NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ADAM PAUL BLOMDAHL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0655

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-000575-001

The Honorable Jennifer C. Ryan-Touhill, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Brian Coffman

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jennifer Roach

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 3-30-2021
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Adam Paul Blomdahl appeals his convictions and sentences 

for first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He raises 

issues related to his waiver of counsel and the superior court’s revocation 

of his self-representation at trial. Blomdahl also challenges the court’s jury 

instructions and its award of presentence incarceration credit. For the 

following reasons, we affirm Blomdahl’s convictions but award an 

additional eight days of presentence incarceration credit to the sentence 

imposed for the first-degree murder conviction (count 1). We also correct a 

non-substantive clerical error in the sentencing order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Blomdahl told his neighbor that he suspected the neighbor’s

adult daughter, G.G., had broken a window in his home. The following 

evening, Blomdahl pulled G.G. from her car to his driveway where he 

“started hitting her in the face, and . . . kicked her in the stomach[.]” 

Blomdahl stopped assaulting G.G. when her fiancé, D.P., approached. 

Blomdahl then left the driveway but returned with a gun. He shot G.G., 

D.P., and P.E., another neighbor. G.G. fell to the ground, but the three 

victims survived the shooting.

¶3 Blomdahl then got into his car. As G.G. attempted to stand, 

Blomdahl “drove right into her[,] . . . knock[ing] her down[.]” Blomdahl 

retreated and waited in his car until G.G. “start[ed] limping across the 

street” when he drove into her again, knocked her down, and drove over 

her. Blomdahl then backed up and “stopped his car right on top of [G.G.]” 

before speeding away.

¶4 G.G. survived but was unconscious. She was transported to 

a hospital where, a few days later, her mother made the decision to remove 

her from life support. G.G. died from multiple gunshot wounds and blunt 

force injuries.
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The State charged Blomdahl with first-degree murder and 

two counts of aggravated assault, all dangerous felonies. After three mental 

health experts subsequently evaluated Blomdahl, the superior court found 

he was competent to stand trial. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”) 11 (describing 

procedures for determining a criminal defendant’s competence to stand 

trial). Blomdahl eventually waived counsel and represented himself at 

trial. During opening statements, however, the superior court revoked 

Blomdahl’s self-representation and appointed his advisory counsel to 

represent him for the remainder of trial.

¶6 The jury found Blomdahl guilty as charged. At sentencing, 

the superior court imposed consecutive prison terms of life for the firstdegree murder conviction and twelve years each for the aggravated assault 

convictions. The court also awarded 1191 days of presentence incarceration 

credit and applied the credit to each prison term. Blomdahl timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Self-Representation

¶7 Attached to his motion seeking self-representation, Blomdahl 

included a copy of a letter he wrote to his lawyer in which he refers to 

“Hotel/motel receipts from Fidiciary [sic]” as among the evidentiary items 

he had previously requested and not yet received. Based on that reference, 

and “other fiduciary-related documents [that] were later filed in the 

record[,]” Blomdahl argues the superior court erred by accepting his waiver 

of counsel without considering that he had a fiduciary appointed by the 

Veteran’s Administration. According to Blomdahl, “[i]f an indigent person 

requires assistance to manage his finances, then he is unlikely to have the 

competency to utilize his right to self-representation[.]” See State v. Cornell, 

179 Ariz. 314, 324 (1994) (“[T]he law guarantees a defendant the right to 

waive counsel if he is mentally competent to do so.”) (citing Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)); State v. Ibeabuchi, 248 Ariz. 412, 416, ¶ 16

(App. 2020) (discussing Indiana v. Edwards, 545 U.S. 164 (2008), and how, 

compared to the competency required to stand trial, self-representation 

requires “more in the way of mental capacity”).

¶8 We reject Blomdahl’s argument. He cites no authority that 

requires a court to delve further into a defendant’s competency based solely 

on the defendant’s having a fiduciary or similar representative who assists

with managing his financial affairs. See State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152,
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

4

162 (1990) (the superior court has broad discretion in determining whether 

to order competency hearings). More importantly, Blomdahl refers to 

nothing in the record that indicates he lacked the requisite competency to 

represent himself. Indeed, the superior court expressly noted the 

heightened competency necessary for self-representation and nonetheless 

accepted Blomdahl’s waiver of counsel having found he did so knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily. The record supports that finding.

¶9 In addition to challenging the superior court’s decision to 

accept his waiver of counsel, Blomdahl argues the court erred in revoking

his self-representation. We review the decision to revoke a defendant’s selfrepresentation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hidalgo, 241 Ariz. 543, 554, 

¶ 44 (2017).

¶10 Revoking a defendant’s self-representation is permitted when 

the defendant fails to comply with court rules or orders. Id. In this case, 

just before opening statements commenced, the court verbally granted the 

State’s motion in limine and explained to Blomdahl he was prohibited from 

making certain statements to the jury, including that he was a war veteran. 

Nonetheless, during his opening statement that afternoon, Blomdahl told

the jury, “the defendant is a credible United States veteran.”

¶11 On appeal, Blomdahl concedes that he erred by making the

“veteran” comment, but he contends the error was not sufficiently severe 

to justify revoking his self-representation. We disagree.

¶12 When the superior court accepted Blomdahl’s waiver of 

counsel, it warned Blomdahl that he would be held to the same standards 

as an attorney, and his self-representation could be revoked if he failed to 

follow “court rules” and “courtroom procedure.” Indeed, the court 

repeated that warning when it sustained the State’s objection after 

Blomdahl began his opening statement by telling the jury that the State was 

“hiding something.” After the jury was excused from the courtroom, the 

court warned Blomdahl he was improperly referring to issues that had been 

litigated in this case. “The next step,” the court told Blomdahl, “will be 

advisory counsel will be your attorney.” Blomdahl then resumed his 

opening statement and informed the jury he was a veteran. The jury was 

once again excused from the courtroom to address the State’s objection. 

Recognizing the disruptive effect of Blomdahl’s apparent disregard for its 

rulings was having on the trial, the court remarked: “I am not going to send 

a jury in and out of the courtroom every time the defendant violates a court 

order. That will interfere and undermine the court’s ability to conduct this 

proceeding in an efficient and orderly manner.”
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 On this record, we cannot conclude the superior court abused 

its discretion by revoking Blomdahl’s self-representation. See State v. 

Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223, ¶¶ 14-15 (2012) (rejecting argument that “serious 

obstructionist conduct” required to justify revocation of defendant’s selfrepresentation and noting, “[a] defendant who proves himself incapable of 

abiding by the most basic rules of the court is not entitled to defend 

himself”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); State v. Whalen, 192 Ariz. 

103, 108 (App. 1997) (concluding revocation of defendant’s selfrepresentation was not error because the court provided defendant “clear, 

unambiguous, and timely warnings that he would lose the right to 

represent himself unless he was willing to follow [the court’s] order[s]”).

II. Right to Be Present

¶14 Blomdahl next argues the superior court violated his right to 

be present when, at a pretrial hearing, the superior court addressed several

of Blomdahl’s motions in his absence. Most of the motions concerned 

requests for discovery, which the court either granted, denied, or ordered 

Blomdahl to clarify.

¶15 “A criminal defendant generally has the right to be present in 

the courtroom during proceedings in his case.” Morehart v. Barton, 226 Ariz. 

510, 513, ¶ 13 (2011). A defendant can, however, voluntarily relinquish that 

right. A court may infer an absence is voluntary if the defendant had 

personal notice of the date and time of the proceeding, notice of the right to 

be present at it, and notice that the proceeding would continue in his

absence. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1. We review the superior court’s 

determination of voluntary absence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Reed, 

196 Ariz. 37, 38, ¶ 2 (App. 1999).

¶16 Here, as the hearing on Blomdahl’s motions began, he refused 

to be transported from custody. The court therefore found Blomdahl

waived his presence by voluntarily excusing himself. According to the 

record, Blomdahl had the requisite notice and warning for the court to 

properly infer under Rule 9.1. that his absence was voluntary. As Blomdahl 

concedes, he did not request a hearing or otherwise attempt to rebut the 

Rule 9.1 inference. See Reed, 196 Ariz. at 39, ¶ 3 (defendant has burden of 

rebutting the superior court’s inference of voluntary absence). The court 

did not abuse its discretion.

III. Jury Instructions

¶17 Blomdahl contends the superior court erred by denying his 

request for a jury instruction on manslaughter and negligent homicide as 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

6

lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder. See State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 

248, 251 (1983) (A lesser-included offense is an offense “composed solely of 

some but not all of the elements of the greater crime so that it is impossible 

to have committed the crime charged without having committed the lesser 

one.”).

¶18 We need not decide whether the court erred by refusing to 

give manslaughter and negligent homicide instructions because the court 

instructed the jury on second-degree murder as a lesser offense of firstdegree murder. By finding Blomdahl guilty of the charged offense, the 

jury—as instructed—did not consider second-degree murder and thus 

logically would not have considered manslaughter or negligent homicide, 

which are lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder. Accordingly, 

if the court erred by not instructing the jury on manslaughter or negligent 

homicide, the error was harmless. State v. Nelson, 229 Ariz. 180, 186, ¶ 24 

(2012); Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 174; State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 542-43 

(1989); see State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 456 (App. 1996) (“The general rule is 

that negligent homicide is a lesser-included offense of manslaughter and 

the only difference between the offenses is an accused’s mental state at the 

time of the incident.”).

IV. Presentence Incarceration Credit

¶19 Blomdahl argues the superior court should have credited him 

with an additional eight days of presentence incarceration credit for a total 

of 1199 days. In response, the State concedes Blomdahl was in pretrial 

custody for 1199 days and thus entitled to that amount of presentence 

incarceration credit. As the State notes, however, the superior court erred

by applying Blomdahl’s time-served credits to each of his consecutive 

sentences. See State v. McClure, 189 Ariz. 55, 57 (App. 1997) (“When 

consecutive sentences are imposed, a defendant is not entitled to 

presentence incarceration credit on more than one of those sentences, even 

if the defendant was in custody pursuant to all of the underlying charges 

prior to trial.”). Thus, although the court should have awarded eight days 

of credit to one sentence, the State argues Blomdahl ultimately was not 

prejudiced because he “received almost triple the amount of presentence 

incarceration to which he was entitled[.]”

¶20 We recognize that the court erred by crediting time-served to 

each sentence. But the State did not appeal and challenge that error, thus 

precluding our authority to correct it. See State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 286

(1990) (“In the absence of a timely appeal or cross-appeal by the state 

seeking to correct an illegally lenient sentence, an appellate court has no 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

7

subject matter jurisdiction to consider that issue.”). A too-lenient sentence 

that we cannot correct due to the State’s inaction, should not prohibit 

correction to a legally incorrect sentence that, by itself, is prejudicial.

¶21 The superior court was required to credit Blomdahl for “[a]ll 

time actually spent in custody[.]” A.R.S. § 13-712(B). By failing to include 

eight days that Blomdahl was in custody before he was sentenced, the court 

thus erred in awarding only 1191 days. We therefore vacate the 1191 days 

of presentence incarceration credited to the sentence for count 1, and award 

1199 days to that sentence. Lacking the jurisdiction to correct the errors in 

awarding presentence incarceration to the sentences in counts 2 and 3, we 

affirm those awards.

V. Sentencing Order

¶22 While this appeal was pending, Blomdahl filed a motion to 

transfer jurisdiction to correct a clerical error requesting jurisdiction be 

revested in the superior court to correct a statutory citation in the 

sentencing order. Specifically, the sentencing order incorrectly refers to 

A.R.S. § 13-751 in connection with Blomdahl’s sentence for first-degree 

murder. That statute applies to capital cases, not to cases such as this one 

in which the State did not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 

Compare A.R.S. § 13-751(A), with A.R.S. § 13-752(A).

¶23 This court has authority to correct clerical and similar errors 

in sentencing orders. See State v. Vandever, 211 Ariz. 206, 210, ¶ 16 (App. 

2005) (amending minute entry to show conviction was for a class 6, not class 

3, felony). Accordingly, having previously denied the motion, we amend

the sentencing order entered November 26, 2019, by replacing the reference

to A.R.S. § 13-751 with a reference to A.R.S. § 13-752.

¶24 Finally, Blomdahl personally filed an untitled forty-four-page

pleading with this court wherein he “[p]etition[s] the government for a 

redress of his grievances.” Blomdahl is represented by counsel on appeal; 

he is not entitled to hybrid representation. See State v. Dixon, 226 Ariz. 545, 

553, ¶ 39 (2011). We therefore summarily deny his request.
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

8

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm Blomdahl’s convictions. We amend the sentencing 

order to award an additional eight days of presentence credit only to the 

sentence imposed for count 1, and we correct a clerical error in the 

sentencing order. We otherwise affirm the sentences imposed.