UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1913

JAMES SCHNEIDER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GIANT OF MARYLAND, LLC,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY LLC; BILL HOLMES,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:07-cv-01995-PJM)

Argued: May 12, 2010 Decided: July 26, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Orva Lee Boothby, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. 

Lesley Pate Marlin, VENABLE, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert G. Ames, VENABLE, LLP, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

James Schneider (“Schneider”), who suffers from Type 1 

diabetes, sued Giant of Maryland, LLC (“Giant”), under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ § 12101, et seq., alleging disability employment 

discrimination. The claims arose from Schneider’s employment at

Giant, first as a pharmacy supervisor and currently as a 

pharmacy manager. Specifically, Schneider claimed that Giant 

illegally failed to afford him reasonable accommodations when, 

as a result a diabetes-related blackout he experienced while 

driving, his driver’s license was suspended, and when it refused 

to return him to his supervisory position after his license was 

reinstated. The district court granted Giant’s motion for 

summary judgment. For the reasons stated within, we affirm.

I.

Schneider was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes mellitus in 

1963.1

 1 Type 1 diabetes mellitus, unlike Type 2, is characterized 

by the loss of insulin-producing beta cells in the pancreas, 

which leads to insulin deficiency. Type 1 diabetes generally 

develops in childhood or adolescence, and is treated with diet, 

exercise, and drugs that reduce glucose levels, including 

insulin. Later complications of Type 1 diabetes include 

vascular disease, peripheral neuropathy, and predisposition to 

infection. No treatments definitely prevent the onset or 

progression of type 1 diabetes. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis 

and Therapy § 12.158 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 18th ed. 2006).

 The diabetes contributes to his peripheral neuropathy, 
3

retinopathy, and foot ulcers. Schneider’s diabetes has affected 

his ability to walk, stand, digest food, and his energy levels. 

Since early 2001, Schneider has suffered from foot ulcers and 

was advised by medical professionals to avoid weight-bearing 

activities. Since 2002, he has been unable to stand for long 

periods of time and has avoided recreational activities that 

require the use of his feet. Schneider currently treats his 

diabetes with insulin shots; he has had multiple surgeries for 

his foot ulcers. 

Schneider began working for Giant in 1979 as a staff 

pharmacist. In April 2000, he was promoted to regional pharmacy 

supervisor. As a regional pharmacy supervisor, Schneider was 

responsible for all of the pharmacies in a district; among other 

responsibilities, his duties included making sure that the 

pharmacies complied with state and federal law, maintaining 

inventory and proper records, maintaining proper staff levels, 

and ensuring knowledge of pharmacy regulations. Regional 

pharmacy supervisors were also responsible for the day-to-day 

operations of the pharmacy departments in various stores, 

including but not limited to hiring and firing personnel, 

budgeting, and inventory. In carrying out these duties, the 

pharmacy supervisor is required to travel — usually by driving —

from store-to-store within the specified district. Schneider 

was also required to attend frequent meetings at Giant’s 
4

headquarters in Landover, Maryland. Although the position of 

pharmacy supervisor involved considerable travel, many of the 

major duties required by the position, and perhaps a majority of 

them, could be completed in an office. At the time of his 

promotion, Schneider’s district covered an area from southern 

Maryland to Fredericksburg, Virginia. 

On June 2, 2005, Schneider was involved in a car accident 

when he blacked out while driving in Virginia during work hours. 

At the hospital, it was determined he had had a hypoglycemic 

reaction, a not uncommon occurrence among patients with 

diabetes.2

On August 14, 2005, Schneider informed Russell Fair 

(“Fair”), his supervisor, of the suspension of his driving 

 On July 7, 2005, the Virginia Department of Motor 

Vehicles (“the DMV”) notified Schneider that he was required to 

complete a medical report, and on August 12, 2005, the DMV 

notified him that his driving privileges would be suspended for 

at least six months in accordance with the DMV’s 

Seizure/Blackout policy.

 2 Hypoglycemia is the most common complication of insulin 

treatment, and occurs when the blood glucose levels drop below 

normal levels. Symptoms of mild hypoglycemia include headaches, 

light-headedness, blurred vision, and confusion. Symptoms of 

severe hypoglycemia include seizures and loss of consciousness. 

Type 1 diabetics who have suffered from the disease for a long 

period may be unaware of hypoglycemic episodes because they no 

longer experience autonomic symptoms. The Merck Manual of 

Diagnosis and Therapy, § 12.158.
5

privileges at a meeting at the Landover headquarters (but not of 

the reason for the suspension). Schneider drove to Landover 

with another pharmacy supervisor, John Colella (“Colella”) and 

during the drive to the meeting, Colella offered to take 

responsibility for the stores that were farther away from 

Schneider’s home and for Schneider to take over the stores that 

were closer to his residence. At the meeting with Fair and 

Colella, Schneider suggested that he could keep his supervisory

position during the period of his license suspension by having 

one of his family members drive him to a store, and then taking 

taxis from store-to-store to carry out his responsibilities. He 

offered to pay the cab fare and to seek reimbursement only for 

mileage, as he did before the license suspension. Schneider 

also proposed that: (1) as Colella had agreed to switch stores 

with him, he could assume responsibility for all the central 

Virginia stores, thus narrowing his area of travel; and (2) he 

would work nights and weekends, when his family members could 

drive him from store-to-store. In this case, Schneider asserts 

the proposals he offered during this meeting constituted a 

request for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 

Fair told Schneider that his proposed alternatives were not 

acceptable, would not work, and would not be approved. 

Ultimately, Schneider and Fair agreed that Schneider would be 

reassigned to work as a pharmacy manager at a pharmacy near his 
6

home, but with the same pay as a pharmacy supervisor. Another 

employee was reassigned as a pharmacy supervisor to take over 

Schneider’s stores in an official announcement.

The DMV reinstated Schneider’s driving privileges on 

December 28, 2005. In the meantime, even before his driving 

privileges had been reinstated, Schneider began having increased

problems with weight-bearing activities while on his feet. 

These problems worsened in the fall of 2005, when his doctor 

advised him to reduce weight-bearing activities. Unlike his 

position as pharmacy supervisor, Schneider’s position as 

pharmacy manager required him to stand on his feet most of the 

day. In any event, it is undisputed that he never asked for any 

assistance in reducing the amount of time spent on his feet at 

work during the fall of 2005. 

By January 2006, Schneider was in constant pain whenever he 

had to stand, but continued to stand at work for long periods of 

time. On January 19, 2006, Schneider’s friend and podiatrist, 

Dr. Stuart Kramer (“Dr. Kramer”) sent a letter to Fair 

recommending that Schneider return to his previous position as a 

pharmacy supervisor because the change in his job position had 

severely exacerbated Schneider’s diabetic foot problems. After 

Giant received the letter, Colella met with Schneider to discuss 

the letter and his work situation. At the meeting, Schneider 

told Colella that “he was fine, that he was going to be fine.” 
7

J.A. 248. Schneider then had foot surgery in May 18, 2006, as a 

result of his exacerbated foot condition.

On September 25, 2006, Schneider was admitted to the 

hospital after he blacked out at work. On October 3, 2006, 

Colella and Schneider had a meeting with Guy Mullins 

(“Mullins”), the HR representative of Giant. Mullins discussed 

a note from Schneider’s doctor requiring limited duty and wanted 

to know what that meant. Schneider explained that the doctor 

just wanted to make sure he was able to work his shift. Mullins 

asked Schneider if he needed any special accommodations and 

Schneider replied that he was just concerned about standing on 

his feet all day. Mullins replied that Giant would need a note 

from Schneider’s doctor stating what his limited duties were, 

and Schneider replied he would get that note to Mullins. 

II.

On July 26, 2007, Schneider filed a pro se employment 

discrimination complaint in federal district court 

(misidentifying his employer as Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 

LLC). On March 31, 2008, Schneider, now represented by counsel,

filed a second amended complaint naming the correct defendant, 

Giant. In the second amended complaint, Schneider asserted two 

claims: a state law discrimination claim and a claim that Giant 

had violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., in 
8

discriminating against Schneider and by failing and refusing to 

make a reasonable accommodation. 

After the completion of discovery, Giant moved for summary 

judgment and the district court held a hearing. Schneider 

withdrew his state law claim at that time, leaving only his ADA 

claims for consideration by the district court. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the district court, ruling from the 

bench, granted Giant’s motion for summary judgment. The 

district court concluded that Schneider did not project 

sufficient evidence to meet his burden of showing that he had a 

disability cognizable under the ADA at the time he was 

reassigned after his driver’s license was suspended. 

Furthermore, the district court concluded, Schneider did not

communicate that he had a “disability” at that time. The 

district court also determined that the only accommodation 

sought by Schneider at the time his driving privileges were 

restored (and after his condition had worsened) was a request 

for a transfer to his prior supervisory position, which, having

been filled by another employee, Giant had no obligation to 

grant under the ADA. 

Schneider has timely appealed from the district court’s 

adverse judgment.

III.

A.
9

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Waller ex rel. Estate of Hunt v. Danville, VA, 556 F.3d 

171, 174 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is not appropriate 

unless “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986).

B.

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19903

 3 The ADA was amended effective January 1, 2009, after this 

suit was filed. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. Congress did not expressly intend for 

these changes to apply retroactively, and so we must decide this 

appeal based on the law in place prior to the amendments. 

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270-71 (1994); Shin 

v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., No. 09-1126, 

2010 WL 850176 at *5 n. 14 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2010) 

(unpublished) (“Our sister circuits have found that the 2008 ADA 

amendments are not retroactive . . . and we see no reason to 

disagree with their conclusion”).

, 104 Stat. 328, 

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., prohibits discrimination by covered 

entities, including private employers, against qualified 

individuals with a disability. Under the Act, “disability” is 

defined as:
10

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 

limits one or more of the major life activities of 

such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Discrimination under the ADA includes a 

failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical 

or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 

a disability who is an applicant or employee” id.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A), and “denying employment opportunities to a job 

applicant or employee” where the denial of the employment 

opportunity is based on the need “to make reasonable 

accommodation,” id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).

In a failure to accommodate case, the plaintiff must show 

“(1) that he was an individual who had a disability within the 

meaning of the statute; (2) that the [employer] had notice of 

his disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation he could 

perform the essential functions of the position . . .; and (4) 

that the [employer] refused to make such accommodations.” 

Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11 (4th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 

1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999)). 

To assess a claim for disability employment discrimination, 

the first question is whether the plaintiff is disabled and is 

an “otherwise qualified individual.” Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 387. 
11

A qualified individual with a disability is defined by the ADA 

as “an individual with a disability who, with or without 

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 

the employment position that such individuals holds or desires.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).4

Diabetes is not per se a disability under the ADA because a 

“person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by 

medication or other measures does not have an impairment that 

presently ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity.” Sutton 

v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999). Whether 

a person is disabled under the ADA “depends on whether the 

limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are 

in fact substantially limiting.” Id. at 488 (emphasis in 

 In order to survive summary judgment, 

Schneider was required to produce evidence showing that he is 

both qualified and disabled.

 4 Whether “driving” is an essential function of Schneider’s 

former position is disputed. Giant contends that driving is an 

essential function of the job as a pharmacy supervisor, and 

therefore, Schneider was unable to perform an essential function 

for the six months his driving privileges were suspended. 

Schneider contends driving is not an essential function of the 

job. The record shows that the job posting for pharmacy 

supervisor does not include “driving” as one of the job 

duties/functions, nor is it listed under the preferred 

qualifications. Although under “Physical Demand Analysis,” the 

description states “many hours in a car (approximately 30,000 

miles yearly),” the description does not specifically state 

“driving.” In the view we take of the case, we need not further 

address this issue.
12

original). Therefore, although Type 1 diabetes is a chronic 

illness, when successfully managed, it is not a disability under 

the ADA until it causes a substantially limiting impairment of a 

major life activity. See Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176 

F.3d 840, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that diabetes is not per 

se a disability under the ADA); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 

149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“E.E.O.C.”) 

has promulgated regulations to implement the ADA and has 

provided that “substantially limits” means: (i) unable to 

perform a major life activity that the average person in the 

general population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted 

as to the condition, manner or duration under which an 

individual can perform a particular major life activity. 29 

C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulations also list three factors 

to consider when determining whether an individual is 

substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) the nature 

and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected 

duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term 

impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or 

resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). See

Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 256 (4th 

Cir. 2006) (recognizing E.E.O.C. regulations as proper authority 

for interpreting the ADA); Rohan v. Networks Presentations, 
13

LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Pollards v. 

High’s of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2002) 

(same). 

C.

Because the analysis of whether diabetes is a qualified 

disability under the ADA is fact-specific, this court must 

analyze the evidence bearing on Schneider’s diabetic condition 

as of August 2005, when he claims he first asked for an

accommodation, and in January 2006, when he next asked for an

accommodation.

Schneider’s diabetic condition in August 2005

We agree with the district court that Schneider failed to 

project probative evidence that he was disabled under the ADA in 

August 2005 when he asked for an accommodation after his 

driver’s license was suspended. Although Schneider has lived 

with Type 1 diabetes since his diagnosis in 1963, the illness 

did not significantly interfere with his daily life until 2001, 

when he began to have peripheral neuropathy, retinopathy, and 

chronic foot ulcers. The record shows, however, that his 

deteriorating condition did not affect his job performance 

before August 2005. Because of the nature of his job functions 

as a pharmacy supervisor, Schneider was still able to perform 

his duties without any problems. 
14

There is no legal authority in this circuit that would 

support the conclusion that Schneider had a disability, as 

defined by the ADA, in August 2005. Although there were 

physical impairments that were the result of his diabetes — such 

as the inability to stand for long periods of time — these 

impairments were controlled by both medication and lifestyle 

choices. The Supreme Court has clarified that “[a] ‘disability’ 

exists only where an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major 

life activity, not where it ‘might’,‘could’, or ‘would’ be 

substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.” 

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added). 

In this case, Schneider had long been taking mitigating 

measures: he administered insulin injections and he would

“regularly eat[] breakfast every morning and take many snacks 

during the day to prevent hypoglycemia during the work day.” 

J.A. 586. Though diabetic, Schneider was unable to show that as 

of August 2005, the disease had become sufficiently serious to 

have an effect on his major life activities. Schneider claimed 

that the diabetes affected his walking, standing, and digestion, 

but presented no evidence that those activities were

substantially limited in August 2005 such that his condition 

became disabling within the ADA. In fact, at that time, 

Schneider was not yet experiencing constant pain or foot ulcers 

from the diabetic neuropathy. See e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
15

Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that a diabetic 

plaintiff failed to show he had a disability under the ADA 

because he failed to explain how his diabetes substantially 

affected his major life activities). In short, Schneider

produced no evidence that would create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether his diabetic condition constituted a 

disability in August 2005. See e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt 

Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 321 (4th Cir. 2008) (reversing the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment because there was a 

genuine issue of material fact). 

Furthermore, even if we were persuaded that Schneider had 

projected sufficient admissible evidence that he was disabled in 

August 2005, Schneider’s claim for failure to accommodate his 

loss of driving privileges would fail because he never made the 

existence of any such disability known to his employer and did 

not inform his employer that the reason he needed an 

accommodation in August 2005 was because of his diabetes. 

Unlike race or sex discrimination, “there are situations in 

alleged disability discrimination cases where an employer 

clearly did not know and could not have known of an employee’s 

disability.” Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 47 

F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995). When it worsens so as to 

substantially limit one’s major activities, diabetes is often a 

“hidden” or “invisible” disability — one that an employer can 
16

not easily ascertain from daily interactions with an employee. 

See also Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 593 

F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2010) (including diabetes in the 

list of “so-called hidden disabilities”). 

Although we do not suggest that a single occurrence of a 

diabetes-induced black-out would render diabetes a statutorilycognizable “disability” as a matter of law, the record shows 

that Giant never had notice of Schneider’s alleged disability in 

August 2005 and was unaware that Schneider was asking for 

“reasonable accommodations” for his “disability” as those terms 

are used in the ADA. The burden to provide notice is not an 

onerous one: the employee does not need to mention the ADA or 

use the phrase “reasonable accommodation,” but need only inform 

the employer of both the disability and the employee’s need for 

accommodations for that disability. E.E.O.C. v. Federal Express 

Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 369 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Schneider conceded on deposition that he never talked 

to his supervisor specifically about his diabetes when seeking 

alternatives to driving after the DMV suspended his driver’s 

license:

Question: At any time during your conversation with 

Mr. Fair on August 15th, 2005, did you tell Mr. 

Fair that your car accident on June 2nd, 2005 was 

because of a hypoglycemic episode?

Answer: I don’t remember even discussing the accident 

itself with Russ.
17

Question: All you discussed was the loss of your 

drivers license then?

Answer: That was the main — main focus of the 

conversation.

Question: And it was the loss of your drivers license 

that led to your reassignment, correct?

Answer: Correct.

Question: And your reassignment to the pharmacy 

manager position had nothing to do with any 

physical impairment that you may have had at that 

time, correct?

Answer: Correct.

J.A. 150-51.

Schneider argues that at the time of the August 2005 

meeting, management officials at Giant knew about Schneider’s 

diabetes, so it could only be inferred that they knew he was 

asking for an accommodation for his disability. This argument 

is not persuasive for two reasons. First, because Schneider 

never directly mentioned that he was suffering from acute 

impairments, i.e., hypoglycemic episodes, caused by his diabetic 

condition, management should not be held responsible for 

guessing that the diabetes had progressed to a point where 

Schneider was a disabled person under the ADA. See e.g., 

Huppenbauer v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 1996 WL 607087 at *4 (4th 

Cir. Oct. 23, 1996) (unpublished table) (finding that even if 

everyone knew that the plaintiff had a heart condition, such 
18

knowledge would not equal notice that the condition imposed 

limitations on the plaintiff requiring special accommodations). 

Second, Schneider never requested the accommodation of allowing 

him to keep his pharmacy supervisor position by taking taxis to 

the different stores on his route because of his diabetic 

condition and disability. Schneider never mentioned that his 

license was suspended because of hypoglycemia caused by his 

diabetic condition, and there was no reason for Giant’s 

management to assume such a thing without Schneider’s informing

them. Giant cannot be faulted for failure to provide reasonable 

accommodations under the ADA where it did not know of 

Schneider’s disability. See Huppenbauer, 1996 WL 607087 at *7 

(holding that “where an employee failed to make a clear request 

for an accommodation and communicate it to his employer,” the 

employer has not violated the ADA); Larson v. Koch Refining Co., 

920 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D. Minn. 1996) (holding that providing 

accommodations is only appropriate where the employer knows that 

plaintiff is both disabled and in need of accommodation).

In sum, at no time on or before August 2005 did Giant know 

that Schneider had a disability that required accommodation, and 

the evidence in the record does not support the conclusion that 

Schneider was disabled under the ADA. Thus, Giant had no 

obligation to provide reasonable accommodations for Schneider 

because of his diabetic condition. Therefore, the district 
19

court’s grant of summary judgment on Schneider’s claim that 

Giant violated the ADA in August 2005 must be affirmed. 

Schneider’s diabetic condition in January 2006

Schneider also claims that Giant violated the ADA in 

January 2006 because he requested, but was refused, the 

reasonable accommodation of being transferred from his pharmacy 

manager position back to the pharmacy supervisor position so 

that his diabetic foot ulcers would not worsen. It seems 

largely undisputed that by January 2006, Schneider was disabled 

because of his diabetic condition, and that Giant knew about his 

diabetes. Schneider’s foot ulcers, a condition resulting from 

his diabetes, were exacerbated from the prolonged standing and 

excessive weight-bearing activities required for his pharmacy 

manager position. Additionally, his supervisors knew that 

Schneider’s diabetic condition was causing him pain since by 

January 2006, Schneider had spoken to his supervisors about his 

diabetes and submitted a letter from his podiatrist. 

At the same time as his doctor’s letter, Schneider also 

sought an accommodation from Giant for his disability. 

Schneider’s doctor requested in a letter that Schneider be 

returned to his previous position as a pharmacy supervisor, 

which did not require standing for 8-12 hours a day. Schneider 

also sent a letter to the Director of Human Resources at Giant 
20

seeking to be reassigned to his previous position, but he never 

received a response to the letter. 

Despite this evidence, Giant’s refusal to approve 

Schneider’s request to be restored to his previous position as a 

pharmacy supervisor does not mean that Giant failed to provide 

reasonable accommodations in violation of the ADA.

Under the ADA, an employer must make “reasonable 

accommodations” for a disabled employee, unless the company can 

demonstrate that the accommodation “would impose an undue 

hardship on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA does not require that the employer go 

out of his way to provide an accommodation for a disabled 

employee, but only requires that accommodations are 

“reasonable.” See Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 

44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To ‘accommodate’ a disability 

is to make some change that will enable the disabled person to 

work . . . [and] at the very least, the cost could not be 

disproportionate to the benefit.”). This court has found that 

the ADA does not require reassignment “when it would mandate 

that the employer bump another employee out of a particular 

position.” E.E.O.C. v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th 

Cir. 2001). An employer is not required to violate another 

employee’s rights in favor of an employee with a disability in 

order to give the disabled employee a reasonable accommodation. 
21

Id. at 353-54; see also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 

695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring 

affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in 

the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given priority 

in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled”).

In January 2006, however, Schneider had not asked for any 

accommodation other than to be re-assigned as a pharmacy 

supervisor. Giant was not required, though, to place Schneider 

back into his old position. In fact, Giant had since replaced 

Schneider with another employee because management was unsure 

when Schneider driver’s license would be restored and could not 

leave the position unfilled. Furthermore, Schneider had not 

requested any other accommodations for his current position to 

alleviate the pain in his foot from standing for hours. 

Although there may be other alternatives and options that 

will not require Schneider to be on his feet for his entire work 

shift in the pharmacy manager position, Schneider neither 

requested such alternatives, nor requested to discuss any other 

potential accommodations with his supervisors. The record 

further reflects that Giant’s management knew about and were 

concerned about Schneider’s diabetic neuropathy and the effect 

that standing would have on his feet, and provided a stool for 

Schneider to sit on during his shifts. In any event, the mere 

fact that Giant refused to reassign Schneider to the position of 
22

pharmacy supervisor does not show that Giant failed to give 

Schneider a reasonable accommodation for his disability.

IV.

For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the 

district court is

AFFIRMED.