U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–397 PDF 2018

S. HRG. 115–125 

NOMINATION OF JOHN CHARLES DEMERS 

TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(III) 

CONTENTS 

OCTOBER 31, 2017 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia .............. 2 

WITNESS 

Demers, John Charles, Nominee to Be the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division ....................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 20 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 35 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 46 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(1) 

NOMINATION OF JOHN CHARLES DEMERS 

TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Collins, 

Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, 

Manchin, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call this hearing to order. I’d like to 

welcome our witness today, John Demers, President Trump’s nominee to be the next Assistant Attorney General for National Security 

at the United States Department of Justice. John, congratulations 

on your nomination. 

I’d like to start by recognizing the family that you’ve brought 

here with you. I understand your wife, Cindy, is here, as well as 

your children, Elizabeth and Matthew. Senator Warner will sign a 

slip for you to take to school and get extra credit. 

[Laughter.] 

And also your sister-in-law, Sue. 

In his statement for the record, John speaks strongly about the 

support each of you have provided to him over the years. I know 

from personal experience just how important a supportive family is. 

And to each of you, I thank you for the sacrifices you make. 

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee 

to consider the nominee’s qualifications and to allow for a thoughtful deliberation by committee members. Mr. Demers has provided 

substantive written responses to over 30 questions presented by 

the committee, and today, of course, members will be able to ask 

additional questions and hear from him personally in open session. 

Mr. Demers is a graduate from the College of the Holy Cross and 

Harvard Law School, served as a clerk in the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court, and then for the late Honorable Justice Antonin Scalia. 

Mr. Demers served in the Department of Justice National Security Division as Deputy Assistant Attorney General, where he also 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

2 

served as senior counsel to the Assistant Attorney General. While 

at the DOJ’s National Security Division, Mr. Demers additionally 

completed a detail as counsel to the Deputy Attorney General. 

Following his tenure at DOJ, John joined the Boeing Company, 

where he served as the Vice President for international affairs, the 

Vice President and Assistant General Counsel for global law affairs, the Chief Counsel for network and space systems, and currently as the Vice President and Assistant General Counsel for regulatory and government law. John is also currently an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 

John, you are being asked to lead the Justice Department’s division responsible for our national security-related investigations 

during a period of significant debate about what authorities and 

tools are lawful and appropriate. As you know, the committee recently reported out a bill that would renew FISA’s Title VII authorities for eight years, with additional privacy protections for 

U.S. persons. I’m hopeful that this bill will pass the Senate and ultimately be signed into law, as it provides the Department and the 

intelligence community the needed tools and authorities. 

I’m also hopeful, moving forward, you’ll be in an influential and 

forceful—you’ll be an influential and forceful advocate for those foreign intelligence tools you believe are necessary to keep citizens 

safe, like Section 702. 

As I mentioned to others during their nomination hearing, I can 

assure you that this committee will faithfully follow its charter and 

conduct vigorous and real-time oversight over the intelligence community, its operations and its activities. 

We will ask difficult and probing questions of you and your staff, 

and we will expect honest, complete and timely responses. You’ve 

already successfully negotiated one hurdle, having been favorably 

reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee 20 to nothing on 

October 19th, 2017. I look forward to supporting your nomination 

and ensuring its consideration without delay. I want to again 

thank you for being here. 

I would notify members that we’re under a fairly tight time 

frame, so it’s my intention to move this nominee as quickly as we 

possibly can. 

With that, now—I now recognize the Vice Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Demers. Congratulations on your nomination to serve as 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security at DOJ. I’ve reviewed your statement, questions for the record, and testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 4th. I appreciate 

your candor and forthright responses to the questions. And I also 

appreciate the broad amount of bipartisan support you’ve got from 

DOJ officials in terms of your nomination. 

If confirmed as Assistant Attorney General for National Security, 

you will lead an organization that was established after 9/11 to ensure that our counterterrorism, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities are properly and sufficiently coordinated across 

both law enforcement and intelligence communities. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

3 

As you’re aware, another critical role of this position is to shepherd the Department’s review and approval of requests to the FISA 

Court for surveillance activities, including Section 702. As the 

Chairman just mentioned, we had, I think, a very productive session on 702 last week. And last week the committee supported a 

bipartisan bill to reauthorize 702 that seeks to maintain its operational capacities while increasing the privacy and civil liberty protections of U.S. citizens. 

This includes strengthening judicial and Congressional oversight 

of the government’s queries of lawfully collected U.S. persons’ data. 

I will be interested in your comments on the 702 program. In particular, I’ll be listening closely to your responses to be assured that 

you recognize the need to conduct reviews in a matter that—in a 

manner that protects these privacy concerns. 

In your written responses to this committee and to the Judiciary 

Committee, you wrote, quote, that your ‘‘loyalties lie with the Constitution and laws of the United States,’’ unquote, and that you 

would tell the President and Attorney General ‘‘No’’ if asked to perform any task that was contrary to the Constitution or laws of the 

United States. I very much appreciate these words. And let me assure you, we’ll try to hold you to them. 

Mr. Demers, I would also like to hear your commitment that you 

will always seek to provide unbiased, unvarnished, and timely responses to the President, his Cabinet, his advisers and the Congress. Facts are facts, and I expect you to be truthful to them while 

in service to this nation. 

You’re also aware that this committee is conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. 

This morning, and I will ask you during the question and answer 

session, I want to hear your assurance that you will fully cooperate 

with this review and provide this committee with all the information requested in a timely fashion. 

I will ask you—I will ask that you faithfully inform this committee if you become aware of additional relevant information in 

your course of your duties, if you’re confirmed. 

I believe yesterday’s indictment of President Trump’s campaign 

manager and deputy campaign manager by the special counsel and 

the guilty plea by campaign adviser George Papadopoulos is further evidence that these investigations are serious and that this 

country needs to hold accountable any of those who do a disservice 

to our nation. 

This investigation, let me make clear, is not about re-litigating 

the election or playing gotcha with the President. It’s about following the facts where they lead and ensuring the sanctity of our 

democratic principles through free and fair elections, untarnished 

by foreign interference. 

Again, congratulations on your nomination. I look forward to this 

morning’s discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Mr. Demers, will you please stand and raise your right hand? 

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. DEMERS. I do. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

4 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CHARLES DEMERS, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION 

Chairman BURR. Please be seated. 

John, before we move to your statement, I’ll ask you to answer 

five standard questions the committee poses to each nominee who 

appears before us. They just require a simple yes or no answer. 

Do you agree to appear before the committee, here or in any 

other venues, when invited? 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from 

your office to appear before the committee and designated staff, 

when invited? 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to provide documents or any other 

materials requested by the committee in order to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Will you both ensure that your office and your 

staff provide such materials to the committee, when requested? 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the 

fullest extent possible all members of the committee on the intelligence activities and covert action, rather than only the Chairman 

and the Vice Chairman? 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much. 

We’ll now proceed to opening statements, after which I’ll recognize members by seniority for five minutes. 

And I would once again remind members that, pursuant to Senate Resolution 400, the committee received this nomination on referral from the Judiciary Committee and we have 20 calendar days 

within which to report this nominee to the full Senate. 

It’s my intentions, again, to move to this as quickly as we can 

in a business session. 

With that, Mr. Demers, the floor is yours. 

Mr. DEMERS. Great. Thank you very much, Chairman Burr, Vice 

Chairman Warner and distinguished members of this committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you here today and 

for considering my nomination. 

During my last time at the National Security Division, I worked 

closely with this committee to draft and negotiate the FISA 

Amendments Act of 2008. Should I be confirmed, I hope that this 

hearing will be only the beginning of working with you again on 

issues critical to the nation’s security, issues best addressed when 

the Congress and the executive work constructively together. 

Public service is never an individual endeavor, and I’d like to 

thank my wife, Cindy, and children, Lizzy and Matthew, who are 

here behind me and have graciously agreed to join me on this next 

chapter. Their love and the fun we have together provide me always with a focus and sense of calm I think will be needed. 

I’d also like to thank my parents, whose example and encouragement have inspired me to be here today. My sister-in-law and 

friend, Sue Lim, is here as well, and I’m grateful to her and to the 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

5 

other close friends and colleagues, here and watching remotely, for 

their love and support. 

And because I come from a family of teachers, I would do well 

to thank all the teachers I’ve had along the way. I owe them more 

than they and I will ever know. 

I am grateful for and humbled by this opportunity to return to 

the Department of Justice and to the National Security Division. 

Protecting the national security is the highest priority of the Department, and the National Security Division is at the forefront of 

these efforts. 

Although the thinking behind the division may seem obvious 

now, those of you who have worked these issues since before September 11th know that the reorganization that created the division 

was revolutionary. It brought together the lawyers prosecuting terrorism and espionage offenses with those working on intelligence 

investigations, and it created a strong link between the Department and the intelligence community. More broadly, it recognized 

the effectiveness of this combination of law enforcement and intelligence efforts in combating a variety of threats and the danger and 

needlessness of drawing lines and building walls between criminal 

and intelligence investigations. 

Since that time, the capabilities and the mission of the division 

have broadened to confront new manifestations of old threats. The 

women and men of the division have worked tirelessly with the intelligence community and the other parts of government to help 

guard our security, regardless of whether the threats come on airplanes or over the Internet. 

The dedicated lawyers and professionals of the division understand that without this security the promise of liberty enshrined in 

our founding documents would be an empty one. They also understand that without liberty, security has no purpose, and they recognize that the guarantor of both is the rule of law. Having worked 

with many in the division and followed the division since I left, I 

know this firsthand and would consider it an honor to return to 

serve with them. 

Critical to our security and our liberty are the statutory and 

other authorities that the investigators and prosecutors use every 

day. I look forward to working together with you and your colleagues to ensure that the intelligence community and prosecutors 

have the tools they need, and that these tools keep up with 

changes in technology and the threats that face us. 

I also understand that the only way to keep the confidence of the 

American people in these tools is to use them lawfully and wisely. 

Thus, I look forward to furthering the oversight function of the division and supporting the proper oversight conducted by the Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

The threats we face are real. The objectives of our adversaries 

are plain: to weaken our culture, our democracy, our values, our 

economy and our resolve to lead—indeed, to undermine the very 

idea of America. I appreciate that you have always taken these 

threats seriously. 

I look forward to working with you to ensure that this country 

continues to thrive and that all Americans enjoy both liberty and 

security under the rule of law. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

6 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Demers follows:] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 1 here 27397.001
7 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 2 here 27397.002

dedicated lawyers and professionals of the Division understand that without this security, 

the promise of liberty enshrined in our founding documents would be an empty one. 

They also understand that without liberty, security has no purpose. And they recognize 

that the guarantor of both is the rule of law. Having worked with many in the Division, 

and followed the Division since I left, I know this first-hand and would consider it an 

honor to return to serve with them. 

Critical to our security and our liberty are the statutory and other authorities that the 

investigators and prosecutors use every day. I look forward to working together with you 

and your colleagues to ensure that the Intelligence Community and prosecutors have the 

tools they need and that these tools keep up with changes in technology and the threats 

that face us. I also understand that the only way to keep the confidence of the American 

people in these tools is to use them lawfully and wisely. Thus, I also look forward to 

furthering the oversight function of the Division and supporting the proper oversight 

conducted by the Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

The threats we face are real. The objectives of our adversaries are plain-to weaken our 

culture, our democracy, our values, our economy, and our resolve to lead-indeed, to 

undermine the very idea of America. I appreciate that you have always taken these 

threats seriously. I look forward to working with you to ensure that this country 

continues to thrive and that all Americans enjoy both liberty and security under the rule 

of law. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 
8 

Chairman BURR. John, thank you very much. I’ll recognize members based upon seniority for up to five minutes. The Chair would 

recognize himself first. 

Mr. Demers, leaks of classified information are deplorable and 

put sensitive sources and methods at great risk. I’m increasingly 

alarmed at the number of individuals who feel they can safely disclose classified details to the press under the cloak of anonymity, 

which seems to be the most common last name in America today. 

How do you plan to proceed with investigations and prosecutions 

of those who leak classified information? 

Mr. DEMERS. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you that the leaks 

of classified information present serious threats to the national security, as you mentioned, in particular to the sources and methods 

we use, but also in revealing what we know to others, what we 

know about them. And let’s make no mistake; sometimes those 

sources are human beings. 

The cases themselves, the investigations, need to be pursued 

fully and on the facts, following those facts wherever they may go. 

And then, the prosecutions need to be considered carefully as well, 

taking into account, of course, the equities of the intelligence community, as well as the need to deter—obviously incapacitate folks 

who are leaking now, but also deter future leakers as well. 

I’ll work closely with the career attorneys at the Department who 

have been doing these cases for many years, who continue to focus 

on them today, and just follow the facts wherever they lead us. 

Chairman BURR. Will you commit to communicate with the committee on the progress of investigations and potential prosecutions? 

Mr. DEMERS. I think, within the bounds that I can—that is, as 

long as it’s not interfering with the investigation itself—I will. 

Chairman BURR. Good. 

We mentioned FISA Title VII authorities, including what is well 

known as Section 702, and they expire at the end of the year. As 

you’re aware, the committee has significant interest in reauthorizing these authorities. 

Based upon your experience, how critical is reauthorizing to our 

nation’s national security? 

Mr. DEMERS. Well, Senator, I saw the world before the FISA 

Amendments Act of 2008. I saw what it was like without this authority, and it was very difficult for the intelligence community and 

it was very difficult for the lawyers at the Justice Department. 

And we were focusing a lot of our resources at that time on folks 

who—you know, non-U.S. persons outside the U.S., folks without 

constitutional rights. And I saw the very early days of the implementation of this law. I followed it, of course, in the news since 

then. I understand the intelligence community considers it to be a 

critical, if not one of the most critical, tools it has in the work that 

it does. 

I’ve also seen the review that the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Board did of this authority, and I take note of the fact that they 

found no intentional misuses of this authority. 

So it strikes me that, as best I can see from the outside, this is 

a critical authority. I support its reauthorization, and I look forward to working with the committee on that if I’m there in time; 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

9 

and if not, then working with you on your oversight efforts of the 

authority, making sure it’s used effectively and well. 

Chairman BURR. I thank you for that. 

Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein called cybersecurity attacks 

and threats against our nation’s security and infrastructure one of 

the Department’s highest priorities. How do you foresee furthering 

the Department’s cybersecurity efforts from within the National Security Division? 

Mr. DEMERS. So I think cybersecurity is the area that has 

changed the most since I was there last, about nine years ago. It 

now seems to permeate all of the work of the division, whether it’s 

on the counterterrorism side or on the counterespionage side. So 

whether we’re talking about folks who are being radicalized or 

radicalizing themselves on the Internet, or we’re talking about nation-states and the actions that they’ve tried to take, cybersecurity 

is there. 

I note that in the prior administration they developed a separate 

unit in the division to focus more squarely on cybersecurity. I support that. I’m going to be looking closely at that to be sure that it’s 

resourced correctly and that the correct focus is on cybersecurity 

issues. I think they’re going to be one of the biggest parts of the 

job going forward. 

Chairman BURR. Great. Thanks, John. 

Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Again, welcome, sir. And, as you’re obviously aware, one of the most important investigations this committee is involved in at this point is the Russia investigation into 

activities in 2016. And I just want to get you on the record. Do you 

promise to fully and completely cooperate with this committee’s investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election, including 

by turning over all materials in your possession to the committee, 

as requested, as promptly as possible? 

Mr. DEMERS. I do support the work of this committee and that 

investigation. I think it’s a very important one, and I do pledge to 

cooperate with you on the investigation, obviously, in terms of 

turning over everything. 

I—from the outside, I don’t know all the rules, Senator. I’d have 

to talk to other folks at the Department about it. But I do support 

your efforts. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. But within the constraints of the rules, 

obviously. 

Mr. DEMERS. I will, yes. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. We need that cooperation. 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes. And you’ll have it. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. And we’ve had it from many. There are 

some entities that I think we still need—have got a ways to go. 

I also just want to—again, I think you’ve answered this before, 

but I want to get it on the record here. I think one of the most important functions of the I.C. is speaking truth to power. And can 

you talk about the assistant A.G.’s role in ensuring that the intelligence community will continue to provide unvarnished assessments to Congress, to the Attorney General and to the President, 

regardless of politics? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

10 

Mr. DEMERS. Well, for sure, Senator. Politics has no place in the 

work of the intelligence community. Partisanship has no place in 

the work of the intelligence community, nor in the work of the National Security Division as part of those efforts. 

And it is—it’s critical for all of us to speak truth to those within 

the Executive Branch and also here on the Hill. So I pledge to do 

so and pledge to support the efforts of others to do so. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. The Chairman’s already raised 702. We 

had a spirited debate last week on this important tool. I believe 

that we strengthened 702 in terms of putting additional responsibilities in place, in terms of protections of American—particularly 

known Americans’ privacies. 

Some of my colleagues didn’t fully agree we went far enough. But 

I do think it’s important, and I’d like to hear your comments about 

the overwrite—oversight responsibilities of the Assistant A.G. for 

National Security to ensure that there is that full and robust oversight of the FISA legislation, including 702, and what you’re going 

to do to make sure that representations made by the United States 

Government to the FISA Court are always accurate. 

Mr. DEMERS. So I’ve not read the bill that came out of committee. 

But I do support, obviously, the oversight within the bill that— 

there was, I think, significant oversight in the law as it stands 

today, as well. 

The role of the Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division when it comes to any FISA collection, whether it’s 

Section 702 or Title I, is of course to conduct that oversight of the 

use by elements of the intelligence community of these authorities 

to be sure that the minimization procedures are being followed accurately, that the orders are being followed, and in this case, that 

the targeting procedures are being followed as well, and then to 

promptly report any noncompliance both to the FISA Court, which 

has authorized the use of those targeting minimization procedures, 

but also to the Congress; and then to look and see to, you know, 

really do a root-cause analysis of what the reason for that noncompliance is, and to fix it going forward. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, I would strongly urge you to 

please take a look at that legislation. We’ve added some additional 

requirements, while not perfect, but I think go a long way, should 

a known American be in any way queried, to make sure that there 

is a simultaneous appropriate review. It will add some additional 

challenges, but I think those challenges are appropriate in terms 

of balancing the very, very critical privacy protections. 

This is a tool, but again I think, as your comments indicated, 

while there’s been no indication of abuse, because there are Americans inadvertently swept up in the 702 foreign-to-foreign contact 

information, I think we have to go the extra mile, and I would hope 

that you would do a thorough review of what at least this committee has passed out, and we look forward to getting your comments on whether you think we’ve struck that right balance. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Demers, I want to follow up on the questions on Section 702, 

which have been a matter of great debate before our committee and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

11 

ultimately before the full Senate. As you’re well aware, if a U.S. 

person is in contact with a foreign target of Section 702 collection, 

some of their communications could be collected incidentally to the 

intent of targeting the communications of a foreigner located overseas. 

My—the question that has been a matter of debate is whether 

the FBI should be able to search the content of the Section 702 

database using a U.S. person identifier or search term without first 

securing a warrant. 

I have a couple of questions for you. First, are you confident that 

such a process does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibitions 

against unreasonable searches and seizures? And second, since you 

have worked in the National Security Division before, could you tell 

us from an operational perspective what harm you would see if 

Congress were to require the FBI to get a warrant every single 

time it sought to query the Section 702 database using a U.S. person’s identifier? 

Mr. DEMERS. Thank you, Senator. 

I think here we’re talking about the querying of lawfully acquired information in the government’s possession, information 

which the government acquired by targeting non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. And as you say, you know, it can and does incidentally pick up communications of U.S. persons as well. 

As I understand it, every court to consider this has found that 

there is no Fourth Amendment requirement that the government 

get a search warrant before looking at this information, before 

querying this information for a U.S. person identifier. And that’s 

consistent, I think, with the general Fourth Amendment principle 

that the government doesn’t need a search warrant to look at information lawfully in its possession. So I believe that is the state of 

the case law today. 

In terms of the operational question that you posed, again, I’d— 

it’s been a little while. I’d have to talk again to the FBI, but if what 

we’re talking about is getting the equivalent of a FISA order every 

time you query the database, a FISA order is a fair bit of work, 

one, to put together, because you have to have probable cause. 

So it’s not just about the amount of work. It’s of course also 

about at what stage of an investigation you’re willing to do this and 

whether you have enough information to do probable cause. So it’s 

not just, well, it will take X number of hours, but it’s can you do 

it at all based on the information you have to tie that U.S. person 

to being an agent of a foreign power or a foreign power. 

So I think, you know, if you had a warrant requirement, it would 

slow things and it would also limit the amount of querying that 

you were able to do. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

This year’s intelligence authorization bill includes a provision 

that I drafted with Senator Manchin and Senator Lankford that 

would require you, assuming you’re confirmed to your position, to 

report to Congressional intelligence committees every six months 

regarding the status of every criminal referral made in the last 

year from the intelligence community to the Department of Justice 

about any unauthorized disclosure of classified information. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

12 

If you are confirmed and if our provision does become law, do you 

commit to faithfully reporting the information required by this provision to serve as a deterrent to would-be leakers of classified information? 

Mr. DEMERS. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I will certainly follow the 

law if it’s enacted. And as I mentioned to Senator Warner, just be 

careful that we’re obviously not interfering with the investigation 

itself. But to that—beyond that, yes, to share that information with 

you. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I had the 

opportunity to meet with Mr. Demers before his hearing in Judiciary on October 4, and I have since voted in support of his nomination to be Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division. And I’m very pleased, sir, that you have prior experience in 

that division. I think you’re well qualified to lead the division, so 

I assume I am going to vote again for you here. 

Having said that, I must tell you I disagree strongly with your 

answer to Senator Collins’ question. Let me try and explain why, 

and let me preface this with the fact I am not a lawyer, but the 

702 reauthorization gave me cause for really serious study. 

And as I understood the Ninth Circuit case in Mohamud, what 

it upheld was that the incidental collection of an American in the 

program initially did not essentially detract from the constitutionality of the program. No court to my knowledge has played a 

role in determining whether a second query or a query of that separately by the FBI for a civil criminal case would require a warrant 

or not. I moved such an amendment in the Intelligence Committee. 

I was voted—I did not have the votes. I voted for the bill as is, but 

I very strongly believe that that second part is really open to conjecture and I think some discussion. 

Do you have any comment to make, because you spoke about incidental collection? Once that incidental collection is achieved, the 

use separately is a different item. 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes, that’s true, Senator. Certainly this question is 

open for legal discussion and debate. There is no question about 

that. But I do think that there is a general principle of Fourth 

Amendment law which is that searching information that is lawfully in the government’s possession does not require a court order. 

Now, perhaps that principle isn’t applicable here for some reason 

that I would have to give some more thought to. But at least as 

a starting point, that is, as I understand it, the general principle. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would—I would like to ask that when you 

are in the job you would follow up on this and perhaps write with 

your thoughts, because I think this is going to be a problem in the 

future. 

Mr. DEMERS. I will certainly be doing a lot of thinking about this, 

yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. Let me go to one of my written questions. It was question number 7: Recent media reports described 

two American citizens apprehended by Syria, by Syrian Defense 

Forces. The article stated they’re being held as enemy combatants 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

13 

and may be transferred to Iraqi custody. That question has come 

up in the public press recently. 

Here is the question I asked in writing: What is the legal status 

of an American apprehended while fighting in Syria? Should that 

individual be returned to the United States for trial and held as 

an enemy combatant? Your response was: ‘‘I’m not familiar with 

the facts regarding these individuals or their detention. I am committed to identifying and considering all legally available options 

and pursuing the option or options that best protect national security and the liberty interests of Americans.’’ 

Well, much more has been said in the press about these two people. What is your view today? 

Mr. DEMERS. I don’t know that my view is any different, Senator. 

I don’t know the facts of this case. My view is, you know, in general 

that folks who are detained on the battlefield or captured on the 

battlefield can be lawfully detained by the U.S. armed forces. But 

then I think the question becomes, well, what are you going to do 

in the long run with these folks and especially with an American? 

And there, you know, you really would need to know all of the facts 

and circumstances to make that determination. 

I’d say when it comes to Americans, my leaning—and this is not 

a definite rule, but leaning, you know—is that we should, if we can, 

bring them here and try them. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I’m going to make a small personal request 

and that is that you—obviously I have voted for you and I am 

going to vote for you again. However, I would like you to take a 

look at this and give me an answer in writing, if you can. And after 

you’re confirmed is fine with me. It’s not a—I am not doing this 

to jeopardize my vote. 

Mr. DEMERS. Right. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So I would appreciate your advice on that 

question. 

Mr. DEMERS. Sure. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to get your testimony. I want to be able to press on a little 

bit on what the chairman brought up earlier about leaks, leaks 

that not only come to the press, but leaks out to other entities or 

individuals that may at some point talk to others. 

One of the challenges has been prosecution of those individuals. 

It’s one thing to identify the leak and it’s one thing to identify the 

universe of where it came from. It’s another thing to actually identify the person and actually prosecute. What can you do or put into 

place to make sure we move from yes, there’s a leak, to we’ve identified the individual and actually—and are actually prosecuting 

those individuals? 

Mr. DEMERS. Thank you, Senator. Yeah, look, these investigations are difficult to do just to find the facts as you mentioned: Who 

did the leak, who did they pass it to, and then maybe who leaked 

it further to the public? But also, there are difficult considerations 

about whether you move forward with prosecutions, because the 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

14 

prosecution itself can risk having to use classified information or 

that classified information or other information would be raised. 

So these are—I don’t have the answer to your question coming 

in from the outside. But I do acknowledge the importance of the 

issue and, you know, this is something I will certainly be working 

on with those folks in the division who have been doing these cases 

for some time and with the FBI and others who are investigating 

these cases. 

Senator LANKFORD. Right, so what I’m trying to pursue is how 

will it be different? What would you do different than what was 

done in the past? Because what has been done in the past has not 

been able to close the deal, to actually find those individuals and 

be able to prosecute? 

Mr. DEMERS. I guess the answer to that is, I can’t tell you, coming from the outside, what I would do differently at this point. 

Senator LANKFORD. We will look forward to that conversation in 

the future once we put you on the inside to be able to help resolve 

some of those. Talk to me about your coordination with the Office 

of Director of National Intelligence. There is a unique role in the 

coordination there. How do you foresee that with your office and 

their office? 

Mr. DEMERS. Last time I was at the National Security Division 

I worked a lot with the Office of the Director, with the general 

counsel who was there, with the chief of staff, the other folks in 

the general counsel’s office who are there, worked a lot, obviously, 

on the FISA Amendments Act the first time through, but also on 

other issues as well. 

I have met with the Director as part of this process to just begin 

to establish a relationship with him. And my view of what the role 

is of the National Security Division when it comes to the Director 

is that really I’m to be, you know, the main link to the ODNI, but 

also to appreciate and be the voice of the equities of the intelligence 

community within the Department, whether we’re talking about 

legislative or policy issues or whether we’re talking about again 

particular prosecutions and what equities of the intelligence community may be affected by a particular prosecution. 

So I anticipate regular communications with that office, with the 

Director, with the chief of staff and with the general counsel. 

Senator LANKFORD. Do you anticipate any changes from what we 

currently have status quo in the relationship between that office 

and ODNI? 

Mr. DEMERS. I think—— 

Senator LANKFORD. Anything that you look at now and say, I 

plan to change this or this in it? 

Mr. DEMERS. I don’t know that I know enough to answer that 

question. 

Senator LANKFORD. Okay, fair enough. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Demers, thank you for coming by yesterday. I very much enjoyed the conversation and your history with some of the people sitting behind me on 702. Like I indicated, there is absolutely no disagreement, none, about the need for the government to have the 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

15 

tools to go after threats overseas. 15 people on the committee, 

everybody’s on the program with respect to that. 

The question is what happens, particularly as global communications have changed, when law-abiding Americans are swept up in 

searches? And I will tell you, I’m very troubled by the answer you 

gave my colleagues Senator Feinstein and Senator Collins on this 

point. And I’m not going to go into it any further, but your position 

is at odds with, for example, Mike Morell, the former CIA Director 

who just said point-blank, wrote a big article about it, the government ought to have a warrant to search for Americans’ communications in Section 702 collection, and of course an emergency exception. 

So we’re going to debate this some more, but I will tell you I find 

it very troubling that you’re now in disagreement with, certainly, 

what I heard Senator Feinstein and Senator Collins say and the 

former CIA Director. And as we consider your nomination, I want 

you to know that. 

But I do want to get into the question you and I talked about 

in the office, and we can call it the bridge guy issue. This is the 

issue presented by Director Wray. He essentially gave an example 

of somebody taking pictures of a bridge at night. And according to 

the Director, the government ought to be able to go directly to 

reading the content of this American’s communications based on 

what somebody thinks could be suspicious behavior. 

Now, I personally think there are legal arguments for why you 

shouldn’t be able to do it, but again from a security standpoint it’s 

unnecessary. The government has a lot of authorities for obtaining 

information about Americans, including 215 of FISA, which tells 

the government who that American is talking to. So we’re going to 

know about bridge guy, basically knowing who they’re talking to. 

There’s an emergency provision, so there is no delay, and, as you 

and I talked about, I put that into every single proposal I’ve ever 

had, that there be an emergency exception. 

So the question here is, as we talked about in the office, why 

should the government be reading the content of Americans’ communications based on the smallest little sliver of a suspicion when 

it’s got the authority to obtain non-content information first, very 

significant authority? 

Mr. DEMERS. So I found that hypothetical after we spoke last 

night and I read it and having read it, I do understand your concern, as you’ve just expressed it, which is that we go from a noncriminal but suspicious act to reading the content of some aspect 

of this person’s communications. 

Senator WYDEN. I want to sop you right there because that’s encouraging. So you think that that’s a valid concern to be just kind 

of making that leap to reading content? 

Mr. DEMERS. I do understand the concern, yes. 

Senator WYDEN. Go ahead. 

Mr. DEMERS. No, definitely. And then this brings us to, so then 

if the solution is the warrant requirement, as we also discussed 

last night and as we’ve been talking about today, so then, you 

know, then it just becomes a question, okay, so then we’re putting 

a warrant requirement in to search information that’s lawfully collected by targeting non-U.S. persons where, at least as I underLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

16 

stand it, no court has held that a warrant is required to do so and 

where if you—we’ve been chastised for not connecting the dots in 

the past and I think that’s the worry of the FBI here, but I—you 

should just let them speak for themselves on that. 

And then, and of course if you’re ever interested in the American, 

and really want to surveil the American, you’d have to go get a 

FISA warrant on that. I guess, I just say that on balance, at least 

from where I’m coming from here right now, I don’t think you 

should need a warrant to look at those communications that are already in the government’s possession. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, if the government wants to read the content of communications they can also just use the query. So, we’re 

going to continue to put in these emergency provisions. I think 

there’s plenty of authority under 215. To your credit, you’ve acknowledged that this is a valid concern. I’m going to want to explore that with you. 

I’ll also have some—and my time is up. I’ll also have some written questions with respect to encryption because, given the fact 

that Mr. Rosenstein has now got us back in the business of looking 

at what he calls responsible encryption, which is really requiring 

companies to build a back door into their products under a different name, I think that’s very troubling as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Demers, for being here today. I want to start 

with an issue. In August, the Attorney General announced that the 

Department is reviewing its policies for subpoenaing reporters, suggesting that current guidelines that are in place and the limits on 

the practice could be potentially rolled back. 

In recent testimony, the Attorney General refused to say whether 

or not he would actually jail journalists. This is a reversal of the 

stance of Attorneys General in the last administration, who had 

said that they would not seek to imprison members of the news 

media for doing their job. 

So, I want to ask you, Mr. Demers, do you believe that journalists should be jailed for seeking the truth? 

Mr. DEMERS. I think that—well, first of all, I would hate to ever 

have to go down a path like that. And I understand the importance 

of journalism and of journalists in our political system and the significant First Amendment concerns that are raised by taking an action like that. 

I think, you know, at least coming in from the outside, I don’t 

want to say that something could never happen. It always depends 

on what the facts are of that investigation. I can’t imagine it would 

ever be lightly undertaken. And as I said, I’d be loath to do it. But 

I hate just in the abstract saying I can’t imagine anything that 

would ever cause the government to go in that direction. 

Senator HEINRICH. Do you understand why the suggestion that 

we should change that policy and raising the specter of jailing journalists has people highly concerned? 

Mr. DEMERS. Yes, I can understand why you’d be concerned, and 

it would be a question of how you applied it and if you changed 

it. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

17 

Senator HEINRICH. Back in 2013, the Justice Department guidelines with regard to the media state that quote, ‘‘In light of the importance of the constitutionally protected news-gathering process, 

the Department views the use of tools to seek evidence from or involving the news media as an extraordinary measure.’’ End quote. 

And that such tools should be used, quote, ‘‘only as a last resort’’. 

End quote. 

Do you agree with that statement? Does that sort of line up more 

accurately with your—— 

Mr. DEMERS. I would say they are extraordinary, yes. And yes, 

they’d be a last resort or close to a last resort. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

As you note in your testimony, you helped this committee draft 

Section 702 of FISA and you were working in the Department of 

Justice as the statute was first implemented, and I understand 

your support of the statute, in particular Section 702. Obviously, 

Section 702 collection has grown since the law’s passage back in 

2008, and we still don’t have data just to show how many Americans’ communications are being incidentally swept up in that collection. Do you believe there’s a potential point at which incidental 

collection of Americans becomes so preponderant, so significant, 

that there might be either a policy or a constitutional issue associated with the current query standard? 

Mr. DEMERS. Well, I think in the abstract, certainly if the incidental collection was getting so significant that you’d actually think 

there’s been reverse targeting taking place, that would be a serious 

concern. 

Senator HEINRICH. When Congress passed those FISA Amendments back in 2008, do you believe that it was the intent of Congress to use that to be intentionally searching Americans’ communications using that, using the 702 section? 

Mr. DEMERS. Well, I think that—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Or is that an afterthought basically? 

Mr. DEMERS. I mean, I think the intent of Congress there is just 

expressed in the language which requires you to use the authority 

against non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. and not to engage in reverse targeting. 

Senator HEINRICH. So since 9/11, obviously, the intelligence community has come a long way in tearing down the stovepipes that 

kept agencies from sharing information. But we recently heard 

from the FBI that they cannot simply count how many times FBI 

agents searched the Section 702 holdings for communications of 

Americans. And they reference that stovepipe issue and say they’d 

have to basically rebuild the stovepipes to know that data. 

I’m concerned that the FBI is hiding behind that stovepipe argument. I would frankly suggest that it is a fairly mundane technical 

issue or an I.T. issue. I cannot in a million years imagine Google 

saying it’s impossible to count the number of queries on a particular subject. Do you think that that is data that we ought to be 

able to see to be able to properly do our oversight role? 

Mr. DEMERS. I can’t say I’m familiar enough with the concerns 

expressed by the FBI to comment on those. I think I can certainly 

see why the committee would want to know the numbers of queries 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

18 

and U.S. person queries that were being done. But I can’t talk to 

how the computer systems work or any of that. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Heinrich. 

Seeing no additional members here—John, it was pretty easy 

this morning. But it should be when you’re going your second time 

around. And, Matthew, that tie lasted a lot longer than I thought 

it would. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much to you and your family 

for your willingness to come back into government one more time. 

It’s always a tough decision, but you have performed there in an 

exemplary fashion prior to this. 

I know that the folks at Boeing would probably like to keep you 

there, but to have you at the National Security Division as the 

chief there certainly is advantageous to the country and to this 

committee. We look forward to very quickly moving your nomination. 

At this point this hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:23 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(19) 

Supplemental Material 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

20 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 3 here 27397.003

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTW.- NOMINEES 
21 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 4 here 27397.004

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

PART A· BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 

t, FULL NAME: John Charles Demers 

OTHER. NAMES USED: None 

2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: September 21, 1911; Italy 

CTI1ZBNSHIP: USA 

3. MARITAL STATUS: Married 

4: SPOUSE'S NAME: Cyn1hia Marie Zmijewski Demers 

5. SPOUSE'S MAlDEN NAME IF APPLrCABLE: Cynthia Marie Zmijewski 

6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN: 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

7. EDUCATION SINCEmGH SCHOOL: 

INSTITUTION DATB$ATI'BNDED DEGREE RBCBMID DATE OFDEGRBB 

College of the Holy Cross August 1989-May 1993 

Harvard Law School August 1996-May 1999 

B.A. 

J.D. 

May19!l3 

Mayl99!l 

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST AIL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING 

MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, 

LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT). 

EMPLOYER POSITI0Nf1'ITLB LQCATION llAl1lS. 

The Boeing Comp1111y Vice President & Ass't.GCIICrlll Counsel, Arlington, VA May2016-prescnt 

Regulatory & Government Law 

Vice President, Int'l Govemment Affairs Arlington, VA March2016-June2017 

Vice President & Ass't General Counsel, Arlington, VA April2011-May2016 

Global Law Aft'aJrs 

Chief Counsel, Network & Space Systems Arlington, VA March 2009-April2011 
22 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 5 here 27397.005

Georgetown University Adjunct Professor Washlngton, DC 2010-present 

Laweentor 

N!llional Security Division, Deputy AssislantAttomey Gonoral Washington DC Sept. 2007 -Jan. 2009 

U.S. Department of Ju!llice 

Senior Counsel to the Washlngton, DC Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007 

A.sslstant Attorney General 

Counsel1o the Deputy Attorney General Washington, DC 11111. 2007-Juno 2007 

(on detail) 

Justice Antonln Scalia, Law Clerlc 

U.S. Supreme Court 

Office ofLegal Counsel, Attorney Advisor 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Ropes & Gray Associate 

Suinmer Associate 

Judge Dillrmuld O'Scannlain, 

U.S. Ccurt of Appeals 

LawCiedc 

for the Ninth Circuit 

Simpson, Thacher & 

Bartlett 

Summer Associate 

U.S. Attorney's Office, Law Clerk 

District ofMassachusetts 

The National Center on R.eseeroh Assistant to the Presidect 

Addlcti.on & Substance Abuse 

at Columbia University 

Washlngton, DC July 2005-August 2006 

Washington, DC June2003 -Jona 2005 

Boaton,MA 

Boaton,MA 

Oct. 2000-May 2003 

May 1999-June 1999 

Portland, OR Aug. 1999-Aug. 2000 

New York, NY June 1998-August 1998 

Boaton,MA June 1997-August 1997 

New York, NY Aug. 1994-Aug. 1996 

9. GOVERNMBNTBXPBRIBNCB (INDICATE EXPER1BNCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, 

STATE, ORLOCALGOVBRNMENTS,INCLUDINO ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR 

OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DONOTREPBAT INFORMATION ALREADY 

PROVIDED IN QUBSTlON 8). 

None beyond that listed in 'the response to question 8. 

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTBWGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOUHA VE 

ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THBPOSIDONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9. 

My most dlrectl.y relevant experience came during the time I served in the N!llional Security Division, 

ultimately as Deputy Assistant Attorney Oeceral for tho Office of Law and Polley. In that capacity, I worlced 

on a variety of national security legal issues, including those involving surveillance law, other investigative 

authorities including those under Exeoutive Order 12333 BDd the laws authorizing n!llional security letters, and 

cyber operations. I was closely involved in the drafting and negotiation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act of2008, and worked on internal investigati'Vl! guidelines. Also in that capacity, I worked closely with 

various ageccies of the Intelligence Community, including the Federa!Bureau ofinvestigation, the N!llional 

Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Aller I left the Department of Justice, I began to co- leach a olass on national security inveslig!llions and litigation at Georgetown University Law Centor. This 

provided me with the motiv!llion and opportonity to maintain a working knowledge of; and keep up with · 

changes in, n!llional security law. 
23 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 6 here 27397.006

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS,. 

HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY 

OTHBRSPBCrAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE ORACHIBVEMRN'l). 

Attornc:y General Award for Excellence in National Sccurll:y (2008) 

Intelligence Commllllizy Legal A ward (2008) 

Asslsmnt Attorney General (National Seourif¥ Division) Award fur Speoial Initiative (2008) 

Thomas I. Watson Fellowship, Italy (August 1993-May 1994) 

Phi Beta Kappa (1993) 

Alpha Sigma Nu (1993} 

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN TEE 

LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CMC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, 

CULTURA.L, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS). 

ORGANIZATION QFFICBHBLD 

None, other than the bar memberships lismd In .response to question 35. I have not hold any offices In tho 

bars of !hose ststes. 

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND 

PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHBRPUBUSHBD 

MATBRrALS YOU HA VB AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBUC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU 

HA VB MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH TIIElm IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR 

VIDEO). If ASKED, WILL· YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF BACH REQUESTED PUBUCATION,.TEXT, 

TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO? 

Charles Nesson &· Jobn Demers, Gatelcseping: An Enhanced Foundational Approach to Determining the 

,4-dmissibillty uj'Sclentfjic Evtdence, 49 HASTJNGSLJ. 335 (1998). 

H_erbet Kleber, Joseph A. Calliimo, Jr. & John Demers, 'nlB CLINICAL AND SOClBTALlMPLICATlONS OF DRUG 

LBGALIZATION,IN SUBSTANCE All USB: A COMI'RB!IIlNS!VB Tl'!XrBOOJC 855 (Joyce Lowlnson et al. eda., 3d ed. 

1997). 

Hila Richardson, Joseph A. Califlmo, Jr., Donna Tapper & John Demers, Substance Ahll8e and Public Health 

in Urban America: Analysis of Casts in New York City, 2 Ctnuu!N'I"IsSUI!S lN PUBIJCHBALTH 91 (1996). 

Teatlmony on behalf of the U.S. Department ofl"ust!ce before the Committee on Foreign Rolsfions, United 

Stst.es Senate, May 7, 2008, conc:eming the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and an amendment to the 

Convention on the Physical Protection ofNuclear Material 

Yes, I will provide copies of any oftbo above if requested to do so. 

I have made additional public speeches or rematks In the past ten years but 1heJ'II is no text avatlablo of those 

romllrks. 
24 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 7 here 27397.007

PART B ·QUALIFICATIONS 

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHYYOUBELIBVB YOU ARB QUAL!FIBD TO SBRVB AS THB 

ASSISTANT ATIORNBY GENERAL FOR Tim NATIONAL SECURITY DMSION ATTHBUNITBD 

STATBS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE). 

I belie~ that I am qualified for Ibis position because of the prior work I ha~ done in the area of national 

security, especially as part of the founding leadership team of1he National Sccurif3 Division from 2006 to 

2009. During that time, I developed a fiunillarfty wl1h lhe work ofthe Division, particularly in the area of 

intelligence investigations, but elsa in that of prosecutions. I helped to represent the United Slates before the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and learned the goveming legal ftamcwork for national securlzy 

investigatioos and prosecutions, ftom the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to Exccu~ Order 12333 to 

the internal guidelines that govern the Executi~ Branch operations in this area. And I learned lhe 

constitutional isauea, especially those implicating the Fourth Amencltnent, that arise in .Intelligence 

investigations and prosecutlons. ln addition, my teaching ln the area of national securlzy law bas allowed me 

to de~ my knowledge of the law in this area. Finally, my years ofwork at The Boeing Company has given 

me the experience of managing groups oflawyers, working coUaboratively with olher parts of a large 

orgaoimtion, and providing mission-focused legal advice. 

PART C • POLl'TICAL AND FOREIGN AFnnATIONS 

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIBS (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL 

CONTRIBUTIONS ORSBRVICBS RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION 

COMMI.TI'EE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEB, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE 

LAST TBN YEARS). 

Boeing Political Action Committee (ex officio in my capacif3 as Assistant General Counsel for Govermnent 

Operations) 

$3462 donation, Boeing Political Action Committee, 2016 

$4032 donation, Boeing Political Action Committee, as of October 2017 

$1000 donation, Brower for Congress, 2011 

$2500 donation, Romney Victory, 2012 

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACYFORBLECTIVE 

PUBLIC OFFICE). 

None. 

17. FOREIGN AFFlLlATIONS 

{NOTB: QUESTIONS 17 A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRlNG REGISTRATION 

UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUBSTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR. 

A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHOlUZED BY THE 

UNITED STATBS GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT 

IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.) 

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVBRREPRESENTIID IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, 

ATI'ORNEY, OR POLITICALIBUSINBSS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, 

A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ORANBNTI'IY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMBNT'l IF 

SO,PLBASBFULLYDESCRIBBSUCHRELATIONSHlP. 

No. 
25 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 8 here 27397.008

B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, 

WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY 

CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASEFULLYDESCRlBE SUCH 

RELATIONSHIP. 

No. 

C. DURING THE PASTTBNYEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY 

COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANYFINANCIALORBUSINBSS 

TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A 

FOREIGN GOVBRNMBNT'I IPSO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

D. HA VB YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS 

REGISTRATION Aar? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

18. DESCRIBBANYLOBBYlNGAcnVITYDURINGTHEPASTTBNYBARS,OTHERTHANINAN 

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOURSPOUSEHAVEBNGAGED 

FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DBFBAT, OR 

MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE 

ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY. 

None. 

PARTD- FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RBLATIONSIDP,FINANCIAL TRANSAcnON, 

INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS 

WITHTHBFBDERALGOVBRNMBNTONYOUROWNBEHALFORONBB.HALFOFACLIBNT), 

WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF lNTBRESTINTHEPOSmON 

TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED. 

rn connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of Government Ethic:s and the 

Department of Justice's designated agency ethic:s oftlclal to Identify potential conflicts ofi.utetest. Any 

potential conflict of interest will be resolved in accordiiiiCe with tbe terms of an ethics agreement that I have 

entered witb tbe Department's designated agency ethic:s officials. 

20. 00 YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITHYOURPRBSBNTEMPLOYERS, 

FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/ORPAR1NBRSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 

EVENT THAT YOU ARB CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLBASBBXPLAIN. 

Yes, with one exception. 1 will retain my ownership interest in Paulding, LLC. which holds a residential house 

that my wire and I rent. My wife Js tbe sole managing partner oftbe LLC. 
26 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 9 here 27397.009

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOUHAVEMADEORPLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU 

ARB CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVBRANCBFR.OMYOURCURRBNTPOSIDON. 

PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCBPAY, PBNSIONlUGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME 

ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WilL OR MIGHT BE RBCBIVED 

IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINBSS OR PROFESSIONAL 

RELATIONSHIPS. 

AJJ described in SF-286 and my Ethics Agreement, after my departure from The Booing Company, I wiD 

reeelve the following: 

• a lump sum annual cash incentive payment fur the work performed up to the date of my departure from 

the Boeing Company. Tb.is payment will be pro-rated based on service time and will be paid by March 

15,2018. 

• payment for accrued, unused wcation 

• a portion of my lntcrest in the Supplemental Benefit Plan in a lump sum payment In the Januery fullowing 

my departure and tho rest in annuallnstaUments for ten yem after n:aclting entitlement 

• preparation of my 2017 taxes 

• payments fur already granted performance awards fur 2015, 2016, and 2017. These award payments will 

be paid three years after grant-the 2015 award in 2018, the 2016 award in 2019, and the 2017 award in 

2020. These paymen!B will be pro-rated based on service time. 

• vesting of Restricted Stock: Units {RSUs) in the Boeing Company, which were granted to me as part of the 

company plans in 2015, 2016 and 2017, as wen as an additional supplemental RSU grant glvan in 2015. 

This vesting will occur as soon as administratively possible, but no later than 60 days from my separation 

from the Company. The ordinary 2015, 2016 and 2017 gnmiB wt11 be pro-rated based on servke time. 

The 2015 supplemental RSUs wiD vest in full. 

• payments ofPerfurmance Based !Uls1rlcted Stock Units (PBRSUs). The PBRSU payments will be paid 

three years after grant-the2015 ewardin2018, the2016 award in2019, and thc2017 awardin2020. 

These payments will be pro-rated based on service time. 

22. DO YOU HA VB ANY PLANS, COMMITMBNTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE 

EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, OUR!NG YOURSBRVICE WITH THE 

GOVERNMENT?. IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

23. ASFARASCANBEFORBSEEN,STATEYOURPLANSAFTBRCOMPLETINGGOVERNMENT 

SBRVICB. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGRB.BMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, 

WRITTEN OR UNWRITI'BN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTBRLBAVINGGOVBRNMENT 

SBRVICB. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS 

TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENTPOsmON. 

I have no agreements to return to my current position. Following my government service, I expect to return to 

the private sector either ln an in-bouse capacity or in prlvato practice. 

24. IF YOU ARB PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH 

SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFEROR 
27 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 10 here 27397.010

EXPRESSION OF INTBRESTTO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVBRNMBNT 

SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

NIA 

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED 

IN ANYWAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE 

INDICATBYOURSPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE 

POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMBN'I' IS NOT RELATED TO THE 

POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE. 

My wife is not employed outside the home. 

26. IJST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER. 

ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN 

WEnCH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. 

NAME OF ENTITY POSITlON DATES HELD SELF OR gpOUSB 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING $100 INV ALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY 

YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOURDEPBNDBNTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES 

AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE ORDBPBNDENTNBBD NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE 

OIFTWASGIVENWTI1IYOURKNOWLEDGBANDACQUIBSCENCEANDYOUHADRBASONTO 

BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.) 

None. 

18. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PAR'l'NERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS 

OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKBTV ALUEISNOT 

ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) INBXCESS OF $1,000. (NOTE: THE 

INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHIIDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE 

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BYRBFBRBNCB, PROVIDED THAT 

CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.) 

DESCRIPTION OF PRQPERTY MBJ'HOD OF VALUATION 

Please see my SF-278. CUrrent valuations are the same as those noted on the :tbliii, with one exception: the 

value of the Boeing common stock I hold is now approximately $650,000. 

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) lN 

EXCESS OF $10,000. BXCLUDEAMORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS ITIS 

RENTED OUT, AND I:.OANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNlTORB, OR 

APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE lNFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE 

DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMBNTBTHICSMAYBE lNCORPORATBD BY 

REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIBS ARE ALSO INCLUDED.) 
28 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 11 here 27397.011

NATURE OF OBLIGATION NAME OF OBLIGEE AMOUNT 

Please see my SF-278. 

30. ARB YOU OR YOURSPOUSBNOW!NDBFAULTON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL 

OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSBBBEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR 

OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION INTHBPASTTENYBARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE 

EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR. HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER. TO 

ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES,PLBASBPROVIDEDETAILS. 

None. 

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALI.. INCOME RBCElVED DURING THE LAST 

FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALI.. SA.LARIES, FBBS, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, 

ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING $200. (COPIES OF U.S. 

INCOME TAX RETIJRNS FOR. THESE YEARS MA YBB SUBSTITUTED HBRB, BUT THEIR. 

SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.) 

2012 2011 2014 2015 2016 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMl'l'TEE WITH COPmS OF YOUR.AND YOUR SPOUSE'S 

FBDERALINCOMETAXRETURNSFORTHEPASTTHR.BEYEARS? 

Yes. 
29 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 12 here 27397.012

33. UST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX 

RETURNS. 

In addition to our federal income tax retuins, my spouse and I also file tax returns in the Commonwealth of 

Virginia. 

34. HA VB YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BBBN1'HB SUBJBCT OF AN AUDIT, 

INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING 

THB RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING. 

No. 

35. IF YOU ARE .AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER. PROFESSIONAL, PLEASEUST ALL 

CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOUBILLBD MORE THAN $200 WOR'IH OF SERVICES 

DURING THEP AST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST AIL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE 

LICENSED TO PRACTICE. 

My work as an attorney in ihe past five years has been exclusively for The Boeing Company. 

Bar licenses: 

Commonwealth ofM81!Sachusetts, March 24, 2000 

State ofNew York, May22, 2002 

Commonwealth ofVi.rginia-August 6, 2009 (as corporate counsel) 

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND 

DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, 

PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER.ARRANGEMENTSFORAVOIDING ANY 

POTEN'TIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. 

No. 

37. IF APPUCABLE, LIST THB LAST 'IHREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS 

YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF 

GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF 1HBSB RBPORTS? 

Please see my SF-278. I have f'tled no other financial disclosurea in the last three years. 

PART E-E'IIDCAL MA'ITERS 

38. HAVE YOUBVERBEEN THE SUB.JECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FORA 

BREACH OFElHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT .BY, ORBEBNTHESUBJECT OF A 

COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMlNISTRATIVEAGBNCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

DISCIPUNARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER. PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

No. 
30 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 13 here 27397.013

39. HAVE YOU BVER.BEBN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AU'lHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANYFED:BR.AL 

STATE, COUNTY, OR. MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTilBR. THAN A MINOR 

TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHBR.WISE lN ANY lNDIC'I'Ml!NT OR. 

INFORMATIONRELATlNG TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

40. HAVE YOUEVERBEBN CONVICTED OF OR.ENTBRED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR. NOLO 

CONT.BNDBR.B TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTilBR. THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF 

SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR. HAVE YOU BVERBEBN A PAR.TYlNlNTBR.BSTlN ANY 

ADMINISTRATIVE AOENCYPR.OCEEDlNO OR CiVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

No. 

42. HAVBYOUBEBNINTER.VffiWEDORASKBDTOSUPPLY ANYINFORMATIONASA WITNESS OR 

OTBBRWISB lN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR 

STATE AGENCY PltOCEEDlNG, GRAND JURY lNVBSTIGATION, OR. CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 

LITIGA,TIONINTHBPASTTBN YEARS? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER 

BEBNAPAR.TYTOANYADMINISTRATIVEAGENCYPR.OCEEDlNOOR.CRIMINALOR.CIVIL 

LITIGATION BELEVANTTO THB POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, 

PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE 

AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDBRPROCBEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED 

WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS,) 

No. 

44. HAVE YOUEVERBEBNTHE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERALlNVESTIGATION? IF SO, 

PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

PART F- SECURITY INFORMATION 

45. HAVBYOUEVERBEBNDENIEDANYSBCURITYCLEARANCEORACCESSTOCLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAINlNDETAIL. 
31 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 14 here 27397.014

No. 

46. HAVE YOU BEENRBQU!RBD TO TAKE APOLYORAPHEXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY 

CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSlFIBD INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN. 

Yes. I have had a security clearance~ in my capacity as an employee of The Boeing Company, and took a 

polygraph exam as part of the clearance process. 

47. HAVEYOUBVERREFUSEDTOSUBMITTOAPOLYGRAPHEXAMlNATION? IFYES,PLEASB 

EXPLAIN. 

No. 

PART G-.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

48. DESCRIBE lN YOUR. OWN WORDS TEIB CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 

IN'l'BLLIGBNCB ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTBRIZB WHATYOUBELIEVB TO BE 

THB OBL£GATIONS OF TEIB ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR TE1B NATIONAL SECURITY 

DIVISION AT TEIB UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTELLIGENCE 

COMMI'ITEBS OF TEIB CONGRESS, RESPECTIVELY, IN TEIB OVERSIGHT PROCESS. 

The national security threats the country :!llces are not short-lived, and much of the activity condw:ted to 

COUI1IIlr them Is, of necessity, confidcnt:isl. Thus it is Important to maintain, over the long-term, the public trust 

that counterterrorism and counterespionage operations are oonducted legally and prudently and that the tools 

that the public has given tho Executive to tight these tbreats are used appropriately. Otherwise, these tools will 

be !)arrowed or taken away. Congressional oversight of these investigative activities, especially those that are 

confidenlial, provides tho public wflh some large measure of that trust and thus is especially important in the 

area of national security. The Assistant Attorney General must worlc: with the Intelligence Committees of the 

Congress to make them aware of the legal issues arising out of significant intelligence activities and to ensare 

that they have the information they need to oversee the use of the tools used by the Executive Brancb. The 

Intelligence Committees thalliBClves must satisfY thelOBelves that the counterterrorism and counterespionage 

activities are 1alcing place within the bouuds of the law, are focused en the most significant tbreats, and are 

consistent wflh the priurities and values of the Amerlcl!ll people, 

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 

GENERAL FOR THE NATIONAL SECUlUTY DlVISION ATTHB UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

1USTICB, 

he job of the Assistant Attcmoy General fOr National Security is to oversee those operationa ofthe Department 

of Justice that were brought together after September 11, 2001, in order to pNVOnt and combat national 

security threets. These include the counter-teJrorism and counter-espionage prosecutors, as well as the 

attorneys who work with the Intelligence Comunmity on natiOlllll security investigations. The Division plays 

an important role in the oversight of the Intelligence Co!llll1unity's use ofnaticnal security investigative toOls, 

particularly of those used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation In Its national security investigationa and of 

the use by eily intelllgence community element of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The Assistant 

Attotney Generalis also responsible for being the conduit between the Intelligence Community and the 

Department of Justice and fur ensuring that the interellls of the Community are properly represented in the 

Department The Assistant Attorney Generalis responsible for the Department's and the J'ntelligance 

Community's relationsblp with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and represents the Intelligence 

Cominunlty before that Court. Importantly, tha Assistant Attorney General worlcs closely with this Committee 

and other puts of Congress in order to ensure that the national security professionals have the tools they naed 
32 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 15 here 27397.015

to protect the country and that tho Congress has the lnfo.rma.tion it needs to conduct proper oversight of the use 

of these tools. 
33 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 16 here 27397.016

AFFIRMATION 

I, JOHN C. DEMERS, DO SWEAR THAT THB ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS 

QUEST.IONNAlRE ARE ACCtJRATB AND COMPLETE. 

''o/J In (D >7 

[SIGNATURE} 

I SIGNATURE] 

QfoUry) 

PHAEDRA N Sli\TON 

Notary PUbliC 

Commonwealth ol VIrginia • 340856 

My Commission Explrss N'IV 30. 2017 
34 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 17 here 27397.017

TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTElliGENCE: 

In connection with my nomination to be the Assistant Attomey General for the 

National Security Division at the United States Dep!Utment of Justice, I hereby 

express my willin~ess to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly 

constituted committee of the Senate. 

[SIGNATURE] 

.~icrnaitire 

Date: __ ~~ /,~z~/~,u7~---------- rJ 
35 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 26 here 27397.026

Responses To Additional Pre-Hearing Questions For John C. Demers Upon 

His Nomination To Be Assistant Attorney General for the 

National Security Division, Department of Justice 

Keeping the Intelligence Committee Fully and Cu"ently Informed 

QUESTION 1: Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that the obligation to 

keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence 

activities applies not only to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) but also to "the heads of 

all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in 

intelligence activities." Section 503 establishes a similar requirement concerning covert actions. 

Sections 502(a)(2) and 503(b)(2) provide that these officials shall"furnish to the congressional 

intelligence committees any information or material" concerning intelligence activities or covert 

actions, including the legal basis for them, that is requested by either of the committees in order 

to carry out its authorized responsibilities. Finally, 28 C.P.R. § 0.72(a)(l) provides that the 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security (AAG/NS) shall conduct, handle, or supervise 

the "briefing] of Congress, as appropriate, on matters relating to the national security activities of 

the United States[.]" 

a. What is your understanding of the obligation of the Attorney General and the Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to keep the congressional intelligence 

committees, including all their Members, fully and currently informed? 

RESPONSE: The national security threats posed by our adversaries, be they terrorists or 

nation states, will continue over long periods of time. And government operations to 

counter these threats rely on the predictable availability of tools and resources, most of 

which are provided by the Congress. To support the continued use of these tools, the 

public needs assurance that they are being used appropriately and effectively. Because 

certain government operations are necessarily confidential or classified, much of this 

assurance comes from the oversight conducted by the intelligence committees. Section 

502 of the National Security Act of 1947 reflects this reality. It imposes an obligation on 

the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all agencies involved in intelligence 

activities to keep the congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed 

of all intelligence activities ... including any significant anticipated intelligence activity 

and any significant intelligence failure." The Act also provides that this responsibility be 

exercised "to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized 

disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods 

or other exceptionally sensitive matters." These obligations apply to intelligence 

activities undertaken by the FBI and DEA components that are part of the Intelligence 

Community. The Attorney General, like all department heads, has responsibility for 

ensuring that Intelligence Community elements within the Department fulfill this 

obligation with respect to their activities. 

1 
36 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 27 here 27397.027

b. To what activities of the Department of Justice (Department), including the FBI. does this 

obligation ordinarily apply? 

RESPONSE: The FBI and DEA have obligations to keep the congressional intelligence 

committees fully and currently informed about their intelligence activities, as set forth in 

Section 502 of the National Security Act. These pertain to certain activities of the FBI's 

National Security Branch and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)'s Office of 

National Security Intelligence, both of which are Intelligence Community elements. 

c. What is your understanding of the Attorney General's obligation to provide to the 

congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning the legal 

basis for intelligence activities or covert actions, which either committee requests in order 

to carry out its legislative or oversight responsibilities? 

RESPONSE: The congressional intelligence committees in particular have a unique and 

important role in authorizing and overseeing the Executive Branch's intelligence 

activities. To facilitate that role, it is important for the committees to receive timely 

information concerning the legal basis for intelligence activities or covert actions, as 

Sections 502 and 503 provide. The intelligence agencies themselves are required to 

provide information or material relating to their own intelligence activities to the 

committees as set forth in the National Security Act. The Attorney General has 

responsibility for ensuring that Intelligence Community elements within the Department 

fulfill this obligation with respect to their activities. 

d. The Committee utilizes detailed information on the overall national security threat 

environment and other intelligence matters to fulfill its intelligence authorization and 

oversight functions. Do you agree that the Department and the FBI should fully notify 

and brief the congressional intelligence committees on potential counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence threats to the United States, as well as FBI intelligence-related 

activities to thwart such threats? 

RESPONSE: Yes. I agree that the Department, including the FBI, should fully notify 

and brief the congressional intelligence committees on potential counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence threats to the United States, as well as the Depamnent's intelligencerelated activities to thwart such threats. 

e. The Committee's legislative and oversight responsibilities include assessing the utility 

and effectiveness of counterterrorism and counterintelligence authorities, as well as the 

legality of those authorities as applied. Do you agree that the Department's and FBI's 

notifications and briefings should include detailed information on these authorities, as 

well as their use in ongoing and completed investigations? 

RESPONSE: Yes. I agree that the notifications and briefmgs of the Department, 

including the FBI, should include detailed information on these authorities. These 

intelligence briefings must be conducted in a way that keeps the intelligence committee 

fully informed as required, consistent with law enforcement and intelligence 

2 
37 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 28 here 27397.028

responsibilities. And they provide the public with much of the confidence it needs to 

know that the authorities are being used appropriately and effectively. 

Liaison to the Director of National Intelligence 

QUESTION 2: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 507A(b)(2), the AAG/NS "shall serve as primacy 

liaison" to the DNI for the Department. 

a. What is your understanding of how past AAG/NS's have performed this responsibility? 

Describe the principal ways in which the AAG/NS should carey out this responsibility 

and the principal matters that the AAG/NS should address in performing this 

responsibility. 

RESPONSE: As the Department's primacy liaison to the DNI, the AAG/NS and, by 

extension, NSD as a whole, works closely with the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI) and the Office of General Counsel for ODNI. NSD was created to 

bring together law enforcement and intelligence efforts to counter national security 

threats. Coordinating and deconflicting these efforts is of great importance, and the 

AAG/NS plays a critical role in ensuring that intelligence equities are appropriately 

considered when making decisions in law enforcement matters, and similarly, ensuring 

that equities related to criminal investigations and cases are appropriately considered 

when making decisions in intelligence matters. This responsibility is best carried out 

through regular consultations and coordination with ODNI and its Office of General 

Counsel, thereby facilitating protection of national security consistent with the law. 

b. Have you discussed with the DNI, and with personnel in the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI), your respective understandings of that responsibility? If 

so, please describe. 

RESPONSE: During my time as Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the NSD, I 

worked closely with ODNI, primarily with the Office of General Counsel, on matters 

ranging from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act and the 

rewrite of Executive Order 12333 to the Attorney General procedures governing the 

activities of the intelligence community that relate to U.S persons. I was also involved in 

discussions weighing intelligence community equities in the decisions to prosecute. I 

have not yet had the opportunity to discuss our respective understandings of this 

responsibility with the DNI or his staff, but look forward to doing so should I be 

confirmed. 

Priorities of the National Security Division and the Attorney General 

QUESTION 3: Have you discussed with the Attorney General his specific expectations of you, 

if confirmed as Assistant Attorney General, and his expectations of the NSD as a whole? If so, 

please describe those expectations. 

3 
38 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 29 here 27397.029

RESPONSE: No, the Attorney General has not conveyed any specific expectations to 

me, although we have discussed in general terms the need to work to counter the threat 

from cyber operations, the Department's public announcement to pursue leak 

investigations, as well as the need for NSD to work effectively with the U.S. Attorney's 

offices. 

QUESTION 4: Based on your experience in, and current understanding of, the NSD, please 

provide any observations or recommendations related to the strengths or weaknesses of the NSD, 

including its organization, responsibilities, personnel, allocation of resources, and any other 

matters that you believe are relevant to strengthening the NSD. 

RESPONSE: Having been in the private sector for almost nine years, I do not have any 

recommendations concerning the organizational strengths and weaknesses ofNSD. I am 

aware that the Division has focused increasingly on cyber since my time there and in 

light of the growing importance of threats related to cyber, I am looking forward to 

ensuring that the Division has the right structure and resources to counter those threats. 

Oversight of Intelligence Activities 

QUESTION 5: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0. 72(17), the AAG/NS shall "[p ]rovide oversight of 

intelligence, counterintelligence, or national security matters by executive branch agencies to 

ensure conformity with applicable law, executive branch regulations, and Departmental 

objectives and report to the Attorney General on such activities." 

a. What is your understanding ofNSD's oversight role, including the manner in which it 

has been exercised, concerning the FBrs intelligence activities? 

RESPONSE: During my time at NSD, the Division created a dedicated Oversight 

Section in its Office of Intelligence. The Section oversees both the intelligence 

community's use ofFISA and more broadly the FBI's national security 

investigations. The Section also ensures that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court and Congress are informed of identified instances ofFISA-related noncompliance. Furthermore, the Division works to approve the Executive Order 12333 

guidelines that govern the U.S. person activities of the Intelligence Community. 

b. What is your understanding of the NSD's oversight role undertaken in the offices of 

United States Attorneys, including the manner in which it has been exercised? 

RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 

the NSD, my understanding is that NSD is responsible for ensuring that national 

security activities conducted by United States Attorney's Offices are coordinated as 

part of a national program. To fulfill that responsibility, NSD supervises the 

application of most federal criminal laws related to counterterrorism and 

counteresP.ionage. Through its authority to approve the use of certain statutes in 

national security prosecutions, NSD seeks to ensure a coordinated and consistent 

approach in combating national security threats. NSD also ensures that the 

4 
39 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 30 here 27397.030

Department's national security activities are coordinated with other members of the 

Executive Branch's national security apparatus. 

c. What is your understanding of the NSD's oversight role, including the manner in 

which it has been exercised, concerning the IC's intelligence activities outside of the 

Department? 

RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 

the NSD, my understanding is that NSD exercises its oversight responsibilities with 

respect to elements of the Intelligence Community outside the Department of Justice 

in several ways. First, through its role as the government's representative before the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, NSD reviews and submits all FISA 

applications from outside the Department and monitors compliance by the elements 

of the Intelligence Community with orders from the FISC. Together with ODNI, 

NSD reviews acquisition under Section 702 of FISA to ensure compliance with 

targeting and minimization procedures established pursuant to the statute. 

Additionally, NSD performs oversight through its role as the liaison to the Director of 

National Intelligence. In that role, NSD reviews policies that require consultation and 

approval by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333. Lastly, NSD, along 

with other Department components, may participate in National Security Council 

policy development and decision-making meetings in which intelligence activities are 

subject to legal and policy discussion. 

d. Are there improvements, in terms of resources, methodology, and objectives in the 

conduct of this oversight that you believe should be considered? 

RESPONSE: I cannot comment whether improvements are needed because I have 

not been with NSD for almost nine years. If conflilll.ed, however, I look forward to 

managing the important oversight function of the Division and will make any needed 

changes. 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

QUESTION 6: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(6), the AAGINS shall administer the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 

a. What responsibility does the NSD have with regard to ensuring that representations 

made to the United States courts, both by other Department elements and by 

Intelligence Community (IC) elements, are accurate and complete with regard to 

intelligence activities and other classified matters? What responsibility does NSD 

have to correct any inaccurate or incomplete representations? Please describe how 

NSD fulfills this responsibility. 

RESPONSE: NSD has the responsibility to ensure that the Department's 

representations in court are accurate, and to do its best to ensure that the same is true 

of representations made by the Intelligence Community in matters handled by NSD. 

5 
40 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 31 here 27397.031

If there are mistakes, NSD must inform the courts promptly and work with the 

Intelligence Community to correct the mistakes. To fulfill this responsibility, NSD 

attorneys must work diligently to understand the facts of intelligence activities and 

other national security-related matters that may be at issue in litigation or other 

matters for which they are responsible. 

b. Based on your experience in and current understanding ofNSD, what improvements, 

if any, would you make to the administration ofFISA, in terms of policies, resources, 

technology, and relations with both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

(FISC) and IC elements? 

RESPONSE: I cannot comment whether improvements are needed because I have 

not been with NSD for almost nine years. If confirmed, I am looking forward to 

ensuring that the Division maintains a strong relationship with the FISC and that the 

Division has the appropriate policies, resources and technology. 

c. What is the role ofNSD in the declassification of FISC opinions? What changes, if 

any, would you make to this process? 

RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, I am not privy 

to the current role ofNSD in the declassification of FISC opinions. 

d. Title Vll of the FISA Amendments Act of2012 is set to expire on December 31, 

2017. Do you support reauthorization for a period of years or making these 

provisions permanent? Please provide the principal reasons for your support. 

RESPONSE: I support permanent reauthorization of this law. During my prior time 

at the Division, I worked closely with the staff of this Committee to draft this Jaw. I 

believe the law provides the Intelligence Community with the speed and agility that it 

needs to counter the serious threats to our national security, and that it contains 

important protections for the civil liberties of Americans while ensuring appropriate 

oversight by all three branches of government. My understanding from public 

testimony is that the Intelligence Community views Section 702 as a critical tool and 

that, after a thorough review, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 

determined that there have been no intentional misuses of this authority. Thus, I 

support its reauthorization. 

Protection of Classified Information 

QUESTION 7: Describe your understanding of the personnel resources that NSD should devote 

to the prosecution of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and how the NSD 

should divide responsibility on these matters with the Criminal Division. Please describe any 

recommendations related to prosecutions connected to unauthorized disclosures of classified 

information with regard to Department policies and resources. 

6 
41 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 32 here 27397.032

RESPONSE: Unauthorized disclosures of classified information can pose a serious risk 

to the nation's security, including to its sources of information and methods of 

information gathering. Effective enforcement of laws forbidding such disclosure has 

both a specific and general deterrent effect. That said, because I have not been with the 

Department for almost nine years, I am not privy to the personnel resources the NSD uses 

to investigate and prosecute unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Nor do I 

know how responsibility for these matters is shared with the Criminal Division. 

QUESTION 8: Pursuant to 28 C.P.R. § 0.72(a)(l), the AAG/NS has the responsibility to advise 

the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House on matters 

relating to the national security. In addition, pursuant to 28 C.F .R. § 0. 72(a)(7), the AAGINS has 

the responsibility to prosecute crimes involving national security, foreign relations, and 

terrcrism. 

a. Describe your understanding of the personnel resources within the NSD that should be 

devoted to the prosecution of media leak cases, and how the NSD should divide 

responsibility on these matters with the Criminal Division. 

RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department for almost nine years, I do 

not know what personnel resources the NSD uses to investigate and prosecute media leak 

cases. Nor do I know how responsibility for these matters is shared with the Criminal 

Division. 

b. Describe your understanding of the role that the NSD has played since its inception in 

media leak prosecutions in United States district courts and on appeal to the United States 

courts of appeals. 

RESPONSE: I did not work on media leak prosecutions during my last time at NSD, 

and, because I have not been with the Department for almost nine years, I am not privy to 

the role that NSD has played in media leak prosecutions in United States district courts 

and on appeal to the United States courts of appeals. 

c. Are there any steps that the Department could take to increase the number of individuals 

who are prosecuted for making unauthorized disclosures of classified information to 

members of the news media? If so, please describe. 

RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department for almost nine years, I am 

not familiar with the resources and investigative techniques the Department is utilizing, 

or other steps the Department may be taking, to combat unauthorized disclosures of 

classified information. I look forward to learning more about the steps NSD and the 

Department are taking and further studying this issue to determine whether more should 

be done. 

d. Are there any additional steps that the U.S. government as a whole should take to prevent 

the unauthorized disclosures of classified information from occurring? If so, please 

describe. 

7 
42 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 33 here 27397.033

RESPONSE: Because I have not been in Government or with the Department for almost 

nine years, I am not familiar with the steps the Department and U.S. government as a 

whole may be taking to prevent the unauthorized disclosures of classified information. I 

look fotward to learning more about the steps the Department and government are taking 

and further studying this issue to determine whether more should be done. 

e. Are there any additional steps that the U.S. government as a whole should take to prevent 

the unauthorized removal and retention of classified information from occurring? If so, 

please describe. 

RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department fur almost nine years, I am 

not familiar with the steps the Department and U.S. government as a whole may be 

taking to prevent the unauthorized removal and retention of classified information. I look 

fotward to learning more about the steps the Department and government are taking and 

further studying this issue to determine whether more should be done. 

f. Please describe your understanding of the NSD's prepublication review responsibilities 

and the administrative and judicial review, which is available to an officer or employee, 

or former officer or employee, with respect to the Department's exercise of prepublication 

authorities, including those applicable to the FBI. In answering this question, please 

provide your evaluation of the extent to which present and former officers and employees 

of the Department adhere to their prepublication obligations. 

RESPONSE: While I was last there, NSD reviewed the manuscripts of several current 

or former employees before publication to ensure that no classified information was inadvertently released. Because I have not been at the Department for almost nine years, 

I do not have an understanding ofNSD's current prepublication review responsibilities, 

whether employees are adhering to their responsibilities, or of the administrative and 

judicial review of the Department's exercise of its prepublication authorities. 

Obtaining Approvals from the Department/National Security Undercover Operations 

QUESTION 9: In general, if a particular investigative authority has been underutilized because 

of governmental administrative burdens, are you committed to eliminating unnecessary 

administrative burdens so that intelligence professionals are more willing to use the authority? 

RESPONSE: Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to eliminating unnecessary administrative 

burdens so that intelligence professionals are more willing to use the authority. 

a. What is your understanding of how long it takes for the FBI to obtain authority for 

exemptions in national security undercover operations? 

RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, I do not know how 

long it takes for the FBI to obtain authority for exemptions in national security 

undercover operations. 

8 
43 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 34 here 27397.034

b. What additional steps should the Department take to ensure to eliminate unnecessary 

delays? 

RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, I do not know the 

current process, or whether there are additional steps the Department should take to avoid 

unnecessary delay. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue and ensuring 

that there are no unnecessary administrative burdens. 

Counterterrorism Prosecutions 

QUESTION 10: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(8), the AAG/NS has the responsibility to 

"[p]rosecute and coordinate prosecutions and investigations targeting individuals and 

organizations involved in terrorist acts at home or against U.S. persons or interests abroad, or 

that assist in the f'mancing of or providing support to those acts(.]" 

a. Describe your understanding of the personnel resources that NSD should devote to the 

prosecution of terrorism cases. 

RESPONSE: The Department's highest priority is protecting our nation against acts of 

terrorism, espionage and other national security threats, and NSD plays a critical role in 

achieving that mission. Because I am not currently working at the Department, however, 

I am not privy to the personnel resources ofNSD that are dedicated to the prosecution of 

terrorism cases and have no views on whether they are correctly allocated in light of 

competing responsibilities. 

b. Describe your understanding of the role that the NSD has played since its inception in 

terrorism prosecutions in United States district courts and on appeal to the United States 

courts of appeals. 

RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the 

NSD, NSD has played a key role since its inception in terrorism prosecutions in the 

United States district courts. Since I left, the Division has added an appellate capability 

in national security cases. NSD is responsible for ensuring that national security 

activities conducted by United States Attorney's Offices are coordinated as part of a 

national program. To fulfill that responsibility, NSD supervises the application of most 

federal criminal laws related to counterterrorism. Through its authority to approve the 

use of certain statutes in terrorism prosecutions, NSD seeks to ensure a coordinated and 

consistent approach in combating terrorism threats. NSD also ensures that the 

Department's counterterrorism activities are coordinated with other elements of the 

Intelligence Community. 

c. Describe what role NSD will play, if any, in prosecutions before military commissions. 

RESPONSE: NSD attorneys support the work of the military prosecutors before the 

military commissions, and NSD is responsible for handling related appeals to the U.S. 

9 
44 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 35 here 27397.035

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. I expect that work to continue as the 

Division seeks justice for those, and the families of those, who died on September 11, 

2001, and in other attacks. 

Counterespionage Prosecutions 

QUESTION 11: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(7), the AAG/NS has the responsibility to 

"(p]rosecute federal crimes involving national security, foreign relations and terrorism[.]" 

a. Describe your understanding of the personnel resources that NSD should devote to 

the prosecution of espionage cases. 

RESPONSE: I understand that the Department's highest priority is protecting our 

nation against acts of terrorism, espionage and other national security threats, and that 

NSD plays a critical role in achieving that mission. Because I am not currently 

working at the Department, however, I am not privy to the personnel resources of 

NSD that are dedicated to the prosecution of espionage cases and have no views on 

whether they are correctly allocated in light of competing responsibilities. 

b. Describe your understanding of the role that the NSD has played since its inception in 

espionage prosecutions in United States district courts and on appeal to the U.S. 

courts of appeals. 

RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 

the NSD, NSD has played a key role since its inception in espionage prosecutions in 

the United States district courts. Since I left, the Division has added an appellate 

capability in national security cases. My understanding is that NSD is responsible for 

ensuring that national security activities conducted by United States Attorney's 

Offices are coordinated as part of a national program. To fulfill that responsibility, 

NSD supervises the application of most federal criminal laws related to espionage. 

Through its authority to approve the use of certain statutes in espionage prosecutions, 

NSD seeks to ensure a coordinated and consistent approach in combating the threat of 

espionage. NSD also ensures that the Department's counterintelligence activities are 

coordinated with other elements of the Intelligence Community. 

QUESTION 12: For each of the following, describe specifically how your experiences will 

enable you to serve effectively as the AAG/NS. Include within each response a description of 

issues relating to the NSD that you can identify based on those experiences. 

a. Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, Regulatory & Government Law, at The 

Boeing Company; 

RESPONSE: As a vice president in the law department at the Boeing Company, I have 

gained valuable experience advising the business on achieving its objectives consistent 

with applicable law and policy, hiring and managing groups oflawyers, and allocating 

10 
45 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 36 here 27397.036

resources to meet the organization's top priorities. I have developed a close relationship 

with the business leaders so that I could provide early and on-going advice and counsel, 

rather than legal "sign-off' (or not) when a policy or plan is already well formulated. I 

have participated in a variety of legal matters including investigations, litigation and 

commercial negotiations. I have also been responsible for trade controls, anticorruption 

and other compliance matters, which has helped me learn how to design and operate an 

effective compliance program. These lessons are applicable to compliance in other 

subject matter areas as well. During my time at Boeing, I have worked on several subject 

matters areas that will relate to my work at the Division, including export controls and 

some aspects of cyber security. 

b. Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Law and Policy, and Senior Counsel 

to the Assistant Attorney General, fur the NSD at the Department; and 

RESPONSE: My work as a Senior Counsel and Deputy Assistant Attorney General in 

NSD is most directly relevant to serving effectively as MG/NS. In that prior capacity, I 

worked on a variety of national security legal issues, including those involving 

surveillance law and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, other investigative 

authorities including those under Executive Order 12333 and the National Security Letter 

statutes, and cyber operations. I was closely involved in the drafting and negotiation of 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of2008, and worked on minimization 

procedures and internal investigative guidelines. I also worked closely with various 

agencies of the Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau oflnvestigations, 

the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of that 

work, I am familiar with many of the issues facing the Division. 

c. Attorney Advisor for the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department. 

RESPONSE: This job was my introduction to the Department and how it operates. I 

was also able to dive deeply into a variety oflegal issues, although few that related 

directly to NSD. My experience at OLC, like that of clerking, trained me to think 

carefully about specific and difficult legal issues, and how to reconcile competing 

authorities and views. This is experience that served me well later at NSD when looking 

at particular legal and constitutional issues involving surveillance law. 

11 
46 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 18 here 27397.018

Senate Seleet Intelligence Committee 

Responses to Questions for the Record for Mr. Jobn Demers, 

Nominee for Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Department of Justice 

Hearing on October 31,2017 

QUESTIONS FORIHE RECORD FROM SENATOR RON WfDEN 

Seetion 702 of FISA 

1. In 2015, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum entitled "Restriction Regarding 

the Use ofFISA Section 702 Information in Criminal Proceedings Against United States 

Persons." 

a. Do you believe there should be any restrictions on the use of information 

obtained from Section 702 other than as evidence in criminal proceedings, ie. 

as part of criminal investigatiom or as part of administrative or civil 

investigations or proceedings? 

RESPONSE: As I was not involved in the drafting of this 2015 policy, I am not 

aware of what factors the government may have weighed when deciding its scope, 

and thus am not in a position to assess whether that scope should be changed. 

Should I be confirmed, I would expect to be briefed further on Section 702, 

including on the development and implementation of this policy. 

b. The 2015 policy includes an exception for "transnational crime." Do you 

support this exception and, if so, what would be ineluded as a "transnational 

'1Jime." 

RESPONSE: See response to Question l(a) above. 

2. Section 702 ofFISA prohibits the government from targeting a person reasonably 

believed to be located outside the United States "if the purpose of such acquisition is to 

target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States." Both 

the foreign target and the U.S. communicant can be the subject of repeated queries and 

disseminated reporting, and Section 702-colleeted information on either the foreign target 

or the U.S. communicant can be used in criminal and other proceedings. · 

a. Assuming the government has a purpose for targeting the foreign target, are 

there any limm to how extensively the government can query, disseminate 

and use 702-eolleeted information on the U.S. communicant, relative to the 

overseas target, before the current statutory prohibition on "reverse 

targeting" applies? 

RESPONSE: As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. 

person has been reverse targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target 

necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of 

factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil LI'berties Oversight Board noted in 
47 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 19 here 27397.019

its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the 

Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about the 

Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have 

occurred. 

b. If the answer above is no, would you support a change to the Jaw that would 

require the government to consider the relative extent of queries, 

dissemination and use of 702-eollected information in making a reverse 

targeting determination? 

Encryption 

RESPONSE: As noted above, under existing law I understand that a reverse 

targeting determination is a fact-specific inquiry that would involve consideration 

of a variety of factors. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board has 

found no intentional misuse of Section 702 authority. Nonetheless, should I 

become aware of instances of reverse targeting through the Division's oversight 

function, I would conduct a root-cause analysis and consider a variety of 

approaches to ensure it did not reoccur. 

3. When the government mandates that companies weaken the encryption of the products 

used by the American public, it comes at serious cost to the security of Americans. 

Moreover, recent events such as the Office of Personnel Management breach and 

election-related Russian hacking have demonstrated that weak encryption is a serious 

national security problem. If you are confirmed as Assistant Attorney General for the 

National Security Division, what will be your position with regard to policies or 

legislative proposals to permit the government to mandate weaknesses in strong 

encryption? 

RESPONSE: Encryption is important to enable the government, the private sector, and 

our citizens to safeguard private information and strengthen our personal and national 

security. However, it also poses serious challenges for law enforcement's ability to 

protect public safety by providing cbild molesters, terrorists, spies and other criminals 

with a more confidential way of communicating. I know that the Department of Justice 

and the FBI have expressed serious concerns, across Administrations, about their 

inability to obtain electronic infor,mation pursuant to lawful court orders because of 

encryption and other technOlogical issues. If I am confinned, I would work with all 

interested stakeholders, including Congress and the private sector, to come up with 

solutions to this challenge. 

4. Under Section 702 ofFISA;the govemment can direct an. electronic communications 

service provider to provide "assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition." 

a. Does this provisio11 authorize tbe government to direct a provider to 

circumvent or weaken the encryption of the provider's product or to insert 

surveillance-enabling software into a customer's device? 

2 
48 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 20 here 27397.020

Media 

RESPONSE: Section 702(h) authorizes the Attorney General and Director of 

National Intelligence to direct an electrODic communications service provider to 

provide "all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the" 

Section 702 acquisition. This language is very similar to that found in Title I of 

FISA. I do not know whether section 702{h) could be used in the manner you 

describe, and determining the appropriate scope of such "information, facilities, 

or assistance" that is "necessary to accomplish the acquisition" in particular cases 

would involve a fact-based inquiry and could vary based on different service 

providers and different technologies. A provider is always :free to challenge the 

lawfulness of a directive under this section or to require the Government to file a 

motion to compel. 

b. If the answer above is yes, should the FISA Court be informed of any such 

directive? 

RESPONSE: The FISA Court would be provided a Title VII directive for review 

if a service provider cballenged the lawfulness of a directive as permitted under 

Section 702(h)(4), or if the Government filed a motion ta compel a provider's 

compliance with a directive as permitted by Section 702(h)(S). 

S. On July 12, 2013, the Department of Justice released a Report on Review ofNews Media 

Policies. Which aspects of that Review do you agree with and which would you 

advise be modified? 

RESPONSE: I have not had occasion to review the Department's Report on Review of 

News Media Policies during the prior Administration, so I am not in a position to 

comment on whefuer I would support or propose to modify any policies adopted as a 

result of that review. As I said at my confirmation hearing, I believe that issuing a 

subpoena to a journalist is not a decision to be taken lightly and should be a last resort or 

close to a last resort. 

Enemy combatants 

6. Can a U.S. person who is arrested in the United States be held as an enemy 

combatant? 

RESPONSE: Federal courts have rendered d±fferent opinions on the question whether, 

and if so when, a U.S. person arrested in the United States may be held as an enemy 

combatant in the conflict with al Qaeda, the Tallban, and associated forces, and fue 

Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. I have not examined this issue closely, but 

would do so if the question arises. As I stated at my confirmation hearing, my 

predisposition is that Americans ultimately be tried in Article ill courts. 

3 
49 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 21 here 27397.021

Other 

7. Section 4 ofPPD-28 calls on each Intelligence Community element to update existing or 

i,ssue new policies and procedures to implement principles for safeguarding all personal 

information collected thi:ougb SIGINT. Those policies and procedures are currently 

posted publicly by the ODNL 

a. Do you support the continuation of these policies? 

b. Please describe any modifications you would make to these policies. 

RESPONSE to 7(a) and 7Cbl: I have not had occasion to review the policies and 

procedures adopted pursuant to PPD-28 or to discuss their basis and investigative 

impact with the Intelligence Community, so I am not in a position to comment on 

the substance of the policies. 

8. .Are there any circumstances in whieh an element of the Intelligence Community 

may not eondnct a warrantless search for a U.S. person of communications that 

have been coUected pursuant to Section 12333? If so, please describe. 

RESPONSE: Rules governing U.S. person information collected pursuant to Executive 

Order 12333 are set forth in guidelines established by the head of1he relevant element of 

the Intelligence Community and approved by the Attorney General in accordance with 

section 2.3 of that order. Whether a particular query could be conducted would depend 

on application of any such rules to the circumstances at hand, and I have not had the 

opportunity to review those rules in many years. 

4 
50 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 22 here 27397.022

Senate Select Intelligence Committee 

Responses to Questions for the Record for Mr. John Demers, 

Nominee for Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Department of Justice 

Hearing on October 31,2017 

QUESTIONS FORIHE RECORD FROM SENATOR TOM COTTON 

1. Do you believe the growing presence of Chinese state-owned telecommanicatious 

carriers and equipment providers, such a China Mobile, China Telecom, China 

Unicom, Huawei, and ZTE, in the United States is a national security threat that 

we will have to deal with? 

RESPONSE: I believe that the U.S. government must remain vigilant against the 

national security threat posed by the presence of foreign state-owned or controlled 

telecommunications carriers and equipment providers in the United States, including 

from China. I know that the Intelligence Community recently assessed publicly that 

China will continue to actively target the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. 

companies for cyber espionage, and that our communication networks are at risk as 

our adversaries become more adept at compromising those networks. 

2. Will yon commit to reading the latest intelligence on the threat these entities 

pose? 

RESPONSE: Yes. 

3. Do you believe U.S. telecommunications providers, such as AT&T, should be 

wary about partnering in any way with Chinese state-owned telecommunications 

carriers and equipment providers, such as China Mobile, China Telecom, China 

Unicom, Huawei, and ZTE? 

RESPONSE: The U.S. telecommunications sector is part of our nation's critical 

infrastructure, underlying the operations of all businesses, public safety organizations, 

and government As such, I believe U.S. telecommunications providers must have a 

heightened awareness of the wlnerabilities in the telecommunications supply chain 

and take into account the security risks associated with doing ht¥~iness with thirdparty vendors, suppliers, and other partners, particularly those subject to influence by 

foreign governments. Ultimately, the U.S. government has the responsibility to 

ensure the security and resilience of the U.S. telecommunications sector, and to use 

every appropriate authority to address national security risks. 

4. Do you believe that China telecommunications and equipment providers should 

be allowed to have their equipment incorporated into critical infrast;ructure, 

such as first responder networks? Should U.S. government agencies be allowed 

to purehase phones if they include components produced by Huawei? 

RESPONSE: I believe the U.S. government bas a responsibility to ensure the 

security and resilience of the U.S. telecommunications sector, which is an essential 

5 
51 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 23 here 27397.023

part of our critical infrastructure. If confirmed, I would work with :interagency 

partners, including the Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland 

Security, and sector specific agencies, as well as critical infrastructure owners and 

operators to address national security threats to the sector-including threats :from 

telecommunications and equipment providers subject to influence by foreign 

governments. 

5. If confirmed, will you commit to reviewing and updating any National Security 

Threat Assessment associated with China Mobile Communications Corporation, 

Huawei, ZTE, China Telecom, China Unieom, or any other Chinese 

telecommunications ~ompany? 

Q§PONSE: I have not been with the Department of Justice for almost nine yem:s. 

so I am not aware of what role the National Security Division has played in drafting 

National Security Threat Assessments associated with the Chinese 

telecommunications companies you reference. If confirmed, I commit to working 

with relevant interagency partners to take appropriate steps to address any national 

security threats posed by foreign-owned telecommunications carriers and equipment 

providers' operations in the United States. 

·6. If confirmed, what other steps will you take in this area? Are there ways the 

DOJ NSD can better partner with the FCC and NTIA in this area? 

REgpONSE: I have been away from the Department for almost nine years, and I am 

not aware ofwbat role the National Security Division cur.rently plays with respect to 

addressing national security risks affecting the U.S. telecommunications sector. I 

know that the Division participates in ''Team Telecom," an ad-hoc interagency group 

that assists the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in reviewing certain 

license applications and determining whether granting a license to foreign-owned orcontrolled entities poses national security risks. If confirmed, I commit to working 

with relevant interagency partners to take appropriate steps to address any national 

security risks posed by foreign-owned telecommunications carriers and equipment 

providers• operations in the United States. 

6 
52 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 24 here 27397.024

Senate Select lntelligenee Committee 

Responses to Questions for the Record for Mr. John Demers, 

Nominee for Assistant Attorney General for National Seeurity, Department of Justice 

Hearing on October 31, 2017 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR KAMALA D. HARRIS 

1. There has been a troubling uptick in domestic terror attacks targeting ethnic and religious 

minorities. Prior to the August 12, 2017 "Unite the Right'' violenclf in Charlottesville, on 

May 20, 2017, FBI and DHS issued a Joint Intelligence Bulletin entitled "White 

Supremacist Extremism Poses Persistent Threat ofLethal Violence." The report notes 

that White Supremacist Extremists were responsible for 49 homicides in 26 attacks from 

2000 to 2016, "more than any other domestic extremist movement." Additionslly, a 

recent Government Accountability Office report stated that of the 85 violent extremist 

incidents in the U.S. that resulted in death since September 12,2001, far-right extremist 

groups were responsible for 73 percent. 

a. Would the NSD, under your leadership, commit to dedicating more resources 

to addressing these incidents of white supremacy and domestic terrorism? 

b. If confirmed to head the NSD, what other steps will you take to combat 

domestic terrorism? 

RESPONSE; The violence in Charlottesville was reprehensible, and, like all 

terrorism, domestic terrorism must be prevented and prosecuted. As a private 

citizen who has been out of the Justice Department for nearly a decade, I am not 

in a position to assess whether NSD is devoting sufficient resources to the threat 

of domestic terrorism. I understand from the FBI Director's recent testimony that 

the FBI devotes sigoificant resources to domestic terrorism investigations, which 

reflects the gravity of this threat to our nations! security, and I am committed to 

working with the FBI and using the full range of our authorities to protect the 

public against thi!l serious tl:u:e&t. I would U3e every lawful tool, consistent with 

the First Amendment, to deter and disrupt the domestic terrorism threat, including 

terrorist activities by white supremacists, and bring those responsible to justice. 

2. Recently, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division released a report entitled, "Black Identity 

Extremists Likely Motivated to Target Law Enforcement." The report details that in the 

aftermath of Black Lives Matter protests, the FBI created a new category of extremist for 

individuals who seek to "establish a separate black homeland or autonomous black 

institutions through unlawful acts of force or violence." 

a. The NSD and FBI often work together on national security issues. Please 

explain the NSD's role in determining whether an individual is categorized as 

a "Black Identity Extremist"? 

7 
53 

Æ 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 25 here 27397.025

b. Please explain whether the NSD provides any advice or guidance to the FBI 

in terms of how to train its offieers to deal with individuals designated as a 

"Black Identity Extremist." If so, what is this guidance? Should this 

guidance include implicit bias training? Should it include training to prevent 

racial profiling? 

c. Bow will you ensure that this new designation will not be abused to target 

Americans that are merely exercising their right to free speech and 

assembly? 

RESPONSE: I am not familiar with this report, and because I am not currently 

working at the Department of Justice, I am unaware of what role NSD is play.ing 

with respect to this issue, including with respect to any training. It is essential 

that our national security laws and policies both safeguard the American people 

:from a wide range of threats and maintain the individual h"berties and :freedoms 

that define American life. I note that the Attomey General's Guidelines for 

Domestic FBI Operations prohibit investigations of and information gathering on 

United States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by 

the First Amendment. This is similar the language in FISA with respect to 

foreign intelligence surveillance. Thus, various laws recognize the sensitivity of 

the First Amendment issues that may be implicated by terrorism investigations. 

Together with the career attorneys in the Division, I would ensure that NSD's 

national security activities are conducted in accord with the law and the :facts, and 

consistent with the constitutional protections for .ftee speech and assembly. 

8