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1 § 121.483 does not contain a provision that is 

parallel to § 121.481(d). Nevertheless, the flight 

time limits for 48 and 72 hour periods found in 

§ 121.483(b) are less restrictive than the flight time 

limitations in § 121.481(d). 

On July 15, 2010, the FAA received a 

request for a legal interpretation 

regarding how to apply flight time 

limitations and rest requirements for 

pilots engaged in flag operations when 

those pilots participate in varying sizes 

of flightcrews during a seven-day 

period. Specifically, a pilot labor 

organization requested a legal 

interpretation regarding the application 

14 CFR 121.481(d), limiting a two-pilot 

crew to 32 hours of flight time within 

any seven consecutive days, when that 

same crew is augmented with an 

additional pilot during or after the 

completion of 32 hours of flight time 

within a seven-day period. We have not 

previously addressed these questions. 

We do not require an air carrier to use 

a pilot for just one flightcrew 

complement in flag operations. Air 

carriers engaged in flag operations are 

permitted to use the same pilot as part 

of a crew of two pilots, a crew of two 

pilots and one additional flightcrew 

member, or a crew of three pilots and 

one additional flightcrew member. This 

flexibility allows certificate holders who 

use multiple flightcrew complements 

throughout their operations to use 

flightcrew members interchangeably. 

The FAA’s rules have a long history 

of acknowledging that pilots may be 

used in flightcrews of varying sizes, in 

that § 121.487 provides a framework for 

calculating monthly and quarterly flight 

time limitations for such pilots. In an 

early version of the current requirement, 

Special Civil Air Regulation No. 386F, 

it was envisioned that this rule would 

‘‘not allow evasion of the stricter 

limitations applicable to smaller crew 

combinations, but will allow assignment 

of a pilot in any given month to another 

type of crew combination without 

additional flight time limitations if he 

flies not more than 20 hours in the type 

of crew to which the more restrictive 

flight time limitations apply and if such 

assignment is not interrupted more than 

once during such month.’’ See 28 Fed. 

Reg. 2000, 2000 (1963). Although 

§ 121.487 provides a structure for 

calculating monthly and quarterly flight 

time limitations for pilots used in 

varying sizes of flightcrews, neither the 

current § 121.487 nor the regulatory 

history answer the question of how to 

apply daily and weekly flight time 

limitations for these same pilots. 

We did not intend, however, for this 

flexibility to be used by a certificate 

holder to select less restrictive flight 

time limitations for a flightcrew by 

augmenting that flightcrew midway or 

at the completion of a scheduling 

period. For example, the flight time 

limits of 14 CFR 121.481(d) would be 

circumvented if a certificate holder 

schedules a two-pilot crew for a series 

of operations and then augments that 

two-pilot flightcrew during or at the 

completion of a 32 hours of flight time 

within any seven-day period, for the 

purposes of extending the flightcrew’s 

flight time under the less restrictive 

framework of § 121.483. 

Although we have not clarified the 

effects of augmenting a two-pilot 

flightcrew within a seven-day period, in 

a Legal Interpretation issued August 24, 

1999, we examined the application of 

§§ 121.481 and 121.483 when a twopilot flightcrew is augmented so as to 

extend the duty times for the original 

two-pilot flightcrew members within a 

24-hour period. See Legal Interpretation 

from Donald P. Byrne to James W. 

Johnson (August 24, 1999). As 

previously stated, § 121.481 applies 

when a certificate holder conducts flag 

operations with a one- or two-pilot 

crew. When a certificate holder 

conducts flag operations with a twopilot crew with one additional 

flightcrew member, § 121.483 applies. 

However, in an August 24, 1999 Legal 

Interpretation, we stated that once an air 

carrier conducting flag operations 

schedules a pilot to fly under § 121.481 

and the pilot completes the flight time, 

it would be contrary to the intent of 

§ 121.481 to then schedule that pilot to 

fly under § 121.483 without providing 

the rest required within a 24-hour 

period as required by §§ 121.481(a) or 

(b). See Legal Interpretation from 

Donald P. Byrne to James W. Johnson 

(August 24, 1999) (stating that the 

regulations prohibit augmenting a twopilot crew after completing a 55 minute 

flight, subject to § 121.481, so that those 

two pilots may then continue on to 

operate a 9 hour and 50 minute flight 

subject to § 121.483(b) without 

providing the rest required by 

§ 121.481(a) or (b)). The August 24, 

1999, Legal Interpretation ensures that 

pilots who have operated as part of a 

two-pilot crew receive the rest intended 

by 14 CFR 121.481(a) and (b). 

Finally, our knowledge regarding the 

causes and effects of fatigue has 

significantly increased since the 

regulations on flight time limitations 

were drafted. We now know that the 

longer one has been awake and the 

longer one spends on task, the greater 

the likelihood of fatigue. We also know 

more about transient and cumulative 

fatigue. Transient fatigue and 

cumulative fatigue are conditions 

brought on by sleep restriction that 

occurs over one or two days or a series 

of days respectively, thus making the 

daily and weekly flight time limitations 

and rest requirements a significant 

safeguard to ensure adequately rested 

pilots. 

Therefore, similar to the principle 

articulated in the August 24, 1999 legal 

interpretation and considering what we 

now know about fatigue, to fulfill the 

intended rest requirements of 

§ 121.481(d), the FAA has tentatively 

determined that once a flightcrew has 

completed 32 hours of flight time under 

14 CFR 121.481(d), that flightcrew must 

be provided the rest required by 

§ 121.481(d) before being scheduled 

under § 121.483. Further, should an air 

carrier engaged in flag operations use 

two pilots in both a two-pilot flightcrew 

and a flightcrew of two pilots and one 

additional flightcrew member, within 

any seven consecutive days, then the 

flight time limitations and rest 

requirements of § 121.481(d) would 

apply to the two pilots who have moved 

between crew complements.1

This clarification would fulfill the 

intent that pilots serving in two-pilot 

crews in flag operations are afforded the 

rest contemplated by § 121.481. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 22, 

2011. 

Rebecca B. MacPherson, 

Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations, 

AGC–200. 

[FR Doc. 2011–4271 Filed 2–28–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

18 CFR Part 35 

[Docket Nos. RM11–7–000; AD10–11–000] 

Frequency Regulation Compensation 

in the Organized Wholesale Power 

Markets 

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, DOE. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (Commission) is 

proposing to revise its regulations to 

remedy undue discrimination in the 

procurement of frequency regulation 

service in the organized wholesale 

electricity markets. The emergence of 

technologies capable of responding 

more quickly than the generators that 

have historically provided frequency 

regulation service has prompted the 


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11178 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 40 / Tuesday, March 1, 2011 / Proposed Rules 

1 16 U.S.C. 824e (2006). Accord 16 U.S.C. 824d 

(providing that rates must be just and reasonable). 

2The following RTOs and ISOs have organized 

wholesale electricity markets: PJM Interconnection, 

LLC (PJM); New York Independent System 

Operator, Inc. (NYISO); Midwest Independent 

Transmission System Operator, Inc. (Midwest ISO); 

ISO New England Inc. (ISO–NE); California 

Independent System Operator Corp. (CAISO); and 

Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP). 

3 ‘‘Ramping’’ or the ability to ‘‘ramp’’ is 

traditionally defined as the ability to change the 

output of real power from a generating unit per 

some unit of time, usually measured as MW/ 

minute. A generator ramps up to produce more 

energy and ramps down to produce less. A storage 

device ramps up by discharging energy and ramps 

down by charging. A demand response resource, in 

the context of the provision of frequency regulation, 

ramps up by consuming less energy, and ramps 

down by consuming more. 

4 In this instance, the ability to provide more 

accurate frequency regulation service means to 

follow the system operator’s dispatch signal more 

closely. 

5See infra n.32–33 and corresponding text. 

6ACE comprises two components, one measuring 

the difference between a balancing authority’s 

scheduled and actual interchange, and another 

measuring the balancing authority’s share in 

correcting the frequency of the interconnection. In 

order to keep ACE within acceptable ranges, entities 

will pre-schedule resources in anticipation of load 

changes and use frequency regulation resources to 

make up the difference. The frequency regulation 

resources are sent a signal to increase or decrease 

their provision of energy (or discharge or charge in 

the case of a storage device, or consume more or 

less energy in the case of a demand response 

resource). This is done through what is known as 

Automatic Generation Control (AGC). Because the 

Balancing Area Authority must respond rapidly to 

correct ACE deviations, fast responding resources 

are particularly well-suited to maintaining system 

frequency. 

7Both existing market participants and potential 

entrants are affected by inefficient pricing. It is 

possible that existing market participants would 

offer faster ramping capabilities to the system 

operator in response to a pricing scheme that 

recognized the service this provides. 

8This NOPR is limited to the RTOs and ISOs. In 

an RTO/ISO region (except SPP, which currently 

does not have a frequency regulation market), the 

frequency regulation market is designed to select 

and compensate the resources needed to provide 

frequency regulation service. The RTO/ISO market 

design sends a price signal in order to incent 

particular resource behavior that leads to the 

reliable, least-cost provision of frequency 

regulation. By contrast, in non-RTO/ISO regions, 

frequency regulation is provided by the 

transmission provider on a cost-of-service basis 

through Schedule 3, with the transmission provider 

selecting the mix of resources it uses to provide 

frequency regulation service. 

9A balancing authority achieves acceptable 

ranges by being in compliance with Control 

Performance Standards 1 and 2 as defined in the 

Commission-approved Reliability Standard BAL– 

001–0.1a. 

10On January 20, 2011, the Commission released 

for public comment a staff study evaluating the use 

of frequency response metrics as a tool to assess the 

Commission to evaluate market rules to 

ensure that they are not unduly 

discriminatory or fail to provide just 

and reasonable compensation for the 

service being provided. If found, the 

Commission proposes to remedy the 

undue discrimination by requiring a 

uniform price for regulation capacity 

paid to all cleared resources and a 

performance payment for the provision 

of frequency regulation, with such 

payment reflecting a resource’s accuracy 

of performance. This proposed action 

helps to ensure that market rules do not 

present unnecessary barriers to the 

participation of all resource types in the 

wholesale ancillary services markets. 

The Commission seeks comment on the 

proposed regulations. 

DATES: Comments are due May 2, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number by any of 

the following methods: 

• Agency Web Site: http://ferc.gov. 

Documents created electronically using 

word processing software should be 

filed in native applications or print-toPDF format and not in a scanned format. 

• Mail/Hand Delivery: Commenters 

unable to file comments electronically 

must mail or hand deliver their 

comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, Secretary of the 

Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 

Washington, DC 20426. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert Hellrich-Dawson (Technical 

Information), Office of Energy Policy 

& Innovation, 888 First Street, NE., 

Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502– 

6360, bob.hellrich-dawson@ferc.gov. 

Eric Winterbauer (Legal Information), 

Office of the General Counsel, 888 

First Street, NE., Washington, DC 

20426, (202) 502–8329, 

eric.winterbauer@ferc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

1. Pursuant to section 206 of the 

Federal Power Act (FPA),1 the 

Commission is proposing to revise its 

regulations to ensure just, reasonable 

and not unduly discriminatory or 

preferential rates in the procurement of 

frequency regulation in the organized 

wholesale electric markets. Maintaining 

the frequency of the transmission 

system within an acceptable range is 

critical to reliable operations. 

Historically, generators have provided 

the power to regulate or correct 

frequency deviations. Non-traditional 

technologies that have the capability to 

respond quickly and accurately to 

certain transmission system needs are 

being deployed in regional transmission 

organization (RTO) and independent 

system operator (ISO) 2 markets to 

varying degrees. Resources such as 

large-scale battery systems, flywheels, 

electric vehicle-to-grid (V2G) systems, 

and demand-side processes have the 

ability to ramp 3 up or down faster than 

some traditional resources and, as such, 

are able to provide frequency regulation 

services more accurately than 

traditional resources.4

2. Taking advantage of the capabilities 

of faster-ramping resources can improve 

the operational and economic efficiency 

of the transmission system and has the 

potential to lower costs to consumers in 

the organized wholesale energy 

markets.5 However, current 

compensation methods for regulation 

service in ISO and RTO markets may 

not acknowledge the inherently greater 

amount of Area Control Error (ACE) 6

correction being provided by fasterramping resources.7 Frequency 

regulation is the tool used to manage 

ACE. In addition, some RTOs currently 

provide unit-specific opportunity cost 

payments to regulating resources rather 

than incorporate the marginal resource’s 

opportunity cost into the uniform 

market clearing price, resulting in an 

economically inefficient economic 

dispatch. 

3. The Commission is concerned that 

frequency regulation compensation 

practices may be resulting in rates that 

are unjust and unreasonable and unduly 

discriminatory or preferential. 

Therefore, the Commission proposes to 

require regional RTOs and ISOs to adopt 

tariff revisions that will ensure that 

resources providing frequency 

regulation service are appropriately 

compensated.8 The Commission seeks 

public comment on these proposed 

reforms. 

I. Background 

A. Frequency Regulation Service 

4. Frequency regulation service is the 

injection or withdrawal of real power by 

facilities capable of responding 

appropriately to a transmission system’s 

frequency deviations or interchange 

power imbalance, both measured by the 

ACE. When generation dispatch does 

not equal actual load and losses on a 

moment-by-moment basis, the 

imbalance will result in the grid’s 

frequency deviating from the standard 

(60 Hertz). Minor frequency deviations 

affect energy consuming devices; major 

deviations cause generation and 

transmission equipment to separate 

from the grid, in the worst case leading 

to a cascading blackout. Frequency 

regulation service can prevent these 

adverse consequences by rapidly 

correcting deviations in the 

transmission system’s frequency to 

bring it within the acceptable range.9

5. Frequency regulation is 

distinguishable from Frequency 

response.10 Frequency response 


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reliability impacts of varying resource mixes on the 

transmission grid. 

11 In Midwest ISO, Alcoa’s Warrick metallurgic 

induction (smelting) operation provides 

approximately 70 MW of frequency regulation. 

Alcoa Comments, Docket AD10–11–000, at 2 (June 

16, 2010). In ERCOT’s model, controllable loads are 

a type of Load Acting as a Resource (LaaR) that is 

capable of reducing or increasing consumption 

under dispatch control (similar to AGC) and able to 

immediately respond proportionally to frequency 

changes (similar to generator governor action) to 

provide Ancillary Services. See Electric Reliability 

Council of Texas, Controllable Load Resource 

Qualification (2007), available at http://www.ercot/ 

content/services/programs/load/laar/

Controllable%20Load%20Resource

%20Qualification.doc.’’ 

12Frequency Regulation Compensation in the 

Organized Wholesale Power Markets, Technical 

Conference, Beacon Speaker Materials, Docket No. 

AD10–11–000, at Figure 3 (May 26, 2010), which 

shows the difference between ISO–NE’s ACE 

control signal, Beacon’s flywheel response, and the 

allowable response rate under current ISO–NE 

rules. Here, ‘‘allowable response rate’’ means the 

rate at which the resource must respond to be 

considered in compliance with the dispatch signal. 

13This type of capacity payment, based on dayahead offers to sell ancillary services, is 

distinguishable from a long-term capacity payment 

such as provided for in PJM’s reliability pricing 

model or ISO–NE’s forward capacity market. 

14NYISO, Market Services Tariff, § 15.3.5.5. 

15NYISO uses telemetry data to track how closely 

a frequency regulation resource’s output is to the 

dispatch signal. NYISO then weights the resource’s 

payments to reflect its accuracy. For example, if the 

resource’s response falls outside an acceptable 

range 10 percent of the time, for a performance 

index of 0.9, it will receive 90 percent of its 

payment. 

16 ISO–NE, Transmission, Markets and Services 

Tariff, § III.3.5.5. 

17See, e.g., NYISO, Ancillary Services Manual, 

Manual 2, at 4–8 (Nov. 2010). 

18A resource’s capacity is limited by the amount 

it can ramp in 5 minutes because the system 

operator in most RTOs and ISOs dispatch resources 

every 5 minutes. CAISO dispatches every 10 

minutes, and so a frequency regulation resource’s 

capacity in that market is bound by the total 

capacity it can ramp in 10 minutes. 

19See PJM, Market and Reliability Committee 

Meeting Materials, (Jan. 2011), http:// 

www.pjm.com/∼/media/committees-groups/ 

committees/mrc/20110119/20110119-item-05- 

regulation-market-performance-incentive-problemstatement-clean.ashx. 

20CAISO, Board of Governors, Decision on 

Regulation Energy Management (Feb. 3, 2011), 

available at http://www.caiso.com/2b1a/ 

2b1acd6d20610.pdf. 

involves the automatic, autonomous and 

rapid action of turbine governor control 

to change a generator’s output and of 

technically capable demand response 

resources that can automatically change 

consumption to respond to changes in 

frequency. These changes occur 

independent of any dispatch signal from 

a system operator. Frequency regulation 

service, in contrast, requires a dispatch 

signal sent by the system operator to 

those resources capable of and 

dispatched to provide frequency 

regulation service. 

6. Today, frequency regulation is 

largely provided by generators (e.g., 

water, steam and combustion turbines) 

that are specially equipped for this 

purpose. Provision by other resources is 

emerging, as technologies develop and 

tariff and market rules are appropriately 

adapted to accommodate new resources. 

For example, the Electric Reliability 

Council of Texas (ERCOT) and Midwest 

ISO currently use controllable demand 

response in addition to generators to 

provide frequency regulation service.11

Such ‘‘regulation capable’’ generation, 

storage devices, and demand response 

resources can respond automatically to 

signals sent by the RTO or ISO, through 

AGC, to increase or decrease real power 

injections or withdrawals to correct 

frequency deviations or interchange 

schedule imbalance, as measured by the 

ACE. The faster a resource can ramp up 

or down, the more accurately it can 

respond to the AGC, or ACE correction, 

signal and avoid overshooting ACE 

correction needs.12 When a resource 

ramps too slowly, its ramping 

limitations may cause it to work against 

ACE correction needs and force the 

system operator to commit additional 

regulation resources to compensate. 

B. Current ISO and RTO Practices 

7. In the ISO and RTO markets, 

compensation for frequency regulation 

service is presently based on several 

components. Depending on the ISO or 

RTO, these payments include 

consideration for capacity set aside to 

provide the service, as well as some of 

the following: The net energy the 

resource injects into the system; 

accurately following the ISOs or RTOs 

dispatch signal; and/or the absolute 

(rather than net) amount of energy 

injected or withdrawn. These payments 

are intended to cover the range of costs 

incurred in order to provide this service: 

Operation and maintenance costs for 

providing frequency regulation and loss 

of potential revenue from foregone sales 

of electricity. 

8. With regard to the payment for 

capacity set aside, this is essentially an 

option payment 13 to the resource to 

keep a certain amount of capacity out of 

the energy market in order to provide 

frequency regulation service (based on a 

market clearing price per MW of 

capacity sold). ISO–NE, NYISO, 

Midwest ISO, and PJM incorporate into 

this payment the opportunity cost of 

foregone energy sales incurred by a 

resource that provides frequency 

regulation service; though in ISO–NE 

and PJM, opportunity costs are not 

applied uniformly to all cleared 

resources. 

9. Compensation for regulation 

service also generally includes 

payments for the net energy the resource 

injects into the system. RTOs and ISOs 

currently provide a payment for the net 

energy injected by a resource providing 

regulation service during the operating 

hour, calculated as the amount of energy 

injected less energy withdrawn 

multiplied by the real-time energy price. 

10. Accuracy of performance can be 

incorporated into payments for 

regulation service. Currently, NYISO 

incorporates accuracy into its 

compensation for regulation service 

through a penalty that reflects the 

accuracy with which the resource 

follows its dispatch instruction.14 This 

is done through a performance index 

that tracks how accurately a resource 

follows the dispatch signal.15

11. ISO–NE makes payments for 

regulation service to reflect the amount 

of work performed by a resource by 

reflecting the absolute amount of energy 

injected and withdrawn. Regulating 

resources receive a ‘‘mileage’’ payment 

that reflects the amount of ACE 

correction provided.16

12. In general, when a resource 

submits its bid, the bid is typically 

required to include its ramp rate in MW 

per minute, its cost per MWh of 

ramping ability, and the total capacity it 

is offering for frequency regulation.17

The resource’s total amount of capacity 

is based on and limited by its ability to 

ramp up or down in 5 minutes.18 For 

example, a resource with a relatively 

large amount of capacity, but a 

relatively slow ramp rate would be 

limited in how much capacity it could 

offer as regulation. If the resource can 

ramp one MW per minute, it would only 

be able to offer 5 MW of regulation 

capacity (for a five minute dispatch) 

even if it has a total capacity of many 

hundreds of megawatts. On the other 

hand, a smaller capacity, fast-ramping 

resource might not face such a 

constraint. For instance, a storage device 

that can hold a 20 MW charge and ramp 

at 10 MW per minute, could offer its full 

20 MW of capacity for five minutes. 

13. Some RTOs and ISOs are actively 

discussing changes to their frequency 

regulation markets or stated at the 

technical conference that changes might 

be appropriate.19 For example, CAISO 

has recently approved a new Regulation 

Energy Management proposal.20

Likewise, the Commission is aware that 

ISO–NE is preparing new rules for 

frequency regulation compensation to 

formalize the participation of energy 


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21 ISO–NE, Report of ISO New England Inc. 

Regarding the Implementation of Market Rule 

Changes to Permit Non-Generating Resources to 

Participate in the Regulation Market, Docket No. 

ER08–54–014, at 5 (Dec. 17, 2010). 

22See Final Agenda, Frequency Regulation 

Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power 

Markets, Docket No. AD10–11–000 (May 26, 2010). 

23Request for Comments Regarding Rates, 

Accounting and Financial Reporting for Electric 

Storage Technologies, Docket No. AD10–13–000 

(June 11, 2010). 

24Tr. 93: 2–5 (Walawalkar); Tr. 103: 6–10 (Capp). 

25Tr. 72: 1–11 (Ott). 

26Beacon, Technical Conference Speaker 

Materials, at 7, Data from 1 MW in ISO–NE 

Alternative Regulation Pilot (May 26, 2010) 

(attached hereto as Appendix A). 27Tr. 84:9–16 (Ott), 72:1–11 (Ott). 

28Tr. 72–73 (Ramey); Tr. 132: 8–11 (Ramey); Tr. 

75–77 (Pike). 

29Tr. 68:13–22 (Todd). 

30Beacon, Comments, Docket No. AD10–13–000, 

at 8 (Aug. 9, 2010); NEMA, Comments, Docket No. 

AD10–13–000, at 2 (Aug. 9, 2010); Xtreme Power, 

Comments, Docket No. AD10–13–000, at 5 (Aug. 9, 

2010); A123 Systems, Comments, Docket No. 

AD10–13–000, at 5–7 (Aug. 9, 2010); ESA, 

Comments, Docket No. AD10–13–000, at 2 (Aug. 9, 

2010); NAATBatt, Comments, Docket No. AD10– 

13–000, at 4–5 (Aug. 9, 2010). 

31MegaWatt Storage Farms Comments Docket No. 

AD10–13–000, at 8–9 (Aug. 9, 2010); Xtreme Power, 

Comments, Docket No. AD10–13–000, at 2–3 (Aug. 

9, 2010); A123 Systems, Comments, Docket No. 

AD10–13–000, at 4 (Aug. 9, 2010); ESA, Comments, 

Docket No. AD10–13–000, at 2 (Aug. 9, 2010). 

32Tr. 35–36 (Ott); Tr. 30–31 (Kathpal); Tr. 37–39 

(Ramey). 

storage devices, something that has been 

only a pilot project to date.21

C. Commission Inquiries into FasterRamping Resources 

14. The Commission began its inquiry 

into faster-ramping resources in May 

2010. On May 26, 2010, the Commission 

hosted a publicly noticed technical 

conference 22 inviting various 

stakeholders, including representatives 

from the RTOs and ISOs, industry, and 

academia to share their views on 

whether current frequency regulation 

market designs reflect the value of the 

service provided, and whether the use 

of faster-ramping resources for 

frequency regulation has the potential to 

provide benefits to the organized 

markets. Interested parties were 

permitted to file comments after the 

technical conference. Separately, the 

Commission on June 11, 2010 issued a 

request for comments regarding 

potential approaches to categorizing 

storage service for compensation 

purposes.23

1. Market Design and the Value of the 

Service Provided 

15. With regard to market designs for 

frequency regulation service, 

participants at the technical conference 

generally agreed that compensation for 

regulating resources ought to reflect the 

service they perform for the system 

operator. However, there was 

disagreement regarding whether current 

market designs accomplish this 

objective. Some current market design 

features were cited as resulting in 

efficient price signals and appropriately 

differentiating between the amount of 

ACE correction that is provided by 

different regulating resources,24 while 

others were said to be deficient.25

16. At the technical conference and in 

written comments, Beacon Power 

Corporation (Beacon) provided data on 

the amount of ACE correction provided 

by a faster-ramping resource relative to 

the generator response allowable under 

the ISO tariff.26 According to Beacon’s 

analysis of resources performing in the 

ISO–NE market, it is possible for a 

faster-ramping resource to provide more 

frequency regulation service than a 

slower-ramping resource. Beacon 

presents data showing, over a one hour 

period, a faster-ramping resource 

providing a total of 0.48 MWh of 

movement in response to the system 

operator’s dispatch signal. If this same 

signal had been sent to a slowerramping resource, it could have 

provided only 0.18 MWh and still been 

within ISO–NE’s allowable response 

rate. 

17. In addition, under certain 

circumstances a slower-ramping 

resource could actually be working 

against the system operator’s need for 

ACE correction, so that only a portion 

of the energy produced positively 

contributes to correcting the ACE signal. 

By contrast, the faster-ramping resource 

can respond to the system’s control 

needs more exactly. In the example 

discussed above, the allowed generator 

response produces 0.18 MWh, but 0.07 

MWh of that is working against the 

system’s ACE correction needs because 

of its slow-ramping capability. 

Therefore, only 0.11 MWh (61 percent) 

actually contributes to correcting ACE. 

At the same time, the fast-ramping 

resource is being dispatched more often 

and all of the energy it produces helps 

to correct ACE. Both resources are 

considered, from the perspective of 

ISO–NE’s current tariff, to be 100 

percent accurate, even though at times 

the slower-ramping resource is working 

against the system operator’s ACE 

control needs. 

18. In this example, Beacon asserted 

that the fast-ramping resource actually 

is providing more than four times as 

much ACE correction relative to the 

allowable response from an existing 

generator providing frequency 

regulation. With the exception of ISO– 

NE, the RTOs and ISOs limit 

compensation to frequency regulation 

resources to a capacity payment and net 

energy balancing. ISO–NE includes a 

payment for the amount of frequency 

service provided. As a result, these ISOs 

and RTOs would pay the fast-ramping 

resource and the slow-ramping resource 

the same amount, assuming both 

resources set aside the same amount of 

capacity to provide the service. 

19. During the technical conference, 

PJM stated that it has no compensation 

structure for how much it asks a 

resource to move when providing 

frequency regulation and, as a result, it 

is likely under-compensating resources 

for speed and accuracy.27

20. On the other hand, representatives 

of Midwest ISO and NYISO indicated 

that they believe their current market 

designs are sufficient, because the 

amount of regulating capacity a resource 

is allowed to sell is based on its ramp 

rate, so faster-ramping resources are 

allowed to sell more regulating 

capacity.28

21. Alcoa noted that MISO and 

NYISO’s rationale is only relevant to 

resources that are ramp constrained. 

Alcoa stated that its demand responsebased regulating resource is capacity 

constrained, but not ramp constrained. 

Alcoa added that because Midwest ISO 

and NYISO both net the regulation up 

and regulation down that a regulating 

resource provides, neither compensates 

for the resource’s actual ramping 

contribution. As a result, Alcoa’s fast 

ramp rate does not allow it to sell any 

additional regulating capacity, and 

Alcoa has no incentive to bid into the 

market its true ability to ramp, instead 

offering a lower ramp rate.29

22. Several entities responding to the 

June request for comments also 

addressed market design issues for 

frequency regulation service.30 These 

commenters argue that the market 

should place a monetary value on the 

service provided by the speed and 

accuracy with which certain storage 

technologies can respond to a regulation 

signal. Commenters also identified the 

potential benefits of using fasterramping resources to provide frequency 

regulation service.31

2. Potential Cost and Reliability Benefits 

23. Participants at the technical 

conference stated that the use of fasterramping resources for frequency 

regulation has the potential to provide 

benefits to the organized markets. These 

benefits include allowing RTOs and 

ISOs to use less regulation capacity to 

meet current NERC standards, thus 

lowering regulation costs.32 Further, use 

of faster-ramping resources frees slowerVerDate Mar<15>2010 18:33 Feb 28, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\01MRP1.SGM 01MRP1

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33 Id. 34Makarov, Y.V., Ma, J., Lu, S., and T.B. Nguyen, 

‘‘Assessing the Value of Regulation Resources Based 

on Their Time Response Characteristics,’’ Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory, PNNL–17632, June 

2008. 

35For example, NERC reliability requirement 

CPS1 requires each balancing authority to operate 

within a specific limit, taking into consideration 

clock-minute averages of ACE, frequency bias, and 

interconnection frequency error. NERC reliability 

requirement CPS2 requires each balancing authority 

to operate such that its average ACE is within a 

specific limit, during a calendar month, for at least 

90 percent of clock-ten-minute periods. 

36Tr. 49:2–14 (Pike); Tr. 53:24–25 (Potishnak). 

37See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through 

Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 

Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded 

Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 

Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540, at 21569 (May 10, 

1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order 

on reh’g, Order No. 888–A, 62 FR 12274 (Mar. 14, 

1997), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, order on reh’g, 

Order No. 888–B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order 

on reh’g, Order No. 888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 

(1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission 

Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 

(D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 

535 U.S. 1 (2002) (‘‘In the context of an emerging 

competitive market in generation, discriminatory 

practices that once did not constitute undue 

discrimination must be reviewed to determine 

whether they are being used to prevent the benefits 

of competition in generation from being achieved.’’). 

38A simplified example would be to consider two 

resources that clear with the same amount of 

capacity and are directed to provide regulation up 

and regulation down over the course of a fiveminute interval. The fast-ramping resource might be 

directed, for example, to move around an initial setpoint up five MW, then down three MW, up one 

MW, down ten MW, and finally up nine MW. A 

netting approach to compensation would determine 

that the resource provided an additional two MW 

of energy to the system (+ 5 ¥ 3 + 1 ¥ 10 + 9 = 

+2) uring that five minute interval. Meanwhile, a 

slower-ramping resource may be directed to move 

up three MW and then down one MW for a net of 

two MW in relation to its set-point. The operator 

is not able to direct more movement because the 

slower-ramping resource would not be able to 

respond in the requisite timeframe. Both resources 

would receive identical compensation for their 

movement, despite the first resource providing 

more ACE correction. 

39See, e.g., Tr. 83:9–24 (Ramey). 

ramping resources to operate at stable 

output levels and, therefore, at more 

efficient heat rates which allows them to 

submit lower bids into energy markets, 

thereby lowering energy prices.33

24. To illustrate the efficiency of 

faster-ramping resources, some industry 

representatives—during the technical 

conference and in comments—referred 

to a Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory study that examined the 

ability of faster-ramping resources to 

replace traditional generation resources 

in providing frequency regulation 

service in the CAISO.34 The study 

defined an ‘‘ideal resource’’ as one that 

has a ramp rate equal to its entire 

capacity in one minute. The study’s 

authors determined the ramping ability 

for various resource types in the current 

CAISO generation fleet that provide 

frequency regulation service, including 

hydro, combustion turbine, steam 

turbine, and combined cycle. The 

authors then estimated how many 

megawatts of these types of capacity can 

be replaced by 1 MW from an ideal 

resource. In one case, the ideal resource 

was assumed to have no limits on its 

ability to sustainably provide energy. In 

a second case, the resource’s ability to 

sustain energy reflects the actual ability 

of a flywheel, i.e., it reflects an energylimited resource. In either case, the 

authors concluded that a fasterresponding resource is able to provide 

more effective regulation capacity than 

most other resources, including the 

current generation fleet mix in the 

CAISO. When replacing these resources 

for frequency regulation service with an 

ideal resource, the authors found that 1 

MW of an ideal resource with limited 

energy could replace 1.43 MW of an 

average hydro unit. The authors state 

that effectiveness increases as the ideal 

resource is compared to even slower 

ramping resources, reaching a maximum 

when 1 MW of an ideal resource with 

limited energy replaces more than 24 

MW of an average steam turbine. 

Compared to the current CAISO fleet 

mix providing frequency regulation, 

which includes fast-responding hydro 

units, the authors found that 1 MW of 

a limited energy ideal resource could 

replace 1.17 MW of the current 

generation mix. 

25. Representatives from some RTOs 

and ISOs, however, questioned at the 

technical conference whether procuring 

more fast-response resources would 

materially improve their ability to meet 

NERC ACE control performance 

standards.35 For example, ISO–NE and 

NYISO acknowledged that using a 

combination of faster-responding 

resources has allowed them to meet 

their NERC standards by procuring 

relatively less regulation capacity than 

they would otherwise need.36

II. Discussion 

A. The Need for Reform 

26. The Commission proposes to 

adopt a frequency regulation 

compensation mechanism, as set forth 

below, for compensating regulation 

providers in organized wholesale 

electricity markets in order to eliminate 

undue discrimination and ensure just 

and reasonable rates. Faster-ramping 

resources provide more ACE correction 

to system operators than slower ramping 

resources and are, at least in some RTOs 

and ISOs, explicitly given priority in the 

dispatch order. Yet these resources do 

not appear to be receiving compensation 

for all of the service they provide as a 

result of pricing mechanisms that may 

be unduly discriminatory. Further, the 

Commission believes there are market 

efficiencies to be gained by ensuring 

efficient price signals for regulation 

resources that forego the opportunity to 

earn revenues in the energy markets. 

1. Unduly Discriminatory Pricing 

27. The Commission is concerned that 

current rules that govern pricing and 

compensation for frequency regulation 

services in RTOs and ISOs may be 

unjust and unreasonable because fasterramping resources are compensated at 

the same level as slower ramping 

resources, even though they can 

respond more quickly and provide more 

ACE correction.37

28. Specifically, the Commission is 

concerned that under some existing 

frequency regulation compensation 

methods, a faster-ramping resource may 

not be compensated for all of the service 

it provides. For example, CAISO, 

NYISO, Midwest ISO, and PJM net the 

regulation up and regulation down 

provided by resources. This 

compensation method does not 

acknowledge the inherently greater 

amount of ACE correction being 

provided by faster-ramping resources.38

As a result, slower-responding resources 

are compensated as if they are providing 

the same amount of ACE correction 

when, in reality, they are not. 

29. Some ISOs and RTOs dispatch 

faster-ramping resources earlier than 

other resources to take advantage of 

their enhanced operation capabilities, 

i.e., their ability to ramp faster, yet pay 

all resources at the same rate, i.e., the 

same clearing price for capacity and the 

same price per MWh of net energy.39

Again, this could lead to providing 

different amounts of ACE correction, yet 

receiving the same compensation due to 

netting practices. 

30. The Commission acknowledges 

that a resource’s ability to sell capacity 

into the regulation market is dependent 

on its ramping ability, such that a fasterresponding resource is able to offer a 

relatively greater amount of capacity. 

This does not, however, alleviate our 

concerns about potential undue 

discrimination toward resources that 

provide more ACE correction. For 

example, some new market entrants are 

relatively small in terms of capacity 

(capacity-constrained), but are capable 

of responding rapidly to AGC signals 

(not ramp-constrained), so a 

compensation scheme that does not 

reflect work performed will lead to 

inadequate compensation when 

compared to larger, slower responding 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
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40A resource that is capacity constrained but is 

able to ramp at a very high rate will clear its 

relatively small amount of capacity in the 

regulation market and then be paid for providing 

regulation service in real-time. But this performance 

payment does not acknowledge ramping ability due 

to netting. On the other hand, a ramp constrained 

resource with a large amount of capacity to sell 

could clear its relatively large amount of regulation 

capacity (and, thus, receive a higher capacity 

payment) and get paid at the same rate for 

providing regulation service in real-time. 

Expanding the hypothetical scenario provided 

above, see supra n.37, assume that the first (faster) 

resource is capacity constrained and can offer only 

10 MW of regulation, while the second (slower) 

resource, while ramp-constrained, can offer 30 MW 

of regulation. The 30 MW resource will receive a 

larger capacity payment for offering more 

regulation, but the two resources will receive 

identical net payments for their actual movement if 

they are directed as indicated above. In other 

words, the slower, larger resource receives a 

compensatory advantage for its size, but the faster, 

smaller resource does not similarly receive a 

compensatory advantage for its ramping speed. 

41By participating in the regulation market, an 

energy market resource is dispatched at a set-point 

below its maximum capacity. Because this amount 

of capacity is held in reserve to provide regulation, 

the resource misses the opportunity to provide 

energy at the current LMP. 

42PJM, Manual 18: Operating Agreement 

Accounting, at 12–16, available at http:// 

www.pjm.com/∼/media/documents/manuals/ 

m28.ashx. 

43 ISO–NE Comments at 8. 

44See Tr. 53:24–25 (Potishnak), Tr. 54:1–2 

(Potishnak), Tr. 49:6–14 (Pike). 

45Participants at the May 26, 2010 technical 

conference noted that it was unlikely that any 

frequency regulation market would comprise only 

fast-ramping storage resources due to the need for 

sustained energy. Tr. 23:8–25 (Pike). 

46 Xcel Energy’s Pawnee coal plant shows 

maintenance and capital costs (i.e., wear and tear) 

for load following of approximately $1.5k per load 

following cycle. Aptech Engineering Services, Inc., 

Cost of Cycling Analysis for Pawnee Station Unit 1 

Phase 1: Top-Down Analysis, at vii (November 

2008), available at http://www.xcelenergy.com/ 

SiteCollectionDocuments/docs/ 

CRPExhibit4CostofCyclingExecutiveSummary.pdf. 

47Tr. 28:13–24 (Potishnak); Tr. 40:9–15 (Ott). 

48This applies whether an RTO or ISO allows 

resources to sell regulation up and regulation down 

generators.40 The Commission 

preliminarily finds that slower, larger 

resources are being given a 

compensatory advantage for their size 

while faster, smaller resources do not 

similarly receive compensation for their 

ramping speed. The Commission 

believes compensation should take into 

account the greater amount of service 

that is being provided by faster-ramping 

resources, through more frequent 

provision of both up and down 

regulation; this greater amount of ACE 

correction is lost when positive and 

negative contributions to ACE 

correction are netted and no additional 

payment is made to reflect performance. 

Therefore, the Commission proposes to 

reform current market designs that lack 

a payment that reflects the amount of 

ACE correction provided by a resource, 

thereby under-compensating fasterramping resources when compared to 

payments made to slower-ramping 

resources. 

31. Additionally, the Commission 

believes that the manner in which some 

resources that provide frequency 

regulation service are compensated for 

their opportunity costs may be unjust 

and unreasonable and unduly 

discriminatory.41 For instance, PJM 

provides ex post ‘‘make whole’’ 

payments based on individual unit 

opportunity costs, something that is not 

reflected in the uniform market clearing 

price calculation.42 ISO–NE pays 

opportunity costs on a resource-specific 

basis. Both of these methods have the 

potential to inefficiently select 

regulating resources and also fail to 

reflect the marginal unit’s full marginal 

cost (including opportunity cost) that 

should set the market clearing price that 

is paid to all cleared suppliers. In 

addition, as is noted by ISO–NE in 

comments submitted after the technical 

conference, failing to pay a uniform 

clearing price that includes the marginal 

unit’s opportunity costs could result in 

inefficient price signals being sent that 

will result in inappropriate long-term 

investment.43 Therefore, the 

Commission proposes to require that all 

resource bids include opportunity costs 

and that all cleared frequency regulation 

resources be paid the single market 

clearing price, which will reflect the 

total marginal costs of the marginal 

cleared unit. We believe that this 

proposal will result in just and 

reasonable rates and correct potential 

undue discrimination. 

2. Potential Market Efficiencies 

32. The Commission preliminarily 

finds that the use of faster-ramping 

resources for frequency regulation has 

the potential to improve operational and 

economic efficiency and, in turn, lower 

costs to consumers in the organized 

markets. As described above, fasterramping resources may be able to 

replace resources that currently provide 

frequency regulation, so RTOs and ISOs 

may be able to procure less regulation 

capacity, thereby lowering costs to load. 

This can be seen in both ISO–NE and 

NYISO. Both have a relatively higher 

concentration of faster-ramping 

resources, easily meet NERC reliability 

standards, and yet procure less 

regulation capacity, as a percentage of 

peak load, than other RTOs and ISOs.44

When dispatching faster-ramping 

resources, the system operator is better 

able to rely on those resources to 

quickly and accurately follow the AGC 

signal, without overshooting, thus 

avoiding the need for additional 

regulation resources to compensate. 

33. The Commission also anticipates 

a secondary effect on energy markets: as 

slower ramping resources move out of 

the frequency regulation market and are 

able to focus on providing sustained 

energy, they should be able to operate 

at more efficient heat rates.45 For 

example, for traditional thermal 

generators, providing frequency 

regulation results in both operating at 

inefficient heat rates and additional 

wear and tear on equipment.46 If these 

modes of operation are avoided, costs 

can be reduced and lower energy bids 

offered, thereby lowering prices in the 

energy market. The Commission notes 

that, at the May 2010 technical 

conference, some participants 

questioned the value of procuring only 

faster-ramping, but short duration 

resources, for frequency regulation. 

Accordingly, the Commission seeks 

comment on the benefits that fasterramping resources, no matter their exact 

type, can and do bring to the RTO and 

ISO markets. Likewise, the Commission 

seeks comments on the drawbacks of 

using faster-ramping resources, if any.47

B. Specific Proposals 

34. In light of the foregoing concerns 

the Commission proposes to amend its 

regulations to provide a frequency 

regulation compensation mechanism for 

the RTO and ISO markets to ensure that 

pricing and compensation of frequency 

regulation service is just and reasonable 

and not unduly discriminatory or 

preferential. Specifically, the 

Commission proposes to require ISOs 

and RTOs to change their tariffs so that 

regulation resources receive a two-part 

payment. This two-part payment 

structure is based on what the 

Commission preliminarily finds are 

‘‘best practices’’ used by the RTOs and 

ISOs. As further described below, the 

first part of the payment is a capacity, 

or option, payment to have a certain 

amount of capacity held in reserve and 

not participate in the energy market in 

order to provide frequency regulation 

service. While all RTOs and ISOs with 

a centrally-procured frequency 

regulation market currently provide for 

a capacity payment to frequency 

regulation resources, the payment varies 

by RTO or ISO. To produce the efficient 

market outcome, this payment must 

include the marginal regulating 

resource’s opportunity costs. The 

second part of the payment is a 

performance payment based on the 

amount of up and down movement, in 

megawatts, the resource provides in 

response to a control signal.48 This 


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separately or requires resources to offer both 

regulation up and regulation down. 

49A cross-product opportunity cost, in this case, 

is the revenue a regulation provider loses because 

it is on stand-by to provide regulation and is not 

providing energy. 

50An inter-temporal opportunity cost represents 

the foregone value when a resource must operate at 

one time, and therefore must either forego a profit 

from selling energy at a later time or incur costs due 

to consuming at a later time. The trade-off 

presented to thermal storage provides an example 

of inter-temporal opportunity costs. A thermal 

storage operator would prefer to ‘‘charge’’ (heat 

bricks or freeze water) when prices are low. If such 

a resource were to provide frequency regulation, it 

could be asked to stop charging during low price 

periods and then be forced to charge during high 

price periods. 

51See, e.g., Tr.124:10–131:19. 

52EPSA Comments at 9–10 (‘‘Going forward cooptimizaton and how that is evaluated will be 

important to generation resources because the rules 

that result will play an important role in 

determining whether and when the resource will 

provide energy or ancillary services.’’). 

53See Tr. 85–86 (Potishnak) and Tr. 117–118 

(Ott). 

performance payment should also take 

into consideration a resource’s accuracy 

in providing ACE correction. The 

Commission preliminarily finds that 

this compensation structure is necessary 

to ensure that pricing schemes for 

frequency regulation service in the 

organized wholesale electricity markets 

result in rates that are just and 

reasonable, and not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential. 

1. Capacity Payment and Opportunity 

Cost 

35. The Commission proposes to 

require that each regulating resource is 

paid a uniform capacity payment that 

includes the opportunity cost of the 

marginal regulating resource. As 

discussed above, some ISOs and RTOs 

currently pay resource-specific 

opportunity costs in addition to or as 

part of a capacity payment, while others 

incorporate the marginal unit’s 

opportunity cost into a uniform 

frequency regulation market clearing 

price for capacity. In order to send an 

efficient price signal to frequency 

regulation resources, the Commission 

proposes that RTOs and ISOs base the 

clearing price for frequency regulation 

on the marginal resource’s marginal 

cost, including opportunity cost. Paying 

a unit-specific opportunity cost distorts 

the market by basing the commitment of 

regulating units on incomplete market 

information, potentially leading to 

committing units with higher costs than 

other units not committed. Accordingly, 

the Commission preliminarily finds that 

a frequency regulation compensation 

mechanism that includes a uniform 

clearing price with accuratelydetermined opportunity costs will 

reduce errors in selecting the optimal 

portfolio of regulation suppliers each 

hour (and each day), which reduces 

total regulation costs to consumers and 

ensures that rates are just and 

reasonable and not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential. 

36. In addition, the Commission 

preliminarily finds that cross-product 

opportunity costs 49 should be 

calculated by the RTO or ISO, as it has 

the best information to determine a 

frequency regulation resource’s crossproduct opportunity cost due to not 

participating in the energy market. 

Further, where appropriate, resources 

should be permitted to include intertemporal opportunity costs in their 

capacity bid.50 The Commission seeks 

comment on its proposal to require each 

regulating resource to be paid a uniform 

capacity payment that includes the 

opportunity cost of the marginal 

regulating resource. 

2. Payment for Performance with 

Accuracy Adjustment 

37. The Commission preliminarily 

finds that requiring a component in the 

frequency regulation compensation 

mechanism that recognizes the 

resource’s contribution to ACE 

correction is necessary to remedy undue 

discrimination and ensure just and 

reasonable rates in the organized 

wholesale electricity markets. Resources 

that provide more value to the grid by 

doing more of the work to correct ACE 

deviations should be paid more than 

resources doing less work. Accordingly, 

taking performance into consideration is 

a key element of ensuring that any 

frequency regulation compensation 

mechanism is just and reasonable and 

not unduly discriminatory or 

preferential. We, therefore, propose to 

require that all regulating resources be 

paid for their performance, with this 

payment taking the form of a payment 

for each MW, up or down, provided by 

the resource in response to the system 

operator’s dispatch signal. Specifically, 

an RTO or ISO would determine the 

total movement up and down and then 

multiply that sum by a price-per-MW of 

ACE correction. We seek comment on 

the proposed method and whether there 

are alternative payments for 

performance that can address our 

concern about undue discrimination. 

38. The Commission proposes that the 

price-per-MW of ACE correction be 

market-based. Specifically, resources 

would specify the capacity (in MW) 

available to provide regulation, a ramp 

rate (in MW/minute), and bid into the 

market a price-per-MWh ramping 

capability and price-per-MW of ACE 

correction. The RTO or ISO would then 

determine the least cost set of resources 

and set the price-per-MW of ACE 

correction based on the bid of the 

marginal regulating resource. We note 

that there was little discussion at the 

technical conference about how to 

design the price-per-MW of ACE 

correction.51 The alternative to a 

market-based price is to use an 

administratively set price-per-MW of 

ACE correction. We seek comment on 

this proposal as well as the alternative 

of an administratively determined price, 

including how an administratively 

determined price could be set. We note 

that some commenters stressed the 

importance of the ISO’s and RTO’s 

energy and ancillary service cooptimization algorithms in producing 

the least-cost portfolio of resources.52

We therefore seek comment on how this 

proposal will integrate with the ISO’s 

and RTO’s existing co-optimization 

algorithms. 

39. The Commission also proposes 

that the performance payment must 

reflect the resource’s accuracy in 

following the system operator’s dispatch 

signal. Specifically, we propose that the 

accuracy be measured by the RTO or 

ISO using currently available telemetry 

technology. If an RTO or ISO receives 

telemetry data every 10 seconds, for 

instance, it would be able to measure 

over the course of 5 minutes how often 

the resource was delivering exactly the 

megawatts requested. The resource 

would then be compensated for the 

fraction of its energy injected or 

withdrawn that met the dispatch signal. 

This method accepts as given the 

resource’s stated ramping ability and 

provides a disincentive to deviate from 

the dispatch signal, which incorporates 

actual ramping performance. 

40. We note that there was little 

agreement among the technical 

conference panelists on how accuracy 

should be incorporated into the 

frequency regulation market design.53

Therefore, we seek comments on 

alternative methods, including methods 

to incorporate accuracy into the ACE 

correction calculation. It is possible to 

approximate how a resource contributes 

to correcting ACE by taking the 

difference between the energy it 

provides that was in the direction 

needed to correct ACE at any moment 

and the energy that was in the direction 

opposite to what was needed to correct 

ACE. If ACE indicates that the system 

requires regulation up, yet a resource is 

still providing regulation down due to 

its slow ramping ability, that resource 

could be considered to not be 


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54 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2006). 

55 5 CFR 1320.11 (2010). 

56SPP is not included in the respondents because 

they currently do not have a frequency regulation 

compensation mechanism in their tariff and 

independent of this proceeding they have indicated 

that they are already planning to implement such 

a mechanism. Therefore, it is expected that any 

additional burden on SPP due to this proceeding is 

expected to be de minimus. 

57Regulations Implementing the National 

Environmental Policy Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR 

47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. 

Preambles 1986–1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987). 

contributing to ACE correction. Thus, its 

payment for ACE correction would only 

include the MWh that were actually 

correcting ACE. The Commission seeks 

comments on how to structure 

payments for frequency regulation that 

compensate a resource for its 

contribution to ACE correction. We seek 

comment on whether this method could 

result in a resource being penalized 

through lower measured ACE correction 

even when it is following the system 

operator’s dispatch signal. 

3. Net Energy 

41. Currently, regulating resources 

receive a payment (or charge) for the net 

energy injected (or withdrawn) as a 

result of providing regulation service in 

every RTO and ISO market. The 

Commission seeks comment on the 

appropriateness of retaining net energy 

payments in light of the two-part 

payment proposed here. Specifically, 

the Commission seeks comment on 

whether the provisions in existing tariffs 

for net energy payments are redundant 

given the proposed requirement 

discussed herein that all RTOs and ISOs 

must pay regulating resources a mileage 

payment for the ACE correction they 

provide, or whether this payment is a 

necessary, appropriate feature of dayahead and real-time energy account 

balancing and settlement. 

III. Information Collection Statement 

42. The following collection of 

information contained in this Proposed 

Rule are subject to review by the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) 

under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995.54 OMB’s 

regulations require approval of certain 

information collection requirements 

imposed by agency rules.55 The 

Commission solicits comments on the 

Commission’s need for this information, 

whether the information will have 

practical utility, the accuracy of the 

burden estimates, ways to enhance the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected or retained, 

and any suggested methods for 

minimizing respondents’ burden, 

including the use of automated 

information techniques. 

43. Additionally, the Commission 

encourages comments regarding the 

time burden expected to be required to 

comply with the proposed rule 

regarding the requirement for ISOs and 

RTOs to change their tariffs so that the 

regulation resources receive just and 

reasonable compensation for the 

services provided, and the potential 

time burden on regulation resources to 

conform to new or modified bidding 

requirements. Specifically, the 

Commission seeks comment on: (1) The 

additional burden and cost (human, 

hardware and software) associated with 

implementation, operation and 

maintenance of this new provision in 

ISO/RTO tariffs; and (2) the additional 

burden and cost (human, hardware and 

software) on regulation resources, if any, 

associated with changes to the type of 

information submitted in the bid or the 

manner in which the bid is submitted. 

Burden Estimate: The additional 

estimated public reporting burdens for 

the proposed reporting requirements in 

this rule are as follows. 

Data collection Number of 

respondents 56

Number of 

responses 

Hours per 

response Total annual hours 

FERC 516 [1] [2] [3] [1 × 2 × 3] 

Conforming tariff changes (18 CFR 35.28(g)(3)). One time burden 5 1 100 500 

Totals ........................................................................................ .......................... ........................ ........................ 500 one time burden. 

Cost to Comply: The Commission has 

projected the cost of compliance to be 

$57,000. Total Annual Hours for 

Collection in initial year (500 hours) @ 

$114 an hour [average cost of attorney 

($200 per hour), consultant ($150), 

technical ($80), and administrative 

support ($25)] = $57,000 

Title: FERC–516, Electric Rate 

Schedules and Tariff Filings. 

Action: Proposed Collection. 

OMB Control No. 1902–0096. 

Respondents for this Rulemaking: 

Businesses or other for profit and/or 

not-for-profit institutions. 

Frequency of Information: As 

indicated in the table. 

Necessity of Information: The Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission is 

proposing to require ISOs and RTOs to 

change their tariffs to provide for 

compensation of frequency regulation in 

a manner that remedies undue 

discrimination in the procurement of 

such service in the organized wholesale 

electricity markets. 

Internal Review: The Commission has 

reviewed the proposed changes and has 

determined that the changes are 

necessary. These requirements conform 

to the Commission’s need for efficient 

information collection, communication, 

and management within the energy 

industry. The Commission has assured 

itself, by means of internal review, that 

there is specific, objective support for 

the burden estimates associated with the 

information collection requirements. 

44. Interested persons may obtain 

information on the reporting 

requirements by contacting the 

following: Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 

Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen 

Brown, Office of the Executive Director], 

e-mail: DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone: 

(202) 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873. 

45. Comments on the collections of 

information and the associated burden 

estimates in the proposed rule should be 

sent to the Commission in this docket 

and may also be sent to the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget, DC 

20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission]. For security reasons, 

comments to OMB should be submitted 

by e-mail to: 

oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. 

Comments submitted to OMB should 

include Docket Number RM11–7 and 

OMB Control Number 1902–0096. 

IV. Environmental Analysis 

46. The Commission is required to 

prepare an Environmental Assessment 

or an Environmental Impact Statement 

for any action that may have a 

significant adverse effect on the human 

environment.57 The Commission has 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 40 / Tuesday, March 1, 2011 / Proposed Rules 11185 

58 18 CFR 380.4. 

59See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(15). 

60 5 U.S.C. 601–612. 

61 13 CFR 121.101. 

62 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities & n.1. 

categorically excluded certain actions 

from this requirement as not having a 

significant effect on the human 

environment.58 The proposed 

regulations are categorically excluded as 

they address rate filings submitted 

under section 206 of the FPA and the 

establishment of just and reasonable 

rates, terms and conditions of 

jurisdictional service under this section 

of the FPA.59 Accordingly, no 

environmental assessment is necessary 

and none has been prepared for this 

NOPR. 

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

47. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 

1980 (RFA) 60 generally requires a 

description and analysis of final rules 

that will have significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. The RFA mandates 

consideration of regulatory alternatives 

that accomplish the stated objectives of 

a proposed rule and that minimize any 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The Small Business Administration’s 

(SBA) Office of Size Standards develops 

the numerical definition of a small 

business.61 The SBA has established a 

size standard for electric utilities, 

stating that a firm is small if, including 

its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in 

the transmission, generation and/or 

distribution of electric energy for sale 

and its total electric output for the 

preceding twelve months did not exceed 

four million megawatt hours.62 Five 

ISOs and RTOs, not small entities, are 

impacted directly by this rule. 

48. CAISO is a non-profit organization 

with over 54,000 megawatts of capacity 

and over 25,000 circuit miles of power 

lines. 

49. NYISO is a non-profit organization 

that oversees wholesale electricity 

markets, dispatches over 500 generators, 

and manages a nearly 11,000-mile 

network of high-voltage lines. 

50. PJM is comprised of more than 

600 members including power 

generators, transmission owners, 

electricity distributors, power 

marketers, and large industrial 

customers, serving 13 states and the 

District of Columbia. 

51. Midwest ISO is a non-profit 

organization with over 145,000 

megawatts of installed generation. 

Midwest ISO has over 57,000 miles of 

transmission lines and serves 13 states 

and one Canadian province. 

52. ISO–NE is a regional transmission 

organization serving six states in New 

England. The system is comprised of 

more than 8,000 miles of high-voltage 

transmission lines and over 350 

generators. 

53. The Commission certifies this rule 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities, and therefore no initial 

regulatory flexibility analysis is 

required. 

VI. Comment Procedures 

54. The Commission invites interested 

persons to submit comments on the 

matters and issues proposed in this 

notice to be adopted, including any 

related matters or alternative proposals 

that commenters may wish to discuss. 

Comments are due 60 days from 

publication in the Federal Register. 

Comments must refer to Docket No. 

RM11–7–000, and must include the 

commenter’s name, the organization 

they represent, if applicable, and their 

address in their comments. 

55. The Commission encourages 

comments to be filed electronically via 

the eFiling link on the Commission’s 

Web site at http://www.ferc.gov. The 

Commission accepts most standard 

word processing formats. Documents 

created electronically using word 

processing software should be filed in 

native applications or print-to-PDF 

format and not in a scanned format. 

Commenters filing electronically do not 

need to make a paper filing. 

56. Commenters that are not able to 

file comments electronically must send 

an original to: Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the 

Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 

Washington, DC 20426. 

57. All comments will be placed in 

the Commission’s public files and may 

be viewed, printed, or downloaded 

remotely as described in the Document 

Availability section below. Commenters 

on this proposal are not required to 

serve copies of their comments on other 

commenters. 

VII. Document Availability 

58. In addition to publishing the full 

text of this document in the Federal 

Register, the Commission provides all 

interested persons an opportunity to 

view and/or print the contents of this 

document via the Internet through the 

Commission’s Home Page (http:// 

www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s 

Public Reference Room during normal 

business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE., 

Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426. 

59. From the Commission’s Home 

Page on the Internet, this information is 

available on eLibrary. The full text of 

this document is available on eLibrary 

in PDF and Microsoft Word format for 

viewing, printing, and/or downloading. 

To access this document in eLibrary, 

type the docket number excluding the 

last three digits of this document in the 

docket number field. 

60. User assistance is available for 

eLibrary and the Commission’s Web site 

during normal business hours from 

FERC Online Support at (202) 502–6652 

(toll free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail 

at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the 

Public Reference Room at (202) 502– 

8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the 

Public Reference Room at 

public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. 

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35 

Electric power rates, Electric utilities, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

By direction of the Commission. 

Commissioner Spitzer dissenting in part with 

a separate statement attached. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Commission proposes to amend Part 35 

Chapter I, Title 18 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 35—FILING OF RATE 

SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS 

1. The authority citation for Part 35 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a–825r, 2601– 

2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101–7352. 

2. Amend § 35.2 by adding a new 

paragraph (g) to read as follows: 

§ 35.2 Definitions. 

* * * * * 

(g) Frequency regulation. The term 

frequency regulation as used in this part 

will mean the capability to inject or 

withdraw real power by resources 

capable of responding to a balancing 

area’s frequency deviations or 

interchange power imbalance, measured 

by the Area Control Error. 

3. Amend § 35.28 by adding a new 

paragraph (g)(3) to read as follows: 

§ 35.28 Non-discriminatory open access 

transmission tariff. 

* * * * * 

(g) * * * 

(3) Frequency regulation 

compensation in ancillary services 

markets. Each Commission-approved 

independent system operator or regional 

transmission organization that has a 

tariff that provides for the compensation 

of frequency regulation must provide 

such compensation based on the actual 

service provided, including a capacity 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS
11186 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 40 / Tuesday, March 1, 2011 / Proposed Rules 

1Compare Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 

16–18, P 24 with Transcript of May 26, 2010 

Technical Conference (Transcript) at 24:2–16 (Pike); 

Transcript at 18:13–25 and 29–1–21 (Potishnak). 

2Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) June 

16, 2010 Comments at 2; Xcel Energy Services Inc. 

(XES) June 16, 2010 Comments at 3, 5–7; Transcript 

at 59:15–24 (Lowell); Transcript at 124:4–9 (Pike). 

3Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 25; ISO 

New England Inc. (ISO–NE) June 16, 2010 

Comments at 5–6; California Independent System 

Operator Corporation (CAISO) June 16, 2010 

Comments at 2–3. 

4 ISO–NE June 16, 2010 Comments at 4–6; 

Transcript at 14:18–22 (Masiello); Transcript at 

49:3–14 (Pike). 

payment that includes the marginal 

unit’s opportunity costs and a payment 

for performance that reflects a frequency 

regulating resource’s contribution to 

correcting the relevant balancing area’s 

Area Control Error (when the resource is 

accurately following the dispatch signal) 

when providing regulation service. 

Note: The following appendixes will not 

appear in the Code of Federal Regulations: 

SPITZER, Commissioner, dissenting in 

part: 

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the 

majority is concerned that current 

mechanisms for compensating frequency 

regulation service in regional transmission 

organization (RTO) and independent system 

operator (ISO) regions may not adequately 

compensate for the true value of the 

frequency regulation service provided. I 

share the majority’s concern. Resources that 

have faster-ramping capability have the 

potential to respond quicker and more 

accurately to certain transmission system 

needs. 

However, the majority concludes, based on 

the existing record, that the Commission 

should require a standard formula through 

which all RTO/ISO regions must compensate 

frequency regulation service. I believe the 

record is not adequate to propose a specific 

proposal at this time. Accordingly, I believe 

the Commission should have taken a 

preliminary step (such as the issuance of a 

Notice of Inquiry or Advanced Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking) before moving 

forward with the specific proposal in a 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 

I disagree with the majority that the record 

is sufficiently robust to make a specific 

proposal at this time to change our 

regulations. Although the record provides 

some data regarding potential reliability and 

efficiency benefits of faster-ramping 

resources providing frequency regulation 

service, I am concerned this evidence may be 

incomplete.1 In the existing record, several 

commenters raise concerns about the lack of 

hard data; these commenters argue that more 

study is needed to demonstrate incremental 

value.2 Even RTO/ISOs examining these 

issues express reservations that the evidence 

may be inadequate to support the 

conclusions asserted in the NOPR.3

The May 26, 2010 Staff Technical 

Conference and subsequent outreach 

provided some feedback on these issues. 

However, I am concerned that the limited 

participation from entities other than the 

RTOs/ISOs and non-traditional technologies 

undermines the record on which to base a 

change to our regulations. There are 

‘‘traditional’’ resources, such as pumpedstorage hydro and certain combustion turbine 

resources that provide this type of ‘‘fasterramping’’ service,4 but we have received only 

limited feedback from these types of 

resources so far. In addition, there may be 

proponents of new technologies that we have 

not heard from whose role with regard to 

frequency regulation may warrant a different 

change to our regulations than proposed in 

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 

Initiation of a Notice of Inquiry or Advanced 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking may better 

allow evidence regarding those technologies. 

Appropriately, the Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking asks questions to develop a more 

complete record. However, the nature of the 

questions posed is an indication that we 

should do more prior to issuing a specific 

proposal. While the Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking asks some generic questions in 

this regard, the majority fails to address the 

concerns already in the record about coVerDate Mar<15>2010 18:33 Feb 28, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\01MRP1.SGM 01MRP1

jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALSEP01MR11.009</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 40 / Tuesday, March 1, 2011 / Proposed Rules 11187 

5Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 38; EPSA 

June 16, 2010 Comments at 9–10; Southern 

Company Services, Inc. (Southern) June 16, 2010 

Comments at 6–8; Southern California Edison 

Company (SCE) June 16, 2010 Comments at 3. 

6Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 33; ISO–NE 

June 16, 2010 Comments at 5; EPSA June 16, 2010 

Comments at 6–8; XES June 16, 2010 Comments at 

5; Transcript at 15:13–15 (Potishnak); Transcript at 

18:18–25 and 19:1–5 (Ramey); Transcript at 23:18– 

25 and 24:1 (Pike); Transcript at 75:15–25 and 76:4 

(Pike); Transcript at 86:18–20 (Potishnak). 

7Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 33, n.51; 

ISO–NE June 16, 2010 Comments at 5; EPSA June 

16, 2010 Comments at 8–9; Transcript at 17:20–25 

(Ramey); Transcript at 73:4–16 (Ramey). 

8 ISO–NE June 16, 2010 Comments at 7–8; SCE 

June 16, 2010 Comments at 2,5; Southern June 16, 

2010 Comments at 3. 

9Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at P 13; SCE 

June 16, 2010 Comments at 3–4; CAISO June 16, 

2010 Comments at 1–2. 

optimization,5 sustainability 6 and potential 

limitations of faster-ramping resources.7

Moreover, I believe there is no basis to 

propose a single, one-size-fits-all approach 

for frequency regulation compensation. In 

fact, several commenters caution specifically 

against such an approach.8 In addition, I 

have concerns that the majority decision 

could detract from, or otherwise delay, efforts 

ongoing at the RTO/ISO stakeholder level.9

It is essential that this Commission address 

frequency regulation compensation to ensure 

appropriate compensation for service 

provided. Moreover, new technologies could 

offer substantial benefits. While I recognize 

the majority’s desire to move quickly, I 

believe it is more important to ‘‘measure 

twice, cut once.’’ Accordingly, I believe the 

Commission should have taken a preliminary 

step (such as the issuance of a Notice of 

Inquiry or Advanced Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking) before moving forward with the 

specific proposal in a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking. For these reasons, I respectfully 

dissent in part from this Order. 

Marc Spitzer, 

Commissioner. 

[FR Doc. 2011–4267 Filed 2–28–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Mine Safety and Health Administration 

30 CFR Part 75 

RIN 1219–AB75 

Examinations of Work Areas in 

Underground Coal Mines for Violations 

of Mandatory Health or Safety 

Standards 

AGENCY: Mine Safety and Health 

Administration, Labor. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of 

comment period. 

SUMMARY: The Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA) is extending 

the comment period on the proposed 

rule addressing Examinations of Work 

Areas in Underground Coal Mines for 

Violations of Mandatory Health or 

Safety Standards. It proposed revising 

MSHA requirements for preshift, 

supplemental, and on-shift, and weekly 

examinations of underground coal 

mines. This extension gives commenters 

an additional 30 days to comment on 

the proposed rule. 

DATES: The comment period for the 

proposed rule published December 27, 

2010, at 75 FR 81165, is extended. All 

comments must be received or 

postmarked by 12 midnight Eastern 

Daylight Savings Time, March 28, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: All submissions must be 

clearly identified and reference MSHA 

and RIN 1219–AB75. Comments may be 

submitted by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Electronic mail: zzMSHAcomments@dol.gov. Include ‘‘RIN 1219– 

AB75’’ in the subject line of the message. 

• Facsimile: (202) 693–9441. Include 

‘‘RIN 1219–AB75’’ in the subject line of 

the message. 

• Regular Mail: MSHA, Office of 

Standards, Regulations, and Variances, 

1100 Wilson Blvd., Room 2350, 

Arlington, Virginia 22209–3939. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: MSHA, 

Office of Standards, Regulations, and 

Variances, 1100 Wilson Blvd., Room 

2350, Arlington, Virginia 22209–3939. 

Sign in at the receptionist’s desk on the 

21st floor. 

MSHA will post all comments on the 

Internet without change, including any 

personal information provided. 

Comments can be accessed 

electronically at http://www.msha.gov 

under the ‘‘Rules & Regs’’ link. 

Comments may also be reviewed in 

person at the Office of Standards, 

Regulations, and Variances, 1100 

Wilson Boulevard, Room 2350, 

Arlington, Virginia. Sign in at the 

receptionist’s desk on the 21st floor. 

MSHA maintains a list that enables 

subscribers to receive e-mail notification 

when the Agency publishes rulemaking 

documents in the Federal Register. To 

subscribe, go to 

http://www.msha.gov/subscriptions/ 

subscribe.aspx. 

• Information Collection 

Requirements: Comments concerning 

the information collection requirements 

of this proposed rule must be clearly 

identified with ‘‘RIN 1219–AB75’’ and 

sent to both the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) and MSHA. 

Comments to OMB may be sent by mail 

addressed to the Office of Information 

and Regulatory Affairs, Office of 

Management and Budget, New 

Executive Office Building, 725 17th 

Street, NW., Washington, DC 20503, 

Attn: Desk Officer for MSHA. Comments 

to MSHA may be transmitted by any of 

the methods listed above in this section. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

December 27, 2010 (75 FR 81165), 

MSHA published a proposed rule, 

Examinations of Work Areas in 

Underground Coal Mines for Violations 

of Mandatory Health or Safety 

Standards. The proposal would require 

operators to examine for violations of 

mandatory health or safety standards in 

addition to hazardous conditions, and 

take corrective actions if violations are 

found. It would also require that 

operators review with mine examiners 

on a quarterly basis all citations and 

orders issued in areas where 

examinations are required. The proposal 

would require that underground coal 

mine operators find and fix violations of 

mandatory health or safety standards, 

thereby improving health and safety for 

miners. The proposed rule is available 

on MSHA’s Web site at http:// 

www.msha.gov/REGS/FEDREG/ 

PROPOSED/2010PROP/2010-32410.pdf. 

In response to a request from the 

public and to provide the opportunity 

for additional public participation in 

this rulemaking, MSHA is extending the 

comment period from February 25, 

2011, to March 28, 2011. All comments 

and supporting documentation must be 

received or postmarked by 12 midnight 

Eastern Daylight Savings Time, March 

28, 2011. 

Dated: February 24, 2011. 

Joseph A. Main, 

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety 

and Health. 

[FR Doc. 2011–4592 Filed 2–25–11; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4510–43–P 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS 

38 CFR Part 59 

RIN 2900–AN77 

Due Date of Initial Application 

Requirements for State Home 

Construction Grant 

AGENCY: Department of Veterans Affairs. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: This document proposes to 

amend the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA) regulation concerning the 

calendar date that VA must receive an 

initial application for a State Home 

Construction Grant in order for the 

application to be included on the 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with PROPOSALS