In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-19-00067-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 211th District Court

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 17-7613-211

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., A CHILD
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Based on a jury verdict, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationship 

between Appellant N.M. (Mother) and her son, B.M. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (O), (2). Mother appeals that final order. Her courtappointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in 

support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); In 

re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the 

requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. at 741–42, 

87 S. Ct. at 1399. Further, counsel and this court informed Mother of her right to 

request the record and to file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 

319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re S.P., 509 S.W.3d 552, 559 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2016, no pet.). Mother filed a pro se response challenging the legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting all the grounds of termination found by the 

jury. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (O), (2). The Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services did not file a brief.

As the reviewing appellate court, we must independently examine the record to 

decide whether counsel is correct in determining that an appeal in this case is 

frivolous. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 28, n.14; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991). Having carefully reviewed the record, the Anders brief, and 

Mother’s pro se response, we agree with counsel that this appeal is frivolous. See In re 
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K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). We find nothing in 

the record that might arguably support Mother’s appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s final order.

As for appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, we deny it in light of P.M.

because the brief does not show “good cause” other than counsel’s determination that 

an appeal would be frivolous. See 520 S.W.3d at 27 (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw 

brought in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, 

may be premature.”); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 582 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2016, pets. denied) (noting that since P.M. was handed down, “most courts of 

appeals affirming parental termination orders after receiving Anders briefs have denied 

the attorney’s motion to withdraw”). The supreme court has held that when 

intermediate appellate courts affirm Anders termination cases, “appointed counsel’s 

obligations [in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that 

satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Delivered: August 15, 2019