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S. HRG. 114–741 

RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF BORDERS, 

TREATIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 7, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 2 

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. ............................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria Nuland by 

Senator Cardin .............................................................................................. 47 

Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria Nuland by 

Senator Isakson ............................................................................................. 50 

Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria Nuland by 

Senator Boxer ................................................................................................ 51 

Answers to questions for the record submitted to Victoria Nuland by 

Senator Perdue .............................................................................................. 53 

Carpenter, Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Russia, Ukraine, 

and Eurasia, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC. .......................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Satter, David, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. ..................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Kara–Murza, Vladimir, National Coordinator, Open Russia Movement, Russian Federation ..................................................................................................... 36 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF BORDERS, 

TREATIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Johnson, 

Gardner, Perdue, Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, 

Murphy, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to 

order. 

We thank our witnesses for being here, and look forward to their 

testimony. 

We are obviously here today to talk about Russia and its role in 

the world. Together, our countries have conquered the Nazis, prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1990s, and 

worked against terrorists in the years after 9/11. Yet, for most of 

modern history, Americans and Russians have found themselves at 

cross-purposes. Throughout the Cold War, we trained to obliterate 

each other. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, many politicians argued that the difficult days of confrontation were behind us. 

Leaders like Gorbachev and Yeltsin worked to place Russia on a 

path towards democracy and peaceful engagement with the rest of 

the world. Reagan asked for the walls to be torn down, George W. 

Bush had Putin come to his home in Texas, and Obama sought to 

reset the relationship in a way that prioritized communication and 

cooperation. 

Scholars will long argue over exactly when the U.S./Russia relationship again became confrontational, but looking back, the Russia-Georgia war in August of 2008 seems to mark the beginning of 

a new age. Since that summer, a so-called resurgent Russia has 

pushed back on the institutions and allies of the West. Russia has 

invaded Georgia and Ukraine, striking them in ways designed to 

prevent their integration into the European Union and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Russia has acted contrary to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Incidents at Sea 

Agreement. Russia has altered the human rights landscape within 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

2 

its own country, decreasing democracy and begging questions about 

the future of governance, not just in Moscow, but across the Federation. Moreover, Russia has joined the civil war in Syria and 

begun militarizing the Arctic. 

Now when we talk about the U.S./Russia relationship and the 

ways that we interact globally, the days following the end of the 

Cold War seem very far away as the relationship has once again 

grown distrustful and confrontational. As we meet today to talk 

about the role that Russia has come to play in the last several 

years, we must address these topics through the lens of realism. It 

would be easy to simply catalog the events that have brought us 

to where we are today, but we are charged with a higher responsibility, which is not only to diagnose the problem, but to begin generating prescriptions for where we go next. Discussions about the 

violations of norms must be paired with conversations about ways 

of effectively setting boundaries and engaging with Russia in order 

to make our world more stable and ultimately to serve U.S. national interests. Our countries are too powerful and the interplay 

between us too important to resign ourselves to the increasing escalation and risk of confrontation. 

I look forward to hearing today how we can recognize the new 

realities of the U.S./Russia relationship and implement a new 

strategy that puts us on a better trajectory. 

And, with that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member, 

Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Chairman Corker, first let me thank you 

for calling this hearing, and let me concur in all of your comments 

in your opening statement. I totally agree with the points that you 

raised and the challenges we have in regards to our relationship 

with Russia. 

Today we meet to discuss Russia’s efforts to undermine institutions that have maintained peace and security in Europe since the 

end of the Cold War. Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008, support 

for separationist enclaves in Georgia and Moldova, invasion of 

Ukraine, illegal annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing support for 

the combined Russian separationist forces in eastern Ukraine have 

challenged the security of sovereign borders, something that has 

been a mainstream of relations in Europe since the signing of the 

Helsinki Accord in 1975. And we have serious concerns about Russia’s compliance with seminal arms control treaties. While I understand that Russia complies with treaties like New START, it is in 

violation of others, like the INF and there are compliance issues 

with the Open Skies Treaty. I am concerned about these violations 

and look forward to hearing how we can strengthen our ability to 

verify and enforce their terms. There are legitimate questions 

about the value of such accords as Russia wantonly disregards its 

international commitments. This should not lead us to the conclusion that all arms-control agreements should be ripped up. While 

not perfect, these agreements afford us some visibility into Russia’s 

intentions. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

I also want to underscore the importance of these treaties to our 

allies, especially Open Skies. As we seek to bolster European unity 

in the face of Russian aggression, I believe that pulling out of Open 

Skies would send the wrong message to our friends. 

What is often lost in the debate about Russia’s negative behavior 

abroad is how it treats its own people at home. Last year’s horrific 

murder of Boris Nemtsov, just steps from the Kremlin, is the most 

sobering example of the danger facing the opposition. Today, we 

are honored to be joined by Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent 

member of the political opposition, who was poisoned in Moscow 

under suspicious circumstances and spent months in a coma. 

Vladimir, thank you for your courage and all that you do for the 

people of the Russian Federation. 

New laws targeting foreign agents in undesirable organizations 

which label NGOs as traitors of the Russian state have impeded 

the work of NDI, OSF, and the MacArthur Foundation. Putin has 

fueled corruption by weakening the rule of law, and his associates 

know that their fortunes depend on access and allegiance to the regime. And those who make public these corrupt acts are threatened, abused, or even worse. Sergei Magnitsky was one of them, 

and he paid the ultimate price for his honesty. As everyone here 

knows, the Magnitsky law targets human rights abusers inside 

Russia. While 40 people have been sanctioned since 2012, I call on 

the administration to hold accountable more human rights abusers 

in the country. 

As human rights violations increase, so should our response. In 

summary, Russia under Putin is a kleptocratic regime intent on 

undermining democracy at home and abroad. Yes, we will have 

shared interests with the Russian regime, and we need to pursue 

them, but we can never forget our principles and turn a blind eye 

to human rights violations committed by the Putin regime. 

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for convening this hearing. I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. 

We do appreciate our witnesses being here. I do not think we 

have had as many people outside trying to get in the building in 

quite a while, so it is obviously something people care about. 

And we thank The Honorable Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 

for being here. We look forward to your testimony. And Dr. Michael 

Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, 

Ukraine, and Eurasia. You all have been here before. You know 

you can summarize your testimony in about 5 minutes. We have 

read your written testimony in advance, and we look forward to the 

questions that follow. 

But, if you would start, Tory, that would be great. 

STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member 

Cardin, members of this committee, for the opportunity to join you 

and discuss the challenges posed to international peace and secuFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

4 

rity by Russia today and the administration’s policy towards Moscow. 

As you all know, for more than 20 years following the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, the United States has sought to build a constructive relationship with Russia and to support that country’s 

greater integration into regional and global institutions and the 

rules-based international order. Our working assumption in doing 

this was that a more integrated, democratic, secure, and prosperous Russia would be a safer, more predictable and willing partner for the United States and our allies. 

By 2014, however, we had no choice but to reevaluate our assumptions, following Russia’s invasion of sovereign Ukrainian territory, first in Crimea and then in eastern Ukraine, which shattered 

any remaining illusions about this Kremlin’s willingness to abide 

by international law or live by the rules of the institutions that 

Russia joined at the end of the Cold War. 

Our approach to Russia today seeks, first, to deter further aggression through the projection of strength and unity with our allies; second, to build resilience and reduce vulnerability among 

friends and allies that are facing Russian pressure and coercion; 

third, to cooperate on core security priorities when our interests 

and Russia’s do align; and, fourth, to sustain ties to the Russian 

people to preserve the potential for a more constructive relationship in the future. Let me go through these. 

First, strength and deterrence. To counter the threat posed by 

Russian aggression and deter any military moves against NATO 

territory, over the past 2 years the United States and our NATO 

allies have maintained a persistent rotational military presence on 

land, sea, and air all along NATO’s eastern edge: the Baltic states, 

Poland, Romania, Bulgaria. As we look towards the NATO Summit 

in Warsaw this coming July, allies will institutionalize a more sustained approach to deterrence, including by enhancing forward 

presence in the East to reduce response times to any aggression. 

To support this commitment, the President has requested $3.4 billion to fund the European Reassurance Initiative. With your support, these funds will be used to deploy an additional rotational armored brigade combat team to Central and Eastern Europe, and 

for pre-positioning of combat equipment as well as additional trainers and exercises in Europe. Dr. Carpenter will talk about this in 

detail. 

To press Moscow to bring an end to the violence in Ukraine and 

fully implement its commitments under the Minsk Agreements, we 

have worked with the EU, the G7, and other like-minded nations 

to impose successive rounds of tough economic sanctions on Russia 

over the past 2 years, and we are now working intensively with Europe to ensure that EU sanctions are rolled over at the end of this 

month and to support France and Germany in their lead diplomatic 

role to push for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 

including the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukraine and 

the return of Ukraine’s sovereign border. 

Next, resilience of partners. Even as we defend NATO territory, 

we are also working to reduce the vulnerabilities and increase the 

resilience of those countries across Europe that face pressure from 

Moscow. To help Ukraine, the United States has committed over 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

$600 million in security assistance, we have trained 1700 Ukrainian conventional forces and National Guard personnel, we have 

provided counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars, over 3,000 

secure radios, and a number of other pieces of equipment to help 

Ukrainian troops successfully resist further advances and to save 

lives. 

To continue our work across Europe and Eurasia to strengthen 

democratic institutions, reform economies, fight corruption, and 

build the resilience of our partners, we have requested $787 million 

in FY17 focusing on our priorities on those countries that are most 

vulnerable to Russian pressure. Our programs and advisors focus 

on improving governance, squeezing out graft and fraud, strengthening justice systems, improving election standards, hardening border security and homeland defenses, and building energy independence to make countries more resilient and stronger in the face of 

pressure. We are also deepening intelligence cooperation across Europe and Eurasia to detect and blunt Russia’s covert and overt efforts to manipulate the internal politics of European countries. 

Even as we push back against Russian aggression and support 

neighbors that are under pressure, the United States will continue 

to look for areas where our interests and Moscow’s align. We have 

worked with Russia, for example, to remove Syria’s declared chemical weapons, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, to 

contain the nuclear threat emanating from the DPRK, and to negotiate and implement the New START Treaty. As you all know, over 

the past 8 months, Secretary Kerry has led multilateral efforts to 

try to resolve the crisis in Syria, establishing the International 

Syria Support Group and forging a critical agreement on a cessation of hostilities, which has reduced violence even as that agreement is tested every single day. These efforts have all required 

hardheaded diplomacy with Russia, and we continue to call on the 

Kremlin to bring its influence to bear on the Assad regime to prevent civilian casualties and to end barrel-bombing and the regime’s 

obstruction of humanitarian aid deliveries to the besieged communities. 

Finally, we must continue to engage directly with those Russian 

individuals, businesses, and organizations who want to work with 

us, who share our interests and values, and who are working for 

a better future for their country. Despite Moscow’s crackdown on 

civil society and a free press, our exchange programs and our scientific cooperation remain hugely popular with the Russian people. 

We will also continue to speak out against laws and policies that 

impede the work of Russian civil society and contravene the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association 

in Russia and elsewhere in the region. 

The approach that I have just outlined is not without challenges 

and contradictions. I will not claim that it has yet brought an end 

to Russian aggression in Ukraine or Moscow’s unmitigated support 

for the Assad regime or its violations of treaties and global norms. 

However, I am convinced that U.S. and allied unity regarding Russia over the last 2 years has been essential to deterring even worse 

behavior, to protecting our own security, and to bringing the Kremlin to the table on critical issues, from Ukraine to Iran to Syria. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

Thank you very much for your attention. I would turn to Dr. 

Carpenter. 

[Ms. Nuland’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTORIA NULAND

Thank you Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of this committee for the opportunity to join you and discuss the challenges posed to international peace and security by Russia today, and the administration’s policy toward 

Moscow. 

As this committee knows, for more than 20 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, across multiple administrations led by both political parties, the United 

States sought to build a constructive relationship with Russia, and to support that 

country’s greater integration into regional and global institutions and the rulesbased international order. Our working assumption was that a more integrated, 

democratic, secure, and prosperous Russia would be a safer, more predictable and 

willing partner for the United States and our Allies in pursuing shared regional and 

global goals. 

We had some success and some challenges with this approach, which I won’t 

recap here. 

By 2014, however, we had no choice but to reevaluate our assumptions following 

Russia’s invasion of sovereign Ukrainian territory—first in Crimea, then in eastern 

Ukraine—which shattered any remaining illusions about this Kremlin’s willingness 

to abide by international law or live by the rules of the institutions that Russia 

joined at the end of the Cold War. 

Our approach to Russia today seeks first to deter further aggression through the 

projection of strength and unity with our Allies; second, to build resilience and reduce vulnerability among friends and Allies facing Russian pressure and coercion; 

third, to cooperate on core national security priorities when our interests and Russia’s do align; and fourth, to sustain ties to the Russian people and business community to preserve the potential for a more constructive relationship in the future. 

STRENGTH AND DETERRENCE

To counter the threat posed by Russia’s aggression and deter any military moves 

against NATO territory, over the past 2 years the United States and our NATO Allies have maintained a persistent, rotational military presence on land, sea, and air 

all along NATO’s eastern edge—in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the three Baltic 

States. All 28 Allies have participated, and the U.S. has used the $985 million in 

FY 2015 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funding that Congress generously 

appropriated to increase the number of exercises, training sessions, and patrols that 

we are supporting throughout Europe. This month, over 30,000 U.S., NATO and 

partner nation troops will exercise together as a part of a series of military training 

events, including the Polish-led ANAKONDA exercise. 

As we look toward the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July, Allies will institutionalize a more sustained approach to deterrence, including by enhancing forward 

presence in the East to reduce response times to any aggression. To support this 

commitment, the President has requested $3.4 billion to fund the European Reassurance Initiative. With your support, these funds will be used to deploy an additional rotational Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to Central and Eastern 

Europe; the prepositioning of combat equipment; as well as additional trainings and 

exercises in Europe. 

We also expect significant contributions from all other Allies to improve NATO’s 

readiness, responsiveness, and interoperability. The threats we face today demand 

that all Allies meet the pledges they made at the last NATO Summit in Wales to 

reverse the slide in defense budgets, and commit to spending at least two percent 

of GDP on defense. Seventy percent of Allies are already on track, but all NATO 

members must do their part. 

And, we must make investments that align with future threats. Russia’s own investments in hybrid tactics, electronic and cyber capabilities, disinformation, and 

violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty illustrate where we 

need to respond. 

We are also pushing our Allies and partners to prioritize investment in their own 

homeland and cyber security and encouraging increased information sharing to protect against internal and external threats. 

To press Moscow to bring an end to the violence in Ukraine and fully implement 

its commitments under the Minsk agreements, we have worked with the EU, the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

G7 and other like-minded nations to impose successive rounds of tough, economic 

sanctions on Russia over the past two years. 

These sanctions, combined with low oil prices and Russia’s continued structural 

weaknesses, have imposed significant costs. While Moscow has not yet changed its 

approach to Ukraine, our readiness to toughen sanctions even further has likely 

played a role in deterring further Russian efforts to grab Ukrainian territory. We 

are now working intensively with Europe to ensure EU sanctions are rolled over at 

the end of this month, and to support France and Germany in their lead diplomatic 

role to push for full implementation of the Minsk agreements. 

RESILIENCE OF PARTNERS

As we defend NATO territory, we are also working to reduce vulnerabilities and 

increase the resilience of countries across Europe that face pressure from Moscow. 

This effort is a part of our firm and deep commitment that countries must be able 

to choose their own futures. 

To help Ukraine better monitor and secure its borders, deploy its forces more safely and effectively, and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the United 

States has committed over $600 million in security assistance. We have trained over 

1,700 Ukrainian conventional forces and National Guard personnel and 120 Special 

Operations Forces (SOF). We have provided counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars, over 3000 secure radios, 130 Humvees, over 100 armored civilian SUVs, and 

thousands of medical kits to help Ukrainian troops successfully resist advances and 

save lives. 

To strengthen democratic institutions, reform economies, fight corruption, and 

build the resilience of partners, we have requested $787 million in funding for Europe and Eurasia, including to those countries most vulnerable to Russian pressure, 

especially Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans. Our programs and 

advisors focus on improving governance, squeezing out graft and fraud, strengthening justice systems, improving election standards, hardening border security and 

homeland defense, and building energy independence. In Georgia, Moldova, and 

Ukraine, our assistance is reorienting economies away from excessive dependence 

on Russia and toward growth-spurring markets in Central and Western Europe. In 

the Balkans, we have also increased our focus this year on countering violent extremism. And we’re deepening intelligence cooperation across Europe and Eurasia to 

detect and blunt Russia’s covert and overt efforts to manipulate internal politics. 

Energy diversification also continues to be a key component of our strategy, and 

we have seen progress on this front across Europe. Ukraine has now broken its dependence on Russian gas, ended costly household energy subsidies, and is making 

real strides in introducing full market standards across the sector. In the Baltics 

and Central Europe, critical projects and actions have reduced energy vulnerability, 

including the opening of Lithuania’s and Poland’s new LNG terminals, and the construction of electricity grid connections between the Baltic countries and their EU 

partners. 

We appreciate the attention so many members of this committee have paid to 

these issues, your visits to countries under threat, and your energy security advocacy, including for the completion of projects like the Southern Gas Corridor and 

against schemes like Nord Stream II that will increase Europe’s dependence on single energy sources. 

COOPERATION ON SHARED INTERESTS

Even as we push back against Russian aggression and support neighbors under 

pressure, the United States will continue to look for areas where our interests and 

Moscow’s align, and we can work together to tackle global challenges, including nonproliferation, nuclear and other WMD security, preventing atrocities and humanitarian crises, and combating violent extremism and terrorism. 

We have worked with Russia to remove Syria’s declared chemical weapons, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, to contain the nuclear threat emanating 

from the DPRK, and to negotiate and implement the New START Treaty. 

For the past eight months, Secretary Kerry has led multilateral efforts to resolve 

the crisis in Syria, establishing the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), and 

forging a critical agreement on a cessation of hostilities, which has reduced violence, 

even as that agreement is tested daily. 

These efforts require hard-headed diplomacy with Russia. While working in the 

ISSG for a political settlement, we continue to call on the Kremlin to bring its influence to bear on the Asad regime to prevent unnecessary civilian casualties and suffering, and to end barrel bombing and the regime’s obstruction of aid deliveries to 

besieged communities. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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ENGAGING WITH RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Finally, we must continue to foster direct engagement with those Russian businesses, organizations, and individuals who want to work with us, who share our interests and values and are working for a better future for their country. Despite 

Moscow’s crackdown on civil society, a free press, exchanges with the West, and political pluralism, our people-to-people exchanges; health, environment and cultural 

programs; and educational opportunities for Russians remain hugely popular, and 

continue to promote constructive ties between our countries. And we will continue 

to speak out against laws and policies that impede the work of Russian civil society 

and contravene the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association in Russia and elsewhere in the region. 

The approach to Russia that I have outlined is not without its challenges and internal contradictions. And I will not claim that it has yet brought an end to Russian 

aggression in Ukraine, its unmitigated support for Asad in Syria, or its violations 

of treaties and global norms. However, I am convinced that U.S-Allied unity has 

been essential to deterring worse behavior, protecting our own security, and bringing the Kremlin to the table on critical issues from Ukraine, to Iran, and Syria. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of this committee, thank you 

for your careful attention to the challenges that today’s Russia poses. My colleague 

and friend from the Defense Department, Dr. Michael Carpenter, will give you further detail on DoD’s efforts to mitigate the threats we face. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Carpenter. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CARPENTER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EURASIA, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and 

members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to update 

you on the Department of Defense’s strong and balanced approach 

to deterring Russian aggression, defending the homeland and our 

treaty allies, and strengthening the resilience of our allies and 

partners to Russian coercion and intimidation. 

Russia’s interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 

have demonstrated a blatant disregard for its international commitments, including the most basic principles of the international 

order, including sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the 

inviability of borders. 

In Syria, Russia has intervened militarily to prop up a murderous dictator, allying itself with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling 

raises troubling questions about Russian leaders’ commitments to 

strategic stability and to norms against the threat of use of nuclear 

weapons. 

With regards to arms-control commitments, Russia’s record has 

been mixed. It has violated those agreements that pose impediments to its military modernization plans, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty. However, it has honored others, such as the New 

START Treaty, which limits Russian and U.S. deployed strategic 

nuclear weapons to historical low levels. 

Thanks to a robust military modernization program, Russia 

seeks to be a qualitative, if not quantitative, peer to the United 

States across the land, sea, and air and space domains, as well as 

in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. 

Our approach to countering Russian coercion and aggression involves coordinating efforts across the force to strengthen our capaFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

9 

bilities, posture, investments, and plans. We aim to do this without 

foreclosing the possibility of working with Russia, when it is in our 

interest. 

The most critical element of this approach is ensuring effective 

deterrence to support our most vital mission, defense of the homeland, which is reflected in the President’s $583 billion FY 2017 

budget request. We are modernizing our nuclear forces. This recapitalization program includes a new long-range strategic bomber, 

ballistic-missile submarine, an air-launched cruise missile, as well 

as the Life Extension Program for the B61 gravity bomb. 

We are also moving forward the development of new technologies 

to ensure we maintain a qualitative military edge over potential 

high-end adversaries. These include new unmanned systems, enhanced ground-based air and missile defenses, new long-range antiship weapons, and innovative technologies, like the electromagnetic 

rail gun, lasers, and new systems for electronic warfare, space, and 

cyberspace. 

We will also continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships. I thank Congress for its continued support for the European 

Reassurance Initiative (ERI). As Assistant Secretary Nuland has 

mentioned, since its inception in 2014, ERI has enabled the Department of Defense to strengthen our deterrence and assurance 

missions in Europe. The President’s FY 2017 budget proposes 

quadrupling funding for ERI to more than $3.4 billion, which will 

allow us to increase our force posture in Europe by augmenting two 

permanently stationed Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with a third 

rotational armored BCT as well as a fourth BCT worth of pre-positioned warfighting equipment. 

With our non-NATO partners, our goal is to improve their capabilities and capacity to deal with conventional and unconventional 

threats. In Ukraine, we have provided over $600 million to enhance 

security since the start of the crisis. Our support has consisted of 

training programs to enhance Ukraine’s internal defense capabilities, equipment to support the operational needs of its security 

forces, and advisors to advance the implementation of key defense 

reforms. So far, we have trained six companies from Ukraine’s National Guard and are in the process of training five Land-Forces 

battalions and one Special Operations battalion. While the scale of 

our assistance to Ukraine is unique, we are engaged in similar capacity-building efforts with other non-NATO partners, such as 

Georgia and Moldova. 

As Secretary Carter has underscored, the Department’s policy towards Russia is predicated on a strategic approach that is both 

strong and balanced, leaving the door open to Russia to return to 

compliance with international norms and to constructive engagement with the international community. In the meantime, in concert with our allies and partners, we will continue countering Russian coercion and aggression with a posture that is defensive and 

proportional. In spite of Russia’s actions, we will also continue to 

advance our strategic vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Dr. Carpenter’s prepared statement follows:] 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. CARPENTER

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to update you on the Department of Defense’s strong and 

balanced approach to deterring Russian aggression, defending the homeland and our 

treaty allies, and strengthening the resilience of our allies and partners to Russian 

coercion and intimidation. 

Today’s Russia is increasingly revanchist abroad and repressive at home. It has 

demonstrated a blatant disregard for its international obligations and commitments, 

both to other countries and to its own citizens. Outside its borders, Russia has acted 

aggressively in violation of the most basic principles of the global order—sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within internationally recognized 

borders—to seek what Kremlin leaders call a ‘‘sphere of privileged interests’’ along 

Russia’s periphery. In Syria, Russia has intervened militarily to prop up a murderous dictator, allying itself with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hizballah to prolong a bloody conflict that has gone on far too long. Russia’s 

nuclear sabre rattling raises troubling questions about Russian leaders’ commitments to strategic stability, their respect for norms against the threat of use of nuclear weapons, and whether they respect the profound caution that nuclear-age 

leaders have shown with regard to the brandishing of nuclear weapons. This behavior is irresponsible and dangerous. Nuclear threats will neither intimidate NATO 

nor make Russia a more influential and respected player on the world stage. 

With regard to arms control agreements, Russia’s record has been mixed: it has 

violated those agreements that pose impediments to its military modernization 

plans, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty or the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, it has honored others, such as the 

New START Treaty, which limits Russian and U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons to historically low levels. 

Across the board, Russia’s aggressive actions and flouting of international norms 

have been enabled by a military modernization campaign that has benefitted from 

windfall hydrocarbon revenues over the last 15 years, as well as from significant 

internal restructuring, reform, and technological advances. Russia seeks to be a 

qualitative, if not quantitative, peer to the United States across the land, sea, air, 

and space domains, as well as in cyberspace and the lectromagnetic spectrum. Russia is also projecting power in all directions: in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, the 

Arctic, and the Middle East. 

Moscow’s military modernization has resulted in the development of new capabilities that must be factored into U.S. plans, strategies, and our own capability development. Moscow’s increasing willingness to use its military power for aggressive 

purposes requires reorienting the Department to counter the challenges posed by a 

revanchist Russia. 

RUSSIA’S DISREGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its military intervention in Ukraine beginning in 2014 have not only threatened European security, but also violated the 

bedrock principles of the international order enshrined in such foundational documents as the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Charter of 

Paris for a New Europe. Russia has likewise shown a brazen disregard for its own 

political commitments, such as the 2008 ceasefire between Russia and Georgia or 

the February 2015 Minsk agreement. More than a year since the Minsk agreement 

was signed, Russia still has not fulfilled the first three commitments listed in that 

document: ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons from proscribed zones, and 

unhindered access for OSCE monitors to the entire territory of the Donbas. 

Russia’s disregard for basic global norms, international legal obligations, and its 

own political commitments pose a challenge to the future of arms control and confidence building in Europe. In 2007, Moscow unilaterally ceased implementing the 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, effectively withdrawing from 

the only legally-binding conventional arms limitation agreement in Europe. While 

Russia is currently in compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty, 

it is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) by producing 

and flight testing a ground launched cruise missile with a range between 500 and 

5,500 kilometers. 

We also have concerns about Russia’s implementation of other agreements, such 

as the Open Skies Treaty, since Russia has placed restrictions on observation missions over its territory—to include the region of Kaliningrad, which borders two of 

our NATO Allies—that are not permitted under the treaty. 

Finally, Russia has undermined confidence and transparency-building measures 

by increasing the number of large-scale snap exercises on its territory, which are 

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exempt from reporting under the Vienna Document on transparency of military activities within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

Russia’s dangerous and unprofessional intercepts of U.S. aircraft and ships in the 

Baltic and Black Seas further undermine confidence and efforts to promote risk reduction. 

RUSSIA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Russia’s ambitious 2010 State Armaments Program aims to replace 70 percent of 

Russia’s military equipment by 2020, prioritizing investments in strategic nuclear 

forces, aerospace defense weapons, high-precision conventional weapons, and command and control systems. While this modernization effort has been slowed somewhat by Western sanctions and the recent fall in oil prices, this will likely delay 

but not derail Russia’s modernization goals. Russian ground forces have already 

fielded more than 1,000 new or modernized armored personnel carriers, main battle 

tanks, and artillery systems, primarily in the Western, Central, and Southern military districts. Additionally, Russia has made significant advances in warfighting 

technology, especially in the areas of precision guided munitions, missile technology, 

and submarine warfare. In the Ukraine conflict, we have seen Russia deploy worldclass electronic warfare capabilities, and Russia’s cyber capabilities remain formidable. Finally, Russia’s military modernization effort has also expanded its anti-access and area denial capabilities in an effort to assert control along Russia’s periphery in the Baltic and Black Seas, the Arctic, the Asia-Pacific rim, and now in Syria 

as well. 

As its military has modernized, Russia has also devoted considerable resources to 

developing asymmetric capabilities. As Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery 

Gerasimov wrote in 2013, ‘‘The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in 

the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, 

and other nonmilitary measures. All this is supplemented by military means of a 

concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the 

actions of special operations forces.’’ 

Nowhere have these asymmetric capabilities been more readily on display than 

in Ukraine, where Russia has deployed thousands of regular soldiers and established command and control support over tens of thousands of additional separatist 

forces trained in Russia and equipped by Russia. Russia has honed its abilities to 

conduct information campaigns. In Ukraine, Russia maintains the fiction that its 

forces are not present at all, and that the sophisticated air defense systems and 

thermobaric weapons deployed on the battlefield are fielded by volunteers. Russia’s 

$300 million per year state-run international TV station, RT, is but one tool at Russia’s disposal that is used to promote these myths, in addition to internet trolls, socalled patriotic hackers, and botnets. 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S STRONG

AND BALANCED APPROACH TO RUSSIA

In order to address the challenges of a revanchist Russia, the Department of Defense pursues a strong and balanced approach to countering Russian coercion and 

aggression. Our approach involves coordinating efforts across the force to strengthen 

our capabilities, posture, investments, and plans to respond to the transregional, 

multi-functional, and multi-domain threats we face from Russia. We aim to do all 

this without foreclosing the possibility of working with Russia when it is in our interest, for example on counter-proliferation or combatting violent extremism. We 

seek to ensure that the U.S. homeland and vital U.S. national interests abroad, including the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our NATO and other treaty allies, 

are secure. We seek to ensure a strong, united, and resolute NATO Alliance that 

is capable and postured to deter and if necessary defeat Russian aggression. We are 

also reinvigorating our alliances in East Asia. Finally, we seek to develop resilient 

partners capable of withstanding Russian pressure and coercion. 

The most critical element of this approach is ensuring effective deterrence to support our most vital mission, defense of the homeland, which is reflected in the President’s $583 billion budget request for Fiscal Year 2017. While new technologies have 

allowed us to strengthen our capabilities dramatically in a number of areas, they 

have also created potential vulnerabilities that must be addressed. That is why we 

are taking actions to ensure our critical assets are protected through measures such 

as hardening and dispersal and by building greater resiliency into our command and 

control networks. We are also moving forward the development of new technologies 

to ensure we maintain a qualitative military edge over potential high-end adversaries. These include new unmanned systems, enhanced ground-based air and missile defenses, new long-range anti-ship weapons, and innovation in technologies like 

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the electromagnetic railgun, lasers, and new systems for electronic warfare, space, 

and cyberspace. 

We are modernizing our nuclear forces because they are beyond their planned 

service lives or are reaching the point where they can no longer be extended. This 

recapitalization program includes a new long-range strategic bomber, ballistic-missile submarine, and air-launched cruise missile, as well as the Life Extension Program for the B61 gravity bomb. 

We will also continue to strengthen our alliances and partnerships. I thank Congress for its continued support for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Since 

its inception in 2014, ERI has enabled the Department of Defense to strengthen our 

deterrence and assurance missions in Europe. We have expanded several major exercises, to include TRIDENT JUNCTURE, the largest NATO exercise in over 20 

years, with participation from over 30 Allies and partners. We have focused on operational effectiveness within NATO by supporting the Readiness Action Plan, including contributions to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, and NATO Force 

Integration Units along the Alliance’s eastern flank. We are funding critical U.S. 

enablers, such as a Division Headquarters Mission Command Element, and enhanced allied and partner capacity and capability through additional training opportunities, such as the inaugural training deployment of F-22s to our European Command. The President’s FY 2017 Budget proposes quadrupling funding for the European Reassurance Initiative, to more than $3.4 billion. This will allow us to increase 

our force posture in Europe by augmenting two permanently stationed Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) with a third rotational armored BCT and a fourth BCT of 

prepositioned warfighting equipment. 

With our non-NATO partners, our goal is to improve their capabilities and capacity to deal with conventional and unconventional threats. Again, ERI has helped us 

by funding upgrades to existing host-nation ranges and training sites to increase capacity for use by U.S. and Allied forces and to increase the quality of training events 

with key partners, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Our capacity building 

efforts with non-NATO partners are exemplified by the security assistance funding 

that Congress has appropriated for Ukraine, which since the start of the crisis in 

2014 has exceeded $600 million. Our support to Ukraine has consisted of training 

programs to enhance Ukraine’s internal defense capabilities; equipment to support 

the operational needs of its security forces; and advisors to advance the implementation of key defense reforms. We have trained six companies from Ukraine’s National 

Guard and are currently training its conventional armed forces as well as its Special 

Operations Forces. Over the coming years, we will continue working with our 

Ukrainian partners to build more capable and professional forces that can defend 

against outside aggression. While the scale of our assistance to Ukraine is unique, 

we are engaged in similar efforts with other non-NATO partners. For example, since 

Russia’s invasion in 2008, Georgia has received over $481 million in bilateral security assistance funding. Efforts such as these will continue to improve our partners’ 

resilience against foreign pressure and coercion. 

It is safe to say that Russia has taken notice of our efforts. However, despite its 

false accusations that the United States and our NATO Allies are in violation of the 

NATO-Russia Founding Act, our efforts are wholly defensive and proportionate in 

nature, and constitute a direct response to Russia’s aggressive actions to undermine 

the security of its neighbors. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, we 

expect that Russia will continue to modernize its military, seek to expand its influence along on its periphery, and operate in aggressive ways. The Department of Defense will continue to ensure that the U.S. homeland and our vital national interests 

abroad are protected and that we support countries’ rights to make their own security and economic choices, free from outside coercion and intimidation. As Secretary 

Carter has underscored, United States policy toward Russia is predicated on a strategic approach that is both strong and balanced. In concert with our allies and partners, we will continue countering Russian coercion and aggression with a posture 

that is defensive and proportional. In spite of Russia’s actions, we will also continue 

to advance our strategic vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

We have votes at 4:00 o’clock. We have two panels. So, I have 

asked Bertie to put 5 minutes on the clock and ask that everybody 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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try to stay within that time frame. I am just going to ask one question and move on to Ben. 

Secretary Nuland, we met briefly prior to this hearing. There is 

a narrative out there that the U.S. and NATO pressured Russia by 

expanding to areas obviously adjacent to their border, and that is 

what has generated some of the discord, if you will, that exists between our countries. You were involved in those negotiations extensively. Would you give us a brief summary of your view of that narrative? 

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Senator. 

I completely reject this narrative of grievance that it is somehow 

our fault. As you know, NATO is a defensive alliance. As we said 

to Russia at every stage in the expansion of NATO, we are not a 

threat to Russia in any way. And, as you know, as we—through the 

various expansions of NATO, we sought also to deepen NATO’s 

own relationship with Russia, first with the creation of the Permanent Joint Council, and then the NATO–Russia Council. I was, as 

you said, active in those efforts, both in negotiating and as Ambassador to NATO, to try to implement those agreements. I, frankly, 

think that Russia did not take advantage of the opportunity that 

NATO put before it for cooperation. We really could have gotten to 

a place with a different attitude in the Kremlin, where much of the 

affirmative security that we were seeking in Europe and we were 

seeking against terrorists and with regard to dangerous Iranian behavior could have been done jointly in that structure, but we could 

never get there because of old efforts. 

Also, in the aught years, we reached out to Russia quite strongly, 

the U.S. did, to try to work together on missile defense programs, 

to try to cooperate, and the Kremlin was never willing or able to 

take us up on those opportunities. 

So, I regret very much that we are where we are, but I really 

do think that we tried very hard, on the U.S. side, across three administrations of both parties, to reach out. And we will continue to 

try to do that, as I said. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I am going to reserve the rest of my time for interjections and 

turn to our ranking member. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To defend ourselves from Russia’s behavior and aggression, it 

would be nice to know why they are doing what they are doing. 

Since 2008, they have used their military in an aggressive way to 

violate the sovereignty of other countries. So, can you just share 

with me your thoughts as to what Russia’s game is here? Are they 

trying to get a greater Russia? Are they trying to take on more territory under the umbrella of Russia? Are they trying to recreate the 

Soviet Union? What is their game plan, here? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator Cardin, I would simply say that, as a U.S. 

official, I do not think it is particularly productive to try to speak 

for Russia, but I would just highlight some of the things that Russia’s President, himself, has said. I would point to his speech at the 

Munich Security Conference in 2007, where he very much regretted 

the loss of control over Soviet space, the loss of control over the— 

the failure—the end of the Soviet Union, et cetera. So, clearly that 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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is something on his mind. But, I would defer that question to Russians, frankly. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me say it is not safe to be in the political 

opposition these days in Russia. What is the administration doing 

to help political pluralism in Russia in regards to those who are opposing the Putin regime? 

Ms. NULAND. I assume that is for me, Senator? 

Senator CARDIN. Either one. 

Ms. NULAND. Yeah. 

Senator CARDIN. I am open to a good answer. 

Ms. NULAND. Well, obviously we continue to speak out strongly 

whenever Russia takes moves to further constrain the space for the 

nongovernmental organizations, to restrict human rights, as I said 

in my opening, to constrain press freedom. We have worked with 

Vladimir and others who are seeking a different future for Russia. 

We have programs both inside Russia and outside Russia to work 

with those Russian activists who want to work with us to try to 

strengthen rule of law, to try to strengthen a free press. We have 

a large number of Russian journalists who have actually fled the— 

fled Russia now, who are working with us and with others in Europe to try to ensure there is independent Russian-language news 

going back in to the country. We also work on LGBT rights and 

other things inside Russia with those who want to work with us. 

Senator CARDIN. I will follow up with some questions for the 

record in regard to this, but let me move to the Arctic for one moment. Climate change is changing the Arctic with the ice melts. 

Russia has 4,000 miles of Arctic coastline. It is my understanding 

they have established six new bases in the—north of the Arctic Circle, and they have deployed certain weapon systems there. What 

are we doing to respond to Russia’s militarization of the Arctic? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, you are absolutely right, Ranking Member 

Cardin, that Russia has invested significantly in capabilities in the 

Arctic over the last several years, including trying to create infrastructure in places like Novaya Zemlya and other parts of the Russian Arctic. We seek to preserve the Arctic as a space for cooperation on scientific issues, as we have, in fact, with Russia in the 

past, working on things like black carbon and the danger that it 

poses to the Arctic environment, as well as other issues. However, 

we take very seriously Russia’s advancing capabilities in the Arctic, 

including the possibility that, over time, Russia will be able to create, in the Arctic elements of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) bubbles, if you will, that will preclude other nations from being able 

to enjoy their freedom of navigation in parts of the Arctic. And so, 

we are investing, and the President’s FY 2017 budget invests in the 

types of capabilities that will allow us to augment our force posture 

in the Arctic and also develop the sorts of capabilities that will help 

us to ensure freedom of navigation and freedom of flight for our 

troops in that region. 

Senator CARDIN. And I take it we are working with our other 

Arctic partners to try to minimize the potential, here, of conflict, 

but it does seem like Russia is investing an awful lot in territorial 

claims in the Arctic. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, Senator, we do have a good working relationship with Russia in the Arctic Council, where we try to preFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

serve, as I said, those areas of cooperation that are ongoing, including environmental cooperation. But, also, importantly, our Coast 

Guard has search-and-rescue agreement with its Russian counterpart that has worked very successfully over the years. So, we seek 

to preserve these areas of cooperation, but, at the same time, develop our own military capabilities so that we are not caught off 

guard and so that we are keeping track with the types of investments that Russia is making. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

I am going to be respectful of the Chairman’s 5-minute clock, but 

I am going to be asking other questions for the record, including 

questions on Russia’s aggressiveness in revising history and using 

its communications to try to change the narrative of reality, and 

how we are trying to counter that. Propaganda can have a pretty 

strong impact, and part of our strategies must be to make sure people understand what are the facts. And I would welcome your response for the record in regards to those issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Perdue. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, with the debt crisis we have got and the popularity 

of your hearings, I think we might start charging tickets here. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator PERDUE. In all seriousness, though, I really thank you 

for this, and I hope we will have many more haerings like this 

about Russia and China. I think the rise of these traditional rivals 

are really concerning to people back home. 

I would like to talk, Dr. Carpenter, first about Russia, and I have 

got a second followup on the hybrid warfare. But, I want to talk 

about Georgia for a minute, because I think—I want to know what 

lessons we think we have learned after 8 years. The Russians have 

had a history of creating these frozen conflicts, where, without a 

peace treaty, everything seems to be going in the normal, and yet 

I know next year, in one of their regions, I think it is Shevali actually, they are rumored to be having a referendum about joining 

Russia again. So, I mean, this is a pressure that Russia keeps putting on there, and I am very concerned. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, testified that the nation of Georgia, despite all its progress on Western integration, domestic reforms, is 

at increasing risk from Russian aggression and pressure. I visited 

Serbia last year and met the Georgian Defense Minister, Tina 

Khidasheli, and heard her concerns about the ongoing pressure and 

so forth in Georgia. What lessons have we learned, in terms of 

standing up—I know that the Georgia National—I mean U.S.— 

has—National Guard—has just had a forward deployment there. I 

would like to get some feedback on that. And also, what are we 

doing now, from a DOD standpoint, to put pressure on Russia, relative to Georgia? And what have we learned there, relative to Crimea and the Ukraine? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, thank you, Senator. And I completely 

agree with your assessment that Russia is continuing to place pressure on Georgia through a variety of different means. Russia curFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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rently occupies about 20 percent of Georgian territory in Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia, but—— 

Senator PERDUE. But, a third of the population, right? 

Dr. CARPENTER [continuing]. It is a significant portion of the population, and those administrative boundary lines that Russia maintains continue to shift, especially in the South Ossetia region, 

claiming ever more pieces, increments of Georgian territory. Russia 

is also putting pressure on Georgia in a variety of other ways, and 

including the proclaimed desire by the de facto leader of South 

Ossetia to have a referendum on integration with Russia. 

Our goal, since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, has 

been to build Georgia’s resilience and reduce its vulnerabilities to 

Russian coercion. So, we have spent about $480 million on security 

assistance in Georgia since the crisis. Just recently, 2 weeks ago, 

I was in Tbilisi to participate in the Noble Partner exercise that 

we conducted with Georgia, where we had about 650 U.S. troops 

alongside about 500 Georgian troops and about 150 U.K. troops, 

where we had airborne jumps into Georgia, and we had Abrams 

tanks as well as Bradley infantry fighting vehicles on the ground, 

helping them to develop their self-defense capabilities. 

Over the course of the last 10 years, Georgia has contributed 

mightily to our NATO efforts overseas, including especially in Afghanistan, where, up until recently, they have been the secondlargest troop contributor, after the United States, with 850 troops. 

And, in fact, they have suffered about 31 casualties, if I am not 

mistaken, about 282 wounded. So, they have had major sacrifices 

there. And a lot of our training program over the course of the last 

decade has been focused on preparing Georgian troops for these 

overseas deployments, including Iraq and then, later, Afghanistan. 

Now we are starting to position ourselves to devote more attention 

to training up Georgia’s troops for their self-defense capabilities. 

Senator PERDUE. Do we have permanent troops on the ground in 

Georgia? 

Dr. CARPENTER. We do not plan to have permanent troops on the 

ground, but we do plan to increase the tempo of our exercises and 

training with Georgia. 

Senator PERDUE. What lessons have we learned, relative to Georgia, as it relates to Crimea and the Ukraine? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Senator, I think the first one is the one that 

Dr. Carpenter highlighted, which is that we, in our security partnership with Georgia, spent a lot of the last decade helping Georgian forces prepare for expeditionary deployments to Afghanistan, 

et cetera, and probably not enough focus on strengthening Georgia’s own homeland security, which is what we are now trying to 

correct, and not just in U.S./Georgia relations, but also in NATO/ 

Georgia relations. 

The other lesson is the abiding one, which has significant applicability for Ukraine, which is that the best antidote to Russian 

pressure is a successful increasingly European democratic Georgia 

or Ukraine, and to take maximum advantage of the association 

agreements that both of these countries have with Europe. So, that 

is why all of the programs that we manage from the State Department are designed to squeeze out corruption, improve justice system, et cetera. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Senator PERDUE. Well, with due respect—and I have all the respect in the world for you, Assistant Secretary. I have watched 

you—and I am sorry, I am over time—but, I hate to—I walk 

away—I have been over there quite a bit, and I walk away with 

a feeling that, when we deal with Russia and Ukraine, we deal 

with Russia and Georgia—and I do not mean to belittle this, but 

it sounds like it is their fault. It is Ukraine, it is Crimea, it is Georgia’s fault. Because they are not quite as Western as we want them 

to be, therefore we have not been able to do everything we need 

to do to help them. I know the—I know we have got corruption 

issues in Ukraine. I know we have got westernization issues in 

Georgia. But, we have got an invasion that occurred, and sovereign 

territory being possessed, in violation of the 1972 agreement with 

Russia. And yet, we are talking about all this other stuff at the 

same level of the invasion issue. So, I am sorry to take issue with 

that, but I really think that they are two different—— 

Ms. NULAND. No question. We cannot blame the victim. I agree 

completely, Senator. We have to strengthen these countries so that 

they can resist economically, politically, in security terms. 

Senator PERDUE. Sorry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Assistant Secretary Nuland, I had an opportunity to meet with 

Vitaly Churkin, the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, 

earlier this year. And you referenced the difficult balance we try 

to strike between cooperating with the Russians on a number of 

important areas, some of our bilateral treaties containing Iran’s aggressive nuclear weapons program and other areas where clearly 

we have strongly discordant interests and where we are working to 

strengthen our allies, whether in the Baltics or Ukraine or NATO, 

in the face of Russian aggression. I came away from a meeting with 

Ambassador Churkin convinced that they will do everything they 

can to protect Iran and their ballistic missile launches from action 

by the Security Council. Am I wrong? What leverage do we have 

to sustain Russian engagement in a concerted effort to put pressure on Iran to stop some of its activities outside the JCPOA that 

really are destructive to Iran’s intentions or expressed desire to rejoin the community of nations? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I think you are not wrong in your assessment that Russia has only joined us in joint work against a nuclear 

threat from Iran. Having worked with Russia over many decades 

to try to encourage them to understand that that nuclear threat 

was a threat to Russia, too, I would say that that is the numberone trajectory we have to work with regard to the missile threat 

now, that Russia should not be so secure in its confidence that it 

could not be on the other end of said missiles, and therefore, it has 

an interest in limiting or stopping Iran’s missile program. That is 

where we have to work, and we are continuing to try. 

Senator COONS. I would be interested, Dr. Carpenter, as well, in 

hearing whether, in your view, the European Reassurance Initiative is genuinely working and whether our allies in the Baltics are 

confident in our commitment to their security, and what else you 

think we, here in the Congress, can and should be doing to provide 

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support across a whole range of areas of engagement. As the Senator mentioned, there are these frozen conflicts in Georgia and 

Moldova, and now, for at least the time being, in the Ukraine. It 

is my hope—and you have both worked very hard on this—that our 

EU allies will be advancing and continuing sanctions and continuing to engage with us. What more can and should we do to 

strengthen our Baltic allies? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, thank you for that question, Senator. I 

think the ERI is working well. And I think when we begin to implement the 2017 requested portions of ERI, we will be dramatically increasing our force posture on the eastern flank of the alliance, which will have a significant deterrent impact on Russia. It 

will also, at the same time, assure our allies that we have force 

posture, that we have genuine high-quality, high-end warfighting 

equipment in place as necessary in the event of a crisis. 

I think the other piece to this that we cannot neglect is working 

with our NATO allies to ensure that those allies also have skin in 

the game. And so, as we talk about augmenting NATO’s presence 

in these countries, a lot of what we are doing under ERI is bilaterally with each of these allies in the east. But, as we talk about 

NATO’s footprint, I think we will be in a better place to have other 

allies with skin in the game, as I said, and with additional assets 

that they can bring to bear, which they uniquely possess because 

of their proximity to some of these countries, that will greatly aid 

in deterring Russia in case it thinks about potential aggressive action in any one of these countries. 

Senator COONS. And, Assistant Secretary Nuland, my last question. As we look forward to the NATO Summit, have we done everything we need to, to brace up and shore up and fully engage our 

NATO allies to provide that deterrent impact so that we then have 

a chance at meaningful diplomacy? And how do you assess Putin’s 

willingness to engage in rational diplomacy around the Ukraine 

conflict? 

Ms. NULAND. Two big questions. Just to add to what Dr. Carpenter has said, on the Baltic states, two pieces, here. As I said in 

the opening, we, over the past 2 years, have had sort of an ad hoc 

approach to put a patchwork together of land, sea, and air presence 

in the Baltic. What you will see at the Warsaw Summit is a sustained approach so that these allies can be confident that they will 

have regular, persistent support, and to make that much more routine and normal, to create joint headquarters in all of these countries, and to ensure we can get there. 

The other piece on the Baltics that I think deserves highlighting 

is that we have worked on the spectrum of their resilience, so not 

just hard military, but also border security, integrated communications across domestic agencies, et cetera. We have had our Homeland Security folks out there, and we have really made pretty good 

progress. But, we need other allies to be as vigorous and rigorous 

in their support, and we are working on that as we head towards 

Warsaw. 

With regard to Russia’s readiness, willingness to negotiate with 

regard to Ukraine, there is an agreement on the table, as you 

know, the Minsk Agreements, which call, first, for a full cease-fire, 

access for the OSCE across eastern Ukraine, then a political packFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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age of decentralization for the people of Donbas, and then the withdrawal of weapons. So, the French and Germans have taken the 

lead in trying to see that implemented. We have, in the last month 

and a half, greatly increased the role the U.S. is playing in parallel, 

working with both Kiev and Moscow. I think our concern is, whereas we are making some progress now on the political package for 

the Donbas, we have not made the kind of progress that we need 

to see on the security piece, and we are going to have to do a lot 

more to push Russia and the separatists to end the violence to 

allow the OSCE fully in. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Kara-Murza, thank you for your willingness to testify 

here today, as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Nuland, good to see you again. 

I wanted to talk about the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty. Russia has been violating the INF Treaty for quite some 

time. It was finally made official in public in 2014. In response to 

questioning on the matter, the administration said they are exploring their, quote, ‘‘economic countermeasures in response to the violation.’’ You know, in the President’s speech back in April of 2009 

in Prague, he committed to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. 

He said that, in order for a nonproliferation regime to work, he 

said violations must be punished, and then he said, ‘‘Words must 

mean something.’’ President Obama, ‘‘Words must mean something.’’ This administration has now said, for years, that they are 

considering economic sanctions against Russia for its violation of 

the INF Treaty. Is Russia still in violation of that treaty? And 

when is the administration finally going to get around to punishing 

this violation of the treaty? 

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Senator Barrasso—Dr. Barrasso, as I 

like to call you. 

As you have said, we have found Russia in violation over the last 

2 years. We are engaged in discussions, negotiations with Russia 

to try to bring them back into compliance. We are also working 

with allies to bring pressure to bear on Russia with regard to the 

violations. We are also working intensively—and this is part of our 

package for the Warsaw Summit—to ensure that NATO’s own deterrent, including its nuclear deterrent, is updated and strong. We 

are—and this is about all I can say at this point, in an open hearing—we are reviewing and working on a full range of options—a 

full range of options—to make sure that Russia cannot gain any 

significant military advantage from any system that they might develop outside of the treaty. And we are also investing in U.S. technologies that are designed to deter and defeat any Russian provocations. But, I think going further than that, we would have to be 

in another setting. 

Senator BARRASSO. Yeah, but just in terms—in that line of 

thought with what we could do, you know, the Open Skies Treaty, 

according to the State Department reports on arms-control compliance. Russia is failing to meet its obligations on the Open Skies 

Treaty. It is restricting access to some of its territories. It has 

shown a repeated pattern of violating its arms-control obligations, 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

including, as we have just talked about, the Intermediate-range 

Nuclear Forces. So, it is now asking the Open Skies Consultative 

Commission for permission to use more powerful collection capabilities on flights over the United States. You know, it—to me, it says 

that U.S. should not be approving such a request for these upcoming—these—those requested sensors. At least make it contingent 

upon Russia first coming into full compliance with the Open Skies 

Treaty and the INF Treaty. And I would just be interested in your 

thoughts on that. 

Ms. NULAND. Well, you are not wrong that Russia has been restricting some overflights. There is a list of places—Kaliningrad, 

low altitude over Moscow, et cetera—where they have been restricting Open Skies flights. They had been restricting Open Skies 

flights over Chechnya in the last couple of weeks. They have reopened that territory, in part due to the pressure we have been 

able to bring to bear from other Open Skies Treaty partners, particularly the Europeans, who highly value this. I think you know 

that the first round of Russian requests for higher-definition cameras were within the constraints of the treaty. And so, from that 

perspective, were we to unilaterally restrict those flights, we could 

just expect they would do the same to us, and that would make us 

less capable, ourselves. 

With regard to their more recent requests for really potent 

visuals, we are still reviewing that internally. I do not know if Dr. 

Carpenter has anything to add on that. We can certainly brief you 

in a closed setting on that, as well. 

Senator BARRASSO. Okay. 

Doctor? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, I would just add that—to answer your 

question, Senator, that, yes, Russia is in violation of its INF Treaty 

requirements not to produce, deploy, or flight-test a groundlaunched cruise missile with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. We are looking at this more broadly in the context of Russia’s aggressive behavior. And so, we are taking a number of steps 

in that broader context, to include expanding and modifying air-defense systems, together with our allies. We are also looking at investments, together with our allies and partners, in advanced capabilities that will allow us to defend against complex cruise-missile 

threats. 

On the Open Skies issue, I would just associate myself with everything that Assistant Secretary Nuland has said. The treaty 

process already provides a way forward for certification of the 

electro-optical camera that is now being used as wet film goes out 

of business, essentially. And so, our ability to use this same sensor 

down the road is impacted by the decisions that we take today. 

Senator BARRASSO. Yes, that is the followup, in terms of security 

risks, and, Secretary Nuland, you said you wanted to take additional security risks for our country on this, are there additional security risks and vulnerabilities if, in fact, these new types of sensors are allowed on Open Skies aircrafts, for us? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I am comfortable with the decisions that 

we have already made. We are reviewing exactly this set of issues 

as we look at the next set of requests from Russia. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, for some context to my question, let me summarize the current events, as I see it. 

As Russia’s September 18th primary—parliamentary election 

draws closer, the Kremlin is preparing the groundwork for another 

victory of Putin’s United Russia Party. The current Duma, itself a 

product of a fraudulent 2011 election, has rubber-stamped a slate 

of new laws targeting the electoral process from impeding, campaigning, and observation to authorizing police forces to open fire 

on protesters. The state-sponsored ballot-stuffing that sparked 

those Moscow protests in 2011 has now evolved. The Kremlin and 

the Duma are, instead, barring opposition from registering now. 

Pro-government vigilantes have set up attacks on opposition. Putin, 

himself, is repeatedly implicated in political assassinations and assassination attempts, as with Boris Nemtsov, shot outside the 

Kremlin—dead outside of the Kremlin, or Mr. Kara-Murza, who is 

a witness here, who was poisoned near to death. The flames of nationalism are burning as bright as Putin’s imperial adventure, 

seem to be part of a campaign to make Russia great again. 

Whether in Ukraine, where, with the exception of congressional 

sanctions that I and others have offered and passed through this 

committee and the Congress passed in 2014, the administration 

has done relatively little to hold Russia accountable in meaningful 

material ways, or in Syria, where we have been maneuvered into 

having to coordinate with Russian forces who neither share common interests nor pursue common goals while hundreds of thousands have died and millions have been displaced, or at the U.N., 

where they resist sanctions on Iran for missile violations, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, which they supporting, or 

their violation of the INF Treaty for which 2 years we have had 

discussions, but no consequences. 

I worry that the message that Putin must be taking from our responses is that his limit-testing aggression and opportunism is the 

right approach, particularly when there are relatively negligible 

consequences, at the end of the day, for all of the things that I have 

listed, among others. And this is certainly a dry run for the presidential 2018 presidential elections in Russia, where we would certainly expect Putin to continue to take advantage of the opportunities that he sees, whether that is the arbitrary violation of international borders, treaties, human rights compacts, or whatever he 

decides that suits his personal interests at the time. 

I am trying to get a grasp of—we pushed the Ukrainians really 

hard to meet their four pillars, which you testify here very hard, 

but, on the security side of the Minsk Agreement, we are failing 

dramatically, but we keep pushing the Ukrainians. We do not even 

talk about Crimea anymore. That is, I guess, gone. We have this 

violation of the INF Treaty, yet there are no consequences 2 years 

later, despite whatever engagement and conversations are to bring 

them back. Why are we not more aggressively engaging in tools of 

diplomacy that can help us, hopefully, have Russia understand that 

there are consequences? Why are we not using the OSCE, which 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

has—clearly, they are a signatory to, and have clear violations. 

Why are we not looking at more visa denials? Why are we not looking at more frozen accounts? Why are we not looking at more 

Magnitsky listings? I do not get it. Because if everything—if what 

you are doing—and I heard your testimony, and I read it before I 

came, and I wanted to listen to it again—is still leaving you in the 

place that we are at, why is it that we do not seem to step up towards the challenge that we have? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I would not take issue with anything that 

you have said here with regard to the constraining of space inside 

of Russia and ramp-up to the elections and Russian external behavior. I would take issue with whether Russia is paying a price 

for this. We talked about the economic sanctions that this committee has supported over the last 2 years. I think Russia has paid 

a steep price, not simply through sanctions, but also through its 

over-dependence on oil. We now have Russians—you know, 13.4 

percent of Russians living below the poverty line. We have a GDP 

contraction of 3.7 percent in Russia in 2015 alone. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But, let me—I have 18 seconds. Why not— 

answer my core question—why not more visa denials, why not 

more Magnitsky listings, why not more refusal to U.S. banks, as 

you—we will hear a witness who says, ‘‘Do not let his ill-gotten 

gains of his cronies end up in the United States’’—why are we not 

pursuing all of those OSCE—why are we not doing that? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, we are working on all of those things. As you 

know, every year we add names to the Magnitsky list. The 

Magnitsky legislation is relatively constraining. It has to go to that 

particular case. But, we have denied a number of visas in the context of Ukraine sanctions, in the context of Syria sanctions, and we 

are continuing to look at what more we can and should do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, both of you, for being here today. 

And I want to follow up on what Senator Menendez just talked 

about, and that is consequences of bad behavior. This past week, 

a number of us had the opportunity to visit southeast Asia, where 

we visited with ministers from Singapore, government leaders in 

Myanmar, to new leadership in Taiwan, participated in the 

Shangri-La dialogue, where we visited with leaders from around 

the world who participated in that defense dialogue, including our 

own Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter. But, when meeting with 

foreign governments, when meeting with leaders, they talk about 

U.S. leadership, and they talk about the positions that we are trying to secure, positions that we are fighting for, like the South 

China Seas. And when we are asking them to take a tough line, 

perhaps on something like the South China Sea, they see our lack 

of consequences in other circumstances and question whether or 

not they should take a hardline position against a powerful nation 

or a situation such as their neighbor, China. And so, we cannot 

look at things in isolation as how we are responding to Russia, 

how—because it affects what is happening and what is on people’s 

minds in Asia—in southeast Asia, excuse me—in Singapore. It is— 

people around the globe are looking at our lack of response and 

lack of consequence to—and deciding whether or not the U.S. is 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

somebody that they should hitch their wagon to, so to speak, or 

not. And I think that is the great challenge. 

And so, whether it is Crimea, Ukraine, INF, Syria, Georgia, they 

do not see the consequences. And when we ask them to take a 

tough position, they do not see the reason why they should, because they know the United States is not going to follow through. 

And that is hurting our leadership around the globe. And it is hurting our ability to rally our allies to our side and to create the kind 

of rules-based order that we need to in order to counter the behavior of China, the behavior of Russia. 

And so, I guess, a couple of questions. In your testimony, you 

state that, quote, ‘‘We have worked with Russia to remove Syria’s 

declared chemical weapons, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 

weapons, to contain the nuclear threat emanating from the DPRK, 

North Korea, and to negotiate and implement the New START 

Treaty.’’ Obviously, I think you would agree that the nuclear threat 

in North Korea has not been contained. Is that correct? 

Ms. NULAND. It has not. 

Senator GARDNER. And so, what is it that we are actually getting 

Russia to accomplish? Are they following through with the implementation of United Nations Resolution 2270, the sanctions bill 

against North Korea? 

Ms. NULAND. As you know, in the context of these—this latest 

round of sanctions, we had difficult conversations with Russia, but 

we were able to get Russia to join a deeper regime against North 

Korea than we have had in the past. We will—you know, and they 

had particular interests that they wanted managed there. But we 

did better than some expected because of the pressure from the 

Asian allies. 

Senator GARDNER. Are they completely implementing 2270? 

Ms. NULAND. I, frankly, do not have the details. My understanding is that, in the broad strokes, they are. Whether they are, 

in detail, I would have to do more work. 

Senator GARDNER. And what is their position on THAAD in 

South Korea? 

Dr. Carpenter, if that is more appropriate, to you. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Russia has traditionally opposed the advanced 

air-defense capabilities that we provide to allies, both in Europe as 

well as in East Asia. 

Senator GARDNER. And what is their position—let us just say, 

you know, if they are teaming up with China on THAAD and our 

efforts to contain the nuclear threat from North Korea, what are 

they doing in other areas? Are they teaming up with China on the 

freedom of navigation operations, as well, and opposing our efforts 

to provide rules-based governance according to international law? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I do not see them teaming up with 

China on freedom of navigation, although clearly the Chinese and 

other great powers are watching to see what Russia is able to get 

away with—— 

Senator GARDNER. But Russia has not supported our operations 

in the South China Sea, have they? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Has Russia supported our—— 

Senator GARDNER. Correct. 

Dr. CARPENTER. No. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

Senator GARDNER. Okay. So, they are taking the same position 

as China, then, on freedom of navigation operations. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I would characterize it as they have not 

taken a vocal position, one way or the other. They have largely remained in the background on this. 

Senator GARDNER. Dr. Carpenter, while I am with you, I guess 

I would just follow up, and we can have that conversation, as well, 

in terms of what we are doing to push Russia to implement 2270 

and to agree to a true commitment to a nuclear-free peninsula. 

I want to talk about a report that came out several months ago. 

And I am sure you are familiar with it. This is the RAND report. 

Looking at an article here that says, ‘‘Russian invasion could overrun NATO in 60 hours.’’ This article was published in February of 

2016. That is about the time of the report. I am sure you are familiar with this report. Has this assessment changed, in your mind, 

since this report was first published? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I would say that Russia clearly possesses a time-distance advantage, if it were to decide to be an aggressor in the Baltic states, and that that poses certain limitations 

that we would have to overcome, in terms of our ability to defend 

our NATO allies. We are making the investments through ERI and 

otherwise precisely to have forces pre-positioned, along with 

warfighting equipment so that we are better able to deter Russian 

aggression in the first place. 

Senator GARDNER. But, I mean, has this assessment, in your 

mind, changed substantially or substantively since this report came 

out in February? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, we have done a number of our own internal exercises and reviewed our plans, and we have looked very 

carefully at the geography of the Baltic Basin and precisely that 

advantage that Russia possesses, and we are taking steps to try to 

mitigate. 

Senator GARDNER. What you are saying is, basically, nothing has 

changed since this report, substantively. And are you saying that 

your reports agree with the assessment of the RAND report? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I would say that, by the end of 2017, 

when we implement all of the ERI funding that is coming online, 

that we will be much better poised to address the challenges, and 

much better poised to deter Russian aggression in that region than 

we are now. I do not know that we have made significant—— 

Senator GARDNER. So, the end of 2017 until we are better poised 

to deter the Russian threat. 

Dr. CARPENTER [continuing]. Well, Senator, we are pre-positioning equipment on a sort of ongoing basis. I do not know that 

we are significantly more advanced now than when the RAND report came out, but I am confident, by the end of 2017, when we 

have an additional Armored Brigade Combat Team worth of force 

posture on the eastern flank of the alliance, that we will be. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here and for your ongoing efforts. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Part of Russia’s campaign in eastern Europe, in the Baltics and 

Ukraine, has been to produce disinformation. They are spending a 

lot of money on RT television, in lots of other ways, to get their 

message out into parts of eastern Europe. Can you talk a little bit 

more about what we are doing to respond to that propaganda? I do 

not know which one of you wants to address that. 

Ms. NULAND. Thanks, Senator. 

Well, as you know, this has been a line of effort that been—we 

have been working on very hard with members of the Congress and 

the Senate since 2014. The total appropriation now—State Department, USAID, BBG, Broadcast Board of Governors—on the U.S. 

side is about $100 million to counter Russian propaganda. That 

money, as you know, goes for a number of things, from clean, honest, Russian-language programming that BBG is now putting out 

every day, the expansion of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 

VOA, to about $88 million that we use in State Department and 

AID money to support civil society, independent media, journalist 

training, including outside Russia for those Russian journalists 

who have fled. We are also doing quite a bit to bolster programming inside Russia, to the extent that we can. But, this pales in 

comparison to the 400 million, at least, that Russia is spending, 

and, frankly, to the levels that we spent during the Cold War on 

these kinds of things, which were over a billion dollars a year in 

the days of old USIA. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And can you talk a little bit about the substance of what we are doing and who we are engaging in working 

with us on the content? Is it journalists who—or reporters who 

have fled Russia, who are helping us look at what kind of messages 

we are using? Are there others who are engaged in that effort with 

us? 

Ms. NULAND. I will be 30,000 feet, if you will allow me, to protect 

those who participate in these programs, many of whom depend on 

that protection. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Ms. NULAND. But, we conduct training programs at various locations in Europe for journalists who have either fled or who have 

come out to get training and are planning to go back in. We support a number of Russian-language news organizations in the Baltic states and in other periphery countries that are designed either 

to address Russian-speaking populations in those home countries 

and counter Russian propaganda or to beam back in. We obviously 

support Russian-language programming in Ukraine, which has 

some impact also in Russia, as well. And then this good portion 

that goes to BBG and VOA programming, which is U.S. Government free news content. We also do quite a bit to pull together efforts of the EU, U.K., Baltic states, central Europeans, through 

consultation, through sharing of programming, et cetera. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You raised Ukraine, and obviously there have been a number of 

questions around what is happening in Ukraine and Russia’s failure to comply with Minsk II. And there was a period where there 

were some countries in Europe that did not seem to appreciate the 

extent to which this was a failure on Russia’s part, and viewed it 

more as a failure of Ukraine. I wonder if you can talk about where 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

we are with respect to how the EU is viewing Minsk II at this 

point and what more we can do to put pressure on Russia to comply. 

Ms. NULAND. As I said in my opening, Senator, I think we are 

cautiously optimistic that the EU countries will again roll over 

sanctions at the end of June because they see what we see, namely 

that Minsk is far from being implemented on—in any of its components. We have intensified our own diplomacy after the President’s 

meeting in Hanover with President Hollande and Chancellor 

Merkel to support what those countries are doing to try to get 

Minsk fully complied with. They are pushing on two fronts, both 

to negotiate a fair political decentralization deal for Donbas, which 

does not cross over the line of creating a cat’s paw or a permanent 

enclave of Russia in Ukraine. At the same time, we are trying to 

get the commitments that Russia and Donbas made to the OSCE 

for full access, pullback of weapons implemented. As I said at one 

point, it is this security package that is not being implemented 

well. We have had a sharp spike in attacks over the last 6 weeks, 

in particular, and we have had a conscious blinding of the OSCE, 

disabling of cameras, shootdown by separatists of two OSCE UAVs. 

So, in both our own advocacy at every level, the President, the Secretaries, my work with the—President Putin’s advisor on this work, 

we are calling this out. So, we are working on it very hard. I think 

the point is for Ukraine to fulfill its obligations, and then we test 

whether Russia was ever serious about these agreements. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Nuland, let me read you a quote, here, from the same 

individual. It is the general—General Philip Breedlove. He said, 

‘‘Russia has chosen to be an adversary and poses a long-term existential threat to the United States and to our European allies and 

partners.’’ Goes on to say, ‘‘Russia does not just want to change’’— 

or ‘‘challenge the agreed rules of the international order, it wants 

to rewrite them.’’ Is that your assessment of the state of Russia 

today under Vladimir Putin, as far as their role in the international scene? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I do not have a problem with that characterization at all. 

Senator RUBIO. So, then let me ask about Ukraine. It—Roman 

Sohn, who is a Ukraine activist. He wrote about Minsk II. He 

said—he called it a farce, and here is his quote, ‘‘While Russia does 

nothing to implement the agreement, the U.S. and the EU are forcing Minsk II down the throat of Kiev and that Putin knows that 

it is much easier for the West to put pressure on Ukraine to accept 

bad terms than it is to forge a consensus on keeping the pressure, 

including sanctions, on Russia,’’ end quote. 

I seem to share those views, given the fact that it appears that 

Russia is perfectly comfortable with what they view as a frozen 

conflict in the region. Obviously, some of what they are doing in 

Syria is distracting attention. We do not talk about Ukraine around 

here nearly as much as we once did. Everyone is focused on the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

role they are playing in Syria. And I think part of the calculation 

Putin had was exactly that. But, it is, in fact, a frozen situation. 

And I walked in late, when Senator Menendez was asking about 

this. But, why is he wrong when he characterizes it as a farce? 

Why is he wrong when he characterizes it as a situation where no 

one is pressuring Russia to comply, but they know that the West 

and our European partners are pressuring Kiev, especially the Germans, to comply? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I think the largest piece of leverage that 

we have on Russia is the sustainment over 2 years of deep and 

comprehensive sanctions across the U.S. and the EU countries, 

Japan, Canada, et cetera. So, again, this is why we are advocating, 

because Minsk has not been implemented, that sanctions have to 

be rolled over again. We are continuing to press, as I said to—in 

response to Senator Shaheen’s point, that Ukraine cannot be asked 

to vote on the political decentralization pieces of Minsk until the 

prior actions that are demanded in Minsk—real cease-fire, real access throughout Donbas for OSCE, cantonment of heavy weapons— 

has been implemented. So, that is the frame that we are using. 

That is the frame that Germany and France are using. I think 

Ukraine does itself a service by being ready with text on an election law, being ready with special status to implement when those 

agreed conditions are met. But, Russia has not, either itself or with 

its clients in Donbas, gotten the security conditions met. 

Senator RUBIO. So, when you talk about rollover, you mean the 

extension of the existing framework. Why not increase sanctions? 

These are now violations of an agreement that they reached, and 

they have not complied with. And I—I mean, am I right in guessing—or in stating that your argument is going to be that we can— 

we do not want to go any further than our partners in Europe are 

willing to go, and they are not willing to do additional sanctions? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Senator, I would say, I was quite gratified 

when the G7 nations that met in Japan just a couple of weeks ago 

made clear that we are ready to increase sanctions if we need to. 

The United States, as you know, not only maintains the sanctions, 

but does regular maintenance to them to ensure that they cannot 

be circumvented. We have done that on two occasions, and we are 

prepared to do it again. 

Senator RUBIO. It is—could an argument be met that this pain 

threshold is something Putin has—willing to accept? It clearly has 

not impacted his behavior. Or do you argue that the sanctions have 

impacted his behavior? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, all I can tell you is, we have deterred further 

land grabs in Ukraine, and that was a real risk when we first 

started with sanctions, that they would try to run all the way to 

Kiev and to Kharkiv. I will tell you that Russians are openly talking now about the pain of sanctions, including when we work with 

them on the Minsk thing. So, they know what it is going to take 

to get these sanctions rolled back, and it is their choice whether 

they want to do what is necessary. 

Senator RUBIO. And what about Crimea? How come we no longer 

hear Crimea mentioned? Is it a de facto, now, matter of fact? Is it 

something we have just accepted as reality, or does that continue 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

to be a part of our conversations, that Crimea should be returned, 

rightfully? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I mentioned Crimea here in my opening. 

Secretary mentions it every time he speaks publicly in Russia. We 

will maintain the Crimea sanctions, which are significant, both 

U.S. and EU, until Crimea is returned rightfully to Ukraine. 

Senator RUBIO. When they took over Crimea, there was a sense, 

and I thought that it would be a boondoggle for the Russian Government, that it would cost them a bunch of money to maintain 

that area. Has it, in fact, turned out—other than the geostrategic 

advantage, do we have any sense as to how many resources they 

are having to put in to uphold and maintain this now as part of 

their national territory? 

Ms. NULAND. It is our estimate that Russia is spending billions 

of rubles trying to maintain its foothold in Crimea. I think the 

most concerning factor, though, is that they are further militarizing 

Crimea. 

Dr. Carpenter might want to speak to that. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Well, I would just say that, absolutely, that Russia is militarizing Crimea. They have put in very sophisticated A2/ 

AD capabilities there since the start of the conflict. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very good. 

Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, to both of you. Thank you for taking so much time with 

us. 

I know that there was some conversation with Senator Perdue 

over the U.S./Georgia bilateral relationship, but I wanted to explore that relationship in the context of the upcoming NATO Summit. We are hopeful that we will continue on track to offer membership to Montenegro. I think they are ready, and it is an important signal that NATO still has an open-door policy for those that 

are ready, and that, in general, transatlantic institutions are still 

open for business, despite the aggressive tactics of Moscow. But, 

the Georgians are likely going to leave Warsaw disappointed, and 

the question remains whether there is any future for Georgia inside NATO while there is still a contest over these territories. 

What we know is that Putin’s ambition, I do not think—what I 

believe is that Putin’s ambition is not to militarily own Ukraine. 

He wants to continue clouded title over a portion of that country 

so that eventually there becomes such economic and political tumult that a government is reinstalled in Kiev that is much more 

friendly to Moscow’s interests. And so, it is in our interests to make 

it clear to the Russians that, to the extent that they are successful 

in Ukraine or other places in the future of creating clouded title 

over portions of territory, that it does not prevent those countries 

from being eligible to join transatlantic institutions. 

So, I am happy that both of you are involved in this book of business, so talk to me about what the future of Georgia’s potential 

NATO membership is. I am someone who supports at least a Membership Action Plan for Georgia, but—and is concerned that, without the settlement of these territorial questions, Georgia will forever be disappointed, walking away from NATO Summit after 

NATO Summit. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I think we expect, at the Warsaw Summit, 

that the alliance will reiterate the message that we have had to 

Georgia since 2008 regarding our expectations of membership. One 

of the things that we are seeking to do as an alliance for Georgia 

is reorient NATO/Georgia relations, U.S./Georgia relations away— 

in security terms—away from simply preparing them to deploy 

with us in Afghanistan or in Kosovo, and much more towards a 

focus on their homeland security needs, their national defense resilience, et cetera. So, we are working on that. 

The best antidote to Russian pressure is a successful, prosperous, 

democratic Georgia. That is why we work so hard with them on 

justice reform, on rule of law, on strong institutions, on market access. We are also encouraging Georgia in its relationship with the 

European Union as it implements the trade benefits of that, to 

reach out to the Abhaas, et cetera, and make it possible for them, 

through Tbilisi, to have the benefits of the trade relationship with 

Europe so that someday those parts of Georgia may see stronger 

benefit from Tbilisi than anything that is being offered by any external neighbor. 

But, you are absolutely right that it is essential for us to continue to be strong supporters of Georgia’s aspiration. 

Senator MURPHY. Let me actually ask a different question of you, 

Dr. Carpenter, and you can answer this one, as well, if you would 

like. We have been obsessive in this place about military assistance 

for the Ukrainians. There have been many members of the Senate 

who have been disappointed at the level of military assistance we 

have provided. But, it is not a coincidence that the Ukrainians 

have become much more effective at rebutting Russian advances. 

And it is not a coincidence that this has happened during a time 

in which, notwithstanding a question over the future of Javelin 

missiles, we have been transferring pretty important technology 

and important expertise and training resources to the Ukrainians. 

There is a success story to tell here about the integration of the Department of Defense here and the Ukrainian military, which is 

part of the story, as to why the—well, insufficient, the lines have 

been able to largely hold over a longer period of time. Can you just 

talk to us a little bit about the success of the partnerships that we 

have had with the Ukrainian military? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Yes, absolutely. Thank you, Senator. 

So, we have launched, with Ukraine, a substantial training and 

equipping program. There is also an advisory component to this 

that is focused on defense reforms, which was actually a fairly substantial effort. But, the training and equipping alone is hundreds 

of millions of dollars. For this year, it is $335 million. Last year, 

we were focused on the National Guard, which is within the Ministry of Interior. We trained six companies. Now we are training 

Ukraine’s Conventional Armed Forces as well as its Special Operations Forces. All told, by the time the—this training package is 

completed, we will have trained close to 3,000 Ukrainian troops. 

And the results on the battlefield have been significant. A lot of 

the training process involves taking soldiers who have fought in 

the Donbas, forming new units. We train them primarily in 

Yavoriv, in western Ukraine. And we train them in realistic conditions. We run them through basic skills, where they learn marksFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

30 

manship and how to emplace artillery, up through more advanced 

techniques, and then send them as coherent units out to the 

Donbas, where they are able to defend their territory. 

And one of the best examples, as you referenced, Senator, of 

Ukraine being able to hold the line came a year ago in June, when 

the separatists launched a massive assault on the town of Marinka, 

and Ukrainians actually had the capability to detect surveillance 

by the Russian-separatist combined teams, and push back, resulting in significant casualties on the other side. 

And so, I think our training and equipping program is very successful. We would like to be able to continue it, thanks to support 

from Congress for this effort through USAI. And we are very proud 

of the work that our folks are doing from the 173rd as well as from 

the California National Guard to run this program. 

With regards to your earlier question about Georgia, part of what 

we are trying to do now in Georgia is to replicate some of the success that we have had with Ukraine and to implement a training 

program that is not just focused on expeditionary operations that 

Georgians perform in Afghanistan, which are primarily counterinsurgency-focused, to training and equipping that is more focused 

on territorial defense, because that is something that clearly Georgia needs, as does Ukraine, after years of hollowed-out military and 

mismanagement. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Absolutely. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I am going to ask you three questions, and I will submit these 

questions for the record for the second panel, because I cannot stay 

to hear their answers to them. But, first, in your professional opinion, what would the likely effect on Russian behavior be if the 

United States dramatically reduced or withdrew its support from 

NATO? 

Ms. NULAND. As a former Ambassador to NATO, I would say, 

Senator, that that would be a strategic mistake for the United 

States. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Carpenter? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I could think of no greater gift to Russia, and no greater strategic vulnerability for the United States 

and the Euro-Atlantic area, than that course of action. 

Senator KAINE. Second question. On the eve of the Warsaw Summit in early July, how concerned are our European NATO allies 

about a potential change in the U.S. level of support for NATO? 

Ms. NULAND. You know, obviously, allies are watching the debate 

here in the United States with a lot of interest, as they always do. 

In our conversations, I think they find it very difficult to imagine 

that the United States would break a 70-year treaty commitment 

which has served us so well. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Carpenter? 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I will say that, in my conversations and 

travels with my counterparts, I have heard significant concern, but 

I think a lot of our partners believe that we will remain committed 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

members of NATO, in fact, and play a leadership role in the alliance. 

Senator KAINE. Third. In your professional opinion, is NATO obsolete? 

Ms. NULAND. NATO is needed now more than ever. 

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I could not agree more. 

Senator KAINE. I do not have any other questions. 

Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have no idea under—in what context those 

questions were asked, but—[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Just to follow up—and I do very much appreciate 

you asking those questions—I know that we have had Madeleine 

Albright here. We certainly have had people of various persuasions 

before this committee. Obviously, the NATO alliance is very important to us, and very important to Europe, as we hope TTIP will be 

over time. As a result, we hope economically tie our two sides of 

the ocean more closely together. 

On the other hand, what is it that we can do to actually leverage 

our NATO allies? We are, let’s face it, a global entity. Seventy percent of NATO defense resources are spent by the United States, 30 

percent by other members. I realize that we have other responsibilities around the world outside of NATO, but what leverage points 

do we have over those who are, for lack of a better word, being laggards? What can can we do to pressure those who are not fulfilling 

their 2-percent level of commitment? All of us, on both sides of the 

aisle, talk with our counterparts at Munich and other places, but 

we continue to be the primary provider of security services. We appreciate so much what they have done to help us, especially in Afghanistan, which was a very unusual circumstance. We appreciate 

their commitment, but we still only have four countries that are 

honoring the monetary portion of the treaty. 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I would say that culmination of the Kremlin and ISIL have motivated allies in a way that we have not seen 

for many years. As we head towards—as you remember, at the 

Wales Summit, we got commitments from allies to reverse defense 

spending slide. Seventy percent of allies are meeting those commitments, and I think we will be able to say, at Warsaw, that most 

allies are now increasing their defense budgets, and that, within a 

few years, we will have—we will be in double digits on the number 

of allies who are at 2 percent. But, we all have to continue to advocate and push, and we have to create structures in NATO, as we 

are trying to do as we head towards Warsaw, where the burdensharing is built in as the U.S. is more evident in some countries, 

others are more evident in other countries, as we did with Afghanistan. 

So, we are going to continue to work on that, but we very much 

value the advocacy that you all do when you are in Europe in—on 

a bipartisan basis. It is very important for Europe to know that 

burden-sharing is expected by all Americans. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Carpenter, do you wish to add to that? 

Dr. CARPENTER. I would just say, Chairman, that right now we 

have got five allies, including the United States, that are at 2 percent. I would add a couple of things. One, there is an additional 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

32 

pledge of 20 percent of defense spending spent on capital investments and equipment, which is very important to sustain the capabilities of the alliance, going forward. So, it is important to accentuate that, as well. I think we need to talk to allies about this each 

and every day. 

But, the other point I wanted to make is, having just come from 

a trip to the Western Balkans, where I met with some of our allies 

there, they also do provide troops to some of the NATO missions 

that we run in Afghanistan and other places. And so, it is important to remember that, in addition to their defense spending, that 

a lot of our allies are also contributing troops to the fight. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

You all have been outstanding witnesses. People have gained a 

lot from your knowledge and your willingness to be here. 

The record will close on Thursday at the end of the day. If you 

would please respond to questions in a timely manner. 

Thank you for your service to our country and for being here to 

help us. 

And, with that, we will move to the second panel. 

Thank you both very much. [Pause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank our second panel for being here. I 

think you’ll see that sometimes after our first panel, there is an exodus. Yet, we often find that our second panel, in many cases, is 

more interesting and more enlightening. I am not saying that is 

necessarily the case today, but we thank you both for being here. 

Today, we have Mr. David Satter, a Senior Fellow from the Hudson Institute. Thank you for coming to share your wisdom with us. 

Additionally, we have Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, and we thank you 

so much for being here as well. I know you were at an earlier hearing we had this year, and all of us wanted to have you back. We 

thank you for making the effort to be here. 

So, with that, Mr. Satter, if you would begin, with about 5 minutes, we would appreciate it. We will move to Mr. Kara-Murza. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID SATTER, SENIOR FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. SATTER. Thank you, Senator. I am very glad to be here and 

very anxious to talk about U.S./Russian relations, not only from the 

point of view of policies, treaties, and bilateral arrangements, but 

also a very important question which informs all of the latter, 

which is the spirit of Russia. 

Oftentimes, we make policy on the assumption that the spirit of 

Russia is actually very little different from the spirit of the United 

States. This is one of the reasons why we often are surprised by 

Russian behavior. If we take it for granted that the leaders of a 

country are dedicated to the national interest and the welfare of 

the population of the country, we find it hard to understand a 

country in which the leadership is totally indifferent to the welfare 

of the population. If we take it for granted that the human individual is an end in himself, we find it hard to deal with a country 

in which individuals are raw material for the realization of the political goals of the political leaders. And many of those goals are 

very bizarre indeed. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

For this reason, there is always a danger that we will mistake 

Russian actions. One of the most important things to bear in mind 

about Russia is that war is an instrument of internal policy. The 

first Chechen war was launched in order for there to be a short victorious war that would boost the rating of, at that point, President 

Yeltsin, who was suffering because of the aftereffects of privatization and the impoverishment of the population. The war proved 

out—proved to be neither short nor victorious. 

The second Chechen war was undertaken in order to guarantee 

the succession to Yeltsin. And this is one of the most important episodes of Russian history, also one about which Americans are very 

much in the dark. A terrorist act took place. It was used to justify 

a new war in Chechnya. Yeltsin, who was—Putin, rather, who was 

very little known, became the Prime Minister, took charge of that 

war, and, on the strength of the successful prosecution of that war, 

was elected President. 

Later, the bombs that were placed began to appear very suspicious. A fifth bomb was found in the city of Ryazan, outside of 

Moscow, and the persons who put it in the basement of that building turned out to be not Chechen terrorists, but actually agents of 

the FSB. The—war broke out again, as a result of the events in 

Ukraine, where a self-organizing anticriminal revolution demonstrated to the Russian people potentially how it might be possible to resist the kleptocratic authorities who were in charge in 

their own country. A massive, in effect, diversionary effort was 

made to distract Russians from the true lessons of Euromaidan. 

And when the resistance of the Ukrainians proved greater than the 

Russians expected, a new diversionary operation was launched in 

Syria to distract the Russian population from what was going on 

in Ukraine. 

Under these circumstances, one of the most important things 

that the United States can do is it reinforce the deterrence to using 

war in this manner, and also to make renewed efforts to reach the 

Russian people about the true activities and motivations of their 

authorities so that they are not just unwitting instruments in the 

hands of their leaders, but are in a position, finally, to make their 

leaders answer to them. This is the intellectual challenge that faces 

American policy, and over and above, and complementary to, the 

challenge of strengthening the purely practical aspects of deterrence on which, in fact, European stability and world stability depend. 

[Mr. Satter’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID SATTER

The leaders of post-Soviet Russia, a supposedly democratic country, have used 

wars to achieve internal political objectives. The first Chechen war was ‘‘a small victorious war’’ that was calculated to raise the popularity of President Yeltsin which 

suffered because of the lawless process of privatization and resulting impoverishment of the Russian people. The second Chechen war was intended to save those 

who had pillaged the country and assure Putin’s elevation to power. In perhaps the 

greatest political provocation since the burning of the Reichstag, four apartment 

buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk were blown up in 1999 and the attack was blamed on Chechen terrorists. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence that 

the bombings were carried out not by Chechens but by the Russian Federal Security 

Service (FSB). This evidence includes but is not limited to the fact that FSB agents 

were arrested after placing a bomb in a fifth building in the city of Ryazan southFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

east of Moscow and Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the State Duma, announced 

the bombing in Volgodonsk September 16, 1999 three days before it occurred. 

The bombings were used as a pretext for a new war in Chechnya and success in 

fighting this war brought Putin to power. In other words, there is overwhelming evidence that Putin rules as a result of an act of terror against his own people. 

The war in Ukraine was also undertaken to distract the Russian people. In this 

case, it was intended to blind them to the real lesson of Maidan revolt—the possibility of a people to spontaneously and freely organize against a kleptocratic regime. 

The war in Syria, in turn, was undertaken in order to distract attention from the 

lack of success in Ukraine. The ambitious plans to carve out a ‘‘New Russia’’ from 

sovereign Ukrainian territory were at least temporarily frozen in the face of Western sanctions and stiff Ukrainian military resistance. 

Calls by presidential candidates for a ‘‘grand bargain’’ with Russia which, in fact, 

only repeat the premise of the ‘‘reset policy’’ are therefore naive and misguided. The 

only bargain that the U.S. can obtain are on terms that no President concerned to 

honor American principles could accept—the right of Russia to suppress its people 

and attack its neighbors. If such terms were accepted, the Russian leaders would 

immediately escalate their demands. 

The following are some of the areas in which Russian actions represent a danger 

to the U.S., its neighbors or civilized principles: 

UKRAINE

Russia is guilty of aggression against Ukraine, having deliberately started a war 

on an invented pretext in order to destabilize the Ukrainian Government and discredit the Ukrainian anti-criminal Maidan revolution. The war in Ukraine is sometimes referred to as a ‘‘hybrid war.’’ But this term is incorrect. What is taking place 

is a real war with full Russian participation but under conditions in which Russia’s 

role is hidden. A better term for what is going on is ‘‘concealed war.’’ Russia is seeking to achieve success with the help of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine who, 

along with Russian volunteers and regular Russian forces are fighting the Ukrainian Army. But the operation is a full scale invasion and was organized by Russia 

from the start. 

In light of the possible destabilizing consequences of Russia’s aggression for international security, the situation requires a greater commitment on the part of the 

U.S. to the defense of Ukraine. The Minsk-2 agreement in which a Russian cease 

fire was purchased with the help of a commitment to allow Russia to change the 

nature of Ukrainian statehood cannot be the base of a resolution of the conflict. According to the latest UN figures, more than 9,000 persons have been killed in a war 

that has no purpose except to reinforce the Putin regime’s hold on power. Arming 

Ukraine with defensive lethal weapons to be used on their sovereign territory and 

the toughening of the sanctions regime can help to raise the cost of aggression and 

restore the international order. 

THE BALTICS

Russia is no match for NATO or the U.S. in an all-out war but it could provoke 

a localized conflict in the Baltics where it has strategic superiority and then threaten to use nuclear weapons, presenting NATO with a choice of escalation or backing 

down. This is perhaps the greatest strategic threat to the U.S. at the present time 

because a failure to defend one of the Baltic NATO members would destroy the effectiveness of NATO as a whole. 

The Russians are clearly ready to take risks. On April 14, a Russian SU-27 fighter jet flew dangerously close to a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea. It came to within 50 feet of the plane and conducted a barrel roll starting 

from the left side of the aircraft, going over the aircraft and ending up to the right 

of the aircraft. This incident came two days after a simulated Russian aerial assault 

against the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea. One of 

the jets came to within 30 feet of the warship. This was the most reckless flyover 

of a U.S. ship by a Russian jet since the Cold War. Neither of these incidents could 

have occurred by accident. 

The air incidents are a message that the Russians want the U.S. out of the Baltic 

region. They have been accompanied by Russian prevention of U.S. and allied flights 

over the heavily militarized Kaliningrad region that are allowed under the Open 

Skies Treaty, the latest of a number of violations of that treaty. 

Russian intimidation, however, does not need to succeed. The Russian leaders are 

not ideological. The effort that they have invested in amassing personal fortunes attests to this. They will not risk their hold on power on behalf of a conflict they know 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

they will lose. The proper response to Russian tactics is therefore a commensurate 

strengthening of NATO’s Baltic defenses. 

INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE

The Russian authorities act with a complete disregard for human life. This is of 

concern to the U.S. not only on humanitarian grounds but also because Russian violence can claim the lives of Americans and can have consequences for Americans. 

In Syria, the Russian bombing is indiscriminate. According to the Violations Documentation Center, which seeks to document the attacks by all sides, the civilian 

death toll from Russian strikes by mid-March was over 2,000. In January alone, according to the Syria Network for Human Rights, another monitoring organization, 

Russian air strikes killed 679 civilians, including 94 children and 73 women. This 

exceeded the number of civilians killed by the Syrian Army, which is also guilty of 

indiscriminate bombing. For purposes of comparison, the total number of civilians 

killed by ISIS in January was 98, the number killed by the al-Qaeda affiliated alNusra front was 42. 

Russian forces have intentionally bombed civilian areas to spread fear and clear 

areas where government ground troops were preparing to advance. This is consistent with Soviet military doctrine, employed by both sides in the Ukrainian war 

and an important factor in the death toll in that conflict. The bombing of civilian 

targets in Syria, including bakeries and hospitals, also increases the flow of refugees 

towards Turkey and Europe, exacerbating internal tensions in those regions and 

creating pressure to accept a resolution of the Syrian crisis on Russian terms. 

Americans were among the victims when on July 17, 2014 Malaysia Airlines flight 

MH17 was shot down over Eastern Ukraine killing all 298 persons on board. The 

Dutch Safety Board confirmed that MH17 was destroyed by a missile fired from a 

Russian made BUK anti-aircraft battery. The Putin regime, in complete disregard 

for the safety of innocent international air travelers, had transferred missiles capable of shooting down planes flying at over 30,000 feet to a quickly assembled army 

fighting in an area traversed by one of the busiest commercial air corridors in the 

world. 

There was an American victim, Sandy Booker of Oklahoma, in the 2002 Moscow 

theater siege in which the Russian authorities flooded a theater with lethal gas. In 

all cases, the Russian leaders need to be put on notice that the indiscriminate killing of hostages in ‘‘anti-terrorist’’ operations will not be tolerated and the deaths of 

any Americans will lead to serious sanctions. 

The Putin regime is not a normal government but a regime that is at war furtively with its own people. The Putin regime claims an approval rating of 85 to 87 

per cent but they have found it necessary to create a 400,000 member national 

guard for suppressing domestic disturbances and have passed a new law making it 

legal for FSB agents to fire without warning into a crowd. 

In fact, the Russian leaders fear their own people and have no compunction 

against using violence against them. As a result of the sanctions and the fall in the 

price of oil, Russia last year lost 1.5 per cent of its gross national product. The existing sanctions have made it difficult for Russian banks and enterprises, both state 

and private to refinance their debts and have cut off Western technology to the gas 

and oil industry. If this state of affairs continues, the consequences for the economic 

development of the country will be catastrophic. 

In light of the dangers that the present Russian regime represents, it is important 

for the U.S. to understand the importance of psychological deterrence. Restraining 

the behavior of the Putin regime requires creating the impression in both word and 

deed that violations will meet with a serious response. One little explored way of 

doing this is with truthful information. The Russian authorities have benefited from 

the 17 year refusal of U.S. officials to raise the many unanswered questions about 

the 1999 Russian apartment bombings that brought Putin to power and also the delicacy with which the U.S. has discussed the obvious signs of official involvement in 

the murders of such opposition figures as journalist Anna Politkovskaya, Duma deputies Yuri Shchekochikhin and Sergei Yushenkov and opposition leader Boris 

Nemtsov, among others. The U.S. should weigh the example of the court in the 

United Kingdom which found that Putin ‘‘probably’’ approved the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, the former FSB officer poisoned with radioactive polonium in London in 2006 and seek to emulate it. 

The ‘‘reset’’ policy toward Russia, now largely discredited, could have been avoided 

if U.S. officials had considered the significance of the murders of Politkovskaya and 

Litvinenko only two years earlier. 

The willingness to insist on the truth about the Russian regime’s crimes will not 

in and of itself deter Russian aggressivity including the regime’s repression of its 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

own people. But insofar as deterrence is also a matter of psychology, it will reinforce 

steps at the policy level to convince the Russian leaders that it is simply not in their 

interest to act in defiance of civilized rules. 

The Russian leaders need to be convinced that the U.S. is fully aware of their true 

character. This will encourage restraint and discourage miscalculation. It will also 

act in Russia’s long term interest, encouraging changes that will make it possible 

for Russia one day to take its deserved place in the world of Western nations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for that. 

Mr. Kara-Murza. 

STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR KARA–MURZA, NATIONAL COORDINATOR, OPEN RUSSIA MOVEMENT, RUSSIAN FEDERATION 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you very much, Chairman Corker, 

Ranking Member Cardin, Senator Risch, Senator Shaheen. Thank 

you for holding this important and timely hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey stepped in, as well. I know he 

is hard to see. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Oh. Senator Markey, thank you so much for 

being here. And thank you for the opportunity to testify and to appear before you today. 

Twenty-five years ago, at a conference held, of all places, in Moscow, member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe established as a principle that issues relating to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and I quote, ‘‘are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and 

do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned,’’ end of quote. 

Through its membership of both the OSCE and the Council of 

Europe, the Russian Federation has undertaken clear and binding 

commitments with respect to election standards, the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly, and other important aspects of 

human rights. And all these principles are also enshrined in the 

Russian Constitution. 

In its 16 years, nearly a full generation in power, Vladimir 

Putin’s regime has turned these commitments and these principles 

into a dead letter. Today, elections in our country serve as a mere 

ritual for ordaining the incumbents, with any meaningful opposition, in most cases, simply disqualified from the ballot, and with 

voting marred by intimidation and fraud. 

After March 2000, so more than 16 years, not a single national 

election in Russia has been assessed as free and fair by OSCE and 

Council of Europe observers. And, according to independent estimates, up to 14 million votes were stolen in favor of the ruling 

party in the most recent parliamentary election, in 2011, which 

was followed by the largest street demonstrations under Vladimir 

Putin’s rule, as more than 100,000 people went to the streets of 

Moscow to protest against fraud. 

And preparations for this September’s parliamentary vote are 

certainly not promising, with new restrictions imposed on both 

campaigning and observation, and with the establishment of a new 

National Guard that will be allowed to use force and shoot without 

warning in the event of mass demonstrations after the election. 

For more than a decade now, the Russian parliament has been 

devoid of genuine opposition, not a place for discussion in the unFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

37 

forgettable words of its own Speaker. The same applies to most 

media outlets. 

After taking over or shutting down independent television networks in the early years of Mr. Putin’s rule, the Kremlin now controls all the national airwaves, which it uses to rail against the 

outside world, primarily the West, including the United States and 

Ukraine, as well as Mr. Putin’s political opponents at home who 

are denounced as traitors, foreign agents, and enemies of Russia. 

The few surviving pockets of media independents are under severe pressure as we saw again recently with the editorial purges 

of the RBC Media Group following its coverage of the Panama Papers. 

The police, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts are used 

by the Kremlin as tools for suppressing and punishing dissent. According to Memorial, Russia’s most respected human rights organization, there are currently 87 political prisoners in our country, a 

number which is already comparable with the late Soviet era. 

These prisoners include leftist politicians, Sergei Udaltsov; the 

brother of anticorruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, Leg Navalny; 

opposition activist Ildar Dadin, who was jailed under a new law 

that targets individual street protests; and Alexei Pichugin, the remaining hostage of the Yukos case. And they also include prisoners 

of the infamous Bologna case who were jailed merely for the fact 

that they came out on the streets to protest against Mr. Putin’s inauguration in May of 2012. 

But, those who oppose Vladimir Putin’s regime risk not only 

their well-being and their freedom, they also risk their lives. On 

the 27th of February of last year, Boris Nemtsov, former Deputy 

Prime Minister and the leader of Russia’s pro-democracy opposition, was killed by five bullets in the back as he walked home over 

the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, just 200 yards from the Kremlin 

wall. A year on, the investigation into his murder is stalling. Although they have apprehended the alleged perpetrators, investigators have been unable to pursue the organizers and the masterminds. In fact, according to media reports, attempts to track the 

higher-ups were personally vetoed by General Alexander 

Bastrykin, the head of Russia’s investigative committee. And, despite the obvious links between the murder suspects and Kremlinappointed Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, he has not been even 

formally questioned in the case. 

I can also speak to the dangers that face opposition activists in 

Russia from personal experience. Exactly 1 year ago in Moscow, I 

fell into a coma as a result of severe poisoning that led to multiple 

organ failure that was certainly intended to kill. In fact, doctors 

told my wife, who is here today, that they estimated the chance of 

survival at around 5 percent. So, I am very fortunate and certainly 

very happy to be here today and to be speaking and to be testifying 

before you. 

Our friends in the West often ask how they can be helpful to the 

cause of human rights and democracy in Russia. And the answer 

to this is very simple. Please stay true to your values. We are not 

asking for your support. It is our task to fight for democracy and 

the rule of law in our country. The only thing we ask from Western 

leaders is that they stop supporting Mr. Putin by treating him as 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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1 1991 CSCE/OSCE Moscow Document. 

2 ‘‘Russia’s Dubious Vote,’’ The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2011. 

a respectable and worthy partner and by allowing Mr. Putin’s cronies to use Western countries as havens for their looted wealth. 

The United States has been a pioneer in putting a stop to this. 

Nearly 4 years ago, this Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky Act, 

a groundbreaking law that, for the first time ever, introduced personal accountability for human rights abuse and corruption by prohibiting those who violate the rights of Russian citizens and who 

pillage the resources of Russian citizens from traveling to the U.S. 

and using the U.S. financial system. 

And I would like to use this opportunity to thank you, Senator 

Cardin, for your leadership and your unyielding commitment on 

this issue. 

Testifying before this committee—in fact, in this very room; I 

was here with him on that day—in June 2013, Boris Nemtsov 

called the Magnitsky Act, and I quote, ‘‘the most pro-Russian law 

in the history of any foreign parliament,’’ end of quote. It is my sincere hope that this law is implemented to its full extent without 

regard for rank or influence, and that these crooks and these abusers get a clear message that they will not be welcome here. And 

that will be the best possible way to support the cause of human 

rights in Russia. 

Thank you very much once again for the opportunity to testify. 

[Mr. Kara-Murza’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR V. KARA-MURZA

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, esteemed members of the committee, 

thank you for holding this important and timely hearing, and for the opportunity 

to testify before you. 

Twenty-five years ago, at a conference held, of all places, in Moscow, member 

states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe established as a 

principle that issues relating to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law ‘‘are 

matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.’’ 1 Through its membership of both the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the Russian Federation has 

undertaken binding commitments with respect to election standards, the freedom of 

expression, and other important aspects of human rights. All of these principles are 

enshrined in the Russian Constitution. 

In its sixteen years—nearly a generation—in power, Vladimir Putin’s regime has 

turned these commitments into a dead letter. 

Today, elections in our country serve as a mere ritual to ordain the incumbents, 

with any meaningful opposition, in most cases, disqualified from the ballot, and with 

voting marred by intimidation and fraud. After March 2000, not a single nationwide 

election in Russia has been assessed by OSCE and Council of Europe observers as 

free and fair. According to independent estimates, up to fourteen million votes were 

stolen in favor of the ruling party in the most recent parliamentary election in 2011, 

which was followed by the largest street demonstrations under Mr. Putin’s rule, 

when more than 100,000 people went to the streets of Moscow to protest fraud.2

Preparations for this September’s parliamentary vote are not promising, with new 

restrictions imposed on both campaigning and observation, and with the establishment of a new National Guard that will be allowed to use force and shoot without 

warning in the event of mass demonstrations. 

For more than a decade, the Russian parliament has been devoid of genuine opposition—‘‘not a place for discussion,’’ in the unforgettable words of its own speaker. 

The same applies to most media outlets. After taking over or shutting down independent television networks in the early years of Mr. Putin’s rule, the Kremlin now 

controls all nationwide airwaves, which it uses to rail against the outside world— 

including the West and Ukraine—and against Mr. Putin’s political opponents at 

home, who are denounced as ‘‘traitors’’ and ‘‘enemies of Russia.’’ The few surviving 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

39 

3 List of people recognized as political prisoners by the Memorial Human Rights Center (in 

Russian) http://memohrc.org/pzk-list 4 ‘‘RBC Investigation: Where the Nemtsov Case Has Led’’ (in Russian), RBC, January 20, 

2016. 5Testimony by Hon. Boris Nemtsov, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing 

held June 13, 2013. 

pockets of media independence are under severe pressure, as witnessed by the recent editorial purges at the RBC media group following its coverage of the ‘‘Panama 

Papers.’’ 

The police, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts are used by the Kremlin 

as tools for suppressing and punishing dissent. According to Memorial, Russia’s 

most respected human rights organization, there are currently eighty-seven political 

prisoners in our country—a number comparable with the late Soviet era.3 These 

prisoners include leftist politician Sergei Udaltsov; the brother of anticorruption 

campaigner Alexei Navalny, Oleg Navalny; opposition activist Ildar Dadin, jailed 

under a new law that targets individual street protests; and Alexei Pichugin, the 

remaining hostage of the ‘‘Yukos case.’’ 

But those who oppose Mr. Putin’s regime risk not only their wellbeing and their 

freedom. They also risk their lives. 

On February 27, 2015, Boris Nemtsov, former deputy prime minister and leader 

of Russia’s pro-democracy opposition, was killed by five bullets in the back as he 

walked home over the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, two-hundred yards from the 

Kremlin wall. More than a year on, the investigation into his murder is stalling. 

Although they have apprehended the alleged perpetrators, investigators have been 

unable to pursue organizers and masterminds. According to media reports, attempts 

to track the higher-ups were vetoed by Gen. Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia’s Investigative Committee.4 And, despite the obvious links between the murder 

suspects and Kremlin-appointed Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, he has not been 

even formally questioned in the case. 

I can speak to the dangers that face opposition activists in Russia from personal 

experience. Exactly one year ago, in Moscow, I fell into a coma as a result of severe 

poisoning that caused multiple organ failure and that was certainly intended to kill. 

Doctors told my wife that they estimated the chance of survival at around five percent. I am very fortunate indeed to be speaking with you today. 

Our friends in the West often ask how they can help the cause of human rights 

in Russia. The answer is simple: please stay true to your values. We are not asking 

for support—it is our task to fight for democracy and the rule of law in our country. 

The only thing we ask from Western leaders is that they stop supporting Mr. Putin 

by treating him as a respectable partner and by allowing his cronies to use Western 

countries as havens for their looted wealth. The U.S. has been a pioneer in the efforts to put a stop to this. Nearly four years ago, Congress passed the Magnitsky 

Act, a groundbreaking law that, for the first time, introduced personal accountability for human rights abuse and corruption by prohibiting those who violate the 

rights and pillage the resources of Russian citizens from traveling to the U.S. and 

using its financial system. Testifying before this committee in June 2013, Boris 

Nemtsov called the Magnitsky Act ‘‘the most pro-Russian law in the history of any 

foreign parliament.’’ 5 It is my hope that this law is implemented to its full extent, 

without regard for rank or influence, and that the crooks and abusers get a clear 

message that they will not be welcome here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. I certainly appreciate the deep commitment you have and the personal 

experiences you’ve shared. 

We have a vote. I am going to turn over to Senator Cardin for 

questions. I think what I will do is go vote so that we can flip it 

and you can so the same. 

I want to thank you, though. I appreciate your mention of the 

Magnitsky Act. And I want to thank Senator Cardin for his tremendous leadership, for years, on human rights issues, but particularly in causing this to become law. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Let me, first, thank the Chairman 

for his incredible support in regards to this committee focusing on 

human rights issues. And let me thank you, Mr. Kara-Murza, for 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

40 

being here. I know that it was a long trip from Russia to come and 

visit. And we thank that your wife is here, and we are thankful 

that you are healthy. We know the personal risks that you have 

taken. 

Let me just update you, first, on the Sergei Magnitsky global efforts that we are making so that the legislation that we passed 

aimed towards Russian can be used to help all countries protect 

the rights of their citizens. And you are absolutely right, the Moscow document in 1990 made it very clear that the commitments to 

basic human rights are not an internal matter for a country, but 

are legitimate interests of all the members of the OSCE. So, the 

Sergei Magnitsky enforces that by saying that, if Russia does not 

take action against the abusers, we are not going to give them the 

benefits of our country. And it is—as I indicated in my opening 

statement, we have applied that numerous times in the United 

States against Russians who have violated human—basic human 

rights and have not been held accountable by their government. 

And we believe it can be further used. 

Today, on the floor of the United States Senate, by a unanimous 

consent, all 100 Senators once again, second time, confirmed that 

the Magnitsky law should be global. So, we anticipate, by the end 

of this Congress, that we will, in fact, have a global Magnitsky law 

so that we can take the—our experience from Russia and use it in 

other countries. As you know, Russia’s influence is also in other 

countries, so we—be helpful. 

I want to drill down a little bit on your comments about personal 

safety. It is so important to put faces on issues. We saw that with 

Sergei Magnitsky. It allowed us to pass a bill. Otherwise, when you 

talk about 50 people being in prison, it sort of rolls off the international news stories pretty quickly, but, when you put a face to 

it and recognize what an individual has gone through—and your 

personal presence here today makes a huge difference, and I thank 

you for doing that. 

The elections are September. What type of opportunities do you 

believe opposition forces will have in Russia, both directly participating in the elections and then expressing their views in regards 

to the parliamentary elections? Will there be an opportunity for opposition participation? 

And you indicated that the protests after the 2011 was pretty 

embarrassing to Russia. What do you anticipate will be done if the 

Russian public believes these elections are not fair and want to express themselves? How will the government respond? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, for the 

question. And thank you also for your efforts on the global 

Magnitsky Act. I completely associate myself with what you said. 

And we know that human rights are universal, and the protection 

of human rights is universal. And so, I think the responsibility for 

violating human rights should be universal, too. 

On your question about the elections, as I mentioned in the opening statement, we have not had a free and fair national election in 

Russia in more than 16 years, if we take the gold standard of 

OSCE election observation and Council of Europe election observation. And, of course, we have no reason to believe that the upcoming parliamentary election on September the 18th will be free and 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

41 

fair. In fact, we are seeing the preparations already: new restrictions imposed on election observers, new restrictions imposed on 

journalists who cover the elections, new restrictions imposed on the 

campaign itself, this new National Guard that is clearly being prepared by the Kremlin in the event of a repeat of the mass protests 

we saw on Bologna and other places in December 2011 and early 

2012. 

And there is always this ongoing debate within the opposition 

whether we should even participate in the rigged and unfair elections. And I believe that, yes, we should. And my colleagues believe 

that, yes, we should, because we can use even this flawed and manipulated and rigged electoral process in order to help get our message across, get through that wall of propaganda and lies that has 

been built up by the regime, and also, I think, very importantly, 

to help this young generation of pro-democracy and civil-society activists in our country to go through that process and gain the political experience that they will need in the future. Because the day 

will come when Russia will have a free and fair election, and we 

have to start preparing for that, I think, now. 

And so, the Open Russia Movement, which I have the honor of 

representing, will be supporting candidates in individual singlemember districts for the state duma, across the country. It is a 

wide geography from St. Petersburg to Irkutsk. And I am now 

going around the country in different regions and taking part on 

the campaign events in meetings with voters. I was just in St. Petersburg a few days ago, and Irkutsk a couple of weeks ago. And, 

you know, I am seeing how effective and how necessary, how important that is. 

And I think it is also important to mention that we have this opportunity to participate in this election this year, thanks to Boris 

Nemtsov, because 2 and a half years ago, in 2013, he won the legislative seat in the region of Yaroslava. And, according to Russian 

law, a party that is represented in at least one of the regional legislatures in Russia does not need to collect signatures in order to 

have access to the ballot. And the Putin regime usually uses the 

signatures as a filter to get unwanted candidates off the ballot, to 

disqualify them. So, because we have that opportunity, the People’s 

Freedom Party, which was founded and led by Boris Nemtsov, has 

this opportunity. 

We will be on the ballot—our candidates will be on the ballot this 

September. And I think it is also—it will be very important for our 

partners in the OSCE, including the United States, to pay attention to what will be going on, to pay attention to a potential fraud, 

to send a robust monitoring mission, as much as possible. And I 

know there will be an OSCE parliamentary assembly session coming up in July, I believe, in Tbilisi. It will be very important, I 

think, to raise that issue, that there should be robust observation 

of the Russian parliamentary election this September. And if there 

are cases of fraud, they should be publicized, they should be talked 

about, they should be paid attention to, because I think the only 

thing this regime is afraid of is public reaction in Russia. We saw 

how afraid they were during the mass protests in the winter of 

2011–2012. And I think we should—the whole world should be 

watching closely as this September election approaches, especially, 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

42 

as we have both mentioned today, election status and human rights 

are not an internal affair. 

Senator CARDIN. Yeah. 

Congressman Smith and Senator Wicker will be leading a delegation to Tbilisi in July. I will make sure that the Russian election 

is part of our priorities for those discussions. And yes, we will participate within the OSCE on the monitoring, and we will make sure 

that we report accurately what happens in Russia. 

We are concerned, though, that—knowing what happened in the 

previous election, that there could be some personal safety issues 

associated with participation in this election. Do you have that concern? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Well, as you know, I have had some reason to 

worry about personal safety. And I know many of my colleagues 

also obviously face this risk on a daily basis. But, I think, you 

know, those of us who are, you know, activists, leaders, public faces 

of the democratic opposition in Russia, you know, we have known 

for a long time that it is a dangerous location to be in opposition 

to Mr. Putin’s regime. But, you know, we have accepted that. We 

think, you know, frankly, that our country has no future under this 

regime, that it is—this regime is driving our country into a deadend, and, if we want to fight for our country’s future, we have to 

accept those risks. And I think there is nothing better this regime 

would like us to do than to give up and run away. And I do not 

think—— 

Senator CARDIN. Yeah. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA [continuing]. We should be giving them that 

pleasure. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Satter, you raise a very almost frightening 

point, that Russia uses war for its domestic agenda more than it— 

and not necessarily the importance of the battle itself, but the political significance or the—how it distracts from other issues. Do 

you anticipate that we might see more military action by Russia to 

further its overall objectives, not so much the specific area where 

the military operations take place, but to further their domestic 

support for their broader goals? 

Mr. SATTER. That is the key determinant. And that is the most 

important thing for the United States to keep in mind in anticipating possible Russian aggression, that what will motivate it—the 

Russian authorities is not the desire to rebuild the Soviet empire. 

They are actually, I think, indifferent to that. What—they go to 

war to strengthen the hold on power of a small kleptocratic group 

which monopolizes the instruments of power and property in the 

country. If they feel threatened, and they understand that the best 

way to consolidate their hold on power is to find a pretext for military aggression, they will look for it. And that is why the—deterrence is so important. But, not only deterrence in military terms, 

but psychological deterrence, something which is very much neglected by the United States, because we are—we, with great difficulty, understand the cultural context in Russia, in the psychological context, what is really going on there. And all of the goodwill that we show—I was struck, in fact, by a statement of Secretary Kerry recently in which he said, about Minister Lavrov, 

that, ‘‘He lied to me to my face.’’ And I was taken aback by that 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

43 

remark, because I was surprised that Kerry expected anything different. This is the indispensable background to policy decisions, an 

awareness of the people with whom you are having—with whom 

you are dealing. And this, I think, is what is missing. This is what 

has to be reinforced. This can also be an important element in deterrence. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for that answer. 

We are going to stay in brief recess til the Chairman returns so 

that I can vote on the amendment that is pending on the floor of 

the Senate. 

So, the committee will stay in brief recess. [Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Gentlemen, it looks like you are having a nice conversation. Would you like to share any of that with 

me? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Please forgive—[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. I actually would like to just leave it 

open. I know you had 5 minutes for comments and I very much appreciate your reference to the Magnitsky Act. I wonder if there is 

anything else, from a personal standpoint, you would like to share 

with us while you are here. You heard the first two witnesses, from 

a professional standpoint. I know there were a number of questions 

from committee members about things that we could be doing that 

we are not doing. Do you have any observations relative to additional pressure on Russia or relative to what is happening internally? 

I know you did not ask for help. I heard that in your testimony. 

And I know you said ‘‘remain true to our values,’’ but, are there 

other things we could be involved in on top of that? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you, Chairman Corker. Thank you for 

the question. And also, thank you for your leadership on the global 

Magnitsky Act, which has recently been marked up by the committee, and also for the Senate Resolution number 78, which is— 

was dedicated to the memory of Boris Nemtsov, and which, as one 

of its points, tasked the U.S. Government with raising this question of the investigation and the progress, or the lack thereof, in 

the investigation every time they meet with the Russian Government counterparts. And that is very important. And thank you for 

this. 

And on your question, I think, first of all, it is very important 

to distinguish—and sometimes, you know, even informed commentators make this mistake; they use a shorthand by saying 

‘‘Russia,’’ when what they actually mean is the Putin regime and 

the Kremlin and the behavior of the Putin regime. And obviously, 

for me, as a Russian citizen, that is a pretty important difference. 

And I think these things should not be confused with each other. 

And the current regime, of course, is not the product of a democratic election; it is not the product of the free will of the Russian 

people. And I think it is important to bear this in mind. 

And on the question of what could be done, I think, frankly, a 

more robust and more active implementation of the Magnitsky Act 

is the single most important thing that I would mention in this regard. Of course, this act targets not just those implicated in the 

Magnitsky case itself, but Section 4(b) of this act widens its scope 

to other gross human rights abuses. And, you know, there has 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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been—I think, if I am not mistaken, there have been 39 people 

added to the U.S. Magnitsky list since the law came into force, but 

most of them have been low- or mid-level human rights abusers. 

And, of course, they should be on the list, too, but, as I mentioned 

in the opening statement, I think it is very important not to have 

any glass ceilings, in terms of rank and influence. 

The CHAIRMAN. From your perspective, why do you think mostly 

low-level indivivuals have been targeted? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Well, it is probably not for me to comment on 

the—you know, on the motivations behind the U.S. administration’s actions. Again, I am not an American; I am a foreigner. And 

I do understand—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m only asking from your perspective. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA [continuing]. I do understand that there are 

rigid criteria built into the law itself, so there have to be—there 

has to be clear evidence. But, I think there, frankly, is clear evidence about very high-profile and high-ranking human rights abusers within the current Kremlin regime. And there have been media 

reports here in the U.S. that, for instance, Ramzan Kadyrov, whom 

I mentioned, and General Bastrykin, the head of the investigative 

committee, have both been put on the classified part of the 

Magnitsky Act. And, frankly, I think, in my personal view, the 

most important aspect of this act is the public naming and shaming 

of human rights abusers. I see no reason why these individuals 

should not be placed on the open list. 

In early 2014, when Mr. Nemtsov came here for the last time, 

he had several meetings here on the Hill with members of leadership of both parties in both houses, and he suggested several 

names of high-profile human-rights abusers in the Putin regime 

that could be added to the list. One of those was General 

Bastrykin. Another was Mr. Churov, the now former head of the 

Central Election Commission who was responsible for covering up 

the mass fraud in the 2011 and 2012 electoral cycle, and earlier as 

well. And I think—I believe there were 13 names that Mr. Nemtsov 

suggested be put on the list. And so far, not a single one has been 

put on the list. 

A year ago, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 

and I came here and also had several meetings here on the Hill, 

and we suggested that the names of Kremlin propaganda officials, 

who call themselves journalists, but who are not, they are state officials involved in, effectively, state-sponsored incitement against 

those who oppose Mr. Putin’s regime—and we suggested that, in 

particular, those who are engaged in incitement against Boris 

Nemtsov, who called him a traitor, who called him a foreign agent, 

who called him an enemy of Russia, who said that he is financed 

by the U.S., who said that he would have broken Nazi troops had 

he been in Moscow in 1941, and so on and so forth—and I am not 

making this up; these are direct quotes—that these people who are 

responsible for incitement should also be put on the sanction list. 

Well, so far, not one of those has been put on the sanctions list. 

So, I really think that the most effective way, and, frankly, the 

most principled, the most honorable way to deal with those human 

rights abusers is to place them on that sanctions list, because the 

unique thing, and the groundbreaking thing about the Magnitsky 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Act, was that it was not sanctioning a country. These—they are not 

sanctions against Russia. They are not even sanctions against the 

Russian Government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. These are sanctions against specific individuals personally involved in human rights abuse and personally involved in corruption. And I think this is the way it should be done. 

The CHAIRMAN. In your observation, when somebody is placed on 

the list, is it truly a significant punishment to be sanctioned in that 

manner? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you. This is a very important question. 

And we can talk about many similarities that exist between the Soviet regime and what we have in our country today. We have political prisoners, we have media censorship, we have the lack of free 

and fair elections, and so on and so forth. But, for all these similarities, there is also one very important difference, and that is that 

members of the Soviet Politburo did not hold their bank accounts 

in the West, they did not send their kids to study in the West, they 

did not buy real estate and yachts in the West. Leaders of the current regime and Kremlin-connected oligarchs do that. And I think 

there is a double standard, and this hypocrisy has to stop. And we 

certainly know from experience that, when high-ranking human 

rights abusers are placed on the sanction list, it has a very strong 

effect. And I can give you just one example. 

In 2007, when there was this whole controversy about the relocation of a Soviet war memorial in Tallinn, in Estonia, members of 

the Nashi, which was a pro-Kremlin youth group, engaged in a 

harassment campaign against the then Estonian Ambassador to 

Moscow, Marina Kaljurand. She is currently the Estonian Foreign 

Minister. They were following her everywhere, trying to sabotage 

her press conferences, throwing things at her, and shouting abuse, 

and so on and so forth. And so, the Estonian Government decided 

to impose visa sanctions on Mr. Yakimenko, who was then the 

serving minister in Mr. Putin’s government, Minister for Youth. 

And he was the de facto leader of this group. So, he was placed on 

a visa ban list. And, because Estonia is a member of the Schengen 

Agreement, this visa ban had a Schengen-wide force, so he could 

not travel to any Schengen country, which is most of the European 

Union. 

So, for 9 years that have passed since then, Mr. Yakimenko has 

been desperately trying to get himself off that list, off the visa 

black list. And, for all those 9 years, for all the other transgressions 

and all the other human rights abuses that are happening in our 

country, there has not been a single case of harassment against a 

foreign diplomat stationed in Moscow. And I think this is all you 

need to know about the effect and the effectiveness of these types 

of personal targeted measures against those human rights abusers. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Satter, do you want to add anything? 

Mr. SATTER. Well, I think that the future of Russia depends—I 

have been involved with Russia for many years, and have thought 

a great deal about it. I think the first priority—the danger of participating in elections, which the regime controls, although I am 

not opposed to it, is that it gives legitimacy to the regime and actually, under controlled circumstances, gives the impression to the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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population that what is taking place is a real democratic process. 

This is the same dilemma that people face—for example, I faced it 

one time when I was receiving invitations to appear on Russian television, that I did not want to take part in a performance that, in 

fact, was not honest and was—did not conform to normal ethical 

rules. I think—but, to—but, the—there is some value in taking 

part in these elections, as long as those who do so do not nurture 

illusions that this can change the regime. It cannot. That is a process that is controlled by the regime. The regime will be changed 

in other ways. 

Most important, in my view, requirement for Russia’s future is 

something—a Russian equivalent of the South African Commission 

on Truth and Reconciliation. The 25 years of post-communist history are not well understood. And, unfortunately, the abuses began 

not with Putin—Putin is the handpicked successor of Boris 

Yeltsin—they began with Yeltsin. And the crimes began with 

Yeltsin. They began it with the massacre at the Ostankino television tower in 1993, and the shelling of the Russian parliament. 

The carpet-bombing of Grozny in 1995, in which the—it is estimated 20,000 people were killed, all of them—almost all of them 

civilians. Now it appears that the 1996 elections in which Yeltsin 

was, quote/unquote, ‘‘reelected’’ were falsified. And, most important 

of all, the circumstances under which Putin became the new Russian President—he became the President in the aftermath of the 

bombing of four apartment buildings in Russia that terrified the 

entire country, galvanized support for a new and even more bloody 

war in Chechnya, and created the conditions for Putin, who had a 

2-percent approval rating in the country, to become the national 

savior and the country’s new President. When he took over as 

President, he brought with him his KGB–FSB entourage, and they 

proceeded to eliminate what was left of the freedoms that had been 

tolerated under Yeltsin. 

The precondition for Putin’s coming to power was the criminalization of Russia under Yeltsin, because only a provocation like the 

apartment bombings could save such a kleptocratic regime as the 

one that was put in place by Yeltsin under conditions of formal democracy. This group that is now in power will do anything to hold 

onto power, but one of the most important instruments at their disposal is the ability to confuse the population about the population—about the people’s true interests and their true history. 

So, the first requirement for Russia’s resurrection, in my view, 

is to clarify all of the historical episodes—the apartment bombings, 

the Nordost Theater siege, the Beslan school massacre in 2004 in 

which children and parents in a gymnasium who were held hostage 

by Chechen terrorists were attacked by Russian troops with flamethrowers and grenade launchers, and burned alive, and, of course, 

the war—the wars in Georgia and Ukraine. 

Only on the basis of a true—truthful understanding of the country’s history will it be possible to change the psychological state of 

the country, making it realistic to create a genuinely law-based system. And once that psychological and ethical basis exists, it is important for Russia to have what it lost in 1918, when the Bolsheviks dispersed the constituent assembly, a new constituent assembly, in order to create a real Constitution, not the Constitution 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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1 ‘‘Golos’’ is the Russian word for ‘‘voice.’’ 

that was created in the wake of the destruction of the Russian Parliament in 1993 in order to suit the power requirements of Yeltsin. 

Under those circumstances, and with the understanding that 

those parts of the Russian Federation, including the Caucasus that 

wish to detach themselves and have an independent national existence, be given the right to do so, the conditions will then exist for 

Russia to transform itself into a democratic country. 

It must be pointed out that, as a result of 25 years of post-communist history, Russia has acquired an educated, sophisticated, 

worldly middle class for which this type of regime is absolutely inappropriate. And that process is going to continue as globalization 

continues and as people take advantage of the exposure to free information, which was denied them under the Soviet regime. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you both for being here. 

We will have a number of questions coming from people who 

were not able to be here for the second panel. We will try to have 

all those in by the close of business on Thursday. If you all could, 

please respond fairly quickly to those, though we do know you do 

not have as many staff as the previous two witnesses. 

We thank you for the light you have shed here today, for your 

personal experiences, and for your help. We look forward to having 

you back again in the near future. 

With that, the committee is adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO VICTORIA NULAND BY SENATOR CARDIN

Question 1. Venerable NGO Golos,1 which has monitored every Russia election 

since the fall of the Soviet Union, has come under increased pressure from the Putin 

regime and may have to close its doors before September’s parliamentary elections. 

♦ What is the State Department’s position on the Putin regime’s targeting of 

Golos and what diplomatic tools can we bring to bear to pressure the Putin regime to stop its harassment of the organization? 

Answer. We continue to be deeply concerned about increasing restrictions on the 

freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly in Russia. By restricting 

the work of Golos and other civil society organizations in Russia, the so-called ‘‘foreign agent law’’ law encroaches on the right of every Russian to freedom of association. Civic organizations such as Golos, AGORA, and Memorial are essential elements of societies that respect the rule of law and accountable government. The 

Russian people deserve a government that values, rather than undermines, the contributions of civil society. 

Recent harassment and fines directed toward Golos are particularly troubling as 

Russia prepares for parliamentary elections in September. A government effort to 

shutter one of Russia’s most important election watchdogs raises questions about 

the government’s commitment to free and fair elections. The Department will continue to raise these concerns at the highest level with Russian government interlocutors and in our public statements. In the OSCE and other multilateral fora we 

will also continue to call publicly on the Russian Government to uphold the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, in keeping with Russia’s 

international obligations and the rights enshrined in Russia’s own constitution. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

48 

Question 2. The New York Times reported last week on the abusive online harassment by pro-Russian forces of a Finnish reporter whose work focused on the prevalence of Russian media trolls. According to the New York Times, these trolls bombard websites and social media with fake news and commentary denunciating Russia’s critics and Western institutions. This is just one example of Putin’s use of soft 

power that seeks to discredit and divide the West. 

We have put considerable effort into confronting ISIS on the internet, but I am 

concerned that we do not have a coordinated strategy to address Russian propaganda. What is the administration’s strategy to address this onslaught of Russian 

propaganda, funding of far right parties in Europe, and other tools of soft power 

that take aim at the West? 

Answer. The State Department is leading a coordinated effort to support the free 

flow of information, build the capacity of independent local media, and refute 

disinformation, particularly in countries where Russian-language television content 

is dominated by Kremlin-backed broadcasts. 

The Department employs a combination of short-term messaging strategies and 

long-term programs to build resilience and the capacity to recognize and reject Russian Government disinformation. We have formed a cadre of Russian-speaking officers to engage with the media and by employing a Russian-language, policy-oriented 

Twitter handle, and developed exchanges to encourage independent media voices, 

including workshops on digital skills and investigative journalism. These efforts are 

focused on three distinct audiences: Western Europeans, Russian-speaking populations writ large, and Russians themselves. 

In Western Europe, we work to underscore allied unity and bolster resolve to 

work together on global challenges that include Russia’s revanchist policies. We also 

offer journalists from Western Europe to Central Asia opportunities to have a firsthand view of the realities on the ground in countries, like Ukraine, where the Kremlin often distorts the facts. 

For Russian-speaking audiences in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, we offer information and programming alternatives while bolstering the capacity of civil society and 

independent journalists to identify and dispel disinformation. Inside Russia, we 

work with media—both traditional and social—to maintain a dialogue with the public through programs that accurately describe U.S. society and our values. The U.S. 

Embassy in Moscow facilitates multiple people-to-people exchange programs, including Fulbright Scholarships, International Visitors Leadership Program, the Peer-toPeer Program; hosts approximately 70 high-level speakers per year; and maintains 

close working contacts with a network of more than 75,000 alumni of U.S.-funded 

exchange programs. 

The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) 

for Public Diplomacy chairs an Interagency Strategic Communications working 

group to coordinate messaging between EUCOM, NATO, State, OSCE, and others. 

The DAS also chairs the Ukraine/Russia Public Engagement Working Group within 

the Department, which meets weekly to develop media and engagement strategies 

to highlight the country’s successes. 

The Department hosts a Russian language communications platform, which connects 150 plus officers across the world for rapid information sharing, analysis, and 

pushback. The Bureau of Public Affairs manages the @USApoRusski Twitter handle, which has attracted 8,700 plus followers in less than a year. 

Finally, as part of a broader effort to counter Russian pressure, and in parallel 

with our public diplomacy work, in FY 2017, the Department is requesting approximately $121 million in bilateral ESF assistance funding to support civil society and 

independent media in the Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia regions, in addition 

to the funding that is centrally managed by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and USAID. 

Question 3. The Putin regime’s corrupt practices, including its violations of property rights and silencing of NGO’s monitoring corruption, fuels economic and political instability inside Russia and influences its actions abroad. 

♦ Do you support efforts to use U.S. tools, like indictments in U.S. courts, to pursue corrupt figures in Russia? 

Answer. Secretary Kerry reaffirmed the administration’s commitment to combating corruption at the Anti-Corruption Summit in London in May. Corruption 

drives political instability, erodes trust between citizens and government, cripples 

basic functions of the state like security and justice, fuels violent extremism, and 

stifles economic prosperity and human rights. The administration has deepened its 

commitment to increasing fiscal transparency and fighting corruption, including 

through initiatives such as the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Center 

(IACCC). The United States has also committed to co-hosting with the United KingFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

49 

dom the first meeting of the Global Asset Recovery Forum in 2017 in Washington, 

DC. The U.S. also remains committed to collaborating with the international community to fight against corruption. 

We have routinely voiced our concerns about corruption with the Russian Government, and remain concerned about corruption in Russia at all levels of the government. We strongly urge the government of Russia to support efforts, including by 

civil society and non-governmental actors, to promote increased transparency and to 

counter corruption. 

Question 4. The Magnitsky Act, in addition to sanctioning those who were 

complicit in Sergei’s murder, sanctions those who commit gross human rights violations inside Russia. 

♦ Given the deteriorating human rights situation inside Russia, how will the administration use this authority to sanction more human rights violators under 

the Act? 

Answer. Over six years after Sergei Magnitsky’s death, we remain disturbed by 

the impunity for this and other violent crimes against activists, journalists, and the 

political opposition, as well as the growing atmosphere of intimidation for those who 

work to uncover corruption or human rights violations in the Russian Federation. 

The Department of State continues to fight impunity for human rights violations 

in Russia through implementation of the Magnitsky Act. On February 1, in concert 

with the Treasury Department, we added five new names to the list of persons sanctioned under this act, bringing the total number of publicly listed names to 39. This 

is a significant list that will continue to promote accountability for Russian officials 

for their role in the Magnitsky case or for gross violations of human rights. 

Work on this list is ongoing, but we cannot comment on specific potential future 

designations. Placing a name on this list is a serious undertaking that requires a 

determination that a person meets one or more of the criteria for inclusion on the 

list, and that determination must be supported by credible information. The law sets 

a high bar for conduct that would qualify an individual for listing under the gross 

violation of human rights prong and consequently we look very carefully at information we receive and assess whether it would support a determination that an individual fits the criteria for designation. Where there is insufficient credible information, we are unable to list individuals. 

Question 5. Russia’s implementation of its arms control agreements presents a 

mixed picture. On one hand, the United States and Russia continue to successfully 

implement the New Start Treaty and other arms control agreements. However, Russia is in clear violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and there 

are compliance concerns with the Open Skies Treaty. What diplomatic steps have 

we taken to address our concerns about Russian compliance with these treaties and 

what mechanisms exist to bring the Russians into compliance? 

Answer. Our priority is for Russia to be fully compliant with the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty to ensure the continued viability of both treaties, which have long contributed to security and stability 

in Europe and remain in the interests of the United States and our allies. 

Regarding Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, we have sought to isolate Russia 

diplomatically and persuade Russia to return to compliance. Senior administration 

officials have raised U.S. concerns over Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty dozens 

of times with Russian officials. In consultation with Allies, we are reviewing a range 

of appropriate options should Russia persist in its violation and we will not allow 

Russia to gain a significant military advantage through its INF violation. 

We continue to have concerns about conduct by Russia that raises questions about 

its adherence to obligations under the Open Skies Treaty—namely, the denial or restriction of flights over parts of its territory, including Kaliningrad, central Moscow, 

and near its border with Georgia, and inadequate air traffic control facilitation for 

Open Skies flights. We are working closely with our Allies on an approach to address these issues with Russia. These issues also continue to be raised with Russia, 

bilaterally and through the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC). 

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ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO VICTORIA NULAND BY SENATOR ISAKSON

Question 1. Are there concerns that Russia will not meet its treaty obligations by 

February 2018? 

Answer. We remain confident that the Russian Federation is committed, as is the 

United States, to meeting the New START Treaty’s central limits by the end of the 

seven-year reduction period in February 5, 2018. 

Question 2. Should Russia fail to meet its treaty obligations—as it has with the 

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, what will the repercussions be? 

Answer. We remain confident that the Russian Federation is committed, as is the 

United States, to meeting the New START Treaty’s central limits by February 5, 

2018. If they are not met, any repercussions would be for the next Presidential administration to decide. 

Question 3. Have there been any repercussions for its failure to comply with the 

1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty? 

Answer. We have conveyed to Russian officials that we expect the Russian Federation to cease any further development, testing, production, and deployment of the 

missile system that is noncompliant with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty and to eliminate the existing missiles and launchers in a verifiable 

manner. We have consulted our European and Asian allies every step of the way 

and are maintaining cohesion with them. While this treaty violation is only one element of Russia’s overall bellicose attitude to its international obligations, it is an 

element that contributes to Russia’s isolation. 

We continue to pursue the diplomatic resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia, as 

the INF Treaty benefits the security of the United States, our allies, and Russia, 

and contributes to stability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The priority of 

the United States is to return Russia to compliance to ensure the continued viability 

of the Treaty, and we continue to engage the Russian Government to resolve our 

concerns. 

The administration is committed to ensuring that Russia gains no military advantage from its violation of the INF Treaty. Russia’s violation of the Treaty, and its 

policies that challenge the European security order, are not going unanswered. The 

administration has determined that we need to consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior 

that flouts international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order. 

Question 4. As you may know, President Putin made comments in April stating 

that the administration’s plan to end the MOX program will deviate from our obligations under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PDMA). Indeed, Putin skipped this year’s Nuclear Security Summit citing the cancelling of the 

MOX program as the reason. 

♦ Are his comments valid? 

♦ From the State Department’s perspective, does this complicate our efforts to get 

Russia’s compliance on key arms control treaties—including New START? 

Answer. We regret Russia’s decision not to participate in the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. We hope that Russia still shares the view that securing nuclear materials and combating nuclear terrorism are priorities well worth the personal attention of world leaders. The Summit was a unique opportunity to spur more aggressive action toward success on these important security priorities. 

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which the 

United States and the Russian Federation signed in 2000 and which entered into 

force in 2011, provides a path for the Parties to consult and agree on disposition 

methods that do not involve irradiation in nuclear reactors. The PMDA does not set 

binding timelines. The United States has not violated this agreement and any suggestions to the contrary are inaccurate. We remain fully committed to meeting our 

obligations under the agreement. In addition, Mr. Putin’s suggestion at the time 

that the United States seeks to retain a ‘‘breakout capability’’ for additional weapons production is simply false. 

As stated in the most recent Annual Report on the Implementation of the New 

START Treaty, which was provided to Congress in January 2016, the United States 

certified, based on information available as of December 31, 2015, that the Russian 

Federation was in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty. We do not 

consider President Putin’s comments regarding the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) program have any impact on New START implementation. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

51 

Question 5. Has the United States allowed some areas of noncompliance to slide 

in order to gain Russia’s support in other foreign policy objectives, i.e. Iran? 

Answer. No. The United States takes matters of treaty compliance very seriously. 

We are not afraid to raise our concerns with our treaty partners or publicly. 

Question 6. Russia has failed to recognize the sovereignty of many of its neighbors, which destabilizes the region. Beyond our engagement with NATO partners, 

can you discuss U.S. efforts to counter Russia’s increasing presence and influence 

in places like Georgia, Armenia, and Syria? 

Answer. Georgia: Despite Russia’s warnings to Georgia, the United States continues to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. The United States 

provided more than $75 million in foreign assistance to Georgia in FY 15 to promote 

democratic, economic, judicial, and other reforms, and to assist the country in 

achieving its goal of integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. U.S. foreign military financing for Georgia seeks to enhance ties to NATO by increasing the interoperability of its armed forces with NATO, strengthening its institutional capacity 

to train, field, and care for its forces, and modernizing Georgia’s defense institutions. 

The United States also provides assistance to improve access to independent information in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to promote national unity throughout 

Georgia. We continue to press Russia to give the EU Monitoring Mission access to 

both sides of the Administrative Border Lines. We also participate in the Geneva 

International Discussions and work with our partners at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and reach a lasting settlement to the conflict. 

Armenia: The United States provided approximately $27 million in FY 2014 and 

more than $16 million in FY 2015 in foreign assistance to Armenia in support of 

reforms that are key to Armenia’s democratic development and European integration. Despite Armenia’s decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on December 4, 2014, the United States will continue to support Armenia’s links to Europe, as well as support its efforts to increase its energy security and economic prosperity. The United States remains engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve the 

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully and to reopen Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey. We maintain positive and constructive military-to-military cooperation, including by supporting Armenia’s contributions to international peacekeeping operations, helping to professionalize its forces, and inviting select military 

officer to train in the United States through our security assistance programs. 

Syria: The United States will continue our campaign to degrade and defeat Da’esh 

and support a moderate opposition that is essential for a political solution to the 

Syrian crisis. We have pressured Russia to use its influence to compel the Asad regime to stop its attacks against innocent civilians during the cessation of hostilities 

and to agree to a political transition through talks in Geneva with the United Nations. We have also repeatedly conveyed our concerns to Russian officials that its 

intervention in Syria has exacerbated, and will continue to exacerbate, the sectarian 

divide and the humanitarian crisis, unless a political solution can be reached. We 

are holding Russia to its commitments, including in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which lays out the steps for a Syrian-led political transition, and which Russia supported in the Security Council. 

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO VICTORIA NULAND BY SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. How is the United States working with media organizations and civil 

society in Russia to support democracy, free speech and the rule of law in Russia? 

How is the United States encouraging political openness in Russia? 

Answer. Despite the closing space for civil society, Russian organizations and individuals continue to express a desire to engage with the United States. As long as 

this continues to be the case, the United States will support opportunities for peerto-peer, educational, cultural, and other regional programs that create opportunities 

to exchange views and best practices. It is also our position that free media and free 

speech are the best way to fight propaganda. We will continue to support a number 

of programs in the region that help build the capacity of independent media, and 

provide legal and physical defense of journalists and activists suffering from government repression and retaliation. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

52 

We will continue to raise our concerns about the human rights situation in Russia 

at the highest levels, both in public and in private. We will continue to speak out 

against laws and practices that serve to impede the work of civil society and contravene the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association. 

We spoke out following the tragic murder of Boris Nemtsov, when the laws on 

foreign agents and undesirableorganizations were passed, when the offices of human 

rights groups have been raided, and when the Russian Government failed to condemn the threats that Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov made against journalists and members of the political opposition. We are heartened that there continue 

to be human rights defenders, journalists, and activists willing to continue their 

work in Russia, often at great personal risk, and we stand ready to support them. 

On March 29, Secretary Kerry presented the Department’s International Woman of 

Courage Award to Zhanna Nemtsova, Boris Nemtsov’s daughter, for her courageous 

activism in her father’s memory. 

As Russia prepares for parliamentary elections in September, we will continue to 

call on the Russian Government to foster an environment in which dissent is tolerated and those who express dissenting views are protected, in keeping with the 

rights enshrined in Russia’s own constitution. 

We also will continue to fight impunity for human rights abuses in Russia 

through implementation of the Magnitsky Act. On February 1, in concert with the 

Treasury Department, we added five new names to the list of persons sanctioned 

under this act, bringing the total number of publicly listed names to 39. This is a 

significant list that will continue to hold Russian officials accountable for their role 

in the Magnitsky case or other gross violations of human rights. 

Question 2. What efforts is the United States making to protect the rights of 

LGBTQ individuals in Russia? 

Answer. The promotion and protection of the human rights of LGBTI persons is 

an essential part of the United States’ foreign policy. Our efforts are guided by 

President Obama’s December 2011 Presidential Memorandum on International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of LGBT Persons, which directs federal departments and agencies to combat the criminalization of LGBT status or conduct 

abroad; protect vulnerable LGBT refugees or asylum seekers; enhance assistance to 

protect human rights and advance nondiscrimination for LGBT persons; and help 

ensure swift and meaningful responses to human rights abuses of LGBT persons 

abroad. 

We have spoken out consistently against anti-LGBTI legislation in Russia, where 

a law banning the distribution of so-called ‘‘LGBTI propaganda’’ to minors, which 

effectively limits the rights of LGBTI citizens and their allies to free expression and 

assembly. We are also concerned that this law appears to have emboldened extremist elements to commit attacks on LGBTI citizens. Our Ambassador in Moscow and 

other State Department officials have regularly raised U.S. concerns with Russian 

officials. Embassy Moscow also remains in close contact with the LGBTI community 

in Russia and includes LGBTI activists in roundtables, exchanges, and other initiatives. In addition to our public statements, we repeatedly have also raised restrictive legislation and hate crimes in Russia against LGBT individuals in OSCE and 

other multilateral meetings. 

Question 3. Russia’s continued support for the Asad regime has countered the efforts of the United States and our coalition partners in Syria and the region. While 

Russia has played a role in the negotiations to end the conflict in Syria, Russia’s 

military intervention has bolstered the position of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad 

in peace negotiations. 

The administration has asserted that Asad’s eventual removal from power will be 

critical to any long-term solution to the Syrian civil war. 

♦ Given Russia’s interests in preserving the Asad regime, are the Russians undertaking actions to help facilitate Asad’s eventual departure? 

♦ How is Russia working with the Syrian Government to allow for humanitarian 

relief to areas under the Syrian regime’s control? 

Answer. We continue to press Russia to work towards a genuine Syrian-led political transition in Syria and to persuade Russia to encourage Asad’s departure. Russia voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a Syrianled political transition that establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and a process leading to a new constitution. Russia’s military and political actions, however, have supported Asad and tightened his grip on power. Our diplomatic engagement is intended to persuade all parties that there is no military solution to this conflict and that we must use the cessation of hostilities to allow huFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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manitarian access to populations in need and to provide space for the political process to develop. 

We continue to press the Russians to use their influence with the regime to allow 

full access for humanitarian aid on the basis of assessments made by the UN, not 

the regime. Since the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) went into effect, Russia has 

been helpful in convincing Asad to allow the passage of some humanitarian aid convoys. Since the beginning of 2016, the UN—in coordination with the ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent—has reached over 820,000 civilians in besieged, hard-toreach, and other priority locations. One recent positive development concerns 

Daraya, where on June 9 convoys brought food assistance to the town, which had 

not received humanitarian assistance since 2012. Despite these successes, far too 

many communities in Syria remain in need and Russia needs to do more to honor 

its commitments to use its influence with the regime to address these humanitarian 

emergencies. 

ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

TO VICTORIA NULAND BY SENATOR PERDUE

Question 1. As you know, in its 2016 Arms Control Compliance Report, the State 

Department found that for the third year in a row, Russia stands in violation of the 

INF treaty because it continues to develop, possess, produce, and test groundlaunched cruise missiles (GCLMs) and launchers with medium-range capabilities. 

As State’s report tells us, the Department has ‘‘as was the case in previous years 

. . . raised concerns’’ with Russia on repeated occasions to resolve this issue. It appears that our efforts to raise our concerns with Russia aren’t working, and they 

repeatedly deny that they are in violation with the INF Treaty. 

♦ What more can be done to pressure Russia to return to compliance with the INF 

Treaty? 

♦ What are the implications for U.S. security interests of a continued failure by 

the Russians to be in compliance with INF? 

Answer. We have sought to isolate Russia diplomatically and persuade Russia to 

return to compliance. senior administration officials have raised U.S. concerns over 

Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty dozens of times with Russian officials. We continue to engage Allies and encourage them to tell Russia the importance that they 

place on the INF Treaty for European security. 

We and NATO believe that the INF Treaty is integral to European security. In 

consultation with Allies, we are reviewing a range of appropriate options should 

Russia persist in its violation. We will not allow Russia to gain a significant military 

advantage through its INF violation. Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty has been 

factored into our response to Russia’s overall aggressive behavior. 

Question 2. We’ve seen incident after incident in which Russian aircraft are performing dangerous and irresponsible maneuvers near American aircraft and naval 

vessels. This is in direct violation of the 1972 agreement (on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas), in which Article IV states that, ‘‘commanders 

of aircraft of parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party operating on and over the high seas, and . . . shall 

not permit simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and 

ships, or performance of various acrobatics over ships.’’ 

♦ What diplomatic efforts is the State Department pursuing, if any, to deter this 

Russian military aggression? 

♦ Does State coordinate with DoD on any efforts to deter this aggression? If so, 

can you speak to what is being done at the DoD to discourage this continued 

aggressive military behavior from Russia? Are the Russians aware of the fact 

that they’re violating this 1972 agreement with us? Do they care? 

• The Departments of State and Defense routinely coordinate on strong responses 

to Russia’s unsafe and unprofessional behavior. For instance, we have vigorously protested the actions of Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea on April 11- 

12, April 14, and April 29 to the Government of the Russian Federation. I, as 

well as Ambassador Tefft and the U.S. Embassy Moscow staff, formally protested these incidents at senior levels with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Russian Security Council. In addition, Secretary Kerry raised this issue directly with Foreign Minister Lavrov. In Washington, the Department of Defense has repeatedly protested the Russian actions 

to the Russian Ambassador. On April 20, the United States and several of our 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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NATO Allies protested these incidents during a NATO-Russia Council meeting. 

On each occasion, we have stressed the risk that such behavior could result in 

loss of life, and we called for Russia’s aircraft to observe international standards 

and professional safety practices. 

• Bilateral discussions under the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents 

On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA) were held in Moscow on June 8. I refer 

you to the Department of Defense for details, but we understand the topic of 

unsafe Russian flights was discussed in detail and the two sides also considered 

measures to mitigate the risks of accidents occurring. 

In public remarks and in Russian interactions with us about the incidents, Russian officials have claimed that they are flying at safe distances, have inaccurately 

characterized certain aspects of the incidents, and have repeatedly asserted that 

their actions are a response to our operations in areas they deem politically sensitive. 

Question 3. What efforts are being made to encourage a Russian withdrawal from 

Georgia? 

Answer. The United States strongly supports Georgia’s sovereignty, independence, 

and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. We participate 

in the Geneva International Discussions, the forum that addresses the ongoing security and humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Georgia. In Geneva, our primary objective is to draw attention to Russia’s violation of the August 2008 ceasefire 

agreement through its continuing occupation of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia regions. We strongly object to Russia’s policy of ‘‘borderization,’’ through 

which Russia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia harden 

the Administrative Boundary Lines separating the occupied territories from the rest 

of Georgia. We continue to push Russia to end its military occupation of the territories and reverse its recognition of their purported independence, permit unfettered 

international access to the territories, and facilitate freedom of movement across the 

Administrative Boundary Lines for all citizens of Georgia. 

Question 4. How can we prevent Ukraine from becoming a similar frozen conflict? 

Answer. The best opportunity to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine is to seek 

the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. We continue to work with our 

Normandy partners to support their efforts to accelerate Minsk implementation. 

At the same time, we must maintain transatlantic unity on sanctions, which must 

remain in place until Moscow fully implements its Minsk commitments. 

Question 5. What are the lessons learned from Georgia that could be applied to 

Ukraine-both in dealing with Russian aggression, but also in institution building 

and countering corruption and propaganda? 

Answer. We believe that the Minsk agreements are the best and only way to 

achieve peace in eastern Ukraine. Since the start of the crisis in Ukraine, the 

United States, EU, G-7, and other nations have worked in close cooperation to develop sanctions that increase pressure on Russia and support Ukraine’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity. The pressure of sanctions and the framework of the Minsk 

agreements provide an opportunity to confront Russian aggression. 

We have been very clear with Moscow that sanctions will remain in place until 

Russia fully implements its commitments under the Minsk agreements and returns 

control of Crimea to Ukraine. We are prepared to increase costs on Russia if it takes 

new aggressive actions in Ukraine. 

As in Georgia, the United States will implement long-term assistance programming in Ukraine to build democratic institutions, promote economic development, 

combat corruption, and strengthen Euro-Atlantic integration. U.S. assistance in 

anti-corruption and security has been critical in aiding both Ukraine and Georgia 

in confronting Russian aggression. In Ukraine, we have committed over $600 million 

in training and equipment since the start of the crisis to help Ukraine’s forces monitor and secure Ukraine’s borders, operate more safely and effectively, and defend 

their country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance has 

saved lives while helping to build Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity. 

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement achieved one of our most visible successes in U.S. assistance programming in 

fostering the establishment and rollout of patrol police in every major Ukrainian 

city. This programming is similar to that implemented in Georgia. The patrol police 

have become a symbol of a new Ukraine—a force of highly-trained professionals (including over 20 percent women) whose mandate is to protect and serve the public. 

In a recent nationwide poll, the police have gone from the least trusted institution 

in Ukraine to the third most trusted, after the Army and the Church. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Question 6. This February, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI) testified that the nation of Georgia, despite all its progress on western integration and domestic reforms, is at increasing risk from Russian aggression and 

pressure. The DNI reported that, in part, Russia is capitalizing on increasing frustration in Georgia about the slow pace of western integration. Russia is taking advantage of the space created due to the seeming ambivalence on Georgia’s NATO 

membership and upcoming parliamentary elections in October. 

♦ Can you inform us about the administration’s current efforts to support Georgia’s western integration? For example, what more can be done to bring Georgia 

into NATO and demonstrate a strong U.S. political and security commitment 

to Georgia? 

♦ Are we engaging with our EU allies to help support Georgia’s integration into 

the European Union? 

Answer. The U.S. Government stands by the commitment Allies made in Bucharest that Georgia will become a member of NATO, and we continue to provide tangible support to move Georgia towards membership. Our bilateral security assistance, which totaled approximately $60 million in FY 2015, enhances Georgia’s 

NATO interoperability, enabling Georgia to deploy with NATO and EU missions 

and further its integration with western security institutions. U.S. support for Georgia within a NATO context includes contributing to a NATO Trust Fund to clear 

landmines and explosive remnants of war in Georgia and significant contributions 

to the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP). The SNGP was first approved 

in 2014, and new projects will be considered at this year’s NATO Summit, such as 

increased exercises with NATO and support in areas like strategic communications 

and cyber defense. One American serves as Deputy on the Core Team charged with 

implementing the SNGP and another heads the NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi. In 

addition, the United States lobbied-and helped secure-a visit by Allied Permanent 

Representatives to Georgia later this year. At the last Summit, we also supported 

designating Georgia as one of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOPs). Now 

that Georgia has this status, they are included in Alliance activities and political 

discussions as often as is practicable. Only five other nations hold this status. 

To speed Georgia’s integration with the EU, U.S. technical assistance helps Georgia achieve the reforms necessary to implement its Deep and Comprehensive Free 

Trade Area with the EU as part of the Association Agreement it signed in 2014. 

Priorities include accelerating integration with EU energy markets and increasing 

generation of hydropower and other alternative energy sources, as well as promoting 

sustainable economic growth in the areas of agriculture, small and medium enterprises, and workforce development. The United States strongly supports visa-free 

travel for Georgian citizens within the Schengen travel zone and has encouraged our 

European partners to grant political approval now that Georgia has met all the 

technical requirements for visa liberalization. 

For FY 2016, the United States plans to provide approximately $80.6 million in 

assistance to support Georgia’s reforms and Euro-Atlantic trajectory-this represents 

approximately a $5 million or seven percent increase above FY 2015 levels. Roughly 

half of the FY 2016 allocation will be allocated to security assistance, 28 percent 

to democracy programs, 22 percent to economic growth programs, and the remaining 

two percent to education programs. 

Question 7. How do you assess the stability of the European coalition, as a whole, 

on the Russia sanctions issue? 

Answer. EU sanctions rollovers require unanimity among all 28 EU Member 

States. To date the EU has maintained strong solidarity on Russia sanctions. We 

have robust and continual engagement with EU Member States on the need to 

maintain sanctions on Russia until Moscow fully implements its Minsk commitments. Our separate Crimea-related sanctions will remain in place until Russia returns the peninsula to Ukraine. 

Question 8. Could EU sanctions be rolled back in the next year or two? 

Answer. We have been clear that we believe sanctions must remain in place until 

Moscow fully implements its Minsk commitments. President Obama and other senior administration officials have been clear with President Putin and European leaders on this issue. 

In terms of when they are rolled back, the answer depends on Russia’s behavior. 

In March 2015, the European Council explicitly agreed that the duration of sectoral 

sanctions is linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. The 

Council maintained this linkage when it extended sectoral sanctions in December 

2015. 

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Question 9. What would that mean for European security? How might it affect 

US-EU relations? 

Answer. We believe the combined weight of U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia 

has prevented further Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and raised the costs 

of Moscow’s occupation of Crimea. We continue to work to maintain our transatlantic solidarity on this issue so that Russia may be incentivized to implement its 

Minsk commitments and end its occupation of Crimea. 

It is clear that Russia is trying, without success, to break EU solidarity, while 

failing to fully implement its commitments under Minsk. Despite Russia’s efforts, 

U.S.-EU solidarity on sanctions will remain strong. 

Question 10. We are seeing less of a conventional show of force from Russia, but 

an intensification of so-called hybrid warfare. Russia is using a dangerous combination of cyberattacks, propaganda, and little green men to destabilize and otherwise 

subvert Ukraine. Last December, Russia was behind a cyberattack on Ukraine’s 

power grid that caused widespread outages, a fact confirmed by Obama administration officials last month. 

♦ How do you think Russia might use cyber warfare going forward to destabilize 

Ukraine? 

Answer. With regard to the December 2015 attack on Ukraine’s power grid, the 

United States has not made any judgements on attribution, but we view malicious 

cyber activity that targets critical infrastructure particularly seriously, as it potentially places the public at risk of harm. 

The Director for National Intelligence has recently assessed that Russian cyber 

operations are likely to support several strategic objectives: intelligence gathering 

to support Russian decision making in the Ukraine and Syrian crises, influence operations to support military and political objectives, and continuing preparation of 

the cyber environment for future contingencies. 

Ukraine has been an excellent partner in identifying cyber events and sharing information about tactics, techniques, and procedures. We look forward to continuing 

to work with Ukraine to build its resilience in the area of cyber defense. 

Question 11. To what extent is the return of Crimea to Ukraine a part of the discussion among leaders in the U.S. and Europe? 

Answer. Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of sovereign Ukrainian 

territory, Crimea, disrupts 70 years of international order and has drawn the condemnation of free, democratic societies around the globe. The United States does not 

and will not recognize Russia’s attempted annexation. Ending Russia’s ongoing occupation of Crimea remains a central part of our Ukraine policy. 

In response to Russia’s occupation of Crimea, the United States, in coordination 

with our European partners, instituted sanctions against Russia in December 2014. 

The sanctions prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in most economic activities with 

the territory of occupied Crimea and allow Treasury, in consultation with State, to 

designate any entity that operates there. These sanctions will remain in place as 

long as Russia continues to occupy Crimea and we are committed to a long-term 

non-recognition policy, backed with the force of sanctions. 

Since Russia’s attempted annexation, the human rights situation in Crimea has 

deteriorated dramatically, with mounting repression and harassment of individuals 

from minority communities, in particular of Crimean Tatars, those of non-Russian 

Orthodox Christian faiths, and those who oppose Russia’s occupation. De facto authorities have systematically denied individuals their fundamental freedoms of 

speech, assembly, and association. Local residents have been detained, interrogated, 

and, in many cases, subjected to forced disappearance. NGOs and independent 

media have been driven out of the peninsula. Russian occupation authorities have 

also banned the Mejlis, the legislative body of the Crimean Tatars. 

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The Department of State has consistently raised the human rights situation 

under Russian occupation at multilateral fora, in press statements, and at the podium to shine a light on ongoing abuses and mobilize the international community 

to condemn the occupation and continue to impose costs on Russia. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power has raised the human rights situation 

regularly in her remarks in the Security Council and in public events. Also, U.S. 

Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Dan Baer 

has raised by name the cases of hostages and persons unjustly detained by Russia 

in many statements in the OSCE Permanent Council. The United States will continue to raise the situation in Crimea until Russia ends its occupation of sovereign 

this piece of Ukrainian territory. 

Æ 

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