Air University

Steven L. Kwast, Lieutenant General, Commander and President

Air Command and Staff College

Brian Hastings, Colonel, Commandant

Bart R. Kessler, PhD, Dean of Distance Learning

Robert J. Smith, Jr., Colonel, PhD, Dean of Resident Programs

Michelle E. Ewy, Lieutenant Colonel, PhD, Director of Research

Liza D. Dillard, Major, Series Editor

Dennis Duffin, PhD, Essay Advisor

Selection Committee

Kristopher J. Kripchak, Major

Michael K. Hills, Lieutenant Colonel, PhD

Barbara Salera, PhD

Jonathan K. Zartman, PhD

Please send inquiries or comments to

Editor

The Wright Flyer Papers

Department of Research and Publications (ACSC/DER)

Air Command and Staff College

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Fax: (334) 953-2269

E-mail: acsc.der.researchorgmailbox@us.af.mil

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

The Future of Remotely Piloted 

Aircraft in Special Operations

Methods to Improve AFSOC MQ-9 Effectiveness 

for Supporting Special Operations

Jordan Kowalski

Captain, USAF

Wright Flyer No. 60

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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Project Editor

Belinda Bazinet

Published by Air University Press in September 2017

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of 

the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 

the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared 

for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the AU Press website: http://

aupress.au.af.mil.

Copy Editor 

Carolyn B. Underwood

Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations

Daniel Armstrong

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AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Air University Press

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iii

Contents

List of Illustrations v

Foreword vii

Preface ix

Abstract xi

About the Author xiii

Introduction 1

Background 2

Operational Considerations 9

Conclusion 20

Recommendations 21

Abbreviations 29

Bibliography 31

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v

Illustrations

1 TCAS RA display implemented on an instantaneous 

vertical speed indicator 5

2 Pilot rack setup with heads-up display and tracker display 6

3 MQ-9 station depiction 7

4 Typical GCS MCE configuration 12

5 Tracker display used for navigation 14

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vii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright Flyer 

Papers. Through this series, Air Command and Staff College presents a 

sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence and distancelearning students. This series has long showcased the kind of visionary 

thinking that drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation 

pioneers. This year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. 

As the series title indicates, these papers aim to present cutting-edge, actionable knowledge—research that addresses some of the most complex 

security and defense challenges facing us today.

Recently, The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively electronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print 

editions to an electronic-only format will fire even greater intellectual 

debate among Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms as 

the series reaches a growing global audience. By publishing these papers 

via the Air University Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach more 

readers, but also to support Air Force–wide efforts to conserve resources. 

In this spirit, we invite you to peruse past and current issues of The 

Wright Flyer Papers at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/papers_all.asp?cat=

wright.

Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to 

disseminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of our 

Air Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what follows will 

stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air, 

space, and cyber war fighters in their continuing search for innovative 

and improved ways to defend our nation and way of life.

BRIAN HASTINGS

Colonel, USAF

Commandant

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ix

Preface

The research conducted to bring this paper to life was a labor of intensity and love for my aircraft and its often thankless mission. Many times 

I have felt that the mission failed due to faulty or inadequate equipment 

or by not having the correct weapons to accomplish the task at hand. 

Sometimes that led to the proverbial “bad guy” getting away, while other 

times it contributed to the loss of American lives. The problems of less 

than adequate equipment to accomplish the mission are exacerbated by a 

poor understanding of how to employ the aircraft once tasked to support 

a given unit, leading to frustration on both ends. Many of these frustrations could be avoided if there were better communication and understanding between the supported units and the crews flying the mission 

for them. With new threats popping up around the globe and our special 

forces’ relentless mission of eliminating those threats before they can 

harm the homeland, I felt it prudent to provide a documented recommendation on how to improve remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) operations 

for current and future theaters without impeding on anyone’s authority.

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xi

Abstract

Unmanned aerial vehicles’ support to US special operations forces has 

grown throughout the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq to find, fix, and 

finish high-value targets in numerous terrorist networks. As conflicts 

continue to evolve across multiple new theaters in new environments and 

countries, several limitations with the MQ-9 and its support network 

generated the question “How might Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) MQ-9s be improved to better support special operations 

teams around the world?” The report utilized a problem/solution framework, with examples presented in scenario vignettes to provide context 

to the current capabilities and limitations of the MQ-9. The resulting 

research identified solutions, including several hardware and software 

upgrades that improve communication, navigation, deconfliction, and 

weapons employment capabilities of the aircraft.

Specifically, adding a second airborne radio, a flight management system (FMS) with certified global positioning system (GPS) navigation and 

a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) or an equivalent system will 

provide safer and more effective flight into the US National Airspace System (NAS) as well as International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 

airspace. Secondly, the requirement to quickly adapt new and more 

weapons to support ground teams would be solved by rapidly incorporating the Universal Armament Interface as well as weaponinzing the 

outer stations of the MQ-9’s external stores. Finally, the research highlighted the need for the preemptive emplacement of subject matter experts, in addition to the liaison officers already in place, to train with 

special operations teams and units stateside before they are tasked with 

an operation. These changes will enhance current and future support to 

special operations and even conventional US military forces in every theater to come.

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xiii

About the Author

Capt Jordan Kowalski received his commission and entered the Air 

Force in 2007 as a graduate of Norwich University. He attended undergraduate pilot training at Laughlin AFB, Texas, and was assigned to Air 

Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to fly MQ-1 Predators at 

Cannon AFB, New Mexico. He executed numerous missions supporting 

special operations for four years then moved to the mission qualification 

training schoolhouse to train future remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) 

crews on the AFSOC mission as an instructor and evaluator. After two 

years instructing new crews and maintaining the excellence of established crews through continuation training and evaluation, he converted 

to the MQ-9 Reaper and continued to fly in support of special operations 

forces (SOF) taskings. His time spent instructing tactics to work around 

technical problems and limitations led to a passion in helping develop 

new techniques, tactics, and procedures to better support SOF missions.

Capt Kowalski earned his masters of organizational leadership 

through Air Command and Staff College during his operational tenure at 

Cannon AFB. He completed a seven-year tour at Cannon and has moved 

to Hurlburt Field, Florida, to the Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center to lead changes to training as the chief of Flying Training.

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1

Introduction

The scenarios described in this report do not detail specific operations 

but provide examples of plausible missions and issues for the Air Force 

Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC) General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper 

remotely piloted aircraft (RPA).

Scenario

A special operations forces (SOF) team is tasked to hunt for a high-ranking leader 

of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in central Africa for Operation 

Threatening Viper. The US military presence in the region is scattered, and the air 

assets to assist the team in locating the high-value individual (HVI) are sparse. 

Many of the few information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft already in place do not have the sortie duration to develop adequate patterns of life 

(POL) models of the HVI for the team to plan operations. The decision is made to 

utilize Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) RPAs to support the 

SOF team’s mission. US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) plans to establish a launch and recovery element (LRE) at an airfield within the MQ-9’s sortie 

range, but the nations the Reaper would operate over will not allow a US “drone” 

to fly in their airspace. They do not understand how it operates, perceiving only 

that it does not work similarly to other aircraft. Ultimately, much effort is expended by the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State to 

ensure all host-nation approvals are met. The MQ-9 is allowed to fly over targets; 

however, missions are ineffective, as aircraft systems hamper effective communications and the supported SOF team has little practice working with RPAs.

Many ISR hours are spent searching vast swathes of wilderness, and eventually, 

despite locating and attempting to strike the HVI before he can move against US 

interests, a lack of adequate weaponry and a poor understanding of MQ-9 employment allow the HVI to escape and complete his attack. How might this scenario 

change with improvements to the aircraft; the techniques, tactics, and procedures 

(TTP) used by the aircrew operating the RPA; and a greater understanding of capabilities by the SOF team prior to attempting to utilize the RPA for the task?

The preceding presents a possible scenario for future operations based 

on previous mission sets with numerous issues such as difficulty getting 

aircraft in country, communication problems, limited weapons capabilities, and little to no TTP development. The purpose of this research was 

to provide a series of solutions to the problems presented in the theoretical scenario. The overall issue regarding the current limitations affecting 

the effectiveness of MQ-9 systems, TTP development, and force interoperability must be addressed to improve support for SOF. Though the research was focused toward SOF support, the suggestions for improvement should prove beneficial to any end user of the RPA’s ISR data 

streams. More specifically the problems presented deal with airspace over 

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2

foreign countries, communications with SOF teams or any ground force 

component, the shared understanding of what a RPA can brings to the 

table and how, and finally the correct application of the RPA’s ISR capabilities through joint training. This report’s purpose was improving the 

US Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper aircraft and AFSOC joint operations.

The research method used was problem/solution with the scenario 

presented providing examples of operational limitations that have hampered mission effectiveness and which could be improved. When drafting the scenario, many of the issues have proven to be real-world problems when establishing MQ-9 combat air patrols in new theaters, though 

not during the same operation in the same area of responsibility (AOR). 

There has been friction and inefficiency in each instance of RPAs moving 

to a new theater with a new SOF end user, as the end user attempts to 

apply their knowledge and TTPs to what they know the RPA should be 

capable of to achieve the desired effects. Importing lessons learned from 

previous theater stand-ups overcomes some of the problems; however, 

not all SOF teams from each service branch can effectively communicate 

in the timelines needed to respond to rapid SOF operations overseas. To 

that end, the research has identified capability gaps and provided solutions from the viewpoint of the example scenario. With improvements to 

the communications structure, navigation equipment, weapons delivery 

capabilities, and systems education to develop TTPs with the supported 

units, SOF RPA will be more effective in shorter timelines.

Background

RPAs have proven over the course of Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan, as well as 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), 

their capability to provide high fidelity, real-time intelligence and armed 

reconnaissance to battlefield commanders.1 The US Air Force Weapons 

School has written several research papers on how best to improve the 

tactical employment of the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9. 

The collective focus of many RPA-related papers has been to clearly define how to solve a tactical problem with a given toolset already established in the weapons system or on how to integrate a new piece of technology into existing TTPs. The papers, though designed to improve 

battlefield effectiveness, are limited to work with existing technology and 

equipment already in place on the aircraft or in the associated ground 

control station (GCS).

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3

USAF RPAs 

The current USAF inventory of RPAs consists mainly of the MQ-1, the 

MQ-9, and the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk. Ground parties 

generally interact with the MQ-1 and MQ-9 while executing their missions or from a forward operating base (FOB) receiving RPA full-motion 

video. Two main aircrew components of an RPA system—the LRE and 

mission control element (MCE)—are vital to the successful implementation of an RPA combat air patrol, the name designated to one continuous 

period of ISR coverage for a single RPA. The LRE is composed of a series 

of crews who reside in country with the aircraft they are launching. This 

is similar to manned platforms in that LRE crews ensure air worthiness 

before taking control of the aircraft via line-of-sight radio signals, taxi, 

takeoff, and landing. After the launch, a “handover” is performed with 

the MCE crew designated to control the RPA for the mission portion of 

the flight. MCE crews control the RPA via satellite signal from continental United States (CONUS) after establishing a positive handover from 

the LRE crew. The MCE crews, after taking control from the LRE, then fly 

to the target area and execute the mission task assigned by the supported 

unit, either a SOF ground team or traditional ground force.2

The mission tasks will vary depending on the supported unit’s requirement to gather intelligence on a given target. For example, if a high-value 

target has been identified at a specific location, the crew might be tasked 

to watch a house associated with the individual while an intelligence 

video analyst carefully annotates who interacts with the target and how 

the targeted individual behaves. With the gathering of the HVI’s POL, the 

supported unit can determine how best to exploit the individual. Sometimes the SOF team will elect to capture the individual in question as in 

Benghazi, Libya.3 At other times, the RPA will employ weapons to eliminate the individual. These weapons vary from 500-pound (lb.) class bomb 

to Hellfire missiles.

The Air Force has traditionally utilized the find, fix, target, track, engage, assess (F2T2EA) targeting cycle, focused on localized engagements 

and the destruction of a given target that meets certain target criteria. 

USSOCOM and its SOF subordinate units utilize the find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) targeting cycle, which emphasizes looking for 

the second- and third-order effects from a SOF action.4 How this differs 

from the F2T2EA construct is the purpose behind the action. F3EA uses 

previously developed or discovered target information to determine the 

next target in the cycle (find), then uses RPA or other tracking sources to 

specify that target’s location (fix). From there the decision to action, and 

how to action, the target is made (finish), which may be to capture the 

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4

individual for questioning or to eliminate the individual. After the target 

has been actioned, all the target’s information is assessed for viability, collected, and stored for later analysis (exploit). If the target is eliminated in 

a strike, the reactions of that individual’s associates may also provide information that is exploited. Finally, based on any information or reactions generated, the next target in the chain is identified (assessment), 

and the chain starts over.

Communications and Navigation Issues

There are severe limitations to the current aircraft configuration as 

well as TTPs, despite the persistent presence of RPA across multiple theaters where SOF teams are operating. A poor understanding of what an 

RPA—specifically an MQ-9—is and what it can do to the local civilian air 

traffic compounds the difficulty in establishing an LRE in a new country. 

The current navigation and onboard communications systems are limited in scope and by bandwidth. There is currently one AN/ARC-210 radio to communicate via line-of-sight with other aircraft and ground parties.5

 The ARC-210 can transmit in both the very high-frequency and the 

ultrahigh-frequency ranges and can store up to 25 frequencies or presets.6

 There is also an antijam Have Quick capability as well as the ability 

to passively monitor the guard frequency.7

However, there is a limit on how many simultaneous channels may be 

received. The GCS has the option to monitor up to five channels nearly 

simultaneously in “scan” mode; however, when a signal is detected on 

one of the scanned channels, the radio will remain on that frequency 

until the transmission is finished. This blocks the other four channels, 

creating a serious hazard.8 Additionally, guard monitoring is often overridden in the same way, making any passive guard monitoring ineffective. This can directly contribute to international flying incidents when 

controllers attempt to provide direction or clearance but are unable to 

contact the MQ-9 crew because the crew is limited to a single channel 

radio. This communications problem contributes to CONUS aviation restrictions as Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations require 

aircrew to adhere to air traffic control direction and clearance unless 

there is an emergency or an immediate response required by a traffic alert 

and collision avoidance system (TCAS) directive.9 These regulations are 

American derivatives of International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) procedures used to govern international flight rules, to which 

most nations with established international flight programs adhere.10

Thus if an MQ-9 crew is unable to follow an air traffic controller’s (ATC) 

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5

direction, many governments are less willing to allow that aircraft into 

their airspace.

The MQ-9 lacks other navigation and flight safety items that are required for flight in certain airspace. The TCAS system aids pilots in 

avoiding aircraft collisions in heavily trafficked airspace. TCAS operates 

by passively sending and receiving signals with aircraft telemetry such as 

altitude, airspeed, and vertical velocity indications or climb and descent 

rates—to other TCAS equipped aircraft.11 The latest versions of the system provide resolution advisories or directives to avoid colliding with 

another aircraft.12

Figure 1. TCAS RA display implemented on an instantaneous vertical speed 

indicator. (Reprinted from FAA, “Introduction to TCAS II,” version 7.1, 28 

February 2011, 15.)

However, the system only provides information and resolution advisories on aircraft also flying with an active TCAS installed. Future systems, such as the Airborne Digital Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB), will 

allow ground radar feeds to be projected into a display like TCAS but 

incorporating all aircraft, not just TCAS- or ADSB-equipped ones, to see 

who else is flying nearby.13 These systems allow many aircraft to transit 

and approach busy airports with a higher safety margin than if the systems were not in use.

Another limiting factor that causes consternation among international ATCs and government agencies is the inability for MQ-9s to either navigate via global positioning system (GPS) database coordinates 

or fly approved ICAO or FAA procedures. The MQ-9 currently uses GPS 

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6

receivers to navigate in conjunction with digital terrain elevation data 

(DTED) maps via a tracker display in the GCS pilot control station.14

Figure 2. Pilot rack setup with heads-up display and tracker display. (Reprinted from Air Force Technical Order (TO) 1Q-9(M) A-1, Flight Manual, 

USAF Series MQ-9 Aircraft, change 1, 2 May 2014, 1-79.)

The aircraft matches its GPS position over the map, and pilots navigate 

to and from a location by inputting the coordinates of a given point into 

a “points of interest” file that is then displayed on the tracker maps.15 The 

system is not approved for GPS navigation as the points are not loaded 

from an official and approved FAA or ICAO GPS database and the autopilot system has no way to navigate via the database points. Aircraft navigating solely via GPS must load all points along the intended route of 

flight with no addition or modification by the crew to ensure the points 

are accurate.16

Without the ability to verify where an MQ-9 will fly, nor the ability to 

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7

tional community are skeptical of allowing MQ-9s free flight through 

their airspace. The FAA mirrors those sentiments and is actively attempting to provide direction to RPA manufacturers as well as the US Air Force 

about adding necessary equipment and procedures to ensure the safety of 

all aircraft.17

Weapons Systems 

The current MQ-9 weapons system is controlled via a stores management system (SMS) interface controlled by the pilot in the GCS. The 

loadout of the weapons consists of air-to-ground (AGM) 114 missiles 

adapted for RPA use in the early stages of OEF, and 500 lb.-class laserguided bombs.18 These weapons are attached via either launch rails for 

the AGMs or bomb rails on one of seven hard-point stations on the underside of the aircraft.19

Figure 3. MQ-9 station depiction. (Reprinted from TO 1Q-9(M) A-34-1-1, 

Technical Manual, USAF Series MQ-9 Aircraft Nonnuclear Munitions Delivery, change 1, 1 March 2014, 1–3.)

Four hard points are currently utilized to carry weapons at any given 

time, but all were originally designed to be used as viable weapons launch 

points from the aircraft. The current weapons loads are also limited to the 

two weapons previously listed, which lack flexibility in their employment 

tactics due to fixed munition sizes and capabilities. The system software 

currently does not allow for other weapon types and their associated release mechanisms to be attached to any of the hard points and employed 

on a mission.

The AGM-114, known as a helicopter-fired (or Hellfire) missile, is a 

small payload missile originally designed as an antiarmor weapon to be 

launched from attack helicopters in a conventional land war.20 The GBU12 is a laser-guided, 500 lb.-class bomb designed for blast and fragmentation effects against nonreinforced targets.21 These weapons, though 

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8

effective in their primary roles, vary in regard to destructive power and 

accuracy. If a target is in an environment with large amounts of potential 

collateral damage, either weapon could misguide or malfunction and 

miss the intended aim point.

There are other weapons of varying explosive power currently in use 

that could provide a SOF ground force commander (GFC) options to 

engage a hostile target. The AGM-176 Griffin missile is smaller and 

weighs significantly less than a Hellfire—approximately 30 lbs. as compared to approximately 100 lbs. A given station could carry three Griffins 

instead of a single Hellfire with a different launching mechanism.22 The 

GBU-39 is another viable alternative that weighs approximately 250 lbs. 

and has additional GPS navigation and targeting capabilities, allowing 

for precise targeting and a scaled down and more manageable blast radius as compared to a standard GBU-12.23 These or other weapons which 

may be employed in the future currently have no active interface in the 

GCS software.

Techniques, Tactics, and Procedure Education and Development

RPA have been employed in Afghanistan since the beginning of the 

war. SOF have traditionally utilized ISR to learn about the battlespace 

and have relied on manned aircraft for support during the operation with 

little to no situational awareness gained just before moving to the objective area. With the addition of RPA to the field, SOF teams now rely on 

constant ISR in preparing and executing missions.24 Despite the demand, 

many within the SOF community do not know how to employ MQ-9s or 

even what capabilities they possess. Often SOF teams are assigned an 

RPA for overwatch and target area monitoring prior to an operation and 

may assign scanning tasks that are not possible with the limited fields of 

view afforded by the Multi-Spectral Targeting System.

USSOCOM was created after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 

Iran in 1980, which aimed to extract the US hostages from the American 

embassy in Tehran.25 The mission failed when, during a severe dust storm 

at the staging area, one of the helicopters assigned to the mission collided 

with one of the refueling C-130 transport aircraft nearby, killing eight US 

military personnel.26 Many of the lessons learned from after action reports cited the lack of interservice planning prior to the start of the mission. In other words, each service branch’s troops planned only their 

small portion of the mission without interaction from the other players. 

USSOCOM was charged with training and equipping elite special forces 

for operations and to understand what each player brought to the field to 

maximize efficiency and minimize risk. As such, integrated exercises and 

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training rehearsals were required among each service branch’s special 

forces contingent—Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, 

US Army Special Operations Command, AFSOC, and Naval Special 

Warfare Command—that would work together for an operation.27

In executing many of the preoperation training exercises and rehearsals, members of the units involved will send representatives to train with 

and educate the other unit about the capabilities and limitations offered 

by the other unit and its associated hardware. These liaison officers 

(LNO) often are the conduit between home station mission units and the 

partners executing mission. The LNO’s tour may last for a specific operation’s duration or for several months. During this time, the system LNO 

serves as the subject matter expert who provides solutions and ideas toward endstate objectives and actioned goals by the supported unit. However, the LNO is a temporary assignment, and with a constant flux of 

personnel and mission requirements, knowledge and trust between units 

can be easily lost.

Operational Considerations

SOF RPA in OEF and OIF

Each AOR generates different requirements for each type of aircraft to 

enter and operate within the given theater’s airspace. Recent wartime examples of theaters RPA operate within include OFS (formerly OEF) in 

Afghanistan and OIR (formerly OIF) in Iraq.28 In each theater, a primary 

enabler of MQ-9 flight has been a permissive environment with respect 

to antiaircraft systems due to systems limitations in combatting such 

threats. Afghanistan’s poor integrated air defense system and lack of ability to counter US Air Force aircraft quickly dissolved their formal opposition to US efforts to track down and eliminate al-Qaeda leadership in the 

country. AFSOC aircraft and SOF teams were utilized to infiltrate the 

country and establish a series of bases from which to build US forces in 

the country as well. Venturing beyond the confines of a FOB often meant 

little to no support so many of the first few cycles of the F3EA cycle was 

permitted through the use of ISR aircraft, specifically MQ-1 Predators 

and MQ-9 Reapers. 

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10

Scenario: Communications

During the mission in central Africa, the MQ-9 MCE crew has switched frequencies from civilian ATC to their SOF team via the ARC-210. Though air traffic is 

scarce, light civilian aircraft occasionally transit through the target area. While the 

ground team moves toward their objective, the MQ-9 crew must switch rapidly 

between encrypted radio communications with the team and unencrypted radio 

communications with ATC to ensure air traffic deconfliction. During one of the 

ATC check-ins, the crew notices sentries in the target area. Due to the delay in 

sending commands to the aircraft via satellite signal and the transmission delay in 

the radio, the crew does not alert the ground team in time and the sentries begin 

firing on friendly positions. If another radio were present within the system, the 

crew could monitor ATC as well as speak to the ground team to warn of threats or 

activity at the target.

MQ-9 Communications

Within the confines of OFS and OIR, RPA are able to operate under 

procedural and radar control from ATC which utilizes “kill boxes” and 

“keypads” to define airspace boundaries at a specific altitude for an aircraft to operate.29 Kill boxes are segments of airspace in 30 nautical mile 

by 30 nautical mile sections, effectively squares. Each kill box is further 

subdivided into keypads similar to the three-by-three numerical pad on 

most telephones. ATC can separate aircraft procedurally by tracking 

where each aircraft is assigned and direct separation by altitude or directing air traffic via routes using the Common Grid Reference System 

(CGRS) kill-box designations. ATC also separates and controls aircraft 

via radar, similar to how aircraft are controlled in the national air space 

(NAS). The radar tracking is enhanced by identifying aircraft via their 

on-board transponder, which is often “identify friend or foe” capable. 

RPA transponders are robust enough to be tracked by ATC and correlated to a radar track for precise control. ATC instruction to RPA is delivered by a tactical Internet relay chat (mIRC) due to the limited radio capabilities of RPA.

As discussed, the single ARC-210 radio employed by the MQ-1 and 

MQ-9 is limited in range and receiving capability as it can only track one 

audio channel’s worth of transmission.30 Should there be an audio signal 

on one of the passively monitored channels, such as “guard,” there is a 

high likelihood of missing communications from ATC or another aircraft. As regulations require at least two forms of communication with a 

controlling agency for redundancy, mIRC is an acceptable alternative to 

poor radio communications. 31 Both Afghanistan and Iraq currently allow mIRC as the primary means MQ-9s use to communicate with ATC; 

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11

the US Air Force is uniquely equipped to utilize this form of technology 

to overcome the communications limitations of the MQ-9 and its single 

radio. However, such technological work-arounds will not always be 

possible.

Should an RPA deploy to a country unwilling to allow US military 

ATC primary control over both military and civilian aircraft, mIRC will 

no longer be an option. Other forms of communication, such as telephones, are authorized but not all civilian ATC agencies overseas have 

ready access to a phone that may be called from a DOD unclassified 

line.32 So robust radios are needed to facilitate communication with ATC. 

Cases where the US military does not control the airspace for a given 

operation will become more prevalent as SOF RPA operations move to 

new theaters to hunt targets or gather intelligence. Operations such as the 

capture of a high-value terrorist in Libya, where the United States does 

not control the airspace, would have hindered an MQ-9’s ability to aid the 

SOF team in their operation.33

Often when operating over a given target, there are more communications messages passed in mIRC than target updates and tactical information. Airspace notifications, movement directives, and traffic advisories 

all populate simultaneously while a crew scans for threats and passes 

those over-radio communications to the ground party. The current layout of the GCS does not allow for an efficient, nor all-encompassing scan 

that allows a pilot or special operator to quickly see a mIRC message and 

respond while talking to a ground team member.34

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Figure 4. Typical GCS MCE configuration. (USAF photo by TSgt Ricky Best.) 

The number of screens and information they contain at any given moment can quickly become overwhelming. It is also easy to miss scrolling 

messages from military ATC while conducting other tasks during a typical mission. The inability to quickly communicate with ATC and the 

ground party poses a safety risk to operators in terrestrial and airborne 

realms.

The same concern arises when speaking to multiple ATC agencies in 

civilian aviation. Many aircraft with two radios are able to monitor a primary ATC frequency but utilize a second radio to update airfield weather 

through the automated terminal information service, call other aircraft 

for pilot or in-flight reports regarding airway weather conditions, or call 

flight service stations to amend filed flight plans. When changing between ATC entities, there is a positive handover from one to the other 

initiated by having the aircraft “establish good two-way communications” (or “call good two-way”) with the next agency before that aircraft 

is allowed to cease monitoring their current ATC frequency. A single radio hampers these efforts as any immediate and critical calls from ATC 

will be missed while checking in with the next ATC agency. The second 

radio facilitates vital safety and regulatory needs in nonmilitary ATC environments. Additionally, should an MQ-9 need to work on a tactical 

frequency to facilitate SOF team objectives during an operation, a second 

radio would provide the means to monitor ATC as well, negating the 

need for alternate forms of communication and enhancing flight safety.

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Scenario: Navigation

The MQ-9 is vectored by civil ATC to several en route navigation points depicted 

only via GPS coordinates due to a lack of traditional navigational aid infrastructure. The MCE crew has the points loaded in their tracker display via their “points 

of interest” file, with the coordinates manually inputted by the crew. Due to task 

saturation from coordinating for the impending operation, they miss their navigation point by several miles, prompting ATC to begin directing them to vacate the 

airspace for failing to comply with directions. The crew is able to resolve the issue 

with help from support agencies at the AOR staff level and continue the mission, 

albeit delayed due to the coordination required.

MQ-9 Navigation

Both MQ-1 and MQ-9 navigation is structured DTED maps and inertial navigation system (INS) coupled with GPS navigation. The aircraft 

knows its INS/GPS position, which is overlaid on a map known as the 

GCS tracker display.35

The aircraft’s actual position relative to the ground is based on the accuracy of the maps created. When operating in a given military-controlled 

airspace, locations are generally given in CGRS/Military Grid Reference 

System grids with kill-box/keypad references. Additional waypoints may 

be generated, but due to software rounding and accuracy limitations, the 

coordinates entered may not be accurate.

GPS navigational requirements dictate that all points to be navigated 

to or from along with GPS-only procedures must be loaded in their entirety and unaltered from an approved database.36 An MQ-9 can load a 

series of points known as a “points of interest” (POI) file, but each point 

must be manually input to the system and saved, introducing the possibility of coordinate errors. Additionally, the MQ-9 is incapable of precisely navigating to those points during normal “autopilot” flying. A “preprogrammed” mission may be built by overlaying the waypoints onto the 

POI points, but each point of the mission’s coordinates must be manually 

updated by the pilot—again introducing the possibility for input errors.

A flight management system (FMS) incorporated into the existing 

GCS architecture would eliminate the possibility of navigation input errors as well as increase the fidelity of navigation in a foreign civilian airspace. Foreign controllers currently cannot direct an MQ-9 to fly to a 

given navigation point, traditional or GPS, unless a crewmember previously built it into the system. In a new theater with controllers who are 

unfamiliar with the inaccuracies of operating an MQ-9, there is a high 

probability of MQ-9 crews violating flight directions. Worldwide GPS 

navigational databases eliminate crew-controller confusion as to where 

precisely an aircraft is expected to fly.

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Figure 5. Tracker display used for navigation. (Reprinted from TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, USAF Series MQ-9 Aircraft, change 1, 2 

May 2014, 8–71.)

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Furthermore, having an FMS capable of GPS-only navigation allows 

for the possibility of executing GPS approaches as well. The MQ-9’s 

present software does not allow for the execution of precision arrivals, 

departures, or approaches associated with takeoff and landing at an airfield. The aircrew can build a facsimile approach in which the parameters of a given traditional approach—such as glide slope, descent points, 

and headings—are built into each GCS individually.37 These approaches 

are able to be modified by the crew executing them, and as such, are not 

approved for instrument flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). MQ-9s are thereby restricted to visual meteorological 

conditions (VMC) “straight-in” approaches. This affects the MQ-9’s 

ability to safely fly given the limited airfields to launch from and recover 

to. Should an FMS GPS approach be fielded, MQ-9s could be cleared 

and treated the same as any host-nation aircraft with respect to airfield 

approaches, separation, and navigation. However, this would not address safe separation of aircraft requirements for flying in ICAO airspace generally handled TCAS.

Scenario: Traffic Awareness

Finally established on target and with positive communications with the ground 

team, the MQ-9 crew inadvertently flies within several thousand feet of a commercial airliner. The crew missed the radio alert from ATC due to the single ARC210 on-board the MQ-9. ATC and the civilian airliner file a hazardous air traffic 

report to annotate the failure of the MQ-9 crew to adhere to safety regulations. As 

the report works its way through the system the issue in both the host nation and 

international community could result in the MQ-9 crew receiving disciplinary action in the form of downgrades in their aeronautical rating. Additionally, questions will be asked as to why a US military aircraft was operating without a means 

of safely deconflicting from other aircraft outside a declared warzone, bringing 

unwanted attention to the SOF mission.

MQ-9 Traffic Awareness

ATC is currently the only means of actively avoiding other traffic in a 

civilian controlled environment. As discussed, the lack of TCAS and 

TCAS II is prohibitive to safely navigating in civilian airspace. Although 

not perfect, TCAS does need to interact with the transponder or TCAS 

module of another aircraft to deliver timely resolution advisories, providing a greater safety margin for all aircraft in the vicinity. Future capabilities such as ADSB will further mitigate the MQ-9’s inability to see and 

avoid other aircraft in a given piece of airspace.

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The use of TCAS in a military-controlled theater is less restrictive due 

to the restrictions and separation requirements dictated to all military 

aircraft operating in that theater. Each aircraft under ATC control is 

separated by regulations in the airspace control plan (ACP) and vectored for safety accordingly. For operations requiring multiple aircraft in 

a localized restricted operating zone (ROZ), deconfliction and separation is handled by the ROZ controller or sometimes handed to an air 

warden to manage which aircraft are positioned where. The safe separation, both laterally and vertically, of aircraft in a ROZ is most important 

when conducting strikes. The aircraft in a ROZ may be positioned 

within altitude layers—“stacked”—preparing to support an operation. 

The need to quickly relocate to facilitate an air-to-ground strike is vital 

to that strike’s success.

Delays in relocation due to the communications limitations via radios 

and mIRC take time in which ground members may be exposed to unnecessary risk. TCAS or ADSB would provide a picture for situational 

awareness of where the other aircraft in the stack are located relative to 

the MQ-9 and shorter, more direct communications could be delivered 

to move aircraft out of the way. For example, “F-16, MQ-9, I have you on 

TCAS, no factor for strike.” This would also provide situational awareness 

in civilian airspace about other traffic in a given target area that may inadvertently fly through a US ROZ with only RPA inside. TCAS or ADSB 

could alert the MQ-9 pilot of a possible traffic conflict. This would allow 

either a conversation with ATC to divert the civilian traffic away from the 

target or the ability to safely adjust a flight or weapons path to continue 

the mission with the civilian traffic none the wiser. 

Scenario: Weapons Limitations

The HVI at the target location is reported to drive a generic sedan with no armor 

plating or reinforcement. The Hellfire variants and 500-lb. bombs are ideally suited 

for destroying the vehicle should it flee the SOF team’s raid on his headquarters. 

Upon arriving at the location, the sedan is located in a narrow street with several 

presumed civilian homes located close by. Four Hellfires with programmable effects and a single 500 lbs.-class bomb were loaded at the LRE location. Due to the 

location of the potential target relative to high collateral damage, the MQ-9 cannot 

ensure it can precisely strike the vehicle to prevent the target’s escape and ensure 

no damage to the surrounding buildings or people. The four-hour transit to the 

LRE plus the re-arming with different Hellfire missiles and the removal of the existing bombs result in delays to arrive on station and developing the target before 

the operation can commence. The GFC asks for other options should the vehicle 

remain in the high collateral damage area, but the MQ-9 crew can offer no alternatives to the loads they had carried.

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MQ-9 Weapons Systems Interface Update

As discussed, the MQ-9 weapons system is limited to AGM-114 Hellfire missiles as well as 500 lbs.-class bombs.38 A number of variants of 

each kind of weapon caters to numerous desired kinetic effects and guidance programs that are effective against most types of enemy combatants 

in current theaters.39 The SMS from the pilot’s control station within a 

GCS controls each weapon.40 Electrically controlled and powered munitions are able to change a number of settings to meet the target requirements based on the GFC’s intent. Though the attack parameters for each 

weapon may be changed in flight, the current available weapons implemented are hard coded into the software for both the aircraft and the 

GCS, limiting stores to only Hellfires and 500 lbs.-class bombs.41

With the wide variety of targets in the current conflict—specifically in 

OFS against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS) in Iraq—Hellfires and 500lbs bombs may not have the correct 

parameters or precision to meet the GFC intent while also minimizing 

collateral damage. Numerous open-source reports and ISIS social media 

posts speak of seizing numerous military-grade weapons systems, including tanks and other heavily armored vehicles.42 Specific Hellfires are designed to effectively neutralize such targets, but equipping an MQ-9 with 

antiarmor missiles reduces its capacity to employ for maximum lethality 

against other target types such as enemy personnel in the open or civilian 

structures.43 Alternative weapons—such as the AGM-176, GBU-39, or 

other weapons that are compatible with the weight limitations for each 

station—coupled with 500 lbs.-class bombs and Hellfires, could meet the 

diverse requirements to combat the ever-changing threat in the latest and 

future conflicts.

Unfortunately, implementing new types of weapons means updating 

the SMS code to understand and interface with that weapon. The US Air 

Force has stated that it intends to implement a more versatile software 

line that essentially acts as a weapon plug-and-play system without having to ensure correct hard code is added to the current MQ-9 software 

load. The system is known as the Universal Armament Interface (UAI) 

and was originally designed for use with current and next generation 

fighter and bomber aircraft.44 The system actively communicates with a 

given weapon to generate employment considerations and allows an ondemand new set of weapons to be loaded to the aircraft specifically tailored to the mission without having to wait for long-term code updates.45

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Scenario: Number of Weapons

After the MQ-9 is established in orbit over the target area, the SOF team begins 

their raid via a helicopter drop off a few miles from the target and then completes 

the rest of the transit on foot. The HVI is known to keep to a small protection force 

formed from his AQIM members in the area; when the team nears the target, the 

greater part of the enemy force begins to move against the team’s position. The 

team calls in air strikes to eliminate the threat while they assault the target building, and the MQ-9 crew employs all four of their Hellfires and their 500 lbs.-class 

bomb. This kills many of the first line of the enemy forces but not all. The team is 

still in danger and their only air support is out of weapons after only a short engagement. The team is forced to retreat early without the HVI.

Limited Weapons Capacity

The Air Force and all joint air components in a given theater are generally given the air tasking order (ATO), which is generated in a tasking 

cycle. The overall objectives passed from the theater commander drive 

the targeting decisions on what is targetable to the appropriate degree, 

which further generate the requirements for specific effects against those 

targets.46 The desired effects are compared against the available strike 

platforms; the weapons they can carry are then allocated to a task list 

with target information within the ATO.47 The aircraft are then outfitted 

with the weapons appropriate for the mission. MQ-9s are potentially only 

allotted a maximum of six weapons based on this type of weapon assignment and the available weapons able to integrate with the system.

Despite having the potential for a larger variety of weapons and 

weapon size changes with the UAI, the number of weapons carried still is 

a limiting factor. Four of the seven stations on the MQ-9 are capable of 

carrying weapons, with only two stations able to carry Hellfire variants.48

The MQ-9 is capable of launching with stations two, three, five, and six 

loaded with the maximum weight weapons at takeoff at the cost of reduced fuel load to not exceed maximum ramp weight.49 The approved 

configuration index shows a number of different combinations of Hellfires and 500 lbs.-class bombs but are severely limited in number.50 An 

MQ-9 is therefore loaded with what munitions it may need for a given 

dynamic mission without the ability to add more or a different variety. 

The typical sortie duration of an MQ-9 is over 12 hours, far longer than 

the crew of a typical manned aircraft is able to remain airborne without 

aerial refueling. With this extended mission, all six weapons could be 

expended relatively early into the mission and no further support could 

be provided kinetically to any nearby friendly forces.

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Combining the ability to load a number of new weapons with more 

weapons than previous SCLs creates the possibility for more varied 

weapon sets. Given the long sortie durations of the MQ-9, the aircraft’s 

downtime between sorties is minimal compared to other airframes. The 

time it takes to switch out weapons racks—from a Hellfire launcher to a 

GBU for example—needs to be shorter than the time between sorties, 

otherwise it could impact launch times and mission prosecution. The 

weapons suspension systems to integrate new weaponry must be versatile 

enough to carry and employ the weapons while needing minimal maintenance effort to ensure continued effectiveness.

Scenario: SOF Team/MQ-9 Integration

In the time leading up to the operation against the HVI in central Africa, multiple 

experts in MQ-9 operations—including experienced pilots and sensor operators 

from the squadron tasked with supporting the team— briefed the SOF team. The 

SOF team ran many rehearsal missions, practicing how the personnel on the 

ground would execute the raid and accounting for many contingencies. The SOF 

unit had little to no practical experience with MQ-9 operations other than brief 

experiences receiving ISR video while deployed to OFS in Afghanistan. Their plan 

did not include detailed integration with the MQ-9 on station beyond standard 

overwatch callouts used by other SOF support aircraft. The MQ-9 crew is given the 

details of the raid, and despite knowing the SOF team has studied the MQ-9’s capabilities, are unable to quickly provide the directed support to the team. The SOF 

team is very directive of the MQ-9’s crew as to how to operate their system, rather 

than passing a desired effect. The resulting micromanagement drives the sensors 

away from the target building, during which time the HVI escapes.

AFSOC MQ-9 TTP Development

The responsibility to develop TTPs for effectively employing a given 

aircraft generally falls under the purview of a squadron’s weapons officer. 

The weapons officer ensures that the TTPs are sound techniques based in 

repeatable processes to meet a given commander’s intent, whether that is 

the air commander attempting to meet strategic objectives or the GFC 

managing a small, tactical scenario within the AOR.51 When divorced 

from constant interaction with a ground party, a given aircrew may rely 

upon doctrinal publications, such as the Joint Publication (JP) 3 series, 

which cover all manner of joint mission sets.52 The ability to reference 

and train to these common standards accounts for much of the missionrelated training accomplished by aircrew.

SOF’s specialized missions require an intensified training and planning schedule for executing operations, requiring its own publication in 

the JP 3 series.53 Many of the tenets that mark a given force or operation 

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designated as SOF include the special training and equipment employed 

to garner high success of the mission.54 As such, the habitual and direct 

support provided by SOF MQ-9s requires intimate knowledge of a given 

SOF team’s internal TTPs as well as their capabilities. In turn, the SOF 

teams in each service branch attempt to integrate with and learn the capabilities of each weapons system they plan to utilize during an operation.55 The implementation of effective aircraft use is facilitated by the use 

of LNOs to coordinate and educate the SOF leadership and teams in theater and just prior to deployment.

In established operations, AFSOC MQ-9 LNOs work daily with teams 

to effectively work through the F3EA chain. However, the requirement to 

assign LNOs is usually reserved until the SOF team is preparing to execute operations in a given theater for a “just-in-time” sense of establishing partnered TTPs and operational standards. This, coupled with unclear lines of command and control at the strategic level, can contribute 

to frustrations and inefficiencies while employing MQ-9s in that new 

theater. There are several training opportunities throughout a given calendar year where a SOF team may train with and learn about AFSOC’s 

unique MQ-9 capabilities, but given the limited resources of manpower 

and FAA NAS flight rules prohibiting free MQ-9 flight, the training is not 

as effective as it could be. LNO education at the SOF unit level, specifically at each of the major service component special operations organizations well prior to deployment times, has proven to improve MQ-9 support while simultaneously broadening the knowledge of how to effectively 

employ the weapons system in theater.56

Conclusion

RPA’s support to SOF entities may be improved through the addition 

of existing flight technology, improving the communications scheme utilized by RPA systems, providing subject matter experts to the supported 

units around the globe, and training effectively prior to an operation 

commencing in accordance with the fourth SOF truth: “Competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.”57

The research within this report answered how best to improve MQ-9s 

with regard to entering and navigating in national or extranational airspace while also improving mission effectiveness. It is no longer solely 

AFSOC’s prerogative to see MQ-9 support to SOF teams succeed, but the 

SOF team’s prerogative as well. The knowledge gained from previous initiatives into new theaters shows that airspace controllers worldwide, including the FAA in the United States, do not know nor trust RPA capability to effectively communicate and navigate safely among human 

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populated aircraft. Adding the standard navigation, communication, and 

deconfliction equipment common on most other military aircraft will 

limit doubts to MQ-9 safety, which will smooth entry of the aircraft into 

theater.

Additionally, the limited and slow-to-adapt weapons cycle of the 

MQ-9 does not account for the new and varied environments that the 

enemies of America will operate from in the future. USSOCOM and the 

US Air Force must work toward rapidly expanding the weapons capabilities of the MQ-9 to account for the numerous target sets that will be prosecuted in every conceivable environment. A plug-and-play weapons system in the form of the UAI will ensure the correct application of force, 

on-demand, with minimal collateral damage. The new weapons and environments will require the need to develop new TTPs with SOF teams 

who have not previously worked with RPA. Embedding LNOs with the 

SOF teams year round before they are required to deploy will increase the 

corporate knowledge of their SOF RPA brethren as well as their trust that 

the RPA crew will watch over them as they hunt the enemies of America.

Recommendations

To help solve the difficulty of establishing SOF RPA in a new theater 

with all of the necessary equipment and tools to be effective ISR platforms for any end user, this research proposes six recommendations. The 

recommendations will follow the order they have been presented in the 

preceding research. 

Recommendation 1: Add Second Radio to MQ-9

A second radio with the necessary satellite bandwidth to allow the 

MCE crew to utilize them will greatly improve RPA on-scene communications. This provides many advantages concerning aircraft communication, not the least of which is interaction with air traffic control. The ability to have and use redundant communication systems is an FAA and Air 

Force flight requirement.58 Additionally, a second radio affords the ability 

to speak to other military assets quickly and securely should secure military chat fail to be an option. RPAs with two radios will further be able to 

speak directly to ground parties while monitoring ATC. This configuration would eliminate delays in conveying critical information to those in 

harm’s way, while also allowing the RPA to stay out of the way of other 

traffic operating under ATC control.

Factors that could hamper the effectiveness or implementation of a 

second airborne radio include the lack of a second aircraft ARC-210 in02-article.indd 21 9/25/2017 2:00
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terface in the GCS and limited satellite bandwidth for a second radio. 

Adding GCS interface functionality for a second radio in theory should 

not be difficult. It could be incorporated to the same upgrade cycle due 

out in the next several years. The window from the tracker display controlling ARC-210 functionality is simple, so adding a second radio interface to it could prove simple, but more research is needed from a program of record perspective to investigate actual difficulty. Bandwidth 

across the satellite control signal could also prove to be a challenge to 

upgrade. Each change in bandwidth affects the quality of the data streams 

from other systems, such as video quality or synthetic aperture radar 

(SAR) update rates.59 A solution could be to limit or remove SAR functionality from dual radio-equipped aircraft. Neither of these factors 

should impede nor delay implementation of a second radio for both ATC 

awareness. The ability to communicate on multiple tactical frequencies 

will greatly enhance mission effectiveness. 

Recommendation 2: Add GPS Navigation and Approach Capability 

to MQ-9

To act in accordance with flight regulations and deconfliction requirements for international flying, MQ-9s require the ability to navigate and 

execute GPS approaches from an approved database through an FMS. 

Many ICAO navigational and approach procedures have a GPS equivalent if an aircraft is unable to execute via traditional navigational aid. The 

current system employed by SOF RPA does not meet the USAF or ICAO 

GPS standards of maintaining an updated GPS database.60 If an MQ-9 

could navigate and execute GPS procedures from host-nation and ICAO 

standards, there would be little cause for concern as to where the RPA 

was flying and by what procedure. The effort to educate the host nation 

would be easier than attempting to explain “normal” RPA operations.

The use and implementation of FMS navigation would require training for MQ-9 pilots with no previous aircraft experience. Additionally, 

the maintenance of the systems and file updates would need to be incorporated into maintenance personnel contracts to ensure compliance with 

FAA regulation. Additionally, current GCS software and navigation techniques are not integrated with an FMS, requiring hardware upgrades for 

implementation, which will take time and money. None of these considerations should impede implementing true FAA compliant GPS navigation systems on MQ-9s.

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Recommendation 3: Add TCAS or Equivalent to MQ-9

In addition to true GPS database navigation via FMS adding TCAS to 

the aircraft will also put host-nation and partner aircraft more at ease 

when flying near RPA. Though current TCAS systems give some advanced warning of traffic, and resolution advisories give several seconds 

to react, RPA’s inherent control delay when operating under the MCE 

satellite configuration is not accounted for, leading to potential catastrophic delays. Adding TCAS or ADSB functionality will allow safer 

passage through host-nation and US NAS as well as make deconflicting 

strike assets in a target area easier. RPA would also be able to separate 

from other RPA easier without the need for additional software or attempting to coordinate and deconflict through the use of secure chat.

Including TCAS or a similar deconfliction system would require further bandwidth allocated to the new part of the system as well as additional changes to the GCS. A lengthy training process is required to incorporate an accurate and timely presentation to avoid collision with 

other aircraft into normal operating procedures for MQ-9 crews. Feasibility studies for current GCS configurations may be warranted, but implementation should be a priority to allow MQ-9 flight in US NAS as well 

as in ICAO compliant airspace. 

Recommendation 4: Equip MQ-9 with UAI Weapons Interface

To correct the limited armament capability of the MQ-9, the UAI architecture should be incorporated as soon as possible into the MQ-9 software. As mentioned, the current weapons update cycle requires an overall system software update which includes hard-coded weapons files to 

allow the MQ-9 to interact with the weapons. Adding the UAI to current 

and future software upgrades to the system will allow for more weapons 

choices by both the crews and the supported unit to meet mission needs. 

With the addition of the UAI comes the need for an interchangeable rail 

system on the hard points. Changing mission needs and weapons requirements, coupled with 20-hour missions, necessitates the ability to 

quickly change out weapon types from under the wings of the MQ-9. 

Universal launch rail fittings that can accept a variety of missiles or 

bombs and could be changed during an aircraft’s down time would revolutionize the concept of weapons-on-demand. The present systems development cycle does not allow for rapid adaptation of new weaponry 

without extensive, multiyear testing and procurement cycles. Despite the 

intentions listed in the RPA vision and vectoring document through 

2038, current dynamic target sets and missions must be accounted for 

faster than typical development. The USAF headquarters has acknowl02-article.indd 23 9/25/2017 2:00
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edged it plans to implement the program. It is being developed concurrently for all major weapons systems, so there is no reason to delay implementing UAI on MQ-9s.

Recommendation 5: Add Ability to Weaponize All Seven Hard Points 

of MQ-9

Current SCLs only place weapons on four of the seven hard points 

depicted in the TO, but each has been rated to carry at least an equivalent 

payload as the Hellfire single-missile rail.61 Plans to place an external fuel 

tank on one of the inboard stations notwithstanding, there are five remaining stations that could easily be converted to carry a number of different munitions capable of interacting with the universal launch interface. MQ-9s could truly be AFSOC’s most versatile strike platforms with 

many precision weapons to ensure the safety of SOF teams and the disruption of enemy terrorist networks in multiple situations. Weaponizing 

the remaining stations—specifically one, four, and seven—will require a 

change in the procedures for exchanging weapons racks and missile rails. 

A new system of plug-and-play rails or racks would negate the need for 

heavy maintenance and limit aircraft down time between sorties should 

the mission require a different set of munitions quickly.

The addition of munitions pylons on stations one and seven could increase wing drag significantly. Flight profiles for airworthiness would determine the on-station loiter impacts of the additional weapons pylons. 

Given the weight limitations cited previously—150 lbs. on the outer stations—the size of the munitions should limit the performance reductions 

of the aircraft’s loiter time, but further studies are required.

Recommendation 6: Place RPA LNOs with SOF Units prior to Commencing Operations

Each SOF team that deploys to an AOR understands what to expect 

from each aircraft that will support them, but treat RPA differently. Educating SOF teams and their parent commands before they deploy will 

increase in-theater effectiveness immensely, starting from the instant operations commence. To that end, RPA LNOs should be embedded with 

the SOF component of each service year round. These LNOs would facilitate training and form the habitual relationships that are crucial to 

SOF success. The LNOs would provide the most up-to-date capabilities 

and training RPA systems and crews have while developing TTPs for 

mission execution in whatever environment the SOF unit is operating in. 

The LNOs would be a permanent presence in the SOF ground communi02-article.indd 24 9/25/2017 2:00
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ties, working hand-in-hand with other Air Force assets to ensure the SOF 

teams know how to use RPA effectively.

The current limitation to implementing LNOs with each SOF unit in 

all DOD branches is the current manning shortage faced by the RPA 

community. The Air Force chief of staff has outlined plans to improve 

RPA pilot retention and manning, but until the effectiveness of the initiatives is realized, there are limited personnel who are able to fill LNO billets.62 The implementation of LNOs should be executed as manning increases as soon as able.

Scenario: Implemented Solutions

Prior to Operation Threatening Viper, the SOF MQ-9 LNO worked closely with 

the SOF unit command staff and team leaders throughout their training and operational spin-up. The team leaders and command staff became intimately familiar 

with established MQ-9 TTPs for target prosecution and communications prior to, 

during, and after a raid has been conducted as well as kinetic employment of the 

varied weapon sets available. The SOF teams were able to train multiple times with 

MQ-9 crews in different locations to simulate different environments and conditions around the US NAS. MQ-9s, having been equipped with multiple radios, 

were able to effectively communicate to ATC, other aircraft, and the ground teams 

efficiently while avoiding civilian and other military traffic through the use of 

TCAS.

When the order to execute Operation Threatening Viper was issued by USSOCOM 

headquarters, the SOF unit and their MQ-9 support were ready. The MQ-9 was 

quickly allowed into the country by demonstrating technical proficiency and ability to comply with ICAO and host-nation aviation procedures, allaying safety concerns. The SOF team was then able to analyze the target HVI’s pattern of life, determine the best weapons to support the raid to capture the individual, and quickly 

modify the load-out of the MQ-9 assigned to match mission needs. The extra 

weapons on station one and seven proved vital to halting the advance of enemy 

fighters on the SOF team’s position, providing enough time to capture the HVI or 

to vacate the hostile area. The MQ-9 still had enough weapons to employ kinetically on the HVI should the decision be made to kill rather than capture.

Notes

Notes will appear in full form only in their first iteration. Thereafter, they will appear in 

shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.

1. Jim Garamone, “Military Uses Remotely Piloted Aircraft Ethically,” American Forces 

Press Service, 22 May 2014, accessed 7 February 2015, http://www.defense.gov/news/news

article.aspx?id=122308. 

2. Kevin Auger, Understanding Remotely Piloted Aircraft (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 

Command and Staff College, June 2012), 7–9.

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3. Dan Lamothe, “Capture of Benghazi Suspect Thrusts U.S. Special Operations in Africa 

into Spotlight Again,” Washington Post, 17 June 2014, accessed 16 February 2015, https://

www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/06/17/capture-of-benghazi-sus

pect-thrusts-u-s-special-operations-in-africa-into-spotlight-again/.

4. Mitch Ferry, “F3EA – A Targeting Paradigm for Contemporary Warfare,” Australian 

Army Journal X, no. 1 (30 May 2013): 52. 

5. Air Force Technical Order (TO) 1Q-9(M) A-1, Flight Manual, USAF Series MQ-9 

Aircraft, change 1, 2 May 2014, 1-207.

6. Ibid., 1-208.

7. Ibid. Guard is a reserved emergency frequency that all aircraft and controllers are 

supposed to monitor or communicate on should normal channels or frequencies fail. 

8. Ibid., 1-210.

9. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation, Code of 

Federal Regulations Title 14: Aeronautics and Space, vol. 2, chap. 1, subchap. F. Pt 91, 

“General Operating and Flight Rules,” 2016, 699.

10. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Annex 2 to the Convention on 

International Civil Aviation, “Rules of the Air” (Montréal, Quebec: ICAO, July 2015). 

11. FAA, “Introduction to TCAS II,” ver. 7.1, 28 February 2011, 5.

12. Ibid., 5.

13. ICAO, ADS-B Implementation and Operations Guidance Document, 7th ed. 

(Montréal: ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, September 2014), https://www.icao.int/APAC

/Documents/edocs/cns/ADSB_AIGD7.pdf.

14. TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 1-94.

15. Ibid., 1-94.

16. FAA, “General Operating and Flight Rules,”834.

17. FAA, “Press Release—FAA Releases Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration 

Roadmap,” 7 November 2013, accessed 18 September 2015, https://www.faa.gov/news

/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=15334.

18. Air Force Technical Order (TO) 1Q-9(M)A-34-1-1, Technical Manual, USAF Series 

MQ-9 Aircraft Nonnuclear Munitions Delivery Manual, change 1, 2 May 2014, 1-3.

19. Ibid. 

20. Ibid., 1-188–1-191.

21. Ibid., 1-192.

22. “Griffin Missile System,” fact sheet, Raytheon, accessed 7 September 2015, http://

www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/griffin.

23. “Small Diameter Bomb II (SBD II),” fact sheet, Raytheon, accessed 7 September 

2015, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/sdbii/.

24. Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L Cantrell, “Employing ISR: SOF Best 

Practices,” Joint Force Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2008): 56–61.

25. Gregory Ball, “OPERATION EAGLE CLAW,” fact sheet, US Air Force, 8 October 

2015, accessed 9 October 2015, http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id

=19809.

26. Ibid.

27. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014, I-3–I-4.

28. RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts 2013–2038 (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, US Air Force, 17 February 2014), 11.

29. Air Force Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.59, Multi-Service 

Technique Tactics and Procedures (MTTP) for Kill Box Planning and Employment, April 

2014, 6.

30. TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 1-210.

02-article.indd 26 9/25/2017 2:00
27

31. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2MQ-1&9, vol. 3, MQ-1 and MQ-9—Operations 

Procedures, 1 November 2012, 11.

32. Ibid.

33. Karen DeYoung, Adam Goldman, and Julie Tate, “U.S. Captured Benghazi Suspect 

in Secret Raid,” Washington Post, 17 June 2014, accessed 27 August 2015, https://www.wash

ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-captured-benghazi-suspect-in-secret-raid

/2014/06/17/7ef8746e-f5cf-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html.

34. Jefferey Brown, “Mock MQ-9 Cockpit Featured at 174th Fighter Wing Display at 

New York State Fair,” Hancock Field Air National Guard Base press release, 26 August 2012, 

accessed 18 February 2015, http://www.hancockfield.ang.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=1233

15543.

35. TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 8-39.

36. FAA, Instrument Procedures Handbook, FAA-H-8083-16A. FAA Flight Standards 

Service, September 2015, 6–9.

37. TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 9-223.

38. TO 1Q-9(M)A-34-1-1, Munitions Delivery Manual, 1-3.

39. Ibid., 1-189–1-194.

40. Ibid., 1-4.

41. Ibid.

42. Richard Sisk, “ISIS Captures Hundreds of US Vehicles and Tanks in Ramadi from 

Iraqis,” Military.com, 20 May 2015, accessed 18 September 2015, http://www.military.com

/daily-news/2015/05/20/isis-captures-hundreds-of-us-vehicles-and-tanks-in-rama

di-from-i.html.

43. TO 1Q-9(M)A-34-1-1, Munitions Delivery Manual, 1-190.

44. USAF, “RPA Vector,” 36.

45. Ibid.

46. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, III-23.

47. Ibid.

48. TO 1Q-9(M)A-34-1-1, Munitions Delivery Manual, 1-3.

49. TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 5-8.

50. Ibid.

51. “USAF Weapons School,” fact sheet, US Air Force, July 2015, http://www.nellis

.af.mil/About/FactSheets/Display/tabid/6485/Article/284156/united-states-air-force-wea

pons-school.aspx.

52. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, I-1.

53. JP 3-05, Special Operations, I-2.

54. Ibid., I-5.

55. Ibid., IV-12.

56. Ibid., I-3 to I-4.

57. US Army Special Forces, “SOF Truths,” http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/SOFTruths

.html.

58. AFI 11-2MQ-1&9, Operations Procedures, 11.

59. TO 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 9-218.

60. ICAO, “Rules of the Air.”

61. TO 1Q-9(M)A-34-1-1, Munitions Delivery Manual, 1-3.

62. “AF Rolls out Details to Improve RPA Mission,” US Air Force press release, 15 July 

2015, accessed 10 October 2015, http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article

/608716/af-rolls-out-details-to-improve-rpa-mission.aspx.

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29

Abbreviations

ACP airspace control plan 

ADSB Airborne Digital Surveillance Broadcast 

AFI Air Force instruction

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AGM air-to-ground missile

AOR area of responsibility 

AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ATO air tasking order 

CGRS Common Grid Reference System

CONUS continental United States 

DOD Department of Defense

DTED digital terrain elevation data 

F2T2EA find, fix, target, track, engage, assess 

F3EA find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FMS flight management system 

FOB forward operating base

GCS ground control station 

GFC ground force commander 

GPS global positioning system 

HVI high-value individual

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 

IMC instrument meteorological conditions

INS inertial navigation system 

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISR information, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JP Joint Publication

lb. pound

LNO liaison officer

LRE launch and recovery element

MCE mission control element 

03-abb.indd 29 9/25/2017 2:01
30

mIRC tactical Internet relay chat 

NAS national air space

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OIR Operation Inherent Resolve

POI points of interest

POL patterns of life 

ROZ restricted operating zone

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SMS stores management system

SOF special operations forces

TCAS traffic alert and collision avoidance system

TO Technical Order 

TTP techniques, tactics, and procedures

UAI Universal Armament Interface

USSOCOM US Special Operations Command 

VMC visual meteorological conditions

03-abb.indd 30 9/25/2017 2:01
31

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