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THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA

AND LEBANON

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 29, 2017

Serial No. 115–95

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, 

Council on Foreign Relations .............................................................................. 7

Paul Salem, Ph.D., vice president for policy analysis, research, and programs, 

Middle East Institute ........................................................................................... 21

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, 

The Brookings Institution ................................................................................... 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement ............................................ 10

Paul Salem, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................ 23

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................ 36

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 70

Material submitted for the record ...................................................................... 72

(1)

THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN SAUDI 

ARABIA AND LEBANON 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for our 

opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

Thank you so much for being with us today, and without objection, your prepared statements will be made a part of the record 

and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions 

for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for as much time as she may 

consume. 

The one true constant in the Middle East has been the uncertainty and the instability of Lebanon since it gained its independence from France in the 1940s. 

Sectarian divisions and decades of mistrust among the predominant forces—Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, 

as well as outside actors exerting undue influence on what should 

be internal matters—has ensured that Lebanon will remain in a 

constant state of uncertainty and instability. 

It was just 7 weeks ago today that this subcommittee convened 

a hearing on U.S. policy toward Lebanon. I cautioned then as I 

have for many years now that U.S. policy in Lebanon must be calibrated to scale back Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah’s, influence while 

spurring much needed security, stability, and prosperity to the 

country. 

Then, on November 4th, Lebanon’s prime minister departed for 

Saudi Arabia, where he announced his resignation from office. 

It is probably no coincidence that this surprise announcement 

came on the very day that Saudi Arabia had intercepted a Houthifired missile outside of the international airport in Riyadh. 

The Saudis blamed Iran and Hezbollah directly for providing the 

arms and support for the Houthis that allowed them to carry out 

this attack, calling it an act of war on Tehran’s part. 

2

It should also be noted that Iran provided the missiles for the 

Houthis that were fired directly at U.S. ships off the coast of 

Yemen as well. 

These events also happened to coincide with the crackdown by 

Saudi’s crown prince on that same day, which he says is an anticorruption campaign. Others say it is a power grab, and the truth 

may be somewhere in the middle. 

Hariri, a Saudi citizen himself, stated in his resignation speech 

that Iran and Hezbollah had undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty 

and he said that his life was in danger. 

And if anyone would know what Iran, Hezbollah, and other outside actors are capable of in Lebanon, it is Hariri. As we know, it 

was his father who was assassinated in 2005 in Beirut with both 

Hezbollah and Syria’s Assad linked to that act of terror and it is 

no secret that Iran and Hezbollah’s influence undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon. 

And, unfortunately, we are seeing an effort by Iran to expand 

this influence and its presence across the region, which has given 

its main rival, Saudi Arabia, justifiable reason for concern. 

Hariri has since returned to Lebanon this week, where he has 

put his plans to resign on hold but has demanded that Hezbollah 

cease its interference in regional conflicts. 

I would take that a step further and say that Hezbollah and Iran 

must not be legitimized nor allowed to interfere in domestic issues 

as well. 

I still believe the U.S. must remain cautious over ties between 

the terror group and the Lebanese Armed Forces—LAF—and we 

should not put all of our support behind the LAF until those ties 

are severed completely. 

And while this committee has focused on Hezbollah and Iran’s 

role in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, we haven’t spent as much time 

focusing on Iran’s latest strategic position in Yemen. 

The new Saudi crown prince has taken a series of drastic steps 

in recent weeks and has shown that he is perhaps more willing to 

engage Iran directly and he is seeing what would be a great cause 

for alarm in Saudi Arabia, for the Gulf and for the United States. 

Aside from Iran’s continued support for the Houthis, there is increasing concern of a Hezbollah presence in Yemen. Imagine what 

that would mean for Iran’s ability to interfere in internal matters 

of other countries and to put the entire region under threat. 

There is simply no way that Saudi Arabia would allow for 

Hezbollah to gain a presence in Yemen and then build up an arsenal presence on the Saudi border. 

Perhaps this is why we are seeing rumors of a willingness for 

Saudi and Israel to work together. Saudi now understands what it 

means to be living under constant and immediate threat from 

Hezbollah and Iran. 

But these recent developments should be a cause for concern for 

the U.S. and our partners. Lebanon is already hosting 1.5 million 

or more Syrian refugees. 

Millions more would flee, likely making their way to Europe or 

elsewhere. It is also likely to spark yet another conflict as Iran continues its malign behavior and threatens its neighbors. 

3

So how should the United States respond? We must make it clear 

that Iran cannot continue its destabilizing activity and we must 

continue to put pressure on it and its proxy, Hezbollah. 

We must make it clear that we support a stable Lebanon, free 

from outside interference, free from Hezbollah’s damaging behavior. 

We must also make it clear that Iran’s support for the Houthis 

and its buildup of Hezbollah presence in Yemen are red lines that 

cannot be crossed. We must also continue to support the people of 

Yemen and the people of Lebanon. 

I believe that the U.S. and international partners need to have 

unfettered access to help deliver humanitarian assistance in 

Yemen. 

I welcome the announcement from Saudi Arabia and the Saudiled coalition that it is reopening ports and the international airport 

to allow the urgent flow of humanitarian aid to the people of 

Yemen. 

The Saudi-led coalition must play a role to allow humanitarian 

assistance into Yemen but the Houthi leadership must stop preventing the shipment and distribution of lifesaving aid without manipulation or diversion to those people in critical need, particularly 

in those residents in areas controlled by the Houthis’ militias. 

I further call on all parties to work toward a cessation of hostilities and I urge the Houthi leadership to return to the peace 

process to halt any further escalation including cross-border attacks in Saudi Arabia. 

We need to find a way to hold all parties accountable while working with those willing to work with us to curtail the violence and 

to bring stability to both Yemen and Lebanon free from outside interference. 

I am now pleased to yield to my friend, the ranking member of 

our subcommittee, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Madam Chairman, for convening today’s 

important and timely hearing and thanks to our excellent panel of 

witnesses for being with us today. 

The past few weeks have been dizzying and today’s hearing offers an opportunity to help understand the implications of the 

changes that we have seen in the region. 

At the 30,000-foot view, we are clearly seeing a continuation of 

the ongoing power struggle in the region between the Sunni Arab 

kingdom of Saudi Arabia as they seek to push back against the expansionism of the Persian Shiite Republic of Iran. 

But the Middle East is a complex region and simply painting everything as Iran versus Saudi Arabia is an oversimplification when 

there is a vast web of actors nations and interests at stake. 

I think it is worth reviewing a quick time line of the past few 

months that have brought us to this moment. In May, the United 

States reached a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, and 

President Trump flew to Riyadh for his first foreign travel. 

Shortly after that, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors imposed 

a blockade on Qatar, presumably over its support for Hamas, the 

Muslim Brotherhood, and ties to Iran. 

Then Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef was pushed in 

an unusually public way in favor of Deputy Crown Prince MohamVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:14 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\112917\27660 SHIRL
4

med Bin Salman—MBS—who will likely succeed the current King 

Salman. 

Now, the new crown prince then launched an unprecedented 

crackdown on corruption, or a purge of political rivals, or both, in 

which princes, government ministers, and scores of officials were 

arrested including the commander of the Saudi National Guard 

and Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal, the international investor worth 

$17 billion. 

That same day, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Saad Hariri, a close 

ally of Saudi Arabia, resigned from Riyadh over Iranian meddling 

in this country and now, 3 weeks later, Hariri is actually back in 

Lebanon resuming his duties as prime minister. 

So the question for our witnesses is what is going on. I know 

we’re all eager for you to help unpack this whirlwind of activity. 

I would like to just touch on a few of the issues that I see as crucial 

to today’s discussion, though. 

The first is stability in Lebanon. When I was young, the capital 

of Lebanon, Beirut, was known as the Paris of the Middle East. 

Tragically, a long civil war, sectarian strife, and proxy conflicts 

have changed its image. 

Lebanon remains and important country, though, and we should 

work to maintain the delicate power sharing that exists between 

Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and Maronite Christians, particular at a time when Lebanon has accepted more refugees per 

capita than any country in the world, due to the war in neighboring Syria. 

Sadly, Iran has taken advantage of the chaos in Lebanon to exert 

its influence through its proxy, Shiite militia, Hezbollah. Over the 

past several years, Hezbollah has built up its military capacity and 

firmly entrenched itself in the Lebanese Government. 

In Hariri’s resignation speech, he called Hezbollah the arm of 

Iran that has, and I quote, ‘‘managed to impose a fait accompli in 

Lebanon using the force of its weapons.’’

Hezbollah’s capabilities now rival those of the national army, the 

Lebanese Armed Forces. And it is worth repeating when I said in 

this committee last month a legitimate Lebanese Government cannot function effectively when it is in a constant power struggle to 

govern with a nonstate actor. 

Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed terrorist organization responsible 

for attacks around the globe and we should all be interested in 

marginalizing their influence. 

The second issue is Saudi stability. Our relationship with Saudi 

Arabia is vital to the Middle East as strategic partners who share 

common interests. 

But we have to be honest in assessing where those interests diverge. While the new crown prince has stated his commitment to 

reforms, progress on human rights has been slow and unacceptable 

practices against minority groups and women remain national policy. 

And I am worried that the current administration’s sole focus on 

the strategic relationship while ignoring other aspects does not 

help provide full American leadership on issues vital to the United 

States like human rights in the broader region. 

5

This administration’s perceived carte blanche support for Saudi 

Arabia has empowered them to take additional steps like the public 

split from Qatar. 

And while Qatar’s behavior has no doubt been problematic, and 

we need to push back against harboring terrorists, Al Jazeera’s biased coverage, and their close ties to Iran. 

I am concerned that this crisis is a distraction from precisely 

those efforts needed to combat Iran and lead the fight against terrorism. 

Similarly, the war in Yemen is both a distraction from larger 

challenges and a horrific human disaster. The war has killed more 

than 10,000 civilians. Twenty million are in need of humanitarian 

support. 

Three million have fled their homes and the country is now facing the fastest-growing cholera epidemic in history with nearly 1 

million cases recorded. 

The third key issue is the need to push back against Iran, and 

while this administration continues to talk tough against Iran, I 

am concerned that our policies on the ground paint a different picture, particularly in Syria where we are allowing Iran, Iran’s client 

Assad, and its proxy Hezbollah to assert greater control over the 

future of the country. 

The de-escalation zones that the administration negotiated with 

Russia have allowed Iran and its proxies to essentially set up permanent forward bases, operating across from Israel’s northern border. 

This should be deeply troubling to anyone interested in preventing another war between Israel and Hezbollah and safeguarding Israel’s and Lebanon’s future. 

So, clearly, a lot to discuss. I look forward to learning and getting 

the answers to all these questions from our witnesses, and I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, as always. 

And so pleased to yield to our members so they can make their 

opening statements and we will start with Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank 

you for holding this very important hearing here this morning. 

We have a—clearly, a distinguished panel all looking forward to 

hearing, especially Mr. Abrams. Unfortunately, I have a markup 

which began at the same time as this hearing started in Judiciary 

and I have to chair the Small Business Committee starting at 

11:00. 

But I can guarantee all the witnesses that I will read their testimony and thank you for giving it. I just, unfortunately, won’t be 

here for much of it. 

Stability in the Middle East is in the best interests of our nation, 

obviously, and the world. That is why today’s hearing is so timely. 

Prime Minister Hariri’s pending resignation and a too-powerful 

Hezbollah in Lebanon threaten to bring more chaos to a region that 

is already volatile. 

Further, political developments in Saudi Arabia raise questions 

about near and long-term stability in the Middle East, and then, 

of course, there is Iran. 

6

President Obama and his now famous deal with Iran and infamous side deals have allowed Tehran to meddle even more 

throughout the Middle East. 

This committee has, of course, paid very close attention to that 

as Tehran seizes opportunities to increase its influence, to develop 

its military capacity, and to strengthen its proxies, especially 

Hezbollah and Lebanon. 

Nothing threatens our allies in the region more than an unchecked Iran. So I, again, want to thank you, Madam Chair, for 

holding this important hearing and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And we thank you very much for always 

making the time to come to our hearings in spite of other commitments. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Boyle is recognized. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you as well, 

Ranking Member Deutch, for holding this hearing. I look forward 

to this as an opportunity to learn specifically because the last few 

weeks in the kingdom have been among the most dramatic in decades. 

And I am of two minds in terms of what MBS is doing. One was 

forward in the New York Times piece by Friedman I think a few 

days ago, which is a fairly generous view that this is a modernization, a crackdown on corruption, a returning of Saudi Arabia back 

to a more moderate practice of Islam. 

However, that piece has also come in for some criticism that that 

is a naive or overly generous view. So this is really one of the most 

critical questions that we face, given the Saudi role in funding 

Wahabbism for the last several decades. 

If Saudi Arabia were to return to a pre-1979, more open practice 

of Islam, that certainly would have a dramatic effect not only on 

the kingdom but on the wider region in the world. 

And so as we go through the witness testimony today, I would 

be very interested in hearing your thoughts about what you think 

is behind what MBS is doing and what direction you see Saudi 

Arabia taking. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, my friend. 

And now, I don’t know if any of our Republican members would 

like to be—we will go to Mr. Lieu. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. One of the issues I am interested in hearing about today is Jared Kushner’s role in U.S. policy toward Saudi 

Arabia. 

I am concerned that he has no idea what he is doing. He has no 

foreign policy experience and zero foreign policy credentials. 

I am equally concerned he has a massive conflict of interest. Earlier this year, media reports that Jared Kushner companies—the 

Kushner companies sought a $500 million cash infusion for the 

troubled 666 Building in New York. 

From the ex Qatari prime minister that didn’t work out and then 

Saudi Arabia blockaded Qatar. Did Jared Kushner give them the 

green light? 

Last month, Jared Kushner took an unannounced trip to Saudi 

Arabia. Did he ask those Saudi Arabia officials for a cash infusion 

for the 666 Building? 

7

We need to know if Jared Kushner is working on behalf of the 

American people or is he working for himself and his family? 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Lieu. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for this 

hearing to you and the ranking member. 

I look forward to the testimony here. I know there are a lot of 

scary things going on in the world, including right here in the 

United States of America, where we are witnessing a depletion of 

State Department personnel and resources, which in the opinion of 

many is a threat to our own national security because we are failing to use the tools of diplomacy and development, and I am interested in your opinion on that subject. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, my friend. 

Any other members wish to be recognized? Seeing no other signs, 

I would like to introduce our panelists. 

First, I am delighted to welcome back an old friend, Mr. Elliott 

Abrams, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on 

Foreign Relations. 

Prior to holding this position, Mr. Abrams served in various roles 

for previous U.S. administrations including Deputy Assistant to the 

President, Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy 

Strategy, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights 

and Humanitarian Affairs. Wow. 

Thank you for your service. We look forward to your testimony. 

And next, I am pleased to welcome Dr. Paul Salem—Salem? 

What—Salem is good? Okay. I don’t—I don’t know which one is 

correct, sorry—who serves as the senior vice president for policy research and programs at the Middle East Institute. 

Prior to joining the Middle East Institute, Dr. Salem was the 

founding director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. He 

served in various other capacities, focusing on Lebanon. 

Thank you for being with us today. Thank you, sir. 

And finally, we welcome back our good friend, Dr. Tamara 

Cofman Wittes, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy 

at Brookings. 

Previously, Dr. Wittes served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for Near Eastern Affairs. She also served as a Middle East 

specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace and as director of programs 

at the Middle East Institute. 

We look forward to hearing your testimony. Welcome back. 

And we will begin with you, Mr. Abrams. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR 

FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. I’ve got material here for about five hearings. 

Let me start with Saudi Arabia. I will try to answer some of the 

questions—what’s going on. I think that what the crown prince is 

doing is reacting to several crises that face the kingdom. 

8

The first is economic—a very young and fast-growing population, 

huge decline in oil prices, the old economic model that is going to 

collapse. The state just couldn’t throw off enough revenue to support the population and the government. 

So some way had to be found—has to be found to employ all of 

these young people, men and women, and make the economy more 

productive and less oil dependent and that is the goal of his plan, 

Saudi 2030. 

Second challenge is governance, moving from the old model 

where you go from one very elderly brother to another. Any event 

or passage of time is going to render that generation out of the picture. 

And the third challenge is the challenge of Iran, and as the 

Saudis see it, there is a nightmare here, being sandwiched between 

an Iranian-controlled Iraq and an Iranian-controlled Yemen, with 

growing Iranian power in Lebanon, growing Iranian power in 

Syria, and we now see some subversion in the Gulf States as well. 

So they’ve seen a decade of Iranian advances. They believe they 

see American reluctance to halt those advances and thus, I think, 

their more assertive foreign policy. 

So I think if you ask the crown prince he would say he is reacting rather than acting, and I think that basically we should very 

much hope that these plans succeed. 

But let me turn to Lebanon. Obviously, I’d be happy to go back 

to that in the Q and A. We have seen in the last decade a very 

significant increase in the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon and outside Lebanon. 

Their realm of operations now includes a lot of the Middle East—

thousands of fighters in Syria, trainers to Iraq, backing the rebels 

in Yemen, organizing a battalion of militants from Afghanistan. 

So now Iran has a foreign legion. In addition to the Quds Force, 

it has Hezbollah. And I say that in part because I have heard people say the Saudis are creating a crisis in Lebanon and I don’t 

think that is right. I think Iran and Hezbollah have created this 

crisis in Lebanon and, more broadly, in the region, and it raises 

some real questions for us about our policy toward Lebanon. 

What the Saudis are asking for in Lebanon, which is for 

Hezbollah to stop acting as if it were completely independent of the 

state, acting on behalf of Iran, refusing to allow the state to have 

sovereignty within the borders, these are actually the demands of 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 that ended the last war between Hezbollah and Israel. 

It called for the extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory, full sovereignty, no weapons without the consent of the government, disarmament of all armed 

groups in Lebanon. 

That—that is 1701. So when—that Saudi policy that is also 

American policy. That is also what the U.N. Security Council called 

for. 

Hezbollah is creating, I think, enormous dangers with these actions including the increasing danger of another confrontation with 

Israel. 

In the remaining time I’d just like to raise the question of aid 

to the LAF—Lebanese Armed Forces—because I wonder if—you 

9

know, we have given them over $1 billion and the most recent 

year’s amount was I think FY 2017 $123 million—I wonder what 

we are getting for that money. 

It seems to me we are financing a model that we know is failing, 

a model in which Iran is serving increasingly as foreign—Hezbollah 

is serving as the Foreign Legion of Iran. 

I am not suggesting today that we cut off all of that aid but I 

do think it is worth asking. I believe it is the fourth or fifth largest 

recipient of American military assistance. 

If we are trying to strengthen Lebanon’s independence we are 

failing. If we are trying to limit Hezbollah’s power, we are failing. 

If we are trying to eliminate the degree to which Hezbollah serves 

Iran, we are failing. 

If we are trying to strengthen the Sunni or Druze or Christian 

influence inside Lebanon against Hezbollah, we are failing. So 

should we continue with this policy of significant financial support 

for the LAF when it seems not at all to be working? 

That is why I think this committee and others need to reassess 

those expenditures. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]

10


27660a-1.eps

COU NCI Lon., 

FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

The Latest Developments in Saudi Arabia and 

Lebanon 

Prepared stateinent by 

Elliott Abrams 

Sc11ior Ft-.Jlow f(-,£ Middle Easn--·nJ Studies 

C'ou11al 011 Foreign Rdations 

Before the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

United States 1 louse oiR .. ep£esentatives 

1st Session, llSth Congress 

Madam Chainnan and Mcrnbcrs of the Subconunittcc, 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today about events regarding Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. 

Let Inc begin with Saudi Arabia. 

/\s you know, several weeks ago the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Moham1ned bin Salman, announced the 

arrests of eleven princes, son1c of the Kingdorn's rnost prominent busir1cssincn, and sornc fonncr oHicials. 

He also announced several dramatic changes to top government ministries, induding the creation of a 

powerful ne\V anticorruption comnrittee.l 

The background to these events is the continuing centralization of pmver in the hands of the cro\vn prince, 

who is one of King Sahnan's sons. Over the past two years he has taken over most of the key economic and 

1 Portions of this testimony haw been exce-rpted from .Elliott Abrams, ·"G-ame of Thrones· Comes to Saudi Arabia,'' New York 

Times, Nm'C!nbcr 6. 20 l 7, http:'l:fhv\vw.nytimc'l.com/20 17fllf06fopinionfcrown-princc-saudi-arabia.htmL and Hili ott Abram'l, 

''Ri~'adh Realpolitik," lf.-ff1.{r _'-.fandanl, November 17. 2017, http:j fw\vw .weeklystandard.comfriyadhrcal olitik artidc 2010533. 

Ali 
11


27660a-2.eps

security posts and has clearly ernerged as the n1ost powerful person in the government. The cro\Vll prince is 

also deputy prUne minister (under the king, who is also prUne minister) and nrinister of defense. All this at 

the age of thirty two. 

This steady seizure of power has given rise to resistance "\Vi thin and outside the royal family, and 

Mohammed bin Sahnan's elevation to crmvn prince was not unanimously supported when the top royal 

prll1ces rnet to approYe it. In the Saudi systern, power has been passed arnong the sons of the fOm1der of the 

modern Saudi kingdom, known as Ibn Saud, since his death in 1953. That made the king more prim us inter 

part's than absolute monarch. One king was ren1oved by his brothers (Saud, in 1964), and the systen1 has 

permitted fiefs: The late King Abdullah was head of the National Guard for decades, and his son Mitch bin 

Abdullah took it over after his death; the late Prince Nayef served as minister of interior for thirty seven 

years and his son caine after him; the late Prince Sultan was nrinister of defense for nearly a half century, and 

his son Khalid was his deputy. 

C:rown Prince Mohammed bin Sahnan is putting an end to al1 that, taking some of those posts himself and 

ren1oving <>thers from the seemingly pennanent contnJ1 <>f any <me branch <>f the family. /\11 p<>wer is g<>ing 

to his branch-to Iris father, hin1self and his own allies; one brother is now the new Saudi ambassador to the 

United States. 

Is this centralit.ation of power a. good thing for the United States, or even for Saudi 1\rabia.?That question 

will best be answered retrospectively, ll1 about a decade. \Vhat's clear now, though, is that Crown Prince 

Mohammed hin Salman has annotmced ambitious economic and social changes, from a11owing \Vomen to 

drive and mix with men in sports stadiums, to selling off a part of the kingdom's key asset, the /\ram co oil 

cmnpany, to challenbDng the ideology of the \V ahhabi clerics. lle appears to believe that such moves require 

sheer po\ver, both to overcorne resistance and to rnove the Kingdorn's poorly educated and youthful 

population (roughly half are under the age of2S) of 33lnillion into the twenty first century. 

The crown prince has spoken of a n1ore modern Saudi Arabia, at least when it cmnes to the role of religion 

and the rights ofwornen. Last rnonth he called fOr 01 a rnoderate Islarn open to the world and all religions." 2 

But political liberalization is not ll1 the cards. Indeed, a serious crackdown has been tmderway for the last 

two years, including lengthy prison terms for t~:eets that critilit.ed the Saudi authorities. The message from 

the palace is clear: get on board or pay the price. That rnessage applies not only to conunoners, but to the 

entire royal family. 

The crown prince is reacting to several crises that face the kingdom. The first is econonric: \Vith a fastgrmving and youthful population, and the decline in oil prices we have seen, the old econonric rnodcl was 

2 Flliott C McLaughlin, "Saudi crmvn prince promise.:; 'a more moderate Tslam."' C!VtVcom. October 2S, 20 I 7, 

http://www .cnn.com/20 l 7/10/2 4/nllddleea~t/ ~audi -arabia-prince-more-moderatt'-islam/index.html. 
12


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going to collapse. No longer could the state throw off enough income in oil revenues to support the entire 

population. Smne way would need to be found to create jobs for young men, and wmnen, and m_ake the 

cconmny less oil-dependent and rnorc productive. That is the goal of the Saudi 'vision 2030 plan. The 

second, as noted, is the chaHenge of governance, and the crown prince has turned away from the old 

brother-to-brother systcrn which in any eYcnt the passage of tirnc was rcnderir1g irnpossiblc. T11e third is the 

challenge oflran. 

To the Saudis, recent years have presented a nightmare vision ofbeing sandwiched between an Iraniandominated Iraq and an Iranian-dominated Yemen, with Iranian-dominated Lebanon and Syria to the west, 

and with Iranian subYcrsion of the Smull Gulf states. In their eyes, the last decade has seen extraordinary 

Tranian advances and a reluctance on the part of the United States to ha1t them. Thus their more assertive 

foreign and defense policy, in Yemen, Lebanon, and elsewhere. 

It is co nun on to refer to Mohanuned bin Salrnan's actions, at hmnc and abroad, as rcrnarkably bold, 

assertive, and risky, but I am wi11ing to bet that is not hovv he sees them. My sense is that he sees himself1ess 

as acting than as reacting-to a series of events in the Kingdom and in the region that bring the Kingdom 

into real danger. That is, a steady-state policy, where the next brother had becmne king for a few years, 

where the state contirn1cd to live solely on dimirllshir1g oil revenues, where the \Vahhabi strictures held back 

the development of a more moden1 soliety, and where Iran became the regional hegemon, was simply too 

dangerous. Inaction was the real danger, in his view-not bold action. So he is taking action. lie vvi11 have 

failures and he ·will rnakc nllstakcs, but it is very greatly ir1 the interest of the United States that in the rnain 

he succeed. 

Now 1 \Vouldlike to turn to Lebanon. 

Since the resibmation of Lebanese Prime Minister Sa' ad Hariri was annotmced from Riyadh on November 4, 

there has been renev..:ed attention to the situation in Lebanon and Sam]i policies toward that country. 

\Vhat arc the Saudis trying to do in Lebanon? Is the ne-vv Saudi approach another cxarnplc of the oftenalleged over-reach of the crown prince, Mohanuned bin Salrnan? 

Not in rny Yiew. On the contrary, the new and tougher Saudi approach sccrns to rnc rnorc realistic-and 

unsurprisingly in line with the new Tsraeli approach. And both are not actions but reactions, to the reality 

that HezhoHah is in fact in charge of Lebanon. 

First, a bit ofhistory. In the 2006 war benvecn Israel and Lebanon, Israel rnadc a sharp distinction between 

Hczbollah and Lebanon. Israeli attacks decirnated Hczbollah targets, but did not focus on the Lebanese 

infrastructure. For exa1nple, to put the Rei rut airport out of use the Israelis hit the runway, making take-offs 
13


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and landings ilnpossible. They did zero da1nage to the terminal, hangars, and so on, so that repaving the 

runway ~md opening the airport could be done fast when hostilities ended. Silnilarly, 1 recall visiting Beirut 

with then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the conflict and seeing the tall lighthouse in the port. 

/\n Israeli missile had gone right through the lighthouse's top and taken out its searchlight. There was no 

darnage to the structure, so that all that was needed was a new searchlight and the lighthouse would ilrstantly 

be operational again. Israel made a special effort to avoid rnajor damage to the Lebanese national 

infrastnKttu-c, despite claims to the contrary fi"mn the Lebanese govcrnrncnt. 

In May 200B, lle.dmllah ended a govermnent crisis over its own po\-\'ers by using its weapons-allegedly 

rncant only to protect the comury ffmn Israel-to seize control ofikinn's streets and effectively of the 

entire state. The 1Vew York Times quoted one expert on Het.hol1ah concluding "This is effectively a collp."3 

In the near decade silKe, llez;bollab's po\ver has grown and so has its dornination of Lebanon. During the 

war in Syria since 2012, Hezbollah has served as Iran's foreign legion and sent thousands of Lebanese Shia 

across the border to fight. !\story in the New York Timesin August smnmed up the current situation: 

He;.hollah 

has rapidly expanded its realnr of operations. It has sent legions of fighters to Syria. It has sent 

trainers hJ Iraq. It has backed rebels in Yemen. And it has helped organize a battalion (Jf militants 

from Afghanistan that can fight almost anywhere. /\sa result, llet.bollah is not just a power unto 

itself: but is one of the nrost important instnuncnts in the drive fOr regional suprcrnacy by its 

sponsor: Iran. HezhoHah is involved in nearly every fight that matters to fran and, more significantly, 

has helped renuit, train and arm an array of new militant gnmps that are also advancing fran's 

agenda. 4 

That story concluded that "few checks remain on Hezbollah's domestic power" in Lebanon. And 

throughout 2017, Israeli officials have been warning that the distinction between HezboHah and "Lebanon" 

can no longer be maintained.llezbollah is quite sil11ply nmning the cmmtry. \VIrile it leaves administrative 

rnattcrs like paying goYenuncnt salaries, paving the roads, and collecting garbage to the state, no important 

decision can be taken without Hczbollah's agrcernent. 

Lebanon's president nmst constitutionally be a Christian, but today that rnarris :rvfichcl Amur, arr ally of 

Het.boHah since 2006. That is why he got to he president in 2016. As an analyst at the Institute for National 

Security Studies in Israel put it, "Het.h<)llah has he en very squarely hacking A<mn f(Jr president and this \Vas 

3 Robert fi. \Vorth and Nada nakri, ·'JTezhollah Seizes S\vath ofneirut from 1J.S.-nacked T,ehanon Government," New }"ork 

lin1cs, May 10, 2008, http:jjwww.nytimes.comj2008j05/10/vvorldjmiddlceastjl0lebanon.html. 

4 nen TTuhhard, '·Iran Out to Remake Mideast \\lith Arab Fnforcer: ITezbollah." New York Times. August 27, 20 J 7, 

http'-: //www .nvtimes.com/20 1 7(08/2 7/world/middleea,.t/hezbollah-iran-,.yria-isr;Jel-lebanon.html? r=l 
14


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alwavs the deal between Amm's party and llezbollah. llezbollah has upheld its end of the deal. With this 

election ... you can see llezbollah being consolidated in terms of its political allies as well as its position in 

Lcbanon." 5 

Tony lladran, a research fellow at the l 1'o1mdarion for Defense ofDcnwcracics who specializes in Lebanon, 

sununed up the current situation: "In tern1s of the actual balance of power, the actual power on the ground, 

regardless of the politics, regardless of the Cabinets, regardless of the parliarncntary rnajoritics: it' s 

llet.bo1lah."Cl 

The Lebanese .Arrncd Porccs (LAP), a recipient ofU.S. assistance, is increasingly intertwined with 

Het.ho11ah. David Schenker of the \Vashington Institute for Near East Policy described the sitlJation this 

way: 

in April 2017, Hezbollah brought more than a dozen international journalists on a tour of 

Lebanon' s frontier with Israel, breezing through several checkpoints manned by national 

inte11igence organs and LAF units, suggesting a high degree of coordination. The next month, 

llezbollah turned over several of its Syria border observation posts to the LA.l i . .l iinally, in late Jtme, 

the LAF sent 150 officer cadets to tour Hczbollah' s Mlccta \var rnuscmn, ncar Nabatiyah, a shrine to 

the organization' s 'resistance' credentials vis-a-vis Israel. 7 

Last sununcr Badran, in an article entitled "Lebanon is Another Name for Ilczbollah," concluded that "The 

Lebanese state . .is vvorse than a joke. Tt's a front."8 

Smnetllnes, it is \Vorse than a joke; it is an insult. A rerninder of the way in \vhich Lebanese political culture 

has beenm1dermined and warped by Hezbollah is the story of Samir Kuntar. Km1tar \vas a terrorist. CNN 

described his crimes: 

A member of the Palestine Liberation l 1'rmlt, Kuntar led a group of four men who entered Israel frmn 

Lebanon by boat in 1979. They killed a police officer who carne across them. Then they took a 28-

year-old man and his 4-year-old daughter hostage. 

5 Reuters et aL ''Lebanon·~ Ne\v Pro-Hezbollah President Vow~ to Retake 'Israeli-Occupied' Land." jt'nls:tlt'nl Post October 31. 

2016, http:} Jwww.jpost.com}Middk-bast}Hczbollah-ally-Michd-Aoun-ckctcd-llrcsidn1t-of-Lcbanon-4 71301. 

G Jenna l,ifl1it'l, ·'T.ehane:'le PM's Resignation Magnifies Congre.:;sional Scrutiny ofTTc7bollah." H/L·ck{r Standanf, November 7. 

20 l 7, http: /fwww. weekl ystandard.comfle banese-pms-resignation-m<lgnifie,.-congression;J.l-,.cnltiny-oflwzbollahjartidef20 10377. 

-David Schenker, Pnli£ylVatch 2840· US. Security-· Aso;i~'tanccto Tcbanon at Rio;k (\Va'lhington, DC: \Vashington Tn:=ltitute for 

Ncar East Policy. 20 17), http: f Jww>v.\vashingtoninstitute .orgjpolicy-anal}·sis }view ju.s.-sccurity-assistance-to-lcbanon-at-risk 

sTony Bad ran, ·'T.ehanon i:'l .'\not her Name for Tlezhollah," Tahlet July 26.20 l 7, 

http://www .tabletmag.com/ ~croll/2 41 7 49/lebanon-is-another-name-for-heLbollah. 
15


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Kuntar shot the father dead at close range in front of his daughter and tossed his bodv in the sea. 1 le 

then sm_ashed the girl' s head, killing her. 9 

Kuntar vvas captured by Israel, tried, convicted, and imprisoned, and then released in 200X in an exchange 

with 1 lczbollah for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers captured in 2006. Ktmtar returned to Lebanon-and 

was celebrated as a hero. But this greeting caine not only fron1llezbollah, which is grotesque enough; it 

carne fi"mn the entire Lebanese govcnuncnt, fron1 all parties. Lebanon's president and its prirnc nrinistcr 

greeted Kuntar as a hero. I le was flown from the border to Beirut International Airport, where he was met 

on a red carpet by the entire cabinet. Kuntar was kil1ed by an Israeli air strike in 20 IS. But think about a 

govcrruncnt and a political systcrn that celebrates a I Iczbollahrnurdcrcr this way. That rnay be the true 

measure ofHezboHah's influence. 

That is the situation to which Mohann11.ed bin Sahnanis reacting. The key n1an in n1aintallring this fac;ade 

has been Lebanon's prirne rninistcr, who nmst constitutionally be a Stumi and is Saad Hariri. HariTiis the 

son of Rafik Hariri, the fonner prin1e 1ninister assassinated in 2005 (almost certainly in a joint effort by 

Het.ho11ah and the Assad regime in Syria). Mohammed bin Salman looks annmd the region and sees his 

own country in danger of being sandv.riched between iranian-donrinated iraq and an iranian-dominated 

Y crncn, while h-an-and Hezbollah-incrcasingly donrinate Syria as \veil as Lebanon. Sa ad Hariri has 

always been subject to Saudi pressures, in large part because his fa1nily's fortune was made in Saudi Arabia 

and depends to this day on Saudi largesse. Mohan1med bin Salman nmst have wondered why he was paying 

to rnaintain that front or fac;adc, propping up a Lebanese govcrnrncnt that docs not goY ern and ir1stcad 

allows free rein to Het.ho1lah. Tndeed Hezbo11ah is part ofHariri's coalition government, and his resignation 

C(mld co11apse that coalition. Tt now appears that he has rescinded his resignation, at least for the moment. 

In addition to pressurir1g Hariri, the Saudis have several ways ofprcssm:ir1g Lebanon ccononrically. The 

Saudi deposit of$X60 million in the Lebanese C:entral Bank, meant to stabilit.e Lebanon's currency, 1night 

he withdrawn.IO Remittances from Lebanese working outside the country are critical for the country's 

econon1.y, constituting about 15 percent of Lebanon's GDP, and Lebanese working in Saudi Arabia and its 

Gulf allies provide a sigrrificant portion of that; those workers could start to be sent hornc. 11 "80 percent of 

foreign direct investrncnt in Lebanon corncs frorn the Gulf," and it could decline prccipitously.l2 Finally, 

( ~ulf tourists are a key part of Lebanon's tourism sector both in numbers and per capita spending. "The 

ntunbcr of Saudi tourists to Lebanon increased by 86.77 percent in the first 7 rnonths of 2017 cmnparcd to 

9 "Lebanon haib. militants freed in prisoner "wap." LJV.Ncom. July l 7, 2008. 

http: jjw\\'W .cnn.comj2008j\V OR.LlJ jmeastj07jl6jisradswapj. 

to Ilanin Ghaddar, Polh~vlE1tch 2891: SaudiArahia:.,- lVaroo T,chaooo, (\Va'lhington, DC \Vashington Institute for Ncar Hast 

Policy. 20 1 7), http:/ fwv.'\Y .washingtoni.nstitutc.orgfpolicy -analysis/Yicw fsaudi-arabias-\var-on-lcbanon. 

11 Ibid 

12 Ibid 
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the same period last year," the 1Jai{v 5'raroflleirut reported in August, but now the Saudis and other Gulf 

nations have told their litiz;ens to leave Leb~mon. ·:; This will hit the tourism industry hard. 

\Vhy punish Lehanon?Thereis no doubt that such measures can affect every Lebanese-hut that is the 

point. The Saudis arc no longer willing to prop up Lebanon while it serves as the base for llezbollah's 

military and terrorist activities in league with Iran. They are asking a different question: what ¥.rill it take for 

Lebanese to pressure Hezbollah to cut back on its actions and to allmv the Lebanese state to goY ern again? Is 

it possible that if all Lebanese-not just Sunnis, C:hristians, and l)rut.e but also Shia-pay a higher price for 

llet.bollah's subservience to Iran, llezbollah might begin to worry about its own political base in Lebanon? 

One estimate in Newsweek puts I lezbollah's own toll at 2,000-2,500 dead and 7,000 injured in Syria, 

meaning that every Shia vi11age and most families have suffered some loss.I4 The Shia population is about 

one million, so about one percent has been injured or killed fighting for Iran in Syria, and every casualty is of 

course a Ineinber of a nnKh larger family group. 

The point is, it is not Mohammed bin Salman who is bringing danger to Lebanon; it is not the Saudis who 

are brinbring Lebanon into the region's wars; it is not Saudi policy that threatens to collapse Lebanon's 

coalition politics. lt is the actions of llezbollah, abandoning any national role to act as Iran's enforcer and 

foreign legion. \Vhat the Saudis arc doing is saying, Enough-let's start describing Lebanese reality instead 

ofhurying it. Let's stop financing a situation that allows llet.bollah to feed off the Lebanese state, dominate 

that state, and use it as a launching pad for terror and aggression in the Middle l·:ast, all on Iran's behalf. 

There is of course no guarantee that this approach \Vil1 s11cceed: Lebanese may he too terrified ofHet.hollah. 

And s11ccess wi11 require action by the United States and its allies, partin1larly France. I fall ofLebanon's 

friends take the same approach, demanding that llez;bollah's grip on the cmmtry and the state be limited, we 

rnay ernbolden Lebanon's citizens and its politicians to protest Hezbollah's chokehold. Economic assistance 

to Lebanon and military assistance to its army should be made dependent on pushing back on Hezbol1ah 

and regaining Lebanese independence. The price Lebanon pays for Het.bollah should be made far dearer, 

and the advantages 1 lezbol!ah gains from its control of Lebanon should be reduced-and made far more 

controversial. 

It remains to he seen ifSaad Hariri hin1self \viii now seek to limit Het.bollah's room form~meuverin any 

way. In the last several years he has not, but his statcnients since returning to Lebanon have been tougher 

and have criticit.ed Hezhollah for its involvement in the affairs of other Arab states. \Vhat the Saudis, and 

13 ·'Saudi touri.:;t.:; return to T.chanon in drovc'l: report," The Dai~v Star, August J 2, 20 I 7, 

http: j jw\\'W .dail)·star.com.lbj Business/ Localj20 17 j Aug-12/415 7 50-saudi-tourists-rcturn-to-lcbanon-in-droYcs-report.ashx. 

14 Mona :\!ami. ''\Viii Tle7hollah remain in Syria forever?." New<;rveek March 28, 20 J 7. http:/h'i'W\v.newsweek.comhvillhezbollah-remain-svria-forever-57 3818. 
17


27660a-8.eps

perhaps Saad 11ariri, are asking for is a governn1ent in Lebanon that actually governs the cmmtry, and does 

so to advance and protect the interests of Lebanon, not those oflran. 

Are these outrageous den1ands? On the contrary, they are in fact demanded by UN Security C:ouncil 

Resolution 17(Jl, adopted in August 2006 to end the war between llezbollah and lsracl.lt's worth recalling 

what started that war: an tmprovoked attack by llezbollahinto lsrael, killing and kidnapping Israeli soldiers. 

Resolution 1701 includes these provisions: 

1~/nphasixes the in1portance of the extension of the control of the C ~overnment of Lebanon over all 

Lebanese territory [ and] for it to exercise its flill sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons 

without the consent of the Government ofLebanon and no authority other than that of the 

Govennnent of Lebanon .. 

C'aDs fiJI· .. the disannarncnt of all anned groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese 

cabinet decision of27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of 

the Lebanese State .. 1.::; 

In other words, \vhat the Saudis arc dernanding is what the UN Security CotuKil dcrnanded unanimously 

over a decade ago-and the Lebanese government accepted days later. No~', llet.bollah is once again 

thrusting Lebanon into deadly conflicts in the region-including the risk of another war with Israel These 

dangers will not be avoided by burying our heads in the sand, nor will Lebanon's soYcrcignty be restored by 

ignoring Hezbollah's destruction of that sovereignty. A better vvay forward is to tell the truth about the 

sitt1ation in lebanon, and 11se both diplomatic and economic pressure to undermine Hezho11ah's iron grip. 

Tbis raises, of course, the question of U.S. aid to the Lebanese Anned Forces. On Novernbcr 6, Senator Ted 

Crur. cmnmented on this matter: 

'The resignation of Lebanese Prilne .Minister 11ariri is the latest consequence of Iran' s increasil1gly 

perYasiYe influence in Lebanon through its terrorist proxy' Hezbollah,' Sen. Cruz said. 'Given these 

deYcloprncnts, it is time for the United States to reassess the military assistance we provide to 

Lebanon, including to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and conduct a formal review of our strategy 

there. It was just a few days ago that Lebanon' s President Aom1 yet again threatened Israel, saying, 

'All the Lebanese are prepared to fight against Tsrael.'l6 

15 {JN Security C:ouncil, Resolution 170 I, Middle fast, SJRP.Sj 170 I, ,-r:1. ,-rs, 

https:jjwYV\v.un.orgjenjscjdocumenrsjresolutionsj2006.shtml. 

16 Office of Senator Ted C:ru7, ·'Sen. C:nt7 ls.:;ue.:; Statement in Re.:;pon.:;e to the Re.:;ignation ofT .ebanese Prime Mini.:;ter T Tariri," 

pre'-S rdea,.e. November 6, 2017, https:flwww .lTUL.'-enate.gov /?p=press rdease&id=34 74. 
18


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This seems to 1ne the correct approach: to reassess our military assistance and our entire strategy. After all, if 

our strategy has been aim_ed at strengthening Lebanon's independence, we have failed. I£ our goal has been 

to linrit the po\vcr ofHczbollah and its integration into Iran's regional systcnl of nrilitary aggression, \VC 

have failed. If our goal has been to strengthen Sunni, J)ruze, and C:hristian minorities in Lebanon, vve have 

failed. If we haYe tried to make the LA!' a counterbalance to 1 lczbollah, we have failed.l'erhaps things would 

be even worse today without our aid and our efforts, but that is a proposition that should be examined and 

tested. 

On July 2S, when Prin1e Minister I lariri visited the \Vhite I louse, President Donald J. Trump said this: 

\\.That the Lebanese Armed Forces have accomplished in recent years is very impressive. In 2014, 

when ISIS tried to invade northern Lebanon, the Lebanese anny beat rhern back. Since that thne, the 

Lebanese anny has been fighting continually to t,'llard Lebanon' s border and prevent ISIS and other 

terrorists-of which there arc rnany-fi·mn gaining a foothold inside their country. 

The United States military has been proud to help in that fight and will continue to do so. America' s 

assistance can help ensure that the Lebanese army is the only defender Lebanon needs. It' sa very 

dfcctivc fighting force. 

Threats to the Lebanese people come from inside, as well. I lit.ballah is a menace to the Lebanese 

state, the Lebanese people, and the entire region. TI1c group continues to increase its nrilitary arsenal, 

which threatens to start yet another conflict with Israel, constantly fighting them back.I7 

I think •.ve would all agree with the comments onliezbollah, but I am not sure \Ve ""'ouldall agree \Vith the 

conunents on the LAF. \Vc'Ye giYcn the LAF oYer a billion dollarsinnrilitary aid, including $123nrillionin 

i-'Y20 17, and Lebanon is the fifth largest recipient of foreign military financing (FMF). Our a1nbassador to 

Lebanon, Elizabeth Richard, said publicly on October 31 that total support for the LAF from State 

Department and Defense Departtnent accmmts totaled $160 million over the previous year.18 The State 

Departrnent's proposed budget for FY20 18 zeroes out FMF for Lebanon, which rnay suggest sorne doubt 

witlrin the admirristration regarding the LAF's aclricvcrncnts. According to the rnost recent report on 

Lebanon by C:ongressional Research Service, dated November <J, 2017, 

As part of the Trump Administration proposal to cut 12o/tnf overall bilateral aid to the Middle Fast 

and North Africa (from FY20 16 enacted levels), RvJF grants to a number of regional governments1 ~ Office- of the-Pre-ss Secre-tary. "Re-marks by Preside-nt Tnunp and Primc-l\1inistc-r Hariri of Le-banon in Joinr Pre-ss Conference-,'" 

pre.:;<; re-lease, July 2S, 20 ]7, https:f/'-N"\\".\'.whitehou'lc.goYjthc-prcss-officcf20 I 7f07f2Sfrcmarks-prc-'lidcnt-tntmp-and-primc--

ministcr-ltariri-lcbanon-joint-prcss. 

ts Jack Detsch, "( JS Sticks by T ebanese army despite Tlariri Resignation," ,1/-,\1rmitor, November 6, 20 I 7, https:f h'i'W\v.al~ 

monitor.com/pul,.e/ originals/20 l 7/ll/u"-snpport -lebanon-annv-hariri-re"ignation-"audi-arabia.html 
19


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including Lebanon-would be halted. I'M!' has been one of the primary sources of U.S. funding for 

the LA!', along with CTI'l' funds.lloth the !louse (!l.lt. 3362) and Senate (S. 1780) l'Y2018 State 

and Foreign Operations appropriations bills cnYision FNIF continuing to Lebanon. The Senate 

appropriations report (S.Rept. I IS-I 52) recommends $105 million in FMF to Lebanon .. 

In October 2017, Ambassador Richard announced the delivery of the first two (of six) A-29 Super 

Tucano aircraft to the Lebanese military, and stated that U.S. support to the LAFin 2017 totaled 

$160 mil1ion. Also in October, the Trump Administration notified Congress of its intention to 

prcJVide more than $121 millicm in new \)epartment cJfl)efense suppcJrt to the L/\.1: Special! :cJrces 

and LAP Air force using 10 U.S.C. 333 authority, including helicopters for close air support ... 

In the llSth Congress, language in proposed aid legislation for Lebanon largely mirrors previous 

years, with son1e exceptions reflecting enhanced concen1 among son1e Me1nbers and the T nm1p 

Ad..tninistration about the LAF's role and operations in Lebanon. In July 2017, the House 

Appropriations C:ommittee reported its version of the FY20 I X State and i-''oreibrn Operations 

appropriations biB (H.R. 3362) without a notwithstanding provision exe1npting ESF for Lebanon 

from the LA! i deployment certification requirements of Section 1224 of l'.L. 107-22~. The 

conunittee report on the bill also directed the Administration to submit a report on LAF operations. 

I I.R. 3362 was incorporated into the omnibus biB (II.R. 33S4) which the I louse passed in 

Septe1nber. The Senate Appropriations C:ommittee reported version of the bill indudes a 

notwithstanding provision for ESP aid to Lebanon (S. 1780). The Ilouse version of the 2018 

National Defense Authori:r.ation Act (H.R. 2R I 0) would require reporting on threats to the United 

States posed by He:r.bo1lah operations in Syria and Iranian use of commercial airnaft: to support 

lle.t.bollah and other groups. 19 

There is also the question ofLAF coordination with Hezbollah. As a Center for An1erican Progress report 

stated, "The Lebanese government has repeatedly denied any coordination with Hezbollah. However, 

events along the border 1nake these claims increasingly implausible. Reports of such coordination lmdercm 

the LAP's standing and raise vexing questions for policyn1akers regarding the utility ofU.S. security 

assistance to Lebanon."2U The leader ofHezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, himsclf"characterized the LAF as a 

'partner' and a 'pillar' in what Het.bollah has described as the 'golden formula, ~:hich means the resistance, 

the Anny, and the people"' in the words of a recent Congressional Research Service report. 21 

19 US. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Lebiinon, by Carla E. Ihunud. R44759 (2017). 27-29, 

https:f /fas.orgfsgpfcrsfmidC"astf R44 759.pdf. 

20 Tlardin T.ang and Alia A\vadallah. Pla_vingthc !,ot~[{ Game: US. Cmrntcrtcrrori'>m As~-~:~-tancc fiJr !,chanon (\Va'lhington, DC 

Center for American Progress. 20 17). https:f jwYv\v.americanprogress.orgjissuesjsecurityfreports/20 17/08/30/43 7853/playinglong-gamej 

21 Humud, Lt'b.mon, ll 
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A reassessment of what we've gotten for that n1oney seetns essential to n1e, and it's clear that many in 

Congress take this view.ls Lebanon closer to 1neeting the detnands of 1701 than it was a decade ago-to 

exercising sovereignty oYer its territory and disarnring nrilitias and terrorist groups? I think not. And that's 

why American strategy for Lebanon requires a careful reassessment. 

Thank you, Madam Chainnan, for this opportunity to testify. 
21

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Abrams. 

Dr. Salem. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL SALEM, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

POLICY ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND PROGRAMS, MIDDLE 

EAST INSTITUTE 

Mr. SALEM. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Punch that button. 

Mr. SALEM. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

My opening statement will be mainly on Lebanon but I would be 

happy to share my views on Saudi and Iran in the discussion. 

Lebanon occupies a strategic position on the eastern Mediterranean and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Ratney 

said in this venue last month, a stable pluralist prosperous Lebanon is in the U.S. national interest. 

Lebanon has been an effective ally on the war on ISIS and alQaeda, defeating and expelling both in August. The country hosts 

over 1 million Syrian refugees. 

It maintains a society of pluralism, openness, and democracy in 

a troubled region, and the army, along with U.N. multinational 

forces, have kept the peace across the critical Lebanon-Israel border for the past 11 years. 

But Lebanon has also been a very contested space between a proIranian pro-Assad coalition that now includes Russia and a proArab pro-Western coalition. 

If allies give up on Lebanon, it will fall fully into Iran, Syria, and 

Russia’s sway, and if tensions are pushed too high, we risk having 

another collapsed state in a region which already has too many. 

It is a long-term commitment, in my view, not one that can be 

won overnight nor one that should be abandoned in frustration. 

Many parties and leaders in Lebanon including Saad Hariri have 

been struggling in this contest for many years. 

Saad’s father, Rafic, was assassinated in 2005 along with numerous others for doing just that. But these leaders have not and will 

not give up and they deserve support and encouragement for struggling to rebuild national sovereignty under very difficult conditions. 

Both coalitions share power in Parliament and government. Iran 

and Syria have built a massive armed nonstate actor in Hezbollah, 

starting from the days when Lebanon was a failed state. 

But the Lebanese have also maintained an inclusive democratic 

nation-state and with American help have built an effective national army and internal security force. 

Although successive governments have insisted on a policy of 

noninterference in regional affairs, Hezbollah has violated that 

principle since 2012 and become militarily engaged in Syria as well 

as in Iraq and in Yemen. 

Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen is what mainly sparked the 

latest crisis with Saudi Arabia, particularly its apparent assistance 

in delivering and helping militants launch missiles into Saudi Arabia, including the capital, Riyadh. 

Obviously, this is completely unacceptable to Saudi Arabia and 

it is fully understandable that Riyadh could not countenance that 

22

an ally of theirs would head a government that includes a party 

lobbing missiles on their own capital. 

Hariri’s resignation was perhaps a necessary signal, a positive 

shock, as he himself put it, that the Lebanese Government could 

not continue with business as usual. 

Hariri is now back in Lebanon. He has put his resignation on 

hold until he receives guarantees that Hezbollah will cease its activities against ‘‘friendly Arab governments.’’

If Hezbollah ceases its involvement in Yemen, this latest Lebanon crisis might subside. Some signs from Beirut and regional 

capitals indicate that that might be in the works. 

But the challenge of Hezbollah is a large and long-term one. It 

might be pulling back from limited engagements in Yemen and 

Iraq. We don’t know yet. But its sizeable presence in Syria is part 

of the challenge of dealing with the tens of thousands of Iranian 

proxies there. 

Making sure all proxy forces leave Syria as part of a final settlement should be a primary objective for the U.S. and other regional 

partners in the next phase of contest and diplomacy over Syria. 

In Lebanon, as you know, Hezbollah has both a political and 

military presence. Politically, it is a principal elected representative 

of the Shiite population. Militarily, it has been armed by Iran to 

go head to head with Israel. 

An attempt to fight Hezbollah internally would likely lead to a 

devastating and losing civil war and another Hezbollah-Israel war 

would cause much harm in both countries and Iran would be 

around to rearm Hezbollah immediately afterward. 

In the short term, the goal should be to withdraw Hezbollah from 

regional conflict zones, maintain peace across the Lebanon-Israel 

border and seek to reduce Hezbollah’s influence on the Lebanese 

state. 

The long-term resolution of the challenge of Hezbollah will depend probably on wider regional developments such as a reckoning 

militarily or diplomatically with Iran or a breakthrough in IsraeliPalestinian or Israeli-Arab peace, an issue that Hezbollah and 

other armed non-state actors thrive on. 

I address a number of other issues in my written testimony, but 

I thank you for your attention and look forward to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Salem follows:]

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HEARING, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, NOVEMBER 29, 2017 

THE LATEST DEVELOMENTS IN LEBANON AND SAUDI-IRANIAN PROXY TENSIONS 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE 

PAUL SALEM 

Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs 

The Middle East Institute 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify in this hearing. I was asked to 

share my views on the recent developments in Lebanon, the elements of a SaudiIranian proxy contest there, and the implications this may have for Lebanon's 

future and stability. 

Prime Minister Saad Hariri and other like-minded leaders in Lebanon have had a 

long history of struggling with the presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon1

. Sa ad's 

father, Rafik Hariri, struggled with this challenge for a decade and a half, and was 

assassinated in 2005 for trying to stand up to the Assad regime and their ally 

Hezbollah in Lebanon. Numerous other political and media figures were also 

assassinated apparently for the same reason. Iran and the Assad regime have 

been building up Hezbollah as an arm of their foreign power for 37 years. 

Particularly since the lsareli withdrawal of 2000, the persistence of Hezbollah as 

an armed non state actor answerable mainly to Iran has been the primary 

obstacle to Lebanon achieving stability, security, and economic prosperity. The 

challenge that Hezbollah poses is part of a much wider Iranian empowerment in 

the region that has only gotten more acute after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 

2011 Arab uprisings. The Saudi outrage at Hezbollah's apparent involvement in 

Yemen is real and legitimate. Hezbollah must abide by the Lebanese 

government's own policy of non-interference in regional affairs, and there are 

1 See Annex 
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some steps that Lebanese leaders can take. But these steps are limited, and policy 

makers must balance between the limited capacity of Lebanon to confront an 

Iranian proxy army, and the need to maintain stability in Lebanon and avoid 

another fully failed state in a region which already has too many. 

Run-up to the Crisis 

Hariri's current government was formed in December 2016. It contains two 

Hezbollah members, and a slight majority of Hezbollah political allies. This 

formation reflected the unfavorable balance of power that had transpired in Syria 

after American prevarication and decisive Russian intervention in 2015. 

Nevertheless, the government was formed with the formal understanding that all 

parties would maintain a policy of neutrality and non-interference in regional 

affairs (what is termed 'dissociation' in the Arabic text). Hariri was also given tacit 

assurances that his government would not be pushed to normalize relations with 

the Assad regime. 

Both conditions were violated. Hezbollah not only continued its presence and 

interventions in Syria and Iraq, but escalated its presence in Yemen. Also, 

members of Hariri's government, without his approval, visited Damascus and held 

meetings there and elsewhere with Syrian government officials, pushing for a de 

facto normalization. Hariri also feared that Iran, the Assad regime, and Hezbollah, 

after their 'victory' in Syria, would ratchet up the pressure on him to translate 

their victory there into even more sway over his government in Lebanon. Ali 

Akbar Velayati, the foreign affairs adviser to Iran's supreme leader, met with 

Hariri just hours before the latter's sudden departure, and in a public statement 

afterward boasted that the victories against terrorism in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq 

"means that the axis of resistance has achieved victory in the battles in the 

region." Hariri also feared that assassination could return as a tool of politics in 

his country. Despite the pressures, he felt that holding his ground and 

maintaining the power sharing government in Beirut was in the best interests of 

Lebanon. 

The strains with Saudi Arabia began months before the events of November 4. 

The new leadership in Saudi had been making it clear that they did not approve of 

the policy of coexistence and accommodation with Hezbollah and its political 

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allies in Lebanon. So while the events of that fateful week were a surprise in 

terms of the rapidity and conditions within which they unfolded, they did not 

constitute a major political surprise. Sa ad Hariri has long been a citizen and ally of 

Saudi Arabia, and he could not maintain a policy for too long if it clashed with 

serious Saudi concerns. 

What had intensely piqued Saudi concerns was Hezbollah's championing of the 

Houthi cause in Yemen and their apparent involvement in delivering, assembling 

and launching missiles from Yemen into Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Hezbollah leader, 

Hassan Nasrallah, had raised the Houthi cause and the war against Saudi Arabia as 

a primary cause for Hezbollah in fiery speeches throughout the past year. The last 

of these missiles was reportedly launched at Riyadh airport on November 4, the 

day of Hariri's announced resignation. 

Saudi Arabia legitimately fears that as Iran had built up Hezbollah's missile 

arsenal in Lebanon over the past two decades to threaten Israel; it was now 

starting, with Hezbollah's help, to build a large missile presence in Yemen to 

permanently and strategically threaten Saudi Arabia. It is fully understandable 

that the Saudi authorities could not countenance an ally of theirs sharing power in 

a government that included a party that was apparently involved in organizing 

missile attacks on their own capital. But the strategic and political alternatives 

and next steps were not clear. 

The Resignation and Its Impacts 

Hariri's sudden resignation unsettled Hezbollah and their allies. They had enjoyed 

relative calm in Lebanon, and Hariri's presence gave them some cover from Arab 

or Western pressure. They rushed to issue conciliatory statements and urged 

Hariri to return home and reconsider. Hariri's own followers were taken aback by 

the murky conditions ofthe sudden resignation and while they understood and 

sympathized with the Saudi concerns about Hezbollah, they felt that the 

conditions ofthe sudden resignation had humiliated and weakened Hariri and his 

movement. 

American, French and Egyptian diplomacy made a difference in de-escalating the 

crisis. These parties all argued that while they agreed with Saudi Arabia's 

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concerns about Hezbollah, maintaining Lebanon's precarious stability was also a 

common shared interest. Instability and disintegration in Lebanon would 

strengthen Hezbollah, not weaken it; it would also give an opportunity for groups 

like ISIS and AQ, that had just been evicted from Lebanon, to come back. And it 

would jeopardize the condition of over 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon that 

might then seek shelter further west. 

Hariri left Saudi Arabia to France and Egypt, and then back to Lebanon. He did not 

go through with his resignation, but agreed to put it on hold and to give 

diplomacy and mediation more time to find a resolution. Hariri is insisting that he 

could return to a government that includes Hezbollah, provided that Hezbollah 

respects the government's principal of neutrality and non-interference in regional 

conflicts, and most importantly, that it stops any activities that "affect the 

security of our Arab brothers and their states." 

In effect, this boils down mainly to Yemen. Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, 

has claimed that Hezbollah has no military involvement or presence in Yemen-a 

claim that might be negotiated into a commitment; and French President Macron 

is attempting to mediate with Iran to seek de-escalation in Yemen in exchange for 

stability in Lebanon. 

Hariri might also gain commitments that normalization with the Assad regime 

will not be pursued and that Hezbollah could agree to restarting a National 

Dialogue about a national defense strategy that, at least in theory, is supposed to 

agree a pathway for Hezbollah to eventually integrate into the Lebanese state 

armed forces. 

Hezbollah and Iran indeed do not want instability in Lebanon, and hence the 

shock resignation might bear some limited fruit. And that fruit might be a 

disengagement of Hezbollah from Yemen, and a gradual withdrawal from Iraq. 

But there are limits to what further political or economic moves can produce. 

Iran and Hezbollah are hard targets that soft political and economic measures 

cannot greatly impact. Even in a military escalation, Lebanon would be easily 

devastated while Hezbollah would survive and thrive. 

While Riyadh is clearly giving diplomacy a chance, it is not clear what the Saudi 

decision will eventually be. Yemen is indeed a main national security concern for 

Riyadh. They would welcome a full Hezbollah disengagement from Yemen; and 

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that might be enough to at least resolve this current Lebanese crisis. But if Iran 

just replaces Hezbollah operatives with others from the Quds or other allied 

forces, and continues to build up a missile presence in Yemen, Riyadh might still 

want to react in Lebanon. It might feel that punishing an Iranian asset in 

Lebanon, even if that asset is not itself involved, is one of the means to raise the 

cost for Iran of its involvement in Yemen. Obviously, a more lasting resolution to 

the current Iran-Saudi clash in Lebanon, is to find a negotiated end to the Yemen 

conflict, and for Iran to use its influence to stop all missile attacks on Saudi from 

Yemen. 

Riyadh certainly has great economic leverage over Lebanon. And economic 

concerns have already galvanized intensified political bargaining in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah and their allies certainly don't want an economic disaster on their 

hands. But if it came to that, Hezbollah and its Iranian backers, would be better 

able to ride it out, then any other sectors of the country. 

Hariri's options are limited. He can go ahead with his resignation and go into 

opposition from outside the government. But that will not weaken Hezbollah or 

its allies, nor will it block the formation of a new government that might be more 

under their sway. Or he can use the threat of resignation to get a better deal, 

especially over Hezbollah's interventions against other Arab countries, which he is 

trying to do now. Other more extreme options are dead ends; attempting to 

move into some form of armed opposition would be both a losing battle and 

ruinous for the country. 

Weighing Interests and Policy Options 

As Acting DAS NEA Michael Ratney said in this venue just last month, "A Lebanon 

that is stable, tolerant, moderate and prosperous" is in the US national interest. 

Lebanon, and the LAF, have been critical partners in the war against ISIS and AQ 

affiliates. Lebanon hosts over one million Syrian refugees who otherwise might 

be desperately making their way to allies in Europe. And Lebanon is an example 

of communal coexistence, tolerance, and democracy-even if flawed-that 

undermines extremism, and that Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya can learn from. 

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It is important to note that Hezbollah, Iran and the Assad regime do not want 

the Lebanese government or the Lebanese army to have strong relations with 

the US or with Saudi Arabia. They assess correctly that those relations weaken 

their hold on the country. When Prime Minister Hariri met with President Trump 

this past July, Hezbollah undermined him and the army by launching a unilateral 

attack against an AQ affiliate and preempting the army's own attack. When he 

met with President Obama in January 2011, Hezbollah waited until he was seated 

in the Oval office to bring down his government in Beirut. Hezbollah and its 

backers were also relieved when Saudi Arabia cancelled its $4 billion aid package 

to the Army and internal security forces in February 2016. 

Saudi Arabia is correct to insist that Hezbollah's involvement in regional wars is 

intolerable. And if the latest crisis serves to stop Hezbollah's involvement in 

Yemen, then it would have not been in vain. But shoring up Lebanon's precarious 

stability should also be an important priority. The region can ill afford another 

failed state. 

For the US and other friends of Lebanon, that means continued support to 

Lebanese state institutions and the constitutional order, precarious as it is, as well 

as economic engagement and refugee aid. It should also mean continued support 

to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces. They have fought 

and defeated ISIS and AQ-affiliated groups and have managed to maintain 

stability and security in Lebanon while war raged next door; and they play an 

important role, along with UNIFIL, in maintaining stability across the southern 

border and working to avoid another Hezbollah-lsrael war. 

But the LAF should do more to enforce the government's own policy of noninterference in regional conflicts. This means that the LAF and Lebanon's internal 

security forces should be pressed to play a more effective role in monitoring 

border crossings, ports and airport. Also there had been some coordination, 

dictated by the geography of the fight, in the recent battle against ISIS and AQ in 

the Eastern Bekaa; but it should be made clear that this coordination must end. 

At a higher level, one of the weaknesses of the UNSCR 1701 that ended the 2006 

lsraei-Hezbollah war is that it mandated international forces in the south, but not 

along the eastern border with Syria. If the international community wishes to 

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truly prevent Hezbollah from acting as a proxy for Iran and a regional army, then 

the UNSC could take up the matter under Chapter VII. 

Saudi Arabia and other friends of Lebanon who are concerned about Hezbollah, 

could also work more closely together to enact targeted sanctions that would 

impact Hezbollah without simultaneously threatening the Lebanese economy. 

On a more general political level. Opponents of Hezbollah in Lebanon have had 

to tread a difficult path; facing a formidable Iranian-armed and Syrian-backed 

force, under constant threat of assassination, and struggling to maintain a 

nationalist line against long odds. It is understandable that friends and allies are 

occasionally frustrated that they can't achieve more; and indeed, they should 

always be pressed to at least try to do more. But friends and allies should also 

appreciate the enormous challenges under which they operate, and the risks they 

and their country takes. These political forces require continued backing. If they 

are cut off, this will only weaken them further, strengthen their opponents, and 

make the challenges ever more difficult. 

Engagement is preferable to disengagement. And building influence is preferable 

to ceding further influence to Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. In this vein, support to 

the Lebanese armed forces and Lebanese state-with their imperfections-is 

preferable to disengagement; and providing political and other forms of support 

to those in Lebanon trying to counterbalance or stand up to Hezbollah and its 

political allies is preferable to cutting them off. 

Broader Considerations 

Lebanon is a victim and a symptom of Iran's empowerment in the region. 

Limited change and pushback on Hezbollah can be realistically asked of Lebanon 

without jeopardizing the country's broader stability. But rolling back Iranian 

influence and/or stabilizing the Middle East requires a much broader and 

sustained strategy. Among considerations for a wider strategy should be the 

following. 

First, it must be recognized that armed non state actors, whether ISIS and AQ or 

Iranian proxies, essentially thrive in the context of failed states and unresolved 

civil wars. Hence, one way to gradually undermine armed non state actors and 

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regional proxies is to end civil wars and work with reformed state institutions to 

rebuild nation-state capacities. 

• In Iraq, this means working with the Iraqi government while pressing it to 

continue along the path of national reconciliation with the Kurds and Arab 

Sunnis and to reform and clean up state institutions. 

• In Lebanon, it means working with the state institutions on maintaining 

stability and security, while pressing them to do what they can to limit 

Hezbollah's extra constitutional behavior, both inside and outside the 

country. 

• In Yemen, it means focusing intensely on trying to find a negotiated end to 

the civil war, withdrawing all foreign forces, and encouraging partners to 

help rebuild Yemeni state capacities. 

• In Syria, it means not giving in to the Russian-Iranian supposed victory, but 

rather keeping the pressure on for some meaningful political resolution to 

the conflict that could create the possibility of rebuilding some measure of 

legitimate and effective national governance in Syria. 

Second, it means an effective and multi-tiered strategy vis a vis Iran. This 

means serious pushback on Iran in areas where it is clearly violating international 

agreements and regional stability, but also a robust negotiating track-whether 

direct or indirect-that proposes to Iran a secure way forward if it plays by the 

rules of international order. 

The grave concern of the Saudi leadership regarding Iran's extended reach in the 

Middle East is not new. Previous Saudi leaders bemoaned the fact that the US-led 

invasion of Iraq ended up empowering Iran, and that the Obama administration's 

fixation on the nuclear deal only led to further Iranian involvement in the Middle 

East. 

The focus on Iran is shared with the new US administration, but although the US 

administration announced a new Iran policy, that policy is short on details or 

teeth. 

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• In Syria, although US forces are likely to stay for the medium term, the US 

has stopped support to the anti-Assad anti-Iranian opposition, and appears 

to be leaning toward a Russian-managed outcome there. 

• In Iraq, the US plans to keep forces there and to support the central 

government, but the Baghdad government will likely remain quite close to 

Tehran. 

• On Qatar and Lebanon, the two capitals seem to have not been on the 

same page. 

• And on Yemen, there is still no pathway to ending the crisis despite a 

horrific humanitarian crisis. 

The US is also weakening its diplomatic arm, the state department, at a time 

when able and tough diplomats are needed most. And on the nuclear deal, the 

policy has been confusing at best, and currently idling somewhere between 

decertification and actual abrogation. 

Saudi Arabia has an intense interest in a stable Middle East. The new 

leadership, in particular, wants to move along with the ambitious domestic 

priorities of economic, social and cultural reform. It can be a partner in the 

attempt at regional stabilization. But until the US has a more comprehensive 

strategy that combines pushing back on Iran with working toward ending civil 

wars and stabilizing failed states in a conflicted region, the responses to crises 

that erupt will remain episodic. 

I thank you for giving me the opportunity to share some of my views about 

Lebanon and the region, and I look forward to your questions and comments. 

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Annex 

Background: Lebanon and Hezbollah 

Lebanon has been deeply split over the presence of Hezbollah for many years. At the end of 

the 15 year civil war in 1990, all Lebanese militias agreed to disband and hand in their heavy 

weapons; but the Syrian regime of Hafez Assad, which held sway over the country, rammed in a 

provision that Hezbollah would be allowed to keep its weapons as the nucleus of armed 

popular resistance against the Israeli occupation of part of south Lebanon that had started in 

1978. Lebanon and Israel, under American mediation, negotiated an Israeli withdrawal 

agreement in 1983. Syria opposed the agreement because they felt that if Lebanon got its 

occupied territory back unilaterally, that would weaken their leverage with Israel to get their 

own Syrian Golan back. The Soviets backed the Syrians in this opposition, because they did not 

want another Arab country to drift closer into the pro-Western orbit. Syria scuttled the 

agreement and encouraged Iran to ramp up its support for a nascent Hezbollah. This ushered 

in 17 years of resistance activity led by Hezballah that eventually resulted in the Israeli 

unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The withdrawal was a great victory for Hezbollah 

and was welcomed nationally. But Syria was disconcerted by the unilateral withdrawal, as it 

again left them with less leverage regarding the return of the Golan. 

In Lebanon the Israeli withdrawal of 2000 reignited calls for the armed group to disband; but 

Syrian dominance once again protected the group. In 2004, the current prime minister's father, 

Rafik Hariri, began assembling a political coalition to attempt to stand up to the Syrian diktat 

and to Hezbollah's free hand in Lebanon. Likely for doing just that, he was assassinated in 

February of 2005. The international tribunal for Lebanon has charged what many suspected, 

that the Assad regime and Hezbollah operatives were involved in the assassination. The 

assassination further deepened the political divisions in Lebanon between opponents and 

supporters of the Assad regime and Hezbollah-what came to be known as the March 14 and 

March 8 coalitions, respectively. 

The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005 ended a military presence that had started in 

1976, and indicated to some that their withdrawal would leave Hezbollah weak and vulnerable. 

But Hezbollah adapted quickly to the new conditions. It consolidated its political coalition and 

secured a Christian ally in Gen. Michel Aoun, and built a strong presence in parliament and 

government. Even so, the government in May 2008 issued a decision to shut down Hezbollah's 

telecoms networks and to replace the head of airport security who was thought to be close to 

Hezbollah. The group reacted by sending their fighters onto the streets where they clashed 

with, and quickly defeated, armed men loyal to current Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Eighteen 

years after 1990, the capital was once gain on the brink of civil war. The national army did not 

intervene in that fight, and came under great criticism; but the army command feared that the 

multi-confessional army would disintegrate if it was used in an internal battle in which battle 

lines were drawn up on confessional lines. 

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Israel too had hoped that the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 would leave Hezbollah more 

vulnerable. In 2006 Israel reacted to a Hezbollah cross border attack with a full scare war. The 

two sides effectively fought each other to a draw. Although Hezbollah and Lebanon took heavy 

losses, Iran, through Syria, quickly re-equipped and reinforced Hezbollah after the war and 

rendered it stronger than before the war. 

The uprising in Syria in 2011 was another turning point. Opponents of Hezbollah hoped that 

the uprising would succeed in removing Assad, and thus weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah apparently had the same assessment of risk; and although the Lebanese government 

of which they were a part had a declared policy of 'non-interference', Hezbollah fully entered 

into the war in Syria on the side of Assad, and in alliance with Iran and, eventually, Russia. 

American prevarication on Syria, and the Russian military intervention in 2015 finally tipped the 

scales in Syria in the decisive favor of the Assad coalition. 

In Lebanon, this result in Syria dismayed anti-Hezbollah parties and convinced them, grudgingly, 

that they were going to have to continue to coexist with Hezbollah and its allies for the near 

future. By this time, the country had entered into a constitutional crisis after the term of 

president Michel Suleiman had come to an end. To break the crisis, Hariri nominated a 

member oft he Hezbollah coalition, Suleiman Frangieh, to the presidency, apparently at the 

time with Saudi backing. Hariri's Christian allies, the Lebanese Forces, rejected this nomination, 

and nominated another Hezbollah ally, Michel Aoun, instead. Aoun was elected to the 

presidency in June of 2016, and Hariri was subsequently named prime minister. 

11 
34

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Dr. Wittes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS 

INSTITUTION 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the chance to 

share my views with you. 

ISIS is on the run militarily, and the JCPOA has, for now, constrained and rolled back Iran’s nuclear program, and it is these 

gains that allow America and its partners to turn our attention to 

Iran’s relentless effort, directly and through local proxies, to subvert other sovereign states in the region and gain influence over 

their politics. 

For Saudi Arabia, this has long been the dominant regional security concern and it is now motivating dramatic moves in Saudi foreign policy. 

Constraining and reversing this expansion of Iranian influence in 

the region is a worthy and important goal for the U.S. and it is a 

goal that, for the moment, unites most of America’s regional partners. 

It is one that could bring others in the international community 

on board. Although our regional partners see a common threat, 

they have different priorities and that means American leadership 

is essential to bring them together. 

Building this coalition will require persistence, trust with our allies, resolution of regional conflicts, dialogue with a wide range of 

international partners—in other words, containing Iran will require adroit and assertive American diplomacy. 

Now, the swiftness and decisiveness of Saudi decision making 

has surprised many and raised some alarm. Saudi tactics and tone 

have changed from hedging bets between dialogue and confrontation with Tehran to going all in in a face off designed to unsettle 

Iran, raise its costs, and try to impose some red lines on its behavior. 

In certain areas, Saudis’ policy has involved primarily soft power 

and it has brought noticeable gains such as the kingdom’s concerted outreach to Shi’a politicians in Iraq. 

In other areas, like Yemen and now Lebanon, the approach has 

been more unilateral and more coercive and I think it reveals some 

limits to the kingdom’s leverage and its capacity to shape events. 

The bottom line is that Saudi Arabia is more effective in regional 

affairs with carrots than with sticks, and this new propensity for 

all-out confrontation has already complicated some U.S. policy 

goals in the region. 

Most notably, the Saudi intervention in Yemen is now, at nearly 

3 years old, both a military and humanitarian nightmare. 

It has mired the kingdom in an expensive quagmire, it has produced a horrific level of human suffering, and it has strengthened 

both al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. 

It is time for this war to end. Every day the war goes on, the 

humanitarian costs mount with little real impact on the outcome, 

35

which will inevitably involve intricate political compromises and 

power sharing amongst Yemen’s rival factions. 

In the domestic arena, Mohammed Bin Salman, the crown 

prince, is now dancing on the edge of a knife. Some of his political 

and economic goals are very worthy. Some seem contradictory. 

For example, it is hard to inspire the confidence of foreign investors while casting doubt on the rule of law by arresting hundreds 

on vague charges with no public evidence or judicial process. 

My own view is that top-down reform without meaningful improvements in government accountability, transparency and respect for human rights will not ultimately succeed in winning the 

support either of foreign investors or, more importantly, the kingdom’s citizens. 

The missile attack on the Riyadh airport last month was a wakeup call, but Saudi worries about the missile threat from Yemen 

have been growing steadily. 

The kingdom faces the possibility that Iran and Hezbollah could 

create in northern Yemen a duplication of the challenge Israel 

faces in southern Lebanon and that is an intolerable prospect for 

the kingdom, one they are prepared to take dramatic steps to forestall. 

I think it is possible that Hezbollah will agree to some concessions regarding its purported activities in Yemen in order to keep 

Hariri as prime minister in Lebanon. 

But an undeclared end to unacknowledged activity in Yemen is 

hard to see and it is hard to enforce. So I think we should expect 

to see continued tussles between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Lebanese politics. 

It is important to note that none of our regional allies want to 

see Lebanon destabilized or to become a front in a regional war, 

and American support for Lebanon is valuable in maintaining that 

stability. 

The U.S. should stay engaged to support democratic development 

there, push for parliamentary elections that are scheduled for next 

spring, and hope that one legacy of the Saudi pressure on Hariri 

is increased support for his coalition at the ballot box. 

Now, the United States can successfully build an international 

coalition to constrain and push back on Iran’s destabilizing influence. 

Components of that effort would include diplomacy with Iraq, 

with Russia over Syria, pressure on Iran in the U.N. Security 

Council, intelligence cooperation with allies and persuading European and—European nations and China that Middle East stability 

is a public good that Iranian intervention degrades. 

But as with the effort that brought Iran to the nuclear table, 

ramping up this international pressure to a level that shifts Iranian behavior will require painstaking diplomatic work. 

The most important tool in the American policy toolbox to contain Iran and restore stability in the region is the tool that the current administration seems most committed to degrading—our diplomacy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]

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Testimony of 

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy 

The Brookings Institution 

before the 

Honse Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and Africa 

Hearing: The Latest Developments in Sandi Arabia and Lebanon 

November 29, 2017 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the subcommittee, good 

morning. Thank you for inviting me to share my analysis with you today. T must begin, as 

always, by noting that I represent only myself before you today; the Brookings Institution does 

not take any institutional positions on policy issues. 

Today's hearing is called amidst events that mark a turning point in two interwoven Middle 

Eastern conflicts that have consumed the attention of the region and the United States in the last 

several years. 

• The ouster of the Islamic State group tram nearly all of the territory it controlled in Iraq 

and Syria is an unalloyed good, but begs the question of who will establish and 

administer governance in the liberated areas, how displaced populations can return in 

safety and security, and how to prevent extremist violence from remerging in Syria and 

Iraq. 

• The Assad regime, with robust support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, and in the face 

of global indifference, has nearly defeated its armed opposition, after displacing half its 

population and slaughtering a half-million people. Assad and his patrons seem prepared 

now to enshrine his victory in a political settlement, and this begs the question of what 

kind of diplomatic process can produce any hope for lasting peace, much less dignity or 

justice for the Syrian people. 

The answers to these questions will shape the future of the Middle East, the balance of power 

amongst the major players in the region, and the role of outsiders, including the United States, in 

the region's future order. It's thus an important moment to review and reconsider American 

policy. So I will address the committee's questions regarding Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and 

American policy through the lens of this regional fulcrum, and the choices facing the United 

States at this key moment. 

Iran's Gains from the Syrian War and the Anti-ISIS Campaign 

With ISIS on the run, the overarching strategic challenge in the region, for both America and its 

partners, is Iran's relentless effort, directly and through local proxies, to subvert other sovereign 

states in the region and gain influence over their politics. Tn recent years, regional upheaval has 

given Iran numerous opportunities to expand its influence and its reach, by exploiting divisions 
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and conflict within Arab societies. At times, Arab leaders have played into this strategy by 

sharpening instead of healing divisions within their nations, by stoking instead of resolving civil 

conflicts in the Arab world, and by employing sectarian rhetoric as a tool to mobilize popular 

support for their policies. prior 

to the completion of the JCPOA, I predicted that Iranian efforts at regional were likely 

to escalate whether or not a nuclear deal was agreed to, simply because the opportunities for Iran 

were so wide and the cost of exploiting them so low. Sadly, that prediction has proven true. 

It's been clear for some time that, should the Assad regime survive the Syrian civil war, it would 

emerge even more dependent on Iran than before, and that a Syria dominated by Iranian power 

and influence would be destabilizing and dangerous for the region and for American partners. I 

ms.U.ile_d to this CQI"D!lllll~i: about eighteen months ago as to growing Israeli concerns over 

precisely the scenario we now see unfolding, in which Assad remains the head of government in 

a Syria that is essentially an Iranian suzerainty. What's changed in recent months is the public 

voicing of those concerns by Israeli officials, and increased Israeli activism to establish its own 

red lines with respect to Iranian and Hezbollah behavior in Syria. 

What's also changed is that these concerns are exacerbated by the role of Iraqi Shia militias in 

liberating territory on the lraqi-Syrian border from ISIS and then ~ortc4.1;Lcros§.Lrm...into Sxt:i_<m 

!crril.Ql}: in early November to help the Syrian Arab Army oust ISIS from Al-Bukamal. This 

apparent coordination between Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq, and the effort to solidify 

hold over a land corridor stretching from Baghdad to Beirut, represents an escalation of the 

challenge Iranian influence poses to American partners and to regional stability. But it is worth 

noting that this presents a difference of degree, not a difference in kind. The Iranian challenge 

has been consistent, and consistently growing, at least since 2011 and some would argue since 

the US. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

Constraining and reversing this expansion of Iranian influence in the region is a worthy 

and important goal for American policy in the context of stabilizing a disordered region. It 

is a goal that, for the moment, unites most of America's regional partners, and one that 

could bring others in the international community on board. But pursuing this goal will 

require persistence, trust with American allies, resolution of regional conflicts, dialogue 

with a wide range of international partners- in other words, adroit and assertive 

American diplomacy. 

Whereas two years ago, America's major regional partners disagreed as to whether Iran's 

regional troublemak:ing, or its nuclear program, was the greatest threat, today they are united in 

their focus on the regional subversion. Indeed, this singular goal has become the shared focus of 

America's regional partners in part because the JCPOA has, for now, bracketed the nuclear 

program that had been a second major vector for Iranian threat projection against America and 

its allies. Saudi Arabia is one of America's closest regional partners, and the government in 

Riyadh views regional developments almost exclusively through the lens of their concern about 

the rise and expansion of Iranian influence in the Arab world. Israel, America's closest Middle 

Eastern ally, likewise is focused primarily on the implications of this moment for the Iranian 

threat. Both these American partners seek to push back against Iranian expansionism, and both 

seek a more active and engaged American role in the Middle East. This convergence of interests 

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around a shared threat may offer opportunities for these t\vo countries to work more closely 

together with the United States to establish a more stable and secure equilibrium in the Middle 

East 

A shared threat, however, does not a shared strategy make. Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other 

American partners like Egypt and Jordan, do not share common priorities in the region, not even 

when it comes to where and how to try and constrain Iranian influence. They do not share a 

vision for what a more engaged American role should look like. And most significantly, they do 

not share a vision for what a new Middle East order should look like, or what they themselves 

must do to achieve it This means that American leadership is necessary, although not sufficient, 

to harmonize the efforts of our various friends on behalf of a shared goal. I will try in the 

testimony that follows to lay out a few of these divergent perspectives, and suggest components 

for a successful American effort to contain Iranian expansionism. 

What is Riyadh Thinking? 

Saudi Arabia's greatest concern in the region is the rise and expansion of Iranian influence. 

Everything that the Kingdom is doing outside its borders- and some of what it's doing inside its 

borders- is a response to this threat 

Over the last months, the Saudi government has taken a number of steps that serve to 

consolidate, centralize, and underscore Mohammed bin Salman's control over the levers of 

power in the Kingdom, and his determination to undertake significant changes in the orientation 

of both domestic and foreign policy. The events of the past month- the wide-ranging arrests on 

vague charges of corruption, and the forced resignation of Saad Hariri as prime minister of 

Lebanon- are of a piece with the approach we've seen since King Salman ascended the throne 

and designated his son as then-deputy crown prince. The swiftness and decisiveness of Saudi 

decision-making has surprised many, and raised concerns about recklessness or at least a 

tolerance for risk that some observers tind unnerving. Most concretely, the Saudi decision to 

intervene in Yemen appears impetuous and ill-considered, miring the Kingdom in a military 

quagmire, producing a nightmarish level of human suffering, and strengthening both AI Qaeda of 

the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. 

Domestic Policy 

At the same time, it's important to recognize that this shift in leadership style follows years of 

decision-making in Riyadh that was slow and cautious, even as events in the region and at home 

demanded a robust response. To Saudis and others in the Middle East who were concerned about 

the wave of popular revolution sweeping the region, alarmed at the growth of Iranian influence, 

and frustrated by the stagnation of the Saudi economy and society, this double-barreled assault 

on the status quo must feel refreshing, if uncertain. 

In the domestic arena, Mohammed bin Salman is now dancing on a knife's edge. He has 

announced and begun, but has not tully carried out, a set of reforms that will dramatically reset 

the economic and political foundations of the Kingdom. Politically, he is laying the basis for the 

tirst transfer of power to a grandson of the Kingdom's founder, Abdul Aziz al-Saud; he is also 

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shifting the monarchy's political base from a network of royals and elites who live off state 

patronage to a wider more populist base in Saudi's overwhelmingly large rising generation. He 

seeks to consolidate this shift by centralizing power in his own hands, marginalizing and 

discrediting rival royal family members, and promising young Saudis better services, greater 

social freedom and wider economic opportunities. 

Economically, Mohammed bin Salman seeks to diversify Saudi Arabia's energy-based economy 

and expand its private sector, to compensate for long-term lower oil prices, to create more jobs 

for young Saudis, and to extend the country's prosperity into the post-oil era. But to do this, he 

must slash government subsidies and rein in a very leaky and bloated government budget, while 

raising cash for domestic investment, including through a public offering of 5% of the state oil 

company. 

Some of the young crown prince's political and economic goals seem contradictory- for 

example, it's very hard to inspire the confidence of foreign investors while casting doubt on your 

nation's reliability and rule of law by arresting hundreds on vague corruption charges with no 

public evidence or judicial process. It's very hard to encourage innovation and promise young 

Saudis greater opportunity to pursue their dreams, while severely restricting freedom of 

expression and enforcing the horrific guardianship laws that allow Saudi males to treat their 

daughters, sisters, and wives like chattel. 

The real question is whether Mohammed bin Salman's bold decision making can keep up with 

the changes already underway in and around Saudi Arabia. Can he shift his political base and 

make new friends faster than he is alienating his opponents amongst the royal family and the old 

elites? Can he catalyze new growth and investment in the Saudi economy faster than the drop in 

oil prices and the burdens of social services and regional leadership are draining government 

reserves? And can he really put a fence around the extreme interpretation oflslam that has 

dominated Saudi public life, overtaken the educational system and the airwaves, and been an arm 

of Saudi foreign policy for decades? My own view is that top-down reform, without meaningful 

improvements in government accountability, transparency, and inclusion, will not ultimately 

succeed in winning the support either of foreign investors or, more importantly, the Kingdom's 

citizens. I detail that analysis in this P'W!'IForeign Policy 

Despite the dramatic shift in speed and tone, in foreign policy, the primary motives of Saudi 

policy remain the same: to push back revolutionary movements and to contain Iranian influence. 

But Saudi tactics and tone have changed, from risk-averse to risk-taking, from hedging bets 

between dialogue and confrontation with Tehran to going all-in on a face-otT designed to unsettle 

Iran, raise its costs, and try to impose some red lines on its behavior. In some areas, the policy 

has involved primarily soft power, and brought noticeable gains- such as Saudi Arabia's 

warmer relations with the government in Baghdad, its opening of the Saudi-Iraqi border to trade, 

and its outreach to Iraqi Shia political figures. In other areas, like Yemen and now Lebanon, the 

approach has been more unilateral and coercive, and reveals the limits of the Kingdom's 

leverage and capacity to shape events. These are the areas of greatest risk for the United States 

and its partners. The bottom line is that Saudi Arabia is far more efl'ective in regional atl'airs with 

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carrots than sticks, and its current leadership's propensity for confrontation has already 

complicated key US. policy goals including the fight against Islamist terrorism. US. policy 

should encourage Saudi Arabia to stop picking fights and instead invest in conflict resolution and 

coalition-building around common and concrete objectives. 

What is Happening With Lebanon? 

Saudi Arabia's power play in Lebanon should be understood as an attempt to gain leverage over 

Iran by pressuring its main regional proxy, Hezbo11ah. The Saudi government is alarmed, not just 

by Iranian expansionism, but by Hezbo11ah's role in facilitating it 

The missile attack on the Riyadh airport last month was a wake-up ca11, but Saudi worries over 

the missile threat from Yemen has been growing steadily. While Hezbollah' s Secretary General, 

Hassan Nasra11ah, to Yemen, the missile fired on Riyadh came from 

somewhere outside Yemen; someone either came into the country to fire that sophisticated 

missile, or trained Y emenis to do so. l!.Si foH.:_\c,'iJH!Y.Q imetCQPl£<1 arms shipments from Iran that 

they believe were destined for the Houthis. And over the last year or so, Hezbollah !TI£m.h£L'i 

lJ£Y.LQ.Q_astc.li about their involvement with the Houthi insurgency and targeting Saudi Arabia 

with rockets. Saudi Arabia has faced the possibility that Iran and Hezbo11ah would create in 

northern Yemen a duplicate of the challenge Israel faces in southern Lebanon: a hostile militia 

armed with long-range missiles that threaten Saudi infrastructure and civilian populations. This 

is an intolerable prospect for the Kingdom, and they are prepared to take dramatic steps to 

forestall it 

Since 2006, shortly after Rafik Hariri's assassination and Syria's military withdrawal from 

Lebanon, Hezbollah has exercised an effective veto over Lebanese politics. It was Hezbollah' s 

insistence that left Lebanon without a government for nearly two years before Saad Hariri 

acceded to the deal that made Hezbollah ally Michel Aoun president and returned Hariri himself 

to the prime ministry. By removing Hariri's Sunni fig leaf on a Hezbollah-dominated 

government in Lebanon, the Saudi leadership apparently hoped to isolate Lebanon economically 

and politica11y, and so increase international pressure on Hezbo11ah to curb its regional activities 

in favor of shoring up its domestic legitimacy. The Hariri resignation was thus an indirect move 

to try and constrain Iranian behavior in other conflict arenas outside Lebanon itself 

But the Saudi gambit was i11-suited to this task, for two reasons. First, Lebanon is really on the 

periphery of the geopolitical struggle between Saudi and Iran. The Kingdom's leverage there is 

both limited and blunt, while Hezbollah' s roots in Lebanon are deep and strong. Beyond the 

Hariri resignation itself, Saudi leverage over Lebanon is economic, and is entirely negative -it 

could withdraw deposits in the central bank or block the flow of remittances tram Gulf-based 

Lebanese citizens back home. These steps would harm Lebanese Sunnis as much as Hezbollah, if 

not more- and could plunge Lebanon into political chaos, with unpredictable repercussions. 

Second, the ham-handedness of the Saudi pressure on Hariri backfired in Lebanon itself, 

reducing Saudi influence. There, Hariri was seen as acting under a Saudi diktat, held hostage and 

forced to resign against his own preferences and those of his constituents. Hariri himself has 

gained popularity even as he has lost Saudi support Saudi Arabia appears in this context as both 

a bully and a fickle ally willing to sacrifice its client, Hariri, for the sake of its own interests. 

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Hezbollah gets to paint itself as the reasonable party, committed to the rules of Lebanese politics 

in the face of external demands; and Iran is seen as a stalwart supporter to its allies in Lebanon in 

Syria. 

At the moment, Hariri' s resignation is "suspended" while the Lebanese political factions 

negotiate on a possible bargain to keep him in office. Saudi Arabia's most urgent concern 

regarding Iranian and Hezbollah external activity is to halt their cooperation with the Houthi 

rebels, and especially :vvbat_tb!;_~r,!i.'i.Jlll"g9 as their supply to the Houthis oflong-range 

missiles. Since Hezbollah publicly denies involvement in Yemen, it's possible to imagine a deal 

whereby this covert cooperation ends and Hariri remains as prime minister. But an undeclared 

end to unacknowledged cooperation is hard to see and hard to enforce; I think we should expect 

to see continue tussles between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Lebanese politics in the months to 

come, even if neither of them wants to entirely upset the Lebanese apple cart. 

How should the United States respond to these events? The Lebanese state is indeed tainted by 

Hezbollah- not just its role in formal governance, but also its effective veto power over political 

decision-making and its apparent penetration of government entities that we hope would serve as 

independent, unifying national institutions in the tractured country. For example, we saw in 

August the Lebanese Armed Forces ill2!mrcntlv CiKlnli nat,; with Hezbollah, for example, in 

fighting ISIS along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Additional sanctions and other pressure to cut 

tinancing and support for Hezbollah are certainly worthwhile endeavors. 

At the same time, increased isolation of or pressure on the Lebanese state by the United States or 

European countries is unlikely to constrain Iranian or Hezbollah regional behavior in any 

meaningful way. Destabilizing Lebanon's politics or economics might even increase the 

incentives for Hezbollah to bolster its nationalist credentials in the country by provoking a 

confrontation with Israel. The prospect of instability in Lebanon is unnerving to Israel. Jerusalem 

is resolutely working to contain the missile threat it faces from Hezbollah and to prevent the 

group gaining additional capabilities, and Israel is fully prepared for a scenario in which it must 

quickly work to destroy the extensive missile capability Hezbollah already has. But Israel does 

not seek to be drawn into a conflict with Hezbollah due to external factors or miscalculations. 

Such a war, should it come, would likely be intense and costly for civilian populations on both 

sides of the border. 

Hezbollah faces continual pressure in balancing its regional activism on Iran's behalf with its 

national claims and constituents in Lebanon itself As the Syrian war winds down, and Lebanese 

electoral politics heat up, this balancing act becomes more difficult The United States should 

take advantage of this trajectory. The regular functioning of the Lebanese state and the 

democratic demands of the Lebanese citizenry remain the best mechanisms for constraining 

Hezbollah' s behavior in Lebanon and toward Israel. TheUS should stay engaged, continue to 

support democratic development in Lebanon, push for parliamentary elections to take place next 

year under maximally tree conditions, and hope that one legacy of the maladroit Saudi pressure 

on Hariri is increased support for his March 14'h coalition at the ballot box. 

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The Disaster in Yemen 

The Saudi intervention in Yemen, now nearly three years old, is both a military and a 

humanitarian disaster. Deaths from the conflict itself have topped 10,000, including many 

civilian deaths from airstrikes by the Saudi-led and U.S.-backed coalition. But the greater loss of 

life today is as a result of starvation and disease amongst a beleaguered population that was 

living on the edge even before this conflict began. ,~~.Qrdiggj_()_ the l'l"'L twenty million people 

living in Yemen need emergency humanitarian assistance. Cholera has already infected more 

than 900,000 people, and killed more than 2000. More than four million women and children are 

acutely malnourished. The blockade imposed by the Saudi-led coalition after a missile launched 

from Yemen nearly reached the international airport in Riyadh exacerbated an already-dire lack 

of food and medicine, and the partial lifting of that blockade has only marginal impact at 

ameliorating this humanitarian nightmare. The war needs to end as soon as possible. 

Militarily, the conflict is at a stalemate, but in a state far worse for Saudi Arabia and for 

American interests than when the Kingdom intervened nearly three years ago. Intense Saudi 

suspicion ofHouthi connections to Iran is what drew Riyadh into this conflict -and by 

intervening the Kingdom created a self-tulfilling prophecy, one that boosted the Houthis with 

support from Iran and Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was once a Saudi client but was ousted with 

Saudi support in the Arab Spring uprisings of2011. Meanwhile, the intensification of the conflict 

via Saudi intervention increased maneuvering space for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the 

Al Qaeda affiliate that has been the most fixated on attacking the U.S homeland. 

In its effort to beat back Houthi territorial gains and reestablish the Hadi government, Saudi 

Arabia has achieved what it can through an intensive aerial campaign. Tt is unlikely to make 

further territorial gains for the Hadi government without ground operations that would cost 

significant additional blood and treasure. Saudi Arabia's allies in this tight have mostly been 

reluctant partners from the first, and are wary about further investments. Every day the war goes 

on, the humanitarian costs mount with little real impact on the outcome, which will inevitably 

involve intricate political compromises and power-sharing amongst Yemen's rival factions. 

The Houthi's bullheaded approach torpedoed the last round of serious negotiations in 2016, and 

there appears to be !JiLYllib1~.Q.z\lD"5lHOW !JJliill':Y{'!J' to seek a settlement for the war. The Saudi 

Arabian govermnent in fact expressed renewed interest in negotiations just days before the 

missile attack on Riyadh's airport last month; the seriousness of the missile threat, if anything, 

underscores the urgency of effective negotiations. While the previous administration, like this 

one, provided logistical and intelligence support to the Saudi war etiort, Secretary of State Kerry 

also actively supported a diplomatic process to end the war and President Obama sought toward 

the end of his term to use American weapons sales as leverage to reduce civilian sutiering and 

push toward contlict resolution. But when it comes to diplomacy, the Trump Administration, 

aside from th.~_hl\;\;asi<ml\l.Wg~'iJ~.!:Fi~, seems to be missing in action. Congress can and should 

play a role in encouraging an early end to this conflict, and meanwhile should assiduously 

oversee the implementation of American laws designed to prevent our weapons and assistance 

being used in ways that violate human rights or the laws of war. 

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Yemen is another area, like Iraq and Syria, where divergent priorities amongst seemingly allied 

governments complicate efforts to end contlict and stabilize the region. In this instance, the 

United Arab Emirates objects to the inclusion of Yemen's Islah (Reform) party in a postwar 

government, because of the party's ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and has ='cc~"'"""'-== 

~l!J)QQtj:j_Q a separatist coalition that rejects the internationally recognized government 

Mohammed bin Salman recently mel}yith ren.r.?gntatiy<&ofls_Li!ll to build support for the Hadi 

government Until the Saudi-led coalition can resolve its own internal differences, it's hard to see 

how diplomacy can make progress. 

U.S. Policy: How to Push Back on Iran? 

Confronting the reality of stalemate in Lebanon and Yemen, we return to the Syrian-Iraqi arena 

as the place where it might still be possible, and meaningful, to push back against Trani an 

intluence. How might the United States achieve such a goal? 

The first step is to realize that America cannot afford to rapidly draw down engagement in Syria 

and Iraq just because ISIS has been ousted. As recently as August, U.S. special envoy J:l.I.Q.TI 

'vlc.\l!!':.~J:Il.Phasiz<'si to international partners that the United States would not seek to rebuild 

effective security or governance in those parts of Syria it had liberated from ISIS, but would 

undertake ''basic stabilization" before withdrawing. This sent a signal to actors in the region, and 

to Russia, that the United States sought no direct leverage over a political settlement in Syria. It's 

no surprise that Iranian-backed forces then rushed for the Iraqi-Syria border. Carrying through 

such an intention also means leaving America's anti-ISIS partners, primarily the Kurdish fighters 

who make up most of the Syrian Democratic Forces, to cut their own deal with Damascus and its 

Iranian patron. 

More recently, administration officials that U.S. forces may 

remain on the ground in Syria longer, but it's not clear what strategy is for 

leveraging that military presence into gains at the diplomatic table. It is hard to imagine how this 

tactic can work when President Trump seems satisfied leaving the diplomatic initiative in Putin's 

hands. It is imperative that the United States seek to enforce Russia's formal commitment to the 

Geneva process, and to a political transition in Syria, as the bases for a political settlement The 

clear priority for American engagement in the Geneva process should be to insist, with the united 

support of the Arab parties to the talks and the Syrian opposition, that all foreign fightersincluding and especially the Iranian-sponsored foreign militias, and Hezbollah- demobilize and 

ultimately withdraw tram Syrian territory. Russia can hardly object to a goal of removing nonstate foreign fighters, when its ostensible justification for intervening in Syria was to combat 

terrorism. 

In Iraq, it is imperative that the United States remain engaged diplomatically and politically, to 

head otT further Kurdish-Arab confrontation, to encourage Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement, to 

constrain the role of the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces, and to nudge important Shia 

political leaders like Moqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah al-Sistani farther away tram Tehran's orbit 

Iraqi elections are expected next spring, and like the Lebanese elections they are an opportunity 

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for local champions of national sovereignty and opponents of Iranian influence to demonstrate 

their strength and determination. 

More broadly, containing Iran demands a wide and diverse international coalition to constrain 

Iran's regional interventions, to marginalize and weaken its proxy forces, to expose Iranian 

sponsorship of terrorism, and to enforce constraints on Iran's missile proliferation and missile 

program. Components of such a coalition effort would include: 

• persuading Russia, as the dominant actor in Syria, to constrain TRGC and Hezbollah 

freedom of movement within the country, and to enforce understandings excluding these 

forces from the "de-escalation" zones and, later, to extend those understandings into other 

parts of the country by writing them into a political settlement of the civil war. 

• using the United Nations platform to call out and punish Iranian violations of Security 

Council resolutions pertaining to its ballistic missile program. 

building on strong intelligence cooperation with regional and international partners, 

expose and interdict Iranian activities such as weapons proliferation, sponsorship of 

terrorism, and subversion of domestic politics. 

• persuading European countries and China that Middle East stability is a global public 

good, and that Iranian interventionism degrades that good. They should therefore slow 

their diplomatic and economic re-engagement with Iran, and condition those relations on 

Iran's pulling back especially from the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. Iran's involvement 

in these two wars has prolonged their violence, magnified the human suffering, displaced 

large numbers of people including into Europe, exacerbated the terrorist threat emanating 

from these places, and threatened free flows of energy and commerce in and out of the 

Middle East These phenomena should be of significant concern to European and Asian 

governments, and motivate them to cooperate in a multilateral pressure campaign on 

Tehran. 

As with the effort that brought Iran to the nuclear table, ramping up international pressure to a 

level that shifts Iranian behavior will require painstaking and persistent diplomatic work by the 

United States, alongside stepped-up pressure through sanctions and U.N. bodies. It should be 

obvious that building this international pressure is an uphill climb as long as the U.S. 

commitment to its JCPOA obligations is in question. 

The most important tool in the American policy toolbox to contain Iran and restore stability to 

this disordered region is the tool the Trump Administration seems most committed to destroying: 

our diplomacy. Congress and this Committee can work to hold the administration accountable 

for building a credible, coherent diplomatic strategy to advance American interests and support 

American partners in the Middle East. 

9 
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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to all of our panelists. 

Mr. Abrams, I will start with you. You have written that successfully undermining Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon will require diplomatic and economic pressure from the United States and our allies, 

especially France. 

European nations, as we have seen, have long been reluctant to 

designate the totality of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. 

So what is it going to take for France and all the members of the 

EU to take a harder line on Hezbollah and what can the U.S. do 

to push everyone in the right direction? 

Mr. ABRAMS. As you know, Madam Chairman, the French have 

had, for obvious historic reasons, a special interest in Lebanon. 

There was a lot of cooperation between the U.S. and the French at 

the time that the Cedar Revolution rose up and the Syrians were 

finally forced to leave Lebanon. 

So I think we could start a process of talking to the French privately about exactly what you are proposing. How do we move 

ahead here? 

They would have to bring the Europeans along. But I think there 

is a real good chance that—because the Europeans recognize the 

special French role that this would happen. 

I think Ms. Frankel is right in saying that we are, in many ways, 

weakening our diplomatic instruments. But I think the beginning 

of it is for us to adopt a policy that says we have a goal of weakening Hezbollah. 

Let us go to the French with that and say okay, what do we do 

in terms of military aid, in terms of economic aid, to put pressure 

on Lebanon not to say the current deal where Hezbollah gets to do 

whatever it wants anywhere in the Middle East is fine with us and 

we will keep paying. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And to either Dr. Salem or Dr. Wittes—either one would like to 

answer in the interest of time—Saudi Arabia has accused 

Hezbollah of playing an increasing role in Yemen by allegedly helping to train, equip, and finance the Houthis and there are also concerns of a Hezbollah presence on the Saudi border. 

And in announcing his resignation, Hariri was particularly 

grieved by the presence and participation of Hezbollah and the 

IRGC in Yemen. 

So what does a Hezbollah presence in Yemen mean for Saudi 

Arabia? How does Hezbollah’s assistance to the Houthis change the 

current situation on the ground and how do the U.S., the Saudis, 

and others work together to curb Iran’s latest attempt to expand 

its presence? 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SALEM. I think what concerns the Saudis most about 

Hezbollah and Iran’s presence are the missiles that are being 

launched on Saudi Arabia and as my colleague said, I think the 

Saudis fear that there is a reproduction of the pattern that happened in Lebanon vis-a-vis Israel and I think that is probably accurate—that the Iranians have that ambition. 

As far as anyone knows, the Hezbollah presence in Yemen is limited to advisors, technicians, maybe missile experts and so on—

very different than the thousands of fighters that they have in 

46

Syria, that they have rotated through Syria, and that have fought 

there. So the presence is limited. 

The Saudis are also concerned, as are many Lebanese, that Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, for many, many months 

has championed the anti-Saudi cause publicly in all of his speeches 

and his media, and that is something that is also unacceptable to 

the Saudis. 

There is, obviously, general rejection of Iran’s presence in Syria 

and Iraq, but for Saudi, Yemen is the urgent case; and I think if 

there were some de-escalation or some commitments whether public or behind the scenes—that could be something that could resolve this temporary Lebanese crisis. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Did you want to add anything, Dr. Wittes? 

Ms. WITTES. Well, I will only add that although Hassan 

Nasrallah has denied that Hezbollah is engaged in Yemen or in 

supporting the Houthis, the U.S. military has intercepted shipments of weapons that seem to come from Iran and are destined 

for the Houthis in Yemen and there has been news reporting of 

Hezbollah fighters boasting about their engagement in Yemen. 

So it is something that they formally deny but the evidence is 

mounting. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much to all three of you. 

Now I will yield to my friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. 

Just to follow up, Dr. Salem, the last point about Hezbollah’s 

presence in Lebanon, what—what happens to all of the now welltrained Hezbollah fighters after Syria? 

And Mr. Abrams referred to them as Iran’s Foreign Legion. 

Where do they go and how disruptive will that be? Will they return 

home to be disruptive there? 

Mr. SALEM. Well, Hezbollah has about 20,000 full time fighters, 

and about 50,000, 60,000 reservists. It has been rotating about 

8,000 at any one time in the Syrian battlefield, as far as we can 

tell. 

They have lost from 1,000 to 2,000 people killed, 4,000 to 5,000 

at least wounded. So it is a heavy toll in terms of the fairly small 

community that they come from in Lebanon, but it is a very massive force. 

They have expanded: They have gained a lot of capacities and 

fighting skills and so on through their engagement in Syria. 

They still are deployed in Syria in those ratios so there isn’t any 

massive sort of exit from there. Their presence apparently in Iraq 

and Yemen, while it is there it is not in massive numbers. 

This is part of an Iranian expeditionary force which probably 

numbers about 150,000, if you add Hezbollah numbers plus some 

of the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, which are very close to 

or answerable to the Quds forces and General Qasem Soleimani as 

well as Afghan and Pakistani and other fighters that have been 

brought to the fight, particularly in Syria. 

We are talking about an Iranian expeditionary force of around 

150,000. Indeed, they are already causing a lot of trouble in the 

four arenas where they are. 

47

But it is a very troubling question for countries in the region, 

probably countries around the world: Where will Iran deploy these 

people if things settle in Iraq or settle in Syria? 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Wittes, you—at the end of your testimony you 

said that the most important tool to contain Iran’s ability is the 

same tool the President seems committed to destroying our diplomacy. 

Many members of this committee expressed our deep concern 

over the exodus of more than 100 senior Foreign Services officers 

from the State Department since January. 

It was particularly startling to learn that 60 percent of our career Ambassadors have left the department since the President 

took office. 

When you say that we need our European allies, we need others 

to understand the Middle East stability is a public good, how can 

we convince them of that when in our own public sphere—in our 

own Government we seem less inclined to want to play any role in 

international diplomacy? 

Ms. WITTES. I think that is a crucial question at the moment and 

I would say as well that President Trump’s approach on U.S. involvement in implementation of the JCPOA has also raised a lot 

of questions amongst those same international partners that we 

would need to deal with the regional behavior of Iran. 

If they see the United States walking away from its JCPOA commitments, they are—they will at the very least question whether 

it is worthwhile cooperating with the U.S. on this dimension of Iranian behavior. 

But I think that the rhetoric about America first only takes us 

so far. The widespread nature of Iranian subversion and the variety of tools that they use are such that this is not something the 

United States can do alone. 

It is not something the United States and its regional partners 

can do alone. We need maximum leverage over this situation and 

that means that we need those who are economically reengaging 

right now with Iran to reconsider the consequences of those 

choices. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Abrams, you have lots of experience in government. Yesterday, when the Secretary of State defended—attempted 

to defend the massive cuts to the State Department budget by effectively suggesting we won’t need the personnel because the efforts of this administration will help to resolve so many of these 

crises that we face around the world, and yet here we are less than 

a day later and we are talking about 150,000 Iranian-trained militias, soldiers. 

We don’t know where they go next. It doesn’t seem like the conflicts are being resolved and how do we—first of all, is there any—

does that argument make any sense to you at all, and assuming 

that it does not, how do we help everyone in the administration understand that the challenges that we face require more than—more 

than one conversation with world leaders or one visit but actually 

ongoing diplomacy? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Are you trying to get me in trouble here on this? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DEUTCH. Indeed I am, Mr. Abrams. 

48

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I didn’t—I would have to say I think you 

could always, in an organization as large as the State Department 

cut 5 percent, maybe 10 percent, and there are efficiencies in any 

large organization. 

But the kind of cuts that we are hearing about—30 percent—

have had a devastating impact on morale. I think that is obvious 

and cannot be denied if you go over and visit the State Department. 

I don’t know what to say except that I would think influential 

Members of Congress such as yourself might try to have these conversations with the Secretary of State and try to persuade him that 

there is an enormous amount of diplomatic work that needs to be 

done. 

It is not a one-man job. It is going to require people at the second 

and third and fourth and fifth level and Ambassadors in the field. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. 

I would also suggest, Mr. Abrams, that important figures like 

yourself with a relevant history might also have an important voice 

in all this, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That would be great. I am all for that. 

Mr. Donovan of New York is recognized. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Many of you spoke in your statements about Hezbollah and their 

activity. We know that it is a criminal enterprise, is financed 

through a lot of drug trade. They use the proceeds of that drug 

trade to buy weapons in Syria and a lot of the drugs that are being 

traded are sold in Europe and here in the United States. 

Anyone have any ideas? I mean, this is a twofold problem—one, 

the drug crisis, secondly, that they are using the proceeds to buy 

weapons. 

And if you have any ideas if there is activities that the United 

States should be doing and aren’t doing now that could help quash 

this activity both in the drug trade and the purchasing of weapons. 

When everyone looks at one another I see nobody wants to answer this question. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I would just say I think a lot of this drug trafficking 

takes place in Latin America—that is, Hezbollah drug trafficking. 

We are, I believe, doing a lot to try to stop it through DEA and 

through other parts of the U.S. Government. Whether it could be 

made much more effective, I don’t know. 

But we would have to say that they are getting an enormous 

amount of money—in the hundreds of millions of dollars—from 

Iran and part of the problem here is that it is likely that, you 

know, if we turn off one spigot, the Iranians will just open another 

spigot just that much more because they are apparently so committed to the Hezbollah model. 

Mr. SALEM. Yes, if I may—I mean, I second that view that I don’t 

have much information about the drug activity and other criminal 

activity but I am aware that the U.S. and others are trying to 

interdict it. 

But I would second that view that Hezbollah essentially is an 

emanation of Iranian financial military ideological support. It is 

part of their sort of defense and security deployment, with a lot of 

support from the Assad regime in Syria. So I don’t think that stopVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:14 Jan 25, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\112917\27660 SHIRL
49

ping one source will end the problem. It would just go in other directions. 

But I do want to comment on the issue of diplomacy and say effectively that, I mean, obviously, having less diplomats is a serious 

problem. 

I see the real problem is the lack of an overall strategy to address the problems that military and diplomatic tools could be used 

toward a broad strategy. 

To my mind—and I will just mention a few things—one is that 

the crisis that we are going through that includes empowerment of 

Iran has to do with the collapse of states and the outbreak of civil 

war. 

That is where Iran as well as ISIS and other sort of radical and 

terrorist groups can grow and thrive. We still have four ongoing 

collapsed state civil wars in the region. Ending those civil wars—

and each one has very different conditions—must be a very high 

priority for the U.S. and all regional players. 

We have talked about Yemen. We have talked about Syria. Iraq 

might be moving in the right direction; and we still have Libya 

lying out there. 

Secondly, in the approach toward Iran, I think a comprehensive 

strategy must have both more push back and more diplomacy. 

But the point is to get Iran to change its behavior, to change its 

policy, and neither are the costs being made high enough for Iran 

nor is there any sort of diplomatic or political offer on the table to 

say, ‘‘If you want us to reduce the pressure, you have to abide by 

international law, do this, do that.’’

What we seem to be having now is sort of ‘‘speak loudly and 

carry a small stick’’ rather than ‘‘speak softly and carry a big 

stick.’’

And in effect, in terms of push back, this administration has 

rolled back anti-Iranian support in Syria. It is basically, you know, 

stopped support for the Syrian opposition, possibly dropping support for the Kurds. 

Handing over Syria to a Russian-managed situation—that is not 

pushing back on Iran, nor is there any visible push back in Iraq, 

and Lebanon alone won’t do it. The big arenas need to be addressed as well, and there needs to be engagement with Iran, with 

a lot of pressure at the same time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Madam Chair—quickly, because my time is running out, I know Saudi Arabia spoke about extracting uranium recently as last month to promote or develop a nuclear power system. 

Is there any concern that at some point this will be upgraded to 

weapon-capacity uranium? 

Ms. WITTES. Congressman Donovan, I think that the question of 

nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is one that the U.S. Government and policy experts have focused on for a long time. 

I would say that if there were a risk of nuclear weapons in Saudi 

Arabia, it probably would not come from that kind of ground up 

program. 

Saudi would probably look to relationships with other nuclear 

powers, especially Pakistan, to get something off the shelf rather 

than developing it indigenously. 

50

So I think we do always have to pay attention to nuclear programs that have the capacity to create proliferation challenges. 

But I think that in the case of the kingdom what this is really 

about is a very swiftly escalating domestic energy demand and 

their desire to use more of their petroleum for world markets and 

revenue generation than for domestic consumption. 

Mr. SALEM. But I would say that this concern about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East relates directly also to the nuclear 

deal with Iran—that despite its faults and limitations, other than 

the risk of what Iran will do, if the nuclear deal itself is dismantled 

or is no longer applicable, that will immediately spur countries like 

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, possibly Egypt and others, to acquire some 

kind of nuclear option, whether it is off-the-shelf or to build it 

themselves. 

So I think the whole nuclear deal is, obviously, a key component 

of what we are talking about. 

I think it is true that under the Obama administration the nuclear deal had some maybe unforeseen consequences. One, it gave 

Iran a sense of immunity that they could do things in other parts 

of the Middle East and the Obama administration wouldn’t react. 

Secondly, I think when they no longer had the nuclear option as 

deterrent, that spurred them to do more in asymmetric warfare. 

It sort of created a bigger problem, that they wanted to assure 

their security through other means, and it also probably gave them 

some sense that they had more money to spend. 

But I think the solution is not to drop the nuclear deal but to 

engage in a wider push back and diplomacy with Iran, which could 

then add some sunset issues or missile clauses as well as pushing 

Iran to abide by international law. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I thank you, Madam Chair. My time has expired. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Donovan. Good questions. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you 

again for having this hearing. Witnesses, thank you for your insight and comments today. 

Mr. Abrams, you noted you have enough material for five hearings. I have enough questions for at least those five hearings and 

so I will try to squeeze a little bit into these 5 minutes. 

I am going to glance over these, but these are very important 

issues, you know, you all talked about Iran’s regional goals and 

their multifaceted strategy within that region but in particular 

Hezbollah and their use of Hezbollah—how they are using them 

particularly in Lebanon and Syria, but also around the region and 

we have talked a lot about that. I think we need to address that. 

I wish we could talk and maybe suggest for a future hearing 

about United Nations Security Council 1701, and I can’t even use 

the word effectiveness on that but the fact that Hezbollah has 

150,000 rockets, give or take—it doesn’t matter what that margin 

of error is—threatening Israel and now Hezbollah and Iran using 

the same strategies you highlighted in Yemen is of grave concern. 

But what I really want to focus on in the few minutes I have is—

Dr. Wittes, you used the term what’s our maximum leverage and 

I think you have to think of the image of a lever. There are four 

aspects to that lever. 

51

There is the load—what are we trying to effect, what are we trying to move, what are our goals specifically. There is the beam, and 

by analogy the beam is what resources do we bring to this with 

U.S. resources but also our allies. The fulcrum—where do you put 

the fulcrum, what opportunities there are to place and get the leverage we need to have. 

And the last piece—and this may be the most concerning in the 

context we have talked about the cuts at the State Department—

is the effort. This isn’t going to be one push and we are done. 

We are going to have to work the levers to get that maximum 

leverage over a period of time and how do we do that—how do we 

maintain that attention. 

So that is a brief introduction, using 2 minutes. I apologize. I will 

open it up to the panel and say help, where do we go from here. 

Ms. WITTES. Well, if I may—sorry, guys—Congressman Schneider, thank you. I think that is a wonderfully drawn out picture for 

us and I think part of the challenge that we face in getting grips 

on this problem is that we and our partners in the region share a 

sense of threat but we—but there are very divergent priorities 

amongst our partners. 

So for the Saudis, as we have discussed the missile threat from 

Yemen and Hezbollah’s role there, is priority number one. 

For the Israelis, the threat that Hezbollah or the IRGC would be 

able to set up permanent bases near its border or to establish 

weapons factories that would further exacerbate the precision missile threat from Hezbollah onto Israel’s civilian population, that is 

priority number one. 

But, you know, if you are—if you are talking about Egypt or Jordan or other American partners, you’re going to have different priorities as well. 

This is where American leadership comes in is looking across the 

region, seeing how these pieces fit together and saying where—

where do we begin to have the maximum effect. 

Now, we haven’t talked a lot about Iraq or the slow wind down 

of the war in Syria so far in this hearing but it seems to me that 

Iraq and Syria are the place where we actually have maximum leverage. 

Not only because we still have forces on the ground—as Paul 

said, forces are not a strategy. We need a strategy that combines 

our tools, and I think that one of the—one of the most troubling 

signals that the current administration has sent with respect to the 

war in ISIS is its consistent message that it wants to get the military job done of taking territory back from ISIS and then he wants 

to get out and go home—where what we need to do is stay engaged 

in Syria in order to have leverage on a political settlement with the 

Russians and the Iranians. 

We need to not betray our allies who fought beside us so that our 

other allies stay on side and we need to look ahead in Iraq where 

yes, we have made a lot of progress. The Saudi outreach to Iraq 

is helpful there as well and they have elections next year and that 

matters very much. 

So, you know, I don’t think of push back and diplomacy as opposing means. I think that diplomacy is actually a very important part 

52

of pushing back and I think that we need to start in Syria and 

Iraq. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Abrams? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think we are all agreeing on this. To put it a different way, we are never going to win at the negotiating table what 

we have not won on the ground in Syria. 

This has been the problem, I think, in the years of Secretary 

Kerry’s negotiations in Geneva. So push back is part of this but, 

you know, I am struck—we are talking about Iran’s rise over the 

last 5 years. We are talking about what Hezbollah has been doing 

over the last few years. 

They pay no price, and one way of thinking about this is how and 

where could we impose a price on Iran and its proxies. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. I think that is a good point. There has 

been a lot of evidence of big gains for little loss for Iran in the area. 

Dr. Salem, anything you want to add? 

Mr. SALEM. Well, no. I mean, I agree with my colleagues. Maybe 

I will say a couple things. On the question of what you gain from 

diplomacy if you haven’t won on the ground, that is true; although 

in some cases you might be imposing a cost in one arena and you’re 

trying to get a concession in something else. 

I think the end point that we would like to get to and we are 

not going to get to anytime soon—is an Iran that abides by international law. Now, that is extremely long term. 

If we get more practical, I think we do have a path forward in 

Iraq. It has been a rocky road but I think the defeat of ISIS by the 

central government, the rebuilding of much of the army, and the 

outreach by the Saudis as well creates conditions for a reasonable 

way forward. Iran will have influence but it won’t dominate and 

won’t dictate. 

In Yemen there is an Iran presence, it is quite minor still, and 

I think efforts to end the Yemeni civil war almost succeeded in Kuwait a few months ago. There is a lot going on behind the scenes. 

It is not an impossible conflict to negotiate an end to, and the 

Iranians don’t dominate as they do in other arenas. So I think 

there is a way forward in Yemen. And there is certainly a way forward in Libya where Iran doesn’t have a major presence. 

The real ‘‘Chernobyl’’ of the region is Syria. That is where 

Hezbollah reemerged from Lebanon to have a major deployment 

and from there to Iraq and Yemen, and that is a sort of a meltdown 

that is in a very bad place and that is going in the wrong direction, 

particularly with U.S. policy effectively leaning toward the Russian 

option and so on. 

The fight against ISIS went very well but there doesn’t seem to 

be any long-term plan. So a practical approach might be to focus 

our efforts on finding a better resolution for Syria that would involve a settlement that doesn’t include Assad but is workable and 

that leads to a pathway where Iranian influence can be reduced. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

I have far exceeded my time. If we had five before the questions, 

we are now at 10 hearings, going forward. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Schneider. 

53

And I am very proud to yield to our good friend from Florida, Mr. 

Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairwoman. I appreciate that. 

My line of questioning is certainly in the aim of historical understanding. I think Iran has done a very good job of being tactical 

and strategic in working toward long-term goals, and so I’d love to 

hear a few responses from you on where historical context might 

lead us. 

How long has Hezbollah been operating in Lebanon? Mr. 

Abrams, if you want to answer—Doctor, anyone. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think the real turning point comes when the Syrian troops leave Lebanon because Syria dominated Lebanon and 

held in check a number of domestic forces, some democratic but 

also Hezbollah. 

Once the Syrian army was out, fairly quickly, I would say, 

Hezbollah became the dominant military force and they used that 

power to increasingly dominate the political structures of the country as well. 

So I would say, roughly, the first half of the previous decade. 

Mr. SALEM. I would give you a bit more context. To go back to 

the 1980s when Hezbollah first started, obviously emanating from 

the Iranian Revolution, particularly in the aftermath in Lebanon of 

the ’82 invasion and the removal of the PLO from Lebanon. 

The PLO used to dominate south Lebanon. And a key turning 

point there that is often missed is the 1983 withdrawal agreement, 

which the Lebanese and Israelis, under American auspices, negotiated and in which Israeli troops were to withdraw from Lebanon. 

This is something that the Syrians opposed extremely—you 

know, the Syrians opposed it effectively because they wanted any 

negotiations with Israel to be in tandem—Lebanon and Syria on 

one side and Israel on the other—so that they could get the occupied Golan back. 

They opposed the agreement. They scuttled the agreement and, 

moving forward, as the PLO had been removed, they backed Iran 

to arm and grow Hezbollah in Lebanon partly to serve Syrian interests. 

Syria controlled Lebanon all the way up to 2005 and I mean completely governed Lebanon effectively. And for them—for Syria—

Hezbollah was a main tool to pressure Israel over issues relating 

to the Golan. 

For Iran, obviously, it was, first, an ideological issue, it was the 

first place they could export their Islamic revolution to and show 

what they could do; but on national security issues, since they considered themselves to be at war both with Israel and the United 

States, they created a kind of ‘‘aircraft carrier,’’ which they parked 

north of Israel, which is Hezbollah, as an attack force or a deterrent. 

So over 25 years Syria helped Iran build this massive army at 

a time when there was no Lebanese say in any of it. The important 

turning point of 2005 is very significant and I would say a couple 

of things. 

I agree with Mr. Abrams that when Syria withdrew, Hezbollah 

stepped up and did its own dirty work itself rather than the Syrians doing the dirty work. 

54

But after 2005, it is fair to say that about half of the Lebanese 

parties, voters, leaders, its political system was now free. 

Not free not to be assassinated, but they were no longer under 

Syrian diktat or Hezbollah. They struggled. And that is what we 

have now. 

We have a semi-free country and a semi-occupied country struggling with a problem that was created by Syria and Iran and 

which, you know, regional countries and the U.S. were okay with, 

until the shift in the Bush era in 2004 and the aftermath of the 

Iraq invasion changed those calculations. 

Mr. MAST. The word model and tool has been used by several on 

this panel to describe Hezbollah. Would you say that this is a 

model in the historical context that you just gave? 

Would we say that that is something that is being layered upon 

Yemen? Would you say that this is a model that they are looking 

to play out over another 25 to 30 years—that is a long-term goal 

for Yemen so they would be on now, you know, multiple directions 

of Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. SALEM. Yes, it is a model that they sort of apply in Iran 

itself. The Revolutionary Guards is not the national army. It is an 

ideological force. That model ‘‘succeeded’’ for them in Lebanon. 

They are certainly trying to reproduce it in Iraq but the central 

government, I think, is trying to fight back. They are—have already or trying to make it a part of the future in Syria, although 

Russia might not be terribly comfortable with that. 

Certainly, we shouldn’t be comfortable with that. And they 

would—the Houthis are asking, effectively, to be like—in the negotiations the Houthis are saying, ‘‘Okay, we will agree, but we need 

to be able to maintain our own private army.’’

So yes, they are trying to create that model. It must not be allowed to be recreated. 

Mr. MAST. My time has expired. Do you mind if I ask one last 

question? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Please, go right ahead. 

Mr. MAST. You know, you used the term ‘‘an ideological force.’’ 

Do you see them whatsoever as a colonizing force? [Laughter.] 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. I don’t know that I would say colonizing. 

I think that the Revolutionary—the aim of the Islamic Republic 

has been to export revolution and to gain influence. 

What we have seen with Hezbollah is that it wants to exercise 

veto power. It doesn’t want to exercise absolute control. It is certainly not colonizing in the sense that it is extracting resources and 

bringing them back to the metropol. 

So I wouldn’t say colonization is the model. I think it is really 

about a power that understands—Iran understands that in the majority Sunni region of the Middle East there are some natural limits on its ideological reach and its political reach. But it is trying 

to maximize its ability to shape events by exercising vetoes where 

it can. 

Mr. SALEM. But if I may, I think there is a little element of it 

in their sort of sectarianization and looking at the region in sectarian terms and finding ways that that links to their projection of 

power—that in Iraq look at Shiites and Lebanon look at Shiites. 

55

In Syria, with the Assad regime they are actually trying to do 

ethnic cleansing and rejiggering the sort of sectarian geography of 

the country so that they have a solid core. 

In Yemen as well, the group there didn’t consider themselves 

Shiites in the same way that the Iranians do but they are being 

moved in that direction and that is where the link to the collapse 

of nation states and civil war is the real problem—that once the 

state collapses people revert to their sectarian or communal identities and Iran steps in, says, ‘‘Okay, your state isn’t working—I can 

help you.’’

So that is why I emphasize ending civil wars and standing up 

states even if they are rickety and imperfect and what not but they 

are very significant—that is a very important goal. 

Secondly, I am extremely heartened that Saudi Arabia, hopefully—I mean, since 1979, as was mentioned, Saudi Arabia fell into 

that game—that ‘‘oh, the Iranians are backing Shiites—maybe we 

should back Sunnis and maybe that is a good way to do it.’’

I think the new leadership in Saudi Arabia is realizing that is 

bad for them, it is bad for their own societies, and it is bad for the 

region. It is not good domestic policy. It is not good foreign policy. 

And I think if MBS succeeds in some of the things that he’s 

doing, particularly to reverse that decision that was made in 1979 

to finance and export a pretty virulent form of sort of Wahabbi 

Islam I think that is being recognized, that is of historic importance for the kingdom, for the Middle East, and for the world in 

ratcheting back that and helping reinforce nation-state identities. 

And I would also say that what he is doing in Saudi Arabia in 

terms of pushing back against radical Islam, empowering women, 

trying to build an open society, is something that many Iranians 

want and that their government is not delivering. 

So I think progress in Saudi Arabia might even cause some worries for the Iranians domestically whose population wants something quite similar to that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Mast. 

Mr. Lieu of California is recognized. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair, for calling this hearing on 

Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. I want to thank the witnesses for your 

expertise and coming here today. 

As you know, the President has put Jared Kushner in charge of 

Middle East policy. So I have some questions for Dr. Wittes. Am 

I pronouncing that correctly? 

Are you aware if Jared Kushner has any foreign policy credentials? 

Ms. WITTES. He has no formal academic credentials in that regard, although I think some of us—yes, no formal academic credentials, no previous professional experience. 

Mr. LIEU. When you served in the Obama administration, did the 

President ever put someone in charge of Middle East policy that 

had no foreign policy experience or foreign policy credentials? 

Ms. WITTES. Not to my recollection, no, and I think that as all 

of us have been describing the intricacies of the relationships and 

history in this region, our essential background for effective American diplomacy, which is why it is so valuable to have professional 

56

diplomats with that long experience in the region engaged in the 

policy. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

Now, as you know, there are reports—actually, it is not even disputed by Kushner companies—that they own 666 Building in Manhattan and that they have a $1.2 billion debt on it, of which they 

own over half of. 

Kushner companies also does not dispute that they have been 

trying to seek cash infusions. So I am going to read you the first 

paragraph from this Bloomberg article earlier this year. 

It says, ‘‘A few months before President Donald Trump encouraged Saudi Arabia and others to blockade Qatar, the real estate 

business owned by the family of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, 

sought a substantial investment from one of the Gulf State countries’ wealthiest and most politically influential figures, according 

to a spokesman for Kushner companies.’’

Is it your view that the Trump administration gave Saudi Arabia 

the green light to impose the economic blockade on Qatar? 

Ms. WITTES. I don’t have any specific information on that, Congressman Lieu, and, frankly, I—in my experience, it would be surprising for the kingdom to explicitly, you know, ask for a green 

light or seek approval. 

I think what I would say is that President Trump’s visit there 

in which he made crystal clear that he’s not interested in local disputes or criticism. 

He is interested in an uncritical embrace. That sent a strong signal that I think affected decision-making and calculations across 

the region. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

As you know, last month Jared Kushner took an unannounced 

trip to Saudi Arabia. Is that unusual for a senior White House official to make an unannounced trip like that? 

Ms. WITTES. I wouldn’t say it is at all unprecedented actually 

and in the context of the significant reporting around preparation 

of a U.S. proposal on Middle East peace, it would be a reasonable 

step to take. 

Mr. LIEU. So shortly after that, media reports that Chief of Staff 

Kelly was none too happy with that trip, partly because Saudi Arabia then started engaging in actions such as rounding up various 

folks in Saudi Arabia, recalling the prime minister of Lebanon, and 

so on. 

Again, do you have any sense of whether Jared Kushner or the 

Trump administration gave a green light or sent signals to Saudi 

Arabia to say that that was okay? 

Ms. WITTES. I have no specific information on that. 

Mr. LIEU. Do you have any knowledge of whether Jared Kushner 

asked anyone in Saudi Arabia for financing for the 666 Building? 

Ms. WITTES. I certainly have no information on that, no. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

I would like to now move to Yemen. As you know, in Yemen the 

Saudi-led coalition has engaged in a number of air strikes. 

Reporting from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 

and other organizations suggest that a number of these air strikes 

struck civilians nowhere near military targets. When I served on 

57

active duty in the Air Force one of my duties was to teach the law 

on conflict. 

These look like war crimes to me. Do you have any indication of 

whether there have been less war crime like strikes in Yemen or 

has the situation remained the same? 

Ms. WITTES. The question of Saudi targeting is not one I have 

followed closely. The civilian casualties from bombings have been 

significant. 

The greater threat to civilian life in Yemen today is starvation 

and disease, which is the result of the conflicts—the inability to 

end this conflict. 

What I would say about the air campaign is that as far as I can 

tell it is unlikely that the Saudis are going to achieve much more 

territorially through an aerial campaign. The targets that they are 

bombing today are targets that they have bombed before. 

And so to achieve more gains on the ground would require very 

bloody ground warfare that I don’t think the Saudis or their coalition partners are interested in right now. 

The way to solve this conflict is at the negotiating table. It is not 

going to be done militarily. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Lieu. 

Mr. Suozzi. Did I do it right now? 

Mr. SUOZZI. You did it right. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SUOZZI. One of my colleagues earlier made reference to—

thank you so much for being here today. We appreciate all your expertise and your contributions to our country. 

The—one of my colleagues earlier today referenced Thomas 

Friedman’s column in the New York Times on November 3rd and 

it talked about, you know, this—this version of the Arab Spring 

going on under the Saudi Arabian prince and the actions he’s taking with the detainments and the women driving in their cars and 

everything else that is going on. 

What is your opinion of what’s going on and did you—did you 

read the article—the op-ed piece by Thomas Friedman? What is 

your opinion? 

Is he—is he accurate? Is he—or is he being Pollyannaish? Do you 

have as positive a view as he does of what’s going on in Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I don’t have as positive a view as he does. 

That situation—I thought he missed a critical point, which is that 

the Arab Spring came from the bottom up. The Arab Spring was 

in—you know, in places like Tunisia and Egypt—the people overthrowing——

Mr. SUOZZI. Syria also. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. Rising up against a tyrant. That is not what 

is happening in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is top down. 

It may get substantial popular support but I think—I think it 

was Dr. Wittes who said a few minutes ago that’s a question. This 

is not going to be a 1- or 2-year program. 

The crown prince calls it Saudi 2030. We are talking about decades here. I think they are going to need popular support and I 

58

think that is something that Friedman really missed. How do they 

get that popular support and maintain it over time? 

Mr. SALEM. Yes, I wouldn’t compare it. As Mr. Abrams said, the 

Arab Spring gets into different models of how things happened or 

succeeded or failed. 

My reading of what is happening in Saudi Arabia is that it is a 

very, very profound change. It is a top-down attempt at revolution—social revolution, cultural revolution, and economic revolution 

and, in a sense, political revolution as well. 

I think the economic side as, I think, Mr. Abrams said in his 

opening statement, had to be done and was way overdue. 

The numbers in the economy would not add up because of oil 

prices and consumption and so on. So Vision 2030 was the heart 

of trying to sort of privatize and get away from energy. 

I think on the issue of corruption that the Crown Prince is absolutely right in having to tackle it in a major way. Corruption—it 

would be even hard to have called it corruption was sort of a way 

of life—that money sort of flows up and is shared among royals in 

all kinds of deals. That was the way business was done, and his 

attempt to go from that to an economy where that is no longer the 

norm is absolutely necessary. 

Now, how he did it and in what ways, can be debated. In the cultural side, his stand against extremists or politicized Islam is incredibly necessary and incredibly important for Saudi Arabia and 

for the entire region and the world, and I think he has taken an 

incredibly bold position on that and extremely valuable. 

On the empowerment of women, it is not just driving—that is a 

big move and other things as well—it is that that direction is at 

least the right direction to be going in. 

And I think if this succeeds he might, at the end of the day, have 

a problem of how to empower these people he’s empowered politically. We haven’t figured that out yet. 

But I think we should be hoping that a lot of what he does succeeds—that yes, it is done in a regularized way and is not that—

in a way that could eventually also encourage growth and investment and so on. But I think what is going on is very historic. 

Ms. WITTES. I will just add two quick points. One is I don’t think 

that revolutionary is the appropriate word to apply. This is about 

consolidating and sustaining the Saudi kingdom, and in fact, the 

transformation that is underway is shifting the political base of the 

monarchy from this patronage network of royals and elites to a 

more populist base in the younger generation. 

This swift decision making, these bold moves, are popular and 

the fact that the crown prince is of this generation is popular. But 

he is—he is doing this by centralizing power in his own hands. 

He is doing this by marginalizing and discrediting rival members 

of the royal family and he is doing this by making a lot of promises 

to that young Saudi population that it is not clear he is going to 

be able to deliver economically, socially, and certainly, as Mr. 

Abrams pointed out, politically. 

So this is a very risky play that is about consolidation of power. 

I also think, as Dr. Salem said, it is about strengthening the nation-state in the face of these transnational forces in the region. 

59

The second point I’d make is about the cultural liberalization and 

the empowerment of women, and I understand that the driving 

issue is extremely symbolic and there are dozens of Saudi women 

who worked for years demanding their right to drive. 

But at the end of the day, the ability to drive a car has economic 

consequences. It cannot—it has important personal consequences 

but it is not transformational. 

This is a country with guardianship laws that allow Saudi males 

to treat their wives, daughters, and sisters as subordinate property, 

and until the guardianship system is tackled in this reform process, I, for one, am going to remain a bit skeptical about the reach 

of this liberalization. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you. 

So I am more than used up my time. I have a lot more to ask 

you but I enjoyed your answers and your perspective on this. I 

mean, I think it is a very positive development. There is just always more to be done, obviously. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good questions and thank you for your 

answers. 

And now my good friend, Ms. Frankel from Florida. Go get them, 

tiger. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. 

Doctor—well, you know, I know it will be that—it will be the two 

of us here. First off, thank you all so much for being here. 

Well, we will see. I don’t know if Mr. Suozzi is going to stay. Oh, 

Mr.—oh, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. SUOZZI. I know—I am——

Ms. FRANKEL. That’s right. Mr. Connolly, welcome. Thank you 

for being here. Usually I am the last one here. That’s due to seniority or lack—there lack of. 

So thank you. You know, it is interesting because I know we are 

trying to have a very sincere intellectually discussion here this 

morning and, you know, we don’t always agree but we do have serious discussions. 

But, you know, my chairlady and I, we are from Florida and, you 

know, there is this expression—NASA, we have a problem. 

Guess what? DC, we have a problem, and I think it is in the 

White House, I think. I think a lot of people agree. I mean, we 

have our own Cabinet members reportedly calling our President—

one called him, allegedly, a moron. 

One allegedly called him an idiot. I have seen reports on TV by 

mental health experts who think that the President has a serious 

mental health problem. In my opinion, he is a looney tune. I don’t 

know. I have never—it is hard—it is hard to keep track. 

But I bring this—and I want to add one other thing, which is not 

apt to this conversation, but what his policies are doing to the 

women of the world are disgraceful. In cutting off the health to the 

women of the world, that is going to come back, I think, in so many 

negative ways. But I am going to not ruminate on that. 

One of you said today that, you know, lack of policy, a lack of 

strategy, a lack of personnel is part of the problem in trying to develop this Mideast or try to deal with this chaos that is going on. 

60

So I have—I do have questions from this. Today, I think it is, the 

President tweeted or retweeted the most bigoted anti-Muslim—how 

do I say it politely? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Video. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Video venom—I was going to call it fake video—

which has been apparently—I don’t even think I should say what 

it is. 

But it supposedly emanates from Great Britain, where even their 

leaders there—one of them just said the President of the United 

States is promoting a fascist racist extremist hate group whose 

leaders have been arrested and convicted and he’s no ally or friend 

of ours. 

I mean, so one question is, is the President’s own behavior and 

his bullying tweets and crazy things he says, do you—do you think 

it has any effect at all in terms of trying to have some rational policy or strategy or whatever. 

That’s number one. Number two, now, give me some hope. Is 

there anyone behind the scenes that is doing anything meaningful 

and rational that can overcome this President? 

And then my third question, which is a little bit off subject but 

I am really—since it is us girls and Gerry over here and Tom, you 

know, there has been a lot of chatter about this ‘‘forced peace 

agreement’’ between Israel and the Palestinians and Jared 

Kushner going to Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia getting the Palestinian leader Abbas and threatening him to accept the peace agreement. 

And I am just wondering if you have an opinion on any of that, 

whether it is real or possible. So those are my questions. Who 

wants to give it a shot? 

Ms. WITTES. Well——

Ms. FRANKEL. Start with the tweets. [Laughter.] 

Ms. WITTES. Congresswoman Frankel, maybe I will start, if I 

may, with a question about the Middle East peace process and I 

suspect that my colleagues will have some things to say on that as 

well. 

But I think that in—as our partners in the region have confronted this common threats from Iran we have seen a lot of tentative outreach in different directions and the possibility for some 

new rapprochement. And so that offers hope for cooperation on 

Middle East peace. 

I would say that the agreements on Gaza to return the Palestinian Authority and particularly to return PA personnel to the 

borders of Gaza is an extremely significant development if in fact 

it is implemented as agreed. 

What I worry about, as I said earlier, is that our partners in the 

region have different priorities that pull them in different directions and so when push comes to shove, I am not sure we have the 

ingredients we need for a big Middle East peace deal that would 

enable this kind of open Arab-Israeli rapprochement. 

The Egyptians, who have been crucial to brokering the agreement on Gaza are, as you know, struggling with a fierce insurgency 

in Sinai. 

This massive terrorist attack I think will compel them to rethink 

what an open border from Gaza means for them and, certainly, it 

61

takes their attention away from this broader Middle East peace effort. 

The Jordanians and the Palestinians have their own concerns 

about preference—the Gulf’s preferences with regard to Middle 

East peace and the future of the—of leadership in the Palestinian 

Authority. 

So I think that all of these tensions are coming into play before 

we even get to the question of Iran and Hamas and that kind of 

thing. 

So I just don’t think that our expectations should be too high. I 

don’t think that this package is an easy thing to put together. 

Mr. ABRAMS. I agree with that. I am a pessimist about the 

chances for a comprehensive peace deal. I don’t appear today as an 

administration spokesman. I have done that many times in hearings that the chairman has held over the years. 

But I would say I think if you ask a number of governments in 

the region—Saudi, Emirati, Israeli, Egyptian—they are actually 

happier with American foreign policy than 1, 2, 3 years ago—the 

previous 8 years. So I think that has to be part of record as well. 

Mr. SALEM. Yes, I think I would agree with that, that they had 

other serious disagreements with the Obama administration, particularly, obviously, over Iran, but also over Egypt and some other 

things as well. 

I think, again, dealing with governments in the region, gauging 

the effects of this administration, I don’t think it is so much the 

President’s personality—whatever you want to describe it, as in a 

tweet here and a tweet there. I think there are two more structural 

things. One, I think they are happy with a lot of the elements that 

they have seen: Strong position against Iran, strong position 

against extremist Islam and so on. 

But a year into the administration I don’t think they see the 

clarity of a full strategy—a lot of talk on Iran but no real teeth; 

not clear about Russia—is Russia partner of the Trump administration or not? A few fundamentals that are not clear as well: An 

administration where it is not clear who is in charge and who do 

you talk to. 

Secretary Tillerson doesn’t seem to be on the same page with the 

President or his son-in-law on many issues. I find when I go to the 

region there is a problem of personnel—should we talk to Jared 

Kushner, should we talk to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

Defense? 

There is confusion about who is managing America’s foreign policy in the Middle East and that can’t be good. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, just one follow-up. On the question 

of Russia, we had a hearing I think maybe a couple weeks ago on 

some of the issues related to Russia and one of the experts I remember—I forget who it was—said make sure you just—so be cautious that you differentiate between cooperation and, what was it, 

sharing? Wait. A staff question. Between cooperation and coordination. 

And, basically, they said to us, you know, don’t tell them any secrets. Don’t give them anything that they might use against us but 

that—that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t try in the right times to 

have some cooperation. 

62

So I wanted to ask you this in regards to Russia. Do you see a 

role of Russia at all in how in this whole Middle East chaos what 

should—what do you think their involvement or our involvement 

should be with them, given, obviously, what’s going on with the interference with the elections and so forth? 

Mr. SALEM. Well, when it comes to the Middle East, the area we 

are talking about today, I think there are two modes of thinking 

about this. 

Some think that maybe we could work with the Russians and 

that will be separate from Iran and what Iran wants to do and try 

to create some space between Russia and Iran. In Syria, for example, the idea that if Russia is empowered in Syria they might remove Assad. They might build the army rather than the militias. 

They might help us get the Iranian proxy forces out. 

But on the other hand, the pattern that I see developing is that 

Russia has jumped on an opportunity to ally effectively with Iran. 

Both of them are anti-American forces. 

They have different colors, different ideologies, but on that they 

agree. On those, you know, they agree on that in a strategic way 

and Iran has secured dominance in the Levant. 

I mean, a lot of influence in Iraq, victory in Syria, a lot of influence in Lebanon, and that is a core area. And Russia has jumped 

into that in Syria, providing air cover there and support in the Security Council. 

So what I fear is happening is not necessarily that Russia is a 

problem for the U.S. in the Middle East because they could be partners in the Middle East peace and other things, but they have chosen to enter the Middle East with this alliance with Iran. 

They can’t really separate from Iran. They would lose what they 

gained in Syria. So that is where our problem lies and hence, yes, 

it is really a big problem to think that the U.S. can work with Russia blindly in Syria or the Middle East. 

We have to be tough with them but also diplomatic and, you 

know, use all the levers to get a result that we want. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Frankel. 

And now I am so pleased to yield to one of my favorite Members 

of Congress, Mr. Connolly of Virginia. Many people don’t know 

that—weren’t you part of the Senate staff of this equivalent committee on the——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am impressed you know that——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, I know that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. And remember that. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And he is recognized for such time as he may 

consume. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, the feelings are mutual, Madam Chairman, 

and I wish you would change your mind about leaving. 

Anyway, I can’t help but observe, since Mr. Abrams decided to 

opine about unpopular Trump—I mean, Obama is with certain 

countries and how much more popular Trump is. 

Well, of course they are, because we are not pressing human 

rights. We are not holding them to account. We have seen authoritarian regimes rise in Egypt and in other parts of the region and 

they now know that no one’s going to hold them to account. 

63

And, of course, you know, our policies with the Netanyahu government in Israel remain the subject of great debate and controversy about what’s in U.S. interest and Netanyahu, of course, 

would prefer Trump over Obama. 

We will see. There is an old expression—be careful what you 

wish for. We will see how that plays out. 

But if I were those countries, as I think, Dr. Salem, you were 

just indicating, I would be worried a little bit about some of the 

policies of this administration. 

Ceding, frankly, Syria to Russia and letting the Russians lead 

the negotiations for what comes next—you’re worried about Iranian 

influence? You are worried about the role of Hezbollah? 

I don’t think that is a positive step for Iran or for Egypt and, of 

course, the administration compounds its problem by—well, some 

senior diplomats have called dismantling the Foreign Service and, 

I think, Dr. Wittes, you talked about that in your testimony as 

well. 

Madam Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to enter into 

the record the op-ed piece by Ryan Crocker and Nicholas Burns. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. Abrams, you and I go back a long way. Let me ask, I hope, 

a nonpolitical question. How serious do you think it is that we are, 

as some have said, dismantling or hollowing out? And, for the 

record, Secretary Tillerson takes great exception to that. 

But when I look at, you know, some data, so he proposes to cut 

the Foreign Service 8,000 officers by 8 percent. He has—well, the 

President has proposed a budget cut at State and USAID of 31 percent. 

We know that one of the results of all of that this year is that 

the number of Americans who have applied for Foreign Service has 

declined by one third—33 percent. 

We also know lots of people are headed for the exits who can retire. We are losing a lot of senior diplomats—a lot of collective wisdom about various and sundry regions of the world. 

Is this, from your point of view, something that is just a 

downsizing that will make us leaner and meaner and more effective or is this something that actually we ought to be concerned 

about in terms of our capability to project ourselves diplomatically, 

especially in this region? 

Mr. ABRAMS. I think it is a great concern. I would just take 10 

seconds to say I do think there was no American human rights 

pressure on Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their preference for 

Trump over Obama does not have to do with American human 

rights pressure, and in Israel the preference is not just 

Netanyahu’s. Obama had lost the confidence of the people of Israel 

left, right, and center. 

So I don’t think—I don’t think the—I would not associate myself 

with your opening remarks. But I would associate myself on these 

remarks. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I did not assume you would——

Mr. ABRAMS. Yes. 

64

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Because since I took direct issue 

with you, and I don’t think that is true that we never talked about 

human rights with Saudi Arabia. 

I take your point, though. Perhaps what they really objected to 

was the agreement with Iran and I happen to think Obama has 

been proved right in that regard, not wrong. But——

Mr. ABRAMS. On the State Department, I think, of course, Secretary Tillerson objects if you, you know, say to him, you are destroying the Foreign Service—you are deliberately undermining the 

ability to conduct diplomacy. 

But I think top-down is the wrong way to look at it. It should 

be looked at in a sense, from the point of view of the Department, 

of the Foreign Service, of the morale of the building because the 

morale of the building can be judged, not by the intention of those 

on the top but rather what is actually happening. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. ABRAMS. And you have described, I think, what’s actually 

happening. I have played the game almost of saying with a number 

of friends, okay, who would you choose for Ambassador here or Ambassador there or Assistant Secretary for this. 

Very often the answer is, well, so and so, but she is gone—so and 

so, but he just retired. So you are getting a depletion of the top 

ranks and we are not starting to refill at the bottom because of 

these decisions not to have entering classes. 

Sure, the impact of that next year is not great. But we need to 

plan for the future. We need an absolutely first rate global power 

foreign ministry 10 years from now and 25 years from now when 

those entering classes are going to be assuming position of responsibility. 

So I think it is—it is happening if you ask people in the Foreign 

Service, and I think it is very unfortunate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. If the chair would allow—Dr. Wittes, you 

looked like you were chomping at the bit to comment as well, and 

I know—I know you actually said the most important tool in the 

American policy toolbox—to contain Iran and restore stability in a 

disordered region is the tool the Trump administration seems most 

committed to destroying—our diplomacy. Do you want to elaborate? 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Congressman. 

First, I will associate myself with Elliott’s comments in that regard entirely, and I will note that I think it is now more than half 

of our posts—our Embassies in the Middle East do not have a permanent Ambassador in place. 

It is—including Saudi Arabia, by the way—and although we 

have a very able team and very able charges and deputies in those 

places, it is impossible to substitute for somebody who is given the 

charge by the President of being his representative. 

And so in addition to the long-term institutional damage to our 

foreign ministry that Elliott was describing, I think we have to look 

at the near term problem of empty chairs and nobody on the other 

end of the phone. 

And so it is almost impossible to imagine even if the White 

House could construct a comprehensive strategy to contain Iran 

and push back this influence that we would be able to implement 

65

on that strategy effectively, given the range and breadth of vacancies that we see. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, and I think one of the things that those 

empty chairs and phones not answered creates a vacuum that our 

adversaries know how to fill. 

The Iranians are quite aggressive. The Chinese are quite aggressive. The Russians, we know, are quite aggressive. And this is just 

the wrong time to have a whole bunch of empty chairs and phones 

not answered. 

But I thank you all for being here. I wish we had a little more 

time. Madam Chair, thank you so much for having the hearing 

and, Ms. Frankel, thanking—thank you for letting a guy ask some 

questions. [Laughter.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly. 

Thank you to our excellent witnesses and thank you for the audience as well for being with us, and members of the press. 

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned as we fly out. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(67)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and N01·th Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

November 22. 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building 

(and available live on the Committee website at hhn://ww\v.ForeirmAffatr:-,.house.P.0v). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. November 29,2017 

10:00 a.m. 

Examining Latest Developments in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon 

Mr. Elliot Abrams 

Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations 

Dr. Paul Salem 

Vice President for Policy Analysis 

Middle East Institute 

Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes 

Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy 

The Brookings Institution 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ______ _::M..::i::d'.::llc:_' E::'':::'·'.::":::"':::".::N:::oc:rt::_h,_,Afic_r:::k=.a ______ HEARING 

Day Wetlnestlar Datc ___ _,l_,l"/2"'9"-/-'-1'-7 ___ Room, ___ _c2"'1'-'7-'2'----

Starting Time TO·fJ6AM EndingTime 11:49AM 

Recesses ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) (__to __ ) (__to __ ) (__to __ ) ( __ lo __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Clutimum Ros-Lehtineu 

Check all ~fthefo/lowing tlwt app~v: 

Open Session 0 Electronicall 

Executive (closed) Session D Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

y Record~ taped) 0 

Stenogl'aphic Record ~ 

The Latest Developments in Sautli Arabia anti Lebanon 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

GOP- Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. Chabot, Meadows, Kinzinger, Zeitlin, Donovan, Ma.<t, Fitzpali'ick 

Dem- Ranking Member Deutch, Reps. Connolly, Frankel, Gabhart!, Boyle, Sclmeitle1; Suozzi, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMMITTKE MEMBERS PRESENT: ~Wark wit/1 an * if they are not memhers of full committee) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ No 0 

(If ''no", please list helolV and include Iitle, agency, department, or organizatwn.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record) 

Representative Connolly's article for tile recortl 

Re]JJ'e.,·entative Connolly's Statement for tile record 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 11:49 AM 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginiu 

Over the last month, Saudi Arabia has taken a series of internal and external steps that have alarmed its 

partners, including Lebanon and the United States. While Saudi Arabia has sought to provide a 

necessary counterweight to Iran's malign activities, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's hamhanded efforts are backfiring and contributing to greater instability in the region Consistent with the 

Trump Administration's unilateral retreat from U.S. global leadership, the President is asleep at the 

wheel and blindly endorsing the Crown Prince's foreign policies, even where they might diverge from 

U.S. interests. 

During a visit to Saudi Arabia on November 4, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri abruptly resigned 

his post and condemned Iran and Hezbollah's "destruction and chaos" in the region. Many observers 

argue that bin Salman likely pressured Hariri to resign in order to isolate Hezbollah in Lebanon. That 

same day, Saudi Arabia intercepted a Houthi-fired missile outside Riyadh, after which the Saudis 

obstructed all air and sea access to Yemen. The blockade was designed to prevent Iranian anns transfers, 

but has also impeded the delivery of humanitarian assistance to a Yemeni population with 7 million 

people living on the brink of famine. These events also coincided with a so-called anti-corruption purge 

in which the Crown Prince has detained approximately 500 people, including II Saudi princes 

Prime Minister Hariri has since returned to Lebanon and suspended his resignation amid consultations 

Just this week, the Saudis allowed the first humanitarian aid ship and plane to access rebel-controlled 

territories in Yemen since initiating the country-wide blockade. However, aid agencies warn that Yemen 

is still at risk of a large-scale famine. According to World Food Program estimates, the latest blockade 

may have pushed an additional 3.2 million people into hunger. Yemen is now home to the worst 

humanitarian crisis in the world, with 20 million people, including more than II million children, in 

need of urgent humanitarian assistance. 

Following a Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall that killed more than 140 people in October 2016, the 

Obama Administration initiated a review of security assistance to Saudi Arabia. According to the 

Guardian, more than a third of the Saudi-led coalition's airstrikes have hit civilian sites and more than 

10,000 civilians have perished in the conflict. Despite these desperate circumstances, President Trump 

resumed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and proposed cutting U.S aid to Yemen by 83 percent in his FY 

2018 foreign assistance budget. 

Saudi Arabia has also played a leading role in the diplomatic dispute between Qatar and many of its 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors, citing Doha's close ties with Iran and support for terrorism. 

However, the move to cut off diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar has sowed further chaos in 

the region and only pushed Doha closer to Iran. Rather than brokering a deal with our varied GCC 

partners to resolve the issue, President Trump exacerbated the situation by endorsing Saudi Arabia's 

actions. 
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President Trump has vowed to strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia, and visited Riyadh before any 

other city on his first foreign trip. However, his Administration has failed to outline a strategy to protect 

U.S. interests in several regional conflicts where they may diverge with Saudi policies. In the wake of 

these recent events, President Trump tweeted that he has "great confidence in King Salman and the 

Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly what they are doing.'' Such a blanket endorsement of 

the leadership in Riyadh, which has been at times throttled and reversed in a whiplash fashion, is not the 

way to protect US. interests in the region. The Trump Administration must learn the lesson that we 

cannot outsource U.S. global leadership. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding how the United States can navigate our policy 

differences with Riyadh and seize opportunities to promote US. interests in our relationship with Saudi 

Arabia. 

2 
72

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE GERALD E. CONNOLLY, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA


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Diplmnats negotiate the landing and basing arrangements for Amrrican troops 

overse.as, snch as at Ce.ntral Command's major Middle East base in Qatar. Onr 

strongest and smartest presidents have known that integrating onr diplomatic and 

military strategies is the most effective way to succeed in the world today. 

Both of us served overseas and in Washington for decades as career diplomats. 

VVe '\Vere ambaf>sadors rluring both Republican and Dernocratjc at..hnlnistrations. VVe 

are proud of the nonpartisan cultnre of our brethren at the State Department. 

President Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson can count on them to work 

tirelessly, loyally and with great skill for our country. 

But we are concerned the Trump administration is weakening the Foreign 

Service by a series of misguided decisions since taking office. Tt has proposed a 31 

percent budget reduction for the State Department that would cripple its global 

reach. II has failed to fill the majority of ibe most senior ambassadorial positions in 

Washington and overseas. It is on track to take the lowest number of new officers 

into the service in years. 

It has even nominated a former officer with a scant eight years of experience to he 

the director general of the Foreign Service, the chief of its personnel sysiem. The 

nonpartisan American Academy of Diplomacy (of which we both are members) 

ad,ised Congress that this would he "like making a former Army captain the chief of 

staff of the Army." 

As a result, many of our most experienced diplomats are leaving the 

department. illong with the senior diplomats who were summarily fired by the 

Trump team early this year, we are witnessing the most significant departure of 

diplomatic talent in generations. The drop in morale among those who remain 

behind is obvious to both of us. The number of young A.meri cans who applied to take 

the Foreign Service officer entry test declined by 33 percent in the past year. This is 

particularly discouraging and will weaken the service for years. 

We are not arguing that the State Department is a perfectly functioning agency 

that requires no improvements. We support cre~ting a culture of reform and renewal 

al the department. The Trump administration is right to look for budget and 

operatlonallneffidencies to ensure the best nse of taxpayers' money. We also agree 

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with the American academy's support for the elimination of more than 6o special 

envoy positions to save money and improve. effectiveness. The Trump tc.am should 

additionally consider shifting more positions from Washington to diplomatic posts 

overseas. 

The recent decision by Mr. Tillerson to dow~1size the Foreign Service by up to 8 

percent of the entire officer corps, however. is particularly dangerous. The Foreign 

Service, which has about 8,ooo officers who do core dip lorna tic work, is a fraction of 

the size of the military. The service is already overwhelmed by the growing 

challenges to the United States on every continent. In our view. Mr. Tillcrson has 

failed to make a convincing case as to why deep cuts will strengthen, rather than 

weaken, the service, and thus the nation. This is not about belt tightening" It is a 

deliberate effor1 lo deconstruct the State Department and the Foreign Service. 

That is why Congress must now exercise its constitutional responsibili1ies to 

overrule tlle most dangerous aspects of the administration's plans. House and Senate 

committees must continue to oppose the huge budget cuts. Congressional committee 

chairmen should bloek the appointments of Trump nominees clearly unqualified for 

service. And Congress sbouJd ensure that there are sufficient funds to entice patriotic 

young Americans to join the Foreign Service. Senators .John McCain, Republican of 

~A.rizona, and .Jeanne Shaheen, Democrat of New Hampshire, are leading the 

bipartisan questioning of Mr. Tillcrson's hiring freeze and warning of its dire 

consequences. 

\\Teare ringing the village bell in alann because Mr. Trump's neglect of the State 

Depmtment "ill harm our country at an already dangerous time. The Foreign 

Service is a jewel ofthe American national security establishment, with tlw deepest 

and most effective diplomatic corps in the world. i\ll that is now at risk. 

Nicholas Burns, a forn1er llilder secretary· of state and arn bassador to NATO, teaches 

diplomacy and inlernational relatious at Harv:H'd. Kynn Crorke1, a fanner 

mnbuBsador to Iraq and Afghanistan) is a lecturer at Princeton. 

Follow The lvew York Times Opinion section on Face book and Twitter ( @NYTopinion), 

and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter. 

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Dismantling the Foreign Service- The New York Times 

01·1 November 28. 2017, on Page A23 of the New York edition with 

Service. 

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