LEARNING LESSONS 

+ IN THE + 

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~~~@[Q)O'ij'O @~& W [? @~©@~ 

Kenneth E. Hamburger 

United States Army 

Center of Military History 
CMH Pub 24–1
lty of preparing for the unexpected. A trained and ready

 possess a sound doctrine, competent leaders, and effective,

uipment. Just as important to success is the Army’s capacity

It must be able to rapidly adapt existing organizations, tac

ques, and procedures to meet the demands of emerging sit

ow our military leaders did just that in the past is the subject

sed essay.

War I—“The Great War”—was no less of a contingency

han the many smaller overseas missions that the U.S. Army

aken over the past decade. While the general nature of that

flict was well known to the U.S. Army’s leaders prior to the

t of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) to Europe in

ny of the specifics involved with raising a force that could

ively in the harsh trench warfare environment of that period

n fact, the small size of America’s prewar Army and the des

d of its European allies for fighting forces meant that large

f U.S. Army troops entered combat with minimal prepara

e task at hand. The ability of American units and their com

 identify problems and correct them in a systematic fashion

me critical to the AEF’s growing effectiveness and ultimate

the battlefield.

commemorate the eightieth anniversary of this nation’s

nt in World War I, it is entirely appropriate to recall our ear

nce to determine what might be relevant today. The “intel

dcraft” that served the AEF so well during World War I

ital part of our heritage, one that ultimately led to the estab

f the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Similarly,

s postwar attempt to generalize from that earlier experiiv
merican Expeditionary Forces

d be 

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tal war of the modern period. The participants, unprepared

g and bloody conflict that ensued after the summer of 1914,

to mobilize their manpower and industry to prosecute the

arched for a decisive military victory. Instead, dramatic and

oreseen changes in warfare quickly followed one another, in

tering both Europe and the larger Western culture that it

d. Although the bloody conflict finally ended with an

n November 1918, it cast a long politico-military shadow

cades that followed.

he United States entered the war in 1917, it was participating

conflict for only the second time, and the repercussions of that

would have a deep and lasting influence on the American mil

ishment. To even take part in the struggle, the tiny prewar

Army, which the German General Staff evaluated as barely an

, had the greatest imaginable hurdles to overcome. Many

my officers—captains and higher—had some experience fight

ctionists in the jungles of the Philippine Islands, but had little

and knowledge of combat. Nevertheless, they had to trans

rmy as rapidly as possible from its traditional mix of regulars

raised militia into a mass army of millions and to learn the

of modern warfare at the same time. That the Army was able

and prevail over its foes at such places as Cantigny, Chateau

he Aisne-Marne, and the Meuse-Argonne in 1918 was a

 achievement. This successful transformation came about

ause the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) had conscious

o learn all it could from the experiences of its allies and ene

 analyze and profit from its own successes and failures.
 nation and its military use history and the experiences of the

rt the future in war and peace constitutes a significant subject

tary professional in any age. Many observers have been decid

mistic regarding mankind’s ability to learn from history—

rnard Shaw said, “Alas! Hegel was right when he said that we

history that men never learn anything from history.” It seems

ul, however, to heed the sage notion that “History gives us a

art, and we dare not surrender even a small rushlight in the

he hasty reformer who does not remember the past will find

demned to repeat it.”1

historians dislike drawing “lessons” from history for good rea

have outlined the perils of using historical “lessons” in guiding

uch as the conduct of foreign policy. Trevelyan commented,

epeats itself’ and ‘History never repeats itself’ are about equally

We never know enough about the infinitely complex circum

any past event to prophesy the future by analogy.”2 Too often

ngs have made flawed use of their own or others’ experiences;

applications of the past range from Mark Twain’s cat that

ver to sit on a stove, hot or cold, to statesmen who confused

aigon with Munich. Nonetheless, when the lessons drawn from

are limited to, as Mark Twain put it, “only the wisdom that is

h as the techniques of tactics and administration of military

essons can be helpful and accurate. When they are broader and

4

 Bernard Shaw, introduction to Heartbreak House; John Buchan, general

o The Nations of Today (1923). 

from Laurence J. Peter, Peter’s Quotations: Ideas for Our Time (New York:

), p. 245.
sorbed experiences that the French and British provided in

e AEF in camps near the battlefields. Not all these experiences

ly relevant to the war as it had evolved by the time the

arrived in Europe, so Pershing and his staff had to be discrimi

etermining which lessons to draw from these vicarious experi

nd were the lessons that the soldiers of the AEF drew from

experiences in the war and used to adjust their weapons and

e organization quickly disseminated these lessons throughout

nd, and predictably they became its most important and last

 Finally, there are the larger lessons that the U.S. Army took

ar in forming a postwar army. At least partly because this last

clearly a case of drawing lessons from experiences in one set of

ces and applying them in a different context, this use of

m experience was the most problematical.

B

l John J. Pershing, the commander of the newly designated

Expeditionary Forces, arrived in Paris in June 1917, two

er the United States entered the war. Troops of the American

n began debarking at St. Nazaire by the end of the month.

h cheered both events, but it was clear to any casual observer

mericans would need more than their abundant enthusiasm to

tribution to the war. The soldiers were an untrained organiza

 in Capt. George Marshall’s words, “hadn’t even been trained

eft and squads right.” He recalled one rangy backwoodsman

entry duty with his blouse unbuttoned when a senior and

y turned out French officer asked him a question about his

5
y to use the fresh troops from across the Atlantic would be to

with Allied instructors and put them into the trenches with

d French units that could shepherd them through their

with the Germans.

ng, however, envisioned a different role for his force than that

es. He felt that the solution to the long stalemate that had

by the time the United States entered the war was to reestab

ver on the battlefield. This meant that the AEF would have to

acing the trench warfare mentality of the Allies and train and

what he termed “open warfare.” At the same time, he felt it

that the Americans have their own sector where the entire

d be employed as an integral military force, rather than be

ed with the British and French forces. To the Allies, this was

ma from the beginning. Nevertheless, the iron-willed American

r prevailed over all of the arguments, cajoling, and threats

military and civilian leadership of the Allies. He employed the

ctor of its own, using tactics that emphasized the spirit of the

nd individual marksmanship.

B

ionals in the Army were attempting to draw lessons from the

ope even before their nation entered the war. Articles in the

l journals and the periodicals that served military audiences

amifications of the war from the time of its outbreak in 1914.

6

C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939 (New

1963), pp. 145–47.
aSoldiers t~ a Hill With Damaged Building in the Background:» by J. 

And,'e Smith (Army Art Collection) 

The most pro minent example was the Army and Navy Journal, which 

many offi cers read, During the war years it published a trove of deta iled 

information on happenings o n all fronts. It carri ed ana lytical pieces on 

tactical and technological developments, and professional debates raged 

7 
8

e forcefully the wretched state of American military prepared

National Guard was unprepared in terms of manpower, equip

raining. Guard units lacked not only the equipment needed for

weapons and ammunition—but also the wherewithal to even

the field—adequate tents, cots, blankets, and so forth.

s, the citizen-soldiers who spent a few months’ service on the

far more experience than those whose military background was

 few successive two-week summer encampments.7

er movement toward preparedness was the so-called Plattsburg

ement, which provided military training for civilians. Maj.

ard Wood and former President Theodore Roosevelt promot

a of civilians learning military skills in peacetime summernts. After the sinking of the ocean liner Lusitania in May

ans—primarily businessmen and professionals—journeyed to

nd Navy Journal, passim; all service journals were filled with articles about the

winter of 1914–1915 on. The issue of 14 December 1914 ran an advertise

h an anonymous correspondent wrote that “owing to the President’s order to

vy officers it is the sole source—for a nation of 110 millions—of informing

o military and naval operations in the European War.”

loviev, Actual Experiences in War: Battle Action of the Infantry; Impressions of a

mander, War Department (WD) Doc. no. 279, 1906; Drill Regulations for the

man Army, WD Doc. no. 299, 1907.

Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A.

 1:159.

preparedness movement, see Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States

York: Macmillan, 1967), ch. 15, “Preparedness: 1914–17.” Edward M.

a colorful short description of the Mexican Campaign in The War To End All

ork: Oxford, 1968), pp. 13ff.
allenges confronting the military staff were immense. In 1917

een officers comprised the War Department General Staff, a

would mushroom to over one thousand by the time of the

he Army had few weapons beyond small arms that were simi

 combatants were using in Europe, and no personnel trained

m. For the United States to make a timely contribution to the

nd warfare, it would have to accept weapons and training from

ast in the beginning.

B

g had few illusions about how much training his AEF would

tical subjects ranging from field hygiene and small unit tactics

oyment of machine guns and howitzers, all ranks were at best

 novices. Pershing considered training 

mportant question that confronted us in the preparation of our

zen soldiery for efficient service. . . . Few people can realize what a

undertaking it was to teach these vast numbers their various duties

a large percentage of them were ignorant of practically everything

o the business of the soldier in war. First of all, most of the officer

ailable had little or no military experience, and had to be trained in

d duties of commanders. They had to learn the interior economy of

messing, housing, clothing, and, in general, caring for their men—

ethods of instruction and the art of leading them in battle.9

9

, History of the United States Army, pp. 342–43; Coffman, The War To End

14–15. 

g, My Experiences in the World War, 1:150.
t Point class of 1897. He was a quiet man of morose disposi

ept his own counsel and ran roughshod over the opinions of

 piercing gaze through wire-rimmed glasses and the hard line

th curving down at the corners made him appear critical of all

d. He dismissed out of hand those officers who failed to meet

ng standards of ethical and tactical proficiency; nonetheless,

he hardworking and competent officer with unmatched loyalty

ionalism.11

managed training with an iron grip, as one might expect: “The

characteristics of training in France were a definite system, poli

trine somewhat rigidly and uniformly prescribed by the highest

and a constant followup by inspector-instructors.”12 He

strict compliance with the principles Pershing set for training

hey included a rigorous emphasis on the offensive, a stress on

d the bayonet, and inflexible standards of discipline—“the stan

he American Army will be those of West Point.”13 General

Bullard, one of the most aggressive and hard-driving field com

 the war, characterized Fiske’s training as “the hardest, most

mising and intensive system of drill that the American Army has

 or probably ever will know.”14

10

 Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, N.J.:

age, 1925), pp. 61ff; Assembly 20 (Spring 1961): 78ff.

bly 20 (Spring 1961): 78ff.

d B. Fiske, “Training in the AEF,” n.d. [1919], in Harold B. Fiske Papers,

ry Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Fiske, “Training in the American Expeditionary Forces,” lecture at the Army

16 Jan 21, Fiske Papers, MHI.

d, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War, p. 62.
tfGeneral Head'lttarte1's in Chaumont'» by]. And1'e Smith (Army Art 

Collection ) 

The Training Section of the General Staff was charged with supervising the schools and the conduct of trai ning; translati ng foreign manuals 

and preparing AEF training manuals "with incorporation of changes suggested by actual experiences"- Iessons learned by another name- and 

traj ning inspectio ns. Training inspections included not o nly observing 

units in training but also inspecting those units in actuaJ operations. 

Inspectors had fi'ee rein to accompany any unit, with the goal to have one 

training inspector for every division on line . The G- 5 Section reported 

after the war that "in theolY, what the Section tried to do was not to disturb anyone in his work but to join the troops and simply observe." This 

would place the observers " in an exu'aordi narily fine position for cool judgment as to what was happening and why."IS 

It is easy to q uestio n just how effectively a colonel from AEF head -

quarters at Chaumont could "join the troops and simply o bserve" 

operations given Pershing'S reputation of reli evi ng commanders for relatively minor infractions. General Bull ard penned in his dia ry: "H e is 

15«Reporr o fG- 5 ofGHQ, AEF," 30 Jun 19 , Fiske Papers, MH ]. 

11 
ssioned officer corps, a rigid program of indoctrination and

s an absolute necessity.

ost relevant and readily available lessons for the soldiers of the

sorb were those of the Allies. Both the French and British

provide instructors for the Americans. Both had large school

d training centers set up in safe areas behind the front where

d both individuals and units. These included officer candidate

well as schools for enlisted men and specialists, and they

let soldiers from the AEF attend these courses. The schools

heir curricula as experiences at the front demonstrated new

ts. One American observer remarked that this allowed them

e “courses in the latest methods and developments for

A particular feature of these schools was that they were close

the front that units could undergo instruction, be placed in a

r of the line for battlefield experience, and then be returned to

correct shortcomings observed at the front.19

EF quickly built up a large system of their own “corps schools”

fashioned curricula of four to five weeks. About a third of a

fficers and noncommissioned officers attended such classes prior

12

d, quoted in Coffman, The War To End All Wars, p. 142.

G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917–1918 (Boston: Little,

 p. 98, quoted in Dennis J. Vetock, Lessons Learned: A History of U.S. Army

ng (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988), p. 46.

 Education of a General, pp. 150–55; Ltr, Col George F. Baltzell to Harold

an 32, Fiske Papers, MHI.

altzell to Fiske, 15 Jan 32, Fiske Papers, MHI.
I , 

" , . ~/ ... l I 

~, ';( :' , .. _') 

.J 

"The Walls of Ltmgre,» by J. A ndre Smith (Army Art Collection) 

to the arrival of their divisions in Europe. Although selected grad uates 

went on to attend the "Army School" or the General Staff College of the 

AEF at Langres, most renlrned to their units to train them as they arrived. 

Pershing described the importance of the schools after the war: 

A school system would have been desirable in the best of armies, but it was indispensable in an army wh ich had to be created almost wholly from raw material. 

The training of troops for combat was, of course, the primary objective, and 

schools for instnlctors were merely a means to that end.20 

Unit training was as important as individual training. Ideally, units 

would spend about a month training in small unit tactics, weapons proficiency, and similar tasks. Then companies and sometimes battalions 

rotated into the trenches as part of a regiment on line . Finally, American 

divisions would reassemble for a month's trainin g with all elements of 

the division before moving in to line with a corps.21 

20Pcrshing, My Experimces in tbe Wodd Wa,., 1: 154 . 

21Don Sm)l[he , PC/"shing: Gmem,[ of the Armies (B!oo01l1lgron: Indiana Unive rsity 

Press, 1986), p. 31. 

13 
draft had their first opportunity to receive instruction in musketry, to

us ranges and to become generally acquainted with their rifles.

were selected and received individual instruction as automatic rifle

rs, rifle grenadiers, runners, bombers, and so forth. A Division

School . . . had a large attendance and trained the men who subse

tioned in the intelligence detachments. . . . The machine gun battal

perts to the machine gun companies of the infantry to train them in

e light Brownings, first of their kind to be used abroad. Maneuvers

rge part of the instructions. Division terrain exercises were held

o train . . . in the important work of liaison and combat.22

mericans adopted a huge division organization consisting of

28,000 men and approximating the size of a French, British, or

rps. Although part of the argument for such a large organization

rtage of trained American officers required for divisions, the pri

ale was tactical. In keeping with the demands of trench warfare,

military leaders believed that larger divisions would have greater

wer on the battlefield, lessening the need for rotation in battle

ying both the training of staffs and division support units and the

duct of defensive operations. General Harbord explained that

o provide a division with sufficient overhead in the way of staff, com

 and supplies to permit the infantry and artillery to continue fighting

me. With the deep and very powerful defense developed in the World

sive stroke could be secured in battle without a penetration necessi

l days of steady fighting. It was thus reasoned that the infantry of the

t be of such strength as to permit it to continue in combat for such a

14

k Barber, ed., History of the Seventy-Ninth Division A.E.F. During the World

19 (Lancaster, Pa.: Steinman and Steinman, n.d.), pp. 17–46.
15

conjunction with French troops is slow and we have found that after

demonstrations by French organizations it is difficult to keep our sol

sted. The principal assistance we can derive from the French or

be from officers and specially selected noncommissioned officers of

 acting as advisors and critics.25

ition, many French and British trainers were psychologically

omewhat demoralized, and Pershing worried that their pes

uld infect his eager force. The French units taken from the line

e AEF, in Pershing’s words, were “worn and weary, [and]

t an example of the aggressiveness which we were striving to

 our men.”26 Defeatism was a greater concern, and Americans

both British and French ranks. One lieutenant remembered

nces with Allied soldiers in the trenches:

ng determined to sell their lives or their sectors as dearly as possible, they

y interested only in survival, in holding their areas as cheaply as possible

eful not to provoke “the Boche.” They were “fed up.” They had “had

ll.” It was highly disconcerting to a newly-arrived American officer to be

ritish host that, if the Germans wanted his part of France, they might

d take it. He had had more than enough of it. Or to be reproached by a

r for having prolonged a lost war by gratuitously intervening in it.27

rd, The American Army in France, p. 103.

ng, My Experiences in the World War, 1:153.

Freidel, Over There: The Story of America’s First Great Overseas Crusade

e, Brown, 1964), p. 117.

ng, My Experiences in the World War, 2:114.

, Over There, p. 126.
omeone somewhere would come out of his trenches and start for

hus a stalemate would be broken and the War would eventually be

even one soldier climbed out and moved to the front, the adventure

ame open warfare, a war of movement, and the essentials of minor

then in play. His flanks and rear must be protected as his maneuvers

e training in trench warfare would not be enough for our officers

ent happened.29

tly, Pershing ordered a training program stressing open warfare

nd offensive action: “The . . . methods to be employed must

 become distinctly our own. All instruction must contemplate

tion of a vigorous offensive. Its purpose will be emphasized in

of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought.”30

tely connected with open warfare was the mastery of rifle

hip. The very term evoked images of self-reliant, stubborn

ho embodied the ideals and myths of the American frontier.

rs believed that marksmanship was a singularly American tra

they could exploit. As General Harbord put it, “The authen

an Allied soldier with a rifle strapped on his back, chasing an

get close enough to throw a hand grenade would never have

of any American.”31 In August 1917 Pershing cabled the War

t that all soldiers shipped to France needed to be fully trained

anship. The pace of training and hurrying divisions to France,

ever allowed adequate marksmanship training in the United

16

ng, My Experiences in the World War, 1:152.

rd, The American Army in France, p. 150.

p. 153.p. 185.
"Testing Tim,," by F. C. Yoh" (Arm)' An Collection ) 

17 
essantly with Pershing over the matter and, when he proved

went around him to President Wilson. Unfortunately for their

for the AEF, neither Wilson nor his advisers agreed. Although

nt gave Pershing a relatively free hand in arguing the matter, it

sly highly political.33 Using American doughboys as cannon

British- or French-led offensives would have obvious domestic

e American heartland, especially if those attacks fared no better

ones. Pershing’s only compromises on the amalgamation ques

o provide four black regiments to the French Army and a white

e British. Although these units served throughout the war with

building a distinguished combat record, the AEF commander

xpand the program further.34

sting the thrust of the AEF’s approach and its training, the

tried consciously to alter its direction. Only in the spring of

n some small engagements by the AEF had proved that it

d up to the Germans, did the French grudgingly admit that

ans could benefit from the earlier Allied experiences while still

refusing to accept all their current methods. The French liai

s with the AEF gradually saw the Americans as gifted with

mmon sense and understood that as they accumulated their

ences in the war, they would learn more from them than the

18

ng, My Experiences in the World War, 2:278; Coffman, The War To End All

an, The War To End All Wars, pp. 174–75.

rd C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the

w York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 120–21; Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor, eds.,

Military: Essential Documents (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1981),

mythe, Pershing, p. 72.
inspection team to visit the unit and make a report. The team

he chief of the Army schools, a lieutenant colonel from the

 Section, and Colonel Fiske, then deputy training officer of

The report is concise and thorough. The three pages of

ons and Conclusions” listed specific procedural or organiza

ges needed to avoid similar incidents, such as:

itate rapid exit, hand ropes should be placed on both sides of the

s, the trenches themselves should be provided with steps or ramps,

le procedure drilled until every man knows what he is to do.

rman artillery appears to have registered on the Artois trenches some

sly. The supporting artillery observers should have noted what the

re doing and warned the infantry of what to expect.

mportant than the accurate comments and recommendations

was the speed with which they were disseminated to the AEF.

wo weeks after the raid, copies of the report were distributed

my and corps schools as well as to all general staff sections in

wn to division level.37

B

19

“Training in the AEF,” and Ltr, Baltzell to Fiske, 15 Jan 32, both in Fiske

“Report of the French Military Mission with the American Army,” 6 Mar 18,

m Papers, MHI.

ng, My Experiences in the World War, 1:152 and 2:114–15; Smythe,

70.

oard of Officers, HQ, AEF, France, 14 Nov 17, sub: German Raid of Night

2–3, 1917, MHI. A description of rotation into French lines for training is in

Marshall, Memoirs of My Service in the World War 1917–1918 (Boston:

fflin, 1976), p. 41.
fall of 1918 the problem of finding qualified officer candi

hreatening the program, and it is questionable whether the

 have continued through the winter had the armistice not

 Fiske mused after the war that by September the AEF had

d “the practical disappearance of suitable officer material from

f the divisions.” Enlisted men in the United States had been

y their civilian backgrounds, and virtually all “above the grade

d laborer” had been routed into various military occupational

As a result, “the men of courage, intelligence, energy, educa

eneral capacity so desperately needed to lead infantry platoons

d desks or mending roads or otherwise engaged” in areas of

AEF headquarters unsuccessfully protested the practice, and

ved it “one of the most serious mistakes of the war.”39 With a

e future, he might have called it one of the most serious mis

 history of the U.S. Army in the twentieth century.

B

y organizations have long been required to report in some

heir operations. These reports sometimes served merely to

 a contemporary record existed for historical purposes. More

ever, the reports were expected to serve the same use as that

20

 W. Page, Our 110 Days’ Fighting (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, Page, and

 140.

eorge Marshall’s comments on the number of officers which the 1st Division

strative details in the early days in France, and how these losses continued

, see Marshall, Memoirs, p. 15. See also Fiske, “Training in the AEF,” and

o Fiske, 15 Jan 32, Fiske Papers, MHI.
The order went on to outline the philosophy behind several

re significant reports, especially the war diary, which it

s

vents kept in campaign. While it is required to reproduce in large part

s as are given in situation reports, the mere giving of such facts consti

st part of the keeping of the war diary. What is of most importance is

ould be a narrative of the operations from which the history of the unit

red and also professional and especially tactical instruction.41

inate headquarters down to regimental or brigade size were

uired to submit any training or tactical instructions they issued.

any important period of operations,” each division and corps

rs had to submit a special report with appropriate maps. The lat

nt was clearly seen as an opportunity to capture lessons, with

pecifying:

ill be exercised in its compilation because of its military and historical

 should be a succinct account covering brief of orders issued and the

euver plan of the commander for each phase of the engagement, fol

n epitome of events compiled by G–3 from messages and reports

ng and after the action.42

B

21

, 13 Aug 17, in United States Army in the World War 1917–1919, vol. 16,

rs, GHQ, AEF (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

96, 5 Nov 17, in General Orders, GHQ, AEF, p. 516.

pp. 517ff.
h an ax, followed each half platoon of the lead battalion, in addition,

ed heavy wire cutters were issued to each regiment and men were

arry same and practiced beforehand in cutting wire with them.

nes and runners were found to be the most reliable means of com

3

an find many such lessons in after-action reports incorporated

nal publications of the War Department and the AEF as they

r the course of the war. The most important works during and

y after the war in conveying contemporary developments

 the command were the “Notes on Recent Operations.” All

t-size manuals marked “strictly confidential,” to be “kept at all

ur personal possession, . . . not to be carried into front line

and not to be shown to foreigners, presumably including the

British. The first, published in July 1917, comprised 19 foreign

 6 British, 2 French, and 11 German. The documents ranged

erman “Instructions for gunners drawn from the lessons of the

he Somme,” and “Lessons to be Drawn by Infantry from the

n the Right Bank of the Meuse” to the British “Supply of

n in the Field.” Many were quite specific in outlining doctrine.

instructions for battle, in discussing the difficulties of mopping

nes and wiping out pockets of resistance, stated: 

e leading waves of an assault should not halt owing to these pockets,

re is room to pass between and establish the line beyond, it is impor22 

 230–32.15, 30th Division, A.E.F., 14 Oct 18, in United States Army in the 

917–1919, vol. 7, Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), pp. 560–62.
y 

Its question-and-answer format contained separate sections on

t of the soldier; on the squad, the company, and the battalion;

 and a final catch-all, “Miscellaneous.” Designed for the prewar,

oldier, it promoted rote regurgitation of answers at inspections,

boards, and the like. Nothing in its precepts encouraged the

earn, to think, to analyze situations, or to adapt theory to the

ombat.46

following spring the document had completely changed. The

 of war on the Western Front had transformed the peacetime

nto a realistic tactical manual to train a soldier to improvise

 others on the battlefield. Its five sections now incorporated

at, marches and camps, ceremonies and inspections, and man

ugh prescriptive in nature, the format was no longer couched

on-and-answer mode, and the soldier was bluntly informed

 expected to think for himself in tactical situations. After eight

describing formations and methods of crossing open areas,

e, the authors reminded the reader that the methods described

uggestions, that “other and better formations may be devised

cular cases, [and that] the best formation is the one which

e line farthest with the least loss of men, time, and control.”47

23

s on Recent Operations” [no. 1], Jul 1917, WD Doc. 630, p. 55, MHI.

es on Recent Operations” [no. 2], Jul 1917, WD Doc. 641 [no. 3], Aug

c. 655, and [no. 4], Feb 1919, WD Doc. 896, all in MHI.

hismal Edition Infantry Drill Regulations: Corrected to November 1, 1917

Mo.: Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1917).

ry Drill Regulations: Corrected to May 6, 1918 (New York: Sherwood, 1918),
24

B

category of reports includes the variety of combat accounts

r the war. The formal after-action reports of many AEF units

sed by hundreds of memoirs by participants at all levels in the

 as by hundreds of unit histories. To these may be added the

ssments of AEF actions and activities compiled in the decade

he war by various official researchers. As in any such melange,

a range of suggestions to the analyst, some brilliant but many

worthless.

rmal after-action reports are often detailed, analytical, and

orporating accounts of hundreds of problems encountered

vel. The First Army Report of Operations, signed by its

r, General Hunter Liggett, recounts problems the Army

ed as well as solutions or suggested improvements for the

topics range from problems in traffic control at St. Mihiel

too few military police to difficulties in crossing no-man’s

g the Meuse-Argonne because of shortages of pioneer and

ng equipment, with the general intent “to profit by past

e.” In a section entitled “Special Considerations and

ndations,” a plethora of suggestions for better organization,

weapons, coordination between branches, and employment

par. 224 (emphasis in original).

ry Drill Regulations (Provisional) 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government

e, 1919), WD Doc. 953, par. 220. (Although this edition was published in

t was originally written in the AEF.)
mber of lessons that were on the mark; others showed that its

was a bit clouded; while the many omissions of important top

r themselves. The board endorsed, for example, the continued

f separate machine gun battalions, the wartime practice of slav

o the maneuver of foot infantry, and, on a larger scale, the

ainly “square” (four regiments in two brigades) infantry divi

he AEF had fielded in France. In fact, Pershing’s reaction, as

n his cover letter, will surprise anyone with an image of the

American general as a somewhat inflexible thinker. After argu

e AEF divisional organization was appropriate only for the cir

 in which the AEF fought in France, he stated that it would be

o think that future warfare would in any way resemble the

flict. Finally, he observed, “The false doctrine that the division

eed to maneuver arises from our experience in the break

d especially through the difficulties which we faced and the

h we committed and which it seems that many of us now pre

void and not to correct but to call ‘the lessons of the war.’”51

B

may one conclude of the uses of experience and reports by the

 a rigid but workable system for rapidly digesting battlefield

, it did quite well at learning the rudiments of warfare in a

time. Whether such a system would have continued had the

25

Army Report of Operations,” 26 Mar 19, Drum Papers, MHI.

AEF, “Report of the Superior Board on Organization and Tactics,”

D.C., 16 Jun 20.
ersion in water, such as trench foot and immersion foot.

of cold-weather injuries is difficult, often futile, and some

ed to the amputation of extremities to halt the spread of gan

vention, rather than treatment, is crucial. A well-conditioned

h a minor wound often healed rapidly and returned to duty

d injuries of even moderate degree, however, often rendered

rained and experienced soldiers unfit for duty for long peri

mes permanently. Yet these injuries constituted only a minor

r the AEF during World War I, thanks largely to British AEF

who emphasized the role of the chain of command in preven

es. If commanders checked their soldiers’ feet for trench foot

d that they had proper clothing and equipment to keep warm,

er injuries would not occur. As a result, they were a minuscule

of total injuries in the AEF. Yet this easily effected preventive

as largely forgotten before the next war. Cold-weather injuries

ificant troop losses in both the Italian and northern European

of World War II and in the Korean War.52

operational and strategic levels, there is the case of drawing

that was an entirely erroneous application of wartime experi

deployment of railway artillery for the coastal defenses of the

ates in postwar years constituted a significant expense

t World War II. Because the Coast Artillery Corps was the

26

ample, see Robert S. Anderson, ed., Preventive Medicine in World War II

D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1969), pp.

Tom F. Whayne and Michael E. DeBakey, Cold Injury, Ground Type, Medical

United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the

ral, 1958).
after the war. The chief of the Coast Artillery was, however,

in persuading Congress to appropriate funds for railway

 asserting that it would enhance and supplement the forts

d their ability to defend the coastal cities. Superficially, rail

for the Coast Artillery sounded like a good idea—even some

n the corps could see that the fortifications would become

y vulnerable to bombardment from the air. Railroad guns, it

ned, would be able to range up and down the coasts at will,

hostile fleet at any point. In practice, it was an impossible

he weight of the railroad artillery meant that most railroad

uld not carry them without special reinforcement. The guns

fire from any random point on the line, but had to have spe

ced concrete hardstands on railroad spurs. In effect, they

a little more mobile than the fortifications, with all the same

ies to attack from air or sea. In the process of deploying,

and maintaining railway coast artillery, the United States

d millions of scarce dollars during the interwar period, all to

apon that was unable to perform its mission of destroying

ships and was obsolete before it was built.53

er lesson of World War I quickly forgotten was the shortage of

utenants caused by diverting to other uses all soldiers possess

ctical skills, already cited as “one of the most serious mistakes

” The shortage of lieutenants was a significant problem in

27

uller discussion of the shortcomings of railway artillery for coastal defense, see

ger, “The Technology, Doctrine, and Politics of U.S. Coast Defenses,

A Case Study in U.S. Defense Planning,” Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1986,

62.
cases, beyond the scope of this study, abound

for example,

 misuse, of black troops, or those of different cultural back

 race. Another example pertained to the dependence on other

r the provision of contemporary military equipment of all

the associated length of time needed to build an effective war

o produce such equipment. (The U.S. Army never had a quali

over its German opponents during World War II despite the

oductive capabilities of American industry.) Still others can be

he variety of issues that surrounded the demobilization efforts

the armistice, both in Europe and in the United States.

institution like the U.S. Army and the nation it defends can

much from how it has failed to learn from experience in the

ow faces an uncertain future.

B

28

ndebted to Dr. Timothy Nenninger of the National Archives for this infor