www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 1 

S

ince the mid-1990s, China’s military modernization has focused on 

deterring Taiwan independence and preparing for a military response if 

deterrence fails. Given China’s assumption of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan 

conflict, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing military 

capabilities to deter, delay, and disrupt U.S. military support operations. The 2008 

election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, however, has contributed to improved 

cross-strait economic and political cooperation and dramatically reduced the 

threat of Taiwan independence and war across the Taiwan Strait. Cooperation 

has included full restoration of direct shipping, flights, and mail across the strait, 

Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly, regularized cross-strait 

negotiation mechanisms that have already reached several agreements, and the 

recent signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.1

This decreased cross-strait tension and tentative rapprochement have 

raised the prospect of fundamental changes in China’s security challenges. 

If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan sustain this positive 

cooperation over the next 5 to 10 years and continue to deepen rapprochement, how would this affect regional stability, China’s diplomatic grand strategy, and China’s military modernization? Other analysts have examined the 

implications of an ultimate political resolution to the Taiwan issue, but this 

paper analyzes the implications of deeper cross-strait rapprochement, a much 

more likely scenario over the next 5 to 10 years.2

 This deeper rapprochement would probably not resolve the issue of Taiwan’s political status, but 

would greatly reduce the chances that the PRC would use force. Sustained 

cross-strait stability would make the Taiwan issue less important in Chinese 

Getting Beyond Taiwan?

Chinese Foreign Policy and 

PLA Modernization 

by Michael A. Glosny

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Center for Strategi

c

ReSEARCH

About the Author

Michael A. Glosny is an Instructor 

in the National Security Affairs 

Department at the Naval 

Postgraduate School and an Adjunct 

Senior Research Fellow in the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University. 

Key Points

◆ Deeper rapprochement across the 

Taiwan Strait would remove a 

longstanding source of regional 

tension and the most likely source 

of war between the United States 

and China.

◆ Cross-strait rapprochement would 

also lead to new frictions and 

new worries among regional 

countries and the United States 

that a China no longer focused 

on Taiwan will use its increased 

power to challenge their interests 

elsewhere in Asia.

◆ Stabilizing the cross-strait 

political situation will free up 

resources previously devoted to 

military preparations for Taiwan 

contingencies and allow the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

to undertake new missions and 

reassess priorities. 

◆ The direction of PLA modernization can help alleviate or further 

exacerbate the concerns about a 

rising China that will become more 

powerful but also less constrained 

by Taiwan.

January 2011
2 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

domestic politics and much less prominent in China’s 

relations with others. This could occur as a result of 

a peace agreement or through a series of cooperative 

measures by both sides that put the relationship on 

a course toward peaceful resolution. Experts devote 

a great detail of attention to scenarios of crisis and 

conflict in the Taiwan Strait, but the implications of 

deeper cross-strait cooperation also deserve analytical 

attention. This discussion of potential future implications of deeper cross-strait rapprochement is speculative in nature.

Deeper rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait 

would clearly be a positive development. It would remove the most likely source of war between the United 

States and China, or at least greatly reduce the chances 

of such a war breaking out over the Taiwan issue. China 

would also no longer need to issue threats or conduct 

coercive military exercises to intimidate Taiwan. These 

provocative acts often undermined regional stability, damaged China’s relations with Asian countries, 

and led to concerns about China’s future intentions. 

As any deeper rapprochement would include a clearer 

understanding about Taiwan’s international space, the 

United States and other Asian countries would welcome the removal of the irritant of Beijing’s sensitivity and angry responses to interactions with Taiwan. 

Sustained cross-strait stability would also remove the 

“nightmare scenario” in which regional countries might 

have to choose whether to support the United States 

or China in the event of a war over Taiwan. For China, 

deeper rapprochement would remove a political threat 

to the regime and make it easier to manage relations 

with Washington and with Asian countries. In military 

China’s integration into the world 

economy and expanding interests 

are already leading to new pressures 

to take on some additional missions

terms, cross-strait rapprochement would also remove 

concerns about Taiwan being used by outside powers 

as a potential base to exert strategic pressure on China 

and make it easier for China to break out of the first 

island chain.

Stability across the Taiwan Strait, however, would 

not remove all concerns that a rising China might destabilize the region. Analysts have not fully considered 

the new challenges that deep rapprochement would 

produce in China’s relations with Asia and the United 

States. Asian countries would be relieved, but many 

would worry that a rising China no longer constrained 

by a focus on Taiwan would use its increased power to 

challenge their interests elsewhere in Asia. The United 

States would have similar concerns about an unconstrained China challenging its interests and would face 

demands for enhanced, credible defense commitments 

from regional countries. 

Former U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley 

referred to Taiwan as “the cork in China’s bottle.”3

Deeper rapprochement will remove the cork, freeing 

resources devoted to military preparations for Taiwan 

contingencies and giving the PLA new options. China’s potential choices for its military modernization 

include: relaxed modernization, domestic and continental concerns, antiaccess focus, assertive pursuit of 

regional maritime claims, and extra-regional activities. 

China’s integration into the world economy and expanding interests are already leading to new pressures 

to take on some additional missions, but deeper rapprochement will likely lead to a more thorough evaluation of the proper mix of roles and missions for the 

PLA. The direction of PLA modernization and how 

China uses its military can help alleviate or further 

exacerbate international concerns about a rising China that will become more powerful, but also less constrained by Taiwan.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, it briefly lays 

out China’s overall grand strategy. Then, it analyzes the 

new challenges and difficulties that China will face in 

its relations with the region and the United States as a 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 3 

result of stable cross-strait relations. Third, it briefly discusses the potential choices for PLA modernization after 

deeper rapprochement provides more resources and new 

options. Lastly, it offers conclusions.

China’s Grand Strategy and 

Military Modernization

Through cooperation and attempts to demonstrate its benign intentions, China’s grand strategy of 

reassurance aims to prevent the formation of balancing 

coalitions as China rises. For China’s leaders, the next 

5 to 10 years correspond to the important “period of 

strategic opportunity” (zhanlüe jiyuqi) for China’s economic modernization and development during which 

the leadership hopes to focus its efforts on building a 

“moderately well-off society” (xiaokang shehui).4 During this “period of strategic opportunity,” China’s grand 

strategy is focused on maintaining a peaceful and stable 

international environment that will allow it to increase 

China’s “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli), 

focus on economic modernization and development, 

and rise to great power status. 

Scholars have characterized this grand strategy in 

different terms, but this paper suggests that China’s 

grand strategy should best be conceptualized as one 

of reassurance.5 The goal of this diplomatic strategy is 

to prevent complications in China’s international environment that may distract attention from this focus 

on development and force China to divert resources 

to deal with external challenges. For a rising China, 

the goal is to increase power and influence without 

provoking a balancing coalition. In implementing this 

grand strategy of reassurance, China will continue to 

cooperate with major powers and regional powers in 

an effort to demonstrate that it has benign intentions 

and to show that as it gets more powerful it will not 

threaten the interests of these countries, but will use its 

increased power to help protect those interests. China 

is trying to convince the United States and the region 

that its increasing power will actually provide these 

countries with new opportunities to benefit as well, 

China will continue to cooperate 

with major powers and regional 

powers in an effort to demonstrate 

that it has benign intentions and to 

show that as it gets more powerful 

it will not threaten the interests of 

these countries

and rather than a “zero-sum” outcome, the rise of 

China can and will produce “win-win” (shuangying)

outcomes.

Some may argue that if China continues its rise 

for the next 5 to 10 years, the government will likely 

shift its grand strategy. However, any fundamental 

change in China’s grand strategy will likely only occur after fundamental reassessments of key Chinese 

judgments about the international environment and 

China’s international position—including the “trend 

of the times” (shidai zhuti), “international structure” 

(guoji geju), and China’s “orientation” (dingwei).6 As 

these judgments are unlikely to fundamentally shift 

during this period, China’s grand strategy of reassurance will likely endure in general, though China may 

become more assertive on certain issues. Moreover, as 

China will remain focused on economic modernization and increasing power, Chinese experts argue that 

deeper cross-strait rapprochement would not lead to a 

shift in grand strategy.7

Although the broad contours of China’s grand 

strategy have not changed substantially in the last decade, and are not likely to in the next 5 to 10 years, 

China’s deeper embrace of globalization and engagement with the world are leading to new challenges and 

pressures for its foreign and security policy. China’s 

economic integration and increased global activism 

have led to an unprecedented expansion of national 

interests. As new actors and new interests have become more prominent in China’s global engagement, 
4 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

coordinating and managing foreign affairs has become 

much more difficult.8

 Recent diplomatic meetings 

(such as the summer 2006 Foreign Affairs Work Conference and the 2009 Ambassadorial Meeting) have 

addressed how to manage these expanding overseas 

interests (haiwai liyi).9

These expanding interests have also created new 

requirements for the military to protect these national 

interests. As part of implementing the “New Historic 

Missions,” which were first outlined in 2004, Hu Jintao 

has tasked the PLA to prepare to conduct “diversified 

military tasks” (duoyanghua junshi renwu) and develop an 

improved capability to conduct “non-war military operations” (feizhanzheng junshi huodong).10 These new formulations highlight the continued importance of domestic 

operations to maintain regime security, social stability, 

and border security, but they also include a new emphasis on international operations such as peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, and military diplomacy that are 

designed to protect China’s expanding global interests. 

No matter how the cross-strait political situation develops, new pressures on the PLA to take on a more diverse 

set of missions are likely to continue, but if deeper rapprochement is achieved, the PLA will be able to conduct 

a more comprehensive review of the proper mix of roles 

and missions. 

China’s Relations with Asia

Regional states worry that a more powerful China, 

especially one no longer constrained by a focus on the 

Taiwan issue, may pursue new opportunities to expand 

its regional power and influence at their expense. Although they have taken notice of China’s rapid post–

Cold War military modernization, Asian countries have 

been somewhat reassured that these efforts have been focused on preventing Taiwan independence and coercing 

Taiwan. Many Asian officials, while still expressing concerns about the long-term implications of PLA modernization, believe that China is not likely to launch a significant challenge to their interests in the short term if the 

Taiwan issue, China’s first priority, remains unresolved.11

If cross-strait relations continue to improve, however, 

a rising, unconstrained China will produce heightened 

concerns among regional countries that China may turn 

its attention to them next. These worries will be further 

exacerbated because much of the force structure developed to deter Taiwanese independence and complicate 

U.S. intervention could be transferred for use in other 

regional contingencies.12

If China was no longer constrained by its focus 

on Taiwan, it could undermine regional stability and 

challenge the interests of countries in the region. 

Maritime Southeast Asian states would worry that 

China might seize the Spratly Islands, given China’s 

expansive South China Sea claims, potential energy 

reserves, and the importance for sea lines of communications (SLOCs). China might try to seize the 

Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands or aggressively challenge 

Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims. India 

would worry that China might take a tougher stance 

on unresolved land border disputes. Russia would fear 

that an unrestrained China could mount an aggressive 

move into the Russian Far East, both to reclaim territory and to try to seize energy resources in Siberia. 

A more powerful and less constrained China might 

abrogate recent territorial agreements with India, 

Russia, and Vietnam and try to reclaim historic territories once it is stronger. Improved Chinese naval 

capabilities could also provoke worries that it may try 

to threaten SLOCs in the western Pacific, South China Sea, or Indian Ocean to pressure other countries; 

although they have taken notice of 

China’s rapid post–Cold War military 

modernization, Asian countries 

have been somewhat reassured that 

these efforts have been focused on 

preventing Taiwan independence 

and coercing Taiwan 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 5 

many Asian countries worry about this possibility as 

China’s modernization continues.13 

Some Chinese rhetoric, new developments in military doctrine, and recent assertive behavior in the region 

show that Asian countries have reason to be concerned 

about the potential threat from a rising, unconstrained 

China. Fudan University Professor Shen Dingli famously commented on what China might do after settling 

the Taiwan issue. In a 2002 interview with the New York 

Times, he said, “Once the Taiwan front is closed, we may 

turn to the South China Sea,” adding that beyond the 

South China Sea, “we have a third issue to resolve [the 

Diaoyutai Islands].”14 Although this statement is not official PRC government policy, several Asian officials and 

experts have invoked Shen’s statement and comments 

from other Chinese officials and scholars that have led to 

suspicions about China’s long-term intentions.15

There is already evidence of PLA preparations for 

potential operations in the East China Sea and South 

China Sea, including exercises that appear aimed at 

such contingencies. The 2006 version of the Science of 

Campaigns [Zhanyixue] included a new type of naval 

campaign called “attacks against coral islands and reefs” 

(dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi) that the PLA must 

prepare to fight.16 Another book from a regional PLA 

institution refers to “large-scale island attack operations” (daxing daoyu jingong zuozhan) as an important 

combat operation.17

Recent evidence of Chinese assertiveness and willingness to challenge the interests of regional countries 

highlights the potential future threat from China. Examples have included patrols by submarines, survey 

ships, and surface combatants in Japan’s EEZ and territorial waters, as well as near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. China has tried to strengthen its maritime claims 

in the South China Sea through patrols and intimidation of oil companies that have tried to operate in the 

area. China has also challenged Indian claims to disputed territory.18 If China is willing to take such actions 

while it is still somewhat dissatisfied with the progress 

in cross-strait reconciliation and worried about the possibility of the Democratic Progressive Party returning 

to office and pushing Taiwan independence, an unconstrained China might be even more likely to directly 

challenge regional powers.

Regional countries have certainly followed PLA 

modernization in recent years, but China’s focus on Taiwan has meant that modernization efforts have not been 

seen as an imminent threat to the countries of the region. 

After cross-strait rapprochement, continued military 

modernization will force Asian countries to be much 

more attentive and vigilant. In the next 5 to 10 years, 

weaknesses in power projection capability will place limits on the threat China can pose to the region, but regional countries will not only devote greater attention to 

the acquisition of new capabilities but also closely monitor PLA training, deployments, and doctrine. 

To date, regional states have been reluctant to pressure China to explain its skyrocketing defense budget 

and defense modernization plans. The removal of the 

Taiwan issue, however, will make regional countries 

more likely to demand such explanations, as well as 

greater military transparency. This is likely to make 

China’s relations with its neighbors more acrimonious 

and make it more difficult to reassure them that it has 

peaceful and cooperative intentions.

Potential threats from a rising, unconstrained 

China will likely force the United States to clarify its 

defense commitments to regional allies and friends. 

American allies and friends are likely to press for 

regional countries have certainly 

followed PLA modernization 

in recent years, but China’s 

focus on Taiwan has meant that 

modernization efforts have not been 

seen as an imminent threat to the 

countries of the region 
6 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

clearer commitments in the South China Sea and 

East China Sea, areas where U.S. commitments have 

been limited and sometimes ambiguous. In the face of 

China’s rising power and a global diffusion of power, these states are likely to ask the United States to 

make these commitments more credible. If worries 

about China cause a strengthened U.S. commitment 

to the region and strengthened defense ties between 

the United States and Asian countries, this will complicate China’s security environment, damage China’s 

relations with its neighbors, and potentially unleash 

spirals of hostility. 

If the U.S. response to demands for a clearer commitment to the region is insufficient, or if its commitments are no longer seen as credible, this could have 

various implications for China. If America’s alliances 

weaken or collapse and the United States reduces its 

presence in Asia, this could greatly improve China’s international environment as it would face several weaker 

powers that may have difficulty cooperating to oppose 

it. On the other hand, this could also lead to an independent Japan that acquires nuclear weapons and 

devotes more resources to military modernization. Regional powers, even without cooperation with Washington, are powerful enough to complicate China’s 

international environment, especially if they work together to prevent China’s dominance.

China’s Relations with the 

United States

The most important consequence of a sustained 

cross-strait rapprochement is the removal of the most 

likely source of war between the United States and 

China. Alan Romberg writes, “It is hard to conjure 

up a scenario that would pit the PLA against another 

major power, including the United States, in all-out 

conflict other than one relating to Taiwan.”19 Stability across the Taiwan Strait, however, will not necessarily ensure smooth U.S.-China relations. The deeper 

structural issues between a declining hegemon and a 

rising power will remain. Historical experience has 

shown that these shifting power dynamics often lead 

to friction, competition, and conflict. These structural 

pressures may drive the United States and China into 

competition over spheres of influence, relative status, 

and regional hegemony.20

Although conflict is not structurally determined, a 

rising China no longer constrained by a focus on Taiwan will produce similar concerns for American leaders about where China will focus its attention next.21

China could use its increased military power and enhanced leverage to attempt to break apart America’s 

regional alliance network. American leaders would 

worry that China might try not only to drive U.S. 

forces away from China’s coastal waters, but also to 

push the United States out of East Asia. China might 

also devote significant resources to wage a global battle 

for military and political influence around the world. 

In the face of a wide range of potential threats from a 

rising, unconstrained China, the United States would 

likely need to reexamine how it defines its interests 

in East Asia and decide what commitments to make 

and with what degree of clarity. Although appeasement has taken on a bad name, the United States will 

likely need to begin to consider the relative costs and 

merits of adjusting some of its policies, in the form 

of either burden-sharing or reducing commitments. 

In the face of a rising autocratic China, U.S. leaders should also consider which interests in the region 

in the face of a wide range of 

potential threats from a rising, 

unconstrained China, the United 

States would likely need to 

reexamine how it defines its 

interests in East Asia and decide 

what commitments to make and 

with what degree of clarity
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 7 

are nonnegotiable and worth responding to potential 

Chinese challenges with great vigilance. 

How the Taiwan issue is resolved will also affect 

Sino-U.S. relations. Cliff and Shlapak argue that “almost 

any type of peaceful resolution implies that subsequent 

relations between the United States and China will be 

cooperative and peaceful.”22 This is generally correct, but 

China’s perception of the U.S. role in either facilitating 

or obstructing this deepening rapprochement will affect 

the future of bilateral relations and Beijing’s perception 

of the United States. If the United States is seen as helpful or neutral in this process, then U.S.-China relations 

will likely be relatively positive. If China perceives Washington as having worked to obstruct rapprochement, this 

could damage relations and produce a more competitive 

bilateral relationship. There is already deep suspicion in 

China that despite U.S. official support for “peaceful 

resolution,” the United States will never accept unification.23 Some PRC scholars and think tank researchers 

view the 2008 and 2010 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as 

especially provocative because they are seen as part of an 

effort to derail cross-strait rapprochement. If China believes that the United States tried to obstruct cross-strait 

reconciliation, this would be seen as further evidence that 

the true U.S. intentions are to split (fenhua) and weaken 

China, which would likely lead to a more contentious 

bilateral relationship. The PRC’s perception of the U.S. 

role in cross-strait rapprochement is likely to affect the 

state of U.S.-China relations both during and after the 

resolution of Taiwan’s status. 

New Options for 

PLA Modernization

Deepening cross-strait rapprochement is beginning to reduce the centrality of Taiwan contingencies in 

PLA modernization. If the cross-strait rapprochement 

continues to deepen, China will have the opportunity to 

consider new options and mixes of forces as it continues 

its military modernization. Mark Cozad argues, “Resolution of the Taiwan issue would certainly clear the way for 

an expanding review of the PLA’s missions.”24 According 

to Nancy Tucker, “Unification could release a significant 

percentage of China’s resources. The PLA would be free 

to change its priorities, redeploy its forces, and reconceptualize its strategic objectives.”25 These authors have 

analyzed the implications of political resolution of the 

Taiwan issue, but the deeper cross-strait rapprochement 

discussed in this article will also likely reduce the PLA’s 

need to focus on Taiwan contingencies and will allow the 

PLA to adjust its mix of missions and forces.26 This section briefly describes five different options for China’s 

future military modernization. Each involves changes 

in PLA capabilities, Chinese behavior, or both. Some of 

these options are not mutually exclusive. To a limited extent, the PLA has already begun to conduct some of the 

missions contained in these five options, and no matter 

what happens with Taiwan, there will be pressure to take 

on more of these missions. However, a sustained period 

of cross-strait stability will likely lead to a deeper reassessment of the relative priority placed on these missions 

and free up resources to make larger investments in moving down one or more of these modernization paths. 

Option 1: Relaxed Modernization. After the crossstrait situation stabilizes, China could adopt a more relaxed approach to military modernization, allowing the 

annual military budget to grow, but by a much smaller 

percentage than it has recently. Eminent PLA expert Ellis Joffe argued, “Without Taiwan as the driving force, 

the scope and pace of the future build-up might be reduced.”27 Deeper rapprochement will produce a new 

“guns versus butter” debate inside China, and the civilian 

leadership may decide to divert resources toward domestic issues as part of a “peace dividend.” China’s leaders 

traditional missions such as internal 

security, border security, and 

defense of maritime claims will 

require continued investments in 

manpower, training, and equipment
8 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

may see a stronger connection between reduced defense 

spending and regime security; after the Taiwan issue has 

improved substantially, the regime may conclude its security and legitimacy would be enhanced by diverting 

resources away from the military and toward addressing 

China’s many difficult economic and social problems. 

Traditional missions such as internal security, border 

security, and defense of maritime claims will require continued investments in manpower, training, and equipment. Demands to protect China’s overseas interests as 

part of its “New Historic Missions” will also drive improvements in the PLA’s ability to project limited power overseas and participate in peacekeeping operations 

(PKOs), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/

DR), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), 

as well as provide public goods. There would no longer be 

a need, however, to develop capabilities to coerce Taiwan 

or develop robust antiaccess capabilities to defeat U.S. 

intervention. The rapid buildup of submarines, cruise 

missiles, fighters, and cyber warfare would likely slow as 

well. China would also be relatively restrained in using 

its military capabilities in a coercive manner. The overall 

picture in this scenario is one of continued military modernization, but at a much slower pace.

In a “post-Taiwan” world, there will likely be powerful domestic forces supporting cuts in the defense budget. As a result of the immense social, economic, and 

political problems China is currently facing, Susan Shirk 

argues that “a subterranean ‘guns vs. butter’ debate is beginning among the policy elite.”28 Stability across the 

Taiwan Strait would remove the imminent threat of Taiwan independence, which Chinese hardliners have used 

to justify rapid military modernization. After deeper rapprochement, the PLA would be forced to make different arguments for why high levels of defense spending 

should continue. Slowing the growth of the defense budget and diverting resources to address growing domestic 

challenges would have many domestic supporters.29

Relaxed modernization would also have military 

and domestic benefits. Civilian experts and PLA officers recognize that building a force designed to protect 

global SLOCs, vie for regional dominance, or project 

power around the globe with multiple aircraft carrier 

battle groups requires a huge financial investment. Such 

missions would be costly and also strain China’s diplomatic relations and complicate its international environment as this type of modernization would make 

China more threatening. A more moderate military 

modernization would be less expensive and also serve 

China’s diplomatic interest in keeping friendly and 

cooperative relations with important countries in the 

region. It would likely take a strong civilian leader to 

reduce defense spending, as he would face opposition 

from both the PLA and political opponents trying to 

portray him as weak on defense. Relaxed modernization is not the most probable future trajectory for the 

PLA, but continued high levels of defense spending 

might come under new domestic pressure if the need to 

prepare for Taiwan contingencies disappears.

Option 2: Domestic and Continental Concerns.

30

Although much commentary on recent developments 

in the PLA emphasizes the new international activities 

and missions, maintaining internal stability and regime 

security will continue to be the PLA’s most important 

tasking. After the achievement of deeper rapprochement and the reduced importance of Taiwan contingencies, China may decide to devote more resources to 

strengthen the PLA’s capabilities to respond to domestic security threats and potential threats around China’s 

after the achievement of deeper 

rapprochement and the reduced 

importance of Taiwan contingencies, 

China may decide to devote more 

resources to strengthen the PLA’s 

capabilities to respond to domestic 

security threats and potential threats 

around China’s land borders
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 9 

land borders. There is an important domestic component to official PLA discussions of the “new historic 

missions” and “non-war military operations” that could 

become even more important over time.31 The leadership may conclude that strengthening China’s domestic 

coercive capacity would be the best way to strengthen 

regime security and legitimacy.

China faces several potential threats to its security 

internally and on its land borders. As unbalanced economic development continues, the dangers of economic 

instability and political instability are prominent concerns for the regime. The Chinese military would be responsible for maintaining order and stability in the face 

of large-scale mass protests. Recent uprisings in Xinjiang 

and Tibet have reminded the leadership that disaffected 

ethnic and religious minorities could undermine regime 

legitimacy and must be swiftly controlled and repressed. 

The PLA must also maintain border security, and many 

PLA analysts worry about the potential for instability in 

neighboring regions spilling into China.32 Some analysts 

highlight that as a continental power, China must not 

lose sight of potential threats from Russia and India.33

Preparation for this range of missions, in addition to the 

PLA’s role in domestic disaster relief operations, will require substantial resources, and the PLA could decide to 

prioritize these domestic and continental concerns. 

If China decides to prioritize domestic and continental security in its future modernization, investments 

in international military activities and operations will 

likely continue as interests expand, but even after crossstrait deeper rapprochement, these investments would 

only increase slowly. There would be increased investments in capabilities to maintain control on China’s 

borders and in the face of potential large-scale riots. An 

open question for this modernization option is whether 

there would be a change in the division of labor between 

local police forces, the People’s Armed Police, and the 

PLA. Currently, these other forces play the leading role, 

with the PLA serving as the “last line of defense.”34

Option 3: Antiaccess Focus. A third choice for 

the PLA would be to focus on developing antiaccess 

capabilities and preventing hostile military forces from 

operating near China’s coast or in its EEZ. In recent 

years, China’s antiaccess strategy has been associated 

with complicating U.S. wartime intervention to enable 

China to defeat Taiwan, but antiaccess is a much broader 

concept.35 It can include preventing an adversary from 

operating in the air and sea area around a country and 

can extend to peacetime as well as wartime. Increased 

attention to antiaccess will require changes in the way 

the PLA operates. It would likely require much more 

aggressive peacetime air and sea challenges to surveillance operations near China’s coast and in its EEZ in an 

effort to deter these activities, or at least push them farther away from China’s coast. Moreover, if China wants 

to deter such activities and be prepared to quickly meet 

such challenges, it will need more aggressive patrols of 

the sea and airspace of China’s EEZ. Some of these activities are already occurring, with the EP–3 and USNS 

Impeccable incident as examples, but a focus on antiaccess 

would include a much more aggressive posture and require greater investments.36 

Although some assets that were focused on Taiwan 

could be diverted to antiaccess operations, this antiaccess 

focus would also include demands for new capabilities. 

The PLA would require a greater number of surface 

ships to be able to challenge maritime incursions, and it 

would need an aggressive building campaign to be able 

to sustain around-the-clock patrols of its EEZ to keep 

potential challengers out. More aircraft would be needed 

to maintain a strong presence in the sky as well. Chinese 

investments in aerial refueling could enable the PLA to 

in recent years, China’s antiaccess 

strategy has been associated 

with complicating U.S. wartime 

intervention to enable China to 

defeat Taiwan, but antiaccess is a 

much broader concept
10 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

maintain aerial patrols with fewer airplanes. The PLA 

will also need to improve its logistics and maintenance 

capabilities, as well as develop a new training regimen, 

to enable sustained naval and air operations. To prevent 

submarine incursions in its EEZ and territorial waters, 

China would also need to strengthen its antisubmarine 

warfare capabilities. Continued development of cruise 

missiles, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiship 

ballistic missiles (ASBMs) would likely continue. These 

assets would be less useful, however, in deterring or responding to peacetime incursions.

These antiaccess capabilities could also enable 

some limited offensive operations. If China wanted 

to extend its antiaccess capabilities to deter or disrupt 

third party intervention during a potential seizure of 

islands in the East China Sea or South China Sea, 

however, this would require a significant investment in 

capabilities. This type of operation would require much 

greater antiaccess and power projection capabilities 

than those in support of operations against Taiwan. 

To be prepared for the intervention of a third party, 

China would need to deny or restrict the ability of 

others to project power in defense of the island. This 

would require a combination of surface ships, airplanes, 

and submarines operating far from Chinese ports to 

limit the effectiveness of such an intervention. Cruise 

missiles, SAMs, and ASBMs could also be required, 

but depending on the area, they would have insufficient 

range. Moreover, China will need power projection 

capabilities to attack, seize, and hold islands, which 

would require a significant investment of capabilities 

given the long-range requirements of such operations. 

Option 4: Assertive Pursuit of Regional Maritime 

Claims. If the Taiwan mission becomes less central, 

the PLA could adopt a posture geared toward pursuit 

of regional maritime claims in the East China Sea and 

South China Sea. This includes at least the ability to defend maritime claims, and could also include the ability 

to seize and control disputed islands. This mission requires the procurement of more surface combatants with 

advanced air defense capabilities, which would enable 

these ships to operate beyond the reach of land-based 

airpower. Surface combatants would need to respond to 

any detected challenges by other countries to China’s 

maritime claims and likely require patrols of the areas 

surrounding the disputed islands to deny others from 

seizing the islands or its resources. Greater numbers of 

fighters with extended range or helicopters could also 

help to deter challenges to China’s maritime claims and 

chase potential challengers away. Naval and air patrols 

aimed at deterring or preventing other countries from 

operating in the surrounding area would also strengthen 

Chinese claims to disputed areas and weaken the claims 

of other countries. 

The ability not only to more aggressively defend 

maritime claims and prevent challenges but also to be 

able to seize and occupy disputed islands would require 

substantial increases in regional power projection capabilities. In addition to the naval and air force elements to 

maintain sea and air control, requirements will include 

enhanced combat lift and expeditionary capability. Projecting sustained combat power to the disputed territories of the East China Sea and South China Sea would 

require a significant increase in resources.

In addition to capabilities, the biggest change in this 

defense posture is in deployment patterns. In recent years, 

the PLA has increasingly operated naval and air assets 

out in the region, but such a posture would require it to 

do this on a more sustained basis. Moreover, the posture 

implies much more assertive and aggressive patrolling 

of these disputed areas and more assertive challenges 

the ability not only to more 

aggressively defend maritime claims 

and prevent challenges but also 

to be able to seize and occupy 

disputed islands would require 

substantial increases in regional 

power projection capabilities
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 11 

to the navies and fishing vessels of other countries operating near these disputed areas. The PLA has begun 

to pay more attention to defense of maritime claims 

and maritime rights and interests, but a more assertive 

pursuit of these aims would require investments in forces 

and changes in operations. 

Option 5: Extra-regional Activities. This option is the 

broadest and least well defined. The capabilities required 

to implement it depend on the types of military operations 

and activities envisioned. Constructive and cooperative 

missions such as PKOs, HA/DR, NEOs, antiterrorism, 

and antipiracy are within this category, with the PLA’s deployment of surface ships to the Gulf of Aden to assist 

in antipiracy efforts as an example. These are part of the 

“New Historic Missions” dictated by Hu Jintao, and most 

of these types of operations give China an opportunity to 

demonstrate that it is a force for peace and stability and a 

“responsible stakeholder.” Constructive extra-regional activities also include military diplomacy efforts such as port 

visits and joint exercises. 

This modernization option, however, could also include more assertive power projection missions that undermine international peace and stability and provoke 

deeper suspicion about a rising China. Projecting capabilities outside of East Asia could allow China to threaten or pressure other countries in its own form of “gunboat diplomacy.” If China tries to develop global SLOC 

defense capabilities, many of these capabilities could also 

be used to threaten or interdict the key SLOCs for other 

countries as well. These capabilities could allow China to 

extend its sphere of influence into the Indian Ocean and 

beyond, potentially challenging important areas of U.S. 

and European influence.

Given that sustaining extra-regional military operations will likely require improved logistical support, 

many have focused on whether China is trying to establish overseas bases. Based on a 2005 report commissioned 

by the Department of Defense, many have begun to refer 

to China’s improved relations with and assistance in developing port facilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, 

Thailand, and Sri Lanka as a “string of pearls” strategy 

that will enable China to project military power in South 

Asia and the Middle East. Although these reports of establishing military bases are usually exaggerated, there 

is some evidence that the antipiracy deployments in the 

Gulf of Aden are pushing some within China to begin to 

consider the need for overseas supply facilities and bases. 

In February 2009, Air Force Colonel Dai Xu began his 

call for bases by asking rhetorically, “Can one supply ship 

allow two combat ships to provide long-term escort for 

the commercial ships of the world?” Colonel Dai went 

on to say that establishing “Chinese ‘bases on the high 

seas’” (yuanyang jidi) is a logical extension of this thinking.37 In a December 2009 interview on Chinese television focused on the Gulf of Aden deployments, retired 

Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo offered his views on the potential utility of overseas bases. He highlighted that the 

decision rested with the central government but that “if 

China wanted to have a relatively stable and fixed supply 

and repair and maintenance base [buji xiuzheng jidi], I 

think that would be appropriate.”38

The Chinese Ministry of National Defense immediately ruled out the establishment of overseas naval 

bases, and Rear Admiral Yin argued that foreign media 

exaggerated his original statement, repeating that the 

decision rested with the central government and denying rumors that China was building overseas bases.39

Although the government has been very vocal in denying these rumors, there appear to be the beginnings of a 

debate over whether China needs some improved overseas supply and logistics capability. If China increases its 

focus on extra-regional activities, either constructive or 

there is some evidence that the 

antipiracy deployments in the Gulf 

of Aden are pushing some within 

China to begin to consider the 

need for overseas supply facilities 

and bases
12 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

aggressive, it will need to improve its ability to project 

power far away from China and sustain such operations. 

The required changes in capability will depend on 

the types of extra-regional activities China wants to be 

able to conduct, how long it hopes to sustain its power 

projection, and how permissible an environment China 

needs to be able to operate in. At a minimum, any increased focus on extra-regional activities will require investments in lift capacity, replenishment, and refueling. 

Operating out of the region for short duration during 

peacetime, such as for port visits, will not require too 

great an investment in resources. Fighting long-duration 

wars far from China will require huge investments in 

logistics and combat power. The need to project limited 

combat power for relatively short duration is less demanding and would require smaller investments in capabilities. The size of investment, types of power projection 

forces developed, and how these forces are used are the 

major issues that will distinguish which of these types of 

extra-regional activities China focuses on. 

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the implications of a 

deeper cross-strait rapprochement for regional stability, China’s foreign policy, and PLA modernization. As 

other analysts have pointed out, cross-strait rapprochement would be a positive development as it would remove a longstanding source of regional tension and the 

most likely source of war between the United States 

and China. However, this would also produce new challenges in China’s relations with Asia and the United 

States. Asian countries have certainly paid attention to 

China’s military modernization over the last two decades, but the focus of this modernization on Taiwan 

contingencies as the number one priority has made this 

threat less imminent. Once China no longer needs to 

focus on the Taiwan issue, many Asian countries will 

perceive the rise of China as a more imminent threat 

and will worry that it might challenge their interests 

next. The United States and China will continue to deal 

with the structural contradictions of the ongoing power 

transition. The United States, moreover, will have similar concerns as the rest of Asia concerning the potential 

for a rising, unconstrained China to challenge its interests in Asia and elsewhere.

Stability across the Taiwan Strait will also allow 

China to make different choices in its military modernization and alter the mix of its military forces. New 

pressures as a result of China’s deeper international engagement and expanding interests have already begun 

pushing the PLA to adopt a more diversified set of 

missions. These pressures to diversify will likely continue even if cross-strait relations deteriorate, but deeper 

cross-strait rapprochement would free up resources 

and provide an opportunity for a different mix of roles 

and missions. 

This paper introduced five potential options for 

future PLA modernization over the next 5 to 10 years: 

relaxed modernization, domestic and continental concerns, antiaccess focus, assertive pursuit of regional 

maritime claims, and extra-regional activities. Although “relaxed modernization” is probably the least 

likely trajectory, the potential for a new “guns versus butter” debate in China is underappreciated. The 

PLA will have to make new arguments that do not 

focus on Taiwan to continue to receive high budgets 

after Taiwan becomes less central; the “new historic 

missions” have become the basis for these new arguments. Domestic and continental concerns will remain 

important, but unless there are several major riots or 

incidents, this mission will not likely become the focus 

of PLA modernization, especially as it does not require 

once China no longer needs to 

focus on the Taiwan issue, many 

Asian countries will perceive the 

rise of China as a more imminent 

threat and will worry that it might 

challenge their interests next
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 13 

expensive force structure. The most likely future trajectory is a combination of limited investments in antiaccess focus, assertive pursuit of regional maritime 

claims, and extra-regional activities, without China 

“picking” one. Changes in China’s external environment, such as other regional states trying to seize disputed territory or an increased need to operate out of 

area, could push the PLA in one direction. But absent 

that, the PLA will continue to face pressures to execute 

each mission and will likely develop some capability to 

execute all of these missions at the same time. 

Over the next 5 to 10 years, as China’s rise continues, other states are likely to become more worried 

about the possibility of a threatening China, which 

will make China’s grand strategy of reassurance more 

difficult to implement successfully. For Asia and the 

United States, deeper rapprochement across the strait 

will remove one major problem but will also add a new 

layer of apprehension and concern about China’s future behavior on top of the existing uncertainties. The 

direction of China’s military modernization and the 

new mix of forces and missions can help alleviate these 

concerns about a rising, unconstrained China, or it can 

further exacerbate them. If China is restrained in how 

it modernizes and employs its military, such as through 

relaxed modernization, focus on constructive and cooperative regional and extra-regional activities, or a combination of limited investments in the other options, 

China’s reassurance may alleviate some of these worries 

and help maintain a stable international environment. 

If it follows a more assertive course in PLA modernization, and makes significant investments in antiaccess, 

assertive pursuit of regional maritime claims, or aggressive extra-regional activities, China will help make 

potential concerns become realities and likely trigger 

strong countervailing balancing responses from the 

United States and the region. The most threatening 

course for the United States and region would be if 

China simultaneously made significant investments in 

all three areas. A more aggressive course for PLA modernization will undermine China’s reassurance strategy 

by making it more difficult to credibly demonstrate 

China’s benign intentions. 

Notes

1 For a review of these developments, see Alan D. Romberg, 

“Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy, Now the Hard,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 28 (Spring 2009); and Bonnie S. Glaser, Building 

Trust across the Taiwan Strait: A Role for Military Confidence-building 

Measures (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2010).

2 For earlier analysis of the implications of resolution of the 

Taiwan issue, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses 

Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly

25, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 15–28; Roger Cliff and David A. Shlapak, 

U.S.-China Relations after Resolution of Taiwan’s Status (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2007); and Andrew Scobell, “How China Manages 

Taiwan and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Roy Kamphausen, 

David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions 

Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2009), 29–38.

3 Tucker, 22.

4 At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) leadership formally declared the first 20 years of the 

21st century to be a period of strategic opportunity that needed to be 

effectively grasped. For more on the diplomatic aspects of this report, 

see Chu Shulong, “Quanmian Jianshe Xiaokang Shiqi de Zhongguo Waijiao Zhanlue” [“China’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Period 

of Building a Well-off Society in an All-around Way”], Shijie Jingji 

yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 8 (2003), 8–13; and 

Shi Yinhong, “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi de Zhanlue Jiyu he ruogan 

Jiben Tiaojian” [“The Strategic Opportunity of China’s Peaceful Rise 

and Several Fundamental Conditions”], Guoji Guancha [International 

Survey], no. 3 (2004), 22–23, 26. 

5 The official characterization is one of a strategy of peaceful 

development (heping fazhan). For the official white paper, see 

“China’s Peaceful Development Road” (Beijing: Information Office 

of the State Council, December 2005). For analysis of China’s 

grand strategy, see Huang Renwei, The Time and Space for China’s 

Rise [Zhongguo Jueqi de Shijian he Kongjian] (Shanghai: Shanghai 

Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2003); Ye Zicheng, China’s 

Grand Strategy: Important Issues and Strategic Choices for China in 

Becoming a World Great Power [Daguo DaZhanlue: Zhongguo Chengwei Shijie Daguo de Zhuyao Wenti ji Zhanlue Xuanze] (Beijing: 

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2003); Yan Xuetong 

et al., “Pen Discussions on ‘The Rise of Great Powers and China’s 

Choices’” [“Daguo de Jueqi yu Zhongguo de Xuanze” Bitan], 

Social Sciences in China [Zhongguo Shehui Kexue], vol. 5 (2004), 

51–63. For a thorough English-language analysis of China’s grand 

strategy, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand 

Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University 

Press, 2005); and Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting 

China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2000).

6 On the importance of these assessments for Chinese foreign 

policy, see Wang Jisi, “International Relations Theory and the Study 

of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective,” in Chinese Foreign 

Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 481–505; and David 

Finkelstein, “China Reconsiders Its National Security: The ‘Great 

Peace and Development Debate’ of 1999,” CNA Regional Assessment, December 2000.

7 Author’s interviews, Beijing, spring 2010.
14 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

8 For discussions of the background and drivers of these expanding interests, see Men Honghua, “Zhongguo Guojia Zhanlue Liyi de 

Tuozhan” [“The Expansion of China’s National Strategic Interests”], 

Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Management], no. 2 (2003), 83–89; 

Wang Yizhou, “Heping Fazhan Jieduan de Guojia Anquan” [“National Security during the Stage of Peaceful Development”], Shijie 

Zhishi [World Affairs], no. 23 (2006), 48–51, and Su Changhe, “Lun 

Zhongguo Haiwai Liyi” [“On China’s Overseas Interests”], Shijie 

Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 8 (2009), 13–20. 

For analysis of expanding interests in a military context, see Wang 

Lidong, Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun [On China’s National Maritime 

Interests] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2007); and Yang 

Mingshu, chief ed., Haishang Tongdao Anquan yu Guoji Hezuo [SLOC 

Security and International Cooperation] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 

2005). See also Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy 

Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 26, September 2010. 

9 See Bonnie S. Glaser, “Ensuring the ‘Go Abroad’ Policy Serves 

China’s Domestic Priorities,” China Brief, May 9, 2007; and Bonnie S. 

Glaser and Benjamin Dooley, “China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference Signals Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy,” China Brief, 

November 4, 2009.

10 Hu Jintao first laid out these missions in a December 24, 2004, 

speech and they were repeated in the 2006 and 2008 Defense White 

Papers. These tasks include “providing an important source of strength 

for consolidating the ruling position of the CCP, providing a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development, providing a strong strategic support for 

safeguarding national interests, and playing a major role in maintaining 

world peace and promoting common development.” For authoritative 

Chinese-language analysis, see Song Guocai, Shi Limin, and Yang Shu, 

chief ed., Feizhanzheng Junshi Xingdong Shili Yanjiu [Case Studies on 

Non-War Military Operations] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 

2009); Shou Xiaosong and Xu Jingnian, chief eds., Jundui Yingdui Feichuantong Anquan Weixie Yanjiu [Research on the Military’s Responses to 

Nontraditional Security Threats] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2009); 

Wang Mingwu et al., chief eds., Feizhanzheng Junshi Xingdong [NonWar Military Operations] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2006); 

and Xiao Tianliang, Junshi Liliang de Feizhanzheng Yunyong [Non-War 

Uses for Military Power] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2009). 

For English-language analysis, see Daniel M. Hartnett, “The PLA’s 

Domestic and Foreign Activities and Orientation,” testimony before 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 4, 

2009; James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor, No. 27, Winter 2009; and 

Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell. For analysis of how the PLA is trying 

to balance traditional combat missions and these newer nontraditional 

missions, see Michael S. Chase and Kristen Gunness, “The PLA’s Multiple Military Tasks: Prioritizing Combat Operations and Developing 

MOOTW Capabilities,” China Brief, January 21, 2010.

11 Three Asia experts similarly argue that “Asian elites regard 

China’s military buildup as primarily aimed at Taiwan but harbor a 

residual wariness about China’s long-term intentions.” See Ellen L. 

Frost, James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising 

Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy,” INSS Strategic Forum 

231(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 

2008). Robert Sutter similarly argues that “Some [Asian countries] 

worry, for example, that a resolution of the Taiwan issue, now the 

focal point of a large-scale Chinese military build-up, would see the 

Chinese military focus shift to remaining territorial claims, notably 

in the South China Sea.” See Robert Sutter, “China’s Rise, Southeast 

Asia, and the United States: Is a China-centered Order Marginalizing 

the United States?” in China, the United States, and Southeast Asia: 

Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics, ed. Evelyn 

Goh and Sheldon Simon (London: Routledge, 2008), 95.

12 For other similar assessments, see Michael A. Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s 

Policy towards Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2, no. 1 (2006), 24–57; 

and Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang, eds., In China’s 

Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military 

Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998). Judgments are also 

based on author’s interviews with Asian embassy officials in Beijing in 

2005 and 2006.

13 For discussions of these concerns, see Pollack and Yang; 

Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Engaging China: The 

Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999); 

David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); and Kevin Cooney 

and Yoichiro Sato, eds., The Rise of China and International Security: 

America and Asia Respond (New York: Routledge, 2009).

14 Craig Smith, “China Reshaping Military to Toughen its 

Muscle in the Region,” The New York Times, October 16, 2002. Other 

Western analysts have voiced similar concerns. According to one 

Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, “Resolution of the Taiwan issue 

may lead China’s leaders to move on to the last remaining territorial 

disputes in the East and South China Sea.” See Mark Cozad, “China’s 

Regional Power Projection: Prospects for Future Missions in the 

South and East China Seas,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, 304.

15 Author’s interviews, Beijing, spring 2006.

16 Zhang Yuliang, chief ed., Zhanyi Xue [The Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe, 2006), 535–538. 

17 Gai Shijin and Zhang Peizhong, Duoyanghua Junshi Renwu 

Lun [On Diverse Military Tasks] (Beijing: Changzheng Chubanshe, 

2009), 64–65.

18 For reports on these examples, see Peter J. Brown, “China’s 

Navy Cruises into Pacific Ascendancy,” Asia Times, April 21, 2010; 

John Pomfret, “U.S.-China Talks End Without Accords on Key 

Issues,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2010; “As China Swaggers, 

Neighbors Embrace U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2010; and Rahul Singh, “Indian Army Fears Chinese Attack by 2017,” Hindustan 

Times, March 26, 2009.

19 See Alan D. Romberg, “Future East Asian Security Architecture: Implications for the PLA,” in Michael D. Swaine et al., eds., 

Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2007), 314.

20 For a discussion of these dynamics and their application to 

U.S.-China relations, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-

China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 

2 (Fall 2005), 7–45; and John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful 

Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006), 160–162.

21 According to one scholar, “For Washington, this change [resolution] means a less predictable, flexible, and potentially less-burdened 

opponent, though one still noted for its lack of transparency.” See 

Tucker, 21. 

22 See Cliff and Shlapak, 21.

23 Several PRC interlocuters have referenced Nancy Tucker’s article “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” 

as evidence that the U.S. Government would never support unification even if Taiwan wants it. Author’s interviews, Beijing, Shanghai, 

summer 2002.

24 Cozad, 287.

25 Tucker, 21. 

26 For an insightful analysis of the effect of cross-strait political 

dynamics on the PLA, see the interview with Major General Peng 

Guangqian, “Liang’an Baofa Junshi Chongtu Weixian Dajian” [“The 

Danger of Cross-Strait Military Conflict Breaking Out has Dropped 

Greatly”], Da Gongbao, December 24, 2008. 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 261 15 

27 See Ellis Joffe, “China’s Military Buildup: Beyond Taiwan?” 

in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, Shaping China’s Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), 43.

28 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How Internal 

Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2008), 74. 

29 Ibid., 74–75.

30 I am grateful to Andrew Scobell for suggesting the addition 

of this section.

31 M. Taylor Fravel, “Economics and Security: The Effect of 

Economic Growth on China’s Military Strategy” (unpublished draft, 

2010); and Andrew Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving 

Doctrine, Circa 2009,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, 103–138.

32 M. Taylor Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s Doctrine and 

Force Structure for Frontier Defense,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, 

no. 4 (August 2007), 705–737.

33 Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 

2009).

34 Murray Scot Tanner, “How China Manages Internal Security 

and its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, 

39–98.

35 See Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese 

Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2008); and Michael McDevitt, “The PLA Navy 

Anti-Access Role in a Taiwan Contingency” (unpublished manuscript, 2010).

36 For more on EEZ operations, see Peter A. Dutton, “The 

Implications of China’s Naval Modernization for the United States,” 

Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, June 11, 2009.

37 Dai Xu, “Zhongguo Ying Jianli Yuanyang Jidi” [“China 

Should Establish Bases on the High Seas”], Huanqiu Shibao [Global 

Times], February 3, 2009. Some have translated yuanyang jidi as 

“overseas bases,” but “bases on the high seas” is more accurate. The 

usual Chinese phrase for the broader concept of “overseas bases” is 

haiwai jidi. 

38 “Zhuanjia: Zhongguo Haijun ke Tantao Jianli Changqi Anji 

Buji Jidi” [“Expert: PLAN May Explore Establishing a Long-Term 

Coastal Supply Base”], available at <www.chinareviewnews.com>. 

Several other Chinese-language news outlets summarized the content 

of the interview, but the citation above includes the full text of the 

interview.

39 “China Rules out Overseas Naval Base Now,” China Daily, 

January 1, 2010; and “Haijun Zhuanjia Fouren Haiwai Jian Junshi Jidi 

Chuanwen” [“Naval Expert Denies Rumor that China is Establishing Military Bases Overseas”], Zhongguo Qingnianbao [China Youth 

Daily], March 5, 2010.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Research

Center for Strategic Research

Dr. Hans Binnendijk 

Director

INSS

Institute for National Strategic Studies
16 SF No. 261 www.ndu.edu/inss

Other titles from 

NDU Press For online access to NDU Press 

publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

Chief of Mission Authority as 

a Model for National Security 

Integration

Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 2, 

December 2010) 

China’s Out of Area Naval 

Operations: Case Studies, 

Trajectories, Obstacles, and 

Potential Solutions

Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with 

Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman

(Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, China 

Strategic Perspectives 3, December 2010)

The Surge: General Petraeus and 

the Turnaround in Iraq

William T. Knowlton, Jr.

(Industrial College of the Armed Forces Case Study, 

December 2010)

Democracy and the Chain of 

Command: A New Governance 

of Africa’s Security Sector

Dominique Djindjéré

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 

8, November 2010)

Private Contractors in Conflict 

Zones: The Good, the Bad, and 

the Strategic Impact

T.X. Hammes

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 260, 

November 2010)

Global Commons and Domain 

Interrelationships: Time for a 

New Conceptual Framework?

Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 259, 

November 2010)

Enhancing Civilian Protection in 

Peace Operations: Insights from 

Africa

Paul D. Williams

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Research Paper 1, 

September 2010)

Redefining Success: Applying 

Lessons in Nuclear Diplomacy 

from North Korea to Iran

Ferial Ara Saeed

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 1, 

September 2010)

Nonstate Policing: Expanding 

the Scope for Tackling Africa’s 

Urban Violence

Bruce Baker

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 

7, September 2010)

Civil-Military Relations in China: 

Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite 

Politics

Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders

(Center for Strategic Research, China Strategic 

Perspectives 2, August 2010)