2020 IL App (1st) 180266-U

No. 1-18-0266 

Order filed January 16, 2020 

Fourth Division 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RANDALL JARRETT, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 97 CR 25447 02 

Honorable 

Kenneth J. Wadas, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant failed to establish the gist of a constitutional claim to warrant further 

proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 

¶ 2 Defendant Randall Jarrett appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for 

post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

(West 2016)). On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously dismissed his petition 

where he set forth a non-frivolous claim of a constitutional violation, namely the court’s imposition
No. 1-18-0266 

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of a discretionary life sentence where defendant had an intellectual disability and its failure to 

consider the attendant circumstances of defendant’s intellectual disability during sentencing. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 Defendant has not filed a copy of the common law record or reports of proceedings 

containing any matters prior to the 2017 post-conviction proceeding. Therefore, by necessity, our 

recitation of the facts of the underlying 2003 trial proceedings is taken from our 2007 order 

addressing defendant’s direct appeal (People v. Jarrett, No. 1-04-2025 (2007) (unpublished order 

under Supreme Court Rule 23)) and the December 2017 circuit court order dismissing defendant’s 

post-conviction petition. 

¶ 4 Following a bench trial in March 2003, defendant was found guilty of three counts of firstdegree murder and one count of armed robbery stemming from the 1997 murder of Herman Bailey 

in Chicago. The evidence at trial established that, on September 2, 1997, defendant, along with his 

codefendant uncle, traveled to Bailey’s office in order to rob him. They repeatedly struck Bailey

in the head with a hammer they had brought with them and robbed him of money and a gold chain. 

¶ 5 On July 7, 2003, the court ordered a behavioral clinical examination for the purpose of 

determining defendant’s fitness for sentencing. Following a three-day fitness hearing, the court

found defendant was fit for sentencing but, because his IQ score was 75, was statutorily exempt 

from the death penalty. On May 13, 2004, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms 

of discretionary natural life for first-degree murder and 30 years for armed robbery.1

 

1 Our 2007 order conflicts with the trial court’s 2017 dismissal order regarding whether these 

sentences are concurrent or consecutive. The record on appeal is insufficient to resolve the conflict. We 

adopt the findings of the 2007 order stating the sentences are concurrent.
No. 1-18-0266 

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¶ 6 Defendant filed a direct appeal with this court, arguing that the trial court erred by not 

inquiring into his pretrial pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that one of his two 

convictions for murder and his conviction for armed robbery should be vacated under the one-act, 

one-crime rule. People v. Jarret, No. 1-04-2025 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 

23). On January 12, 2007, this court vacated one of defendant’s murder convictions, but affirmed 

in all other respects. Id. 

¶ 7 On September 27, 2017, defendant filed a 452-page pro se post-conviction petition with 

the Circuit Court of Cook County.

2 Relevant here, defendant claimed his life sentence was 

unconstitutional because the court had determined he was intellectually disabled.3 In support of 

this claim, defendant asserted the sentencing court conducted a hearing “for assessing his 

intellectual functioning,” and determined he was intellectually disabled based upon “expert 

witness psychological results consistent with legislative policy.” Defendant claimed that, after the 

fitness hearing, the court stated: “I no longer believe your (sic) retarded. Although you are eligible 

for a term of 20 to 60 years now, you have already escaped the death penalty, I am enhancing your 

sentence and giving you natural life plus 30 years.” Defendant argued that he was deprived of a 

fair sentencing hearing where he was eligible for a term of 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment due to 

2 The copy of the petition included in the record on appeal is missing at least one page in issue 1, 

so we address the claim using the information available to us. As the appellant, it is defendant’s burden to 

provide a sufficient record to support his claim of error, and any incompleteness in the record will be 

resolved against him. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). We note the majority of

defendant’s argument on appeal arises from issue 4 in his petition, which is complete in the record.

3 While defendant consistently uses the terminology “mentally retarded” throughout both his postconviction petition and his briefing on appeal, the correct terminology currently is “intellectually disabled.” 

People v. Coty, 2018 IL App (1st) 162383, ¶ 1, n. 1 (“ ‘mentally retarded’ * * * is no longer the preferred 

nomenclature”). We therefore use “intellectually disabled” rather than “mentally retarded.”
No. 1-18-0266 

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his intellectual disability, and the sentencing court improperly enhanced his sentence to “natural 

life plus 30 years” due to its own speculation and personal opinion of defendant’s mental capacity.

¶ 8 In a separate claim, defendant argued his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment, and 

violated due process of law and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution,

“given [his] history from the mitigation report, including his low IQ score,” and he was

“categorically less culpable.” He analogized his intellectual functioning to that of a juvenile 

offender, citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding executions of intellectually 

disabled individuals are unconstitutional under the eighth amendment) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 

U.S. 551 (2005) (citing Atkins, holding executions of individuals under 18 years of age is 

unconstitutional). Defendant argued the sentencing court improperly failed to take into account 

“the hallmark features” of intellectual disability before sentencing him to natural life imprisonment 

without parole, analogizing the sentencing of intellectually disabled persons to the sentencing of 

juveniles, citing Atkins, Roper, and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding mandatory 

life imprisonment without parole for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under the eighth 

amendment).4

 

¶ 9 Defendant attached voluminous exhibits to his petition, including an affidavit from his 

codefendant uncle asserting defendant did not know the uncle intended to kill Bailey, an article

published in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology regarding sentencing mitigation for 

young adults, a letter from defendant’s appellate defender, writings by defendant, and certificates 

he earned while incarcerated. 

4 While defendant did not provide the full citation for Miller, we infer from the context in which it 

was used that defendant was citing to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
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¶ 10 On December 18, 2017, the trial court entered a written order dismissing defendant’s 

petition, finding defendant’s claims frivolous and patently without merit. The court was aware of 

no case or statute prohibiting life sentences for intellectually disabled persons. It further found the 

sentencing court “diligently analyzed [defendant’s] fitness for sentencing and imposed a lawful 

life sentence for a heinous crime,” and defendant was ineligible for the protections offered by 

Miller and its progeny as he was not a juvenile at the time of the offense. 

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his postconviction petition because he set forth a non-frivolous claim of a constitutional violation, namely 

that the sentencing court improperly imposed a discretionary life sentence without parole “for a 

purportedly [intellectually disabled] person” without considering the “proper attendant 

circumstances” of his diminished capacity. 

¶ 12 The Act provides a method by which imprisoned persons may collaterally challenge their 

convictions for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 

2016); People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 43 (2007). At the first-stage of post-conviction 

proceedings, the trial court must independently review the petition, taking the allegations as true, 

and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-

2.1(a)(2) (West 2016); People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). A petition is frivolous or 

patently without merit if it has no arguable basis either in law or in fact and, rather, is based on a 

meritless legal theory or fanciful factual allegations. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-13, 16 

(2009). An example of a petition which lacks an arguable basis in law or fact is one which is 

completely contradicted by the record. Id. at 16-17; People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-81 

(1998) (“[T]he allegations in the petition must be supported by the record in the case or by its 
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accompanying affidavits. Nonfactual and nonspecific assertions which merely amount to 

conclusions are not sufficient to require a hearing under the Act.” (Internal citations omitted.)).

Our review of the summary dismissal of defendant’s petition is de novo. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. 

For the following reasons, we find defendant’s claim that the court erred in imposing a natural life 

sentence on him, an intellectually disabled adult, to be frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 13 Defendant’s contention that the sentencing court failed to consider the attendant 

circumstances of his intellectual disability would normally be verifiable by a review of the report 

of proceedings, and possibly the common law record, for the original trial court proceedings. 

Indeed, defendant contends that a petition should only be dismissed if a quick look at the record 

shows that the allegations therein are absolutely untrue or without merit. See People v. Rivera, 198 

Ill. 2d 364, 372 (2001). He argues “[t]here is no record [here] that the proper attendant 

circumstances * * * were considered by the sentencing body.” There is no record regarding 

whether the sentencing court considered the proper factors because defendant failed to provide it. 

Not only did he not attach relevant support to his petition as will be discussed below, he failed to 

provide this court with the underlying record of the sentencing proceedings. 

¶ 14 This court has consistently upheld dismissals of post-conviction petitions at the first stage 

where the allegations are contradicted by the record from the original trial proceedings. See, e.g., 

People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 221-22 (2001); People v. Hernandez, 2014 IL App (2d) 131082, 

¶ 17; People v. Deloney, 341 Ill. App. 3d 621, 629 (2003). The trial court was apparently able to 

review the record of the original trial proceedings before it summarily dismissed the petition. 

However, this court does not have this same benefit because defendant did not file a copy of the 

common law record or reports of proceeding from sentencing for our review. Counsel offers no 
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explanation for their absence in the record on appeal, even though the State directly addresses this 

point. On the limited record before us, we cannot know what the sentencing court considered. In 

fact, we cannot verify that defendant was in fact found to be intellectually disabled or the extent 

of his disability. Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record, including the 

degree to which the sentencing court considered his intellectual disability, must be resolved against 

defendant. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92 (it is the appellant’s burden to provide a sufficiently 

complete record to support a claim of error and any incompleteness in the record is resolved against 

the appellant). 

¶ 15 Further, defendant provided no factual support with his petition for his assertion that he is 

intellectually disabled and the court did not consider the attributes of his intellectual disability at 

sentencing. Although a first-stage post-conviction petition has a low threshold to survive summary 

dismissal, a pro se petitioner is not excused from providing factual support for his claims, and 

must supply a “sufficient factual basis to show the allegations in the petition are ‘capable of 

objective or independent corroboration.’ ” People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24 (quoting People 

v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 67 (2002)). To that end, the Post-Conviction Act requires a petition to 

attach affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or state why they are not 

attached. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2016); Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 10. Unsupported allegations in a 

post-conviction petition are frivolous and patently without merit. See Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 68-69. 

¶ 16 Here, defendant attached no “affidavits, records, or other evidence” supporting his claim 

that the sentencing court failed to consider the attendant characteristics of his intellectual disability 

in sentencing him. The voluminous exhibits attached to his petition contain no factual support that

defendant had an intellectual disability, let alone that the court failed to consider the attendant 
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characteristics of that disability during sentencing. Nor does defendant explain in his petition why 

this evidence is not attached. Defendant’s assertions are fanciful factual allegations, unsupported 

and merely speculative, which is insufficient even at the first stage of post-conviction proceedings

to state the gist of a constitutional claim. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 10; see Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 

68-69. Accordingly, we find defendant’s unsupported claim that the sentencing court failed to 

consider the attendant characteristics of his intellectual disability in sentencing him to a natural 

life sentence frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 17 Defendant cites to People v. Coty, 2018 IL App (1st) 162383, appeal allowed, No. 123972 

(Ill. Jan. 31, 2019), for the proposition that the imposition of a life sentence on an individual with 

an intellectual disability without the procedural safeguards of Miller and its progeny creates 

constitutional error. See Coty, 2018 IL App (1st) 162383, ¶ 86. In Coty, on direct appeal following 

the defendant’s resentencing, citing Miller, the court analogized defendants with intellectual 

disabilities to juvenile defendants, finding they should be treated similarly in a proportionality 

analysis. Id. ¶ 69. The court found the trial court’s imposition of a de facto life sentence on an 

intellectually disabled defendant violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 

Constitution because the record revealed the trial court was not presented with “any information 

about the state of the attributes of the defendant’s intellectual disability” at the time of 

resentencing, which occurred 10 years after his original sentencing. Id. ¶ 86. Coty found the trial 

court’s imposition of a de facto life sentence without the necessary facts from which to determine 

whether the defendant could be restored to useful citizenship or was irretrievably depraved was so 

wholly disproportionate as to violate the moral sense of the community. Id. 
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¶ 18 Defendant argues that, as in Coty, this court should find the sentencing court’s imposition 

of a discretionary life sentence “without a record sufficient to assess the unique factors that can 

impact the culpability of the intellectually disabled” was constitutional error. See Coty, 2018 IL 

App (1st) 162383, ¶ 56. We decline defendant’s invitation to apply Coty here. Unlike in Coty

where the record on appeal showed the defendant’s intellectual disability was undisputed (Id. ¶¶ 

15, 85), here the record on appeal is insufficient to show defendant is similarly situated. Moreover, 

in Coty, the appellate court clearly had the transcript from the resentencing hearing and could 

unequivocally conclude that the trial court was not presented with current evidence about the 

defendant’s intellectual disability. Id. ¶ 82. Here, without the sentencing record, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court was not presented with information about defendant’s alleged 

intellectual disability to consider. Without this most basic information, we find that Coty is 

distinguishable on its face, and we need not further consider its applicability.

¶ 19 As a final matter, in defendant’s reply brief, he raises a new argument for the first time on 

appeal: the trial court violated the standard applicable for first-stage post-conviction proceedings. 

He claims the court improperly went “far beyond” taking a “quick look” at the record and made 

conclusions that went beyond factfinding and were reserved for second and third stage 

proceedings. Because defendant raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is 

considered forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018); People v. Chatman, 2016 IL App 

(1st) 152395, ¶ 40. 

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s 

post-conviction petition. 

¶ 21 Affirmed.