COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Deck er and Senior Judge Coleman

AMIRAH ALFARQUI v. Record No. 0469-14-1
NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AMIRAH ALFARQUI v. Record No. 0470-14-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION * NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT PER CURIAM OF HUMAN SERVICES SEPTEMBER 23, 2014 AMIRAH ALFARQUI v. Record No. 0471-14-1
NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AMIRAH ALFARQUI v. Record No. 0473-14-1
NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS C. Peter Tench, Judge (Oldric J. LaBell, Jr., on briefs), for appellant. (Patrick C. Murphrey, Assist ant City Attorney; Dywona L. Vantree-Keller, Guardian ad litemfor the minor children; City Attorney’s Office, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHEDAmirah Alfarqui, mother, appeals the trial cour t’s orders terminating her parental rights to four of her children. On appeal, she contends th e trial court “lacked jurisdiction or procedural and statutory authority to terminate [her] parental rights . . . with regard to each child in issue because the Juvenile [and Domestic Relations District] Court no longer had ju risdiction of the matters at the time it ordered termination of her parental rights.” Mother also lists numerous assignments of error asserting the evidence was insufficie nt to support the trial court’s te rmination of her parental rights to the children pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). In addition, mo ther argues the trial court erred in: approving permanency planni ng orders for the child ren with the goal of adoption; approving foster care service pl ans with the goal of adoptio n for each child; “failing to evaluate the evidence relating to each child in issue separately and indi vidually and mak[ing] individual findings for the child in issue;” “interpr eting and applying the p ublic policy of [Code] § 16.1-283(C)(2) by making the one-year period the controlling factor;” and “failing to apply a clear and convinci ng standard in determining the issues relevant to (a) approval of the adoptions goal and (b) the termination of parental rights.” Upon reviewing the record and brie fs of the parties, we co nclude that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisions of the trial cour t. See Rule 5A:27. Jurisdiction Appellant contends Code § 16.1-283 provide s that the juvenile a nd domestic relations district court (JDR court) “must have approved a Fo ster Care Plan with the goal of adoption before it can entertain or rule upon a petition to terminat e residual parental righ ts.” However, Code § 16.1-283 states: “No pe tition seeking termination of residual parental right s shall be accepted by the court prior to the filing of a foster care plan , pursuant to Code § 16 .1-281, which documents termination of residual parental rights as being in th e best interest of the child.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, contrary to mother’s assertion, the statute does not re quire the approval of a foster care- 3 - plan with the goal of ad option before a court can co nsider a petition to term inate residual parental rights. Rather, the statute requires the filing of the requisite foster care plan before a court can consider a petition to terminate resi dual parental rights. Here, the record shows that the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed th e foster care plans in the JDR co urt on April 30 , 2013 and the petitions to terminate mothe r’s parental rights on May 13, 2013. Therefore, these filings complied with the terms of Code § 16.1-283. See al so Rader v. Montgomery Cnty . Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 5 Va. App. 523, 526, 365 S.E. 2d 234, 236 (1988) (the statutory pr ocedures of Code § 16.1-283 must be strictly followed before courts are permitted to te rminate parental rights). Mother also asserts that b ecause she appealed th e JDR court’s approval of the permanency planning orders to the trial cour t prior to the JDR court’s consideration of th e termination petitions, the JDR court lost juri sdiction to consider th e petitions to terminate her parental rights. DHS filed the perman ency planning petitions pursuant to Code § 16.1-282.1. The JDR court entered the permanency planning orders on Ma y 28, 2013. Mother appe aled those orders on June 7, 2013. DHS filed the petiti ons for the termination of mother’s parental rights on May 13, 2013, and pursuant to Code § 16 .1-283 those petitions involved separate proceedings from the permanency planning hearings. Before the residual parental ri ghts of an individual may be terminated, a separate proceeding must be conducted upon the filing of a petition specifically requesting such relief. Code § 16.1-283. We construe the term “separate proceeding” as used in Code § 16.1-283 to mean a hearing se parate and distinct from an abuse and neglect adjudication, entrustment disposition, or foster care placement and review. This does not mean, however, that a totally separate case must be initiated in the juvenile court. Rather, the statute requires th at initially, a petit ion must be filed specifically requesting termination of parental rights so that proper notice is given. Because of the pot entially drastic consequences of a termination proceeding, a separate hearing must be conducted to ensure that the termination issue is not confused with other issues which may have been before the court previously. This interpretation of the term “separat e proceeding” is consistent with the juvenile court statutory framework. We find that the- 4 - legislature intended that this fram ework, rather than general rules of civil procedure, govern the ma nner in which cases are filed and proceed within the juvenile courts. Stanley v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 596, 601-02, 395 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1990), aff’d, 242 Va. 60, 405 S.E.2d 621 (1991). The JDR court held a separate hearing on August 20, 2013 related to the petitions for termination, and the JDR c ourt entered orders terminating mother’s parental rights to the children on that date. On August 23, 2013, mother filed noti ces of appeal for the JDR court orders terminating her parental rights. The prior appeals of the permanency planning orders did not affect the jurisdiction of the JDR court to consider the termina tion petitions. Rather, as stated above, the statutory framework of Code § 16.1-283 was followed. Mother also contends that be cause she appealed the permanency planning orders, this “had the effect of voiding” those orders so that the JD R court did not have an approved foster care plan with the goal of adoption in effect when it acted on the te rmination petitions. Code § 16.1-242.1 provides: Upon appeal to the circuit court of any case involving a child placed in foster care and in any appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court of Virg inia, the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction to continue to hear petitions filed pursuant to §§ 16.1-282 and 16.1-282.1. Orders of the juvenile court in such cases shall continue to be review ed and enforced by the juvenile court until the circuit court, Cour t of Appeals or Supreme Court rules otherwise. Thus, pursuant to the second sentence of this statute, the permanency planning orders issued by the JDR court pursuant to Code § 16.1-282.1 “c ontinue[d] to be reviewedand enforced” by the JDR court until the trial cour t or appellate court rule d on the appeal of the orders. Nothing in the statute indicates that the filing of a notice of appeal to the tria l court for a permanency planning order renders that order void.- 5 - Sufficiency of the Evidence On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below and grant to it all reasonable infe rences fairly deducible therefrom. Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 46 0, 462 (1991). ‘“In matters of child welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interest s.’” Id. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)). The trial court’s judgment, “when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Peple v. Pepl e, 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988). A court may terminate parental rights if it finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interests of the child and that: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). [S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that cr eated the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated fa ilure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services. Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of So c. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)).- 6 - On March 3 and 4, 2011, the DHS took custody of four of mo ther’s children : R.D., Jr., T.D., Am.J. and A’L.J., af ter she told DHS th at she was “overwhelmed” with the children. At that time, mother was receiving services through DHS’s Family Stabilization Unit. In addition, in 2008 and 2010, mother ha d instances resulting in Le vel 2 Dispositions for Lack of Supervision of the children. Dr. Jennifer Gildea, a licensed clinical psyc hologist, performed psychological and parenting capacity assessments on moth er in May and June 2011. Dr. Gildea also conducted re-evaluations in 2012. In 2011, Dr. Gildea recommended that mother particip ate in individual th erapy and structural family therapy, de monstrate increased indepe ndence in managing daily responsibilities, participate in parental coaching sessions, and commit to safe ty planning goals, including an agreement to not leave the children in th e care of inappropriate individuals. In addition, Dr. Gildea recommended mother obtain gainful em ployment, maintain stable housing, and not have unsupervised visits with the children. After the 2012 reas sessments of mother, Dr. Gildea opined that mother had made positive progress, however, she was still not r eady for a trial home plac ement of the children. DHS provided mother with clothing vouchers, bus passes, use of co mputers to search for employment, a prepaid cell phone, be dding, and food vouchers . She also received structural family therapy beginning in May 2011. However, mother only sporadi cally attended the therapy from 2011 until 2013. DHS provided moth er with parental coaching services beginnin g in September 2011. These services were terminat ed in 2013 due to mother’s lack of participation. DHS provided mother with opportunities for supervised and uns upervised visitation with the children. On one occasion during an unsupervised visit, mother had been with the children for only about forty-five minutes when she contacted the DHS and asked that a worker retrieve th e children early because she had a headache and the children were not foll owing directions. During two other unsupervised visits mother violated the safety plan regarding her supervision of the children.- 7 - Mother was unable to sustain stable housing despite DHS’s nu merous housing referrals. She was unemployed at the time of the trial. She failed to complete services recommended by the parental capacity assessment, in cluding structural family thera py. Mother cancelled meetings related to resuming unsupervised visitation with the children. On Febr uary 1, 2013, she was advised that she needed to schedule an appointmen t for structural family therapy, schedule an assessment for individual therapy, and provide he r case worker with eviden ce that she had applied for employment with three places. Mother only scheduled the appo intment for structural family therapy. Later in February 2013, DHS dr afted a letter asking mother to fully re-engage in structural family therapy and individual ther apy and to provide evidence that she was seeking employment. When mother was handed the letter she left the r oom and stated she was “done.” Mother failed to return messages left on her phone and she disengag ed all services, including visitation with the children until February 25, 2013. At the time of the trial, the children had been in foster care for two years and nine months. DHS presented evidence that they e xhibit a strong bond with their foster parents, who are potential adoptive placements for the children. In her closing argument, mother’s counsel st ated she did not believe mother was ready to regain custody of all of the children at that time . Rather, she suggested a “gradual reunification or integration of the children into [mother’s] home.” In addition, the guardian ad litemfor the children opined it was in the best interest s of the children to terminate mother’s pa rental rights because mother had failed to reme dy the conditions that brought the chil dren into foster care despite the assistance and reasonable efforts made by DHS. The trial court found mother had been “making an effort over a period of time, but somewhere in there toward the beginning of 2013, sh e regressed and hasn’t re medied the situation.”- 8 - The trial court noted mother had issues with ho using, employment, reliance on others for financial assistance, and remedying the situation that le d the children to come into foster care. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’ ” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). Virginia law recognizes the “maxim that, sometimes, the most reliable way to gauge a person’s fu ture actions is to examine those of his past.” “As many courts have observed, one permissible ‘measure of a parent’s future po tential is undoubtedly revealed in the parent’s past behavior with the child.’” “No one can divine with any assurance the future course of human events. Nevertheless, past actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of wh at the future may be expected to hold.” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 267-68, 616 S.E.2d at 770 (citations omitted). As addressed above, DHS offere d mother numerous services desi gned to reunify the family. Mother failed to consistently pa rticipate in the recommended pa renting coaching services, the structural family therapy, and individual therapy. She had several issues with the unsupervised visitation with the children and failed to maintain st able housing and employment. Based upon a review of th e circumstances in this case , DHS provided re asonable and appropriate services to mother and there was clear and convin cing evidence that mother was unwilling or una ble to remedy the pr oblems during the period in which she was offered services. In addition, the children had been in foster care for two years and ni ne months at the time of the hearing. “It is clea rly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or ev en if, a parent will be capable of resuming hi s [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Furthermore, the record supports th e determination that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial- 9 - court’s decision to terminate mother’s parent al rights to the four children under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). For thes e same reasons, the evid ence supports the trial c ourt’s decisions to enter permanency planning orders with the goal of adopti on and to approve the fost er care plans with the goal of adoption. Assignments of Error Not Preserved In assignments of error VII, XII and XIII, mother argues the trial court erred in: “failing to evaluate the evidence re lating to each child in issue separately and indi vidually and mak[ing] individual findings for the child in issue;” “interpreting and appl ying the public pol icy of [Code] § 16.1-283(C) by making the one-ye ar period the controlling factor ;” and “failing to apply a clear and convincing standard in determining the issues re levant to (a) approval of the adoptions goal and (b) the termination of parental rights.” Mother failed to present any of these arguments to the trial

court. “The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwea lth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). See Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of these assignments of error on appeal. Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. For these reasons, we affirm the trial cour t’s decisions. Affirmed.