SUMMARY

April 2, 2020

2020COA59

No. 19CA0124, Huffman v. City and County of Denver — Public 

Records — Criminal Justice Record Sealing — Municipal 

Convictions

A division of the court of appeals interprets section 24-72-

708(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2018, and holds that the statute does not 

preclude the sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic 

violence. Instead, the division concludes that the domestic violence 

prohibition applies only to petitioning defendants who have 

committed a new offense after the conviction they seek to seal. 

Accordingly, the order is reversed, and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings.

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA59

Court of Appeals No. 19CA0124

City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CV33472

Honorable Michael A. Martinez, Judge

Timothy Roy Huffman,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

City and County of Denver, Colorado,

Respondent-Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE

Richman and Grove, JJ., concur

Announced April 2, 2020

The Law Offices of Joshua Johnson, LLC, Joshua Johnson, Denver, Colorado, 

for Petitioner-Appellant

Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, Andrew Saliman, Assistant City Attorney, 

Marley Bordovsky, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for RespondentAppellee
1

¶ 1 In this record sealing case, we are asked to interpret, for the 

first time, a provision of the municipal conviction record sealing 

statute, section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2018, that the General 

Assembly added in 2017. Prior to this amendment, the statute 

permitted a defendant to request sealing of a municipal conviction 

if, among other requirements, at least three years had passed since 

the conviction’s disposition or the defendant’s release from 

supervision (whichever was later), and if the defendant had not 

been charged with or convicted of a new felony, misdemeanor, or 

misdemeanor traffic offenses since the conviction’s disposition or

the defendant’s release from supervision (no new offenses 

requirement).1 § 24-72-708(1)(a)(I).

¶ 2 The provision at issue, section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II), reflects an 

exception to the “no new offenses” requirement. It allows a 

defendant who has committed a new offense to petition for sealing 

of a municipal conviction, but only if (1) the municipal conviction to 

 1 The statute also prohibits the sealing, under any circumstances, 

of municipal convictions for misdemeanor traffic offenses committed 

either by the holder of a commercial learner’s permit or a 

commercial driver’s license, or by the operator of a commercial

motor vehicle. § 24-72-708(1)(a)(I)(C), C.R.S. 2018.
2

be sealed did not involve domestic violence and (2) the new offense 

did not involve domestic violence and is not a felony. The question 

we must answer is whether the General Assembly, when it 

expanded the reach of the municipal sealing statute, intended to 

preclude the sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic 

violence when it added this subsection, as argued by the City and 

County of Denver (City) and found by the district court, or whether 

this domestic violence prohibition applies only to petitioning 

defendants who have committed a new offense after the disposition 

of the municipal conviction they seek to have sealed.2 Petitioner, 

Timothy Roy Huffman makes the latter argument and appeals the 

district court’s order denying his petition to seal his municipal 

assault conviction. For the reasons described below, we agree with 

Mr. Huffman. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and 

remand the case for a hearing on Mr. Huffman’s petition under 

section 24-72-708(2)(b).

 2 This provision also includes an unlawful sexual conduct and child 

abuse limitation not at issue.
3

I. Background

¶ 3 In 2007, Mr. Huffman pleaded guilty to a single count of 

municipal assault where the underlying facts involved domestic 

violence. The court sentenced Mr. Huffman to one year of 

supervised probation, which he successfully completed in 2008. He 

has incurred no additional charges or convictions since his release 

from supervision.

¶ 4 In September 2018, and for reasons related to his 

employment, Mr. Huffman petitioned the district court to seal his 

municipal conviction under section 24-72-708. The City objected

and argued that subsection (1)(a)(II) categorically bars the district 

court from sealing municipal convictions involving domestic 

violence. It reasoned that because Mr. Huffman was convicted of a 

municipal assault involving domestic violence, he is ineligible to 

have the conviction sealed.

¶ 5 The district court agreed with the City’s interpretation of the 

statute, found Mr. Huffman’s municipal conviction ineligible for

sealing, and denied the petition.
4

II. Sealing of Municipal Conviction Records Under 

Section 24-72-708

¶ 6 Mr. Huffman contends that the district court misinterpreted 

section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II) by applying its domestic violence 

prohibition to all municipal convictions. He argues that the 

statute’s plain language only applies this prohibition to defendants 

who have committed a new offense and whose convictions would

not otherwise qualify for sealing under section 24-72-708(1)(a)(I). 

We agree. 

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

¶ 7 We review the district court’s interpretation of section 24-72-

708 de novo. See Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365, 367 (Colo. 2009) 

(noting “[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de 

novo review”). In doing so, we apply basic principles of statutory 

construction.

¶ 8 We begin with the plain language of the statute, and if the 

statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, we need not look any 

further. Id. We read words and phrases in context and construe 

them “according to grammar and common usage.” Jefferson Cty.

Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010); see 
5

also § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2019. “We apply the plain meaning of the 

statutory language, give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, 

and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory 

design.” Associated Gov’ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 

2012 CO 28, ¶ 11. We avoid interpretations that “defeat the 

obvious intent of the legislature,” Klinger v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. 

No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006), as well as interpretations 

that lead to illogical or absurd results, Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 

807, 811 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 9 Only when a statute is ambiguous may we look beyond its 

plain language to other sources of legislative intent. Associated 

Gov’ts of Nw. Colo., ¶ 11. A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably 

susceptible of multiple interpretations. Hunsaker v. People, 2015 

CO 46, ¶ 11. “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 

determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context 

in which that language is used, and the broader context of the 

statute as a whole.” People v. Yoder, 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17 (citation

omitted).

¶ 10 Section 24-72-708 authorizes a district court to seal a 

defendant’s municipal criminal conviction records.
6

(1) Sealing of convictions records. (a)(I) A 

defendant may petition the district court of the 

district in which any conviction records 

pertaining to the defendant for a petty offense 

or municipal violation are located for the 

sealing of the conviction records, except basic 

identifying information, if:

(A) The petition is filed three or more years 

after the date of the final disposition of all 

criminal proceedings against the defendant or 

the release of the defendant from supervision 

concerning a criminal conviction, whichever is 

later; and

(B) The defendant has not been charged or 

convicted for a felony, misdemeanor, or 

misdemeanor traffic offense in the three or 

more years since the date of the final 

disposition of all criminal proceedings against 

him or her or the date of the defendant’s 

release from supervision, whichever is later; 

and

(C) The conviction records to be sealed are not 

for a misdemeanor traffic offense committed 

either by a holder of a commercial learner’s 

permit or a commercial driver’s license, . . . or 

by the operator of a commercial motor vehicle.

§ 24-72-708(1)(a)(I). We refer to the second requirement for sealing 

explained in subsection (1)(a)(I)(B) as the “no new offense” 

requirement.

¶ 11 The 2017 amendment, which added subsection (1)(a)(II), sets 

forth additional sealing requirements and provides, in relevant part, 
7

(II) Notwithstanding the provisions of 

subsection (1)(a)(I)(B) of this section, a 

defendant may petition the district court of the 

district in which any conviction records 

pertaining to the defendant for a municipal 

violation, except a municipal assault or battery 

offense in which the underlying factual basis 

involves domestic violence, as defined in 

section 18-6-800.3(1), or any other municipal

violation in which the underlying factual basis 

involves domestic violence, as defined in 

section 18-6-800.3(1), or petty offense are 

located for the sealing of the conviction 

records, except basic identification 

information, if:

(A) The defendant was convicted of a single 

offense that was not a felony and did not 

involve domestic violence as defined in section 

18-6-800.3(1) . . . ;

. . . .

(B) That offense occurred within three years of 

the date of the final disposition of all criminal 

proceedings against him or her related to the 

conviction that the defendant is seeking to 

have sealed or within three years of the date of 

defendant’s release from supervision related to 

the conviction that the defendant is seeking to 

have sealed; whichever is later; and

(C) The defendant has not been convicted for a 

felony, misdemeanor, or misdemeanor traffic 

offense in the ten or more years since the date 

of the final disposition of all criminal 

proceedings against him or her for the 

subsequent criminal case or in the ten or more 

years since the date of the defendant’s release 
8

from supervision for the subsequent case, 

whichever is later.

§ 24-72-708(1)(a)(II).

B. Statutory Analysis

¶ 12 We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the sealing 

statute’s history. See Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 24 (noting 

that a “statute’s history can ‘inform[] our understanding of 

legislative intent’”) (citation omitted). Initially, the Criminal Justice 

Act of 1977 permitted courts to seal all criminal records, including 

convictions, upon petition and hearing. People v. Bushu, 876 P.2d 

106, 108 (Colo. App. 1994) (citing Ch. 340, sec. 1, § 24-72-308, 

1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1249). But, in 1988, the General Assembly 

repealed and re-enacted this statute. Id. (citing Ch. 190, sec. 3, 

§ 24-72-308, 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 979). In doing so, it 

substantially narrowed the class of persons eligible to have criminal 

records sealed to (1) persons investigated but not charged with a 

crime; (2) persons whose charges were completely dismissed; and 

(3) persons who were acquitted at trial. 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws at 

979-80. Thus, a person convicted of a criminal offense could no 

longer petition to seal criminal records. Bushu, 876 P.2d at 108.
9

¶ 13 In 2008, the General Assembly enacted legislation permitting 

certain criminal convictions involving controlled substances to be 

sealed. See Ch. 393, sec. 2, § 24-72-308.5, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 

1938. In 2012, the General Assembly expanded sealing to include 

offenses committed by victims of human trafficking. Ch. 174, sec. 

7, § 24-72-308.7, 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 623. In 2013, the General 

Assembly added a new provision to the sealing statute that set forth 

separate requirements and a separate procedure for sealing petty 

and municipal offenses. Ch. 289, sec. 10, § 24-72-308.9, 2013 

Colo. Sess. Laws 1544. And in 2014, the General Assembly 

expanded sealing to include offenses related to posting intimate 

photographs of a person on the internet, Ch. 283, sec. 3, 

§ 24-72-709, 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 1166.3 

¶ 14 As originally enacted, the municipal conviction sealing statute 

required a petitioning defendant to satisfy the same three 

requirements now set forth in section 24-72-708(1)(a)(I)(A)-(C) to 

seal a municipal or petty offense conviction. 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws

 3 In 2014, the statutes pertaining to sealing of criminal records were 

recodified at sections 24-72-701 to -708. See Ch. 317, secs. 2-3, 

§§ 24-72-701 to -708, 2014 Colo. Sess. Laws 1377-94.
10

at 1544. Importantly, the original statute did not permit any 

defendant who had been charged with or convicted of a new offense 

to request sealing of a municipal conviction. That changed in 2017

when the General Assembly added the provision at issue,

subsection (1)(a)(II), to section 24-72-708. With this history in 

mind, we turn to the language of this provision. 

¶ 15 We begin with the first phrase, “[n]otwithstanding the 

provisions of subsection (1)(a)(I)(B),” and conclude that it plainly 

concerns the “no new offense” sealing requirement in the first 

subsection. See § 24-72-708(1)(a)(I)(B). The word 

“notwithstanding” means “despite” or “in spite of.” MerriamWebster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/EQR4-9MN9; see Black’s 

Law Dictionary 823 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “notwithstanding” as 

“[d]espite” or “in spite of”); see Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 

929 P.2d 1332, 1339 n.9 (Colo. 1997) (noting that the terms 

“despite” and “notwithstanding” are often used interchangeably); 

see also Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO 13, ¶ 11

(“When used in a statute, ‘notwithstanding’ is intended ‘to exclude

— not include — the operation of other statutes.’”) (citation 

omitted). Giving this phrase its ordinary meaning, we conclude that 
11

it signals an upcoming exception to the “no new offense” 

requirement in subsection (1)(a)(I)(B). See Mendoza v. Pioneer Gen. 

Ins. Co., 2014 COA 29, ¶ 24 (where the statute does not define a 

term, courts may refer to dictionary definitions to determine the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the word); see also Roup v. 

Commercial Research, LLC, 2015 CO 38, ¶ 8 (courts prefer to apply 

a commonly accepted meaning over a strained or forced 

interpretation, and when a statute does not define a term, we 

assume that the General Assembly intended to give the term its 

usual and ordinary meaning).

¶ 16 Next, section 24-72-708(1)(a)(II) says that “a defendant may 

petition the district court of the district in which any conviction 

records pertaining to the defendant for a municipal violation, except 

a municipal assault or battery offense in which the underlying 

factual basis involves domestic violence . . ., are located for the 

sealing of the conviction records, . . . .” Because the domestic 

violence exception is set off by commas, we conclude that it relates 

to the words “municipal violation” that precede it. See Pena v. 

Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 117 P.3d 84, 87 (Colo. App. 2004), as 

modified on denial of reh’g (May 26, 2005) (a phrase set off from a
12

category by commas modifies one or more categories that precede 

it). Thus, this language begins the exception to the “no new 

offenses” requirement by first limiting its applicability to cases 

where the petitioning defendant’s underlying municipal conviction

did not involve domestic violence. 

¶ 17 Assuming a petitioning defendant’s municipal conviction

satisfies this condition, then subsection (1)(a)(II)(A)-(C) sets forth 

additional requirements for sealing. As relevant here, (A) requires 

that a defendant be convicted of a single, nonfelony offense that did 

not involve domestic violence. The City argues that “single offense” 

refers to the underlying municipal conviction sought to be sealed 

because the word “subsequent” appears nowhere in this provision. 

We disagree because such a reading would be nonsensical. If the 

General Assembly meant “single offense” to be the underlying 

municipal offense, then there would be no need for the “not a 

felony” language that follows it, because a municipal offense can 

never be a felony. We may not read language out of a statute,

People v. Coleman, 2018 COA 67, ¶ 51 (citing Turbyne v. People, 151 

P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007)), nor may we interpret a statute in a way 

that would render any of its language superfluous or absurd, Am. 
13

Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barriga, 2018 CO 42, ¶ 8. Hence, the “not a 

felony” phrase reveals that subsection (1)(a)(II)(A) pertains to the 

new offense, and not the underlying municipal conviction to be 

sealed. 

¶ 18 This interpretation is bolstered by the language of section 24-

72-708(1)(a)(II)(B), which begins, “[t]hat offense . . .,” which plainly 

refers back to the offense referenced in subsection (1)(a)(II)(A). It 

goes on to require that “[t]hat offense” have occurred “within three 

years of the date of the final disposition of all criminal proceedings 

against him or her related to the conviction that the defendant is 

seeking to have sealed . . . ,” id. (emphasis added), which confirms 

that “that offense” can only mean a new offense and not the 

underlying municipal conviction.

¶ 19 Finally, subsection (C) sets forth a time requirement not found 

in subsection (1)(a)(I). It requires that a petitioning defendant not 

be convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or misdemeanor traffic 

offense within ten years of the disposition of all proceedings or 

release from supervision in the “subsequent criminal case.” § 24-

72-708(1)(a)(I)(C). Thus, this provision requires a defendant who 

commits a new offense within three years of the municipal violation 
14

to wait at least ten years from the disposition of that new offense to 

file a petition to seal the underlying municipal offense. And if 

another new offense is committed within that ten-year time period, 

then the defendant can never petition for sealing of the underlying 

municipal offense. That subsection (1)(a)(I) permits a defendant to 

petition for sealing three years after the completion of the municipal 

offense, in contrast to the ten years required by subsection 

(1)(a)(II)(C) further supports our conclusion that subsection (1)(a)(II) 

unambiguously provides an exception to the “no new offense” 

requirement of subsection (1)(a)(I)(B), and that it does not 

categorically bar the sealing of all municipal convictions that involve 

domestic violence. See Associated Gov’ts of Nw. Colo., ¶ 11 (Courts 

“give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, and construe each 

provision in harmony with the overall statutory design.”).

¶ 20 We are not persuaded that this statute is reasonably 

susceptible of any other interpretation.4 Subsection (1)(a)(II) 

specifically references the “no new offense” requirement in 

(1)(a)(I)(B) and provides a domestic violence prohibition that does 

 4 Both parties argue that the plain language supports their position 

and that we need not consider the statute’s legislative history. 
15

not appear in subsection (1)(a)(I). When read together, this 

difference demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to 

expand sealing to municipal defendants who incurred new charges 

or convictions, but only in limited circumstances. See People v. 

Owens, 219 P.3d 379, 382 (Colo. App. 2009) (reading statutes in 

their entirety to discern meaning). As well, if, as Mr. Huffman

argues, the General Assembly had intended to categorically prohibit 

the sealing of all municipal convictions involving domestic violence, 

then it could simply have added this category of offenses to 

subsection (1)(a)(I)(C), which lists the convictions and records not 

eligible for sealing. See Zamarripa, 929 P.2d at 1339 (legislative 

omissions must be viewed as intentional and must be given effect).

¶ 21 Based on the plain language and structure of section 24-72-

708(1)(a)(II), we hold that subsection (1)(a)(II) applies only to 

petitioning defendants who have been charged with or convicted of

a new offense following their original municipal conviction, and that 

it does not categorically bar the sealing of all municipal convictions

involving domestic violence. 
16

C. Application

¶ 22 The undisputed record shows that Mr. Huffman successfully 

completed probation on his municipal assault conviction in 2008 

and that he has not incurred any additional charges or convictions 

since that time. Because he has satisfied all of the criteria under 

subsection (1)(a)(I), he was eligible to file a petition to seal the 

municipal conviction in the district court as early as 2013 when the 

municipal conviction sealing statute first became effective. And 

because he has committed no new offenses, the “no new offense” 

prohibitions of subsection (1)(a)(II) do not apply to his case. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erroneously found 

that Mr. Huffman is ineligible to have his municipal conviction 

sealed because it involved domestic violence. 

III. Conclusion

¶ 23 We reverse the district court’s order and remand the case for a 

hearing on the petition.

JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE GROVE concur.