alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-05-166-CR

DOUGLAS RAY SMITH	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF WISE COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

	On April 6, 2005, appellant Douglas Ray Smith pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated.  Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Appellant was sentenced to 365 days’ confinement in the Wise County Correctional Facility; the trial court judge suspended the imposition of this sentence and placed Appellant on two years’ community supervision.  On that same day, the trial court entered its certification of Appellant’s right to appeal in accordance with Rule 25.2(a)(2).  Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).  The certification states that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” 

	On May 4, 2005, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.  We notified Appellant on May 10, 2005 that the certification indicating he had no right to appeal had been filed in this court and that this appeal would be dismissed unless Appellant or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3.  We have received no response to our notification. 

	Rule 25.2(a)(2) limits the right to appeal in a plea bargain case to those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or to those cases in which the appellant obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A), (B).  Appellant has not indicated that either of these exceptions apply in this case.  Therefore, in accordance with the trial court’s certification, we hold that Appellant has no right of appeal.

	Because Appellant has no right to appeal, we dismiss this appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f). 

							PER CURIAM 

PANEL D:	MCCOY, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and LIVINGSTON, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  June 16, 2005
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6802** 

KENDALL GREEN , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. SGT. D. ANDERSON, of Lee Correctional Institution; JON OZMINT, Director of SCDC; LT. RICHARDSON, SMU Security; MS. L. JOHNSON, Grievance Coordinator; MAJOR JAMES C. DEAN, Security Over Institution; WARDEN PADULA , Defendants

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston
. Cameron McGowan Currie , District Judge. ( 2:10

- cv - 03080

- CMC )

Submitted : September 27 , 2012 Decided: October 1, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Kendall Green, Appellant Pro Se. Edgar Lloyd Willcox, II, WILLCOX BUYCK & WILLIAMS, PA, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Kendall Green appeals the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint. We hav e reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. Green v. Anderson , No. 2:10

- cv - 03080

- CMC (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2012)
. We deny Green’s motion for a transcript at government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### SUBCHAPTER II—DEBTOR'S DUTIES AND BENEFITS
§ 17.6 Procedure and timing for emergency filing for public inspection. ( a ) Each agency requesting emergency filing for public inspection shall briefly describe the emergency and the benefits to be attributed to immediate public access. The request must be made by letter.
( b ) The Director of the Federal Register shall approve an emergency filing for public inspection request whenever the Director concurs with a request for that action and it is feasible.
( c ) Each document approved for emergency filing for public inspection shall be filed as soon as possible following processing and scheduling.
[54 FR 9680, Mar. 7, 1989]
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 512 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                          May 25, 2000.
    Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to 
consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 2559) to amend the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act to strengthen the safety net for agricultural 
producers by providing greater access to more affordable risk management tools 
and improved protection from production and income loss, to improve the 
efficiency and integrity of the Federal crop insurance program, and for other 
purposes. All points of order against the conference report and against its 
consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered as read.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
§ 166.1000 Who owns the records associated with this part? ( a ) Records are the property of the United States if they: ( 1 ) Are made or received by a tribe or tribal organization in the conduct of a federal trust function under 25 U.S.C. § 450f *et seq.,* including the operation of a trust program; and
( 2 ) Evidence the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities undertaken in the performance of a federal trust function under this part.
( b ) Records not covered by paragraph (a) of this section that are made or received by a tribe or tribal organization in the conduct of business with the Department of the Interior under this part are the property of the tribe.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated Balance Sheet of IENTERTAINMENT NETWORK, Inc. as of March 31, 2000
and the related Statement of Operations for the three month period ended March
31, 2000 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                    MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                                1,921
<SECURITIES>                                              0
<RECEIVABLES>                                           941
<ALLOWANCES>                                             34
<INVENTORY>                                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      3,100
<PP&E>                                                1,836
<DEPRECIATION>                                        1,036
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        6,829
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 1,700
<BONDS>                                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               1
<COMMON>                                              1,505
<OTHER-SE>                                            3,554
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          6,829
<SALES>                                                  10
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      1,555
<CGS>                                                    19
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         2,605
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        (20)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      (26)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (1,004)
<INCOME-TAX>                                              6
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (1,010)
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (1,010)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (0.07)


</TABLE>
### §1115. Property of the estate

(a) In a case in which the debtor is an individual, property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541—

(1) all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs first; and

(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs first.

(b) Except as provided in section 1104 or a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.

(Added Pub. L. 109–8, title III, §321(a)(1), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 94.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective 180 days after Apr. 20, 2005, and not applicable with respect to cases commenced under this title before such effective date, except as otherwise provided, see section 1501 of Pub. L. 109–8, set out as an Effective Date of 2005 Amendment note under section 101 of this title.
# C_2006290EN.01003201.xml

| 29.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 290/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 290/32

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4398 — Veolia Cargo/RAIL LINK/JV)

(2006/C 290/10)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 9 November 2006, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4398. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://ec.europa.eu/eur-lex/lex) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4398. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://ec.europa.eu/eur-lex/lex)

---
# C_2006261EN.01002002.xml

| 28.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 261/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 261/20

---

Action brought on 26 August 2006 — Budějovický Budvar v OHIM — Anheuser-Busch (BUD)

(Case T-225/06)

(2006/C 261/39)

Language in which the application was lodged: French

Parties

Applicant: Budějovický Budvar, národní podnik (České Budějovice, Czech Republic) (represented by: F. Fajgenbaum, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Anheuser-Busch Incorporated

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

| — | annul the contested decision of 14 June 2006 of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision of 14 June 2006 of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM;

| — | reject the application for registration of the word mark ‘BUD’ No 1 603 539 to designate goods in Classes 32 and 33; |
| --- | --- |

—

reject the application for registration of the word mark ‘BUD’ No 1 603 539 to designate goods in Classes 32 and 33;

| — | send the decision of the Court of First Instance to OHIM; |
| --- | --- |

—

send the decision of the Court of First Instance to OHIM;

| — | order Anheuser-Busch to pay all the costs and expenses. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Anheuser-Busch to pay all the costs and expenses.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: Anheuser-Busch Incorporated

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: Word mark ‘BUD’ for goods in Classes 32 and 33 — Application No 1 603 539

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The applicant

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: Protected designation of origin ‘BUD’ to designate beer

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Rejection of the opposition

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 62(1) of Regulation No 40/94 (1) and Article 20 of implementing Regulation No 2868/95 (2) in that the Board of Appeal is not competent to rule on the validity of the designation of origin invoked by the applicant in the context of its opposition. It also submits that the sign ‘BUD’ constitutes a designation of origin, protected in both France and Austria. The applicant moreover invokes misapplication of Article 8(4) of Regulation No 40/94 in that, in its view, the designation of origin ‘BUD’ is indeed a sign used in the course of trade.

Pleas in law:

1

2

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1)

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1)

2

---
### §774. Religious apparel: wearing while in uniform

(a) General Rule.—Except as provided under subsection (b), a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the member's armed force.

(b) Exceptions.—The Secretary concerned may prohibit the wearing of an item of religious apparel—

(1) in circumstances with respect to which the Secretary determines that the wearing of the item would interfere with the performance of the member's military duties; or

(2) if the Secretary determines, under regulations under subsection (c), that the item of apparel is not neat and conservative.

(c) Regulations.—The Secretary concerned shall prescribe regulations concerning the wearing of religious apparel by members of the armed forces under the Secretary's jurisdiction while the members are wearing the uniform. Such regulations shall be consistent with subsections (a) and (b).

(d) Religious Apparel Defined.—In this section, the term "religious apparel" means apparel the wearing of which is part of the observance of the religious faith practiced by the member.

(Added Pub. L. 100–180, div. A, title V, §508(a)(2), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1086.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 774 was renumbered section 776 of this title.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Regulations

Pub. L. 100–180, div. A, title V, §508(c), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1087, directed the Secretary concerned to prescribe the regulations required by subsec. (c) of this section not later than the end of the 120-day period beginning on Dec. 4, 1987.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

WIGENS ALEXANDRE
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 21

- 703

[ October 28, 2021 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Dina Keever

- Agrama , Judge; L.T. Case No.

21MH000221ANB

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jacqueline I. Kurland, Senior Assista nt Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

W ARNER
, L EVINE
, and K LINGENSMITH

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
### §8541. Function

There is a United States Naval Postgraduate School, the primary function of which is to provide advanced instruction and professional and technical education and research opportunities for commissioned officers of the naval service in—

(1) their practical and theoretical duties;

(2) the science, physics, and systems engineering of current and future naval warfare doctrine, operations, and systems; and

(3) the integration of naval operations and systems into joint, combined, and multinational operations.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 437, §7041; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title V, §523(a), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3244; renumbered §8541, Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title VIII, §807(c)(1), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 1836.)

| Revised section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 7041 | 34 U.S.C. 1076. | July 31, 1947, ch. 420, §1, 61 Stat. 705. |

The words "There is a" are substituted for the words "That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized and directed to establish the", as the Postgraduate School is in operation. The words "technical education" are substituted for the word "training" to describe more aptly the higher level of instruction at the Postgraduate School. The words "naval service" are substituted for the words "Regular Navy and Marine Corps and the reserve components thereof". The word "their" is substituted for the words "of commissioned officers".

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 8541, act Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 527, authorized President to assign regular and reserve Air Force officers to National Guard Bureau, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 103–337, div. A, title XVI, §1661(c)(2), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2982, effective Dec. 1, 1994. See section 10507 of this title.

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–232 renumbered section 7041 of this title as this section.

2006—Pub. L. 109–163 amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "There is a United States Naval Postgraduate School for the advanced instruction and technical education of commissioned officers of the naval service in their practical and theoretical duties."

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2018 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 115–232 effective Feb. 1, 2019, with provision for the coordination of amendments and special rule for certain redesignations, see section 800 of Pub. L. 115–232, set out as a note preceding section 3001 of this title.
No. 1294.

#### Mrs. Clara J. Mullen, wife, etc., vs. Zuberbier & Behan.

The Supreme Court lias no jurisdiction over a suit in nullity of a judgment rendered on an hypothecary action, when the amount, to pay which the property is sought to he subjeoi cd, does not exceed two thousand dollars.

The circumstance that the demand in nullity is coaled with a prayer for damages exceeding that sum, does not make the case appealable.

A PPEAL from the TweDty-fifth District Court, Parish of Lafayette. *i\ DeBaiUon,*J.

*L. L. Bourges*for Plaintiff and Appellant.

*Felix Voorldes & Son*for Defendants and Appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Bermudez, C. J.

This is a suit to annul a judgment. The complaint is, that the judgment was rendered without any citation issued to and served on the then defendant, but contradictorily with a curator *ad hoe,*whom the court was powerless to appoint and wiio could not represent her.

The suit in which the judgment complained of was rendered, had for its object the enforcement of a money judgment for five hundred and forty dollars and thirty-five cents ($540 85) by the hypothecary action. That judgment had been rendered against the party from whom the *889defendant; had acquired the property, and was recorded at the time of the transfer.

The action of nullity is therefore brought to relieve the property from, a claim which does not exceed $2000, the actual lower limit of our jurisdiction.

It is true that the plaintiff sues besides for $3000 damages, said to have been sustained in consequence of the judgment attacked, which it is said prevented plaintiff from selling the property, and also in attorney’s fees for bringing the present suit; but there is nothing to show that the judgment was executed and that injury was entailed in consequence.

The claim for damages clearly appears to have been made for the sole purpose of bringing the case within the jurisdiction of this Court; and, unfounded as it seems on the face of the papers, it must be deemed frivolous.

In the case of Young vs. Duncan, 39 Ann. 86, in which an attorney claimed a fee of $1500, with privilege on a judgment valued at more than $2000, the appeal was dismissed, the title to the judgment not being involved and the only question at issue being the value of the services of counsel and the existence *vel non*of the security claimed.

This Court could pass on the question of damages only after having annulled the judgment attacked.

Ttis tlieiefore ordered that the appeal herein be dismissed with costs.