Filed 6/24/24 Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY J. OLIN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B324159

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22STCV08788)

 ORDER MODIFYING 

 OPINION (NO CHANGE IN

 JUDGMENT) AND DENYING

 APPELLANT’S PETITION

 FOR REHEARING

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 30, 

2024 is modified as follows:

1. On pages 6–7, the entire sentence beginning with the 

words, “At the time, Jeffrey believed he was being detained” is 

replaced with the following sentence (including unrevised fn. 5):
2

At the time, Jeffrey believed he was being detained “as a suicide 

risk,” but he later learned that he was being “held for threatening 

‘to kill a judge.’ ”

5

 It is helpful at this point to describe some of the statutorily 

prescribed procedures for initiating a 5150 hold. Namely, “[w]hen 

a peace officer takes a person into custody under section 5150 

and presents that person to a facility designated by the county 

for evaluation and treatment, the officer must provide a written 

application describing the circumstances that brought the person’s 

condition to the officer’s attention and stating the officer ‘has 

probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental 

health disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or 

gravely disabled.’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).) In determining whether there 

is probable cause, a person authorized to make that determination 

may consider ‘available relevant information about the historical 

course of the person’s mental disorder’ (§ 5150.05, subd. (a)) 

and ‘shall not be limited to consideration of the danger of imminent 

harm’ (§ 5150, subd. (b)). [¶] Before admitting a person into 

a designated facility, ‘the professional person in charge of the 

facility or his or her designee shall assess the individual in person 

to determine the appropriateness of the involuntary detention.’ 

(§ 5151.) ‘If, in the judgment of the professional person in charge

of the facility designated by the county for evaluation and 

treatment [or other authorized individuals], the person cannot 

be properly served without being detained, the admitting facility 

shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances 

under which the person’s condition was called to the [facility’s] 

attention . . . and stating that [the facility] has probable cause 

[to detain the person].’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).)” (Julian, supra, 

11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 375-376, capitalization & fn. omitted.) 

Notably, Jeffrey does not allege in a nonconclusory fashion that 

Wing or other individuals involved in initiating his section 5150 

failed to comply with these procedures, except to claim that there 

was an insufficient basis for the requisite finding of probable cause.
3

2. On page 11, the following two sentences are deleted: 

“The court later sustained demurrers and granted anti-SLAPP 

motions filed by all remaining defendants, including the County. 

The court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal.”

3. On page 11, the entire paragraph beginning with 

the words: “Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal” is deleted and 

replaced with the following paragraph:

Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the court’s 

rulings on the R&M defendants’ demurrer and anti-SLAPP motion 

and the LASD’s demurrer. The instant appeal does not challenge 

rulings regarding any other defendants.

4. On page 20, the following sentences are deleted:

Jeffrey added the County as a defendant in his first amended 

complaint, but Jeffrey failed to appeal the court’s subsequent 

judgment of dismissal in the County’s favor. His pursuit of the 

instant appeal thus can only be understood as an effort to hold 

LASD, rather than the County, liable for the actions of LASD 

deputies. But because LASD deputies are County employees, 

this is fundamentally incorrect.

5. On page 20, footnote 8 is inserted at the end of the 

following sentence as shown below:

We acknowledge the potential for such liability, but not where, 

as here, the plaintiff has identified the incorrect defendant to 

hold liable under what must necessarily be a theory of vicarious 

liability, because the complaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations 
4

supporting an LASD policy or practice giving rise to the alleged 

injury.1

6. On page 21, footnote 9 is inserted at the end of the 

following sentence as shown below: 

Nor does the first amended complaint contain any additional 

factual allegations that would address these issues.2

These modifications do not constitute a change in the 

judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on June 14, 2024 

is denied.

_______________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. WEINGART, J.

1 In noting that the County, rather than LASD, is the 

appropriate defendant, we do not intend to express any opinion on 

the merits of the claims against the County Jeffrey sets forth in the 

first amended complaint.

2 The proposed addition of the County as a defendant in the 

first amended complaint does not breathe life into Jeffrey’s claims 

against LASD or otherwise render the court’s order dismissing his 

claims against LASD incorrect.
Filed 5/30/24 Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY J. OLIN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B324159

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22STCV08788)

APPEAL from judgments and orders of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.

Jeffrey J. Olin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Torres & Brenner and Anita Susan Brenner

for Defendant and Respondent Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department.

Clyde & Co US, Douglas J. Collodel and Gretchen S. 

Carner for Defendants and Respondents Rombro & Manley, 

S. Roger Rombro and Melinda A. Manley.
2

Appellant Jeffrey J. Olin appeals from orders and 

judgments in his lawsuit against respondent Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Department (LASD); LASD Detective 

David Wing; the Los Angeles County Superior Court and 

two judicial officers thereof; his former wife, Kelly Olin; and 

Rombro & Manley, LLP, Roger Rombro, and Melinda A. Manley

(collectively, R&M defendants), the attorneys representing Kelly3

in family law proceedings against Jeffrey. Jeffrey’s lawsuit 

asserts numerous causes of action, all relating to an alleged

conspiracy among the defendants to alienate Jeffrey from

his son. Jeffrey argues the court reversibly erred when 

it (1) sustained, without leave to amend, the R&M defendants’ 

demurrer, (2) granted the R&M defendants’ special motion to 

strike the claims against them as a strategic lawsuit against 

public participation (SLAPP) under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) and awarded them 

attorney fees under that statute, and (3) sustained, without 

leave to amend, LASD’s demurrer.

The causes of action against the R&M defendants are 

based entirely on their assisting Kelly in preparing and filing 

a declaration in family law proceedings. In that declaration, 

Kelly states Jeffrey was temporarily detained under Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 5150.

4 Jeffrey’s lawsuit alleged 

3 To avoid confusion, we refer to Jeffrey Olin and Kelly 

Olin by their first names. No disrespect is thereby intended. 

4 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory 

references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 5150 

“allows temporary detention of mentally disordered individuals 

who pose a danger either to themselves or to others, for 
3

that this disclosure violated his constitutional right to privacy 

and the confidentiality requirements of section 5328. We hold

the court correctly concluded the litigation privilege barred these 

claims and, on this basis, correctly granted the R&M defendants’ 

anti-SLAPP motion and sustained their demurrer without leave 

to amend. 

As to the causes of action against LASD, we conclude the 

complaint does not allege any LASD policy or practice, as it must 

to support Jeffrey’s federal civil rights causes of action against 

LASD. We further conclude that the actions of the individual 

LASD personnel in the complaint cannot provide a basis for 

LASD to be held vicariously liable, because these individuals 

are employees of Los Angeles County (the County), not LASD.

Finally, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Jeffrey leave to amend his complaint to address these 

deficiencies. As to what additional allegations he would include, 

were he granted leave to amend, Jeffrey identifies only those 

reflected in the first amended complaint5 he filed after the 

treatment and evaluation.” (Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 

108 Cal.App.4th 69, 71–72.) We shall refer to such a detention as

a “5150 hold,” consistent with the parties’ briefing and common 

vernacular. (See fns. 4 & 5, post, for additional detail regarding 

section 5150 holds.)

5 This amended complaint still names LASD and the R&M 

defendants as defendants, despite the court’s order sustaining 

their demurrers without leave to amend. The court apparently 

accepted the document as an amended complaint against the 

remaining defendants, the claims against whom had not yet been 

dismissed at the time Jeffrey filed the amended complaint, as 

well as against the County, which the first amended complaint 

adds as a defendant.
4

challenged rulings. But nothing in the amended complaint 

addresses the deficiencies in his original claims against the R&M 

defendants and LASD.

Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint

In an appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the 

sustaining of a demurrer, our review is de novo, and we must 

“determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to 

constitute a cause of action.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 

311, 318.) Because a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency 

of the pleading, we accept as true all properly pleaded material 

facts, and are “not concerned with the ‘plaintiff’s ability to 

prove . . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such 

proof.’ ” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 

949, 958, quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 

Cal.3d 493, 496.) We disregard, however, allegations constituting 

contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank, 

supra, at p. 318.) “Facts appearing in exhibits attached to 

the first amended complaint also are accepted as true and are 

given precedence, to the extent they contradict the allegations.” 

(Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091.) The 

following factual summary is thus based on properly pleaded 

factual allegations in Jeffrey’s complaint, as well as the 

documents it attaches and incorporates by reference:

Kelly and Jeffrey were divorced in 2011. On July 21, 2018, 

Jeffrey “became aware that he was a victim of parental alienation 

caused by Kelly.” On August 3, 2018, Jeffrey sent Kelly a text 

message stating that he “inten[ded] to appear ex parte . . . to 
5

ask the court to appoint a therapist to evaluate [their son] for 

parental alienation.” Kelly “retaliated” by seeking a restraining 

order against Jeffrey in the pending family law proceedings 

between them. In November 2018, the family law court, through 

Commissioner Glenda Veasey (defendant below, but not a party 

to this appeal), granted Kelly’s request for a domestic violence 

restraining order (DVRO) against Jeffrey for a period of five 

years. The restraining order was affirmed on appeal, and 

required, inter alia, that Jeffrey “surrender any firearms in 

his possession.” Around this same time—in the “latter half 

of 2018”—Kelly and Veasey began a conspiracy to “destroy 

[Jeffrey’s] relationship with his only child,” which would later 

expand to include the other defendants Jeffrey named in his 

lawsuit.

In March 2019, Jeffrey filed a declaration in the family 

court proceedings, over which Veasey was still presiding, stating 

that he had been “ ‘caused to sink into the deepest depths of 

suicidal depression.’ ” In another filing with the court in April 

2019, Jeffrey stated that he had been “ ‘rendered suicidal by 

the malicious actions of [his ex-wife] in combination with the 

injustices that have been meted out by Glenda Veasey,’ ” that 

he “ ‘hopes this ends soon, one way or the other,’ ” and that 

“ ‘[t]he only reason [he] is still alive is that [he] got a list of four 

people who need to precede him.’ ” Veasey experienced these 

statements, taken in the context of Jeffrey’s “open hostility 

against [her]” in other ways, to be “frightening and credible 

death threats.”

On October 3, 2019, “Veasey and Kelly met, in private, 

outside the presence of the court reporter.” (Capitalization 

omitted.) A minute order attached to the complaint reflects 
6

that Veasey considered on this date “an ex parte application 

from [Kelly]” to amend the existing DVRO and granted the 

application. Veasey “modified the existing restraining order . . . 

to specify that [Jeffrey] shall not possess any swords, knives, 

daggers, fixed blade knives or other stabbing weapons and that 

all stabbing weapons must be turned over to law enforcement.”

Kelly and Veasey then contacted LASD Detective David 

Wing (defendant below, but not a party to this appeal) and 

“he agreed to go [to] [Jeffrey’s] home with the intent to ‘5150’ 

[Jeffrey] [i.e., place him on a 5150 hold] at Veasey’s request, 

because [Jeffrey] had expressed he was suicidal no less than 

[six] months before.”6 Wing and other LASD deputies went to 

Jeffrey’s home “concerned with was whether [Jeffrey] was feeling 

suicidal” and did not immediately reference the amended DVRO, 

although Wing ultimately obtained a copy and provided it to 

Jeffrey at Jeffrey’s request. Jeffrey allowed Wing and LASD 

deputies into his home to retrieve the weapons prohibited by the 

amended DVRO. LASD did not document the property they took 

in this process, and later denied having records of the property. 

Jeffrey was “put . . . in handcuffs” and “informed he was being 

[section] 5150’d. He was transported to College Hospital of 

Cerritos and placed on a 72-hour hold.” At the time, Jeffrey 

believed he was being detained because he was suicidal, but he 

6 As noted, section 5150 “allows law enforcement 

officers . . . to bring an individual to an appropriate facility for 

assessment, evaluation, and treatment for up to 72 hours where 

there is ‘ “probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result 

of mental disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, 

or gravely disabled.” ’ ” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital

(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 375 (Julian).)
7

later learned that he was being “held for threatening ‘to kill 

a judge.’ ”

7 On the recommendation of the psychologist 

7 It is helpful at this point to describe some of the 

statutorily prescribed procedures for initiating a 5150 hold. 

Namely, “[w]hen a peace officer takes a person into custody 

under section 5150 and presents that person to a facility 

designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, 

the officer must provide a written application describing 

the circumstances that brought the person’s condition to the 

officer’s attention and stating the officer ‘has probable cause 

to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental health 

disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely 

disabled.’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).) In determining whether there is 

probable cause, a person authorized to make that determination 

may consider ‘available relevant information about the historical 

course of the person’s mental disorder’ (§ 5150.05, subd. (a)) 

and ‘shall not be limited to consideration of the danger of 

imminent harm’ (§ 5150, subd. (b)). [¶] Before admitting a 

person into a designated facility, ‘the professional person in 

charge of the facility or his or her designee shall assess the 

individual in person to determine the appropriateness of the 

involuntary detention.’ (§ 5151.) ‘If, in the judgment of the 

professional person in charge of the facility designated by 

the county for evaluation and treatment [or other authorized 

individuals], the person cannot be properly served without 

being detained, the admitting facility shall require an application 

in writing stating the circumstances under which the person’s 

condition was called to the [facility’s] attention . . . and stating

that [the facility] has probable cause [to detain the person].’ 

(§ 5150, subd. (e).)” (Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 375-376, capitalization & fn. omitted.) Notably, Jeffrey 

does not allege in a nonconclusory fashion that Wing or other 

individuals involved in initiating his section 5150 failed to 

comply with these procedures, except to claim that there was 

an insufficient basis for the requisite finding of probable cause.
8

who evaluated Jeffrey, Jeffrey was released early—after 

approximately 56 hours—from the 5150 hold.

In early 2021, Jeffrey filed a motion in the family law 

proceedings seeking a forensic psychologist evaluation of his 

son to assess the parental alienation that had been concerning 

him since 2018. To support her opposition to the motion, Kelly 

filed a declaration, which the R&M defendants assisted her in 

preparing and filing. In it, she declares that Jeffrey “was taken 

into [LASD] custody on or about the evening of October 4, 2019, 

under . . . section 5150, presumably due to his menacing and 

unstable behavior. At that time, [LASD personnel] contacted 

[her] advising [her] to ‘get out of town for the weekend because 

they weren’t sure how long he would be held.’ As a safety 

precaution, [she was] escorted by [LASD deputies] both into 

and out of the courtroom, on multiple occasions.” A copy of this 

declaration is attached to the complaint.

Also attached to the complaint is a copy of a declaration 

by Veasey.8 The Veasey declaration states that “[o]n information 

and belief, on or about October 4, 2019, representatives went 

to [Jeffrey’s] residence to take possession of [the] weapons 

[prohibited by the amended DVRO], and during such contact, 

[Jeffrey] was placed on a . . . section 5150 psychiatric hold.” 

Neither Kelly’s declaration nor Veasey’s declaration contains 

any further details regarding Jeffrey’s section 5150 hold, mental 

health, or mental health treatment.

The complaint describes the Kelly and Veasey declarations 

as reflecting that both Veasey and Kelly were “told about the 

8 Veasey filed this declaration in July 2021 in connection 

with subsequent efforts to obtain her own protective order 

against Jeffrey after he allegedly threatened her and her family.
9

[section] 5150 hold by LASD personnel” and as proof that “LASD 

personnel kept both of the women in the conspiracy [Kelly and 

Veasey] apprised of the status of [Jeffrey’s] constitutionally and 

statutorily-confidential medical information throughout . . . [such 

that they] knew what was happening from beginning to end.”

Later in 2021, Wing executed a search warrant to 

investigate claims by Veasey that Jeffrey had sent Veasey

threatening emails. Jeffrey “posited that he had been hacked 

and that someone else sent some or all of the emails to Veasey.” 

Wing, as opposed to another LASD detective, investigated these 

claims because a different detective would not “conceal[ ] [LASD]

wrongdoing.” Wing “demonstrably failed to follow the law with 

regard to that search warrant” by never providing Jeffrey with 

a copy. Jeffrey asked LASD for the records of his 5150 hold and 

was told that there was no record of it.9

As a result of the time Jeffrey spent in detention pursuant 

to the 5150 hold and the conspiracy against him, he suffers from

posttraumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder.

Based on these allegations, the complaint plead several 

causes of action: a false imprisonment claim against Kelly, 

Veasey, Wing, and LASD; a claim for intentional interference 

with parent-child relationship against all defendants except the 

R&M defendants, based on the custody and restraining order 

rulings of Veasey, which the complaint attributes to the broader 

conspiracy among all defendants; claims for “publication of 

private facts” (capitalization, boldface & underscoring omitted) 

and “intrusion into private matters” (capitalization, boldface

9 The complaint also contains numerous allegations against 

the court and judicial officers that are not relevant to the instant 

appeal, and we therefore do not summarize them here.
10

& underscoring omitted) against all defendants based on 

disclosure by LASD (to Veasey and Kelly) and by Kelly and the 

R&M defendants (to the court in Kelly’s declaration) of Jeffrey’s 

“statutorily-confidential information”—namely, the fact that 

Jeffrey was placed on a 5150 hold; a claim against all defendants 

for denial of due process under the California and federal 

Constitutions; a claim under section 1983 of title 42 of the 

United States Code against all defendants for violation of 

Jeffrey’s federal civil rights and a companion claim against 

LASD and the Los Angeles County Superior Court only under 

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 

658, 694; a derivative claim for interference with exercise of civil 

rights (Civ. Code, § 52.1) against all defendants; and a derivative 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all 

defendants.

B. Procedural History

In response to the complaint, the R&M defendants filed 

a demurrer and special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP 

statute. The court concluded that all claims against the R&M 

defendants arose from petitioning activity protected under the 

anti-SLAPP statute, and that litigation privilege barred these 

claims. On this and other bases, the court sustained the R&M 

defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend and granted the

R&M defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, including the motion’s 

request for attorney fees and costs.

LASD also filed a demurrer, which the court sustained 

without leave to amend on the grounds that LASD is not a suable 

entity in a money damages lawsuit under California law, and 

that the complaint was vague and fatally flawed as to LASD. 

Following the orders sustaining the dismissal of claims against 
11

LASD and the R&M defendants without leave to amend, the 

court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal in these 

defendants’ favors.

On October 4, 2022, Jeffrey filed a first amended 

complaint as to the remaining defendants, adding the County 

as a defendant as well. The court later sustained demurrers and

granted anti-SLAPP motions filed by all remaining defendants, 

including the County. The court entered corresponding 

judgments of dismissal.

Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the 

court’s rulings on the R&M defendants’ demurrer and antiSLAPP motion and LASD’s demurrer. He did not file an 

appeal challenging any of the court’s rulings regarding any

other defendants, including the order sustaining the County’s 

demurrer and the resulting judgment of dismissal in the 

County’s favor.

DISCUSSION

A. Rulings Regarding the R&M Defendants 

The complaint alleges the R&M defendants participated in 

the conspiracy and committed the torts alleged solely by assisting 

Kelly in preparing and filing a declaration stating that Jeffrey 

had been placed on a 5150 hold. The complaint alleges no other 

conduct by the R&M defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy 

or as a basis for any of the other causes of action. Jeffrey argues 

that disclosing the fact of his 5150 hold in Kelly’s declaration 

violated his constitutional right to privacy, as well as his 

statutory right under section 5328 to keep such information 

confidential. These violations form the basis for all causes of 

action against the R&M defendants in the complaint. 
12

Section 5328 requires that “[a]ll information and records 

obtained in the course of providing services under[, inter alia] . . .

Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) . . . to either 

voluntary or involuntary recipients of services are confidential,” 

subject to the exceptions enumerated in the section. (§ 5328, 

subd. (a).) Because section 5150 is within Division 5, “all 

information, records, and services provided pursuant to 

section 5150 involuntary psychiatric holds are confidential.”

(In re M.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.) “Any person 

may bring an action against an individual who has willfully 

and knowingly released confidential information or records 

concerning him or her in violation of [section 5328].” (§ 5330, 

subd. (a).)

Jeffrey argues that the fact of his “having been subjected 

to a . . . 5150 hold” constitutes “confidential medical information” 

protected from disclosure under section 5328. We are aware 

of no case, and Jeffrey cites none, holding that the fact of 

an individual being detained under a section 5150 hold is 

“information” of the type section 5328 protects. We need not 

resolve this issue, however, because even accepting, for the 

purposes of Jeffrey’s arguments on appeal, that section 5328 

protects against disclosure of the fact that an individual was 

detained on a section 5150 hold, we agree with the trial court 

that the litigation privilege bars any cause of action based on 

the R&M defendants disclosing this information by filing Kelly’s 

declaration.

1. Demurrer ruling

The litigation privilege, set forth in Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (b), “applies to any publication required or permitted 

by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects 
13

of the litigation, even [if] the publication is made outside the 

courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved.” 

(Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212; accord, Rusheen v. 

Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.) “The usual formulation 

is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in 

judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other 

participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the 

litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation 

to the action.” (Silberg, supra, at p. 212.) The purposes of the 

privilege include “afford[ing] litigants and witnesses free access 

to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by 

derivative tort actions, . . . encourag[ing] open channels of 

communication and zealous advocacy, . . . promot[ing] complete 

and truthful testimony” (Rusheen, supra, at p. 1063), and

“promot[ing] effective judicial proceedings by encouraging 

‘ “open channels of communication and the presentation of 

evidence” ’ without the external threat of liability [citation], 

and ‘by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients’

interests.’ ” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.) “To 

further these purposes, the privilege has been broadly applied. 

It is absolute and applies regardless of malice.” (Jacob B. v. 

County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955 (Jacob B.).) The 

concerns underlying the privilege apply with particular force 

in the context of family law proceedings, because “when a court 

must make very difficult and critical decisions regarding child 

visitation, it should receive the maximum amount of relevant 

information. Accordingly, ‘[c]ase law is clear that [Civil Code] 

section 47[, subd.] (b) absolutely protects litigants and other 

participants from being sued on the basis of communications 
14

they make in the context of family law proceedings.’ ” (Jacob B.,

supra, at p. 956.)

Here, the Kelly declaration, including its reference to 

the section 5150 hold, is “a communication to the court relevant 

to a family law decision [the court] must make”—namely, a 

decision regarding the relationship between Jeffrey and his son, 

something that Jeffrey’s mental state necessarily factors into.

(Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 959.) “[S]uch a communication 

is privileged even if a specific communication might not be 

permitted by law because . . . it was . . . meant to be kept 

confidential. . . . [T]he privilege . . . extends to communications 

otherwise within its reach that might be deemed confidential.” 

(Ibid.) Indeed, our state Supreme Court has concluded that 

the privilege applies “even to a constitutionally based privacy 

cause of action.” (Id. at p. 961.) Because all causes of action 

against the R&M defendants in the complaint are based on a 

communication protected by the litigation privilege, the court 

correctly sustained the demurrer against these causes of action.

2. Anti-SLAPP ruling

The court did not err in granting the R&M defendants’ 

anti-SLAPP motion for much the same reason it correctly 

sustained the R&M defendants’ demurrer. The anti-SLAPP 

statute permits any cause of action against a person “arising 

from any act . . . in furtherance of the . . . right of petition or free 

speech” to be stricken unless the court finds a “probability” that 

the plaintiff will prevail on the claim involved. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) When a defendant files an anti-SLAPP 

special motion to strike, the court proceeds with a two-step 

analysis. “At the first step of the analysis, the defendant must 

make two related showings. Comparing its statements and 
15

conduct against the statute, it must demonstrate activity 

qualifying for protection. (See [Code Civ. Proc.,] § 425.16, 

subd. (e).) And comparing that protected activity against the 

complaint, it must also demonstrate that the activity supplies 

one or more elements of a plaintiff’s claims. ([Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 425.16], subd. (b)(1).)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887.) That is, that the claim “arise[s] from” 

the protected activity. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson 

(2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) If the defendant establishes this,

the court proceeds to the second step, and considers whether 

the plaintiff has established a probability that he will prevail 

on the merits under a summary-judgment-like analysis. (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 

Cal.App.4th 901, 907.)

Our review of an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is 

de novo. (Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1020.) 

We employ the same two-pronged analysis as the trial court 

in determining whether the anti-SLAPP motion was properly

granted. (Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc.

(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652.) 

The R&M defendants met their burden below of 

establishing the claims against them arose from protected 

conduct “ ‘in furtherance of a person’s right of petition’ ” under 

the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

The statute defines such conduct as including: “any written or 

oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or 

judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized 

by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) Indeed, “all 

communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their 

representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other 
16

petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity 

by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 

Cal.App.4th 471, 480.) This protected activity provided an 

element of all Jeffrey’s claims against the R&M defendants, 

because it is effectively the only conduct by the R&M defendants 

the complaint alleges. The claims against the R&M defendants 

thus arise from protected activity.

This shifted the burden to Jeffrey to make the substantial 

likelihood of success showing in the second step of the antiSLAPP analysis. Jeffrey did not and could not make that 

showing because, for the reasons outlined above, the litigation 

privilege bars these claims. Accordingly, the court correctly 

granted the R&M defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. 

Jeffrey argues that “case law explicitly says that . . . 

section 5150 holds are not the type of subject the SLAPP statute 

was intended to protect.” But the authority he cites for this 

proposition addresses the implementation of a 5150 hold, not 

communication regarding the hold. (See Swanson v. County of 

Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 361, 373.) Specifically, in that 

case, unlike here, the plaintiffs “[did] not seek recovery for the 

[defendant’s] act of communicating information . . . [regarding]

medical records. Instead, their allegations regard[ed] the 

[defendant’s] alleged . . . decision to release [a plaintiff] before 

72 hours [of his section 5150 hold] expired. There [was] nothing 

in the [defendant’s] decision to release [plaintiff] before the 

72-hour hold that implicate[d] the rights of free speech or 

petition. Therefore, it is not protected by the anti-SLAPP 

statute.” (Swanson, supra, at p. 373.)
17

B. Rulings Regarding the LASD Demurrer

1. Federal civil rights causes of action

“The United States Supreme Court has held that cities, 

counties, and local officers sued in their official capacity are 

themselves ‘persons’ for purposes of [United States Code] 

section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable 

under section 1983 for their subordinate officers’ unlawful acts, 

they may be held directly liable for constitutional violations 

carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or 

usages by persons having ‘final policymaking authority’ over the 

actions at issue.” (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 820, 829 (Venegas), italics omitted; see Julian, supra, 11 

Cal.App.5th at p. 384 [quoting this language from Venegas; cited 

by Jeffrey as supporting the viability of his federal claims against 

LASD].) Jeffrey’s Monell claim likewise requires allegations to 

support a policy, custom or practice that was the “ ‘moving force’ ” 

behind the constitutional violation. (Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic 

Festival Assn. (9th Cir. 2008) 541 F.3d 950, 957 [claim requires 

“ ‘a direct causal link between a [county] policy or custom and the 

alleged constitutional deprivation’ ”].)

The parties disagree as to whether LASD is a “person” 

for the purposes of Jeffrey’s claim under United States Code 

section 1983 or the Monell variation thereof. Even assuming, 

for the sake of argument, that LASD is a “person” in this sense, 

however, the complaint does not contain any nonconclusory 

allegations that could establish an LASD “polic[y] [or] custom[ ]” 

that violated Jeffrey’s constitutional rights or caused his alleged 

injury, nor that any LASD agent with “ ‘final policymaking 

authority’ ” took actions having this effect. (Venegas, supra, 

32 Cal.4th at p. 829.) To the contrary, the complaint alleges a 
18

conspiracy aimed at a specific individual (Jeffrey), carried out 

through the actions of specific individuals at LASD—primarily 

Wing. Indeed, some allegations are inconsistent with Wing’s 

actions being part of an LASD practice or policy—for example, 

that Wing handled the investigation of emails Veasey claimed 

Jeffrey sent to her, because a different detective would not

“conceal[ ] [LASD] wrongdoing.” Because the complaint lacks 

nonconclusory allegations of an LASD custom, practice, or policy, 

Jeffrey’s federal civil rights causes of action fail as a matter 

of law—even under the very authority Jeffrey cites in arguing 

to the contrary. Namely, in Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 

on which Jeffrey relies to support the viability of his federal 

claims, the court held that “[e]ven if the [defendants] [the 

Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles School 

District Police] were ‘persons’ for purposes of United States 

Code section 1983, [plaintiff] did not state a claim against them[, 

because] [g]overnment entities are liable under [United States 

Code] section 1983 only where their ‘regulations, policies, 

customs, or usages by persons having “final policymaking 

authority” ’ violate another’s constitutional rights . . . 

[citations] . . . [and plaintiff] did not identify any such regulation, 

policy, or custom that allegedly violated [his] constitutional 

rights.” (Julian, supra, at pp. 386–387.) In the other case on

which Jeffrey primarily relies, Streit v. County of Los Angeles

(9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 552, the court held that LASD could

be sued for federal civil rights violations resulting from actions 

“implementing [LASD] policy of conducting prisoner release 

records checks.” (Id. at p. 555, italics added.) Whether or not 

LASD is acting as an agent of the state or the County in engaging 

in the acts alleged here—a key issue in Streit and similar cases, 
19

and a point of contention in the parties’ briefing—the complaint 

does not allege in a nonconclusory way that LASD was 

implementing any sort of broader LASD policy to alienate Jeffrey 

from his son, or that this conspiracy was the result of any LASD 

policy. Accordingly, Jeffrey’s federal civil rights claims against 

LASD fail as a matter of law. (See id. at p. 559 [“[a] county is 

subject to [United States Code] section 1983 liability for such 

suits if its policies . . . caused the particular constitutional 

violation at issue”].)

2. LASD is not the appropriate entity to 

sue based on the actions of Wing or 

other LASD personnel

As noted above, the complaint does not allege an LASD 

policy, pursuant to which these individuals took the actions

alleged, and the overarching theory of the complaint—a 

conspiracy to alienate Jeffrey from his son—is inconsistent 

with these alleged actions being part of a broader LASD policy. 

The complaint instead alleges actions of Wing and various 

other unnamed LASD personnel as the sole basis for all state 

law claims against LASD. But “the sheriff’s department is 

a political subdivision of the county and not a separate legal 

entity (Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Dept. (2014) 232 

Cal.App.4th 995, 1000, fn. 1 . . . [‘The [s]heriff’s [d]epartment 

is not a separate government entity, but [it] is a department’ of 

the county]; Trejo v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 

129, 135 . . . [sheriff’s department is a political “subunit” of 

the county]), and those employed by the sheriff’s department, 

including sworn peace officers, are paid by the county (see 

County of Kern v. Sparks (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 11, 16–17 . . . 

[county board of supervisors, not the sheriff, has authority to 
20

set the compensation of employees in the sheriff’s department]).” 

(People v. Tice (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 246, 254.) Accordingly, the 

County can be held vicariously liable for certain actions of LASD 

personnel, as they are County employees. (See Rodriguez v. 

County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 806, 807; see also 

Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 

992 [discussing scope of county’s vicarious liability for county 

sheriff’s deputies’ conduct, describing them as county, not 

sheriff’s department, employees].) Thus, Jeffrey should have 

sued the County, rather than LASD. Jeffrey added the County

as a defendant in his first amended complaint, but Jeffrey failed 

to appeal the court’s subsequent judgment of dismissal in the 

County’s favor. His pursuit of the instant appeal thus can only 

be understood as an effort to hold LASD, rather than the County, 

liable for the actions of LASD deputies. But because LASD 

deputies are County employees, this is fundamentally incorrect. 

In arguing to the contrary, Jeffrey cites authority for 

the proposition that “aggrieved individuals can enforce the . . . 

provisions [of which section 5328 is a part] through . . . common 

law and statutory causes of action, such as negligence, medical 

malpractice, false imprisonment, assault, battery, declaratory 

relief, United States Code section 1983 for constitutional 

violations, and Civil Code section 52.1.” (See Julian, supra, 11 

Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) Our holding regarding Jeffrey’s claims 

against LASD does not suggest otherwise. We acknowledge the 

potential for such liability, but not where, as here, the plaintiff 

has identified the incorrect defendant to hold liable under 

what must necessarily be a theory of vicarious liability, because

the complaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations supporting 

an LASD policy or practice giving rise to the alleged injury.
21

Because the complaint does not state a legally viable 

claim against LASD for these reasons, we may affirm the order 

sustaining the demurrer without addressing whether the basis 

set forth in the trial court’s order would likewise support this 

outcome. (See Schermer v. Tatum (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 912, 

923 [“ ‘If a demurrer is sustained, we exercise our independent 

judgment on whether a cause of action has been stated as a 

matter of law, regardless of reasons stated by the trial court. 

[Citation.] We affirm if the trial court’s decision was correct 

on any theory.’ ”].)

C. Leave to Amend

“ ‘If it is reasonably possible [the complaint that is the 

subject of a sustained demurrer] can be cured by amendment, 

the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting leave to 

amend. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving 

the possibility of cure by amendment.’ ” (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai 

Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Jeffrey 

argues that “the first amended complaint, filed after the 

demurrers and anti-SLAPP motion from which this appeal 

resulted, shows that [he] could have amended his complaint” to 

state a legally viable claim for relief. (Capitalization omitted.) 

He specifically notes that the complaint added a claim under 

section 5330, the section providing for a private right of action 

based on the violation of, inter alia, section 5328. This does not 

change the fatal flaws in Jeffrey’s claims against LASD or the

R&M defendants noted above. Nor does the first amended 

complaint contain any additional factual allegations that would 

address these issues. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying leave to amend. 
22

DISPOSITION

The judgments and orders are affirmed. Respondents are 

awarded their costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.