NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

BRETT J. STUBBLEFIELD, SR.,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2019-2180

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 18-2797, Judge Michael P. Allen.

______________________

Decided: August 6, 2020

______________________

KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter 

Chartered, Topeka, KS, for claimant-appellant.

 ROBERT R. KIEPURA, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

ETHAN P. DAVIS, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., LOREN 

MISHA PREHEIM; CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, Y. KEN LEE, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

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2 STUBBLEFIELD v. WILKIE

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Brett J. Stubblefield appeals from a decision of the 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) 

affirming a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

(“Board”) denying service connection for post-traumatic 

stress disorder (“PTSD”). Stubblefield v. Wilkie, No.

18-2797, 2019 WL 1511223 (Vet. App. Apr. 8, 2019). Before 

the Veterans Court, Stubblefield argued that the Board’s

reliance on a November 2011 VA examination was erroneous because the examination was inadequate. Before us, 

Stubblefield argues that the regulations governing service 

connection for PTSD are invalid in light of our decision in 

Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Because Stubblefield did not present this argument to the 

Veterans Court, he has waived his right to raise it on appeal. We therefore affirm. 

 I. BACKGROUND

Stubblefield served honorably in the Army Reserves 

from April 1981 to July 1987, with active duty training 

from April 1981 to July 1981. During his active duty training, Stubblefield reports that he was threatened with a rifle by a fellow recruit. Shortly after his training, in October 

1981, Stubblefield’s vehicle collided with a freight train

near his home in Missouri, causing him to suffer partially 

debilitating spine and jaw injuries. In the years since the 

accident, Stubblefield has experienced various mental 

health issues and occupational impairments. 

In April 2011, Stubblefield submitted a claim for VA 

benefits for PTSD. The VA scheduled Stubblefield for an 

examination with a VA psychologist, Dr. Andrew Darchuk, 

which was held in November 2011. Dr. Darchuk was “unable to verify the presence of symptoms” of PTSD due to 

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STUBBLEFIELD v. WILKIE 3

Stubblefield’s inconsistent statements during the examination. J.A. 29. Dr. Darchuk further noted that Stubblefield’s symptoms were consistent with both “organic 

brain injury” and “some mood and anxiety disorders.” J.A. 

40. Given Stubblefield’s history and automobile accident, 

Dr. Darchuk was left with a strong suspicion that Stubblefield’s symptoms were connected to organic brain injury. 

Id. Dr. Darchuk did not provide any final diagnosis for 

Stubblefield’s condition. 

In August 2012, the St. Louis, Missouri regional office 

(“RO”) issued a decision denying Stubblefield’s PTSD claim 

due to the lack of a current disability and the absence of an 

in-service stressor event. Stubblefield timely appealed to 

the Board. The Board considered the record and denied 

service connection for PTSD on the same grounds as the 

RO. 

Stubblefield appealed to the Veterans Court. He argued that the November 2011 examination was inadequate 

because it failed to provide any diagnosis and made only 

suggested conclusions based on speculation. He further argued that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for 

its reliance on the November 2011 examination. The Veterans Court found that the Board sufficiently justified reliance on the November 2011 examination and that 

Stubblefield failed to establish that the examination was 

inadequate. The Veterans Court further concluded that

anything that might be lacking in the examination’s PTSD 

analysis was harmless because the Board found Stubblefield lacks credibility due to inconsistent statements—a 

finding Stubblefield did not challenge on appeal. 

Stubblefield filed a motion for reconsideration or panel 

review. He argued that the November 2011 examination 

was inadequate in its conclusion that he does not suffer 

from PTSD because the examination report indicates that 

Stubblefield has many of the symptoms. He further argued 

that, if PTSD was not the proper diagnosis, the Board was 

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4 STUBBLEFIELD v. WILKIE

obligated to assess whether some other condition was present and to assess whether that condition was service connected. The Veterans Court denied reconsideration, 

granted panel review, and adopted the original opinion as 

the decision of the panel. 

Stubblefield appeals. We have jurisdiction to hear appeals of purely questions of law pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 

§§ 7292(a), (c). 

II. DISCUSSION

“Arguments not made in the court or tribunal whose 

order is under review are normally considered waived.” 

Gant v. United States, 417 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

In appropriate circumstances, we can address issues not 

previously raised if the resolution of those issues is “beyond 

any doubt” or if an injustice might otherwise occur. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). We can also excuse 

waiver if the appeal presents “an issue of exceptional importance.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 

1320, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 

On appeal, Stubblefield argues that the regulations 

governing a determination of service connection for PTSD, 

specifically 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.2, 4.125(a), and 3.304(f), impermissibly require a diagnosis. He contends that the diagnosis requirements are inconsistent with our interpretation 

of 38 U.S.C. § 1110 in Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356 

(2018), in which we held that pain can qualify as a disability under § 1110. He asserts that under Saunders, entitlement to service connection must be based on whether a

veteran demonstrates a loss of functioning amounting to a 

disability; it does not require any formal diagnosis. 

Stubblefield maintains that this argument was not 

waived by his failure to “explicitly” raise it before the Veterans Court. Appellant’s Reply Br. 1. He argues that because he “presented the question of whether VA’s 

examination report . . . was inadequate to determine his 

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STUBBLEFIELD v. WILKIE 5

entitlement to service connected compensation,” the Saunders argument was implicitly raised before the Veterans 

Court. Id. at 1–2. He further contends that the Veterans 

Court necessarily interpreted the requirements of 38 

U.S.C. § 1110 in its holding, meaning this issue was not 

raised for the first time on appeal. We disagree. 

Stubblefield’s briefing to the Veterans Court contains 

no mention of Saunders or any argument that the applicable regulations are invalid. Rather, he argued that the VA 

examination was insufficient in its analysis and did not 

support a conclusion of no PTSD. In its opinion, the Veterans Court noted that Stubblefield “questions the examiner’s conclusion that he did not meet the medical criteria 

to establish a PTSD diagnosis.” Stubblefield, 2019 WL 

1511223, at *2. It did not, however, expressly interpret any 

regulation or address the regulations’ validity. 

Although an argument first raised in a motion for reconsideration would also likely be waived, we note that 

Stubblefield failed to raise his Saunders-based argument 

even at that stage. Stubblefield raised two issues in his 

motion for reconsideration. He reiterated his argument 

that, given the symptoms noted in the examination, the 

Board’s conclusion that he did not meet the criteria for a 

PTSD diagnosis was unsupportable. And he argued that 

the examiner failed to answer “the critical question of 

whether these symptoms represent a mental condition connected to the veteran’s service.” J.A. 8. Neither of these 

arguments invoke the validity of regulations governing 

compensation for PTSD in light of Saunders. Nor do his 

arguments address the correct interpretation of § 1110. 

Stubblefield does not cite the statute in his motion; he does 

not mention this court’s holding in Saunders; and he does 

not attempt to parse the correct legal definition of the term 

“disability,” all of which he does for the first time on appeal. 

Because Stubblefield failed to question the validity of 

38 C.F.R. §§ 4.2, 4.125(a), and 3.304(f) before the Veterans 

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6 STUBBLEFIELD v. WILKIE

Court, his argument is waived. Stubblefield does not, 

moreover, argue any exceptional or compelling reasons for 

us to excuse the waiver. We see none. Accordingly, we decline to depart from our general rule and hold that Stubblefield’s Saunders-based argument is waived.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we find Stubblefield’s 

statutory interpretation argument is waived. We have considered Stubblefield’s remaining argument but find it to be 

without merit. We therefore affirm the Veterans Court’s 

decision.

AFFIRMED

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