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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Merrimack

No. 2018-0332

RON L. BEAULIEU & COMPANY

v.

NEW HAMPSHIRE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY

Argued: April 18, 2019

Opinion Issued: June 25, 2019

Vanacore Law Office, of Concord (John G. Vanacore on the brief and 

orally), for the plaintiff.

Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Seth M. Zoracki, assistant 

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

HANTZ MARCONI, J. The plaintiff, Ron L. Beaulieu & Company, appeals 

an order by the Superior Court (Kissinger, J.) affirming an order of the New 

Hampshire Board of Accountancy. The Board suspended the plaintiff’s license 

to do business in New Hampshire for three years and imposed a $5,000 fine 

after concluding that the plaintiff committed professional misconduct by failing 

to retain work papers and records for five years and by failing to properly 

conduct auditing services for Tri-County Community Action Program (TCCAP)

from 2008-2011. We affirm.
2

The trial court recited the following facts. Ron Beaulieu is a licensed 

certified public accountant (CPA) in Maine who owns Ron L. Beaulieu & 

Company, which is licensed to do business in New Hampshire. TCCAP is a 

New Hampshire voluntary corporation registered as a charity with the 

Charitable Trusts Unit (CTU) of the Attorney General’s Office. TCCAP retained 

Beaulieu to provide auditing services for the agency from 2008 to 2011. Each 

year the plaintiff performed financial statement audits and compliance audits 

as of June 30.

In December 2012, the Attorney General received notice of serious 

financial problems at TCCAP and subsequently initiated an investigation. In 

January 2013, the plaintiff received a letter from a Special Trustee for TCCAP 

appointed by the Probate Court at the behest of the New Hampshire Attorney 

General advising it to “immediately place [its] insurance carriers on notice of 

potential claims from TCCAP based upon the audits and services [it] performed 

for TCCAP.” In July 2015, following the investigation, the Attorney General 

issued a report (Report) revealing that a number of factors contributed to 

TCCAP’s financial failure, including the plaintiff’s “incomplete and inaccurate 

reports” and failure “to detect or report internal control weaknesses and 

improper accounting procedures.”

The Board of Accountancy initiated an investigation after it became 

aware of allegations that the plaintiff had failed to properly conduct auditing 

services for TCCAP. See RSA 309-B:11, I (2015). The Board found that there 

was probable cause to commence a disciplinary proceeding, see RSA 309-B:12, 

I (2015), and held a hearing in April 2017 at which Beaulieu and Thomas 

Musgrave, a member of the Board who assisted with the investigation and was 

therefore recused from deliberating with the Board, testified. A number of 

exhibits, including the Report, were admitted into evidence, and the Board 

Chair stated the Board would give “weight to them as [it] deem[ed] appropriate.”

In July 2017, the Board issued its Final Decision and Order. In it, the 

Board unanimously concluded that New Hampshire Administrative Rule, 

Ac 404.03(g) required the plaintiff to keep all records related to the audits of 

TCCAP for a minimum of five years, and, therefore, its failure to “retain work 

papers and/or all records of [its] work file for all audits conducted of TCCAP” 

for a five-year period constituted professional misconduct. See N.H. Admin. R., 

Ac 404.03(g) (“A CPA shall ensure that the work product and the work papers 

created in the performance of an engagement for a client are retained for a 

minimum of 5 years after creation unless the CPA is required by law to retain 

such records for a longer period.”). The Board reasoned that after Beaulieu

received notice in January 2013 that TCCAP may file a claim, “at a minimum, 

he should have ensured that no records were destroyed, including but not 

limited to his work file, that recorded his notes documenting the basis for his

findings. . . . However, [Beaulieu] did not even ensure that the required work 
3

file [was retained] for three years [the time period he told the Board he thought

was applicable under federal law] as he himself conceded.”

The Board also unanimously concluded that the plaintiff “was in 

violation of . . . RSA 309-B:10, I-a(e) and/or (j) in that he committed 

professional misconduct in failing to properly conduct auditing services for 

TCCAP for fiscal years 2008 through 2011.” The Board noted that the 

plaintiff’s 2008 audit did not disclose the reason for a $1.6 million prior period 

adjustment, and that Beaulieu agreed at the hearing that the failure to include 

a disclosure was a mistake. The Board also found that the plaintiff’s 2011 

audit “misstated the financial condition of [TCCAP] resulting in over 

$516,000.00 of unfavorable prior period adjustment[s] for the FY 2012 audit, 

including [an] overstatement of cash of $460,000.00.” The Board stated that 

Beaulieu was “unable to explain” these “unfavorable periods of adjustments” at 

the hearing. The Board also noted that the subsequent auditor identified more 

than twenty “material weaknesses specifically related to the findings of systems 

of internal controls of the agency,” and therefore the plaintiff’s “audit finding 

that TCCAP was low risk for those years was inaccurate.” Finally, the Board 

referred to a statement in the Report about TCCAP’s financial failure which 

indicated that the plaintiff prepared incomplete and inaccurate reports and 

otherwise failed to detect certain issues with TCCAP’s internal controls and 

accounting procedures. The Board unanimously voted to impose sanctions 

including a three-year license suspension and a $5,000 fine. The Board 

subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider, stay, and dismiss 

charges of misconduct.

The plaintiff appealed to the superior court. See RSA 309-B:12, X (2015)

(allowing a person or firm adversely affected by a Board order entered after a 

hearing to appeal by filing a written petition with the superior court). It

argued, among other things, that the Board misinterpreted the relevant 

statutes and administrative rules related to record retention, that the Board’s 

conclusions regarding the quality of its audit work were unreasonable or 

unlawful, and that the Board unlawfully shifted to the plaintiff the burden of 

proving that it had not engaged in professional misconduct. The court affirmed 

those portions of the Board’s order at issue in this appeal and this appeal 

followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that RSA 309-B:19 (2015) and 

Ac 404.03(g), when properly interpreted, require retention of client records for

five years but do not “define a retention period for auditors’ proprietary Audit 

Work Papers.” Alternatively, it asserts that if Ac 404.03(g) does apply to 

auditor work papers, the rule is unlawful because it adds to the statute and 

therefore exceeds the Board’s rulemaking authority. It also contends that the 

court lacked “substantial evidence” demonstrating that the 2008-2011 audits 

of TCCAP constituted professional misconduct because the Board had to 
4

identify “facts which constitute professional misconduct,” and not just rely 

upon conclusions in the Report which, it asserts, was not admitted into 

evidence. The plaintiff contends that no other evidence supports the 

conclusion that it committed professional misconduct. It further asserts that

the Board, in stating that “[t]here was insufficient evidence, if any, submitted 

by [the plaintiff] to rebut [evidence of professional misconduct],” erred as a 

matter of law because it improperly shifted the burden of proof.

RSA 309-B:12, X specifies that the superior court reviews an appeal 

brought under the statute “pursuant to the procedures and standards of RSA 

541.” RSA 309-B:12, X. Therefore, the superior court — having chosen not to 

exercise its right to order a trial de novo — was obligated to treat the factual 

findings of the Board as prima facie lawful and reasonable and could not set 

aside its decision absent unreasonableness or an identified error of law. RSA 

541:13 (2007). The superior court’s task was not to determine whether it 

would have found differently or to reweigh the evidence, but rather to 

determine whether the findings were supported by competent evidence in the 

record. Appeal of Dell, 140 N.H. 484, 498 (1995).

RSA 309-B:12, X does not specify a standard for us to apply when 

reviewing appeals of the superior court’s decision. Therefore, as we have in 

other cases where the superior court has deferentially reviewed a decision of an 

administrative board, we will uphold the superior court’s decision unless it is 

unsupported by the evidence or is legally erroneous. See Dietz v. Town of 

Tuftonboro, 171 N.H. 614, 618 (2019) (applying standard in appeal of trial

court review of zoning board decision); Ltd. Editions Properties v. Town of 

Hebron, 162 N.H. 488, 491 (2011) (applying standard in appeal of trial court 

review of planning board decision). At the same time, we review interpretations 

of both statutes and administrative rules de novo. See Appeal of Cole, 171 

N.H. 403, 412 (2018).

We use the same principles of construction when interpreting both 

statutes and administrative rules. Bach v. N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 169 N.H. 87, 

92 (2016). In construing rules, as in construing statutes, where possible we 

ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. We interpret 

intent from the statute or rule as written and will not consider what the 

enacting body might have said or add language that the enacting body did not 

see fit to include. See Appeal of New England Police Benevolent Ass’n, 171 

N.H. 490, 493 (2018).

With these principles in mind, we first consider the plaintiff’s arguments 

regarding the applicable retention period for auditing work papers. Although 

Ac 404.03 is titled “Retention of Client Records,” the plain text of the rule 

refutes the plaintiff’s argument that the five-year retention period therein

applies solely to client records and not audit work papers. Although the rule 
5

does not define “work papers,” it recognizes that not all “work papers” are part 

of the client’s records. See N.H. Admin. R., Ac. 404.03(e) (“Work papers 

considered part of the client’s records shall include but not be limited to . . . .”); 

N.H. Admin. R., Ac 404.03(f) (“Work papers developed by the CPA . . . which do 

not result in changes to the client’s records, or are not in themselves part of 

the records ordinarily maintained by such clients, shall be solely the CPA’s 

work papers and shall not be the property of the client.”). The rule then 

establishes a five-year retention period for “work papers,” without reference to 

whether those work papers are part of a client’s records: “A CPA shall ensure 

that the work product and the work papers created in the performance of an 

engagement for a client are retained for a minimum of 5 years after creation 

. . . .” N.H. Admin. R., Ac. 404.03(g) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we reject 

the plaintiff’s contention that the rule’s five-year retention period applies to 

client records but not work papers other than client’s records because the 

plaintiff’s interpretation adds language to the rule that the enacting body did 

not see fit to include. See Police Benevolent Ass’n, 171 N.H. at 493.

The plaintiff next argues that if the rule applies to licensee work papers, 

it impermissibly adds to the statute it was intended to implement. It is well 

settled that the legislature may delegate to administrative agencies the power to 

promulgate rules necessary for the proper execution of the laws. Appeal of 

Mays, 161 N.H. 470, 473 (2011). The authority to promulgate rules and 

regulations is designed to permit the Board only to fill in the details to 

effectuate the purpose of the statute. Id. Thus, administrative rules may not 

add to, detract from, or modify the statute that they are intended to implement. 

Id. To discern whether Ac 404.03(g) constitutes a proper exercise of the 

Board’s rule-making authority, we first look to the intended scope of the rulemaking power granted by the legislature to the Board, and the purpose of the 

Accountancy Act of 1999. Id. In so doing, we review the plain language of the 

statute at issue, RSA 309-B:19, in the context of other statutes relevant to the 

Board’s statutorily prescribed authority. Id. at 473-74.

The stated purpose of the Accountancy Act of 1999, RSA chapter 309-B, 

is “to promote the reliability of information that is used for guidance in 

financial transactions or for accounting for or assessing the financial status or 

performance of commercial, non-commercial, and governmental enterprises.” 

RSA 309-B:2 (2015). The Act as a whole regulates the practice of public 

accounting and comprises a certification or licensing system for that 

profession, including public accountants, CPAs, and CPA firms. Mays, 161 

N.H. at 474. For example, the Act sets forth required qualifications for 

licensees, see, e.g., RSA 309-B:5 (2015), and lists unlawful acts pertaining to 

the practice of public accounting, see RSA 309-B:14 (Supp. 2018).

The legislature charged the Board with the “responsibility for the 

administration and enforcement of” RSA chapter 309-B. RSA 309-B:4, I 
6

(2015). The legislature also required the Board to adopt rules “governing [the 

Board’s] administration, the enforcement of [RSA chapter 309-B] and the 

conduct of licensees.” RSA 309-B:4, VIII (2015). The Act identifies numerous 

specific areas in which the Board is to adopt rules, including “[r]ules for 

records retention.” RSA 309-B:4, VIII(k). Thus, the Act gives the Board 

authority to “fill in the details” with respect to records retention requirements.

In analyzing whether Ac 404.03(g) is within the lawful bounds of that 

authority, we note that RSA chapter 309-B does not specify a record retention 

requirement but acknowledges that other applicable statutes may impose such

a requirement on licensees. See RSA 309-B:19, III. By choosing not to specify 

a durational requirement for records retention, while simultaneously delegating 

to the Board the responsibility and authority to adopt “[r]ules for records 

retention,” RSA 309-B:4, VIII(k), the legislature left the creation of a record 

retention requirement entirely to the Board and left significant room for the 

Board to “fill in the details.” Mays, 161 N.H. at 475 (highlighting legislature’s 

use of “open-ended language” in delegating authority to the Board to fill in 

details of applicable statute). In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that 

the five-year record retention requirement in Ac 404.03(g) exceeds the Board’s 

broad authority to promulgate such rules. RSA 309-B:4, VIII(k); Mays, 161 

N.H. at 475.

Ac 404.03(g) required the plaintiff to “ensure that the work product and 

the work papers created in the performance of an engagement for a client are 

retained for a minimum of 5 years after creation.” N.H. Admin. R., Ac

404.03(g). However Beaulieu conceded that the firm did not ensure retention 

of its work files for even three years. Accordingly, we find no basis to reverse 

the conclusion that the plaintiff committed professional misconduct by “failing 

to retain work papers and/or all records of his work file for all audits 

conducted of TCCAP,” for a period of five years in violation of RSA 309-B:10, 

I-a(g) and/or (j) and Ac 404.03(g).

We next consider whether the court erred in affirming the Board’s 

conclusion that Beaulieu’s auditing work for TCCAP from 2008 through 2011 

constituted professional misconduct. The trial court, in reviewing the Board’s 

decision, had to accept the Board’s factual findings as “prima facie lawful and 

reasonable,” RSA 541:13, and then determine whether those findings were 

supported by competent evidence in the record. Dell, 140 N.H. at 498. The 

court concluded that the plaintiff had “failed to establish[] it was unreasonable 

or unlawful for the Board to find that the plaintiff committed professional 

misconduct by failing to properly conduct auditing services.” The court noted 

that the Board “describe[d] in detail the facts relied upon in support of its 

finding of professional misconduct,” and further noted that “the Board relied 

not only on the Report produced following the investigation [of TCCAP], but 

also on Mr. Beaulieu’s own testimony at the hearing.” The court observed that 
7

five of the seven members of the Board hold CPA certificates, see RSA 309-B:4, 

I(a), and that professionals are expected to recognize conduct constituting 

unprofessional conduct within their profession. See In the Matter of 

Bloomfield, 166 N.H. 475, 481-82 (2014).

The plaintiff argues that the superior court erred because it “merely 

repeated the Board’s rationale that the Report’s conclusions, which had been 

excluded from evidence, were sufficient, despite the lack of supporting facts, to 

warrant a finding of professional misconduct.” We disagree.

The trial court correctly noted that the Board admitted the entire Report 

into evidence at the hearing, and that it had the authority to do so. See RSA 

309-B:12, VI (2015) (“In a hearing under this section, the board shall not be 

bound by the technical rules of evidence.”); N.H. Admin. R., Ac 210.04(b) (“All 

data that will reasonably assist the board arrive at the truth shall be 

admissible, except that irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence 

shall be excluded.”); Ruel v. N.H. Real Estate Appraiser Bd., 163 N.H. 34, 45 

(2011) (administrative agencies have broad discretion in determining the 

admissibility of evidence). Moreover, the Board relied on Beaulieu’s own 

testimony in addition to the Report in concluding the plaintiff had committed 

professional misconduct. Beaulieu testified that he could not recall the reason 

for the $1.6 million prior period adjustment from the 2008 TCCAP audit and 

conceded it was a “mistake on my part” to not have required TCCAP to provide 

an “additional disclosure in the notes.” With regard to the $516,000 

unfavorable prior period adjustment that the 2012 auditor made to the 

plaintiff’s 2011 audit of TCCAP, Beaulieu testified that he stood by the 

accuracy of the numbers in his audit, but that he had “no idea” as to the 

reason for the adjustment because he had not “looked at those on an 

individual adjustment-by-adjustment basis.” He also testified that his firm did 

not keep records of when it deleted files and that it had no system to back up 

files. Therefore, we conclude competent evidence in the record supports the 

finding that the plaintiff committed professional misconduct in connection with 

its audit of TCCAP.

Finally, the plaintiff argues, based on the portion of the Board’s order 

that states that “[t]here was insufficient evidence, if any, submitted by [the 

plaintiff] to rebut [evidence of professional misconduct],” that the Board 

unlawfully shifted the burden of proof. However, as the trial court correctly 

noted, RSA 309-B:12, III (2015) expressly permits a licensee to present 

evidence and witnesses on the licensee’s behalf. Therefore, it was not improper 

for the Board to note that the plaintiff had not rebutted the evidence which 

demonstrated that it engaged in professional misconduct. See Lisbon School 

Committee v. Lisbon Ed. Ass'n, 438 A.2d 239, 243 (Me. 1981).

Any remaining arguments raised by the plaintiff are either not preserved,

because the plaintiff did not raise them before the Board in its motion for 
8

reconsideration or otherwise, see RSA 541:3, :4 (2007); Appeal of Coffey, 144 

N.H. 531, 533 (1999), or do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 

137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

LYNN, C.J., and HICKS and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.