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S. HRG. 114–736 

THE OVERSIGHT, ACQUISITION, TESTING, AND 

EMPLOYMENT OF THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

(LCS) AND LCS MISSION MODULE PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2016 

Page 

THE OVERSIGHT, ACQUISITION, TESTING, AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE LITTORAL

COMBAT SHIP (LCS) AND LCS MISSION MODULE PROGRAMS ............................ 1 

Gilmore, Honorable J. Michael, Ph.D., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, United States Department of Defense, Washington, DC ......................... 9 

Stackley, Honorable Sean J., Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, 

and Acquisition, United States Department of Navy, Washington, DC .......... 26 

Rowden, Vice Admiral Thomas S., Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and 

Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, United States Navy, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 39 

Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 

Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC ........................................ 40 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 93 

(III)

(1) 

THE OVERSIGHT, ACQUISITION, TESTING, 

AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) AND LCS MISSION MODULE 

PROGRAMS 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:35 a.m., in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, 

Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the 

committee to consider a list of 2,385 pending military nominations. 

Of these nominations, five nominations are six days short of the 

committee’s requirement that nominations be in committee for 

seven days before we report them out. 

No objection has been raised to these nominations. I recommend 

the committee waive the seven-day rule in order to permit the confirmation of the nomination of these officers before the Senate adjourns the 114th Congress, thank God. 

Is there a motion to favorably report these 2,385 military nominations? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there a second? 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All in favor, say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

[The information referred to follows:] 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON DECEMBER 1, 2016. 

1. BG Robert N. Polumbo, USAFR to be major general (Reference No. 

1206) 

2. In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Daniel J. Bessmer) (Reference No. 1553) 

3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Brian C. Garver) 

(Reference No. 1557) 

2 

4. MG Jerry D. Harris, Jr., USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters US 

Air Force (Reference No. 1617) 

5. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Suzanne L. Hopkins) (Reference No. 1633) 

6. LTG James M. Holmes, USAF to be general and Commander, Air Combat Command (Reference No. 1664) 

7. RADM William K. Lescher, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, N8, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1671) 

8. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Clifford D. Johnston) (Reference No. 1689) 

9. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Reinaldo Gonzalez 

II) (Reference No. 1692) 

10. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Graham F. Inman) 

(Reference No. 1712) 

11. Capt. Kelly A. Aeschbach, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 1767) 

12. VADM Dixon R. Smith, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the 

Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 1804) 

13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of 

brigadier general (list begins with Joel E. DeGroot) (Reference No. 

1811) 

14. In the Air Force Reserve there are 13 appointments to the grade of 

major general (list begins with David P. Baczewski) (Reference No. 

1812) 

15. BG Jesse T. Simmons, Jr., ANG to be major general (Reference No. 

1813) 

16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of 

major general (list begins with David M. McMinn) (Reference No. 1814) 

17. Col. William E. Dickens, Jr., USAFR to be brigadier general (Reference 

No. 1815) 

18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade of 

brigadier general (list begins with Brian K. Borgen) (Reference No. 

1817) 

19. BG Randolph J. Staudenraus, ANG to be major general (Reference No. 

1818) 

20. In the Air Force Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of 

major general (list begins with Craig L. LaFave) (Reference No. 1819) 

21. Col. Stephen C. Melton, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference No. 

1820) 

22. MG Paul E. Funk II, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding 

General, III Corps and Fort Hood (Reference No. 1821) 

23. MG Gary J. Volesky, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding 

General, I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord (Reference No. 1822) 

24. MG James H. Dickinson, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command/US 

Army Forces Strategic Command (Reference No. 1823) 

25. BG Patrick M. Hamilton, ARNG to be major general (Reference No. 

1824) 

26. In the Army Reserve there are 18 appointments to the grade of major 

general (list begins with Benjamin F. Adams III) (Reference No. 1826) 

27. Col. Mark A. Piterski, ARNG to be brigadier general (Reference No. 

1827) 

28. Col. Ellis F. Hopkins, ARNG to be brigadier general (Reference No. 

1828) 

29. In the Army Reserve there are 70 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Michael A. Abell) (Reference No. 1829) 

30. RADM(lh) Mary M. Jackson, USN to be vice admiral and Commander, 

Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1830) 

3 

31. In the Air Force there are 28 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Kip T. Averett) (Reference No. 1832) 

32. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Shawn M. Garcia) (Reference No. 1833) 

33. In the Air Force there are 1,903 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Daniel C. Abell) (Reference No. 1834) 

34. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Gary 

A. Fairchild) (Reference No. 1835) 

35. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Megan M. 

Luka) (Reference No. 1836) 

36. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Brandon D. Clint) (Reference No. 1837) 

37. In the Air Force Reserve there are 90 appointments to the grade of colonel 

(list begins with Isamettin A. Aral) (Reference No. 1838) 

38. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Eileen 

K. Jenkins) (Reference No. 1839) 

39. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Jeffrey 

M. Farris) (Reference No. 1840) 

40. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Matthew T. Bell) (Reference No. 1841) 

41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Melissa B. Reister) 

(Reference No. 1842) 

42. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Charles 

M. Causey) (Reference No. 1843) 

43. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Stephen A. LaBate) (Reference No. 1844) 

44. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Roxanne E. Wallace) (Reference No. 1845) 

45. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Eric A. Mitchell) 

(Reference No. 1846) 

46. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Jonathan 

J. Vannatta) (Reference No. 1847) 

47. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Dennis 

D. Calloway) (Reference No. 1848) 

48. In the Army Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Kenneth L. Alford) (Reference No. 1849) 

49. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Henry 

Spring, Jr.) (Reference No. 1850) 

50. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Craig 

A. Yunker) (Reference No. 1851) 

51. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Cornelius J. Pope) (Reference No. 1852) 

52. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Anthony 

K. McConnell) (Reference No. 1853) 

53. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Jennifer L. Cummings) (Reference No. 1854) 

54. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Donald J. Erpenbach) (Reference No. 1855) 

55. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Carl I. Shaia) 

(Reference No. 1857) 

56. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Lisa 

M. Barden) (Reference No. 1858) 

57. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Roger 

D. Lyles) (Reference No. 1859) 

58. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Clara 

A. Bieganek) (Reference No. 1860) 

59. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Isaiah M. Garfias) 

(Reference No. 1861) 

60. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Louis E. 

Herrera) (Reference No. 1862) 

4 

61. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Schnicka L. Singleton) (Reference No. 1863) 

62. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (John R. 

Burchfield) (Reference No. 1864) 

63. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Elizabeth S. 

Eatonferenzi) (Reference No. 1865) 

64. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Richard D. Mina) 

(Reference No. 1866) 

65. In the Army there is 44 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list 

begins with Temidayo L. Anderson) (Reference No. 1867) 

66. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Richard A. Gautier, 

Jr.) (Reference No. 1869) 

67. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Joseph 

A. Papenfus) (Reference No. 1870) 

68. In the Army Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Stuart G. Baker) (Reference No. 1871) 

69. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (David 

S. Yuen) (Reference No. 1872) 

70. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Donta A. White) 

(Reference No. 1873) 

71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Tony A. Hampton) 

(Reference No. 1874) 

72. In the Army Reserve there are 18 appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Charles C. Anderson) (Reference No. 1875) 

73. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (David 

A. Yasenchock) (Reference No. 1876) 

74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Aaron C. Ramiro) 

(Reference No. 1877) 

75. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Richard M. Strong) (Reference No. 1878) 

76. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Brendon S. Baker) 

(Reference No. 1879) 

77. In the Army there are 19 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins 

with Lanny J. Acosta, Jr.) (Reference No. 1880) 

78. In the Navy there are 46 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Jafar A. Ali) (Reference No. 1881) 

79. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (Meryl 

A. Severson III) (Reference No. 1882) 

80. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Ashley R. Bjorklund) (Reference No. 1883) 

81. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Adeleke O. Mowobi) (Reference No. 1884) 

82. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(list begins with Mary K. Arbuthnot) (Reference No. 1885) 

83. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Stephen W. Hedrick) (Reference No. 1886) 

84. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Vincent M.J. Ambrosino) (Reference No. 1887) 

85. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (Neal P. 

Ridge) (Reference No. 1888) 

86. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Abdeslam Bousalham) (Reference No. 1891) 

87. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Scott M. Morey) (Reference No. 1892) 

88. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander 

(Christian R. Foschi) (Reference No. 1893) 

89. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Andrew 

J. Wade) (Reference No. 1900) 

90. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Christopher S. Besser) (Reference No. 1902) 

5 

91. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Chad C. Black) 

(Reference No. 1903) 

92. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Thomas 

D. Starkey) (Reference No. 1904) 

93. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Joshua 

D. Fitzgarrald) (Reference No. 1905) 

94. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Anthony C. Lyons) (Reference No. 1906) 

TOTAL: 2,385 

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee meets this morning to receive 

testimony on the oversight, acquisitions, testing, and employment 

of the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS] and LCS mission module programs. We welcome our witnesses, who are key officials responsible 

for acquiring, testing, employing, and overseeing these programs. 

The Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

for Research, Development, and Acquisition, has been the Navy’s 

acquisition executive since 2008. Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, 

Commander of Naval Surface Forces, is responsible for manning, 

training, and equipping the Navy’s in-service surface ships. The 

Honorable J. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Testing and 

Evaluation [DOT&E], has been the senior adviser to the Secretary 

of Defense for operational live fire test and evaluation of weapons 

systems since 2009. Mr. Paul Francis, Managing Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, at the Government Accountability Office [GAO], whose 40-year career with GAO has focused 

mostly on major weapons acquisitions, especially shipbuilding. 

The Littoral Combat Ship, or LCS, is an unfortunate, yet all too 

common, example of defense acquisition gone awry. Since the early 

stages of this program, I have been critical of fundamental LCS 

shortcomings. Here we are 15 years later with an alleged warship 

that, according to Dr. Gilmore’s assessment, cannot survive a hostile combat environment, and has yet to demonstrate its most important warfighting functions, and a program chosen for affordability that, as the GAO has reported, has doubled in cost with the 

potential for future overruns. 

Like so many major programs that preceded it, LCS’ failure followed predictably from an inability to define and stabilize requirements, unrealistic initial cost estimates, and unreliable assessments of technical and integration risk, made worse by repeatedly 

buying ships and mission packages before proving they are effective and can be operated together. 

What is so disturbing is that these problems were not unforeseen. In 2002, the Navy first requested Congress to authorize funding for the LCS program. After reviewing the Navy’s plan, the consensus of the members of the two Armed Services Committees was 

‘‘LCS has not been vetted through the Pentagon’s top requirements 

setting body called the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.’’ The 

Navy’s strategy for the LCS does not clearly identify the plan and 

funding for development and evaluation of the mission packages 

upon which the operational capabilities of LCS will depend. 

Despite such serious concerns, it will not come as a surprise to 

many members of this—of this committee, to you, that Congress 

then approved funding for LCS. When the Navy awarded the first 

LCS construction contract in 2004, it did so without well-defined 

6 

requirements, a stable design, realistic cost estimates, or a clear 

understanding of the capability gaps the ship was needed to fill. 

Taxpayers have paid a heavy price for these mistakes. The LCS was initially expected to cost $220 million per ship, but the cost of 

each ship has more than doubled to $478 million, and we are not 

through yet. 

The LCS’ first urgently needed combat capability and mine countermeasures was supposed to be delivered in 2008. That capability 

is still not operational, nor is it expected to be until 2020, 12 years 

late. Twelve years late. Today, 26 ships of the planned 40-ship LCS 

fleet have either been delivered, are under construction, or are on 

contract. In other words, taxpayers have already paid for 65 percent of the planned LCS inventory. 

LCS’ combat capability is supposed to come from three mission 

packages: mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. Taxpayers have invested more than $12 billion to 

procure LCS seaframes and another $2 billion in these three mission packages. Yet for all this investment, all three of these mission packages are years delayed with practically none of the systems having reached the initial operational capability. 

So far, the LCS has fielded only the most basic capabilities: a 30- 

millimeter gun with a range of two miles and the ability to launch 

and recover helicopters and small boats. The surface package was 

five years late. The mine package is 12 years late. The anti-submarine package is nine years late. 

The Navy failed to meet its own commitment to deploy LCS 

seaframes with these mission packages in part because for some 

reason, Navy leaders prioritized deploying a ship with no capability 

over completing necessary mission package testing. In other words, 

the taxpayers have paid for, and are still paying for, 26 ships that 

have demonstrated next to no combat capability. This is unacceptable, and this committee wants to know, Secretary Stackley, who 

is responsible and who has been held accountable. 

Let me be the first to say that Congress belongs on the list of 

those responsible. We could have intervened more forcefully and 

demanded more from the Department of Defense and the Navy. We 

did not. But as long as I’m chairman, this committee will. 

Mission packages are not the only problem. Keeping the LCS 

seaframe underway at sea has also been challenging. Despite commissioning the first ship eight years ago in 2008, the Navy continues to discover ‘‘first of class problems.’’ This year is 2016. Since 

2008 when it was commissioned first, we continue to discover ‘‘first 

of class problems.’’ 

Since 2013, five of the eight LCSs delivered have experienced significant engineering casualties resulting in lengthy import repair 

periods. Amazingly, despite nearly no proven LCS combat capability and persistent debilitating engineering issues in both design 

and operation, the Navy is charging ahead with an ambitious plan 

that keeps most ships deployed more than half the time, stationed 

around the world far from supports of facilities in the United 

States. In contrast, most Navy destroyers are planned to be deployment—deployed from the United States far less than 25 percent of 

their service lives. The rush to put four ships forward in Singapore 

by 2018 without proven combat capability, and to maintain a deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
7 

ployment tempo more than twice that of destroyers, is a recipe for 

more wasted taxpayers’ dollars. 

Although the LCS may yet deliver some capability, the Nation 

still needs a capable small surface combatant that addresses the 

LCS’ critical shortfalls, including the ability to attack enemy surface ships at over-the-horizon ranges with multiple missile salvos, 

defend nearly non-combatant ships from air—nearby non-combatant ships from air and missile threats, as an escort conduct longduration missions, including hunting enemy submarines, without 

frequent refueling, and exhibit robust survivability characteristics. 

The recent—the recently concluded LCS review was long overdue, and it yielded some promising initiatives. But I am concerned 

that several critical fundamental assumptions of the program were 

not challenged, including excessive operational availability goals, 

insufficient in-house technical support for LCS, unexamined manpower requirements, and no urgency in transitioning to a new 

small surface combatant. 

Fortunately, the Department of Defense is curtailing the LCS 

program at 40 ships and downselecting to a single ship design. 

Given the cost overruns, mission package testing lows, and the rate 

of engineering failures, reducing the size of this program is a necessary first step. I am prepared to go even further by taking a hard 

look at any further procurement of ships until all of the mission 

packages reach IOC [initial operational capability]. 

It is up to the Navy to explain to this committee and to the 

American taxpayers why it makes sense to continue pouring money 

into a ship program that has repeatedly failed to live up to its 

promises. The LCS continues to experience new problems, but it is 

not a new program. That is why the Department’s leaders must not 

delay in reconciling their aspirations for the LCS with the problems—troubled reality by demanding accountability and reducing 

the size of this program. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join the 

chairman in welcoming Director Gilmore, Secretary Stackley, Admiral Rowden, and Mr. Francis to the committee this morning to 

testify on various aspects of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, LCS 

program, and we are grateful to each of you for your service. 

The Navy’s fundamental architecture of the LCS program separate changes in the mission package from changes that would disrupt the ship design and ship construction. In the past, when there 

were problems with developing the right combat capability on a 

ship, that would almost inevitably cause problems in the construction program. What the LCS architecture means is that changes inside the mission packages should not translate into changes in the 

ship construction schedule. 

However, since the mission packages and the vessels are divorced from each other, we are now experiencing a new set of difficulties, many of them indicated by Senator McCain. While the 

shipbuilders had problems with costs and schedule early in the program, that has not been the big issue since the Navy conducted the 

competition for fixed price contracts in 2010. The shipbuilders and 

8 

shipyard workers have been performing well under those contracts 

since then, so well, in fact, that we now have built are in the process of building 26 of the LCS vessels, when not a one of the single—of the three types of mission modules has passed full operational testing. Since LCS combat capability largely resides in the 

mission packages, the Navy will have to operate LCS vessels for 

several more years in relatively benign circumstances, waiting on 

combat capability to complete testing. 

Chairman McCain and I wrote to Admiral Richardson, the chief 

of naval operations, and Secretary Stackley about the LCS program 

in September, which raised a number of concerns. We asked that 

the Navy consider reducing the planned operational availability of 

the LCS to a sustainable level, or see if the Navy can support normal deployment availability before expanding availability to 50 

percent under a blue/gold crewing concept. 

The CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] respond that the Navy is 

going to continue to plan for 50 percent availability with the blue/ 

gold crew concept because that is what the Navy needs to support 

the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. I believe that some of the problems we are experiencing now with LCS vessels is because we got 

too far in front of ourselves by trying to deploy ships before they 

were ready to deploy, which in turn reduced testing resources and 

focus. 

Saying that we will attain the 50 percent deployment availability 

goal for LCS because that is what we need to make the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan achievable rings a little hollow with me. It 

sounds a lot like previous assurances that there would be no problem in shifting from the original LCS blue/gold crewing concept to 

a three crews for every two ship concept, which has now been 

found wanting, and now we are back trying to make the blue/gold 

concept work. 

In our letter, the chairman and I also asked the Navy to establish the land-based LCS propulsion and machinery control test site 

because the Navy is not providing sufficient in-house LCS engineering technical support for the LCS program. The CNO responded that the Navy will consider a land-based propulsion machinery control test site at some later date, but not now. I am willing for the moment to let the Navy play out this string of trying— 

to try to enhance support for the deployed LCS without such a facility, but I am concerned that LCS fleet material support will suffer without such a facility when such support is available for all 

other Navy combatants. 

The chairman I also asked that the Navy conduct a bottom-up 

review of the manpower requirements for each LCS to validate or 

re-validate the quantity and quality of manpower requirements to 

determine if sufficient personnel are assigned to perform all watch 

standing, warfighting, damage control force, protection, maintenance, and other duties. The CNO responded that the Navy’s LCS 

Review Team have already assessed manpower requirements. I 

would just say that I am skeptical that the LCS Review Team 

would have had sufficient time to do much more than decide how 

to allocate the 70 sailors which building space would be available. 

Such an allocation process would not constitute the manpower requirements review that I had in mind at least. 

9 

Finally, the chairman and I suggested that the Navy should start 

planning new—now rather—to procure and begin deliveries of a 

new small surface combatant as soon as possible in 2020. The CNO 

responded that the Navy will address the future small surface combatant at some later date after the Navy has completed an analysis 

of future fleet requirements. 

I understand that CNO Richardson needs time to review overall 

future fleet requirements. However, I believe that when the Navy 

begins a program for a follow-on small surface combatant, it should 

avoid repeating what we did with the LCS program, where we were 

in such a hurry to field the ship we did not take the time to go 

through important parts of the acquisition process, such as deciding what our requirements are, deciding how much we are willing 

to pay to achieve those requirements, and programming ahead of 

time for the manpower and logistics programs that we needed to 

support the program. If the Navy waits too long, we may face similar urgency in the schedule. 

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the hearing. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. We will begin with you, Director 

Gilmore. Welcome, Dr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE J. MICHAEL GILMORE, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. GILMORE. I apologize. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Reed, members of the committee. 

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, although the first LCS was 

commissioned in 2008, the LCS program has not yet demonstrated 

effective warfighting capability in any of its originally envisioned 

missions by the Navy’s—according to the Navy’s own requirements, 

surface warfare, or SUW, mine countermeasures, or MCM, and 

anti-submarine warfare, ASW. 

The Increment II Surface Warfare Mission Package is the only 

fielded system on LCS seaframes. It has demonstrated a modest 

ability to aid the ship in defending itself against small swarms of 

fast in-shore attack craft, although not against threat representative numbers and tactics, and the ability to support maritime security operations, such as launching and recovering boats and conducting pirate interdiction operations. However, when [the] Hellfire 

[missile] is fielded as part of the next increment of the surface warfare package, its capability should improve, and it will be important to solve the problems and do the testing with Hellfire that 

have—that have enabled us to discover so many of the problems 

that exist with the current ships. 

In a June 2016 report based on the testing conducted before 

2016, I concluded that the LCS employing the current Mine Countermeasures Package would not be operationally effective or suitable if called upon to conduct mine countermeasures missions in 

combat. That testing demonstrates the LCS Mine Countermeasures 

Package did not achieve the sustained area mine clearance rate of 

the Navy’s legacy systems, nor can the package be used to meet the 

Navy’s reduced Increment I mine countermeasures requirements 

for mine area clearance rate, even under ideal benign conditions, 

10 

achieving at best one-half of those requirements, which are a fraction of the Navy’s full requirements. 

The ships, as well as the mine countermeasure systems, are not 

reliable, and all the mine countermeasure systems, not just the Remote Minehunting System [RMS] and the Remote Multi-Mission 

Vehicle [RMMV] that were recently cancelled, had significant 

shortfalls or limitations in performance. Based on those results, 

after more than 15 years of development, the Navy decided this 

past year to cancel the Remote Minehunting System, halted further 

procurement of the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle, abandoned 

plans to conduct operational testing of individual mine countermeasures mission package increments, at least in the interim, and 

delayed the start of fully-integrated LCS mine countermeasures 

mission package operational testing until at least fiscal year 2020. 

As the Navy attempts to fill capability gaps and correct the 

shortfalls in performance of these cancelled and restructured key 

elements of the LCS Mine Countermeasures Package, it is very 

likely operational testing of either LCS variant, equipped and fully 

integrated with the final fully-capable Mine Countermeasures 

Package, will not be completed until at least 2023, more than a 

decade after the schedule set forth in the Navy’s original requirements documents. 

All of the LCSs have suffered from significant and repeated reliability problems with both sea frame and mission package equipment. No matter what mission equipment is loaded on either LCS 

variance, the lower reliability and variability of sea frame components, coupled with the small crew size, impose significant constraints on mission capability. 

For example, when averaged over time, LCS–4 was fully mission 

capable for surface warfare missions just 24 percent of the 2015 

test period. Both variants fall substantially short of the Navy’s reliability requirements, and have a near zero chance of completing a 

30-day mission, and a sustained 30-day mission is the Navy’s requirement, without a critical failure one or more sea frame subsystems essential for wartime operations. 

Testing conducted during the past two years on LCS–2, 3, and 

4 also revealed significant cybersecurity deficiencies. Now, the 

Navy is developing plans and taking actions to correct some of the 

problems identified, but the severity of the problems discovered will 

degrade the effectiveness of both LCS variants until the problems 

are fully corrected. 

In closing, I want to emphasize the importance of realistic testing. It was only through testing of full mission packages at sea and 

aboard the ship with a crew from the fleet that the significant 

problems and shortfalls I have just discussed were clearly revealed. 

In fact, the Navy’s Independent Mine Countermeasures Review 

Team emphasized that a reliance on segmented shore-based testing 

‘‘provided a false sense of system maturity.’’ Similarly, only with an 

operationally realistic testing of the Surface Warfare Mission Package were the inaccuracies of the gun, limitations of the ships maneuvering and tactics, and the deficient training revealed. 

Therefore, my strongest and most important recommendation to 

you and to the Navy is to fund and execute realistic and rigorous 

testing of LCS and its mission packages as we go forward. 

11 

1Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Richard Hunt, Director, Navy Staff before the 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, July 

25, 2013. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY J. MICHAEL GILMORE

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss my assessment of the Littoral 

Combat Ship (LCS) program. The first LCS was commissioned in 2008, and the 

Navy now has in commission a total of eight ships, with two more anticipated in 

the coming months. The Navy has also deployed three LCSs in the past three years, 

with each of the three ships conducting freedom of navigation and forward presence 

missions in the western Pacific. Despite the success of delivering ships to the Navy, 

and recent peacetime operations during deployments, the LCS program has not yet 

demonstrated effective warfighting capability in any of its originally-envisioned missions: surface warfare (SUW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and anti-submarine 

warfare (ASW). The effectiveness of the ship is closely tied to the capabilities of the 

installed mission packages; yet, the Navy has not yet delivered effective mission 

packages that meet the Navy’s own requirements for any of these missions. Furthermore, all of the ships have suffered from significant and repeated reliability problems with both seaframe and mission package equipment. No matter what mission 

equipment is loaded on either of the ship variants, the low reliability and availability of seaframe components coupled with the small crew size imposed significant 

constraints on mission capability. Unless corrected, the critical problems that I have 

highlighted in multiple DOT&E reports and multiple formal memoranda over the 

last seven years will continue to prevent the ship and mission packages from being 

operationally effective or operationally suitable in war. 

With respect to survivability, neither LCS variant is expected to be survivable in 

high-intensity combat because the Navy’s requirements accept the risk of abandoning the ship under circumstances that would not require such an action on other 

surface combatants. As designed, the LCS lacks the shock hardening, redundancy, 

and the vertical and longitudinal separation of equipment found in other combatants. Such features are required to reduce the likelihood that a single hit will result 

in loss of propulsion, combat capability, and the ability to control damage and restore system operation. Thus far, the results of the LCS Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) program confirm this assessment. While there is still much work to 

be done, the LFT&E program has already identified over 100 technical improvements that could be applied to improve LCS’s performance against threat weapons, 

although, given the ships’ fundamental limitations, none of these improvements will 

make the ships’ survivability comparable to that of the Navy’s other surface combatants. Once I have all the shock trial data in hand and have analyzed it in conjunction with the data from the Total Ship Survivability Trials (TSST) and the Navy’s 

Survivability Assessment Reports, I will issue a more comprehensive assessment of 

both seaframes’ survivability. 

Understandably, the Navy’s concept of employment and concept of operations 

(CONOPS) for these ships has changed over time. The original vision for the class 

was to rely heavily on off-board and largely unmanned systems, which would allow 

engagement of the threats well away from the seaframe, thus enabling the ship to 

remain out of harm’s way and survivable. Second, the Navy championed the idea 

of interchangeable mission packages through modularity in order to add to LCS’s 

flexibility and contribution to a dynamic war effort. As the Navy stated several 

years ago, ‘‘By having the flexibility to swap out mission packages, Navy has a ship 

that can adapt to meet the ever-changing spectrum of mission requirements.’’ 1 Notably, both of these cornerstones of the program have been either abandoned or not 

yet realized, as the limitations of the mission packages and seaframes have become 

clear through testing and experimentation. 

The Navy has most recently decided, following a program review, to employ a 

‘‘semi-permanent’’ installation of specific mission packages, making any given ship 

dedicated to a single mission, a sharp and limiting contrast from the Navy’s original 

concept, as well as from the traditional multi-mission frigates that LCS is now envisioned to replace. Moreover, the off-board, unmanned systems that would have enabled the seaframes to stay far from danger have not yet been developed: neither 

the SUW or ASW mission packages plan to use unmanned undersea or unmanned 

12 

surface vehicles to accomplish those missions, and the MCM mission package’s offboard vehicles have encountered significant developmental delays or cancelation, the 

primary MCM system, the Remote Minehunting System (RMS), being recently canceled after more than 15 years of development. Although all the mission packages 

will employ a helicopter or an unmanned aerial vehicle, those assets will not obviate 

the need for the ship itself to be engaged in high-intensity battle where the crews 

will face threats like small boats, submarines, naval combatants, and shore defenses 

that are likely to employ weapons like anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), torpedoes, 

and mines. Therefore, the use of LCS as a forward-deployed combatant, where it 

will be involved in intense naval conflict, is inconsistent with the ships’ inherent 

survivability in those same environments. 

One of the primary design features and selling points of the LCS seaframe was 

its speed. With the ability to sprint at 40 knots, the ship enjoys some enhanced ability to defeat fast small boats (albeit not the ever growing numbers that are faster) 

and some lightweight torpedoes, thereby protecting itself in some scenarios. However, such speed capabilities provide no benefit in conducting ASW or MCM; furthermore, the Navy’s CONOPS require LCS, in some scenarios, to remain stationed 

near much slower units who are providing the LCS with dedicated air defense support to have any reasonable chance of surviving attacks using ASCMs launched in 

the littorals also obviates the need for the high speed. Moreover, this CONOPS implies that destroyers and cruisers will be required to provide this protection to 

LCSs, which is contrary to the concept that independently operated LCSs will free 

up the Navy’s destroyers and cruiser and ‘‘allow [them] to focus on the high-end 

missions,’’ which is what the Navy has touted in the past. The realities of intense 

Naval conflict and the multitude of threats in the littoral environment paired with 

the evolved CONOPS has therefore also called into question the need for high speed 

as one of the primary design considerations for this class of ship. Indeed the Navy 

plans to modify future LCSs (the so-called frigate design) by eliminating the high 

top speed requirement. 

I want to correct one misconception about LCS and my assessments. LCS was 

bought to ‘‘punch below its weight class,’’ to specifically counter asymmetric threats 

in the littorals. LCS was not designed to be a destroyer, which has survivability and 

lethality capabilities to counter peer threats. No evaluation should hold LCS to that 

standard with respect to survivability or mission capabilities. Nevertheless, I have 

found no evidence to date that LCS will be effective or survivable even in the scenarios and missions in which it was designed to be successful. Those capabilities 

may yet appear as the Navy progresses in the development of the Increment 3 SUW 

mission package, the incorporation of an over-the-horizon missile onto the 

seaframes, a restructuring of the MCM mission package, and the long-awaited ASW 

mission package, which showed some promise in early developmental testing. To 

date, however, LCS does not provide a lethal capability in the primary missions it 

was built for, and given the change in CONOPS, its design is not survivable in those 

missions either. 

SEAFRAME SUITABILITY

After operational testing of the Freedom variant equipped with the Increment 2 

SUW mission package in 2014, and recent operational testing in 2015 – 2016 of the 

Independence variant equipped with the same mission package, DOT&E has sufficient data to conclude that both seaframe variants are not operationally suitable because many of their critical systems are unreliable, and their crews do not have adequate training, tools, and documentation to correct failures when they occur. No 

matter what mission equipment is loaded on either of the ship variants, the low reliability and availability of seaframe components coupled with the small crew size imposed significant constraints on mission capability. During this last year, problems 

with main engines, waterjets, communications, air defense systems, and cooling for 

the combat system occurred regularly and required test schedules to be revised or 

operations to be conducted with reduced capability (e.g., conducting MCM missions 

without operational air defense systems). These reliability problems are often exacerbated because, by design, the ship’s force is not equipped to conduct extensive repairs; problems cannot be corrected quickly due to the need to obtain vendor support, particularly when several vendor home bases are at disparate overseas locations. The inability of the ship to be ready at all times to reach maximum speed, 

keep its main air defense system in operation, and to cool its computer servers are 

substantially detrimental to the ships’ ability to defend themselves in time of war, 

much less conduct their assigned missions in a lengthy, sustained manner. As an 

example, when averaged over time, and accounting for both planned and unplanned 

maintenance downtimes, LCS 4 was fully mission capable for SUW missions just 24 

13 

percent of the 2015 test period. Failures of the propulsion and maneuvering subsystems and the ship’s computing network, which are fundamental to ship operations, caused LCS 3 to return to port for repairs or reduced readiness while at sea 

for weeks at a time during its 2014 operational test period. Both variants fall severely short of the Navy’s reliability requirements, and have a near-zero chance of 

completing a 30-day mission (the Navy’s requirement) without a critical failure of 

one or more seaframe subsystems essential for wartime operations. The trend of 

poor reliability of critical seaframe systems has also affected the deployments of 

LCS 1 and 3, and most recently LCS 4, and these deployments did not exercise the 

ships in stressing wartime operational tempo. The poor suitability demonstrated 

during the operational test periods are therefore, not anomalous, but in fact, a clear 

indication that these ships will not be operationally available nor fully mission capable more than a fraction of the time in wartime conditions. The recent problems observed during peacetime are likely only the tip of the iceberg for the problems crews 

might deal with when in more severe combat. Such results also have grave implications for operations and sustainment costs, which will plague the Navy for years to 

come if these inherent engineering problems are not corrected. 

The intentionally small crew size has limited the mission capabilities, combat endurance, maintenance capacity, and recoverability of the ships. For example, the 

small crew size has limited the Independence variant from operating with sufficient 

watchstanders to maintain an alert posture for extended periods of time. By design, 

the ship’s small crew does not have the capacity to effect major repairs. Instead, the 

Navy’s support concept depends on the use of remote assistance in troubleshooting 

problems and the use of Navy repair organizations and contractors for repair assistance. However, the Navy’s limited stock of repair parts for LCS systems, many of 

which were sourced from offshore vendors, can result in long logistics delays and 

occasionally forces the Navy to resort to cannibalization of another ship in order to 

expedite repairs. Because of the planned reliance on shore-based contractor support, 

in many cases the LCS crew lacks the documentation, training, test equipment, and 

tools required to troubleshoot and repair serious problems as they emerge. An example of this limitation occurred during LCS 4’s operational testing during 2015 and 

2016, where the ship’s primary air defense system, SeaRAM, suffered from seven 

long periods of downtime (greater than 48 hours). Each repair required the delivery 

of replacement components that were not stocked aboard the ship, and most required assistance from shore-based, subject matter experts. These failures left the 

ship defenseless against ASCMs, and would likely have forced it to return to port 

for repairs if it had been operating in an ASCM threat area. During the LCS 3 operational test period, the crew was unable to repair multiple critical systems, such as 

the ship’s navigation data distribution system, the air search radar, and Link 16 

tactical link, each of which resulted in multiple days of downtime while awaiting 

assistance from contractors to troubleshoot and repair the systems. The limited ability of the crew to effect repairs became particularly acute during the 2015 MCM 

technical evaluation period; the LCS 2 crew relied on shore-based maintenance personnel to complete repairs of the ship’s twin boom extensible crane, main propulsion 

diesel engines, electrical systems, boat davit, straddle lift carrier, and air conditioning units and the mission package’s Remote Multi-Mission Vehicles (RMMV) 

and Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) Launch and Handling Systems. 

In the preceding six month work-up period, the ship also called on contractor personnel to troubleshoot, diagnose, and correct problems. It remains to be seen whether the Navy can provide the same level of support in theater for wide-area, multiLCS MCM operations that must be completed quickly, let alone during combat at 

sea. 

In September 2016, the Navy released new plans to change the LCS crewing 

structure. The Navy now plans to phase out the 3:2:1 crewing construct and transition to a Blue/Gold model similar to the one used in crewing Ballistic Missile submarines. Originally, core crews and mission module crews were intended to move 

from hull to hull independently of one another, but core crews will now merge with 

mission module crews and focus on a single warfare area – either SUW, MCM, or 

ASW. DOT&E does not yet have sufficient information to assess whether the new 

crewing model will solve some of the problems observed in the previous testing of 

both variants. 

AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF LCS

Air defense testing has not yet been completed for either LCS variant. The Navy 

has not conducted any of the planned live-fire air defense test events or the modeling and simulation studies necessary to definitively determine the ship’s ability to 

defend itself against ASCMs. Despite the dearth of testing, DOT&E has compared 

14 

the capabilities of LCS’s air defense system to other ships in the Navy. I assess that 

LCS likely has less or nearly equivalent capability to the LPD 17 air defense systems, which also employ Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) but have a more capable 

combat system. In 2011, I assessed the LPD 17 class ships are not operationally effective against several modern classes of ASCMs. Therefore, it is unlikely that LCS 

will be able to meet the Navy’s requirements for air defense based on the results 

available from LPD testing. More recently, limitations in the SeaRAM system (currently installed on Independence variants) revealed some significant classified con- cerns. For the Freedom variant, DOT&E learned in fiscal year 2015 (FY15) that the 

Navy stopped work on the air defense modeling and simulation test bed because it 

did not have the intellectual property rights and detailed technical information for 

the ship’s air defense radar (AN/SPS–75). The lack of intellectual property for these 

foreign radars has been a problem for both variants of LCS, making it difficult for 

engineers to develop high-fidelity models and understand the capabilities and limitations of these radars or effect changes when problems are found. I proposed alternative test strategies to overcome this difficulty; however, in 2016, the Navy decided 

it is not satisfied with the Freedom variant’s radar and RAM system for defense 

against ASCMs. The Navy now plans to replace the RAM system with SeaRAM, 

which is the system installed on the Independence variant. Because of this decision, 

the Navy does not plan to test (at all) the existing Freedom-variant air defense systems installed on LCS 1 through 15. This is a high risk for deploying crews, given 

that many Freedom-variant ships will deploy between now and 2020 when backfits 

of the SeaRAM system on those hulls are scheduled to begin. Although the Navy 

has conducted some training events where a single subsonic drone is shot down in 

non-stressing, operationally unrealistic conditions (not emulating actual threats), 

the fact remains that no end-to-end operationally realistic live-fire testing has been 

conducted. The crews of these ships will remain unaware of any problems with their 

air defense systems that might have been discovered during testing, and will likely 

discover these problems at the worst possible time: when under attack. The need 

for this testing is all the more acute given the recent ASCM attacks against Navy 

ships off the coast of Yemen. 

For the Independence variant, air defense testing continues to be delayed and its 

completion is now in doubt as well because of higher priority testing of the CVN 

78 air defense systems. Additionally, the Program Executive Office for LCS sent a 

letter to the Navy’s Surface Warfare Director (N96) stating that Independence variant air warfare testing cannot be executed at current funding levels. The Navy had 

planned to conduct the first of the planned operationally realistic live-fire events on 

the self-defense test ship in fiscal year 2016, but postponed the test indefinitely because of anticipated poor performance predicted by pre-test modeling and analysis 

of the planned test event scenario. Without these tests, an adequate assessment of 

the Independence-class probability of raid annihilation requirement is not possible. 

Based on the Navy’s most recent plans, DOT&E expects that the Independence variant will have been in service nearly 10 years by the time that air defense testing 

is complete, which at the time of this testimony is not anticipated before fiscal year 

2020. 

Although the Navy has postponed indefinitely its plans to conduct live-fire testing 

of the LCS air defense systems, the Navy has conducted some initial testing of the 

SeaRAM system, as it is employed aboard Arleigh Burke destroyers. In December 

2015, the Navy-conducted a live-fire event aboard the self-defense test ship, the 

SeaRAM system was successful at defeating a raid of two GQM–163 supersonic targets. Although a stressing event, these targets were not representative of the 

threats they were attempting to emulate. The Navy does not currently have an aerial target that is capable of emulating some modern ASCM threats. During this test, 

SeaRAM employed the RAM Block 2 missile, which is different than the current 

LCS configuration that employs the RAM Block 1A missile. However, if the Navy 

decides to deploy LCSs with the Block 2 missile, then this test and others planned 

are germane to an LCS evaluation, however incomplete. DOT&E and the Navy continue to conduct test planning to make best use of the available resources and ensure that LCS’s air defense testing reflects the capabilities of deploying LCSs. 

The Navy has also successfully completed some non-firing air defense tests that 

provide some initial insights into the capabilities and limitations of components of 

the air defense systems. For the Freedom variant, these tests revealed that because 

of the limited capabilities of the air defense radar, the crew was unable to detect 

and track some types of air threats well enough to engage them. The lack of integration between the WBR–2000 Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system and the 

RAM system limited the ship’s capability to make best use of its limited RAM inventory. For the Independence variant, although the ships relies on the SeaRAM sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
15 

tem, the ship’s air surveillance radar provided LCS crews with only limited warning 

to defend itself against ASCMs in certain situations. The Independence variant’s 

ESM system is able to detect the presence of the ASCM seekers in most instances 

but did not reliably identify certain threats, and in some cases did not provide LCS 

crews with adequate warning to defend itself. 

Finally, with respect to air defense, the ship is expected to struggle to defend 

itself against low, slow-flying aircraft such as unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, 

and small planes. In the Navy’s developmental test events, we learned that the 

electro-optical system used to target the seaframe’s gun was unable to provide reliable tracking information against some targets. Furthermore, the safety standoff requirements on Navy test ranges were so severe that they precluded meaningful livefire gun engagements against these targets. Because of these problems and constraints, the program decided to cancel all subsequent live-fire events, including 

those scheduled for operational testing, conceding that the Independence variant is 

unlikely to be consistently successful when engaging some of these threats until future upgrades of the tracking system can be implemented. 

CYBERSECURITY

Much of my assessment of the two seaframes’ cybersecurity posture and capabilities is classified and covered in detail in my recent operational test reports. However, I will state that the testing conducted in fiscal year 2014 on LCS 3, testing 

conducted in 2015 on LCS 2, and finally the most recent test aboard LCS 4 have 

revealed significant deficiencies in the ship’s ability to protect the security of information and prevent malicious intrusion. Although the Navy is developing plans to 

modify the network architecture in the both Freedom and Independence variants to 

enhance cybersecurity, the severity of the cybersecurity problems discovered on LCS 

will degrade the operational effectiveness of either variant until the problems are 

corrected. 

In early 2016, the Navy made substantial changes to the LCS 4’s networks, calling the effort ‘‘information assurance (IA) remediation,’’ to correct many of the deficiencies in network security on the baseline Independence variant’s total ship computing environment. The Navy designed and implemented the IA remediation program to mitigate or eliminate some of the vulnerabilities found during the 2015 test 

aboard LCS 2 and was successful in eliminating some of the deficiencies that placed 

the ship at risk from cyber-attacks conducted by nascent (relatively inexperienced) 

attackers. 

Unfortunately, because of numerous limitations, the Navy’s testing aboard LCS 

4 was inadequate to fully assess the LCS 4’s survivability against cyber-attacks 

originating outside of the ship’s networks (an outsider threat). The testing was adequate to determine that some deficiencies remain when attacks occur from an insider threat; however, it was not adequate to determine the full extent of the ship’s 

cybersecurity vulnerability or the mission effects of realistic cyber-attacks. 

Although the Navy’s IA remediation corrected some of the most severe deficiencies 

known prior to the test period, the testing revealed that several problems still remain which will degrade the operational effectiveness of Independence-variant 

seaframes until the problems are corrected. The Navy plans a second phase of IA 

remediation to correct additional network deficiencies; however, DOT&E is unaware 

of the plans to install or test these changes on future ships, or whether these 

changes will correct the problems observed during the LCS 4 test. Nevertheless, 

routine and thorough cybersecurity assessments of each ship, and each configuration of mission packages, particularly those being deployed, should be a core strategy for LCSs as well as all Navy ships. The inadequacies in test execution and poor 

performance discovered in recent LCS cybersecurity testing strongly suggest that 

the Navy must undertake a more concentrated and focused effort to improve cybersecurity for these ships. 

SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST SURFACE THREATS

Both variants of LCS rely exclusively on the seaframe’s MK 110 57 mm gun and 

a gunfire control system that is fed by an electro-optical/infrared sensor to defend 

the ship against attacking surface threats, such as a small fast boat. Unless the 

SUW mission package is installed, this one gun is the ship’s only defense against 

these targets (as well as low, slow-flying targets). Too few data exist on the Freedom 

variant to provide a definitive evaluation of that ship’s ability to defend itself with 

only the 57 mm gun. Furthermore, the test that was conducted was limited to a single target boat attacking LCS and the events were not conducted in a realistic cluttered environment where identification of threats will be more challenging. 

16 

On the Independence variant, however, the Navy conducted seven test events, 

each consisting of a single attacking small boat. LCS failed to defeat the small boat 

in two of these events, because of gun failures that have since been corrected. Overall, the 57 mm gun demonstrated inconsistent performance even in benign conditions, which raises doubts about the ship’s ability to defend itself without the SUW 

mission package installed. The inaccuracy of the targeting systems, the difficulty in 

establishing a track on the target, and the requirement to hit the target directly 

when using the point-detonation fuze combine to severely impair effective employment of the gun, and limit effective performance to dangerously short ranges. The 

Navy has not conducted any testing to determine how well the ship will perform 

when faced with an attack in a realistic cluttered maritime environment including 

both neutral and hostile craft; the Navy has also not conducted operational testing 

to determine how well the ship (without the SUW mission package) will perform 

against multiple attacking boats. Nevertheless, given the performance observed during operational testing, the combination of faster threats, multiple threats, threats 

with longer-range standoff weapons, cluttered sea traffic, or poor visibility are likely 

to make it difficult for LCS (without the SUW mission package) to defend itself. 

The ship’s electro-optical/infrared camera, SAFIRE, is the primary sensor for targeting the 57 mm gun. The system suffers from a number of shortcomings that contribute to inconsistent tracking performance against surface and air targets, including a cumbersome human-systems interface, poor auto-tracker performance, and 

long intervals between laser range finder returns. These problems likely contributed 

to the poor accuracy of the 57 mm gun observed during live-fire events, though the 

root cause(s) of the gun’s inaccuracy have not been determined definitively. 

In the most recent of the seven live-fire test events the Navy conducted against 

a single-boat target, the crew employed the 57 mm differently than it had in previous live-fire events, and defeated the attacking boat with less ammunition and at 

a slightly longer range than in previous events. One event does not provide conclusive evidence that the ship can be effective in these scenarios, and such performance 

was never observed during the swarm-defense test events. Nevertheless, these results are encouraging and suggest that the Navy should examine tactics and alternative gun employment modes, including different projectile fuze settings, as a 

means to enhance LCS’s currently limited capabilities. 

SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST SUBSURFACE THREATS

As I have stated in multiple reports, LCS will have no capability to detect or defend against torpedoes unless the ASW mission package is embarked, specifically 

the lightweight tow countermeasure. This is in contrast to the USS Oliver Hazard 

Perry-class Frigates (FFG), which had some inherent capability to detect threat torpedoes and could employ a torpedo countermeasure system. The lack of capability 

implies that a submarine could launch an attack on an LCS, without the crew 

knowing that they were under attack, and successfully hit the ship. 

Because an LCS equipped with the SUW mission package has no ASW capability, 

nor any torpedo defense capability, many areas of operation where multiple threats 

are present will require multiple LCSs to work together for mutual protection, or 

for the likely multi-mission character of many Navy warfare scenarios. Such groups 

of two or three LCSs with disparate single-mission packages is in addition to the 

now-acknowledged need for destroyer/cruiser support for air defense in some scenarios. The Navy’s CONOPS documents acknowledge the difficulty of planning LCS 

surface action groups because of the inherent lack of multi-mission capabilities, 

making three or four ships sometimes necessary to enable mission accomplishment 

and ensure survivability. The same mission scenarios might be accomplished by 

fewer ships, provided those ships had multi-mission capabilities. The original vision, 

therefore, of a nimble, mission-focused ship has been overcome by the realities of 

the multi-mission nature of naval warfare combined with the multiple threat environments of high-intensity naval conflicts. 

SURVIVABILITY

As I have previously reported, neither of the LCS designs includes survivability 

features necessary to conduct sustained operations in a combat environment. Furthermore, during DOT&E’s review of the work completed by the Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force in 2014, it became clear that LCS does not have the 

survivability features commensurate with those inherent in the FFG it is intended 

to replace. The FFG is designed with shock-hardened mission and propulsion systems. It has redundancy and separation of major combat and engineering systems 

and equipment. These design features are meant to enable the ship to not only exit 

17 

the area once hit by significant threat weapons, but also to retain critical mission 

capability and continue fighting if need be. LCS is not designed to do so. 

The LCS CONOPS acknowledges LCS vulnerabilities to some air, surface, and 

subsurface threats and suggests that LCS is best suited for missions such as Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime Security Operations. At the same time, the 

LCS CONOPS states that LCS is expected to spend the majority of its time operating independently or in surface action groups, ahead of the strike group, preparing 

the environment for joint force access to critical littoral operating areas. Such operations could expose LCS to the full spectrum of potential threats, and the CONOPS 

acknowledges that the limited air defense and survivability capabilities of LCS will 

necessitate an appropriate defense plan provided by the very forces LCS is supporting. Providing additional warships for LCS protection means stretching already 

limited battle group air defense assets. Furthermore, the presence of such air defense ships to aid LCS does not guarantee the susceptibility to these attacks will 

be reduced to zero or its survivability improved, given the potential threats that 

LCS might encounter as one of the first assets present in a hostile combat environment. 

Aluminum Ship Vulnerability 

The Navy has not yet adequately assessed the LCS aluminum hull and deckhouse 

fire vulnerability; however, this is an obvious survivability concern for these ships. 

Aluminum structure is vulnerable to melting and loss of structural integrity during 

shipboard fires. This is not a problem for steel hulled ships. Battle damage and collision incidents involving ships with aluminum superstructures, such as USS Stark 

and USS Belknap, highlighted these survivability concerns for the Navy. The Navy’s 

Survivability Review Group concluded in the 1980s that aluminum ship structure 

was highly vulnerable to fire spread and loss of strength, which was codified in the 

1985 edition of the General Specifications for Ships of the United States Navy, section 150a, by requiring deckhouses and superstructure to be steel. This policy was 

reversed for LCS. More recently, an aluminum ship, HSV Swift, suffered extensive 

structural damage from blast and fire when she was hit by a missile off the coast 

of Yemen. This recent attack serves as a grim reminder of the increased risk inherent in the Independence variant, which is constructed primarily from aluminum. 

The Navy has not yet assessed the likelihood of major structural damage from a 

weapon-induced fire on LCS. These assessments have not been done because the 

Navy was not equipped with the analytical tools necessary to model this problem. 

The LCS LFT&E program included tests to gather data for model development and 

validation, but that process is still ongoing. The Independence-variant survivability 

assessment report that is due in fiscal year 2017 will not include comprehensive 

analysis of fire induced structural damage potential. 

Based on testing of fire insulation conducted by the LCS program, the Navy reported that it is unlikely that major structural damage will occur to aluminum 

structures from an internal fire in an undamaged compartment (i.e., all fire suppression systems are operable and fire insulation is intact). This nuanced reporting 

did not address the fact that internal blast effects can damage fire insulation and 

suppression systems that would normally be available to mitigate the fire effects in 

an undamaged compartment. It is, therefore, premature to draw any other conclusions about the structural integrity of the LCS hull. 

Shock Trials 

This year, the Navy conducted reduced severity shock trials on the Independencevariant USS Jackson (LCS 6) and the Freedom-variant USS Milwaukee (LCS 5). I 

approved the reduced severity trial geometries for LCS 6 because of serious concerns 

about the potential for damage to non-shock hardened mission critical equipment 

and ship structure. There was also concern about the damage tolerance of the ship’s 

hull structure relative to steel hulled ships. Unlike other surface combatants the 

combat systems on LCS are not shock hardened. Also, the main propulsion system 

on the Independence variant is not shock hardened. The Navy argued that the reduced severity approach was necessary because they lacked specific test data and 

a general understanding of how the non-Grade A systems (Grade A systems must 

remain functional after shock) would respond to shock. To further mitigate potential 

equipment damage and personnel injury, some mission systems were removed, other 

equipment was modified to improve shock resistance, and construction deficiencies 

were corrected. 

LCS 6 was tested in June and July 2016. The trial consisted of three shots of increasing severity, ending at 50 percent of the required shock design level. At these 

reduced levels, most non-Grade A components and systems, including electrical 

power generation systems and the SeaRAM air defense system, remained operable 

18 

or were restored to a limited or full capability prior to the ship’s return to port after 

each shot. The Navy is still analyzing the structural response data. 

Based on the LCS 6 shock trial lessons learned and limited equipment damage, 

I directed the Navy to conduct a traditional three shot shock trial for LCS 5, with 

the final shot at two-thirds the required shock design level. The Navy conducted the 

first two shots from August 29 through September 23, 2016, starting the trial at 

the same shock severity as other modern surface combatants. However, the Navy 

stopped the LCS 5 trial after the second shot, thereby not executing the planned 

third shot due to concerns with the shock environment, personnel, and equipment. 

The Navy viewed the third LCS 5 trial as not worthwhile because the Navy was 

concerned shocking the ship at the increased level of that trial would significantly 

damage substantial amounts of non-hardened equipment, as well as damage, potentially significantly, the limited amount of hardened equipment, thereby necessitating costly and lengthy repairs. The Navy view is that its modeling could be used 

to confidently conclude what would occur if the third shot were conducted based on 

the results of the first two shots. I disagree and maintain that the third LCS 5 shot 

is needed: the Navy’s models have not correctly predicted important aspects of the 

response of the LCS 6 and LCS 5 seaframes to the shock events that were conducted; nor have those models accurately predicted the responses of the equipment 

installed and integrated onto the ships. 

As planned and conducted, neither shock trial resulted in catastrophic damage, 

yet both shock trials exposed critical shock deficiencies, which I will detail in an upcoming classified report. These deficiencies, which were only identified in the shock 

trial, can now be specifically addressed and corrected by Navy engineers to make 

the ships more survivable. 

Total Ship Survivability Trials (TSST) 

As an element of the LFT&E program, the TSST is the primary source of 

recoverability data and is intended to provide a damage scenario-based engineering 

assessment of the ability of the ship’s crew to utilize the installed firefighting and 

damage control systems to control damage, reconfigure, and reconstitute mission capability after combat damage. 

The LCS 3 TSST revealed significant deficiencies in the Freedom-variant design. 

Much of the ship’s mission capability would have been lost because of damage 

caused by the initial weapons effects or from the ensuing fire. The weapons effects 

and fire damage happened before the crew could respond, and the ship does not 

have sufficient redundancy to recover the lost capability. Some changes could be 

made to make the ship less vulnerable and more recoverable without major structural modifications. Examples include providing separation for the water jet hydraulic power units, redesigning the Machinery Plant Control and Monitoring System, 

and reconfiguring the chilled water system into a zonal system with separation for 

the air conditioning (chilled water) plants. The Navy has not yet made any plans 

to make such changes in future ships, however. 

The LCS 4 TSST, conducted in January 2016, exposed weaknesses in the Independence-variant design. While the shock-hardened auxiliary bow thruster would 

have provided limited post-hit propulsion, much of the ship’s mission capability 

would have been lost because critical support systems such as chilled water are not 

designed for reconfiguration and isolation of damage caused by the initial weapons 

effects or from the ensuing fire and flooding. There were many survivability improvements identified by the trial team that could be implemented in the Independence-variant ships, for example, outfitting the rescue and assistance locker with additional damage control gear to make it a third damage control locker, and modifying the damage control and chill water systems to increase the ability to reconfigure and isolate damaged sections. 

MISSION PACKAGES

The ability of LCS to perform the bulk of its intended missions (SUW, MCM, and 

ASW) depends on the effectiveness of the mission packages. To date, despite LCS 

having being in service since 2008, the Navy has not yet demonstrated effective capability for LCSs equipped with the MCM, SUW, or ASW mission packages. The Increment 2 SUW mission package is the only fielded system on LCS seaframes; it 

has demonstrated some modest ability to aid the ship in defending itself against 

small swarms of fast-inshore attack craft (though not against threat-representative 

numbers and tactics), and the ability to support maritime security operations, such 

as launching an recovering boats and conducting pirate interdiction operations. 

19 

2Legacy MCM capabilities also include Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units and Marine Mammals. 3 ‘‘Ensuring Global Access and Commerce—21st Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare,’’ 

PEO(LMW) / OPNAV N85 Mine Warfare Primer, June 2009. 

Surface Warfare (SUW) 

The Navy has now conducted one operational test of the Increment 2 SUW mission package installed aboard a Freedom variant and one operational test of the 

mission package installed aboard an Independence variant. The ship’s organic 57 

mm gun is augmented with two 30 mm guns and an MH–60R helicopter, which can 

be armed with a machine gun and HELLFIRE missiles. 

For the Freedom variant, the Navy conducted three live-fire engagements aboard 

LCS 3 consisting of a small swarm of fast-inshore attack craft (small boats) under 

the specific conditions detailed in the Navy’s reduced and interim requirement. LCS 

3 achieved mixed results against these small swarms during fiscal year 2014 testing. In the first developmental test, the ship successfully defeated a small swarm 

beyond the prescribed keep out range. In the second developmental test, LCS 3 was 

not successful. Following intensive remedial training to hone the crew’s tactics, shiphandling, and gunnery, LCS 3 repeated the test and was successful in the one operational test event. Although the tests demonstrated that the Freedom variant could 

defeat a small swarm under benign conditions, there is little evidence that such results are repeatable under these same conditions as well as other less favorable conditions. Moreover, the Navy does not have in place intensive training programs for 

small boat defense that enabled the crew to be successful in the last test event, nor 

has the Navy taken my recommendation to develop a shore-based operator-in-theloop team trainer, which has the potential to alleviate some of the uncertainty in 

LCS SUW performance, enable more adequate testing of the ship’s capabilities in 

these scenarios where test resources are scarce, and potentially examine other conditions (such as varying sizes of swarms and interfering traffic). 

In 2015, LCS 4, similar to LCS 3, participated in three engagements with small 

swarms of small boats. LCS 4 failed the Navy’s reduced requirement for interim 

SUW capability, failing to defeat each of the small boats before one penetrated the 

prescribed keep-out zone in two of the three events. Although LCS eventually destroyed or disabled all of the attacking boats in these events, these operational test 

results confirmed that the Increment 2 SUW mission package provides the crew 

with a moderately enhanced self-defense capability (relative to the capability of the 

57 mm gun alone) but not an effective offensive capability. LCS 4’s failure to defeat 

this relatively modest threat routinely under test conditions raises questions about 

its ability to deal with more realistic threats certain to be present in theater, and 

suggests that LCS will be unsuccessful operating as an escort (a traditional frigate 

role) to other Navy ships. Additional details about the LCS gun performance and 

the factors and tactics that contribute to the ship’s effectiveness are discussed in my 

November 2016 classified report. In it, I also detail my recommendations for improving performance and tactics so that these ships might be effective in these scenarios. 

The Navy has begun work on developing and testing the Surface-to-Surface Missile Module (SSMM), the core component of the Increment 3 mission package. Although early developmental testing has shown the Longbow HELLFIRE missile employed from the SSMM has the needed lethality to defeat some of these small boat 

threats, operational testing in 2015 and 2016 revealed some potential limitations in 

the targeting capability of the ship. The Navy intends to conduct additional developmental testing to better understand these limitations; and the results of these tests 

will be used to inform future decisions by the Navy to modify missile targeting algorithms and tactics, as needed to overcome the limitations. The Navy plans to demonstrate the ability to meet the LCS requirements for SUW swarm defense during 

operational testing of the Increment 3 mission package in fiscal year 2018. These 

tests will be the first time that the Navy will have investigated LCS’s ability to defend ships other than itself. 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 

In 2009, the Navy recognized that its legacy MCM capabilities, particularly 

Avenger-class and Osprey-class surface ships and MH–53E Sea Dragon helicopters, 

were aging while the worldwide mine threat continued to modernize. 2 In response 

to the advancing mine threat abroad and planned retirement of legacy assets at 

home, the Navy articulated an overarching vision for 21st-century mine warfare 

hailing the LCS as the ‘‘keystone’’ of the future MCM force. 3 The principal objective 

of the Navy’s MCM vision was ‘‘to decrease significantly the time required to conduct countermeasures operations, while ensuring low risk to naval and commercial 

vessels, and to remove the man from the minefield.’’ The plan was based on the 

20 

4 In Annex A section 5.4 of the LCS Flight 0+ CDD, the Navy further defined baseline mission 

packages as ‘‘those that will contain the full set of Spiral Alpha systems and achieve all Spiral 

Alpha performance attributes contained in this CDD.’’ More recently, the Navy described the 

Increment 4 MCM mission package as the configuration expected to achieve LCS Flight 0+ CDD 

requirements. 

premise that a suite of MCM systems, deployed from an LCS stationed outside the 

minefield, could replace and outpace legacy capabilities that put sailors in harm’s 

way. 

After initially setting high expectations for LCS MCM performance, the Navy continues to temper its outlook. As the Navy embarked on efforts to transform its MCM 

vision to reality, analysts employed performance modeling to estimate the area 

clearance rates of each LCS equipped with a package of MCM systems in a variety 

of operational scenarios, including large-scale scenarios requiring operations of multiple LCSs for sustained periods. These modeling estimates formed the basis for the 

MCM requirements the Navy documented in the LCS Flight 0+ Capabilities Development Document (CDD) approved in 2010. In the CDD, the Navy also postulated 

that remaining development and integration of the systems needed to complete the 

fully capable MCM mission package could be accomplished quickly, indicating that 

‘‘delivery of the first baseline Spiral Alpha MCM mission package is on schedule for 

fiscal year 2012.’’ 4 As it became clear that this optimistic goal would not be met, 

the Navy developed a plan to test and field three ‘‘increments’’ of partial Spiral 

Alpha capability before achieving full Spiral Alpha capability in a fourth and final 

increment. In doing so, the Navy asserted that an LCS equipped with the first partial Spiral Alpha MCM mission package (or Increment 1 MCM mission package) 

would replace aging legacy systems and improve clearance rates by a factor of two. 

The Navy has not yet delivered on the promise of its 21st-century MCM vision, 

even at reduced expectations. The Navy has not yet demonstrated in end-to-end 

testing that the sustained area clearance rate of an LCS equipped with the current 

MCM mission package exceeds its own estimates of legacy clearance rate, nor has 

it demonstrated that an LCS could meet the Navy’s Increment 1 requirements for 

area clearance rate. The Navy has also not yet demonstrated the capability of an 

LCS to conduct efficient MCM operations in an operationally realistic shipping 

channel. Given the currently ineffective and limited line-of-sight communications between LCS and off-board vehicles, an LCS is forced to clear a series of operating 

areas that allow the ship to follow MCM operations as they progress along the channel while remaining within operational range of its off-board systems. This alone 

has the negative effect of vastly increasing mission timelines regardless of the effectiveness of the minehunting and clearing systems LCS employs. In addition, the 

performance demonstrated during LCS developmental testing that has been completed since 2014 provides ample evidence that the small number of LCSs equipped 

with the current MCM mission package that the Navy might be able to muster before fiscal year 2020 would not provide an operational capability to complete MCM 

clearance missions at the levels needed by operational commanders. Even under the 

best conditions the Navy might hope to experience, the technical evaluation in 2015 

revealed that an LCS with the current MCM mission package would deliver less 

than half the Increment 1 requirements, which themselves are a fraction of the full 

Spiral Alpha requirements. 

In a June 2016 early fielding report, based exclusively on the testing conducted 

before 2016, I concluded that an LCS employing the current MCM mission package 

would not be operationally effective or operationally suitable if called upon to conduct MCM missions in combat. In the same early fielding report, I concluded that 

the current versions of the individual systems that comprise the current MCM mission package—specifically the RMS (consisting of the RMMV and AN/AQS–20A) and 

the MH–60S Airborne MCM (AMCM) helicopter equipped with the Airborne Laser 

Mine Detection System (ALMDS) or the AMNS—would not be operationally effective or operationally suitable if called upon to conduct MCM missions in combat. 

The Navy has conducted limited operational testing of the individual systems it 

expected to field in the Increment 1 MCM mission package and has not initiated 

any operational testing of an LCS equipped with an integrated MCM mission package, other than a preliminary cybersecurity assessment. The lack of progress in developing, operationally testing, and fielding a credible, LCS-based MCM capability 

contrasts sharply with the timeline and performance expectations the Navy conveyed in the LCS Flight 0+ CDD. As the Navy attempts to fill capability gaps left 

by canceled programs and correct shortfalls in the performance of the original Spiral 

Alpha systems still in development, it is increasingly likely that the Navy will not 

complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) of either LCS variant 

equipped with the final (fully capable, Spiral Alpha) MCM mission package until at 

21 

5Since 2010, the Navy has canceled the RMMV, OASIS, and RAMICS programs and discontinued use of the MH–60S in towing missions (thereby eliminating its employment of the AN/ 

AQS–20A). 6OPNAV N852 MIWIP 2012 briefing 

7See Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 

Development, and Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Richard Hunt, Director, Navy Staff before the 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, July 

25, 2013 and Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Integration of Capabilities and resources, and Lieutenant General Kenneth J. 

Glueck, Jr., Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration and Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command before the Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2014. 

least 2023, more than a decade after the optimistic schedule set forth in the CDD. 5

Moreover, it is not clear that any future version of the mission package will meet 

the MCM requirements the Navy established in the LCS Flight 0+ CDD. Not surprisingly, I understand the Navy is now considering changes that would reduce 

some requirements for the so-called Spiral Alpha (or final) MCM mission package. 

Although such reductions may ultimately prove necessary to realign expectations 

with technical reality, the operational implications of lower clearance rates include 

longer clearance timelines and more LCSs equipped with MCM mission packages, 

as scenario geometry permits. 

In October 2015, the Navy delayed operational testing of the Independence-variant 

LCS equipped with the first increment of the MCM mission package pending the 

outcome of an independent program review, including an evaluation of potential alternatives to the RMS. The Navy chartered the review in response to an August 21, 

2015, letter from Senators John McCain and Jack Reed, Chairman and Ranking 

Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces expressing concerns about the 

readiness to enter operational testing given the significant reliability problems observed during a technical evaluation in 2015, a topic I have repeatedly reported on 

in previous years. In early 2016, following the completion of the independent review, 

among other actions, the Navy canceled the RMS program, halted further RMMV 

procurement, abandoned plans to conduct operational testing of individual MCM 

mission package increments, and delayed the start of LCS MCM mission package 

IOT&E until at least fiscal year 2020. After canceling the RMS program, the Navy 

also announced its intention to evaluate alternatives to the RMS such as the unmanned surface craft towing improved minehunting sensors, and an improved 

version of the Knifefish unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV). However, the Navy has 

not yet fully funded these potential alternatives. 

Ironically, the Navy’s mine warfare resource sponsor (OPNAV N852) identified a 

multi-function LCS unmanned surface vessel (USV) as a ‘‘game changer’’ and potential RMMV replacement in 2012. 6 In the years that followed, however, Navy officials touted RMMV reliability improvements that never materialized and funded additional RMMV development, but did not prioritize development of a multi-function 

USV capable of integrating with the RMS’s AN/AQS—20 sonar. 7 These choices 

could leave the Navy without a viable means of towing improved AN/AQS–20C sonars when the contractor delivers initial production units next year and could delay 

realistic testing and fielding of the system. By accepting objective analysis of RMMV 

performance and committing to the USV sooner, the Navy could have avoided this 

unfortunate position and saved millions in RMMV development costs. 

The Navy is developing the AN/AQS–20C sonar with upgrades designed to correct 

RMS and AN/AQS–20A minehunting performance shortfalls observed in combined 

developmental and integrated testing. Unless corrected, AN/AQS–20A shortfalls will 

delay completion of LCS-based mine reconnaissance and mine clearance operations. 

Although the Navy has demonstrated the AN/AQS–20A can find some mines when 

employed in ideal conditions, the sonar does not meet its detection and classification 

requirements over the prescribed depth regimes and simultaneously provide adequate coverage against all threats spanning a representative range of operationally 

realistic conditions. In addition, testing has repeatedly shown that AN/AQS–20A 

sensor does not meet Navy requirements for contact depth localization accuracy or 

false classification density (number of contacts erroneously classified as mine-like 

objects per unit area searched). Contact depth localization problems complicate efforts to complete identification and neutralization of mines. False classifications, unless eliminated from the contact list, require identification and neutralization effort, 

result in the expenditure of limited neutralizer assets, and negatively affect the LCS 

sustained area coverage rate. 

Because of funding constraints, the Navy is struggling to implement many of the 

independent review team’s recommendations. Although the Navy now plans to emVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
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ploy the Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) and AN/AQS–20C as the primary replacement for the RMS, even by its own optimistic schedule the Navy will 

not complete IOT&E of the system until at least fiscal year 2021. In addition, the 

program does not appear to have sufficient funding to compare the capabilities of 

the AN/AQS–24 (currently operated in 5th Fleet) to the AQS–20, nor to examine different configurations of MCM mission packages with the two sonars. . 

Many of the Navy’s recent decisions regarding the future composition of the MCM 

mission package have focused on improving surface and subsurface MCM capabilities, but the suite of LCS-based airborne MCM systems, which the Navy plans to 

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2017, is not without problems requiring attention. For example, developmental and operational testing of the MH– 

60S with either the ALMDS or the AMNS has shown that the reliabilities of MH– 

60S and its AMCM mission kit do not support sustained operations at a high tempo. 

Although the ALMDS pods themselves have not been the primary source of mission 

downtime, at least during stateside testing, the associated equipment for conducting 

missions with ALMDS, including the helicopter and AMCM mission kit, together experience a high failure rate (approximately once every 12 flight hours), making sustained LCS-based operations difficult. Similarly, the combined results of MH–60S, 

AMCM mission kit, and AMNS reliability suggest that the integrated AMCM system experiences one operational mission failure every 7 neutralizer launches and 

5.9 flight hours, on average, during AMNS operations. By any measure, system reliability precludes timely and sustained operations. 

The ALMDS does not meet Navy detection/classification requirements, except in 

particularly benign conditions such as those observed during the technical evaluation in 2015. Earlier testing revealed that the system does not meet the Navy’s detection requirement in all depth bins or Navy’s requirement for the average probability of detection and classification across a specified depth band. When the system and operator detect and classify a smaller percentage of mines than predicted 

by fleet planning tools, the MCM commander will likely underestimate the residual 

risk to transiting ships following clearance operations. In favorable conditions, tactics, techniques, and procedures, specifically a multiple-pass technique, has been 

successful in reducing false classifications (erroneous indications of mine-like objects) to the Navy’s acceptable limits. However, in other conditions, the system generates a large number of false classifications that can delay near-surface 

minehunting operations until conditions improve or slow mine clearance efforts because of the need for additional search passes to reduce the number of false classifications. In 2016, the Navy reportedly reallocated funding intended to support nearterm development of ALMDS pre-planned product improvements, to correct some of 

the detection and classification limitations and improve false classification rates. 

The Navy also reported that the improved system would not be available to the LCS 

MCM mission package until at least fiscal year 2021. 

The current increment of the AMNS cannot neutralize mines that are moored 

above the system’s prescribed safe operating ceiling, which will preclude neutralizing most of the mines expected in some likely threat scenarios. In addition to this 

fundamental limitation which precludes the system’s use against many threat 

mines, AMNS performance is frequently degraded by the loss of fiber-optic communications between the aircraft and the neutralizer. The system often experiences 

loss of fiber-optic communications in a wide range of operationally relevant operating conditions, including those that are relatively benign, and has not demonstrated the ability to neutralize mines in even moderate water currents. Although 

the Program Office has stated that it intends to develop an improved AMNS to extend its depth range and potentially improve performance in coarse bottom conditions and higher currents, none of these efforts are funded. The Navy is now considering the Barracuda Mine Neutralization System as a potential alternative to the 

AMNS, but does not expect to commence Barracuda developmental testing until at 

least fiscal year 2022. In the meantime, legacy forces will be needed in all MCM 

missions requiring clearance of near-surface mines. 

The Navy is continuing to develop the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and 

Analysis (COBRA), Knifefish UUV, and Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS), 

but has not yet conducted any operational testing of these systems. However, early 

developmental testing or contractor testing of COBRA Block I and Knifefish have 

revealed problems that, if not corrected, could adversely affect the operational effectiveness or suitability of these systems, in operational testing planned in fiscal year 

2017 or fiscal year 2018, and subsequently the future MCM mission package. In addition, LCS-based communications and launch and recovery problems observed in 

earlier testing of the RMS are likely to affect the upcoming phases of Knifefish and 

UISS operational testing. Thus, it is critically important that developmental and 

operational testing of these systems include end-to-end operations encompassing 

23 

multiple sorties and realistic conditions and communications ranges to identify additional problems that must be corrected prior to fielding. 

During developmental testing of COBRA Block I in early fiscal year 2016, test 

data revealed that the system’s probability of detection is low against small mines 

and mines emplaced in some environmental conditions. Without improvements, the 

capability of the current system will likely be limited in some operationally realistic 

threat scenarios and will not provide the capability needed to satisfy LCS MCM requirements for minehunting in the surf zone and beach zone. The Navy expects the 

COBRA Block II system to include surf zone capability, improved beach zone detection capability against small mines, and nighttime capability. The Navy expects 

these improvements to provide the capability needed to meet LCS MCM requirements in the surf zone and beach zone and expects the Block II system to reach 

IOC in fiscal year 2022. 

Knifefish contractor testing in September 2016 identified a significant problem 

with Knifefish watertight integrity that will require a redesign of components that 

will likely delay the start of operational testing. During testing in October 2016, an 

engineering development model Knifefish UUV broke in half as contractor personnel 

attempted to launch it into the water from a shore base. The Navy and contractor 

have suspended further testing pending the outcome of a root cause investigation 

of the latest failure. Although billed as another potential game changer following 

cancelation of the RMS program, pre-planned product improvements to Knifefish 

are currently unfunded. In fact, the entire Knifefish program is in jeopardy pending 

funding decisions. The program is currently examining the possibility of delaying 

Milestone C indefinitely until additional funding can be provided, which also places 

the delivery of a full MCM mission package in jeopardy on the timelines described 

above. 

The UISS contractor delivered the first engineering development unit only recently and has not yet conducted testing of a production representative system. The 

Navy will need to consider integration challenges that include off-board communications, maintainability, launch and handling equipment and procedures, and the ability of the crew to recover the system safely and reliably. Although the Navy plans 

to characterize UISS performance in dedicated minesweeping scenarios during the 

initial phases of LCS-based testing, operationally realistic testing of the system in 

the combined MCM mission package is essential. The UISS program, similar to 

Knifefish, is also facing the potential of significant delays to the delivery of capability, because of funding shortfalls. 

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 

The Navy has not yet conducted any operational testing of the planned ASW mission package since it is still in the early stages of development. The Navy planned 

an IOC for the mission package in fiscal year 2016 following operational testing in 

fiscal year 2015. Now, however, the earliest the LCS program might achieve IOC 

for the ASW mission package is fiscal year 2019 for the Freedom variant and fiscal 

year 2020 for the Independence variant. The primary causes for these delays are 

higher testing priorities of the other mission packages and the lack of availability 

of ships, which in recent years have been affected by the push for deployments. Additionally much work has gone into a weight reduction program for the sonar and 

handling system, and a re-compete of the variable depth sonar. The Navy recently 

downselected from three vendors, selecting the variable depth sonar and handling 

system, and will begin ship integration efforts in the coming year. IOT&E is now 

planned for 2019. 

The Navy did conduct an at-sea test of an advanced development model of the 

variable depth sonar in September 2014 aboard LCS 1, albeit that test was conducted with a different sonar than was selected in the Navy’s recent decision. Those 

tests showed promising sensor performance in one acoustic environment, and demonstrated the potential of a variable depth sonar, which several other foreign navies 

already employ from their frigates. The operators were highly-cued in that test, 

since they were provided prior knowledge of the target submarine’s position, and the 

submarine did not execute evasion tactics. Given the significant departures from 

operational realism in that test and given the Navy has now chosen to go with a 

different design and vendor, I cannot provide any assessment of the expected effectiveness of the ASW mission package in a real-world combat scenario at this time. 

LCS’s sonar system is specifically optimized for deep water and will not be suitable for some very shallow-water environments such as in the littorals. Its limitations in shallow water are yet to be determined, however, and operational testing 

against diesel-electric submarines will be essential for understanding the ship’s capabilities. Nevertheless, in deep water environments, the ASW mission package has 

the potential to provide LCSs with comparable or enhanced detection capability relVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
24 

ative to other surface ships that employ hull-mounted sonars. LCS will face challenges that other ships do not, particularly the need to tow two systems behind the 

ship reliably. 

The Navy is developing a torpedo countermeasure as part of the ASW mission 

package, which will provide LCSs equipped with that system to counter some, but 

not all, threat torpedoes. The lightweight tow countermeasure is still in development, but the Navy has completed some initial testing of prototypes. Most recently 

the Navy has determined that LCS seaframes will need to be modified for the employment of this system; these changes will be implemented on LCS 7, LCS 10, and 

all future seaframes planned to receive an ASW mission package. The Navy has not 

yet addressed the plan for backfitting these changes in earlier seaframes. Nor is 

there any plan to outfit other LCSs equipped with MCM or SUW mission packages 

with torpedo defense capabilities, making those ships reliant on protection from a 

second LCS, equipped with the ASW mission package, or an Aegis combatant that 

is operating nearby. 

With respect to the ability to engage a submarine once detected, LCS will be less 

capable than Navy frigates or other ASW-capable surface ships. LCS has no organic 

capability to engage submarines and must rely on a single embarked helicopter to 

deliver torpedoes, whereas FFGs have the capacity to launch two helicopters (meaning at least one is more likely to be available), or use over-the-side torpedo launchers to engage nearby targets immediately. LCS, along with other Navy units, will 

suffer from the limitations of the Mk 54 torpedo’s effectiveness and lethality recently discovered in testing; these problems affect LCS, DDGs, P–8, P–3, and helicopter effectiveness in ASW missions, and warrant a concerted effort to correct as 

soon as possible. 

LCS–FRIGATE DESIGN

In December 2015, the Secretary of Defense curtailed the buy of LCSs from 52 

to 40, citing that a rebalancing of capability is needed to ‘‘reverse the trend of 

prioritizing quantity over lethality’’ and ‘‘reduce the number of LCS available for 

presence operations,’’ a need that will be met by other high-end ships. The Secretary’s decision is supported by the results of operational testing and the lack of 

lethality demonstrated by LCS to date. Of those 40, the Navy now plans to build 

the last 12 as a modified version of LCS that is more frigate-like. I have reported 

multiple times on the anticipated capabilities and limitations of the envisioned LCSfrigate; my most comprehensive assessment was provided in recent Congressionallydirected reporting requirements and in the assessment the Secretary requested of 

my office when the Small Surface Combatant Task Force was stood up in late 2014. 

I summarize some of my observations here from that and other recent reports. 

The Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force identified that only major modifications to the existing LCS design could provide the Navy the survivability and 

lethality characteristics of past frigates desired for the future Small Surface Combatant. Because of the Navy’s decision to keep the LCS seaframe, any future small 

combatant will, by and large, inherit the limited survivability characteristics inherent to the LCS design as well as the limitations in space, weight, power, and cooling. 

The Joint Staff recently approved a CDD for the LCS–Frigate. The CDD requires 

that the modified LCS be multi-mission capable, more lethal, and more survivable. 

Its primary missions will be ASW and SUW, but is also required to be capable of 

launching an over-the-horizon missile, albeit without a clearly specified means of 

target designation. Because of the space, weight, power, and cooling limitations inherent in the current LCS design, the LCS-frigate most likely will not meet all of 

the requirements specified in the CDD simultaneously; this was a finding from the 

Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force. It will most likely require swapping 

mission modules or components of the modules to provide either the full mission capability for SUW or ASW, but not all of the capabilities of both mission sets simultaneously. In my estimation, the LCS-frigate will, therefore, not be a true multi-mission frigate. For example, the LCS-frigate configured with full SUW capability, 

would likely only retain an acoustic towed array and towed torpedo countermeasure 

to provide the ship some limited submarine detection capability and a torpedo defense capability, but not an active sonar. While such a configuration is clearly more 

capable than an LCS equipped with the SUW-mission package alone, it does not enable the LCS-frigate to conduct full ASW missions with an active sonar and act as 

an effective escort to high-value naval units. 

Moreover, the ship’s ability to simultaneously be equipped to conduct these missions plus others such as land-attack, anti-ship warfare, or provide local air defense 

to other Navy units (a traditional frigate role) are likely infeasible given the limitaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
25 

8See also the Senate Armed Services Committee letter to Secretary Mabus and Chief of Naval 

Operations Admiral Richardson dated February 5, 2016. 

tions imposed by this design. The Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force identified that if a true multi-mission SUW, ASW, and local area defense air warfare 

capability (for the frigate to be able to act as an escort) are desired, then a major 

design change to the LCS seaframes or a new design would be required. 

I have previously expressed my concern that the CDD relegates all mission performance measures, other than the two measures for force protection against surface 

and air threats, to Key System Attributes rather than Key Performance Parameters, 

which permits the combat capabilities desired in these follow-on ships to be traded 

away as needed to remain within the cost constraints. As a result, the new LCSfrigate could, in the extreme, be delivered with less mission capability than desired 

and with limited improvements to the survivability of the ship in a combat environment. In fact, the LCS-frigate could meet all its KPPs without having any mission 

capability. 

The vulnerability reduction features proposed for the LCS-frigate, while desired 

and beneficial, provide no significant improvement in the ship’s survivability. Notwithstanding potential reductions to its susceptibility due to improved electronic 

warfare system and torpedo defense, minor modifications to LCS (e.g., magazine armoring) will not yield a ship that is significantly more survivable than LCS when 

engaged with threat missiles, torpedoes, and mines expected in major combat operations. The vulnerability reduction features included in the FFGs the Navy has deployed in the past made them significantly more survivable than an LCS. The LCSfrigate requirements do not address the most likely causes of ship and mission loss 

against certain threats. Specifically, the current LCS seaframes do not have sufficient separation and redundancy in their vital systems to recover damaged capability. Because the LCS-frigate design is not substantially different from the LCS 

Flight 0+ baseline and will not add much more redundancy or greater separation 

of critical equipment or additional compartmentation, it will be less survivable than 

the Navy’s previous frigate class. 

The Navy does plan several susceptibility reduction features to offset the abovedescribed limitations of the seaframes. Testing has demonstrated that while the proposed susceptibility reduction features are clearly desirable, they do not reduce susceptibility to being hit to a value at all close to zero. Therefore, the incorporation 

of these features does not allow the assumption the ships will not be hit in highintensity combat. The susceptibility reduction features to be incorporated in the 

LCS-frigate would not eliminate the possibility of being hit, and would, therefore, 

not provide significant improvement in the ship’s overall survivability relative to the 

current LCS. 

Finally, while the Navy is examining methods to reduce weight, it is anticipated 

the LCS-frigate, because of the simultaneous employment of ASW and SUW equipment, will be significantly heavier than the existing LCS resulting in a lower maximum sprint speed and less fuel endurance. The loss of sprint speed will therefore 

affect its success in small boat swarm defense, and its ability to keep up with a carrier strike group. 

At a recent Surface Navy Association national symposium, the Secretary of the 

Navy redesignated LCS as a frigate, stating that LCS can ‘‘deploy with a carrier 

strike group,’’ has ‘‘robust anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare capabilities’’ and 

‘‘is capable of putting the enemy fleet on the bottom of the ocean.’’ 8 None of these 

claims appear to be supported by the current capabilities demonstrated in testing, 

and instead describe a ship that is not yet built and under current Navy plans may 

never be built. Current LCSs do not have the endurance to deploy with a carrier 

strike group, its ASW and MCM mission packages do not yet exist, LCS has no antiship weapon to sink enemy combatants, and only a limited capability to sink a few 

small fast attack craft as I previous described. Some subset of these capabilities may 

yet come to fruition in the coming years; however, currently, LCS’s limited lethality 

make these ships a shadow of the abilities of modern navy frigates. 

FUTURE TEST AND EVALUATION PLANS

In response to conditions that the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization 

Act placed on the availability of LCS program funding, the Navy successfully completed a partial update of the LCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) to support future OT&E of the seaframes and mission packages. Congress required the 

update to support planning of the needed testing of the Increment 3 SUW mission 

package, the ASW mission package, to reflect the significant changes to the program’s air defense plans, as well as MCM mission package development and comVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
26 

position. I approved the change pages to the TEMP in March 2016. Additional updates are now required to complete a revision to the TEMP, including developmental and integrated testing plans, changes to reflect the Navy’s evolving plans 

for the MCM mission package, air defense testing of the seaframes, and plans for 

providing seaframes with an over-the-horizon missile capability. 

In closing, I would like to emphasize that operational, live-fire, and operationallyrealistic developmental testing have been essential in identifying the significant 

problems that need to be overcome for this program to be successful. Although I had 

predicted the poor performance in my earlier reporting on the MCM mission package, it was only in testing of the full mission package, at sea, and aboard the ship 

with a trained crew that the Department was able to discover the significant problems and shortfalls that crews would face in MCM missions. In fact, the Navy’s 

independent review team emphasized that a reliance on shore-based metrics and 

shore-based testing ‘‘provided a false sense of [system] maturity’’. Similarly, only in 

operationally-realistic testing of the SUW mission package were the inaccuracies of 

the gun, the limitations of the ship’s maneuvering and tactics, and the deficient 

training revealed, and the overall effectiveness of the ship in those missions characterized. Testing should not be limited to only self-defense scenarios (as has been 

suggested by a narrow reading of the requirements), but should examine the LCS’s 

ability to escort other ships, as a frigate would. I continue to recommend to the 

Navy that adequate developmental and operational testing be funded and conducted 

to ensure that the future capabilities envisioned for LCS are adequately characterized, and problems discovered and fixed prior to deployment and future procurements. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Secretary Stackley? 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF NAVY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today to address the Littoral Combat Ship Program. 

With your permission, I would like to make a brief opening statement and have my full testimony entered into the record. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Mr. STACKLEY. The Littoral Combat Ship, or LCS, is designed to 

fill critical warfighting gaps in anti-surface, anti-submarine, and 

mine countermeasure warfare mission areas. Within the Navy’s 

overall balanced force structure, LCS is the replacement for three 

legacy small service command ship classes. It is about one-third the 

size of a DDG–51-class destroyer and designed for missions that 

the destroyer is not equipped to do or that could otherwise be well 

performed by a small surface combatant, thus freeing the destroyer 

for missions tailored for its higher-end capabilities. 

LCS’ reduced size results in greatly reduced procurement cost, 

manpower and operating and support costs. In fact, the procurement cost for LCS is about one-third that of a DDG–51 and, likewise, the manpower requirements for the ship. 

The LCS hull is designed and built to provide the ship with its 

high-speed mobility, damage control survivability, aviation, and 

combat systems, including a 57-millimeter gun, surface to air missiles for self-defense, and an over-the-horizon missile that the Navy 

is currently adding for offensive firepower against long-range surface targets. In addition to this core capability, this ship carries a 

modular mission package tailored for the missions planned for each 

ship’s deployment. 

27 

The Surface Warfare Mission Package adds 30-millimeter guns, 

an armed helicopter, unmanned aerial vehicle for extended surveillance, and surface-to-surface missiles. The Anti-Submarine Warfare, or ASW, Mission Package adds a variable depth sonar that 

operates in tandem with a multifunction towed array, an ASW helicopter with dipping sonar, sonobuoys and anti-drop torpedoes, antitow decoy. The Mine Countermeasure Mission Package adds air, 

unmanned surface, and unmanned underwater vehicles with associated sensors and systems to detect and neutralize mines. 

There are four cornerstones of the program that I would like to 

briefly summarize. First, the shipbuilding program. As the committee is well aware, the LCS program was initiated with unrealistic cost and schedule estimates and with highly incomplete design, resulting in extraordinary budget overruns and scheduled 

growth. The program was subsequently restructured. Production 

was placed on hold pending the insertion of production readiness 

reviews to verify design quality and completeness. Authorizations 

to approve design requirement changes was raised to the four-star 

level, specifically the CNO and myself. 

Navy oversight of the shipyards was greatly increased. The acquisition strategy was restructured to compete long-term contracts 

under fixed price terms and conditions. In response to the strategy, 

industry made significant investments in terms of skilled, labor, 

and facilities to improve productivity and quality. 

As a result, costs, schedule, and quality have greatly improved 

such that current ships under construction are delivering at less 

than half the constant year-dollar cost of the lead ships, performance has stayed reliably within the budget throughout this time, 

and the quality of each ship has successively improved as measured by the Navy’s Board of Inspection survey. Bottom line, LCS 

construction is stable, and performance continues to improve on a 

healthy learning curve. 

Of note, the CNO and I have implemented a similar rule set 

across all of shipbuilding, and though we were not able to get out 

in front of all of our lead ship programs, cost discipline from requirements, to design, to production and testing has been firmly 

drilled into place throughout the Navy. 

Second, mission packages. The program’s acquisition strategy is 

that we will incrementally introduce weapon systems as part of a 

mission package when they are mature and ready for deployment. 

Consistent with this approach, the LCS has been successful at integrating mature weapon systems, such as the Image 60 helicopter, 

the Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle, 11-meter rigid hull inflatable boats [RHIBs], the Mark 50 30-millimeter gun system, and 

most recently we are seeing the Harpoon Block II over-the-horizon 

missile integrated and deployed. We are currently integrating the 

Hellfire Longbow Missile in support of testing in 2017. As a result, 

we have successfully fielded the first increments of the Surface 

Warfare Mission Package and are on track to complete the next increment in 2018. 

The next mission package we will field is the Anti-Submarine 

Warfare, or ASW, Mission Package. The performance of this system, as demonstrated by its prototype in 2014, greatly exceeds that 

of any other ASW sensor system afloat. We are currently in the 

28 

process of awarding the contract to build the developmental model 

which will be put to sea for shipboard testing on LCS in 2018. 

These are relative success stories that demonstrate the benefit 

provided by the LCS modular design and mission package approach. As the Navy develops or requires new weapons systems appropriate to the LCS mission, we will leverage the ship’s modular 

design and flow these new weapons to this ship, and be able to do 

so in rapid fashion once they are mature. 

We have run headlong, however, into challenges with developing 

these capabilities that are central to filling what is arguably one 

of the Navy’s most critical warfighting gaps, and that is mine countermeasures, or MCM, warfare. The Navy requirements for LCS/ 

MCM are to locate, identify, and clear mines at a rate that significantly exceeds our current capability, and to do so without putting 

the ship or the sailor into the minefield. 

The MCM Warfare Mission Package airborne capability and 

MH–60 helicopter, carrying an Airborne Laser Mine Detection System that locates mines in the upper layer of the water column, and 

an Airborne Mine Neutralization System that destroys mines below 

the surface, has completed testing and we are ready to deploy it. 

Additionally, an unmanned aerial vehicle carrying a sensor capable 

of detecting mine-like objects in the surf zone close to shore is on 

track to complete testing in 2017. 

The true workhorse of the MCM Mission Package, however, is 

the high-endurance unmanned vehicle with its towed sonar system, 

which we rely upon to achieve the high area clearance rate required by our operational plans. The Navy is satisfied with the performance of the towed sonar system and its ability to detect mines 

as demonstrated in developmental testing. We expect to demonstrate further improvements to the sonar in conjunction with ongoing upgrades. 

The unmanned vehicle, however, which is actually a semi-submersible, referred to as a remote multi-mission vehicle, has failed 

to meet our reliability requirements. Despite extensive redesign efforts, following a series of test failures, we stopped testing and assigned an independent review team to assess and recommend. The 

results of this review were threefold: low confidence that continuing our current path would result in a reliable vehicle; higher 

confidence that advances in towed sonar handling and acoustic 

processing have greatly reduced the risk associated with towing the 

mine detection sonar with an alternative unmanned surface vehicle; and recognition that the long-term solution will be to eliminate 

the towed vehicle altogether, and operate with an unmanned underwater vehicle with an embedded sonar when technology can 

support it. 

As a result of these findings, we have restructured the MCM 

Mission Package to utilize the unmanned surface vehicle that is 

currently being built to tow the Mine Sweeping System to likewise 

tow the mine detection sonar. Testing with this vehicle is scheduled 

to commence in 2019. 

The third cornerstone is performance of in-service ships. Vice Admiral Rowden will address performance of the ships and operations 

and on deployment as well as the details of the LCS review he conducted. I would like to address the ship’s material readiness. 

29 

In total, LCS material readiness, as reflected in operational 

availability metrics and casualty report metrics, is consistent with 

other combatant ship classes. However, over the past year five 

ships have been operationally impacted by engineering casualties 

of concern. The Navy has conducted formal engineering reviews 

and command investigations to assess the root causes and corrective actions for each of these casualties. 

One was design related. A new manufacturer was required for 

the Freedom-variant propulsion gear, and operational deficiency 

traced to the gear itself resulted in the gear’s clutch failure. Design 

modifications have been developed, and are being tested, and will 

be incorporated in future ships prior to delivery and during proshakedown availability for the two ships delivered that are affected. The manufacturer is being held accountable. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, you will have to summarize 

here. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We have a limited amount of time and four 

witnesses. Please summarize if you can. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The manufacturer is being held accountable for these corrective actions. 

Two of the five engineering casualties were due to crews departing from established operating procedures. The type commander is 

implementing corrective actions associated with those to ensure 

good order and discipline going forward, as well as reviewing training and operational procedures. 

The remaining two casualties are traced to deficiencies in ship 

construction and repair. We are reviewing all those procedures 

across not just the shipbuilders, but the manufacturers, and the repair yards, and the Navy standards to ensure we have the right 

procedures in place and that they are properly being carried out by 

the shipbuilders and repair yards. In those specific cases where 

warranties apply, the shipbuilder is paying for those repairs. 

More importantly, we do need to raise the level of engineering 

design, and discipline, and rigor on the new ship class to that of 

zero tolerance for departure from standards. In this vein the Naval 

Sea Systems Command has initiated a comprehensive engineering 

review, and will provide their findings to the committee upon completion of the review. 

The fourth cornerstone is transition to the frigate. As you are 

aware, we have revised the plan going forward for small surface 

combatants. Commencing in 2019, our intention is to transition 

from LCS to a multi-mission ship that incorporates the ASW plus 

the Surface War Mission Package capabilities of the LCS into a 

multi-mission frigate going forward. We are working that design 

today. 

The message I want delivered to this committee is that as we 

complete this design, before we proceed into production of a future 

frigate, we will conduct the production readiness reviews. We will 

ensure that the design is complete and ready to go. We will ensure 

that the requirements are stable, and we will open the books and 

invite this committee to participate throughout that review process. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important program. I look forward to answering your questions. 

30 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stackley and VADM Thomas S. 

Rowden follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE SEAN J. STACKLEY AND VADM THOMAS

S. ROWDEN

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the current status of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, specifically to discuss the 

outcomes and implementation of the LCS Review, status of the delivered ships and 

the mission packages, and the current status of the transition from LCS to Frigate 

(FF). We appreciate the opportunity to provide the Navy’s assessment of the various 

issues raised of late as well as provide an update on the significant progress we 

have made in the program over the last few years. 

INTRODUCTION

The LCS program is of critical importance to our Navy. It consists of a modular, 

reconfigurable Seaframe, designed to meet validated Fleet requirements for Surface 

Warfare (SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine Countermeasures 

(MCM) missions in the littoral region through the use of modular mission packages 

(MPs). LCS was designed as a focused-mission surface combatant to replace our legacy small surface combatants; Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigates, Avenger-class 

MCMs, and Patrol Craft. The ship, independent of an embarked mission, package 

provides air warfare self-defense capability with anti-air missiles, a high rate of fire 

57mm gun, 3D air search radar, electronic warfare systems, and decoys for electronic warfare. The Navy is currently adding a capability improvement that outfits 

each deployed LCS with an Over the Horizon (OTH) Missile system. LCS ships will 

embark an aviation detachment and helicopter along with a vertical take-off unmanned air vehicle (referred to as Fire Scout). With its shallow draft, great speed, 

and interchangeable modules, LCS will provide increased warfighting flexibility to 

our Fleet and close critical warfighting gaps in mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare. The modular, open systems architecture inherent in LCS 

allows for rapid, affordable integration of new warfighting capabilities as technology 

evolves. This approach is consistent with the objectives of Defense Strategic Guidance directive to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to 

achieve our security objectives. LCS complements our surface fleet and brings 

unique strengths and capabilities to the Fleet’s mission. She will be our predominant MCM capability, and will deliver game changing ASW capability at an affordable cost while freeing up the higher end multi-mission large surface combatants 

to focus on their primary missions such as area air defense, land strike, and ballistic 

missile defense. With 67 percent of Surface Combatant Total Life Cycle Cost being 

driven by operations and sustainment (O&S) costs, the LCS and Frigate (deployed 

more than half of their lifecycle and costing less than one third the O&S of a DDG 

per deployed year) provide fleet commanders with the quantity of ships needed that 

are capable of accomplishing critical missions within a challenging budget environment. 

The LCS is capable of operating in a wide range of environments, from the open 

ocean to coastal, shallow water regions known as the littorals. LCS uses an open 

architecture design, modular weapons and sensor systems, and a variety of manned 

and unmanned vehicles to help gain and sustain maritime supremacy in the 

littorals, assuring access to critical areas of operation. LCS will be an integral component in countering adversary anti-access/area denial operations: clearing mines; 

neutralizing enemy submarines; and defeating hostile swarming surface craft. The 

Navy plans for LCS to be used in rotational deployments in support of our nation’s 

rebalance efforts to the Western Pacific. As LCS forward presence increases, these 

ships will play a significant role in defense cooperation and naval engagements that 

contribute to maintaining freedom of the seas while deterring conflict and coercion. 

The 2013 deployment of USS Freedom (LCS 1) to the Asia-Pacific region demonstrated the ability of LCS to conduct several of the core missions of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Freedom and her crews conducted operations and exercises, ranging from demonstrating forward presence while executing 

operational tasking in the South China Sea to providing humanitarian assistance/ 

disaster relief support in the Philippines following Super Typhoon Haiyan. USS Fort 

Worth (LCS 3) deployed to the Asia Pacific Region in November 2014 and assisted 

in the AirAsia plane recovery search efforts and multiple international exercises. 

Most recently, USS Coronado (LCS 4) deployed to Singapore which marks the first 

31 

overseas deployment of the Independence variant in which she will participate in a 

full range of LCS missions to include opportunities to operate with partner nations. 

Currently, there are eight LCS in the Fleet, with another eighteen on contract. 

By 2018, LCS will be the second largest surface ship class in the Navy. The designs 

are stable, new yard facilities are in place, with a right-sized, qualified work force, 

and both shipyards and industry teams are in full serial production in order to ensure each can deliver two ships per year. Today, the LCS program is on budget and 

below the Congressional cost cap. The block buy contracts for the fiscal year (FY) 

2010 through fiscal year 2016 ships resulted in continued reductions in the LCS 

shipbuilding program’s production unit costs, and both shipyards are building these 

ships in an affordable manner. 

With a stable design and a mature production line, we have been able to make 

significant progress in completing both ship and mission package testing requirements. Both variants have completed initial operational test and evaluation 

(IOT&E) and have achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC). This year both 

variants conducted Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) approved 

Live Fire Test and Evaluation Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST) events. Our detailed 

analysis of the shock trial’s results is in progress but all test objectives were met. 

Both the Freedom and Independence variant ships demonstrated the ability to survive the degrading effects of the underwater shock event associated with the closeproximity detonation of a 10,000 pound charge. We have now completed all required 

testing for the ships themselves and are incorporating lessons learned from that 

testing into future LCS and FF ships. 

Additionally, we continue testing and making progress for all three mission packages on both variants, incrementally bringing new capability to the Fleet. 

• Surface Warfare Mission Package (SUW MP): The SUW MP will make LCS the 

most capable ship in the Navy in countering the Fast Inshore Attack Craft/Fast 

Attack Craft (FIAC/FAC) threat. The Navy is delivering this capability in three 

increments with full MP IOC anticipated in fiscal year 2020: o Increments 1 

and 2 consist of an Aviation Module (MH–60R with Hellfire Missiles), a Maritime Security Module (two 11-meter manned rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs), 

and two 30mm guns. Increments 1 and 2 for the SUW MP, achieved IOC in 

2014. This has allowed the Fleet to deploy LCS with enhanced SUW capability, 

most recently with the current deployment of USS Coronado to the Western Pacific. 

o Increment 3 consists of the Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) 

armed with the Longbow Hellfire Missile. 

o USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), with an embarked SUW MP, conducted an extended 

operational deployment based out of Singapore. This SUW MP included a 

composite aviation detachment of one MQ–8B Fire Scout VTUAV and one 

MH–60R helicopter. This was the first time that such a combination had been 

deployed. The SUW MP, through its Maritime Security Module and aviation 

components, was extensively employed during the ship’s search and rescue efforts for Air Asia flight 8501 in January 2015. 

• Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package (ASW MP): The ASW MP will significantly increase the Navy’s ASW capability and capacity. It consists of three 

modules netted together to continuously exploit real-time undersea data: a Torpedo Defense and Countermeasures Module (Light Weight Tow); an ASW Escort 

Module (Multi-Function Towed Array Acoustic Receiver (MFTA) and Variable 

Depth Sonar (VDS)); and an Aviation Module (MH–60R Helicopter and 

VTUAV). The ASW MP had a successful at-sea demo in 2014. ASW Escort Mission Module testing will commence in fiscal year 2018 in support of IOC in fiscal year 2019. 

• Mine Countermeasure Mission Package (MCM MP): The MCM MP will replace 

aging legacy MCM equipment, significantly reducing the timeline for access to 

the contested littorals and removing the ship and crew from the minefield. The 

Navy is delivering this capability in four increments, with full MP IOC in fiscal 

year 2021: o Increment 1 consists of a Minehunting Vehicle towing a Sonar 

Mine Detecting Set, an Airborne Laser Mine Detection Set (ALMDS), an Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), and the MH–60S Helicopter. This 

increment provides the capability to detect waterborne mine threats throughout 

the water column and on the sea floor. IOC was declared in November 2016 for 

ALMDS and AMNS. 

o Increment 2 consists of Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis 

(COBRA) and VTUAV which provides the capability to detect mine threats 

and obstacles on the beach and in the surf zone. 

32 

o Increment 3 consists of an Unmanned Influence Sweep System and an Unmanned Surface Vehicle which provides the capability to sweep acoustic and 

magnetic mine threats throughout the water column and on the sea floor. 

o Increment 4 consists of the Surface MCM Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 

(UUV) (Knifefish) which provides the capability to detect, classify and identify 

bottom and volume mines, including buried mines and stealthy mines. 

As you are aware, the Navy is in the midst of a transition from focused mission 

LCS platforms with modular Mission Packages to a multi-mission FF capable of conducting simultaneous anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and anti-submarine warfare 

(ASW) missions as well as providing effective air, surface and underwater self-defense capabilities. It will be equipped with OTH surface-to-surface missiles in addition to LCS baseline SUW and ASW MP capabilities, and have additional upgrades 

to combat systems, electronic warfare systems, and ship survivability features. The 

FF will complement our inherent blue water capability and fill warfighting gaps in 

the littorals and strategic choke points around the world. 

STATUS OF DELIVERED SHIPS

Each of the eight LCS that are in service was delivered at a successively lower 

cost, and with improved reliability as compared to their predecessors. We continue 

to capture lessons learned and refine the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for operating these ships forward, as demonstrated, for example, by the development and 

execution of the Expeditionary Maintenance Capability (EMC). During USS Fort 

Worth’s (LCS 3) deployment to the South China Sea from November 2014 through 

January 2016, she followed the LCS maintenance and sustainment model, pulling 

into port every 4–6 weeks for a week-long preventative maintenance availability and 

every 4–6 months for a two-week corrective maintenance availability and core crew 

turnover. Although this maintenance was typically conducted in the LCS Forward 

Operating Station (FOS) in Singapore, the EMC concept also allowed this maintenance to be conducted in Sasebo, Japan, to better support USS Fort Worth’s tasking 

in the Northwest Pacific. This EMC approach has significantly expanded the operational employment of the LCS in theater, allowing the ships to operate for extended periods far removed from the FOS. The same capability was delivered to 

Singapore in advance of USS Coronado’s arrival to support the execution of planned 

maintenance in remote locations for the Independence variant as well. This model 

was proven effective at supporting sustained forward deployed operations. 

During her deployment, USS Fort Worth conducted U.S. and multinational operations from India to Japan and also successfully demonstrated the ability to perform 

in high-tempo environments just days after entering theater. USS Fort Worth’s first 

12 months forward offer significant insight into the potential of these ships: 

• Operated side-by-side and hull-to-hull with valued Southeast and South Asia 

partners during seven theater security cooperation (CARAT) exercises, MALABAR with India and with Northeast Asian allies during OPLAN training operations (FOAL EAGLE); • Contributed to theater CONOPs by executing freedom of navigation and presence operations in the South China Sea; • Supported multi-national Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response missions, 

such as the search and recovery mission for AirAsia flight 8501 on 96-hours’ notice less than one week after arriving in Singapore; and • Executed an expeditionary maintenance period in Sasebo, Japan and leveraged 

fueling resources in Subic Bay, Philippines, thus extending LCS’s operational 

range and bringing the logistical hub-and-spoke model to life. 

USS Freedom completed a 10-month (pre-IOC) deployment in 2013, conducting 

similar operations in the same locations as USS Fort Worth. Comparing the reliability and maintenance records of these two deployments, only a year apart, demonstrates how effectively the LCS Fleet has incorporated lessons learned and best 

practices to improve operational availability. During an equivalent 10-month period, 

USS Fort Worth was underway 33 percent more, spent less time pierside conducting 

maintenance, conducted maintenance away from Singapore, and experienced fewer 

casualties. These initial deployments of the USS Fort Worth and USS Freedom demonstrate the increasing capabilities that LCS will continue to bring to the Navy as 

the program matures. 

As we increase our operational experience with LCS, we are closely monitoring 

material readiness and making changes, as warranted to improve operational availability. In total, LCS readiness as reflected in operational availability and casualty 

report metrics is consistent with other combatant ship classes. However, we are 

quickly and strongly addressing issues as they emerge to raise the system reliability 

to yet higher levels sooner in this new class. Of particular concern, five LCS class 

33 

ships have been operationally impacted by propulsion casualties in the past year. 

The Navy has conducted formal engineering reviews and command investigations to 

assess the root cause and corrective action for each of the casualties. In general, the 

root causes can be broken into three separate categories: procedural non-compliance 

(failure to follow approved engineering procedures); design related deficiencies; or 

production-related deficiencies. 

Two of the five engineering casualties were related to procedural (non-) compli- ance: The first such casualty occurred onboard USS Fort Worth while inport Singapore, 

after 12 months of her 14 month maiden deployment. As a result of improper alignment of the lube oil service system (as outlined by the ship’s Engineering Operating 

Procedures), three of the five bearings in the Combining Gear were damaged and 

USS Fort Worth was unable to continue her mission in the western Pacific. Upon 

completion of repairs, the ship departed Singapore and returned to San Diego in 

early October 2016. 

The second casualty related to procedural (non-) compliance occurred onboard 

USS Freedom while inport San Diego. Improper corrective action following the routine failure of Freedom’s Main Propulsion Diesel Engine (MPDE) attached seawater 

pump mechanical seal resulted in seawater contamination of the engine. Upon subsequent inspection, significant corrosion and damage was discovered inside the 

MPDE. The affected engine is planned for replacement commencing December 2016. 

In response to these procedural compliance issues, the type commander has conducted a formal investigation and root cause analysis on both casualties. The commander, Naval Surface Forces directed an engineering stand down for all LCS-class 

crews to review, evaluate, and renew their commitment to safe ship operation, procedural compliance, and good engineering practices. Additionally, the Navy’s Surface 

Warfare Officer’s School Command is revising the current LCS training program, 

to include LCS specific engineering training and related proficiency examinations. 

In parallel, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is reviewing design details 

for potential design enhancements that may mitigate the possibility of such operator 

errors. One of the five engineering casualties was specifically design-related: 

While operating USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) on all four engines at full power during 

transit in the Atlantic, an emergency stop of the gas turbine engines led to excessive 

wear of the high speed clutch causing damage to the high speed clutch and combining gear. Root cause analysis is in progress, but the combining gear on LCS 5 

and follow is a new design (prior manufacturer ceased operations), and changes to 

the control logic for the de-clutch sequence and clutch piston release speed associated with the new design are apparent causes. Design modifications based on root 

causes have been developed and are being tested by Lockheed Martin and RENK 

(the gear manufacturer), in parallel with ongoing root cause analysis efforts. Pending satisfactory testing this month (December 2016), the associated high speed 

clutch modifications and machinery control software updates will be applied to LCS 

9 and follow prior to delivery and LCS 5 and 7 during their Post Shakedown Availabilities (PSAs). LCS 1 and LCS 3 gear sets are not affected. 

The remaining two engineering casualties trace to deficiencies in the ship construction process: 

USS Coronado (LCS 4) experienced a failure of the flexible shaft coupling between 

the starboard MPDE reduction gear and stern tube during transit from Hawaii to 

Singapore. A failure review board was convened, and while material testing of the 

failed coupling is still in progress, shaft misalignment has been identified as a contributing factor in the root cause analysis. An alignment summit with the shipbuilder, NAVSEA design engineers, the Original Equipment Manufacturer, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, and the Program Office has since been conducted to review, validate, and better document waterborne alignment procedures. The coupling 

in LCS 4 was replaced with a new coupling design in Hawaii. USS Coronado is now 

on station in Singapore on her maiden deployment. This new coupling design has 

already been installed on LCS 6 and follow ships. 

USS Montgomery (LCS 8) experienced a production deficiency related propulsion 

casualty shortly after sail away from the new construction shipyard. Prior to getting 

underway, the crew discovered seawater contamination in the steering hydraulic 

system for one of the four waterjets. The shipbuilder drained the system, replaced 

the system’s seawater cooler, and flushed the system restoring full waterjet 

functionality. The root cause assessment determined that the cooler had not failed, 

but rather contamination was introduced into the system most likely in conjunction 

with the repair of a component external to the hull in the period between delivery 

and sailaway from the building yard. The shipbuilder has since implemented an improved procedure for waterborne waterjet hydraulic work. 

34 

The Navy has taken a consistent and rigorous approach in assessing and addressing root causes of equipment casualties in LCS. Early deficiencies in the designs of 

each variant have been addressed in follow ships, but there is still work to be done 

in increasing the operational availability of the ships in-service. In response, 

NAVSEA has initiated a comprehensive engineering review of both propulsion 

trains, to include logistics and training, and will report their findings upon completion of the review. 

LCS REVIEW

In February of this year, the Navy initiated a review of the LCS program to assess the concept of operations based on lessons learned from Fleet operations and 

the early operational deployments of the ships. The review focused on LCS crewing, 

training, and maintenance based on experience gained and lessons learned by the 

program and Fleet during operations and ship deployments. The review noted that 

USS Fort Worth’s deployment many successes must be replicated on a larger scale 

and setting conditions for crews to excel forward is the Navy’s first priority. With 

this in mind, the Review Team identified challenges with regard to manning, crew 

training, maintenance, and operational testing, identifying immediate and longer 

term recommendations to address those challenges, reduce risk, and strengthen the 

program. Immediate recommendations and enabling actions include the following: 

• Single crew Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) hulls—As more hulls are delivered, 

pairing a single crew to a ship in construction for approximately 18 months allows the pre-commissioning crew to ‘‘grow with their ship’’ and places experienced crews where they matter most: on ships deployed forward. • Forward Deploy all LCS in Blue/Gold Crewing Construct—Implementing a 

Blue/Gold crew rotation approach will result in two crews rotating to the same 

hull every 4–5 months, forging a ‘‘cycle of virtue’’ between the two crews who 

will consistently turn the same ship over to each other. • Fuse the Core Crew and Mission Modules Detachments—Although the overall 

number of personnel remains the same, merging core crews and mission module 

detachments into a single fused crew dedicated to a single mission will improve 

enlisted rating utilization, create crew stability, and reduce complexity. • Stand up of a Maintenance Execution Team (MET)—Due to a LCS’ small crew 

size, maintenance that would traditionally be performed by the crew on other 

vessels is outsourced to contractors for LCS. The LCS review recommended 

standing up a MET comprised of support from off-hull, Active and Reserve 

Duty, and LCS Squadron Sailors to conduct preventive maintenance. The review found that minimally manned ships require a pool of trained personnel to 

fill watchbill and specialty qualification gaps. The MET would also serve to relieve the unforeseen tasking of ‘‘shadow hours’’ whereby crew members merely 

shadow contractors for force protection, security and safety purposes. The MET 

will conduct preventive maintenance while learning the operation and maintenance of their equipment, thereby reducing wasted manhours and increasing 

crew ownership. Additionally, a forward-deployed team (Destroyer Squadron 7) 

will complement MET functions overseas while also performing material assessments. • Lengthen LCS Crew Turnover in Theatre to Include an O–6 Assessment—As recommended in the recent USS Fort Worth Command Investigation, this longer 

time period will enhance the oncoming crew’s situational awareness and allow 

the combined crews to perform critical maintenance tasks together if needed. 

Broadly resembling an approach used in SSGN turnovers, O–6 assessments 

during turnovers will provide leadership greater awareness of crew readiness. 

In addition to the immediate recommendations listed above, the review team identified the following longer-term recommendations: 

• Establish Testing Ships—Assign the first four LCS ships (LCS 1 – 4) as dedicated CONUS-based testing, training, and surge platforms through Mission 

Package IOC, to be manned by a single crew and commanded by a post command LCS O–5 commander to insulate deploying ships from broader testing requirements. The ships will be maintained at deployable configurations and upgraded, as planned, to support the myriad of operational functions and integration intricacies of the associated mission packages to fully support testing. We 

will evaluate the effectiveness of these assets for this purpose in the near term, 

and if it becomes evident that a dedicated land-based facility would prove more 

efficient and effective, adjust accordingly. 

• Establish Training Ships—Beyond the four test ships, divide the remaining 24 

ships into six four-ship divisions of the same variant including a dedicated 

training ship in each division. Of the four ships, retain one training ship in 

35 

CONUS to certify the Blue/Gold crews that will man the three forward deployed 

ships of each division. This approach provides a surge-ready LCS Fleet with 

more operational availability forward and an improved blend of ownership and 

stability. To support this concept, we will also homeport all Independence variant ships in San Diego, CA and all Freedom variant ships in Mayport, FL over 

time. • Steady State: Establish Blue/Gold Crewing Construct with Training Ships—A 

Blue/Gold deployment approach is projected to present a more optimal rotational posture. This concept creates six four-ship divisions of the same variant 

including a dedicated training ship in each division. Of the four ships, one 

training ship will remain in CONUS to certify the Blue/Gold crews that will 

man the three forward deployed ships of each division. Also referred to as 7:4:3 

(seven crews, four hulls, three ships forward), this approach provides a surgeready LCS Fleet with more operational availability forward and an improved 

blend of ownership and stability beyond the legacy LCS operational 3:2:1 concept. 

In the course of this study, it became clear that the LCS crewing construct is the 

critical variable that most impacts other factors such as manning, training, maintenance, and—most importantly—operations. The LCS Review Team assessed manpower requirements in detail and implementation of these recommendations are underway. Changing to a Blue/Gold crew rotation (a tried-and-true model proven by 

the submarine Fleet) will increase LCS Sailors’ familiarity with specific ship systems, enabling the crew to have a greater sense of ownership in their ships. 

Our assessment is that the recommended solutions from the Navy’s recent review 

of LCS will yield the results needed to increase forward presence and provide a 

proven capability to our fleet commanders. 

FULL SHIP SHOCK TRIALS (FSST)

As part of the DOT&E approved Live Fire Test and Evaluation Plan for the LCS 

program, Full Ship Shock Trials were conducted on USS Jackson (Independence var- iant) and USS Milwaukee (Freedom variant) this summer. The unprecedented 

achievement of completing FSST on two different ships in a single test was the positive result of efficient test execution and effective ship performance under shock 

loading. Data collected during FSST is used to validate the models used to predict 

how a ship reacts to an underwater shock event. The results of the FSST, as well 

as other testing and modeling efforts, are then used to determine the overall survivability of the ship against the specified set of threats that the ship is required to 

meet. 

The LCS Program Office accomplished all FSST test objectives within budget, for 

both ship variants, demonstrating that the ships and ships’ systems are able to survive the degrading effects of an underwater shock event. Initial results indicate that 

ship performance was consistent with requirements and the data collected shows a 

strong correlation to the modeling and simulations done before the trials. Data analysis is ongoing with final test reports expected in the third quarter of fiscal year 

2017. 

In advance of the final report, the significant findings have been analyzed and 

recommended design changes are being assessed for incorporation into follow on 

hulls. In the Independence variant, modifications to some structural details in specific forward fuel tanks and bulkheads are being assessed and planned. The design 

work is complete and associated modifications will be accomplished in LCS 6 during 

her upcoming PSA. In the Freedom variant, there is need for modification to reduction gear lube oil bellows to allow for greater travel and improved bracing of lube 

oil piping in the vicinity of the bellows. The majority of the required changes were 

implemented in LCS 5 during the FSST period with the outstanding work to be 

completed in her PSA. For all follow ships of both variants, these relatively minor 

modifications will be accomplished at the most cost effective opportunity in the new 

construction window. 

The trials also highlighted the value of planned survivability improvements, beyond LCS threshold requirements, for both the LCS and FF ships. These improvements, which include hardening of potable water systems, chill water systems, and 

the ship’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile system, are part of the fiscal year 2017 LCS solicitation and are integral to the FF design. 

MISSION PACKAGE (MP) STATUS

Modular mission packages are a central feature of the LCS concept and provide 

the ship’s main combat systems capability. The MP embarked is determined based 

on planned employment of the ship on a specific deployment or mission, optimized 

36 

as needed for MCM, SUW, or ASW. The LCS Mission Module program is integrating, testing, and fielding mission packages in accordance with Fleet needs coupled with cost, schedule, and performance requirements. Rigorous and thorough 

testing in realistic environments continues to validate the mission modules concept 

and the mature capabilities in each increment. Stable funding is key to ensuring 

the MPs continue successful procurement, development, and testing. 

Surface Warfare (SUW) MP—The SUW MP provides a flexible capability to rapidly detect, track and prosecute small-boat threats, giving the joint force commander 

the capability to protect the Sea Base and move a force quickly through a choke 

point or other strategic waterway. The ship uses its speed and the SUW MP capabilities, including manned and unmanned aviation assets, to extend the ship’s surveillance and attack potential. LCS configured with the SUW MP can also conduct 

maritime security operations, including those involving Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) and Expanded MIO for compliant and non-compliant VBSS. When augmented with the SUW MP, the LCS has enhanced detection and engagement capability against FIAC/FAC and similar littoral surface threats. The full SUW MP, 

when fielded and deployed, will make LCS the most capable ship in the Navy in 

countering the FIAC/FAC threat. 

IOC was declared for the SUW MP (Increment 1 and 2) aboard a Freedom variant 

LCS on November 25, 2014, and aboard an Independence variant LCS on December 

24, 2015. It was embarked aboard USS Fort Worth during her deployment to Singapore, the first time that such a combination has been deployed. The SUW MP, 

through its Maritime Security Module and aviation components, was extensively 

employed during the ship’s search and rescue efforts for AirAsia flight 8501 in January 2015, highlighting the versatility of the LCS modular mission package concept. 

The Surface-to-Surface Mission Module (SSMM) is the next capability to be added 

to the SUW MP. Beginning in 2015, the Navy completed a series of Guided Test 

Vehicle (GTV) test launches of the Longbow Hellfire missile to evaluate performance 

of the SSMM launcher and missile system in a littoral environment. The GTV–1 

testing successfully conducted against multiple threat-representative targets in a 

relevant environment was completed in June 2015, achieving success in seven of 

eight missile engagements. The demonstration proved that the vertically-launched 

missiles could acquire the representative targets, discriminate among the targets 

and the surrounding environment, and engage the targets. The GTV–2A testing, the 

first tests of the Engineering Development Model (EDM) missile integrated with the 

LCS module prototype, was completed in December 2015, achieving success in three 

of four missile engagements. 

The program conducted a restrained firing test that validated the structural design of the SSMM Missile Exhaust Containment Structure in August 2016. The program also successfully completed the GTV–2B testing, achieving success in six of 

eight missile engagements, demonstrating the system’s ability to engage high speed, 

maneuvering targets and complete quick succession launches while withstanding 

the associated harsh environment caused from the rocket exhaust. Six successful engagements in eight missile tests were accomplished. SSMM Longbow Hellfire testing to date has resulted in 16 successful engagements out of 20 total tests, representing a success rate of 80 percent to date, with one of the unsuccessful engagements occurring during GTV–1 due to target failure. The program plans to complete 

the development of the first SSMM and then conduct a Tracking Exercise 

(TRACKEX), Structural Test Fire, and formal Developmental Test in fiscal year 

2017 on the Freedom variant and a TRACKEX on the Independence variant in fiscal 

year 2017. The program is on track to operationally test the SSMM in fiscal year 

2018 in support of IOC in the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. 

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) MP—The ASW MP systems will provide the joint 

force commander with both an in-stride and rapid ASW escort and large area search 

capability against modern diesel-electric and nuclear submarines. Through studies 

and testing, an LCS with an ASW MP embarked has consistently shown the ability 

to significantly increase detection range and overall ASW performance as compared 

to existing fleet systems in use on large surface combatants. The addition of this 

capability will significantly increase Fleet ASW capability and capacity. 

The ASW MP completed its initial integration test onboard USS Freedom on September 30, 2014. All primary test objectives were completed successfully, including: 

verifying form, fit, and function of the ASW Escort Mission Module on the Freedom 

variant; evaluating mechanical and hydrodynamic characteristics, including maneuvering characteristics at up to 12 knots; deploying and retrieving the Variable Depth 

Sonar; verifying safe dual tow and measured dual hydrodynamic tow characteristics; 

and evaluating deep water (convergence zone) search performance. 

The Navy released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the ASW Escort Mission Module EDM on August 14, 2014. After evaluating proposals, three vendors were awardVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
37 

ed base contracts on July 20, 2015. The base contract awards funded a study by 

each selected contractor to address ship integration issues, at-sea testing at the subsystem and mission module level, and the development of production/delivery schedules. 

In August 2016, the Navy modified all three vendor contracts to minimize and/ 

or retire these technical and programmatic risk areas. Based on the results of the 

more detailed transition studies and risk reduction efforts, the Navy is in the process of exercising the contract option for one vendor to build the ASW Escort Mission 

Module EDM (pre-production test article). 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) MP—When augmented with the MCM MP, the 

LCS is capable of conducting detect-to-engage operations (mine hunting, sweeping, 

and neutralization) against sea mine threats. LCS outfitted with the MCM MP provides the joint force commander with the capability to conduct organic mine countermeasure operations ranging from intelligence preparation of the environment to 

first response mine countermeasures enabling joint operations to be conducted 

ahead of power projection forces. With the MCM MP a broader range of options will 

be available to the joint force commander, and we will remove the ship and crew 

from the minefield. 

The MCM MP provides these capabilities through the use of sensors and weapons 

deployed from organic unmanned vehicles and the MH–60S multi-mission helicopter. The unmanned vehicles include the Common Unmanned Surface Vessel 

(CUSV), unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Knifefish UUV. 

TECHEVAL of the initial MCM MP capabilities was completed in August 2015, 

aboard USS Independence (LCS 2). The mission package met the majority of its sustained area coverage rate test requirements, but significant reliability issues were 

noted with the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV). Based on TECHEVAL results, the Navy delayed MCM IOT&E and initiated an Independent Review Team 

(IRT) to assess the system. 

The IRT submitted their findings and recommendations in February 2016, following which Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)) directed OPNAV (N9) and 

PEO LCS to develop an implementation plan to execute the RMS IRT recommendations. The implementation plan was to coordinate experimentation, technology maturation, Concept of Employment development, and industry and Fleet engagement 

to ensure a supportable MCM capability, tested, and delivered to the Fleet before 

legacy systems reach the end of their service life, including: 

• OPNAV and PEO alignment of responsibility and authority with clear lines of 

accountability for delivery of MCM capability; • Concept development and testing for both LCS and non-LCS based systems; • Employment of expeditionary mine warfare capability from LCS and other Navy 

platforms; 

• Deployment of MCM MP initial increment on Independence variant ships using 

upgraded low rate initial production RMMVs to gain operational experience. 

• Cost and recommended budgetary actions. 

Subsequently, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum cancelling further development of 

the RMMV and separately establishing the associated towed mine-detection sonar, 

the AN/AQS–20A, as an independent acquisition program. 

The CNO and ASN(RD&A) approved the IRT Implementation Plan on June 28, 

2016. Execution of the plan is based on a three-phase approach. The first ‘‘deploy’’ 

phase of the plan focuses on exercising MCM capability from LCS or other platforms 

of opportunity in fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2019. The second ‘‘assess and 

decide’’ phase will evaluate data from the fiscal year 2018–2019 deployment with 

the MCM MP initial increment and Fleet assessments of CUSV minehunting capability and Knifefish UUV, culminating in an MCM minehunting platform decision 

in fiscal year 2019. The final ‘‘re-baselining’’ phase efforts focus on the long-term 

plan to deliver MCM capability to support IOC in fiscal year 2021 to address legacy 

surface and airborne mine countermeasures systems end of service life. 

To execute the IRT implementation plan, the Navy submitted an fiscal year 2016 

Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR). This ATR was not supported, resulting in 

the Navy developing a revised implementation plan which was briefed to professional staff members of the congressional defense committees in September 2016. 

The revised plan focuses on CUSV as the tow vehicle for the AQS–20A mine hunting sonar. In the interim, two RMMVs will be groomed and one will be overhauled, 

and these RMMVs will then be used to continue AN/AQS–20 sonar testing, conduct 

data collection, and support user operational evaluation until the CUSV is available 

in late fiscal year 2018, at which point the RMMVs will be replaced. 

38 

TRANSITION TO FRIGATE

On February 24, 2014, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed that the Navy 

limit the number of Flight 0+ LCS ships to no more than 32 and that the Navy 

submit alternatives for a more capable and lethal Small Surface Combatant (SSC) 

with capabilities generally consistent with a FF. In response, the Navy formed a 

Small Surface Combatant Task Force (SSCTF). The SSCTF’s efforts informed the 

Navy’s recommendation and SECDEF’s decision memorandum of December 10, 

2014, approved the Navy’s plan to procure a SSC based on an upgraded LCS Flight 

0+ hull form. 

The SSCTF approach entailed five key activities. First, establish and co-locate a 

team of operational, technical, and acquisition experts with experience in surface 

combatant operations, design, and program execution. Second, develop a process 

that integrates capability concept development, requirements analysis, engineering 

and design, cost analysis, and program planning to characterize a rich trade space. 

Third, obtain and consider the Fleet’s views and perspectives on SSC capability 

needs in the 2025+ timeframe. Fourth, seek and consider industry’s ideas regarding 

existing ship designs and ship systems including hull, mechanical, and electrical 

and combat system components. Fifth, ensure the analysis and findings represent 

technically feasible and operationally credible SSC alternatives for consideration by 

Navy leadership. 

The SSCTF proposed to Navy leadership that a modified LCS fulfilled the requirement of ‘‘a capable and lethal small surface combatant’’ providing the multi-mission 

SUW and ASW capability consistent with the Fleet’s view on the most valued capabilities delivered by a SSC at the most affordable cost. Further, the study concluded 

that this approach would provide the shortest timeline to first ship delivery (fiscal 

year 2023) and last ship delivery (fiscal year 2028) with no gap in production; and 

could support a subset of capability and survivability upgrades on LCS production 

ships as early as fiscal year 2017. Navy leadership accepted this recommendation 

and proposed for SECDEF’s decision that the upgraded LCS Flight 0+ hull form be 

used as the basis for the new SSC (termed a Frigate). 

The FF’s design continues to mature in preparation for a RFP release to both LCS 

shipbuilders in 2017, which could support contract award in late fiscal year 2018. 

The FF will bring multi-mission capability to a modified LCS hull form, incorporating MP components from both the SUW and ASW mission modules. The FF 

does not change the fundamental LCS mission sets, but rather provides additional 

lethality and survivability capabilities that support executing independent, integrated, high-value unit escort, and both offensive and defensive SUW and ASW operations. 

In December 2015, SECDEF directed that the total LCS/FF procurement be truncated to 40 ships. This programmatic decision, reflected in the President’s Budget 

2017 submission, is not indicative of a change in the overall 2012 Force Structure 

Assessment (FSA) interim update conducted in fiscal year 2014. The FSA interim 

update determined a post-2020 requirement of 308 ships in the battle force, corresponding with a 52 SSC requirement necessary to fulfill the Navy’s essential combat missions. 

The December 2015 SECDEF memorandum also directed that the LCS program 

down-select to a single variant and transition to the FF no later than fiscal year 

2019. In response to the SECDEF direction, the Navy has outlined a path to 

downselect to one shipbuilder (one variant) as early as fiscal year 2018, but no later 

than fiscal year 2019, for the last twelve ships of the program based on the FF design. The Navy intends to make a downselect decision based on best value criteria 

based on cost and warfighting capability. This acquisition strategy sustains the two 

shipbuilders competing for the single ship awards in fiscal year 2017 while enabling 

competitors to align long term options with their vendor base in support of the subsequent down-select, and accelerates delivery of the desired FF capability to the 

Fleet. Additionally, the plan preserves the viability of the industrial base in the 

near term in support of potential opportunities for Foreign Military Sales opportunities. 

CONCLUSION

The LCS and FF classes close critical warfighting gaps for our fleet commanders. 

LCS will provide much-needed MCM, ASW, and SUW capability at an affordable 

cost, freeing up the higher end multi-mission large surface combatants to focus on 

their primary missions such as area air defense, land strike, and ballistic missile 

defense. 

Looking ahead, the Navy is planning for the next generation Fleet, including 

SSCs, using the established requirements generation process to determine what 

39 

warfighting gaps will be present and what capabilities the future SSC will require 

in order to fill those gaps. When completed, we look forward to briefing you on the 

outcome of this analysis and the composition of the future Fleet. 

The Navy’s role in providing for our national security strategy includes ensuring 

freedom of navigation for all maritime traffic, providing reassurance to our partner 

nations, and deterring those who would challenge us. As more LCS ships are deployed forward, these innovative ships will deliver the persistent presence our allies 

and partners desire and our nation’s security demands consistent with this role. 

We are committed to working with Congress as we continue to make adjustments 

to how these ships are employed. We thank you for your past support and urge your 

continued support. We welcome your oversight, and we look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. Admiral? 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS S. ROWDEN, COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCES, AND COMMANDER, 

NAVAL SURFACE FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, UNITED 

STATES NAVY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Admiral ROWDEN. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

distinguished members of the committee, I am honored for the opportunity to testify about the Littoral Combat Ship. 

As the commander of U.S. Surface Forces, I have the privilege 

of leading the sailors that take our ships to sea. These ships and 

the sailors that man them are the center of our professional universe, and my frequent visits to the waterfront give me real-time 

feedback of what we are getting right and on things that we need 

to address. 

This committee’s support of the Surface Force has been strong 

and consistent, and we are moving steadily forward in posturing a 

more lethal, distributed, and networked force. Small surface combatants have a key role to play in implementing this vision, and 

the LCS program is a cornerstone of this effort. 

The LCS program has had a number of setbacks, something that 

you, and I, and the Navy leadership team are acutely aware of. We 

are doggedly pursuing solutions that will improve operational 

availability of the ships, and you have my assurance that these are 

never far from my mind. 

The CNO testified in his posture statement that for the first time 

in 25 years there is competition for control of the seas. This statement underpins my entire approach to the LCS fleet introduction. 

As the ship begins to join the fleet in numbers, it is my job to 

examine past assumptions about every aspect of its employment, 

and implement changes that reflect the operational environment of 

the future. The Surface Force must be prepared to not only impose 

sea control over uncontested seas, but it must also be prepared to 

contest control of the seas by others. 

The capabilities of the LCS will bring the fight—the capabilities 

that the LCS will bring to the fight are in high demand by our fleet 

commanders, specifically with respect to anti-submarine warfare, 

mine countermeasures, and over-the-horizon anti-surface warfare. 

These aspects of sea control from the—form the basis of a more robust, conventional deterrence posture, which in turn frees our 

cruisers and destroyers to focus on high-end tasking. 

We have learned quite a bit from the Freedom Fort Worth and 

Coronado deployments and the options provided to our fleet commanders by their presence. The challenges encountered during 

40 

these early deployments prompted the recent CNO directed 60-day 

review, which resulted in a number of straightforward changes that 

will drive simplicity and stability into the program, even as we increase unit lethality. I am confident we are on the right track to 

increasing crew ownership and reliability of this ship, while delivering critical warfighting capability to the fleet. 

There is work to be done, and I join Secretary Stackley in committing to continuously improving this lethal, necessary, and 

versatile component of our fleet architecture. 

Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Francis. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FRANCIS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Reed, members 

of the committee. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a real slick statement to read from. I thought I would just talk to you for a few minutes if that was okay. 

I think the bottom line on the LCS, as we have talked—the other 

panelists have talked already, we are 26 ships into the contract, 

and we still do not know if the LCS can do its job. Over the last 

10 years, we have made a number of what I would call trade 

downs. We have accepted higher costs. We have accepted construction delays, mission module delays, testing delays, reliability and 

quality problems, and we have accepted the lower capability. 

To adjust to this or accommodate the lesser performance of the 

ship, we have accepted a number of workarounds, higher crew 

loads, more shore support. We have kind of dialed down the concept of operations, and we have reduced some mission expectations 

for the ship. Still it will be 2020 by the time we know the ship and 

all its mission modules will work. 

I was doing my own math. I think we did the first contract for 

the first ship in 2004 or 2005, but it is 16 years from first contract 

to when the ship will be finally tested with all its mission modules. 

That is 16 years. To me, that is aircraft carrier territory. The miracle of LCS did not happen. 

What did happen? I think when the Navy started off, they had 

a really good plan. They were going to build two ships, experimental ships, using commercial yards and commercial derivative 

designs because they had a rough construct of a new mission, the 

littoral mission, and they wanted to use some ships to see what 

they could do with it, which I think was a good idea. 

About 2005, things really changed, and that is when the Navy 

decided that they could not just stop with two experimental ships. 

They had to go forward with construction for the industrial base. 

In my mind, that is when the program really made a change. It 

went from an experimental program to a ship construction program. As with any construction or production program, once you 

get into it and once the money wheel starts to turn, the business 

imperatives of budgets, and contracts, and ship construction take 

precedence over acquisition and oversight principles, things like design, development, tests, and cost. 

41 

Let me switch now to a little discussion about oversight. On any 

major weapon system, Milestone B is the most important milestone. That is when you lay down—that is when the legal oversight 

framework kicks in. Your approved baseline, your Nunn-McCurdy 

requirements, your cost estimates, your operational test and evaluation, selective acquisition reports all kick in at that time. Usually on ships, you have a Milestone B decision when detailed design 

and construction is approved for the first ship. 

On LCS, the Milestone B decision was made in 2011. That was 

after we had already approved the block buy of 20 ships and had 

already constructed and delivered most of the first four ships. The 

cost growth that occurred on the early ships was grandfathered 

into the baseline of the LCS program. That is why today if you go 

to look at the selected acquisition report for LCS, you are not going 

to see much of a schedule or cost variance because of the 

grandfathering in. 

Mission modules, turning to those, those were actually produced 

before the Milestone B decision to keep pace with the ship. What 

we had was, in my view, a highly concurrent buy-before-fly strategy on an all new class of ships. I think the picture for oversight 

for the frigate program is concerning. It is not going to have milestone decisions. It is not going to be a separate program. There will 

not be a Milestone B. You are not going to have Nunn-McCurdy 

protections for the frigate itself. You will not have a selective acquisition report on the frigate itself. 

Some of the key performance parameters as they relate to the 

mission modules have been downgraded to key system attributes, 

which means the Navy, and not the JROC [Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council], will make decisions on what is acceptable. 

Let me wrap up by saying that the ball is now in your court. In 

a few months, you will be asked to approve the fiscal year 2018 

budget submit, which will, if current plans hold, include approval 

for a block buy of 12 frigates. In my mind, you are going to be 

rushed again. You are going to be asked to put in upfront approval 

for something where the design is not done. We do not have an 

independent cost estimate. The risks are not well understood. Oh, 

by the way, the mission module still have not been demonstrated 

yet. 

You will be told that, hey, it is a block buy, we are getting great 

prices, and the industrial base really needs this. Now, on the 

prices, you know, in my view the block buy is a pretty loose construct for accountability. You do not have to say how much you are 

saving. You are not held accountable for what you are saving. 

There is an instrument that exists for that, and it is called 

multiyear procurement. The Navy was able to use multiyear procurement after the fourth Virginia-class submarine. You have to 

ante up what your savings are going to be. You have to test to the 

stability of the design. It is a real commitment. For the frigate, 

they are going to use the same contracts that they used for the 

LCS, and we know how well they have worked in holding down 

costs. 

On the—on the industrial base side, as we have looked past—the 

past 10 years, we have seen a lot of decisions made to protect the 

42 

industrial base. Again, this is an industrial base we did not think 

we were going to create because we were using commercial firms. 

But my question now is, have we not done enough for the industrial base? Is it not time for the industrial base to come through 

for us? Can we get one ship delivered on time? Can we get one ship 

delivered without cost growth? Can we get one ship delivered without serious reliability and quality problems? That is my question. 

Once the block buy is approved, your oversight is marginalized 

because what you will be hit with in the future is we got great 

prices, and we have to protect the industrial base. With these two 

things, you cannot change the program from then on, and I am saying you can. 

I think that your first oversight question is going to be is a program that has doubled in cost and has yet to demonstrate its capabilities worth another $14 billion in investment, and that is the 

floor. That is assuming everything goes well. 

If you do think it is worth it, and that is a big if, I would say— 

my counsel to you in fiscal year 2018 is do not approve a block buy. 

Have the Navy do a competition on detailed design, and let them 

compete the two—the two ship designs and downselect. Make it a 

major acquisition program with its own baseline, and its own milestones, and its SARs [Selected Acquisitions Reports]. 

In 2019, then you can consider if you want to authorize more 

ships, and that should be based on the demonstrated performance 

of the ships. If you did, you do not have to do a block buy. You can 

consider what kind of arrangements you want to make at that 

point. 

In wrapping up, my view is you have got one shot left in fiscal 

year 2018 to preserve your oversight power over this program, and 

my advice is take it. Take that shot, and I can assure you the 

Earth is not going to come off its axis if you do. You will be sending 

an important signal to other programs as to what you are willing 

to prove and what you are not. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:] 

43 


16-73_Francis_1.eps

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30a.m. ET 

Thursday, December 1, 2016 

GA0-17-262T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

AND FRIGATE 

Congress Faced with 

Critical Acquisition 

Decisions 

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Managing Director, 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
44 


16-73_Francis_2.eps

GAO 

Highlights 

Highlights of GA0-17-262T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Armed Services. 

U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Navy envisioned a revolutionary 

approach for the LCS program: dual 

ship designs with interchangeable 

mission packages intended to provide 

mission flexibility at a lower cost. This 

approach has fallen short, with 

significant cost increases and reduced 

expectations about mission flexibility 

and performance. The Navy has 

changed acquisition approaches 

several times. The latest change 

involves minor upgrades to an LCS 

design-referred to now as a frigate. 

Yet, questions persist about both the 

LCS and the frigate 

GAO has reported on the acquisition 

struggles facing LCS and now the 

frigate, particularly in GA0-13-530 and 

GA0-16-356. This statement 

discusses: (1) the evolution of the LCS 

acquisition strategy and business case; 

(2) key risks in the Navy's plans for the 

frigate based on the LCS program; and 

(3) remaining oversight opportunities 

for the LCS and small surface 

combatant programs. This statement is 

largely based on GAO's prior reports 

and larger work on shipbuilding and 

acquisition best practices. It 

incorporates limited updated audit work 

where appropriate 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is not making any new 

recommendations in this statement but 

has made numerous recommendations 

to the Department of Defense (DOD) in 

the past on LCS and frigate 

acquisition, including strengthening the 

program's business case before 

proceeding with acquisition decisions 

While DOD has, at times, agreed with 

GAO's recommendations, it has taken 

limited action to implement them 

View GA0-17-262T. For more information, 

contact Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841 or 

francisp@gao.gov 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP AND FRIGATE 

Congress Faced with Critical Acquisition Decisions 

What GAO Found 

The Navy's vision for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved 

significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying 

business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships 

adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an 

acquisition approach that committed to numerous ships before proving their 

capabilities. Ships were not delivered quickly to the fleet at low cost. Rather cost, 

schedule, and capability expectations degraded over time. In contrast, a sound 

business case would have balanced needed resources-time, money, and 

technical knowledge-to transform a concept into the desired product. 

Evolution of Expectations for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program 

Early program 

Quantity and 55 seaframes@ $220 million each 

cost 

Schedule Ship initial operational capability 

IOC in 2007 

Design Leverage existing designs for 

reduced cost, rapid fielding 

Seaframe Sprint speed: 40-50 knots; range 

1,000 nautical miles@ 40 knots 

Mission IOC for three mission packages by 

Packages 2010 

Updated program 

40 seaframes@ $478 million each 

Ship IOC with partial capability in 2013 

Considerable design changes, under 

revision throughout early construction 

Neither seaframe meets combined 

original speed and range expectations 

Revised IOC one package in 2015; two 

more planned bv 2020 

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports and Navy documentation. 1 GA0·17 -262T 

Concerned about the LCS's survivability and lethality, in 2014 the Secretary of 

Defense directed the Navy to evaluate alternatives. After rejecting more capable 

ships based partly on cost, schedule, and industrial base considerations, the 

Navy chose the existing LCS designs with minor modifications and re-designated 

the ship as a frigate. Much of the LCS's capabi lities are yet to be demonstrated 

and the frigate's design, cost, and capabilities are not well-defined. The Navy 

proposes to commit quickly to the frigate in what it calls a block buy of 12 ships. 

Congress has key decisions for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 that have significant 

funding and oversight implications. First, the Navy has already requested funding 

to buy two more baseline LCS ships in fiscal year 2017. Second, early next year, 

the Navy plans to request authorization for a block buy of all 12 frigates and 

funding in the fiscal year 2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Making these 

commitments now could make it more difficult to make decisions in the future to 

reduce or delay the program should that be warranted. A more basic oversight 

question today is whether a ship that costs twice as much yet delivers less 

capability than planned warrants an additional investment of nearly $14 bil lion. 

GAO has advised Congress to consider not funding the two LCS requested in 

20 17 given its now obsolete design and existing construction backlogs. 

Authorizing the block buy strategy for the frigate appears premature. The 

decisions Congress makes could have implications for what aspiring programs 

view as acceptable strategies 

------------United States Government Accountability Office 
45 


16-73_Francis_3.eps

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the 

Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy's 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and frigate programs. The Navy envisioned a 

revolutionary approach to the LCS program. Unlike other surface 

combatant programs, LCS consists of two different ship design variants 

(called seaframes) with interchangeable mission packages carrying 

equipment for three mission areas-surface and anti-submarine warfare, 

and mine countermeasures-intended to give the Navy flexibility to 

rapidly deploy equipment and incorporate new systems. Coupled with this 

approach, the LCS would have a smaller crew that would rely on shorebased support for its maintenance needs in an effort to reduce life-cycle 

costs. To execute the program, the Navy deviated from traditional 

shipbuilding acquisition in hopes of rapidly delivering ships to the fleet. 

The consequences of this approach are well known today--<:osts to 

construct the ships have more than doubled from initial expectations, with 

promised levels of capability unfulfilled and deliveries significantly 

delayed. Acknowledging capability and affordability concerns, the 

Department of Defense (DOD)-in conjunction with the Navy-changed 

course in February 2014 to pursue a more capable frigate based on the 

LCS concept. 1 

Today, with 26 ships delivered or under contract, the LCS program again 

stands at a crossroads, as Congress will decide on funding the last two 

planned LCS and will be asked early next year to authorize the Navy's 

plans to procure the remaining 12 ships, including funding the lead 

frigate. With that context in mind, I will discuss today: (1) the evolution of 

the LCS acquisition strategy and business case; (2) key risks in the 

Navy's plans for the frigate based on the LCS program; and (3) remaining 

oversight opportunities for the LCS and small surface combatant 

programs 

1The term ufrigateM can be applied to ships of different sizes and capability. The now· 

retired Oliver Hazzard Perry-class frigate (FFG 7) was the last U.S. Navy frigate. 

Frigates-including the FFG 7-have been identified as typically being open-ocean, multirole ships capable of performing surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare 

Page 1 GA0-17-262T 
46 


16-73_Francis_4.eps

The Course of the 

LCS Program Has 

Changed Significantly 

overTime 

This testimony largely leverages our past reports on the LCS program 

from 2005 to 2016. 2 We also draw on some conclusions from our broader 

work on Navy shipbuilding and acquisition reform initiatives. More 

detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology for that 

work can be found in the issued reports. We conducted the work on which 

this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This 

statement also includes updates to information, as appropriate, based on 

program documentation and discussion with DOD officials-work that 

also was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

When first conceived, the LCS program represented an innovative 

approach for conducting naval operations, matched with a unique 

acquisition strategy that included two nontraditional shipbuilders and two 

different ships based on commercial designs-Lockheed Martin's 

Freedom variant and Austal USA's Independence variant, respectively. 3 

The Navy planned to experiment with these ships to determine its 

preferred design variant. However, in relatively short order, this 

experimentation strategy was abandoned in favor of a more traditional 

acquisition of over 50 ships. More recently, the Secretary of Defense has 

questioned the appropriate capability and quantity of the LCS. The 

purpose of the program has evolved from concept experimentation, to 

LCS, and more recently, to an LCS that will be upgraded to a frigate. The 

strategy for contracting and competing for ship construction has also 

changed. This evolution is captured in figure 1. 

2GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and 

Frigate Acquisition Strategies, GA0-16-356, (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016); Navy 

Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid 

Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, GA0-13-530, (Washington, 

D.C.: July 22, 2013); and Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to 

Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships, GA0-05-255, (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 1, 2005). 

3Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for LCS 1 and the odd numbered seaframes. For 

LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics was the prime contractor for the Austal USA built 

ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming arrangement in 2010. 

Austal USA is the prime contractor for the remaining even-numbered seaframes 

Page2 GA0-17-262T 
47 


16-73_Francis_5.eps

Figure 1: A Persistent Pattern of Change to the littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Acquisition Strategy 

• Two shipyards would each build an LCS "Flight o· prototype, which would be tested by 

experimentation in the fleet and inform design changes or a decision to downselect to one design 

variant 

• The Navy continues procurement of both Flight 0 seaframe designs, and experimentation will now 

occur concurrently with buying more seaframes 

• The Navy decides to incorporate design changes and lessons reamed into what it terms a "Flight 0+" 

configuration and continues purchasing both LCS variants-with no plans to downselect 

• The Navy approves plans to downselect to a single design in fiscal year 2010 that will be procured in 

a block buy of up to 10 ships over 5 years. Plans include a requirement for a second shipbuilder to build 

5 ships of the winning design. 

• The Navy subsequently decides to continue buying both variants and awards a 10-ship block buy 

contract to each contractor after receiving competitive pricing from both. 

• The Navy reassesses LCS in response to direction from the Secretary of Defense based on capability 

concerns and recommends pursuing an LCS with minor modifications starting in fiscal year 2019. The 

Secretary of Defense endorses this recommendation 

• The new Secretary of Defense announces a reduction of LCS and frigate procurement from 52 total 

1 the need for the department to reprioritize capability over quantity of ships when 

decisions 

• The fiscal year 2017 budget submission indicates the Navy will buy 2 LCS in 2017 and downselect to 

a single design for 11 frigates in fiscal year 2019 

• The subsequent March 2016 acquisition strategy includes plans to award 2 LCS in 2017 and receive 

block buy pricing for 12 additional LCS options. The Navy plans to request proposals for frigate-specific 

modifications later in 2017 and evaluate LCS block buy pricing with bids for frigate design changes in 

order to downselect to one contract award in summer 2018 

SOurce: GAO analysis of Department of Qefense dala. 1 GA0-17 -262T 

While one could argue that a new concept should be expected to evolve 

over time, the LCS evolution has been complicated by the fact that major 

commitments have been made to build large numbers of ships before 

Page3 GA0-17-262T 
48 


16-73_Francis_6.eps

LCS Business Case 

Has Eroded as Cost, 

Schedule, and 

Performance 

Expectations Have 

Not Been Met 

proving their capabilities. Whereas acquisition best practices embrace a 

"fly before you buy" approach, the Navy has subscribed to a buy before 

you fly approach for LCS. Consequently, the business imperatives of 

budgeting, contracting, and ship construction have outweighed the need 

to demonstrate knowledge, such as technology maturation, design, and 

testing , resulting in a program that has delivered 8 ships and has 14 more 

in some stage of the construction process (includes LCS 21, with a 

planned December 2016 construction start) despite an unclear 

understanding of the capability the ships will ultimately be able to provide 

and with notable performance issues discovered among the few ships 

that have already been delivered. 

The Navy's vision for the LCS has evolved significantly over time, with 

questions remaining today about the program's underlying business case 

In its simplest form , a business case requires a balance between the 

concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the resourcestechnologies, design knowledge, funding, and time-needed to transform 

the concept into a product, in this case a ship. In a number of reports and 

assessments since 2005, we have raised concerns about the Navy's 

business case for LCS, noting risks related to cost, schedule, and 

technical problems, as well as the overall capability of the ships. Business 

case aside, the LCS program deviated from initial expectations, while 

continuing to commit to ship and mission package purchases. 

The LCS acquisition was challenging from the outset. The Navy hoped to 

deliver large numbers of ships to the fleet quickly at a low cost. In an 

effort to achieve its goals, the Navy deviated from sound business 

practices by concurrently designing and constructing the two lead ship 

variants while still determining the ship's requirements. The Navy 

believed it could manage this approach because it considered LCS to be 

an adaptation of existing commercial ship designs. However, transforming 

a commercial ship into a capable, survivable warship was an inherently 

complex undertaking. Elements of the business case further erodedincluding initial cost and schedule expectations. Table 1 compares the 

Navy's initial expectations of the LCS business case with the present 

version of the program. 

Page4 GA0-17-262T 
49 


16-73_Francis_7.eps

Table 1: Evolution of Expectations for the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program 

Quantity and 

cost 

Schedule 

Design 

Seaframe 

Capability 

Mission 

Packages 

Capability 

Crewing and 

Logistics 

Constructs 

Early program 

55 seaframes 

$220 million per seaframe 

Ships rapidly fielded , with initial 

operational capability (IOC) in 2007, 3 

years after program initiation 

Leverage existing designs to enable a 

low-cost, rapidly fielded platform 

Sprint speed: 40-50 knots 

Range: 4,300-nautical-mile range when 

operated at a speed of 16 knots and 

1 ,000-nautical miles at 40 knots 

New capabilities would be rapidly fielded 

as the Navy would integrate existing 

technologies on to the three types of 

mission packages-mine 

countermeasures, surface warfare, and 

anti-submarine warfare 

LCS would be minimally manned (55-60 

crew), with many support functions 

transferred to shore facilities 

LCS was initially intended to have a 3-2-1 

crewing construct, where 3 crews would 

support 2 LCS, and 1 LCS would remain 

forward deployed 

Updated program 

40 seaframes (includes 12 frigates) 

$478 million per seaframe 

IOC achieved with partial capability in 2013, 9 years after 

program initiation 

Designs required considerable change and were under 

revision throughout the first several ships built 

Speed: Freedom variant (odd-numbered ships, e.g., LCS 1) 

can meet speed requirements, but Independence variant 

(even-numbered ships, e.g., LCS 2) did not meet speed 

requirements; frigate will have reduced speed 

Range: In 2009, endurance requirement reduced to 3,500-

nautical-mile range at a speed of 14 knots. Freedom variant 

cannot meet these reduced requirements-with a 2,138-

nautical miles range at a speed of 14 knots and 855 nautical 

miles at 43.6 knots; Independence variant can meet range 

requirements 

Some technologies were ultimately less mature than 

envisioned, leading to significant difficulty developing mission 

capabilities 

Only one of three packages (surface warfare) has 

demonstrated required performance. However, initial 

operational capability was achieved at a temporarily reduced 

minimum capability requirement 

Crew size has increased over time to 70 

The Navy is transitioning to a blue/gold crew concept for LCS, 

where two crews will rotate on and off the same hull 

Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports and Navy clocumentalion. I GA0·17·262T 

Note: Costs are in fiscal year 2005 dollars 

Our recent work has shown that the LCS business case continues to 

weaken. LCS ships under construction have exceeded contract cost 

targets, with the government responsible for paying for a portion of the 

cost growth. This growth has prompted the Navy to request $246 million 

in additional funding for fiscal years 2015-2017 largely to address cost 

overruns on 12 LCS seaframes. Similarly, deliveries of almost all LCS 

under contract (LCS 5-26) have been delayed by several months, and, in 

some cases, closer to a year or longer. Navy officials recently reported 

that, despite having had 5 years of LCS construction to help stabilize ship 

delivery expectations, the program would not deliver four LCS in fiscal 

year 2016 as planned. Whereas the program expected to deliver all 55 

PageS GA0-17-262T 
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16-73_Francis_8.eps

ships in the class by fiscal year 2018, today that expectation has been 

reduced to 17 ships 

LCS mission packages, in particular, lag behind expectations. The Navy 

has fallen short of demonstrating that the LCS with its mission packages 

can meet the minimum level of capability defined at the beginning of the 

program. As figure 2 shows, 24 LCS seaframes will be delivered by the 

time all three mission packages achieve a minimum capability 

Figure 2: Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Operational Capability Delays Since 2007 

Original 

Planned Ship Deliveries 

and Capability Milestones 

45 

51 

55 

27 

33 

39 

Mine Countermeasures Initial Operational Capability 

• Surface Warfare Initial Operational Capability 

• Anti-Submarine Initial Operational Capability 

• Surface to Surface Missile Capability 

21 

Source: GAO ana~is of Department of Defense data. I GA0-17 -262T 

Page 6 

15 

201 

Current 

Planned Ship Deliveries and 

Capability Milestones 

GA0-17-262T 
51 


16-73_Francis_9.eps

Since 2007, delivery of the total initial mission package operational 

capability has been delayed by about 9 years (from 2011 to 2020) and the 

Navy has lowered the level of performance needed to achieve the initial 

capability for two packages-surface warfare and mine countermeasures 

In addition to mission package failures, the Navy has not met several 

seaframe objectives, including speed and range. For example, Navy 

testers estimate that the range of one LCS variant is about half of the 

minimum level identified at the beginning of the program. As the Navy 

continues to concurrently deliver seaframes and develop mission 

packages, it has become clear that the seaframes and mission package 

technologies were not mature and remain largely unproven. In response, 

the Navy recently designated the first four LCS as test ships to support an 

aggressive testing schedule between fiscal years 2017 and 2022. 

Additional deficiencies discovered during these tests could further delay 

capability and require expensive changes to the seaframes and mission 

packages that have already been delivered. 

As the cost and schedule side of the business case for LCS has grown, 

performance and capabilities have declined. Changes in the LCS concept 

of operations are largely the consequence of less than expected lethality 

and survivability, which remain mostly unproven 7 years after delivery of 

the lead ships. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as 

compared to other surface combatants, and over time the Navy has 

lowered several survivability and lethality requirements further and 

removed some design features-making the ships less survivable in their 

expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. This 

has forced the Navy to redefine how it plans to operate the ships. Our 

previous work highlighted the changes in the LCS's expected capability, 

as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Evolution of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Capability 

Concept 

LCS's capability 

against 

adversaries 

How LCSwill 

deploy 

Initial 

LCS was primarily planned to be used in 

major combat operations, enter contested 

spaces, and be employable and 

sustainable throughout the battlespace 

regardless of anti-access or area denial 

environments 

Current 

The Navy acknowledges current LCS weapon systems are underperiorming and offer little chance of survival in a combat scenario 

LCS lacks the ability to operate independently in combat and should 

not be employed outside a benign, low-threat environment unless 

escorted by a multi-mission combatant providing credible anti-air, 

anti-surface, and anti-submarine protection 

LCS wi ll be a self-sufficient combatant LCS's dependencies in combat require it to be well-protected by 

designed to fight and win in shallow water multi-mission combatants. Multiple LCS will likely have to operate in 

and near-land environments without risking a coordinated strike attack group fashion for mutual support 

larger combatants in constricted areas 

Page 7 GA0-17-262T 
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16-73_Francis_10.eps

Concept Initial Current 

How mission 

packages swaps 

will be utilized 

Mission packages will be quickly swapped 

out in an expeditionary theater in a matter 

of days. 

Mission packages can be swapped within 72 hours only if all the 

equipment and personnel are in theater. An LCS executing a 

package swap could be unavailable for between 12-29 days. The 

Navy now expects mission package swaps will be more infrequent 

than initially envisioned 

Source GAO analysis of Navy documentation. 1 GAO-17 -262T 

Business Case for 

Frigate Program 

Remains Uncertain 

Further capability changes may be necessary as the Navy continues to 

test the seaframes and mission packages, as well as gain greater 

operational experience. For example, the Navy has not yet demonstrated 

that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements and does not plan to 

complete survivability assessments until2018-after more than 24 ships 

are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified 

unknowns related to the Independence variant's aluminum hull, and 

conducted underwater explosion testing in 2016 but the Navy has yet to 

compile and report the results. Both variants also sustained some 

damage in trials in rough sea conditions, but the Navy has not completed 

its analytical report of these events. Results from air defense and 

cybersecurity testing also indicate capability concerns. 

The Navy elected to pursue a frigate concept based on a minor modified 

LCS. The frigate, as planned, will provide multi-mission capability that is 

an improvement over LCS and offers modest improvements to some 

other capabilities, such as the air search radar. Still, many questions 

remain to be settled about the frigate's design, cost, schedule, and 

capabilities-all while the Navy continues to purchase additional LCS. 

Despite the uncertainties, the Navy's acquisition strategy involves 

effectively demonstrating a commitment to buy all of the planned 

frigates-12 in total-before establishing realistic cost, schedule, and 

technical parameters-because the Navy will ask Congress to authorize 

the contracting approach for the 12 frigates (what the Navy calls a block 

buy contract) in 2017 4 Further, the frigate will inherit many of the 

4

The Navy plans to request authorization in 2017 to use what it calls a block buy contract 

to purchase the frigate-the same contracting approach used for LCS-and funding in the 

fiscal year 2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Our past analysis of the LCS contracts 

found that a block buy approach could affect Congress's funding flexibility. For example, 

the LCS block buy contracts provide that a failure to fully fund a purchase in a given year 

would make the contract subject to renegotiation, which could result in the government 

paying more for ships. If similar terms are included in the frigate contract, the same 

potential effect may apply 

Page 8 GA0-17-262T 
53 


16-73_Francis_11.eps

Frigate Cost Uncertainty 

and a Compressed 

Schedule Contribute to 

Gaps in Program 

Knowledge 

shortcomings or uncertainties of the LCS, and does not address all the 

priorities that the Navy had identified for its future frigate. 

The costs for the frigate are still uncertain. Navy officials have stated that 

the frigate is expected to cost no more than 20 percent-approximately 

$100 million-more per ship than the average LCS seaframes. However, 

the Navy will not establish its cost estimate until May 2017- presumably 

after the Navy requests authorization from Congress in its fiscal year 

2018 budget request for the block buy contracting approach for 12 

frigates-raising the likelihood that the budget request will not reflect the 

most current costs for the program moving forward. 

In addition to the continued cost uncertainty, the schedule and approach 

for the frigate acquisition have undergone substantial changes in the last 

year, as shown in table 3 

Table 3: Changes in Frigate Acquisition Plan 

Previous plan (December 2015) 

Dual contract award in fiscal year 2019 

20 frigates (10 per shipbuilder) 

Government-led, prescribed design 

Current plan (October 2016) 

Oownselect award to one shipbuilder in summer 2018 

12 frigates 

Contractor-driven design process based on build specifications; increased 

government furnished equipment 

Multiple frigate upgrade packages, with a fiscal year 2019 

bid to mature frigate design 

Single frigate upgrade package expected from each contractor in fiscal 

year 2016 

Detail design in fiscal year 2018 to increase design 

knowledge prior to contract award 

Detail design begins after downselect award in 2018 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. I GA0-17-262T 

According to frigate program officials, under the current acquisition 

approach the Navy will award contracts in fiscal year 2017 to each of the 

current LCS contractors to construct one LCS with a block buy option for 

12 additional LCS-not frigates. Then, the Navy plans to obtain proposals 

from both LCS contractors in late 2017 that would upgrade the block buy 

option of LCS to frigates using frigate-specific design changes and 

modifications. The Navy will evaluate the frigate upgrade packages and 

then exercise the option-now for frigates-on the contract that provides 

the best value based on tradeoffs between price and technical factors. 

This downselect will occur in summer 2018. Figure 3 illustrates how the 

Navy plans to modify the fiscal year 2017 LCS contract to convert the 

ships in the block buy options to frigates. 

Page 9 GA0-17-262T 
54 


16-73_Francis_12.eps

Figure 3: Navy Block Buy Option Contract Modification Process for Frigate Procurement 

Littoral Combat 

···········~-~.~~-~ ~7.! .... Spring2017 

Navy awards contracts to 

eachshipyardforoneLCS, 

withoptionsforablockbuy 

of12additionai LCS 

Earlyfall2017 

Navy requests proposals 

1 fr?mbothshipyardsfor 

'+ fngateupgradedes1gn 

changes to block buy 

ships 

SOureeGAOanalysisoiNavydata. 1 GA0-17-262T 

......................................... ~ Navy evaluates 

l., f~o~~~~;i~:en:!:S 

by modifying one 

shipyard's fiscal year 

2017 LCS contract to 

exerciseoptionforblock 

buyofLCSwithfrigate 

~~~ .... . .... . .... . .. . .. ............. .~~~~!~ ... . Late2019 

l., Shipbuilder begins frigate 

construction 

The Navy's current plan, which moves the frigate award forward from 

fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2018, is an acceleration that continues a 

pattern of committing to buy ships in advance of adequate knowledge. 

Specifically, the Navy has planned for its downselect award of the frigate 

to occur before detail design of the ship begins. As we previously 

reported , awarding a contract before detail design is completed-though 

common in Navy ship acquisitions-has resulted in increased ship 

prices-' Further, in the absence of a year of frigate detail design, the 

5 GA0-16-356 and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could 

Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GA0-05-183 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005) 

Page 10 GA0-17-262T 
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Frigate Does Not Address 

All Navy Priorities and Will 

Likely Carry Forward 

Some of the Limitations of 

the LCS Designs 

Navy plans to rely on a contractor-driven design process that is less 

prescriptive. This approach is similar to that espoused by the original LCS 

program, whereby the shipyards were given performance specifications 

and requirements, selecting the design and systems that they determined 

were best suited to fit their designs in a producible manner. Program 

officials told us that this new approach should yield efficiencies; however, 

history from LCS raises concern that this approach for the frigate similarly 

could lead to the ships having non-standard equipment, with less 

commonality with the other design and the rest of the Navy. 

As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense 

directed the Navy to explore alternatives to the LCS to address key 

deficiencies. In response, the Navy created the Small Surface Combatant 

Task Force and directed it to consider new and existing frigate design 

options, including different types of modified LCS designs. The task force 

concluded that the Navy's desired capability requirements could not be 

met without major modifications to an LCS design or utilizing other nonLCS designs. When presented with this conclusion, senior Navy 

leadership directed the task force to explore what capabilities might be 

more feasible on a minor modified LCS. This led the task force to develop 

options with diminished capabilities, such as reduced speed or range, 

resulting in some capabilities becoming equal to or below expected 

capabilities of the current LCS. Ultimately, the department chose a frigate 

concept based on a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable small 

surface combatant options because of LCS's relatively lower cost and 

quicker ability to field, as well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS. 

Table 4 presents an analysis from our past work, which found that the 

Navy's proposed frigate will offer some improvements over LCS. For 

example, the Navy plans to equip the frigates with the mission systems 

from both the surface and anti-submarine mission packages 

simultaneously instead of just one at a time like LCS. However, the 

Navy's planned frigate upgrades will not result in significant 

improvements in survivability areas related to vulnerability- the ability to 

withstand initial damage effects from threat weapons-or recoverabilitythe ability of the crew to take emergency action to contain and control 

damage. 

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Table 4: Proposed Frigate Capability Changes 

Proposed change Description Significance 

Switch from single to multi- Frigate will be able to embark surface and A multi-mission capability was recognized in Navy analysis 

mission capability anti-submarine warfare mission packages as a key characteristic of a frigate. A frigate will be able to 

at one time instead of just a single engage different types of threats at all times, unlike LCS 

mission package, like LCS which depends on the mission package embarked 

Improve air warfare systems Frigate will be equipped with an improved This reduces susceptibility to attacks from air-based 

air search radar and defensive threats (e.g. aircraft or missiles). The Navy also is 

countermeasures considering these improvements for LCS 

Add armor to vital spaces and Armor reduces vulnerability; intended to LCS already has some armor in these areas; shock 

hardening is limited to anti-air missile system. The Navy 

believes adjusting the concept of operations for the frigate 

is more cost-effective and feasible than a further increase 

in armor and shock hardening. 

magazines. Improve shock lessen risk of magazine detonation 

hardening in anti-air missile Shock hardening reduces vulnerability of 

system missile system 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. I GA0-17 -262T 

Further, the Navy sacrificed capabilities that were prioritized by fleet 

operators. For example, fleet operators consistently prioritized a range of 

4,000 nautical miles, but the selected frigate concept is as much as 30 

percent short of achieving such a range. 

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has noted that the Navy's 

proposed frigate design is not substantially different from LCS and does 

not add much more redundancy or greater separation of critical 

equipment or additional compartmentation, making the frigate likely to be 

less survivable than the Navy's previous frigate class. Further, the Navy 

plans to make some similar capability improvements to existing and future 

LCS, narrowing the difference between LCS and the frigate. We found 

that the proposed frigate does not add any new offensive anti-submarine 

or surface warfare capabilities that are not already part of one of the LCS 

mission packages, so while the frigate will be able to carry what equates 

to two mission packages at once, the capabilities in each mission area 

will be the same as LCS. While specific details are classified, there are 

only a few areas where there are differences in frigate warfighting 

capability compared to the LCS. 

Since it will be based on the LCS designs, the frigate will likely carry 

forward some of the limitations of the LCS designs. For example, LCS 

was designed to carry a minimally-sized crew of approximately 50. The 

Navy has found in various studies that the crew is undersized and made 

some modest increases in crew size. A frigate design based on LCS may 

not be able to support a significant increase in crew size due to limited 

space for berthing and other facilities. Additionally, barring Navy-directed 

changes to key mechanical systems, the frigate will carry some of the 

Page 12 GA0-17-262T 
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Limited Opportunities 

Remain to Shape 

LCS and Frigate 

Programs 

more failure-prone LCS equipment, such as some propulsion equipment, 

and will likely carry some of the non-fleet-standard, LCS-unique 

equipment that has challenged the Navy's support and logistics chain. 

Uncertainties or needs that remain with the surface and anti-submarine 

warfare mission packages, such as demonstrating operational 

performance of the surface-to-surface missile and the anti-submarine 

warfare package, also pose risk for the frigate. 

The Navy's plans for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 involve significant 

decisions for the LCS and the frigate programs, including potential future 

commitments of approximately $14 billion for seaframes and mission 

packages. First, the Navy plans to buy the last two LCS in fiscal year 

2017, even though DOD and the Navy recognize that the LCS does not 

meet needs. Second, the Navy is planning to seek congressional 

authorization for a block buy of all planned frigates and funding for the 

lead frigate as soon as next year-2017-despite significant unknowns 

about the cost, schedule, and capability of the vessel. The Navy's 

acquisition approach for the frigate raises concerns about overcommitting 

to the future acquisition of ships for which significant cost, schedule, and 

technical uncertainty remains. Similar to what we previously have advised 

about LCS block buy contracting, a frigate block buy approach could 

reduce funding flexibility. For example, the LCS contracts provide that a 

failure to fully fund the purchase of a ship in a given year would make the 

contract subject to renegotiation. Following this reasoning, such a failure 

to fund a ship in a given year could result in the government paying more 

for remaining ships under the contract, which provides a notable 

disincentive to take any action that might delay procurement, even when 

a program is underperforming. 

The Navy requested funding for two LCS in its fiscal year 2017 budget 

request. We previously suggested that Congress consider not funding 

any requested LCS in fiscal year 2017 because of unresolved concerns 

with lethality and survivability of the LCS design, the Navy's ability to 

make needed improvements, and the lagging construction schedule of 

the shipyards. As figure 4 depicts, even if no ships were funded in fiscal 

year 2017, delays that have occurred for previously funded ships have 

resulted in a construction workload that extends into fiscal year 2020. 

Page 13 GA0-17-262T 
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16-73_Francis_16.eps

Figure 4: Construction Demands for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Shipyards 

Seaframe 

LCS9 

LCS 10 

LCS11 

LCS 12 

LCS 13 

LCS 14 

LCS 15 

LCS 16 

LCS 17 

LCS 18 

LCS 19 

LCS 20 

LCS21 

LCS22 

LCS 23 

LCS24 

LCS 251 

LCS 261 

LCS 27b 

LCS 28b 

FY 2017 FISCALYEAR(FYI 

2016 

t::- Current start construction date 

-e- Original delivery date 

-OOill Modified delivery date 

LCS = Littoral Combat Ship 

FY 2018 

Delay 

FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 months 

11 

15 

10 

13 

11 

12 

11 

13 

11 

11 

11 

11 

11 

11 

11 

15 

Source: GAO analysmof Navy contract data and budge! documents. 1 GA0-17-262T 

"The delivery dates for LCS 25 and 26-awarded in March 2016-have not been modified 

~he Navy has not awarded contracts for construction of LCS 27 or 28 

In all, 8 ships have been delivered (LCS 1-8) and 14 are in various 

phases of construction (LCS 9-22), with 3 more (LCS 23, 24, and 26) set 

to begin construction later in fiscal year 2017. Although the Navy has 

argued that pausing LCS production would result in loss of production 

work and start-up delays to the frigate program, the schedule suggests 

Page 14 GA0-17-262T 
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16-73_Francis_17.eps

Summary 

that the shipyards in Marinette, Wisconsin, and Mobile, Alabama, will 

have sufficient workload remaining from prior LCS contract awards that 

offsets the need to award additional LCS in fiscal year 2017. The Navy's 

concern also does not account for any other work that the shipyards may 

have from other Navy or commercial contracts and the possibility of 

continued delays in the delivery of LCS. 

On the heels of the decision to fund fiscal year 2017 LCS will be the 

decision on whether to authorize the frigate contracting approach and 

fund the lead frigate. As I noted above, the current acquisition plans for 

the frigate have been accelerated during the past year. If these plans 

hold, Congress will be asked in a few months to consider authorizing a 

block buy of 12 frigates and funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 

2018 budget is proposed-before detail design has begun and the scope 

and cost of the design changes needed to turn an LCS into a frigate are 

well understood. The frigate acquisition strategy also reflects a proclivity 

by the Navy to use contracting approaches such as block buys and 

multiyear procurement for acquisition programs, which may have the 

cumulative effect of inuring the programs against changes-such as in 

quantities bought 

To the extent that both the LCS and the frigate successfully demonstrate 

their ability to conduct their intended missions, it is reasonable to assume 

they will provide useful capability to the Navy. By the same token, the 

LCS's weakened business case raises a basic oversight question: does a 

program that costs twice as much but delivers less capability than 

planned still warrant an additional investment of nearly $14 billion? 

Congress has two key decisions remaining for LCS and the frigate that, 

once made, will put a set of commitments in place that will make it difficult 

for Congress to alter in the future. The first decision is whether to fund 

additional LCS in fiscal year 2017, in light of the backlog of work already 

in the shipyards and the fact that these ships are baseline LCS, not the 

frigate. Second-and more importantly- is the decision on whether to 

authorize a block buy of 12 frigates, wh ich would conclude the entire buy 

of 40 LCS and frigates. If Congress were to authorize the block buy, 

those ships would still require annual appropriations. While Congress 

could still thus conduct oversight of the program through the 

appropriations process, it could be more difficult to make decisions to 

reduce or delay the program should that become warranted, as the Navy 

may point to losses in favorable block buy prices, like it has done 

previously with LCS. At a minimum, holding the Navy to the plan it set 

Page 15 GA0-17-262T 
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GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

forth in the fiscal year 2017 budget submission, which provided for detail 

design activities in advance of a contract award in fiscal year 2019, 

affords more time to reduce LCS uncertainties that directly affect the 

frigate and to build design knowledge to reduce technical and cost risks 

Additionally, forgoing a frigate award in fiscal year 2018 offers the Navy 

an opportunity to better demonstrate to Congress whether the frigate's 

estimated cost and expected capabilities warrant the additional 

investment. 

GAO has reported extensively about what we refer to as the defense 

acquisition culture, a prevailing set of incentives that encourages 

decisions to go forward with programs before they are ready and a 

willingness to accept cost growth and schedule delays as the likely 

byproduct of such decisions. This Committee has been particularly 

concerned with repeated acquisition problems and has actively advocated 

for legislative solutions. As I testified last year on the Ford-class Aircraft 

Carrier, Congress has a very important role to play in shaping the 

acquisition culture, particularly in what it sanctions via funding approvals. 

If programs that propose optimistic or rushed acquisition strategies win 

funding approval, those strategies are, in effect, sanctioned. The 

upcoming decisions on the LCS and the frigate represent opportunities for 

Congress to take a stand on what it is willing to fund and what that means 

for maintaining-or changing-the defense acquisition culture 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the 

Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you may have at this time 

If you or your staff has any questions about this statement, please contact 

PaulL Francis at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Michele Mackin (Director), Diana 

Moldafsky (Assistant Director), Pete Anderson, Jacob Leon Beier, Laurier 

Fish, Kristine Hassinger, C. James Madar, Sean Merrill, LeAnna Parkey, 

and Robin Wilson. 

Page 16 GA0-17-262T 
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Related GAO Products 

Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS 

and Frigate Acquisition Strategies. GA0-16-356. Washington, D.C.: June 

9, 2016. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions. GA0-16-201 . 

Washington, D.C.: December 18,2015. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight 

Management Needed Prior to Further Investments. GA0-14-827. 

Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2014. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two 

Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery. GA0-14-7 49. 

Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2014. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs. GA0-14-44 7 

Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2014. 

Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting 

Quality. GA0-14-122. Washington, D.C.: November 19,2013. 

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost. 

GA0-13-738T. Washington, D.C .. July 25, 2013. 

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost. 

GA0-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22,2013. 

Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat 

Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of 

Risks. GA0-11-277T. Washington, D.C.: December 14,2010. 

National Defense: Navy's Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for 

the Littoral Combat Ship Program. GA0-11-249R. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Navy's Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 

Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GA0-10-523. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31,2010. 

Page 17 GA0-17-262T 
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(101256) 

Related GAO Products 

Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost 

Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts. 

GA0-10-257. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2010. 

Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate 

Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. GA0-09-322. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13,2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on 

Mine Countermeasures Capabilities. GA0-08-13. Washington, D.C. : 

October 12, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate 

Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GA0-05-255. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2005. 

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64 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Stackley, as Ronald Reagan used to say, ‘‘Facts are 

stubborn things.’’ You painted a rather rosy picture, but the facts 

are that the LCS was initially expected to cost $220 million per 

ship. That was the testimony before this committee. The cost has 

now doubled to $478 million. The first LCS combat capability mine 

countermeasures was supposed to be delivered in 2008. That capability is still not operational, nor is it expected to be until 2020, 12 

years late. 

You have served as the Navy’s acquisition executive for the past 

eight years. Who is responsible, and who should be held accountable for a doubling of the cost of the ship, delivery 12 years late, 


16-73_Francis_22.eps
65 

and obvious difficulties, which I will mention in later questioning. 

Who is responsible, and who is going to be held accountable? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, let me start with the reference to the $220 

million ship, that number that dates back to the 2004, 2005 timeframe. Everybody here would absolutely agree that was unrealistic. 

Chairman MCCAIN. No, I would not because it was testified before this committee that that would be the cost per ship. In retrospect, we see that it was unrealistic, but at the time this committee 

and this Congress, which approved it, was on the basis of $220 million per ship. If we had been told it was $478 million and 12 years 

late for some of the programs, I do not think that this committee 

and the Congress of the United States would have approved it, Mr. 

Secretary. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I am telling you that the $220 million 

number was unrealistic. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, then why—— 

Mr. STACKLEY. This Congress—this Congress—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—why was it unrealistic to tell the Congress 

of the United States? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I agree. Sir, I agree. This Congress was led to believe that the ship would cost $220 million. That was an unrealistic 

number that was put before the Congress in terms of a program 

to authorize and appropriate. The result of the lead ship going to 

$500 to $700 million dollars each, that was—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Who was—who gave that information of $220 

million per ship to the—to the Congress and this committee? Do 

you know? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Navy’s cost as an independent variable cap of $220 million (fiscal year 2005 

dollars) for the ship platform and basic core systems was first reported in the report 

to Congress directed by section 218 of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107–314). The report was signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, John Young, and 

delivered to the congressional defense committees on February 10, 2003. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I would have to go back to the records to see who 

testified. The number was directed from the top down. I can tell 

you that the Naval Sea Systems Command’s estimate for the program at that point in time was not $220 million. That was the 

number that was in place as a cost cap for the program, and they 

pressed down to try to achieve what could not be achieved, and industry followed suit. 

We have the experience of the lead ship in terms of things that 

went wrong that we have been trying to recover from since. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Seventeen years, $700 million of taxpayers’ 

money has been sunk into the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle. The 

program was canceled earlier this year due to unsatisfactory performance, reliability, and the Navy formulated a new way ahead 

for the mine countermeasures mission. For nearly a decade, the 

GAO has reported the Navy was buying this system before they 

would approve it. Dr. Gilmore reported the RMMVs were not effective. 

Why did the Navy recommend to the RMMV in 2010 after a 

Nunn-McCurdy breach revealed a shoddy business case for the system to continue development? 

66 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir, 2010 timeframe, we went through the 

Nunn-McCurdy process, and we looked at a couple of key things. 

One was the performance issues that we were having with the 

RMMV and whether or not we believed that we could correct the 

reliability issues through a reliability improvement program. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Obviously you could not. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Correct, we failed in that assessment. We believed we could. We did a redesign effort. We did not go back and 

build new vehicles in accordance with the redesign. What we did 

was took the existing vehicles and back fit what fixes we could, and 

took that to test. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Which obviously did not work since now it 

has been abandoned, right? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. One more question, Admiral. Of the major 

casualties encountered to date, are these issues of ship design, inferior shipbuilding quality, a lack of procedural compliance, a lack of 

training, or something else? Who has been accountable? 2013 generator failures. That is on the LCS–1. Hundred and ninety-five 

days and $1.6 million to fix. Sea water contamination, and combining you have 20 days and $377,000. 

2016, contamination of a main engine, 258 days and $12 million 

dollars to fix. LCS–3, 2016, combined gear bearings, 184 days and 

$5.6 million to fix. LCS–4 in 2016, water jet failure, 24 days, and 

we do not know the cost. LCS–5 in 2015, high-speed clutch failure, 

355 days and counting. LCS–8 in 2016, water jet failure. 

What is going on here, Admiral, and who is held accountable? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. Starting specifically back in the early 

part of this year when—with the Fort Worth failure associated with 

personnel errors on the USS Fort Worth, I started to look very hard 

at the training and the qualification of the men and women that 

serve on our ships to see if we had short-changed them with respect to the training that they had been provided. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Who was held accountable for that? They 

were not well-trained. Somebody is supposed to train them. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Absolutely, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Was it you that was in charge of that? 

Admiral ROWDEN. I am responsible for training the men and 

women on these ships. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Should you be in your job? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, I believe I am capable of fulfilling the 

responsibilities. What I did find was that the training that we had 

provided to the young men and women was insufficient in reviewing two casualties specifically, the one on the Fort Worth and then 

one on the Freedom. 

The men and women, when we—I stepped back and got our Surface Warfare Officer School to conduct an assessment of the engineering knowledge of the men and women on the ships, it was 

found to be deficient. One of the things that we found was that, 

and that I directed, was that we start to import much more of the 

training than we had been relying on for the vendors to provide to 

our sailors that serve on these ships. 

Given the fact that we have pulled that engineering training in, 

given the fact that we have—are moving to get the curriculum necVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
67 

essary in order to be able to get the right knowledge into their 

heads in order to operate the propulsion plants, I think we are in 

a much better place going forward. 

Specifically associated with the accountability—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I agree. We may be better going forward. 

But, Admiral, we are going to start holding people accountable. We 

are talking about millions of dollars here that were failures that 

you say were a problem with training. Who was responsible for the 

training? Was not someone? Was it not anticipated that the crew 

would have to be well trained to avoid these tens of millions of dollars of problems? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Absolutely, sir. I feel that as we have operated 

the ships and as we have learned about these new propulsion 

plants—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am glad we have learned at the cost to the 

taxpayers of tens of millions of dollars. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 

Stackley, in the letter that the chairman I wrote to the CNO, we 

talked about the replacement of the LCS. As I understand it, the 

current plan is to stop building LCS in fiscal year 2025. Mr. 

Francis’ assessment was interesting. He suggested that LCS is simply going to morph into something called a frigate, and we are 

going to buy frigates, but we are not going to have a real opportunity to review, nor are you going to have the opportunity given 

the compressed timeframe, to do all the requirements, to validate 

the requirements, to do the testing, to do the proving, if you will. 

Can you give us an indication of where this program is headed? 

Is it going to morph into frigates? Is it going to be a new design 

for a surface combatant? If it is, does that have to be up and running by fiscal year 2026 because we stop buying LCSs in 2025? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, in 2014 we were directed by then Secretary 

Hagel to take a review of our small surface combatants and to 

come back with a proposal for what was referred to as capabilities 

consistent with a frigate. We did that review in the 2015 timeframe. In fact, we briefed the defense committees and invited them 

to participate in some of the out briefs. 

The plan going forward that we then presented in our subsequent budget was to take the ASW Mission Package capabilities, 

plus the Surface Warfare Mission Package capabilities that are currently planned for the LCS, and combine them and permanently install them on the LCS platform to give it the multi-mission capabilities, trade away modularity, but to give it multi-mission capabilities. Add to that over-the-horizon missile, and add to that upgrades to electronic warfare and decoys, specifically, our Nulka 

decoy, in effect, using existing capabilities or capabilities that we 

already have in development and that the ship is already designed 

to accommodate, permanently install them on the platform to give 

them multi-mission capability I have referred to as a frigate. 

That work was done—was chartered in 2014, done in 2015, 

shared with the defense committees at least at the staff level, included in our budget. The capabilities development document has 

gone through the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] for 

validation of the requirements. The shipyards have been turned on 

68 

to do the design associated with permanently integrating those existing capabilities into their platforms. That design effort is going 

on today. 

The competitive downselect for that future frigate design, that 

RFP [request for proposals] is planned to go out next summer. We 

will be doing those design reviews, and, as I described in my opening statement, we will invite your staffs to look at the process, look 

at the products, look at the criteria, and provide basically your 

oversight. We will ensure that you have the insight before we go 

further forward. 

Senator REED. Okay. Will that plan include a block buy of the 

frigates or a block buy of another group of LCSs? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Today, that is the plan. We do not have—we do 

not have a formalized—we have not finalized the acquisition strategy with the 2018 budget. We will be bringing that formal acquisition strategy over to present to the Congress for your review and 

ultimately for your approval. 

I want to—I do think it is important, though, to make a comment. First, I fully appreciate all of Paul Francis’ comments in his 

opening statement, and we work closely together. I do need to point 

out when we talk about a block buy versus talking about a 

multiyear, effectively what we are—what we are describing with 

the competitive downselect is the competitive downselect will be 

based on best value associated with the detailed design by the shipbuilders. 

What we are telling them is somebody is going to win this, one 

is going to win this, and they will get 12 ships of this frigate design. The details in terms of whether that is one-plus options, 

whether that is 12 options, or whether we convert that to a 

multiyear in the future, that is not decided today. But we do want 

to get—to ensure we procure those ships as affordably as possible 

when we go through that competitive downselect. 

Senator REED. Again, just to get my perspective, it appears that 

the LCS Program is morphing into the frigate program. Is that 

fair? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We went from 52 LCSs. We determined—yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Yeah, thank you. Dr. Gilmore points out that one 

of the things we have to consider is this ship gets heavier literally 

with these systems placed on it, that it will be lower maximum 

sprint speed, as he describes, with less fuel endurance. The loss of 

sprint speed will, therefore, affect the success of small boat swarm 

defenses and the ability to keep up with the carrier strike group. 

In fact, anecdotally, I have heard that the present ships have a difficult time keeping up with the carrier strike groups, and, therefore, are not available when needed. 

Now, let me ask—— 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. My time is limited, so if you have a quick response. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. First, we will be adding capability which 

will add weight to the ship. However, the impact on speed is marginal. Today, the requirement is 40 plus knots. These ships will 

69 

still be faster than any other combatant or warship that we have 

today with the added weight. 

Second, a part of our—in this requirement cycle—requirement 

and design cycle, we are not trading off endurance. In fact, as we 

look at our—the competitive strategy that we are going to put out 

there in our best value criteria, we are—we are not just going to 

not trade off endurance. We are going to place a premium on being 

able to increase endurance. Endurance is not going to go down, and 

speed is only going to be affected at the margins. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, and I will—I might have 

some written questions for the other panelists. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, we have heard this before in the eight years I spent 

on the House Armed Services Committee and the 22 years on this 

committee. We are always talking about cost overruns. We are 

talking about increased—you know, the costs and delays. 

I actually sat next to B–1 Bob [Former Represenatative Robert 

Dornan], and some you may remember the B–1 Bob, and all the 

problems we went through there, and then the B–2 came along, 

and we went through FCS, Future Combat System. Just about had 

everything. Same problems. It worked out Gates canceled it. Then 

the F–35, we have actually had tested. It is not just the Navy. This 

is a problem, Mr. Francis, and it is all over. 

But just in terms of the Navy, Mr. Secretary, the—how does this 

compare to the other problems, like the DDG Zumwalt, in terms 

of delays and the things we have been talking about in this committee hearing? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I think all the previous discussion and 

testimony regarding delays in the program, the LCS delays have 

been unacceptable. Frankly, when we think about going forward 

and what we are doing different, LCS, DDG–1000, I would add 

CVN–78 to the mix. There is a period of time where the Navy went 

forward with all clean sheet designs, high risk, a lot of new development wrapped up in the lead ships. That is in our—we are still 

working through those lead ships, but that approach is in our rearview mirror. We are not going forward with that approach today 

and in the future 

When we talk about LCS transitioning to a frigate, we are 

leveraging mature designs, mature systems, and that gives us the 

ability to compete this ship, this future ship, under a fixed price 

contract. LCS and DDG–1000 are on a cost plus—— 

Senator INHOFE. Well, but there—yeah. You do not need to elaborate on that because the fact that in 2013, five of the eight LCSs 

delivered to the Navy have experienced significant engineering casualties, and then it just gets worse and worse, USS Montgomery. 

We have talked about all of this. 

But, Mr. Francis, you have been at the GAO for quite a while. 

How long? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Forty-two years. 

Senator INHOFE. Forty-two years, and you have been doing the 

same types of things, evaluating military systems and so forth? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I have to keep doing it until I get it right, Senator. 

[Laughter.] 

70 

Senator INHOFE. No, I am serious about this because you have 

watched all this, and one of your recommendations was—there are 

a lot of good recommendations in your—the final part of your statement that says, ‘‘Congress should consider not funding finding any 

requested LCS in fiscal year 2017, and should consider requiring 

the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy for the frigate.’’ Is this 

one of your recommendations? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. What do you think about that recommendation, 

Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I do not propose to halt production of the LCS in 

2017. As it relates to the frigate, I listened carefully to Mr. Francis’ 

comments, and I am taking notes. 

What I welcome is the committee, the GAO to sit down and look 

at the Navy’s plan and whether or not it can be improved upon. 

We will take recommendations to improve upon it, but in terms of 

the fundamentals of locking down the requirements, stable design, 

ensuring that we have a competitive fixed price approach to a frigate, I think all those fundamentals that you all would want us to 

do, we have got in place. 

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Rowden, what do you think about that 

specific recommendation? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Sir, I agree with Secretary Stackley. It is—— 

Senator INHOFE. You do not agree with that recommendation and 

carrying out that recommendation as a partial solution to the problem that we are discussing. 

Admiral ROWDEN. I am sorry, sir? 

Senator INHOFE. I will read it again. ‘‘Congress should consider 

not funding any requested LCS in the fiscal year 2017, and should 

consider requiring the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy of the 

frigate. 

Admiral ROWDEN. No, sir, I would disagree with that recommendation. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The fiscal year 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 115–31) provided $1,563.7 million for three LCS in fiscal year 2017. The President’s 2018 submission programs the first year of FFG(X) procurement in fiscal year 2020 to define 

FFG(X) requirements, thoroughly evaluate design alternatives, and mature the design. To ensure we maintain the small surface combatant industrial base to support 

the FFG(X) procurement and leverage the efficiencies from the facilitization investments made in LCS shipyards, the Navy plans to continue LCS production in fiscal 

year 2018 and fiscal year 2019. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, for the record, I would—I would kind of 

like to have you—both of you elaborate on what is wrong with that, 

and what is a better solution. I know we have got a long hearing 

here, and we have heard a lot of things. But, you know, I read 

these things, and particularly when it comes from someone who 

has been doing this for such a long period of time. 

I would also say, Mr. Francis, I would like some time to sit down 

with you, not just on this stuff we are talking about in this committee, but on some of the others that I mentioned that we have 

had to suffer through, FCS and all that. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I would like to do that. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono. 

71 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow up on some of Mr. Francis’ suggestions to this committee. This 

is probably a question that can be responded to by either the Secretary or the admiral. 

One of Mr. Francis’ suggestions is that we not okay the block buy 

strategy for the frigates. I would like to know what would that kind 

of strategy or are not okaying this block buy due to the industrial 

base, and what kind of message would that decision by this committee give to the Navy’s acquisition strategy in other programs. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Well, let me—let me start by trying to describe 

a little bit about what the block buy itself is. We are going to go 

out and downselect the frigate to a single shipbuilder. We plan to 

procure 12. We want that shipbuilder to go out to its vendor base 

and secure long-term agreements with its vendors as best as possible so that pricing and stability across the industrial base will 

support the program. 

Senator HIRONO. Mr. Secretary, if I can get a clarification then. 

The concern with the block buy is that it does not really interject 

the kind of competition that Mr. Francis thinks would be warranted. Was that your point, Mr. Francis? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, actually, Senator, I think the competition 

could be done under the detail design phase. My concern is oversight for this committee once you approve the block buy. Now, the 

Navy will execute, and I would believe they would do a good job 

of trying to lay it out in a program. But your opportunity to influence what gets done is going to be largely compromised once you 

approve the block buy. Your ability in the future to make changes 

is going to be limited. 

Senator HIRONO. Mr. Secretary, you—your explanation seems to 

go to the competition aspect of the suggestion, but apparently it 

has much more to do with our ability to provide oversight. When 

we okay a block buy, then we are letting go of the oversight responsibilities that this Congress has. Can you respond to that aspect? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I disagree that you are relinquishing any of your 

oversight responsibilities. A block buy is still annual procurement 

of each ship in the block buy. There is termination liability or cancellation ceiling that the Congress is taking on responsibility for, 

and you will have absolute insight and oversight of the program 

each step of the way. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, I’m sorry. You know, that is all well and 

good, but the entire history of this program has been that, yes, we 

have always had that decision-making capability. But, you know, 

you can go down a path, and next thing you know a ship is costing 

twice what it originally started because we have gone down a particular path. 

I think we are at the point where listening to all of this testimony that we want to have reassurances that going forward, that 

we are not going to just throw more money into a program that is 

going to continue to haunt us with a lack of capability, and 

unreliability, and all the other factors that have been brought to 

light. 

I realize you sit here and you reassure us. That has been the 

case at every hearing with regard to this program. But I am looking for something very concrete that we can do that enables us to 

72 

get the kind of product that the taxpayers are paying for. Aside 

from your reassurances, is there something very specific that you 

are going to do that is going to result in the kind of product that 

we are paying for? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Well, let me just start to go down the list. Unlike 

the start of this program, we are not going to suffer through requirements, churn, and instability. We are not going to introduce 

new design late in production that are going to cause costs to go 

through the roof. We are not going to put these ships under contract in a cost-plus environment where the government owns responsibility for the cost itself. 

I think Mr. Francis’ concerns about a Milestone B, I would be 

happy to sit down with the committee staff and walk through what 

you need to ensure that you do, in fact, have confidence that all 

the statutory requirements in terms of cost estimates, in terms of 

acquisition program baselines, in terms of requirements, 

documentations, just like a Milestone B. 

We will prepare that for you. We will prepare that for you, and 

we will—we will walk through it with you. If we need to establish 

a pseudo-Milestone B or a Milestone B, I do not hesitate to do that, 

ma’am. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. I think it is really important that 

we have those kinds of very specific items that you are going to follow, just as the initial testimony was that this—these ships would 

cost some $200 million, and we are—you have been asked to justify 

the kind of changes. Yes, it would be good for us to have some very 

specific items that we can check off as we go forward if we go forward with this. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I recommend—— 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I recommend that we work with committee staff 

and we come up with the agreed plan in that regard going forward. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Ma’am, if I—if I may, I would say while these are 

modifications, they are rather significant, at least the $100 million 

dollars per ship, and that cost has not independently validated yet. 

My thinking is if we are that close to being able to have everything 

ready for Milestone B, let us have the Milestone B. 

Although there are not legal requirements for you to approve 

ships under a block buy, if past history is any indication, if you try 

to alter the plan, try to reduce the number of ships, you will be told 

you are going to jeopardize our prices, and you are going to affect 

the industrial base. Pressure will be brought to bear to keep things 

the way they are. 

Senator HIRONO. I understand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Francis, I totally agree, and I have seen 

that movie before. This idea of a block buy before it is a mature 

system is absolutely insane. Again, $220 million per ship. 

Mr. Stackley—Secretary Stackley to say that was really bogus. 

We can only go by the—by the numbers that we are given. Again, 

who gave us that? Do you know? Do you know who gave us the 

$220 million per ship instead of the $478 it will cost today? Do you 

know who that unknown bureaucrat was? 

73 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, I believe it was uniform leadership in the 

Navy at that time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. It was all the uniform Navy that was responsible for it. I did not know that the uniform Navy was responsible 

for this kind of acquisition. I thought it was the civilian side. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. I just want to thank the 

chairman for his very important focus on the issues with the LCS. 

I want to also thank Mr. Francis for his very good insight as to 

how we could try to really bring back some real oversight over this 

and the cost overruns. I thank you for that. 

Dr. Gilmore, I want to on a different topic wanted to ask you, 

right now OT&E is currently planning an F–35 versus A–10 comparison test. I also want to thank the chairman for the work that 

we have done together to make sure that there is not a premature 

retirement of the A–10 because of its important capacity to provide 

close air support for our troops on the ground, and the importance 

of that close air support. 

I have been getting some mixed signals between what has been 

happening with the Air Force. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

testified before this committee that the A–10—that, in fact, the F– 

35 will not replace the A–10. This comparison testing for what happened in terms of close air support is very, very important. In fact, 

I want to thank the chairman as well for working, and it was an 

honor to work with him to make sure that there are provisions in 

the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], which we are 

going to consider shortly, hopefully next week, that will make sure 

that this comparison test is done before there is any retirement of 

the A–10. 

I want to ask you where the comparison test process is, and also 

how that process will be conducted in a thorough way. 

Dr. GILMORE. I, in conjunction with the commander of the Navy’s 

Operational Test and Evaluation Force and the commander of the 

Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, the three of us 

approved a detailed plan for all of the testing in F–35 operational 

tests this past summer, including, in particular, a comparison test. 

There is a detailed design that is on the record that the three of 

us have approved. It does not mean that my successor might not 

change that, but it is a good plan, and I hope that that will not 

occur. 

The test design includes comparison testing with the A–10 and 

the F–35 conducting close air support, combat search and rescue, 

and forward air controller airborne missions. It is a rigorous test, 

and if it is conducted it will provide excellent information on how 

well the F–35 can conduct those kinds of missions in comparison 

with what the A–10 can do. We are also going to be doing other 

comparison testing, suppression of air—enemy air defenses with 

the F–16 and surface attack with the F–18. 

Again, the justification for all of these tests, these comparison 

tests, comes back to the requirements that the Air Force chief of 

staff has approved. Those include specifically, as I think I said the 

last time that I appeared before the committee where I read them 

from the requirements document, that the A–10 is meant to take— 

or excuse me, the F–35 is meant to take on the role of the A–10. 

74 

I mean, that is just unambiguously stated in the requirements document. 

I understand there has been debate and testimony that is confusing about it, but you can refer to that document, and it is there 

in very plain English. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, that is excellent because we are going to 

find out whether that measures up—— 

Dr. GILMORE. Now, with regard to conducting that test, my projection is that the operational test for the F–35, which will include 

this comparison test, will not begin in all likelihood until late Calendar Year 2018 or early Calendar Year 2019, because my estimate 

is that mission systems testing is not going to end until July of 

2018. 

At that point, you could get a fleet release of the mission system’s capability software together with the mission data file, which 

enables the aircraft to actually deal with the threat environment. 

The Joint Program Office’s own projections are that that mission 

data file will not be ready until the summer of 2018. You cannot 

do meaningful testing until that time. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Does that mean that the F–35 is not ready 

to engage in combat? 

Dr. GILMORE. Until it has a mission data file that is verified and 

accredited, it would not have the capability to deal with the threats 

that we are spending $400 billion to have it deal with. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We are dealing—we are dealing with ISIS 

[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Syria and Iraq as we speak 

using the A–10. 

Dr. GILMORE. Correct. That is not why we are buying the F–35. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is the F–35 ready to assume that role? 

Dr. GILMORE. There are people who argue it could. I kind of wonder about that argument because right now the capability that the 

F–35 has is two air-to-air missiles and two bombs, with limitations 

in close air support that actually are discussed—that are significant and discussed in detail in the Air Force’s own IOC readiness 

assessment, which states clearly that the current F–35 with the 

Block 3i software does not provide the close air support capability 

that our existing fourth generation aircraft provide. That is a quote 

from an Air Force report. I have written evaluations that are consistent with that quote. 

Then there are the problems with the 35 availability. The fleetwide availability is at best 50 percent, sometimes bottoming out 

around 20 or 30 percent. Why it is that a commander would choose 

to send an aircraft that has two bombs, limited endurance, low 

availability to fight ISIS is, I think—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The cost—— 

Dr. GILMORE.—a question. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The cost of an F–35 is per copy roughly? 

Dr. GILMORE. You know, I hesitate to give a number. It is well 

over the initial cost estimates. I think it is up around—it is up 

around—it is between $80 and $100 million. It is coming down. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The cost of an A–10? 

Dr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, I do not know. 

Senator AYOTTE. Except that the—— 

Dr. GILMORE. A lot less. 

75 

[Laughter.] 

Senator AYOTTE.—the A–10 has the lowest cost per flying hour. 

Dr. GILMORE. Oh, yes. 

Senator AYOTTE. I do not think we are going to have the low cost 

per flying hour with the F–35. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I believe it is—I believe it is—I believe the 

A–10 is $15 million per—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Yeah. 

Dr. GILMORE. I—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Your time has—— 

Senator AYOTTE. May I follow up briefly, Chairman, on one other 

issue with regard to the A–10? Given the timing that we are hearing this comparison testing, one of the provisions that is also—that 

if the NDAA is passed, which we hope it is, that has been publicly 

released is that the Secretary—one of the issues that I have been 

going back and forth with the Air Force on has been the actually 

removal—of not ensuring that the A–10 continues to be viable. 

The 2018 budget requests make sure that the Air Force cannot 

remove any active inventory of A–10 from flyable status due to unserviceable wings or other components. I think this is really important given the timing that you have just talked about about this 

comparison test and what the A–10 is doing right now against the 

fight against ISIS. 

Dr. GILMORE. Let me just be as clear as I can be about the timing. If I am correct, we would not start training for the operational 

test until mid-2018, which takes about six months. Then the test 

would be conducted beginning in very late 2018 or early 2019. By 

the time the test is over and the reporting gets done, another year 

has gone by. The report that is mandated in the—in the bill would 

not be available until the end of 2019 or early 2020. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I listen to this discussion, it strikes me that it would profit us—profit us to talk 

about a broader issue. Mr. Stackley, first I start with the premise 

that nobody involved in this process was malicious or meant to do 

harm. I want to say that you are one of the most capable officials 

that I have met in this—in this business. 

However, we could have had this same hearing today and you 

cross out ‘‘LCS’’ and put in ‘‘F–35.’’ You cross out ‘‘F–35’’ and put 

in the ‘‘new class of carrier.’’ You cross out the ‘‘new class of carrier’’ and put in the ‘‘future combat systems.’’ It seems to me there 

is a more—a deeper issue going on here, and it strikes me that it 

is our desire to have the latest and greatest new technology as soon 

as possible, and at the same time control costs and do it on time. 

We are trying to invent things while we are building them. 

Could you comment on this larger question? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Senator, I think—I think you nailed it right 

there. We have spent a lot of time reviewing programs that either 

have failed or have just gone out of bounds in terms of cost and 

schedule, and almost invariably there are common themes. One of 

them is a lot of concurrency in terms of developing multiple technologies and trying to integrate them at the same time on a major 

76 

weapons platform or major system. There is—and GAO has written 

a number of reports. 

There is an inclination to underestimate the cost—— 

Senator KING. Particularly of something that has never been 

built before. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Then, when you get into that 

contract environment and you get started, it is difficult to stop. You 

press forward. Now—— 

Senator KING. On the other hand, if you stop and say we are 

going to fully test—build a prototype and fully test, then that is 

going to lengthen your—— 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING.—your deployment window, and that conflicts with 

the need of the Navy, or the Air Force, or the Army to have these 

weapons to meet current threats. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. What we are doing is, and this is the 

CNO and myself. We are co-chairing requirements reviews, design 

reviews, production readiness reviews, program reviews. We are— 

we are challenging every requirement, every specification in terms 

of do we absolutely have to have that, or is there another way, a 

less—a lower risk way to deliver the ultimate capability that we 

have got to have. 

I would point out a couple of examples. The decision to, frankly, 

to truncate the DDG–1000 and to revert back to the DDG–51 was 

a recognition in the 2009 timeframe that we had overreached in 

terms of technology versus what we really needed in terms of 

warfighting capability. We go back to the tried and true DDG– 

51—— 

Senator KING. But that—but that decision made it likely that 

only building three ships—— 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING.—in one class was going to make them more expensive and all that. 

Mr. STACKLEY. It is going to drive cost into those three ships, 

but—— 

Senator KING. The first DDG back in the 80s was very expensive. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir, but what it avoided was the recognition—it recognized the cost that was coming—— 

Senator KING. Right. 

Mr. STACKLEY.—in terms of completing that ship program. Then 

going back to the 51 and incrementally introducing the capabilities 

that we need to keep pace with the threat, particularly in the 51’s 

mission areas. 

Senator KING. The key word is ‘‘incrementally,’’ not trying—— 

Mr. STACKLEY. Absolutely. 

Senator KING. We had a hearing on carriers, and as I recall, 

what we learned was we were trying to do too much in the—in the 

new carrier. 

Mr. STACKLEY. That is exactly right. The original carrier concept 

was incremental over three ships. It was collapsed onto a single 

hull ole called CVN–78, and we are paying the price in terms that 

concurrent development and integration on that ship. 

Senator KING. Okay. How do we avoid this in the future? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Well, we—— 

77 

Senator KING. We have got the B–21 coming down the road. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I gave you the 51 example. On the next amphib, 

the LXR, we threw away the notion of a clean ship sheet design. 

We took the proven LPD–17 hull form, and what we are doing is 

tailoring that ship to meet the requirements associated with replacing the LSD–41. That was a year-long effort with myself, the commandant, and the CNO co-chairing those design reviews to get 

down to a design that we are confident that it is mature enough. 

We are not introducing unnecessary risk. We understand the cost, 

and now we are ready to put it into the—— 

Senator KING. It seems to me, though, that one of the—one of the 

things, and I know I am running out of time. But one of the things 

we need to think about is how to design these weapon systems in 

a—a way, and I hesitate to use the word—the word ‘‘modular’’ because that is not a good word in today’s hearing, but in a modular 

way so that they can be upgraded as technology improves instead 

of having to rebuild the whole—the whole thing. 

Mr. STACKLEY. We are getting there. It is open architecture, that 

general term. If you take a look at the vertical launching system 

on the DDG–51, that is an open system design. It started off with 

the SM–2. It now handles the SM–3. It handles the SM–6. It handles the Tomahawk. It handles the evolved cease-fire missile. Now 

we can develop the missiles in their environment and bring them 

to the ship, and then we will deal with the upgrades to the software and the land-based system. 

Senator KING. The whole system is not—is not built from 

scratch. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding 

this hearing, and I look forward to future hearings. I hope we can 

continue this broader discussion of why does this keep happening. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Chairman, could I follow up for a moment with 

Mr. King? Mr. King, I think you are right on about the broader 

problem, and we have done quite a bit of work. I think what we 

have is an age-old acquisition culture problem where there are 

really strong incentives when a program is getting started to over 

promise on its abilities to perform and underestimate cost and 

schedule. 

Senator KING. To load requirements on. 

Mr. FRANCIS. To load requirements on, especially if you are only 

going to have platforms once a generation, you had better get everything on that platform you can. 

We have to look at what those incentives are and why they occur, 

some as competition for funding in the—in the Pentagon. If you 

show any weakness, your lunch is going to get eaten. Your program 

is not going to go forward. You have to be a strident supporter of 

those programs going through. 

We have to learn where to take risk and how to take risk, and 

I would say it is before that Milestone B decision. That is where 

we really need to make investments, and try things out, and be 

willing to put money there. 

You’re right, there is—there is an aversion to if we take time to 

do that, that is going to delay the capability of the warfighter, and 

78 

we find that to be unacceptable. But when we have approved the 

program and then it runs into delays, we find that is acceptable. 

I think we can get it right. 

I empathize with Secretary Stackley. He is in a very difficult position, and I think he is one of the best service acquisition executives I have—I have had the pleasure to work with. But he is 

charged dually with executing these programs and defending the 

programs, and that is a very tough position to put somebody in, but 

our acquisition process demands it. 

Dr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, I know—I would just like to say 

one thing on this topic based on my experience over 26 years. What 

we have to do is quit denying the facts. There are plenty of facts 

that were available about what was happening with LCS all along. 

Yet as recently as 2013 when it comes to the Mine Countermeasures System on LCS, that Navy testified, and I will quote 

here, ‘‘Most of the systems in the first few increments consist of off 

the shelf products. The risk in these early increments is very low 

and very well managed.’’ That turned out not to be the case. Again, 

in 2013 the Navy testified, ‘‘The linchpin of the MCM package, the 

remote—the RMMV, now has over 850 hours of reliability growth 

over the span of 47 missions in five months, which has shown the 

mean time between operational mission failure substantially exceeding requirements.’’ 

That statement was absolutely incorrect. I have been reporting 

for several years that those claims were incorrect, and the program 

office and the Navy could not bring themselves to deal with what 

the facts were. Ultimately, they did to their credit with the independent review team. 

But what I have seen repeatedly is an inability, a refusal to deal 

with what the facts are of how well the systems are or are not performing, and it is because of these incentives and other the other 

things that have been discussed. But it keeps happening, and it is 

a real problem. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Doctor, that is why some of us express such 

extreme frustration because we are only as good as the information 

we receive as that the LCS would cost $220 million dollars per 

ship, which now Secretary Stackley says, well, that was absolutely 

wrong. Nobody said it was wrong at the time. Everybody said it 

was right. 

I do not want to take the senator’s time, but there are two stories 

here that I could relate to. One was the MRAP [Mine Resistant 

Ambush Protected Vehicle], which we needed very badly in Iraq, 

and then the Secretary of Defense had to preside over a weekly 

meeting in order to get the MRAP to the battlefield to save lives 

from the IED [improvised explosive devices]. Then we had the 

other extreme, an RFP for a new pistol that is 200 hundred pages 

long, for a pistol because it has gone through layer, after layer, 

after layer, after layer. 

The reason why I am frustrated and other members are, we are 

only—we can only make decisions on the information we get. If 

that information is incorrect or false, as Secretary Stackley just 

said about the LCS, then how can we function effectively for the 

people we represent? That is why you sense this frustration here 

79 

amongst members of the committee, including this chairman, because we see it time after time. 

We have not even talked about the aircraft carrier, and the arresting gear, and the catapults, but—and I do not want to take 

more time of the committee. But I hope that our witnesses understand that we have to bring this to a halt. Fooling around on the 

fringes is not—has proven to be unsuccessful. 

Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I agree with the chair 

that we have to have honest brokers, and we have to have people 

that will be held accountable. I do not know that we have seen that 

so far. But I do want to thank all of you for coming in today. 

As you may be aware, improving acquisition program management is a priority for me, and I have passed legislation to improve 

program management government wide. Not just in the DOD [Department of Defense], but government wide, with an emphasis on 

areas that are designated by GAO as high risk. This especially includes DOD acquisition program management. 

I know we can all agree that this LCS has become really an example of one of those DOD challenges. We mentioned the aircraft 

carrier. We will not go there today, but that is another one that 

we need to take a look at. 

But during times of defense spending caps, we know how difficult 

it is, and we have looming entitlement spending which will further 

squeeze our military budgets. We cannot have repeats of acquisition failures like we have seen with the LCS. Acquisition success 

is bottom line a matter of national security. 

This is a question for all of you, if you could just briefly respond, 

please. The LCS program changed its acquisition approach several 

times, something cited by the GAO as a reason for the increase in 

costs, and it also created performance issues. In your opinion, 

would the LCS program and others throughout DOD benefit from 

a standardized approach to managing the portfolio based on the 

best practices, not only of the industry, but also the government, 

before fully moving forward? If you could briefly respond, please, 

starting with you, Mr. Stackley. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me just describe that, you know, the experience of LCS, it broke the Navy, and we retooled the entire way 

that we do business when it comes to acquisition programs, and I 

think we are trying to pull best practices in. I described CNO [the 

Assistant Secretary of Navy] and RDA [Research, Development, 

and Acquisitions] sitting side by side reviewing requirements, reviewing specifications that lead to design, that lead to production. 

We have our program managers pretty much under a microscope 

right now, and we have taken things like cost, and we have put 

cost into our requirements so that you do not get to—you do not 

get to ignore cost while you are chasing a requirement. Just like 

speed, range, power, and payload, if you start to infringe on the 

cost requirement that we put—we put into our documents, then 

you have to report to RDA and CNO just like you do if you infringe 

on one of the other requirements. You have to identify what are 

you going to do to revert that, either trading away or otherwise. 

We would look at either canceling or, if necessary, padding costs 

to the program. 

80 

Senator ERNST. Would that have been good to have had before 

the process was started? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman’s reference to the $220 

million ship, the witnesses that informed the Congress, I do not 

think they knew. I do not think they knew or understand what this 

ship would cost. The system led to information that was provided. 

Chairman MCCAIN. If they did not know, why did they tell the 

Congress that it would be—that the cost would be—— 

Senator ERNST. Absolutely. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Because I think they believed or they desired it 

strongly enough that they believed that it would cost $220 million, 

but the underpinnings below that was broken. That is why I am 

sitting side by side with the CNO reviewing our programs, holding 

program managers accountable, understanding the details of the 

cost element by element, time phase by time phase. If we need to 

make trades, we will make trades. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Thank you very much. Vice Admiral? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, ma’am. With respect to the application of 

lessons learned, feeding back into the acquisition system and from 

my perspective as a—as the commander of the Surface Forces, 

clearly one of the things I think that the review that we recently 

conducted, the 60-day review, showed that we needed to take a— 

take a step back, take a pause, and apply, and look at what lessons 

we had learned associated with the program, and make the appropriate adjustments in order—in order to get the value down to the 

combatant commanders, in order to get the operational availability 

of the ships up. 

I think that the—it is a constant process, and I know that we 

will be continuing to look at the ships as we continue to deploy 

more of them, applying those appropriate lessons as we—as we 

learn them, and then feeding them back into the system. As it applies to the acquisition system, if we can apply those lessons back, 

then certainly we are going to do that. 

Senator ERNST. Dr. Gilmore, if you could respond as well. It is 

well and good. I am amazed that we are only now just discovering 

that we should be reviewing these processes and having a finished 

product in mind before we start the process. Could you respond, 

please? 

Dr. GILMORE. We should use best practices, and if you read the 

Department’s acquisition—the documents that describe its acquisition process, they incorporate most of these best practices that people talk about, except they are often waived. 

What I have watched over 26 years is what I call a constant 

search for process solutions to what I think are fundamentally 

leadership problems. When leadership is presented with a cost estimate that a number of people, and I was working at CBO [Congressional Budget Office] at the time when the original cost estimates were put out, and we were warning that they were probably 

quite low. When leadership does not make itself aware, does not 

critically question the information that it is being given, and lets 

it go forward, that is a big problem. A process can help give them 

that information, but if they do not do their jobs as real leaders 

and critically question the information that they are being given 

81 

and that it is being recommended that they send to the Congress 

and elsewhere, then they are failing. 

I have watched those kinds of failures occur for 26 years, and 

it—I am certainly for process improvements. If you have a bad 

process that stops information from getting forward from the, you 

know—does not enable the reviews to peruse that information to 

occur, then that is all bad. But if you have leadership that does not 

do its job, those process solutions will not fix things. 

Senator ERNST. That is very well put, Dr. Gilmore. Thank you. 

Mr. Francis? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for having this hearing. Thank you to each of you for being here 

today, realizing that this topic is a challenging one for you. But as 

the chairman said at the very beginning quoting Ronald Reagan, 

‘‘Facts are stubborn things,’’ and leadership is important. 

Dr. Gilmore, I find your testimony probably the most damning 

document concerning any government program I have ever read, 

not just as to what has happened in the past, and my colleagues 

have amply and ably focused on the procurement process, but the 

decision what should we do going forward. Not only is the survivability of this ship in question, but is very ability to accomplish the 

essential missions and endure the testing that has been reduced, 

in effect, because the ships are not sufficiently shock hardened, 

and, in fact, its cybersecurity defenses are not amply developed. 

In this approach that Mr. Francis has outlined of a procurement 

process rather than a block purchase, what is the case now for 

going forward with this program at all? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, sir, it is not my purview to say what ships 

the Navy should buy or what capabilities the Navy should have in 

those ships. That is—that is the Navy’s decision. What we have 

seen is that the ships thus far are not meeting the Navy’s own performance requirements, and we are well into the program. 

I cannot predict what the future will hold. I know it sounds parochial, but I will say it again. I said it in my opening comments. 

Whatever the Navy decides to do with regard to going forward, the 

history here in this program, as well as in many other programs, 

is clear, and that is that the only way you are going to discover the 

problems with performance that are significant that you will have 

to deal with, you have to deal with before you send sailors into 

harm’s way in combat. You do not want to discover these problems 

for the first time when you are in combat. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, that—— 

Dr. GILMORE. The only way you’re going to discover those problems is by doing realistic testing along the way. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I agree completely that you want to fly before you buy, which apparently has not been done here, and obviously test before you use the ship in combat. But what is—what 

assurance can any of the witnesses give us that the ship is actually 

going to be capable of accomplishing its mission and protecting the 

sailors who are going to be on board? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, the—again, we can give you information 

along the way about how well the ships and the crews are doing 

82 

with regard to what the Navy expects the ships and crews to do. 

Of course, the Navy’s views of what the Navy—the ships and crews 

are going to do is changing along the way as they learn more, 

which is appropriate. Which is appropriate. It is late in the process, 

but it is appropriate. 

You are never going to get from me or anyone else an honest, 

ironclad guarantee that the ships are going to perform the way 

people now say they hope they will. Those hopes are sincere, but, 

again, and I know it sounds parochial. What you have to continue 

to do is to do the testing that will tell you along the way whether 

your hopes are actually going to be realized, not deny the results 

of that testing, and adjust accordingly along the way. Now, finally, 

the Navy is doing some of that adjusting, and I actually commend 

them for it, but it took a while for all that to occur. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral, did you have a comment? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, if I could just add. There are a number of things that we are doing to ensure the value of the ships to 

the combatant commanders as they go forward. In my discussions 

with forward commanders, both in the Mediterranean and the 

Western Pacific, one of the things that they constantly tell me is 

we cannot get enough of these ships here to provide the presence 

and to provide the operational availability forward. 

I am excited about the direction that we are taking the ships. I 

am excited about the capabilities that we are bringing to the fleet. 

I am excited by the conversations that I have with the sailors on 

the ships as they look forward to innovating with the capabilities 

that we are delivering forward. 

There is no doubt that we have a lot of work to do, but as recently as 18 months ago, one of the things that we did was we 

stood up the Surface and Mine War Fighting Development Center, 

an organization that we are building, which mirrors a similar organization that the aviation community has had for a long time and 

the submarine community, where we can take those good ideas, 

take the equipment and the—and the—and the capability that the 

acquisition system is delivering, and put that in the hands of the 

sailors and get it forward. 

I think that what we are finding and what I am finding as I talk 

to these young men and women that take these ships to sea, yes, 

there are problems, and they are—and they are not shy about telling me what needs to be fixed about the Littoral combat ships. But 

they are also very excited not only about the potential or the capabilities that they do deliver, but also that the potential that are 

built into these particular ships. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Blumenthal, may I make a comment? As regards to the ships, once you do produce a hull, then the Navy is 

going to have to support it. For the ones that we have already committed to and are under contract, the Navy will have to do whatever is required through mission equipment and so forth to make 

them viable. As we know, there is no guarantee it is going to work 

out the way we thought. It is hard to—hard to say, as Mike Gilmore said. 

The Navy is committed to the full buy of LCS and the frigate, 

and they are obviously entitled to that decision. But you have to 

83 

make your own decision. It is at least a $14 billion commitment, 

and there are opportunity costs. Really the question for the committee is, is that the next best use of $14 billion. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, I hate to take 

exception to something you said earlier. You said that the handgun 

RFP was 200 pages. It is actually almost 680 pages, and it has 

been in the works for 10 years. It is a shining example of a, to me, 

disastrous procurement process. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you for that correction. 

Senator TILLIS. But the acquisition people did tell me that there 

are only 39 nine pages of specifications, so I asked them are the 

other pages just blank pages for notetaking, or are they relevant 

to the acquisition. 

Mr. Francis, look, first off, I believe everyone here is trying to do 

the very best to put warfighting capabilities out there to protect 

our men and women and to let them accomplish their mission. I 

think everybody’s intention is to do that. Mr.—or Secretary 

Stackley, I think you have inherited a problem. There is a great 

joke that I will not use my time on now that talks about the difference between a bear skinner and a bear hunter, and you are trying to skin a bear that somebody took down. They did not quite 

wrestle it to the ground. I appreciate the fact that you are dealing 

with something and expectations that were set back over a decade 

ago. I do think that there are things even in this Administration 

that we have to face up to in going forward. 

Mr. Francis, I worked in complex consulting environments in research and development. When we would go about estimating large 

projects, we would use past history as a basis for going out and creating an estimate for what we are doing now. Once we did that, 

we would still handicap it with examples of other projects that we 

did not hit our—did not hit our mark. 

It seems to me until we come up with an acquisition process that 

actually comes close to its original mark, we have got to start 

handicapping any estimates here. In my—if I go through the LCS, 

the F–35, the carrier, the future combat systems, it would seem to 

me anytime someone comes in here—either you or your successors 

come in here, I should multiply somewhere on the order by two or 

two and a half times the amount of money and the length of time 

that is going to be necessary to deliver this platform, because past 

history has proven that to be the case most of the time. Would you 

agree with that? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I would, sir. 

Senator TILLIS. I have to ask you just as a point of interest on 

my part, I do not know how on earth anybody who has worked in 

your—in your position for 42 years could possibly have the amount 

of hair that you do—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator TILLIS.—because I have got to believe you are tearing it 

out. I mean, why can we not front end load—the insights that you 

are providing here, why can that not be instructive to the estimating process to begin with? In other words, in the same way that 

84 

we would handicap these large, complex projects, not anywhere approaching the complexity of what we are talking about here in the 

IT world, why do we not have a function that says, you know, you 

guys, you think you have got it, an ideal circumstance, $200 million, it is going to be great, time horizon. But then have somebody 

come in and say, but because all of you have been consistently and 

habitually wrong, we are going to require handicapping of some 

multiplier. 

Why should we not have that sort of methodology until we actually get our act together and deliver something on time and on 

budget? 

Mr. FRANCIS. It is a really interesting discussion. Then, if you 

look at the private sector and I think this is the point the chairman 

is getting to, accountability is pretty clear. I mean, if you blow the 

estimate and you cannot sell your product at a profit, then the company loses money, and you know who is accountable. 

Senator TILLIS. Mr. Francis, I want to keep to my time. I know 

that the committee has gone long. But that is another point that 

the chair has made and a source of frustration for many of us that 

I think we also have to change in the procurement process. I used 

to call them memorable moments. 

When I would have a team who would come out and do these 

sorts of estimates, and then we do the handicapping, I would put 

a tag on every single one of them. Who was ultimately responsible 

for this, whether the supplier—whether inputs or, in my case, subcontractors, staff on board. I would create a memorable moment so 

if that person still worked for the government at a point in time 

that we were two and a half times over a cost or two and a half 

times over time budget, they lost their job. 

I think that in this process we have to start looking that way, 

we are going to continue these poor results, and we are going to 

continue to be frustrated at the expense of having more money to 

put to more warfighting systems that make our men and women 

safer and more—and the probability of our completing our missions 

more likely. I think we have to start doing this. 

I am going to reach out to your office and speak with you about 

maybe how we can front end load some of this handicapping. It is 

clear to me it has not happened. If it has happened, we have got 

incompetent people doing it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield 

back my time. 

Dr. GILMORE. Senator, could I just—— 

Senator TILLIS. All two seconds. 

Dr. GILMORE. Senator, could I just add something because in my 

previous life I actually worked as a career person in what is called 

cost assessment, is now called Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation [CAPE] in OSD [The Office of the Secretary of Defense]. 

There is a group there that does cost estimates. There are independent cost estimates, independent of the services and the program offices, cost estimates of programs. 

They do it on the basis that you just described, historical experience. There is a very rigorous process that exists and good literature that exists about how to do that, and they do it very well. 

They present their estimates, and then the acquisition leadership 

starts rationalizing why the next time this time things will be difVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
85 

ferent, things will be better. They go through the handicapping 

that you talked, but in exactly the opposite way that you just described. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, if I may, Dr. Gilmore’s description of the role 

of the CAPE cost estimating is correct. His description of what happens between the acquisition community and the CAPE regarding 

that estimate is not correct. 

Senator TILLIS. But the bottom line—the bottom line, Secretary 

Stackley, with all due respect—— 

Mr. STACKLEY. Oh, yes, it is. 

Senator TILLIS.—and I have gone over—with all due respect, 

they have been wrong. The LCS, the F–35, the carrier. If I had 

more time, I would ask Mr. Francis in his 42 years many—this is 

a bipartisan failure. It has transcended Administrations. But at 

some point you have to look at history and recognize history for 

what it is. It is the only way you will not repeat the mistakes. 

The fact of the matter, if somebody wants to come up to me and 

say, you know, Senator Tillis, look at all these programs in DOD 

that we have gotten right, it is just unfair for you to say that we 

are off almost every single time, I do not believe that the data 

would be very compelling to support that argument. Let us figure 

out a way to handicap it so that we can have discussions and set 

realistic expectations so that we can help the warfighter. 

I am sorry, Mr. Chair. I have gone over. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Secretary Stackley, you wanted to comment. 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. What I was going to—well, two things. 

One, I think we owe you the data. I think we—as a task here we 

should be providing the data in terms of cost growth on programs, 

and it is not a pretty picture cost growth programs over history. 

My comment with regards to the CAPE’s estimate, I cannot point 

to many programs in the Navy, I cannot think of any off hand, 

where we are not, in fact, budgeted to the CAPE’s estimate, with 

the exclusion of programs where we have a fixed price contract in 

hand, and so we do not budget above the fixed price. I think we 

actually try to work very collaboratively with the CAPE to arrive 

at the best estimate for our programs going forward. 

I would go back Mr. Francis’ discussion regarding the importance 

of Milestone B and getting—that is the critical point where we 

have got to get it right, lock in the program baseline, get the independent cost estimate as best as possible, budgeting the risks and 

everything else accounted for. That is—that is the critical point. In 

fact, LCS went forward without a Milestone B. That rigor was not 

there. 

Chairman MCCAIN. On, again, wonders why and who did it. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, we have 

gone from 52 ships to 40. Why? Why are we going to just buy 40 

of these things? 

Admiral ROWDEN. The requirement for the Small Surface Combatant remains 52. So—— 

Senator GRAHAM. But Secretary Carter said we are going to 

build 40. Is it because of budgets? 

Admiral ROWDEN. That was a budget driven decision, yes, sir. 

86 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. One, the committee needs to know sequestration probably. Is that right? Is that right, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me weigh in. The Budget Control Act, yes, sir. 

Secretary Carter’s decision was we have to take risk due to the 

budget and where we are going to take risk—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, I got you. He said I got to do something 

because I just do not have enough money, so I am going to, like, 

go from 52 to 40. Admiral, you said that people out in the field out 

on the—you know, fighting the wars and preventing wars, they like 

this. They want more of these ships. Is that right? 

Admiral ROWDEN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. What does this ship do that is so important? What can it do that is different than the ships we have 

today? Very briefly. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Well, certainly, sir, as we—as we move forward, the building of the—of the—of the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it more stealthy? What makes it different? 

Admiral ROWDEN. It gives us—it will deliver higher operational 

availability forward. I think it will give—deliver more capacity forward I think as we bring in the minesweeping capabilities, as we 

bring in the anti-submarine capabilities, which I think will significantly improve our ability to hunt and track—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is this a modernization program? Are we trying to modernize ships? Is that what this is about? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Well, certainly the advanced technologies will 

be—that we will deliver will be—will be of much use to the—to 

the—to the sailors as we move them forward, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. All right. Modernization of the existing 

fleet is one of the goals to be achieved if this ship comes online, 

right, and operates. It would be more effective. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. That is why we are doing this, right? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. The reason we are not building 52 is because 

of money, not because demand. The world is not safer to justify 40 

versus 52. Is that correct? 

Admiral ROWDEN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. When it comes to estimating ships, who 

actually said $220 or mean whatever the number was? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, we are going to have to go back to the 

record—— 

Senator GRAHAM. All right. Let us do that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

OPNAV memo regarding ‘‘Objectives for Family of Ships Concept Studies’’ dated 

July 8, 2002, stated that $220 million (fiscal year 2005 dollars) was the targeted 

goal for ship construction cost of one LCS. 

Mr. STACKLEY.—the leadership. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. Well, that is a lot of people. Let us find 

the guy or gal or the groups of guys and gals that said it is $220 

million, and see who they are, and figure out what we should do 

about that. I think we should, like, call him in Mr. Chairman, and 

talk to them. 

87 

This $448, why did it go up so much? Was it because we asked 

for things additional to what was originally required? Was it sort 

of add on capability? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, the one major change that was done to the 

program early on after contract award or commensurate with contract award, was we changed the specifications to go to what is referred to as naval vessel rules to give it the degree of design details 

associated with—— 

Senator GRAHAM. How much did that add to the cost? 

Mr. STACKLEY. It is hard to pin a number on it, but it created 

extraordinary disruption at the front end of the program. 

Senator GRAHAM. You cannot blame the original people who gave 

the cost estimate because they were not confronted with that requirement. 

Mr. STACKLEY. That is a good point that that requirement was 

added after the $220. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who put that requirement on? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I would have to go back to the record to find out. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Many factors contributed to the rise in cost per ship of the LCS compared to that 

originally bid by industry, some of those due to specification changes. 

The January 2004 LCS Final Design Request for Proposals (RFP) included the 

Navy’s intent to classify LCS to the new American Bureau of Shipbuilding (ABS) 

Naval Vessel Rules (NVR). This occurred prior to the final ABS NVR rules which 

were not available until May 2004 (Note: the NVR development was primarily tied 

to DDG 1000 need dates). The ABS NVR were developed to create a less prescriptive means to specify ship requirements than Military Specifications (MILSPECS), 

and also represented a shift away from design specifications to performance specifications. The Navy stated its intent to develop and impose these requirements, but 

industry bids developed and submitted in March 2004 did not completely capture 

the impact of the final ABS NVR. The LCS industry bids were based on commercial 

designs to contain cost. However, the commercial design did not meet many key 

LCS requirements and the cost to modify the designs was underestimated. After 

contract award, industry and the Navy worked to change the design specifications 

to one which would meet Capabilities Development Document requirements and 

could be approved and certified by the Navy. In addition, complete details of mission 

package interfaces were not available at RFP release for industry to adequately bid, 

and industry underestimated the cost of mission package integration. These and all 

other changes were contractually settled with each industry team through the LCS 

Engineering Change process. 

In addition to the above specification changes, there were documented requirements for rapid delivery of LCS to the Fleet. These requirements resulted in initiation of ship construction prior to design completion, resulting in rework, schedule 

impacts and cost increases. 

Senator GRAHAM. I want to find out who did the 220. I want to 

find out who said it needs to do this, not that so we can talk to 

them as to why they decided that. Mr. Francis, do you have any 

idea who did that? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I do not remember at this point, Senator. But I 

think what happened with the ship is it was thought to be a relatively simple derivation of high-speed ferries of commercial vessels 

when they got in, and they made that estimate before they entered 

the detail design. When they got into detailed design and they got 

naval vessel rules, then they found out it was way more complicated than they thought. That was—— 

Senator GRAHAM. They found that out after they started building 

the thing. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

88 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. I want to end with this. If we do not 

modernize our force, we will pay a price. The A–10 works today, 

but it is not going to work forever because we will not be fighting 

ISIL forever. There will be an environment where the F–35 makes 

more sense. It makes no sense to me to retire the A–10 because it 

actually works. But all of us need to know what you are trying to 

do is modernize the force so that the next war we are in or the next 

war we need to prevent that we are capable of doing both, right? 

Modernization is not an exact science. Part of the problem is 

when you modernize your force, it is not like just duplicating something. It is not a commodity. But what have I learned, that in the 

effort to modernize the force, our estimates of what it cost and the 

capabilities we need are ever changing. The process is completely 

broken, and it goes back to what you said, Doctor, about leadership. 

If you want this to stop, somebody needs to get fired. One of the 

reforms we did in this committee is to make every Service Secretary and Service Chief responsible for the big programs under 

their control. Hopefully in the future someone will be held accountable and get fired if this happens again. If nobody ever gets fired, 

nothing is going to change. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Gilmore, I wanted to follow up on some of the questions you 

received from Senator Blumenthal. You were talking about kind of 

the hopes that you had. Matter of fact, I think you use the word 

‘‘hopes’’ three or four times just in answering the questions on the 

capability of the ship. But in your written testimony—your written 

testimony is not full of hope at all, so let me—let me read a little 

bit of what you said with regard to the written testimony. 

′′With respect to survivability, neither of the LCS variant is expected to be survivable in high intensity combat. Neither of the 

LCS designs include survivability features necessary to conduct 

sustained operations in a combat environment. The LCS’ limited 

lethality makes these ships a shadow of the abilities of modern 

Navy frigates. 

With regard to combat capability, you seem very concerned, so let 

me ask him more operationally focused question, Admiral. Given 

what Dr. Gilmore said, do you think—are you confident that these 

ships could, say, for example, go into the South China Sea, conduct 

a FONOP [Freedom of Navigation Operation] near Mischief Reef or 

other places, and be able to survive if Chinese frigates responded 

with force, or could an LCS in the fleet today survive attacks from 

small boats and other patrol craft like the ones that were used in 

the recent capture of American sailors by Iran? Are you confident 

of that given what Dr. Gilmore clearly states is a ship that is not 

combat survivable? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, I am. I—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Are you, Dr. Gilmore? 

Dr. GILMORE. No, for the reasons that are stated in detail and 

all the reporting that I have done at the classified level and other 

levels. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral—— 

89 

Dr. GILMORE. These ships—the original vision for these ships 

was that they could use unmanned systems that would go in and 

conduct combat operations, and they could stand off away from 

threats. But those unmanned systems that can reach out and conduct combat operations we do not have, and it is not clear when 

we ever will. 

The ship was built to not be nearly as survivable, as, for example, the Frig 7s [Perry-class Frigates] that we used to have. It was 

built according to high-speed naval vessel rules, which fundamentally limits the amount of compartmentalization and redundancy 

you can put on the ship. It is not nearly as survivable as other 

ships, and, frankly, it was not meant to be in that regard. 

The original CONOPs [concept of operations], if it could be—ever 

be realized, that might have been fine. But as I understand the 

CONOPs and the way it has been written, and the Navy is continually revising it based on what it learns, the CONOPs still says 

that the ship would be out there preparing the way for the battle 

fleet. If that is true, then it will be subject to attack by anti-ship 

cruise missiles, torpedoes, and mines. The Navy’s own requirements show that the only the—only thing the Navy expects if it is 

hit by one of those kinds of threats is for it to be able to exit the 

battle area and/or provide for an orderly abandon ship. 

Against those kinds of threats, which ASCMs [anti-ship cruise 

missiles], for example, the Chinese are fueling thousands of them, 

and they are supersonic, and they are very threatening. Those are 

going to be a challenge for any ship, but a particular challenge for 

this kind of ship. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Admiral, how do you respond to that, and, 

you know, are you—are you confident, you know, in putting our 

marines and sailors on these ships to conduct those kind of operations, say, again, in the South China Sea or a standoff or a confrontation with Iranian small boats? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir. There are a number of variables that 

go into the equation associated with the survivability of the ships. 

Certainly, the manufacturer of the ship, the watertight integrity of 

the ship, the way the ship is manufactured. That is part of the survivability. Part of it is the damage control systems that we put on 

the ship in order to ensure the survivability. Part of it is the defensive systems that we put on—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. You do not—you do not agree with Dr. Gilmore’s written testimony. 

Admiral ROWDEN. I think there are a number of—there are a 

number of variables that have to be looked at when you look at the 

survivability of the ship. For example, one of the variables that you 

have to look at is the intensive training that we provide to all of 

our sailors, not only to fight the ships, but also to fight battle damage. 

I go back to the example of the USS Samuel B. Roberts that hit 

the mine in the Arabian Gulf. Every analysis said that ship should 

have gone to the bottom of the Arabian Gulf. It did not. Those sailors fought, and they saved that ship. That is—and that is one aspect that I think is sometimes lost in talking about the survivability of a ship. 

90 

Clearly, we do not want to have any of our ships get hit, and 

we—and we—and we rely on operations, we rely on intelligence, we 

rely on operating those ships to hopefully not have to lean into a 

punch. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Despite Dr. Gilmore’s written testimony, you 

are comfortable putting marines and sailors on these ships in combat situations against Chinese frigates or Iranian naval ships. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, but I think you have to take it in the 

proper context in that I do not think that necessarily we would find 

these ships operating alone and unafraid in the middle of an adversary’s fleet. 

Senator SULLIVAN. If they were? 

Admiral ROWDEN. If they were, then I think that we would do 

our best to fight the ship, and we would do our best to defend the 

ship. If the ship took a hit, the crew would fight to save the ship 

and exit the area as the ship is designed. 

Dr. GILMORE. Can I add something, Senator? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Sure. 

Dr. GILMORE. We do something called a total ship survivability 

trial, and it gets at exactly the issues that the Admiral was just 

raising. Now, of course, we do not actually let an ASCM, an antiship cruise missile, hit a ship. Obviously not. But we do have the 

crew there. They are trained in all the damage control measures 

that they are supposed to take. We do then go through a simulation of one of these threat systems, like an anti-ship cruise missile—we have done this—hitting the ship—we have done this for 

the LCS. We then have the crew fight to save the ship. 

In the total ship survivability trials that we did, the crews did 

their best, but in almost every instance there was major damage 

to the ship, and the combat capability was fully lost. In some instances, the ship would have been lost. 

Again, an anti-ship cruise missile hit on any ship is going to be 

a problem, no doubt about it. But a hit on one of these ships with 

their lack of redundancy, their lack of compartmentalization, which 

is driven by, you know, their small size and the speed requirement, 

and their construction according to high-speed naval vessel rules. 

A hit on one of these ships is going to be a real problem, and we 

have analyzed that, and we have done the kind of testing that enables the crew to fight—try to fight to save the ship. There are 

definitely problems with these ships. 

If you can keep them out of harm’s way, okay, but the current 

CONOPs says that they will be out ahead of the battle fleet preparing the way. Again, they will—if they are going to do that, they 

will be subject to being hit and attacked by these threats. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your testimony this morning, and thank you 

for your dedicated service to our men and women in uniform. 

The near peer threat we are facing is increasing across the globe, 

with our Nation’s adversaries bolstering their defense capabilities 

and focusing on new technology in the hopes that they can deny 

access to the United States Navy or, if necessary, compete militarily with the United States in a more limited scenario. 

91 

Recent acts of aggressions by our adversaries prove that the men 

and women in the United States Navy operate in an incredibly difficult environment every single day. Whether facing threatening 

shows of force from Iran, Russian belligerents, and unsafe practices, or China’s egregious claims and illegal expansions into the 

South China Sea, our Navy sailors are to be commended for their 

professionalism and steadfast service. However, these actions 

should remind us that there is simply too much at stake if we willfully choose to ignore the ambitions of our foes. 

There is undoubtedly room for improvement in the LCS program, 

and I appreciate your candid testimony regarding several of the reviews and efforts that are already underway. But instead of looking 

back, I am most concerned that future problems might plague the 

program, and that it could have a crippling impact on the Navy’s 

entire modernization efforts. Between the Ford-class carrier, F–35 

procurement, the LCS, and an Ohio-class replacement ballistic submarine, the Navy simply must make the most effective and efficient use of every single dollar it receives if we are to have any 

hope of rebuilding the fleet. 

Now, Secretary Stackley, there have been many studies that 

have attempted to determine the appropriate size and mix of Navy 

forces, including the 1993 Bottom-Up Review in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, to name a couple. Most of the studies indicate 

that we need more than the Navy’s current plan to build 308 ships 

in order to defend our global interests. 

In the time since those reports, our Navy has now shrunk to 

around 275 ships, while commitments and the number of deployments have remained relatively constant. This has resulted in a 

larger percentage of the force being at sea on any given day, often 

for longer deployments than their predecessors, and add an—at the 

expense of other mission requirements. The incoming Administration has set a goal to increase the Navy to 350 ships and to reverse 

this damaging trend. That is a goal with which I strongly agree. 

My question to you is can you provide your professional opinion 

to this committee on how we can accomplish a 350-ship fleet, what 

an appropriate high/low mix of platforms might look like, and 

where you believe the LCS and its successor will fit into that construct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me—let me describe that right now 

the CNO and his staff is conducting an update to the force structure assessment that was last updated in 2014. He has been very 

clear and testimony in the public describing that the threat vector 

has only—has only increased. The 308-ship Navy that is currently 

on the books, all pressure says that number has got to go up. 

The force structure assessment taking place right now is identifying what number and mix of ships we need for the future, mid 

2020s and beyond. He has been clear, the number is going to go— 

the number in terms of requirements will go north. That going to 

put more pressure on the budget. What we have to determine is in 

that mix of ships, what the specific modernized capabilities that we 

will need platform by platform, and then how to procure those as 

affordably as possible so we do not add more pressure to the budget 

than absolutely necessary. 

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Inside of that construct, high-low mix, LCS is the small service 

combatant today, and we have talked about the frigate modification 

to the LCS platform going forward. The today 52 in the force structure assessment, 40 in terms of a budget determination. If we fail 

to deliver the small surface combatant in those numbers, then 

what that means is we are going to put more pressure on the high 

end of our—of our force structure. That is going to add costs, and 

that is going to take those ships off of the—where they need to be, 

tax them in terms of operational demand compared to where they 

need to be, and that is going to put more pressure in terms of turnaround time and the entire operations and maintenance cycle. 

Senator CRUZ. What do you see as the biggest challenges facing 

growing to a 350-ship fleet, and what do you see as a realistic timeframe for that? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me—let me first say the first big 

challenge that is already in the program of record is the High Replacement Program due to its uniqueness, its imperative in terms 

of schedule and the capability that we have to provide, and then 

its cost. It is a—it is a high-cost program. 

We are, and when I say ‘‘we,’’ it is CNO and myself are on top 

of that program in terms of the design process, in terms of the 

planning to ensure that it does not grow. In fact, we are looking 

to find ways to make it more affordable than it is today. That already stands as a challenge going forward. 

The next—the next thing we need to do is leverage existing designs. What we do not want to do is bring a whole bunch of new 

design to the table, add the technical risk that that brings, the 

startup costs that that adds, and the uncertainty that that introduces, and add the amount of time that that will take to go 

through the design and production cycle. Let us leverage the existing production lines that we have and introduce capability to those 

platforms as best as possible looking at that future threat. That is 

the path that we are on. 

Then the next is raising the rate at which we produce those 

ships. I will tell you the first part of it is going to be looking at 

our attack submarines. When you look at our force structure going 

forward, we have a very serious shortfall in attack submarines in 

the late 2020s. We have got to stem that as best as possible. That 

would be the first place that we go in terms of increasing our production rates. 

Surface combatants. Right now, we are building surface combatants at a rate that in the long-term results in dropping off in terms 

of total number of large surface combatants, because we built at 

such a high rate during the Reagan buildup years. Well, if we— 

if we stay at two per year, we are going to start settling down to 

a 60 to 70 number of large surface combatants, which will not meet 

our operational requirements. 

Then amphibs. Today, we are—we are below what the CNO and 

the commandant agreed to in 2009 in terms of the amphibs force 

structure. We have got to get up to that number, and we are on 

that path. But the reality is that these are high utility platforms. 

They are high demand, high utility, very flexible. Wherever we 

have operations going, amphibs find a way to support that operVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:25 Feb 01, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\28323.TXT WILDA
93 

ation. There is—that will be the next leg in terms of increasing our 

production rates. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am sure that you will get support from this 

committee on that. You will not get support if we have double—redouble the cost of these systems. We owe the taxpayers a lot more 

than that. 

This has been a very helpful hearing, and I thank the witnesses. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SESSIONS

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM

1. Senator SESSIONS. When is the next Force Structure Analysis (FSA) due for 

completion and dissemination? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Force Structure Assessment was released on December 16, 2016. 

2. Senator SESSIONS. If the next FSA shows the Navy’s force-level needs to be 

higher—for example 325 or 350 ships—shouldn’t we anticipate the Navy’s current 

requirement for 52 small surface combatants to increase? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Force Structure Assessment, released on December 16, 2016, reaffirmed the requirement for 52 Small Surface Combatants. 

3. Senator SESSIONS. Given the need for 52 small surface combatants, what is the 

rationale for truncating the LCS program and how does the Navy intend to start 

a new program to get to the required small surface combatant force-level? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s requirement for 52 Small Surface Combatants 

was validated through the 2014 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) and revalidated 

with the Navy’s 2016 FSA. The truncation to 40 Small Surface Combatants reflects 

a consequence of the hard choices that had to be made to deliver the fiscal year 

2017 budget in compliance with the Bipartisan Budget Act. At that point in time, 

Secretary of Defense Carter concluded that the Navy could accept risk associated 

with slowing the rate of ship construction in the near term in order to rebalance 

its investments towards other warfare systems and advanced capabilities. The Navy 

plans to continue LCS procurements in fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 while 

transitioning to the more capable Frigate in fiscal year 2020 to meet the full Small 

Surface Combatant requirement. 

4. Senator SESSIONS. Are there benefits of keeping the LCS program on its original course of two shipyards building to 52 units and if so, what are they? 

Secretary STACKLEY. By maintaining the two LCS shipyards, the Navy maintains 

a competitive environment for not only the shipbuilders, but also for the supporting 

vendor industrial base, resulting in highly competitive pricing throughout the supply chain. Additionally, maintaining two construction yards provides the Navy capacity and flexibility to address changes to the LCS acquisition plan and preserves 

industrial base necessary to meet changing Force Structure Assessment (FSA) requirements. The Navy’s requirement for a minimum of 52 Small Surface Combatants (SSC) was validated through the 2012, 2014, and the 2016 FSA and no subsequent analysis has revised this requirement. The truncation to 40 SSCs reflected 

the consequence of the hard choices that were made to deliver the fiscal year 2017 

budget in compliance with the Bipartisan Budget Act. Secretary Carter (former Secretary of Defense) concluded that the Navy could accept risk associated with slowing 

the rate of ship construction in the near term in order to rebalance its investments 

towards other warfare systems and advanced capabilities. The two LCS shipbuilders 

currently utilize facilities optimized for LCS serial production, resulting in stable 

production planning and improved cost and schedule performance. The benefit of 

keeping the two shipyards constructing LCS viable throughout the procurement of 

the 52 SSCs allows the Navy to meet the FSA requirements within a highly competitive framework. 

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5. Senator SESSIONS. What is the current cost per unit of LCS? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The current budget estimate for two fiscal year 2017 LCS 

is $1,125.6 million, $562.8 million per ship end cost in then year (TY$) dollars. 

Based on the previous year’s procurement profiles of up to four ships per year, the 

current Program Managers estimate for the average end cost of the block buy ships 

(LCS 5, 6, 7, 8 and LCS 10 delivered, and LCS 9, 11—LCS 26 under construction) 

is $486.9 million in TY$ dollars. End cost includes the basic cost of construction, 

government furnished equipment, and budget for change orders, plans and other. 

6. Senator SESSIONS. Will the cost of the remaining units in the LCS program be 

increased by down-selecting the LCS before reaching the currently planned 40 vessels? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Increasingly complex operating environments, emphasis on 

distributed maritime operations, and the need for combat logistics force escort-capable ships to free up large surface combatants for high-end missions has prompted 

the Navy to reevaluate frigate requirements and pursue a Guided Missile Frigate 

(FFG(X)) having local air defense capability and increased survivability characteristics. To allow adequate time to mature the design and thoroughly evaluate design 

alternatives, the PB18 budget defers the FFG(X) contract award to fiscal year 2020. 

A revised acquisition strategy will be developed to conduct a full and open competition using existing designs in fiscal year 2020, vice doing a down-select of the existing LCS variants. 

If the existing LCS shipbuilders do not secure additional workload, the Navy will 

experience cost growth and schedule delays for the ships currently under contract 

with the affected shipbuilder(s). Additional schedule and cost risk will be introduced 

through reductions in the industrial base as each stage of construction concludes, 

with corresponding manpower reductions. Each shipyard is managed by stage of 

construction for which trades and skills are not transferable from one stage to another. Due to this, lack of follow on work will begin to impact the industrial base 

much earlier than delivery of the last LCS from the affected shipyard(s). In addition, the ability of the affected shipyard(s) to compete for future Navy and commercial work will be jeopardized, exposing the Government to costs related to shipyard 

closure should the affected shipyard(s) not remain viable. The Government’s exposure to cost growth resulting from these risks is limited by the contract price ceiling 

and related fixed price incentive terms and conditions. 

7. Senator SESSIONS. What is the projected cost per unit for the LCS replacement—the Future Frigate? 

Secretary STACKLEY. To allow adequate time to mature the design and thoroughly 

evaluate design alternatives, the first year of Frigate procurement is now planned 

for fiscal year 2020. The Navy is finalizing the requirements for the Frigate and will 

begin seeking Industry design solutions for review in the summer of 2017. In conjunction with finalizing requirements and design solutions, the Navy will develop 

a cost estimate for the program, ensuring a balance of both capability and affordability. 

8. Senator SESSIONS. What would be the benefits and costs of accelerating the 

LCS replacement, or Future Frigate, to ensure the Navy continues building to its 

current 52 ship requirement as quickly and as efficiently as possible? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment revalidated the 

warfighting requirement for a total of 52 small surface combatants (SSCs). While 

LCS provides valuable capability, the Navy needs to transition to the more capable 

Frigate. This improved capability will provide the remaining ships needed in order 

to meet the full Small Surface Combatant requirement and allow for an expanded 

mission to address the emerging threat environment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR AYOTTE

BUILDING ENOUGH VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINES

9. Senator AYOTTE. In the April Seapower Subcommittee hearing, I asked you, 

Secretary Stackley, as well as Admiral Mulloy, about the requirement for attack 

submarines. I also raised the issue with Admiral Richardson in March in the Navy 

posture hearing. Admiral Mulloy and Admiral Richardson confirmed that the current requirement for 48 attack submarines was established around 2006. Admiral 

Richardson stated in May what we all understand: ‘‘The security environment [has] 

changed a great deal since then.’’ As a result, he said the Navy is only able to meet 

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about 50 to 60 percent of combatant commander demands right now for attack submarines. The Chief of Naval Operations said that he had commissioned a study to 

reassess the attack submarine requirement. Secretary Stackley, can you provide an 

update on that study? When do you expect it to be complete and delivered to Congress? Do you expect that the attack submarine fleet requirement will likely increase? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s current Force Structure Assessment (FSA) was 

released on December 16, 2016. The FSA concluded 66 attack submarines (increased 

from 48) would be needed to provide the global presence required to support national tasking and prompt warfighting response. 

10. Senator AYOTTE. In light of this projected decline in the size of our attack submarine fleet at a time when the demand for them is increasing, you and I have discussed the issue of building two—instead of only one—Virginia-class submarines in 

2021. In April, you mentioned to me in the Seapower Subcommittee hearing that 

the Navy is working with industry to see if in 2021 we could simultaneously execute 

the planned Ohio Replacement program and also build two (not just one) Virginiaclass submarines that year. I included language in the NDAA Committee Report on 

this issue. I understand that there are at least two elements to consider: funding 

and capacity of the industrial base. You said this is a top priority. Secretary 

Stackley, can you provide an update? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Additional funding will be needed in fiscal year (FY) 2019 

for advance procurement and economic order quantity (EOQ) funding in order to 

commence long lead time material activities and optimize savings from EOQ material procurements to add a second Virginia-class Submarine (VCS) in fiscal year 

2021. No industrial base investments are required. A thorough study to determine 

the impact of a steady state two VCS build rate concurrent with the Columbia-class 

is in development and will be provided in the report to Congress that was requested 

in House Report 114–537, accompanying H.R. 4909, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR REED

LCS SPEED AND ENDURANCE

11. Senator REED. Director Gilmore, Secretary Stackley responded to a question 

where I repeated information from Director Gilmore’s testimony that said: 

‘‘Finally, while the Navy is examining methods to reduce weight, it is anticipated 

the LCS-frigate, because of the simultaneous employment of ASW and SUW (surface 

warfare) equipment, will be significantly heavier than the existing LCS resulting in 

a lower maximum sprint speed and less fuel endurance. The loss of sprint speed will 

therefore affect its success in small boat swarm defense, and its ability to keep up 

with a carrier strike group.’’ 

Secretary Stackley replied that the Navy was not going to be trading off endurance, but would be placing a premium on being able to increase endurance. As far 

as lower speed, Secretary Stackley said that speed is only going to be affected at 

the margins. Director Gilmore, do you believe that the Navy will be able to increase 

endurance for the frigate variant of LCS while avoiding anything more than marginal reductions in speed capability? Mr. Francis, does GAO have a position on 

these differing positions? 

Dr. GILMORE. My fiscal year 2015 review of draft Navy requirements for the LCS 

Flight 0+ Frigate Increment informed my testimony statement. From these Navy requirements I concluded a Frigate, utilizing the same seaframe design as the existing 

LCSs, would be significantly heavier resulting in a lower maximum sprint speed 

and less fuel endurance compared to the current LCS ships. Since then, the Navy 

issued its final requirements for the Frigate that are different than those of the fiscal year 2015 draft. The Navy acknowledged the predicted weight increase for both 

Freedom and Independence variant Frigates would be approximately 200 metric 

tons. This is approximately a 6 percent increase in weight. The Navy also said it 

would permit the vendors to alter the ship designs. The Navy draft ‘‘Request for 

Proposal,’’ intended for procurement of the Frigate, incentivized the vendors to alter 

ship designs to enhance endurance up to 4200 nautical miles and to maximize the 

number of surface-to-surface missiles. The Navy also designated all but one of the 

relevant LCS warfighting requirements as Key System Attributes that may be traded off. The lone exception is the range of the over-the horizon surface-to-surface missile, which is a Key Performance Parameter. The Navy’s Frigate requirements document indicated Navy fleet operators recommended trading short duration maximum 

96 

speed, known in the LCS Flight 0+ requirements as ‘‘Sprint Speed,’’ for enhanced 

lethality and survivability features. Navy leadership accepted this feedback and excluded the legacy requirement for ‘‘Sprint Speed’’ from the LCS Frigate requirements, replacing it with a new Key System Attribute requirement for sustained high 

speed referred to as ‘‘Sustained Speed.’’ Considering the potential for altering the 

ship designs to accommodate increased weight and trading Sprint Speed for Sustained Speed, it may now be possible for the Navy to increase endurance and 

achieve sufficient ‘‘Sustained Speed’’ to be comparable with other combatant ships. 

The proposed Frigate design is preliminary, with details known only to the Navy 

and its vendors. Until the Navy makes the final design for the ship available, 

DOT&E will not be able to characterize quantitatively the effect of the design 

changes on the Frigate variant of LCS. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

READINESS

12. Senator HIRONO. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program was scheduled to 

produce 52 ships. However, in December of 2015, the Secretary of Defense directed 

the Navy to reduce the LCS buy from 52 ships to 40. What is the Navy’s requirement for this class of ship and how would a reduction to 40 ships impact our capabilities and readiness, particularly with respect to our presence in the Asia-Pacific? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Force Structure Assessment, released on December 16, 2016, reaffirmed the 52 Small Surface Combatant (SSC) requirement. A reduction to 40 ships, employed under the same operating constructs, 

would result in about six fewer ships deployed globally conducting steady state theater security operations. Should conflict arise, the reduced SSC inventory would result in delays for the arrival of required forces and/or risk to other missions should 

other forces be diverted from currently planned missions to mitigate the delays. 

LCS DOWN-SELECT

13. Senator HIRONO. The Secretary of Defense also directed that the Navy downselect the 2 LCS designs to a single variant by fiscal year 2019. What are the Navy’s 

plans in determining how to down-select from the two versions? Moving to a single 

production line would likely eliminate competition as well as the benefits that can 

be derived from it. How would this change impact overall cost and schedule performance on the program? Finally, what would be the impact to the industrial base 

at the prime, sub, material and component supplier levels? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Increasingly complex operating environments, emphasis on 

distributed maritime operations, and the need for combat logistics force escort-capable ships to free up large surface combatants for high-end missions has prompted 

the Navy to reevaluate frigate requirements and pursue a Guided Missile Frigate 

(FFG(X)) having local air defense capability and increased survivability characteristics. To allow adequate time to mature the design and thoroughly evaluate design 

alternatives, the PB18 budget defers the FFG(X) contract award to fiscal year 2020. 

A revised acquisition strategy will be developed to conduct a full and open competition using existing designs in fiscal year 2020, vice doing a down-select of the existing LCS variants. If the existing LCS shipbuilders do not secure additional workload, the Navy will experience cost growth and schedule delays for the ships currently under contract with the affected shipbuilder(s). Additional schedule and cost 

risk will be introduced through reductions in the industrial base as each stage of 

construction concludes, with corresponding manpower reductions. Each shipyard is 

managed by stage of construction for which trades and skills are not transferable 

from one stage to another. Due to this, lack of follow on work will begin to impact 

the industrial base much earlier than delivery of the last LCS from the affected 

shipyard(s). In addition, the ability of the affected shipyard(s) to compete for future 

Navy and commercial work will be jeopardized, exposing the Government to costs 

related to shipyard closure should the affected shipyard(s) not remain viable. The 

Government’s exposure to cost growth resulting from these risks is limited by the 

contract price ceiling and related fixed price incentive terms and conditions. 

LCS BLOCK BUY

14. Senator HIRONO. I am concerned about the issue raised in the testimony of 

Paul Francis of the Government Accountability Office stating that committing to the 

block buy of the frigate variant of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) at this point in time 

would be premature. He points out that the process that the Navy plans on using 

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in this procurement is almost identical to the original procurement of the LCS variant, which resulted in large cost overruns and unmet mission capability in past. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Increasingly complex operating environments, emphasis on 

distributed maritime operations, and the need for combat logistics force escort-capable ships to free up large surface combatants for high-end missions has prompted 

the Navy to reevaluate Frigate requirements and pursue a Guided Missile Frigate 

(FFG) having local air defense capability and increased survivability characteristics. 

To allow adequate time to mature the design and thoroughly evaluate design alternatives, the PB18 budget defers the FFG contract award to fiscal year 2020. A revised acquisition strategy will be developed to conduct a full and open competition 

using existing designs in fiscal year 2020, vice pursuing a block buy strategy using 

one of the existing LCS variant designs. 

15. Senator HIRONO. During the hearing, you committed to working with the 

Armed Services Committee to come up with a set of benchmarks against which we 

could measure LCS cost, schedule, and testing performance before approving any 

block buy for the last 12 ships in program. I would like the Navy to provide: a) A 

detailed cost and schedule baseline for any ships proposed in an LCS block buy that 

establishes cost per ship and savings that would result from utilizing block buy contracting and; b) A detailed assessment of how the testing requirements will need 

to be changed for a frigate variant of the LCS. 

Secretary STACKLEY. a) Increasingly complex operating environments, emphasis 

on distributed maritime operations, and the need for combat logistics force escortcapable ships to free up large surface combatants for high-end missions has prompted the Navy to reevaluate Frigate requirements and pursue a Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) having local air defense capability and increased survivability characteristics. To allow adequate time to mature the design and thoroughly evaluate design 

alternatives, the PB18 budget defers the FFG contract award to fiscal year 2020. 

A revised acquisition strategy will be developed to conduct a full and open competition using existing designs in fiscal year 2020, vice pursuing a block buy strategy 

using one of the existing LCS variant designs; b) The FFG Test and Evaluation 

Master Plan (TEMP) is currently in development to support the FFG Request For 

Proposal release in the fall of 2018. This FFG TEMP will leverage LCS testing 

where applicable, however for systems that are new for improved warfighting and 

multi-mission capabilities, additional testing may be required. The Navy will work 

with the appropriate testing organizations to finalize requirements for the FFG 

TEMP. It is anticipated that the TEMP will be complete in 2021 with final approval 

from Director, Operational Test & Evaluation in 2023. The conduct of Frigate Developmental Testing, Technical Evaluation, and Operational Testing is projected to 

occur in late 2025 through early 2027. Once the FFG TEMP is approved, specific 

details can be provided for an updated baseline. 

LCS INFLUENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

16. Senator HIRONO. Our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific appears to gain in importance, given recent actions of North Korea and China. It is also important to show 

our support to our allies and partners in the region. How has the deployment of the 

LCS to the Asia-Pacific helped to increase our influence and deterrence in the region? 

Admiral ROWDEN. LCS has proven to be an excellent platform for our engagements in the region. Its use in the popular and enduring CARAT series of exercises 

in Southeast Asia is particularly noteworthy. The LCS well-fits in our engagement 

program with other Navies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and offers substantial options 

for tailoring Navy-to-Navy activities with like-minded maritime forces, fielding similarly-sized platforms. As LCS force structure in the SCS region increases, so too will 

our access to friends and allies. The deterrent effect on more-belligerent regional actors will increase as well, due to the increased operational availability and additional engagement and interoperability opportunities in the region, vital to our national security interests. 

17. Senator HIRONO. During this past year’s Rim of the Pacific exercise, the LCS 

Coronado was able to successfully launch a Harpoon surface-to-surface missile. 

While the missile did not hit its target, this is a good step towards increased capability of the LCS. How would this capability aid in our presence and capabilities in 

the Asia-Pacific region? 

Admiral ROWDEN. The Navy has invested in live fire testing of two different antiship cruise missiles from USS Coronado (LCS 4): the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM), fired in 2014 from a temporary launcher as a demonstration of a 

98 

100NM+ precise aimpoint capability; and the 2016 structural test fire of a Harpoon 

missile fire to complete launcher certifications in preparation for an extended operational demonstration during her 2016–2018 deployment. Live fire events have and 

will continue to develop our understanding of LCS structural engineering, reducing 

risk for procurement and installation of installed missile systems on the LCS and 

Frigate (FF). 

By 2030, LCS and FF will be more than half of the surface combatants on deployment at any given time. When implemented, a missile capability will give LCS the 

surface warfare capability of a larger combatant, changing the risk calculus of potential adversaries and making LCS a key enabler for warfighting capability and 

capacity increases for the combatant commanders in support U.S. interests in the 

region. 

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