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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re S.T., L.T., E.E., and M.E.

No. 20-0956 (Putnam County 20-JA-45, 20-JA-46, 20-JA-47, and 20-JA-48)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother C.T., by counsel Brenden D. Long, appeals the Circuit Court of Putnam 

County’s November 17, 2020, order terminating her parental rights to S.T., L.T., E.E., and M.E.

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The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Brandolyn 

N. Felton-Ernest, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem

(“guardian”), Lisa A. Estes, filed a response on the children’s behalf in support of the circuit 

court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for an 

improvement period and terminating her parental rights.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In March of 2020, the DHHR implemented a protection plan with petitioner after two-yearold E.E. was found in the father J.E.’s vehicle surrounded by large quantities of heroin, 

methamphetamine, and fentanyl, and with J.E. unresponsive. During arrest, J.E. was so intoxicated 

that he could not communicate with law enforcement officers and attempted to evade arrest by 

biting an officer. J.E. also stated that E.E. had not eaten since the prior day. The DHHR then placed 

E.E. with petitioner who was thirty weeks pregnant with another child by J.E. and agreed to the 

DHHR’s protection plan that required no contact with J.E. Petitioner obtained a domestic violence 

protective order (“DVPO”) against J.E. when he appeared at her home after being released from 

incarceration. Petitioner admitted to the DHHR worker that she had a history of drug abuse and 

that she relapsed in February of 2020 with methamphetamine. Petitioner claimed to have custody 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

FILED

June 3, 2021 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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of S.T. and L.T. but stated that she left them to be raised by their father, R.T., so that she could be 

with J.E. In May of 2020, petitioner gave birth to M.E. Despite the protection plan over the 

previous four months and the DVPO, petitioner allowed J.E. to live in the home with E.E. and 

M.E. As a result, the DHHR filed a child abuse and neglect petition in July of 2020, alleging that 

petitioner abused methamphetamine while pregnant with M.E., violated the DHHR’s protection 

plan and the DVPO by allowing J.E. to live in the home, exposed the children to domestic violence

and placed them in unsafe situations, and allowed J.E. to expose the children to drug abuse. The 

DHHR further alleged that petitioner was previously adjudicated as an abusing parent for exposing 

S.T., LT., and E.E. to domestic violence, substance abuse, and unsafe living conditions in 2013 

and 2017, but successfully completed improvement periods resulting in the dismissal of those 

petitions. Thereafter, petitioner waived her preliminary hearing. 

The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing in August of 2020, during which petitioner 

stipulated that she placed the children in unsafe situations and environments, permitted the children 

to have contact with J.E. in violation of court order, exposed the children to domestic violence, 

and abused methamphetamine while pregnant with M.E. The circuit court accepted the stipulations 

and adjudicated petitioner as an abusing parent. Petitioner then moved for a post-adjudicatory 

improvement period, which the court held in abeyance. 

According to the guardian’s report submitted prior to the dispositional hearing, petitioner 

had been adjudicated as an abusing parent for domestic violence, substance abuse, and exposing 

the children to unsafe situations in three separate cases. The guardian opined that petitioner 

continued to make poor decisions, which placed the children at risk of physical, emotional, and 

psychological harm. The guardian noted that she interviewed sixteen-year-old S.T. and ten-yearold L.T. and learned that petitioner abruptly left the two older children by “sneaking out” while

S.T. was in the shower, later texting him that she left to go live with J.E. Also, while petitioner 

was visiting L.T., she violated the active DVPO by leaving with J.E. During that visit, L.T. was so 

distraught that she begged petitioner not to leave and laid in front of the door to prevent her from 

leaving. Petitioner instead left the home by stepping over crying L.T. In the guardian’s opinion, 

petitioner had no meaningful relationship with L.T. and S.T. and failed to provide for any of their 

needs. 

Notably, the guardian reported that petitioner complained to family members that she did 

not have the ultimate say as to whether J.E. saw M.E. and E.E. This concerned the guardian as 

petitioner admitted knowing of J.E.’s drug abuse and selling of illicit drugs yet claimed that J.E. 

was a “good father.” Also, according to family members, at the time of J.E.’s arrest in March of 

2020, E.E. had been in his custody for ten days and petitioner had not checked on the child.

According to petitioner, she left the home after an argument without taking E.E., which allowed 

J.E. to leave with the child for several days. J.E. was arrested twice at petitioner’s home for 

violating the DVPO and his criminal bond. Most importantly, after M.E. and E.E. were removed 

from petitioner’s care, petitioner continued to reside with J.E. and the two had a domestic 

altercation in August of 2020, which resulted in petitioner’s hospitalization with serious injuries. 

Petitioner stated that she started the fight by pushing J.E. The guardian added that J.E. has multiple 

domestic battery charges and active felony charges in Cabell County, West Virginia, for which 

petitioner is the victim. Of note, the guardian indicated that in the 2017 case, the court ordered that 

J.E. have no contact with E.E. and that he must petition the court to modify this condition. 
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However, J.E. never did so and petitioner allowed J.E. to have contact with E.E. despite the court’s 

explicit orders in the prior 2017 case. Finally, the guardian stated that petitioner lacked housing 

and employment, and was not in a position to provide for the children. 

Despite the receipt of numerous services such as parenting and adult life skills classes, drug 

screening, drug treatment, and supervised visitations during two previous improvement periods, 

petitioner failed to make lasting changes as she continued her drug abuse and violent relationship 

with J.E. The guardian also noted that S.T. requested that petitioner’s parental rights be terminated.

In October of 2020, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing, wherein the DHHR

moved to terminate petitioner’s parental rights based upon her failure to make lasting changes and 

continued abuse and neglect of the children despite the implementation of numerous services in 

two previous cases. The guardian recommended the termination of petitioner’s parental rights, 

arguing that her behaviors demonstrated an unwillingness to change her lifestyle, relationships, 

and habits to provide for the children’s needs. In response, petitioner moved for a post-adjudicatory

or a post-dispositional improvement period, arguing that she ceased having contact with J.E., was 

seeking employment and housing, and had been testing clean on her drug screens. Upon hearing 

the evidence, the circuit court found that petitioner was presently unable or unwilling to provide 

for the children’s needs. The circuit court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that 

petitioner could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future and that termination 

of her parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare. Accordingly, the circuit court 

denied petitioner’s motion for an improvement period and terminated her parental rights by its 

November 17, 2020, order.2

The Court has previously held:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

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The father of S.T. and L.T. was a nonabusing parent, and the permanency plan for the 

children is to remain in his care. J.E., the father of E.E. and M.E., had his parental rights terminated 

below. According to the DHHR, the permanency plan for those children is adoption by their foster 

family.
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On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for a postadjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period. Petitioner asserts that she was willing to 

comply with the terms and conditions of an improvement period, had all negative drug screens, 

was actively seeking employment and housing, and had successfully completed improvement 

periods in two prior cases. Upon our review of the record, we find petitioner is entitled to no relief.

West Virginia Code §§ 49-4-610(2)(B) and (3)(B) provide that a circuit court may grant a 

parent a post-adjudicatory or post-dispositional improvement period when the parent

“demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that [she] is likely to fully participate in the 

improvement period.” It is well established that “West Virginia law allows the circuit court 

discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent an improvement period.” In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 

108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015). Most importantly, this Court has clearly held that “[t]he 

circuit court has the discretion to refuse to grant an improvement period when no improvement is 

likely.” In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002). 

Here, the guardian’s report clearly indicates that petitioner was unlikely to improve. Most

glaringly, the report stated that petitioner believed J.E. was a “good father” and should be around 

the children despite her acknowledgement of his drug dealing and placing E.E. in serious danger

by his unresponsiveness and having the child surrounded by large quantities of drugs, including 

fentanyl. Also, petitioner expressed frustration with the DVPO and the court’s orders regarding 

J.E.’s contact with the children, arguing that she should have the discretion to allow contact. 

Overall, petitioner gave no indication that she would completely sever her abusive relationship 

with J.E. and choose to protect her children from their caustic and violent relationship. Indeed, the 

record shows that petitioner failed to recognize the severity of their domestic violence and how it 

impacted the children. This Court has recognized that 

[i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be 

acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth 

of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the perpetrator 

of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable and in making 

an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (citation omitted). Petitioner also 

demonstrated a pattern of prioritizing her relationship with J.E. over the relationship with her two 

older children, S.T. and L.T., and failed to provide for those children’s needs or have any 

meaningful relationship with them. Thus, the evidence below suggests that petitioner was unlikely 

to fully participate in and benefit from any improvement period as she gave no indication that she 

comprehended the severity of her actions and needed to make any lasting changes in her life to 

protect herself and the children. Therefore, we find no error in the circuit court’s decision to deny 

her an improvement period. 

The above evidence likewise supports the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) provides that circuit courts are to terminate parental rights upon 

finding that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination is necessary for the children’s 

welfare. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) provides that a circuit court may find that there is no 
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reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected when 

the abusing parent has “demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or 

neglect on their own or with help.”

The record establishes that petitioner demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the 

problems of abuse or neglect either on her own or with help. As noted above, the same allegations 

of abuse and neglect have persisted since 2013. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the DHHR 

has a “three-strike rule” requiring the DHHR to oppose an improvement period in a third case, no 

such rule exists. Rather, the DHHR argued below that petitioner had already received numerous 

services to address the same issues of abuse and neglect in the instant case, yet continued to abuse 

drugs, remain in a violent relationship with J.E., and place the children at risk of physical, 

psychological, and emotional harm. On appeal, petitioner also claims that the DHHR failed to 

make reasonable efforts to preserve the family but fails to support this argument. According to the 

record, the DHHR worked with petitioner for over four months through a protection plan prior to 

filing the underlying petition. It was only after petitioner failed to follow through with the plan and 

permitted J.E. back into her home, that the DHHR went forward with the underlying proceedings. 

Petitioner conveniently ignoresthe fact thatservices were implemented prior to the petition’s filing 

in this case and blames the DHHR for her own failures. Additionally, petitioner had no 

employment or housing by the time of the dispositional hearing and was unable to provide for the 

children’s needs. As petitioner failed to make lasting changes after the receipt of services in now 

three cases and, as discussed above, did not indicate a willingness to change her circumstances in 

the instant case, the circuit court properly found that there was no reasonable likelihood that 

petitioner could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future. 

Insomuch as petitioner argues that she should have been given more time to correct the 

conditions of abuse and neglect, we apply the following precept:

“[C]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of 

parental improvement . . . where it appears that the welfare of the child will be 

seriously threatened, and this is particularly applicable to children under the age of 

three years who are more susceptible to illness, need consistent close interaction 

with fully committed adults, and are likely to have their emotional and physical 

development retarded by numerous placements.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M.,

164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, syl. pt. 4. Here, M.E. and E.E. were under the age 

of three and deserved stability. Furthermore, petitioner lacked a meaningful relationship with L.T. 

and S.T., and sixteen-year-old S.T. requested that petitioner’s parental rights be terminated. As 

such, it was necessary for the children’s welfare that petitioner’s parental rights be terminated. 

Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that there was no reasonable 

likelihood that the conditions of neglect and abuse could be substantially corrected in the near 

future and that termination of petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and 

November 17, 2020, order is hereby affirmed.
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Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 3, 2021

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton