INTERNET FIREARM 

SALES

ATF Enforcement 

Efforts and Outcomes 

of GAO Covert Testing

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2017

GAO-18-24

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-24, a report to 

congressional requesters

November 2017

INTERNET FIREARM SALES

ATF Enforcement Efforts and Outcomes of GAO 

Covert Testing

What GAO Found

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is responsible 

for investigating criminal and regulatory violations of firearms statutes and 

regulations that govern firearms transactions, including sales that are facilitated 

by the Internet. Two components of the Internet may be used to facilitate Internet 

firearm sales: the Surface Web and the Dark Web. The Surface Web is 

searchable with standard web search engines. The Dark Web contains content 

that has been intentionally concealed and requires specific computer software to 

gain access. ATF created the Internet Investigations Center (Center) to

investigate buyers and sellers who use the Internet to facilitate illegal firearms 

transactions. The Center uses several tools to provide investigative support to 

ATF, which has resulted in the arrests of individuals using the Internet to 

facilitate illegal firearm purchases. ATF officials with the Center also noted that 

investigations might involve both the Surface Web and the Dark Web. For 

example, to identify an anonymous user on the Dark Web, the Center works to 

establish a user’s “digital footprint” on the Surface Web.

In 2016, the Center also issued a report about Internet firearm transactions. This 

and other ATF reports highlighted the following about Internet-facilitated firearm

transactions:

• The relative anonymity of the Internet makes it an ideal means for prohibited 

individuals to obtain illegal firearms.

• The more anonymity employed by a firearms purchaser, the greater the 

likelihood that the transaction violates federal law.

• Firearm transactions that occur on the Dark Web are more likely to be 

completed in person or via the mail or common carrier, versus through a 

Federal Firearm Licensee.

GAO agents attempted to purchase firearms from Dark Web and Surface Web 

marketplaces. Agents made seven attempts to purchase firearms on the Dark 

Web. In these attempts, agents did not disclose any information about whether 

they were prohibited from possessing a firearm. Of these seven attempts, two on 

a Dark Web marketplace were successful. Specifically, GAO agents purchased 

and received an AR-15 rifle and an Uzi that the seller said was modified so that it 

would fire automatically. GAO provided referral letters to applicable lawenforcement agencies for these purchases to inform any ongoing investigations.

Tests performed on the Surface Web demonstrated that private sellers GAO 

contacted on gun forums and other classified ads were unwilling to sell a firearm 

to an individual who appeared to be prohibited from possessing a firearm. Of the 

72 attempts agents made to purchase firearms on the Surface Web, 56 sellers 

refused to complete a transaction: 29 sellers stated they would not ship a firearm 

and 27 refused after the disclosure of the undercover identities’ stated prohibited 

status. Furthermore, in 5 of these 72 attempts, the accounts GAO set up were 

frozen by the websites, which prevented the agents from using the forums and 

attempting to make a purchase. View GAO-18-24. For more information, 

contact Seto Bagdoyan at (202) 512-6722 or 

bagdoyans@gao.gov, or Wayne McElrath at 

(202) 512-2905 or mcelrathw@gao.gov. 

Why GAO Did This Study

The current federal legal framework 

governing buying and selling of 

firearms does not specifically address 

the use of the Internet to facilitate 

these transactions. Additionally, private 

transactions involving the mostcommon types of firearms between 

individuals who are not licensed to 

commercially sell weapons and who 

are residents of the same state, 

including transactions facilitated by the 

Internet, are generally not subject to 

federal background-check 

requirements.

Congressional requesters asked that 

GAO assess the extent to which ATF is 

enforcing existing laws and investigate 

whether online private sellers sell 

firearms to people who are not allowed 

or eligible to possess a firearm. This 

report describes (1) techniques ATF 

uses to investigate and enforce 

generally applicable firearm laws in 

instances where the firearm or firearmcomponent transaction is facilitated by 

the Internet and (2) results of GAO’s 

undercover attempts to buy firearms on 

the Dark Web and Surface Web.

GAO analyzed documents and 

interviewed officials to identify actions

ATF has taken to prohibit illegal firearm 

transactions. GAO also attempted to 

purchase firearms from Dark Web and 

Surface Web marketplaces. The 

results of the testing are illustrative and 

nongeneralizable.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this report. ATF provided technical 

comments, which GAO incorporated as 

appropriate.
Page i GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Letter 1

Background 4

ATF Takes Various Actions to Enforce Firearm Regulations 

Related to Prohibited Firearm Transactions Facilitated by the 

Internet 13

Agents Purchased Two Firearms on the Dark Web, but Covert 

Attempts to Illegally Purchase Firearms on the Surface Web 

Were Unsuccessful 19

Agency Comments 23

Appendix I Methods for Performing GAO Covert Testing 25

Appendix II Examples of Illegal Firearms Sales Facilitated by the Internet 29

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 32

Table

Table 1: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) Firearm Arrest Statistics, Fiscal Years 2014–2016 18

Figures

Figure 1: Using the Internet to Facilitate the Firearm Purchasing 

Process 8

Figure 2: Description of Internet Firearm Marketplaces 11

Figure 3: Photo of AR-15 Rifle Purchased by GAO Agents on 

the Dark Web 20

Figure 4: Photo of Uzi Purchased by GAO Agents on 

the Dark Web 20

Figure 5: Summary of Surface Web Purchase Attempts 22

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

Center Internet Investigations Center

CRS Congressional Research Service

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ Department of Justice

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FFL Federal Firearm Licensee

GCA Gun Control Act of 1968

NFA National Firearms Act of 1934

NICS National Instant Criminal Background Check System

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 21, 2017

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Brian Schatz

United States Senate

The Honorable Elizabeth Warren

United States Senate

Mass public shootings in the United States, such as those in Las Vegas, 

Nevada; Newtown, Connecticut; and Orlando, Florida, have sparked 

debate about existing firearms laws designed to reduce firearm violence. 

Such debate has included questions about how prohibited individuals, 

such as convicted felons, may have access to firearms.1 In 2016, the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)—part of the 

Department of Justice (DOJ)—reported a steady increase in Internetbased criminal enforcement cases within ATF since 2011.2 According to 

the ATF FY 2010 – FY 2016 strategic plan, the privacy of the Internet 

makes it an ideal means for gang members, violent criminals, terrorists, 

and juveniles to traffic and obtain illegal firearms. 3 Further, the 2016 

report noted that the more anonymity employed by a firearms purchaser, 

the greater the likelihood that the transaction violates federal law.

The current federal legal framework of statutes and regulations governing 

the buying and selling of firearms does not specifically address the use of 

the Internet to facilitate these transactions. Federally regulated 

transactions include those in which the seller is engaged in the business 

of dealing in firearms and is required to conduct a background check on a 

 1

Throughout this report, we use the term “prohibited individuals” to refer to those 

categories of individuals who, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and (n) are generally 

legally prohibited from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing firearms or 

ammunition. 

2

Department of Justice, Firearms and Internet Transactions: ATF Intelligence Assessment

(Washington, D.C.: 2016).

3 Department of Justice, Strategic Plan: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives FY2010- FY 2016 (Washington, D.C.: 2010).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

prospective nonlicensed buyer.4 Conversely, private transactions for the 

most common types of firearms between nonlicensed individuals who are 

residents of the same state, including transactions facilitated by the 

Internet, are generally not subject to federal background-check 

requirements.5

You asked us to assess the extent to which ATF is enforcing existing gun 

laws as they apply to firearms transactions facilitated by the Internet and 

investigate whether online private sellers sell firearms to prohibited 

individuals. This report describes (1) techniques ATF uses to investigate 

and enforce generally applicable firearm laws in instances where the 

firearm or firearm-component transaction is facilitated by the Internet and 

(2) results from our covert attempts to buy firearms on the Surface Web 

and Dark Web.6

To describe the investigative and enforcement techniques ATF has 

implemented to detect prohibited firearm or firearm-component 

transactions facilitated by the Internet, we reviewed relevant ATF 

documentation, such as planning and policy documents. We also 

reviewed and analyzed relevant statutes and regulations to understand 

the legal framework in which ATF performs its enforcement duties. 

Further, we examined applicable DOJ and ATF documentation to identify 

examples of closed adjudicated cases. We performed additional research 

using public court records to augment these reports in order to describe 

enforcement actions ATF has taken on prohibited firearms transactions 

facilitated by the Internet. Additionally, we interviewed ATF officials, 

including those with its Internet Investigations Center (Center), to 

understand enforcement actions ATF takes to respond to firearm crimes 

facilitated by the Internet. We also observed ATF regulatory officials 

perform a compliance inspection of a Federal Firearm Licensee (FFL) that 

engages in online commerce of dealing firearms to understand how the 

 4

The term nonlicensed refers to individuals who are not licensed by ATF to engage in the 

business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. 

5

States may impose additional requirements or restrictions, which are outside the scope of 

this report. 

6

The Surface Web is a portion of the Internet that is readily available to the general public 

and searchable with standard web search designs. The Dark Web is a hidden part of the 

Internet that specialized software enables users to access with little risk of detection. For 

more information please see the sidebar on page 9.
Page 3 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

FFL inspection process works and learn how legitimate FFL transactions 

are facilitated by the Internet.7

To attempt to use the Internet to facilitate test firearm purchases, our 

agents performed covert tests on the Dark Web and Surface Web. Agents 

covertly accessed a Dark Web marketplace and attempted to purchase 

firearms or firearm components from nonlicensed private sellers. For our 

Dark Web testing, we examined the feasibility of obtaining different types 

of firearms. We made seven attempts to complete firearm transactions on 

the Dark Web, and we concluded testing when the transactions were 

successfully completed. For these covert tests, we did not disclose any 

information about our presumed prohibited status. On the Surface Web, 

using a variety of scenarios designed to make the seller believe that the 

transaction would be illegal, agents accessed gun forums and other 

classified advertisements and made 72 attempts to purchase firearms or 

firearm components from private nonlicensed sellers. The results of our 

testing are for illustrative purposes only and are not generalizable. We 

also reviewed DOJ and ATF published reports, as well as adjudicated 

criminal cases, to understand how prohibited individuals may use the 

Internet to purchase firearms or firearm components. Additionally, we met 

with third-party groups with knowledge of the firearms industry, including 

state law-enforcement agencies, a purveyor of a commercial website that 

hosts online firearm classified advertisements, a gun-control advocacy 

group, a firearm-industry organization, and an academic research center 

to learn about online firearm marketplaces, criminal pathways to illegally 

purchase or sell firearms, and enforcement responses. See appendix I for 

more information on our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to November 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We conducted our related 

investigative work in accordance with the standards prescribed by the 

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

 7

For the purposes of our report, an FFL is an entity that is licensed by ATF to engage in 

the business of dealing firearms. 
Page 4 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

ATF is one of several DOJ law-enforcement components, including the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), responsible for fighting violent crime.8 ATF is the 

lead agency charged with enforcing federal firearms laws and regulating 

the firearms industry. ATF is also responsible for investigating criminals 

and criminal organizations that use firearms, arson, or explosives in

violent criminal activity.9

ATF investigates and combats violent crime related to firearm trafficking, 

criminal possession and use of firearms, and the diversion of firearms 

from legal commerce. This work includes law-enforcement operations and 

intelligence gathering and analysis. For example, special agents 

investigate reports of prohibited individuals acquiring or attempting to 

acquire firearms from private sellers in order to avoid background checks 

that would otherwise be required if purchasing through an FFL. According 

to ATF officials, intelligence analysts may help agents by gathering 

information from the public social-media profiles of individuals under 

investigation. In addition, ATF investigates reports of individuals engaging 

in the business of dealing firearms without a license, thereby 

circumventing background-check, record-keeping, and other 

requirements.

The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) and the Gun Control Act of 

1968 (GCA) are the primary federal laws that regulate the manufacture, 

sale, distribution, and possession of firearms. There are no laws that 

specifically regulate firearms transactions facilitated by the Internet. 

Rather, firearms transactions facilitated by the Internet are subject to the 

same legal requirements and regulations as traditional firearms sales.

 8

We reported in April 2011 that DOJ law-enforcement components—ATF, DEA, the FBI, 

and the U.S. Marshals Service—have overlapping jurisdiction over violent-crime 

investigations, specifically when the investigations involve illegal drugs, gang violence, 

firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitive apprehension. See GAO, Law Enforcement 

Coordination: DOJ Could Improve Its Process for Identifying Disagreements among 

Agents, GAO-11-314 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2011). 

9

28 U.S.C. § 599A and 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.130 – 0.131. 

Background

ATF

Statutes and Regulations
Page 5 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

The NFA defines the specific types of firearms and components subject to 

the provisions of the act based on the firearm’s function, design, 

configuration, or dimensions.10 For example, the NFA applies to machine 

guns, short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, and silencers.11 The 

NFA requires these firearms and components to be registered with ATF. 

The lawful transfer of firearms and components subject to the NFA 

generally requires ATF approval, a process that involves the submission 

of application forms, fingerprints, and photographs to ATF, as well as 

payment of a transfer tax. Transfers outside of this ATF-approval process 

are generally illegal.

The GCA, the main federal statute applicable to firearms such as 

handguns, shotguns, and rifles, requires all persons engaged in the 

business of manufacturing, importing, or dealing in firearms to become an 

FFL through ATF.12 The GCA defines a person “engaged in the business” 

as a dealer of firearms as someone who “devotes time, attention, and 

labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with 

the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive 

purchase and resale of firearms.”13 The definition excludes individuals 

who make “occasional” sales or purchases to enhance a personal 

collection or for a hobby or who sell all or part of a personal collection of 

firearms. The GCA requires that FFLs maintain records of all their gun 

sales. These records are used, among other purposes, to trace a firearm 

recovered by law-enforcement officials from its first sale by the 

manufacturer or importer through the distribution chain to the first retail 

 10The original National Firearms Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (June 26, 

1934), contained defects that made the law difficult to enforce after the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). To address the problems raised 

by the Haynes decision, a revised version was reenacted by the National Firearms Act 

Amendments of 1968, part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, Title II, §§

201 –207, 82 Stat. 1213, 1227 – 1236 (Oct. 22, 1968). The NFA is codified, as amended, 

at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 – 5872, with implementing regulations at 27 C.F.R. Part 479.

11The NFA defines the term machine gun as any weapon that shoots, is designed to 

shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot without 

manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term includes the frame or 

receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively or 

combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a 

machine gun, and any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled 

if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.

12Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (Oct. 22, 1968), codified, as 

amended, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931, with implementing regulations at 27 C.F.R. Part 478.

1318 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). 

National Firearms Act of 1934, 

as Amended

Gun Control Act of 1968, as 

Amended
Page 6 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

purchaser, in order to provide law-enforcement agencies with 

investigative leads.

As amended by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, the GCA 

generally requires FFLs to contact the FBI’s National Instant Criminal 

Background Check System (NICS) prior to transferring a firearm to a 

nonlicensed individual.14 During a NICS background check, the buyer 

provides the FFL with appropriate identification, such as a valid driver’s 

license. The FFL submits descriptive data, including the buyer’s name 

and date of birth, to NICS, which searches three national databases 

containing criminal history and other relevant records to determine 

whether federal or state law prohibits the person from receiving or 

possessing a firearm. The transfer may proceed if NICS informs the FFL

that it has no information indicating that the transfer would be in violation 

of law, or if 3 business days have elapsed without notification that the 

transfer would violate the law. The GCA prohibits individuals from 

knowingly making a false statement intended to deceive FFLs with 

respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale, such as a 

person claiming that he or she is the actual buyer of a firearm and not 

acquiring the firearm on behalf of another person, when in fact he or she 

is purchasing the firearm with the intent to transfer it to a prohibited 

person. This type of transaction is often referred to as a “straw purchase.”

In addition, the GCA establishes the categories of persons generally 

prohibited from shipping, transporting, receiving, or possessing firearms 

and ammunition.15 Specifically, persons are prohibited from shipping, 

transporting, receiving, or possessing a firearm if they (1) have been 

convicted of a felony; (2) are a fugitive from justice; (3) are an unlawful 

user of or addicted to any controlled substance; (4) have been committed 

to a mental institution or judged to be mentally defective; (5) are aliens 

illegally or unlawfully in the United States, or certain other aliens admitted 

under a nonimmigrant visa; (6) have been dishonorably discharged from 

the military; (7) have renounced their U.S. citizenship; (8) are under a 

qualifying domestic violence restraining order; or (9) have been convicted 

of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. In addition, federal law 

prohibits persons under felony indictment from shipping, transporting, or 

receiving a firearm.

 14Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102(b), 107 Stat. 1536, 1539 (Nov. 30, 1993), codified, as 

amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 922(t).

1518 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and (n).
Page 7 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Individuals who are not engaged in the business of dealing in firearms 

may not legally sell firearms to other unlicensed individuals under certain 

circumstances.16 For example, a transaction between unlicensed 

individuals would be illegal if the seller knows or has reasonable cause to 

believe that the buyer is legally prohibited from possessing firearms or is 

a resident of a different state than the seller. If the seller is not aware of 

these circumstances, the seller may transfer the firearm to the buyer 

without any record-keeping or background-check requirements.

Nonprohibited, nonlicensed individuals may legally purchase firearms 

through an FFL or through individual private sales with residents of the 

same state. Regardless of whether an FFL is involved in an Internetfacilitated firearm purchase, if a seller knows or has a reasonable cause 

to believe that the prospective recipient is prohibited from possessing 

firearms, the seller must not transfer the firearm. See figure 1.

 16For the purposes of clarity in this report, the term “firearm” refers to all firearms that are 

not regulated by the NFA. We specifically denote when a firearm is regulated by the NFA.
Page 8 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Figure 1: Using the Internet to Facilitate the Firearm Purchasing Process
Page 9 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

As outlined in figure 1, the Internet can facilitate legal purchases either 

through FFLs or through nonlicensed private sellers. For purchases 

through an FFL, an individual orders a firearm online, and generally 

completes the transaction process in person. The FFL submits the 

required paperwork to ATF. A background check is processed directly by 

NICS or through a state government that checks NICS. Unless denied by 

the background check, the transaction is completed. If the individual is 

purchasing the firearm from an FFL in another state, the original FFL will 

transfer the firearm to an FFL in the state the buyer resides in to complete 

the transaction. If both the buyer and seller are residents of the same 

state, transfers between private nonlicensed parties facilitated by the 

Internet without the involvement of an FFL may be lawful. The firearm 

may be transferred in person between the buyer and the seller, or, if the 

firearm is a shotgun or rifle, it may be mailed intrastate between the 

individuals.17 The seller has no record-keeping obligations, and no NICS 

background check is performed on the buyer. However, a nonlicensed 

individual is usually prohibited from directly transferring a firearm to a 

person who the transferor knows or had reasonable cause to believe is 

residing in another state.18 In addition, it is usually illegal for any 

nonlicensed individual to transport into or receive in the state where he 

resides any firearm purchased or otherwise obtained outside that state. 

Therefore, interstate transactions between two nonlicensed individuals 

are likely to be illegal unless an FFL becomes a party to the transaction. 

For a legal transaction between residents of different states, the seller 

must send the firearm to an FFL in the buyer’s state.19 The FFL submits 

the paperwork, a background check is processed, and, unless denied by 

the background check, the FFL transfers the firearm to the buyer.

 17Although unloaded rifles and shotguns may be mailed through the United States Postal 

Service, pistols, revolvers, and other firearms capable of being concealed on the person 

may not be mailed by nonlicensed individuals, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1715.

18There are exceptions for the transfer, transportation, or delivery of a firearm in 

accordance with the settlement of a decedent’s estate or for the loan or rental of a firearm 

to another person for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5). 

19Nonlicensed individuals may ship a firearm to an FFL in a different state through the 

United States Postal Service if the firearm is a rifle or shotgun. In addition, a nonlicensed 

individual may ship a handgun, rifle, or shotgun to an FFL in a different state through a 

carrier such as FedEx or UPS with proper written notice. 18 U.S.C. § 922(e).

Defining the Surface Web, the Deep Web, 

and the Dark Web

According to a 2015 Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) report, the layers of the 

Internet go far beyond the surface content 

that many can easily access in their daily 

searches. The Surface Web is a portion of the 

World Wide Web that is readily available to 

the general public and searchable with 

standard web search engines. Deep Web 

content, however, has not been indexed by 

traditional search engines such as Google. 

Examples of Deep Web sites include certain 

classified listings, forums, and invite-only 

groups. A small portion of the Deep Web, 

known as the Dark Web, contains content that 

has been intentionally concealed and requires 

specific software. The Dark Web may be used 

for legitimate purposes, for example some 

news organizations have sites on the Dark 

Web that enable users to transmit information 

anonymously. However, some users may 

access the Dark Web to conceal criminal or 

otherwise malicious activities.

Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives and Congressional Research Service. | 

GAO-18-24
Page 10 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Potential gun buyers can view firearm advertisements and make 

purchases from the following categories of websites: major retailers, 

online retailers, online auctions and marketplaces, online classified 

listings, online forums and social media networks, and Dark Web 

websites. According to ATF reports, major retailers and online retailers 

meet the definition of firearm dealers and therefore must be FFLs in order 

to operate. To see how purchases may be facilitated by various Internet 

marketplaces, see figure 2.

Internet Firearm 

Marketplaces
Page 11 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Figure 2: Description of Internet Firearm Marketplaces
Page 12 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

GAO, DOJ, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), as well as a 

gun-control advocacy group, have reported on the issue of Internet 

firearm sales since the early 2000s. In 2001 we reported the results of our 

undercover inquiries to private individuals who advertised firearms online. 

We attempted to purchase firearms from two of these individuals. Both 

individuals were willing to complete the transactions in person, though we 

did not complete the sales.20

Also in 2001, as part of a larger report on reducing gun violence, DOJ 

identified issues related to firearms sales facilitated by the Internet.21

Among the issues outlined in the report was the possibility prohibited 

individuals may use the Internet to acquire firearms. The report also 

stated that the Internet may facilitate illegal sales by individuals selling 

firearms commercially without a license. The report stated that 

enforcement mechanisms must be established to prevent prohibited 

individuals from obtaining firearms through the Internet and to make sure 

that both FFLs and nonlicensed sellers follow existing law when 

conducting sales through the Internet. The report noted that ATF was 

working to establish a unit to identify and respond to criminal violations 

involving the Internet and other new computer technology and worked 

with other federal law-enforcement agencies to establish enforcement 

mechanisms to prevent prohibited individuals from obtaining firearms 

through the Internet and to make sure both FFLs and nonlicensed sellers 

follow existing law when conducting sales through the Internet.

In 2012, CRS reported on Internet firearm and ammunition sales.22 The 

report outlined the extent to which federal law regulates the sale of 

firearms via the Internet, which is not treated as legally distinct from sales 

not facilitated by the Internet. CRS noted that this situation has raised 

concerns about the possibility of increased violation of federal firearm 

laws and about challenges that law-enforcement agencies may face when 

attempting to investigate violations of these laws.

 20GAO, Firearms Purchased from Federal Firearm Licensees Using Bogus Identification, 

GAO-01-427NI (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2001). 

21Department of Justice, Gun Violence Reduction: National Integrated Firearms Violence 

Reduction Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 2001).

22Congressional Research Service, Internet Firearm and Ammunition Sales (Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 28, 2012).

Prior Reporting on Internet 

Firearms Sales
Page 13 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Additionally, a prior report by an advocacy group explored how the 

Internet may facilitate firearm sales to prohibited individuals.23 However, 

the report described how prohibited individuals may use the Internet to 

find firearms for sale and then to conduct face-to-face transactions. The 

report did not demonstrate how prohibited individuals may have firearms 

mailed directly to them, thus circumventing the FFL purchase process, or 

otherwise break the law. Representatives from the investigative 

organization that performed this work stated that they did not break the 

law when performing their testing.

As we noted above, there are no specific statutes or regulations 

pertaining to Internet firearms transactions. Hence, ATF does not 

distinguish between private firearms transactions taking place in person 

versus those that use the Internet to facilitate the sale. Licensed and 

nonlicensed sellers use the Internet to facilitate firearm sales in a variety

of ways. Major retailers with a federal firearms license enable customers 

to browse available firearms on their websites but require transactions to 

be made in person at the store. Online retailers with a federal firearms 

license advertise firearms online and transfer the firearm to the purchaser 

through either a storefront that qualifies as an FFL or another FFL in the 

buyer’s state. Online auction and marketplace websites, online 

classifieds, and online forums also facilitate sales between buyers and 

both licensed and nonlicensed sellers. Depending on the website, 

potential buyers can search for firearms nationwide or narrowed down to 

city or zip code. According to ATF, searching capabilities can affect 

 23Mayors Against Illegal Guns and the City of New York, Point, Fire, Click: An 

Investigation of Illegal Online Gun Sales (New York, N.Y.: 2011). Mayors Against Illegal 

Guns is now known as Everytown for Gun Safety. 

ATF Takes Various 

Actions to Enforce 

Firearm Regulations 

Related to Prohibited 

Firearm Transactions 

Facilitated by the 

Internet

ATF Does Not Distinguish 

between In-Person Sales 

and Sales Facilitated by 

the Internet when 

Enforcing Firearms 

Statutes and Regulations
Page 14 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

whether transactions among nonlicensed individuals are more likely to 

occur in person or through an FFL as well as the potential for illegal 

activity to occur.

A private sale between two nonlicensed individuals would have an 

unlawful component if, for example, (1) the seller knows or has 

reasonable cause to believe that the buyer is legally prohibited from 

possessing firearms or is a resident of a different state; (2) the seller is 

engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a license; or (3) the 

item is an NFA-restricted weapon.24 ATF officials who oversee Internetrelated investigations said that it is not possible to monitor private 

firearms transactions coordinated over the Internet as they take place. 

Federal law does not require the seller in a private firearm transaction to 

conduct a background check or otherwise process paperwork through 

ATF.

According to ATF officials, in 2012 the agency created a national center

for Internet-related investigations, now known as the Internet 

Investigations Center (Center).25 ATF officials noted that, as an example 

of its activities, field agents who perform work involving the Internet will 

coordinate with the Center to ensure they have the necessary training to 

operate online in an undercover capacity. The Center has access to a 

variety of tools to facilitate Internet investigations. Much of the Center’s 

software that is used to analyze online content for investigations is free 

and open source. For example, according to ATF officials, using free 

open-source software allows analysts to glean information from public 

websites without violating users’ privacy rights. 

ATF officials stated that the Center investigates buyers and sellers who 

use the Internet to facilitate illegal firearms transactions. The officials with 

the Center noted that these investigations are generally reactive, meaning 

that the Center initiates them after receiving a tip or a request from a field 

agent. For example, in November 2014 the Center received a tip from a 

person who was selling firearms on an online firearms marketplace and 

was suspicious of a prospective buyer attempting to obtain a pistol 

 24NFA-restricted weapons are specific classes of firearms that must be registered with 

ATF in accordance with the National Firearms Act (NFA), including machine guns, shortbarreled shotguns, and short-barreled riles, among others. 

25According to ATF officials, the Center was initially named the Cyber Intelligence Branch. 

ATF Developed an 

Internet Investigations 

Center to Help Identify 

Individuals Unlawfully 

Transferring Firearms 

Using the Internet
Page 15 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

without involving an FFL. The Center identified the prospective buyer and 

engaged in an undercover operation in which the individual agreed to 

provide the undercover agent with components designed to turn pistols 

and rifles into fully automatic firearms in exchange for a pistol and cash. 

The undercover agent and the buyer met in person and completed the 

transaction. ATF agents arrested the buyer at the scene, and he was later 

sentenced to 33 months in prison.

ATF officials said the agency frequently receives tips about nonlicensed

sellers engaging in the business of firearms. For example, ATF 

investigated a nonlicensed seller who posted more than 280 firearms for 

sale on multiple online firearms marketplaces; purchased at least 54 

firearms; and sold at least 51 firearms at a profit. The seller, who was also 

found to have made straw purchases for other buyers, was sentenced in 

August 2010 to 2 years in prison.26 For additional examples of ATF 

enforcement actions involving sales facilitated by the Internet, please see 

appendix II.

According to ATF officials, the Center also performs investigative work on 

the Dark Web, which requires knowledge of the Internet and investigative 

techniques. For example, ATF analysts must understand virtual currency, 

such as Bitcoin values. They must also know what sellers are charging for 

their products, because prices on the Dark Web “skyrocket” due to the 

criminal nature of the merchandise. In addition, the analysts learn 

common terms associated with firearm culture, in order to communicate 

with users engaged in criminal activity.

ATF officials with the Center also noted that investigations might involve 

both the Surface Web and the Dark Web. For example, to identify an 

anonymous user on the Dark Web, the Center works to establish the 

user’s “digital footprint” on the Surface Web. In some cases, users might 

conduct illegal activity on the Dark Web but might then go to the Surface 

Web, such as a social-networking website with chat forums on a wide 

variety of topics, and discuss their illegal activity. From there, analysts 

can link the user to other social-media accounts, where the user may post 

a photo showing a street sign or other characteristics to help investigators 

narrow the user’s location. The ATF officials with the Center noted that 

 26A “straw purchase” occurs when an individual knowingly makes a false statement on the 

federal background-check form with respect to being the actual buyer of the firearm, when 

in fact the purchase is being made with the intent to transfer the firearm to another person.
Page 16 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

posts on some websites contain meta-data, which includes geo-coding 

that helps the analysts identify where posts originated.

ATF issued the Firearms and Internet Transactions Intelligence 

Assessment Report in April 2016 to provide information and analysis in 

the area of online firearm sales, including both legal and illegal 

transactions. The report highlighted several key findings about how 

firearm transactions are facilitated by the Internet. Specifically, the ATF 

analysis of the online marketplaces for firearms demonstrated the ease 

with which individuals can choose to circumvent the generally applicable 

law in this arena. Within the report, ATF detailed a market analysis of 

firearms transactions, including Surface Web and Dark Web 

marketplaces. Firearms transactions that occur on the Dark Web are 

more likely to be conducted in person or via the mail or common carrier, 

versus through an FFL. Additionally, the report noted that it appears that 

the price of a firearm increases as the transaction becomes more covert 

or when parties attempt to subvert laws and regulations. According to 

ATF staff, they plan to update the report when there is a significant shift in 

Internet gun trafficking. The ATF officials with the Center said they have 

not determined the frequency with which updated reports will be issued 

but they do not plan to update it annually.
Page 17 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

To enforce the NFA, GCA, and related firearms regulations, ATF carries 

out a variety of regulatory activities. For example, ATF monitors the 

firearms industry from manufacture and importation through retail sale. 

Specifically, ATF Industry Operations Investigators determine whether 

FFL applicants are qualified to engage in firearms commerce through 

routine inspections and regulatory oversight. Industry Operations 

Investigators also routinely inspect FFLs to ensure continued compliance 

with statutes and regulations. ATF officials stated that investigators 

conduct compliance inspections of FFLs—who must renew their licenses 

every 3 years. ATF conducts these inspections at least once during the 3-

year licensing period. Additionally, ATF officials stated that as part of 

each inspection, officers will review all sales transactions an FFL has 

made in the last 12 months and analyze the data for aberrant patterns. 

Based on a review of DOJ Office of Inspector General documentation and 

our own observations during an FFL inspection, we determined that,

during these inspections, ATF

• performs an inventory of the FFL’s firearms and checks it against the 

FFL’s inventory to ensure that firearm transactions reconcile with the 

firearm inventory;

• reviews the FFL’s records of background checks for purchases 

processed through NICS;

• checks the prior year’s Firearms Transaction Record forms, which 

document acquisition and disposition information that ATF uses to 

trace firearms involved in crimes;27 and

• reviews sales records to ensure that the FFL has recorded 

appropriate tax information.

While ATF investigators routinely monitor firearms transactions of FFLs, 

the agency does not monitor private firearms transactions among 

nonlicensed individuals. As noted above, private sales among 

nonlicensed individuals who are residents of the same state are not 

subject to record-keeping or background-check requirements, so ATF 

does not have a means by which to monitor these sales as they take 

place.

 27Firearms tracing is the systematic tracking of movement of a firearm recovered by lawenforcement officials from its first sale by the manufacturer or importer through the 

distribution chain to the first retail purchaser.

ATF Enforces Firearms 

Laws through Regulatory 

Inspections of Licensed 

Firearms Dealers to 

Detect Prohibited Firearms
Page 18 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

One aspect of the enforcement work undertaken by ATF agents is to 

investigate reports of individuals engaging in the business of dealing in 

firearms without a license. According to agency officials with the ATF 

Violent Crime Intelligence Unit, as part of these investigations, agents 

gather information about a suspect’s firearm transactions. On the basis of 

the activity detected, agents will determine whether the extent of the sales 

history is significant enough to warrant further action.

In fiscal years 2014–2016, ATF made 322 arrests for engaging in the 

business of dealing in firearms without a license. These figures represent 

all arrests, as ATF does not identify or track whether transactions were 

facilitated by the Internet. During the same time, ATF also made 53

arrests for charges related to the unlawful interstate transfer of firearms, 

204 arrests for charges related to the sale of firearms to a prohibited 

person, and 12,586 arrests for charges related to the possession of a 

firearm by a prohibited person. These arrests may include but are not 

limited to Internet-related investigations. According to documentation 

provided by ATF, 89 percent of the defendants in these arrests received a 

conviction. See table 1.

Table 1: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Firearm Arrest Statistics, Fiscal Years 2014–2016 

Charge 2014 2015 2016 Total

Dealing firearms without a license 112 96 114 322

Unlawful interstate transfer of firearms 18 19 16 53

Sale to prohibited individual 83 72 49 204

Prohibited person in possession of firearm 4,116 4,237 4,233 12,586

Source: ATF. | GAO-18-24

ATF Law-Enforcement 

Operations Investigate 

Firearm-Related Crimes, 

Including Those Facilitated 

by the Internet
Page 19 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Our agents successfully purchased two firearms from sellers we located 

on a Dark Web marketplace as a result of seven total attempts.28 ATF 

officials stated that the Dark Web is completely anonymous and is

designed to facilitate criminal activity online. Further, an ATF report states 

that most used firearms are sold via the online auctions, online 

marketplaces, and on the Dark Web as compared to the Surface Web. In 

the seven attempts, our agents did not disclose any information indicating 

they were prohibited from possessing a firearm. In the five attempts 

where we did not ultimately purchase a firearm, the prospective seller 

stopped responding to our inquiries, stated the firearm was no longer for 

sale, refused to use an escrow account for payment, or experienced 

technical problems using the Dark Web marketplace. The first weapon 

that we purchased was an AR-15 rifle, which is a semiautomatic firearm. 

The serial number on the firearm was obliterated. The Dark Web seller 

shipped the dismantled weapon directly to the undercover address 

provided by our agent. It is unlawful for any person to possess or ship in 

interstate commerce a firearm which has had the importer’s or 

manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered, if the 

individual had such knowledge about the serial number. Additionally, 

because the firearm was shipped across state lines, the seller may not 

have been a resident of the same state as our agent. We did not confirm 

whether the seller notified the shipping company that the package 

contained a firearm. Any of these circumstances—removing a serial 

number, selling to a resident of a different state, or failing to properly 

notify the shipping company that the shipment contained a firearm—if 

 28According to an ATF report, most Dark Web websites that sell firearms are scams. 

Unlike our Surface Web testing, our agents did not get scammed by sellers on the Dark 

Web. 

Agents Purchased 

Two Firearms on the 

Dark Web, but Covert 

Attempts to Illegally 

Purchase Firearms 

on the Surface Web 

Were Unsuccessful

Agents Successfully 

Purchased Two Firearms 

on the Dark Web
Page 20 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

proven, would likely violate federal law. A photo of the weapon can be 

seen in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Photo of AR-15 Rifle Purchased by GAO Agents on the Dark Web

The second weapon we purchased was an Uzi, which is an Israeli-made 

semiautomatic firearm, and was advertised as a fully automatic firearm.

See photo in figure 4.

Figure 4: Photo of Uzi Purchased by GAO Agents on the Dark Web

Note: The United States Postal Inspection Service retrieved this firearm from the mail stream for our 

agents and took photographs documenting the firearm on our behalf.
Page 21 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

If the firearm meets the NFA’s definition of a machine gun, the seller’s 

prior possession of the Uzi, and the shipment to our agent, likely violated 

federal law. Generally, only machine guns that were lawfully possessed 

prior to May 19, 1986, may continue to be possessed and transferred, 

with ATF approval, if they are registered in accordance with the NFA. 

We are referring information regarding our two Dark Web purchases to 

applicable law-enforcement agencies to inform any ongoing investigations 

for any further action they deem appropriate.

Our covert testing involving GAO agents attempting to purchase firearms 

illegally on the Surface Web were unsuccessful. Specifically, private 

sellers on Surface Web gun forums and in classified ads were unwilling to 

sell a firearm to our agents that self-identified as being prohibited from 

possessing a firearm. In our 72 attempts to purchase firearms from 

private sellers on the Surface Web, 56 sellers refused to complete a 

transaction once we revealed that either the shipping address was across 

state lines or that we were prohibited by law from owning firearms. The 

scenarios we applied to the purchases were derived from provisions in 

the GCA. The five scenarios disclosed status information that would 

disqualify our agents from purchasing a firearm. For example, in one 

scenario we stated that we were a convicted felon; in another scenario, 

we informed the seller that we had a dishonorable discharge from the 

military.29 In these 56 attempts, 29 sellers refused because they would 

not ship a firearm and 27 refused after we presented the scenario. 

Furthermore, in five of these attempts, the accounts we set up on several 

forums were frozen by the websites, which prevented us from using them 

 29Investigations by law-enforcement agencies may also involve undercover buyers 

voluntarily disclosing disqualifying information to individuals suspected of selling firearms 

or ammunition to prohibited individuals or residents of different states. See, e.g., United 

States v. Clements, 686 Fed. Appx. 849 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming conviction for selling 

ammunition to a local police department’s confidential informant who told the defendant 

that he was an alien illegally in the United States); United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263 

(11th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction for selling a firearm to an ATF confidential informant 

who told the defendant that he was a convicted felon); DiMartino v. Buckles, 129 F. Supp. 

2d 824 (D. Md. 2001) (granting ATF’s motion for summary judgment in petition for review 

of denial of a federal firearms license renewal application where the defendant, among 

other things, transferred ammunition to an ATF confidential informant who told the 

defendant that he was a convicted felon and transferred a firearm to an undercover ATF 

agent who told the defendant that he was a resident of a different state).

All of Our Attempts to 

Illegally Purchase 

Firearms from Private 

Sellers on the Surface 

Web Were Unsuccessful
Page 22 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

after we disclosed our prohibited status or requested interstate shipment 

and attempted to make a purchase.

In the 11 remaining attempts, we encountered private sellers that 

appeared to have scammed us, or attempted to scam us, after we 

disclosed our prohibited status or asked to avoid using an FFL.30 In two of 

these instances, we made a payment and never received the firearm or a 

refund. In the remaining nine attempted scams, our agents determined 

that the seller may not be legitimate and therefore did not complete the 

purchase. For example, in one attempt, the agent conducted investigative 

research on the seller and found evidence suggesting that the seller may 

be involved in online fraud. As a result, the agent did not follow through 

with the purchase attempt. ATF does not have jurisdiction over fraud 

cases so, when it encounters such circumstances, the agency may refer 

the case to the Joint Support and Operations Center or to local or state 

law-enforcement agencies or may encourage the victim to file a police 

report. The results of our attempts on the Surface Web are summarized in 

figure 5.

Figure 5: Summary of Surface Web Purchase Attempts

 30We use the term scam in instances we remitted payment for a firearm we did not 

receive, or our agents otherwise determined that the firearm would not be shipped.
Page 23 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

We provided a draft of this report to ATF and DOJ on October 31, 2017,

for review and comment. ATF provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Deputy Director of 

ATF and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available 

at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

Agency Comments
Page 24 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

Seto Bagdoyan at (202) 512-6722 or bagdoyans@gao.gov, or Wayne 

McElrath at (202) 512-2905 or mcelrathw@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

Seto J. Bagdoyan

Director of Audits

Forensic Audits and Investigative Service

Wayne McElrath

Director of Investigations

Forensic Audits and Investigative Service
Appendix I: Methods for Performing GAO 

Covert Testing

Page 25 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

For our covert attempts to buy firearms on the Internet, we performed 

tests on both the Dark Web and the Surface Web to compare and 

contrast how transactions are completed. For the tests, our agents 

employed undercover identities and accessed online marketplaces where 

firearms were advertised for sale. In both Dark Web and Surface Web 

testing, the agents contacted sellers that posted ads online, and 

attempted to complete firearm purchases. For our testing, we did not 

proactively attempt to purchase firearms from Federal Firearm Licensees

(FFL), focusing our efforts on private sellers. We counted an attempt as 

successful if we received a firearm. We counted an attempt as a failure if 

we contacted the seller and expressed interest in purchasing the 

advertised firearm and the seller refused to complete the purchase, or if 

the seller failed to respond after initial contact was made. In some 

instances on the Surface Web, after we contacted a seller and described 

our prohibited status, we were “banned,” or prohibited from accessing the 

gun forum or classified ad website. Additionally, in two instances, our 

agents were apparently “scammed” in that we remitted payment for a 

firearm we did not receive, or our agents otherwise identified indicators 

that the firearm would not be shipped. The results of our testing are for 

illustrative purposes only and are not generalizable.

Prior to beginning our testing, to understand how prohibited individuals 

may use the Internet to purchase firearms or firearm components, we 

reviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published reports, including adjudicated 

criminal cases. We also met with third-party groups with knowledge of the 

firearms industry, including state law-enforcement agencies, a purveyor of 

commercial website that host online firearm classified advertisements, a 

gun-control advocacy group, a firearm-industry organization, and an 

academic research center, to learn about online firearm marketplaces, 

criminal pathways to illegally purchase or sell firearms, and enforcement 

responses.

Additionally, we reviewed reports by a gun-control advocacy group to 

understand how prior similar work in this area was performed. We learned 

through our review and our subsequent interviews with individuals who 

performed this work that no federal laws were broken when this testing 

was conducted. Accordingly, to demonstrate how the Internet may 

facilitate illegal firearm transactions, we decided our agents would 

complete the firearm purchases.

Appendix I: Methods for Performing GAO 

Covert Testing

Scope
Appendix I: Methods for Performing GAO 

Covert Testing

Page 26 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Agents also accessed firearm advertisements on a Dark Web 

marketplace and attempted to purchase firearms or firearm components 

from nonlicensed private sellers. Agents focused on one Dark Web 

marketplace for this stage of testing. Our agents performed a preliminary 

test to assess the feasibility of purchasing a firearm on the Dark Web. 

This attempt was successful, so our agents proceeded with additional 

planned attempts to purchase additional firearms on the Dark Web. 

Testing ended once a firearm was successfully purchased and received 

by our agents, with a total of seven attempts completed. For these covert 

tests, we did not disclose any information about our presumed prohibited 

status. We also focused our efforts on purchasing a firearm that appeared 

to be restricted by the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA).

To perform Surface Web testing, our agents accessed public gun forums 

and other classified ads where private nonlicensed sellers listed firearms 

for sale. These forums and classified ads were identified from our 

meetings with ATF and third-party entities, and a review of available 

documentation. We considered the following factors when selecting 

online classified websites:

• hosted nationwide or regional ads,

• quantity of ads,

• variety of firearms available, and

• accessibility of website.

Recently posted ads on these sites were selected if they fell within a 

designated price range, and were for transactions between private 

nonlicensed individuals.

The purpose of our Surface Web purchase attempts was to determine 

whether private sellers would knowingly sell a firearm to an individual 

prohibited from possessing one, as outlined by the Gun Control Act of 

1968 (GCA). Our agents used one of five scenarios based on a provision 

of the GCA when attempting to purchase a firearm. The scenarios 

Methodology for Dark 

Web Covert Testing

Methodology for 

Surface Web Covert 

Testing
Appendix I: Methods for Performing GAO 

Covert Testing

Page 27 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

involved overtly explaining why our agent was prohibited from possessing 

a firearm.1 The scenarios based on the GCA covered the following:

• a felon avoiding a background check,

• an individual with a domestic-violence background or a restraining 

order against him or her,

• an individual who unlawfully uses controlled substances (or is an 

addict),

• an individual who was dishonorably discharged from the military, and

• an individual who has renounced his or her citizenship or is otherwise 

an unlawful alien.

Before we began testing, we determined that we would run each scenario 

iteratively until we successfully completed a purchase, we exhausted the 

number of applicable ads, or we capped out our predetermined cap of 15 

purchase attempts, with a total of 75 attempts to be made in total. 

However, due to investigative decisions, we only employed 72 attempts.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to November 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We conducted our related 

 1

Although it is unlawful to sell a firearm to a prohibited individual if the individual knows or 

has reasonable cause to believe that the person is prohibited, private sellers are not 

required to ask a prospective buyer if they are prohibited from possessing a firearm. 

Therefore, law-enforcement agencies may utilize confidential informants or undercover 

agents who voluntarily disclose their prohibited status or different state of residency to a 

potential seller as part of an investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Clements, 686 Fed. 

Appx. 849 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming conviction for selling ammunition to a local police 

department’s confidential informant who told the defendant that he was an alien illegally in 

the United States); United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming 

conviction for selling a firearm to an ATF confidential informant who told the defendant 

that he was a convicted felon); DiMartino v. Buckles, 129 F. Supp. 2d 824 (D. Md. 2001) 

(granting ATF’s motion for summary judgment in petition for review of denial of a federal 

firearms license renewal application where the defendant, among other things, transferred 

ammunition to an ATF confidential informant who told the defendant that he was a 

convicted felon and transferred a firearm to an undercover ATF agent who told the 

defendant that he was a resident of a different state).
Appendix I: Methods for Performing GAO 

Covert Testing

Page 28 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

investigative work in accordance with the standards prescribed by the 

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Appendix II: Examples of Illegal Firearms Sales 

Facilitated by the Internet

Page 29 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

As noted above, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) does not track statistics on firearm enforcement actions 

that involve illegal transactions facilitated by the Internet. However, ATF 

officials provided several examples of closed, adjudicated cases where 

the agency took enforcement action against individuals who were using 

the Internet to facilitate illegal transactions. The following summaries 

provide examples of the type of investigative and enforcement work ATF 

agents perform:

• One individual was indicted in February 2015 for being a felon in 

possession of firearms and for possessing a machine gun. In 

November 2014, ATF’s Internet Investigation Center (the Center) 

received a tip from the ATF Tip Line; a legitimate seller was 

suspicious of a buyer who was attempting to obtain a firearm without 

involving a Federal Firearm Licensee (FFL) and suggested the seller 

could obliterate the serial numbers. The Center identified the 

prospective buyer as a convicted felon. The individual agreed to 

provide the undercover agent with a Glock auto sear—which, when 

attached to a firearm makes it a fully automatic weapon—and firearm 

components that could be used to transform an M-16 style rifle into a 

machine gun. In exchange, the undercover agent would provide the 

individual with a Glock pistol and $300 cash.1 The individual and an 

undercover agent completed the transaction and the individual was 

immediately arrested. The individual’s criminal history included a 

recent prior felony gun-possession conviction. The individual pleaded 

guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and to the illegal 

transfer or possession of a machine gun, and was sentenced to 33 

months imprisonment and 36 months of supervised release.

• In 2009, one individual was indicted on six counts of federal criminal 

violations, including one count for engaging in the business of 

firearms without a license. According to the indictment, from 

approximately January 1, 2005, to May 8, 2008, while serving as an 

FBI agent, the individual purchased multiple firearms from various 

sources including private sellers, local stores, and sellers he dealt with 

over the Internet. He posted at least 280 firearms for sale on a 

legitimate firearm website, some of which were multiple listings of the 

same item in the event that interested bidders did not meet his target 

price. During this period, he purchased at least 54 firearms and sold 

at least 51 firearms. He profited from all the sales, collecting more 

 1

As noted earlier in this report, firearm components that enable a weapon to fire 

automatically are considered machine guns.

Appendix II: Examples of Illegal Firearms 

Sales Facilitated by the Internet
Appendix II: Examples of Illegal Firearms Sales 

Facilitated by the Internet

Page 30 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

than $118,000 in gross receipts. The individual was also indicted on 

four counts of causing a firearms dealer to maintain false records, 

which related to his purchasing firearms for third parties (straw 

purchases). In addition, the individual was indicted on one count of 

providing ATF with a false document listing the firearms he bought 

and sold; agents recovered a more-extensive and more-descriptive 

list. The individual was found guilty on all counts in April 2010, and 

was sentenced in August 2010 to 2 years in federal prison.

• According to an affidavit from an ATF Special Agent, an individual 

offered silencers, pistols, and rifles for sale on the Dark Web, as well 

as nationwide shipping. The ATF Center “proactively targeted” the 

individual’s vendor name “through various methods of analysis,” 

identified numerous Internet forum and social-media profiles 

associated with the individual, and ultimately discovered his true 

identity. The Center referred “an investigative lead” and the

corresponding evidence and analysis to the respective ATF Field 

Division. According to the affidavit, the Special Agent conducted a 

controlled purchase through one of the Dark Web marketplaces, 

reviewed U.S. Postal Service security video and observed the 

individual mail the firearm, and executed arrest and search warrants. 

The individual pled guilty to one count of causing a firearm silencer to 

be delivered by the U.S. Postal Service without proper notification, 

and was sentenced to 6 months in federal prison and 3 years of 

supervised release.

• In October 2013, an individual was indicted for illegal exportation, 

shipment, and delivery of firearms and firearm components that were 

sold on a Dark Web site. The man shipped a handgun concealed in a 

video game system to a buyer in Sydney, Australia. Australian 

Federal Police intercepted the package and alerted ATF, which began 

an investigation. During the investigation, the individual shipped a 

9 mm pistol with an obliterated serial number to the United Kingdom, 

various assault-rifle parts to Australia, and a .22-caliber pistol with an 

obliterated serial number and a weapon magazine to Sweden. Each 

firearm was disassembled and concealed in a broken electronic 

device. The individual pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2 years 

imprisonment and 2 years of supervised release.

• In February 2015, an individual was indicted for dealing in firearms 

without a license and selling firearms to residents of other states. The 

individual sold firearms via two Dark Web sites and shipped them to 

buyers in the United States and internationally. In an attempt to hide 

his identity, the man placed false return-address labels on the 

packages, used aliases to send the packages, and packed the 
Appendix II: Examples of Illegal Firearms Sales 

Facilitated by the Internet

Page 31 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

firearms so that they appeared to be computer hard drives. The 

individuals agreed to sell handguns to undercover ATF agents posing 

as gun buyers and then shipped the guns from Alabama to Nebraska 

and New Jersey. The individual was found guilty and sentenced in 

November 2015 to 51 months in prison and 36 months supervised 

release.
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 32 GAO-18-24 Internet Firearm Sales

Seto J. Bagdoyan, (202) 512-6722 or bagdoyans@gao.gov

Wayne A. McElrath, (202) 512-2905 or mcelrathw@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Dave Bruno (Assistant Director), 

Dean Campbell, Julia DiPonio, Robert Graves, and Kristen Timko made 

key contributions to this report. Other contributors include Marcus Corbin, 

Colin Fallon, Maria McMullen, James Murphy, Anna Maria Ortiz, Julie 

Spetz, and Helina Wong.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100206)
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Strategic Planning and 

External Liaison

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