NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA MORTON, AKA Melissa Ann Morton, AKA Melissa Thomson Morton, AKA Melissa Thomson, AKA Melissa Ann Thomson; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 20

- 56099

D.C. No. 8:19

- cv

- 019 57

- PSG

- ADS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 16, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: BERZON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, * * District Judge.

Appellants appeal the district court’s dismissal of their quiet title action

against the United States for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

DEC 1 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

jurisdiction under 28 U.S .C. § 1291

. We review the district court’s dismissal de

novo, DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States , 926 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019)
,
and we affirm.

Appellants claim ownership of real property located at 8801 Riderwood

Drive in Sunland, California . They brought this suit against the United States to
quiet title to that property. Specifically, Appellants sought to remove a cloud on the

title caused by two instruments related to a p revious lawsuit : a 2007 notice of lis

pendens recorded by the United States and a 2008 default judgment obtained by

the United States against a prior lienholder. Shortly after receiving the complaint,

the United States filed a disclaimer with the district court disclaiming “any interest

in the real property that is the subject of this quiet

- title action.” The district court

confirmed this disclaimer and dismissed the case for lack of subject

- matter
jurisdiction. Appellants timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in

dismissing the case because the United States did not specifically disclaim the lis

pendens and default judgment by instrument number

. The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the United States from suit

except where it has cons ented to be sued. United States v. Bormes , 568 U.S. 6, 9

(2012). The Qu i et Title Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States as

necessary to “adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States

claims an interest.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). But “[i]f the United States disclaims all3

interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time

prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by

order of the court, the jurisdicti on of the district court shall cease.” § 2409 a (e).

Appellants’ contention on appeal that the disclaimer was insufficient

because it did not specifically reference the lis pendens and default judgment by

instrument number is without merit. The United States disclaimed “ any interest” in

the subject property . This unrestricted language necessarily includes the lis

pendens and the default judgment to whatever extent those instruments represented

interest s claimed by the United States in the first place. See, e. g. , Webster’s Ninth

New Collegiate Dictionary 93 (1989) ( defining “any” as a synonym of “all” ) . Once

the United States filed its disclaimer of interest and the district court confirmed that

disclaimer
, the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case ceased under the plain terms of

§ 2409 a (e) . D ismissal was therefore proper. 1

AFFIRMED

.

1 Appellants’ challenge to the assignment of this case to Judge Gutierrez lacks merit. See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall) , 721 F.3d 10 32, 1040 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that “judges are vested with ‘inherent’ authority to transfer cases among themselves ‘for the expeditious administration of justice’” (quoting United States v. Stone , 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam)) ).