(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS 

OF COUNTY OF BURLINGTON ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 10–945. Argued October 12, 2011—Decided April 2, 2012 

Petitioner was arrested during a traffic stop by a New Jersey state 

trooper who checked a statewide computer database and found a 

bench warrant issued for petitioner’s arrest after he failed to appear

at a hearing to enforce a fine. He was initially detained in the Burlington County Detention Center and later in the Essex County Correctional Facility, but was released once it was determined that the

fine had been paid. At the first jail, petitioner, like every incoming

detainee, had to shower with a delousing agent and was checked for 

scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as he disrobed. Petitioner claims that he also had to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out 

his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. At the second jail, petitioner, like other arriving detainees, had to remove his clothing while 

an officer looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband; had an

officer look at his ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, armpits, and other body openings; had a mandatory shower; and had his 

clothes examined. Petitioner claims that he was also required to lift

his genitals, turn around, and cough while squatting. He filed a 42 

U. S. C. §1983 action in the Federal District Court against the government entities that ran the jails and other defendants, alleging 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and arguing that persons arrested for minor offenses cannot be subjected to invasive 

searches unless prison officials have reason to suspect concealment of

weapons, drugs, or other contraband. The court granted him summary judgment, ruling that “strip-searching” nonindictable offenders

without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment. The 

Third Circuit reversed. 

Held: The judgment is affirmed. 
 

 

2 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Syllabus
 

621 F. 3d 296, affirmed. 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to

Part IV, concluding that the search procedures at the county jails 

struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of

the institutions, and thus the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 

do not require adoption of the framework and rules petitioner proposes. Pp. 5−18, 19. 

(a) Maintaining safety and order at detention centers requires the 

expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to problems. A regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 

482 U. S. 78, 89. This Court, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 558, 

upheld a rule requiring pretrial detainees in federal correctional facilities “to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of

a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from

outside the institution[s],” deferring to the judgment of correctional 

officials that the inspections served not only to discover but also to

deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other prohibited items.

In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576, 586−587, the Court upheld a 

general ban on contact visits in a county jail, noting the smuggling

threat posed by such visits and the difficulty of carving out exceptions

for certain detainees. The Court, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 

522−523, also recognized that deterring the possession of contraband

depends in part on the ability to conduct searches without predictable

exceptions when it upheld the constitutionality of random searches of 

inmate lockers and cells even without suspicion that an inmate is

concealing a prohibited item. These cases establish that correctional 

officials must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities, and

that “in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate 

that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such

matters,” Block, supra, at 584–585. 

Persons arrested for minor offenses may be among the detainees to

be processed at jails. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 354. 

Pp. 5−9. 

(b) The question here is whether undoubted security imperatives 

involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from the invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. 

Correctional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process. The admission 

of new inmates creates risks for staff, the existing detainee popula-
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

Syllabus 

tion, and the new detainees themselves. Officials therefore must 

screen for contagious infections and for wounds or injuries requiring 

immediate medical attention. It may be difficult to identify and treat

medical problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection. Jails and prisons also face potential gang violence, giving

them reasonable justification for a visual inspection of detainees for

signs of gang affiliation as part of the intake process. Additionally, 

correctional officials have to detect weapons, drugs, alcohol, and 

other prohibited items new detainees may possess. Drugs can make

inmates aggressive toward officers or each other, and drug trading 

can lead to violent confrontations. Contraband has value in a jail’s 

culture and underground economy, and competition for scarce goods 

can lead to violence, extortion, and disorder. Pp. 9−13. 

(c) Petitioner’s proposal―that new detainees not arrested for serious crimes or for offenses involving weapons or drugs be exempt from 

invasive searches unless they give officers a particular reason to suspect them of hiding contraband―is unworkable. The seriousness of 

an offense is a poor predictor of who has contraband, and it would be

difficult to determine whether individual detainees fall within the 

proposed exemption. Even persons arrested for a minor offense may

be coerced by others into concealing contraband. Exempting people

arrested for minor offenses from a standard search protocol thus may 

put them at greater risk and result in more contraband being 

brought into the detention facility. 

 It also may be difficult to classify inmates by their current and prior offenses before the intake search. Jail officials know little at the 

outset about an arrestee, who may be carrying a false ID or lie about

his identity. The officers conducting an initial search often do not

have access to criminal history records. And those records can be inaccurate or incomplete. Even with accurate information, officers 

would encounter serious implementation difficulties. They would be 

required to determine quickly whether any underlying offenses were 

serious enough to authorize the more invasive search protocol. Other 

possible classifications based on characteristics of individual detainees also might prove to be unworkable or even give rise to charges of

discriminatory application. To avoid liability, officers might be inclined not to conduct a thorough search in any close case, thus creating unnecessary risk for the entire jail population. While the restrictions petitioner suggests would limit the intrusion on the privacy

of some detainees, it would be at the risk of increased danger to everyone in the facility, including the less serious offenders. The Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendments do not require adoption of the proposed

framework. Pp. 13−18, 19. 
 

 

4 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Syllabus

 KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV. 

ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and ALITO, JJ., joined that opinion in full, 

and THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part IV. ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, 

J., filed concurring opinions. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 

which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–945 

ALBERT W. FLORENCE, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF
 

CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF
 

BURLINGTON ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

[April 2, 2012]

 JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, 

except as to Part IV.* 

Correctional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed 

a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less 

secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on

their bodies. Facility personnel, other inmates, and the 

new detainee himself or herself may be in danger if these 

threats are introduced into the jail population. This case 

presents the question of what rules, or limitations, the

Constitution imposes on searches of arrested persons who 

are to be held in jail while their cases are being processed. 

The term “jail” is used here in a broad sense to include

prisons and other detention facilities. The specific 

measures being challenged will be described in more

detail; but, in broad terms, the controversy concerns 

whether every detainee who will be admitted to the general population may be required to undergo a close visual 

inspection while undressed.

The case turns in part on the extent to which this Court 

—————— 

* JUSTICE THOMAS joins all but Part IV of this opinion. 
 

2 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

has sufficient expertise and information in the record to

mandate, under the Constitution, the specific restrictions

and limitations sought by those who challenge the visual

search procedures at issue. In addressing this type of 

constitutional claim courts must defer to the judgment of 

correctional officials unless the record contains substantial 

evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security. That 

necessary showing has not been made in this case. 

I 

In 1998, seven years before the incidents at issue, petitioner Albert Florence was arrested after fleeing from

police officers in Essex County, New Jersey. He was 

charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly 

weapon. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to two lesser

offenses and was sentenced to pay a fine in monthly installments. In 2003, after he fell behind on his payments

and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing, a bench

warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid the outstanding balance less than a week later; but, for some unexplained reason, the warrant remained in a statewide 

computer database.

Two years later, in Burlington County, New Jersey, 

petitioner and his wife were stopped in their automobile

by a state trooper. Based on the outstanding warrant in 

the computer system, the officer arrested petitioner and

took him to the Burlington County Detention Center. He 

was held there for six days and then was transferred to 

the Essex County Correctional Facility. It is not the arrest or confinement but the search process at each jail that

gives rise to the claims before the Court.

Burlington County jail procedures required every arrestee to shower with a delousing agent. Officers would 

check arrestees for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as they disrobed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a–56a. 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Petitioner claims he was also instructed to open his

mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and 

lift his genitals. (It is not clear whether this last step was

part of the normal practice. See ibid.) Petitioner shared a 

cell with at least one other person and interacted with

other inmates following his admission to the jail. Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 17. 

The Essex County Correctional Facility, where petitioner was taken after six days, is the largest county jail

in New Jersey. App. 70a. It admits more than 25,000 inmates each year and houses about 1,000 gang members at 

any given time. When petitioner was transferred there, 

all arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and

waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search.

When they left the holding cell, they were instructed to

remove their clothing while an officer looked for body 

markings, wounds, and contraband. Apparently without 

touching the detainees, an officer looked at their ears,

nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, 

and other body openings. Id., at 57a–59a; App. to Pet. 

for Cert. 137a–144a. This policy applied regardless of the

circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or the

detainee’s behavior, demeanor, or criminal history. Petitioner alleges he was required to lift his genitals, turn

around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the 

process. After a mandatory shower, during which his

clothes were inspected, petitioner was admitted to the

facility. App. 3a–4a, 52a, 258a. He was released the next 

day, when the charges against him were dismissed.

Petitioner sued the governmental entities that operated

the jails, one of the wardens, and certain other defendants.

The suit was commenced in the United States District 

Court for the District of New Jersey. Seeking relief under

42 U. S. C. §1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, petitioner maintained that persons arrested for a minor offense could not be required 
4 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

to remove their clothing and expose the most private areas

of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part

of the intake process. Rather, he contended, officials could 

conduct this kind of search only if they had reason to

suspect a particular inmate of concealing a weapon, drugs,

or other contraband. The District Court certified a class of 

individuals who were charged with a nonindictable offense 

under New Jersey law, processed at either the Burlington 

County or Essex County jail, and directed to strip naked 

even though an officer had not articulated any reasonable

suspicion they were concealing contraband.

After discovery, the court granted petitioner’s motion

for summary judgment on the unlawful search claim. It 

concluded that any policy of “strip searching” nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violated the 

Fourth Amendment. A divided panel of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding

that the procedures described by the District Court struck

a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the 

security needs of the two jails. 621 F. 3d 296 (2010). The 

case proceeds on the understanding that the officers

searched detainees prior to their admission to the general

population, as the Court of Appeals seems to have assumed. See id., at 298, 311. Petitioner has not argued 

this factual premise is incorrect.

The opinions in earlier proceedings, the briefs on file, 

and some cases of this Court refer to a “strip search.” The 

term is imprecise. It may refer simply to the instruction 

to remove clothing while an officer observes from a distance of, say, five feet or more; it may mean a visual inspection from a closer, more uncomfortable distance; it

may include directing detainees to shake their heads or to

run their hands through their hair to dislodge what might 

be hidden there; or it may involve instructions to raise 

arms, to display foot insteps, to expose the back of the

ears, to move or spread the buttocks or genital areas, or to 
 

 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

cough in a squatting position. In the instant case, the 

term does not include any touching of unclothed areas 

by the inspecting officer. There are no allegations that 

the detainees here were touched in any way as part of the 

searches. 

The Federal Courts of Appeals have come to differing

conclusions as to whether the Fourth Amendment requires 

correctional officials to exempt some detainees who will be 

admitted to a jail’s general population from the searches

here at issue. This Court granted certiorari to address the

question. 563 U. S. ___ (2011). 

II 

The difficulties of operating a detention center must not 

be underestimated by the courts. Turner v. Safley, 482 

U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Jails (in the stricter sense of

the term, excluding prison facilities) admit more than 13 

million inmates a year. See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, T. Minton, Jail Inmates at Midyear 

2010—Statistical Tables 2 (2011). The largest facilities 

process hundreds of people every day; smaller jails may be

crowded on weekend nights, after a large police operation, 

or because of detainees arriving from other jurisdictions. 

Maintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must 

have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions 

to the problems they face. The Court has confirmed the 

importance of deference to correctional officials and explained that a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld “if it is reasonably related 

to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, supra, at 89; 

see Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U. S. 126, 131–132 (2003). 

But see Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 510–511 

(2005) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications). 

The Court’s opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 

(1979), is the starting point for understanding how this 
6 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

framework applies to Fourth Amendment challenges. 

That case addressed a rule requiring pretrial detainees 

in any correctional facility run by the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons “to expose their body cavities for visual inspection 

as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact

visit with a person from outside the institution.” Id., at 

558. Inmates at the federal Metropolitan Correctional

Center in New York City argued there was no security

justification for these searches. Officers searched guests

before they entered the visiting room, and the inmates 

were under constant surveillance during the visit. Id., at 

577–578 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There had been but 

one instance in which an inmate attempted to sneak contraband back into the facility. See id., at 559 (majority

opinion). The Court nonetheless upheld the search policy. 

It deferred to the judgment of correctional officials that

the inspections served not only to discover but also to

deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs, and other prohibited items inside. Id., at 558. The Court explained that

there is no mechanical way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are reasonable. Id., at 559. 

The need for a particular search must be balanced against 

the resulting invasion of personal rights. Ibid. 

Policies designed to keep contraband out of jails and

prisons have been upheld in cases decided since Bell. In 

Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576 (1984), for example, the 

Court concluded that the Los Angeles County Jail could 

ban all contact visits because of the threat they posed: 

“They open the institution to the introduction of

drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Visitors can 

easily conceal guns, knives, drugs, or other contraband in countless ways and pass them to an inmate 

unnoticed by even the most vigilant observers. And 

these items can readily be slipped from the clothing of

an innocent child, or transferred by other visitors 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

permitted close contact with inmates.” Id., at 586. 

There were “many justifications” for imposing a general 

ban rather than trying to carve out exceptions for certain

detainees. Id., at 587. Among other problems, it would be

“a difficult if not impossible task” to identify “inmates who 

have propensities for violence, escape, or drug smuggling.” 

Ibid. This was made “even more difficult by the brevity of 

detention and the constantly changing nature of the inmate population.” Ibid. 

The Court has also recognized that deterring the possession of contraband depends in part on the ability to conduct searches without predictable exceptions. In Hudson 

v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984), it addressed the question 

of whether prison officials could perform random searches

of inmate lockers and cells even without reason to suspect 

a particular individual of concealing a prohibited item. 

Id., at 522–523. The Court upheld the constitutionality of 

the practice, recognizing that “‘[f]or one to advocate that

prison searches must be conducted only pursuant to an

enunciated general policy or when suspicion is directed at

a particular inmate is to ignore the realities of prison 

operation.’” Id., at 529 (quoting Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 754, 757, 284 S. E. 2d 809, 811 (1981)). 

Inmates would adapt to any pattern or loopholes they

discovered in the search protocol and then undermine the 

security of the institution. 468 U. S., at 529. 

These cases establish that correctional officials must be 

permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect 

and deter the possession of contraband in their facilities.

See Bell, 441 U. S., at 546 (“[M]aintaining institutional 

security and preserving internal order and discipline are 

essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of

retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners 

and pretrial detainees”). The task of determining whether 

a policy is reasonably related to legitimate security inter-
 

8 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

ests is “peculiarly within the province and professional

expertise of corrections officials.” Id., at 548. This Court 

has repeated the admonition that, “‘in the absence of 

substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the 

officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts should ordinarily defer to their expert 

judgment in such matters.’” Block, supra, at 584–585; 

Bell, supra, at 548. 

In many jails officials seek to improve security by requiring some kind of strip search of everyone who is to be 

detained. These procedures have been used in different 

places throughout the country, from Cranston, Rhode

Island, to Sapulpa, Oklahoma, to Idaho Falls, Idaho. See 

Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F. 3d 107, 108–109 (CA1 

2001); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F. 2d 393, 394 (CA10 

1993); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F. 2d 614, 615 (CA9 1984) 

(per curiam); see also, e.g., Bull v. City and Cty. of San 

Francisco, 595 F. 3d 964 (CA9 2010) (en banc) (San Francisco, California); Powell v. Barrett, 541 F. 3d 1298 (CA11 

2008) (en banc) (Fulton Cty., Ga.); Masters v. Crouch, 872 

F. 2d 1248, 1251 (CA6 1989) (Jefferson Cty., Ky.); Weber v. 

Dell, 804 F. 2d 796, 797–798 (CA2 1986) (Monroe Cty.,

N. Y.); Stewart v. Lubbock Cty., 767 F. 2d 153, 154 (CA5 

1985) (Lubbock Cty., Tex.). 

Persons arrested for minor offenses may be among the

detainees processed at these facilities. This is, in part, a 

consequence of the exercise of state authority that was the

subject of Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318 (2001). 

Atwater addressed the perhaps more fundamental question of who may be deprived of liberty and taken to jail in 

the first place. The case involved a woman who was arrested after a police officer noticed neither she nor her 

children were wearing their seatbelts. The arrestee argued the Fourth Amendment prohibited her custodial 

arrest without a warrant when an offense could not result 

in jail time and there was no compelling need for immedi-
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

ate detention. Id., at 346. The Court held that a Fourth 

Amendment restriction on this power would put officers in 

an “almost impossible spot.” Id., at 350. Their ability to

arrest a suspect would depend in some cases on the precise weight of drugs in his pocket, whether he was a repeat

offender, and the scope of what counted as a compelling 

need to detain someone. Id., at 348–349. The Court rejected the proposition that the Fourth Amendment barred

custodial arrests in a set of these cases as a matter of 

constitutional law. It ruled, based on established principles, that officers may make an arrest based upon probable cause to believe the person has committed a criminal 

offense in their presence. See id., at 354. The Court 

stated that “a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is 

not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-bycase determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion 

for constitutional review.” Id., at 347. 

Atwater did not address whether the Constitution imposes special restrictions on the searches of offenders 

suspected of committing minor offenses once they are

taken to jail. Some Federal Courts of Appeals have held

that corrections officials may not conduct a strip search of

these detainees, even if no touching is involved, absent 

reasonable suspicion of concealed contraband. 621 F. 3d, 

at 303–304, and n. 4. The Courts of Appeals to address

this issue in the last decade, however, have come to the 

opposite conclusion. See 621 F. 3d 296 (case below); Bame 

v. Dillard, 637 F. 3d 380 (CADC 2011); Powell, supra; 

Bull, supra. The current case is set against this precedent

and governed by the principles announced in Turner and 

Bell. 

III 

The question here is whether undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the asser-
 

10 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

tion that some detainees must be exempt from the more

invasive search procedures at issue absent reasonable

suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. The 

Court has held that deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is “substantial 

evidence” demonstrating their response to the situation is 

exaggerated. Block, 468 U. S., at 584–585 (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner has not met this standard, 

and the record provides full justifications for the procedures used. 

A 

Correctional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake 

process. The admission of inmates creates numerous risks 

for facility staff, for the existing detainee population, and 

for a new detainee himself or herself. The danger of introducing lice or contagious infections, for example, is well

documented. See, e.g., Deger & Quick, The Enduring 

Menace of MRSA: Incidence, Treatment, and Prevention 

in a County Jail, 15 J. Correctional Health Care 174, 174–

175, 177–178 (2009); Bick, Infection Control in Jails and 

Prisons, 45 Healthcare Epidemiology 1047, 1049 (2007). 

The Federal Bureau of Prisons recommends that staff 

screen new detainees for these conditions. See Clinical 

Practice Guidelines, Management of Methicillin-Resistant 

Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Infections 2 (2011); Clinical Practice Guidelines, Lice and Scabies Protocol 1 (2011).

Persons just arrested may have wounds or other injuries 

requiring immediate medical attention. It may be difficult 

to identify and treat these problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection. See Prison and 

Jail Administration: Practice and Theory 142 (P. Carlson 

& G. Garrett eds., 2d ed. 2008) (hereinafter Carlson & 

Garrett).

Jails and prisons also face grave threats posed by the 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

increasing number of gang members who go through the 

intake process. See Brief for Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Local 249, et al. as Amici Curiae 14 (hereinafter PBA Brief); New Jersey Comm’n of Investigation,

Gangland Behind Bars: How and Why Organized Criminal

Street Gangs Thrive in New Jersey’s Prisons . . . And 

What Can Be Done About It 10–11 (2009). “Gang rivalries 

spawn a climate of tension, violence, and coercion.” Carlson & Garrett 462. The groups recruit new members by 

force, engage in assaults against staff, and give other 

inmates a reason to arm themselves. Ibid. Fights among

feuding gangs can be deadly, and the officers who must 

maintain order are put in harm’s way. PBA Brief 17. 

These considerations provide a reasonable basis to justify 

a visual inspection for certain tattoos and other signs of 

gang affiliation as part of the intake process. The identification and isolation of gang members before they are

admitted protects everyone in the facility. Cf. Fraise v. 

Terhune, 283 F. 3d 506, 509–510 (CA3 2002) (Alito, J.) 

(describing a statewide policy authorizing the identification and isolation of gang members in prison).

Detecting contraband concealed by new detainees, furthermore, is a most serious responsibility. Weapons, 

drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a jail.

Cf. Hudson, 468 U. S., at 528 (recognizing “the constant 

fight against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit 

drugs, and other contraband”). Correctional officers have 

had to confront arrestees concealing knives, scissors, razor 

blades, glass shards, and other prohibited items on their 

person, including in their body cavities. See Bull, 595 

F. 3d, at 967, 969; Brief for New Jersey County Jail Wardens Association as Amicus Curiae 17–18 (hereinafter 

New Jersey Wardens Brief). They have also found crack, 

heroin, and marijuana. Brief for City and County of San 

Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae 9–11 (hereinafter San 

Francisco Brief). The use of drugs can embolden inmates 
 

12 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

in aggression toward officers or each other; and, even 

apart from their use, the trade in these substances can

lead to violent confrontations. See PBA Brief 11. 

There are many other kinds of contraband. The textbook definition of the term covers any unauthorized item.

See Prisons: Today and Tomorrow 237 (J. Pollock ed.

1997) (“Contraband is any item that is possessed in violation of prison rules. Contraband obviously includes drugs

or weapons, but it can also be money, cigarettes, or even 

some types of clothing”). Everyday items can undermine

security if introduced into a detention facility: 

“Lighters and matches are fire and arson risks or potential weapons. Cell phones are used to orchestrate 

violence and criminality both within and without jailhouse walls. Pills and medications enhance suicide 

risks. Chewing gum can block locking devices; hairpins can open handcuffs; wigs can conceal drugs and 

weapons.” New Jersey Wardens Brief 8–9. 

Something as simple as an overlooked pen can pose a

significant danger. Inmates commit more than 10,000 

assaults on correctional staff every year and many more 

among themselves. See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, J. Stephan & J. Karberg, Census of State and 

Federal Correctional Facilities, 2000, p. v (2003). 

Contraband creates additional problems because scarce

items, including currency, have value in a jail’s culture

and underground economy. Correctional officials inform 

us “[t]he competition . . . for such goods begets violence, 

extortion, and disorder.” New Jersey Wardens Brief 2. 

Gangs exacerbate the problem. They “orchestrate thefts, 

commit assaults, and approach inmates in packs to take

the contraband from the weak.” Id., at 9–10. This puts

the entire facility, including detainees being held for a 

brief term for a minor offense, at risk. Gangs do coerce

inmates who have access to the outside world, such as 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

people serving their time on the weekends, to sneak things 

into the jail. Id., at 10; see, e.g., Pugmire, Vegas Suspect

Has Term to Serve, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 23, 2005, 

p. B1 (“Weekend-only jail sentences are a common punishment for people convicted of nonviolent drug crimes . . .”). 

These inmates, who might be thought to pose the least

risk, have been caught smuggling prohibited items into

jail. See New Jersey Wardens Brief 10. Concealing contraband often takes little time and effort. It might be done

as an officer approaches a suspect’s car or during a brief 

commotion in a group holding cell. Something small

might be tucked or taped under an armpit, behind an ear,

between the buttocks, in the instep of a foot, or inside the 

mouth or some other body cavity.

It is not surprising that correctional officials have 

sought to perform thorough searches at intake for disease,

gang affiliation, and contraband. Jails are often crowded, 

unsanitary, and dangerous places. There is a substantial 

interest in preventing any new inmate, either of his own

will or as a result of coercion, from putting all who live or 

work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is

admitted to the general population. 

B 

Petitioner acknowledges that correctional officials must

be allowed to conduct an effective search during the intake 

process and that this will require at least some detainees

to lift their genitals or cough in a squatting position.

These procedures, similar to the ones upheld in Bell, are 

designed to uncover contraband that can go undetected by 

a patdown, metal detector, and other less invasive 

searches. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23 

(hereinafter United States Brief); New Jersey Wardens 

Brief 19, n. 6. Petitioner maintains there is little benefit 

to conducting these more invasive steps on a new detainee 

who has not been arrested for a serious crime or for any 
 

14 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

offense involving a weapon or drugs. In his view these detainees should be exempt from this process unless they 

give officers a particular reason to suspect them of hiding

contraband. It is reasonable, however, for correctional 

officials to conclude this standard would be unworkable. 

The record provides evidence that the seriousness of an

offense is a poor predictor of who has contraband and 

that it would be difficult in practice to determine whether

individual detainees fall within the proposed exemption. 

1 

People detained for minor offenses can turn out to be 

the most devious and dangerous criminals. Cf. Clements v. 

Logan, 454 U. S. 1304, 1305 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., in 

chambers) (deputy at a detention center shot by misdemeanant who had not been strip searched). Hours after 

the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was 

stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving 

without a license plate. Johnston, Suspect Won’t Answer 

Any Questions, N. Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1995, p. A1. Police 

stopped serial killer Joel Rifkin for the same reason.

McQuiston, Confession Used to Portray Rifkin as Methodical Killer, N. Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1994, p. B6. One of 

the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks was 

stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before 

hijacking Flight 93. The Terrorists: Hijacker Got a Speeding Ticket, N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2002, p. A12. Reasonable 

correctional officials could conclude these uncertainties 

mean they must conduct the same thorough search of

everyone who will be admitted to their facilities.

Experience shows that people arrested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle prohibited items into jail, 

sometimes by using their rectal cavities or genitals for the

concealment. They may have some of the same incentives

as a serious criminal to hide contraband. A detainee 

might risk carrying cash, cigarettes, or a penknife to 
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

survive in jail. Others may make a quick decision to hide 

unlawful substances to avoid getting in more trouble at

the time of their arrest. This record has concrete examples. Officers at the Atlantic County Correctional Facility,

for example, discovered that a man arrested for driving

under the influence had “2 dime bags of weed, 1 pack of 

rolling papers, 20 matches, and 5 sleeping pills” taped 

under his scrotum. Brief for Atlantic County et al. as 

Amici Curiae 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

person booked on a misdemeanor charge of disorderly 

conduct in Washington State managed to hide a lighter,

tobacco, tattoo needles, and other prohibited items in his 

rectal cavity. See United States Brief 25, n. 15. San 

Francisco officials have discovered contraband hidden in 

body cavities of people arrested for trespassing, public

nuisance, and shoplifting. San Francisco Brief 3. There 

have been similar incidents at jails throughout the country. See United States Brief 25, n. 15. 

Even if people arrested for a minor offense do not themselves wish to introduce contraband into a jail, they may 

be coerced into doing so by others. See New Jersey Wardens Brief 16; cf. Block, 468 U. S., at 587 (“It is not unreasonable to assume, for instance, that low security risk

detainees would be enlisted to help obtain contraband or 

weapons by their fellow inmates who are denied contact 

visits”). This could happen any time detainees are held in 

the same area, including in a van on the way to the station 

or in the holding cell of the jail. If, for example, a person

arrested and detained for unpaid traffic citations is not 

subject to the same search as others, this will be well

known to other detainees with jail experience. A hardened 

criminal or gang member can, in just a few minutes, approach the person and coerce him into hiding the fruits of

a crime, a weapon, or some other contraband. As an expert in this case explained, “the interaction and mingling

between misdemeanants and felons will only increase the 
 

 

16 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of the Court 

amount of contraband in the facility if the jail can only 

conduct admission searches on felons.” App. 381a. Exempting people arrested for minor offenses from a standard search protocol thus may put them at greater risk and 

result in more contraband being brought into the detention facility. This is a substantial reason not to mandate 

the exception petitioner seeks as a matter of constitutional 

law. 

2 

It also may be difficult, as a practical matter, to classify

inmates by their current and prior offenses before the 

intake search. Jails can be even more dangerous than

prisons because officials there know so little about the 

people they admit at the outset. See New Jersey Wardens 

Brief 11–14. An arrestee may be carrying a false ID or lie 

about his identity. The officers who conduct an initial 

search often do not have access to criminal history records.

See, e.g., App. 235a; New Jersey Wardens Brief 13. And 

those records can be inaccurate or incomplete. See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 

Press, 489 U. S. 749, 752 (1989). Petitioner’s rap sheet is

an example. It did not reflect his previous arrest for possession of a deadly weapon. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18–19. In 

the absence of reliable information it would be illogical to 

require officers to assume the arrestees in front of them do

not pose a risk of smuggling something into the facility.

The laborious administration of prisons would become

less effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded, were

the practical problems inevitable from the rules suggested 

by petitioner to be imposed as a constitutional mandate.

Even if they had accurate information about a detainee’s

current and prior arrests, officers, under petitioner’s proposed regime, would encounter serious implementation 

difficulties. They would be required, in a few minutes, to

determine whether any of the underlying offenses were 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

serious enough to authorize the more invasive search 

protocol. Other possible classifications based on characteristics of individual detainees also might prove to be

unworkable or even give rise to charges of discriminatory 

application. Most officers would not be well equipped to

make any of these legal determinations during the pressures of the intake process. Bull, 595 F. 3d, at 985–987 

(Kozinski, C. J., concurring); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 

466 U. S. 740, 761–762 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) 

(“[T]he Court’s approach will necessitate a case-by-case

evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts are poorly

equipped”). To avoid liability, officers might be inclined 

not to conduct a thorough search in any close case, thus 

creating unnecessary risk for the entire jail population. 

Cf. Atwater, 532 U. S., at 351, and n. 22. 

The Court addressed an analogous problem in Atwater. 

The petitioner in that case argued the Fourth Amendment 

prohibited a warrantless arrest when being convicted of 

the suspected crime “could not ultimately carry any jail 

time” and there was “no compelling need for immediate

detention.” Id., at 346. That rule “promise[d] very little in

the way of administrability.” Id., at 350. Officers could 

not be expected to draw the proposed lines on a moment’s 

notice, and the risk of violating the Constitution would

have discouraged them from arresting criminals in any 

questionable circumstances. Id., at 350–351 (“An officer

not quite sure the drugs weighed enough to warrant jail 

time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight

would not arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn 

out that, in fact, the offense called for incarceration and 

the defendant was long gone on the day of trial”). The 

Fourth Amendment did not compel this result in Atwater. 

The Court held that officers who have probable cause to 

believe even a minor criminal offense has been committed 

in their presence may arrest the offender. See id., at 354. 
Opinion of the Court 

18 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

Opinion of KENNEDY, J. 

Individual jurisdictions can of course choose “to impose

more restrictive safeguards through statutes limiting 

warrantless arrests for minor offenders.” Id., at 352. 

One of the central principles in Atwater applies with

equal force here. Officers who interact with those suspected of violating the law have an “essential interest in

readily administrable rules.” Id., at 347; accord, New York 

v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981). The officials in charge

of the jails in this case urge the Court to reject any complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to conduct less 

thorough inspections of some detainees based on their 

behavior, suspected offense, criminal history, and other 

factors. They offer significant reasons why the Constitution must not prevent them from conducting the same 

search on any suspected offender who will be admitted to

the general population in their facilities. The restrictions 

suggested by petitioner would limit the intrusion on the 

privacy of some detainees but at the risk of increased 

danger to everyone in the facility, including the less serious offenders themselves. 

IV 

This case does not require the Court to rule on the types

of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, 

for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to

the general jail population and without substantial contact

with other detainees. This describes the circumstances in 

Atwater. See 532 U. S., at 324 (“Officers took Atwater’s

‘mug shot’ and placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one 

hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate and 

released on $310 bond”). The accommodations provided in

these situations may diminish the need to conduct some

aspects of the searches at issue. Cf. United States Brief 30 

(discussing the segregation, and less invasive searches, of 

individuals held by the Federal Bureau of Prisons for

misdemeanors or civil contempt). The circumstances 
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

before the Court, however, do not present the opportunity 

to consider a narrow exception of the sort JUSTICE ALITO 

describes, post, at 2–3 (concurring opinion), which might 

restrict whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet 

been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer,

and who can be held in available facilities removed from 

the general population, may be subjected to the types of 

searches at issue here.

 Petitioner’s amici raise concerns about instances of 

officers engaging in intentional humiliation and other 

abusive practices. See Brief for Sister Bernie Galvin et al. 

as Amici Curiae; see also Hudson, 468 U. S., at 528 

(“[I]ntentional harassment of even the most hardened

criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society”); Bell, 

441 U. S., at 560. There also may be legitimate concerns 

about the invasiveness of searches that involve the touching of detainees. These issues are not implicated on the

facts of this case, however, and it is unnecessary to consider them here. 

V 

Even assuming all the facts in favor of petitioner, the

search procedures at the Burlington County Detention

Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility struck 

a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the 

needs of the institutions. The Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments do not require adoption of the framework of

rules petitioner proposes.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–945 

ALBERT W. FLORENCE, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF
 

CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF
 

BURLINGTON ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

[April 2, 2012]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring. 

I join the opinion of the Court. As with JUSTICE ALITO, 

however, it is important for me that the Court does not 

foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announces. JUSTICE KENNEDY explains that the circumstances before it do not afford an opportunity to consider

that possibility. Ante, at 18–19. Those circumstances 

include the facts that Florence was detained not for a 

minor traffic offense but instead pursuant to a warrant for 

his arrest, and that there was apparently no alternative, if 

Florence were to be detained, to holding him in the general jail population.

Factual nuances have not played a significant role as

this case has been presented to the Court. Both courts 

below regarded acknowledged factual disputes as “immaterial” to their conflicting dispositions, 621 F. 3d 296, 300

(CA3 2010), and before this Court Florence challenged 

suspicionless strip searches “no matter what the circumstances.” Pet. for Cert. i. 

The Court makes a persuasive case for the general 

applicability of the rule it announces. The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to

ensure that we “not embarrass the future.” Northwest 

Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944) 

(Frankfurter, J.). 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

ALITO, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–945 

ALBERT W. FLORENCE, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF
 

CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF
 

BURLINGTON ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

[April 2, 2012]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring. 

I join the opinion of the Court but emphasize the limits 

of today’s holding. The Court holds that jail administrators may require all arrestees who are committed to 

the general population of a jail to undergo visual strip

searches not involving physical contact by corrections

officers. To perform the searches, officers may direct the

arrestees to disrobe, shower, and submit to a visual inspection. As part of the inspection, the arrestees may be

required to manipulate their bodies.

Undergoing such an inspection is undoubtedly humiliating and deeply offensive to many, but there are reasonable grounds for strip searching arrestees before they are

admitted to the general population of a jail. As the Court 

explains, there is a serious danger that some detainees 

will attempt to smuggle weapons, drugs, or other contraband into the jail. Some detainees may have lice, which 

can easily spread to others in the facility, and some detainees may have diseases or injuries for which the jail

is required to provide medical treatment. In addition, if a 

detainee with gang-related tattoos is inadvertently housed

with detainees from a rival gang, violence may ensue.

Petitioner and the dissent would permit corrections

officers to conduct the visual strip search at issue here 
2 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

ALITO, J., concurring
 

only if the officers have a reasonable basis for thinking

that a particular arrestee may present a danger to other

detainees or members of the jail staff. But as the Court 

explains, corrections officers are often in a very poor position to make such a determination, and the threat to the 

health and safety of detainees and staff, should the officers miscalculate, is simply too great. 

It is important to note, however, that the Court does not

hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip 

search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population. Most of 

those arrested for minor offenses are not dangerous, and 

most are released from custody prior to or at the time of

their initial appearance before a magistrate. In some 

cases, the charges are dropped. In others, arrestees are 

released either on their own recognizance or on minimal 

bail. In the end, few are sentenced to incarceration. For 

these persons, admission to the general jail population, 

with the concomitant humiliation of a strip search, may 

not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative procedure 

is feasible. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons

(BOP) and possibly even some local jails appear to segregate temporary detainees who are minor offenders from 

the general population. See, e.g., Brief for United States 

as Amicus Curiae 30; Bull v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 

595 F. 3d 964, 968 (CA9 2010) (en banc).* 

—————— 

* In its amicus brief, the United States informs us that, according to

BOP policy, prison and jail officials cannot subject persons arrested for 

misdemeanor or civil contempt offenses to visual body-cavity searches

without their consent or without reasonable suspicion that they are 

concealing contraband. Brief for United States 30. Those who are not 

searched must be housed separately from the inmates in the general

population. Ibid. Similarly, as described by the Court of Appeals in 

Bull, 595 F. 3d 964, the San Francisco County jail system distinguishes

between arrestees who are eligible for release because, for instance,

they can post bail within 12 hours and those who must be housed for an 
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

ALITO, J., concurring 

The Court does not address whether it is always reasonable, without regard to the offense or the reason for detention, to strip search an arrestee before the arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a judicial officer. The lead 

opinion explicitly reserves judgment on that question. See 

ante, at 18–19. In light of that limitation, I join the opinion of the Court in full. 

—————— 

extended period of time. Id., at 968. The former are kept in holding

cells at a temporary intake and release facility where they are pat 

searched and scanned with a metal detector but apparently are not

strip searched. Ibid. The latter are transported to a jail with custodial 

housing facilities where they are then strip searched prior to their 

admission into the general population. Ibid. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–945 

ALBERT W. FLORENCE, PETITIONER v. BOARD OF 

CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF 

BURLINGTON ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

[April 2, 2012]

 JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The petition for certiorari asks us to decide 

“[w]hether the Fourth Amendment permits a . . . suspicionless strip search of every individual arrested for 

any minor offense . . . .” Pet. for Cert. i. This question

is phrased more broadly than what is at issue. The 

case is limited to strip searches of those arrestees

entering a jail’s general population, see 621 F. 3d 296,

298 (CA3 2010). And the kind of strip search in question involves more than undressing and taking a 

shower (even if guards monitor the shower area for 

threatened disorder). Rather, the searches here involve close observation of the private areas of a person’s body and for that reason constitute a far more

serious invasion of that person’s privacy. 

The visually invasive kind of strip search at issue 

here is not unique. A similar practice is well described 

in Dodge v. County of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41

(SDNY 2003). In that New York case, the “strip 

search” (as described in a relevant prison manual) 

involved: 

“‘a visual inspection of the inmate’s naked body. This 

should include the inmate opening his mouth and 
2 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

moving his tongue up and down and from side to side, 

removing any dentures, running his hands through

his hair, allowing his ears to be visually examined,

lifting his arms to expose his arm pits, lifting his feet 

to examine the sole, spreading and/or lifting his testicles to expose the area behind them and bending over

and/or spreading the cheeks of his buttocks to expose 

his anus. For females, the procedures are similar except females must in addition, squat to expose the 

vagina.’” Id., at 46. 

Because the Dodge court obtained considerable empirical 

information about the need for such a search in respect

to minor offenders, and because the searches alleged in 

this case do not differ significantly, I shall use the succinct 

Dodge description as a template for the kind of strip

search to which the Question Presented refers. See, e.g., 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a–4a (alleging that officers inspected his genitals from an arm’s length away, required 

him to lift his genitals, and examined his anal cavity).

In my view, such a search of an individual arrested for a

minor offense that does not involve drugs or violence—say

a traffic offense, a regulatory offense, an essentially civil

matter, or any other such misdemeanor—is an “unreasonable searc[h]” forbidden by the Fourth Amendment, unless 

prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe

that the individual possesses drugs or other contraband. 

And I dissent from the Court’s contrary determination. 

I 

Those confined in prison retain basic constitutional

rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 545 (1979); Turner 

v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84 (1987) (“Prison walls do not 

form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution”). The constitutional right at

issue here is the Fourth Amendment right to be free of 

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” And, as the Court 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

notes, the applicable standard is the Fourth Amendment 

balancing inquiry announced regarding prison inmates in 

Bell v. Wolfish, supra. The Court said: 

“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth 

Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against 

the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. 

Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 

conducted.” Id., at 559. 

I have described in general terms, see supra, at 1–2, the 

place, scope and manner of “the particular intrusion.” 

Bell, 441 U. S., at 559. I now explain why I believe that 

the “invasion of personal rights” here is very serious and

lacks need or justification, ibid.—at least as to the category of minor offenders at issue. 

II 

A strip search that involves a stranger peering without

consent at a naked individual, and in particular at the 

most private portions of that person’s body, is a serious invasion of privacy. We have recently said, in respect to a 

schoolchild (and a less intrusive search), that the “meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may 

reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category 

of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.” Safford 

Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2009) (slip op., at 11). The Courts of Appeals have more

directly described the privacy interests at stake, writing,

for example, that practices similar to those at issue here

are “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, 

terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repulsive,

signifying degradation and submission.” Mary Beth G. v. 
 

4 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Chicago, 723 F. 2d 1263, 1272 (CA7 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Blackburn v. Snow, 771 

F. 2d 556, 564 (CA1 1985) (“‘[A]ll courts’” have recognized 

the “‘ severe if not gross interference with a person’s privacy’” that accompany visual body cavity searches (quoting 

Arruda v. Fair, 710 F. 2d 886, 887 (CA1 1983))). These 

kinds of searches also gave this Court the “most pause” in 

Bell, supra, at 558 (guards strip searched prisoners after

they received outside visits). Even when carried out in a 

respectful manner, and even absent any physical touching, 

see ante at 4–5, 19, such searches are inherently harmful,

humiliating, and degrading. And the harm to privacy

interests would seem particularly acute where the person

searched may well have no expectation of being subject

to such a search, say, because she had simply received a

traffic ticket for failing to buckle a seatbelt, because he 

had not previously paid a civil fine, or because she had 

been arrested for a minor trespass.

In Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 323–324 (2001),

for example, police arrested a mother driving with her two 

children because their seat belts were not buckled. This 

Court held that the Constitution did not forbid an arrest 

for a minor seatbelt offense. Id., at 323. But, in doing so, 

it pointed out that the woman was held for only an hour

(before being taken to a magistrate and released on bond) 

and that the search—she had to remove her shoes, jewelry, and the contents of her pockets, id., at 355—was not 

“‘unusually harmful to [her] privacy or . . . physical interests.’” Id., at 354 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 

U. S. 806, 818 (1996)). Would this Court have upheld the 

arrest had the magistrate not been immediately available,

had the police housed her overnight in the jail, and had 

they subjected her to a search of the kind at issue here? 

Cf. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 56 

(1991) (presentment must be within 48 hours after arrest).

The petitioner, Albert W. Florence, states that his pre-
 

 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

sent arrest grew out of an (erroneous) report that he had

failed to pay a minor civil fine previously assessed because

he had hindered a prosecution (by fleeing police officers 

in his automobile). App. 25a–26a. He alleges that he was

held for six days in jail before being taken to a magistrate

and that he was subjected to two strip searches of the kind 

in question. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. 

Amicus briefs present other instances in which individuals arrested for minor offenses have been subjected to

the humiliations of a visual strip search. They include a

nun, a Sister of Divine Providence for 50 years, who was arrested for trespassing during an antiwar demonstration. 

Brief for Sister Bernie Galvin et al. as Amici Curiae 6. 

They include women who were strip-searched during

periods of lactation or menstruation. Id., at 11–12 (describing humiliating experience of female student who was

strip searched while menstruating); Archuleta v. Wagner, 

523 F. 3d 1278, 1282 (CA10 2008) (same for woman lactating). They include victims of sexual violence. Brief 

for Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals 

Project et al. as Amici Curiae. They include individuals

detained for such infractions as driving with a noisy muffler, driving with an inoperable headlight, failing to use a

turn signal, or riding a bicycle without an audible bell.

Brief for Petitioner 11, 25; see also Mary Beth G., supra, at 

1267, n. 2 (considering strip search of a person arrested for 

having outstanding parking tickets and a person arrested

for making an improper left turn); Jones v. Edwards, 770 

F. 2d 739, 741 (CA8 1985) (same for violation of dog leash

law). They include persons who perhaps should never

have been placed in the general jail population in the first 

place. See ante, at 2 (ALITO, J. concurring) (“admission to 

general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation

of a strip search, may not be reasonable” for those “whose

detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and 

who could not be held in available facilities apart from the 
6 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

general population”).

I need not go on. I doubt that we seriously disagree

about the nature of the strip search or about the serious

affront to human dignity and to individual privacy that it 

presents. The basic question before us is whether such

a search is nonetheless justified when an individual arrested for a minor offense is involuntarily placed in the 

general jail or prison population. 

III 

The majority, like the respondents, argues that strip

searches are needed (1) to detect injuries or diseases, such 

as lice, that might spread in confinement, (2) to identify

gang tattoos, which might reflect a need for special housing to avoid violence, and (3) to detect contraband, including drugs, guns, knives, and even pens or chewing gum, 

which might prove harmful or dangerous in prison. In 

evaluating this argument, I, like the majority, recognize:

that managing a jail or prison is an “inordinately difficult

undertaking,” Turner, 482 U. S., at 85; that prison regulations that interfere with important constitutional interests

are generally valid as long as they are “reasonably related 

to legitimate penological interests,” id., at 89; that finding 

injuries and preventing the spread of disease, minimizing

the threat of gang violence, and detecting contraband are 

“legitimate penological interests,” ibid.; and that we normally defer to the expertise of jail and prison administrators in such matters, id., at 85. 

Nonetheless, the “particular” invasion of interests, Bell, 

441 U. S., at 559, must be “‘reasonably related’” to the justifying “penological interest” and the need must not be 

“‘exaggerated.’” Turner, supra, at 87. It is at this point 

that I must part company with the majority. I have found 

no convincing reason indicating that, in the absence of 

reasonable suspicion, involuntary strip searches of those

arrested for minor offenses are necessary in order to fur-
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

ther the penal interests mentioned. And there are strong

reasons to believe they are not justified. 

The lack of justification is fairly obvious with respect to

the first two penological interests advanced. The searches 

already employed at Essex and Burlington include: (a) 

pat-frisking all inmates; (b) making inmates go through

metal detectors (including the Body Orifice Screening

System (BOSS) chair used at Essex County Correctional

Facility that identifies metal hidden within the body); (c) 

making inmates shower and use particular delousing

agents or bathing supplies; and (d) searching inmates’ 

clothing. In addition, petitioner concedes that detainees

could be lawfully subject to being viewed in their undergarments by jail officers or during showering (for security

purposes). Brief for Petitioner 9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–8 

(“Showering in the presence of officers is not something 

that requires reasonable suspicion”). No one here has 

offered any reason, example, or empirical evidence suggesting the inadequacy of such practices for detecting 

injuries, diseases, or tattoos. In particular, there is no 

connection between the genital lift and the “squat and

cough” that Florence was allegedly subjected to and health 

or gang concerns. See Brief for Academics on Gang Behavior as Amici Curiae; Brief for Medical Society of New 

Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae. 

The lack of justification for such a strip search is less

obvious but no less real in respect to the third interest, 

namely that of detecting contraband. The information

demonstrating the lack of justification is of three kinds.

First, there are empirically based conclusions reached in

specific cases. The New York Federal District Court, to 

which I have referred, conducted a study of 23,000 persons

admitted to the Orange County correctional facility between 1999 and 2003. Dodge, 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 69.

These 23,000 persons underwent a strip search of the kind 

described, supra, at 1. Of these 23,000 persons, the court 
 

 

8 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

wrote, “the County encountered three incidents of drugs

recovered from an inmate’s anal cavity and two incidents

of drugs falling from an inmate’s underwear during the 

course of a strip search.” 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 69. The 

court added that in four of these five instances there may 

have been “reasonable suspicion” to search, leaving only 

one instance in 23,000 in which the strip search policy 

“arguably” detected additional contraband. Id., at 70. The 

study is imperfect, for search standards changed during

the time it was conducted. Id., at 50–51. But the large

number of inmates, the small number of “incidents,” and 

the District Court’s own conclusions make the study probative though not conclusive.

 Similarly, in Shain v. Ellison, 273 F. 3d 56, 60 (CA2 

2001), the court received data produced by the county

jail showing that authorities conducted body-cavity strip 

searches, similar to those at issue here, of 75,000 new 

inmates over a period of five years. Brief for PlaintiffAppellee-Cross-Appellant in No. 00–7061 etc. (CA2), p. 16

(citing to its App. 343a–493a). In 16 instances the 

searches led to the discovery of contraband. The record 

further showed that 13 of these 16 pieces of contraband

would have been detected in a patdown or a search of shoes 

and outer-clothing. In the three instances in which contraband was found on the detainee’s body or in a body cavity,

there was a drug or felony history that would have justified a strip search on individualized reasonable suspicion. 

Ibid.; Brief for National Police Accountability Project as 

Amicus Curiae 10. 

Second, there is the plethora of recommendations of 

professional bodies, such as correctional associations, that 

have studied and thoughtfully considered the matter. The 

American Correctional Association (ACA)—an association 

that informs our view of “what is obtainable and what is 

acceptable in corrections philosophy,” Brown v. Plata, 563 

U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 43)—has promulgated a 
 

 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

standard that forbids suspicionless strip searches. And 

it has done so after consultation with the American Jail 

Association, National Sheriff’s Association, National Institute of Corrections of the Department of Justice, and

Federal Bureau of Prisons. ACA, Performance-Based 

Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, Standard 

4–ALDF–2C–03, p. 36 (4th ed. 2004); Dept. of Justice,

Federal Performance-Based Detention Standards Handbook, §C. 6, p. 99 (Feb. 23, 2011, rev.-2), http://www.

justice.gov/ofdt/fpbds02232011.pdf (all Internet materials

as visited Mar. 30, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s 

case file); ACA, Core Jail Standards §1–CORE–2C–02,

pp. vii, 23 (2010). A standard desk reference for general 

information about sound correctional practices advises

against suspicionless strip searches. Dept. of Justice, 

National Institute of Corrections, M. Martin & T. Rosazza, 

Resource Guide for Jail Administrators 4, 113 (2004); see 

also Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, M. 

Martin & P. Katsampes, Sheriff’s Guide to Effective Jail 

Operations 50 (2007).

Moreover, many correctional facilities apply a reasonable suspicion standard before strip searching inmates

entering the general jail population, including the U. S.

Marshals Service, the Immigration and Customs Service,

and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See U. S. Marshals 

Serv., Policy Directive, Prisoner Custody-Body Searches 

§9.1(E)(3) (2010), http://www.usmarshals.gov/foia / DirectivesPolicy / prisoner_ops / body_searches.pdf; Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detention Standard: Searches

of Detainees 1 (2008), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/

dro/detention-standards/pdf/searches_of_detainees.pdf; 

ICE/DRO, Detention Standard: Admission and Release 4–5

(2008), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/

pdf/environmental_health_and_safety.pdf; Bureau of Indian

Affairs, Office of Justice Servs., BIA Adult Detention 

Facility Guidelines 22 (Draft 2010). The Federal Bureau 
 

10 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

of Prisons (BOP) itself forbids suspicionless strip searches

for minor offenders, though it houses separately (and does

not admit to the general jail population) a person who does 

not consent to such a search. See Dept. of Justice, BOP 

Program Statement 5140.38, p. 5. (2004), http://www. 

bop.gov/policy/progstat/5140_038.pdf. 

Third, there is general experience in areas where the

law has forbidden here-relevant suspicionless searches.

Laws in at least 10 States prohibit suspicionless strip 

searches. See, e.g., Mo. Stat. Ann. §544.193.2 (2002) (“No

person arrested or detained for a traffic offense or an 

offense which does not constitute a felony may be subject 

to a strip search or a body cavity search . . . unless there is 

probable cause to believe that such person is concealing a

weapon . . . or contraband”); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22–2521(a) 

(2007) (similar); Iowa Code §804.30 (2009) (similar); 725

Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/103–1(c) (2011) (similar but 

requiring “reasonable belief ”); 501 Ky. Admin. Regs. 

3:120, §3(1)(b) (2011) (similar); Tenn. Code Ann. §40–7–

119 (2006) (similar); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–3–405(1) 

(2011) (no strip search absent individualized suspicion

unless person has been arraigned and court orders that 

suspect be detained); Fla. Stat. §901.211(2) (2010) (similar); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §764.25a(2) (2000) (similar); 

Wash. Rev. Code §10.79.130(1) (2010) (similar).

At the same time at least seven Courts of Appeals have 

considered the question and have required reasonable

suspicion that an arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband before a strip search of one arrested for a minor 

offense can take place. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 

239 F. 3d 107, 112–113 (CA1 2001); Weber v. Dell, 804 

F. 2d 796, 802 (CA2 1986); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F. 2d 

1007, 1013 (CA4 1981); Stewart v. Lubbock Cty. Tex., 767 

F. 2d 153, 156–157 (CA5 1985); Masters v. Crouch, 872 

F. 2d 1248, 1255 (CA6 1989); Mary Beth G., 723 F. 2d, at 

1266, 1273; Edwards, 770 F. 2d, at 742; Hill v. Bogans, 
 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

735 F. 2d 391, 394 (CA10 1984). But see 621 F. 3d, at 311

(case below); Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 

595 F. 3d 964, 975 (CA9 2010) (en banc); Powell v. Barrett, 

541 F. 3d 1298, 1307 (CA11 2008) (en banc). Respondents

have not presented convincing grounds to believe that

administration of these legal standards has increased the 

smuggling of contraband into prison. 

Indeed, neither the majority’s opinion nor the briefs set

forth any clear example of an instance in which contraband was smuggled into the general jail population during 

intake that could not have been discovered if the jail was 

employing a reasonable suspicion standard. The majority

does cite general examples from Atlantic County and 

Washington State where contraband has been recovered 

in correctional facilities from inmates arrested for driving 

under the influence and disorderly conduct. Ante, at 15. 

Similarly, the majority refers to information, provided by

San Francisco jail authorities, stating that they have

found handcuff keys, syringes, crack pipes, drugs, and 

knives during body-cavity searches, including during

searches of minor offenders, including a man arrested for 

illegally lodging (drugs), and a woman arrested for prostitution and public nuisance (“bindles of crack cocaine”).

Brief for City and County of San Francisco et al. as Amici 

Curiae 7–13; Bull, supra, at 969; ante, at 15. And associated statistics indicate that the policy of conducting visual

cavity searches of all those admitted to the general population in San Francisco may account for the discovery of 

contraband in approximately 15 instances per year. Bull, 

supra, at 969. 

But neither San Francisco nor the respondents tell us 

whether reasonable suspicion was present or absent in any 

of the 15 instances. Nor is there any showing by the 

majority that the few unclear examples of contraband 

recovered in Atlantic County, Washington State, or anywhere else could not have been discovered through a policy 
12 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

that required reasonable suspicion for strip searches. And 

without some such indication, I am left without an example of any instance in which contraband was found on an 

individual through an inspection of their private parts or

body cavities which could not have been found under a 

policy requiring reasonable suspicion. Hence, at a minimum these examples, including San Francisco’s statistics,

do not provide a significant counterweight to those presented in Dodge and Shain. 

Nor do I find the majority’s lack of examples surprising. 

After all, those arrested for minor offenses are often 

stopped and arrested unexpectedly. And they consequently will have had little opportunity to hide things in 

their body cavities. Thus, the widespread advocacy by

prison experts and the widespread application in many

States and federal circuits of “reasonable suspicion” requirements indicates an ability to apply such standards in 

practice without unduly interfering with the legitimate penal 

interest in preventing the smuggling of contraband. 

The majority is left with the word of prison officials in

support of its contrary proposition. And though that word

is important, it cannot be sufficient. Cf. Dept. of Justice,

National Institute of Corrections, W. Collins, Jails and the 

Constitution: An Overview 28–29 (2d ed. 2007) (Though

prison officials often “passionately believed” similar requirements would lead to contraband-related security 

problems, once those requirements were imposed those

“problems did not develop”).

The majority also relies upon Bell, 441 U. S. 520, itself. 

Ante, at 5–6. In that case, the Court considered a prison 

policy requiring a strip search of all detainees after “contact visits” with unimprisoned visitors. 441 U. S., at 558. 

The Court found that policy justified. Id., at 560. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, that case does not provide precedent for the proposition that the word of prison

officials (accompanied by a “single instance” of empirical 
 

 

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 13 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

example) is sufficient to support a strip search policy. 

Ante, at 6. The majority correctly points out that there 

was but “one instance” in which the policy had led to the 

discovery of an effort to smuggle contraband. Bell, 441 

U. S., at 558. But the Court understood that the prison

had been open only four months. Id., at 526. And the 

Court was also presented with other examples where 

inmates attempted to smuggle contraband during contact 

visits. Id., at 559. 

It is true that in Bell the Court found the prison justified in conducting postcontact searches even as to pretrial detainees who had been brought before a magistrate, 

denied bail, and “committed to the detention facility only 

because no other less drastic means [could] reasonably 

assure [their] presence at trial.” 441 U. S., at 546, n. 28. 

The Court recognized that those ordered detained by a

magistrate were often those “charged with serious crimes,

or who have prior records.” Ibid. For that reason, those 

detainees posed at least the same security risk as convicted inmates, if not “a greater risk to jail security and

order,” and a “greater risk of escape.” Ibid. And, of 

course, in Bell, both the inmates at issue and their visitors 

had the time to plan to smuggle contraband in that case, 

unlike those persons at issue here (imprisoned soon after 

an unexpected arrest).

The Bell Court had no occasion to focus upon those 

arrested for minor crimes, prior to a judicial officer’s determination that they should be committed to prison. I 

share JUSTICE ALITO’s intuition that the calculus may be 

different in such cases, given that “[m]ost of those arrested

for minor offenses are not dangerous, and most are released from custody prior to or at the time of their initial 

appearance before a magistrate.” Ante, at 2 (concurring 

opinion). As he notes, this case does not address, and 

“reserves judgment on,” whether it is always reasonable

“to strip search an arrestee before the arrestee’s detention 
 

 

 

14 FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF 

 COUNTY OF BURLINGTON 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

has been reviewed by a judicial officer.” Ante, at 3. In my

view, it is highly questionable that officials would be 

justified, for instance, in admitting to the dangerous world 

of the general jail population and subjecting to a strip

search someone with no criminal background arrested for 

jaywalking or another similarly minor crime, supra, at 5. 

Indeed, that consideration likely underlies why the Federal Government and many States segregate such individuals even when admitted to jail, and several jurisdictions 

provide that such individuals be released without detention in the ordinary case. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. 

§853.6 (West Supp. 2012). 

In an appropriate case, therefore, it remains open for 

the Court to consider whether it would be reasonable to 

admit an arrestee for a minor offense to the general jail 

population, and to subject her to the “humiliation of a strip 

search,” prior to any review by a judicial officer. Ante, at 2 

(ALITO, J., concurring). 

* * * 

For the reasons set forth, I cannot find justification for 

the strip search policy at issue here—a policy that would

subject those arrested for minor offenses to serious invasions of their personal privacy. I consequently dissent.