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E x p a r t e J O N A T H A N E V A N S , A p p l i c a n t
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K E L L E R , P . J . , f

i l e d a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n . I disag ree with the Court’s statement that Meza “addr essed the d u e proce ss protec tions 1 require d befor e imposing ‘sex offe nder conditions’ as a g ener al matter.” On the contra ry , the Meza 2
court stated: “Ha

ving deter mined that sex offe nder reg istration and thera py are at issue in this case ,
we find it is unnece ssary to exami n e wh ether Meza has a liberty interest in any of the other sex offe nder c onditions.” 3

Meza v . Livingston , 607 F.3d 392 ( 5 Cir. 2010). As the Court ac knowledg es, Meza is 1 t h not binding upon us, but we c an conside r the c ase f or its persuasive value. See Court’s op. at 20. 2 607 F.3d a t 400. 3EVANS CONCURRENCE - 2

Conditi ons order ing sex offe nder reg istration and thera py wer e found to inf

ring e on liberty interests inhere nt in the Four teenth Amendment beca

use those conditions are “hig hly stigmatizing and invasive.” Other “sex of fende r conditions” may not implicate liberty interests inhere nt in the 4
Four teenth Amendment but may be subject to notice in a parti cu l ar case wher e there is a statecre ated liberty interest, such as the rig ht to rele ase on mandatory supervision, the conditional rig ht
to rele ase on discretionar

y mandatory supervision, or the rig ht of a person on ear ly rele ase (whe ther 5 parole or mandatory supervision) to rema in on rele ase while he maintains his go o d behavior

. Deter mining the nature and importance of the liberty interest involved is cruc ial to deter mining what
proce dures a

re r equire d by

due proc ess. 6 Appellant’s parole was not revoke d for an y fa ilure to reg ister or underg o thera py . I t was

re v o ked for his failure to abide by other conditions that wer e not at issue in Meza

. Most o f t h e violations involved conditions that denied the righ t t o p o ssess, send, or rec eive sexually expli cit imag es. The rema ining violation involved a condition tha t denied the rig ht to possess a cell phone with still picture and video cap ab i l i t y . These conditions might or might not be considere d “invasive,” but as mere prohibitions on cer tain ty pes of activities, the conditions did not involve any stigma. Neve rtheless, these conditions wer e a signific ant depar ture from the conditions previously imposed upon applicant, under which he had bee n l i v i n g s ucce ssfully , and applicant had a due
proce ss rig ht to be hear d befor e his parole conditions were modified so signific antly

. I n Meza , rele ase was mandatory

. I n the p re s en t case , rele ase had alre ady occur red. The

Id. at 401, 409. 4 See E x parte Ge iken , 28 S.W .3d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 5 See Meza , 607 F.3d 401- 410. 6EVANS CONCURRENCE - 3

question of whethe r a he aring is require d if rele ase is dis cre tionary or if conditions are imposed at the t ime of re lease is not before us. I think the C ourt speaks too broadly when it sug g ests that the
proce dures i t n o w i m p oses would apply to any sex-offende r conditions, reg ardle ss of rele asee ’s status or when those c onditions are imposed. Wit h these c omments, I concur in the Court’s judgme nt. Filed: May

4, 2011 Publis h