1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

STEVEN RAYMOND BANGHART and 

BECKY JUNE BANGHART,

Debtors.

BAP No. AZ-23-1049-LCF

Bk. No. 0:17-bk-13527-SHG

MEMORANDUM*

JIM D. SMITH,

Appellant,

v.

UST-UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, 

PHOENIX,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Arizona

Scott H. Gan, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: LAFFERTY, CORBIT, and FARIS, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Jim D. Smith, trustee of the chapter 71 estate of Steven and Becky 

Banghart, was employed at the outset of the case to serve as attorney for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of 

Bankruptcy Procedure, and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil 

FILED

DEC 19 2023

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

the estate with the approval of the bankruptcy court. Smith filed a fee 

application seeking $1,530 in attorney’s fees which was approved as no 

objections were filed. Smith subsequently filed an application for trustee’s 

commission for $847.80 to which the U.S. Trustee (“UST”) objected on the 

basis that Smith was “double-dipping,” i.e., seeking payment for the same 

tasks or activities twice. After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court 

reduced the previously approved attorney’s fees to $210 but allowed the 

trustee’s commission in full. Smith appealed the rulings. Seeing no error,

we AFFIRM.2 

FACTS3

A. The bankruptcy case and Smith’s activities

Steven and Becky Banghart filed their chapter 7 petition on 

November 14, 2017. Smith was appointed trustee. On December 27, 2017, 

Smith filed a two-page application to have himself appointed attorney for 

the estate. Concurrent with the application, Smith filed a one-page 

declaration which simply stated that he is a sole practitioner and had no 

conflicts. There being no objections, the application was approved. 

Procedure.

2 This appeal was concurrently heard with three others: (1) Smith v. UST (In re 

Rivera), BAP No. AZ-23-1047-LCF; (2) Smith v. UST (In re Figueroa), BAP No. AZ-23-

1048-LCF; and (3) Smith v. UST (In re Earle’s Custom Wines, Inc.), BAP No. AZ-23-1050-

LCF. These companion appeals are the subject of their own separate written decisions. 

3 We exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of documents electronically 

filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and adversary proceeding. See Atwood v. Chase 

Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
3

The same day, Smith filed a one-page Trustee’s Objection to Exempt 

Property. The objection stated that the Debtors’ exemption on their 2007 

Dodge Ram 3500 improperly exceeded the allowed amount of $12,000. The 

Debtors did not respond and the objection was sustained. Approximately a 

month later, Smith filed a Notice to Deliver Non-Exempt Asset requesting 

that the Debtors turn over their 2003 BMW 325Ci.

Thereafter, Smith settled with the Debtors, resolving the issues over

both vehicles for a payment of $2,500 paid over one year. Smith’s 

application for approval of the settlement was approved without objection.

The court clerk filed and served a Notice of Bar Date, and ultimately

six proofs of claim were filed totaling $9,447.66.

B. The fee application

On January 15, 2019, Smith filed a six-page Application for 

Allowance of Administrative Expense – and – Rule 2016 Disclosure (the 

“Trustee’s Fee Application”). The Trustee’s Fee Application sought fees of 

$1,530.00 for 5.1 hours of work at $300 per hour. The services were 

categorized as: 4.1 hours for the settlement negotiations and 

documentation with the Debtors; and 1.0 hours for preparation of the 

Trustee’s Fee Application. Smith included a cursory explanation of the 

work but no declaration to support the application. As there were no 

objections, the Trustee’s Fee Application was approved.
4

C. The Trustee Final Report

On June 5, 2019, Smith filed his Trustee Final Report (“TFR”) and 

separately filed an Application for Compensation [and] Reimbursement of 

Expenses (the “Trustee’s Commission Request”). The TFR disclosed that 

Smith had received Debtors’ tax refunds of approximately $950 from the 

IRS, and that, at the time of filing the TFR, Smith held $3,311.21 in his trust 

account. The Trustee’s Commission Request proposed that Smith pay 

himself $847.80 for trustee’s commission, $30 for trustee’s expenses, and

$1,530 for his previously awarded attorney’s fees. That left $903.41 for 

creditors.

The bankruptcy court docket indicates that the UST reviewed the 

TFR and Trustee’s Commission Request and had no objections. But a few 

weeks later, the UST filed an objection to the Trustee’s Commission 

Request. The objection asserted that since Smith “has already compensated 

himself as an attorney for the bankruptcy estate for performing chapter 7 

trustee duties,” further compensation should be denied. The objection 

noted that the UST was not aware that the fee application had been filed 

because its office was closed at that time. The objection also noted that it

did not dispute that Smith had the right to the commission requested but 

argued that he was “double-dipping” because he was going to be paid 

attorney’s fees for doing the same work. Smith did not respond to the 

objections. 
5

On July 1, 2020, and again on August 26, 2021, the bankruptcy clerk

filed a preprinted Memorandum to Case Trustee noting that there had been 

no activity in the case for more than one year and that “it is unclear as to 

whether this case is continuing to be administered or whether an 

appropriate final report should be filed and the case closed.”

D. The hearings on Smith’s TFR

Neither Smith nor the UST timely responded to either of the case 

memoranda; rather nine months after the second one was issued, the UST 

filed a “[r]equest for status hearing regarding Memorandum to Case 

Trustee and United States Trustee’s Objection to Trustee’s Application for 

Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses.” The request noted that

there was no activity in this case and the TFR was pending. Thereafter, the 

bankruptcy court set a status hearing which was heard on August 4, 2022.4

At the hearing, Smith suggested that the bankruptcy court simply 

rule on the pleadings to date without further hearings, and the UST agreed. 

The court invited Smith to file a response to the UST’s objection, but Smith 

demurred. The court then stated on the record that the matter was 

submitted.

On September 8, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered its order 

requiring simultaneous further responses from Smith and the UST and 

setting a further hearing. In its order, the court made tentative findings 

4 This was a combined hearing for all four of the cases for which the Panel heard 

argument on September 28, 2023. 
6

including that one single entry in the fee application for “limited legal 

research” “may be compensable for attorney’s fees, provided there is 

further explanation from Mr. Smith[,]” suggesting that the remainder of the 

time would be disallowed. (Emphasis added). The court invited Smith to 

respond to the UST objections as well as its tentative findings. 

As to the UST, the court ordered the UST to file a reply “describing 

its procedure for identifying such violations when it reviews fee 

applications and whether it uses the same procedure and scrutiny to 

review fee applications by independent counsel as it does to review those

by trustees also serving as attorneys for the estate.”

Smith’s response repeated his position that all of his billed time was 

for services “routinely performed” by attorneys employed by chapter 7 

trustees. The response further complained that the UST was not objecting 

to the fees requested by trustee Lawrence Warfield’s5 attorney who “was 

paid over $800,000 in the Year 2021 . . . for representing Chapter 7 Case 

Trustees in cases where issues similar to this Case were made and 

litigated.” Smith noted that his fee application had been approved by the 

court on February 12, 2019, i.e., more than three years ago. 

The UST’s response summarized its process for reviewing chapter 7 

fee applications. 

On November 1, 2022, the bankruptcy court conducted a second 

hearing and advised the parties that its review of the supplemental 

5 Apparently, the only other chapter 7 trustee in the Yuma, Arizona area. 
7

responses left it with questions and further concerns directed at both

parties. After lengthy colloquy between the court and the parties, the court 

invited the parties to file further supplemental pleadings regarding its 

specific concerns. The court requested “case law” from the parties that 

differentiated a trustee’s efforts as trustee and those of trustee’s counsel. 

The court stated that it wished to better understand the UST’s position on 

that issue so that it could “more clearly set a standard . . . to apply across

the board.” As to Smith, the court asked him to “take a hard look” at his 

time entries as some appeared to be administrative overhead expense. 

Over Smith’s objection, the court set an evidentiary hearing in December. 

Subsequently, the UST filed a further memorandum which 

essentially repeated its earlier recitation of its procedures regarding fee 

applications. It attached numerous exhibits containing turnover motions 

filed by trustees without counsel, arguing that this type of turnover action 

is routinely done by trustees without counsel. 

Smith filed a “Notice of Filing ‘De-Lump’ Time Entries as Required 

by 9/8/2022 Court Order.” He also filed a list of thirty-four “recent” cases

purporting to establish that “the Attorney for the Chapter 7 Trustee was 

compensated (without objection) for services which the U.S. Trustee now 

claims are services that must be provided by the Chapter 7 Trustee, not an 

Attorney.” The list contained some details about each case and a 

“[d]escription of the work” but contained no analysis or statement by 
8

Smith establishing a direct relationship between those cases and his case 

nor showing any relevance to the tasks Smith performed. 

On December 20, 2022, the bankruptcy court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing at which Smith testified and was cross-examined.

Smith testified that his request for fees was reasonable because, among 

other reasons, he limited his request to the settlement with the Debtors, 

and specifically to time spent negotiating the settlement and preparation of

the settlement documents. On cross-examination, Smith stated that in his 

opinion, drafting a settlement agreement and related pleadings is “attorney

work.” The bankruptcy court inquired: “But again, you agree that you 

could have in your Trustee capacity filed that motion to approve 

settlement, correct?” Smith responded: “Absolutely, I could have done it.”

Smith stated in response to another question by the court: “Judge, I submit 

you understand the case. You can just do what you want.” 

The UST argued that a fee application remains “open” until the TFR 

is approved, also suggesting that the fees were approved on an interim 

basis and thus could be revisited but offered no authority for either

proposition. The UST stated that it objected to the Trustee’s Commission 

Request rather than the fee award only because it was more expedient to 

do that rather than object to the Trustee’s Fee Application. 

E. The bankruptcy court’s rulings

The bankruptcy court issued its Ruling on United States Trustee’s 

Objection to Jim Smith’s Trustee’s Application on February 21, 2023 (the 
9

“Memorandum”). The bankruptcy court first addressed the Trustee’s

Commission Request ruling that it was not appropriate to deny the 

commission provided to the trustee under § 326(a) on the basis that “Smith 

previously received attorney’s fees.” It next addressed the procedural 

concern that the fees in the Trustee’s Fee Application had already been 

approved. The court stated that under Civil Rule 60(b), it would grant the 

UST relief from that approval because “closure of the UST’s office during 

the time Mr. Smith filed his Attorney Application is ‘excusable neglect’

within [Civil] Rule 60(b)(1).”6

As to the merits, the court disallowed all the attorney fee time except 

for an entry in the amount of .7 hours which was attributable to the 

preparation of the fee application itself. As to each of the disallowed

entries, the court stated that “[t]his time entry is not compensable for 

attorney’s fees. Objection sustained,” or “negotiating a settlement 

regarding turnover is a trustee duty.” Further, on most of the entries, it 

noted that Smith did not “show what legal issues or services were 

involved.”

The bankruptcy court concluded that the disallowed “services were 

neither reasonable nor necessary.” It stated, “Smith . . . failed to 

demonstrate how any of those services performed involved legal expertise 

beyond the duties routinely performed by trustees without counsel 

6 As to the Civil Rule 60(c)(1) requirement that the request be made within one

year, the court noted that the UST filed its objection a few months after entry of the 

order approving the Trustee’s Fee Application which was within the one-year limit.
10

assistance.” It further noted that the reduction “is warranted based on [the 

court’s] review for reasonableness and necessity and the anticipated return 

to creditors in this case.” It reduced the attorney’s fees previously allowed 

from $1,530 to $210. It allowed the full amount of the Trustee’s

Commission Request of $847.80 and expenses of $30. 

Smith timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUE

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in reducing the 

trustee’s attorney’s fee request from $1,530 in fees to $210?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion a bankruptcy court’s order 

awarding compensation to an estate professional under § 330. Hopkins v. 

Asset Acceptance LLC (In re Salgado-Nava), 473 B.R. 911, 915 (9th Cir. BAP 

2012). We will not disturb a bankruptcy court’s award of attorney’s fees 

“absent an abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of the law.” In re 

Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Dawson v. 

Wash. Mut. Bank F.A. (In re Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Factual findings made in the course of awarding compensation are 

not disturbed unless clearly erroneous. See Friedman Enters. v. B.U.M. Int'l,

Inc. (In re B.U.M. Int'l, Inc.), 229 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 2000). A finding is 
11

not “clearly erroneous” unless, based on the entire evidence, the reviewing 

court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

We review for abuse of discretion decisions on relief from judgment 

under Civil Rule 60(b). Flores v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 720, 731 (9th Cir. 2020).

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Black v. Bonnie 

Springs Family Ltd. P'ship (In re Black), 487 B.R. 202, 211 (9th Cir. BAP 2013).

DISCUSSION

In his opening brief, Smith cites two specific issues to be resolved in 

this appeal: was the bankruptcy court “legally correct” in 1) vacating the

approval of the attorney’s fees application; and 2) “summarily reducing the 

preciously allowed Attorney’s fees to $210?”7

There are reasons why a court of appeals defers to the trial court,

especially when reviewing attorney’s fee applications. Fundamentally, the 

Bankruptcy Code and cases interpreting § 330 make clear that the trial 

court has an independent obligation, whether a party objects or not, to 

review, critique, and reduce the fees requested if necessary, using the given 

standards; see In re Crown Orthodontic Dental Grp., 159 B.R. 307, 309 (Bankr. 

C.D. Cal. 1993). See also Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re 

7 Smith does not argue for reversal on the basis that the UST targeted him by 

objecting to his fee application while at the same time not objecting to similar fee 

applications by other trustees. That issue is therefore waived and not discussed herein. 

Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2017) (issue not argued in briefs is

waived).
12

Eliapo), 298 B.R. 392, 399 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) (stating that the court has 

“wide discretion in determining reasonable and necessary fees under 

§ 330(a)[.]”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded by 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 

2006).8

The basis for the extremely deferential standard is that the 

bankruptcy court is uniquely in the best position to assess the amount of 

8 Section 330(a) states in relevant part:

(a) (1) [The bankruptcy court may award] –

(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services 

rendered by the . . . attorney . . . employed by [the trustee]; 

. . . 

(2) The court may . . . award compensation that is less than the 

amount of compensation that is requested.

(3) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be 

awarded . . . the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value 

of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including—

(A) the time spent on such services;

(B) the rates charged for such services;

(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or 

beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the 

completion of, a case under this title;

(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable 

amount of time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and 

nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;

(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is 

board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the 

bankruptcy field; and

(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary 

compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other 

than cases under this title.

(4)(A) . . . the court shall not allow compensation for—

(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or

(ii) services that were not—

(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate; or

(II) necessary to the administration of the case.
13

work done, its contribution to the administration of the estate, and its 

benefit to the stakeholders; and thus, to determine the appropriate amount 

of fees. See Phillips v. Gilman (In re Gilman), CC-18-1101-STaL, 2019 WL 

3074607, at *4 (9th Cir. BAP July 12, 2019) (“It is uniquely the province of 

the bankruptcy court to determine the level of review and the basis for 

critique in fee review, and a reviewing court should defer as thoroughly to 

that decision by the bankruptcy court as it would to any other decision 

concerning reasonableness of fees[.]”) (citations omitted), aff'd, 836 F. App’x 

511 (9th Cir. 2020). The skill requisite to achieve those results may be much

more obvious in mid-size or larger cases of some complexity than they may 

be in cases such as the one before this Panel where there is very little

activity and the court simply does not have the same opportunity to assess 

the nature of the work or whether it was actually necessary.

These cases represent exactly that dilemma. While we do not suggest 

that in every small case the court should schedule a hearing to probe the 

necessity of employing counsel, neither do we accept the proposition that 

the court must rely on the general assertion by the trustee in the 

employment application regarding the need for attorney assistance as 

establishing that any particular services actually rendered required the 

expertise of counsel. 

The Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee to do his or her own work; 

this requirement sometimes creates a tension in small cases like these 

between the work that should be done by the trustee and that which 
14

genuinely requires the assistance of an attorney. Therefore, it is not 

surprising that the only meaningful review of the fees in small cases occurs 

at the end of the case, and may frequently be predicated on an objection, or 

the court’s independent concern, that the services for which compensation 

is requested do not rise to the level of tasks for which the expertise of an 

attorney was required. 

A. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting Civil 

Rule 60(b) relief to the UST. 

Civil Rule 60(b), made applicable to this matter by Rule 9024, permits 

a court to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order or proceeding

for [among other reasons] . . . (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”

The bankruptcy court specifically found excusable neglect justifying 

relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(1) because “closure of the UST’s office during 

the time Mr. Smith filed his Attorney Application is ‘excusable neglect’

within Rule 60(b)(1).” The court’s ruling under these circumstances was not

illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn 

from the facts in the record. 

B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing

the requested compensation.

1. There was insufficient evidence to permit the bankruptcy 

court to find that the services were reasonable and necessary.

Section 330 requires that an applicant establish that the fees incurred 

were reasonable and necessary as the bankruptcy court correctly ruled. 
15

Smith’s application simply does not demonstrate adherence to that 

standard. 

Smith’s fee application contained no separate declaration ascribed 

under penalty of perjury supporting the proposition that the fees he 

incurred were reasonable and necessary under § 330. His sole explanation 

in the Trustee’s Fee Application for the work is: “1) [t]his Case likely would 

have been a ‘No Asset’ case if the legal services had not been rendered. 

2) Legal work to negotiate and obtain Court approval of a settlement to 

resolve the Bankruptcy Estate’s interest in a 2007 Doge [sic] Ram 3500 

Pickup and a 2003 BMW 325CI.” 

Smith’s response to the UST objection contained his short declaration 

which simply concluded that “in [his] legal opinion,” the services 

performed were “not duties which are required to be performed by a

chapter 7 Trustee, and that these settlements are normally handled by an 

Attorney for the Bankruptcy Estate.” His testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing was no more than that; a few conclusory comments about the work 

he did and his belief that he should be paid for it. 

In his opening brief, Smith set forth fifteen time entries that are 

“specific examples of disallowance where the findings and conclusions are 

illogical, implausible and without support in the record.” For these entries,

Smith offers a cursory explanation that the tasks were a “component of the 

required documentation . . . .” That conclusory statement is woefully short 

of the sort of factual support necessary to establish that the requested fees 
16

were reasonable and necessary. And identifying a task as related to a 

settlement does not remove it from the trustee’s obligations.

The bankruptcy court’s ruling does not leave us with a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

2. There was insufficient evidence to permit the bankruptcy 

court to find that the disallowed services required special 

expertise. 

The UST’s main objection to the Trustee’s Fee Application was that

the services performed by Smith purportedly as the trustee’s attorney were 

services which the trustee would generally undertake. Section 328(b)9

unambiguously requires that the fees awarded to an attorney representing 

a trustee in a bankruptcy case must not include any time for “performance 

of any of the trustee’s duties that are generally performed by a trustee

without the assistance of an attorney . . . for the estate.”

Section 704 sets forth the trustee’s duties which include collecting 

and reducing to money the property of the estate, investigating the 

financial affairs of the debtor, examining the proofs of claim with a view 

toward objecting to allowance, and preparing the trustee’s final account.

The role of counsel for the trustee is to perform those tasks that require 

9 Section 328(b) states in relevant part: 

(b) If the court has authorized a trustee to serve as an attorney . . . for the 

estate under section 327(d) of this title, the court may allow compensation 

for the trustee’s services as such attorney . . . only to the extent that the 

trustee performed services as attorney . . . for the estate and not for 

performance of any of the trustee’s duties that are generally performed by 

a trustee without the assistance of an attorney . . . for the estate.
17

special expertise beyond that expected of an ordinary trustee. “Only when 

unique difficulties arise may compensation be provided for services which 

coincide or overlap with the trustee’s duties and only to the extent of 

matters requiring legal expertise.” See Ferrette & Slater v. U.S. Tr. (In re 

Garcia), 335 B.R. 717, 725 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Attorneys must therefore present sufficient evidence including 

billing records with enough detail to establish that the services rendered

went beyond the scope of the trustee’s statutory duties and involve unique 

difficulties. Id. at 727. The cryptic descriptions in the billing statements 

provoked the court’s concern about Smith’s dual role in this case. Even the

bankruptcy court’s entreaties to Smith before the evidentiary hearing did 

not prompt Smith to adequately explain why the tasks required attorney

expertise. Smith’s failure to do so prevented the court from making the 

required findings in Smith’s favor. 

There is nothing in the record that would support a finding that the

time entries disallowed by the bankruptcy court required expertise beyond 

that expected of an ordinary trustee. It is not clear error to find that these 

and similar entries are efforts Congress intended to be undertaken by the 

trustee and compensated under § 326(a). 
18

3. Section 330 implicitly requires counsel to exercise billing 

discretion; therefore, the bankruptcy court properly 

considered the anticipated return to creditors standard when 

disallowing the time and fees. 

Beyond the literal language that the services must be reasonable and 

necessary to be compensable, “[p]rofessionals have an obligation to 

exercise billing judgment.” Lobel & Opera v. U.S. Tr. (In re Auto Parts Club, 

Inc.), 211 B.R. 29, 33 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). Having an attorney perform a task 

does not compel a finding that the fees were necessary per se, and we 

implicitly rely on the trustee to exercise appropriate discretion before 

burdening the estate, and in particular a small estate, with attorney’s fees

where the task might well have been performed by the trustee. 

The “actual and necessary” prong of § 330(a)(1) requires the trustee

to consider the potential for recovery and balance the effort required 

against the results that might be achieved. See Unsec. Creditors' Comm. v. 

Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. (In re Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.), 924 F.2d 955, 961

(9th Cir. 1991) (“Absent unusual circumstances, an attorney must scale his 

or her fee at least to the reasonably expected recovery.”).

Smith offered no explanation as to why having an attorney do the 

paperwork for a settlement was required to monetize what was obviously

going to be a simple and nominal recovery for the estate. Smith offered no 

evidence that he considered the potential for recovery and did any 

balancing assessment before incurring attorney’s fees. That was his burden,

and we cannot second guess the bankruptcy court’s finding that the 
19

expertise of an attorney was not necessary. Smith’s blind insistence that it 

was compensable professional time because he said so is not sufficient to 

satisfy the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.