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Home : Media : Speeches / Testimony

# TRANSCRIPT: Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the U.S. Pacific Command & US Forces Korea

By Pacom Posted

Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the U.S. PacificCommand and U.S. Forces Korea in review of the Defense Authorization Requestfor FY2016 and the Future Years Defense Program 
April 16, 2015 04:57PM ET
 
Subject: Pacific Command/U.S. Forces Korea AuthorizationParticipants: Senator John McCain (R-AZ) Witnesses: Navy Adm. Samuel LocklearIII, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command; and Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti,commander of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. ForcesKorea
 
MCCAIN: Committee meets today to receive testimony on U.S.Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. I'd like to thank both of our witnesses,Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, for appearing before us today and fortheir many years of distinguished service.
 
In the past three months, this Committee has receivedtestimony from many of America's most respected statesmen, thinkers, and formermilitary commanders. These leaders have all told us that we are experiencing amore diverse and complex array of crises than at any time since the end ofWorld War II.
 
As we confront immediate challenges in Europe and the MiddleEast, the United States cannot afford to neglect the Asia-Pacific region, whichSecretary Carter has called, quote, "the defining region for our nation'sfuture."
 
Put simply, if the 21st century is to be another Americancentury, the United States must remain an Asia-Pacific power. Our nationalinterests in the Asia-Pacific are deep and enduring. We seek to extend freetrade, free markets, free navigation, and free commons, air, sea, space, andnow cyber. We seek to maintain a balance of power that fosters the peacefulexpansion of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and many other values thatwe share with increasing numbers of Asian citizens. And we seek to defendourselves and our allies by maintaining the capability to prevent, deter, andif necessary, prevail in a conflict.
 
Achieving these objectives will require sustained Americanleadership. We must use all elements of our national power. In particular, I amhopeful that Congress will pass trade promotion authority for the Trans-PacificPartnership. This vital trade agreement will open new opportunities for tradeand level the playing field for American businesses and workers, while sendinga powerful strategic signal about America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
 
Yet we must remember that our soft power is the shadow castby our hard power. That's why the United States must continue to sustain afavorable military balance in the region. The Department of Defense will needto update concepts of operations with emerging military technology to enableour military to operate in contested environments.
 
From projecting power over long distances and exploiting theundersea domain, to developing new precision-guided munitions and to investingin innovative ways to build the resiliency of our forward- deployed forces, wehave a great deal of work to do if we aim to sustain our traditional militaryadvantages in the Asia-Pacific region. None of these will be possible if wecontinue to live with mindless sequestration and a broken acquisition system.
 
As we build in posture forces to secure America's interestsin the Asia-Pacific, we must remain clear-eyed about the implications ofChina's rise and its evolving foreign defense policy.
 
As Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, toldthis Committee back in February, China has engaged in a rapid militarymodernization deliberately designed to counteract or thwart American militarystrengths.
 
I believe China can and should play a constructive role inthe Pacific -- Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, in recent years, China hasbehaved less like a responsible stakeholder and more like a bully.
 
In the South China Sea, we have seen the latest example of atrend toward more assertive behavior. China's land reclamation and constructionactivities on multiple islands across the Spratly chain and the potentialcommand and control surveillance and military capabilities it could bring tobear from these new land features are a challenge to the interests of theUnited States and the nations of the Asia-Pacific region.
 
Such unilateral efforts to change the status quo throughforce, intimidation, or coercion threaten the peace and stability that haveextended prosperity across the Asia-Pacific for seven decades.
 
As I wrote in a letter together with my colleagues SenatorReed, Corker, and Menendez, the United States must work together with like-minded partners and allies to develop and employ a comprehensive strategy thataims to shape China's coercive peacetime behavior. This will not be easy andwill likely have impacts on other areas of our bilateral relationship.
 
But if China continues to pursue a coercive and escalatoryapproach to the resolution of maritime disputes, the cost to regional securityand prosperity as well as to American interests will only grow.
 
I'm also concerned by the recent assessment from AdmiralBill Gortney, the head of NORAD and Northern Command, that North Korea has anoperational, road-mobile missile that could carry nuclear weapons to the UnitedStates.
 
General Scaparrotti, I look forward to hearing yourassessment of this potential breakthrough and the implications of our -- to ournational security, if the erratic and unpredictable regime of Kim Jong Unachieves the ability to carry out a nuclear strike against our homeland.
 
I thank the witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
 
Senator Reed?
 
REED: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me joinyou in welcoming Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti.
 
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and sacrifice andthat of your family. And particularly convey to your men and women under yourcommands our deep -- deepest appreciation for what they do every day.
 
On Tuesday we had an extremely insightful hearing on some ofthe challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region. The consensus from the panelis that we face some very serious challenges, especially in light of China'sincreasing military budget and destabilizing activities in the region.REED: Andone of the biggest challenges will be to continue to provide, as we have for 70years, security, stability and free transit in the Pacific, particularly, asSenator McCain emphasized, with pending sequestration in the face of decliningresources that we have. And I echo his call for the end of sequestration.
 
Admiral Locklear, we'd be very interested in your viewsabout the land reclamation activities of China in the Spratlys and elsewhere.That is something, as the chairman has noted, that we both, along with SenatorMenendez and Corker, objected to, or at least criticized.
 
What more, also, must we do to build a capacity of ourpartners in the region to help them with their maritime-domain awareness and toencourage all the regional actors to seek legal redress to problems, not toinvoke lethal threats with respect to sovereignty and respect to stability inthe region?
 
As the chairman indicated, Admiral Gortney's comments thisweekend -- and I will quote him, as he said, "North Korea," quote,"has the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at thehomeland." Quite disturbing.
 
And General Scaparrotti, would you, in your comments orquestions, please let us know about the dimensions of this threat as it existstoday and if it might evolve in the future?
 
Again, we thank you, because the North Koreans appear to benot only, unfortunately, well-armed but very difficult to predict theirbehaviors, and your views and insights would be extremely important.
 
Also, if you could comment on the possible deployment of aTHAAD missile defense system and its contribution in defense of our allies, theRepublic of South Korea.
 
We are considering all of these challenges, once again,under the constraint of serious budget limitations. And Admiral Locklear andGeneral Scaparrotti, please indicate to us the impact of the sequestration onyour operations. It would be very helpful, I think.
 
Thank you very much for joining us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 
MCCAIN: I thank the witnesses.
 
Admiral Locklear?
 
LOCKLEAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed anddistinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity toappear before you today with General Scaparrotti.
 
Before we begin, I'd like to ask my written statement besubmitted for the record.
 
MCCAIN: Without objection.
 
LOCKLEAR: For more than three years, I've had the honor andprivilege of leading the exceptional men and women, military and civilian, ofthe United States Pacific Command.
 
These volunteers are skilled professionals dedicated to thedefense of our nation. They're serving as superb ambassadors to represent thevalues, the strengths that make our nation great.
 
I want to go on record to formally thank them for -- fortheir service and their families for their sacrifices.
 
In U.S. PACOM, we continue to strengthen alliances, ourpartnerships, maintain an assured presence in the region and demonstrate anintent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national interest.
 
When I spoke to you last year, I highlighted my concern forseveral issues that could challenge the security environment across theIndo-Asia Pacific.
 
Those challenges included responding to humanitarianassistance and disaster relief, dealing with an increasingly dangerous andunpredictable North Korea, a challenge that General Scaparrotti and I remainaligned in addressing, a continued escalation of complex territorial disputes,increasing regional transnational threats and the complexity associated withChina's continued rise.
 
In the past year, these challenges have not eased. They willnot go away soon. But the Asia rebalance strategy has taken hold, and it'sachieving intended goals.
 
However, the greatest challenge remains the continualphysical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. If the Budget Control Actremains enforced, the greatest challenge in the Indo-Asia Pacific will bedealing with the consequences to the security of our national interest as werespond to a rapidly changing world.
 
I echo the secretary of defense, the chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and the service chiefs' testimony before Congress. Our nationis being forced into a resource-driven national-security strategy instead ofone properly resourced and driven by our enduring interest.
 
In the Indo-Asia Pacific, we're accepting more risk, notless. Sequestration will force harmful reductions in force size, structure andreadiness that will reduce my ability to manage crisis space, provide optionsto the president and diminishes United States prestige and credibility in theregion and around the globe.
 
In the last year, the great -- at great expense to thereadiness of the surge force's position in the continental United States, PACOMhas been able to maintain its forward forces focused on protecting thehomeland, deterring aggressors, such as North Korea, strengthening alliancesand partnerships and developing the concepts and capabilities required remaindominant in a world that is growing in complexity with threats that continue toincrease against a seemingly unending stream of constraints.
 
Without adequate resources, we will be forced to makedifficult choices today that will have strategic consequences to our future.
 
I'd like to thank the committee for your continued interestand support. I look forward to your questions.
 
SCAPARROTTI: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed anddistinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to testify today as thecommander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and UnitedStates Forces Korea.
 
On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors andtheir families, who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea, one of ourmost important allies, thank you for your support.
 
I prepared brief opening remarks, but I would like to askthat my written posture statement be entered into the record.
 
Last year, I testified that the combined and joint forces ofthe United States and Republic of Korea were capable and ready to deter and, ifnecessary, respond to North Korean threats and actions.
 
Due to our accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that ourstrong alliance is more capable of addressing the rapidly evolving andincreasing asymmetric North Korean threat.
 
In recent years, North Korea's aggressively developed andutilized asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber warfare, nuclear weapons andballistic missiles to advance its interest.
 
To put this in perspective over time, in 2012, mypredecessor noted North Korea's advancements in cyber and nuclear capabilitiesduring his opening statement to this committee.
 
A year later, North Korea conducted cyber attacks on SouthKorea's banks and broadcasting stations, and in 2014, they boldly projectedtheir cyber capabilities against Sony Pictures in the United States in aneffort to inflict economic damage and pressure and suppressed free speech.
 
This example represents a trend that is persistent acrossseveral North Korean asymmetric capabilities.
 
My top concern is that we will have little to no warning ofa North Korean asymmetric provocation, which can start a cycle of action andcounteraction leading to unintended escalation. This underscores the need foran alliance -- for the alliance to maintain a high level of readiness andvigilance.
 
Last year, the alliance took significant steps in improvingits capabilities and capacities to deter aggression and to reduce itsoperational risk. But our work is not done.
 
In 2015, we will maintain this momentum by focusing on mytop priority: sustaining and strengthening the alliance with an emphasis on ourcombined readiness.
 
This includes ensuring a rapid flow of ready forces intoKorea and the early phases of hostilities and improving ISR capabilities andcritical munitions.
 
Chairman, the return of sequestration would negativelyimpact these priorities, reduce readiness and delay deployment of the forcesrequired to defend the Republic of Korea and U.S. interest. In crisis on thepeninsula, this will result more military and civilian casualties for theRepublic of Korea and the United States and potentially place the mission atrisk.
 
The men and women serving on freedom's frontier, defendingthe Republic of Korea, remain thankful for this committee's unwavering supportin prioritizing resources that enable us to defend our national interest inAsia while advancing universal values and international order.
 
I'm extremely proud of our service members, civilians andtheir families serving in the Republic of Korea, who never lose site of thefact that we are at freedom's frontier, defending one of our most importantallies and vital American interests.
 
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
 
MCCAIN: Thank you very much.
 
General, I mentioned in my remarks Admiral Gortney said thatNorth Korea has an operational road-mobile missile that could carry nuclearweapons to the United States. Do you agree with that assessment?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Senator, I -- I believe that they've had thetime and the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead. They've stated thatthey have an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nuclear capability.They've paraded it. And I think as a commander, we must assume that they havethat capability.
 
MCCAIN: Admiral?
 
LOCKLEAR: I would agree with that assessment. I mean, wehaven't seen them effectively test it, but we -- you know, as commanders, allthe indications are that we have to be prepared to defend the homeland from it,and we're taking actions to do that.
 
MCCAIN: Those actions are?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, first, we work -- in PACOM, we work veryclosely with NORTHCOM to ensure that the defensive capabilities of ourballistic missile systems are optimized. Forces forward in the theater that Iand General Scaparrotti have command of are integral to that. Our ability inthe region to partner with our Japanese allies and our South Korean allies to-- to bring the BMD capabilities to bear has been productive. And in addition,we've been in discussions about the potential deployment of additional THAADbattery, beyond the one that's in Guam but on the Korean Peninsula.
 
MCCAIN: General, this is rather disturbing, particularlygiven the unpredictability of this overweight young man in North Korea. Isthat...
 
SCAPARROTTI: Yes, sir. That's...
 
MCCAIN: Is that -- is that a disturbing factor?
 
SCAPARROTTI: That's a disturbing factor, sir.
 
And I think -- you know, I believe that Kim Jong Un isunpredictable. He has a mind that he can intimidate. He does that withprovocations. He's -- he's committed provocations this year.
 
So I think it's a great concern given the leadership there,as well.
 
MCCAIN: Let's talk about China and the reclamation.
 
Admiral, we, from time to time, put a picture up of theareas that are reclaimed by China out in the East China Sea -- or South ChinaSea, and the problem is our pictures don't keep up with their activities.
 
It's my information that they have now, in the last year,filled in some 600 acres of land and are constructing runways and possiblyartillery and missile defense systems.MCCAIN: The Congressional ResearchService -- Congressional Research Service on April 6 asked you to report onthis issue. And I quote their report, saying, quote, "the publicly visiblecurrent U.S. strategy for dissuading China from continuing its land reclamationactivities appears to focus primarily on having U.S. officials make statementsexpressing the U.S. view that China should stop these activities on the groundsthat they are destabilizing and inconsistent with commitments China has madeunder the non-binding 2002 DOC."
 
Do you know anything else about our strategy concerningChina's continued expanding and filling in these areas, which are internationalwaters? And how great a threat do you -- do you -- does that appear to you,Admiral, as far as long-term threat to our commitment to freedom of the seas?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. Well, the -- the overall U.S. strategy Ithink is -- goes way beyond the military component of what I deal with eachday, and so I only make recommendations on the military side. So I'd refer thepolicy decisions about how we deal...
 
(CROSSTALK)
 
MCCAIN: And your recommendations are?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, in general, where you find that the U.S. hasa clear policy on how it feels about something, military solutions ordiplomatic solutions become easier for that.
 
The policy we have in the South China Sea, as I understandit today, is as we take globally on territorial disputes, we don't take sideson those territorial disputes, that there's -- but that we do want them workedout in peaceful, non-coercive ways in legal matters.
 
(CROSSTALK)
 
MCCAIN: ... over time impede our ability to navigate throughthose areas?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. Well, I think that -- given the factthat my view of all the claimants in the South China Sea, and some of them --they all own some of these land features and -- and -- and have differentpostures.
 
MCCAIN: We don't fill in areas of some 600 acres, either.
 
LOCKLEAR: No, sir. No, they don't. And so my assessment isthat all the claimants, except for China, are just kind of doing what theyagreed to in 2002, is they're just maintaining them while the legal process is-- would work out.
 
The Chinese, however, are doing much different than that.They're -- obviously, as you stated, it's been aggressive. I think it's beenhow fast they've been able to do it has been actually astonishing. They'rebuilding a network of outposts to enforce control over most of the South ChinaSea.
 
The Southeast Asian nations are increasingly worried thatthe PRC's new capabilities will allow China to take de facto control of thesurrounding waters, places like Fiery Cross Reef, where they're putting in arunway. I mean, just in the last 10 months, it went from a barely noticeablefeature to now having a -- a deep-water port on it and a -- and a potentialrunway.
 
This will allow the PRC to, number one, to improve theirability to put their maritime security force down there, which is theequivalent to a coast guard or a fisheries patrol, which is going to be themagnitude of -- of the size of the PRC's capabilities is if you take all the --the -- the Southeast Asian countries' coast guards and put them together, it'sstill a smaller number than what China has been able to produce.
 
I have also observed that they've taken what would have beenconsidered a couple of years ago gray-hulled warships and painted them whiteand turned them into maritime security craft.
 
So it has been astonishing. And to get -- we -- we portraythis, I think, try to to the PRC, to China, and their response is generally,well, this is our sovereign territory and stay out of our business, which isfor them to enforce their nine-dashed (ph) line claim.
 
So the implications are if this activity continues at pace,is that it -- those would give them de facto control, I think, in peacetime, ofthe -- much of the world's most important waterways where much of the world'seconomic energy is created. It would -- if they desired, it would in the futuregive them an opportunity to have outposts to put long-range detection radars inthere, to place -- to put more warships. They could put warplanes to enforcepotential down the road air defense zones.
 
So those are the kinds of areas where we have to thinkabout. And it certainly complicates the security environment. So far, the ASEANnations who have tried to work with China on this to develop a code of conduct,in my view has been not produced very much at all. In fact, you know, the ASEANis an effective diplomatic organization, but it's not designed to handle thesesecurity issues that pop up.
 
So I think we've got to watch this situation very carefully.
 
REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
 
And General Scaparrotti, we have very complicated relationswith the Chinese and particularly in the context of North Korea. To what degreedo you have sort of a contingency plan to communicate with them if there's aprovocation, a serious provocation by the North Koreans that would introducethe idea of -- of using force?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Yes, sir. Well, you know, as we, even in ourexercises, one of the first priorities is communications with China if there'sconflict on the peninsula. And so we exercise that in communications even inour exercises, and of course, it's very important for us to understand that andensure that they understand our intent.
 
REED: Now that's one side of the equation. The other side ofthe equation is to the extent that they're facilitating some of theseactivities by the North Koreans, particularly cyber, do you have any sort ofsense of that degree of facilitation?
 
And the general question is, you know, they have toappreciate the instability of this regime, the irrationality of the regime.They like the -- the buffer between South Korea. They like the -- becausethey're affecting our behavior and disturbing us. But they have to, I hope,realize is the danger of, you know, looking the other way. Is that...?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Yes, sir. And I think they do. My sense is, andthose who have had conversations with them, I haven't talked to their militarydirectly, but that they also are concerned and have some frustrations with theKim regime.
 
I -- in terms of cyber, you specifically asked thatquestion. You know, we know that -- that North Korea has some of their cyberactivities take place in China. But I don't know and I haven't seenintelligence that'll lead me to believe that they've had a direct relationshipwith North Korea in their cyber development.
 
REED: And just finally, and then this spans not just themilitary capacity but diplomatic capacity, are there efforts to try to move the-- the -- the Chinese government to be more proactive in terms of -- withfinancial pressures, with diplomatic pressures, to -- to at least demonstrateto the North Korean regime that, you know, they can't do these things?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Yes, sir, there has been.
 
REED: Admiral Locklear, you described the situation in thesouth Pacific and the southeast Pacific as one where China is exerting itself(ph). The witnesses in the last panel suggested that in terms of the northPacific, Korea and Japan, et cetera, we're fairly well positioned againstpotential operational threats. But that's not the case in the -- in the -- inthe southern Pacific and the southeast Pacific, is that fair?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. It's a -- it's a large region. You know,as we talked about the beginning of the whole rebalance discussion was tryingto move ourselves from what had been a post-Cold War to a kind of location innortheast Asia and to bring that to be more relevant to the security challengesthroughout the region.
 
So a number of initiatives. One is that we, with ourFilipino allies, have reinvigorated that alliance and are looking at -- at thecapabilities to improve -- help them improve their minimum defense, but also toimprove access to the region to ensure better security.
 
We've opened partnerships with nations in -- in SoutheastAsia that we probably wouldn't have considered possible in the last coupledecades -- Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, countries that have becomeincreasingly important to the security of the region and to the global securityenvironment.
 
REED: As the -- the Chinese are creating these artificialislands in the Pacific, there are a lot of real geographic islands that ourallies control. Are we thinking about, in conjunction with our allies,positioning forces forward in effect using the islands as sort of a -- a way todeny, you know, oceans to the Chinese as they appear are trying to do to us?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, I wouldn't go into the specifics of where wewould -- where our planning would take us in this forum, sir. But I would saythat, first what we're doing is we're ensuring that the -- the five alliancesthat we have there are set right for the security that -- the securityenvironment we're going to see ourselves in in this century.
 
And we're encouraging -- and to their credit, most of themare spending money and spending money on defense assets. And are -- and theywant the things that allow them to be able to be complementary to us. So we're-- we are working hard in that area.
 
REED: Final question, Admiral Locklear. Admiral Roughead washere on Tuesday and indicated that one of the clear advantages we have is oursubmarine fleet in the Pacific. In fact, he recommended doubling the number ofdeployed submarines. Is that your view also in terms of -- particularly with theiraerial denial, their surface capabilities, is that your view also?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. Well, as I've said in this forum before,we have the best submarines in the world. We continue, I think, to -- tooutpace the rest of the world in that capability. I -- in my AOR, they areessential to any operations that I have, both in peacetime and in crisis andcontingency.
 
I have concern about the size of the submarine force as wego into this -- the middle of this century. And our -- and its ability toremain relevant globally. Plus we're going to have to -- to figure out thisreplacement of our strategic nuclear submarine force, which is the mostsurvivable leg of our triad. And the importance of that as we -- as we see the-- the modernization of strategic nuclear capabilities in both countries likeChina and Russia.
 
REED: Just finally, the submarine appears to be the onlyweapon system that still can approach virtually to the shores of China anddeliver, if necessary, weapons. Is that -- is that true?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, sir, I wouldn't say it's the only system.
 
REED: OK. That -- that's even more encouraging. Thank you somuch.MCCAIN: Senator Inhofe?
 
INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 
Look, first of all, Admiral Locklear, let me thank you,again, for the hospitality you afforded us and our whole group when we were inHawaii and we laid the wreath on the Memorial of the USS Oklahoma. That was --you went out of your -- beyond your call of duty.
 
On that same trip, we went to South Korea. And at that time,I recall in some of our meetings there, they were talking about the use of a,what now, the -- banning the use of the cluster munition switch had been veryeffective. In fact, that's probably the place where they were -- because of theproximity between North Korea and South Korea, where they were most effectivelyused at that time.
 
Now we have a policy which is a self-imposed policy. I'm notcriticizing it. I know the reasons for it. But we're being forced todiscontinue that. And I'd like to ask you, what are we doing in the place toperform those functions, those missions that we were depending on upon theclusters?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. As you know, the cluster munitions, asyou indicated, very important to our plans and particularly on the Peninsula,if there were crisis. There's presently work under way to replace our presentmunitions with those that will provide the same effects, but with less -- youknow, with meeting their requirements -- meeting the requirements of the treatyand -- in essence, less than 1 percent dead rate.
 
INHOFE: Mm-hmm. You're talking about -- you've both talkedabout the increase in the casualties, as a result of some of the lack in theabilities to use some of the equipment we've used in the past. Is thissomething that could expose more risk and more casualties by not having thiscapability and not replacing it for something as effective?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir. Absolutely. It's a critical component ofour planning on the Peninsula.
 
INHOFE: OK. Let me -- I know the both of you agree with thisstatement that was made by James Clapper, so we don't need to rehash all that,when we said looking back over, by now, more than half a century ofintelligence would not experience a time when we've been beset by more crisesand threats around the globe. I think both of you agree with that. You'vestated that in the past. I'd like to get in -- in kind of the remainder of thetime, Admiral Locklear, talking about the submarines thing. Senator Rounds andI were on the USS Carl Vinson last week, without having any details in thissetting, they were very busy. We're now down to 10 submarines. Admiral Rougheadsaid on Friday that we're going to have to be moving one or we should move oneof those into the Pacific.
 
Now my question would be -- and Admiral Locklear, I think itwas a year ago before HASC, you were quite outspoken in the fact that we shouldhave 11 areas to carry out the mission. We still -- do you still feel that way?
 
LOCKLEAR: I do. Yes, sir. I do.
 
INHOFE: You'd like to get back to that, wouldn't you?
 
LOCKLEAR: I'd like to get back to it. I mean, we've -- Ithink the Navy is undergoing a bathtub -- I call a "bathtub ofreadiness" now because we delayed through the war years, we've delayedreadiness -- maintenance on these nuclear aircraft carriers. So on one hand,they are magnificent machines. On the other hand, you have to take care of themcorrectly to make sure they're safe.
 
INHOFE: Yeah.
 
LOCKLEAR: And so, we'll be enduring that, I think, for thenext five to six years before we get back to where we're at the level we needto be, I think, for kind of day-to-day operations in my AOR.
 
INHOFE: Mm-hmm. Well, of course maintenance andmodernization are the first two things to go when you're faced with what we'vebeen faced with. And I -- in the event that you do move one into -- into theAsia-Pacific area, where would it come from? What kind of a vacuum would beleft behind in other AORs?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, I think that decision would have to be madeat the Secretary of Defense level. But we have -- you know, generally, we have11 aircraft carriers. And out of that 11, we -- they generate a global presenceof some number, kind of for day-to-day operations and another level that wouldbe able to surge in times of crisis or in times of conflict.
 
I think that aircraft carriers are probably best suited forthe types of missions that we do in the Asia-Pacific today. And where it wouldcome from, I can't say. But my guess is it would probably come out of theMiddle East, given that that's been the primary demand signal for a carrierpresence in the last decade and a half.
 
INHOFE: Now in Senator Reid's -- in your final response tohis last question, it came to my mind that -- the carrier capability. Well,that's very helpful. And I -- but I'd like to have, for the record, somethingin a little bit more detail, because some of us are not as familiar as weshould be with that capability. In fact, I'm going down to Norfolk this weekendto try to become a little bit more informed on this. So if you could, for therecord, try to come out with where we might have the capacity where we couldafford to move something into the Pacific and then how busy everybody is at thepresent time? It'd be helpful.
 
LOCKLEAR: All right, sir.
 
MCCAIN: Senator Hirono.
 
HIRONO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of yougentlemen for your service and, of course, the service of the men and women whoserve under your commands. And Admiral Locklear, my very best to you in yourfuture endeavors. Thank you very much for being PACOM commander.
 
Admiral Locklear, I know that Secretary of Defense AshCarter spent, as I understand it, a day with you. And so, are -- were thediscussion that you had with -- reflective of the priorities you've laid out inyour testimony today?
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, ma'am.
 
HIRONO: You did mention that with everything that is goingon in South and East China Seas and the provocation of North Korea, that we doneed to strengthen our alliances with our partners and also establish newrelationships.
 
And in this regard, despite historical differences, lastDecember, the U.S., South Korea and Japan signed an information- sharingarrangement in what appears to have been a first step in what Deputy Secretaryof State Tony Blinken calls, and I quote, "a profoundly positivetrajectory," end quote.
 
Admiral, please discuss the relationships between SouthKorea and Japan and the challenges we faced in furthering a trilateral, U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance?
 
LOCKLEAR: The challenges we face, from my perspective, areprimarily political and social challenges. On the military side, themilitaries, if allowed, are able to work together for -- I think, for thecommon good of the security in Northeast Asia, in particular.
 
The impediments what's happened, thus far, is because of thepolitical pressure to not have true information-sharing agreements betweenJapan and Korea limit our ability to allow this to bring together in atrilateral way that optimizes the forces that they've invested in and we'veinvested in and particularly in critical areas such as ballistic missiledefense, et cetera.
 
So I highly encourage both Korea and Japan to move forwardat the highest level of governments with the types of agreements that allow usto optimize the military capability that this trilateral arrangement can bring.
 
HIRONO: So the information-sharing arrangement that wasagreed to, you're saying that that is not enough? It's not what you wouldconsider a true information-sharing arrangement?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, it is a good start. HIRONO: Again to you,Admiral. Many countries within the Indo- Asia Pacific region are increasingtheir defense capabilities. China is procuring submarines quickly, and we'veheard all of this, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore and Australia have beenshoring up their military capabilities. Malaysia and Indonesia have a couple ofmore submarines. And Vietnam recently announced the purchase of Russian- madesubmarines. How would the continued growth of the region's submarine fleetimpact the balance of power within the South China Sea region? Does this causeus to adjust our strategies or our basing decisions, if growth continues on itscurrent trajectory?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, the Indo-Asia Pacific Region or the PACOMregion is the most militarized part of the world. And it's increasing in itsmilitarization because most of the countries there have the resources now andthe will and the desire to grow their militaries.
 
Those that have military capability to actually operate asubmarine force are pursuing that because they understand the asymmetricadvantages that it brings. They understand the ability for access in areadenial capabilities that submarines bring. And they also recognize thesignificant deterrent value that submarines bring. So my numbers are -- roughlyare, there's about 300 submarines in the world that aren't U.S. submarines, 200of them are in the Indo-Asia Pacific.
 
Now some of those are owned by our partners and allies, butmany of them are not. And so the increasing number of submarines that haveincreasing lethality, increasing quieting technology certainly does change thedynamic of how we have to operate in that -- in the area the type of tacticsand procedures and operational concepts that we have to develop to ensure weremain dominant.
 
But I look at it as like a fact of life. It's going happen.
 
HIRONO: Mm-hmm.
 
LOCKLEAR: And we have to deal with it.
 
HIRONO: So in our dealing with it, though, especially withour partner, with our allies, does this require us to be very much more collaborativeand to share information so that we're on the same page, so to speak, in thatpart of the world?
 
LOCKLEAR: It does. It not only requires us to sharebilaterally more in a particularly difficult environment undersea and maritimedomain, but it also requires them to be able to share with their otherneighbors that have that capacity as well. And as you know, in the Indo-AsiaPacific, those multilateral organizations don't exist to facilitate that. Sowe're seeing the growth of that, but it's a work in progress.
 
HIRONO: Thank you.
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.(UNKNOWN): Thank you. Thank you,gentlemen, for your service.
 
We have a memo here, talking about noteworthy challenges inthe Pacific Area. And they list, of course, North Korea as the most dangerousand predictable challenge and I'm sure both of you agree with that. But alsoterritorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, natural disasters,including weather and disease, violent extremism, transnational crime, Russianintent and Chinese intent. Are there any of these gentlemen that would notinvolve a need to deliver our Marines quickly and effectively throughamphibious ships, Admiral?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, I think it's -- historically the MarineCorps is a cornerstone of the force structure that we have in the Asia-Pacific.I mean, its uniquely suited for large archipelagos, large sea spaces. It usesthe sea as a -- as a -- highways to move around on. And it's -- I can't -- ofall the ones you listed there, I can't think of one that the Marine Corps doesnot play as a part of the joint force in a significant way.
 
So, yes, they do play in all of those.
 
The question not whether or not they have enough lift, theanswer to that's no. We don't have enough lift. And I've said this before,we've got to -- not only is it our -- the number of amphibious ships that wecan build in our own shipyards, but we've got to look at connectors. We've gotto look at the types of alternative platforms that'll allow us to operate inmore unique security environments.
 
(UNKNOWN): Connectors. Connectors and alternatives.
 
LOCKLEAR: Connectors and alternatives. I mean, connectorsare like joint high-speed vessels that move Marines and troops around faster.There's -- so it also gets into the whole issue of how do you -- in hugecrisis, in large crisis, what is your military sea lift command? What is thecondition of that?
 
(UNKNOWN): Well, I want the General to get a crack at thisquestion, too. But -- but let's talk about that. We understand that we have arequirement for 50 amphibious ships. Is that correct?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, I don't know that I would -- I heard thenumber 50. I think you'd have to go back to the Department of the Navy for themto calculate globally how many they need.
 
But when we've had a greater pressure on our amphibiousforce, particularly in - - when we have operations in the Middle East that nowrequire us to -- to put Marine units in -- in position to be able to monitorthings like embassy safety and for embassy extraction in various hotspots.
 
So all that's put a demand of signal that's pulled theamphibious...
 
(UNKNOWN): Very real contingency that happens.
 
LOCKLEAR: Yes, sir.
 
(UNKNOWN): Well, OK, the information I have is that we havea requirement for 50 and we only have 30 amphibs in our inventory. And of thoseships, approximately 15 to 20 are operationally available. Would you say thatthat is pretty close to being correct information, Admiral? 30 in the inventoryand 15 to 20 operational?
 
LOCKLEAR: 30 is about my understanding of it.
 
(UNKNOWN): OK.
 
LOCKLEAR: In operation availability, depending on how theydefine it, I mean, my AOR I have an amphibious readiness group that's -- that'sin west of the dateline all the time that's available on a much greater basisthan that. But globally I would say that's probably about right.
 
(UNKNOWN): General, let's let you weigh in on this and howwould the effectiveness of our Marines be diminished if there are insufficientamphibious ships to get them delivered effectively?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Senator, I would just say this, that they'revery important to me in the peninsula for rapid response. And they're acritical part of all of our plans. Operating on the peninsula, it's the MarineCorps and their ability to -- to be lifted quickly to different places. Theyprovide me agility. It's the quickest, kind of the most succinct way to put it.
 
I am very concerned about the -- the amount of liftavailable in order to support our plans and the maintenance of that lift, aswell.
 
(UNKNOWN): Now so if we -- if we don't have enough amphibs,the connectors alone are not a solution, are they?
 
SCAPARROTTI: Well, sir, you know, we've looked atalternative methods of -- and -- and the use of alternate ships in order tohelp us with the delivery of Marines. I can be more specific, you know, in a --in a response for the record as to how we look at our planning.
 
(UNKNOWN): Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 
MCCAIN: Senator Heinrich?
 
HEINRICH: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
 
Admiral Locklear, I want to start with a little bit onmissile defense. And obviously the Asia-Pacific is of critical importance tothe U.S., both economically and strategically. Yet the current securityenvironment in your combatant command is increasingly complex. Countries in theregion continue to invest in greater quantities of ballistic missiles withextended range and new capabilities.
 
While I think we should continue to invest in missiledefense programs that have proven effective, I also think we should beinvesting in left of launch and other non-kinetic means of defense.
 
Given the vast number of incoming missiles that an adversarycould use to potentially overwhelm U.S. missile defense systems, I want to getyour thoughts on what steps are being taken in the realm of left of launchtechnologies like electronic warfare, cyber, that could blind, deceive, ordestroy enemy sensors before they actually launch.
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, Senator, I agree very much with yourassessment that -- that the ballistic missile defense threat grows because ofthe ability for them to -- for people to produce ballistic missiles at greaterdistances, that have greater distances and have greater accuracies and havemultiple reentry vehicles and those types of things that complicate theproblem.
 
And that you can't build enough interceptors to take themall out. You just can't -- you're in tail chase (ph) that you can't do.
 
That said, I think there is a good place for a good solidamount of ballistic missile defense. It's a deterrent. It buys decision space.it makes the decision for whoever's going to fire at you a lot harder for themto make. And when they do, it gives your troops that are in the way of themsome confidence that at least they'll be able to get through the first fewminutes of this thing before we have to take other action.
 
So we are working left of launch and -- and thinkingdifferently about how we would -- how we would attack this particular problem.One of the things that is not just about EW and cyber. Those events are beingworked. And I won't go into them in this particular forum, but they are beingpursued.
 
But it's also more about thinking differently about how youemploy your forces and at what trigger points would you do things like adispersal of your force in a different way throughout the region? How would youdo selective hardening of places that would -- and put in place things likerapid runway repair kits in the places where you have to have them?
 
Through this body, ya'll have allowed us to go forward withsome of those initiatives in some of the places that we have in the Asia-Pacific. The hardening of some fuel heads and those types of things make -- canmake a big difference. So left of launch is a priority for us.
 
HEINRICH: Let me ask a question that sort of overlays on thatin terms of emerging technologies. What's your assessment at this point on thevalue of directed energy systems to support defeating missile threats?
 
And do you think that directed energy should be a priorityfor -- for the research and development community, given the advancements inthe last couple of years?
 
LOCKLEAR: Well, we've seen some progress. I think the Navyhas some directed energy systems that are employed (ph) in operations routinelythat have proven effective, at least in the tactical area.
 
I'm in favor of directed energy weapons if they get the jobdone, if the technology is there. I kind of live in the -- the here and nowproblem. And I project -- and hopefully project in the future what we -- wemight need. Directed energy, if it solves -- if it's a good solid solution setfor the types of threat we're facing, then we should pursue it.