J-S34008-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: T.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.A., NATURAL MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 475 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2-AD-2020

IN THE INT. OF: T.A., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.A., NATURAL MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 476 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 3-AD-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 24, 2020

In these consolidated appeals, T.A. (“Mother”) appeals from the order 

and decree entered February 20, 2020, in the Dauphin Court of Common 

Pleas. The order changed the permanent placement goal of her children 

(“Children”), T.B. (“Son”), born in September of 2004 and T.A. (“Daughter”), 

born in August of 2012, from reunification to adoption. A decree entered the 
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same day involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her children.1In 

addition, Mother’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we 

grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm both the order and the decree.

The parties are well aware of the facts and procedural history underlying 

this appeal, which the trial court details in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 

4/03/20, at 1-5. Accordingly, we need not reiterate them at length herein. 

In summary, Mother was involved with Delaware County Children and Youth 

Services (“CYS”) from 2012-2017. In August 2017, Dauphin County CYS 

became involved after receiving reports of conflicts between Mother and her 

oldest child,2 and Mother’s use of Phencyclidine (“PCP”). On August 23, 2017, 

following a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Children dependent. 

Son resides in a stable foster home, while Daughter lives in a 

preadoptive foster home. When CYS initially placed the Children in foster 

care, the goal was to return to their parent(s). On January 29, 2020, CYS 

filed a petition for goal change to adoption and a petition to terminate 

involuntarily Moher and Fathers’ parental rights. Following a February 20, 

____________________________________________

1 The Children’s fathers, K.B. to Son, and Unknown Father and K.R. to 

Daughter have not been involved in these proceedings. The trial court 

involuntary terminated their rights the same day and they have not appealed.

2 This child is over age eighteen and is not involved in these proceedings.
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2020 hearing, at which counsel represented Mother and Mother participated, 

the trial court entered an order changing the Children’s permanency goal to 

adoption, and a decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

Mother filed timely notices of appeal from both the order and decree on March 

9, 2020, accompanied by a statement of intent to file an Anders brief.3 See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). On May 20, 2020, Mother’s counsel filed an Anders

brief in this Court.4

We begin by addressing counsel’s request to withdraw and Anders

brief. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.”) (quotation omitted). This Court extended the Anders procedure 

to appeals from decrees terminating parental rights involuntarily in In re V.E., 

611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), and to appeals from goal change orders in 

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903 (Pa. Super. 2017).

To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must comply with the 

following requirements:

____________________________________________

3 We note Mother properly filed separate notices of appeal for each docket. 

See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). 

4 On May 22, 2020, this Court directed counsel to file a proper petition to 

withdraw and serve it upon Mother. On May 25, 2020, counsel complied. On 

June 9 and 18, 2020, this Court received letters from both Children’s guardian 

ad litems stating they would not be filing briefs in this matter. Dauphin County 

CYS has also failed to file a brief.
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1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Counsel must provide this Court with a copy of the 

letter advising the appellant of his or her rights. See Commonwealth v. 

Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following requirements 

for Anders briefs:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d, at 361.

In the instant matter, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and Anders

brief stating she conducted a review of the record and determined Mother’s 

appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Application for Leave to Withdraw, 5/25/20, at 3. 

The Anders brief includes a summary of the facts and procedural history of 

this case, the issue that could arguably support the appeal, and counsel’s 
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assessment of why the issue is frivolous, with citations to the record and 

relevant legal authority. Counsel also provided this Court with a copy of her 

letter to Mother, advising her of her right to obtain new counsel or proceed 

pro se.

5

 Moreover, we note Mother has not filed a response to counsel’s 

petition. Therefore, we find counsel has complied with the requirements of 

Anders and Santiago, and we may proceed to review the issue outlined in 

her brief. Additionally, we must “conduct an independent review of the record 

to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by 

counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (footnote omitted).

Counsel’s Anders brief presents the following issue for our review: 

whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law by 

determining it was in the Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights.6 See Anders Brief, at 7.

Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights. See Anders Brief, at 7. We apply the 

____________________________________________

5 Counsel indicated in her letter that she had enclosed a copy of the Anders

brief.

6 Mother does not challenge the change of the permanency goal from 

reunification from adoption. See Anders Brief, at 6-7. Our independent 

review of the record does not demonstrate any nonfrivolous issues with 

respect to the trial court’s determination; we therefore will not address it 

further.
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following standard of review when considering the propriety of a termination 

decree:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs the involuntary termination of 

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis:

. . . . Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In the instant matter, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only 
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agree with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

* * *

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
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Mother contends the court abused its discretion in terminating her rights 

under Subsection 2511(a)(2) because “she did everything she could to be 

reunited with her children.” Anders Brief, at 17. We disagree.

Considering first the grounds for termination under subsection 

2511(a)(2), we note:

. . . . In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted).

The trial court summarized the evidence supporting its decree as 

follows:

[CYS] established service objectives. Mother’s service objectives, 

and her level of compliance, are as follows:

1. Submit to 3 drug screens per week at [CYS].

Over the life of the case, Mother was required to 

submit to 354 urine screens. Mother submitted to 

only 17, all of which tested positive. Mother’s last 

test, on August 29, 2019, was positive for PCP. 
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Mother is presumed to have tested positive on the 

times she failed to appear; therefore, all 354 tests 

were positive. 

Mother stated that she failed to appear for drug 

testing because she lacked transportation, although 

[CYS] made transportation available to her through 

STOPP, (Short-Term Therapeutic Outreach to Prevent 

Placement). STOPP provides transportation for urine 

screens. Mother was discharged from STOPP as 

unsuccessful. Although Mother submitted to some 

drug screens at the YWCA, those screens did not test 

for PCP [Mother’s drug of choice]. 

2. Submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation.

Mother obtained a drug and alcohol evaluation and 

received the recommendation that she undergo drug 

and alcohol treatment at NASR Consultant Group, a 

drug rehabilitation facility. Mother did not complete 

this objective. Mother states that she has received 

outpatient drug and alcohol treatment but offered no 

supporting evidence.[7]

3. Obtain a psychological evaluation and follow all 

recommendations.

Mother obtained a psychological evaluation but did not 

follow through with the recommendations. The 

examiner, Howard Rosen, Ph.D., recommended that 

Mother continue with drug and alcohol treatment, 

undergo outpatient therapy, continue with psychiatric 

medication management, seek evaluation, 

management and intervention for chronic pain, and 

complete the Strengthening Families parenting 

program. Mother did not follow through with any of 

the recommendations. 

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7 While Mother claimed the same counselor treated her for several years for 

both her drug and mental health issues, she did not know her last name, 

provided no records, did not ask the counselor to appear at the hearing, and 

did not know her credentials.
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3. Cooperate and comply with [CYS] objectives.

Mother failed to maintain contact with [CYS]. In 

October and December of 2018, [CYS] required 

Mother’s authorization for medical management for 

[Son]. [CYS] was unable to locate Mother to obtain 

authorization, necessitating the filing of motions for 

authorization with the [trial court]. In April 2018. 

[CYS] filed a motion for medical authorization for 

mental health services regarding [Daughter]. 

Mother did not timely notify [CYS] of a change in 

address. 

Mother failed to cooperate with efforts toward 

reunification. [CYS] offered visits with Mother and 

[the Children] at the YWCA. However, the YWCA 

discharged Mother from the program due to lack of 

attendance. Mother frequently arrived late, after [the 

Children] left. There were some occasions on which 

[the Children] did not appear for visits. Following 

discharge from the visitation program at the YWCA, 

[CYS] offered Mother visitation at [their building]. 

[Son] did not attend consistently, as he did not wish 

to visit with Mother. At some visits, Mother’s yelling 

and cursing . . . required intervention. 

Frequently, [CYS] could not reach Mother to advise of 

school appointments. 

Mother did not sign necessary releases for 

participation in the parenting program. Strengthening 

Families. 

Mother believes she complied with everything [CYS] 

has asked of her.[8]

____________________________________________

8 Mother’s testimony on this point was somewhat less than clear. Based upon 

the context in which this statement occurred, and her later testimony on 

cross-examination, it appears she was referring to a previous occasion when 

her Children were in care with Delaware County CYS, who later returned them 

to her, not the present instance. N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/20/20, at 61, 

63, 69-70.
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5. Obtain and maintain appropriate and stable housing.

Mother’s one-bedroom apartment has insufficient 

room for [the Children]. 

6. Participate in and successfully complete a parenting 

program.

Mother enrolled in, but did not complete, the Samara 

Intensive Parenting Program. Mother attended only 9 

out of 19 classes. 

7. Participate in therapeutic counseling with [the Children to 

address trauma associated with [their] placement.

Mother failed to participate in counseling. 

8. Attend all Court hearings, meetings and treatment plan 

meetings.

Mother attended 9 out of 10 court hearings. Mother 

did not attend medication management 

appointments. 

Both Children have been in care since August 23, 2017. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/03/20, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

Our review of the record reveals ample support for the court's findings. 

Indeed, the Children’s case manager testified Mother has made no progress 

towards her objectives. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/20/2020, at 16. 

Mother only participated in 17 out of 354 drugs screenings and failed all 17. 

See id., at 18. Mother did not comply with the recommended drug and alcohol 

treatment. See id., at 19. Mother did not sign releases. See id., at 20, 22, 

29. 
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At various times, CYS has been unable to locate Mother, necessitating 

further court proceedings in order for the Children to get needed medical 

treatment. See id., at 22-24. 

Mother has not completed a parenting program. See id., at 25-26, 28. 

Mother has not complied with the recommendations made by Dr. Rosen after 

her psychological evaluation. See id., at 26-28. Mother’s attendance at visits 

has been, at best, sporadic; she failed to appear for a visit scheduled just one 

week prior to the termination hearing. Id. at 33-34.

Accordingly, we can find no error with the trial court’s determination 

CYS presented clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s “repeated and 

continued incapacity” to care for the Children. M.E.P., 825 A.2d, at 1272. 

This caused the Children to be “without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary” for their well-being, and the cause of Mother’s 

incapacity, i.e., her drug use, mental health problems, and refusal to 

cooperate with service providers, “cannot or will not be remedied.” Id. 

As we have found the evidence supported the involuntary termination 

of Mother’s parental rights under Subsection 2511(a)(2), we next consider 

whether the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). The requisite analysis is as follows:

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 
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between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the [S]ection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quotations and some punctuation omitted).

In concluding CYS presented clear and convincing evidence under 

Subsection 2511(b), the trial court opined:

We find that the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of [the Children] are best served by termination of 

Mother’s parental rights.

* * *

Termination of Mother’s parental rights provides [the Children] 

with the opportunity for permanency.

* * *

Here, the record is devoid of evidence of a bond between Mother 

and [the Children]. To the contrary, [Son] chooses not to visit with 

Mother. Mother offered no testimony as to her relationship with 

[Daughter].

Both foster homes provide stable and loving care. [Son’s] foster 

family has ensured that his medical, psychological and educational 

needs are met. [Daughter] has bonded well with her pre-adoptive 

foster mother. We will not subordinate their best interests and 
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the stability they enjoy to the hope that Mother can someday 

overcome her obstacles.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/03/20, at 8-9.

Again, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The 

evidence demonstrated Son has no interest in having contact with Mother, 

and both Children expressed the wish, through their guardian ad litems, to be

adopted. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/20/2020, at 6. Mother had made 

minimal efforts to foster a relationship with the Children. See id., at 33-34, 

46-47, 53-54, 57-58. Further, both Children are in stable foster homes, and 

Daughter’s foster mother wants to adopt her. Id. at 14-16. Accordingly, 

Mother is entitled to no relief on her challenge to the court’s involuntary 

termination of her parental rights.

Therefore, because our review of Mother’s claims demonstrates they do 

not entitle her to relief, and because our independent review of the record 

does not reveal any non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel, we grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm both the order and decree entered 

on February 20, 2020.

Order affirmed. Decree affirmed. Application to withdraw as counsel 

granted.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/24/2020