Space and Missile Defense Command

2001-Present 

The Eastern Mandates 

Campaign: 

A Staff Ride Guide for 

Operation FLINTLOCK

The Seizure of Kwajalein 

by 

Dr. James A. Walker 

Dr. Lewis Bernstein 

Mrs. Sharon Lang 

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Historical Office 

2004 
ii
Table of Contents 

Page 

Command Historian’s Preface and Acknowledgements ............................................................ xiii 

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Data Sheet ....................................................xv 

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................1 

The Colonial Period: Spanish, German and Japanese, 1550-1943 ................................................5 

Japanese and American Prewar Planning, 1904-1938 ...................................................................9 

The Japanese - American Road to War, 1940-1941 ....................................................................15 

Wartime Actions and Planning, 1941-1943 .................................................................................21 

The First Test of Amphibious Assault: Tarawa ...........................................................................27 

The Marshalls Decided On ..........................................................................................................31 

Organization and Command of Operation Flintlock ...................................................................33 

The Campaign Begins, November 1943 ......................................................................................37 

The Assault Begins, 31 January 1944 ..........................................................................................41 

The Seizure of Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944 .............................................................................45 

The First Day, 1 February 1944 ..................................................................45 

The Second Day, 2 February 1944 .............................................................49 

The Third Day, 3 February 1944 ................................................................51 

The Fourth Day, 4 February 1944 ..............................................................54 

The Roi-Namur Assault Begins, 31 January 1944 .......................................................................57 

Roi-Namur Captured, 1-2 February 1944 and The Seizure of Engebi and Eniwetok .................63 

Strategic and Tactical Significance of The Marshall Islands Campaign .....................................69 

Self-Guided Battlefield Tour .......................................................................................................73 

The Battle for Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944 .............................................73 

iii
The Battle for Roi-Namur, 1-2 February 1944 ...........................................85 

Appendices ...................................................................................................................................99 

iv
List of Illustrations, Tables and Charts 

Figure Page 

Introduction 

The Marshall Islands Flag, Maps, and Seal .................................................................................................................3 

Map of the South Pacific .............................................................................................................................................4 

The Colonial Period: Spanish, German and Japanese, 1550-1943 

Imperial Powers in Asia and the Pacific ......................................................................................................................7 

Japanese and American Prewar Planning, 1904-1938 

Secret Overlay of Majuro Atoll .................................................................................................................................13 

The Japanese - American Road to War, 1940-1941 

Far East and the Pacific, 1941 ...................................................................................................................................16 

Major Japanese War Objectives and Planned Opening Attacks, 1941 ......................................................................19 

Wartime Actions and Planning, 1941-1943 

The Pacific and Adjacent Theaters, 1942 ..................................................................................................................21 

Original Allied Strategic Concept, May 1943; Situation 1 November 1943 .............................................................24 

The First Test of Amphibious Assault: Tarawa 

Map of Betio Island with Defense Locations ............................................................................................................27 

Map of the Betio Island Assault, Second Day’s Action, 1943 ...................................................................................28 

The Marshalls Decided On 

Map of the South Pacific Ocean ................................................................................................................................32 

Organization and Command of Operation Flintlock 

Operation Flintlock, Aerial View of Ships in the Lagoon .........................................................................................35 

Operation Flintlock, D Day .......................................................................................................................................35 

Sunrise over the Marshall Islands ..............................................................................................................................36 

The Campaign Begins, November 1943 

Map of Landings and First Two Days of Battle on Kwajalein Island ........................................................................40 

The Assault Begins, 31 January 1944 

Map of Kwajalein Atoll, Inset of Kwajalein Island ...................................................................................................41 

Kwajalein Island Bombardment ................................................................................................................................42 

75mm Pack Howitzer Giving Fire Support ...............................................................................................................43 

Fire Support ............................................................................................................................................................44 

The Seizure of Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944 

The First Day, 1 February 1944

Kwajalein Island – Operation Flintlock .....................................................................................................................45 

Aerial View of Battlefield on D Day .........................................................................................................................46 

Operation Flintlock - D Day, Landing Craft Approaching Kwajalein .......................................................................47 

Tanks on Kwajalein ...................................................................................................................................................48 

Firing at a Pill Box, Kwajalein ..................................................................................................................................48 

The Second Day, 2 February 1944 

Map, Landings and First Two Days of Battle on Kwajalein Island ...........................................................................49 

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Meal Break, Kwajalein ..............................................................................................................................................49 

LSTs Unloading on Kwajalein, in Support of Seventh Infantry Division Troops .....................................................50 

The Third Day, 3 February 1944 

Map, Third Day on Kwajalein, Morning, 1944 .........................................................................................................51 

Soldiers and Light Tank Moving Through Jungle, Kwajalein (right) ........................................................................52 

Battlefield, Kwajalein (below) ...................................................................................................................................52 

Map, Third Day on Kwajalein Island, Afternoon, 1944 ............................................................................................53 

The Fourth Day, 4 February 1944

Map, Last Day of Battle on Kwajalein Island, 1944 ..................................................................................................54 

Hot Spot – Main Drag, Kwajalein .............................................................................................................................56 

The Roi-Namur Assault Begins, 31 January 1944 

Map, Capture of Roi and Namur, WWII ...................................................................................................................57 

Map of Kwajalein Atoll, Inset of Kwajalein Island ...................................................................................................58 

Roi-Namur Island Bombardment ..............................................................................................................................60 

Roi-Namur Island Bombardment, SSW View ...........................................................................................................61 

Roi-Namur Captured, 1-2 February 1944 and The Seizure of Engebi and Eniwetok 

Map, Capture of Roi and Namur, 1944 .....................................................................................................................63 

Aerial View of Roi-Namur Bombardment ................................................................................................................64 

Building Destroyed ....................................................................................................................................................64 

The Great Explosion ..................................................................................................................................................65 

An Aerial View of the Great Explosion .....................................................................................................................65 

Japanese Prisoner Taken ............................................................................................................................................66 

Tanks Maneuver Through Battlefield ........................................................................................................................67 

Destruction (top) ........................................................................................................................................................68 

Marines Advancing on the Battlefield (middle) ........................................................................................................68 

Funeral (bottom) ........................................................................................................................................................68 

Strategic and Tactical Significance of The Marshall Islands Campaign

Marines Climbing Down Nets from a Transport into a Landing Craft, Kwajalein Atoll ..........................................69

Landing Craft in the Lagoon ......................................................................................................................................71 

Marshall Island Battle collage ...................................................................................................................................72 

Self – Guided Battlefield Tour

Kwajalein

Kwajalein on the Day of the Invasion .......................................................................................................................73 

LCVPs Approaching the Line of Departure ..............................................................................................................74 

Fire Support from Carlos and Carlson .......................................................................................................................75 

These maps show Kwajalein today, with the Locations of the Battlefield Markers, the Landings and First 

Two Days of the Battle on Kwajalein Island ....................................................................................76 

Diagram of a Typical Field Fortification System ......................................................................................................77 

Photo of Japanese Field Fortifications .......................................................................................................................78 

Battlefield Markers 3 and 4 .......................................................................................................................................79 

Beach Sniper Post and Adjoining Ammunition Shelter .............................................................................................79 

Meal Break Behind a pillbox (note the corpse of a Japanese soldier) .......................................................................80 

Battlefield Markers 5 and 6 .......................................................................................................................................81 

Tanks on the Battlefield .............................................................................................................................................82 

Kwajalein Island Map ................................................................................................................................................83 

Roi and Namur Island Map ........................................................................................................................................84 

Roi-Namur

This map of Roi-Namur today shows the various stops on this battlefield tour – Stops One and Two of the 

 Battle Tour ........................................................................................................................................85 

Marines Taking Cover Behind Palm Trees and Leaves .............................................................................................86 

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Stops Three, Four and Five of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour ........................................................................87 

Diagram of a Japanese Pillbox on Roi .......................................................................................................................88 

Stop Six of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour ......................................................................................................89 

Moving across Roi .....................................................................................................................................................89 

Stops Seven, Eight and Nine of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour ......................................................................90 

Map of Roi and Namur, 1944 ....................................................................................................................................91 

On the Beach on Namur ............................................................................................................................................92 

The Torpedo Warehouse Explosion ..........................................................................................................................93 

Stops Ten and Eleven of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour .................................................................................94 

Stops Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour .........................................................95 

A Single Japanese Soldier Surrenders to Marines in Front of an Ammunition Bunker .............................................96 

Stops Fifteen, Sixteen and Seventeen of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour .........................................................97 

Clearing a Dugout ......................................................................................................................................................98 

Appendices

Kwajalein Island in the Distance ................................................................................................................................99 

Appendix A

Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi ...............................................................................................................101 

President Chiang Kai-shek ......................................................................................................................................102 

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ......................................................................................................................103 

Map, The Far East and the Pacific 1941, The Imperial Powers 1939 ......................................................................103 

President Wang Jingwei ..........................................................................................................................................104 

Map, The Far East and the Pacific, 1941 .................................................................................................................104 

Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku ....................................................................................................................................105 

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ......................................................................................................................105 

Japanese Konoe Fumimaro ......................................................................................................................................106 

Prime Minister r Konoe and Ambassador Joseph Grew ..........................................................................................106 

Secretary of State Cordell Hull ................................................................................................................................107 

General Tojo Hideki ................................................................................................................................................107 

Japanese Navy Minister Shimada ............................................................................................................................107 

Ambassador Kurusu and Ambassador Nomura .......................................................................................................108 

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt Signing Declaration of War .........................................................................108 

General Douglas McArthur .....................................................................................................................................108 

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle ....................................................................................................................109 

Raider Taking off From the USS Hornet .................................................................................................................109 

Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright Making Surrender Broadcast .................................................................109 

Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson ......................................................................................................................110 

Japanese War Objectives and Planned Opening Attacks .........................................................................................110 

Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance ......................................................................................................................111 

Admiral William Halsey ..........................................................................................................................................111 

Admiral Thomas Kincaid ........................................................................................................................................111 

Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner ....................................................................................................................112 

Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall ...........................................................................................................................112 

Map, Betio Inset Map of Tarawa Atoll ....................................................................................................................113 

Map, Original Strategic Conception and Situation, 1 November 1943 ...................................................................113 

Major General Holland M. Smith ............................................................................................................................113 

Makin Atoll and Tarawa Atoll Maps .......................................................................................................................114 

D Day, The Main Defensive Area of Butaritari .......................................................................................................114 

Major General Ralph C. Smith ................................................................................................................................115 

Map, First Night on Butaritari, 20-21 November 1943 ...........................................................................................115 

Major General Julian C. Smith ................................................................................................................................116 

Map, Betio Island ....................................................................................................................................................116 

Map, Second Day’s Action, 21 November 1943, Makin Island ..............................................................................117 

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Map, Capture of Betio, 20-23 November 1943 .......................................................................................................117 

Map, Securing Makin, 22-23 November 1943 ........................................................................................................118 

Map, Progress and Prospects, 31 December 1943 ...................................................................................................120 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz .....................................................................................................................................121 

Admiral Marc Mitscher ...........................................................................................................................................122 

Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill ....................................................................................................................................122 

Marines Climbing Down Nets from a Transport into a Landing Craft, Kwajalein ..................................................123 

Map, Kwajalein Atoll Map with inset of Island ......................................................................................................124 

Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly ............................................................................................................................124 

Aerial View of Roi-Namur under Bombardment ....................................................................................................125 

Major General Charles C. Corlett ............................................................................................................................126 

Map, Landings and First Two Days of Battle on Kwajalein Island .........................................................................126 

Soldiers and Light Tank Moving Through Jungle, Kwajalein .................................................................................127 

Map, Capture of Roi and Namur, 1-2 February 1944 ..............................................................................................128 

Marines Carrying Ammunition Boxes .....................................................................................................................128 

Sniper, Kwajalein ....................................................................................................................................................128 

Marines Firing at Japanese Snipers, Roi-Namur .....................................................................................................129 

Map, Third Day on Kwajalein Island, Morning of 3 February 1944 .......................................................................130 

Map, Japanese Killed in Action serving as Gun Crew, Kwajalein ..........................................................................131 

Map, Third Day on Kwajalein Island, Afternoon of 3 February 1944 .....................................................................132 

Japanese Killed in Action in Foxhole Courtesy Chrysler Corporation, Kwajalein ..................................................133 

Map, Last Day of Battle on Kwajalein Island, 4 February 1944 .............................................................................134 

After the Battle, Kwajalein ......................................................................................................................................135 

Stretcher Bearers, Kwajalein -...................................................................................................................................135 

Marines Holding a Funeral Service, Roi-Namur .....................................................................................................136 

Map, Eniwetok Atoll Map .......................................................................................................................................137 

Map, The Capture of Engebi, 17 February 1944 .....................................................................................................138 

Map, The Capture of Eniwetok Atoll, 19-21 February 1944 ...................................................................................139 

Map, of the Central Pacific, Kwajalein Showing geographical relationships ..........................................................140 

Appendix B

USS Indianapolis .....................................................................................................................................................141 

USS Rocky Mount ...................................................................................................................................................141 

USS Appalachian .....................................................................................................................................................143 

Major General Harry Schmidt .................................................................................................................................143 

Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson .....................................................................................................................144 

Rear Admiral John H. Hoover .................................................................................................................................146 

Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood .......................................................................................................................146 

Chart 1 Task Organization for Various Commands for the Attack on the Gilbert Islands ......................................147

Chart 2 Task Force of Major Commands for the Attack on Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls .....................................147 

Chart 3 Task Organization of Major Commands of the Attack on Eniwetok ..........................................................148 

Appendix C

General Richard L. Conolly .....................................................................................................................................149 

General Charles Harrison Corlett ............................................................................................................................151 

Admiral Harry W. Hill .............................................................................................................................................153 

Admiral Marc A. Mitscher ......................................................................................................................................155 

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz ....................................................................................................................157 

General Harry Schmidt ............................................................................................................................................161 

General Holland McTyeire Smith ............................................................................................................................163 

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance ...............................................................................................................................166 

Admiral Richmond K. Turner ..................................................................................................................................168 

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Appendix D

The United States Army and Marine Corps

Infantry Weapons

M1911A1 pistol .......................................................................................................................................................169 

M1A1 (Thompson) submachine gun .......................................................................................................................169 

M1903 rifle (Springfield) ........................................................................................................................................169 

M1 rifle (Garand) .....................................................................................................................................................169 

M1 carbine ...............................................................................................................................................................169 

M1918A2 Browning Automatic rifle (BAR) ...........................................................................................................169 

M1919A4 (Browning light machine gun) ...............................................................................................................169 

M1917A1 (Browning heavy machine gun) .............................................................................................................169 

Browning M2HB (Heavy Barrel) ............................................................................................................................169 

Mortars and Anti-Tank Weapons

M2 60mm Mortar ....................................................................................................................................................170 

M1 81mm Mortar ....................................................................................................................................................170 

M1A1 Rocket Launcher (Bazooka) .........................................................................................................................170 

M2A1 37mm antitank gun .......................................................................................................................................170 

M2-2 Portable Flamethrower ...................................................................................................................................170 

Artillery

M8 75mm Pack Howitzer ........................................................................................................................................171 

M2 105mm Howitzer ...............................................................................................................................................171 

M1 155mm Howitzer ...............................................................................................................................................171 

Tanks

M4A1 Sherman Medium Tank ................................................................................................................................171 

M5A1 Stuart Light Tank .........................................................................................................................................171 

Imperial Japanese Army

Infantry Weapons

Model 14 (1925) 8mm Pistol ...................................................................................................................................172 

6.5mm Model 38 (Arisaka) Rifle .............................................................................................................................172 

7.7mm Model 99 (Arisaka) Rifle .............................................................................................................................172 

Model 96 (1936) 6.5mm Light Machine Gun ..........................................................................................................172 

Model 99 (1939) 7.7mm Light Machine Gun ..........................................................................................................172 

Model 92 (1932) 7.7mm Heavy Machine Gun ........................................................................................................172 

Model 93 (1933) 13mm Machine Gun ....................................................................................................................172 

Model 89 (1929) 50mm Grenade Discharger (“Knee Mortar”) ...............................................................................172 

Model 99 (1939) 81mm Mortar ...............................................................................................................................172 

Artillery

Model 1 (1941) 47mm Gun .....................................................................................................................................173 

Model 92 (1932) 70mm Howitzer ...........................................................................................................................173 

Model 38 (1905) 75mm Gun ...................................................................................................................................173 

Model 41 (1908) 75mm Infantry Gun .....................................................................................................................173 

Model 91 (1931) 105mm Howitzer .........................................................................................................................173 

Tanks

Type 95 Ha-Go Light Tank .....................................................................................................................................174 

Appendix E

Aircraft Carriers

Lexington Class Aircraft Carrier, USS Saratoga .....................................................................................................176 

Yorktown Class Aircraft Carrier, USS Enterprise ...................................................................................................176 

Essex Class Short Hull Group, USS Intrepid ...........................................................................................................176 

Independence Class Light Carrier, USS Cabot ........................................................................................................177 

Bogue Class Escort Carrier, USS Nassau ................................................................................................................177 

Sangamon Class Escort Carrier, USS Sangamon ....................................................................................................177 

Casablanca Class Escort Carrier, USS Corregidor ..................................................................................................177 

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Battleships

Pennsylvania Class Battleship, USS Pennsylvania ..................................................................................................179 

New Mexico Class Battleship, USS Mississippi .....................................................................................................179 

Tennessee Class Battleship, USS Tennessee ...........................................................................................................179 

Colorado Class Battleship, USS Maryland ..............................................................................................................180 

North Carolina Class Battleship, North Carolina ....................................................................................................180 

South Dakota Class Battleship, USS Alabama ........................................................................................................180 

Iowa Class Battleship, USS Iowa ............................................................................................................................180 

Cruisers

Pensacola Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Salt Lake City ..............................................................................................182 

Northampton Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Chester ....................................................................................................182 

Portland Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Portland ..........................................................................................................183 

New Orleans Heavy Class Cruiser, USS San Francisco ..........................................................................................183 

Wichita Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Wichita ............................................................................................................183 

Baltimore Heavy Class Cruiser, USS Baltimore .....................................................................................................183 

Atlanta Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Oakland ............................................................................................................183 

Cleveland Class Cruiser, USS Santa Fe ...................................................................................................................183 

Destroyers

Farragut Class Destroyer, USS Dale ........................................................................................................................185 

Porter Class Destroyer, USS Phelps ........................................................................................................................185 

Mahan Class Destroyer, USS Cummings ................................................................................................................186 

Gridley Class Destroyer, USS Craven .....................................................................................................................186 

Fanning Class Destroyer, USS Dunlap ....................................................................................................................186 

Benham Class Destroyer, USS Maury .....................................................................................................................186 

Sims Class Destroyer, USS Anderson .....................................................................................................................187 

Benson Class Destroyer, USS Bancroft ...................................................................................................................187 

Fletcher Class Destroyer, USS Bell .........................................................................................................................187 

Evarts Class Destroyer Escort, USS Burden R. Hastings ........................................................................................187 

Submarines

Porpoise, P-5 Type Class Submarine, USS Permit ..................................................................................................188 

Salmon Class Submarine, USS Seal ........................................................................................................................188 

Sargo Class Submarine, USS Squalus .....................................................................................................................188 

Gato Class Submarine, USS Guardfish ...................................................................................................................188 

Minecraft

Light Minelayer, USS Preble ...................................................................................................................................190 

Fast Minesweeper, USS Zane ..................................................................................................................................190 

Raven/Auk Class Minesweeper, USS Revenge .......................................................................................................190 

Motor Minesweeper, YMS 44 .................................................................................................................................190 

Submarine Chaser SC-497 Class, SC 1287 .............................................................................................................190 

 Specialized Amphibious Warfare Ships

Amphibious Force Command Ships

Appalachian Class Amphibious Force Command Ship, USS Appalachian .............................................................191 

Cargo Ships and Transports

Crater Class Cargo Ship, USS Kenmore .................................................................................................................193 

Attack Cargo Ship, USS Whitley ............................................................................................................................193 

Andromeda Class Attack Cargo Ship, USS Aquarius .............................................................................................193 

Arthur Middleton Class Attack Transport Ship, USS LaSalle .................................................................................193 

USS Neville, in convoy with other troopship, February 1942 .................................................................................194 

Bayfield Class Attack Transport Ship, USS Callaway ............................................................................................194 

High Speed Transport, USS Barry ...........................................................................................................................194 

Tugs and Seaplane Tenders

Fleet Tug, USS Chickasaw ......................................................................................................................................195 

Curtiss Class Seaplane Tender, USS Curtiss ...........................................................................................................195 

Barnegat Class Seaplane Tender, USS Casco ..........................................................................................................195 

x
Landing Ships and Landing Craft

Landing Ship Dock (LSD), USS Ashland ...............................................................................................................198 

Tank Landing Ship (LST) ........................................................................................................................................198 

Landing Craft Infantry (Large) [LCI(L)] .................................................................................................................198 

Landing Craft Infantry (Gunboat) [LCI(G)] ............................................................................................................198 

Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) ..........................................................................................................................199 

Tank Landing Craft (LCT) ......................................................................................................................................198 

Landing Craft Personnel (Large) [LCP(L)] .............................................................................................................199 

Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) ..............................................................................................................199 

Landing Vehicle Tracked, Mk 1 (Armored) - LVT(A)1 .........................................................................................199 

Landing Vehicle Tracked, Mk 11 (Armored) - LVT(A)2 .......................................................................................199 

DUKW Amphibious Truck ......................................................................................................................................199 

Ground and Naval Aircraft

Grumman F6F-3 Fighter “Hellcat” ..........................................................................................................................201 

Douglas SBD-5 Dive Bomber “Dauntless”/A-24 Attack Bomber “Banshee” .........................................................201 

Torpedo Bombers (TBF)-1 from USS Essex, July 1944 .........................................................................................201 

Curtiss SB2C-1 Dive Bomber “Helldiver” ..............................................................................................................201 

Consolidated PBY-5A Patrol Bomber “Catalina” ...................................................................................................201 

Martin PBM-5 Patrol Bomber “Mariner” ................................................................................................................202 

Lockheed-Vega PV-1 Patrol and Reconnaissance “Ventura” .................................................................................202 

Consolidated B-24 bomber “Liberator”/ PB4Y-1 Patrol Bomber “Liberator” ........................................................202

North American B-25 Medium Bomber “Mitchell” ................................................................................................202 

Bell P-39 Fighter/Ground Attack “Aircobra” ..........................................................................................................202 

Curtiss P-40 Fighter “Kittyhawk” ............................................................................................................................202 

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xii
Command Historian’s Preface and Acknowledgements 

The Eastern Mandates Campaign: A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK; 

The Seizure of Kwajalein Atoll is a history and a self-guided tour of Kwajalein and RoiNamur battlefield that provides an overview of the American seizure of the atoll.

Operation FLINTLOCK was mounted 70 days after the invasion of the Gilbert Islands 

and decisively proved that amphibious assault doctrine worked, and that the Army-Navy 

team Admiral Nimitz assembled could use new tactics and doctrine to defeat a 

formidable enemy. His strategic daring and use of his task forces made it possible to

proceed directly to the Marianas, increasing the operational tempo of the war against 

Japan after almost a year of relative inaction. 

At Kwajalein, the Navy was the chief coordinating service and showed it mastered 

the art of successfully striking across the seas. Even though the Marshalls were the last 

coral atolls seized and the nature of the Pacific War changed, the innovations tested there 

were important and served the Army and Navy in both the European and Pacific theaters.

The reader will quickly discover our belief that the record of Army-Navy collaboration in 

the campaign was a true success story. 

The Eastern Mandates Campaign: A Staff Ride Guide for Operation FLINTLOCK; 

The Seizure of Kwajalein Atoll is the result of research begun for a monograph on the 

Army’s use of Kwajalein as part of a national missile test range. This brief work is one 

aspect of a larger project. 

The picture and maps are from the National Archives or Department of Defense

sources with the exception of Admiral Conolly’s picture, which came from Long Island

University. The authors especially wish to thank Jay Graybeal of the U.S. Army Military 

History Institute for the pictures of and biographical information about General Corlett, 

as well as Jane Dorfman and Janet Marks archivists and reference librarians of Long 

Island University, Brooklyn Center and LIU, University Center, Brookville, NY 

respectively, for pictures and biographical information about Admiral Conolly. In

addition, we would like to acknowledge the help of the Patton Museum of Cavalry and 

Armor at Fort Knox, Dr. Boyd Dastrup, Command Historian at the Field Artillery Center 

at Fort Bliss and Z. Frank Hanner, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning for the

photos of the various types of weapons. We would also like to thank Ms. Susan Gahagan

of Sigma Services of America who designed the layout. The authors accept all 

responsibility for errors and will gratefully accept corrections. 

James A. Walker, Ph.D.

 Command Historian 
xiv 
About the U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and 

U. S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site 

The USASMDC is a unique worldwide command whose missions include space 

operations, information operations, global strike, integrated missile defense and C4ISR 

(command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance). SMDC moves warfighting technologies from concept to operations and 

is the Army Service Component Command to the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM). To accomplish its missions SMDC oversees the following elements: 

 The 1st Space Brigade (Provisional) in Colorado Springs conducts continuous, global

space support, space control and space force enhancement operations to support of

STRATCOM and combatant commanders through its 1st Satellite Control Battalion and

its Colorado and Alaska Army National Guard team members. 

SMDC-Colorado Springs manages the Army’s astronaut detachment at the Johnson 

Space Center. 

The TRADOC System Manager Ground-based Midcourse Defense (TSM-GMD)

integrates and manages GMD user activities within the Army and as a single Army user

representative and advocate in developing the land-based GMD system. 

The Force Development and Integration Center develops the Army’s space and 

missile defense concepts, validates requirements, and ensures Army-wide solution 

integration. 

The Space and Missile Defense Technical Center is the command’s research and 

development element and as the MDA’s executive agent it provides cost, schedule, and 

technical oversight for missile defense technology, and supplies the Program Executive 

Office, Air, Space, and Missile Defense with technical matrix support. 

The Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab’s introduces innovations for space, missile 

defense, C4ISR, and information operations to the warfighter through lab and field 

experiments, analysis, and simulation, leading to testing in exercises and experiments and 

in current military operations. 

The Office of Technical Integration and Interoperability combines technical and

operational requirements with materiel developers, improves interoperability for our Joint 

and Coalition warfighters, and advances Space and Integrated Air and Missile Defense. 

The Space and Missile Defense Test and Evaluation Center centralizes the 

command’s materiel development, targets, and test facility management and includes 

three facilities and program offices: the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at 

White Sands Missile Range, a national center for high-energy laser research,

development, testing, and evaluation, the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Ronald Reagan 

Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site for ballistic missile testing and space object tracking
and Fort Greely, Alaska, developing as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Testbed to 

support the MDA. 

With more than 40 years of experience in successful ballistic missile testing and

supporting space operations, the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Ronald Reagan Ballistic

Missile Defense Test Site (USAKA/RTS) plays a vital role in research, development, 

test, and evaluation for America’s defense and space programs. 

Radar, optical and telemetry sensors operated at USAKA/RTS help sustain missile 

testing, space surveillance operations and science experiments for the Departments of 

Defense and Energy as well as NASA. Instruments on the atoll collect metric, signature

and science data to characterize missile re-entry systems and maintain the STRATCOM

catalog of artificial satellites. 

Space Operations 

USAKA/RTS supports the Army’s space mission, the Air Force, NASA space 

transportation system operations and experiments, and DoD and commercial satellite 

launches. USAKA/RTS conducts space-object identification and provides orbital 

information on new foreign launches; the ALTAIR and TRADEX radars monitor deep 

space and near earth satellite observations for the Space Surveillance Network; both 

provide data on more than 42,000 tracks annually. Millimeter wave (MMW) and 

ALCOR radars provide high-resolution, near-real-time images of space objects. 

Missile Testing 

USAKA/RTS is the only exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense location and 

supports land impacts besides recovery of re-entry vehicles and test articles from the 

lagoon. Its isolated location minimizes environmental and safety constraints and allows 

control of the radio frequency spectrum. 

Sensor Complex 

The $4 billion complex of sophisticated radar, optical and telemetry sensors provides 

quantitative and qualitative data acquisition and includes radar, optics and telemetry. 

High-resolution radars provide precision metric, signature, and imaging for deep-space 

operations, satellite observations, strategic re-entry missions, and multiple-intercept 

engagement tracking. Precise optical metric data are collected on objects inside and 

outside the atmosphere using large-aperture optics equipped with video, infrared, and 

film sensors. Critical onboard missile information transmitted to the ground is collected

with nine geographically dispersed telemetry antennas while ground stations receive,

record, and display high data rate links. 

USAKA/RTS can launch strategic interceptors that destroy targets in space, smaller 

multi-stage scientific rockets that take measurements in the atmosphere, and all types of 

theater-range missiles. The integrated command and control center provides technical 

range support. 

xvi
Introduction 

he Central Pacific was one of the last places both settled by man and

divided among imperial powers. Sixteenth century Spaniards first 

reached the Marshalls looking for a shorter route to the Spice Islands of

Southeast Asia. It was not until the 18th century that English expeditions made

the first charts of the islands. Whaling ships’ crews were the most frequent 

visitors to the Marshalls through the 1850s. By the 1860s German trading firms 

were active and the German government bought the islands from Spain in the 

1880s. The Marshalls remained a German colony until October 1914. 

T 

Although Japan conquered the islands as Britain’s World War I ally, Japanese 

companies had traded there since the 1890s. While Germany ruled approximately

75 percent of the goods exported to the Marshalls came from Japan. The League

of Nations made the Marshalls a Japanese mandate in 1920. In 1922, the Pacific 

powers mutually pledged not to fortify their island possessions. In 1943 no one 

knew the extent of Japanese fortifications. 

The Pacific War began and was waged because of the irreconcilable differences

between Japan and the United States over the shape of the world expressed in 

their competing China policies. Japan’s lightning conquests between December

1941 and May 1942 shattered notions of Western invulnerability. Elated by these 

initial successes, Japan expanded its goals and moved into Burma and the islands 

of the Southwest Pacific to isolate Australia and New Zealand from their 

American ally. The drive toward Australia was halted at the Coral Sea and the 

move toward Hawaii ended at Midway. 

In July and August 1942, the strategically opportunistic allied offensive in New 

Guinea and the Solomons forestalled a renewed attack against Australia and the

sea lanes connecting the United States to the Antipodes. Although Japan was 

beaten at Midway, it was still powerful and held the strategic initiative. The loss

of four aircraft carriers did not affect land-based aviation. The attrition battles 

waged in the Southwest Pacific between July 1942 and February 1943 resulted in 

mutual exhaustion. However, the Japanese were bled of men and ships while 

American strength was increasing. 

As American and Australian forces advanced up the Solomons and across the 

New Guinea coast their landings were unopposed or met with light to medium

resistance. The same was true of the Anglo-American landings in North Africa 

(November 1942), Sicily (July 1943) and Italy (September 1943). Although the 

U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had worked to solve the problems of amphibious 

operations since 1908, actual operations had only undergone minor changes since 

the 18th century. The amphibious assault techniques the Marines had been 

devising since publishing The Tentative Landing Manual (Draft) in 1934 were 
2   

untried. The Combined Chiefs of Staff realized that an invasion of Northwest 

Europe would be an amphibious frontal assault against a fortified position. The

last attempted amphibious assault was the 1915 Gallipoli (Dardanelles) debâcle. 

Between February and November 1943, neither the Japanese nor the allies could 

exercise strategic and tactical initiative. Both seizing the initiative and the

doctrinal test began on 20 November 1943 as American forces invaded Makin and 

Tarawa Atolls (Operation Galvanic), opening a series of amphibious assaults in 

the Central Pacific. At both places, landing forces were beset with supply 

difficulties and communications failures. Of the two, the landings at Tarawa were 

made with greater difficulty and with heavier casualties. To use a historical 

analogy, Tarawa was similar to the Battle of Shiloh in that both were learning 

experiences for their commanders and both had large numbers of casualties. 

Additionally, both ushered in new eras in their respective wars. 

All three services learned from their Operation Galvanic experiences. Tarawa 

influenced the invasion of the Marshalls as the commanders closely studied the 

results and changed training as well as logistical and assault techniques. The 4th

Marine Division’s landing rehearsals in early January 1944 became a full dress 

rehearsal for the upcoming invasion. The performance of the landing craft and 

ships greatly concerned the planners. In the 7th Infantry Division, a veteran of the 

Attu invasion, combat units faced new problems because of the different 

geographic conditions in the Central Pacific. Each unit underwent intensive 

training with special emphasis placed on amphibious techniques to be used on 

Kwajalein. The entire division spent a week at the jungle training center on Oahu. 

It was battle conditioned and instructed in jungle fighting, jungle living, booby

traps and demolitions, sniping and infiltration and defense against various types of

Japanese tactics that might be employed in the coming campaign. The troops 

practiced attacking fortified positions using chemical mortars, flame throwers,

grenades, engineer-infantry teams, tanks, machine guns and rifles. 

While the Marines concentrated on amphibious assault coordination, the Army

concerned itself with remedying tactical defects uncovered in fighting at Makin 

and Tarawa, poor coordination between tanks and infantry, by training tank 

companies and platoons with the infantry battalion with which they were to work. 

The amphibious training centers also trained the joint assault signal companies to

ease ship to shore communications. 

The lessons of Tarawa helped refine intelligence gathering, improved training 

methods and pointed out the need for better vehicles for crossing reefs. The battle 

pointed up the flaws in amphibious assault doctrine as it had been practiced. The 

assault on Betio became a textbook example for future landings. The lessons 

learned were priceless. The public outcry over the relatively high cost of securing 

the atoll was fearsome. The more than 3,000 casualties were decried as excessive 

and perhaps even unnecessary. The invasion of the Marshalls would be a test for 

amphibious assault doctrine revised in light of the lessons learned at Tarawa. 
The Republic of the Marshall Islands 

Kwajalein

Roi-Namur

Meck

Carlos 

Legan 

Illeginni

Gagan 

3
4   
The Colonial Period: Spanish, German and Japanese, 

1550-1943 

ar in the Central Pacific was three dimensional—waged on land, on the sea and 

in the air. It ranged over enormous distances and took place on tiny coral atolls

as well as larger islands. The Central Pacific, one of the last places to be settled 

by man and the last area to be divided among imperial powers, was one of the first to 

experience the full ferocity and devastation of 20th century warfare. The fighting between 

1943 and 1945 stretched over the islands of Micronesia, from the Gilbert and Marshall 

Islands in the south and move west through the Caroline Islands and north to the Mariana 

Islands. 

W 

These island chains lie athwart the major sailing routes from the United States to East and 

Southeast Asia. In 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas ceded ownership of all of Micronesia to

Spain. The Marshalls, being off the main trade routes, received little attention from early

European explorers. The first Europeans to reach the region in the 16th century were

Spaniards looking for a shorter route to the Spice Islands of Southeast Asia. Garcia de 

Loyassa sighted what became the Marshalls in 1526 and Alvaro de Saavedra followed him in 

1529. In 1542, Ruy Lopez de Villalobos was the first European to report the existence of 

Kwajalein Atoll. They were followed by others and Spain annexed the islands, along with 

the Caroline and Mariana Islands in 1686. The Spanish used the island chains as possible 

way stations for its portion of trade with China and the Spice Islands. The Manila galleon

made semi-annual voyages between the west coast of Mexico and the Philippines. 

The Marshall and Gilbert Islands slipped out of the European imagination until the 18th

century. In 1765, British Commodore John Byron explored a portion of the Gilberts while 

the rest of the chain was first charted by Captain Thomas Gilbert in 1788. At the same time, 

Captain John Marshall charted the island chain to the north. The two published the first 

maps of the region and named the two island chains after themselves. Other Westerners

visited most of the other islands between 1799 and 1824. Much mapping was done on 

Russian expeditions under Adam Johann von Krusenstern (1803) and Otto von Kotzebue 

(1815 and 1823). Until the 1850s the most frequent visitors were whaling ships’ crews. By 

1857, Protestant missionaries, notably the Reverend Hiram Bingham, Jr. of the American 

Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions created a missionary outpost in the Marshalls

on Ebon. 

In the 1860s Adolph Capelle built the first large-scale trading company in the Marshalls 

and several other German trading firms begin operations in the Marshalls soon thereafter. In 

the 1870s, German commercial interests began to expand in the Central Pacific. In 1878, a 

German naval captain negotiated a treaty with the local rulers that granted special trade

privileges to German traders. In 1885, with the aid of Pope Leo XIII, the German 

government annexed the Marshalls and compensated Spain with $4.5 million. There was

friction between British interests in the Gilberts and the Germans in the Marshalls and the

two powers reached an accommodation in 1886 when agreements between Britain and
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Germany were signed demarcating their respective spheres of influence in the region. 

Germany established a protectorate that year and established trading stations on Jaluit and

Ebon to carry out the flourishing copra (dried coconut meat) trade. Spain sold the rest of her 

Pacific possessions to Germany, with the exception of Guam, in 1899. 

During the German colonial period, phosphate deposits in the islands were discovered 

and developed and more than 100 missionaries arrived to convert and civilize the 

Marshallese. Politically, the German protectorate terminated the incessant warfare between

the Iroij (high chiefs) of the various clans. This imposed peace froze the relative social 

positions of the various clans. German rule concentrated on promoting trade with the home 

country and developing markets for exports. The Germans encouraged the expansion of 

copra production by developing the local population’s craving for imported manufactured 

goods and processed foods. Politically, the Marshallese Iroij continued to rule under indirect 

colonial German administration. 

The German colonial period abruptly ended in October 1914 when the Japanese sent a 

naval squadron to invade the islands after they declared war on Germany under the terms of

the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. At the same time they also conquered the Mariana and 

Caroline Islands extending the Japanese Empire further into the Central Pacific. Australia

also took German colonies in the Southwest Pacific (on New Guinea, the Solomon Islands 

and the Bismarck Archipelago) while New Zealand seized Western Samoa. The war also

provided Japan with the opportunity to move into China by conquering the German

concession in Qingdao (Shandong Province). In 1915, the Japanese attempted further 

expansion in China by presenting the republican government with Twenty One Demands, 

which, if accepted would have made China into a Japanese protectorate. Vigorous protests 

from the United States and pressure from Great Britain force the Japanese to withdraw most 

of the demands. 

Undeniably the Japanese used World War I to advance its own interests in the Central 

Pacific and in China. In December 1914, the Japanese government informed the Allies that 

Japan had already made a substantial contribution to the war effort against Germany and that 

the Japanese people expected that effort to be rewarded. The price was, of course, the 

extension of the Japanese Empire into the Central Pacific. The initial Japanese effort 

concerning the Central Pacific had two stages. The first concluded with the military seizure

of the islands from Germany in October 1914. The second took shape after the fall of Jinan

in November 1914 and lasted until the Washington treaties of 1922. Its goal, successfully 

achieved, was the international recognition of the Japanese presence in the Central Pacific. 

Although they conquered the islands only in 1914, there was a strong Japanese 

commercial presence in the Marshalls that dated from the 1890s. Expansion into the Central 

and South Pacific islands (the South Seas or the Nanyō) was a dream cherished by Japanese 

expansionists since the 1870s. Japanese commerce with the islands began in 1890. One of

the earliest trading companies, the Hioki South Seas Trading Company was founded in 1893

and merged with another, the Murayama Shokai in 1906. The merged company, known as

South Sea Trading Company (Nanyō Boeki), was the largest firm in the region under 

Japanese rule. Under German rule, Japanese traders exported copra and shells to Japan and

6 
The Colonial Period, 1550-1943 

imported general merchandise—about 75 percent of all exports to the German possessions in

the Central Pacific came from Japan. 

Initially placed under military rule, Japanese control of the islands was formalized by the

League of Nations in 1920. Japan was granted a Class C mandate over the islands in the 

Central Pacific, which dictated that the islands be governed for the benefit of their native 

inhabitants and were to be unfortified i.e., no naval or military installations would be 

constructed. (Territories in this class were considered to be the most backward, furthest from 

having the ability to determine their own future.) The goal of the Japanese mandate was to 

prepare the Marshallese to make their own way in a complex world and to govern themselves 

or decide who would govern them. The islands’ neutralization was further guaranteed by a 

series of multilateral treaties signed in Washington in 1922. 

Imperial Powers in Asia and the Pacific 

As a League of Nations mandate, the islands were administered by the South Seas Bureau 

(Nanyō Chō), a Japanese government agency. While the bureau’s director had theoretically 

wide ranging powers, in practice he was the prisoner of Tokyo’s dictates as no important 

decisions about the islands were taken there. Initially, the Japanese followed German

colonial policy, but after 1922, understanding the islands’ political and strategic value, policy 

gained a distinct Japanese flavor. 

7
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The Japanese used more colonial administrators than the Germans. They created a local 

administrative system on the Japanese model. Marshallese served as local government 

functionaries on the atoll level. They were policemen, scribes and assistant magistrates and

served as public health nurses and headman in the villages. These measures reduced the 

Iroij’s political power but the Japanese administrators did not significantly alter the basis of

land tenure in the Marshalls and it seems that the Japanese colonial administration permitted 

custom to play a role in selecting Marshallese for administrative jobs. 

The core of their colonial policy lay in economic development. Japan was more active in 

promoting economic development than any other colonial power in the Pacific. Copra 

production was increased as government subsidies increased. Local Japanese trade stores, 

operated by the Nanyō Boeki purchased the copra and shipped it to Jaluit. Through their 

stores, these merchants had contact with the company and the villages, serving as general 

merchants and money brokers as well as suppliers of black market goods, like alcohol. They 

were able to garner substantial profits from these local businesses. The Japanese government

and local merchants also encouraged the production of handicrafts. Markets were identified, 

village quotas established and incentive awards given to efficient producers. 

Both economic and political measure made it plain that the Japanese intent was to govern

the islands and derive the maximum benefits from them. The administrative rules indicated 

that the Japanese wanted to rule as cheaply as possible while extracting the maximum 

benefit. However, the policies the Japanese implemented did not result in great changes in 

local political and social patterns and while the Japanese economic policies did influence the 

local economy, some say that these policies had neither a profound nor a detrimental effect 

on the Marshallese. It is evident that the Japanese administration was characterized by

careful planning, caution and thoroughness. 

8 
Japanese and American Prewar Planning, 1904-1938 

t has been suggested that the Pacific War was fought between Japan and the United 

States over who would dominate China. Ultimately, Japanese-American relations 

during the first forty years of the 20th century foundered on the rock of their 

irreconcilable differences over the shape of the world that was expressed in their competing 

China policies, which were based on both countries’ illusions about the nature of the Chinese 

polity. 

I 

In the broadest sense, the war that erupted in December 1941 was the result of the 

emergence of two non-European powers in Asian diplomacy, Japan and the United States.

Both made their entry onto the world stage at about the same time—the 1890s. The SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895 upset the old order of local Chinese supremacy in Northeast 

Asia. The Chinese loss of Taiwan and its outlying islands as well as the end of its suzerainty 

over Korea signaled the beginnings of Japanese predominance in the region that was to last 

until 1945. In fact, Chinese foreign policy since then can be seen as a drive to restore

China’s status. 

Beginning in 1895, Japan and the United States emerged as two extra-European powers 

with interests in Asia. Japanese expansionists had long desired to add the Philippines to the 

Japanese Empire but were thwarted by the American victory in the Spanish-American War 

which made the Philippines and Guam American colonies. In turn American war planners

were presented with a strategic dilemma after 1899 when the United States took possession 

of Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. 

When the United States acquired the Philippines in 1899 as its far western border, this 

shifted that border 7,000 miles to the west of California. American war planners had two 

choices, either build up American forces in the Philippines to defend the islands or invest in a

navy that could fight its way to the islands after the outbreak of war. Not surprisingly, before 

the First World War, a sizeable faction of Army planners opted for the former solution while 

Navy planners preferred the latter option. The American army and navy were at minimal

strength and there were no bases that could be used outside the continental United States.

The remedy for this dilemma began to take shape with the creation of the Pearl Harbor naval 

base and the fortification of Manila Bay. 

As Japan gained strength from the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance and the victory over 

Russia in 1905, which expanded Japanese interests in Northeastern China (Manchuria),

tensions between the United States and Japan were exacerbated by a series of incidents, the 

San Francisco school segregation case, ending Japanese immigration to Hawaii and antiJapanese laws passed by state legislatures west of the Rockies. These tensions played a part 

in the decision to fortify Pearl Harbor in 1904, reinforce the Hawaiian garrison and construct

harbor defenses in Honolulu and Manila Bay. Theodore Roosevelt’s decision to send the 

Great White Fleet on a world cruise was, in part, designed to impress the Japanese with 

American naval strength. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Through World War I, the imperial rivalries in Eastern Asia, Great Britain, Japan, Russia,

Germany, France and the United States were united against a possible resurgence of the 

“Yellow Peril,” another anti-foreign rebellion in China like the Boxers in 1900. The First 

Word War and the Versailles Treaty changed the make-up of power in Asia. 

Traditional American foreign policy called for a fair field and no favor in commercial 

relations with China. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Japanese assumed an 

imperial role in China, seizing for itself the same privileges as the Western imperial powers.

During the First World War Japan tried to extend its influence by imposing “Twenty One 

Demands” on the Chinese Republican government, but was thwarted by American interests. 

Japan’s role as a British ally in the war enabled it to take over the German territorial

concession in Shandong. However, the war and the Fourteen Points changed the rules of 

international relations and a new power constellation emerged in Eastern Asia. 

The end of the old diplomacy of imperialism was a result of war which had led to the

disappearance of the German and Russian monarchies as well as the weakening of the British

Empire. The Bolsheviks in Russia, the Americans, the Chinese and the Japanese were eager 

to construct a new Asian order conducive to their own interests. Between 1921 and 1931 a 

series of diplomatic and military initiatives created a new Asian political order, but not until a

second world war was fought. 

The post-Versailles rules of international relations centered on self-determination and 

revolution. The military-diplomatic initiatives of the 1920s and 1930s spurred military

planning. The American initiative began with the Washington Conferences of 1921-1922.

The treaties that emerged from them dealt with naval arms control and the non-fortification 

of Pacific islands as well as guarantees of Chinese territorial integrity. The naval treaties 

ended the Anglo-Japanese alliance but left Japan as the dominant naval power in the western

Pacific. This American initiative did not solve the major diplomatic problem, what was to 

become of China. Its failure and the rise of an independent Chinese nationalist movement

led to a Soviet initiative.

This Soviet initiative was part of Lenin’s colonial strategy—to attack the capitalist West

through its Asian colonies. Beginning in 1922, the Communist International began 

organizing communist parties among Asian nationalists. Sun Yat-sen, the primary organizer 

of the 1911 Chinese Revolution sought Soviet aid to help him regain power. In 1923, he 

signed a treaty with the Russians and began receiving Russian arms and advisors. This 

Soviet initiative resulted in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the beginning 

of a Chinese civil war and a Northern Expedition to unite the country. In 1927, there was an 

anti-communist coup and anti-foreign incidents in Nanjing and Jinan. The former resulted in 

the deaths of several British, American and Japanese citizens and the naval bombardment of

the city. The latter resulted in a pitched battle between the Japanese army and the Chinese 

National Revolutionary Army. 

The anti-Communist coup purified the Chinese Nationalist movement and the Northern 

Expedition nominally united the country under Kuomintang rule. The Chinese initiative,

1928-1931, was primarily diplomatic and legal, concentrating on changing the terms of the

10 
Prewar Planning, 1904-1938 

unequal treaties with the West and on internal administrative governmental reform. It 

foundered on the shoals of the Great Depression.

The Japanese, alarmed by strident anti-Japanese component of Chinese nationalism and 

by its imperial partners’ eagerness to negotiate with the new Chinese government, became

estranged. The Great Depression hit Japan particularly hard and the façade of civilian

parliamentary rule, in place since 1890, began to crumble in the face of military action. The 

Japanese initiative concentrated on conquest and the creation of a yen economic zone and the 

enforcement of a “Japanese Monroe Doctrine” for Eastern Asia. Through the 1930s, the

Japanese were unable to defeat the Chinese government and escalated their war to cut the 

Chinese off from foreign aid. This gradually brought them to an armed confrontation with

the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. 

The crisis unfolded gradually between 1931 and 1937 against the backdrop of the Great 

Depression, the apparent decline of liberal-democratic institutions and civil-military conflict 

in Japan. The latter culminated in an attempted coup d’etat in 1936. 

Over the course of these years, the Japanese Army engaged in an expansionist policy in 

China that led to the China Incident of 1937. Apparently deceived by the Chinese Civil War

between Communists, Nationalists and local militarists, the Japanese Army and government 

assumed that the Chinese would be unable to unite and mobilize against them. 

After the war began in July 1937, the Japanese seized North China and the Yangzi Delta. 

Surprisingly bitter and protracted Chinese Nationalist resistance around Nanjing after 

German and Italian mediation attempts failed, did not change the Japanese policy of nonrecognition of the Chinese Nationalist government. The war was expanded into Central and 

Southern China in 1938 and while the regular government armies were defeated, the Chinese 

government retreated, formed new alliances with warlords and the Communists and looked 

for outside aid. The Japanese Army found itself drawn deeper into the Chinese interior 

without any way to exploit its economic gains or to defeat its enemies. 

The only political solution the Japanese could devise involved expanding the war, but

this, too, had reached a dead end until 1940. The initial attempt to punish the Russians for 

supporting the Nationalist Chinese failed in 1938 at Changkufeng-Khasan and in 1939 at 

Nomohan. After France fell, the Japanese invaded northern Vietnam to halt traffic to China 

along the Haiphong-Kunming railroad and pressured Great Britain to curtail traffic along the 

Burma Road. 

The mounting hostility of the United States, expressed in the practical terms of economic

warfare, led the Japanese government to consider taking arms against its sea of troubles and 

by opposing it, end them. In other words, judging from the shape of the world in the summer

of 1940, the Japanese decided that the Rome-Berlin Axis would win the war—liberal 

democracy as a political system was finished. Concretely, the Japanese began to move in

this direction by negotiating a treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy in September 1940 

and a treaty of friendship with the Soviets in April 1941. 

11
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Japanese military strategy evolved on two different tracks after the country was united in 

its pursuit of a “rich nation, strong army” in the 1880s. Great students of history, Japanese 

soldiers and sailors drew upon historical lessons learned, from their own experiences and 

from those of others. Her wartime strategies concentrated on operations in the areas around 

Northeast Asia and relied upon the Navy to transport the Army to the theater of operations. 

Japan’s wartime experiences in 1894-1895, 1900 and 1904-1905 relegated the navy to a 

supporting role, even though it had tested and proved the efficacy of modern naval weapons 

in combat. The results of the First World War gave the Japanese armed services pause. The 

prolonged carnage and bloodletting on the Western Front led to post war debates in all the 

world’s armies over the new face of war. After the war, the Japanese army and navy took

divergent paths in war making. The Japanese army, based on its experiences in Siberia and 

in China, prepared for a continental war. Its planners assumed the war would pit Japan 

against the Soviet Union. Soviet activities in China during the 1920s reinforced this view as 

did the aid the USSR provided to the Kuomintang government at the beginning of the China

Incident. 

After the war, the army, a service that concentrated on infantry and artillery was faced 

with the dilemma of applying the war’s lessons and modernization. This led to protracted 

internal factional debates that concentrated on the question of whether it would be prudent to 

modernize at the expense of infantry strength or to invest in ideological training to ensure 

that Japanese soldiers could defeat their foes through the application of “Japanese spirit.” 

The victory of the strength through spirit faction made the Japanese woefully unprepared to 

fight a fully industrial war. 

The navy also studied the lessons learned of its wars. Its experience in World War I on

convoy escort in the Mediterranean, led it to conclude that its primary lesson was to integrate 

new forms of technology, i.e. the torpedo, the submarine and the airplane, into its tactics. 

However, it remained tactically wedded to the notion of the decisive naval battle between 

dreadnoughts. All the new weapons platforms would act as auxiliaries to the battle line,

which would seek out the enemy’s fleet in a Jutland-style decisive engagement. Japanese 

warship design reflected an obsession with big guns and speed. 

The Japanese Navy’s war plans had identified the United States Navy as its most likely 

adversary since 1908. Initial Japanese plans called for the navy to transport the army to the 

Philippines where it would seize the islands. It was assumed that the American fleet would

sortie from Pearl Harbor to seek a decisive engagement with the Japanese near the Marianas.

The Japanese plans assumed there would be a long battle of attrition that would culminate in 

a decisive victory in the Central Pacific. 

American army and navy planners were at loggerheads on specifics but in general

agreement about a general wartime strategy. They, too, had been preparing for a war with 

Japan since 1908. While China was the cornerstone of American foreign policy in East Asia, 

the lodestone for army and navy war planning was the Philippines. 

12 
Prewar Planning, 1904-1938 

In preparing for a possible war in the 1920s and 1930s, U.S, Navy and Marine Corps 

strategists returned to an idea that was propounded before 1914, setting up advanced fleet 

bases. While the U.S. Navy forced its presumptive maritime strategy on the Army, it 

grappled with the problem of seizing and protecting these bases. This problem engaged the 

Marine Corps before the First World War. The Marine Corps’ experience before and during 

World War I convinced the first postwar Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, that 

its earlier mission of protecting 

American lives and property 

overseas was ending and that the 

future lay in seizing and protecting 

its advanced fleet bases. His

protégés, among them Earl H. 

Ellis, began to develop plans for

taking and holding naval bases in 

the Central Pacific in a war against 

Japan. 

American interest in the 

Marshall Islands was stimulated

before the Washington (1922) and 

London (1930) Naval 

Conferences. However, reports

concluded that the Japanese were 

not engaged in fortifying any of 

their League of Nations Pacific 

mandates and were acting in 

accordance with the treaties they

had signed. However, the planners 

believed that possession of the

islands would be invaluable to the 

United States in its drive to relieve

the garrison in the Philippines. 

War Plan Orange, as it was revised 

in the mid-1930s, called for the 

islands’ capture. 

By the 1930s, as war became 

more and more likely, planners

predicted a protracted, bloody conflict against Japan in which the Philippines would be an

early loss. The navy wanted to concentrate on striking across the Central Pacific to the 

Philippines, meeting the Japanese fleet in the area around the Mariana Islands to fight a

decisive battle. The army wanted to withdraw to stronger bases in Hawaii and Panama while 

holding the area around Manila Bay in the face of a Japanese invasion. Neither the army nor

the navy was able to muster enough support in Congress to mount an adequate defense of the 

13
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Philippines. This inability, along with the failure to fortify Guam underlined the dilemma the

Army and Navy faced in defending American possessions in the Pacific. 

Both public opinion and national policy demanded that these insular possessions be 

defended even though military planners said they could not be held with existing forces. The 

nation, speaking through Congress, would neither abandon these islands nor would it 

appropriate adequate monies to ensure their defense. These policies dictated a separation of 

national objectives and national means. 

14 
The Japanese - American Road to War, 1940-1941 

y 1940, Japanese policy had reached a dead end—the non-recognition policy was 

not working; the outside world had not yet abandoned China to Japan. Public

opinion in Western nations had turned against Japan and the Japanese army, as 

strong as it was, was not physically able to control China. There was an active partisan 

movement, fostered by a 2nd United Front of the Communists and the Kuomintang. The 

Soviets supplied aid through a military mission while the United States had made it easier for 

the Chinese to obtain aid from private sources. 

B 

Events in Europe in spring 1940 changed Japan’s options. The Nazi conquest of the 

European colonial powers presented Japan with new possibilities. In summer 1940, Japan 

successfully forced the French Indochinese government to stop allowing Chinese aid to be 

transported through Haiphong to Yunnan and pressured the British to temporarily halt aid 

shipments to China on the Burma Road. However, even when tied to the new alliance with

the Rome-Berlin Axis, and despite the defection of Wang Jingwei to establish a Japanesesponsored government in Nanjing, the Chinese still would not surrender and British, 

American and Dutch hostility was unremitting. 

The Japanese reaction was to escalate the conflict by continuing to move south. This 

reaction epitomized Japanese foreign and military policy in that it was unrealistic, inflexible,

not part of a larger coordinated political and military plan and obsessed with destroying 

Chinese nationalism. Japanese war planning to date had been characterized by separate 

service plans that usually concentrated on two different enemies, with no effort at 

coordination. Until summer 1941, no one had considered the possibility of Japan having to 

fight a coalition. 

The inability to end the China Incident led to the formation of a new government in July

1940 under the leadership of Prince Konoe Fumimaro. The new government’s over-arching 

goal was creating Japanese sphere of influence in East Asia. This goal would be served by

working to eliminate all foreign aid to the Chinese government and adopting a “firm attitude” 

toward the United States while negotiating closer relations with the Rome-Berlin Axis and

the Soviet Union. Further, the Konoe government would pursue its economic ends in the 

Netherlands East Indies and continue to mobilize the society and economy to prepare for 

war. Over the course of the year, the Japanese government followed this plan. American

economic efforts to discourage Japanese actions were futile. Indeed, the goal of American 

policy was to take no action that would provoke war with either Germany or Japan because 

precipitous conflict would find the United States unprepared to wage war—rearmament was

just beginning and was given greater urgency after the fall of France. 

The Japanese government moved towards its goal through April 1941. It concluded the 

Tripartite Pact in September 1940, four days after Japanese troops moved to occupy Tonkin.

The Konoe government did not see the pact as committing them to war. Instead it believed

that this new alliance would aid them in their quest to conquer China by deterring the United

States, Great Britain and Holland. They were also hopeful that the Russo-German
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Nonaggression Pact would be used to tempt the Russians toward Iran, India and the Persian 

Gulf and that German influence would lessen Soviet aid to China. The Konoe government

considered that war with the United States and Great Britain would occur only if Japan’s

national security was in imminent danger. Throughout the period, the Japanese engaged in 

negotiations with the Dutch to increase their purchases of oil from the East Indies, but were

ultimately unsuccessful. In April 1941 the Foreign Minister had negotiated a nonaggression

pact with the Soviet Union. 

The occupation of northern French Indochina and the creation of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo 

Axis changed the view of the American government toward Japan and the conflict in China. 

Before September 1940, it had believed that the problems in Europe and Asia were separate 

and could be treated individually. After September 1940, the Roosevelt Administration 

realized that Japan had chosen to ally herself with Hitler and Mussolini and that the United 

States had to speed up its rearmament. 

Part and parcel of this policy was moving the United States Fleet to Pearl Harbor from 

San Pedro, California. The move, a political one made to deter the Japanese and show 

American interest in the Pacific, was made over the objections of the fleet commander, 

Admiral J.O. Richardson. He believed that the move to Pearl Harbor was wrong because it 

distracted the Navy from its Western Hemisphere defense positions and because Pearl Harbor

16 
Road to War, 1940-1941 

was at the end of a long logistics lifeline. The base facilities on the American mainland were 

better equipped to succor the fleet. He also pointed out that Pearl Harbor was too congested 

for a fleet anchorage. Admiral Richardson was relieved in February 1941 and the United 

States Fleet was renamed the Pacific Fleet and it remained at Pearl Harbor. 

Although the fleet had been in Hawaii since annexation, the use of Pearl Harbor as a fleet 

port meant that it could be improved. In the year following the fall of France, the civilian

labor force at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard doubled and naval personnel stationed there 

increased exponentially. Construction of a new dry dock began, foundries were improved

and machine and tool shops were established while the Navy purchased more of the

surrounding land for further expansion. The year 1940-1941 saw the Navy Yard become

almost independent of the mainland in several crucial areas. 

Nevertheless, the American government adopted a policy that would avoid an open

struggle with Japan in the Pacific, but that the policy in effect since 1931 and 1937 would 

remain: the United States would maintain its treaty rights in East Asia continue its economic

pressure on Japan and continue to aid China. 

Despite its isolationist foreign policy, the United States had acted in concert with allies in 

Asia since the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Informal staff conversations between the United 

States Navy and the Royal Navy began after the China Incident began and Japan joined the 

Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937. It was informally and tentatively decided that an American

fleet at Pearl Harbor would cooperate with a British fleet stationed at Singapore. 

These conversations were picked up again in May 1939 when war in Europe appeared 

imminent. The British informed the U.S. Naval War Plans division that given the need to 

counter the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy would not be able to send a 

battle fleet to Singapore. In this light, it was asked that the U.S. Navy undertake the defense 

of the Malay Barrier. 

The disagreements continued. In staff conversations held in 1940-1941, the U.S. Navy’s 

war planners resisted the British call for American aid to defend Malaya and Singapore. 

While the British believed that Singapore was vital to defending the Netherlands East Indies, 

Australia and New Zealand, the Americans did not believe the base could be held if the 

Japanese occupied southern Indochina and established air bases there. The talks broke off in 

a stalemate, with each side agreeing to disagree—Great Britain believed it was fundamental 

to hold Singapore while the United States believed it was fundamental to hold the Pacific 

Fleet intact. These talks further informally committed the United States to hold Europe as 

the decisive theater of operations. Germany would be defeated first, while operations against 

Japan would be defensive in nature. The main problem was to define a plan to safeguard 

Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies—this was not accomplished. 

By July 1941 much had changed but much remained the same. American planners had a 

strategy to protect American interests in the Western Hemisphere and to concentrate on 

defeating Germany first if war came. The German invasion of Russia had not changed

American policy or options. The Japanese faced a dilemma.

17
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Despite their success in French Indochina, their strategic and tactical dilemma had not 

altered. China was still implacably hostile, the Dutch, aided by the United States, would not 

sell them increased amounts of petroleum products and American economic restrictions on

exports and influence in South America were making it impossible to stockpile strategic 

materials. By July 1941, the Japanese government was rapidly approaching a point of 

decision. The beginning of the Russo-German war caused them to re-evaluate their policy.

Despite the rapid German gains, the Japanese decided they would not enter the war on 

Germany’s side and invade Russia through Siberia. Instead they chose to continue their 

policies toward China, the United States and Southeast Asia. 

To further isolate China, Japan presented an ultimatum to the French colonial

government of Indochina on 19 July 1941. On July 25, 1941, the Japanese army moved into

southern Indochina, occupying air and naval bases. The immediate American response was 

to freeze Japanese assets in the United States. This effectively ended Japanese purchases of 

materials, paid for in American dollars, from the United States, Malaya and the Netherlands

East Indies. In effect, the United States began an economic blockade of Japan. This action 

galvanized the Japanese government and it began to consider the possibility of conflict with 

the United States, Great Britain and Holland. 

The actions of July 1941 also changed American military strategy. Previously, the goal

had been to avoid war with the Japanese and remain on the defensive if war occurred. In 

July, a military aid mission was sent to China to assess the needs of the Chinese army and air 

force. By August, after freezing Japan’s American assets and imposing an oil embargo, the 

Untied States began to strengthen its forces in the Philippines by calling the Philippine army 

into American service, sending more troops to the country and making the major 

reinforcement air power—bombers. 

It was still hoped that the Japanese would be deterred by this display of American 

strength. However, the Japanese believed they were pushed into a corner and their national 

existence was at stake. The repeated American negotiating position of (1) respect for the 

territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations, (2) noninterference in the internal affairs of 

other nations, (3) equality of commercial opportunity and (4) maintenance of the status quo

in the Pacific except as it may be changed through peaceful means, while true to U.S. foreign

policy since 1898, seemed to be the height of hypocrisy to the Japanese government. This

implicitly meant that all territorial gains and indeed, Japanese policy, since 1931 were null 

and void. Aside from patriotic and nationalist considerations, the volatile nature of civilmilitary relations in Japan and the renewed power of the army made it impossible for Japan

to satisfy these conditions. 

The Japanese army and navy began to plan for war seriously in August 1941. They saw 

the issue as one of national survival because they believed the economic embargo the United

States had placed on Japan would lead to economic strangulation within two years. In the 

fall, Japan’s minimum demands of the United States and Great Britain were formulated 

within the government. They included recognition of Japan’s pre-eminent position in East 

Asia, the closing of the Burma Road and the cessation of all aid to China, recognizing 

18 
Road to War, 1940-1941 

Japan’s “special position” in Indochina and Thailand as well as resuming trade with Japan.

In return, the Japanese were prepared to use Indochinese bases only against the Chinese,

withdraw from Indochina after peace had been negotiated with China and guarantee the 

neutrality of the Philippines. 

As the diplomatic plans were finalized, the military plans were formulated. By October,

the army and navy agreed that the immediate objectives were the petroleum products of the 

Netherlands East Indies and rubber, tin and copper of Malaya. After the navy neutralized the 

American fleet at Pearl Harbor and these positions occupied it would be very hard for the

Japanese to be dislodged. The planners believed they would fight a limited war for limited 

gains and that after the initial conflict, there would be a negotiated settlement. Their implicit 

assumption was that the worst possible case involved Japanese defeat in a limited war. 

In October, it was obvious in both Washington and Tokyo that a crisis was rapidly 

approaching. The Japanese felt pressured by American actions and their diplomatic attempts 

foundered on American intransigence. The Prime Minister, Prince Konoe negotiated with 

the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries for a renewal of negotiations after the latest American 

rejection of the Japanese proposals. The War Minister, General Tojo Hideki, refused and the 

Konoe government fell on 16 October 1941. On the 18th, General Tojo was appointed Prime 

Minister. 

An Imperial Liaison Conference on 1 November 1941 confirmed the decisions taken in 

September. However, it gave its sanction to two new negotiating positions that would be

proposed the Secretary of State Cordell Hull. A second special envoy would be sent to 

Washington to present them. They were designated Proposal A and Proposal B. The first 

amended and already rejected

negotiating position. It proposed

the following: (1) Japanese troops 

would be withdrawn from French 

Indochina and China after a peace 

treaty had been signed by the 

Chinese, (2) Japanese troops would 

occupy “certain areas” of China for

25 years, (3) the Japanese 

government would divorce itself 

from concerted action with Rome

and Berlin and (4) Japan would not 

discriminate in trade matters as long

as she was not the victim of

discrimination. If the United States 

rejected the first proposal the 

second would be offered. It called for (1) Japan to withdraw its troops from southern 

Indochina immediately and from northern Indochina after a peace treaty had been signed

with China, (2) American non-interference with the Japanese peace negotiations with China, 

(3) American cooperation with Japan to facilitate its exploitation of the Netherlands East 

Indies resources and (4) end the American oil embargo. 

19
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The proposals were presented in November 1941. The American negotiators realized 

that rejecting both plans could be taken as a casus belli and would precipitate war. However, 

accepting either one would negate American foreign policy in Asia since 1900 and acquiesce 

to making the region a Japanese sphere of influence. Instead a modus vivendi was prepared

in which the U.S. offered to modify its economic restrictions by permitting trade in cotton 

and medical supplies and a limited amount of oil if the Japanese would withdraw from

southern Indochina, reduce the number of troops in the north. In addition, both nations 

would not use force to advance their interests in Asia and the Pacific. However, after a

discussion about its possible effects on Great Britain, China, Holland and Australia, it was 

decided that the possible gains were outweighed by the impression of appeasement. The 

subsequent reply did not mention the proposal. 

The American rejection of the Japanese proposals meant that the Japanese made a 

decision for war on 1 December after long and acrimonious discussions. It was reached

despite overt warnings and the feeling within parts of the Imperial Japanese Navy that it 

would be a futile undertaking. However, the consensus among the Japanese leadership was 

that too much blood and treasure had been invested in the China Incident for Japan to tamely

withdraw in the face of American displeasure and hostility. If Japan was to act it had to act 

decisively before the United States was able to finish mobilizing its social and economic

resources. A limited war ending in a stalemate was their most preferred outcome and they 

believed a loss in a limited war would not be catastrophic. Each side underestimated the

others’ determination. In conversations with Admiral Nomura, the special envoy sent to 

negotiate in October, Admiral Harold Stark warned that war would break the Japanese 

Empire. While the Japanese would grow weaker, unable to make up their losses, the United 

States “will grow stronger as time goes on. It is inevitable that we shall crush you before we 

are through with you.” 

20 
Wartime Actions and Planning, 1941-1943 

he speed and the daring of the Japanese onslaught that began in December 1941 took

the allies by surprise. By April 1942, the Japanese controlled all the lands and 

waters stretching from Burma to the Solomon Islands. In fact, the Japanese 

offensive had gone better than expected. The Japanese planners expected much stiffer 

resistance—they had thought it would take between four and five months to conquer Malaya 

and the Netherlands East Indies and an additional six months to repair the oil fields and 

provide petroleum for wartime purposes. Instead resistance collapsed in relatively short 

order and the oil field equipment was hardly damaged by scorched earth tactics. 

T 

These successes speeded up the Japanese war plan, but did not change its basic goal. The 

Japanese Army and Navy would (1) move immediately into the lower Solomon Islands and 

New Guinea to control the Coral Sea and its environs, (2) seize Midway and the Aleutian 

Islands to precipitate a decisive engagement with the American fleet and (3) capture New 

Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa to sever the lines of supply and communication between the 

United States, Australia and New Zealand. Admiral Yamamoto’s goal was to engage the

American fleet, defeat it and control the air and sea-lanes in the Central and Eastern Pacific. 

Japanese naval planners that they would have to annihilate the American fleet in 1942 and 

end the war then or, based on the naval expansion acts, face an overwhelming U.S. fleet in 

1943-1944. Their attempt to satisfy the first goal resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea, 

American resistance to the second goal caused the Battle of Midway and the third goal was 

never reached. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted in a Japanese tactical victory but a strategic victory

for the United States. The Japanese invasion force scheduled to occupy Port Moresby and 

threaten northern Australia was turned back although the Japanese occupation of Tulagi and 

Guadalcanal was unopposed. The Japanese advance was blunted but only turned aside. The 

victory gave the Australians and Americans breathing room to consider new possibilities 

(which eventually resulted in the attrition campaign on New Guinea and in the Solomons), 

but in truth all depended on thwarting the Japanese move to seize Midway and destroy the 

American fleet in a decisive battle. 

The object of the Midway attack was to draw the American fleet into a decisive battle

with the Japanese navy. After the victory, the Japanese assumed they would be able to 

occupy Hawaii and gain control of the Eastern Pacific. The Japanese plan was complicated 

as it consisted of three mutually supported but separate actions, (1) occupying the Western 

Aleutians, (2) occupying Midway and (3) a fleet action. If the United States played its part in 

the Japanese script, as it had been doing for most of the previous six months, a victory was 

assured. The story of Midway is well known and does not have to be gone into in detail.

The American victory at Midway upset the Japanese timetable and was the first irrevocable 

defeat the Japanese had suffered. The losses in ships would be made up eventually but the 

loss of trained manpower was a blow from which the Japanese would not recover. 

Nonetheless, the Midway victory gave the United States an opportunity to go on the 

offensive in the Pacific in a defensive manner. 

The transition to this defensive offensive was hindered by dividing the Pacific Theater 

into two commands, a political move designed to short circuit domestic political criticism of

the conduct of the war in the Pacific and Army-Navy rivalry. It did not materially aid the 

prosecution of the war in the Pacific as it resulted in two commands creating two plans to get 

to Japan. 

The two commands were the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) commanded by General 

MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) commanded by Admiral Nimitz. The SWPA 

consisted of Australia, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Netherlands East Indies,

the Philippines and the adjacent waters. The POA consisted of all land and bodies of water

south of the Bering Strait, west of the continental United States, north of the South Pole and

east of SWPA. Admiral Nimitz further divided his command into three areas, (1) the North 

Pacific (NORPAC), north of 42° degrees latitude, (2) the South Pacific (SOPAC), south of 

the Equator and east of the SWPA and (3) the Central Pacific (CENPAC), north of the 

Equator to 42° north latitude. The major island groups in the Central Pacific area were the 

Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, part of the Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Caroline 

Islands, the Mariana Islands, the Bonin (Volcano) Islands, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and 

the Japanese archipelago. 

The offensive launched against the Japanese in the Solomons and New Guinea was 

designed to forestall a renewed offensive against Australia and the sea lanes connecting the 

United States to Australia and New Zealand. The decision taken to launch an offensive in 

the Southwest Pacific was done to mollify the Australians and General MacArthur. (The 

22 
Wartime Actions and Planning, 1941-1943 

trigger was the discovery that the Japanese had begun to build an airstrip on Guadalcanal.)

The latter’s ambitious plan to advance through the Bismarck Sea to Rabaul was rejected as 

too risky—although Japan had been beaten at Midway, the Japanese Navy and Army were 

still powerful. While the number of Japanese aircraft carriers had been diminished, the 

power of their land-based aviation was not affected by Midway. The attrition battles waged 

in New Guinea and in the Solomons over six months (August 1942 - February 1943) resulted 

in a bloody stalemate. Allied forces (American and Australian) advanced up the ladder of the 

Solomons and westward across the New Guinea coast, but the way was slow and hard.

While the Japanese were unable to exercise strategic and tactical initiative, neither were the

allies. As the Japanese were bled of men and ships, American strength was increasing. 

At Casablanca in January 1943, Admiral Ernest King argued that the Allies were 

engaging the Japanese in four distinct regional Pacific fronts, (1) in the Aleutians, (2) in and

around Midway, (3) in the South and Southwest Pacific and (4) in China-Burma-India. King 

argued that the successes in the Southwest Pacific called for a new strategy. 

Several possibilities presented themselves, advance through the Aleutians directly into 

northern Japan, invade the Netherlands East Indies or attack the Philippines. King stated that 

attacking the Philippines would cut Japan off from the resources in both Malaya and the

Indies. Of these, isolating Japan from the petroleum of the Netherlands East Indies would be 

decisive. The question of how to get to the Philippines also had three possibilities, a northern

route to Luzon through the Aleutians, a southern route easily outflanked by the Japanese or a 

direct thrust into the Central Pacific. King argued for the latter route going directly to the 

Philippines through the Gilberts, Marshalls, the Carolines and the Marianas and from there to 

the Chinese mainland to strike at Japan itself. In essence, he restated the prewar War Plan 

Orange. General Marshall also agreed that such a plan would keep the Japanese off balance 

and prevent them from exercising the initiative in the Pacific.

Predictably the British objected claiming that devoting new resources to the Pacific 

would detract from the primary effort of defeating Germany. King replied that resources 

already allocated to that theater would handle the offensive in the Pacific. He said it would 

be possible to mount offensives in Burma, in the Southwest and in the Central Pacific by 

husbanding and shuttling resources between the different fronts. The British acquiesced to 

the American proposal. It was decided that the Aleutians would be secured, the advance in 

the Southwest Pacific would be continued and an offensive would be mounted in the Central 

Pacific. 

At the same time the Navy was preparing plans for an offensive in the Central Pacific, the 

Army, under General MacArthur was also preparing its plans for the eventual reconquest of 

the Philippines. The SWPA planners argued for an advance to seize Rabaul based on

converging movements from New Guinea and New Britain in the west and the Solomons and 

New Ireland in the east. 

For the Navy the Central Pacific route to the Philippines was the wisest, but for 

MacArthur, the Central Pacific drive was not prudent. MacArthur concluded, following 

received opinion, that it would have to be made without land based air support and therefore 

23
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

demand a heavy cost in Naval assets as well as a reorientation of the front. Instead,

MacArthur argued that after the capture of Rabaul the SWPA forces should advance west 

along the north coast of New Guinea and then assault the coast of Mindanao in the 

Philippines. The Palaus would be neutralized and the Banda and Arafura Seas would protect 

the flanks of the advance. 

Both MacArthur and Nimitz prepared plans for the remainder of 1943 that would use the

ships that were beginning to join the fleet. MacArthur's staff was also placing the finishing

touches on another, more comprehensive plan for the remainder of the war in the Pacific

which was presented at the March 1943 Pacific Military Conference. 

MacArthur’s plan argued for a two axis advance against Rabaul, one going through New 

Guinea and New Britain on the west and the other through the Solomons and New Ireland on 

the east, culminating in a converging assault on Rabaul. MacArthur’s plan called for 222⁄3

divisions of troops and 45 groups of aircraft. Together, the South and Southwest Pacific 

could muster only 152⁄3 trained divisions and had a shortage of transport and aircraft. As a 

result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to scale back the plans. Rabaul would not

be taken. Instead, MacArthur would proceed up New Guinea, capture western New Britain

and drive through the Solomons to southern Bougainville. Cutting back MacArthur's scope

of operations made a drive through the Central Pacific the more likely avenue of approach. 

By March 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were about to decide if the axis of advance was to be 

in MacArthur's or Nimitz's theater. However, final judgment would be made at the Trident 

Conference in Washington in May 1943. 

24 
Wartime Actions and Planning, 1941-1943 

The Trident Conference discussed the various courses of action against the Japanese. 

The over-all objective was to obtain bases in the Western Pacific that could be used to force 

Japan to surrender either by air and sea blockade or by a combination of blockade and

invasion. The northern approach through the Kuriles was discarded because of the persistent 

bad weather in the Kuriles-Aleutians area and because Siberia could not be used as a base for 

operations against Japan until the Russians entered the Pacific War. The southern route, with 

its long supply and communications lines, through the Palaus could be easily outflanked by 

the Japanese as long as they retained their strength in what they perceived as the major 

theater in the Pacific—New Guinea. 

Since the planners believed that neither the Bonins, Okinawa nor Taiwan offered a 

suitable base for the invasion of Japan, a base in China must be acquired and Hong Kong

appeared to be the most suitable location. Even if the British could retake Singapore and the 

Straits of Malacca, it would not necessarily shorten the supply routes necessary for a 

Japanese invasion. If a single line of advance was adopted, the Japanese may be able to 

concentrate their forces against it—and use their forces to launch flank attacks against Allied 

forces. 

The only plausible solution that suggested itself to the Navy planners was to strike along 

the central route and seize key positions in the Gilberts, the Marshalls and the Carolines. If it 

was combined with an Army advance through the Solomons and New Guinea, the Japanese 

would be kept guessing about Allied intentions. Additionally, the drive through the Central 

Pacific would at least follow an outline of a plan with which the Army and Navy were

familiar and would use the new ships joining the fleet. 

Therefore, the JCS directed Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans to seize strategic points in 

the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Based on the experience gained in the SWPA and in North

Africa, the JCS believed that the Gilberts must be seized before an invasion of the Marshalls 

could be contemplated. Air mastery, using bases in the Gilberts for photo reconnaissance 

and bombing missions, was a prerequisite for invading the Marshalls. 

The advance into the Central Pacific was fraught with unknowns and difficulties. In 

1943, both strategists and tacticians believed it would be risky to risk amphibious task forces 

beyond the range of land-based aircraft. They believed that shore-based bombers had sunk 

the Japanese aircraft carriers at Midway and the experience in the Solomons re-emphasized 

the necessity of land-based air cover. The island chains in the Central Pacific lay far beyond 

the range of land planes. However, the aircraft carrier advocates believed that the new

Essex-class carriers, the Independence-class light carriers and escort carriers could provide 

enough air power to isolate the islands chosen for invasion and repel any attempted Japanese 

counter-strikes. At the same time, the ships for transporting and landing the troops were 

beginning to join the fleet. The organizations formed in summer 1943 existed largely as 

blueprints, waiting to be filled with men and equipment. Nevertheless, planning and training 

for the invasion of the Gilberts began that summer. Army, Navy and Marine planners and 

leaders would follow John Paul Jones’s dictum of doing the best you can with what you 

have. They were motivated by a sense of urgency since the invasion would take place in

November. Neither aircraft carrier operations nor amphibious assault were proven military

25
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

methods at the time. Thus far, escort carriers had not proved very effective in the Pacific and 

experience with aircraft carrier operations had exposed shortcomings in tactics, protection 

and their employment. 

The Army and Navy also faced unprecedented logistical problems in waging war in the 

Central Pacific. After the round-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet (1907-1909) the 

Navy began to build destroyer and submarine tenders, as well as repair and supply ships to 

ensure a certain amount of independence from navy yards. The trend was accelerated after 

the success in using tenders in World War I to repair convoy escorting destroyers in the

Atlantic. After the war, the Navy established a Service Force to provide mobile logistical 

support to the fleet. The idea for this kind of force goes back to the beginning of the 20th

century when Navy foresaw it would need ships to accompany the fleet to provide it with 

navy yard services as part of a mobile base force. 

By 1943, it was apparent that the movement across the Pacific could not be supported by 

advance bases because they would take too long to build. In order to fight the Pacific War, 

the Army and Navy needed mobile logistics bases. The closest advance base to the Gilberts

and the Marshalls was Pearl Harbor, 2-3,000 miles to the east. The new service forces must

be able to supply an amphibious force unprecedented in size in an area without large land 

masses, labor, supplies or any other facilities. The mobile service force had to supply food, 

fuel, medicine, construction material, clothing, ammunition and small luxuries to troops 

spread out over an enormous area, it would be the logistical equivalent of an aircraft carrier. 

The extended campaign in the Gilberts and the Marshalls would be the first combat test of 

amphibious assault; fast carrier doctrine and the strategy of seizing strategically placed atolls

in the Central Pacific and the new fleet service force. 

26 
The First Test of Amphibious Assault: Tarawa 

he test began on 20 November 1943 as American forces invaded Makin and Tarawa 

Atolls (Operation Galvanic), opening a series of amphibious operations in the 

Central Pacific. Air and naval gunfire bombardment preceded and closely supported 

assault teams while local aerial supremacy had already been achieved. At both atolls,

landing forces were beset with supply difficulties and communications failures. Of the two, 

the landings at Tarawa were more difficult. Although it took two weeks for the Marines to 

secure the atoll and hand it over the Advanced Base Commander, the most difficult fighting

ended in 96 hours. 

T 

 The 2nd Marine Division’s main landings took place on Betio Island, located at the 

southwest tip of Tarawa atoll, where the airfield and the main enemy forces were located.

The landings were made with great difficulty and with very heavy casualties. The transports

arrived south of the assigned area and came under fire of the previously alerted enemy at 

0507. While the transports moved north out of range of enemy guns, the warships attempted 

to neutralize the enemy positions. 

The gunfire support ships, three battleships, four cruisers and accompanying destroyers,

fired on the island for two and a half hours. The Navy expected that the 3,000 tons of shells 

fired would have destroyed the defenses and left the defenders dazed and disoriented. No 

one realized how effective coconut log bunkers shielded by coral sand were in absorbing 

shell fire. Although more gunfire supplemented by aerial bombardment should have been 

used, the shelling destroyed the above ground installations and communications. 

Aircraft delivered brief strikes before the troops landed but the troops landed ten minutes 

after the strikes ceased. As an aside, the ammunition the planes fired at the positions did not 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

penetrate the coconut log revetments. Given that respite, the Marines landed under direct 

fire, many wading from the partly exposed reef that fringes the coast because there were not 

enough amphibious tractors to carry them over the reef. When they reached shore, landing 

teams became intermingled and disorganized. 

Landings were made on three adjacent beaches (Red Beaches 1, 2 and 3, from west to 

east) on the northwest coast. The assault force landing on Red Beach 1 gained a beachhead

on the northwest tip of the island but was isolated there. In the center, assault battalion was 

pinned down by enemy fire on Red Beach 2. The Marines discovered that their rifles and 

hand grenades had little effect on the Japanese machine gun positions and pill boxes. They 

began attacking with flame throwers (of which there were not enough) and blocks of 

explosive used like hand grenades. The regimental reserve was committed to the assault by

1030. This unit arrived at the beach at approximately noon, having had to wade across the 

reef and suffered heavy casualties. By late afternoon, half the division’s reserve had been 

committed to the fight. That evening there were approximately 5,000 men ashore and they

had suffered 1,500 killed and wounded. Fortunately, the counterattacks that were expected 

after nightfall failed to materialize and the meager gains were held. 

On 21 November, the rest 

of the division’s reserve was

landed and the Marines 

continued to meet grim

opposition but strengthened 

their hold on the island

assisted by aircraft, artillery 

and naval gunfire. The 

reinforcements that were 

landed brought the total 

number of battalions ashore to 

seven. Artillery and naval 

gunfire directed against 

Betio’s eastern end prevented 

the enemy from escaping to 

the next island. 

The next day, the Japanese 

on Betio underwent heavy air,

naval and artillery bombardment as the battle for the island continued. The enemy was 

brought under cross fire as artillery was emplaced on Bairiki, the neighboring island. One 

Marine battalion drove east along the south coast, continuing to advance to the eastern end of 

the airfield. By the end of the day, the enemy was compressed into the eastern part of Betio 

and retained a pocket between Red Beaches 1 and 2. During the night of 22-23 November, 

the Marines repelled the Japanese counterattacks.

On 23 November, Marine units reached the end of Betio shortly after 1300 and the end of 

organized resistance on Betio was reported at 1330. The Marines then proceeded to secure

28 
First Amphibious Assault: Tarawa 

the rest of the islands in Tarawa Atoll. On 24 November, two of the division’s regiments left 

for Hawaii. On 28 November, the atoll was completely secured. Marine casualties on 

Tarawa totaled 3,301 while the Japanese losses were estimated to be 4,690 killed, 17 

captured and 129 Koreans taken prisoner. On 4 December, the Marines turned the island 

over to the Advanced Base Commander. During December 1943 and January 1944, air bases 

were constructed in the Gilberts. 

The Navy and Marines made three principal mistakes. First, the naval bombardment that 

was not long, heavy or accurate enough. Second, the air support immediately before the 

landings was poorly timed and the naval aviators provided the Marines with inadequate close 

air support. Finally, there were not enough amphibious tractors to move the entire landing 

force over the reef and those that were available easily broke down. The errors in timing and 

the communications difficulties were the result of matériel shortcomings and the training

deficiencies that one would expect to occur in so big an amphibious force. The detailed after 

action reports and post-mortems, pointing out flaws in performance and suggesting remedies,

began flowing into the Amphibious force Headquarters in Pearl Harbor before the end of 

November. 

The naval gunfire and air support parts of the assault failed to function properly. 

Although 3,000 tons of naval shells were fired at Betio, an island less than half a mile square, 

the bulk of it before the landings on the morning of 20 November, it did not have the desired 

effect since the wrong mix of explosives was used. After Tarawa, naval gunfire experts 

made duplicates of Japanese fortifications on Hawaiian gunnery ranges to determine the best

types of munitions needed to destroy them. 

Naval gunnery officers also determined the differences between destructive fire and 

neutralizing fire. The former called for pinpoint accuracy, while the latter would be obtained

with a large amount of explosives saturating a large area. In addition, destructive fire also 

called for using large numbers of armor-piercing and base-fused shells. Neutralizing fire 

would be used to isolate parts of the battlefield after landing to prevent the Japanese from 

moving reinforcements to areas under attack. 

The most obvious need was for pilots who were better trained for close air support. The 

navy airmen were shocked by the number of Marine casualties into a better understanding of

the importance of close air support missions. Pilots were better trained in this mission and 

studies done to determine the best types of bombs to use against above ground and 

underground installations. High explosives were used to destroy buildings and rip up 

camouflage and undergrowth. 

Beach defenses were investigated and it was determined that a method to destroy 

underwater beach obstacles before the invasion began must be found. The task was beyond

the capabilities of naval gunfire support and this fact stimulated the creation of underwater

demolition teams, first conceived of in the 1920s. 

The battle at Tarawa showed it was possible to neutralize and destroy beach defenses and 

lay down rolling barrages using naval gunfire. Another lesson learned was to keep the 

29
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

barrage moving just ahead of the landing troops and along their flanks. The Navy and 

Marines recognized the need for ships to provide close gunfire support. Landing craft armed

with rockets assisted destroyers in this work. The Navy also discovered that destroyers were

necessary to give barrage and close-in gunfire support. This discovery led to providing 

destroyers with more high explosive shells as well as antiaircraft ammunition. The small 

ships were also required to close within 40-mm range of the shore to provide gunfire support. 

One of the most important lessons learned was the need for more amphibian tractors to 

get the assault troops over the fringing reef of the atoll. The Marines found that the assault 

lost its momentum not because there was insufficient gunfire support but because there were 

insufficient numbers of amphibian tractors to get the assault troops to the beach quickly. 

Besides the more effective application of naval gunfire and air power, logistics lessons

were also learned. It became obvious that better communications were a key to better

logistics as well as exploiting tactical advantages. Although new types of ships, designed as

amphibious landing command ships were joining the fleet, they were not a panacea. 

Additionally, portable communications equipment had to be improved—it had to be lighter 

and waterproof and shock resistant. Communications specialists had to be assigned to fire 

control parties, air liaison groups and beachhead logistical parties were needed to prevent 

needless missteps and keep the flow of supplies and information constant and timely. 

The Marines also learned that infantrymen had to become adept at skills normally 

associated with combat engineers and that teamwork between infantry, armor, artillery,

flamethrowers and demolitions experts was crucial in isolating and destroying Japanese 

strong points. The infantryman’s vulnerability also spurred developing armored amphibian

tractors that could serve as moving strong points in the initial phases of the assault. 

The experience on Tarawa helped refine intelligence gathering mechanisms, improved 

training methods and pointed out the need for better vehicles for crossing reefs. The Tarawa 

battle pointed up the flaws in amphibious assault doctrine as it had been practiced to that 

time. The assault on Betio became a textbook example for future landings. The lessons 

learned were priceless. Although the losses were relatively high, the more than 3,000

casualties suffered by the Navy and Marine Corps were comparatively light when compared

to later engagements in the Marianas or Iwo Jima or Okinawa. Tarawa set the in place 

advance air bases for the attack on Kwajalein, and provided a number of tactical lessons that 

would be applied to future amphibious operations against fortified positions. The Gilberts 

had to be seized in order to capture the Marshalls. 

30 
The Marshalls Decided On 

n September 22, 1943 Nimitz handed Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance the

preliminary study he had presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Spruance began 

studying two alternatives to Nimitz's course of action, both calling for a 

simultaneous assaults on three atolls, Maloelap, Wotje, and either Mille or Kwajalein. By

October 12, 1943 Nimitz's planning staff issued an operation plan for the Marshalls invasion 

code named Flintlock, but had not selected specific objectives. Then within two days he 

decided to employ the 7th Infantry Division against Wotje and Maloelap and the 4th Marine

Division and the 22nd Marines against Kwajalein. He then fixed January 1, 1944 as the target 

date for storming Wotje and Maloelap and proposed an attack on Kwajalein the following 

day. General Holland Smith of the V Amphibious Corps then directed his staff to prepare an 

estimate of the situation based on these preliminary plans. Smith's staff believed that the 

likeliest course of action was a simultaneous strike at Wotje and Maloelap, holding the 

Kwajalein assault troops in reserve. Then, as the need for reinforcements passed, the 

conquest of the third objective would begin. The invasion of Tarawa and the ensuing battle 

interrupted this planning. 

O 

By the beginning of December, the planners began to integrate the lessons learned from 

Tarawa into the planning of Operation Flintlock. Perhaps the most significant lesson learned 

was the need to use naval gunfire to destroy specific enemy positions along with neutralizing

fire from naval guns. The second conclusion Admiral Turner and General Smith reached was 

that there were insufficient forces to take Kwajalein immediately after the landings on Wotje 

and Maloelap. 

By 1 December 1943, Nimitz had an idea that took his staff completely by surprise. 

Instead of the more cautious approach, Nimitz recommended that the invasion of the 

Marshalls be accomplished by a simultaneous seizure of Kwajalein; Maloelap, and Wotje 

Atolls. Nimitz argued that since these three atolls contained 65 percent of the enemy aircraft 

in the Marshalls, the other 35 percent could be neutralized from Kwajalein. Then, in another 

surprise move Nimitz proposed bypassing Wotje and Maloelap and concentrating all 

available forces against Kwajalein. This radical revision led all the Central Pacific 

commanders, with the exception of two members of Nimitz's personal staff, Rear Admirals

Forrest P. Sherman and Charles H. McMorris, to oppose the revised plan. 

Despite these objections Nimitz informed the Joint Chiefs of his changed plan and on 

December 14th received their final approval. He then directed Spruance to devise a plan to 

assault Roi as well. Alternative objectives assigned included Maloelap and Wotje. D-Day 

was set for 18 January 1944, but four days later Nimitz requested Admiral King to allow him 

to move his invasion date to January 31st because he was concerned about the lack of training

given his assault troops and the need to make repairs to the carriers U.S.S. Saratoga, 

Princeton, and Intrepid. Admiral Turner was still worried. While additional forces were

allocated, including the 106th Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Infantry Division, he was

still worried about the readiness of the various units. Turner therefore, requested the D-Day 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

date moved to February 10, 1944 to complete the additional training. The Joint Chiefs 

refused, ordering operations to begin no later than 31 January 1944. 

On 20 December 1943 Nimitz issued Flintlock II which combined the work of the two

staffs. Carrier aircraft, land based bombers and surface ships would shell the Japanese bases 

on Wotje and Maloelap and if necessary the carriers would also launch air strikes to help the 

land based aircraft neutralize Mille, Jaluit, Kusaie, and Eniwetok. While the primary land 

objectives still remained Roi and Kwajalein, the secondary target of Majuro Atoll was also 

included. Spruance believed that making Majuro an objective would allow the United States

to provide land based air cover for shipping moving into the attack on Kwajalein. 

Additionally, if Kwajalein turned into a protracted operation it would provide a protected 

anchorage. While the geography of the Gilberts allowed the fleet to refuel at sea without the 

danger of submarine attack, the more restricted waters around the Marshalls allowed for a 

greater opportunity for submarine interdiction. Thus, Majuro was made a target that was to 

be assaulted by Tactical Group I, 22nd Marines and the 106th Infantry. 

32 
Organization and Command of Operation Flintlock 

dmiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded all the forces assigned to Flintlock and 

were designated as the Fifth Fleet. Spruance’s fleet was divided into following 

Task Forces (TF): TF 51, Joint Expeditionary Task Force commanded by Rear 

Admiral Richmond K. Turner, TF 58, Fast Carrier Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Marc 

A. Mitscher and TF 57, Defense Forces and Land Based Air, commanded by Rear Admiral 

John H. Hoover. 

A 

While Admiral Spruance accompanied the Joint Expeditionary Force to the Marshalls, he 

would not assume tactical command unless the force came under attack by the Japanese

Navy. Admiral Turner's primary mission was to carry the assault force to the objective and 

get them safely ashore. 

Admiral Turner divided his Joint Expeditionary Force into a Southern Attack Force (TF 

52), commanded by himself and a Northern Attack Force (TF 53) commanded by Rear 

Admiral Richard L. Conolly. A Majuro Attack Group commanded by Rear Admiral Harry 

W. Hill accompanied the Reserve Force (which was later redesignated the Eniwetok 

Expeditionary Group). Captain Harold B. Sallada commanded Headquarters, Supporting

Aircraft, the element responsible for providing air support and finally the Army and Marine 

assault troops were commanded by Major General Holland M. Smith. 

Admiral Turner had 297 vessels directly assigned to his command. These consisted of 

two new amphibious command ships, seven old battleships, 11 aircraft carriers of various 

classes, 12 cruisers, 75 destroyers and destroyers escorts, 46 transports, 27 cargo vessels, 5 

landing ship docks, and 45 landing ship tanks. Operationally, Turner would exercise tactical 

control until the amphibious phase was complete and the troops were ashore. After the 7th

Infantry Division landed on Kwajalein and the 4th Marine Division on Roi-Namur General 

Smith would assume the role of Corps Commander and retain it until capture and occupation 

of the objectives were completed. 

Smith's authority was limited, he could not make major changes in the tactical plan nor 

order unscheduled landings without Turner's express permission. Included within the two 

assault divisions, the 7th Infantry Division and 4th Marine Division were the 106th Infantry,

22nd Marines, 1st and 15th Marine Defense Battalions, Marine Headquarters and Service 

Squadron 31 and several Army and navy units to help develop and garrison the atolls once

they were captured. 

The tiny islands of Roi-Namur, connected with a causeway, were the targets of the 

Northern Attack Force and 4th Marine Division while the Southern Attack Force and the 7th

Infantry Division would strike Kwajalein. Admirals Turner and Conolly commanded the

assault forces through the respective landing force commander until the latter determined his 

troops had made lodgment. Once that had been accomplished, the landing force commander 

assumed command ashore. The only exception was the Majuro landing. Admiral Hill, the
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

attack group commander, remained in total control of the Majuro operation until Admiral 

Spruance declared the atoll captured.

Before the invasion efforts were made to gather intelligence. Since the Japanese held the

islands for 25 years and had been secretive about all their holdings it was assumed elaborate

defenses were in place. Initial assessments of the first intelligence photos received were 

completed by November 26, 1943. Carrier planes also took extensive photographs during 

their raids on the Marshalls on December 4th and the results of pilot debriefings disseminated. 

Aerial photograph reconnaissance continued throughout December and January until two

days before the assault. In addition, the submarines U.S.S. Seal and Tarpon carried out 

reconnaissance missions to gain information about reefs, beaches, tides and currents in

December and January respectively. The invasion marked the first appearance of the Navy's 

Underwater Demolition Teams. They would make their first combat appearance to finish the

work begun by the submarines and scout the beaches of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur Islands 

the night before the invasion. After obtaining their hydrographic data the swimmers were to 

return to the beach and destroy mines and anti-boat obstacles.

After analyzing all but the last minute information, intelligence officers concluded that 

the 6th Base Force and the Headquarters, Fourth Fleet was the cornerstone of the Marshalls 

defenses. The Japanese, too, learned from Tarawa. Before the Gilberts invasion the weapons 

emplaced on the larger islands were sited to protect the ocean beaches, but since Tarawa, 

when the Marines attacked from the lagoon, the garrisons were strengthening and rearranging 

their defenses. Except for Kwajalein Island, where photographs showed a cross island 

defense line, the Japanese concentrated their heaviest installations along the beaches. In 

essence, the planners looked for the same kind of operation they found on Tarawa—a bitter 

fight on the beach then after beach defense lines were breached the defenders would fight to 

the death from shell holes and ruined buildings. 

Force estimates put the enemy strength at 8,000 to 9,600 troops spread throughout 

Kwajalein Atoll and it was estimated that there were between 6,150 and 7,100 combat troops. 

Therefore, it was assumed that the 7th Infantry Division would face between 2,300 to 2,600

combat troops and 1,200 to 1,600 Korean laborers. On Kwajalein the Japanese built a 

defensive line east of the airfield. This line was built to provide some defense in depth 

behind the pillboxes, trenches and gun emplacements that ringed the island. The Roi-Namur

photographs showed coastal defensive lines that featured strong points at the corners of each 

island. However, while there were prepared interior strong points, there were also large 

numbers of buildings and heavy undergrowth which permitted a defense in depth. The 

troops that landed on Majuro found the Japanese had abandoned the atoll. Enemy forces 

were believed to be composed of the 6th Base Force, 61st Naval Guard Force, elements of the 

122nd Infantry Regiment, and a detachment of the 4th Civil Engineers. 

34 
Operation Flintlock 

Operation Flintlock, Aerial View of Ships in the Lagoon 

Operation Flintlock, D Day 

35
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Sunrise Over the Marshall Islands 

36 
The Campaign Begins, November 1943 

perations against the Marshalls begin as part of the air campaign against the 

Gilberts. After Makin and Tarawa were taken strikes against the Marshalls 

continued. The air campaign was designed to destroy the Japanese air forces and 

defenses. Its first phase was conducted by land based medium and heavy bombers. Until 

December all air operations were carried out by B-24s based south and east of the Gilberts.

After 23 December flights could be made by planes based in the Gilberts, allowing heavier 

and deeper bombing raids into the Marshalls. In November and December Mille atoll,

nearest the Gilberts received the heaviest attacks. However, Maloelap with its large air

facility was not spared; while Jaluit also was attacked although not as often as the others.

Beginning in January Kwajalein and Wotje were also targeted. 

O 

Air action over the Marshalls was sustained and harsh. A carrier borne strike was 

launched against Mille on 18 and 19 November to keep the Japanese away from operations in 

the Gilberts. But, despite the raids the Japanese made every effort to keep the air strip 

operating and by 20 November the Japanese had fighters in the air and enemy bombers over 

Tarawa. 

Maloelap atoll was considered the greatest potential threat to operations in the Marshalls.

Taroa, with the exception of Kwajalein, was the most important airbase between Tarawa and 

Truk. Between 26 November and 10 January Japanese interceptors met each flight and for

thirty to fifty minutes of each raid bomber crews fought their way to and from the targets. 

During the Taroa portion of the air campaign nine B-24s were shot down and fifty-nine

Japanese fighters were destroyed. Despite the intensity and heavy damage caused by the 

raids, Taroa was never completely put out of operation. During the second period,

concentrating on Maloelap, B-25s made more frequent strikes against the islands dropping

seventy tons of bombs between 11 and 25 January. Fifteen enemy fighters were destroyed 

and the lagoon cleared of shipping at a loss of six B-25s. But, despite the intensity of the 

effort the airfield still remained in operation. The attack’s last phase began on 26 January 

1944 with fighter escorts to accompany the B-25s. On 29 January, one day before the 

invasion task force moved into the Marshalls, the B-25s made a low level attack on 

ammunition dumps and buildings on the neighboring outer islands. No enemy planes met

them and Maloelap was declared neutralized. 

Between 12 December and 29 January thirteen air strikes were made against Jaluit, which 

received less attention that Mille or Maloelap. Fighters and attack bombers from Makin and 

Tarawa concentrated their efforts on low level strafing and bombing runs, destroying oil and 

ammunition dumps, communications facilities and three ships in the lagoon. By the time the 

task force arrived in the Marshalls, Jaluit like the other islands had been neutralized. 

The island of Wotje was not struck until 13 December. A total of 325 tons of bombs 

were dropped on the airfields, fuel and ammunition dumps, and shipping on and around 

Wotje. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The Seventh Air Force conducted only light strikes against Kwajalein and Roi-Namur 

because of the distances involved, undertaking nine more missions against Kwajalein and 

Roi-Namur during December and January, dropping about 200 tons of bombs on the atolls 

causing some damage to the installations and shipping. While the Japanese did not intercept 

the land based bombers after 22 January, Roi-Namur, unlike the other island airbases was not 

neutralized as the Marshall invasion force steamed into the 10,000 square mile lagoon. 

What the Army Air Force couldn't reach the Navy did with its carrier based planes. 

Between 24 and 29 November, Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3 were brought together for the 

operation against Kwajalein and Wotje. The two task groups consisted of six fast carriers, 

five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, three anti-aircraft cruisers, and twelve destroyers. The

fleet refueled 820 miles northeast of Kwajalein on 1 December then proceeded southeast,

arriving unobserved near Kwajalein on the morning of 4 December 1943. The first strike of 

the 246 plane force left their carriers at 0630 for Roi-Namur. The carrier pilots discovered 

enemy planes parked on the runways of Roi-Namur and in the air. Additionally, two light 

cruisers and one large freighter were anchored off the island. The carrier pilots destroyed 

nineteen Japanese interceptors and one medium bomber. Three more bombers were 

destroyed on the ground and several hits were scored on the cruisers and freighters. But

despite the success of the raid, carefully camouflaged locations protected many of the 

Japanese aircraft. 

The same strike also hit Kwajalein. Since the Kwajalein airfield was still under 

construction no aircraft were found. However, thirty cargo vessels were anchored in the 

lagoon off of the island. Seven were sunk and two large multi-engine aircraft flying boats

were strafed and set afire. Twenty-nine other carrier planes attacked Wotje at noon while 

strikes were still hitting Roi-Namur and Kwajalein. On Wotje the carrier pilots destroyed

five planes on the ground and fired the machine shops, hangars, and barracks. 

The original plans had called for a two day air operation against Kwajalein and RoiNamur, but while the carrier planes were busy with their strikes, Japanese aircraft operating 

from Roi-Namur hit the carrier group. One carrier received a torpedo hit but no other 

damage occurred. Some operational problems were caused as the carriers maneuvered to

avoid torpedo hits and recovering aircraft was complicated. That night the carrier task forces

withdrew and the second day of strikes were cancelled. While extensive damage had been 

made on Kwajalein and Roi-Namur the land based attacks continued. The final task of 

neutralizing Roi-Namur's airfield and Kwajalein was left to the invasion force that would 

arrive on 29 January 1944. 

While the air strikes took place against targets in the Marshalls, the largest wartime 

contingent of shipping assembled to date began to sortie from ports in the Hawaiian, Fiji, 

Samoan, and Ellice Islands and San Diego, California on 13 January. On 22 January, the 

Southern Attack Force left Pearl Harbor and Honolulu while the Northern Attack Force 

sailed from Lahaina Roadstead in the outer islands, after a thirty hour break in their journey 

from San Diego. The Southern Force was about thirty-five miles ahead of the Northern 

Force. Since embarkation had taken most of the previous day the slower amphibians 

carrying the amphibian tractors and a detachment of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion 

38 
The Campaign Begins 

departed ahead of the main convoy. The Attack Force Reserve and the Majuro Attack Group

departed on 23 January. The reserve force was to arrive in the general vicinity of the three 

landings, ready to reinforce which ever group ran into difficulty. 

American submarines operating in the Marshalls for a month now took up their preinvasion stations west of the islands. Three boats patrolled near Truk, one near Ponape, one 

near Kusaie, and another near Eniwetok as the invasion fleet continued its voyage without 

mishap to an area near the eastern Marshalls. At dawn on 29 January 1944 the four task 

groups that composed Task Force 58 and the Neutralization Group, Task Group 50.15, 

moved into their attack positions. Despite the presence of squalls, Rear Admiral John W.

Reeves of Task Group 58.1 launched an air strike from the carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, and 

Belleau Wood against the airfield on Taroa. By nightfall the airfield was considered

completely neutralized. Simultaneously, Task Group 58.2 under the command of Rear

Admiral A.E. Montgomery launched a strike from the carriers Essex, Intrepid and Cabot

against Roi-Namur. Ninety-two enemy planes were based on Roi-Namur when the attack

began and within hours air superiority was achieved and numerous hits were made on the 

supporting structures. Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman’s Task Group 58.3 reached its target 

area and before sunrise aircraft from the carriers Cowpens, Monterey, and Bunker Hill struck

the airfield and adjacent buildings on Kwajalein. Successive strikes strafed and bombed the 

remainder of Kwajalein. That evening Admiral Sherman moved his group to the northwest 

in order to be able to launch a dawn strike against Eniwetok. The fourth Task Group, under 

the command of Rear Admiral Samuel P. Ginder, which included the carriers Saratoga, 

Princeton, and Langley launched a series of strikes against Wotje which encountered little 

opposition. 

Along with the carrier air strikes, U.S. Army Air Force land based bombers operating 

from the Gi1berts also participated in the general aerial assault. A flight of seven B-24s 

dropped fifteen tons of bombs on Roi-Namur and three tons of bombs on Kwaja1ein on the 

morning and afternoon of 29 January. At dusk the same evening as the carrier planes retired 

seven more heavy bombers deposited another twenty tons of bombs on Kwajalein. 

Naval surface ships joined in the pre-invasion softening up exercises as well. Battleships,

cruisers, and destroyers accompanying the carrier groups moved in and pounded Wotje and 

Maloelap late on the afternoon of 29 January. That same day Task Forces 52 and 53, 

approaching from the northeast on converging courses met north of Ailuk Atoll, 200 miles

east of Kwajalein. On the morning of 30 January the destroyers and cruisers convoying the 

invasion force broke from their convoys and pounded Maloelap and Wotje again, rejoined 

the convoys and made ready for the pre-invasion bombardment of Kwajalein. Carrier based 

strikes continued on Kwajalein, Wotje, Taroa, Roi-Namur and Eniwetok. Thus, Task Group

58.2 was replaced by Task Group 58.1, formally assigned the neutralization of Taroa, and 

Task Group 58.4 whose previous mission was Wotje also continued the neutralization of 

Taroa as well. Task Group 58.2 continued its attack on Roi-Namur. The carrier groups 

attacking Wotje and Taroa concentrated on airfield installations, runways and buildings.

Those attacking Kwajalein and Roi-Namur flew 400 sorties on 30 January 30. By that

afternoon, the surface ships arrived off of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur and began a four hour 

naval bombardment. 

39
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Meanwhile Task Group 58.3 launched planes against Eniwetok. Torpedo bombers swept 

over the island followed by fighters whose combined efforts found and destroyed nineteen 

planes on the ground. Naval aircraft destroyed virtually every building on the atoll and 

cratered the runway as naval ships took defensive positions under gunfire. Task Force 58.3 

and later Task Group 58.4 would remain south of Eniwetok as a covering force. While the 

bombardment was going on, the Northern and Southern Attack Forces split halfway between 

Ailuk and Kwajalein each taking station in their respective transport and fire support areas on 

the night of 30-31 January. Troops on board the attack transports of the Southern Force 

could see the fires burning on Kwajalein as they made last minute preparations for the 

assault. 

40 
The Assault Begins, 31 January 1944 

dmiral Turner’s Southern Task Force approached their first objectives early in the 

morning of 31 January. The APDs Overton and Manley moved toward the islands

of Gea (Carter) and Ninni (Cecil) carrying 155 men organized into a provisional 

unit composed of troops from the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and a unit composed of 

men from Company B of the 111th Infantry. Both were attached to the 17th Regimental

Combat Team. Troop A's mission was to take Ninni Island and Troop B’s mission to take 

Gea. Once the two lightly defended islands were seized the troops were to be reunited then 

taken to Gehh Island (Chauncey) and neutralize any resistance on it. The infantry units 

attached to the provisional units were to garrison and defend the channel islands. 

A 

About 2,600 yards from the beach, the APDs filled rubber boats with the assault units and 

a motor launch towed the troops within 800 yards of the shore line. The rubber boats would

then be paddled closer to the shore line where they awaited a two man team to plant lights on

the beach and then move onto the islands—with the balance of troops following in Higgins 

boats. 

Map of Kwajalein Atoll, Inset of Kwajalein Island

 The Manley's landing force, B Troop, was delayed because of difficulty in finding Carter 

Island, and then ran into difficulty when the lead assault boat mistook Cecil for Carter. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Once the confusion was sorted out it was too light to put a reconnaissance platoon ashore so 

the entire unit landed at 0620. A patrol encountered only one Japanese soldier and quickly 

killed him. However, as the reconnaissance platoon turned to take a second look at the island 

in light of the skirmish they were taken under fire. Following a brief and furious fight 

American troops, using hand grenades, small arms, knives, and bayonets, secured Carter 

Island by 0930. The intelligence materials were gathered up and sent to Admiral Turner. By 

1000 control of Carter was passed from the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop to the infantry 

force detailed to hold the island. 

At 0430 A Troop left the Overton paddling against a strong current and an off shore wind

towards what they thought was Cecil Island. By 0545 the troop made an unopposed landing

only to find they were on the wrong island. The A Troop commander left a small party of

infantrymen on Chauncey to guard a beached Japanese tugboat and continued to search for 

Japanese. The majority of the force took to their rubber boats and began to paddle along the 

reef line to their intended objective, Cecil Island. Cecil was occupied and was reported 

secure at 1235. With the small island guarding the passage through the reef secure, the ships 

that would provide fire support for the main landings could safely enter the lagoon.

Meanwhile back on Chauncey, the force guarding the beached tugboat came under attack by 

about 100 Japanese troops. Under orders to withdraw to Cecil, the company broke off the 

engagement, established a defensive perimeter for the night and waited for transport to Cecil. 

One squad remained, which was later reinforced by a platoon. 

The next two islands were Carlson, to be used as a divisional artillery base, and Carlos, to 

be used as a supply base. The 17th Regimental Combat Team's plan called for simultaneous

battalion size attacks on the northwestern tip of each island. Each battalion making the 

landing would be supported by a platoon of tanks and a battalion was to be held in reserve to 

reinforce should that be necessary. The transports carrying the three battalion landing teams 

arrived at 0544 on 31 January along with five LSTs carrying four amphibian tractor groups.

The most complicated part of the assault occurred when the troops disembarked from the

transports to Higgins boats, then transferred to amphibians. The LSTs, laden with the 

amphibians were to proceed to the Line of Departure, open their bow doors and disgorge 

their cargo. Since the operation had to be carried out in total darkness, the resulting

confusion led Admiral Turner to postpone H-Hour from 0830 to 0910. 

The preparatory naval bombardment of 

Kwajalein’s southern tip, provided by the 

battleships Pennsylvania and Mississippi began 

at 0618. Three merchant ships in the lagoon 

received fire from the destroyer Ringgold and

the cruiser San Francisco and carrier planes

cut through the heavy overcast sky at 0840 to 

begin strafing runs. At 0810 the battleships

New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Idaho, and

Mississippi, the cruisers Minneapolis, San

Francisco, and New Orleans, and the 

destroyers Stevens, McKee, Ringgold, and 

Kwajalein Island Bombardment 

42 
Assault Begins 

Sigsbee shifted from preparatory fire to plotted bombardment fire. They brought Carlos, 

Carlson, Kwajalein, Burton, and Beverly Islands under fire simultaneously. By 1040 the first 

wave hit the beach on Carlos unopposed. After meeting minor resistance the island was 

reported secure at 1615. 

The first wave landed at Carlson at 0912 with one company on the left of a three hundred 

yard beach and another on the right with one company held in reserve. The second wave bit 

the beach at 0920 and the third two minutes later. Meanwhile carrier planes strafed and 

bombed the island. By 1210 the island was secured. All the objectives were secured with 

minimal casualties. 

75mm Pack Howitzer Giving Fire Support

The lack of strong resistance led General Corlett to speed up the landing of the division

artillery on Carlson. During the night of 31 January and early hours of 1 February the men of

the field artillery battalions were busy setting up gun positions to lay supporting fire on 

Kwajalein. Gun pits, tree cutting, and ammunition hauling, registration points, and 

communications networks all had to be finished before the morning assault began. By the 

morning of 1 February, all was ready on Carlson—12 batteries of 105-mm howitzers were 

packed together in an area 900 yards long and 150 yards wide. In addition, headquarters

elements transferred from the amphibious command ship Rocky Mount to Carlson. Activity

43
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

was no less furious on Carlos as 7th Division supply units constructed communications 

networks, built supply dumps, and set up service repair facilities. The army guns on Carlson

accompanied by the guns of the San Francisco, Idaho, New Mexico, and screening destroyers 

steadily pounded Kwajalein through the night. 

At the same time, the Navy’s Underwater Demolition Teams made their first appearance 

in combat. Composed of Army and Navy personnel a team conducted a close-in 

reconnaissance of the beaches on the western end of Kwajalein. The team approached the 

beach twice on the 31 January, once at 1000 at high tide and again at 1600 at low tide, 

working within 300 yards of the shore under covering fire from the Pennsylvania and the 

Mississippi. While there were no underwater obstacles to destroy, the team did determine 

surf and reef conditions. After the invasion they destroyed wrecks, coral heads and other 

underwater obstacles along the coral side of the island. 

With all going according to schedule Admiral Turner announced H-Hour as 0930 on 1 

February according to plan. Hours before sunrise the ships carrying the assault force and 

those providing fire support moved into position as the guns from the screening vessels and 

Carlson kept up a study fire against the Japanese on Kwajalein. 

Fire Support 

44 
The Seizure of Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944 

The First Day, 1 February 1944 

t 0900 Lieutenant Colonel William P. Walker’s 3rd Battalion, 184th Infantry and the 

1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest H. Bearss 

crossed the Line of Departure to begin the thirty minute run to the Kwajalein beach. 

Navy planes began their last minute strafing run of the beach and the Army and Navy 

artillery barrage began at 0905. At 0928, the Navy and Army firing on the beach stopped as

the first assault wave approached the shore line and shifted 200 yards inland. Boats equipped

with 20-mm and 40-mm guns also provided harassing fire. Unlike Tarawa, the heavy 

bombardment worked, only light Japanese small arms and mortar fire greeted the assault 

boats. A damaged steering mechanism on an LVT coupled with a strong current led the 

landing boats farther south, but the only result was crowding at the southern end of the 

landing zone. The

32nd Regimental

Combat Team hit

the beach right on 

schedule and met

light mortar and 

automatic 

weapons fire 

despite the heavy 

bombardment. On

Red Beach 1, 

where the sea wall 

was almost at the 

waters edge, the

LVTs could gain a

field of fire inland.

On Red Beach 2 

the amphibians

stopped at the 

water line with 

their fire barely

sweeping above 

the men of the 1st Battalion as they moved forward to destroy a pillbox holding up the line of 

advance. Meanwhile on the left, two companies moved 150 yards inland against light 

resistance. Despite some problems with amphibians getting bogged down on the beaches and 

hung up on palm tree stumps, the first four waves were ashore within fifteen minutes of the

designated H Hour. By 1800 on 1 February the beach head was secure and the support and 

reserve units were in place ready to move inland. 

A 

Kwajalein Island – Operation Flintlock
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The line established by the initial assault was 250 yards inland along the western loop of 

the main island roadway that ran north and south, just about parallel to the two Red Beaches.

Resistance to the advance varied as units began to move inland. The advance of the 1st

Battalion, 32nd Infantry met little resistance. While they met some obstacles constructed of 

coconut logs that were not indicated on maps and found well prepared firing positions

unoccupied, they met only scattered resistance. Japanese rifleman preferred to wait until the

main line passed. The 3rd Battalion, advancing on the northern zone ran into a network of 

pill boxes. The action faced at each pill box was similar. Upon coming under fire from 

them, the troops would quickly take cover in a shell hole and assess the situation. A first 

attempt usually involved attempting to silence the objective with grenades, but many times 

these were thrown back. A second attempt would use a flame thrower, which proved 

ineffective if not aimed just right. Finally, a disgruntled private would crawl out of his 

foxhole to within a few yards of the pillbox where he would throw white phosphorous 

grenades in, an action that would often flush the Japanese from their cover. Often another 

solider would crawl on top of the pill box and fire a clip of M-1 rounds into the bunker.

Then, if one was available, an amphibian tank would be summoned to fire its flamethrower 

and 37-mm gun into the aperture. By 1135 of the first day the troops reached Wallace Road 

and began to reorganize for the next stage of the advance—Wilma Road, a north-south road

that ran east of Wart Area and west of the landing strips, connecting Will Road on the north

with the ocean shore stretch of Wallace Road. 

Aerial View of Battlefield on D Day

46 
Seizure of Kwajalein 

Operation Flintlock - D Day, Landing Craft Approaching Kwajalein 

While the log covered shelters and prepared pill boxes were taken the same way, as the 

troops moved up the length of the island resistance got tougher. The fighting was further 

complicated by thick underbrush and heavy woods. Once the troops reached the area east of 

Wilma Road they were in position to seize the airfield. The attack against the airfield began 

at about 1440, generously supported by artillery fire. The 1st Battalion, which advanced

along the ocean side of the field, moved quicker than those who took the inland route. Their 

advance was delayed only because of a major fire caused when an artillery round hit a fuel 

dump. By 1525 resistance stiffened for Company E, fighting to clear out the Japanese 

defensive positions along both sides of Wallace Road called Strong Point Canary. The 

Japanese mounted a strong defense taking advantage of the rubble and underground tunnels.

After an hour of tough fighting and the commitment of a reserve company, it became clear 

the whole movement had been stopped. At 1800 the attack was broken off and defensive 

positions prepared for the night. 

Defensive perimeters were established approximately one fourth of the distance from the 

invasion beaches. In the northern zone, Companies L and I held the most advanced position 

supported by two platoons from Company K, which took positions along Wilma Road

linking up with supporting companies just east of the road. In the southern zone, Company

F, 32d Infantry held the line along the beach to the southern edge of the landing strip. The

47
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry took up positions west and northwest of 

Company F. In addition, three antitank guns were set up at equal intervals, interspersed with 

machine guns in Company F's easterly line. All personnel were dug in with two or three to a 

foxhole. Between the southernmost positions of Company F and Company I was the landing 

strip and about 250 yards of open ground, which could not provide cover for defending or 

attacking forces. Company C was sent forward to guard the area to check any possibility of

infiltration. In the lagoon the destroyer Sigsbee was stationed to put a search light over the 

area every half hour. Harassment and interdiction fire was also scheduled for the entire area.

Intelligence estimates placed remaining Japanese strength at 1,500 men who still had some

artillery. 

Tanks on Kwajalein Firing at a Pill Box, Kwajalein 

A chilling rain fell across the

island and under cover of darkness 

the Japanese came out of their 

bunkers and air raid shelters to 

organize counterattacks against the 

forward positions. Individual

Japanese soldiers and machine gun 

squads attempted to infiltrate

along the flanks of the American 

lines or in the space between the 

two regiments. As the Japanese 

soldiers continued their efforts,

their remaining dual purpose guns 

and their mortars continued 

harassment and interdiction fire

against American positions. The 

Japanese also fired at the Sigsbee

from Nob pier. Throughout the nigh

against the American positions. 

t the Japanese made uncoordinated but concerted attacks 

48 
Seizure of Kwajalein 

The Second Day, 2 February 1944 

General Corlett ordered the two Regimental Combat Teams to launch a coordinated 

assault at 0715 on 2 February, preceded by fifteen minutes of preparatory fire delivered by 

the battleship Idaho, the 

cruiser Minneapolis, four 

destroyers and five field 

artillery batteries. The 

artillery fire would be 

followed by a twenty minute 

air strike that would start at 

0800. The 2nd Battalion led 

the advance, slowly at first,

and began to find scattered 

unorganized enemy

resistance. While they 

encountered heavy sniper 

fire it was "more harassing

than deadly.” By 0900 

advance units of the leading 

companies passed the H 

Docks with the 1st Battalion

following closely, mopping 

up rear areas and eliminating snipers. 

The advance elements were led by tanks spraying treetops with .30 caliber machine gun fire 

and stopping when necessary to fire 75-mm rounds into pillboxes. By 1040 the advance 

companies were across Carl Road. 

Meal Break, Kwajalein 

49
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Units advancing up the other side of the island had greater difficulty. The lead company 

encountered an unknown anti-tank ditch running from the landing strip to Carl Road, forcing

the tanks to swing left to go along the air strip, exposing the accompanying infantrymen to 

fire from a pill box. It took the ocean side advance units two hours of heavy fighting to work 

through the Japanese rifleman in trees, shallow trenches and revetted pill boxes. The 

movement picked up again until they reached a similar line of defenses at Cat Strong Point. 

At 1040 the ocean side advance linked up with the lagoon side at the first stage objective, 

Carl Road. 

LSTs Unloading on Kwajalein, in Support of Seventh Infantry Division Troops 

The next stage of the advance pitted the advancing force against the strongest Japanese 

defensive positions—the main tank trap and Corn Strong Point. Once again plans called for 

an advance supported by tanks, a heavy pre-assault bombardment from field artillery and 

naval guns coupled with an air assault on the northeastern end of the island to prevent

Japanese artillery and providing reinforcements. Unfortunately, a series of delays in 

coordinating the air, artillery and naval gunfire support assignments delayed the start of the 

operation until 1400. Despite the delay, the troops moved out and in a strongly coordinated 

infantry-tank effort advanced some 225 yards. By nightfall of the second day a rapid victory 

on the third day seemed likely. Despite the necessity to withdraw about 15 yards to 

straighten the lines, the second day’s casualties were light and the Japanese seemed near the 

end of their strength. Despite fears of a vicious Japanese suicide attack, none materialized. T 

he only casualties were caused by a Japanese round and a premature burst that split the tube

on an American 155- mm howitzer. General Corlett ordered his assault regiment 

50 
Seizure of Kwajalein 

commanders to "Organize vigorous attack 0715 tomorrow. Finish the job not later than 1500 

3 February. The Northern Force has finished the job.” 

The Third Day, 3 February 1944 

The third day's first objective was Nathan Road, the location of the headquarters

complexes. Heavy resistance was expected since well built fortifications were still intact 

along the coast and there was heavy 

vegetation throughout the island.

All the defenses were well

organized positions with trenches,

covered by artillery and the 

remaining pill boxes. Once again

Corlett’s plan called for a 

preparatory ten minute artillery

barrage. Once the advance began it 

would move northeast gradually 

turning to the north. This rotation

of the axis of advance meant that 

the 32nd Infantry would have to 

advance more rapidly than the 

remainder of the troops since it had 

the greater distance to cover. The 

jump off began keeping in mind 

General Corlett's orders for a

“vigorous attack." The 32nd

Infantry moved forward under the 

creeping barrage about 250 yards 

before it began taking fire from a 

pillbox that controlled their route of 

advance. The demolished buildings 

in the area meant the defenders

could move about quickly leaving 

the attackers to slow down to make sure they had eliminated the resistance. Meanwhile 

Corlett ordered the infantry to "keep smashing ahead." By noon the 32nd Infantry and the 

184th Infantry were separated by a vertical gap. The inability of the Japanese to mount a 

strong counterattack and drive a wedge between the two units left the gap unexploited. 

th The 184 Infantry, however, was as fortunate. When they crossed the Line of Departure 

at 0715 they did so without armor support. Nevertheless, the units moved out for 225 yards 

meeting only scattered rifle and machine gun fire leading them to report at 0806 that enemy

resistance was weak. Then they ran directly into an intact Japanese blockhouse supported by 

huge shelters and small bunkers that were part of an extensive Japanese defensive network. 

As they approached the structure there was an increase in fire. Since the company had hit the 

51
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

block house complex without supporting weapons it waited until a 37-mm anti-tank gun 

arrived. Despite repeated attempts, the gun seemed to have no effect on the dense structure.

Deciding to leave the blockhouse for the reserve companies and heavier weapons, the

decision was made to bypass the structure. Unfortunately, the undergrowth and ruins were so 

thick that the company became lost and separated from its supporting units although there

was only twenty yards between them. Quickly, squads and platoons became separated and 

the whole advance turned into a series of uncoordinated actions with small units either taking

cover or attempting to ferret out the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, tanks moved up to 

support the advance but since there were no leaders to direct them, they sat idle. To make

matters worse, in an act of desperation, artillery fire as called in, landing only a short distance 

from one platoon. 

Soldiers and Light Tank Moving Through 

attlefield, Kwajalein (below)

An hour passed when the company commander realized that two of his platoons were not

Jungle, Kwajalein (right)

B

reporting advances. Warned by an air observer that some Japanese near the lagoon were

gathering for a counterattack, he committed part of his reserve platoon to the lagoon shore.

He then went forward to join Lieutenant Klatt in the debris around the bunker complex.

Captain White quickly ordered machine guns placed to cover the gaps in the lines,

reorganized his lines then ordered tanks to precede the infantry in a second assault that began 

at 0945. But once again the attack bogged down. Captain White was unable to communicate

with the tanks since the telephones mounted on the hulls were not waterproof, so crawled 

onto the lead tank and beat on the turret with his rifle butt. By the time the tankers got the 

word they were separated from the infantry units all coordination between them was lost.

The battle then boiled down to planting satchel charges in the blockhouse and making sure 

52 
Seizure of Kwajalein 

platoons were kept together as best as possible. Meanwhile units of both companies,

exercising initiative and leadership, took individual bunkers and trenches under attack,

routing out small units of Japanese soldiers. But as in the earlier actions, some units were 

fighting only ten yards apart without knowing of the other’s presence. 

The advance and the hopes 

Once again the attack got 

The reports reaching the regimental headquarters painted a confusing picture. The terrain

By 0430 some units reported concentrated attacks by units of Japanese infantrymen. 

of a quick end on Kwajalein

were being destroyed by

determined Japanese resistance.

Company B could neither move 

forward nor bypass the area

because of the numerous enemy 

soldiers, leading to a revised

plan of attack announced at 

1225. The 2nd Battalion, 184th

Infantry was limited to a

northern boundary that curved 

from Noel Road to the juncture

of the lagoon and Nathan Road. 

The 32nd Infantry was to take

over all the island north of that 

point pinching off 184th’s zone. 

This freed the 1st Battalion,

184th Infantry to attack on a 

lesser front. 

underway but the day was not a 

good one. Company A's right

wing advanced and took out the 

resistance and by 1800 reached 

the lagoon. Likewise Company

C, despite a counterattack by the

bogged down near Nob Pier and like the earlier attacks of other units, began to separate into 

smaller uncoordinated groups. The battalion commander lost control of the action. The 32

enemy reached its objective. Company E, however, was 

nd

Infantry also had serious problems. Some units reported making excellent advances while 

others became bogged down and separated. 

features that divided the infantry units and prevented coordinated attacks had been caused by

the shell fire. Units, in some cases, were receiving fire from those all around them. General 

Corlett’s objective changed, while only a few hours earlier he ordered his units to finish the 

offensive, now they had to regroup, regain the momentum and finish the attack. Unlike the 

first and second nights, units were disbursed in small groups, in some cases surrounded by 

the enemy. Units were harassed by the Japanese, who launched grenade and banzai attacks.

53
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The Fourth Day, 4 February 1944 

By the morning of 4 February, despite the efforts of the Japanese, it was obvious that the 

ortion of the island remaining in their hands (1,000 yards long, 400 yards wide) would be 

rn

ttack Force’s main 

p

taken. Sunrise was at 0700 and that’s when the attack began. The lines that had been in

confusion the night of the 3 February remained that way causing a disorganized start. As

units moved forward, they came under full scale attack by the Japanese who were bypassed 

the day before. Thus, straightening out the lines of the 32nd Infantry did not occur until l000.

Meanwhi1e, the 184th Infantry experienced the first large scale surrender, capturing thirtyone Koreans laborers and one Japanese soldier. Surrender became more common as 

Japanese and Koreans, living without water for four days and aided by intelligence officers

using loud speakers

decided to give up. All 

the Japanese, however, 

did not surrender. Live

Japanese were

intermingled with bodies 

caused by the previous 

days’ bombardment. As

late as 1900, troops were 

still under small arms fire 

from individual enemy

riflemen. At dusk tanks

were brought forward to 

reduce the last 150 yards 

and in a few minutes had

driven over or killed the 

remaining Japanese

defenders. The last

vestiges of Japanese 

resistance ended at 1920

on 4 February. At 1610, 

General Cor1ett

announced that “All

organized resistance... 

bas ceased. The troops 

have been organized for 

mopping operations." 

While the Southe

A

objective was Kwajalein 

Island, once that was 

54 
Seizure of Kwajalein 

complete they had to secure the other islets as far north as Bigej, Ennuqenliggelap, Ebeye, 

Loi, South Gugegwe, North Gugegwe, Gehb, Torrulj, Mann, Legan, and Cohen. Chauncey

Island was secured on 1 February. When it became apparent that the Carlos and Carlson

reserve force was not needed on Kwajalein, it was ordered to capture Burton (Ebeye) on 3 

February. There was a seaplane base on Ebeye and positions containing pill boxes and gun 

emplacements near the beaches. The Japanese had apparently expected the attack to come

from the ocean side instead of the lagoon. However, newer positions were beginning to 

appear near the lagoon side. 

 The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry commanded by Colonel Hartl moved toward the beach of 

Ebeye in LVTs; two companies landed abreast. Despite the mechanical failure of one tractor

and the collision of two others, the first wave, flanked by two LCI gunboats to provide fire

support, hit the Ebeye beach at 0935. Only four men were wounded during the initial assault 

and the assault elements quickly moved inland from south to north. After an hour the 

extreme left flank met resistance on the lagoon side from Japanese troops and Korean 

laborers armed with rifles, machine guns, a dual purpose gun, improvised dynamite throwers 

and spears. 

The Japanese positions were eliminated by direct artillery and mortar fire. Despite the 

presence of overwhelming fire power, progress was slowed on the left by enemy troops in 

well camouflaged positions. The Japanese waited in positions covered by palm fronds, then 

after American troops passed, delivered fire or grenades from the rear. At about 1900, units 

began consolidating for night positions and throughout the night any threat of a counterattack 

was greatly diminished by almost constant illumination, artillery, machine gun fire, and

mortar fire. The single Japanese 17-mm dual purpose gun was silenced by 81-mm mortar 

fire. 

The attack against the Japanese on Ebeye was resumed at 0730 on 4 February. As the 

troops moved forward on the right they encountered increased resistance because Japanese 

troops had reoccupied four pillboxes closer to the American lines. The addition of selfpropelled guns and a flight of Navy bombers broke the resistance. By 1337 the island was

secured. Between 3 and 4 February the remaining islands were captured by other units of the 

111th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. Bennet was the last island captured at 

1642 on 4 February by the Army forces from the Southern Landing Force. 

Total American losses in the Southern Landing Force were reported as 142 killed, 845

wounded and two missing in action. Enemy losses were estimated at 4,938 killed and 206

prisoners, 79 of whom were Japanese and 127 were Koreans. 

55
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Hot Spot – Main Drag, Kwajalein 

56 
The Roi-Namur Assault Begins, 31 January 1944 

t 0300 on 30 January, the small task group assigned to take Majuro broke off from

the main convoy. At 2130 the U.S.S. Kane launched rubber boats led by 1st

Lieutenant Harvey C. Weeks, USMC, of the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance 

Company, who landed on Calalin Island. Weeks' small unit, the first to land on a prewar 

Japanese possession, reported he found a Marshallese who told him there were 300-400 

Japanese on Darrit Island but nowhere else on the atoll. The Kane continued around the 

eastern end of the atoll and at 0200 on 31 January landed the remainder of the reconnaissance 

company on Dalap Island. They learned that all but four Japanese had left Majuro. This was

confirmed by another Marshallese, Michael Madison, who spoke English. Despite some

difficulty in obtaining communications with the amphibious group, Captain Jones radioed the 

naval gunfire support ships to suspend their bombardment of the eastern end of the atoll. 

That afternoon the Marines who made up the reconnaissance company boarded the Kane and 

went to Majuro. At 2145 forty-two Marines landed from rubber boats and began a search of

the island where they discovered Japanese Naval Warrant Officer Nagata, the lone Japanese 

defender of Majuro. 

A 

The Roi-Namur assault, like Kwajalein, began with taking smaller islands to secure the

flanks and provide a base for logistical supplies for the assault. The 4th Marine Division's 

plan was similar to the Army’s plan. The twin islands of Roi- Namur, connected by a small 

sandy strip of beach and a causeway, were the primary targets. Like Kwajalein, the day 

before the assault on the primary objective the outlying islands would be captured to ensure 

the safe passage of the invasion fleet and provide a location for artillery and supply support 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

for the invasion troops. At 0900 on 31 January the 1st Battalion 25th Marines, plus the Scout 

Company made simultaneous landings from the ocean side on Mellu (Ivan) and Ennuebing

(Jacob) Islands which guarded the deepwater pass to the lagoon. After the lagoon was swept 

for mines, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the same regiment would land on Ennumennet 

(Albert) and Ennubir (Allen) islands, southeast of Namur. Unfortunately, there were only 

enough amphibian tractors to carry two battalion landing teams ashore at a time, which

meant extensive coordination was required to make five separate landings during the course 

of the day. 

Map of Kwajalein Atoll, Inset of Kwajalein Island

At 0535 Admiral Conolly's flag ship the Appalachian, in convoy with its fire support 

ships moved to their designated stations southwest of Mellu and Ennuebinq islands. At 0651 

the Biloxi and the Maryland began shelling the two islands. Additional support ships for the 

Northern Landing Force included the battleships Tennessee and Colorado and the heavy 

cruisers Louisville, Mobile, and Indianapolis, the light cruiser Santa Fe along with the escort 

carriers Sangamon, Suwannee, and Chenango accompanied by seventeen destroyers, one 

destroyer escort, and three minesweepers. At 0715 a check fire order was issued to the 

Maryland and Biloxi to allow Navy planes to perform an aerial reconnaissance of the two 

islands to access the value of the pre-invasion bombardment. 

58 
Roi-Namur Assault 

The tractor shortage was exacerbated by a host of other problems. Initially, sixty minutes 

was allowed for debarkation from the transports to the LSTs, but higher than expected winds 

and heavy seas complicated the maneuvers. Instead of sixty minutes, the LVTs took twice 

that time. To further complicate the situation, the boat control officers left the tractors to 

search for a landing craft and did not return in time to lead the LVTs to the Line of

Departure. The tractors wallowed in the heavy seas to wait for the troops and became

damaged or swamped. At 0825 another air strike was launched and the control officer on the 

Phelps radioed Admiral Conolly that H-Hour could not be met. Admiral Conolly postponed 

the landing for thirty minutes and ordered another strafing and bombing run on the beaches. 

Finally, by 0917 there were enough tractors to make the assault and the run began with 

touchdown at 0952. The troops who hit Ivan were also behind schedule, touching down at 

1015. Fortunately, there was only token resistance and both islands were reported secured at 

1015. Attention now turned to the capture of Albert, Allen, and Abraham islands on RoiNamur’s eastern flank. 

By 1116 a curtain of smoke was laid down and the minesweepers moved through Jacob 

Pass within 1,500 yards of Albert Island. At about the same time aircraft from the carriers 

began to strafe and bomb the islands along with complementary fire from the destroyers 

Porterfield and Haraden while the cruisers and the battleships were firing into Namur. At 

1210 Admiral Conolly gave an order that would endear him to the soldiers and marines for

the remainder of the Pacific War. Aware of the blockhouses that existed and their threat to

the troops Admiral Conolly sent a message "Desire Maryland move in really close this 

afternoon for counter battery and counter blockhouse fire, using pointer fire for both main 

and secondary batteries.” Forever after Admiral Conolly was affectionately referred to as 

"Close in Conolly." 

While the pre-invasion preparations were proceeding, another landing plan mix up 

occurred. As the landing craft were forming up about 3,000 yards from the Phelps, acting as 

the central control vessel, she received a message to leave station and move into the lagoon

for a fire support mission. Obeying, the Phelps dispatched a signal to Sub Chaser SC 997 to

take control of the landings. General Underhill aboard the SC 997 faced a crisis; for some

reason the SC 997 staff did not have a copy of the plans for boat control or a sufficient 

number of radios to properly communicate with the landing craft. To make matters worse,

when the amphibians saw the Phelps leave for the lagoon they began to follow her through 

the pass. General Underhill quickly evaluated the situation and ordered the SC 997 to 

overtake the landing craft and herd them together. Finally, after a series of false starts the 

Marines moved out for the beaches on the two islands. The first group hit the beach at 1513 

and the second island was reached at 1518. Within twenty minutes both islands were secure.

Plans to assault the last island before taking Roi-Namur were complicated by delays on 

Albert and Allen. 

While General Underhill knew about the plans to invade Abraham by 1600 the LVTs 

commanders were not informed. Thus, they returned to the LSTs for fuel. The delay in the

return of the LVTs meant that artillery support would not be available. The Navy did not 

have enough time to station a ship for gunfire support and the artillery was not yet in place on

the recently captured islands. Therefore, the decision was made to capture the island at 1800 

59
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

with fire support provided by 81-mm and 60-mm mortars along with the guns mounted on 

accompanying half-tracks. The 120 Marines hit the beach and secured the island by 1915. 

By the close of D-Day, the 25th Marines succeeded, despite some coordination difficulties, in

capturing the five islands flanking Roi-Namur. The navy had swept the lagoon for mines and 

an underwater demolition team found the beach clear of obstacles. Teams began to establish

artillery support bases and off-load supplies. Destroyers kept up harassment and interdiction 

fire against the Roi-Namur garrison throughout the night as the Marines on the assault ships

waited for the arrival of dawn to invade. 

Roi-Namur Island Bombardment

At 0650 the Santa Fe, Maryland, Indianapolis, Biloxi, Mustin, and Russel opened fire on 

Roi. Twenty minutes later the Tennessee, Colorado, Louisville, Mobile, Morris, and 

Anderson began their bombardment of Namur. Marine artillery preparatory fire began at 

0645 with the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 14th Marines shelling Namur and the 3rd and 4th

Battalions firing on Roi. The coordination problems that plagued the previous day’s landings 

reasserted themselves. The LVTs of the 10th Amphibious Tractor Battalion had been 

launched too far from the Line of Departure and were bucking choppy seas and strong winds.

This meant the higher than average fuel consumption left many of the ungainly craft out of 

60 
Roi-Namur Assault 

fuel which spelled disaster. The LVTs were not equipped with manual fuel pumps, and were 

unable to pump out the water they shipped in the heavy seas. This meant that the 24th

Marines could only muster 62 out of 110 tractors assigned to them. More problems occurred 

as they tried to substitute LCVPs. The Regimental Commander, Colonel Franklin A. Hart,

USMC had not yet received the report from the underwater demolition team so he did not 

know if there was enough water in the lagoon to float the LCVPs. 

Roi-Namur Island Bombardment, SSW View 

 The 23rd Marines, scheduled to assault Roi, had their own problems. Their LSTs were 

late reaching the lagoon and after reaching their destination had difficulty disembarking their 

LVTs. Meanwhile, the gunfire support ships and naval aircraft continued their devastating 

bombardment of the island. Roi and Namur were covered with such towering plumes of

smoke that an air observer reported the ceiling as zero. As the Marines moved toward the 

Line of Departure confusion still existed because of the communications difficulties caused

by the wet radios. When the 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines reached the Line of Departure at 

1100, they believed they had failed in their mission because they had not been told of the

delay in the landing time. In another case, some of the LVTs were lost, at 1045 while some

of the LVTs were at the Line of Departure, but a jammed elevator on an LST meant that 

61
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

others were still not ready. Eleven o'clock passed with no orders and the naval gunfire 

support had been lifted. Admiral Conolly ordered the landing force to begin the run to the 

beaches with whatever was on hand at 1112. 

62 
Roi-Namur Captured, 1-2 February 1944 and 

The Seizure of Engebi and Eniwetok 

he Roi assault waves, led by LCI gunboats, with the assault troops (1st and 2nd

Battalions, 23rd Marines) in amphibian tractors and tanks in LCMs, made their way 

from the Line of Departure to the beach. The 1st Battalion’s armored amphibians 

touched down at 1133 and moved

inland to the anti-tank ditch. A 

platoon of LVTs moved around 

the left flank through the water 

and over Wendy Point to open 

fire on Norbert Circle at the west

end of the northern runway. The 

first two waves of infantry landed 

west of the assigned zone by 

1158. Resistance was very light, 

with fire coming from one pillbox

located on the middle of the sand

strip connecting Roi and Namur

and some from the debris caused 

by the shelling near the beach.

By 1311 Colonel Jones went 

ashore and radioed back that 

"This is a pip. No opposition near the beach. Located scattered machine gun fire vicinity of 

split... Landing teams moving in to O-1 line. Little or no opposition [Fifteen minutes later] 

Give us the word and we will take the rest of the island." General Schmidt, concerned about

the lack of coordination between the units on the island, ordered Colonel Jones to await 

orders and get his tanks under control. 

T

At 1530 the order was issued to push off the attack. Company E, assigned the left flank,

reached its objective by 1600. Companies G and F, assigned the right and center, had a 

tougher time, but managed to destroy a blockhouse and by 1800 the Marines had secured Roi 

with comparative ease, leaving only a tiny pocket of Japanese that were dealt with the next 

day. 

The battle to take Namur was not as easy. Namur, unlike Roi, contained the bulk of the 

buildings, vegetation, shelters and the majority of the troops. The bombardment created

ruins and did not burn off the vegetation. Thus, the message passed by an air observer flying

over the beaches, "... Don't think a bird could be alive...”was over optimistic. The four

assault companies of the 3rd and 2nd Battalion Landing Teams landed on Green Beaches 1

and 2 between 1145 and 1200. The plans called for the landing teams to move as quickly as 

possible to about 100 yards up from the beach then pause to regroup. The regrouped forces 

would then move as rapidly as possible to objective O-1, Sycamore Boulevard, a road 

running about 400 to 500 yards inland from the beach. Initial Japanese resistance to the 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

assault was light and unorganized. It was obvious that despite the intensive shelling, the 

Japanese were still able to fight and at least slow down the attack’s progress. Within two

hours of the landing, Companies I and K, moving forward in a skirmish line reached their 

first objective, where they were told to hold and prepare for a coordinated northward advance 

with the second battalion lading team on their right. The jump-off time was to be 1630. 

Aerial View of Roi-Namur Bombardment 

Building Destroyed

In the meantime, the frenzied activities of units preparing to advance were carried on. As the 

hour drew closer Companies I and B were on the O-1 line with Company L in reserve and 

Company K occupying Pauline Point. On Green Beach, Companies E and F came ashore 

around noon and within ten minutes Company G started to land to the right of the Yokohama

Pier. By early afternoon ten light tanks were ashore and in their assembly areas. As on the 

rest of the island initial reaction was light. Even the area designated as Sally Point, the 

southeast promontory of Namur, did not present a serious obstacle to the Marines. Naval 

gunfire was ordered lifted at 1250 because it was falling too close to the Marines and a final 

dive bombing attack was launched at Natalie Point on the northeastern tip of the island. With 

64 
Roi-Namur, Engebi and Eniwetok

the dive bombing attack over, it was determined that the uneven course of the advance and 

the closeness of the fighting ruled out fire support. 

The Great Explosion 

By 1300 progress 

with a few exceptions

had been favorable.

At about 1300, a 

Marine demolitions

group began moving 

forward under cover 

of rifle fire to take out 

what was thought to

be a revetted gun

position. The 

Marines placed a 

shaped charge against 

the wall of the 

building and then

quickly tossed in a

sixteen pound satchel 

charge. What was 

thought to be a gun 

position was a 

torpedo warhead storage 

magazine that blew up in a thick cloud of pungent black smoke. Rock, debris and fragments

An Aerial View of the Great Explosion 

65
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

from the building and its contents were thrown into the air. The smoke was so acrid many 

went on frenzied searches for gas masks thinking the building destroyed was a poison gas 

storage facility. Within a few minutes two more serious, but less violent explosions rocked 

the island. The explosion stopped any coordinated advance, knocked out communications 

and accounted for half the casualties required to secure Namur. 

Japanese Prisoner Taken 

 The 3rd Battalion Landing Team (on the left) had been in position to attack for 21⁄2 hours 

while the 2nd Battalion Landing Team (on the right) was not ready until 1730 because armor 

support and supporting units arrived late. Thus, when the attack began at 1630 the 2nd

Battalion was not ready while the Japanese had more than two hours to recover from the 

bombardment. Thus, while progress on the battalion’s left was fairly steady, the right flank 

was pinned down with fire from a blockhouse. As on Kwajalein, poor communication 

between the infantry and armor hampered coordination among the assault units. By 1830 a 

few of the Marines reached Narcissus Street, less than 100 yards from the shoreline, the 

ultimate objective. But, by 1930 it became obvious to the Regimental Commander that 

darkness would overtake the advance, so he issued the order to dig in on a perimeter defense, 

hold where the units were and prepare for an advance early in the morning. The night proved 

difficult for the Marines. The Japanese who were bypassed during the day came out of their

hiding places and infiltrated from the front and rear. Marines working in the rear became 

overzealous with rifle fire and endangered the front line troops. The only organized Japanese

counter attack came about dawn when about 100 Japanese soldiers into ten and twenty man 

66 
Roi-Namur, Engebi and Eniwetok

groups fell upon two separated Marine rifle companies. The furious hand to hand fight went 

on for about thirty five minutes. 

Tanks Maneuver Through Battlefield

The morning's final push began at 0900 assisted by medium tanks supporting Company I 

in the middle, Company K on the left and Company L on the right. These companies of the 

3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla J. Dyess, along with 

companies A, C, and E. The two battalion landing teams pushed forward along the east and 

west coasts of Namur. By 1100 the 3rd Battalion reached Nora Point and both battalions

were in sight of one another. The supporting tanks were then sent to the rear and direct fire 

support was provided by half tracks. By 1215 the 1st Battalion and Company L secured 

Natalie Point and all that remained was mopping up. Lieutenant Colonel Dyess personally 

led the final assault and, while standing in a parapet directing a group of infantry in a 

flanking attack, was killed by enemy machine gun fire. At 1418 General Schmidt, 

Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division, announced the end of all organized

resistance and declared the island secured. All that remained was to dig out a few remaining 

Japanese from the undergrowth and secure the fifty five small islets that made up the rest of 

the northern part Kwajalein Atoll. The 25th Regimental Combat Team occupied the 

remaining fifty islands between 2 and 7 February. No resistance was encountered. In 21⁄2 

days of fighting the 4th Marine Division suffered 737 causalities, of which 190 were killed or 

died of wounds. The Japanese losses totaled 3,472 dead, with 51 Japanese and forty Korean 

laborers captured. 

The quicker than expected victory on Kwajalein and Roi-Namur hastened the plans to 

seize the remainder of the Marshalls. Engebi Island was captured on 17 February and the

islets around it on 18-19 February. The assault on Eniwetok began on 18 February and 

concluded on 21 February. The job to capture the remainder of the islands in the Marshalls 

fell to the 22nd Marines. By 22 April, the conquest of the Marshall Islands, except for Wotje, 

Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap was completed. Those islands were left to "wither on the vine" 

and were constantly harassed by American planes and ships. 

67
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

68 

Destruction (top) 

Marines Advancing on the Battlefield

(middle) 

Funeral (bottom) 
Strategic and Tactical Significance of 

The Marshall Islands Campaign 

hile the strategic victory at the Coral Sea blunted the Japanese advance toward 

Australia, the American victory at Midway ended the Japanese offensive in the 

Central Pacific. However, the Japanese still possessed the strategic initiative as

the primary theater of battle shifted to the fighting in the Solomons-New Guinea-New Britain 

region of the South Pacific. The hard fought attrition battles in this area during 1942-1943 

drained the Japanese army and navy of experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen while 

inflicting grievous matériel damage to both sides. The disparity in Japanese and American 

economic power meant that the former were unable to replace their losses fully while the 

latter not only replaced losses, but was able to increase its armed power. Nevertheless while 

the strategic initiative had passed from Japan, it had not yet been picked up by the United 

States. Before the Marshalls campaign it was conceivable that the Japanese might attempt to 

retrieve the initiative. 

W 

Marines Climbing Down Nets from a Transport into a Landing Craft
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The success of the campaign in the Marshalls exposed the Japanese weakness in the

Central Pacific, allowed the United States to seize the initiative by accelerating the 

operational tempo of the war. The quick seizure of the Marshalls led to bypassing Truk and 

the rest of the Carolines and mounting an invasion of the Marianas in June 1944. The

success in the Marshalls made the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions as well as the 27th and

77th Infantry Divisions available for use in the Marianas. In addition, it made the 1st Marine

Division available to invade the Palaus and allowed Admiral Nimitz to transfer the 7th and 

77th Infantry Divisions to the SWPA to invade the Philippines. 

Within one week, one of the most complicated amphibious campaigns of World War II 

had been mounted and brought to a successful conclusion. The cost in men and matériel was 

far lower than the cost paid for the Gilberts. Only 4.7 percent of the troops committed on 

Kwajalein Atoll were casualties. The small number of Army and Marine Corps casualties 

was the result of careful planning and preparation that thoroughly assimilated the lessons 

learned at Tarawa, overwhelming American air, land and sea power and bad Japanese tactics.

These tactics included not guarding the entrances to the lagoons with artillery and mines or

planting underwater obstacles and mines on the approaches to the beaches to supplement the

beach defenses already in place. The Japanese defensive plan appeared to be a tenacious

defense in a maze of previously prepared positions. 

The seizure of the Gilberts and the Marshalls also liberated the Army and Marines from 

the tyranny of their reliance on land based aircraft for air support. In doing so, both naval 

and air doctrine changed. Now American forces would rely on aircraft carrier mobility and 

move quickly towards their next objectives, the Marianas and the Philippines. In a period of

less than 90 days, the United States acquired and began to exploit the strategic initiative in 

the Pacific War. In other words, the combined operations against the Gilberts and the 

Marshalls confirmed the Joint Chiefs Staff’s opinion that the Central Pacific route to the 

Philippines and Japan was the easiest and most profitable one and the economy of force used 

in the campaign made a large body of troops available to accelerate that drive and later the 

drive in the Southwest Pacific. 

At Kwajalein, the Navy served as the chief coordinating service and showed exactly what 

was involved in mastering the art of combining all arms in an amphibious assault—striking 

successfully across the seas. Even though the nature of the Pacific War changed after the 

Marshalls were seized, the innovations made in that campaign were important and served the 

Army and Navy in both the European and Pacific theaters. 

Perhaps the most important innovation at Kwajalein was the amphibious headquarters 

ship. Introduced in the Mediterranean, it was sorely missed at Tarawa and decisively proved 

its worth at Kwajalein. The most effective weapon in the American arsenal was accurate,

concentrated gunfire delivered from the land, the sea and the air, designed to kill as many

Japanese as possible. A third factor in the Kwajalein victory was the improvements made to 

ship-to-shore techniques. In particular, shallow draft gunboats equipped with 20-mm, 40-

70 
The Marshall Islands Campaign 

mm guns and rockets provided last minute gunfire support to the assault troops—these 

became a permanent part of amphibious warfare. 

Other innovations included the first use of Underwater Demolition Teams in combat, the 

first large-scale use of amphibious trucks (DUKWs) and increased use of naval star shells to

illuminate the areas behind friendly lines to frustrate the standard night infiltration tactics of

the Japanese. The amphibious assault on Kwajalein Atoll set the standard pattern for this 

operation for the rest of the war, even though the nature of the Pacific War changed. There 

would be heavy and prolonged air and naval bombardment of the beachhead, supplemented

by shelling from land based artillery as long as possible. Underwater Demolition Teams 

were used for reconnaissance, intelligence and to remove obstacles from the paths of the 

landing craft. Last minute gunfire support for the assault troops was supplied by from

shallow draft gunboats and the troops themselves would be transported to the beachhead in 

amphibious tractors. 

Landing Craft in the Lagoon

The tactics employed in the Marshalls showed the Army, Navy and Marine Corps

cooperating and willing to learn from each other. All eagerly put the lessons learned at 

Tarawa and Makin to use very quickly. All cooperated in an exemplary fashion and good 

feeling and mutual respect between them was perhaps at its height in February 1944. 

Sympathetic understanding for each other’s problems and exemplary levels of cooperation

and coordination was the rule at Kwajalein. 

71
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

72 
Self - Guided Battlefield Tour 

The Battle for Kwajalein, 1-4 February 1944 

Kwajalein on the Day of the Invasion

STOP 1 – Landing Beaches – During World War Two, Kwajalein Island was much smaller 

than it is today. Since the war it has been enlarged with fill to accommodate mission

requirements. Olympus Drive generally marks the location of the original shoreline on the 

western tip of the island. This Japanese pillbox was part of the defenses to guard these 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

beaches from amphibious landings and housed two or more 7.7mm machine guns. A 1995 

archeological investigation suggest that this structure was so heavily damaged that American 

troops repaired the concrete in some places so it could be used for their own defense systems. 

LCVPs Approaching the Line of Departure 

Major General Charles H. Corlett’s 7th Infantry Division landed on the part of the island 

at 0930 on February 1, 1944. Within fifteen minutes an additional 1,200 soldiers of the 7th

Division landed to support the advance. Additional troops in LCVPs approaching the Line of 

Departure were landed throughout the operation. The 184th Infantry Regiment led the assault 

along the lagoon side of the island with the airfield on their right flank, while the 32nd

Infantry Regiment had the ocean to their right and the airfield on their left.

74   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

Fire Support from Carlos and Carlson 

First Night Of The Battle

STOP 2 – The 32nd Infantry Regiment’s first day’s advance concluded about 100 yards 

behind you, inside what is now the ammunition storage area. The 3rd Battalion, 184th

Infantry set up night defense positions on the opposite side of the island. By the end of the 

first day American forces had grown to 6 infantry and 1 engineer battalions, along with 60 

tanks and various support units. During the day most of the Japanese had fought from inside 

bunkers and pillboxes, but as night fell, the Japanese emerged from their positions to counter 

attack under cover of a chilling rainstorm. 

75
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

These maps show Kwajalein Today, with the Locations of the Battlefield Markers, the Landings and First 

Two Days of the Battle on Kwajalein Island

76   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

S.L.A. Marshall Interview

The holes were everywhere. Each one had to be searched from close up. Every spot

where a man might be hiding had to be stabbed out. So greatly was the beach littered with

broken foliage that it was like looking though a haystack for a few poisoned needles....

The fire which cut the men down came from the side holes farther up the line. It was the

kind of bitter going that made it necessary for the junior leaders to prod their men constantly.

The leader of the 3rd Squad had been trying to get his men forward against the fire. Private 

First Class John Treager got up, rushed forward about ten yards, hit the dirt, fired a few shots 

with his BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), and crumpled with a bullet in his head. 

Diagram of a Typical Field Fortification System 

Somewhat further along, a bayonet was seen sticking up through a patch of fronds. The 

Jap crouched within it hadn’t room to draw in the whole length of the weapon. 

Private First Class Edward Fiske fired his BAR at the hole; the dried fronds caught fire 

from the tracers. At that point, Fiske ran out of ammunition. 

77
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Private First Class Julian Guterrez then took up the fire with is M1 (rifle). He stood 

directly above the hold and fired down into it. Then the hold exploded; the Jap inside had 

turned a grenade on himself. A man’s shattered arm came flying out of the hole and hit 

Guterrez on the shoulder, splattering blood all over his face and clothing. The arm bounced

off and fell to the side. As Guterrez looked at it, fascinated and horror-stricken, he saw 

another bayonet rising out of a patch of fronds just beyond the outstretched and still 

quivering fingers. He yelled to the man behind him. The man relayed a grenade and 

Guterrez pitched it with all of his might into the patch of fronds. It erupted in a shower of 

palm leaves and blood and flesh. 

Guterrez reeled over toward the lagoon to cleanse himself of the blood. Before he could 

reach the water, in sight of all other men, he vomited all over the beach. Minutes passed 

before he could gather himself together again. 

Photo of Japanese Field Fortifications 

STOP 3 – Ammunition Bunker – By the end of February 2, the 32nd and 184th Infantry 

Regiments had secured the Japanese airfield. This surviving bunker was part of a vast array 

of Japanese defensive structures that once dotted the island. Most were destroyed or buried

78   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

by development during the post war years. This bunker was built to service several machine

gun pillboxes in this area. One of its associated pillboxes has also survived and is located on 

the shoreline about 90 yards south of your current position. It was captured in the morning of 

February 2, 1944, by the 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. As the 32nd continued 

its drive up the island, the Japanese mounted stiff resistance and the American infantrymen

were required to reduce each pillbox and strong point along the way. At the end of the day 

the 32nd Infantry halted and dug in for the night near the end of the present runway, about 

1200 yards east of this point. 

Japanese Concrete Rifle Pit

STOP 4 – This seldom visited Japanese fighting position includes a magazine and firing pit 

for a machine gunner or rifleman. Its small window allowed an assistant gunner to pass

ammunition from the magazine to the firing pit. The entire structure was covered with earth 

up to the top deck at the time of battle. The 7th Division soldiers faced approximately fifteen 

of these rifle pits on Kwajalein. This is the only surviving example of this type of structure.

Post was photographs reveal that this particular structure received little damage during the

battle. Most of the deterioration was caused by erosion from heavy surf. 

Battlefield Markers 3 and 4

Beach Sniper Post and Adjoining Ammunition Shelter 

79
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Meal Break Behind a Pillbox (note the corpse of a Japanese soldier) 

STOP 5 – The Third Day And The Admiralty Area – American commanders expected to

face light Japanese resistance and final victory on February 3, however, they were mistaken. 

The defense around the Admiralty Area proved to be much more formidable that expected.

Named by American intelligence officers because of the suspected location of the Japanese 

Navel headquarters, it was heavily developed with large numbers of supply and

administrative buildings. This area had been reduced to rubble by bombing, thus it provided 

excellent cover for the Japanese defenders. The 7th Infantry Division did not even reach its

first objective of the day near present day 6th Street, despite the loss of 310 men. Over 1,100 

Japanese defenders died, many by suicide. In a large blockhouse over 200 Japanese were 

found dead of self-inflicted wounds. 

S.L.A. Marshall Interview

Weird things can happen in such fighting. A Japanese officer charged a U.S. tank 

with just his bare saber. In the dusk one evening Japanese riflemen tried to walk into the 

American lines carrying palm branches in front of their bodies so they would not be seen. A 

U.S. infantryman carrying a flame-thrower approached a pillbox, and out through its door

80   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

bolted a Japanese officer in counterattack. He was squirting a fire extinguisher towards the

flame gun. The liquid doused the American soldier as he let the flame go. The Japanese 

officer dropped dead at his feet, burned to a crisp. 

STOP 6 – Bunker Hill – Stiff opposition continued to the last day of the battle as American

soldiers pushed the Japanese to your present position. (Nike Road in front of the marker is

the end of World War II island. The area beyond Nike Road is earthen fill added in 1964.) 

The mound to the front of the marker is all that remains of a Japanese 5 inch dual purpose 

gun. “G” Company, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment mounted the assault against this 

position late in the afternoon of February 4th. Kwajalein was officially declared secure by 

General Corlett, at 1610 hours (4:10 P.M.). Fighting continued, however, against scattered 

Japanese resistance for another few hours. By the end of the 4th, another 317 Americans 

would be killed or wounded from the stubborn Japanese resistance. Captain Albert W. Pence

of “G” Company would become one of the last American casualties when he was shot near 

your present location at about 1900 hours (7 P.M.). 

Casualties for the 7th Division on all the southern atolls were killed 142, wounded: 845. 

Japanese casualties amounted to: killed 4,938 and captured 206, including 127 were 

Koreans. 

Battlefield Markers 5 and 6

81
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Tanks on the Battlefield

Casualties for the campaign in the Marshalls was best summed up by Marine Corps 

General Holland Smith who concluded that “very few recommendations can be made to 

improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in the Marshalls.” 

While the Marshalls were the last of the coral atolls captured in the Pacific Theater, it 

provided a testing ground for the lessons learned at Tarawa and proved amphibious 

operations could be successful. Strategically, their capture made it possible to launch the 

drive against the Marianas at a far earlier date than had originally been anticipated, and 

therefore, in the words of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, “we [could] get on with the war.” 

82   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

83
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

84   
The Battle for Roi – Namur, 1-2 February 1944 

Roi 

STOP 1 – Roi Invasion Beaches – The assault on Roi and Namur was to be carried out by 

the 4th Marine Division. The plans called for the Navy to secure the pass inside the lagoon 

and then Marine elements would seize and secure the outlying islands. Once secured, the 

islets would serve as bases for artillery to support the main force landing in a coordinated 

assault on Roi and Namur. The wartime intelligence photographs of Roi suggest an island 

similar in appearance to the one you now see. The current airfield is an enlargement of the 

Japanese one, from which Japanese fighters flew sorties against Americans. You are 

standing on an area of beach that is close to the center of the Marine advance. The 1st 

Battalion, 23d Marines was responsible for the area designated RED Beach 2, while 2nd 

Battalion, 23d Marines landed in an area designated by the invasion planners as Red Beach 3

(see maps). Landing craft of the 23d Marine Regimental Combat Team came ashore on the 

beach you can see from this location at 1133 hours (11:33 A.M.) on February 1, 1944, and 

under light opposition moved across present-day Perimeter Road towards their objectives on

the north side of the island. 

This map of Roi-Namur today shows the various stops on this battlefield tour – Stops One and Two of the 

Battle Tour 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

STOP 2 – Wendy Point – As you look to your left you will notice a chain of islets. The first 

two, Ennuebing (nearest) and Mellu, were seized by the Marines, on January 31, in order to 

secure the ocean channel into the lagoon and to serve as a base for artillery and supplies. 

Actor Lee Marvin, then a private, was wounded while helping to secure Mellu Island. The 

point of land to your left was designated Wendy Point by the American intelligence officers.

In 1944, it contained Japanese defensive positions consisting of rifle pits and

communications trenches. The Japanese did not begin to fortify the lagoon side of the 

islands until late 1943; therefore, the heavier, permanent defenses were located on the 

northern shore of the islands. The defenders expected the Imperial Japanese Navy to play a 

much greater role in defense of the islands that was actually the case. An earlier Japanese 

plan, designated Plan Z, called for their fleet to sortie from Truk and serve as the islands’ 

primary defense. 

Marines Taking Cover Behind Palm Trees and Leaves 

86   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

Combat Report 3/25 Marines, 4th Marine Division

D-DAY (31 January 1944) 

Reveille sounded at 0500 and D-Day had arrived. The LCVPs and LCMs were lowered 

at about 0530. After chow, the troops waited quietly for their turn to disembark. From the 

transport area, the bombing and selling of CAMOUFLAGE (Namur), BURLESQUE (Roi),

JACOB and IVAN could be seen diving in to drop bombs and strafe, and then pulling out 

again. Columns of smoke arose from CAMOUFLAGE and BURLESQUE while the 

bombing continued. At 0800, the troops commenced debarkation. The transport changed 

position in the transport area on two occasions, but debarkation continued until all troops

were in the small boats. The sea was not calm, and, as a result many of the Marines found 

themselves wishing the boats would head for the beach instead of circling in the transport 

area. The waves then moved to the LVT transfer area at mid-day. The first three or four 

waves transferred to LVTs, and, on signal that JACOB Pass was clear, moved into the 

lagoon. The LCIs could be seen up ahead shelling ALBERT and ALLEN. 

STOP 3 – Japanese Cemetery – This small Japanese cemetery was dedicated to the

memory of nearly 3,500 Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen who died while defending Roi 

and Namur. Immediately after the battle thousands of Japanese dead were interred in 

common graves. Following the war, some of the Japanese remains were removed to Japan.

You should turn left on the next road and continue until you reach an intersection, then turn 

right on to Speedball Road. 

STOP 4 – Japanese 5” Guns – As you approach the north shore, or ocean side, you will see 

an increasing number of fortifications. Continue on Speedball Road until you reach the only

surviving large gun position on either Roi-Namur or Kwajalein. As you stand behind this

Japanese five-inch gun position and look seaward, you hold the view of the Japanese 

defenders who were waiting for an ocean side attack that never came. As you look seaward, 

you will notice the remains of a fire direction mount. On your left rear is the ammunition

storage facility that held the

ammunition to serve the guns.

Continue on Speedball Road

to Pandanus Road and the 

battlefield marker located 

next to building 8176. 

STOP 5 – End Of Marine 

Advance – As discussed at 

the previous site, most of the 

Japanese defensive structures 

were located to provide a

defense from an ocean side 

invasion (note their location

on the marker map). Now, 

look directly north to see the Stops Three, Four and Five of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

87
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

end of the line of advance that concluded at 1800 (6:00 P.M.) on February 1. If you wish to 

visit a nearly intact pillbox proceed down the road behind building 8132 to the KYZI-FM 

building (No. 8161) and west along the beach. While the Marines advanced across open

ground, they enjoyed the advantage of being able to attack the fortified positions to the rear. 

(As you begin a more in-depth examination of the Japanese fortifications, it is essential to be 

a safe battlefield explorer. The highly corrosive atmosphere has seriously deteriorated the 

World War II fortifications therefore, it is important that you not go inside the bunkers.) 

These pill boxes served as command posts for specific areas of the beach and were placed to

provide interlocking fields of fire into an invasion force. The troops inside would fire 

machine guns from inside of the accordion like gun ports. The specially designed openings 

prevented all but direct fire from entering the bunkers. These were caused by Marine smallarms fire. Continue east on Pandanus Road to the next marker. 

Diagram of a Japanese Pillbox on Roi 

STOP 6 – Pfc Richard Anderson – Near this location Marine Private Richard B. Anderson,

while taking a Japanese emplacement under attack, dropped an American hand grenade. In 

order to save the lives of his fellow Marines, he threw himself on the grenade. This location

also marks the end of the advance of the left flank of the 23d Marines (see maps). They

successfully secured their objective by 1700 (5:00 P.M.) on February 1. Another Japanese 

pillbox is located on the beach. This fortification, unlike the previous one, has been severely

damaged by air and naval bombardment. Despite the heavy damage the small arms fire at 

the rear of the pillbox suggests some defenders survived to resist the advance. As you move 

back onto Eleanor Wilson Road, you will see a Japanese sea wall constructed about 1939. 

Continue south on Eleanor Wilson Road until you reach the headquarters of the Japanese air

commander. 

88   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

Stop Six of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

Moving across Roi 

89
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

STOP 7 – Japanese Air Headquarters – The building was used as the headquarters from 

which the Japanese commander and his staff implemented the Imperial Japanese strategy for 

air operations. The long cylindrical structure adjacent to the headquarters building is an air 

raid shelter. Originally, these shelters were covered with earth for camouflage and additional 

protection. The Japanese military complex on Roi-Namur was more that a stationary airfield,

it was also an important logistical center and base of operations for Japanese submarines. 

You have now completed the tour of the Roi battlefield. To continue your tour move south 

on Eleanor Wilson Road to Copra Road. Turn left and continue east to the intersection of

Copra and TRADEX Roads. 

Namur 

(During the World War II Campaign, Roi and Namur were connected by a narrow causeway. 

The land between the two islands today is the result of fill.) 

Stops Seven, Eight and Nine of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 8 – Green Beach 1 – At the intersection of Copra and TRADEX Roads looks south 

towards the lagoon. You can see GREEN Beach 1, where the 3d Battalion, 24th Marine 

Regimental Combat Team landed at 1145 (11:45 A.M.) on February 1. In 1944 a series of 

Japanese defenses consisting of rifle pits, communications trenches, and anti-tank ditches 

stretched from your right to what is now a fill area and to your left to Yokahoma Pier. The

small concrete pillbox almost directly in front of you proved to be especially troublesome to

the Marines until it was reduced by naval gunfire. Immediately north of where you are

standing was the Japanese refrigeration building. It is painted silver and attached to the 

KREMS warehouse. Continue east on Copra Road until it intersects with a dirt road and 

stand behind the battlefield marker. 

90   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

STOP 9 – Green Beach 2 – Orient yourself behind the marker and take note of the

photograph in the lower right hand corner which shows U.S. Marines dismounting from an

amphibious tractor. Study the photograph, and then turn toward the beach. There you will 

see Yokohama Pier, originally constructed by the Japanese and still in use today (see maps). 

During the invasion it served as a reference point for the 24th Marine Regimental Combat 

Team which landed at GREEN Beach. Follow the dirt road to the two large Japanese 

structures and continue to the marker on your left. 

Map of Roi and Namur, 1944

Second Lieutenant John C. Chapin, 24th Marines

By now everything was all mixed up, with our assault wave all entangled with the 

armored tractors ahead of us. I ordered my driver to maneuver around them. Slowly we

inched past, as their 37mm guns and .50-cal. machine guns flamed. The beach lay right 

before us. However, it was shrouded in such a pall of dust and smoke from our 

bombardment that we could see very little of it. As a result, we were unable to tell which 

section we were approaching (after all our hours of careful planning, based on hitting the 

91
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

beach at one exact spot!) I turned to talk to my platoon sergeant, who was managing the 

machine gun right beside me. He was slumped over – the whole right side of his head 

disintegrated into a mass of gore. Up to now, the entire operation had seemed almost like a 

movie, or like one of the innumerable practice landings we’d made. Now one of my

men lay in a welter of blood beside me, and the reality of it smashed into my consciousness. 

(Excerpt from Captain John C. Chapin, USMC (Ret), Breaking the Outer Ring: Marine

Landing in the Marshall Islands, from the Marines in World War II Commemorative Series.)

On the Beach on Namur 

STOP 10 – Marine Advance - The two buildings you just passed, served as Japanese diesel 

fuel storage facilities for the submarines that operated out of Namur. Your present position 

places you approximately in the center of the advance of “F” and “A” Companies on the 

Marine right flank about 1300 (1:00 P.M.) on February 1. From your present position look at 

the area a few hundred yards to your left. In 1944, it was the site of a Japanese ammunition

storage building (see maps). One of the lessons learned from the battle of Tarawa was the 

requirement for specially trained combat engineers, known as boat teams by the Marines, to 

neutralize enemy fortifications with satchel charges or Bangalore torpedoes. At 1305 (1:05

P.M.) on February 1, the Marine advance was held up by automatic fire from the building. A

Marine boat team moved in and threw a satchel charged inside of the structure. Unknown to

92   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

the Marines, the building was filled with high explosives. The resultant explosion threw 

debris hundreds of feet into the air and created such a heavy, choking smoke that some

believed that the Japanese had launched a gas attack. One Marine, who was headed ashore in

an assault boat, described a shock wave that was so strong that it literally stopped the boat in 

its place. The explosion disrupted communications and all but stopped the advance on 

Namur for the remainder of the day. Continue your tour by taking the left fork on the dirt 

road in front of you. As you intersect with another dirt road take a left and proceed north 

about 100 yards to a pillbox. 

“Great God Almighty! The whole damn island has blown up!” On the beach another 

officer recalled that “trunks of palm trees and chunks of concrete as large as packing crates 

were flying through the air like match sticks....The hole left where the blockhouse stood was 

as large as a fair-sized swimming pool.” (Marine artillery spotter at 1,000 feet) 

The Torpedo Warehouse Explosion 

93
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

STOP 11 – Nadine Point – You are entering the Japanese defensive position code-named

Nadine Point by American intelligence officers. The entire area was a honeycomb of

interconnected trenches. These trenches, designed to provide support and communications to 

the large pillbox, were discovered in 1995 during an archaeological survey of the island. The

battleship U.S.S. Maryland provided fire-support to the Marines and many of the marks on 

the pillbox are from the Maryland’s projectiles. 

Stops Ten and Eleven of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 12 – Sally Point – The area around the air raid shelter and along the shoreline was 

another Japanese defensive complex called Sally Point. Japanese troops from this point 

poured heavy fire into the Marines, as they attempted to secure positions on GREEN Beach. 

Continue through Sally Point to the intersection of Copra and Surf Roads. Turn right on Surf

Road and stop at the large ammunition bunkers.

STOP 13 – Ammunition Storage Building – The ammunition bunker you see is identical to 

the bunker that caused the large explosion (described in stop 10) and the delay in the 

advance. As you walk around the building notice the marks from the small arms fire and the 

heavy projectile penetration of the building. When you come upon the double door, look for

holes burned though the doors, most likely by high explosive anti-tank rockets fired from a

2.36-inch bazooka. Proceed on Surf Road and turn left on a dirt road and move to the 

intersection of ALTAIR Road. 

94   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

Stops Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

STOP 14 – Lieutenant John Powers – The push on the left flank was spear-headed by the 

3d Battalion, 24th Marines. The Japanese inside their fortifications directed heavy fire into 

the advancing Marines and the advance began to slow. Lieutenant John V. Power 

posthumously received the Medal of Honor for his actions in neutralizing an enemy pillbox.

As you continue your advance on ALTAIR Road you will come abreast of an air raid shelter 

on your left. Stop at the shelter and look to the right. A mine from your position to Nadine 

Point marks the end of the first day of the Marines’ advance on Namur (see maps). The 

massive explosion of the Japanese explosives storage building (stop 10) not only held up the

Marine advance, it also provided the Japanese with an opportunity to recover and better 

organize their defenses. 

Second Lieutenant John C. Chapin

A little later I encountered another lieutenant from our company, Jack Power. He had 

been hit in the stomach but was still fighting. Crouching behind a concrete wall, he showed 

me a pillbox about 25 feet away that was full of Japs who were still very much alive and full 

of fight. This strong point commanded the whole area around us and was holding up our 

advance very effectively. It was about 50 feet long and 15 feet wide, constructed of double 

rows of sand-filled oil drums. Grabbing the nearest men, we explained our plan of attack and 

went to work. With a couple of riflemen, Jack covered the rear entrance with fire. Taking 

95
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

another man and a high-explosive Bangalore torpedo, I crawled around the front and 

observed for a few minutes. Then we inched our way up to the silt that served as a front 

entrance, and I threw a grenade in to keep down any Jap who might be inclined to poke a 

rifle out in our faces. 

Next we lighted the fuse on the Bangalore, jammed it inside the pillbox, and scrambled 

for shelter. The fuse was very short, we knew, and barely had tumbled into a nearby shell 

hole when we were overwhelmed by the last of the Bangalore. Dirt sprayed all over us,

billowing acrid smoke blinded us, and the numbering concussion deafened us. In a few 

moments we felt all right once more, and a glance told us that we had closed that entrance 

permanently. We worked our way back to where we’d left Jack Power, and found that he’d 

managed to locate a shaped charge of high explosives in the meantime. Taking this, we 

repeated our job – this time blowing the rear entrance hut. 

A Single Japanese Soldier Surrenders to Marines in Front of an Ammunition Bunker 

That took care of that pillbox! Jack looked like he was in pretty bad shape, and I urged 

him to get some medical attention, but he refused and moved on alone to the next Jap pillbox 

(where, I later learned, he was killed in a single-handed heroic attack for which he was

awarded the Medal of Honor).” 

96   
Self-Guided Battlefield Tour 

STOP 15 – Private Richard Sorensen – By nightfall the Japanese had managed to regroup 

and launch a series of uncoordinated but vicious counterattacks against the dug-in Marines.

During one such attack, near your present location, Marine Private Richard K. Sorenson 

rolled on a Japanese hand grenade and absorbed the blast in order to protect his fellow 

Marines. Private Sorenson, who received the Medal of Honor, survived and was a guest of

the U.S. Army at the 50th Anniversary of the invasion of Roi and Namur in 1994. Continue 

down the dirt road to the shoreline to the next marker. 

Sorenson Interview – 1994

As I mentioned, we landed just left of the pier and our objective was to move up to the 

end of the island. Toward sundown the unit I was with had moved quite rapidly and because 

of the explosion to our right, which had almost decimated half of G company, it had slowed 

them down Just before dark, General Hart wanted to straighten out the line because we were 

forward, and we were exposing our right flank and so he gave the word, “Go Back.” But 

there was always that ten percent that don’t get the word. And there was about thirty of us 

that were up in pockets up here that weren’t notified to pull back to a main line of resistance.

The next morning, when it became daylight, we found ourselves completely surrounded with 

Japanese, and it was during that time that the grenade occurred. We had other wounded with 

us, and it took a while to evacuate them. They couldn’t, until our people behind us broke 

through and relived 

us, and they didn’t 

know we were there, 

and we were

subjected to our own

mortar and machine 

gun fire for a while 

until they found out 

we were up there. 

That’s basically

what occurred. As I 

say I’m, we were 

pretty close to the 

water. We withdrew 

probably fifty yards 

or so and there was 

lots of debris in the

center but there were 

two pockets and at 

one end we had a light machine gun and at the other end we had another light pile of debris 

in between them and sort of holed up and then there were several other holes ten, fifteen 

yards away on both sides that were occupied by other infantrymen. I’d say there were about 

thirty-five. But after that that’s all I remember. 

Stops Fifteen, Sixteen and Seventeen of the Battle of Roi-Namur Battle Tour

97
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

STOP 16 – Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla Dyess – The last organized resistance took place 

around the area in which you are now standing. The remaining defenders waited for the final 

Marine onslaught. On the morning of February 2, the Marines launched their final assault 

converging from the right a left flanks on the Japanese position (see map). The assault was 

led by Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla J. Dyess, who was mortally wounded during the last action 

on the island. Return on the same path. Pass TRADEX/ALCOR complex and move south 

on TRADEX Road. Continue on TRADEX Road to a series of Japanese structures on your 

left. 

STOP 17 – Japanese Support Complex – The Complex that stands before you includes 

(from left to right): torpedo workshop, oxygen generating plant, fuel storage building, and 

the main power plant. The Fourth Marine Association has erected a plaque which lists those 

Americans who paid the ultimate sacrifice in this battle to defeat Imperial Japan. Namur was 

officially declared secure at 1418 (2:18 P.M.) on February 2, 1944, after two and one-half

days of fighting. American losses on Roi-Namur included 3,472 killed in action. Fifty-one 

Japanese were captured along with 40 Korean laborers. 

Clearing a Dugout

98   
Kwajalein Island in the Distance 
Appendices 

Appendix Page 

A: Chronology From the Road to War to the Seizure of The Gilbert and the Marshall Islands 

(Operations Galvanic, Flintlock and Catchpole) September 1931-February 

1944 ..........................................................................................................101 

B: U.S. Order of Battle, Operations Flintlock and Catchpole ..................................................141 

C: Biographies of Principal American Commanders ................................................................149 

D: The United States and Japanese Land Force Weaponry, 1943-1944 ...................................169 

The United States Army and Marine Corps ..............................................169 

 Imperial Japanese Army ...........................................................................172 

E: American Ships and Aircraft in Operation Flintlock ...........................................................175 

F: Selected Sources ...................................................................................................................203 

100
Appendix A: Chronology 

From the Road to War to the Seizure of 

The Gilbert and the Marshall Islands 

(Operations Galvanic, Flintlock and Catchpole) 

September 1931—February 1944 

1931 

18 September Japan invaded Manchuria. 

 1932 

1 March Manchukuo established. 

15 May Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi assassinated by 

Army faction. 

Prime Minister Inukai 

1933 

March Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. 

1934 

May Amau Doctrine promulgated: Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” for East Asia 

that challenged Washington’s Open Door policy.

1936 

26 February A portion of elite Imperial Guards Division attempted a coup d’etat in 

Tokyo to “free the emperor from his corrupt advisors.” 

29 February Coup attempt failed; mutineers arrested, tried, convicted and executed. 

“Conservative” faction gained control of the Japanese army. 

25 November Japan signed Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

12 December Xian Incident: President Chiang Kai-shek arrested by dissident faction of

Manchurian army. He was released after negotiations brokered by 

Chinese Communists. 

25 December President Chiang reached Nanjing and 2nd United Front 

(anti-Japanese alliance) with the Communists 

announced. 

 1937 

19 January Japan formally withdrew from the Washington and 

London Naval Treaties restricting the size of its navy. 

5 July Formal agreement between Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party 

announced. 

Chiang Kai-shek 

7 July Chinese and Japanese troops clashed near Beijing (Marco Polo Bridge 

Incident). 

27 July Japan proclaimed a “new order” for East Asia and “total war” against 

China. 

13 August Japanese bombed Shanghai, beginning of China Incident. 

6 October Nine Power Conference meets in Brussels, recommended economic 

sanctions against Japan; action vetoed by U.S.—conference failed. 

24 November Japanese landed Hangchow Bay near Shanghai to outflank 18th Route 

Army. Chinese retreated upriver to Nanjing. 

12 December Japanese planes sank U.S. gunboat Panay on Yangzi River.

13 December Nanjing fell to Japanese army (3 month long spate of atrocities labeled 

Nanjing Massacre ensued). 

1938 

March Japanese National Mobilization Law promulgated. 

17 May Vinson-Trammel Naval Expansion Act passed into law. 

11 July Battle of Chang Ku-feng between Japanese and Soviet armies. 

21 October Japanese army and navy seized Canton. 

102 
Appendix A: Chronology 

25 October Japanese army took Hankow; Chinese government retreats to Chungking. 

1939 

7 March Japan announced renewal of Naval Expansion Law. 

31 March Japan occupied Hainan and Spratley Islands. 

24 July Arita-Craigie Agreement: British recognized Japanese 

interests in China. 

26 July FDR announced abrogation of 1911 Treaty of Commerce 

and Friendship with Japan to take effect in January 1940. 

20 August Battle of Nomohon between Japanese and Soviet armies 

ended. 

President Roosevelt 

23 August Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact signed. 

Imperial Powers in Asia and the Pacific 

103
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

1940 

March Wang Jingwei (protégé of Sun Yat-sen and rival to Chiang 

Kai-shek) sets up Japanese puppet government in Nanjing. 

22 June French Indochinese government (Vichy) closed HaiphongKunming Railway to China. 

British closed Burma Road. 

Wang Jingwei 26 September FDR imposed embargo on scrap iron to Japan. 

27 September Japan joined Pact of Steel (Tripartite Pact) with Germany and Italy. 

17 October British re-opened Burma Road. 

Far East and the Pacific, 1941 

 1941 

7 January Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku proposed Operation Z (Pearl Harbor raid) in 

letter to Naval Staff.

104 
Appendix A: Chronology 

31 January Japan announced creation of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” 

(included Indochina and Thailand). 

Admiral Yamamoto

10 April Admiral Yamamoto formed 1st Air Fleet (4 aircraft carriers,

200 planes).

22 June Germany invaded the Soviet Union (Barbarossa). 

2 July Imperial Liaison Conference decided 

a. to adhere to the Tripartite Pact and the Nonaggression Pact with the 

Soviet Union 

b. war with the Soviet Union would be undertaken only under 

exceptionally favorable circumstances 

c. continue to negotiate with the United States and strengthen its own 

defenses 

d. continue to work to destroy the Chinese government 

e. continue with plans to dominate southern Indochina. 

24 July FDR placed embargo on crude oil exports to Japan. 

25 July Southern Indochina occupied. 

26 July FDR froze Japanese assets in the United States. 

1 August U.S. imposed aviation gas embargo upon Japan.

6 August Japan's new proposal for reaching agreement with U.S. President Roosevelt

8 August Japan's proposed Konoe-Roosevelt meeting at Honolulu. 

9 August Army General Staff definitely decides not to attack Russia in 1941. 

12 August Peacetime conscription in U.S. extended by one vote. 

16 August Draft of "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the Empire" 

drawn up by Navy presented for discussion at staff meeting between Army 

and Navy. 

17 August U.S. asked for clearer statement from Japanese government on its attitude 

and plans as preliminary requirement for holding Konoe-Roosevelt 

meeting. 

105
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

18 August While continuing deliberations on "Essentials for executing the National 

Purpose of the Empire," Army General Staff argued for immediate 

decision to go to war. 

28 August Konoe directly asked Roosevelt to agree to meeting in 

message. 

30 August Agreement definitely reached at Army-Navy staff meeting 

on substance of "Essentials for Executing the National 

Purpose of the Empire." 

3 September Roosevelt replied to Konoe message, laying stress on 

necessity of preliminary discussion on fundamental and 

essential questions between U.S. and Japan. Liaison 

Conference convened to make decision on "Essentials for 

Executing the National Purpose of the Empire." 

Prime Minister Konoe 

5 September Cabinet meeting held to approve above decision.

6 September The "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the Empire" was 

sanctioned at the conference in the Imperial Presence. Its essence was as 

follows: 

a. Determine not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in 

a war with America (and England and Holland); in order to secure 

our national existence, we will proceed with war preparations so 

that they will be completed approximately toward the end of

October. 

b. At the same time, we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic 

means to have our demands agreed to by America (and England), 

together with the Empire’s maximum concessions, which are 

embodied in the attached document. 

c. If, by the early part of October, there is no reasonable hope of 

having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations 

mentioned above, we would immediately make up our minds to get 

ready for war against America (and 

England and Holland). 

6 September After the Conference, Konoe met Ambassador 

Grew in hope that his strong desire to talk with 

Roosevelt in order to avoid war be more fully 

understood in Washington. 

25 September Japan makes new proposal in line with "Basic 

Principles for Realizing Peace Between Japan 

and China," adopted at Liaison Conference on September 20. 

Konoe and Ambassador Grew

106 
Appendix A: Chronology 

2 October Hull note to, expressing reluctance on part of U.S. 

government to hold Konoe-Roosevelt conference on 

grounds that no agreement had been reached as to basic 

principles and attitude between two governments. 

Secretary of State Hull

5 October Army reached the conclusion that Japan should 

immediately decide on going to war, in view of the 

hopelessness of further diplomatic efforts. 

6 October Navy defines attitude: 

(1) Necessity for further diplomatic negotiations

with America. 

(2) Japan should agree to withdraw troops from China in principle. 

Question of withdrawing should not be regarded as constituting 

reasonable cause for Japan to go to war with 

America. 

12 October Conference of Five Ministers met at Konoe's private 

residence to discuss Japan's response to Hull note. 

Division in views clearly noted. 

16 October Fall of Konoe Cabinet. 

18 October General Tojo made Prime Minister and War Minister. 

General Tojo

23-30 October Liaison conference convened every day, except 26 October, to study 11 

specific questions related to September 6 decision. 

29 October Navy Minister Shimada made up mind for waging war. 

30 October Navy Minister expressed determination for war to senior 

officers of Navy Ministry. 

1 November Liaison Conference, lasting about 17 hours, confirmed 

substance of September 6 decision. New points: 

(1) Deadline for diplomatic efforts extended to very 

end of November. 

(2) Two proposals to be submitted to U.S. 

government. Proposal B represents new effort for modus vivendi

and purported to set Japanese-U.S. relations back where they stood 

at beginning of July. If Japan withdraws troops from southern 

Indochina; U.S. will lift oil embargo and unfreeze Japanese assets. 

Admiral Shimada

5 November Imperial Conference gives sanction to November 1 decision. 

107
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Ambassador Kurusu flew to U.S. to help A

negotiations. 

mbassador Nomura in 

il

Ambassador Nomura and 

Ambassador Kurusu

7 November Submits Proposal A to U.S. government. 

20 November Proposal B submitted to U.S. government. 

26 November U.S. government turns down Proposal B, 

taking stronger stand than previously. 

27 November Pearl Harbor attack force leaves the Kuriles. 

Attack could be canceled any time before the 

planes reached the point of no return if 

diplomatic circumstances warranted.

29 November The group of ex-prime ministers (genrō) summoned to express views. 

1 December Imperial Conference made final decision on going to war with U.S. 

7 December Pearl Harbor attacked. 

Japan invaded Malaya. 

8 December Japan declared war on United States and Great Britain. 

Clark Field, Philippines bombed (2nd Pearl Harbor). 

9 December Japanese invaded the Gilbert Islands. President Roosevelt 

Signing Declaration of War 

10 December Guam surrendered. 

 HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk. 

11 December Japanese invasion of Burma began. 

16 December Japanese invaded Borneo. 

22 December Japanese invaded Philippines. 

23 December Wake Island surrendered. General MacArthur 

MacArthur declared Manila an open city and withdrew F

forces to Bataan and Corregidor. 

-American 

24 December MacArthur moved headquarters to Corregidor.

108 
Appendix A: Chronology 

25 December Fall of Hong Kong to Japanese. 

30 December Borneo fell to Japanese. 

31 December Manila occupied by the Japanese. 

1942 

11 January Japan invaded Netherlands East Indies. 

20 January Japan began major offensive in Burma. 

1 February Units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet made surprise naval and air attacks on 

Japanese air and naval bases at Roi, Kwajalein, Wotje, Taroa and Jaluit 

Islands in the Marshalls and Makin in the Gilberts. 

15 February Singapore surrendered to the Japanese. 

19 February Japanese bombed Darwin, Australia.

9 March Java surrendered to Japanese. 

10 March Rangoon (Burma) fell to Japanese. 

Lexington and Yorktown raid Japanese landings in New Guinea. 

13 March Japanese landed in Solomon Islands. Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle

5 April Japanese 1st Air Fleet raided Ceylon.

9 April Bataan surrendered. 

18 April Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. 

28 April Lashio (northern Burma) fell to Japanese; land route to China 

severed. 

6 May Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright surrendered all Fil-American 

forces in the Philippines.

7-8 May Battle of Coral Sea. 

20 May Japanese completed conquest of Burma. 

4-6 June Battle of Midway Lieutenant General Wainwright 

109
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

2 July Joint Chiefs of Staff approved opportunistic strategy: attack 

Japan in southwest Pacific—Guadalcanal and New Guinea. 

17 August Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s 2nd Marine Raider 

Battalion, consisting of 221 Marines, moved by two 

submarines from Pearl Harbor to Makin and began a two day 

raid on Butaritari Island, during which scattered enemy 

forces are engaged and a radio station destroyed. Enemy 

planes attacked the Raiders on both days. Thirty 

Marines were lost in the action. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson

1943 

Japanese War Objectives and Planned Opening Attacks 

110 
Appendix A: Chronology 

15 March Fleets in Pacific reorganized: 5th Fleet 

(Spruance) for Central Pacific; 3rd

Fleet (Halsey) and 7th Fleet (Kincaid)

Southwest Pacific. 

11-25 May Trident Conference in Washington. 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) decided 

to seize the Marshall Islands and to move 

against Japanese outer defenses. Trident 

Conference in Washington ends. General 

approval was given to the U.S. “Strategic 

Plan for the Defeat of Japan” calling for a 

drive on Japan through the Central Pacific.

7 May Joint Staff Planners directed the Joint War 

id-June Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed Admiral Nimitz to submit plan for the 

July Admiral Nimitz submitted concept for operations. 

0 July JCS directed Admiral Nimitz to seize bases in the Gilbert Islands and on 

3 August 4 Marine Division organized. 

8 August Implementing the directive of 20 July 1943 to establish bases from which

0 August Admiral Nimitz submitted outline plan for occupation of Kwajalein, Wotje 

2 August An advance party of the 2nd Marine Airdrome Battalion landed at 

7-24 August At the Quadrant Conference at Quebec, routes of advance on Japan were 

Admiral Halsey

Vice Admiral Spruance 

Admiral Kincaid

2

Plans Committee to determine troop needs 

and suggest target dates for the invasion of 

the Marshall Islands, Pacific Ocean Area. 

M

occupation of the Marshalls. 

1

2

Nauru and organize and train forces to operations in the Marshall Islands

on 1 January 1944. 

th 1

1

the assault on the Marshalls can be supported, an advance party landed on 

Nanomea, Ellice Islands, to reconnoiter and choose an airfield site. 

2

and Maloelap. 

2

Nukufetau, Ellice Islands, where an air base was to be established.

1

laid out and operations in the Marshalls agreed to. 

111
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

24 August V Amphibious Corps (VAC) formed, Rear Admiral 

Richmond Kelly Turner commanding. 

1 September JCS dispatched directive to Admiral Nimitz, allocating 

troops and naval forces for the invasion of the Marshall 

Islands. 

16 September 7th Infantry Division arrived at Oahu, Territory of Hawaii 

to begin preparations for the Marshalls. 

19 September Carrier and Army Air Forces planes made coordinated 

attacks on Tarawa, during which complete photographic 

coverage was obtained. The carrier force, Task Force 

(TF) 15 under Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall, i

carriers Belleau Wood, Princeton and Lexington. The 11

ncluded

he BVAC estimated that the capture of Nauru with the forces 

0 September 4 Marine Division assigned to VAC. 

4 September Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance recommended to Admira

.

October The 27 Infantry Division, previously authorized to plan for the invasion

October Commander-in-Chief Pacific—Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area 

e

ter

October Nukufetau (Ellice Islands) airstrip ready for use. 

2 October Admiral Nimitz issued Operations Plan 16-43, the first formal operation 

3 October Photographic coverage of Makin Island obtained.

th

Bombardment Group (Seventh Air Force) supplied t

24s, which operate from Canton and Funafuti. 

Rear Admiral Turner

available will be difficult. 

th 2 Rear Admiral Pownall

2 l Nimitz 

that an amphibious operation against Makin be substituted for the 

projected invasion of Nauru. This plan was subsequently accepted

th 2

of Nauru, was notified that its mission will be to capture Makin Atoll in 

the Gilberts.

5

(CINCPAC—CINCPOA) issued plan for offensive in the Central Pacific. 

Admiral Spruance would seize Makin, Tarawa and Apamama in the 

Gilberts, cover amphibious landings on each with air and naval surfac

forces and deny the enemy use of bases in the Marshalls and at Nauru 

during the operation. D Day for landings were set for 19 November, la

postponed to 20 November. 

9

1

plan for the Marshalls. 

1

112 
Appendix A: Chronology 

20 October Photographic coverage of Tarawa obtained. 

12 November ern Attack Force for Operation

Galvanic (seizure of the Gilberts) 

13 November 

Galvanic departed from the New Hebrides. 

t

The South

completed rehearsal off New Hebrides. 

The Southern Attack Force for Operation

Pre-invasion air operations against the 

Gilberts began. B-24s from Funafuti 

bombed Tarawa without interception bu

met unusually heavy antiaircraft fire.

Tarawa Map

Original Strategic Conception and Situation, 1 November 1943

15 November M 2-43,

first over-all troop directive for the Marshalls. 

16 November der No. 55-43.

ir

e flew 141 sorties against the Gilbert and Marshall Islands 

and dropped some 173 tons of bombs. 

ajor General Holland M. Smith issued Operations Plan

Task Group-1 organized under VAC General Or

17 November During 13-17 November, heavy bombers from the Seventh A

Forc

Major General H.M. Smith

113
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Land-based and carrier-based aircraft joined in the final bombardment of 

the Gilberts, Ma

19 November 

rshalls and Nauru to prepare for the invasion of the 

Gilberts. 

Makin Atoll and Tarawa Atoll Maps 

20 November U.S. forces invaded Makin and Tarawa Atolls (Operation Galvanic), 

opening a se the Central Pacific aimed 

ultimately at invading Japan. Air and naval gunfire bombardment 

ries of amphibious operations in

preceded and closely supported assault teams. Aerial supremacy had 

already been achieved. At both atolls, landing forces were beset with 

supply difficulties and communications failures. 

114 
Appendix A: Chronology 

 Makin: TF 52’s landing force (the 27th Infantry Division’s 165th Infantry

reinforced by the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry, tanks of the 193rd Tank 

Battalion and other supporting units), commanded by Major General 

Ralph C. Smith, invaded Makin. As a preliminary to the 

main invasion of Butaritari Island, largest of the Makin 

group, a special landing detachment sailed for Kotabu at 

0645 and secured the island without opposition. The 

invasion of Butaritari began on schedule at 0830 when 

the 1st and 3rd Battalion Landing Teams (BLT), 165th

Infantry started landing on Red Beaches 1 and 2 on the 

west coast. At 1041, about 10 minutes behind schedule, 

BLT 2 began landing on Yellow Beaches, located on the 

northern (lagoon) sore between On Chong’s Wharf and 

King’s Wharf. Both assault forces secured beachheads 

and with tank support pushed rapidly forward against 

light resistance, converging along the West Tank Barrier, where enemy 

opposition was overcome although a small pocket remained to the 

northwest. Artillery was emplaced on Ukiangong Point. 

 Tarawa: TF 53’s landing force (2nd Marines, 2nd Marine Division, 

reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines and supporting units), 

commanded by Major General Julian C. Smith, invaded Betio Island, 

Major General R. Smith

115
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

located at the southwest tip of Tarawa atoll, where the airfield and the 

main enemy forces were located. The landings were made with great 

difficulty and very heavy casualties. Transports 

arrived south of the assigned area and at 0507 came

under fire of the previously alerted enemy on Betio. 

While the transports were moving northward out of 

range of enemy guns, the warships attempted, with 

some success, to neutralize the enemy positions. 

Aircraft delivered brief strikes before the forces 

landed. Although H Hour was postponed from 0830 

until 0900, first troops did not reach shore until 

0910. Marines landed under direct fire, many 

wading from the partly exposed reef that fringes the 

coast. Upon reaching shore, landing teams became intermingled and 

disorganized. Landings were made on three adjacent beaches (Red 

Beaches 1, 2 and 3, from west to east) on the northwest coast. The 3rd

Battalion, 2nd Marines, the Red Beach 1 assault force, gained a beachhead 

on the northwest tip of the island but was isolated there. In the center, the 

2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines was pinned down by enemy fire on Red Beach 

2. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, from the regimental reserve and the 3rd

Battalion, 8th Marines, from the division reserve, were committed. 

Fortunately, counterattacks, expected after nightfall, failed to materialize 

eager gains were held. Shortly before the invasion of Betio, a 

rtly

Major General J. Smith

and the m

scout-sniper platoon cleared enemy positions from the main pier, pa

burning it in the process.

21 November Makin: The 2 r nd BLT, 165th Infantry, attacked on Butaritari Island, after ai

and artillery preparation, and overran the fortified area between the West 

116 
Appendix A: Chronology 

and East Tank Barriers as it pushed eastward to Stone Pier. The 1st BLT

mopped up in the western part of the island and eliminated a pocket near 

the West Tank Barrier. A reconnaissance detail landed on Kuma Island 

early in the day, 

reconnoitered and withdrew.

 Tarawa: Marines on Betio 

continued to meet grim

opposition but strengthened 

their hold on the island 

assisted by aircraft, artillery 

and naval gunfire. Further 

reinforcements were landed, 

bringing the total number of 

battalions ashore to seven. 

The 6th Marines was 

released from the VAC 

reserve to the 2nd Marine

Division and its 1st Battalion 

landed on Green Beach, on the western end of the island. The rest of the 

8th Marines landed on Beach Red 2. The 3rd Battalion secured the entire 

western end of Betio (Green Beach), while the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 

moving from Beaches Red 2 and Red 3 pushed across the airfield to the 

nd th south coast, splitting enemy forces. The 2 Battalion, 8 Marines on 

Beach Red 3 made little progress during the day. Meanwhile artillery and 

naval gunfire directed against the eastern end of Betio prevented the 

enemy from escaping to the next island (Bairiki) and the 2nd Battalion, 6th

Marines landed on Bairiki after a preliminary bombardment that killed the 

few enemy troops there. While fighting was in progress on Betio, 

Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion

Tarawa Atoll. 

started reconnoitering other islands of 

117
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

22 November 

nd

e

ff the

a

ve to the narrow neck of the island to intercept the enemy. 

A special detail moved to Kuma Island to halt enemy withdrawal there. 

Makin: After preparatory bombardment, the 3rd BLT, 165th Infantry took

over the attack from the 2nd BLT and drove east on Butaritari well beyo

the East Tank Barrier, which the enemy abandoned. Though the eastern 

tip of the island remained to be explored, Admiral Turner declared th

island captured. General Ralph Smith assumed command ashore. On the 

night of 22-23 November, the Japanese were virtually wiped out when 

they made an unsuccessful counterattack. Steps were taken to cut o

enemy’s escape from Butaritari: elements of Company A, 1st BLT made

waterborne mo

Tarawa: The Japanese on Betio underwent heavy air, naval and artillery 

bombardment as the battle for the island continued. The enemy was 

brought under cross fire as artillery was emplaced on Bairiki. Passing 

through 3

2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, with elements of the 3rd Battalion attached 

passed east along the north coast to the eastern end of the airfield. The 1st

Battalion, 8th Marines, attached to the 2nd Marines attacked a strongpoint 

between Red Beaches 2 and 1 and succeeded in containing it. By the end 

of the day, the enemy was compressed into the eastern part of Betio and 

retained a pocket between Red Beaches 1 and 2. The 3rd Battalion, 6th

Marines landed on Green Beach and moved forward along the south coast 

behind the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. General Julian Smith established a 

Command Post (CP) ashore. During the night of 22-23 November, 

Japanese counterattacks were repelled by 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. 

rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines drove east 

along the south coast on a narrow front, making contact with the 2nd

Marines and continuing to advance to the eastern end of the airfield. The

118 
Appendix A: Chronology 

23 November Makin: Organized resistance on Butaritari Island ended at 1030 when 

advance elements of 3rd BLT, 165th Infantry reached the tip of the island. 

Re-embarkation of assault forces began. 

 Tarawa: The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, attacking through the 1st

Battalion, reached the end of Betio shortly after 1300 and General Smith 

reported the end of organized resistance on Betio at 1330. The 8th

Marines, less the 1st Battalion, moved to Bairiki. The 2nd Battalion, 6th

Marines moved from Bairiki to Betio and was given the task of securing 

the rest of the islands in Tarawa Atoll. The 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines 

moved to a village of Eita where the 3rd Platoon of Company D, 2nd Tank 

Battalion was attached to it. 

24 November Makin: The 165th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), less the 3rd Battalion

left for Hawaii. The 3rd Battalion and miscellaneous units were left behind

to conduct minor mopping up operations and to support construction 

forces. Command was turn over to Colonel Cleson H. Tenney, Garrison

25 November 

 Battalion, 6 Marines 

26 November 

e enemy forces believed 

27 November 

ed

th Force Commander. The 27 Infantry Division’s casualties totaled 218, of

whom 58 were killed and 8 died of wounds. Enemy casualties, aside from

those subsequently inflicted during the mop up are estimated at 550, 

including 105 prisoners. 

A Japanese submarine sunk the escort carrier USS Liscombe Bay off 

Makin; 644 persons aboard were lost. 

Tarawa: Two of the 2nd Marine Division’s regiments (8th and 2nd

Marines) left for Hawaii. Embarking from Betio, 2nd Battalion, 6th

Marines, guided by scouts from the 2nd Tank Battalion began an 

uneventful search for the enemy on the island up along the east side of 

Tarawa Atoll. 

Tarawa: After scouting about half way up the eastern side of the atoll,

Company D, 2nd Tank Battalion was recalled to the village of Eita to

prepare to reconnoiter other atolls. The 2nd th

continued its uneventful trek up Tarawa Atoll. 

Tarawa: The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines reached Buariki, the last relatively 

large island of the atoll and prepared to attack th

to be there. 

Tarawa: The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines cleared the enemy from Buariki.

The small islet of Naa, at the northern tip of the atoll remained to be 

explored. 

119
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

28 November 

rawa totaled 3,301. Japanese losses were 

estimated to be 4,690 killed, 17 captured and 129 Koreans taken prisoner.

30 November 

1 December

4 December R. Tate, USN, Commander, Advanced Base, 

Tarawa, took command, relieving General Julian Smith. During 

First aerial photo coverage of Kwajalein Atoll effected. 

Tarawa: The atoll was completely secured. No Japanese were found on 

Naa. Marine casualties on Ta

The 2nd Tank Battalion scouts reconnoitered Abaiang and Marakei Atolls 

north of Tarawa, finding 5 Japanese on the former. 

The 2nd Tank Battalion scouts found Maiana Atoll free of enemy, 

concluding their mission. 

Tarawa: Captain Jackson

December 1943 and January 1944, air bases were constructed in the 

Gilberts. 

120 
Appendix A: Chronology 

5 December iral Yamada Michiyuki assumed command of 

7 December Sextant Conference concluded at Cairo. CCS established a 

tentative timetable for the offensive against Japan: seizure of 

Marshalls and New Britain, January 1944; Manus, 

Admiralties, April 1944; Hollandia, New Guinea, June 1944; 

Marianas, October 1944.

14 December Admiral Nimitz revised Operations Plan 16-43; target date 

postponed. 

20 December Admiral Nimitz issued final JCS Study, Flintlock II in which all changes 

have been ratified. 

1944 

3 January Rear Admiral Turner issued Operations Plan A6-43; listing components 

(shipping and pre-D Day bombardment plan) and setting forth mission of 

Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51). 

5 January VAC Operations Plan 1-44 released, superseding Operations Plan 3-43. 

6 January Commander, Central Pacific issued Operations Plan for invasion of the 

Marshall Islands. 7th Infantry Division Field Order 1 called for occupation 

of Kwajalein in several phases. 

13 January Main body of TF 53 (4th Marine Division) departed San Diego. 

Campaign Plan Granite outlined the tentative operations to be conducted 

and a timetable. Carrier raid on Truk about 24 March in support of 

invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng; capture of Eniwetok and Ujelang 

Atolls in the Marshalls (Catchpole), 1 May; capture of Mortlock and Truk 

ager), 1

d, it is proposed that the Palaus be 

invaded on 1 August; the 27th Infantry Division is alerted to prepare to 

22 January tionary Force), largest 

297 ships),

Marshalls. 

ased.

Vice Adm

Admiral Nimitz

Japanese aviation in the Marshalls. 

in the Carolines, 1 August; invasion of the Marianas (For

November). If Truk can be bypasse

seize Eniwetok. 

Main body of Flintlock Assault Force (Joint Expedi

U.S. force assembled in the Pacific thus far (54,000 troops and

sailed from Hawaii for the

Enemy interception of land-based planes over Kwajalein ce

121
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

23 January Attack force reserve for Flintlock and Majuro Attack Group 

sailed for target. 

29 January As invasion forces approached the Marshalls, carrier planes 

(from USS Cowpens, Mo Bunker Hill) and naval 

vessels joined in the final neutralization program, 

other targets on

Kwajalein Atoll; completely neutralized Taroa airfield on 

In addition, the neutralization group, Task Group (TG) 50.15 bombarded 

lap, Jaluit and Mille Atolls.

Marshalls, attacking Eniwetok Atoll, where 19 planes were 

tje. Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill’s 

Majuro Attack Group (TG 51.2), consisting of the 

n the atoll.

1 January

Kwajalein Atoll: Under over-all command of the Fifth Fleet (TF 50), 

orce (TF 51,

ear Admiral Turner) invaded the Marsha

Atoll, opening Operation Flintlock. Air, naval and ground operations 

sualties were

r the first 

rn end of Kwajalein 

Rear Admiral 

era

issippi, Idaho

Rear Admiral Mitscher

nterey and 

supplementing the action of land-based planes already in 

progress. Carrier aircraft from Admiral Marc Mitscher’s TF 

58 thoroughly covered airfields and

Maloelap Atoll; made repeated attacks on Wotje airfield. 

Wotje and Maloelap. Land based planes (B-24s) concentrated on 

Kwajalein Atoll (dropping 23 tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island) and 

attacked targets on Wotje, Maloe

30 January Carrier plans of TF 58 continued the neutralization of the 

destroyed on the ground, in addition to targets on 

Kwajalein, Wotje and Maloelap Atolls. Immediate 

objectives on Kwajalein Atoll—Roi-Namur and Kwajalein 

Islands—were pounded during 400 sorties and subjected to 

naval bombardment of surface vessels for 4 hours. Assault 

forces arrived at target after nightfall; accompanying 

destroyers and cruisers turned aside en route to bombard 

Maloelap and Wo

reinforced 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry Regiment, 27th

Infantry Division and VAC Reconnaissance Troop made unopposed 

landings on Calalin and Dadap Islands i

Rear Admiral Hill

3 D-Day in the Marshalls. 

Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance, U.S. Joint Expeditionary F

commanded by R lls at Kwajalein

were well coordinated. Little opposition was met and U.S. ca

extremely light. Underwater demolition team is employed fo

time in the Pacific to explore beaches at the Weste

Island. 

Southern Attack Force (TF 52, also commanded by

Turner) invaded Southern Kwajalein Atoll. Preliminary op

early in the morning when battleships (Pennsylvania, Miss

tions began

122 
Appendix A: Chronology 

and New Mexico), heavy cruisers (Minneapolis, San Francisco and New 

Orleans) and destroyers (Stevens, McKee, Ringgold and Sigsbee) m

firing runs on the island, 0618-0840. . Provisional units attached to the

17

ade 

shipping

into the lagoon, with occupation of Cecil (Ninni) and Carter (Gea), small 

en

position by

mistake, where some

of another provisional

and

al

labegan) and

. BLT 1 occupied

as put ashore on

battery of 155 mm 

lein Island

th RCT, 7th Infantry Division, secured a channel for entry of

islets northwest of Kwajalein Island. Reconnaissance elem

Company B, 111

ts and part of 

th Infantry Regiment, took Cecil without op

1235 after landing earlier on Chauncey (Gehh) by

infantrymen were left to contain the enemy. Troops

force from the 7th Infantry Division landed on Carter at 0620

overcame opposition by 0930. After preparatory air and nav

bombardment, 17th RCT began the invasion of Carlos (Enny

Carlson (Enubaj) at 0910, 40 minutes behind schedule

Carlos and BLT 2, Carlson, with little trouble. Artillery w

Carlson (four battalions of 105-mm howitzers and one

howitzers) and registered on next objectives, Kwaja

and Burton (Ebeye). 

(Porcelain)

Marines Climbing Down Nets from a Transport into a Landing Craft, Kwajalein Atoll

123
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Kwajalein Atoll Map with inset of Island

Northern Attack Force (TF 53 under Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly) 

invaded North Kwajalein. 4th Marine Division 

opened operations with preliminary landings by 

the 25th Marines, Reinforced, on islands 

adjacent to the main objective, twin islands of 

Roi-Namur (Burlesque-Camouflage), to secure 

and for artillery sites. The 1 Battalion, 25

Marines, quickly quelled token resistance on 

Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob (Ennubing), southwest 

of Roi, during the morning, making Jacob Pass 

available for shipping. In the afternoon, 3rd

Battalion, 25th Marines, took Albert 

(Ennumennet) and the 2nd Battalion seized Allen (E

Namur, with ease. The 3rd Battalion then proceed

(Abraham) and occupied it. Artill

on Roi-Namur. 

 Majuro Atoll: The atoll was secured without a f

completed an uneventful reconnaissance. 

safe passage for naval vessels into the lagoon 

st th

nnubirr), southeast of 

ed to Ennugarrett 

ery was brought ashore and registered 

ight as VAC scouts 

Rear Admiral Conolly 

124 
Appendix A: Chronology 

1 February Troops of the VAC opened the attack for the main objectives. That 

generally light opposition was met was a tribute to the effectiveness of 

preliminary bombardment by naval vessels, aircraft and artillery, which 

was closely coordinated and overwhelming. 

ent

fantry Division invaded

l, advance elements 

y bombard

rth on Beaches Red 1 and 2 at the western end of the 

th try

ong

ily eastward to the north-south

Aerial View of Roi-Namur under Bombardm

In the Southern Landing Force area, the 7th In

Kwajalein Island at the southern bend of the atol

touched down at 0930. During the preparator

naval vessels fired approximately 7,000 14-, 8- and 5-inch shells into the 

target, while the divisional artillery fired 29,000 rounds of 105 and 155 

mm ammunition. B-24s also dropped fifteen 1,000 and 2,000 pound

bombs on the landing areas. BLT 184-3 and 32-1 landed abreast, the 

former on the no

ment, supporting 

island and quickly secured the beaches. In the zone of the 184 Infan

Regiment, the enemy clung to the ruins of his main beach defenses al

the lagoon shore. Both teams moved stead

125
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Wilma road, which connected coastal roads Will on the

ld.

Major General Charles C. Corlett, the 7 Infantry 

Division’s Commanding General, landed on Carlson 

and took command ashore. U.S. forces were 

withdrawn from Chauncey, infantry elements to Cecil 

and the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop aboard 

Overton. A few naval troops were left to guard barges. 

north and Wallace on the south. BLT 32-2 attacked 

through BLT 32-1 in the afternoon. By the end of the 

day the 7th Infantry Division held about a third of the 

island, including the western edge of the airfie

th

Major General Corlett

two

ar

r,

largely covers, stunned and disorganized Japanese offered no effective 

In the Northern Landing Force area, the 4th Marine Division landed

battalions of the 23rd Marines on the southern shore of Roi and a simil

force from the 24th Marines on the south shore of Namur. Assault hou

set for 1000, was delayed because of boating difficulties, and the landings

actually occurred between 1145 and noon. On Roi, which the airfield 

126 
Appendix A: Chronology 

resistance as the 23rd Marines sped to the north coast and

island except for a small pocket in the center of th

Marines was less fortunate on Namur, where thick v

buildings concealed the enemy. The 2

cleared the

e airfield. The 24th

egetation and many 

lions pushed north

opposition as the

he 2nd battalion 

owerful 

. Reinforced by reserves 

e 24th Marines 

he eastern shore to 

western flank. The 

r. E

 2-3 February culminated in a 

counterattack by 100 Japanese at dawn, but the attack was repelled in 

close combat. 

nd and 3rd batta

abreast, the 2nd on the right, meeting considerable

Japanese rallied from the preliminary bombardment. T

suffered more than 50 percent of its casualties from the p

explosion of a blockhouse containing ammunition

from the 1st Battalion and tanks from the 23rd Marines, th

reached a line extending from the initial objective on t

positions 175 yards north of the initial objective on the

Landing Force Commander established a CP on Namu

infiltration attempts on the night of

nemy

Soldiers and Light Tank Moving Through Jungle, Kwajalein 

127
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Marines Carrying Ammunition Boxes 

 Sniper, Kwajalein 

2 February In the Southern Landing Force campaign, the 7th Infantry Division met 

increased resistance, which planes, artillery and naval gunfire helped 

neutralize as the division concentrated on clearing Kwajalein. The 2nd

Battalion, 184th Infantry, passing through the 3rd Battalion, advanced along 

128 
Appendix A: Chronology 

the lagoon side of the island on the left while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd

In elming enemy 

strong points, both assault forces soon reached Carl Road, which crossed

the island at the eastern end of the airfield. As the advance continued 

toward the next cross island road, Nora, some 300 yards ahead, the 3rd

Battalion, 32nd Infantry, attacking through the 2nd Battalion, crossed an 

antitank ditch and cleared a strong point called Corn. Although forward 

elements of the division get well beyond Nora Road, the line was 

organized for the night short of it, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry taking up

positions in the Corn strong point and the 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry on a 

line 75-100 yards northeast of Carl Road. 

fantry continued to attack on the ocean side. Overwh

Marines Firing at Japanese Snipers, Roi-Namur

Elements of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop landed on Chauncey, 

where the enemy was becoming aggressive, and cleared it during a sharp 

fire fight. Japanese dead total 125. 

In preparation for the invasion of Burton, the island was searched from

destroyer and seaplane and pounded by artillery and naval gunfire. 

129
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

search

ll,

of

In the Northern Landing Force campaign, the 4th Marine Division 

completed the mop up of Roi and the capture of Namur and began a

of the remaining islands of the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll for the

enemy. On Namur, the 24th Marines, with tank support, attacked with the

3rd Battalion on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right. Organized 

resistance ceased by 1215, ending the battle for northern Kwajalein Ato

except for mopping up. Major General Harry Schmidt, 4th Marine 

Division Commanding General, announced the end of organized 

resistance on Namur at 1418. The 25th Marines was given the task

securing the other islands in the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll and 

began an uneventful search for the enemy. 

130 
Appendix A: Chronology 

3 Admiral Hill arrived by plane from Majuro to take part in formal plannin

for Eniwetok with forces previously allocated as reserves for Kwajale

February g

in.

Planning continued until the expeditionary force sailed on 15 February. 

Japanese Killed in Action serving as Gun Crew, Kwajalein

 In the Southern Landing Force campaign, the 7th Infantry Division 

attacked to clear the rest of Kwajalein Island, with Nathan Road (the eastwest road opposite Nob Pier) as the immediate objective. Assault forces 

encountered dense construction and must destroy blockhouses and 

concrete positions in detail. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry advanced on 

the lagoon side, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry attacked on the ocean side. 

Beyond Nora Road, frontal attacks prove so costly, particularly in the 

184th Infantry’s zone where Company B was virtually halted along the 

lagoon at the western edge of the built-up Admiralty area, that the plan of 

attack was changed. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, swung left to the 

lagoon shore while the 2nd Battalion attacked through its right flank 

toward Nathan Road, forcing an exposed salient into enemy positions. 

The 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, assisted by the 1st Battalion, continued 

toward Nathan Road, advance elements getting to within 100 yards of it. 

Numerous enemy pockets were bypassed. Enemy counterattacks were 

repulsed during the night. 

131
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

After effective naval gunfire, artillery and carrier aircraft bombardment 

eli antry Regiment, 7th

Infantry Division, invaded Burton, two companies going ashore abreast 

t of

the

ete

y

minated enemy opposition, the 1st Battalion, 17th Inf

(Company A on the right; Company B on the left) on the southern par

the lagoon beach at 0935. After crossing the southern end of the island, 

the 1st Battalion drove north supported by amphibian tractors and later by

light and medium tanks. Opposition developed about an hour after

landing, particularly on the left where Company B passed through 

Company C shortly before 1700. By 1900 forward elements halted for the 

night on a line that crossed the island just south of Bailey Pier, a concr

structure extending into the lagoon about midway up the island. The 3rd

Battalion, upon landing, took responsibility for the rear area. Illumination

throughout the night and the fire of supporting arms helped prevent enem

counterattacks. 

Amphibious tank detachments were sent to Buster and Byron islets 

between Kwajalein and Burton took them without opposition.

132 
Appendix A: Chronology 

Japanese Killed in Action in Foxhole

4 February The 184th RCT, in the southern part of the atoll, continued the difficult 

mop up of the enemy along the lagoon shore, completing this as far as 

Green Beach 4 by 1435. The 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, attacked through 

d

nd

.

ed by 1337. Troops of the 2 Battalion, 17 Infantry 

secured Burnet and Blakenship (Loi), north of Burton, capturing about 40 

the 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, towar

the end of the island, arriving at Nathan Road in a highly disorganized 

state. Here, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry passed through the 1st

Battalion to complete the capture of the island. Advance elements reached

Nero Point at the tip of the island by 1515, but organized resistance 

continued until 1920. General Corlett announced the capture of Kwajalein

Island to Admiral Turner at 1610. A considerable number of Japanese a

Koreans surrendered during the day. 

The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry continued its northward attack on Burton, 

this time meeting main opposition on the right, in the zone of Company A

At 1130, the 3rd Battalion attacked through the 1st Battalion. Company K 

reached the northeast corner of the island at 1210 and Burton was 

completely secur nd th

133
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Marshallese on Burnet and subduing more than 20 Japanese and Kor

on Blakenship. 

eans

 100th Naval Construction Battalion begins repair on Roi airfield. 

As the mopping up was conducted on Kwajalein Island; other islands in

the southern part of Kwajalein Atoll were reconnoitered. The 3

5 February 

ext

antry

ern Force worked south from the 

north end of the southeastern leg of the atoll toward Bennett, taking five 

rd

Battalion, 17th Infantry found three Japanese on Beverly (South 

Gugegwe); the 1st Battalion cleared about 200 Japanese from Berlin 

(North Gugegwe). Company C proceeded with tanks to Benson, n

island to the north and secured it. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop 

invaded Bennett (Bigej); assisted there by the 3rd Battalion, 184th Inf

with two tanks; 94 Japanese were killed before the island was secured. 

The 2nd Battalion (–), 17th Infantry, organized into Eastern and Western 

Forces, continued to mop up. The East

islands without opposition. The Western Force advanced north from

Carlos and took four islands, three of them without opposition. 

134 
Appendix A: Chronology 

6 February 

t 

Stretcher Bearers, Kwajalein 

In the Southern Landing Force area, the Western Force of the 2nd

Battalion, 17th Infantry occupied Cohen (Ennugenliggelap), next island 

north of Clifton (Eller), without opposition, bringing the offensive agains

southern Kwajalein Atoll to an end. 

After the Battle, Kwajalein 

135
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Southern Landing Force losses totaled 142 killed, 845 wounded and 2 

missing. Japanese losses are estimated at 4,938 killed and 206 captured. 

The NORTHERN LANDING FORCE continued its uneventful 

reconnaissance of the islands of North Kwajalein Atoll. 

February The Northern Landing Force concluded its uneventful search of the 

islands of North Kwajalein Atoll, completing the offensive against 

Kwajalein Atoll. During the action, the 4th Marine Division suffered 737 

casualties, of whom 190 were killed or died of wounds. Japanese losses 

were 3,472 killed and 91 captured.

February Kwajalein Atoll secured.

2 February Japanese air attack on Roi. 

TF 58, less one attack group sailed for Truk from Majuro. 

5 February Eniwetok Expeditionary Group (TG 51.11 under Admiral Hill) left 

Kwajalein for Eniwetok. 

6 February In preparation for invasion of Eniwetok, TG 58.4 attacked and 

oastal

Marines Holding a Funeral Service, Roi-Namur

7

8

1

1

1

photographed the atoll. Most buildings were destroyed, one of two c

guns on the northeast corner was wrecked and Engebi airfield was left 

temporarily unserviceable. Fourteen enemy planes were estimated 

destroyed on the ground. 

136 
Appendix A: Chronology 

Admiral Hill’s Eniwetok Expeditionary Group (TG 51.11) invaded 

Eniwetok Atoll (Operation Catchpo

17 February

le) after preliminary naval gunfire, air 

made unopposed landings from the lagoon side 

ellia (Aitsu) Islands, southeast of Engebi, at 

led no Japanese and artillery was brought 

ashore and registered on Engebi, the main objective in the northern part of

AC scouts

pany

ded for Zinnia (Bogon) west of Engebi, to block 

ted

itered the beaches. 

bombardment and minesweeping operations. Troops of the VAC 

Reconnaissance Company

on Canna (Rujoru) and Cam

1318. A quick search revea

the atoll. In order to insure the safety of the artillery units, V

then took several small islands in the vicinity of Canna and Camellia 

without enemy interference. The 4th Marine Division scouts of Com

D, 4th Tank Battalion, hea

withdrawal from Engebi. In the darkness they mistakenly landed on two 

islands below and worked their way back to Bogon without opposition. 

The first day’s objectives were secured without any American casualties. 

In preparation for the invasion of Engebi, naval gunfire was supplemen

by shore-based artillery fire placed on the island and underwater 

demolition teams reconno

137
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

The 22nd Marines, supported by elements of an Army cannon company, 

19 February 

led for this date.

18 February 

invaded Engebi after preparatory bombardment. The enemy offered 

organized resistance only at the southern tip of the island, which was

declared secure by 1450. Part of the assault force re-embarked for Parry. 

Scouting parties began to search for the enemy on the smaller islands

between Engebi and the southern part of the atoll. 

The 106th RCT, 27th Infantry Division, landed of the lagoon shore of 

Eniwetok Island after naval and air bombardment. Two battalions went 

ashore abreast, the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3rd Battalion on the 

left. Pushing through outposts, assault forces reached the ocean side of the

island. The 1st Battalion then pivoted to the right to secure artillery sites in

the southern part of the island. A strong enemy counterattack delayed the 

southward attack. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines, the reserve force, was 

committed to strengthen the 1st Battalion in the afternoon. The 3rd

Battalion, which was to have conducted a holding action, was ordered to 

the north end of the island instead and at 1230 started northward 

cautiously. Unexpectedly slow progress on Eniwetok forced 

postponement of attack on Parry Island schedu

138 
Appendix A: Chronology 

20 February While the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry slowly worked northward on 

Eniwetok Island, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines, assisted by the 1st

Battalion, 106th Infantry, overcame resistance on the southern part of the 

island. The 1st Battalion (—), 106th Infantry conducted mopping up 

operations on southern Eniwetok Island. Preparations for the assault on 

Parry, last of the three big islands of the atoll continued. Artillery on 

Eniwetok Island was registered on Parry and supplemented other 

bombardment. The 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion was emplaced 

on Japtan Island and joined the bombardment of Parry. 

1 February The capture of Eniwetok Island was completed, but mopping up 

he

he

22 February for the northern part of

Eniwetok Island. The 3 Battalion was withdrawn as the floating reserve 

rry

f the

2

continued. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry reached the northern tip at 

1630. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines was withdrawn to prepare for t

invasion of Parry, still under large-scale preliminary bombardment. T

plan for the capture of Parry was completed and approved. 

The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry took responsibility

rd

for the Parry Island operation. The 22nd Marines started landing on Pa

at 0900 as a three-day preliminary bombardment ended. During the 

preparatory phase, Parry received 944.4 tons of naval shells, 245 tons of

artillery shells and 99 tons of bombs. The 22nd Marines landed on the 

lagoon shore and met lively resistance at once. After pushing across to the 

ocean shore, the 1st Battalion on the left turned north and cleared the 

northern part of the island by 1330. The 2nd Battalion joined by the 3rd

Battalion drove south and by 1930 overwhelmed the southern part o

island, whereupon Parry is declared secure. 

139
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Map of the Central Pacific, Showing Geographical Relationships

140 
Appendix B: 

Order of Battle for Operations Flintlock and Catchpole 

(29 January – 23 February 1944) 

Kwajalein Atoll 

Pacific Fleet 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at Pearl Harbor 

Fifth Fleet 

Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in USS Indianapolis

Task Force (TF) 51 Joint Expeditionary Force 

Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner in USS Rocky Mount also on board was Commander, 

Expeditionary Troops (V Amphibious Corps), Major General Holland M. Smith USMC 

TF 52 Southern Attack Force 

Rear Admiral Turner
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Southern Landing Force 

7th Infantry Division 

Major General Charles H. Corlett, Commanding General 

7th Medical Battalion 

7th Reconnaissance Troop 

13th Engineer Battalion 

17th Infantry Regiment 

32nd Infantry Regiment 

184th Infantry Regiment 

7th Infantry Division Artillery 

 31st Field Artillery Battalion 

 48th Field Artillery Battalion 

 49th Field Artillery Battalion 

 57th Field Artillery Battalion 

 145th Field Artillery Battalion 

767th Tank Battalion 

708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor 

Battalion 

50th Engineer Battalion 

3rd Army Defense Battalion 

4th Army Defense Battalion 

Special Troops 

 7th Infantry Division Band 

 707th Ordnance Light Maintenance 

Company 

 7th Quartermaster Company 

 7th Signal Company 

Military Police Platoon 

2 destroyer transports, 4 attack transports, 1 attack cargo transport, 1 landing ship dock 

(LSD), 8 landing ship, tanks (LST) carrying 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor 

Battalion 

Task Group (TG) 52.5 Southern Transport Group

8 attack transports, 2 attack cargo ships, 2 LSDs, 8 LSTs 

TG 52.6 Control Group 

3 submarine chasers and 3 landing craft 

TG 52.7 Destroyer Screen 

6 destroyers, 2 destroyer minesweepers 

TG 52.8 Fire Support Group 

Unit 1: 2 destroyers 

Unit 2: 2 heavy cruisers, 2 battleships, 4 destroyers 

Unit 3: 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 3 destroyers 

Unit 4: 2 destroyers 

12 LCI (L) 

TG 52.9 Carrier Support Group 

3 escort aircraft carriers (CVE) and 4 destroyers 

TG 52.10 Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group

3 minesweepers, 4 motor minesweepers, 1 landing craft 

142 
Appendix B: U.S. Order of Battle 

TG 52.11 Southern Salvage Unit

3 ocean tugs

TG 51.3 Southern Defense Group

1 destroyer escort, 4 LSTs 

TG 51.4 Southern Garrison Group

5 transports and 2 destroyer escorts 

TF 53 Northern Attack Force 

Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly in USS Appalachian

TG 53.9 Initial Transport Group

4 attack transports, 1 attack cargo transport, 1 LSD 

Raider Unit: 1 destroyer transport, 9 LSTs (1 with LCTs aboard), 2 submarine chasers, 3 

destroyers, 1 minesweeper 

TG 53.3 Minesweeper Group 

4 minesweepers, 4 motor minesweepers 

TG 53.4 Northern Landing Force 

4th Marine Division 

Major General Harry Schmidt, Commanding General 

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion 

4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion 

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion 

4th Tank Battalion 

23rd Marines 

24th Marines

25th Marines

14th Marines

20th Marines

15th Defense Battalion 

Major General Schmidt

143
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

TG 53.5 Northern Support Group

Unit 1: 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers 

Unit 2: 1 battleship, 2 light cruisers, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers 

Unit 3: 2 destroyers, 3 LCIs 

Unit 4: 2 destroyers 

Unit 5: 1 destroyer, 6 LCIs 

TG 53.6 Carrier Group

3 CVEs, 3 destroyers 

TG 53.10 Main Attack Detachment

8 attack transports, 2 attack cargo transport, 1 LSD, 6 LSTs, 2 submarine chasers, 4 

destroyers, 2 minesweepers 

TG 53.12 Northern Salvage Group 

3 ocean tugs

TG 51.5 Northern Defense Group

5 LSTs, 1 minesweeper 

TG 51.6 Northern Garrison Group 1

4 transports, 2 destroyer escorts 

TG 51.7 Northern Garrison Group 2 

2 transports, 1 destroyer escort 

TG 51.1 Reserve Force (later became TG 51.11 Eniwetok Expeditionary 

Group, 17 February – 24 February 1944) 

9 attack transports, 2 attack cargo transport, 3 destroyer transports, 12 LSTs (carrying an 

amphibious tractor battalion), 1 LSD, 6 LCI (L), 2 minesweepers, 2 motor minesweepers, 

3 ocean tugs, 2 oilers, 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 18 destroyers 

Tactical Group 1 

Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson, Commanding General 

D Company (Scout), 4th Tank 

Battalion 

V Amphibious Corps 

Reconnaissance Company 

22nd Marines 

2nd Separate Pack Howitzer 

Battalion 

2nd Separate Engineer 

Company 

2nd Separate Medical Company 

2nd Separate Tank Company 

2nd Separate Transport 

Company 

10th Defense Battalion 

Brigadier General 

Watson

144 
Appendix B: U.S. Order of Battle 

106th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd

Battalion) 

104th Field Artillery Battalion 

708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor 

Battalion 

3rd Army Defense Battalion 

TG 51.2 Majuro Attack Group (31 January – 1 February 1944) 

Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill in Cambria

1 attack transport, 2 destroyer transports, 1 LST, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 CVEs, 4 destroyers, 1 

minesweeper 

2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry Regiment 

1st Defense Battalion 

V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company 

TG 51.8 Defense Group

1 destroyer escort, 4 LSTs (1 with LCTs aboard) 

TG 51.9 Garrison Group 

6 cargo ships, 3 destroyer escorts 

TF 58, Fast Carrier Force 

Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher 

TG 58.1 Carrier Task Group 1

2 fleet aircraft carriers (CV), 1 light aircraft carrier (CVL) 

3 fast battleships, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers 

TG 58.2 Carrier Task Group 2

2 CVs, 1 CVL 

3 fast battleships, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers 

TG 58.3 Carrier Task Group 3

1 CV, 2 CVLs 

2 fast battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 9 destroyers 

TG 58.4 Carrier Task Group 4

1 CV, 2 CVLs 

2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 8 destroyers 

TG 50.15 Neutralization Group

3 heavy cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2 minelayers 

145
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

TF 57 Defense Forces and Land-Based Air 

Rear Admiral John H. Hoover 

3 aircraft tenders 

TG 57.2 Strike Command

6 B-24 squadrons, 4 B-25 squadrons, 1 fighter-bomber squadron, 3 f

squadrons 

ighter

TG 57.3 Search and Patrol Group

3 Navy patrol squadrons, 4 Navy bomber squadrons, 1 photo 

reconnaissance squadron, 3 scout squadrons, 2 Marine bombing 

squadrons Rear Admiral Hoover

Patrol Submarines 

Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood at Pearl Harbor 

Truk Patrol: 3 fleet submarines 

Ponape Patrol: 1 fleet submarine 

Kisaie Patrol: 1 fleet submarine 

Eniwetok Patrol: 1 fleet submarine 

Vice Admiral Lockwood

146 
Appendix B: U.S. Order of Battle 

147
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

148 
Appendix C: Biographies of Principal American 

Commanders 

Admiral Richard L. Conolly 

dmiral Richard L. Conolly was born in Waukegan, Illinois 

in 1892. Appointed to the United States Naval Academy

in 1910 he graduated as part of the class of 1914. Over the

n

A 

ext four years he served in battleships and destroyers. 

The American entry into World War I found him on the 

destroyer USS Smith and he served in that ship while ship

performed convoy duty in European waters, stationed at Brest,

France. He was awarded a Navy Cross while attached to Smith for 

his role in salvaging the transport Westbridge torpedoed by a U-boat 

in August 1918. The citation read in part, “For distinguished service 

in the line of his profession on the occasion of the torpedoing of the 

Westbridge, when he, with a party of eight others remained on board 

for five days steering by hand and handling the lines form the tugs,

while the ship was towed four hundred miles to port.” Admiral Conolly 

 He left Smith in November 1918, returned to the United States and served in the fitting 

out of the destroyers Foote and Worden. He then served as the Executive Officer of USS 

Hunt. Beginning in August 1920 he was a student in electrical engineering at the 

Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland and at Columbia University in the City of New 

York. He received a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from Columbia in June 

1922. In November 1922 he joined USS Mississippi and served in her until March 1924, 

when he became assistant Engineer Officer of USS New York. 

Between September 1925 and June 1927, Conolly was an instructor in the Department of 

Electrical Engineering and Physics, United States Naval Academy. In June 1927 he returned 

to sea duty as Engineer Officer of USS Concord. In August 1929, he assumed command of

USS Dupont and served in her until he reported to the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode

Island as a student in May 1931. He completed the junior course and stayed on as a faculty 

member until May 1933.

In May 1933, he became Aide and Flag Secretary on the staff of Commander, Cruisers,

Scouting Force. In April 1935, he went to USS Tennessee as Navigator and served in her 

until June 1936. He then reported to the Naval Academy where he again served as an 

instructor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Physics and later in the 

Department of Seamanship and Navigation. He was the head of the latter department for six 

months in 1938 and stayed at Annapolis until May 1939. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

He assumed command of Destroyer Division 7 in May 1939 and became Commander, 

Destroyer Squadron 6 in January 1941. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Conolly 

was at sea commanding his squadron. He and his squadron participated in the raids on the 

Gilbert and Marshall Islands on 1 February 1942 as part of the task force commanded by 

Vice Admiral Halsey. In April, his destroyer squadron provided the screen for the aircraft 

carrier Hornet when it launched the Doolittle Tokyo Raid. He commanded the destroyers in

Rear Admiral Spruance’s task group when it bombarded Wake Island. He received a Letter 

of Commendation with authorization to wear the Commendation Ribbon with Combat V, 

from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. 

Between April 1942 and February 1943, he served on the staff of Commander-in-Chief,

U.S. Fleet in Washington, D.C. In March 1943 he became Commander, Landing Craft and 

Base, Northwest African Waters. In that capacity he participated in the invasions of Sicily

and Italy. In October 1943 he reported to Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet. During

Operation Flintlock he commanded the Northern Attack Force that seized Roi-Namur. In 

July 1944 he was given command of Group 3, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet and in this 

capacity participated in the invasions of Guam and the Philippines. As an amphibious 

commander, he became known as “Close-in Conolly” because of his daring shore 

bombardments in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific. He received the Distinguished

Service Medal with two Gold Stars in lieu of second and third awards for his services which 

included operations at Kwajalein, Wake, Marcus, Guam, Leyte and Lingayan Gulf. After the 

Japanese surrender, he supervised the initial occupation of northern Honshu and Hokkaido in 

October 1945. 

Upon his return to the United States he was appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

In this capacity he also served as naval advisor to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris 

and the European Advisory Commission in London. Between 1946 and 1950 he was

Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Area. 

Between 1950 and 1952 he returned to the Naval War College as its president. 

He retired in 1952 and became the second president of Long Island University and its 

branch C.W. Post College, which he held until his death in a plane crash in March 1962. He 

was responsible for the growth of the latter from 200 to 3,800 students at his death. He died 

seven months before his announced retirement date. He stated he wanted to make way for “a 

younger man with a fresh outlook.” Admiral Conolly survived the hazards of service of sea

and two world wars and had both a distinguished naval career followed by a second career as 

a university builder. 

150 
Appendix C: Biographies 

General Charles Harrison Corlett 

orn in Burchard, Nebraska on 31 July 1889,

Charles Harrison Corlett graduated from West 

Point in 1913. Corlett was appointed to the United

States Military Academy in West Point in 1909 and as a 

cadet was captain-manager of the polo team and played

football. He graduated as a second lieutenant in the Regular 

Army on 12 June 1913, and was assigned to Fort Michael,

Alaska. 

B 

In spring 1916 he was transferred to San Antonio, Texas, 

and helped clear the area where Fort Sam Houston is now 

located. A few weeks later, his outfit moved to Eagle Pass 

where action in the Mexican Campaign was expected. 

When nothing developed, Corlett was assigned to the

National Guard Brigade in Maryland. On 11 October1916 he was promoted to first 

lieutenant and assigned to Fort Sam Houston and then Brownsville, Texas. 

General Corlett

When the U.S. entered World War I, Corlett was Assistant Signal Officer of the Eastern

Department in New York and was soon promoted to captain, then major. He went to France 

in January 1918, as Deputy Chief Signal Officer, and that October was promoted to 

lieutenant colonel. Just before the St. Mihiel offensive, he was stricken with pneumonia but 

was on duty in Paris at the time of the Armistice. As a result of the pneumonia, Corlett’s

health was poor and in 1919, he resigned his commission to become a manager of the 

Quemdo Sheep and Cattle Company in New Mexico. The life outdoors improved his health

and in November 1920 he returned to military duty as a major and was assigned at Fort 

Harvey J. Jones, Arizona. 

In September 1941 he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to command Fort 

Greely, Alaska. His second wife, the former Pauline Wherry, whom he had married in 

August 1928, was with him. With the threat of a Japanese invasion, however, civilians were 

evacuated. 

In World War II, General Corlett headed the Task Force which took Kiska and

commanded the division which took Kwajalein in the Central Pacific under Admiral Nimitz. 

From there he was sent to command the XIX Corps in the European Theater. His corps made 

the historical breakthrough at St. Lo, captured 19 miles of the Siegfried Line and was the first 

American unit in Germany. Later, again under Admiral Nimitz’s command, he prepared and 

began to train an Army to invade Japan when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki. 

General Corlett retired in 1946 because of illness and lived near Espanola, New Mexico.

He was involved in several community activities and became New Mexico State 

151
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Commissioner of Revenue. He organized and directed the first Onate Fiesta; was on the 

Board of Espanola Hospital for many years; conducted the first hospital drive for a pediatric

wing and was on the managing board for the School of American Research. General Corlett 

was also sent to Mexico by President Eisenhower to conduct the fight against a hoof and 

mouth disease outbreak and many other activities. He died in Espanola, New Mexico on 14

October 1971. 

General Corlett’s decorations include two Distinguished Service Medals (one from the 

Army and one from the Navy), Star of Abdon Calderon from Ecuador, Victory of Medal with 

three stars, Silver Star from the United States for gallantry, Legion of Merit, Mexican Border 

Service Medal, Commanders Order if Leopold with Palm, Croix de Guerre with Palm from

Belgium and Grand Order or Orange and Nassau from Holland. 

152 
Appendix C: Biographies 

Admiral Harry W. Hill 

graduate of the Naval Academy in 1911, Admiral 

Harry W. Hill served successively in USS Maryland

(ARC 8), torpedo boat tender USS Iris, USS Perry

(DD 11), and with the Pacific Flotilla as the Engineering Officer

in USS Albany (CL 23). His follow-on assignments included 

service during World War I in USS Texas (BB 35) and as 

Navigator in USS Wyoming (BB 32) when both battleships were 

attached to the British Grand Fleet. Immediately after WW I, he 

served as Navigator in USS Arkansas (BB 33) until January 

1919 when he was assigned duty as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to 

Admiral R. E. Coontz, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet's

Division Seven. In July of the same year, he transferred to 

similar duty on the Staff of Commander Division Six, Pacific 

Fleet. Continuing as Aide to Admiral Coontz as Chief of Naval 

Operations from 1919 to 1923, Lieutenant Commander Hill then 

joined USS Concord (CL 10) as Gunnery Officer from 1923 to 1926. After serving the next

three months as Aide to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, he again had duty afloat as

Gunnery Officer in USS Maryland (BB 46) from 1926 to 1931 and then served in the 

Executive Department at the Naval Academy. 

A 

Admiral Hill

Since a number of his ships won gunnery awards while under his direction, he served as 

Force Gunnery Officer on the Staff of Commander Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, in the Pacific 

from 1933 to 1934. As a Commander, he commissioned and commanded USS Dewey (DD 

349) from October 4, 1934 to June 17, 1935, when he was again assigned to the Office of the 

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. In May 1938, Commander Hill completed the 

Senior Course at the Naval War College, and was promoted to Captain. He then served as 

War Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, until February 1940, 

after which he had a third tour of duty in the Office of Naval Operations, where he was 

attached to the War Plans Division until January 1942. 

Captain Hill took command of the heavy cruiser USS Wichita (CA 45), which operated 

for several months on convoy duty with the British Home Fleet to the north Russian port of 

Murmansk. In September 1942, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and reported as 

Commander Battleship Division Four, Flag Ship USS Maryland (BB 46) serving a year in

the South Pacific. He was also Commander of a task force which was the first ever to 

comprise both battleships and escort carriers. 

In September 1943, he became Commander Amphibious Group Two, Fifth Amphibious 

Force, and in that capacity, participated in the capture of Tarawa, and later in operations

against the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, where he commanded the 

amphibious and support operations of that force until the island was secured at the end of 

June. At the close of the war in August 1945, Admiral Hill commanded the Amphibious

153
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Force that landed the Sixth Army for the occupation of Japan. He later served as the first 

Commandant of the Naval War College, Chairman of the General Board of the Navy, and 

Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Although he retired in the rank of Admiral in May 1952, he was not detached from his

final assignment until the following August. Admiral Hill then reported as Governor of the 

Naval Home at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where he continued to serve on active duty until 

May 1954. Admiral Harry Wilbur Hill passed away on July 19, 1971. 

154 
Appendix C: Biographies 

Admiral Marc A. Mitscher 

arc Andrew Mitscher was born in

Hillsboro, Wisconsin, on 26 January 

1887. He attended elementary and 

secondary schools in Washington, D.C., and

graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in June

1910. 

M 

Over the next five years, Mitscher served in

armored cruisers, gunboats and destroyers, and 

then received training as a pilot. Designated a 

Naval Aviator in June 1916, he served at 

Pensacola, Florida until 1917, when he was 

assigned to conduct experiments with shipboard 

catapults. Later in 1917 and in 1918, he served at 

Naval Air Stations, commanding those at

Rockaway, Long Island, and Miami, Florida. In 

May 1919, he participated in the trans-Atlantic 

flight attempt of the seaplane NC-1. 

Admiral Mitscher 

Over the next 20 years, Mitscher had a variety of important aviation duties in 

Washington, D.C., San Diego, California, and on board ship. He was a member of the Navy 

team in air races held in 1922 and 1923, helped place the new aircraft carrier Saratoga in 

commission (1927), was Executive Officer of USS Langley (1929-1930) and of Saratoga

(1934-1935). In 1937-39, he commanded the seaplane tender Wright and Patrol Wing One. 

Following two years as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Captain Mitscher 

commanded the aircraft carrier Hornet in 1941-1942, launching the April 1942 Doolittle 

Raid and participating in the Battle of Midway. After his promotion to Rear Admiral, he

commanded Patrol Wing Two and Navy air units in the Southern Pacific during the 

Guadalcanal and Central Solomons campaigns of 1942-1943 and during the last five months

of 1943 he commanded Fleet Air, West Coast. 

After commanding Task Force 58 during the Marshalls campaign, Vice Admiral Mitscher 

was placed in command of the Pacific Fleet's fast carriers. During 1944 he took part in the 

campaigns to capture the Marianas, Palaus and Leyte as well as the Battles of the Philippine

Sea and Leyte Gulf. In January-May 1945, he commanded air assaults on Iwo Jima, 

Okinawa and the Japanese Home Islands. 

In July 1945, Mitscher became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air. During 

March-September 1946 he commanded the Eighth Fleet during the Navy's first major post155
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

World War II combat training exercises. Admiral Mitscher was then assigned to command 

the Atlantic Fleet. While holding that position, he died of a heart attack on 3 February 1947. 

156 
Appendix C: Biographies 

Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz

leet Admiral Chester William Nimitz led the Allied

naval forces to victory in the Pacific in World War II.

He was born February 24, 1885, in Fredericksburg,

Texas to Anna (Henke) Nimitz. He died on February 20, 

1966, of complications following a stroke. 

F 

Nimitz's father, Chester Bernard Nimitz, did not live to 

see his son born. His grandfather became his surrogate 

father, influencing his character and values during his early 

years. Charles H. Nimitz was a German immigrant, former

seaman, and owner of the Nimitz Hotel in Fredericksburg, 

Texas. 

Anna married her late husband's younger brother, 

William Nimitz, in 1890. He was manager of the St. Charles 

Hotel in Kerrville, Texas. Chester eventually became chief handyman at the hotel. To get a 

college education he decided to get an appointment to the United States Military Academy. 

No appointment was available, so he then applied for the United States Naval Academy. He 

graduated a passed midshipman on January 30, 1905, seventh in his class of 114 at 

Annapolis. 

Fleet Admiral Nimitz 

He spent fours with the Asiatic Fleet. After two years' service on the U.S.S. Ohio, he was

commissioned an ensign. His first command was the Spanish gunboat Panay in the

Philippines. Later transferred to the destroyer Decatur, he ran the ship aground. As a result,

he was court-martialed and reprimanded. He was also denied the battleship duty he wanted,

and was ordered to serve on a submarine instead. In 1909-13, after his return to the United 

States, Lieutenant Nimitz was assigned to submarine duty, gaining a reputation as an expert 

in the field of undersea warfare. On January 25, 1909, Nimitz reported for duty under 

instruction in the First Submarine Flotilla. His first submarine was Plunger [A-1] (SS-2) 

which he also commanded in the Atlantic. "In those days," said Nimitz, "they were a cross

between a Jules Verne fantasy and a humpbacked whale." Now a lieutenant (junior grade),

Nimitz was given command of the First Submarine Flotilla, in May 1909, with additional 

duty in command of the Plunger (SS-2). He was transferred to command of the submarine 

Snapper [C-5] (SS-16) when that submarine was commissioned on February 2, 1910, and on 

November 18, 1910 assumed command of the Narwhal [D-1] (SS-17). 

On October 10, 1911, he became Commander Third Submarine Division, Atlantic 

Torpedo Fleet. Now a lieutenant, Nimitz was ordered to the Navy Yard, Boston, 

Massachusetts, to oversee and assist in fitting out of the submarine Skipjack [E-1] (SS-24), 

which he was next to command – assuming command of that submarine at her 

commissioning on February 14, 1912. On March 20, 1912, Nimitz, while commanding the

submarine E-1, was awarded the Silver Lifesaving Medal by the Treasury Department for his 

157
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

heroic action in saving Fireman second class W. J. Walsh, USN, from drowning. A strong 

tide was running and Walsh, who could not swim, was rapidly being swept away from his

ship. Nimitz dove in the water and kept Walsh afloat until both were picked up by a small

boat. In June of that year, a young Lieut. Chester W. Nimitz addressed the Naval War

College on the subject of submarines – "Defensive and Offensive Tactics of Submarines."

Even then, Nimitz foresaw the submarine as the unparalleled commerce-destroyer that it

turned out to be during World War II. From May 1912 to March 1913 he served as 

Commander, Atlantic Submarine Flotilla. The four consecutive submarine commands he 

held gave him invaluable experience in the coming world wars. 

In 1913, Nimitz married Catherine Vance Freeman. They would have three daughters 

and a son. The newlyweds went to Europe where Nimitz was sent to Germany to study 

diesel engine technology. He put that knowledge to work during 1913-17 supervising the 

construction and installation of diesel engines in the oiler Maumee (AO-2) and serving as her 

Chief Engineer. 

With the coming of the First World War, he was given the rank of commander, and 

served as chief of staff to Admiral Samuel S. Robison, commander of the Atlantic Submarine 

Force. Soon after, Nimitz was executive officer of the battleship South Carolina. He was

then sent to Pearl Harbor where he built the submarine base and commanded the Submarine 

Division. 

After the World War I, aware of Lieut. Nimitz's skill, a leading American engineering

firm offered him a job for $25,000 a year (his Navy pay was $3,456 at the time. He refused 

the offer, preferring the "honorable, soul-satisfying" duties of a Naval Officer. At the Naval 

War College in Newport, Rhode Island, a plan he helped develop in 1922-1923 at the Naval 

War College, Newport, R.I., for a hypothetical Pacific war was a variant of the one 

eventually used in the Second World War. Then, with Admiral Robison now Commanderin-Chief of the United States Fleet, Nimitz returned as his chief of staff. 

In 1926, Nimitz developed a prototype for the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps at 

the University of California, Berkeley. His model was widely used throughout the country.

In 1929, now holding the rank of Captain, he began two years as Commander, Submarine 

Division 20, followed by two more years in charge of reserve destroyers at San Diego, 

California. He then took the heavy cruiser Augusta (CA-31) to the Orient, where, under his 

command, she was flagship of the Asiatic Fleet in 1933-35. Three years' duty at the Bureau 

of Navigation in Washington, D.C., ended in 1938 with his promotion to Rear Admiral. 

Following promotion to rear admiral, he commanded a cruiser division, followed by 

command of a battleship division. In 1939 he returned to Washington as Chief of the Bureau 

of Navigation. It was during his service there that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. After 

the relief of the Pacific Fleet’s commander, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Nimitz became the 

commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 25, 1941. With the rank of 

Admiral, and Fleet Admiral after December 1944, he commanded American forces during 

their long advance across the Pacific to full victory in August 1945. 

158 
Appendix C: Biographies 

After Pearl Harbor, Nimitz indicated his confidence in his new staff by not replacing a 

single officer. Forced by circumstances to abandon traditional naval doctrine favoring

battleships and drawing on his own extensive and varied command experience especially in

submarines, Admiral Nimitz knew the situation was not as bleak as it seemed because the 

Pearl Harbor submarine base was intact, as were the navy yard’s repair facilities and the oil

storage facilities. The aircraft carriers, the core of his fleet, survived because they were at 

sea. With this confidence, Nimitz directed the Navy’s early raids against the Japanese 

mandated islands in the Central Pacific. His confidence in his intelligence staff was 

vindicated by the battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway Island. 

As Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Nimitz proved to be the right man at the right 

time. He restored morale by building an aggressive combat team led by men like Halsey and

Spruance. He brilliantly and instinctively chose the correct moves in the gamble of the Battle 

of Midway, to this day the greatest victory of the United States Navy. His biographer, E.B. 

Potter, described his method of command in the following manner, “He surrounded himself 

with the ablest men he could find and sought their advice, but he made his own decisions. He

was a keen strategist who never forgot that he was dealing with human beings, on both sides 

of the conflict. He was aggressive in war without hate, audacious while never failing to 

weigh the risks.” 

As overall commander of the Central Pacific area Nimitz commanded all U.S. and Allied

military forces in his theater bordered on the west by the Southwest Pacific area of General 

MacArthur's. Nimitz led the "island hopping" amphibious drive toward Japan. The Navy 

and the Marines took Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, 

Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa; each a step closer to Japan, and each at a greater cost than

the one before. 

On December 19, 1944 Chester W. Nimitz was promoted to the grade of fleet admiral,

newly established by the Congress about a year earlier. Only four five-star admirals were to 

be chosen during World War II: Leahy, King, Nimitz and Halsey. 

At Japan’s unconditional surrender, aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 

September 2, 1945, Nimitz signed the surrender document as the representative of the United

States. He was awarded the Army and Navy Distinguished Service medals and many foreign

decorations.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz became Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945. On his 

watch, the Navy endured a massive postwar downsizing and began to find its place in the 

peacetime national defense establishment. He left office in December 1947, taking residence

in California. As a Fleet Admiral, he technically remained on active duty, and in 1949-52,

served at the United Nations.. He was a roving ambassador for the United Nations and a 

regent of the University of California. President Truman appointed him chairman of the 

Presidential Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. 

In the afterglow of World War II books written by officers involved in the war's battles 

and decisions fueled rivalries and controversies. Admiral Nimitz refused to take part in the

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The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

literary autopsy of the war. He felt no one would be helped and that his beloved Navy would

be hurt the most in the end. Also during these years, the Admiral was often approached with 

business opportunities and high-salaried positions. He turned down all such offers

considering instead "how the Gold Star Mothers might feel." As his son later remarked, "he 

maintained the Navy's image until his death." 

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz died at his home on Treasure Island in San Francisco 

Bay on February 20, 1966. He would have been 81 years old on the day of his funeral at 

Golden Gate National Cemetery at San Bruno. He was the last surviving five-star admiral. 

160 
Appendix C: Biographies 

General Harry Schmidt 

eneral Harry Schmidt served as Commanding 

General of the Fourth Marine Division during

the Marshall Islands and Saipan campaigns 

and as Commanding General of the Fifth (V) 

Amphibious Corps during the Tinian and Iwo Jima

campaigns during World War II. 

G 

During the battle for Iwo Jima from February 19, 1945, 

to March 26, 1945, he was awarded a Gold Star in lieu 

of the third Distinguished Service Medal for his part in 

this operation. His citation reads in part, “Against 

determined enemy resistance and incomparable natural 

defenses, Major General Schmidt skillfully directed the 

attack of his troops to capture and occupy this strategic 

island. He handled the various units under his command

with brilliant tactical skill. His sound judgment, distinctive administrative ability and

unfailing devotion to duty were vital factors in the success of the entire operation.” 

General Schmidt 

General Schmidt was born in Holdrege, Nebraska, on September 25, 1886. He attended 

Nebraska State Normal College before entering the Marine Corps as a second lieutenant on 

August 17, 1909. Following instruction at the Marine Officers’ School at Port Royal, South 

Carolina, he reported in January 1911, to the Marine Barracks, Guam, Mariana Islands.

While attached to this station he accompanied an expeditionary force to Chefoo, China. In

October 1912, he was ordered to duty in the Philippines where he remained until detached to 

the United States in April 1913. 

Following an assignment with the Recruiting Service in Minnesota, a tour of duty at the 

Marine Barracks, New Orleans, Louisiana, and temporary duty at Vera Cruz aboard the USS 

Kearsarge in 1915, he was ordered to sea duty aboard the USS Oklahoma in May, 1916. In 

January 1917, he went aboard the USS Montana and from February 25 to March 22, 1917, 

was ashore with the ship’s landing force at Guantanamo, Cuba. 

 Leaving the USS Montana in September 1918, he spent most of the next two years at the

Marine Barracks, Norfolk, Virginia. He again went to sea in June, 1920, as Commanding 

Officer of the Marine Detachment aboard the USS Tennessee. 

From August, 1922 to May 1926, the General was a member of the Marine Corps 

Schools, first as a student then as an instructor. He then spent a year in recruiting at St. Paul, 

Minnesota and a six month tour with the 6th Marines in China. 

From February, 1928 to June 1929, General Schmidt was with the Second Brigade of 

Marines in Nicaragua as Brigade Intelligence and Operations Officer. He returned to the 

161
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

United States to attend the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

and graduated June 18, 1932. In addition to Command and General Staff School, he was a

graduate of the Field Officers’ Course, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. 

Following graduation, he was assigned to duty with the Paymaster Department and 

served variously at Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.; with the Department of

the Pacific, San Francisco; the 4th Marines in Shanghai, China; and again with the 

Department of the Pacific. In June 1937, he was assigned to the Second Marine Brigade. He 

sailed for Shanghai, in August with the Brigade as Chief of Staff and served in that capacity 

until detached to the United States in February, 1938. 

General Schmidt was assigned to Headquarters, Marine Corps as Executive and 

Personnel Officer of the Paymaster Department in July, 1938, in which capacity he was 

found upon this country’s entry into World War II. In January 1942, he was appointed

Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps where he served until ordered to the

Fourth Marine Division as Commanding General, which command he assumed on August

18, 1943. 

He commanded the Fourth Division in the seizure of Roi and Namur in the Marshall 

Islands and in the Battle for Saipan. On July 12, 1944, he assumed command of the V 

Amphibious Corps and led that command in the assault and capture of Tinian. For

exceptional meritorious service in the seizure and occupation of the Marshall Islands and in

the assault and capture of Saipan and Tinian, the General was awarded a Distinguished 

Service Medal and a Gold Star in lieu of a second Distinguished Service Medal. Continuing 

in command of the V Amphibious Corps, the General led it through the Iwo Jima Operation. 

Following the conclusion of hostilities, the General led the V Amphibious Corps in the 

occupation of Japan. On February 15, 1946, he was ordered back to the United States to 

assume command of the Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego Area. He 

was serving in that capacity when he concluded his 39 year career as a Marine on July 1, 

1948, when he retired at the age of 61. 

In addition to the Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars, his decorations and 

medals include the Navy Cross, Nicaragua 1918; Legion of Merit (Army), Japan 1945; 

Bronze Star Medal, 1945; Presidential Unit Citation with One Bronze Star, Saipan and 

Tinian 1944; Navy Unit Commendation, Iwo Jima 1945; Expeditionary Medal with Two

Bronze Stars, China 1911, Cuba 1917, China 1927-28; Mexican Service Medal, 1914; 

Victory Medal with Convoy and Escort Clasp, 1918; Yangtze Service Medal, China 1927; 

Second Nicaraguan Campaign Medal, 1928-30; China Service Medal, 1937-38; American 

Defense Service Medal; American Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; 

World War II Victory Medal; Nicaraguan Medal of Distinction (with Diploma); and the 

Nicaraguan Medal of Merit with Silver Star. General Schmidt died 10 February 1968. 

162 
Appendix C: Biographies 

General Holland McTyeire Smith 

eneral Holland McTyeire Smith, the officer who 

led Marines to victory, island hopping across the

Pacific during World War II, died on 12 January 

1967 at the U.S. Naval Hospital, San Diego, California.

Sometimes called "the father of modern amphibious 

warfare," he was one of America's top commanders in the 

Pacific during World War II. He retired in 1946 after a 41-

year career that included sea duty, expeditionary service

from the Philippines to Haiti and World War I combat in

France. 

G 

On the eve of World War II General Smith directed

extensive Army, Navy and Marine amphibious training, a 

major factor in successful U.S. landings in the Atlantic and 

Pacific. Later he helped prepare U.S. Army and Canadian 

troops for the Kiska and Attu landings, and then led the V Amphibious Corps in the assaults 

on the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and Saipan and Tinian in the Marianas. In the latter operation, 

besides the V Amphibious Corps, he commanded all Expeditionary Troops in the Marianas,

including those which recaptured Guam. He then served as the first Commanding General of 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and headed Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops) at Iwo Jima, 

which included all the assault troops in that battle. He was awarded the Distinguished

Service Medal for his part in training America's amphibious forces on both coasts; a Gold 

Star in lieu of a second for his planning and execution of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands 

operations; a Gold Star in lieu of a third for similar service in the Marianas; and a Gold Star

in lieu of a fourth for his part in the invasion and capture of Iwo Jima. 

General Smith 

Son of Mr. and Mrs. John V. Smith, the general was born 20 April 1882, in Seale, 

Alabama. He received a Bachelor of Science degree from Alabama Polytechnic Institute 

(now Auburn University) in 1901, obtained his Bachelor of Laws degree from the University 

of Alabama in 1903 and practiced law in Montgomery, Alabama, for a year before he was

appointed a Marine second lieutenant 20 March 1905. (Later he was awarded an honorary 

Doctor of Laws degree by Alabama Polytechnic Institute.) 

In April 1906, after completing the School of Application at Annapolis, Maryland, 

General Smith sailed for the Philippines, where he served on expeditionary duty with the 1st

Marine Brigade until September 1908. He returned to the United States the following month 

and was stationed at the Marine Barracks, Annapolis, until December 1909, when he 

embarked for expeditionary duty in Panama. Returning from there in April 1910, he served 

at Annapolis; Puget Sound, Washington; San Diego, California; and the Recruiting Station,

Seattle, Washington, before sailing in September 1912, to rejoin the 1st Marine Brigade in 

the Philippines. 

163
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Smith remained with the 1st Brigade until April 1914, when he took command of the 

Marine Detachment aboard the USS Galveston. He served in that capacity in Asiatic waters

until July 1915, and returned to the United States the following month for duty at the Navy 

Yard, New Orleans, Louisiana. From there he was ordered to the Dominican Republic in 

June 1916, as a member of the 4th Marines. During that unit's operations against rebel 

bandits, he saw action in the march to Santiago and engagements at La Pena and Kilometer 

29. Returning to the United States May 30, 1917, he sailed for France just two weeks later as 

commander of the 8th Machine Gun Company, 5th Marines. 

In France General Smith was detached from the 5th Marines and sent to the Army Staff 

School at Langres, from which he was graduated in February 1918. He was then named

Adjutant of the 4th Marine Brigade, in which capacity he fought in the Verdun Sector and the 

Aisne-Marne Defensive, including the epic Battle of Belleau Wood. Transferred to the I 

Corps, 1st Army, in July, 1918, he served as assistant operations officer in charge of liaison 

during the Aisne-Marne, Oisne-Aisne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. After the 

Armistice he participated in the March to the Rhine through Belgium and Luxembourg as an

assistant operations officer with the 3rd Army, and served with the General Staff, U.S. Army,

during the occupation of Germany. For his service at Belleau Wood he was awarded the 

Croix de Guerre with palm by the French government. He also received a Meritorious

Service Citation from the Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, for which 

he was later awarded the Purple Heart Medal. 

Returning to the United States in April 1919, General Smith's assignments in the next 

four years included duty at Norfolk, Virginia, study at the Naval War College, Newport, 

Rhode Island, and service in Washington, D.C., with the War Plans Section of the Office of 

Naval Operations. There he was the first Marine officer to serve on the Joint Army-Navy 

Planning Committee. Leaving Washington in May 1923, he served aboard the battleships 

Wyoming and Arkansas as Fleet Marine Officer, U.S. Scouting Fleet, until that September 

In February, 1924, after serving at Marine Corps Headquarters and in the West Indies in 

connection with joint Army-Navy maneuvers, the general joined the Marine Brigade on 

expeditionary duty in Haiti, serving as the Chief of Staff and Officer in Charge of Operations 

and Training. He returned from Haiti in August, 1925, to serve as Chief of Staff of the 1st

Marine Brigade at Quantico, Virginia, until September, 1926; as a student in the Marine 

Corps Schools, Quantico, from then until June, 1927; and as Post Quartermaster of the

Marine Barracks, Philadelphia Navy Yard, from July, 1927 to March, 1931. 

In April, 1931, Smith began another tour of sea duty, this time aboard the USS California

as Aide to the Commander and Force Marine Officer of the Battle Force, U.S. Fleet. He

served in those capacities until June 1933, commanded the Marine Barracks at the 

Washington Navy Yard from then until January 1935, and served the following two years at 

San Francisco, California, as Chief of Staff, Department of the Pacific. From there he was 

ordered to Marine Corps Headquarters in March, 1937, to serve two years as Director of the 

Division of Operations and Training, after which he was Assistant Commandant of the

Marine Corps under Major General Thomas Holcomb from April to September, 1939. 

164 
Appendix C: Biographies 

After this last assignment General Smith assumed command of the 1st Marine Brigade at 

Quantico, taking that unit to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for extended amphibious training in

October 1940. In February, 1941, when the brigade was redesignated the 1st Marine Division 

he became its first commander. He returned with the division to Quantico in April, 1941,

and in June was detached from it to take command of the organization which eventually 

became the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Under this command, the 1st Marine Division 

and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions received their initial training in amphibious warfare. 

Moving to San Diego in August 1942, the general took command of the Amphibious

Corps, Pacific Fleet, under which he completed the amphibious indoctrination of the 2nd and 

3rd Marine Divisions before they went overseas and the 7th Infantry Division and other units 

involved in the Aleutians operation. The Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, was later 

redesignated the V Amphibious Corps, and in September, 1943, as commander of that unit,

General Smith arrived at Pearl Harbor to begin planning for the Gilberts campaign. He 

commanded the V Amphibious Corps until August 1944, when he was named Commanding

General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific at Pearl Harbor. In addition to that post, he commanded

Task Force 56 at Iwo Jima before returning to the United States in July, 1945, to head the 

Marine Training and Replacement Command at Camp Pendleton, California. A lieutenant 

general when he was retired 15 May 1946, at the age of 64, he was promoted to general on 

the retired list for having been especially commended in combat. 

As already mentioned, the general held the Distinguished Service Medal with three Gold 

Stars in lieu of additional awards, the Croix de Guerre with palm and the Purple Heart Medal. 

His other medals and decorations included the Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal with three 

bronze stars; the Mexican Service Medal; the Dominican Campaign Medal, the World War I

Victory Medal with five sector clasps; the Army of Occupation of Germany Medal; the 

American Defense Service Medal with Base clasp; the American Area Campaign Medal; the 

Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal with one silver star in lieu of five bronze stars; the

World War II Victory Medal; the Dominican Order of the First Merit; and the British Order

of Commander of the Bath. 

Following a long illness, General Smith died 12 January 1967, at the age of 84. Funeral 

services were held on 14 January, at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot Chapel, San Diego and 

the general was interred with full military honors in Ft. Rosecrans National Cemetery 

overlooking San Diego harbor and North Island. 

165
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance 

aymond Ames Spruance was born on July 3, 1886 in 

Baltimore, Maryland. He was appointed to the U.S. 

Naval Academy at Annapolis and graduated in 1906. 

Passed midshipman upon graduation in September 1906 and

operated less than a year in the North Atlantic on the battleship 

Iowa (BB-4) before transferring to the Minnesota (BB-22) for 

the global voyage of the Great White Fleet (1907-1909), during

which he was commissioned a ensign in September 1908. After 

receiving instruction in electrical engineering he was assigned to 

the Connecticut (BB-18) for a year (1910-1911) and thereafter

assigned to the Asiatic Fleet as senior engineer of the cruiser 

Cincinnati (C-7) and commander of the destroyer Bainbridge

(DD-1) in the rank of lieutenant (junior grade) and was again

promoted in 1914. 

R 

Admiral Spruance 

Lieutenant Spruance was assigned to the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock

Company, where he helped to outfit and serve as electrical officer of the Pennsylvania (BB38) from February 1916 through Chesapeake maneuvers until November 1917. As lieutenant 

commander he was assistant engineer officer at New York Navy Yard (1917-1918) and was

made executive officer of the troop transport Agamemnon for four months and in the rank of 

commander. In April 1919 he commissioned and commanded the Aaron Ward (DD-132) for

station ship duties during the flight of the NC boats and Pacific operations, and the Percival

(DD-298) in March 1920 out of San Diego until June 1921. 

Commander Spruance served a tour of duty at the Electrical Division at the Bureau of 

Engineering (1921-1924), and commander of the Dale (DD-290), followed as assistant chief 

of staff to Admiral Philip Andrews, commanding U.S. Naval Forces in European waters 

(1924-1925) on the cruiser Pittsburgh (ACR-4). His subsequent sea duties included 

command of the Osborne (DD-295) in European and Mediterranean waters (1925-1926),

executive officer of the Mississippi (BB-41) with the Battle Fleet (1929-1931), and later 

(1938-1940) her skipper. He was promoted to the rank of captain in June 1932. He became

chief of staff to Commander Destroyers Scouting Force, Adolphus E. Watson, flagship light 

cruiser Raleigh (CL-7), along the West coast (1933-1935). In December 1939, he was 

promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral. 

Having served in battleships, destroyers and cruisers through his whole career, Spruance 

assumed command of Cruiser Division Five, flagship heavy cruiser Northampton (CA-26), at 

the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. In this office, Spruance supported 

Admiral Halsey's carrier Enterprise during the early 1942 carrier raids, including shelling of 

Wotje, Maloelap, Wake and Marcus Islands. Later, he escorted the task force conducting the 

Doolittle Raid. 

166 
Appendix C: Biographies 

Halsey, falling ill on the conclusion of the raid, appointed Spruance as his replacement as

Commander, Task Force 16, Enterprise and Hornet. Spruance, under the nominal command

of Rear-Admiral Fletcher, led his carriers expertly with the help of Commander Browning,

Halsey's Chief-of-Staff, and justly received a large part of the praise for the US Navy success 

in the battle. 

Following this battle, Spruance became Chief-of-Staff of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in which 

role he had a major part in planning future operations. In November 1943, he became 

Commander, 5th Fleet, commanding the Central Pacific Forces, including carriers,

battleships and amphibious assets. He once again performed very well, but in the carrier

staffs concern arose over the Admiral's battleship consciousness. After leading the Navy

across the Pacific through the Marshalls, Spruance got to lead the attack on the Marianas, 

leading the 5th Fleet into the Battle of the Philippine Sea. There, his air groups destroyed the 

enemy aerial attacks in conjunction with a new concept for the battleships, in which

Spruance would deploy them in the van, shooting down planes even before fighters would

attack. Although his forces did not follow the beaten Japanese fleet, they sank the medium

carrier Hiyo. Spruance has often been blamed for not following the retiring Imperial 

Japanese Navy. This is unjust because Spruance's task was to guard the invasion forces and 

beaches. Besides, if Spruance was to blame, so were the aviation officers responsible for 

ignoring torpedo-plane training which resulted in only bombs hitting most carriers except 

Hiyo. 

After the Philippine Sea battle, Spruance, for the first time, turned over the 5th Fleet to

Admiral Halsey (the numerical designation was changed to 3rd Fleet, but the ships remained 

the same, only the staffs changed), going back to Pearl Harbor to plan future landing 

operations. The invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were partly his work. He got back to

lead the 5th Fleet in battle off those two islands, still not yet fully clear of his idea of a 

battleship duel. Finally returning one last time to Pearl Harbor, Spruance began planning the 

Operations Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, and Operation Coronet, the invasion of

Honshu, which he would have commanded had the war gone on. 

However, the atomic bombs worked successfully and with war's end, these invasions

never occurred. After the war, Spruance became CINCPAC for a short term, President of the 

Naval War College, and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines. 

A quiet, shy and intelligent officer, Spruance was the ideal man to lead the Navy in the 

Central Pacific, despite the problems he sometimes had with naval aviation. He was always 

quite interested in the opinions of his staffs, and would stand by his decisions. Precise and 

calculating, he was as good a planner as a combat leader. Of the two major naval 

personalities in Pacific fleet command, Halsey and Spruance, it must be said that Spruance 

rated higher for promotion to Fleet Admiral, for he was a better commander, an admirals'

admiral, not a sailors' admiral as Halsey. 

167
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Admiral Richmond K. Turner 

ichmond Kelly Turner was born in Portland, 

Oregon, on 27 May 1885. Appointed to the U.S.

Naval Academy from California in 1904, he 

graduated in June 1908 and served in several ships over

the next four years. In 1913, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) 

Turner briefly held command of the destroyer Stewart. 

After receiving instruction in ordnance engineering and 

service on board the gunboat Marietta, he was assigned to 

the battleships Pennsylvania, Michigan and Mississippi 

during 1916-19. 

R 

From 1919 to 1922, Lieutenant Commander Turner 

was an Ordnance Officer at the Naval Gun Factory in 

Washington, D.C. He then was Gunnery Officer of the

battleship California, Fleet Gunnery Officer on the Staff of 

Commander Scouting Fleet and Commanding Officer of the destroyer Mervine. Following 

promotion to the rank of Commander in 1925, Turner served with the Bureau of Ordnance at 

the Navy Department. In 1927, he received flight training at Pensacola, Florida, and a year 

later became Commanding Officer of the seaplane tender Jason and Commander Aircraft 

Squadrons, Asiatic Fleet. He had further aviation-related assignments into the 1930s and was 

Executive Officer of the aircraft carrier Saratoga in 1933-34. Captain Turner attended the 

Naval War College and served on that institution's staff in 1935-38. He next commanded the

heavy cruiser Astoria and took her on a diplomatic mission, returning the ashes of the 

Japanese ambassador who had died in Washington, to Japan in 1939. 

Admiral Turner 

Captain Turner was Director of the War Plans Division in Washington, D.C., in 1940-41

and was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral late in 1941. He was Assistant Chief of Staff 

to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet from December 1941 until June 1942 and was then

sent to the Pacific war zone to take command of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force. 

Over the next three years, while holding a variety of senior Pacific Fleet amphibious force 

commands as both a Rear Admiral and Vice Admiral, he planned and executed the conquest 

of enemy positions in the South, Central and Western Pacific, contributing greatly to ultimate 

victory in the Pacific War. In the rank of Admiral, he would have commanded the 

amphibious component of the invasion of Japan, had that nation not capitulated in August 

1945. 

Following the end of World War II, Admiral Turner served on the Navy Department's

General Board and was U.S. Naval Representative on the United Nations Military Staff 

Committee. He retired from active duty in July 1947. Admiral Richmond K. Turner died in 

Monterey, California, on 12 February 1961. 

168 
Appendix D: The United States and Japanese 

Land Force Weaponry, 1943 - 1944 

The United States Army and Marine Corps 

Infantry Weapons

Weapon Length Weight Caliber Magazine

Capacity 

Muzzle 

Capacity 

Rate of Fire 

M1911A1 pistol 8.66 in. 2.2 lb (empty); 

2.76n lb (loaded) 

0.45 in. 7 rounds 853 ft. per 

second 

M1A1 (Thompson) 

submachine gun 

32 in. 10.34 lb. (empty), 

11.88 lb. (loaded) 

0.45 in. 20 - 30 round 

clip 

918 feet per 

second 

700 rounds per minute 

M1903 rifle (Springfield) 43.3 in. 8.58 lb. 0.30 in. 5 rounds 2,788 feet per 

second 

M1 rifle (Garand) 43.3 in 9.7 lb 0.30 in 8 round clip 2,778 ft per 

second 

Semi automatic 

M1 carbine 35.4 in 5 lb (empty) 5.7 lb 

(loaded) 0.30 in 30 round clip 1,903 ft per 

second Semi automatic 

M1918A2 Browning 

Automatic rifle (BAR) 48 in 18 lb (empty), 19.3 

lb(loaded) 0.30 in 20 round box 2,805 ft per 

second 

300 - 350 or 500 - 600

rounds per minute 

M1919A4 (Browning 

light machine gun) 

41 in 30.8 lb (gun), 14 lb 

(tripod) 0.30 in 250 round 

belt 

2,805 ft per 

second 

400 - 500 rounds per 

minute 

M1917A1 (Browning 

heavy machine gun) 38.6 in 

33 lb (gun) 52.8 lb 

(tripod) 

8.8 lb (water) 

0.30 in 250 round 

belt 

2,805 ft per 

second 

500 - 600 rounds per 

minute 

Browning M2HB (Heavy 

Barrel) 83.6 lbs (gun only) 0.50 in 110 round belt 

2,887 ft per 

second 

450 - 550 rounds per 

minute 

M1911A1 pistol

M1A1 submachine gun M1903 rifle

M1 carbine

M1 rifle

Browning M2HB

M1917A1 Browning heavy machine gun 

M1919A4 Browning light machine gun 

M1918A2 Browning Automatic rifle
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Mortars and Anti-Tank Weapons 

Weapon Length Weight Range Caliber Traverse Elevation/

Depression 

Shell Type Shell 

Weight 

M2 60mm Mortar 28.75 

in 

Barrel 12.75 lb, 

Bipod 16 lb, Base 

12.75 lb, Total 

41.5 lb 

1,968.3 

yds 

60mm 14o +40o to +85o Smoke, 

Explosive, 

Illuminating 

3 lb 

M1 81mm Mortar 49.6 in Barrel 44.2 lb, 

Bipod 46.2 lb, 

Base 44.8 lb, 

Total 135.2 lb 

3,280 

yds 

81mm 14o + 45o to

+85o 

Smoke, 

Explosive 

6.8 lb 

M1A1 Rocket 

Launcher 

(Bazooka) 

54.7 in 13.2 lb 2.36 in 3.3 lb 

M2A1 37mm 

antitank gun 

902 lb 492 yds 37 mm 60o -10o to 

+15o 

1.9 lb

M2-2 Portable 

Flamethrower

70.4 lb 80 - 130 

ft 

10 sec. 

duration 

M1 81mm Mortar

M2 60mm Mortar

M1A1 Rocket Launcher

M2A1 37mm antitank gun

M2-2 Portable Flamethrower

170 
Appendix D: Infantry Weapons 

Artillery

Weapon Weight Length Height Width Range Rate of

Fire 

(Rounds per

minute)

Traverse Elevation Time to

Emplace 

M8 75mm 

Pack 

Howitzer 

1,339 

lbs 

12 ft. 2 ft., 

10 in 

3 ft., 

11 in 

9,600 yards 

maximum 

in bursts 6; 

in 

prolonged 

fire 3 

3o, right & 

left 

+45o - -5o; 

fires from 

wheels 

1⁄2 min.; 3 min. 

when 

disassembled. 

M2 

105mm 

Howitzer 

4,980 

lbs 

19 ft., 8 

in 

5 ft., 5 

in 

6 ft., 8 

in 

12,200 yds in bursts 4; 

in 

prolonged 

fire 2 

22.5o 

right & 

left 

+64o, -0o; 

fires from 

wheels. 

3 min. 

M1 

155mm 

Howitzer 

13,400 

lbs. 

26.5 ft 6 ft., 

11.5 in 

7 ft., 

11.5 

in 

16,600 yds. 

normal; 21,125 

yds. with 

supercharge 

in bursts 4; 

in 

prolonged 

fire 1 

26.5o 

right & 

left 

+60o - -2o; 

fires from 

wheels or 

firing jack. 

5 min 

M8 75mm Pack Howitzer

M2 105mm Howitzer

M1 155mm Howitzer

Armor

Type Crew Weight Length Height Width Maximum

Speed 

Armament 

M4A1 Sherman 

Medium Tank 

5 67,000 -

70,000 lbs. 

19 ft., 2 

in. 

9 ft., 10 

in. 

8 ft., 7 

in. 

24 mph 75mm gun; 2 .30 cal. machine 

guns, 1 .50 cal. machine gun 

M5A1 Stuart 

Light Tank 

4 33,500 lb 15 ft., 11 

in. 

8 ft., 5 

in. 

7.5 ft. 36 mph 1 37 mm gun, 2 .30 caliber 

machine guns, 1 .50 caliber 

machine gun 

M4A1 Sherman Medium Tank M5A1 Stuart Light Tank

171
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Imperial Japanese Army 

Infantry Weapons

Weapon Length Weight Caliber Range Ammunition

Types 

Magazine 

Capacity 

Muzzle 

Velocity 

Rate of

Fire 

Model 14 (1925) 

8mm Pistol 

2 lbs. (empty) 8 mm 

(.315 in.) 

8 rounds 950 feet

per second 

6.5mm Model 

38 (Arisaka) 

Rifle 

50.25 

inches 

9.08 lbs. 

(unloaded), 9.4 

lbs. (loaded) 

6.5 mm 

(.25 in.) 

5 round,

internal box 

2,400 feet 

per second 

7.7mm Model 

99 (Arisaka) 

Rifle 

45 in. 9 lb., 2 oz. 

(unloaded) 

7.7 mm 

(.303 in.) 

5 round,

internal box 

2,400 feet 

per second 

Model 96 (1936) 

6.5mm Light 

Machine Gun 

20 lbs. (empty) 6.55 mm 

(.256 in.) 

30 round 2,410 feet

per second 

550 rounds

per minute 

Model 99 (1939) 

7.7mm Light 

Machine Gun 42 in. 20 lbs. (empty) 7.7 mm 

(.303 in.) 30 round 2,300 feet 

per second 

800 

rounds 

per 

minute 

Model 14 8mm Pistol

7.7mm Model 99 Rifle

172 

6.5mm Model 38 Rifle

Model 96 6.5mm Light Machine Gun

Model 92 7.7mm Heavy Machine Gun

Model 99 7.7mm Light Machine Gun

Model 89 50mm Grenade Discharger

Model 99 (1939) 81mm Mortar Model 93 13mm Machine Gun
Appendix D: Infantry Weapons 

Weapon 

Cont’d 

Length Weight Caliber Range Ammunition

Types 

Magazine 

Capacity 

Muzzle 

Velocity 

Rate of

Fire 

Model 92 (1932) 

7.7mm Heavy 

Machine Gun 

122 lbs. 

(including 

tripod) 

7.7 mm 

(.303 in.) 

30 round 

strip 

2,400 feet 

per second 

450 

rounds 

per 

minute 

Model 93 (1933) 

13mm Machine 

Gun 

89 

inches 87 lbs. 

(empty) 

13.2 mm 

(.52 in.) 30 rounds 2,250 feet 

per second 

Model 89 (1929) 

50mm Grenade 

Discharger 

(“Knee Mortar”) 

10.25 lbs. 50 mm 

(1.97 in.) 

high explosive shell,

grenade, 

pyrotechnic signals 

and incendiary 

Model 99 (1939) 

81mm Mortar 25.25 in 52 lbs. 81 mm 

(3.19 in.) 

2,200 

yds. 

Artillery

Weapon Weight Range Caliber Traverse Elevation/

Depression 

Rate of Fire Muzzle 

Velocity 

Model 1 (1941) 47mm 

Gun 

1,600 

lbs. 

47 mm (1.85

in.) 

60o +19o to -11o 2,700 feet per 

second 

Model 92 (1932) 70mm 

Howitzer 

468 lbs. 3,075 

yds. 

70 mm (2.76 

in.) 

45o +50o 2,400 feet per

second 

Model 38 (1905) 75mm 

Gun 

9,025

yds. 

75 mm (2.95 

in.) 

7o +16o to -8o 8-10 rounds per 

minute 

Model 41 (1908) 75mm 

Infantry Gun 

1,200 

lbs 

7,800 

yds. 

75 mm (2.95 

in.) 

6o +40o to -

18o 

Model 91 (1931) 

105mm Howitzer 

4,250 

lbs. 

11,500 

yds. 

105 mm 

(4.13 in.) 

45o +45o to -7o 6-8 rounds per 

minute 

1,790 feet per 

second 

Model 1 (1941) 47mm Gun

Model 92 (1932) 70mm Howitzer

Model 38 (1905) 75mm Gun

Model 41 (1908) 75mm Infantry Gun Model 91 (1931) 105mm Howitzer

173
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

Armor

Type Crew Weight Length Height Width Armament

Type 95 Ha-Go 

Light Tank 

3 20,000

lbs 

14 ft., 4 

in 

7 ft. 6 ft., 9 

in. 

1 37 mm gun, 1 7.7 mm rear turret machine gun, 1 

7.7 mm hull machine gun 

Type 95 Ha-Go Light Tank

174 
Appendix E: American Ships and Aircraft in Operation Flint

Aircraft Carriers 

Class Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Armament Power Plant Complement Cruising 

Range 

Ships and Commissio

Lexington 33,000 tons 910' 105' 35' 34 

knots 

12x5.38," 2x2 40mm, 23x4 40mm, 16 20mm, 86 planes 

Turbines with electric motor, 4 screws, 180,000 hp 

337

3

4,600

miles @ 25 knots; 9,500 miles @ 15 knots 

Saratoga, 1

Yorktown 19,800 tons 827'4" 83' at 

water line 

31' 34 

knots 

8x 5.38," 8x2 40mm, 6x4 40mm, 50 20mm, 85 planes 

Geared turbines with four screws, 120,000 hp 

2919 Enterprise, 

Essex Class, Short-Hull 

27,100 tons 874' 93' at 

water line 

28' 33

knots 

12x 5.38," 10-18x4 40mm, 56-62 20mm, 103 planes 

Geared turbines with four screws, 150,000 hp 

3448 10,700 

miles @ 25 knots; 16,900 miles @ 15 knots 

Essex, 194Bunker HillIntrepid, Yorktown, 

Independence (Light) 

11,000 tons 619' 71' at 

water line 

24' 32

knots 

10x2 40mm, 2x4 40mm, 16-20 20mm, 33 planes 

Geared turbine engines with 4 screws, 103,000 hp 

1569 5,800 

miles @ 25 knots; 10,100 miles @ 15 knots 

Belleau WoCabot, CowLangley, Monterey, Princeton, 

Bogue (Escort) 

15,200 tons (full load) 

495'8" 69' at 

water line 

26' 17 

knots 

2 x5.38," 10x2 40mm, 27 20mm, 28 planes 

1 screw, 8,500 hp 

890-1205

22,500

miles @ 17 knots; 26,300 @ 15 knots 

Nassau, 19
Sangamon 

(Escort) 

23,350 tons (full load) 

553' 75' at

water line 

32' 17

knots 

2 5.38," 7x2 40mm, 2x4 40mm, 21 20mm, 30 planes 

Geared turbines, twin screws, 13,500 hp 

1080 20,000

miles @ 17 knots; 23,900 miles @ 15 knots 

Chenango, SangamonSuwanee, 

Casablanca (Escort) 

10,982 tons (full load) 

512'3" 65' at 

water line 

22'4" 19

knots 

1 5.38," 8x2 40mm, 20 20mm, 28 planes 

Skinner Unaflow reciprocating engines, twin screws, 11,200 hp 

860 10,200

miles @ 15 knots; 7,200 miles @ 19 knots 

Coral Sea, Corregidor, Bay, Natom1943 

176 

Lexington Class Aircraft Carrier, USS Saratoga 

Yorktown Class Aircraft Carrier, USS Enterprise 

Essex Class Short Hull Aircraft Carrier, U
177 

Independence Class Light Carrier, USS Cabot

Bogue Class Escort Carrier, USS Nassau 

Casablanca Class Escort Carrier, US

Sangamon Class Escort Carrier, USS Sangamon 
Battleships 

Class Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Armament Complement Power Plant Ships and Dates 

Commissioned 

Pe

n

nsylva

nia

31,400 tons

(normal) 35,929 tons (full load) 

608' 106'3" 33'6" 21

knots 

4x3 14.45,” 12x1 5.51,” 8x1 5.25,” 8x1 .50-cal machine guns, 221" torpedo tubes; 3 planes 

2555

Stea

m

turbines, 12 boilers, 4 shafts, 31,500 hp 

Pennsylvania, 1916 

New Mexico 33,000 tons 

(normal) 36,157 tons (full load) 

624' 106'3" 34' 21.5

knots 

4x3 14.5,” 12x1 5.51,” 8x1 5.25,” 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 2planes 

1945-2116 Turbo-electric 

steam turbines, 6 300 psi boilers, 4 shafts, 40,000 hp 

Mississippi, 1917; New Mexico, 1918Idaho, 1919 

T

e

n

nessee

32,300 tons

(normal) 40,354 tons (full load) 

624'-624'6" 

114' 34' 20 

knots 

4x3 14.5,” 14x1 5.51,” 4x1 5.25,” 2 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes 

2243-2375 Turbo-electric 

engines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 26,800 hp 

Tennessee 1920 

C

olora

do

32,600 tons

(normal) 34,946 (full load) 

624' 108'1"-

114' 

33'7"-34'8" 

21 knots 

4x2 16.45,” 12x1 5.51,” 8x1 3.50,” 2 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes 

1968-2182

T

urboelectric, 8 285 

psi boilers, 4 shafts, 28,900 hp 

Maryland, 1921; Colorado, 1923 

North Carolina 

37,484 tons (standard) 44,377 (full load) 

729' 108'4" 35'6" 27

knots 

3x3 16.45,” 10x2 5.38,” 4x4 1.1", 18x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3planes 

2339 Steam 

turbines, 8 575-psi boilers, 4 shafts, 121,000 shp 

North Carolina, Washington, 1941 

178 
South 

Dakota 

37,970 tons (standard) 44,519 tons (full load) 

680' 108'2" 36'2" 27 

knots 

3x3 16.45,” 10x2 5.38,” 3x4 1.1", 12x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3planes 

2257-2354 Steam 

turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 130,000 shp 

Alabama, Indiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota, 1942 

Iowa 48,110 tons

(standard) 57.540 tons (full load) 

887'3"-887'7" 

108'1"-108'2" 

37'9"-38' 

33 knots 

3x3 16.50,” 10x2 5.38,” 19x4 40mm. 50x1 20mm; 3 planes 

2753-2978 Steam 

turbines, 8 600 psi boilers, 4 shafts, 212,000 shp 

Iowa, New Jersey, 1943 

179 

Pennsylvania Class Battleship, USS Pennsylvania New Mexico Class Battleship, USS Mississipp

Tennessee Class Battleship, USS Tennessee 
180 

Colorado Class Battleship, USS Maryland 

North Carolina Class Battleship, USS No

South Dakota Class Battleship, USS Alabama 

Iowa Class Battleship, USS Iow
Cruisers 

Class

Displa

ce

me

nt Le

ngth

Bea

m

Draft S

peed

Arma

me

nt C

omple

me

nt Cruising

Range 

Power Plant Ships and 

Commissio

Pe

nsa

cola

9100 tons

(normal) 11,512 (full load) 

585'8" 65'3" 22'5" 32.5

knots 

2x3 8.55,” 2x2 8.55,” 4 5.25,” 6x4 40mm, 28x1 20mm; 2 planes 

1113-1135 

Stea

m

turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp 

Pensacola1930; SalCity, 1929 

N

ortha

mpton

9050-9300 tons

(normal) 11,826 (full load) 

600'3" 

66'1" 24' 32.5

knots 

3x3 8.55," 4x2 5.25," 6x4 40mm, 28 20mm, 6 21" torpedo tubes; 3 planes 

1020-1155

Stea

m

turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp 

Chester, 1Louisville, 

Portla

nd

9800-9950 tons

(normal) 13,767 tons (full load) 

610'3"-610'4" 

66'1" 24'6" 32.5

knots 

3x3 8.55," 8x1 5.25," 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3 planes 

1229-1382

Stea

m

turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp 

Indianapo1932; Port1933 

New Orleans 9375-9973 tons 

(normal) 12,411 tons (full load) 

588'2" 61'9"-

61'10" 

24'4" 32.5

knots 

3x3 8.55," 8x1 5.25," 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 3 planes 

1042-1121 Stea

m

turbines, 8 boilers, 4 shafts, 107,000 hp 

MinneapoNew OrleaSan Franc1934 

Wichita 10,000 tons

(normal) 13,015 (full load) 

608'4

61'9

25' 32.5

knots 

3x3 8.55,” 8x1 5.38,” 4x4 40mm, 4x2 40mm, 20x1 20mm, 8x1 .50-cal machine guns; 2 planes 

1343

G

eared

turbine engines, 8 boilers with 4 shafts, 100,000 hp 

Wichita, 19

181 
Baltimore 13,600 tons 673'5 70'10 26'10 33

knots 

3x3 8.55,” 6x2 5.38,” 12x4 40mm, 28-28 20mm, 4 planes 

1648-1969 4,800 

miles @ 25 knots; 7,900 miles @ 15 knots 

Geared turbine engines with 4 screws, 120,000 hp 

Baltimore, Boston, 19

Atlanta 6000 tons 541'6"-

541'9" 

53'2" 26'6"-

26'8" 

32-33 knots 

16 5.38,” 1x4 40mm, 9 20mm, 2 depth charge racks, 8 21" torpedo tubes 

688-820 High

pressure steam boilers, geared steam turbines, 85,000 shp 

Oakland, 1San DiegoJuan, 194

Cleveland 10,000 tons 610'-

610'1" 

66'3"-66'4 

24'7"-26'6" 

32.5 knots 

3x4 6.47,” 2x6 5.38,” 4x4 40mm, 2x2 40mm, 20 20mm, 3 planes 

1214-1475 Geared

turbines, four screws 

Biloxi, Mob1943; San1942 

182 

Northampton Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Chest

Pensacola Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Salt Lake City 
183 

Portland Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Portland New Orleans Class Heavy Cruiser, U

Wichita Class Heavy Cruiser, USS Wichita 

Baltimore Heavy Class Cruiser

Atlanta Class Light Antiaircraft Cruiser, USS Oakland 

Cleveland Class Light Cruiser, U
184 

Destroyers 

Class Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Armament Complement Power Plant Ships and Dates Commissioned Farragut 1375 tons 341'3 34'2" 8'10" 36.5 

knots 

4 5.38,” 2x4 21" torpedo tubes 

251 Geared

turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp 

Dewey, Farragut, 1934; Alwyn, DHull, MacDonough, Monaghan, 1

Porter 1805 tons 381' 36'2 10'3 37.5

knots 

6 5.38,” 2x4 21" torpedo tubes 

294 Geared

turbines with twin screws, 50,000 hp 

Phelps, 1936 

Mahan 1395-1500

tons 

341'8 34'10 9'10 36.5

knots 

4 5.38,” 3x4 21" torpedo tubes 

251 Geared

turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp 

Case, Cummings, 1936 

Gridley 1500 tons 341'8 36'2 10'3 36.5

knots 

4 5.38,” 4x4 21" torpedo tubes 

251 Highpressure 

steam turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp 

Craven, Gridley, 1937 

Fanning 1500 tons 341'3" 34'8 17'0 35

knots 

4-5 5"/38, 3x4 21" torpedo tubes 

251 Dunlap, Fanning, 1937 

Benham 1500 tons 341'3 34'8 17'0 36.5

knots 

4 5.38,” 2x4 21" torpedo tubes 

251 

Highpressure super-heated boilers, geared turbines with twin screws, 42,800 hp 

McCall, Maury, 1938; Ellet, StacSterett, Wilson, 1939 

Sims 1570 tons 347'11" 35'7 17'4 37 

knots 

4 5.38,” 2x4 21" torpedo tubes 

251 Highpressure 

super-heated 

Anderson, Hughes, Mustin, RussMorris, 1940 
Benson 1620 tons 348'2 35'4 17'4 37 

knots 

4 5.38,” 1x5 21" torpedo tubes 

276 Bailey, Bancroft, Caldwell, Cogh

Frazier, Meade, 1942 

Fletcher 2050 tons 376'6 39'4 17'9 35

knots 

5 5.38,” 2x5 21" torpedo tubes 

329 Highpressure 

super-heated boilers, geared turbines with twin screws, 60,000 hp 

Fletcher, 1942; Abbot, Bell, BlacBradford, Brown, Bullard, Burns, Caperton, Charrette, Chauncey, Clarence K. Bronson, Cogswell, Conner, Cotton, Cowell, Dortch, Franks, Gatling, Haggard, HaileyHall, Halligan, Haraden, HarrisonHazelwood, Healy, Heermann, HHopewell, Hunt, Ingersoll, Izard, Rogers, Johnston, Kidd, Knapp, Valette, Lewis Hancock, McCordMiller, Murray, Owen, PorterfieldRinggold, Schroeder, Sigsbee, SStephen Potter, Stevens, The Su

18Trathen, Walker, 1943 5 Evarts 1436 tons 289'5 35'1 11'10 21 

knots 

3 3.50,” 1x2 40mm, 9 20mm, 1 hedgehog, 2 depth charge tracks, 8 "K"gun projectors 

198 Dieselelectric drive 

with tandemmotor drive; 6,000 hp 

Burden R. Hastings, Charles R. Deede, Dempsey, Duffy, Harold Thomas, Le Hardy, Sederstrom, Wileman, Wintle, 1943 

Porter Class Destroyer, USS Phelps 

Farragut Class Destroyer, USS Dale 
Mahan Class Destroyer, USS Cummings 

186 Gridley Class Destroyer, US

Fanning Class Destroyer, USS Dunlap 

Benham Class Destroyer, USS M
187 

Sims Class Destroyer, USS Anderson 

Benson Class Destroyer, USS Bancroft 

Fletcher Class Destroyer, USS Bell 

Evarts Class Destroyer Escort, USS Burden R. Hastin
Submarines 

Class Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Armament Complement Power Plant Porpoise, P-5 Type 

1,330 tons surfaced, 1,998 tons submerged 

300'6 25' 15'10 20 knots

surfaced, 9 knots submerged 

1 3.5,” gun, 4 bow and 2 stern torpedo tubes, 18 torpedoes 

73 

Salmon 1,450 tons

surfaced, 2,198 tons submerged 

298' 26' 14'3 21 knots

surfaced, 9 knots submerged 

1 3.5” gun, 4 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes 

75 

Sargo 1,450 tons

surfaced, 2,350 tons submerged 

310’6” 27’1” 17’1” 20 knots

surfaced, 9 knots submerged 

1 3.5” gun, 4 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes 

78 

Gato 1,526 tons

surfaced, 2,424 tons submerged 

311' 27'3 16'10 20 knots

surfaced, 9 knots submerged 

1 3.5,” 1 4.5” or 1 5.5”, 6 bow and 4 stern torpedo tubes, 24 torpedoes 

80 

Diesel engines for surface running/ electmotors for submerged running 

188 

Gato Class Submarine, USS Gua

Salmon Class Subm

Sargo Class Submarine, USS Squalus

Porpoise, P-5 Type Class Submarine, USS Permit 
189 

Minecraft

Type Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Armament Complement Power Plant Ships and Dates 

Commissioned/ Converted 

Light Minelayers (converted Flush-Deck Destroyers) 

1,700 tons 314' 32' 12' 30 knots 3 3.5,” 1x2 40mm, 

6 20mm, 80 mines 

149 Geared

turbine engines, twin screws, 24,200 shp 

Ramsay, 1930; Preb1937 

Fast Minesweepers (converted Flush-Deck Destroyers) 

1,880 tons 314' 32' 12'6" 27 knots 3 3.5,” 1x4 40mm, 

5-7 20mm 

149 Geared

turbine engines, twin screws, 24,000 shp 

Chandler, Hogan, LoPalmer, Perry, StansZane, 1940; Hamilto1942 

Raven/Auk Class Minesweepers 

1,100 tons (full load) 

221'2" 32' 11' 17

knots, 9-12 knots (econ) 

1 3.5,” 2 40mm, 8 20mm 

105 Diesel

electric drive, twin screws, 3,500 horse power 

Sage, 1942; Chief, HMotive, Oracle, PursRequisite, Revenge, 

Motor Minesweepers (numbered) 

320 tons (full load) 

136' 24'6 6'1 13 knots 1 3.5,” 2 20mm, 2 

depth charge tracks + 2 extensions, 2 depth charge projectors 

33 Diesel

engines, twin screws, 500 hp 

Placed in service, 191945 

Submarine Chasers SC-497 Class 

98 tons 110'10" 17' 6'6" 20 knots 1 3.5,” 2x2 .50-

caliber machine guns 

22 Diesel

engines, twin screws 1,200 shp 

Commissioned1942
Light Minelayer, USS Preble

Fast Minesweeper, USS Zan

Raven/Auk Class Minesweeper, USS Revenge

Submarine Chaser SC-497 Class, SC 1287

190 

Motor Minesweeper, YMS 44
Specialized Amphibious Warfare Ships 

191 

Amphibious Force Command Ships 

Class Displacement Length Beam Draft Armament Speed Complement Power Plant Ships and Dates 

Commissioned 

Appalachian 12,690 tons

(full load) 

459' 63' 24' 2 5.38;” 4x2 

40mm; 10x2 20mm 

17 knots (max); 12 knots (econ) 

473-633 Geared turbine

engines, single screw, 6,000 hp 

Appalachian, Rocky Mount, 1943 

Appalachian Class Amphibious Force Command Ship, USS Appalachian
192 

Cargo Ships and Transports 

Class Displacement Length Beam Draft Armament Speed Complement Power Plant Ships and Dates 

Commissioned 

Crater (Cargo ships)

Almaack, Mercury, 1942; Alkes, Caelum, De Grasse, Kenmore, Livingston, Rutilicus,1943 

Attack Cargo Ships 

11,565 tons (full load) 

441'6" 57' 30' 1 5.38,” 1 

3.5,” 2 40mm, 6 20mm; or 1 5.38,” 4 40mm, 12 20mm 

11.5 knots 

206 Reciprocating 

engines, single screw, 1,950 shp 

Alcoyne, Electra, 1943 

Andromeda Attack Cargo Ships 

13,905 tons (full load) 

459' 63' 26' 1 5.38,” 4x2 

40mm, 12 20mm 

16.5 knots 

380 Geared turbine

engines, single screw, 6,000 hp 

Aquarius, Centaurus, 1943 

Arthur Middleton Attack Transports 

11,058 tons 489' 69'6" 27'4" 1 5," 4 3." 8 

20mm AA, 4 .50-cal. machine guns 

18.4 knots 

512 Troops: 1,840 

Wharton, 1939; Heywood, JFranklin Bell, 1941; Arthur Middleton, , 1942; Calvert, Harris, Harry Lee, La Salle, Leedstown, Leonard WoodMonrovia, Neville, OrmsbyPierce, President Monroe, President Polk, Sheridan, Sumter, Warren, Wayne, William P. Biddle, Windsor, Zeilin, 1943 

Bayfield Attack Transports 

16,100 tons (full load) 

492' 69'6" 28'6" 1 5," 4 3." 8 

20mm AA, 4 .50-cal. machine guns 

18 knots 

575 Troops: 1,000-2,000 

Turbine engines; 8,500 hp 

Bolivar, Callaway, CambriaCuster, Du Page, Elmore, Fayette, 1943 
High Speed 

Transports (converted Destroyers) 

1,190 tons 314 31' 12' 3 3.5,” 2 

40mm, 5 20mm, 1 depth charge track, 4 depth charge projectors 

22-24 knots 

666 Geared turbine

engines, twin screws, 13,000 shp 

Ships and Dates ConvertedManley, 1940; Schley, 1942Kane, Overton, 1943 

193 

Crater Class Cargo Ship, USS Kenmore

Attack Cargo Ship, USS Whitley

Andromeda Class Attack Cargo Ship, USS Aquarius

Arthur Middleton Class Attack Transport Sh
USS Neville in convoy with other Troopships, February 1942

194 

Bayfield Class Attack Transport Ship, USS Callaway High Speed Transport, 
195 

Tugs and Seaplane Tenders 

Class/Type Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Complement Power Plant Armament Ship

Com

Fleet Tugs 1646 tons (full 

load) 

205' 38'6" 15'3" 16

knots 

85 Diesel-electric

engines; 1 screw; 3,000 hp 

1 3.5,” 2x2 40mm, 2 40mm, 6 .50 cal. Antiaircraft machine guns 

ArapMataTeke

Seaplane Tender/ Curtiss 

13,880 tons (full load) 

527'4" 69'3" 22' 20 

knots 

1,195 Geared turbine

engines; twin screws; 12,000 shp 

4 5.38,” 3x4 40mm, 2x2 40mm, 2 20mm

Curt

Seaplane Tender/ Barnegat 

2,750 tons (full load) 

311' 41' 20' 13

knots 

215 Diesel engines, twin 

screws, 6,000 hp 

1 5.38,” 2x2 40mm, 1x4 40mm, 4x2 20mm, 2 depth charge tracks 

Casc

Curtiss Class Seaplane Tender, U

Fleet Tug, USS Chickasaw

Barnegat Class Seaplane Tender, USS Casco
Landing Ships and Landing Craft 

Type Displacement Length Beam Draft Speed Complement Power Plant Armament Ships and Dates 

Commissioned 

R

Landing Ship, Dock (LSD) 

7930 tons (loaded) 

457'9" 72' 5'6"

forward, 16'2" aft (seagoing loaded) 

17 knots 

266 1 5.38,” 2x2 

40mm, 2x4 40mm, 16 20mm 

Ashland, Belle Grove, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall, Lindenwald, 1943 

CmLem14Tehcdpg

Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 

1490 tons (lite); 4,080 tons (full load of 2,100 tons) 

327' 50' 8' fwd;

14'4" aft (full load) 

10.8 knots (max); 9 knots (econ) 

125; Troop Capacity: 140 

Diesel engines, twin screws 

1 3.5,” 1 40mm; 6 20mm 

1,152 were ordered fromNovember 1941 to August 1945 

Ctowooa

Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) [LCI(L)] 

387 tons (full load) 

160'4” 23'3 5'4" 

forward, 5'11" aft (full load) 

15.5 knots 

24 2 sets G.M. 

diesel engines; twin variable-pitch screws, 1600 BHP 

4 20mm C

7F

196 
Landing 

Craft, Infantry (Gunboat) [LCI(G)] 

2’10”

forward, 5’10” aft 

70 (gun grew 

54) 

2-3

40mm,

3-4 20mm, 6 .50 cal, 10 Mk 7 & 2 Mk 22 rocket launchers 

C

glaCK

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM) 

52,000 lbs (light); 52 tons (loaded) 

50’ 14’1” 3’ forward;

4’ aft 

8.5 knots 

4 2 110-125 hp 

diesel engines; twin screws 

2 .50 cal machine guns 

C

oo

Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) 

309 tons (landing) 

119' 32' 3'7"

forward, 4' aft (landing) 

8 knots 13 3 Gray 225 hp 

diesels; triple screws 

2 20mm C

3ta9 cfo

Landing Craft. Personnel (Large) [LCP(L)] 

13,500 lbs (unloaded, 21,600 lbs (loaded) 

36’ 10’9” 3’6” aft

(loaded) 

10 knots 

4

Diesel

engines 

2 .30 cal machine guns 

2,193 built C

8

Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) 

18,000 lbs. (light) 

36'3" 10'10" 3' aft, 2'2" 

forward 

9 knots 3 225 hp Gray 

diesel or 250 hp Hall-Scott gasoline engines 

2 .30-caliber machine guns 

3

vg

Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Mk 1 (Armored) - LVT(A)1 

29,050 lbs. 26’1” 10’8” 

5.4

knots (water); 25 mph (land) 

6

C

ontine

ntal

W670-9A (7-cyl. air-cooled radial, ohv, 250-bhp) gasoline engine 

Light tank turret with 37mm gun. 

509 supplied during 1942-44 by FMC. 

A

197 
Landing 

Vehicle, Tracked, Mk 11 (Armored) - LVT(A)2 

27,600 lbs. 26’1” 10’8” 5.4 

knots (water); 25 mph (land) 

2 450 supplied

during 1943-44. All manufactured by FMC. 

6e

DUKW Amphibious Truck 

7.5 tons 31’. 8’ 55 mph 

(land); 6 mph (water 

2 GMC 270 cu 

in 6 cylinder gasoline engine and a 5-speed transmission 

manufactured

from 1942 to 1945 by General Motors Corporation 

Cowpwbtoc

198 

Tank Landing Ship (L

Landing Ship Dock (LSD), USS Ashland

Landing Craft Infantry (Large) [LCI(L)] Landing Craft Infantry (Gunboat) [LCI(G)] Tank La
199 

Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) 

Landing Craft Personnel (Large) [LCP(L)

Landing Vehicle Tracked, Mk 1 (Armored

Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) 

DUKW Amphibious Truck

Landing Vehicle Tracked, Mk 11 (Armored) - LVT(A)2 
200 

Ground and Naval Aircraft 

Aircraft Type Crew Wingspan Length Height Power Plant Speed ArmamentGrumman F6F-3 Fighter “Hellcat” 1 42’10” 33’4” 11’3” 1 2000 hp Pratt & 

Whitney R-2800 engine 

360 mph 

6 .50 cal fixed machine guns, rockets 

Douglas SBD-5 Dive Bomber “Dauntless”/A-24 Attack Bomber “Banshee” 

2 41’6” 32”6” 13’7” 1 1200 hp Wright 

1820 engine 

252 mph 

2 .50 cal fixed machine guns, machine guns, 2250 lb. bomb

Grumman TBF-1/General Motors TBM1 Torpedo Bomber “Avenger” 3 54’2” 41’ 16’5” 1 1700 hp Wright R- 2600 engine 273 mph 1 .30 cal or 2 .50 cal fixed ma

and 1 .30 cal flexible machine or 1 torpedo 

Curtiss SB2C-1 Dive Bomber “Helldiver” 

2 49’9” 36’4” 15’6” 1 1700 hp Wright R2600 engine 281 mph 5 .50 cal fixed machine guns 

.30 cal flexible machine guns

Consolidated PBY-5A Patrol Bomber “Catalina” 

9 104’ 64’ 19’ 2 1200 hp Pratt & 

Whitney R-1830 engines 

195 mph 

2 .30 cal and 2 .50 cal flexible bombs or 2 torpedoes 

Martin PBM-5 Patrol Bomber “Mariner” 9 118’ 79’10” 27’6” 2 2100 hp Pratt & 

Whitney R-2800 engines 

200 mph 

8 .50 cal flexible machine gun2 torpedoes 

Lockheed-Vega PV-1 Patrol and Reconnaissance “Ventura” 

6 65’6” 51’9” 14’3” 2 2000 hp Pratt & 

Whitney R-2800 engines 

313 mph 

5 .50 cal fixed machine guns, machine guns, 5000 lb. bomb

Consolidated B-24 bomber “Liberator”/ PB4Y-1 Patrol Bomber “Liberator” 

11 110’ 66’4” 17’11” 4 1200 hp Pratt & 

Whitney R-1830 engines 

270 mph 

13 .50 cal flexible machine gu

North American B-25 Medium Bomber “Mitchell” 

5 67’7” 52’11” 16’4” 2 1700 hp Wright R2600 engines 272 mph 4 .50 cal flexible machine gun

machine guns, 3000 lb bomb

Bell P-39 Fighter/Ground Attack “Aircobra” 

1 34’ 30’2” 11’10” 1 1150 hp Allison V1710 engine 360 mph 1 37mm fixed, 2 fixed .50 cali

machine guns 

Curtiss P-40 Fighter “Kittyhawk” 1 37’4” 31’9” 12’4” 1 1150 hp Allison V1710 engine 362 mph 6 .50 cal fixed machine guns 
201 

Douglas SBD-5 Dive Bomber “Dauntless”/A-24 Attack Bom

Grumman F6F-3 Fighter “Hellcat”

Curtiss SB2C-1 Dive Bomber “H

Torpedo Bombers (TBF) from USS Essex, July 1944

Consolidated PBY-5A Patrol Bomber “Cata
202 

Lockheed-Vega PV-1 Patrol and Reconnaissance “Ventura” Martin PBM-5 Patrol Bomber “Mariner”

North American B-25 Medium Bomb

Consolidated B-24 Bomber “Liberator”/ PB4Y-1 Patrol Bomber “Liberator”

Bell P-39 Fighter/Ground Attack “Aircobra” Curtiss P-40 Fighter “Kittyhaw
Appendix E: Selected Sources 

Arnold, A.V. "Preparation for a Division Amphibious Operation." Military Review, 26 

(May 1945): 3-11. 

Corlett, Charles H. Cowboy Pete: The Autobiography of Major General Charles H. Corlett. 

Santa Fe, NM: Sleeping Fox, 1974. 

Crowl, Philip A. and Edmund G. Love. The United States Army in World War II, The War in 

the Pacific. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, 1955 (reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995).

Gole, Henry G. The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940. 

Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2002. 

Heinl, Robert D., Jr. and John A. Crown. The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo. 

Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954. 

Isely, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl. The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and 

Its Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. 

Marshall, S.L.A. Island Victory: The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll. Washington, DC: Infantry 

Journal Press, 1944 (reprint edition, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001). 

Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945. 

Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991. 

Proehl, Carl W., ed. The Fourth Marine Division in World War II. Washington, DC: 

Infantry Journal Press, 1946 (reprint edition, Nashville: The Battery Press, 1988). 

Shaw, Henry I., Bernard Nalty and Edwin Turnbladh. History of U.S. Marine Corps 

Operations in World War II. Volume 3: Central Pacific Drive. Washington, D.C.: 

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1966. 
The Eastern Mandates Campaign 

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