbitrator concluded that the settlement agreement did not require 

the Town to make PERS contributions for that period. Van Leuven 

nevertheless obtained a letter from PERS determining, based on the 

information Van Leuven submitted, that his return to work constituted a 

retroactive reinstatement under NRS 286.435. Relying on that letter, Van 

Leuven filed the underlying petition for a writ of mandamus against PERS, 

seeking to compel PERS to obtain the disputed contributions from the 

Town. The Town intervened, and both PERS and the Town filed motions to 

dismiss, which the district court granted. This appeal followed. 

Relying on the letter from PERS, Van Leuven argues that NRS 

286.435 applies, and he is therefore entitled to writ relief. In opposition, 

both the Town and PERS argue that NRS 286.435 cannot apply because the 

arbitrator found that the agreement provided less-than-whole 

reinstatement. PERS further contends that the letter it sent to Van Leuven 

determining that he was retroactively reinstated should not be treated as 

the agency's final determination on this issue because it was not aware of 

the entire procedural history of this dispute at that time. 

'In relevant part, NRS 286.435(1)(c) provides that an employee who 

was "involuntarily terminated and who is thereafter reinstated 

retroactively to employment with a participating public employer. . . by the 

terms of any settlement agreement[ ] shall pay . . . [the] employee 

contributions which would have been made on the back pay awarded to 

[him]." Under NRS 286.421(9), "[p]ublic employers . . . shall pay the entire 

employee contribution for those employees who contribute to the Police and 

Firefighters' Retirement Fund on and after July 1, 1981." Because Van 

Leuven is a firefighter paramedic, the Town would have to pay his PERS 

contributions if NRS 286.435 applied. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

101 1947A 440. 

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"A district court's decision to grant or deny a writ petition is 

reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard." DR Partners 

v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs of Clark Cty., 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468 

(2000). A writ of mandamus is available to compel a legal duty to act, but 

only if the petitioner is legally entitled to have the act done, see NRS 34.160, 

and "the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy." 

Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1194, 

1196 (2020). "A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that 

extraordinary relief is warranted, and whether to consider a writ of 

mandamus is ultimately within [the] court's discretion." Cameron v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 135 Nev. 214, 216, 445 P.3d 843, 844 (2019) (internal 

citation omitted). 

A court will review an arbitrator's factual findings under "the 

arbitrary-and-capricious standard [which] limits a reviewing court's 

consideration to whether the arbitrator's findings are supported by 

substantial evidence." Clark Cty. Educ. Ass'n v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 122 

Nev. 337, 342, 131 P.3d 5, 9 (2006). "Substantial evidence exists if a 

reasonable person could find the evidence adequate to support the 

[arbitrator]'s conclusion." Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, 784, 

312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Van Leuven's petition for writ of mandamus because Van 

Leuven failed to establish that the district court had a clear duty to grant 

Van Leuven's requested writ relief. Importantly, the arbitrator found "the 

evidence established that the parties agreed that the [s]ettlement would 

involve something less than a complete restoration to the status quo ante 

with an adjustment made for disciplinary suspension." This factual finding 

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is supported by substantial evidence. The settlement agreement 

specifically listed the compensation Van Leuven would receive. And, it did 

not include PERS contributions, even though Van Leuven's counsel initially 

requested this be included in the agreement early in the negotiation 

process. The Town's Human Resources Director testified about handling a 

retroactively reinstated employee during the arbitration proceedings. Her 

testimony indicates that such employees are not provided a lump sum but 

rather her staff would make the payments per payroll period. Further, the 

first arbitrator allowed the parties to agree upon a remedy—but the 

arbitrator did not order the Town to make Van Leuven whole or provide him 

with all back wages and benefits. Notably, too, PERS has since disavowed 

its own determination that NRS 286.435 applies and asserts that it would 

not have issued this determination had Van Leuven provided PERS with 

the second arbitration award. 

Therefore, because the district court is bound by the factual 

findings in the arbitration award—notably that the settlement agreement 

did not include Van Leuven's PERS contributions and did not provide makewhole relief—the district court did not err when it concluded that NRS 

286.435 does not apply. Consequently, because NRS 286.435 does not 

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Pairaguirre 

Cadish 

Pickering 

apply, Van Leuven failed to establish that he is entitled to writ relief on this 

basis. Accordingly, because the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

dismissing Van Leuven's petition for a writ of mandamus,2we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

eLLAt,tx, C.J. 

Hardesty 

, J. 

Stiglich 

CLIZt/Aa2A) 

Silver 

J. 

cc: Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge 

Law Office of Daniel Marks 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Downey Brand LLP 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2In light of this disposition, we need not address the remaining issues 

raised on appeal. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1447A 01§ND 

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