COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

BRIAN KEITH STONE, A/K/A 

 ANTONIO STONE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0388-95-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MARCH 19, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 

Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge 

 Aubrey J. Rosser, Jr. for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

 brief), for appellee. 

 Brian Keith Stone was convicted in a bench trial of 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Stone contends 

that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he constructively 

possessed the contraband and that he intended to distribute it. 

We find that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the 

defendant's conviction. 

 On April 2, 1994, Deputies Ray Link and Ernest Powell of the 

Halifax County Sheriff's Office were patrolling a "high drug 

area" near a convenience store in Cody. Both deputies were in 

uniform and riding in a marked police car that Deputy Powell was 

driving. As they entered the convenience store parking lot, they 

observed two men run and jump into a Toyota pickup truck. The 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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defendant was driving the truck, and according to the deputies, 

he spun the truck's tires and exited the parking lot at a high 

rate of speed. Almost immediately after leaving the parking lot, 

the defendant crossed over a double-solid line into the left lane 

in order to pass another vehicle. 

 After witnessing the truck exit the parking lot, the 

deputies pursued the truck at speeds of seventy-five to eighty 

miles per hour. During the pursuit, the deputies observed Tort 

Dickerson, who was sitting in the passenger seat, throw a brown 

paper bag from the passenger window. The bag was later recovered 

at the side of the road and determined to contain several rocks 

of crack cocaine. 

 The defendant pulled the truck to the side of the road less 

than a mile away from the store where the pursuit began. The 

deputies ordered the defendant and Dickerson out of the truck, 

placed them on the ground, and searched them for weapons. Deputy 

Powell testified that both the defendant and Dickerson were 

cooperative. During a search of the truck, the deputies found 

loose crack cocaine under the passenger seat, and recovered a 

smoking device from a leather jacket located between the 

passenger's seat and driver's seat. 

 The defendant testified that he was alone when he entered 

the convenience store parking lot and that he met Dickerson at 

the store and agreed to give Dickerson a ride home. They left 

the store once, but returned so Dickerson could buy beer. The 
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defendant stated that he saw the police car across the street 

from the store and that he waited in the truck while Dickerson 

entered the store to buy beer. He denied that either he or 

Dickerson ran to the truck, and he also denied spinning the 

truck's wheels and driving at a high rate of speed. The 

defendant claimed that he did not observe Dickerson throw 

anything from the passenger window. 

 When the Commonwealth's case is based on circumstantial 

evidence, "all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent 

with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 

9 Va. App. 430, 440, 388 S.E.2d 659, 665 (1990) (quoting Inge v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)). On 

appeal, the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth and must be accorded all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The 

trial court's judgment will not be disturbed unless it "is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Id.

 The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knowingly 

exercised dominion and control over the drugs in order to sustain 

a conviction for possession. Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 

440, 447, 425 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1992). 

 "Although proof that cocaine is found [in a 

vehicle being operated by the defendant] is 
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insufficient, standing alone, to prove 

constructive possession, such evidence is 

probative of possession and is a circumstance 

which may be considered along with other 

evidence. While awareness is an essential 

ingredient in the crime of possession of 

narcotics, it may be proved by evidence of 

acts, declarations or conduct of the accused 

from which the inference may be fairly drawn 

that he knew of the existence of the 

narcotics in the place where they were 

found." 

Id. (quoting Wymer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 294, 300, 403 

S.E.2d 702, 706 (1991)). The defendant's conduct while operating 

an automobile where drugs are found may indicate that he knew 

about the drugs and exercised control over them. See Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 9-10, 421 S.E.2d 877, 882 (1992) (en

banc); Castaneda v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 574, 583, 376 S.E.2d 

82, 87 (1989) (en banc). 

 The defendant cites Pemberton v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 

651, 440 S.E.2d 420 (1994), in support of his contention that the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. In 

Pemberton, this Court held that the evidence was insufficient to 

support Pemberton's conviction for possession of cocaine even 

though he was standing three inches from a trash can where drugs 
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were found. The evidence showed that Pemberton "was `facing the 

trash can and rubbing his hands up and down both his pockets' on 

the outside." Id. at 652, 440 S.E.2d at 421. We held that the 

evidence failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence because "[t]he gestures by appellant were too 

attenuated to link his movement with the drugs in the trash can." 

Id. at 655, 440 S.E.2d at 423. 

 The facts in the present case are distinguishable from those 

in Pemberton. Here, both Deputy Link and Deputy Powell testified 

that as they pulled into the store parking lot, the defendant and 

Dickerson ran from the convenience store, which was located in an 

area known for drug distribution, to the truck. The defendant 

exited the parking lot at a high rate of speed and the deputies 

pursued the truck at speeds of seventy-five to eighty miles per 

hour for almost one mile. Deputy Powell testified that he 

activated the patrol car's emergency lights immediately after the 

defendant exited the parking lot, and although the defendant 

pulled over, he did so only after Dickerson had thrown the bag 

containing drugs out of the truck. 

 This evidence proves that the defendant and Dickerson sped 

away from the convenience store after deputies arrived at the 

scene and thereafter the defendant attempted to allude the 

deputies until Dickerson could dispose of or conceal the drugs. 

Cf. Castaneda, 7 Va. App. at 583, 376 S.E.2d at 87 (finding that 

the accused attempted to divert the police officer's attention 
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away from the backseat, where the drugs were hidden). 

Accordingly, the link between the defendant's actions and the 

drugs is not "too attenuated" to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he had knowledge that the drugs were present and that he was 

exercising dominion and control of them. Pemberton, 17 Va. App. 

at 655, 440 S.E.2d at 423. 

 Although the defendant testified that he waited for 

Dickerson in the truck and did not speed away after leaving the 

parking lot, the trial court was entitled to accept the deputies' 

testimony and infer that the defendant's testimony was intended 

to conceal his guilt. See Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 

842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981). We find that the defendant's 

actions, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

are sufficient to prove that he was aware of the drugs and 

exercised dominion and control over them. 

 The evidence is also sufficient to prove intent to 

distribute cocaine. Deputy Link, who qualified as an expert 

witness concerning narcotics, testified that the amount of 

cocaine recovered here totaled 4.5 grams and that this amount was 

consistent with sale as opposed to personal use. "Possession of 

a quantity greater than that ordinarily possessed for one's 

personal use may be sufficient to establish an intent to 

distribute it." Castaneda, 7 Va. App. at 584, 376 S.E.2d at 87. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction. 

Affirmed.