No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 1

1990s. The close and friendly relationship 

between leaders has evolved, if only as the 

result of natural selection’s insidious impact 

on both sides. The practical basis for military 

interoperability and the strategic thinking at 

the core of the relationship have also changed. 

All this has happened without the emergence 

of an effective mechanism for restructuring 

the practical interactions that constitute the 

military-to-military relationship, and without 

the intellectual investment necessary to infuse 

new strategic meaning into the relationship.

Defense Cooperation

Security issues were the core motivating force behind Washington’s commitment to 

preserve Thailand’s sovereignty and dignity at 

the end of World War II—even as our British 

and French allies sought to treat the kingdom 

as a belligerent that should have been occupied and compelled to pay reparations for its 

wartime alliance with Japan. The rationale 

for the postwar alliance with the United States 

was the common commitment to opposing 

and containing the threat of communism.

The Manila Treaty that created the 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 

and the reaffirmation of the U.S. security commitment to Thailand in the 1962 Rusk-Thanat 

agreement, provided the legal basis for the 

alliance and focused U.S. and Thai attention 

on responding to the security threats posed by 

external communist threats from China and 

Vietnam and the internal communist insurgency. 

The 175th anniversary of the signing of 

the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 2008 was 

seized by both Thailand and the United States 

as a reason for celebrating a long and mutually beneficial treaty alliance. This alliance 

has been defined by the shared though not 

uncomplicated commitment to democracy and 

human rights, and the common interest in free 

and fair trade, all of which inform the tradition 

of bilateral cooperation.

For the last 50 years, Thailand supported 

a continuous U.S. presence in the region, 

offered unfettered access to port and airfield 

facilities to the American military, and provided 

unparalleled training opportunities for U.S. 

forces. Since the 1980s, Thailand has hosted and 

participated in strategically important exercise 

opportunities, which have given substance to a 

continuous Thai commitment to interoperability 

with the U.S. military.

Thailand’s security equities paralleled 

evolving U.S. defense priorities as transnational 

threats in the 1980s and 1990s began to overwhelm the resources of all regional players. 

These threats also began to tax the ability of 

individual allies and partners outside the region 

to respond to burgeoning requirements for new 

defense and security capabilities, modernized 

hardware, and new strategic thinking.

The U.S.-Thai defense relationship, 

however, has been in a long, awkward 

transitional moment since at least the late 

 Strategic Forum No. 241

June 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Diverging Roads: 21st-century 

U.S.-Thai Defense Relations

by Lewis M. Stern

America’s involvement in the Vietnam War 

deepened the alliance and turned Thailand 

into an indispensable ally that hosted a massive U.S. presence based on U.S.-built airfields, 

an important deepwater port at Sattahip, and 

a military communications infrastructure that 

became a critical support and logistics base for 

conducting the war in Vietnam.

From the early 1950s to the end of the 

Vietnam War, the Royal Thai Armed Forces 

received U.S. military training, equipment, 

counterinsurgency training, arms, ammunition, assistance with road building and infrastructure development in remote areas, and 

vehicles that helped build Thailand’s police 

force and its military’s special operations 

capabilities. The relationship effectively lapsed 

in the face of America’s diminished interest in overseas commitments at the end of the 

Vietnam War and in the aftermath of the Thai 

decision to limit U.S. military access to facilities following the unilateral American decision 

to respond to the seizing of the Mayaguez

without consulting with Bangkok on the use 

of Utapao airbase. Thailand’s importance as a 

logistical center for America’s extended presence in the region diminished. Bangkok’s reliance on Washington’s commitment to defend 

the kingdom waivered. Thailand sought to 

fulfill its security requirements by negotiating a normalized relationship with China; 

Beijing’s end to sponsorship of the Communist 

Party of Thailand, and China’s willingness 

to confront Vietnam’s aggressive behavior in 
2 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009

addition to Washington’s own evolving relationship with China, changed security realities 

in the region.

Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia 

and installation of a Vietnamese-backed government led to the reinvigoration of U.S.-Thai 

defense relations and security cooperation. 

The United States invested in the professionalization and modernization of Thailand’s 

armed forces through strategic military sales 

and the beginning of a generation of joint 

and combined training exercises that had as 

their centerpiece the annual Cobra Gold exercise that began in 1981. Washington became 

enmeshed in a series of strategic agreements 

intended to deepen American involvement in 

the defense of Thailand, including an agreement to create a War Reserve Stockpile, the 

first U.S. stockpile outside of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization and South Korea.

However, Thailand’s “frontline state” role 

in the effort to resist Vietnam’s continued occupation of Cambodia, and the prominent part 

played by the core members of the Association 

for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in defining the basis for a peaceful resolution of the 

Cambodian conflict, plus China’s willingness to 

actively provide lethal assistance to the Khmer 

Rouge (KR) through Thailand, changed the 

shape of defense realities in the region and provided the basis for a Sino-Thai alliance. In 1986, 

China began supplying Thailand with a wide 

range of military equipment including armored 

personnel carriers, artillery, and missiles.

Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia 

in 1989, the end of the war in Cambodia, the 

unceremonious withering away of the Soviet 

Union and the finale to the Cold War, and 

the regional activism that focused the energies of the United Nations on resolving the 

Cambodian problem eliminated the external security threats that had motivated the 

Thai-U.S. condominium of defense and security interests, and prodded Thailand to reorganize the strategic basis for its key relationships. Trade and commerce came to the 

fore. American commitment to invigorating 

democracy in Southeast Asia brought with it a 

range of foreign and defense policy standards. 

In 1991, the United States responded to a military coup by suspending economic and military assistance. In 1992, in the face of Thai 

military violence against peaceful protestors, the United States suspended Cobra Gold 

exercises. Thereafter, American laws required 

the cessation of economic and security assistance in response to extra-constitutional acts 

against duly elected governments.

During the course of the last two 

decades, the United States has gone from 

accelerating deliveries of “friendship price” 

ammunition to Thailand in the 1980s to 

underscore commitment to its security during the conflict in Cambodia, to enforcing 

elaborate policies in the 1990s aimed at preventing the introduction of new defense technologies into Southeast Asia in a fashion that 

required Washington to explain why the Thai 

could not purchase certain military technologies from the United States, such as vertical launch capabilities or beyond-visual-range 

missile innovations. The United States has 

gone from scrambling to respond positively to 

mid-1980 requests for replacement F–16s from 

Thailand, to managing failed sales of nextgeneration fighter jets, the F/A–18, in the mid1990s. And the United States has gone from 

special arrangements to provide tailored assistance requested by Thai army chiefs (such 

as heavy engineering equipment support for 

General Chawalit Yongchaiyut’s Greening of 

Isarn program) to efforts in the late 1990s and 

early 2000s aimed at shoehorning Thailand 

into legislatively funded global capabilitybuilding programs in such areas as peacekeeping capabilities, disaster response preparation, and counterterrorism training.

The presumptive alternatives to U.S. 

largess (diminished as it may have been) 

offered far less satisfactory packages, minimal followup support, inferior training, and 

equipment that the Thai military was not at 

all prepared to embrace as a substitute for 

American-made military hardware. In spite 

of this fact, Thailand became less willing to 

depend exclusively on an identity of security and defense visions with the United States 

The tipping point in the relationship came 

in the mid-1990s. At that juncture, Thailand 

began to feel that it had as much to give to 

the relationship as the United States could 

bring to the table. Sometime between the 

first Persian Gulf War and the late 1990s, 

Thailand’s interests in defense and security 

terms had grown complex enough so that 

the U.S. relationship was but one variable in 

Thailand’s calculations of its interests.

In that context, a string of increasingly 

intractable bilateral conflicts over strategic judgments, bilateral trade and commercial relations, regional commitments, and 

global policy issues entered into the calculus 

of U.S.-Thai relations in a fashion that undermined Thai confidence in the American 

security umbrella and spurred recognition 

in Washington and Bangkok of the need to 

define a means of responding to new security challenges and transnational threats. The 

U.S.-Thai relationship has been tested by a 

number of legislatively mandated reactions to 

Thai military coups against elected governments, by decisions taken in Washington that 

suggested to Thailand a lack of gratitude for 

Bangkok’s side of the alliance relationship, 

a failure to appreciate the historical depth of 

the relationship, and a reluctance to act in 

honor of the friendship instead of in response 

to economic calculations and policy interests. Serious issues in the relationship have 

chipped away at the friendship:

■ The 1992–1993 accusations that 

Thailand was surreptitiously supporting KR 

efforts to thwart regional peacekeeping initiatives probably prolonged and extended KR 

reach into Cambodia and provoked U.S. legislative initiatives that threatened the cutoff of 

American commitment 

to invigorating democracy 

in Southeast Asia 

brought with it a range 

of foreign and defense 

policy standards 

Lewis M. Stern is a Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense 

University. The author thanks two colleagues, Mr. George Thomas and Captain David Chase, USN, for reviewing the 

paper, offering cogent suggestions, and helping to invigorate the section on policy recommendations.
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 3

U.S. military assistance if Thailand persisted 

in trading with the KR at a rate and volume 

that, according to the legislation, provided 

the money guerrillas needed to buy arms on 

the open market and thereby enabled the KR 

to thwart the United Nations effort to disarm 

the competing Cambodian factions.

■ The long-dwindling support for sustained levels of foreign military assistance, 

including International Military Education and 

Training funding levels, eroded Thai military 

confidence in the alliance with Washington.

■ Congressional challenges to 

Thailand’s record regarding trafficking in 

people, human rights, and support for democracy soured Thailand’s enthusiasm for the 

bilateral relationship.

■ The Clinton administration decision 

to refrain from decisive steps in the aftermath 

of the economic crisis of 1997 represented a 

real blow to the Thai government.

■ Legislatively mandated cessations of 

economic and security assistance in the wake 

of acts against duly elected Thai governments have cut into the vigor with which U.S. 

defense and security initiatives are embraced 

by Thailand, and diminished the Thai military’s willingness to rely on such assistance 

as its unique source of hardware and support.

Three Benchmark Issues

Three major benchmark issues in U.S.-

Thai defense relations in the last 15 years 

have indicated the limits of cooperation, 

defined Thailand’s expectations, and shaped 

Bangkok’s thinking about the parameters of 

defense cooperation with Washington.

First, the 1994 U.S. proposal to preposition 

military equipment in Thai territorial waters, 

and Thailand’s rejection of that initiative, 

underscored the shifts in balance of dividends 

that had powered the relationship forward for 

decades, and provides a perspective on growing 

divergence in what had long been an unquestioned common strategic starting point.1

Second, the 1997 failure of the F/A–18 

sale impacted on the way the United States 

conducted defense sales with Thailand for 

many years. A U.S. Government letter of offer 

and acceptance (LOA) for eight F/A–18 aircraft was offered to Thailand on April 2, 1996. 

In September-October, the Thai government 

trimmed the military’s budget and ordered a 

review of procurement plans. By that time, the 

Thai air force plan for a second-generation 

fighter had run into serious financing problems. 

In October 1997, in the face of the baht devaluation, the Royal Thai Armed Forces submitted a revised payment schedule for the LOA and 

asked the Defense Security Assistance Agency 

to consider ways to restructure the program 

without impacting on the delivery schedule. 

On December 19, 1997, Prime Minister Chuan 

Leekpai wrote to President Clinton asking for 

U.S. Government agreement to a rollover of payments for the arms procurement program of the 

Thai armed forces until the economy stabilized. 

Within months, the sale would fail, the United 

States would buy back the eight aircraft, and the 

issue of sunk costs invested in the production 

line would become a major sticking point in the 

bilateral relationship.

Third, the legislatively mandated cessation 

of security and economic assistance caused further erosion of the relationship. On September 

19, 2006, Thailand’s army seized control of the 

government and declared martial law. Coup 

leaders suspended the constitution and most 

branches of the government. Section 508 of the 

U.S. Foreign Operations Appropriations Act prohibited obligating or expending funds for a foreign government deposed by decree or military coup. U.S. Government displeasure with the 

coup, Washington’s vocal concern over the coup 

group’s willingness to invoke emergency powers 

to quash public demonstrations of support for 

the deposed prime minister, and Washington’s 

public criticism of the interim government’s 

unwillingness or inability to drive forward more 

rapidly with plans for drafting a new constitution, holding a referendum, and conducting a 

new election began a serious downward spiral 

in the relationship as the senior Thai military 

officials and foreign policy managers wondered 

why they were coming in for inordinate negative 

attention from a treaty ally.

In each of these issues, on the U.S. 

side, a Presidential decision was required to 

approve the Department of Defense proposed 

course of action:

■ Following the 1996 and the 2006 

coups, American law required Presidential 

certification to Congress that a democratically elected government had taken office in 

Thailand before U.S. assistance under the 

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act could 

be resumed.

■ Presidential intervention was required 

once the Thai government put the decision 

regarding the U.S. proposal to position stocks 

of equipment in the Adaman Sea to their 

prime minister.

■ Presidential authority had to be sought 

in the instance of the 1998 decision to eliminate Thai liability for the F/A–18 contract, 

as well as the Defense Department’s plan 

to purchase the aircraft for foreign military 

sales (FMS) purposes, largely because of the 

administration’s obligation to ask Congress for 

the necessary authority for the $250 million 

price tag for the eight aircraft.

In all three issues, each side walked 

away with less than they hoped to get out 

of their treaty ally, meaning that the weight 

of the Presidency and the prime minister’s 

power were not sufficient to move the issues 

to a mutually satisfactory decision. The individual equities of the two countries were, on 

these matters, far apart, the differences hard 

to breech, and the stakes for each country significant enough that policy positions were not 

easily modified, even with the involvement of 

the highest levels.

In each of these issues, significant financial stakes were involved, and complex legislation constrained the U.S. Government maneuverability, underscoring Washington’s limited 

ability to tailor responses in a fashion that 

would redound to Thailand’s favor. In each 

instance, the Thai military and government 

came to look at the U.S. response as a litmus 

test of the bilateral defense relationship. In all 

three instances, massively different departmental level equities were at stake within the 

U.S. Government. By the time the government 

arrived at a decision point and devised a strategy for each issue, it was already necessary to 

deploy serious measures to counter the impact 

of these issues on the relationship.

In each of these three cases, the Thai 

side balked at a one-size-fits-all approach to 

the relationship and riled at the end of the era 

of friendship prices and special treatment. The 
4 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009

a staging area for pretests of defoliants that were 

ultimately deployed to Vietnam ignited a frenzy 

of press speculation, National Assembly interventions, and government debate over culpability, 

liability, and environmental and health impacts 

that loomed as a problem for the whole relationship. In early 1999, nothing rankled Bangkok 

more than Washington’s support of the Canadian 

candidate for the presidency of the World Trade 

Organization (WTO), thus freezing out the Thai 

candidate, Suphachai Phanitchaphak, the deputy minister for economic affairs and minister 

of commerce. Beginning in April 1999, Thailand 

was increasingly inclined to publicly vent its 

extreme disappointment with how the United 

States handled the WTO process of selecting a 

candidate for the next presidency. Suphachai’s 

candidacy was viewed in Bangkok as an opportunity for Thailand to step out onto the world 

stage. Thailand rejected the explanation that 

U.S. positions were based on trade policy interests, and as such should not negatively affect the 

bilateral relationship. Thai officials were increasingly convinced that the United States was the 

only hard line opposition to Suphachai. It was 

not until the middle of the year that an acceptable alternative emerged, according to which 

Suphachai would succeed the Canadian candidate for the WTO presidency with a 2-year term 

of his own. But even after the issue was at least 

nominally put to rest, there was still a distinct 

aftertaste that impacted the bilateral relationship.

Evolving Relationship 

In the first years of the 21st century, the U.S.-

Thai relationship remained proper and positive, though it had clearly begun to evolve away 

from the enthusiastic and vigorous pro-American 

views that characterized Thailand’s link with the 

United States during the Vietnam War, and had 

Thai policy bureaucracies responded to these 

issues in diffuse ways, with no center of decisionmaking gravity emerging. Various ministerial level authorities eschewed a voice in 

what many expected would ultimately become 

a National Assembly issue, or a prime ministerial–level decision; Thailand’s governments 

could not reshape these issues in a way that 

might have avoided the potential collision 

course with U.S. interests.

The U.S.-Thai relationship leveled off in 

1998 at a low ebb as a result of Thai perceptions of Washington inaction in the face of 

serious economic times for Bangkok. Though 

the tone of the relationship remained formal, proper, and friendly, public opinion and 

the views expressed by outspoken and influential Thai commentators and legislators 

suggested that the reservoir of goodwill had 

dropped precipitously. Throughout the first 

half of 1999, senior Thai generals, journalists, and academics remained perplexed as to 

what it was that Thailand had done to anger 

Washington enough that it would stand by 

and allow Thailand to feel so much economic 

pain without stepping in to help. The Thai 

military felt the economic pinch, and its concerns escalated to a fever pitch over shortfalls 

in accounts dedicated to managing FMS.

Probably the most painful and bilaterally sensitive of these three benchmark issues 

was Prime Minister Chuan’s effort to terminate 

the F/A–18 sale. In his view, the contract to purchase the fighter was an irrational one. Indeed, 

Chuan’s decision to press for a termination of 

the F/A–18 sale was part of his commitment 

to scrub the military budget and reverse what 

he saw as unnecessary weapons acquisitions. 

Even after the Presidential decision to release 

Thailand from further financial obligations in 

this contract, bad feelings remained within the 

Thai officer corps about the lengthy, excessively 

legalistic deliberations and the manner in which 

financial determinations overrode friendship 

and the spirit of alliance cooperation—feelings 

evidenced by audible Thai complaints about 

U.S. reliability as a treaty ally.

 In this atmosphere, bilateral issues that 

would have been otherwise manageable were 

viewed as crisis points in the relationship. Issues 

such as the late March 1999 discovery of a chemical spill at Hua Hin airport traced to authorized U.S. use of that facility during the 1960s as 

begun to shift away from the identity of views on 

regional issues that sustained the coherence of the 

relationship in the post–Vietnam War decades. 

U.S.-Thai relations transitioned in the context 

of a changing region where ever more sophisticated multilateral interactions fulfilled immediate 

defense and security needs.

The strains in bilateral economic relations resulting from trade and intellectual property rights issues were paralleled by growing 

difficulties in the security relationship. Some 

of the elements of this evolution included the 

“graduation” of Thailand from status as an 

FMS recipient, the suspension of security and 

economic assistance following coups against 

elected governments, and the U.S. inability to 

satisfy Thai requests for military hardware at 

friendship prices. These and other variables, 

including changing regional alignments and 

the reality of active efforts by a rising China to 

influence Southeast Asia, have driven Bangkok 

to search for alternative sources of military 

hardware, to question some elements of the 

security relationship with the United States, 

to contemplate procurement arrangements 

that did not necessarily accord with U.S. interests, to be publicly more critical of elements of 

American policy in the region, and to search for 

balance between independence and “proximity” to any single country.

Importantly, these growing pains have 

not yet undermined bilateral security cooperation or had a negative impact on U.S. access to 

critical facilities or the ability to conduct joint 

exercises. The Thai value the security relationship with the United States, but believe that 

Thailand’s security is increasingly of marginal 

interest to Washington. They understand that 

the lion’s share of dividends (access and training opportunities) go to the United States and 

believe that Washington has tended to take the 

relationship for granted. In instances where 

Washington and Bangkok do not have a commonality of interest, or where Thailand does 

not see its defense equities as being at stake, 

it has indeed become harder to get Thailand 

to support U.S. positions. The increasing complexity of regional relations, and growing political sophistication of the members of ASEAN in 

diplomacy, have combined to yield a Thailand 

that does not feel the compunction to automatically support U.S. positions on regional and 

global challenges, to make contributions to 

the U.S.-Thai relationship 

leveled off as a result 

of Thai perceptions 

of Washington 

inaction in the face 

of serious economic 

times for Bangkok
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 5

international peacekeeping efforts at the level 

the United States feels is appropriate, to support U.S. positions on regional arms procurement issues, or to accommodate U.S. access 

and prepositioning requirements.

Senior Thai officials had recognized 

that with the end of the Cold War, and the 

emergence of a range of regional issues and 

transnational challenges that had seized the 

attention of the United States, Thailand in 

particular and Southeast Asia more generally had receded in Washington’s ranking 

of foreign and defense policy priorities. Thai 

officials believed that the United States had 

been slow to recognize the importance of 

Southeast Asia in the face of the rapid emergence of India in South Asia and the rise of 

China, and remiss at identifying the strategic 

relevance, increasing importance, and adaptability of ASEAN, which in some Asian minds 

was well placed to serve as a bridge between 

and among the emerging powers in the 

region and a link between the two oceans.2

Moreover, Bangkok’s vigorous commitment to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and 

the East Asia Dialogue, and the fact that former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, a distinguished Thai diplomat, had assumed the position of ASEAN Secretary General in early 2008, 

suggested to many Thai officials that Bangkok 

is a “natural partner” for a reinvigorated U.S. 

relationship with the region. Thailand’s willingness to adapt the showcase military exercise with the United States to reflect the evolving nature of relations in the region by adding 

more countries to the mix each year (including 

Japan and China), and incorporating peacekeeping and disaster relief scenarios, coupled 

with Thailand’s readiness to serve as an anchor 

for regional responses to natural disaster demonstrated during the 2004 tsunami, placed 

Thailand in a particularly strategic position to 

accomplish critical American goals, including 

coping with the perceived tide of anti-American 

sentiment in the Muslim countries of Southeast 

Asia, as former Ambassador to Washington Krit 

Garnjana-Goonchorn has pointed out.3 Finally, 

the one critical point that Thai officials stressed 

during 2007–2008 was that though the relationship with the United States was vigorous 

and would thrive in the face of a renewed commitment by Washington to reengage fully with 

Thailand, it would no longer necessarily stand 

as the first among equal relationships cultivated 

by Thailand. In Ambassador Krit’s words:

[A]s a country caught up in a fast-changing geopolitical landscape, Thailand, as 

has historically always been the case, must 

remain open to engagement and interaction with a spectrum of countries. Where 

the United States fits in that spectrum 

depends on its own actions. These actions 

should, however, not merely be a gesture 

of goodwill, but they must come from the 

realization or indeed, cold strategic calculation of the United States’ own interests in 

Thailand and Southeast Asia.4

Attempts to restore normal U.S.-Thai 

defense and security relations, deepen the strategic relationship, and sustain attention to capability development took place in the context of 

diminished vigor in bilateral defense relations, 

Thai distress over Washington’s inattentiveness, 

and the growing Thai sense that its own strategic interests would be better served by foreign 

and defense relations with a range of countries 

beyond the United States. Senior U.S. defense 

policy officials have told Thai military interlocutors that the goal is to “renew” bilateral military 

interactions, emphasize multilateral cooperation 

in maritime security, continue counterterrorism cooperation, support Thai military transformation, and enhance Thailand’s humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response capabilities.

To the Thai side, however, this sounds like 

little more than returning to the status quo ante. 

While that would be welcome in Thailand in 

terms of the resources, financial commitments, 

practical programs, military sales, and real 

training that this would entail, it does not key 

into the perspective that Thailand is not merely 

an old treaty ally and a convenient port of call. 

Thailand believes that it is a significant player 

with which the United States could do much to 

achieve strategically meaningful advantages in 

the region. The Thai have attempted to make 

clear that they have something to bring to the 

table and that they welcome U.S. assistance and 

packaged “capacity building” initiatives. But 

Thailand needs to be seen as a regionally significant country poised to make real contributions to 

the vision of a peaceful, integrated, economically 

vibrant Southeast Asia that is increasingly capable 

of managing new defense and security challenges.

New Roles

One way of looking at what Thailand 

might mean by this is to review what 

Bangkok may have in mind regarding Burma. The Thai were one of the first 

responders to cyclone Nargis, which crippled Burma in 2008. They moved a C–130 

into Rangoon early in the aftermath of the 

cyclone’s deadly foray through the Irrawaddy 

Delta. Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej lent 

his voice to the international effort to nudge 

the Burmese military leadership to begin 

issuing visas to international aid experts, and 

to allow aircraft into Burma with specialists who could facilitate the distribution of 

relief commodities. The Burmese rebuffed the 

international community, insisted that they 

could handle the consequences of the cyclone, 

and continued to allow only select relief 

flights by the United Nations and, beginning 

on May 9, the United States. Prime Minister 

Samak, initially snubbed by the junta, visited Burma on May 14. He was instrumental 

in getting an agreement in principal from the 

Burmese to receive an ASEAN disaster assessment team. Thailand worked closely with 

Singapore in organizing the ASEAN effort 

to press the Burmese toward flexibility on 

relief flights and access for regional assessment teams and disaster response experts. 

Thailand provided a staging area at Utapao 

for the U.S. Pacific Command joint task 

force and accommodated the presence of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Disaster Assistance Response Team. Moreover, 

in late May, the Thai hosted the 27th annual 

Cobra Gold exercise, with a significant 

humanitarian disaster response component 

to its command post dimension.

The Thai have long felt that they had 

something to offer the United States in terms 

of perspectives regarding, and access to, the 

leadership of Burma. The Thai have urged 

flexibility, understanding, a certain amount 

of accommodation, and real recognition 

that the equation of power in Burma suggests that the military will be in a leadership role for a long time. From the days of 

General Suchinda Kraprayoon’s close and 

friendly relations with the original State Law 

and Order Restoration Council leadership, the 

United States has rebuffed those views, which 
6 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009

of Thailand’s continuing commitment to 

shared goals. However, while the relationship is sound and stable, there is a dimension 

to it that bears ill-concealed scars from some 

tough moments and difficult-to-manage 

issues that grow harder to heal with age.

Thailand’s preoccupation since the coup 

of September 2006 with the complex issues of 

national governance, political power, social 

justice, stability, and the viability of democratic institutions has diverted Bangkok’s 

attention from the effective management of 

foreign policy without dulling the strategic 

value of the U.S.-Thai alliance, and without 

devaluing the strong economic partnership 

that makes bilateral trade and commerce so 

important to both Bangkok and Washington. 

It is not clear how the fundamental institutes 

of democracy and the Thai monarchy will 

emerge from the bewildering contests between 

domestic political forces that were vying chaotically for influence and power through mid 

2009. It does appear that the military will 

remain a key, strong, and powerful institution; that the Thai defense establishment and 

foreign policy leadership will value its relationship with the United States; and that the 

cumulative conflicts and issues that have 

shaped bilateral defense and security issues 

will have to be managed cleverly by both sides 

in order to engineer sustained commitment 

to common goals in a changing regional and 

global strategic context. The future of bilateral defense and security cooperation will be 

shaped by how effectively Thailand and the 

United States manage the treaty relationship 

in the face of diverging strategic interests.

What Is to Be Done?

It is not clear how much energy each 

side is prepared to invest in bridging the gap 

between the legacy of strong and historically meaningful defense ties and the trend 

toward separate and unequal strategic goals 

in the region.

Thailand is preoccupied with domestic political issues and internal contests for 

power, and is experiencing a transition that 

has begun to yield new roles in the political 

system for a wider range of interest groups, 

a continuing generational change in leadership, and new rules for conducting politics 

struck a succession of U.S. administrations 

as deriving from individual relations between 

the Thai military and their Burmese counterparts. That Thai perspective, to Washington’s 

way of thinking, placed a primacy on using 

these channels of communication to establish peace and quiet rather than determining 

ways to press the Burmese toward the vision 

of a democratic state capable of conducting free and fair elections, willing to achieve 

peace with the ethnic groups seeking independence, and prepared to allow the population to engage in trade and commerce.

It is not clear that the current Thai government is in a position to add more to the mix 

now, but it is clear that the Thai have grown 

closer to the Singaporean view of how Burma 

should be managed in the ASEAN context5 than 

to Washington’s perspective over the last 15 years 

that placed a primacy on achieving the junta’s 

eventual replacement by a coalition of some sort 

that integrates a wide range of players into the 

formula for a national government in Burma. 

The Thai appear confident in the perspective, 

increasingly shared as the ASEAN point of view, 

that places a primacy on sustaining lines of 

communication with the junta because it is the 

only source of power in the country. Importantly, 

Thailand and other ASEAN friends have ceased 

efforts to justify Burma’s domestic policies.

Another area where the Thai believe 

that they have something to offer is in overall regional relations, and especially the U.S. 

relationship with ASEAN. The Thai, perhaps 

more than any other Southeast Asian country, believed that the U.S. refusal to lend help 

during the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a 

serious strategic error in judgment, and demonstrated Washington’s “too little, too late” 

relationship with ASEAN. The Thai took the 

position that the United States, rather than 

Japan, should have formed the monetary fund 

to stabilize the region. Senior Thai officials 

pointed out that China, Japan, and Korea had 

all played a galvanizing role in meetings with 

the region, but there has been no U.S.–ASEAN 

summit in the 30-year life span of the organization, and the first glimmer of the idea 

for such a meeting derived from the ASEAN–

U.S. Enhanced Partnership, not the United 

States. Similarly, from the Thai perspective, 

one shared by many ASEAN observers, the U.S. 

Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) and the 

ASEAN Cooperation Plan both derived their 

primary inspiration from the 2002 meeting 

of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) meeting. ASEAN, as Surin Pitsuwan 

puts it, is an afterthought to APEC.

Thailand and other regional countries viewed the U.S.–ASEAN relationship as 

a perfunctory expression of commitment to 

Southeast Asia and shared their confusion 

about why the United States remained the 

only ASEAN dialogue partner that had not 

yet announced intentions to accede to the 

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 

Asia through late 2008, only edging toward 

this decision under the new administration 

of President Barack Obama. To paraphrase 

former Foreign Minister Surin, if the United 

States is intent on maintaining the momentum and trajectory of its relationship with 

Thailand, it cannot continue to view things 

through the prism of Thailand of the past; 

mere military and other assistance are not 

enough to allow the United States to maintain its presence in the region.6

Over time, it has grown more difficult 

to manage issues in the defense relationship 

and to persuasively articulate the core goals 

and values of the alliance without bumping 

up against the misunderstandings that have 

dotted the landscape of the relationship for 

the last two decades. None of this means that 

Thailand is any less important to the United 

States or that the bilateral relationship has 

grown cold and irrelevant. Thailand remains 

a good friend, deserving its status as a major 

non-NATO Ally, clearly willing to make sacrifices to support continued U.S. presence in 

the region and to team up with the United 

States and others in prosecuting the war on 

terror. Indeed, two Thai troops made the 

ultimate sacrifice in Iraq while deployed 

as part of the coalition, a serious reminder 

the Thai have long felt 

that they had something 

to offer the United States 

in terms of perspectives 

regarding, and access to, 

the leadership of Burma
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 7

in this evolving environment. The military 

has eschewed its traditional and practiced 

“defense of the Kingdom” rationalization for 

strong, reactive behavior in the face of large 

public displays of political activism. The 

defense establishment and the foreign policy 

making apparatus are weighing new security 

options, agreeing to increased proximity to 

China through specialized naval and military 

joint training and operations, and looking 

for a central role in the emergence of a new 

regional architecture, an increasingly active, 

strategically meaningful ASEAN.

The United States continues to emphasize the strength, resilience, and adaptability of 

the original relationship focusing on interoperability, facility access, and joint and combined 

training, though the two countries have come 

to the shared realization of the need to multilateralize Cobra Gold, shift resources to address 

regional threats and nontraditional challenges 

such as avian flu and humanitarian disasters, and take into account new requirements 

deriving from competing maritime claims and 

China’s growing naval capabilities. The challenge will be to identify elements of the bilateral 

relationship that can offer an effective basis for 

both continued bilateral cooperation and growing regional security and defense mindedness.

What kinds of initiatives could press 

bilateral defense cooperation beyond current constraints and define a trajectory for 

defense and security engagement that could 

be embraced by both sides? Thailand and the 

United States should build on the record of 

success in several areas:

■ Specific, technical-level defense consultations on issues such as strategic plans for 

system acquisition, defense procurement budgeting, and rationalizing acquisition plans 

across services dating from the late 1990s.

■ Cooperation on broad spectrum 

reform in areas such as the management of 

security assistance that could conceivably be 

the model on which larger bilateral defense 

reform projects are formulated.

■ Assistance in the form of advice and 

guidance for the military in its efforts to 

define an effective, appropriate, constitutionally correct role against threats to sovereignty 

and stability of Thailand posed by both indigenous forces and groups with external support, focusing on efficient unit structure, 

force management, and development of effective doctrine and codes of conduct supporting 

laws, orders, and regulations.

■ Joint work in the area of military education, both in terms of pursuing long-term training opportunities for Thai officers and modernizing the national military education system.

There is a natural basis for sustained 

cooperation in these areas and clear ways 

to reflect the need for a new responsiveness 

to complex strategic equities with impacts 

beyond the narrow bilateral stakes for 

Thailand and the United States. For example, the United States and Thailand need 

to move ahead with plans for Phase Two of 

the Defense Resources Management System 

(DRMS) program aimed at offering Thailand 

the professional guidance on management 

practices, methods for enhancing transparency and accountability, means of acquiring new capabilities, and steps that could 

be taken to deepen bilateral staff and senior 

level military exchanges.7 The Thai have, 

during the course of the last 5 to 7 years, recognized the need to do more effective work in 

the area of retaining trained officers and specialists, especially as the economy began to 

offer highly trained technicians a much more 

lucrative alternative. The DRMS program is a 

mechanism for focusing on such issues.

The Thai have evinced long-term interest in developing counterterrorism capabilities and maritime security resources. During 

his June 2008 visit to Bangkok, Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates promised continued U.S. help with Thailand’s installation of 

a new coastal radar network. However, the 

issue of strengthening Thailand’s coastal 

defense capabilities should not revolve 

around U.S. ability to procure maritime 

radars. Priority attention needs to shift to the 

development of Thailand’s blue water naval 

capabilities, capacity to conduct operations 

that transcend local patrols, and willingness 

to contribute in constructive ways to multinational maritime operations.

Joining MALSINDO (the Trilateral 

Coordinated Patrols) patrols and “Eyes in the 

Sky” in the Strait of Malacca in 2008 was a 

good start. However, Thailand needs to put its 

efforts into readying the Royal Thai Navy to 

pull its weight in coastal patrols alongside of 

contributing ASEAN neighbors. Thailand also 

needs to focus on developing the naval wherewithal to support the Proliferation Security 

Initiative, rather than fixing its attention on 

procuring one discrete defense system (the 

coastal radars). Continued work with the 

DRMS project should help raise Thailand’s 

vision from military hardware-focused solutions to narrow problems to more effective 

ways of factoring strategic variables and policy priorities into procurement choices. The 

United States needs to follow up on that promise for specific systems such as the coastal 

radar, but the acquisition needs to be wedded to strategic goals, and in this environment 

of fiscal caution and overall diminishing 

resources as well as the shifting of attention 

to the threats in the triborder area, the coastal 

radar system is not nearly as relevant as an 

investment in blue water capabilities, and not 

nearly as pressing as the need to develop a 

nimble way to make strategic decisions relevant to Thailand’s status as a maritime power.

Thai resources need to be leveraged in a 

way that could bring both new bilateral relevance to training and exercise cooperation, 

and increased vigor to the multilateral aspect 

of joint and combined training exercises such 

as Cobra Gold. The Thai are clearly concerned 

about their capacity to conduct effective logistics in the context of contemporary multinational planning efforts, disaster relief efforts, 

and peacekeeping operations. That area holds 

promise as a fertile field for expanded cooperation. In 2008, the United States and Thailand 

agreed to expand the field training exercise and 

to extend full partnership to other countries. 

Inviting the participation of capable navies of 

friends and allies such as South Korea would be 

a positive step in the direction of continuing to 

invent ways of making Cobra Gold regionally 

relevant and strategically important.

The Philippines is enmeshed in a process aimed at reforming the defense establishment, and invigorating the defense ministry, in the form of the Philippine Defense 

Reform. Indonesia and the United States continue to discuss the potential for a formal 

plan aimed at uniting defense resources, talent, and capabilities with the goal of streamlining, modernizing, and professionalizing the Indonesian military. There has never 
8 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009

been a parallel attempt to work with the Thai 

to rationalize a swath of defense establishment practices or to conduct a large-scale 

review of the operating environment, ministerial organization and management practices, or procurement processes. Parochial 

service equities have militated against broad 

defense reform cooperation with Thailand, 

and legislatively mandated cessations of security and economic assistance may have cooled 

political support for anything so ambitious. 

Nevertheless, Thailand needs to ask itself 

whether the synergies and resources that the 

United States can bring would be sufficient 

incentive to sit down at a planning table with 

some tailored version of this kind of defense 

reform enterprise in mind.

The current problems in southern 

Thailand represent a special case, far different 

than the Cold War efforts to meet the challenges 

posed by insurgencies, with a decidedly regional 

dimension to the problem that has been lost in 

efforts to localize and minimize the impact of 

southern Thailand on broader ASEAN strategic 

equities. The Thai have been sensitive to introducing foreign military resources and personnel 

into the fray in a manner that could escalate the 

issue beyond its current parameters. However, 

without challenging those assumptions, or trespassing against the Thai policy decisions regarding the way to manage the southern unpleasantness, the United States could do more than 

current train and equip work with specific Thai 

armed forces units. Systematic assessments of 

the etiology of conflict beyond technical targeting and intelligence-sharing, organized scrutiny 

of the situation by strategic critics, more systematic efforts to draw conclusions about the nature 

of the fight in the south, and attempts to discern 

the utility in lessons learned regarding building basic security, inculcating the habits of good 

governance and economic development, and 

working directly with local populations through 

provincial reconstruction teams are necessary 

parts of any equation aimed at addressing an 

insurgency. In view of this, the application of the 

kind of historic recordkeeping that has made 

lessons learned efforts more lucrative for the U.S. 

Army in Iraq and Afghanistan might add meaningfully to Thai efforts to determine the shape 

and trajectory of the southern problem.

There is a long, historical basis for U.S. 

defense cooperation with Thailand in the area 

of military education. The Thai have recognized 

the need for some “modernization” of their 

national military education system. In June 

2008, Secretary Gates told then–Prime Minister 

Samak that the United States would be strongly 

interested in helping with efforts to professionalize the country’s military officer corps through 

the Thai National Defense College (NDC). Senior 

Thai military officers have expressed interest 

in future partnerships regarding military education. In late 2008, Supreme Commander 

General Boonsrang Niumpradit articulated his 

willingness to explore collaboration between the 

NDC and the U.S. National Defense University. 

Thailand’s Strategic Research Institute, established as the think tank for the Royal Thai 

Armed Forces National Defence College in 2007, 

was designed to be the equivalent of the NDU 

Institute for National Strategic Studies. That 

connection needs to be energized. A concerted 

effort to cooperate on developing this institution 

as the basis for a sustained strategic dialogue 

would serve the interests of the relationship and 

should be a priority focus for the United States.

Finally, there is a recognized commonality of interests regarding the ASEAN architectural design and ARF role as a contributing factor to strengthen local cooperation on defense 

and security issues that matter to the neighborhood. The United States should support 

Thailand’s efforts to take a more prominent role 

in the region through the activities and mechanisms of the regional association, possibly by 

co-hosting a future voluntary demonstration of 

response humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise that would be a positive step 

following the inaugural demonstration in May 

2009 in the Philippines. Both the United States 

and Thailand should focus on finding the strategic commonalities that have informed bilateral 

relations for decades and building on the record 

of success that has characterized the practical 

dimensions of defense engagement between the 

two. They should look to past successes in developing training and exercise regimens and traditions, the shared commitment to modernizing and professionalizing the Thai armed forces, 

and close familiarity with procurement processes and the innate sense of how to improve 

acquisition processes. Both countries should 

work to shape those achievements in ways that 

begin to serve more complex strategic requirements in a fiscally challenging moment.

This work needs to be accomplished in a 

fashion that infuses the bilateral relationship 

with greater strategic depth and acknowledges the increasing responsibilities that 

Thailand is capable of assuming in regional 

defense and security cooperation regarding 

efforts to counter piracy and terrorism, cope 

with and prepare for humanitarian disasters 

and pandemic threats, and deal with weapons 

proliferation and other unanticipated threats 

to regional stability and prosperity.

Notes

1

 The role of Royal Thai Army Commander in Chief 

General Wimon Wongwanit in thwarting this U.S. initiative 

was hailed, and the episode was regarded by critics of the alliance as a Thai foreign policy Declaration of Independence 

from Washington.

2

 Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, “Thai-U.S. Relations in 

the Regional Context,” Southeast Asia Bulletin, March 2008, 

1–2.

3

 Krit, 2.

4

 Ibid.

5

 K. Kesavanpany, “Myanmar, ASEAN’s Albatross,” 

Southeast Asia Bulletin, July 2008, 1–2.

6

 Surin Pitsuwan, “U.S.-ASEAN Cooperation,” 

Southeast Asia Bulletin, February 2008, 1–2.

7

 Thai Embassy Update, April 2008, available at 

<www.thaiembdc.org/Ann_Doc/ThailandUpdate4_08.pdf>.

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I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press