UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 1I 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

SICILY AND THE SURRENDER 

OF ITALY 

by 

Liel/tellGllt Cololl el Albert N. Garland 

alld 

H award !If cGaw Smyth 

Assisted by 

Af artin Bll/mensoll 

llIlMY l~ 

Q;;NIER OF M ILITARY HISTORY 

UNIT~1J STAlES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. C., 1993 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Numbe r: 64-60002 

First Prin ted 1965- CMH Pub 6-2-1 

For sate by the Supe rintendent of Documents. U.S. Governmeut I)ri llling Office 

Washington . D.C. 20402 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Stetson Conn, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(A'\of 15June 1963) 

Fred C. Cole 

Washington and Lee Un iversity 

William R. Emerson 

Yale U niversi ty 

Earl Pomeroy 

University of Oregon 

Theodore Ropp 

Duke University 

Bell I. Wiley 

Emory University 

Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Exton 

U.S. Contine ntal Army Command 

Maj. Gen. Tom R. Stoughton 

Industria l College of the Armed Forces 

Brig. Gen. Ward S. Ryan 

U.S. Army War COllege 

Col. Elias C. Townsend 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Col. Vincent]. Esposito 

United States Military Academy 

C. Vann Woodward 

Yale University 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History 

Chief Historian 

Acting Chief, Histories Division 

Chief, Editorial and Graphics Division 

Editor in Chief 

III 

Stetson Conn 

Lt. Col. Paul W. Phillips 

Lt. Col. J ames R. Hillard 

J oseph R. Friedman 

· . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

This volume, the second to be published in the Mediterranean Theater of 

Operations subseries, takes up where George F. Howe's Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West left off. It integrates the Sicilian Campaign with 

the complicated negotiations involved in the surrender of Italy. 

The Sicilian Campaign was as complex as the negotiations, and is equally 

instructive. On the Allied side it included American, British, and Canadian 

soldiers as well as some Tabors of Goums; major segments of the U.S. Army 

Air Forces and of the Royal Air Force; and substantial contingents of the U.S. 

Navy and the Royal Navy. Opposing the Allies were ground troops and air 

forces of Italy and Germany, and the Italian Navy. The fighting included a 

wide variety of operations: the largest amphihious assault of World War II; 

parachute jumps and air landings; extended overland marches; tank battles; 

precise and remarkably succes!'lf ul naval gunfire support of troops on shore; 

agonizing struggles for ridge tops; and extensive and skillful artillery support. 

Sicily was a testing ground for the U.S. soldier, fighting beside the more experienced troops of the British Eighth Army, and there the American soldier 

showed what he could do. 

The negotiations involved in Italy's surrender were rivaled in complexity and 

delicacy only by those leading up to the Korean armistice. The relationship of 

tactical to diplomatic activity is one of the most instructive and interesting 

features of this volume. Military men were required to double as diplomats and 

to play both roles with skilL 

The authors were uniquely qualified to undertake this difficult volume. Rare 

indeed is the collaboration of an authority on Italian, German, and diplomatic 

history with an experienced infantry officer who is a Master of Arts in history. 

Washington, D. C. 

15 June 1963 

vii 

HAL C. PATTISON 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Authors 

Lt. Col. Albert Nutter Garland received a B.S. degree in education and 

an M.A. degree in history from Louisiana State University and has taught in 

New Orleans private schools and at Louisiana Polytechnic Institute. A Regular Army officer with more than 20 years of active service, he served during 

W orid War II as a rifle company commander with the 84th Infantry Division 

and participated in the Northern France, Ardennes-Alsace, and Central Europe 

Campaigns. Since 1945 he has served in Alaska and Taiwan and in numerous assignments in the States. Colonel Garland was a member of OCMH 

from 1958 to 1962 and is now Assistant Editor of Military Review, the U.S. 

Army's professional magazine, which is published at the Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Howard McGaw Smyth, a graduate of Reed College, received the M.A. 

degree in history from Stanford and the Ph.D. degree from Harvard University. 

He has taught, chiefly in the field of modern European history, at Reed, 

Princeton, Union College, American University, and the University of California, where he devoted himself to work in the history of modern Italy. He 

served a term as a member of the Board of Editors of the .I ournal of Modern 

History. 

During World War II he served for a time in the Office of Strategic Services 

and then in the Department of State, working on problems relating to Italy 

in the Division of Territorial Studies and the Division of Southern European 

Affairs. Dr. Smyth was a member of the staff of OCMH from 1946 to 1952 

when he joined the staff of the Historical Office, Department of State, where 

he is now Editor in Chief, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. 

Vlll 
Preface 

\'Vith the expulsion of German and Italian armed forces from North Africa 

in May 1943, Allied forces in the Mediterranean prepared to jump ninety miles 

across the sea to strike Sicily and thus launch the first blow against Europe's 

"soft underbelly." This is the story of that jump, a story which includes the 

high-level decisions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston 

S. Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference, 

the planning in \Vashington, London, and in the theater, and the subsequent 

fighting on the island. 

Before landing in Sicily, the A.llies had hoped that a successful island campaign, coming hard on the heels of Allied victories in North Africa, would 

cause Italy to abrogate its Pact of Steel with Germany and pull out of the 

war. How this Allied hope was fulfilled--the politico-military diplomatic negotiations, the ambiguities, the frustrations, the culmination in Italian surrender- -

is also part of the story. 

A wealth of Allied documentary material, of captured German and Italian 

records, and of primary and secondary published material dealing with the period has been available to the authors in their attempt to reconstruct the crucial 

events of the spring and summer of 1943. Although their narrative focuses on 

American participation in these events, it does not neglect the important role 

played by Great Britain. The enemy side of the campaign and the Axis strategies and policies are also presented in full measure. 

This volume itself has an interesting history. It was begun some years ago 

by Dr. Smyth when Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony was Chiet of Military History 

and it is a pleasure to testify to the stimulation and guidance which he offered; 

to acknowledge the assistance and encouragement given by Dr. George F. Howe 

and Dr. Sidney T. Mathews, colleagues in the then Mediterranean Section; to 

recall the helpful critical comment proferred from time to time by Dr. Hugh 

M. Cole, then Chief of the European Section. Mr. Detmar Finke and Mr. 

Israel Wice were unflagging in their aid in the search for materials. 

At a later stage Colonel Garland joined the staff of OCMH and took over 

the responsibility for the work. The volume thus is a product of joint authorship. Colonel Garland tells the story of the Sicilian Campaign. Dr. Smyth narrates the story of the Italian surrender. The combined work submitted by the 

authors ran to excessive length and Mr. Blumenson was called in to assist in 

IX 
condensing and revising portions of the manuscript. He contributed materially 

to its final structure and form. 

In the later stages of the work this volume benefited from the assistance 

rendered by many individuals. Conspicuous among these have been Mr. Charles 

MacDonald, Chief of the General Histories Branch of the Office of the Chief 

of Military History, who guided the project during its last four years, and Mrs. 

Magna E. Bauer, of the same branch, whose exhaustive research in German 

and Italian records provided the authors with an invaluable series of studies on 

the enemy's defense of Sicily. 

The authors have also benefited from the help of other colleagues in OCMH, 

notably Brig. Gen. William H. Harris, Col. Leonard G. Robinson, Lt. Col. 

Joseph Rockis, Dr. John Miller, jr., Lt. Col. William Bell, and Lt. Col. James 

Schnabel. Many thanks are due also to David Jaffe, senior editor of the 

volume; B. C. Mossman, chief cartographer; Mrs. Loretto Stevens, assistant 

editor; and Mrs. Norma Sherris, photographic editor. 

During the research stage, invaluable help was provided by Mr. Sherrod 

East, Chief Archivist, World War II Division, National Archives and Records 

Service, and certain of his assistants, Mrs. Lois Aldridge, Mrs. Hazel Ward, 

and Mrs. Frances J. Rubright. Without their willing and cheerful aid, this project might well never have been completed. 

Although these individuals contributed much to the final product, the language used, the interpretations placed on the events, the conclusions reached, 

are the authors' own. No one else bears this responsibility. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 June 1963 

x 

ALBERT N. GARLAND 

Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry 

HOWARD McGAW SMYTH 
Chapter 

Contents 

PART ONE 

Background and Plans 

I. ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 

Casablanca: The Decision for Sicily 

TRIDENT: Beyond Sicily 

Algiers - And Italy? 

The Surrender Problem 

II. THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

The Italo-German Alliance 

The Disintegration of Fascism 

The Allied Threat 

III. PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 

The Beginnings 

The Plan 

Other Factors 

IV. THE AXIS SITUATION 

Pantelleria 

Growing German Strength 

The Defenses of Sicily 

V. FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

Missions and Forces 

Seventh Army Plans 

Naval and Air Plans 

The Final Days . 

PART TWO 

Opera tions and N egotia tions 

VI. THE ASSAULT 

The Airborne Operations 

The Seaborne Operations 

Xl 

Page 

12 

23 

25 

27 

27 

39 

44 

52 

52 

58 

63 

69 

69 

73 

75 

88 

88 

96 

105 

108 

115 

115 

119 
Chapter 

VII . 

VIII . 

IX . 

x . 

XI . 

XII . 

XIII . 

XIV . 

XV . 

XVI . 

THE FIRST DAY ................... 

The Axis Reaction ................... 

The Battle ...................... 

The Beaches ................... 

THE AXIS THREAT .................. 

AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENT ............ 

THE BEACHHEAD SECURE .............. 

Straightening Out the Sag ................ 

On to the Yellow Line ................. 

CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS . 

Sixth Army and OB SUED ............... 

The Allied Problem: How to Continue ........... 

Comando Supremo and OKW ............... 

SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS ...... 

The II Corps Front .................. 

Army Directive of 15 July 1943 ............. 

Discord and Harmony ................. 

THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX ............. 

The Feltre Conference .................. 

Planning the Western Sweep ............... 

The Pounce on Palermo ................. 

Denouement ..................... 

THE CLIMAX ..................... 

Sardinia Versus the Mainland .............. 

The Overthrow of Mussolini ............... 

Allied Reaction .................... 

Rome: Open City ................... 

DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS ..... 

Badoglio's First Moves . ................ 

Friction Along the Alps ................. 

The Italian Course is Changed .............. 

THE DRIVE TO THE EAST .............. 

Developing an East Front ................ 

Axis Reactions .................... 

Nicosia ....................... 

Along the North Coast ................. 

The Eighth Army Attempt To Break Through ........ 

Agrigento ...................... 

xii 

Page 

147 

147 

150 

156 

163 

175 

185 

185 

189 

202 

202 

205 

211 

218 

218 

219 

224 

230 

234 

239 

239 

244 

250 

254 

258 

258 

263 

268 

278 

281 

281 

288 

295 

300 

300 

306 

309 

316 

Chapter Page 

VII. THE FIRST DAY 147 

The Axis Reaction 147 

The Battle . ISO 

The Beaches 156 

VIII. THE AXIS THREAT. 163 

IX. AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENT 175 

X. THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 185 

Straightening Out the Sag . . 185 

On to the Yellow Line 189 

Xl. CONTINCING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 202 

Sixth Army and OB SUED . 202 

The Allied Problem: How to Continue 205 

Comando Supremo and OKr-V. . 211 

XII. SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 218 

The Eighth Army Attempt To Break Through 218 

The II Corps Front 219 

Agrigento 224 

Army Directive of 15.July 7943 230 

Discord and Harmony 234 

XIII. THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 239 

The Feltre Conference . 239 

Planning the Western Sweep 244 

The Pounce on Palermo 250 

Denouement 254 

XIV. THE CLIMAX 258 

Sardinia Versus the Afainland 258 

The Overthrow of Alussolini 263 

Allied ReactIon 268 

Rome: Open CIty . . . 278 

XV. DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS. 281 

Badoglio' j First Ai oves 281 

Friction Along the Alps . . . 288 

The Italian Course is Changed 295 

XVI. THE DRI VE TO THE EAST 300 

Developing an East Front 300 

Axis Reactions . . . 306 

Nicosia . . . . . . 309 

Along the North Coast 316 

Xll 
Chapter 

XVII. THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

XVIII. BREAKING THE SAN FRA TELLO LINE 

XIX. EVACUATION. 

The Tar vis Conference 

The Italian Dilemma. 

The Decision to Evacuate Sicily 

Allied Reaction 

The Evacuation Begins 

XX. BROLO 

XXI. THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

The Race to Alessina . 

Conelusions 

Patton 

PART THREE 

The Surrender 

XXII. THE QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE 

QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 

Strategic Issues at Quebec . 

The ;Hission of General Castellano 

The Quebec ~Memorandum 

Approval of the Long Terms 

XXIII. THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

The Xanussi iMission . 

Castellano at Lisbon 

Zanussi's Negotiations in Lisbon and Algiers. 

Thoughts in Rome 

XXI V. THE ITALIAN DECISION 

ACHSE . .... 

The Parleys at Cassibile 

The Decision at Rome 

XXV. THE ARMISTICE . . 

The Signature 

Planning GIANT II . 

Second Thoughts in Rome 

XIU 

Page 

324 

348 

368 

368 

371 

374 

378 

382 

388 

406 

406 

417 

425 

435 

435 

440 

446 

448 

451 

451 

455 

461 

465 

469 

469 

474 

479 

482 

482 

485 

489 
Chapter Page 

XXVI. THE RENUNCIATION. 497 

"Innocuous" . . 498 

The Announcement 505 

XXVII. THE SURRENDER 510 

Badoglio's Announcement 510 

Flight of the King and High Command 513 

Interpretations 519 

XXVIII. THE DISSOLUTION 522 

German Reaction 522 

The Battle for Rome 524 

Dissolution of the Italian Armed Forces 532 

Mussolini 536 

XXIX. THE SECOND CAPITULATIOX 540 

Mission to Brindisi 540 

The Long Terms 543 

Malta 549 

Epilogue 552 

Appendix 

A. COMPOSITION OF AMERICAN FORCES 555 

B. THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM . 556 

C. SHORT (MILITARY) TERMS IN GENERAL 

EISENHOWER'S POSSESSION ON 6 AUGUST 1943 558 

D. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS (LONG TERMS) SIGNED 

ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1943 559 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 565 

GLOSSARY . 571 

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 575 

INDEX 579 

Maps 

I. British Eighth Army Operations, 10 July 1943 ...... 122 

2. The Seizure of Agrigento, 3d Infantry Division, 14~ 17 July 1943. 227 

3. 15th Army Group Front, 23 July 1943 . . . . . . . . . 305 

4. II Corps Advance, 24-31 July 1943. .... 312 

5. The Capture of Traina, 1st Infantry Division, 1-6 August 1943. 335 

6. The Fight for San Fratello, 3d Infantry Division, 8 August 1943. 362 

7. 15th Army Group Gains, 24 July~~l0 August 1943 ..... 381 

8. Brolo and the Naso Ridge, 3d Infantry Division, 11-12 August 1943 395 

A1aps I-VIII are in accompanying map envelope 

I. The Battleground and the Enemy, 10 July 1943 

XIV 
II. The Final Landing Plan 

III. The Seventh Army Assault, 10 July 1943 

IV. Counterattack at Gela, 11 July 1943 

V. Seventh Army Advance, 11-12 July 1943 

VI. The Seventh Army Changes Direction, 13-18 July 1943 

VII. The Seventh Army Clears Western Sicily, 19-23-July 1943 

VIII. The Race to Messina, 13-17 August 1943 

Illustrations 

Page 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill 9 

Allied Leaders in the Sicilian Campaign .... 13 

Churchill Addressing the U.S. Congress, May 1943 20 

Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini 28 

King Victor Emmanuel III . . . . . . . . . . 30 

Generale d'Armata Ugo Cavallero . . . . . . . 31 

Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring and General der Infanterie Enno von 

Rintelen with Prince Umberto Di Savoia . . 34 

I Generale d'Armata Vittorio Ambrosio . . . . 36 

Generale di Corpo d'Armata Giacomo Carboni 37 

Count Dino Grandi . . . . . . . . 40 

Count Galeazzo Ciano . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., 

in Sicily . . . . . . . . . 55 

Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey 62 

Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver Leese . . . 63 

Pantelleria Under Attack . . . 71 

Generale di Carpo d'Armata Comandante Designato D'Armata Mario 

Roatta . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

Generale d' Armata Alfredo Guzzoni 

Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt . . 

Feldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen 

Generalmajor Paul Conrath . . . . . . . . . 

Generalleutnant Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin 

Col. Ernst Guenther Baade . . . . . . . . . 

General der Panzertruppen Hans Valentin Hube 

Looking South From the Heights of Enna . . . 

Gela Beach .. . ........... . 

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley and Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen 

Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton .. 

Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway . 

Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. 

Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy 

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey 

xv 

77 

80 

80 

80 

81 

81 

81 

85 

90 

93 

94 

94 

94 

95 

95 
Lt. Col. William O. Darby, Leader of Force X ...... .. 

Ponton Causeway From an LST to Shore . . . . . . . . . . . 

Landing Craft Massed in Bizerte Harbor for the Invasion of Sicily 

Paratroopers Preparing To Emplane for Sicily 

Glider Casualty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ponte Dirillo Crossing Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

USS Boise Bombarding Coastal Defenses in Gela Landing Area 

Licata and Beach Areas to the East 

The Right Flank Beach at Licata 

Highway 115 . . . . . . . . . . 

A Shore-to-Shore LCT at Licata Beach 

Army Donkeys Wading Ashore at Licata 

Bringing Up Supplies by Cart at Licata Beach 

Knocked-Out Italian Railway Battery on Licata Mole 

Enemy Defense Positions Along Coast Road East of Licata. 

Road Junction Y . . . . . . . . . . 

Italian Prisoners Taken at Gela on D-day 

The Coast Line West of Scoglitti . . . . 

Landing Heavy Equipment at Scoglitti . 

Looking Down the Niscemi Road to Piano Lupo 

American Troops in Gela on D Plus I .... 

Paratroopers Moving In on the Ridge at Abbio Priolo. 

American Ships Under Air Attack . . . . 

Col. James M. Gavin in Biazzo Ridge Area . . . 

Wrecked German Tanks Dot Gela Plain .... 

The Robert Rowan Exploding Off the Coast at Gela 

Airborne Reinforcements in a C-47 Heading for Sicily 

Paratroop Reinforcements Moving Through Vittoria 

Ponte Olivo Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tank-Mounted Troops Rolling Through Palma 

Canicatti Under Artillery Fire . . . . . . . 

Butera ................. . 

Agrigento and the Surrounding High Ground . 

A Dukw Hauling Supplies in Porto Empedocle . 

Signal Corps Troops in Caltanissetta . . . . . 

Caltanissetta, Southwest Corner of the Enna Loop 

General Ridgway and Staff Near Ribera . . . . 

Mortar Squad Preparing To Attack Santo Stefano 

The 2d Armored Division Rolls Into Palermo 

Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes and Italian Generale di Brigata Giuseppe 

Molinero After Surrender of Palermo 

Maresciallo d'Italia Pietro Badoglio 

Southern Approach to Enna . 

Leonforte . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XVI 

Pag' 

95 

104 

109 

116 

116 

118 

121 

124 

126 

127 

130 

130 

132 

132 

134 

137 

138 

140 

145 

151 

153 

166 

167 

169 

171 

178 

180 

183 

186 

193 

198 

221 

225 

229 

234 

247 

250 

251 

252 

253 

264 

302 

303 
Caronia Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Gangi, \Vith Mount Etna in Distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Coast Road Patrol Passing the Bombed-Out Castelbuono Railroad 

Station, 24 July 1943. .......... . 

Demolished Bridge Along Highway 117 . . . . . . 

Traina Ridge From the High Ground Near Cerami. 

Looking \Vest From the Town of Troina 

Goumiers Moving Toward Capizzi . . . . . . . . 

Forward Observation Post Directing Fire on Troina 

Artillery in Position Xear Cerami . . . . . . . . 

Half-Track Squeezing Through a Narrow Street in Cerami 

Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner and General Allen, 8 August 1943 

Provisional Pack Train and Mounted Troops . . . . . . . . 

Enemy Field of Fire Over Furiano River Crossing Site From San 

Fratello Ridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Looking South O\'er the Furiano River Valley . . . 

Highway 113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Looking North Over the San Fratello - Cesaro Road 

San Fratello Ridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sant' Agata From the Seaward Side of San Fratello Ridge 

Treating a Wounded Soldier .... 

San Marco D' Alunzio . . . . 

Axis Second Echelon Leaders at Tarvis 

Smoke Pall Covers Parts of Messina After Bombing Attack. 

Randazzo From the Southern Approach 

Destroyed Bridge Along Highway 116 

Americans and British Meet at Randazzo 

Pillbox Overlooking Highway 113 

Cape Orlando. . . . . . . . . . . 

Brolo Beach From the East .... 

Enemy View of Landing Area at Brolo 

Setting a Machine Gun Position on Monte Cipolla 

Lt. Col. Lyle A. Bernard and His Radioman in Command Post Atop 

Monte Cipolla . . . . . .. ....... . 

The Objective, Messina ............... . 

Troops Moving Around Blown-Out Section of Cliffside Road 

The Bridge That Was "Hung in the Sky" . . . . . . . . . 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Montgomery Observing 

the Effect of Artillery Fire on the Italian Mainland 

Secret Emissaries to Lisbon . 

The Tiber River at Fumicino . . . . . . . . . . 

The "Rescue" of Mussolini . . . . . . . . . . . 

Signing Surrender Document Aboard H.M.S. Nelson 

XVll 

Page 

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456 

4-87 

538 

550 
The U.S. Army Center of Military History 

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by 

the U.S. Army. I t coordinates Army historical matters, including historical properties, and superyises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaison with public 

and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field 

of military history. The Center is located at 1099 11th Street, :\'.W., Washington, 

D.C. 20005-3402. 

XVlll 


CHAPTER I 

Allied Strategy In the Mediterranean 

Casablanca: The Decision for Sicily 

At a series of meetings held in Casablanca, French Morocco, in January 

I943, the United States and Great Britain decided to attack the island of Sicily. 

The decision made by President Franklin 

D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston 

S. Churchill, in concert with their principal military advisers, the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, started a chain of events which 

kd ultimately to invasion of the mainland 

of Italy, collapse of the Italian Fascist 

regime, and the surrender of Italy. 

The Casablanca Conference set up the 

initial Allied move to return to the continent of Europe by way of the Mediterranean. It marked a continuation of the 

indirect approach toward the center of 

Axis might started by the Anglo-American 

landings in French North Africa two 

months before, in November I942. 

In retrospect, the decision taken at 

Casablanca appears as an essential link 

in an apparently consistent over-all Allied 

strategy for W orId War II in the Mediterranean: first, to expel Italo-German 

forces from North Africa; second, to attack Sicily as a steppingstone to the 

I talian mainland; third, to invade the 

mainland and eliminate Italy from the 

war; and finally, to contain and wear 

down German forces in Italy as a prelude 

to the main attack across the English 

Channel into northwest Europe. 

In reality this was not the case. There 

was no broad plan at the outset to eliminate Italy first as the weaker of the Axis 

partners.! Actually, Allied strategy in the 

Mediterranean~after the decision of July 

I942 to invade North Africa-evolved 

as a series of ad hoc decisions, each setting 

forth objectives limited by available resources and the conditions of the time. 

At Casablanca, for the first time, the 

strategic initiative passed to the Allies. 

Hitherto the Allies could do little more 

than react to Axis movements: resist the 

submarine warfare against their sea lines 

of communications; hold the thin line in 

Egypt protecting the Suez Canal; attack 

Germany from the air for lack of other 

avenues to the enemy heartland; support 

the Soviet Union; contain the Japanese 

in the Pacific. But between July I942 

and January 1943 the pattern had begun 

to change: there was the Russian breakthrough behind Stalingrad; British victory at El 'Alamein; Anglo-American occupation of French Northwest Africa. 

Though each of these was essentially a 

defensive action, by the time Allied lead1 Although something similar had been suggested in Anglo-American discussions in mid1942. See Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950, rev. ed.), p. 459; Maurice 

Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning 

for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 285-86. 
2 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ers convened at Casablanca the balance 

had shifted. For the first time the Allies 

had a considerable degree of freedom in 

selecting their next move or their next 

objective. 

The instrument of discussion and deCISIon at Casablanca-the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff ( CCS) ~-·represented a 

new institution in the evolution of warfare. A body composed of the service 

chief;:; of staff of the United States and 

Great Britain, it had taken form within 

a month after Pearl Harbor.2 Despite 

the fact that this combined directorate 

helped make possible an extraordinary integration of Anglo-American effort, serious differences on strategy did emerge 

2 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 97ff; see also 

Gordon A. Harrison. Cross-Channel Attack 

(Washington, 195I), ch. I, and Forrest C. Pogue, 

The Supreme Cummand (Washington, 1954), pp. 

3 7-'t!, both in UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II; John Ehrman, Grand Strateg}', 

voL V, August 1943-Septembet (London: 

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, , pp. 15-

24· 

Members of the CCS were: Field Marshal Sir 

Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First 

Sea Lord; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, 

Chief of the Air Staff; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U,S, Army; Admiral Ernest 

J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Lt. Gen. Henry 

H, Arnold, commanding general of the U.S. 

Army Air Forces and Marshall's Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Air. Until March 1942, Admiral 

Harold R. Stark was Chief of Naval Operations 

and a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs, 

Admiral William D. Leahy became a member in 

the summer of 1942 in his capacity as Chief of 

Staff to President Roosevelt. Because the CCS 

sat in Washington, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, 

personal representative of Mr. Churchill as Minister of Defence, represented the British Chiefs 

during the intervals between formal conferences, 

The main planning bodies of the Joint Chiefs 

were the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint 

Strategic Survey Committee, the latter established 

in early November 1942 to study long-range policies and strategy. 

between the U.S. Joint Chiefs and the 

British Chiefs of Staff. 

These differences reflected the dissimilar geographic pOSItIOns, the unequal 

war potentials, and the divergent historical experiences of the two countries. 

Even the English language as used in 

America and Britain is not identical, and 

occasionally problems of verbal expression 

superimposed themselves on divergent 

concepts arising from diverse national 

outlooks. 

A basic Allied strategic plan for the 

global conduct of the war began to appear at the ARCADIA Conference in \\1' ashington, December 194I, when the Combined Chiefs of Staff came into being. 

Here the Anglo-American decision was 

made, or reaffirmed, that the main weight 

of America's effort \vould be directed toward Europe to achieve, in co-operation 

with Great Britain and the USSR, the 

defeat of Germany. Against Japan, a limited and essentially defensive action would 

be conducted until after victorY in 

Europe.s 

Though the American Government 

would threaten at times to turn its effort 

against Japan, the Allies fought a genuinely coalition war, one great group of 

powers against another. And though the 

Americans might have preferred to turn 

their major energies toward avenging 

Pearl Harbor, they had to retain a British base from which to mount an attack 

against the European continent; and they 

realized the value of the eastern land 

"Harrison, Crass-Channel Attack) p. 8; Ray 

S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), p. 144; 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New 

York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 

27-28. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 3 

front in absorbing much of the strength 

of Germany's ground forces. 

How was Germany to be defeated? 

General George C. Marshall, Chief of 

Staff of the U.S. Army, asked this question of Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower 

soon after the latter reported to the "Var 

Department in December 1 94 I. As chief 

of the War Plans Division, which in 

March 1942 was reorganized to become 

the Operations Division (OPD), Eisenhower had the task of formulating the 

basic plan. In the early spring of 1942 

Eisenhower considered a variety of plans 

for defeating the Axis in Europe: plans 

for attacking through Norway; plans for 

working through the Iberian Peninsula; 

even plans for the use of sea and air 

power only. The Mediterranean route 

was also briefly considered, this when the 

British situation in the Middle East was 

relatively good. But the domination of 

the central Mediterranean by Axis air 

forces ruled out detailed planning for an 

attempt to attack Italy from Gibraltar. 4 

By early April 1942 OPD had developed the basic American strategic concept. 5 Rejecting the Mediterranean route 

for a number of cogent reasons-the 

great distance from North African bases 

to the German industrial centers; the 

improbability of achieving a decisive result by first eliminating Italy from the 

war; the disadvantage of attacking Germany over the great natural barrier of the 

4 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 18, 41-

43. For a full account of the development of 

OPD, see Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 

76- 87. 

5 The Operations Division set forth this concept in the so-called Marshall Memorandum. See 

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 177-87; Harrison 

Cross-Channel Attack, p. 15; Cline, Washington 

Command Post, pp. 143-54. 

Alps; the inability to concentrate the full 

power of the United States and of Great 

Britain in the Mediterranean-OPD came 

out strongly for a cross-Channel attack. 

Only in England could the Allied military 

resources be effectivelv concentrated for 

the main blow against the Axis. No natural barriers comparable to the Alps 

protected Germany from attack from the 

west. Furthermore, England was closer 

to the great American ports on the Atlantic seaboard. 

After getting the concurrence of the 

other two members of the Joint Chiefs--

,\dmiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval 

Operations, and Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forcesthen President Roosevelt's acceptance, 

General Marshall in the second week of 

April presented the concept to the British 

Chiefs. The British agreed enthusiastically, and the idea took concrete form 

under the code name ROUNDUP, which 

projected a full-scale attack across the 

Channel into northern France in the 

spring of 1943. 

General Marshall and his colleagues 

adhered consistently to this concept, 

which was based on a number of assumptions that in the spring of 1942 were little 

more than mere hopes. Could the Soviet armies resist under Adolf Hitler's 

second summer onslaught? Could the 

,\nglo-American coalition relieve the pressure on Russia's ground forces? 6 \Vhen 

President Roosevelt pressed for any action 

which would assist the Russians in some 

manner, however minor, the outcome was 

the July 1942 decision in favor of TORCH, 

an Allied invasion of French Northwest 

6 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 29-3 0 . 

The project for an emergency cross-Channel operation was termed SLEDGEHAMMER. 
Africa. An emergency decision designed 

to help the Russians, it also had the virtue of getting American troops into battle quickly and giving them combat 

experience. 

The landings in North Africa in November 1942 created a new situation. 

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff felt 

that the TORCH decision had undermined 

the basic strategy agreed upon in April 

for the North African operations meant 

such an investment of resources that a 

cross-Channel operation became improbable in 1943. Even the decision to concentrate first against Germany rather 

than against Japan was thrown open to 

question. The TORCH decision necessitated a reconsideration of fundamental 

policies. 

Thinking about the next step beyond 

TORCH began even before the successful 

execution of that operation in November 

1942. During the planning phase for 

TORCH, Allied leaders hoped and believed that the North African expedition 

would culminate in a campaign of no 

more than a few weeks. Prime Minister 

Churchill forecast “a peaceful occupation 

for liberation purposes of French North 

Africa and the next step will be to build 

up the attack on Sicily and Italy as well 

as on Rommel’s back at Tripoli.”7

But Churchill also envisaged a left 

hook after the Allied jab with the right: 

a new expedition to Norway which would 

eliminate Axis aerial interference with 

the convoys to Russia and bring visible 

evidence to the Soviet Government that 

7 Ltr, Prime Minister to Harry Hopkins, 4 Sep 

42, as quoted in Winston S. Churchill, “The 

Second World War,” vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 

541. 

the Western Powers were waging war 

against the Germans.8

By November 1942, British thinking 

tended to favor continued Mediterranean 

operations. At the very time the Allied 

landings in North Africa were taking 

place, Churchill informed the British 

Chiefs of Staff that he foresaw for 1943 

efforts to pin down enemy forces in northwest Europe by threatening a cross-Channel attack; by invading Italy or southern 

France, preferably the latter; and by 

pressure “to bring in Turkey and operate 

overland with the Russians into the Balkans.” 9 

Toward the end of the same month, he 

felt that the paramount task was to conquer North Africa and use the bases 

established there to strike at the Axis 

underbelly. The second immediate objective, he considered, should be either Sardinia or Sicily. Churchill considered Sicily by far the greater prize.10 Accordingly, the British Joint Planners already had 

code names, appreciations, and outline 

plans for attacking the major Italian 

islands: BRIMSTONE for Sardinia; HUSKY 

for Sicily. 

Elated by the initial successes gained 

by the North African venture, President Roosevelt supported British inclinations toward a Mediterranean strategy. 

On 18 November, the President proposed to Churchill a survey of all possible 

insular and peninsular invasion targets 

along the southern fringe of the European 

continent: Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, 

and the Balkans.11

Roosevelt’s thoughts did not reflect a 

unified outlook in the American camp. 

8 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 569–71. 9 Ibid., p. 649. 

10 Ibid., pp. 654–55. 11 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 35. 

4 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Africa. An emergency decision designed 

to help the Russians, it also had the virtue of getting American troops into battle quickly and giving them combat 

experience. 

The landings in North Africa in November 1942 created a new situation. 

The American Joint Chiefs of Staff felt 

that the TORCH decision had undermined 

the basic strategy agreed upon in April, 

for the North African operations meant 

such an investment of resources that a 

cross-Channel operation became improbable in 1943. Even the decision to concentrate first against Germany rather 

than against Japan was thrown open to 

question. The TORCH decision necessitated a reconsideration of fundamental 

policies. 

Thinking about the next step beyond 

TORCH began even before the successful 

execution of that operation in November 

1942. During the planning phase for 

TORCH, Allied leaders hoped and believed that the North African expedition 

would culminate in a campaign of no 

more than a few weeks. Prime Minister 

Churchill forecast "a peaceful occupation 

for liberation purposes of French North 

Africa and the next step will be to build 

up the attack on Sicily and Italy as well 

as on Rommel's back at Tripoli." 7 

But Churchill also envisaged a left 

hook after the Allied jab with the right: 

a new expedition to Norway which would 

eliminate Axis aerial interference with 

the convoys to Russia and bring visible 

evidence to the Soviet Government that 

7 Ltr, Prime Minister to Harry Hopkins, 4 Sep 

42, as quoted in Winston S. Churchill. "The 

Second World War," vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950). p. 

54!. 

the \Vestern Powers were waging war 

against the Germans.8 

By November 1942, British thinking 

tended to favor continued Mediterranean 

operations. At the very time the Allied 

landings in North Africa were taking 

place, Churchill informed the British 

Chiefs of Staff that he foresaw for 1943 

efforts to pin down enemy forces in northwest Europe by threatening a cross-Channel attack; by invading Italy or southern 

France, preferably the latter; and by 

pressure "to bring in Turkey and operate 

overland with the Russians into the Balkans." 9 

Toward the end of the same month, he 

felt that the paramount task was to conquer North Africa and use the bases 

established there to strike at the Axis 

underbelly. The second immediate objective, be considered, should be either Sardinia or Sicily. Churchill considered Sicily by far the greater prize. W Accordingly, the British Joint Planners already had 

code names, appreciations, and outline 

plans for attacking the major Italian 

islands: BRIMSTONE for Sardinia; HUSKY 

for Sicily. 

Elated by the initial successes gained 

by the North African venture, President Roosevelt supported British inclinations toward a Mediterranean strategy. 

On 18 November, the President proposed to Churchill a survey of all possible 

insular and peninsular invasion targets 

along the southern fringe of the European 

continent: Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, 

and the BalkansY 

Roosevelt's thoughts did not reflect a 

unified outlook in the American camp. 

8 Churchill, Hinge ot Fate, pp. 569-iI. 

9 Ibid., p. 649. 

1/) Ibid., pp. 654-55. 

11 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack .. p. 35. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 5 

Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy of OPD 

saw the continuation of operations in the 

Mediterranean beyond North Africa as 

logistically unfeasible and strategically 

unsound. He recommended either the 

continuation of ROUNDUP as originally 

planned or turning the weight of America's resources against Japan. 12 

In the middle of December 1942, General Marshall still hoped for a crossChannel attack in 1943-a modified 

ROUNDUP. Marshall wanted to turn 

back to the main road immediately after 

what he considered the North African 

detour. According to a private conversation reported by Field Marshal Sir John 

Dill, Marshall was "more and more convinced that we should be in a position to 

undertake a modified 'Round-up' before 

the summer if, as soon as North Africa 

is cleared of Axis forces, we start pouring 

forces into England instead of sending 

them to Africa for the exploitation of 

'Torch.' Such an operation would, he 

[Marshall] feels, be much more efIective than either 'Brimstone' or 'Husky,' 

less costly in shipping, more satisfying to 

the Russians, engage more German air 

forces, and be the most effective answer 

to any German attack through Spain." 13 

Churchill's and Marshall's views were 

colored by early successes in Africa. The 

race for Tunisia was on. Until Christmas 

of 1942, the Allies hoped to seize Tunisia 

quickly. But it soon became clear that 

the North African campaign would be 

long and hard and that the next operations beyond North Africa would follow 

not in the spring, but in the summer of 

12 Ibid., pp. 35-36. For U.S. War Department planning in this period see Matloff and 

Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

1941-1942, Chapter XVII. 

13 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 658-59. 

1943. Furthermore, the Axis reaction 

required more Allied resources than initally allotted and outgrew the proportions contemplated in the TORCH planning phase. 

In this new situation the U.S. Joint 

Chiefs felt the need for a long-range view 

in order to guide American mobilization 

and the allocation of fnen and material. 

Early in December they had proposed a 

strategy of three basic elements: a balanced build-up in the United Kingdom 

for a cross-Channel attack in 1943; a 

great air offensive against Germany from 

bases in England, North Africa, and the 

Middle East; and a massive air bombardment of Italy "with a view to destroying 

Italian resources and morale and eliminating her from the war." 14 They made 

no reference to further operations in the 

Mediterranean. 

Meanwhile, Allied Force Headquarters 

(AFHQ) in the Mediterranean, commanded by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, had begun to consider possible 

alternatives beyond TORCH. It looked 

at Sardinia as a possible next step after 

North Africa, and made this proposal to 

the chiefs in London and WashingtonY 

1. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 36; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 

Warfare, 194[-1942, pp. 376-77. 

15 AFHQ JPS P/24 (Final), 4 Dec 42, sub: 

Appreciation and Outline Plan for Assault on 

Sardinia, 0100/ 12A/ 1 0 I, II. See also the collection of AFHQ JPS planning papers in the 

Salmon Files, 5-B-2, item 6, OCMH. (The Salmon Files consist of a body of papers and other 

materials collected at AFHQ by Col. E. Dwight 

Salmon.) See also 0100/12A/IOI, I and 0100/ 

12A/102, I; Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years 

With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1946), p. 218, entry for 9 Dec 42. 

Unless otherwise indicated, all file numbers in 

this volume are those used by the World War 

II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service (NARS). (See Bibliographical Note.) 
6 SICIL Y AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

The British Chiefs gave greater support 

to this proposal than the American Joint 

Chiefs who gave it only limited encouragement.I6 

The British were thinking of what 

would later be termed a peripheral strategy to defeat Germany: continue the 

build-up in the United Kingdom; initiate 

operations in the Mediterranean against 

Sicily, Sardinia, Italy, and the Balkans; 

and hold back the effort against Japan. 

The Americans, by contrast, were eager 

to initiate direct action against Germany 

by means of a power thrust across the 

English Channel. If no offensive action 

against Germany were possible in the near 

future, the Americans were ready to consider increasing their allocations to the 

Pacific theaters for more powerful blows 

ag:linst the Japanese. In the view of 

Admiral King, the defeat of Japan would 

be infinitely more difficult once the Japanese had consolidated their conquestsY 

After studying the British views, General Marshall concluded that the British 

Chiefs wanted the build-up in the United 

Kingdom but not the cross-Channel operation until a serious crack in German 

morale appeared. Opposed to any offensive action that might result in a heavy 

loss of resources inimical to the crossChannel thrust, in particular the loss of 

shipping, Marshall did not entirely rule 

out operations in the eastern Mediter16 Min, 48th Mtg JCS, 29 Dec 42; Br JP 4, 

14 Jan 43, sub: Merits of BRIMSTONE and 

HUSKY (arguing that "an earlier BRIMSTONE 

would probably contribute as much as a later 

HUSKY"), OIOOjI2A/I77; AFHQ JPS Pj49 

(Second Draft), 23 Jan 43, OIOO/I2A/103, II. 

17 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for 

Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, p. 377; Min, 49th 

Mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43; Arthur Bryant, The Turn 

of the Tide (New York: Doubleday and Compan~ 1957),P. 441n. 

ranean-near Palestine, Iraq, or Cyprus 

-in order to retain Turkish good will 

and perhaps even to induce Turkish support of the Allies. But he opposed an 

invasion of Sardinia, which, he felt, would 

be too costly in terms of shipping. IS 

Neither Americans nor British had as 

yet mentioned the possibility of a return 

to the Continent by the Mediterranean 

route, though both agreed that the elimination of Italy from the war was a desirable aim. A seed of serious disagreement on the price to pay for this goal--

a difference which would emerge fullblown at the next major conference in 

May 1943 (TRIDENT)--already was apparent in early January. The Americans 

obviously were willing to pay only a small 

price. Although they accepted the need 

of putting pressure on Italy to bring about 

Italian collapse, they believed that air 

operations from North Africa would be 

enough, and they rejected the idea of 

ground operations on the Italian mainland. The British were not averse to 

paying a higher price to knock Italy out 

of the war. They were interested in 

eliminating Italy as a means of diminishing German strength. Churchill noted 

that the North African campaign had 

compelled the Germans to shift eleven 

divisions to southern France, thus weak~ 

ening the forty~division force that garrisoned and protected the Channel areas 

of northern France and the Netherlands. 

He predicted that the Germans would 

probably need to move four to six divisions into Italy against the threat of Allied invasion of Sardinia and other vulnerable targets in the Mediterranean. 

Dispersing German strength and stretching the German defensive line in Europe 

18 Min, 49th Mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 7 

would, of course, facilitate Allied re-entry 

into the Continent by way of northern 

France. 19 Carrying the thought further, some British planners explored the 

possibilities of "an offensive aimed at the 

collapse of Italy, and subsequently developed against the Balkans." One conclusion was that "the loss of either Sardinia 

or Sicily would almost certainly lead to 

the collapse of Italy." It would then be 

necessary for Germany to fill the vacuum 

by increasing the German commitment 

in Italy and the Balkans to the extent of 

twenty to thirtv additional divisions. 20 . . Immediately before departing for Casablanca, Pre.'lident Roosevelt called his 

Joint Chiefs to the White House on 7 

January 1943 to determine whether they 

had formulated what might be considered 

an American position. Acting as spokesman, General Marshall admitted that 

though the Joint Chiefs regarded a crossChannel strategy more favorably than a 

Mediterranean course of action, the question remained open. He summarized 

the British position as he understood it 

to maintain the momentum of the North 

African campaign even at the expense of it 

build-up in the United Kingdom, and to 

attempt to bring about the collapse of 

Italy in order to force the commitment 

of additional German military units to 

replace Italian troops in Italy and the 

occupied countries. 

General Marshall saw the issue primarily in logistical terms. He declared 

his willingness to take tactical risks, but 

19 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 37; 

Notes by Minister of Defence, 3 Dec 42, as 

quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 657-58. 

20 This argument is developed in an unofficial British planning paper, dated 19 January 

1943, subject: Development of thc Mediterranean 

Offensive,0100/12A/I77· 

he preferred not to gamble with shipping. 

Heavy shipping losses in an operation 

such as an invasion of Sardinia. he said. 

might destroy the opportunity to close 

with the main enemy in the near future. 

If he had to choose between Sardinia 

and Sicily, Marshall would favor the latter. Sicily was a more desirable, though 

probably a more difficult objective because it had more and better airfields. 

But any operation in the Mediterranean, 

Nlarshall believed, would impose a limit 

on the resources that could be sent to 

the United Kingdom. Admiral King 

added his explicit preference for Sicily 

over Sardinia, if a choice had to be made, 

for his primary concern was the protection of sea lanes of communications in 

the Mediterranean. Allied possession of 

Sicily would insure a sheltered corridor 

between the island and the African north 

coast. All the Joint Chiefs were agreed 

in opposing the concept of invading the 

southern shore of the European mntinent. 

When they indicated that Sardinia looked 

like a blind alley, the President summed 

up their feeling by saying that if the 

;\llies took Sardinia, they could shout 

"Hooray," and then ask, "'Vhere do we 

go from here?" The only argument in 

favor of invading Sardinia, Marshall remarked, was Eisenhower's suggestion that 

the operation could be mounted from 

outside the Mediterranean, perhaps one 

division coming directly from the United 

States, several from England. 21 

The American party. with the exception of Admiral William D. Leahy, who 

was ill, arrived in Casablanca .on 13 January. Before meeting formally with the 

British, the Joint Chiefs again came to21 Min of Mtg at White House, 7 Jan 43, OPD 

Exec 10, item 45. 
SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

gether to try to work out a clear-cut 

American position. Concerned with the 

diversion of resources in the struggle 

against Germany and Japan, Admiral 

King urged the formulation of an over-all 

strategy which would enable the Americans to resist expected British pressure in 

favor of an invasion of Sardinia. But 

General Marshall made no real effort to 

unite the American Joint Chiefs except 

to emphasize the necessity of a crossChannel invasion. Lt. Gen. Brehon B. 

Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply, estimated that once the 

Mediterranean was cleared of enemy 

forces the Allies would save 1,825,000 

tons of shipping in the first five months. 

King supported the estimate and spoke 

in favor of opening the Mediterranean to 

eliminate the long voyage around Africa 

and the Cape of Good Hope. Saving 

cargo space, the Americans believed, was 

much more important than eliminating 

Italy from the war, an aim which they 

were sure the British would favor. 

Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Eisenhower's 

deputy commander in chief in the Mediterranean, who was asked to consult with 

the Joint Chiefs, estimated that an operation against either Sardinia or Corsica 

could not be undertaken before the summer of 1943 because an all-out offensive 

against the Axis forces in Tunisia could 

not be mounted until the middle of 

March. To expel the Axis from North 

Africa by spring, the Allies would have 

to build up a force of half a million men. 

Might it be better, after North Africa 

had been cleared, to use critical shipping 

space to move part of that force elsewhere? Or should the force be used in 

operations launched directly from North 

Africa? If, as AFHQ calculated, four 

divisions plus service troops and air force 

units were needed for occupation and 

other purposes, Clark said, it would be 

necessary to keep 250,000 men in North 

Africa. An excess of some three American divisions and the entire British First 

Army would then remam in the theater 

at the conclusion of the North African 

campaIgn. 

The main concerns of the U.S. Joint 

Chiefs before their meetings with the 

British at Casablanca were three: the 

shortage of shipping; how to use excess 

forces in the theater at the end of the 

Tunisia Campaign; and apprehension 

that the British would insist on invading 

Sardinia.22 

Somewhat ironically, the main concern 

of the British Chiefs was their apprehension that the Americans would prefer 

the invasion of Sardinia over that of 

Sicily. Field Marshall Sir ;\lan Brooke, 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who 

spoke for the British when the conference 

opened on 14 January, indicated a lessening of anxiety with respect to Spain, 

which was increasingly likely to remain 

neutral, and at the other end of the Mediterranean a more positive hope that 

Turkey, though not expected to undertake an active campaign in the Balkans, 

might grant the Allies air bases from 

which to launch attacks against the German oil supply in Rumania. In the center of the Mediterranean area, Brooke 

suggested, the Allies had their major 

opportunity~to knock Italy out of the 

war; to force Germany to disperse her 

resources, and thereby to give positive 

aid to the Russians. As for the crossChannel operation, Brooke estimated that 

the Allied build-up in England would 

total thirteen British and nine American 

22 Min, 50th Mtg JCS, 13 Jan 43. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 9 

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL at Casablanca, surrounded 

by members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other high-ranking milita~y advisen. 

divisions by August 1943; these would 

comprise a force large enough to take 

advantage of a break in German morale. 

Brooke the next day, I5 January, again 

urged the elimination of Italy from the 

war. He presented several choices of invasion: Sardinia, Sicily, Crete, and the 

Dodecanese. The threat to all these islands would compel Germany to take 

defensive measures or face the prospect 

of relinquishing them. With Italy out 

of the war, Germany would have to make 

larger commitments of military forces to 

hold Italy and the Balkans. The British 

favored Sicily as the best invasion target 

but did not advocate going beyond it unless Italy collapsed completely. "We 

should be very careful about accepting 

any invitation to support an anti-Fascist 

insurrection," General Brooke warned. 

"To do so might merely immobilize a 

considerable [Allied military] force to no 

purpose." 23 

Relieved that the British were not interested in occupying Italy, and beginning to feel that he was fighting a losing 

battle for a cross-Channel attack in 1943, 

General Marshall did not oppose an 

operation against Sicily. One of the 

strongest reasons was his appreciation of 

the need to use the excess of Allied troops 

that would remain in North Africa after 

Tunisia was clear of Axis forces. He 

therefore urged that operations undertaken in the Mediterranean be conducted 

with troops already in the theater. Yet 

he returned to a question more fundamental than the immediate issue- what 

23 Quote is from Min, 58th Mtg CCS, ,6 Jan 

43; see also Min, 55th Mtg CCS, 14 Jan and 

57th Mtg CCS, 15 Jan 43; Bryant, Turn of the 

Tide , pp. 445-46, 448. 
10 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

about an over-all strategy? "'Vas an 

operation against Sicily merely a means 

toward an end, or an end in itself? Is 

it to be part of an integrated plan to 

win the war or simply taking advantage 

of an opportunity?" 

The questions were asked, but they 

were not answered. Perhaps they could 

not be. Perhaps the Americans had, as 

Churchill remarked with some annoyance, 

an "undue liking for logical clear-cut 

decisions," whereas the British were basically inclined toward an opportunistic 

approach to strategy.24 

Despite their differences, the British 

and Americans reached agreement on the 

fourth day of the conference, 18 January. 

They decided then to invade Sicily following completion of the Tunisian campaign. 

As General Marshall explained, although 

the Americans preferred a cross-Channel 

attack in 1943, they were willing to accept an invasion of Sicily because of the 

large number of troops which would become available in North Africa, the great 

economy in shipping tonnage to be obtained (the major consideration), and the 

possibility of eliminating Italy from the 

war and thereby forcing Germany to assume responsibility for Italian commitments.2;) 

Z4 Quotes are in Min, 58th Mtg CCS, 16 Jan 

43, and Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 651. See 

also Min, JCS Mtg with the President, 16 Jan 

43, Casablanca Conf Book, p. 61. 

2" Min, 2d Anfa Mtg, 18 Jan 43, Casablanca 

Conf Book, pp. 146-47. See also Richard M. 

Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955), 

ch. XXV, and Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washirgton, 1959), ch. I, both volumes in UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; Bryant, 

Turn of the Tide, pp. 449-50; James Leasor, 

The ClOCk With Four Hands (New York: Reynal and Co., 1949), pp. 233-36. 

On the question of alternative operations, General Marshall reiterated American opposition to an invasion of Sardinia 

because that island offered merely an air 

advantage whereas either Sicily or the 

cross-Channel operation might produce 

decisive results. Though invading Sicily 

would be more difficult than invading 

Sardinia, Marshall was more concerned 

with the security of Mediterranean shipping and with the immediate effects of 

operations against Germany, however indirect, than he was with eliminating Italy 

from the war. General Brooke, though 

stating his general agreement, insisted 

that plans be prepared for other operations on which the Allies could fall back 

in case of absolute necessity. The British 

and the Americans could not resolve differences of opinion, and in the end the 

decision for Sicily was the only concrete 

achievement of the Casablanca Conference affecting Mediterranean strategy. 

In discussing the date of the projected 

invasion of Sicily, the British mentioned 

22 August as coinciding with the favorable phase of the moon, though they were 

willing to settle on another, possibly earlier, date. Favorable lunar conditions 

actually represented a compromise between the divergent requirements of the 

Navy and of the airborne units-airborne 

troops needed a brief period of moonlight for their drops, the fleet required 

total darkness to cover its approach toward the Sicilian shore. When Admiral 

King proposed 25 July as another suitable date, the CCS quickly approved. 

The CCS also decided that General Eisenhower was to command the operation, 

General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander 

was to be the deputy commander in chief 

and in charge of the ground warfare, 

Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham was 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 11 

to command the naval forces, and Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder was to 

be the air commander.26 

General Eisenhower was "infuriated" 

with the new command establishment and 

planned to combat actively "intrusion of 

the British Committee system" into the 

:\lIied Force Headquarters "scheme of 

things." He drafted a cable to the Combined Chiefs demanding a continuation 

of the centralization of command in his 

own person, which he felt had worked so 

well during the early stages of TORCH. 

The cable was never dispatched. At the 

insistence of Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith, 

his chief of staff, General Eisenhower tore 

up the draft; Smith felt this was no time 

to be "creating any fuss." Thus, General Eisenhower found himself lifted to a 

supreme command with actual operations 

to be conducted by a committee of commanders over which he presided. 27 

From even immediate retrospect, the 

decision for Sicily represented a compromise between .\merican and British views. 

eG AFHQ IN Msg 466, 23 Jan 43, AFHQ 

CofS Log, Army War College; Min, 66th Mtg 

CCS, 22 Jan 43; Min, 69th Mtg CCS, 23 Jan 

43; CCS 170/2, Final Report to the President 

and Prime Minister, and CCS 163, System of 

Air Command in the Mediterranean, 20 Jan 43, 

all in Smith Papers (Smith Papers arc in Army 

War College and NARS); George F. Howe, 

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the 

West, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II ( Washington, 1957), pp. :> 53-55. 

"7 Diary of the Office of the Commander in 

Chief, bk. VII, p. A-59B. The Diary of the Office of the Commander in Chief (hereafter cited 

as Diary Office CinC) was kept by Comdr. 

Harry C. Butcher, USNR, for General Eisenhower. It includes summaries of the Supreme 

Commander's activities, memoranda written for 

the diary, many of the top secret letters which 

came to or were sent by the Supreme Commander, 

and copies of plans, intelligence estimates, and 

the like. Edited portions of this diary appeared 

in Butcher's My Three Years With Eisenhower. 

The purposes of the invasion were to secure the Mediterranean sea lanes, to divert pressure from the Russian front, and 

to intensify pressure on Italy. There was 

no agreement on the matter of the Mediterranean versus cross-Channel strategy, 

no agreement on what to do beyond Sicily, no agreement even that knocking Italy 

out of the war was the immediate objective of Anglo-American strategymerely hope that the limited insular operations might, in conjunction with air 

bombardment, force Italy from the war. 

Even the expression of this hope reflected 

a difference that was later to emerge as 

a head-on clash. In the session of 18 

January, General Marshall remarked 

"that he was most anxious not to become 

committed to interminable operations in 

the Mediterranean." He wished northern France to be the scene of the main 

effort against Germany. Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, chief of the British Air Staff, replied that "it was impossible to say exactly where we should 

stop in the Mediterranean since we hoped 

to knock Italy out altogether." 21\ 

Toward the end of the Casablanca 

Conference President Roosevelt, in a 

seemingly offhand manner, announced to 

the press the unconditional surrender 

formula to be imposed upon Germany, 

Italy, and Japan. The phrase was not 

made on the spur of the moment, for Mr. 

Roosevelt had discussed the matter with 

his Joint Chiefs on 7 January. He had 

told them of his intention to speak with 

Mr. Churchill on the advisability of informing Marshal Joseph Stalin (who had 

declined two invitations to confer with 

the American and British leaders) that 

the United Nations would prosecute the 

2S Min, 60th Mtg CCS. 18 Jan 43. 
12 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

war until they reached Berlin and that 

their only tenus would be unconditional surrender. Mr. Roosevelt's original 

thought was to assure the Soviet Government that the Anglo-American allies 

would make no separate peace in the 

west. Sometime before 20 January, he 

had proposed to Churchill that they make 

a public announcement. At Casablanca 

some thought was given to excluding Italy 

in the hope that the omission would encourage Italian collapse. When the Prime 

Minister on 20 January wired a report 

of the conference to the War Cabinet in 

London, he asked its views on an official 

statement. The Cabinet discussed the 

matter and expressed a desire for even 

greater rigor. In view of the misgivings 

that might arise in Turkey and the Balkans if Italy were excepted, the Cabinet 

recommended that unconditional surrender be applied to all three chief enemy 

powers alike. Although Churchill personally had no reservations on the unconditional surrender formula or on application of it to Italy, he was nevertheless 

surprised at the President's public announcement; but, recovering quickly, he 

indicated his full support.29 

TRIDENT: Beyond Sicily 

The CCS at Casablanca were hopeful 

that an amphibious invasion of Sicily 

and a subsequent ground campaign on 

that island, together with intensified air 

bombardment of the Italian mainland, 

would produce Italian collapse. But 

29 Min of Mtg at White House, 7 Jan 43, 

OPD Exec [0, item 45; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition War/are, 1943-1944, pp. 37-

38; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 696-

97; Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 684-88. 

after the conference, as planners in Washington, London, and Algiers began to 

consider the Sicilian decision, the question arose not only how to use the Allied 

forces in the Mediterranean if the Sicilian 

Campaign did indeed precipitate Italian 

collapse, but also what to do if it did not. 

An Italian collapse would leave Germany facing three alternatives, all of them 

favorable to the Allies: ( I) occupation 

of Italy, Sicily, and perhaps Sardinia; 

(2) withdrawal from Italy but reinforcement of the Balkans; and (3) occupation 

of both Italy and the Balkans. The Allies regarded the latter as the most improbable of the three alternatives, for 

they felt that Germany did not have the 

resources to undertake so large an enterprise while at the same time trying to 

stabilize the Russian front. 

If the invasion of Sicily did not lead to 

Italian collapse, the Allies could move 

into three areas, each with disadvantages 

as well as benefits. The invasion of the 

Continent through southern France could 

be undertaken with profit only in conjunction with an assault from the United 

Kingdom; immediate preparatory steps 

would be the conquest of Sardinia, Corsica, and possibly of the Italian Riviera 

for air bases. An invasion of the Italian 

mainland would bring the difficult problem of maintaining internal security and 

perhaps even of establishing civil administration throughout the country; nor was 

a crossing of the Alps enticing. Entrance 

into the Balkans would threaten Rumanian oil, perhaps induce Turkey to enter the 

war on the Allied side, and possibly force 

the Germans to abandon Greece and the 

Aegean Islands; but several subsidiary 

operations were necessary first-the capture of Crete and occupation of the toe 

and heel of Italy to insure control of the 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 13 

ALLIED LEADERS IN THE S ICILIAN CAMPAIG:"J . General Eiseni,ower meets in N orth Africa u)ith 

(foreground, left to right): Air Chief Ma rshal Sir Arthur Tedder, GeneraL Sir Harold R . L. G. Alexander, AdmiraL Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, and (top row): Mr. H arold Macmillan, Maj. Gen. Walter 

Bedell Smith, and unidentified British officers. 

Strait of Messina and to open up the 

Adriatic. 30 

Top Allied commanders in the Mediterranean were in general agreement except Air Chief Marshal Tedder, who felt 

that the planners had not properly evaluated the benefits to be realized from an 

invasion of the Italian mainland. North 

Italy in particular was attractive, he 

30 See AFHQ JPS P/ 55, Action in the Medbelieved, for the air bases that would 

permit intensification of the air offensive. 

Italy, Tedder declared on 26 March 1943, 

was "the backdoor of Germany's vitals," 

and he called for a fuller examination of 

this target area.

31 

Embarked on an examination of what 

might be required if Italy did not collapse 

during or after the Sicilian Campaign, 

iterra nea n in the Event of the Collapse of Italy, 31 Comment appended to document cited 

7 Mar 43, job lOA, reel 13C. above, n. 30. 
14 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

AFHQ planners continued to feel that 

the Allies ought to seize Sardinia and 

Corsica. Conquest of all three islands 

"and the subsequent bombing offensive 

against Italy which can be conducted 

from bases in these islands" might be 

sufficient to drive Italy out of the war. 

If not, air action from these islands could 

cover amphibious operations launched 

either through Genoa into the Lombard 

plain or into the Rome-Naples area. Invading Italy directly from Sicily, without 

the prior conquest of Sardinia and Corsica, as a means of forcing Italian collapse 

was a possibility not even considered. 32 

Though General Eisenhower agreed 

with his planners and though he kept 

open the possibility of moving into the 

Balkans, he was convinced that the best 

strategy for the Allies was a cross-Channel 

blow~a main assault against Germany 

from England and through northern 

France. Yet even as he asked General Marshall for his views on the best 

courses of action in various assumed situations~that Sicily would prove difficult 

to conquer; that the Sicilian operation 

would proceed according to plan and 

without great difficulties; and that the 

Sicilian defenses would collapse suddenly 

~Eisenhower outlined his own ideas on 

possible Mediterranean operations. Seeing Sardinia and Corsica as immediate 

objectives after Sicily, he indicated that 

General Henri Philippe Giraud, commander of the Free French forces in 

North Africa, had specifically requested 

permission to take Corsica, a request Eisenhower favored granting. More important, the long-range implication of 

taking the major Tyrrhenian islands, 

32 AFHQ JPS P/7o (First Draft), Action 

Against Italy After Operation HUSKY, 2 [ Apr 

43, job IOC, ree! [38E. 

Eisenhower thought, was the need to invade the Italian mainland immediately 

thereafter, particularly since the Italian 

west coast seemed very weakly defended. 

The major objection to an Italian campaign appeared to be the great material 

investment required, not only to support 

the troops but to nourish the Italian 

population. The main advantage to be 

gained was the basing of bombers within better range of such critical targets 

as the Ploesti oil fields. Or, Eisenhower 

suggested, the attack on the southern 

shore of Europe could be shifted eastward in the Mediterranean, an attractive 

course in view of Turkey's neutrality, 

but disadvantageous because of the 

lengthening of Allied sea communications. 

Yet in the final analysis, if Mediterranean 

operations interfered with the build-up 

required for the cross-Channel attack, 

Eisenhower favored calling a halt to further offensive warfare in the Mediterranean. 33 

To AFHQ planners, a campaign on the 

Italian mainland seemed heavily weighted 

on the side of disadvantage. If Italy 

remained in the war or if Germany 

strongly reinforced the Italian peninsula, 

the Allies might find themselves committed to a major campaign necessitating 

heavy garrison requirements, heavy shipping and economic commitments, and 

heavy military forces--even though the 

campaign were limited to the toe and 

heel areas. Since the AFHQ planners 

were unable to gauge in advance the 

state of Italian morale at the end of the 

Sicilian Campaign, they preferred the 

insular operations, particularly because 

only comparatively limited forces would 

be needed. This would give the Allies full 

:!:! Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, [9 Apr 43, 

Diary Office CinC, bk. V, pp. A-332-A-333. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 15 

liberty of action to strike, at the conclusion of HUSKY, in whatever direction 

seemed advisable at that time. 34 

Tedder continued to disagree. The 

difficulties of a Sardinian operation, he 

said, were consistently being glossed over 

and the air advantages of Sardinia grossly 

exaggerated. He insisted that he perceived a great benefit to be obtained from 

e~tablishing air bases in central Italv for 

bombing targets in Germany.35 

Though Brig. Gen. Lowell S. Rooks, 

the AFHQ G-3, presented on 8 Mayan 

outline plan for an invasion of Sardinia 

and proposed that the operation be entrusted to the Fifth U.S. Army, now 

commanded by General Clark and engaged in occupation and training duties 

in French Morocco, Eisenhower refrained 

from issuing a directive. 36 He awaited 

guidance from the CCS, but until the 

British and Americans came closer in their 

strategic thinking, the CCS could give no 

advice or instruction. 

British planners in London believed 

that upon the collapse of Italy Germany 

would withdraw its military forces at 

least as far to the north as the PisaRavenna line to cover the Po valley, thus 

permitting the Allies to land directly in 

southern and central Italy without great 

difficulty. They also envisaged the pos34 AFHQ JPS P/74 (Final), Availability of 

Forces in the Mediterranean, 3 May 43, job 

lOA, reel 18C; Memo for AFHQ CofS, sub: 

Opns After HUSKY, Incl A to CCS 223, 14 May 

43, TRIDENT Conf Book, pp, 38-42. 

35 Ltr, Tedder to Eisenhower, 8 May 43, Incl 

B to CCS 223, TRIDENT Conf Book, p. 43. 

3f) Memo, AFHQ G-3 for AFHQ CofS, sub: 

Plan, for Opn BRIMSTONE, 7 May 43, Incl A to 

CCS 223, 14 May 43, TRIDENT Conf Book, pp. 

3fl-42; AFHQ JPS P /69, OJtline Plan for Operation BRIMSTONE, 8 May 43, job lOA, reel 18C; 

draft directive to CG Fifth U.S. Army, 8 May 

43, job IOC, reel 138E. 

sibility of offensive action in the Balkans. 

They therefore recommended a series of 

expeditions to exploit Italian collapse-· 

not against determined German resistance, 

but rather to follow the expected German 

withdrawal everywhere in the Mediterranean. After these advances and occupations, the Allies could then face the 

problem of choosing the route for the 

decisive strike against the enemy heartland. 

The British were not thinking of deploying great armies on the Continent, 

where the decisive strike would be made. 

They were thinking rather of the largescale employment of air power, of cutting 

the German lines of economic supply, of 

drawing in new allies such as Turkey, of 

aiding patriot forces in Yugoslavia, of 

stimulating political revolt in Hungary. 

As a consequence, logistical problems were 

no more important than other factors of 

politico-strategic planning. Furthermore, 

the British had no liking for far-reaching 

plans. They wished instead to retain a 

freedom of choice and the ability to adjust to new opportunities as they arose. 37 

The effect of this thinking on a crossChannel attack was to reduce it to a 

moderate-scale operation, one of many 

which might be executed if the situation 

appeared favorable. If, for example, the 

Allies decided to invade southern France, 

then a limited cross-Channel operation 

might have value as a holding attack to 

divert German ground and air forces 

from the main invasion area. 

Specifically, the big prize for the British 

was eliminating Italy from the war. They 

therefore excluded immediate operations 

against the Dodecanese "since the capture 

37 Br JP (43) 99 (Final), 3 May 43, Report 

by the Joint Planning Staff, Mediterranean 

Strategy-If Italy Collapses, job lOA, reel 21C. 
16 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

of these islands would have no immediate 

effect on the collapse of Italy." 38 

If Italy did not fall after Sicily, was Sardinia and Corsica or the Italian mainland 

the better invasion target in order to produce Italian surrender? If Italy did not 

sue for peace during the Sicilian Campaign, the British planners recommended 

invading the toe of Italy (Operation BUTTRESS) as soon as possible after Sicily. 

Whereas AFHQ planners tended to think 

of the insular operations as necessary 

preliminaries to the Italian mainland, the 

British considered the problem as a choice 

between the islands and the mainland. 

Both invasion targets imposed difficulties. An amphibious operation against 

a defended shore would not be easy, 

particularly because of shortages of landing craft. Escort carriers would be 

needed to provide air cover for the landings, and these could be had only at the 

expense of requirements in the Atlantic. 

Considerable quantities of shipping 

would also be necessary. But, as the 

British put it, "In the long run, the War 

in Europe would thus be shortened and 

the switch over of our European resources to the War against Japan would 

be brought correspondingly closer." 39 

In the sprin/? of 1943, while considering the choice of immediate targets after 

Sicily, the British planners preferred the 

Italian mainland over Sardinia and Corsica. Operations on the mainland, they 

helieved, would more likely lead to Italian 

collapse that year and would open a land 

front capable of attracting and containing more Axis forces. Capture of Sardinia 

and Corsica, on the other hand, would 

increase the weight of Allied aerial pres-

:IS Br JP (43) 174, 3 May 43, Operations 

Against Italy, job lOA, reel 21 C. 

39 Ibid. 

sure on Italy, but not until the spring of 

1944. The British, therefore, favored an 

operation (BUTTRES s) against the toe of 

Italy before completion of the Sicilian 

Campaign or as soon thereafter as possible, with the initial objective to capture 

Reggio di Calabria across the Strait of 

Messina and to open a land front on the 

European continent. The campaign on 

the I talian mainland was to develop 

toward Crotone in the Italian instep 

(GOBLET) and toward the heel (MusKET) with Bari and Naples as eventual 

objectives. If opposition seemed strong 

enough to deny the Allies the heel, Sardinia could be an alternative target. 40 

Although considerable long-range politico-strategic speculation took place in· 

London in the spring of 1943, the focus 

was on immediate and short-range possibilities. The next Allied task, according to the British view, was to force Italy 

out of the war, and the best way to assure this was by invading the mainland 

as soon as possible and at the nearest 

point. No grand design for winning the 

war by the Mediterranean route was 

even implied. British long-range plano 

ning faded out at the Alps or on the 

fringes of the Balkan peninsula. 41 

40 Ibid. 

4l See Notes on Visit to United Kingdom, 

Operations in 1943, dated 24 April 1943, job 

lOA, reel 18C, a record left by a high-ranking 

but otherwise unidentified officer at AFHQ on 

concepts being formulated in London. 

In the spring of 1944, Mr. Churchill frankly 

told Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer "that if 

we had been able to persuade the Chiefs of 

Staff, the Allies would have gone through Turkey and the Balkans from the South and into 

Norway on the North, thus surrounding the 

enemy and further dispersing his forces." Ltr, 

Wedemeyer to Handy, 13 Apr 44, OPD Exec 

1, item 18. See also Churchill's instructions to 

General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, 17 Apr 43, in 

Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 951-52. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 17 

In contrast, the Americans felt that the 

single route by which a great Allied army 

might penetrate the shore defenses of the 

Continent and break through to the vital 

area of German power was by way of 

northern France, and this General Marshall emphasized when he replied to General Eisenhower's request of 19 April for 

his views. Yet General Marshall admitted that plans to seize Sardinia or Corsica or both had to be available for immediate implementation if the Sicilian 

Campaign went according to plan or if 

the Italians suddenly collapsed. An allout invasion of Italy, Marshall believed, 

would have such an effect on shipping 

as virtually to put a stop to serious offensive operations elsewhere in the world. 

"The decisive effort," Marshall was 

sure, "must be made against the Continent from the United Kingdom sooner or 

later." 42 

American planners in '''' ashington were 

searching for a grand design by which 

to reach the heartland of Europe. Visualizing large-scale armies re-entering the 

Continent to engage the Axis armies in 

decisive battle, they wanted a basic overall plan to which could be fitted such 

matters as war production, the raising of 

forces, and the movement of those forces 

to the theaters of war. Hence they regarded approaches to the Continent in 

terms of where these approaches would 

lead. They were concerned about the 

stretch of road beyond the point where 

British thinking stopped. Having gained 

a beachhead on the Continent, could the 

Allies develop it into a base capable of 

supporting a feasible and effective drive 

into Germany? 

4" Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, CM-OUT 

[1068, 27 Apr 43, OPD Cable File, Out, [ Jan 

43-3 0 Apr 43. 

In assessing Mediterranean possibilities 

in terms of a decisive blow to be struck 

against Germany, the American planners 

examined the Iberian Peninsula, southern 

France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Aegean Islands, and Turkey as possible entrances into the Continent. But none 

offered the possibility of a strong base 

backing a good route for a great Allied 

movement into Germany. 

To invade Europe by way of Italy and 

southern France seemed the best of the 

Mediterranean approaches, and these possibilities the American planners studied 

with care. They soon concluded that 

there seemed little point in considering 

anything beyond the initial move into 

Italy. Collapse or unconditional surrender of Italy, they recognized, would 

make it necessary for Germany to divert 

some fifteen divisions to replace Italian 

troops in occupied areas; the Italian Fleet 

would probably be lost to the Germans, 

a~ would certain industrial and agricultural products of marginal significance; 

and the Allies would gain an area from 

which to conduct air operations against 

German industrial centers. But the planners calculated that these disadvantages 

to Germany would in part be offset by 

certain advantages. Germany would regain the use of rolling stock required to 

supply Italy with some twelve million 

tons of coal annually, and would probably seize a large part of the Italian railroad cars. It would save not only coal 

but also bread grains and other materials 

provided to the Italian ally. The loss 

of Italy to the Germans, therefore, 

would be a decidedly mitigated one. Although occupation of Italy after its collapse 

would give the Allies a small quantity 

of critical nonferrous metals and some 

supplemental supplies of certain agri-
18 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

cultural products, as well as enhanced 

safety of ship transport through the Mediterranean, they would be burdened with 

a heavy occupational and administrative 

force of some fifteen divisions. It would 

drain shipping resources, for an estimated 

one and a half million dead-weight tons 

of merchant shipping would be needed to 

maintain the Italian economy at a mInImum level, a requirement the Allies 

would find very difficult to meet. Political and psychological gains were speculative and incapable of precise measurement, whereas the burden of supporting 

an Italy pried loose from the Axis was a 

tangible consequence-a huge subtraction from Allied shipping and manpower 

resources. 43 

The American Chiefs wanted a definite commitment and a definite date for 

a cross-Channel attack as the main effort 

of the Allies in Europe. 44 While rejecting the Mediterranean as unsuitable for 

a main effort, the American Chiefs did 

not rule out limited operations in this 

area. A blow against the Dodecanese, 

they admitted, would be most suitable 

for bringing Turkey into the war as an 

ally. Occupation of the toe and heel of 

Italy, they estimated, would be the best 

way to compel the dispersion of Axis 

forces, divert German divisions from the 

Russian front, and "best satisfy a situation whereby a limited scale operation 

might force Italy out of the war." But 

4:) jCS 288/1, 8 May 43, sub: Invasion of 

the European Continent From Bases in the Mediterranean in 1943-44. 

44 Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition 

Warfare, 1943-1944, pp. 120-25. See also Ernest j. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet 

Admiral King, A Naual Record (New York: W. 

W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), p. 435; 

William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: 

Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 157. 

because operations against Sardinia and 

Corsica would be limited in size and 

scope, the U.S. Chiefs judged such a 

course as the least objectionable-in 

general, the most acceptable alternative 

if political pressure impelled the Allies to 

take some action between the completion 

of the Sicilian Campaign and the inception of the cross-Channel endeavor. In 

any case, a choice among the three possible acceptable limited operations, the 

U.S. Chiefs felt, ought to be postponed 

as long as possible in order to better assess 

the motives impelling additional operations 

in the Mediterranean. 4

" 

Thus, on the question of what to do 

after Sicily, a gap still existed between 

American and British views. The British wanted to put all resources available 

in I 943 into the Mediterranean and to 

force Italy out of the war by invading 

Calabria, the toe of the Italian mainland, 

at its nearest point to Sicily, and eventuallv to secure the airfields of central 

Italy and those in the north. But they 

did not foresee the movement of large 

Allied armies from the Mediterranean into the heartland of the Continent to meet 

the Germans directly. The Americans 

wished precisely what British planning 

avoided-a grand scale re-entry into the 

Continent, which meant a main effort 

across the Channel and through northern 

France. They did not wish to win the 

fight on points, they wanted a knockout. 

Opposed to the occupation of Italy because Italy was not a vital area and because an Italian invasion would involve 

a huge shipping commitment, the AmerIcans envisaged Mediterranean opera-

." jCS 293, 7 May 43. sub: Limited Opns in 

the Mediterranean, and jCS 305, 12 May 43, 

sub: Strategic Analysis of the Seizure and Occupation of the Toe of Italy. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 19 

tions beyond Sicily as involving limited 

objectives and sustained by limited resources. Seizing Sardinia and Corsica, 

perhaps even the heel of Italy, might be 

sound, but a landing on the toe of Italy 

seemed unwise. 

As for the unconditional surrender 

formula, which was to have an indirect 

effect on the combat not only in Sicily 

but beyond, President Roosevelt had reiterated in February the remark he had 

first made at Casablanca the previous 

month. In March, when British Foreign 

Secretary Anthony Eden came to \Vashington to discuss political matters, the 

phrase again came under consideration. 

President Roosevelt once more declared 

that "he wanted no negotiated armistice 

after the collapse." The Allies, he said, 

"should insist on total surrender with no 

commitments to the enemy as to what 

we would do or what we would not do 

after this action." 46 

Soon after Eden's departure the State 

Department submitted several memorandums to the White House dealing not 

only with the treatment of Italy but also 

with the Allied military government to be 

established there. Unconditional surrender was the implicit assumption in all the 

State Department's papers. Thus, the 

department recommended the removal 

of "the entire fascist party leadership 

from local party secretaries to the top." 

Yet the department recommended that 

local technical and professional officials 

be retained in the lower ranks, responsible to the military administration. 

President Roosevelt was dissatisfied. 

With the advice of Harry Hopkins he 

." Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 715, 

792-93; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell 

Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), yol. II, p. 

1571. 

revi~ed this to read: "On the basis of 

unconditional surrender, the entire fascist party membership from the highest 

to the lowest should be removed from any 

post of government authority." Although 

the State Department suggested "some 

special treatment" of the power of Crown, 

the President simply deleted the statement. 47 Not only was Roosevelt preparing to demand unconditional surrender, 

he was also ready to assume the responsibility, through military government, for 

the domestic regeneration of the country. 

All these matters came under examination at the next formal meetings of the 

CCS, held at Washington between 12 and 

25 May 1943 and called the TRIDENT 

Conference-where "the movements of 

the land, sea, and air forces of the American and British Allies combined. . . 

[were] translated into firm commitments." 48 

Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs 

of Staff sailed on the Queen Mary on 4 

May for the United States. During the 

voyage the British leaders worked out 

their final paper proposing the seizure of 

a beachhead on the toe of Italy, followed 

by an assault in the heel, and finally an 

advance up the Italian boot. Soon after 

the Prime Minister and his party of about 

one hundred persons reached \Vashington by special train from New York, the 

British delegation delivered the paper to 

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as the basis 

for discussion. 49 

As Churchill stepped off the train in 

the U.S. capital, he was in fine fettle. 

47 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 721-

24· 

48 Quote from Biennial Report of the Chief 

of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 

to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War (Washington, 1945), p. 10. 

49 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 785. 
20 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

CHURCHILL addressing the Congress oj the United States, May 1943. 

He was big and magnificent, Washington 

loved him, and the whole nation admired 

his courage. Invited to speak before the 

Congress, he made an impression there 

that no foreigner since Lafayette had 

equaled. His straightforward, simple 

words, his great speaking voice, came at 

a time for rejoicing, for his visit coincided 

with the final Allied victory in Tunisia. 

There was much to cheer about, and there 

was no one who could better lead the 

cheering. 

It was one thing for Churchill to speak 

to the public in generalities. It was 

another matter for him to match his per-

;;uaSlve powers and oratorical talents 

against the careful calculations of the 

American Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the 

plenary opening session of TRIDENT, held 

in the White House on the afternoon of 

12 May, the Prime Minister sketched out 

the British view for the full employment 

of all Allied resources in the Mediterranean in 1943 and the relegation of a 

cross-Channel attack to the indefinite 

future. Admitting the need to find employment for the large Allied forces in 

the Mediterranean theater, President 

Roosevelt drew back from the idea of 

putting large military forces into Italy. 

Mr. Churchill expressed a lack of enthusiasm for Roosevelt's proposal for recon-
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 21 

stituting Italy, stating that he did not 

feel an occupation of the countrv would 

be necessary. If the Italians collapsed, 

the United Nations could occupy the 

necessary ports and air bases from which 

to conduct operations against the Balkans 

and southern Europe, but they could let 

an Italian government control the country, subject to United Nations supervision."o 

When the Combined Chiefs met to 

work out a program in detail, the Americans suggested that winning the war 

against Japan and the European Axis 

were aspects of a single problem. The 

Americans still favored the basic goal of 

defeating Germany first, but to them 

that meant a determined attack against 

Germany on the Continent at the earliest 

possible date. A strategy of nibbling at 

the periphery of German power, the 

Americans implied, was equivalent to repudiating the idea of first defeating Germany. And in that event, though they 

did not state it, the inference was clearthe Americans would consider seriously 

concentrating the greater part of their 

resources against Japan. fi1 

The American position clearly set the 

limits to the discussions at TRIDENT. If 

the British had had any thought of candidly proposmg to discard the crossChannel concept in favor of a Mediterranean strategy, they abandoned the notion at the outset. The official discussions accepted in principle the American 

frame of reference-all proposed opera-

.• 0 Min, [st White House CCS Mtg, [2 May 

43, TRIDENT Conf Book, pp. 253-6 [; Leasor. 

The Clock With Four Hands, pp. 2:19-4[; Bryant. Turn of the Tide, p. 503. 

51 Annex A, Global Strategy of the War: 

Views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, appended to 

Min. 83d Mtg CCS, [3 May 43. 

tions were to be weighed in terms of a 

cross-Channel attack. 

The British nevertheless insisted that 

the main Allied task in 1943 was the 

elimination of Italy from the war. The 

continuance of Mediterranean operations 

and the intensification of the Allied bomber offensive, the British felt, were the 

only methods of giving effective aid to the 

Russians that year."~ \Vhen General 

Marshall suggested that air power could 

hasten the collapse of Italy, General 

Brooke voiced doubt that air bombardment alone would be enough. Admirals 

King and Leahy cautioned against diverting to, or maintaining in, the Mediterranean forces that could be used in a 

cross-Channel operation. Suspicious that 

the British were not really converted to 

the cross-Channel idea, the :\mericans 

stated that U.S. ground and naval forces 

in the Mediterranean would not be used 

east of Sicily."a The British protested 

that a premature attempt to land in 

France would court disaster. The Americans continued to argue that further 

ground operations in the Mediterranean 

would delay the invasion of northwest 

Europe and prolong the war. Reassured by British declarations accepting 

the cross-Channel concept, the Americans 

agreed to consider Mediterranean operations beyond Sicily as preliminary steps 

for re-entry into northern France.'" 

By the end of the first week the issue 

was clear: would Mediterranean operations facilitate and expedite the main at-

"" Memo by Br COS, Conduct of the War in 

[943, [2 May 43, TRIDENT Conf Book. pp. 336-

41. 

5" CCS 2[9, Memo by U.S. CofS, [4 May 43, 

sub: Conduct of the War in [943-44. 

54 Min. 84th and 85th CCS Mtgs, [4 and [5 

May 43. 
22 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tack based on the United Kingdom? "" 

As the CCS debated the question during 

the second week of the conference, the 

~\mericans proposed halting ground force 

operations at the Messina Strait, the Briti~h persisted in their desire to eliminate 

Italy as a requisite preliminary for the 

mam attack into northern France. 

\Vhere the discussion concerned a course 

of action for the immediate future, the 

British made some telling arguments and 

presented their case skillfully. The 

Americans couched their views chiefly in 

negative terms, but held out for a crossChannel attack in April 1944."H The 

British pointed out the loss of deception 

that would result from discontinuing operations in the Mediterranean and concentrating forces in the United Kingdom; 

the threat that could be created against 

southern France; and other benefits implicit in their concept. Eliminating Italy 

from the war might even make the difference, they claimed, between success 

and failure in the invasion of northwest 

Europe in 1944. The British believed 

that continued operations in the Mediterranean need not detract from the 

build-up in the United Kingdom.'" 

By 18 May the Americans were coming around to the modified British position. General Brooke emphasized the 

low cost of the Mediterranean strategy, 

55 AFHQ's views as embodied in a memorandum, 7 May 1943, to which Tedder had added 

his dissent, were circulated for the information of 

the CCS. This paper advocated Sardinia and 

Corsica as the next objectives; Tedder recommended the Italian mainland. CCS 227, 16 May 

43· 

51l CCS 235, 18 May 43, Defeat of the Axis 

Powers in Europe: Defeat of Germany From 

the U.K. 

57 CCS 234, 17 May 43, Defeat of the Axis 

Powers in Europe: British Plan for the Defeat 

of the Axis Powers in Europe. 

a loss of only three and one-half or four 

divisions from the build-up of forces in 

the United Kingdom. General Marshall 

still had doubts, for he feared that Mediterranean operations might exceed in 

magnitude those now visualized because 

a drive in Italy might generate its own 

momentum and draw in increasing numbers of troops.:iR Finally, the American 

Chiefs accepted the elimination of Italy 

as a prerequisite for a cross-Channel attack, although they insisted on holding 

Mediterranean operations to a role subordinate to re-entry into northern France 

in the spring of 1944. The date originally proposed for the cross-Channel attack was I April 1944, the conclusion of 

the fourth phase of the Allied bomber 

offensive against Germany and the earliest 

practicable date from the point of view 

of weather. But when General Brooke 

noted that I Mayor I June would coincide more nearly with the spring thaw 

and the opening of operations on the Russian front, the CCS readily accepted a 

postponement. ;;9 

Final agreement came on 19 Ma\,. 

The CCS decided to launch the crossChannel attack on I May 1944 and to 

eliminate Italy from the war immediately. 

For the latter purpose, General Eisenhower could use only those forces already 

in the Mediterranean, less seven divisions 

to be withdrawn on I November 1943 and 

transferred to the United Kingdom. Ho 

The Mediterranean strategic plan transmitted by the CCS to General Eisenhower 

directed the Allied commander "to plan 

such operations in exploitation of HUSKY 

[the invasion of Sicily] as are best cal-

,,8 Min, 87th Mtg CCS, 18 May 43; see also 

Bryant. Turn of the Tide, pp. 507-08. 

5" Min, 88th Mtg CCS, 19 May 43. 

[,0 Min, 89th Mtg CCS, 19 May 43. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 23 

culated to eliminate Italy from the war Brooke and General Sir Hastings L. 

and to contain the maximum number of 

German forces." Which of the various 

possible plans beyond Sicily would be 

adopted and exactly how far along the 

southern approaches the Allies would go 

were matters that the CCS reserved for 

future determination. 61 

TRIDENT, as it turned out, was only 

one stage in the protracted Anglo-American struggle to reach agreement on a 

lVfediterranean versus a cross-Channel 

strategy. 

Algiers-And Italy? 

Keenly disappointed because the TRIDENT Conference did not commit the 

Allies to an invasion of the Italian mainland and still confident that an attack on 

Italy, if properly pushed, might be decisive enough to make unnecessary General Marshall's direct attack on Germany, 

Churchill decided to press his case in 

another quarter. Since General Eisenhower now had the responsibility of formulating specific plans designed to knock 

out Italy, Churchill determined to fly to 

Algiers, there to attempt to influence the 

planning in favor of the Italian mainland 

instead of Sardinia and Corsica. He 

made no secret to Mr. Roosevelt of his 

hopes and intentions. Lest he appear to 

exert undue influence on the Allied field 

commander, Churchill requested that 

General Marshall accompany him. General Marshall did so, along with General 

"1 CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, Final Report to 

the President and Prime Minister, and Memo by 

CCS, Opns in Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy 

From the War, both in TRIDENT Conf Book, p. 

174; see also Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 

5 12- 16. 

Ismay.tl2 

Churchill had wanted for some weeks 

to consult with General Eisenhower. He 

apparently hoped that a powerful blow 

against Italy might start in the unstable 

~editerranean-Balkan region a kind of 

chain reaction, the ultimate results of 

which, together with Russian pressure, 

might render Germany incapable of continuing the war. General Brooke, and 

apparently Churchill too, subscribed to 

the belief that only the armies of Soviet 

Russia could yield decisive results in continental warfare; an Anglo-American 

force would be, in comparison, only a 

drop in the bucket. Brooke therefore 

urged that ~\llied strategy be directed 

toward diverting German strength from 

the Russian front so as to enable the 

Soviets to inflict a decisive defeat on the 

Germans. Naval blockade and aerial 

bombardment, in Brooke's opinion, were 

the prime Allied weapons. Tremendom 

losses sustained in a ground campaign, 

he maintained, would be useless, and a 

land front in Italy was about the size he 

thought appropriate for the Allies. 63 

The formal meetings of what became 

known as the Algiers Conference opened 

on 29 May 1943 in General Eisenhower's 

villa as ten British officers, including 

Brooke, ,\lexander, Cunningham, and 

62 Min, 6th White House Mtg CCS, item 6, 25 

May 43, TRIDENT Conf Book, p. 310; Churchill, 

Hinge of Fate, pp. 810-11; Bryant, Turn of the 

Tide, p. 516. 

na Min of Mtg at Eisenhower's Villa, 29 May 

43, TRIDENT Conf Book, p. 469; Sherwood, 

Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 727; Leahy, I Was 

There, pp. 156-57; Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 

782-83, 939; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 494-

95, 520-21; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 

167-68; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition 

Warfare, 1943-1944, pp. 152-53. 
24 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Tedder, and four American officers, Marshall, Eisenhower, Smith, and Rooks, met 

with Mr. Churchill. General Marshall 

came right to the point. When, he 

asked, should Eisenhower submit his plan 

for eliminating Italy from the war? He 

suggested that Eisenhower set up two 

headquarters in different places, each 

with its own staff, one to prepare operations against Sardinia and Corsica, the 

other operations against the mainland. 

:\s soon as the situation in Sicily became 

clearer, the choice could be made and 

the appropriate air and naval elements 

shifted to the force charged with executing the plan. 

Mr. Churchill expressed the thought 

that the Sicilian Campaign-now less 

than six weeks away--might proceed too 

rapidly, thereby causing an embarrassing 

interlude of Allied inactlVlty. Eisenhower quickly replied that he would be 

willing to go straight into Italy if Sicily 

fell easily. But beyond that, the same 

factors of uncertainty that had precluded a firm choice of plan at TRIDENTthe strength of Italian resistance and 

German intentions--still obtained at AlgIers. All agreed that it would be unWIse to attack the Italian mainland 

against strong resistance. After considerable discussion on the opposition to be 

met in Sicily, including Churchill's guess 

that the campaign would end by 15 

August, Eisenhower summarized three 

possibilities: (I) if the enemy collapsed 

quickly in Sicily, immediate operations 

should be undertaken against the Italian 

mainland; (2) if the enemy offered prolonged resistance on Sicily, no Allied 

resources would be available for immediate post-Sicily operations; (3) if resistance was stubborn but could be overcome 

by the middle of August, no decision 

could be made in advance. The best 

idea, Eisenhower said, was for him to 

designate two separate headquarters to 

plan for the alternative courses of action. 64 

This was the extent of the decision 

reached at Algiers, even though Churchill began to talk of Rome as the most 

productive Allied objective in the theater. 

"The capture of Rome, with or without 

the elimination of Italy from the war," 

he concluded, "would be a very great 

achievement for our Mediterranean 

forces." 6" 

Not only the ancient capital but the 

prospect of sweet revenge on M ussolini, 

once greatly admired by Churchill but 

now the object of his distaste, fascinated 

the Prime Minister. Control of the 

Adriatic ports would also make it possible to supply the patriot bands in the 

Balkans, particularly in Yugoslavia, and 

to foment revolt in Greece and Albania. 

And Turkey-this time surely the conditions would be ripe for Turkey's entrance 

into the war.66 

One other matter came under discussion at Algiers: the bombing of Rome. 

Because daylight preci~ion bombardment 

was quite accurate, the Allies could bomb 

railroad marshaling yards with little risk 

of damaging the city and no danger of 

hitting the Vatican. A tenable objection 

no longer existed. The conferees agreed 

that the marshaling yards were an important target, and they decided to reG4 Min of Mtg at Eisenhower's Villa, 29 May 

43, TRIDENT Conf Book, pp. 469-75. 

GC,Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 822; Min of 

Mtg at Eisenhower's Villa, 31 May 43, TRIDENT 

Conf Book, pp. 478-81; ibid., 3 Jun 43, p. 502; 

see also Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 317- 1 8. 

GG Background Notes by the Prime Minister 

and Minister of Defence, 31 May 43, TRIDENT 

Conf Book, pp. 491-92. 
ALLIED STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 25 

quest permIssIOn from their respective 

governments to authorize General Eisenhower to bomb them at a time best suited 

to advance the Sicilian Campaign.fiT 

T he Surrender Problem 

And what if Italy surrendered? How 

were the Allies to accept an Italian surrender and validate it? This was as 

much a political as a military problem. 

The first set of armistice terms for use 

in Italy emerged from the planning for 

the conquest of Sicily. As early as 29 

.\pril, General Eisenhower had forwarded 

a set of terms to Washington for approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

The twenty-one clauses of this instrument 

provided in detail for full use by the .-\1-

lies of all material resources in Sicily for 

further prosecution of the war. ''''ith a 

few minor changes, the terms had been 

approved by the CCS on 10 May.fl~ 

Though surrender was to be unconditional, the terms did not deal with the 

sovereignty of the Italian state or the 

question of the continuance of the Italian 

monarchy. In formulating the paper, 

General Eisenhower had been considering a situation in Sicily where the enemy 

field commander might wish to surrender 

the whole island. 

At about the same time, the U.S. Joint 

Chiefs began to study the problem of 

Italian surrender from a broader VIewH7 Min of Mtg at Eisenhower's Villa, 3 Jun 

43. TRIDENT Conf Book, pp. 499-501; Butcher. 

My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 322-23; 

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., 

"The Army Air Forces in World War II," voL 

II, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: The 

University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 463-65. 

HS Msgs 7990, 7991, 7992, 7993 (NAF 212), 

Eisenhower to AGWAR, Salmon Files 5-B-I, 

VIrg, OCMH; CCS 205/2, 10 May 43. 

point. The Joint War Plans Committee 

(jWPC) assumed that civil war, collapse, 

or unconditional surrender might occur 

in Italy.69 Civil war was the most unlikely. But if a revolution developed, the 

Allies could establish ground and air 

forces in Italy to support the revolutioni.,ts, give economic assistance, and secure 

from the revolutionary government military bases useful in the further prosecution of the war. Collapse might arise 

from Italian military reverses, from German refusal of further military assistance, 

from destruction caused by Allied air attacks, from a loss of faith by the Italian 

people in their leadership. In this situation, the Germans would probably withdraw from Italy. The Allies might then 

occupy a defensive line in north Italy, 

establish air bases in Italy, provide garrIsons to maintain order, and give economic assistance. The Italian Government might surrender--but this was 

scarcely to be expected from Mussolini, 

who was publicly branded in the l\llied 

cam p as a war criminal. Yet the Italian 

Government might nevertheless try to 

negotiate for an armistice. 70 

To the British planners, the Italian alternatives seemed clearly collapse or surrender. In the event of collapse, a draft 

declaration of the United Nations to Italy, 

setting forth the general purposes of continuing the war against Germany from 

Italian soil, might be sufficient. In the 

event of surrender, the sovereign government of Italy would have to make a legal 

guarantee that all opposition against 

H9 The JWPC was created just shortly before 

the TRIDENT Conference. See Matloff, Strategic 

Planning for Coalition Warfare, [943-[944, pp. 

106-1 L 

70 JCS 302, I I May 43, Collapse or Unconditional Surrender of Italy. 
26 

United Nations military operations would 

cease, and that the Allies could make full 

use of Italian territory, facilities, and resources to prosecute the war against 

Germany. For this contingency, the 

British proposed a formal list of armistice 

terms totaling forty-five articles, which 

formed the basis of what later became 

known as the Long Terms.71 

The British submitted to the CCS the 

draft of their armistice terms on 16 June, 

and requested that if approved the terms 

be submitted to the Soviet Union and to 

the other governments at war with Italy. 

The U.S. Joint Chiefs referred the British 

draft to the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) 

for study, and the CAD recommended 

withholding concurrence because the British draft instrument "does not constitute 

an unconditional surrender." The CAD 

proposed that, after surrender, the Italian 

Government cease to exist, at least for the 

period of the war against the Axis—that 

it be superseded by an Allied military 

government functioning throughout Italy, 

except over the Vatican City.72 The 

U.S. Joint Chiefs accepted the recommendation (after the concurrence of the 

State and Treasury Departments) on 29 

June, and presented it, with minor modi71 CCS 258. an. II 16 Jun 43. 

72JCS 373, 23 Jun 43, Surrender Terms for 

Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation, 

Report by the Civil Affairs Division. 

The CAD was established on 1 March 1943 

to formulate and co-ordinate U.S. military policy 

concerning the administration and government of 

captured or liberated countries. The division 

served as the central office and clearinghouse 

where occupation plans (including surrender 

and related documents) were drawn up. 

fications, as a substitute for the British 

proposal. 

When the CCS on 2 July--a week before the invasion of Sicily--considered 

the problem of Italian surrender, a gap 

existed between British and American 

views, a gap so wide that no reconciliation 

of views was immediately possible. The 

CCS decided to refer both British and 

American proposals to a newly established Combined Civil Affairs Committee 

When the CCAC took up the problem 

on 10 July, the British members requested 

instructions from their capital. On this 

point the Anglo-American machinery for 

directing the war stalled. For, seventeen 

days later, though the Sicilian Campaign 

was by then well under way, the British 

representatives were still waiting to receive the views of their government.74 

A remarkably skillful and successful 

organization in formulating a military 

strategy, the CCS could not draw up an 

Anglo-American political program. Planning the Italian surrender, like the strategic planning to achieve it, had to await 

further developments and the outcome 

of the combat in Sicily. 

(CCAC) .73 

75 

73 Min, 100th CCS Mtg, 2 Jul 43, Supplementary. 

The CCAC was constituted on 3 July 1943 in 

Washington as an agency of the CCS. Its membership was made up of one representative each 

of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. State 

Department, the British Foreign Office, two representatives of the British Joint Staff Mission, 

and two additional civilians designated respectively by the U.S. and British Governments. See 

CCS 190/6/D, 3 Jul 43, Charter, Combined 

Civil Affairs Committee. The first formal CCAC 

meeting was held 15 July 1943. 

74 CCS Memo, 27 Jul 43, Supplementary 

Status of Papers. 
CHAPTER II 

The Axis on the Defensive 

The !talo-German Alliance 

Germany and Italy, bound together in 

the Pact of Steel of May 1939, had nothing even remotely resembling the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They determined 

their strategy according to a method that 

was considerably different from and much 

less cohesive than the modus operandi 

of the English-speaking Allies. The ItaloGerman alliance, termed by the treaty a 

pact between the National Socialist and 

the Fascist regimes, was essentially a personal union of the two dictators, Adolf 

Hitler and Benito Mussolini, each the 

Head of Government of his state and 

each the supreme commander of his 

armed forces. Whatever agreements were 

reached, whatever tensions developed were 

ultimately determined by the personal 

relations between the two individuals. 

Hitler directed and controlled all the 

executive departments in Germany. After he assumed command of the German 

armed forces (Wehrmacht) in 1938, the 

Armed Forces Supreme Command 

(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or 

OK W) emerged as the over-all organ of 

command. Under OKW each military 

service had its own commander and 

staff-Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz heading the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 

(OKM) after early 1943, Reichsmarschall 

Hermann Goering controlling the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), and 

Hitler himself at the head of the Army, 

the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH).l 

With Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm 

Keitel as chief of OKW and Generaloberst 

Alfred JodI head of the operations branch 

( Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab or WFSt), 

Hitler directed German strategy during 

the first two years of the war through 

the OKW. After Hitler relieved Feldmarschall Walter von Brauchitsch in 194 I 

and assumed personal command of the 

Army, he used the OKH to direct the 

forces fighting in Russia. He then used 

the OKW to direct the forces elsewhere-in Finland, Norway, France, the 

Balkans, and the Mediterranean. 

The geographical bifurcation in the 

chain of command, illogical while the 

Axis was on the offensive, became an 

1 MS # P-049, Die Strategie der deutschen 

obersten Fuehrung im zweiten Vierteljahr 1943, 

also known as: OKW Activities, Project #35, 

Strategy of the German Armed Forces High Command, April-June 1943 (General der Artillerie 

Walter Warlimont), pp. 49-50 (See Bibliographical Note.); War Department Technical Manual 

E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces 

(15 March 1945), pp. 1-15; The German General Staff Corps, a study produced in the German 

Military Documents Section, Alexandria, by a 

combined British, Canadian, and U.S. staff, April 

1946; General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, 

translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: 

E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952), pp. 47-63, 84-

88, 430-44, 454-65; Walter Goerlitz, History of 

the German General Staff, 1657-1945, translated 

by Brian Battershaw (New York: Fredrick A. 

Praeger, 1953), chs. X-XIV. 
28 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

HITLER AND M USSO LI NI with Italian Honor Guard in the Brenner Pass. 

acute problem when the Axis had to assume the defensive after November 1942. 

There was no over-all organ of command, 

no chief of staff who could plan total 

German strategy, who could view the 

requirements of each service and each 

theater in terms of available resources. 

Conflicting demands for resources could 

be resolved ultimately only by Hitler himself. Becoming more and more jealous 

and suspicious of the generals, he made 

it increasingly difficult for men of independent minds to serve him.

2 

2 MS #P-049 (Warlimont), pp. 50-52 ; Pogue, 

Supreme Command, pp. 175-76. 

Mussolini's powers in Italy were almost 

as great. The King, Victor Emmanuel 

III, was the head of the state, to whom 

the officers and men of the Royal Army, 

Navy, and Air Force were bound by oath. 

Mussolini, the Duce of the Fascist party, 

whose members, both civilians and uniformed militia, had sworn personal allegiance to him, was the Head of the 

Government (Capo del Governo) . With 

all the powers of that office as enumerated by the Fascist constitutional laws of 

1925-26, he had complete control of the 

executive branch of the government. 

After 1939, Mussolini served simul-
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

taneously as Minister of War, of the 

Navy, and of the Air Force. The undersecretaries of the Navy and Air Force 

were at the same time chiefs of staff of 

their respective armed forces, while the 

War Ministry had both an undersecretary 

and a chief of the Army General Staff. 

Mussolini maintained close control over 

the Italian armed forces through their 

respective ministries. 

Because the Italian constitution vested 

the power of command over the Army 

and Navy (and by implication over the 

Air Force) in the King alone, M ussolini 

in 1938 secured for himself the military 

rank of Marshal of the Empire, the same 

title as that held by the King. With 

Italy's entrance into the war in June 

1940, Mussolini gained the command 

prerogative by having the King delegate 

to him the command of all forces operating on all fronts. 3 

Like Hitler, Mussolini had served in 

a humble position in World 'Var I, was 

fascinated by military glory and display, 

had a keen, retentive mind, and had 

read much military literature. But while 

Hitler after 1942 tended increasingly to 

intrude on the lower levels of command, 

dictating the movements of even a single 

division, and eventually depriving his 

field commanders of the freedom to 

maneuver, Mussolini was not interested 

in details. Exercising his command at 

:J Carmelo Carbone, La posizione giuridica del 

comandante supremo in guerra (Rome: Ugo 

Pinnaro Edi tore, 1946) , p. 18; Quirino Armellini, Diario di guerra: Nove mesi al Comando 

Supremo (Cernusco sui Naviglio: Garzanti, 

[946), pp. [-2, 5, 9, [2; The Ciano Diaries, 

1939-1943, edited by Hugh Gibson, with an introduction by Sumner Welles (Garden City, N.Y.: 

Doubleday and Company, 1946), pp. 250, 256, 

261; Emilio Faldella, L'Italia nella sewnda 

guerra mondiale (Rocca San Casciano (Forli): 

Cappelli, [959), p. 123. 

29 

the strategic level only, Mussolini was 

amenable to argument and he operated 

with the advice of and through his professional officer corps. 4 

Before 194 I the Armed Forces General 

Staff (Stato Maggiore Generale) , known 

as the Comando Supremo, had only seven 

members, exercised no command, had 

no direct dealings with other staffs, and 

served primarily as an advisory body for 

Mussolini as Head of Government. Each 

military service had its own staff, the 

Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito or Superesercito for the Army; the Stato M aggiore Regia Marina or Supermarina for 

the Navy; and the Stato Maggiore Regia 

Aeronautica or Superaereo for the Air 

Force." After 1941, when Mussolini 

ousted Maresciallo d'Italia Pietro Badoglio as chief of Comando Supremo and 

appointed Generale d'Armata Ugo Cavallero his successor, the Comando Supremo 

went through a radical reorganization. 

The staff developed intelligence and operation sections, the service chiefs of 

staff became directly subordinate to the 

chief of Comando Supremo, and that 

body grew into a huge organization that 

acted not only as Mussolini's command 

organ but also as the group that cooperated with the OKW. Through its 

operations section, the Comando Supremo 

controlled the operational theaters: 

North Africa, Russia, Greece, and the 

Balkans; Superesercito, the Army Gen4 Mario Roatta, Otto milioni di baionette: 

L' esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944 

(Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Edi tore, [946), pp. 

21-30; Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln: Aus 

den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn: AthenaeumVerlag, [950), pp. 210-[[. 

5 See Howard McGaw Smyth, "The Command 

of the Italian Armed Forces in World War II," 

Military Affairs, XV, No. [ (Spring, [95 1), 39-43. 
30 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

KING VICTOR EMMANUEL III 

eral Staff, retained the direction of the 

ground troops in Italy and in occupied 

France and of the antiaircraft defenses 

within Italy.6 

On matters of interest to both powers, 

Italy and Germany depended on the 

older and more traditional methods of 

co-operation between states allied in war: 

ministerial correspondence, military attache reports, periodic conferences between Hitler and Mussolini (who were 

6 Cavallero was promoted to Maresciallo d'Italia on [ July [942. See Ugo Caval1ero, Comando Supremo: Diario 1940-43 del Capo di S.M.C. 

(Bologna: Cappelli, 1948), pp. 10[-03; Roatta, 

Otto milioni, pp. [4[-42; U.S. Mil Attache Rpt 

17965, Rome, [0 Jun 4[, G-2 files; Giuseppe 

Castellano, Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile 

(Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, [945), p. 

[0. 

accompanied by members of the OKW 

and of the Comando Supremo), personal 

letters (usually drafted in the appropriate offices), and liaison officers. But the 

important matters were decided by the 

dictators. 

Though Hitler had great admiration 

and friendship for Mussolini, it is more 

than doubtful that M ussolini reciprocated 

this feeling. As the war progressed and 

German predominance grew, Mussolini 

found Hitler's ascendancy galling. 7 

Nazi and Fascist party leaders for the 

most part had considerable liking for 

each other, and the Nazi Weltanschauung tended constantly to distort 

favorably the picture of Italy's military 

capabilities. Professional military elements in both nations, however, remained 

generally unaffected by the mysticalmythological exuberance of the parties, 

and the German and Italian Armies each 

retained its own traditional view of the 

other. The Germans had a rather low 

estimate of Italian capabilities. They remembered not only that Italy had abandoned, then turned against the Central 

Powers in W orId War I, but also that the 

essential function of the Italian Army since 

the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy 

had been the defense of the Alps against 

the enemy to the north. 8 

When Italy entered World War II, 

Mussolini announced that Italy would 

7 The Coebbels Diaries 1942-1943, edited, 

translated, and with an introduction by Louis P. 

Lochner (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and 

Company, [948), pp. 469, 48[; Dr. Henry Pick~r, 

Hitlers Tischgespraeche im Fuehrerhauptquartier 

1941-1942 (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, [95 [), 

pp. 4[, 76-77, 109, [20-22, 235; Mario Donosti, 

Mussolini e [,Europa: La politica estera fascista 

(Rome: Leonardo, [945), pp. 8[-82; Ciano 

Diaries, pp. 383, 402, 435, 439, 463-64, 467, 509, 

539,580. 

8 Roatta, Otto milioni, p. [I. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

fight a "parallel war" with Germany. 

Since both powers had the same enemies, 

each would fight for its own objectives 

within its own sphere. Mussolini wished 

no German forces in the Mediterranean, 

which he regarded as an Italian theater. 

Though Hitler never appreciated the 

significance of the Mediterranean, his 

respect for Italian prestige and his unwillingness to intrude there led in great measure to his neglect of opportunities for 

striking decisive blows at Britain during 

the winter of 1940-41.9 

After the Germans managed in the 

summer of [940 to restrain Mussolini 

from invading Yugoslavia, the Italian 

leader attacked Greece, a move that surprised and annoyed the Germans. Before long, Mussolini had to appeal for 

German assistance, and after receIv10g 

frantic calls for help the Germans dispatched units to the Mediterranean. io 

"Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 6; Raymond de 

Belot, Rear Admiral, French Navy (ReL) , The 

Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939-1945, translated by James A. Field, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, (951), p. 50. 

The relations of Germany and Ita ly in this 

early period are well portrayed in D ocuments 

on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, issued by 

the Dep artmen t of State, Series D , vol. X, June 

23-August 3 I. 1940 (Washington, (9 57); vol. 

XI, September I. I940-January 3 1, 1941 (Washington, (960 ); and vol. XII, February I-June 

22 , 1941 (Washington. (962 ). 

10 For the Italian plan to attack Yugoslavia see 

Documents on German Foreign Policy, vol. X , 

No. 343, pp. 481-83, with Rintelen's report of 

9 August; No. 367, pp. 512-13, Ambassador Mackensen's memorandum of 19 August; and No. 

388, pp. 538-39, Mussolini's letter to Hitler of 

24 August. For the Italian attack on Greece 

and Hitler's a ttitude see vol. XI, No. 246, pp. 

411-22, a record of the discussion between Hitler 

and Mussolini at Florence on 28 October, a nd 

No. 477 , pp. 817-23. the record of Hitler's discussion with Alfieri, the Italian Ambassador, on 

8 December. For Mussolini's calls for help see 

No. 538. pp. 911-14, and No. 541 , pp. 916-17. 

31 

GENERAL CAVALLERO 

The dominant pOSItIOn of Germany and 

the subordinate place of Italy in the alliance was, therefore, a fact as early as 

Italy's first winter in the war. Mussolini 

and the Comando Supremo were never 

thereafter able to establish a parity 10 

conference with the Germans.ll 

11 After Italy's entrance into the war Marshal 

Badoglio met with M a rshal Keitel on seemingly 

equal terms on the one occasion at Innsbruck 

14 and 15 November 1940. See Documents on 

German Foreign Policy, vol. XI, No. 400, p . 709 

and n. I. The Italia n military failures were so 

painful that the German Embassy in Rome on 

27 December urged that Germany take the lead 

in the Mediterranean. See No. 583, pp. 983-87. 

Hitler declined this suggestion. He felt that he 

himself could exert much influence by personal 

discussion with Italian leaders. See vol. XII, 

No. 17, pp. 26-30 ; No. 24, pp. 44-45; and No. 

35. pp. 62-63. 
32 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

The concept of parallel war did not 

long endure. In his enthusiasm to march 

with Hitler, Mussolini strewed his forces 

all over the map. During the summer 

of 1941, when Hitler attacked Russia, 

Afussolini sent an expeditionary corps of 

four divisions to help; a year later, the 

strength of this force had reached the 

size of an army totaling 217,000 men: 

the Eighth Army, containing three corps 

and eight divisions. 12 In Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, Albania, Montenegro, 

Greece, and the Aegean Islands, there 

were 579,000 troops. In North Africa, 

by the end of September 1942, the Italians had 147,000 men. After the Allied 

invasion of North Africa, when the unoccupied zone of Vichy France ceased to 

exist, an army of some 200,000 men 

moved into southern France. By January I 943, I~alian ground forces were 

stationed in Russia, Greece, the Balkans, 

southern France, North Africa, and the 

ltalian homeland. About 1,200,000 of 

Italy's best trained soldiers and best 

equipped unit'> were on foreign soil, about 

800,000 in Italy.I3 

In the early stage of the war, only a 

:;imple expedient was necessary to maintain liaison between the Comando Supremo and the OKW. General der Infanterie Enno von Rintelen, German 

Military Attache in Italy since 1936, be12 Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. [85-93; MS #1' 

15, an, 6, The Italian Expeditionary Corps in 

Russia (General der Infanterie Friedrich Schulz 

et al. ), pp, 2-4. 

," These figures include replacements and troops 

of the Territorial Defense. See Statistics of go 

September I 942, Italian Collection, item IT I I 7/l, 

In the present study the individual folders of 

the I tali an Collection will be identified by the 

designation appearing on them, or by a description of their contents, followed by the key 

letters IT and the number, (See Bibliographical 

~ote.) 

came the OKW representative to the 

Comando Supremo, In addition to reporting to 0 KH and the German Foreign 

Office as Military Attache, Rintelen now 

had direct communication with OKW as 

welL Having mastered the Italian language, holding a high appreciation of the 

admirable qualities of the Italian people, 

and en joying a sympathetic understanding and friendship with many Fascist 

leaders, Rintelen nevertheless estimated 

the capabilities of the Italian armed forces 

on a basis strictly professional. He felt 

that Nazi enthusiasm for Mussolini and 

fascism seriously distorted and magnified 

the military power of Italy,14 

Though Rintelen sufficed during the 

brief period of Mussolini's parallel war, 

something more than a single liaison officer was necessary to link the Germans 

and Italians when Germany moved into 

the Mediterranean to rescue Italy in 

November 1940. As the Germans prepared to invade Greece, to dispatch armored forces (later to be known as 

Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel's 

Gennan Africa Corps, the Deutsches Afrika Korps) to North Africa, and to shift 

some 400 to '500 planes of the German X 

Air Corps (the X Flieger Korps) to fields 

in southern italy and Sicily, the problem 

of commanding the combined forces became acute. Hitler solved the problem 

in a directive of 5 February 1941 when 

he specified that the German troops in 

Libya (and if the occasion arose, in Albania as well) would be under the direct 

tactical command of the Italian theater 

commander; the X Air Corps was to 

Ie; Enno von Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse: Erinnerungen des deutschen Militaerattachis in Rom, 1936-1943 (Tuebingen: R, 

Wunderlich, 1951), p. 26; Howe, Northwest 

A/rica, p. 9, 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

remain subordinate to Goering but was 

to co-operate closely with the Italian 

authorities. Hi Over those units crossing 

Italian territory to reach southern Italy, 

Sicily, and North Africa, over convalescents and men returning from furlough, 

over service troops and, later, antiaircraft 

batteries stationed in Italy, Rintelen was 

to exercise command. 

This arrangement lasted until December I 94 I, when Hitler sent the German 

Second Air Force (Luftflottenkommando 

2) to Italy. He named the air commander, Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring, 

Commander in Chief South ( 0 berbefehlshaber Sued) yi The title Commander in Chief South had little real significance at this time, for Kesselring's command was not much more than an air 

force headquarters located at Taormina, 

Sicily, for the units operating from Italian 

airfields and under Italian operational 

control. I T 

A gifted, thoroughly trained, and ex1 .• Rintelen's new title was German General at 

the Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces 

(Deutscher General bei dem Hauptquartier der 

italienischen W ehrmacht). 

See Howe, Northwest Africa, ch. I; Hitler 

Directive 18, 12 Nov 40, and Hitler Order, 5 

Feb 41, both in Office of Naval Intelligence 

(ONI), Fuehrer and Other Top-LeL'el Directive, 

of the German Armed Forces, 1939-1941 (hereafter cited as ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1939-

194 1) . This is a selection of translated documents from German military and naval archives. 

in two volumes; the second volume covers the 

period 1942-45. 

1 r. The term Commander in Chief South will 

be used in this vol ume to refer to the person 

holding the title Oberbefehlshaber Sued, while 

the abbreviated form ( 0 B SUED) will refer 

to his headquarters. 

17 Order signed by Keitel. 29 Oct 41, and Hitler Directive 38, 2 Dec 41, both in ONI. Fuehrer 

Directives, 1939-[941. Though the German 

naval forces in the Mediterranean remained under the OKM, the German admiral attached to 

Supermarina reported to Kesselring. 

:n 

perienced officer, Kesselring had a strong 

sense of duty as well as considerable personal charm and tact. He found much 

to admire in Italy and in the Italian people, and he developed a high regard for 

Mussolini and a firm bond of friendship 

with Cavallero, then chief of Comando 

Supremo. 

In October I942, when OKW began 

to be apprehensive over the possibility of 

an Allied move in the Mediterranean, 

Hitler gave Kesselring command over all 

the German armed forces in the Mediterranean, with the exception of the 

German-Italian panzer army in North 

Africa. General von Rintelen was made 

subordinate to Kesselring for all his command functions, but as the immediate 

OK\V representative in Italy, Rintelen 

retained the right of direct communication with that staff. Kesselring thereby 

became and remained the only German 

to hold a unified theater command.! R 

He moved his headquarters to Frascati, 

near Rome, to facilitate close co-operation 

with Comando Supremo. The size of his 

staff increased not only through the addition of a small operations group but also 

by the attachment of Italian air force 

and naval liaison officers.!9 

1 K Vice Admiral Eberhard Weichold, commander of the German naval forces in Italy 

(which consisted of one destroyer, about fifteen 

submarines, an E-boat flotilla, about a dozen 

mine sweepers, and several landing boat flotillas). 

came under the Commander in Chief South. 

1!1 Hitler Order, 13 Oct 42, ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945; MS #D-008, Beauftrar;unr; 

des Oberbefehlshabers Sued (O.B. Sued) durch 

"Fuehrerweisung" im September 1942 mit dem 

Oberbefehl im Mittelmeerraum (General der 

Flieger Paul Deichmann). 

For a few months Kesselring also controlled 

the five and a half divisions in Greece and the 

Balkans. But at the end of the year (1942) 

Hitler created an army group headquarters under 

Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, named List 

Oberbefehlshaber Suedost, and removed him from 
:34 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

FIELD MARSH AL KESSELRI NG AND G ENERAL 

VON RINTELEN, WITH PRINCE DI SAVOIA 

Hitler extended Kesselring's command 

further in January 1943, when he placed 

him over the two German armies III 

Tunisia. Kesselring's staff again 10-

creased in size. 20 

While Kesselring's increasing authority 

represented the growing German influence, Mussolini was concluding that an 

Axis military victory was no longer possible. As early as December 1942, he 

thought that the Axis ought to make a 

separate peace with the Soviet Union so 

that Germany would be free to commit 

any subordination to Kesselring. Kesselring, however, reta ined control over all German aerial 

warfare in the entire Mediterranean area, with 

the exception of the southern France-Mediterranea n a rea, until June 1943. See Hitler Directive 47 , 28 Dec 42, and Change to Directive 4 7, 

I Jun 43, ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945. 

"0 Hitler Order, 5 Jan 43, ONI, Fu ehrer Directives, 1942-1945. 

the bulk of its forces against the AngloAmericans in the Mediterranean. To 

Goering, who was in Italy at the time, 

:\1 ussolini said that if the war in the east 

could not be terminated by agreement 

with Russia, the Axis forces should withdraw to a shorter line. Because he expected the "Anglo-Saxons" to make their 

major effort in 1943, Mussolini thought 

that the Axis should defend Africa, the 

Balkans, and perhaps even the west with 

the greatest possible number of divisions. 

Apparently encouraged by Goering, who 

suggested that Hitler might approve a 

new Brest-Litovsk, with compensation to 

Russia in middle Asia, Mussolini proposed 

a conference of the dictators. 

Because of the critical developments at 

Stalingrad, Hitler refused to leave his 

headquarters for a meeting with Mussolini. Because of his ulcers, ~1ussolini 

decided against taking the long trip to 

see Hitler. The Duce therefore entrusted 

the mission of persuading Hitler to make 

peace with Stalin to Count Galeazzo 

Ciano, his son-in-law and Minister of 

Foreign Affairs. 21 

At Hitler's headquarters, Ciano, who 

was accompanied by Cavallero, found no 

inclination to discontinue the war against 

the Soviet Union. During three days of 

~ 1 Goebbels Diaries, p. 249, entry for 18 Dec 

42; Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 192; Leonardo Simon i 

(pseudonym for Michele Lanza), Berlin o, Ambasciata d'Italia 1939-1943 (Rome: Migliaresi, 

Editore, 1946 ), pp. 296-97; Ciano Diaries, pp. 

555-56 ; Min of Conv, Mussolini and Goering, 

6 Dec 42, Ciano Papers (Rose Garden ), pp. 71 3-

14, copy in OCMH. T he last source is a typewritten German transla tion of supporting p apers ~­

ferred to ,in the published Ciano dia ries. It 

consists of 749 pages of documents for the yea rs 

1938-43. A Germa n woma n, employed as a 

transla tor in I taly, re tained a copy, wh ich she 

buried in the garden of a house in Munich . U .S. 

Army Counter Inte lli gence Corps investigators 

discovered the papers a t the end of the war. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

conferences, 18-20 December, the German Fuehrer as usual doing most of the 

talking, it became clear that Hitler saw 

no advantage to be gained by terminating 

the war in the east. Hitler's strategic 

views were defensive in nature, designed 

to hold the territories overrun by the 

Axis armies, and Hitler thought that the 

Axis could do so. He had the wishful 

notion that the Russians would bleed to 

death and make it possible for the Germans to push again to the Don River, 

which he conceived as the ultimate barrier between Europe and the Bolshevist 

east. He considered it essential to hold 

not only a bridgehead in North Africa to 

protect the central Mediterranean and 

retain Italy's alliance but also Greece 

and the Balkans for the bauxite, copper, 

and oil necessary for the German war 

machine. 22 

"" The Italian record is found in military subjects discussed in the conversations at German 

General Headquarters, Comando Supremo, Rapporti, 18 and 20 December 1942, IT 107. The 

German records survive on microfilm only. Members of the German War Documents Project, in 

the course of assembling the records of the former 

German Foreign Office, discovered a box containing microfilm copies of memorandums summarizing conversations of Hitler and of Ribbentrop with foreign statesmen, the so-called Loesch 

Film. Copies of these microfilms. designated by 

serial and frame numbers, are deposited at the 

:-Jational Archives in Washington. D.C. and in 

the Public Record Office in London. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, 

Series D, vol. II (Washington, 1950), pp. viii. 

1021, and 1041-42. The memorandums of the 

conversations of December 1942, all composed 

by Paul Otto Schmidt, the senior interpreter in 

the German Foreign Office, are as follows: F45. Hitler-Ciano conversation, 18 Dec F 20/580-

626 and F 7/243-245: RAM-48, RibbentropCiano conversation, 19 Dec F 20/254-253; F49, Hitler-Ciano conversation, 19 Dec F 20/ 

252-248: RAM-50, Ribbentrop-Ciano conversation, 19 Dec F 20/247-242; RAM-51, Ribbentrop-Ciano conversation, 19 Dec F 20/241-237; 

35 

\\Then he returned to Rome on 22 

December and reported to Mussolini the 

discouraging results of his mission, Ciano 

was not altogether displeased. He believed that if Italy collapsed through 

M ussolini' s failure, the Western Powers 

would be glad to negotiate with him as 

.Mussolini·s successor.~:l Count Ciano also 

found the occasion to disparage Cavallero, 

who, he said, had been servile to the Germans at Hitler's headquarters. 

Cavallero personified the policy of close 

integration with Germany, and the Germans regarded him highly. But at the turn 

of the year Cavallero began to undergo a 

change of heart. He resented the German 

accusation that Russian success at Stalingrad was largely the fault of the Italian 

troops there. He objected to the German 

proposal that the Germans, in the event of 

Allied landings, assume command over 

Italian units in the Balkans. He urged Kesselring to recall Rommel from North Africa 

because Rommel had embittered the Italian 

officer corps by his conduct toward the 

I talians after EI' Alamein. 24 

Cavallero's change of heart came too 

late. Mussolini suddenly dismissed him 

on I February 1943. The day before, he 

had summoned Generale d'Armata Vittorio Ambrosio to the Palazzo Venezia in 

Rome and told him that the cycle of 

Cavallero was closed, the cycle of Ambrosio opemng. \\Then Ambrosio expressed surprise and some disinclination 

F-52, Hitler-Ciano conversation, 20 Dec F 20/ 

23 6-226. 

Cf. Ciano Papers, pp. 7 I 6-28; Simoni, Berlino, 

Ambasciata, pp. 298-99; MS P-049 (Warlimont), pp. 18-19. See also Hitler Directive 47, 

28 Dec 42, ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 194:)-1945. 

23 Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, p. 300. 

24 Ibid.; Cavallero, Comando Supremo, pp. 

433-34. 44 I. 
SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

GENERAL AMBROSIO 

to inherit Cavallero's legacy, Mussolini 

declared, "We will divide the responsibility." He then asked Ambrosio for his 

ideas. Unprepared, Ambrosio nevertheless stated three points: lighten the 

organization of Comando Supremo; bring 

back to the I talian homeland the greatest 

possible number of Italian divisions; and 

stand up to the Germans. To the 

last point, M ussolini exclaimed, U Benissima'" 25 

Ambrosio thoroughly disliked the Germans.26 He had a faithful protege in 

2" Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 26-27; MS 

#P-058, Events in Italy, I February-8 September 1943. 

26 Ambrosio had commanded a cavalry squadron in the Libyan war of 1912-13, served as 

chief of staff of a cavalry division, then of an 

infantry division in World War I. An army commander at the beginning of World War II, with 

experience in Yugoslavia in 194 I, he was appointed chief of the Army General Staff in 

January 1942. 

Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Castellano, 

who not only hated the Germans violently 

but was predisposed to political intrigue. 

Ambrosio met Ciano through Castellano, 

and together with Generale di Corpo 

d' Armata Giacomo Carboni, who was 

also close to Mussolini, these officers 

hoped that the dependence of Italy on 

Germany could be brought to an end.27 

The cordial relationship between C 0-

mando Supremo and OKW ceased with 

Ambrosio's appointment, and this change 

was part of a general shift by M ussolini 

toward a greater independence with respect to Germany. The Germans regarded Ambrosio as correct, but it was 

a cold and formal type of correctness. 

The wartime spirit of comradeship in arms 

vanished, and Kesselring and Rintelen 

found Ambrosio to be a stickler who 

made difficulties. When it appeared to 

the Germans in Italy that Ambrosio 

hampered or frustrated the execution of 

Mussolini's declared intentions, they frequently found it necessary to appeal 

directly over Ambrosio's head to Mussolini.28 

Though Ambrosio made but few 

changes in Comando Supremo, retaining 

the basic structure and powers established 

by Cavallero,29 he made strenuous efforts 

to carry out the second and third points 

of his program. In February 1943, 

when Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler's 

27 Castellano, Come firm ai, pp. 15, 23-26; 

Ciano Diaries, pp. 558, 572, 576. 

28 MS #C-OI3, Special Report on the Events 

in Italy, 25 July-8 September 1943 (Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring), pp. 3-4; Deichmann in MS #T-Ia, Der Feldzug in [talien 

April 1943-1 I May 1944 (General der Kavallerie 

Siegfried Westphal et al.), ch. I, p. 9; General der 

Infanterie Enno von Rintelen in MS #T-Ia, ch. 

II, pp. 8-9. 

29 Chart of organization of Comando Supremo, 

IT 10 l. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

GENERAL CARBONI 

Foreign Minister, and General der Artil-

!erie Walter Warlimont, Jodi's deputy at 

OKW, traveled to Rome to plan the suppression of the resistance forces in Yugosla via, Warlimont was startled to hear 

Ambrosio state his intention of withdrawing some Italian forces from Croatia. 

Throughout several conferences Ambrosio 

stubbornly refused to participate in measures to disarm the Mihailovitch elements. 

Considering the Axis forces in the Balkans 

inadequate to crush all the partisans 

completely, he preferred to use the Chetniks against the Communists. The discussions reached a degree of argument 

never before heard, and what seemed like 

obscure Italian political intentions in the 

Balkans first excited Hitler's suspicions 

that the Italian generals were plotting 

" treason" against the Axis.30 

:10 MS #P-049 (Warlimont), p. 21. 

37 

Italy could ill afford to provoke Gerrriany, for Italy by this time was an 

economic province of the Reich. With 

the weakest war potential of all the states 

classified as great powers, Italy lacked 

almost all the raw materials required for 

warfare in the modern industrialized age. 

Cut off from overseas supplies of coal, 

scrap iron, cotton, oil, and rubber, Italian 

heavy industry had too narrow a base to 

supply the new types of aircraft engines, 

tanks, and guns necessary to put the 

Italian armed forces on a par in equipment with the leading armies of the 

world. The coal and iron for heavy industry and the oil for the ships and planes 

could come only from Germany or German-controlled areas of Europe. As the 

Axis shifted to the defensive, Italy faced 

a contraction of its war production.

31 

Germany, too, was showing serious 

economic strains by the spring of 1943. 

After the manpower losses at Stalingrad, 

Germany began to draw from marginal 

groups. Although German production 

increased greatly, the increase did not 

equal both losses and new requirements. 

By March 1943 the rubber supply and 

the production of motor vehicles had become critical and fuel oil had to be carefully allotted. 

Submarine warfare remained the only 

offensive German activity in the spring 

of 1943. Elsewhere, the Axis was on the 

defensive. Fully committed in support 

of the ground forces in the east and to convoy protection in the Mediterranean, even 

the once mighty Luftwaffe had ceased to 

be significant as an offensive weapon. 

But reflecting more clearly the state of 

affairs was the fact that the Axis no 

31 Carlo Favagrossa, Perche perdemmo la 

[;uerra: Mussolini e la produzione bellica (Milan : 

Rizzole and Co., (946), p. 192. 
SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

longer had the semblance of a clear strategic aim. 32 

During February and March, 1943, 

tension grew between the Axis partners 

as Mussolini pressed for peace with the 

Soviet Union or withdrawal in the east, 

Hitler concentrated on destroying Bolshevism, Ambrosio and the OKW wrangled over the Balkans, and the Italian 

war machine began to sputter for lack 

of German supplies.33 

Though the German Government and 

high command had never entertained a 

high esteem for the Italian people as 

allies, they had placed great faith in Mussolini. After March 1943, German trust 

even in Mussolini began to waver. 'When 

Ribbentrop explained Hitler's reason why 

a renewed offensive in the east was necessary, M ussolini promised to give energetic 

help, both political and military . Yet 

Mmsolini wrote Hitler on 8 March and 

again on 26 March to urge a separate 

peace with the Soviet Union. 34 

Having made up his mind on a given 

course, Hitler was merely annoyed by 

advice to the contrary. This was evident 

early in April when the Duce and the 

Fuehrer, accompanied by military and 

diplomatic staffs, met for three days (7-

10 April) at the Klessheim Castle near 

Salzburg, Austria, their first meeting in 

almost a year. Hitler's fanatical will to 

concentrate all available power to destroy 

the Soviet Union determined all aspects 

of the conference, and the results of the 

meeting were a bitter disappointment to 

the Italians. Mussolini was ill during 

32 MS #P-049 (Warlimont), pp. 25-29. 

33 Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, p. 316. 

,,4 Hitler e Mussolini: Lettere e documenti, 

(Milan and Rome: Rizzoli Editore, 1946), pp. 

141-45, 151-54; Goebbels Diaries, p. 286; Simoni, 

Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 324-28. 

most of the time and was confined to his 

suite, and though Hitler visited the Duce 

twice a day, the Italian's illness put him 

at a decided disadvantage. Germany 

seemed unwilling to send men or materials to support the Italian homeland 

threatened by direct attack. In the face 

of the great superiority of material the 

Allies enjoyed in the Mediterranean, Hitler spoke in a lofty vein: hopes for future 

success in submarine warfare; an iron will 

in the face of all obstacles; and a ruthlessness toward Greek and Yugoslav rebel 

forces. The only concrete offer came 

from Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler 

who promised thirty-six heavy German 

tanks for a special division of Fascist 

militia to be assigned the task of preserving order in Rome. 35 

The Klessheim Conference did not 

bring Italy and Germany closer together; 

it served only to increase the growmg 

friction. Ambrosio, no longer believing 

that a separate peace could be made in 

the east, saw hope for Italy only in the 

possibility that Mussolini would be able 

to break the alliance with Germany. 

'I" Vittorio Ambrosio, Pro memoria sui colloqui 

di Klessheim, 14 Apr 43, IT 109. The principal 

German records are the memorandums composed 

by interpreter Schmidt and preserved in the 

Loesch microfilms: RAM-19, Ribbentrop-Bastianini conversation with Mackensen and Alfieri 

present, 8 Apr 43, F 13/055-090; RAM-20, 

Ribbentrop-Bastianini conversation, 9 Apr 43, F 

4/51-36; RAM-20a, Ribbentrop-Bastianini conversation, 9 Apr 43, F 4135-23. See also Paolo 

Monelli, Roma 1943 (3d ed., Rome: Migliaresi, 

1945). p. 76; Leonardo Vitetti, Notes on the Fall 

of the Fascist Regime, pp. 4-5. This last is a 

ten-page, typewritten manuscript by a high-ranking official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, procured for the authors by the Honorable Harold C. Tittmann. in 1946 assistant to 

the Honorable Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the President of the United States 

to His Holiness the Pope. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

The Disintegration of Fascism 

The difficulty of breaking the alliance 

lay in the fact that the Fascist regime 

was secure only so long as the prospect 

of victory existed. And victory without 

the power of Germany was hard to 

lmagmc. 

As early as the summer of I 942, ~fussolini's personal popularity had begun to 

diminish, and the Fascist party structure 

to crack. Mussolini was ill during much 

of the winter, and many Italians hoped 

and prayed that God might solve the 

country's problems by removing the Duce. 

But the Duce remained alive, his capacity 

for work scarcely impaired in spite of his 

illness, even though he apparently considered giving up command of the armed 

forces and restricting his efforts to the 

political leadership of the state.IIS 

Failing at Klessheim to persuade Hitler 

to end the war in the east so as to make 

it possible for the Germans to concentrate 

their forces in the ,Mediterranean against 

the Allies and in support of Italy, Mussolini apparently reached the definite conclusion that the Axis had lost the war. 

He had felt this several months earlier, 

and he had already taken steps to tighten 

the reins of power over his increasingly 

disenchanted people. Soon after dismissing Cavallero from the Comando 

Supremo, Mussolini on 5 February discharged almost all the members of his 

cabinet and appointed new ones. The 

most important change was in foreign af-

:l<; Vitetti, Notes on the Fall of the Fascist 

Regime. pp. l-2; Benito Mussolini, II tempo del 

bastone e della carota: Storia di un anno, Ottobre 1942-Settembre [943 (Suppiemento del 

Corriere della Sera, No, 190 del 9 Agosto 1944). 

p. 17; Memoriale Cavallero, 27 August 1943, in 

Francesco Orlando, Mussolini volle il 25 luglio 

(Milan: Edizioni "S.P.E.S.," 1946), pp. 82-83. 

fairs-Ciano became Ambassador to the 

Holy See, Mussolini, himself, took the 

Ministry, and Giuseppe Bastianini, a 

faithful follower of M ussolini, became 

Under Secretary. Soon after his return 

from Klessheim to Rome, Mussolini dismissed Carmine Senise, Chief of Police 

and Prefect of Rome, and replaced him 

with a reliable Fascist. On 18 April 

he made Carlo Scorza, an ambitious thug, 

secretary of the Fascist party, and Scorza 

sought to rejuvenate the party by a return to the club and castor oil tactics of 

the early twenties. 37 

But Mussolini was incapable of checking the decline in Italian morale. Defeatism became widespread. Clandestine 

political parties became more vigorous. 

On 1:2 March, when almost 50,000 working men in northern Italy went on strike 

ostensibly to demand compensation payments to bombed-out families, leaflets 

were circulated demanding liberty and 

peace. Unable to cope with what was 

the first open rabor strike under a totalitarian regime, the Fascist authorities acceded to the demands for compensation, 

then arrested and executed several of the 

reputed leaders.38 On I May, despite 

police prohibitions, labor unions marched 

in :May Day demonstrations. 

An obvious solution was to make peace 

with the Allies, but two factors complicated the situation: reluctance to break 

the alliance with Germany and, later, 

disinclination to accept unconditional surrender. Though some of Mussolini's associates urged him to find a way out of 

37 Vitetti, Notes on the Fall of the Fascist 

Regime, pp. 4-5; Monelli, Roma 1943, pp. 76, 

80. 

:18 Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis: 

A History of the Relations Between Hitler and 

Mussolini (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford 

University Press, 1949), p. 295. 
40 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

COUl\'T GRAN DI 

the war, Mussolini was at an impasse. 

In October I942, the Honorable Myron 

C. Taylor, Personal Representative of the 

President to His Holiness the Pope, informed the Pope that Mr. Roosevelt 

would not receive any peace overtures 

made by Mussolini through the Holy See. 

When Count Dino Grandi, former Italian 

Ambassador to London, made arrangements in November I942 to travel to 

Madrid in order to talk with the British 

Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoa re, Mussolini at first did nothing to prevent the 

trip, but finally refused to let Grandi 

leave the country.39 In the same month, 

members of the Italian embassy in Berlin 

drew up a plan not only to dissolve the 

alliance with Germany but also to secure 

a united withdrawal from the war by 

Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.40 

b January I943, after the Italian min39 "Count Dino Grandi Explains," Life, vol. 

[8, NO.9 (February 26, [945 ), p. 80. 

40 Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 294-95. 

ister at Bucha rest had several frank discussions with Ion Antonescu, the Rumanian Prime Minister, on how Italy might 

take the lead in a joint peace maneuver, 

Ciano laid the proposal before M ussolini 

who listened but declined to take action. 41 

By early I943, three distinct groups of 

Italians were trying to find a way out of 

the war: dissident Fascists; military 

officers; and underground anti-Fascist 

parties. The first two had the primary 

aim of finding a solution to end the war, 

and their object was to do so with Mussolini if possible, without him or even 

against him if necessary. The anti-Fascists 

wanted Mussolini's overthrow and the 

end of the Fascist system as goals in 

themselves. With only the most tenuous connections with each other, all looked 

to the King for initiative. 

After Ciano left the cabinet, he became 

leader of the dissident Fascists. He had 

frequent contacts with Grandi, Giuseppe 

Bottai, Roberto Farinacci, and other Fascists who expressed criticism of the Duce's 

leadership. Though Ciano himself had 

negotiated the German alliance, he disliked the Germans and disbelieved in the 

pact. He assumed it was possible to force 

Mussolini out of offi ce by means of intrigue and yet maintain the Fascist party 

intact. Grandi, Luigi Federzoni, and 

others shared Ciano's hope of tossing 

Mussolini overboard without swamping 

the Fascist boat. They could then seize 

the rudder and steer the ship into the 

port of a separate peace with the' Allies. 

These men suddenly discovered that they 

were monarchists at heart, and as their 

contacts with the royal palace increased, 

41 Renato Bova Scoppa, Colloqui con due dittatori (Rome : Nicola Rufolo, [949 ), pp. 70-72 ; 

Ciano Diaries, p p. 572- 73 . 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

they suggested themselves as successors 

to Mussolini.42 

The milita ry party began to take form 

under Ambrosio, though it rema ined 

small. Most officers had neither the time 

nor the inclination for political activity. 

Their oath of offi ce was to the King, and 

their stronger loyalty, in case of conflict 

between fascism and monarchy, was to 

him. Seeing no point in war for its own 

sake, or war by Italy for the sake of 

Hitler, and believing the war lost as earl~ ' 

as Februa ry 1943, Ambrosio favored 

terminating the Germa n alliance. He 

wa nted to cut Italy's losses a nd save not 

only the Army but the monarchy as well. 

By keeping Ylussolini clearly informed of 

the military situation, he hoped that the 

Head of the Government would draw 

the proper inference tha t a political solution of the war was essential. \Vhen he 

went further and suggested openly the 

suitability of terminating the German alliance, he only stirred M ussolini to vigorous reaction, 1'v1 ussolini declaring fervently 

that he would march to the very end 

with his German ally.4:! 

Close to Am brosio were Generals Castellano and Carboni, both of whom recogni zed fa r earlier than Ambrosio that 

any hope of getting M ussolini to break 

with Hitler was illusory. Castellano, in 

particula r, rapidly added to his contacts, 

and he was soon on good terms with Bastia nini in the Ministry of Foreign ;\ffa irs 

and with Duke Pietro Acquarone, the 

King's personal secretary.H 

I~ Franco M a uge ri, From th e Axit es 0/ Disgrace 

( New York : Reyna l and H itchcock, 1948), p. 

B9: CastelimlO, Co me firm ai, p p. 40-41. 

I:: Castellano, Come fir mai, pp. 33-34 ; MS 

# P- o')8, Project #46. 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Q uestion 3. 

H V itetti, Notes on the Fall of th e Fascist Regime. p. 3; Caste llano, Come firmai, pp. 36-38. 

41 

COUNT CIANO 

Bv M a rch 1943, Castellano was so 

deep in intrigue tha t he drew up a detailed plan for a coup d'etat. He provided measures to capture Mussolini and 

those leading Fascists most pro-Duce, and 

he included steps to be taken against 

possible Fascist and German rcactions. 

He submitted the plan to Ambrosio who 

kept it twenty-four hours. But Ambrosio 

thought the idea premature, and he returned the paper with the suggestion that 

Castellano limit himself to alerting Army 

commanders in a general way to the possibility of public disturba nces and orienting them on their duties should such 

situations arise. Not satisfied, Castella no submitted the plan to Ciano, who 

read it, refused to commit himself, and 

carefully locked the treasonable paper in 

his embassy safe at the Holy See.4o, 

Tn May, Ambrosio had some rather 

candid discussions with Mussolini. He 

., Castell ano. COllie firmai , pp. :I H-40 ; Vi te lli . 

:\"otes on the Fa ll of the Fasc ist Regime, p. 3. 
42 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

pointed out the Duce's responsibility for 

the war and the absurdity to which the 

concept of a lightning war had been reduced. But he received no favorable 

response. Losing hope that Mussolini 

would separate Italy from Germany, he 

began to make certain that the King 

received all the important papers on the 

state of the Italian armed forces and on 

the over-all military situation. Ambrosio 

was ready to help overthrow Mussolini if 

the King gave the word, but without 

that word, he would not act. 46 

Castellano, meanwhile, had been busy 

making contacts and lining up men in 

key positions for his coup d'etat. He 

won over Bastianini, and he secured from 

Renzo Chierici, head of the police, assurances that there would be no interference 

from that quarter with a political upheaval. ''''hen the Duke of Acquarone in 

mid-June hinted to several dissident Fascists that the King was thinking of replacing M ussolini as Head of Government, the 

isolation of Mussolini was virtually complete. By the end of June, both dissident 

Fascists and military party members were 

waiting only for a signal from the King 

to turn against the Duce. 47 

As for the underground anti-Fascist 

parties, they gained a new lease on life 

during the second half of 1942-Liberals, 

Christian Democrats, Socialists, Labor 

Democrats, Communists, and the Party of 

Action, each of which proposed different 

remedies for Italy's ills. The most conservative, the Liberals, wished the complete abolition of the Fascist system and 

the restoration of parliamentary govern4G Castellano, Came firmai, pp. 42-43; MS 

# P-oS8, Project #46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 

3· 47 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 45-46; Vitetti. 

Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime, p. 7. 

ment as it had existed before 1922, while 

the Party of Action regarded the monarchy and the church as the chief evils of 

Italy. Ivanoe Bonomi, a former Prime 

Minister, was influential in drawing the 

leaders of the underground parties together in a loose coalition. He was concerned in particular with restraining the 

Party of Action, which he feared might 

drive the crown to the embrace of the 

dissident Fascists. In March Bonomi 

secured agreement on a kind of party 

truce for the periods of wartime transition 

and reconstruction. Thus, despite their 

divergent views on the future needs of 

Italy, all the underground parties in the 

spring of 1943 were monarchical in the 

sense that they, too, looked to the King 

for action against M ussolini. 48 

Bonomi himself expected little from the 

King in the way of vigorous action, and 

he therefore made no approach to the 

throne until April, when he learned that 

the British Minister at the Holy See had 

indicated the British Government's preference for a monarchical solution to Italy's 

political problem. Since the British Minister, Sir D' Arcy Osborne, had not repulsed the efforts of Ciano and Grandi 

to see him, Bonomi began to be apprehensive that the Anglo-Americans might 

be willing to deal not only with the monarchv but even with the dissident Fascists.' He therefore made an appeal to 

the King through an old and retired admiral, Grand Admiral Paolo Thaon di 

Revel, who had an almost superstitious 

reverence for the crown. The elderly 

admiral went to church and prayed before undertaking the audience, but when 

48 Ivanoe Bonomi, Diario di un anno (2 Ciugno 1943-10 Giugno 1944) (Cernusco sui Naviglio: Garzanti, 1947), pp. XXI-XXVIII. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

he explained the tragic situation of the 

country to the King, the monarch revealed nothing of his thought". The 

King's sphinxlike attitude came as quite 

a ~hock to Paolo Thaon di Revel's monarchist principles.49 

More satisfactory was Bonomi's secret 

meeting on 26 May, two weeks after the 

end of the Tunisian campaign, with the 

Duke of Acquarone. The course Bonomi 

urged was: arrest Mussolini; nominate 

a ministry headed by a prominent general 

and staffed by anti-Fascists; and denounce the alliance with Germany. 

Acquarone did little more than agree to 

arrange an audience for Bonomi with 

the King.~o 

King Victor Emmanuel III held the 

pivotal position in Italy's political situation during the spring of 1943. Having 

virtually withdrawn from public life during the turbulent war years, a cautious, 

timid, and secretive person, he disliked 

making decisions. First urged in November 1942 to dismiss M ussolini, he stated 

that he would act "when and if he 

thought it was necessary, and in whatever manner he himself deemed best for 

the country." 51 Yet the King had begun, it appeared, to be skeptical of Axis 

victory at least as early as 19 N ovem ber 

1942, for on that date he kept Ciano for 

an hour and twenty minutes at an audience and requested news of the neutral 

powers-Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. Apparently concerned over the 

scarcity of troops in Italy, he asked Ciano 

to suggest to Mussolini, without revealing 

that the suggestion came from the King, 

'10 Ibid., pp, XXVIII-XXIX, XXXVIIXXXVIII; Domenico Bartoli, Vittorio Emanuele 

III (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1946), p. 229. 

,,0 Bonomi, Diario, pp. XXXVIII-XXXIX. 

51 Maugeri, Ashes of Disgrace, p. 96. 

that some troops be brought home. 

Though the monarch repeated rather 

generic statements of faith in the progress 

of the war, he asked many questions 

about \Vashington and London, and he 

advised the Foreign Minister to cling to 

any thread leading in those directions, 

even if the thread was "as thin as a 

spider's web." 1\2 

Throughout the early months of 1943 

the King remained impassive. He listened 

discreetly to all suggestions but said nothing. To Badoglio, who gained an audience at the insistence of his friends that 

he explain the situation and recommend 

a change in political leadership, the King 

listened attentively but revealed nothing 

of his thoughts. 

Bonomi had his day before the King 

on 2 June 1943. He drew a picture of 

impending disaster and suggested that 

the crown had the power, by the Italian 

constitution, to recall 'Nlussolini. Since 

the alliance with Germany was a pact 

between National Socialist and Fascist 

regimes, Bonomi said, Mussolini's dismissal would give the Italian Government 

a sound legal basis for denouncing the 

treaty. The King refused to commit 

himself. 

Six days later, the King remained quiet 

during an audience with Marcello Soleri, 

lawyer and politician, and eight days 

later still, during a meeting with Badoglio, 

he maintained his silence. 53 

Although it was not apparent to those 

who sought comfort in the King, Victor 

Emmanuel III had in actuality corne to 

5Z Ciano Diaries, pp. 545-46. 

53 Bonomi, Diario, pp, III-IX; Bartoli, Vittorio 

Emanuele III, pp. 234-37; Pietro Badoglio, 

L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale: Memorie 

e documenti (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editori, 1946), pp. 61-62; Vitetti, Notes on the Fall 

of the Fascist Regime, pp. 6-7. 
44 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITl\LY 

a decision. On 15 May 1943 he presented Mussolini with three memorandums, a clear suggestion for the course 

the King wished the Duce to follow. 

Based on the military data provided by 

Ambrosio, the first paper compared the 

military forces of the Axis and the satellite powers with those of the Allies and 

the Soviet Union; the second paper listed 

the Allied military capabilities and contrasted the scanty possibilities of Italian 

resistance. The third memorandum outlined a course of action: 

One ought now to do everything to hold 

the country united, and not make rhetorical 

speeches with a purely Fascist basis. It is necessary to maintain close contact with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, countries that 

have little love for the Germans. One ought 

not to neglect making whatever courtesies 

are possible toward the governing men of 

England and of America. It is necessary to 

consider very seriously the possibility of separating the fate of Italy from that of Germany 

whose internal collapse can come unexpectedly like the collapse of the German Empire 

in 1918.54 

Disliking the Germans, fearful of their 

reaction if he removed Mussolini, the 

King was also scrupulous in his conduct. 

He wished to terminate the German alliance, but only with German consent. 

Admiring, even envying Mussolini's 

power and cleverness, the Italian monarch 

saw no one in Italy as well qualified as 

the Duce to solve the incredibly difficult 

problem of ending the alliance and withdrawing from the war. 55 

Perhaps the task was insuperable. 

M ussolini had lost prestige in the eyes of 

his allies, his military forces, his govern54 The three memorandums are printed in full 

in Enzo Galbiati, II 25 Luglio e la M. V.S.N. 

(Milan: Editrice Bernabo, 1950), pp. 180-83. 

55 Bartoli, Vittorio Emanuele III, pp. 205-06. 

ment associates, his party members, and 

his people. The Fascist system was nothing more than a hollow shell. Thoroughly war-weary, the Italian people desired 

only an end to bombings and hardships 

and sorrow. The military units had lost 

confidence in themselves, and their commanders were without hope of victory. 

Defeatists staffed the foreign service, and 

their reports from Berlin, Budapest, 

Bucharest, and the neutral capitals insisted that continuing the war would 

bring only disaster to Italy. A considerable number of Mussolini's personal followers, members of the Fascist Grand 

Council, began to see the beginning of 

the end. 

In this situation, Mussolini could only 

grope for a way out. The Allies, however, blocked the way toward a separate 

peace with their publicly proclaimed demand for unconditional surrender. 

T he Allied Threat 

Expecting the Allies to invade the 

European continent, aware of Russian 

demands on the Allies for a second front, 

and anticipating therefore that the Allies 

would try to time their offensive move to 

coincide with Russian attacks tying down 

German forces in the east, Axis intelligence agencies shrewdly guessed that 

build-up and other invasion preparations 

would occupy the Allies until the end of 

June or the beginning of July. But 

where the blow would strike was, of 

course, the other side of the coin. The 

likely targets in the Mediterranean were 

southern France, Sicily, Sardinia, southern Italy, Rhodes, Greece, and the Balkans; some reports mentioned Spain, Turkey, Sweden, the Netherlands, and northern France; and a rumor persisted that 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

the Allies would invade the Continent 

by way of Norway.56 

Among the various Axis headquarters, 

there was no agreement on the most 

likely target in the Mediterranean. C amanda Supremo, in general, inclined toward Sardinia for many reasons-Allied 

forces could converge there from Gibraltar and North Africa; Sardinia was a 

necessary preliminary on the way to 

southern France; Allied aIr based on 

Sardinia could range over the entire 

Italian mainland and also over southern 

Germany; Sardinia was the gateway to 

the Po valley; Allied possession of Sardinia would bottle up the Italian Fleet 

in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Sicily, in contrast, would neither appreciably shorten 

the air distance to the industrial centers 

in the Po valley and southern Germany 

nor increase the threat to central Italy 

by air or ground forces. 

5n Rpt, Feindlagebericht Nr. 10/43, GenStdH, 

Abt. Fremde Heere West to GenStdH, Op.Abt., 

15 May 43, OKH.Op.Abt. (II), Feindnachrichten 

England, noch Rd. IV (H 2/186); Rpt, Feindlagebericht, OKW/WFSt, 10 Jun 43, and Rpt, 

Roenne, Chef, Abt. Fremde Heere West to Chef, 

GenStdH, 20 Jun 43, both in OKH /Op.Abt., 

Feindnachrichten Allgemein vom 6.III.43-13.I.44 

(H 22/384); Rpts, Feindlageberichte Nr. 12 and 

Nr. 13/43, GenStdH, Abt. OKH/Op.Abt. (II), 

Fremde Heere, Rd. III., r.III.-15.vII.43 (H 2/ 

182); Estimates of Allied Intentions, IT 106; The 

Trip of the Commander in Chief, Navy, to Rome 

and His Subsequent Report to the Fuehrer, 12 

May 1943- 1 5 May 1943 (cited hereafter as CinC 

Navy Visits Italy, 12-15 May 43), pp. 44-68; 

Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences 

on matters dealing with the German Navy, 1943 

(hereafter cited as ONI, Fuehrer Conferences, 

1943) . Fuehrer Conferences is a selection of 

translated documents from German naval archives. 

The conferences cover the period from 1939 to 

1945, and each ONI issue covers one year. Pietro 

Maravigna, "Lo sbarco Anglo-Americana in Sicilia," Rivista Militare, vol. VIII, No. 1 (Rome, 

January 1952), pp. 7-31 (cited hereafter as 

Maravigna, Rivista Militare, (952). 

45 

Ambrosio, chief of Camanda Supremo, 

saw Sardinia as being important only if 

the Allies intended to occupy the Italian 

mainland, and he thought that the Allies 

would figure a mainland campaign too 

costly and time-consuming for the results 

they could expect. He chose Sicily, 

which did not necessarily presuppose a 

later invasion of the Italian mainland. 

Sicily would assure the Allies freedom of 

sea movements in the Mediterranean, 

and would prevent the Italian Navy from 

shifting even it'> small ships and submarines from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the 

Ionian and Adriatic Seas.57 

Mussolini, possibly motivated by wishful thinking, expected the Allies to harass 

the Italian mainland by air attacks and 

perhaps try to occupy the major Italian 

islands for use as bases in future operations. But he did not believe that the 

Allies would attempt to invade the Italian 

boot. He thought that the Allies were 

mainly interested in free passage through 

the Mediterranean, a condition they 

would have achieved by securing the 

North African coast. Though doubting 

57 Emilio Faldella, Lo sbarco e la difesa della 

Sicilia (Rome: L'Aniene, Editrice 1956), pp. ~)I, 

:,4; Rpt, VaLutazione d'importanza della Sardegna 

neL quadro strategico e neL quadro tattico, 27 Jan 

43, IT 1179; Rpt, Coman do Supremo, Prospettive operative per la difesa dell'ItaLia e della 

Ralcania, 15 Feb 43 (hereafter cited as Rpt, Prospettive operative, C;omando Supremo), IT 1181; 

Min, Riunione operativa esigenza S.S., Impiego 

dei mezzi dell' Aeronautica e della Marina, 28 

May 43, item 156, Min of Confs, Comando Supremo, IT 26. (The documents in this folder are 

copies of minutes of conferences held by members 

of Comando Supremo. They are hereafter identified only by date and item number in IT 26.); 

Rpt, Studio operativo, Superaereo, 21 Feb 43, IT 

1189; Marc' Antonio Bragadin, Che ha fatto La 

Marina? (1940-1945) (Cernusco sui Naviglio: 

La Lampada, 1950), pp. 434-35; CinC Navy 

Visits Italy, 12-15 May 43, ONI, Fuehrer Conferences, 1943. 
46 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

that the Allies would consider it imperative to occupy Sicily or Sardinia, he 

thought Sicily the more directly threatened. In May I943, as the Tunisian 

campaign drew toward its close, M ussolini was saying that the Allies would 

probably land in France for a direct attack on Germany, or perhaps in the 

Balkans.58 

Hitler expected the Allies to land in 

Greece or the Balkans, and his reasoning 

was sound. Both areas were more important to the German economy than 

Italy. The populations were friendly to 

the Allies. An Allied invasion would supplement Russian pressure, force the dispersal of Axis troops over widely separated 

areas, and forestall a Russian occupation 

of the Balkans.59 

Noting the movement of New Zealand 

troops back to the Middle East after the 

capture of Tunis, and inferring that the 

entire British Eighth Army was to follow, 

OKW guessed that the Allies were planning to mount an attack against Greece 

and the Balkans from eastern Mediterranean ports. The Germans gave credence to an Allied intelligence plant, and, 

as a consequence, OKW m May I943 

looked toward Greece. 60 

"8 MS # P-049 (Warlimont), p. I7 ; Msg, 

Mussolini to Hitler, 9 Mar 43, Oberkommando 

der W ehrmacht-W ehrmachtfuehrungsstab, Krieg.<-

tagebuch (cited hereafter as OKW/WFSt, KTB) 

1.-3l.III.43, 14 Mar 43; Min, 6 May 43, item 

138, Min of Confs, Comando Supremo, IT 26; 

CinC Navy Visits Italy, 12-15 May 43, ONI, 

Fuehrer Conferences, 1943; MS #R-115, The 

Fall of Pantelleria and the Pelagian Islands, I I13 J u'ne 1943, ch. II of Axis Tactical Operations 

in Sicily, July-August 1943 (Magna E. Bauer). 

59 Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. I, pp. 7-8; Rpt, Prospettive operative, Comando Supremo, IT I 18 I. 

60 Memo, Gen.St.d.H., Abt. Fremde Heere 

West, Nr. 874/43, g.K., 9 May 43, and Telg, 

Fremde Heere West, Nr. 27/43, g.Kdos.Chefs., 12 

Kesselring saw the gravest threat in 

the western Mediterranean, and in May 

he was considering such places as Spain, 

the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, and Sicily. 

He ruled out southern France, northern 

Italy, and the Balkans as being too far 

removed from effective air support, a 

prerequisite, he figured, in any Allied 

planning. Guessing in mid-May from 

air reconnaissance photos of the distribution of Allied divisions and landing 

craft in North Africa, he chose Sicily 

first, Sardinia second. 61 

How well prepared were the Axis nations to meet the blow? 

Comando Supremo had hoped in February I 943 that the Italian Fleet, with 

the support of air, both German and 

Italian, would defeat an Allied landing 

before the ground troops got ashore. 

But a survey made early in May indicated 

that the Navy, whose major elements 

consisted of three battleships, four cruisers, and ten destroyers, did not have 

enough surface vessels to defeat an invasion fleet. Submarines and small craft 

could only harass but not deter approachmg enemy convoys. 

The combined German and Italian air 

forces m the Mediterranean early in 

I943 consisted of some 2,000 planes, 

one-half of them fighters. By May I943 

the number had dropped more than fifty 

percent, and of these many were obsoJes-

-- --------------

May 43, both in OKH/Op.Abt., Allgemein Mittelmeer. Chefs., 9.III.-29.XII.43 (H 22/147); 

CinC Navy Visits Italy, 12-15 May 43, ONI, 

Fuehrer Conferences, 1943; Telg, OKW/WFSt/ 

Op.Nr. 661055/43, g.Kdos.Chefs., 12 May 43, 

ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945, pp. 79-80. 

(See below, pp. 64-65.) 

61 Min, 4 May 43, item 132, Min of Confs, 

Comando Supremo, IT 26; MS #T -3, PI, pt. 

II, Mittelmeerkrieg, II. Teil, Tunesien und die 

gleichzeitigen Kaempfe der Achsenmaechte in 

Tripolitanien (Kesselring), pp. 65ff. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

cent. Hundreds of planes had been 

destroyed on the ground because of failure to camouflage and disperse them and 

because antiaircraft defenses proved ineffective.62 

The Italian ground forces appeared 

completely unequal to the ta~k of doing 

more than retarding or delaying an invasion. With Italian strength drained 

and equipment expended in Russia and 

North Africa, with very little having been 

done to improve coastal defenses, with 

units spread much too thin along the 

extensive Italian coast line, there was 

little hope of defensive success. "\Ve 

may be able to put up an honorable 

defense against a large-scale landing," a 

high-ranking Italian officer said, "but we 

have no chance to repel the enemy." 63 

Italy urgently needed help, not only 

planes, tanks, and guns, but fuel and 

ammumtIOn as well. The Germans 

promised to deliver I66 guns to Italy 

during the month of March I943, but 

German requirements delayed the first 

shipment until the end of April. The 

Germans were ready to send planes and 

crews to the extent that Italy could 

provide airfields and ground defenses, 

but, while Ambrosio claimed the capacity 

of accommodating 2,500 aircraft, Goering considered the airfields unfit for immediate use and the protection offered 

inadequate.64 

"" Rpt, Prospetti,'e operative, Coman do Supremo, IT 1181; Rpt, Studio operativo Superaereo-, 21 Feb 43, IT 1 18g; CinC Navy Visits Italy, 

12-15 May 43, ONI, Fuehrer Conferences, 1943. 

G:l Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 32-33; quotation 

from Roatta in Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 33. 

(;4 Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. I, pp. 20-22; III, pp. 10-12; Min, 27 Jun 43, 

Min of Confs, Comando Supremo, IT 3032; MS 

#T-2, K I. Der Kampf um Sizilien: Abschliessende 

Betrachtung des seinerzeitigen Oberbefehlshabers 

Sued, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring, p. 7. 

47 

Italy needed ground troops, too, but 

Mussolini was reluctant to request them. 

Concerned chiefly with his tattered prestige, he sought to deny his dependence 

on Germany by trying to persuade himself that the Allies would not attempt to 

occupy Italian territory, and at the same 

time that there would be an upsurge of 

spirit among Italian units defending the 

homeland. If the burden of defense fell 

on German units, Mussolini's dependence 

on Hitler would become too obvious, 

and he would lose any freedom for political maneuver. 

The Italian c\rmy commander in Sicily, 

Generale di Corpo d' Armata Comandante 

Designato d' Armata Mario Roatta, concerned purelY with his military problem, advocated the use of German 

divisions, welcomed German offers of assistance, and provided his superiors with 

arguments on why German troops should 

be sought. 65 

Ambrosio adopted a middle position. 

From a professional point of "iew, he 

was aware that German ground forces 

were indispensable for the defense of 

Italy, and occasionally he appeared willing to accept them.' But Ambrosio was 

very conscious of representing a break 

with the tradition of intrusive German 

ascendancy, and he wished to disentangle 

Comando Supremo from the influence of 

OKW. To obviate German help, he 

withdrew the Italian Army from Russia; 

he tried to recall to Italy some of the 

divisions occupying France and the Balkans; and he prevented the dispatch to 

North ;\frica of an effective unit, the 

4th (Livorno) I nfantry Division, which 

was stationed in Sicily. Unfortunately 

for Ambrosio, he was endeavoring to refl'Rintelen in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. II, p. II; Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 26 I. 
48 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

assert Italian prestige at a time when the 

military need for German reinforcement 

was becoming irresistible. Unable to 

deny the need, he feared that the presence 

of German ground troops would make 

them master of the Italian house. He 

therefore sought zealously to guard and 

maintain the established principle of Italian command over the German troops 

stationed in Italy. But this, he recognized, was ultimately only a device to 

save face. Unable to take a wholly military view of Italian problems, neither 

did he envisage a purely military solution 

of the war, which he regarded as hopelessly lost. 66 

On 4 May 1943, Kesselring met with 

Mussolini to discuss how to meet the 

next Allied move after Tunisia. Mussolini said that the Allies might try to land 

on Italian soil, but he doubted that they 

would attempt an invasion. Perhaps he 

was trying to distinguish between a small 

Dieppe-style landing and a full-scale invasion such as that in North Africa. In 

any case, after Kesselring presented a 

lucid analysis of Allied capabilities, M ussolini agreed that Sardinia and Sicily 

might be threatened. With this admission stated, Kesselring offered the Italians 

the use of one German division. G7 

Two days later, Rintelen submitted to 

OKW a comprehensive and devastating 

report on the combat effectiveness of the 

Italian armed forces. They "have not 

up to now fulfilled the missions assigned 

them in this war," he wrote, "and have 

1;" Rpt, German Military Attache, Rome, on 

Cooperation with Italian High Command/Commitment of German Forces in Italy, 14 Jul 43, 

OKW, Amtsgruppe Ausland, 30Y1.43-3I.VIII.44, 

Wehrmacht Attache Italien (OKW 1029); OK Wi 

WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VII.43, 21 Jul 43, p. 3· 

C,7 Min, 4 May 43, item 1:,2, Min of Confs. 

Comando Supremo, IT 26. 

actually failed everywhere." The reasons, 

Rintelen found, were inadequate and 

insufficient armament and equipment; 

faulty training of the officers; and a lack 

of spirit and (Han among the troops, the 

latter stemming from a "disbelief In a 

favorable outcome of the war." Only 

with German support, he affirmed, could 

the Italians repel a Llrge-scale invasion of 

their homeland. 6s 

On the same day, 6 May, Kesselring 

again met with Mussolini. He told the 

Duce that Hitler had promised to send 

a division from Germany to Italy and 

that Hitler had ordered Kesselring to 

reconstitute into a complete unit those 

parts of the Hermann Goering Dh'ision 

that had not gone to Tunisia because of 

lack of transportation and that were, 

therefore, still in I tal;;. In addition to 

these two German divisions that would 

soon be available, Kesselring pointed out, 

other contingents of va no us German 

units still in I tall' because they had not 

been shipped in time to Tunisia could be 

gathered together and formed into a 

third division. Though Kesselring insisted that Sardinia and Sicily needed 

immediate reinforcement, Mussolini preferred to believe that the Allies intended 

to land in France.un 

Four days later, on I 0 ~·fay, ,\mbrosio 

accepted the three divisions Kesselring had 

offered to reinforce the defense of Itak 

Ambrosio planned to station one in Sicily, 

another in Sardinia, and a third on the 

mainland, stipuiating carefully that they 

would be under his operational command. 

'" Rpt. Beurteilung der derzeitigen Kampfkraft der italienischen Wehrmacht, 0 KH, 0 p. 

Abt. (II), Afrika-A I Berichte, Bd.3, 16.I.-18Y. 

43 (H 22/190 ). 

"9 Min, 6 May 43, item 138, Min of Confs, 

Comando Supremo, IT 26. 
THE AXIS ON THE DEFENSIVE 

In a subsequent discussion with Rintelen 

that same day, Ambrosio reiterated that 

the German divisions in Italy would be 

under Italian tactical command, and he 

declared unnecessary the retention of a 

German liaison group that had entered 

Italy with an Italian corps withdrawn 

from the Russian front. With the fall 

of Tunis, Ambrosio said, there would be 

less need for OKW liaison with Coman do 

Supremo. Hereafter, he continued, German officers might be in contact with 

Superesercito, which had command in the 

national territory, but, in any case, he 

would issue the orders in this regard. 70 

On either the same day or a day later, 

Hitler offered ~fussolini five fully 

equipped German mobile divisions for 

the defense of Italy. Mussolini at first 

was ready to accept, but Ambrosio induced him to reconsider, and on 12 

May, Mussolini declined the new German 

offer.'l Mussolini's refusal to accept Hitler's offer of five additional German divisions constituted an important turning 

point in the Italo-German alliance. 

Hitler considered two things essential 

for the defense of Germanv: critical materials from the Balkans, in particular 

bauxite, copper, and chrome; and Italian 

political stability. Reports from German 

visitors to Italy had long warned of the 

possible collapse of fascism.72 As Hitler's 

70 Min, IO May 43, item 137, and Min, 10 May 

43, item 139, both in Min of Confs, Coman do 

Supremo, IT 26. 

71 Rintelen in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.). 

ch. II, p. II; Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), ch. I, pp. 24-25; Westphal in MS 

#T-Ia (Westphal et al.), ch. IV. p. 6; Westphal. 

Heer in Fesseln, p. 218. 

7" See, for example. Rpt, Reise nach Rom und 

Sizilien vom 11.-14. V.43, signed by Maj. 1. G. 

Freiherr von Tisenhausen, OKH, Op. Abt. (II). 

Afrika-A I Berichte, Bd. 3, 16.I.-18.V.43 (H 22/ 

190 ). 

4~) 

special adviser on the Mediterranean, 

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, embittered 

since his relief in Africa, excited the 

Fuehrer's suspicions of Italy as an ally.73 

Increasingly apprehensive of Italian defection from the alliance, Hitler was 

concerned because he was convinced 

that if Italv withdrew from the war, 

whether voluntarily or otherwise, he 

would have to give the Mediterranean 

front at least temporary priority over the 

other theaters, even the east. Thus, in 

February and March 1943, partly as a 

precaution against Italian defection, partly to holster Italy, and partly to reinforce 

the defenses of two of the most threatened 

areas in the :Mediterranean, Hitler had 

ordered strong German elements placed 

on Sardinia and Sicily. He also gave 

high priority to Italy on the weapons 

being produced in Germany.74 

In May, speculation in the German 

camp on Mussolini's intentions, as well as 

on his strength, was far from favorable. 

Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, 

noted that "the Duce no longer sticks to 

a clear line, either in his policies or in 

his war strategy." Mussolini seemed unable to rely on anyone for help in waging 

the war or in carrying out his policies. 

"If it be true," Goehhels remarked, "that 

the Fuehrer, despite his tremendous 

powers, has nevertheless been lied to and 

cheated so often by the generals, how 

much more must that be the case with 

M ussolini!" The Duce had become "an 

old and tired man," and Hitler was "not 

7:1 Canadian Historical Section (G.S.), Army 

Headquarters, Ottawa, Report by Bogislaw von 

Bonlll. Considerations on the Italian Campaign. 

1943-1944, copy in OCMH; Deichmann in MS 

#T-Ia (Westphal et al.), ch. I. p. 34. 

H MS #P-049 (Warlimont), p. '7; Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et a/.l. ch. 1. pp. 

22-24· 
50 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

at all convinced that the Italians will stay 

put when the heaviest strain comes." 75 

On 19 May OKW submitted to Hitler 

a report on the defense of Italy. The 

situation, OKW declared, was hardly 

encouragmg. There were no principles 

established to guide the co-operation of 

OKW and Comando Supremo. Italy 

demanded command and other prerogatives, yet failed to mobilize completely. 

Italy could not be defended on the basis 

of the alliance as then constituted. What 

were needed were predominant German 

influence on the command structure and 

German ground troops as "corset stays" 

for the Italian units. The three divisions 

proposed by Kesselring were not sufficient. 

If Sardinia were lost, the threat to northern Italy would be acute, and the Po 

valley was the key area for the whole of 

Italy, for the Balkans, for southern 

France, and for an Allied air offensive 

against southern Germany. OKW recommended an immediate build-up of supplies for the defense at least of northern 

Italy.i6 

A long discussion took place at the 

Fuehrer's headquarters on '20 May with 

Keitel, Rommel, \Varlimont, and others 

in attendance. Like many of the conferences when Hitler was in the process 

of making up his mind, the talk was 

often desultory. Hitler listened to a description of conditions in Italy, heard how 

I talian commanders lacked confidence in 

their abilities, deliberated over the rumor 

that the German troops in Sicily were 

75 Entry of 10 May 1943 from The Goebbels 

Diaries, by Louis P. Lochner. Copyright 1948 by 

The Fireside Press, Inc. Reprinted by permission 

of Doubleday & Company, Inc. 

7'1 Memo, OKH, Vorlragsnoliz, 19 May 43, 

West!. Millelmeer Chefs. (H 22/290). 

not well liked, learned that Italian authorities were doing nothing to check expressions of anti-German sentiment. Many 

Italians were apparently not to be 

trusted; some were Anglophiles. Rommel suggested that the Italians might 

suddenly close the Brenner frontier and 

cut off the German troops in Sicily and 

southern Italy. Gossip was reported 

that in certain circumstances the Italians 

might turn against the Germans. Hitler 

remarked that he would not be surprised 

if the Italian crown, with the support of 

the Army chiefs, tried to overthrow Mussolini and the Fascist party. At the 

end of the meeting, Hitler told Keitel 

that it would be well, in the event of 

Italian treachery, for Rommel to have 

authority to handle the situation. 77 

Two days later OKW issued Plan 

ALA RICH, a course of action to be 

taken if fascism collapsed or Italy defected. Essentially, the plan provided 

for a German occupation of northern 

Italy, with evacuation by German troops 

of the rest of the Italian boot. 

Initially, six or seven mobile divisions 

were to be withdrawn from the Eastern 

Front when necessary to carry out the 

occupation. In command of the occupation operation, Rommel expected an eventual force of thirteen or fourteen divisions. 

But when no Allied attack materialized 

and when the internal affairs of Italy 

seemed to quiet down, Hitler decided to 

launch an offensive in the east. As a 

consequence, the only divisions remaining 

to execute Plan ALARICH were a total 

77 Minutes of Conference 5 Between Hitler 

and Sonderfuehrer von Neurath, 20 May 1943, 

part of the collection known as Minutes of Conferences Between Hitler and Members of the Ger· 

man Armed Forces High Command, December 

1942-March 1945 (cited hereafter as Min of 

Hi tler Confs) . 
of eight that could be withdrawn from 

the command of OR WEST in France.78 

While Hitler, the OKW, and Rommel 

made their secret preparations, Kesselring continued to co-operate with the 

Italians on the defense of Italy, and Mussolini and the Comando Supremo gradually diminished their opposition to additional ground reinforcement. After 

Kesselring visited Sicily in May 1943 

and discussed matters thoroughly with 

the Italian generals, Rintelen on 22 May 

obtained from the Italians firm agreement 

to employ four German divisions—a panzer grenadier division (to be known later 

as the 15th) to be reconstituted in Sicily 

by 1 June and trained by 15 June; 

another panzer grenadier division (eventually designated the 90th) to be expanded from a brigade stationed in Sardinia; a panzer division (the Hermann 

Goering) to be reconstituted on the 

mainland; and another panzer division 

(the 16th) to arrive after being reconstituted in France. The Italians also 

agreed to permit General der Panzertruppen Hans Valentin Hube and his

staff of the XIV Panzer Corps to come 

to Italy to prepare the German divisions 

for combat.79

78 For information on Plan ALARICH see: 

Msg, OKW/WFSt to Rommel, No. 661138/43, 

G.Kdos.Chefs., 22 May 43; Msg, OKW/WFSt to 

OB WEST and others, No. 661127/43, G.Kdos. 

Chefs., 24 May 43; Rpt, WFSt-Op. H. Tarnwort 

“ALARICH,” 27 May 43: Msg, OR WEST to 

GenStdH, Op.Abt.II, 31 May 43; Msg, OKW/ 

WFSt-Op. (H) to OB WEST, 25 Jun 43; all in 

Westl. Mittelmeer Chefs. (H 22/290). 

79 Min, 17 May 43, item 148, Min, 18 May 

43, item 150, Min, 22 May 43, item 152, all in 

Min of Confs, Cornando Supremo, IT 26; see 

also Roatta. Otto milioni, pp. 242–43; Giacomo 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe d’Italia, giugno 

1943–maggio 1945 (Rome: Casa Editrice Libraria Corso, 1946), vol. I, pp. 287–313; MS #T-3, 

P 1 (Kesselring), pt. II, pp. 67–70. 

Still more German troops for Italy 

were in the offing. Ambrosio, despite his 

wish to sever the German alliance, was becoming increasingly concerned by the Allied threat. And Kesselring, whose views 

were diametrically opposed to those of 

Rommel, believed that if the Italians cooperated, the Germans could defend the 

whole of Italy. As long as Mussolini remained in power, Hitler was willing to 

support him. And as the Italians demonstrated, even though reluctantly, their intention to react positively to the next Allied 

move, OKW made no plans to withdraw 

to a shorter line on the Italian mainland. 

Despite Rommel’s suspicions of Italian 

trickery, Plan ALARICH receded into the 

background, a vague expedient to be executed in the unlikely event of political 

change in Italy. 

Mussolini was altogether uncomfortable. Resenting German domination of 

the war effort, anxious to save his Fascist 

regime, ambitious to restore Italy’s status 

and prestige, fearful of Allied capabilities 

and intentions, he was looking for a way 

out. But as hurtful as the acknowledgment of German superiority was, more 

painful was the acceptance of unconditional surrender. If he could, with German help, repulse an Allied invasion, if 

he could gain even a small moment of 

triumph, the conditions might be propitious for approaching the Western nations 

for a negotiated peace. 

Italy was in a predicament. Fascist 

Italy, which Mussolini had advertised as 

a great power, was in the tragic and 

ridiculous position of being unable either 

to make war or to make peace. Exactly 

how ridiculous was to become apparent 

in June 1943 when the Allies made their 

next offensive move in the Mediterranean. 
CHAPTER III 

Preparations and Preliminaries 

The Beginnings 

In directing General Eisenhower to 

execute an amphibious operation to seize' 

Sicily, the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 

Casablanca had in mind securing Allied 

~ea lanes through the Mediterranean, 

trying to knock Italy out of the war, and 

diverting German strength from the Russian front. Whereas almost any objective 

in the Mediterranean might have contributed equally well to the last of these 

aims, the very location of Sicily made the 

island a particularly likely target for contributing to the other two. For Sicily 

lies only ninety miles across the Sicilian 

channel from the tip of Africa at Cape 

Bon and a scant two miles across the 

Strait of Messina off the southwestern tip 

of the Italian peninsula. 

The Greeks had a word for SicilyTrinacria, the three-cornered, a great triangle encompassing an area of approximately 10,000 square miles, roughly the 

size of the state of Vermont. (Map l) 

The northern side measures some 180 

miles; the southwestern side is almost as 

long, approximately 170 miles; the eastern 

edge, running in a general north-south 

direction, is considerably shorter, about 

125 miles. 

Of strategic importance since the earliest history of migrations and wars in 

the Mediterranean, a steppingstone for 

Romans, Carthaginians, and Moors, Sicily in the modern age of air power had 

assumed new significance. 'Vhen Mussolini was building up the Italian Fleet, 

he made no provisions for aircraft carriers 

because he felt that Italy already had 

them in the existence of the southern 

extremity of the Italian peninsula, Sardinia, and, above all, Sicily. Sicily and 

its airfields had forced Britain to abandon 

the direct Mediterranean route for maritime traffic with the Near and Middle 

East and had compelled the Admiralty to 

maintain two fieets in the Mediterranean, 

one based on Gibraltar, the other on 

Alexandria and Port Said. Sicily, together with the small island of Pantelleria, which lies between the western tip 

of Sicily and Cape Bon, had given the 

Axis a domination of the air over the 

central Mediterranean that might have 

been complete had not the British held 

on to Malta, some 55 miles off the southeastern tip of Sicily. 

Scalloped with wide, sweeping bights 

separated by capes, the coast of Sicily 

has numerous beaches of sand and shingle. They range in length from less than 

a hundred yards to several miles. A narrow coastal plain backs the beaches in 

the blunt northwestern corner of the island, then widens somewhat midway 

along the southwestern coast opposite the 

Gulf of Gela and maintains this width 

on either side of the sharp southeastern 

corner, the Pachino peninsula. Less than 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 

halfway up the cast coast ncar the port 

city of Catania the plain widens into the 

only sizable stretch of flat land in Sicily, 

the plain of Catania. ,\11 the island's airfields were located on the coastal plains, 

none more than fifteen miles inland. I 

From Catania northward on the east 

coast and all along the north coast, steep 

slopes and precipitous cliffs face the sea. 

In the northeastern triangle stand the 

highest and most rugged mountains of 

the island whose surface is almost all 

mountainous, the Caronie Mountains 

with peaks from 4,500 to 5,400 feet, and 

massive Mount Etna itself, 10,000 feet 

high and twenty miles in diameter at its 

base. 

Throughout the island the more important and better roads were close to 

the coast, including those riding a narrow 

shelf between beach and mountain in the 

north and northeast. In the interior the 

roads were poorly surfaced and narrow, 

with sharp curves and steep grades. The 

roads were particularly difficult for military traffic in the towns and small cities, 

for most of the settlements were estab-

! The listing of airfields and seaplane bases on 

Sicily is contained in S.S.O. 17/3 (Final), par. II, 

and mentions nineteen known airfields and landing grounds in Sicily (Salmon Files, 5-G-3. 

item 5). Likewise the same figure of nineteen 

known airfields, later raised to thirty at the time 

of the Allied attack, is mentioned in The Conquest of Sicily. 10 July 1943-17 August 1943, 

Despatch by His Excellency Field Marshal the 

Viscount Alexander of Tunis (cited hereafter as 

Alexander Despatch), p. 2, in ~ARS, The figure of thirty at the time of the Allied attack is 

not borne out by enemy accounts and is probably 

achieved by counting landing strips, Cf. Samuel 

Eliot Morison, "History of United States Naval 

Operations in World War II." vol. IX, SicilySalerno-Anzio, January 1943-June 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), p, [2n. 

For information on the Sicilian ports see Alexander Despatch, p. 65. and S.S.O.! (Final), 

par. 10. 

lished in classical or medieval times, and 

they were built on hilltops for the sake 

of defense, with steep, winding approaches 

and narrow streets designed not for trucks 

and tanks but for pedestrians, chariots, 

and mule carts. The bulk of the island's dense population of some four 

million was located in the towns and 

cities. 

The major ports were Messina ncar 

the northeastern tip, Catania and Syracuse on the eastern side, and Palerrno 

near the western end, each with a daily 

capacity of more than 1,000 tons. Messina, the largest port, was dosest to the 

mainland. There, ferry service across the 

strait to Calabria connected the Sicilian 

railroads with the continental sYstem. 

~fessina was clearly the most strategic 

objectiYe on the island, for, as the link 

with the mainland, its capture by an invading force would seal off the island's 

defenders and deny them reinforcement 

or resupply. Catania, with a port capacity somewhat less than Messina and 

Palermo, was scarely less important by 

\'irtue of its location and it~ relative 

proximity to the Italian mainland. 

The problem of attacking Sicily had 

been blocked out in a general way in 

London and submitted to the CCS 

at the Casablanca Conference. 2 The 

ground forces to be committed, the planners predicted, would ha\'e to be 111 

sufficient strength to attain a decisive 

superiority over an "\xis force estimated 

to have a maximum potential of eight 

divisions. If "",xis strength did not reach 

this figure by the time of the invasion, 

the rate of build-up was calculated at 

one German or one and a half Italian 

divisions per week by the NIessina ferry 

"Br JP (43) i (Final), an. 1,10 Jan 43, 

oroo/4/59,1. 
54 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

servIce alone. On the other hand, Messina was vulnerable to air attack and 

might be eliminated or severely crippled 

before the invasion. Of the eight Axis 

divisions likely to be defending Sicily, the 

planners estimated, four could be concentrated against anyone Allied landing 

within two or three days. The Allied 

forces, it appeared, would have to total 

at least ten divisions, and if separate 

landings were made, each would have to 

be strong enough to defeat a force of 

four enemy divisions. 

The heavy fortifications known to exist 

along the strait ruled out a direct blow 

against Messina. Similar defenses excluded direct assaults against the naval 

bases of Syracuse, Augusta, and Palermo. 

Admiral Horatio Nelson's adage, "A 

ship's a fool to fight a fort," was as 

relevant for battleships and modern harbor defenses as it was in the days of 

wooden vessels and stone forts. Because 

the technique of bringing supplies across 

the assault beaches was still only theoretical, the Allies would have to secure 

ports at once. They would have to come 

ashore along the relatively unfortified 

stretches of coast line close to one or more 

rna jor ports. 

.\nother reason militating against a 

direct assault on Messina was its distance 

from fighter aircraft bases on Malta and 

in North Africa. The range of the planes 

would preclude adequate fighter protection of an amphibious landing. The 

Catania area, within the extreme range 

Df fighter aircraft, was also more attractive because of the assault beaches and 

a nearby group of airfields, but the port 

could be expected to handle initially the 

needs of only four divisions and later, 

after expansion of the port facilities, only 

six, four less than the ten needed for 

InvasIOn. Palermo was adequate to supply ten divisions, but a landing near 

Palermo alone would leave the enemy in 

possession of the two other major portsMessina and Catania-and a majority of 

the airfields. Also, it would be difficult, 

perhaps impossible, to land at Palermo 

alone forces superior to those that the 

:-\xis might quickly concentrate. 

The London planners thus suggested 

two simultaneous assaults in the general 

areas of Palermo and Catania. Landings 

there would deny the Axis two of the 

island's major ports and most of the airfields; would block the major routes to 

Messina; and would reduce the enemy's 

ability to concentrate against a single 

landing. 

The disadvantages of the PalermoCatania scheme derived primarily from 

the great resources required. The two 

areas would not be mutually supporting. 

Each attacking force would have to be 

in sufficient strength to avoid defeat in 

detail. The forces and shipping required 

would be greatly increased over those for 

a single, concentrated attack. And unless the Italian Fleet were driven back 

into the Adriatic before the assaults, 

two naval covering forces would be required. Nevertheless, the planners concluded that a single assault would be 

feasible only if the Axis forces in Sicily 

numbered distinctly less than eight divisions, and only if enemy ability to make 

rapid reinforcements within the island and 

from the mainland were drastically reduced. If these conditions prevailed, a 

single assault could be considered in the 

Catania area. 3 

The CCS directive of 2 3 January ordering General Eisenhower to invade 

~ Ibid. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 55 

Sicily also established the chain of command and determined the organization 

for planning. General Eisenhower as 

Supreme Commander had the ultimate responsibility. General Alexander, named 

Deputy Commander in Chief, was 

charged " with the detailed planning and 

preparation and with the execution of 

the actual operation when launched," in 

effect, the ground command. Admiral 

Cunningham was to command the naval 

forces; Air Chief Marshal Tedder the air 

forces. Contemplating the use of two 

task forces, one American, the other British, the Combined Chiefs directed General Eisenhower to recommend the offi cers 

to be appointed to the subordinate command positions. Because the Tunisian 

campaign was still under way and a ttracted the ma jor energies of AFHQ, the 

CCS also directed Eisenhower, in consultation with Alexander, to set up a special 

operational and administrative staff, separate from AFHQ, to plan the invasion.· 

To command the British task force in 

the invasion, Eisenhower settled quickly 

on Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, the 

experienced Eighth Army commander. 

To lead the American force, he gave 

serious consideration to General Cla rk, 

who commanded the Fifth U .S. Army in 

French Morocco and who had demonstrated great diplomatic skill. But because Clark and his army, organized only 

in early J anuary 1943, were charged with 

keeping French Morocco under control 

and with being ready to invade Spanish 

Morocco should Spain become less than 

neutral, Eisenhower turned instead to 

M aj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. H aving 

commanded the \Vestern T ask Force in 

·CCS I 7 I/ 2/ D , 23 J an 43. D irective to CinCo 

Casablanca Conf Book, pp. 12 7-28. 

G ENER A I.S MONTGO M E RY AN D P ATTO N 

in Sicily, ]uly 1943. 

the North Afr:i can invasion, having gained 

considerable combat experience in North 

Africa, and soon to be promoted to lieutenant general, Patton was, moreover, 

free for a new assignment. As commander of the U.S. I Armored Corps, not 

actively engaged in Tunisia, Patton had 

a staff already available to plan the 

American role in the Sicily invasion.

5 

CCS approval of Eisenhower's nominations set the scene for the contrasting 

operations of two of the most highly individualistic ground commanders of W orId 

War II. Patton was of the "rough and 

ready" school, Montgomery the " tidy" 

type. These differences in temperament, 

technique, and personality, to become 

markedly appa rent ill northwest Europe 

,. AFHQ NAF 143, I I Feb 43, a nd AFHQ 

CofS M tg I, 25 Feb 43, both in 0100/ 12C/ IOI ; 

AFHQ, HU SKY, M in of Mtg, 10 Feb 43, 0 10 0 1 

4/ 59. I. 
56 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

in 1944, were not pronounced during the 

early days of planning for Sicily; but before the campaign was over, the differences would be more than noticeable.6 

In conformity with the CCS instructions to set up a separate headquarters 

to plan the invasion of Sicily, General 

Eisenhower in late January 1943 established in Algiers the nucleus of what became known as Force I4I-from the 

number of the room in the St. George's 

Hotel where the originally assigned officers first met. The headquarters eventually moved into the Ecole N onnale in 

La Bouzarca. Without administrative 

responsibilities, the staff remained a part 

of the AFHQ G-3 Section until the end 

of the Tunisian campaign, when, on 15 

May, it became an independent operational headquarters. American officers 

assigned to Force 141 came for the most 

part from the United States, though some 

were transferred from the Fifth Army 

headquarters and others from the I 

Armored Corps. British personnel came 

largely from the United Kingdom and 

the Middle East. At the end of the 

Tunisian campaign, Alexander's 18 Army 

Group headquarters was deactivated and 

merged into Force 141; and on D-Dav 

of the Sicily invasion the whole organization became the 15 Army Group headquarters, commanded by Alexander and 

with a staff of American and British 

officers who had served together and 

fl Among the many characterizations of Patton 

are, for example, Omar ~. Bradley, A Soldier's 

Story (~ew York: Henry Holt and Company, 

1951), p. 159; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

pp. 40-41. 82, li6, 225; Maj W. G. Bell and 

~1artin Blumenson, "Patton the Soldier," Ordnance, XLIII, ~o. 232 (January-February 1959), 

pp. One of the best appraisals of Montgomery found in Major General Sir Francis de 

Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles 

Scribner's Sons, 1947), pp. 165-93. 

could make a combined headquarters 

work. 

As deputy chief of staff and senior 

American representative in Force 141, 

General Eisenhower initially appointed 

Maj, Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, who 

soon found himself in a situation of friction. In this period of the war, in February 1943, General Alexander had a 

rather low estimate of the combat effectiveness of American troops. Though he 

considered the material, human and 

otherwise, magnificent, he deemed the 

;\merican troops inexperienced and of 

little value in combat. Even at the end 

of the Tunisian campaign, Alexander 

would still consider them below the 

standard of the British fighting man. 

Apparently resenting this attitude, Huebner felt impelled to become the protector 

of American interests. Not until Brig. 

Gen. Lyman 1. Lemnitzer succeeded 

Huebner in July 1943 would American 

relations with Alexander show marked 

improvement. 7 

Force 141 had difficult problems to 

solve. Lacking a G-2 Section, the force 

had to co-ordinate intelligence matters 

with AFHQ. Commanders who had 

been selected for roles in the invasion 

were actively engaged in Tunisia (Patton 

commanded the U.S. II Corps during 

most of March and April I943) or scattered on three continents. Units were 

coming from the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and the Middle East. Because all the key personnel involved in 

7 Intervs. Dr. Sidney T. Mathews with Field 

::Vbrshal Alexander, 10-15 Jan 49. at Government House, Ottawa, Canada, pt. I, North Africa 

and Sicily, par. 22. The typescript of the inter-

"iews was suhmitted to Alexander and his corrections are inserted in ink. (All interviews cited in 

this volume are in OCMH, unless otherwise 

noted. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 57 

the ground, sea, and air planning could 

not be gathered in one place, co-ordination of some aspects of the operation 

would still be somewhat lacking even on 

D-day.8 

Designating Patton's I Armored Corps 

to head the American forces led to some 

confusion in command relationships, for 

another corps headquarters was also 

scheduled to take part in the operation. 

To clarify command channels and also to 

match the British organization, the I 

Armored Corps (Reinforced), known as 

Force 343 during the planning phase, 

would become the Seventh U.S. Army 

headquarters on D-day of the inyasion.!l 

"History of Allied Force Headquarters and 

Headquarters NATOUSA, December 1942-Decpmber 1943, pt. II, sec. I, pp. 1:>7-40 (copy in 

OCMH); Msg, Force 141 to AFHQ, 12 Feb 4:\, 

0100/4/67, II; AFHQ JPS P/47 (Final), 26 

Jan 43, Planning for HUSKY, and AFHQ Memo. 

4 Feb 4:" Formation of New Units, both in 

0100/21/1207; Min of Mtg, Hotel St. George. 15 

Apr 43, to discuss the Revised War Establishment 

and '1'/0 of Hq Force 141. 0100/12C/854, with 

copy in 0100/4/59, I; AFHQ, Min of CofS Mtg 

16, 19 Apr 43; Mtg 18.26 Apr 43; Mtg 21, IO 

May 43; and Mtg 23, 17 May 43. all in 0 I 00/ 

12C/IOI; Msg, 18 Army Gp to AFHQ, 0920, 13 

May 43. 0100/21/1473. T/O for U.S. element 

of Hq Force 141 is contained in OPD 320.2 Security, sec. II, case 53; the allotment of grades is 

in same file. case 47. 

"Ltr, AFHQ, AG 322.12/384 A-M. to CG I 

Armd Corps. 5 Apr 43, sub: Redesignation of Hq 

I Armd Corps and Activation of Force 14 I, job 

loA, reel 80F: AFHQ Out Msg 3972 to AGWAR, 

2 Mar 43, OPD Exec 3, item 13; Memo, Hull 

for Marshall, 13 May 4:1, sub: Br Twelfth Army, 

OPD Exec :" item IC: AFHQ In Msg SD/55602 

from MidEast. 26 May 43, AFHQ CofS Cabk 

Log; AFHQ Min of Exec Planning Mtg 39. 4 

Jun 43. 0100/12A/146. I; AFHQ Out Msg 2003. 

6 Apr 43. to AGWAR, OPD Exec 3. item I I; 

FREEDOM Out Msg 5008. I Apr 43, to NATOUSA. 

OPD Exec 3. item 10: NATOUSA Out Msg 332 

to AGWAR, 30 Mar 43, and AFHQ Out Msg 

9069 to AGWAR. 2., Mar 4:\. both in OPD Exec 

3. item 13: AFHQ Min of Exec Planning Mtg 

The major elements under Seventh 

Army control were to consist of one corps 

headquarters and six divisions~four infantry (one to be the follow-up force), 

one armored, and one airborne. Because 

of the desire to employ experienced units, 

the II Corps headquarters replaced the 

VI Corps, which had been originally assigned, and the 15t Infantry Division replaced the 36th Infantry Division. lo 

The British force, known a~ Force 5{5, 

as well as the Twelfth Army during the 

planning period, was somewhat larger. 

Under Eighth c\rmy there would be two 

corps headquarters, the 13th and the 

30th (a third, the loth, was held 1. 

Tripoli), six infantry divisions, one armored division, one airborne division, a 

tank brigade, and an infantry brigade.! I 

42. I I Jur. 43. 0100/12A/146. I; AFHQ, Min 

of CofS Mtg 22, 13 May 43; Mtg 24, 20 May 

43; Mtg 27. 31 May 43; and Mtg 30,10 Jun 43, 

all in 0100/12C/IOI. See also Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944. 

pp. 148-49. 

10 The VI Corps and 36th Division went uncler Fifth Army control. See AFHQ NAF 185, 23 

Mar 43, ABC 381 HUSKY (1943), sec. IA; AFHQ 

Out Msg 7645 to AGWAR, 19 Mar 43, OPD 

Exec 3. item 13; AFHQ, Min of Exec Planning 

Mtg 19. 19 Apr 43, 0100/12A/146, II; Ltr. 

Force 141 to Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, 16 Apr 

4:\. Seventh Army G-3 File; AFHQ, Min of CofS 

Mtg 18. 28 Apr 43, and Mtg 2 I, 10 May 43, 

both in 0100/12C/IOI; AFHQ Out Msg 1828 

to 18 Army Gp, I I May 43, and AFHQ Out Msg 

2384 to Fifth Army, J7 May 43, both in I\'ARS: 

Report of Operations of the United States Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 JulY-J7 

August 1943 (hereafter cited as Seventh Army 

Rpt of Opns), pp. B-I-B-3. 

11 Twelfth Army Opns Order I. 3 I May 43, 

0100/12A/141; app. A. to S.S.O. 17h (Final), 

21 May 43, 0100/12A/182; Field Marshal Sir 

Bernard L. Montgomery, Eighth Army: El Alamein to the River Sanr;ro (Germany: Printing 

and Stationery Services, Army of the Rhine, 1946) 

(hereafter cited as Montgomery. Eir;hth Arm)'). 

pp. 89-90 . 
58 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

The Plan 

Detailed planning started on 12 February when Force 141 distributed copies 

of the basic design formulated by the 

London planners before the Casablanca 

Conference and accepted by the CCS. 12 

Since General Alexander and his staff 

had not had an opportunity to study the 

plan in detail, Alexander accepted it as 

preliminary and tentative, recognizing the 

need of some modification. 1s 

This plan sought to secure adequate 

port facilities and sufficient airfields by 

means of two simultaneous assaults: one 

in the west, the other in the southeast. 

Subsequent landings closer to the principal objectives were to follow at Palermo 

and Catania. Ten divisions were to be 

ashore in a week. 

Though this plan in some respects 

looked like an intended double envelopment of the enemy forces in Sicily, it 

was in reality focused less on enemy troops 

than on the ports of Palermo and Catania. 

A provision for the immediate seizure of 

all the important airfields would add to 

the dispersal of the assault forces because 

the airfields were widely scattered 

throughout the island. The great disadvantage, as already mentioned, was 

the fact that the two task forces would 

not be mutually supporting. Thus, the 

enemy might concentrate against either 

one and roll it back into the sea. 

Though General Alexander considered 

1" Force 141 Planning Inst I, 12 Feb 43, printed 

in Alexander Despa teh, pp, 30-3 I, 

1:1 AFHQ JPS P/53 (Final), 2 Feb 43, Preliminary Directive to Commanders of Ground, 

!'."aval, and Air Forces, 0100/12A/103, I; AFHQ 

Preliminary Directive to CinC's of Naval, Ground, 

and Air Forces, 2 Feb 43, 0403/10/300; AFHQ 

Out Msg 4063 to MidEast and Malta, ABC 381 

HUSKY (1943), sec, lA, 

landing both task forces together in a 

concentrated assault against the southeastern corner, he rejected the idea 

temporarily because his staff believed that 

the port facilities that could be seized in 

a single assault (Catania, Syracuse, and 

Augusta) would be inadequate to support the total Allied forces required for 

the operation.14 

The commander of the British invasion 

force, General Montgomery, found the 

CCS concept objectionable on another 

ground. His Eighth Army was to land 

in a great arc around the southeastern 

tip of Sicily, with part coming ashore on 

the southwestern side near the ports of 

Gela and Licata, the remainder on the 

eastern face. Those forces landing on 

the eastern side were more important because they were oriented toward the port'> 

of Syracuse and Augusta as immediate objectives. Yet the CCS had designated 

only about a third of the initial British 

assault force~one division plus a brigade-to make these landings. This 

seemed hardly enough, and in mid-March 

Montgomery emphatically indicated that 

he could not accept the plan as presented. 

To Montgomery the plan was valid 

only against weak Italian OpposltlOn. 

Against German troops, or against Italian 

troops backed by Germans, the plan 

seemed to be of little value. Montgomery 

wanted another division in his main assault on the eastern face of Sicily, and 

to get it he recommended elimination of 

the landings in the Gela-Licata area. 

Not only would this make his main landings stronger, but his army would be 

united, an important point in Montgomery's concept of any tactical operation, 

Though he realized that his substitute 

14 Alexander Despatch, p, 5. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 59 

plan did not provide for the seizure of 

some airfields, it seemed to him that even 

if he took the airfields, he would be unable to hold them with the two divisions 

allotted for that task.l" 

Air force and naval commanders immediately raised a hue and cry. Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder pointed out that 

failure to land in the Gela-Licata area 

and to occupy the group of airfields there 

would not only "gravely affect the whole 

air situation in the Southeast corner of 

Sicily" but would also "seriously increase 

the risk of loss of the big ships involved 

in certain of these assaults." To Tedder, 

this was intolerable, even when he made 

allowance for the weakening of the enemy 

air strength which Tedder was "determined to achieve before the assault takes 

place." To the Allied air commander, 

air superiority was as vital as securmg 

the ports, and the only sure way to 

weaken air opposition critically was to 

capture the enemy's airfieldsY; 

Admiral Cunningham agreed with Tedder. He preferred attacking with widely 

dispersed forces instead of concentrating 

against what Cunningham considered the 

most strongly defended part of the island. Furthermore, Montgomery's plan 

would involve a large number of ships 

lying offshore with protection against air 

attack severely lessened by failure to take 

the airfields in the Gela-Licata areaP 

'" Opn HUSKY: Comdrs Mtgs, 04IO/2/297; 

AFHQ, Min of CofS Mtg 7, 18 Mar 43, 0100/ 

12C/IOI; Alexander Despatch, p. 6; De Guingand, 

Operation Victory, pp. 249-50. 

In Ltr, Tedder to Alexander, 18 Mar 43,0100/ 

4/66, II; Opn HUSKY; Comdrs Mtgs, 0410/2/ 

297· 17 Alexander Despatch, p. 6; Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography 

of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of 

Hyndhope (London. New York: Hutchinson and 

Co .. 1951), p. 535. 

While General Alexander recognized as 

valid the points raised by the air and 

naval commanders, he nevertheless accepted Montgomery's modification "from 

a purely military point of view." 18 He 

agreed to transfer the British forces from 

the Gela-Licata landings to strengthen 

those on the east coast. But to satisfy 

the air and naval requirements, Alexander reached into the U.S. task force and 

plucked the U.S. 3d Infantry Division 

for use in the British sector under Montgomery's command. The 3d Divison, 

scheduled for a D-day landing far up the 

southwestern coast near the western end 

of the island, was to side-;lip southeastward to make the Gela-Licata landings. 

To compensate in some degree for this 

weakening of the American assault, he 

proposed that the American landings be 

delayed several days until the British 

were ashore and thus, presumably, had 

attracted the bulk of the opposition.1 9 

General Patton objected to the loss of 

the 3d Division. The Montgomery plan 

assumed, Patton felt, that enemy airfields 

in the American sector would be so neutralized prior to the invasion that adequate 

air support for the main American landings would be assured. But since the 

same thesis when applied to the GelaLicata airfields had been acceptable 

neither to the air forces and Navy, nor 

"presumably" to Montgomerv and Alexander, it was "no less unacceptable" to 

Patton when applied to the Palermo airfields. For under the Montgomery plan, 

the American assault on Palermo could 

be made only if the British were highly 

I R AFHQ, Min of CofS Mtg 7, 18 Mar 43, 

OIOO/12C/IOI. 

l!1 AFHQ NAF 182, 20 Mar 43, ABC 38 I 

HUSKY (1943), sec. IA; Alexander Des!,atch, 

p. 6. 
60 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

successful, that is, if the enemy defenders 

cracked completely. Furthermore, withdrawal of a division from the U.S. troop 

list would not only weaken the American 

assault force but also would deprive the 

Americans of close air support from the 

airfields the 3d Division was to have taken. 

If the British were stopped after getting 

the bulk of their divisions ashore, would 

all the forces be withdrawn from Sicily? 

Or would Patton continue trying to carry 

out an operation predicated on prior 

British success? Under Montgomery's 

plan, Patton believed, the :\mericans were 

provided with inadequate forces. 2o 

Despite Patton's protest, General Eisenhower approved the new plan became 

of "the obvious fact that initial success in 

the southeast is vital to the whole project." Even though the change made the 

later U.S. landings more difficult because 

air support expected from Montgomery's 

area would not equal that which the original plan had contemplated, as Eisenhower admitted, "the decision must stand, 

under the existing circumstances." 21 At 

the same time, Eisenhower began to seek 

another division he could assign to Montgomery in order to move the U.S. di\'ision 

back to its original landing area. The 

problem was less that of finding additional troops than of finding the shipping 

necessary to transport an additional division to Sicih.22 

"0 Ltr, Hq Force :14:1 to CinC Alli .. d Forces. 2:1 

Mar 43, sub: Outline Plan for Opn HUSKY. 

0100/ I 2C/645, IV. 

"1 AFHQ NAF 182 and 18:;. 20 and 23 Mar 

43, ABC 381 HUSKY (1943), sec. IA; Ltr, Eisenhower to Alexander, 23 Mar 43, 0100/4/66. II: 

Ltr, AFHQ to Force 343, 26 Mar 43, sub: Outline Plan for Opn HUSKY, OIOO/I2C/645, IV. 

"" Memo, ]SP for U.S. ]CS, 25 Mar 43, and 

CCS 161/5, 26 Mar 43, both in ABC 381 HUSKY 

( (943), sec. 2; Memo. COS for CCS. COS (W) 

546, 25 Mar 43, ABC 38 I HUSKY (1943), sec. 

When the British eventually provided 

another division and the necessary shipping for Montgomery's assault, Alexander 

on 6 April returned the U.S. 3d Division 

to Patton, But he still retained the features of staggered landings. The 3d 

Division was to assault on D plus 2 rather 

than on D-day as originally planned, 

and the other American landings in the 

Palermo area were moved back to D plus 

5, by which time the 3d Division would 

have secured the airfields in its zone, 

thereby affording air support for the 

Palermo landings. 23 

None of the ground force commanders 

selected for the Sicily operation could, in 

this early period, devote much attention 

to planning. Alexander was busy with 

ground operations in Tunisia. Patton 

had been shifted on 7 March to temporary 

command of the U.S. II Corps, also in 

Tunisia. Montgomery's attention was 

devoted to the immediate task of commanding the British Eighth Army. It 

was, as Montgomery subsequently put it, 

a period of "absentee landlordism." 24 

The planning staffs of Forces 343 and 545 

largely functioned without benefit of the 

views of those on whom the responsibility for successful execution of the plan 

would fall. 

For all their inability to devote full attention to the Sicilian planning, few of 

the commanders involved were satisfied 

IB; GHQ MEF, Min of Mtg, 28 Mar 43, 9th 

Mtg, 0100/4/59, I; AFHQ, Min of CofS Mtg 

8, 22 Mar 43, and Mtg 9, 25 Mar 43, OIOO/I2C/ 

10 l. 

":1 Min of AFHQ Exec Planning Mtg 14. 7 Apr 

4:1: Mtg 15,9 Apr 43; and Mtg 16, 12 Apr 43, 

all in OIOO/12A/I46, II. Map in ABC 381 

HUSKY (1943). sec. 2, shows the approved plan. 

Also, see Alexander Despatch, p. 7. 

"4 Rpt of 21 Army Gp Mission on Opn HUSKY, 

15 Aug 43, 21 Army GP/89/0pns: Montgomery, 

Eighth Army, p. 86. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 61 

with Alexander's latest solution. Still 

concerned over what he considered too 

dispersed landings, Montgomery sent his 

own chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Francis de 

Guingand, to Cairo to serve at Force 545 

headquarters as his deputy and chief of 

staff. Arriving in Cairo on 17 April, de 

Guingand for the next several days carefully studied the 6 April outline plan, 

and discussed it with Lt. Gen. Miles C. 

Dempsey, commander of the British 13 

Corps, earmarked to participate in the 

operation. De Guingand's analysis of the 

new plan agreed with that of his chiefa much greater concentration would be 

req uired if the Allies were to overcome 

resistance on a scale similar to that encountered in North Africa. 2

:; 

His reasoning having been confirmed, 

Montgomery himself flew to Cairo on 23 

April for additional study and consultation. Though Montgomery appreciated 

the need to seize ports and airfields, he 

considered the plan to be based on an 

underestimate of enemy capabilities. "To 

spread four divisions, with a relatively 

slow build-up of forces behind them, between the Gulf of Catania and the Gulf 

of Gela," he wrote later, "obviously implied negligible resistance to our as'iault 

and a decision by the enemy not to send 

reinforcements from Italy to oppose us." 

On 24 April he made known his objection in a message to Alexander. "Planning so far has been based on the assumption that the opposition will be slight 

and that Sicily will be captured rather 

easily," he wired. "Never was there a 

greater error. The Germans and also 

e'De Guingand. Operation Victory, pp. 269, 

27 2 -74. 

the Italians are fighting desperately now 

in Tunisia and will do so in Italy." 26 

\Vhat Montgomery wanted was to confine the British landings within a much 

more restricted area in order to give his 

force more strength in the assault. He 

urged that his landings be restricted to 

the Gulf of N oto (south of Syracuse) 

and the two sides of the Pachino peninsula. Since this area was within range 

of fighter planes based on Malta, the 

landings would have adequate air cover. 

From a beachhead in the Gulf of Noto, 

the port of Syracuse might be captured 

rapidly, and operations could then be 

extended northward to secure Augusta 

and Catania. Most important of all, his 

whole force would be concentrated. 

Montgomery's proposed plan received 

no enthusiastic reception 111 Algiers. 

Alexander again faced conflicting army 

and air-naval demands. Tedder and 

Cunningham still pointed to additional 

airfields (at Ponte Olivo, near Gcla, and 

Comiso) which they wanted included in 

the beachhead. Montgomery countered 

by asking for two more assault divisions. 

Only with additional strength, he said, 

could he extend the beachhead as far as 

Gela. 27 

Though Alexander called a new conference for 27 April in Algiers to iron 

out the differences, it had to be postponed 

two days when :Montgomery's representative, de Guingand, suffered injuries in 

an aircraft crash en route to the conference. Lt. Gen. Oliver Leese, come" Montgomery, Eighth Army, pp. 86-87; De 

Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 278; Alexander 

Despatch, p. 7. 

"7 Montgomery, Eighth Army, pp. 87-88; De 

Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 280. 
62 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

GENERAL DEMPSEY 

mander of the British 30 Corps, took his 

place.

28 

The conference at Algiers of 29 April 

was less than conclusive. After ably presenting Montgomery's arguments, Leese 

introduced a new concept. He proposed 

that the basic design of the two-pronged 

attack be abandoned and that both the 

United States and the British forces assault the southeastern corner, the British 

along the Gulf of Noto and the Americans close by on both sides of the Pachino 

peninsula. Admiral Cunningham at once 

demurred, citing his conviction that amphibious landings should be dispersed, 

not concentrated, and that the enemy 

airfields had to be taken at the earliest 

28 Alexander Despatch, p . 8; D e Guingand, 

Operation Victory, p. 281. 

possible moment in order to protect the 

shipping which would be lying off the 

beaches, less than thirty miles away. Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder objected even more 

vigorously. H e pointed out that the new 

plan would leave thirteen airfields in enemy hands, far more than could be 

neutralized by air action alone. T edder 

declared he would oppose the whole operation unless the plan included prompt 

seizure of the principal Sicilian airfields. 

The deadlock was now complete. 

The contradictory demands of army, navy, 

and air could not be reconciled on the 

plan proposed either by Alexander or by 

Montgomery.29 

To break the deadlock, General Eisenhower called another conference in Algier.'; 

on 2 May. Though Alexander was unable to attend because of bad fl ying 

weather, Montgomery appeared in person 

to state his views. On the following day, 

Eisenhower accepted the new Montgomery proposal. The invasion of Sicily, 

the first large-scale amphibious assault 

to be made by the Allies against a coast 

line expected to be staunchly defended, 

was to be a concentrated thrust limited 

to the southeastern part of the island. ~o 

Alexander's plan of 3 May, issued as an 

order later that month, embodied Montgomery's strategic conception.31 The lOdependent American assault on the 

e" Alexander D espa tch , p. 8. 

"0 Min of AFHQ Exec Planning Mtg 26, 5 

May 43; Mtg 27 , 7 May 43 ; and Mtg 28, 10 M ay 

43 , all in 010o / 12A/ 146, II; AFHQ NAF 215 , 

5 May 43, 0403/ 10/3 21; CCS 161 / 6, 10 M ay 

43, ABC 38 1 HUSKY ( 1943), sec. 3; Ltr, AFHQ 

to Force 141 , 8 M ay 43, sub : Directives to T ask 

Force Comdrs, 0 IOO/ 12C/ 33 1, II; Memo, Force 

141 to Patton, 141 / F/ G(P), 3 May 43, sub : 

Change in Plan for H US KY, Seventh Army G-3 

File. 

:11 Force 141 Opn Inst 2, 21 May 43, prin ted 

in Alexa nder D espa tch, pp. 74-83. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 63 

western corner of Sicily was discarded. 

The whole weight of the U.S. force 

was shifted to the southeastern corner 

with landings to be made along the Gulf 

of Gela from Licata eastward to the 

Pachino peninsula. The whole weight of 

the British force was concentrated on the 

coastal sector from the Pachino peninsula 

almost to Syracuse. The new plan did not 

embody such a radical bunching of assaults as General Leese had proposed on 

29 April because the American sector was 

considerably extended to the northwest. 

Moving the entire assault to the southeastern corner of Sicily in effect rejected 

the CCS concept of the necessity to take 

ma jor ports and airfields quickly. For 

the Americans, it meant no major port 

at all- they would have to rely for their 

supplies on maintenance over the beaches 

ior an indefinite period of time. The 

exclusion as immediate objectives of both 

the cluster of airfields in the southwest 

and the complex in the Catania-Gerbini 

area disturbed air officers, as well as 

Admiral Cunningham, who continued to 

have misgivings on what he considered the 

sacrifice of the tactical advantage of 

dispersion. 

Whatever the merits of dispersion versus concentration, there was no gainsaying the loss of airfields. ,\nd this led to 

a new Allied focus on the island of 

PantelIeria. 

Other Factors 

One of the major questions that concerned the planners was whether the Axis 

would reinforce the island defenders beyond Allied expectations. According to 

Allied estimates the Axis garrison consisted of three major elements: Italian 

coastal divisions, Italian field divisions, 

GENERAL L EES E 

and German units. All were under the 

Italian Sixth Army headquarters at Enna 

which controlled two corps and four 

Ita lian field divisions. The XII Corps 

commanded the 28th (Aosta ) and the 

26th ( Assietta ) Infantry Divisions in the 

northwest corner of the island. The XVI 

Corps controlled the 4th (Livorno ) and 

the 54th (Na poli ) Infantry Divisions, in 

position to counter a landing on both 

sides of the Pachino peninsula in the 

southeast. Five or six coastal divisions 

added to this strength. 32 

:12 Hq Force 343, FO I , 20 Jun 43, an. II, 

Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p . d-7ff ; Alexander 

Despatch , pp. 15- 16. 

For some time, Allied intelligence offi cers mistakenly believed tha t the I03d (Piacenza ) Infantry D ivision was south of Catania . The mistake, 

as Alexander stated , " was discovered before it 

could have any untowa rd effect." 
64 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

How well would the Italian units fight? 

A few bold spirits among Allied planners 

predicted that the Italians would be a 

pushover. Their arms and equipment 

were well below the standards of German, 

British, and American divisions. The 

Sixth Army had no combat experience. 

Sicilians made up a high proportion of 

all units. "Ersatz stuff, all of it," one 

American officer said. "Stick them in 

the belly and sawdust will run out." 33 

But no one really knew. Fighting on 

home soil, they might have higher morale 

than in North Africa. To be safe. the 

Allies assumed that the Italians on Sicily 

would resist strenuously.34 

Allied intelligence discovered two German divisions in support of the Italians. 

Though definite data on the German order 

of battle in Sicily was hard to come by, 

the information was accurate. Not until 

the approach of D-day, however, did a 

relatively clear picture emerge. Of the 

two German divisions identified in Sicily, 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier and the H ermann Goering, the latter was somewhat 

puzzling, for it had been destroyed in 

Tunisia. Apparently, then, it had been 

reconstituted. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was divided into three battle groups, one in the extreme western 

part of the island, the second near the 

center (together with division headquarters) , the third near Catania. Shortly 

before D-day, division headquarters and the 

center battle group moved to the west. 

The Hermann Goering Division was 

also divided, but into only two battle 

groups, one in the Catania area, with 

33 Quotations from A Soldier's Story, by Omar N. 

Bradley, p. 114. Copyright 1951 by Holt, Rinehart 

and Winston, Inc. Reprinted by permission of 

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 

34 Msg 8707, AFHQ to TROOPERS, 7 Jun 43, 

job 24, reel [[ 8D. 

supervision over the panzer grenadier 

battle group already there, the other 

poised for action in the southeast and 

capable of operating against the Gela 

and Comiso airfields. The distribution 

of forces indicated that the enemy anticipated landings on the southwestern corner, along the Gulf of Gela, near Catania, 

and along the Gulf of Noto. The Germans had not reinforced Sicily to the 

extent possible, a failure the Allies correctly attributed to their cover plan. 35 

The efforts of the Allies to disguise 

their intentions were based in the main 

on a central cover plan requested by 

Force 141 and developed in London by 

British intelligence. One part of this 

plan, known as Operation MINCEMEAT, 

was designed to convince the enemy high 

command that the objectives of the impending Allied offensive in the Mediterranean were Sardinia and the Peloponnesus rather than Sicily. The plan itself 

was simple but highly imaginative. With 

painstaking care a counterfeit letter from 

"Archie Nye" of the British War Office 

in London was drawn up and addressed 

to General Alexander. Indicating that 

a feint against Sicily would be a deception maneuver to screen an invasion of 

Sardinia, the letter suggested that Gen. 

Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the British 

commander in chief in the Middle East, 

veil his thrust against the Greek mainland 

by simulating action against the Dodecanese islands. 

To get this letter into Axis hands, British intelligence obtained with great difficulty the body of a service man who had 

been a victim of pneumonia. Endowed 

with the fictitious personality of Major 

Martin of the Royal Marines, the corpse, 

whose lungs and general condition would 

!l5 Alexander Despatch, pp. [5-[7. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 65 

indicate death by drowning, was carried 

in a sealed container by a British submarine to the coastal waters of Spain. 

\\Tith a courier's briefcase realistically 

chained to the wrist, the body was cast 

adrift at a predesignated spot where tide 

and current would carry it to shore. 

Three days after the submarine accomplished its mission, London received 

a telegram from the British Naval Attache in Madrid to the effect that the 

counterfeit body of Major Martin, "the 

man who never was," had been picked 

up by friends of the Axis, who believed 

him to be an official messenger drowned 

after an aerial mishap. Subsequent 

scrutiny of the contents of the brief case, 

after the body had been duly transferred 

to British authorities in neutral Spain, 

indicated that :\rchie Nye's letter had 

been opened, then refolded and replaced. 

The information reached the Germans 

who accepted it as authentic. On 12 May 

the OK\\' directed that measures to be 

taken in Sardinia and the Peloponnesus 

were to have priority over any others.36 

The other part of the HUSKY cover 

plan, Plan BARCLAY, sought to inspire the 

Axis to give priority to maintaining and 

reinforcing its sizable forces in southern 

France and in the Balkans.37 If these 

areas appeared subject to imminent at-

:11; Memo, Gen.St.d.H., Abt. FTemde HeeTe 

West, Nr. 874/43, g.K., 9 May 43, and Telg, 

Fremde Heere West, Nr. 27/43, g.Kdos. Chefs., 

12 May 43, both in OKH/Op.Abt., Allgemein 

Mittelmeer, Chefs., 9.IIl.-29·XIl.43 (H 22/147); 

Telg, OKW/WFSt/Op. Nr. 661055/43, g. Kdos. 

Chefs., 12 May 43, ONI, Fuehrer Directil'es, 

1942-1945, pp. 79-80; Ewen Montagu, The 

Man Who Never Was (Philadelphia: ]. B. Lippincott Company, 1954); Cf. Goebbels Diaries, p. 

:$94· :J7 Force 141. Intelligence Opns Prior to 10 luI. 

Salmon Files, 5-G-I-Ib; Plan BARCLAY, 0100/ 

41308; Progress Rpt on Plan BARCLAY, folder 3, 

job III. NWD, Record Group 13, NARS. 

tack, the Germans would be loath to 

weaken them in favor of reinforcing Sicily. 

By the end of June, German intelligence could not yet decide the ultimate 

purpose of bogus shifts of Allied troop, 

along the North African coast and other 

signs of impending invasion. Corsica 

seemed in no immediate danger, but 

whether the Allies would attack the Balkans, Sicily, Sardinia, or any combination 

of targets was far from clear.:1H 

Not all the Axis commanders were 

deceived. To some the signs were unmistakable. Increased Allied air attacks, 

increased naval activity, and the concentration of ground forces near North African ports of embarkation argued for the 

contention that Sicily was next. 

While Allied feints were in process, 

some Allied planners began to wonder 

whether an earlier invasion of Sicily might 

be advantageous. If the :\xis forces on 

Sicily were actually as confused and unprepared as they seemed, would it not be 

better to strike at the island just as soon 

as the Allies destroyed the ~\xis armies in 

North Africa? The prospect particular-

\v attracted planners in \Vashington. 

Several times during April and Mav they 

raised the question of the feasibility of 

what would be in effect an ad hoc 

HUSKy."9 In North Africa, too, AFHQ 

;;s SKI-/I. Abt., KTB, Teil A. I.-30.vI.43, 

13 and 14 lun 43 (see Bibliographical Note); 

Rpt, Beurteilung der Lage auf den Inseln Sizilien, 

Sardinien und Korsika, Der ObeTbefehlshaber 

Sued, Fuehrung<abteilung to GenStdH lOp. Abt. 

(II), 30 lun 43, OKH/Op. Abt., West I. Mittelmeer, Chefs., 1 9.v.43-1 I. VIl.44 (H 22/290) (cited 

hereafter as Westl. MittelmeeT. Chefr. (H 22/290). 

"9 Msg, FORTUNE 116. 117, 118. to AFHQ. dl 

Apr 43. and Msg, OPD 164 to AFHQ, 30 Apr 

43. both in OPD Exec 3, item 10; Memo. Strategy Sec Strategy and Planning Gp OPD to Cen 

Marshall, 12 Apr 43; Msg, OPD 3465 to AFHQ, 

18 Apr 43; and Memo. U.S. ]SP for U.S. CofS. 

19 Apr 43, all in OPD 381 Security. sec. lB. 
66 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

planners were working on a plan for a 

surprise landing in Sicily in conjunction 

with an amphibious assault-Operation 

VULcAK-·against the remammg Axis 

forces still holding out on Cape Bon. 40 

To General Eisenhower and his principal subordinate commanders, however, 

an ad hoc HUSKY seemed impractical 

and almost impossible. As Eisenhower 

informed the Combined Chiefs in April, 

.\FHQ was finding it difficult enough to 

meet the requirements of a formal invasion in the time required. To prepare 

alternate plans would undoubtedly cause 

a delayY 

In response, General Marshall suggested 

that "your planners and mine may be too 

conservative in their analyses." The element of suprise contained in a modified 

HUSKY, Marshall continued, and the lack 

of time afforced the enemy to strengthen 

his forces in Sicily lent tremendous advantages to an early HUSKY and "may 

justify your accepting calculated risks." 

Planners were notoriously orthodox, Mar1ihall added. They lacked the boldness 

and daring "which won great victories 

for Nelson and Grant and Lee." Eisenhower's conclusion, he noted, might "suggest a lack of adaptability." 42 

General Eisenhower was quick to reply. 

.\FHQ planners were continually searching, he said, for ways to exploit success. 

Quite obviously, stronger invasion forces 

would be necessary after the Axis had 

had two months to prepare Sicily's defenses. "I am willing," he wrote, "to 

take the risk of capturing important 

40 AFHQ JPS P/iS, 4 May 43, job loA, reel 

138E; AFHQ JPS P/64 (Final), 2 Apr 43, job 

loA, reel 13M. 

11 Msgs 7728 and 7729, AFHQ to AGWAR. 

28 Apr 43, OPD Exec 3, item I!. 

.," Msg, FORTUNE 164 to AFHQ, 30 Apr 43, 

OPD Exec 3, item IO. 

Southeastern airfields with no greater 

strength than that necessary to hang on 

to a bridgehead while all of the later 

strength is brought along to exploit the 

initial success." But AFHQ was having 

enough trouble getting the ground, naval, 

and air commanders to agree on the landing sites; securing their agreement on an 

earlier operation would be almost impossibleY 

Making his final decision on 10 May, 

Eisenhower concluded there would be 

no impromptu invasion to try to exploit 

the confusion among the Axis forces incident to their final defeat in North Africa. 

He so informed the Combined Chiefs on 

the following day. "We have not sufficient landing craft at the moment," he 

wrote, "to carry a total of more than 

one division and, of this, assault landing 

craft for one regimental combat team 

only. r consider an attack with less than 

two divisions . . . too great a risk. . . ." 

The prospect of having more landing 

ships and craft later in the year made a 

thoroughly planned operation infinitely 

more desirable.H 

Hardly had this matter been settled 

when a new CCS directive arrived. It 

embodied the decision reached at the 

TRIDENT Conference: to continue Mediterranean operations after Sicily with the 

purpose of eliminating Italy from the 

war and containing the maximum number of German forces. While Mr. 

Churchill was in Algiers immediately after 

4:l Msg, AFHQ Out 9271 to AGWAR, 4 May 

43. Smith Papers. 

44 AFHQ, Red of Mtg Held by CinC AF, 10 

May 43. 0100/4/59, I; AFHQ JPS Pli5 (Third 

Draft), 10 May 43, job IOA, reel I38E; Msg, 

AFHQ Out W-305 to AGWAR, II May 43, 

Diary Office CinC, Book VI, p. A-373; see also 

Memo for Personal Red, I Jul 43, Diary Office 

CinCo Book VII, p. A-515. 
PREPARATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES 67 

TRIDENT, AFHQ continued its planning 

of future operations in the Mediterranean. 

Despite Churchill's efforts to badger 

General Eisenhower and his staff into a 

direct attack on the Italian mainland, 

.\FHQ studied several alternative courses: 

attacks against Sardinia and Corsica, followed by an invasion of the Tyrrhenian 

coast, and attacks against the toe and 

sale of the Italian boot. The chief tangible result of Churchill':,; vi,iit was his 

definite offer to make some eight British 

divisions then in the Middle East available to .'\FHQ. 

General Rooks, the AFHQ G-3, on 3 

June outlined the general scheme of 

;\FHQ's alternative operations. It differed from earlier plans drawn in May 

only in its elimination of MUSKET (an 

amphibious attack against Taranto) as a 

possibility. BUTTRESS, an assault on the 

toe near Reggio, and GOBLET, an assault 

near Crotone, were the operations proposed. Provided that conditions were 

auspicious, the two assaults would be 

closely correlated and the objective would 

he, not the mere occupation of the Calabrian peninsula, but the seizure of Calabrian ports and airfields to enable Allied 

forces to march overland and gain control 

of port facilities adequate to maintain a 

larger force in southern Italy. .\n advance up the west coast to Naples or a 

drive to Taranto and the southern Adriatic ports in the heel were alternatives. 4 r. 

Invasions of Sardinia and Corsica were 

considered to be easier. The Allies would 

need a separate headquarters to plan and 

execute the operation, though follow-up 

forces might be drawn from Sicily. The 

I" AFHQ JPS P/B7 (Final), 3 Jun 43, job 

54A, reel 88 Special. 

U.S. Fifth Army, under General Clark, 

appeared to be the logical headquarters 

for the task, which might be launched 

by I October. It was also decided that 

the Fifth Army would be directly under 

AFHQ's command. 

On 10 June, therefore, General Eisenhower directed General Clark to prepare 

plans for seizing Sardinia, a ta~k Fifth 

:\rmy completed by the end of the month. 

Eisenhower also asked General Giraud, 

French commander in North ;\frica, to 

name a commander and a staff to plan 

an as~ault on Cor~ica as a purely }'rench 

operation. 

The plans for seizing Sardinia and Corsica at this time were alternative cour"es 

to be followed in case AFHQ judged an 

attack on the Italian mainland too risky. 

This denoted a change in AFHQ strategy. 

Before the Casablanca Conference, General Eisenhower would have preferred 

Sardinia over Sicily if, at that time, the 

ultimate objective had been fixed a<; the 

invasion and occupation of the Italian 

mainland. In early May, likewise, Eisenhower endorsed Rooks' strategic concept that the next operations after Sicily 

should be the occupation of Sardinia and 

Corsica. Once the ;\lIies controlled the 

airfields on those islands, the\" would be 

able to mount amphibious att~cks against 

southern France or against any point 

along the western coast of Italy. But 

since the CCS after the TRIDEKT Conference had defined AFHQ's mission as 

eliminating Italy from the war, the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica and intensified aerial bombing attacks hardly 

seemed likely in June to be sufficient to 

force the Italian Government out of the 

war. The considered opinion of AFHQ's 

intelligence agencies was that Italy would 

collapse only after the Allies had invaded 
the mainland and were marching on 

Naples and Rome. 

By the last week of June, AFHQ had 

delegated the detailed planning of mainland operations to 15 Army Group (still 

using the code name Force 141) , while

the Fifth Army worked on the invasion 

of Sardinia. By then, BUTTRESS, the invasion of the toe, had been assigned to 

the British 10 Corps, and GOBLET, the 

invasion of the sole, to the British 5 Corps. 

No time schedule for these operations 

could be forecast, but their sequence 

seemed evident. BUTTRESS would have 

to wait one month after Sicily, and GOBLET one month after BUTTRESS. Thus, 

if the Sicilian Campaign ended 1 August, 

BUTTRESS might be launched 1 September, GOBLET the following month. If no 

mainland operations were undertaken, 

the assault on Sardinia might be launched, 

Eisenhower believed, by 1 October.46 

46 JIC Algiers. Estimates on Italian Morale, 29 

Jun 43, job 10A, reel 17C; Br JP (43) 218 (Final). an. II, 21 Jun 43, Mediterranean Strategy. 

job 10A, reel 21C; an. I, 21 Jun 43, to Br JP (43) 

218 (Final), sub: Note by C.G.S., MidEast; 

HF/M/2, Mtg to Discuss Future Opns in Mediterranean, 14 Jun 43, job 10A, reel 18C; COS 

(43) 134th Mtg, 23 Jun 43. item 2, job 10A, reel 

21C; Notes of Mtg at Hq Force 141 on 24 Jun 

43 To Discuss the Mounting of Opns BUTTRESS 

and GOBLET, job 26A, reel 225B; AFHQ JPS 

P/92 (Final). 26 Jun 43, sub: Memo G–3 

These cautious plans for attack on the 

Italian mainland inspired little enthusiasm 

at AFHQ. BUTTRESS and GOBLET promised only a toe hold on the Calabrian 

peninsula. They offered small hope of 

striking a blow to Italy capable of eliminating it from the war; they did not 

even guarantee an area suitable as a base 

for future large-scale operations. What 

the Allies needed was a strike at Rome. 

But such a step demanded the prior 

seizure of ports. And this in turn led to 

preoccupation with Naples. Various proposals for overland approaches ran into 

the problem of the intervening terrain--- 

the ground in southern Italy favored the 

defense. Until there were more definite 

indications of a weakening of Italian morale, Allied commanders fitted all the 

schemes for gaining adequate ports on 

the mainland into a cautious framework-- 

capturing the toe of Italy first. The Allies were aware, however, that success in 

Sicily might open new and exciting courses 

of action.47 

AFHQ for CofS AFHQ, POST-HUSKY Opns, job 

10C, reel 138E; Msg, AFHQ NAF 250 to CCS, 

29 Jun 43, printed in Alexander, Allied Armies 

in Italy, vol. I, an. II to app. B, pp. 60–63; Min 

of AFHQ Exec Planning Mtg 2, 7 Jul 43, job 

61C. reel 138C. 

47 See further discussion below in section one 

of Chapter XIV. Sardinia Versus the Mainland. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Axis Situation 

P antelleria 

A small island about eight miles long, 

five miles wide, Pantelleria is rugged, 

with sheer cliffs rising out of the sea. 

The few small areas of level ground were 

intensively cultivated except around the 

airfield, which could handle eighty singleengine fighter aircraft. About 120 miles 

southwest of Palermo, Pantelleria is about 

the same distance as Malta from Catania. 

Since late 1940, the British had wanted 

to reduce Pantelleria in order to remO\'e 

the air threat which it posed. But by the 

time the British could devote some attention and effort to the problem, the German 

Air Force had moved into Sicily, making 

the risks of assaulting Pantelleria too 

great. British plans lay dormant until 

the end of 1942, when they began to 

receive consideration. 1 Still, seizing Pantelleria would not be easy, for by the 

spring of 1943 the island was a seemingly 

impregnable fortress garrisoned by about 

12,000 troops, with underground aircraft 

hangars hewn from solid rock impervious 

to bombardment. 

AFHQ began to look hard at Pantelleria in early February 1943, when General 

Marshall informed General Eisenhower 

that the U.S. Navy could not provide 

1 Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World 

War," \'oL III, The Grand Alliance (Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin Co .• 1950). pp, 56-59. 

eight auxiliary aircraft carriers requested 

for air coyer of the American assault on 

Sicily. Marshall suggested instead that 

Eisenhower seize Pantelleria for its airfield, from which Allied fighters could 

support the Sicily operation. 2 

Though Eisenhower at first was not 

impressed, he set his staff to prepare a 

plan to reduce Pantelleria, but only "if 

the capture became necessary." ~ The 

conclusion of the planners was unfavorable. Pantelleria posed difficult problems even if unlimited resources were 

available. With preparations for Sicily 

limiting available resources sharply, Pantelleria seemed altogether too tough. 

Pantelleria could be taken only at the expense of postponing the Sicilian assault, 

and planners felt that the importance of 

Pantelleria to the success of HUSKY was 

too small to justify delay.4 

So the matter rested until May, when 

the invasion plan moved the entire Allied 

assault to the southeastern corner of 

Sicily. General Eisenhower again (on-

" Msg. AGWAR Out 2152, 12 Feb 43, and Msg, 

AFHQ Out 1413, 17 Feb 43. both in 0100/21/ 

1079; Ltr, King to Marshall, II Feb 43, sub: 

Opn HUSKy-Employment of ACV's (auxiliary 

aircraft carriers), WDCSA HUSKY, 

:: Msg, AFHQ Out 1409 to AGWAR, 17 Feb 

43. OPD Cable File, 

j AFHQ JPS P/5S (Third Draft), 30 Mar 43: 

Memos. AFHQ G-3 for AFHQ CofS. sub: Capture of Pantelleria, 4 May 43, and Interrelationships of Certain Opns, 9 May 43. all in 01001 

12C/3II, II. 
70 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

sidered seizing Pantelleria. He admitted 

that there were disadvantages in such an 

operation: possible heavy losses in men, 

ships, and landing craft, which could be 

ill afforded on the eve of the Sicilian invasion; the fact that a successful defense 

at Pantelleria would put heart into the 

Sicilian defenders at a time when "we 

sought to break it;" and the fact that 

the operation would point rather obviously to the next Allied move in the 

Mediterranean. Yet Eisenhower now 

saw great advantages in having the island: 

better air cover for the American landings; removal of a serious Axis threat to 

Allied air and naval operations during the 

Sicilian invasion; the use of Pantelleria 

as a navigational aid for Allied aircraft 

and for bases for air-sea rescue launches; 

denial of Pantelleria as a refueling base 

for enemy E-boats and submarines; and 

elimination of enemy radio direction finder 

and shipwatching stations to insure a 

better possibility of achieving tactical 

surprise for the Sicilian invasion. ~ 

Intelligence reports were promising. 

Only five Italian infantry battalions, for 

the most part untested in battle, defended 

Pantelleria, and they were supported 

mainly by antiaircraft batteries manned 

by militia troops. The only evidence of 

the state of their morale was "the poor 

display of the antiaircraft gunners when 

our air forces raided on 8 May." G 

C'Msg, AFHQ Out W-2460 to AGWAR, II 

Jun 43, 0100/21/1079; Col. Joseph I. Greene, 

"Operation CORKSCREW: Tough Decision," Infantry Journal, vol. LIX, No. S (November, 1946), 

pp. 20-21. 

fl Eisenhower's Pantelleria Dispatch. copy in 

OCMH: app. XL to the Zuckerman Rpt, 0100/ 

11/966 and 0100/21/1081, II. Professor S. 

Zuckerman was the scientific adviser to NAAF 

with the official title of Chief, Operations Analysis Unit, A-3. 

On 10 May, perhaps still stung by 

General Marshall's rebuke on his "lack 

of adaptability," Eisenhower decided to 

seize Pantelleria, but without expending 

heavily in men or materieL To obviate 

a full-scale assault, Eisenhower thought 

of making the operation "a sort of laboratory to determine the effect of concentrated heavy bombing on a defended 

coastline." He wished the Allied air 

forces "to concentrate everything" m 

blasting the island so that the damage to 

the garrison, its equipment and morale, 

would be "so serious as to make the landing a rather simple affair." Constant 

artillery pounding on the defenders of 

Corregidor in 1942 seemed to have had 

that effect and Eisenhower wanted "to 

see whether the air can do the same 

thing." 7 

The British 1St Infantry Division, supported by appropriate naval forces, was 

to follow the bombardment and seize and 

occupy the island. The smaller nearby 

Pelagian Islands-Lampedusa, Linosa, 

and Lampione-were also to come under 

attack. 8 

All three services established a headquarters at Sousse and 

Increasingly heavy air 

and a naval shoot soon 

went to work. 

bombardments 

reduced Pantel-

'Ltc Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 May 43, 

Diary Office CinC, Book VI, pp. A-400-A-402; 

Memo for Personal Red, I .luI 43, Diary Office 

CinC, Book VI, pp. A-SIS-A-SI9; AFHQ, Rcd 

of Mtg Held by CinC AF, 10 May 43, 0100/ 

1 2C133 I. II; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 

16S· 

H Ltr, MAC to NAAF, 14 May 43. sub: Opn 

CORKSCREW, 0403/11/968; Msg, AFHQ Out 

W-2460 to AGWAR, II Jun 43,0100/21/1079; 

Ltr, AFHQ to Br 1st Inf Div, 14 May 43, sub: 

Opn CORKSCREW. OIOO/I2C/S23, I; AFHQ JPS 

P /81 (Final), IS May 43, sub: Action Against 

Lampedusa, job loA, reel 138E; Memo, AFHQ 

DCofS for AFHQ G-3, 19 May 43, sub: Opn 

Against Lampedusa, 0100/I2C/33I, I. 
THE AXIS SITUATION 71 

PANTELLERIA UNDER ATTACK, "a hurricane cifJire and smoke." 

lcria to shambles. Enemy casualties were 

few in number, but damage to housing, 

roads, and communications was severe. 

By I June the port was in ruins, the town 

practically destroyed, and the electric 

plant knocked out. Shortages in water, 

ammunition, and supplies, plus the almost 

incessant explosions, began to have serious effects on morale. During the first 

ten days of June, more than 3,500 planes 

dropped almost 5,000 tons of bombs. 9 

On the morning of 8 June, members 

of the I talian garrison brought to the 

island commander some surrender leaflets 

dropped by the aircraft. As Supermarina 

proudly reported the incident to Comando 

"Crave n and Cate, eds. , Eu rope: TORCH to 

POINTBLANK .. pp. 425-26. 

Supremo, Pantelleria had not replied to 

the Allied ultimatum, Pantelleria would 

resist to the utmost.

10 

Again on 10 June the ,Italians refused 

to accept surrender. The single radio 

station working assured Rome that " despite everything Pantelleria will continue 

to resist. " Successive telegrams, as many 

as twenty that night, told of Pantelleria's 

crumbling endura nce, but none mentioned 

surrender. 11 

' 0 NotiziaTi opeTa tiv i SupeTmaTina, IT A I 17.">; 

Informa=ioni dei vaTi JeTvizi relativi aile FOTze 

Aeree, Servizio I nformazio ni MilitaTi (SIM ) Rpts, 

IT 1423. See also Enzo Cirone, L'isola disp erata 

(PantelleTia ) 1942- 1943 (Milan : Edizioni Ariminum, 1946 ). 

" MS #R- 135, Report on Visit to Rome 

During J a nua ry 1959 (Bauer), pp. 24-25; see 

a lso MS #R-I 15 (Bauer ). 
72 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

On the morning of I I June, the Allied invasion fleet carrying the British 1st 

Division halted about eight miles off the 

harbor entrance of the port of Pantelleria. 

The ground troops loaded into assault 

craft. The weather was good, the sea 

calm. Only a few low-hanging clouds 

flecked the sky. Pantelleria itself was 

cloaked in the haze and dust raised by 

air bombardment earlier that morning. 

The Italian island commander had followed his usual custom of holding a staff 

conference that morning, even though 

Allied planes were plunging the island 

into a "hurricane of fire and smoke." 

Heavy smoke and dust clouds blocked a 

view of the ocean, and the island commander was unaware of the Allied fleet 

offshore. Discussion at the staff meeting 

soon showed everyone in agreement---

the situation had become untenable because of lack of water, communications, 

ammunition, and also because of the 

danger of disease. Furthermore, no Axis 

planes remained on Pantelleria; help from 

outside could not be expected; and the 

'24,000 people on the island had about 

reached the end of their endurance. 

Since the commander had wired Supermarina several hours earlier that "the 

situation is desperate, all possibilities of 

effective resistance have been exhausted," 

he ordered his air commander to display 

a white cross on the field. Because it 

would take almost two hours for the 

order to reach all the posts, the commander set the time for the cessation of 

hostilities at I 100. Shortly after he made 

his decision, the clouds opened and he 

saw the Allied shipsY 

At about that time the landing craft 

started their final run to the beaches. 

I~ MS #R-[35 (Bauer), pp. [9-21. 

There was a strange stillness, the only 

nOIse being the pounding of the assault 

craft, the drone of fighters orbiting overhead. Cruisers started to fire at shore 

battery positions around I 100, and thirty 

minutes later escorting destroyers added 

their fires. No reply came from the island. At I 135, U.S. Flying Fortresses 

bombarded the island in "the most perfect precision bombing of unimaginable 

intensity." At 1145, the assault echelon 

commander released his craft. By noon 

British troops were ashore. Shortly afterwards white flags appeared on many of 

the buildings. 13 

Lampedusa had also refused the Allied 

surrender offer, the island commander 

notifying Rome that "bombardments are 

continuing without interruption, both 

from the air and from the sea. Air Support required urgently." Instead of help, 

only words of intended cheer arrived: 

"\Ve are convinced that you will inflict 

the greatest possible damage on the enemy. 

Long live Italy." Disappointed, resentful, 

feeling that they had done their duty, 

the members of the garrison, after being 

ordered to do so by the island commander, 

raised white flags in surrenderY Linosa 

fell the next day, 13 June. The Allies 

found Lampione unoccupied. 

Allied intelligence had overestimated 

the will to resist of the defending garnI" Rpt of S~OL, Force 2, [:I Jun 43, End 2 

to Rpt, CinC Med Station, 0[00/2[/1080, I; 

Rpt, Lt Comdr G. A. Martelli (Br),.Diary Office 

CinC, Book VI, pp. A-495-A-498; AFHQ G-2 

Weckly Intcl Sum 42 and AFHQ Special Communique. [[ J un 43, job lOA, reel [38E. 

1 I Review of Sebi Caltabiano, Missione a 

I.ampedusa (Catania: Edizione Camene), Rivista 

Militare, vol. XI (Rome, [955), p. [364; MS 

#R-[[S (Bauer), pp. 47-50. See also Rpt, [5th 

Cruiser Squadron, End 5 to RpL CinC Med Station; Rpt, LCI(L) [6[,22 Jun 43. Ene! 6 to RpL 

CinC Med Station. 
THE AXIS SITUATION 

sons. Despite Fascist propaganda, Pantelleria and the Pelagian Islands were 

hollow shells manned largely by over-age 

and inexperienced individuals, many of 

whom had their homes on the isles. 

'Vhen the Allies attacked, quite a few 

succumbed to the temptation of looking 

after their families instead of remaining 

at their posts. But against the power of 

the 'Vestern c\llies, there was probably 

little they could have done with their inadequate and obsolete equipment. 

On 20 June British aircraft began to 

operate from the field at Lampedusa, and 

six days later a group of U.S. P-40 

fighters was based at Pantelleria. 

Eisenhower's laboratory experiment had 

been eminently successful. Pantelleria 

and the Pelagian Islands gave the Allies 

a safer channel for shippin~ in the central 

:Mediterranean and, more important, valuable airfields closer to Sicily and the 

I talian mainland. 

Growing German Strength 

Allied seizure of Pantelleria furnished 

no sure indication to Axis intelligence of 

the future course of Allied operations in 

the Mediterranean. 'Vhether the attack 

on the outlying Italian islands was preliminary to an attack on Sicily or whether 

it served a plan of greater scope was not 

clearY' 

'Vhat was more than clear was the 

speed with which Pantelleria and the 

other islands had fallen. The rapid collapse showed that the Axis had definitely 

lost the initiative, for the c\xis Powers 

could do little more than await invasion 

elsewhere, prepare to counterattack, and 

I" Promemoria, Comando Supremo, 15 Jun 43, 

SIM Rpts. IT 1423; MS #R-I IS (Bauer), p. 53. 

73 

hope to repel the landings. Naval forces 

could react with only light surface craft 

and submarine actIvIty against Allied 

shipping. Air forces were reduced to 

purely defensive efforts. Moreover, Pantelleria seemed to prove to Mussolini that 

air bombardment, like artillery, conquered 

ground and allowed the infantry to occupy it. Considering the fact that the 

Allies were blessed with a superiority of 

artillery and other equipment, the inference was evident. 16 

To the Italians, the loss of Pantelleria 

was depressing. If this was the start of 

the battle for Sicily, Sardinia, or the Italian mainland, it was a poor beginning. 

As the Italian people awakened increasingly to the realization that they had lost 

the war, defeatism spread. I. 

To the Germans, loss of the islands 

meant not only a military defeat and a 

blow to Axis morale, it served also as an 

indication of the performance they could 

expect in the future from their Italian 

allies. The Germans could not understand why the outlying islands had not 

been sufficiently stocked with the supplies 

of war. It was difficult for them to 

comprehend why the Italians, fighting on 

their own soil, had offered so little resistance. Did the speedy fall of Pantelleria foreshadow the course of future operations in the Mediterranean? 18 

If the capitulation of Pantelleria made 

the Germans feel that they could expect 

no resurgence of Italian morale in defense of the homeland, it made Coman do 

I" Speech by Mussolini, 12 Jun 43, summarized 

in OSS Rpt A-63366. undated, OCMH. 

17 See Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 13. 

I' Rpt. 8.Armee, 8. VII.1943: Bereitschaft 

u'egen Einnahme l'on Pantelleria, IT 53/2; SKL/ 

LAbt., KTB, Teil A. L-3o,VI.43, 12 Jun 43, 

referring to a report received from the Italians 

dated II June 194:,. 
74 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Supremo much more willing to accept 

German help in the form of divisions to 

defend Italian soiU9 

Just before the fall of Pantelleria, Ambrosio, increasingly worried over defending Italy, had reluctantly concluded that 

two robust and highly mobile German 

divisions were necessary for the defense 

of Sicily. But if the Hermann Goering 

Division moved to Sicily, southern Italy 

would be exposed, for the 16th Panzer 

Division could not act as mobile reserve 

against landings on both east and west 

coasts. 20 Ambrosio discussed these problems with Kesselring and Rintelen on I 

June. And when Kesselring forced the 

issue by asking, "Do you request me to 

inquire with the OKW to see if there is 

another division in addition to the 16th 

Panzer Division?" Ambrosio admitted 

that that was what he meant. 21 The 

I talians were now willing to accept five 

German divisions, the number Hitler had 

originally offered to Mussolini. 

Believing that the Germans could defend Italy if the Italians co-operated, 

having great faith and confidence in Mussolini though suspicious of the Italian 

military command, Kesselring asked Ambrosio whether the Italians needed more 

antiaircraft protection for the arterial 

railway lines and the power dams. Ambrosio did not commit himself at once, 

but a month later a formal, written re1!' Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. I. p. 33; Rintelen in MS #T-Ia (Westphal 

et al.). ch. II, p. 15. 

"0 The Hermann Goering Division was officially 

named the Hermann Goering Panzer Fallschirmjaeger Division, and was a unit of the German 

L'lftwaffe. The new men were drawn largely 

from the Luftwaffe, and thus the division acquired 

the name of a paratroop division. 

"' Min, I Jun 43, item 158, Min of Confs, 

Comando Supremo, IT 26. 

quest reached Kesselring. The Italians 

asked for antiaircraft guns and also for 

German crews. These would not arrive 

in Italy until August; by then they would 

be too late. 22 

Meanwhile, Kesselring returned to 

Rome on 8 June after visiting Hitler's 

headquarters. Hitler had told him that 

he was willing to send more planes, tanks, 

reconnaissance units, self-propelled guns, 

and troops to Italy. All the Italians had 

to do, Hitler said, was to have the Duce 

and Comando Supremo ask for them.23 

But Ambrosio was in a quandary. If 

Mussolini was really going to break with 

the Germans, the fewer German troops 

in Italy the better. If, on the other 

hand, Italy was to oppose an Allied attack, more German troops were necessary. 

More were available, as Kesselring 

pointed out to Ambrosio on I I June, 

the day that Pantelleria surrendered. 

But when Kesselring said that both General Hube, the XIV Panzer Corps commander, and the Italian commander in 

Sicily thought that additional German 

troops were needed, Ambrosio professed 

to be unconvinced. He wondered whether the 16th Panzer Division might be 

sent to Sardinia, the Hermann Goering 

Division held in southern Italy. Kesselring objected on two counts: Sardinia 

was inappropriate terrain for employing 

an armored division--the 16th Panzer 

Division should therefore stay on the 

22 MS #T-2, K I (Kesselring), pp. 5-6; Min, 

I Jun 43, item 158, Min of Confs, Cornando Supremo, IT 26; Ltr, Gomando Supremo (Generale 

di Corpo d' Armata Carlo Rossi) to the Commander in Chief South (Kesselring), I J ul 43, No. 

14450/0p., sub: Difesa controaerea delle communicazioni ferroviarie Italia-Germania. an. 6, 

folder IV, IT 3029. 

2:1 Min. 8 Jun 43. item 165, Min of Cones, 

Comando Supremo, IT 26. 
THE AXIS SITUATION 

mainland; and one mobile German division was insufficient as a reserve in Sicily 

because two areas of attack were likely, 

in the west and in the southeast. Kesselring urged that Ambrosio, if he planned 

to request additional German forces, make 

his requests promptly so that OKW 

would have adequate time to prepare the 

divisions and move them. Ambrosio replied with some irritation that he was 

not prepared to make a formal request, 

though he said he would submit a complete statement of Italy'S requirements 

within a few days.24 

The fall of Pantelleria and the Pelagian 

Islands, which prompted Hitler to order 

both Sardinia and Sicily reinforced, 

caused Ambrosio to change his mind. 

When Ambrosio met again with Kesselring on 12 June, he was in a completely 

different mood. He acknowledged the 

validity of not moving the r6th Pan::er 

Division to Sardinia, though he wanted 

to be sure that there were adequate gum 

and tanks on the island. Upon learning 

that the Germans intended to send additional strength to Sardinia, Ambrosio 

agreed to keep the 16th Panzer Division 

on the mainland. Kesselring then announced that the Germans had another 

motorized division- -the 3d Panzer Grenadier-available and, if requested, it 

could be promptly moved to southern 

Italy, making possible the transfer of the 

Hermann Goering Division to Sicily. 

Ambrosio agreed to this proposal and to 

another by Kesselring that the reconnaissance battalion of the Hermann Goering 

Division proceed to Sicily at once. He 

also agreed that the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

Division might move into Italy immediately. Kesselring then said that if the 

~4 Min, II Jun 43, item 166, Min of Confs, 

Comando Supremo, IT 26. 

75 

Italians wished, the Fuehrer could send 

a fourth division for the defense of the 

Italian soil, making a total of six German 

divisions in Italy. Ambrosio replied that 

he would have to study the di,tribution 

of divisions carefully, and would gIve a 

formal answer in a few days.2:; 

A few days later professional advice 

from field commanders overcame Ambrosio's reluctance to admit additional 

German troops to Italy. After a very 

pessimistic report by the Italian commander in Sicily on 14 June, Comando 

Supremo three days later requested OKW 

to send to Italy two additional armored 

or motorized divisions. OKW complied 

by selecting the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

and the 26th Panzer Divisions, units that 

in mid-May had been earmarked for the 

occupation of northern Italy under Plan 

ALARICH.26 

By the end of June 1943, five German 

divisions, in whole or in part, were in 

Italy; two more divisions were about to 

enter the country; the XIV Panzer Corps 

headquarters was already in I tall'; and 

agreement had been reached for the arrival of another corps headquarters (the 

LXXVI Panzer Corps). Italy was beginning to resemble an occupied territory. 

The Defenses of Sicily 

Recognizing the impossibility of constructing and manning effective fortifica-

".> Min, 12 Jun 43, item 167, Min of Confs, 

Coman do Supremo, IT 26. 

~H Rpt, Generale d' Armata Alfredo Guzzoni to 

8.M.R.E., Coman do Supremo: Situazione difensiva della Sicilia, IT 3027; OKW/WFSt, KTB 

I.-3I.VIl.43, 21 Jul 43, pp. 3-4; Rintelen in MS 

#T -I a (Westphal et al.), ch. II, p. 12; Rpt. 

German Military Attache, Rome, on Co-operation 

With Italian High Command/Commitment of 

German Forces in Italy, 14 Jul 43, OKW/Amtsgruppe Ausland, 30.VI.43-3IYIlI.44. Wehrmacht 

Attache Italien (OKW 1029). 
76 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tions along the entire extensive Italian 

coast line, Comando Supremo had orIgmally decided to concentrate the defenses 

on the major islands, plus part of the 

southern mainland. During the winter 

of 1942-43, the Italians began to give 

precedence to the defenses of Sardinia, 

the most likely Allied target. Around 

March 1943, they started to make 

special efforts to brace Sicily.27 

German coastal defense advisers, who 

had supervised the construction of the 

Atlantic W' all on the Channel coast, arrived in Italy in the spring of 1943, and 

one group went to Sicily to make recommendations for its defense. Though 

Italian fortification experts, some of whom 

had visited the Atlantic Wall, were impressed and anxious to duplicate it, the 

Italians lacked the resources to build and 

man such a fortified belt. Despite strenuous efforts to improve and extend the 

few existing fortifications on the coast of 

Sicily, the Italians made little progress. 28 

The Italian Sixth Army had been stationed on Sicily since the autumn of 194 I. 

Generale di Corpo d' Armata Comandante 

Designato d' Armata Mario Roatta, former 

chief of staff of the Italian Army, took 

command in February 1943 and assumed 

responsibility for part of Calabria as well 

as for Sicily. Roatta controlled almost 

a dozen divisions under two corps headquarters, an air reconnaissance force, and, 

through liaison, certain German units. 

''\lith only partial control over the terri-

", Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 222-24; Faldella, 

Lo sbarco, pp. 34, 41. 

"Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. I, p. 24; Mario Caracciolo di Feroleto, "E 

poi?": La tragedia dell'esercito italiano, (Rome: 

Casa editrice libraria Corso 1946), pp. 94-95; 

cf. Memoirs of General Caracciolo di Feroleto, 

Commanding General of the Italian Fifth Army. 

EAP-21-a- 14/3 2. 

torial antiaircraft defenses manned by the 

Fascist Militia (headquartered at Palermo), Roatta had no control over ground 

militia, naval, and air forces on Sicily. 

He had no direction of the units under 

the civilian prefects of the provinces. To 

co-ordinate his dispositions with the plans 

of various independent headquarters, 

Roatta had to rely on liaison. In all, the 

Italian command authority was divided 

among seven military and nine civilian 

agencies. Except for the naval bases and 

a few ports, the island in early I 943 wa~ 

not on a wartime basis. 29 

Shortly after assuming command, Roatta obtained a degree of unified command by having Comando Supremo give 

his Sixth Army headquarters the additional title of Armed Forces Command, 

Sicily.30 Roatta then became responsible for the tactical commitment of the 

Italian Army, Navy, Air, and militia 

elements, plus the German ground troops 

in Sicily and in southern Calabria. 

Through a high commissioner for civilian 

affairs, Roatta also assumed control of 

the civilian administration of the nine 

provincial prefects. The relatively small 

German air and naval elements remained 

under autonomous German control. 31 

Roatta next requested troops and 

weapons to bring his ground forces up 

to wartime strength. He wanted manpower and materials so he could construct 

"!J Rpt, Difesa della Sicilia, 9 Mar 43, IT 3024; 

Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), ch. 

I. p. 14. 

:<0 The designations Armed Forces Command, 

Sicily and Sixth Army are used interchangeably 

in this volume. 

:11 Cir, Unitii di comando in Sicilia e in Sardegna, No. 9880, in a separate folder entitled 

Costituzione Comando FF.AA.della Sardegna, part 

of IT 830; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, I, 30 I. 
THE AXIS SITUATION 

GENERAL ROATTA 

additional fortifications, improve communications, make possible the evacuation 

of the civilian population from battle 

areas, and stockpile supplies and food. 

But the men and materials he received 

were far below the amounts he considered 

minimum requirements. 

Roatta nevertheless set soldiers and 

civilians to work to enlarge and improve 

the defenses on the beaches and at vital 

points on the main highways. He also 

began to construct a belt of fortifications 

and obstacles twelve to fifteen miles behind the beaches in order to contain 

Allied forces that might get ashore. He 

assigned each military unit a specific 

coastal sector for defense.32 

:l" Dante U go Leonardi, Luglio 1943 in Sicilia 

(Modena : Societa tipografi ca modenese editrice 

in Modena, 1947), p. 55 ; Zanussi, Guerra e 

catastrole , vol. I, pp. 303-04. 

77 

GENERAL GUZZONI 

After serving as commander for three 

months, Roatta issued a proclamation 

that the population interpreted as a slight 

to Sicilian patriotism. 33 This, added to 

changes recently made in the Italian high 

command, prompted Comando Supremo 

to appoint Roatta chief of the Army 

General Staff (Supe resercito ) and to 

nominate Generale d' Armata Alfredo 

Guzzoni in his place. 

Guzzoni's appointment was somewhat 

surprising, for he was sixty-six years old 

and had been in retirement for two 

years. Furthermore, he had never been 

to Sicily, nor had he ever displayed interest in the island and its military problems. Guzzoni's chief of staff, Col. Emilio 

"" The proclamation and the consequences are 

discussed in detail by Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 

251-53. See also Zanussi, Guerra e catastrote, I, 

3 12- 13. 
78 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Faldella, a young and capable officer, 

appeared a good choice, but he, too, was 

a stranger to Sicily. Nor had Faldella, 

contrary to the usual Italian practice of 

keeping a commander and his chief of 

staff together, ever served with Guzzoni.~4 

The Italian command structure was 

not rigid but rather relied on co-operation 

and co-ordination among commanders. 

An officer's ability to engage in teamwork 

was therefore important. Similarly, unit 

organization was flexible. Commanders 

formed small groups of varied composition to meet various situations, without 

formal reassignment or reorganization, designating them by location, the name of 

the commander, or by letters of the alphabet. When the need disappeared, the 

task force was informally dissolved and 

its elements returned to the original 

units. 35 These features were particularly 

significant in Sicily where an army headquarters had become responsible for employing a diversity of forces, Italian and 

German. Despite his unified command, 

Guzzoni exercised real control in great part 

only through liaison and mere recommendations. 

The co-ordination of German and Italian units on Sicily varied, with the result 

that the German elements were partially 

under German and partially under Italian 

control. In due course, parallel channels 

of communication and command developed, one from Guzzoni to C omando 

Supremo and Mussolini, the other from 

the individual German headquarters on 

the island to 0 B SUED. Liaison between 

34 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, I, 313-14. 

Faldella was subsequently promoted to brigadier 

general. 

35 Army Map Service, U.S. Army, Handbook on 

the Italian Army (Provisional Copy) (Washington, 1943). 

Kesselring and Ambrosio, chief of C omando Supremo, re-established co-ordination 

at that level. 

Part of this setup was the outgrowth 

of the organization established during the 

North African campaign. Hitler's predilection for dual control channels, mutual 

distrust between Italians and Germam 

after their defeat in Tunisia, and the need 

for flexibility brought about considerable 

vagueness, not to say confusion, in the 

command organization of the Axis 

partners. 

At the close of the North African 

campaign, when an Allied attack on Italy 

appeared in the offing, Kesselring was the 

main connecting link between Hitler and 

OKW on one hand and Mussolini and 

Comando Supremo on the other. Kesselring had controlled the German armed 

forces in Italy and the central Mediterranean through German representatives in 

Italy who also maintained liaison with 

Comando Supremo. Now, for better 

liaison, Kesselring established within Comando Supremo a mixed staff of Germans 

and Italians headed by his own chief of 

staff, General der Artillerie Siegfried 

Westphal. 36 

In mid-June, when Kesselring relinquished his air command to Feldmarschall 

Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen but 

:1(, Kesselring was also the commander of the 

German Second Air Force until replaced in June 

1943 by Field Marshal von Richthofen, who assumed command over all German air forces on 

the Italian mainland, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, 

and certain training units in France. He was 

also responsible for the Luftwaffe ground units, 

most of the German antiaircraft units in Italy, 

Luftwaffe signal units, and all air force administrative matters. See Deichmann in MS #T-Ia 

(Westphal et al.), ch. III, pp. 3-4, 34; British 

Air Ministry Pamphlet No. 248, The Rise and 

Fall of the German Air Force (1933 to 1945) 

(London, 1948). 
THE AXIS SITUATION 

retained his prerogatives as Commander 

in Chief South, he emerged as the 

strongest German officer in Italy. As 

theater commander, unifying in his person control of all the German armed 

forces in Italy, Kesselring was Hitler's 

representative on all questions concerning 

the conduct of the war in the central 

and western Mediterranean areas. Guzzoni found Kesselring a typical German 

officer who had a determined though 

courteous and conciliatory manner and 

who promised effective co-operation. 

Two of Kesselring's major problems were 

trying to reconcile the sometimes conflicting demands of German commanders and 

Italian prerogatives and trying to combat 

Italian pessimism on defending Sicily. 

Guzzoni, like his predecessor, saw little 

strength in the Sicilian defenses. The 

coastal battalions, he reported to Comando Supremo, were composed of men of 

older age groups, often hadly commanded, 

and in some instances covering defensive 

sectors up to twenty-five miles in length. 

Guzzoni, lacking antina val guns and deficient in all other types of artillery, had 

but one antitank gun for each five miles 

of coast line. As against a daily need of 

8,000 tons of supplies to meet civilian 

and military requirements, he was receiving I ,500 to 2,000 tons. The morale 

of the civilian population was very low 

because of Allied air bombardments and 

the restricted food supply-the rationing 

system had broken down, and blackmarket operations were widespread. The 

people wanted only an end to the war. 

If resolutely committed, Guzzoni estimated, his forces might hold back the 

initial Allied landings but could not check 

successive attacks. Reiterating Roatta's 

earlier demands for more artillery and 

tanks, he urged in addition the immediate 

79 

transfer of the Hermann Goering Division 

to Sicily.37 

Except at the naval bases, no continuous system of coastal defenses existed. 

Obstacles, mine fields on and off shore, 

antitank ditches, and concrete fortifications appeared only at widely separated 

points. Many fortifications lacked garrisons or weapons, many were poorly 

camouflaged and lacked troop shelters. 

In the interior, only a few roadblocks 

were ready, and most of these were inadequate. On the highway from Licata 

to Campobello, for a distance of more 

than twelve miles, for example, the entire 

antitank defense consisted of one 47-mm. 

gun. The inland blocking line consisted 

of a beautiful colored pencil mark on a 

map.38 

The three naval bases on Sicily were 

equipped with antinaval and antiaircraft 

artillery, and their seaward defenses were 

effectively organized. Their weaknesses 

were the undependable militia who 

manned many of the guns, the age of the 

guns, and their small caliber and short 

range. The bases had little defense 

against landward attack.30 

Though the naval commanders remained in control of technical, administrative, and training matters, Guzzoni 

was responsible for the defense of their 

bases. In the event of a ground attack, 

he was to send army reinforcements. Because of the importance of liaison to the 

command channels, the poor condition 

of signal communications caused serious 

37 Rpt, Guzzoni to S.M.R.E., Coman do Supremo: Situazione di/ensiva della Sicilia, 14 Jun 

43, IT 3027· 

!lR Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 46-48, 62; Maravigna, Rivista MilitaTe, 1952, pp. 13-14. 

39 Maravigna, Rivista MilitaTe, 1952, p. 14. 
80 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

GENERAL RODT FIELD MARSHAL VON RICHTHOFEN GENERAL CONRATH 

apprehension among all the commanders 

concerned. 40 

Expecting the Allies to try to seize airfields quickly, the Italians started work to 

surround the airfields with obstacles and 

strongpoints manned by infantry supported by artillery. They mined all landing 

strips to render them useless in the event 

of lossY 

The heart of Sicily's defenses consisted 

of forces under the two corps commanded 

by the Sixth Army: six coastal divisions, 

two coastal brigades, one coastal regiment, and four mobile divisions. In 

addition, two mobile German divisions 

were in Sicily by the end of June. 

The Italian units, numbering some 

200,000 men (including the airfield defense troops), generally had a poor combat effectiveness. The coastal units especially had antiquated or deficient arm40 Marc'Antonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy 

in World War II (Annapolis, Md.: United States 

Naval Institute, (957), ch. XIII. 

41 Faldella, La sbareo, pp. 50-53 and an. 2, 

p. 421; Roatta, Otto Milioni, p. 218. 

ament and virtually no transportation, 

they were badly commanded in many 

cases, and their indigenous personnel, as 

much as 75 percent in some units, reflected the low morale of the Sicilian 

population. Tactical groups created from 

division elements and from corps reserves 

were deployed relatively close to the 

beaches to support the coastal units, and 

these had some mobile elements. 

The special groups organized to defend 

the airfields consisted usually of one infantry and one artillery battalion per airfield, but they were soon augmented by 

mobile elements-light tanks, self-propelled guns, armored cars, motorized infantry and artillery, and various engineer 

units-and they served as a mobile 

reserve for general defensive operations. 

The four Italian mobile divisions, the 

best of the Italian combat forces on the 

island, were none too good. The Aosta 

and Napoli Divisions, largely composed 

of Sicilians, were poorly trained. The 

Assietta Division was somewhat better. 

But all three operated under reduced 
THE AXIS SITUATION 81 

GENERAL VON SENGER COLONEL BAADE GENERAL HUBE 

Tables of Organization, and their artillery 

and other equipment were for the most 

part antiquated. Only the Livorno Division was at full strength and had organic transportation. In all four divisions, artillery ammunition was generally 

in short supply or nonexistent, signal communications varied from poor to inadequate. 42 

The two German divisions made quite 

a contrast. The Division Sizilien, redesignated the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division on 29 June and commanded 

by Generalmajor Eberhard Rodt, was 

ready for commitment. It had supplies 

for twenty days of operations. Though 

not completely mobile, the division could 

move relatively quickly with its organic 

42 Rpt, Gilzzoni to S.M.R.E., Comando Supremo: Situazione difensiua della Sicilia, IT 3027 ; 

Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 50-53, 58-60; Maravigna, Riuista Militare, 1952, pp. 13-14; Comando 

Supremo, Situazione 0 peratiua logistica al 10 

luglio 1943, IT 17; MS #R-I 17, The Mission 

of General Guzzoni, ch. IV of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943 (Bauer) ; MS 

#R-135 (Ba uer), pp. 10-1 3, 18. 

equipmentY The Hermann Goering 

Division, under the command of Generalmajor (later, General der Fallschirmtruppen) Paul Conrath, moved from 

southern Italy into Sicily during June. 

It was somewhat deficient in infantry, 

but was also well trained and equipped, 

although the process of combined training did not effectively begin until the 

arrival of the division on Sicily. Airborne elements and other German units 

in southern and central Italy, if necessary, could also be employed in the defense of Sicily.44 

Though operational command of German units-totaling some 30,000 men4" MS #C-077, Studie ueber den Feldzug in 

Sizilien bei der 15.Pz.Gren.Div., Mai-August 1943 

(Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt ) ; Unit Record 

Card, OKH / Org Abt., Karteiblatt, 15.Pz.Gren. 

Diu (H 1/ 540). 

H MS #T-2, Der Kampf um Sizilien (General der Panzertruppen Walter Fries et al.); the 

detailed order of battle for the I talian and German units on Sicily can be found in MS #R-125, 

Order of Battle, I July 1943, ch. V of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943 

(Bauer) . 
82 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

remained in Italian hands, Hitler and the 

OKW sometimes sent instructions directly to local commanders, who frequently 

communicated directly with the OKW. 

The Italians soon came to accept the view 

that obtaining German co-operation was 

preferable to a strict imposition of Italian 

authority.45 

The XIV Panzer Corps headquarters, 

located in southern Italy, functioned under DB SUED to administer and supply 

the German units in Sicily. The Italians could hardly object to this, and the 

Germans had a headquarters ready to 

take over active operations should such a 

course of action become necessary or desirable. General Hube had commanded 

the corps in Russia and had received 

high praise for his performance.46 

Late in June 1943, the Germans introduced another officer into the command picture, Generalleutnant Fridolin 

von Senger und Etterlin, who became 

liaison officer with the Sixth Army headquarters and responsible for co-ordinating the employment of German troops 

{;ommitted on the island. 

The Italian battle fleet, stationed at 

La Spezia and far removed from Sicily, 

was seriously reduced in strength, lacked 

radar and aircraft carriers. I t could be 

effective against an Allied armada only 

with adequate air protection, which was 

not available. Furthermore, it needed 

twenty-four hours to reach the waters 

45 Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.). 

ch. I, pp. 24-25; Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 65; 

Rintelen in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), ch. II, 

p. 12; OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3 I. VII. 43, I Jul 

43· 46 Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. I, p. 27; XIV Panzer Korps, la, Taetigkeitsbericht mit Anlagen, 29.III.-19.v·43 (33394/3), 

I7 May 43; Unit Record Card, OKH /Org Abt., 

Karteiblatt, XIV Panzer Korps (H 1/540). 

off Sicily. For these reasons and because 

of apprehension that the first major battle of the surface fleet might well be its 

last, Comando Supremo decided late in 

May to commit the naval forces in the 

defense of Sicily only if an extraordinarily 

good opportunity presented itself and if 

sufficient fuel oil was on hand to support 

the operation. Comando Supremo also 

directed the small naval craft stationed in 

Sicilian and Sardinian waters to remain 

in defense of their home stations rather 

than join forces in the event one or the 

other island came under attack. 

The most important German vessels 

consisted of a landing craft flotilla at 

Messina. Plans to supplement the few 

German submarines in the Mediterranean 

had to be abandoned because the passage 

through the Strait of Gibraltar had become increasingly difficultY 

The better to organize their services of 

supply across the Messina Strait, the 

Germans in May unified a number of 

Army, Navy, and Air Force transportation installations into a single headquarters. Eventually known as Commandant 

Messina Strait under Col. Ernst Guenther 

Baade, it was responsible for ferry service, 

depots, and antiaircraft defenses, controlling in the latter function some seventy 

antiaircraft batteries on the Italian mainland and on Sicily to guard the strait.48 

---:j7-CinC Navy Visits Italy, 12-15 May 43 and 

Rpt on the War Situation by the German Staff, 

Supermarina, 2 Apr 43, both in ONI, Fuehrer 

Conferences, 1943; SKL/I. Abt., KTB, I.-30.VI. 

43, 9- 10 Jun 43· 48 Details on the organization and execution of 

the ferrying service are contained in the Translation of the Report on the Evacuation of Sicily 

(August 1943) by Vice-Admiral Friedrich von 

Ruge (1946), with enclosures (cited hereafter as 

Ruge Rpt), folder X-III, OCMH, and in Kommandant Messina Strasse, KTB, 25. VII.-25. VIII. 

43 und Anlagen (35746/1-3) (cited hereafter as 

Baade Diary) . 
THE AXIS SITUATION 

The Italian Air Force was III a hopeless situation because of obsolete and inferior aircraft. After the fall of Tunisia, 

Allied air attacks on Sicilian airfields became so intense that toward the end of 

May the Axis withdrew its bombers to 

the mainland. Italo-German co-ordination of air matters was poor, the German 

fighter units taking over the protection of 

Sicily from their own fields as though 

the Italians were not even present. But 

in a series of twenty-one air battles from 

the latter half of May through the early 

days of July, the Germans sustained heavy 

losses. Goering, who recognized what 

was happening but not the cause, brought 

heavy pressure to bear on the German 

Second Air Force, calling for incessant 

commitment of long-range bombers and 

fighters. But the German aircraft were 

not able to match the speed and armament of Allied planes. Goering added 

insult to injury by sending a special 

message to the fighter pilots of the Second Air Force: 

Together with the fighter pilots in France, 

Norway, and Russia, I can only regard you 

with contempt. I want an immediate improvement and expect that all pilots will 

show an improvement in fighting spirit. If 

this improvement is not forthcoming, flying 

personnel from the commander down must 

expect to be remanded to the ranks and 

transferred to the Eastern front to serve on 

the ground. 49 

Though Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek, 

chief of staff of the OKL, visited Kesselring and learned that decisive numerical 

49 Deichmann in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.). 

ch. III, pp. 9, 13, 14-15, 20-23, 29-30; Min, 28 

May 43, item 156, Min of Confs, Comando Supremo, IT 26; Note, Coman do Supremo to OKW, 

20 Jun 43, sub: Problema aereo del Mediterraneo, 

Giugno 1943, IT 3029, folder IV, an. 2; Operazioni in Sicilia dal 9 al 19 luglio, N arrativa, Allegati (cited hereafter as IT 99 a), an. 2. 

83 

and technical inferiority of German aIrcraft to those of the Allies was at the 

bottom of German air failure, Goering 

stubbornly refused to admit that the responsibility was his own. 

Because of air and naval weakness, the 

whole burden of the defense of Sicily fell 

on the Axis ground forces. Misunderstandings and misinterpretations among 

Italian and German commanders further 

aggravated the situation. 50 

Despite inadequate forces, materiel, and 

fortifications to defend the entire coast, 

the Italians felt impelled to fight at the 

water's edge. Small tactical reserves were 

to stand ready close behind the coastal 

defense forces, and mobile reserves in centrally located positions farther to the rear 

were to be available to counterattack as 

soon as the point of the main Allied attack became apparent. Because the Italians considered their coastal units 

incapable of repelling a landing, the commitment of these units to stubborn defense 

meant their sacrifice. Since reserves were 

few, the commanders hoped to increase 

their effectiveness by holding them together and ready to move to anyone of 

a number of widely separated points. 

The great drawback in this concept was 

the lack of sufficient mobility on the part 

of most units. The German units, with 

far greater mobility, could form the only 

effective reserve. Appreciating this, Kesselring, late in May, instructed German 

commanders to counterattack as soon as 

they knew the location of the main Allied 

attacks without waiting for orders from 

Guzzoni's headquarters. 51 

50 CinC Navy Visits Italy, 12-15 May 43, ONI, 

Fuehrer Conferences, 1943. 

51 MS #T-3, P I (Kesselring) pt. II, pp. 73-

75; MS #T-2, K I (Kesselring), pp. 12-13; 

Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 65-67, 82-86. 
84 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Guzzoni's headquarters was near Enna, 

fairly close to the center of the island. 

The Italian XVI Corps under Generale 

di Corpo d' Armata Carlo Rossi was to 

defend the eastern half of the island; the 

Italian XII Corps, first under Generale 

di Corpo d' Armata Mario Arisio, later 

under Generale di Corpo d' Armata 

Francesco Zingales, was assigned the 

western half of the island. By the latter 

part of May the coastal units were in 

their assigned sectors, and the Sixth Arm:}' 

had attached the Italian mobile divisions 

to both corps for commitment in their 

respective areas-Aosta and Assietta 

under XII Corps in southwest Sicily, 

Napoli near Catania, and Livorno near 

Gela under XVI Corps. In the Sixth 

Army reserve and reinforced by a selfpropelled Italian regiment of artillery, the 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division split its 

forces into three regimental teams-Group 

Ens in the southwest; Group Fullriede 

in the southeast; and Group Koerner in 

the Enna area as an unassigned reserve. 52 

General Rodt, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division commander, represented bv 

his chief of staff, discussed with Guzzoni 

the possibility of holding the mobile reserves closer to the coast. He proposed 

moving two of his regimental groups 

quite close to Gela and Catania, the third 

to the west but keeping it ready for immediate transfer to the east if necessary. 

Assuming that the Italian coastal divisions 

would barely delay the attackers, and 

estimating that the Allies would land in 

several different places before moving inland in pincer movements, Rodt wanted 

52 Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 62-63; Rintelen in 

MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), ch. II, p. 10; see 

Overlay, app. B.: Deployment as Planned by 

Mid-May 1943, MS #R-126, Deployment, ch. 

VI of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, JulyAugust 1943 (Bauer). 

to counterattack immediately and eliminate each landing in turn. He asked Guzzoni to attach to his division the mobile 

groups organized to defend the airfields. 

Convinced that the airfields would be 

immediately threatened, Guzzoni refused. 

Admitting that the southeastern corner 

of Sicily was vulnerable and that the 

Napoli Division lacked sufficient mobility 

to move in time to any area under attack, 

Guzzoni, contrary to the German view, 

doubted that the Allies would space their 

landings in such a way as to permit 

counterattacking forces to execute successive operations. He nevertheless issued a revised plan on 9 June. The 

Aosta and Assietta Divisions under the 

XII Corps and the Napoli Division under the XVI Corps were to remain in 

their previously assigned areas. But because General Guzzoni was very consciom 

of the German determination to attack 

immediately, he feared that the German 

units, representing his only truly mobile 

reserves, would escape his grasp. Deeming it wise to have some Italian troops 

firmly in hand, he transferred the Livorno 

Division to army reserve and moved it 

closer to his Sixth Army headquarters. 

The German elements remained generally 

in place. But additional units arriving in 

Sicily formed a fourth reserve force as 

Group Neapel in the center.53 

5;) Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 69; MS #C-077 

(Rodt): see Overlay, app. C: Planned Deployment of Reserves, 9 June 1943, MS #R-126 

(Bauer). 

The identity and composition of Group Neapel 

is unclear. It may have included the 2 15th Tank 

Battalion (German general headquarters troops), 

attached later to the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division; it may also have included the reconnaissance battalion of the Hermann Goering Division. 

The deployment of German troops on Sicily as it 

appeared on a German map dated 12 June 1943., 

but not otherwise identified, is shown as an overlay in Appendix D, MS #R-126 (Bauer). 
" t I , . ' 

LOOKING SOUTH FROM THE HEIGHTS OF ENNA, site of General Guzzoni's 6th Army Headquarters. 
86 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Transfer of the Hermann Goering Division to Sicily as the second German 

division created a new problem. The 

German commanders in Sicily wished to 

use the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 

in the eastern half of the island where 

they saw the greatest Allied threat and 

where the division was well acquainted 

with the terrain-where, in fact, the 

division had executed a map maneuver 

based on a simulated Allied landing in 

the Gela area. They therefore wanted 

the Hermann Goering Division, which 

was not so far advanced in combined 

training as the 15th, committed as a 

whole in the western part of the island, 

where the threat seemed not so great. 54 

Guzzoni, convinced that the main Allied attack would hit the eastern coast 

near the southeastern corner, wanted to 

hold both German divisions together as a 

mobile reserve in the eastern part of Sicily. 

He envisioned the Livorno and Napoli 

Divisions fighting delaying actions until 

the two German divisions could mount a 

counterattack and strike. 

Kesselring reiterated the German view 

that an invader was weakest when he left 

his assault boats and waded ashore. He 

therefore wanted the reserves very close 

to the coast because he believed that the 

Axis forces were too weak to eliminate 

beachheads once they were well established, and because he was concerned that 

Allied air might retard daylight movements of the reserves on the narrow, 

winding, Sicilian roads. Furthermore, 

reserves stationed inland would literally 

have to come down the mountains in 

daylight and would thus present good 

targets for Allied naval gunfire. Reserves 

54 MS #C-on (Rodt); MS #C-095, Der 

Kampf um Sizilien (General der Panzertruppen 

Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin), pp. 7-10. 

stationed close to the coast would be 

spared long and difficult approach marches 

and casualties from Allied air attacks. 55 

The decision reached was to commit 

the German divisions as much as possible 

as complete units, one in the east, the 

other in the west. The Hermann Goering Division was to assemble in the southeastern area in Sixth Army reserve but 

was to be available for use by the XVI 

Corps with Guzzoni's permission. Group 

Koerner of the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division, located near Catania, was to be 

attached to the Hermann Goering Division. Group Ens of the 15th was to remain in the west under direct army control. Group Fullriede, integrating Group 

N eapel into its organization, would be in 

the center near Caltanissetta. 

Guzzoni then had as the Sixth Army 

reserve the augmented Group Fullriede 

and the Livorno Division. This fully 

motorized reserve near Caltanissetta would 

be ready for commitment toward Catania, 

sixty miles to the east; Gela, thirty miles 

to the southeast; Licata, thirty miles to the 

south; and Agrigento, thirty miles to the 

southwest. 

When the Hermann Goering Division 

established its headquarters at Caltagirone, twenty miles northeast of Gela, it 

assembled about two-thirds of its units in 

the area. The other third combined 

with Group Koerner of the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division to form Group 

Schmalz and went into position near 

Catania. The 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division headquarters and Group Fullriede 

moved into the western part of Sicily. 

Kesselring, though expecting the main 

Allied landings to take place on the 

eastern or southern coasts, was still pre55 MS #T-2 K 1 (Kesselring), pp. 11-14; MS 

#C-0 95 (Senger), p. 7. 
THE AXIS SITUATION 

occupied with a possible secondary attack 

in the west. He proposed transferring 

Group Fullriede to the western sector, 

leaving Group N eapel in the Caltanissetta 

area. He also proposed moving the German units closer to the coast than the 

Italians contemplated, and he suggested 

concentrating them in the south central 

part of the island. 

Guzzoni agreed. On 26 June Kesselring summarized his concept of repelling 

an invasion: the battle was to be fought 

at the coast line by coastal units supported by local reserves under division 

and corps control; mobile reserves-the 

four Italian mobile divisions-relatively 

close to the coast in small groups, were 

to be ready to pounce as soon as the 

Allies set foot on shore; finally, the German divisions were to clean Up.56 

O{; MS #T-2 K 1 (Kesselring), pp. 10-14; MS 

#C-095 (Senger), pp. 5-10; MS #C-on 

(Rodt), pp. 9-10; Schmalz in MS #T-2 (Fries 

et al.), p. 72; see Overlay, app. E: Plan for Deployment of Reserves on 26 June 1943, in Effect 

9 July 1943, in MS #R-126 (Bauer). 

87 

At the end of June, then, the Aosta and 

Assietta Divisions and the bulk of the 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division were in 

the west; the Napoli, Livorno, Hermann 

Goering Divisions, and one-third of the 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division were in 

the south and east. (See Map 1.) 

Expecting the Allies to land in several 

quite separate places, the Axis commanders planned to counterattack the 

landings immediately, wipe them out one 

after another, and prevent the establishment of a continuous front. When Guzzoni committed his mobile reserves, he 

hoped to do so at that "fleeting moment" 

when the main invasion sites were evident 

but the individual beachheads were not 

yet fully merged. 

The axis commanders believed they had 

several more weeks to complete their final 

preparations, for they expected the Allies 

to attack about the middle of July.57 

57 Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 65-66, 86; MS #T2 (Fries et 'at.), pp. 6-7 Aosta Division, though 

under XII Corps, could be moved only after securing army approval. 
CHAPTER V 

Final Allied Preparations 

Missions and F orees 

The Allied concept of making a concentrated assault on the southeastern 

corner of Sicily did not mean that all the 

troops would land bunched together. It 

meant instead that more than seven divisions, preceded by airborne operations 

involving parts of two airborne divisions, 

would come ashore simultaneously along 

a front of one hundred miles. Both 

frontage and initial assault forces would 

be larger than those of the Normandy 

invasion a year later. In fact, the invasion of Sicily, the first crack at Europe's "soft underbelly," was to be at once 

the largest and most dispersed amphibious assault of World W'ar II. 

Though the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

had hoped that the invasion could go in 

June, the length of the Tunisian campaign, which ended 13 May, and the 

difficulties of preparing the Sicilian operation made it impractical before July. 

Important in the choice of date and invasion hour were the conflicting requirements of the naval forces, which would 

convey the ground forces to Sicily, and 

of the airborne troops, which were to 

drop onto the island to disrupt the enemy 

rear and thereby assist the amphibious 

elements ashore. Specifically, moonlight, 

necessary for airborne operations, was unfavorable for naval operations. 

Allied planners had assumed from the 

outset that an airborne attack was essential for a successful assault on Sicily. 

Yet as plans were developed, 'Vashington 

planners began to feel that it was absurd 

to threaten the succe,s of the naval effort 

by requiring the Allied naval convoys to 

approach the hostile shore in broad moonlight simply to accommodate an airdrop 

of relatively small proportions. To them, 

it seemed that Eisenhower was "jeopardizing the entire operation because of the 

desire to use paratroops." Since current 

doctrine favored beach assaults during 

the hours of darkness, the planners noted, 

could not the airborne troops be dropped 

at dusk the evening before D-day to enable the naval convoys to approach during the night and the amphibious troops 

to hit the shore just before daylight? 1 

General Eisenhower thought not. Supported by Admiral Cunningham and Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder, and also by his 

airborne adviser, Maj. Gen. F. A. M. 

Browning, the Allied commander in chief 

stated that moonlight was necessary so 

that troop-carrying aircraft could find 

the proper drop zones. Thus, moonlight 

was not a requirement imposed by the 

airborne troops; it was "mandatory for 

the air force." Though Cunningham 

realized the disadvantages of such an 

action, he believed that heavy air attack 

would diminish the threat of enemy air 

1 Msg, OPD 138 to AFHQ, 23 Apr 43, OPD 

Exec 3, item 10. 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

action against the naval forces and also 

that moonlight would enhance Allied defense against enemy surface ships and 

submarines. In the Sicilian region, Eisenhower concluded, a second quarter 

moon provided the necessary light and 

darkness. This occurred between the 

10th and 14th of July. 

Having secured the agreement of the 

planners in Washington, Eisenhower designated H-hour as 0245, D-day as 10 

July, for the beach assaults. The airborne drops would occur around midnight, some two and a half hours earlier.2 

Under Admiral Cunningham's operational command, the Western Naval Task 

Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Henry 

K. Hewitt and numbering more than 

1,700 ships, craft, and boats, was to carry 

the American troops to Sicily; the Eastern Naval Task Force under Vice Adm. 

Sir Bertram H. Ramsey was to transport 

the British troops. Though enemy air 

attack was the major naval concern, 

Cunningham assigned six battleships to 

cover the convoys against the potential 

threat of surface attack by the Italian 

Fleet.3 

Under General Alexander's 15th Army 

Group headquarters, Montgomery's 

Eighth Army was to land on the beaches 

fronting the Gulf of Noto, just south of 

Syracuse, and on both sides of the southeastern point of Sicily; Patton's Seventh 

Army was to come ashore on seventy 

miles of beach along the Gulf of Gela. 

(Map II) Both the southwestern elusO! AFHQ, Min of CofS Mtg 6, 15 Mar 43, 

0100/12A/145; AFHQ NAF 182, 20 Mar 43, and 

AFHQ NAF 186, 23 Mar, in ABC 381 HUSKY 

(1943), sec. IA; AFHQ NAF 188, 25 Mar 43, 

OPD Exec 3, item 13; AFHQ NAF 199, 5 Apr 

43, and Msg, AFHQ Out 6666 to AGWAR, 24 

Apr 43, both in OPD Exec 3, item I I. 

3 Eisenhower Sicilian Dispatch, p. 8 I. See also 

Morison, Sicily-Salerno-AnzlO, pp. 27-29. 

89 

ter of airfields and the Catania-Gerbini 

complex remained excluded as immediate 

objectives, and the hope was that the 

major port of Syracuse would be occupied 

soon after the landings. If operations 

developed quickly out of the initial 

beachhead, Augusta and Catania would 

soon add their facilities to Allied port 

capacity. 

Though the British thus expected to 

have three major ports quickly, the Americans, served only by the minor ports of 

Licata and Gela, would have to depend 

on beach maintenance. Alexander justified this logistical risk for two reasons: 

the probability of good weather in July, 

and the availability of a newly developed two-and-a-half-ton amphibious truck 

called the Dukw, which could ferry men 

and materiel directly to beach dumps. 

Furthermore, after the British captured 

and opened the port of Syracuse, they 

agreed, after the fourteenth day of the 

campaign, to dispatch 1,000 tons of supplies daily to the Seventh Army. But 

whether this, plus beach maintenance, 

would be enough remained to be seen. 4 

Before the landings, Alexander made 

no specific plans to develop the land 

campaign growing out of the initial beachhead. He preferred to get the two armies 

firmly ashore before launching out. But 

he counted on the British Eighth Army to 

make the main effort, and he expected 

Montgomery to drive quickly through 

Catania to the Strait of Messina. 5 He 

, Alexander Despatch, pp. 9-10; Force 343 Outline Plan, 18 May 43. 

5 Lt. Col. G. W. L. Nicholson, "Official History 

of the Canadian Army in the Second World War," 

vol. II, The Canadians in Italy 1943-1945 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Queen's Printer and 

Controller of Stationery, 1956), pp. 86-87; De 

Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 285; Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, p. '78; Churchill, Hinge of 

Fate, p. 827. 
GELA BEACH, designated landing areafor Patton's Seventh Army troops. 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

was aware of possible resentment in the 

American Seventh Army over the fact 

that the Americans would only protect 

the British flank and rear while Montgomery drove for the main strategic objective in Sicily. Patton's army would 

be the shield in Alexander's left hand; 

Montgomery's army the sword in his 

right. 

As Alexander expected, some resentment 

did arise, for Admiral Cunningham reported that the Americans were "very 

sore about it." Maintenance, too, was 

bound to be "a tricky problem" for the 

Americans, for whether they could bring 

3,000 tons ashore daily for six weeks 

over the beaches and through the small 

ports was highly questionable. Yet Patton, Cunningham learned, had taken "the 

attitude that he has been ordered to land 

there and he will do it." (; Though some 

of Patton's associates urged him to protest, he refused. An order was an order, 

and he would do his "goddamndest to 

carry it out." 7 He apparently convinced Alexander of his good faith and 

firm intention to do the best he could. R 

As finally drawn up, the plan provided 

for the employment of thirteen divisions 

and one brigade. The British Eighth 

Army was to land four divisions and one 

brigade, most of them on the Gulf of 

Noto beaches, the 1st Canadian Division 

on one beach around the southeastern 

corner of the island. Their objectives 

were the port of Syracuse and a nearby 

airfield. The British 1st Airlanding Brigade was to precede the main British 

amphibious landings and seize the bridge 

called Ponte Grande over the Anapo River 

6 Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 538. 

7 Quoted in Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, 

p.20n. 

8 Alexander Despatch, p. 10. 

91 

just south of Syracuse. The American 

Seventh Army was to land three divisions 

on beaches oriented on the ports of Licata 

and Gela and several airfields nearby. A 

reinforced regimental combat team from 

the 82d Airborne Division was to drop 

several hours ahead of the main l\merican 

landings to secure important high ground 

a few miles inland from Gela. 9 

The British Eighth Army planned to 

make five simultaneous predawn landings, preceded by the air-landing operation just south of Syracuse. The 13 

Corps (General Dempsey) on the right 

was to come ashore on the northern 

beaches of the Gulf of Noto, the 5th 

Division near Cassibile, the 50th Division 

near Avola. Troops of the 1st Airborne 

Division were to land south of Syracuse 

on the corps north flank, and together 

with Commando units landing just south 

of Syracuse, were to assist the 5th Division to take the port. With a beachhead 

and Syracuse secured, the 13 Corps was 

to advance to the north to take Augusta 

and Catania. 

The 30 Corps (General Leese) was to 

make its amphibious landings on both 

sides of the Pachino peninsula, the southeastern corner of Sicily. The 23 I st Infantry Brigade was to protect the right 

flank and gain contact with the adjacent 

I 3 Corps in the N oto area; the 5 1st 

Division was to take the town of Pachino. 

On the left, the 1st Canadian Division, 

with two Royal Marine Commando units 

attached, was to capture the Pachino 

airfield and make contact with the American Seventh Army at Ragusa. After a 

secure beachhead was established, Montgomery planned to have the 5 I st Division 

9 AFHQ FAN 121, 12 May 43, 0100/4A/2g; 

AFHQ, Min of CofS Mtg 22, 13 May 43, 0100/ 

12C/IOI. 
92 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

relieve the 50th Division at Avola to enable the latter unit to move north toward 

Messina with the 13 COrpS.l0 

The British airborne troops, unlike the 

Americans who would parachute into 

Sicily, planned to come in by glider. 

They were to seize two objectives: the 

Ponte Grande over the Anapo River on 

Highway I 15, and the western part of 

Syracuse itself. Montgomery hoped that 

the glider troops would assist the advance 

of his ground troops into the city and 

quicken the opening of the port of Syracuse, essential to Eighth Army's logistical 

plans. The U.S. 51st Troop Carrier 

Wing, which had worked with the British 

airborne troops since April 1943, was to 

furnish a majority of the gliders and the 

tow planes. 

Again, unlike the Americans, who preferred not to schedule follow-up airborne 

operations, the British scheduled two, 

one against Augusta, and one in the Catania area. But until the invasion actually started, no one could say with 

certainty which, or if indeed either, of 

these operations would be needed.ll 

The problem of mounting, assembling, 

and supplying the various units in the 

Eighth Army was rather more difficult 

than the one faced by the Seventh Army, 

primarily because of the dispersed locations of the units. The 5th and 50th 

Divisions and the 23Ist Infantry Brigade 

were to be mounted in the Middle East. 

10 Twelfth Army Opns Order I, 31 May 43, 

oloo/12A/141. See also Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 62-63; Montgomery, Eighth 

Army, pp. 89, 94-95. 

11 Br 1St AS Div Plan, job 61C, reel 124A; 

NAAFTCC Rpt of 0pI.S, 31 Jul 43., 0403/11/ 

949; John C. Warren, Airborne Missions in the 

Mediterranean, 1942-1945, USAF Historical 

Study 74 (Air University, Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Ala. 1955) (hereafter cited as Warren, 

USAF Hist Study 74) pp. 2 H19, 42. 

The 1 st Canadian Division was to come 

from the United Kingdom; the 51st Division was to be mounted in Tunisia and 

partly staged in Malta. The 78th Division and a Canadian tank brigade, followup units, were to be mounted in the 

Sfax-Sousse area of North AfricaP 

In the American invasion, perhaps the 

most dramatic role was assigned to the 

paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division, 

the newest member of the invasion team, 

a unit which had yet to celebrate it'> 

first birthday. 

Delivering ground combat troops to a 

battlefield by air was not a new idea in 

1943, nor was Sicily the first place which 

saw the use of this dramatic method of 

warfare. But Sicily was to be the scene 

of the first Allied employment of a large 

number of airborne combat troops, delivered by parachute and glider, to support larger bodies of combat troops 

engaged in conventional ground warfare. 

Sicily also marked the first test of the 

airborne division concept, which had not 

been accepted by the U.S. Army until 

1942 .

13 

1 ~ Eisenhower Sicily Dispatch; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 124; Montgomery, Eighth Army, 

P·90 . 

13 Generally, the authors will not differentiate 

between parachute and air-landed operations, but 

will use the term airborne for methods of aerial 

delivery of troops and supplies into a combat zone. 

For details in the growth of the airborne division 

concept see: Robert R. Palmer, Bell 1. Wiley, and 

William R. Keast, The Procurement and Training 

of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, 1948), 

pp. 433-54, and Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. 

Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of 

Ground Combat Troops (Washington, 1947), pp. 

96-98, both volumes in UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; John T. Ellis, Jr., 

The Airborne Command and Center, AGF Study 

25, 1946; John A. Huston, Airborne Operations, 

MS in OCMH; William H. Peifer, Supply by Sky, 

QMC Historical Studies, Series II, No.2, pp. 7-

71. 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

Commanded by Maj. Gen. Matthew 

B. Ridgway, the 82d Airborne Division 

had been activated in August 1942. It 

had had a difficult trammg period. 

Shortages of transport aircraft, gliders, 

and parachutes hampered the program, 

and as late as March 1943 inspection 

rcvealed an "insufficient training in the 

field" and a need for "maneuver experience" before the division could be certified "fully prepared for combat duty." 14 

Organizational changes immediately before the scheduled departure of the division for the Mediterranean theater disrupted what little training time remained. 

With only about one-third the amount 

of training normally accorded the infantry 

divisions, the 82d sailed for North Africa. 

It arrived early in May, two months 

before the projected invasion of Sicily. 

Training continued "in a fiery furnace," according to Ridgway, "where 

the hot wind carried a fine dust that 

clogged the nostrils, burned the eyes, and 

cut into the throat like an abrasive." 15 

Pilots of the Northwest African Air Forces 

Troop Carrier Command (NAAFTCC), 

activated on 21 March 1943, worked with 

both the 82d Airborne and the British 

1st Aifborne Divisions, but a lack of unity 

of command between the airborne and 

the air units precluded full co-ordination. 

Although an American air force officer 

was attached to the 82d Airborne Division and an airborne liaison officer was 

attached to the 52d Troop Carrier Wing 

(the specific NAAFTCC component 

scheduled to support the American airborne operations), the efforts of a few li14 Huston. Airborne Operations, ch. III, p. 8 ; 

see also General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: 

The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New 

York : Harper and Brothers, 1956 ), pp. 59-60. 

15 Ridgway, Soldier, p. 65. 

93 

GENERALS BRADLEY AND ALLEN 

alson officers could not overcome the 

deficiencies of a system which split command in a single operation. 16 

Arriving in North Africa in April 1943, 

the 52d Troop Carrier Wing was considered fully qualified in dropping parachutists and towing gliders, but only on 

daylight missions. Accordingly, the troop 

carrier units concentrated on night formation and navigational flying, using both 

normal navigation lights and, later, as 

proficiency increased, small and lavendercolored resin lights, which would be the 

only aids available during the Sicily operation. But no real effort was made by 

the wing to check the location of pinpoint drop zones at night. A night joint 

tramll1g program with airborne troops 

and carriers fared poorly. 

1 r, Lt. Col. C . Billingslea, Report of Airborne 

Operations, HUSKY and BIGOT, 15 August 1943 

(cited hereafter as Billingslea Rpt), 0 I 00/ 21 / 

1071, I. 
94 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

GENERAL MIDDLETON G E NERAL RIDGWAY GENERAL TRUSCOTT 

General Ridgway selected the 505th 

Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat 

Team, commanded by Col. James M. 

Gavin, reinforced by the 3d Battalion, 

504th Parachute Infantry, to make the 

initial drop. With no specific assignment, 

the remaining airborne units worked on 

several plans covering various contingencies that might lead to their commitment. 

Unlike the airborne troops, the American ground units scheduled to make the 

invasion were for the most part combatexperienced. Despite its new title, to 

become effective on D-day, the Seventh 

Army headquarters was essentially that of 

the I Armored Corps. The headquarters 

planned the Sicilian operation first at 

Casablanca, then at Oran, later at Rabat, 

and finally at Mostaganem. The chief 

planner was Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, 

deputy commander. Patton, himself, participated only in the resolution of major 

problems. 17 

The subordinate ground units most 

concerned with the detailed planning of 

11 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, pp. A-2--

A-6; Bradley, A Soldier's S tory, p. [[ 2 . 

the operation were those eventually allocated to the Seventh Army: the II Corps 

headquarters; the 1st, 3d, and 45th Infantry Divisions; the 2d Armored Division; the 82d Airborne Division; and a 

portion of the 9th Infantry Division, the 

bulk of the latter cast in the role of a 

follow-up unit to be committed only with 

General Alexander's approval. 

Scheduled to control a sizable portion 

of the assaulting echelon, the I I Corps 

had played an important role in the 

North African campaign, first under Maj. 

Gen. Lloyd Fredendall, then under General Patton, and finally under Maj. Gen. 

Omar N. Bradley. A West Point graduate in the class of 19 I 5 and the first of 

that class to receive a star, General Bradley had commanded in turn two infantry 

divisions in the United States before coming to North Africa in early 1943 to act as 

General Eisenhower's personal representative in the field . On 16 April, Bradley 

had assumed command of the II Corps 

and had demonstrated a competence that 

marked him for higher command. 

The 3d Infantry Division had participated in the North African invasion and 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 95 

GENERAL EDDY GENERAL GAFFEY COLONEL DARBY, leader of 

Force X. (Photograph taken in 

1944.) 

in part of the ensuing campaign. Its commander, Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, 

Jr., had served as head of the American 

mission to the British Combined Operations 

Headquarters, where he had conceived the 

idea of creating American Ranger battalions patterned after the British Commandos. An observer in the ill-starred Dieppe 

raid of August 1942, he had helped plan 

the North African invasion, and had commanded the American landings at PortLyautey in Morocco. Truscott assumed 

command of the 3d Division on 8 March 

1943· 

The 1 st Infantry Division, the oldest 

division in the American Army, had participated in the North African invasion 

and had seized Oran after some of the 

bitterest fighting of the campaign. The 

dillision had then served throughout the 

remainder of the North African campaign, 

often under trying circumstances. Maj. 

Gen. Terry de la Mesa Allen had assumed command shortly before the division had shipped overseas. 

The 45th Infantry Division was an 

Oklahoma National Guard unit that had 

been federalized in 1940. Alerted in 

January 1943 for an amphibious operation in the Mediterranean theater, the 

division was probably one of the best 

trained divisions in the American Army 

when it sailed from the United States in 

June 1943. Its commander, Maj. Gen. 

Troy H. Middleton, had been the youngest regimental commander in the American Army in France during W orId War 

I. He had retired in 1937, but had 

returned to active duty in earIy 1942 

and soon assumed command of the 

division. 

The 2d Armored Division, which was 

to provide supporting armor to the assault forces as well as to constitute a 

floating reserve, was a comparatively new 

unit on the rolls of the American Army, 

although its tank strength could be traced 

back through the 66th Infantry (light 

tanks) -the nation's only tank regiment 

in 1940-to the American Tank Corps 

of W orId War I days. Three invasion 

teams had been drawn from the division 
96 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

to provide armored support in the American landings in North Africa but had 

taken no part in the later Tunisian fightmg. In early 1943 the division provided 

some two thousand replacements and 

numerous wheeled and tracked vehicles 

to the 1st Armored Division. Maj. Gen. 

Hugh J. Gaffey, who as Patton's chief of 

staff in the II Corps had gained considerable experience during the Tuni'5ian 

campaign, assumed command of the 2d 

Armored Division on 5 May 1943. Gaffey had been one of the pioneers of the 

American armored effort in the early 

days of World War II. 

The follow-up 9th Division, which had 

participated in the invasion of North 

Africa and had fought in the Tunisian 

campaign, notably at Hill 609, was under 

Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, who had 

been in com'l1and since mid- 1942. Its 

39th Infantry Regiment and division artillery were alerted for commitment in 

Sicily any time after D-day. 

In addition to the major ground units, 

the Seventh Army included a number of 

units designed for specialized functions. 

Of primary importance to the assault 

phase were three Ranger battalions, the 

1St, 3d, and 4th. The latter two had 

been newly activated in North Africa. 

The 1st Rangers, led by Lt. Col. William 

O. Darby, had earned an enviable combat reputation in the Tunisian fighting. 

Another special unit was a motorized 

chemical battalion equipped with the 

4.2-inch mortar, an extremely accurate, 

rifted-bore, muzzle-loading weapon. Four 

of these battalions were assigned to 

the Seventh Army, one to each infantry division. Each consisted of forty 

officers and over five hundred men, 

equipped with forty-eight of the big mortars, a Chemical Corps weapon designed 

originally for firing smoke and gas shells, 

although quite capable of firing high explosive and white phosphorus rounds. 

There was little opportunity for combined 

training and for instructing infantry commanders and their staffs on the capabilities and limitations of the mortar. This 

was doubly unfortunate because the 4.2-

inch mortar was, in effect, a new weapon 

and few infantry personnel in North Africa had had any previous experience with 

it. 

To give the Free French, who were reequipping their Army units in North 

Africa with United States assistance, at 

least token representation in the Sicilian 

invasion, General Eisenhower accepted a 

battalion-size unit, the 4th Moroccan 

Tabor of Goums, to operate with the 

American forces. N umbering almost goo 

men, the tabor had French officers and 

noncommissioned officers, Berber goumiers 

in the ranks, I 17 horses, and 126 mules. 

Attached to the 3d Division, the goums 

were scheduled to come ashore on the 

fifth day of the invasionY 

Seventh Army Plans 

The troops of the Seventh Army were 

to land on the beaches of the Gulf of 

Gela west of a boundary line running 

from the coast near Pozzallo inland 

through Ragusa to Vizzini, these towns 

and the road connecting them being assigned to the British. Patton was to 

seize the airfields of Licata, Ponte Olivo, 

Biscari, and Comiso. He was to capture 

18 W. C. Baxter, "Goums Marocains," Cavalry 

Journal, LUI, No. 2 (March-April 1944), pp. 

62-64; for U.S. assistance to the French, see 

Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957). 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

and put into operation the ports at 

Licata and Gela. He was then to be 

ready for future operations as directed. 

As Patton analyzed the terrain, he saw 

a dome-shaped plateau facing his landing 

areas as the important piece of grounda high saddle springing from the Caronie 

Mountains in the north and extending 

southeast from Enna to Piazza Armerina 

and onto the peak of the plateau at 

Monte Lauro. Hardly less important 

wa~ the Salso River on the left. 

These terrain features indicated roughly 

an outline of the beachhead that the 

army would have to secure. The obvious 

strongpoint on which to base the beachhead on the west was a secondary ridge 

east of the Salso River, which would 

provide a further obstacle to enemy intrusion. Elsewhere the high ground at 

Piazza Armerina would delineate the 

beachhead. Possession of this terrain 

would deprive the enemy of ground overlooking the assault beaches and give the 

Seventh Army protection for building up 

its strength preliminary to a push inland. 

But this beachhead would not give the 

army two of its important and assigned 

objectives, the port and airfield at Licata. 

To get these, Patton extended the 

beachhead line on the west to a high 

ridge fourteen miles northwest of Licata. 

But the key to the entire problem remained the high ground at Piazza Armerina, which was not only commanding 

terrain but also carried the main road 

(Highway I 17) leading from Enna to 

Gela and Syracuse. The enemy would 

mmt certainly utilize this road in shifting 

his forces from the western and central 

portions of the island to oppose the Allied 

landings. To get to this high ground 

quickly became the basic motive of Seventh Army planning. 

97 

The seventy miles of beach assigned the 

Seventh Army from Licata on the west 

to Pozzallo on the east comprised the 

crescent shore line of the Gulf of Gela. 

Though only a few of the beaches had 

good exits, almost all had some access to 

inland trails and roads. Except for the 

small ports of Licata and Gela and the 

tiny fishing village of Scoglitti, the coast 

was open, with sandy beaches and occasional rocky outcroppings. The beaches 

appeared ideal for amphibious landings, 

but in reality they were not. Gradients 

were too gentle for many of the assault 

landing craft. False beaches, shifting 

sand bars covered by sufficient water to 

float smaller landing craft but not enough 

for the larger craft carrying vehicles and 

heavy equipment, fronted much of the 

shore line. 

The shallow plains behind the a~sault 

beaches extended inland only a few miles 

before merging with the foothills of the 

dome-shaped plateau. The main rivers 

flowing from the high ground-the Salso, 

the Gela, and the Acate-presented problem,; for cross-country movement. 

The length of assault frontage and the 

compartmenting of terrain created by the 

rivers strongly influenced General Patton 

in organizing the army for the invasion. 

He assigned the II Corps the bulk of the 

assault units and a large section of the 

front. He kept the 3d Division, reinforced heavily with combat and service 

support units, directly under his control. 

The II Corps was to make the main 

effort and seize the key terrain features 

in the Piazza Armerina area; the 3d Division was to attack in the Licata area 

and anchor the beachhead on the west by 

seizing the ridge line west of the Salso 

River. An army reserve was to comprise 

four principal elements: ( I) the 2d Ar-
98 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

mored Division, minus Combat Command 

A but reinforced by the 18th Infantry 

Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the 

1St Division, which was to sail with the 

assault forces prepared to land in support 

of any assault; (2) the remainder of the 

82d Airborne Division, which was to be 

on call any time after H-hour; (3) the 

39th Infantry RCT of the 9th Infantry 

Division, plus the 9th Division's artillery, 

which was to be ready to move from North 

Africa at any time after D-day; and (4) 

the remainder of the 9th Division. 19 

Patton's scheme of maneuver called for 

simultaneous landings in the Licata-GelaScoglitti areas in order to capture the 

airfields, the air landing ground at Farel10, just east of Gela, and the ports of 

Licata and Gela by darkness of D plus 

2. For control, Patton designated two 

phase lines. The first, called the Yellow 

Line, marked a secure initial beachhead 

and included the initial objectives-a 

line through Palma di Montechiaro, 

Campobello, Mazzarino, Caltagirone, and 

Grammichele, roughly twenty miles inland. The second, denoted the Blue 

Line, through Campobello, Piazza Armerina, and Grammichele, included the 

high ground overlooking the lateral roads 

in the army sector. 

To General Bradley's II Corps went 

three principal missions. Under the cover 

of darkness on D-day, the assault unitsthe 1st and 45th Infantry Divisionswere to land at Gela and near Scoglitti, 

and capture the Ponte Olivo airfield by 

daylight on D plus I. After pressing inland and seizing the Comiso airfield by 

daylight on D plus 2 and the Biscari airfield by darkness of that day, the corps 

was to extend its beachhead to the Yel19 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. a-8. 

low Line, from Mazzarino on the west to 

Vizzini on the east, and gain contact 

with the British Eighth Army at Ragusa. 

Truscott's reinforced 3d Division also 

had three principal missions. It was to 

land in the Licata area on D-day and 

capture the port and airfield there by 

nightfall. After extending its beachhead 

to the Yellow Line (from Palma di Montechiaro on the west up to and through 

Campobello toward Mazzarino) to protect the army's beachhead from enemy 

interference from the west and northwest, 

the division was to gain and maintain 

contact with the II Corps on the right. 20 

Expecting Truscott's 3d Division to 

capture the port and airfield at Licata 

by nightfall of the first day and the high 

ground around Naro soon after, and anticipating that Bradley's II Corps would 

have the three airfields in its zone by the 

end of the third day, General Patton 

hoped to have his initial objectives in 

three days. Then he wanted the beachhead expanded to the final phase line, 

named Blue. To bolster the II Corps 

landing in the Gela area, he directed that 

a parachute task force in reinforced regimental strength be dropped in front of 

the 1st Division to secure the high ground 

overlooking the 1st Division's assault 

beaches. 

Commanding the left invasion forces, 

Truscott, with CCA of the 2d Armored 

Division and the tabor of goums attached 

to his 3d Division, had about 45,000 

20 Force 343 Outline Plan, 18 May 43, Seventh 

Army Rpt of Opns, p. d-2; Map, Final Allied 

Plan (HUSKY), Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. 

a-5; Hq Force 343 FO I, 20 Jun 43, Seventh 

Army Rpt of Opns, pp. d-7-d-8; the detailed 

order of battle of the Seventh Army may be 

found in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, pp. d-9-

d-IIL 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

men. About half were to land on D-day 

on a front of more than twelve miles. 

His objective, Licata, a city of about 

30,000 people, a minor port, rail, and 

road center, nestled against a mound 

that rises about 500 feet above the Licata 

plain, flat terrain rimmed, five miles away, 

by the foothills of the dome-shaped 

plateau. In the middle of the plain, 

three mile~ northwest of the city and 

adjacent to the highway running north to 

Caltanissetta and Enna, was the Licata 

airfield. 

The Seventh Army designated four assault beaches as suitable for the 3d Division-two west of Licata, two east of 

the town. Because beach data was far 

from complete, Truscott appealed personally to Maj. Gen. James Doolittle, who 

commanded the Northwest African Strategic Air Force (N ASAF) , for serial 

photos of the landing sites, which Doolittle supplied. 21 

Early capture of Campobello and Palma 

di Montechiaro, both on Patton's Yellow 

Line and both controlling avenues of 

approach from the northwest, were Truscott's essential objectives for protecting 

the army's left flank. But the Salso 

River, bisecting his zone, could be 

crossed only by road and railway bridge~ 

at Licata. The beaches west of Licata 

were poor, those east of the city good. 

Assuming that the enemy would destroy 

the bridges across the Salso, should Truscott commit his entire force to the eastern beaches and risk its temporary confinement within the narrow limits of the 

river, hill, and sea? Or should he land 

in strength on both sides of the river 

21 Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions 

(New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1954), 

pp. 200-20 I. 

99 

and risk isolation of the western landings 

in view of the necessity for seizing Campobello and Palma di Montechiaro? 

Even though it would be difficult to reinforce from the sea over the beaches 

west of Licata, Truscott chose to land on 

both sides of the river. 

Truscott wished to land all his infantry 

as rapidly as possible, with some tanks 

in close support, and seize four key points 

in the foothills dominating the Licata 

plain. With a beachhead formed and 

secured, he would then strike immediately 

for Campobello and Palma di Montechiaro, using if necessary CCA of the 2d 

Armored Division, his floating reserve. 

The right invasion force, Bradley's II 

Corps, was to bite off more than fifty of 

the seventy miles of army front, though 

in actuality the landings would occur on 

somewhat separated fronts totaling fifteen 

miles. The 1st Division was to land on 

the left, the 45th Division on the right. 

The 1st Division's zone extended from 

a point midway between Gela and Licata 

eastward to the Acate River. Gela, 

about twenty miles east of Licata, was an 

overgrown fishing village with 32,000 inhabitants. It had a pier jutting goo feet 

into the water from near the center of the 

town to serve small ships. Behind the 

town was the treeless plain of Gela, used 

for growing grain. The Gela River 

reached the sea a mile or so east of the 

town. Three miles east of Gela and adjacent to the coastal highway was the 

Gela-Farello landing ground. Six miles 

east of Gela, the Acate (or Dirillo) River 

emptied into the sea. 

General Allen, controlling two regiments of the I st Division, two Ranger 

battalions, and supporting units, was assigned six beaches with a total frontage 

of five miles. He split his troops into 
three attack groups. The Rangers were 

to take the city of Gela; one of the infantry regiments was to assist the Rangers, if necessary, or was to take high 

ground overlooking the Ponte Olivo airfield from the west; the other regiment 

was to move to the northeast toward the 

hilltop town of Niscemi, thirteen miles 

northeast of Gela, make contact with 

paratroopers dropped inland, and advance 

against the Ponte Olivo airfield from the 

east. 

Between the Acate River and the Seventh Army boundary on the right, a distance of fifteen miles, lay the zone of the 

45th Division, a smooth arc of coast 

line virtually devoid of indentation. Two 

rocks jutting above the water signaled 

the entrance to two coves that served 

the fishing village of Scoglitti. Behind 

the shore was a broad, relatively open 

plain sloping gradually to the foothills 

of the mountainous terrain and to inland 

towns on relatively high ground. About 

ten miles inland, Biscari and its airfield 

(three miles to the north of the town) 

and Comiso and its airfield (three miles 

north of the town), were the main objectives of General Middleton’s division. 

Between the relatively uninhabited coast 

line and the coastal highway, which sheers 

away from the coast after leaving Gela, 

there were no good roads. One regiment 

coming ashore just east of the mouth of 

the Acate River was to drive north to 

Biscari to take the town and airfield and 

seize the crossing of the coastal highway 

over the Acate River—Ponte Dirillo. 

Another regiment was to seize Scoglitti, 

then capture the town of Vittoria, seven 

miles inland, and be prepared to help 

take the Comiso airfield. The third regiment was to drive on the Comiso airfield, 

protect the II Corps right flank, and gain 

contact with the Canadians at Ragusa.22 

The assault forces and the floating reserve were paired off with the naval task 

forces which comprised the component 

parts of Admiral Hewitt’s Western Naval 

Task Force. The 3d Division was to 

be transported on a shore-to-shore basis 

by Naval Task Force 86 under the command of Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly. 

Two light cruisers and eight destroyers 

were to perform escort and gunfire support duties for this task force. The 1st 

Division and the army’s floating reserve 

were to be carried by Rear Adm. John L.

Hall’s Naval Task Force 81 on both a 

ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore basis, 

escorted and supported by two light 

cruisers and thirteen destroyers. The 

45th Division was paired off with Rear 

Adm. Alan G. Kirk’s Naval Task Force 85 

on a wholly ship-to-shore operation. One 

light cruiser and sixteen destroyers were 

allotted to this force for supporting duties. 

There was to be no naval counterpart to 

the II Corps headquarters, nor did General Bradley have a naval opposite number. The II Corps commander and a 

few key members of his staff were allotted 

space aboard Admiral Kirk‘s flagship, 

while the remainder of the corps’ staff 

was distributed among five LST’s of the 

same force.23 

22 For details of the divisions’ plans see: 3d Inf 

Div FO 5, 26 Jun 43; II Corps FO 8, 15 Jun 43; 

1st Inf Div FO 26, 20 Jun 43; AGF Rpt 217, 

sub: Rpt on Opn HUSKY, 1943. 

23 Action Report, Western Naval Task Force, 

The Sicilian Campaign, Operation HUSKY, JulyAugust 1943 (cited hereafter as WNTF Action 

Rpt), 25–26; pp. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 

Interv, Maj. A. N. Garland and Mr. Martin Blum119; Morison, Sicily–Salerno–Anzio, 27–33; pp.

enson with Lt. Gen. Troy H. Middleton (Ret.), 

16 Jun 59, at Louisiana State University. 

A total of 601 ships and 1,124 ship-borne landing craft were assigned to WNTF. This figure 

includes 32 Liberty ships and 92 LCM’s carried 

100 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

three attack groups. The Rangers were 

to take the city of Gela; one of the infantry regiments was to assist the Rangers, if necessary, or was to take high 

ground overlooking the Ponte Olivo airfield from the west; the other regiment 

was to move to the northeast toward the 

hilltop town of Niscemi, thirteen miles 

northeast of Gela, make contact with 

paratroopers dropped inland, and advance 

against the Ponte Olivo airfield from the 

east. 

Between the Acate River and the Seventh Army boundary on the right, a distance of fifteen miles, lay the zone of the 

45th Division, a smooth arc of coast 

line virtually devoid of indentation. Two 

rocks jutting above the water signaled 

the entrance to two coves that served 

the fishing village of Scoglitti. Behind 

the shore was a broad, relatively open 

plain sloping gradually to the foothills 

of the mountainous terrain and to inland 

towns on relatively high ground. About 

ten miles inland, Biscari and its airfield 

(three miles to the north of the town) 

and Comiso and its airfield (three miles 

north of the town), were the main objectives of General Middleton's division. 

Between the relatively uninhabited coast 

line and the coastal highway, which sheers 

away from the coast after leaving Gela, 

there were no good roads. One regiment 

coming ashore just east of the mouth of 

the Acate River was to drive north to 

Biscari to take the town and airfield and 

seize the crossing of the coastal highway 

over the Acate River-Ponte Dirillo. 

Another regiment was to seize Scoglitti, 

then capture the town of Vittoria, seven 

miles inland, and be prepared to help 

take the Comiso airfield. The third regiment was to drive on the Comiso airfield, 

protect the II Corps right flank, and gain 

contact with the Canadians at Ragusa.22 

The assault forces and the floating reserve were paired off with the naval task 

forces which comprised the component 

parts of Admiral Hewitt's Western Naval 

Task Force. The 3d Division was to 

be transported on a shore-to-shore basis 

by Naval Task Force 86 under the command of Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly. 

Two light cruisers and eight destroyers 

were to perform escort and gunfire support duties for this task force. The 1st 

Division and the army's floating reserve 

were to be carried by Rear Adm. John L. 

Hall's Naval Task Force 81 on both a 

ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore basis, 

escorted and supported by two light 

crUlsers and thirteen destroyers. The 

45th Division was paired off with Rear 

Adm. Alan G. Kirk's Naval Task Force 85 

on a wholly ship-to-shore operation. One 

light cruiser and sixteen destroyers were 

allotted to this force for supporting duties. 

There was to be no naval counterpart to 

the II Corps headquarters, nor did General Bradley have a naval opposite number. The II Corps commander and a 

few key members of his staff were allotted 

space aboard Admiral Kirk's flagship, 

while the remainder of the corps' staff 

was distributed among five LST's of the 

same force. 23 

22 For details of the divisions' plans see: 3d Inf 

Div FO 5, 26 Jun 43; II Corps FO 8, 15 Jun 43; 

1st Inf Div FO 26, 20 Jun 43; AGF Rpt 217, 

sub: Rpt on Opn HUSKY, 1943. 

23 Action Report, Western Naval Task Force, 

The Sicilian Campaign, Operation HUSKY, JulyAugust 1943 (cited hereafter as WNTF Action 

Rpt), pp. 25-26; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 

119; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 27-33; 

Interv, Maj. A. N. Garland and Mr. Martin Blumenson with Lt. Gen. Troy H. Middleton (Ret.), 

16 Jun 59, at Louisiana State University. 

A total of 60 I ships and I, I 24 ship-borne landing craft were assigned to WNTF. This figure 

includes 32 Liberty ships and 92 LCM's carried 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

The airborne mission, designed primarily to assist the 1st Division landing, was 

the seizure of the high ground ( Piano 

Lupo) in the Gela area for the purpose 

of blocking enemy approach from the 

north and east. The troops were also to 

cover the Ponte Olivo airfield by fire and 

facilitate its capture by the seaborne infantry. Under Seventh Army control 

until they made contact with the ground 

forces, the parachute troops were then to 

come under the II Corps. General Bradley planned to attach the 3d Battalion, 

504th Parachute Infantry, to the 1st Division to assist the latter unit in taking 

Niscemi, while the remainder of the parachute combat team assembled near Gela 

as I st Division reserve. 

The drop zone for the major parachute 

elements-Piano Lupo-was a hill mass 

which dominated a road intersection seven 

miles northeast of Gela. There the roads 

from Caltagirone (via Niscemi) and Vittoria met, providing excellent approaches 

for an enemy force arriving to contest 

the 1st Division's landings., Drop zones 

for lesser elements were chosen for similar 

reasons--troops dropped in these areas 

were to knock out roadblocks and obstruct 

the highway approaches to the beaches. 

One party of forty-two men was to drop 

from three planes in the early minutes of 

10 July to demolish or hold the vital 

Dirillo bridge across the Acate River. 

Attachments of engineers, signal troops, 

medical personnel, and naval gunfire and 

air support parties reinforced Colonel 

Gavin's combat team. Though the planners hoped for early contact with the 

seaborne forces, they planned at least one 

aerial resupply mission. 

on those Liberty ships which arrived off the 

beaches between D plus 1 and D plus 8. WNTF 

Action Rpt, p. 96. 

101 

The 52d Troop Carrier Wing planned 

to employ 227 aircraft, all C-4is, organized into five groups to transport the 

paratroopers. They were to fly at just 

above sea level in closed V of V formations of nine craft, rising during their 

final approaches to 600 feet and widening their formations. All were to arrive 

over the drop zones between 2330, 9 

July, and 0006, 10 July. After discharging their loads, they were to execute a 

wide I80-degree turn and fly back to 

their home bases in North Africa. 

Though the initial route proposed for 

the troop carriers was a relatively short 

and straight flight over Pantelleria, the 

planners eventually chose a route over 

Malta in order to keep the planes away 

from the naval convoys and their antiaircraft guns. The final route accepted 

had three sharp turns over water during 

dim moonlight, "a complicated dog-leg 

course requiring over three hours flight 

each way." 24 

The pilots were to identify their drop 

zones from aerial photographs carried in 

their cockpits. There were to be no 

markers on the drop zones, no pathfinder 

teams. But this seemed satisfactory, for 

on a previous night reconnaissance, Colonel Gavin found that "all check points 

and terrain showed up clearly in the 

moonlight, exactly as we had memorized 

them from photographs." 25 

A problem of great concern to General 

Ridgway, the 82d Airborne Division's 

commander, was adequate night fighter 

protection for the troop carriers, which 

24 Harry L. Coles, Participation of the Ninth 

and Twelfth Air Forces in the Sicilian Campaign, 

USAF Historical Study 37 (Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1945), p. 80. 

25 James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 5. See 

also Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, p. 28. 
102 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

were vulnerable to attack. No one could 

guarantee that the Allied air forces would 

have complete air mastery by the time of 

the invasion. Though Ridgway requested 

fighter protection, and though General 

Patton and the troop carrier commander 

supported him, the NATAF disapproved 

the request on the basis that other missions were of greater importance to the 

operation as a whole. As a result the 

paratroopers and the troop carrier crewmen would have to bank on achieving 

tactical surprise or possibly on the unwillingness of enemy air to make a fight of it. 26 

Though tactical planning was not particularly troublesome, logistics posed its 

problems. Planners provided the 45th 

Infantry Division with twenty-one days 

maintenance plus ten units of fire in the 

assault and first follow-up convoy of D 

plus 4. Seven additional days maintenance, plus one and one-sixth units of 

fire, would be carried on the second 

follow-up convoy on D plus 8.27 The 

1st Division, furnished with enough supplies for the airborne elements committed 

in its zone, was to carryon its assault 

convoy seven days maintenance plus two 

26 For details of the airborne planning, see: II 

Corps FO 8, 15 Jun 43; 82d AB Div FO I, 23 

Jun 43; 505th RCT (Reinf) FO I, 28 Jun 43; 

1St Inf Div FO 26, 20 Jun 43; 82d AB Div 2d 

rev. an. 2 to FO I, 8 Jul 43; Ltr, U.S. Naval 

Forces, NWA Waters, to CinC U.S. Fleet, 24 Jul 

43, sub: Naval Gunfire Liaison Offs Operating 

With AB Troops, with Incl, Rpt from Ensign 

Seibert; History of 3d USAF Air Support Communications Squadron, 10 January 1944, Sq-ASup-Com-3-Hi, Air University, Maxwell Air 

Field Base, Ala., p. 16; Billingslea Rpt; 

NAAFTCC Rpt. 

27 The units of fire used in the Sicilian operation are shown in Annex 3, FO I, Headquarters 

Force 343, '5 June 1943, Seventh Army Report 

of Operations, p. d-44. A unit of fire represents 

a specific number of rounds of ammunition per 

weapon, which varies with the type and caliber of 

weapons. 

and one-third units of fire, while its D 

plus 4 follow-up was to bring in an additional seven days of maintenance plus 

one and one-sixth units of fire. Fourteen days maintenance, plus two and onethird units of fire, were provided on the 

D plus 8 convoy. The 3d Division generally followed the same plan: seven days 

maintenance plus one and one-sixth units 

of fire on the assault convoy; seven days 

maintenance and one and one-sixth units 

of fire on the first follow-up convoy; but 

only seven days maintenance and one and 

one-sixth units of fire on the D plus 8 

convoy. 

There was also to be a floating supply 

reserve. In Oran, Algiers, and Bizerte, 

twenty days maintenance and four units 

of fire were to be loaded in seven cargo 

ships and held on call to unload over the 

beaches any time after D plus 14. In 

addition, the logistical planners established 

on the ground in the Bizerte area a reserve of supplies of three and one-half units 

of fire, 25 percent combat vehicles, 10 

percent general purpose vehicles, and 10 

percent weapons, plus fifteen days maintenance for 140,000 men, to be available 

on call for movement to Sicily. 

An emergency stockpile of supplies, 

established in the Kairouan area of central Tunisia for the 82d Airborne Division and available for shipment on call 

from army, consisted of seven days maintenance and two and one-third units of 

fire for one infantry regimental combat 

team reinforced by three antiaircraft battalions and one tank battalion. 

The division commanders were responsible for their own supply from ships 

and landing craft over the beaches, or 

through any of the captured ports, until 

the Seventh Army could assume the logistic function. This responsibility lll-
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

cluded maintaining all the beaches in the 

division areas. To carry out this function, each assault division received an 

engineer shore regiment or an engineer 

combat regiment. When the army took 

over the supply mission, the 1st Engineer 

Special Brigade (a permanent headquarters) was to assume command of all 

division beach groups and become responsible for the execution of all supply plans 

emanating from army, including the 

operation of captured ports. The II 

Corps would have no administrative functions other than those pertaining to corps 

troops unless an emergency arose. 28 

The most crucial aspect of all army 

logistical planning remained the balancing 

of army requirements with the available naval shipping capacity. The limitations on the number of landing craft 

assigned to the division task forces caused 

logistical planners many sleepless nights. 

Artillery wanted its guns ashore as quickly as possible and did not particularly 

care if the weapons displaced necessary 

service units. Engineers wanted more 

bridging equipment and did not hesitate 

to argue for the displacement of certain 

artillery units. General Bradley, whose 

headquarters was responsible for the 

preparations of two of the three assault 

forces, was in the middle of the dispute. 

Bradley fought, pleaded, cajoled, and ordered his supply people to come up with 

a workable plan. But the separate arms 

and services were difficult to handle, "each 

contending," Bradley said, "that if its 

particular allotment were cut, the whole 

invasion might fail." 29 

Truscott's supply people faced much 

the same problem. Since the 3d Division 

28 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, pp. E-I-E-4; 

1-10; 1-16-1-21. 

29 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 1 '7. 

103 

would be almost three times the size of 

a normal infantry division and expected 

to be responsible for its own supply and 

maintenance for a long time, Truscott 

found it necessary to establish an administrative organization much larger than 

that normally found in a division, one 

that was comparable to an army-size 

unit.ao 

The assault against Sicily represented 

an enormous improvement in specialized 

craft and in the technique of amphibious 

operations over the North African landings of 1942. Several new devices were 

to be used on a large scale for the first 

time. A whole new series of landing 

craft and ships were to play a prominent 

part. The most important of these were 

the LST (landing ship, tank), the LCT 

(landing craft, tank), the LCI (landing craft, infantry) , and the LCVP 

(landing craft, vehicle or personnel) . 

Their function was to come aground on 

the shore and disgorge men and materiel 

rapidly. Yet they were so new that no 

one could be sure of certain aspects of 

their performance. For example, the 

LCI had never been beached successfully 

in water shallow enough for infantry to 

wade ashore; many naval officers thought 

that the troops would first have to disembark into canvas or rubber boats. 

No one knew precisely how many men 

could be loaded into an LST or LCT 

with both comfort during the voyage and 

30 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 204. The 

variety of organizations scheduled for the operation was in no wayan aid to the logisticians. 

The II Corps alone contained 151 different types 

of units "ranging from infantry regiments to engineer well-drilling sections, balloon batteries, 

MP prisoner-escort companies, auxiliary surgical 

groups, graves registration companies, and naval 

shore battalions." Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 

1 '7-18. 
104 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

• 

PONTON CAUSEWAY extending from an LST to shore wasfirst used in invasion rif Sicily. 

adequate egress ashore. There was also 

the Dukw, an ingenious vehicle able to 

swim and roll, and on this vehicle rested 

much of the hope of supplying the Seventh Army adequately over the beaches. 

Basically an amphibious ~ 1'2-ton truck 

capable of carrying twenty-five troops and 

their equipment, or five thousand pounds 

of general cargo, or twelve loaded litters, 

the Dukw, with its six-cylinder engine 

and propeller, could make a speed of five 

and a half knots in the water in a moderate sea, and race fifty miles per hour on 

land on its six wheels.S! 

31 For descriptions of landing craft see ONI 

226, Allied Landing Craft and Ships; Samuel 

Eliot Morison, "History of United States Naval 

0perations in World War II," vol. II, Operations 

in North African Waters, Odober 1942-June 

1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 

1947), pp. 266-71; ASF Manual M409, 14 Dec 

43, sub: Logistical Planning and Reference Data. 

The vanous new craft, products of 

American and British imagination and 

industrial skill, in large measure provided 

the answer to the chief problem of amphibious warfare-the rapid transfer of 

For their development see: James Phinney Baxter 

3d, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Company, 1946), pp. 69-77; Matloff 

and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 192-94; George E. Mowry, 

Landing Craft and the WPB (Historical Report 

on War Administration: WPB Special Study 11), 

rev. ed., Washington, 1946). For a description 

of the large troop-carrying transports see Roland 

W. Charles, Troopships of World War II (Army 

Transportation Association, Washington, 1947). 

For the development of the Dukw see: Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, 

and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: 

Planning Munitions for War (Washington, 1955), 

pp. 227n, 227-28, and Chester Wardlow, The 

Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and 

Supply (Washington, 1956), pp. 442-91, both 

volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II. 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

men and materiel to the, far shore. But 

the Sicilian beaches presented a peculiar 

problem. Between the false beaches and 

the true beaches were depressions, or 

runnels. To overcome this hazard, the 

Navy devised two methods of transferring 

vehicles and other cargo from the large 

landing craft across the runnels to the 

shore line. The first was the ponton 

causeway, several of which were constructed at Bizerte and Arzew under the 

direction of Admiral Conolly. A number of ponton units were clamped securely together to form a causeway or portable 

bridge either to be towed to Sicily or 

carried there on the sides of LST's. 

The second method married an LCT 

to an LST. Cut out, hinged sections of 

selected LCT's permitted these modified 

craft to be joined to the bow of an LST, 

at right angles to the larger vessel. The 

vehicles, or other cargo, on the LST could 

then be moved across the lowered bow 

ramp of the LST onto the LCT. From 

the first LCT, the vehicle or cargo could 

then be transferred to a second LeT, 

bow to bow, and the second LCT could 

transport the load to shore.32 

N aual and Air Plans 

The peculiar difficulty in planning 

HUSKY was that the operation did not 

fall specifically into either a ship-to-shore 

or a shore-to-shore operation. In the 

first place, it could not be called shoreto-shore since the 45th Division was tactically loaded in the United States before 

the final tactical plan was firm. On the 

other hand, many of the vessels allotted 

to the army units were the types specifically designed for shore-to-shore opera-

"~Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. p. 3 I. 

105 

tions, a situation which posed untold 

problems since this technique of amphibious warfare had been given little study 

in the United States and there was little 

official American literature on the subject. 

As late as the middle of May the naval 

staff was planning to employ equipment 

whose capabilities and limitations were 

virtually unknown.33 Nor was there a 

sufficient number of any category of craft 

for component forces within the Army to 

be similarly equipped. The 45th Division, coming directly from the United 

States, was loaded on the pre-TORCH 

principle of "Trans-Divs" (Transport 

Divisions), consisting of combat-loaded 

AP and AK ships.34 The 1st Division, 

executing a shore-to-shore operation, had 

for the most part ship-to-shore ships and 

craft with the bulk of its vehicles loaded 

into AK or other types of cargo ships. 

The 3d Division alone had an adequate 

number of shore-to-shore craft entirely 

suitable for its task. 

There could be no argument with the 

suballotment of the available shipping: 

Patton did not have enough of anyone 

kind to go around. He chose to concentrate in a single sector-that of the 3d 

Division-the means to put ashore rapidly 

a powerful armored force which in the 

initial phases could have a material effect 

on the whole of the subsequent campaign. When deciding on the allotment 

of landing craft to the divisions, Patton 

felt that one of the most vital, if least 

spectacular, of the assigned tasks was the 

protection of the left flank of the Allied 

33 COHQ Bull Y/I, sub: Notes on Planning 

and Assault Phases of the Sicilian Campaign, 

October 1943,8-7.0010/43. 

34 The term AP is used to denote a troop transport vessel; the term APA to denote an attack 

transport. The AK designation refers to a cargo 

ship; the term AKA to an attack cargo ship. 
106 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

landings against counterattacks from the 

strong German formations known to be 

in the western part of the island. The 

rapid disgorgement of armor onto the 3d 

Division beaches would greatly assist in 

meeting any such threat. 

\Vhether it was vital to soften the beach 

defenses by naval gunfire before the landings was a question on which the Army 

and Navy took opposite views. Not optimistic about the effect of naval gunfire 

on fixed beach defenses, Army planners 

were concerned with the safety of paratroopers dropped ashore before the landings; they were also interested in achieving 

tactical surprise. The Navy planners 

argued that it was impossible to expect to 

achieve surprise because of the heavy preparatory air bombardments, the dropping 

of paratroopers several hours before the 

beach assault, and the approach of huge 

convoys in bright moonlight. 

The Army prevailed. There was to be 

no preparatory naval fire. Yet the Army 

wished the warships to be ready to furnish 

fire support after the troops were ashore. 

To this end, fire control parties from each 

artillery battalion received some training 

in observing and controlling naval gunfire 

on ground targets; arrangements were 

made for air observation and control of 

naval fires; and a naval gunfire liaison 

officer was assigned to each infantry 

division staff. 

In the event that the enemy discovered 

the invasion forces offshore and began to 

take effective measures to prevent the 

landings, the Navy was to be ready to 

take shore targets under fire. The planners prepared a system of prearranged fires, 

Army planners selecting certain targets 

for the Navy, others for the Air Forces.55 

35 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, pp. A-lo-A12; WNTF Action Rpt, pp. 86-87. 

Unlike the naval planners who cooperated closely with Army planners, the 

Air Forces refused to co-ordinate its 

planning with either Army or Navy. 

Part of this was due to the influence of 

the British concept, which held that the 

air service was independent of and coequal with the other services--a concept 

different from the American point of view, 

which saw the air arm as having a support function as well as a more or less 

independent mission. But the Air Forces 

adopted as its primary mission the neutralization of Axis air power, and until 

that objective was accomplished to the 

satisfaction of air commanders, little 

could be done to secure ground support. 

The Air Forces' position was that air 

strength should not be parceled out to 

individual landings or sectors, but should 

instead be kept united under a single 

command to insure the greatest possible 

flexibility. Thus, air power could be 

massed where it was needed and not 

kept immobilized where not needed. Because the enemy air forces remained the 

overriding target, and since enemy aircraft comprised "a fluid target not easily 

pinpointed in advance," the air plan gave 

ground and naval commanders no concrete information on the amount and type 

of air support they could expect on 

D_day.36 

The air plan issued late in June was 

described by one American general as a 

"most masterful piece of uninformed prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval 

and Military Joint Plan." 37 D-day 

36 Quote is from Graven and Gate, eds., Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, p. 445; see 

also Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 4'7-27. 

37Quote is from GOHQ Bull Y/t. The 

air plan may be found in 0407/488, Rpt of Opus 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

bombardment targets were not disclosed, 

except those diversionary bombardments 

in support of the airborne drops.3s 

Ground and naval commanders had no 

idea of the degree of protection they 

could expect, and when the assault troops 

set sail for Sicily, their commanders had 

not the faintest idea of when, where, 

under what circumstances, and in what 

numbers they would see their own aircraft. 

The U.S. XII Air Support Command 

(Maj. Gen. Edwin House) had the mission of providing air support for the 

Seventh Army. The command comprised seventeen squadrons of aircraft: 

six of fighter-bombers, ten of day fighters, 

and one reconnaissance squadron. The 

command also included signal construction 

and signal operation units for maintaining 

and operating an extensive communications network plus a signal aircraft warning battalion which could provide radar 

coverage over the battle area and ground 

control for the aircraft. Of the allotted 

aircraft, however, only the reconnaissance 

squadron operated under the direct control 

of the XII Air Support Command; all 

fighter-bomber and day fighter aircraft 

were placed under the operational control 

of the RAF's Malta Command and under 

NATAF itself, operating through XII Air 

Support Command's rear headquarters in 

Tunisia.39 

by Northwest African Tactical Air Force in the 

Capture of Sicily. 

38 Ltr, NAAF to NASAF, 4 Jul 43, sub: Radio 

Counter-Measures, and HUSKY Outline Plan for 

Attack on Enemy Radar, 21 Jun 43, both in 0403/ 

11/947; see also Ltr, NAAF to multiple addressees, 7 Jul 43, sub: Diversionary Air Opns, same 

file; Coles, USAF Hist Study 37, p. 87; Warren, 

USAF Hist Study 74, pp. 25-26. 

39 See files 0407/430, sub: Co-operation With 

Force 343, and 0407/418, sub: Operational Planning-XII ASC, for details of working out the air 

107 

The most support that would be furnished the Seventh Army during the 

initial phases of the Sicilian Campaign 

consisted of a maximum of eighteen tactical reconnaissance mISSIons per day, 

each mission lasting some thirty minutes. 

Despite ground dissatisfaction with air 

plans, the Allied air forces actually performed their preinvasion roles effectively. 

Furnishing all the fighter and fighterbomber support and much of the light 

and medium bomber support, the NAT AF 

moved three Spitfire wings from North 

Africa to Malta in June to bring the air 

strength on that island to twenty fighter 

squadrons. An American P-40 fighter 

group moved to Pantelleria, also in June, 

to cover the assault landings at Gela and 

Licata. American aviation engineers in 

the remarkably short time of twenty days 

constructed a new airfield on the island of 

Gozo, near Malta, to base another American fighter group. By the end of June, 

Allied planes based on the three islands 

totaled 670 first-line aircraft. 

On the Cape Bon peninsula of North 

Africa, twelve newly constructed, or improved, Axis airfields went to the XII 

Air Support Command and to the Tactical Bomber Force. The British Desert 

Air Force, based in the Tripoli area and 

employing fighter-bombers entirely, was 

support plan. Several air officers tried to secure 

close co-ordination with the ground forces, Col. 

Lawrence Hickey in particular. Working with 

General Patton on air problems, Hickey became 

persona non grata with air force commanders and 

was prevented from receiving a command as the 

result of the personal intervention of Air Marshal 

Cunningham, who felt that the "Hickey-Patton 

relationship [was] a weakness." See correspondence in 0407/418. See also Ltr, No. 1 Planning 

Staff, Force 545 (Air), 2 Jun 43, to Deputy Air 

CinC on Matter of Air Support for Seventh 

Army, 0403/10/251. 
108 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ready to support ground operations in 

Sicily and prepared to move to Malta as 

soon as planes there shifted to newly 

captured airfields on Sicily. 

The NASAF started its Sicilian operation by first attacking the southwestern 

group of Sicilian airfields, then shifted 

during the final week before the invasion 

to the eastern fields. Enemy air opposition proved surprisingly light. 

The Final Days 

The general plan for the forces approaching Sicily from the west, which 

included the entire American assault and 

a goodly portion of the British assault 

force, was an accretive process in which 

the layers were added in consideration of 

the mounting areas, the relative speeds 

of the vessels, the mutual protection of 

the convoys, and to the end of providing 

maXImum traveling comfort for the 

troops. 

First to sail, the 45th Division Teembarked on the afternoon of 4 July at 

Oran on the same ships that had brought 

the division from the United States only 

a short time before. The 1st Division, 

less a few units staging through Tunis, 

boarded transports in the Algiers harbor 

on the following afternoon. Still later, 

the 3d Division departed Bizerte, CCA 

of the 2d Armored Division, Oran. General Patton, accompanied by General 

Ridgway, sailed on Admiral Hewitt's 

flagship, the Monrovia. The subordinate 

ground commanders sailed with the naval 

commanders who headed the smaller task 

forces carrying the three major elements 

of the Seventh Army invasion force: 

Generals Bradley and Middleton with 

Admiral Kirk on the Ancon; General 

Allen with Admiral Hall on the Samuel 

Chase; General Truscott and Admiral 

Conolly aboard the Biscayne. 

The Mediterranean was relatively calm 

until the morning of 9 July when wind 

and sea began to rise. From a velocity of 

ten miles per hour, a westward wind increased to a maximum of almost forty 

miles in early afternoon. Discomfort and 

seasickness increased, especially among the 

troops crowded into the LCI's. 

As the invasion fleet turned to the 

north in the late afternoon of 9 July for 

the final approach, the ships began taking 

the wind and seas broadside. This 

slowed the landing craft to the point 

where it was difficult to maintain the 

speed required to keep up with the convoy. Some of the LCT formations began 

to straggle. Other vessels, including control ships, lost their places in column. 

As LST's and LCI's rolled heavily, cargoes shifted, and courses and speeds had 

to be changed. All the convoys were 

about an hour late in arriving at their 

assigned areas offshore, and many of the 

vessels were not on proper station. 

The gale also had its effect on Generals Eisenhower and Alexander who had 

gone to Malta to await reports on the invasion. As increasing tension developed 

over the weather, the question arose 

whether the operation ought to be postponed twenty-four hours. Once made, 

the decision could not be revoked, for the 

naval forces needed at least four hours 

to transmit the information to all concerned. After conferring with Admiral 

Cunningham's meteorological experts, Eisenhower decided against postponement. 

After dinner, hoping to catch a glimpse 

of some of the troop carrier aircraft towing the gliders filled with men of the 

British Ist Airborne Division, Eisenhower 

scanned the skies. He saw a few planes. 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 109 

LANDING CRAFT MASSED IN BIZERTE HARBOR FOR THE INVASION OF SICILY. 3d Division 

troops marching aboard, 6 Ju?J 1943. 

He rubbed his ever-present seven lucky 

coins and offered up a silent prayer for 

the safety and success of all the troops 

under his command. Returning to the 

governor's palace, he sent a wire to General Marshall to inform him that the 

invasion would take place as scheduled. 

Then he returned to Cunningham's underground headquarters to await first 

news of the invasion. 40 

40 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 17 1- 1 72 ; 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 

347-52 ; Stars and Stripes, London ed., 12 July 

1943, p. I. 

On Sicily, meanwhile, General Guzzoni's intelligence had reported early in 

July that 90 percent of available Allied 

troops, 60 percent of the air forces, and 

96 percent of the landing craft were concentrated in the central-western Mediterranean and directly threatening Sicily. 

As the weather during the first ten days 

of July seemed particularly propitious for 

an amphibious landing, information from 

Italian and German intelligence sources 

repeatedly warned of the Allied danger to 

Sicily and Sardinia, with emphasis on 

Sicily. Though the Germans were not 
110 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

entirely convinced, the Italians began to 

feel certain that the Allies would make a 

massive effort including, in all probability, 

the use of parachute troopS.41 

When news came to the Sixth Army 

headquarters at Enna on 4 July that an 

Allied convoy of twenty-five merchant 

vessels with naval escorts had been observed in North African waters, Guzzoni 

issued an estimate of the situation that 

stressed the lessened threat to Sardinia, 

the increased danger to Sicily, particularly the eastern part, and also to Calabria. 

Noting the "substantial number" of Allied fighter planes on Malta, the movements of heavy Allied warships, and increased Allied air bombardments, Guzzoni 

alerted his forces to the possibility of an 

Allied invasion during the period up to 

10 July-when the moon would be invisible. The Germans still inclined toward the opinion that the Allies would 

launch simultaneous attacks against Sardinia, Sicily, and Greece, though not in 

the immediate future, but Guzzoni thought 

an attack "against Sicily could come even 

today. We must be extremely alert." 42 

Noting on 5 July an increase in Allied 

hospital ships from two to sixteen, the 

Italians took this to mean an operation 

was imminent. By nightfall, Italian reconnaissance pilots observed a convoy 

traveling under an umbrella of barrage 

balloons. With the location of the British 

Eighth Army confirmed on the same day, 

Guzzoni in his evening bulletin concluded 

that that army would operate against 

Sicily. To him this was "a very serious 

and decisive indication. The danger of 

an imminent attack is increasing." 43 

41 Italian intelligence report quoted in Faldella, 

Lo sbarco, pp. 100-101. 

42Ibid.,p.IOI. 

43 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 

Italian military commanders in Rome 

by then held a similar opinion.44 So 

much on edge were staffs in Rome that 

many officers interpreted Supermarina 

reports on numerous fires near Marsala 

on 7 July as indications of Allied landings. Late that same day, German reconnaissance pilots reported the presence 

of a large Allied convoy four miles off 

Licata. The report turned out to be 

false, but in the meantime an alert had 

sent coastal defenders hurriedly to their 

postS.45 

By 8 July Guzzoni had ordered the 

ports of Licata, Porto Empedocle, and 

Sciacca on the southern shore prepared 

for demolition. Comando Supremo ordered Trapani and Marsala rendered useless by dumping earth and rock into 

the harbors; when this proved impractical, the Italians demolished the docks in 

the hope of interfering with Allied landings. When Luftwaffe headquarters on 

the morning of 9 July reported seventy 

to ninety landing craft and transports 

traveling at high speed not far from Pantelleria, Guzzoni concluded that an invasion on the southeastern corner of Sicily, 

from Gela to Catania, was not far off.46 

At 1810, 9 July, Guzzoni received 

another message reporting the approach 

of additional convoys. Late in the evening and during the night, information 

kept coming in to Sixth Army headquarters of several Allied convoys of varying 

size off the southeastern corner of the island. Meanwhile, Guzzoni, at about 

44 Telecon, Roatta and Guzzoni, 1245, 7 Jul 

43, mentioned in Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 102. 

45 Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 102; IIIPz. Rgt. 

H.G., KTB Nr. I, 9.XI.42-15.IX.43. Typewritten copy of the war diary of the 2d Battalion of 

the Panzer Regiment of the Hermann Goering 

Division, in OCMH folder X-878. 

46 Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 102. 
FINAL ALLIED PREPARATIONS 

1900, issued the order for a preliminary 

alert; three hours later, he ordered a full 

alert. 47 

When Hitler learned of the approaching Allied fleet on 9 July, he ordered the 

German 1st Parachute Division to be 

alerted for immediate transfer, by air if 

necessary, from France to Sicily, a movement that could be made in five days.4H 

That evening Allied air forces bombed 

Caltanissetta (headquarters of the Livorno Division), Syracuse, Palazzolo Acreide 

(headquarters of the Napoli Division), 

47 IT 99a, 9 and 10 Jul 43; OKWjWFSt, KTB, 

I.-3I.VII.43, 9 and 10 Jul 43 (time of first alert 

reported by OB SUED as 1840); MS #T-2 

(Fries et a/.), p. 10; Faldella, La sbaTca, p. 105 

(time of first alert reported as 1930); Maravigna, 

Rivista MilitaTe, 1952, p. 17. 

48 OKWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3 I. VII.43, 9 Jul 43. 

111 

and Catania, where serious damage was 

caused to the various Italian command 

installations. Naval gunfire was reported 

to have struck Syracuse, Catania, Taormina, Trapani, and Augusta. 49 

At nightfall on 9 July the waters off 

Sicily seemed deserted. Yet despite the 

windy weather and rough sea, the coastal 

defenders were a ware of the presence of 

a huge fleet of vessels somewhere in the 

darkness. Filled with American and 

British soldiers, the ships were moving 

toward the island. The Italian and German island defenders could do little except await the resumption of Allied air 

bombardments that would signal the start 

of the invasion. 

4" Faldella, La sbarca, p. 105; IT 99a, 10 Jul 

43· 

PART TWO 

OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 

CHAPTER VI 

The Assault 

The Airborne Operations 

At various airfields in North Africa 

during the afternoon of 9 July, British 

and American airborne troops, under a 

glaring sun, made the final preparations 

for the operation scheduled to initiate the 

invasion of Sicily.1 While crews ran 

checks on the transport aircraft, the soldiers loaded gliders, rolled and placed 

equipment bundles in para-racks, made 

1 Major sources for the British and American 

airborne operations are: Warren, USAF Hist 

Study 74 (an excellent account of the part played 

by the troop carrier units) ; 82d Airborne Division 

in Sicily and Italy (a mimeographed historical 

study prepared by the division's historical officer 

and found in the division's files, probably the best 

single account of the 82d Airborne Division's part 

in the Sicily Campaign); 505th Para Inf Regt 

AAR; NAAFTCC Rpt of Opns, 0402/11/949; 

82d AB Div G-3 Jnl, 4 JUI-21 Aug 43; Rpt, 

Maj. Gen. F. A. M. Browning, 99-66.2; Gavin, 

Airborne Warfare; Ridgway, Soldier; Maj. Edwin 

M. Sayre, The Operations of Company A, 505th 

Parachute Infantry (82d Airborne Division), Airborne Landings in Sicily, 9-24 July 1943 (Fort 

Benning Ga., 1947); Maj. Robert M. Piper, The 

Operations of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team (82d Airborne Division) 

in the Airborne Landings on Sicily, 9-1 I July 

1943 (Sicilian Campaign) (Fort Benning, Ga., 

1949); By Air to Battle, the Official Account of 

the British Airborne Divisions (London: Great 

Britain Air Ministry, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945), pp. 56-60; Robert Devore, "Paratroops Behind Enemy Lines," Collier's, vol. I 12, 

No. 12 (September 18, 1943), pp. 18-19, 54-55; 

Lt. Col. William T. Ryder, "Action on Biazza 

Ridge," Saturday Evening Post, vol. 216, No. 26 

(December 22,1943), pp. 14,49-54. 

last-minute inspections, and received final 

briefings. Heavily laden with individual 

equipment and arms, with white bands 

pinned to their sleeves for identification, 

the troops clambered into the planes and 

gliders that would take them to Sicily. 

The British airborne operation got under way first as 109 American C-4 is 

and 35 British Albermarles of the U.S. 

51st Troop Carrier Wing at 1842 began 

rising into the evening skies, towing 144 

Waco and Horsa gliders. Two hours 

later, 222 C-4is of the U.S. 52d Troop 

Carrier Wing filled with American paratroopers of the 505th Parachute Infantry 

Regimental Combat Team and the attached 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute 

Infantry, were airborne. 

The British contingent made rendezvous over the Kuriate Islands and headed 

for Malta, the force already diminished 

by seven planes and gliders that had 

failed to clear the North African coast. 

Though the sun was setting as the planes 

neared Malta, the signal beacon on the 

island was plainly visible to all but a few 

aircraft at the end of the column. The 

gale that was shaking up the seaborne 

troops began to affect the air columns. 

In the face of high winds, formations loosened as pilots fought to keep on course. 

Some squadrons were blown well to the 

east of the prescribed route. others in the 

rear overran forward squadrons. Despite the troubles, 90 percent of the air-
PARATROOPERS, IDENTIFIED BY WHITE ARM BANDS, preparing to emplanefor Sicily. 

GLIDER CASUALTY 
THE ASSAULT 

craft made landfall at Cape Passero, the 

check point at the southeastern tip of 

Sicily, though formations by then were 

badly mixed. Two pilots who had lost 

their way over the sea had turned back 

to North Africa. Two others returned 

after sighting Sicily because they could 

not orient themselves to the ground. A 

fifth plane had accidentally released its 

glider over the water; a sixth glider had 

broken loose from its aircraft--both gliders dropped into the sea. 

The lead aircraft turned north, then 

northeast from Cape Passero, seeking the 

glider release point off the east coast of 

Sicily south of Syracuse. The designated 

zigzag course threw more pilots off course, 

and confusion set in. Some pilots released their gliders prematurely, others 

headed back to North Africa. Exactly 

how many gliders were turned loose in 

the proper area is impossible to sayperhaps about I 15 carrying more than 

1,200 men. Of these, only 54 gliders 

landed in Sicily, 12 on or near the correct 

landing zones. The others dropped into 

the sea. The result: a small band of 

less than 100 British airborne troops was 

making its way toward the objective, the 

Ponte Grande south of Syracuse, about the 

time the British Eighth Army was making 

its amphibious landings. 

As for the Americans who had departed 

North Africa as the sun was setting, the 

pilots found that the quarter moon gave 

little light. Dim night formation lights, 

salt spray from the tossing sea hitting the 

windshields, high winds estimated at 

thirty miles an hour, and, more important, insufficient practice in night fiying in 

the unfamiliar V of V's pattern, broke up 

the aerial columns. Groups began to 

loosen, and planes began to straggle. 

Those in the rear found it particularly 

117 

difficult to remain on course. Losing direction, missing check points, the pilots approached Sicily from all points of the 

compass. Several planes had a few tense 

moments as they passed over the naval 

convoys then nearing the coast-but the 

naval gunners held their fire. Because 

they were lost, two pilots returned to North 

Africa with their human cargoes. A third 

crashed into the sea. 

Even those few pilots who had followed 

the planned route could not yet congratulate themselves, for haze, dust, and firesall caused by the preinvasion air attacksobscured the final check points, the 

mouth of the Acate River and the Biviere 

Pond. What formations remained broke 

apart. Antiaircraft fire from Gela, Ponte 

Olivo, and Niscemi added to the difficulties of orientation. The greatest problem 

was getting the paratroopers to ground, 

not so much on correct drop zones as to 

get them out of the doors over ground of 

any sort. The result: the 3,400 paratroopers who jumped found themselves 

scattered all over southeastern SicilY-33 

sticks landing in the Eighth Army area; 

53 in the 1st Division zone around Gela; 

127 inland from the 45th Division beaches 

between Vittoria and Caltagirone. Only 

the 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry (Maj. Mark Alexander), hit 

ground relatively intact; and even this 

unit was twenty-five miles from its designated drop zone.2 

Except for eight planes of the second 

serial which put most of Company I, 

2 50 5th RCT Drop Zones, 10 Jul 43 (an overlay and table prepared by Capt. John Norton, 10 

Aug 43), in Gen. James M. Gavin's Papers; Msg 

4597, NAAFTCC to AFHQ, 10 Jul 43, 0100/21/ 

1099, IV. Eight aircraft were shot down by 

enemy antiaircraft fire after releasing their paratroopers. Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, pp. 33-

34· 
118 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

HIGHWAY II~ 

TO GELA TO VITTORIA 

THE PONTE DIRILLO CROSSING SITE, seized by paratroopers on D-day. 

505th Parachute Infantry, on the correct 

drop zone just south of the road junction 

objective; except for eighty-five men of 

Company G of the 505th who landed 

about three miles away; and except for 

the headquarters and two platoons of 

Company A and part of the 1St Battalion 

command group, which landed near their 

scheduled drop zones just north of the 

road junction, the airborne force was 

dispersed to the four winds. 

The planes carrying the headquarters 

serial, which included Colonel Gavin, the 

airborne troop commander, were far off 

course, having missed the check point at 

Linosa, the check point at Malta, and 

even the southeastern coast of Sicily. 

The lead pilot eventually made landfall 

on the east coast near Syracuse, oriented 

himself, and turned across the southeast 

corner of the island to get back on course. 

Assuming that the turn signaled the correct drop zone, the pilots of the last three 

planes- carrying the demolition section 

designated to take care of the Ponte Dirillo over the Acate River southeast of 

Gela-released their paratroopers. The 

other pilots, about twelve of them, dropped 
THE ASSAULT 

their loads in a widely dispersed pattern 

due south of Vittoria about three miles 

inland on the 45th Division's right flank. 

Coming to earth in one of these sticks, 

Gavin found himself in a strange land. 

He was not even sure he was in Sicily. 

He heard firing apparently everywhere, 

but none of it very close. Within a few 

minutes he gathered together about fifteen men. They captured an Italian soldier who was alone, but they could get 

no information from him. Gavin then 

led his small group north toward the 

sound of fire he believed caused by paratroopers fighting for possession of the 

road junction objective. 

The fire actually marked an attack by 

about forty paratroopers under 1st Lt. H. 

H. Swingler, the 505th's headquarters 

company commander, who was leading 

an attack to overcome a pillbox-defended 

crossroads along the highway leading 

south from Vittoria. Other sounds of 

battle came from Alexander's 2d Battalion, which was reducing Italian coastal 

positions near Santa Croce Camerina. 

Near Vittoria, scattered units of the 3d 

Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, had 

coalesced and were also engaged in combat. The eighty-five men from Company 

G, under Capt. James McGinity, had 

seized Ponte Dirillo. Elsewhere, bands 

of paratroopers were roaming through 

the rear areas of the coastal defense units, 

cutting enemy communications lines, ambushing small parties, and creating confusion among enemy commanders as to 

exactly where the main airborne landing 

had taken place.3 

3 See review comments of Lt. Col. Charles W. 

Kouns (former commander of the 3d Battalion, 

504th Parachute Infantry) for an example of individual initiative and resourcefulness. OCMH. 

11 ~) 

But less than 200 men were on the 

important high ground of Piano Lupo, 

near the important road junction, hardly 

the strength anticipated by those who 

had planned and prepared and were now 

executing the invasion of Sicily. 

The Seaborne Operations 

General Guzzoni, the Sixth Army commander, received word of the airborne 

landings not long after midnight. Certain 

that the Allied invasion had begun, he 

issued a proclamation exhorting soldiers 

and civilians to repel the invaders. At 

the same time he ordered the Gela pier 

destroyed. Phoning the XII Corps in 

the western part of Sicily and the XVI 

Corps in the east at 0145, 10 July, he 

alerted them to expect landings on the 

southeastern coast and III the GelaAgrigento area. 4 

An hour later, the initial waves of the 

15 Army Group assault divisions began 

to come ashore. Near Avola in the Gulf 

of N oto, on both sides of the Pachino 

peninsula, near Scoglitti, Gela, and Licata, small British and American landing 

craft ground ashore and started to disgorge Allied soldiers. Hard on their heels 

came the larger LCT's and LST's with 

supporting artillery and armor. Offshore 

stood Allied war vessels ready to pound 

Italian coastal defense positions into submlSSIOn. 

Overhead, Allied fighter aircraft from 

Malta, Gozo, and the recently captured 

Pantelleria, covered the landings. Concerned lest the enemy make his maximum 

air effort against Allied shipping and the 

assault beaches early on D-day and disorganize the operation at the outset, 

4 Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. I I I, 120-2 I. 
120 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Allied air planners had spread their available aircraft over as many of the assault 

beaches as possible while maintaining a 

complete fighter wing in reserve. As the 

ground troops went ashore, fighter aircraft patrolled in one-squadron strength 

over all the landing areas to ward off 

hostile air attacks, a commitment that 

was decreased later in the day.5 In addition, at daylight, formations composed 

of either twelve A-36 or twelve P-38 

fighter-bombers were dispatched every 

thirty minutes throughout the day to disrupt potential counterattacks by hitting 

the main routes leading to the assault 

beaches.6 Because of the heavy commitment of Allied aircraft to these and other 

missions, no direct or close support was 

available to the ground troops this day.7 

The seaborne landings of the British 

Eighth Army were uniformly successful. 

Everywhere the first assault waves 

5 Patrols in one-squadron strength flew continuously over two beaches throughout the daylight 

hours on 10 July. The same sized patrols also 

flew over all landing beaches from 1030 to 1230, 

from 1600 to 1730, and for the last one and a 

half hours of daylight. See 0407/386, sub: Preliminary Rpt on HUSKY Opns by Malta-Based 

Aircraft, 9-17 Jul 43; see also NATAF Rpt of 

Opns, 0407/488; NASAF Opns Rpt, 12 Jul 43, 

II Corps file 202-20.1; Craven and Cate, eds., 

Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 449-

52; Coles, USAF Hist Study 37, pp. 99-106. 

6 The A-36 was a modified P-51 fighter aircraft, a single-engine, low-wing monoplane. The 

P-38 was a twin-engine, single-seat fighter, the 

first U.S. fighter aircraft which could be compared 

favorably with the British Spitfire or the German 

ME-I09. As a fighter-bomber, it could carry a 

bomb load of 2,000 pounds in external wing racks. 

See Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 

eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," 

vol. VI, Men and Planes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 198-99; 214-

15· 

7 Or for that matter, with but one exception, 

for the next several days. The terms direct and 

close support used in this volume are terms defined 

in TM 20-205, 18 January 1944. 

achieved tactical surprise and Italian 

coastal defense units offered only feeble resistance.s Some fire from coastal batteries 

and field artillery positions inland did 

strike the beaches but it was quickly silenced by supporting naval gunfire and the 

rapid movement of assault troops inland. 

In Enna, General Guzzoni received a 

phone call from the commander of the 

Naval Base Messina at 0400. The German radio station at Syracuse, the naval 

commander said, had announced that Allied troops had landed by glider near the 

eastern coast and that fighting had 

started at the Syracuse seaplane base. In 

response, Guzzoni instructed the XVI 

Corps commander to rush ground troops 

to the apparently endangered Naval Base 

Augusta-Syracuse. This, plus the previous information from German reconnaissance aircraft that Allied fleets were 

close to the southern coast as well, 

brought home to Guzzoni the fact that 

the Allies would land simultaneously in 

many different places. Realizing his 

forces would be unable to' counter all of 

the landings, he committed his available 

reserves to those areas he considered most 

dangerous to the over-all defense of the 

island: Syracuse, Gela, and Licata. Of 

these three, Guzzoni considered Syracuse 

on the east coast the most serious. But 

he also apparently felt that the presence 

there of both Group Schmalz and the 

Napoli Division, plus the supposedly 

strong defenses of the naval base itself, 

would be sufficient to stabilize the situation and prevent an Allied breakthrough 

into the Catania plain. Thus, he or8 The account of the British landings is based 

on: Alexander Despatch, pp. 12-1:3; Montgomery, Eighth Army, pp. 94-95; De Guingand, 

Operation Victory, pp. 284-85; Nicholson, The 

Canadians in Italy, pp. 20, 62-63; Morison, 

Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 148-61. 
THE ASSAULT 121 

USS BOISE BOMBARDING COASTAL DEFENSES in Gela landing area. 

dered the bulk of the Hermann Goering 

Division to strike the Allied landings near 

Gela. 9 

In front of the easternmost British landing the small band of British airborne 

troops, eight officers and sixty-five men, 

seized Ponte Grande. By 0800, the 5th 

Division held Cassibile, on the coastal 

highway, and by the middle of the afternoon successfully consolidated its beacho Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 118-23; OKH, Op. 

Abt., Meldungen des Ob. Sued, 1.-31. VII.43 and 

1.-31.VIII.43 (H 22/137 and 138) (cited hereafter as OB SUED, Meldungen), IO Jul 43. 

head and started north to join with the 

air-landed troops at the bridge site. (Map 

1) 

But by 1500, the small band of British 

soldiers at Ponte Grande found themselves in difficult straits. After battling 

with Italian soldiers, marines, and sailors 

sent against them from the Naval Base 

Augusta-Syracuse, only fifteen men remained unwounded. At 1530, these men 

were overrun. Only eight managed to 

make their way southward to meet the 

advancing 5th Division, a column of 

which, supported by artillery and tanks, 
MAP 1 

BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY 

OPERATIONS 

IOJuly 1943 

_ AXIS OF ADVANCE, 10 JUL 

• AMERICAN PARATROOP DROPS,9- IOJUL 

Cdo COMMANDO 

Elevations in meters o I'i " i ' l I 5 0 I 

5 MILES 

1 

5 KILOMETERS H.C B rC'.wt:r,Jr. 
THE ASSAULT 

recaptured the bridge intact. As Italian 

opposition disintegrated, the British column continued unopposed into Syracuse. 

Scarcely pausing, British troops continued 

northward along the coastal highway on 

the way to Augusta. But early in the 

evening at Priolo, midway between Syracuse and Augusta, Group Schmalz, which 

had rushed down from Catania to counter the British landings, halted the I3 

Corps advance. 

According to Axis defense plans Group 

Schmalz, in conjunction with the Napoli 

Division, was supposed to counterattack 

any Allied landing on the east coast. But 

on IO July, Col. Wilhelm Schmalz had 

been unable to contact the Italian unit 

and had proceeded alone toward Syracuse. Unknown to the German commander, the Napoli Division had tried to 

counterattack, but some units had been 

turned back by British forces near Solarino, while other units were lost trying to 

stem British advances in the Pachino 

area. IO 

By the end of D-day the British 30 

Corps had secured the whole of the 

Pachino peninsula as far as Highway I I5, 

which crossed the base between Ispica 

and Noto. The Ist Canadian Divi~ion, 

the British 5 I st Highland Infantry Division, and the 23 I st Independent Infantry 

Brigade had gone ashore against only 

feeble resistance and had pushed on in 

good fashion. 

U nloadings over the British beaches 

progressed slowly but steadily during the 

day, despite small-scale enemy air attacks 

that proved annoying but caused relatively little damage. By the end of the day, 

the Eighth Army had secured a beach10 Generalleutnant Wilhelm Schmalz in MS 

#T -2 (Fries et al.); Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 

130 -3 2, 143-44; IT 4432. 

123 

head line extending from north of Syracuse on the east coast, west to Floridia, 

thence southward roughly paralleling 

Highway I I5. 

The Seventh Army had a more difficult time. The gale and high seas had 

delayed the three naval task forces and 

after fighting their way to the landing 

craft release points in the Gulf of Gela, 

they were somewhat disorganized. Yet 

only one was seriously behind schedule, 

that carrying the 45th Division. Those 

landings were postponed an hour. 

Admiral Conolly's Naval Task Force 

85 brought the 3d Division to the Seventh Army's westernmost assault area in 

four attack groups, one group for each 

of the landing beaches on both sides of 

LicataY Conolly's flagship, the Biscayne, dropped anchor in the tramport 

area at 0 I 35. The winds had made it 

difficult for the LST's, LCI's, and LCT's 

of his task force to maintain proper speed 

and formation, so that Conolly, around 

midnight, when it had seemed virtually 

impossible to meet H-hour, had ordered 

his vessels to go all out to make the deadline. Since he had not heard from his 

units, all of which had been instructed to 

break radio silence only to report an 

emergency, Conolly assumed that all his 

units were in position and ready to disembark the troops of the 3d Division. 

At OI35, IO July, Admiral Conolly's 

as'iUmption that all units were in posi11 The account of the 3d Division landings is 

based on: COHQ Bull Y/I, Oct. 43; Joss Force 

Planning File, Sicilian Campaign, vol. I (Operations); 3d Inf Div in Sicilian Campaign AAR, 

10-18 J ul 43; WNTF Action Rpt; Rpt of Arty 

Opns, Joss Force; Truscott, Command Missions, 

pp. 192-212; ONI, The Sicilian Campaign, pp. 

73-95; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 71-

86; Interv, Howard McGaw Smyth with Maj 

Gen William W. Eagles (former asst div comdr 3d 

Inf Div), I7 Jan 51. 
LICATA AND BEACH AREAS TO THE EAST toward Gela. Note Licata's cliffs in lifi foreground. 
THE ASSAULT 

tion was not altogether correct. Particularly in the west, the landing ships and 

craft carrying the 7th RCT had had considerable difficulty making headway in 

the heaving Mediterranean. All were 

late in reaching the transport area, but 

no one had reported that fact to Admiral 

Conolly. 

By using all four of his assigned beaches, 

General Truscdtt had adopted two axes of 

advance for his assault units-actually 

axes that formed the outer and inner 

claws of a deep pincer movement against 

Licata. The left outer claw consisted of 

the 7th Infantry Regimental Combat Team 

(Col. Harry B. Sherman) landing over 

Red Beach. The left inner claw, consisting of a special force (the 3d Ranger Battalion; the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry; a 

company of 4.2-inch mortars; a battery 

of Ios-mm. howitzers; and a platoon of 

75-mm. howitzers) under the command 

of the I sth Infantry's executive officer, 

Lt. Col. Brookner W. Brady, was to land 

over the two Green Beaches. As the 

right inner claw of the pincer, and the 

counterpart of the special force, the remainder of the 15th Infantry, led by Col. 

Charles R. Johnson, was to land over Yellow Beach. Meanwhile, the right outer 

claw, the 30th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (Col. Arthur R. Rogers), was 

to assault across Blue Beach. Each assault was to move in columns of battalIons. Combat Command A, under Brig. 

Gen. Maurice Rose of the 2d Armored 

Division, constituted the 3d Division's 

floating reserve~ prepared to land in support of any of the assaulting units or for 

commitment against Campobello to the 

north, Agrigento to the west, or Gela to 

the east. 

The division's assault plan, involving 

two distinct pincer movements one inside 

125 

the other, was somewhat complicated. Its 

execution was aided by the intensive training program undertaken after the end of 

the North African campaign; by General 

Truscott's extensive knowledge of amphibious and combined operations learned 

in England and in North Africa; and by 

the extremely close and pleasant working 

relations which existed between the division and Admiral Conolly's naval task 

force. The assault was further facilitated 

by the weakness of the enemy's defenses 

in the Licata area, probably the weakest 

of all the Seventh Army's assault areas. 

Only one Italian coastal division, backed 

by a few scattered Italian mobile units, 

stood initially in the 3d Division's path. 

Two Italian mobile divisions-Assietta and 

Aosta--and two-thirds of the German 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division, the only 

effective fighting forces in the X lIe orps 

sector, were well off to the west near 

Palermo. 

Fully exposed to the westerly wind that 

was churning up the surf, the LST's carrying the 7th Infantry had great difficulty 

hoisting out and launching the LCVP's 

that would take the assault waves to Red 

Beach. When one davit gave way and 

dumped a boatload of men into the water, 

nine men were lost. Nevertheless, around 

0200 the small craft were loaded with 

troops and in the water, and soon afterwards they were heading for the rendeZvous area. The LCVP's had trouble 

locating the control vessels, which had 

been serving as escort ships during the 

voyage across the Mediterranean and 

which had not been able to take their 

proper places. Shortly after 0300, already fifteen minutes beyond the time 

scheduled for touchdown on the beach, 

the attack group commander ordered the 

LCVP's in to shore. He was fearful 
126 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

THE RIGHT FLANK BEACH AT LICATA, 10 ]uly 1943. 

that the LCI's, scheduled to land at 0330, 

would use their superior speed to overtake the LCVP's and he was unable to 

contact the LCI flotilla commander. 

As it was, the first wave, Lt. Col. Roy 

E. Moore's 1st Battalion, did not touch 

down until 0430. The delay was imposed partly by the late start, partly by 

the longer run to the beach than was 

originally contemplated because of the 

faulty disposition of the LST's in the 

transport area. The latter error also 

helped cause the LCVP's to land at the 

far right end of the beach rather than at 

the center as planned. The small craft 

met no fire on the way in, and only light 

and ineffective artillery fire on the beach 

after the landings were made. 

Red Beach lay in a shallow cove, the 

seaward approach clear of rocks and 

shoals. Only 8 to 20 feet deep, 2,800 

yards long, the beach at its widest part 

was backed by cliffs, many reaching a 

height of 60 feet. Exits were poor: a 

small stream bed near the center, three 

paths over the cliff at the left end. 

Lying in the Italian 207th Coastal Divisian's zone (as were all the division's landing areas), Red Beach was probably the 

most heavily fortified of all. Artillery 

pieces dominated the exits and most of 

the beach; numerous machine gun posi-
THE ASSAULT 1~7 

HIGHWA y 115, the coastal road) shown running west to Licata in the distance. 

tions near the center and western end 

provided the defenders with ample firepower to contest an assault landing; an 

extensive defensive position along some 

350 yards of the bluff line contained three 

coast artillery pieces and another ten 

machine gun emplacements, all connected 

by a series of trenches; and the San Nicola Rock at the right end and the Gaffi 

Tower off the left end gave the defenders 

excellent observation posts and positions 

from which to place enfilading fire. 

Once ashore, the 1st Battalion promptly 

set to work. While one company turned 

to the west and began clearing out beach 

defenses, a second swept the center of the 

landing area and set up a covering position on three low hills just inland from 

the beach. The third company wheeled 

to the east and occupied San Nicola Rock 

and Point San Nicola, completing both 

tasks an hour and a half after landing. 

(Map III) 

The six LCI's bearing Maj. Everett W. 

Duvall's 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, had 

assembled just east of the LST anchorage, 

more than two miles farther offshore than 

planned. Unaware of this, the flotilla 

started for shore at 0240, exactly on the 

schedule planned for the second wave. 

At this moment the 1st Battalion's LST's 

were completing their launching of the 

LCVP's. Because the 1st Battalion's landing craft had veered to the right, the 
128 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

LCI's carrying the 2d Battalion saw no 

signs of small boat activity as they passed 

the LST's. Assuming that the assault 

had not yet started, the flotilla commander turned his craft back to the LST 

anchorage to find out whether H-hour 

had been postponed. 

After ascertaining that no delay was in 

order, the flotilla commander again turned 

his craft shoreward. He sighted a control vessel herding a number of LCVP's 

toward shore. Recognizing thereby that 

the assault wave was behind schedule, he 

halted his own craft, planning to wait 

twenty-five minutes to give the 1st Battalion time to clear the beach. At 04 I 5, 

as the sky began to get light, he started 

the final run to shore. There was no 

evidence of the 1st Battalion's LCVP's. 

The LCI's sailed straight toward the center of Red Beach, the troops of the 2d 

Battalion little realizing that they constituted an initial assault wave. 

The LCI's were about 450 yards from 

the beach in a wide, shallow V-formation 

just opening into a line abreast formation 

when enemy artillery batteries opened a 

heavy fire directed chiefly at the left half 

of the line. The LCI's increased their 

speed temporarily, then 150 yards from 

shore slowed down quickly, dropped stern 

anchors, and beached at 0440 in the face 

of heavy small arms fire on the beach. 

The LCI's on the right side of the line escaped the heaviest fire because the Italian 

gunners could not depress their gun tubes 

enough to take these craft under fire. 

Five of the LCI's beached successfully. 

One stuck on the false bar off the shore 

line, tried three' times without success to 

ride over the bar, landed a few troops 

in rubber boats, and finally transferred 

the remainder of its troops to an LCI 

bringing i:n the third wave. The heavy 

surf added to the difficulties of the five 

craft that did manage to ride over the 

false beach. One lost both ramps soon 

after they were lowered and was able to 

land its troops only after salvaging the 

port ramp. 

Almost constant enemy fire harassed 

the boats. Soldiers in some instances became casualties before they reached the 

ramps, others were hit while disembarking. The LCI on the left flank drew the 

heaviest fire, a flanking fire from both 

left and right. The Italians shot away 

her controls and communications as she 

beached, and though able to lower both 

ramps, the LCI started to broach almost 

immediately and had to cut the ramps 

away. She swung completely around until her stern rested on the shore. Disdaining normal disembarkation procedures, the 

troops scrambled over her stern and 

dropped to the beach. By 0500, the bulk 

of the 2d Battalion was ashore. Two 

companies swarmed inland and seized 

Monte Marotta (some four and a half 

miles inland west of the north-south Highway 123), while the third turned northeast after landing, cut the railroad, and 

established a roadblock at Station San 

Oliva where the railroad crossed Highwa y 123 some three and a half miles 

northwest of Licata. By 1000, after bypassing most of the enemy resistance 

along the beach, the 2d Battalion was on 

its objectives and successfully drove off a 

dispirited counterattack launched against 

Station San Oliva by an Italian coastal 

battalion, a XII Corps reserve unit. 

While the five 2d Battalion LCI's were 

trying to retract from the beach, six LCI's 

carrying Lt. Col. John A. Heintges' 3d 

Battalion came in, along with three LCI's 

transporting part of the engineer beach 

group. With some overlapping of the 2d 
THE ASSAULT 

Battalion's LCI's, the 3d Battalion touched 

down at 0500 on the left end of Red Beach 

and received the same heavy fire from the 

shore defenders which was peppering the 

leftmost LCI of the 2d Battalion group. 

In fact, it was not until the LCIs' guns 

went into action to provide covering fires 

that the 3d Battalion troops were landed. 

The section of beach where the 3d 

Battalion landed~-near Gaffi Tower--had 

not been cleared either bv the 1st or 2d 

Battalion. Nevertheless, despite wire entanglements along the side of the bluff 

and despite heavy Italian rifle and machine gun fire from positions along the 

top of the bluff, the battalion pushed aggressively inland and cleared the immediate beach area. One company, after 

capturing nineteen Italians along the cliff, 

pushed westward and inland, took the 

tower, and occupied the high ground just 

south of the railroad and coastal highway. 

The other two companies occupied the 

hill mass north of the highway. An eightman demolition section pushed on to the 

west through a defile and blew the railroad crossing over the Palma River, some 

two miles in front of the battalion's hill 

positions. 

The LCI bearing Colonel Sherman and 

his staff came ashore near the center of 

the beach as dawn was breaking. Tangling with another LCI on its way to assist 

the broached LCI of the first wave, the 

boat lost both ramps after only fifteen 

men had disembarked. The LCI commander tried to discharge the rest of his 

troops by rigging wooden ladders and rope 

lines over the side of the boat. But the 

weight of individual equipment hampered the men, and they floundered in the 

water, helpless against the fire coming from shore. The craft commander 

stopped the unloading by this method, 

12~) 

deliberately broached the LCI, and sent 

the RCT command group over the sides. 

The RCT headquarters opened ashore at 

06 I 5, just inland from the beach on top 

of the cliff. 

Naval gunfire might have helped the 

small craft to the beach, but the two fire 

support destroyers assigned to Red Beach 

-the Swanson and the Roe-~had collided 

near Porto Empedocle at 0255 and were 

concerned with their own troubles. However, help was arriving. At 0520, with 

enemy fire still falling on the beach, 

twenty-one LCT's carrying the RCT's 

supporting armor and artillery approached 

through the heavy seas. Fearful for the 

safety of the LCT's landing under enemy 

fire, the commander of the Red Beach 

naval force ordered the craft to halt until 

the fire could be silenced. But four of the 

LCT's, either ignoring the order or failing to receive it, kept on going and 

beached at 0630. The four carried the 

loth Field Artillery Battalion. V nloading quickly, utilizing the full-tracked mobility of its M 7's, the artillery unit established firing positions 500 to 1,000 yards 

inland and began firing in support of the 

infantry units. 12 

At about the same time, the destroyer 

12 Before embarking them in North Africa, General Truscott had his organic artillery battalions 

exchange their towed los-mm. howitzers for the 

full-tracked Mis of the 5th Armored Field Artillery Group, a swap to last during the assault 

phase only. Once ashore, the units exchanged 

pieces again. 

The M 7 (called the Priest because of its pulpitlike machine gun platform) had a IOs-mm. 

howitzer mounted on the medium MS tank. The 

tank was modified for this purpose by having its 

turret removed and its armor reduced. See 

Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, pp. 314-

15· 
SHORE-TO-SHORE LeT at Licata Beach. 

ARMY DONKEYS wading ashore at Licata. 
THE ASSAULT 

Buck, which had been serving as escort 

for the LCT convoy, was sent in by Admiral Conolly to take over the Red Beach 

fire support role. I3 The cruiser Brooklyn, which had been firing in support of 

the Green Beach landings, also moved over 

on Conolly's orders and opened fire on 

Italian artillery positions which had been 

firing on Red BeachY By 07 15, Italian 

fire had slackened appreciably. Seven 

minutes later, Conolly ordered the remaining LCT's to beach regardless of cost. 

Two additional destroyers moved over to 

assist the Buck in laying a smoke screen 

on the beaches to cover the LCT landmgs. Concealed by the smoke and covered by the Brooklyn's six-inch guns, the 

LCT's touched down without incident. 

By ogoo the supporting tanks and the 7th 

Infantry's Cannon Company were ashore, 

followed soon after by the remainder of 

the engineer beach group and two batteries 

of antiaircraft artillery. 

The 7th RCT's assigned objectives were 

secured by 1030 and its establishment of 

a defensive line on the arc of hills bordering the western side of the Licata plain 

assured the protection of the beachhead's 

left flank. Heavy equipment and supplies were pouring ashore and being moved 

inland over the soft sand. 

A mile to the east of Red Beach and 

three miles west of Licata, Green Beach, 

l;j The Buck carried a main armament of four 

;i-inch 38-caliber guns. Information on the armament of the various gunfire support ships has been 

taken from Navy Department, Chief of Naval 

Operations, Naval History Division, Dictionary of 

American Naval Fighting Ships, vol. I (Washington, 1959). 

14 The Brooklyn carried a main armament of 

fifteen 6-inch 47-caliber guns, a secondary battery 

of eight 5-inch 25-caliber guns. 

131 

flanked by rocks, had the most dangerous 

approach. Divided into two distinct 

parts by the Mollarella Rock (82 feet 

high), which was joined to the island by 

a low, sandy isthmus, the western part 

(350 yards wide and almost 20 yards 

deep) was rockbound except for a short 

stretch of about 150 yards, the eastern 

part (400 yards wide, 40 yards deep) lay 

within a snug cove with a mouth 200 

yards across. The eastern beach opened 

into a stream bed and to a number of 

tracks providing good vehicular and personnel exits to Highway I 15, about a 

mile and a half inland. The west beach 

also possessed exits, but its limited size 

would restrict its use to personnel traffic. 

Both appeared to be obstructed by barbed 

wire entanglements. Gun positions on 

Mollarella Rock dominated the west beach. 

Immediately back of a stretch of vineyards 

on the sector of land forming the beach, a 

defensive position containing at least four 

machine gun positions and a trench and 

wire system had been located. 

The special force, spearheaded by the 

3d Ranger Battalion, touched down at 

0257, just twelve minutes behind schedule. 

Moving smartly, three Ranger companies 

cleared the beaches and Mollarella Rock 

and established a defensive line on the 

high ground at the left end of Green 

West, while the other three companies 

cleared the way inland to the western edge 

of Monte Sole. Lt. Col. William H. Billings' 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, went in 

over Green West at 0342, reorganized, 

passed through the Rangers at Monte Sole 

as planned, and thrust toward Licata, 

the left inner claw of the planned pincer 

movement. Clearing enemy hill positions 

as they moved eastward, the men of the 

3d Battalion by 0730 had possession of 

Castel San Angelo, but a strong naval 
BRINGING Up SUPPLIES by cart at Licata Beach. 

ITALIAN RAILWAY BATTERY ON LICATA MOLE destroyed fry American naval bombardment on D-day. 
THE ASSAULT 

bombardment of Licata in support of the 

Yellow Beach landings prevented the 

battalion from pushing immediately into 

the city. 

Yellow and Blue Beaches east of Licata 

were much better for assault landings. 

Beginning not quite two miles east of the 

mouth of the Salso River and running 

almost due east for a mile and a half, 

Yellow Beach was of soft sand, about 60 

yards deep at the western end, narrowing 

gradually to 15 yards at the eastern end. 

Licata on the left and the cliffs of Punta 

delle due Rocche on the right would serve 

as general guides in the approach. Many 

good paths and cart tracks ran from the 

beach across a cultivated strip to Highway I 15, here only some 400 yards inland. 

One-half mile to the east lay Blue Beach, 

which consisted generally of firm sand 

with occasional rocky outcrops. Not 

quite a mile wide, Blue Beach deepened 

from 15 yards on the left to 60 yards on 

the right. Low sand dunes backed up 

the right half of the beach; a low, steep 

bank, the left half. Exits for personnel 

and vehicles were easy and plentiful, and 

Highway I 15 ran everywhere within 500 

yards of the beach. 

Naval bombardment was the American 

answer to the only real Italian interference. with the Yellow Beach landings. 

The opposition consisted primarily of an 

Italian railway battery on the Licata mole, 

an armored train mounting four 76-mm. 

guns. When the naval fire finally lifted, 

the train had been destroyed and other 

Italian resistance silenced. Soldiers from 

both Green and Yellow Beaches swarmed 

into Licata, while a battalion which had 

swung north from Yellow Beach to the 

bend in the Salsa River moved south into 

the city shortly after. 

At Blue Beach, farthest to the right, 

133 

the Italian defenders put up a somewhat 

bigger show of resistance, though not so 

strong as that offered at Red Beach. 

With the 30th RCT forming the right 

outer claw of the pincer, the naval task 

force had been delayed in reaching its 

transport area. The LST's leading the 

convoy moved into position and began 

anchoring at 0 I 15. But the anchorage 

later proved to be well south of the correct position, thus forcing the LCVP's 

carrying the assault battalion to make a 

much longer run to the beaches than 

planned. Despite this, the first LCVP's 

grounded just two hours after the LST's 

had begun anchoring and only a half-hour 

behind schedule. The first wave met 

some rifle and machine gun fire from pillboxes on the beach, and some artillery 

fire from guns on Poggio Lungo, high 

ground off to the right. Like its counterpart on the far left, the 7th RCT, the 

30th RCT before noon occupied its three 

primary objectives: three hill masses bordering the eastern side of the Licata plain. 

Shortly after daybreak Admiral Conolly took the Biscayne close in to shore 

so that both he and General Truscott 

could see the beaches. What they ~aw 

was encouraging, and reports from two 

light aircraft that had taken off from an 

improvised runway on an LST confirmed 

their impressionsY; The infantry troops 

were on their objectives or about to take 

them. The airfield and city of Licata 

13 Piloted by 1st Lts. Oliver P. Board and Julian 

W. Cummings, the Piper L-4 grasshoppers took 

off from a flight deck (approximately 2 16 feet 

long, 12 feet wide) built along the center and over 

the top deck of the LST. The pilots flew over 

the beaches for more than two hours and reported 

enemy positions and the locations of friendly units. 

On occasion, they directed landing craft to proper 

beaches. See Rpt of Arty Opns, Joss Force; 

41st FA Bn AAR; loth FA Bn AAR; WNTF 

Action Rpt, p. 97. 
ENEMY DEFENSE POSITIONS ALONG COAST ROAD east of Licata. 
THE ASSAULT 

were in hand. Artillery and armor were 

moving into position to support further 

advances. One counterattack had been 

beaten back. The beaches were well organized, men and equipment commg 

ashore without difficulty. The Seventh 

Army's left flank seemed well anchored. 

In the process, the 3d Division, its commander ashore by midmorning, had suffered fewer than 100 casualties. 

Ten miles southeast of the 3d Division's 

Blue Beach, and extending twenty miles to 

the southeast, General Bradley's II Corps 

was landing to secure three primary objectives lying at varying distances inland 

from the assault beaches: the airfields at 

Ponte Olivo, Biscari, and Comiso. Ponte 

Olivo, along with the city of Gela, was the 

responsibility of the left task force, the 1st 

Division; the others belonged to the 45th 

Division. 

East of the mouth of the Gela River, 

high sand dunes with scrubby vegetation 

lay back of the coast. Three miles east 

of the city and adjacent to and on the 

inland side of the coastal highway (Highway I 15) was the Gela-Farello landing 

ground, an intermediate division objective. 

Farther to the east, relatively high ground 

(400 feet at Piano Lupo, one of the 

paratroopers' objectives) flanked the right 

side of the Gela plain and separated the 

Gela River drainage basin from that of 

the Acate River, which empties into the 

gulf six miles east of Gela. The Acate 

River, which swings to the northeast at 

Ponte Dirillo, and its tributary, the Terrana Creek, marked the boundary between 

the division task forces of the II Corps.I6 

From Gela, the railroad paralleled the 

coast to Ponte Dirillo, but the highway, 

16 The Acate is sometimes called the Dirillo 

River. The Acate River from Ponte Dirillo northeastward lay in the zone of the 45th Division. 

135 

while initially following the coast line, 

swung inland some five miles east of Gela 

as it wound around Piano Lupo. From 

the height of Piano Lupo, a good secondary road branched off northward to 

Niscemi, following high ground on the 

eastern edge of the Gela plain. From 

this point, known to the paratroop task 

force as Road Junction Y, the coast road 

took a sharp turn to the southeast to 

cross the Acate River at Ponte Dirillo. 

Another good road, Highway I 17, led 

directly inland from Gela, paralleling the 

western bank of the Gela River for five 

and a half miles. A vivid line bisecting 

the treeless plain, the highway crossed to 

the east side of the river at Ponte Olivo 

to a triple road intersection. There, 

while Highway I 17 continued on its northeasterly course, a secondary road swung 

almost due east to Niscemi, another ran 

northwest to Mazzarino. In the right 

angle formed by Highway I I7 and the 

secondary road to Niscemi lay the Ponte 

Olivo airfieldY 

In contrast with the 3d Division's assault plan of landing initially only one 

battalion from each assault force, the 1st 

Division plan committed two assault battalions from each regimental task force 

17 Chief sources for the 1st Division landings 

are: 1st Inf Div FO 26, 20 Jun 43; 1st Inf Div 

G-3 Opns Rpts, 10-14 Jul 43; AAR's of units 

involved; Lucas Diary, pt. I, pp. 28-3 I, OCMH; 

ONI, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 49-58; Morison, 

Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 93-100; CO NTF 81 

Action Rpt, 6-1.2610.43; Interv, Smyth with Lt 

Col Bryce F. Denno (former ExO 2d Bn, 16th 

Inf) and l"Iaj. Melvin J. Groves (former CO Co E, 

16th Inf), 24 Oct 50, with an addendum dated 

27 Oct 50 by Maj Groves; James J. Altieri, Darby's Rangers (Durham, N.C.: The Seeman Printery, Inc., 1945); Bradley, A Soldier's Story; 

Maj. James B. Lyle, The Operations of Companies A and B, 1st Ranger Battalion, at Gela, 

Sicily, 10-11 July 1943 (Fort Benning, Ga., 1947). 
simultaneously, the third battalion remaining in reserve. 

To capture Gela, General Allen, the 1st 

Division commander, created what he 

called Force X, a special grouping of 

Rangers and combat engineers.18 Under 

Colonel Darby (commander of the 1st 

Ranger Battalion), the force was to land 

directly on the beach fronting Gela, one 

portion on each side of the pier. While 

the special force worked on the city, the 

division would make its main effort east 

of the Gela River, where the division’s 

two remaining combat teams were to 

land over four sections of the three-milelong beach extending southeast from 

the river. For want of natural boundaries, the four sections were given color 

designations arbitrarily marking off one 

section from the other. 

The two left sections of the beachYellow and Blue-were assigned to Col. 

John W. Bowen’s 26th RCT. While one 

battalion forced a crossing over the Gela 

River to aid Force X to subdue Gela, the 

remainder of the 26th RCT was to bypass the city on the right, cut Highway 

117, and occupy high ground two miles 

to the north. There the RCT would be 

ready to attack Gela from the landward 

side if the city still held out, or move farther inland to take other high ground 

overlooking Ponte Olivo from the west. 

Over the other two sections, Red 2 and 

Green 2, the 16th RCT under Col. George 

A. Taylor was to come ashore. After reducing the beach defenses, the regiment 

was to cross the railroad, bypass the long, 

swampy Biviere Pond on the force’s right, 

18 The 1st and 4th Ranger Bns; the 1st Bn, 

39th Engr Combat Regt; three companies of the 

83d Chem Bn (4.2-inch mortars) ; and the 1st Bn, 

531st Engr Shore Regt. 

cut the coastal highway, and move along 

the highway to Piano Lupo to join Colonel 

Gavin’s paratroopers. From there, the 

16th RCT was to drive on Niscemi. 

Although the Italian XVIII Coastal 

Brigade (thinly stretched from west of 

Gela to below Scoglitti) caused no serious 

concern, the Livorno Division, concentrated to the northwest near Caltanissetta, 

and the bulk of the Hermann Goering 

Division, assembled to the northeast near 

Caltagirone, presented serious problems. 

Two fairly strong Italian mobile airfield 

defense groups at Niscemi and at Caltagirone were also in position to strike. 

Short one combat team-the 18th RCT 

was a part of the Seventh Army’s floating reserve; shy supporting armor, for only 

ten medium tanks were in direct support 

of the entire 1st Division; with no division 

reserve (the parachute task force was to 

form the division reserve after link-up)- 

the 1st Division faced the strongest grouping of enemy forces in Sicily. 

In three long columns, with transports 

in the center and LST’s and LCI’s on 

the flanks, Admiral Hall’s Naval Task 

Force 81 brought the 1st Division to the 

Gela area in the center of the Seventh Army zone. The eleven transports 

reached their proper stations at 0045, 1 0

July. Thirty minutes later, eleven of the 

fourteen LST’s were in position (the other 

three turned up later in the 45th Division’s zone). The twenty LCI’s came 

up just a few minutes later. Shortly before midnight the wind had dropped, and 

as the transports and landing ships and 

craft anchored offshore, the sea leveled off 

into a broad swell. Behind Gela the entire coastal area, it seemed, was aglow as 

the result of fires started by the preinvasion aerial bombardments and because 

the few paratroopers at Piano Lupo had 

136 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

simultaneously, the third battalion remaining in reserve. 

To capture Gela, General Allen, the 1st 

Division commander, created what he 

called Force X, a special grouping of 

Rangers and combat engineers. ls Under 

Colonel Darby (commander of the 1 st 

Ranger Battalion), the force was to land 

directly on the beach fronting Gela, one 

portion on each side of the pier. While 

the special force worked on the city, the 

division would make its main effort east 

of the Gela River, where the division's 

two remaining combat teams were to 

land over four sections of the three-milelong beach extending southeast from 

the river. For want of natural boundaries, the four sections were given color 

designations arbitrarily marking off one 

section from the other. 

The two left sections of the beachYellow and Blue-were assigned to Col. 

John W. Bowen's 26th RCT. While one 

battalion forced a crossing over the Gela 

River to aid Force X to subdue Gela, the 

remainder of the 26th RCT was to bypass the city on the right, cut Highway 

1 17, and occupy high ground two miles 

to the north. There the RCT would be 

ready to attack Gela from the landward 

side if the city still held out, or move farther inland to take other high ground 

overlooking Ponte Olivo from the west. 

Over the other two sections, Red 2 and 

Green 2, the 16th RCT under Col. George 

A. Taylor was to come ashore. After reducing the beach defenses, the regiment 

was to cross the railroad, bypass the long, 

swampy Biviere Pond on the force's right, 

18 The 1St and 4th Ranger Bns; the 1St Bn, 

39th Engr Combat Regt; three companies of the 

83d Chern Bn (4.2-inch mortars) ; and the 1st Bn, 

53 1st Engr Shore Regt. 

cut the coastal highway, and move along 

the highway to Piano Lupo to join Colonel 

Gavin's paratroopers. From there, the 

16th RCT was to drive on Niscemi. 

Although the Italian XVIII Coastal 

Brigade (thinly stretched from west of 

Gela to below Scoglitti) caused no serious 

concern, the Livorno Division, concentrated to the northwest near Caltanissetta, 

and the bulk of the Hermann Goering 

Division, assembled to the northeast near 

Caltagirone, presented serious problems. 

Two fairly strong Italian mobile airfield 

defense groups at Niscemi and at Caltagirone were also in position to strike. 

Short one combat team-the 18th RCT 

was a part of the Seventh Army's floating reserve; shy supporting armor, for only 

ten medium tanks were in direct support 

of the entire 1st Division; with no division 

reserve (the parachute task force was to 

form the division reserve after link-up)-

the 1st Division faced the strongest grouping of enemy forces in Sicily. 

In three long columns, with transports 

in the center and LST's and LCI's on 

the flanks, Admiral Hall's Naval Task 

Force 81 brought the 1st Division to the 

Gela area in the center of the Seventh Army zone. The eleven transports 

reached their proper stations at 0045, 10 

July. Thirty minutes later, eleven of the 

fourteen LST's were in position (the other 

three turned up later in the 45th Division's zone). The twenty LCI's came 

up just a few minutes later. Shortly before midnight the wind had dropped, and 

as the transports and landing ships and 

craft anchored offshore, the sea leveled off 

into a broad swell. Behind Gela the entire coastal area, it seemed, was aglow as 

the result of fires started by the preinvasion aerial bombardments and because 

the few paratroopers at Piano Lupo had 
THE ASSAULT 137 

HIGHWAY 115 

TO GELA TO VITTORIA 

ROAD JUNCTION Y, the road to Niscemi at its junction with coastal Highway 115, seen from the 

Piano Lupo area. 

lighted a huge bonfire. The beach contours appeared plainly in silhouette. 

While the two Ranger battalions on the 

left were sailing toward shore, a great 

flash and loud explosion signaled the destruction of the Gela pier in accordance 

with Guzzoni's instructions. An enemy 

searchlight fixed its beam on the boats, 

but the destroyer Shu brick, designated to 

render gunfire support if the enemy detected the invasion, immediately opened 

fire and knocked the light out after five 

quick salvos. Three salvos destroyed a 

second light.19 By this time, Italian 

coastal units were at their guns, and mortar and coastal artillery fire began to fall 

around the landing craft. The Shubrick 

19 The Shubrick carried a main battery of four 

s-inch 38-caliber guns. 

and soon afterwards the cruiser Savannah 

returned a steady stream of naval gunfire. 20 Five hundred yards offshore, the 

Rangers came under machine gun fire, 

and some Rangers answered, as best they 

could, with rockets from their bazookas. 21 

As the enemy fire continued, the Rangers 

touched down at 0335, fifty minutes late, 

followed shortly by the 39th Engineers. 

Incurring a few casualties from mines 

on the beaches, losing an entire platoon 

from one company to enemy rifle and 

20 The Savannah had a main battery of fifteen 

6-inch 47-caliber guns and a secondary battery of 

eight s-inch 2s-caliber guns. 

21 A rocket launcher, 2.36 inches in diameter, 

merely a tube open at both ends that fired an 

electrically triggered, shaped-charge rocket. See 

Green, Thomson, and Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, pp. 

328- 29. 
138 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ITALIAN PRISONERS TAKEN AT GELA on D-day. 

machine gun fire, the Rangers finally 

cleared the beach defenses and by dawn 

pushed up the face of the Gela mound 

into the city. Two companies under 

Capt. James B. Lyle wheeled to the west 

and captured an Italian coastal battery of 

three 77-mm. guns on the western edge 

of the mound. None of the guns had 

been fired, although an ample supply of 

ammunition lay in the battery position. 

Though the Italians had removed the gun 

sights and elevating mechanisms, the 

weapons could still be fired. Captain 

Lyle decided to turn the guns around, 

face them inland, and use them, if necessary, against any enemy force moving 

against his positions. As the two Ranger 

companies prepared hasty defensive positions straddling Highway I I5, Lyle manned 

the Italian artillery pieces with Rangers 

who had a working knowledge of this particular weapon. He also set up an observation post in a two-story building from 

which he could adjust the fire of the captured guns. 

In the meantime, the remainder of the 

special force had worked its way through 

the city and had established a defensive 
THE ASSAULT 

perimeter around the northern and eastern outskirts. By 0800, the entire city 

had been cleared of resistance, two hundred Italians taken prisoner, and a strong 

line formed facing inland. The three companies of 4.2-inch mortars were ashore and 

ready to fire. Portions of the town were 

still burning, and clouds of billowing 

smoke poured into the sky. 

To the southeast, the 26th RCT was 

coming on strong to link up with the 

special force. Having met little resistance 

at the beaches, the 1st Battalion (Maj. 

Walter H. Grant) by ogoo was nearing 

Gela, while the other two battalions were 

across the highway, past the Gela-Farello 

landing ground, moving slowly inland to 

cut Highway I 17 north of Gela. 

The 16th RCT had slightly more trouble. Enemy searchlights picked up the 

assault waves on their way in, but no 

opposition came from the beach defenders 

until the troops started to disembark, 

just two minutes after the scheduled 

H-hour. From several pillboxes on the 

beach and from a few scattered Italian 

riflemen, light and largely ineffective fire 

fell upon the leading American infantrymen, then petered out. Yet vigorous 

enemy machine gun fire from apparently 

bypassed positions struck the second 

wave. Even after these positions were 

eliminated, the Italians continued to be 

active, firing mortars and artillery against 

the third and fourth waves, which landed 

after 0300. Not until 0400 when supporting naval guns opened up-from the 

cruiser Boise and the destroyer Jeffers-did 

the enemy fire begin to diminish.22 

Holding one battalion in reserve, Colonel 

Taylor sent two battalions of his 16th 

22 The Boise carried fifteen 6-inch 47-caliber 

guns and eight 5-inch 25-caliber guns; the Jeffers, 

four 5-inch 38-caliber guns. 

139 

Infantry toward Piano Lupo in order to 

link up with Colonel Gavin's parachute 

force. The leading battalions made contact with Company I, 505th Parachute 

Infantry, which had. been holding the 

southern portion of Piano Lupo since early 

morning, but they were unable to locate 

the sizable numbers of paratroopers they 

expected. 

Thus, by ogoo on 10 July, the 1st 

Division, with much less difficulty than 

anticipated, was well on its way to securing the first day's objectives: Gela, the 

Gela-Farello landing ground, and Niscemi. 

Unfortunately, General Allen was unaware 

that the important high ground in front of 

the 16th Infantry was not in the firm 

possession of the paratroopers. 

On the far right of the Seventh Army's 

assault area, Admiral Kirk's naval task 

force brought the 45th Division to offshore 

positions in the face of a fairly rough sea 

and heavy swell. The landings in that 

area had been postponed one hour, but 

the pitch and roll of the ships, straggling, 

and confusion dispersed and disorganized 

the assault waves. 23 

The 45th Division would land southeast of the Acate River, along a coast 

line extending fifteen miles in a smooth 

arc almost devoid of indentation. The 

stretch of sandy, gentle beach was broken 

only by a few patches of rocky shore or 

23 See as major sources: AGF Rpt 217, Rpt on 

Opn HUSKY, 1943; AAR's of the units involved; 

45th Inf Div Arty AAR, 4 Jul-16 Aug 43; Observation and Comments on the Sicilian Campaign, 345-11.5; II Corps G-3 Jnl; Interv, Garland with Middleton, 16 J un 59; Rpt of Opn 

HUSKY, Comdr Transports, Amphibious Force, 

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, I7 Jul 43, 6-1.1707/43; Rpt, 

Trans Div 5, 17 Jul 43, 6-1.1409/43; ONI, 

Sicilian Campaign, pp. 28-36; Interv, Smyth with 

Brig Gen Charles M. Ankcorn (Ret.) (former CO 

157th Inf), 20 Mar 51; Morison, Sicily-Salerno 

-Anzio, pp. 126-37, 143. 
THE COAST LINE west from Scoglitti. 
THE ASSAULT 

low stone cliffs. The only harbor was the 

tiny fishing village of Scoglitti, where two 

rocks jutting above the water marked the 

entrance to two coves forming a haven for 

fishing boats. The passage was only some 

fifty yards wide, with a rocky bottom at 

a depth of eight feet. A mile southeast 

of Scoglitti lay the low headland of Point 

Camerina, a rocky bank about fifty feet 

high faced by five small patches of underwater rocks. At Point Branco Grande, 

two miles down the coast, and at Point 

Braccetto, a little farther along, submerged 

rocks fronted low cliffs. 

Inland was a broad, relatively open 

plain sloping gradually to the foothills of 

the mountain core of southern Sicily, 

which held the cities and larger towns.24 

Highway I 15 proceeded eastward beyond the Acate River, swinging gradually 

inland and upward, following a southeasterly course cutting across the center 

of the 45th Division's zone through Vittoria (36,000) and Comiso (23,000) to 

Ragusa (48,000 people) , the Seventh 

Army's eastern boundary and co-ordinating point with the British Eighth Army. 

Seven miles north of Biscari was the Biscari airfield; three miles north of Comiso 

was the airfield of that name. 

Avenues of approach from the assault 

beaches to the airfields were limited and 

poor. Between the relatively uninhabited 

stretch of coast line and the highway there 

were no good roads. A fourth class road 

connected Scoglitti with Vittoria; a 

scarcely better road led from the eastern 

beaches through the little town of Santa 

Croce Camerina to Comiso. An unpaved 

road followed the east bank of the Acate 

River from the western beaches as far as 

Ponte Dirillo, while a secondary road con24 Vittoria, 880 feet; Comiso, 803 feet; Biscari, 

660 feet; Ragusa, 1,680 feet. 

141 

nected Highway I 15 and Biscari with 

the junction near Ponte Dirillo. 

To insure the capture of Scoglitti 

(which could be used as a minor port); 

to narrow the gap between the 45th Division and the 1st Division on the left; 

and to put the assaulting units on as direct a route as possible to the Biscari and 

Comiso airfields, General Middleton selected two sets of beaches for his landing, 

one on each side of ScogIitti, with a total 

frontage of some 25,000 yards. 

Three beaches northwest of ScoglittiRed, Green, and Yellow-nicknamed 

Wood's Hole by the naval force, actually 

constituted an extension of the 16th 

RCT's beaches and were similar in terrain. Lying in an uninterrupted line 

for almost four miles, the beach area was 

of soft sand which rose gradually for half 

a mile to an uninterrupted belt of fortyto eighty-foot sand dunes. Pillboxes were 

scattered along the beaches, the dune line, 

and the highway. A few coastal artillery 

batteries dotted the area. 

Two regiments would land there. On 

the left, Col. Forrest E. <0ookson's 180th 

RCT would come ashore with two battalions abreast, the left battalion to seize 

Ponte Dirillo (also a paratrooper objective) , the right battalion to take Biscari. 

On the right, Col. Robert B. Hutchins' 

179th RCT would send its left battalion 

to seize Vittoria, then the Comiso airfield, 

the right battalion to capture Scoglitti. 

On the division right, Col. Charles M. 

Ankcorn's 157th RCT was to land over 

two beaches southeast of Scoglitti. Included in an area nicknamed Bailey's 

Beach, pressed between Point Branco 

Grande and Point Braccetto, these beaches 

were quite different from those to the 

west. Rock formations and sand dunes 

came almost to the water's edge, and 
142 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

rocky ledges jutted into the surf. The 

beaches, Green 2 and YeHow 2, were 

small, ten to twenty yards deep, less than 

a half-mile wide. Neither was suitable 

for bringing vehicles ashore. 

Landing nine miles southeast of the 

other combat teams and fifteen miles 

northwest of the I st Canadian Division, 

the 15 7th RCT constituted an almost independent task force. Yet Ankcorn had 

to get to Comiso as quickly as possible to 

join with the I 79th RCT for a co-ordinated 

attack on the airfield. Colonel Ankcorn 

therefore planned to land a battalion on 

each of his beaches, the one on the right 

to move due east to capture Santa Croce 

Camerina, the left battalion to bypass the 

town to the north for a direct thrust to 

Comiso. The RCT's major effort would 

follow the left battalion's axis of advance. 

All of the 45th Division's supporting armor, a medium tank battalion, was attached to the 15 7th. 

Enemy forces in the division's zone were 

few and scattered, mainly troops from the 

XVIII Coastal Brigade, right flank units 

of the 206th Coastal Division (where the 

157th RCT would be landing), and a 

mobile airfield defense group at Biscari. 

The Hermann Goering Division might be 

expected to strike at part of the division's 

beachhead, but disposed as it was in the 

Caltagirone area, it posed a more serious 

threat to the 1st Division's landings. If 

the I79th and 157th RCT's moved fast 

enough, they would have little to fear from 

enemy attempts to interfere with their 

juncture at Comiso. 

An unexpected benefit came from the 

dispersed paratroopers who landed in large 

numbers in the division's zone. At the 

very time the 45th Division started ashore, 

Captain McGinity's Company G, 505th 

Parachute Infantry, was making its way 

toward Ponte Dirillo; Major Alexander's 

2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, 

was reorganizing preparatory to moving 

on Santa Croce Camerina; Lieutenant 

Swingler's forty paratroopers were reducing an Italian strongpoint along the Santa 

Croce Camerina-Vittoria road; and elements of the 3d Battalion, 505th, were 

creating confusion and havoc in the rear 

areas of the XVIII Coastal Brigade from 

the Acate River east to Vittoria. 

In a few cases, postponing the division's 

landings led to some additional difficulties, 

particularly in the 180th RCT, the westernmost landing force. The transport 

Calvert's crew did a splendid job of 

getting the landing craft loaded with Lt. 

Col. William H. Schaefer's 1st Battalion 

and into the water. Thirty of the thirtyfour boats of the first four waves were 

circling in the small craft rendezvous area 

by 0200 and, under guidance of a control 

vessel, started for shore shortly thereafter. 

But the Calvert had performed too well. 

Her small boat waves were far ahead of 

the others. Just before 0300, as word of 

the H-hour postponement reached the 

Calvert, her commander had no choice 

but to recall the four assault waves to the 

rendezvous area. When the control vessel arrived back near the transport, the 

assault waves were in a bedraggled condition: some of the small craft had 

straggled, others had lost the wave formations and had headed off in various directions. When the control vessel received 

new orders to take the assault waves in 

to the beach to meet the new H-hour, she 

obediently turned to execute the order. 

The result of this movement back and 

forth in unfamiliar waters and in complete 

darkness was that the I st Battalion, 180th 

Infantry, landed late and badly scattered. 

What could be collected of the first wave 
THE ASSAULT 

eventually touched down on Red Beach 

at 0445, almost three hours after its start. 

Parts of the other three waves arrived at 

brief intervals thereafter. 

In contrast, the transport Neville, carrying Lt. Col. Clarence B. Cochran's 2d 

Battalion, had a most difficult time 

launching her small craft. It took almost 

four hours to load most of the first four 

assault waves. At 0337, about threefourths of the total number of landing 

craft started in to shore even as the ship's 

crew still struggled to get the remaining 

landing craft loaded and launched. But 

like the 1st Battalion's waves, the 2d Battalion's first assault waves scattered on the 

way in, and only five boats of the first 

wave touched down on Red Beach at 

0434, eleven minutes before the first wave 

from the Calvert. Only three boats from 

the second wave found the beach, three 

minutes later. Seven boats from the third 

wave touched down at 0438, and eight 

boats from the fourth wave made it at 

0500. Fortunately for both of Colonel 

Cookson's assault battalions, Italian opposition at the shore line was negligible. 

Though Italian machine guns fired briefly 

at the Neville's decimated second wave, no 

one was hit. 

The rest of both assault waves were 

scattered from Red Beach 2 in the 16th 

RCT's sector all the way down the coast 

to Scoglitti. Colonel Cookson and part 

of his RCT staff landed on the I st Division beach. Instead of a compact landing along twelve hundred yards of coast 

just east of the Acate River, the I 80th 

RCT was scattered along almost twelve 

miles of shore line. 

Of the 2d Battalion, only Company F 

landed relatively intact. With this unit, 

plus a few men from Company E, Colonel 

Cochran started inland after first clear143 

ing out some pillboxes. Following the 

secondary road parallel to the Acate River, 

Cochran's small force was at Ponte Dirillo by dawn, there to find and join McGinity's paratroopers. With Cochran in 

command, the combined American force 

put a guard on the bridge and then established and consolidated its position on 

the high ground just to the north to block 

the coastal Highway I 15. 

Meanwhile, Colonel Schaefer had gathered what he could find of his 1st Battalion. Just before daylight, he began moving inland across the dune area to the 

highway. There he paused to reorganize 

before marching on Biscari. 

The landing craft that could retract 

from the beaches returned to the transport 

Funston to get the 3d Battalion, I 80th 

Infantry (Lt. Col. R. W. Nolan), ashore. 

The first wave was ready to go at 0700 

and the commander of the wave's control 

vessel, who had been with the Calvert's 

waves on the earlier landings, started the 

wave shoreward. But soon after leaving 

the rendezvous area, the wave commander 

noticed that landing craft from other 

transports were crossing his front and 

heading toward shore on a northwesterly 

course. Mistakenly concluding that Red 

Beach had been shifted, he changed course 

and followed the other craft. The Funston's first Wave grounded on the 16th 

RCT's Red Beach 2, west of the Acate 

River, as did the second and fourth waves. 

For some strange reason, the third wave 

landed on the correct Red Beach at 0800. 

The 3d Battalion troops which landed in 

the 1St Division's sector, almost 300 men 

from all units of the battalion, banded 

together under three officers and started 

the three-mile trek to the correct beach 

area. The group crossed the Acate River 

about ogoo, met the battalion's executive 
144 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

officer who had landed with the third 

wave, and moved into an assembly area 

just inland from the beach, there, in II 

Corps reserve, to await further orders. 

On the other two Wood's Hole beaches, 

the landings proceeded more smoothly. 

The first waves of the 179th RCT touched 

down either right on time or just a few 

minutes late against no enemy opposition. 

The only resistance occurred after daylight, when fire flared briefly from an Italian pillbox against the fifth wave. 

Lt. Col. Earl A. Taylor's 3d Battalion 

on the left quickly secured the dune line. 

After a speedy reorganization, the battalion 

moved inland, reached Highway 115, and 

as day broke turned toward Vittoria. 

Sixty paratroopers of the 3d Battalion, 

505th Parachute Infantry, and three howitzers from Battery C, 456th Parachute 

f'ield Artillery Battalion, joined Taylor's 

battalion, taking places in the line of 

march. 

Lt. Col. Edward F. Stephenson's 1st 

Battalion had turned southeast immediately after landing to work toward Scoglitti. One company remained on the 

beach to clear enemy installations, while 

the others pushed along the dune line to 

Point Zafaglione, which dominated Scoglitti from the north and which proved to 

be well fortified against a seaward approach. Attacked from the landward 

side, the Italian garrison of seventy artillerymen quickly surrendered. 

At Bailey's Beach the landings of the 

157th RCT proceeded smoothly, although 

a few landing craft grounded on the 

rocky ledges thrusting out into the surf. 

From the transport Jefferson, Lt. Col. 

Irving O. Schaefer's 2d Battalion started 

toward shore at 0303. Battling wind and 

sea, grazed by what appeared to be 

friendly fires from supporting warships, 

the control vessel veered off course and at 

0355 finally touched down, not on Green 

2, but on the southern end of Yellow 2 

close to Point Braccetto. A few scattered 

rifle shots greeted the first Americans 

ashore but caused no casualties. A machine gun crew surrendered without firing 

a shot. There was little will here to contcst the invasion. 

The Jefferson's second wave veered off 

even farther to the right. About fifty yards 

offshore, the boat crews finally woke to 

the fact that they were heading straight 

for the rocks at Point Braccetto and into 

a ten- to twelve-foot surf. Too late to 

change course, the first two landing craft 

went broadside into the rocks and 

capsized. Twenty-seven men drowned, 

weighed down by their equipment and 

pounded against the submerged rocks. 

The other landing craft managed to get 

to the point without capsizing, and their 

passengers with some difficulty crawled 

ashore.25 

Six of the seven landing craft from the 

third wave followed close behind. In 

vain did the men already on the rocks try 

to wave off the approaching boats. Only 

two of the six incoming craft grounded 

on sand. Four hit the rocky area along 

the north side of Point Braccetto, and 

though able to unload their troops and 

cargo, were unable to retract. The seventh boat, far off course from the begin25 Three more men would have drowned had 

it not been for Sgt. Jesse E. East, Jr., Company 

F, 157th Infantry, who, after scrambling ashore, 

tossed off his equipment and dove back into the 

surf three times to save fellow soldiers. He tried 

a fourth time, but, apparently tired from his previous efforts, failed, and drowned with the man 

he was trying to save. See correspondence in the 

possession of Mr. Sherrod East, Chief Archivist, 

World War II Branch, National Archives and 

Record Service. 
THE ASSAULT 145 

LANDING HEAVY EQUIPMENT over the causeway) at ScogLitti. 

ning, landed most of Company G north 

of Scoglitti on the I79th RCT's beaches. 

The first wave from the transport Carroll, carrying Colonel Ankcom, his RCT 

staff, and Lt. Col. Preston J. C. Murphy's 

1st Battalion, touched down an hour after 

the Jeff erson's first wave, a delay caused 

by the loading and lowering of the assault 

craft. All six of the Carroll's waves 

landed within the next hour on the correct beach- Yellow 2. No assault troops 

landed on Green 2. 

Despite the lateness of its landing, the 

1st Battalion was the first to leave the 

immediate beach area. The 2d Battalion, 

disorganized by its troubles with the rocks, 

spent some time in reorganizing and 

worked mainly on clearing enemy installations along the shore line. Nevertheless, by ogoo both battalions were pushing 

inland toward Santa Croce Camerina 

and Comiso. Though enemy resistance 

around Point Braccetto and Point Branco 

Grande had been eliminated, the sandy 

hinterland behind the beaches made it all 

but impossible to move the RCT's vehicles inland to follow the assault battalions. 

Eventually, after much effort, a third 
146 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

beach-Blue 2, south of Point Braccettowas opened, and the original beaches 

closed. 

Across the entire Seventh Anny front 

by ogoo, 10 July, infantry battalions were 

pushing inland. The assault had been 

accomplished with a minimum of casualties against only minor enemy resistance. 

Supporting armor and artillery were coming ashore; mountains of supplies began 

appearing on many of the beaches; and 

commanders at all echelons were urging 

their troops to keep up the momentum of 

the initial assault. 
CHAPTER VII 

The First Day 

The Axis Reaction 

The Axis was unable to react effectively 

against the initial Seventh Army landings. 

At 0430, 10 July, the first enemy planes 

appeared over the Allied shipping massed 

in front of the assault beaches. The destroyer Maddox took a direct hit and sank 

within two minutes, just before 0500, and 

a mine sweeper went down at 06 I 5. 

Enemy fighters shot down several planes 

that were spotting targets for the cruisers' 

guns, and occasionally enemy bombs fell 

in the transport area. The air raids interfered but little with the landings.! 

Axis commanders were already trying 

that morning to stem the American advances. To counter the Gela landings 

and back up the weak XVIII Coastal 

Brigade, General Guzzoni attached to the 

XVI Corps the two Italian mobile airfield 

defense groups intended for the defense 

of the Ponte Olivo and Biscari airfields, 

the Livorno Division, and the Hermann 

Goering Division (minus Group Schmalz). 

He wished these forces to counterattack 

before the Americans could consolidate a 

beachhead. At the same time, despite his 

1 The spotting aircraft were SOC's (Seagull 

scout observation float planes), Curtiss single 

radial engine biplanes with large single floats and 

two-man crews: pilot and radioman. The aircraft were used primarily for spotting gunfire and 

for scouting purposes and had a top speed of 1116 

miles per hour. Each U.S. cruiser had two catapults and carried four SOC's. 

continued apprehension over an Allied 

landing in the western part of the island, 

Guzzoni ordered the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, the larger part of which had 

just completed its transfer to the west, to 

retrace its steps and return to the Canicatti-Caltanissetta-San Cataldo area in 

the center of the island.2 

With these new units, the XVI Corps 

intended to launch a co-ordinated attack 

against the Gela landings, the Hermann 

Goering Division and the two Italian mobile groups to strike from the northeast, the 

Livorno Division from the northwest. 

But since telephone communications, poor 

to begin with, had been almost totally 

severed by the scattered groups of American paratroopers and by Allied bombing raids during the night, many of the 

units failed to receive the corps order. 

They proceeded to act on their own initiative according to the established defensive 

2 IT 99a; Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 1113; MS # 

C-077 (Rodt); MS #T-II, K I (Kesselring); 

MS #C-095 (Senger), KTB entry for !425, 10 

Jul 43· This manuscript contains certain entries 

from the war diary of the German liaison staff 

with the Armed Forces Command, Sicily; the 

war diary itself is not available. These war diary 

excerpts will be cited as follows: KTB entry, 

hour, and date. 

Parts of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 

(an infantry regiment, plus artillery and other 

units) were operating under Schmalz's control on 

the east coast; other smaller elements had not 

yet made the move to the west. Basically the 

two major units involved in moving back to the 

east were Group Ens and Group Fullriede. 
148 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

doctrine for the island. 3 The broadfronted, massive, co-ordinated push visualized against the Gela beaches would 

turn out to be a series of un-co-ordinated, 

independent thrusts by small Axis units 

at varying times and at various places 

along the center of the American front. 

General Conrath, the Hermann Goering 

Division commander, had learned of the 

American landings early that morning, not 

from the Sixth Army headquarters but 

from messages relayed to him from Kesselring's headquarters in Italy and from 

his own reconnaissance patrols, several of 

which clashed with American paratroopers 

near Niscemi. Later, word from Colonel 

Schmalz reporting his commitment of 

troops against the British landings convinced Conrath that the time had come 

to carry out the predetermined defense 

plan. He decided to counterattack at 

Gela. 4 

The German division was not altogether unprepared. General Conrath had 

alerted his units at 2200 the previous 

night, instructing them to stand by for 

definite word on the expected Allied assaults. Because his communications with 

both Sixth Army and XVI Corps had 

gone out early on 10 July, and because 

he wished someone i~ authority to know 

of his counterattack plan, Conrath phoned 

General von Senger, the German liaison 

officer with the Sixth Army, outlined his 

3 Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 118-19. 

4 MS #C-087 a, Division Hermann Goering 

in Sicily 1943 (Bergengruen); MS #C-087 c, 

Division Hermann Goering in Sicily 1943, Commentary (Conrath); MS #C-087 d, Hermann 

Goering Division Questionnaire, 11-12 July 1943 

(Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt and Col. Helmut Bergengruen); Bergengruen in MS #T-2 

(Fries et al.). 

plan, and told him he was jumping off 

without delay.5 He was not aware of the 

XVI Corps' plan for a co-ordinated attack. 

N or did he know that his division was 

attached to the corps for the attack. 

The bulk of the Hermann Goering Division was assembled in and around Caltagirone. Conrath had organized the 

division forces into two reinforced regiments, assembled as task forces. 6 One, 

heavy in infantry, consisted of a two-battalion infantry regiment mounted on trucks, 

an armored artillery battalion, and an 

attached Tiger tank company of seventeen 

Mark VI tanks. 7 The other task force, 

heavy in tanks, had a two-battalion tank 

regiment (about ninety Mark III and 

Mark IV tanks), two armored artillery 

battalions, and the bulk of the armored 

5 It seems odd that Conrath could contact 

Senger, but not General Guzzoni or the XVI 

Corps. He presumably used a separate German 

telephone net. 

6 Called Kampfgruppe, a term loosely assigned 

to improvised combat units of various sizes, usually named after the commander. 

See MS #R-137, ch. VIII, The Counterthrust on the First Day, 10 July 1943, Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily (Bauer), pp. 4-6. For 

a complete order of battle of the Hermann 

Goering Division, see MS #R-125 (Bauer), pp. 

46-49; for its tank strength, see pp. 50-51. 

7 The colloquial name, Tiger, was not applied 

officially to this tank until 1944. This was a 

heavy tank, 60 tons, with a 5-man crew, an 88-

mm. gun as main armament, and carried the 

thickest armor ever to be fitted on a German 

tank up to this time. The vehicle was 2 I feet 

long, 12 feet wide, and could do 15 miles per 

hour on roads, 5 miles per hour cross-country. 

The Tiger tank company, part of the :1 15th 

Tank Battalion, 15th Panter Grenadier Division, 

had been left behind when that division moved 

to the west, only the forty-six Mark III and Mark 

IV tanks of the battalion having gone along. 

The Tiger tank company was attached to the 

Hermann Goering Division either just before or 

at the beginning of the ope!'ations. 
THE FIRST DAY 

reconnaissance and engineer battalions, 

which functioned as infantry.s 

General Conrath planned to commit 

his task forces in a two-pronged attack 

toward the beaches east of Gela. The 

troops were to move on three secondary 

roads to assembly points south of Biscari 

and Niscemi. With the infantry-heavy 

force on the Biscari side, both were then 

to jump off in a concentric attack on the 

beaches. Conrath hoped to begin his attack before ogoo, 10 July, for a later hour 

would put the sun in his men's eyes and 

make it easier for the Americans to locate 

his units. Besides, the earlier he could 

attack, the better his chances for success. 

Both German task forces were on the 

move shortly after 0400. (See Map III.) 

Although the roads had been previously 

reconnoitered and found to be passable, 

if mediocre, the approach march to the 

assembly areas turned out to be much 

slower than Conrath had anticipated. 

Allied armed reconnaissance air strikes 

against the columns and clashes with scattered groups of American paratroopers 

caused some confusion and delay. Ac8 The Mark III was a medium (240-ton) 

tank, carried a 5-man crew, and was armed with 

a long-barreled 50-mm. or short-barreled 75-mm. 

gun. It was 170 feet long, almost 10 feet wide, 

could do 22 miles per hour on roads, and about 

half that speed cross-country. The Mark IV 

medium (26 tons) tank also carried as-man 

crew, but was armed with the long-barreled, highvelocity (3,200 feet per second) 75-mm. gun. It 

was 19 feet long, about 9 Yo feet wide, and had 

roughly the same speed characteristics as the 

Mark III. 

For an excellent description of the development 

of German armor, see Garrett Underhill, "Introduction to German Armor," Part I, Armored 

Cavalry Journal, vol. 58, No. 4 (July-August 

1949), pp. 3-9, and Part II, Armored Cavalry 

Journal, vol. 58, No. 5 (September-October 

1949), pp. 42-47. 

149 

companying his tank regiment, Conrath 

had to work hard more than once to prevent panic among his inexperienced troops 

and admittedly not very capable junior 

commanders. The task forces soon lost 

contact with each other, and ogoo came 

and went with both groups still struggling 

toward their assembly areas. 9 

Meanwhile, the Italian Mobile Group 

E under XVI Corps orders had started 

its movement south from Niscemi. Organized into two columns, one moving 

along the secondary road leading to Piano 

Lupo and Highway I 15, the other turning west toward Ponte Olivo to pick up 

Highway I I7 for a drive south on Gela, 

the group had no contact with the H ermann Goering Division. But it was 

aware of a corps order to the Livorno 

Division to commit a battalion in an attack on Gela from the northwest. Moving by truck, this battalion approached a 

jump-off point near Gela for an attack in 

conjunction with the mobile group. 

At ogoo, 10 July, therefore, three Axis 

forces were moving against the center of 

Seventh Army's front. In the path of 

these forces Ilay the special force in Gela, 

the 26th RCT moving around Gela toward Highway I 17, the 16th RCT advancing toward Piano Lupo, and the 

badly disorganized 180th RCT immediately east of the Acate River, with one of 

its battalions preparing to push from 

Highway 115 to Biscari. Elsewhere, there 

seemed to be no contest. On the right, 

only a few static Italian defensive positions 

remained. On the left, the XII Corps 

was trying to scrape together enough units 

9 I talian coastal defense troops fleeing inland 

from Gela and Scoglitti with confusing and 

alarming reports of speedy American advances 

did little to help. 
150 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

to halt, or at least slow down, the Americans until the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division returned from the west. 

The Battle 

At Casa del Priolo, halfway between 

Piano Lupo and Niscemi, where less than 

100 men of the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, had, under Lt. Col. Arthur Gorham, reduced a strongpoint and 

set up a blocking position, an American 

soldier saw a column of Italian tanks and 

infantry heading his way. Alerted, the 

paratroopers allowed the point of the 

column, three small vehicles, to enter their 

lines before opening fire, killing or capturing the occupants. The sound of firing halted the main body. 

After thirty minutes of hesitation, about 

two infantry companies shook themselves 

out into an extended formation and began moving toward the Americans, who 

waited until the Italians were 200 yards 

away. Then they opened a withering fire 

not only of rifles but of the numerous 

machine guns they had captured when 

they had taken the strongpoint. Their 

first fusillade pinned down the enemy 

troops except for a few in the rear who 

managed to get back to the main column. 

Several minutes later, the Italians 

moved a mobile artillery piece into firing 

position on a hill just out of range of any 

weapon the paratroopers possessed. As 

the gun opened fire, a previously dispatched paratrooper patrol returned and 

reported to Colonel Gorham that there 

appeared to be no strong enemy force at 

the battalion's original objective. This 

was the road junction on Piano Lupo, 

where only a few Italians armed with 

machine guns held a dug-in position surrounded by barbed wire. 

Unable to counter the artillery fire, 

Gorham decided to make for Piano Lupo. 

The move would have several advantages: 

it would put him on his objective and 

closer to the 16th RCT, which he was 

supposed to contact; it would probably 

facilitate contact with other paratroopers. 

Even though naval gunfire began to come 

in on the Italian column, Gorham had no 

way of controlling or directing the fire. 

Leaving one squad to cover the withdrawal, he started the paratroopers south, 

staying well east of the Niscemi-Piano 

Lupo road to escape the effects of the 

naval fire. It was then close to 0930.10 

The naval gunfire had come in response 

to a call from observers with the 16th 

RCT's leading battalions, which were 

moving toward Piano Lupo. Because the 

RCT's direct support artillery unit, the 

7th Field Artillery Battalion, was not yet 

in firing position, the destroyer Jeffers 

answered the call with nineteen salvos from 

her 5-ir:.ch gunsY A few of the Italian 

tanks were hit, but the majority were unscathedP No Italian infantry ventured 

10 There is a brief account of this action in 

the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment AAR, 

9-11 July 1943, and in 82d Airborne Division 

in Sicily and Italy, pp. 10-1 I. A complete account is contained in the Sayre narrative, The 

Operations of Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry. The material presented by General Gavin 

in Airborne War/are, pp. 6-8, is drawn from 

Sayre's account. 

11 The 7th Field Artillery Battalion managed 

to get its personnel ashore early on D-day, but its 

howitzers were aboard the LST's which veered 

off into the 45th Division's zone. Two batteries 

were unloaded during the course of 10 July east 

of the Acate River and were moved up the beach 

(northwestward) and across the river by late 

afternoon. 

12 The cruiser Boise, at the request from the 

pilot of one of her scout planes, had previously 

fired two minutes of rapid fire with 6-inch guns 

at the same target. Apparently the Boise's skipper was not aware of the nature of the target, 

for as he said later: "Had we only known what 
THE FIRST DAY 151 

VITTORIA- GElA- NISCEMI 

CROSSROADS 

PIANO Lupo, LOOKING DOWN THE NISCEMI ROAD to the high ground south of the crossroads 

past the Piano Lupo road junction, for 

they preferred to take cover from the relatively flat trajectory naval fire in previously prepared defensive posItIons. 

Masked on the south by high ground 

that caused most of the naval fire to overshoot the junction, the Italian infantrymen reached and occupied their positions 

just a few minutes ahead of Gorham's 

paratroopers. 

The Italian tanks that passed through 

the fire, about twenty, continued past the 

we were shooting at, we would have cut loose 

with the whole fifteen,gun battery." (Morison, 

Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. [03.) 

The scout planes, continually harassed by enemy fighter planes, had to take continual evasive 

action as long as they were in the air and had 

little opportunity to keep any target in sight long 

enough to accurately adjust fires. 

road junction and turned on Highway I 15 

toward Gela. 13 They proceeded downhill only a short way. The two forward 

battalions of the 16th ReT, though armed 

only with standard infantry weapons, 

13 The [6th ReT reported twenty tanks in 

this attack. (1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entry 17, 10 

J ul 43.) The exact number of tanks in this 

group is not known. One report indicates Mobile Group E had nearly fifty tanks when it started 

its movement on 10 July (Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 103). Another report (MS # 

R-[25 (Bauer)) indicates that the Italian unit 

had one company (twelve to fourteen) of Renault 35 tanks; possibly sixteen 3-ton tanks; and 

possibly som,e Fiat "3,000" tanks. The Renault 

tanks, captured from the French in [940, weighed 

two tons and were armed with 37-mm. guns. 

From reports contained in other American sources, 

the number of Italian tanks appears to have been 

between thirty and forty total in both Italian 

groups. 
knocked out two of the tanks, thoroughly 

disrupted the Italian thrust, and halted 

the column. Without infantry support, 

its artillery under heavy counterbattery 

fire from American warships, the Italian 

tankers broke off the fight and retired 

north into the foothills bordering the Gela 

plain on the east.14 

The threat dispersed, the 16th RCT 

resumed its movement to the Piano Lupo 

road junction. But Gorham’s paratroopers, approaching from the opposite direction, arrived first. After reducing one 

Italian strongpoint, the paratroopers made 

contact with scouts from the 16th RCT 

at 1100.15 The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (Lt. Col. Charles L. Denholm), 

then cleaned out several remaining Italian 

positions around the road junction, a task 

facilitated by a captured map, while the 

2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Joseph Crawford) 

and the paratroopers moved across the 

road and occupied high ground to the 

northwest. 

Meanwhile the heterogeneous Rangerengineer force in Gela had observed a 

column of thirteen Italian tanks escorted 

by infantry moving south along Highway 

117 toward the city-the right arm of 

Mobile Group E’s two-pronged attack. 

Another column, the Livorno Division’s 

battalion of infantry, could also be seen 

moving toward Gela along the Butera 

14 16th Inf Regt AAR, Jun–Jul 43; ONI, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 60–61; Morison, Sicily– 

Salerno–Anzio, p. 103. 

15 In a letter received by OCMH 26 December 

1950, Brig. Gen. George A. Taylor (Ret.), former 

commander of the 16th RCT, noted: “Any report that any unit of the 82d Division captured 

anything and turned it over to me is without 

foundation.” But the 16th Infantry’s report of 

action shows that paratroopers were on Piano 

Lupo by the time the leading elements of the 

RCT arrived. This is also shown in the 82d 

Airborne Division’s records. 

road. While the destroyer Shubrick 

started firing at the tank-infantry column 

on Highway 117, the Ranger-manned Italian 77-mm. guns opened up on the Livorno 

battalion. 

The first Shubrick salvos halted the Italians in some confusion. But the tankers 

recovered a measure of composure ; they 

resumed their movement, though fewer 

now, for several tanks were burning in the 

fields along the highway. Without further loss, nine or ten tanks dashed down 

the highway and into the city. But the 

same thing happened here that had happened on the Niscemi–Piano Lupo roadItalian infantrymen did not follow the 

tanks. And so, in the city, the Rangers 

and the engineers began a deadly game 

of hide and seek with the Italian tanks, 

dodging in and out of buildings, throwing 

hand grenades and firing rocket launchers. 

Colonel Darby jumped in a jeep, dashed 

down to the beach, commandeered a 37- 

mm. antitank gun, returned with it to the 

city and knocked out a tank. Another 

burned as Rangers and engineers teamed 

up, first to stop it and then to destroy 

it. After twenty minutes of this kind of 

fighting, the Italians started back out of 

the city hotly pursued by American fire. 

The Italian crews suffered heavily. Almost every survivor carried with him 

some kind of wound.16 

As for the Livorno Division’s battalion 

-in almost formal, parade ground formation, the Italian infantrymen advanced 

against the western side of Gela. The 

two Ranger companies firing their captured Italian artillery pieces took heavy 

toll among the closely bunched enemy soldiers. Rifles, machine guns, and mortars 

joined in as the range closed. Not an 

16 Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 117. 

152 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

knocked out two of the tanks, thoroughly 

disrupted the Italian thrust, and halted 

the column. Without infantry support, 

its artillery under heavy counterbattery 

fire from American warships, the Italian 

tankers broke off the fight and retired 

north into the foothills bordering the Gela 

plain on the east.14 

The threat dispersed, the 16th RCT 

resumed its movement to the Piano Lupo 

road junction. But Gorham's paratroopers, approaching from the opposite direction, arrived first. After reducing one 

Italian strongpoint, the paratroopers made 

contact with scouts from the 16th RCT 

at I 100.15 The I st Battalion, 16th Infantry (Lt. Col. Charles L. Denholm), 

then cleaned out several remaining Italian 

positions around the road junction, a task 

facilitated by a captured map, while the 

2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Joseph Crawford) 

and the paratroopers moved across the 

road and occupied high ground to the 

northwest. 

Meanwhile the heterogeneous Rangerengineer force in Gela had observed a 

column of thirteen Italian tanks escorted 

by infantry moving south along Highway 

I I 7 toward the city-the right arm of 

Mobile Group E's two-pronged attack. 

Another column, the Livorno Division's 

battalion of infantry, could also be seen 

moving toward Gela along the Butera 

14 16th Inf Regt AAR, Jun-Jul 43; ONI, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 60-6 I; Morison, SicilySalerno-Anzio, p. 103. 

15 In a letter received by OCMH 26 December 

1950, Brig. Gen. George A. Taylor (Ret.), former 

commander of the 16th RCT, noted: "Any report that any unit of the 82d Division captured 

anything and turned it over to me is without 

foundation." But the 16th Infantry's report of 

action shows that paratroopers were on Piano 

Lupo by the time the leading elements of the 

RCT arrived. This is also shown in the 82d 

Airborne Division's records. 

road. While the destroyer Shubrick 

started firing at the tank-infantry column 

on Highway I 17, the Ranger-manned Italian 77-mm. guns opened up on the Livorno 

battalion. 

The first Shubrick salvos halted the Italians in some confusion. But the tankers 

recovered a measure of composure; they 

resumed their movement, though fewer 

now, for several tanks were burning in the 

fields along the highway. Without further loss, nine or ten tanks dashed down 

the highway and into the city. But the 

same thing happened here that had happened on the Niscemi-Piano Lupo roadItalian infantrymen did not follow the 

tanks. And so, in the city, the Rangers 

and the engineers began a deadly game 

of hide and seek with the Italian tanks, 

dodging in and out of buildings, throwing 

hand grenades and firing rocket launchers. 

Colonel Darby jumped in a jeep, dashed 

down to the beach, commandeered a 37-

mm. antitank gun, returned with it to the 

city and knocked out a tank. Another 

burned as Rangers and engineers teamed 

up, first to stop it and then to destroy 

it. After twenty minutes of this kind of 

fighting, the Italians started back out of 

the city hotly pursued by American fire. 

The Italian crews suffered heavily. Almost every survivor carried with him 

some kind of wound. 16 

As for the Livorno Division's battalion 

-in almost formal, parade ground formation, the Italian infantrymen advanced 

against the western side of Gela. The 

two Ranger companies firing their captured Italian artillery pieces took heavy 

toll among the closely bunched enemy soldiers. Rifles, machine guns, and mortars 

joined in as the range closed. Not an 

16 Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 117. 
THE FIRST DAY 153 

AMERICAN TROOPS IN GELA ON D PLUS 1. 

enemy soldier reached the city. Leaving 

behind numerous dead and wounded, the 

remnants of the Italian battalion fled. 17 

The Italian thrust against Gela stopped, 

the 26th Combat Team moved from the 

Gela-Farello landing ground into Gela 

and made contact with Darby's force by 

17 1st Ranger Bn AAR, 10-14 Jul 43; 4th 

Ranger AAR, 10-12 Jul 43 ; 39th Engr Combat 

Regt AAR, 10 Jul-IS Aug 43 ; Morison, SicilySalerno-Anzio, pp. 103-04; Lyle, Operations of 

Companies A and B, 1 st Ranger Bn, p . 16; Altieri, Darby's Rangers, p. 50; Faldella, Lo sbarco, 

pp. 119, 120, 123. 

noon. Two battalions swept past the city 

on the east, cut Highway 117, and took 

high ground two miles to the north. 

With the city firmly in American hands, 

Colonel Bowen, the 26th RCT commander, began to think of seizing the terrain overlooking Ponte Olivo airfield from 

the west. Yet he was not anxious to start 

until he had adequate field artillery and 

armor support. As of noon, Bowen had 

neither. Nor was the situation along the 

Piano Lupo-Niscemi axis clear. 

South of Niscemi, the right column of 

Conrath'~ two-pronged counterattack, the 
154 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tank-heavy force, closed into its assembly 

area. The infantry-heavy force closed in 

the Biscari area. With all in readiness at 

1400, five hours late, Conrath sent his H ermann Goering Division into its attack. 

The tank regiment struck the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, which had prepared 

defensive positions on ground overlooking 

the road junction at the coastal highway 

and had sent patrols almost to Casa del 

Priolo. 

Colonel Crawford's 2d Battalion, along 

with Colonel Gorham's paratroopers, bore 

the initial brunt of the German tank 

thrust, and soon Colonel Denholm's 1st 

Battalion was drawn into the fight. Calls 

for naval gunfire soon had shells dropping 

on the Niscemi road, but the German 

tanks, accompanied by reconnaissance 

and engineer troops in an infantry mission, rolled slowly past Casa del Priolo. 

Not far from Casa del Priolo the tanks 

slowed, sputtered, and eventually stopped. 

The tankers could not go on because they 

had nothing to cope with the five- and 

six-inch naval shells that came whistling 

in from the sea. Also, American small 

arms fire had knocked out the accompanying foot soldiers and had thrown the lead 

tanks into confusion. Then, too, no support developed from the infantry-heavy 

column on the left.18 

Conrath ordered the tank attack re· 

newed at 1500. But even Conrath's inspiring and hard-driving presence was not 

enough to furnish impetus. The attack 

failed to get rolling. Still uncertain about 

the location and the fate of the infantryheavy task force, which was supposed to 

18 None of the 16th ReT's AT guns (37-mm. 

in the battalions, 57-mm. in the regimental AT 

platoon) were up at this time. The guns did 

not arrive until later that night and early the 

following morning. 

have crossed the Acate River and attacked Piano Lupo from the southeast, 

Conrath called off his offensive action. 

"The tanks are trying to withdraw," the 

16th Infantry reported around 1700. 

And at 1845, "Tanks are withdrawing, it 

seems we are too much for them." 19 

Conrath's infantry force had jumped off 

at 1400, had promptly lost communications with division headquarters, and had 

run into the I st Battalion, 180th Infantry, which, together with some paratroopers picked up along the way, was moving 

toward Biscari. Their attack blunted by 

the relatively small American force supported by one battery of the 171 st Field 

Artillery Battalion, the Germans came to 

a halt by 1530. Though the terraced 

terrain was well suited for infantry operations, dense groves of olive trees interfered 

with the movement of the heavy Tiger 

tanks that were part of the column. 

Moreover, some of the Tigers, among the 

first produced, had defective steering 

mechanisms, and those that dropped out 

blocked the others. Inexperience among 

junior officers and some of the troop units, 

failure to get the Tiger tanks forward, and 

American tenacity on the ground stopped 

the German attempt. 

Regaining communications later that 

afternoon, Conrath relieved the task force 

commander. After much prodding from 

Conrath and under a new commander, 

the infantry-heavy force regrouped and 

jumped off again. This time the German 

attack was better co-ordinated. The 

Tiger tanks led off, followed closely by 

foot soldiers. Breaking through the thin 

American lines, the Germans overran the 

positions of the 1 st Battalion, 180th In19 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 21 and 23, 10 

Jul 43. 
THE FIRST DAY 

fantry, and took prisoner the battalion 

commander, Colonel Schaefer, and most 

of the surviving troops. The remnants of 

the battalion streamed south toward the 

coastal Highway 115.20 

The way seemed open for German exploitation that would endanger the 1st 

Division beaches, when the 3d Battalion, 

180th Infantry, suddenly appeared. Released from corps reserve to counter the 

German attack, this American force took 

defensive positions and held fast. Imminent American disaster was averted as 

the Germans unexpectedly panicked. 

German soldiers broke and ran in wild 

disorder, their officers finally stopping the 

rout just short of Biscari. The Americans 

were content to remain along a line paralleling the south side of Highway I 15.21 

Some confused fighting among combat patrols lasted until well after dark. 

Though strong enemy forces ringed the 

Gela plain and the Acate River valley, 

20 Maj. Gen. Stanhope B. Mason, former chief 

of staff of the 1st Infantry Division, a close, per· 

sonal friend of Colonel Schaefer's. later had the 

pleasure of seeing the former 45th Division battalion commander released by American troops 

from the U.S. V Corps in Germany in 1945. See 

comments of Maj. Gen. Stanhope B. Mason on 

MS. 

21 180th Inf Regt AAR, 10 Jul 43; AGF Rpt 

217; 171st FA Bn AAR; 45th Inf Div Arty AAR; 

MS #C-087 a (Bergengruen). 

The wartime German record states simply that 

the attack mounted by the Hermann Goering 

Division against the Allied forces advancing from 

the Gela beaches to the area west of Caltagirone 

did not bear results. See OR SUED, Meldungen, No. 0114, 0340, II Jul 43, and Daily 

Sit rep West, 10 Jul 43, in OKH, Tagesmeldungen 

WEST. It was apparently the early evening advance of the German force that was used in 

ONI, Sicilian Campaign, page 47, to indicate 

withdrawal of the 180th ReT to the beaches at 

2150, 10 July 1943. No doubt part of the 1st 

Battalion did go all the way back to the beaches, 

but there is no indication that any part of the 

3d Battalion did the same. 

155 

though commanders were concerned about 

the arrival of supporting tanks and artillery and the extent of their frontages, 

the troops in the center of the American 

beachhead had earned the right to a brief 

pause. 

On the army left, General Truscott sent 

the 15th RCT, his center unit, seven 

miles up Highway 123 toward Campobello, holding the others ready to counter 

Axis thrusts. Reconnaissance pilots had 

picked up the movement of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which was returning from the western part of Sicily, and 

Truscott was preparing to meet the threat. 

Landing the 3d Division's floating reserve, General Rose's CCA, would help, 

and the armored command began coming 

ashore over the beaches east of Licata and 

through Licata itself. Truscott planned 

to send the armor to N aro, a small town 

fifteen miles northwest of Licata, between Palma di Montechiaro on the south 

and Campobello on the east. With troops 

at Naro and Campobello, Truscott would 

block an important avenue of approach 

to the division's beachhead from the 

northwest. 

On the army right, General Middleton 

kept pushing his easternmost regiments, 

the 179th and 15 7th. By nightfall they 

were seven miles inland. In contrast with 

the 180th Infantry's rough experience in 

the Acate River valley, the 179th Infantry had Colonel Taylor's 3d Battalion, 

and some paratroopers who had joined, 

at the outskirts of Vittoria before 1600. 

A few men entered the city, but small 

arms fire drove them out. Unwilling to 

unleash his supporting artillery until city 

authorities had a chance to surrender, 

Colonel Taylor spent much time trying 

to persuade a civilian to go into the city 

to bring out the mayor or some other 
156 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

municipal official. The civilian refused. 

Infantry attack preceded by artillery bombardment appeared the only solution. 

Unknown to Taylor, negotiations for 

Vittoria's surrender were already taking 

place. Three of the ubiquitous paratroopers had been in the city since early 

morning, having been captured by the 

Italians shortly after dropping to ground. 

Two by this time were roaring drunk. 

The third, 1st Lt. William J. Harris 

(Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 

505th Parachute Infantry), was trying to 

persuade the Italian commander to capitulate. The approach of Taylor's battalion 

strengthened Harris' arguments considerably. At 1640, as American artillery 

units prepared to open fire, the Italians 

agreed to surrender. Beckoned by the 

hurried display of white flags, the infantrymen outside the city marched in unDpposed. 

Farther to the right, where Americans 

were moving on the Comiso airfield, Santa 

Croce Camerina was taken in the early 

afternoon as the result of an unplanned 

pincer movement. Colonel Murphy's 1st 

Battalion, 15 7th Infantry, and Major 

Alexander's 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute 

Infantry, neither of which apparently 

knew of the other's presence, attacked the 

town about the same time. The Italian 

garrison, concerned with Murphy's approach from the west and totally unprepared for the paratrooper attack on the 

east, conceded defeat. 

While Alexander's paratroopers moved 

off to the north and west in search of a 

higher parachute headquarters, Murphy 

outposted the town and sent a partially 

motorized company thirteen miles northeast to Ragusa, the 1st Canadian Division objective. With only negligible 

opposition, the two motorized platoons entered Ragusa at 1800. No Canadians 

and only a few Italian soldiers were in the 

city. Since they were unwilling to chance 

an ambush during the night, the American platoons withdrew to the western 

outskirts, where the remainder of the 

company joined them shortly before midnight. 

Sliding past Santa Croce Camerina on 

the west, the other two battalions of the 

157th Infantry overran a strongpoint at 

Donnafugata. A four-truck motorized patrol to high ground northeast of Comiso 

secured an assembly area for the leading 

battalion. And from that point, Hill 643, 

the battalion the next day would support 

by fire the attack planned to seize the airfield. 22 

The Beaches 

By nightfall of D-day, 10 July, the 

Seventh Army was firmly established on 

Sicily. Only in the center was there cause 

for any immediate concern, and this 

stemmed from the failure of the airborne 

drop. The absence of paratroopers on 

Piano Lupo deprived the I st Division of 

a reserve, put the 16th Infantry at a 

disadvantage, and increased the threat of 

enemy counterattack. The paratroopers 

had created confusion in enemy rear areas, 

but they had not seriously interfered with 

the movement of German and Italian units 

against the invasion. 

22 179th Inf Regt AAR; an account of the Sicilian Campaign (22 pages) written by Brig. 

Gen. Raymond S. McLain, then Commanding 

General, 45th Infantry Division Artillery, probably in late July or early August 1943, copy in 

OCMH; 45th Inf Div Arty AAR; AGF Rpt 217; 

IS7th Inf Regt AAR; Interv, Smyth with Ankcorn, 20 Mar 51; IS8th FA Bn AAR; 160th FA 

Bn AAR; 45th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 9-10 

Jul 43. 
THE FIRST DAY 

The cause of failure lay with the troop 

carriers. As late as Z 0 June, three weeks 

before the invasion, observers had considered the 5zd Troop Carrier Wing deficient 

in night formation flying, night navigation, and drop zone location during darkness. The wing had had only two practice 

missions at night under simulated combat 

conditions. One of these had scattered 

the 50Sth Parachute Infantry all along the 

flight route. Further training was impossible after 20 June because of the need to 

start moving troops and planes to the advanced take-off airfields.23 

On the evening of 9 July, serious doubts 

had existed in some quarters on the ability 

of the troop carrier units to deliver the 

paratroopers to the correct drop zones; at 

least one commander felt that the Troop 

Carrier Command was far too optimistic 

about the proficiency of the aircraft 

crews.24 Late in July 1943, General 

Ridgway was unequivocal in stating that 

the operation "demonstrated beyond any 

doubt that the Air Force ... cannot at 

present put parachute units, even as large 

as a battalion, within effective attack distance of a chosen drop zone at night." 25 

German commanders tended to minimize the effect of the American airborne 

operation. Col. Hellmut Bergengruen, a 

staff officer with the Hermann Goering 

Division, judged that the airdrops "were 

made in rear of the Italian coastal divisions, but in front of the German units 

and did not interfere with the conduct of 

the battle." He conceded only the possibility that the parachute landings might 

23 Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, pp. 28, 37. 

24 Ibid., p. 28. 

25 Ltr, Ridgway to AFHQ, 26 Jul 43, sub: 

Analysis of Methods of Employment of 82d AB 

Div, in Seventh Army 373 file labeled Parachute 

Air Support, KCRC. 

157 

have helped cause panic among some 

Italian units.26 Generalmajor Walter 

Fries, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division 

commander, was less impressed. "Since 

they landed in front of the Germans," he 

wrote later, "even if they were in rear of 

the Italian troops, there was little prospect of their being able to intervene decisively." 21 Kesselring took a different 

tack. Admitting that the paratroopers 

"effected an extraordinary delay in the 

movement of our own troops and caused 

large losses," he was more inclined to 

place blame on the leadership of General 

Conrath and other officers of the H ermann Goering Division. The command, 

he said, "was not fortunate." Because 

the "march groups" were "incorrectly 

composed," the paratroopers delayed the 

division. "It is incorrect armor tactics," 

Kesselring continued, "for the tank units to 

march separate from the armored infantry 

as occurred here. With proper composition of the march groups the armored infantry riflemen would quickly have cleared 

out the snipers." 28 

26 Bergengruen in MS #T-2 (Fries et al.). 

Answer to Question 14 Til Feldzug Gruppe Sizilien, p. 60. 

27 See Fries in MS #T-2 (Fries et al.), p. 12. 

28 MS #T-2 K 1 (Kesselring), pp. 20-21; 

Quotation from copy of a draft, initialed "Z," 

16 Jul 43.> OB SUEDWEST, Abt. Ie, I8.VI·43-

!:I3.II.44 (Heeresgruppe "C," 75138/28). A 

summary of the analysis is given in OKW'lWFSt, 

KTB, I.-3I.vIII.43, [3 July 1943. This analysis of the first direct German experience against 

a large-scale amphibious attack was immediately 

transmitted by OKW to the headquarters in the 

other OKW theaters of war and areas under its 

command. 

Very probably this analysis was the basis for 

the statement of Generaloberst Kurt Student in 

October 1945 that "It is my opinion that if it 

had not been for the Allied airborne forces 

blocking the Hermann Goering Armored Division 

from reaching the beachhead, that division would 

have driven the initial seaborne forces back into 
158 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

General Patton's solution to the vacuum created by the unsuccessful airborne 

drop was to get his floating reserve ashore. 

In the early afternoon, as the threat of 

the Axis counterattack developed in the 

center, Patton directed General Gaffey to 

land his 2d Armored Division (less CCA 

but augmented by the 18th RCT) in the 

1st Division's zone, to assemble just inland, 

and to prepare for commitment as later 

ordered. A second, reinforcing airborne 

drop, considered for that evening and 

shelved in view of the need for armor 

ashore, was tentatively scheduled for the 

following night. 

Throughout the morning the armored 

division's headquarters aboard the transport Orizaba had been intercepting messages from the I st Division to the Seventh 

Army, messages that urged the immediate 

landing of artillery and armor to support 

the assault units. By noon, not one piece 

of artillery, nor any of the ten tanks attached to the 1st Division had gotten 

ashore.29 

For better information on possible plans 

for his commitment, Gaffey boarded the 

the sea." (Quoted in Gavin, Airborne Warfare, 

p. 16.) General Student was in France at the 

time of the Sicilian invasion, but as commander 

of the XI Parachute Corps he probably received 

the analysis. 

29 The landing of the Seventh Army's floating 

reserve is covered in: 2d Armored Division in 

the Sicilian Campaign, a research report prepared at Fort Knox, 1949-50 (cited hereafter as 

2d Armd Div in Sicilian Campaign), p. 20; 2d 

Armd Div AAR, 22 Apr-25 Jul 43; W~TF Action Rpt, p. 25; Comments of Col Redding L. 

Perry on MS; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, 

p. 108; 18th Inf Regt AAR, Jul 43: Lt Col F. 

M. Muller, "2d Armored Division Combat Loading, Part Two, Sicily," Armored Cavalry Journal, 

vol. 56 (September-October 1947), pp. 9-I 3 ; 

CCB, 2d Armd Div AAR, Jul 43; Interv, Smyth 

with Lt Col Russel G. Spinney (former CO Co 

F, 18th Inf Regt), 31 Oct 50. 

Monrovia, the naval force flagship which 

also carried Patton and his army headquarters. Just before 1400, Gaffey received the order to land. He was to go 

ashore over the 1st Division's Yellow and 

Blue Beaches, the beaches nearest Gela. 

Returning to the Orizaba, General Gaffey sent ashore his chief of staff, Col. 

Redding L. Perry, to reconnoiter the assigned beaches and to make the necessary 

arrangements with the 1st Division for 

assembly areas, routes, and guides. 

On shore, Perry discovered a picture 

quite different from that visualized on the 

Monrovia. General Allen, the I st Division commander, expressed concern about 

getting armor ashore. Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, the assistant division commander who had visited all the division 

beaches, brought word that YeHow and 

Blue were heavily mined-both had been 

closed. He strongly recommended bringing in the 2d Armored Division across Red 

Beach 2. 

Apprised of Roosevelt's recommendation upon Perry's return, Gaffey approved 

the change to Red 2, even though it entailed some delay in amending the previous orders. 

About 1700, the command echelon of 

Col. 1. D. White's CCB landed on Red 

Beach 2. After contacting General Allen 

and reconnoitering several possible assembly areas, White settled on a site near the 

Gela-Farello landing ground which was 

being vacated by the rearmost units of 

the 26th Infantry. 

The first unit scheduled to land was 

the 18th RCT. When General Gaffey 

learned that the LCI's carrying the unit 

had remained in a cruising formation during the day instead of shifting to the 

planned landing formation, he nevertheless ordered debarkation from the cruising 
THE FIRST DAY 

formation, counting on subsequent reorganization on shore. Because the beach 

was unsuitable for LeI's, the beachmaster 

was expected to provide LCVP's to discharge the men from the LCI's and take 

them ashore. But apparently because of 

a failure in communications between the 

landing craft and the beachmaster, 

LCVP's were not available, so the LCI's 

approached as near to shore as possible 

and the infantrymen waded the rest of 

the way through the high surf. One 

officer and two enlisted men were drowned. 

Considerable equipment was lost. But 

the first wave was ashore by 2 I 30; the entire regiment was on the ground soon after 

midnight. 

Col. George A. Smith moved his regiment into an orchard near the landing 

ground. The dismounted riflemen of the 

1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, landed soon afterwards and took 

positions nearby. Two platoons of Company I, 67th Armored Regiment, came 

ashore at 0200, I I July, and the ten 

medium tanks immediately stalled in the 

soft sand. High surf and beach congestion prevented the landing of additional 

armored vehicles. 

By morning of I I July, the chief result of 

Patton's decision to land the army's floating reserve was that four additional infantry battalions equipped with handcarried weapons only were ashore. The 

ten medium tanks were still having considerable trouble getting off the beach. 

Difficult beach conditions had not only 

interfered with landing the reserve, they 

had impeded all the other landings. 

The delay in the arrival of the 1st Division's supporting artillery and armor 

could be traced to enemy artillery fire, 

particularly in support of the various 

counterattacks, to enemy air raids against 

159 

Allied shipping lying off the Gela beaches, 

and to the poor beaches themselves. Enemy air strikes had begun two hours after 

the invasion. After daylight, enemy batteries inland, from Ponte Olivo to Niscemi, 

had started pounding the beaches. By 

0900, such heavy fire came in that Yellow 

Beach (26th Infantry) was closed. Shipping was diverted eastward to Blue Beach. 

Enemy artillery fire soon forced this beach 

to be closed, too, and boat traffic was 

again diverted eastward, this time to Red 

Beach 2. Soon after 1000, enemy shelling 

became so accurate that this beach had 

to be closed for twenty minutes. Only 

one beach, Green 2, was then available 

to receive landing craft. Though Red 2 

was reopened at 1030, enemy artillery 

fire and intermittent enemy air attacks 

throughout the day greatly delayed unloadings and did considerable damage to 

landing craft and beach supply. Even 

after the enemy artillery fire slackened, 

both Yellow and Blue Beaches remained 

closed because numerous uncleared mine 

fields lay in the dune area just back from 

the shore.30 

The closing and shifting of beaches 

created serious problems, particularly in 

getting the 1st Division's heavy equipment 

ashore. General Allen's calls for armor 

and artillery support during the morning 

were so pressing that Admiral Hall finally 

ordered in those LST's carrying the heavy 

equipment even though there were few 

places to accommodate the large landing 

ships. Furthermore, because of the assumption that the Gela pier would be captured intact and put to immediate use, 

Hall's naval task force had only three 

ponton causeways. One, unfortunately, 

was carried by one of the three LST's 

300NI, Sicilian Campaign, p. 59. 
160 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

that had beached by mistake in the Scoglitti area. 

One causeway was finally rigged on 

Red Beach 2. By 1030 one LST was 

fully unloaded and a second was moving 

in to start. As other LST's began rigging 

the second causeway on Green 2 late in 

the afternoon, an enemy aircraft coming 

in low dropped a bomb directly on one 

of the landing ships. Loaded with elements of the 33d Field Artillery Battalion 

and an antiaircraft artillery battalion, the 

LST blew up with a horrendous roar, 

scattering fragments of trucks, guns, and 

exploding ammunition in all directions. 

All of the vehicles of Battery A, 33d Field 

Artillery, and of one section of the antiaircraft battalion were lost. Fortunately, 

the howitzers were already ashore, having 

been landed by Dukws. But what was 

more serious was the fact that fragments 

from the exploding LST knocked out the 

ponton causeway in operation on Red 

Beach 2. 

By 1800, only three LST's had been 

unloaded over the Gela beaches. Only 

one field artillery battalion and four separate field artillery batteries were ashore. 

These were the 33d Field Artillery Battalion (minus two howitzers lost when 

Dukws overturned on the way to shore); 

two batteries of the 7th Field Artillery 

Battalion (the howitzers were landed in 

the 45th Division zone, the personnel in 

the 1st Division's area); and two batteries 

of the 5th Field Artillery Battalion (delayed in landing until late afternoon when 

the LST carrying the batteries made landfall off Licata and had to traverse almost 

the entire length of both the 3d Division 

and I st Division beaches). Available all 

together were eighteen 105-mm. howitzers 

and eight 155-mm. howitzers. As for the 

16th RCT's Cannon and Antitank Companies, they were unloaded in the 45th 

Division's zone, and were still east of the 

Acate River. 

With Red Beach 2 receiving everything 

coming ashore, it became so congested 

with landing craft and supplies that many 

of the small craft had to turn away without unloading. Beach parties were completely swamped with work even before 

the 18th RCT started ashore. And General Allen continued to call for more artillery and armor.31 

Across the Acate River, the 45th Division beach situation was little better, 

although more supporting units did move 

ashore during the day. Except for the 

17 I st Field Artillery Battalion, the 180th 

RCT's direct support battalion, the division artillery landed in good fashion. 32 

The medium tank battalion came ashore 

in the 157th RCT's sector during the late 

afternoon. 

31 For a full discussion of the 1st Division's 

beach situation see: ONI, Sicilian Campaign, 

pp. 65-66; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 

105-09; 1st Inf Div Arty AAR, 9 MaY-9 Aug 

43; 5th FA Bn AAR, Jun-Dec 43; 33d FA Bn 

AAR, J un-Dec 43; 7th FA Bn AAR, Sicilian 

Campaign, 10 MaY-31 Aug 43; Comments of 

Col Leonard G. Robinson (former executive officer of the 5th Field Artillery Battalion) on MS; 

WNTF Action Rpt, pt. II, Narrative of Events, 

entries timed 2215 and 2350, 10 Jul 43. 

32 In the 171 st Field Artillery Battalion, Battery A was badly scattered in landing: some of 

its vehicles landed on the proper beach, but the 

howitzers unloaded on the 1st Division's Red 

Beach 2 and other battery impedimenta on the 

179th RCT's beaches nearer Scoglitti. The battery was not ready to fire until 2000, and then 

with only three pieces. The fourth howitzer arrived near midnight. Battery B was also scattered 

on landing but got itself together quickly and 

was ready to fire at 1230. It moved to a new 

position at 1530 and fired its first mission fifteen 

minutes later in support of the I st Battalion, 

180th Infantry. Because of the shortage of landing craft, Battery C remained afloat until II July. 
THE FIRST DAY 

But, in general, the 45th Division 

beaches presented a most deplorable picture throughout D-day. Backed by soft 

sand dunes and with few usable exits, 

the five assault beaches were cluttered 

with masses of stranded landing craft and 

milling groups of men and vehicles soon 

after the initial landing. Many landing 

craft were hung up on offshore sand bars, 

unable to retract. Others broached on the 

beaches, the sea breaking completely over 

some, eddying into others over lowered 

ramps. Scattered and disorganized shore 

parties were still not functioning properly 

as late as 0800. In the meantime, landing craft waited on the beaches for three 

to four hours to be unloaded. Because 

the efforts of the naval salvage parties to 

get stranded craft off the beaches were 

largely unsuccessful, a diminishing number were available to unload the supplies 

still on board the transports. An inshore 

movement of the transports just after 

0600 helped a little, but the ever-growing 

shortage of landing craft soon vitiated 

even this slight improvement. 

Because they were simply unsuitable, 

all the southern beaches except Blue 2 

were closed at 1050, and even though 

Blue 2 was no prize, it had a good exit. 

North of Scoglitti, Red and Green Beach 

traffic used the exit road from Yellow 

Beach, where the sandy area behind the 

beaches was smaller in size. 

Concerned by the beach conditions and 

the serious loss of landing craft, Admiral 

Kirk sent one of his transport division 

commanders ashore in the middle of the 

morning to see what could be done 

to alleviate the situation. The report 

was pessimistic: between ISO and 200 

stranded landing craft on the beaches; 

insufficient naval salvage parties; not 

enough beach exits; poor boat handling; 

161 

poorer shore party work. Except for 

trying to get some of the stranded craft 

off the beaches and back into operation, 

there was little that could be done. 

In the early afternoon, after the division shore party command post and a reinforced engineer shore company moved 

into Scoglitti and reconnoitered the area 

around the village, Admiral Kirk and 

General Middleton were told it was advisable to close the three northern assault beaches at noon the next day and 

to open six new beaches-three above 

Scoglitti, two at Scoglitti itself, and one 

just below the village. Both commanders 

approved the recommendation, but improvement was still almost two days 

away.33 

Only in the 3d Division sector was the 

beach situation satisfactory. Red and 

Green beaches west of Licata were closed 

very early and all further unloadings were 

made over the two beaches east of the 

city and in the port itself.34 Enemy air 

attacks spilling over from the 1St Division 

beachhead were a nuisance, but none 

caused more than superficial damage to 

the mounting accumulation of supplies at 

the dumps.35 

33 AGF Rpt 2 I7; Morison, Sicily-SalernoAnzio, pp. 138-41. On 13 July, another set of 

beaches was opened above Scoglitti, and another 

beach was added to the one below Scoglitti. 

Morison (page 140) states that a survey as of 

noon, 1 [ July, revealed that only 66 of the original 175 LCVP'g and LCM's in this naval task 

force were still usable. The 18 transports left 

almost 200 LCVP's on the beaches, many of 

which were subsequently salvaged. 

34 Most of the 3d Division's LST's were unloaded in Licata harbor. 

35 On [0 July 1943, over the Gela beaches, 

20,655 men, 1,027 vehicles, and 2,000 long tons 

of supplies were put ashore. Over the Licata 

beaches and through Licata harbor, [8,464 men, 

3,310 vehicles, and 4,714 long tons of supplies 

were landed. (See Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, 

pp. E-15-E-16.) Figures for the 45th Divi-
162 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Despite formidable obstacles the invasion thus far appeared eminently successsion are lumped together for the three-day period 

10-12 July 1943. 

fuI. The next test would be whether 

the Allies could stand up to the inevitable 

Axis attempts to push them back into the 

sea. 
CHAPTER VIII 

The Axis Threat 

On the evening of 10 July, Guzzoni had 

a far from clear understanding of the situation. 1 Reports indicated that British 

and Canadian forces had established 

beachheads along the eastern coast between Syracuse and the Pachino peninsula. But because signal communications 

with the naval base had failed completely that day, General Guzzoni dismissed reports of British proximity to 

Syracuse as exaggerations. Not until 

0300, I I July, did he learn from General 

von Senger that Syracuse had fallen and 

that Augusta had been evacuated briefly 

by Axis forces. 2 Until then, though he 

was aware that only isolated pockets of 

Italian troops still resisted near Noto and 

south of Modica, he counted on Group 

Schmalz and the Napoli Division to destroy the British and Canadian beachheads. General Guzzoni also knew that 

American troops had been located in Vittoria and near Comiso, apparently moving 

inland from a well-established beachhead 

near Scoglitti. The failure of the counterattacks against the Gela beaches disappointed him.3 

About 2000, 10 July, Guzzoni ordered 

lOKH, Meldungen, Dtsch. Gen.b.H.Qu.d.Ital. 

Wehrmacht, I.VII-B.IX.43 (cited hereafter as 

OKH, German General with Comando Supremo) 

(H 22/144)' 10 Jul 43. 

2 Faldella, Lo sbareo, p. 157; IT gga. 

3 IT gga; OB SUED, Meldungen; Heeresgruppe C, OB SUED, Ie, 18.V.43-30.IX.43, 10 

Jul 43. 

the XVI Corps to commit both Group 

Schmalz and the Napoli Division in a 

determined attempt to knock out the 

British beachhead south of Syracuse. He 

instructed the Hermann Goering Division 

and the Livorno Division to launch a 

co-ordinated attack against the American 

beachhead at Gela. He directed the reinforced 207th Coastal Division to strike 

the American beachhead at Licata. 

At his headquarters near Rome, Field 

Marshal Kesselring, who lacked communications with Guzzoni and who had been 

receIvmg information from Luftwaffe 

headquarters in Catania and Taormina, 

was unaware of Guzzoni's intention to 

counterattack on I I July. Learning of the 

fall of Syracuse (and promptly notifying 

Comando Supremo), Kesselring concluded 

that this, plus the earlier breakdown of 

the Italian coastal defenses, meant the 

Italian units were putting up little resistance. There seemed little likelihood of a 

more determined stand in the future. 

Convinced that only the German units 

were effective, Kesselring sent a message 

through Luftwaffe channels to the Hermann Goering Division and ordered it to 

counterattack toward Gela on the morning of I I July. If pressed home with great 

vigor and before the Americans could land 

the bulk of their artillery and armor the 

attack, he believed, would be successful,4 

40B SUED, Meldungen, 0350, II Jul 43. 
164 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Conrath, the Hermann Goering Division 

commander, who had received a call from 

the XVI Corps commander, went to the 

corps headquarters at Piazza Armerina. 

He learned for the first time of his attachment to the corps and together with 

Generale di Divisione Domenico Chirieleison, the Livorno Division commander, 

also in attendance, he received word of 

Guzzoni's plan for a co-ordinated attack 

against Gela. According to the plan, the 

attack, starting at 0600, would have the 

German division converging on Gela from 

the northeast in three columns, the Italian division converging on Gela from the 

northwest, also in three columns.5 

Upon returning to his command post, 

Conrath received Kesselring's order. But 

this posed no complication. He reorganized his division into three attack groups: 

two tank-heavy forces west of the Acate 

River, one infantry-heavy force east of the 

river. One tank battalion was to move 

from the Ponte Olivo airfield south along 

Highway I 17, then east across the Gela 

plain, and meet with the other tank battalion at Piano Lupo. Several tanks of 

the Ponte Olivo force were to make a 

feint north of Gela to deceive the Americans into believing that the city of Gela 

was the main objective. Instead, the 

main effort was to be made by the other 

tank column south along the NiscemiPiano Lupo road to occupy Hills 132 

and 123 (the southern edge of Piano 

Lupo). Joined by the tank battalion 

coming across the Gela plain from the 

west, the tanks were to strike south for 

the sparsely woode'd area between the 

Biviere Pond and the Gulf of Gela. The 

infantry-heavy force, meanwhile, was to 

cross the Acate River at Ponte Dirillo and 

5 Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 144-46. 

join the tank forces on Piano Lupo. 

From the sparsely wooded area near the 

shore line, the entire force was then to roll 

up the 1st Division's beachhead from east 

to west, while the Livorno Division, coming in from the west, was to overrun Gela 

and roll up the 1st Division's beachhead 

from the west. 6 

Northwest of Gela, General Chirieleison 

ordered one column to strike at Gela from 

the north, a second to advance astride 

the Gela-Butera road and strike Gela from 

the northwest, the third, while guarding 

the division right flank against American 

forces near Licata, to move southeast from 

Butera Station to Gela. The remnants of 

the Italian Mobile Group E were to support the first column. 

While the division commanders were 

completing their attack preparations, Guzzoni, at his headquarters in Enna, finally 

learned of the fall of Syracuse. The 

Syracuse-Augusta area, previously considered the strongest defensive sector in 

all of Sicily, had turned suddenly into a 

major danger area. If the British advanced quickly from Syracuse into the 

Catania plain and from there to Messina, 

they would bottle up all the Axis forces 

on Sicily. 

Since all his reserves were too far away 

or already committed, Guzzoni modified 

his previous orders to the XVI Corps. 

Early on I I July, he had instructed the 

corps to execute its counterattack as 

planned. But now, as soon as the H ermann Goering Division attack showed 

signs of success, the division was to wheel 

eastward, not to the west, and advance 

on Vittoria, Comiso, and Palazzolo Acre6 MS #R-138, The Counterattack on the Second Day, II July 1943, ch. IX of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943 (Bauer), 

pp. 1-3· 
THE AXIS THREAT 

ide in succession. With the entire German division then reunited, a strong 

blow could be mounted against the British. 

At the same time, the move would knock 

out the 45th Division's beachhead around 

Scoglitti. The Livorno Division, after 

taking Gela, was to wheel westward and 

destroy the American beachhead at Licata. 

The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, returning from the west, would assist the 

Livorno Division against Licata. 7 

Before the Axis divisions could launch 

their attacks, the 1st Division acted. In 

keeping with General Allen's confidence 

in the skillful use of night attacks, the 

26th Infantry on the left and the 16th Infantry on the right jumped off at midnight, 10 July, toward the division's major 

objectives, the Ponte Olivo airfield and 

Niscemi. 

Lt. Col. John T. Corley's 3d Battalion, 

26th Infantry, moved up Highway I I7 

toward Monte della Guardia (Hill 300), 

the commanding terrain west of the highway overlooking the airfield. But within 

thirty minutes, heavy enemy fire from the 

front and flanks brought the battalion to 

a halt.s 

On the Niscemi-Piano Lupo road, 

Colonel Denholm's 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, advanced north toward Casa del 

Priolo, while Company G of Colonel 

Crawford's 2d Battalion paralleled this 

movement on the west side of the road. 

Though the I st Battalion reached Casa 

del Priolo without difficulty and began 

digging in, Company G spotted German 

tanks to its left front and returned to its 

original position near Piano Lupo. Dismayed at the return of his company and 

fearing the German tanks would pounce 

on the unprotected left flank of the 1st 

7 Faldella, La sbarca, p. 158. 

R 26th Inf Regt S-I Jnl, I I Jul 43. 

165 

Battalion, Crawford ordered Companies 

E and F to move out and dig in on the 

little orchard-covered ridge at Abbio Priolo, about a thousand yards north and 

west of Casa del Priolo. Accompanied 

by Colonel Gorham's paratroopers, these 

companies reached the ridge at 0530.9 

In Gela, the Rangers and engineers 

continued to improve their defenses. 

Across the Acate River, in the path of 

the infantry-heavy German task force, the 

I80th Infantry remained in a disheartening situation. Though the I st and 3d 

Battalions had thrown back the German 

counterattack on the previous evening, 

the regiment still had no contact with the 

I st Division on the left and with the 

179th Infantry on the right. In addition, 

the regimental commander probably had 

no more than a faint notion of the location of his front. Whether he knew that 

most of the 1st Battalion had been captured by the Germans is not clear. Communications with Colonel Cochrane's 2d 

Battalion were tenuous at best, and often 

lost, and the regimental headquarters had 

no knowledge of the whereabouts of portions of Companies E, G, and H, which, 

in actuality, held a strongpoint astride 

Highway 115 near Ponte Dirillo and occupied the high ground just north of the 

bridge. The one bright spot in the 180th 

Infantry zone was that the bulk of the 

I71st Field Artillery Battalion was prepared to fire in support. 10 

Unable to make contact with the Livorno Division, but assuming that the 

Italian division would launch its attack, 

General Conrath at 0615, I I July, sent 

9 Interv, Smyth with Denno and Groves, 24 

Oct 50; Sayre, Operations of Company A, 505th 

Parachute Infantry, p. 15; 16th Inf Regt AAR, 

I I Jul 43. 

10 180th Inf Regt AAR; I7lst FA Bn AAR; 

AGF Rpt 217. 
166 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

PARATROOPERS MOVING IN ON THE RIDGE AT ABBIO PRIOLO 

the three task forces of the Hermann 

Goering Division forward. (Map IV) 

At the same time, one Italian task force, 

the one nearest Highway I 17, jumped off, 

but on its own initiative, apparently after 

seeing the German tank battalion start 

south from Ponte Olivo airfield. To 

help support the converging attacks on 

Gela, German and Italian aircraft struck 

the beaches and the naval vessels lying 

offshore. 

The 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, which 

had been advancing up the east side of 

Highway I 17, bore the brunt of the German attack. Company K was driven to 

the south and west toward Gela, but the 

remainder of the battalion held firm. 

The Italian column passed the 26th Infantry, bumped into Company K, which 

was trying to get back to Gela, and 

headed directly for the city. Colonel 

Darby's force in Gela laid down heavy 

fire on the approaching enemy. The 33d 

Field Artillery Battalion began pounding 

away at both columns. The two batteries from the 5th Field Artillery Battalion joined in. The 26th Infantry's 

Cannon Company and the 4.2-inch mortars in Gela also opened fire. The combination of fires stopped the Italians. 

The German tanks then swung east 

across the Gela plain to join the force 

descending the Niscemi-Piano Lupo road. 

There, the situation had quickly dissolved 

into a series of scattered infantry-tank 

actions. First to feel the weight of the 

German attack was the 2d Battalion, 

16th Infantry, at Abbio Priolo, where the 
THE AXIS THREAT 167 

AMERICAN SHIPS UNDER AIR ATTACK Off Gela on 11 July. 

infantrymen and paratroopers had little 

time to complete more than hasty foxholes and weapons emplacements. German tanks, a conglomeration of Mark 

Ill's and IV's, appeared, flanking the 2d 

Battalion from the west. The tanks 

rushed in, shooting their machine guns 

and cannon at almost point-blank range. 

With only a few bazookas plus their 

regular weapons, the infantrymen and the 

paratroopers fought back. Aided by 

fires from eight howitzers of the 7th Field 

Artillery Battalion and part of the regiment's antitank company, which had 

finally managed to get across the Acate 

River that very morning, the battalion 

heldY As yet, there was no naval gun11 The 7th Field Artillery Battalion fired a total 

of 56 [ rounds in ten missions during the day. 

fire support. Nor were there aircraft 

available to fly direct or close support 

missions. 12 

'" Morison. In Sicily-Salerno-Anzio (page 

[ [0), suggests that the shore fire control parties 

probably did not call for fires because smoke obscured the targets. It seems more likely, however, since the 7th Field Artillery Battalion was 

firing-indicating the battalion had observation 

-that the field artillerymen either felt they 

could handle this counterattack without additional help. or the very nearness of the enemy 

troops and the rough nature of the terrain made 

it too dangerous to call in naval fires at this 

time. 

Six requests for direct air support were made 

on IO July-five by the [st Division, one by 

Seventh Army. None of these missions were 

flown. On [[ July, the [st Division requested 

five more direct air support missions; one was 

flown, in the late afternoon. See Seventh Army 

File, G-3 Opns, sub: Air Support, KCRC. 
168 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Personally directing the attack on the 

Niscemi-Piano Lupo road, General Conrath regrouped his forces and again sent 

them rushing at the American positions. 

This time, the tanks rolled directly down 

and tried to circle both flanks. The 

swinging German movement to the right 

brought the 1st Battalion at Casa del 

Priolo into the fight. As German tanks 

swept past the embattled Americans and 

joined with other German tanks at the 

eastern edge of the Gela plain, the Americans pulled slowly back to Piano Lupo 

under cover of supporting fires, both artillery and naval. By I 100, the Americans 

were back where they had started from 

around midnight. 

East of the Acate river, the German infantry-heavy task force drove down from 

Biscari to Highway 115, where Company 

F, 180th Infantry, defending Ponte Dirillo, 

delayed it a short while. But the company could not hold, and retired to the 

beaches. North of the bridge, Colonel 

Cochran, with the remainder of the 2d 

Battalion, 180th Infantry (less than 200 

men), and the small group of paratroopers, 

lost all contact with regimental headquarters. Fortunately, he made contact with 

the 17 I st Field Artillery Battalion, and 

through the battalion with naval vessels. 

The artillery and the destroyer Beatty 

both gave heroic support,l3 

At that very moment, about 0900, as 

the German force pushed past the highway toward the mouth of the river, a 

13 The Beatty, from 0730 to 1030, fired a total 

of 799 five-inch rounds on this one German column. Three other destroyers also fired on this 

column during the course of the day: the Laub 

(751 rounds); the Cowie (200 rounds); and the 

Til/man (46 rounds). See Morison, SicilySalerno-Anzio, p. I 13. See also Infantry Combat, pt. Five: Sicily, (Fort Benning, 1943), p. I 

(copy in OCMH); I7ISt FA Bn AAR, II Ju143. 

group of American paratroopers led by 

Colonel Gavin appeared from the east and 

struck the enemy column. 

Colonel Gavin had halted about noon 

on D-day to await darkness before continuing westward with his small party of 

paratroopers. As yet, he had made no 

contact with any American force. As the 

sun began to set on 10 July, Gavin and 

his men set forth. At 0230, II July, five 

miles southeast of Vittoria, the paratroopers finally made their first contact with an 

American unit, Company I, 179th Infantry. For the first time since landing in 

Sicily, Colonel Gavin knew his exact location. Entering Vittoria about 0500, and 

collecting the paratroopers and three airborne howitzers that had assisted in the 

capture of the city the previous afternoon, 

Gavin then turned west on Highway 115. 

Five miles west of the city, Gavin met 

180 men of the 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, led by Maj. Edward C. 

Krause. Krause had halted here the previous evening after he, too, had failed to 

make contact with other American forces. 

Instructing Krause to organize the now 

sizable paratrooper force into march formation and to follow, Colonel Gavin and 

his S-3, Maj. Benjamin H. Vandervoort, 

continued westward along the highway. 

After covering another two miles, Gavin 

came upon a group of forty men from 

Company L, 180th Infantry, and twenty 

paratroop engineers. They told Gavin 

that the Germans were astride the highway farther to the west, but they could provide no details on strength or dispositions. 

Wanting to see the German force for 

himself, and apparently not knowing the 

location of the 180th Infantry, Gavin took 

the paratroop engineers and began walking along the highway toward Biscari 

Station. A German officer and a soldier 
THE AXIS THREAT 

on a motorcycle suddenly came around a 

bend in the road and were captured. 

Though the two made no effo~ to res~st, 

they refused to give informatlOn. WIth 

enemy troops close by, Gavin sent Vandervoort back to hurry along the force of 

250 paratroopers under Major Krause. 

Vandervoort was then to continue on to 

the 45th Division command post near 

Vittoria to let General Middleton know 

Gavin's location. 

Gavin took his engineers toward Casa 

Biazzo, a group of five buildings on high 

ground sloping gently westward and 

overlooking the Acate River. Across what 

the paratroopers would call Biazzo Ridge 

ran the road to Biscari. 

A few hundred yards short of the buildings, Gavin's little group came under small 

arms fire. Gavin pushed his men forward 

to the crest of the ridge where they drove a 

small detachment of Germans down the 

far slope. As they prepared to follow, 

enemv fire increased. Gavin, ordered his 

men 'to dig in and hold until the arrival 

of Krause's force. 

The appearance of Gavin's small unit 

drew German attention from Piano Lupo 

and the Gela beaches, where the entire 

I st Division front was aflame. The bulk 

of the Livorno Division had by this time 

joined the Hermann Goering Division 

attack. General Conrath's two tank battalions were once again united, and though 

he stiH contended with the 16th Infantry 

on Piano Lupo, he decided to send the 

bulk of his armored force across the Gela 

plain to the beaches. General Chirieleison the Livorno Division commander, was 

al~ pushing for a concentrated attack 

that would surge over the American positions. He had already lost one hour waiting for contact with the Germa.n unit. 

He did have one column engagmg the 

169 

COLONEL GAVIN in Biazzo Ridge area on the 

morning oj J J July. 

Americans in Gela. Now he sent a 

second from Butera toward the city. 

With most of the Rangers and engineers heavily engaged against the Italian 

thrust down Highway I 17, only two 

Ranger companies on the wes~. si~e ~f 

Gela stood in the way of Chmeleison s 

second column. "You will fight with 

the troops and supporting weapons you 

have at this time," Colonel Darby told 

them. "The units in the eastern sector 

are all engaged in stopping a tank 

attack." 14 

When the Italian column came within 

range, the two Ranger companies op~ned 

fire with their captured Italian artdlery 

pieces, and with their supporti~g platoon 

of 4.2-inch mortars. The Itahan movement slowed. General Patton appeared 

at the Ranger command post in this sector, a two-story building, and watched the 

" Lyle, Operations of Companies A and B, 

I st Ranger Battalion, p. '7. 
170 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Italian attack. As he turned to leave, he 

called out to Captain Lyle, who commanded the Rangers there, "Kill every 

one of the goddam bastards." 15 

Lyle called on the cruiser Savannah to 

help, and before long almost 500 devastating rounds of 6-inch shells struck the 

Italian column. Through the dust and 

smoke, Italians could be seen staggering 

as if dazed. Casualties were heavy. The 

attack stalled. Moving out to finish the 

task, the Ranger companies captured almost 400 enemy troops. "There were 

human bodies hanging from the trees," 

Lyle noted, "and some blown to bits." 16 

As it turned out, a large proportion of 

the officers and more than 50 percent of 

the Italian soldiers were killed or wounded. 

North of GeIa, artillery and naval fire, 

small arms, machine gun, and mortar 

fires reduced the Livorno column to company size, and these troops were barely 

holding on to positions they had quickly 

dug. The third Italian column, in about 

battalion size, starting to move from 

Butera Station to GeIa, ran into a combat patrol which had been dispatched by 

the 3d Division to make contact with the 

Gela force. The company-size patrol inflicted heavy casualties on the Italians, 

who pulled back to their original position. 

The battering received during this attack on Gela finished the Livorno Division 

as an effective combat unitY 

East of Gela, as General Conrath sent 

the major part of both his tank battalions toward the beaches, the Gela plain 

became a raging inferno of exploding shells, 

smoke, and fire. The lead tanks reached 

the highway west of Santa Spina, two 

thousand yards from the water. As they 

15 Ibid., p. 18. 

16 Ibid. 

17 MS #R-138 (Bauer), pp. 13-20. 

raked supply dumps and landing craft 

with fire, the division headquarters reported victory: "pressure by the Hermann Goering Division [has] forced the 

enemy to re-embark temporarily." 18 At 

Sixth Army headquarters, General Guzzoni was elated. After discussion with 

General von Senger, he instructed XVI 

Corps to put the revised plan into actionwheel the German division that afternoon 

to the east toward Vittoria and continue 

movement during the night to Palazzolo 

Acreide and the Syracuse sector.19 

But the German tanks never reached 

the 1st Division beaches. Nor was there 

any thought of American re-embarkation.20 The 32d Field Artillery Battalion, 

coming ashore in Dukws moved directly 

into firing positions along the edge of the 

sand dunes and opened direct fire on the 

mass of German armor to its front. The 

16th Infantry Cannon Company, having 

180KH, Tagesmeldungen West, l.V·-31.VIII. 

43, Teil II (cited hereafter as OKH, Tagesmeldungen West), 1 I J ul 43; MS #C-095 (Senger), KTB entry 0110, 12 Jul 43, for the day 

before; OB SUED, Meldungen, TWX No. 0134, 

0940, 12 Jul 43; OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1·-31.VlI. 

43, 12 Jul 43· 

19 Faldella, Lo sbareo, p. 158. 

20 There is no evidence in the official records 

of any order to re-embark personnel or equipment from any beaches. The WNTF Action Report, page 56, indicates that the engineer shore 

parties were called inland to establish a temporary defensive line, "and the withdrawal seaward 

by boats of other beach personnel." Morison 

(Sieily-Salerno-Anzio, page 116) states "neither they [the Navy's advanced base group] nor 

anyone else were given orders to re-embark, as 

the enemy reported." General Faldella, the 

Sixth Army chief of staff, reported (Lo sbareo, 

page 148) an intercepted Seventh Army radio 

message that ordered the U.S. 1st Division to prepare for re-embarkation. Faldella repeated this 

to Mrs. Magna Bauer in Rome during an interview in January 1959, asking repeatedly whether 

the original message appeared in the records. 

The intercept was probably misinterpreted. 
THE AXIS THREAT 171 

AFTER THE TANK B ATTLE, wrecked German tanks dot Gela Plain at Highway J 15. 

just been ferried across the Acate River, 

rushed up to the dune line, took positions, 

and opened fire. Four of the ten medium tanks of Colonel White's CCB finally got off the soft beach, and, under 

White's direction, opened fire from the 

eastern edge of the plain. The 18th Infantry and the 41st Armored Infantry 

near the Gela-Farello landing ground prepared to add their fires. Engineer shore 

parties stopped unloading and established 

a firing line along the dunes. Naval 

gunfire, for a change, was silent-the 

opposing forces were too close together 

for the naval guns to be used. 

Under the fearful pounding, the German attack came to a halt. Milling 

around in confusion, the lead tanks were 

unable to cross the coastal highway. The 

German tanks pulled back, slowly at first 

and then increasing their speed as naval 

guns opened fire and chased them. Sixteen German tanks lay burning on the 

Gela plain. 

On Piano Lupo, the I st and 2d Battalions, 16th Infantry, had managed to 

hold the road junction, even though six 

German tanks had broken into their lines. 

The single remaining 37-mm. antitank 

gun in the 2d Battalion disabled one. A 

lucky round from a 60-mm. mortar 

dropped down the open hatch of another. 

A bazooka round badly damaged a third. 

Colonel Gorham, the paratroop commander, put a fourth out of commission 

with bazooka fire. The other two retired. 

With almost one-third of his tank 

strength destroyed or disabled, General 

Conrath called off the attack shortly after 

1400. Though fighting east of the river 

continued until late that evening, the tank 

units withdrew to the foothills south of 

Niscemi. 21 

"1 It is difficult to sta te exactly how many tanks 

the Hermann Goering Division lost in this counterattack. The division had go Mark III and 

IV tanks on 9 July. Attached were the 17 Tiger 

tanks from the :n 5th Tank Battalion. The division reported 54 tanks operational on II July, 

and 45 on 14 July. Since none of the division's 

tanks were attached to Group Schmalz, all tank 
172 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

At Enna, General Guzzoni again 

changed his plans. The fierce American 

resistance at Gela, the known arrival of 

additional Allied units, and the continued 

pressure of the 45th Division in the 

Vittoria-Comiso area indicated the difficulty of getting the Hermann Goering 

Division to the east coast by way of Vittoria and Palazzolo Acreide. In addition, 

a further American advance inland from 

Comiso might bypass the Hermann Goering Division and cut it off entirely from 

the east coast. Thus, during the afternoon of I I July, Guzzoni ordered the 

XVI Corps to suspend all offensive action 

in the Gela area, to withdraw the H ermann Goering Division to Caltagirone for 

movement on the following day to Vizzini and commitment against the British, 

and to consolidate the Livorno Division 

along a line from Mazzarino to Caltagirone 

to cover the German withdrawa1.22 

Before Guzzoni's instructions reached 

Conrath, General von Senger visited the 

Hermann Goering Division. Though disappointed because the tanks had not 

broken through to the beaches, Senger 

considered the situation favorable for 

turning the division eastward toward Vitlosses during the period 10-14 July 1943 occurred 

in the battle for Gela and in the subsequent 

withdrawal. with a majority of these lost on I I 

July. Thus, the German tank loss is estimated 

as being a minimum of 26, and a maximum of 

45. In addition, 10 of the I7 Tiger tanks were 

also lost. See Mins of Conf 13 Between Hitler, 

Buhle, Jodi and Others, 25 .lui 43, in Min of 

Hitler Confs. See also OB SUED, Meldungen, 

I.-3I.VII.43, Telg No. 0940, 12 Jul 43, and Telg 

No. 0618, 1940, 14JuI43;MS#T-2 (Friesetal.); 

MS #C-087 a and d (Bergengruen); Faldella, 

Lo sbareo, p. 425; MS #C-077 (Rodt); Rpt, 

Maj Gierga to Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, 28 Aug 43, in XIV Panzer Corps, KTB Nr. 

5, Anlagenheft I, 8·-30,/X.43 (No. 48702/8). 

22 Faldella, Lo sbareo, p. 158; MS #C-095 

(Senger), KTB entry 1315, II Jul 43. 

toria and Comiso. This would cut off 

from the beaches those units of the 45th 

Division that had pushed well inland. 

Feeling that the 1st Division, which had 

borne the brunt of Axis counterattacks 

for two days, was in no position seriously 

to contest this movement, he ordered Conrath to the east. 

Conrath was in agreement with Senger's 

estimate. Still expecting his tanks to 

reach the beaches, he was sure his infantryheavy task force could wheel to the east 

from Biscari to strike at Vittoria. Unfortunately for Conrath, his infantryheavy force had been so manhandled by 

Gavin's men on Biazzo Ridge that it was 

hardly in any condition to initiate any offensive action. 

About 1000, a good many of the paratroopers, coming from Vittoria under 

Major Krause, had joined Colonel Gavin 

on Biazzo Ridge. Gavin directed this 

force to advance westward along Highway I 15, seize Ponte Dirillo, and open a 

route to the 1st Division's zone. Augmented by random troops of the 180th 

Infantry rounded up by Gavin" the paratroopers got going. After a mile of slow 

progress against increasing German resistance, the attack halted when four Tiger 

tanks, supported by infantrymen, came 

into view and began pressing the paratroopers back. Though American soldiers 

crawled forward singly with bazookas, 

they could not get close enough to register 

a kill. Fortunately, two of the three airborne howitzers came in behind Biazzo 

Ridge, went into position, and opened 

fire. 

The fight continued until well after 

noon. As American casualties increased 

to the danger point, artillerymen manhandled one of the little howitzers to the 

top of the ridge just in time to engage 
THE AXIS THREAT 

in a point-blank duel with a Tiger tank. 

In the face of heavy small arms fire and 

several near misses from the tank gun, the 

paratrooper crew got off several quick 

rounds, one of which knocked out the 

tank. Two half-tracks towing 57-mm. 

antitank guns arrived from the 179th 

Infantry, went into firing positions, and 

engaged the other three Tiger tanks. 

Around 1500, the Germans had had 

enough. 

The antitank guns had arrived in response to Colonel Gavin's request, through 

another staff officer dispatched to the 

45th Divi'lion command post for assistance, especially for antitank guns, artillery liaison parties, and tanks. General 

Middleton had been quick to react. 

Shortly after the antitank guns rolled up, 

a naval gunfire support party and a liaison 

party from the l89th Field Artillery Battalion reached Colonel Gavin's headquarters. Within a very few minutes, the 

field artillery battalion signaled rounds on 

the way and the Navy joined in blasting 

the German troops along the Acate River. 

Still later in the afternoon, eleven tanks 

from the 753d Medium Tank Battalion 

arrived. At the same time, Gavin received word that Lieutenant Swingler, 

commander of the 505th'S Headquarters 

Company, was on the way with an additional one hundred paratroopers. With 

this growing strength, Gavin decided to 

switch to the offensive. 

On trucks furnished by the 45th Division, Lieutenant Swingler and his men 

arrived shortly after 2000. Forty-five 

minutes latp.r, after a tremendous artillery 

concentration, the paratroopers launched 

their second attack. Every available man 

was committed, including a few from the 

Navy who had enrolled in the unit during 

the day. Not long afterwards, the Ger173 

man force was scattered, most of the 

troops making their way north toward 

Biscari, a few crossing at Ponte Dirillo to 

re join the main body of the division, a 

smaller number remaining near the bridge 

in blocking positions. With the advent 

of darkness, Gavin called off the attack 

before his troops reached the river, Pulling his men back, he organized a strong 

defensive line along the ridge. 

The paratrooper stand on Biazzo Ridge 

prompted General Conrath to change his 

plans. Learning of the heavy losses being sustained by his infantry-heavy force, 

he decided, apparently on his own initiative, to break off contact with the Americans near Gela. Ignoring General von 

Senger's instructions to wheel eastward, 

he decided to withdraw to Caltagirone in 

compliance with Guzzoni's orders. But 

instead of retiring at once to Caltagirone, 

Conrath planned to pull his Hermann 

Goering Division back in stages. He 

would reach Caltagirone during the night 

of 13 July, a day later than Guzzoni 

wished. 23 

Though bitter patrol clashes continued 

in the hills near Piano Lupo during the 

night, and though the 16th Infantry reported an enemy infantry and tank buildup, the 1St Divi"ion beachhead was no 

longer in any serious danger. General 

"3 For a complete discussion of Conrath's decision, see MS #R-138 (Bauer), pp. 7-9, and 

MS #R-164 b, General Remarks to Individual 

Chapters and Suggested Corrections, Comments 

on Chapter XIX (Bauer). Though General Conrath, it seems certain, ordered a withdrawal to 

start during the night of I I July, this information 

apparently did not reach all of his units. Interrogation of a German prisoner by 2d Armored 

Division personnel on 12 July disclosed that the 

prisoner's unit was ordered to attack Gela, which 

was reported clear as a result of the tank attack 

on II July. See 1st Inf Div G-2 Jnl, 10-14 

Jul 43· 
174 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Allen had established physical contact 

with the 3d Division on his left. Almost 

all of the floating reserve was ashore. 

The Navy stood by to render gunfire 

support. More supplies and equipment 

were arriving.24 

24 By nightfall, I I July, all tanks of the 3d 

Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment; eight light 

tanks from the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion; 

all of Company E, 67th Armored Regiment; and 

the bulk of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion were ashore. All this, of course, was in 

addition to the foot elements put ashore during 

the night of 10 July. 

Colonel Perry, then Chief of Staff, 2d Armored 

Division, disagrees with one report (Morison, 

Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, page I I I) that the desperate need for more armor ashore was not fully 

appreciated. Colonel Perry states (see his comments on the MS) that the need for armor was 

appreciated by the 2d Armored Division, but that 

due to the lack of causeways and the slowness 

of unloading tanks from LST's to LCT's and 

then to shore, tanks could not be gotten ashore 

quickly. Colonel Perry further states that on I I 

Despite the fact that the 1st Division 

had taken quite a battering on I I July, 

in particular the 16th Infantry, and despite the fact that enemy air raids had 

caused some damage, notably the destruction of a Liberty ship filled with ammunition, General Patton was ashore urging 

General Allen to get on with the business 

of taking Ponte Olivo and Niscemi, objectives which, according to the Seventh 

Army's plan, should have been taken that 

day.25 

July there was no causeway operating on any 1st 

Division beach until late in the afternoon. The 

only U.S. tanks to see action on I I July were four 

of the ten medium tanks that were unloaded early 

in the morning. 

25 See Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry 

Division During World War II (a 43-page mimeographed document prepared by General Allen), 

p. 36. According to General Allen's report, General Patton was very much "wrought up" because 

the 1st Division had not as yet taken Ponte 

Olivo airfield. 
CHAPTER IX 

Airborne Reinforcement 

Early on the morning of I I July, in 

order to bolster the Gela forces, General 

Patton ordered the 504th Combat Team 

to drop into the 1st Division's beachhead 

that evening.1 At I goo, about the time 

that Colonel Gavin on Biazzo Ridge was 

issuing his second attack order of the day, 

Col. Reuben H. Tucker's 504th began 

taking off from the airfields in Tunisiathe 1st and 2d Battalions, 504th Parachute Infantry; the 376th Parachute 

Field Artillery Battalion; and Company 

C, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalionin all a few more than 2,000 men. 2 

One hundred and forty-four aircraft 

from the U.S. 52d Troop Carrier Wing in 

the aerial column flew a basic nine-ship 

V of V's formation stepped down to make 

it easier to see the silhouette of the lead 

1 General Ridgway dispatched the order at 

0839, II July. The order was received in North 

Africa at 1100, and acknowledged fifteen minutes later. See 82d AB Div G-3 Jnl, entry 42, 

II J ul 43: "Mackall tonight wear White Pajamas." See also, Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, 

p. 39· 

2 The NAAFTCC Report (page 85) states 

that 2,008 troops were carried on the mission; 

Brig. Gen. Paul L. Williams (commander of TCC) 

states in his report that 2,304 troops participated. 

There is no airborne report available that gives 

the number of men carried, but, according to 

the strengths of the units at the time, it appears 

that the TCC report is more nearly accurate. 

Undoubtedly, General Willi'lms based his figure 

on an average load of sixteen men per aircraft; 

the TCC report indicates an average load of 

slightly less than fourteen men per aircraft. 

aircraft against the sky. The air over the 

Mediterranean Sea was quiet and calm. 

A quarter moon offered some illumination. 

Many pilots, who remembered the earlier 

flight, were confident that this mission 

would not suffer from the vagaries of the 

weather. Knowledge that they would be 

flying a course over friendly territory made 

them feel secure. They looked forward 

to a relatively quiet and peaceful nighta milk run. 

The course had been worked out in 

planning sessions attended by General 

Ridgway (the 82d's commander); Maj. 

Gen. Joseph M. Swing (American airborne adviser at Allied Forces Headquarters); British General Browning ( the 

AFHQ airborne adviser); and representatives from Air Chief Marshal Tedder's 

Mediterranean air command and Admiral 

Cunningham's Mediterranean naval command. Concerned because the airborne 

troops might be fired on by friendly naval 

vessels off the Seventh Army assault 

beaches, Ridgway had tried repeatedly to 

get assurances that the Navy would clear 

an aerial corridor to the island. He had 

even gone to General Browning with a 

strong request for assurances that the 

Navy would not fire on any reinforcing 

mISSIOns. Since it had already been 

planned that any reinforcing mISSIOn 

would be flown over the same route used 

by the 505th Combat Team, General 

Ridgway was most anxious lest his follow-
176 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

up units draw fire from the large number 

of naval vessels which would be off the 

beaches. General Browning could offer 

no such assurances. 

On 22 June, General Ridgway had 

presented his views to a joint conference 

presided over by General Eisenhower. 

The naval representatives in attendance 

refused to provide a definite corridor for 

any airborne mission flown after D-day 

in the Seventh Army sector. Ridgway 

had then written to General Keyes, the 

Seventh Army deputy commander, and 

recommended that, unless a clear aerial 

corridor into Sicily could be provided, no 

subsequent airborne troop movement be 

made after D-day. 

As a result of energetic action by Generals Keyes and Swing, General Ridgway 

and the Troop Carrier Command received 

assurance from the Navy on 7 July that 

if a follow-up air transport movement 

followed certain designated routes and 

made its last leg overland, the withholding 

of friendly naval fire could be guaranteed. 

Accordingly, the 504th's route was carefully plotted to hit the island at Sampieri, 

thirty miles east of Gela and at the extreme eastern end of the Seventh Army 

zone. Once over land, the troop-carrying 

aircraft were to turn to the northwest and 

fly toward the Gela-Farello landing 

ground-over friendly lines all the wayalong a corridor two miles wide and at an 

altitude of 1,000 feet. 3 Earlier AFHQ 

3 Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, p. 37; Ltr prepared by Ridgway, 2 Aug 43, sub: Reported 

Loss of Transport Planes and Personnel Due to 

Friendly Fire, in Ridgway Personal File, 1942-

1943, item 42; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew 

B. Cunningham, Despatch, The Invasion of 

Sicily, a Supplement to the London Gazette, 

April 25, 1950, p. 2081; Notes on the Routing 

of Troop Carrier Aircraft, 24 Jul 43, 99-66.2, 

sub: AFHQ Rpt of Allied Force Airborne Board 

in Connection With the Invasion of Sicily. 

radio instructions and Seventh Army 

warnings were supplemented at 0845 on 

I I July when General Patton sent a top 

priority message to his principal subordinate commanders. He directed them to 

notify their units, especially the antiaircraft battalions, that parachutists would 

drop on the Gela-Farello landing field 

about 2330 that night. 4 

General Ridgway, on Sicily, visited six 

crews of antiaircraft artillerymen near the 

1st Division command post during the 

afternoon of I I July to make sure that 

the warning had been sent down the 

chain of command. Five crews had received the warning; the sixth had not. 

When he brought this to the attention of 

an officer from the IOgd Coast Artillery 

Antiaircraft Battalion he learned that a 

conference of all officers from the antiaircraft units in the vicinity was being 

held later that afternoon. The officer 

assured Ridgway that he, personally, 

would see to it that the subject of the 

airborne mission was discussed. 5 

Following the prescribed course, the 

air column rounded the corner at Malta 

in good shape and headed for Sicily with 

all formations intact. A few aircraft encountered some light antiaircraft fire from 

Allied shipping north of Malta, but no 

damage was done and the column continued serenely on its way. Inside the 

planes, some paratroopers closed their 

eyes and dozed; others craned their necks 

to look down at the sea. 

4 Annex A, Ridgway Ltr, 2 Aug 43; Warren, 

USAF Hist Study 74, p. 37; 82d AB Div in 

Sicily and Italy, p. 19n; 82d AB Div G-3 Jnl, 

entries 43 and 44B, II Jul 43; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 132-33; Seventh Army G-3 

Opns File, sub: Air Support. This last contains 

copies of the various messages dealing with the 

warnings issued to various commands. 

5 Ridgway Ltr, 2 Aug 43. 
AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENT 

Off the Seventh Army beaches, though, 

all had not been serene on 1 I July. 

Dawn of the 11th had brought with it a 

heavy aerial attack. At 0635, twelve 

Italian planes had swept down over the 

transport area off GeIa, forcing the ships 

to weigh anchor and disperse. Two 

transports received near misses. One, 

the Barnett, was badly damaged by a 

near miss which blew a hole through her 

side. Enemy air attacks against the 

beaches and shipping continued throughout the day.6 At 1400, four planes 

strafed the GeIa beaches while a high 

level enemy bomber dropped five bombs 

in the anchorage area. In the ScogHtti area, four bombs fell about 700 yards 

off the port bow of the Ancon at 1430. 

At 1540, around thirty Junker 88's attacked the GeIa area, harmlessly bracketing the cruiser Boise with bombs but 

striking the Liberty ship Robert Rowan 

(one of seven arriving in the first followup convoy). Loaded with ammunition, 

the Rowan took an enemy bomb in her 

Number Two hold, caught fire, exploded, 

and sank in shallow water. Her bow 

exposed, with smoke pouring from the 

hulk, she provided a perfect beacon for 

later waves of enemy bombers. 

Around 2150 came a massive strike. 

Near Gela, the Boise and all the destroyers 

except one were closely straddled. Many 

ships were damaged by near misses. 

Bomb fragments hurt another Liberty 

ship. Again the transports weighed anchor and dispersed. The sky over Gela 

became a confused jumble of friendly and 

o The Axis air forces committed Ig8 Italian 

and 28S German planes against the various Allied beachheads on I [July. By far the largest 

number of enemy air missions was flown against 

the Seventh Army beaches. OKH, Tagesmeldungen West; IT gga, an. 2. 

177 

enemy aircraft flying among the puffs of 

smoke of ground and naval antiaircraft 

fire. The melee lasted about an hour. 

Just before the planes carrying paratroopers of the 504th crossed the coast line, 

the enemy bombers withdrew. The antiaircraft fire died down. Into this calm 

flew the 504th. 

The leading flight flew peacefully to the 

Gela-Farello landing ground. At 2240, 

five minutes ahead of the scheduled drop 

time, the first paratroopers jumped over 

the drop zone. The second flight was in 

sight of Biviere Pond, the final check 

point, when the calm was rudely shattered by a lone machine gun. Within the 

space of minutes, it seemed as though 

every Allied antiaircraft gun in the beachhead and offshore was blasting planes 

out of the sky. The slow-flying, majestic 

columns of aircraft were like sitting ducks. 

As one company commander (Capt. Willard E. Harrison) remembered later: 

". . . guns along the coast as far as we 

could see . . . opened fire and the naval 

craft lying offshore . . . began firing." 7 

Only the few planeloads of paratroopers 

who had jumped several minutes ahead of 

schedule floated safely to the correct drop 

zone. 

The first flights of the second seriai 

were just turning into the overland aerial 

corridor when the firing started. Squadrons broke apart, tried to re-form, then 

scattered again. Eight pilots gave up and 

returned to North Africa still carrying 

their paratroopers. Those pilots who 

managed to get over Sicily dropped paratroopers where they could. Troops 

dropped prematurely, some dropped in the 

sea. A few planes turned to the east and 

782d AB Div in Sicily and Italy, p. 7. 
178 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

THE ROBERT ROWAN exploding off the coast at Gela, 11 July. 

released their loads in the British zone. 

Six aircraft received hits as paratroopers 

were struggling to get out of the door. 

Many pilots, after dropping their paratroopers, tried to escape the gantlet of fire 

that extended the length of the beachhead 

corridor by turning immediately out to 

sea, flying as low as possible, and taking 

evasive action against the deadly hail of 

fire rising from the ships.8 

8 A few of the pilots reported they were under fire for as much as thirty miles after leaving 

Sicily. 

Control over Army and Navy antiaircraft gunners vanished. One aircraft 

passed low over the bow of the Susan B. 

Anthony (off Scoglitti) and close by the 

Procyon. Not identifying the C-47 as 

friendly, both ships opened fire. The 

plane crashed in flames just off the stern 

of the cruiser Philadelphia. Seconds 

later, fire from all the nearby ships 

blasted another C-47 out of the sky.9 

At his command post in Scoglitti, General Bradley, the II Corps commander, 

9 CO Transport Div 5 Action Rpt, p. 6. 
AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENT 

watched in helpless fury as the antiaircraft fire from both ground and naval 

batteries cut the troop carrier formations 

to pieces. At the Gela-Farello landing 

ground, waiting to receive the paratroopers, General Ridgway was thunderstruck 

at the events around and above him. At 

his command post just north of Gela, 

Colonel Bowen, the 26th Infantry commander, felt stunned by the terrific volume 

of naval fire. 

In the lead aircraft of the third serial, 

which broke apart even before reaching 

Sicily, Colonel Tucker Was dumbfounded. 

His aircraft, well off course, flew through 

the smoke pouring up from the stillsmoldering Robert Rowan, came out on 

the Gela side, and went in low over the 

1st Division beaches. Heavy fire raked 

the aircraft. The pilot could not find the 

drop zone. By this time, the plane was 

alone. The wingmen were gone, the rest 

of the serial completely scattered. Going 

forward, Colonel Tucker instructed the 

pilot to turn west until he could locate 

some identifiable geographical feature. 

Licata eventually came into view. The 

pilot turned and flew back toward Gela. 

Though the fire was still heavy, Colonel 

Tucker and his men jumped over the 

landing ground. On the ground, Tucker 

stopped the crews of five nearby tanks 

from firing on the aircraft with their .50-

caliber machine guns. 10 

Other paratroopers and aircrew members were not so fortunate. Some paratroopers were killed in the planes before 

they had a chance to get out. Other 

paratroopers were hit in their chutes while 

10Interv, Garland with Brig Gen Reuben H. 

Tucker III, Washington, 24 Sep 59; Interv, Garland with Maj Gen John W. Bowen, Washington, 

4 Nov 59; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 133; 

Ridgway, Soldier, p. 7 I. 

179 

descending. A few were even shot on the 

ground after they landed. It seems that 

each succeeding serial received heavier 

fire than those preceding it. The last, 

carrying the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, received the heaviest fire 

and suffered the greatest losses. Flight 

Officer J. G. Paccassi (the 6 I st Group) 

lost sight of his element leader after the 

turn to the northwest had been made 

and he went on alone to the drop zone, 

encountering heavy antiaircraft fire all 

the way. Paccassi's plane was hit just as 

the paratroopers went out the door and 

he quickly turned and headed out for sea, 

flying almost at surface level. Just off 

the coast, the plane was hit again, the 

rudder shot away, then both engines 

failed. As naval vessels still fired, Paccassi crash-landed into the sea. The destroyer Beatty fired on the downed aircraft 

for five seconds with 20-mm. guns before 

realizing that the plane was American, then 

dispatched a small boat to pick up the 

survivors.ll 

Two survivors from an aircraft of the 

3 14th Group picked up by the destroyer 

Cowie stated that their element of three 

planes passed over the drop zone, but received such intense fire that the pilots 

considered the dropping of paratroopers 

suicidal. Their plane turned back to the 

coast and followed it south at an altitude 

of 500 feet before being hit. As the plane 

filled with smoke and flame, the pilot 

ordered everybody out just before the 

plane crashed. 12 The destroyer Jeffers 

picked up seven survivors from an air11 S ta temen t of Fligh t Officer J. G. Paccassi 

(F/O, AC, T-185665) on board USS Beatty. 

The statement is attached to Report of Action 

of the Beatty, dated 15 July 1943, DD640/AI6, 

ser. 00 I, part of NTF 85's report of action. 

12 Rpt, USS Cowie, 15 Jul 43, DD632/AI6-

3, ser. 09· 
180 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENTS in a C-47 heading for Sicily on 11 July. 

craft of the 3 16th Group which had crashlanded nearby-the entire five-man crew, 

plus Maj. C. C. Bowman from 82d Airborne Division headquarters, who had 

been flying as an observer, and one paratrooper who had refused to jump.13 

Capt. Adam A. Komosa, who com13 Rpt, USS Jeffers, 15 Jul 43, DD621/AI6, 

ser. 025. Morison (in Sicily-Salerno-Anzio 

page 121, note 51) points out that this ship did 

not fire on the troop-carrying aircraft because 

its gun crews had been intensively trained in 

plane recognition. If so, this was one of the few 

ships that did not fire. 

manded the 504th's Headquarters Company, later recalled: 

It was a most uncomfortable feeling knowing that our own troops were throwing 

everything they had at us. Planes dropped 

out of formation and crashed into the sea. 

Others, like clumsy whales, wheeled and 

attempted to get beyond the flak which rose 

in fountains of fire, lighting the stricken 

faces of men as they stared through the 

windows. 14 

14 Capt. Adam A. Komosa, Airborne Operation, 504th Parachute Regimental Combat Team, 

Sicily, 9 JulY-19 August 1943: Personal Experiences of a Regimental Headquarters Company 

Commander (Fort Benning, Ga., 1947), p. 13. 
AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENT 

Chaplain Delbert A. Kuehl made a 

bruising landing against a stone wall 

somewhere in the 45th Division sector, 

well southeast of Gela. Almost immediately after landing, the chaplain and a 

few men with him were taken under fire 

by American troops. Confidently, Chaplain Kuehl shouted the password. The 

reply was heavier fire. While he tried in 

vain to identify himself as an American, 

the firing continued. Then, as several of 

the paratroopers fired into the air, the 

chaplain maneuvered around the flank, 

crawled through a vineyard, and closed in 

on the American position from the rear. 

He crept up to one soldier who was blasting away at the paratroopers, tapped him 

on the shoulder, and asked him what he 

was doing. The firing soon stopped. It 

appears that not every American unit had 

the same sign and countersign. 15 

Of the 144 planes that had departed 

Tunisia, 23 never returned, 37 were badly 

damaged. 16 The loss ratio in aircraft 

was a high 16 percent. Brig. Gen. Charles 

L. Keerans, Jr., the assistant division commander, had been aboard one of the planes 

15 Komosa, Airborne Operation, 504th Parachute ReT, p. 16. Also see the Ridgway letter 

of 2 August which brings out the firing on paratroopers by American troops. Both the 171st and 

I58th Field Artillery Battalions (45th Division) 

reported skirmishes with paratroopers during the 

night of I I July. The 171st Field Artillery Battalion's report states that "since no news of the 

American Paratroopers had reached this Hq, they 

were assumed to be hostile and the Bn was deployed for all around defense." During the period of confusion which existed after the drop of 

the 504th, one artilleryman was killed by his own 

men when "mistaken for an enemy paratrooper." 

16 General Tucker stated that the aircraft in 

which he flew to Sicily did return to North Africa; the crew later reported over 1,000 holes in 

the craft. 

181 

that did not return. 17 

Of the six aircraft shot down before 

the paratroopers had a chance to jump, 

one carried 5 officers and 15 enlisted men 

from the 504th's Headquarters and Headquarters Company; another carried 43 

officers and 15 men from the 2d Battalion's 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company; and the remaining four carried I 

officer and 32 men from Battery C, 376th 

Parachute Field Artillery Battalion. Of 

these 9 officers and 62 men, a few miraculously survived. Lt. Col. L. G. Freeman 

the 504th's executive officer, 2 other officers, and 12 men (I [ of them wounded), 

crawled from the wreckage of their downed 

plane. 1St Lt. M. C. Shelly, from the 

2d Battalion's Headquarters Company, 

standing at the door of the aircraft when 

it crashed, was thrown clear. All the 

other occupants were killed. One of the 

Battery C planes was shot down at sea, 

carrying with it all the occupants. From 

the other three aircraft, 5 men saved 

themselves by using their reserve chutes2 managed to get out of one plane after 

it had been hit twice and was afire, 3 men 

were blown clear when antiaircraft fire demolished their planes. 

A total of twelve officers and ninetytwo men were aboard the eight planes 

which returned to North Africa without 

dropping: two planes with personnel 

from the 504th's Headquarters Company; one plane, Company F, 504th; two 

planes, Battery C and two planes Battery 

D, 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battallion; and one plane, Headquarters Battery, 

Division Artillery. Four dead and six 

wounded paratroopers were taken from the 

planes that returned. 

A final computation would show that 

17 Warren, USA}' Hist Study 74, p. 40; 82d 

AB Div in Sicily and Italy, p. 8. 
182 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the 504th Combat Team suffered a total 

of 229 casualties on the night of II July 

1943: 81 dead, 132 wounded, and 16 

missing. IS 

In less than an hour, the 504th Combat Team had become a completely disorganized unit. The first few sticks 

landed on and around the drop zone, and 

the bulk of the parachutists carried by 

the lead group managed to drop fairly 

near the Gela-Farello landing ground. 

For the most part, the other groups dispersed before they reached the drop zone, 

and a large number of the aircraft dropped 

paratroopers between Vittoria and the 

Acate River in the 45th Division's sector. 

The 504th'S dispersal was as great as 

that of the 505th, with paratroopers landing on Sicily from Gela on the west to the 

east coast. Colonel Tucker himself did 

not locate General Ridgway until 07 I 5 

the next morning. At that time, of his 

2,000-man force, Tucker counted as present for duty the equivalent of one rifle 

company and one battery of airborne 

howitzers. By late afternoon, the effective troops of the 504th numbered only 

37 officers and 518 men. 19 

General Eisenhower quickly demanded 

a full report of the disaster. On 13 July, 

Brig. Gen. Paul L. Williams, commanding 

the Troop Carrier Command, submitted 

his report to Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the 

NAAF commander. Williams stated that 

the heavy ground and naval antiaircraft 

fire directed against the troop-carrying 

aircraft showed a definite lack of co18 Rpt, Ridgway to TAG, 19 May 44, sub: 

Casualties, Sicilian Campaign, CT 504, Ridgway 

Personal File, item 32; 82d AB Div in Sicily and 

Italy, pp. 8, 19. On 24 July, 52d Troop Carrier Wing casualties were reported as 7 dead, 30 

wounded, and 53 missing. 

1982d AB Div G-3 Jnl, entries 5IA and 58A, 

12 Jul 43; 82d AB Div in Sicily and Italy, p. 13. 

ordination between air, naval, and ground 

forces, or a definite breakdown in the communication systems used to disseminate 

the instructions of higher headquarters to 

lower echelons. General Williams would 

not say which opened fire first-the Navy 

or the Army-but stated simply that his 

troop carriers were fired on by both 

ground and naval antiaircraft batteries. 

Endorsing General Williams' report, 

Spaatz added that the greatest mistake, in 

his opinion, was the failure to place definite restrictions on all antiaircraft units 

during the time period when the aerial 

column approached Sicily as well as during the period when the parachutists 

dropped. Air Marshal Tedder agreed 

with Spaatz and Williams, but went even 

further. He considered the airborne 

mission to have been operationally unsound because it had required aircraft to 

fly over thirty-five miles of active battle 

front. "Even if it was physically possible 

for all the troops and ships to be duly 

warned, which is doubtful," Tedder said, 

"any fire opened either by mistake or 

against any enemy aircraft would almost 

certainly be supported by all troops within range-AA firing at night is infectious 

and control almost impossible." 20 

Admiral Cunningham, quick to defend 

the naval gunners, felt that the lack of 

antiaircraft discipline was only partially 

responsible for the tragic occurrence. At 

night, he pointed out, "no question of A.A. 

undiscipline can arise. All ships fire at 

once at any aeroplane particularly low 

fIying ones which approach them." Noth20 File 99-66.2, sub: AFHQ Rpt of Allied 

Force Airborne Board in Connection With the Invasion of Sicily. See also 0100/4/78, sub: Airborne Operations in HUSKY; 0100/21/1072, sub: 

Airborne Employment, Operation and Movement 

of Troops, vol. 2, 23-30 Jul 43; and 0100/12A/ 

71, III, sub: Airborne Forces. 
AIRBORNE REINFORCEMENT 183 

SCATTERED PARATROOP REINFORCEMENTS moving through Vittoria the morning oj 13 July. 

ing less than that could be acceptable to 

the Navy, otherwise merchant vessels and 

naval combat ships would incur severe 

losses and strong damage. The major 

cause of the tragedy, Cunningham felt, 

was either bad routing or bad navigation 

on the part of the aircraft crews. 21 

21 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Despatch, The Invasion of Sicily, a 

Supplement to the London Gazette, April 25 , 

1950, p. 2081 ; Msg, Cunningham to Eisenhower, 

23 Jul 43 , sub: Airborne Troops-Enquiry, 99-

66.2. 

Admiral Cunningham carefully left unsaid why 

the naval fire was not stopped sooner, or why 

the ships' crews failed to recognize the C-47 aircraft, particularly when they were flying at such 

a low altitude and were flashing recognition signals (amber belly lights) continuously. 

The exact cause of the catastrophe 

could not be pinpointed. A board of officers appointed by AFHQ to investigate 

the circumstances uttered only generalities. Despite agreement that advance 

warning had been given to naval vessels 

and ground antiaircraft batteries, some 

individuals and units hotly denied ever receiving such a warning order. Other 

units and individuals claimed that enemy 

bombers returned and mixed with the 

friendly aerial column. Still others reported that the antiaircraft fire came from 

enemy guns. To the last charge, it was 

true that at least one plane was brought 

down by enemy machine gun fire near 

Comiso. But returning pilots and para-
184 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

troopers alike noted that the heaviest fire 

came not from the right-the direction of 

the front-but from Allied guns to the left 

of the overland aerial corridor. As one 

pilot said: "Evidently the safest place for 

us tonight while over Sicily would have 

been over enemy territory." 22 

General Ridgway probably expressed it 

best of all: 

The responsibility for loss of life and material resulting from this operation is so divided, so difficult to fix with impartial 

22 Warren, USAF Hist Study 74. P: 41. 

justice, and so questionable of ultimate value 

to the service because of the acrimonious debates which would follow efforts to hold 

responsible persons or services to account, 

that disciplinary action is of doubtful 

wisdom. 

Deplorable as is the loss of life which occurred, I believe that the lessons now learned 

could have been driven home in no other 

way, and that these lessons provide a sound 

basis for the belief that recurrences can be 

avoided. 

The losses are part of the inevitable price 

of war in human life. 23 

23 Ridgway Ltr. 2 Aug 43. 
CHAPTER X 

The Beachhead Secure 

Straightening Out the Sag 

Gradually, around midnight of I I July, 

the antiaircraft fire died down. The 

tragic show was over. As groups of 504th 

paratroopers made their way toward Gela, 

their advance sometimes marked by fire 

fights with other Americans, a relative 

stillness stole over the front. It was the 

lull before the next phase of operations, 

aimed at moving the Seventh Army to the 

Yellow Line, which would signify that the 

beachhead was secure. 

Though the 1st Division fought primarily a defensive battle on I I July, it 

would go over to the offensive the following day. Late on the afternoon of I I 

July, after his troops broke the Hermann 

Goering Division counterattack and drove 

the Italians from Gela, General Allen announced his intention in blunt words: 

"Sock the hell out of those damned 

Heinies," he ordered, "before they can 

get set to hit us again." 1 

The first task was to straighten out 

the sag in the 1st Division front, and in 

the very early hours of 12 July, three 

American columns departed their defensive positions fronting Gela and set out to 

do just this. (Map V) A composite 

1 Maj. Gen. Terry Allen, Situation and Operations Report of the First Infantry Division, 8 

August 1942-7 August 1943 (a 22-page mimeographed report prepared for the Society of the First 

Division), p. 12. 

force under Colonel Darby captured 

Monte Lapa and Monte Zai on the GelaButera road by daylight to cover the 26th 

Infantry advance up Highway I 17.2 The 

26th Infantry, reinforced by Lt. Col. Ben 

Sternberg's 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, 

drove toward Monte della Guardia and 

the Ponte Olivo airfield. Quickly clearing a small Italian roadblock just north of 

Gela, the troops pushed on to Castle Hill 

(II Castelluccio), an eminence topped by 

the ruins of a medieval tower. There 

they came under fire from an artillery 

battalion of the Livorno Division, and at 

dawn the three forward battalions were 

somewhat scrambled in the ditches and 

ravines below the hill. 

Daylight facilitated reorganization and 

permitted observed artillery fire on the 

Italian lines and artillery positions. After 

the 33d Field Artillery Battalion pounded 

the rocky eminence with telling effect, and 

the cruiser Boise lobbed in 255 rounds, 

the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, surged 

forward, gained the crest and the tower, 

and rounded up the remnants of a Livorno Division rifle battalion. While the 

1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, swung left 

and took Monte della Guardia, the 2d 

2 Darby's command consisted of the 1st and 

4th Ranger Battalions; the 1st Battalion, 41st 

Armored Infantry Regiment (minus Company 

A); the 1st Battalion, 39th Engineer Combat 

Regiment; Company A, 83d Chemical Weapom 

Battalion; and a platoon of medium tanks. 
PONTE OLIVO AIRFIELD, secured on 12 July. 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

Battalion of the 18th Infantry dashed forward to take Ponte Olivo airfield. By 

1000, the combat team's objectives were 

secure. A large portion of the sagging 

center had been moved forward five miles. 

The third American column, the 16th 

Infantry, had harder fighting as it advanced astride the Piano Lupo-Niscemi 

road to secure the division's eastern flank 

and to protect the 26th Infantry's right 

during the advance to the Ponte Olivo 

airfield. The 16th Infantry struck the 

bulk of the Hermann Goering Division, 

reinforced by those Tiger tanks that had 

withdrawn across the Acate River after 

the fight at Biazzo Ridge. Though Conrath had decided to withdraw, the German forward units had had no opportunity to begin their retirement. Early 

morning patrols had reported the disquieting news of the Germans' presence, 

but Colonel Taylor ordered the advance 

as planned. 

Colonel Crawford's 2d Battalion, with 

Colonel Gorham's paratroopers leading 

the way, moved out from positions west of 

Piano Lupo, crossed the road, and advanced up the east side of the road toward 

Casa del Priolo. Without opposition, the 

battalion reached the ridge line just south 

and east of the Casa and quickly occupied 

the trenches and emplacements earlier 

dug by the Germans. On reverse slopes 

to their left, the Americans could hear 

German troops digging in. 

Soon after first light, about 0530, heavy 

German fire struck the 2d Battalion from 

the north and northwest. West of the 

road, between the forward battalion elements and a single rifle company left near 

Piano Lupo, the Americans saw Germans 

threatening to cut off the route to the 

rear. When Colonel Crawford and Capt. 

Bryce F. Denno, the executive officer, left 

187 

their command post to visit the front-line 

units, Crawford took a couple of machine 

gun bullets in the neck and shoulder. 

Denno carried the battalion commander 

back to the command post and saw to his 

evacuation. 

Three hours later, the remaining company came up from Piano Lupo bringing 

with it an M7 105-mm. howitzer and a 

half-track 75-mm. howitzer. About the 

same time, the German infantrymen 

across the road pulled back to the north. 

With the German threat removed, the 1st 

Battalion moved up in echelon to the right 

rear of the 2d Battalion and faced east 

toward the Acate River valley. 

Near 1000, southeast of Piano Lupo, 

Lt. Col. Robert H. York's 1st Battalion, 

18th Infantry, supported by a platoon of 

medium tanks, had to fight off a column 

of three German tanks moving northwest 

along Highway 115. This American force 

had gone into position shortly after midnight as part of the army reserve, with the 

mission of screening between the two forward combat teams of the 1st Division 

and protecting the division's east flank. 

Artillery fire from the 7th Field Artillery 

Battalion, plus fires from the five medium 

tanks, destroyed two of the three German 

tanks. The third withdrew out of range. 

Half an hour later, American artillery fire 

broke up another German tank reconnaissance effort in the same area. One 

tank burned, the others withdrew. 

Thirty minutes later, six Mark VI tanks, 

supported by armored cars, half-tracks, 

and two platoons of infantry, moved down 

the Acate River valley and turned westward against the 16th Infantry positions 

near Casa del Priolo, while artillery fire 

from Niscemi gave support. 

In the 2d Battalion area, Denno moved 

his two howitzers into position to fire on 
188 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the approaching enemy armor. Hardly 

had the 75-mm. piece got out of defilade 

when it was hit and destroyed by an 

enemy artillery round. The I05-mm. 

howitzer managed to get off five rounds 

before it was knocked out by tank fire. 

Colonel Gorham, trying to repeat his 

bazooka work of the previous day, was 

killed by a direct hit from an enemy tank. 

Despite the threat, the 16th Infantry 

was in good shape. The regimental Cannon and Antitank Companies were up and 

in position, armored support was nearby, 

and the 7th Field Artillery Battalion was 

giving excellent fire support. The 5th 

and 3zd Field Artillery Battalions were 

taken off reinforcing missions elsewhere 

to lend their weight. 3 Two platoons of 

medium tanks arrived near the 1st Battalion and added their fire power-though 

they lost four of their own tanks, they got 

three Tigers. 

By noon the German threat had petered 

out, but by this time the forward infantry battalions were badly battered. Colonel Denholm, the 1st Battalion commander, had been shot and evacuated. The 

rifle companies were at less than half 

strength. The zd Battalion was left with 

perhaps zoo men, including the few surviving paratroopers. 

Despite the ragged strength of his elements, Captain Denno moved his troops 

forward and occupied Casa del Priolo 

with ease. Colonel Taylor urged further 

movement, but Denno was reluctanthis companies were tired and understrength, his flanks were open, the enemy 

appeared strong between the Casa and 

3 The 7th Field Artillery Battalion fired 15 

missions, 9 14 rounds during the day. The 32d 

Field Artillery Battalion fired 7 mISSIOns, 304 

rounds. The 5th Field Artillery Battalion fired 

6 missions, 583 rounds. 

Niscemi. Denno prevailed on the regimental commander to hold what had been 

gained. Increased German artillery fire, 

growing in intensity just before dark and 

continuing until midnight, seemed to indicate a possible attack. In reality the 

Hermann Goering Division was covering 

its withdrawal. The Piano Lupo road 

junction remained under heavy interdictory fire throughout the night. But no 

more German soldiers or tanks molested 

Casa del Priolo.4 

The 16th Infantry had not taken its 

objective, Niscemi, and a sag remained in 

the center of the Seventh Army front. 

But enemy resistance, despite the heavy 

artillery fire, was lessening, and on the 

following morning, 13 July, as the H ermann Goering Division continued to pull 

back toward Caltagirone, the Americans 

entered Niscemi unopposed. 

The 16th Infantry, particularly the 1st 

and zd Battalions, had had by far the 

sev~rest fighting thus far in the invasion. 

These two battalions had been largely 

responsible for blunting the Hermann 

Goering Division's counterattacks. Each 

battalion had lost its commander. And 

each subsequently would receive a citation for its outstanding performance. 

Casualty figures alone indicated the sev4 1St Inf Div G-3 Jnl, I 1-12 Jul 43; 1St Inf 

Div G-3 Diary, I 1-12 Jul 43; II Corps Rpt of 

Opns, p. 5; AAR's 16th Inf Regt; CCB; 18th 

Inf Regt; 5th FA Bn; 7th FA Bn; 32d FA Bn, 

and 2d Armd Div; 2d Armd Div in Sicilian Campaign, pp. 28-3 I; Danger Forward: The Story 

of the First Division in World War II (Washington, 1947), pp. 107-10; Lt. John W. Baumgartner et al., The 16th Infantry, 1798-1946 

(Bamberg, Germany: Sebald us Verlag, 1946) , 

pp. 11-13; History of the 67th Armored Regiment (Brunswick, Germany: Georg Westermann, 

1945), pp. 235-40 ; Morison, Sicily-SalernoAnzio, p. 113; Interv, Smyth with Denno and 

Groves, 24 Oct 50; Sayre, Operatior.s of Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, pp. 17-18. 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

erity of the fighting between Piano Lupo 

and Casa del Priolo on the I I th and 

12th of July. During these two days the 

1st Battalion lost 36 dead, 73 wounded, 

and 9 missing, the 2d Battalion lost 56 

dead, 133 wounded, and 57 missing. 5 

But if the sag had not been eliminated 

by nightfall 12 July, the bulge represented 

no serious threat to the 1st Division. 

Rather, American units on the flanks were 

threatening to outflank the German 

salient. 

On to the Yellow Line 

On the Seventh Army right, the town 

of Comiso fell without opposition to the 

157th Infantry early on II July. The 

regiment then looked to the west for the 

arrival of the 179th Infantry, which was 

to comprise the left arm of the division's 

deep pincer movement against the Comiso 

airfield. Stopped at times by enemy artillery fire, slowed occasionally by longrange machine gun fire, the 179th Infantry in the early afternoon was ready to 

attack the airfield in conjunction with 

the 15 7th. Co-ordination between the 

two direct support artillery battalions was 

quickly established, and the artillery radio 

net was used from then on to regulate 

the moves of the infantry units. 

Soon after 1600, as artillery fires lifted, 

two battalions of the 179th Infantry 

moved into the airfield proper from the 

west, driving the defenders into a battalion of the 15 7th Infantry coming in from 

the southeast. Within twenty minutes, 

the field was in American possession, along 

with 125 enemy planes (20 in operating 

condition), 200,000 gallons of aviation 

5 WDCO 60, 29 Jul 44. 

189 

gasoline, and 500 bombs. One German 

plane escaped.6 

Turning over the job of clearing the 

airfield to supporting engineers, the Infantry continued inland, the 179th Infantry going due north along the secondary 

road leading to the Acate River, the 15 7th 

Infantry turning due east, and then north 

toward Chiaramonte Gulfi. 

Disregarding the boundary line between the Seventh U.S. and British Eighth 

Armies, a rifle company entered Ragusa, 

captured the mayor and chief of police, 

and seized the city's switchboard intact. 

The rest of the day, in addition to policing the city, the Americans amused themselves by answering phone calls from 

anxious Italian garrisons that wanted to 

know what was going on near the beaches. 

As night fell on II July, the company had 

still not made contact with the Canadians. 

The 180th Infantry, which had been 

having some trouble, finally untracked itself and on 12 July began advancing. 

Having been allowed a day's breathing 

spell by the paratrooper action at Biazzo 

Ridge, the regimental commander was 

able to reorganize his units and now 

moved through Colonel Gavin's lines. 

That evening, by 2000, Biscari was 

secured. 

The movement to Biscari was heartening, for the performance of the regiment 

had hitherto been less than impressive. 

General Middleton considered relieving 

the commander, and went. so far as to 

request General Bradley for a replacement. Bradley asked General Patton for 

6 II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 5-6; 15 7th Inf 

Regt S-I Jnl, I I Jul 43 (which reports approximately 150 planes captured or destroyed on 

Comiso airfield in one entry; over 200, in serviceable condition, in another entry); 179th Inf 

Regt S-I Jnl, I I Jul 43; McLain MS, Sicily 

Campaign, pp. 8-9. 
190 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Lt. Col. William O. Darby, the 1St Ranger 

Battalion commander. Though Patton 

offered the young Ranger commander the 

I80th Infantry and an immediate promotion, Darby turned down the offer. He 

preferred to stay with his unit. With no 

other qualified replacement immediately 

available, Middleton made no change, 

except to send the assistant division commander to that headquarters to exercise 

close supervision.7 

The 179th Infantry, which had met 

only minor Italian resistance on I I July, 

next day encountered stiffer opposition 

north of Comiso as it began to meet 

increasing numbers of Germans. This 

resulted from General Conrath's response 

to urgent messages from General Guzzoni 

directing him to make an immediate withdrawal to the east coast. Pulling some of 

his units out of line in the Gela area, 

Conrath sent them to the northeast, his 

intention to occupy first a line along 

Highway 124 from Caltagirone east to 

Vizzini. The sudden thrust by the 1st 

Division prevented him from denuding his 

defenses until the American advance from 

Gela was stopped. The 180th Infantry 

push posed another problem, for if the 

regiment crossed the Acate River north of 

Biscari it would threaten to cut the German withdrawal route. Thus, small German units, primarily interested in securing 

the routes of withdrawal to Highway 

124, moved northeast and across the 

7 McLain MS, Sicily Campaign, pp. 11-14; 

45th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 45 and 53, 12 

J ul 43; 753d Med Tk Bn AAR, 12 J ul 43; George 

S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, annotated 

by Col. Paul D. Harkins (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), p. 58; Bradley, A Soldier's StOT)', 

pp. 139-40; OPD 201 Wedemeyer, A. C., Security, case 5; 180th Inf Regt AAR, p. 6; II Corps 

Rpt of Opns, p. 6. 

routes of advance of the 179th Infantry. 

Just before noon, part of the Hermann 

Goering Division armored reconnaissance 

battalion jumped the forward units of the 

179th Infantry. Not until late in the 

afternoon did the regiment stabilize the 

situation. Further advance toward Highway 124, the Seventh Army's Yellow Line, 

it seemed, would be hotly contested. 

In contrast, the 15 7th reached Chiaramonte Gulfi, fourteen road miles northeast of Comiso, without incident. Here 

for the first time since landing, Colonel 

Ankcorn was able to pull his scattered 

battalions together. At Ragusa, where 

the rifle company was waiting for Canadian troops to show up before rejoining 

the regiment, a misdirected shelling from 

a British artillery unit preceded the arrival of 1 st Canadian Division elements. 8 

The contact followed good gains on the 

part of the British 30 Corps on the Seventh Army right. The corps had reached 

the Pozzallo-Ispica-Rosolini line at the 

end of I I July, and next day, while the 

British 5Ist Division advanced and took 

Palazzolo Acreide, the Ist Canadian Division cleared Modica, entered Ragusa, 

and moved ten miles beyond to Giarratana. The 30 Corps advance, paralleling 

the 45th Division inland movement, 

threatened to interpose a strong Allied 

8 IS7th Inf Regt S-1 Jnl, 12 Jul 43; 45th Inf 

Div G-3 JnI entries 39, 40 , 4 1, 43, 47, 62, 64, 

66, 12 Jul 43; Nicholson, The Canadians in 

Italy, p. 81; History of the I57th Infantry Regiment (Rifle), by the regimental society (Baton 

Rouge, La.: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 

1946), p. 24; Rpt, 45th Inf Div in Sicilian Opn 

(mimeographed), p. 4, with maps 2B, 2C, 2D; 

179th In! Regt S-I Jnl, 12 Jul 43; 160th FA 

Bn AAR, 12 Jul 43; 45th Inf Div Arty Jnl, 

entries 57 and 70, 12 Jul 43; 753d Med Tk 

Bn, 12 Jul 43; OB SUED, Meldungen, 13 Jul 

43, First Report; MS #C-095 (Senger). 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

force between the Hermann Goering Division and those Axis forces opposing the 

British 13 Corps north of Syracuse. If 

the British 30 Corps moved into the gap 

between these two Axis forces-a gap of 

eighteen miles from Vizzini to Lentiniit would prevent the Hermann Goering 

Division from joining the defenders blocking the road to Catania and, ultimately, 

Messina. 

Progress in the British I 3 Corps zone 

was slower. The stubborn resistance of 

Group Schmalz prevented the 5th Division from advancing north from Syracuse 

on I I July. Despite his defensive success, Schmalz was concerned, for his 

Kampfgruppe could not hold indefinitely 

against the stronger British forces. If 

the British broke into the Catania plain, 

they would block the bulk of the Axis 

forces from access to Messina and would, 

themselves, have an unobstructed passage 

to this key Sicilian city. Because no units 

backed Group Schmalz on the east coast, 

because he needed reinforcement from the 

main body of the Hermann Goering Division, Schmalz decided to fight a delaying 

action along the coastal highway (Highway I 14) in the hope of preventing an 

Allied breakthrough. During the night 

of I I July, Colonel Schmalz withdrew to 

a defensive line centered on Lentini. 

The withdrawal uncovered the port of 

Augusta, and on I 2 July British troops 

entered the city. But advance north to 

the Catania plain was impossible, for 

Group Schmalz held firm. 

Schmalz's situation remained serious. 

He did not have enough troops to hold 

for long at Lentini. Nor did he have 

sufficient troops to close the gap to the 

west between him and the bulk of the 

Hermann Goering Division, which had 

just started to move northeast from Nis191 

cemi.9 The British 50th Division, paralleling the British 5th Division's advance, 

headed directly toward the gap, having 

moved from its landing areas at Avola 

through Cassibile, Floridia, and Sortino. 

On the west flank of the Seventh Army, 

the 3d Division, heavily supplemented by 

armored and reconnaissance units, highly 

mobile and readily employable in the terrain ahead, had gained an ideal position 

from which to exploit inland to Highway 

124. Such an advance would cut the 

Sixth Army in two at Enna, the important 

hilltop town almost in the geographical 

center of Sicily. 

General Guzzoni was concerned by the 

deep penetration of the 3d Division toward Campobello, fourteen miles north 

of Licata, for continued advance would 

cut off the Axis forces in the western part 

of the island and would threaten the 

Hermann Goering Division's right flank. 

To counter this movement Guzzoni gathered together what forces he could. 

During the night of 10 July, Colonel 

Venturi, who commanded the Italian 

177th Bersaglieri Regiment, had arrived 

with one of his battalions at Favarotta, 

where a makeshift force of Italian artillerymen and motorcyclists had managed to 

halt 3d Division progress along Highway 

123. Taking over the Italian units then 

on the ground, Venturi created a provisional tactical group-Group Venturiand ordered a counterattack the next 

morning to recapture Licata. 

West of Licata, along Highway I 15, 

the Italian 207th Coastal Division organized a tactical group near the Naro 

River bridge with the mission of advanc9 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 81-

84; Schmalz in MS #T -2 (Fries et ai.), pp. 

74-75; OB SUED, Meldungen, 12 Jul 43, Third 

and Fourth Reports. 
192 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ing east toward Licata. Other Italian 

units arriving during the night and going 

into defensive positions at Agrigento and 

Canicatti were alerted to the possibility 

that at least one might move through 

N aro to Palma di Montechiaro in order 

to assist the attack on Licata from the 

west.10 

Meanwhile, the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division was hurriedly retracing its steps 

to the central part of the island. Like 

other Italian and German units, the German division had received no specific 

orders on 10 July on its probable future 

operations. But from fleeing Italian 

coastal units, General Rodt was able to 

learn that the original Sixth Army plan 

to throw the Allies back into the sea was 

not having great success. He therefore 

decided to try to stop the several American columns moving inland on the roads 

emanating from Licata. The result of 

this decision was to embroil elements of 

the division during the transfer from west 

to east in numerous small actions, generally in battalion strength. 

Arriving at his new command post 

south of Pietraperzia (some twenty miles 

northeast of Campobello) about 0400, I I 

July, Rodt learned more about the invasion. From additional reports he concluded that the Americans who had landed 

in Gela were advancing north toward 

Piazza Armerina, while those American 

forces which had landed in Licata planned 

to drive on through Campobello to 

Canicatti. 

Feeling that he could not block both 

major thrusts, he decided to strike the 

closer one, the advance of the 3d Division 

from Licata. Sending the bulk of Group 

Ens (the reinforced 104th Panzer Grena10 Faldella, Lo sbarto, p. 152, and corrections 

made available to Mrs. Bauer by Faldella. 

dier Regiment) to screen against the thrust 

from Gela and to protect his east flank, 

he planned to move one battalion from 

Pietraperzia through Riesi in a flanking 

movement from the east against the American column moving toward Canicatti. 

This attack would relieve pressure on 

both the Livorno and 207th Coastal Divisions. The reinforced reconnaissance 

battalion of the division, known as Group 

Neapel, was to block the main roads 

north and east from Canicatti and delay 

the Americans as long as possible. Group 

Fullriede (the reinforced I29th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment) would deploy along 

a line from Canicattl through Delia to 

Sommatino to halt advances inland along 

the roads leading from Licata, Palma di 

Montechiaro, and Agrigento to Caltanissetta. His main hope was to disrupt the 

3d Division advance by dealing it a damaging blow on its deep eastern flank by 

means of the battalion attack from Riesi.ll 

General Truscott, meanwhile, had called 

his senior commanders together on the 

evening of 10 July and issued his orders 

for the next day's operation. The 7th 

Infantry was to thrust westward to take 

Palma di Montechiaro and the high 

ground just beyond; the 15th Infantry 

was to continue north along Highway 123 

to seize Campobello; General Rose's CCA, 

operating between these two combat 

teams, was to seize Naro, then assemble 

on the high ground to the north and east 

11 MS #0-077 (Rodt) and sketch; MS # 

0-095 (Senger); DB SUED, Meldungen, 12 Jul 

43· 

The commitment of the reconnaissance battaiion from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division is 

controversial. It seems that part of the battalion 

was also deployed between Palermo and Canicattl at major road intersections. I t is difficult 

to reconstruct the actions of this unit from the 

scanty Axis reports available. 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 193 

TANK-MoUNTED CCA MEN push through Palma en route to N aro. 

and prepare for further action. The 

30th Infantry, guarding the division's exposed right flank, was to send one battalion cross-country to seize Riesi, there 

blocking an important avenue of approach 

into the division's eastern flank. 

The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (Lt. 

Col. John A. Heintges), led the advance 

on Palma di Montechiaro early on I I 

July. Crossing the Palma River bridge 

without incident, the battalion encountered heavy fire from Italian troops who 

occupied strong positions along a line of 

low hills just south of the town. Deploying his troops, building up a base of fire, 

and using supporting weapons to excellent 

advantage, Heintges pushed slowly ahead 

and drove the Italians into the town itself. As the battalion prepared to push 

into Palma around I 100, numerous white 

flags appeared on buildings in the town. 

Colonel Heintges dispatched a smaIl patrol to accept the surrender. Unfortunately, civilians, not soldiers, had displayed 

the white flags, and the small American 

patrol came under fire. Two men were 
194 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

killed, another two were wounded. Enraged, Heintges gathered together ten 

men and personally led them across an 

open field to a building which seemed to 

house the heaviest fire. They reached 

the building safely, planted demolitions on 

the lower floor, withdrew a short distance, 

and set off the explosives. The blast signaled start of the attack, and the battalion 

swept into town behind its commander. 

The Palma defenders had been reinforced 

by a task force that had moved down 

from the Naro River, and heavy fighting 

erupted up and down the main street. 

For two hours the battle raged from house 

to house. Around 1300, having had 

enough, the surviving Italians began pulling out westward along Highway I 15. 

Quickly reorganizing his battalion, Heintges followed in close pursuit, rapidly 

cleared the hills on the south side of the 

highway, and dug in there to await the 

rest of the combat team. 12 

To Heintges' right, General Rose's 

CCA had begun to move against NaroY 

With a reconnaissance company forming 

a screen and the 3d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry, reinforced by a company 

of medium tanks as the advance guard, 

12 7th Inf Regt Unit Jnl, I I Jul 43; 3d Inf 

Div in Sicilian Campaign AAR, p. I I; 7th Inf 

Regt AAR, p. 3; overlay showing dispositions of 

7th Infantry troops, 1100, I I Jul 43, 3d Inf Div 

G-3 Jnl File, I I Jul 43; 7th Inf Regt S-3 Opns 

Rpt 2, I I Jul 43; loth FA Bn in Sicily Campaign AAR, I I Jul 43; Nathan W. White, From 

Fedala to Berchtesgaden: A History of the 7th 

U.S. Infantry in World War II (Germany, 1947), 

pp. 26-27. 

13 On I I July, CCA consisted of the 66th 

A.rmored Regiment; the 41st Armored Infantry 

Regiment, minus the 1st Battalion; the 14th 

Armored Field Artillery Battalion; the 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (which, at this 

time, had only one battery ashore); reconnaissance, engineer, and service units. The remainder of the 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion closed at 1600, I I July 1943. 

the combat command proceeded slowly 

along the narrow, secondary roads and 

trails northwest of Licata. The terrain 

was difficult, the roads were poor, but the 

only opposition came from snipers, scattered long-range machine gun fire, and a 

strafing attack by two German aircraft. 

For the first time in a procedure that would 

become standard, the armored infantrymen mounted the tanks and rode the 

last few miles. 

Just outside Naro, a civilian volunteered 

the information that the town was unoccupied and the population friendly. 

Unwilling to take any chances on this 

rather nebulous bit of information, Col. 

Sidney R. Hinds, the 41st Armored Infantry commander, placed the civilian 

and his small son on the hood of his halftrack and led the column into town while 

small tank-infantry teams cleared the 

flanks and secured the exits. The civilian 

was right. By mid-morning of I I July, 

CCA was in possession of Naro. 

Continuing toward Canicattl, six miles 

north, a company of tanks was briefly 

delayed by an attack delivered by friendly 

P-38 aircraft, which, fortunately, caused 

no damage to men or equipment. Two 

miles northeast of Naro, on the approaches to a pass between two hills, the 

company ran into stiff resistance. An 

Italian infantry battalion had moved up 

from Agrigento that morning, and despite 

repeated Allied air attacks, had reached 

the pass minutes before the American 

tanks arrived. Halting and deploying, 

the tankers called for infantry support. 

The battalion of armored infantrymen 

under Lt. Col. Marshall L. Crawley, Jr., 

came forward, and an attack at 1600 

made slow progress against hard-fighting 

Italians. With the approach of darkness, 

the Italians withdrew. By nightfall, the 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

Americans were in possession of the pass 

and were four miles short of Canicatti.14 

The mistaken strafing by friendly 

planes turned out to be a harbinger of 

things to come for CCA. During the 

week of I I July, CCA was to lose fourteen vehicles and seventy-five men from 

such attacks. The friendly pilots, who 

were briefed to be alert for the 15th 

Panzer Grenadier Division, mistook the 

eCA armored vehicles for enemy vehicles 

despite the rather prominent display of 

yellow smoke-the agreed signal for the 

identification of friendly vehicles. One 

pilot, I st Lt. R. F. Hood (86th FighterBomber Group), shot down over Naro by 

eCA's antiaircraft fire, said that he had 

seen the yellow smoke but had not been 

informed of its meaning. Later, the 15th 

Army Group changed the method of 

recognition from smoke to peIinants, and 

this apparently solved the problem. 15 

The 15th RCT, meanwhile, was advancing north along Highway 123 from 

Favarotta to Campobello. 

Under Colonel Johnson's plan of attack, the 3d Battalion moved directly up 

the highway to capture the high ground 

west of Campobello, while the 1st Battalion made a wide, ninety-degree envelopment of the enemy left flank, using for 

its approach a series of north-south draws, 

well defiladed from Campobello and the 

highway. With the 2d Battalion in reserve and the 39th Field Artillery Battal14 4 [st Armd Inf Regt AAR, [[ J ul 43; 66th 

Armd Regt AAR, [[ J ul 43; overlay of opns, 

eCA, [0-[8 Jul 43, in 602-CC (A)-3.6; disposition of troops, CCA, overlay as of [900, [[ Jul 

43, 3d Inf Div G-3 Jnl File, [[ Jul 43; 2d 

Armd Div in Sicilian Campaign, pp. 36-38; 

CCA S-3 Jnl, [[ Jul 43; Faldella, Lo sbarco, 

pp. [52-55, 179· 

15 3d Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries [0 and [2, [2 

Jul 43; CCA S-3 Jnl, entries [3 and [5, [2 Jul 

43; 2d Armd Div in Sicilian Campaign, p. 39. 

195 

ion and a battery of the 9th Field Artillery Battalion in support, the attack 

started at 0445. 

Because the 1st Battalion, east of the 

highway, was delayed almost an hour in 

assembling, the 3d Battalion moved out 

cautiously. At Station Favarotta the 

leading elements ran into Group Venturi, 

which was moving down the highway to 

attack Licata. For four hours, Americans 

and Italians battled for the commanding 

terrain around Favarotta, American artillery units firing with devastating effect 

on Italian artillery pieces and armored 

vehicles emplaced near the small town. 16 

The end came after a rifle company 

worked its way around the right of the 

I talian line on the west side of the highway. Under fire from four or five enemy 

machine guns on the western edge of 

Favarotta, the company called for support. 

Because these particular enemy positions 

were defiladed from the artillery, Colonel 

Johnson ordered his available elements 

of the 15th Infantry Cannon Company, a 

platoon of three half-tracks mounting 

75-mm. howitzers, to come forward. To 

do so, the half-tracks had to move along 

a stretch of road that had several hairpin 

turns. 

The hairpin area was no place for halftracks to leave the road, and besides, the 

enemy had several artillery pieces registered on the treacherous curves. The 

first half-track stuck its nose out from 

behind a hill and into the open and three 

enemy salvos checkerboarded the road. 

The half-track quickly reversed and got 

back to shelter. Another try five minutes later brought the same result. The 

platoon commander decided to dash down 

16 The 39th Field Artillery Battalion fired 

[,484 rounds in the day's actions; the battery of 

the 9th Field Artillery Battalion, 86 rounds. 
196 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the road on a dead run. First withdrawing farther into defilade in order to 

get a running start, he burst out from 

behind the hill at thirty miles an hour. 

The others followed at fifty-yard intervals. 

The enemy laid down at least four salvos, 

and the bursts seemed to be within inches 

of the half-tracks, but the half-tracks kept 

going and managed to stay on the road. 

Through the hairpin area safely, they 

dashed into position to give support. 

With this added fire, the Sd Battalion 

overwhelmed the roadblock. Having lost 

three artillery pieces and more than half 

its automatic weapons, and with the mfantry battalion seriously reduced m 

strength, Group Venturi withdrew to 

Campobello. 

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, 

advancing almost without resistance on its 

wide enveloping movement, reached high 

ground east of Campobello at I soo, just 

as the Sd Battalion, following Group Venturi from Favarotta, gained high ground 

west of the town. Though Campobello 

seemed ripe for a squeeze play, it was 

harder than it appeared. 

That morning, the XII Corps had ordered Generale di Brigata Ottorino Schreiber, commander of the 207th Coastal 

Division, to go from his headquarters at 

Agrigento to Canicatti and assume command of a counterattack aimed at retaking Licata. Schreiber was to take over 

all the Italian and German forces already 

at Canicattl and those who would arrive 

during the day. Col. Augusto de Laurentiis, commander of the military zone of 

Port Defense UN" at Palermo, assumed 

command of the coastal division. 

At Canicattl around I I So, Schreiber 

planned to attack south along Highway 

12S with Group Venturi, already engaged, and Group N eapel, dispatched by 

Rodt. Schreiber immediately sent Group 

Neapel to Campobello to reinforce Group 

Venturi, both to be supported by Italian 

artillery at Casa San Silvestro, two miles 

south of CanicattL 

General Schreiber's counterattack, 

scheduled to jump off at 13SO, never 

started. Group Venturi had been mauled 

too severely to think of offensive action, 

Group Neapel became involved in defending Campobello, and American artillery fire and the threat to his right flank 

posed by the advance of CCA into Naro 

prompted General Schreiber to withdraw 

to Casa San Silvestro. Group N eapel remained at Campobello temporarily to 

cover the withdrawaPT 

At 1500, behind a thunderous concentration laid down by the 39th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions 

of the 15th Infantry advanced on Campobello. The attack progressed slowly 

but steadily until just short of town where 

concentrated German fire forced a halt. 

Another artillery preparation and the 

squeeze of the two American battalions 

hurried the Germans out of town. At 

1600 the 3d Battalion entered Campobello.Is 

17 Faldella. Lo sbareo, pp. 153-55. 

18 15th Inf Regt AAR, II Jul 43; 15th lnf 

Regt J nl, I I J ul 43; overlay showing routes 

traveled and positions occupied by 15th Infantry 

troops, II Jul 43, 303-70.4; 66th Armd Regt 

AAR, I I Jul 43; 3d lnf Div in Sicilian Campaign AAR, p. I I; 39th FA Bn AAR, I I Jul 43; 

9th FA Bn AAR, II Jul 43; Donald G. Taggart, 

ed .• History of the Third Infantry Division in 

World War 11 (Washington, 1947), pp. 56-57. 

In the final push on Campobello, 1St Lt. 

Robert Craig, Company L, 15th Infantry, singlehandedly knoeked out two enemy machine gun 

positions, killing eight Germans and wounding 

three others before he, himself, was killed. 

Lieutenant Craig was posthumously awarded the 

Medal of Honor. 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

That day also, the 3d Battalion, 30th 

Infantry, marched over fourteen miles of 

rugged mountains, overcoming scattered 

enemy resistance, and occupied Riesi. 

After making physical contact with the 1St 

Division on its right, the 3d Division at 

nightfall on I I July-a day ahead of 

time-was in possession of its invasion 

objectives. With the Yellow Line now 

extended to Palma di Montechiaro, 

Naro, and Campobello, the divi .. ion front 

formed a broad semicircle from Palma on 

the west to Poggio Lungo on the east. 

Now that he had carried out the order 

to gain the YeHow Line so as to protect 

the army group left flank, General Truscott had no further mission. Nor had 

General Patton been instructed on how 

to develop the situation beyond the Yellow Line. General Alexander had been 

less than explicit in his instructions-the 

Seventh Army was "to prevent enemy 

reserves moving eastwards against the left 

flank of Eighth Army." 19 

Unwilling to sit still, Truscott ordered 

General Rose to reconnoiter toward Canicattl during the evening of I I July as the 

prelude to a possible attack the next day. 

Since Caltanissetta and Enna appeared 

to be logical objectives, Truscott decided 

to seize Canicatti as a necessary preliminary first step.20 

At Casa San Silvestro, General Schreiber's hasty development of new defensive 

positions was interrupted at 1800 when 

an Allied bombing attack on Canicattl 

severely damaged the town and railroad 

station and produced heavy casualties in 

the Italian infantry battalion that had retired from Favarotta earlier that day. 

19 15th AG Opns Inst I, 19 May 43; Truscott, 

Command Missions, pp. 214-15. 

20 COHQ Bull Y/I, Oct 43, p. 26; Truscott, 

Command Missions, p. 215. 

197 

Not long afterwards, Schreiber received 

word from the XII Corps. He was to 

counterattack the next morning with several new units being sent to him-an 

infantry battalion from the Assietta Division, an infantry battalion and an antitank gun company from the Aosta Division, and two Italian artillery battalions. 

Apprehensive over the developments in 

the Licata sector, Guzzoni apparently 

hoped that Schreiber's counterattack on 

12 July would not only delay further 

American advances inland but would 

also block the major avenues of approach 

into central Sicily.21 

At 2000, [I July, Col. Fritz FuHriede 

reported in to General Schreiber as the 

commander of all German troops in the 

area and placed himself and his units under the Italian general's tactical leadership.22 Fullriede reported American tanks 

had driven through to points west of 

Canicatti, thus threatening to cut off 

German and Italian units south of that 

town. Fullriede told General Schreiber 

that he had assembled the bulk of his 

German force north of Canicatti, leaving detachments at Sommatino and Delia, 

small towns to the east of Canicatti, to 

cover his flanks. He urged the Italian 

commander to do the same with the Italian units. Fullriede also stated that he 

had received instructions from Sixth Army 

headquarters to switch to the defensive in 

the Canicatti area and to await the arrival of additional German units. 

What then of Schreiber's counterattack? 

Several telephone calls to X II Corps and 

to Sixth Army cleared up the confusion. 

Guzzoni had changed his mind. On I 2 

n Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 155. 

22 Ibid.; IT gga, Sitrep, 2000, II Jul 43. 

There is no confirmation of this In German 

sources. 
198 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

CANICATTI BEING SHELLED by GGA supporting armored field artillery. 

July, Schreiber was to limit his actions to 

local thrusts only, those that would not 

seriously deplete manpower and material. 

In view of his amended orders, General 

Schreiber decided to withdraw his units 

during the night to positions north of 

Canicatti and behind Group Fullriede's 

lines. American patrols hung on tenaciously to the withdrawing Italians; one 

Italian artillery battery, unable to fall 

back quickly enough, blew up its I05-mm. 

guns and surrendered.23 

The leading elements of Group Ens 

were by then arriving at Pietraperzia. 

Col. Karl Ens was slightly wounded when 

Allied aircraft bombed General Rodt's 

headquarters, but he continued in command of his battle group. He ordered 

one battalion to a position just south of 

Pietraperzia, its counterattack through 

Riesi called off because the 3d Division 

occupied the town; a second battalion to 

Barrafranca; and the third to Piazza 

Armerina, to gain contact with the H er23 Faldella, La sbarca, pp. 155-56. 

mann Goering Division which was known 

to be somewhere off to the east.24 

The Herman Goering Division was in the 

precarious position of operating with a gap 

in its center. Between its left flank and 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier right was 

another gap, this one covered by the 

Livorno Division. But the combat efficiency of the Livorno Division was near 

zero. If the Italians could not, as seemed 

likely, prevent the Allies from breaking 

through to Highway 124, the Germans 

would suffer disastrous consequences. 

General Keyes, the Seventh Army deputy commander, visited General Truscott 

on the morning of 12 July. Though 

Keyes had no information on further 

missions for the division, he agreed with 

Truscott that Canicatti should be seized 

as a prelude to further advances into 

central Sicily. At Canicatti Highway 123 

from Licata met Highway 122 from 

Agrigento, the latter continuing north to 

24 MS #C-077 (Rodt) and sketch ; MS # 

C-095 (Senger) ; OB SUED, Meldungen, 12 

Jul 43· 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

Caltanissetta. Except for the mountain 

pass at Naro, the secondary road northeast to Canicattl. was a valley thoroughfare practicable for mechanized forces. 

The road went through the pass ( occupied by CCA late on I I July) and 

emerged on a plain in front of Canicatti. 

East from Canicatti a good secondary 

road ran to Delia, Sommatino, and Riesi, 

the base of the secondary road net in the 

upper part of the Licata-Agrigento-Canicatti triangle. Quite certain that General 

Patton would approve, Keyes told Truscott to go ahead and take Canicatti. 25 

Truscott immediately telephoned General Rose to get CCA moving on Canicatti.26 At the same time, he ordered 

the 30th Infantry to move to Naro, leaving its 3d Battalion in Riesi. He notified 

the 15th Infantry to move forward on 

the right of the armored command to 

seize Delia and Sommatino and then 

swing to the west to aid the armor in 

taking Canicattl. The 7th Infantry was 

to guard the division left flank. After 

taking Canicatti, General Truscott planned 

to place eCA in division reserve as a 

mobile force for exploitation north or 

west.27 

Preceded by a five-minute preparation 

from the two supporting armored field 

artillery battalions, CCA jumped off at 

1330, 12 July, through the pass and down 

the road toward the southern outskirts of 

Canicatti. A tank-infantry team (with 

infantry on the tanks) leading the advance was still some distance from the 

town when observers saw a white flag 

flying over one of the buildings. Colonel 

Hinds and another officer jumped into a 

jeep and drove toward town to accept the 

25 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 2IS. 

26 GGA S-3 Jnl, entry 19, 12 Jul 43. 

27 3d Inf Div FO 7, 12 Jul 43. 

199 

surrender. Hardly had Hinds started 

forward when enemy artillery fire from 

high ground north of Canicatti began to 

pattern the road. At that moment, Hinds 

noted that the white flag was actually a 

Red Cross flag on top of a hospital. By 

then white sheets, towels, and other signs 

of surrender began to appear. Taking 

no more chances, Hinds deployed his 

force on both sides of the road and called 

in the supporting artillery. 

The 14th and 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalions obliged. For thirty 

minutes the two artillery units methodically worked over the town from end to 

end, shifting their fires periodically to 

batter the German positions in the hills 

north of town.28 As the last artillery 

rounds were being fired, a company of 

tanks roared down the road and into 

town. There was no opposition. Canicatti was secured at 1500. 

Scarcely pausing, the company of tanks 

drove out the northern exit from town and 

ran into Colonel Fullriede's main battle 

pOSItIon. After expending all its ammunition and losing one tank, the company 

pulled back to town to await reinforcements. A tank-infantry team swung to 

the right and secured the eastern edge of 

a ridge line a mile north of town. Though 

the Germans fought stubbornly, they 

were driven off the ridge line by 2000. 

By darkness, CCA had Canicatti, but 

Group Fullriede held the bulk of the hill 

mass northwest of the town. 

The enemy was in poor shape, however. 

American counterbattery fire had destroyed most of the supporting Italian 

artillery. The German battalion holding 

28 The 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

fired a total of 1,862 rounds during the day, most 

of them at this time. The 62d Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion fired a total of 627 rounds. 
200 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the ridge line had been severely mauled. 

Other small German detachments east of 

Canicattl-on the road to Delia and Sommatino-suffered heavy losses from American tank-infantry teams that overran 

their positions. Deeming his forces too 

small to hold longer, Colonel Fullriede, 

with General Schreiber's approval, pulled 

back that evening to a new line along the 

railroad running from Serradifalco to San 

Cataldo.29 

The 15th Infantry had contributed to 

Fullriede's decision. It moved smartly 

and by dark of 12 July had both Delia 

and Sommatino, although the former 

would not be entirely secure until the 

following morning. Here, the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, had quite a stiff fight 

with part of the Group Ens battalion 

which had gone into position earlier in 

the day. With the entire important 

secondary east-west road from Canicattl 

east to Riesi in 3d Division hands, General Truscott again faced the problem of 

what to do. The 7th Infantry was patrolling vigorously westward toward Agrigento; the 30th Infantry closed in N aro 

and prepared to relieve CCA at Canicattl; 

the 15th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion, 

30th Infantry, at Riesi, lay along the 

secondary road running east from Canicattl. Truscott could go either west 

against Agrigento or north toward Enna. 

Canicattl had been taken with General 

Keyes' approval, but to go any further 

29 4 1st Armd Inf Regt AAR, 12 Jul 43; 66th 

Armd Regt AAR, 12 J ul 43; overlay of opns, 

eGA, 10-18 Jul 43; GGA S-3 Jnl, 12 Jul 43; 

14th Armd FA Bn AAR, 12 Jul 43; 62d Armd 

FA Bn AAR, 12 Jul 43; Falde\1a, Lo shareo, 

pp. 179-80; OB SUED, Meldungen, 13 Jul 43, 

Third Report and Fourth Report; 14 Jul 43, 

Third Report. 

would require, Truscott thought, a nod 

from General Patton himself. To go 

ahead and take Caltanissetta and Enna, 

Truscott would need at least one more 

regimental combat team to guard his 

lengthy western flank. His front was 

almost fifty miles long, and both flanks 

were open. Though patrols had traversed with relative ease the area between 

Riesi and Butera, the area was far from 

secure. Less than two miles east of Riesi 

lay a strong enemy roadblock, and no one 

knew for certain how many other such 

positions were in the general area. Until 

the I st Division on the right moved up 

from Ponte Olivo, Truscott would have 

to classify the area as uncertain, though 

not particularly dangerous. Truscott 

would also need a stronger reserve, 

stronger than the 3d Ranger Battalion, 

which for two days had been the only 

uncommitted unit. 

General Keyes, who had spent the day 

with General Truscott observing the capture of Canicattl, phoned General Patton 

that evening. He reported the successful 

attack and stated that the situation was 

favorable for a prompt operation against 

either Agrigento or Caltanissetta. But, 

concluded General Keyes, "Neither will 

be instituted tomorrow without your 

instruction." 30 

General Patton could give no instruction because he had none from General 

Alexander. And the 15th Army Group 

commander was primarily concerned with 

protecting the British Eighth Army left 

flank. With continued reports from pilots 

on sizable enemy movements from west to 

east, Alexander remained apprehensive 

over the possibility of a massive enemy 

30 Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entry 13, 13 Jul 43. 
THE BEACHHEAD SECURE 

counterattack.31 And thus he was not 

anxious to move the 3d Division, which 

provided a solid block on the army group 

left. 

Still, Keyes was loath to leave the 3d 

Division completely sedentary. Before 

leaving Truscott's headquarters, he verb31 General Alexander feared that the road 

complex in central Sicily would be used by the 

Germans to launch an attack against the Eighth 

Army. Until the day the Seventh Army captured Palermo, Alexander continued to be worried about this possibility. Alexander Despatch, 

pp. 12,24; 15th AGp Radios J,P, 13 Jul 47; 184, 

16 Jul 43; and 0165, 18 Jul 43, all quoted in 

Seventh Army Rpt of Opns. These are indicative of Alexander's concern for Eighth Army's 

left flank. See also, Interv, Smyth with Lt Gen 

Lucian K. Truscott (Ret.) and Maj Gen William W. Eagles, 19 Apr 5 I. 

201 

ally approved a reconnaissance in force 

in battalion strength toward Agrigento. 

At the same time, the division was to 

gain the heights northwest of Canicatti 

and eliminate the troublesome enemy roadblock southeast of Riesi. Beyond this, 

Keyes would not go, though on the following afternoon, apparently after consulting with General Patton, Keyes restated 

his approval in writing.32 

These small movements were to develop in a surprIsmg fashion. They 

would help General Alexander make up 

his mind on how to use the Seventh Army 

in Sicily. 

32 Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entry 36, 14 Jul 43 

(memo dated 13 July but filed one day later). 
CHAPTER XI 

Continuing the Campaign: The Decisions 

Sixth Army and OB SUED 

At Sixth Army headquarters in Enna, 

it was clear by the morning of 12 July 

that the period of counterattacks against 

the various Allied beachheads had ended. 

Until further decisions were made at 

higher levels in Rome and Berlin on 

whether or not to reinforce the island's 

defenders, Sixth Army had no choice but 

to go over to the defensive.1 

Lacking the manpower to erect a solid 

line around the Allied beachheads, General Guzzoni planned to shorten his 

front to a line across the northeastern 

corner of Sicily-from the east coast south 

of the Catania plain to Santo Stefano di 

Camastra on the north coast. He planned 

to withdraw slowly the forces in contact 

with the British and Americans to the 

eastern end of this line-from Catania to 

Nicosia-while the forces in the west 

moved to the sector of the line running 

between Nicosia and the north coast. 

Seeing this as a final defense line, Guzzoni 

planned to pull the units back first to 

intermediate defensive positions, along a 

line from Priolo on the east coast, through 

Melilli, Vizzini, Caltagirone, Canicatti, 

to Agrigento on the southwestern coast. 

1 Faldella, Lo sbaTco, p. 163. Maravigna, 

Rivista MilitaTe, 1952, p. 21, and Maravigna, "La 

conquista della Sicilia (Luglio - Agosto 1943)," 

Rivista MilitaTe, vol. VIII, No. 7 (Rome, July 

1952), pp. 793-812. 

After temporarily delaying the Allied advance from the southeastern corner of the 

island, Guzzoni would fight a delaying 

action while falling back to the CataniaSanto Stefano line. But if this line was 

breached, Guzzoni intended to establish 

a third defensive line-a final battIe line 

that was to be held at all costs. Guzzoni 

did not immediately determine the location of this third line, except that he 

wanted it anchored on the east coast 

south of the Catania plain.2 

Guzzoni realized that the success of this 

withdrawal maneuver depended on preventing an Allied breakthrough at the 

eastern hinge: Catania. This was the 

critical spot. This was the reasoning behind the order of I I July that had directed 

the bulk of the Hermann Goering Division to disengage and move northeast, first 

to the new intermediate defensive line, 

then to the southern edge of the Catania 

plain. The Livorno Division was also to 

fall back to this new line, screening the 

area between the Hermann Goering Division on the east and the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division on the west. For the 

Italian division, this meant a withdrawal 

of fifteen miles, from Mazzarino (where 

contact with the German Group Ens was 

to be made) east to San Michele di Ganzeria ( on Highway 124 northwest of 

Caltagirone), where contact with the H er2 FaldelIa, Lo sbaTco, pp. 163, 185-87, 304-06. 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 203 

mann Goering Division was to be made. 

With part of the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division even then nearing Mazzarino, 

Guzzoni hoped the Livorno Division would 

be strong enough to block any American 

penetration into the important network of 

roads near Enna. But his entire plan 

relied on transferring the bulk of the 

Hermann Goering Division quickly to the 

northeast. 3 

While Guzzoni was making his tactical 

arrangements, higher headquarters in 

Italy and Germany were following the 

campaign closely. In Germany OKW, 

after Pantelleria, had modified its views 

that the Allies were preparing a twin 

invasion of Sardinia and Greece. But as 

late as 9 July, OKW still considered that 

the Allies were preparing an invasion of 

Greece, with the first step being the occupation of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. 

OKW had considered that an Allied landing in Calabria might take place in conjunction with the landing in Sicily, but 

that a subsequent Allied landing on the 

Italian mainland was far less probable 

than the use of Sicily (or Sicily and Calabria) as a springboard for a jump to 

the Peloponnesus. 

On the basis of this appreciation, OKW 

on 9 July had directed Kesselring to move 

the German 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to the area north of Cosenza 

(ninety miles north-northeast of Reggio 

di Calabria); to shift the German 26th 

Panzer Division to an area east of Salerno; 

and to retain the German 16th Panzer 

Division near Bari, on the Adriatic Sea. 

Under the XIV Panzer Corps, the Ger3 Ibid., pp. 159-60, 187-88; IT 99a, 12 Jul 

43; OKH, Tagesmeldungen West, rpt for 12 Jul 

43; MS # R-I 40, Withdrawal, First Phase, 12-

16 July 1943, ch. XI of Axis Tactical Operations 

in Sicily, July-August 1943 (Bauer), pp. 1-10. 

man units were to co-operate with the 

Italian Seventh Army in opposing an Allied landing in southern Italy. With one 

jaundiced eye directed at Mussolini's unstable control of Italy, OKW retained the 

German 3d Panzer Grenadier Division 

and LXXVI Corps headquarters north 

of Rome. On Hitler's order, OKW 

alerted the German 1st Parachute Division, stationed near Avignon in southern 

France, for possible air movement to 

Sicily.4 

The first reports of the fighting in 

Sicily did not give Hitler or the OKW a 

clear picture of the situation. Kesselring 

reported during the evening of 10 July 

that he had issued orders to General von 

Senger directing the bulk of the Hermann 

Goering Division to destroy the American 

forces advancing toward Caltagirone and 

Group Schmalz to counterattack immediately and recapture Syracuse.5 

With a better grasp of the situation on 

II July, Hitler decided to reinforce the 

German units in Sicily. Specifically, Kesselring was to transport the 1st Parachute 

Division by air to Sicily; transfer the 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division to that 

island; and, upon commitment of the latter division, shift the headquarters of the 

XIV Panzer Corps to Sicily in order to 

give unified direction to all the German 

units there.6 

Kesselring, too, by II July, had a 

much better appreciation of the strength 

which the Americans and British had 

landed on the loth, and he also realized 

that his plan to throw the invading Allied forces back into the sea had failed. 

He believed that he had an accurate 

view of the developments on the island 

40KW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-3I,VIl.43, 9 Jul 43. 

50B SUED, Meldungen, 10 Jul 43. 

6 OKW /WFSt, KTB, 1.-31. VIl.43, I I Jul 43. 
204 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

from reports furnished him by the German Second Air Force. He attributed 

the failure of the Axis counterattacks 

chiefly to what he considered was Guzzoni's delay in ordering the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division back to the central 

part of the island and to General Conrath's slowness in counterattacking at 

Gela early on the morning of IO July.7 

Kesselring flew to Sicily on 12 July 

to see the situation at firsthand. At 

Sixth Army headquarters, Guzzoni and 

Senger were pessimistic about repelling 

the Allied invasion, and Kesselring had to 

agree. Resuming the offensive would 

have to await the arrival of reinforcements. Guzzoni doubted that he could 

hold all of Sicily. His main concern 

was no longer defending the entire island, 

but holding eastern Sicily until help arrived. Then a new counteroffensive could 

be started. He felt that his immediate 

tasks were to prevent any Allied breakthroughs into the interior of the island, 

and to consolidate all Axis forces then on 

Sicily in one strong battle position forward of Mount Etna. 

Kesselring shared Guzzoni's doubts on 

the ultimate outcome of the battle of 

Sicily. But he also felt that the Allies 

had not yet gained a free hand on the 

island. Strong and immediate countermeasures might delay the Allies Indefinitely. 

The prospective arrival of the ISt Parachute and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions brought mixed feelings to Guzzoni 

and Senger. Both feared that the ad7 MS # T -2 K I (Kesselring) , pp. 19-2 I. 

Kesselring was wrong in his assumption that Guzzoni was slow in ordering the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to retrace its steps. Guzzoni had 

issued this order on 10 July, a quick decision considering the limited amount of information avail· 

able as to Allied intentions. 

ditional troops would accentuate an already serious strain on transportation and 

supply lines. Moreover, Senger privately 

opposed the introduction of more German 

forces into Sicily because he was convinced that the best course of action was 

an immediate evacuation from the island. 

Accompanied by Senger, Kesselring 

flew to the Catania airfield, where he met 

with Colonel Schmalz. Pleased with the 

steady and sure leadership demonstrated 

by Schmalz, Kesselring assured Schmalz 

that reinforcements were on the way. 

The 3d Regiment, ISt Parachute Division, 

was en route and would be placed immediately at Schmalz's disposal. 

Like Guzzoni, Kesselring believed that 

the Axis might, at best, establish a tenable position across the northeastern neck 

of the island. But even this, Kesselring 

believed, required a strong directing headquarters such as the XIV Panzer Corps, 

reinforcement by at least one additional 

German division, and great improvement 

in the system of tactical communications. 

About 1800, while Kesselring waited to 

take off for Frascati, the three infantry 

battalions of the 3d Regiment, 1st Parachute Division, flew in under fighter plane 

escort and dropped near the Catania airfield. The successful execution of this 

operation convinced Kesselring that more 

paratroopers could be brought safely to 

Sicily by air.s 

As Kesselring departed the Catania airfield, the three paratrooper rifle battalions 

loaded on trucks and moved into line to 

reinforce Group Schmalz, two battalions 

8 MS #T-'.1 K 1 (Kesselring); MS #C-095 

(Senger); OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VII.43, 13 

Jul 43; Msg., Mil Attache Rome to Gen StdH., 

Au. Abt., 13 Jul 43, OKW /Amtsgruppe Ausland, 30. VI.43-3 I. VIII.44, Wehrmachtsattache 

Italien (OKW 10'.19). 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 205 

south of Lentini, between the coastal 

highway and the coast line, the third 

battalion to Francofonte, a crucial point 

for the link-up with the main body of 

the Hermann Goering Division. 

General Conrath had executed only 

minor withdrawals during the night of I I 

July when General Guzzoni ordered him 

early on 12 July to hurry his withdrawal to the Caltagirone-Vizzini-Palazzolo 

Acreide area. Still, Conrath did not appear in any rush to conform. While the 

Hermann Goering Division fought near 

Niscemi and Biscari, Guzzoni repeated his 

order-Conrath was to disengage from 

the Gela sector and move back as quickly 

as possible to Highway 124. General von 

Senger confirmed and amplified this order 

in two radio messages dispatched before 

noon, directing Conrath to make contact 

at Palazzolo Acreide with the Napoli Division and Group Schmalz, while the 

Livorno Division covered his western flank. 

Planning to wait until nightfall to pull 

his major units out of line, Conrath 

started his reconnaissance battalion back 

during the afternoon. After encountering the 179th Infantry north of Comiso, 

the battalion reached Vizzini during the 

late afternoon of 12 July. There it was 

reinforced by an infantry replacement 

battalion.9 

At 2140, 12 July, General von Senger 

dispatched another radiogram to Conrath 

instructing him to speed up his withdrawal to the Caltagirone line (Highway 

9 See OB SUED, Meldungen, 13 Jul 43, First 

Report; MS #C-095 (Senger); MS #R-138 

(Bauer), p. II; MS #R-140 (Bauer), pp. 24-

25. Conrath's reconnaissance battalion was reinforced by elements of an infantry regiment, probably the 382d; this regiment had been on Sicily 

for some time, had been attached to the 15th 

Panzer Grenadier Division until I July, and subsequently, while stationed at Regalbuto, to the 

Hermann Goering Division. 

124). The division's slow movement was 

causing apprehension at Sixth Army headquarters, for the division was needed not 

only to strengthen the eastern wing but 

also to stop the American and British 

thrusts northward from Comiso and 

Ragusa. Just before midnight, Sixth 

Army ordered General Conrath to attack 

from Vizzini toward Palazzolo Acreide 

the following day. But by the morning 

of 13 July, the division was still south of 

Caltagirone, along a line running from 

Vizzini on the east almost to Highway I I7 

on the west. 10 

To top off an extremely trying day for 

Sixth Army, the headquarters at Enna 

received a heavy Allied bombing attack 

late in the evening, making a transfer to 

Passo Pisciaro, east of Randazzo, imperative. The transfer was completed late 

the next dayY 

The Allied Problem: How to Continue 

Even as the Axis commanders sought 

ways and means of slowing up the Allied 

advances, General Patton, late on the 

afternoon of 12 July, moved his headquarters ashore. He opened the first 

Seventh Army command post on Sicily at 

the eastern edge of Gela "in a very handsome mansion, abandoned in a hurry by 

the prominent owner, a doctor and fascist apparently, who lived there . . . in 

a spot which was apparently a Roman 

villa or something." 12 Optimism pervaded the army headquarters. Despite 

the Hermann Goering Division's resistance 

to the 16th Infantry's advance on Niscemi, and German opposition along part of 

10 MS #R-140 (Bauer), pp. 30-31. 

11 Faldella, Lo sbareo, p. 191; MS #C-095 

(Senger) . 

12 Lucas Diary, pt. I, pp. 58-59. 
206 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the 45th Division's front, General Patton 

and General Bradley were aware of the 

indications of Axis withdrawal from the 

1st Division's front. Reports from both 

the 16th and 26th RCT's during the 

night were cheering. The 45th Division 

seemed to be encountering no more than 

delaying forces in its push to the Yellow 

Line. And General Keyes returned from 

the 3d Division's area with a very satisfactory report. All in all, General Patton 

was happy with the performance of the 

Seventh Army units. A number of distinguished visitors that day had been most 

complimentary. Admiral Lord Louis 

Mountbatten, the chief of the Combined 

Operations Headquarters, was greatly 

impressed by the operation in the II 

Corps zone. General Eisenhower, though 

pleased with the extent of the beachhead, 

was unhappy with what he considered 

General Patton's failure to get news of 

the Seventh Army's operations back to 

AFHQ promptly. "Ike ... stepped on 

him hard." 13 

Determined to keep the Seventh Army 

moving aggressively, General Patton directed the II Corps to continue its movement inland to seize its portion of the 

Yellow Line-from Mazzarino on the west 

to Grammichele on the east. He approved Keyes' instructions to the 3d Division for a reconnaissance toward Agrigento, the seizure of Canicattl., and the 

reduction of the roadblock southeast of 

Riesi. Without General Alexander's approval, General Patton felt that he could 

not tell Truscott to exploit toward Cal13 Ibid. pt. I, p. 64; OPD 201 Wedemeyer, 

A. C., Security, case 5; Butcher, My Three Years 

With Eisenhower, p. 360. CE. Morrison, SicilySalerno-Anzio, p. 123 and 123n. 

Lucas states, "I didn't hear what he [Eisenhower J said but he must have given Patton hell 

because Georgie was much upset." 

tanissetta and Enna, or toward Agrigento 

and the western part of the islandY 

General Bradley's two divisions moved 

quickly on 13 July. (Map VI) The 

1st Division, with the 18th RCT returning 

to its control, entered Niscemi at 1000, 

advanced six miles north of Ponte Olivo 

airfield to seize two important hill masses 

astride Highway I 17, and sent a third 

column seven miles northwest of Ponte 

Olivo to seize two other hill masses 

astride the Ponte Olivo-Mazzarino road. 

These advances were opposed only by 

long-range sniper and artillery fire. 

The 45th Division, in contrast, met 

with an unexpected complication. Late 

in the evening of I 2 July, General Middleton sent word to his combat team commanders to continue driving toward 

Highway 124, the Yellow Line, by leapfrogging battalions forward and maintaining constant watchfulness to the flanks. 

On the left the 180th RCT was to cross 

the Acate River, secure the Biscari airfield, 

then push north toward Caltagirone. 

In the center, the I79th RCT was to 

push to Highway 124 in the vicinity of 

Grammichele. On the right, the 15 7th 

RCT was to drive northeast to Monterosso 

Almo, then swing northwest to take 

Licodia Eubea, almost on the highway. 

Because the 15 7th would be operating in 

part across the army boundary and in 

the British zone, Middleton warned Colonel Ankcorn to maintain careful liaison 

with the I st Canadian Division on his 

right. 

Unknown to General Middleton, as well 

as to Generals Patton and Bradley, General Montgomery, the Eighth Army commander, had decided that Highway 124 

14 Seventh Army Directive, 13 Jul 43, Seventh 

Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-6. 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 207 

west of Vizzini (the Seventh Army's Yellow Line) belonged to him. Though the 

original invasion plan reserved the highway to the Americans, Montgomery 

halted the I st Canadian Division at the 

small town of Giarratana and directed 

General Leese to use the rest of his 30 

Corps in a drive on Caltagirone, Enna, 

and Leonforte. While the 30 Corps thus 

moved directly across the Seventh Army 

front, the 13 Corps was to continue to 

try to break through into the Catania 

plain. The Eighth Army would then 

advance on Messina on two widely separated axes: one up the coastal road on 

the east, the other into the interior 

through Enna, Leonforte, on to Nicosia, 

Troina, and Randazzo, in a swing around 

the western side of Mount Etna. The 

13 Corps was to make the Eighth Army's 

main effort. A second airborne drop 

was to seize the Primosole bridge over the 

Simeto River and a Commando landing 

was to capture the Lentini bridge. The 

operation was to start on the evening of 

13 July. Without General Alexander's 

approval, Montgomery ordered his units 

to start the operation. 15 

15 General Montgomery knew of Seventh 

Army's plan to take Highway [24, since this was 

part of the original plan for the invasion of the 

island. But apparently General Montgomery 

felt that American operations should be restricted 

to the Caltanissetta-Canicatti-Agrigento area, 

while the Eighth Army made the main effort 

against Messina (Montgomery, Eighth Army, 

page 99). The fact that Montgomery had not 

yet secured Alexander's approval to his new plan 

is indicated in a message which the 30 Corps 

commander sent to the [st Canadian Division on 

[3 July: "45 U.S. Div now on general line Chiaramonte-Biscari. Information received they intend to send one brigade Vizzini, two brigades 

Caltagirone tomorrow [4 July. Army Comd 

rapidly attempting to direct them more to west 

to avoid clash with you, but in case NOT retire 

from accordingly. Warn all concerned." Quoted 

in Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 87n. 

General Montgomery's new plan gave 

to the British Eighth Army the use of all 

the roads leading to Messina. There 

were only four roads on the entire island 

leading toward the important port city, 

and of the four, only two went all the 

way. The first was the east coast highway, on which Montgomery had his 13 

Corps. The other through road was the 

north coast highway. Two roads to Messina were inland routes that ran toward 

Messina from Enna. The southernmost 

of these ran along the rim of Mount Etna; 

the other, some fifteen miles south of the 

north coast road, passed through Nicosia 

and Troina. Both the inner roads converged at Randazzo, on the Messina side 

of Mount Etna, where one road headed 

for the east coast road, and the other ran 

toward Messina. Montgomery's specified 

axis of advance for the 30 Corps, if carried through to the north coast, would 

give that corps the possession of the fourth 

one. The assignment of these roads 

would effectively restrict the Seventh 

Army's activities to the southwestern part 

of the island. 

In keeping with the Eighth Army 

directive, General Leese, commander of 

the 30 Corps, directed the British 23d 

Armored Brigade to seize Vizzini during 

daylight of 13 July, Caltagirone during 

the evening of the same day. The British 51st Highland Infantry Division was to 

follow the armored brigade to secure Vizzini, and drive on the town of Scordia to 

protect the corps' north flank. The 1st 

Canadian Division was to remain near 

Giarratana. 16 

Thus, when daylight came on 13 July, 

American and British units were heading 

toward the same objectives. Pushing out 

16 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 88. 
208 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

of Biscari m difficult terrain, along a 

single, narrow, secondary road effectively 

blocked by the Germans, facing strong 

delaying forces of the Hermann Goering 

Division, the 180th RCT did not get 

across the Acate River until late in the 

afternoon and then pushed only a little 

way farther on before being stopped 

again at the narrow Ficuzza River. 

Though the Ficuzza was no more than a 

small stream, both banks were precipitous, 

and the Germans had destroyed the bridge 

and blocked the narrow road which 

wound down to the crossing site.l1 

On the 179th RCT front, the regiment 

quickly abandoned the leapfrogging procedure and advanced on a wide front, 

battalions abreast. Detachments from 

the Hermann Goering Division fought 

stubborn rear guard actions while withdrawing toward Highway 124. Often 

the leading battalions were delayed by a 

few German troops supported by one or 

two armored vehicles left on critical terrain features. To dislodge even these 

small units, the battalions either had to 

deploy or wait for the flank security 

elements to catch up and flush out the 

Germans. In one or two cases, the Germans, from positions on especially good 

terrain features, counterattacked sharply 

before withdrawing to the next hill. The 

supporting American tanks proved of little 

use in the rugged terrain, but the I 60th 

Field Artillery Battalion, a platoon of 

4.2-inch mortars, and a platoon of selfpropelled howitzers from the regimental 

Cannon Company performed yeoman 

service in aiding the infantry's advance. 

By late afternoon, the 3d Battalion, I79th 

17 Infantry Combat, pt. v: Sicily, pp. I, 3-

4; 180th InC Regt AAR, 13 Jul 43; McLain MS, 

Sicily Campaign, pp. 14-15; 45th Inf Div G3 Jnl, entries 13, 22, 30, 44, 57, 13 Jul 43. 

Infantry, entered the small village of 

Granieri, about five miles south of Highway 124. By this time, too, the advance 

on a wide front had been discarded in 

favor of a column formation. Because 

civilians indicated that the Germans had 

a large armored force (an estimated 500 

men and 35 tanks) deployed in an olive 

grove about three miles north of Granieri, 

the 3d Battalion commander pushed his 

men to gain the high ground just north 

of the village. It took a night attack to 

accomplish this, but by 2300 the 3d Battalion was in position on the hill mass 

astride the narrow dirt road it had been 

following all day. The remainder of the 

combat team closed in near the village. 

On the right Monterosso Alma fell to 

the 1St Battalion, 157th Infantry, at noon. 

A further advance by the battalion of almost three miles toward Vizzini was 

registered before increasing German resistance called a halt to the day's activities. 

Licodia Eubea fell late in the afternoon 

to the 3d Battalion, 15 7th Infantry, but 

not before the battalion lost twenty men 

killed and forty wounded. Across its 

front, the 15 7th RCT stood less than 

three miles from the Yellow Line. 

Just before the news of the seizure of 

Licodia Eubea reached the combat team's 

command post at Monterosso Almo, Colonel Ankcorn received an inkling of the 

Eighth Army's new plan of action. 

Shortly after 1700, the leading elements 

of the 5 I st Highland Division began to 

arrive at Monterosso Alma. Surprised, 

Ankcorn learned that the Highlanders 

were on their way to take Vizzini. The 

23d Armored Brigade, advancing northeastward from Palazzolo Acreide, had run 

head on into the Hermann Goering Division (going the opposite way) and had 

been stopped by fierce resistance from 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 209 

Germans and Italians (the remnants of 

the Napoli Division) east of Vizzini. The 

Highlanders had been committed to the 

south of Vizzini to clear the town for 

the armored brigade. Colonel Ankcorn 

had been told of the armored brigade's 

move on Vizzini, but since he had neither 

seen nor heard anything from that column, he had continued his attack on 

Vizzini. Now it appeared to Colonel 

Ankcorn that the British were to take 

Vizzini after which the Eighth Army 

would swing northward along the army 

boundary. But as far as the 15 7th Combat Team commander was concerned, the 

rest of the highway was in the Seventh 

Army's area and that part of the highway west of Vizzini was still his objective. 

Nevertheless, he radioed General Middleton news of the latest British movements. IS 

The news from the 157th Combat 

Team's front neat Vizzini must have 

created some r:onfusion at Seventh Army's 

command post late in the afternoon of 13 

July. General Alexander had visited 

General Patton that very morning. Patton asked for approval to take Agrigento 

and Porto Empedocle, the ports which 

he felt would be needed to continue the 

logistical support of Seventh Army. The 

army group commander did not disapprove the request, but he did not want 

the Seventh Army to get entangled in a 

fight which might interfere with its primary mission: the protection of the Eighth 

Army's left flank. Accordingly, he told 

General Patton that the Seventh Army 

could take Agrigento and Porto Empedocle provided this could be done by re18 157th Inf Regt AAR 13 Jul 43; 157th Inf 

Regt S-I Jnl, 13 Jul 43; 158th FA Bn AAR, 

13 Jul 43; Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 

pp. 85, 88; Montgomery, Eighth Army, pp. 99, 

101. 

connaissance troops and provided the 

operation did not cost too much in manpower or material. Nothing was said 

about any change in the boundary between 

the Seventh and Eighth Armies. Nothing 

was said about the assignment of Highway 

124 to the British.19 

Just before midnight, any confusion 

that may have existed was cleared up 

when General Alexander radioed the 

following directive to the Seventh Army: 

Operations for the immediate future will 

be Eighth Army to advance on two axes, 

one to capture the port of Catania and the 

group of airfields there and the other to 

secure the network of road communications 

within the area Leonforte-Enna. Seventh 

Army will conform by pivoting on Palma di Montechiaro-Canicaui -Caltanissetta 

-gaining touch with Eighth Army at road 

junction HOW 1979 [the junction of Highways 117 and 122 southwest of Enna]. 

Boundary between Seventh and Eighth 

Armies, road Vizzini-Caltagirone-Piazza Armerina-Road Junction HOW 1979-Enna, 

all inclusive to Eighth Army. Liaison will 

be carefully arranged between Seventh and 

Eighth Armies for this operation.20 

The directive came as a surprise and a 

distinct disappointment to the Seventh 

Army staff, for the order gave the Americans a passive role in the campaign. 

I,. Lucas Diary, pt. I, p. 64; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 218. Seventh Army's directive of 13 July, which was issued shortly before 

nOon on IS July, and which must have been seen 

by General Alexander, indicates that nothing was 

said about any change in the boundary between 

the two Allied armies. It also indicates that 

General Montgomery must have approached General Alexander with his new proposal after the 

latter returned from visiting the Seventh Army, 

and that the approval to Montgomery's new plan 

was given at the same time. 

20 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-6; Alexander Despatch, app. C-I, p. 84; Seventh Army 

G-S Jnl. entry 4, 14 Jul 43. The message was 

received at 2316, IS July, and posted in the journal at 0145, 14 July 1943. 
210 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Patton's staff had expected to advance to 

the general line Agrigento-Canicatti-Caltanissetta and the II Corps to advance inland along Highway 124. The Americans 

had expected to make the swing around 

the western side of Mount Etna toward 

Messina, while the British Eighth Army 

massed its power for a drive around the 

eastern side. 

But General Patton did not dispute the 

order. On the morning of 14 July he 

called General Bradley to Seventh Army 

headquarters and explained the new directive. It entailed sideslipping the 45th 

Division to the west; giving up Highway 

124; and shifting the II Corps advance 

from north to west. 

General Bradley was keenly disappointed. "This will raise hell with us," 

he exclaimed. "I had counted heavily on 

that road. Now if we've got to shift over, 

it'll slow up our entire advance." The 

II Corps commander asked whether he 

could use Highway 124 at least to move 

the 45th Division to the left of the 1st 

Division in order to maintain the momentum of his advance. The answer was, 

"Sorry, Brad, but the changeover takes 

place immediately. Monty wants the 

road right away." 

After reading General Alexander's directive, Bradley returned it gloomily to 

Patton. He knew that the Germans 

were falling back toward the northeast. 

He felt certain that the Axis commanders 

were pulling back hoping to reassemble 

their forces across the narrow neck of the 

Messina peninsula. The delay encountered in pulling the 45th Division out of 

line and moving it around the rear of the 

I st Division to a new position on the left 

of General Allen's unit would take considerable pressure off the Hermann Goering Division and perhaps enable the 

Germans to recover their balance. To 

General Bradley, it appeared that General 

Montgomery planned to take Messina 

alone, while the Seventh Army confined 

its efforts to the western half of the 

island.21 

Although there had been no prepared 

plan by 15th Army Group for the maneuver of the two armies after the seizure of 

the initial assault objectives, the assault plan 

itself contained by implication the general 

scheme which General Alexander hoped 

to follow. While the Eighth Army thrust 

forward into Catania and then into Messina, the Seventh Army was to protect the 

flank and rear of the main striking force 

because General Alexander was convinced 

that the Eighth Army was better qualified 

for the main task than the Seventh Army.22 

On 13 July, when General Alexander issued his directive to General Patton, he 

felt it necessary to restrain the impetuous 

American commander, to keep the Seventh 

Army doing its primary job, and not to 

endanger the operation by movements 

which might expose the Eighth Army to 

strong Axis counterattacks. Events were 

going according to plan: the Eighth 

Army had secured a firm beachhead and 

was moving on Catania with seeming 

21 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 135-36. 

22 Intervs, Mathews with Alexander, 10-15 Jan 

49, p. 12. 

The views which Alexander entertained of the 

capabilities of American troops were by no means 

unique but were widespread among British officers and officials. See Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 

pp. 58-59, 67-68. 

Alexander's skeptical attitude regarding the 

quality of American troops persisted long after 

the Sicilian Campaign; in fact, it persisted to the 

period when the situation had changed radically, 

when American troops in Italy had to bear the 

brunt of the fighting because of the exhaustion 

of British divisions. See Interv, Smyth and 

Mathews with Marshall, 25 Jul 49, at the Pentagon, p. 20. 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 211 

good speed. The inexperienced American 

divisions could best be nursed along with 

limited assignments which would gradually build up their fighting morale and 

experience. 

In addition to his confidence in the 

Eighth Army and his distrust of American 

troops, General Alexander was most concerned about the network of roads which 

converged in the center of Sicily like the 

spokes of a huge wheel-in the rough 

quadrangle bounded by CaltanissettaSan Caterina-Enna-Valguarnera Caropepe. As long as this network of roads 

remained in enemy hands, General Alexander feared that the Axis might use the 

area to launch a mighty counterattack 

against General Montgomery's left flank. 

It was this concern that led Alexander 

to make sure that his armies held a solid 

front-meaning that the Eighth Army 

would be firmly established on a line from 

Catania to Enna-before pushing the 

campaign any further. 

Seventh Army, General Alexander felt, 

should cover the Eighth Army's left flank 

until the latter had secured the firm line. 

Once that line had been secured, the exploitation phase of the operation could 

begin. It would then be safe to thrust 

out. General Alexander feared that if 

the Seventh Army pushed out prematurely 

all over the western half of the island, the 

enemy might drive in on Eighth Army's 

left flank. This could cause the Allied 

armies on Sicily a serious reverse, if not a 

disaster. Alexander wanted no defeat. 

He wanted to be certain that the Eighth 

Army was in a secure posItIOn before he 

let "Georgie" go and exploit.23 

23Intervs, Mathews with Alexander, 10-15 

Jan 49, pp. I I, 15-16. 

Comando Supremo and OKW 

After telephoning a report of the situation in Sicily to General JodI, Field Marshal Kesselring saw Mussolini on 13 July. 

Kesselring's account of developments on 

the island shocked Mussolini. 

News of the apparently successful 

counterattacks on 10 July had raised Italian hopes and prompted joyful celebrations in Rome. Disappointment was 

therefore greater when, less than two 

days later, the scanty war bulletins spoke 

of "containment" instead of "elimination" 

of the Allied beachheads. Even in those 

military circles where no one had seriously 

expected the coastal defense units to 

put up much more than token opposition, the resistance appeared disappointingly brief. The two mobile divisions, the 

Livorno and Napoli, had shown some 

good fighting qualities, but as soon as 

they had come into range of the Allied 

naval guns, they had halted their attacks 

and retired. The collapse of the naval 

base at Augusta and Syracuse was beyond comprehension. 24 For Mussolini, 

news of the fall of the naval base was the 

more depressing because it reached him 

through German channels and on the 

heels of the first favorable reports from 

Gela. 25 

The unfavorable developments on Sicily 

increased the already serious friction between the Italian and German high com24 MS #R-I39, High Command Decisions, 12 

JulY-IS August 1943, ch. X of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily (Bauer), p. 4. 

25 OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VII.43, 13 Jul 43. 

General von Rintelen, the German Military Attache, brought Mussolini a copy of the message 

received in OKW on 12 July 1943. See Benito 

Mussolini, The Fall of Mussolini, His Own Story, 

translated by Frances Frenaye (New York: Farrar 

Straus, 1948), pp. 37-38. 
212 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

mands. Discussions soon went beyond 

the defense of the island and entered the 

far-reaching problems connected with the 

Italo-German partnership III the war 

effort. 

Examining the situation at the end of 

1:2 July, Comando Supremo determined 

that the coastal defenses had indeed collapsed and that Axis inferiority in naval 

and aerial strength had made it relatively 

easy for the Allies to land additional 

troops faster and in greater numbers than 

the Axis countries could hope to match. 

Since the counterattacks had failed, the 

only effective defense now appeared to be 

to wage unrelenting warfare on the Allied 

sea lanes. But in order to do this, it was 

imperative to increase the Axis air forces 

committed to the defense of Sicily. Since 

Italy had no reserve of planes, Mussolini 

asked Hitler for help. In an appeal to 

the Fuehrer, the Duce pointed out that 

Gemlan planes were needed immediately, 

but only for a short time. Once the crisis 

in Sicily had been overcome, the aircraft 

would again be available for other commitments. If Germany really came to 

Italy's aid and German planes arrived 

promptly, Mussolini saw some hope for 

the defense of Sicily. Otherwise, "if we 

do not throw out the invaders right now, 

it will be too late." 26 

On 14 July, Mussolini continued to find 

the situation on Sicily to be disquieting 

26 Msg 10I7/S to Comando Supremo, 12 Jul 

4'1, IT 99a, an. 15; Msg 5 I 505, Ambrosio to 

Generale di Corpo d' Arma ta Efisio Marras, I talian Military Attache to the B~rlin Embassy, 12 

Jul 43, IT 99a, an. 16; Msg, Comando Supremo 

to Kesselring, 12 Jul 43, IT 99a, an. 17; Translation of Msg, Mussolini to Hitler, sent through 

OKW, in folder OKL, von Rhoden Collection, 

4576/5; OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3IYU.43, 12 

and 13 Jul 43 (quotation in entry 13 Jul 43, 

referring to 12 Jul 43); MS # C-093 , OKW Activities, I Ju1Y-30 September 1943 (Warlimont). 

but not irretrievable. Before he would 

make any further decisions, the Duce 

wanted to know from Comando Supremo 

exactly what had happened, what the remaining potential was, and how that 

potential could be increased.27 

But if Mussolini saw a possibility of 

saving the situation in Sicily-provided 

the Germans sent planes and reinforcements-Comando Supremo was ready to 

toss in the sponge. Ambrosio, on 14 

July, notified Mussolini that the fate of 

Sicily had been sealed, and he urged the 

Duce to consider ending the war to spare 

I taly further waste and destruction. 28 

In Germany, Hitler's spontaneous reaction upon learning of the Allied invasion 

had been to send help in the form of the 

IS! Parachute Division. But the news 

immediately after of the failure of the 

coastal defense troops and the coll<1pse of 

the Naval Base Augusta-Syracuse called 

for a review of the situation. 

Kesselring's telephone report to General Jodi on 13 July described the situation on the island as critical. Because of 

Allied strength, the failure of the Italian 

coastal units, and the lack of mobility of 

the German units, Kesselring said there 

was no chance to mount another concerted counterattack against the Allied 

beachheads. The best that could be 

hoped for was to fight for time. This 

in itself, Kesselring believed, would be an 

accomplishment of great importance in 

view of the detrimental effect the loss of 

Sicily would have on Italian determination 

to continue the war. In Kesselring's 

opinion, all was not yet lost. He proposed to move the remainder of the Ger27 Msg, Mussolini to Chief of Comando Supremo, 14 Jul 43, in Faidella, Lo sbarco, an. 6; 

Mussolini, The Fall of Mussolini, pp. 35-3i. 

28 See page 241, note 7. 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 213 

man parachute division and all of the 29th 

Panzer Grenadier Division to Sicily; to 

reinforce the Luftwaffe; and to increase 

the number of submarines and small motor 

boats operating against Allied convoys.29 

Aware of the danger inherent in fighting a two-front war, Hitler had known 

for months-at least since the defeats at 

Stalingrad and in North Africa-that he 

would have to weaken the Eastern Front 

if he wanted to strengthen the German 

position in the Mediterranean. The German offensive to retake Kursk on the 

Eastern Front-Operation ZIT ADELLE 

-had started on 5 July, only five days 

before the Allied invasion of Sicily. But 

in view of the changed military situation 

in the Mediterranean, and because of 

Hitler's wish to have politically reliable 

troops in Italy, he decided to call off 

ZIT ADELLE on 13 July. This measure 

gave Hitler the troops for Italy, including 

in particular an SS Panzer corps on whose 

political attitude he could rely. 

Although predominantly preoccupied 

with the events in Russia, Hitler saw the 

possible loss of Sicily principally in the 

light of a threat to the Balkans. Moreover, the probable loss of air bases on 

Sicily would decrease the radius of Axis 

air activity and increase that of the Allies, 

thus bringing Allied air power closer to 

the northern Italian industrial cities as 

well as to the German homeland. 

If the Germans intended to hold on to 

the Italian mainland as a bulwark against 

an assault on the Balkan peninsula, or on 

Germany itself, they could do so only 

with Italian co-operation. The German 

high command knew full well that the 

Italians were tired of the war. Long before, Hitler had planned ALA RICH to 

290KW/WFSt, KTB. 1.-3 I. VII. 43, 13 and 

14 Jul 43· 

keep the Italians from going over to the 

Allies. But the invasion of Sicily by 

strong British and American armies renewed German fears of a possible overthrow of Mussolini and the withdrawal 

of Italy from the war. 

General JodI felt that Sicily could not 

be held for any great length of time. He 

decided that the moment had come to 

prepare for the defense of the Italian 

mainland and of the German homeland. 

He also felt that no German forces should 

be sent south of the line of the northern 

Apennines for fear that they would be 

cut off in the event of a military or political upheaval in Italy. But Kesselring's 

recommendation to continue the defense 

of Sicily coincided with Hitler's doctrine 

of holding whatever territory German 

soldiers occupied, and Kesselring's recommendation helped override JodI's objections. Hitler decided to aid his Italian 

ally. He was prepared to take radical 

action in case of a political change in 

Italy, but as long as M ussolini remained 

in power, Hitler was willing to give him 

all possible support. 

Hitler acknowledged that the German 

forces on Sicily were, alone, not strong 

enough to throw the Allies back into the 

sea, the more so since another Allied 

landing on the western coast had to be 

anticipated. He therefore redefined the 

task of the German troops on the island 

as "to delay the enemy advance as much 

as possible and to bring it to a halt in 

front of the Aetna along a defense line 

running approximately from San Stefano 

via Adrano to Catania." In other words, 

only eastern Sicily was to be held, western 

Sicily was to be abandoned. Hitler alsG 

confirmed the insertion of the XIV Panzer Corps under General Hube into the 

chain of command on the island-without, 
214 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

however, rescinding his previous orders 

that the Italians were to hold all tactical 

commands-and he ordered the rest of 

the 1st Parachute Division moved to 

Sicily. At the same time, the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division was to move to Reggio 

di Calabria to await possible transfer to 

Sicily. The final decision on its transfer 

across the Strait of Messina would depend on the amount of supplies within 

the German position on Sicily and on 

the maintenance of safe traffic across the 

Strait of Messina. The German Second 

Air Force was to receive three bomber 

groups (including one night bomber 

group) as reinforcements. One additional 

bomber group and a torpedo plane squadron were to be added at a later date. 

Hitler also ordered eight 2 Io-mm. guns 

sent to the Strait of Messina, and demanded the addition of German personnel 

to the crews of the Italian coastal batteries, a measure to which Ambrosio 

agreed. 

Hitler then issued special instructions 

to the XIV Panzer Corps, with the understanding that the instructions were to 

be kept secret from the Italians and that 

knowledge of the instructions was to be 

confined to a restricted group of German 

officers. Working closely with General 

von Senger and the German liaison staff 

then at Sixth Army, General Hube was 

quietly to exclude the Italian command 

echelons from any further German planning; assume complete direction of 

operations in the Sicilian bridgehead; and 

extend his command to the remaining 

Italian units on the island. 

General JodI, most anxious to save German manpower for the future defense of 

the Italian and German homelands, enlarged on Hitler's secret instructions. 

JodI directed Hube to conduct operations 

on Sicily with the basic idea of saving 

as much of the German forces as possible. 

This, too, was to be kept secret from the 

Italians.30 

Kesselring may not have known of 

Hitler's and JodI's secret orders to Hube 

when he informed Ambrosio and Roatta 

on 14 July that the existing line on Sicily 

could not be held with the then available 

Axis forces. After a general withdrawal 

all along the line, however, the northeastern part of Sicily could be defended 

on a line between Santo Stefano and 

Catania. This was in agreement with 

Guzzoni's views. Kesselring also announced General Hube's transfer to Sicily 

to assume command of the German forces, 

and he received assurances from Ambrosio that Comando Supremo had issued 

sharp orders for the restoration of discipline in the Italian Army.3! 

On the next day, IS July, Mussolini, 

Ambrosio, Kesselring, and Rintelen met 

in a conference in Rome. The discussions 

satisfied no one. Mussolini wanted the 

proposed defensive line extended farther 

west to include all of the Madonie Mountains. Ambrosio pressed for the immediate transfer of the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division to Sicily and for the movement 

of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division into 

Calabria to protect the toe of Italy. Kesselring had the unpleasant task of explaining that the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

30 MS #T-2 K I (Kesselring); MS #T-2 

(Fries et al.), p. 22; OKWjWFSt, KTB. 1.-

31.VII.43, 13-15 Jul 43; quotation and text of 

Hitler's directive for further warfare in Sicily, 13 

Jul 43, in ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945; 

German text in Msg, Keitel to OB SUED, 13 

Jul 43, in folder OKH, Op Abt, Westliches Mittelmeer, Chefs., 19. V.43-1 1. VII.44; SKLj 1 .Abt. 

KTB, Teil A., 1.-31.vII.43, 14 Jul 43; Erich 

von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1955), pp. 501-04. 

31 OKW jWFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43, 15 Jul 43. 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 215 

Division could not be shifted into Sicily 

until its requisite supplies were assured. 

Meanwhile, everything should be done to 

protect the traffic over the Strait of Messina. Ambrosio, holding to his views, 

urged that since Calabria represented a 

most delicate zone, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division should be moved immediately to that area. Here Kesselring was at a 

loss. The Fuehrer insisted on holding 

that particular division near Lake Bolsena 

to protect the area of Livorno (Leghorn), 

Kesselring declared, but why Hitler had 

fears for Leghorn, Kesselring did not know. 

This concluded the conference. 32 Although no specific decisions had been 

made, it was evident that at least some of 

the Axis leaders intended to defend Sicily 

as long as possible. 

On the same day, Kesselring talked 

with Roatta, the chief of Superesercito, 

about the best place to defend Italy: in 

Sicily or on the northern Apennines line. 

Kesselring convinced Roatta that holding 

a bridgehead on Sicily was imperative for 

both military and political reasons. The 

two men then decided to establish a defensive front "around the Etna" from 

which the Axis forces on Sicily would first 

offer stubborn resistance and then resume the offensive. Since General Hube 

was scheduled to arrive in Sicily on this 

day to take over command of the German 

troops, Kesselring assured Roatta that in 

all circumstances the tactical command 

over the German forces on the island 

would remain in General Guzzoni's hands. 

General von Senger was to retain only 

his function as liaison officer with Sixth 

Army. Kesselring also suggested that 

Italian units be intermingled with the 

32 Min of Mtg between Mussolini, Kesselring, 

and others, in Rome, 15 Jul 43, IT 3037. See 

Faldella, Lo Sbarco, p. 19I. 

German divisions, but Roatta deferred 

a decision on this point. The two generals estimated that the addition of the 

two German divisions and Hube's corps 

headquarters would make it possible to 

hold a front on Sicily, at least until midAugust. 33 

Thus, by 15 July, Kesselring and Guzzoni seemed united in believing that at 

least a part of Sicily could be held. Kesselring wanted always to fight, as long as 

there was a chance. Guzzoni wanted to 

do his duty, but he fully realized that 

his only effective troops on Sicily were 

German, and that he would have to depend on full German support to hold 

even the northeastern corner of the island. 

At the higher echelons of Axis military 

command, this unity of feeling was not 

so apparent. Ambrosio felt that the war 

was lost, and he wanted to save the Italian 

armed forces and to separate Italy from 

Germany. JodI did not want to risk having the German forces in Sicily cut off, or 

to send good money after bad. Mussolini 

appeared undecided. He wanted to end 

the war but he needed a tactical success 

to achieve the proper time for making a 

peace move. Hitler did not want to 

withdraw, and he was willing to support 

Mussolini if the Italians would fight. 

On Sicily itself after Kesselring's departure Guzzoni found little good in the 

situation. Group Schmalz was barely 

holding on to its Lentini positions; the 

delay in the withdrawal of the bulk of 

the Hermann Goering Division prevented 

the blocking of the Allied advances toward Francofonte and Vizzini, and made 

it doubtful that the formation could be 

moved east fast enough to defend at the 

"" Rpt, Confs, Kesselring-Roatta, OB SUEDWEST, Abt. IC, IB.vI.43-23.Il.44 (Heeresgruppe C, 75I3B-2B). 
216 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

southern edge of the Catania plain. 

There was, consequently, no assurance 

against an Allied advance into the Catania 

plain. Guzzoni did not know when he 

could expect the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division. The Italian units had suffered 

heavy casualties and were exhausted. 

Italian morale was at a low ebb. The 

Allies seemed to be exerting their strongest pressure on both wings of the invasion 

front while, at the same time, maintaining 

dangerous pressure in the center. 

General Guzzoni still expected to form 

and hold a main defensive line with its 

eastern hinge south of the Catania plain. 

Again, on 13 July, he urged the Hermann 

Goering Division to move to the Catania 

area with the greatest possible speed. 

Guzzoni also picked this time to define 

his main battle position farther to the 

rear, the position which would be held at 

all costs and from which the Axis forces 

could return to the initiative. He proposed the line running from Acireale 

(north of Catania) -Adrano-Cesaro-San 

Fratello, and he notified Superesercito to 

this effect, adding that, he planned to 

start the withdrawal of the units immediately, delaying as much as possible.34 

Superesercito reluctantly consented to 

Guzzoni's proposal but qualified its approval by stating that such a movement 

to the rear was authorized only if it 

should prove impossible to prevent an 

Allied breakthrough into the Catania 

plain and only if the new eastern wing 

would be strong enough to permit Axis 

units in central and western Sicily to move 

to eastern Sicily in time. 3:} • 

34 IT 99a, 13 Jul 43; Faidella, Lo sbareo, pp. 

170, [90-20L 

3" IT 99a. an. 20 and entry, 13 Jul 43 (no 

time given, but apparently late at night, 13 J ul 

43 ). 

Just a short time later, though, Comando Supremo overrode the army command's approval. The Italian high 

command insisted that the positions then 

occupied by Sixth Army be held at all 

costs. Specifically, the Catania plain and 

the airfields at Catania and Gerbini were 

to remain in Axis hands. The telephone 

message transmitting these instructions 

closed with the remark that "very numerous" German planes were on their way 

to Sicily.36 

Because the British 13 Corps was regrouping preparatory to making its major 

effort that same evening, Group Schmalz 

had little difficulty in holding its positions 

just south of Lentini on 13 July. Colonel Schmalz received further reinforcements in the form of other units from the 

1st P arac hute Division: a parachute machine gun battalion; an airborne engineer 

battalion; and four batteries of airborne 

artillery. In addition, two separate German infantry battalions which had crossed 

into Sicily on the I I th were also attached 

to his command.31 

In the late afternoon of 13 July, Colonel Schmalz was able to get through a 

telephone call to General Conrath. After 

some discussion, the German commanders 

agreed that both groups would fall back 

to a position along the northern rim of 

the Catania plain, there to make contact 

on the morning of 15 July. The whole of 

the Hermann Goering Division would then 

be united and would form its main line 

of resistance along the line LeonforteCatenanuova-Gerbini-Catania. For the 

remainder of 13 and 14 July, Colonel 

311 IT 99a, an. 21, 13 Jul 43. 

37 Schmalz in MS #T-2 (Fries et al.), pp. 

77-79 and sketch III; OKH, Tagesmeldungen 

West, 14 and 15 Jul 43; maps, Sizilien, (1:200,-

000), WFSt Op. (H), II, 12, and 13 Jul 43. 
CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN: THE DECISIONS 217 

Schmalz would have to hold where he 

was. 38 

By late evening of 13 July, the H ermann Goering Division completed its withdrawal to the Caltagirone-Vizzini line, although it kept strong elements south of 

that line to blunt the various American 

thrusts inland from Niscemi, Biscari, and 

Comiso. The Italian Livorno Division 

also withdrew further into the interior 

to establish a new line between the two 

German divisions and to prevent a possible American breakthrough at Piazza 

Armerina. 

In the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 

area, the German units had little trouble 

holding their new line on 13 July. Only 

minor actions took place between American patrols and the German and Italian 

units. Group Fullriede, still under General Schreiber's control, extended its front 

eastward toward Caltanissetta. Group 

Ens remained along a line running from 

Piazza Armerina to Pietraperzia. Sometime during the late evening of 12 July, 

General Rodt, the division commander, 

received word from Sixth Army to pre3R Schmalz in MS #T-2 (Fries et al.), p. 79. 

pare to withdraw to the new line of 

resistance south of Mount Etna. The division was to fight delaying actions back 

to a new line which extended from AgiraLeonforte-Nicosia-Gangi, and at the same 

time establish contact with the Hermann 

Goering Division across the remnants of the 

Li·vorno Division. Accordingly, General 

Rodt moved his division headquarters to 

Grottacalda (two and a half miles southwest of Valguarnera) and started to transfer the division's service elements to the 

new line.39 

The Axis defenses were giving way, 

but they were not crumbling. The Allies 

had yet to conquer Sicily. 

:1" MS #R-140, p. 35, n. 52; Faldella, La 

sbareo, pp. 170, 179-80, 189-90; OR SUED, 

Meldugen, 13 Jul 43, Third Report; 13 Jul 43, 

Fourth Report. The date of the order to Rodt's 

division is not clear. General Rodt, in MS #C077, says 12 July; Senger, in MS #C-095, 

says 15 July; Faldella says 0800, IS July 1943. 

Map, Sizilien (I :200,000), WFSt OP. (H), IS 

July 1943, indicates that the withdrawal was 

I"ither planned or under way. It appears logical 

that the date listed by Rodt is the correct date, 

since this would tie in with Guzzoni's plan to 

withdraw to a shorter defensive line south of 

Mount Etna. 
CHAPTER XII 

Seventh Army Changes Directions 

The Eighth Army Attempt 

To Break Through 

General Montgomery's major effort to 

break through into Catania got under 

way on the evening of 13 July when Commando units landed and seized the Lentini 

bridge soon after dark. Though the 

commandos removed the demolition 

charges from the bridge, the Germans 

soon drove off the British raiders. 

The airborne operation (code named 

FUSTIAN) on the same evening to seize 

the Primosole bridge (seven miles south of 

Catania) over the Simeto River and establish a bridgehead on the river's north 

bank suffered double bad luck. In the 

first place, the American and British troop 

carrier pilots ran into heavy antiaircraft 

fire from Allied ships massed along the 

southeastern shores of Sicily. A route 

supposedly cleared proved to be replete 

with ships, and the aircraft began to receive fire from the time they rounded 

Malta. Off Cape Passero, the real trouble started-more than one-half of the 

aircraft reported recelvmg fire from 

friendly naval vessels. Though only two 

troop carriers were hit and downed, nine 

turned back after injuries to pilots or 

damage to planes. Those aircraft that 

flew on soon ran into what seemed to 

be a solid wall of antiaircraft fire thrown 

up by the enemy along the coast line. A 

large number of the pilots lost formation 

and circled up and down the coast trying 

to find a way through the fire into the 

four drop zones. Ten more aircraft 

turned back, each with a full load of 

British paratroopers. Eighty-seven pilots 

managed to thread their way through the 

fire, but only 39 of these dropped their 

paratroopers within a mile of the drop 

zones. All but four of the remainder 

managed to get their sticks within ten 

miles of ,the Primosole bridge; the other 

four sticks landed on the slopes of Mount 

Etna, about twenty miles away. Of the 

1,900 men of the British 1st Parachute 

Brigade who jumped into Sicily on the 

evening of 13 July, only about two hundred men with three antitank guns reached 

the bridge. Though they seized it and 

removed the demolition charges, they comprised a dangerously small contingent for 

holding the bridge until the ground forces 

arrived. 

The second piece of bad luck was that 

the main drop came in almost on top of 

the machine gun battalion of the German 

I st Parachute Division. The German 

paratroopers themselves had jumped just 

north of the river only a few hours earlier, 

and they reacted in a savage manner. 

Yet the little band of British paratroopers 

managed to hold on to the bridge all d~y 

long. At nightfall, the paratroopers withdrew to a ridge on the south bank of the 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 219 

river, where they could cover the bridge 

with fire and prevent the Germans from 

damaging it. 1 

General Montgomery's main assault 

was executed by the 50th Division and 

a brigade of tanks against the Group 

Schmalz Lentini positions. On the afternoon of 14 July, some of the British tanks 

worked their way between the German 

positions along Highway 114 and the two 

German parachute battalions east of the 

highway, thereby threatening to isolate 

the paratroopers from the rest of the German battle group. Colonel Schmalz, who 

had been apprehensive all along of being 

outflanked and cut off from withdrawal, 

decided to leave the Lentini positions and 

fall back faster than he had anticipated. 

Leaving small delaying forces behind, he 

pulled back in two steps, first, eight miles 

to the north behind the Gornalunga River, 

then, early on 15 July, three miles farther 

north behind the Simeto River. (See 

Map VI.) 

In the wake of the German withdrawal, 

the British 50th Division moved forward 

readily and joined the British paratroopers 

at the southern end of the Primosole 

1 Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, pp. 47-54; 

By Air to Battle, pp. 60-64; Montgomery, Eighth 

Army, p. 100. See also 99-66.2, sub: AFHQ 

Report of Allied Forces Airborne Board in Connection With the Invasion of Sicily: 0100/4/78, 

sub: Airborne Operations in HUSKY; 0100/21/ 

1072, sub: Airborne Employment, Operation, 

and Movement of Troops, vol. 2; NAAFTCC 

Rpt of Opns; Alexander Despatch, p. 23. Cf. B. 

H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, rev. 

ed. (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 355; DB SUED, 

Meldungen, 14-16 Jul 43 (implicit testimony of 

the toughness of the Bri tish para troopers) ; 

Schmalz in MS #T-2 (Fries et al.), pages 11-

12 criticizes the operation as incorrect use of 

para troopers. 

FUSTIAN started with 145 aircraft, 126 carrying paratroopers, 19 towing gliders. There were 

1,856 paratroopers and 77 glider-borne artillerymen starting out on the mission. 

bridge. A thrust north of the river on 

15 July netted nothing. Additional German reinforcements rushed forward to 

strengthen the Simeto line, and Colonel 

Schmalz finally made contact with the 

bulk of the Hermann Goering Division. 

On 16 July, a heavier British attack regained the bridge that the Germans had 

been unable to destroy and pushed a 

shallow bridgehead across the river, extending it by the 17th to a depth of 

3,000 yards. Another attack by the 50th 

Division during the night of 17 July made 

little headway. The British had failed to 

break Schmalz's Catania defenses. The 

Germans were in strong positions, and 

after the 17th they felt certain they could 

block the east coast road.2 

The II Corps Front 

The bulk of the Hermann Goering Division, retiring to the northeast to gain 

contact with Colonel Schmalz's battle 

group, had not had an easy time making 

it back to the Simeto River line. Successful on 13 July in holding General 

Guzzoni's intermediate defensive line along 

Highway 124, the division began to run 

into trouble on the 14th. The Germans 

had to contend not only with American 

attacks against the entire front from Caltagirone on the west to Vizzini on the 

east, they also had to face the British 30 

Corps attacking along the axis of the 

highway toward Vizzini. 

Opposite the eastern flank of the German division, Colonel Ankcorn, the 15 7th 

2 DB SUED, Meldungen, 15 Jul 43, Second 

Report; Schmalz in MS #T-2 (Fries et al.), p. 

sub: Airborne Operations in HUSKY; 0100/21/ 

George Aris, The Fifth British Division, 1939-

1945 (London: The Fifth Division Benevolent 

Fund, 1959), pp. 123-25. 
220 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

RCT commander, found himself on the 

evening of 13 July in a rather uncomfortable position: his forces were between 

the British on the south and east and the 

Germans to the north. By this time, 

through British liaison officers, Colonel 

Ankcorn knew that the British 30 Corps 

was intent on taking Vizzini. Ankcorn 

had no objection. He pulled one battalion away from Vizzini and sent it to 

occupy the high ground northeast of Licodia Eubea. He assembled the rest of 

his combat team in the same general area. 

On the morning of the 14th, Colonel 

Ankcorn again made contact with the 

British south of Vizzini. Despite a twopronged advance, the 30 Corps was having some trouble securing Vizzini. An 

attack during the night by the British 

5 I st Division had been thrown back, as 

had another by the armored brigade in 

the early morning. Together with British officers, Colonel Ankcorn surveyed the 

situation at Vizzini and agreed to furnish 

what support he could to the British 

51st Highlanders in a renewed attempt to 

wrest that town from the Germans' grasp. 

Returning to his command post at Monterosso Almo, Colonel Ankcorn reached 

up to an abandoned Italian railway car, 

tore off an old shipping ticket, and across 

the back of the ticket scrawled a note to 

Colonel Murphy, the 1st Battalion commander: "Murphy, go help the British." 3 

From positions northeast of Licodia, 

Murphy's 1st Battalion struck at Vizzini 

at noon in conjunction with the renewed 

British attempt from the south and east. 

3 The Fighting Forty-Fifth, compiled and 

edited by the Historical Board (Baton Rouge, 

La.: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1946), p. 

23; History of the [57th Infantry Regiment, p. 

25; 45th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 34, 42, 43, 51, 

14 Jul 43· 

The added weight of the American battalion, ably supported by the 158th Field 

Artillery Battalion, was not enough. As 

on the day before, the Germans, fighting 

to hold their withdrawal route open, 

threw back every Allied thrust. 

Staunch opposition also developed from 

the Hermann Goering elements west of 

Vizzini. Early in the morning, a strong 

German tank-infantry force struck the 

leading battalion of the I79th RCT. 

Close-in fighting raged throughout the 

morning, additional infantry and artillery 

units finally turning the tide. Resuming 

its advance, the 179th reached a point 

just two miles south of Grammichele by 

nightfall. 4 

On the favorable side, the sag that had 

existed on the left of the II Corps zone 

straightened out nicely on 14 July after 

Darby's Ranger force took Butera. A 

typical Sicilian town with feudal antecedents, Butera lies on high, almost inaccessible ground, an objective to intrigue 

the military imagination. Flouting an 

old tradition that previous conquerors of 

Sicily had always bypassed the town, the 

Rangers occupied Butera after a swift 

night approach and a dash into the center of town past startled Italian defenders. 5 

On the right side of the sag, the 180th 

RCT finally secured Biscari airfield, despite several strong German counterat4 Maj. Ellsworth Cundiff, The Operations of 

the 3d Battalion, I79th Infantry, 13-14 July 

1943, South of Grammichele, Sicily: Personal Experience of a Regimental S-2 (Fort Benning, 

Ga., 1948); Infantry Combat, pt. V: Sicily, pp. 

8-14; I79th Inf Regt AAR, 14 Jul 43; I79th 

Inf Regt S-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 43; 45th InC Div 

G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 43; 753d Med Tk Bn AAR, 14 

Jul 43· 

o 1st Ranger Bn AAR, 14 Jul 43; Remarks by 

Col Darby to Col R. F. McEldowney, 12 Oct 43, 

in Rpt, AGF Bd NATO, 8 Nov 43, sub: Remarks 

Regarding Ranger Force, 4-1.67/43. 
BUTERA, BUTERA, taken by Darby’s Rangers to straighten the sag in the center of the II Corps Line, 14 July. taken by Darby's Rangers to straighten the sag in the center if the II Corps Line, 14 July. 
222 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tacks which came after two infantry 

battalions gained the field by surprise. 

The German counterattacks persisted 

throughout most of the day, but were all 

turned back. Toward evening, the Germans began pulling back to the north 

and the I80th set out in pursuit. Its 

leading battalion finally caught up with 

the Germans early the next morning at 

the very outskirts of Caltagirone.6 

In the center, that is, in the vicinity 

of Niscemi in the 1st Division's sector, 

the line also pushed forward, not because 

<:If any action by the 16th RCT but because of the general withdrawal of the 

German forces to the northeast. Though 

the town of Niscemi remained a hot spot 

during the morning, by early afternoon 

the rate of enemy firing decreased and 

16th Infantry patrols moved almost into 

Caltagirone before meeting German resistance. The 16th Infantry did not 

follow up this advantage; the advance of 

friendly units to the east and west made 

the move unnecessary. 

While inclined to keep the 16th RCT 

in position, General Allen was in no way 

disposed to let the retiring enemy get away 

without some action. Early on 14 Julya few hours after the Rangers jumped 

Butera-the 26th RCT moved toward 

Mazzarino, its Yellow Line objective. 

The 26th met little opposition-the Livarna Division's few remaining battalions 

had withdrawn the previous evening-and 

before noon consolidated on high ground 

north and west of Mazzarino. With the 

26th RCT pushed out this far, General 

Allen ordered the 18th RCT straight 

north toward Bivio Gigliotto-the juncture point of Highways 117 and 124-

6 180th Inf Regt AAR, 14-15 Jul 43; Infantry Combat, pt. V: Sicily, pp. 4-8, 14-16; 753d 

Med Tk Bn AAR, 14 Jul 43. 

to secure the 26th's right flank. By late 

afternoon, the 18th RCT came to rest on 

two high hills, some two miles south of 

the road junction. 7 

By early morning of IS July, then, both 

the 1st and 45th Divisions stood at or 

near the Seventh Army's Yellow Line 

across the entire II Corps front. But in 

the higher echelons of American command, 

the impact of General Alexander's directive of 13 July to Seventh Army began 

to be felt. At II Corps headquarters 

just before 0900, 14 July, General Bradley received from Seventh Army a general 

outline of the army group's order. Accordingly, before going to the army headquarters to receive the specifics, General 

Bradley notified the 45th Division to halt 

its forward unit,> at least two miles south 

of Highway 124: that road was now in 

the British zone and had been turned 

over to General Montgomery. General 

Bradley later visited the 1st Division and 

left the same instructions.s Still later, 

American artillery units were instructed 

not to fire within an area extending from 

one mile south of the highway north to 

and past the highway, this to prevent the 

artillery from firing on British troops.9 

The initial effect of these orders was 

slight. Only the 157th RCT had by then 

come within two miles of Highway 124. 

General Bradley's instructions stopped the 

179th and 180th RCT's from entering 

Grammichcle and Caltagirone, although 

the 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry, had 

quite a tussle with the Germans in the 

southern outskirts of Caltagirone early on 

the morning of 15 July. Since the 26th 

7AAR's of 16th, 18th, and 26th Inf Regts; 

S-I Jnls of the same units; 1st Inf Div G-3 

Jnl, 14 Jul 43. 

B 45th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 28 and 29, 14 

Jul 43; lst Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entry 37, 14 Jul 43· 

9 45th Inf Div Arty Jnl, entry 19, 14 Jul 43. 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 223 

RCT stood on it'! Yellow Line objective 

at Mazzarino, it was in no way bothered 

by the change of plans. On the other 

hand, the new instructions would have 

affected at lea~t one American unit on 

I 5 July had not the I st Division commander, General Allen, chosen to persist 

in his advance. The 18th RCT, striking 

for Bivio Gigliotto, had just a little way 

to go before reaching the highway. General Allen declined, apparently with General Bradley's tacit approval, to halt the 

18th R CT two miles south of the highway. On the morning of 15 July, the 

18th RCT continued its advance and after 

mauling a battalion from the Livorno 

Division in a cork tree grove just south 

of the road junction (taking 200 prisoners 

and I I artillery pieces in the process) 

sent patrols into Bivio Gigliotto. Only 

there did General Allen halt the combat 

team. 10 

The American thrusts caused General 

Conrath to become increasingly worried 

about his situation. News in the late 

afternoon of 14 July of Group Schmalz's 

withdrawal from the Lentini positions 

along the east coast highway deepened his 

concern, for this move left the Hermann 

Goering Division's left flank open. Conrath therefore decided to take the bulk of 

his division back in one movement, not 

pausing to defend until after he reached 

the Simeto River line. When Conrath 

notified the XVI Corps of his decision, 

the corps chief of staff, with Sixth Army's 

approval, went to General Conrath's headquarters near Caltagirone and begged the 

German commander to hold the VizziniCaltagirone line through 15 July so that 

10 18th Inf Regt AAR, 15 Jul 43; 1St lnf Div 

G-3 Jnl, 15 Jul 43. There is no indication of 

disapproval of General Allen's actions in the 

records. 

the Axis troops holding the remainder of 

the front would have time to withdraw. 

Conrath agreedY But later in the day, 

General von Senger, urged by Kesselring 

to strengthen the endangered eastern wing 

by weakening the center, ordered the 

Hermann Goering Division to move immediately to the Catania area.i2 

With General Conrath's verbal agreement, Sixth Army formally ordered the 

German division to stay in the VizziniCaltagirone line until nightfall on 15 July. 

During that night, the division was to 

move back to the Gornalunga-Raddusa 

line, starting its movement with it'> eastern 

wing. The Livorno Division was also to 

withdraw at the same time, adjusting its 

movements to those of the German 

divisionY 

Not long afterwards, General Conrath 

reported to XVI Corps that Allied pressure made it impossible for him to hold 

his positions along Highway 124. Sixth 

Army then authorized General Conrath 

to start his withdrawal. 

In the confusion of the previous contradictory orders, beset by the British and 

the Americans, apprehensive of his eastern 

flank, unable to contact the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division to the west, Conrath 

ordered his units to withdraw immediately. In executing this withdrawal, 

elements of the division in Vizzini and 

Caltagirone lost several tanks and suffered light casualties during the morning 

of 15 July. The bulk of the division 

moved to the rear in good order and took 

up positions (along with Group Schmalz) 

on a line from the mouth of the Simeto 

River along the Dittaino River to Castel 

11 MS #R-140 (Bauer), pp. 36-37. 

12 MS #C-095 (Senger), KTB entry. 2330, 

14 Jul 43· 

13 Faldella, La sbarco, pp. 174-75. 
224 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Judica and Radnusa, with outposts further south. On its right, a wide gap 

separated these troops from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which stuck far 

out to the south.14 

The tenacious defense put up by the 

Germans in Vizzini caused another change 

in plans for the the British go Corps. 

Although the armored brigade and the 

5 I st Division entered Vizzini early on 15 

July, the two British units had been severely strained in the process. Aware of 

this even before the town fell, General 

Leese, the corps commander, ordered the 

I st Canadian Division to pass through 

the 5 I st Division and press on to Enna. 

At 0600, 15 July, one Canadian brigade moved west along Highway 124 

toward Grammichele. Unfortunately, the 

45th Division's artillery was silenced by 

the previous day's order and could provide no assistance. The 157th and 179th 

RCT's could only watch helplessly as the 

Germans, then pulling out to the northeast, massed a small rear guard to block 

the Canadian approach. 15 At 09°°, as 

the Canadian advance guard neared 

Grammichele, which was situated on a 

high ridge well above the surrounding 

countryside, it was haIted bv German tank 

and antitank guns firing at almost pointblank range. Not until noon were the 

Canadians able to clear the road center. 

Pushing on to the west, but delayed by 

mines along the road, the Ca~adian's 

entered an undefended Caltagirone by 

midnight. General Montgomery, his major effort on the east coast stalled at the 

Simeto River, then ordered the go Corps 

14 Faldella. Lo sbarco, p. 175; II /Pz. Regt, 

H.C., KTB Nr. I, 9.XI.42-15.lX.43, copy in 

folder OCMH X-878. 

15 45th Inf Div Arty AAR, pp. 3-4. 

to push on "with all speed to Valguarnera-Enna-Leonforte." 16 

Agrigento 

General Patton paid his first visit to 

the 3d Division shortly after noon on 14 

July and told General Truscott something 

of his future plans. With his eyes set on 

Palermo, Patton said he would need Porto 

Empedocle to support such a drive. But 

because of the limitations imposed by 

General Alexander, Patton declared, the 

Seventh Army could not attack the port 

in strength for fear of becoming involved 

in a costly battle which might expose the 

Eighth Army's left flank to an Axis 

counterattack. 

General Truscott, who with army approval had already conducted one smallscale reconnaissan~e effort against Agrigento and Porto Empedocle on the 13th, 

felt that the gd Division could take both 

towns without too much trouble. All he 

needed was General Patton's approval. 

The Seventh Army commander agreed to 

another reconnaissance in force, this time 

in greater strength than the one battalion 

used previously. But Patton specified 

that the move was to be made on Truscott's own responsibility. For General 

Truscott, there was much to gain and 

little to lose. If he could take Agrigento 

and Porto Empedocle, everybody would 

be happy. If he failed, he nevertheless 

would have gained valuable information 

on the status of the enemy's defensesY 

Porto Empedocle serves Agrigento in 

somewhat the same fashion as Piraeus 

16 Quoted in Nicholson, The Canadians in 

Italy, p. 92. 

17 Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 218-19; 

Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 380; Lucas Diary, 

pt. 1, p. 71. 
LA MONTAGNA 

AGRIGENTO AND THE SURROUNDING HIGH GROUND 
226 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

serves Athens. A town of 14,000 people, 

Porto Empedocle had a town mole, almost completely surrounded by two breakwaters jutting from a narrow shelf of land 

slightly above sea level. On the eastern 

and western sides of town, abrupt cliffs 

rose in some places two hundred feet or 

so above the level of the shelf, and parts 

of the residential area faced the sea on 

these heights. In the center of town, a 

deep ravine cut through the cliffs to the 

lower shelf, sharply dividing the upper 

part of town into eastern and western 

halves. The daily capacity of the port 

was 800 tons, approximately the same as 

that of Licata. 

Agrigento, a city of some 34,000 inhabitants, was perched on a hilltop about 

three miles from the coast. Seventeen 

miles west of Palma di Montechiaro and 

twenty-two miles southwest of Canicatti, 

Agrigento was the most important road 

center along the southwestern coast of 

Sicily. Highway 115 connected Agrigento with Licata and Gela. Highway 

122 linked it to Caltanissetta, Canicatti, 

and Favara. 

For the Seventh Army, Agrigento represented the gateway to western Sicily. 

From there, Highway I 15 continued 

northwestward along the coast to Marsala 

and Trapani; Highway 118 zigzagged 

northward over the mountains through 

Raffadali, Prizzi, and Corleone to the 

north coast and Palermo. Veering at 

first northeastward, a second-class road 

also led to the north coast by way of the 

inland towns of Conistini and Lercara 

Friddi. The seizure of Agrigento thus 

was essential for a drive on Palermo, while 

Porto Empedocle would give Seventh 

Army a port twenty-five miles closer to 

its front. 

General Patton's preoccupation with 

Palermo amounted to an obsession. Porto 

Empedocle was a logical objective in terms 

of augmenting the minor capacities of 

Gela and Licata. But with Porto Empedocle in hand, why Palermo, too? Perhaps he thought of a rapid, dramatic 

thrust to draw public attention to the 

capabilities of U.S. armor. Perhaps it 

was the only objective that could compensate partially for having been relegated the mission of acting as Alexander's 

shield. "Palermo," General Truscott 

would write after the war, "drew Patton 

like a lode star." 18 

The 1St Battalion, 7th Infantry, which 

had conducted the reconnaissance toward Agrigento on 13 July, had reported 

considerable enemy artillery defending 

Agrigento along the eastern perimeter. 

There appeared to be at least twelve direct 

fire, high-velocity weapons and one or 

more battalions of field artillery positioned 

against an approach along Highway [15. 

Too, the enemy appeared dug in east of 

Agrigento along the Naro River. Although General Truscott estimated the 

enemy's infantry strength at no more than 

one coastal regiment-a fairly accurate 

appraisal-he ruled out a frontal assault 

because of the strength of the enemy ar18 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 222. Truscott remarks elsewhere: "It was perfectly clear 

to me why General Patton was obsessed with 

Palermo, it had been made so by all planning 

connected with the Sicilian operation from the 

first. . . . The reasons had also been made 

clear in many discussions with both General 

Patton and General Keyes .... General Patton 

made no secret of the fact that he was not only 

desirous of emulating Rommel's reputation as a 

leader of armor, he wanted to exceed it. General Patton was also anxious for the U.S. armor 

to achieve some notice.... The capture of 

Palermo by an armored sweep through western 

Sicily appeared to suit this purpose. . .. " Comments of Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. (Ret.) 

on MS. 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 227 

3D INFANTRY DIVISION 

14-17 July 1943 

c=.:J U. S . UNIT LOCATION S, EvEN ING. 13 JUt. 

~ U.S. AXIS OF ADVANCE, CATE INDICATED 

~ ~ 207 TH COASTAL DIY DEf ENSES . EvE NING. 13JUL 

Conl()vr inllirVal 100 me/firs 

I 0 

! 'j\ ,',I I 0 

MAP 2 

I 2 

I I I I I 

Z 3 4 KILOME TE RS 

tillery. He determined instead on a 

flanking movement to strike at Agrigento 

from the northeast by way of Favara on 

Highway 122. To do the job, General 

Truscott selected the 7th Infantry Regiment, the loth Field Artillery Battalion, 

and one battalion from the 77th Field 

Artillery Regiment. 19 

The route to Favara had already been 

checked by a company of the 7th Infantry 

that had worked its way cross-country 

19 3d Inf Div FO 8, 14 JuI 43; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 219. 

H.C.arc".r, J ,.. 

during the night of 13 July, entered Favara early the next morning, and stayed 

there. Basing his decision on the information sent back by this company, General Truscott directed Colonel Sherman, 

the 7th Infantry commander, to move two 

battalions in the company's path, one to 

go all the way into Favara, the other to 

advance on the north side of Highway 

I 15 to high ground before the N aro River. 

( Map 2) The 3d Ranger Battalion, 

which was in division reserve, was to move 

to Favara, then reconnoiter to the west of 

Agrigento. 
228 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Until the ground troops could get 

within striking distance of both towns, 

the enemy was to be allowed no rest. 

The Navy agreed to furnish the maximum 

possible gunfire support. Since 12 July, 

the cruisers Birmingham and Brooklyn 

had been firing missions against Agrigento 

and Porto Empedocle. On 14 July, the 

Birmingham concentrated on Italian shore 

batteries, and as the foot troops moved 

out to the new areas that night, the British monitor, H.M.S. Abercrombie, joined 

the Birmingham. The next day, the guns 

of the Philadelphia added their fires. 20 

Before daylight on 15 July, the two 

infantry battalions occupied their objectives without difficulty. Now General 

Truscott attached the Ranger battalion 

to the 7th Infantry and ordered a continuation of the reconnaissance effort 

against Agrigento. That night the 3d 

Ranger Battalion was to move from Favara to the little town of Montaperto, 

situated on commanding ground northwest of Agrigento. The 2d Battalion, 7th 

Infantry, at Favara was to move on Agrigento to take Hill 333, which commanded 

the northern approaches into Agrigento. 

These two moves would block the northern and western exits from Agrigento. 

Then the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, 

along Highway I 15 was to push straight 

to the west, cross the Naro River, and 

drive on Agrigento. Only one change 

was made in this plan: after taking 

Montaperto, the 3d Ranger Battalion was 

20 Rpt, Lt (jg) H. C. Manning, USN, to 3d Inf 

Div, 23 Jul 43, sub: Naval Gunfire Support for 

the JOSS Attack Force During HUSKY Opn, in 

3d Inf Div file, Special Material; Rpt, 3d Inf 

Div Arty to CG 3d Inf Div, 25 Aug 43, sub: 

Rpt of Naval Gunfire Support Joss Force, same 

file; loth FA Bn AAR, [4 and [5 Jul 43; ONI, 

Sicilian Campaign, pp. 98-99; Morison, Sicily 

~Salerno~Anzio, pp. 174-75. 

to swing south over Hill 3 I 6 to take 

Porto Empedocle. 

As night fell on 15 July, the Rangers 

moved out from Favara. Though they 

came under scattered artillery fire, they 

suffered no casualties. A half hour after 

midnight, 16 July, the Rangers ran into 

an Italian roadblock just east of the junction of Highways 122 and 118. While 

scouts uncovered the Italian positlon, 

Maj. Herman W. Dammer, the Ranger 

battalion commander, deployed his men 

and sent them in. Within an hour the 

action was over; one hundred and sixtyfive Italians surrendered. 

At daylight, 16 July, Major Dammer 

started his men westward cross-country 

toward Montaperto. The Rangers had 

crossed Highway 118 and were on high 

ground some two hundred yards west 

of it when an enemy column composed 

of ten motorcycles and two truckloads of 

troops came unsuspectingly down the 

highway toward Agrigento. Deploying 

along the high ground, the Rangers permitted the enemy force-all Italians-to 

come fully abreast before opening fire. 

The first shots threw the enemy column 

into complete confusion. Many Italians 

were killed; forty were added to the bag of 

prisoners. 

Without further incident, the Rangers 

moved into Montaperto. From the hilltop, they had a commanding view of the 

valley below where four batteries of Italian artillery were emplaced. Major Dammer quickly set up his 60-mm. mortars 

and opened fire. Individual Rangers 

joined in with their small arms. Though 

a few Italians escaped toward the south, 

most came up the hill with hands held 

high. 

Meanwhile, the two battalions of riflemen from the 7th Infantry were execut-
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 229 

THE VERSATILE DUKW bringing in supplies to Seventh Infantry troops in Port Empedocle. 

ing their roles in what was euphemistically 

called a reconnaissance in force. The 2d 

Battalion, advancing westward along 

Highway 122 from Favara, gained two 

hills about a thousand yards east of 

its objective by 0900. Little resistance 

was encountered, but loss of contact with 

the Rangers and spotty communications 

with combat team headquarters prompted 

Major Duvall, the battalion commander, 

to hold his attack until he could further 

develop the situation to his front and 

flanks. The 1St Battalion, along Highway 

I 15, was having a hard fight trying to 

get into Agrigento. After dark on 15 

July, Colonel Moore, the battalion commander, sent his men across the Naro 

River and onto three barren hills which 

fronted the city. His companies soon 

found themselves hotly engaged with Italian infantrymen representing parts of two 

infantry battalions. By early afternoon of 

16 July the 1st Battalion was still unable 

to move forward. 

In the early afternoon, General Truscott ordered the 3d Battalion, which had 

been in reserve, to move south of Highway 

I 15 to assist the I st Battalion. Just after 

1400, Colonel Heintges led his 3d Battalion down to the highway. Quickly, 

the battalion finished off one of the Italian forces opposing the I st Battalion. 

Together the two battalions started for 

Agrigento, as Italian resistance slowly 

crumbled. In Agrigento, Colonel de Laurentiis, commander of the defense forces, 
230 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

was undergoing some trying moments. 

His command post had been the object 

of heavy Allied naval and ground bombardments during the day. By early 

afternoon of 16 July all of the Italian 

artillery batteries had been silenced. 

Fires had broken out in many places. 

The town was completely enveloped. The 

Americans were nearing the town. Finally, after the 1st Battalion had broken 

into the city proper, Colonel de Laurentlls, his staff, and his troops surrendered to 

Colonel Moore. By this time, too, Porto 

Empedoc1e had fallen to the Rangers.21 

Army Directive of 15 July 1943 

The 7th Infantry's thrust against Agrigento and Porto Empedocle was only one 

Df a number of events growing out of 

General Alexander's directive of 13 July, 

which turned the Seventh Army's axis of 

advance from the north to the west. On 

15 July, even as the 7th Infantry's re21 7th lnf Regt S-3 Rpts, 14-17 Jul 43; 7th 

Inf Regt S-3 Jnl, 14-17 Jul 43; 3d Inf Div G3 Jnl, 14-17 Jul 43; loth FA Bn, 77th FA Regt, 

3d Inf Div Arty, and 3d Ranger Bn AAR's; 

Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 217-2 I; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 174-76; Lt Col 

Roy E. Moore, A Reconnaissance in Force at 

Agrigento, Sicily, 12-16 July 1943 (Command 

and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, 1947); Maj Edward B. Kitchens, Operations of the 3d Ranger Infantry Battalion in the 

Landings at Licata and Subsequent Attack on 

Porto Empedode, 10-17 July 1943 (Fort Benning, 

Ga.: 1950); MS #R-141, Withdrawal, Second 

Phase (12-21 July 1943), ch. XI of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily (Bauer), pp. 1-10. 

In an action west of Agrigento, 1st Lt. David 

C. Waybur, 3d Reconnaissance Troop, 3d Infantry Division, earned the Medal of Honor when, 

though seriously wounded, he stood in the middle of a road and opened fire with a submachine 

gun on a column of Italian tanks. Waybur 

knocked out the leading tank and brought the 

-others to a halt. See 3d Recon Troop AAR, 

16 Jul 43. 

connaissance in force gathered momentum, 

General Patton outlined his plan and issued his instructions for executing the army 

group's order. Apparently still anticipating a drive on Palermo, he rearranged his 

forces in the belief that he could win 

sanction for a thrust to the north coast. 

While recogmzmg the initial line of 

advance as spelled out by General Alexander to be a line from Caltanissetta 

to Palma (a line already out "tripped by 

the 3d Division) , General Patton extended the army boundary past Enna 

(where General Alexander's army boundary stopped) to the north coast just west 

of Santo Stefano di Camastra. Within 

this new zone, he disposed his forces 

under two corps headquarters, the existing 

II Corps and a newly created Provisional 

Corps. To each of the corps, General 

Patton assigned roughly one-half of the 

new zone of operations. 

The right sector, running from just 

east of Serradifalco to M ussomeli, Lercara Friddi, Manneo, and Palermo, went 

to General Bradley's II Corps. The newly 

organized Provisional Corps, under the 

command of General Keyes, the Seventh 

Army deputy commander, took over the 

left sector. To the new corps went the 

3d Infantry Division, minus CCA and 

other supporting units; the 82d Airborne 

Division; units from the 9th Infantry 

Division; and artillery units which had 

been supporting the 3d Division. The 

3d Division was to continue on its mISsion of taking Agrigento and Porto Empedocle and of securing Highway 122 in 

its sector before passing to Provisional 

Corps control. The 2d Armored Division was to form the army reserve. 

Once the II Corps had shifted the 45th 

Division from the east to the west of the 

1St Division, the divisions were to drive 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 231 

to the northwest to secure Caltanissetta 

and a stretch of Highway 122 by nightfall on 19 July. Expecting the 3d Division to secure the line Serradifalco-Agrigento by dark on 17 July (which was an 

extension forward of the anny group's 

contemplated line), General Patton directed the 82d Airborne Division, plus 

the 9th Division's units then on the island, to relieve the 3d Division along 

Highway 115 by dark on 19 July as a 

first step in continuing the drive to the 

west. The 2d Armored Division was to 

be prepared to exploit any offensive operation toward the north coast, operating 

principally in the Provisional Corps zone.22 

Thus, General Patton apparently hoped 

that by the end of 19 July the situation 

on the island would have developed sufficiently to enable the Seventh Anny to 

start on a thrust to the north coast. As 

indicated by the extension of the army 

boundary past Enna, General Patton was 

not thinking at this time of Messina as 

a Seventh Anny objective. Seventh 

Anny, of course, could not launch out to 

the west until General Alexander gave 

approval. But General Patton fully intended to be ready to go as soon as General Montgomery had firmly established 

the Eighth Army on a line from Catania 

to Enna. 

General Bradley, with the problem of 

pulling his front apart and putting it 

together again, started the 45th Division 

to a new assembly area near Riesi on 16 

July. Thus. the 1st Division became the 

right guide for the Seventh Anny, responsible for maintaining contact with the 

British on the right. Since the east 

boundary of the "Enna loop" belonged 

2 2 Seventh Army Directive, 15 J ul 43, in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-7, and map to 

accompany directive, p. D-8. 

to the British, the 1st Division's axis of 

advance was along an axis to the west of 

that boundary, cutting the middle of the 

loop roughly parallel to the Salso River. 

The 26th RCT, on 15 July, held the 

old Yellow Line positions on the hills in 

and around Mazzarino and was astride a 

secondary north-south road that paralleled Highway I 17 and joined Highway 

122 about midway between Enna and 

Caltanissetta. The latter road was the 

division objective and the 26th RCT had 

a direct line of advance to it. Because 

of the rough terrain ahead, General Allen 

ordered the combat team to advance on 

16 July by leapfrogging battalions. Barrafranca was the first intennediate objective. The 16th RCT shuttled over from 

Niscemi, while the 18th RCT, after making contact with the 1st Canadian Division along Highway I 17, began moving 

south to follow the division's main aXIS 

of advance. 

On the first day of the advance, the 

26th RCT quickly developed a pitched 

battle with Group Ens at a point just 

forward of Barrafranca. Because the retiring Germans had not destroyed the 

bridge north of Mazzarino, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, had no trouble 

crossing. The mile and a half stretch 

before the road entered the plain in 

front of the first intennediate objective 

was also traversed without incident. But 

from this point on, German reaction to 

the advance became heavy. 

From the approach taken by the 1st 

Battalion, the town of Barrafranca gave 

the impression of being "over behind" 

rather than "up on top" the high ground. 

Pocketed in a hill plateau, the town 

was shielded by lower hill masses west 

of the Mazzarino road. At the town's 

left front, a stream made a corridor from 
232 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the Mazzarino road to a traverse road 

at the rear, and below this narrow valley 

a line of lesser hills screened the town 

from a larger plain. Barrafranca was 

well suited for defense. The Germans, 

expert in such matters, had dug in well, 

and controlled all approaches and most 

of the plain where tanks could be employed. The Germans sat in positions of 

their own choosing, looking down the 

throat of the American advance. 

On reaching the plain in front of Barrafranca, the 1st Battalion swung to the 

left of the road and took position on Hill 

432, close to the road. The 2d Battalion 

bypassed to the left of the I st Battalion 

and moved on Hill 504. Here, the 2d 

Battalion came under heavy fire from 

positions west of the town and was driven 

back. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion entered the low line of hills to the right of 

the road, fronting the plain. From these 

low hills, covered by Hills 432 and 504 on 

the left, the 3d Battalion was to debouch 

onto the plain and advance on Barrafranca in a frontal attack. But even as 

the 2d Battalion fought to get Hill 504, 

the Germans sent a column of tanks 

down into the plain toward the 3d Battalion. American light tanks (the 70th 

Light Tank Battalion) from positions on 

the rim of Hill 432 opened fire on the 

German tanks, but their guns were not 

heavy enough to be effective and a number of the light tanks lost out in the 

ensuing encounter. 

Though three supporting artillery battalions opened a steady fire on the approaching German armor, the advance 

was not halted. Unable to counter the 

tanks from its exposed positions on the 

low hills, the 3d Battalion pulled back 

across the road to Hill 432 where it tied 

in with the 1st Battalion and where the 

remaining light tanks continued their efforts to slow down the enemy armor. The 

3d Battalion's withdrawal also permitted 

the supporting artillery battalions to tum 

the plain into a killing zone. Concentration after concentration patterned the 

plain. Slowly the enemy drew back to 

Barrafranca; eight German tanks lay 

smoldering in the fields. 

In the afternoon, the reorganized 1st 

and 3d Battalions again made for Barrafranca. Their advance was unopposed; 

the Germans had gone. Immediately, the 

16th RCT moved up to keep the pressure 

on the withdrawing enemy. That night 

the 16th passed through Barrafranca, 

leapfrogged the 26th RCT, and pushed 

on to Pietraperzia. Though they met some 

resistance, the advance detachments occupied the high ground northeast of the 

town. Late on 17 July, the 16th forced 

a crossing over the Salso River and reached 

Highway 122.23 

The 1st Division's advance from Mazzarino was closely paralleled by that of 

the 45th Division. Faced with the extremely difficult task of moving his combat 

teams from the far east of the Seventh 

Army sector facing north to the center 

of the Seventh Army sector facing west, 

General Middleton, the 45th Division 

commander, at daylight on 16 July began 

to move his units, pulling them from 

right to left away from Highway 124.24 

The 15 7th RCT was the first to move; 

its front had been the first uncovered by 

23 16th, 18th, and 26th Inf Regt AAR's; 1St 

Inf Div G-3 Jnl; 753d Med Tk Bn AAR; 70th 

Lt Tk Bn AAR; 33d FA Bn AAR; 1St Inf Div 

Arty AAR. 

24 As General Middleton points out, the move 

had to be made through the rear areas of the 

1St Division and over a limited road net. See 

comments by Lt Gen Troy H. Middleton (Ret.) 

on MS. 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 233 

the 1St Canadian Division thrust along 

Highway 124. On trucks borrowed from 

other units throughout the II Corps zone, 

the combat team was forced to retrace 

its steps south to Highway I 15, through 

Gela, and then northwest toward its new 

sector. At midnight, 16 July, after a 

ride of almost ninety miles, the 15 7th 

RCT reached Mazzarino. Close behind 

came the 753d Medium Tank Battalion 

and two battalions of division artillery. 

Four hours later, at 0400, 17 July, the 

I57th jumped off in the attack. It 

passed through Pietraperzia, already 

cleared by the 1St Division, and went up 

to the Salso River where a demolished 

bridge stopped its advance. By nightfall 

crossing sites had been reconnoitered, and 

at 0100 on 18 July the I57th RCT crossed 

with Caltanissetta as the first objective 

and, if opposition proved weak, Santa 

Caterina (another ten miles away) the 

final objective. 

The attack met no serious opposition. 

By 1600, Caltanissetta was secured and 

three hours later Santa Caterina fell. 

Practically the only opposition came when 

patrols pushing out from Santa Caterina 

along Highway 121 ran into a strong, 

Italian-defended roadblock which had 

been established the day before at Portella 

di Recattivo, one of several bottlenecks on 

the highway. There was no town here, 

but the road at this point had narrow 

curves and a steep incline. Moreover, 

it was close to one of the rare side roads 

which ran through the barren, hilly area 

to Highway 120, and thus was an important point for the enemy to hold.25 

25 157th Inf Regt AAR, 18 Jul 43; MS #R141 (Bauer), pp. 30-33. The designation "Portella" whieh appears frequently on Sicilian maps 

-literally translated "narrow passage"-indicates 

a particularly difficult spot in the road net. 

The rest of the 45th Division, following the same difficult route traversed by 

the I57th RCT, closed in the Caltanissetta area on 18 July. From all appearances, and though it was now held up at 

Portella di Reccativo, the 15 7th had scored 

a clean breakthrough of the enemy's defensive line and little or no resistance appeared to confront the division farther to 

the west. In contrast to the I st Division, 

which confronted the Enna loop and an 

apparently strong enemy force, the 45th 

Division appeared ready for a dash on 

Palermo.26 

The Germans had indeed fallen back. 

General Rodt, commander of the 15th 

Panzer Grenadier Division, had received 

orders from General Guzzoni to withdraw 

northeastward and to take up a defensive 

line running from Agira to Leonforte and 

on to Nicosia and Gangi to block an American advance from the west into the Catania area. As an additional measure, 

Guzzoni ordered Group Schreiber (minus 

Group Fullriede, which returned to Rodt's 

control) to pull back from Serradifalco 

to Alimena and Portella di Reccativo to 

hold the roads open for the passage of 

the German division. By evening of 17 

July, Group Schreiber was in position 

and fighting off the 157th RCT thrust 

from Santa Caterina. 

General Rodt had started his rearward 

movement during the evening of 16 July. 

Group Ens drew back from Barrafranca, 

passed Valguarnera, and by daylight, 17 

July, was in positions in the hills northeast and northwest of that town, opposing the advance of the 1 st Canadian 

Division. Group Fullriede by that same 

morning had fallen back to a westward26 157th, I79th, and 180th Inf Regt AAR's; 

45th Inf Div G-3 Jnl; 45th Inf Div Arty AAR; 

II Corps Rpt of Opns. 
234 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

SIGNAL CORPS LINEMEN setting up wire installations in Caltanissetta, 18 July. 

facing salient running from the southwest 

to the northwest of Enna in line with 

the Imera River. From these positions, 

the German unit could maintain fire on 

the 1st Division advancing across the base 

of the Enna 100p.27 

27 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 93-

95; Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 192-95, 201-04; MS 

#C-095 (Senger); IT 99a, 16 Jul 43; MS #C077 (Rodt); OB SUED, Meldungen, 16 Jul 43, 

Second Report, and 17 Jul 43, First Report; Rpt, 

Liaison Staff at Sixth Army to OKH, 17 Jul 43, 

OB SUED, Meldungen . 

Discord and Harmony 

Even as General Patton prepared to 

thrust to Palermo, General Alexander became increasingly worried about the problems of clearing the Messina peninsulathe "long, mountainous, isosceles triangle 

with the great mass of Etna filling its 

base." 28 The German withdrawal from 

the west to a strong defensive line across 

the base of the peninsula was becoming 

apparent, and General Alexander was 

28 Alexander Despatch, p. 12. 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 235 

anxious for the British Eighth Army to 

strike hard around both sides of Mount 

Etna before the Germans could get set.29 

With this hope in mind, the army 

group commander on 16 July issued a 

new directive. In reality, this was nothing more than a modification of his 13 

July order, slight at best, made to conform 

with what appeared to be a quick Eighth 

Army sweep around the western slopes of 

Mount Etna and the failure of the British 

13 Corps to break through to Catania on 

the east coast. General Alexander for the 

first time spelled out his plan to exploit from the "firm line" -a term he 

used to refer to positioning Eighth Army 

along a line from Catania in the east to 

Enna in the west. 

General Montgomery was to drive into 

the Messina peninsula along three main 

axes: along the east coast road through 

Catania; to Adrano on Highway 121 in 

order to cut the enemy's lateral communications; and from Nicosia around the 

western slopes of Mount Etna. If the 

30 Corps could reach the north coast and 

cut the island in two, General Montgomery would no longer have to fear an attack against his left flank and could 

concentrate on getting to Messina. 

The major task of the Seventh Army, 

its only task, was m protect the Eighth 

Army's rear. General Patton was to do 

this by securing the Enna loop area, which 

would cut important roads, and by advancing to the north coast on the British 

left. Apparently ignorant of General 

Truscott's reconnaissance in force, by then 

substantially completed, General Alexander authorized the seizure of Agrigento 

and Porto Empedocle. As for Palermo, 

29 Ibid.; Intervs, Mathews with Alexander, lOIS Jan 43, pp. I I, IS. 

or even the lesser course of moving beyond Agrigento, Alexander said nothing. 

For Patton and Bradley, the outlook 

seemed dim. Montgomery was to get the 

first prize, Messina; the Americans were to 

be denied even the consolation prize, 

Palermo.30 

Having accepted General Alexander's 

earlier directive without audible comment, Patton was "mad as a wet hen" 

when he got the new directive. What 

rankled was not the assignment of Messina to the British (and with it assignment 

of three of the four main roads leading 

to Messina) but what he considered a 

slight to the U.S. Army: the passive mission of guarding Montgomery's rear. 

The directive also knocked out Patton's 

hope of gobbling up Palermo. 

After conferring with General Keyes, 

Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, and Brig. Gen. Hobart R. Gay, Patton decided to protest 

his asSigned mission, and he did so by 

presenting an alternate plan whereby the 

Seventh Army would make an enveloping 

attack on Palermo through Castelvetrano 

(sixty-eight miles west of Agrigento) and 

Corleone (fifty-eight miles northwest of 

Agrigento). Impinging in no way on 

Montgomery's operations, the plan led 

the Americans westward toward the only 

objective of consequence after Messina, 

Palermo. 

30 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-9; Alexander Despatch, p. 12; Nicholson, The Canadians 

in Italy, pp. 88, 92; Truscott, Command Missions, 

p. 22 I; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 140; Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entry I, 17 Jul 43. The 

directive was received in Seventh Army's headquarters at 2355, 16 July 1943. 

Montgomery (Eighth Army, page 102) states 

that Alexander decided on this course of action 

on IS July. 
236 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Meeting with Alexander in La Marsa, 

Tunisia, on 17 July, Patton argued his 

case. Since the enemy had been knocked 

back, he declared, aggressive action was 

not only imperative but the only way to 

give Montgomery complete protection of 

his left flank and rear. An American 

drive to Palermo would split the enemy 

forces irreparably. Alexander reluctantly 

agreed and gave his consent to Patton's 

proposal. 

At the same time, General Lucas was 

meeting with Maj. Gen. Lowell Rooks, 

the AFHQ G-3, General Eisenhower being absent from Algiers on that day. Not 

until General Eisenhower returned on the 

20th could Lucas unburden his soul. By 

then his resentment over seeming British 

determination to keep the Americans in a 

secondary role had been erased by news 

that Alexander had accepted Patton's 

plan. In any case, Lucas thought the 

situation was rapidly becoming dangerous 

and that something should be done about 

it. General Eisenhower stated that he 

had never encountered a case where the 

British had deliberately tried to put something over on the Americans. In the 

circumstances, Eisenhower continued, Alexander should not be blamed for being 

cautious. But, said Eisenhower, Patton 

should be made to realize that "he must 

stand up to Alexander" or else Eisenhower 

would relieve Patton from his command.31 

Whereas there was widespread indignation among American officers regarding 

the original scheme of maneuver, British 

officers apparently were hardly aware of 

31 Lucas Diary, pt. I, pp. 82-83; Patton, War 

As I Knew It, p. 380; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 

pp. 140, 144; Butcher, My Three Years with 

Eisenhower, p. 368; OPD 201 Wedemeyer, A. C., 

201 Security, case 5; Seventh Army Rpt of 

Opns, p. D-IO (a true copy of the map showing Patton's proposed plan). 

this feeling. Patton was the only American officer to raise the point about pushing out to the west, and until he went to 

Alexander the army group commander did 

not know how strongly the Americans 

felt about carrying out only a passive 

role. When confronted with this sentiment, Alexander realized that he probably 

could not restrain Patton indefinitely 

from pushing out; if he waited too long 

Patton would probably say, "To hell with 

this," and push out anyway. With the 

situation then developing and with the 

enemy withdrawing into the Messina peninsula, Alexander was now willing to 

go along with Patton's plan, albeit reluctantly.32 

Somewhat paradoxically, even as the 

element of disunity emerged between the 

British and Americans, the politically enforced co-operation between Germans and 

Italians on Sicily was going through a 

period of relative calm. Two command 

changes in the German structure might 

have led to friction, but both took place 

smoothly. 

The first was the arrival on 15 July of 

General Hube, XIV Panzer Corps commander, who was to take charge of all 

the German forces on the island. On the 

same day, Kesselring gave Colonel Baade 

increased responsibility for protecting the 

Messina Strait.33 

32Intervs, Mathews with Alexander, 10-15 

Jan 43, pp. 15-16. 

330KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VIl.43, 15 Jul 

43; ibid., 14 Jul 43. For organization of the German ferrying service, see MS #R-146, Facts, Figures, and Thoughts, ch. XVII of Axis Tactical 

Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943 (Bauer), 

pp. 27-38. See also Capt. S. W. Roskill, "History 

of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series," The War at Sea, 1939-1945, vol. 

III, pt. I, 1 June 1943-31 May 1944 (London: 

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960), pp. 143-

46. 
SEVENTH ARMY CHANGES DIRECTIONS 237 

After establishing his command post in 

the eastern portion of the island, Hube 

reported to General Guzzoni on 16 July 

and was briefed on Guzzoni's plans for 

the Italian XVI Corps to organize the 

Etna line as a final defensive line behind 

temporary positions toward which the 

Axis forces were then moving. When the 

two German divisions reached the forward 

defenses, Hube was to supplant General 

von Senger but remain under Guzzoni's 

tactical controp4 

Kesselring, too, visited Guzzoni's Sixth 

Army headquarters that day. He found 

no fault with Guzzoni's plans, both for 

deploying the troops in Sicily and for holding the Etna line. The two divisions in 

Hube's corps, the Hermann Goering and 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier, were to be 

held in reserve for counteroffensive operations provided they were not needed to 

man the line itself, though Kesselring 

agreed to let the latter relieve the Livarna Division in the line so that the 

Italian unit could have needed rest and 

rehabilitation. Kesselring promised to try 

to reinforce the troops on Sicily by dispatching units from the Italian mainland, and Guzzoni promised to capture the 

initiative as soon as possible. As a result 

of conversations during two days, Kesselring and Guzzoni, though aware that 

the Allies might resort to additional amphibious operations, agreed that they 

would not evacuate the island of Sicily.35 

34 Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 202-03, 220-2 I; 

Min, Riunione a Palazzo Venezia del 15.7.1943, 

IT 3037; IT gga, an. 31, and map, 15 Jul 43; 

MS #C-095 (Senger); see OB SUED, Meldungen for the dates in question. A description of 

the over-all situation as seen in OKW is contained in OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 15 

Jul 43. 

3" Comando Supremo, Liaison Staff with OB 

SUED, 18 Jul 43, sub: Notes on Conversation 

To forestall command difficulties, Guzzoni entrusted Hube's XIV Panzer Corps 

with the eastern sector of the front. He 

gave the Italian XII Corps responsibility 

for the western half. He placed the Italian XVI Corps in reserve and in command 

of the northeastern portion of Sicily, 

where it was to receive and process units 

expected from the mainland, in particular the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. 36 

Another problem Guzzoni tried to deal 

with was the Italian ferry service across 

the Strait of Messina. Though the Germans operated an independent ferry 

service with utmost regularity and started 

to move the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to Sicily (as authorized by Hitler 

on 19 July), the Italian movements were 

on the verge of breakdown. From all 

over Italy came Sicilians, including military personnel on leave, who converged 

on Reggio di Calabria, demanding transportation to the island on the pretext of 

defending their homeland. Many who 

reached the island disappeared at once, 

presumably having rushed off to join their 

families. Other Italian troops in Sicily 

used all their ingenuity to move in the 

other direction. In an attempt to tighten 

the water service, Guzzoni urged the 

Naval Base Messina commander to enforce rigid discipline and regulate traffic 

across the strait in the strictest conformance with military necessity.37 

Meanwhile, during the evening of 16 

With Kesselring, 16, I7 J ul 43, IT gga, an. 42; 

Telg, Armed Forces Command, Sicily to Comando Supremo, 0020, 18 Jul 43, IT gga, an. 

43· 

:If) IT gga, an. 5 I, signed Guzzoni. Effective 

2400, 18 July Ig43, Rube assumed tactical command over the Hermann Goering, the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier, and the Livorno Divisions. 

37 Faldella, La sbareo, pp. 203-04; IT gga. 
238 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

July, Guzzoni learned of the fall of Agrigento. The way was now open to the 

Americans to advance and cut off all the 

remainder of the XII Corps. The last 

moment had obviously come to move 

these forces to the east. Early on the 

following morning, Guzzoni ordered the 

XII Corps to begin withdrawing immediately to a defensive line running from 

Nicosia west along Highway 120 to Cerda. 

Two coastal divisions were to be left in 

place to ward off any Allied amphibious 

attack. 

The XII Corps thus had to execute a 

difficult tactical maneuver. The major 

units-the Assietta and Aosta Divisionsmobile in name only, had to make flanking movements from the west to east 

across the spearheads of the American 

columns advancing toward Palermo and 

the north coast. To defend Palermo, 

Guzzoni ordered Generale di Divisione 

Giovanni Marciani, commander of the 

208th Coastal Division, to take charge of 

all coastal units in and around Palermo 

and to keep the Palermo-Cerda portion of 

Highway I 13 open. All told, the Italians 

had almost 60,000 men in the western 

portion of Sicily, including the units at 

the Palermo and Marsala naval bases.3s 

The aura of accord between Italians 

and Germans in the face of adversity as 

demonstrated on Sicily failed to extend 

back to the Continent. Here, rifts in 

Italo-German unity widened to great 

proportions. 

38 Faldella, La sbarca, pp. 204-06. 
CHAPTER XIII 

The Drive to the Climax 

The Fellre Conference 

In the early summer of 1943 Benito 

Mussolini's hopes and plans were all 

based on a successful resistance to an 

Allied invasion of the Italian homeland. 

Though convinced that the Axis had lost 

the war, he was caught in the dilemma 

between Hitler's insistence on continuing 

the war and the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. The only solution 

seemed to be Victor Emmanuel's, for the 

King had, in May, given Mussolini three 

memorandmns suggesting a separation 

from Gennany as a means of terminating 

the war.1 M ussolini' s halfhearted efforts 

to convince Hitler of the need for peace 

had failed. Perhaps the Western Allies 

might relent in their demand for absolute 

defeat. Mussolini had therefore asked the 

King to give him three more months to 

prepare for a peace move.2 

The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Bastianini, on IS June had presented 

the Duce with a memorandum suggesting 

the close collaboration of Italy with the 

Danubian countries as the path to a 

political solution of the war. On I July, 

when Mussolini met with Ion Antonescu, 

and listened to the Rumanian premier 

speak long and openly in advocating a 

joint approach to the Western Powers, he 

apparently agreed except with respect to 

1 See above, pp. 43-44. 

2 MS #P-058, I Feb-8 Sep 43. Question 3. 

the tImmg. What he needed, he said, 

was a better bargaining position, an improved military situation, a time when the 

Italian Anny would have repulsed the 

then impending invasion of Sicily or Sardinia. Sometime later that month, though 

neither his political nor his military situation had ameliorated, he orally requested 

his ambassador at Madrid, the Marchese 

Giacomo Paulucci di Calboli, to sound 

out the Western Powers on a compromise 

peace.3 

The King, with great confidence in 

Mussolini's political skill, gave no encouragement to those who since February 

had suggested the dismissal or arrest of 

the Duce in order to save Italy from total 

defeat. The King considered Mussolini 

much better qualified to achieve a compromise peace than any of his possible 

successors. 

The entire Fascist propaganda system 

in early July turned to the theme of an 

impassioned defense of the homeland by 

the Italian anned forces and people. 

However indifferently the Italian soldier 

had previously fought in overseas theaters, 

Mussolini fully expected an improvement 

3 Bova Scoppa, Colloqui con due dittatori, pp. 

112-15; Gheorghe Barbul, Memorial Antonesco: 

Ie IIIe Homme de l'Axe (Paris: Editions de la 

Couronne, 1950), vol. I, p. 98; Cf. Andreas 

Hiligruber. Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall 

Antonescu: Die deutsch-rumiinischen Beziehungen 

1938-1944 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 

1954), p. 171. 
240 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

in fighting morale when the war reached 

I talian soil. He himself definitely proclaimed that the invaders would be hurled 

back at the shore line.4 

Always a journalist and therefore tending to regard the published account of 

an event as of equivalent importance to 

the action itself, Mussolini helped delude 

the Italian people with optimistic initial 

bulletins on the campaign in Sicily. The 

third bulletin, which on 12 July conceded 

the Allied occupation of the coast line 

from Licata to Augusta, pricked the bubble of popular enthusiasm and faith. 5 

With Allied success a rude jolt not only 

for the Italian people but for the Duce 

himself, who had believed his own propaganda, Mussolini had sent his impassioned 

plea to Germany for rescue. 

To Hitler and the OKW the complete 

failure of the defense of Sicily appeared 

to be due essentially to the collapse of the 

Italian armed forces-the refusal of the 

Italian units to fight. Colonel Schmalz 

had submitted through channels a critical 

report on the conduct of Contrammiraglio Priamo Leonardi at Augusta, accusing 

Leonardi of blowing up his guns and 

throwing his ammunition into the sea before the Allies arrived. Forwarding this 

report to Mussolini, OKW seemed to request Leonardi's punishment. In a personal reply to Mussolini's message for help, 

Hitler declared that he shared the view 

of the seriousness of the developments in 

Sicily, promised additional planes, but 

sharply criticized the faulty Italian ground 

organization for its failure to provide for 

protective dispersal of planes on the 

ground: "In the last three weeks alone 

4 Rintelen, Bundesgenosse, pp. 199, 206-07; 

Badoglio, Memorie e doeumenti, pp. 63-64; 

Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, p. 215. 

5 Mussolini, Storia di un anno, p. 1 I. 

in Sicily and southern Italy," he wrote, 

"there have been more than 320 fighter 

planes destroyed on the ground as a result of enemy aerial attack, a majority of 

which could have been employed against 

the enemy." 6 

Mussolini swallowed the bitter cup and 

on the same day that he received Hitler's 

message, 13 July, he assured Field Marshal Kesselring that the XIV Panzer Corps 

might be committed in Sicily. 

The Comando Supremo, much closer to 

the visible manifestations of Anglo-American power than the OKW, now concluded 

that continuation of the war was without 

military justification. In a memorandum 

presented to Mussolini on 14 July, Ambrosio stated: 

The fate of Sicily must be considered 

sealed within a more or less brief period. 

The essential reasons for the rapid collapse are: the absolute lack of naval opposition and the weak aerial opposition during 

the approach to the coast, the debarkation, 

the penetration of the adversary and during 

our counter offensive reactions; the inadequacy of the armament and of the distribution of our coastal divisions; the scarcity and 

lack of strength of our defensive works; the 

slight efficiency (armament and mobility) 

of Italian reserve divisions. 

I t is useless to search for the causes of 

this state of affairs: they are the result of 

three years of war begun with scanty means 

and during which the few resources have 

been burned up in Africa, in Russia, in the 

Balkans. 

The memorandum continued by stating 

that the Allies would be able to invade 

the Italian peninsula at will, unless the 

main weight of the Axis effort were 

shifted to the Mediterranean. A second 

6 Translation of Msg, Mussolini to Hitler, sent 

through OKW, in folder OKL, von Rhoden Collection, 4576/5; Msg, Hitler to Mussolini (Italian 

translation), 13 Jul 43, IT 3029, folder V, an. I. 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 

front would be opened up with the invasion of Italy, and as long as the Russian 

campaign continued there was no hope of 

Axis victory unless the constitution of 

such a second land front could be prevented. If not, "it pertained to the 

highest political authorities to consider 

if it be not appropriate to spare the country further fighting and defeats, and to 

anticipate the end of the struggle, given 

that the final result will undoubtedly be 

worse within one or a few years." What 

the Comando Supremo hoped for was that 

a meeting of the Duce and the Fuehrer 

could be arranged for a real showdown. 7 

Hitler's immediate military advisers in 

OKW also hoped for a showdown, for 

they were disgusted with the feeble Italian 

resistance in Sicily, with the ineptitude of 

Mussolini's government, and with the perpetual bickerings of Comando Supremo. 

On 14 July the OKW revised and brought 

up to date plans ALARICH (occupation 

of northern Italy by Rommel's Army 

Group B) and KONST ANTIN (reinforcement of German troops in the Balkans and Greece). 8 

On 15 July, JodI had reached the conclusion that Sicily could probably not be 

held. He advocated evacuating the troops 

from the island. Together with Rommel, 

he prepared a memorandum suggesting 

that Hitler make certain demands of Mussolini: for full unity of command in the 

Mediterranean theater under the Duce; 

for this supreme command over both 

7 Coman do Supremo, Appunto per il Duce, 

Prospettive operative nell' eventualita di perdita 

della Sicilia, 14 Jul 43, IT 112 (another copy in 

IT 3029, folder VI). The concluding' paragraph 

of the memorandum is printed in Francesco Rossi, 

Come arrivammo all' armistizio (Cernusco sui 

Naviglio: Garzanti, 1946), p. 41. 

B OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3 I. VII.43, 14 Jul 43. 

241 

German and Italian ground forces to be 

entrusted to a German commander in 

chief, most likely Rommel; for the key 

positions in Comando Supremo to be 

filled with officers whom the Germans 

considered competent and trustworthy; 

and for a unified command of the air 

forces under Feldmarschall Wolfram 

Freiherr von Richthofen. 9 

Meeting on 17 July with Doenitz, 

Keitel, JodI, Rommel (who was present 

only during part of the conference), and 

others, Hitler admitted that Sicily could 

not be held. The units were to be 

denied no supplies, but ultimately they 

would have to withdraw. For the moment, until the issues with Italy were 

clarified, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was not to be moved to Sicily. If 

Italy collapsed politically, the Germans 

would execute ALARICH and take over 

the positions formerly held by Italian 

units. In this case, the Germans would 

have to withdraw to a shorter line in 

Italy, for "without the Italian army we 

cannot hold the entire Italian peninsula." 

If there was no political collapse in Italy, 

the Germans could defend the entire 

Italian peninsula, but only with Mussolini's full support. JodI accordingly urged 

Hitler to present Mussolini with his memorandum of 15 July as an ultimatum. 

Or, Hitler had to convince the Duce of 

the need to take radical measures to improve Italian morale. The Italian Army 

was demoralized, Hitler declared, and 

only the most severe measures, like those 

taken by the French in 1917 or by Stalin 

in 194 I, could save it. As for the com90KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 15 Jul 

43; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 27-29. 

Some inkling of this German plan reached the 

Italian Government. See Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 359-60; Dino Alfieri, Due dittatori 

di fronte (Milan: Rizzoli, 1948), p. 306. 
242 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

petent Italian officers available, Rommel 

mentioned Roatta. Though the Germans 

considered him abler than the others, they 

did not trust him and thought him devoid 

of character. Hans Georg von Mackensen, 

Ambassador to Italy, suggested-and Hitler decided to say nothing about it to 

Mussolini--that Rommel become the German commander in chief in Italy. Still 

hoping that the Fuehrer would present 

an ultimatum to M ussolini and secure 

unified command under a German general, JodI urged the value of a political 

revolution in Italy that would eliminate 

the monarchy and retain Mussolini in 

full power. 10 

On 18 July Mussolini adopted the 

view of the Comando Supremo and sent 

Hitler a long telegram. He refuted the 

charge that the Italian units had failed 

to fight; he criticized the delay in the 

dispatch of German reinforcements. The 

final paragraphs, which followed closely 

the Comando Supremo's memorandum 

of 14 July, were ominous: 

In Italy the enemy has opened up the second front on which the enormous offensive 

possibilities of England and America will be 

concentrated, not only to conquer Italy but 

also to open up the Balkan route precisely 

at the moment irY which Germany is heavily 

committed on the Russian front. 

The sacrifice of my country cannot have 

as its principal purpose that of delaying a 

direct attack on Germany. 

Germany is stronger economically and 

militarily than Italy. My country, which 

entered the war three years earlier than was 

foreseen and after it already had engaged in 

two wars, has step by step exhausted itself, 

burning up its resources in Africa, Russia, 

and the Balkans. 

10 Min of Conf of CinC with Fuehrer at Hq 

Wolfsschanze, 17 Jul 43, ONI, Fuehrer Confer· 

ences, 1943; Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Pri· 

vate KTB, 9 May 1943-6 September 1943, entries 

for I7 and 18 July, copy in OCMH (X-743). 

I believe, Fuehrer, that the time has come 

for us to examine the situation together attentively, in order to draw from it the consequences conforming to our common interests 

and to those of each of our countries.ll 

It was not, then, that the faithful Duce's 

work was being sabotaged by his incompetent collaborators as Hitler had hitherto 

preferred to believe: M ussolini himself 

was weakening. The Fuehrer immediately forgot his fears of being poisoned 

and discarded the scruples which had restrained him since the spring from visiting 

Italy. In the greatest haste arrangements 

were made for a new meeting of the two 

dictators at Feltre in northern Italy. 

Hitler's whole purpose was to put Mussolini back on the rails. F or this reason 

he discarded the tentative plans for an 

ultimatum demanding German command 

in the Italian theater. In his own peculiar fashion Hitler again prepared to treat 

Mussolini with deference, to reinfuse him 

with faith in ultimate Axis victory, to concentrate his criticisms on the work of 

Mussolini's subordinates, and at the same 

time to offer whatever was possible in the 

way of German reinforcements. 12 

Mussolini was accompanied to Feltre 

by Ambrosio and Bastianini. Ambassador 

Dino Alfieri flew down from Berlin. The 

Italian delegation was not briefed in advance: neither the military men nor the 

diplomats had any knowledge of the purpose of the meeting. The military men, 

11 Telg, Mussolini to Hitler, 18 Jul 43, IT 3029. 

Rossi, in Come arrivammo, page 42, prints the 

final sentences of this telegram, states that it was 

drafted in the Coman do Supremo and presented 

to Mussolini on 18 July, but doubts that it was 

sent. It is filed in a folder marked Scambio 

messagi fra Fuehrer eDuce, and the folder heading describes it as telescritto allegato 2, which 

would indicate that it was sent. 

12 MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 32-33. 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 

however, had shown Mussolini the complete military weakness of Italy, and had 

prepared him for a frank declaration to 

Hitler that Italy could not continue the 

war. 

The plenary session consisted of one 

item: a harangue by Hitler which lasted 

a couple of hours and left everyone but 

himself worn out. Hitler made it quite 

clear that the faulty Italian ground organization was responsible for plane losses 

in Sicily and southern Italy. 

"If, as had happened," he declared, 

"some 300 or 400 machines out of 500 or 

600 were destroyed on the ground, that 

meant that the organization was bad." 

The Fuehrer said it was "absolutely intolerable that in Sicily, through unskillful 

and unsoldierly conduct of the ground 

personnel, on one day 27 machines should 

have been destroyed on the ground and 

on another day 25." 

Turning to the question of Sicily, Hitler 

said that "he was of two minds on this 

subject. If it were possible to insure the 

supply line, Sicily should be defended and 

at a certain point the defense should be 

transformed into an attack." He advised 

that Reichsmarshall Goering was prepared to concentrate a large number of 

flak batteries at Messina. It would be far 

better, Hitler urged, to fight the decisive 

battle in Sicily rather than in Italy. If 

such a decision were made, "Germany 

would send superior troops down there. 

Such a decision required great capacity in 

the way of leadership. What was now 

done in Sicily could not be recalled. 

Many German units must be despatched 

down there in order first to establish a 

defensive front and, following that, a front 

suitable for an attack." Italy, in such a 

case, should send additional divisions. 

Germany, Hitler said, did not have 2,000 

243 

planes available but would send two special 

bomber groupS.13 

During the course of Hitler's speech 

reports were brought in to M ussolini that 

the Americans were bombing Rome. Following a few questions by the Italian representatives the session ended. Hitler and 

Mussolini then had lunch together, apart 

from the rest. 

Ambrosio was perplexed and disillusioned. After the luncheon he, Bastianini, 

and Alfieri saw Mussolini and bitterly reproached him for his silence. They urged 

that it was his duty to save Italy from the 

situation into which he had plunged it, 

and that he should take the opportunity 

which still remained for direct contact with 

Hitler and explain the true situation. 

M ussolini, a sick man, listened impassively-made some dry remarks-but 

failed to pluck up his courageY 

Ambrosio had two discussions with 

Keitel during the course of the Feltre 

Conference. During the automobile trip 

from the Treviso airfield to the Villa 

Gaggia at Feltre the conversation was a 

brief bit of fencing, Ambrosio revealing 

what was in his mind and Keitel what 

was in Hitler's. Keitel asked for infor13 "Memorandum of Conversation Between 

the Fuehrer and the Duce in North Italy on 

July [9, [943," (translation from the German) 

U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XV, No. 349 

(6 October [946) 607-[4, 639; Breve sintesi 

questioni militari trattate al convegno di F eltre 

[9 luglio [943, IT 303 [, II; Relazione sopra Ie 

dichiarazioni del Fuehrer in occasione del suo incontro col Duce nell' [talia settentrionale il [9/ 

7/1943, IT 3029. With some artful deletions of 

Hitler's sharpest specific criticisms, this document 

is printed by Rossi, in Come arrivammo, pages 

324-35· 

14 MS #P-058, [ Feb-8 Sep 43, Question [; 

Alfieri, Due dittatori, pp. 3 [4-[6. See also: 

Castellano, Come /irmai, pp. 55-56; Badoglio, 

Memorie e documenti, pp. 64-65; Simoni, Ber· 

lino, Ambasciata, pp. 367-68. 
244 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

mation regarding Sicily and Ambrosio 

asked how things were going on the Russian front. The German replied in substance that they were wearing the Russians 

down. "This," said Ambrosio, "is not an 

active program but the renunciation of the 

initiative in operations. In substance the 

Axis is besieged, it is closed in a ring; it 

is necessary to get out. What prospects 

have you for doing this?" The question 

was eluded and the subject switched back 

to the Mediterranean. 15 

On the return trip Keitel again rode 

with Ambrosio, and, at Hitler's orders, 

the discussion was confined to those matters which Hitler had mentioned in his 

speech. If Italy would contribute two 

additional divisions, preferably Alpine 

divisions, then Germany, said Keitel, was 

prepared to send two additional divisions 

to reinforce Sicily and southern Italy. 

It was up to Italy to decide whether or 

not Sicily would be defended to the limit. 

Keitel declared that the two additional 

German divisions would be sent immediately once the Italian High Command 

made the decision to fight to the limit in 

Sicily. There were three essential points 

on which the OKW would insist: 

(I) From the tactical point of view, 

the increase of the forces so as to permit 

the forming of a strong line and with-

<lrawal of the mobile forces (15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division and Hermann Goering 

Division) to a secondary line; 

(2) From the operational point of view, 

the assurance of supplies and the creation 

15 Comando Supremo, 20 July 1943, Convegno 

ifi Feltre (19 luglio 1943): Sintesi primo colloquio Ecc. Ambrosio Mar. Keitel, IT 3029, folder 

VII, an. 3. Rossi, in Come arriuammo, pages 

335-36 prints a portion of this document, but 

his whole document, (pages 335-38) is incomplete 

and is a fusion of the record of two separate 

discussions. 

of a strong defense in Calabria and Puglia; 

(3) From the organizational point of 

view, firmness and rigor in arrangements 

giving maximum liberty to the military 

authorities of southern Italy for organizing and strengthening the defense-aviation fields, railroads, roads, depots, etc. 

Keitel reiterated the demand for a formal pledge by Italy to fight to the limit 

in Sicily and to accept the three points. 

Ambrosio promised to examine the possibility of sending two additional Italian 

divisions to Calabria. But as to the 

three points, which concerned the civil 

power, the decision would be placed before MussolinP6 

Planning the Western Sweep 

This friction on the Axis side obviously 

could not be so quickly nor so happily 

resolved as the relatively minor discord 

in the Allied camp. Having returned 

during the evening of 17 July from his 

visit to General Alexander's headquarters 

in North Africa, General Patton the next 

day issued his directive spelling out Palermo as the Seventh Army objective. 

General Bradley's II Corps (the I st and 

45th Divisions) was assigned a dual mission. First of all, using the 1st Division, 

the corps was to gain control of the western half of the Enna loop (the eastern 

half of the loop and Enna belonged to the 

Eighth Army). Thereupon, the I st Division was to strike for the north coast 

along the axis Alimena-Petralia-Cefalu, 

thus paralleling the advance of the British 30 Corps, which was expected to 

reach the north coast by using the axis 

16 Comando Supremo, 20 July 1943, Convegno 

di Feltre, IT 3029, folder VII, an. 4; OKWj 

WFSt, KTB, I.Vll.-31.VII.43, 19 Jul 43; Cf. 

Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 336-38. 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 

of Highway I 17 through Enna-NicosiaSanto Stefano di Camastra. 

Meanwhile, the 45th Division was to 

advance to the northwest toward Palermo, 

using Highway 121 as its main axis of 

advance. Once the division reached the 

north coast road, it was to wheel to the 

west and, if necessary, strike at Palermo. 

II Corps' eastern boundary, and the 

army's as well, was a line running due 

north from Enna to the north coast just 

west of Santo Stefano di Camastra. The 

corps' western boundary, and the boundary with the Provisional Corps, ran from 

Serradifalco (entered by the 3d Division 

on 18 July) northwestward to Palermo, 

paralleling Highway 12 I . 

On the II Corps left, the Provisional 

Corps was assigned the zone from Highway 121 (exclusive) on the east to the sea 

on the west and north. With the 82d 

Airborne and 3d Infantry Divisions, General Keyes was to advance on Palermo 

from the south and southwest. The 2d 

Armored Division was to remain in army 

reserve, follow the Provisional Corps advance, and be prepared to exploit a 

breakthrough or to extend the envelopment of Palermo to the west. 

General Patton designated three phase 

lines for control purposes, but he specified 

that the units were not to stop unless 

ordered to do so. He expected to coordinate the final assault on Palermo 

himself, and he planned to use the 2d Armored Division for the final thrust into 

the cityY 

Though the mountains in western Sicily 

17 Seventh Army Directive, 18 Jul 43, in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-I I, with accompanying opns map on p. D-12; Truscott, C ommand Missions, p. 222; Harry H. Semmes, Portrait 

of Patton (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 

Inc., 1955), p. 162. 

245 

are not high or rugged, they are not easy 

to cross. A network of secondary roads, 

spaced at intervals of about twenty miles, 

are good near the coast but become progressively poorer inland. Following the 

intermediate slopes and ridges rather than 

the valleys because of winter floods, the 

roads are easily blocked by demolition 

work. The towns, located on hilltops or 

on the upper slopes of the mountains, are 

difficult to approach, for the access roads 

are usually steep. The Platani and Belice 

Rivers, though insignificant as water 

courses during the dry summer season, 

run through valleys which offer excellent 

sites for interrupting road traffic. The 

Salso River, a potential barrier, had 

already been crossed by the 1st and 45th 

Divisions. The mountainous terrain and 

the poor road network would constitute 

the main obstacles to a rapid advance. 

Seventh Army intelligence officers 

painted a picture of fluidity on 19 July, 

noting the difficulty of locating the enemy 

front. They deemed the Italian units 

capable of only limited defensive action, 

but the Germans might be dangerous, 

even though they seemed to have withdrawn from the entire Seventh Army front 

in favor of final defensive positions protecting Messina.Is 

Four hours after Patton ordered the advance to Palermo, Seventh Army received 

General Alexander's written confirmation 

of approval. But instead of giving Patton 

carte blanche, Alexander imposed certain 

restrictions, conditions which he had not 

indicated to Patton during the conference 

the preceding day. Now Alexander said 

go ahead, and exploit, but first, capture 

Petralia; then send detachments to the 

18 Seventh Army Periodic Rpt 9, 19 J ul 43; 

G-2, G-3 J nl, Prov Corps, 16-2 I J ul 43. 
246 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

north coast from Petralia, cutting the island in two at Campofelice, eleven miles 

west of Cefalu; and, finally, establish the 

Seventh Army along a line running from 

Campofelice on the north coast, through 

Petralia, Santa Caterina, Caltanissetta, to 

Agrigento on the south coast-a long, 

curving line established across the width 

of Sicily that would provide protection 

to Eighth Army's rear as it swung around 

Mount Etna. Only then, after establishing this line, was the Seventh Army to 

advance and mop up the western end of 

the island. Alexander was willing to let 

Patton exploit, but only on his terms, and 

not on the terms laid down in the I 7 

July conference. 19 

General Gay, the Seventh Army's chief 

of staff, apparently kept Alexander's order 

from reaching the army commander. 

Instead, Gay used only the first portion 

of the message as an order to General 

Bradley to modify II Corps' instructions: 

the 1st Division was to advance through 

Petralia to the north coast, coming out 

now at Campofelice instead of at Cefaill. 

Gay ignored the rest of the message. 20 

1n Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entry 66, 18 Jul 

43, TOO 1820, is a copy of Seventh Army's 18 

July directive; entry 74. same file and date, TOR 

2220, is Alexander's directive. 

20 Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entry 85, 18 Jul 

43, TOO 2256, is a message to II Corps; II 

Corps G-3 Jnl, entry 43, 19 Jul 43, TOR 0401, 

is the message received in II Corps headquarters. 

According to Semmes (Portrait of Patton, page 

168), Gay saw to it that the message (after taking out the portion he planned to use) was a 

long time in being decoded and then, saying the 

original message had been garbled, asked 15th 

Army Group for a repeat. By the time this 

process was completed, the Seventh Army was on 

the outskirts of Palermo. 

There is no verification in Seventh Army's G3 Journal for this statement. But if Gay did hold 

General Bradley was disappointed at 

the role assigned to II Corps. He had 

wanted all along to join with the Eighth 

Army in a drive against Messina. Indeed, 

the II Corps commander completely misinterpreted the motives behind Patton's 

visit to Alexander's headquarters on the 

17th. Bradley thought that Patton was 

going to propose using the Seventh Army 

against Messina. Thus, Gay's message 

to II Corps on 19 July meant to General 

Bradley that the worst had come: Seventh Army would be confined to the 

western half of the island where "there 

was little to be gained" and where "there 

was no glory in the capture of hills, docile 

peasants, and spiritless soldiers." General 

Bradley sided with an officer from General Patton's staff who noted that after 

the Seventh Army reached the north 

coast "we can sit comfortably on our 

prats while Monty finishes the goddam 

war." 21 

But II Corps was encountering problems of its own in the loop area south 

and west of Enna. The corps mission 

had called for the securing of Caltanissetta and Highway 122 by dark on 19 

July. The first objective had been taken 

care of. To secure the highway within 

II Corps' zone, which would also secure 

up the message, he almost certainly would also 

have seen to it that no entry would be made in 

the journal where Patton would probably have 

picked it up. Semmes further states that Patton 

did not know of Gay's action until days afterward. Be that as it may, the Seventh Army did 

not delay the start of the advance, moved without the southern half of the loop area being 

established, and reached Palermo before cutting 

the island in two. Semmes' story, apparently 

based on an interview with General Gay, gains 

strong credence from the course of these operations. 

21 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 140, 144. 
CALTANISSETTA, SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE ENNA Loop 
248 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the American portion of the loop, General 

Bradley decided that, while the 45th Division was taking Santa Caterina, the 1st 

Division would move as far as Santa 

Caterina, turn eastward on Highway 12 I , 

and take the small town of Villarosa, 

seven miles northwest of Enna. With 

elements of the two divisions along this 

road, Highway 122 would be secure from 

an enemy attack from the north. The 

Canadians on the right, then nearing 

Enna, would secure the highway from the 

east. 

Accordingly, the 18th RCT moved to 

Santa Caterina on the evening of 18 July, 

and next morning, the 19th, started eastward toward Villarosa. Though some 

German resistance slowed the 18th RCT 

at the stream crossing some three miles 

west of Villarosa, by noon the combat 

team had forced a crossing and was on 

high grand overlooking the approaches to 

the town. 

By this time, however, the new Seventh 

Army directive had arrived. This called 

for a change in the 1St Division's mission, 

from one of securing the loop area to 

~me of pushing on to the north coast. 

Before General Bradley could draw up 

his own plans to carry out the army's 

directive, word came from the 1St Division 

that the British 30 Corps, which had 

finally cleared Piazza Armerina on the 

morning of the 17th but then had been 

delayed by strong German resistance 

farther along Highway I 17, had also received new orders: the 30 Corps was 

now to bypass Enna to the east and advance instead on Leonforte and Assom. 

The I st Canadian Division, which had 

been leading the corps advance, was now 

to swing its axis of advance to the north. 

This was in keeping with a new Eighth 

Army plan which called for a renewed 

push on :Messina. On the night of 17 

July, the British 50th Division had tried 

once again to break through into Catania; 

again, a breakthrough had not been made. 

General Montgomery then decided to 

shift the weight of his advance to the 13 

Corps left flank. He brought the British 

5th Division up on the left of the 50th 

Division and directed an attack toward 

Misterbianco. But here, too, the Germans offered stubborn resistance, and the 

5th Division could do little more than 

draw even with the 50th Division's 

bridgehead north of the Simeto River. 

I t soon became apparent to General 

Montgomery that the Eighth Army was 

not strong enough to encircle Mount Etna 

on both sides. Accordingly, he got General Alexander's permission to bring in 

his reserve, the British 78th Infantry Division, from North Africa. This would 

enable the Eighth Army to shift the main 

axis of its advance from the east coast 

highway to the western side of Mount 

Etna. If sufficient pressure could be 

brought to bear there, Montgomery felt, 

the Germans would have to withdraw 

from their Catania positions. Until the 

78th Division arrived, the 13 Corps, on 

the east, was to confine itself to patrol 

activity to keep the Germans pinned down 

at Catania. The 30 Corps was to continue 

pushing the 1st Canadian Division around 

Mount Etna, not on the route originally 

planned, that through Nicosia and Ran~ 

dazzo, but instead, to the northeast. Before reaching Enna, the division was to 

take the secondary road leading from Highway I 17 to Leonforte, and push along 

Highway 121 toward Agira and Regalbuto. 

General Montgomery planned to commit 

the 78th Division in the 30 Corps zone, 

but he could not do so before I August. 

On that date, Montgomery hoped to start 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 

the final offensive to throw the Axis forces 

out of Sicily.22 

General Bradley, whose II Corps had 

been tied in tightly with the 30 Corps 

since I I July, felt that the change in 

British plans endangered his right flank 

too much to be ignored. Unwilling to 

take any chances on the Germans using 

this entree from Enna into his rear areas, 

Bradley dashed off a note to General Leese 

and told him of his intention to take Enna: 

"I have just learned you have sideslipped 

Enna leaving my flank exposed. Accordingly, we are proceeding to take Enna at 

once even though it is in your sector. I 

assume we have the right to use any of 

your roads for this attack." Leese, who 

had assumed that his staff had notified the 

Americans of the bypassing of Enna and 

the shift in the Canadian axis of advance, 

replied immediately. Bradley, he said, 

was to use whatever roads he needed to 

take the town.23 

With this settled, Bradley then told 

General Allen to send the 18th RCT into 

Villarosa and then against Enna from 

the west, while the 16th 'RCT advanced to the north from its Salso River 

crossings to strike Enna from the south. 

Until such time as the Enna situation was 

clarified, General Bradley was going to 

send the 1st Division neither to Petralia 

nor to the north coast.24 

22 Alexander Despatch, pp. 25-26; Nicholson, 

The Canadians in Italy, pp. 95-102; Montgomery, Eighth Army, pp. 104-06; Aris, The Fifth 

British Division, pp. 123-29. 

23 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 143; II Corps 

G-3 Jnl, entry 61,19 Jul 43; II Corps G-3 

Jnl, entry 90, 20 Jul 43 (a letter from Bradley 

to Patton outlining what had happened at Enna 

and giving Bradley's strong feelings toward having his right flank left open); II Corps G-3 Jnl, 

entry 96, 20 Jul 43 (Bradley's letter to Leese). 

24 II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 9-10; II Corps 

G-3 Jnl, entry 80, 19 Jul 43 (a copy of Bradley's 

verbal orders to Allen). 

249 

The 45th Division, on the other hand, 

was not involved in the Enna crisis. To 

General Middleton's Thunderbirds, then, 

fell the task of cutting the island in two. 

By the afternoon of 18 July, the 45th Division was ready to go for the north coast. 

The 180th RCT began moving up to pass 

through the 157th RCT. Once this had 

been accomplished, and the Italian roadblock at Portell a di Reccativo cleared, the 

180th was to continue pushing just as 

hard as it could along Highway 12 I. The 

north coast was eighty miles away; it 

would take aggressive and hard-hitting 

leadership to get the 45th Division to the 

sea. 

Elsewhere, the Provisional Corps, without a worrisome problem like that faced 

by General Bradley's II Corps, regrouped 

its newly assigned forces for the thrust at 

Palermo. Drawing a boundary that extended from Agrigento northwestward between Highway I 15 on the south and 

Highway 118 on the north, General Keyes 

disposed the 82d Airborne Division, reinforced by the 39th RCT (from the 9th 

Division), on the left and the 3d Infantry 

Division on the right. Both divisions were 

to advance by phase lines; both were to 

advance within their zones and were not 

to halt at the phase lines unless ordered 

to do so by corps headquarters; and both 

were to get to the north coast and to 

Palermo as rapidly as po&<;ible. 

By the late afternoon of 18 July, the 

Provisional Corps was ready to go for 

Palermo. In a meeting held during the 

early evening, General Keyes passed the 

word: the attack would begin at 0500 

the following morning, 19 July.25 

25 Prov Corps FO I, 18 J ul 43; Prov Corps 

Rpt of Opns, p. 3; Truscott, Command Missions, 

p. 224; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 73; 82d AB Div FO 

2, 18 Jul 43; Ketterson, 82d AB Div in Sicily 

and Italy, p. 14. 
250 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

GENERAL RIDGWAY AND STAFF at the edge of Ribera near the 2d Armored Division assembly area. 

The Pounce on Palermo 

Jumping off on I9 July for Palermo, 

more than a hundred miles away, the 

Provisional Corps would strike through 

rough, mountainous country for the first 

fifty miles, then through forty miles of 

undulating interior plateau terrain, and 

finally through rugged highlands blocking 

Palermo on the west and south. (Map 

VII) 

The advance turned out to be little 

more than a road march. Swarms of 

planes struck at targets of opportunity. 

Naval vessels standing by to render gunfire support were, as it turned out, not 

needed. On this same day, Hitler and 

Mussolini were meeting at Feltre; on this 

day, too, more than 500 U.S. heavy 

bombers struck in the first large-scale Allied bombing attack on Rome. 

The initial advance forecast the shape 

of things to come. Paratroopers of Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry 

swept through the 39th Infantry two 

hours ahead of schedule, and six hours 

later had crossed the Platani River, seventeen miles from their starting point. A 

demolished bridge had threatened to hold 

up the advance, but quick engineer work 

produced a vehicular bypass, and the 

movement continued with hardly a stop. 

Reconnaissance troops screer.ing the advance brushed aside the few opposing 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 251 

MORTAR SQUAD PREPARIKG TO ATTAC K SANTO STEFANO in the drive on Palermo, 20 July. 

Italians. A few rounds of cannon fire, a 

few rounds of small arms fire, the deployment of a squad or two of infantry, were 

usually enough to convince the Italians 

they had no chance of success. 

The most serious resistance occurred in 

early afternoon, when an Italian antitank 

gun concealed in a pillbox across the 

Verdura River fired on the lead American 

vehicle-a 7s-mm. gun mounted on a 

half-track. Backing off, the half-track 

slid into a fairly deep ditch. Fortunately, 

when the vehicle came to rest, its gun 

pointed directly at the pillbox. The 

gunner opened fire at once. As the reconnaissance troops deployed along the 

river bank, and as the supporting weapons- machine guns, mo,rtars, and several 

37-mm. guns-began to fire, seventy Italian soldiers came out of their positions 

with their hands held high. 

By nightfall, when General Keyes halted 

the advance, the paratroopers had gained 

twenty-five miles. 

The second day's advance was the 

same-scattered Italian garrisons offering little resistance, occasional mine fields, 

and surrendering enemy troops. By the 

end of the day, the Americans were in 

possession of Sciacca and its abandoned 

airfield and had moved another twenty 

miles toward Palermo. 

Convinced that the lack of resistance 

offered an opportunity for armored ex-
252 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

THE 2D ARMORE D DIVISION ROL LS I NTO PALERMO and an enthusiastic welcome. N ote white 

surrender flags. 

ploitation, Keyes decided to commit General Gaffey's 2d Armored Division. With 

General Patton's approval, Keyes ordered 

Gaffey to assemble his division, which 

stretched over an area of more than 

twenty-five miles between Ribera and 

Agrigento. While the armor assembled, 

Keyes formed Task Force X, composed of 

the two Ranger Battalions (reinforced by 

artillery and the 39th Infantry, which had 

landed just three days before ), and put it 

under Colonel Darby for another push to 

the west. The task force was to secure 

the Belice River line astride Highway I 15, 

and then push on through Castel vetrano 

to establish a line covering the flank of 

the armored division as it moved into an 

assembly area along the Belice River line. 

At the same time, Keyes turned Ridgway's 

82d Airborne Division north to cover the 

armored division's assembly along the 

Belice River line on the east. From this 

assembly area, the 2d Armored Division 

was to thrust to the northeast to take 

Palermo. 

Wasting little time assembling the units 

to make up Task Force X, Darby moved 

out from Menfi on the morning of 2 I July. 

Because the Italians had demolished both 

the highway and railroad bridges across 

the Belice River and because the river 

was a hundred feet wide and four feet 

deep, engineer support was needed to get 

the task force vehicles across. Pending 

the arrival of engineers, Darby directed 

one of the Ranger battalions to ford the 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 253 

GENERAL KEYES AND ITALIAN GENERAL MOLINERO enter Palermo together following surrender 

of the city. 

river to establish a bridgehead. Pillboxes 

and field fortifications on the far side 

might have been used to obstruct the 

crossing, but the Italians had abandoned 

them. By the time the battalion had a 

secure bridgehead, Rose's CCA of the 2d 

Armored Division had arrived. His engineers lost little time constructing a 

bridge. 

While waiting for the bridge, a reconnaissance platoon of Darby's force managed to snake several light tanks and jeeps 

across the river. After removing a mine 

field along the highway, the platoon raced 

to Castelvetrano where four hundred 

Italians surrendered without a fight. 

After a bridge was in, Darby sent his 

regiment of infantry, the 39th under Lt. 

Col. John J. Toffey, Jr., in pursuit of the 

reconnaissance platoon, which was by then 

rushing toward Akamo, thirty-five miles 

to the northeast and only twenty-seven 

miles from Palermo. At Akamo 800 Italians surrendered and a large stock of 

gasoline was discovered. 

Moving like wildfire through the Task 

Force X zone of advance, Rangers and 

infantry collected almost 4,000 Italian 

prisoners that day. The time was obviously ripe for a swift thrust and Rose 

moved his units across the river and 

prepared for what Patton would later 

characterize- despite the paucity of opposition-as "a classic example of the use of 

tanks." 26 

"(; Semmes, Portrait of Patton, p. 163. 
254 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Meanwhile, Truscott's 3d Division, 

after marching to the Belice River in three 

days of grueling effort, was also ready to 

drive on Palermo. The division's advance, like that of the units following the 

coastal road, had been marked for the 

most part by only spotty enemy resistance. 

By this time, too, the 45th Division, which 

had been driving for Palermo, had been 

diverted farther to the east, and its plan 

now was to come out on the north coast 

near Termini Imerese, thirty miles east of 

Palermo. 

As events developed, there was to 

be no concentrated, powerful assault on 

Palermo. Both the 3d Division and the 

2d Armored Division by the evening of 

22 July were in position to launch such 

an assault. But the city's defenders and 

the civilian population had had quite 

enough of the war and were willing to 

give up without a fight. In fact, one 

delegation of civilians arrived at the 7th 

Infantry's command post in the early 

afternoon of the 22d and offered to surrender the city to Brig. Gen. William W. 

Eagles, the 3d Division's assistant commander. The offer was declined; General 

Eagles had instructions from General Truscott that General Keyes was to accept the 

surrender of the city. 

General Marciani, commander of the 

Italian defense forces, fell prisoner to the 

82d Reconnaissance Battalion, and the 

final act of the drama devolved on Generale di Brigata Giuseppe Molinero, the 

commander of Port Defense UN," Palermo. Late in the afternoon, one of 

CCA's patrols returned with General 

Molinero; the patrol had pushed into the 

city without encountering any oppos~U.on. 

Molinero offered to surrender the city to 

General Keyes. Together with the Italian general, Generals Keyes and Gaffey 

entered Palermo. At the royal palace, 

shortly after 1900, 22 July, the American 

officers formally accepted Palermo's surrender. With this, General Patton, trying to get up to the armored division's 

leading elements, sent word to occupy the 

city. At 2000, from the east and from 

the west, the two American divisions 

marched into the largest city on the island. 

General Patton, with Colonel Perry, the 

2d Armored Division's chief of staff, serving as guide, threaded his way into 

Palermo an hour later. Palermo was 

his. 27 

Denouement 

After the capture of Palermo, only the 

now isolated ports of western Sicily remained to be mopped up. Early on 23 

July, Keyes instructed General Ridgway 

to shift the 82d Airborne Division from 

the Belice River line, move behind the 2d 

Armored Division, and seize Trapani and 

the extreme western tip of the island. 

Colonel White's CCB, 2d Armored Division, was to take care of the port cities 

along the north coast east of that line, 

a move accomplished the same day. To 

assist in the mopping-up operations, General Ridgway was given Colonel Darby's 

27 For details of the pounce on Palermo see: 

Prov Corps Rpt of Opns; Ketterson, 82d AB Div 

in Sicily and Italy; 39th Inf Regt AAR; Col. 

Paul A. Disney, Operations of the 82d Armored 

Reconnaissance Battalion in the Sicilian Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1947), file X2253.53; 7th, 15th, and 30th Inf Regt AAR's; 

1st, 3d, and 4th Ranger Bn AAR's; 3d Inf Div 

in Sicilian Campaign, 19-23 J ul 43; 82d AB Div, 

2d Armd Div, 3d Inf Div, 45th Inf Div, II Corps, 

and Seventh Army G-3 Jnls; Truscott, Command 

Missions, pp. 222-27; Patton, War As I Knew 

It, pp. 61-62; Semmes, Portrait of Patton, pp. 

163, 165; Comments of Maj Gen William W. 

Eagles on MS; Comments of Gen Truscott on 

MS. 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 

Task Force X. Accordingly, the airborne 

division commander directed Darby to 

Marsala (twenty-seven miles west of 

Castelvetrano); Colonel Gavin and the 

505th Parachute Infantry to Trapani 

(nineteen miles north of Marsala); and 

Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry to Castellammare (forty miles north of 

Castel vetrano ) . 

At noon on 23 July, Colonel Darby 

moved the 39th RCT west along Highway 

I 15 toward Marsala. By late afternoon 

the RCT was halted by a demolished 

bridge over the Marsala River and as 

engineers moved forward to construct a 

bypass, enemy artillery began shelling 

the crossing site. Colonel Toffey, the 

RCT commander, thereupon decided to 

halt his advance for the night. Early 

the following morning, 24 July, Toffey 

sent two battalions across the river under 

covering fire laid down by the 26th Field 

Artillery Battalion and quickly overran 

the city. 

Meanwhile, on the 23d, Colonel Gavin 

had started his 505th Parachute Infantry 

moving by truck toward his objectiveTrapani. Without opposition, the column rolled through Santa Ninfa and 

Salemi, then to Highway I 13, where it 

turned and started west for Trapani. 

The motor march proved to be a pleasant 

parade; all along the route west of Santa 

Ninfa the local population exuberantly 

welcomed the paratroopers, showering the 

Americans with fruit, bread, and chocolate-the fruit obviously home-grown, the 

chocolate obviously pilfered from abandoned Italian military stores. 

The mood suddenly changed at 1600 

just before the column reached the eastern 

outskirts of Trapani. Here, the lead 

vehicles ran into a defended roadblock 

and mine fields, and as the advance guard 

255 

detrucked and deployed to return the 

small arms fire, the Italians, from positions on the hills southwest and north of 

the city, laid down a concentration of 

artillery fire on the road. 

F or the next two or three hours the 

Italians kept up a steady drumfire of 

largely ineffective shelling. While the 

paratroopers moved against the roadblock, 

the 376th Parachute Field Artillery and 

the 34th Field Artillery Battalions rolled 

onto position and began answering the 

Italian fire. This fire, coupled with the 

clearing of the roadblock and the envelopment of the positions in the hills, persuaded Contrammiraglio Giuseppe Manfredi, commander of the Trapani naval 

district, to give up the fight, the city, and 

his sword and field glasses. Even as 

Gavin's men entered Trapani, the trucks 

which had transported the unit this far 

turned and headed back to shuttle the 

504th Parachute Infantry to its objective 

on the north coast. By noon, 24 July, 

the 504th was in Alcamo; by 1730, in 

Castellammare.28 

The Provisional Corps' combat operations in Sicily ended on this happy note. 

At a cost of 272 casualties (57 killed, 

170 wounded, 45 missing), the corps 

captured 53,000 of the enemy (mostly 

Italians), and killed or wounded another 

2,900. In addition, a grab bag filled 

with 189 guns of 75-mm. caliber or 

larger, 359 vehicles, and 4 I tanks was 

collected. For the rest of its existence, 

until 20 August, the Provisional Corps 

would concentrate on garrisoning and administering western Sicily. For the 2d 

Armored Division and the 82d Airborne 

28 Prov Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 8; Ketterson, 

82d AB Div in Sicily and Italy, pp. 16-17; 39th 

Inf Regt AAR; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 74-75. 
256 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Division, the fighting in Sicily was over, 

and under Provisional Corps control, they 

settled down to occupation duties. 

Palermo, the objective of this drive to 

the west, would now become the center 

of the Seventh Army's logistical operations. The preparation of the port and 

of the city for this function became a 

matter of great urgency. Though the 

opening of the port would not signal an 

end to supply operations across the assault 

beaches (now over a hundred miles away), 

it would mark a gradual reduction in the 

amount of supplies unloaded in the southeastern part of the island. 29 

By 19 July, the 1st Engineer Special 

Brigade had taken over the operation of 

the beaches and ports and was operating 

the supply services in the south directly 

under Seventh Army control. New supply points had been opened as the army 

advanced inland, with the main axis of 

supply running to the north and northwest. But the capture of Palermo placed 

in the army's hands for the first time a 

deepwater port capable of handling ships 

bringing stores and supplies directly from 

the United States. On 24 July, the 

540th Engineer Shore Regiment and the 

20th Engineer Combat Regiment moved 

into Palermo to open the port. A great 

amount of work had to be done in cleaning up the harbor area and the piers, 

opening road exits, and bridging over 

wrecked vessels so as to secure more 

berthing space. On 28 July the first 

supply ships-six coasters (two of which 

29 Scoglitti was closed on 17 July and Porto 

Empedocle opened the following day; Gela was 

closed on 7. August except for tankers--by this 

time, pipelines extended from the Gela pier to 

Comiso and Biscari airfields; Licata was kept 

open during the entire campaign. For details on 

the unloading of men and supplies in Sicily, see 

Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, pp. E-15-E-16. 

unloaded at Termini Imerese) from North 

Africa-entered the harbor. By this time, 

the engineers could operate the port at 

only some 30 percent of its full capacity 

because of the still uncleared wreckage of 

forty-four enemy vessels that had been 

sunk alongside of moles and in the 

channel. 3o 

On 27 July, the Seventh Army directed 

that the main axis of supply be transferred 

as quickly as possible from the southeastern beaches to Palermo, a move made 

even more necessary by the turn of the 

fighting forces to the east. But until the 

port could be placed in better operating 

condition and until the stocks of supplies 

already gathered in the south had been 

reduced, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade 

was to remain responsible for supply to 

the north in the direction of Caltanissetta and to the northwest toward Alessandria and Sciacca. The troops moving 

to the east were thus to be supplied from 

two directions: from Licata and Porto 

Empedocle in the south, from Palermo 

in the west.31 

By this time, too, the railroad lines on 

the island could be counted on to carry 

a heavy share of the supply burden. The 

entire 727th Railway Operating Battalion 

had arrived in Sicily by the end of July 

and had rapidly restored rail service in 

southern and central Sicily. The line 

east along the north coast from Palermo 

was usable as far as Termini Imerese at 

:1O Palermo's operating capacity was raised to 

60 percent by 29 August. During the period 

from 28 July to 31 August, the port received 

forty-eight ships, excluding craft. During this 

same period, 120,706 dead-weight tons of supplies were discharged at the port. See Seventh 

Army Rpt of Opns, p. E-15; Joseph Bykofsky 

and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: 

Operations Overseas (Washington, 1957), p. 198. 

31 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. E-15. 
THE DRIVE TO THE CLIMAX 

the seacoast end of Highway 120. The 

line from Termini to the Enna loop area 

at Caltanissetta was put into operating 

condition, as was the lower section running from Licata to Caltanissetta. The 

first train moved eastward from Palermo 

on 29 July, and with Italian help, the 

line was opened along the north coast as 

far as Cefalu.32 

With the build-up of supplies through 

32 Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation 

Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 200. 

257 

Palermo, General Patton could now turn 

his full attention to getting the Seventh 

Army moving to the east on Messina. 

The use of the Seventh Army in a drive 

on Messina had finally been ordered by 

General Alexander. 

But elsewhere, in Italy and in North 

Africa, events of great importance, though 

not directly influencing the operations on 

Sicily, were taking place, events that 

would have a profound effect on the 

future course of the war. 
CHAPTER XIV 

The Climax 

Sardinia Versus the Mainland 

The successful invasion of Sicily clarified strategi<: problems and enabled the 

Allies to tum from debate to decision. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the 

TRIDENT Conference in May had directed 

General Eisenhower to knock Italy out of 

the war and contain the maximum number of German forces, but they had not 

told him how. Preparing to launch operations beyond the Sicilian Campaign, 

AFHQ had developed several outline 

plans: BUTTRESS, invasion of the Italian 

toe by the British 10 Corps; GOBLET, 

a thrust at the ball of the Italian foot by 

the British 5 Corps; BRIMSTONE, invasion 

of Sardinia; and FIREBRAND, invasion of 

Corsica. But a firm decision on the 

specific course of action to be taken was 

still lacking.l 

The four plans, Eisenhower had explained to Churchill during the Algiers 

meetings in June, pointed to two broad 

1 Memo, G-g AFHQ for AFHQ CofS, 1 J un 

43, sub: Opns After HUSKY, oloO/I~C/5g4,1I; 

AFHQ Directive to Comdrs of Naval, Ground, and 

Air Forces, 5 Jun 43, 0100/12C/534.II. 

For details of planning the invasion of Italy 

prior to the evolvement of AVALANCHE, see Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, a volume in 

preparation for the series UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. See also Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

1934-1944, pp. 152- 61 , 245-46. 

alternative courses. If the Axis resisted 

vigorously in Sicily, thereby forecasting 

high Italian morale and a bitter and protracted struggle for the Allies, then BRIMSTONE and FIREBRAND, insular operations, 

were preferable. Otherwise, operations 

on the Italian mainland were more promIsmg. Despite Churchill's articulate enthusiasm for the latter course, Eisenhower 

had made no commitment. He awaited 

the factual evidence to be furnished in 

Sicily. 

Meanwhile, the Americans and British 

continued to argue over strategy. The 

Americans remained intent on guaranteeing a cross-Channel attack in 1944 and 

also advocated operations in Burma. The 

British were still intrigued by Mediterranean opportunities. The crux of the 

argument hinged on resources. 

Conscious of theater requirements 

after Sicily, no matter what operations 

were launched, General Eisenhower on 

29 June asked the Combined Chiefs 

whether two American convoys could be 

diverted to his command. He requested 

a total of 13 combat loaders (9 for personnel, 4 for cargo) for retention in the 

theater. He recommended retaining 15 

American destroyers in the area. He 

forecast his need for 930 military government officers in case of rapid Italian 

collapse. He again sought assurance that 

40 ships per month were to be allocated 
THE CLIMAX 

to meet civilian supply requirements III 

Italy.2 

The Combined Chiefs made no Immediate commitment, for they too were 

awaiting the initial results of the Sicily 

invasion. Not until 15 July-five days 

after the invasion-did the Combined 

Staff Planners draft a proposed reply to 

Eisenhower's requests, and they favored 

granting Eisenhower's wishes. Still, the 

divergence of American and British views 

prevented acceptance. The U.S. planners 

called attention to requirements elsewhere in the world. The British planners 

saw "the potential results" in the Mediterranean "so great" as to make unthinkable denying Eisenhower the resources he 

wished. 3 

Discussing their planners' recommendations on 16 July, the CCS decided to 

defer action on Eisenhower's requests for 

resources, even though the news from 

Sicily was good. At Admiral Leahy's 

suggestion, the Combined Chiefs agreed 

to accept Eisenhower's strategic concept 

(as embodied in AFHQ's four outline 

plans,) but only "for planning purposes," 

and at General Marshall's suggestion, they 

informed Eisenhower of their interest in 

a direct landing at Naples in place of an 

invasion of Sardinia, "if the indications 

regarding Italian resistance should make 

the risks involved worthwhile." 4 

Indications of crumbling Italian resistance continued to encourage the Allies. 

With increasing frequency, reports from 

Sicily made clear the advanced state of 

" Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 250, 29 Jun 

43, printed in Alexander, Allied Armies in Italy, 

vol. I, pp. 60-63. 

!J CCS 268/2, Post-HUSKY Opns North African 

Theater, Rpt by Combined Staff Planners, 15 J ul 

43· 4 Min, 192d Mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43, Supplementary Min, item 6. 

259 

disintegration in the Italian Army. In 

contrast, German units were displaying 

"their traditional determination and skill," 

probably stimulated, AFHQ guessed, by 

the "poor performance of their Allies." 5 

Looking to the Italian mainland, AFHQ 

believed that the Germans would reinforce 

the Italians and prepare for a strong defense of the Italian heel because of its 

proximity to the Balkans. In contrast, 

AFHQ planners underestimated the importance of the toe, Calabria, to the Axis. 

The planners felt that the terrain was not 

suitable for employing large forces, supply 

routes were vulnerable to Allied air attack, 

the Germans would find air support of 

their ground troops almost impossible, 

and their forces in that area would be 

continually threatened by the possibility of 

successive Allied seaborne outflanking 

movements. AFHQ estimated that the 

Germans would elect to defend Italy south 

of Naples but would place only small forces 

in Calabria.6 

Disintegrating Italian morale, the expectation of finding small enemy forces in 

Calabria, and the relatively light losses in 

landing craft during the invasion of Sicily 

prompted AFHQ to become somewhat 

bolder in its strategic thinking. Allied 

success achieved in Sicily as early as the 

first three days of operations gave rise to 

the hope that the British Eighth Army 

would sweep rapidly up the east coast to 

Messina, making unnecessary the commitment of the British 78th and 46th 

Infantry Divisions as planned. AFHQ 

5 AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intel Sum 46, 12 Jul 43. 

and AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intel Sum 47, 20 Jul 

43, both in job 9, reel 23A. See also Telg 1783, 

AFHQ G-2 to TROOPERS, and 51 IO to AGWAR, 

17 J ul 43, job 24, reel II 8D. 

o JIC (A) 13/43, JIC Algiers Estimate of 

German Intentions in the South of Italy, 12 Jul 

43. job 26, reel 73, Special. 
260 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

decided to employ these divisions to gain 

lodgment in Calabria, and approved a 

plan called BAYTOWN, which was, in effect, 

an ad hoc BUTTRESS. This projected an 

assault on the tip of Calabria, in the 

Reggio area, five days after the capture 

Df Messina, by a brigade of the British 13 

Corps assisted by paratroopers and commandos. The 78th and 46th Divisions 

were then, soon afterward, to make an 

assault landing on the shore of the Gulf 

of Gioia. 7 

But the tenacious defense conducted by 

the Germans around Catania blocked the 

British sweep toward Messina, and in conformity with original plans the 78th DiVISIOn was committed in Sicily. The 

formal BUTTRESS and GOBLET, plans to 

be executed by the British 10 and 5 Corps 

remained valid. 8 

In addition, AFHQ began seriously to 

consider alternative plans leading to a 

rapid build-up of forces in the Naples 

area-MUSTANG, a rapid overland drive 

from Calabria, and GANGWAY, a seaborne 

landing to reinforce those troops that had 

seized Naples after an overland advance. 

More important was Eisenhower's directive to General Clark, the U.S. Fifth Army 

commander, on 16 July: if the Allies 

landed in the toe, Clark and his army 

were to be ready not only to invade Sardinia but also "to support Italian mainland operations through Naples." 9 

7 Min of Third Weekly Exec Planning Sec, 14 

Jul 43, item 22, job 61C, reel IS3C: Alexander, 

Allied Armies in Italy, vol. I, p. 10; Eisenhower, 

Italian Dispatch, p. S. 

8 Eisenhower, Italian Dispatch, p. 10; Memo, 

AFHQ for multiple addressees, 2S J un 43, sub: 

Chain of Command for, and Channels of Communication for Mounting, Opns BRIMSTONE, BUTTRESS and GOBLET, OIOO/I2C/S34,II; Ltr, MIDEAST to AFHQ, IS Jul 43, sub: BUTTRESS and 

GOBLET Order of Battle, same file. 

9 Directive, CofS AFHQ to CG Fifth Army, 

On 17 July, after meeting with his 

chief subordinates, Tedder, Alexander, 

and Cunningham, General Eisenhower 

came to a major decision. He canceled 

the invasion of Sardinia in favor of operations on the Italian mainland, the best 

area for "achieving our object of forcing 

Italy out of the war and containing the 

maximum German forces." Though the 

situation had not sufficiently crystallized 

to permit informing the CCS precisely 

how the mainland was to be attacked or 

even the dates on which operations might 

be undertaken, the commanders discussed, 

as suggested by the Combined Chiefs, 

the possibility of a direct amphibious 

assault on Naples. This appeared impractical for two reasons: Naples lay 

beyond the limit of effective land-based 

fighter support, and too few landing 

craft would be available for such an 

assault in addition to BUTTRESS and 

GOBLET. MUSKET, on the other hand, a 

plan to invade the heel near Taranto, 

now appeared feasible even though it had 

earlier been rejected. The unexpectedly 

light losses of landing craft in Sicily would 

compensate for the difficulty of furnishing air protection over the Taranto assault 

area. Eisenhower therefore instructed 

Clark to plan MUSKET as an alternative 

to GANGWAY, which was oriented on 

Naples. 1o 

sub: Opns on Italian Mainland. 16 Jul 43. Fifth 

Army Reds, KCRC, Opn GANGWAY, cabinet 196, 

drawer 4. 

lORcd of Mtg at La Marsa, 1430, 17 Jul 43, 

job 26A, reel 22SB; Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, 

NAF 26S, IS Jul 43, Salmon Files. S-B-I (NAF, 

I J un 43-3 I Dec 43): Directive, Maj. Gen. J. 

F. M. Whiteley, DCofS AFHQ. to CG Fifth 

Army, sub: Opns on Italian Mainland, 22 Jul 

43, printed in Alexander, Allied Armies in Italy, 

vol. 1. pp. 66-67. The outline plan for Operation MUSKET (AFHQ P/96 Final, 24 Jul 43) 

is found in job lOA, red 13C. 
THE CLIMAX 

The crucial aspect of this project was 

the great distance of the Bay of Naples 

from the airfields which the Allies would 

be able to use-those in Sicily and those 

in Calabria to be seized in the initial attack 

on the mainland. Auxiliary aircraft carriers were not feasible for reinforcing landbased fighters because they could not 

launch modern fighters. In contrast, the 

Axis air forces, able to use airfields around 

Naples and Taranto, would have an extreme advantage. The P-39's (Airacobras) and P-40's (Kittyhawks) had short 

ranges. The P-38's (Lightnings) and 

A-36's (Mustangs) had the required 

range but lacked other desired characterIStiCS. Spitfires, the best of the available 

fighters, if equipped with auxiliary ninetygallon gasoline tanks, could reach the 

target areas but would not be able to operate over Naples for long. Only one 

aircraft carrier was operating in the Mediterranean, and this could not furnish 

enough planes to adequately support an 

amphibious operation.ll 

Despite the problem of air cover, enthusiasm grew in Washington and London 

for a direct attack against the Naples area, 

with the American and British Chiefs 

united and drawn toward this bold course 

by the manifest weakness of Italian resistance. But the argument over the allotment of resources continued. The British 

wished to pour into an invasion of the Italian mainland everything that could be 

made available, the better to guarantee 

success. The Americans, while recognizing the opportunity for aggressive action, 

11 Notes on the Air Implications of an Assault 

on Italian Mainland-Naples Area, 25 Jul 43, 

printed in Alexander, Allied Armies in Italy, vol. 

I, pp. 68-71. See also Craven and Cate, eds., 

vol. II, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, 

pp. 489-9 1 . 

261 

insisted on holding to the previous over-all 

decisions limiting Mediterranean resources 

so as to make possible operations in northwest Europe and the China-Burma-India 

Theater. 12 

Reports on disintegrating Italian morale 

continued to come in. In Greece and the 

Balkans at least five instances came to 

Allied attention of Italian commanders 

who indirectly approached British representatives attached to the patriot forces 

in Greece and in Yugoslavia. Italian 

war-weariness and a desire to come to 

terms seemed quite obvious from such 

overtures as well as from negotiations 

which some Italian officers were conducting with Mihailovitch, the Yugoslav Partisan leader. The Germans, appreciating 

clearly the danger of defection, had begun 

to occupy vital areas formerly held exclusively by Italians, thereby hoping to 

stiffen such areas, particularly those vulnerable to invasion. As the Allies continued in their conquest of Sicily and as 

the collapse of Italy seemed to draw ever 

nearer, the Allies believed that the Italian 

troops in the Balkans would remain passive except to defend against guerrilla 

attack; the Germans, in contrast, would 

remain staunch.13 

With the benefit of such intelligence, 

the CCS came to partial agreement. On 

20 July they approved General Eisenhower's decision to invade the Italian 

12 CCS 268/3, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North 

African Theater, Memo by the Representatives 

of British Chiefs of Staff, 19 Jul 43, ABC 384 

Post-HUSKY (14 May 43), Sec. 3; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, 

pp. 158-60; Bryant, The Turn of The Tide, pp. 

549-5 1. 1~' Telg, MIDEAST to TROOPERS, repeated to 

FREEDOM, sub: Enemy Morale in the Balkans, 

1/83652, 19 Jul 43, job 24, reel 188D. Cf. 

Butcher, lily Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 

274 (entry for 2 Aug 43). 
262 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

mainland, and then instructed him to 

extend his amphibious operations "northwards as shore-based fighter cover can be 

made effective." 14 

The British, however, were not satisfied. 

On the next day, 2 I July, the British 

Chiefs wired their representatives in 

Washington that the "Italian will to continue the war may be within measurable 

distance of collapse." They urged Immediate bold action, specifically an amphibious attack against Naples. A day 

later the British Chiefs went further. 

They provided a plan, code-named AVALANCHE, for such an invasion and suggested the last week of August as a favorable, if fleeting, moment. The prospect 

of success, they admitted, depended largely 

on the adequacy of air cover, and they 

proposed allotting Eisenhower four escort 

carriers and one large British carrier, plus 

about forty cargo vessels over and above 

the TRIDENT allocations. Until General 

Eisenhower indicated his requirements for 

an attack in the Naples area, the British 

Chiefs urged that orders be issued to stop 

the movement of forces away from the 

Mediterranean theater.15 

The Americans did not consider additional resources necessary. AFHQ already 

had, they believed, sufficient means to take 

Naples, and, if not, "reasonable hazards 

could be accepted." They therefore 

proposed that the CCS instruct Eisen14 CCS 268/4, 20 Jul 43, sub: Post-HUSKY 

Opns North African Theater, Rpt by Combined 

Staff Planners, 20 Jul 43; Min, 97th Mtg JCS, 

20 Jul 43, item 12; Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, 

FAN 169, 20 Jul 43, Salmon Files, S-B-I. 

15 CCS 268/6, 21 Jul 43, sub: Post-HUSKY 

Opns North African Theater, Memo by Representatives of British Chiefs of Staff; CCS 268/7, 

22 Jul 43, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North African 

Theater, Msg From British Chiefs of Staff. 

hower to prepare a plan, as a matter of 

urgency, for such an invasion, but using 

only the resources already made available 

for operations beyond Sicily. This meant 

an assault in the strength of about four 

divisions, as compared with the seven 

mounted for Sicily.16 

The British were "most disappointed." 

The Sicilian Campaign, it seemed to them, 

was even stronger proof that Italy could 

be eliminated from the war. This, they 

believed, would increase the chances not 

only for a successful but a decisive crossChannel attack into northwest Europe. 

Italian defeat the British regarded as the 

best if not the essential preliminary to the 

earliest possible defeat of Germany. 

And AVALANCHE, if feasible, was the best 

and quickest way to knock Italy out of 

the warP 

By this time AFHQ had made a formal 

study of the possibility of landing in the 

Naples area. General Rooks, the AFHQ 

G-3, on 24 July suggested the beaches 

fronting the Gulf of Salerno as the most 

suitable for an initial assault. He proposed that Clark's Fifth Army start planning the operation as an alternative to 

MUSKET, a landing near Taranto. He 

thought an assault force of about four 

divisions would be enough, if provision 

was made for rapid follow-up and buildup. He felt that the Allies should make 

their main effort and strike their first blow 

in Calabria, by means of BUTTRESS and 

GOBLET. If as the result of these operations the Allies held the toe of Italy by the 

beginning of October, they could go ahead 

16 Min, i03d Mtg CCS, 23 Jul 43, Supplement, item 7. 

17 CCS 268/8, sub: Post-HUSKY Opns North 

African Theater, Memo by Representatives of 

British Chiefs of Staff, 24 Jul 43. 
THE CLIMAX 

and launch an invasion in the Naples area 

at Salerno. is 

AFHQ's conservative and deliberate 

approach to an invasion of the Italian 

mainland changed radically because of a 

revolutionary event which occurred on 

the next day. 

The Overthrow of Mussolini 

Soon after the Italian delegation returned from the Feltre conference to 

Rome on 20 July, Mussolini told Ambrosio that he had decided to' write a 

letter to Hitler to request termination of 

the alliance. Because Mussolini's abject 

behavior at Feltre had dispelled Ambrosio's last illusions that the Duce might 

break away from Germany, Ambrosio 

made a sharp rejoinder. The opportunity 

of the spoken word, Ambr6sio said, had 

been lost at Feltre. Declaring that he 

could no longer collaborate in a policy 

that jeopardized the fate of Italy, Ambrosio offered Mussolini his resignation. 

M ussolini refused to accept it and dismissed the chief of Comando Supremo 

from the room.19 

At this time, arrangements began to 

take definite form in Comando Supremo 

for a coup d'etat against the Duce as the 

essential step for getting Italy out of the 

war. Yet in a curiously inconsistent 

policy, Ambrosio made arrangements with 

OKW to reinforce the troops in Sicily. 

Either on 2 I or 22 July, the decision 

was made to fight the campaign III 

Sicily to the limit. Formal assurance 

18AFHQ P/g8 (Final), 24 Jul 43. sub: Appreciation of an Amphibious Assault Against the 

Naples Area, job loA. reel 13C. 

19 MS #P-058. Projeet 46, I Feb-8 Sep 43, 

Question 4; Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 56-57; 

Badoglio, Memorie e dotumenti, p. 65. 

263 

was made to OKW and the request forwarded for two additional German divisions. Comando Supremo promised to 

do all within its power to this end and 

Ambrosio asked that German coastal and 

antiaircraft artillery be shipped to the 

Messina Strait area immediately, and that 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division be 

transferred from Calabria to Sicily,20 

The Germans replied on 22 July. The 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division would 

immediately be sent to Sicily.21 Two 

days later, Ambrosio conferred with Kesselring on getting more German divisions. Kesselring named the 305th and 

76th Infantry Divisions as available. Both 

were in France but ready for transportation to Italy. Roatta had already discussed their commitment with Kesselring; 

he planned to place one in Calabria, the 

other in Puglia.22 Thus, while some Italians intrigued to get rid of Mussolini and 

the German alliance, others-in some 

instances the same ones~were permitting 

the Germans to tighten their military 

grip on Italy. 

At the beginning of July 1943 there 

were still three distinct groups in Italy 

who were actively working and plotting 

for Mussolini's overthrow: dissident Fascists; the anti-Fascist opposition; and the 

military conspiracy. The dissident Fas20 Ltr, Ambrosio to RinteIen, Comando Supremo, Prot. N. 15112, 22 Jul 43, IT 3029, 

folder IV, an. 4bis. There is another copy in 

Operazioni in Sicilia dal 20 al 31 luglio 1943, 

Narrativa, Allegati, It 99b, an. 67 (hereafter referred to as IT 9gb). See also OKW/WFSt, 

KTB, I.-3I.VlI.43. 23 Ju143. 

21 Ltr, Lt. Col. Jandl (on behalf of Rintelen), 

fa No. 0641143, Rome, 22 Jul 43, Comando Supremo, Proiezione vie comunicazione del Brennero, 1943, IT 102. 

22 Min, Colloquio a Palazzo Vidoni, Roma, 

24 luglio 1943, IT 3037. 
264 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

MARSHAL BADOGLIO 

-cists were led by Count Ciano and Dino 

Grandi. They were in touch with the 

Duke of Acquarone (the King's private 

secretary) and, through him, with the 

King. Their hope was to supplant Mussolini but to retain the Fascist system. 

The underground anti-Fascist parties 

were held together by I vanoe Bonomi. 

Their minimum program was a complete 

overthrow of the Fascist system and an 

immediate return to the pre-Fascist, parliamentary system of government. General Castellano and the small group . associated with him in Comando Supremo 

were, like the others, in frequent contact 

with Acquarone and waited only for the 

King to give the word. For this group, 

the questions of institutional changes were 

altogether secondary to the problem of 

terminating the war, but they wished the 

command of Italy's armed forces restored 

to the King in accordance with the Statuto. 

All three groups thought alike with 

respect to the German alliance. Dino 

Grandi wished an immediate break of the 

alliance following Mussolini's dismissal, 

and a simultaneous approach to Great 

Britain for a separate peace. Bonomi advocated overtures to the Allies as soon as 

the new government was formed. Castellano's whole purpose in plotting against 

Mussolini was to permit Italy to make a 

quick and direct approach to the Western 

Powers to end the war. 

Among the small groups who had access to the Royal Palace, it was known 

that the King was considering a change in 

the head of the government, but he had 

not yet definitely made up his mind. On 

5 July he mentioned to his aide de camp, 

Generale di Divisione Paolo Pun toni, that 

Ambrosio was making preparations for 

the removal of Mussolini which would be 

followed by a military dictatorship headed 

by either Maresciallo d' Italia Enrico 

Caviglia or Marshal Badoglio. The King 

was not happy about ~ither choice: he 

did not trust Badoglio's character; he 

thought that Caviglia in power would 

mean a revival of freemasonry and 

rapprochement with the Anglo-Americans. 

Victor Emmanuel did not want to overthrow fascism at one stroke: he wished 

for gradual changes only. He recognized 

that Badoglio had a certain following 

among the masses which would be useful if Mussolini were dismissed. The 

King remarked to Puntoni that Ambrosio 

was undertaking too much and was having too many contacts outside military 

circles.23 

n Paolo Puntoni, Parla Vittorio Emanuele III 

(Milan: Aldo Palazzi editore, 1958), pp. 136-

37 (entry for 5 J ul 43)· 
THE CLIMAX 

Alessandro Casati, an intimate of Bonomi, spoke with Acquarone on 12 July 

and learned that the King's private secretary was a gradualist, opposed to approaching the Allies at the same time that 

Mussolini was removed from power. 

Hoping to get Badoglio to change Acquarone's position, Casati and Bonomi 

had a long conversation with the marshal 

on 14 July. Badoglio agreed that denunciation of the alliance with Germany 

should immediately follow the formation 

of a new government. He agreed that 

the new government would need the support of all the anti-Fascist parties~ 

Liberal, Christian Democrat, Socialist, 

Communist, Actionist, and Democracy 

of Labor. He agreed with Bonomi that 

the proper solution was a politico-military 

cabinet that would eliminate fascism and 

break with Germany. He agreed to become -the head of the prospective government and to name the military members 

of the cabinet while Bonomi selected the 

civil members and served as vice president. But he objected to Bonomi's desire 

for Della Torretta as Foreign Minister, 

insisting instead on Raffaele Guariglia, 

Ambassador to Turkey. Bonomi acceded 

on this point after some heated argument. 24 

At an audience with the King on 15 

July, Badoglio presented a proposal for a 

new government under himself and the 

inclusion of Bonomi and other politicians 

in the cabinet. The King seemed to be 

decidedly averse to the proposal. He 

said he did not want any politi cans. 

The men whom Badoglio proposed were 

all old, the King said, and they would 

simply give the appearance of a return to 

the pre-Fascist system. Unwilling to 

admit that he was even thinking of mov-

~4 Bonomi, Diario, pp. 19-21. 

265 

ing against M ussolini, Victor Emmanuel 

remarked that prearranged coups had little 

chance of success, particularly in Italy 

where people were not accustomed to 

keeping secrets. He terminated the audience without coming to a decision. 

Two days later, when Badoglio discussed with Bonomi and Casati the royal 

reception of his idea, he was only lukewarm on the feasibility of forming a government based on party support. Either 

the King would accept the BadoglioBonomi proposal, said the marshal, or 

else he, Badoglio, would withdraw the 

suggestion, thereby letting everyone resume his liberty of action. Sometime 

during the next few days, he sent personal and unofficial representatives to 

Switzerland to inform the British Government that he desired to make contact with 

the Western Allies. 25 

On 18 July, Acquarone let it be known 

that the King was preparing to act against 

M ussolini but that he wanted the new 

cabinet to consist of nonpolitical civil servants. Bonomi was greatly alarmed. The 

mere dismissal of Mussolini would leave 

the problem of the war and the German 

alliance unsolved. Calling on Badoglio 

on 20 July, Casati and Bonomi learned 

that Badoglio had been won over to the 

course of gradualism favored by Acquarone 

and the King. To warn the sovereign that 

gradualism would not solve the pressing 

problems of breaking the alliance and 

getting out of the war, Bonomi and Casati 

on 22 July submitted a memorandum to 

Acquarone. The memorandum was 

prescient though without effect. It 

pointed out that Germany would have no 

doubt of Italy's real intentions once Mus25 Ibid., pp. 22-24; Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 63, 70-71; Puntoni, Vittorio Emanuele 

III, p. 139. 
266 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

solini was eliminated from power; that a 

gradualist policy would give Germany 

time to prepare for action against a new 

Italian Government; that a cabinet of 

civil servants devoid of political tendencies would be viewed as an enemy by 

Fascists, yet would find no support in 

the anti-Fascist circles; that the AngloAmerican coalition would not be favorably disposed to such a cabinet because 

it would lack men of guaranteed antiFascist reputations; that in choosing 

politicians representing the people the 

King would follow custom, but in appointing civil servants he would draw 

upon himself the responsibility for the 

policies of that cabinet.26 

Badoglio had several conversations with 

Ambrosio, who brought him up to date 

on the military situation and who carefully explained that Italy's position toward Germany excluded a unilateral 

Italian declaration of withdrawal from 

the war because Italy had insufficient 

forces to back up an 'immediate breach of 

the alliance. Badoglio cautioned Ambrosio to do nothing without the express 

approval of the King. But in one of 

their discussions attended by Acquarone, 

they agreed that two things were necessary for the good of the country : to arrest 

Mussolini and half a dozen leading Fascist officials; and to use the Regular Army 

to neutralize the force of the Fascist 

militia. Acquarone carefully reported 

this discussion to the King. 27 

On 20 July, under the impact of Mussolini's failure at Feltre and of the Amer26 Bonomi, Diario, pp. 26-28. 

27 Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 62-

63, 7[, 76; Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 5[-52; 

MS #P-058, Project 46, [ Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 6. Castellano (Come firmai, page 49) states 

that at this time the German reaction appeared 

less of a danger than that of the Fascists. 

ican bombing of Rome, the King made 

up his mind to act. He told Pun toni : 

"It is necessary at all costs to make a 

change. The thing is not easy, however, 

for two reasons: first, our disastrous 

military situation, and second, the presence of the Germans in Italy." Two 

days later Victor Emmanuel apparently 

tried to induce M ussolini to offer his resignation. There was a long discussion 

between the Duce and the King who subsequently told Puntoni: 

I tried to make the Duce understand that 

now it is only his person, the target of enemy propaganda and the focal point of public opinion, which impedes an internal 

revival and which prevents a clear definition of our military situation. He did not 

understand and he did not wish to understand. It was as if I had spoken to the 

wind. 28 

Through Acquarone, the sovereign informed General Castellano that he had 

made up his mind to appoint Badoglio as 

Mussolini's successor. All preparations 

for the change in regime would have to 

be completed within six or seven days. 

Acquarone said that Mussolini had an 

audience scheduled with the King for 26 

July, and Castellano made plans to have 

the Duce arrested shortly after that 

event. 29 

Another critical step was to protect the 

new government against a reaction by the 

Fascist militia. Comando Supremo therefore moved the loth (Piave) Motorized 

Infantry Division and the 135th (Ariete) 

Armored Division to the Rome area, both 

to constitute a special corps under General Carboni. An intimate of Count 

28 Puntoni, Vittorio Emanuele III, pp. [40-

41. See also Castellano, Come firmai, p. 57; 

Vitetti, Notes on the Fall of the Fascist Regime, 

p. [0; Bonomi, Diario, p. 25. 

29 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 57-60. 
THE CLIMAX 

Ciano and at the same time of Castellano, 

Carboni was ambitious. Though he had 

at times been a difficult subordinate, he 

was strongly anti-German and pro_Ally.30 

No measures were planned in advance 

against a possible German reaction. The 

King intended neither to create an Immediate rupture in the Axis alliance nor 

to make an immediate approach to the 

Western Powers. 

As for Badoglio, in deciding to accept 

the high office, he acted with a soldierly 

sense of duty toward his sovereign. 

Whatever course the King wished to 

follow, Badoglio made clear that he, Badoglio, would execute. If the King commanded continuance of the war in alliance 

with Germany, Badoglio would loyally 

carry out that policy. If the King directed an approach to the Allies, Badoglio would undertake that course. The 

responsibility, Badoglio also made clear, 

would remain with the King.31 

Victor Emmanuel was not happy to 

have the responsibility placed on his royal 

person, and he almost regretted the imminent change. Things were much easier 

with Mussolini, he thought, who was very 

clever and who took responsibility upon 

himself. The appointment of Badoglio 

meant, not a return to pre-Fascist constitutional procedures, but a return to 

absolute monarchy. While Mussolini as 

Capo del Governo claimed for that office 

all the power he could grasp, Badoglio 

30 Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 262-63; Rossi, 

Come arrivammo, p. 204. For unfavorable comments on Carboni as a general officer, see Generale Comandante di Corpo d'Armata Carboni, 

Giacomo, IT 972; for his early friendship with 

Ciano and Castellano, see Castellano, Come 

firmai, pp. 22ff. 

31 See the penetrating comments in Telg, Col. 

Helfferich, Rome, Chef. Amt Ausland Abwehr, 

22 or 23 Jul 43, OKW/Amtsgruppe Ausland, 

19.IV.-I.XI.43 (OKW/IOoo.2). 

267 

deliberately restricted himself to the role 

of the King's executive secretary.32 

Curiously enough, M ussolini himself 

helped set the stage for his overthrow. 

Early in July, Carlo Scorza, the new 

Fascist party secretary, had planned a 

series of mass meetings in the principal 

cities of Italy and invited leading Fascists 

to exhort the people to determined resistance. Largely at Dino Grandi's instigation, quite a few party officials refused 

the invitation. Several of these men saw 

Mussolini on r6 July, expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation, and proposed convening the Grand Council of 

Fascism, which had not met for more 

than three years. Surprisingly enough, 

five days later, on 2 r July, after returning 

from the Feltre conference, Mussolini 

called the Fascist Grand Council to a 

meeting on 24 July.33 

Aware of the King's intention to oust 

Mussolini, Grandi skillfully lined up a 

majority of the council members against 

the Duce. He drew up a resolution calling for the King to resume command of 

the armed forces. Some members signed 

it in the belief that it would merely force 

Mussolini to relinquish the military power 

he had exercised since the beginning of 

the war. Grandi and others hoped that a 

majority vote favoring his resolution would 

be taken as a lack of confidence in Mussolini's leadership and would induce the 

King to replace Mussolini by a trium32 For Badoglio's constitutional position, see 

Howard McGaw Smyth, "Italy: From Fascism 

to the Republic," The Western Political Quarterly, vol. I, NO.3 (September 1948), pp. 205-22. 

33 Vitetti, Notes on the Fall of the Fascist 

Regime, pp. 8-9; Mussolini, Storia di un anno, 

p. 14; Ltr, Dino Grandi, 23 Jun 44, Inc! 3 to 

Dispatch 835, 9 Aug 44, from the American Embassy, Lisbon, U.S. Dept of State Files; George 

Kent, "The Last Days of Dictator Benito Mussolini," Reader's Digest (October 1944), p. 13. 
268 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

virate: Grandi, Ciano, and Federzoni 

(president of the Royal Academy) .34 

The Grand Council of 28 members met 

at 1700, Saturday, 24 July. The debate 

on Grandi's resolution lasted almost nine 

hours. Around 0300, 25 July, Mussolini 

acceded to Grandi's demand for a vote. 

Of the 28 members, many of whom had 

remained silent during the course of the 

debate, 19 voted with Grandi against 

Mussolini. 35 

Neither Mussolini nor Grandi immediately realized what had happened. The 

Grand Council meeting was but a sideshow designed to furnish an appropriate occasion, a constitutional crisis, for 

dismissing the Head of Government. 

When Mussolini saw the King after the 

fateful poll, he told the monarch that the 

Grand Council vote did not require his 

resignation. The King would not listen. 

Coldly he told M ussolini that he had to 

resign-Marshal Badoglio would take his 

place. On leaving the palace, Mussolini 

was unable to find his car. Accepting 

the help of a carabinieri officer, he was 

escorted into an ambulance and whisked 

away. Not until later did he realize that 

he was under arrest. 36 

Grandi hung around all day waiting 

to be called to an appointment in the new 

cabinet. Like Bonomi, he believed in 

making immediate contact with the Allies, 

and to this end he sought permission to 

leave for Spain at once. Grandi wished 

to talk to the British Ambassador at Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, whom Grandi had 

34 "Count Dino Grandi Explains," Life, vol. 

18, NO.9 (February 26, 1945), pp. 81-82; Badoglio, Memorte e documenti, pp. 73-74, 82. 

3" Mussolini, Storia di un anno, pp. di .... 18; 

Bonomi, Diario, pp. 30-32. 

36 Mussolini, Storia di un anno, pp. 19-20; 

Monelli, Roma 1943, pp. 188-94; Puntoni, 

Vittorio Emanuele III, pp. 143-45. 

known when he was Mussolini's Ambassador to London. But Grandi had already played the part deftly assigned to 

him by Acquarone, and Grandi cooled his 

heels in Rome. Not until several weeks 

passed did the new government permit 

Grandi to go to Madrid, but without instructions, credentials, or power. 37 As it 

turned out, Grandi's trip proved to be of 

value, but as a red herring, for the Germans, who were hot on Grandi's trail, 

failed to pick up the scent of the official 

mission dispatched to make contact with 

the Allies. 

The meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on 24 July gave the Roman public a 

sense of the political crisis. When news 

of Mussolini's dismissal raced through the 

city on 25 July, people embraced each 

other in joy, danced in the streets, and 

paraded in gratitude to the King. Mobs 

attacked Fascist party offices. Fascist 

symbols were torn down. 

With one stroke the House of Savoy had 

removed the great incubus that had 

brought Italy into the war on the losing 

side, and everyone expected the new government to bring about an immediate 

peace. Never was a people's faith in 

royalty destined to be more bitterly disappointed. 

No one paid much attention to the 

Germans, who disappeared from public 

view. 38 

Allied Reaction 

The overthrow of Mussolini took the 

Allies by surprise. At the TRIDENT Conference the Americans had argued that 

37 Ltr, Dino Grandi, 20 Feb 44, Incl 2 to Dispatch 835, 9 Aug 44, from the American Em. 

bassy, Lisbon, U.S. Dept of State Files. 

38 Monelli, Roma 1943, pp. 156-57; Bonomi, 

Diario, p. 36. 
THE CLIMAX 

the Allies might bring about the collapse 

of Italy without invading the Italian 

mainland. The conquest of Sicily and 

intensified aerial bombardment of the 

mainland, they believed, might be enough. 

The British felt that only an invasion of 

the Italian mainland would guarantee 

Italian surrender, and this course of action had become the basic Allied conceptcontinuing ground force operations beyond Sicily in order to knock Italy out of 

the war. 

The U.S. Department of State had as 

yet scarcely discussed the peace terms to 

be imposed upon a vanquished Italy. On 

26 July, if it had been necessary, the 

Allies would have found it impossible to 

state their basic terms for peace-aside 

from unconditional surrender. 

The Allies even lacked a set of armistice 

terms for an Italy offering to surrender. 

They had discussed this matter but without reaching agreement. The British had 

proposed a long and detailed list of conditions to be imposed upon a defeated 

Italy. The Americans had not concurred because the British list did not 

mean total surrender. They had instead 

proposed a series of diplomatic instruments 

to obtain unconditional surrender and 

allow the extension of Allied military 

government over the whole of Italian 

territory. Differences in ultimate objectives effectively hindered Anglo-American agreement. The Americans had no 

qualms about putting the House of Savoy 

into protective custody and undertaking 

the political reconstruction of the country. To the British, the prospect of 

another dynasty going into discard was 

too painful to contemplate. Transatlantic 

discussions were continuing without definite conclusions when the developments on 

the Tiber made a decision vital. 

269 

Contradictory crosscurrents further 

complicated the discussions. The troublesome Italian Fleet had aroused British 

passion for revenge, and Churchill's and 

Eden's bitter experiences with Mussolini 

made them endorse a complete Italian surrender. American feeling against Mussolini had never reached a boiling point; 

the U.S. Government had no wish to 

gain territory at Italian expense, and a 

significant element in the American electorate was of Italian descent or origin 

and could not be ignored. These factors 

exerted a moderating influence on U.S. 

policy. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff held a 

special meeting on 26 July, the day after 

M ussolini' s overthrow; greatly elated by 

the news, they reached a decision of some 

import. Though the Americans refused 

to alter their stand on resources for an 

attack on Naples, they did not object 

when the British added one heavy and 

four escort carriers to the Mediterranean 

resources. The CCS agreed to expedite 

the elimination of Italy from the war by 

authorizing Eisenhower to launch AVALANCHE at the earliest possible date and 

with the resources available to him.39 

In Tunis, also heartened by word of 

Mussolini's downfall, Eisenhower was 

meeting with his principal subordinates to 

review the new situation. They decided 

that promising conditions called for a 

bolder course of action. Upon receipt of 

the CCS directive authorizing an invasion 

in the Naples area, Eisenhower ordered 

Clark to draw detailed plans for executing 

AVALANCHE. He also instructed Clark 

to prepare one division to sail directly 

into Naples and seize the port in conjunc39 Min, Special CCS Mtg, 26 Jul 43; Telg, 

CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 175, 26 Jul 43, CCS 

Cable Log. 
270 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tion with an airborne operation. Sensing 

the prospects of securing a speedy capitulation of the Italian Government, Eisenhower looked forward to occupying rapidly key points on the Italian mainland 

with Italian consent.40 

By this time, Allied intelligence reports 

of Italian morale in the battle for Sicily 

were caustic. One stated: 

For the most part the Italian field formations have not shown a standard of morale 

and battle determination very much higher 

than that of the coastal units whose performance was so lamentably low .... Sheer 

war weariness and a feeling of the hopelessness of Italy's position have, however, obviously been more potent influences and 

these have moreover permeated the field 

army to a considerable degree, with the result that a sense of inferiority and futility 

has destroyed its zest and spirit.41 

To exploit the new political situation 

and Italian war weariness, General Eisenhower decided to pull all the stops on the 

organ of psychological warfare. If he 

could, by offering a simple set of armistice terms, eliminate Italy as a belligerent, 

the Allies would be able to use Italian 

territory in the war against Germany. 

Therefore, Eisenhower asked CCS approval of a radio message he proposed to 

broadcast constantly to the Italian people. He wished to commend the Italians 

and the Royal House for ridding themselves of M ussolini; to assure them that 

they could have peace on honorable conditions; to promise Italy the advantages 

40 Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 300, 27 Jul 

43, Salmon Files, 5-B-r; Directive, DCofS 

AFHQ to CG Fifth Army, sub: Opns on the 

Italian Mainland, 27 Jul 43, Personal Papers of 

Col Robert J, Wood, file Outline Plan, Operation AVALANCHE; Min of Exec Planning Mtg 5, 

27 Jul 43, job 6rC, reel r83C. 

41 AFHQ G-2 Weekly Intel Sum 48, 27 Jul 

43, job g, reel 23A. 

of the Atlantic Charter and the Four 

Freedoms and also a voice in the final 

negotiations for world peace; to suggest 

that if the King remained at war with the 

Allies much longer, British and American 

odium concentrated on Mussolini would 

be transferred to the monarch, thereby 

making an honorable surrender difficult. 

The radio broadcasts, Eisenhower proposed, should urge the King to make 

immediate contact with the Allied commander in chief.42 

General Eisenhower also drafted a set 

of armistice terms: 

I. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces with disarmament as dictated by the C-in-C, and a 

g-uarantee by the Italian Government that 

German forces now on the Italian mainland 

will immediately comply with all provisions 

of this document. 

2. All prisoners or internees of the United 

Nations to be immediately turned over to 

the C-in-C, and none of these may, from 

the beg-inning of these negotiations, be evacuated to Germany. 

3. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet 

to such points as may be designated by the 

C-in-C Med., with details of disarmament 

and conduct to be prescribed by him. 

4- Immediate evacuation from all Italian 

territory of the German Air Force. 

5. Immediate beginning of the evacuation 

of German land forces from the Italian 

mainland on phase lines to be so prescribed 

by the Allied C-in-C that the evacuation 

from all Italy will be complete within one 

month. German forces in Sicily are not affected by this armistice and will either surrender unconditionally or will be destroyed. 

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of 

all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as opera42 Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 266, 26 Jul 

43, OPD TS Cable, IN, r Jul-3 r Jul 43. Cf. 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 

371. 
THE CLIMAX 

tional bases and other purposes as the Allies 

may see fit. 

7. Immediate acknowledgment of the 

overriding authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief to establish military government and with the unquestioned right to 

effect, through such agencies as he may set 

up, any changes in personnel that may seem 

to him desirable. 

8. Immediate guarantee of the free use by 

the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in 

Italian territory, regardless of the rate of 

evacuation of the Italian territory by the 

German forces. These ports and fields to 

be protected by Italian armed forces until 

the function is taken over by the Allies. 

9. Immediate withdrawal of Italian 

armed forces from all participation in the 

current war from whatever areas in which 

they may now be engaged. 

10. Guarantee by the Italian Government 

that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of 

this armistice. 43 

General Eisenhower proposed that this 

set of terms serve as the basis for a CCS 

directive, and that it also be broadcast to 

Italy. Knowledge of the terms and the 

assurances therein of honorable conditions 

of peace, he believed, would make the 

Italian population force the government 

to sue for an armistice. He did not 

envisage the active co-operation of Italian 

troops in the war beyond the enforcement 

of German withdrawal from Italian soil, 

for he believed that "they would deem it 

completely dishonorable to attempt to 

turn definitely against their former allies 

and compel the surrender of German 

formations now III the mainland of 

43 Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 302, 27 Jul 

43, Capitulation of Italy, p. '4 (a bound file of 

copies of telegrams and other documents relating 

to the Italian surrender, assembled for Maj. Gen. 

Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff, AFHQ). 

271 

Italy." 44 His terms were an attempt to 

meet an Italian request for armistice before an Allied invasion of the mainland, 

and he made no mention of unconditional 

surrender.45 

Neither did President Roosevelt urge 

the unconditional surrender formula when 

he heard the news of Mussolini's downfall. Cabling Churchill immediately, he 

suggested that if the Italian Government 

made overtures for peace, the Allies ought 

to come as close to unconditional surrender as possible and then follow that 

capitulation with good treatment of the 

Italian people. Roosevelt thought it essential to gain the use of all Italian territory, the transportation system and 

airfields as well, for the further prosecution of the war against the Germans in 

the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe. He 

wished provision made for the surrender 

of Mussolini, "the head devil," and his 

chief associates, and he asked the Prime 

Minister for his VIews on the new 

situation.46 

As Minister of Defence and with the 

approval of his War Cabinet, Mr. Churchill sent the President his proposals on how 

to deal with a defeated Italy. Considering it very likely that the dissolution of 

the Fascist system would soon follow 

Mussolini's overthrow, Churchill expected 

the King and Badoglio to try to arrange 

a separate armistice with the Allies. In 

this case, he urged that every possible 

advantage be sought from the surrender 

44 Ibid. 

45 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p. 372 (entry for 27 Jul 43). 

4(; Telg 3 2 4, President to Prime Minister, 25 

Jul 43, OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers); 

Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World War," 

vol. V, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin Company, '95'), p. 55. 
272 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

to expedite the destruction of Hitler and 

Nazi GermanyY 

The text of Churchill's proposals 

reached AFHQ soon after Eisenhower had 

dispatched his draft of terms to the CCS. 

Both sets of terms were closely similar. 

Both required the use of all Italian territory; insisted on control of the Italian 

Fleet; stipulated the return of prisoners 

of war to prevent their transfer to Germany; demanded the withdrawal of the 

Italian armed forces from further participation in the war against the Allies; and 

assumed that the Italians on Italian soil 

would be able to enforce German compliance with the terms of surrender. 

There were some differences. Using 

phraseology originally suggested by Roosevelt, Churchill called for the surrender of 

Mussolini and the leading Fascists as war 

criminals. Churchill thought of gaining 

the active aid of Italy's armed forces 

against the Germans. If the Italian 

Fleet and Army came under Allied control 

by the armIstIce, the Prime Minister 

apparently would have been willing to 

acquiesce in the retention of sovereignty 

by the Italian Government (the monarchy) on the mainland. Eisenhower, in 

contrast, wished not only the power to 

establish military government but also an 

overriding authority over the Italian 

Government with power to appoint and 

dismiss officials. 

Eisenhower on 27 July explained to the 

CCS why he preferred his own conditions 

47 Telg 383, Prime Minister to President, 26 

Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), Sec 

I-A; a copy of this telegram, No. 4116, which 

was forwarded by General Devers (in England) 

to Eisenhower was received at AFHQ at 0850, 

27 July 1943, Capitulation of Italy, p. 9; Churchill (Closing the Ring, pages 56-58) prints the 

whole message. 

to Churchill's. He wished to have a simple set of terms that could be broadcast 

directly to the Italian people. Hope for 

an honorable peace among the population, 

he thought, would make it impossible for 

any government in Italy to remain in 

power if it declined to make peace. But 

he did not wish to ask Italy to turn 

against the Germans, for he doubted the 

existence of much "fury" among the Italian people. Requiring active aid against 

the Germans would be offering the Italians merely a change of sides, whereas 

the great desire of the Italian people, he 

felt, was to be finished with the war. 48 

Eisenhower's program of psychological 

warfare, designed to bring the Badoglio 

regime to prompt capitulation, came under 

close scrutiny and eventual change by the 

heads of the British and American Governments. On the same afternoon, 27 July, 

that Eisenhower renewed his recommendation for a simple set of terms, the Prime 

Minister, in the House of Commons, was 

making the first official public declaration in response to Mussolini's downfall. 

Churchill said: 

We should let the Italians, to use a homely 

phrase, stew in their own juice for a bit, 

and hot up the fire to the utmost in order to 

accelerate the process, until we obtain from 

their Government, or whoever possesses the 

necessary authority, all our indispensable 

requirements for carrying on the war against 

our prime and capital foe, which is not Italy but Germany. It is the interest of Italy, 

and also the interest of the Allies, that the 

unconditional surrender of Italy be brought 

about wholesale and not piecemeaJ.49 

48 Telg 4894, Eisenhower to Devers for Prime 

Minister, 27 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 17. 

49 Onwards to Victory: War Speeches by the 

Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, compiled by 

Charles Eade (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1944), pp. 186-87. 
THE CLIMAX 

As he explained to Eisenhower privately, 

Churchill saw "obvious dangers in trying 

to state armistice terms in an attractive, 

popular form to the enemy nation." It 

was far better, he said, for all to be "cut 

and dried and that their Government 

should know our full demands and their 

maximum expectations." 50 On the following day, 28 July, President Roosevelt 

in a public address reiterated the strong 

stand to be taken with Italy. He said: 

Our terms for Italy are still the same as 

our terms to Germany and Japan-'Unconditional Surrender.' We will have no truck 

with Fascism in any way, shape, or manner. 

We will permit no vestige of Fascism to remain. 51 

The arguments seemed to be a luxury 

in view of the immediate prospect of getting Italy to surrender, and General Marshall explained the difficulty involved. 

The British Government, he telegraphed 

Eisenhower, had the attitude that a surrender involved political and economic 

conditions as well as military stipulations. 

The British therefore viewed Eisenhower's 

authority as limited to purely local surrenders. And the President agreed that 

the Allied commander should not fix 

general terms without the approval of both 

governments.62 

Eisenhower replied by asking for a directive from both governments empowering him to state general terms. There 

might be, he wrote, a fleeting opportunity 

to gain all objectives. Most important, 

he felt, was the prospect of obtaining 

50 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 60-6 I. 

51 United States and Italy 1936-1946: Documentary Record, U.S. Department of State Publication 2669, European Series 17 (Washington, 

1946), p. 45· 

52 Telg 3600, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 

43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 30. 

273 

Italian co-operation in selZlng vital ports 

and airfields. But he had to be able to 

speak precisely and authoritatively to the 

commander in chief of the Italian forces. 

If economic and political matters could 

be settled later, he might by the use of 

military terms alone be able to bring the 

campaign in the Mediterranean to a rapid 

.conclusion, thus saving resources for 

operations elsewhere.53 

At the same time, he sent a message 

to Mr. Churchill, explaining his request 

for a directive on a slightly different 

ground. Because he was conducting the 

war in the Mediterranean in accord with 

the CCS instruction to force Italy out of 

the war, he felt it his duty to take quick 

and full advantage of every opportunity.54 

Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office 

on 27 July had informed the U.S. State 

Department that the British considered 

the King of Italy or Badoglio acceptable 

for the purpose of effecting surrender. 

What continued to be a problem was 

whether the surrendering authority should 

be permitted to continue in office. 55 

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee 

took up the surrender matter on 29 July, 

but was unable to reach a decision or 

to make any positive recommendations. 

The British representative urged that the 

earlier proposal, the lengthy draft of detailed conditions known as the Long Terms, 

be approved by both governments so that 

General Eisenhower could present civil as 

well as military terms. The Americans 

53 Telg W-6024, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 

Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 48-49. 

54 Telg 5499, Eisenhower to Devers for Prime 

Minister, 29 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 

46-47. 

55 Copy of Msg from Br Foreign Office to U.S. 

State Dept, 27 Jul 43, OPD Files, Prime-President, Exec 10, item 63. 
274 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

objected, as they had previously, on the 

ground that the Long Terms did not provide for unconditional surrender. 56 

On the same day, the British Defense 

Committee cabled its views to the CCAC. 

Unconditional surrender, the British believed, had political and economic, as well 

as military, connotations. The armistice 

terms should therefore be comprehensive 

and inclusive. They recommended that 

General Eisenhower be authorized to accept a general surrender, but urged that 

the Long Terms be used as the surrender 

instrument. Considering it rather unlikely for the Italians to approach General 

Eisenhower directly, they anticipated as 

more probable an Italian bid for peace 

through the Vatican or some neutral 

state. The proposal to secure an initial 

surrender on the basis of military terms, 

this to be followed by agreement to economic and political terms, struck the 

British as faulty. What if the Italian 

Government refused to sign at the second 

stage? Precise terms were needed, and 

civil as well as military conditions would 

have to be included. And toward that 

end, the British planned in the near 

future to submit to the U.S. Government 

a comprehensive draft of terms in the 

expectation that the two Allied governments would reach agreement in plenty 

of time for AFHQ to conduct the actual 

negotiations. 57 

At this juncture President Roosevelt, 

though concurring m the British view 

56 Min, 3d Mtg CCAC, 29 Jul 43, ABC 381 

Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43)' Sec I-A, item 6. 

57 Telg 4995, Foreign Minister Eden to Viscount Halifax (repeated to British Resident Minister, Algiers), 29 Jul 43; Telg 387, Churchill to 

Roosevelt, 29 Jul 43, both in OPD Misc Exec 

2, item 5; Telg 4157, Churchill to Eisenhower. 

29 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 43-44; Cf. 

Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 60-61. 

that the precise armistice terms should 

not be broadcast, urged that General 

Eisenhower's recommended draft of surrender articles be accepted.58 He seemed 

mainly impressed by Eisenhower's argument that great military gains would accrue at little cost if a simple set of terms 

of surrender could be used to secure the 

rapid elimination of Italy from the war. 

Thus, although he had publicly proclaimed 

his adherence to unconditional surrender, 

and although he had left the American 

members of the CCAC with the impression that he was standing by that formula, he did not mention the phrase in his 

correspondence with ChurchilL Furthermore, he recognized that insisting on 

having Mussolini turned over as a war 

criminal might prejudice the primary objective of getting Italy quickly out of the 

war, and he did not recommend a modification of Eisenhower's draft on this 

point.59 

As Mr. Roosevelt explained to the 

press, he did not care with whom he dealt 

in Italy so long as that person-King, 

prime minister, or a mayor-was not a 

member of the Fascist government; so 

long as he could get the Italian troops to 

lay down their arms; and so long as he 

could prevent anarchy. At the same 

time, the President warned neutral nations against sheltering Axis war criminals.60 

Meanwhile, the British and American 

Governments had approved an emas58 The President stipulated one slight change 

dealing with the withdrawal of the German 

forces on the Italian mainland. Telg 330, Roosevelt to Churchill, 29 Jul 43, ABC 381 Italy-ArmSurr (5-9-43), Sec I-A. 

59 Telg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 Jul 43, OPD 

Mise Exec 2, item 5. 

60 Harold Calendar in the New York Times, 

July 31, '943, p. I. Cf. Churchill, Closing the 

Ring, p. 64. 
THE CLIMAX 

culated version of Eisenhower's draft message to be broadcast to the Italian people. 

References to the Atlantic Charter and to 

peace conditions were dropped. The return to Italy of Italian prisoners captured 

in Tunisia and Sicily was promised if all 

Allied prisoners held by the Italians were 

repatriated. On 29 July, therefore, 

AFHQ began to transmit the following 

broadcast to Italy: 

We commend the Italian people and the 

House of Savoy on ridding themselves of 

Mussolini, the man who involved them in 

war as the tool of Hitler, and brought them 

to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from 

the United Nations has been removed bv 

the Italians themselves. The only remain~ 

ing obstacle on the road to peace is the 

German aggressor who is still on Italian soil. 

You want peace. You can have peace immediately, and peace under the honorable 

conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you 

as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military 

forces in your country. If you do this, we 

will rid you of the Germans and deliver you 

from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily, our occupation will be 

mild and beneficent. Your men will return 

to their normal life, and to their productive 

avocations and, provided all British and 

Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us, and not taken away to 

Germany, the hundreds of thousands of 

Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia 

and Sicily, will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient 

liberties and traditions of your country will 

be restored. 61 

61 The revision and clearance with the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff of the broadcast to Italy can be 

traced in: Telg 327, Roosevelt to Churchill, 27 

Jul 43, and Telg 384, Churchill to Roosevelt, 28 

Jul 43, as repeated in Telg 4135, Churchill to 

Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43; Telg 3611, Marshall to 

Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43; Telg 4399, Eisenhower 

to Churchill, 29 Jul 43, all in Capitulation of 

275 

The day this broadcast hit Italy, 29 

July, Hitler was directing the new divisions 

for Rommel's Army Group B to make their 

way across the borders into Italy through 

use of force if necessary. Roatta, chief of 

the Italian Army, was drafting instructions 

to commanders in northern Italy to mine 

the railways against German incursion. 

Guariglia, the new Foreign Minister, had 

just returned to Rome where rumors were 

current of an impending German descent 

upon the capital in force. In Sicily, 

where the U.S. Seventh and British Eighth 

Armies were pressing forward vigorously 

all along the line, Italian resistance had 

virtually collapsed. Throughout Italy the 

population expected Badoglio to bring 

about an end to the war. Though 

the Badoglio government banned Eisenhower's broadcast from publication, the 

message in mimeographed form quickly 

appeared on the streets of the principal 

cities, where it became the chief topic of 

discussion in street cars and cafes. According to one competent observer, the 

Allied broadcast was the straw that broke 

the camel's back. 62 

As Churchill and Roosevelt clearly 

wished, the psychological warfare beamed 

to Italy from the Allied headquarters in 

Algiers was sharply differentiated from 

the problem of agreeing on suitable articles of capitulation. There was a difficult problem regarding armistice terms, 

General Marshall telegraphed General 

Italy, pp. 20-21, 31, 46. The Italian text as received in Italy is printed in: Ministero degfi 

AfJari Esteri, Il contributo itafiano nella guerra 

contro fa Germania (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico 

Dello Stato, 1946), p. I. See also Telg 324, 

Roosevelt to Churchill, 25 Jul 43, and Telg 

Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 43, both in OPD 

~00.6 Security (OCS Papers). 

62 Associated Press dispatch from Berne, Switzerland, July 30, 1943, New York Times, July 30, 

1943, p. 3; Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. 72. 
276 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Eisenhower on the 28th, because the 

attitude of the British Government was 

that political and economic conditions 

were involved as well as strictly military 

stipulations. Meeting on 30 July, the 

British War Cabinet agreed to accept Eisenhower's draft conditions for Italian capitulation, subject to several amendments. 

The British wished to omit all references 

to German forces and to add a stipulation 

that the Italians must do their best to 

deny to the Germans facilities useful to 

the Allies. They proposed to augment 

Eisenhower's power by enabling him to 

order the Italian Government to take such 

administrative or other action as he might 

require-this in addition to his authority 

to establish military government. They 

wanted greater clarity in spelling out the 

power to prescribe demobilization, disarmament, and demilitarization. They 

wanted provision made for the surrender 

of Italian war criminals, and for the disposition of Italian merchant shipping. 

With these changes, the cabinet was willing to authorize Eisenhower's terms as an 

emergency arrangement-if the Italians 

suddenly sued for peace and if military 

developments required immediate acceptance. If it turned out that the Allies 

had time to negotiate through diplomatic 

channels, the British desired the Americans to give careful consideration to the 

formal set of articles-the Long Termsproposed earlier by the British.63 

On the following day, the last day of 

July, the President and Prime Minister 

63 Telg 3600, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Jul 

43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 30; Telg, Churchill 

to Roosevelt, No. 389, 30 Jul 43, ABC 38 I ItalyArm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. I-A, repeated to Eisenhower through Devers, Msg 4 I 80, Capitulation 

of Italy, pp. 51-52 (copy also found in OPD 

300.6 Security (OCS Papers). 

approved the short military terms. Nothing was to be said about war criminals, 

for Roosevelt believed that problem might 

better be taken up later. Churchill suggested two changes of wording for the sake 

of precision; emphasized his government's 

agreement to the short terms only to meet 

an emergency situation; and revealed that 

London found puzzling Washington's lack 

of reference to the original British terms, 

a comprehensive and more carefully 

worded version of the armistice terms.64 

On the same day Churchill suggested 

to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that 

concluding an armistice with Italy in two 

stages-initially the short military terms, 

later the signature of the long termsmight be a sound procedure. Even in 

the event of a diplomatic approach, 

Churchill felt, the military conditions 

might serve very well, for the short terms 

would be more easily understood by an 

Italian envoy. The British Foreign Office 

was not particularly receptive to Churchill's thought. Eden preferred unconditional surrender.65 

General Eisenhower now had, by the 

end of July, a draft of armistice terms 

ready for presentation to Badoglio if the 

latter should seek to get out of the war, 

as he was expected to do. But it was 

still not clear between London and Washington what should happen to the Italian 

Government after acceptance of the short 

terms. President Roosevelt studied the 

British draft of comprehensive terms, but 

64 Telg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 3 I Jul 43, 

ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. I-A, 

(copy to Eisenhower in Telg 3824, Marshall to 

Eisenhower, 31 Jul 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 

59-60); Telg, Churchill to Roosevelt, as given 

in Telg 4222, Devers to Eisenhower, 3 I Jul 43, 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 66-67. 

65 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 64-65. 
THE CLIMAX 

he did not wish to use it. He wired this 

view to Churchill: that in the future he 

preferred to let Eisenhower act to meet 

situations as they might arise. A copy 

of this message was given to the American 

Joint Chiefs and to the British Joint Staff 

Mission for their guidance. At the 

same time, in deference to Churchill's inquiries, President Roosevelt directed the 

Joint Chiefs to re-examine the British 

draft of the Long Terms.66 

On 3 August, the Joint Chiefs again 

studied the Long Terms, the British proposal which had first been considered in 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of 

16 June. The Joint Chiefs submitted 

four objections to the British proposal: 

there was no statement or reference to 

unconditional surrender; it referred to the 

"Supreme Command of the United Nations," a position which did not exist; the 

document did not deal with German troops 

in Italy; and it provided for implementation by a Control Commission under the 

authority of the United Nations, rather 

than by Eisenhower under the authority 

of the United States and British Governments through the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. The Joint Chiefs expressed agreement with President Roosevelt's view that 

Eisenhower be permitted to act to meet 

situations as they arose, using the terms 

already furnished him as he saw fit. They 

conceded that the British proposal, with 

appropriate amendments to meet U.S. 

objections, might serve a useful purpose 

for later phases of the Italian situation, 

since it did embrace in a single document 

many well-considered military, political, 

66 Memorandum for General Marshall, Admiral King, and General Arnold, 2 Aug 43, sub: 

Surrender Terms, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 25 

(copy in OPD 300.6 Security (OCS Papers). 

277 

and economic conditions to be imposed 

on Italy.67 

The British Government now reintroduced its draft of the Long Terms, 

with changes of wording to meet the 

American objections, particularly in regard to unconditional surrender. 68 At its 

fourth meeting, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee again considered terms 

for Italian surrender. The British members presented the British War Cabinet's 

point of view: a comprehensive and allinclusive statement of terms would be 

necessary in addition to the terms which 

General Eisenhower already possessed and 

they submitted the revised and amended 

British draft of the Long Terms for this 

purpose. The committee agreed that additional terms dealing with political and 

economic matters would be necessary at 

a later date. The American members 

pointed out that the short terms did not 

include any saving clause empowering 

General Eisenhower to impose the political 

as well as military conditions. The committee then recommended the inclusion of 

such a saving clause. No other decision 

was made. 69 

On 6 August, the Combined Chiefs 

accepted the committee's suggestion for a 

saving clause, and instructed General Eisenhower that if he employed the draft 

67 JCS Memo for President, 3 Aug 43, sub: 

Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, ABC 

38 I Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. I-A. 

68 Memo for rcd, Surrender Terms for Italy, 

n.d., Document A, n.d., ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr 

(5-9-43), sec. I-A. Document A is the revised 

version of CCS 258 with Article 30 filled out, 

and with the formula for unconditional surrender 

incorporated in the preamble. The Civil Affairs 

Division of the War Department and the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD made the suggestions for the rewording. 

69 Min, 4th Mtg CCAC, 5 Aug 43, ABC 381 

I taly-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. I-A. 
278 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

terms which he already had, he should 

make it clear that they were purely military and that other conditions, political, 

economic, and financial, would follow. 70 

Mussolini's downfall, therefore, marked 

no turning point in Allied strategy. It 

merely hastened the decision to invade the 

Italian mainland, but it in no sense brought 

about the decision itself. At American insistence, operations in the Mediterranean 

beyond Sicily were to be limited-subordinate to the main effort to be launched 

later in northwest Europe. With his resources consequently curtailed, General 

Eisenhower was to find that the success 

or failure in the campaign after Sicily 

would depend not on the power marshalled in support of the invasion but 

rather on negotiations to eliminate Italy 

as a belligerent. The blow at the Italian 

mainland, originally conceived as a means 

of forcing the Italians to surrender, was 

to become contingent on first eliminating 

Italy from the war as the result of military 

diplomacy. 

Rome: Open City 

During the last few days of July, while 

working out the terms of military diplomacy to induce Italy to quit the war, 

while broadcasting to the Italian people 

a program of psychological warfare, and 

while expecting word from the Badoglio 

government on the prospect of peace, 

General Eisenhower had suspended heavy 

air raids on Italian cities. The lull coincidentally served another purpose. The 

Mediterranean Allied air forces had been 

operating at close to full capacity for a 

70 Min, 105th Mtg CCS, 6 Aug 43, Supplementary, item 9; Telg 4363, Marshall to Eisenhower. 

long time, and air commanders wished to 

give their crews a rest. 71 

On the first day of August, after conferring with Tedder, Eisenhower decided 

to resume air bombardments, particularly 

in the Naples area and on the railroad 

marshaling yards around Rome. Before 

doing so, he broadcast his intention a day 

earlier. Another Algiers radio broadcast 

on 2 August warned the Italian people 

of dire consequences if the Badoglio government made no move to end the war.72 

The Allied air forces then bombed the 

Italian mainland. U.S. Flying Fortresses 

attacked Naples twice, night-flying British 

Wellingtons raided Naples three times during the first week of August. An operation planned against the Rome marshaling 

yards for 3 August was canceled at the 

last minute because AFHQ received word 

from the Combined Chiefs that the Italian Government had requested a statement of conditions necessary to recognize 

Rome as an open city.73 

The Italian attempt to gain for Rome 

the status of an open city was the first 

diplomatic approach received by the 

Allies. The InItIatIve apparently had 

come from the Holy See, for on 3 I July 

the Vatican received in response to its 

71 Telg W-6503, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 

Aug 43, and Telg 4115, Marshall to Eisenhower, 

3 Aug 43, both in Smith Papers, box 4. See 

also Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

pp. 38 2-83. 

72 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p. 375; Telgs W-6406 and W-6509, Eisenhower 

to Marshall, 3 and 4 Aug 43, and British Resident Minister in Algiers to Churchill, 4 Aug 43, 

Smith Papers, box 4; New York Times, August 

3, 1943, p. I. 

73 Coles, USAAF Hist Study 37, pp. 163-64; 

Telgs W-6406 and W-6509, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 and 4 Aug 43, and Telg W-6516/771 I, 

AFHQto AGWAR, 4 Aug 43, all in OPD Exec 

2, item 6; see also, Butcher, My Three Years 

With Eisenhower, pp. 378-79. 
THE CLIMAX 

request, a written statement from the 

Italian Government that the decision had 

been made to declare Rome an open city. 

Transmitting this information, the Apostolic Delegate in Washington informed 

Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, 

on 2 August that the Papal Secretary of 

State wished to ascertain what conditions 

the Allies deemed necessary for regarding 

the Italian capital in this light. The State 

Department informed the British Government and General Marshall, and the latter advised Eisenhower, suggesting that 

air bombardment of Rome be halted for 

the moment. It was then that General 

Eisenhower canceled the bombardment 

planned for 3 August. Next day Eisenhower learned that he was free to attack 

airfields near Rome being used by Italians and Germans, but bad flying weather 

around the Italian capital caused him to 

cancel the mission. 74 

The War Department, meanwhile, on 

2 August had submitted to the President 

and to the State Department a list of 

seven conditions considered essential for 

recogmzmg Rome as an open city. 

Churchill and his War Cabinet vigorously 

opposed such recognition. Apprehensive 

lest such a move be taken by the Allied 

public as an abandonment of the principle of unconditional surrender and as a 

willingness to make a patched-up peace 

74 Ltr 49 2/42, Archbishop Cicognani to Sumner Welles, 2 Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 6; 

Memo, Col Hammond for President, White 22, 

2 Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 5; Memo, Sumner 

Welles for Marshall, 2 Aug 43, inclosing request 

from Apostolic Delegate; Memo, Marshall for 

Handy, 2 Aug 43, sub: Rome an Open City; 

Telg, Marshall to Eisenhower, FAN 181, 2 Aug 

43; Memo, Col Hammond for President, White 

25, 2 Aug 43; Memo, Col Hammond for Marshall, 

3 Aug 43, all found in OPD 300.6 Security (OCS 

Papers) . 

279 

with the Badoglio regime, Churchill also 

suspected that the Italian Government 

might be taking the first step toward 

trying to secure recognition of all of Italy 

as a neutral area so that the government 

could withdraw painlessly from the war. 

Believing that Allied troops would be in 

Rome within a few months, Churchill 

saw the city's communication and airfield systems as a requirement for further 

advance up the Italian peninsula.75 

Though agreeing with the Prime Minister's objections, the JCS recommended 

that the President avoid making a direct 

denial to the Holy See's request. In accordance with the suggestion, Mr. Sumner 

Welles on 5 August told the Apostolic 

Delegate that the matter was receiving 

the fullest consideration by the highest 

American authorities. He concluded: 

"I am instructed by the President to state 

that, in accordance with the accepted 

principles of international law and of 

pertinent international agreements, there 

is nothing to prevent the Italian Government from undertaking unilaterally to declare Rome an open city." 76 

The first diplomatic move made by 

Italy toward the Allies, tentative and 

tangential though it was, thus received an 

ad hoc reception that was rather cold. 

Without further communication, the Ital7 r. Msg 403, Churchill to Roosevelt, 4 Aug 43, 

OPD Exec 2, item 6; Telg 401, Churchill to 

Roosevelt, 3 Aug 43, and Telg 402, Churchill 

to Roosevelt, 4 Aug 43, OPD 300.6 Security 

(OCS Papers). There were some reports of 

this plan in the press. See Associated Press dispatch of July 31, 1943, Berne, Switzerland, in New 

York Times, August I, 1943, and article by 

Edwin L. James, p. E-3. 

76 Memo, JCS for President, 5 Aug 43, and 

for General Hull, 19 Aug 43, both in OPD Exec 

2, item 6; Telgs, Eisenhower to Marshall and 

Marshall to Eisenhower, Smith Papers, box 4. 
280 SICILY AND THE SURREl\'DER OF ITALY 

ian Government on r 4 August fonnally 

declared Rome an open city. 

At first the CCS instructed Eisenhower 

to make no further air attacks against 

the Italian capital until its status could 

be clarified. But on the following day, 

15 August, the CCS decided that the 

Allies should not commit themselves on 

the matter, and they thereby left Eisenhower free to bomb such military objectives in the Rome area as he judged 

necessary.77 

77 CCS g06, 14 Aug 43, Rome an Open City; 

Min, 108th Mtg CCS. 15 Aug 43, item Il; Telg, 

CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 191, 14 Aug 43, and 

Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 194, 15 Aug 43, 

OPD Exec Il, item 6; Te1g 5309 Marshall to 

Eisenhower, 14 Aug 43. and Telg 1682, AFHQ 

to KKAD, Quebec, 15 Aug 43, both in Smith 

Papers, box 4. 
CHAPTER XV 

Dissolution of the Rome-Berlin Axis 

Badoglio's First Moves 

About I70o, 25 July, the Italian monarch summoned Marshal Badoglio, informed him of his appointment as Head 

of Government, and handed him the list 

of his cabinet members-civil servants 

without party connection or supportthat the sovereign and the Duke of Acquarone had selected. As Head of Government, Badoglio was to be responsible 

for civil functions only. Victor Emmanuel III resumed the supreme command 

of the Italian armed forces, a power that 

M ussolini had exercised since I I June 

I940. Ambrosio was to continue as chief 

of Comando Supremo, Roatta as chief of 

the Army General Staff, Superesercito. 

Badoglio accepted the situation and 

the conditions, including two proclamations already drafted, which the marshal 

issued over his own signature and communicated through the press and radio. 

The first announced Badoglio's appointment and assured Italy and the world 

that "The war continues." The second 

proclamation warned the Italian people, 

the Fascist organization, and other political parties against agitating the government 

with precipitate demands for wholesale 

political changes or for peace. 1 The first 

1 Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, p. 7 I. Badoglio learned later that Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Italian Premier during World War I, had 

assisted in drafting the proclamations. 

was a clear, official announcement of 

the continued vitality of the treaty of alliance with Germany.2 

Though the Badoglio government dissolved the Fascist party and began to incorporate the Fascist militia gradually into 

the Regular Army, the government was 

non-Fascist rather than anti-Fascist. The 

change of regime seemed to mark the first 

step toward a restoration of constitutional 

government, but the actual basis of 

Badoglio's powers was in the Fascist constitutional la\Wi. The King had been careful to maintain his role as a constitutional 

monarch, accepting Mussolini's resignation and appointing Badoglio his successor as Capo del Governo, with all the 

powers of that office created by the Fascist laws of I925 and I926. But Badoglio refused to take any action without 

the explicit authorization of the King. In 

actuality, Italy reverted to absolute monarchy. At Badoglio's insistence, whatever 

civil power he exercised was to be construed as a direct emanation of the King's 

will. Whatever military commands and 

directives Ambrosio issued were in accordance with the King's direct wishes. 

Relieved of the Fascist burden, the 

country seethed with political excitement 

2 It Processo Carboni-Roatta: L' Armistizio e la 

di/esa di Roma nella sentenza del Tribunale 

Militare (Estratto della "Rivista Penale," Maggio-Giugno 1949) (Rome: Societa Editrice 

Temi), p. 9 (cited hereafter as It Processo 

Carboni-Roatta) . 
282 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

and with the expectation of immediate 

peace. To check the unrest, Roatta 

transferred control of four divisions from 

himself to the Minister of War, Generale 

di Brigata in Riserva Antonio Sorice, who 

moved two from the interior of Italy to 

Turin and two from France to Milan. 

Eventually, Sorice controlled five divisions, 

all to be used for maintaining public order 

and therefore not available for defense 

against attack by either the Allies or the 

Germans.3 

While awaiting the return to Italy of 

Raffaele Guariglia, Ambassador to Turkey, who was to become Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, Badoglio took charge of 

foreign policy. In accordance with the 

King's wishes, the immediate aim was to 

avoid conflict with the Germans. Badoglio wished to end the war, jointly with 

the Germans if possible. At the least, he 

was to try to secure German consent to a 

dissolution of the Pact of Stee1.4 

At the carabinieri barracks where he 

spent his first night in captivity after his 

forced resignation, Mussolini received a 

note from Badoglio. The measures taken 

toward him, Badoglio explained, were in 

the interest of his personal safety, for a 

plot had been discovered against his life. 

M ussolini replied, thanking Badoglio for 

his consideration. He would make no difficulties, he added, but would, rather, cooperate to the fullest extent. Expressing 

3 Comando Supremo, I Reparto, Operazioni: 

Regio Esercito-Quadro di battaglia alia data 

del 1 luglio 1943; Quadro di battaglia alia data 

del 1 agosto 1943, IT 10 a-h; Roatta, Otto 

milioni, pp. 263-64; Rossi, Come arrivammo, 

pp. 94, 174-75, 404; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrote, II, 54. 

4 MS #P-058, Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, 

Question II; Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. 199; 

Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 291; Badoglio, Memorie 

e documenti, pp. 84-85; Rintelen, M ussolini als 

Bundesgenosse, p. 224. 

satisfaction over the decision to continue 

the war, he wished Badoglio well in his 

task of serving the King, "whose loyal 

servant I remain." 5 

Immediately after the Feltre conference, 

Hitler and the OKW had felt reassured 

over the situation in Italy. The Italian 

High Command had promised to commit 

four additional Italian divisions in the 

south: one in Sicily, two in Puglia, and 

one in Calabria. On 22 July, Hitler had 

released the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division for employment on Sicily. That 

same day, Ambrosio had accepted the conditions laid down by Keitel at Feltre and 

had formally requested two additional 

German divisions. Field Marshal Rommel, who had been designated to command Army Group B in the ALA RICH 

plan, was on 2 I July removed from this 

assignment and sent to Salonika to take 

command of German troops in Greece. 

The warning orders for operations ALARICH and KONST ANTIN were suspended. 6 On 23 July, Hitler issued 

orders in accordance with Ambrosio's request alerting the 305th and 76th Infantry Divisions for movement from France 

to southern Italy. Hitler entertained no 

suspicion whatsoever that his friend Mussolini might secretly be searching for 

contact with the Western Powers. General von Rintelen did report, however, 

that Comando Supremo had little confidence that Sicily could be held and, 

on 24 July, he indicated that tension in 

I taly had increased rather than diminished as a result of the Feltre conference.7 

News of the political change in Italy 

5 Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, p. 72; Mussolini, Storia di un anno, p. 20. 

6 OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VIl.43, 25 Jul 43; 

Rommel, Private KTB, entry 22 Jul 43. 

7 MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 40-41. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 283 

came as a surprise to the Germans. The 

first reports to reach Berlin on 25 July 

were not alarming. They indicated merely that the Fascist old guard had brought 

about the convocation of the Grand 

Council to urge the Duce to take more 

energetic measures against defeatism. 

Not until the next day did the Germans 

learn that Ciano and Grandi had led a 

revolt, that Mussolini had resigned, and 

that the King had appointed Badoglio in 

his place.s 

Hitler could not believe that M ussolini 

had resigned voluntarily. He was sure 

that force had been used, and he felt 

that the convocation of the Grand Council had been a show carefully prepared 

by the King and Badoglio. He feared 

that these two, who in his opinion had 

been sabotaging the war all along, might 

already have done away with his friend. 

Hitler's first impulse was to strike with 

lightning speed-seize Rome with the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division (located near 

Lake Bolsena 35 miles north of the city), 

and the 2d Parachute Division (to be 

air-transported from France to the Rome 

area); kidnap the King, the Heir Apparent, Badoglio, and the cabinet ministers; and discover and liberate Mussolini 

as the only means of rejuvenating the 

Fascist party. So extreme was Hitler's 

anger and apprehension that he thought 

even of seizing the Vatican and the Pope. 

Goebbels and Ribbentrop, after lengthy 

argument, persuaded Hitler to drop this 

extreme measure.9 

8 Goebbels Diaries, p. 403, entry 25 Jul 

43. Ambassador von Mackensen's early reports 

did not reveal the full extent of the crisis, and he 

was bitterly criticized by Ribbentrop, Minister of 

Foreign Affairs. See MS #C-o I 3 (Kesselring), 

p. 5· 

o Goebbels Diaries, pp. 40 7-0 9. 

The main issue was whether to act at 

once in Italy with the forces available or 

to make more careful preparations that 

involved delay. Hitler favored immediate 

action, even if improvised, in order to 

capture the Badoglio government before 

it could consolidate its power. A quick, 

bold stroke, he believed, would restore the 

prestige of Fascism. 

Rommel and others advocated caution. 

They feared that German moves would 

invite the Allies to establish themselves on 

the Italian mainland and that a blow 

against the King would turn the Italian 

officer corps against the Germans. Since 

Rommel concurred in the general belief 

that Mussolini's overthrow had been carefully prepared, and since he believed that 

the new government had already approached the Allies with an offer of peace, 

Rommel thought it best to retire from 

Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy, but 

to hold northern Italy. He recommended 

that Kesselring withdraw his forces and 

consolidate with Rommel's forces in the 

north, where all would come under Rommel's command. lo 

The first German orders prompted by 

Mussolini's overthrow were issued on the 

night of 26 July. The general framework 

and outline of Plan ALARICH were at 

hand but the German reaction to the 

new situation in Italy had a large measure 

of improvisation. Field Marshal von 

Rundstedt, OB WEST, was ordered to 

move two divisions toward the Italian 

border: the 305th Infantry Division toward Nice, and the 44th Infantry Division toward the Brenner Pass. He was 

to carry out two operations which had 

formed integral parts of the ALARICH 

plan: KOPENHAGEN, the seizure of 

10 Min of Confs 14, IS, and 16, 25 and 26 

Jul 43, in Min of Hitler Confs. 
284 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the Mount Cenis pass; and SIEGFRIED, 

the occupation of the southern coast of 

France in the area of the Italian Fourth 

Army. Field Marshal Rommel was recalled from Salonika to command Army 

Group B, with headquarters in Munich. 

Meanwhile, Ambassador von Mackensen, 

Field Marshal Kesselring, and General 

von Rintelen were instructed to learn all 

they could regarding the intentions of the 

new government.l1 

Plans against Italy began to develop at 

once in three main stages. First, Army 

Group B was to occupy north Italy. Behind the two initial divisions dispatched 

toward Italy, Rundstedt was to move up 

four more divisions from France. The II 

SS Panzer Corps, comprising two SS panzer divisions, was to be withdrawn from 

the Eastern Front to become part of Rommel's new command. Second, Generaloberst Kurt Student was to fly to Rome, 

take operational control of the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier and 2d Parachute Divisions, 

seize the capital and the leading political 

personalities, and liberate Mussolini. 

Capt. Otto Skorzeny, personally selected 

by Hitler, was to have the special mission 

of locating and liberating the Duce. Because earlier ALARICH planning had 

designated Student to occupy the Alpine 

passes with his XI Flieger Korps (ISt 

and 2d Parachute Divisions), OKW assigned this task to General der Gebirgstruppen Valentin Feurstein, who was to 

use troops stationed at the Mountain 

Training School in Mittenwald, fifteen 

miles north of Innsbruck. Third, as soon 

as all was in readiness for the stroke 

planned against the Italian Government, 

Rommel was to take command of all Ger11 OKW/WFSt, KTB, I. VIl-3 I. VII.43, 26 

J ul 43; Rommel, Private KTB, entries for 25-

28 Jul 43. 

man forces in north Italy. Kesselring was 

then to withdraw the German troops 

from the Italian islands and from south 

Italy and consolidate his forces with 

Rommel's command in the north. At 

that time, Kesselring's command in Italy 

would come to an end. 

In connection with the third step, 

Hitler's headquarters dispatched a naval 

officer to Frascati to explain Kesselring's 

role in the plan. Kesselring was to halt 

all movements of additional troops to 

Sicily; prepare to evacuate all air units 

from Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, destroying, if necessary, their heavy equipment; concentrate in assembly areas the 

16th and 26th Panzer Divisions and that 

part of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division still on the Italian mainland, suspending thereby further movements to the 

south; alert the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 

2d Parachute Divisions (the latter upon 

its arrival near Rome) to their mission; 

be ready to take over all the antiaircraft 

defenses in Italy, repossessing the flak material furnished Italian units; and send 

transport aircraft to France to carry the 

2d Parachute Division to Italy.12 

Kesselring took a different view of the 

situation from that of OKW. Optimistic 

by temperament and inclined to trust 

those with whom he worked, he had called 

on Badoglio on 26 July, accompanied by 

the German Ambassador, Mackensen. 

Badoglio assured the Germans that he had 

known nothing of the movement against 

Mussolini until he was summoned by 

the King to take office. He had insisted, 

Badoglio continued, on maintaining the 

alliance with Germany as a condition of 

taking office, and his proclamation made 

clear that the war would continue. When 

120KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3 I. VII. 43, 26 Jul 

43· 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 285 

the Germans expressed some curiosity as 

to Mussolini's fate, Badoglio showed Mussolini's letter as proof not only of his 

personal safety but also of his intention 

to do nothing to oppose the new regime. 

When Kesselring turned the conversation 

to military matters and said it was necessary to overcome the sense of fatigue 

among Italian troops and to eliminate 

certain impediments to the military effort 

raised by the civil administration, Badoglio declared he would do everything he 

could to improve the co-operation of 

Italian civil officials. Problems of morale, 

however, concerned the military, and 

Badoglio urged Kesselring to take up the 

problem directly with Ambrosio, chief of 

Comando Supremo. 

Kesselring and Rintelen called on Ambrosio, who assured them that the political 

change had no effect on military operations. Like Badoglio, Ambrosio emphasized Italy's determination to continue 

in the war on the side of her ally. As 

to improving Italian troop morale, Ambrosio observed that this was not an easy 

matter, it would take time. Kesselring 

reminded Ambrosio that Hitler at Feltre 

had promised to send all the reinforcements Germany could spare, and he 

urged measures to restore the sense of 

comradeship between Italian and German troopS.I3 

Badoglio's and Ambrosio's declarations 

conformed with the King's basic policyto avoid a unilateral breach of the alliance by Italy, and to take no action that 

would bring Italians into conflict with 

Germans. 'These assurances were not altogether dishonest. Kesselring, on his 

13 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 

224-25; OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 26 

Jul 43; Min, Colloquio a Palazzo Vidoni, Roma, 

26 luglio 1943, IT 3037. 

side, appreciated the Italian participation 

in the war. He respected Ambrosio and 

Roatta. Accepting the Italian statements 

in good faith, he bent his efforts toward 

maintaining the alliance. 14 

Though Goebbels cynically wrote that 

"Kesselring fell for a well-staged show," 

Kesselring felt that more was to be gained 

by exploiting the current willingness of 

the Italian Government to co-operate than 

by precipitating a crisis that might lead 

to collapse and chaos. Mter receiving 

the instructions brought personally by the 

naval officer, Kesselring reported to OKW 

his belief that the Fascist party had lost 

out because of its own weakness and lack 

of leadership and that no support could 

be expected from it. He thought that the 

measures planned by Student and Skorzeny could be executed, but not without care and consequent delay. Action 

against the Italian forces guarding Rome 

would completely alienate, he felt, all who 

still bore some good will toward Germany. 

Furthermore, an armed struggle in the 

Rome area would disrupt all traffic to the 

south, halt the movement of supplies and 

reinforcements, and expose the German 

forces in Sicily and southern Italy to the 

danger of being cut off. In the interest 

of these troops at least, he urged, the 

Germans should exploit the willingness of 

the Italian Government to receive additional German units. In contrast with 

Rommel's estimate, Kesselring believed 

that he could, if reinforced, defend all 

of Italy and the Balkans, and he recommended this course of action to Hitler.15 

14 Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, p. 224; MS #T2, K I (Kesselring), pp. 6-7; Eugenio Dallmann, Roma Nazista (Milan: Longanesi & Co., 

1949), p. 138. 

15 OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31.VII.43, 27 Jul 43; 

MS #C-O!3 (Kesselring), p. 13. 
286 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Kesselring's representations had an 

effect. On 28 July, OKW suspended 

Student's mission, ordering him instead 

merely to be ready to seize the Italian 

Government and liberate M ussolini. 16 

Student and Skorzeny were by then at 

Frascati, and the first lift of the 2d Parachute Division arrived that day at Pratica 

di Mare, an airfield not far from Frascati. 

Roatta was curious about the sudden 

arrival of German paratroopers, but he 

accepted with seeming good grace Kesselring's explanation-they were reinforcements for the 1st Parachute Division in 

Sicily. While the Germans thus set the 

stage for Hitler's coup-kidnapping the 

Italian Government-Skorzeny threw 

himself wholeheartedly into the mission of 

finding Mussolini. Dazzled by the honor 

of having been summoned to Hitler's headquarters, Skorzeny had fallen under Hitler's spell. Mussolini, the Fuehrer had 

said, was the last of the Romans and his 

only true friend. He would go to any 

length to save him from being turned over 

to the Allies. Skorzeny vowed to be 

worthy of Hitler's trustP 

Meanwhile, on 27 July, Badoglio formulated his plan for a joint peace effort 

and presented it to the King, who authorized it as official policy. Badoglio then 

sent a telegram to Hitler proposing a 

meeting on Italian soil between the King 

and the Fuehrer. His purpose was to 

160KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VlI.43, 28 Jul 

43· 17 Otto Skorzeny, Geheimkommando Skorzeny 

(Hamburg: Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1950), pp. 

J 00- J 0 J. For additional material on Skorzeny 

see Extract From Revised Notes 1 on The German Intelligence Services, VFZI34, copy 23, 6 

Dec 44, Source M.I.-6, AFHQ reel 365F, and 

Hq U:S. Forces European Theater, Interrogation 

Center, Consolidated Intelligence Report (CIR) 

4, 23 Jul 45, sub: The German Sabotage Service. 

unprocessed files, NARS. 

explain candidly 

peace before the 

was diluted by 

courses. IS 

the need for a joint 

Axis bargaining power 

divergent diplomatic 

Because Alfieri, the Italian Ambassador 

at Berlin, had come to Rome to attend 

the meeting of the Grand Council, where 

he had voted against M ussolini, and had 

not returned to his post, the Italian Military Attache at Berlin, Generale di Corpo 

d' Armata Efisio Marras, received instructions to fly to the Fuehrer's headquarters 

to reinforce the request for a conference. 

Without knowledge of Badoglio's intentions, Marras did not know whether 

Badoglio was trying to secure a joint ItaloGerman peace move, though the idea was 

not excluded. According to his instructions, Marras was to establish contact with 

Hitler on behalf of the new Italian Government, read a copy of Mussolini's letter 

indicating his continuing loyalty to the 

King, propose a meeting of the heads of 

state, and indicate the Italian desire to 

withdraw the Italian Fourth Army from 

southern France to ItalyY 

The same day that Marras was getting 

ready to visit Hitler, 29 July, Kesselring 

was in conference with the Fuehrer. 

There Kesselring reinforced his argument 

in favor of maintaining correct relations 

with the Badoglio government-at least 

until the Germans could introduce additional German divisions into Italy 

peaceably. 

On the surface at least, Hitler accepted 

Kesselring's program. He instructed Kesselring to direct all his dealings with 

Comando Supremo toward securing the 

movement of the maximum number of 

German troops into northern Italy. Ac18 Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 84-85. 

ID Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 377-78; 

Interv, Smyth with Marras, 20 Dec 48. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 287 

tually, however, Hitler was using Kesselring, Rintelen, and Mackensen-the 

"Italophiles" as they were called In 

OKW-to allay Italian suspicions and to 

keep Badoglio in the alliance while OKW 

made ready to take drastic action. 20 

Though all reports from Kesselring and 

Mackensen, and from Admiral Wilhelm 

Canaris, intelligence chief, as well, gave 

credence to the solemn declarations of 

loyalty to the Axis by the King, Badoglio, 

Ambrosio, and Roa:tta, the reports made 

little impression on Hitler. He was certain that the I talian Government was 

planning "treason." A transatlantic conversation between President Roosevelt and 

Mr. Churchill intercepted by Germany on 

29 July confirmed Hitler's suspicions that 

negotiations between Italy and the Allies 

were under way, even though the conversation indicated no more than an expectation of receiving Italian overtures. 21 

Hitler received Marras at his headquarters on the morning of 30 July. 

Marras felt that Hitler suspected him of 

being Badoglio's "torpedo" with the job 

of rubbing out the Fuehrer. For while 

Marras delivered Badoglio's message, he 

was conscious that JodI, Generalmajor 

Rudolf Schmundt, and Ambassador Walter Hewel were facing him from three 

different points in the room, each with 

his hand on a revolver in his pocket. 

Marras remained rigid, not even venturing 

to make a move for his handkerchief. 

Hitler, who appeared calm, criticized the 

sudden I talian political change in the 

midst of war, and asked why a military 

2°OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 29 Jul 

43; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), p. 79; MS #C013 (Kesselring), p. 12. 

210KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3 I. V1Lt3, 29 Jul 

4::\". MS #C-093 (Warlimont), page 84, mistakenly gives credence to this alleged proof. 

attache should be drawn into a political 

matter. Accepting Badoglio's declaration 

that the war would continue, Hitler saw 

no immediate need for a conference with 

the King or Badoglio, particularly because 

of the recent meeting with Mussolini at 

Feltre. Hitler suggested rather that the 

ministers of foreign affairs and the chiefs 

of staff might examine the situation from 

the standpoint of continuing the war. 

He made no direct reply to the proposed 

withdrawal of the Italian Army from 

southern France. He admitted that it 

might be useful at a later date for him 

to confer with the King and Badoglio, in 

which case the Heir Apparent-Prillce 

Humbert-ought also to be present.22 

Marras submitted his report to Badoglio on I August, and on the same day a 

telegram arrived from Hitler proposing a 

conference of foreign ministers and chiefs 

of staff at Tarvis, just across the border 

from Italy, on the 5th or 6th of August. 

Badoglio accepted Hitler's proposal.23 

Hitler refused to confer on Italian soil 

or to leave Germany because he feared an 

attempt on his life. He proposed, instead, 

the meeting of second echelon officials in 

order to avoid a discussion of what Badoglio and others considered the fundamental 

issue: whether or not to make peace with 

the Allies. Badoglio, hoping for a frank 

talk with Hitler in the near future, declined 

to initiate any approach to the Western 

Allies until the Germans had clearly revealed their intentions. 

By then, I August, OKW had a completely formulated plan, code-named 

ACHSE, to meet the possibility of an 

22 Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 379-86; 

Tnterv, Smyth with Marras, 20 Dec 48. 

23 Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, p. 96; Simoni. Berlino, Ambasciata, p. 387. 
288 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Italian double cross. Like ALA RICH, 

drawn up in the latter part of May in 

anticipation of political change in Italy, 

ACHSE was based on the premise of Italian defection. Upon receipt of the code 

word, German units in Italy were to 

take over the country by force.24 

Events occurring on the Italian frontier 

during the last days of July seemed to 

indicate that the ACHSE button might 

be pushed at any moment. 

Friction Along the Alps 

In accordance with OKW instructions 

issued during the night of 26 July, Rundstedt started to move the 305th Infantry 

Division from the interior of France toward Nice and the 44th Infantry Division 

toward the Brenner Pass. At the border, transportation was to be arranged 

with Italian authorities on the assumption that the divisions were destined for 

southern Italy in accordance with agreements concluded with Comando Supremo. 

When on 27 July the leading elements of 

the 30Sth Infantry Division reached Nice, 

which was in the area controlled by the 

Italian Fourth Army, they learned that 

Comando Supremo objected to further 

movement into Italy because of a shortage 

of railway transportation. Comando Supremo refused to provide transportation 

on the following day, and on 29 July the 

Italians infonned OKW that the 305th 

Infantry Division would have to wait at 

least several days before transportation 

24 English translation of two telegrams, 0 KW I 

WFSt, Nrs. 661747 and 661747/43 g.k.chefs., 

both dated I Aug 43 and signed by Keitel, in 

ONI, Fuehrer Directives, 1942-1945 pp. 87-88; 

OKW/WFSt, Kl'BJ 1.-31YIl.43, I Aug 43; MS 

#C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 87-90. 

could be made available to move it to 

southern Italy.25 

Comando Supremo at least had a good 

excuse and perhaps a legitimate reason. 

Roatta, who as chief of Superesercito had 

operational control over all the ground 

forces, German and Italian, in Italy (except those Italian troops moved to the 

large cities to restrain civil disturbances), 

conferred with Kesselring on 28 July and 

reaffirmed that he wanted two more German divisions in the defense of southern 

Italy. But he explained that railway 

traffic was particularly congested because 

of the dispatch of an Italian division 

northward to check civilian unrest in 

Milan, Turin, and Bologna. Gennan 

movements had to be halted temporarily, 

Roatta said, otherwise situations might 

occur wherein German troops would find 

Italian forces unexpectedly blocking their 

way. Roatta hoped to overcome the 

traffic problem by prohibiting all civilian 

travel, and proposed that half the train 

space be allocated for Italian movements, 

half for German. Kesselring seemed 

placated.26 

On 29 July, Mussolini's birthday, while 

a rumor swept Rome that the Gennans 

were preparing to seize the Italian capital, while Ambassador von Mackensen 

brought greetings to Mussolini with inquiries as to his whereabouts, and while 

Kesselring carried a handsome set of the 

works of Nietzsche as a present from Hitler to Mussolini and asked to deliver it 

personally, the Italian Ministry of War 

received three alanning telegrams from 

Generale di Corpo d' Annata Alessandro 

Gloria, commander of the XXXV Corps 

2r. OKWjWFSt, KTB, I.-31.vn.43, 27, 28, 

and 29 Jul 43. 

26 Ibid., 28 Jul 43. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 289 

at Bolzano, forty miles south of the 

Brenner Pass. Gloria reported Gennan 

troops assembling in the German Tyrol 

and at least one group moving on foot 

toward the Brenner Pass.27 

While the Italians politely frustrated 

Mackensen's and Kesselring's attempts to 

discover Mussolini's whereabouts, Comando Supremo prepared to resist the Germans on two fronts-to ward off a surprise 

attack against Rome and to oppose the 

incursion of unwanted German reinforcements into Italian territory. Summoning 

Roatta, Ambrosio informed him that providing for the defense of Rome against a 

possible German coup d'etat had priority 

over protecting the coast against the 

threat of Allied landings. He also told 

Roatta to oppose the movement of German units across the frontier, except 

those specifically requested or permitted 

by Comando Supremo. 

For the first mission, Roatta constituted a command called the Army Corps 

of Rome (the 12th (Sassari) Infantry 

Division, elements of the 2 1st (Granatieri) 

Infantry Division, police forces, African 

police troops, and depot units) under 

Generale di Corpo d' Armata Alberto 

Barbieri to provide for the internal security of the city and to reinforce General 

Carboni, who a week earlier had been 

placed in command of the Motorized 

Corps (the Piave Division, the Ariete 

Armored Division, the remainder of the 

Granatieri Division, and the 13 I st (C entauro) Division) in the outer defenses of 

the city. To augment the defenses of 

27 Rpt, Admiral Canaris, Chef Ausland Abwehr, OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 31 Jul 

43; Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 376-377, 

386; Bonomi, Diario, pp. 46-48; Telgs, Comandante XXXV Corpo d'Armata Nos. 414, 454, 

472/OP., to Ministero Guerra Gabinetto, 29 Jul 

43, IT 102. 

Rome still further, Roatta had the XVII 

Corps move the I03d (Piacenza) Motorized Division to positions just south of the 

capital, leaving only two coastal divisions 

to guard the nearby shore area. 28 

For the second mission, Roatta on 30 

July sent officer couriers to the Fourth 

Army in southern France, to the Second 

Army in Slovenia-Croatia-Dalmatia, and 

to the XXXV Corps in Bolzano, warning 

them to be ready to oppose by force unauthorized German incursions and directing them to place demolition charges along 

the railway lines to impede frontier 

crossings.29 

The 26th Panzer Division, whose entry 

into Italy had been authorized earlier 

by the Comando Supremo, was not affected by these orders. About half of that 

division was already in southern Italy in 

accordance with the joint plans of Comando Supremo and OKW for the defense of the Italian peninsula. The 

remaining parts of the division crossed 

the Brenner Pass without incident during 

the late afternoon and early evening of 

30 July. These troops reported evidence 

of demolition charges planted by Italian 

troops and the impression that the Italian 

forces in the frontier area had been 

reinforced. 30 

2R Coman do Supremo, Operazioni, Regio Esercito: Quadro di battaglia alia data del 1 agosto 

1943, IT IO a-h; Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 274, 

294, 297-99; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 58; 

Rossi, Came arrivammo, p. 204; MS #P-058, 

Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 7. 

29 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 56; 

Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 204-05; Roatta, 

Otto milioni, pp. 274-75. Comando Supremo 

informed OKW that Italian forces had been 

ordered to react vigorously to whatever violation 

or threat. See Comando Supremo, Appunta per 

il Ministero AfJari Esteri, 5 Aug. 43, IT 3030. 

Cf. Rommel, Private KTB, entry 29 Jul 43. 

300KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 30 Jul 43. 
290 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Hitler was outraged by this seeming 

manifestation of Italian perfidy. He 

directed the divisions moving to Italy to 

carry out their orders even if bloodshed 

resulted. Specifically, he wanted an assault group of the 60th Panzer Grenadier 

Division to move to the head of the 305th 

Infantry Division column in the Nice 

area and to fight its way, if necessary, 

across the border into Italy. But since 

the movement of the assault group to 

Nice required two days, the Nice area 

remained quiet. 3! 

The test came, instead, in the Brenner 

area. OKW instructed Kesselring to 

notify Comando Supremo that divisions 

authorized and scheduled to enter Italysuch as the 26th Panzer Division-were 

still crossing the border; and that to avoid 

aggravating the railway congestion still 

further, the motorized elements of these 

divisions were planning to move by road. 

But Kesselring was not to tell Ambrosio 

that the 305th Infantry and the 44th 

Infantry Divisions, units not authorized to 

enter, had also been instructed to make 

a road march into Italy, an instruction 

passed along to these divisions the same 

day. Without awaiting the result of Kesselring's discussions with the Italians, 

OKW directed OB WEST to begin 

moving the other divisions assigned to the 

Army Group B from France toward Italy.32 

Shortly before midnight, 30 July, General Gloria, the XXXV Corps commander 

at Bolzano, received a message from 

General Feurstein who commanded the 

German Mittenwald Training School near 

Innsbruck. Feurstein said he was coming to Gloria's headquarters the following 

morning to co-ordinate the arrival of cer-

.31 Ibid., 31 Jul 43. 

32 Ibid., 30 Ju143; MS #C-093 (Warlimont). 

p. 85· 

tain troops. In accordance with the 

OKW-Comando Supremo agreement, 

F eurstein stated, German elements were 

reinforcing Italian garrisons along the 

Brenner railway line. Before replying, 

Gloria telephoned Rome for instructions.33 

Ambrosio made the decision early the 

next day. He directed Roatta "to make 

certain that there enter into Italy only 

those elements authorized, that is, the 

remaining parts of the 26th Panzer Division and 30 antiaircraft batteries, and 

their 100-200 trucks." 34 

When the leading elements of the German 44th Infantry Division reached the 

Brenner frontier on 3 I July, Gloria refused 

to let them pass. Feurstein appeared at 

Gloria's headquarters at 1000 and the 

two commanders conferred about an hour. 

Feurstein made two points. The 44th 

Infantry Division, he said, was to march 

from the Brenner Pass to Bolzano in three 

days on the basis of OKW-Comando 

Supremo agreements. Because the British were expected to bomb the Brenner 

railway line heavily in the near future, 

German antiaircraft batteries were to reinforce the protection of the pass. After 

a formal and polite discussion, Feurstein 

returned to Innsbruck, and Gloria reported 

a summary of the conversation to his 

immediate superior command, the Eighth 

Army, and to the Ministry of War in 

Rome. The report arrived in Roatta's 

operations section before noon, and from 

there was transmitted to Ambrosio.3u 

~~ Ministero della Guerra-Gabinetto, Notizie 

pervenute dal Comando d' Armata Bolzano nella 

notte dal 30 al 31 luglio 1943, IT 102. 

34 Telg 1540 3, Comando Supremo to Superesercito, 31 Jul 43, IT 102. 

30 Telg, Comando XXXV Corpo d'Armata, 

No. 577 Op. to Ministero della Guerra-Gabinetto, 

31 Jul 43, Comando XXXV Corpo d'Armata. 

IT 120. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 291 

Ambrosio that afternoon addressed a 

sharp note to Rintelen. He pointed out 

that the 44th Infantry Division was scheduled to move to southern Italy, not to 

guard the railway lines in the north. He 

made it plain that the congested railroads 

would make it impossible to move the 

44th and 305th Infantry Divisions for at 

least ten days. He requested Rintelen to 

wait until rail transportation was clear 

before moving the German divisions into 

Italy.36 

Kesselring called on Badoglio later that 

afternoon to clarify the situation. When 

Badoglio explained that military questions 

were outside his competence, Kesselring 

went to Ambrosio. He urged that the 

common war aims of the Axis Powers 

ought to make it possible for the two 

German divisions to be permitted to 

continue their movements. Ambrosio refused, but after a lively exchange he 

agreed to meet again with Kesselring the 

next morning. Rintelen then requested 

OKW to suspend the movements of the 

two divisions pending the outcome of the 

Kesselring-Ambrosio conference.37 

Rintelen was deeply distressed by the 

growing Italo-German conflict. He knew 

beyond all doubt that Badoglio considered 

the war lost, and he found himself in 

sympathy with this point of view and 

with Badoglio's policy of seeking to end 

the war in conjunction with the Germans. 

Not only the Italians, Rintelen was well 

aware, but also certain high-ranking German officers and politicians recognized 

that the Axis had lost the war. Before 

the Feltre conference some of them had 

secretly voiced the hope that Mussolini 

would take the bull by the horns, that as 

36 Msg, Comando Supremo, No. 15416jOp to 

Rintelen, 31 Jul 43, IT 102. 

37 OKWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII.43, 31 Ju143. 

Hitler's equal he would bring up the subject which they, Hitler's subordinates, 

dared not suggest-a compromise peace 

as the only way to save Europe from communism. Now they wished, and Rintelen 

with them, that Badoglio would speak the 

words to Hitler that Mussolini had not 

ventured to utter. 

Disturbed by Hitler's suspicions that 

Badoglio was already trying to make peace 

with the Allies, Rintelen urged Kesselring 

to resign his command rather than execute orders to occupy Italy. Plans 

ALARICH and ACHSE not only involved 

a flagrant breach of faith but also constituted a danger for the German troops 

in the country. How could the war 

continue? For certainly the execution 

of the plans to occupy Italy would throw 

the Italians into the Allied camp. Speaking by telephone with Keitel on 3 I July, 

Rintelen requested an appointment to report personally to the Fuehrer his views 

on the Italian situation. Keitel agreed. 38 

Next day, while Rintelen prepared to 

fly to East Prussia to see Hitler, a further 

crisis occurred in Italo-German relations. 

Momentarily expecting Hitler to give the 

code word ACHSE, OKW instructed 

Feurstein to continue to march the 44th 

I nfantry Division through the Brenner 

Pass into Italy.39 

In Rome, Kesselring met with Ambrosio at 0930. Following OKW instructions, Kesselring made an impassioned 

plea that the 44th Infantry Division be 

allowed to proceed, a unit being sent, he 

emphasized, 10 accordance with Am38 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 

195, 224; Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 314-

15, 326, 341; Raffaele Guariglia, Ricordi 1922-

1946 (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 

1950 ), pp. 548-49.' 

30 MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 87-88. 
292 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

brosio's promise of 22 July to defend 

Sicily to the utmost and in accordance 

with Ambrosio's request of that same day 

for two additional German divisions for 

duty in southern Italy. Ambrosio turned 

a deaf ear. He insisted that the German 

division would have to wait at the frontier until railway transportation became 

available.40 

Soon after the conference, Generale di 

Corpo d' Armata Giuseppe De Stefanis, 

Roatta's deputy, telephoned Gloria at 

Bolzano. Gloria was to advise Feurstein 

to consult with OKW on the result of 

the conference at Rome. Gloria was to 

oppose the movement of the 44th Infantry Division into Italy, and he was to tell 

F eurstein that an outbreak of armed 

strife would be Feurstein's responsibility. 

Gloria telephoned this information to 

Feurstein.41 

Feurstein called back at 1550. He 

said that he had received word from 

OKW at 1100. OKW indicated that an 

agreement had been reached in Rome to 

allow the entry of the 44th Infantry Division. Twenty minutes later Feurstein 

called again. He reiterated the information that Rome had agreed to permit the 

German division to march. If Gloria opposed its movement, Feurstein said, the 

responsibility for initiating armed conflict 

would fall on the Italians.42 

Though the Italians were actually in 

the process of changing their minds, 

OKW's information was probably premature. The main factor modifying Ambrosio's blunt stand was Badoglio, who 

was in frequent contact throughout the 

day with the Comando Supremo chief. 

4°OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-gI.vIII.43, 1 Aug 

43· 41 Tel Conv, 1400, I Aug 43, IT 120. 

42 Tel Conv, 1550, 1 Aug 43, IT 120. 

Badoglio insisted that Ambrosio avoid any 

action that would bring about an ItaloGerman batde. He needed time, Badoglio said, to carry out his basic policy: make 

the Germans realize Italy's plight and the 

need for a common effort to terminate 

the war. 43 

Having learned of Rintelen's intention 

to see the Fuehrer, Badoglio asked Rintelen, as an old friend, to call on him 

before leaving Rome. Rintelen did so, at 

1600, and Badoglio explained his position. Fascism, Badoglio said, had fallen 

of its own weight. As an old soldier he 

had obeyed the call of the King. Now 

he wanted to meet with Hitler, who 

had rebuffed him. "I have given my 

pledge to continue the war and I stand 

by my word as a soldier," Badoglio declared. "But for this I need the trust of 

my ally; it will go bad for both of us if 

we do not cooperate." Pointing out the 

serious military situation, the preponderance of Allied resources, particularly in 

the air, which the bombings of Hamburg 

and Rome had made quite clear, Badoglio 

said that the Germans and Italians had 

to "work together to bring the war to an 

honorable conclusion." \Vould Rintelen, 

Badoglio asked, communicate this to 

Hitler? 44 

Rintelen readily accepted the mission 

entrusted to him by BadogIio. Immediately after this conversation, Rintelen 

went home and wrote down a summary 

43 MS #P-058, Project 46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 4~, 

Questions 8 and I I; Cf. Badoglio, M emorie Ii 

documenti, p. 96. 

44 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 

227-32. Rintelen dispatched a telegram outlining Badoglio's views, a copy (Telg 3706 of I 

Aug 43) of which is in West!. Mittelmeer, Chefs. 

(H 22/290). pp. 91-93. The text as printed 

by Rintelen does not exactly agree with this copy 

which is the copy received from the German 

Foreign Office. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 293 

of the discussion. He then consulted with 

Ernst von Weizsaecker, German Ambassador to the Holy See. Although both 

men could not completely exclude the 

possibility that Badoglio was acting merely 

to win time, they agreed that Badoglio's 

wish to restore mutual confidence was 

probably genuine:15 

By then, BadogIio had probably informed Ambrosio of his conversation with 

Rintelen, for at 18IO, I August, Roatta's 

operations chief, Generale di Brigata 

Umberto Utili, telephoned new instructions to General Gloria. Gloria was to 

permit the head of the 44th Infantry Division column to march to the nearest 

railway station and there await trains for 

further movement into Italy. Some train 

space would be provided on the following morning. But the division was not 

to march beyond Bolzano. The elements 

of the 26th Panzer Division, however, 

could proceed by road if they wished in 

order to rejoin the remainder of the division already in Italy. Less than three 

hours later, Gloria was conferring with 

Feurstein's representative and making arrangements for the continued movement 

of the 44th Infantry Division into Italy 

by rai1. 46 

Thus it was that Army Group B made 

its initial penetration with Italian consent. 

It was seduction, not rape.47 

45 Rintelen. Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, p. 

233· 46 Tel Conv, 1810, I Aug 43. and Tel Conv, 

2230, I Aug 43, both in IT 120; Rommel, Private KTB, entry 1 Aug 43, 

47 Telg No. 636/Op, XXXV Corps to Ministry of War, Rome, 1 Aug 43, IT 102. Italian 

memoirs after the war all state that the descent 

of German reinforcements over the frontiers began on 26 July [943 and without warning. See 

Badoglio, M emorie Ii documenti, p. 85; Roatta, 

Otto milioni, p. 272; Rossi, Come arrivammo, 

p. 88; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrote, II, 47; CasAs quickly as Hitler was successful in 

this test case, and while Badoglio was still 

hoping that Rintelen's mission would bear 

fruit, Hitler directed Field Marshal Kesselring to announce that two panzer divisions would follow along the Brenner 

line, and that another infantry division 

would follow the 305th Infantry Division 

by way of Nice. To keep the passage 

clear for the other troops, the 44th Infantry Division held the sector of the railway 

line from Brennero to Bolzano. By 2 

August the infiltration of Army Group B 

into northern Italy was in full swing, and 

the first lifts of the 2d Parachute Division 

had arrived near Rome, a movement substantially completed after four days. 

Kesselring's explanation to Roatta now 

was that the division was needed in that 

area because of the possibility of an Allied 

parachute attack.48 

A day later, 3 August, OKW transmitted through Kes..<;elring a formal note 

to explain its haste in reinforcing the 

troops in Italy. The Germans had feared, 

OKW said, that the political change in 

Italy might encourage the Allies to use an 

estimated thirteen to fifteen available divisions in a landing on the Ligurian or 

north Adriatic coast. OKW therefore 

thought it prudent to provide for the 

tellano, Come firmai, p, 73; and Guariglia, 

Ricordi, p. 576. The date 26 July appears first 

to have been fixed for subsequent writers in the 

article: Lt. Col. Mario Torsiello, "L'aggressicme 

germanica all'Italia nella sua lase preliminare 

(26 luglio-7 settembre 1943)," Rivista MilitaTe, 

I, vol. 4 (Rome, July, 1945). It is solemnly 

stated as a matter of court record in II Processo 

CaTboni-Roatta, p. 14. Actually, the only German troops entering Italy between 26 July and I 

August were parts of the 26th Panzer Division 

(the bulk of which was already in Italy) and 

parts of the 2d Parachute Division (which came 

by air). 

480KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VIII.43, 1 and 

2 Aug 43; Rommel, Private KTB, entry I Aug 43. 
294 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

security of all forces by moving divisions 

first into the north, then into the south. 

The 305th Infantry and 76th Infantry, 

under LXXXVII Corps, were to protect 

the Ligurian coast. The 94th Infantry, 

moving through the Mount Cenis pass, as 

well as the ISt SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, the 2d SS Panzer 

Division UDas Reich," and the 65th Infantry were also to enter north Italy. 

OKW added that it was considering sending one or two additional armored divisions to Italy to form a reserve. It 

planned to reinforce the Mediterranean 

French coast defenses with the 71 5th 

Infantry and 60th Panzer Grenadier Division, plus two unspecified infantry diVISIOns. All the details of co-ordination, 

OKW proposed, were to be settled at the 

conference scheduled for 6 August at 

Tarvis. 49 

Though the Germans had not mentioned the 94th Infantry and 65th Infantry before, the Italians accepted the 

note without demur. They bent their 

efforts toward effecting such a distribution of the German divisions as to make 

for the least threat to Rome and to the 

principal northern bases of the fleet-La 

Spezia and Pola-and for the most appropriate dispositions to resist an Allied 

invasion of southern Italy. The crisis 

having passed, Ambrosio and Roatta faced 

the Germans with seeming good grace. 

Italo-German discussions on 3 August 

were friendly. Ambrosio agreed to provide transportation in the Brenner area. 

Roatta urged that German reinforcements 

be sent to the south as quickly as possible. Roatta also complained that some 

490KWIWFSt, KTB, I.-3r.VIII.43, 3 Aug 

43; Colloquio Generale Rossi-Generale Westphal, 

1230, 3 Aug 43, Comando Supremo, Colloqui 

1943, IT 104. 

German troops behaved as though they 

believed that the Italians sympathized 

with the Allies, an attitude he found insulting to Italian honor. "Italy," he declared, "is not thinking of changing 

course." 50 

So far as Roatta knew, he had made 

an honest declaration. What he did not 

know was that attempts had already been 

initiated to make contact with the Allies. 51 

On the same day, Rintelen was personally delivering Badoglio's message to 

Hitler, with Keitel and JodI in attendance. 

After listening to Rintelen explain Badoglio's position, Hitler exploded. "This is 

the biggest impudence in history. Does 

the man imagine that I will believe him?" 

"I have the impression," Rintelen replied, "that he is honorably working for 

the establishment of trust." 

Hitler brushed this aside, remarking 

that the Anglo-Americans had probably 

repulsed Badoglio's effort to make peace 

and that Badoglio was therefore again 

seeking German support. After a brief 

discussion of the conference scheduled in 

a few days at Tarvis, Hitler dismissed 

Rintelen without a reply for Badoglio. 52 

Later that day Rintelen received some 

sympathy from General der Infanterie 

Kurt Zeitzler, an old friend in the headquarters and Chief of Staff of the German Army. Zeitzler knew that Hitler's 

:;oOKW/WFSt, KTB, r.-3r.VIII.43, 3 and 

4 Aug 43· 

51 See Guariglia. Ricordi, p. 619. n. I. 

52 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 

233-34. A briefer statement by Rintelen is to 

be found in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), Chapter II, page 23, where the interview with Hitler 

is dated the second rather than the third of August. OKHIAttachtf Abt., KTB I.III.43-3r.V. 

44 (H27/s6) contains the entry that Rintelen 

met with the Fuehrer on the Italian problem on 

3 August 1943. Practically the same entry can 

be found in OKHIAttachtf Abt., Taetigkeitsberichte zum KTB, Feb. 43-IS Jun 44 (H27/s8). 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 295 

alleged proof of Badoglio's negotiations 

with the Western Powers was not true. 

Rintelen also spoke with Keitel and JodI 

and told them that fascism was dead, that 

Mussolini was a sick man, and that it was 

necessary to support the Badoglio government as a bulwark against communism. 

When JodI mentioned this view to Hitler 

the next day, he was roundly cursed and 

abused. Rintelen, Hitler said, was a 

traitor. 

Rintelen had already returned to Rome, 

where he went directly to Kesselring's 

headquarters at Frascati. Richthofen, 

the air commander, was somewhat surprised to see him; he had been doubtful 

that Hitler would allow Rintelen out of 

Germany.53 

Badoglio felt that his hand had again 

been refused. His initial steps to bring 

about a joint peace move or to secure 

German understanding of the Italian situation had ended in failure. Badoglio 

nevertheless continued to hope that he 

might yet obtain German consent to a 

dissolution of the alliance and thereby 

exclude any action that might bring on 

I talo-German conflict. 54 

53 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 

234-36. 

54 On 24 August, Badoglio told Bonomi: "If 

the Germans would attack, the situation would 

have a solution. We cannot, by an act of our 

own will, separate ourselves from Germany to 

whom we are bound by a pact of alliance, but 

if attacked we shall resist and we will be able 

to turn for aid to our enemies of yesterday." 

(Bonomi, Diario, p. 82). 

As late as 3 September the German Naval Attache in Rome reported: "In higher circles the 

opinion prevails that ever since he assumed office, 

Badoglio has been trying to bring the war to as 

favorable a conclusion as possible, but only with 

Germany's consent, for Badoglio takes Italy's 

honor as ar Axis partner very seriously." ONI, 

translation German Naval Staff: Operations 

Division War Diary, pt. A, vol. 49 (September 

1943), p. 37· 

The Italians, however, continued to 

work with the Germans to maintain the 

defense of Sicily and to prepare to oppose 

an invasion of the Italian mainland. At 

the same time they watched closely for a 

hostile German act against Rome and 

sought to make contact with the Allies. 

They were increasingly worried by the 

sttanglehold the Germans had on Italy. 

The locations of the new German divisions offered no protection to the south, 

where an Allied threat was real and acute. 

Rather, the Germans were in position to 

seize the Italian naval bases, to occupy 

the north, and to grab Rome. 55 

The Italian Course is Changed 

About the same time that the crisis of 

29 JUlY-I August was being overcome by 

the decision of the Italian Government 

and High Command to accept unwanted 

German reinforcements, the assumption of 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Raffaele Guariglia gave a new impulse and 

a new direction to Italian foreign policy. 

Brought from his post as Ambassador 

to Turkey, Guariglia was uninformed on 

the true state of affairs in Italy and as a 

result had indulged in some daydreams 

and wishful thinking. He fancied that 

Mussolini, out of love for Italy, had recognized that he himself was the greatest 

obstacle in the way of an approach to the 

Allies, and had therefore made the sacrifice of removing himself from power in 

order to save Italy from total disaster. 

Perhaps, Guariglia thought, a secret understanding with both Germany and the 

Allies had preceded Mussolini's resignation. Assuming that the first step of the 

55 Roatta gave a very clear and prophetic analysis in his memorandum, S.M.R.E., Ufficio di 

Capo di Stato Maggiore, N. 26/CSM di Prot., 

4 Aug 43, IT 104; Cf. Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 

284. 
296 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Badoglio government would naturally be 

an approach to the Allies, he interpreted 

Badoglio's proclamation of continuing the 

war merely as a method of gaining time. 

Before leaving Istanbul, Guariglia asked 

the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to 

convey to the Allied representatives in 

Turkey Guariglia'S personal conviction 

that Italy had to change course as quickly 

as possible. Though he could make no 

commitment, he asked that the Allies 

have faith in Italy's intentions and under~ 

standing of her plight. As an indication 

of their faith and understanding, he felt, 

the Allies should cease bombing Italian 

cities. 56 

After arriving in Rome late in the after~ 

noon of 29 July, Guariglia took over his of~ 

fice, and then met with Badoglio. He 

agreed with Badoglio to limit knowledge of 

any negotiations for peace to the smallest 

circle of officials-the matter should not be 

discussed even in the Council of Ministers. 

But at this point he was rudely awakened 

from the dreams he had conjured up in 

Istanbul, for he found his position in the 

new Italian Government enormously prejudiced by certain stark facts: the war 

continued; there was no contact with the 

Allies. He learned also that his position 

had been prejudiced by Badoglio's proposals to Germany through General Marras, and Badoglio's acceptance of Hitler's 

counterproposal of a meeting of foreign 

ministers, scheduled for 6 August. 

Scarcely had Guariglia taken his oath 

of office on 30 July when General Castellano presented himself and tendered a 

memorandum from Ambrosio, chief of 

Comando Supremo. Identifying Castellano as an intimate colleague who had 

played a certain role In the developments 

56 Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 553-54, 559-61. 

leading to Mussolini's dismissal, Ambrosio's note said that it was absolutely 

necessary for Italy to conclude an armistice 

with the Allies and that therefore immediatecontact had to be made with the 

Western Powers. 51 

Guariglia tried to do so that very evening. In the greatest secrecy he visited 

the Papal Secretary of State and asked 

him to request the British Minister to the 

Holy See, Sir D' Arcy Q. Osborne, to 

transmit a message to the British Government. Unfortunately, the British diplomatic code at the Holy See had been 

broken and was known to the Italians 

and the Germans. This ruled out that 

channel of communication. At about the 

same time, Franco Babuzzio Rizzo, a subordinate of Guariglia's, was meeting with 

Harold Tittmann, assistant to Myron C. 

Taylor, Personal Representative of the 

President to His Holiness, the Pope. 

Rizzo wanted to get a message to the 

American Government. But the American office within the Vatican walls had 

no safe and speedy communication channel either. Though the American office 

could forward dispatches through Switzerland or Portugal in safety, this was a slow 

process.58 

On the following day, 3 I, July, the 

crown council met at the Quirinal Palace. 

Guariglia vigorously advocated an immediate approach to the Allies for the 

purpose of concluding a separate armistice. 

He stated that he had already taken steps 

57 Ibid., pp. 582-85, 609. See MS #P-058, 

Project 46, Question 9 and II Processo CarboniRoatta, pp. 18-19. 

58 Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, p. 96; 

Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 586-87; Ltr, Osborne to 

Maj Gen Orlando Ward, OCMH, 6 Jul 50; Ltr 

and IncIs, Tittmann to Ward, OCMH, 19 Jul 

50. The British minister received a new and 

safe cypher later that summer. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 297 

in that direction by speaking to the Turkish Foreign Minister and by approaching 

the Allied representatives to the Holy See. 

As he understood the situation, the decision to approach the Western Powers had 

already been made by the King some days 

ago. The crown council formally decided 

to separate Italy from the alliance with 

Germany and to seek an armistice with 

the Allies. 59 

Guariglia implemented this decision by 

securing approval from the King and 

Badoglio to send an emissary to Portugal. 

He chose the Marchese Blasco Lanza 

D'Ajeta, Counselor of the Italian Embassy 

at the Holy See, who through Ciano had 

been kept informed of the movement 

to overthrow Mussolini. D' Ajeta spoke 

English, and was the godson of the wife 

of Sumner WeUes, the American Under 

Secretary of State. Furthermore, he was 

of intermediate rank and his transfer from 

the Holy See would excite no German 

susplClons. Accordingly, the Foreign Office nominated D' A jeta Counselor of the 

Italian Legation at Lisbon. Guariglia 

had D' A jeta take along a large suitcase 

full of Foreign Office documents to keep 

them from falling into German hands. 

The gossip of polite circles in Rome 

promptly had it that D'Ajeta's mission 

was to save the Countess Ciano's jewels.60 

D' A jeta received his instructions on I 

and 2 August from Guariglia, Castellano 

taking part in the second session. Sir 

D' Arcy Osborne provided a letter introducing D' Ajeta to his cousin, Sir Ronald 

59 Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 585-86, 6 [gn; II 

Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. [g. 

60 Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 587. Castellano 

(C ome firmai, page 72) records that he knew of 

the D' Ajeta mission but remains silent on whether 

he had any part in instigating the appointment. 

In any event, Castellano did not know the full 

scope of D' Ajeta's instructions. 

Hugh Campbell, British Ambassador at 

Lisbon. D' Ajeta was to make a full and 

candid explanation of the situation of the 

Italian Government, and point out that 

it was threatened internally by the Communists and by German occupation. He 

was to explain that the government wished 

to break with Germany, but that to do 

this the government needed help for its 

armed forces. He was to make it clear 

that he had no power to negotiate, but 

he was to suggest the desirability of military and political agreement by the Allies and the Italians in order to enable 

Italy to break with the Germans or turn 

against them. As a demonstration of 

faith, he was to inform the Allies of the 

German order of battle in Italy. Castellano carefully drilled D' A jeta on the 

name, strength, and location of each German unit in Italy and of those expected 

to enter the country, and D'Ajeta committed this information to memory.61 

D' Ajeta flew to Lisbon on 3 August, 

and presented himself at once to Renato 

Prunas, the Italian Minister. He sent his 

note of introduction to Sir Ronald, and 

the British Ambassador requested and received from his own government authorization to receive the Italian emissary. 

The conference took place the following 

day. 

A tra:ined diplomat, D' Ajeta carefully 

carried out his instructions. After giving 

a candid and detailed exposition of the 

Italian situation, he urged the ambassador 

to inform the British and American Governments that Italy was most anxious to 

escape the German yoke and to withdraw 

from the conflict. He pleaded for understanding in London and Washington of 

Italy's tragic situation: Italy, he said, 

61 Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 5 8 7-88. 
298 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

was on the eve of a German military 

occupation. Besides the German divisions already in Italy, two more had begun 

to arrive from France on 2 August, bound 

for Turin, and about 200,000 German 

troops assembled around Innsbruck were 

occupying the Brenner Pass installations. 

Because Rome was in danger of immediate German seizure-an armored SS division with the most modern Tiger tanks 

was moving toward the capital-the King 

and the government had plans to escape 

to the island of Maddalena, off the coast 

of Sardinia. Some 300,000 Italian workmen were virtual hostages in Germany. 

After three years of warfare, Italy was on 

the verge of economic exhaustion. Italy, 

D' Ajeta continued, wished to negotiate. 

Hungary and Rumania would probably 

follow suit. 

D' Ajeta then gave the exact locations 

of the German divisions as of 2 August. 

He explained that Italian troops had been 

moved to protect Rome, thereby leaving 

the coast of central Italy practically undefended. To maintain its independence, 

the Italian Government was resolved to 

defend the capital against German attack, 

even though the only good division in the 

area was the reconstituted armored Ariete 

Division, which had only enough ammunition to furnish a total of eighty-eight 

shells for each of its guns. 

Emphasizing his lack of authority to 

negotiate, D' Ajeta urged that his disclosure of the German order of battle be the 

starting point for synchronizing Italian 

help with the Allied political and military 

plans. He requested a cessation of propaganda attacks against the King and 

Badoglio, a halting of bombings against 

Italian cities. He asked that Britain and 

America not misinterpret the impending 

Italo-German conference at Tarvis. 

Ambassador Campbell listened attentively, asked several questions. D' Ajeta 

warned that the German armed forces 

were numerous and powerful. Reports 

of serious cleavage between the Nazi 

party and the military command, he said, 

were to be discounted. Campbell explained that he had no instructions except 

to listen. His personal opinion was that 

the Allies had already determined their 

military plans and had clearly announced 

their political views in the unconditional 

surrender formula. 62 

The Italian Government waited for an 

official reply to D' Ajeta's overture. None 

came. 

Meanwhile, on the day that D' Ajeta 

had left Rome for Lisbon, Guariglia and 

Badoglio decided to send another emissary 

to make contact with the British Government. They directed Alberto Berio, 

former Counselor of the Embassy at Ankara, to fly immediately to Tangier, there 

to replace Badoglio's son as Consul General. Berio's real mission was to inform 

the British Consul that Italy was willing 

to negotiate. 

On the morning of 3 August, the day 

that D' Ajeta reached Lisbon, Guariglia 

gave Berio his detailed instructions. Berio 

was to make known the fact that because 

the Italian Government was a prisoner of 

the Germans, it would be useless and damaging to the Allied cause to demand of 

Italy an immediate and public capitulation. The Allied armies should attack 

the Balkans in order to draw German 

troops away from Italy, thereby making 

it possible for the Italians to join the Allies in clearing the Italian peninsula of 

German forces. Finally, the Allied press 

"2 Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 589-99; Telg, 

Churchill to Roosevelt, 5 Aug 43, OPD Exec 9, 

item II, No. 55. 
DISSOLUTION OF THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS 299 

campaign against the Badoglio government 

ought to continue in order to deceive the 

Germans. 

When Badoglio briefed Berio later that 

day, he added the point that the Allies 

would find it to their interest to aid the 

Italian Government maintain itself against 

the internal threat of communism. In 

this connection, the Allies should cease 

bombing Italian cities. The Marshal's 

son, Mario, who was present, made an 

additional suggestion: the Allies should 

land in Italy as soon and as far north as 

possible.63 

63 Alberto Berio, Missione segreta (Tangeri: 

Agosto 1943) (Milan: Enrico Dall'Oglio, 1947), 

pp. 34-42 . 

In Tangier on 5 August, Berio at once 

made contact with Mr. Watkinson, temporarily in charge of the British Consulate. 

After carrying out his instructions, Berio 

wired Rome of his action and, like D'Ajeta 

in Lisbon, waited for an Allied reply.64 

64 Ibid., pp. 54-70. D'Ajeta later presented his 

own account of the mission in his defense at 

epuration proceedings. See Consiglio di Stato: 

Sezione speciale per l'epurazione, Memoria a svolgimento del ricorso del Consigliere di Legazione 

Blasco Lanza d' Ajeta contra la decisione della 

Commissione per l'epurazione del personale dipendente dal Ministero degli AfJari Esteri (Rome: 

Tipografia Ferraiolo, 1946), pp. 79-81, 84-87; 

and Documenti prodotti a corredo della memorai 

del Consigliere di Legazione Blasco Lanza d' Ajeta 

(Rome: Tipografia Ferraiolo, 1946), pp. 17-35. 
CHAPTER XVI 

The Drive to the East 

Developing an East Front 

Little affected by the bubbling, boiling 

political pots in Washington, London, 

North Africa, Italy, and Germany, little 

concerned with AFHQ's plans for the 

invasion of the Italian mainland, General 

Alexander's American, British, Canadian, 

and French soldiers continued their fight 

to clear Sicily. The arena of battle had 

shifted from the lowlands of the southeast 

corner to the mountainous Messina 

peninsula. 

The Provisional Corps' spectacular advance to Palermo completely overshadowed General Bradley's II Corps maneuvers which, like those to the south, had 

also kicked off on I9 July. (See Map 

VII.) Enna, perched high on a mountain, dominated by the ruins of a large 

feudal castle, fell without a struggle, its 

importance to the Germans nullified by 

the advance of the I st Canadian Division 

on Leonforte (which fell on 23 July) and 

the breakthrough by the 45th Division 

toward the north coast. 

Matching the rapid advance of the 

Provisional Corps to Palermo, General 

Middleton's 45th Division started its 

move for Palermo on the evening of 19 

July. With the 180th RCT spearheading 

the advance northwest along Highway 

12 I, the Americans overcame the Italian 

roadblock at Portella di Reccativo and 

made a nineteen-mile advance on the 20th. 

By the morning of 22 July, the 180th 

RCT was in the small town of Villafrati, 

only twenty-two miles from Palermo, and 

had patrols probing the outskirts of that 

port city. But the change in boundary, 

which gave the Provisional Corps the use 

of Highway 12 I, diverted the division's 

main effort from Palermo to the north 

coast town of Termini Imerese, thirty-one 

miles east of Palermo. Accordingly, General Middleton sent his remaining two 

combat teams, the 179th and 157th, 

swinging north f~m Highway 12 I. At 

0900 on 23 July, the 157th RCT reached 

the north coast road-Highway I 13-at 

Station Cerda, five miles east of Termini 

Imerese. There the regiment turned left 

and right and cleared a stretch of the 

highway. Termini fell without a struggle, but a battalion moving eastward met 

Group Ulich, part of the newly arrived 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division, just west 

of Campofelice. Though the battalion, 

aided by a company of tanks, managed to 

clear Campofelice, heavy enemy artillery 

and small arms fire commg from the ridge 

line across the Roccella River brought the 

Americans to a halt.1 

1 157th, I79th, 1 80th Inf Regt AAR's; 753d Med 

Tk Bn AAR; 45th Inf Div Arty AAR; 45th Inf 

Div G-3 Jnl, 21-:23 Jul 43; OB SUED, Meldungen, 23 Jul 43; Faidella, La sbarco, pp. 234-

37; MS #D-095 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, 30 July 1943 (Generalmajor Max Ulich); 

MS #0-077 (Rodt). 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

On the 45th Division right, the 1St 

Division advanced from Enna in a far less 

spectacular, less rapid fashion because 

of greater opposition. GrQup Fullriede's 

withdrawal from its westward facing 

salient southwest of the city during the 

evening of 19 July had not gone unnoticed, and General Allen sent the 26th 

Combat Team in pursuit. By then, the 

German battle group had passed through 

an Italian roadblock at Alimena and was 

sideslipping into a new east-west defensive 

line along Highway 120 from Gangi to 

Sperlinga. Facing south, these troops, 

according to the expectation of General 

Rodt, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 

commander, would prevent an American 

sweep around his division's right flank. 

Although a small gap was still open in the 

center of his line, his left flank was secure, 

for Group Ens had withdrawn slowly from 

Canadian pressure east of Enna and had 

finally made contact with the Hermann 

Goering Division's right flank near Regalbuto. 

F or the first time since the invasion, 

the two major German fighting units on 

the island had made physical contact. 

The gap which had existed in the center 

of the Axis front since 10 July was closed. 2 

Shortly before midnight on 20 July, 

the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, led off 

the 1st Division's advance on its new axis, 

the secondary road which wound through 

rough, mountainous terrain almost due 

north from Enna to Petralia. Pushed on 

by its aggressive commander, Lt. Col. 

Darrell M. Daniel, the 2d Battalion moved 

into Alimena at 0500 'the following morn2 DB SUED, Meldungen, 19-21 Jul 43; Map, 

Sizilien (I :200,000), WFSt Op (H), Stand, 18 

Jul 43; Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 201,210-12, 

221-22; Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 

100; 1St Inf Div FO 28, 20 Jul 43. 

301 

ing. There, the Italian Group Schreiber 

made its final appearance. Sadly reduced 

by ten days of fighting and the loss of units 

at Portella di Reccativo, the Italian unit 

collected the remnants of an infantry battalion and a cavalry squadron north of 

Alimena to counterattack the 26th Infantry's battalion. But American light 

tanks, which had been supporting Daniel's 

battalion, spotted the concentration and, 

roaring down the road from Alimena, 

blasted into the Italian formation with 

all guns blazing. This dashing attack 

proved too much for the sorely tried Italians. Leaving most of their equipment 

behind, the Italians scattered into the 

surrounding hills and were seen no more. 

A few other Italians, hiding in the buildings of Alimena, proved more difficult to 

handle, and it was not until late afternoon that Colonel Daniel could report 

that the last of the enemy soldiers had 

been flushed out of basements and other 

hiding places. 

The light tanks pushing on along the 

road to Petralia soon ran into direct enemy 

artillery fire covering a blown bridge just 

south of Bompietro, halfway to Petralia. 

The Germans, fearful that the 1st Division would move east from Alimena crosscountry through the hills to Nicosia and 

into the gap which existed between the two 

battle groups, had deployed a provisional 

group at this point the previous afternoon 

to plug the hole. 

It took until noon the next day, 22 July, 

before supporting I st Division engineers 

could repair the bridge. Then, after a 

concentration by three artillery battalions, 

the 1st and 3d Battalions, 26th Infantry, 

attacked across the small stream. Group 

Fullriede's outposts put up stiff resistance-"the enemy resisted stubbornly, 

and, for the second time in Sicily, showed 
302 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

SOUTHERN ApPROACH TO ENNA 

artillery strength." 3 It was this German artillery, and the difficult terrain, 

that slowed the advance. The tanks 

were road-bound. The infantrymen were 

pinned down until the tanks could move 

forward to knock out at least some of the 

opposing guns. It was not until 1900 

that the tanks managed to get through 

Bompietro with the 3d Battalion, 26th 

Infantry, hard on their heels. 

With Bompietro taken, General Allen 

3 33d FA Bn AAR. The 1St Division ArtiJIery 

fired a total of 1,146 rounds on 22 July in the 

various attacks on Bompietro. 

leapfrogged the 18th Combat Team to 

continue the push on Petralia, and to 

open a hole through which the 16th 

Combat Team, still at Enna, could move 

to the north coast. 4 F or this was still 

the mission of the I st Division, even 

though it had been temporarily diverted 

by the need to clear up the Enna area. 

With Enna in hand, the division could 

move to the north coast at Cefalu, paralleling the British 30 Corps advance. Near 

midnight, 22 July, the 1st and 2d Bat4 Change I, 1st Inf Div FO 28, 21 ·Jul 43. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 303 

LEONFORTE 

talions, 18th Infantry, dismounted from 

trucks at Bompietro, and moved through 

the 26th Infantry on the road to Petralia. 

Just before ogoo, 23 July, after a stiff 

fight along the southern slopes of the high 

ground overlooking Petralia, the 2d 

Battalion, 18th Infantry, together with 

two companies from the 1st Battalion, 

entered the town. Immediately, Colonel 

Smith, the combat team commander, 

started his battalions east along Highway 

120 toward Gangi to block the secondary 

road which leads northward toward 

Cefalu, the route the 16th RCT was to 

follow to the north coast. This was done 

by late afternoon. 5 

But Petralia proved to be as far to the 

north as the I st Division would go on its 

drive. The division would not be given 

a chance to reach the Tyrrhenian Sea 

as had the 45th Division farther west, for 

the Seventh Army axis of advance was 

changed again, this time to the east. 

On 20 July, General Alexander had 

r. 18th and 26th Inf Regt AAR's; 1St Inf Div 

Arty AAR ; 1St Inf Div G-3 Jnl; IT ggb, entry 

and an. 71 (map ); Map, Sizilien (1:200,000) , 

WFST Op (H), Stand 22 Jul 43. 
304 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

issued new instructions to General Patton. 

Upon reaching the coast north of Petralia, Seventh Army would send strong 

reconnaissance patrols eastward along the 

two main east-west highways left uncovered by the Eighth Army's shift of its 

western axis of advance. These were 

the north coast road and Highway 120 

through Sperlinga, Nicosia" and Troina. 

Thus, General Alexander changed the 

boundary between the two Allied armies. 

From its previous location running due 

north paralleling Highway 117, the new 

boundary ran due east between Highway 

120 and the road serving as the British 

30 Corps axis of advance. If possible, 

General Alexander continued, the Seventh 

Army was to follow up these reconnaissance forces in strength. Apparently, 

then, General Alexander intended to make 

Palermo the Seventh Army main base of 

supply, and to bring at least a part of 

the Seventh Army on line with the Eighth 

Army. General Montgomery concurred 

in the need for Seventh Army assistance. 

Except for the assignment of the two 

northern roads to the Seventh Army, 

General Alexander's 20 July directive 

amounted to little more than a modification of his 18 July directive. It did not 

indicate his intention of throwing the 

Seventh Army full tilt against the Axis 

forces in the Messina peninsula. General 

Montgomery's attempt to break through 

the enemy lines on the east coast was still 

in process, though getting nowhere, when 

Alexander published his new order. The 

Army group commander apparently still 

hoped that Montgomery's push would be 

successful. The directive did nothing 

to the U.S. II Corps plans, except to add 

two more roads to worry about. General 

Bradley's mission of going to the coast 

"north of Petralia" remained; the directive merely moved the point at which the 

north coast was to be reached from Campofelice east to Cefalu.s 

Montgomery's decision on 2 I July to 

bring over the British 78th Division from 

North Africa to reinforce a new push 

around the western slopes of Mount Etna, 

his calling off of attacks by the British 13 

Corps at the Catania plain, and his previous shifting of the British 30 Corps main 

axis of advance from Highway 120 farther 

south to Highway 12 I, indicated to General Alexander that the Eighth Army alone 

was not strong enough to drive the Germans from the Messina peninsula. 

Just two days later, on 23 July, and 

after the capture of Palermo, General 

Alexander abandoned his scheme for a 

cautious, exploratory probing by the Seventh Army. Patton was now to employ 

his maximum strength along the two roads 

Alexander had given the Americans on 20 

July. General Alexander had finally decided to place the Seventh Army on equal 

footing with the Eighth in order to finish 

off the remaining Axis forces. In other 

words, Messina was no longer solely an 

Eighth Army objective; Messina was now 

up for grabs. 7 (Map 3) 

6 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-II; Alexander Despatch, app. C-4, p. 85. Exactly when 

General Alexander reached his decision to turn 

the Seventh Army eastward is not certain. He 

appears to have informed General Eisenhower on 

19 July of the decision to turn part of Patton's 

forces to the east. This could have wen been 

done at Eisenhower's insistence that the Seventh 

Army play a larger role in the campaign. See 

Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshal1, 2 I J ul 43, Diary 

Office CinC, Book VII, pp. A-S99-A-6oo. 

Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 118. 

Montgomery's new view was a distinct change 

from the view held by him in early June. 

7 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-13; Alexander Despatch, app. C-S, p. 86; Intervs, Mathews with Alexander, p. 16; Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 119. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

r"""HENIAN 8EA 

." 

23 July 194:3 

Et, .. DlfonS ' " "" ", S 

00 0 

i ' j' ! 

'0 

MAP 3 

Stopping the 1St Division drive for Cefalu at Petralia, and pivoting on the division, General Bradley began shifting the 

II Corps axis of advance to the east. 

General Patton had said that "the British 

have the bear by the tail in the Messina 

Peninsula and we may have to go in and 

help." 8 He therefore bolstered II Corps, 

to which he assigned the entire Seventh 

Army front. He stripped the Provisional 

Corps of the French 4th Tabor of Goums 

(which had performed well with the 3d 

Division since its landing in Sicily on 14 

July); the 9th Division's 39th Infantry 

8 Semmes, Portrait of Patton, p. 162. 

305 

and its attached 34th Field Artillery Battalion; and other artillery units- and sent 

them scurrying eastward. 9 General Patton 

also called for the remainder of General 

Eddy's 9th Infantry Division to come 

over from North Africa because the 2d 

Armored Division would be less useful in 

the mountainous terrain of northeastern 

Sicily and because both the 45th Infantry 

and 82d Airborne Divisions would shortly 

have to be relieved to prepare for the 

invasion of Italy. General Eddy, a Regular Army officer since 19 16, had led the 

o Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. b-12 ; Brad· 

ley. A Soldier's Story, p. 146. 
306 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

9th Division throughout the North African 

campaign, and would bring a tried fighting outfit to the Seventh Army for the 

final phases of the Sicilian operation.10 

The news of Mussolini's overthrow did 

not evoke much enthusiasm among the 

members of the Seventh Army's frontline units. The soldiers did not believe 

it had really happened, and the news, if 

true, appeared to have little effect on reducing the scale of enemy resistance. If 

anything, the enemy seemed to be fighting more fiercely than ever to hold his 

mountain strongholds.l1 

Axis Reactions 

Outwardly, with the fall of Mussolini, 

nothing had changed in Italy's military 

policy or in the conduct of operations on 

Sicily. In reality, a profound change 

had taken place. The change did not 

stem from Rome, where Marshal Badoglio's proclamations announced the continued vitality of the Gennan alliance. 

Rather, the change stemmed from Hitler's 

headquarters in far-off East Prussia. 

Here, on 25 July, news of Mussolini's 

dismissal led the angry Fuehrer, among 

10 Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, 22-24 Jul 43; 

Seventh Army G-3 Rpts, 14, 16, and 17 Jul 43. 

It was probably just as well that the 2d Armored Division did not have to be used in the 

later stages of the campaign. On the division's 

arrival at Palermo, 151 miles from its starting 

point at Agrigento, about 75 percent of the tanks 

had completely ruined their tracks. The rubber 

track blocks, made of a synthetic material supposedly good for 300 miles and new when the 

division departed North Mrica, simply had not 

held up under the pounding they had to take on 

the dash west. See Rpt by Gen Gaffey on Opns 

of tho 2d Armd Div in Sicily, 5 Aug 43, in file 

602-0·3· 

11 See Richard Tregaskis, Invasion Diary (New 

York: Random House, 1944), pages 28-29 for 

how the news was received by the 151 Division. 

Truscott, Command Missions, does not even mention the occurrence. 

other things, to take drastic steps to save 

his embattled forc~s on the island. He 

excitedly told JodI to evacuate all German 

personnel immediately from Sicily-take 

out the men, leave all the heavy equipment behind; move troops into northern 

Italy; occupy the mountain passes on the 

northern border; maintain firm control of 

the Italians; occupy Rome; capture the 

King, Badoglio, the Crown Prince, and 

other high-ranking officials; let the Germans take over the Italian Government; 

and find Mussolini and liberate him. 

Relieved when he remembered that only 

part of the ISt Parachute Division had 

crossed into Sicily, he insisted that all the 

troops had to be taken out. What happened to their materiel did not matter 

in the least. "Everything will have to 

be done so fast," Hitler said, "that the 

entire movement will be completed in two 

days-perhaps only one." Warned by 

JodI that no more than 17,000 men could 

be ferried over in one day under normal 

conditions, Hitler burst out with: "\Vell, 

they'll have to crowd together. Do you 

remember how it was at Dunkerque? 

Is it not ridiculous to think that our Navy 

cannot ferry these men over such a small 

piece of water in two-nay in one 

provided the materiel stays behind?" 

In closing the discussion, Hitler reminded Jodi of an important point. "Of 

course," he said, "we will have to continue 

the game as if we believed in their [the 

Italians] claim that they want to continue 

[fighting]." To which JodI agreed: 

"Yes, we will have to do that." From 

then on, the Gennans would mask their 

activities behind a cloak of secrecy.12 

12 Min of Conf 14, Second Meeting Between 

Hitler, Keitel, Jodi, and Oth(ml;""25 Jui 43, in 

Min of Hitler Conk Compare also Min 13, 15, 

and 17 of 25 and 26 JuI4S: -
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

That night, General JodI sent a teletype 

ordering Kesselring to evacuate Sicily. 

Since JodI did not dare to entrust detailed 

instructions to conventional means of communication, he dispatched a personal representative to Rome to brief Kesselring on 

his role in Plan ACHSEY 

More detailed information and the 

repeated Italian declarations of continued cobelligerence mollified Hitler. He 

changed his mind on immediately evacuating the German troops from Sicily. The 

final evacuation would be delayed as long 

as possible. 14 

In Sicily, General Guzzoni was certain 

that the Allies would not invade the Italian mainland until after Sicily had first 

been subdued. Thus, the Sixth Army 

commander saw his mission as postponing the Allied conquest of the island 

as long as possible. If he received substantial reinforcements, he might even return 

to the offensive. 15 

But by then the command relationships in Sicily had changed. General 

Hube had committed elements of the 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division along the 

north coast on 22 July, when he had 

nominally had tactical control of only the 

eastern half of the front. The commitment deployed German troops all along 

the front, from the eastern to the northern coast of Sicily. Since the Italian 

troops had lost almost all their combat 

effectiveness, the German troops had become the mainstay of the defense of the 

Messina peninsula. 

On that same day, Hube had informed 

Guzzoni that he wanted tactical control 

130KWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VII.43, 25, 26, 

and 28 Jul 43; SKLj I. Abt, KTB, Teil A. I.-

3I.VII.43, 26 Jul 43· 

14 Bonin in MS #T-2 (Fries et at.). 

15 Faldella, Lo sbarr,o, pp. 218, 236, 305. 

307 

of all the ground forces on the entire front. 

Guzzoni refused for two reasons. First, 

this arrangement would deal a severe 

blow to Italian prestige. Second, Guzzoni realized that Hube had developed a 

different concept of defense-one that he, 

Guzzoni, could not approve.16 Whereas 

Guzzoni still hoped eventually to regain 

the initiative, he suspected, and rightly, 

that Hube had no intention of ever mounting a major counterattack-even though 

the situation had become somewhat stable 

by 2 I July with the British advance on 

Catania stopped. The shift of the British 

main effort from Catania to Regalbuto 

and Leonforte and the highway system west of Mount Etna indicated a dispersal of effort. Withdrawal of the Axis 

forces from the invasion front and from 

western Sicily to the northeastern corner 

had been generally completed, except for 

some 15th Panzer Grenadier Division outposts in the northern sector. British attempts to break through would therefore 

meet solid opposition. Thus far, the 

American forces, still some distance west 

of the main defense line, constituted no 

immediate threat. 

Guzzoni considered it feasible to defend 

northeastern Sicily on what the Italians 

and Germans commonly designated as the 

main line of resistance, a line from south 

of Catania to Santo Stefano di Camastra. 

He expected to hold this line long enough 

to gain enough time to build up the Etna 

line-from Acireale to San Fratello. In 

order to save those troops still west of 

16 Superesereito supported Guzzoni and confirmed on 23 July that the tactical command on 

Sicily would remain divided between the Italians 

and Germans. Later the same day, the Italian 

Army headquarters clarified the issue by stating 

that it would not tolerate Rube's assumption of 

tactical command over all the fighting forces. 

IT ggb, an. 73; Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 233-34. 
308 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the main line of resistance Guzzoni on 2 I 

July ordered both the XIV Panzer Corps 

and the Italian XII Corps to withdraw 

any outposts in the northern sector. He 

considered the troops on Sicily and those 

earmarked to arrive in the near future 

adequate not only to hold the line but 

also to form a reserve for a counterattack 

to regain the initiative, if only temporarily. 

What he needed was to keep together as 

a unit the newly arriving 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, rather than dissipate' 

its strength by commitment in driblets. 

But Hube refused to withdraw the 

northern outposts. He even committed a 

part of the new German formation on the 

northern coast. Quoting Hitler's wellknown doctrine of holding every foot of 

ground, Hube disclosed that no German 

commander would withdraw except under 

overwhelming pressure. These actions 

put an end to any intentions Guzzoni 

had to return to the offensive, even before 

it became painfully evident that Italian 

reinforcements were not going to be sent 

to Sicily. And although Guzzoni was 

still nominally in command of all tactical 

operations on Sicily, the preponderance of 

German over Italian combat troops on the 

island prompted him to bow to Hube's 

decisions.17 

On the other hand, General Hube's 

actions were dictated by sound tactical 

reasons. He wished to give those German troops escaping from Palermo a 

chance to reach the Messina triangle. He 

also wanted to prevent the American 

Seventh Army from getting around the 

right flank of the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division and rolling up the entire Axis 

17 Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 218, 221-24, 234-

38, 305-06. The difference of opinion between 

Guzzoni and Hube is not corroborated in German 

sources. 

line. In accordance with the mission 

given him when he was sent to Sicily, 

Hube's intentions were to execute an orderly withdrawal from the island, to include local counterthrusts but no major 

counterattack operations. The purpose of 

the entire operation was to gain time and 

to save German manpower for the expected future battles on the Italian mainland. 

The Seventh Army's arrival on the 

north coast on 22 July completely changed 

the situation. Except for remnants of 

Italian divisions, nothing stood in the way 

of an American drive on Messina via the 

north coast road. Experience had shown 

that Italian coastal units could not be 

depended on. The 15th Panzer Grenadier 

could not further stretch itself to cover 

the north coast road. Up to this time, 

the eastern and central sectors of the 

front had swallowed up all Axis reinforcements arriving on the island. To prevent 

an American breakthrough on the north, 

then, was the reason Hube had committed 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division.ls 

Convinced that a dual or vague command organization was detrimental to the 

future conduct of operations, Guzzoni 

settled for a compromise. In a conference on 25 July, he and Hube agreed, 

subject to the approval of their respective 

higher headquarters, that Guzzoni would 

nominally retain the over-all tactical command but with the tacit understanding 

that Hube would henceforth conduct the 

defense of the land front.19 

The political upheaval in Rome having 

prevented an immediate reply to Guzzoni's 

180B SUED, Meldungen, 23 Jul 43; MS # 

D-095, !J9th Panzer Grenadier Division, 30 Jul 

43 (Ulich); MS #C-077 (Rodt). 

19 IT ggb, an. 83; Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 

237-3 8. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

and Hube's joint proposal, Hube took over 

the actual conduct of ground operations 

on Sicily. He continued to discuss plans 

and decisions with Guzzoni and the Sixth 

Army staff directly or through the German liaison officer, General von Senger. 

And he tried to create the impression that 

the Germans on Sicily intended to fight 

to the bitter end. Guzzoni saw through 

the deception, but he was realistic enough 

to accept the situation. Though Guzzoni 

remonstrated with Hube against some of 

the latter's decisions, he accepted German 

pre-eminence. 

Nicosia 

Hube's assumption of real command 

and his employment of German divisions 

brought to an end the rapid advances of 

the Seventh Army. Oriented eastward, 

the II Corps would face difficult terrain 

and a most tenacious foe, highly skilled in 

the conduct of defensive operations. 

The II Corps was to advance toward 

Messina along two separate axes: Highway 

I 13 along the north coast, and 'Highway 

120 through Nicosia, Troina, Cesaro, and 

Randazzo. Between the two major axes 

of advance, and parallel to them, ran 

the Caronie Mountain chain, the highest 

mountains on the island except Mount 

Etna. Extremely rugged, not flattening 

out to any appreciable degree until just 

west of Messina, the mountain chain had 

practically no road net save the four roads 

that crossed it in a general north-south 

direction. 

The north coast axis of advanceHighway I I3-skirted the rim of what 

resembled a washboard, created by numerous short streams flowing down from 

the mountain crests at frequent intervals 

to empty into the sea. The streams them309 

selves were obstacles to advance, but 

high, steep ridges separating the streams 

were even more formidable and created 

positions of great natural strength. In 

addition, those ridges over which the four 

transverse roads ran also provided significant defensive lines. The coastal highway itself followed a narrow level belt 

between the ridge ends and the beaches. 

At some places where the ridge ends came 

flush to the Tyrrhenian Sea, the road lay 

bracketed into the cliff directly above the 

surf. In one instance-at Cape Calava 

(east of Cape Orlando) -the road swung 

past the point through a short tunnel. 

The coastal railroad from Palermo to Messina also followed the beach line, usually 

running between the highway and the sea, 

crossing the streams on iron bridges, tunneling frequently through the ridges. 

Though exposed to attack from the sea, 

the coastal highway offered defenders a 

series of good positions. 

The other axis of advance-Highway 

I20-passed along the southern slopes of 

the Caronie Mountains. The road was 

narrow and crooked, with steep grades 

and sharp turns. In many places, heavy 

vehicles had to stop and back up in order 

to negotiate a turn. Like the coastal 

region, the mountainous area would 

provide a determined enemy with numerous ideal defensive positions. But unlike 

the north coast road, which lay exposed 

to seaborne assault, the mountains dominated Highway 120 on both sides. 

The highland divide between the axes 

of advance would also contribute a special 

feature to the campaign in the Messina 

peninsula. Because the divide contained 

some of the most rugged and inaccessible 

terrain in Sicily, and because its slopes 

dominated the two major east-west arteries, 

the mountain chain would separate the 
CARONIA V ALLEY, typical of the rugged terrain in the Caronie Mountains. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 311 

GANGI, with Mount Etna in the distant background. 

American forces advancing along the roads 

except at lateral roads, thereby precluding 

mutual support. Supply problems would 

be greatly magnified. The II Corps advance toward Messina would proceed over 

two distinct battlegrounds. 

In order to establish a solid front before 

pushing on to the east, General Bradley 

first brought the 45th Division on line 

with the 1st Division while keeping the 

momentum of the latter's attack. The 

45th Division had come out on the north 

coast near Termini Imerese, and though it 

immediately turned toward the east, its 

front line was fifteen miles behind the 1st 

Division at Petralia. Until the 45th Division came up with the 1st Division, 

the II Corps would exert unequal pressure 

and enable the Germans to shift forces 

from one highway to the other to counter 

the two distinct American thrusts. The 

9 I st Reconnaissance Squadron filled the 

gap between the I st Division and the 

British 30 Corps on the right, but because 

General Bradley was again concerned 

about the Enna situation, he held the 16th 

RCT in corps reserve to counter a sudden 

Axis movement against his right flank. 

(Map 4) 

General Allen brought forward the 
312 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

24 - 31 July 1943 

~ UNit loc..'~. !' JUL. "-.\\\.1 

TTTT ••• II ~s. ''''0''' . I JVI.. 

, . , ! ,'s \ ,', I 

MAP 4 

26th RCT and passed it through the 18th 

RCT east of Petralia on the morning of 

24 July to take Gangi and the high 

ground beyond, then Sperlinga, just three 

miles from Nicosia.20 

20 1St Inf Div G-3 Jnl 43, entry 94; for General Bradley's worries about the east flank, see 

1St Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Jul 43, entries 23, 28, 

30, 50, 66, and 67. 

The maintenance of contact with the British 

Eighth Army units had posed a problem for the 

1st Division ever since the initial change was 

made in the Seventh Army axis of advance on 

14 July. It was always necessary for the 1st DiVISIOn to divert a portion of its strength-sometimes as much as a battalion-to maintain that 

··r f>.~ __ .;' 

To cover this movement, the 18th Combat Team, late in the afternoon of 23 

July, dispatched a company of infantry to 

the high ground southeast of Gangi. 

But before the company reached its objective, the regimental reconnaissance platoon moved into Gangi and found the 

contact and to protect the division's right flank 

against any unexpected enemy movement into its 

rear areas. It was not until late in the campaign 

that this problem subsided; in fact, it was not 

until the fall of Randazzo. See comments of Maj 

Gen Ray W. Porter, Jr., on MS. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

town clear of Germans. Group Fullriede 

had pulled its outposts back toward the 

main defensive line extending in an arc 

forward of Nicosia. 

The 26th Infantry, after clearing the 

Bompietro road junction, pushed toward 

Gangi, straddling Highway 120 with a 

two-battalion front. Against light and 

intermittent artillery fire, the 1st Battalion moved north of the road toward Hills 

825 (Monte Cannella) and 937 (Monte 

Caolina), while the 3d Battalion headed 

for Hill 937 south of the road. When 

the 1st Battalion commander, Major 

Grant, reported Hill 825 nothing more 

than a big, barren slab of rock, impracticable to occupy, which the battalion 

could cover from high ground then held 

farther to the west, the combat team commander, Colonel Bowen, agreed that it 

was not necessary to take it. Though the 

2d Battalion commander, Colonel Daniel, 

made a similar report on Hill 937, Colonel 

Bowen directed him to secure the objective 

because Bowen wanted to push the 3d 

Battalion around to the right and then 

cross-country directly into Nicosia, eight 

miles away. Daniel complied, and sent 

Company G to occupy the hill, one platoon 

of which reached the crest near midnight. 

Daybreak of 25 July brought heavy enemy artillery fire across the entire 26th 

Infantry's front. General Rodt had reinforced Group Fullriede during the night 

with troops that had just returned from 

the eastern sector. With this added 

strength, Colonel Fullriede sent a battalion 

of infantry to retake Hill 937. The 

American platoon outposting the crest, 

its leader a casualty, withdrew and rejoined the rest of the company at the 

western base of the hill. Disturbed by 

the failure to hold Hill 937 without a 

fight, Colonel Bowen ordered the 2d Bat313 

talion to "work hard on it-get it back." 21 

As Generals Allen and Roosevelt began 

pressing Bowen to retake the hill, Bowen, 

in order to relieve some of the pressure on 

the 2d Battalion, directed the I st Battalion, north of the road, to move forward 

and occupy Hill 825, even though Major 

Grant felt "there is no place to put anyone if we did have it." 22 Bowen also 

directed the 3d Battalion to swing around 

the right of Hill 937 and pinch the Germans between the other two battalions. 

Regaining the hill in the early afternoon, two companies of the 2d Battalion 

began a short-range, murderous fire fight 

with the Germans, who withdrew just off 

the crest down the eastern slope. German and Italian artillery fire raked the 

hilltop, but the two American companies 

stood firm. By this time, Brig. Gen. Clift 

Andrus, the 1st Division's artillery commander, had six artillery battalions plus two 

155-mm. gun batteries firing in support 

of the 26th.23 As the 3d Battalion came 

almost in line with the hill and turned 

toward the highway to take Hill 962 

(Monte Barnagiano) in rear of the Germans on Hill 937, the Germans pulled 

away from this enveloping threat, and just 

before midnight, the 3d Battalion pushed 

onto Hill 962. 

The enemy was far from finished. Instead of hitting with a counterattack, then 

pulling out when American counterpressure became strong, the German reaction 

to the capture of Hill 962 was as strong 

21 26th Inf Regt S-I Jnl, entry timed 0952, 

25 Jul 43. 

22 26th Inf Regt S-I Jnl, entries timed IOq, 

1105, I I 16, and 1404, 25 Jul 43. 

23 The artillery in support of the 26th Infantry fired almost 2,000 rounds during the day. 

The 33d Field Artillery Battalion, in direct 

support, alone fired 687 rounds, while the 7th 

Field Artillery Battalion, reinforcing the 33d, 

fired 620 rounds. 
314 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

as against the loss of Hill 937. When 

Colonel Bowen, on 26 July, sent the 1st 

Battalion to Hills 92 I and 825, eight 

hundred yards farther east, the Gennans 

knocked the assault elements back to their 

starting line. South of the road, the 

Germans threw the 3d Battalion off Hill 

962, to start a seesaw battIe, with Gennans 

and Americans in alternate possession of 

the crest. Hill 962 soon became a no 

man's land, with Gennans on the eastern 

slopes, Americans on the western, and 

artillery controlling the top. Not until 

evening did the 3d Battalion, with support 

from a battalion of the 16th Infantry, 

finally gain full possession of Hill 962. 

General Bradley had released two battalions of the 16th Infantry from corps 

reserve that morning to enable General 

Allen to make a double enyelopment of 

Nicosia. With the 26th Infantry apparently stopped on Highway 120 and the 

Germans showing no signs of giving up 

their positions around Sperlinga and Nicosia, General Allen that afternoon sent 

the two battalions of the 16th Infantry 

south of the highway and around Hill 

962 toward Sperlinga. The 18th Infantry, north of the highway, was to swing 

past the 26th Infantry, take high ground 

north of Sperlinga and cut Highway 

I I 7, the lateral road through Nicosia, 

then move south to assist the 16th in 

clearing Nicosia and Sperlinga. The 

9 I st Reconnaissance Squadron was to 

continue roving in the gap between the 

two annies, the 4th Tabor of Goums was 

to work on the left of the 18th Infantry. 

In explaining his attack plan, General 

Allen said, "Had we kept up just a frontal 

attack, it would have meant just a bloody 

nose for us at every hill." 24 

24 Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, p, 52; 1st Inf 

Div FO 29, 26 Jul 43, 

The envelopment started at 1600, 26 

July, as the 26th Infantry fought off renewed German counterattacks; the approach of darkness prevented more than 

a slight advance. Next day, 27 July, the 

16th RCT south of the road was stopped 

cold in its drive on Sperlinga and Nicosia. 

North of the highway, while one battalion 

of the 18th Infantry cleared the two hills 

that had given the 26th Infantry so much 

trouble, another battalion, aided by the 

Gourniers, swung farther north to the approaches to Monte Sambughetti, a towering hill mass 4,500 feet high. An infantry 

company pushing up the hill took 300 

Italian prisoners, and battalion patrols 

moved farther to the east and cut Highway 117. 

Trying to jar the Germans loose from 

their positions forward of Sperlinga and 

Nicosia, General Allen ordered thirty-two 

light tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion, 

plus a platoon of tanks from the 753d 

Medium Tank Battalion, to sweep south 

to the highway in front of HiII 825, coming out near HilI 962. The light tanks 

deployed at 2030 that evening and, covered by the mediums, roared down to the 

highway, where they "sprayed for miles 

around for at least ten or fifteen minutes 

before receiving artillery fire" and withdrawing. The sweep cost three light 

tanks and six casualties, but it gained one 

German antitank· gun and bolstered the 

morale of the American infantrymen on 

the surrounding hills. By then, the German forces on the Nicosia front had decided to withdraw. 

The Gennan withdrawal during the 

night of 27 July opened the way to the 

1st Division. By 0830, 28 July, the 3d 

Battalion, 16th Infantry, had patrols in 

Sperlinga, and two hours later in Nicosia. 

Some sniping was encountered as well as 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

resistance from dug-in emplacements on a 

few high, rocky points in the north end 

of town. Before the day was over, the 

16th Infantry had captured seven hundred 

Italians and a few Germans who failed to 

escape from Nicosia. 

For General Guzzoni, the loss of Nicosia was a frustrating development. He 

had intended to hold Nicosia, which he 

considered one of the key positions on his 

main line of resistance. He thought that 

Hube had the same idea. But during the 

afternoon of 27 July, Guzzoni had learned 

from the XII Corps headquarters that 

Colonel Fullriede had received orders to 

withdraw. 

General Guzzoni's immediate inquiries 

produced the information that Hube was 

beginning the withdrawal to the Etna 

line. Though the Sixth Army commander 

did not know it, Hube's chief of staff on 

26 July had attended a meeting at Kesselring's headquarters and had returned 

the same day to Sicily with verbal authorization to start consolidating the German 

forces on the island for immediate evacuation. Hitler's reaction to Mussolini's dismissal was taking effect. Early on 27 

July, therefore, Hube had instructed 

Rodt to reconnoiter suitable defensive 

positions just forward of the Etna line for 

the withdrawal of Group Fullriede that 

night. 

At Guzzoni's request late in the afternoon of 27 July, Hube promised to amend 

his orders to Group Fullriede . The German battle group would stop its withdrawal and would organize a new line 

running along the Nicosia-Agira road, thus 

closing the gap which had existed between Rodt's two battle groups. Guzzoni 

then promised that the remnants of the 

Aosta Division would hold the 3,000-foothigh mountain pass (Colle del Contrasto) 

315 

on Highway 1 17 about halfway between 

Nicosia and Mistretta. By consolidating 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and 

holding the pass, the Axis could stop an 

American thrust north along Highway 1 17 

and thus protect the interior flanks of the 

29th Panzer Grenadier and Assietta Dtvision deployed along the north coast. 

Guzzoni was also worried that an American breakthrough at the pass would unhinge from the north coast the entire 

main line of resistance, a move that would 

seriously endanger all of the Axis units to 

the south. 

Apparently neither Rodt nor Fullriede 

received word of Hube's promise to delay 

Group Fullriede's withdrawal from Nicosia, for without informing the Aosta 

Division, Fullriede began withdrawing his 

battle group that night to the new positions he and General Rodt had previously 

reconnoitered: six miles east of Nicosia 

extending from Gagliano (just north of 

Agira), through Serradifalco and Cerami 

(both on Highway 120), to Capizzi (some 

three miles north of Cerami). The Aosta 

Division hastily joined the German withdrawal. The result was that some units 

became lost in the mountainous terrain 

while others, apparently not receiving the 

withdrawal order, stayed to fend off the 

American thrust on Nicosia the following 

day. At the important mountain pass on 

Highway 117, a battalion of the Aosta 

Division pulled back to join the general 

rearward movement, and, as a consequence, opened the north coast road to 

American advance. 25 

25 IT 99b, 27 Jul 43; Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 

231-32, 239-40, 242-43; OKWjWFSt, KTB, 

1.-3I.VIl.43, 26 Jul 43; OB SUED, Meldungen, 

27 Jul 43; OKH Tagesmeldungen West, 28 Jul 

43· 
316 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

COAST ROAD PATROL passing the bombed-out CasteLbuono railroad station, 24 July. 

Along the North Coast 

Despite mine fields and blown bridges, 

the 45th Division had advanced rapidly 

during the night of 23 July and the 

following day. The newly committed 

Group Ulich of the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division was not strong enough to contest 

seriously the American advance. By blowing the bridge over the M alpertugio River, 

five miles east of Cefalu, and by liberally 

planting mines in the river bed, Group 

Ulich brought the 157th Infantry to a 

temporary halt. The 179th Infantry, 

which had been following a secondary 

road six miles inland, reached the town of 

Castel buono, eight miles north of Petralia. 

This brought the 45th Division on line 

with the I st Division. 

When General Bradley directed General Middleton to keep the pressure on 

along the north coast road, Middleton sent 

the I80th Infantry through the I57th on 

the evening of 24 July. The 180th Infantry crossed the Malpertugio River during the night, and under almost constant 

artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, on 

the following day uncovered a new German line on the high ground just forward 

of the Pollina River, where the Germans 

occupied an extremely strong, natural defensive position hinged on the 3,000-foothigh Pizzo Spina. The coastal highway 

skirts the base of almost vertical cliffs lead-
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

ing to the crest of the heights. With their 

main battle position on the west side of the 

river, the Germans did not demolish the 

highway bridge, but deployed their infantrymen and supporting weapons on the 

ground controlling the coastal highway. 

The first American task was seizure of 

Pizzo Spina, and Colonel Cochrane, the 

2d Battalion commander, hoping to nutcracker the Germans, sent Company F 

to occupy a defended blockhouse at a 

bend in the highway just under the enemy 

guns on Pizzo Spina, and Company E 

inland up a ravine to come in on the left 

of the German line. 

While Company E made its tortuous 

way through the ravine toward the southern slopes of Pizzo Spina, Company F, 

under heavy German artillery and small 

arms fire, took, but soon gave up, the 

blockhouse and withdrew. 

Cochrane immediately sent in Company G, which, with the reorganized Company F, tried a frontal attack against the 

German positions. Scaling the almost 

vertical cliffs, with friendly artillery bursting fifty to seventy yards ahead of the 

skirmish line, using rifle fire, rifle grenades, 

and 60-mm. mortars to aid their advance, 

the two companies climbed from sea level 

to almost 3,000 feet in less than a thousand 

yards. But it was slow going. The advance brought down damaging barrages 

from enemy artillery and heavy weapons, 

and German infantrymen rolled hand 

grenades down the slopes. The supporting 4.2-inch mortars, from pOSItions 500 

yards behind the line of departure, blanketed observed and suspected targets, and 

with white phosphorus shells neutralized 

some enemy positions high among the 

crags. 

Just as the advance seemed about to 

stop, Company E bounded in on the 

317 

German left and overran that end of the 

enemy line, gaining positions near the 

pinnacle of Pizzo Spina. Able to enfilade 

the rest of the German line, the company 

drove the Germans down the eastern 

slopes. Company F moved up to the 

pinnacle, while Company G dropped off 

the slopes to occupy the blockhouse position on the highway. 

Group Ulich was not yet ready to give 

up its Pollina River line. Shortly after 

the Americans occupied Pizzo Spina, the 

Germans launched the first of three counterattacks against the mountain pinnacle. 

German direct artillery fire from across 

the river at ranges of less than 3,000 yards 

was precise in searching out American 

positions. But observation posts on Pizzo 

Spina enabled American artillery observers 

to bring down heavy fire on the counterattacking forces. Along the coastal highway, a platoon of 4.2-inch mortars stopped 

one German thrust by laying down a 

Ioo-round, thirty-minute, mixed white 

phosphorus and high explosive concentration. Though some small units gave 

way slightly, and though the line close to 

the shore surged back and forth for a depth 

of three hundred yards, the Americans 

held. After one last try just before darkness, the Germans pulled back across the 

river, with American artillery fire so heavy 

and accurate that the Germans could not 

demolish the bridge.26 

The 180th Infantry could not seize the 

opportunity to pursue. Fourteen unidentified naval vessels, four of which were 

believed to be cruisers, were sighted off 

cn Infantry Combat, Part Five: Sicily, pp. Ig24; OKH, Tagesmeldungen West, 25 }ul 43; IT 

ggb, an. 8 J. The 1 7I st Field Artillery Battalion 

fired 1,100 rounds in support of the 180th Infan try; the 18gth Field Artillery Battalion, reinforcing, fired 500 rounds. 
318 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Campofelice, between Cefalu and Termlm Imerese. Fearing that these were 

Axis ships, General Bradley halted the 

45th Division advance and instructed 

General Middleton to prepare to defend 

the coast line against a possible Axis 

amphibious landing. The 180th Infantry 

consequently faced toward the sea near 

Pizzo Spina, while the 15 7th Infantry, 

with tanks from the 753d Medium Tank 

Battalion, deployed along the beaches in 

the rear. Not until early the next afternoon, 26 July, did a division artillery liaison plane identify the vessels as American 

destroyers and mine sweepers.27 

Oddly enough, General Hube feared 

that these vessels were part of an Allied amphibious force moving to a landing in the rear of the Santo Stefano line, 

the northern hinge of the main line of 

resistance. He, therefore, alerted Axis 

units all the way to Calabria to be ready 

to repel a landing.28 

Group Ulich, meanwhile, had moved to 

a new line closer to Santo Stefano di Camastra, a line which ran from Castel di Tusa 

(on the coast) south through Pettineo 

to Castel di Lucio, the northern half resting behind the Tusa River. Late in the 

afternoon of 26 July, the 2d Battalion, 

180th Infantry, reached the Tusa River, 

halted in the face of heavy German small 

27 II Corps G-3 Jnl, entries 95 and 96, 25 

Jul 43; II Corps G-3 Jnl, entries 110 and 133, 

26 Jul 43; 45th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 40,41, 

and 43, 26 Jul 43; ONI, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 

101-02. 

28 Msg, DB SUED to LXXVI Panzer Corps, 

in LXXVI Panzer Corps, KTB, Anlagen, 10. 

VII.-30.VIII.43 (CRS 43005/2). This message 

was probably the cause for a German air strike 

against the American ships on the next day, a 

strike which caused considerable damage to one 

of the destroyers. See ONI, Sicilian Campaign, 

p. 102. 

arms and artillery fire, and found the 

Germans in a strong, natural defensive 

position on a very steep hill forming the 

eastern slope of the Tusa River valley. 

Here, too, the Germans had not demolished the highway bridge. 

While the 2d Battalion made a show of 

crossing the river near the bridge, the 3d 

Battalion, 180th Infantry, swung inland 

to outflank the German position. At 

2030, the battalion seized a high hilI overlooking the village of Tusa, two miles inland from the coast, west of the Tusa 

River and at the end of a fishhook 

road. Across the river, on a high ridge at 

another road end, lay the village of Pettineo. Since the Tusa and Pettineo ridges 

formed the key to a successful Tusa River 

crossing, the 3d Battalion's mission was to 

get up on the Pettineo ridge, from where 

it could then drive north and strike the 

main German position near the coast on 

the flank and in the rear. 

Early on the morning of 27 July, the 

3d Battalion made its move. Tusa fell at 

0600; there was little opposition. But 

nine hours later, the 3d Battalion had 

managed to progress only a few hundred 

yards more, up to the curve of the fishhook road overlooking the river. Cognizant of the threat that this movement 

presented to his main battle position, 

Col. Max Ulich had a reinforced infantry 

battalion well dug in on the Pettineo ridge 

to block the 3d Battalion. 

The inability of the 3d Battalion to get 

across the Tusa River and outflank the 

main German line threw the entire weight 

of the attack on the I st Battalion, 180th 

Infantry, which tried to cross the river 

near the coast. One company managed 

to get across the bridge just after noon, 

but artillery fire had so damaged the bridge 

structure that it collapsed shortly there-
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

after. This, coupled with heavy enemy 

fire, prevented the battalion from reinforcing the one company on the east bank 

of the river. Though it managed to hold 

on to a precarious position for the rest of 

the afternoon, just after dark the battalion 

commander pulled the company back to 

the west side of the river. 

It was on the same evening, thirty 

miles inland, that the Germans had 

given up Nicosia. Though Guzzoni might 

disagree with Hube on some matters, he 

was in basic agreement with the German 

commander that the Axis front as it was 

then constituted could not long be held 

with the forces available on the island. 

The eastern third of the front, manned 

by the reinforced Hermann Goering Division, appeared to be relatively strong and 

could be expected to hold. But the pressure being exerted by the Americans and 

the Canadians against the northern and 

central sectors seemed to demand a consolidation of the Axis forces on the shorter 

front of the Etna line. The German 

withdrawal from Nicosia was the beginning of this consolidation. On the next 

day, 28 July, as the 1st Division entered 

Nicosia, Group Ens gave up Agira to the 

1st Canadian Division and pulled back 

toward Gagliano to join forces with Group 

Fullriede. The Hermann Goering Division extended its eastern flank to block a 

further Canadian advance, while the entire 15th Panzer Grenadier Division prepared to block a push eastward by the 1 st 

Division. Thus, on 28 July, the central 

sector of· the Axis front had consolidated 

near the Etna line. To cover this pullback, and to delay the Americans on the 

north coast as long as possible, General 

Hube ordered the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division to hold forward of Santo Stefano 

di Camastra at least through the night of 

319 

30 July before moving back on line with 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. 

In the meantime, plans for a combined 

Anglo-American August offensive had solidified. On 25 July, General Alexander 

had met with his two army commanders 

at Cassibile, the new 15th Army Group 

command post south of Syracuse. Here, 

the plan for the expulsion of the Axis 

forces from the Messina peninsula was 

agreed on and placed in effect. The Seventh Army was to continue eastward along 

the two axes previously assigned in "a 

sustained relentless drive until the enemy 

is decisively defeated." 29 General Bradley's II Corps would continue to control 

the ground operations along both axes. 30 

The Eighth Army was to make its major 

effort on the left with the British 78th 

Division thrusting to the north along the 

Catenanuova-Centuripe-Adrano axis and 

the 1st Canadian Division driving to the 

east along Highway 121 through Regalbuto. On the Eighth Army's right, the 

1 3 Corps was to feint an attack toward 

Catania to deceive the Germans into 

thinking this was the main British effort. 

After the fall of Adrano, which General 

Montgomery estimated to be the key to 

the main Axis Etna positions, he expected 

the Germans to pull out of Catania. 

Then the 13 Corps would exploit to Messina around the eastern side of Mount 

Etna. 31 

General Bradley, in accordance with the 

new directive to push on to the eastalthough his push had never really 

stopped-decided to relieve the 45th Di29 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. b-I5. 

30 Seventh Army Directive, 3 I Jul 43, Seventh 

Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-Ig. 

31 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 139; 

Montgomery, Eighth Army, p. 106; Butcher, My 

Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 373. 
320 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

vlslOn with the 3d Division on 31 July 

and to pass the 9th Division through the 

1 st Division. But assembling the bulk of 

the 9th Division would take time, and 

Bradley directed General Allen to keep the 

1St Division moving toward Cerami and 

Troina until the 9th Division could effect 

relief.32 

The American and British foot soldiers 

would have plenty of help in this final 

push to evict the Axis forces from Sicily. 

The Allied air forces roamed almost at 

will through the skies above the battlefield. Almost no hostile aircraft rose to 

contest Allied air superiority. By the time 

Palermo fell, no Axis aircraft were operating from Sicilian airfields; all had been 

withdrawn to the Italian mainland or 

destroyed. With the enemy's air out of 

the way, the attention of the Allied air 

commands could turn to rendering direct 

and close support to the foot soldiers. 

The Seventh Army's advance on Palermo had been so swift that it had been 

unnecessary to call in many close support 

air missions, with the result that most 

tactical sorties had been flown well ahead 

of the advancing units in strafing and 

bombing attacks against targets of opportunity and the road networks leading to 

the active front. Group Ulich had suffered heavily from just such attacks, losing fifty vehicles and a complete artillery 

battery while on the way to oppose the 

45th Division's advance along the north 

coast road.33 

By this time, too, Allied fighters, fighterbombers, and light bombers operated from 

captured airfields on Sicily-at Licata, 

Ponte Olivo, Comiso, and others. Both 

the U.S. 31st and 33d Fighter Wings flew 

under XII ASC control. By 30 July, all 

32 II Corps FO 11,31 Ju143. 

33 MS #D-095 (Ulich). 

units of the U.S. 64th Fighter Wing had 

moved to Sicily. Ample air support 

would be available to support the final 

drive. 34 

Naval support was also available, if not 

in the quantity that had been available 

on 10 July. On 27 July, when Palermo 

was first opened to Allied shipping, Admiral Hewitt created Naval Task Force 

88, consisting of the last few remaining 

American warships in Sicilian waters. 

Under the command of Rear Adm. Lyal 

A. Davidson, NTF 88 became "General 

Patton's Navy"-set up to support the 

Seventh Army's operations along the 

north coast.35 To carry out this mission, 

Admiral Davidson was initially assigned 2 

cruisers, 14 destroyers, 14 MTB's, 19 

landing craft (2 LST's, 10 LCI (L )'s, 

7 LCT's) , and a number of small escort 

craft.36 On the east coast, Admiral Cunningham had warships available to support the Eighth Army operations, and 

was prepared to furnish a number of 

landing craft to lift British ground units 

around the stubborn German Catania 

defense line. Rear Adm. R. R. McGrigor, 

the senior British naval officer in Sicily, 

had completed all preparations necessary 

to launch an amphibious end run. 37 

Even as the 3d Division began its move 

forward to effect the relief of the 45th 

Division on the north coast road, General 

Middleton on the morning of 28 July 

leapfrogged regiments, ordering the 15 7th 

Infantry forward to take up the fight. 

Colonel Ankcorn's leading battalions failed 

34 Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH 

to POINTBLANK, pp. 462-66; Coles, USAF 

Hist Study 37, pp. 122-28; 0403/9/3, sub: 

NAAF Daily Opns Summary, Jun-Jul 43; Seventh Army G-3 Opns File, sub: Air Support. 

35 Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. I9I. 

36 WNTF Rpt of Opns, p. 72. 

37 Roskill, vol. III, pt. I, pp. 142-43. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

to get off to a fast start, for a blown 

section of the coastal road west of the 

Pollina River delayed their arrival at the 

Tusa River until late in the afternoon. 

Eventually, at 1745, the 1st Battalion, 

157th Infantry, relieved the 180th 

Infantry Battalion at the river. Immediately, Colonel Murphy, the battalion commander, sent Company B across the river 

to the left of the demolished bridge and 

along the flat coastal strip. Though it 

suffered some casualties from mines and 

from enemy artillery fire, Company B 

started working up the slopes of the Tusa 

ridge-Hill 335-across the top of which 

the 3d Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment had dug in. In the meantime, 

Company C crossed the river to the right 

of the demolished bridge and started up 

the forward slopes of the hill, finally reaching a terrace just under the steep crest 

where heavy small anns and mortar fire 

forced a halt. Company A, put in on the 

right of Company C, could make no more 

progress. As night came, both companies 

clung precariously to their terrace perch. 

But by this time, Company B had succeeded in reaching the top of the ridge 

overlooking the sea. The company was 

low on ammunition, but it fonned a line 

near the edge of a clearing, and, though 

harassed throughout the night by sniper 

fire and hand grenades, it held. 

While the 1st Battalion developed the 

Tusa ridge positions, the 2d Battalion, 

157th Infantry, had swung inland, passed 

through the 3d Battalion, 180th Infantry, 

at Tusa, and crossed the river into Pettineo by darkness of 23 July. In contrast to the tough resistance encountered 

by the 180th Infantry the previous day, 

the only opposition to the advance on the 

28th came in. the form of a small counterattack launched by a portion of the 

321 

2d Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Thereafter, the Gennans pulled 

back to the high ground along the Motta 

d' Affermo-Mistretta road. The same day, 

to the south, the 18th RCT began sending patrols north on Highway I 17 toward 

Mistretta, thereby threatening the 29th 

Panzer Grenadier Division's open left 

flank. 

On the morning of 29 July, the 2d 

Battalion pushed out toward Motta, driving for two hills south of town. This day, 

though, the enemy refused to relinquish 

ground, and the battalion's attempt to 

flank the German line to the north was 

of no avail. To add weight to the turning movement, Colonel Ankcorn, the 15 7th 

Infantry Combat Team commander, committed the 3d Battalion, which crossed 

the Tusa River behind the I st Battalion, 

moved south toward Pettineo, then turned 

inland to drive directly on Motta. Covered by a three-battalion artillery concentration (almost 1,500 rounds) which 

forced the two forward companies from 

the I st Battalion to cling to their terrace 

walls while shells exploded almost in their 

faces, the 3d Battalion moved slowly toward Motta. The advance was still uphill, for Motta itself was some 900 feet 

higher than the Tusa ridge line and represented the key terrain before Santo Stefano, the 45th Division's objective. This 

ground the 45th Division would remember 

as "Bloody Ridge." By 1900, somewhat 

disorganized, the two 15 7th Infantry battalions halted for the night short of Motta. 

The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division 

was still not ready to give up this line 

before 30 July. Though General Fries 

had lost the Tusa River line and faced 

the threat of an envelopment of Santo 

Stefano from the south-Mistretta (ten 

miles to the south) was entered by Ameri-
322 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

DEMOLISHED BRIDGE ALONG HIGHWAY 117 between Santo Stefano and itIistretta slows down 

45th Division troops. 

can troops on 29 July-he ordered Colonel Ulich to mount a counterattack on 

the morning of 30 July to retake the Tusa 

ridge to slow the American advance toward Santo Stefano from the west. General Fries was confident that the rough 

nature of the terrain between Mistretta 

and Santo Stefano, coupled with the ease 

with which Highway I 17 could be blocked 

at almost any point, precluded any rapid 

American advance from the south. The 

most serious threat to Santo Stefano remained the 45th Division; this was the 

unit that had to be halted if Santo Stefano 

was to hold out another twenty-four 

hours. To make the counterattack, General Fries attached to Group Ulich a battalion from the 7ISt Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment and two battalions from the 

division's artillery. 

At 0430, 30 July, without preparatory 

artillery fires, the German attack jumped 

off from just north of Motta. Initially, 

it achieved full surprise and gained some 

ground, but at heavy cost. The 1St and 

3d Battalions, 15 7th Infantry, recovered 

their composure quickly and dug in to 

hold. Alert to its supporting role, the 

45th Division artillery began firing soon 

after the attack developed. From the 

south, the 2d Battalion poured heavy fire 

on the German flank. By noon, the impetus of the German attack slowed considerably. After taking a fifteen-minute, 

three-battalion artillery concentration 

shortly after 1300, the Germans stopped. 
THE DRIVE TO THE EAST 

That night, the 15 7th Infantry resumed 

its advance. Motta fell without a fight. 

Leaving one reinforced battalion to hold 

Santo Stefano as long as possible, General 

Fries moved his division eastward. The 

town fell the next morning. 38 

For the 45th Division, Santo Stefano 

marked the end of active combat operations in Sicily, although the 15 7th Infantry would take part in an operation 

near Messina late III the campaign. 

38 157th Inf Regt Rpt of Opns; Infantry Combat, Part Five: Sicily, pp. 24-30; MS #D-095 

(Ulich); OKH, Tagesmeldungen West, 29 Jul 43. 

323 

For a short time, at least, the division 

could enjoy a respite from the bloody business of war. 

In its first twenty-one days of combat 

in World War II, the 45th Division had 

earned an enviable reputation. It had 

marched and fought from Scoglitti to the 

north coast, suffered I, I 56 casualties, and 

taken 10,977 prisoners. 

As the 3d Division moved into line on 

the north coast, the I st Division, on the 

II Corps southern axis, Highway 120, 

began what was to be its hardest and 

bloodiest battle of the Sicilian CampaignTroina. 
CHAPTER XVII 

The Battle of Traina 

The 1St Division's pursuit of the [5th 

Panzer Grenadier Division from Nicosia 

came to an end on 29 July, when heavy 

rain and stubborn rear guard resistance 

stopped the 16th RCT about four miles 

east of the former Axis stronghold. That 

afternoon the forward troops of the 16th 

Infantry dug in on three hills which commanded the highway about three miles 

short of Cerami. Beyond Cerami, eight 

more miles of road would have to be taken 

before the 1St Division could enter Troina. 

:Meanwhile, General Rodt's [5th Panzer Grenadier Division had completed its 

preparations to move back toward the 

Etna line, which, in the northern sector 

extended from Sant' Agata to San Fratello 

and Cesaro, first occupying an intermediate defense line hinged on Troina. Along 

this forward line, General Rodt disposed 

Group Fullriede in Troina and along the 

high ground north of the town, Group 

Ens in the terrain to the south. 1 Rodt's 

division, united for the first time during 

the campaign, maintained a loose contact with the Hermann Goering Division 

on its left near Regalbuto, and on the 

right with the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division, also pulling back along the north 

coast toward the Etna line. The Aosta 

Division, holding a vague sector between 

lISt Inf Div Consolidated Preliminary Interrogation Rpt, 2 Aug 43; 1St In! Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 27, 7 Aug 43; DB SUED, Meldungen, 

0750 , 30 Jul 43. 

the [5th and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, placed its four artillery battalions 

under German control just east of Troina.2 

As early as 22 July, American intelligence officers were describing the Etna 

line with accuracy.s But they guessed 

that the Germans were building up 

another, more highly organized, final defensive line from which they could launch 

a vigorous counterattack as well as screen 

a possible withdrawal to the Italian mainland. 4 

In this the Americans guessed wrong. 

General Hube had no concept of a final 

defensive line. Rather, he saw in the 

northeast sector of the island ground on 

which he could establish a succession of 

strongpoints-as opposed to a line of defenses-almost, but not quite, as though 

lateral means of communication did not 

exist. The fact that the terrain denied 

freedom of maneuver was something Hube 

could use to his advantage. If small garrisons proved effective, they could stay as 

long as they were not endangered by the 

fall of a flanking stronghold. And when 

the garrisons were in imminent danger of 

faIling or of being encircled, they would 

have at their rear a good road along which 

2 Faldella, Lo sbarco, p. 244 and Table 12. 

3 Seventh Army G-2 Periodic Rpt 14, 22 Jul 

43, in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. C-35; see 

also Seventh Army G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 5, 23 

Jul 43, in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. C-17. 

4 Seventh Army G-2 Periodic Rpts 18 and 19, 

27 and 28 Jul 43. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

they could withdraw. At the same time, 

most of the defending forces would be well 

away from the front lines. 

It was the failure to appreciate the 

priority which the Germans gave to their 

withdrawal movement that caused the 

Americans most of their trouble at Troina. 

This failure was spotlighted by the unremitting search for a final defensive line 

in the Seventh Army's zone. All information pointed to heavy troop and materiel 

movements passing through, and not stopping at, Troina. Air reconnaissance also 

discovered a large bivouac area near 

Cesaro, and when direct observation from 

Nicosia and Cerami showed how lightly 

Troina was held, the guesses about where 

the Germans would hold focused farther 

and farther eastward. On 28 July, the II 

Corps G-2 believed the Germans would 

continue their rear guard actions and 

make a final stand either along a line 

located on high ground some five miles 

east of Troina, or along a line between 

Cesaro and Randazzo. The reason: "The 

successful defense of Catania and the 

Catania Plain have raised German morale 

and hopes to the point where they are 

willing to gamble two or three more divisions to hold a Sicilian bridgehead." 5 

On 30 July, the II Corps G-2 said: 

"Indications from observed bivouac areas 

north of Cesaro and the general withdrawal of the enemy east of Cesaro following the day's fighting are that the 

enemy is falling back to that area." 6 

The II Corps and the I st Division intelligence estimates also emphasized the 

poor condition and small size of the enemy 

force holding Troina. Relying chiefly on 

prisoner of war and civilian testimony, the 

1st Division G-2 (Lt. Col. Ray W. Por5 II Corps G-2 Est 9, 28 Jul 43. 

6 II Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 18, 30 Ju! 43. 

325 

ter, Jr.) reported at 1215, 29 July, 

"Germans very tired, little ammo, many 

casualties, morale low." 7 And two days 

later, he said: "Offering slight resistance 

to our advancing force, the enemy fought 

a delaying action while the bulk of the 

force withdrew toward Cesaro. The delaying forces consisted of small groups of 

infantry with mortars and machine guns 

and were supported by artillery." 8 That 

same evening, 3 I July, the II Corps announced: "Indications are Troina lightly 

held." 9 

The terrain facing the II Corps forces 

on Highway 120 was difficult. Half a 

dozen ridge systems running generally 

north and south compartmentalize the 

terrain between Nicosia and Randazzo, 

and each series of hills commands the 

highway. Any of several might have 

served to anchor a defensive line forward 

of the Etna positions but the Troina ridge 

in particular possessed several choice features: avenues of communication in the 

vicinity of the town were so few and the 

hill systems so arranged that half a 

dozen fortified hills could completely control not only Highway 120 but also any 

endeavor to flank these positions-any 

attempt to envelop the town would require a very wide encirclement; gun positions in the town not only looked down 

on the highway, they could also pour 

effective fire on Cerami (from which an 

attack had to be launched) and especially on a wide curve which the highway 

made as it left Cerami; the cup-shaped 

valley between Cerami and Troina was exceptionally barren and devoid of cover; 

and, above all, since the Germans had 

shown from the beginning of the campaign 

7 1st Inf Div G-2 In!, 29 Jul 43. 

8 1st Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 20, 3 I Jul 43. 

9 II Corps G-2 In!, 31 Jul 43. 
TROINA RIDGE FROM THE HIGH GROUND NEAR CERAMI. Mount Etna is in the background. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 327 

LOOKING WEST FROM THE TOWN OF TROINA 

that the one line they insisted on holding 

was the line stretching along the southern 

base of Mount Etna, Troina was the 

best place along Highway 120 that would 

serve as the continuation of the line from 

Etna to the north coast. Nicosia and 

even Cerami were not only comparatively 

easy to outflank, but were also too far 

from the towns holding out against the 

Eighth Army-first Agira and Regalbuto, 

but above all Adrano and Catania. To 

give up these towns (except on a definite 

timetable) would mean that the greater 

part of the German garrison in Sicily 

would be trapped in the Etna area, the 

limited communications and stone walls of 

which had been a major factor in the entire delaying action. Again, to let Troina 

go and try to use Cesaro (which had 

nearly the same bundle of things to 

recommend it) would bring the Allies 

entirely too close to the southern portion 

of the Etna line. Cesaro had to be given 

up after, not before, Adrano, to allow the 

German center to evacuate along two 

roads to Messina instead of only one. In 

other words, the loss of Traina would 

mean that the entire Etna line would become a dangerous liability. 

The terrain canalized the 1st Division's 

advance, and Troina was an effective 

blocking point. The road itself came 

under interdiction possibilities at Cerami. 

Just south of Cerami, a high hill (Hill 
328 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

1030), and just beyond that the Cerami 

River, afforded cover for an assembly 

area, and a stream-bed approach to the 

southeast of Troina-the so-called Gagliano 

salient. These features in the approaches 

to Troina weakened somewhat the all 

around defense capabilities. 

Unlike most other towns in Sicily, Cerami 

has wide streets. Through traffic would not 

be a great problem, and a few blown 

houses would not become an effective barrier. But as the highway comes in from 

the southwest, crosses the south end of 

town, then turns north, the exposed road 

emerges into point-blank range for any 

artillery in or south of Troina. Beyond 

Cerami, the highway bears east for a mile 

and a half before making a reverse loop 

which is a pocket. Sheltered from artillery 

positions on Monte Acuto by Hill 1234 on 

the north and from Troina by Hills 1140 

and 106 I on the east, the road pocket 

around a small valley head was in complete defilade; high-angle fire alone could 

reach it. But the mountain streams that 

run through the pocket make steep gulches, 

and two blown bridges in the loop would 

add considerably to the 1st Division's engineering problems. 

Beyond the face of Hill 1030, Troina 

looks down the throat of any force approaching from the west. Two and a 

half miles of the road were completely 

dominated by positions in Troina and 

on the north extension of the Troina ridge. 

Besides controlling the highway, positions in Troina also covered the hill noses 

west of the town. Any approach to 

Troina by troops north of the road must 

come down these noses, and artillery fire 

from across the small valley between them 

and Troina could literally slap an advance 

in the face. The major hill noses are 

those of Hills 106 I and 1035, which could 

be fired upon also from Monte Acuto. 

The south and southwest faces of Hill 1061 

were defiladed from fire from Monte 

Acuto; but Hill 1035 (Monte Basilio), an 

extension of the Acuto ridge, was vulnerable to enfilade on both faces. Thus, an 

advance on Troina in the terrain north of 

the highway would be caught between 

two fires. 

The Monte Acuto position, almost a 

mile high, marked one of the strong features of the German line. It dominated 

the lower ridges and ridge noses toward 

T roina. It covered the valley and the 

entire Troina front; the highway for some 

distance west of Troina, and east of the 

town as far as the Troina River crossing; 

the front of the positions south of Troina 

along the Gagliano road; and its own 

approaches: west from Capizzi, and southwest around the flank of Hill 1254 towards Ceran:i. Only from the north, 

where the ground ascended to Monte 

Pelato, was the Monte Acuto position 

vulnerable, but only if the defenders could 

not hold the higher points. 

Troina proper, a town of 12,000 people, 

was itself a natural strongpoint, built 

on a bluff ridge, high and dominating. 

The highway did not go through the 

town; rather, it ran along the town's 

front, then turned left and crossed the 

ridge through a sort of pa&<;. This 

had several significant implications. First, 

Troina was not in itself a roadblock, but 

its high fortified position enabled it to 

control not only Highway 120, but also 

the road southeast to Adrano and a secondary road running southwest to Gagliano. 

Second, the highway swung around behind the ridge and was defiladed for some 

distance northeast toward Cesaro. This 

would make use of the highway possible 

even under attack from the west, and 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

make it available for a withdrawal from 

Troina should the situation become untenable. These advantages did not obtain 

against positions on the Troina ridge at 

Monte Basilio (Hill 1035) which, if taken, 

would threaten to cut off any forces in 

Troina from withdrawal to the east. 

Troina's streets were narrow with right 

angle turns. The main street made such 

a turn on the northeast face of a cliff. 

At the top of the town, two spires of a 

Norman church overlooked a small public 

square. At the cliff front a round feudal 

tower provided an ideal observation post. 

The streets, buildings, and massive stone 

houses made good holding places for infantry. Once beaten down from the front, 

the infantry could always crawl out the 

back way and down the road to Cesaro. 

The Troina ridge extended northeast 

beyond the town, covered the Cesaro road, 

and afforded excellent artillery emplacements. Shielding the town on the west 

was another ridge system, with key strongpoints both north and south of the highway, and there would occur some of the 

bitterest fighting in the battie for Troina, 

particularly at three key points: Hill 106 I, 

north of the highway; Hills 1006 and 

1034, south of the road. Below Hill 1034 

the same ridge turned to the east, so that 

south of Troina the town's defenses were 

at right angles to the positions north and 

west of the town. The south face held 

the key strongpoints of Hill 85 I, Monte 

Bianco, and Monte San Gregorio. Farther south lay the Gagliano salient: Gagliano, Monte Pellegrino, and Monte Salici, 

the latter two lying on high ground extending east across the Troina River. 

Gagliano was accessible by road from the 

south; it had few natural defenses and 

was too far from Troina to be held by a 

large force. An attacker could make use 

329 

of the lower half of the Gagliano-Troina 

road to help gain flanking approaches to 

the other two hills in the salient and to 

the key points on the ridge line south of 

Troina. A powerful strike here could 

crack the salient and turn up both flanks, 

or else force a rapid withdrawal from the 

Pellegrino positions north to the ridge. 

This would pose a serious threat to the 

left flank of the Troina positions, and like 

Monte Basilio north of the town, the occupation of Monte Pellegrino would put 

the attackers in position seriously to 

threaten the highway east of Troina, the 

only good route of withdrawal. 

Throughout the Troina area, the ground 

was rugged. Hill slopes rose abruptly, 

forming canyons rather than valleys, and 

usually separated by rocky streams only a 

few feet wide. The Americans would find 

these streams sown with mines. Soldiers 

would have to scramble over surfaces that 

would tax the agility of a mountain goat. 

They would find objectives as difficult to 

recognize as to reach, for the hills looked 

much alike, and a distingiIishing feature 

noted from one angle would tend to disappear when viewed from a different 

angle. The Troina area was a demolition engineer's dream. The smallest ravine was a deep gulch, and a destroyed 

road would require a bypass down a long 

descent. The terrain favored the first 

comer, especially the defender, and the 

Germans proved to be most adept in 

selecting and employing the terrain for 

defense. 

I st Division patrols, from both the 

16th and 18th RCT's, on 30 July had already probed the approaches to Cerami. 

Noting some artillery and much activity 

in the town, they made no attempt to 

enter it. A 39th Infantry attack was 

scheduled for the following day. This 
330 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

4TH TABOR OF GOUMS mOl'ing north of Highway 120 toward Capizzi, 30 July. 

unit, now under Col. H. A. Flint, had 

been attached to the 1St Division pending 

the arrival of the remainder of the 9th 

Division. 

North of Highway 120 the 4th Tabor 

of Goums, att<;\ched to the 18th Infantry, 

moved toward Capizzi on 30 July without incident until late in the day. Then 

small arms and mortar fire stopped the 

goums. Not until daylight, 31 July, and 

only after a heavy volume of covering 

artillery fire were the Gourniers able to enter Capizzi. An advance that afternoon of 

a mile and a half northeast of Capizzi to 

Hill 132 I (Monte Scimone) stirred up 

only' minor resistance. The Italian troops 

from the Aosta Division were falling back 

and in the process, though unknown to 

the Americans or Goumiers, were strengthening the right flank of the German defenses at Troina. 10 

South of the highway similar incidents 

occurred. A troop from the 9 I st Reconnaissance Squadron occupied Monte 

Femmina Morta (less than 1500 yards 

west of the German ridge positionsHills 1006 and 1034-west of Troina) 

on 30 July and gained contact with 16th 

Infantry patrols. Another troop of the 

reconnaissance squadron, furnishing right 

flank protection for the division, made 

10 Capt Verlet, CO 4th Tabor, Rpt of Opns, 

3 I Aug 43, KCRC X-I 5667; IT ggb ; Operazioni in Sicilia dal 1 al 17 agosto 1943, N arrativa, Allegati, IT ggc (cited hereafter as IT ggc) ; 

Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 249-5 I. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

contact with the Canadians in Agira, 

then moved northeast along the unimproved road toward Gagliano. Late in 

the afternoon, a huge crater just short of 

the village halted further progress. The 

enemy was nowhere in evidence. 

Not until the following morning, 3 I 

July, when the reconnaissance troop tried 

to repair the crater south of Gagliano did 

a detachment of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division put in an appearance and 

contest the road. And not until the next 

day, I August, after heavy supporting 

fires were laid on the enemy, did the reconnaissance troop enter Gagliano.l1 

Meanwhile, Colonel Flint's 39th Infantry on 30 July had passed through 

units of both the 16th and 18th Regiments 

immediately north and south of the highway and by evening was prepared to jump 

off at dawn to take Cerami, then continue to Troina. Both objectives seemed 

ready to fall, for prisoners' statements 

that day underscored the weakness of 

Troina's defenders. Air reconnaissance 

confirmed this impression, for pilots could 

find little evidence of strong defenses 

around the town. Only light traffic 

passed between Troina and Randazzo. 

Troina seemed to be just another place 

with a skeleton garrison to fight a brief 

delaying action before pulling out, even 

though one report indicated that "they 

seem to be right in there." 12 Consequently, General Allen late on the evening of 30 July planned to reinforce the 

39th Infantry's attack by committing 

the 26th Infantry through the 16th south 

11 9 1st Rcn Squad AAR. Sgt. Gerry H. Kisters, who knocked out two German machine gun 

positions though five times wounded, was later 

awarded the Medal of Honor. 

12 1st Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 19, 30 Jul 

43; 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entry 69, 30 Jul 43. 

331 

of the highway at darkness on 31 July 

for a direct thrust to Troina by daylight 

of I August. 13 This, Allen hoped, would 

coincide with the 39th Infantry's advance 

eastward from Cerami toward the northern edge of Troina. 

In support of the attack, General Andrus, the 1st Division's artillery commander, deployed an impressive array of 

supporting fires. Controlling the eight 

organic battalions of the 1st and 9th Divisions, plus almost the same number of 

artillery battalions attached from the II 

Corps, General Andrus had at his disposal 

165 artillery pieces. 14 

This massive artillery support actually 

did not appear to be needed, for when 

Flint's 39th Infantry jumped off toward 

Cerami at dawn on 31 July the troops 

met no opposition except that offered by 

the rough terrain north of the highway. 

By 0900 that morning a battalion was in 

Cerami. 

Though Allen had contemplated moving Bowen's 26th Infantry through the 

16th Infantry for a direct thrust to Troina, 

Flint's easy success made committment of 

the 26th seem unnecessary. Allen therefore instructed Flint to continue alone, his 

mISSIon to capture Troina and the high 

ground east of Troina astride Highway 

120.15 

Optimism was the order of the day 

when Generals Bradley and Allen visited 

Flint's command post early in the afternoon. They passed along a report from 

civilians who said the town contained 

only a few troops, some antitank guns, an 

antiaircraft battery, and one heavy gun. 

13 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entry 84, 30 Jul 43. 

14 1st Inf Div Arty AAR. 

15 1St Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 12, 14, and 24, 

31 Jul 43; 39th Inf Regt Jnl, entries 23 and 41, 

3 1 Jul 43. 
FORWARD OBSERVATION POST near Cerami. Artilleryfire is being directed on Troina, in the distance. 

ARTILLERY IN POSITION NEAR CERAMI. The 155-mm. rifle isfiring on Troina. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

They informed Flint that they had no 

specific deadline for his capture of Troina. 

They also suggested he use a trail along 

an aqueduct for his approach to the town 

while artillery worked over the reverse 

slopes of the hills shielding Troina.16 

Despite this optimism Flint's troops 

were already running into trouble. German mortar and artillery fire denied the 

Americans a direct approach to Troina. 

Covered by heavy concentrations of supporting artillery, the regiment advanced 

only with difficulty. By the end of the 

day one battalion had reached Monte 

Timponivoli (Hill 1209), about halfway 

to the objective north of the highway, and 

two hills south of the road on line with 

Monte Femmina Morta. 

Yet American optImIsm persisted. 

German prisoners emphasized "There is a 

pull-out now. Troina has a couple of 

guns in it." 17 General Allen still felt 

the 39th Infantry could take Troina alone, 

but he again turned to the idea of bringing up the 26th Infantry if it became 

necessary in the next few days.18 

For Flint's second day of attack on 

Troina, I August, the Tabor of Goums, 

released from attachment to the 18th 

Infantry and placed under division control, 

was to cover the 39th's left flank by moving eastward toward Monte Acuto, then 

southeast to Monte Basilio, and eventually 

past Troina and the highway east of town. 

Flint's scheme of maneuver envisioned Lt. 

Col. Van H. Bond's 3d Battalion making 

the main effort by following the general 

line of the highway to seize high ground 

adjacent to and north of the town. The 

other two battalions were to be echeloned 

16 39th Inf Regt Jnl, entries 43 and 44, 31 

Jul 43· 

17 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entry 45, 3 I Jul 43. 

18 Ibid., entry 36, 3 I Jul 43. 

333 

to the rear on both flanks, the one on the 

right operating as far as two miles south 

of the highway. 

Though the plan for the ground assault 

seemed to promise success, the artillery 

was unable to give the expected support 

because all the battalions could not be 

brought far enough forward in time for 

the attack. The road was in poor shape 

and clogged with traffic. The Luftwaffe 

(making one of its rare appearances) had 

strafed and bombed artillery positions 

and caused some confusion if not casualties. And German artillery was interdicting the routes of displacement.19 

Despite the absence of what was considered adequate artillery support, Flint 

decided to go ahead. Perhaps he had 

little choice in the matter. The remainder 

of the 9th Division was scheduled to 

unload in Palermo on I August and General Allen felt a moral obligation to capture Troina before turning over "a tight 

sector" to General Eddy.20 In any event, 

almost everybody expected Troina to fall 

easily. 

When Colonel Bond's 3d Battalion, 39th 

Infantry, jumped off at 0500, I August, 

the regiment was already halfway from 

Cerami to Troina: a scant four miles 

from the objective. Advancing southeast 

from Monte Timponivoli (Hill 1209) 

19 39th Inf Regt Scheme of Maneuver, I Aug 

43; Verlet Rpt of Opns, 4th Tabor; 1st Infantry 

Division G-3 Journal, entry 54, 31 July 1943 

states: "Tell 39th we can't give them all artillery they ask for." See also 39th Inf Regt Jnl, 

entries 47 and 57, 3 1 Jul 43· 

On 3 I July, for example, it took the 7th Field 

Artillery Battalion three hours to complete a 

seven and a half mile move to new positions 

southwest of Cerami. See 7th FA Bn AAR, 3 I 

Ju1 43· 

20 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entry 27, 2 August 43; 

see also Allen, 1St Inf Div Sit and Opns Rpt, 8 

Aug 42-7 Aug 43, p. 19. 
334 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

39TH INFANTRY HALF-TRACK squeezing through a narrow street in Cerami. 

north of Highway 120, Bond hoped to 

move as rapidly as the terrain permitted. 

He would have to cross a series of abrupt 

hills that paralleled the highway, but 

these constituted no ridge line in the real 

sense of the term. The 3d Battalion, 

though, would be advancing along hill 

noses west of Troina, noses covered by fire 

from Troina as well as from Monte Acuto. 

Colonel Bond was to be disappointed. 

His battalion immediately encountered 

mortar and small arms fire, and beyond 

one thousand yards from Monte Timponivoli the battalion could not advance. 

Artillery fire against suspected enemy 

positions having no effect on the intensity 

of the German reaction, Bond in midmorning pulled back to his line of departure. (Map 5) 

The withdrawal was fortunate. As a 

result, Bond was ready to meet and repel 

a relatively small German counterattack 

down the aqueduct trail from the north. 

With effective artillery support, Bond's 3d 

Battalion turned back the threat before 

noon. Yet continued mortar and machine 

gun fire from German positions east and 

north of Monte Timponivoli was in sufficient volume to negate hopes for any 

advance at all toward Troina. 
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THE CAPTURE OF TROINA 

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336 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Pessimism might have been warranted 

had not Group Ens' defenses south of the 

highway proved porous indeed compared 

to the defense put up thus far by Group 

Fullriede north of the road. Maj. Philip 

C. Tinley's 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, had 

its leading company three miles ahead of 

its line of departure and ensconced on Hill 

1034, a key spot on the important ridge 

position west of Troina, about the time 

that Bond was repelling the counterattack to the north. Because the company had met no opposition, Tinley 

reinforced it early in the afternoon with 

another rifle company. As the lead company dug in on Hill 1034, the company 

coming up behind rounded up thirty prisoners and entered the perimeter. Either 

the 1st Battalion had moved too rapidly 

or Group Ens did not yet have its defenses 

well organized. In any event, Colonel 

Ens began to prepare to retake the high 

ground, less than a mile west of Troina, 

and dislodge the Americans, who had a 

clear view not only of the streets of Troina 

but of artillery positions farther to the 

east. 

The contrasting fortunes of the battalions north and south of Highway 120 

gave General Allen no sure guidance on 

whether or not to commit the 26th Infantry to reinforce the 39th Infantry's 

attack. He first decided to act on the 

side of prudence and in midmorning ordered Colonel Bowen to pass his 26th 

Infantry around Flint's forces, to the 

north of the highway, instead of on the 

south side as originally planned. Operating north of the 39th Infantry positions, 

Colonel Bowen was to cut the highway 

about two miles beyond Troina by striking 

eastward, first to Monte Basilio, and then 

to a hill mass commanding the road. 

Now, too, the 16th Infantry was also to 

join the fight. Allen directed Colonel 

Taylor to attack on the 39th Infantry 

right, striking out from Monte Femmina 

Morta toward the south side of Troina 

and then on to Hill 1056, south of the 

highway and about a mile east of the town. 

By gaining Hill 1056, the 16th Infantry 

would cut the road leading from Troina 

to Adrano, one of the two exit roads from 

Troina available to the Germans. In effect, Allen was applying the same tactics 

used at Sperlinga and Nicosia the week 

before: a double envelopment of a strong, 

natural defensive position. General Andrus promised full support for the attack, 

scheduled to go off at 0500 on 2 August. 21 

Later, however as word of Tinley's 

encouraging progress south of the highway came into division headquarters, Allen began to reconsider. After Flint insisted that his 39th Infantry could do the 

job alone, Allen definitely made up his 

mind to let Flint have another try at 

Troina. Adding support to this decision 

was a conversation Allen had with General 

Bradley. The II Corps commander expected the 9th Division to relieve the 1st, 

not on 4 August as originally anticipated 

but a day or two later. Since the 

39th Infantry seemed to be moving, 

Bradley agreed that there was no reason 

for concern over the possibility that the 

arrival of Eddy's troops might interfere 

with Allen's attack~ Troina would surely 

be taken in ample time to allow the 1St 

Division to retire to Nicosia and cede the 

field of battle to the 9th.22 

But an hour later, near 1400, Allen 

again changed his mind. Now, though 

Flint's regiment was to continue making 

the division's main effort against Troina, 

21 1St Inf Div G-3, Jnl, entry 18, I Aug 43. 

22 Ibid., entries 3 I and 32, I Aug 43. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

the 26th Infantry was to come up on 

Flint's left to go for the hill mass which 

commanded the highway east of Troina. 

Taylor's 16th Infantry was not to be used 

on Flint's right, for it appeared that 

Tinley's 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, would 

be able to take the objective earlier contemplated for Taylor. 

As for Bowen, since Allen did not specify the strength Bowen was to employ, the 

26th Infantry commander proposed to use 

two battalions on Flint's left, as Allen 

had suggested earlier in the morning. The 

I st Division G-3, Lt. Col. Frederick W. 

Gibb, thought one battalion would be 

enough, since the Tabor of Goums would 

be operating on Bowen's left. Bowen 

finally decided to jump off in a column 

of battalions. To satisfy his request for 

all possible artillery assistance, General 

Allen gave him four batteries of I55-mm. 

guns (Long Toms), four battalions of light 

artillery, and one medium battalion for 

direct support. 23 Despite this help, Colonel Bowen was still worried over the 

scale of German resistance around Troina: 

"I think there is a hell of a lot of stuff 

there up near our objective," he said, 

"and down south also." All the information at Bowen's disposal pointed toward 

"a very strong defense," and he questioned 

whether "we have strength enough to do 

the job." Later, when the 2d Battalion, 

26th Infantry, was moving toward its 

line of departure, Bowen thought it was 

"moving right into the teeth of the enemy 

aI].d not around him." 24 

The 4th Tabor of Goums would have 

23 1St Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 37, 38, 40, 45, 

and 58, I Aug 43; 26th Inf Regt 8-1 Jnl, entries timed 1446, 1504, 1516, and 1532, I Aug 43. 

24 26th Inf Regt 8-1 Jnl, entries timed 2115 

and 2340, I Aug 43. 

337 

been in agreement with Colonel Bowen's 

estimate, for the Goumiers that day, trying 

to push from Monte Scimone to Monte 

Acuto, had advanced only a mile to the 

Troina River before being stopped by 

showers of mortar and artillery fire. Efforts to advance during the night and on 

the following day, 2 August, met with no 

success.25 

Meanwhile, Flint, on the afternoon of I 

August and with General Allen's permission, had been trying to take Troina alone. 

He ordered the 2d and 3d Battalions to 

launch a co-ordinated attack to the high 

ground north of Troina. But the push 

turned out to be a gentle shove that got 

nowhere. Enemy shelling was the obstacle. Adding to Flint's problems was 

a counterattack at nightfall directed by 

Group Ens against Tinley's 1st Battalion 

on Hill 1034, just west of Troina. The 

Germans "thumped hell out of A and C 

Companies." Strong German artillery 

and mortar fire accompanied the thrust 

by some two hundred men, which scattered the American companies badly. 

Hoping to use his reserve company positions-more than a mile to the rear-as 

a rallying point, Tinley asked permission 

to withdraw. Flint grudgingly assented. 

By midnight, Tinley had the battalion 

well in hand, though Company A had 

only two platoons left, Company C 

slightly less. The entire battalion numbered about 300 men, and the Germans 

were less than 2,000 yards from the 1st 

Battalion's positions. Ens had gained his 

objective, the important ridge line strongpoint at Hill 1034, but instead of exploiting this success, he set his troops to 

digging in along the ridge to block further 

25 Verlet Rpt of Opns, 4th Tabor. 
338 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

American attempts against Troina he expected from the west and south.26 

The third day of the action against 

Troina on 2 August again proved fruitless. The Goumiers on the division's left 

could not cross the Troina River and remained in place throughout the day. 

Flint's 39th Infantry was able to do no 

more, every attempt to advance meeting 

scorching enemy fires. Only in the terrain between the Goumiers and the 39th 

Infantry, where the 26th Infantry entered 

the battle, did the 1 st Division achieve 

any success, and this gain, a result of 

cautious advance, was only tentative III 

nature. 

Jumping off at 0500 that morning in 

a column of battalions, the 26th Infantry 

moved eastward slowly, hampered by the 

lack of success of the units on its flanks 

as well as by unsatisfactory communication 

with them. The leading battalion met 

little ground opposition, and though they 

received increasingly heavy enemy artillery 

fire as well as occasional small arms fire, 

the forward elements pushed ahead more 

than a half a mile to Rocca di Mania. 

With the regiment's flanks already exposed, 

further advance seemed not only risky but 

pointless. Bowen halted his troops and 

awaited the following day and the execution of a stronger attack which General Allen was even then planning and 

preparing. 

By this time, Allen was finally convinced 

that he had to make a large-scale and coordinated effort to smash the Troina 

defenses. His new plan involved employing additional forces in a frontal assault 

26 39th Inf Regt Jnl, entries 5 I and 53, I Aug 

43, and entry I, 2 Aug 43; 26th Inf Regt S-I 

Jnl, entries timed 0020, 0625, and 0847, 2 Aug 

43; 1st Inf Div G-3 Jnl, entries 73, 75, 76, and 

79, I Aug 43. 

which he hoped would develop in its 

later stages into a double envelopment.27 

He attached a battalion of the 18th Infantry to the 16th on the division's right 

for an attack from Gagliano to Monte 

Bianco, about two miles south of Troina, 

a key strongpoint on the German ridge 

defense line. The organic infantry battalions of the 16th Infantry were to take the 

town and cut the road to Adrano. The 

39th Infantry was to seize Monte San 

Silvestro, two miles northwest of Troina 

and then go into division reserve. The 

26th Infantry was to continue its encircling movement of Troina, swinging past the 

39th Infantry to take Monte Basilio and 

then moving southeast to cut the highway 

behind Troina. 

Though the main attack was scheduled 

to start at 0300, 3 August, the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, moved out shortly 

after midnight, leading the regiment in its 

swing to the south toward the southern 

corner of the German ridge pOSItIOns, 

where the ridge line swings in its arc to 

the east. The 3d Battalion followed. 

By dawn, the leading elements of the 

battalions were halfway up the slopes of 

the ridge, ready for the final assault. But 

as daylight came, German small arms and 

machine gun fire interfered. The men 

were pinned to the ground. Several attempts to get the assault moving failed, 

and by noon it was evident that the 16th 

Infantry could not move. 

Having reached that conclusion shortly 

before noon, General Allen ordered the 

battalion of the 18th Infantry attached 

to the 16th to push beyond its originally 

assigned objective and take high ground a 

half mile south of Troina. The 1St Battalion, 16th Infantry, was to assist. 

27 1st Inf Div FO 30, 2 Aug 43. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

The battalion from the 18th Infantry 

had been advancing from Gagliano without opposition, though hindered by terram. General Allen wanted the battalion 

to speed up its movement, for the two 

battalions of the 16th Infantry, pinned 

down on the ridge slope, appeared to be 

in a precarious position. What Allen 

wanted to do was divert German attention 

from the main body of the regiment. 28 

Before the battalions coming up from 

the south could start a real push, Group 

Ens mounted a counterattack around 

noon, using infantry and tanks in an 

attempt to throw the advance troops of 

the 16th Infantry off the slopes of the 

ridge. Responding to a request from 

Colonel Taylor, General Andrus put the 

fire of six battalions of artillery along the 

high ground. This, plus dogged fighting 

by the infantry, prevented the men from 

being overrun. 

Although stalled in this counterattack, 

Colonel Ens kept exerting pressure throughout the afternoon. The strongest effort 

occurred around 1500, when two hundred men came into such close contact 

with the American troops that artillery 

support could not be used. By the end 

of the day, Companies E and F, 16th 

Infantry, seemed to have little more than 

one platoon each remaining, with the 

others missing. Though the 3d Battalion, 

16th Infantry, was in better shape, it was 

in no condition to resume the attack. 29 

Nor could the two battalions on the 

south make much progress in driving 

toward Troina from Gagliano. German 

raids on both flanks and effective fire 

28 1st Inf Diy Ady G-3 Jnl, entries 9, 10, and 

II, 3 Aug 43. 

29 1st Inf Diy Ady G-3 Jnl, entry 45, 3 Aug 

43; 1st Inf Diy Arty Jnl, entry 99, 3 Aug 43· 

339 

stopped the push about halfway to 

Troina. 30 

Still hoping to keep the attack going on 

his right (south) flank, General Allen ordered one of the two battalions to make 

a wider swing to the east and attempt to 

outflank Troina completely. But a few 

minutes later, the assistant division commander, General Roosevelt, arrived in 

the area, took one look at the terrain to 

the east, and advised Allen against the 

move. The terrain, much of it sheer rock, 

and the condition of the units-badly 

scattered in the process of getting this 

far-seemed to rule out success.31 

Conditions north of the highway were 

hardly better. A battalion of the 26th 

Infantry reached its initial objective, 

Monte Basilio, with surprising ease, about 

the same time that a battalion of the 39th 

Infantry had, with the same facility, 

reached Monte San Silvestro. Yet soon 

after the leading troops of both regiments 

reached these hill masses, enemy artillery 

began to pound them. Observing that 

the fire was coming from reverse slope 

positions to the north and east, positions 

difficult to reach with artillery, Bowen 

called for an air strike. Some half a 

dozen Spitfires responded about I 100 

and bombed and strafed the north slopes 

of Monte Castagna and Monte Acuto. 

The enemy shelling lessened as a result. 32 

About the time that Bowen was getting 

his air strike, Flint called for another. 

He had learned that a road, not shown on 

available maps, ran generally east and 

northeast from Capizzi for some fifteen 

miles to link Monte Acuto, Monte Pelato, 

30 1st Inf Diy Ady G-3 Jnl, entry 41, 3 Aug 

43· 31 Ibid., entries 48 and 49, 3 Aug. 43. 

32 1st Inf Diy Rear G-3 Jnl, entry 43, 3 Aug 

43; 26th Inf Regt S-J Jnl, entry timed 1125, 

3 Aug 43· 
340 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

and Monte Camolato. Guessing that the 

Germans had concentrated their artillery 

along this road, Flint requested help from 

the air. Unfortunately, part of Bowen's 

forward units and the Goumiers were so 

close to the road that division headquarters 

disapproved the request. 33 

Part of the caution at division headquarters developed after the Spitfires 

which had responded to Bowen's call inadvertently strafed the Goumiers, though 

no serious harm had been done. The 

Goumiers were still immobilized at the 

Troina River under the shadow of Monte 

Acuto, still trying to get across the river 

and up on the high ground, still incurring 

heavy casualties in the process. 

Communication with the 4th Tabor was 

rarely as good as with American subordinate units, and for seven hours that 

day the division headquarters had no 

word from the Moroccans and consequently no clear knowledge of their 

location. This did not prevent three artillery battalions from delivering counterbattery fire most of the afternoon against 

reported enemy guns a hundred yards 

from where the Goumiers had last reported 

their positions. 

After dark, Capt. Guido Verlet was able 

to pull his Tabor of Goums back from the 

Troina River and out of enemy fire. 

Shortly thereafter Verlet himself was in 

Capizzi to plead for a half-hour artillery 

concentration on enemy positions two 

hundred yards east of where the 4th Tabor 

had spent the day. This, he was sure, 

would enable the Goumiers finally to take 

Monte Acuto. 34 Dubious, the artillery 

33 1St Inf Div Rear G-3 Jnl, entries 38 and 

47, 3 Aug 43; also see II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 

14· 34 Verlet Rpt of Opns, 4th Tabor; 1St Inf 

Div Rear G-3 Jnl, entries 46, 47, and 79, 3 Aug 

43· 

refused; friendly troops were too close, 

and their locations not altogether clear. 

Meanwhile, a battalion of the 26th Infantry had moved east early that morning 

with the purpose of coming abreast of 

the other two battalions of the regiment 

near Monte Basilio. The battalion became lost, wandered in the hills, and finally came to rest on Monte Stagliata, 

some two miles west of the other regimental elements on Rocca di Mania and 

Monte Castagna. 

This lost battalion could have been of 

use on Monte Basilio, which was struck 

in the early afternoon of 3 August, first 

by a heavy barrage of artillery fire, and 

then by Group Fullriede infantrymen. 

Stubborn defensive fires from the American riflemen and machine gunners, supported by effective artillery concentrations, 

repulsed the German effort to retake this 

key terrain feature. But Monte Basilio, 

vulnerable to enfilade fire on both faces, 

continued to take a pounding from Monte 

Acuto and from the Troina area. 

Although successful in its defensive 

stand, the battalion on Monte Basilio was 

in no condition to resume the 26th Infantry's attack to cut the highway east of 

Troina. During a lull that afternoon, 

when General Allen suggested that the 

39th Infantry might move its leading 

battalion forward about 800 yards to 

Monte di Celso, Flint agreed. "There is 

nobody there now," Flint said. "We 

can take it over if you want." 35 Yet 

when a company started to move toward 

the high ground shortly before dark, artillery and mortar fire heralded an infantry counterattack that scattered and 

disorganiz~d the American unit and drove 

35 1St Inf Div Adv G-3 Jnl, entry 52, 3 Aug 43. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

the riflemen back to the regimental 

positions. 

Actually, the Germans had telegraphed 

their intention, but the division headquarters had been asleep at the switch. 

About an hour and a half earlier, the 26th 

Infantry had become aware of German 

infiltration-troops "walking up the 

stream bed" -on its right flank. Colonel 

Bowen had reported this to division headquarters, but the Division's G-3 had apparently failed to pass the information 

on to Flint. 36 

Despite its failure to take Troina by 

the fourth day of the attack, the division 

had made some important gains. The 

16th and 39th Regiments, though temporarily disorganized by counterattacks, 

retained positlons seriously threatening 

the town. And Bowen's 26th Infantry on 

Monte Basilio could call interdictory fire 

on Highway 120 beyond Troina, thereby 

disrupting German communications. 

During the evening of 3 August, General Allen ordered renewal of the attack 

by the units already committed and with 

added strength from the south against 

the Gagliano salient. Instructing Colonel 

Smith to bring forward a second battalion of his 18th Infantry, General Allen 

gave Smith responsibility for a zone on the 

extreme right flank. Smith was to control 

not only two of his own organic battalions, 

but also the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

already in the area. By these means, 

Allen hoped to execute what would be in 

effect a pincers movement by the two 

regiments on the flanks: the 18th Infantry 

on the south, the 26th Infantry III the 

north, while the two regiments in the 

36 26th Inf Regt S-I Jnl, entry timed 1725, 

3 Aug 43; see also 39th Inf Regt Unit Jnl, entry 

30 , 3 Aug 43· 

341 

center, the 16th and 39th, exerted frontal 

pressure against the town. 37 

General Allen would have been even 

more hopeful of success had he known 

what effect the fighting of the past two 

days had had on the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. The German division had 

incurred heavy losses, at least 1,600 men. 

Furthermore, the XIV Panzer Corps had 

given General Rodt the last of its reserve 

units during the night of 3 August.3s 

General Hube, the XIV Panzer Corps 

commander, was not only watching the 

situation closely at Troina, he was also 

concerned with the sector immediately to 

the south where the Canadians were advancing along Highway 121. Early 30 

July, following a heavy artillery preparation, Canadian troops had struck hard in 

a move to jump the Dittaino River, clear 

Catenanuova, and present the newly arrived British 78th Division with a bridgehead for the attack toward Regalbuto on 

the left, Centuripe on the right. As both 

Canadian and British troops converged 

against Regalbuto and Centuripe, the 

former fell on the evening of 2 August, 

the latter the following morning. The 

two main outposts in the German defense 

of Adrano thus lay in Allied hands. 39 

If the British pressed beyond Regalbuto 

and cut the Troina-Adrano road, as Hube 

was sure they would, the German corps 

commander had to face the danger that 

the Canadians might turn north and cut 

Highway 120 east of Troina. In that 

37 1st Inf Div Adv G-3 Jnl, entry 55, Outline 

Plan, 3, 4 Aug 43, 3 Aug 43· 

38 MS #R-144, The Loss of the Etna, ch. 

XV of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, JulyAugust 1943 (Bauer), pp. 22-23; see also 1st 

Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 27 (app. A), 7 Aug 

43· 39 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 

139-57· 
342 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

case, withdrawal of Rodt's division would 

be imperativeY But as long as Rodt's 

troops retained their escape route to the 

east, there was no reason to give up the 

defenses at Troina that had proved so 

effective. Although the Allies were seriously threatening the Etna line by 4 August they had not yet cracked it. 

Hube's timetable for evacuating Sicily 

(although formal evacuation had not yet 

been ordered) hinged on holding the Etna 

line as long as possible, and this Hube 

was determined to do. As a result, Rodt's 

units dug in still more firmly around Troina for what they expected might 'be a 

last-ditch standY 

The Germans were surprisingly successful during the morning of 4 August, the 

fifth day of the battle for Troina. North 

of Highway 120, Group Fullriede was 

particularly aggressive in its defense. 

Counterattacks by infiltrating parties kept 

the Americans off balance and inflicted 

heavy casualties. South of the highway, 

Group Ens, perhaps not quite so aggressive in launching counterattacks, remained 

firm in its defensive positions. By noon, 

it was evident that the 1st Division needed 

more assistance to get the attack moving. 

Help appeared from the skies. General 

Bradley had successfully solicited two 

large-scale air attacks, one scheduled 

around noon, the other at 1700, each by 

thirty-six P-51 planes. In addition, General Allen had obtained the promise of 

eight P-5 1 's to bomb and strafe Monte 

Acuto at 1445.42 

4°OB SUED, Meldungen, 0740, 5 Aug 43. 

41 MS #R-144 (Bauer), pp. 24-26, 

42 1St Inf Div Adv G-3 Jnl, entries 15, 16, 

28, and 29, 4 Aug 43, The aircraft were dispatched from the 27th and 86th Fighter-Bomber 

Groups, See Attack Order 22, 3d Air Defense 

Wing, 4 Aug 43. 

The planes turned out to be A-36's 

(modified P-5 1 's), but this made little 

difference. Throughout a good part of 

the afternoon, as artillery added its weight, 

American aircraft plastered Troina and 

the surrounding hills, though Monte 

Acuto escaped-the pilots failed to identify that target. Reactions from the 

ground units were uniformly enthusiastic: 

"Air and artillery bombardment lovely." 

"The enemy is completely unnerved." 

"Have captured a few Germans and they 

are jittery, and they seem to be attempting to give themselves up." "It took a 

lot of pressure off our troops." 43 

Though all four of General Allen's regiments moved rapidly during the afternoon 

of 4 August to take advantage of the 

demoralization of German troops, the 

benefit proved to be only temporary. 

The American units could register only 

slight gains before meeting fire and counterattacks. One battalion of the 18th 

Infantry managed to dislodge the Germans from the base of Monte Pellegrino (a key strongpoint in the Gagliano 

salient positions) before setting up its own 

perimeter for the night; but try as it might, 

the battalion could not dislodge the Germans from the rest of the hill. North of 

Highway 120, two battalions from the 

39th Infantry moved quickly down the 

slopes of Monte San Silvestro and against 

4:1 1st Inf Div Adv G-3 Jnl, entries 4 1, 45, 

46, and 47, 4 Aug 43. The Canadians at Regalbuto were not happy with the air strikes. American planes had flown over Regalbuto the day 

before and dropped several bombs. And on 4 

August two flights discharged their loads on the 

Canadians. When American aircraft bombed 

Regalbuto again on the following day, General 

Leese, the British 30 Corps commander, asked 

General Bradley to call a halt. The bombings 

of Canadian troops at Regalbuto came to an 

end. II Corps G-3 Jnl, entry 278, 6 Aug 43; 

see also Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 152. 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

some ineffectual fire reached Monte San 

Mercurio, about a mile northwest of 

Troina. The 26th Infantry finally cleared 

Rocca di Mania, more than two miles 

northwest of Troina, but when the men on 

Monte Basilio tried to move eastward, 

they ran into Group Fullriede's last reserve, but a force strong enough to make 

the Americans retire to their mountain 

position. 

The best gain had been made in the 

south, where part of the 18th Infantry 

was getting into position to roll up the 

Gagliano salient and thrust an attack 

home against the southern approaches to 

Troina. This development seemed promising, all the more so since the Canadians, 

pressing on beyond Regalbuto, had that 

same day crossed the Troina River and 

taken firm possession of a stretch of the 

Troina-Adrano road. 

By this time, the remainder of Eddy's 

9th Division was coming into the Nicosia 

area preparatory to relieving the 1st DiVISIOn. General Bradley had instructed 

General Eddy to replace Allen's forces east 

of Troina 'so that the 9th DivisiOJiI could 

continue along the axis of Highway 120 

to break the next German defensive line, 

expected to be uncovered in the Cesaro 

area. Eager to enter the fray, yet denied 

maneuver room in the Troina area, Eddy, 

with his sights fixed on Cesaro, planned 

to commit Col. Frederick J. DeRohan's 

60th Infantry on the 1st Division left. 

With the Tabor of Goums attached, DeRohan was to make a difficult crosscountry advance generally eastward from 

Capizzi, across Monte Pelato and Camolato; he was to debouch from the hills on 

the north-south Sant' Agata-Cesaro road 

and be ready to attack Cesaro. By that 

time, Eddy hoped, the 1St Division would 

have cleaned up Troina so that he could 

343 

commit Col. George W. Smythe's 47th 

Infantry along Highway 120 for a direct 

advance on Cesaro. There the 47th Infantry could assist DeRohan's enveloping 

attack from the north. 

What Eddy envisioned was making a 

wide bypass of Troina on the north and 

striking quickly toward the next enemy 

defensive line. As an added dividend, 

DeRohan's movement, starting before the 

Germans had given up Troina, might 

prompt the Germans to loosen their hold 

on Traina in order to escape a trap at 

Cesaro. On the assumption that Allen 

would have Troina by nightfall on 5 

August (at the end of the sixth day of 

attack) and that the relief could be completed that night, General Bradley directed 

Eddy to start moving the 60th Infantry 

eastward from Capizzi on the morning of 

5 August. This would permit the 60th 

to work its way toward Cesaro while the 

1st Division and the attached 39th Infantry completed the reduction of 

Troina.H 

As the 60th Infantry, with the Goumiers 

attached, started its cross-country strike 

toward Cesaro on 5 August, the 1St Division resumed its attack against Troina. 

On the left, Bowen's 26th Infantry was 

unable to move forward because of rifle 

fire and artillery shelling. Twice Bowen 

asked for air support-once against Monte 

Acuto, the second time against "some 

guns which we cannot spot from the 

ground . . .. Make it urgent." 45 But 

the missions scheduled could not get off 

the ground because of fog at the airfields. 46 

The 26th Infantry, without gaining 

44 9th Inf Div AAR. 

45 1St Inf Div Adv G-s Jnl, entries 37 and 43, 

5 Aug 43· 

46 Ibid., entry 39, 5 Aug 43. 
344 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ground, sustained serious casualties. In 

the afternoon, after an estimated sixty 

Germans attacked Monte Basilio, only 

seventeen men from Company I could be 

located. The fighting had been hot and 

heavy. Pvt. James W. Reese, for example, had performed with exceptional 

heroism. Moving his mortar squad to a 

more effective position, he had maintained 

a steady fire on the attacking Germans. 

When they finally located his squad and 

placed fire against the mortar position, 

Reese sent his crew to the rear, picked up 

his weapon and three rounds of ammunition (all that was left), moved to a 

new position, and knocked out a German 

machine gun. Then picking up a rifle, 

Reese fought until killed by a heavy 

concentration of German fire. 47 

By late afternoon the 26th Infantry was 

in bad shape. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 

on Monte Basilio for almost three days, 

had been virtually cut off from supplies 

for much of the time and were running 

low on food and ammunition. Two aerial 

resupply missions, one by artillery observation planes on 5 August and one the following day by XII Air Support Command 

aircraft, failed to bring sufficient relief.48 

In contrast with the 26th Infantry, 

Flint's 39th Infantry made a solid gain. 

During the preceding night, two battalions 

worked their way east from Monte di 

Celso and Monte San Mercurio. Reaching a point about a mile due north of 

Troina, they turned southeast to cut the 

highway. When daylight came, the Germans spotted the movement. Accurate 

machine guns, small arms, and mortar fire 

in heavy volume stopped the American 

47 Ibid., entry 51, 5 Aug 43. Reese was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. 

48 26th Inf Regt S-I Jnl, entries timed 1622, 

5 Aug 43, and I3IO, 6 Aug 43. 

advance and sent the men of one rifle 

company back in disorganization. Using 

two tanks as roving artillery, the Germans pounded away at Flint's troops. At 

noon, Colonel Flint ordered his men to 

desist from further eastward advance. It 

would be enough, he instructed, if they 

dug in where they were and did no more 

than threaten the eastward exit from 

Troina. 

Late in the afternoon, eighteen A-36's 

in two groups bombed east and west of 

Troina. Flint, thinking this was the start 

of another air-artillery show (although he 

had not been informed that one was 

coming off), queried Colonel Gibb on 

this matter. Gibb laconically answered: 

"Bombing unscheduled." The division 

had no plans to exploit the unexpected 

appearance of the American fighterbombers. The 39th remained buttoned 

Up.49 

Similarly, Taylor's 16th Infantry spent 

the day trying to advance against the two 

key points on the ridge system west of 

Troina-Hills 1034 and 1006-but made 

no headway because it had to devote its 

major effort to warding off German counterattacks and digging in for cover against 

accurate German fire. 

South of Troina, where Smith's 18th 

Infantry tried to seize the dominating 

hills of the Gagliano salient as well as the 

two hills-Bianco and San Gregoriocloser to Troina, the Americans were no 

more successful. Heavy German fire, 

small counterattacks, and mine fields reduced American units in strength and 

prevented them from seizing the commanding ground. Rifle companies numbering 

49 1St Inf Div Adv G-3 Jnl, entries 15, 22, 

23, 45, and 54, 5 Aug 43; 39th Inf Regt Unit 

Jnl, entries 6, 8, 13, 15, 21, 26, 33, 36, and 39, 

5 Aug 43· 
TRE BATTLE OF TROINA 

sixty-five men became common. At the 

end of the day, Group Ens still held the 

vital heights. 

Despite his defensive success on 5 August, General Rodt knew that he could 

not hold out in Troina much longer. 

With his units badly depleted and his 

men near exhaustion, he had already requested-though it was disapprovedRube's permission to withdraw some 

5,000 yards to a new defensive line. 

Rodt's greatest concern was the threat 

that American units north of Troina, 

particularly the 26th Infantry on Monte 

Basilio, were exerting against Righway 

120 east of the town. Sensitive to the 

necessity of preventing the Americans from 

cutting his single escape route out of 

Troina, Rodt had made his strongest effort 

north of the highway where his troops 

had manhandled Bowen's and Flint's regiments. Though he felt he had the situation under control at Troina, Rodt had 

nothing substantial with which to contest 

the wider envelopment that DeRohan's 

60th Infantry represented. Also, he was 

concerned with maintaining contact on 

his left flank with the Hermann Goering 

Division, which was slowly being pushed 

back up against Mount Etna by the British 30 Corps. Only a slight penetration 

as yet existed on his left flank, but the 

absence of German reserves on the island 

made Rodt doubtful that the Germans 

could long contain the British threat. 

Because of the tense situation along the 

entire front late on 5 August-the greatly 

reduced combat efficiency of the 15th 

Panzer Grenadier Division, the over-all 

lack of German reserves, the danger of an 

Allied breakthrough of the Etna line in 

the Cesaro area, the possibility of Allied 

seaborne landings in his rear-Rube followed Rodt's suggestion and decided to 

345 

withdraw to a shorter line. This line, 

which Rube designated as the shorter 

bridgehead line ( Guzzoni called it the 

Tortorici line), extended from Giarre on 

the east coast over Mount Etna to Randazzo, Poggio del Moro, and on to the 

north coast at Cape Orlando. Ordering 

his divisions to make a fighting withdrawal on successive phase lines, Rube 

hoped to gain a week in pulling back to 

the new line. If he could have his troops 

in this new position by the morning of I 2 

August, he would be more than satisfied. 50 

Guzzoni, still nominally in command of 

the Axis forces on Sicily (though he had 

surrendered most of his prerogatives on 

25 July), protested Rube's decision to 

start withdrawing from the Etna line on 

5 August. Guzzoni thought the movement premature, particularly since the 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division still held 

firmly in the northern sector near San 

Fratello. But over Guzzoni's protests, 

Rube st'lrted to withdraw his forces in 

the eastern and central sectors of the 

front during the night of 5 August. In 

fact, on the east coast, the Hermann Goering Division began withdrawing from 

Catania during the evening of 4 August, 

leaving only a rear guard to contest British entry the following morning. The 

500B SUED, Meldungen, 0815, 6 Aug 43; 

MS #R-144 (Bauer), pp. 26-29. There seems 

to be an error in the OB SUED entry which 

designates the highway from Troina to Nicosia 

instead of from Troina to Cesaro. The description of the new line varies greatly in different 

sources. It was merely a line drawn across the 

map, and was in no way reconnoitered or fortified. Its eastern hinge is shown anywhere from 

2,000 yards north of Acireale to just south of 

Giarre; its northern hinge from 6,000 yards east 

of Sant' Agata to Cape Orlando, and as far west 

as Station Zappulla, with the Zappulla River in 

between. In this narrative, the general description Giarre-Mount Etna-Cape Orlando will be 

used. 
346 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

GENERALS HUEBNER AND ALLEN, 8 August. 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division was to 

hold until forced to withdraw by pressure. 

At the conference with Guzzoni on 5 

August, the Germans urged the Sixth 

Army commander to transfer his headquarters to the Italian mainland. Suspecting that the Germans requested this 

because they wanted a completely free 

hand in Sicily, Guzzoni asked whether 

the Germans intended to withdraw even 

beyond the Messina Strait. Though the 

Germans emphaticaIly denied this, Guzzoni remained on Sicily five more days. 

Not until Comando Supremo charged 

him with the defense of a part of Calabria did Guzzoni evacuate his headquarters to the mainland. G1 

At Troina, with permission at last to 

withdraw, Rodt started to puIl out his 

01 Faldella, La sbarca, pp. 259-62, 269-70. 

troops late in the evening of 5 August. 

Leaving behind rear guards to delay the 

Americans, he moved his forces east along 

Highway 120 to Cesaro. By nightfaIl of 

6 August, Rodt's men occupied a defensive 

line just west of Cesaro, and most of his 

heavy equipment was already on its way to 

Messina for evacuation from Sicily. 52 

The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 

did not slip away from Troina without 

detection. American patrols late on 5 

August reported Monte Acuto abandoned, 

German fires slackening, and even some 

positions no longer held. One patrol 

managed to reach the crest of Monte 

PeIlegrino, earlier firmly defended, without opposition. 

Despite the signs of German withdrawal, General Allen had had enough 

experience at Troina to be wary. He 

made elaborate preparations for the renewal of the attack on 6 August, the 

seventh day of his effort to take the town. 

Planners outlined harassing and preparatory fire missions in great detail. Staff 

members requested at least seventy-two 

A-36's to bomb the last half-mile of the 

highway east of Troina and to strafe the 

road as far east as Randazzo. Yet AlIen 

withheld the hour of the attack until 

noon, presumably on the basis that if the 

Germans were going, it was better to let 

them go. For the subordinate units, the 

missions remained much the same as they 

had been for the past two days. A 

fifteen-minute artillery concentration was 

to precede the attack. 53 

AIl this proved . unnecessary. By dawn 

of 6 August it was clear that the Germans 

were gone. Soon after 0800, 16th In52 OB SUED, Meldungen, 0735, 7 Aug 43 and 

0030, 9 Aug 43· 

5 3 1st Inf Div Adv G-3 Jnl, entries 55, 56, 57, 

58, and 59, 5 Aug 43· 
THE BATTLE OF TROINA 

fantry patrols were in Troina and meeting 

only sporadic rifle fire that was easily 

silenced. 

Troina itself was in ruins. Only several hundred inhabitants remained to 

welcome the Americans, most of the others 

having fled to the hills. One hundred and 

fifty dead-civilians as well as German 

and Italian soldiers-lay in the highway, 

in the streets, in demolished houses, in 

the round feudal tower that had been 

used as a German observation post. Plaster dust and the stench of death filled the 

aIr. Rubble completely blocked one 

street. The water mains were broken. 

The main street, where it made the rightangle turn on the northeast face of the 

cliff, was completely blown away. A 200-

pound aerial bomb lay unexploded in the 

center of the church. 

That afternoon, General Allen relinquished his zone to General Eddy, and 

the 47th Infantry passed around Troina 

on its way to Cesaro. 

General Allen also relinquished command of the I st Division. He and the 

assistant division commander, General 

Roosevelt, turned the division over to 

Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner and Col. 

Willard G. Wyman. General Allen would 

return to the United States to take command of another division, the lo4th Infantry Division, which he would lead 

with distinction in northwest Europe; 

General Roosevelt, after serving as Fifth 

Army liaison officer to the commander of 

347 

the French Expeditionary Forces in Italy, 

would earn a Medal of Honor during the 

Normandy invasion of 1944 as assistant 

division commander of the 4th Infantry 

Division.54 

The end of the battle for Troina may 

well have seemed to the 1st Division commander and his assistant like a most unsatisfactory time to turn over the command 

of "The Big Red One" to General Huebner. For it had taken the 1st Division, 

reinforced with an additional regiment, a 

solid week to reduce defenses that had 

originally seemed easy enough to crack 

with a single regiment. In the proce&<;, 

the division was depleted in strength, reduced to weariness. Perhaps some of this 

depletion, some of this weariness, could 

have been avoided had the intelligence 

estimates of the last few days in July not 

been so inaccurate. Perhaps more could 

have been avoided had General Allen, 

after the failure of the 39th Infantry to 

take Troina on I August, committed 

more of the division's strength, instead of 

waiting for two more days to do so. 

Evaluation of the division's performance 

in the fighting at Troina might also involve an answer to the question: did the 

expected relief by Eddy's incoming 9th 

Division contribute to the initial optimism 

and a possible desire to spare the troops? 

54 See AFHQ Msgs, 28 and 29 Jul 43, in Smith 

Papers, box 4; Butcher, My Three Years With 

Eisenhower, p. 376; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 

p. I56. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

Breaking the San Fratello Line 

On the same day (31 July) that Colonel 

Flint's 39th Infantry opened the battle for 

Troina, Truscott's 3d Infantry Division 

arrived at Santo Stefano di Camastra to 

take the place of the 45th Division on the 

II Corps northern axis of advance. 

Like Allen, Truscott faced difficult terrain and a stubborn enemy. From Licata 

to Palermo, the 3d Division had operated 

generally in terrain where it had space 

for maneuver, sufficient roads and trails to 

accommodate supporting artillery and supply trains, and alternative routes forward. 

Now all this changed. Highway 113, the 

coastal route, is a good, hard-surfaced 

road, capable of carrying two-way military 

traffic. As Sicilian roads go, it is not 

crooked. But it has numerous curves, 

ideal places for roadblocks. On the inland side of the highway there are few 

lateral roads except the four that cross the 

mountains-usually they dead-end in the 

mountainous interior at typical Sicilian 

ridge-end towns, medieval in origin, and 

built on sites chosen because they were 

almost inaccessible. Thus, General Truscott had a choice of making his main 

effort either along the highway or across 

the northern slopes of the Caronie Mountains to outflank German coastal defensive lines. Either way, the defenders 

possessed the advantage: they could deny 

use of the highway by fire, by demolitions, 

and by liberal use of mines; they could 

delay inland movement by plotting 

defense pOSItIons along the several welldefined ridge lines which lie behind deepcut mountain streams. Faced with this 

choice, Truscott decided that the 3d Division would make its major effort through 

the mountains while units along the road 

would keep constant pressure on the enemy. To supply and to communicate 

with the units operating in the mountains, 

Truscott organized a Provisional Pack 

Train (mules) and a Provisional Mounted 

Troop (horses) under the command of 

Maj. Robert W. Crandall, a former cavalryman who had served under Truscott 

before the war. Some of the animals had 

been brought with the division from North 

Africa; the others had been acquired 

during the preceding three weeks of campaigning. I Some had already seen action 

with the 179th Infantry the week before during that regiment's advance to 

Mistretta.2 

Despite the similarities of terrain and 

enemy, General Truscott had one trump 

card not available to General Allen. This 

was the possibility of amphibious landings-seaborne end runs. The enemy 

1 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 230. Before 

reaching Messina the 3d Division would use more 

than 400 mules and over 100 horses. 

"See Comments of Col. Robert B. Hutchins 

(Ret.) (former Commanding Officer, I79th Infan try) on MS. The I79th at first had considerable trouble with the Sicilian animals, but after 

some experimentation found the correct way of 

handling them. 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 349 

PROVISIONAL PACK TRAIN and mounted troops organized for 3d Division supply and communication 

in the Caronie Mountains. 

along the north coast, almost no I1).atter 

where he chose to make a stand, was vulnerable to this type of operation. As 

early as 30 July, Generals Patton and 

Bradley had taken note of this valuable 

military asset. In fact, they had considered an amphibious operation to assist 

the 45th Division in cracking the enemy's 

Santo Stefano position, but enemy withdrawal had canceled this plan. By 2 August, General Patton had definitely decided 

to utilize his "Navy"-Rear Adm. Lyal A. 

Davidson's Task Force 88- to assist the 

3d Division's advance. But Davidson 

had sufficient landing craft to lift one reinforced infantry battalion, no more. 

Accordingly, the Seventh Army selected 

four tentative landing places, each behind 

a predicted enemy defense line, where a 

battalion-size amphibious end run might 

be executed. At General Bradley's request, General Patton agreed to let the 

II Corps commander time any such operation so that an early link-up between the 

relatively small amphibious force and the 

main body of the 3d Division would be 

assured. Bradley apparently felt that the 

Seventh Army commander might be hasty 

and rash in deciding missions to be executed, and he wanted the II Corps, in 

co-ordination with Truscott, to exercise 

full control over the forces involved.s 

3 Seventh Army Ltr of Instr to CG II Corps, 

sub: Special Opns, 2 Aug 43, in Seventh Army 

Rpt of Opns, p. D- 1 5; see also Bradley, A S 01-

dier's Story, p. 157, and Truscott, Command 

Missions, p. 23 I. 

The four possible landing areas selected by the 

Seventh Army were: just east of Sant' Agata ; 

west of Brolo ; near Patti; and at Barcellona. 

Each of these areas was behind an anticipated 

German defense line. See map to accompany 2 

Aug Ltr of Instr, in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, 

p. D-16. 
ENEMY FIELD OF FIRE OVER F URJANO RIVER CROSSING SITE from San Fratello Ridge. 
LOOKING SOUTH OVER THE FURIANO RIVER VALLEY from the mouth of the Furiano River, San Fratello 

Ridge rising at the left. Railroad crossing can be seen in foreground, with highway crossing slightly above. 
352 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

For the first amphibious operations 

General Truscott selected Lt. Col. Lyle 

A. Bernard's 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry 

(which had been one of the assault battalions on 10 July), reinforced by Batteries A and B, 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, a platoon of medium 

tanks, and a platoon of combat engineers. 

The first mission of the task force was 

to plan a landing near the small town 

of Sant' Agata east of the Furiano River. 

Immediately beyond the Furiano River 

(fifteen miles east of Santo Stefano) lay 

the San Fratello ridge. If the Germans 

were going to fight anywhere on the 

north coast, Truscott judged that this 

would be the place. 

The switch of American divisions gave 

General Fries' 29th Panzer Grenadier Division ample time to retire along and near 

the coast to the Etna line, which ran 

roughly along the San Fratello-Cesaro 

road. The withdrawal was hampered, 

however, by heavy American artillery and 

naval gunfire and by repeated Allied air 

strikes. Naval gunfire bothered Fries' 

units most, as Admiral Davidson's warships busied themselves with numerous fire 

support missions along :.he coast from Santo 

Stefano eastward to Cape Orlando. To 

delay the 3d Division's advance to the new 

line, Fries deployed strong rear guards, 

units which included Italian troops. 

By morning of 3 August, Fries' outpost 

line had been driven in. The 15th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion under Maj. 

Frank J. Kobes, Jr., operating on the road, 

and the 3d Battalion under Lt. Col. Ashton Manhart paralleling the advance on 

the slopes of the mountains, hit the Furiano River during the afternoon. Here, 

the 2d Battalion came under heavy fire, 

found the river bank and all likely crossing sites heavily mined, and halted. 

Though Colonel Johnson, the regimental 

commander, sent his Ammunition and 

Pioneer Platoon and the Antitank Company's mine platoon forward to clear lanes, 

heavy fire from acro&<; the river put a stop 

to these efforts. It was obvious that a 

bridgehead would have to be established 

before the mines could be cleared. In 

preparation for seizing such a bridgehead 

the next morning, Johnson moved the 1st 

Battalion (Lt. Col. Leslie A. Prichard) 

up on line with, and inland from the 2d 

Battalion. Farther inland some three 

miles, the 3d Battalion had also arrived at 

the river, some two miles west of the town 

of San Fratello, after a slow and grueling 

march across deep gorges and over mountain trails so precipitous that several of the 

mules carrying rations and ammunition 

had lost their footing and tumbled to their 

deaths hundreds of feet below. 4 

At San Fratello, Fries had terrain 

scarcely less formidable than Rodt had at 

Troina, where, on this same day, the 15th 

Panzer Grenadier Division was throwing 

back every 1st Division thrust. Near it'> 

mouth the Furiano River is wider than 

most Sicilian rivers. Completely dominated by the ridge beyond, the river bed 

provided the Germans with a wide field 

of fire, as well as an ideal setting for liberal use of mines. The San Fratello ridge 

across the river has a seaward face about 

a mile and a half long, rising from a point 

six hundred yards from the beach and 

reaching a climax in the stony plug of 

Monte San Fratello, a rugged, flat-topped 

mountain some 2,200 feet high. The 

ridge then descends into a saddle to the 

town of San Fratello, a thousand yards 

farther south, before rising again into the 

Caronie Mountains. The road leading 

4 Taggart, ed., History of the Third Infantry 

Division, p. 65. 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 353 

southward to Cesaro, one of the four transverse roads across the mountains between 

Santo Stefano and Messina, twists and 

turns up the northeast angle of the 

ridge, and about halfway up turns west 

directly across the end of the ridge. It 

continues on this course for about a mile 

then turns south around the west face of 

Monte San Fratello against a sheer rock 

cliff, hairpins up the ridge crest, and then 

passes through the town. It is ahout 

eight miles by road from the coast to the 

town; it is another sixteen miles to Cesaro. 

Along the entire face of the San Fratello 

ridge, pillboxes, trenches and gun emplacements made things tough for the 3d 

Division. Particularly strong was a pillbox area near San Fratello, a strongpoint 

that extended along the road and up the 

mountainside against the cliff. Connected 

by trenches, these pillboxes blocked the 

approaches on the road from any direction 

and completely covered the Furiano River 

below. South of San Fratello, the ridge 

rises up as distinct as a camel's back and 

is covered with large boulders and rock 

fences. Not far west of the townwhere Manhart's 3d Battalion ended its 

march on 3 August in a state of exhaustion-the Nicoletta River comes into the 

Furiano River from a southwesterly direction. Between the two rivers, the Nicoletta 

ridge runs north and south along the approaches to the Furiano River. This high 

piece of ground, almost indispensable to 

an attacker before he could jump the 

Furiano River, was enfiladed from the 

north by Monte San Fratello, from the 

south by higher ground along the Cesaro 

road. 

Just west of the Furiano River, Highway I 13 passed southward around a 

prominent spur, about one-third the 

height of Monte San Fratello, and crossed 

the river on a high stone-arched bridge, 

now blown from end to end. From the 

bridge north to the sea, a distance of about 

a mile, the river bed widened out. From 

the high ground east of the river the defenders could observe the narrow coastal 

plain as far west as Caronia. This advantage the Germans put to good account, 

and in the days ahead accurate enemy 

artillery fire played havoc with any 

movement eastward along the highway. 

Inland, a flanking movement might be 

covered from the enemy's view, but the 

roughness of the terrain would make progress slow and co-ordination difficult. This 

was by far the toughest enemy position 

the 3d Division had as yet encountered 

in Sicily. Like M.iddleton's men on 

Bloody Ridge, Truscott's regiments were 

to learn to stay "with the damn fight till 

it's over." 5 

At 0600 on 4 August, after spending 

the night in developing the enemy's defenses along the river, the 1st and 2d 

Battalions, 15th Infantry, jumped off in 

the attack. A scheduled thirty-minute 

artillery barrage failed to come off because the supporting artillery battalions 

had displaced forward only during the 

night and had had no chance to register. 

On the left, Kobes' 2d Battalion tried 

first to cross the river to the left of the 

demolished highway bridge, between the 

bridge and the sea.. Within forty minutes the battalion was stopped cold by 

heavy enemy fire pouring down from 

the ridge, and by the dense mine fields in 

the river bed. For almost four hours the 

battalion tried to get across the open area. 

Every attempt failed. Even naval gunfire 

support and the smoking of Monte San 

Fratello did little to help. 

5 Infantry Combat, Part Five: Sicily, p. 30. 
HIGHWA y 113, shown running west along the north coast line to Cefalu from the juncture with the San FratelloCesaro road at lower left. 
LOOKI NG N ORTH OVER THE SAN FRATELLO-CESARO ROAD. Cesaro (lift center) and Highway 120 are at 

the southern terminus of the San Fratello road. 
SAN FRATELLO RIDGE from the highway. The town if San Fratello is at upper right. 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 357 

In the middle of the afternoon, Kobes 

changed the direction of his attack, lunged 

to the right of the bridge site, and sent 

two companies to attack Hill 17 I, just 

across the river and an apparent German 

strongpoint. All went well on the near 

bank. But when the two companies came 

into the open river bed, the Germans met 

them with a withering hail of machine 

gun and mortar fire. A few men of the 

forward platoons managed to get across 

the river to huddle under the steep river 

bank. At dark, Kobes called them back. 

Prichard's 1st Battalion suffered much the 

same fate; it too had been unable to get 

across the river. 

It had been a costly day for the 15th 

Infantry-I 03 casualties, no ground taken. 

But this action showed General Truscott 

that the San Fratello ridge was not to be 

taken by a frontal attack executed by only 

two infantry battalions, no matter how 

much fire support those battalions were 

gIven. 

The next day (5 August) turned out 

to be more a day of preparation than of 

progress. Truscott decided to shift the 

division's main effort to the right, through 

the mountains, to strike at the San Fratello ridge from the south and roll the 

defenders into the sea. Truscott ordered 

Colonel Rogers to take the two remaining battalions of his 30th Infantry to the 

area then occupied by the 3d Battalion, 

15th Infantry, west of San Fratello, to 

attack the next day with all three battalions to take the town and cut the road 

to Cesaro. At the same time, the two 

15th Infantry battalions near the coast 

were again to storm the west slope of 

Monte San Fratello.6 

6 3d Inf Div FO #20, 5 Aug 43. 

Across the river, however, General Fries 

was already taking steps to evacuate the 

San Fratello ridge. The withdrawal of 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division from 

Troina during the night had uncovered 

Fries' left flank. Farther south the British 78th Division was nearing Adrano, the 

key to the center of the Axis front, while 

on the east coast, the British 50th Division had entered Catania. The entire 

central and eastern sectors of the front 

were pulling back slowly in accordance 

with General Hube's decision to form a 

shorter defensive line nearer Messina. 

Though American units on the south had 

not yet reached the Cesaro road, General 

Fries feared that they would do so shortly, 

thus making an envelopment of his San 

Fratello positions possible. Too, ever 

since the commitment of his division on 

the north coast, Fries had been worried 

about the possibility of an Allied attack 

from the sea behind his main lines of resistance. He had tried to provide some 

safeguard against such an attack, but he 

could never spare more than one battalion for this purpose. It was a lengthy 

coast line with numerous suitable landing 

places, and Fries knew he could not guard 

them all. He had instructed all service 

troops and other units committed on or 

near the coast to guard against a surprise 

Allied landing, but even this measure afforded little real security; it only provided 

a watch at the most dangerous points. 

Because of the lack of adequate roads 

through the mountains, Fries' units south 

of San Fratello, as well as some of those 

in Rodt's sector, had to use the CesaroSan Fratello road to reach the coastal 

highway to withdraw to the east. Realizing this, Fries kept one reinforced battalion in the Monte San Fratello positions 

to hold until all troops and vehicles to 
358 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the south had passed around the mountain on their way to the east. He also 

deployed a reinforced Italian regiment 

from the Assietta Division to hold the 

ridge line south of the town. The remainder of the two divisions, less the artillery 

which stayed in position to cover the withdrawal, began moving eastward during 

the night. 7 

General Truscott had not fully appreciated the difficulty of the mountainous 

terrain over which the 30th Infantry 

would be operating. What was supposed 

to be a co-ordinated attack on the morning of 6 August turned into a series of 

un-co-ordinated battalion-size thrusts. 

At the highway bridge, following a halfhour artillery and smoke preparation, both 

Prichard's 1st Battalion and Kobes' 2d 

Battalion, 15th Infantry, jumped off at 

0600. The belts of German fire proved 

to be so effective that progress was limited 

to only a few yards. Prichard's battalion 

on the right managed to get across the 

river and to within a thousand yards of 

the Cesaro road. But this cost heavy 

casualties and by 1400 the battalion was 

barely hanging on. On the left, Kobes' 

battalion met much the same fate trying 

to take Hill 17 I. Company G, followed 

by Company F, crossed the river and went 

600 yards up the slopes of the hill before 

the Germans began firing automatic 

weapons, following this up with deadly 

accurate mortar fire. If the small arms 

fire lacked the intensity of previous days, 

the German mortar fire proved to be as 

effective as before. Company G stalled. 

A flanking maneuver by Company F 

offered more promise. Swinging around 

the stalled Company G, passing along the 

river bank for a short distance, Company 

7 MS #R-I44 (Bauer), pp. 49-53. 

F turned right and advanced up a draw 

toward a German outpost line. Though 

eventually spotted, the troops were close 

enough to leap into the German positions before heavy fire could be brought 

to bear. But even this success was not 

sufficient to drive the Germans from the 

crest of the hill. While reorganizing in a 

small grove of trees preparatory to going 

for the top, Company F was hit by a 

small counterattack supported by mortar fire. The last two company officers 

were hit, and though the company, under 

its noncommissioned officers, beat off the 

German threat, it could not get moving 

agam. 

Kobes, feeling that his two companies 

could not gain the hill, sent word for them 

to hold until nightfall, then to pull back 

across the river. Despite strong German 

combat patrols that ranged the slopes of 

the hill that night, Companies F and G, 

after several fire fights, recrossed the Furiano where the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 

had moved up to cover their withdrawal. 

Just a little earlier, the 1st Battalion had 

also recrossed the river. At a cost of 

thirty dead and seventy wounded, the 

15th Infantry had failed to gain any 

ground. 

While this action was taking place near 

the highway bridge, Colonel Rogers' attempt to roll up the German flank also 

bogged down. It had taken Colonel 

Rogers' two battalions until 2200 on 5 

August to get even as far as a forward 

assembly area, well to the west of the 

Nicoletta River. Colonel Manhart's 3d 

Battalion, 15th Infantry-attached to 

Colonel Rogers for this operation-had 

crossed the Nicoletta River earlier that 

evening and had gained a foothold on the 

Nicoletta ridge overlooking the Furiano 

River, a good position from which to start 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 359 

an assault on San Fratel10 at the prescribed 

time the following morning. Having 

gained this position, Manhart sent guides 

back to lead Colonel Rogers' two 30th 

Infantry battalions to the ridge. 

When the guides arrived, Lt. CoL Fred 

W. Sladen, Jr.'s 1St Battalion and Lt. 

CoL Edgar C. Doleman's 3d Battalion prepared to move forward. The early morning hours turned out to be nightmarish 

for both battalions. Leaving their assembly area at 0200, the battalions moved 

slowly through murky darkness preceded 

by Manhart's guides. Unfortunately, the 

guides had trouble picking their way 

through the woods and down the rocky 

ridges, and the 3d Battalion, leading the 

way, soon became badly strung out. Not 

until 0530 did the head of Doleman's 

battalion arrive at Manhart's positions on 

the Nicoletta ridge; it took another hour 

and a half (until 0700) for the rest of 

the battalion to come in. Sladen's 1st 

Battalion had even tougher going. Its 

guides lost their way, and the battalion 

wasted thirty minutes backtracking to the 

correct traiL After several more delays 

caused by the rough terrain and by the 

need to wait for the mule train to catch 

up, the head of the 1st Battalion finally 

arrived on the west slopes of the Nicoletta 

ridge-south of the other two battalions~ 

at 0630. But not until ogoo did Sladen 

have all of his men together. 

In the meantime, Manhart's battalion 

had jumped off at 0730. Despite heavy 

enemy fire, it reached and crossed the 

Furiano River, and began working its 

way up Hill 673, the key to the enemy's 

ridge positions on the south. It got only 

part way up the southern slopes of the 

hill before being stopped by enemy fire. 

As soon as Manhart's battalion cleared the 

ridge, Doleman began to move, echeloned 

to the right rear. But Doleman's battalion was delayed an hour when one company strayed off course and was punished 

severely by enfilading fire along the Nicoletta ridge. At ogoo, Doleman's battalion finally crossed the Nicoletta ridge and 

went down the eastern slopes toward the 

flver. Below the crest the going Wa"; 

easioc. A crossing was made and Doleman came up on line with the 15th 

Infantry battalion. Here it too was 

stopped by enemy fire. Though Manhart 

finally managed to get one platoon to the 

crest of the hill later in the afternoon, it 

was promptly forced back by the Italian 

and German defenders. At midnight, the 

two battalions still lay along the lower 

slopes of Hill 673. 

Sladen's 1St Battalion, 30th Infantry~ 

the farthest to the right of the three battalions-was out of touch with the other 

two American units for most of the day 

and had little idea of what was happening 

on its left. At 0930, Sladen finally was 

able to send his men up and across the 

Nicoletta ridge, two companies leading, 

two companies behind. But as with 

Doleman's one company, enfilading fire 

from Monte San Fratello and from positions south of the Nicoletta ridge played 

havoc with the companies. For almost an 

hour the battalion suffered under a rain 

of heavy explosives. Both leading companies became badly disorganized. Finally, one of the companies, plus about 

half of the other one-the rest of the 

unit had gone astray while moving through 

thick brush-reached the Furiano River. 

The depleted company never did get across 

because of heavy artillery fire and it remained for the rest of the day in a draw 

at the bottom of the ridge. The other 

company did get across the river at 1530, 

got to within six hundred yards of the 
360 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

crest of the ridge, but could progress no 

further. Since the company's effort was 

isolated, Sladen called the men back. 

Several hours before this, General Truscott, after touring the area in which the 

30th Infantry was operating and realizing 

just how difficult the terrain was, decided 

to outflank the San Fratello line by sea: 

to land Colonel Bernard's small task force 

behind the enemy's line in conjunction 

with a renewal of the division's attack 

the next morning.s Just after noon, 

Truscott ordered Bernard's force to an 

embarkation point a mile west of Santo 

Stefano. Unfortunately, the Luftwaffe 

picked this particular time to interfere 

with Truscott's operations. Even as Bernard marched his infantrymen, artillerymen, and engineers toward Santo Stefano, 

four German aircraft swooped out of the 

sky over Santo Stefano's beaches, bombing 

and strafing the loading area. Although 

two of the attackers were shot down by 

antiaircraft fire, one LST was badly damaged. Because this was a key landing 

vessel, General Truscott postponed the amphibious end run for twenty-four hours 

while the Navy brought up another LST 

from Palermo.9 

With the amphibious end run postponed for at least a day, General Truscott turned again to the job of keeping 

the pressure on the San Fratello defenders, 

hoping that the limited successes gained 

on the far right might be exploited. He 

sent General Eagles, the assistant division 

commander, to supervise the 30th In8 3d Inf Diy FO #21, 6 Aug 43. 

9 2d Bn, 30th Inf (while atchd to 3d Inf Diy) 

AAR, p. I; WNTF Action Rpt, p. 76; 30th Inf 

Regt AAR; ONI, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 106-

07; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. Ig8n; 

Truscott, Command Missions, p. 234. 

fantry's operations on that flank, and he 

ordered Colonel Sherman's 7th Infantry 

into position along the Furiano River 

near the coast to exploit any successes 

the 30th Infantry might gain.10 

Both Manhart's 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and Doleman's 3d Battalion, 30th 

Infantry, launched another attack on Hill 

673 early in the morning of 7 August. 

This time, Doleman's battalion made the 

main effort. Again there was difficulty in 

maintaining contact, and again units became disorganized. 

Using one platoon from Company I in 

the lead-the rest of the company had 

disappeared during the previous day's 

fighting-and pushing Company K after 

it, Doleman started his attack at 0530. 

Almost immediately the infantrymen received heavy fire. As daylight broke, 

Doleman could see that the face of the 

hill on which his two companies were 

trying to move forward was subject to 

enfilading fire from the south. This fire, 

combined with the defenses on the hill itself, made an advance to the top 

seem most unlikely. Doleman accordingly 

called off these two companies, started 

them back down the hill, and dispatched 

his last unit, Company L, to work up the 

hill farther to the west. But during the 

withdrawal, the two forward units became even more scattered, so that by 

the time they returned to their starting 

position, Doleman could count-in addition to Company L-only one platoon from 

Company K, one squad from Company 

I, and two platoons from Company M. 

Company L attacked up the west slopes 

of Hill 673 only a short distance before 

being halted by heavy enemy fire pouring 

10 3d Inf Diy FO #23, 6 Aug 43. 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 361 

down from the summit. Doleman left 

the company on the slopes while he tried 

to reorganize his battalion for another 

attack. 

Late in the afternoon, the two battalion commanders, Colonel Rogers, and 

General Eagles worked out a new plan for 

a co-ordinated attack on Hill 67g. Manhart agreed to turn over to Doleman his 

Company K and a mortar platoon, and 

to send his other two companies in on 

Doleman's left when the attack went off. 

Doleman was to make the main effort, 

this time just before total darkness set in. 

At I9go, the battalions jumped off, 

with Company L, goth Infantry, leading 

the way. Despite heavy enemy fire, the 

rifle companies moved slowly up the slopes, 

maintammg contact with each other, 

fighting a truly co-ordinated battle. The 

line that had held for so long began giving way and finally cracked. Just before 

midnight, Company L, goth Infantry, 

gained the crest of the hill, closely followed by the rifle companies of the 15th 

Infantry. Once on top, the Americans 

began digging in, as Doleman and Manhart pushed up their supporting heavy 

weapons companies to provide close fire 

support. 

This proved fortunate because the Italians and Germans, under a withering 

forty-five minute artillery barrage, moved 

back against the two depleted American 

battalions on Hill 673. For almost two 

hours, a savage, close-in, sometimes handto-hand battle raged across the top of the 

hill. Manhart and Doleman committed 

everything they had in the effort to hold 

on, even distributing machine gun ammunition to the riflemen to keep them 

firing. Grenades, bayonets, even rocks, 

played a part in the struggle. Finally, at 

0200 on 8 August, the enemy pulled away 

from the hill, going north toward the 

coast. 11 

To the south of Hill 673, an area from 

which enemy fire had plagued Doleman 

and Manhart all day, Sladen's 1st Battalion, goth Infantry, had tried hard to 

cover the other units by going for the high 

ground to knock out the enemy guns. 

The battalion's attempt was unsuccessful, 

as the men from the other two units 

could testify. It took Sladen's rifle companies until the middle of the afternoon 

to get organized, and even then Sladen 

could not find all of his small units. Except for a platoon from Company C that 

managed to get a short way beyond the 

river and annoy the Italians along the 

ridge-taking a beating for its painsand for another patrol that eventually contacted the units on Hill 673, the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, did little to assist in 

reducing the San Fratello positions. 

By this time, however, Colonel Bernard's small task force was nearing the 

beaches east of Sant' Agata. At noon, 7 

August, General Truscott, with General 

Bradley's approval, had decided to launch 

the once-postponed end run early on the 

morning of 8 August. Sherman's 7th 

Infantry was to penetrate the enemy's 

defenses on the coast to effect the link-up, 

which Truscott hoped would take place 

before noon. 12 

At 1700, then, Bernard's force again 

moved from its bivouac area to the beaches 

west of Santo Stefano. Another LST had 

arrived from Palermo. But again the 

Luftwaffe almost knocked out the operation. Just before the ground troops be11 War Department General Order 15, 5 February 1946, awarded the Distinguished Unit 

Citation to the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, for 

the period 3-8 August 1943. 

12 3d Inf Div FO #24, 7 Aug 43. 
362 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

MAP 6 

gan loading, Gennan aircraft dropped out 

of the clouds in a bombing and strafing 

attack aimed at the beached landing 

craft. This time the Luftwaffe did not 

succeed. Though an LST and an escort 

vessel were damaged, hurried repairs 

made the LST sufficiently seaworthy to 

go on with the operation. At 1940, the 

ten landing craft pulled away from the 

beaches as Admiral Davidson's two cruisers 

and six destroyers moved in to provide 

cover. 

At the San Fratello line, despite shell-

:3 D INFANTRY DIVISION 

e August 19 4 3 

o u.s. UNIT LOCATIONS. NIGHT . 7 AUG 

---+- U . S . AlelS OF ADVANCE . IroI ORN ING . a AUG 

TTTTTTTTT 2/30 PO SITIONS, 1230, e AUG 

::==> ENE"'''' WITHDRAWAL 

EI~vol ons In m~/~rs 

I 0 I WILES 

!, , ! ,',I['t(I\i',1 i ' I 0 I I 

ing from Davidson's warships during the 

day, General Fries' rear guards had begun 

pulling out of their positions, covered by 

the defenses on Hill 673. That evening, 

one of the warships laid a barrage on the 

highway bridge across the Rosmarino 

River, some two and a half miles east of 

Sant' -Agata, and set off demolitions which 

the Germans had placed to blow the bridge 

after passage of the last group of defenders 

from the San Fratello ridge. Since the 

river bed had already been heavily mined, 

the withdrawal of the rear guard units had 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 363 

to be halted until engineers could clear a 

route. (Map 6) 

By 0300, Gennan engineers completed 

the bypass across the river. The 2d Battalion, 71St Panzer Grenadier Ref'.iment, 

plus part of the Assietta Division's 29th 

Infantry Regiment (most of this regiment 

was left along the San Fratello ridge to 

delay American follow-up movements) 

started across the bypass. At this very 

moment, Bernard's infantrymen came 

across the beaches. 

According to General Truscott's concept of Bernard's operation, the amphibious force was to land near Terranova 

(east of the Rosmarino River), attack inland to seize Monte Barbuzzo (about a 

mile to the southwest), cut the coastal 

highway, and trap the defenders holding 

the San Fratello ridge. At 0 I 50, 8 August, the small naval force hove to off the 

coast, its presence undetected. Companies F and G, 30th Infantry (the first 

wave) and one tank platoon and an engineer platoon (the second wave) immediately began loading into LCVP's from the 

two LST's. At 0230, the two waves 

started their final run in from about six 

thousand yards out. The LST's and the 

one LCI (which carried Company E) 

followed to about 1,500 yards offshore, 

where the LST's launched sixteen Dukws 

loaded with Bernard's headquarters personnel and Company H. 

At 03 I 5, Companies F and G touched 

down and started inland toward the high 

ground less than a mile away. The other 

waves followed at fifteen-minute intervals, with all troops and vehicles unloaded 

by 04I5. 

Surprise was complete, but reaction 

was swift from the German battalions 

spread from the Rosmarino River all the 

way back to San Fratello. Company G 

on the right drew the first German fire 

just after crossing the railroad, some two 

hundred yards inland. A short while 

later, Company F jumped a small group 

of Germans drowsily awakening from a 

sound sleep. By 0430 the beach was secured, and the lead companies began 

moving inland for what they thought 

was Monte Barbuzzo. But Colonel Bernard now realized that his force had not 

landed where it was supposed to land. 

Rather than being east of the Rosmarino 

River near Terranova, he had been put 

ashore west of the river, nearer Sant' Agata, 

and he began to change his plans. Since 

his force could not get to Monte Barbuzzo before the 7th Infantry jumped off 

to link up, Bernard determined to occupy 

high ground on both sides of the river. 

This would give him good defensive terrain and would also provide cover for the 

oncoming 7th Infantry. 

At just about this time, however, the 

Germans launched their first counterattack. Part of the German battalion 

had already crossed to the east side of 

the river, but the elements in and near 

Sant' Agata, delayed by the demolished 

bridge, now found themselves between 

the 7th Infantry-which had jumped off 

at 0600-and Bernard's task force. Fighting in two directions, the Germans sent a 

small infantry detachment supported by 

two Italian Renault and two German 

Mark IV tanks to open a route to the 

east along the coastal highway. 

It was a short-lived effort. Bernard's 

armored field artillery batteries and the 

platoon of medium tanks took the German counterattack under fire and quickly 

destroyed both Italian and one of the 

German tanks. At this, the Germans 

pulled back into Sant' Agata. The American artillery pieces and the tanks moved 
SANT'AGATA FROM THE SEAWARD SIDE OF SAN FRATELLO RIDGE. 

coast past Sant'Agata (middle distance) to Cape d' Orlando (top center). 

The view follows Highway 113 along the 

The town of Acquedolci is at extreme left. 
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 365 

into position in a lemon grove north of 

the highway. From here they could cover 

the coastal road east and west. 

Meanwhile Company G, having finished off the small pocket of German resistance which had been opposing its 

advance, moved up to the highway. One 

platoon established a roadblock covering 

the eastern exits from Sant' Agata, another 

took up security positions around the artillery and tanks, while the remainder of 

the company established a block on the 

secondary road which winds inland to 

Militello. At the same time, Company F 

fanned out toward the Rosmarino River, 

crossed it without difficulty, and secured 

the high ground on the east bank blocking the highway and the trail which leads 

inland to San Marco d' Alunzio. Both of 

Company H's machine gun platoons went 

into position to cover Company F's right 

flank. 

Hardly had these dispositions been completed when the Germans, trying to find 

an inland route around Bernard's coastal 

positions, struck at Company F. One 

German group with two motorcycles, a 

vehicle loaded with cans of gasoline, and 

two troop carriers filled with soldiers, 

moved down the trail from San Marco. 

At the same time, another small column 

came down the coastal highway from the 

east. With Company H's machine guns 

sending out steady streams of flanking 

fire at both German columns, Company 

F held fast. The German gasoline vehicle 

was hit and burned; all other German 

vehicles were put out of action. Again 

the armored artillerymen came into action. 

This combination of American fires proved 

too much. As the German column on the 

coast road pulled back toward Terranova, 

a few Germans from the San Marco 

column managed to get past Company 

F's roadblock and to escape to the east. 

Bernard's third rifle company, Company E, met problems of a different nature. Late in receiving Bernard's change 

of plans, the company had moved inland 

from the beaches toward what the company commander mistook for Monte Barbuzzo. But in the rough terrain, the 

company broke in half. Two of the rifle 

platoons stayed with the company commander; the other rifle platoon and most 

of the weapons platoon went off to the 

south, still moving inland toward what 

the rifle platoon leader thought was his 

objective. The company commander then 

learned of Bernard's change of plans and 

he took his two rifle platoons to a position on Company F's right flank and 

helped that company fend off the German 

counterattacks. The rest of the company, 

which did not learn of the change in 

plans, continued up the river bed and 

finally turned east, well inland from the 

rest of the battalion. The men entered 

San Marco at I 130, passed through, and 

climbed up to a high ridge about a mile 

northeast of the town. This the platoon 

leader took to be Monte Barbuzzo, and 

dug in to hold on until the rest of the 

battalion arrived. 

At San Fratello, meanwhile, the thinning out of the German and Italian defenders made the task of clearing the ridge 

a relatively easy one for the 7th Infantry. 

By I 130, the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 

was in Sant' Agata after overcoming the 

remnants of the small force that had previously tried to break out of Bernard's 

trap. What was left of the 2d Battalion, 

7 ISt Panzer Grenadier Regiment, moved 

inland to circle past the American block 

east of town. At 1230, 7th Infantry 

patrols made contact with Bernard's Company G east of Sant' Agata. By this time, 
366 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

PLASMA BEING ADMINISTERED to a wounded soldier in a first-aid station in Sant'Agata. 

too, Colonel Rogers' 30th Infantry, with 

Manhart's battalion still attached, was in 

San Fratello and on Monte San Fratello. 

This day, the Italians did not seriously 

contest the American advance. Either 

because they knew they were being left behind by the Germans, or because they had 

fought themselves out, the Assietta men 

surrendered in droves, almost a thousand 

to Doleman's battalion alone. 

For Bernard's Companies E, F, and H, 

the fighting was not over, for they lay in 

the line of German withdrawal to the east. 

Concentrating on the hill mass in and 

near San Marco, the Germans, usually in 

small parties, pushed continuously at the 

three American companies, and at the 

two American platoons northeast of San 

Marco. Sometimes small enemy counterattacks came down the coastal highway 

from the east, in an evident attempt to 

co-ordinate attacks with withdrawals inland. Eventually, except for about one 

company and a few vehicles, the German 

battalion succeeded in making good its 

escape. 

Truscott's first amphibious end run, 

while achieving surprise, had failed to cut 

off the German 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division. Most of that division had already retired by the time Bernard's force 

landed. At best, the end run deprived 

the Germans of the use of the Rosmarino 

River as a defensive phase line. It prob-
BREAKING THE SAN FRATELLO LINE 367 

SAN MARCO D'ALUNZIO, with the mouth of the Rosmarino River at left center and with railroad 

bridge just visible. 

ably did encourage the Gennans to give 

up the San Fratello ridge a few hours 

earlier than they had intended. Even a 

landing on the correct beaches east of the 

Rosmarino River would have done little 

better. 13 

13 See 7th, 15th, and 30th Inf Regt AAR's; 

Opns Rpt, 2d Bn, 30th Inf Regt (while atchd 

to 3d Inf Div) AAR; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 234; Rupert Prohme, History of the 30th 

Late in the afternoon of 8 August, the 

7th Infantry closed up to the Rosmarino 

River. That evening it resumed the advance along the north coast road. 

Infantry Regiment in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 61-64; 

Taggart, ed., History of the Third Infantry Division, pp. 66-67; Morison, Sieily-SalernoAnzio, pp. 198-99; Heeresgruppe C, OB SUED, 

Ie, 18.V.43-30.IX'43, 8 Aug 43; OKH, Tagesmeldungen West, 8 and 9 Aug 43. 
CHAPTER XIX 

Evacuation 

The Tarvis Conference 

While the I talian emissaries, D' A jeta 

and Berio, were sounding out the Allies in 

Lisbon and Tangiers, Comando Supremo 

was continuing its wary co-operation with 

the Germans on the basis that its primary 

mission was to defend Italy against the 

Allies, the secondary one to guard against 

a German coup. Ambrosio and Castellano knew of the diplomatic missions to the 

Allies; Roatta, the Army chief of staff, 

knew nothing of this. 

German strategic planning at this time 

was quite fluid. On 5 August OKW 

canceled its plan drawn up for the rapid 

seizure of Rome and of the members of 

the Italian Government. By this time the 

Italians had assembled such forces around 

the capital as to make its capture appear 

more formidable than before. Furthermore, Skorzeny, busy with a variety of 

false leads provided by the Italian counterespionage service, had been unable to 

locate Mussolini. 

Kesselring had helped induce OKW to 

postpone its program of seizing Rome 

with the argument that he would, in that 

event, be forced to withdraw aU his units 

from Sicily and southern Italy. Believing 

that the Italian Government showed a 

genuine will to co-operate, and hoping 

that personnel losses could be restored and 

sufficient munitions supplied, he was sure 

that the Axis could hold Sicily for a relatively long period and thereby tie down 

eleven or twelve Allied divisions. 

The weakness of Kesselring's position 

lay in Calabria and southern Italy, where 

he had only alarm units (in the NaplesSalerno area) and the I 6th Panzer 

Division ( dispersed over the interior) . 

Because he could not guard Puglia and the 

west coast at the same time, Kesselring 

asked for reinforcement so that he might 

have at least one division for each of the 

three critical areas: Calabria, Puglia, and 

Naples-Salerno. 

JodI, chief of the OKW operations 

section, the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, held 

the opposite view. He argued that the 

Allies in Sicily were tying down German 

divisions. He feared that if the Allies 

were to land in force in Calabria, they 

would bag the entire XIV Panzer Corps in 

Sicily and be able to advance at will to 

the northern Apennines. JodI wanted an 

immediate withdrawal from Sicily and 

southern Italy. 

Hitler refused to send reinfmcements to 

southern Italy, but he could not make up 

his mind to withdraw from Sicily. Intent 

on finding and liberating Mussolini, he 

believed that the rescue would be such a 

shock to the "English" as to deter them 

from any further large-scale landings. Student's and Skorzeny's search for Mussolini 

therefore continued. And until they 

found Mussolini, the German commanders 

in Italy were to observe the appearance of 
EVACUATION 

good faith toward the Badoglio government. 1 

Just before the Tarvis conference scheduled for 6 August, the Germans considered asking for a greater share in the 

command of the Axis armed forces in the 

Mediterranean area. To this end they 

wanted a liaison staff attached directly to 

Comando Supremo or to the Army General Staff (Superesercito ) , a staff that 

would represent Kesselring's views on the 

use of forces in central and southern Italy. 

They also wanted a German Army headquarters to exercise command over all the 

German and Italian ground forces in 

northern Italy under the supreme command of the King. They thought of 

bringing up for discussion the matter of 

possible withdrawal from Sicily. But on 

the day before the conference, they decided not to mention the change of command or a withdrawal. 

The conference itself between German 

and Italian foreign ministers and chiefs of 

staff was marked by solemn statements by 

each group which it did not mean, and 

which the other group knew it did not 

mean. Despite Badoglio's intention, the 

conferees explored the means of continuing 

the war rather than the possibilities of 

achieving peace. The Italians, intent on 

keeping up the appearance of being a 

faithful ally and on maintaining the notion that German troops in Italy were 

under operational control of Comando 

Supremo, pressed for agreement on the 

movement of German reinforcements to 

the south and away from the capital and 

from the naval bases of La Spezia and 

Pol a (where the bulk of the Italian Fleet 

10KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VIII.43, 5 Aug 

43; situation appreciation by OB SUED of 4 Aug 

43 and comments by Chef WFSt, in MS #C093 (Warlimont), pp. 102-03. 

369 

was stationed). The Italians also hoped 

to reach agreement on withdrawing to the 

homeland the Italian divisions in southern 

France and the Balkans. Fundamentally, 

the Italians were stalling for time until 

they received word of the Allied reply to 

the overtures of D'Ajeta and Berio. 

Ribbentrop, Keitel, Guariglia, and Ambrosio met on the morning of 6 August. 

Guariglia declared the change of government in Italy to be purely an internal 

matter; Italy held to Badoglio's declaration 

that the war was to continue. Ambrosio 

complained that Germany appeared to 

place little faith in Italy's word; he was 

astonished at the numerous German divisions coming, in part, unannounced. 

Though southern Italy was threatened, 

Ambrosio said, ~he Germans were concentrating near Rome and in the north, 

creating the suspicion that the Germans 

had other intentions than the defense of 

Italy. Keitel said that questioning German good faith was quite unacceptable, 

and he expressed indignation that the ItalIans were not thankful for generous 

German aid. Ribbentrop asked directly 

whether Guariglia had had any conversation with the English or Americans. 

Guariglia replied in the negative, admitting, however, that he had spoken with 

the Turkish Foreign Minister. Ambrosio 

reaffirmed the intention of the Italians to 

march with all their strength by the side 

of the Germans. 

At the afternoon session, attended by 

Keitel, Rintelen, Warlimont, Ambrosio, 

Marras, and Rossi, Ambrosio suggested 

that Italian assurances regarding German 

divisions in transit to Italy were not final. 

Keitel insisted that the north would first 

have to be fully protected before German 

reinforcements could move to the south. 

Ambrosio stated his intention of withdraw-
370 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

AXIS SECOND ECHELON LEADERS meet in Tarvis, 6 August 1943. From left: General Keitel, 

German Foreign Minister Ribben trop, Interpreter Paul Schmidt, Italian Foreign Minister Raffaele 

Guariglia, General Ambrosio. 

ing the Italian Fourth Army from France 

and three divisions from the Balkans, and 

he expressed the hope that the Germans 

would provide for the protection of the 

areas vacated by the Italians. Keitel replied by saying a decision on this matter 

was beyond his authority, but he agreed 

to present the Italian proposal to Hitler. 

He recommended that the movement of 

German reinforcements to southern Italy, 

on which the Italians placed such emphasis, receive priority over the withdrawal of 

Italian troops from occupied territories. 

Except for an understanding that the 

German units in Sicily and southern Italy were to be brought to full strength and 

adequately supplied, no real agreement 

was reached at Tarvis. Pious declarations of alliance were exchanged. The 

Germans believed, or professed to believe, 

that the conferees were in accord that 

protection not only of the Brenner Pass 

but of all the Alpine passes into Italy had 

become a joint responsibility. The Ital-
EVACUATION 

ians understood that Jomt protection by 

ground forces applied to the Brenner Pass 

alone, the other passes remaining under 

Italian competence except for antiaircraft 

batteries.2 

The fundamental question of the command and distribution of forces was in no 

way resolved. The Italians, maintaining 

the sham that all German forces in Italy 

were under the Comando Supremo's operational control, complained that the 

German troops in the north behaved as 

though they were in an occupied country. 

When Ambrosio asked whether Kesselring 

commanded the new troops entering Italy 

from the north, Warlimont replied: "U p 

to now, yes. However, it will be necessary to establish a command over the 

German divisions in North Italy. Notification will be given at an appropriate 

time." Until the traffic crisis was overcome or dissipated, the Germans insisted 

on keeping their new forces concentrated 

in the north. The Italians had no chance 

to expound a plan of joint defense that 

would have left not a single German division in the Po valley. 3 

The conference had opened in an atmosphere of gravest mutual suspicion. 

It closed in the same spirit. Ribbentrop 

brought up the matter of a future meeting 

of Hitler with the King and Badoglio on 

German soil and suggested that the Heir 

Apparent also attend. Guariglia did not 

press the subject because he feared that 

the King might be seized and held in cus-

"See the contrasting minutes in OKW/WFSt, 

KTB, 1.-3 1. VIII·43, 6 August 1943, and Colloquio del giorno 6 agosto ore '530, pages 12-13, 

IT 3030. The minutes of the three sessions at 

Tarvis are printed, but not in full, in Hitler e 

Mu.\solini: Lettere e documenti, pages 190-209. 

3 See map, Comando Supremo, Ufficio Operazioni Esercito, Scacchiere occidentale, Progetto 

dislocazione grandi unitti italiane e germaniche 

per la difesa d'Italia, IT 3030. 

371 

tody or as a hostage. He had, in any 

case, already started on another course. 4 

Leonardo Vitetti complained that the 

trip to Tarvis was like Columbus' first 

voyage: he did not know where he was 

going and when he came back he did not 

know where he had been or what he had 

done." 

The Italian Dilemma 

With the Tarvis conference providing 

formal Italian concurrence for reinforcing 

the north, German troops continued to 

move into north Italy, General Gloria reporting on 7 August that approximately 

30,000 troops had crossed the Brenner 

Pass by that date. 6 OKW's policy in this 

respect, representing an uneasy day by day 

compromise between its own views and 

OB SUED's wishes, exploited the willingness of Comando Supremo to receive reinforcements. Although Hitler remained 

convinced that Italy was planning treason, 

although plans and preparations for seizing Italy were constantly reviewed and 

kept up to date, there existed a wide divergency in strategies to be followed in 

case of Italian betrayal or of Allied attack 

in southern Italy. 

Skeptical and pessimistic of German 

success, Rommel was disappointed in the 

number of forces actually assigned to his 

Army Group B (for the most part infan4 Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 628-29. 

r. Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 392-98 (Vitetti statement, p. 392). See also: Guariglia, 

Ricordi, pp. 613-30; Rintelen, Mussolini als 

Bundesgenosse, pp. 236-39; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), pp. 104-10; Rossi, Come arrivammo, 

pp. 95-98; Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, p. 

98; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, vol. II, pp. 59-

60; Castellano, Come firm ai, pp. 74-77. 

6 Telg, Comando XXXV Corpo d'Armata No. 

970/0P to Ministero della Guerra, 7 Aug 43, 

IT 102. 
372 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

try divisions). They were so meager in 

compaI'ison with the panzer army originally planned in June that he estimated 

he could defend northern Italy against 

Allied invasion only with Italian cooperation. To oppose an invasion without Italian support or while fighting the 

Italians would be, he felt, an impossible 

task. Unaware of how thoroughly the 

Italian officers hated him-he doubted, 

for example, that an announcement of his 

command would cause much reaction 

among the Italians-he wished to move his 

headquarters from Munich to northern 

Italy, hoping in that way to gain the cooperation and good will of the Italian 

generals.7 

Kesselring, who no doubt had little relish for the prospect of merging his command into Rommel's, continued to take an 

optimistic view. He and Rintelen, in 

agreement on the matter, made great efforts to prevent the harsh and suspicious 

attitude of OKW from completely alienating the Italians. 8 

The full scope of German intentionsto compel the Italian Government to continue the war whether it wished or not, 

to seize the Italian Fleet and capital, and 

to convert the Italian peninsula into a 

battlefield for the defense of Germanywas abundantly dear after the Tarvis conference. The German occupation of Italy, which had been Ambrosio's greatest 

fear since May, was rapidly becoming an 

accomplished fact. Though the Italian 

Government had formally accepted un70KW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-3 IYIII·43, 7 Aug 

43· 8 Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, p. 224; Rintelen 

in MS #T-la (Westphal el at.), ch. II, pp. 

22-23; Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, p. 

239; General der Panzertruppen Heinrich von 

Vietinghoff gen. Scheel in MS #T-Ia (Westphal 

et al.), ch. VI, p .. 8. 

wanted German reinforcements, and 

though the unwelcome guest<; were already 

in the house, Comando Supremo did not 

wish them to have the keys to all the 

rooms. Ambrosio therefore ordered certain troop movements to counteract the 

German strangle hold. He strengthened 

the forces guarding Rome and alerted 

them to take increased precautions against 

German moves. He had the I05th (Rovigo) Infantry Division and the 6th (Alpi 

Graje) Alpine Division moved from 

Turin, where they had been maintaining 

public order, to La Spezia, the main base 

of the Italian Fleet, from which the Germans were to be exc1uded.9 

In the Brenner Pass area, General 

Gloria's XXXV Corps had had only the 

2d (Tridentina) Alpine Division, a unit in 

the process of reconstitution after return 

from the Russian front. The 4th (Cuneense) Alpine Division, which also shared 

bitter memories of German behavior in the 

retreat from Stalingrad, had been moved to 

Cosenza (in Calabria) in July. Now, 

however, Ambrosio ordered that division 

moved northward up the whole length of 

the Italian peninsula to become part of 

Gloria's corps.1O 

On 8 August, in accordance with instructions, Gloria sent a note to General 

Feurstein. He stated that Roatta, the 

Army chief of staff, had directed the two 

Alpine divisions to take over the protection of the Brenner Pass in order to free 

the German 44th Infantry Division for 

further movement southward. German 

antiaircraft batteries were to remain, but 

under Gloria's command. Feurstein re9 Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. 97; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastro/e, voL II, p. 57. 

10 Comando Supremo, Operazioni Regio Esereito Quadro di battaglia alia data del 1 agosto 

1943, IT 10 a-h; Ambrosio's order of 2 Aug 43, 

Comando Supremo, No. 15492/Op., IT 102. 
EVACUATION 

plied firmly that the 44th Infantry Division 

would stay where it was and be wholly 

responsible for protecting the BrennerBolzano sector. Professing great indignation over the northward movement of 

Italian troops while German divisions were 

not only moving south to defend Italy 

against Allied invasion but also carrying 

the main burden of the campaign in Sicily, Kesselring submitted a formal note of 

protest to Ambrosio. He demanded the 

withdrawal of all the Italian troops that 

had moved into the Trentino after 5 

August. Otherwise, he threatened, responsibility for the consequences would 

fall upon the Italian GovernmentY 

Confirming all the points in the Tarvis 

agreement, Ambrosio nevertheless refused 

to suspend the movement of the Cuneense 

Alpine Division into the South Tyrol. It 

was to complete its mountain training, he 

said, before commitment against the Allies. An uneasy compromise resulted, as 

German and Italian troops continued to 

share the protection of the Brenner area. 12 

A new misunderstanding in the South 

Tyrol occurred on 9 August, when Feurstein notified Gloria of new troop movements and requested the plans and keys 

of installations suitable for accommodating 

the German units. Informed by Gloria 

and interpreting the request as a demand 

for the plans and keys of all the Italian 

fortifications in the Reschen and Sillian 

Passes, Roatta energetically protested to 

Kesselring th~ presumptious German behavidr. Kesselring notified OKW, which 

agreed to confirm all troop movements 

[t Memo of the German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces, No. 0717/43, 

8 Aug 43, IT 102. 

120KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-31.vIII.43, 7-8 Aug 

43; Min, 8 Aug 43, item 193, Min of Confs, 

Comando Supremo, IT 26. 

373 

with Comando Supremo through Kesselring, in accordance with the Tarvis conference. Yet OKW directed Army Group 

B to prepare to occupy the Tarvis Pass, 

the northeastern gateway into Italy from 

Ljubljana and from Villach-Klagenfurt. 13 

By this time, Comando Supremo had 

developed schizophrenic tendencies under 

the contradictory pressures of opposing 

the Allies in the south and the Germans 

in the north. In accordance with Ambrosio's order, Castellano on 9 August 

traveled to Monterotondo, just outside 

Rome, whither the Army staff was moving 

in anticipation of the proclamation of 

Rome's open city status, and directed 

Roatta to make certain troop dispositions 

in view of a probable conflict with the 

Germans. Roatta objected. The orders 

implied a change in policy, and Roatta did 

not wish to act unless the order for the 

change came from the King and Badoglio. 

Calling on Ambrosio that evening, Roatta 

urged him to take the matter to the King. 

At an audience with Victor Emmanuel III 

on 10 August, Ambrosio secured the 

King's approval of the proposed troop 

movements and informed Roatta, who 

issued a written directive to his subordinate 

commanders. 

The directive confirmed and elaborated 

the verbal orders Roatta had issued at the 

end of July. Italian forces were to react 

positively against German violence, safeguard command posts and assembly areas 

against German surprise attack, reinforce 

the protection of hydroelectric plants and 

other important installations, observe 

closely and report all German troop movements and all supporting actions by Fascists, plan and prepare for action against 

130KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-31.vIII.43, 8-9 Aug 

43; Cf. Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 273. 
374 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

such vital German installations as motor 

parks, mumtlOn depots, and airfields. 

Unless the Germans took the initiative and 

resorted to force, Italian units were to 

execute these plans only upon order from 

Roatta's headquarters. Like previous instructions of this nature issued by Roatta, 

these orders were defensive in nature. 

There was no anticipation of possible cooperation with the Allies against the Germans. Roatta still knew nothing of the 

missions of D' A jeta and Berio.14 

The Decision to Evacuate Sicily 

The Tarvis conference had not settled 

on a future course of action to be followed 

by the Axis armies in Sicily, for Sicily had 

been discussed only incidentally. Wanting to avoid a repetition of the Tunisian 

disaster and fearing that Hitler would 

delay a decision until too late, Kesselring 

took it upon himself to solve the problem. 

Kesselring had received the OKW order of 26 July to prepare for an eventual 

evacuation of the island. To prevent 

leakage of German plans to the Italians 

as directed by OKW, Kesselring had 

called a conference on 27 July to brief the 

German commanders on the planned conduct of future operations on the island. 

"If the Italians should leave the alliance 

with Germany," Kesselring said, "the XIV 

Panzer Corps will immediately disengage 

from the enemy and evacuate all troops 

from Sicily. Preparations for the evacuation will start right away in co-ordination 

between XIV and LXXVI Panzer Corps 

and other headquarters involved." Col. 

Bogislaw von Bonin, chief of staff of XIV 

14 Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 275, 287, 289-91; 

Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 200-201, 205; 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, pp. 56-57; MS 

#P-058, Project 46, I Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 7. 

Panzer Corps, who attended the meeting, 

informed General Hube when he returned 

the same day to Sicily. Hube directed 

Colonel Baade, the commandant of the 

Strait of Messina, and the German sea 

transport commander, Fregattenkapitaen 

Gustav von Liebenstein, to start preparations for the evacuation. Hube also authorized the withdrawal of the ground 

forces from Nicosia that evening and informed General Guzzoni the next day that 

German forces would no longer execute a 

stubborn defense of Sicily.15 

On 2 August Kesselring approved the 

detailed evacuation plan submitted to him 

by Colonel von Bonin, asking only to be 

notified before Hube implemented the 

plan. The next day he informed OKW 

that the evacuation plan was ready and 

that the transfer of troops and materiel to 

the Italian mainland could be made in 

five nights. 

The fall of San Fratello on 8 August 

coincided with several other notable events 

on Sicily. On that day, the 9th Division 

entered Cesaro; the British 78th Division 

seized Bronte; and the British 13 Corps 

on the east coast was eight miles beyond 

Catania striving to break the Hermann 

15 Since most of the German orders were given 

verbally during this period, only scanty documentarv evidence is available. A reeonstruction of 

the' transmittal of the order from OKW /WFSt 

to Hube on 27 July is based on: Instructions 

from OKW /WFSt on the future conduct of operations in Italy reached OB SUED on 26 and 

27 July 1943, as proven by two mentions~with 

hardly any details~in OB SUED, Meldungen, 

°725, 26 July 1943 and 2025, 27 July 1943; arrival of TWX with instructions from OKW/ 

WFSt early in the morning of 26 July 1943, 

Rintelen, M ussolini ats Bundesgenosse; Kesselring's conference on 27 July 1943 and his directive, LXXVI Panzer Corps, Anlagen, Io.VII.-30. 

VIII.43; Bonin's presence at the conference, OB 

SUED, Meldungen, 2025, 27 July 1943; LXXVI 

Panzer Corps, KTB, 22. VI.43-2.II.44, and Anlagen, 8 August and 10 August for 8 August 1943. 
EVACUATION 

Goering Division's hold on Highway 114. 

On that day, too, General von Senger 

visited Kesselring and reported the seriousness of the situation on Sicily. Kesselring 

then ordered Hube to go ahead with the 

evacuation. He did not directly inform 

Hitler or ask his approval. He depended 

on his chief of staff, General Westphal, to 

set matters straight with Comando Supremo. I6 When OKW on 9 August 

learned of Kesselring's order, Hitler accepted the decision as a fait accompli. 

General Warlimont, JodI's deputy chief, 

recalled after the war that the decision to 

evacuate Sicily was one of the instances 

where JodI "in his calm way ... succeeded in guiding Hitler to undesirable but 

necessary decisions .. " 17 

The decision could not be kept from 

General Guzzoni and his staff. Guzzoni 

accordingly examined the possibility of 

continuing to defend Sicily with Italian 

forces alone. He concluded that such a 

course of action was not feasible. The 

Italian forces on the island might delay 

the Allied occupation of all of Sicily by a 

few days, but only at the price of human 

sacrifice and loss of equipment out of proportion to any advantages that might be 

gained. He informed Comando Supremo 

of his views, and on 9 August Comando 

Supremo ordered Guzzoni to take over 

16 Colloquio Generale Westphal-Generale Rossi 

del giorno 9 agosto [943, ore [200, IT 104; 

SKL/l.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-3 1. VIII·43, 16 Aug 

43; Min of Confs in Rome, 1943, IT 26; Min, 

8 Aug 43 Item 193, Min of Confs, Comando Supremo, IT 26; MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.). 

17 SKL/l.Abt, KTB, Teil A, 1.-3 1. VIII.43, 

15 and 16 Aug 43 and one entry 20 Aug 43 

referring to 9 Aug 43; Warlimont in OI-II R/ 

22, Hq U.S. Forces European Theater, Mil Intel 

Center, German General Staff Series; Bonin in 

MS #T-2 (Fries et al.); Westphal's comments 

on the evacuation order as quoted by Fries in 

MS #T-2 (Fries et al.), p. 28; OKW/WFSt, 

KTB, 1.-31.VIII.43, 9 Aug 43. 

375 

the defense of part of Calabria and to 

start evacuating Italian forces from 

Sicily. IS 

With Kesselring finally glVlng the word 

to evacuate, Hube instructed Baade and 

the three German division commanders to 

prepare for final transfer of troops and 

equipment to Messina and across the 

Strait to the Italian mainland. I9 Late 

on the afternoon of 10 August, Hube 

issued the formal order for evacuation, 

designating the night of 1 1 August as the 

first of five nights for ferrying troops across 

the strait in Operation LEH RGANG. 

By this time, Baade had practically 

completed his preparations for receiving 

and transporting the troops and equipment 

from the front-line divisions. Within the 

large, oval-shaped area of his commandincluding the northeast tip of Sicily and 

an area directly across the Strait of Messina in Calabria-Baade exercised command not only over all German Army 

troops, but over the German antiaircraft 

installations and their personnel, even 

though the latter were administratively 

part of the German Second Air Fleet. 

To counter Allied air and naval supremacy, Baade had under his control 

about five hundred guns, a majority of 

them dual-purpose weapons. 20 In addi1 H Faldella, Lo sbarco, pp. 269; IT 99C, an. 

121. 

19 Baade Diary; LXXVI Panzer Corps, KTB 

and Anlagen, 8 and 10 Aug for 8 Aug 43. 

"0 It is difficult to determine just how many 

guns Baade controlled during the evacuation period. A report dated 14 August (Baade Diary, 

pages 119-20) shows 333 antiaircraft guns on 

hand that day. These were in addition to the 

coast defense guns, which were not dual-purpose 

weapons. Other reports (an undated map, probably late July, in Baade Diary; a map dated 

18 July 1943, part of collection Sizilien (I: 200,-

000), WFSt Op (H)) shows even more guns as 

being present. See also Roskill, The War at Sea, 

vol. III, pt. I, pp. 145-46. 
376 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tion, just before the evacuation started, 

the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division relinquished to Baade the two most powerful batteries on Sicily (1 1o-mm. guns with 

an effective range of over ten miles) for 

commitment as part of the coastal defenses on both sides of Villa San Giovanni 

(just across the strait from Messina). 21 

Thus, what many Allied officers had regarded a'S one of the most heavily defended 

areas in Europe during 1942 and early 

1943 had perhaps become the most heavily 

defended. One Allied officer was later to 

call the antiaircraft fire at Messina "the 

heaviest ever encountered in the Mediterranean-heavier than 'flak alley' between 

Bizerte and Tunis--greater than the inner 

artillery of London." 22 The single weakness in Baade's antiaircraft defense system 

was the limited range of his guns. A 

large number would not be able to reach 

high-flying Allied bombers, aircraft like 

the B-17, the B-24, and the British Wellington. This was one reason why Baade 

had taken over the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division's large weapons. If the 

Allied air forces attacked the strait using 

fighter, fighter-bomber, light and medium 

bomber aircraft, then the antiaircraft fire 

would be most effective. If the Allied 

air forces sent mainly high-flying heavy 

bombers, Baade's defenses would prove 

woefully inadequate. In the latter case 

the German infantrymen on Sicily would 

have to depend on the German Second 

Air Fleet to cover the withdrawal. But 

this was a task that the German air force 

in Italy could not possibly hope to perform, for the air force was decimated by 

the previous fighting, frustrated by Italian 

officials who demanded conformity with 

21 Baade Diary; Bonin in MS #T-2 (Fries 

et ai.); MS #C-077 (Rodt). 

22 Quoted in Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, p. 70. 

impossible regulations, and left with less 

than three hundred operational aircraft of 

all types. 

In addition to controlling the defenses 

of the Messina Strait area, Baade also coordinated the German naval ferrying service, although this function remained the 

direct responsibility of Captain Liebenstein, the Sea Transport Commander, 

Messina Strait. Liebenstein had command of three naval flotillas, an engineer 

landing battalion, two or three engineer 

fortification battalions, and two port 

maintenance companies. The flotillas 

had, by the end of July, 33 naval ferry 

barges (somewhat similar to American 

LCT's) , 12 Siebel ferries (I o-ton, flatbottomed, multipurpose supply and troop, 

carriers), 2 naval gun lighters, I I large 

engineer landing craft capable of transporting 2 trucks, and 76 motorboats designed to transport personnel only . .23 

At Hube's request, four of six ferrying 

routes developed by Liebenstein during 

the course of the campaign (with each 

route having several landing places on 

both coasts) were set aside to evacuate 

German troops, all starting from points 

north of Messina. A fifth route, south of 

Messina, was designated a spare route, to 

be used only in emergency. Routes I and 

2, near the northeastern tip of the island, 

Were reserved for the 15th and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions; Route 3, two 

miles north of Messina, was to be used by 

XIV Panzer Corps headquarters and 

headquarters troops; Route 4, a mile north 

of Messina, was set aside for the Hermann 

Goering Division and attached elements'of 

the ISt ,Parachute Division. Other German units were to adjust their movements 

23 For additional details, see MS #R-I46 

(Bauer), pp. 34-35; see also Roskill, The War 

at Sea, vol. III, pt. I, pp. '44-45. 
EVACUATION 377 

SMOKE PALL COVERS PORTIONS OF MESSINA after bombing attack by B-l7's. 

to those of the divisions and were to be 

evacuated on a space-available basis. 

Personnel were to cross the strait only during the hours of darkness; weapons and 

miscellaneous equipment were to be evacuated during both the day and the night 

and in line with a priority of antitank 

weapons first, then artillery pieces, then 

self-propelled weapons of all kinds, and, 

finally, trucks and motor vehicles. All 

materiel that could not be evacuated was 

to be destroyed.

2t 

On 10 August, the day Hube an24 LXXVI Panzer Corps, KTB and Anlagen, 

10 Aug 43. 

nounced the formal evacuation order, the 

German ferrying service was ready to 

transport about 8,000 men each night, 

with ferry barges, Siebel ferries, and engineer landing craft ready to go into action 

at each of the four designated ferrying 

sites. All that remained was for General 

Hube to get the right number of men to 

the proper embarkation points at the right 

time in order to make full use of the available shipping without creating bottlenecks. 

All troops at the front or in the rear 

areas had, by 10 August, received orders 

to move toward the ferrying routes. 

Generalleutnant Richard Heidrich, commander of the ISt Parachute Division, 
378 SICILY AND TRE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

drew the assignment of organizing the 

reception of the troops in Calabria. The 

Tortorici, or shorter, bridgehead line was 

to be held until 12 August, when Rube 

planned to begin moving the entire front 

back in three big strides, delaying at phase 

lines across the northeastern tip of the 

island. To prevent overcrowding on the 

north coast highway, Rube picked the 15th 

Panzer Grenadier Division to start moving through Randazzo toward ferry 

Routes I and 2 on 10 August so that its 

transfer to the Italian mainland could be 

completed by 15 August. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was to follow along 

the north coast. At the same time, the 

Hermann Goering Division, withdrawing 

around both sides of Mount Etna, was to 

fall back toward Route 4. Rube planned 

that each of the three major displacements 

to the rear would be made at night, and 

only on dates that he would specify. 

Upon arrival at each of the phase lines, 

the divisions would release up to two-thirds 

of the troops then on line and start them 

moving toward the embarkation points. 

Since each line was shorter than the preceding one, Rube felt this procedure was 

feasible and that it assured a steady stream 

of men to and across the strait.25 

For the Italians, who had started a 

limited evacuation on 3 August, official 

word to evacuate the island came from 

Comando Supremo on the 9th, when General Guzzoni was ordered to help defend 

Calabria. On the following day, after 

giving Rube command authority over all 

Italian and German units still in Sicily, 

Guzzoni and his Sixth Army headquarters 

moved across the strait.26 Like the Ger25 MS #C-on (Rodt); MS #T-2 (Fries et 

al.) ; Baade Diary. 

26 Faldella, Lo sbareo, pp. 269-70, 308; IT 

99C, an. 1 12 and 121. 

mans, the Italians organized four ferrying 

routes, two starting from Messina itself, 

the other two from points north of the 

city. Operating independently of' the 

German service, the Italian ferrying service consisted of one train ferry (capable 

of lifting 3,000 men at a time), two small 

steamboats, and four navy-manned motor 

rafts. Since the Italian vessels were not 

capable of lifting heavy equipment, General Rube offered to take over some of it, 

if space should become available on the 

German craft. 

Allied Reaction 

Allied commanders and Allied intelligence agencies seemed quite aware of the 

Axis intention to evacuate Sicily, although 

they refused to hazard a guess as to when 

this evacuation might begin. General 

Alexander, himself, as early as 3 August, 

felt that the Germans would start back 

across the strait at almost any time and he 

requested Admiral Cunningham and Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder to co-ordinate the 

Allied forces' naval and air efforts to prevent an enemy evacuation from the 

island.27 On 5 August, the Seventh 

Army G-2 announced that "in all probability evacuation is taking place. The 

entire operation from the enemy viewpoint, therefore, is to delay advance 

against time." 28 Two days later the 

same officer again indicated evacuation of 

German troops as the most likely enemy 

course of action, a report issued daily 

thereafter.29 From a British intelligence 

27 Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, p. 172; 

Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. III, pt. I, p. 146; 

Morison, Sicily-S alerno-A nzio, pp. 212- 1 3. 

28 Seventh Army G-2 Periodic Rpt 27, 5 Aug 

43· 29 Seventh Army G-2 Periodic Rpt 29, 7 Aug 

43· 
EVACUATION 

office on Sicily came the following statement on 9 August: "From now on it 

seems to be a question of who can walk 

back the fastest. The Germans are definitely getting out everything they can." 30 

While it appears that Allied commanders knew of the impending enemy evacuation, if not the exact date when the 

evacuation would start, it also appears that 

these same commanders had no over-all 

plan for thwarting such an operation. 

To General Alexander's query of 3 August 

requesting a co-ordination of the Allied 

air and naval efforts to prevent an enemy 

evacuation from Sicily, Admiral Cunningham replied that he was aware of the 

possibility of the enemy forces leaving Sicily, that he had small craft operating at 

night in the strait, but that he could not 

employ larger warships in the strait area 

until the air forces knocked out the enemy's strong coastal batteries. Cunningham promised that the activities of the 

small craft would be "intensified," and 

that once the air forces knocked out the 

coastal batteries he would send "surface 

forces to operate further in the straits." 31 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder agreed with 

Cunningham's proposal to knock out the 

coastal batteries, as well as with another 

proposal of Cunningham's to permit Allied air forces to operate without "let or 

hindrance" over the whole of the Messina 

Strait area, and he notified his American 

subordinate, General Spaatz (commander 

of the NAAF), to put the air forces to 

work immediately. Thus, Spaatz' two 

major combat air forces-NATAF and 

N ASAF -were committed to blocking 

Hube's evacuation. An order issued on 

2 August which had prohibited the use of 

30 Quoted in Tregaskis, Invasio-n Diary, p. 70. 

31 Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. III, pt. I, 

p. 146. 

379 

General Doolittle's NASAF heavy bombers against the strait was rescinded, with 

the provision that the heavies would not 

be used during the day except at Doolittle's discretion, and then only on a request from Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur 

Coningham (NATAF's commander) with 

a twelve-hour notice. General Doolittle's 

command was suffering from combat fatigue and it had been found necessary to 

decrease the frequency of NASAF's operations during the last week in July in 

order to give the combat air crews more 

rest. Too, N ASAF had many targets on 

the Italian mainland: airfields, lines of 

communications, marshaling yards, and 

rail and road bridges that had to be destroyed before the Allied invasion of the 

Italian mainland. Coningham felt that 

his N AT AF could handle any enemy evacuation that might take place during daylight hours, provided NASAF could 

handle the night hours. Thus, from 5 

to 9 August, although British medium 

Wellington bombers struck nightly at the 

beaches north of Messina, American B-17 

heavy bombers flew only three daylight 

missions against Messina. Despite this 

round-the-clock aerial bombardment, Air 

Vice Marshal Coningham felt that unless 

the Navy could provide a "positive physical barrier" at night across the strait 

NAAF could not prevent an enemy evacuation from Sicily.32 

Unfortunately, Admiral Cunningham, 

after giving "the matter very careful 

thought," concluded that regardless of the 

method used by the Allies, "sea or air," 

there was no "effective method" of stopping an enemy evacuation. Admiral 

Hewitt, the American naval commander, 

32 Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. III, pt. I, pp. 

147-48; Craven and Cate, eds., vol. II, Europe: 

TORCH to POINTBLANK, p. 472. 
380 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

agreed. Admiral McGrigor's small "Inshore Squadron," originally created to work 

with the British Eighth Army, was left 

on its own to do what it could to establish the "positive physical barrier" in the 

strait; no larger warships were ordered to 

help OUt.33 

From the point of view of the ground 

fighters, only two possibilities existed for 

getting sizable numbers of Allied ground 

forces into Messina before the enemy 

could evacuate: additional amphibious 

landings of the type conducted by the Seventh Army at San Fratello, and airborne 

drops designed to sever the last few remaining routes of enemy withdrawal to 

Messina. Both the Seventh and Eighth 

Armies, on 8 August, were still some distance from I\1essina-seventy-five and 

fifty-two miles, respectively-with little 

pos..'1ibility of moving any faster than they 

had during the preceding eight or nine 

da ys unless they sailed around or flew over 

the enemy's defensive lines. 

General Patton, pleased with the results of the II Corps first seaborne end run, 

kept Bernard's small task force intact, 

intending to use it again to expedite the 

Seventh Army advance along the north 

coast road. If such landings in the future 

could be made deeper in the enemy rear 

than at San Fratello, they might be able 

to cut off sizable numbers of German soldiers; they might even cut off the entire 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division. Patton 

also wanted to use an airborne drop to 

further speed up the Seventh Army advance, and he directed preparations aimed 

at using a parachute battalion, the 509th, 

to drop behind the German lines either in 

~3 Morison. Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 213. 

216; Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. In, pt. I. 

pp. 147. 149-,')0. 

conjunction with an amphibious landing 

or alone to cut off more German units. 

As of 8 August, General Montgomery 

still had indicated no desire to use any of 

Admiral McGrigor's Inshore Squadron to 

speed the Eighth Army's advance up the 

east coast, although McGrigor was ready 

and willing to undertake such an operation. In fact, McGrigor twice before had 

embarked a large Commando force (one 

had actually sailed) to land it behind the 

Germans' Catania defense line to cut the 

vital east coast highway. Both times Montgomery had canceled the operation. Four 

small British airborne missions designed to 

harass enemy communications and supply 

areas in northeastern Sicily had been tried; 

all had failed. Montgomery gave no hint 

of a desire to employ larger numbers 

of airborne troops to aid his army's 

advance.34 The Eighth Army commander apparently preferred to slog his 

way slowly around the Mount Etna massif, using much the same plan he had 

developed four days after the invasion.35 

With the Allied naval forces practically 

out of the picture, with the Allied ground 

forces miles away from Mes.."ina, the entire burden of stopping Hube's evacuation 

initially fell on the Allied air forces, who 

were not quite ready to assume the ta'lk. 

Instead of calling on Doolittle's NASAF 

to help out after 9 August, Air Vice Marshal Coningham relied almost exclusively 

on his NATAF to stop the evacuation. 

From 9 August on, the NATAF pilots 

tried desperately to halt the flow of traffic 

across the strait, but they found it difficult 

::-l These were the four so-called CHESTKUT 

missions. three consisting of two planes, the last 

of one aircraft_ 

35 Roskill. The War at Sea, vol. III, pt. L pp. 

142-43; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 

:206-07; Montgomery. Eighth Army, pp. IIQ-II. 
EVACUATION 

24 July - IO August 19 43 

FI F"TEENTH AG FRONT. EVEN ING, U JUL 

FIFTEENTH AG FRONT, EVENING. 10 AUG 

Q ENEMY UNIT LOCATIONS, 10 AUG 

~ ENEMY WITHDRAWAL PHASE LINES 

Form lintls only 

MAP 7 

to penetrate Baade's antiaircraft defenses. 

"M y squadron lost two out of twelve 

planes yesterday," said one American 

flyer. "And I lost two wing tips," reported another. "And I lost my tail 

wheel," said a third. "They put up a hell 

of a lot of flak," stated a fourth. 36 But 

on the same day ( I I August) that Rube 

started his evacuation, Coningham reported that should "withdrawal develop 

on a big scale . . . we can handle it with 

our own resources and naval assistance." 

3 f; Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, p. i I. 

381 

Re recommended that Doolittle's heavy 

bombers be released from their commitment to bomb Messina by day, if requested, 

but asked that the British Wellington 

bombers keep up their night strikes.37 

Despite Coningham's optimistic appraisal of the situation, it appeared that 

unless the ground troops could hurry their 

forward movement and exert sizable pressure on Rube's retiring divisions, it was 

unlikely that Allied air alone, with only 

~7 Roskill, The War at Sea, vol. III, pt. I , 

p. '49· 
382 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

limited naval support, could do much to 

stop Hube from getting most of his men 

and equipment off the island. 

The Evacuation Begins 

The three German divisions reached 

the Tortorici line by 10 August, pressed 

by the American and British forces only 

on the extreme eastern and northern 

wings. (Map 7) Still holding positions 

west of the northern hinge of that line, 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division tried 

to delay the 3d Division's advance forward 

of the Tortorici line for as long as possible, 

giving way only to extreme pressure and 

completing its withdrawal by 12 August. 

Here again, General Fries' division would 

occupy strong natural defensive positions, 

ideally suited to fighting a delaying action. 

Here again, the coastal anchor of the line 

had the same washboard ridges as the San 

Fratello line, and the Zappulla River 

crossings corresponded with those of the 

Furiano. Highway 116, running south 

across the Caronie Mountains from Cape 

Orlando through N aso and U cria to 

Randazzo (on Highway 120), runs over 

high and mountainous terrain like the San 

Fratello-Cesaro road. Roughly halfway 

between Cape Orlando and Randazzo, 

commanding terrain offered the Germans 

positions from which to cover the southern 

terminus of the northern portion of the 

Tortorici line. 

On 9 August, the 71 st Panzer Grenadier Regiment still occupied a salient 

extending westward of the Zappulla River. 

The regiment was under orders to hold 

until forced to withdraw. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment deployed west of 

Highway 116, south of Naso. Most of 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division's artillery battalions were in positions near the 

coast. The Italian elements, reduced to a 

handful of Assietta Division infantrymen 

and a few artillery pieces, were intermingled among the German units. 

South of the mountain chain, the remnants of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division slipped into place along Highway 

I 16 between Floresta and Randazzo. 

This was the division Hube had earmarked 

as the first to be evacuated from Sicily. 

Forward of this main battle line, General 

Rodt deployed strong rear guards astride 

Highway 120 to delay a quick American 

follow-up from Cesaro. He also resorted 

to extensive use of mines and demolitions, 

taking full advantage of the rough terrain, 

narrow road, numerous bridges, and difficult bypasses to aid the defense. 

From the German viewpoint, if the 

evacuation was to succeed, the advance of 

the Allied ground forces had to be slowed 

considerably. In particular, Rodt had to 

hold Randazzo-now threatened by both 

the 9th U.S. Division and the British 78th 

Division-until both his own and those 

elements from the Hermann Goering Division north of Mount Etna could withdraw through the only exit now available 

in the central sector of the Axis front. 

Randazzo was a prime target for the Allied air forces-at least for those air unit'> 

not committed to the Messina Strait area. 

A quick movement by the two Allied divisions into and through Randazzo would 

not only cut off portions of two German 

divisions, it would endanger the German 

units on both the northern and eastern 

coasts. 

Colonel Smythe's 47th Infantry, committed to taking Randazzo, retained positions around Cesaro during the night of 

8 August, despite Smythe's repeated urgings to his battalion commanders to move 

on to the high ground which overlooked 
RANDAZZO from the southern approach. Highway 116 is barely visible winding downfrom the mountains (beyond 

the steeple at left center). 
DESTROYED BRIDGE ALONG HIGHWAY 116 just north of Randazzo. Slope of Jvfount Etna can be seen in background. 
EVACUATION 

the Simeto River, about one-third of the 

way to Randazzo. Since the advance was 

to continue the following morning, Smythe 

wanted to be in position to jump across 

the river quickly. General Eddy, also 

concerned with getting to Randazzo as 

fast as possible, brought all but one battalion of DeRohan's 60th Infantry out of 

the mountains to follow Smythe's advance. 

This, Eddy felt, would strengthen the division's main effort; for the time being, 

he was content to give up the mountainscaling strategy to which the 60th Infantry 

had been committed since 6 August. 

Colonel Smythe's worries were justified 

when, after jumping off at 0600, 9 August, his battalions just barely got to the 

Simeto River's west bank where they were 

halted by heavy enemy fire. A try that 

night also failed to get them across the 

river. Although the regiment managed 

to clear the west bank of the river for some 

distance on 10 August and make contact 

with the British 78th Division off to the 

south, it could not cross the river. General Eddy thereupon sent the 60th Infantry back into the mountains to outflank 

Randazzo from the north, and brought up 

Flint's 39th Infantry (now almost fully 

recovered from the Troina battle) to resume the advance along Highway 120. 

At 0645, I I August, the 39th Infantry 

cros~ed the Simeto River without incident, continued to the east for another 

several miles, but at the Maletto road 

junction ran into an area where the 

ground was practically interdicted by German mines. Moving for the most part 

north of the highway, the 39th Infantry at 

midnight had two battalions just west of 

a long ridge about three miles west of 

Randazzo. Despite the almost total lack 

of opposition-there was only some artillery and small arms fire along the highway 

385 

during the day-the 39th Infantry had 

covered only three and a half miles, obvious testimony to the effectiveness of the 

German mines. 

Coupled with an equally slow advance 

by the British 78th Division, the ground 

movement was doing little to halt German 

evacuation. Not only was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division still holding the 

Randazzo escape route open, but General 

Rodt was even depleting his front-line 

units in accordance with Hube's withdrawal plan. Not all was going according to plan, however, for Rodt's unit'> 

found it increasingly difficult to pass 

through the Randazzo area because Allied 

air had destroyed two important highway 

bridges while other aircraft worked over 

the entire area almost incessantly. Randazzo itself quickly became one of the 

most heavily bombed targets in Sicily.38 

German troops began calling the highway 

through Randazzo the "death road." 

Despite these difficulties, German casualties were kept comparatively low by strict 

traffic discipline and by the fact that the 

German troops, through necessity, had 

long since learned how to take care of 

themselves during Allied air attacks.39 

Early on 12 August the 39th Infantry 

resumed its advance on Randazzo. On 

its right, and almost abreast of Flint's 

front lines, the British 78th Division attacked for Maletto. The British unit took 

its objective; Flint did not take his. General Rodt required only a few more hours 

of delay at Randazzo, and he picked out 

:I,' During the first thirteen days of August. 

Randazzo was hit by a total of 425 medium 

bomber, 249 light bomber, and 72 fighter-bomber 

sorties. See Craven and Cate, eds .. vol. II, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, p. 470. 

:lU MS #R-145, The Evacuation of Sicily, 

ch. XVI of Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, 

July-August 1943 (Bauer), p. 22. 
386 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

THE AMERICANS AND THE BRITISH MEET AT RANDAZZO, 13 August. From the lift: Col 

George A. Smith, Col. H. A. Flint, MaJ. Gen. Vyvyan Evelegh, and Brig. Gen. E. E. Casso 

the 39th Infantry as the Allied unit representing the most serious threat to the 

town. Accordingly, heavy fire was laid 

on the approaching Americans. 

In the meantime, DeRohan's 60th Infantry tried to make its presence felt. But 

the distance the regiment had to travel 

and the mountainous country through 

which it had to move precluded its having any real effect on the situation along 

the highway. The 2d Battalion, 60th 

Infantry, finally managed to make its way 

into Floresta (on the road north of Randazzo) early on 13 August, but the advance fell hours short of catching any of 

Rodt's troops. During the evening of 12 

August, Rodt had pulled his units out of 

Randazzo and Floresta, one group going 

back through Novara di Sicilia, the others 

north to and along Highway I 13, preceding the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. 

The closing scene of the Randazzo operation came early on 13 August. American patrols probed cautiously into the 

shattered town, followed by an infantry 

battalion. Just a short time later, the 

British 78th Division arrived on the scene. 

Like Troina, the capture of Randazzo was 

anticlimactic. Rodt had been able to 

make good his escape by excellent use of 
EVACUATION 

the terrain, liberal use of mines and demolitions, and by the almost complete absence 

of any Allied ground threat to his escape 

routes. 40 

The advances registered by the U.S. 

9th and British 78th Divisions, while slow, 

were faster than those made by units of 

the British Eighth Army on the eastern 

side of Mount Etna. Montgomery, still 

10 See 39th, 47th, and 60th Inf Regt AAR's, 

5-13 Aug 43; 9th Inf Div AAR. 

387 

ignoring Admiral McGrigor's Inshore 

Squadron as a possible means of speeding 

up his advance, even went so far as to try 

a two-division attack across the southern 

slopes of Mount Etna. The push was 

slow and costly and gained little ground. 

With every advantage of terrain, General 

Conrath, using the Hermann Goering DiVlSlOn, fought an almost leisurely withdrawal battle, fending off the British 

with a part of his force, sending the remainder to Messina to cross the strait. 
CHAPTER XX 

Braia 

Only along the north coast was the German withdrawal at any time seriously 

threatened. For that matter, the entire 

German northern and central sectors 

almost fell prey to another American amphibious end run, an operation that for a 

short time altered Hube's carefully conceived timetable for the evacuation of 

Sicily.l 

After relieving Colonel Bernard's battalion at the Rosmarino River on 8 August, 

1 The account of the battle at Brolo and along 

the N aso ridge line, unless otherwise noted, is 

based on the reports of operations and journals 

of the units involved; Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 234-40; Morison, Sieily-SalernoAnzio, pp. 203-05; Rpt, USS Philadelphia to 

CinC U.S. Fleet, 22 Aug 43, sub: Opns From 

IO to 18 Aug 43, in 6-1.1008/43; Maj. James 

L. Packman, The Operations of the 2d Battalion 

(Reinforced), 30th Infantry Regiment in the 

Amphibious Attack on Brolo, 11-12 August 

1943 (Fort Benning, Georgia, 1950); MS #R144 (Bauer), pp. 60-63; Taggart, ed., History of 

the Third Infantry Division, pp. 68-7 I; Prohme, 

History of the 30th Infantry Regiment, pp. 65-

70; White, From Fedala to Berehtesgaden, pp. 

34-37; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 158-59. 

See also, comments of Truscott and Bernard on 

this MS. 

The account of the Brolo landing from the 

enemy side is based principally on Fries in MS 

#T-2 (Fries et al.), supplemented and corrected 

by entries in OKH, Tagesmeldungen West; OB 

SUED, Meldungen; IT 99C; Faldella, Lo sbareo; 

and German and Italian maps for the days in 

question. 

The units participating in the amphibious 

landings as part of Bernard's task force were later 

awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation (WD 

GO 44, 30 May 44). Bernard was awarded the 

Silver Star. 

Colonel Sherman's 7th Infantry had 

pushed on east along Highway I 13 against 

steadily stiffening German resistance. By 

the evening of J 0 August, after being 

knocked back once, the 7th Infantry 

gained a foothold across the Zappulla 

River just south of the highway crossing. 

The opposing 7 ISt Panzer Grenadier Regiment pulled back up the slopes of the 

Naso ridge roughly in line with Cape 

Orlando. It had been unable to delay 

the 3d Division advance until 12 August, 

as originally contemplated. 

The new German defensive line looked 

as formidable as that at San Fratello, but 

Patton, Bradley, and Truscott were not disposed to pick at this line. Even as the 

7th Infantry fought to cross the Zappulla 

River, Truscott sent Johnson's 15th Infantry inland to cross the river south of 

Sherman in order to gain the ridge below 

Naso and roll up the German line. This 

was to be the division's main effort. General Patton, however, had another idea on 

how he could more quickly reduce the 

Naso ridge position. 

Wanting desperately to get to Messina 

ahead of the Eighth Army and "trying to 

win a horse race to the last big town," 2 

Patton called General Bradley to his command post on 10 August and ordered an 

amphibious end run for the next morning. 

The maneuver was to be similar to the 

"Semmes, Portrait of Patton, p. 167. 
BROLO 

one executed three days before. Patton 

had wanted to launch the operation on 

the morning of the loth in conjunction 

with the 15th Infantry's turning movement, but a Luftwaffe attack the evening 

before had sunk one of the LST's earmarked to lift the task force. This setback, 

together with the 7th Infantry's trouble at 

the Zappulla, induced the Seventh Army 

commander to call off the operation for 

twenty-four hours. 3 Now Patton was in 

no mood for another postponement, and 

he left no doubt in Bradley's mind of this 

fact. 

Patton was not the only American who 

was keen on beating Montgomery into 

Messina. Of late, several unfortunate remarks had allegedly been made by the 

British Broadcasting Corporation (the 

BBC ) -the going on the Seventh Army 

front had been so easy that the troops were 

eating grapes and swimming while the 

Eighth Army was fighting hard against 

strong German opposition. Because the 

BBC was the principal radio service heard 

by all the troops in Sicily, Americans were 

quite upset by the disparaging comments. 

Many an American, like Patton, wanted 

to get to Messina ahead of the British in 

order to give the lie to these remarks. 4 

Besides, the Seventh Army's capture of 

Palermo, its rapid and successful dash 

across western Sicily, and its entire conduct 

thus far in the campaign had whetted 

American appetites for the greater prize: 

to beat the proud and vaunted Eighth 

Army to Messina. The success of the 

Seventh Army had, for the first time, 

3 Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entries 83, 8 Aug 43 

and 68, 10 Aug 43. The LST sunk was the 

same one that had previously been damaged, but 

hOld nevertheless participated in the San FrateIJo 

landing. 

4 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

pp. 384, 388. 

389 

enabled Americans in the Mediterranean 

theater to hold their heads high among 

British and other Allied soldiers, who had 

been somewhat doubtful of the American 

soldier's ability after Kasserine. 

General Truscott, initially at least, 

agreed with the plan. He apparently felt 

that the flanking 15th Infantry could occupy the Naso ridge on the evening of 10 

August. This would put the 15th in 

position to link up quickly with the amphibious task force. 

But the 15th Infantry did not get to 

the N aso ridge on the loth. Although 

one battalion progressed as far as the little 

town of Mirto, overlooking the river, enemy fire from across the way forced a halt 

and delayed the arrival of the other two 

battalions. Not until 2 I 00 did the last 

of the battalions close in the new area. 

In addition, the lack of roads prevented 

artillery units from displacing forward to 

support a further advance. These factors, 

and the rough terrain, prevented any 

move by the 15th Infantry across the 

Zappulla River that evening. 

With things not working out as he had 

planned, Truscott wanted to postpone 

Bernard's landing for another twenty-four 

hours. When the Bernard task force had 

been established, General Keyes had assured Truscott that the force would be 

entirely under Truscott's command and 

that he would have the responsibility for 

the timing of any operation involving the 

force. A delay, Truscott believed, would 

permit both the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments to get into better positions from which to move forward to 

effect a quick link-up with the seaborne 

forces. As the situation on the evening 

of 10 August appeared to him, Truscott 

doubted that the two regiments could get 

through the Naso ridge positions fast 
390 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

PILLBOX OVERLOOKING HIGHWAY 113, east of the Zappulla River crossing. 

enough to save Bernard's small force from 

the expected German reaction. 

When General Keyes arrived at the 3d 

Division's command post that evening to 

see how the planning was coming along, 

Truscott informed the deputy commander 

of his desire to postpone the end run. 

Knowing full well Patton's intense feeling, 

Keyes replied that he doubted whether 

the army commander would agree to any 

postponement. Furthermore, Keyes said, 

Patton had arranged for a large number 

of correspondents to accompany Bernard's force, and Patton would not relish 

having to tell the writers that the end run 

had again been delayed. Patton wanted 

no unfavorable publicity for the Seventh 

Army. 

Nevertheless, Truscott picked up the 

telephone and called General Bradley. 

He explained the situation to the II Corps 

commander and his desire to postpone the 

landing. Bradley agreed, and tried to get 

Patton to agree. But his plea fell on deaf 

ears. Patton insisted that the landing 

proceed as scheduled. Shortly thereafter, 

Keyes called Patton and stated that Truscott did not want to carry out the landing. Truscott, called to the telephone, 

tried to explain his reasons for wanting 

to delay, but Patton was in no mood to 

listen. "Dammit," Patton said, "The operation will go on." In the face of this 

bald statement, what could Truscott do? 

He issued orders to Bernard to load his 

force for the landing. 

Link-up. This was what worried Truscott. How to effect a quick link-up be-
BROLO 391 

CAPE ORLANDO (extreme left center) with Naso ridge rising inland. The railway can be detected 

running along the coast line. Route 113 hugs the base of Naso ridge. 

came the major problem at the 3d 

Division's command post the evening of 10 

August. At the time Patton brusquely 

concluded his telephone conversation with 

Truscott, no 3d Division battalion was 

within ten miles of Bernard's objectiveMonte Cipolla, a steep hill about midway 

between the Naso and Brolo Rivers which 

dominated the coastal highway and the 

ground to the east and west. 5 The coastal 

highway constituted the 29th Panzer 

r. On the 1 ' 50,000 map this hill is shown as 

Monte Criole ; on the 1:100,000 map, as Monte 

Cipolla . In the unit After Action Reports, the 

term Monte Creole is used. For the purposes of 

this narrative, the designation as shown on the 

I ' 100,000 map is used. 

Grenadier Division's main escape route to 

the east, and Truscott knew that German 

reaction to Bernard's landing would be 

swift and heavy. Accordingly, the 3d 

Division commander committed every element in the division, including the recently 

attached 3d Ranger Battalion, to break 

through the N aso ridge line defenses. 

From left to right he deployed the remainder of the 30th Infantry, then the Rangers, 

then the 7th Infantry, and, finally, the 

15th Infantry. 

Even as General Truscott prepared his 

link-up plan, the bulk of the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division continued to hold its 

portion of the Tortorici line. Farther to 

the south, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Di-
BROLO BEAcH,jrom the east, showing the nose of Monte Cipolla. 
BROLO 

vision was holding the 9th Division at bay 

along the Simeto River, although it was 

then in the process of pulling back into 

Randazzo. 

Immediately in the rear of General 

Fries' main line of resistance along the 

Naso ridge, a fairly strong German force 

was stationed in and east of the town of 

Brolo maintaining guard along the north 

coast against the kind of landing the 

Americans had made at San Fratello. 

Under Col. Fritz Polack, it consisted of 

the 29th Artillery Regiment, contammg 

the regimental headquarters; the headquarters of the regiment's antiaircraft 

artillery battalion with two 20-mm. fourbarreled antiaircraft guns; and parts of the 

I st Battalion, 71 st Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Polack had located his headquarters on the northeastern slopes of Monte 

Cipolla; the bulk of his troops stretched 

eastward along the coast from Brolo. 

At 1800, 10 August, Colonel Bernard's 

troops completed loading near Caronia 

and put to sea-one LST, two LCI's, and 

six LCT's covered by the Philadelphia and 

six destroyers. At 0100 the next morning 

( I I August) the small task force arrived 

some three thousand yards off the landing 

beach, and the troops quickly loaded in 

LCVP's and Dukws for the final run-in. 

Thus far, Colonel Polack's beach defenders showed no sign of having discovered 

the amphibious force. 

The terrain in the landing area was 

dominated by Monte Cipolla, the base of 

which lies some 450 yards inland from 

the beach, the top of which-divided into 

two' small knobs-reaches an altitude of 

some 750 feet. The slopes are precipitous, and the northeast nose-on which 

Polack's headquarters was located-constituted the only usable approach to the 

knob nearest the beach. The terrain in393 

land from the beach rises in terraces to 

the base of the hill. The terraces themselves are stone-faced, and many other 

stone fences and drainage ditches crisscross the area. Covered with lemon trees, 

this area was soon to be called "the flats." 

Parallel to the beach and only a hundred 

yards inland, a thirteen-foot railroad embankment, through which ran several 

small underpasses, extended east and west 

bisecting the flats, while the coastal highway, another three hundred yards inland, skirted the base of Monte Cipolla. 

Colonel Bernard's plan for the operation was fairly simple. He planned to 

land Company E and the naval beach 

marking party at 0230 in the first wave. 

The rifle company was to destroy any beach 

defenses, clear the lemon grove between 

the railroad embankment and the highway, and block the entrances to the beach 

from the east and west. Fifteen minutes 

later, the tank platoon and the platoon of 

combat engineers were to land: the tanks, 

to reinforce Company E, the engineers, 

after assisting the tanks ashore, to make 

ready to receive the two self-propelled 

artillery batteries scheduled to land in the 

fourth wave. In the third wave, due to 

land at 0300, Bernard put his headquarters and the other three lettered 

companies of the infantry battalion. 

Companies F and G were to make their 

way up Monte Cipolla, with Company F 

to occupy the knob nearest the coast. 

After landing, Company H was to send 

one section of machine guns to each of 

the rifle companies and a section of 8 I -mm. 

mortars to each of the two companies on 

the hill. Finally, at 0315, the two field 

artillery batteries, the naval gunfire liaison officer, and fifteen mules (the battalion's ammunition train) were to land. 

The artillery batteries were to go into 
394 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ENEMY VIEW of landing area at Brolo, Jrom the northeast nose of Monte Cipolla. 

position in the lemon grove in the flats 

with Battery B firing to the west, Battery 

A to the east. Once established on their 

objectives, the units were to dig in, block 

any German attempt to withdraw to the 

east from the Naso ridge, and defend 

until relieved by the main portion of the 

3d Division. 

The final run-in to the beaches started 

at 02 10. At 0243, thirteen minutes late, 

the first wave touched down. (Map 8) 

Company E streamed from its five LCVP's 

and splashed ashore against no opposition. 

Quickly cutting passages through a 

double-apron barbed wire fence twenty 

yards inland, the rifle company crossed 

the railroad embankment and paused 

briefly to reorganize. Pushing on, the 

company soon cleared the lemon grove, 

capturing ten Germans in the process 

without having to fire a shot. As one 

rifle platoon and the weapons platoon 

swung to the right to block the N aso River 

crossing, the remainder of the company 

turned to the left to block the railroad and 

highway bridges across the Brolo River. 

The second wave landed almost on the 

heels of the first. Although the tanks 

moved quickly up to the railroad embankment, intending to go through the 

several underpasses to support Company 

E, the passageways proved too small. As 

the tank platoon leader dismounted to 

search for a way around the obstacle, an 

Engineer officer appeared and offered his 

services in seeking a way either around or 

over the embankment His offer accepted, 

the Engineer officer rushed off one way, 

to the east, while the tank platoon leader 

headed in the other direction. 
BROLO AND THE NASO RIDGE 

3D INFANTRY DIVISION 

11-12 August 1943 

o UNIT LOCATIONS. OATE IND ICATED 

o 2 /30 POSITION. 11-12 AUG 

.--.. U. S. AXIS OF ADVANCE TO TIME OF LINK - UP 

:.=-==~. 29 TH PZ GR 0 ," WI THDR AWAL . II AUG 

MAP 8 

Form IIn.s only 

I 0 I WILES 

!~b b! !I~I I'MI'+I------ --~I 

o I klLowE TE fII S 

15TH INF 

•••• 10 Aug 

~~ ",.. \ 

_--...1'> 0730 ..------" 

12 "., AUtr- /. ..,-:-

./ /" 

./ / 

./ / 

/ / 

/ / 

/ / 

/ 'I 

/ 

/ 

/ 

H.C.Brt'Ac ,.. ,J.-. 
396 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Right on schedule, part of the third 

wave-Companies F and G in LCT'slanded, followed in another fifteen minutes by sixteen Dukws carrying the rest 

of the wave: Bernard, his headquarters, 

and Company H, which promptly dispatched its sections to support the rifle 

companies. The Dukws continued inland following the two rifle companies 

until they, too, had to halt because of 

the railroad embankment. At 0330, the 

fourth and last wave touched down; by 

0400, Bernard's entire force was ashore 

without loss. By this time, Company E 

was in its blocking positions. 

Companies F and G reached the highway without incident at 0345. At the 

railroad, the Engineer officer returned to 

the tanks and reported that he had found 

a way around the thirteen-foot high embankment, via the Brolo River bed. The 

tank officer had not yet returned, so the 

Engineer officer offered to guide the two 

artillery batteries into position. His offer 

was accepted and the artillery pieces 

started to move slowly toward the east. 

The tank commander returned about this 

time and said that he, too, had located a 

bypass route, via the Naso River bed, 

and he started his tanks moving toward 

that exit. 

Even as the tanks and artillery pieces 

began moving out, half of Companies F 

and G crossed the highway and began 

ascending Monte Cipolla by its northeast nose, close to the junction of Highway 

I 13 and the secondary road which wound 

inland to the small mountain town of 

Ficarra. Thus far, not a shot had been 

fired. Colonel Polack's coast defense units 

showed no signs of having discovered the 

landing. 

A German motorcycle, apparently 

heading for Naso, suddenly came roaring 

down the highway. Freezing in place, 

the Americans allowed the. motorcycle to 

pass. They then continued crossing the 

highway and ascending Monte Cipolla's 

slopes. The element of surprise still might 

have been maintained had not a German 

half-track approached from the west. Seeing troops on the road, the driver halted 

his vehicle. As he rose from his seat to 

see whose troops these were, some twenty 

anxious American riflemen opened fire. 

The driver slumped back in his seat, dead. 

Seconds later, a small sedan with two 

occupants pulled up behind the half-track. 

A German officer stepped out to see what 

had happened. A well-placed bazooka 

round exploded the car, killing the officer 

and wounding the driver. 

The noise of the rifle fire and the exploding of the bazooka round woke all 

Germans in the neighborhood, including 

Colonel Polack and his headquarters 

troops on Monte Cipolla. Gathering fifteen men around him, Polack opened fire 

on the leading elements of Companies F 

and G. Machine guns in Brolo began to 

fire seaward, while other machine guns 

and the 20-mm. guns located on high 

ground east of Brolo opened up on the 

landing beach. By the light of flares, 

Polack's men delivered accurate machine 

gun fire that cut down several of the 

Americans. But the rest pushed on, grabbing at long shoots of grass and small 

bushes to pull themselves up the steep 

slope. 

Seeing that his headquarters personnel 

could not stop the Americans, Polack 

gathered up the unit's classified documents 

(including Hube's evacuation order of 10 

August) and made his way down the far 

slopes of the hill into Brolo. Here, from 

a nearby switchboard, he called General 

Fries and informed the division comman-
BROLO 397 

DIGGING IN A MACHINE GUN POSITION on Monte Cipolla, 11 August. 

der of the situation. For the first time, 

Fries knew that the bulk of his division 

was in danger of being cut off. He ordered Polack to attack the American beachhead as soon as possible, using the elements 

of the lSt Battalion, 7 lSt Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment, the antiaircraft unit, and a few 

German tanks located east of Brolo. 

Companies F and G managed to reach 

the top of Monte Cipolla at 0530; within 

thirty minutes both companies were dug 

in. Down on the flats, however, the artillery and tanks were having a difficult 

time trying to get into position to support the rifle companies. Three of the 

tanks bellied trying to cross ditches on the 

beach side of the railroad; the last two 

were damaged trying to knock down 

stone fences. Though the tanks could be 

used as fixed guns, their inability to maneuver made them practically useless in 

the action that was soon to follow. The 

artillery batteries were more fortunate, 

and though they had difficulty traversing ditches and terraces, they managed to 

get around the embankment and into firing positions before daylight in the lemon 

grove north of the highway. 
398 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

With the coming of daylight, Polack's 

men in Brolo turned their guns from the 

beaches and began sweeping the eastern 

slopes of Monte Cipolla. Bernard's men 

soon found it hazardous to make the long 

climb down to the beach, and those on 

the beach found it equally hazardous to 

climb up. Some fifteen men-mainly 

communications personnel and ammunition bearers-were killed during the course 

of the early morning trying to work on 

the slopes of the hill. The battalion's 

mule train carrying badly needed ammunition from the Dukws up to the 

machine guns and mortars on top of the 

hill lost all but two of its fifteen animals 

to the German fire. From this time on, 

ammumtlOn resupply was hazardous, 

spotty, and largely unsuccessful. 

Trying to aid Bernard's men, the 

Philadelphia had opened fire shortly after 

0530 at prearranged targets in the area, 

and then shifted her fires under the shore 

party's direction to Polack's units massing 

to strike back at the seaborne force. To 

the west, General Fries had ordered the 

6th Company, 15th Panzer. Grenadier 

Re giment (then deployed in a reserve 

position near Naso), to attack the American beachhead from the east. He also 

ordered a smaller German force at Ficarra 

to attack the Americans he now knew to 

be on Monte Cipolla. 

The first German ground reaction noted 

by Bernard's companies came at 0700 

when the Germans from Ficarra sent two 

reconnaissance vehicles down the secondary road to probe the American lines. 

Company G allowed the two vehicles to 

come close, opened rapid fire, set the 

vehicles on fire, and scattered the occupants. Shortly thereafter, the main German force of thirty men began working 

their way down the Brolo River bed. 

Again Company G allowed the Germans 

to come close before opening fire. Dropping in mortar concentrations and opening 

up with the heavy machine guns, Company G proceeded to decimate the German 

force. The survivors beat a hasty retreat 

up the river bed, dragging their wounded 

with them. 

For almost an hour the situation remained fairly quiet. Then, the 6th Company-about one hundred strong-made 

its effort down the Naso River bed, marching boldly forward. Engaged by Company H's machine guns, the Germans 

stopped and began deploying. But before they could get into an extended formation, Company H's mortars opened 

fire, and round after round dropped in 

on the German company. Trapped between the high banks of the river, the 

Germans broke and ran. The Americans 

estimated they killed and wounded at least 

seventy of the attacking force. This 

thrust proved to be the last German attack 

from the south, and this sector remained 

fairly quiet until after darkness fell. 

General Fries, nevertheless, continued 

his effort" to knock Bernard's men off their 

lofty perch. Placing heavy fire on all 

points on the hilltop and on the slopes of 

the hill, the German commander at 0900 

started a truck-borne infantry columnanother of his reserve units-eastward 

from Cape Orlando toward the Naso 

River. Fries was deliberately weakening 

his N aso ridge positions in attempts to 

open a way to the east. He had to regain control of the coastal highway if he 

expected to get the bulk of his division out 

of the American trap. 

The Philadelphia spotted the German 

column and opened fire, knocking out 

several vehicles and forcing the rest to 

leave the highway. Continued firing 
BROLO 

scattered the German infantrymen. 

Thirty minutes later, an artillery forward 

observer on Monte Cipolla spotted two 

German tanks with some infantry on the 

highway, also moving toward the Naso 

River. Bringing Battery A in on the target, the forward observer forced the tanks 

to leave the road well before they could 

reach the river, and the German infantrymen to seek shelter north of the highway. 

By this time, Bernard's SI-mm. mortars, 

because of the mule train's failure to get 

up the hill, were low on ammunition and 

could fire only harassing missions in support of the artillery batteries. Bernard's 

firepower was reduced even further when, 

at 1025, the Philadelphia and her covering destroyers set a course for Palermo. 

Having attended to all the prearranged 

targets and having received no more requests for fire after the shoot on the truck 

convoy, Admiral Davidson figured that his 

task had been accomplished and that the 

two field artillery batteries could handle 

any further German threat. Thus far, 

only four enemy aircraft-Italian torpedobombers-had made any sort of threatening gesture toward the American warships, 

but Davidson felt that the longer he lay 

off Brolo the greater the danger that enemy air would strike at his ships. Since 

he was assured of Allied air cover 

only until 1200, Davidson thought it wise 

to have the protection of the shore-based 

Allied antiaircraft guns at Palermo. 

To the west and across the Naso ridge, 

the units of the 3d Division which General 

Truscott had so carefully lined up the 

preceding evening had started their attacks 

to break Fries' hold and link up with Bernard's force. In his command post on the 

eastern edge of Terranova, Truscott anxiously awaited the outcome of the drive. 

Having committed everything he had to 

399 

the effort, there was nothing more he could 

do but wait. Leaving nothing to chance, 

Truscott had dispatched a liaison officer, 

Capt. Walter K. Millar, with a powerful 

jeep-mounted radio, to go along with 

Bernard's force. Through this radio, 

Truscott hoped to keep track of the situation at Monte Cipolla. Throughout the 

early morning, starting at 0600, Millar's 

messages were most reassuring, and General Truscott began to feel better even 

though the progress of his other units up 

the Naso ridge was slow in the face of extensive German mine fields and of light to 

heavy German fire. 

The German division was in a bad 

way. By noon, Fries had pulled the bulk 

of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment 

back behind the N aso River. N ear the 

coast, the 7Ist Panzer Grenadier Regiment 

was caught between the 7th Infantry on 

the west and Bernard's battalion on the 

east. Whereas the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment had a relatively free and protected route to the rear from the Naso 

ridge-by moving cross-country through 

Ficarra to San Angelo di Brolo (on the 

first defensive phase line as laid down by 

General Hube )-the northern German 

regiment had only the coastal highway for 

withdrawal. Fries ordered the regiment 

to fight to open a way to the east by 

falling back off the N aso ridge, first behind the Naso River, then behind the 

Brolo River, and then to Piramo, the 

northern hinge of Hube's first phase line. 

With these orders Lt. Col. Walter 

Krueger, commanding the 71 st, began 

assembling what troops he could spare to 

try to force a passage along the highway. 

Krueger also turned one of his attached 

field artillery battalions around and began 

firing to the east. 

Colonel Polack continued his efforts to 
400 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

LT. C OL. LYLE A. B ERNARD AND HIS RADIOMAN in the command post atop Monle Cipolla. 

assemble his scattered units for an attack 

against the American beachhead. By 

I 100, Polack managed to get together 

two infantry companies mounted on personnel carriers plus several tanks, brought 

them into Brolo, and began probing toward Company E along the Brolo River. 

Polack's assembling of troops did not 

go unnoticed on Monte Cipolla. Company H's mortars began firing slowly on 

the town. Battery B joined in, but, because of the short range, encountered some 

difficulty in placing effective fire on the 

town. Polack sent snipers and machine 

guns into the buildings overlooking the 

river to keep up a steady fire on the single 

American rifle platoon guarding the highway bridge. At I 140, seriously worried 

by this new German threat, Bernard began relaying messages by radio through 

Company E to Captain Millar requesting 

an air strike and naval gunfire on Brolo. 

Twenty minutes later, Bernard asked for 

long-range artillery support: the 3d Division had some attached 155-mm. guns 

(Long Toms) that could reach Brolo, although the town was at the extreme range 

of these guns. 

Bernard's first message caused a stir at 

Truscott's command post in Terranova. 
BROLO 

The 3d Division commander did not know 

that Admiral Davidson had withdrawn 

the warships and he could not understand 

why Bernard was asking for naval support. 

Thinking that Bernard's shore fire control 

party's radio had gone bad, he got several 

of his staff officers to telephone urgent 

messages to Seventh Army for naval and 

air support. These requests had just gone 

out when Bernard's second message came 

in. Truscott ordered the I55-mm. gunsthough firing at the maximum range-to 

open fire on Brolo. At the same time, he 

renewed the requests for naval and air 

help. Word on the naval support was 

slow to arrive, but Seventh Army stated 

that the XII Air Support Command had 

promised an air mission, although it could 

not give a specific time when the mission 

would be flown or the number of planes 

to participate. General Truscott was really 

worried now-his forward units were still 

moving slowly up the Naso ridge, but they 

were still some hours away from a linkup. He knew Bernard's force was too 

small to beat off a senous German 

counterattack. 

Actually, help was already on the way. 

Just as Admiral Davidson's warships were 

about to enter Palermo harbor, the Admiral received word from TF 88's liaison 

officer at the Seventh Army of Truscott's 

urgent request for gunfire support. 

Turning the cruiser back to the east, taking two destroyers along to cover, Davidson sped back along the coast, and 

shortly after 1400 began firing on Polack's 

troops in and around Brolo. By this 

time, Bernard was adjusting the I55-mm. 

guns on Brolo. And just as the Philadelphia opened fire, the air strike materialized 

in the form of twelve A-36's that dropped 

bombs on Brolo and on the area just east 

of the town. Thirty minutes later, twelve 

401 

more A-36's zoomed in over the area and 

strafed the German assemblage. 

The combination of American fires 

proved too much. Polack's men scattered, trying to avoid the rain of American 

shells. Three German tanks remained in 

Brolo, however, huddled near the stone 

buildings, and escaped damage. Unfortunately, at just this moment, the shore 

fire control party's radio link with the 

Philadelphia stopped functioning. Not 

wanting to fire on targets without shore 

control, and since friendly air seemed to 

have the situation well in hand, Admiral 

Davidson at 1505 withdrew his warships 

a second time and turned again for 

Palermo. 

Now a new threat to Bernard's beachhead appeared. On the west side of the 

Naso River, Colonel Krueger had managed to get together a battalion of infantry for an attack across the river. The 

rest of his regiment he left in position to 

delay any American attack from Naso or 

Cape Orlando. At about the same time, 

General Truscott left his command post 

to visit his forward regiments; he wanted 

personally to urge them on with all possible speed. Truscott, because of the 

German mines and demolished roads, 

could reach only the 30th Infantry 

which was then trying to cross the coastal 

flats into Cape Orlando. From Colonel 

Rogers' command post, Truscott called 

Colonel Sherman and told the 7th Infantry commander to forget the town of N aso 

and push forward as quickly as possible 

on Rogers' right. 

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 30th Infantry, began crossing the Zappulla River at 

1420 under a smoke screen laid down by 

supporting chemical mortars. The 1St 

Battalion soon ran into terrain that was 

heavily mined and booby-trapped, and 
402 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

moved only slowly through the coastal 

flats toward Cape Orlando. The 3d 

Battalion also was slowed by much the 

same type of obstacle, but it managed to 

keep pace with the 1st Battalion. The 

7th Infantry renewed its attack at 1500 

straight up the west slopes of the Naso 

ridge, but its advance, too, slowed in the 

face of extensive mined areas. Along the 

ridge, Colonel Krueger's remaining defenders strengthened the mined areas with 

sporadic artillery fire, frequent periods of 

heavy small arms fire, and with just 

enough infantry action to keep the American units from rushing quickly forward. 

Within the beachhead, the situation 

worsened by the minute. After the withdrawal of the American warships, and the 

ending of the air strike, the three German 

tanks that had taken shelter in Brolo, supported by a few infantrymen, started toward the eastern end of the highway 

bridge. The one American platoon guarding the bridge crossing managed to drive 

off the German foot soldiers, whereupon, 

the tanks halted just at the river's edge 

and opened fire on this annoying group of 

Americans. At the same time, Polack's 

20-mm. guns (undamaged by either the 

naval or air strikes) resumed heavy firing 

on the flats and on Monte Cipolla's 

slopes. From the west, Krueger's field 

artillery battery joined in. On Monte 

Cipolla, Bernard rushed off another message to General Truscott: "Repeat air 

and navy immediately . . . Situation still 

cri ti cal." 

Again, Admiral Davidson was flashed 

the word that his guns were needed at 

Brolo; again, the XII Air Support Command promised another air strike, again 

without mentioning numbers of planes or 

time of mission. 

Before either Davidson's warships or 

Allied planes could come to Bernard's aid, 

the three German tanks crossed the Brolo 

River. The platoon of American infantrymen scattered, most moving toward the 

beach to join with the other platoon at 

the railroad bridge. As the tanks waddled 

slowly down the highway, Battery B tried 

to engage them with direct fire, but a high 

wall near the bridge not only limited observation but also prevented the howitzers 

from opening fire. German infantrymen, 

who crossed behind the tanks, turned to 

engage the Americans near the railroad 

bridge. The tanks continued moving 

slowly along the road, seemingly intent on 

going through the American beachhead. 

Battery B tried to displace to positions 

from which it could fire on the tanks, but 

the Germans spotted this movement. In 

the ensuing fire fight, the tanks knocked 

out two of the American guns and two 

ammunition half-tracks. The exploding 

ammunition drove the Battery B crews 

from their other two guns, although one 

crew returned to its vehicle and moved it 

onto the highway, just around a bend in 

the road. No sooner had it gone into 

position than the lead German tank 

rounded the bend. The American artillery crew fired first, and missed. Then 

the tank fired, and also missed. The second rounds from both vehicles, fired almost simultaneously, struck home. Both 

the tank and the self-propelled gun started 

to burn furiously. 

From Monte Cipolla, Company F, overlooking the fight below, sent a shower of 

rifle fire on the other two German tanks 

without much effect. Company H's mortars and machine guns remained silent, 

hoarding their few remaining rounds for 

a last-ditch stand. 

On the right, Battery A had finally 

managed to maneuver its guns into posi-
BROLO 

tion to fire on the last two German tanks. 

The battery set one on fire, whereupon 

the last turned and trundled slowly back 

to the east. Before recrossing the river 

into Brolo, the tank paused for a brief 

moment to destroy the unmanned but 

still serviceable Battery B howitzer. The 

German infantrymen followed the tank 

back across the river. 

Worried about Company E, Bernard 

started Company F down Monte Cipolla 

to take over the Brolo River defenses, 

telling Company F's commander to send 

what he could find of Company E to the 

Nasa River to defend from that direction. 

One platoon of Company E was still in 

position there, and Bernard hoped that 

by consolidating the remnants of Company E into one group, he could use it to 

hold on to the highway crossing. Became of continued German fire, Company F's progress down the hill was slow, 

and it was almost 1600 before the company debouched on to the flats and moved 

to the river line. 

Unfortunately, Company F's arrival in 

the flats coincided with the promised air 

strike. Seven A-36's swept in low over 

Monte Cipolla at just about 1600. Apparently not fully oriented to the ground, 

the pilots dropped two bombs on Bernard's command post, killing and wounding nineteen men, and the rest on Battery 

A's howitzers. Though Company F was 

unscathed, when the smoke cleared the 

infantrymen discovered that the four remaining artillery pieces had been destroyed. With nothing left to support the 

two companies in the flats, Bernard ordered everybody up onto Monte Cipolla. 

Bernard figured the time had corne to 

make his last-ditch stand. 

The Philadelphia arrived back on the 

scene just as Bernard finished ordering 

403 

everybody up out of the low ground. 

Seeing the vessels, an officer from the 

shore fire control party commandeered a 

Dukw to take him out to the cruiser to 

get supporting fires. Through some misunderstanding, three of the other Dukws 

(all loaded with ammunition) followed. 

An artillery officer took a fifth Dukw to 

recall the three carrying ammunition. 

Thus, practically all of the task force's 

remaining ammunition supply headed out 

to sea. The Dukws managed to make the 

cro&<;-water run successfully. After taking the men aboard, the cruiser began 

firing on Cape Orlando, Brolo, and the 

highway east of Brolo. Admiral Davidson 

did not want to bring the fires in any 

closer to Monte Cipolla.6 

After about fifteen minutes of naval fire, 

just before 1700, eight German aircraft 

struck the three American warships. In 

a brisk thirty-minute fight which featured violent evasive actions by the ships, 

near from German bombs, and the 

appearance of friendly aircraft, only one 

German plane managed to make its escape. The cruiser claimed five of those 

shot down. Again, Admiral Davidson 

decided to withdraw his warships. He 

was still devoid of communications with 

Bernard's force; his ships were still prey 

for enemy air attacks. He could see nothing that he could do to ease Bernard's 

situation. Again, the warships set a 

course for Palermo, this time going all the 

way. 

Company F, with men from the engineer 

platoon and the artillery batteries, got 

back up on Monte Cipolla before complete 

darkness set in. Bernard expended the 

last of his mortar ammunition in a concenIJ In all. the Philadelphia expended 1,062 sixinch rounds during the day, 
404 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

tration on a suspected German assembly 

area across the Naso River. This he 

followed with rifle and machine gun 

fire on the bridge to cover Company E's 

disengagement. The latter unit, still 

badly disorganized, began dribbling in to 

Bernard's command post a short time 

later. Some of the company never made 

it to the hill, but dug in on the flats for 

the night, fighting as best they could 

with rifles and hand grenades against the 

retiring German columns. Bernard passed 

the word for the units on Monte Cipolla 

to break into small groups and move back 

toward the 3d Division's lines as soon 

after daybreak as possible. 

By I goo, the 7 ISt Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment was in control of the highway 

and a narrow stretch of land on each side. 

Glad to have opened an escape route, it 

paid little attention to Company E's survivors still in the flats. At 2200, Colonel 

Krueger began withdrawing his units to the 

east, taking with him his vehicles. Krueger 

made no attempt against Monte Cipolla. 

At his command post in Terranova, 

General Truscott was becoming increasingly worried about Bernard's small force. 

Captain Millar, before ascending Monte 

Cipolla, had sent one last message just 

before I goo to General Truscott and then 

destroyed his radio set. Only part of the 

message (which asked again for naval 

support) got through; General Truscott 

felt that the small American force had 

been overrun before the complete message 

could be dispatched: he could see "the 

final German assault swarming over our 

gallant comrades." To add to his worries, both the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments reported they had lost contact 

with their leading battalions; the units 

had outrun their communications with the 

regimental command posts. 

Unknown to General Truscott, both 

regiments by 2200 had gained the Naso 

ridge and were even then starting down 

the eastern slopes to link up with Bernard's force. By this time, the bulk of 

Colonel Krueger's regiment had made 

good its escape to the east, past the trap 

which had been so neatly set but which 

could not be held. 

The 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, crossed 

the N aso River and entered the flats. 

Men from Company E leaped from their 

hiding places to greet the relieving force. 

Patrols were immediately dispatched to 

Monte Cipolla to locate Colonel Bernard, 

who, hearing the sounds of firing which 

marked the approach of the bulk of the 

division, rescinded his previous instructions for the men to make their way to 

the east after daybreak. At 0730, 12 

August, Bernard made contact with a 1st 

Battalion patrol. His force-minus 177 

men killed, wounded, and missing-came 

down off the hill. 

The 3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, moved 

through to take up the pursuit of the 29th 

Panzer Grenadier Division, which had 

been forced to give up its portion of the 

Tortorici line twenty-four hours ahead of 

time. For a short while, this withdrawal 

had posed a threat to General Rodt's 

evacuation of Randazzo. But the 29th 

was able to slip into position in front of 

Patti, where Rodt's escape route from 

Randazzo came out to the north coast. 

Here, aided by the terrain, Fries was not 

only able to gain back the day he had 

lost, but to hold open Rodt's escape route 

as well. 

Except for forcing General Fries to 

give up the Naso ridge a day ahead of 

time, no mean feat considering the natural 

defensive strength of the position, Bernard's landing accomplished little. But the 
BROLO 

operation had come close to trapping a 

large part of the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division, and had come even closer to 

rolling up the whole northern sector of 

Rube's defensive line. It was only because Bernard's force was too small, and 

because continuous air and naval support 

was not available, that Rube's entire 

northern flank was not rolled up and cut 

off from Messina. If a stronger force 

had been landed-at least an ReT-and 

if continuous naval and air support had 

been provided, General Fries could hardly 

have cleared a way out of the trap along 

the coastal highway. 

Operations against the rear of the German defensive line undoubtedly would 

have eased the way for the bulk of the 

3d Division, and would have made for a 

quicker link-up. Pressure from front and 

rear might have so hampered Fries' regiments that probably few if any of the 

Germans could have made their way to 

the east. With Fries' division out of the 

405 

way, advance east along Highway I 13 

might have been virtually unopposed. 

In conjunction with American advances 

from Randazzo, General Truscott might 

have effectively severed General Rodt's 

withdrawal routes to Messina. This, in 

turn, might have led to a rapid dash into 

Messina where at least a part of the H ermann Goering Division could have been 

prevented from making good its escape. 

As it turned out, the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, which suffered about 

the same number of casualties as the 3d 

Division, made good its get-away. It 

managed to withdraw most of its heavy 

equipment to Rube's first phase line just 

east of Piraino--three miles from Brolothus holding open Rodt's escape route to 

the north coast. If the German division's 

morale was damaged by this second American amphibious end run-and it must 

have been-its physical capability for 

fighting more delaying actions was only 

slightly weakened. 
CHAPTER XXI 

The End of the Campaign 

The Race to Messina 

Wasting little time in congratulations, 

General Truscott urged his men on after 

General Fries' back-pedaling German diVISIOn. Tired from their exertions at the 

Naso ridge, the men of the 3d Division 

wearily resumed their eastward trek. The 

preceding five-day battle had been slow, 

costly, and difficult. The 7th Infantry 

reported losses of fifteen officers and four 

hundred men killed, wounded, and missing, a figure approximated by each of 

the other infantry regiments. 

South of the mountains, General Bradley, the II Corps commander, brought 

the 1St Division back into line. Eddy's 

gth Division drew the secondary road 

leading from Floresta northeastward 

through Montalbano to Furnari. Huebner's 1St Division was to pass through the 

British 78th Division east of Randazzo, 

then turn north to Bivio Salica. 1 If they 

were able to move fast enough, Bradley 

believed, the divisions just might catch the 

German division up north and squeeze it 

against the 3d Division. (Map VIII) 

During the evening of 12 August, German units all across the front withdrew to 

Hube's previously designated first phase 

line. This line was to be held at least 

until nightfall on 13 August, whereupon 

the units were to withdraw again to the 

1 II Corps FO 12, 12 Aug 43. 

east, nearer Messina. Thus, on the north 

coast, by the morning of 13 August, the 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division as it 

pulled back some fifteen miles lost contact 

with the 3d Division. Before moving into 

the new line east of Falcone (twentyeight miles east of Cape Orlando)-a 

line which extended south almost to Novara di Sicilia-German engineers effectively blocked the coastal highway by 

partially demolishing the highway tunnel 

at Cape Calava and, just to the east, by 

blowing a 150-foot section of the road, 

bracketed 300 feet high on a cliff, into the 

sea. It was a masterful demolition job; 

overcoming it was to become a landmark 

of American engineer support in Sicily. 

Yet even this stratagem would not save 

the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, General Patton felt, if a new plan reached 

fruition. On the same day (12 August) 

that Truscott executed the link-up with 

Bernard's amphibious force near Brolo, 

Patton had set his staff to preparing still 

another dash around the Germans' right 

flank. With the Navy's promise to supply more landing craft, and with General 

Alexander's permission to use the 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, Patton 

planned a full-scale operation well behind 

the German defenders. Late on 12 August, Patton's staff came forth with the 

plan, calling for a landing any time between 14 and 18 August in the Bivio 

Salica-Barcellona area. The Seventh Army 
THE OBJECTIVE, MESSINA 
408 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

30TH INFANTRY TROOPS MOVING AROUND 

THE CAPE CALA VA CLIFF where the roadbed 

had been blown out by the Germans. 

would retain control of the participating 

units until such time as those units actually landed.2 

This attempt to cut off the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, and possibly other 

German units, was to be much more ambitious than either of the earlier amphibious efforts. Patton hoped to cut Highway 

I 13 as well as the secondary road along 

which the 1St Division would be advancing. 

The battalion of paratroopers was to drop 

at 2000, D minus I, near Barcellona to 

prtvent German forces from moving to the 

2 Seventh Army Directive, 12 Aug 43, in Seventh Army Rpt of Opns, p. D-1S; see also, Seventh Army G-3 Jnl, entries 3, 20, 28, and 39, 

12 Aug 43. 

west to relieve the encircled German units, 

and to seize and hold the highway bridge 

just west of Barcellona until the seaborne 

force landed. Colonel Ankcorn's 15 7th 

RCT (from the 45th Division), reinforced 

by a company of medium tanks and a 

company of 4.2-inch mortars, was to land 

near Bivio Salica, join with the paratroopers, then attack westward to link up with 

the 3d Division. 

As the Seventh Army staff completed 

the details for the new end run, the three 

American divisions then on line kicked off 

to clear the Messina peninsula. On the 

north coast, the 15th and 30th Infantry 

Regiments crossed the Brolo River, the 

30th toward Cape Calava, the 15th crosscountry toward Patti. Neither advance 

was seriously contested. 

The 15th Infantry had a more difficult 

task, for its route led through the mountainous interior over difficult terrain. Yet, 

the 15th reached Patti long before the 

30th, entering the town at 1530. Along 

the highway, the 30th Infantry had come 

to an abrupt halt upon reaching the partially demolished tunnel and blown out 

road section at Cape Calava. Pausing 

just long enough to start his foot troops inland around the obstacle and across the 

neck of the cape, Colonel Rogers loaded 

two Dukws (which had been in a followup motor column for just such a purpose 

as this) with water, signal equipment, and 

a few communications personnel and 

chugged around the cape, rejoining the 

foot elements east of that point. 

The loth Engineer Battalion moved up 

to restore the highway for vehicular 

traffic. By hanging "a bridge in the 

sky" the engineers were able to permit a 

jeep-carrying General Truscott-to cross 

the wooden structure eighteen hours after 

starting work. Six hours later, after a 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 409 

THE BRIDGE THAT WAS " HUNG IN THE SKY" BY THE 10TH ENGINEER BATTALION 

bit of shoring here and there, heavier vehicles began to cross.3 

By 0300 the following morning, 14 August, the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, after 

a night's march, entered Oliveri. The 

29th Panzer Grenadier Division had again 

pulled back to the east. It was now on 

General Hube's second phase line, with 

the northern hinge resting on the coast 

town of Furnari. The 15th Panzer Gren3 Ernie Pyle, Brave Men (New York: Henry 

Holt and Co., 1944 ), pages 65-73, gives a vivid 

accoun t of the construction of this bridge. See 

a lso Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 241-42. 

As General Truscott points out in his comments on this MS, it was just as well the Germans did not destroy the tunnel a t the same time 

they were blowing the section of road. "The 

race to Messina would have ended right there," 

sa ys Truscott. 

adier Division was well on its way toward 

completing its transfer to the Italian mainland. Parts of the other German divisions 

were also moving toward the embarkation points. In fact, by nightfall on '4 

August, only one reinforced infantry battalion held the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division's front. This battalion was to 

hold the second phase line until dark on 

15 August.4 

At Messina, the German ferrying service had swung into full operation with the 

arrival of the first troops from the front on 

the night of I' August. During this first 

night, Captain von Liebenstein's craft ran 

at full capacity until 2045, when the pace 

slowed and then stopped, partly because 

4 MS #R-145 (Bauer), pp. 25-27. 
410 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

British Wellingtons bombed the strait, 

partly because troops were slow in reaching the ferrying sites. Despite renewed 

attacks by Allied bombers, the evacuation 

resumed during the early morning of 12 

August after additional troops from the 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division arrived. 

On the second night of Hube's evacuation 

efforts, the night of 12 August, telephone 

communications between Messina and the 

mainland failed, and some confusion resulted in getting the naval craft and the 

ground troops together on the Messina 

side. Ferrying craft stood by at one of 

the landing places for three hours, only to 

leave shortly before the troops finally 

arrived. 

Ferrying did not get under way again 

until 0200, 13 August. Strong Allied air 

attacks, persisting until 0500, made it impossible to use the ferries at the narrow 

part of the strait. But, then, contrary to 

the original plan of crossing troops only 

at night, Liebenstein ordered the ferrying 

continued throughout the 13th. By evening of 13 August, a total of 15,000 men, 

1,300 vehicles, 2 I tanks, and 22 assault 

guns had completed the crossing.5 

While Liebenstein's fleet of small craft 

lifted German troops and materiel across 

the strait, the Italian ferrying service operated as best it could with its somewhat 

limited equipment. The train ferry 

caught fire on I 2 August and was out of 

commission for forty-eight hours. Motor 

raft'S saved the situation and transported 

20,000 men at the rate of 1,000 a trip. 

In an attempt to relieve the situation, the 

Italians loaded one of the other inoperable 

train ferries with heavy artillery, planning 

to tow it across to the mainland. But 

after all that work, the Italians could not 

find a towboat. Eventually, they scuttled 

pp. 40 -42 . 

the craft to keep the artillery piece.,> from 

falling into Allied hands. 

The Italians now accepted Hube's previous offer to transport their remaining 

heavy equipment in German craft. But 

at the same time, to keep the equipment 

from falling to the Allies, Hube issued 

additional instructions to all German units 

to take charge of any Italian materiel that 

could not be moved by the Italians. 

Thus, many pieces of Italian equipment 

were saved but, at the same time, lost to 

the Italians, for on the mainland the Germans simply appropriated them for their 

own divisions. In fact, after completing 

its evacuation on the evening of 14 August, 

the I 5th Panzer Grenadier Division found 

that it had more and better wheeled 

equipment than at the beginning of the 

campaign, for the simple reason that the 

troops had acquired Italian motor vehicles 

of all kinds before leaving Sicily.6 Instances were also reported of German 

commanders who retained Italian personnel, put the men into German uniforms, 

and refused to let them return to their own 

units. 7 

Despite these difficulties, the evacuation 

of Italian personnel from Sicily was virtually completed by 16 August. Generale 

di Brigata Ettore Monacci, commander of 

Italian army troops at the Naval Base 

Messina, was the last to leave ~:[essina 

after setting mines to blow up the port's 

installations. All told, the Italians evacuated between 70,000 and 75,000 men; 

from 227 to 500 vehicles; between 75 and 

100 artillery pieces; and 12 mules.8 

oMS #C-on (Rodt). 

7 Correspondence to and from Comatldo 

Quinta Armata, Stato Maggiore, Situaziotle, militari reduci dalla Sicilia, IT 792. 

"IT 99C, 14 Aug 43; Faldella. Lo sbareo, p. 

276; Mario Puddu, Tra due invasion;, campagna 

d'ltalia, 1943-1945 (Rome: A. Nardini, (952). 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

The German ferrying service continued 

operations on the evening of 13 August 

-the third night-even though British 

\Vellington bombers were again out in 

force. While these bombing attacks time 

and again forced ce&<;ation of the ferrying 

service across the neck of the strait, at the 

wider parts the service proceeded pretty 

much according to schedule. Concluding 

that these continued heavy bombing attacks made it almost impossible to conduct 

any sort of satisfactory ferry service in the 

narrow part of the strait at night, Liebenstein ordered daylight ferrying service only 

in this zone, though round-the-clock transfers would continue in the wider parts of 

the strait. Until the end of the operation, most of the remaining German troops 

on Sicily were ferried to the Italian mainland during daylight hours. Though the 

frequent Allied air attacks caused some 

damage to the embarkation points, the 

damage was light and quickly repaired, 

particularly because no heavy bombers appeared over the strait during the day. 

And thanks to Baade's massed guns, Allied NAT AF flyers operating during daylight hours encountered great difficulty 

in aiming accurately enough to cause any 

serious damage to either ships or landing 

points.9 

Though quite unknown to the Axis, both 

German and Italian ferrying services were 

being aided, inadvertently to be sure, by 

9 MS #R-!45 (Bauer), pp. 46-47. Craven 

and Cate (Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, 

page 473) list Allied air force claims as follows: 23 ferrying craft destroyed; direct hits on 

43 more; near misses on 204. On the other hand, 

the Axis forces listed their losses as follows: 8 

Italian and 7 German craft sunk (only I of which 

was lost in action); 5 Italian and I German 

craft damaged. See also, Roskill, The War at Sea, 

vol. III, pt. I, p. 150; Monson, Sicily-SalernoAnzio, p. 215. 

411 

the actions of certain commanders in the 

Allied hierarchy of command. 

Almost since the beginning of the Sicilian operation, General Montgomery had 

had ample opportunities to launch amphibious end runs around the German 

defenses in the Catania plain area. 

Rather than make use of "the priceless 

asset of sea power, and flexibility of maneuver," Montgomery chose instead to 

slug his way forward up the difficult east 

coast road, first with one division, then 

with two, and then again with one.10 

Montgomery steadfastly refused to launch 

any amphibious end runs. 

Furthermore, there was the failure on 

the part of the Allied air commanders to 

assess correctly Hube's evacuation plan: 

they believed almost to the end that the 

Axis forces would cross the strait only 

during the hours of darkness, and that 

NATAF alone could handle any daylight 

evacuation attempts. Almost one-half of 

the available Allied air power-the 869 

aircraft that belonged to N ASAF -was 

used in only a limited way to stop the evacuationY True, British Wellington bombers, flying an average of eighty-five sorties 

each night against Messina, did force Liebenstein to shift from night crossings to day 

crossings. But except for three daylight 

U.S. B-17 attacks on Messina, up to 8 

August there were no other calls on the 

NASAF heavies to bomb Messina, the 

evacuation beaches, the embarkation 

10 Quotation from Cunningham Despatch, par. 

40 . 

11 In August 1943, NASAF had 181 U.S. 

heavy bombers, 130 British and 278 U.S. medium 

bombers, and 280 fighters and fighter-bombers. 

NATAF.had 112 U.S. medium bombers, 94 British and 43 U.S. light bombers, and 344 British 

and 377 U.S. fighters and fighter-bombers. See 

chart in RoskHl, The War at Sea, vol. III, pt. 

I, p. 148. 
412 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

points, and Baade's gun emplacements, 

until it was too late. In fact, on I I August, the NATAF commander had even 

released the heavy bombers from any commitment in the Messina Strait area. On 

13 August, when the Germans shifted to 

daylight crossings, "the land battle [on 

Sicily] was going so well" that NASAF 

scheduled a huge raid on the Littorio 

airfield and Lorenzo marshaling yards 

near Rome, committing 106 B-q's, 102 

B-26's, 66 B-25'S, and 135 P-38's to 

this missionY 

Despite numerous signs of Axis withdrawal and evacuation, it was not until 14 

August that General Alexander felt the 

German evacuation had really begun. 

He radioed this belief to Air Chief Marshal Tedder, but NASAF was committed 

too deeply to striking at mainland targets 

to be turned loose against Messina. I t did 

release some medium and light bombers, 

as well as fighters and fighter-bombers, to 

assist the NATAF in a round-the-clock 

pounding of Messina, the strait, and the 

Italian toe. 

The NATAF had undoubtedly tried 

hard to disrupt Hube's schedule, but the 

pilots found it almost impossible to penetrate the antiaircraft defenses. "The immense concentration of flak on both sides 

of the Narrows makes it impossible to go 

down and really search for targets thoroughly with fighter bombers," reported 

the Desert Air Force (the V. S. XII Air 

Support Command's counterpart) . "It 

also greatly restricts the use of light bombers. The Hun knows very well that if we 

really put up a lot of bomber formations 

into his main flak concentration, we 

should have the whole lot unserviceable in 

12 Quotation and figures from Craven and 

Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, 

p. 474· 

no time." 13 Without the support of the 

U.S. B-I7's during the daylight hours, 

and with Admiral Cunningham's refusal 

to commit any large warships in the strait 

area to form a "positive physical barrier," 

the NATAF pilots faced an almost impossible task. 

Thus it was that Hube's evacuation 

proceeded fairly close to schedule. By 14 

August it was too late to catch any sizable 

number of enemy ground troops forward 

of Messina. General Patton, however, 

continued with his plans for launching 

another amphibious end run. 

During the evening of 13 August, the 

Hermann Goering Division gave up Taormina (twenty-nine miles from Messina) 

and fell back to Hube's second phase line, 

anchored at the small town of Santa 

Teresa. Here, twenty miles south of Messina, the German division had orders to 

hold through the evening of 15 August. 

Leaving a strong rear guard at Santa 

Teresa, General Conrath started the rest 

of his division back to the ferrying sites. 

The British 50th Division followed 

slowly, impeded by efficient German demolition and mine work. The British 78th 

Division swung around Mount Etna, 

cleared Highway 120 between Randazzo 

and Linguaglossa, five miles from the east 

coast highway. But contact was not regained with the Hermann Goering Division until late on 15 August, by which 

time even the German rear guards had 

started to pull back to Hube's third phase 

line just short of Messina. 

In the center of the Allied front, both 

the U.S. 1st and 9th Divisions encountered little trouble in closing out their 

roles in the Sicilian Campaign. Leaving 

13 Ltr, Desert Air Force to NATAF, 15 Aug 

43, in 0407/0/490. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

Floresta early on 14 August, DeRohan's 

60th Infantry pushed northeast along the 

secondary road leading to the north coast, 

and that same afternoon his patrols made 

contact with the 3d Division at Furnari. 

On the same day, the 18th Infantry (I st 

Division) passed through Randazzo, 

through the British 78th Division, and 

turned north on the secondary road leading through Novara di Sicilia. This 

movement soon turned largely on how 

fast the division's engineers could remove 

mine fields and construct bypasses. The 

18th Infantry moved slowly along the 

road-there was no enemy opposition--'-

and across the ridges to Novara di Sicilia. 

] ust after noon, General Bradley telephoned General Huebner the information that Truscott's units had already 

passed Bivio Salica and had, therefore, 

pinched out the 1st Division. There was 

little point in going any farther, although 

18th Infantry patrols did link up with the 

3d Division later in the day. 

On the north coast road, the 3d Division pushed on, nearing the very place 

where General Patton planned to pull off 

his combined amphibious-airborne operation-Barcellona. At 0930, 15 August, 

the 7th Infantry, which leapfrogged the 

15th Infantry, punched into Barcellona. 

Continuing its drive to the east, brushing 

aside a series of roadblocks defended by 

a few German machine gunners and 

mortar men, the regiment pushed all the 

way to the point where the coastal highway swings inland across the northeastern 

tip of the island to Messina. At daylight, 

16 August, the 7th Infantry was ready to 

turn for Messina, only twelve miles away. 

At Messina, the German evacuation 

proceeded unimpeded. Hube, confident 

that his troops could fend off the advancing Allied armies and determined to get 

413 

as much equipment as possible off the 

island, had decided on 14 August to extend the evacuation by one night. In 

order not to upset the announced timetable, he ordered the additional night inserted between the previously ordered third 

and fourth nights. Thus, the evening of 

14 August became known simply as the 

additional night, while 15 August was still 

designated as the fourth night, and 16 August as the fifth.14 

When both German divisions reported 

contact regained with the Allied armies 

on 15 August, Hube completed arrangements to transfer the last elements of the 

divisions still on Sicily to the Italian mainland during the evening of 16 August. 

The Hermann Goering and 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Divisions were, after arrival in 

Calabria, to march to the north. The 

I st Parachute Division, the 29th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, and Colonel Baade's 

headquarters were to remain in Calabria 

attached to the LXXVI Panzer CorpsP 

Even as the 7th Infantry neared the 

turn in the road leading to Messina on 

15 August, General Patton was calling 

General Bradley to inform the II Corps 

commander that the 15 7th RCT was to 

land on the morning of 16 August, not at 

Bivio Salica as originally planned but at 

Spadafora, ten miles farther to the east. 

The airborne battalion was not going to 

participate, Patton said, since the 3d Division had already passed Barcellona. General Patton apparently felt that, even if the 

amphibious landing caught no Germans, 

it would put additional troops on shore to 

14 It was probably due to this device that some 

German commanders later claimed to have completed the evacuation in five nights. Hube's 

order of '4 August 43 in Baade Diary, IgOO, 15 

Aug 43, p. 107. 

15 Baade Diary, p. /Og. 
414 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

help speed Truscott's advance into Messina. The thought of taking Messina, of 

beating the Eighth Army to this prime 

objective of the entire campaign, may well 

have appealed even more strongly to the 

Seventh Army commander than the spectacular dash across western Sicily. 

Not pleased with Patton's idea of using 

the 15 7th RCT at this late stage of the 

campaign in what he considered a useless 

operation, knowing that the 7th Infantry 

was encountering only light rear guard resistance and could outrun any amphibious 

force, Bradley protested the operation. 

Determined to go ahead despite General 

Bradley's statement that "we'll be waiting 

for your troops when they come ashore," 16 

Patton sent his deputy, General Keyes, to 

Truscott's command post to co-ordinate 

the details. 

Like Bradley, Truscott was astonished 

when Keyes outlined the Seventh Army 

plan. The 7th Infantry was even then 

approaching Spadafora and undoubtedly 

would be past that town by the time the 

I 57th R CT started landing. Fearing that 

the amphibious landing taking place in 

the middle of the 7th Infantry's column 

might lead to confusion and possibly some 

internecine fighting, Truscott bitterly remonstrated with the Seventh Army deputy 

commander. But, as before the Brolo 

landing, Keyes was reluctant to cancel the 

amphibious end run, knowing full well 

that General Patton counted on the favorable publicity such a spectacular operation would bring to the Seventh Army. 

Finally, after Truscott stated flatly that he 

would halt the 7th Infantry and withdraw 

it west of Spadafora in order to prevent 

any conflict with Colonel Ankcorn's units, 

Keyes relented. Though the operation 

16 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 162. 

would still take place, it would be staged 

at Bivio Salico on the originally assigned 

beaches. Truscott reluctantly agreed, although he preferred to see the landing 

canceled.17 

On the same day, 15 August, General 

Montgomery had finally decided that the 

Eighth Army, too, would launch an amphibious operation. Early on 16 August, tanks from the British 4th Armored 

Brigade and a Commando unit were to 

land at Cape d' Ali, cut off what Germans 

they could, and speed the Eighth Army's 

advance into Messina. Almost four hundred British troops were to be involved, 

and they too had a strong desire to beat 

the Americans into Messina. 18 

The same evening, the Hermann Goering Division rear guards began moving out 

of Santa Teresa, heading for Hube's third 

phase line, anchored at Scaletta, three 

miles beyond Cape d' Ali.19 

Despite the increase in Allied air attacks on 15 and 16 August, the evacuation of German troops and materiel had 

continued without serious interruption. 

General Hube and General Fries, commander of the 29th Panzer Grenadier 

Division, crossed to Calabria at 0530 on 

the 16th. Before leaving, General Fries 

deployed his now less than zoo-man rear 

guard in two widely separated positions: 

half at Acqualadrone to block the road 

around the northeastern tip of Sicily; the 

others at the Casazza crossroads, four miles 

17 Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 242-4:1: 

ONI, Sicilian Campaign, p. 110. 

18 Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, pp. 74, 86; Montgomery, Eighth Army, p. III; Nicholson, The 

Canadians in Italy, p. I7I. 

'" OB SUED, Meldungen, 0250, I7 Aug 43. 

This, and the ensuing British landing are reported belatedly on 17 August. but dated 15 

August. It is confirmed on the German map for 

15 August 1943. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 415 

GENERALS EISENHOWER AND MONTGOMERY OBSERVING THE EFFECT OF AMERICAN ARTILLERY 

SHELLING on the Italian mainland. Commander Harry C. Butcher is behind General Montgomery. 

west of Messina. These two positions 

protected the ferrying sites. 

In the Seventh Army sector, Bradley's 

and Truscott's prediction of the day before 

held true when, early on the morning of 

16 August, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry 

passed through Spadafora. By early 

afternoon, the 7th was on the highway to 

Messina. 

Colonel Ankcorn's 157th Infantry, 

meanwhile, had splashed ashore near Bivio Salica just after midnight, 16 August. 

Except for the loss of eleven men in a 

landing craft accident, the landing was 

uneventful. That afternoon, Truscott ordered Ankcorn to send one battalion to 

follow the 7th Infantry and assist in the 

capture of Messina; the remainder of 

Ankcorn's command was to stay at Bivio 

Salica. 

By the time the 15 7th Infantry battalion caught up with the 7th Infantry, the 

latter unit had already cleared the German 

rear guards at the Casazza crossroads and 

controlled the ridge line overlooking Messina. The 30th Infantry had swung past 

the 7th along the road around the northeastern tip of the island. It was nearing 

Messina from the north. By this time, 

too, Truscott had a battery of 155-mm. 
416 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

howitzers (Battery B, 9th Field Artillery 

Battalion) firing across the strait onto the 

Italian mainland. Just after dark, after 

driving off a small patrol from Company 

I, 7th Infantry, which was probing toward 

Messina, the last German rear guards 

along both roads pulled back to the outskirts of Messina on the edge of the last 

ferrying site that was still operating. 

On the east coast highway, Montgomery's landing caught the tag end of the 

Hermann Goering Division's withdrawing 

rear guard unit, which halted and stopped 

the British column just north of Scaletta. 

Not until dark on 16 August, as the Germans again started back for Messina, did 

the British column move forward, finally 

passing through Tremestieri, two miles 

south of Messina, at daylight 17 August. 

Here again the British column halted, this 

time because of a demolished bridge over 

a deep ravine. By now it was broad daylight-about 08I5-and the Commando 

leader, a lieutenant colonel and distant 

relative of the British Prime Minister, decided to bypass the obstacle in a jeep and 

start for Messina. He was determined to 

get to the city before the Americans.2o 

The British officer might have spared 

himself a bouncing, jostling ride. The 

evening before, a reinforced platoon from 

Company L, 7th Infantry, under the command of 1st Lt. Ralph J. Yates, had pushed 

into the city proper. Early next morning, 

patrols from the other 7th Infantry battalions plus a platoon from the 1st Battalion, 

I57th Infantry, entered Messina. Except 

for occasional rifle fire, they met no 

resistance. 

The last of the German defenders had 

crossed to the Italian mainland just about 

two hours earlier. In Calabria, General 

20 For an account of the British operation, see 

Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, pp. 74-89. 

Hube reported at 0635, 17 August, "Operation LEHRGANG completed." The 

last Axis troops to leave Sicily were 

eight men of an Italian patrol picked up 

by a German assault boat about an hour 

later.21 

On the ridge line overlooking the city, 

General Truscott received Messina's civil 

dignitaries at 0700, and one hour later, 

Col. Michele Tomasello, who offered to 

make the formal military surrender. However, because he had been told by General Keyes to wait for General Patton 

before entering Messina, Truscott sent 

General Eagles, his assistant division commander, into the city with Tomasello to 

prepare for the surrender of the city after 

Patton arrived, to supervise the activities 

of the various American units then roving 

about the port city, and "to see that the 

British did not capture the city from us 

after we had taken it." 22 

General Patton came onto the ridge at 

1000, asked "What in hell are you all 

standing arbund for?," took his place in 

a car at the head of a motor cavalcade, 

and roared down into the city, accompanied all the way by enemy artillery fire 

from the Italian mainland. 

21 Faldella, Lo sbareo, p. 275; OB SUED, 

Meldungen, 2000, 17 Aug 43. The Germans 

evacuated from Sicily 39,569 men, of which number 4,444 were wounded; 9,605 vehicles; 94 guns; 

47 tanks; 1,100 tons of ammunition; 970 tons of 

fuel; and 15,700 tons of miscellaneous equipment 

and supplies. See Translation of Report on the 

Evacuation of Sicily (August 1943) by Vice Admiral Friedrich von Ruge (1946), and an. A, in 

folder X-III, OCMH; Baade Diary. For details of the last two days' fighting by the 3d Division, see AAR's of the units involved, including that of the 157th Infantry Regiment (which 

claims the honor of having the first American 

troops in Messina); II Corps Rpt of Opns; 3d 

Inf Div G-3 Jnl; II Corps G-3 Jnl. 

22 Comments of Eagles on MS. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

At the southern edge of Messina, the 

British annored column had finally caught 

up with the Commando officer, who had, 

by this time, made contact with General 

Eagles and learned that the Americans had 

beaten him to the prize. Continuing 

through the southern outskirts and into the 

center of Messina, the British column 

clanked its slow way forward, arriving in 

a large park just after General Patton had 

accepted the city's surrender. The senior 

British officer walked over to General Patton, shook hands, and said: "It was a jolly 

good race. I congratulate you." 23 

The Sicilian Campaign was over. The 

Western Allies had reached the southern 

gateway to the European continent. 

Conclusions 

The Allied invasion of Sicily and subsequent reduction of the island accomplished 

the objectives laid down by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca in January 

1943: to make more secure the Allied 

lines of communication in the Mediterranean; to divert as much Gennan strength 

as possible from the Russian front during 

the critical summer period; and to intensify pressure on Italy. More, the invasion 

of Sicily on 10 July and the attendant 

heavy bombing raids on key Italian cities 

and installations led directly to the overthrow of Mussolini and of the Fascist 

regime, Italy's first step toward leaving the 

war. Allied arnlies had taken from the 

Axis Powers the Sicilian bridge to the European mainland, and had placed on one 

end of that bridge a force which constituted a serious threat to all Axis-held portions of the European continent. All this 

23 Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, p. 89; Comments 

of Truscott on MS; Comments of Eagles on MS. 

417 

had been accomplished at a cost of less 

than 20,000 men-7,402 in the Seventh 

Anny, II,843 in the British Eighth Anny. 

Measured against Axis losses of 12,000 

Gennan dead and captured and 147,000 

Italian dead, wounded, and captured, the 

Allied losses were slight.24 

From the American point of view, the 

Seventh Anny-the first United States 

field anny to fight as a unit in World War 

II-had done more than well. Landing 

on exposed beaches, its airborne mission 

an almost complete failure, initially facing 

the bulk of the Gennan defenders, hit 

by strong Axis counterattacks within hours 

after landing, the men of the Seventh 

Anny had clawed their way inland. 

Within seventy-two hours after the initial 

seaborne landings, the army had established a firm and secure beachhead. 

Stopped by General Alexander from continuing on to Messina, the Seventh Anny 

refused to relinquish all thought of offensive action and punched its way across the 

western tip of the island and into Palermo. 

Allowed to turn to the alternately 

bucking and plunging, it traveled the 

mountainous roads on and near the north 

coast to enter Messina just a few hours 

before the Eighth Army. 

There were many noteworthy accomplishments in the thirty-eight days of 

fighting. Chief among these was the 

performance of the American fighting 

man. What he may have lacked in North 

Africa, if indeed he lacked anything but 

experience, he more than made up for in 

Sicily. On this Italian island, the American infantryman was a first-class fighter, 

in top physical condition, aggressive, al24 The Seventh Army had a peak strength on 

Sicily of 217,000 men; the Eighth Army, a peak 

strength of 250,000 men. See Morison, SicilySalerno-Anzio, p. 223n. 
418 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ways pushing ahead. The tenacious 

defense by the 1st Division at Gela; the 

aggressive, hard-moving actions by the 

157th and 179th Combat Teams at Comiso, Scoglitti, and Vittoria; the 3d Divsian's capture of Agrigento; the 505th 

Parachute Infantry at Biazza Ridge; the 

sweep across western Sicily, where daily 

thirty- and forty-mile foot marches were 

common; the fighting at Bloody Ridge and 

San Fratello; Troina; Randazzo; Brolo; 

all stand in testimony to this man's fighting 

ability. 

Scarcely less notable were the accomplishments of the supporting arms. All of 

these played key parts in keeping the infantrymen moving forward. From the 

first day of the campaign, the field artillery battalions, divisional and nondivisional, provided tremendous support, and 

their actions in Sicily were marked by a 

high degree of success. Events clearly 

demonstrated that well-trained artillery 

units could maintain effective and continuous fire support despite the difficulties 

imposed by mountainous terrain, scarcity 

of good position areas, limited and congested roads, and, at times, a rapid rate of 

advance. Probably the most important 

lesson learned by the artillerymen was the 

necessity for vigorous and aggressive employment requiring continued rapid displacements in order to maintain fire 

support in a fast-moving situation. At no 

time did the artillery fail to deliver requested fires, although there were times 

when the infantrymen complained that 

they were not receiving enough. While 

the island's road net did not permit all of 

the artillery units to stay near the front 

lines at all times, their fires were massed 

when real resistance was encountered. 

As many as nine battalions of artillery were 

placed on a single important target; four 

and five battalions frequently were used on 

a single target. By the end of the campaign, in II Corps alone, over 120,000 

rounds of 105-mm. howitzer, 34,000 

rounds of 155-mm. howitzer, and 6,000 

rounds of 155-mm. gun ammunition had 

been expended. 

Vital, too, was the information gained 

on the value and versatility of the artillery 

observation aircraft. These small aircraft 

-grasshoppers, puddle-jumpers-proved 

most effective in carrying out fire missions 

and, in addition, served in a variety of 

important secondary roles despite the difficulties posed by scarce and restricted airfields. 

The rugged, mountainous country and 

the difficult and limited road net precluded 

any mass action by the one armored division which participated in the campaign. 

Thus, the major role of the tanks took the 

form of rapid pursuit action and, where 

necessary, of assistance to the infantry in 

small units. The confined areas and narrow valleys flanked by high mountains 

provided little space for large-scale armored 

operations. The main operation of the 

2d Armored Division as a whole was the 

rapid and successful dash for Palermo 

which involved a pursuit action from Agrigento to the latter city in only three days. 

The administrative and technical services also provided outstanding support to 

the infantrymen. Engineer support rendered throughout the Seventh Army's 

various zones of action bordered on the 

spectacular. After operating the assault 

beaches, Engineer units pushed inland to 

repair airfields, roads, and bridges, and 

sometimes to act as infantrymen. Despite extensive road demolitions (the Axis 

forces on Sicily demolished 130 highway 

bridges and cratered roads in 40 places), 

mines, and enemy opposition, the Engineer 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

units managed to maintain the Seventh 

Army's limited road net in a most satisfactory manner and contributed largely to 

the successful ground operations. Military police of the Seventh Army, too, operating with a limited number of units, 

contributed to the successful ground operations by relieving the combat units of 

the staggering total of 122,204 prisoners 

of war, of whom almost 75,000 were evacuated to North Africa, while another 

34,000 were granted island paroles. The 

almost 9,000 Seventh Army Signal Corps 

troops rehabilitated 4,916 miles of telephone wire; laid almost 1,800 miles of 

spiral-four cable; and handled over 8,000 

radio messages. The Seventh Army Medical Corps personnel, usually the unsung 

heroes of any campaign, processed 20,734 

hospital admissions of U.S. personnel and 

established two field and six evacuation 

hospitals. Of the total admissions, 7,7 14 

were for wounds or injuries; the other 

13,320 were for diseases, with malaria and 

diarrhea accounting for two-thirds of 

these. Roughly half of the hospital cases 

were evacuated to North Africa, an equal 

number each by air and water. 

Outstanding, too, was the close cooperation between the ground forces and 

the supporting naval units. Even with 

the mistakes made at some of the assault 

beaches-notably in the 180th Infantry's 

sector-the amphibious phase of the operation was an almost unqualified success. 

Certainly no complaints could be raised by 

the ground forces about the naval gunfire 

support so lavishly rendered during the 

first forty-eight hours.25 Naval gunfire 

25 The U.S. cruisers which participated in 

HUSKY fired a total of 7,537 six-inch rounds rendering close support on the southern beaches, and 

another 5,65 I six-inch rounds on the north coast. 

The twenty-four U.S. destroyers fired a total of 

419 

support on both the loth and 1 I th of July 

played a key role in throwing back the 

strong Axis counterattacks near Gela, and 

in paving the way for a resumption of the 

inland movement the following day. 

Throughout the campaign, American 

naval elements continued to furnish support for the Seventh Army divisions, and 

not only in the form of naval gunfire support. On the north coast in particular, 

in addition to the three amphibious end 

runs, the Navy furnished landing craft 

to ferry troops, supplies, and artillery 

pieces around badly damaged sections of 

the coastal highway to facilitate the ground 

advance. And while some complaint 

might be registered over the lack of continuous naval gunfire support at Brolo, 

this would have to be weighed against the 

performance of the naval gunners at Gela, 

Niscemi, Biscari, Scoglitti, Agrigento, and 

San Fratello. 

None of this should be construed to 

mean that HUSKY was a perfect military 

campaign, that there were no flaws in the 

planning and execution of the operation. 

In analyzing the Sicilian Campaign, one 

might naturally question why the original 

plan was ever changed: why the Allied 

armies were bunched on the southeastern 

coast instead of landing at widely separated points and then converging on Messina. The final plan was based on 

anticipation of strenuous Italian resistance. 

The whole approach toward Sicily was 

cautious and conservative. Emphasis was 

on ensuring success and on the avoidance 

of calculated risk or gamble for high stakes 

at little cost. The plan was also designed 

to avoid the possibility of enemy ground 

force superiority at any point. If any sub6,9 I 2 five-inch rounds on both coasts. See Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 222n. 
420 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

task force landing were to fail or miscarry 

through enemy interference, the adjacent 

landings would guarantee numerical superiority over the defenders. 

The final HUSKY plan was for a power 

drive, a frontal assault along a single sector of the coast. At no time during the 

course of planning of the Sicilian invasion 

did the Allied commanders aim to achieve 

an envelopment of the defending forcesto launch the initial attacks behind the 

flanks of the enemy. Even the twopronged attack envisaged in the initial plan 

was designed to gain port facilities, not 

to get between the enemy and Messina. 

In the final plan, the two Allied annies 

were to land abreast and to advance together. This was to minimize the danger 

of having the enemy concentrate against 

one task force at a time. The risks in the 

plan were strictly in the matter of supply 

and mainly affected the Seventh Army. 

Sound, cautious, conservative, the final 

plan was well designed to achieve the occupation of Sicily, the objective set by the 

Combined Chiefs. At the same time, 

Alexander's idea of first consolidating a 

finn base on the southeast corner offered 

little scope for maneuver with the object 

of destroying the enemy garrison. 

In essence, the plan as finally designed 

was Montgomery's. No one except 

Montgomery was particularly happy with 

it. The strategic conception inherent in 

the plan was both disadvantageous to and 

disparaging of the American force. Although the original two-pronged attack 

was based solely on logistical considerations, 

it implied a twofold advance on Messina. 

Each army, having gained its port, would 

advance by its own route to Messina, the 

hinge of Sicily. The defending forces were 

expected either to concentrate against one 

attacking force, leaving the route of advance open to the other, or to withdraw 

quickly to the northeastern corner of the 

island where the two Allied armies would 

converge. The final plan changed all this, 

and embodied an altogether different conception. There would be but one thrust 

against Messina-the drive through Catania along the east coast highway by the 

Eighth Anny. The Seventh Army would 

protect the flank and rear of Montgomery's 

forces. Only reluctantly and under pressure did General Alexander finally consent 

to release the Seventh Army from a subordinate and purely supporting mission. 

The numerous changes in the HUSKY 

plan during the February-May period 

came about as a direct result of the command structure which had been specifically spelled out by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff at Casablanca. For the second 

time-the first had been in North Africaan Allied military operation was to be conducted under the control of a triumvirate 

of commanders, rather than under the 

direction of one. General Alexander (Eisenhower's deputy) was made responsible 

for the ground operations; Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder for air operations; Admiral Cunningham for naval activities. 

General Eisenhower was to act as a sort 

of chairman of the board, to enter into the 

final decision-making process only when 

the board members presented him with 

unsolved problems. If the three board 

members agreed on policy, there was little 

that Eisenhower could do to change the 

policy unless he was willing to dispense 

with the board members' services. Eisenhower was raised involuntarily far above 

the operational level; only indirectly could 

he influence the course of operations once 

that course had been agreed on by his 

committee of three. 

The committee system of command 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

would have been more palatable if the 

headquarters had not been physically separated-if the committee members had 

established and maintained a joint headquarters at a single location. But with the 

invasion of Sicily, Alexander established his 

headquarters on the island; Tedder's headquarters remained in North Africa, near 

Tunis; Cunningham's naval headquarters 

was at Malta; and General Eisenhower's 

staff remained in Algiers. While the separation had little effect on the conduct of 

the campaign during the month of July, although it appears logical to assume that a 

joint headquarters might have prodded 

General Montgomery into doing more on 

the east coast in the way of amphibious 

end runs, one result of maintaining such 

widely separated headquarters became 

painfully evident during the last ten days 

of the operation, when the Axis forces began evacuating the island. A joint plan 

was not drawn up to prevent an enemy 

evacuation from the island. Each of the 

three services operated independently of 

the others, doing what it thought best to 

prevent the evacuation. Since the issue 

was not presented to the chairman of the 

board (General Eisenhower), the issue remained unsolved, and the Germans and 

Italians completed one of the most successful evacuations ever executed from a 

beleaguered shore. 

Furthermore, there was the question of 

air support: whether or not Allied air 

plans were meshed sufficiently with ground 

and naval plans. Simply put, the Allied 

air forces in the Mediterranean refused 

to work out detailed plans in co-operation 

with the army and navy. This was particularly true in the case of the Seventh 

Army-to a much lesser degree in the 

Eighth Army, where Montgomery's relations with the British Desert Air Force were 

421 

somewhat different from Patton's relations 

with the U.S. XII Air Support Command. 

The official air force historians explain 

the airman's views: 

It should be noted that the air plan dealt 

for the most part with broad policies and 

that it had not been integrated in detail with 

the ground and naval plans. This was 

deliberate, and the result of sound strategical and tactical considerations emphasized 

by experience in the Tunisian and Western 

Desert campaigns. There would be no parceling out of air strength to individual landings or sectors. Instead, it would be kept 

united under an over-all command in order 

to insure in its employment the greatest 

possible flexibility. It would be thrown in 

full force where it was needed, and not 

kept immobilized where it was not needed. 

Too, the chief immediate task of the air arm 

was to neutralize the enemy air force, a fluid 

target not easily pinpointed in advance.26 

Primarily concerned with other matters 

-neutralizing enemy air, strategic targets, 

armed reconnaissances, cover over the 

beaches-the Allied air commanders devoted little thought and attention to providing close air support to the ground 

forces during the campaign. During the 

first critical forty-eight hours, no close air 

support missions were flown in support of 

the Seventh Army, and no close support 

missions were handled by the air support 

parties with the II Corps and with the 

assault divisions until 13 July. Even then 

the cumbersome system of requesting missions, with attendant delays in transmission 

and in identifying targets, proved almost 

unmanageable. It resulted in the scrapping of many requested and approved 

missions, and sometimes worked out in 

disastrous ways for friendly forces. 

As regards the execution of the plan, 

26Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH 

to POINTBLANK, p. 445; see also, Slessor, The 

Central Blue, pp. 417-27. 
422 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

questions might well be raised as to the 

conduct of the ground phases of the campaign. The ground assault started auspiciously on 10 July with the greatest 

amphibious attack ever undertaken by any 

armed force. Within seventy-two hours 

after the initial seaborne landings, the two 

Allied armies advancing abreast had practically secured their designated objectives. 

On the east coast, the Eighth Army entered Augusta on the morning of 12 July. 

Thus far, its advance had not been seriously contested. The bulk of the defending forces, particularly the German 

contingent, was off to the west, one portion counterattacking the Seventh Army 

near Gela and Biscari, the other part 

hurriedly moving eastward to block any 

further American advances inland from 

Licata. Catania was almost in sight. 

The only force of any consequence opposing Eighth Army's two assault corps was 

the German Group Schmalz, and this 

force was almost certainly not strong 

enough to stop an aggressive thrust north 

from Augusta. The Seventh Army, for 

its part and after the initial Axis counterattacks at Gela, had pushed on strongly, 

so strongly that its left task force-the 

reinforced 3d Division-had run out of 

objectives and was poised to strike inland 

at the key communications center of Enna. 

Highway 124, the important east-west 

highway, was almost in Seventh Army's 

grasp. Several huge gaps had been 

created in the Axis line, gaps that were 

being held halfheartedly by remnants of 

the Livorno and Napoli Divisions. 

It was at this very point on the evening 

of 12 July, when the Allied armies were 

in the best position of the entire campaign 

for finishing off the Axis defenders quickly 

and pushing on through to Messina, that 

General Alexander, for some unknown 

reason, permitted General Montgomery to 

change the Eighth Army's plans. Instead 

of moving along a single major axis of advance, throwing his army's entire weight 

against the German defenders at Catania, 

Montgomery split his assault corps into a 

two-pronged effort, one prong continuing 

along the east coast highway, the other 

prong swinging to the west across Seventh 

Army's front around Mount Etna. At 

the same time, Alexander changed the 

Seventh Army axis of advance from the 

north to the west and again relegated 

Patton's force to the passive role of guarding Montgomery's flank and rear. For 

all practical purposes, Seventh Army could 

have stayed on the beaches; its brilliant 

assault achievements were completely nullified by the new British plan. 

Why Alexander permitted this to happen has never been satisfactorily explained. 

Seventh Army was moving ahead nicely; 

it almost had Highway 124; the German 

and Italian forces in front of it had been 

practically dissolved or withdrawn. The 

German forces from the west, not really 

strong enough to contest an advance all 

along the line, were still scrambling to the 

east in a desperate effort to close the tremendous gap in the center of the Axis 

line. No enemy force of any size opposed 

either the 1st or 45th Divisions. General 

Bradley, the II Corps commander, was 

ready and willing to take Highway 124 

and Enna, thus encircling the German defenders facing Eighth Army. In North 

Africa, the remainder of the 82d Airborne 

and 2d Armored Divisions lay ready to 

sail for Sicily to reinforce the American 

effort. But apparently it was Alexander's 

distrust of the American fighting man that 

permitted him to accept Montgomery's 

plan of a two-pronged British advance, of 

dividing Eighth Army in the face of the 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

enemy. Or it may be that General Eisenhower's opinion of Alexander-"At times 

it seems that he alters his own plans and 

ideas merely to meet an objection or a 

suggestion of a subordinate, so as to avoid 

direct command methods" -was correct.27 

Alexander's permission given to Montgomery to launch Eighth Army on its illfated two-pronged offensive constituted the 

turning point in the Sicilian Campaign. 

From this date on the course of the campaign could not have proceeded much 

differently. The Axis forces, suddenly relieved of the tremendous American pressure 

along most of their front, were now given 

enough time to prepare strong defensive 

positions in the mountainous interior, and 

the rest of the campaign turned into little 

more-except for Patton's spectacular 

dash into Palermo, almost a publicity 

agent's stunt-than digging the enemy out 

of strongpoints and knocking him off 

mountain tops. It was not until 23 July, 

when General Alexander finally turned 

Seventh Army toward Messina, that even 

these tactics paid off. 

Questions, too, might be raised about 

the tragic confusion which marked the 

four major Allied airborne operations. 

The scattering of the American paratroopers and British glic;lermen on the evening 

of D minus I, followed by the shooting 

down of large numbers of friendly aircraft 

on the evenings of I I and 13 July 1943, 

almost brought American airborne efforts 

in World War II to an end. Much 

disillusionment set in following the disastrous airborne operations, and many responsible officers became convinced that 

the basic structure of the airborne division 

was unsound. 

27 Memo for personal file, II Jun 43, Diary 

Office CinC, Book VI, pp. A-472-A-474. 

423 

Sicily was an especially bitter disappointment for men who had put great 

faith III airborne operations. General 

Swing, American airborne adviser at 

AFHQ, attributed the unsatisfactory results to five principal causes: insufficient 

planning in co-ordinating routes with all 

forces several weeks earlier; the inability 

of troop carrier formations to follow the 

routes, given, partly because of poorly 

trained pilots, and partly because of the 

complicated routes; the rigid requirement 

that naval forces fire at all aircraft at 

night coming within range, regardless of 

their efforts to identify themselves; the unfortunate circumstance wherein an enemy 

bombing raid coincided with the arrival of 

the airborne force; and the failure of 

some ground commanders to warn the 

men manning antiaircraft weapons of the 

expected arrival of the troop carrier formations.28 

General Browning, British airborne expert and the AFHQ airborne adviser, was 

sharp in his criticism of the aerial navigation: 

In spite of the clear weather, suitable 

moon, the existence of Malta as a check 

point only 70 miles from Sicily and the latter's very obvious and easily recognizable 

coast line, the navigation by the troop carrier aircrews was bad. 

The troops comprising both British and 

American Airborne Divisions are of a very 

high quality and their training takes time 

and is expensive. They are given important 

tasks which may acutely affect the operations as a whole. It is essential both from 

the operational and moral point of view 

that energetic steps be taken to improve 

greatly on the aircrews' performance up to 

date. 

28 Memo, Swing, 16 Jul 43, sub: Comments 

on Night Opns, 82d AB Div, Night of D plus 1 

to D plus 2. Photostat inc! with Ltr, Swing 

to Ward, 5 May 50. 
424 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Intensive training in low flying navigation 

by night, especially over coast lines, must be 

organized and carried on continuously. 

This must form part of the aircrews' training before thev reach a theater of war and 

th~ standard set must be very high.29 

General Ridgway, commander of the 

82d Airborne Division, stated weeks later 

that "both the 82d Airborne Division and 

the North African Air Force Troop Carrier Command are today at airborne training levels below combat requirements." 

He emphasized that airborne and troop 

carrier units were "unprepared to conduct 

with reasonable chances of success night 

operations either glider or parachute, employing forces the size of Regimental Combat Teams." 80 

A report on the Sicilian airborne operations by the Fifth Army Airborne Training Center was more blunt: 

The (B2d) Division was in superb physical condition, well qualified in the use of 

infantry arms, in combined ground operations, and in individual jumping. It was 

extremely deficient in its air operations. 

The (S2d) Troop Carrier Wing did not 

cooperate well. Training was, in general, 

inadequate. Combat efficiency for night 

glider operations was practically zero. The 

combined force of (82d) Airborne Division 

and troop carrier units was extremely deficient.ill 

Allied airborne operations did live up to 

some expectations, but they might have 

29 Browning Rpt, 24 Jul 43, Incl 6 with AFHQ 

Proceedings of Board of Officers. 

30 Ltr, Ridgway to OPD, 6 Nov 43, in AFTCC 

353 (AB Training), quoted in AAF, 1 Troop Carrier Command, The Operational Training Program, pp. 296-97. 

31 Brief of Rpt of AB Opn, HUSKY, I7 Sep 

43, Incl with OPD Memo 319.1 (r5 Aug 43) 

for CofS U.S. Army, 20 Sep 43; quoted in AGF 

Study 25, p. 47; also see extracts of Billingslea 

Rpt, in AB Overseas Rpts, ATTNG, AB Br. 

been far more vital in the conquest of Sicily had the airborne troops been dropped, 

not between the reserves and the beach 

defenses, but en masse on the central plateau, where they could have assembled 

with little interference and then struck 

aggressively at the enemy's rear. 32 

In some respects Allied airborne operations in Sicily bear certain similarities to 

the German airborne invasion of Crete. 

In each case the attacker considered the 

operation a disappointment, while the defender considered the operation a more or 

less spectacular success. Each operation 

was something of a turning point in the 

airborne effort of both sides. For the 

Germans, Crete was the end of major airborne operations. For the Allies, Sicily 

was only the beginning of airborne operations on an even larger scale. 

Mter Sicily, however, it was not certain 

that airborne divisions were here to stay. 

The reaction of the Army Ground Forces 

in the United States was that the airborne 

program had been overemphasized. They 

could see no immediate requirement for 

the airborne strength which had been 

assembled, and were willing to abandon 

the idea of special airborne divisions. 

AGF suggested that the airborne divisions 

then in being be reorganized as light divisions. Parachute units would be removed 

and the light divisions would be given a 

variety of special training. Whenever an 

airborne operation was contemplated, then 

the light division could be trained, preferably in the theater, for that specific operation. Parachute units would be organized into separate battalions, after the 

fashion of the armored infantry battalions, 

32 As suggested by General Swing in a letter 

to General Ward,s May 1950. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

and would then be grouped as necessary 

for training and tactical employment.33 

At the same time, writing from North 

Africa, General Eisenhower also suggested 

a reorganization: 

I do not believe in the airborne division. 

I believe that airborne troops should be reorganized in self-contained units, comprisin~ 

infantry, artillery, and special services, all 

of about the strength of a regimental combat team. Even if one had all the air 

transport he could possibly use the fact is at 

any given time and in any given spot only 

a reasonable number of air transports can 

be operated because of technical difficulties. 

To employ at any time and place a whole 

division would require a dropping over such 

an extended area that I seriously doubt 

that a division commander could regain 

control and operate the scattered forces as 

one unit. In any event, if these troops were 

organized in smaller, self-contained units, a 

senior commander, with a small staff and 

radio communications, could always be 

dropped in the area to insure necessary 

coordination.34 

Opposing this trend was General Swing, 

who had served as an airborne adviser in 

Allied Forces Headquarters and who was 

now at the Airborne Command in the 

United States. He protested that these 

views were based upon a campaign marked 

by certain adverse conditions which were 

remediable. He pointed to the Markham 

valley operation in New Guinea (September 1943) as an example of what could 

be done with proper training and planmng. His conclusion was that airborne 

divisions were sound and that the successful employment of those divisions required 

33 Memo, CG AGF for CofS U.S. Army, 22 

Sep 43, sub: Rpt of Board on AB Opns, file 

353/17 (AB). 

34 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 Sep 43, 

Misc Exec File, bk. 12, case 80; extracts in 

CPS 91/1, 19 Oct 43, ABC 322 (23 Sep 43)· 

425 

careful and exact planning and co-ordination with the major ground effort. In this 

connection, General Swing recommended, 

as he bad done earlier, that an airborne 

staff section be established in each theater 

to assist the theater commander in taking 

full advantage of the capabilities of alrborne unit~.35 

In a later study of the subject, the 

American and British Combined Staff 

Planners saw nothing in combat experience, either British or American, which 

indicated that the division was not the 

proper organization for airborne troops. 

Taking cognizance of the expressed views 

of Eisenhower, Swing, and others, the 

planners recommended that no changes be 

made in that structure until further experience indicated' the need for a change.as 

This recommendation was accepted by 

both Americans and British. It had been 

a near thing for the airborne effort. For 

with the loss of the division structure and 

a reversion to battalion size units only, the 

airborne units would have been no more 

effective than if they had retained the 

same mission originally contemplated for 

them in the days before the war-the 

seizure of an airhead for the benefit of airtransported infantry units. 

Patton 

The campaign had done more from an 

American viewpoint than deal tbe enemy 

a serious blow and prove the abilities of 

the American soldier. The campaign also 

had produced an American field commander, who, on the one hand, by his 

35 Ltr, Swing to CG AGF, 4 Oct 43, sub: 

Overseas Rpts on AB Opns, AGF AB Mise 1942-

1945/15, ATTNG, Air 2d AB Brigade. 

36 App. A, CPS 91/1, 19 Oct 43, ABC 322 

(23 Sep 43). 
426 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

verve, elan, and professional ability, had 

captured the fancy of his troops and the 

American public, and on the other hand, 

because of some of his actions, had incurred severe, even hostile, criticism from 

his superiors, his troops, and the public. 

This commander was General Patton. 

Having first emerged as a colorful, capable leader in North Africa, Patton in the 

Sicilian Campaign had developed as the 

American answer to Montgomery. Part 

of Patton's distinction was sheer histrionics-the characteristic riding breeches 

and the pearl-handled pistols that set him 

apart, gave him a trademark. Of a piece 

with this was the fervor with which he 

pursued a relatively empty but nonetheless 

spectacular objective like Palermo. 

But, as even his severest critics would 

admit, Patton had done a masterful job. 

He had created a battle-worthy field army 

and shaped it in his own image-tenacious, 

bold, aggressive, resourceful, an army 

imbued with Patton's own passion for 

beating the British to Messina. Yet in the 

process, under the pressure of the same 

consuming drive which brought achievement, Patton had proven himself cold, 

uncompromising, and even cruel in dealing 

with any subordinate who seemed to be 

remiss or who might hinder him in attaining his goals. 

If the subordinate was a division commander, like General Allen, who felt the 

lash of Patton's tongue on the beaches 

near Gela, or like General Truscott, who 

questioned what he considered too much 

haste in the end run at Brolo and drew for 

his protests stinging rebuke, there would 

be no widespread repercussions. But when 

these hard, personal methods, exaggerated 

by moments of rage, reached down to 

private soldiers in a war-swollen army, 

closely, even jealously watched by the peopIe at home, the situation could be 

different. 

Two incidents involving hospitalized 

privates came close to damaging the morale of the Seventh Army and even closer 

to knocking Patton from the military pedestal to which the Sicilian Campaign had 

elevated him. These two incidents did 

not affect the actual conduct or outcome 

of the campaign, but, like the debacle of 

the airborne reinforcement, their scandalous nature and the attendant publicity 

have made them an integral part of the 

story of the campaign, sometimes to the 

point of eclipsing the achievements of the 

Seventh Army in Sicily and of Patton himself. These were the two so-called "slapping incidents" involving General Patton 

and two soldiers whom he suspected of 

malingering. 37 

The first of the incidents took place on 

3 August in the receiving tent of the 15th 

Evacuation Hospital (Lt. Col. Charles N. 

Wasten), then in the I st Division's area 

near Nicosia, during one of Patton's periodic visits to medical installations supporting Seventh Army. Patton, in company with General Lucas, entered the 

receiving tent escorted by Colonel Wasten 

and other medical officers assigned to the 

hospital, spoke to various patients, and 

especially commended the wounded men. 

Then he came upon a private from Company L, 26th Infantry, who had just re37 Information on the slapping incidents has 

been drawn from the official reports of the incidents, actions taken by General Eisenhower, 

and Patton's actions found in Diary Office CinC, 

Book IX, pp. A-9 I 5-A-922; papers and telegrams in reference to the incidents in Smith Papers, box 5; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 

'79-8,3; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 160-62; 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 

393, 403, 450 ; Semmes, Portrait of Patton, pp. 

165-66, 168-72; Lucas Diary, pp. "I, "3-

15, 141-43. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

cently arrived in the hospital area with a 

preliminary diagnosis made at the clearing 

station of "psychoneuroses anxiety statemoderate severe." 38 Approaching, Patton asked the soldier what the matter was. 

The man replied: "I guess I can't take 

it." Patton immediately flew into a rage, 

cursed him, slapped the private soldier 

across the face with his gloves, and finally 

grabbed him and threw him out of the 

tent.sll In General Lucas's words: "\Ve 

stopped at an Evacuation Hospital before 

reaching Nicosia to visit the wounded boys 

and try to cheer them up. Brave, hurt, 

bewildered boys. All but one, that is, 

because he said he was nervous and 

couldn't take it. Anyone who knows him 

can realize what that would do to George. 

The weak sister was really nervous when 

he got through." 40 

Patton concluded the inspection of the 

hospital's facilities, toured the front lines, 

and returned to his headquarters where he 

had the following memorandum prepared 

and distributed to his senior commanders: 

It has come to my attention that a very 

small number of soldiers are going to the 

hospital on the pretext that they are nerv38 Rpt, Lt Col Perrin H. Long to Surgeon, 

NATOUSA, 16 Aug 43, sub: Mistreatment of 

Patients in Receiving Tents of the 15th and 93d 

Evacuation Hospitals, Diary Office CinC, Book 

IX, pp. A-915-A-9 I 6. 

39 Long Rpt, 16 Aug 43, Diary Office CinC, 

Book IX, pp. A'915-A-916; Semmes, Portrait of 

Patton, pp. 165-66; Cf. Lucas Diary, pp. 114-

15· 40 Lucas Diary, p. I I I. After the war, General Lucas wrote that he could see nothing serious 

about the incident at the time. ''There are always a certain number of such weaklings in any 

Army," he noted in his diary, "and I suppose 

the modern doctor is correct in classifying them 

as ill and treating them as such. However, the 

man with malaria doesn't pass his condition on 

to his comrades as rapidly as does the man with 

cold feet nor does malaria have the lethal effect 

that the latter has." Lucas Diary, pp. 113-14. 

427 

ously incapable of combat. Such men are 

cowards, and bring discredit on the Army 

and disgrace to their comrades who [sic] 

they heartlessly leave to endure the danger 

of a battle which they themselves use the 

hospital as a means of escaping. 

You will take measures to see that such 

cases are not sent to the hospital, but are 

dealt with in their units. 

Those who are not willing to fight will be 

tried by Court-Martial for cowardice in the 

face of the enemy.41 

Apparently, this particular incident 

caused no serious repercussions on the island or at Allied Force Headquarters in 

North Africa. Nor did General Lucas 

mention the incident to General Eisenhower on his return to North Africa on 

6 August. Patton, himself, was not overly 

concerned with the incident, and in his diary noted: "I gave him the devil, slapped 

his face with my gloves and kicked him 

out of the hospital. . . . One sometimes 

slaps a baby to bring it to." 42 

The soldier, in the meantime, had been 

picked up by a hospital corpsman after 

being thrown out of the receiving tent and 

had been taken to a ward tent where he 

was found to be running a high fever and 

where he gave a history of chronic diarrhea. Two days later, the final diagnosis 

in his case was made: chronic dysentery 

and malaria, and on 9 August the man 

was evacuated to North Africa.43 

Just the day after the ailing soldier was 

sent off the island, General Patton 

dropped in unexpectedly at the 93d Evacuation Hospital (Col. D. E. Currier) 

41 Seventh Army Memo to Corps, Div, and 

Separate Brigade CO's, 5 Aug 43, 107-10.2, 

NARS. 

42 Semmes, Portrait of Patton, pp. 165-66. 

43 Long Rpt, 16 Aug 43, Diary Office CinC, 

Book IX, pp. A-9 15-A-9 16; AFHQ Out Msg 

W-629 I to AGWAR, 27 Nov 43, Smith Papers, 

box 5. 
428 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

where he was met by Maj. Charles B. 

Etter, the hospital's receiving officer, and 

taken to the receiving tent, where fifteen 

patients had just arrived from the front. 

Patton started down the line of cots, asking each man where he had been hurt and 

how, and commending each. The fourth 

man Patton reached was a soldier from 

Battery C, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, 

who had been previously diagnosed at a 

clearing station as suffering from a severe 

case of shell shock. He was huddled on 

his bunk and shivering. Patton stopped 

in front of the bed and, as was his way, 

asked the soldier what the' trouble was. 

The man replied, "It's my nerves," and 

began to sob. Patton, instantly furious, 

roared, "What did you say?" The man 

again replied, "It's my nerves," and continued, "I can hear the shells come over, 

but I can't hear them burst." 

Patton turned impatiently to Major 

Etter and asked, "What's this man talking 

about? What's wrong with him, if anything? " Etter reached for the soldier's 

chart but before the doctor could answer 

Patton's questions, Patton began to rave 

and rant: "Your nerves, Hell, you are just 

a goddamned coward, you yellow son of 

a bitch." At this point, Colonel Currier 

and two other medical officers entered the 

receiving tent in time to hear Patton yell 

at the man, "You're a disgrace to the 

Army and you're going right back to the 

front to fight, although that's too good for 

you. You ought to be lined up against 

a wall and shot. In fact, I ought to 

shoot you myself right now, goddam you! " 

With this, Patton reached for his pistol, 

pulled it from its holster, and waved it in 

the soldier's face. Then, as the man sat 

quivering on his cot, Patton struck him 

sharply across the face with his free hand 

and continued to shout imprecations. 

Spotting Colonel Currier, Patton shouted, 

"I want you to get that man out of here 

right away. I won't have these other 

brave boys seeing such a bastard babied." 

Reholstering his pistol, Patton started 

to leave the tent, but turned suddenly and 

saw that the soldier was openly crying. 

Rushing back to him, Patton again hit 

the man, this time with such force that 

the helmet liner he had been wearing was 

knocked off and rolled outside the tent. 

This was enough for Colonel Currier, who 

placed himself between Patton and the 

soldier. Patton turned and strode out of 

the tent. As he left the hospital, Patton 

said to Colonel Currier, "I meant what I 

said about getting that coward out of 

here. I won't have those cowardly bastards hanging around our hospitals. 

We'll probably have to shoot them sometime anyway, or we'll raise a breed of 

morons." 44 

General Patton left the hospital area, 

still fuming "about the cowardice of people who claimed they were suffering from 

psychoneuroses" and exclaiming that 

"they should not be allowed in the same 

hospital with the brave wounded men," 

and went forward to General Bradley's 

headquarters where he casually mentioned 

what had just happened.45 So casual 

was Patton about the incident that General 

Bradley tended to disregard the whole matter. 46 For the soldier, the preliminary 

diagnosis made of his case was later fully 

44 The accoun t of this episode has been reconstructed from Long Report, 16 Aug 43, Diary 

Office CinC, Book IX, pp. A-gIS-A-gI6; Report by Demaree Bess (Associate Editor, Saturday Evening Post) submitted to General Eisenhower on I 9 Aug 43; Eisenhower, Crusade in 

Europe, p. 180; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 

160-61. 

45 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 180. 

46 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 160. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

confirmed by the 93d Evacuation Hospital's psychiatrist. 4 7 

Two days later, on 12 August, Bradley 

had cause to remember Patton's casual 

mention of the incident. Colonel Currier 

had submitted a report through the II 

Corps surgeon on the incident at his hospital, and Gen. William B. Kean, Bradley's 

chief of staff, rushed it into the II Corps 

commander's trailer. No one else at II 

Corps headquarters had seen the communication, which was a full report of the 

occurrence. Bradley instructed Kean to 

lock the report in a safe and to do nothing 

more about the matter. 48 Other than 

going directly to Eisenhower with the report, which would mean jumping channels, 

there was little else General Bradley could 

do. He was still under Patton's command, and forwarding the report to 

Seventh Army headquarters probably 

would have accomplished nothing. This 

was General Eisenhower's problem and 

General Bradley apparently did not want 

to be a party to accusing the Seventh 

Army commander of any wrongdoing. 

By this time, however, the incident was 

common knowledge all over the island. 

An account of it had been carried back 

orally to Allied Force Headquarters press 

camp by three reputable newsmen who 

had been covering the fighting on Sicily. 

One of the correspondents stated that 

there were at least 50,000 American soldiers on Sicily who would shoot Patton if 

they had the chance; a second felt the 

Seventh Army commander had gone tem· 

porarily insane. Just a few days later, 

another correspondent brought in a detailed written report of what had happened at Colonel Currier's hospital. Thus 

47 Bess Rpt, Diary Office CinC, Book IX, pp. 

A-9 I 7-A-9 I 9. 

48 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 160. 

429 

far, none of the correspondents had filed 

a story on either of the slapping episodes. 

They realized the seriousness of the incidents, and the impact such a story would 

have on the public in the United States; 

they were willing to hush the story at their 

end for the sake of the American effort.49 

General Eisenhower had already acted 

in the matter. On 16 August the Supreme Allied Commander had in his 

hands a detailed report of the two incidents prepared by NATOUSA's surgeon's 

office. General Eisenhower was shocked 

by the report, but determined to give Patton a chance to explain. On the following day, 17 August, Eisenhower wrote a 

personal letter to his senior American subordinate, a letter which offered Patton a 

chance to deny the allegations made 

against him, but which also included a 

strong rebuke if all, or any part of, the 

allegations proved correct. 

Though General Eisenhower planned 

no formal investigation, in the letter to 

Patton, delivered personally by a general 

officer, he indicated his feelings. "I am 

well aware of the necessity for hardness 

and toughness on the battlefield," Eisenhower wrote. "I clearly understand that 

firm and drastic measures are at times 

necessary in order to secure desired objectives. But this does not excuse brutality, 

abuse of the sick, nor exhibition of uncontrollable temper in front of subordinates." While Eisenhower felt that Patton's "personal services" as commander 

of Seventh Army had been of immense 

value to the Allied cause during the Sicilian 

fighting, he stated bluntly that "if there is 

49 AFHQ Out Msg W-629 I to AGWAR, 27 

Nov 43, Smith Papers, box 5; AFHQ Out Msg 

W-6017 to AGWAR, 24 Nov 43, same file; 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 

393, 40 3. 
430 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

a very considerable element of truth in 

the allegations accompanying this letter, I 

must so seriously question your good judgment and your self-discipline as to raise 

serious doubts in my mind as to your future usefulness." The Allied commander 

then stated that if any of the allegations 

were true, Patton was to make amends, 

"apology or otherwise," to the individuals 

concerned, and stated baldly that "conduct 

such as described in the accompanying 

report will not be tolerated in this theater 

no matter who the offender may be." 50 

At the same time, General Eisenhower 

ordered General Lucas to Sicily to talk to 

Patton, and sent the theater inspector general to the island to see what effect Patton's conduct had had on Seventh Army. 

Lucas arrived in Palermo on 2 I August 

and spoke in a "kindly but very firm" tone 

to the Seventh Army commander. By 

this time, Patton had received Eisenhower's letter, and Lucas found him 

"chastened" and agreeable to "everything 

I suggested including never doing such 

things again." 51 Lucas knew of General 

Eisenhower's strong feelings about Patton's actions and realized Patton was in 

serious danger of being relieved. As far 

as the inspector general was concerned, he 

felt that no great harm had been done to 

Seventh Army by Patton's conduct.52 

Patton, apparently not fully realizing the 

seriousness of his actions at the evacuation 

hospitals-"evidently I acted precipitately 

and on insufficient knowledge" -felt that 

"my motive was correct because one cannot permit skulking to exist." 53 He re50 Ltr, Eisenhower to Patton, 17 Aug 43, Diary 

Office CinC, Book IX, pp. A-g 1 6-A-g q. 

51 Lucas Diary, p. 142. 

52 AFHQ Out Msg W-6oq to AGWAR, 24 

Nov 43, Smith Papers, box 5. 

53 Semmes, Portrait of Patton, p. 16g. 

gretted what had happened more because 

of making "Ike mad when it is my earnest 

desire to please him." 54 But he set about 

making amends before answering General 

Eisenhower's letter. He talked to the two 

soldiers, explained his motives, and apologized for his actions. "In each case I 

stated I should like to shake hands with 

them, and in each case they accepted my 

offer." 55 Then, acting on General Lucas' 

suggestions, Patton talked to the medical 

personnel who were present when the 

incidents occurred and expressed his regrets for "my impulsive actions." And, 

finally, he addressed all Seventh Army divisions and expressed his regret "for any 

occasions when I may have harshly criticized individuals." 56 

On 29 August, Patton sent his reply 

to General Eisenhower, assuring the senior 

American commander in the theater that 

he had had no intention of "being either 

harsh or cruel in my treatment of the two 

soldiers in question. My sole purpose 

was to try and restore in them a just appreciation of their obligation as men and 

as soldiers." Continuing, Patton recalled 

a World War I incident when a close 

friend lost his nerve "in an exactly analogous manner." After suffering years of 

mental anguish, Patton wrote, his friend 

had committed suicide. "Both my friend 

and the medical men with whom I discussed his case assured me that had he 

been roundly checked at the time of his 

first misbehavior, he would have been restored to a normal state." It was recalling 

this incident, Patton stated, that caused 

him to "inaptly" try "the remedies sug54 Ibid. 

55 Ltr, Patton to Eisenhower, 2g Aug 43, Diary 

Office CinC, Book IX, p. A-g20. 

56 Ibid. See also Semmes, Portrait of Patton, 

p. 170. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

gested," and, "after each incident I 

stated to officers with me that I felt I had 

probably saved an immortal soul." 57 

Patton's admission of the allegations 

contained in the I 6 August report placed 

General Eisenhower in a most difficult 

posltlOn: were the incidents sufficiently 

damaging to Patton and to his standing in 

Seventh Army to relieve him? Eisenhower could rationalize the incidents, although he admitted that Patton's behavior 

was undeniably brutal. He knew that 

Patton was impulsive and was, when the 

incidents occurred, in a "highly emotional state." 58 Eisenhower wanted Patton "saved for service in the great battles 

still facing us in Europe." 59 He did not 

want to get rid of the general "who had 

commanded an army in one of our country's most successful operations and who is 

the best ground gainer developed so far by 

the Allies." 60 Weighing one set of facts 

against the other, General Eisenhower 

concluded that Patton was too valuable a 

man to lose, and he determined to keep 

him in command of Seventh Army.61 

57 Ltr, Patton to Eisenhower, 29 Aug 43, 

Diary Office CinC, Book IX, p. A-920. 

58 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 181. 

59 Ibid. 

60 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p. 393· 

B1 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 181; 

AFHQ Out Msg W-60I7 to AGWAR, 24 Nov 

43, Smith Papers, box 5. 

431 

He then called in the group of reporters 

who had brought the story over from Sicily, explained what actions had been taken, 

and his reasons for keeping Patton in 

command of Seventh Army. The correspondents were satisfied and voluntarily 

declined to file stories back to the States. 

As far as AFHQ was concerned, the matter was closed.62 

Although much was later said about 

the Patton incidents when a reporter, 

fresh from the United States, got wind of 

the story and released it over the radio in 

November 1943, Eisenhower did not 

waver in his decision to back General 

Patton. Writing then, Eisenhower said 

simply, "I still feel my decision sound," 

and refused to rescind it.63 But the incidents did convince General Eisenhower 

that the horizon of Patton's command 

role was limited. In a later message to 

General Marshall, Eisenhower stated emphatically: "In no event will I ever advance Patton beyond Army command " 64 

62 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 182; 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 

40 3. 

63 AFHQ Out Msg W-60q to AGWAR, 24 

Nov 43, Smith Papers, box 5; see also Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, p. 182; Butcher, My Three 

Years With Eisenhower, p.' 450; AFHQ Out Msg 

W-629 I to AGWAR, 27 Nov 43, Smith Papers, 

box 5; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 16I. 

64 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Dec 43, 

Diary Office CinC, Book IX, p. A-973. 

PART THREE 

THE SURRENDER 

CHAPTER XXII 

The QUADRANT Conference and 

the Quebec Memorandum 

Even as the military operations on 

Sicily neared an end, President Roosevelt 

and Prime Minister Churchill, together 

with their chief military and political advisers, in August 1943 met in conference 

at Quebec. Code-named QUADRANT, this 

meeting was the focal point in the formulation of Allied strategy for the second 

half of 1943. Marking a new stage in 

the Anglo-American strategic argument 

toward delimiting Mediterranean operations and solidifying the cross-Channel 

plan, the conference incidentally and accidentally provided the final conditions for 

Italian surrender, determined the methods 

of applying the terms, and gave final 

approval to an invasion of the Italian 

mainland. 

Strategic Issues at Quebec 

Toward the end of July, the Joint War 

Plans Committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs 

of Staff had suggested that the decisive 

action against the Axis had already taken 

place in the successful Russian counteroffensive against the Germans, together 

with the Anglo-American superiority established in the air and on the sea. Since 

Germany, the committee said, was no 

longer capable of defeating the Soviet 

armies, the assumption that Anglo-American power had to be directed primarily 

to relieve the pressure on Russia was no 

longer valid. Hence, the argument ran, 

the cross-Channel attack could not inflict the decisive defeat on Germany; it 

could only, in conjunction with continued Russian advances, deliver the final 

blow. The members also suggested that 

an inflexible adherence to the crossChannel concept was incorrect; that the 

decision to remove seven battle-tested diVISIOns from the Mediterranean was 

unsound. Robbing the Mediterranean offensive of momentum might nullify the 

attempt to knock Italy out of the war or 

to exploit Italian collapse into an invasion of southern France. Furthermore, 

the committee believed that the Allies had 

not given due consideration to the possibility that Germany might defend Italy 

with strong forces.! 

The return of seven divisions from the 

Mediterranean to the United Kingdom 

by 1 November was the crucial agreement 

through which General Marshall had 

sought to make it possible to direct the 

weight of Anglo-American power into the 

cross-Channel blow, thereby limiting the 

Mediterranean offensive to a subordinate 

role. Although some men who served 

1 JPS 231, Operations in the EuropeanMediterranean Area, 1943-1944, Rpt by the 

Joint War Plans Committee, 26 Jul 43, CofS 

381 File. 
436 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

him had doubts, Marshall believed that the 

decisive defeat of Germany could be inflicted on the classic battlegrounds of 

northern France and nowhere else. 

Among the British planners who served 

Churchill, some were quite sympathetic 

with Marshall's strategic view. Yet the 

British Chiefs of Staff had a genuine 

conviction that the elimination of Italy 

from the war was a prerequisite for a 

successful cross-Channel attack, and that 

everything possible should be done to make 

sure that the attack against Italy would 

knock it out of the war. 

Despite the qualifications and shadings 

around the edges of agreement, an acute 

conflict of views prevailed between 

Churchill and Marshall. The latter held 

resolutely to the concept that the British 

Isles constituted the only base in which to 

gather sufficient power for a decisive blow 

against the heartland of Germany. He 

had no hope for decisive results by an 

offensive into the Balkans, with or without 

Turkish support. He considered attempts 

to reach the German heart by way of the 

Italian peninsula, the Postumia-Ljubljana 

gap, or the Danube valley to be logistically 

and strategically unsound. He did not 

believe it possible to inflict a decisive defeat on the German armies by landing in 

Italy and pursuing them up the ridges of 

the Italian peninsula and over the Alps, 

whether toward Austria or toward France. 

He wanted a main effort in the crossChannel attack, a simultaneous diversionary amphibious landing in southern 

France, and the continued employment of 

limited holding forces in the Mediterranean. This Marshall believed to be the 

best way to achieve decisive defeat of 

Germany in the west. 

Despite the TRIDENT agreements, there 

were indications that Mr. Churchill and 

his advisers shrank from the plan to strike 

the main blow across the Channel in 

1944. At the Algiers conference in late 

May, immediately after TRIDENT, General 

Brooke had privately told General Eisenhower that he would be glad to reconsider 

the cross-Channel project, even to the 

extent of eliminating it from Allied strategy, for he feared that a ground conflict 

in a large theater would be disadvantageous for the Allies and might result in 

tremendous losses.2 Churchill at a later 

date frankly told General Wedemeyer that 

if he had been able to persuade the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Allies would 

have gone through Turkey and the Balkans 

from the south and into Norway on the 

north, thus surrounding the enemy and 

further dispersing his forces. 3 

The British Chiefs of Staff immediately 

after TRIDENT fully recognized the priority 

of operations in the western Mediterranean 

directed by AFHQ over those projected 

by the British Middle East Command: 

ACCOLADE (seizure of the Dodecanese) 

and HARDIHOOD (aid to Turkey to induce 

it to enter the war). They instructed 

General Wilson, the Middle East commander, to make some of his resources 

available to General Eisenhower.4 Despite the American JCS veto against employing American ground forces east of 

Sicily, British strategists kept the AegeanBalkan area in mind as a potential route 

toward the Danube once Italy was knocked 

out of the war. 

During July the British representatives 

2 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 167. Cf. 

Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 520-2 I. 

3 Ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy, 13 Apr 44, OPD 

Mise Exec File, case 61 I, book 18. 

4 Br JP (43) 218 (Final), 21 Jun 43, Rpt by 

Br JPS, sub: Mediterranean Strategy, and CCS 

(43) 134th Mtg, 23 Jun 43, both in job lOA, 

reel 21C. 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 437 

in Washington, on orders from London, 

kept pressing the CCS to allot resources 

to General Eisenhower beyond those allocated at TRIDENT. The JCS, however, 

continued to insist that Eisenhower's invasion of the Italian mainland could be 

made without additional resources. 

When the Secretary of War, Henry L. 

Stimson, visited England in July, he became alarmed by what he heard from 

Churchill and Eden. Mr. Stimson suggested that political reasons made it nece&<;ary to press for a cross-Channel attack. 

Though Mr. Churchill seemed to understand-he "confined his position to favoring a march on Rome with its prestige 

and the possibility of knocking Italy out 

of the war"-Eden contended for carrying the war into the Balkans and Greece. 

Both American and British officers working on plans for the cross-Channel attack 

gave Stimson an impression that the great 

threat to the plan came from the danger 

of becoming too deeply involved in 

the Mediterranean. When Marshall suggested on 16 July that AFHQ study the 

possibility of an amphibious attack in the 

Naples area, Churchill interpreted it as an 

indication that Marshall was shifting from 

his basic position. A transatlantic phone 

call quickly reassured Stimson that he 

knew Marshall's mind better than Churchill did. Yet the check received by the 

British Eighth Army before Catania led 

Churchill to speak of a cross-Channel 

attack as producing a Channel full of 

corpses.5 

The vision of occupying the Italian 

5 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On 

Active Service in Peace and War (New York: 

Harper & Brothers, 1947, 1948), pp. 429-32; 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 

373; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 551-53, 572-

74· 

capital captivated Churchill's mind, and 

Rome was the minimum territorial objective in Italy acceptable to him. Still, he 

told Stimson that if by good luck the 

Allies gained the complete capitulation of 

Italy, he would favor going as far as the 

northern boundary. Stimson received the 

impression that Churchill was looking 

"constantly and vigorously for an easy 

way of ending the war without a transChannel assault." At Algiers, however, 

Stimson was relieved to find EisenhowfT 

in agreement with Marshall's basic ideathe attack on Italy was to be for a limited 

objective, one not impairing or substituting for the cross-Channel attack, but 

rather one that would aid and facilitate 

it. At AFHQ, Mr. Stimson gained the 

impression that the Foggia airfields were 

considered the mam objective of the 

campaign.6 

Upon returning to Washington Mr. 

Stimson on 4 August sent a recommendation to the President. "The main thing 

therefore to keep constantly in mind," he 

wrote, "is that the Italian effort must be 

strictly confined to the objective of securing bases for an air attack and there must 

be no further diversions of the forces or 

materiel which will interfere with the coincident mounting of the ROUND HAMMER 

[cross-Channel] project." 7 

On 9 August, General Marshall called 

on the President in order to ascertain the 

President's views and the American position to be presented at the impending Quebec Conference. Roosevelt stated 

that in a choice between cross-Channel 

invasion and the invasion of the Italian 

mainland he would insist on the former. 

But he felt that more could be done for 

6 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 

432-34; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 160. 

7 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 434. 
438 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the latter than had been proposed. The 

seven battle-tested divisions should be 

moved to England, but perhaps an equal 

number of divisions could go from the 

United States directly to Italy. He stated 

that he would resist an operation into 

the Balkans or any expedition that might 

involve a heavy loss of ships and landing 

craft without the possibility of achieving 

decisive results. He thought that the Allies should secure a position in Italy just 

north of Rome and occupy Sardinia and 

Corsica, thus setting up a serious threat 

to southern France.s 

The following day Secretary of War 

Stimson called on the President. He 

presented a memorandum making a plea 

for holding to the American strategic concept. As a result of talks, personal contacts, and conversations during his recent 

overseas trip, Stimson said, he had reached 

the conclusion that there was no rational 

hope for a successful cross-Channel attack 

under a British commander. He urged 

that the American Government take the 

leadership, insist on a cross-Channel attack, and guarantee its execution by 

securing the appointment of General Marshall as its commander. After reading the 

memorandum, Mr. Roosevelt stated 

that he himself had reached the same 

conclusions.9 

During the few remaining days before 

the conference opened, American policy 

makers, after thorough discussion, formulated their views. The President told the 

Joint Chiefs that he favored setting up a 

great force in Britain as soon as possible. 

Having more American soldiers than 

British for the cross-Channel operation, 

·8 Memo, Marshall for Handy, 9 Aug 43, CofS 

381 File. 

9 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 

43 6-38. 

he said, would make the appointment of 

an American commander easier to secure. 

As for the Mediterranean, the President 

stated that he wished to invade Italy for 

the purpose of establishing bases; he would 

go no farther north than Rome. 10 

The American position to be presented 

at Quebec, therefore, reaffirmed the 

strategy agreed upon in May-because 

"conditions have not changed as to justify 

on sound military grounds the renunciation of the TRIDENT concept." The 

Americans did not wish to jeopardize a 

sound over-all strategy "simply to exploit 

local successes in a generally accepted 

secondary theater, the Mediterranean, 

where logistical and terrain difficulties 

preclude decisive and final operations designed to reach the heart of Germany." 

The essence of American strategy was the 

cross-Channel attack, carefully synchronized with the combined bomber offensive. 

The Mediterranean, strictly delimited to a 

subordinate area, was to be exploited with 

only those resources already available. 

Three phases of operations in Italy were 

forecast: eliminating Italy as a belligerent 

and establishing air bases at least as far 

north as the Rome area; seizing Sardinia 

and Corsica; and maintaining pressure on 

German forces and creating conditions 

favorable for entry into southern FranceY 

The American and British Chiefs of 

Staff opened the argument on 15 August, 

the second day of the conference-the 

day Seventh Army entered Messina. The 

British expressed complete agreement 

10 Ibid., 436-39; MatIoff, Strategic Planning 

for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, pp. 214-16. 

11 CCS 303, 9 Aug 43, sub: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe: Memorandum by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

QUADRANT Conf Book, pp. 72-77; Telg 4751, 

Marshall to Eisenhower, II Aug 43, Smith Papers, box 4. 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 439 

with the Americans in principle, but they 

challenged the phrases used by the Joint 

Chiefs to guarantee the principles. The 

British Chiefs, according to General 

Brooke, were in entire agreement that 

OVERLORD should constitute the major 

offensive for 1944 and that Italian operations should be planned against that background. But they saw operations in Italy 

as creating a situation favorable and even 

necessary for a successful cross-Channel 

attack-by holding down German reserves 

and by bombing German fighter plane 

factories from Italian airfields. Therefore, Brooke said, giving overriding priority 

to the cross-Channel attack over any Mediterranean operation was too binding, for 

sufficient forces had to be used in Italy 

to make the cross-Channel attack possible. 

Suggesting that the Allies could achieve 

far greater success in bombing the fighter 

plane factories in Germany from Po valley 

airfields than from those in central Italy, 

Brooke proposed that the Allies consider 

the line of the Apennines as merely the 

first phase line of their advance, a preliminary for seizing the north Italian plain. 

At this point Admiral King bluntly 

remarked that, as he understood it, "The 

British Chiefs of Staff had serious doubts 

as to the possibility of OVERLORD." The 

British protested that they were thinking 

only of conditions required for a successful 

cross-Channel attack. General Marshall 

then put his finger on the central issue. 

"The essence of the problem," he said, 

"was whether or not the required conditions for a successful OVERLORD could 

only be made possible by an increase of 

strength in the Mediterranean." He 

agreed that the Allies should seize as much 

of Italy as possible if resistance was weak, 

for it would be better if the Allies rather 

than the Germans held the northern airfields. Yet he thought that almost as 

much could be achieved by securing the 

Florence area. On the other hand, 

unless the Allies decided to remove the 

seven divisions from the Mediterranean, 

and unless the Allies gave overriding priority to OVERLORD, the cross-Channel 

operation, he believed, would become 

only a subsidiary operation. The operation would then be "doomed and our 

whole strategic concept would have to be 

recast." 12 

So frank an exchange of views followed 

that the Combined Chiefs preferred not 

to keep a formal record of the discussionP 

Not until I7 August did the American 

Chiefs secure written agreement that 

largely fulfilled their demand for a guarantee of OVERLORD. They did not quite 

get "overriding priority" for the crossChannel operation, but they obtained 

assurance that the Mediterranean theater 

would be subordinate and that the stage 

would be set for only limited operations. 

Ground operations in the Balkans were 

ruled out, and the purpose of an attack 

against southern France was defined as: 

"to establish a lodgment in the ToulonMarseilles area and exploit northward in 

order' to create a diversion in connection 

with OVERLORD." 14 

The Allies thus stipulated OVERLORD as 

the main effort for 1944. But despite 

the cogency of his arguments, General 

Marshall did not obtain a formula for 

the Mediterranean which would serve to 

ward off his most acute fear: the drawing 

off of resources into a secondary theater. 

This was partly due to the general expectation that Italy would promptly surren12 Min, 108th Mtg CCS, 15 Aug 43. 

13 Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 579. 

14 CCS 303/3, 17 Aug 43, sub: Strategic 

Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe, 

QUADRANT Conf Book, pp. 87-88. 
440 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

der and that, in consequence, the Germans 

would withdraw to a line somewhere north 

of Rome. QUADRANT set the Rome area 

as the minimum Allied territorial objective 

in Italy and called for "unremitting pressure" against the German forces in 

"Northern Italy." But in case the Germans did not withdraw to the line of the 

northern Apennines, in case the Italian 

capital did not fall before the momentum 

of the Allied attack, what then? For the 

sake of conquering central Italy, how 

much in men and materiel would the 

Mediterranean theater be permitted to 

absorb at the expense of the cross-Channel 

build-up? In the over-all strategy of the 

war, how much was the occupation of 

the Italian capital and the use of its airfields worth to the Allies once Italy was 

eliminated from the war? QUADRANT 

did not answer these questions because 

the problem was not set in those terms. 

Churchill was fascinated by Rome and 

the prospect of its capture. Marshall 

was profoundly skeptical of the Italian 

theater and considered it the greatest threat 

to the build-up in England required for 

the main blow. 

The QUADRANT Conference devoted but 

little attention to specific plans for 

invading the Italian mainland. The Combined Chiefs had delegated the formulation of precise operations to AFHQ, and 

at the meeting held on the last day of the 

conference, 24 August, Generals Whiteley 

and Rooks presented in outline the plans 

for BAYTOWN (a crossing of the Strait of 

Messina), and AVALANCHE (an assault in 

.the Naples area). The CCS merely 

noted the exposition of General Eisenhower's plans and gave their approvaU5 

15 Min, 1 1 6th Mtg CCS, item 3; Telg, Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, 25 Aug 43, OPD 

300.6 Security (OCS Papers). 

The Mission of General Castellano 

In Rome, General Castellano, who hated 

the Germans for their ill-concealed contempt for Italian officers and soldiers, 

watched with growing alarm the increasing German occupation of northern Italy. 

One of the chief conspirators against Mussolini and predisposed to political activity, 

he saw a means for saving Italy and the 

House of Savoy only in shifting sides in 

the war, a feat which that House had 

often performed with dexterity in the 17th 

and 18th centuries when it ruled Piedmont 

only. Disappointed in the outcome of 

Mussolini's overthrow and regarding Badoglio as a fool for not recognizing Italy's 

obvious course, Castellano flung himself 

with ardor into the task of making contact 

with the Allies. 16 

Castellano was not alone in searching 

for a way to avert the intolerable situation into which Italy was drifting because 

of the lack of firm direction by the King 

and Badoglio. Many individuals on 

lower levels of authority were formulating 

and advocating courses of action for the 

government. Generale di Brigata Umberto Utili and Generale Addetto al Capo 

di Stato Maggiore Giacomo Zanussi of 

Roatta's headquarters, for example, urged 

an immediate break with the Germans independent of agreement with the Allies, 

for they believed that the resulting ItaloGerman conflict would draw the Allies 

into Italy on the Italian side. Though 

less attractive after I August, this course 

16 To borrow a phrase from Churchill, Castellano's tragedy was in trying "to carry out a 

major and cardinal operation of war from a 

subordinate position," and, as Churchill warns, 

"Men are ill-advised to try such ventures." 

Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World War," 

vol. II, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin Company, 1949), p. 15. 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 441 

of action was suggested even after the 

Tarvis conferenceY 

In contrast to this point of view, Ambrosio, Francesco Rossi, his deputy chief 

of staff, and Castellano, felt that the Italians had to oppose the Germans, but only 

after reaching agreement for military cooperation with the Allies.18 Guariglia, 

the Foreign Minister, wished military and 

political agreements with the Allies, but 

he wanted the negotiations to be conducted 

by diplomatists. He preferred not to conclude an armistice with the Allies until 

they had landed on the mainland and 

could occupy and defend Rome. 

Ambrosio pushed for action, but, having great respect for Badoglio, he would 

go no further than the marshal wished. 

Badoglio would take no step except on 

the explicit word of the King. The King, 

however, refused to take any step that 

would lead to a break with the Germans.l~ 

In this situation Castellano acted. 

After conversations with Roatta, Utili, 

and Zanussi on 9 August, Castellano 

urged Ambrosio to see the King on the 

problem of reaching agreement with the 

Allies. Italy, Ca.'ltellano felt, should not 

surrender, but go over to the Allied side. 

An Italian emissary, he thought, should be 

sent immediately to make contact with 

the Allies. The emissary should have 

documentary instructions and credentials 

authorizing him to make agreements for 

military collaboration. After reaching 

agreement, the Italians would turn against 

the Germans. 

At an audience granted to Ambrosio on 

17 Castellano, Come firmai, p. 78; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrofe, vol. II, pp. 49-5 I. 

18 Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. "3-18, 12 I ; 

Castellano, Come firmai, p. 78. 

19 MS #P-058, Project 46, I Feb-8 Sep 43, 

Question II. 

10 August, the King assented to Ambrosio's proposal for sending a representative 

to the Allies, but the monarch declined to 

furnish any credentials or written instructions. Guariglia, when consulted by Ambrosio, was not enthusiastic over an 

additional emissary; he preferred to await 

the outcome of the missions of D' Ajeta 

and Berio, and he declined to send a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 

accompany another emL'Ssary. Thus far, 

the Italian military men did not know the 

full scope of the D' Ajeta and Berio missions. It was Badoglio who decided that 

a military man should be sent, and Castellano was chosen. 

Ambrosio alone instructed Castellano. 

Castellano was to negotiate only with 

Allied military representatives. He was 

to furnish them military information. He 

was to agree with them on a common plan 

of action against the Germans. Though 

he received no written instuctions, he 

secured from Acquarone a letter of introduction by Sir D' Arcy Osborne to Sir 

Samuel Hoare, the British Ambassador at 

Madrid. Guariglia at first declined to issue an individual passport for Castellano, 

arranging instead for Castellano to travel 

on a collective passport being provided 

several diplomatic officials bound for Portugal, but Castellano finally obtained a 

passport for himself made out with the 

fictitious name "Raimondi." 

Before departing from Rome on 12 

August, Castellano saw Guariglia, who 

urged the greatest caution, warning that 

discovery of Castellano's mission would 

mean death to the members of the government. Guariglia reminded Castellano 

that the government was practically a 

prisoner of the Germans and quite unable 

to separate from them unless the Allies 

made it possible. Because Rome was in 
442 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

great danger, Castellano should urge the 

Allies to land on the mainland north of 

the capitaPO 

On that day, General Eisenhower's 

AFHQ diary noted that "what had appeared to be a quick collapse of Italy had 

disappeared into uncertainty...." 21 

And on the following day, Allied bombers 

operating from North Africa and England 

attacked Milan, Turin, Genoa, and Rome 

as a reminder to Badoglio that the Allies 

were in earnest in demanding unconditional surrender. 

The Italians scarcely knew where the 

greater threat lay. The Allied armies 

were making steady progress in Sicily, and 

Allied planes were bombing Italian cities 

at will. In northern Italy, the Germans 

were rapidly consolidating their control. 

The 2d Parachute Division completed its 

move to areas just north and south of 

Rome; elements of the 26th Panzer Division had reinforced the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division near Lake Bolsena; these 

plus the headquarters troops of DB 

SUED at Frascati constituted an immediate threat to Rome. The movement of 

the units under Army Group B into northern Italy was approximately half completed, and even though Rommel's 

headquarters was still at Munich, the 44th 

lnfantry Division controlled the Italian 

side of the Brenner Pass, the Brigade 

Doehla held the entrances to the auxiliary 

passes leading to Bolzano. Along the 

Brenner route, the SS Panzer Division 

Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had moved 

to the Parma area, the 65th Infantry 

Division had moved by the same 

route southwest of Panna, the 24th Pan20 Castellano, Come firm ai, pp. 80-84; 

Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 640-47. 

21 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

p. 386. 

zer Division, destined for Modena, was 

moving into Italy by way of the Tarvis 

Pass, and the 7 ISt Infantry Division was 

to follow and occupy the eastern passes 

into Italy over the Julian Alps. The 

305th Infantry Division, in the Nice area 

since I August, was ready to follow the 

76th Infantry Division, which had moved 

to the Genoese coast. The 94th Infantry Division, not yet in Italy, was awaiting transportation at the entrance to the 

Mount Cenis pass and was poised to gain 

control of the Modane-Bardonecchia sector of the Turin-Lyons railway. Not a 

single German division had moved south 

of Rome in this period, and the Gennan 

intention seemed clear-to seize the Italian capital; to grab the Italian Fleet; to 

pull German forces out of the south and 

defend a line in the northern Apennines.22 

In the meantime, the Allies were tackling the proposals of D' A jeta and Berio. 

Right after his conversation with D' A jeta 

on 4 August, Ambassador Campbell in Lisbon had telegraphed to London the 

substance of D'Ajeta's remarks. From 

Downing Street the report was forwarded to Churchill, who was on the 

point of sailing for Canada. Though 

Churchill had been anxious upon Mussolini's downfall to gain maximum advantage from the political change and to 

turn the "fury" of the Italian people 

against the German "invader," his reaction to the D' A jeta mission was chilly. 

He relayed Campbell's report to President 

Roosevelt without recommendation, commenting only: "D' A jeta never from start 

to finish made any mention of peace terms 

and his whole story, as you will have observed, was no more than a plea that we 

22 Data on German divisions in Italy from 

OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIlI.43, 6-13 Aug 

43· 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 443 

should save Italy from the Germans as well 

as from herself, and do it as quickly as 

possible." 23 

Several days later, when the report of 

the Berio feeler reached London, Churchill was on the high seas and Eden was at 

the Foreign Office. After noting that 

Berio's proposal was an offer to negotiate 

on terms, Eden suggested that the Allies 

take the single course of action in consonance with the Anglo-American public 

declarations: 

Should we not then reply that, as is well 

known, we insist on unconditional surrender, and the Badoglio Government must as 

a first step notify us that Italy surrenders 

unconditionally? Subsequently, at a later 

stage, if the Badoglio Government were to 

do this, we should then inform them of the 

terms on which we should be prepared to 

c~ase hostilities against Italy.2<1 

Though Churchill wrote a note to himself: "Don't miss the bus," he radioed the 

Foreign Secretary: "\Ve agree with the 

course you have taken." When Churchill arrived in Canada on 9 August, he 

sketched out somewhat more fully an appropriate reply. "Badoglio must state," 

the Prime Minister wrote, "that he is 

prepared to place himself unreservedly 

in the hands of the Allied Governments 

who have already made it plain that they 

desire Italy to have a respectable place in 

the new Europe." Yet, as Churchill 

warned Eden, and himself as well, "Merely 

harping on 'unconditional surrender,' with 

no prospect of mercy held out even as an 

act of grace, may well lead to no surrender 

at all." 25 

2 3 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 100; Telg 

55. Churchill to Roosevelt. 5 Aug 43. OPD 

Exec g, Book 1 I. 

24 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. IOI. 

25 Ibid. 

Eden then drafted the full text of a 

reply to be given to Berio in Tangier, a 

draft first forwarded on 12 August to 

President Roosevelt, who approved the 

concept and the precise language. On 

the following day, the day after Castellano departed Rome, Berio received word 

that the Allies were unwilling to negotiate: 

Badoglio must understand that we cannot 

negotiate, but require unconditional surrender, which means that Italian Government 

should place themselves in hands of Allied 

Governments, who will then state their 

terms. These will provide for an honollrable capitulation. 26 

Several days earlier, on 8 August, Mr. 

Harold Tittmann, assistant to the President's Personal Representative to the Pope, 

sent a message through Lisbon that 

reached the Allied leaders in Quebec on 

15 August. Tittmann reiterated the 

Badoglio government's desire to make immediate peace with the Allies, made plain 

its inability to do so because of the German threat to seize control of the Italian 

Government and to occupy the entire 

country. He stated that Badoglio was 

forced to play for time in the hope that 

the Allies would come to Italy's assistance 

by intensifying air warfare against the 

Germans and by landing in the northern 

part of the peninsula. Hitler, the Italians 

insisted, was seeking a suitable pretext to 

occupy Italy.27 

Tittmann sent another message by way 

of Berne on 12 August, a statement that 

reached the Allied leaders on 18 August. 

He repeated that the Badoglio government's chief concern remained the Nazi 

threat of occupation, that the Nazis were 

looking for an excuse to carry out their 

26 Ibid., pp. 102-0 3. 

27 Telg 58, Handy to QUADRANT, KKAD, IS 

Aug 43, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 32. 
444 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

threat, and that if the Italians tried to 

surrender to the Allies, the Gennans would 

undoubtedly take over the country within 

two hours after learning of the effort.28 

To Badoglio's earliest efforts to persuade the Allies that he was not free, that 

he could not unconditionally do anything 

because of the Gennan noose around the 

Italian capital, the Anglo-American leaders 

gave little, if any, attention~no more, in 

fact, than to the question of exactly how 

Badoglio was to surrender unconditionally. 

The capabilities of the Allied navies and 

air forces notwithstanding, the Allies 

could not occupy Rome or any part of 

Italy until Allied ground troops were on 

the Italian mainland. No Allied force 

was in a position to accept a surrender 

and exploit its advantages. 

General Eisenhower saw the close connection between strategy and policy, but 

Churchill and Roosevelt seemed to ignore 

it. The first Italian-Allied exchanges resembled two persons talking to each other 

in their sleep, each the victim of his own 

hallucination. In the nightmare of the 

German occupation, Italy gasped, "Help, 

I am not free." After a long pause, the 

Allies replied, "Say Uncle." Part of the 

Allied reaction came from Churchill's suspicion~"Badoglio admits he is going to 

double-cross someone" ~and Churchill 

was not at all willing to be the victim.29 

Yet there was something decidedly intelligible in what D' A jeta had said at Lisbon on 4 August. He had faithfully 

regurgitated before Ambassador Campbell 

the German order of battle in Italy which 

he had spent hours memorizing. This information would have been helpful to the 

28 Telg 5012, Minister Harrison at Berne to 

State Dept, forwarded to Gen Deane at Quebec 

as Telg 3465, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 36. 

20 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 102. 

Allied military leaders, for AFHQ was 

then toying with plans based on the hope 

of an unopposed landing in the Naples 

area. Unfortunately, Allied diplomatic 

channels were distinctly different and quite 

separate from strategic and military channels. Although General Marshall had 

been careful to keep AFHQ fully informed 

of the negotiations to establish Rome as 

an open city, General Eisenhower learned 

nothing of the D' Ajeta and Berio missions. 30 

Leaving Rome by train on 12 August, 

Castellano intended to present himself to 

the Allies as a representative not of a 

conquered country bowing to the inevitable and asking aid to surrender, but of 

a country that still had sufficient force to 

disown a detested ally and energy enough 

to fight for redemption. The essential 

point he wished to make was that Italy 

asked for help to enable it to join the 

battle on the side of the United Nations. 31 

Traveling as Signor Raimondi of the 

Italian Ministry of Exchange and Currency and in company with a party of 

officials, Castellano arrived in Madrid at 

noon, 15 August. While the party was 

visiting the Prado Museum, Castellano 

took Consul Franco Montanari aside and 

revealed his identity. Swearing Montanari to secrecy and asking him to serve as 

his interpreter, Castellano took him to the 

British Embassy. Montanari was not 

altogether surprised. Before his departure 

from Rome, Guariglia had briefed him 

on Castellano's mission. 32 

Castellano presented his letter of in30 The Capitulation of Italy has no reference to these missions. General Smith told 

Howard Smyth on 13 May 1947 that he, Smith, 

had no knowledge of any Italian overtures prior 

to Castellano's mission. 

31 Castellano, Come {irmai, pp. 86-87. 

32 Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 646; Castellano, Come 

{irmai, pp. 88-90. 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE QUEBEC ME:YIORANDU:Yl 44~) 

troduction, and Sir Samuel Hoare received 

him. Explaining his position as chief of 

Ambrosio's military office, Castellano said 

that his mission was official and that he 

had complete backing from Marshal 

Badoglio. Italy, he declared, was exhausted, the ground forces were poorly 

armed, aviation was weak, and German 

troops were streaming into the country. 

Until the Allies landed on the Italian 

mainland, Castellano said, the government 

was powerless to act. But if and when the 

Allies invaded the mainland, Italy was 

prepared to join them in fighting' the Germans. If the Allies were willing to accept Italian help, Castellano was prepared 

to give detailed information on German 

dispositions and strength. The Italians 

were ready to co-operate with Mihailovitch in the Balkans, to repudiate the independence of Croatia, and to reach 

agreement with Yugoslavia over Dalmatia. 

Attempts had been made to bring Italian 

troops home, all unit'> had been withdrawn from the Russian front, and German units had taken over the duty of 

garrisoning Greece, particularly at Salonika. Because of the rapid build-up of 

German forces in Italy, Badoglio wished 

to take immediate action. Thirteen German divisions were already in Italy, and 

more were arnvmg. The Gernlans, 

Castellano said, planned to defend the 

Genoa-Ravenna line. 

The danger I tall' faced, according to Castellano, was the prospect 

that the Germans would seize control of 

the country. The Germans had threatened to bomb Italian cities and use gas 

if the Badoglio government did not continue in the war. Hating the Germans, 

the Italian people would support a military 

alignment with the Allies. M ussolini and 

the Fascists were discredited. Though 

the Fascist militia had been disarn1ed, it 

was bitterly hostile to the Italian Regular 

Army. If Badoglio could not reach agreement with the Allies, he feared that the 

Germans might re-establish Mussolini in 

power and bring back the militia. If the 

Germans caught Castellano, they would 

kill him. Hence the need for secrecy, and 

the necessity for Castellano to proceed 

under his false name to Lisbon on the 

ostensible mission of meeting the SS Cabo 

de Bueno Esperan:;a, which was bringing home the Italian Ambassador to Chile. 

Castellano had to return to Rome with 

the Ambassador's party some time after 

the 20th of August. 

Sir Samuel asked what the Italians 

would do with respect to the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. Castellano declared: "\'" e are not in a 

position to make any terms. \Ve will accept unconditional surrender provided we 

can join the Allies in fighting the Germans." Stating that his mission was-as 

he firmly believed it to be-to make the 

first official proposal by Italy to the Allies, 

Castellano again expressed his willingness 

to give inforn1ation concerning both the 

Germans and Italians to the British military attache if the British Ambassador 

gave an immediate reply to his proposa1. 

If they could reach agreement, Castellano said, the Italian Army could do much 

to cut the German supply lines. 

Ambassador Hoare expressed no opinion, for he was without instructions, but 

he promised to forward at once Castellano's offer to the British Government. In 

addition, he gave Castellano a letter of 

introduction to Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, the British Ambassador at Lisbon.3s 

,~3 Telgs 1404 and 1406, Hoare to Foreign Office, 15 Aug 43, as repeated in Telg 4488, 

Devers to Eisenhower, 17 Aug 43, in Capitula-
446 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

After leaving the British Embassy, Castellano went to a hotel to make notes of 

his conversation. It occurred to him that 

perhaps he had not been sufficiently explicit in requesting to meet Allied military 

leaders. Nor had he definitely referred 

to the Americans, whom he wished to meet 

as well as the British. He returned to 

the Embassy and asked Hoare whether 

General Eisenhower might send a senior 

staff officer to Lisbon to take part in the 

discussions. That evening, Castellano departed from Madrid in company with 

Montanari and the others of the party. 

Sir Samuel made haste to wire his government a full account of his meeting with 

Castellano. His opinion, based solely on 

the interview, was that the Italian Government was prepared to accept unconditional surrender if the Allies landed on 

the Italian mainland, and if the Italian 

Army could join in the fight against the 

Germans. "'Without these two conditions," he telegraphed, "the Italian Government will not have sufficient courage or 

tion of Italy, pp. 76-77, 79-80; Castellano, 

Come firmai, pp. 91-95; Sir Samuel John Gurney 

Hoare, Viscount Templewood, Ambassador on 

SPecial Mission (London: Collins, 1946), pp. 

212-16. 

The Ambassador's memoirs must be used with 

caution. Though he denies his intent to do so, 

the Ambassador criticizes Allied leadership for 

"the slow motion with which the picture was unfolded which gave the Germans time for sending 

strong reinforcements to Italy." Nor is his accoun t as closely based on letters and daily notes 

as stated in the preface (page 7). The text is 

colored by retrospection. 

The content of Castellano's account agrees 

quite closely with the contemporary telegrams of 

Hoare, except for a slight discrepancy in chronology. Hoare states that the offer of an armistice 

was made to him on 13 August, a Sunday (pages 

2 I 2, 2 16), but the telegrams indicate that he 

received the two Italians on the morning of 15 

August; Castellano states they were not received 

until the afternoon of 15 August sometime after 

1400. 

justification to make a complete volteface and will drift impotently into chaos." 

He recommended that serious attention 

be given to Castellano's proposal, if for 

no other reason than to obtain intelligence 

of German intentions and dispositions. 34 

The Quebec Memorandum 

When Foreign Secretary Eden forwarded Hoare's telegrams to Churchill at 

Quebec, he informed the Prime Minister 

that he had instructed Ambassador Campbell in Lisbon to hold Castellano there, to 

listen to what he had to say, but for 

Campbell to make no reply until he received instructions. Castellano's offer of 

Italian co-operation Eden found tempting, 

but he advised Churchill against accepting the proposal on the ground that it 

might cause the Allies political difficulties. 35 

In Canada, Churchill, in a wire to 

President Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 16 

August, outlined a reply to the Italian 

general. Churchill's draft made no mention of the short terms or of any other 

terms. N or did it state a demand by the 

Allies for unconditional surrender. This 

was implied in the phraseology of Churchill's initial paragraph, which, at the same 

time, excluded any joint Italo-Allied planning of operations prior to Italy's breaking 

with Germany. Churchill said that the 

Allies could make no bargain on the prospect of Italy's changing sides in the war. 

Rather, "by taking action against the 

common enemy, the Italian Government, 

34 Telg 1405, Hoare to Foreign Office, 15 Aug 

43, as repeated in Telg 4488, Devers to Eisenhower, 17 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 79· 

Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 96-98. 

35 Telg 4488, Devers to Eisenhower, 17 Aug 

43, sub: Repeat of Telegrams Sent to QUADRANT 

(Nos. 231, 232, 233, 234), in Capitulation of 

Italy, pp. 76-8 I. 
QUADRANT CONFERENCE AND THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 447 

Army, and people could without any 

bargain facilitate a more friendly relationship with the United Nations." Recogmzmg Badoglio's predicament-Kesselring's forces surrounding Rome and Allied 

forces ready to invade Italy-Churchill 

proposed that Castellano be told: "The 

I talian Government should . . . resist the 

Germans to the best of their ability as 

soon as possible, pending arrival of AngloAmerican armies." Until the Allies arrived, the Italian Government might cut 

German communications in southern Italy, 

safeguard Allied prisoners, sail the fleet to 

Allied ports, provide intelligence information, aid the invasion forces to disembark, 

and co-operate with guerrilla forces in the 

Balkans.36 

On the following day, 17 August, as 

President Roosevelt and Mr. Eden were 

arriving in Quebec, the CCS produced 

what became known as the Quebec Memorandum: "Suggested Action on Italian 

Peace Feelers." Shaping the memorandum were several factors: the unconditional surrender formula, Churchill's 

message to Roosevelt, the approved text 

of the short terms, the still unapproved 

text of the long terms, and an imperfect 

realization of the military difficulties in 

mounting and executing Operation AVALANCHE, the projected invasion of the 

Italian mainland near Naples. 

The CCS in the Quebec Memorandum 

suggested that Eisenhower send two staff 

officers, one American, the other British, 

to Lisbon at once to meet Castellano. 

They were to tell Castellano that: the 

Allies would accept the unconditional surrender of Italy on the conditions of the 

short terms" which were to be handed to 

the Italian emissary; political, economic, 

36 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 103-0 4. 

and financial terms were to be communicated to the Italian Government later; 

though the Allies visualized no "active 

resistance" on the part of Italy in fighting 

the Germans, they expected Italy to hamper German operations, and in return the 

Allies promised to restrict bombing to 

target" affecting the German forces alone; 

hostilities were to cease at a time to be 

determined by General Eisenhower; the 

Italian Government was to proclaim the 

armistice at once and from that time "to 

collaborate with the Allies and to resist 

the Germans"; it was to send Navy, merchant shipping, and aircraft to Allied territory. V ntiI the hour of the armistice, 

the Italians were to institute general passive 

resistance and minor sabotage against the 

Germans, safeguard Allied prisoners of 

war, prevent Italian ships and aircraft 

from falling into German hands, prevent 

the Germans from taking over Italian 

coast defenses, and arrange to march Italian units in the Balkans to coastal areas 

for evacuation by the Allies. If the 

I talians complied, Eisenhower was to have 

authority to soften the armistice terms 

proportionately with the scale of the assistance the Italians rendered to the Allies. Eisenhower was also to arrange for 

a secure channel of communication between him and the Italian Government.37 

This precise course of action laid down 

by the CCS gave General Eisenhower 

:)7 CCS 3' I, 17 Aug 43, sub: Italian Peace 

Feelers, Q1.:ADRA:-;T Conf Book, pp. '41-44; See 

Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAT\" 196, 18 Aug 43, 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 90-92. Churchill 

prints an incomplete text in Closing the Ring, 

pp. 105-06. Most of the memorandum is printed 

in translation by Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 

109-B!. The full title of the Quebec Memorandum is: "Aide-Memoire to accompany conditions of Armistice, presented by General Eisenhower to the Italian C-in-C." See File 10,000/ 

136/584; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 580-82. 
448 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

authority to bring about the surrender of 

Italy, but no power to negotiate. He was 

not to reveal his military plans to Badoglio's representative. He was to announce 

the armistice a few hours before the execution of AVALANCHE, the principal invasion of the Italian mainland,· which he had 

decided on 16 August, two days before 

receiving the Quebec Memorandum, to 

launch on the shores of the Gulf of Salerno. He could offer the Badoglio government but scant inducement to surrender: 

a general assurance that the Allies would 

modify the terms of surrender in the future if Italy surrendered completely on the 

eve of the Allied invasion, and if Italian 

forces gave positive aid to that invasion. 

But he could provide no answer to Badoglio's vital questions: were the Allies 

able, willing, and planning to occupy the 

seat of his government? Or would surrender to the Allies signal the German 

occupation of Rome and the immediate 

establishment of a neo-Fascist Quisling 

regime in Italy? 

During the months following the TRIDENT Conference, the Italian surrender 

and the invasion of the Italian mainland 

had become curiously reversed. TRIDENT 

had directed Eisenhower "to knock 

Italy out of the war," and the assault of 

the mainland was conceived as the most 

appropriate means of doing so. With 

the collapse of fascism, the basic design 

of Allied plans for invading the Italian 

mainland-BuTTRESS, BARRACUDA, BAYTOWN, AVALANCHE-changed. The plans 

envisaged not knocking Italy out of the 

war but getting Allied troops onto the 

mainland to exert pressure on the Germans. What then dominated Allied 

thinking was the idea that Italy, as a consequence of Mussolini's downfall, would 

surrender. Capitulation was not expected to result from the assault on the 

mainland; rather, the surrender was to 

precede and facilitate the invasion. 

Approval of the Long Terms 

The QUADRANT Conference settled an 

additional problem, that of the long terms 

of armistice for Italy. The British members of the CCAC had continued to urge 

the necessity for political and economic 

terms in addition to the military clauses, 

and General Eisenhower on 6 August 

had been informed that if he used the short 

terms he was to make clear that other conditions were to be imposed later. But it 

was not clear to the CCAC members 

what the additional conditions would be. 

\Vould there be a list of purely economic 

and political terms to supplement the short 

terms? Or would there be a single comprehensive instrument to supersede the 

short terms? Hoping that the QUADRANT conferees would answer these questions, the committee on 12 August began 

to prepare for both courses. The members made some changes in the British draft 

and, at American insistence, the unconditional surrender formula reappeared. 38 

When Mr. Eden raised the issue at Quebec with Cordell Hull, the Secretary of 

State consulted with the President and 

learned that Mr. Roosevelt had not 

changed his mind. Roosevelt was satisfied to have Eisenhower use the short 

terms to obtain Italian surrender, with the 

understanding that political conditions 

would be imposed later. Mr. Hull therefore told Eden that he had neither recommendations nor objections to make on 

the long terms. So far as nonmilitary 

38 Min, 6th Mtg CCAC, 12 Aug 43, and 

Special Mtg, 21 Aug 43, ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr 

(5-9-43), sec. I-A. 
OlJADRA::-.JT CONFERENCE AND THE OCEBEC 1fEMORANDUM 449 - - matters were concerned, the Department 

of State concurred with the latest draft 

of the text. 

Churchill and Eden then sought President Roosevelt's approval. Mr. Roosevelt 

must have given them some sort of 

assurance of concurrence, for on 23 

August the British Foreign Office informed 

the Department of State that the Prime 

Minister and the President had reached 

agreement and that the British were instructing their Ambassador in Lisbon to 

use the long terms in place of the short 

terms in any future dealings with Italian 

emissaries. Because the Foreign Office 

was not fully certain of the President's concurrence, however, the British asked the 

State Department to clear the matter with 

the President and have the combined 

Chiefs direct Eisenhower to use the long 

terms-the "Comprehensive Instrument," 

as it was called-in place of the short 

terms--the military terms. Declining to 

take initiative in a matter outside its 

province, the Department of State indicated that it would be more appropriate 

for the Foreign Office to take up the matter with the British Chiefs of Staff. 

The President gave his final and formal 

concurrence on 26 August, when he directed the JCS to instruct Eisenhower to 

substitute the long terms for the short 

terms in any subsequent dealings with 

Badoglio's representatives. Eden on the 

same day instructed the Amba",<;ador at 

Lisbon-Campbell-to use the long terms 

in any negotiations with Italian emissaries. 

On the following day the CCS wired the 

text of the long tenns to Eisenhower and 

instructed him that this document, including the military tenns, was to be used in 

any future negotiations.39 

39 Memo, Mr. James Clement Dunn for the 

U.S. Seey of State, I Sep 43, sub: Conditions 

General Eisenhower thus received several difficult assignments as a result of 

the QUADRANT Conference. With limited 

forces and resources (particularly in landing craft), he was to invade the Italian 

mainland in two places--across the Strait 

of Messina and on the shores of the Gulf 

of Salerno. From the latter landing, he 

was to sweep rapidly to Rome, I40 miles 

to the north. Without revealing his hand, 

he was to bluff Badoglio into surrender to 

make possible the Allied invasion. In 

accordance with instructions to use the 

long tenns-an extraordinary complication 

because negotiations with Badoglio were already under way on the basis of the short 

terms and the Quebec MemorandumEisenhower was to insist on unconditional 

surrender. By this AFHQ intelligence, too, had obtained a clearer picture 

of German strength in Italy. The estimates of enemy capabilities on which the 

AVALANCHE plan for a landing at Salerno 

had been based were radically wrong. 

German strength had been grossly underestimated. 

When the British Resident Minister at 

Algiers, Mr. Harold Macmillan, learned of 

the long terms, he protested against their 

immediate use. "I am told," he wired 

his superiors, "that military difficulties involved in operation of AVALANCHE are so 

great that we cannot exaggerate the value 

of an armistice concluded and announced 

for the Italian Surrender, OPD Exec 2, item 5: 

Extract from Min, 7th Mtg CCAC, 26 Aug 43, 

ABC 381 I taly-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. I-A; 

Telg 5718, 26 Aug 43, Foreign Office to Sir 

Ronald Campbell at Lisbon, OPD Exec 2, item 

5, tab 50 (the context of which indicates the long 

terms had already been received at Lisbon); 

Memo, Deane for .lCS, 27 Aug 43, ABC 381 

Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), sec. I-A; Telg, CCS 

to Eisenhower, FAN 203, 27 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 137. 
450 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

in accordance with timing suggested by 

the President and the Prime Minister." 40 

40 Telg 1537, Resident Minister Algiers to 

Washington and Quebec, 26 Aug 43, as forwarded in Telg 5717 (MS), Campbell, Lisbon, 

to Foreign Office, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 50. 

But the die had been cast. General 

Eisenhower had no alternative but to 

carry out his sometimes conflicting, always difficult, dual assignment-one a 

military mission, the other a diplomatic 

matter. 
CHAPTER XXIII 

The Surrender Preliminaries 

The Zanussi Mission 

After Castellano's departure for Madrid 

and Lisbon, Ambrosio continued to cooperate warily with the Germans; until 

Castellano brought back word that the Allies were willing to support open rupture 

with the Germans, the Italians could do 

little else. 

Roatta, Army chief of staff who was 

responsible for defending Italy against Allied attack, still did not know of Castellano's mission. His recognition since May 

that Italian forces alone were not equal to 

the task of opposing an Allied invasion 

prompted him to keep calling for German 

reinforcements, ground as well as air. 

But the German troops in Italy were poorly 

distributed for defense against the Allies. 

Anxious to defend the entire peninsula 

and believing the most threatened area to 

be southern Italy, particularly the NaplesSalerno area, Roatta pointed out to the 

Germans that loss of southern Italy would 

open the Balkans to Allied operations. 

He proposed that the Germans group their 

divisions into mobile reserves deployed at 

several key points throughout Italy to meet 

various Allied capabilities. A heavy concentration of German units in northern 

Italv would then be unnecessarv, Roatta 

urg~d, unless, of course, the Ge~mans intended to abandon southern and central 

Italy at the very outset. 1 

1 Situation appreciation by Roatta of II Aug 

Because the Germans and Italians at 

the Tarvis conference had not agreed on 

a common plan for the defense of Italy, on 

the command problem posed by German 

forces in Italy, and on the return of the 

Italian Fourth Army from France, Roatta 

proposed a new conference for purely 

military matters. The German Government accepted on the condition that the 

meeting be held at Bologna, the area where 

the II SS Panzer Corps was stationed.2 

Roatta's strategic views were not essentially different from those of Kesselring, 

who still believed that the Italians showed 

a genuine will to co-operate. Kesselring 

also discerned, by the middle of August, 

a slight but definite improvement in the 

morale of the Italian troops. Intent on 

defending the whole of Italy and believing 

the task feasible, he reported that it would 

be difficult for the Germans quickly to 

seize Rome and the Italian Government. 

The 26th Panzer Division's vehicles, essential to render fully mobile the German 

forces around Rome (3d Panzer Grenadier and 2d Parachute Divisions), had 

not yet arrived. More important, Italian 

forces were present around Rome in considerable strength. If Italo-German conflict started in the Rome area, the German 

43, as forwarded by Rintelen, OKWjWFSt, 

KTB, I.-3I.VIII.43, 13 Aug 43. Cf. Roatta, 

Otto milioni, p. 261. 

20KWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIII.43, 12 Aug 

43; Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, pp. 399-400. 
452 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

forces in Sicily and southern Italy would 

be cut off. Kesselring therefore urged a 

postponement of the seizure operation 

( Operation SCHWARZ) until the Germans had incontrovertible proof of Italian 

negotiations with the Allies. Continued 

co-operation with the Italians, he felt, 

would gain the Germans enough time to 

move in sufficient reinforcements to hold 

the entire peninsula, thus preventing the 

Allies from seizing southern Italy, the 

springboard to the Balkans. 

The weakness of Kesselring's position 

lay in his lack of troops in southern Italy. 

He had only a few battalions of the 1st 

Parachute Division and certain security 

units in the Naples-Salerno area. The 

I 6t h Panzer Division alone could not hold 

both Puglia (the heel) and Calabria (the 

toe) . Pleading for reinforcements to enable him to station a full division in each 

of the most threatened areas in the south-;---

the heel, the toe, and Naples-Salerno-he, 

like Roatta, regarded the heavy eoncentration of German troops in northern Italy 

as wastefuP 

Jodi and Rommel, in contrast, saw the 

main danger not in Allied power but in 

Italian treason. Since southern Italy 

needed stronger forces, and since the 

movement of forces from the north would 

merely aggravate the supply problem, Jodi 

recommended an immediate withdrawal 

from Sicily (this was already under way). 

With the XIV and LXXVI Panzer Corps 

concentrated on the mainland, the time 

would be ripe for grabbing Rome. Then 

Kesselring's forces would fall back northward and be absorbed by Rommel's Army 

Group B.4 

3 Kesselring's estimate of the situation, 12 Aug 

43, in OKli/Op. Abt.,Westl. MittelmeeT, Chefs., 

19.V.43-1I.VlI.44 (H 22/290). 

4 Addendum by JodI to Kesselring's situation 

The decision was left for Hitler. Hitler 

continued to insist on the liberation of 

Mussolini, though General Student and 

Captain Skorzeny were still unable to locate him. Hitler refused to permit reinforcement of south Italy, and he instructed 

Kesselring to keep the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 2d Parachute Divisions near 

Rome, to move the 16th Panzer Division 

from the Taranto area to the Gulf of Salerno area. This left the heel unguarded, 

and Hitler asked Kesselring to use his 

influence with the Italians to induce them 

to assume the defense of Puglia, even 

though the Italians since July had sent no 

forces to southern Italy. Hitler refused to 

evacuate Sicily at once because arrangements for defending the Balkans were not 

yet complete. He wanted the Allies tied 

down in Sicily (although by this date a 

large part of the XIV Panzer Corps had 

already been ferried over to the mainland) 

as long as traffic could cross the strait. 

Eventually, the movement of the XIV 

Panzer Corps from Sicily to the mainland 

could provide a force to help defend 

against an Allied invasion of southern 

Italy.;; 

The military conference at Bologna on 

15 August was as inconclusive and unsatisfactorY , for both Italv and Germanv as was , , 

the earlier conference at Tarvis. Diplomatic representatives, as well as Keitel and 

Ambrosio, were absent. JodI represented 

OKW and attended in company with 

Rommel. The presence of Kesselring and 

RinteIen tended only slightly to soften the 

brusqueness of the German attitude. Roatta, Rossi (deputy chief of Comando 

estimate; see also, OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-31. 

VIII·43, 13 Aug 43· 

5 OKW /WFSt, KTB, 1.-3 I.vIII.43, 13 and 

'4 Aug 43· 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

Supremo), and Zanussi (of Roatta's office) represented Italy. 

When Roatta stated the need to withdraw the Fourth Army from France to 

Italy to help defend the Italian homeland, 

JodI asked the direction of an anticipated 

attack-the Brenner frontier or southern 

Italy? Roatta refused to answer the question on the ground that it was tendentious, 

but he agreed to leave two coastal divisions and a corps headquarters in southern France. Acrimonious discussion took 

place on the northward movement of Italian divisions into the Brenner area. When 

Rommel was presented as commander of 

all German forces north of the Apennines, 

Roatta said that he had not been informed 

that the German troops in northern Italy 

were to remain there. \Vho would be 

Rommel's superior? Roatta asked. The 

Germans then agreed to recognize Ambrosio's supreme command on condition 

that the Italians recognize the German 

command over the forces of both nations 

in the Balkans and Greece. Both parties 

then professed to agree, but in bad faith, 

to reduce their forces along the Brenner 

frontieL As for Roatta's proposal that an 

additional German division be sent to 

Sardinia, JodI replied that none could be 

spared. JodI made no objection to moving an Italian corps from Thessaly to 

Albania, and three divisions from the 

Balkans to southern Italy.6 

\Vhen the Italian representatives returned to Rome on 16 August, the King 

summoned Badoglio, Ambrosio, and Roatta to a special council at the Quirinal 

60KWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3 I. VIII.43, 15 Aug 

43; Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 385-401; Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 242-45; 

Rommel, Private KTB, 9 May-Sep 43, entry for 

15 Aug and appended rpt. 

453 

Palace and asked about the outcome of 

the conference. Roatta described the 

cold, suspicious, almost hostile attitude of 

the Germans, He ascribed their use of a 

detaehment of SS troops as a guard during the meeting to their fear of an Italian 

ambush. Badoglio stated that it would be 

necessary to act toward the Germans with 

the greatest prudence for a few days more, 

III view of the negotiations initiated 

with the Allies. Otherwise, the Germans 

would descend upon Rome in force and 

seize the I talian Government. Roatta 

thus learned of Castellano's mission. The 

King reaffirmed the fundamental lines of 

the Badoglio government, stipulated at the 

time of its formation: personnel limited to 

military men and technicians, excluding 

politicians; and the prevention by force if 

necessary of political agitation and organization to avoid "the absurdity of judging 

and condemning by implication the work 

of the King." 7 

A few days afterward, Ambrosio suggested to Badoglio the advisability, in view 

of Castellano's mission, of issuing written 

instructions to the top commanders to inform them of Castellano's mission and to 

outline the course the armed forces were 

to pursue in case of an armistice. Badoglio disapproved. He wished t'o keep the 

secret of negotiations with the Allies limited to the smallest possible circle. He 

told Ambrosio, "We must not give Germany the least possibility of discovering our 

intentions." 8 

Roatta, because he had not been informed of Castellano's mission before he 

7 Mussolini, Storia di un anno, p. 25; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastro/e, II, 77; Roatta, Otto milioni.. 

p. 294; Monelli, Roma I943, pp. 298-99. 

8 Monelli, Rama I943, p. 299; MS #P-058, 

Project 46, I Feb-8 Sep 43, Question II. 
454 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

met with the Germans at Bologna, had 

been something of a dupe-a mere tool for 

negotiating with the Germans while Ambrosio himself was making contact with 

the Allies. Roatta could not object to the 

new course of the government, but he 

questioned whether Castellano was the 

most appropriate choice as emissary. In 

any event, Roatta wished to learn more 

about what was going on.9 

Roatta found an ally in General Carboni, commander of the Motorized Corps 

protecting Rome and known for his proAllied sympathies. Appointed by Ambrosio director of Military Intelligence Service on 18 August in the hope that Carboni 

would be able to disentangle the close connection between Italian and German intelligence offices, Carboni quickly picked 

up the news of Castellano's departure. 

Though Roatta may have had some doubts 

as to Castellano's suitability for the mission, Carboni had none. He hated Castellano, whom he blamed, along with the 

Duke of Acquarone, for Carboni's having 

been passed over for an appointment in 

Badoglio's cabinet. Believing that Castellano was inadequate for the task and untrustworthy besides, Carboni urged that a 

more reliable envoy be sent to control Castellano and to prevent that ambitious Sicilian from trying to grab all the glory in 

representing Italy "in dealings with" the 

Allied powers. Carboni appealed to 

Badoglio, Acquarone, Ambrosio, and Roattao But all apparently wished to await 

Castellano's report. After more than a 

week passed without word, they began to 

fear that the Germans had discovered Castellano. Roatta then took the lead III 

urging that a second dove of peace be 

9 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 75. 

released from the ark, with the same mission as the first. 10 

A suitable man was at hand. With no 

clearly defined functions in Roatta's office, 

General Zanussi could be spared. His 

absence would be no more noticeable to the 

Germans than Castellano's. Like Castellano, Zanussi thoroughly believed in 

changing sides. He had written several 

memorandums for his colleagues and superiors, indicating that a switch to the 

Allied side was the only sensible course 

after the overthrow of Mussolini. 

Ambrosio probably wanted to keep the 

dispatch of a second emissary secret from 

Badoglio, but in the end he decided to let 

the Marshal know. Badoglio approved, 

as he had earlier assented to Castellano's 

mISSIOn. But because Guariglia, Minister 

of Foreign Affairs, would probably object 

to what he might consider another military usurpation of a diplomatic function, 

the Foreign Office was not approached for 

a passport.ll As credentials, Carboni 

suggested that Zanussi take with him a 

British prisoner of war. Lt. Gen. Sir 

Adrian Carton de Wiart was selected. 

He was a good choice, for he was well 

known and easily recognized-he had 

lost an eye and an arm in the service of 

his country. If the German~ discovered 

him in Zanussi's company, it would be 

obvious that the mission concerned merely 

the exchange of prisoners. Lt. Galvano 

Lanza di Trabia, Carboni's aide, was to 

go along as the interpreter. 12 

10 Giacomo Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa di 

Roma: Verita e menzogne (Rome: Donatello de 

Luigi, 1945), pp. 18, 23-24; Zanussi, Guerra e 

catastrofe, II, 82; Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 294-95. 

11 Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 67'. 

12 Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart (London: Cape Publishers, 1950), pp. 225-29; 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 83-85; Roatta, 

Otto milioni, pp. 295-96. 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

On 22 August, two days before Zanussi 

departed from Rome, Ambassador Prunas 

in Lisbon informed Guariglia that Castellano had made contact with the Allies and 

would soon report. Expecting Castellano's quick return, Guariglia saw no 

reason to inform Badoglio or Ambrosio. 

Because Ambrosio and Badoglio had kept 

the Zanussi mission secret from Guariglia, 

they did not know that Castellano had already carried out his mission by the time 

Zanussi had left. 

Like Castellano, Zanussi carried no 

written orders. Ambrosio briefed him, 

but his instructions were broad and vague. 

If Castellano had disappeared, Zanussi was 

to take his place. If Castellano were still 

in Lisbon, Zanussi was to support him in 

his quest to concert plans with the Allies 

for a war against the Germans. 

Zanussi informed Roatta of Ambrosio's 

instructions. Carboni passed along some 

advice-first, Ambassador Prunas could 

be trusted, and second, it was important 

to urge the Allies not to fight their way 

up the Italian peninsula but to land in 

force north of Rome. 13 

Castellano at Lisbon 

General Casteilano had arrived III Lisbon at 2200, 16 August. On the next day 

he called on Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, 

the British Ambassador. Campbell told 

Castellano he would inform him of developments just as soon as he, Campbell, 

received instructions to negotiate. A day 

later Campbell learned that Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See, had verified 

to the Foreign Office the letter of introduction he had prepared for Castellano. 

Sir D' Arcy had also obtained a signed 

13 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 87. 

455 

statement from Badoglio to the effect that 

Castellano was authorized to speak for the 

Marshal. 14 

On the same day, 18 August, Maj. Gen. 

Walter B. Smith, the AFHQ chief of 

staff, and Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, 

the AFHQ G-2-appointed by General 

Eisenhower to meet with Castellanowere flying to Gibraltar in civilian clothes 

and without titles. From there they went 

to Lisbon, where they arrived on the 

morning of 19 August. That evening, at 

2200, Smith and Strong, accompanied by 

Mr. George F. Kennan, U.S. Charge 

d' Affaires, met Castellano and Montanari 

at the British EmbassyY 

After an introduction by the British 

Ambassador, General Smith opened the 

discussion by stating that on the assump14 Castellano, Come firmai, p. 98; copy of Telg, 

Foreign Office to Lisbon, 18 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 89. 

15 The conference is described in: Minutes of 

a conference held at the residence of the British 

Ambassador at Lisbon on August 18, 1943 at 

10 P.M., Capitulation of Italy, pp. 85-88. These 

are condensed minutes, not a verbatim record. 

They were telegraphed to Washington and London in Telg, NAF 334, 2 I Aug 43, Capitulation 

of Italy, pp. 112-17. The second part of the 

conference, which concerned purely military matters, is summarized in Telg, Eisenhower to Marshall, NAF 335, 21 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 126-27. 

At the end of the conference, Castellano was 

handed a copy of the minutes and asked to check 

them for accuracy; it appears in translation in his 

Come firmai as Appendix I, pages 211-15 (his 

resume of the military discussions is in page~ 

2 I 5-1 8); in addition, he gives his account of the 

conference which in some points supplements the 

minutes (pages 102-09). 

The copy of the minutes in Capitulation of 

Italy (pages 85-88) and NAF 334 dates the conference 18 August, which is incorrect. Smith 

and Strong arrived in Lisbon only on the morning of 19 August. The correct date is the 19th, 

as given by Castellano, and by Churchill in a 

speech to the House of Commons on 2 I September 1943. 
456 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

SECRET EMISSARIES TO LISBON (left to right) Brigadier Kenneth W. D. Strong, Generale di Brigata 

Giuseppe Castellano, General Smith, and Consul Franco Montanari, an official from the italian Foreign 

Office. 

tion that the Italian armed forces were 

ready to surrender, he was authorized to 

communicate the tenns on which General 

Eisenhower was prepared to agree to a 

cessation of hostilities. The terms, Smith 

said, constituted a military annistice only 

and had to be accepted unconditionally. 

Somewhat surprised by this abrupt 

statement, Castellano said he had come to 

discuss how Italy could arrange to join 

the United Nations in expelling the Germans from Italy. 

Smith replied that he was prepared 

only to discuss the terms of Italy's surrender. The status of the Italian Government and Anny operations against the 

Germans were, he declared, matters of 

high governmental policy to be decided by 

the heads of the United States and British 

Governments. But the Allies' were ready 

to assist and support any Italian who 

obstructed the Gennan military effort. 

General Smith then read the armistice conditions point by point, the short terms that 

had been furnished General Eisenhower 

on 6 August. 16 

16 See Appendix C for the text of the short 

terms. Clause 3 now read: "All prisoners or in· 

ternees of the United Nations to be immediately 

turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, 

and none of these may now or at any time be 

evacuated to Germany." On instruction from 

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill the words indicated by italics were substituted 

for the original phrase, "from the beginning of 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

To pennit careful translation of the 

documents and an opportunity for study, 

the British and Americans withdrew from 

the room, leaving Castellano and Montanari alone. 

When the group reassembled, Castellano 

stated that he had no power to accept the 

armistice but that he wanted an explanation of certain terms for his government's 

information. With regard to prisoners 

and internees, practical limitations might 

hinder the extent to which the Italians 

could prevent the movement of such personnel to Germany, though the Italians 

would make every effort to comply with 

this condition. General Smith replied 

that the United Nations understood the 

problem, but expected the Italian authorities to do their best. 

'When Castellano requested clarification 

of the clause on Italian ships and aircraft, 

Smith explained that this meant surrender 

of the fleet and of the planes, their future 

disposition to be decided by General 

Eisenhower. Castellano mentioned the 

lack of fuel that might prevent some warships and planes from complying. The 

authorities, Smith said, had to make every 

effort to provide sufficient fuel. 

As for Allied use of Italian airfields and 

ports, Castellano pointed out that most of 

the airfields were already in German 

hands; those remaining under Italian control were small and scattered. 

As for withdrawing Italian armed forces 

to Italy and moving units stationed inland 

in the Balkans, this might prove an impossible task. Smith assured Castellano 

that the Allies did not expect the impossible; certain Italian divisions, however, 

the negotiations," in order to avoid any possible 

inference that they were "negotiating" with the 

Badoglio government, (Telg, USFOR to AFHQ, 

repeated to Lisbon, No. 4522, 19 Aug 42.) 

457 

were near enough to the coast to permit 

their removal to Italy by Allied ships. 

Castellano inquired about the meaning 

of setting up an Allied military government and also about the decision to give 

General Eisenhower an overriding authority over the Italian Governmentwould the Italian Government retain sovereignty? Smith reiterated that his instructions referred only to the terms of a 

military armistice. He was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the 

future government of Italy. He said that 

the Allies would establish military government over parts of Italian territory, and 

he observed that this was being exercised 

in Sicily in a fair and humane manner. 

Castella'no cited the danger to the person of the King. Accepting the terms 

might prompt the Germans to hold the 

King as a hostage and even to threaten his 

life. It was suggested that the King 

might leave Italy on an Italian naval vessel. Castellano was assured that the King 

would be treated with all due personal 

consideration. 

The discussion then returned to the essential point in Castellano's proposal: the 

manner and extent of Italian military 

collaboration with the Allies against Germany. The Allied representatives reiterated that the clauses of the armistice 

were a military capitulation, not an agreement for Italy's participation in the war 

on the Allied side. Immediately thereafter, however, Smith read to Castellano 

a paragraph based on the Quebec Memorandum: 

The extent to which these terms of armistice would be modified in favor of Italy 

would depend on how far the Italian Government and people did in fact aid the 

United Nations against Germany during the 

remainder of the war, but that wherever 
458 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Italian Forces or Italians fight the Germans, 

destroy German property or hamper German 

movements they will be given all possible 

support by the forces of the United Nations. 

He then asked Castellano to weigh carefully the significance of the paragraph and 

explained that the Allied terms had been 

drawn up by General Eisenhower and approved by the Allied governments without 

considering the possibility of active Italian 

participation in the war against Germany. 

As President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 

Churchill had declared at Quebec, with 

Stalin's approval, the conditions enforced 

would be modified to Italy's advantage in 

proportion to the sum total of Italy's participation in the war. Without using the 

unconditional surrender phrase, without 

modifying the impression demanded by the 

predominant Allied powers, Smith skillfully used the Quebec telegram as an inducement to secure Italian capitulationP 

Castellano returned to the point he had 

emphasized to Hoare in Madrid: the Italian Government, without effective aid 

from the Anglo-Americans, was unable to 

turn against the Germans. If Italy accepted and put into effect the armistice 

terms, the Germans would counter with 

immediate reprisals. Italy was an occupied country, and Italians were alarmed 

by the degree of control already exercised 

by the Germans. Nor was Castellano exaggerating, he said, in order to try to convince the Allies to accept his proposal 

to co-ordinate military plans. Though 

the Luftwaffe was relatively weak, it could 

wreak great damage on Italy. The 

strength of the German Army was impres17 Ambassador Campbell, a professional diplomatist, was much impressed with the skill displayed by General Smith as a negotiator. See 

Interv, Smyth with Mr. George F. Kennan, 2 

Jan 47. 

sive. The war, Castellano believed, would 

continue for some time because the Germans had not used up their reserves in 

their recent Russian operations. Castellano hated the Germans because of their 

abominable behavior toward Italian troops 

in Russia. Each time Kesselring visited 

Ambrosio, it was an occasion for a row. 

Despite the fact that the Italian secret 

services worked closely with German intelligence, and despite the fact that many 

pro-German officers were in the Italian 

Army, including Roatta, Castellano believed that Badoglio was quite capable of 

directing policy as the situation required. 

When Castellano again cited the German threat to use gas, the Allied representatives pointed out the folly of such an 

act because the Allies would themselves 

counter with gas. In any event, the effect 

of a few days' vindictive action by the 

Germans would be far less serious for 

Italy than a long war of attrition. 

Stating that he now fully understood 

both the terms of the armistice and the 

supplementary information derived from 

the Quebec telegram, Castellano added 

that he was not authorized to accept the 

terms but would submit them to his government. He said that it would be useful 

for the Italian Government to know when 

or where the Allies planned to invade the 

mainland because German countermeasures would probably make it necessary for 

at least part of the government to leave 

Rome simultaneously with the armistice 

announcement. It was in the Allied interest, he believed, to prevent capture of 

that government which, he again insisted, 

wanted to reach an understanding. General Smith r«plied that Castellano, as a 

soldier, would understand why it was impossible to reveal Allied plans in detail. 

Castellano therefore repeated that he 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

would limit his function to that of acting 

as bearer of the Allied terms to his government. 

They then discussed arrangements for a 

direct channel of communication, and it 

was proposed that if Badoglio should accept the terms, General Eisenhower would 

announce the armistice five or six hours 

before the main Allied landing on the Italian mainland. Castellano objected vigorously. Such short notice, he declared, 

would not allow his government enough 

time to prepare for the landing. He 

asked for longer notice, preferably two 

weeks. Smith thought a longer advance 

notice might be possible, and he assured 

Castellano that he would present the Italian views to General Eisenhower. But 

Smith maintained the point that public 

announcement of the armistice would have 

to precede the principal Allied landing by 

a few hours only. 

All agreed that the Italian Government 

was to signify its acceptance of the armistice by a radio message. If it proved 

impossible for the Italians to do so directly, the government was to send a message to the British Minister at the Holy 

See as follows: "It Governo italiano protesta contro il ritardo nella comunicazione delle liste complete die nomi dei 

prigionieri catturati in Sicilia.» (The Italian 

Government protests against the delay in 

the communication of the complete list of 

names of Italian prisoners captured in 

Sicily. ) 

The Italian Government was to communicate its acceptance by 28 August. 

If no reply came by 30 August, the Allies 

would assume that the terms had been 

refused. Acceptance of the armIstlce 

terms meant also acceptance of the method 

of announcement as then determined-a 

radio announcement by General Eisen459 

hower with five or six hours preliminary 

warning to Italy. For a secret channel of 

communication with AFHQ, Castellano 

was to receive a portable radio, a code, 

and instructions on their use. All communications from the Italian Government 

to AFHQ were to be in the Italian language. In case of acceptance, Castellano 

was to meet again with General Eisenhower's representatives in Sicily, and the 

precise hour of the meeting and the course 

of Castellano's flight to Sicily was stipulated: from Rome at 0700, 3 I August, to 

reach Termini Imerese shortly before 

09 00. 

After copies of the armistice terms and 

of the AFHQ memorandum based on the 

CCS directive were furnished to Castellano, Ambassador Campbell and Mr. 

Kennan withdrew and the discussion 

turned to purely military matters. Brigadier Strong began to question Castellano 

on German troop dispositions, first in general, then in detail. Castellano offered 

only general information until he observed 

Strong's map, which had accurate information on it. Castellano then gave 

detailed unit locations, hoping thus, as he 

stated later, to show his good faith. 

Strong asked no questions about Italian 

units, but Castellano noted that the AFHQ 

map showed them quite as correctly as the 

maps of the Operations Section of Comando Supremo. 

Castellano estimated the total German 

military strength in Italy as 400,000 men. 

More troops could come from France. 

The Germans intended to defend on a 

line from Genoa to Ravenna and to fall 

back, if necessary, to the Po. They also 

planned to hold Sardinia and Corsica. 

Castellano painted a pitiful picture of 

the Italian armed forces. The fleet had 

enough oil for only one action. The air 
460 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

force was very short of materiel, though 

the fighter elements were quite good. All 

airfields except a few small ones were under German control. The Italian Army 

was short of gasoline, entirely dependent 

on the Germans for fuel, very short of 

antitank guns, antitank ammunition, and 

even of such items as boots. If Italy detached itself from the German alliance, 

the nation would require supplies of wheat 

and coal from the Allies. 

The Italian general urged the Leghorn 

area as the best place for an Allied landing. German lines of communication 

were extremely vulnerable, particularly 

along the Brenner route, and Castellano 

recommended attacking the Brenner Pass. 

The Italians planned to withdraw their 

troops from Corsica, he explained, but not 

from Sardinia. At the Bologna conference of 15 August, Roatta had discussed 

plans for defending Italy with Rommel 

and JodI, but, of course, Castellano was 

ignorant of the results. 

Though a number of German commanders wished to get rid of Hitler, loyalty to the Fuehrer was so widespread 

throughout the armed forces, Castellano 

believed, that overthrow appeared unlikely. The Gestapo was an important 

factor in preventing the collapse of German morale. 

In conclusion, Castellano mentioned his 

part in Mussolini's downfall-how Grandi 

had been induced to take the lead in the 

Fascist Grand Council only to be doublecrossed when Badoglio was named Mussolini's successor. On the whole, Castellano 

made a favorable impression. He seemed 

earnest and sincere, and he had an intense 

hatred of the Germans. Yet the Allied 

representatives wondered why he had 

neither credentials nor formal written instructions from Badoglio. Nor was AIlied confidence in the new Italian regime 

enhanced by Castellano's disquisitions on 

honor, peculiar accompaniment to his description of the double-cross of Grandi 

and the idea of turning against Germany 

and jumping into the Allied camp.18 

The conference lasted all night, breaking up at 0700, 20 August, nine hours 

after it had started. Smith shook hands 

with Castellano and expressed the hope 

that their meeting would prove to be the 

beginning of a new collaboration between 

their countries. Smith and Strong then 

flew back to Algiers and AFHQ. Castellano and Montanari remained in Lisbon 

to await the arrival of the Italian Ambassador to Chile, whose ship was several days 

late. 

After reflecting on the conference, Castellano realized that the situation was far 

different from that imagined in Rome at 

the time of his departure. He and Ambrosio had believed that Italy was still in 

a position to bargain. Actually, it was 

too late. They had thought that the 

British and Americans would be receptive 

to the proposal that Italy switch sides. 

Allied suspicion and distrust came as a 

sobering shock. Castellano had, however, 

been able to avoid the humiliating phrase, 

"unconditional surrender." And the Quebec telegram offered assurance that the 

terms of capitulation would be modified 

in Italy's favor if the government and people rendered effective aid to the Allies. 

Castellano believed that the Allied invasion 

of the Italian mainland would be short 

and successful because of Allied air su18 See Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 336, 22 Aug 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 126-27; Interv, 

Smyth with Ambassador Walter B. Smith, 13 

May 47, and with Brigadier Kenneth D. Strong, 

29 Oct 47· 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

periority. He had great faith in AngloAmerican generosity. 

On the following morning, 2 I August, 

Castellano presented himself at the Italian 

legation in Lisbon, where D'Ajeta was 

astonished to see him. D'Ajeta took him 

immediately to Prunas, the Italian Minister, who could not conceal his disappointment that such important negotiations 

had taken place without his knowledge 

and participation. Prunas on 22 August 

sent two cables to Guariglia and informed 

him that Castellano had made contact 

with the Allies and would soon report. The British Embassy delivered to 

Montanari the radio and code for future 

communications. On Ambassador Campbell's advice, Castellano, who had been 

thinking of returning to Rome by plane, 

took his place among the party of officials 

who left Lisbon by train on 23 August. 

The Italian Ambassador to Chile carried 

Castellano's papers across French territory, restored them at the Italian frontier. 

Reaching Rome on the morning of 27 

August, Castellano made haste to report 

to his superiors. 19 

Zanussi's Negotiations In 

Lisbon and Algiers 

Three days earlier, the second Italian 

emissary, General Zanussi, together with 

General de Wiart, had arrived in Madrid. 

More fortunate than Castellano, Zanussi 

traveled by plane. The next morning, 25 

August, he was in Lisbon. He promptly 

got in touch with Prunas, who was not 

overjoyed to see him. Prunas cautioned 

Zanussi to be on his guard, not only 

against German spies, out also against 

some members of the Italian legation. 

19 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 116-25. 

461 

Though Zanussi learned that Castellano 

has been successful in meeting members of 

General Eisenhower's staff, and was even 

then on his way back to Rome, he asked 

to see the British Ambassador. Sir Ronald replied through an intermediary, since 

he saw no reason why he should meet 

another Italian general. The Allied terms 

were already in Castellano's hands. Still, 

he asked Zanussi to remain in Lisbon until 

he, the Ambassador, was certain that there 

was no message for him. General Carton 

de Wiart, the British "prisoner-of-war," offered to return to Rome with Zanussi since 

it began to appear that Zanussi had come 

on a futile mission. 20 

At Quebec on 26 August, Churchill and 

Roosevelt had at last agreed on the long 

terms for Italy. The Foreign Office 

therefore instructed Campbell to present 

the comprehensive document to Zanussi 

and to explain that it embodied both the 

short terms, already in Castellano's possession, and the political and economic terms 

that Castellano had been told to expect. 

He was also to suggest that Zanussi fly 

back to Rome immediately with the text 

of the long terms.21 

Accordingly, on the morning of 27 August, Campbell met Zanussi and gave him 

the long terms. Zanussi immediately noticed the absence of reference to Italian 

military co-operation with the Allies, and 

asked why no mention of this had been 

made. Campbell read the Quebec telegram to him; this at least left the door 

open for eventual Italo-Allied co-operation. 

20 Zanussi, Guerra e calaslro/e, II, 91-94; 

Telg 1721, 26 Aug 43, Campbell to Foreign Office, and Telg 1723, Campbell to Foreign Office. 

26 Aug 43, both in OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 

50; Carton de Wiart. Happy Odyssey, p. 230. 

21 Telg 1352, Deputy Prime Minister to Campbell, 26 Aug 43. OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 50. 

See also, pp. 448-50. 
462 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Zanussi and his interpreter retired to 

their hotel to study the comprehensive 

conditions of capitulation.22 

The British Government had acted with 

extraordinary speed in getting the text of 

the long terms into Zanussi's hands. So 

fast had the government acted that Ambassador Campbell at Lisbon had the comprehensive document before AFHQ 

received it. When Eisenhower's headquarters later that day received the 

document, Allied commanders became 

thoroughly alarmed. The main invasion 

of the Italian mainland, planned for the 

Salerno area, was less than two weeks 

away. It was a risky operation, particularly because the rate of German reinforcement was seriously changing the 

estimates on which the landing plan had 

been based. The success of the operation, it seemed, was becoming increasingly 

dependent on getting the Italian Government to surrender beforehand. Not only 

did Italian opposition have to be eliminated before the landing, but Italian assistance during the critical period of 

getting troops ashore now appeared necessary. Even Eisenhower had doubts that 

Castellano would be able to persuade the 

I talian monarch and high command to 

accept surrender on the conditions of the 

short terms; now the CCS had insisted on 

introducing the long terms with the harsh 

initial statement of unconditional surrender and had ordered their use in all 

additional negotiations with Badoglio. 

General Eisenhower therefore appealed 

to the Joint Chiefs for some leeway. 

The President relented, and Eisenhower 

received authorization to proceed with the 

surrender negotiations on the basis of the 

22 Telg, 27 Aug 43, British Embassy at Lisbon 

to Foreign Office, OPD Exec 2, item 5, tab 53; 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 91-94. 

short military terms. After getting the 

Italians to accept and sign this document, 

Eisenhower could submit the comprehensive paper to the Italian Government.23 

Anxiety still persisted at AFHQ, however. The Allied commanders hoped to 

receive some sort of message from Castellano re-establishing contact with the 

Italian Government. Presumably Zanussi 

was a representative of Roatta, who was believed to have strong pro-German tendenCies. Castellano had told Smith and 

Strong at Lisbon that Roatta had not 

been taken into the confidence of the Badoglio government, though Castellano had 

added that he presumed Roatta, as a 

soldier, would loyally follow the government if it shifted to the Allied side. Zanussi had no credentials whatsoever, 

whereas Castellano at least had brought a 

letter of introduction from Osborne. Did 

the two emissaries represent two distinct 

factions within the Italian Government, 

one in close co-operation with the Germans? Or was the Zanussi mission bona 

fide, and were Roatta and Ambrosio working semi-independently toward the same 

end? 24 

What General Smith feared most was 

that Zanussi would make immediate use 

of the diplomatic channels of the Lisbon 

Embassy to inform Roatta of the long 

terms and thereby nullify Castellano's 

negotiations. Smith therefore made arrangements to get Zanussi out of the hands 

of the diplomatists and into military hands 

23 Telg, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 203, 27 

Aug 43, with text of long terms; Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 342, 28 Aug 43; and Tclg 

6398, ACWAR to Eisenhower, 29 Aug 43, all in 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 137, 160-64. 

24 Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 342, 28 Aug 

43, and Telg, Eisenhower to Lt Cen Sir Noel 

Mason-MacFarlane, 28 Aug 43, both in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 160-64. 
before Zanussi could do any damage. 

While Carton de Wiart was kept out of 

sight and later returned to London, Zanussi was invited to visit the Allied camp. 

Zanussi accepted. Relieved of his copy of 

the long terms, and flown first to Gibraltar under the assumed name of Pierre 

Henri Lamartine, Zanussi, accompanied 

by his interpreter, departed Gibraltar in 

the early afternoon of 28 August; to his 

surprise he found himself that evening at 

Algiers.25 

Castellano later asserted that General 

Eisenhower at first planned to admit the 

Italian armed forces to full collaboration 

with the Allies and that Eisenhower was 

about to explain his plans in full when 

Zanussi’s intervention rendered AFHQ suspicious, thereby inhibiting the Allies from 

divulging their plans to Castellano. Castellano also believed that AFHQ contemplated shooting Zanussi as a spy. But this 

was mere speculation; at no time did Eisenhower and Smith consider revealing Allied 

plans to Castellano, and they had no 

thought of shooting Zanussi. General 

Smith was prepared to hold Zanussi in case 

he turned out to be, under questioning, 

something other than a genuine emissary.26 

During several conferences with General 

Smith, Brigadier Strong, and Mr. Robert 

D. Murphy, General Eisenhower’s U.S. 

political adviser, Zanussi gave considerable 

information about the German forces in 

Italy, information that checked quite well 

against that obtained from other sources. 

He did not, however, divulge the Italian 

25 Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, p. 231; 

Interv with Smith, 13 May 47; Telg 6990, AFHQ 

to Gibraltar, 28 Aug 43, and Telg 25227, Gibraltar to Lisbon, repeated to AFHQ, 28 Aug 43, 

both in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 156–57. Cf. 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 90–99. 

26 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 174–75; Interv 

with Smith, 13 May 47. 

order of battle, though he convinced the 

Allied officers that he was genuine and 

sincere in his efforts to arrange the armistice. As “Chief of Staff of Roatta,” he 

was in a position to know the military 

situation, and he seemed as thoroughly 

persuaded as Castellano of the necessity for 

Italy to make an arrangement with the 

Allies. Like Castellano, Zanussi labored 

under the incubus of the German threat to 

overthrow the Badoglio government and 

occupy Italy. 

Zanussi saw five possible developments, 

each of which made it essential to act in 

concert with the Allies: (1) if Germany 

took the initiative and attacked the Badoglio government, it would be in the interest 

of the Allies and the Italians to join forces 

and prevent the return of fascism or the 

advent of communism in Italy; (2) though 

the Italians did not favor an Allied attack 

on Germany through the Italian mainland, a campaign requiring an estimated 

fifteen to twenty divisions, the Italians 

wanted their armed forces to have a specific role in any such campaign; (3) if

the Allies directed their attack into the 

Balkans, the Italians wished to co-operate; 

(4) if the Allies avoided the Italian mainland and occupied Sardinia and Corsica, 

they should make no request for direct 

Italian assistance, for in that case the 

Germans would immediately occupy Italy; 

(5) if the Allies bypassed Italy and attacked the Germans on the Continent 

beyond Italy’s borders, the Germans might 

withdraw some divisions from Italy, which 

would make it possible for Italy to fight 

the Germans unaided. 

Zanussi’s exposition indicated careful 

consideration of Italy’s plight and the conclusion that Italy had no way out except 

by joining forces with the Allies. He made 

no objection to the specific clauses of the 

THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

before Zanussi could do any damage. 

While Carton de Wiart was kept out of 

sight and later returned to London, Zanussi was invited to visit the Allied camp. 

Zanussi accepted. Relieved of his copy of 

the long terms, and flown first to Gibraltar under the assumed name of Pierre 

Henri Lamartine, Zanussi, accompanied 

by his interpreter, departed Gibraltar in 

the early afternoon of 28 August; to his 

surprise he found himself that evening at 

Algiers.2:; 

Castellano later asserted that General 

Eisenhower at first planned to admit the 

Italian armed forces to full collaboration 

with the Allies and that Eisenhower was 

about to explain his plans in full when 

Zanussi's intervention rendered AFHQ suspicious, thereby inhibiting the Allies from 

divulging their plans to Castellano. Castellano also believed that AFHQ contemplated shooting Zanussi as aspy. But this 

was mere speculation; at no time did Eisenhower and Smith consider revealing Allied 

plans to Castellano, and they had no 

thought of shooting Zanussi. General 

Smith was prepared to hold Zanussi in case 

he turned out to be, under questioning, 

something other than a genuine emissary.26 

During several eonferences with General 

Smith, Brigadier Strong, and Mr. Robert 

D. '\1urphy, General Eisenhower's U.S. 

political adviser, Zanussi gave considerable 

information about the German forces in 

Italy, information that checked quite well 

against that obtained from other sources. 

He did not, however, divulge the Italian 

2;; Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, p. 231; 

Interv with Smith, 13 May 47; Telg 6990, AFHQ 

to Gibraltar, 28 Aug 43, and Telg 25227, Gibraltar to Lisbon, repeated to AFHQ, 28 Aug 43, 

both in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 156-57. Cf. 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrote, II, 90-99. 

2(; Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 174-75; Interv 

with Smith, 13 May 47. 

463 

order of battle, though he convinced the 

Allied officers that he was genuine and 

sincere in his efforts to arrange the armistice. As "Chief of Staff of Roatta," he 

was in a position to know the military 

situation, and he seemed as thoroughly 

persuaded as Castellano of the necessity for 

Italy to make an arrangement with the 

Allies. Like Castellano, Zanussi labored 

under the incubus of the German threat to 

overthrow the Badoglio government and 

occupy Italy. 

Zanussi saw five possible developments, 

each of which made it essential to act in 

concert with the Allies: ( I) if Germany 

took the initiative and attacked the Badoglio government, it would be in the interest 

of the Allies and the Italians to join forces 

and prevent the return of fascism or the 

advent of communism in Italy; (2) though 

the Italians did not favor an Allied attack 

on Germany through the Italian mainland, a campaign requiring an estimated 

fifteen to twenty divisions, the Italians 

wanted their armed forces to have a specific role in any such campaign; (3) if 

the Allies directed their attack into the 

Balkans, the I talians wished to co-operate; 

(4) if the Allies avoided the Italian mainland and occupied Sardinia and Corsica, 

they should make no request for direct 

Italian assistance, for in that case the 

Germans would immediately occupy Italy; 

(5) if the Allies bypassed Italy and attacked the Germans on the Continent 

beyond Italy's borders, the Germans might 

withdraw some divisions from Italy, which 

would make it possible for Italy to fight 

the Germans unaided. 

Zanussi's exposition indicated careful 

consideration of Italy's plight and the conclusion that Italy had no way out except 

by joining forces with the Allies. He made 

no objection to the specific clauses of the 
464 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

terms-military, political, or economic--

demanded by the Allies, but he was certain that Badoglio would object strenuously 

to the formula of unconditional surrender 

as stated in the preamble and in the initial article of the long terms. Could not 

the Allies secure everything they wished, 

he asked, without imposing this unneccessary indignity, which might even result 

in a refusal of the armistice by the Badoglio government? 27 

Zanussi painted a gloomy picture of the 

Italian political situation~the government 

was dominated by old men who were 

tainted by long association with the Fascist regime and who were incapable of 

vigorous action. He compared Badoglio 

to Marshal Henri Petain, and asked how 

long the Germans would allow Italy any 

freedom whatsoever. Badoglio's slowness, 

he said, had given the Germans time to 

occupy the country. At any moment the 

Germans might decide to oust Badoglio 

and set up a Quisling government under 

Farinacci. The only hope, according to 

Zanussi, was in the younger Army officers, 

all of whom, he declared, were fed up with 

the Germans and would welcome collaboration with the Allies. He insisted that 

the Italians would defend Rome at all costs 

if the Germans tried to seize control, and 

he cited the movement of five or six Italian divisions into positions from which they 

could protect the capital. Although these 

troops had no written orders, ivfussolini's 

overthrow told them what was expected 

of them. 

Assertions that Rome would be defended were not altogether consistent with 

Zanussi's expressions of fear for the safety 

of the members of the government. He 

"7 Telg, AFRQ to CCS, NAF 344, 30 Aug 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp_ 166-il; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrote, II, 101-oB. 

and hi" friends, he said, "for months have 

given much study and thought to these 

eventualities [and] have considered the 

means necessary to effect the escape from 

German control of the Government and 

King." These old men, he said, were 

rather helpless in their expectation of being rescued by the Allies, and Zanussi felt 

that some scheme to rescue them ought to 

be planned. If the Allied landing on the 

mainland would not be able, in conjunction with the Italian Army, to protect 

Rome, the King and government leaders 

might escape on a naval vessel from La 

Spezia to Sardinia. There, he said, "the 

four Italian divisions could easily overcome 

the German division present, especially if 

the Allies could provide a little support." 

Zanussi regarded Ambrosio as the only 

man who could possibly replace Badoglio, 

though he admitted that the chief of 

Comando Supremo lacked the marshal's 

prestige. 

The Italian Government, Zanussi explained, was not only obsessed by fears for 

its own immediate safety but greatly 

alarmed that the German High Command, 

realizing that the war had been lost, might 

throw Gern1any into the arms of the Soviet Union. In this case, Italy, in the 

Anglo-American camp, would face a 

Russo-German combination at its front 

door with Britain and America far away. 

Zanussi stated his opinion that the House 

of Savoy had to be preserved to avert 

chaos in Italy; the dynasty, he said, had 

been a stabilizing influence for six centuries. 28 

As a result of these conversations with 

Zanussi, General Eisenhower decided to 

permit Zanussi's interpreter, Lt. Galvano 

28 Telgs W-B750 and W-Bi51, FREEDOM to 

AGWAR, 30 Aug 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp_ 

1 79-B4· 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

Lanza, to return to Italy with a message 

from Zanussi to Ambrosio-a letter urging 

the Italian Government to accept immediately the military terms of the armistice; 

indicating that the clauses of the long terms 

were relatively unimportant as compared 

to the main issue of how much practical 

assistance Italy would give the Allies against 

Germany; and recommending that the 

Italian Government trust the good faith of 

the Allies and send Castellano to Sicily in 

accordance with the agreement reached in 

Lisbon. 

On 29 August Lanza was to take the 

letter to Sicily, and there he was to be 

transferred to an Italian plane for the remainder of the journey to Rome. The 

text of the long terms, which Zanussi had 

received in Lisbon, was not entrusted to 

Lanza, for AFHQ, besides having no official confirmation of Zanussi's mission, did 

not wish to run the risk of having the 

document fall into German hands. Zanussi, therefore, retained his copy of the 

long terms, which had been returned to 

him. 

In reporting his action, General Eisenhower urged the American and British 

Governments to delay communicating the 

text of the long terms to the other United 

Nations governments. He expressed astonishment at the thought of a public 

armistice ceremony in the Compicgne 

tradition when negotiations were still not 

only tenuous and delicate but also being 

conducted with emissaries who had come 

at great risk to themselves and to the members of the Italian Government. 29 

As increasing information on the buildup of German forces in Italy came to 

AFHQ's attention, it became increasingly 

necessary, it seemed to Eisenhower, to have 

"" Telg W-8726, AFHQ to AGWAR, 30 Aug 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 175-76. 

465 

the Italian surrender as a condition essential for the success of AVALANCHE, the 

projected invasion of Italy at Salerno. 

The co-operation of Italian forces, even 

though those forces had little fighting 

power, could well prove the difference between defeat and success and could possibly assure a rapid advance up the Italian 

mainland. 

Thoughts in Rome 

In Rome, meanwhile, Castellano had 

returned on the morning of 27 August, 

just three days after Zanussi's departure. 

Finding Ambrosio temporarily gone from 

the capital, Castellano spoke briefly with 

Ambrosio's deputy, General Rossi, and arranged to see Marshal Badoglio. Guariglia and Rossi were also present to hear 

Castellano report on the Lisbon meeting. 

When Castellano explained that the Allies insisted on announcing the armistice 

at their own discretion in order to have 

it coincide with their main landing on 

Italy, Guariglia was much upset. Declaring that Castellano had not been authorized to state Italy's intention to attack the 

German forces-a statement Castellano 

countered by saying that he had received 

no precise instructions-Guariglia advocated a different approach. Since it appeared that the Allies intended to invade 

the Italian mainland, the government 

should wait until after the landing had 

been made and the Allies were within striking distance of Rome. At that time, 

when the Allies were in position to rescue 

the Italian Government, and only then 

should the Italian Government request an 

armistice. Badoglio listened to all that 

was said, but said nothing himself. At 

the end of the meeting, Badoglio took 

Castellano's documents of the Lisbon con-
466 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ference and consigned them to Guariglia. 30 

Later that day Castellano managed to 

get in touch with Ambrosio by telephone. 

Ambrosio promised to return to Rome on 

the next day. At Comando Supremo, 

Castellano learned that Zanussi had been 

sent to Portugal to make contact with the 

Allies. This development disturbed him 

because he feared it would complicate the 

negotiations. Furthermore, he was not 

reassured by the lack of frankness on the 

part of those who had sent ZanussiRoatta denied his knowledge of the affair, 

as did Carboni. 

Ambrosio, on the morning of 28 August, 

was in Rome as promised, and he listened 

to Castellano's account. Ambrosio then 

took Castellano and Carboni to Badoglio's 

office, where he found Guariglia. The 

Minister of Foreign Affairs again declared 

that Castellano had had no authorization 

to offer Italian military collaboration, and 

he protested once more against agreeing to 

announce the armistice at the time of 

the Allied invasion. In any case, Guariglia considered the negotiations to be essentially political. On that basis, he argued, 

his ministry alone should conduct diplomatic negotiations. Ambrosio and Carboni advocated continuing the negotiations 

through Castellano. No decision was 

reached. 

A few hours later Guariglia prepared a 

memorandum as a counterproposal to the 

Allies. While not objecting to any of the 

Allied terms, Guariglia's memorandum 

stressed the fact that Italy was unable 

alone to separate from the Germans. 

Consequently, it was essential that the Allies land before the armistice and in sufficient force to guarantee the safety of the 

30 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 125-26; Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, p. I ° I; Guariglia, 

Ricordi, pp. 663-65. 

Italian Government against German reaction. 

When Ambrosio and Castellano studied 

Guariglia's proposal, Castellano, though 

agreeing with Guariglia's analysis, said 

that he had already explained the situation 

and the Italian position to the Allied generals at Lisbon. The decision, therefore, 

rested with the Italian Government. 

Ambrosio and Castellano saw Badoglio 

again on 29 August. Badoglio said that 

he would have to consult with the King 

before reaching a decision. Badoglio, Ambrosio, and Guariglia then arranged for 

an audience. When they arrived at the 

Quirinal Palace, they met Acquarone, 

who asked Ambrosio for a detailed account of Castellano's mission and for a 

copy of the Allied terms. Acquarone took 

these to the King. 

Acquarone returned to tell the three 

who waited that before the King gave the 

final word, Badoglio, as Head of Government, should reach a decision and suggest 

a definite course of action. The three 

men discussed the matter but had reached 

no decision when the King received them 

for a brief audience. 

Immediately after seeing the King, Ambrosio called Castellano and asked how a 

reply could be sent to the Allies, a reply 

which would not refuse the armistice and 

at the same time not accept the conditions 

stipulated at Lisbon. The King and his 

advisers did not, apparently, object to the 

terms of the armistice, but they feared that 

if they surrendered without knowing 

where, when, and in what strength the 

Allies would land, they would expose themselves to capture by the Germans-particularly if the Allies were not planning to 

land in strength near Rome. 

Castellano replied that the Allies demanded a yes or no answer. The message 
THE SURRENDER PRELIMINARIES 

could bc sent through Osborne (in the 

Vatican) or by means of the radio he had 

brought from Lisbon. 

After speaking briefly with Guariglia 

and Ambrosio once more, Badoglio departed, leaving to the others the decision 

on how to arrange the details of the 

message. 

After further discu&<;ion with Guariglia, 

Ambrosio called Castellano again. Admitting that the Allies in Lisbon had clarified all points, Ambrosio nevertheless felt 

it essential to secure an agreement that the 

proclamation of the armistice would be 

made only after the Allies had landed in 

force. He directed Castellano to encode 

and transmit a message to the Allies to 

embody this request. 

Castellano did not dispatch the message. 

For at that moment Carboni came in 

with news that he had word from Zanussi, 

believed to be in Lisbon (though in actuality Zanussi was in Algiers). Zanussi 

said he had documents of the greatest importance and requested that a plane. be 

sent to the Boccadifalco airfield near Palermo, Sicily, in order to bring those documents to Rome. Though it was not clear 

how Zanussi in Lisbon could have gotten 

papers to Sicily, Castellano dispatched a 

plane as requested, then inforn1ed the 

King and Badoglio of his action.a1 

The plane dispatched by Castellano 

reached PalernlO safely, picked up Lanza, 

and returned to Rome the same day, 29 

:11 Castellano, Come firm ai, pp. 126-30; 

Guariglia, pp. 672-74. Castellano's is 

the only account detail. There is no mention 

of particulars by Badoglio (Memor;e e documenti, 

page 101), and by Rossi (Come arrivammo, 

pages [26-27). Carboni's account (L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma, pages 24-25) is quite 

fantastic and in glaring contradiction to all the 

other evidence. It is testimony only of Carboni's 

violent hatred of Castellano. 

467 

August. But Lanza carried only two letters, one to Ambrosio recommending acceptance of the armistice conditions as 

explained to Castellano, the other to Carboni urging him to support those who 

were trying to arrange an armistice. 

Since Zanussi had not wired the text of 

the long tenns from Lisbon, Badoglio and 

his advisers remained in ignorance of it.32 

Summoning Ambrosio, Guariglia, and 

Castellano to him on the morning of 30 

August, Badoglio gave Castellano a revised 

version of the Guariglia memorandum as 

his written instructions. Castellano was to 

make contact with the Allies again and 

present the following points. If Italy had 

still enjoyed liberty of political and military action, the government would have 

requested an armistice immediately and 

accepted the conditions offered. But Italy was not able to do this at once because 

the Italian military forces in contact with 

the German forces inside and outside Italy 

were inferior to these forces. Unable to 

withstand a collision with the Germans, 

the Italian forces would be crushed in a 

very brief time. The whole country, but 

Rome above all, would be exposed to German reprisal. Since the Germans intended, at whatever cost, to fight in Italy, 

Italy was bound to become a second Poland. Consequently, Italy was able to 

request an armistice only when, because of 

landings by the Allies with sufficient forces 

and at appropriate places, the conditions 

were changed, or when the Allies were in 

a position to change the military situation 

in Europe. 

Marshall Badoglio canceled the penultimate paragraph of the memorandum. In 

its stead he wrote out with pencil on a 

piece of paper which he gave to Castellano 

32 Castellano, Come firm ai, p. 130; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrofe, II, rro. 
468 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the following points as guidelines for his 

discussion with the Allied generals: 

"I. Report the memorandum. 

2. In order not to be overwhelmed before the English [sic] are able to make their 

action felt, we cannot declare our acceptance of the armistice except after landings 

have taken place of at least 15 divisions, 

with the greater part of them between 

Civitavecchia and La Spezia. 

3. We will be able to place at their disposition the following airfields . . . 

4. The fleet goes to Maddalena; learn 

the approximate period in order that preparations may be made. 

5. Protection of the Vatican. 

6. The king, the heir apparent, the 

queen, the government and the diplomatic 

corps remain at Rome. 

7. The question of prisoners." 

Badoglio instructed Castellano to indicate the airfields still in Italian hands 

and on which Allied planes might land. 

Castellano was to explain that the German 

authorities had asked repeatedly about the 

status of Allied prisoners, and that the Italian Government had put off the Germans 

with various excuses. But German insistence made further delay difficult, if not 

impossible. 

Happy at last to have a piece of paper 

and precise instructions, Castellano made 

haste to confirm, by means of his secret 

radio, his appointment with the Allied 

generals. 33 

33 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 130-32. Cf. 

Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, p. 101; Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 675. 
CHAPTER XXIV 

The Italian Decision 

ACHSE 

What of Italian-Gennan relations? 

After the Bologna conference of 15 August, the relations between the Axis partners continued to be as unsatisfactory as 

before. The only agreements reached had 

been to build German units in southern 

Italy up to strength and to reduce the 

forces of both nations in the Brenner area. 

from the Gennan point of view, no satisfactory solution to the problem of command had been made, and no suitable 

agreement reached on the distribution of 

forces to defend against Allied invasion. 

The Germans remained suspicioqs of 

Italy's intentions.l 

The Italian declaration of Rome as an 

open city the day before seemed to be 

related in some fashion to peace moves, 

and of course boded no good for the Germans. OKW realized that the Allies 

would recognize the status of Rome as an 

open city only if all movements of troops 

and war materials through the city ceased. 

Because traffic to southern Italy could not 

bypass the capital, however, the Germans 

had no way of supplying their forces in 

southern Italy except through Rome. 2 

German anxiety lessened somewhat two 

days after the Bologna conference because 

'0KW/WFSt, KTB, l.-3l.V1ll.43. 15 Aug 

43; MS #C-093 (Warlimont), p. 128. 

Z OKW/WFSt, KTB, l.-3l.VII1.43, 15 and 

21 Aug 43. 

on J 7 August the evacuation of Sicily 

was completed. \Vith some 40,000 German troops, plus their weapons and vehicles, withdrawn from Sicily to southern 

Italy, the Germans no longer had to suffer 

the fear that had beset them ever since 

the overthrow of :Nlussolini-that an Allied landing in Calabria would cut off the 

XIV Panzer Corps in Sicily. After the 

units that had fought on the island had 

had some rest and enough time to make 

up deficiencies in materiel, the six divisions south of Rome would be a strong 

hulwark against an Allied invasion in the 

south. On that same day, 17 August, 

Rommel and his Army Group B took command of all the Gennan formations in 

northern Italy; Rommel moved his headquarters from Munich to Garda, not 

far from the Brenner-Verona railway.s 

Hitler and OKW, for their part, had 

no plans to defend Italy south of Rome. 

They did not consider the task feasible 

without Italian aid, and Hitler still felt 

intuitively certain of the eventual capitulation of the Badoglio government to the 

Allies. Accordingly, all Army Group B 

unit commanders were warned to be ready 

to act against the Italians should the 

political situation change. The 7 Ht Infantry Division was to occupy the city of 

Ljubljana and the Ljubljana-Tarvis pass. 

30KW/WFSt, KTB, r.-sI. VIII.43, 16 and 

18 Aug 43; Vietinghoff in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.l, eh. VI, pp. 11-12. 
470 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

German forces were to defend permanently 

the Pisa-Arezzo-Ancona line along the 

southern slopes of the northern Apennines.4 

A new headquarters, the Tenth Army, 

would be activated in southern Italy to 

control the XIV and LXXVI Panzer 

Corps, and General der Panzertruppen 

Heinrich von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel 

was nominated commanding general on 8 

August. As Hitler explained to Vietinghoff on 17 August, when the latter had 

been summoned to the Fuehrer's headquarters, "I have clear proof that Badoglio is 

already negotiating an armistice with the 

Allies." It was possible, Hitler said, that 

Italian officers were not informed. Hitler 

believed that the Allies would soon invade 

the Italian mainland with large forces. 

The first mission of the Tenth Army after 

activation, therefore, would be to withdraw the German divisions in southern 

Italy as rapidly as possible to the area 

southeast of Rome. Vietinghoff was to be 

careful not to give the Italians any excuse 

for getting out of the war, and he was 

therefore not to withdraw prematurely. 

During the withdrawal toward Rome, Vietinghoff was to operate under Kesselring's 

OB SUED. After the withdrawal to central Italy and the elimination of Kesselring's command, Tenth Army was to come 

under Rommel's Army Group B.5 

As for Kesselring, the signal for the 

start of a German withdrawal from south 

Italy would be the seizure of Rome. This 

Kesselring was to achieve with the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier and 2d Parachute DiVISIOns. But if Skorzeny located and lib-

., OKWjWFSt, KTB, L-3LVIl1.43, 16 Aug 

43· 5 Vietinghoff in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et al.), 

ch. VI, pp. 6-7; MS #D-I 17, Beurteilung der 

Lage durch die hoechsten Dienststellen im August 1943. Einsatz des AOK 10. (Vietinghoff), 

p. 4· 

erated M ussolini, Kesselring was to act 

independently of Allied action: he would 

seize Rome, restore Mussolini to power, 

re-establish fascism, and induce loyal Fascist elements to co-operate with the Germans in defending northern Italy.6 

About this same time, 17 August, Skorzeny learned that M ussolini, guarded by 

about ISO carabinieri, was being held 

on the Sardinian island of Maddalena. 

While he was preparing to raid Maddalena 

and liberate Mussolini, Skorzeny suddenly 

received orders from OK\V to execute a 

parachute drop on a small island near Elba. 

There, OK\V had been informed, Mussolini was being held. But the Italian 

secret service had planted this information, and Mussolini was, in reality, at 

Maddalena. Only after a personal appeal to the Fuehrer did Skorzeny get 

OK\V's order revoked. This, however, 

delayed Skorzeny's preparations, and when 

his plans for the Maddalena raid were 

completed ten days later, on 27 August, 

he learned that Mussolini had again been 

moved. 7 

Kesselring, inclined to believe the repeated declarations of loyalty to the alliance made by Badoglio, Ambrosio, and 

others, continued to view the problem of 

defending Italy differently from either 

Hitler, Rommel, or JodI. Though he 

recognized the low combat effectiveness of 

the Italian units, he wished to gain as 

much as possible from Italian co-opera-

<; Lutz Koch, Erwin Rommel: Die Wandlung 

eines grossen Soldaten (Stuttgart: Walter Gebauer, 1950), pp. 152-53. Some rumors of this 

German plan reached the I talian Embassy in Berlin. See Simoni, Berlino, Ambasciata, p. 403, 

entry for 22 Aug 4:;. 

7 MS #D-318, The Rescue of Mussolini (SS 

Oberstleutnant Otto Skorzeny and SS Major Karl 

Radl), pp. 48-134. Cf. Mussolini, Storia di un 

anno, pp. 22-23. 
THE ITALIAN DECISION 

tion. Along with Rintelen, he feared 

that Hitler's and Rommel's tactless and 

suspicious attitude might drive the Italians 

into needless overt hostility. 8 

Despite Kesselring's Italophile views, 

OKW activated Vietinghoff's Tenth Army 

headquarters on 22 August. Viewing the 

Naples-Salerno area as the one most immediately threatened, OKW gave Vietinghoff three missions: to concentrate as 

quickly as possible in the Naples-Salerno 

area a strong group of three mobile divisions, plus all units lacking organic transportation; to protect the Foggia airfields 

with part of the 1St Parachute Division; 

and to oppose strongly any Allied landing 

in the Naples-Salerno area, but to institute 

only a delaying action against an invasion 

of Calabria south of the Castrovillari neck.9 

The day after Tenth Army activation, 

Vietinghoff made a formal call on General 

Arisio, commander of the Italian Seventh 

Army stationed in southern Italy. The 

two agreed that the six German divisions 

in southern Italy were to be under Vietinghoff's command and not under Arisio's, 

as before. Arisio also agreed that his 

Italian units would form the first line of 

defense along the coast, leaving the more 

mobile German divisions to constitute a 

reserve for counterattack purposes. In 

the event of an Allied landing, and in 

conformity with German principles, the 

stronger force would assume command of 

all the troops within the sector where the 

reserve force was committed. The two 

!l OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-3I.VIII.43, 19 and 

'21 Aug 43; Rintelen, Mussolin; als Bundesgenosse, pp. 246-47; MS #C-OI3 (Kesselring), 

p. 20. 

9 Telg, OKWjWFSt/Op. No. 661966/43 C. 

K. Chefs to OB SUED and others, 18 Aug 43, 

West!. Mitlelmeer Chefs. (H 22/290). 

471 

generals also agreed on maintaining close 

liaison and co-operation. 10 

To OKW Sardinia also seemed endangered, but the threat of an Italian capitulation to the Allies inhibited the Germans 

from sending additional troops to reinforce 

the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division and 

the six fortress battalions on the island. 

Considering a protracted defense impossible, the Germans prepared to evacuate 

Sardinia by way of Corsica and Elba. 

But the troops were not to be evacuated 

unless the Italians failed to co-operate or 

unless developments on the Italian mainland, for example an Allied invasion of 

the coast near Rome, threatened to cut off 

the Germans. 11 

Kesselring, by contrast, believed Sardinia in greater danger than the NaplesSalerno area. Flying to Hitler's headquarters on 22 August, he urged that additional forces be moved to Sardinia, for 

thc troops withdrawn from Sicily, he 

reasoned, gave the Naples-Salerno area 

sufficient protection. In effect, Kesselring 

was supporting a request by Comando 

Supremo for an additional German division for Sardinia. OKW refused. Instead, OKW instructed Kesselring to propose to Ambrosio that Sardinia be guarded 

exclusively by Italian troops so that German troops could take full responsibility 

for Corsica. The Tenth Army, OKW 

emphasized, was to make its main stand in 

the Naples-Salerno area, even if this meant 

giving up Puglia, the Italian heeU2 

10 MS # D-117 (Vietinghoff), pp. 9-roo 

11 OKW/WFSt, KTB, 1.-3I.V1II.43, 18 Aug 

43· 12 Estimate of the Situation by OB SUED, 18 

Aug 43, OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIII'43, 19 

Aug 43; OKWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII1.43, 22 

and 2:) Aug 43. 
472 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

A day after Kesselring's VISIt to Hitler, 

the Badoglio government sent a strong note 

of prote5t to Germany. Report~ from the 

Italian Embassy in Berlin and from other 

sources indicated that certain Nazis were 

working closely with Fascists to overthrow 

Badoglio and re-establish a Fascist government in Rome. On the following day, 

24 August, the Italian Government arrested several former Fascist leaders, including General Ugo Cavallero, who had 

been Ambrosio's predecessor at Comando 

Supremo. Perhaps this action averted an 

incipient Fascist revolt. Whether it did 

or not, it had the effect of causing Hitler 

to postpone his projected stroke against 

Rome. la 

By this time, though, another ItaloGerman crisis was in the making. The 

forces of Rommel's Army Group B were 

carrying out their movement into northern 

Italy, a movement that Rommel planned 

to complete by the end of the month. But 

despite the peaceful German occupation of 

northern Italy, relations between the two 

governments and the two armed services 

worsened when friction developed during 

the relief of the Italian Fourth Army in 

France, a relief that began on 23 August: 

the Germans objected to the movement 

of the 7th (Lu/}i di Toscana) Infantry 

Division to Nice, and they insisted that 

Italian naval vessels evacuate Toulon.14 

Then on 24 August, after guerrilla 

bands attacked a 24th Panzer Division 

supply train near Lubliana, OKW instructed Rintelen to protest to Comando 

Su/nemo and to indicate to the Italians 

that the Germans would have to reinforce 

the troops protecting the Tarvis-Feistritz13 Simoni, Berlina, Ambasciata, p. 403; Guariglia, Ricardi, p. 651; Bonomi, Diaria, pp. 80-82. 

14 OKWjWFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIII.43, 22-24 

Aug 43. 

Ljubljana passes. Before Comando Supremo could reply, the German 7 1st 

Infantry Division on 26 August began 

to move to Tarvis and toward the passes 

of the ] ulian Alps, the only ones still held 

and controlled exclusively by the Italians. 

At first threatening to use force to resist 

German violation of the Tarvis agreement, 

Comando Supremo in the end consented 

to the German move, just as Ambrosio 

had earlier acquiesced in the German occupation of the Brenner Pass, the Riviera, 

and the Mount Cenis pass. 15 

Meanwhile, the question of who was to 

exercise command over Italian and German forces had again arisen to trouble 

both nations. On 20 August, OK\V had 

made an elaborate proposal for all theaters fronting on the Mediterranean: southern France, Italy, and the Balkans. OKW 

proposed Italian supreme command in 

Italy, German supreme command in 

southern France and in the Balkans, with 

each having the power to direct the organization of defense and the conduct of 

battle in case of Allied invasion. The 

distribution of the forces of both nations 

in all three areas was to be regulated from 

time to time by OKW and Coman do 

Supremo. In Italy, Army Group Band 

o B SUED were to be under the immediate command of the King, who would 

issue his directives through Comando Supremo. The Italian Fourth and Eighth 

Armies in northern Italy were to be attached to Army Group B. Four days 

later, on 24 August, Ambrosio accepted 

the proposal as it related to FranceI talian units remaining in southern France 

were to be under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt as Com150KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIII'43, 24-26 

Aug 43; Simoni, Berlina, Ambasciata. p. 405. 
THE ITALIAN DECISION 

mander in Chief West. Ambrosio made 

considerable concessions in the Balkans. 

But in Italy, Ambrosio rejected the German proposal and suggested, rather, as he 

had before, a radical regrouping of German forces. For the time being there 

would be no change in the command 

structure of the two military forces in 

Italy.I6 

By the end of the month, the Germans 

had received increasing indications both of 

an impending Allied invasion and of the 

imminent Italian desertion. Which threat 

was the greater was difficult for the Germans to determine. 

As aerial reconnaissance reports revealed 

extensive Allied troop loadings in North 

African ports, Kesselring's original estimate that Sardinia was the area most 

immediately threatened by invasion 

changed; these preparations were much 

larger than an attack on Sardinia alone 

required. But the distribution of Allied 

shipping in North Africa and Sicily, 

plus the pattern of Allied bombing, still 

seemed to indicate several possibilitiesSardinia and Corsica; an attack on the 

southwest coast of Italy followed by a 

drive to cut off Calabria and to reach 

Naples; or an invasion of Puglia. Should 

the Italians abandon the alliance, the 

coastal region near Rome was not out of 

the realm of possibility, and this prospect 

was not pleasing. The German force 

near the Italian capital-two reinforced 

divisions-was considered sufficient to 

eliminate the Italian forces guarding Rome 

but hardly adequate to resist an Allied 

invasion aided by Italian co-operationP 

160KWjWFSt, KTB, I.-31.V1II.43, 20 and 

25 Aug 43. 

17 Situation appreciation by OB SUED, 28 

Aug 43, OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIII·43, 29 

Aug 43; See also OKW jWFSt, KTB, I.-3I. 

VIII.43, 26 Aug 43. 

473 

Though an Allied invasion was an everpresent danger, the Germans began to 

regard the prospect of Italian treachery 

as the graver threat. Kesselring, while not 

unmindful of the possibility that he could 

be wrong, continued to accept in good 

faith repeated Italian assurances. 18 But 

Hitler had no such illusions. When he 

received from Kesselring and Rintelen 

favorable reports on Italian co-operation, 

he conjectured that Badoglio had approached the Allies, found their terms too 

severe, and swung back momentarily to 

the Axis. Convinced that the reporting 

of his "I talophiles" at Rome was not accurate, he sent General der Infanterie 

Rudolf Toussaint on I September to relieve Rintelen as military attache, and 

Rudolf Rahn to replace Ambassador von 

M ackensen.I9 

Two days before, on 30 August, OKW 

made what turned out to be its final re-

\'ision of Operation ACHSE, the plan to 

seize control of Italy. German units were 

to disarm Italian soldiers, except those 

who remained loyal. Italian troops who 

wished to fight on the German side were 

to be permitted to come over to the 

W ehrmacht; those who wished to go home 

were to be allowed to do so. 0 B SUED 

was to withdraw German units from southern Italy to the Rome area, then conduct 

further operations in accordance with instructions from Army Group B. The latter headquarters was to reinforce the 

troops at all the passes leading into Italy, 

occupy Genoa, La Spezia, Leghorn, Trieste, 

Fiume, and Pola, and pacify northern Italy 

18 See the account of Badoglio's discussion 

with Rintelen on 29 Aug 43, OKWjWFSt, KTB, 

I.-3I.VII1.43, 29 Aug 43; MS #C-OI3 (Kesselring), pp. 26-27. 

19 Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse, pp. 

249-55; OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I. VIII.43, 4 

Sep 43. 
474 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

through the instrumentality of a revived 

Fascist organization. The German Navy 

was to take over the tasks formerly performed by the Italian Fleet, and the 

German Luftwaffe was to do the same 

for the Italian Air Force; both were to cooperate to prevent Italian warships from 

going over to the Allies.20 By the beginning of September 1943, the Germans 

were ready to meet the twin perils of 

Italian capitulation and Allied invasion. 

The Parleys at Cassibile 

Even as the Germans were taking steps 

to counteract a possible Italian defection 

from the Pact of Steel, General Castellano 

and his interpreter, Montanari, reached 

the Termini Imerese airfield near Palermo 

a little before 0900, 3 I August. Brigadier Strong met them, and an American 

plane took the party to the 15th Army 

Group headquarters at Cassibile. 

Earlier that morning, General Smith, 

Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Macmillan had 

flown from Algiers to Cassibile with General Zanussi, who again had the text of 

the long terms of armistice which he had 

originally received from the British Ambassador at Lisbon. 

The Italian generals met at Cassibile, 

and their meeting was not altogether cordial. Resenting what he considered Zanussi's intrusion into the negotiations, Castellano asked why Zanussi had gone to 

Lisbon. The reason, Zanussi replied, 

was the lack of a report from Castellano. 

Castellano then asked why Zanussi had 

requested a special plane for Lieutenant 

Lanza, who had not brought any important documents to Rome. The Allies, 

Zanussi explained, had taken the text of 

the long terms from him at Algiers, and 

had just now returned it. Zanussi seems 

to have briefly mentioned these additional 

conditions of armistice, but Castellano did 

not ask to see the document and Zanussi 

did not offer it. Castellano remained 

ignorant of the long terms.21 

At Cassibile, Castellano, Zanussi, and 

Montanari conferred with Generals Alexander and Smith, Brigadier Strong, Commodore Royer Dick (Admiral Cunningham's chief of staff), Maj. Gen. John K. 

Cannon (NATAF's deputy commander), 

and a British army captain named Deann 

who served as interpreter. General Smith 

presided and opened the discussion by asking Castellano whether he had full power 

to sign the military terms of the armistice. 

Castellano replied in the negative, added 

that he had precise instructions, and read 

the memorandum furnished by his government: If the Italian Government were 

free, it would accept and announce the 

armistice as demanded by the Allies. Because the Italian Government was not free 

but under German control (as the result 

of the considerable increase of German 

forces in Italy since the Lisbon meeting), 

Italy could not accept the condition that 

the armistice be announced before the 

main Allied landings. The Italian Government had to be certain that Allied 

landings were in sufficient strength to 

guarantee the security of Rome, where 

the King and the government intended to 

remain, before it would hazard the announcement of an armistice. Because of 

the inferiority of their equipment, the 

Italians could not face the Germans alone. 

If they did, they would be quickly eliminated. Having eliminated the Italian 

military forces, the Germans could turn 

2°OKW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3I.VII1.43, 29 Aug 21 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 133-34; Za43. nussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 116-17. 
THE IT ALlAN DECISION 

their undivided attention to the Allied 

invaders. Therefore, the Italian Government insisted that the Allies make their 

main landings north of Rome and in the 

force of at least fifteen divisions. 

General Smith bluntly declared the 

Italian proposal unacceptable. The Italian Government had two alternatives: 

it could accept the conditions or refuse 

the armistice. He explained that General 

Eisenhower had had great difficulty securing authorization from the Allied governments to undertake any discussions with 

the Italians, and these were restricted to 

military matters only. The Quebec Memorandum offered Italy an opening, Smith 

said, and General Eisenhower had full 

power to modify the conditions in accordance with the degree of support rendered 

by Italy in the war. If the Italian Government refused the offer of an armistice, 

with its proclamation on the day of the 

Allied landing-as had been planned by 

General Eisenhower with the approval of 

the British and American Governmentsthen General Eisenhower would have no 

power to treat with Italian military leaders 

or to conclude an armistice in the future. 

In this case, negotiations would have to be 

turned over to the Allied diplomats, who 

would necessarily impose much harsher 

conditions. 

Smith was striking at Castellano's essential program of military collaboration 

with the Allies by which the dynasty and 

the government might maintain themselves and save something from the disastrous wreck into which the Fascist regime 

had plunged Italy. Ruling out military 

discussions in the future meant the inability of Italy to participate in the war, the 

exclusion of any mitigation of terms in 

proportion to Italian aid. General Smith 

clearly implied that unless the Italian 

475 

Government at once accepted all of General Eisenhower's conditions, Italy's role 

during the rest of the war would be 

passive, and her ultimate fate at the peace 

table would be determined purely on the 

basis of Allied wishes. As for the fifteen 

divisions that Badoglio regarded as essential, Smith said that if the Allies were 

in a position to land such a force, they 

would not be offering an armistice. The 

Allies intended to invade the Italian peninsula with or without Italian aid, and 

the Italians themselves would have to 

decide whether the struggle would be long 

and devastating or relatively brief. 

Perceiving that the Allies planned to 

commit a total of fifteen divisions in Italy 

rather than to invade with that many, 

Castellano tried to secure a modification 

of the Allied plan to announce the armistice at the time of the main Allied landing. 

Castellano and Zanussi both tried repeatedly to gain some indication of the place 

and approximate time of the principal 

Allied debarkation, but General Smith refused to divulge any information. 

Castellano then declared that he could 

say nothing further. He would have to 

refer the decision to his government, because he was obliged to follow his instructions strictly. He raised the question 

of whether the Italian Fleet might go to 

Maddalena, off Sardinia, rather than to 

an Allied port in order to soften the blow 

of its loss to the Italian people. Again 

Smith refused to modify the terms. 

Still trying to learn when and where 

the Allies would invade the Italian mamland, Castellano asked how the Allies 

planned to protect the Vatican City, 

and when they hoped to reach Rome. To 

no avail. And when he made the threat 

that the Italian Fleet would not remain 

idle as it had during the Sicilian Cam-
476 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

paign, but would attack Allied convoys, 

Smith replied with stronger threats: whatever the German strength or the Italian 

attitude, the Allies would drive the Germans out of Italy regardless of any suffering on the part of the Italian people. 

Nothing could prevent Italy from becoming a battlefield, but the Italian Government might shorten the duration of the 

battle by accepting completely the Allied 

conditions. 

The Italian generals faced a cruel 

dilemma. Italy's refusal to accept the 

military armistice terms, with the possibility that later military collaboration 

might favorably modify the terms, opened 

the way to an overthrow of the dynasty 

and the disappearance of the regime. And 

yet, even more immediate was the threat 

that the Germans would occupy Rome 

and seize the government unless the Allies 

landed close to the capital. The course 

of the discussion revealed to General 

Smith and the others that B(ldoglio and 

his emissaries feared the Germans more 

than the Allies. At Lisbon, Castellano 

had given full information on German 

troop dispositions in Italy; at Cassibile, he 

refused to do so. 

The conference terminated on an inconclusive note, though Smith had the 

impression that the Italian Government 

would not pluck up its courage to sign 

and announce the armistice unless the Allies gave assurances of strong landings in 

the Rome area as a means of protecting 

the government <-gainst the Germans. 

\Vhile adamant during the conference, 

General Smith was nevertheless courteous. 

He invited the Italian representatives to 

lunch, where, after an initial embarrassing 

silence, discussion was resumed. Smith 

repeated that if Italy lost this opportunity, 

its situation in the future would be much 

more difficult. Castellano reiterated his 

government's contention that it would 

accept the armistice, no matter how harsh 

the terms, if the proclamation were 

postponed. The Italian Government, he 

said, would gladly provide military cooperation, but Italy could not do this 

unless the Allies offered guarantees to make 

it possible. Now almost certain that the 

Allies intended to land south of Rome, 

Castellano remarked that Italian forces 

alone could not save the capital, the nerve 

center of the country. He urged the Allies, in their own interest, to furnish help: 

if Rome fell to the Germans, he warned, 

a costly battle would be necessary to regain the city. 

When Smith mentioned the Italian divisions disposed around Rome as being 

able to resist a German attack, Castellano 

countered that their weapons were so inferior to those of the Germans that only 

an Allied landing near Rome in addition 

to the main landing could save the capital. 

Smith then asked Castellano to make a 

specific request, bearing in mind that the 

Allies could not change their general plan 

of operations because of the long and 

minute preparations required for an amphibious landing. In response, Castellano 

requested one armored division to debark 

at Ostia, the old port of Rome at the 

mouth of the Tiber River, and one airborne division to drop nearby. 

After lunch, General Smith conferred 

with Generals Eisenhower (in Africa) and 

Alexander and with AFHQ staff officers, 

while ~1essrs. Murphy and Macmillan 

conversed with Castellano and Zanussi. 

The Allied political advisers urged the 

Italians to act immediately on what was 

the last chance of the Badoglio government 

to salvage something from the war. Otherwise, they said, the Allies would refuse 
THE ITALIAN DECISION 

to deal with the King and the Badoglio 

government and would bomb relentlessly 

the major cities, including Rome. It was 

like preaching to the converted. The 

government of Rome remained more afraid 

of the immediate German threat than of 

the danger posed by the Allies. According to Castellano and Zanussi, the problem was to induce the cautious, fearful men 

in Rome to take the initiative against the 

Germans. Much as they yearned to be 

rid of the Germans, they feared that the 

Allies were not strong enough, even with 

Italian help, to take over and protect a 

large part of the country against the considerable German forces stationed there. 

The German strength in Italy, which 

made the Badoglio government hesitate to 

accept an armistice, was precisely the factor that made the surrender of Italy essential to the Allies. General Eisenhower 

felt that the German forces in Italy had 

become so powerful as to change materially the estimates on which AVALANCHE 

had originally been based. The reserves 

concentrated in north Italy constituted a 

mobile threat, and though Allied air could 

delay their movement, it could not impose a paralysis on enemy traffic. The 

success of AVALANCHE, Eisenhower believed, might very likely turn upon gaining such a degree of Italian aid as would 

materially retard the movement of German 

reserves toward the battlefield. Eisenhower had no thought of abandoning 

AVALANCHE, but he needed every possible 

ounce of support from the Italians. 

General Alexander, on whom would fall 

the immediate responsibility for the first 

large-scale invasion of the European mainland, was even more concerned than 

General Eisenhower. The Germans had 

nineteen divisions, he estimated, the Italians 

sixteen. AVALANCHE projected an initial 

477 

Allied landing of three to five divisions, 

and a build-up over two weeks to a maximum of eight divisions. If the Italian 

units, fighting on their home soil, supported the Germans, the Allies might face 

a disaster of the first magnitude, a failure 

that would have catastrophic repercussions 

in England and in the United States. 

Literally everything had to be done, he 

told Mr. Murphy, to persuade the Italians to help the Allied forces during the 

landing and immediately afterwards. 

In their anxiety to induce the Italian 

Government to surrender and provide 

military assistance, the Allies agreed to 

Castellano's request for protective forces 

at Rome. They decided to send the U.S. 

82d Airborne Division to Rome at the 

time of the main invasion. Two plans 

for using the 82d in AVALANCHE had not 

been approved-one, a plan to seize the 

inland communication centers of Nocera 

and Sarno to block the movement of German reserves (neither place was suitable 

for drop zones); the other, named GIANT 

I, to air-land and drop the division along 

the Volturno River to secure the north 

flank of the Allied beachhead (canceled 

because of the difficulty of supplying the 

airborne troops so far from the ground 

forces). The division was therefore available, and a new plan, GIANT II, was 

drawn up for a drop near Rome. 

Designed to induce the Italians to surrender, a prerequisite on which the entire 

invasion of the Italian mainland seemed to 

depend, the projected airborne operation offered certain military advantages. 

In conjunction with the Italian divisions assembled around Rome, the Allies would thereby gain control of the 

Italian capital and cut off reinforcements 

and supplies from the German units south 

of Rome. The psychological effect of a 
478 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

quick stroke against the city might be so 

stimulating as to cause the Italians to turn 

against the Germans. Caught by surprise, the Germans might pull out of south 

and central Italy at once. This was the 

basis of the decision made by General 

Eisenhower, in discussion with Generals 

Alexander and Smith on 3 I August, to 

accede to Castellano's request for protecting the government at Rome. 

When Smith returned to the tent occupied by the Italian emissaries, Murphy 

and Macmillan departed, and the discussions continued on a military basis. Smith 

told the Italian generals that it would be 

very difficult to get an armored division 

to Rome but quite possible to obtain an 

airborne division-if the I talians could 

provide certain airfields. Castellano saw 

no difficulty in making airfields available, 

but he thought armored units necessary 

to give the whole operation what he 

termed consistency. If an entire armored 

division could not be committed near 

Rome at once, at least some antitank guns 

at the mouth of the Tiber were indispensable. Smith assured Castellano that he 

would study the feasibility of the project; 

perhaps an entire armored division could 

be landed at a somewhat later date. 

The conference then came to an end, 

and both parties summarized the results: 

( I) The Italian Government might accept 

or refuse the conditions of armistice, but 

if it accepted it must accede to the method 

indicated by the Allies for the official declaration. (2) The Allies were to make 

a subsidiary landing on the mainland, and 

against this operation the Italian troops 

could not avoid offering resistance. ( 3) 

Soon afterwards, the Allies would make 

their main landings south of Rome, bringing the total forces employed in both 

landings to at least the fifteen divisions 

regarded as essential by Badoglio; at the 

same time, the Allies would land an airborne division near Rome and one hundred antitank guns at the mouth of the 

Tiber. (4) The Italian Government was 

to make known its acceptance of the armistice by radio within twenty-four hours 

of 2 September; if it refused, no communication was to be made. 22 

After leaving Cassibile at 1600 in an 

American plane, Castellano, Zanussi, and 

Montanari transferred to the Italian plane 

at Termini Imerese and arrived in Rome 

around I goo. During their flight, the 

two generals talked over the problem. 

Sharing Castellano's conviction that the 

Italian Government could follow but one 

course-accept the armistice on the military conditions-Zanussi had supported 

Castellano at Cassibile. There was, however, littk cordiality between the two men, 

because Castellano saw Zanussi as a rival. 

'\Then Zanussi tried to explain the long 

terms, Castellano, believing them to be 

no different from those contained in the 

papers he had received at Lisbon, refused 

to listen. Zanussi did not insist and Castellano still remained ignorant of i.he long 

terms. When Zanussi expressed his fear 

that Castellano might not be able to 

persuade Badoglio to accept the armistice, 

he offered to support Castellano's argu-

"" Telg, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 346, [ Sep 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. [98-202; Castellano, Come firmai., pp. [35-44, and the minutes 

of the conference which he prints as Appendix 

2, pp. 2 [9-22; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 

[[ 7-20; Ltr, Murphy to President Roosevelt, 8 Sep 

43, OPD Files. Italy; Interv with Ambassador 

Smith, 13 May 47; Interv with Strong, 29 Oct 

47; In terv, Smyth wi th Maj Gen Lowell W. Rooks. 

28 Sep 48; Gavin, Airborne W art are , pp. [9-

24; 82d AB Div in Sicily and Italy, pp. 4 [-45; 

Warren, USAF Historical Study 74, pp. 56-57· 

The minutes printed in Castellano are authentic 

(see interview with Strong). 
THE ITALIAN DECISION 

ments. Castellano was not particularly 

receptive. And when Zanussi offered to 

try to get Carboni to feel more favorably 

disposed toward Castellano, the latter was 

surprised. He had had no prevIOus Intimation that Carboni bore him any 

hostility.23 

Both generals realized that the Allies 

had made but slight concessions regarding Badoglio's requests for a landing of 

fifteen divisions north of Rome and for an 

announcement of the armistice after the 

landing. It was quite apparent that the 

Allies had completed their plans, that they 

would not land north of Rome or even in 

that latitude. Where and when the Allies would invade the Italian mainland 

were questions which had not been answered. Zanussi thought the Allies might 

come ashore in the Formia-Gaeta sector 

some forty-five miles northwest of Naples, 

and Castellano appeared to share his opinIOn. The memorandum the Allies had 

given to Castellano indicated only the 

possibility that the main attack would 

come within two weeks.24 

Castellano had not quite carried out 

his instructions to get the Allies to land in 

strength north of Rome. The Allies, it 

was clear, planned a subsidiary landing 

far to the south and a main landing closer 

to the capital, but still not within immediate striking distance. The Allies, General Smith had said, would land "as far 

north as possible, within the possibility of 

protection by fighter planes." 25 The total 

of all the forces employed by the Allies 

would approximate fifteen divisions. The 

decision the Badoglio government had to 

make could be only in these terms. 

2.1 Castellano. Come firmai, pp. 145-46; ZanussL Guerra e catastrofe, II, 123-24. 

~l Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe_. II, 119, 124-

~"Castellano, Come firmai, p. 222. 

479 

The Allies indicated not the slightest willingness to modify the plans they had 

formulated before Castellano had first 

contacted them, and they declined to make 

their invasion of Italy primarily an attempt to rescue the Italian Government. 

As for the long terms, the Allies expected 

the Italian Government to be fully informed of them, for Zanussi had received 

them in Lisbon and carried a copy with 

him back to Rome. But Zanussi, who 

was Roatta's subordinate, was to give his 

copy of the terms to Roatta on I September with the suggestion that the paper 

be passed to Ambrosio. Whether Roatta 

did so or not, Castellano continued uninformed of the comprehensive surrender 

conditions, and for the moment Badoglio 

too was to remain in ignorance of them,26 

T he Decision at Rome 

Back in Rome on the evening of 3 I 

August, Castellano hastened to C omando 

Supremo where he found Ambrosio and 

reported the results of the Cassibile discussions. Since Badoglio had retired for 

the night, Ambrosio made an appointment 

to see him the next morning. 

Accompanied by Ambrosio, Guariglia, 

Acquarone, and Carboni, Castellano on 

I September presented his copy of the 

minutes of the Cassibile conference to 

Badoglio and gave a detailed account of 

what had been said. He admitted frankly 

that he had been unable to obtain what 

the Italian Government desired-postponement of the armistice until after the 

main Allied landings. The Allies, he 

stated, would not modify their plan to 

invade southern Italy. The Allied leaders, 

26 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrole, II, 124; Castellano, Come firm ai, 160; Badoglio, M emIYrie e 

documenti, pp. 102, 132. 
480 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

he explained, considered the Italian units 

around Rome strong enough to defend 

the city. Only after he had made clear 

the absolute inferiority of the Italian troops 

in comparison with the nearby German 

troops had he obtained the promise of an 

American airborne division, one hundred 

pieces of artillery, and the subsequent 

commitment of an armored division. 

Sending these troops, Castellano said, 

would automatically entail the support of 

Allied aviation. Badoglio listened in silence until Castellano finished. Then he 

asked Ambrosio's opinion. Ambrosio said 

he saw no course open other than to accept the proffered conditions. 

At this point, Carboni spoke out in 

decided opposition. It was he, Carboni, 

who commanded the Motorized Corps of 

four divisions. It was he who would have 

to defend Rome against the Germans. 

He believed that the Anglo-American assurances were not to be trusted. They 

were oral promises rather than a written 

agreement. Furthermore, he said, his 

troops could not withstand a German 

attack because they lacked gasoline and 

ammunition. 

Carboni's remarks came as a disagreeable surprise to Castellano, for Carboni 

had favored Castellano's mission to Cassibile, and he had not earlier mentioned 

his lack of ammunition and gasoline. 

But Zanussi had spoken to Carboni on 

the preceding evening and apparently had 

told him something of the discussions at 

Cassibile. Learning that he would have 

the unenviable task of defending Rome 

against the Germans with very little Allied Carboni had become depressed. 

Guariglia, for his part, said there was 

nothing to do but accept the armistice. 

The Italian Government was committed, 

he believed, because so much of Castellano's negotiations had been placed on 

paper, a fact which the Allies might use 

to precipitate an Italo-German conflict. 

Apparently uncertain, Acquarone said 

nothing. Badoglio expressed no opinion. 

He would, he said, refer the problem to 

the King.27 

That afternoon Badoglio saw the King. 

The Italian monarch consented to the 

armistice. Badoglio informed Ambrosio, 

who notified AFHQ by a telegram: "The 

reply is affirmative repeat affirmative. In 

consequence, known person will arrive 

tomorrmv two September hour and place 

established. Please confirm." AFHQ received this message shortly before 2300, 

I September.28 

Though this act had the appearance of 

a decision, Badoglio in reality had not 

made up his mind. He still hesitated, 

still hoped that the Allies would rescue 

him. Unwilling to make any move against 

the Germans, he made no suggestion to 

any subordinate to start planning for 

eventual co-operation with the Allies. 

Perhaps he was upset by the replacement 

that very day of the German Amba&,ador 

and of the military attache, whom Badoglio could hardly expect to be so I talophile 

as the men, Badoglio's good friends, they 

replaced. 

27 The records of this meeting consist merely 

of the autobiographical accounts composed much 

later by some of the participants: Badoglio. Mernoric c documenti, p. 102 (brief and inexact): 

Carboni, L' armis/izio e la difesa di Roma, p. 26 

(brief and suspect), Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 

146-49 (a full account but prejudiced in his 

own behalf); Guariglia, Ricordi. pp. 677-78. 

See also Zanussi, Guerra e catastrole, II, 133-:14. 

and II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 25. 

zs Telg, Eisenhower to CCS. NAF 348, I Sep 

43. Capitulation of Italy, p. 20'); Castellano. 

Come firm ai, p. 149; Badoglio, Memorie e doeunzenti, p. 102. 
THE ITALIAK DECISION 

Ambrosio also remained passive. He 

issued no orders, gave no word to his subordinates of the newly projected orientation of the government. 

For both Badoglio and Ambrosio, it was 

one thing to tell the Allies that the armistice was accepted; it was quite another 

to take steps to meet the consequences of 

the decision. Perhaps more could not 

have been expected. To decide to capitulate, even half-heartedly and after much 

soul-searching, was in itself a traumatic 

experience that robbed them, at least 

temporarily, of further initiative. 

I t remained for Roatta to act. Without instructions from higher authority, he 

issued Memoria 44, an outline order prepared ten days earlier in anticipation of 

a German seizure of Rome and an attempted restoration of Fascist control. Italian 

troops, in the event of open German 

hostility, were to protect railways, command posts, and centers of communication, 

be ready to interrupt German traffic, seize 

German headquarters and depots, and 

sabotage German communications. Upon 

Roatta's order or in case the Germans 

initiated hostile actions, the Italian forces 

on Sardinia and Corsica were to expel the 

Germans; the Seventh Army in southern 

Italy was to hold Taranto and Brindisi; 

the Fifth Army was to protect the fleet at 

La Spezia and at the same time attack the 

German 3d Panzer Grenadier Division; 

the Eighth Army in the South Tyrol and 

481 

Venezia Giulia was to attack the German 

44th Infantry Division; the Fourth Army 

in Piedmont and Liguria was to cut the 

passes leading from France; and the Second Army in the northeast was to attack 

the German 71 st Infantry Division. 

Between 2 and 5 September, officer 

couriers carried the order to the generals 

who commanded the forces under Roatta. 

Each recipient, after reading the warning 

order, wa" to burn it in the presence of 

the courier except for the last page, which 

was to be signed as a receipt.29 

Roatta's was the only action taken by 

the Italian Government-and this at the 

third level of command-as a consequence 

of the decision to accept the armistice. 

Ironically, Roatta had been considered 

somewhat pro-German in sentiment. 

The King, intent on playing the role of 

a constitutional monarch, took no further 

action once he had sanctioned Badoglio's proposed course. Those immediately 

below him, Badoglio and Ambrosio, were 

timid, cautious, and undecided. Only at 

the third level and below were men to be 

found with a real appreciation of Italy's 

predicament and some determination to 

seek a solution. I t was the paralysis of 

will at the top which doomed Italy. 

;,;» Zanussi, Guerra 

Rossi, Come 

Otto milioni, pp, 

mzst!ZIO del settembre 

Rispoli, 1947), p, 33, 

e catastrof e, II, 142-44: 

pp. 207-10; Roatta, 

; Antonio Basso, L' Ar1943 in Sardegna (Naples: 
CHAPTER XXV 

The Armistice 

T he Signature 

When General Castellano, accompanied 

by Montanari as his interpreter, by Maj. 

Luigi Marchesi, an aide, and by Major 

Vassallo, the pilot of his plane, returned 

to Cassibile on the morning of 2 September, he found himself in a fog of 

misunderstanding. The Allies had wanted 

him to return to Sicily for a formal signing 

of the armistice terms. Castellano understood that the Italian Government had 

already formally accepted the armistice by 

means of the radio message Ambrosio had 

sent on the previous day. Castellano 

thought he had returned to Cassibile to 

arrange for Italo-Allied co-operation, specifically for the airdrop near Rome. 1 

General Smith disabused Castellano of 

this idea when the two met. Smith asked 

him at once whether he had full power to 

sign the surrender document. The reason 

for the blunt request was the growing 

Allied concern over the risks of invading the Italian peninsula. Montgomery's 

Eighth Army was scheduled to execute 

Operation BAYTOWN on the following 

day-to cross the Strait of Messina from 

Sicily to Calabria in a subsidiary Allied 

landing. Though reasonably confident of 

success in this operation, the Allies had 

become increasingly concerned over the 

inherent hazards of Operation AVA1 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 152ff. 

LANCHE, the mam mvaSlOn that Clark's 

Fifth Army was scheduled to make 

on 9 September on the beaches of Salerno. 

This amphibious assault posed many difficulties: the convoys transporting the 

ground troops from North Africa to the 

landing beaches would be vulnerable to 

German air and Italian sea power; the 

landing beaches were at the extreme range 

of Allied fighter aircraft; and the three 

initial assault divisions could not be reinforced quickly enough and in sufficient 

strength to meet the German and Italian 

troops on even equal terms. For these 

reasons, the Allies needed the help that the 

I talian surrender promised-neutralization of the Italian Fleet and the aid of 

Italian ground troops in diverting or at 

least interfering with the movements of 

German units to the landing sites. Because of the obvious indecision and fright 

among the members of the Italian Government, the Allies wished to make certain 

that the Italians would stick to their agreement to capitulate. The Allies wanted no 

misstep, no faltering at the last minute to 

jeopardize the already risky plans of their 

first re-entry into the European mainland. 

To Smith's question, Castellano answered 

that he did not have full power to sign 

the armistice terms. 

Despite the summer heat in Sicily, the 

temperature dropped suddenly. The Allied officers departed. F or several hours, 

the Italians were completely ignored. 
THE ARMISTICE 

They found that spending the day alone 

in their tent in the midst of an Allied headquarters was not without its embarrassing 

aspect. 

Late that afternoon, General Smith returned to ask Castellano whether he 

wished to radio Rome for permission to 

sign the surrender document. Castellano 

agreed to do so. Smith also suggested 

that the Italian Government authenticate 

Castellano's authority to sign by means of 

a message to Osborne, the British Ambassador at the Vatican. 

That evening General Smith received a 

message from Comando Supremo indicating Italian acceptance of an airborne 

operation near Rome and suggesting the 

use of three specific airfields. But no 

word came in answer to Castellano's request. 

Again at 0400, 3 September, when the 

Eighth Army was crossing the Strait of 

Messina to invade Calabria, Castellano repeated his request. Would the government authorize him to sign the armistice? 

In Rome that same morning, Badoglio 

summoned the chiefs of staff of the three 

military services. "His Majesty," Badoglio announced, "has decided to negotiate 

for an armistice." He then ordered each 

service chief to make appropriate dispositions of his forces, but he declined to put 

the order in writing because he feared that 

too many persons would learn of the 

decision. 2 

Sometime later Badoglio decided to authorize Castellano to sign the armistice 

terms. As a result, the Allies at Cassibile 

received a radiogram about 1400, 3 Sep-

"Basic sources are: Castellano, Come firmai, 

pp. 16df; Rossi Come arrivammo, pp. 2IOff; 

Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 112ff; Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 68 Iff. See also Monelli, 

Roma 1943, p. 304. 

483 

tember. "Present telegram is sent from 

Head Italian Government to Supreme 

Commander Allied Force." The affirmative reply dispatched two days earlier, 

Badoglio wired, had contained "implicit acceptance [ of the] armistice 

conditions." 3 

Implicit acceptance was not enough. 

The Allies wanted to be absolutely sure. 

And around 1700 Castellano finally received explicit authority to sign. "General Castellano," Badoglio wired, "is 

authorized by the Italian Government to 

sign the acceptance of the conditions of 

armistice." 4 

By then it was clear that Operation 

BAYTOWN was a success. The British 

Eighth Army had landed on the toe of 

Italy with the 13 Corps on a 3-brigade 

front, and had seized Reggio di Calabria 

and a nearby airfield. Virtually no resistance, Italian or German, had materialized. 5 

On that day, too, 3 September, the new 

German Ambassador to Italy, Rudolf 

Rahn, presented his credentials to Badoglio. Rahn took the occasion to bring up 

the matter of reorganizing the chain of 

command in the Italian theater so that the 

Germans would be in control of active operations. Declaring that he welcomed 

3 Telg, AFHQ Adv to AFHQ, No. 12 I, 3 Sep 

43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 252, relayed by 

AFHQ to CCS, :\TAF 354, same file, p. 257. 

According to Guariglia (Ricordi, pages 681-

82), Badoglio decided to authorize Castellano to 

sign the armistice terms at the meeting with the 

chiefs of staff of the I talian armed forces. 

4 Telg 121, AFHQ Adv to AFHQ, 3 Sep 43, 

cited n. 3; See also Armistice Meetings, Fairfield Camp, Sicily, Sep 43, in AFHQ 0100/4/ 

330. A copy of the armistice document is found 

in 10,000/136/584. 

"For a detailed account of the landing, see 

Montgomery, Eighth Army, pp. 123-24; :\Ticholson, The Canadians in Italy, pp. 202-06; and 

Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino. 
484 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Rahn's proposal, Badoglio said that he 

could not intervene directly in military 

matters. He promised, however, to arrange an audience with the King and a 

meeting with Ambrosio for the following 

day.6 

At Cassibile, at 1715, 3 September, 

General Castellano signed the text of the 

short terms on behalf of Badoglio, Head 

Df the Italian Government. General 

Smith signed for General Eisenhower, who 

had flown over from North Africa to 

witness the ceremony.7 

As General Eisenhower explained to the 

CCS, the signing of the short terms was 

absolutely necessary before specific plans 

could be made with Italian representatives 

to secure the maximum possible aid from 

the Italians, and to obtain the co-operation 

of the Motorized Corps for the 82d Airborne Division's projected operation near 

Rome. Formal signature of the long 

terms, he added, would take place later 

and be timed to fit Allied operational 

plans.8 

After the signature of the armistice 

agreement, the Italians withdrew to their 

tent. Castellano sent a message to Rome 

to report his action, whereupon General 

Alexander appeared and invited him to 

dinner.9 

£ Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 110-

II, gives an untruthful account of this meeting. 

See Rahn's Report, Telg 4370, 3 Sep 43, German Foreign Office Documents. U.S. Department 

of State, Serial 131/ frames 71960-62, NARS. 

7 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 156-57; Armistice Meetings, Fairfield Camp, Sicily, Sep 43, 

0100/4/330; Butcher, My Three Years With 

Eisenhower, pp. 405-06; Diary Office CinCo 

Book VIII, p. A-720. 

8 Telg 121, AFHQ Adv to AFHQ. 3 Sep 43. 

Capitulation of Italy, p. 252, relayed by AFHQ 

to CCS, NAF 354, 3 Sep 43, Capitulation of 

Italy, p. 257. 

9 CasteJlal~o, Come firmai, pp. 157-58. 

Somewhat later, General Smith handed 

Castellano a copy of the long terms entitled "Instrument of Surrender of Italy." 

He attached a brief note to explain that 

the document 

Contains the political, financial, and economic conditions which will be imposed by 

the United Nations in accordance with 

paragraph 12 of the Armistice terms. The 

militarv conditions of the Armistice are contained 'in the document which we have just 

signed. The attached paper is identical 

with the one handed to General Zanussi by 

H. M. Ambassador in Lisbon.lo 

Having managed to avoid use of 

the humiliating unconditional surrender 

phrase in all his negotiations, and having 

been responsible for initiating a joint ItaloAllied operation to defend Rome, Castellano was painfully surprised to read the 

initial clause of the comprehensive terms: 

"The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces 

wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally." 

When Castellano protested, Smith said 

that Zanussi had received the document 

in Lisbon; the Italian Government certainly knew the conditions of the long 

terms. Castellano was not so sure. He 

doubted that his government would accept 

the additional clauses. When Smith reminded him of the modifying force of the 

Quebec Memorandum, Castellano said 

that it contained only general prOmL'les, 

that his government had no recourse if the 

Allies did not convey their promises in 

writing. Thereupon General Smith sat 

down and made the promise in writing. 

"The additional clauses," he wrote for 

Badoglio's benefit, "have only a relative 

value insofar as Italy collaborates in the 

war against the Germans." 11 

10 Capitulation of Italy, p. 224. 

11 Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 160-61; Interv with Ambassador Smith, 13 May 47. 
THE ARMISTICE 

At 2030 that evening, Castellano met 

again with Allied officers to discuss what 

the Italian Government should do now 

that it had concluded the armistice agreement. General Alexander presided, Generals Smith, Rooks, and Cannon, Brig. 

Gen. Patrick W. Timberlake (A-3, Mediterranean Air Command) , Brigadier 

Strong, and General Lemnitzer (Deputy 

Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group) took 

part. After the meeting, Castellano received an aide-memoire enumerating the 

general actions the Italian Government 

would take before the announcement of the 

armistice. Commodore Dick handed 

Castellano a memorandum containing instructions for the movement of Italian 

warships and merchant shipping to ports 

under Allied control. 12 

Planning GIANT II 

The Allies also consulted Castellano on 

the plans even then being readied for the 

airborne drop near Rome. Before the 

signing of the armistice, while Castellano 

was waiting explicit permission to sign, 

the Allies had begun to plan the airborne 

operation. At 1430, 3 September, Castellano had met with several Allied officers 

to explore possible alternatives. Presiding 

at the meeting, Rooks, the AFHQ G-3, 

stated that the airborne division had the 

mi~"ion of co-operating with Italian units 

in the defense of Rome. Castellano then 

outlined how he thought the Germans 

might act against the airborne landing. 

12 Capitulation of Italy, pp. 221-23. The 

copy in AFHQ microfilm records, feel R-6z-1, 

item Giant Two, indicates that copy 1 of the 

aide-memoire was given to Castellano. See also 

copy 2, 3 Sep 43. in AFHQ 0100/41330, with 

change to par. 5, dated 6 Sep 43, sent to Rome 

via the secret radio channel. 

485 

The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, located 

between Viterbo and Lake Bolsena, could 

advance on Rome by three parallel roads 

and would probably make the main effort. 

Two Italian units stood in its way, the 

Piave Division, immediately north of the 

city, and the Ariete Division, some fifteen 

miles beyond. The commanders of these 

divisions, Castellano ventured, could defend just south of Lakes Bracciano and 

Martignano. The Sassari Division, stationed in Rome, could reinforce them. 

South of Rome, the Centauro Division 

could block the 2d Parachute Division's 

approach to the capital. 

The Italians did not lack men, Castellano explained. They lacked firepower. 

The Ariete Division, for example, had no 

antitank guns at all and could hold the 

Germans back for perhaps twenty-four 

hours, no more. 

General Ridgway, commander of the 

82d Airborne Division, who had suddenly 

been called to the conference, said that he 

had 57-mm. antitank guns able to penetrate Mark IV and VI tanks at ranges up 

to 500 yards, and still heavier weapons 

possibly might be landed. Furthermore, 

the proposed seaborne expedition to the 

mouth of the Tiber River could bring 

even more arms. 

But Ridgway and the others were more 

concerned with protecting the airfields 

where the landings were to take place, 

and assuring that no Italian antiaircraft 

battery would fire on the incoming planes. 

Could Castellano give assurance that Italian antiaircraft batteries would not fire on 

the Allied planes? 

Castellano gave several specific guarantees. The Italians would secure the fields. 

Antiaircraft defenses would not open fire. 

A route north of the Tiber River would 

pass over minimum antiaircraft defenses. 
486 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

I t was pointed out, and agreed to by Castellano, that sufficient time would have to 

be allowed to enable a specific order to 

get down to every gun. Castellano also 

promised that Italian officers of high rank 

would meet the commander of the airborne 

division on a field to be decided upon by 

the Allies. Navigational aids would be furnished. The airfields would be illuminated; the outlines of the fields in 

orange-red lights, the outlines of the runways and any obstacles within five hundred 

yards of the fields by means of red lights. 

Castellano also promised that the Italians 

would provide motor transportation for 

concentrating the airborne troops and 

their supplies. Finally, he gave assurances 

that all available intelligence regarding 

both German and Italian unit~ in the 

Rome area would be furnished the Allies 

before the operation. 

Castellano suggested six available airfields, none occupied by the Germans. 13 

He produced maps showing the location 

of German and Italian troops near Rome. 

He suggested troop landings at Centocelle 

and Littoria airfields, heavy equipment at 

Guidonia airfield. He recommended the 

Littoria airfield, just north of the city, as 

the point of concentration. Also, to reach 

these fields, which together formed a triangle with its base along the eastern outskirts of the Italian capital and its apex 

at Guidonia, the planes should fly in from 

the west-northwest. 

During the meeting, certain other matters were briefly mentioned. General 

Rooks noted that consideration was being 

13 These were Littoria (U rbe), in the northern 

suburbs; Centocelle, southeast of the city; The 

Race Course, opposite Littoria; Magliana, on 

the river west of Rome; Guidonia, fifteen miles 

northeast of Rome; and Ciampino, southeast of 

the city (not to be thought of since it was in 

the midst of German troops). 

given to running two or three ships up 

the Tiber River with ammunition and 

supplies, and Commodore Royer Dick 

asked if the swing bridges could be opened. 

Castellano stated that the bridge at 

Fiumicino could be kept open, and that 

this would permit ships to go as far as the 

Magliano airfield where supplies could be 

landed along the banks. The Tiber River 

was thirty feet deep as far as the Littoria 

airfield, Castellano said, but the area south 

of the river was occupied by German 

troops armed with antiaircraft batteries. 

This was Castellano's reason for recommending that the approach of the planes 

should be about eight miles north of the 

river. General Taylor, the 82d Airborne 

Division's artillery commander, felt that 

such a route would be more difficult to 

find at night than one directly up the 

river, and urged that the German troops 

south of the river be mopped up by the 

Italians as an initial move in the operation. 

Rooks then asked if a small planning staff 

from the airborne division could be sent 

to Rome in advance to complete the details of the operation; Castellano agreed, 

and offered to take two or three American 

officers with him on his return to Rome 

on the following day. 

After some discussion on the availability of Ioo-octane gasoline for such Allied 

fighter aircraft as might be flown into the 

Rome area, General Ridgway said that 

he had enough information on which to 

draft his outline plan. The meeting adjourned. 14 

14 Min of Mtg held at Cassibile on Friday, 3 

Sep 43, to discuss a certain projected airborne 

operation, reel R-62-1, item Giant Two; Giant 

Two Outline Plan, 3 Sep 43, copy 5, reel R62-1; Gi'lnt Two Outline Plan, copy 3, 3 Sep 

43, typewritten copy with ink insertions and corrections, 82d AB Div G-3 Jnl, 1-15 Sep 43; 

G,win, Airborne Warfare, pp. 24-27; Ridgway_ 
THE TIBER RIVER AT FIUMICINO 
488 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

As General Ridgway worked with a 

small planning group on an outline plan 

for GIANT II, he grew increasingly concerned over the possibility that the Italian 

authorities might not be able to silence a 

sufficient number of the guns in Rome's 

belt of antiaircraft defenses. Should too 

few be silenced, the unescorted C-4is 

would be fat targets as they came in low 

to drop paratroopers or to land supplies. 

General Ridgway remembered how Allied 

fighters on I8 April had intercepted and 

shot down seventy-three Junker 52's flying 

supplies into Tunisia, and recalled painfully the unfortunate experience during the 

invasion of Sicily when friendly fire had 

shot down twenty-three allied transport 

aircraft. He also felt that he could not 

rely on the Italians for other acts of cooperation in the degree "considered essential to success." 15 

Late that night Castellano was called in 

for additional consultation. The Italian 

general was now less certain than he had 

been during the afternoon session, and 

under the pressure of questioning he adSoldier, pp. 80-83; Warren, USAF Hist Study 

74, pp. S 7-S8; Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: 

TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 519-20; 82d 

AB Div in Sicily and Italy, pp. 45-49; copy 2 

of Giant Two Outline Plan may be found in 

0100/12A/I73; see also Hq NAAF, A-S/4363, 

sub: Amendment I to Opr! AVALANCHE-Outline Plan of Troop Carrier Opns (A-S/P.501) 

(Final), 0100/12A/173 and Addendum to AS/P.SOI (Final), same file; Operation Giant, in 

0403/4/ I 029; Directive, AFHQ to multiple 

adressees, sub: Operation Giant Two, 4 Sep 43, 

0100/41330; Ltr, Rpt by Maj Patrick D. Mulcahy, AFHQ Obsv, AFHQ, AG :.\70-1 (Airborne) GCT-AGM, 22 Sep 43, sub: Airborne 

Activities in the AVALANCHE Opn, to Air CinC, 

Med, 0403/10/296. 

15 Rpt, Ridgway to Eisenhower, 25 Oct 43, 

sub: Lessons of Airborne Operations in Italy, 

contained in USAAF, A Report of TCC Activities Including the Italian Invasion, I Aug-30 Sep 

43, II, 120; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 80-81; Warren, USAF Hist Study 74, p. S8. 

mitted the enormous difficulty of silencing 

every gun in Rome's antiaircraft defenses. 

Instead of following the instructions of his 

government and suggesting, as he had 

earlier, the Guidonia, Littoria, and CentocelIe airfields, he admitted that the latter 

two fields lay in the midst of extensive 

flak batteries. He now proposed that initial drops be made at the Furbara and 

Cerveteri airfields, slightly to the north of 

Rome and on the coast. Located outside 

the city's antiaircraft defenses, they were 

completely in Italian hands. The Lupi di 

T oscana Division, coming from southern 

France and scheduled to concentrate on 

8 September between these two airfields, 

could provide additional ground security. 

The airborne planners worked all night, 

and on the morning of 4 September they 

had an outline plan. Initial forces were 

to land on the Cerveteri and Furbara 

fields, followed during the next night by 

parachute drops on the Guidonia, Littoria, 

and Centocelle fields. The division was 

then to assemble in the western outskirts 

of Rome, not at Littoria. The plan carefully defined Italian responsibilities. The 

I talians were to secure and protect the 

five airfields. They alone, without German help, were to man all the antiaircraft 

defenses around those fields. The flak 

batteries were to have explicit orders 

against taking any aircraft under fire during the nights of the operation. Italian 

troops were to block avenues of approach 

open to the Germans, furnish local protection of the airfields and drop zones, and 

guarantee unmolested passage of naval 

craft up the Tiber River to Rome. The 

Italians were to have a horizontal searchlight beam pointing due west at Furbara 

airfield, and two Rome radio stations were 

to broadcast throughout the night as navigational aids. The Italians were to out-
THE ARMISTICE 

line the perimeter of each field with amber 

lights, the airfield runways with white 

lights; to remove or silence all antiaircraft 

guns in a Io-mile-wide corridor astride the 

Tiber and along a shorter, secondary, and 

more direct route from the sea to the 

Cerveteri and Furbara fields; to have a 

senior staff officer of the 1M olorized Corps 

meet General Ridgway at Furbara airfield 

and a senior staff officer at each airfield 

to receive the American troops; and to 

furnish one interpreter guide to each 

company.16 

Castellano later claimed, incorrectly, that 

he had ohtained an agreement for the 

American division to "be placed at the 

orders of General Carboni." 17 The 82d 

Airborne Division was rather to "secure the 

city of Rome and adjacent airfields and 

prevent their occupation by German 

forces," accomplishing this "in cooperation 

with Italian forces." As General Taylor 

described the relationship: 

The a.irborne troops upon arrival will cooperate with the Italians in the defense of 

Rome and comply with the recommendations of the Italian High Command without 

relinquishing their liberty of action or undertaking any operation or making any disposition considered unsound. IS 

The outline plan, a copy of which Castellano received, also stipulated the amount 

of logistical aid the Italians were to provide: 23,000 rations, 355 trucks, 12 

ambulances, 120 tons of gasoline and oil, 

12 switchboards, 150 field telephones, 100 

picks, 200 shovels, 5,000 wire pickets, and 

150 miles of barbed wire. A labor pool 

of 500 men was to be provided by the 

second day. The Americans would bring 

Hi Giant Two Outline Plan. 

17 Castellano, Come finnai, pp. 16 7-68. 

is Giant Two Outline Plan; Program for 

Giant II, 6 Sep 43, signed by Gen Taylor, 82d 

AB Div G-3 Jnl, 1-15 Sep 43. 

489 

in rations for two days, gasoline for one 

day, medical supplies for the initial period, 

and ammunition for the entire operation. 

Convinced by this time that any airborne 

drop in the Rome area would be a tragic 

mistake, General Ridgway protested 

strongly to Generals Smith and Alexander. 

Ridg>vay's opposition led the Allies to send 

two American officers to Rome to confer 

with the leaders of the Italian forces around 

the capital about the final details of ItaloAmerican co-operation. The real purpose 

of their mission was to assess the feasibility 

of the airborne operation. 

Second Thoughts in Rome 

After working with the Allied officers on 

the GIANT II outline plan, Castellano was 

informed that General Eisenhower wanted 

to have an Italian military mission attached 

to AFHQ, a mission composed of ground, 

air, and naval representatives headed by 

Castellano himself. Castellano radioed a 

request to Rome for authority to constitute 

such a mission, and canceled his plans to 

return to Rome. Other arrangements 

would be made for getting the two Allied 

officers to Rome. 

During the early afternoon of 4 September, Smith visited Castellano once more. 

Castellano raised the question of when the 

Allied landing would take place and when 

the armistice was to be announced. Replying through the interpreter, Smith said: 

"I understand very well the great anxiety 

you have to know these dates, but unfortunately I can tell you nothing; it is a 

military secret which I must keep." Then. 

in a lower voice, "I can say only that the 

landing will take place within two 

weeks." III Smith then departed and that 

afternoon returned to Algiers. 

HI Castellano, Come firmai, p. 7I; Inten' with 

Ambassador Smith, 13 May 47. 
490 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

During the afternoon Castellano saw 

several other Allied officers on the problems of co-ordinating various aspects of 

the armistice announcement. The Allies 

would notify the Italian Government what 

day the announcement was to be made by 

the secret radio link already established 

with Rome, and, as an alternate channel, 

by the British Broadcasting Corporation 

(BBC) . The BBC would signal the day 

by broadcasting two special programs between the hours of 1000 and 1200, British 

time: a half hour of Verdi's music and 

a two-minute discourse, during the British 

overseas program, on the theme of Nazi 

activities in Argentina.20 

Castellano then prepared his reports to 

his government, reports to be flown to 

Rome on the following day, 5 September. 

'While Montanari translated the documents 

from English to Italian, Castellano wrote 

a letter to Ambrosio. "Despite every possible effort to succeed," he stated, "I have 

not been able to get any information on the 

precise locality of the landing. Regarding 

the date I can say nothing precise; but 

from confidential information I presume 

that the landing will take place between 

the loth and 15th of September, possibly 

the 12th." 21 

Castellano had reached the conclusion 

from Smith's spoken statement. If the 

main Allied invasion was to be launched 

within one week, Castellano reasoned, 

Smith would not have spoken of two 

weeks. Therefore, he deduced that at 

least one week would elapse between the 

initial landing in south Italy-BAYTOWN 

eo Me.no by Brig Gen Robert A. McClure, :; 

Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 27 I. 

H This is the text of the critical paragraph of 

the letter as given by Castellano (Come firmai, 

page 172). The original letter has not been revealed and there is some doubt about the exact 

wording. See II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 28. 

into the tip of Calabria, launched on 3 September-and the main descent on the 

mainland. Since Smith had talked to 

him on 4 September, the main attack could 

not, according to this line of reasoning, be 

expected before the I I tho It could take 

place any time during the second week10 to 15 September.22 

Castellano's aide and pilot flew his letter and documents, including the GIANT 

II outline plan, to Rome early on 5 September. The aide delivered the papers to 

Ambrosio, who read them and turned them 

over to Badoglio. Castellano's date of 12 

September for the Allied landing and the 

armistice announcement was only a guess, 

but Ambrosio accepted Castellano's estimate as definite, and he told Badoglio so. 

As a result, all the Italian military and 

political leaders involved in the armistice 

expected the main Allied landing no earlier 

than 12 September, possibly later.23 

General Eisenhower and AFHQ staff 

officers expected the Italians to make vigorous efforts to insure the success of the 

invasion-or at least of the airborne drop. 

But Badoglio, Ambrosio, Rossi, and Roatta 

remained doubtful of their ability to give 

real help, possibly because they felt that 

Badoglio had pledged the government to 

a course of action-the surrender of all 

of Italy to the Allies--that was beyond its 

power. The I talian Government and 

High Command therefore continued to be 

more interested in being rescued than in 

helping fight the Germans. While Castellano supported active co-operation with 

the Allies, the leaders in Rome remained, 

"" Castellano, Come firmai, p. 173. 

n Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, pp. 102-

03; Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 133-35; MS # 

P-058, Project #46, 1 Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 

20. According to the above sources Maj. Luigi 

Marchesi in delivering Castellano's letter gave 

oral confirmation of 12 September. 
THE ARMISTICE 

in contrast, passive. Castellano had represented the Italian Army as hating the 

Germans and willing to turn on them. 

In this way, an American officer later remarked, he "sold the Allies a bill of 

goods." 24 Badoglio, Ambrosio, Roatta, 

and Rossi were hardly anxious to fight. 

Their primary aim was to secure Allied 

protection of the capital. 

On 5 September, Roatta later maintained, he received notice from Comando 

Supremo that the armistice with the Allies was concluded, that the time of the 

armistice announcement was as yet undetermined but would not occur before 12 

September, that in accord with the Italian request the Allies would land a force 

of six divisions in central Italy and within 

striking distance of Rome, an unknown 

number of troops by air, and nine Allied 

divisions in a subsequent landing perhaps 

farther to the north. Beyond this, the 

Italian Government had no details and 

awaited precise information regarding Allied plans. 25 

Two days earlier, on 3 September, while 

Badoglio was deciding to authorize Castellano's signature of the armistice terms, 

Ambrosio had written a memorandum for 

his deputy chief, Rossi, to outline the instructions he wished issued to Superaereo, 

Supermarina, and Army Group East (controlling the Italian troops in Greece and 

in the Balkans). This paper, plus Roatta's Memoria 44 (drawn on I September and in the process of dissemination to 

the commanders under his control) , 

reached Rossi on 4 September. In compliance with Ambrosio's wish, Rossi 

2. Quote is from Interv, Smyth with Maj Gcn 

Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 4 Mar 4i. 

25 Roatta is in error (Otto milioni, pages 301-

02) when he gives the date of reception of this 

information as 3 September. 

491 

drafted several directives. Before they 

reached final form, Castellano's documents 

arrived-on 5 September. This held up 

the instructions for another day. On 6 

September, Comando Supremo issued Promemoria I, a general directive for each general staff-Army, Navy, and Air Forcethat was, in effect, a complementary 

order to Roatta's Memoria 44. Like the 

earlier Army order, the Comando Supremo 

directive did not refer to co-operation 

with the Allies. Rather, its chief purpose 

was to spell out Italian reaction to collective, general German aggression as 

distinguished from local, irresponsible German acts. Under the illusion that 12 

September was the firm date for the 

Allied invasion and the armistice announcement, Comando Supremo intended 

subsequently to supplement these instructions. 2fJ 

The intermixture of German and Italian 

headquarters in the Balkans and Greece 

made it appropriate to issue instructions 

to Army Group East as late as possible. 

Since Ambrosio thought of 12 September 

as the target date, he had a draft order 

(Promemoria 2) drawn on 6 September 

for that headquarters, intending to put it 

into effect later. The directive instructed 

the troops in Herzegovina, Montenegro, 

and Albania to withdraw toward the coast 

and maintain possession of the ports of 

Cattaro and Durazzo; the commander in 

Greece and Crete, before withdrawing his 

troops to suitable ports for evacuation, was 

to tell the Germans frankly that the ItalIans would not fight against them unless 

26 Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 211-15. Curiously enough, Roatta (Otto milioni, pages 302-

03, 314) later identified this directive as coming 

from AFHQ. Roatta's Army general staff on the 

same day issued its Memoria 45 to supplement 

the Coman do Supremo directive. 
492 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

the Germans resorted to violence. In the 

Aegean Islands, the Italians were to disarm the Germans to avert open hostilities. 27 

Thus, the only orders actually issued 

during the three days immediately following the signature of the armistice were 

essentially defensive. They indicated little 

intention of pursuing the aggressive action 

against the Germans that Castellano had 

described at Cassibile. 

The role of the forces defending Rome 

was not quite so passive. The nucleus of 

this body of troops had begun to form on 

20 July to protect the government against 

a possible Fascist reaction to Mussolini's 

imminent overthrow. Since 29 July the 

troops had been alerted to act against the 

possibility of a German stroke against the 

capital. Under the immediate command 

of Roatta, chief of the Army General Staff, 

the force consisted of three corps. The 

Corpo d' Annata di Roma, controlling the 

Sassari Division, carabinieri, and service 

and school troops, was within Rome and 

had as its task the internal defense of the 

city against SS agents and other special 

German troops stationed there. The 

XVII Corps had small detachments of the 

220th and 22 ISf C oasta! Divisions distributed along the coast from Tarquinia to 

the V olturno River-a distance of I '25 

miles-and the Piacen;.;a Di'vision interspersed among units of the German 2d 

~7 Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 215-16. The 

Eleventh Army (in Greece and Crete) chief of 

staff was summoned to Rome and received the 

draft order during the evening of 6 September; 

he returned with it to Athens on the following 

morning. The chief of staff of Army Group 

East was summoned to Rome on 7 September, received a copy of the directive the next day, but 

was unable to return to his headquarters at Tirana in Yugoslavia because of bad flying weather. 

See It Processo C arboni-Roatta, p. 48. 

Parachute Division. C'.reneral Carboni's 

/vlolorized Corps controlled the Ariete 

Armored and Piave 1"1otorized Divisions 

north of Rome, the Centauro Armored 

Division east of the capital, and the Gra·natieri Division south of the city. 

As soon 3..<; Roatta learned from Comando Supremo on 5 September that the 

armistice had been concluded, he ordered 

the units regrouped. The Re and Lupi 

di T oscana Divisions were scheduled to 

arrive from the Balkans and from France 

as a result of the agreement reached on 

15 August with the German~who believed the divisions were slated for commitment in southern Italy. Instead, the 

Italiam; planned to use the divisions, scheduled to arrive in Rome on 8 September, 

to reinforce the capital's defenses. Roatta 

intended to have completed by the morning of 12 September the dispositions of 

these units, plus the deployment of a 

Bersaglieri regiment, scheduled to become 

available, as well as the final regrouping 

of the Motorized Corps. His faith in 

this date as the time of the Allied invasion 

and the armistice announcement was 

strengthened on 6 September when he received copies of the GIANT II outline plan. 

According to Generale di Divisione Aerea 

Renato Sandalli, chief of the Air Force 

Staff, who also received a copy of the plan 

and who discussed its implications ;.vith 

Roatta, Italian Air Force preparations to 

comply with the Allied requirements for 

the airborne operation would take at least 

a week. This confirmed Roatta's belief 

in 1O2 September as the effective date of 

the armistice. 28 

~'Roatta, Gtto milioni, pp. 300-305; II Proces.\O Carboni-Roatta, pp. 30-3 I Rossi, Come 

arrivammo, p. 135; Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 102-03. 
THE ARMISTICE 

As for the airborne plan itself, Roatta 

was flabbergasted. It appeared to assign 

missions to the Motorized Corps far beyond its capabilities. Four hundred trucks 

could be rounded up only by stripping 

the Piave and Ariete Divisions of all their 

vehicles ( he did not think of collecting 

autos, buses, and trucks from the municipality of Rome, an expedient which Castellano had considered quite feasible). 

Instead of being a plan to defend Rome, 

it was, Roatta believed, a preliminary step 

for a future drive north from Rome, with 

the capital as the base of operations. 

Though he might have had no objection 

to this concept, he could not concur in 

the basic assumption as to the strength of 

his troops. If his forces were indeed 

strong enough to carry out all the actions 

assigned to them in the airborne plan, they 

would then be strong enough to defend 

Rome against the Germans without Allied 

assistance. The plan, therefore, did not 

project a rescue operation; rather it embodied Castellano's concept of Italian cooperation with the Allies. What was 

most disappointing to Roatta was the lack 

of indication that the Allies would land 

six divisions within striking distance of 

Rome, a move which, he maintained, Comando Supremo had led him to expect. 29 

Something else seemed not quite right. 

Aerial photographs of the North African 

ports of Mers el Kebir, Oran, Arzew, and 

Mostagenem on 4 September and the 

knowledge that Allied ships were loaded 

with landing craft indicated an impending amphibious operation. Comando Supremo conjectured that the destination of 

the force might be Corsica. Two days 

later, Roatta had word of Allied convoys 

assembling in the open sea north of Pa2!l Roatta, Gtto milioni, pp. 305-06. 

493 

lermo. Did this mean that the Allies were 

about to launch a subsidiary attack independent of and before the armIstIce 

announcement expected on 12 September? 

Or were the Allies getting ready to invade 

the mainland far south of Rome, or possibly, Sardinia? 30 

In any event, Roatta concluded that the 

Allies would be in no position to march 

directly on Rome at once. The Italians 

themselves would have to defend the capital. From this belief was to come contradictory and ambiguous conduct on the 

part of the Italian Government for the 

next two days, behavior that revealed the 

wide discrepancy between Castdlano's 

views and those of Badoglio, Ambrosio, 

and Roatta. Part of the trouble was the 

fact that the King gave no firm indication 

of his desire to turn actively against 

the Germans. Thus, Badoglio consistently 

took a passive attitude. For him, and for 

Ambrosio and Roatta as well, the armistice, the invasion, and the airborne operation near Rome comprised a multiple 

plan of rescue, not an opportunity for Italy to pay her passage with the Allies. 

The thing that crystallized matters was 

an estimate of the situation that Roatta 

presented to Ambrosio during the late 

afternoon of 6 September. The location 

of Allied convoys, he averred, made possible only two conclusions as to Allied 

intentions. Either the Allies were about to 

make a landing independent of the armstice-like that of the British Eighth Army 

on the 3d-or they were going to launch 

their main attack before 12 September, an 

invasion directed against south Italy or 

'10 Ibid., p. 306; Rossi (Come arriuammo, 

pages 144-46) contradicts Roatta on this point. 

See also Coman do Supremo, I Reparto, Ufficio del 

capo reparto, NO". 2087/1, 6 Scp 43, IT 4563, and 

Zanussi Guerra e catastrote, II, 168. 
494 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Sardinia. In either case, there was little 

prospect of immediate help from Italian 

forces in the capital. Therefore, the plan 

for joint action with the Allied airborne 

division had to be adjusted to reflect the 

real capabilities of the Italian forces. 

Convinced that otherwise a fiasco would 

result, Ambrosio agreed to the necessity 

for modifying the GIANT II plan.3 ! 

Fortunately for the Italians, a way to get 

in touch with the Allies was at hand. 

In response to General Eisenhower's request that the Italians send a military mission to AFHQ, a request forwarded by 

Castellano on 4 September, the Italian 

High Command had selected eleven officers headed by Col. Paolo Decarli of the 

Military Intelligence Service. These officers were to leave Rome that evening, 6 

September. Two hours before their departure several of these officers received 

instructions at Comando Supremo for 

modifying the Allied plans. There were 

three relatively minor proposals-a change 

in the text of Badoglio's contemplated armistice announcement; a request that the 

Italian Fleet be permitted to sail to Sardinia rather than to Malta; and a request 

that maximum air support be sent to the 

Rome airfields immediately after the armistice announcement. But a fourth point 

was major-the Italians wanted the airborne operation to be executed two days 

after the main landing rather than at the 

same time. 32 

Carboni later asserted that he gave one 

member of the mission, Maj. Alberto 

Briatore, a memorandum completely repudiating the armistice and the airborne 

operation, and he accused Castellano of 

31 Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 140-41; Roatta, 

Otto mifioni, pp. 306-07; Zanussi, Guerra e catastro/e, II, I7 I. 

32 Castellano, Come firmai, p. 18 I. 

deliberately preventing Briatore from delivering it to the Allies. 33 But Carboni's 

memorandum was a fabrication. 34 The 

Italians did not renounce their obligations 

in this fashion. 

That night, at 2200, 6 September, after 

instructing the members of the military 

mission, Ambrosio left Rome by train for 

Turin. His purpose in going, he explained later, was to pick up his diary and 

other compromising documents.35 In his 

absence, Rossi was in charge of Comando 

Supremo, but Rossi felt that he could 

make no basic decision without the concurrence of his chief. During this time, 

for two days, Carboni, Roatta, and Rossi, 

with the full support and co-operation of 

Badoglio, repudiated Castellano's commitments with respect to GIANT II and 

contrived to create a situation that struck 

the Allies as having every appearance of 

a double cross. 

Why Ambrosio chose this moment for a 

trip to Turin is not clear. Perhaps he 

was thoroughly convinced that 12 September was to be the effective armistice date. 

Perhaps he did not altogether comprehend 

33 Carboni, L' armistizio e fa difesa di Roma, 

pp. 27, 59-60, 108-09. 

34 Briatore on 20 January 1945 testified that 

he had never seen such a document. Ambrosio, 

Roatta, and Rossi denied that the document 

printed by Carboni was ever composed in the 

Comando Supremo headquarters. Carboni's text 

was artful, for its concepts resembled somewhat 

a memorandum drafted by Roatta late on 6 September after the departure of the military mission. Cf. note 37. See the excellent critical examination of the Carboni fabrication by the 

UfJicio Storico, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercita, Ministera della Difesa, Allegato af /.n. 1780/St., 12 

Mar 48, Inc! in Ltr, Maj James A. Gray, Assistant Military Attache, to Director of Intelligence, 

GSUSA 16 Jun 48, OCMH files. See also Roatta, Otto mifioni, p. 315, and II Pracesso Carboni-Roatta, pp. 33-34. 

35 MS #P-058, Project #46, I Feb-8 Sep 

43, Question 22. 
THE ARMISTICE 

Roatta's alarm. Perhaps--though rather 

improbably, for he and Castellano were 

close associates-he had even misunderstood Castellano's point of view. 36 

After Ambrosio's departure, Roatta 

talked with Carboni, who not only commanded the Motorized Corps but also directed the Military Intelligence Service. 

Carboni confirmed Roatta's low opinion 

of the strength of the Italian troops around 

Rome. The Motorized Corps, Carboni 

said, without reinforcements and more 

time for preparations, could not put up 

protracted resistance against the Germans, 

nor could it provide effective protection 

for the American airborne landings. 

Embodying these objections to GIANT 

II in a memorandum, Roatta emphasized 

the danger in announcing the armistice 

before 12 September at the earliest. He 

also stressed the necessity of having the 

main Allied landing take place in accord 

with Italian expectations: the invasion 

would have to be made within striking 

distance of Rome. 37 

As director of the Military Intelligence 

Service, Carboni transmitted a copy of 

Roatta's memorandum to Badoglio early 

on 7 September. Later that morning, 

Carboni spoke with Rossi. He told Rossi 

that he had conferred with Badoglio and 

had explained that his Motorized Corps 

had ammunition for only twenty minutes 

of fire, the Ariete Armored Division had 

fuel for about one hundred miles of movement. Alarmed, Rossi sought Roatta for 

confirmation. He learned from Roatta of 

Roatta's discussion with Carboni the night 

before, and Roatta explained that the Lupi 

di Toscana and Re Divisions were neces-

'If; II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 30-3 I. 

,)7 Roatta, Otto milioni. p. 307; Rossi. Come 

arrivammo, pp. '40-4'; Zanussi, Guerra e catastro/e, II. '7 I. 

495 

sary for the defense of Rome but would 

not now be available until 12 September, 

rather than 8 September as earlier expected. Rossi thereupon became convinced that it was essential for the armistice 

to become effective on 15 September if 

possible, in any case not before the 12th. 

Like Roatta, Rossi concluded that Castellano had not accurately presented to the 

Allies the true situation in Rome. At 

noon, Roatta and Rossi sent a message by 

the special radio. Comando Supremo, 

they radioed Castellano, would soon send 

a "communication of fundamental Importance." 3R 

Not long afterward Rossi learned that 

the American officers who were coming to 

Rome to make the final arrangements for 

the airborne operation were due to arrive 

in the city that same evening. Ambrosio 

had already arranged for their trip to 

Rome, but he had not known their ranks 

or exact mission. '''''hen Rossi found out 

that one was a general officer, he telephoned Ambrosio urging him to return 

from Turin to Rome by plane at once. 

Ambrosio, however, did not return until 

lOOO, 8 September.39 

Meanwhile, on the previous evening, 6 

September, AFHQ had sent two messages 

to Rome via the secret radio. The first 

read: 

Please maintain continuous watch every 

day for most important message which will 

be sent between ogoo hours and 1000 hours, 

GMT on or after 7 September repeat seven 

September. It will be necessary for you to 

reply immediately when you receive this important message that it has been received 

and understood. 40 

3R Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. '4'-42; II 

Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 32-33. 

3\) Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. '44. 

40 Msgs 34 and 35, "Drizzle" to "Monkey," 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 23,-32. 
496 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

The second: 

In addition to all other arrangements for 

the Great (G ) day the Italian broadcast 

transmitted by BBe will give two short talks 

on German Nazi activity in Argentina between I I :30 hours Greenwich time and 

12:45 hours. This broadcast will indicate 

the Great (G) day. Telegram number 36. 

There will not be any special program of 

music as requested. Please acknowledge 

receipt. 41 

In response to requests for acknowledgement, the Italians replied; the messages 

acknowledging Italian receipt came in to 

AFHQ shortly after noon, 7 September.42 

The Allied messages were a clear indication of the imminent approach of the 

41 Msg 36, "Drizzle" to "Monkey," Capitulation of Italy, p. 283. 

42 Capitulation of Italy, p. 300. 

invasion day and of the time for the 

surrender announcement. Obviously, both 

events were scheduled to occur soon 

after 7 September. Certainly, Carboni 

must have known because the secret radio 

given to Castellano at Lisbon was located 

in the Military Intelligence Service, which 

Carboni headed. Yet Carboni failed to 

make the information known to Badoglio, 

Ambrosio, Roatta, or Rossi.43 

Thus, when two American officers appeared in Rome on the evening of 7 

September, Ambrosio, chief of Comando 

Supremo, was absent on a personal errand 

in Turin, Roatta and Rossi were attempting to make fundamental changes in the 

arrangements concluded by Castellano, 

and Carboni was playing a dishonest game 

with both the Allies and his own superiors. 

43 11 Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 37. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

The Renunciation 

While the I talians toyed with capitulation and became entangled in its meshes, 

the Germans took further precautions 

against possible defection. Ambassador 

Rahn's meetings with Badoglio and Ambrosio on 4 September, the day after 

Castellano had signed the armistice agreem~nt, produced no mitigation of German 

SUspIclon. On the contrary, OK'Y on 5 

September instructed Kesselring to keep 

his German units well in hand and ready 

for any emergency. Rommel's Army 

Group B, which had the mission of eliminating the Italian military forces in northern Italy and occupying that part of the 

country, was ready to act. Contrary to 

Allied belief, the divisions under Rommel's 

control were not intended to reinforce 

Kesselring's troops in the south---on 6 

September OKW specifically directed 

Rommel to remain north of the northern 

line of the Apennines. 1 

By 7 September, although the Germans 

still had no ,positive proof, indications of 

Italian obstructionism had become clear 

enough to make Hitler absolutely certain 

of eventual Italian "treason." He therefore prepared to send an ultimatum to 

Badoglio, and he ordered JodI to draw up 

a draft of the military portion of the paper. 

In compliance, JodI listed five of Italy's 

basic military policies that seemed fun10KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3r.lX.43. 5 and 6 

Sep 43. 

damentally anti-German in purpose: (I) 

the concentration of Italian troops in 

northern Italy, particularly in the Alpine 

area; (2) the seizure by these troops of 

the commanding ground in the frontier 

zone; (3 ) the placement of demolition 

charges under bridges and other instaIlations near the frontier; (4) the expressions 

of hostility toward Germany among the 

I talian troops, so widespread as to be 

inexplicable unless a central direction was 

assumed; and (5) the failure to reinforce 

south Italy even though troops were 

available in the north and around Rome. 

JodI then listed eighteen specific measures he considered it necessary for Comando 

Supremo to take to remove the antiGerman character of these policies. It 

was Hitler's intention to serve the ultimatum on Badoglio on 9 September.2 Had 

Hitler done so, he would have left Badoglio no choice but to make a clear deci'lion~ 

for a break with Germany, or for complete co-operation. Acceptance of the 

ultimatum would have made Badoglio the 

gauleiter of Italy. Refusal would probably have signaled the start of German 

action to take over the Italian Government and the country. 

But the ultimatum was never delivered. 

Hitler's intended date of delivery turned 

out to be the same day on which the 

Allies landed on the Salerno beaches. 

20KW/WFSt, KTB, I.-3r.IX.43, 7 Sep 4:>; 

MS #C-093 (WarJirnont), pp. 164-68. 
498 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

«Innocuous" 

Proceeding systematically with their 

plans, the Allies had dispatched from 

North Africa on 3 September, the date 

when the Eighth Army crossed the Strait 

of Messina, the first of fifteen convoys 

which would leave Tripoli, Bizerte, and 

Oran. These convoys, carrying assault 

troops of the U.S. Fifth Army, were to 

take part in Operation AVALANCHE, the 

main invasion of the Italian peninsula. 3 

Elsewhere, other Allied headquarters 

worked on the planned airborne operation 

at Rome. 

From the moment that General Ridgway had been summoned to Cassibile on 

2 September to take part in the ItaloAmerican planning, sudden change and 

frantic haste characterized 82d Airborn'e 

Division plans and preparations. Already 

in the final stages of preparing to participate in AVALANCHE and execute GIANT 

I -securing the north flank of the Allied 

bea:..:nhead at Salerno--the division now 

faced a completely new assignment. 

Those units of the division which had 

fought in Sicily had, soon after the campaign ended, been shuttled by air back 

to the Kairouan area in Tunisia. Fully 

reunited there the division engaged in 

some sketchy training. Troops scheduled 

to make an amphibious assault as part of 

the division's role in AVALANCHE boarded 

landing craft on 3 September and were 

ready to sail. On this date GIANT I was 

canceled, and the entire division received 

word to prepare to move by air to Sicily. 

Having completed the GIANT II plan 

as the result of the all-night session at 

Cassibile, General Ridgway on 4 Septem3 A detailed account of the Salerno invasion 

may be found in Blumenson, Salerno to Anzio. 

ber flew to Bizerte to brief his subordinate 

commanders and also to try to speed the 

division's move to Sicily. The division 

staff and representatives of the Troop 

Carrier Command worked most of the 

night of 4 September and developed detailed plans for shifting the division back 

to Sicily. On 5 and 6 September the 

division returned by air. 4 

Ready on 5 September, the final plan 

for the airborne operation near Rome projected a combined drop and air landing 

of the entire division in successive lifts.5 

On the first night, Colonel Tucker's 504th 

Parachute Infantry Regiment (minus the 

3d Battalion); Company C, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion; Battery B, 80th 

Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion (with 

57-mm. antitank guns); and signal, reconnaissance, and medical unit~ were to 

land on the Cerveteri and Furbara airfields and push to Rome. On the second 

night, Colonel Gavin's 505th Parachute 

Infantry RCT would drop on the Guidoma, Littoria, and Centocelle airfields. 

On the same day, 5 September, with 

everything in a rush and while the division was preparing to move back to 

Sicily, a radio message from AFHQ modified the plan. Now, in addition to landing on the airfields near Rome, the 

division would also send a small seaborne 

expedition to land at the mouth of the 

Tiber River: an artillery battalion (the 

482d AB Div in Sicily and Italy, pp. 41-47; 

Rpt of TCC Activities Including the Italian Invasion, vol. II; Ltr, Ridgway to Eisenhower, 25 

Oct 43, in above rpt, p. 120; Gavin, Airborne 

Warfare, pp. 19-24; Msg 640, AFHQ to Br X 

Corps, 5 Sep 43, 0100/4/4,1· 

5 82d AB Div FO 5, 5 Scp 43, 82d AB Div 

G-3 Jnl, 1-15 Sep 43; Msg A.284, MAC to 

AHQ Malta, 7 Sep 43; Msg A.28 I, MAC to 

NATAF, 7 Sep 43; and Msg 318, NATAF to 

MAC, 6 Sep 43, all in 0403/4/1 029. See also 

Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, pp. 99-100. 
THE RENUNCIATION 

3 I gth Glider Field Artillery Battalion was 

chosen); three antiaircraft batteries ( of 

the 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion) ; 

an infantry company (of the 504th Parachute Infantry); and three platoons of 

the 8 13th Tank Destroyer Battalion (attached for the operation) . General 

Ridgway chose Lt. Col. William H. Bertsch 

Jr., to command this force. 

Leaving Col. Harry 1,. Lewis, commander of the 325th Glider Infantry 

Regiment, to supervise the dispatch of the 

seaborne expedition, Ridgway flew to Sicily 

to supervise the final arrangements for 

the airborne operation. Barely in time, 

Lewis diverted the artillery battalion and 

antiaircraft batteries from the air movement to Sicily, and after some searching 

located the tank destroyers, stationed 

about forty miles from Bizerte, and 

started them moving to the dock area. 

After much negotiating by telephone 

on 6 September, Colonel Lewis secured the 

promise of two LCI's, two LCT's, and 

perhaps some additional British vessels 

(whereabouts uncertain) for the seaborne 

force. When the British ships did arrive, 

confusion developed over their availability. 

To meet this emergency, the Bizerte harbor commander provided several extra 

bottoms. Loading began on 7 September, and the men crowded aboard, though 

no one knew when the armada of three 

LCI's and one LST -the eventual composition of the task force-would sail. 

Ha ving organized and loaded the seaborne 

force, Lewis flew to Sicily with the last 

remaining elements of the division, leaving 

Colonel Bertsch in charge of the seaborne 

troops then afloat in Bizerte harbor.G 

Ii'Ridgway Ltr cited above, n. 4; 82d AB Div 

in Sicily and Italy, pp. 47-48; Msg 975, AFHQ 

to 82d AB Div, 5 Sep 43; Msg 1086, AFHQ to 

499 

In Sicily, the 504th and 50Sth Parachute Infantry Regiments were getting 

ready to head for Rome. Takeoff time 

was scheduled for 1830, 8 September, an 

hour selected to coincide with General 

Eisenhower's announcement of the Italian 

surrender. According to the Allied timetable, Badoglio was to make his announcement of the armistice to the Italian people 

shortly thereafter. On the following 

morning, at 0330, 9 September, the amphibious assault troops of Operation AVALANCHE would hit the Salerno beaches. 

At the same time, the airborne troops were 

to be in the process of securing Rome 

against the Germans. 

To be absolutely certain of Italian cooperation at Rome and to work out the 

final details of the arrival of the American 

airborne troops, General Eisenhower had 

selected two American officers to make 

the perilous trip to the Italian capital: 

General Taylor, the 82d Airborne Division's artillery commander, and Col. 'Villiam T. Gardiner of the Troop Carrier 

Command. At a briefing conducted at 

15th Army Group headquarters, the Allied leaders decided that unless word to 

the contrary came from Taylor and Gardiner, the airborne operation would go 

as scheduled. Taylor could recommend 

changes as well as cancellation, all messages 

to be made in code by means of the radio 

given to Castellano and currently operating 

in Carboni's Military Intelligence Service 

in Rome. If Taylor was not satisfied 

with the Italian arrangements, if he judged 

that the airborne operation should be 

canceled, and if the Italian authorities refused to transmit that message, Taylor was 

Fifth V.S. Army, 6 Sep 43; and Telg 1750, 

AFHQ to CinC, Med, 7 Sep 43, all in 0100/ 

4/4,1. 
500 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

to radio to AFHQ a single word-

"innocuous." 7 

General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner 

left Palermo at 0200, 7 September, in a 

British PT boat and made rendezvous off 

Ustica Island with an Italian corvette. 

Escorted to a beach near Gaeta, the 

Americans came ashore. They entered a 

sedan belonging to the Italian Navy and 

transferred to a Red Cross ambulance on 

the outskirts of Gaeta. With their uniforms intentionally splattered with water 

to give the appearance of aviators shot 

down and rescued from the sea, they rode 

toward Rome without incident, though 

they pas.'>ed several German patrols along 

the Appian Way. Just at nightfall, they 

entered the city.8 

Taken to the Palazzo Caprara, opposite 

the War Office, the Americans found accommodations ready for them. Three 

officers met them: Col. Giorgio Salvi, 

chief of staff of Carboni's Motorized 

Corps; Lanza, who had accompanied Castellano to Lisbon as interpreter and who 

had become Carboni's aide; and Marchesi, 

who had accompanied Castellano to 

Cassibile. 

Confronted with a surprisingly elaborate meal, the Americans dined with some 

impatience. Their hosts had not arranged 

to transact any business that evening, and 

it was only after becoming insistent that 

the Americans were able to get someone 

of high rank to come to see them.9 

7 Program for GIANT II, 6 Sep 43, 82d AB 

Div G-3 Jnl, 1-15 Sep 43; Msgs 822 and 823, 

AFHQ to 15th AGp, 5 Sep 43, 0100/4/4,1. 

8 Maugeri, From the Ashes of Disgrace, pp. 

170-77; 82d AB Div in Sicily and Italy. p. 56, 

which quotes in full Taylor's report on his mission to Rome, a report also in 0100/4/330 and 

in OIOO/12A/65,II. 

9 See David Brown, "The Inside Story of Italy's Surrender," Saturday Evening Post (September 16, 1944),. p. 65; Richard Thruelson and 

The Americans asked to see Carboni 

and Rossi. Only Carboni arrived at 2 I 30. 

He proceeded to give his views of the 

military situation: the Germans had been 

building up their forces in Italy since 

Mussolini's overthrow; they had increased 

their forces around Rome by 12,000 paratroopers equipped with heavy weapons, 

including 100 artillery pieces, mainly 

SS-mm. in caliber; they had raised the 

effective strength of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division to 24,000 men with 150 

heavy and 50 light tanks. In contrast, the 

Germans had ceased supplying the Italians 

with gasoline and munitions; the result 

was that his i1:fotorized Corps. virtually 

immobile, had enough ammunition for 

only a few hours of combat. 

As Carboni estimated the situation: 

If the Italians declare an armistice, the 

Germans will occupy Rome, and the C Italians can do little to prevent it. The simultaneous arrival of U.S. airborne troops 

would only provoke the Germans to more 

drastic action. Furthermore, the Italians 

would be unable to secure the airfields, 

cover the assembly and provide the desired 

logistical aid to the airborne troops. If it 

must be assumed that an Allied seaborne 

landing is impossible north of Rome, then 

the only hope of saving the Capital is to 

avoid overt acts against the Germans and 

await the effect of the Allied attacks in the 

South. He declared that he knew that the 

Allied landings would be at Salerno, which 

was too far away to aid directly in the defense of Rome. He stated that General 

Roatta shared his views. 10 

Elliott Arnold, "Secret Mission to Rome," Harper's Magazine (October, 1944), p. 466. 

10 As quoted in Taylor Rpt. Carboni's account (L'armisti~io e la difcsa di Roma, pages 

28-29) is highly fictitious. His statement that 

Taylor revealed the imminent invasion at Salerno 

is not true. ::.lor did Taylor charge Castellano 

with misrepresenting the situation to the Allies 

at Cassibile. See also, Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, 

pp. 102-08, quoting an interview with Gardiner. 
THE RENUNCIATION 

To the Americans, there was nothing 

new in the facts reported by Carboni. 

Castellano had explained fully at Lisbon 

and again at Cassibile. What was new 

was Carboni's realization-and if Carboni 

was to be believed, Roatta's too----that 

the main Allied landing would not be 

near Rome. '''''hat was disturbing was 

Carboni's "alarming pessimism certain to 

affect his conduct of operations in connection with GIANT TWO." Bypassing 

Rossi, the Americans asked to see Badoglio 

at once.ll 

Rossi, as a matter of fact, was on his 

way to meet with Taylor and Gardiner. 

Carboni had telephoned to tell him that 

Taylor had informed him that the armistice announcement was to be made the 

next day, 8 September. Rossi said he 

would be right over and started immediately for the Caprara Palace. Upon his 

arrival, Carboni met him in an anteroom. 

"Everything has been fixed up," Carboni 

said. "We are now going to Badoglio to 

submit the telegram of postponement to 

him." Rossi wished to accompany Carboni and the Americans, but Carboni dissuaded him, saying, "No, it is not necessary; everything is already arranged." 12 

Carboni escorted t9.e Americans to 

Badoglio's villa. As the result of an air 

raid a few minutes earlier, around midnight, the household was awake. Badoglio received Carboni at once. The 

Americans waited in an antechamber. 

After about fifteen minutes, Badoglio admitted them and greeted them cordially. 

Taylor and Badoglio spoke French, their 

conversation being supplemented by English and Italian translated by Lanza. 

Badoglio repeated the figures of German 

11 Taylor Rpt, pars. 2 and 4. 

12 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 35; Rossi, 

Come arriuammo, pp. 151-52. 

501 

troop strength exactly as Carboni had 

stated them earlier and advanced the 

same proposals: the armistice would have 

to be postponed, the airborne operation 

canceled. 

To Taylor and Gardiner, it seemed that 

Carboni had used the fifteen minutes during which he had been alone with Badoglio 

in order to bring the marshal around to 

his point of view-wait until they rescue us. Badoglio's bland disregard of the 

terms signed by his accredited representative, Castellano, and his unwillingness to 

oppose the Germans were extremely disconcerting to the Americans. 

When Taylor asked Badoglio whether 

he realized how deeply his government 

was committed as the result of the agreements already signed, Badoglio replied 

that the situation had changed-Castellano had not known all the facts. Italian 

troops could not possibly defend Rome. 

The only effect of an immediate announcement of the armistice would be a German 

occupation of the capital and the establishment of a neo-Fascist regime. 

Taylor then asked whether the Italians 

feared a German occupation more than 

the possibility of full-scale Allied bombardment. 'With considerable emotion, 

Badoglio replied that he hoped the Allies 

would attack the Germans, that they 

would bomb the northern rail centers 

rather than the Italians, who were friends 

of the Allies and who were only awaiting 

the appropriate moment to join them. 

When Taylor asked Badoglio how he 

expected the Allied leaders to react to his 

changed attitude, Badoglio made repeated 

professions of sympathy for the Allies and 

expressed the hope that Taylor would explain the situation and the new Italian 

point of view to General Eisenhower. 

Taylor refused to do this. But he 
502 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

added that if the Allied command instructed him to do so, he would serve 

as a messenger for whatever communication Badoglio might wish to send. What 

Taylor was angling for was a definite 

statement for Allied headquarters, over 

Badoglio's own signature, of the Italian 

viewpoint and intention. 

Badoglio thereupon wrote a message to 

General Eisenhower-a message canceling 

his earlier commitments. Written around 

o I 00, 8 September, less than twenty-four 

hours before Eisenhower intended to publicize the armistice agreement, the message 

read: 

Due to changes in the situation brought 

about by the disposition and strength of the 

German forces in the Rome area, it is no 

longer possible to accept an immediate armistice as this could provoke the occupation 

of the Capital and the violent assumption 

of the government by the Germans. Operation Giant Two is no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee the 

airfields. General Taylor is ~~ailable to return to Sicily to present the view of the government and await orders. Badoglio.13 

At the same time, Taylor wrote a mes-

~age of his own: 

In view of the statement of Marshal 

Hadoglio as to inability to declare armistice 

and to guarantee fields GIANT TWO is 

impossible. Reasons given for change are 

irreplaceable lack of gasoline and munitions 

::md new German dispositions. Badoglio 

requests Taylor return to present government views. Taylor and Gardiner awaiting 

instructions. Acknowledge. Taylor.!4 

Imploring the Americans to trust him, 

Badoglio swore that there was no trickery 

13 Taylor Rpt, Inel I. There are slight variations in the English translation made at AFHQ, 

where the message was received at 0535 and decoded at 0810. See Capitulation of Italy, pp. 

333-35· 14 Taylor Rpt, Inel 2. 

in the change and spoke at some length 

of his honor as a soldier and officer. It 

was perhaps 0200, 8 September, when 

Taylor and Gardiner returned to the 

Palazzo Caprara and turned over both 

messages to Carboni for encoding and 

transmission. 

To make certain that the Allied command understood the situation in Rome, 

Taylor sent a third message at 0820, a 

"summary of situation as stated by Italian 

authorities," including the Italian request for a cancellation of the airborne 

operation. 15 

Not long afterwards Taylor learned that 

AFHQ had acknowledged receipt of Badoglio's message. But he was concerned 

about his message recommending cancellation of GIANT II. Encoding long messages required, in some cases, three hours, 

decoding somewhat less. In order to be 

certain of stopping the airborne operation, 

scheduled to start at 1830 that afternoon, 

Taylor, at I 135, sent the message, "Situation innocuous." 16 

Meanwhile, Badoglio had telephoned 

Roatta early that morning to ask whether 

he agreed with Carboni's point of view. 

Roatta was cautious-he did not know 

what Carboni had said. On reaching 

Badoglio's house, Roatta learned what 

had taken place during the night. He 

then suggested that a proper course of 

action would be to send a high-ranking 

officer to explain matters fully to General Eisenhower and to point out what 

help the Allies would have to give in view 

of the situation III Rome. Badoglio 

agreed. 17 

15 Ibid., Inel 3. 

16 Ibid., par. 8. 

t 7 II Processo C arboni-Roatta, p. 36; Roatta, 

Otto milioni, p. 3 II; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, 

II. 177. 
THE RENUNCIATION 

After driving to Comando Supremo 

headquarters, Roatta informed Rossi of 

his meeting with Badoglio and prepared a 

memorandum of instructions for whoever 

would be selected to meet with General 

Eisenhower. 

Rossi then went to the railroad station 

at 1000 to meet Ambrosio, who was returning from Turin. Rossi informed him 

of the latest developments-Allied convoys 

were headed for Salerno, the armistice 

announcement was scheduled for that 

afternoon, and Badoglio was planning to 

send a high-ranking officer to Allied headquarters to request basic changes in the 

Allied plans. IS 

Shortly before noon the Italians took 

this request to the American officers and 

asked them to take along a representative 

on their return flight. As General Taylor 

la ter reported: 

The Italians showed great concern over 

the possible reaction of the Allied Chiefs to 

their reversal of position on the armistice. 

The American officers reinforced their apprehension by emphasizing the gravity of 

the situation in which the Badoglio government found itself. The Italians repeatedly 

urged the American officers to return and 

plead their case whereas the latter declined 

to be anything other than messengers. 19 

Finally, however, the Americans agreed 

to have a senior Italian officer accompany 

them to AFHQ. Roatta was first proposed and then immediately withdrawn, 

for he was considered indispensable in dealing with the Germans. He had an engagement with Kesselring's chief of staff, 

'Vestphal, an appointment which he felt 

he could not cancel without arousing German suspicion. Rossi was then selected 

18 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 36-37; 

Rossi. Come arrivammo, pp. 156-57. 

19 Taylor Rpt, par. g. 

503 

to go to Algiers. At I 140, therefore, Taylor sent another message to AFHQ: "In 

case Taylor is ordered to return to Sicily, 

authorities at Rome desire to send with 

him the Deputy Chief of the Supreme 

General Staff, General Rossi, to clarify 

issues. Is this visit authorized?" 20 

Thus, Rossi's mission, which had been 

inadvertently forecast a day earlier by the 

message to Castellano announcing a 

"communication of fundamental importance," was not in bad faith. Indeed, 

Rossi acted entirely with the best of 

intentions. On the other hand, all members of the Italian High Command were 

naIve in wishfully thinking that the Allies 

would, or could, alter their plans radically 

at the last minute. What thev wanted 

was a delay in announcing the armistice 

until they were certain that the Allies 

would occupy Rome. And they had a 

basis in their belief that Eisenhower was 

not altogether certain of proclaiming the 

surrender on 8 September, for certain 

cues were lacking. Initial arrangements 

with Castellano had included a special 

BBC program of Verdi's music as indicating the date of the announcement, a BBC 

discussion of Nazi activities in the Argentine as further indication, and finally a 

special message via the secret radio to give 

the Italians several hours specific warning. 

In reality, AFHQ on G September had 

canceled the program of Verdi's music. 

The Italians had acknowledged receipt of 

this information, but Carboni had apparently failed to disseminate it. 21 As for the 

second cue, General Rooks, the AFHQ 

G-3, had on 6 September requested the 

BBC to discuss or refer to Nazi activities 

20 Ibid., Inc! 5; Capitulation of Italy, p. 3:16: 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 177. 

21 Capitulation of Italy, p. 283. 
504 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

in Argentina during its broadcast of 1130 

or 1230 on 8 September.22 Yet for some 

unknown reason, London failed to make 

the broadcast.23 Finally, Rooks on 6 

September also directed that the warning 

order be sent to Rome via the secret 

radio.24 But this too, apparently, was not 

sent, perhaps because by then General 

Eisenhower was in direct communication 

with Marshal Badoglio. 25 

Consequently, when Rossi left Rome in 

the late afternoon of 8 September in company with Taylor and Gardiner, he had 

the vivid impression that none of the 

signals warning of the date of the armistice 

announcement had been issued. AFHQ, 

he reasoned, must be holding up the proclamation pending his arrival there. And 

did he not have General Eisenhower's 

permission to make the trip? 20 

Actually, he did not. Taylor's message asking whether Rossi might accom22 Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 358, 6 Sep 43, 

Capitulation of I taiy, p. 294, with copy in 0100/ 

4/4,1· 23 In response to a request by Smyth, Mr. Ellis 

Porter, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 

received this reply from Mr. Orin W. Kaye, Jr., 

Chief, London Bureau, FBIS: "Have now obtained from BBC copies of both I I :30-1 I :45 

GMT and 12:30-12:45 GMT Italian show of 

8 September 1943. Neither repeat neither-any 

reference to Argentina or Nazi activity therein." 

In reply to further requests by Smyth, additional 

replies were received On I November and I December 1948. The second reply reported: 

"Word had now been received from the Librarian 

of the Foreign Office that a complete search had 

been made through the file of broadcasts to Italy 

and no trace has been found of a broadcast referring to Nazi activities in the Argentine." The 

documents are in OCMH files. See also II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 37. 

24 Capitulation of Italy, p. 320; Interv, Smyth 

with Rooks, 28 Sep 48. 

25 The message ordered by Rooks does not appear in the "Monkey-Drizzle" code-named senes 

of messages in Capitulation of Italy. 

26 Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. 157. 

pany the Americans on their return had 

not yet reached AFHQ when Taylor received, at 1500, AFHQ's message ordering 

the American officers to return to North 

Africa. Despite the lack of authorization 

for Rossi's visit, Taylor and Gardiner decided to take Rossi-and an interpreter, 

a Lieutenant Tagliavia-with them on 

their own responsibility. Though a message from AFHQ later reached Rome 

granting Rossi permission to come, the 

party had already departed from the 

capital. 27 

Rossi therefore assumed that his mlSSlOn had Eisenhower's approval. The 

basic misunderstanding lay in the fact 

that the radiogram ordering Taylor and 

Gardiner to return was a portion of a message Eisenhower sent to Badoglio, a message encoded and sent in four parts. 

Had the complete message been revealed 

at once, Rossi would have known in advance the complete futility of his errand. 

Without such knowledge, he had the impression that he still had time to explain 

the situation to the Allied commander. 

And when the complete text of Eisenhower's message became available in Rome, 

Carboni, more than likely, withheld the 

vital information from his superiors and 

associates. 28 

Meanwhile, after canceling an interview with Ambrosio scheduled for r830, 

Taylor and Gardiner rode the Red Cross 

ambulance to the Centocelle airfield. 

Hoping that their messages recommending 

cancellation of GrANT II had reached 

AFHQ in time to stop the paratroopers, 

27 Taylor Rpt, par. 10; Capitulation of '1 taly, 

p. 337' 

28 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 38; Rossi, 

Come arrivammo, p. 158. General Eisenhower's 

message is given in full in Capitulation of Italy, 

page 34 I; with one slight variation, it appears 

in Diary Office CinC, Book VIII, page A-737. 
THE RENUNCIATION 

they, together with Rossi and Tagliavia, 

boarded a trimotored Savoia-Marchetti 

bomber. The plane took off at 1705. 

Several hours later it landed near Bizerte. 

The American and Italian officers were 

then driven to AFHQ to report to the 

Allied commander in chief.29 

The Announcement 

On the Allied side, two days before 

Taylor's party arrived in Bizerte, intimations of the turmoil in Rome were completely lacking. The Allies informed Castellano on 6 September that arrangements 

were proceeding smoothly. The Italian 

military mission was to leave from Rome 

that evening. The Allies were working 

hard to complete the preparations for 

GIANT II.~() 

On that day General Eisenhower mformed the CCS that he had made the 

final adjustments in his planning to take 

maximum advantage of the Italian surrender. The British Eighth Army was 

moving through the toe of Italy. The 

U.S. Fifth Army was on its way to the 

Salerno beaches~without the help of an 

airborne operation but with an increase 

in seaborne lift, secured by diverting 

some landing craft from the British assault 

across the Strait of Messina. The 82d 

Airborne Divi"ion was preparing to assist 

the Italian Government in preventing the 

Germans from occupying Rome, the Italians having promised to protect the airfields selected for ~he airborne operation. 

Surrender of the Italian Fleet would make 

it possible to think of releasing some Allied cruisers and destroyers from Mediterranean duty. The Italians had offered 

"" Taylor Rpt, par. 10. 

''0 Castellano, Come firmai, p. 179. 

505 

to open the ports of Taranto and Brindisi 

in the heel of Italy, and Eisenhower 

planned to move the British I st Airborne 

Division by warship to Taranto as soon 

as the Italian Navy was under Allied 

control.~l 

Optimism seemed m order. On 7 

September, the secret radio in Rome acknowledged receipt of the stand-by warning order sent the day before. The Allies 

informed the Italians that two propaganda 

officers would accompany the first American troops into Rome in order to help 

the Minister of Information announce the 

change of sides to the Italian people. ~2 

That afternoon the Allies brought Castellano from Cassibile (where he had remained since signing the armistice on 3 

September) to Tunis. From here Castellano made a hurried flight to Bizerte 

where one designated member of the 

military mission, a Captain Giuriati of 

the Italian Navy, had refused to give 

information to British naval officers on the 

grounds that he had received no instructions. After informing Giuriati that the 

armistice had been signed and that he 

could in conscience give the information 

requested, Castellano flew back to Tunis. 

The other members of the military 

mission had in the meantime arrived in 

Tunis. Although most of them were without instructions, some even being unaware 

of the signing of the armistice, a few 

members brought new instructions for 

Castellano: the text of Badoglio's proposed armistice announcement for Eisenhower's approval; also requests that the 

31 Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 359, 6 Sep 43. 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 291-92. 

,," Msg 13, "Monkey" to "Drizzle," received 

1304, 7 Sep 43, and Msg 38, "Drizzle" to "Monkey," 7 Sep 43, both in Capitulation of Italy, 

pp. 299-3 00. 
506 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Italian Fleet sail to Sardinia rather than 

to Allied ports, that the airborne operation at Rome be executed two days after 

the main Allied invasion, and that Castellano make sure of maximum Allied air 

support immediately after the armistice 

announcement. 33 

Castellano took up these points with 

General Eisenhower that evening. The 

Allied commander made a change in the 

wording of the last paragraph of Badoglio's proclamation to encourage Italian 

military opposition to the Germans. He 

permitted no changes in the program as 

agreed upon by the armistice-the Italian 

Fleet was to follow instructions and not 

sail to Sardinia, the airborne operation 

would be launched simultaneously with 

the armistice announcement rather than 

two days after the invasion of the Italian 

mainland. He assured Castellano that 

all possible air support would be furnished 

operations in Italy. 

Though the encoding process, which required several hours, was started promptly, 

these instructions were not transmitted to 

Rome until after midnight. 34 

Not long after the final portion of the 

instructions had gone from AFHQ, at 

0530, 8 September, AFHQ received the 

message from Badoglio that Taylor had 

transmitted after midnight. Decoding 

the message took until after 0800. By 

that time, General Eisenhower had departed Algiers for a visit to the AFHQ 

advance command post at Bizerte. 

When the contents of Badoglio's message, which renounced the armistice, became known in Algiers, the AFHQ staff 

33 Castellano, Come firm ai, p. 181. 

34 Msg 40 (TOR 0039, dispatched 0455), 

"Drizzle" to "Monkey"; Msg 4 I (TOR 00 I 5, dispatched 0445); Msg 42 (TOR 0 IO I. dispatched 

0430), 8 Sep 43, all in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 

330-32. Cf. Castellano, Come firmai, p. 182. 

was thrown off balance. The staff forwarded Badoglio's message to Eisenhower, 

and at the same time sent a message to 

the CCS asking whether or not to proceed 

with the armistice announcement and 

stating its own belief that the airborne 

operation would have to be canceled. 

Perhaps Ambrosio, whom Castellano and 

Zanussi had mentioned as the only possible successor to Badoglio, might be induced to depart from Rome, announce 

the armistice from another city, possibly 

Palermo, and carry out the provisions of 

the agreement. In any case, they urged, 

the Badoglio government itself deserved no 

consideration because Badoglio was retracting a signed document completed in good 

faith by his authorized representative. 30 

Already nettled by the action of his 

staff in referring the problem to the 

Combined Chiefs, Eisenhower was positively enraged by Badoglio's conduct. He 

immediately drafted a strong reply.30 

As for Castellano, it appeared to him 

that Badoglio had scuttled the success he 

had so patiently achieved. Around I 100, 

Strong called on him and showed him a 

copy of Badoglio's message. Shocked, 

30 Telg. AFHQ to CCS, NAF 365, 8 Sep 43, 

Capitulation of Italy, p. 347. The plan for Ambrosio as alternate for Badogiio is mentioned in: 

Min of Confs with Castellano at Cassibile, 3 Sep 

43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 245; Telg 129, Rooks 

to Gen Sugden. 4 Sep 43. Capitulation of Italy, 

pp. 261-62; Memo by McClure. 5 Sep 43. Capitulation of Italy, p. 272; Telg, AFHQ to CCS, 

NAF 356, 5 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 

279-80. 

General Eisenhower, Genera,! Rooks, Brigadier 

Strong, and Captain Royer Dick remember only 

that such a plan was discussed. See Intervs. 

Smyth with Eisenhower, 16 Feb 49; with Rooks. 

28 Scp 48; with Strong, 29 Oct 47; and Ltr, 

Dick to Smyth, 5 Nov 48; MS # P-oS8; Project 

# 46. I Feb-8 Sep 43, Question 21. 

3{; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 186; Inten's, Smyth with Eisenhower. 16 Feb 49, and with 

Lcmnitzer, 4 Mar 47. 
THE RENUNCIATION 

Castellano prepared a message 

Badoglio to adhere to the original 

urging 

agreedupon course of action. He then accompanied Strong to Bizerte. 

After being made to wait for half an 

hour in a courtyard where he was completely ignored, Castellano was ushered 

into a room. At a table sat Eisenhower, 

flanked by Alexander and Admiral Cunningham and an impressive array of 

other high-ranking Allied officers. Castellano saluted. No one returned it. He 

had the feeling he was facing a courtmartial. 

Eisenhower motioned Castellano to be 

seated. Then he read Badoglio's message. 

Finally, the Allied commander made a 

statement. If Badoglio did not announce 

the armistice that evening as agreed, he 

declared, the inference would be mescapable-the Italian Government and 

Castellano himself had played an ugly 

role in the armistice negotiations. 

l\t these words, Castellano rose to reply. 

Neither he nor his government, he said, 

was guilty of bad faith. Som~thing extraordinary must have developed in Rome. 

He begged General Ei5enhower to reserve 

judgment until Badoglio should reply to 

Castellano's message adherence to 

the armistice provisions. 

General Eisenhower knew the content 

of Castellano's message, he said, but he 

himself was sending a reply to Badoglio. 

He then read to Castellano his own message, which was in the process of being 

encoded for transmission: 

Part I. I intend to broadcast the existence of the armistice at the hour originally 

planned. If you or any part of your armed 

forces fail to cooperate as previously agreed 

I will publish to the world the full record 

of this affair. 

Part 2. I do not accept your message of 

this mornmg postponing the armistice. 

507 

Your accredited representative has an 

agreement with me and the sole of 

Italy is bound up in your adherence to that 

agreement. On your earnest representation 

the airborne operations are temporarily sqspended. 

Part 3. You have sufficient troops near 

Rome to secure the temporary of the 

city but I require full information on which 

to plan earliest the airborne operations. 

Send General Tavlor to Bizerte at once by 

aeroplane. Notify in advance time of ar'-

rival and route of aircraft. 

Part 4. Plans have been made on the assumption that you were acting in good faith 

and we have been prepared to carry out 

future operations on that basis. Failure 

now on your part to carry out the full obligations to the signed agreement will have 

the most serious consequences for your country. No future action of yours could then 

restore any confidence whatever in your 

good faith and consequently the dissolution 

of vour government and nation would cnsu~.:H 

General Eisenhower then dismissed Castellano, who returned to Tunis to spend 

the rest of the day in the greatest anxiety. 

General Eisenhower informed the CCS 

of his course of action. 3 >; He had no reason to be concerned with the action of 

his staff in informing the Combined Chiefs 

of Badoglio's broken promise. Exchanges 

between London and 'Vashington showed 

the Prime Minister and the President 

in full agreement. The CCS urged Eisenhower to make whatever public announcement would most facilitate military 

37 Come firmai, pp. 183-85; Text 

of Italy, p. 341, where it is 

as 45 to "Monkey," 8 43. In 

transmission. thp text was divided into parts 

as indicated. Another copy is in Diary Office 

CinCo Book VIII, p. A-737. Castellano (Come 

firm ai, pages 184-85) correctly gives the Italian 

text. 

38 Telg W-9443iI972. FREEDOM to ACWAR, 8 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 354. 
508 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

operations, without regard for possible embarrassment to the Italian Government.~9 

\Vhatever else might be necessary, the 

airborne operation had to be canceled. 

AFHQ sent a message to the division 

headquarters in Sicily, but because this 

would take so much time for encoding, 

transmission, decoding, and delivery, a 

quicker method of getting word to 

the paratroopers was necessary. General 

Lemnitzer therefore flew from Bizerte to 

Sicily. His pilot, excellent at night flying, became confused in daylight. His 

take-off was shaky, his navigation worse. 

Not until Mount Etna loomed up was the 

pilot able to identify his location. He 

changed his course and flew toward the 

division command post, near Licata, but 

by then it was very close to the scheduled 

hour for the start of the operation. 40 

At various airfields in Sicily during the 

afternoon of 8 September, paratroopers 

had begun to load into about 150 aircraft. At Licata, where the headquarters 

of the division and of the Troop Carrier 

Command were located, General Ridgway 

waited near a radio. Eisenhower was 

planning to broadca<;t his armistice announcement at 1830, Badoglio was to make 

his announcement immediately afterwards. 

The latter was to signal the start of 

Operation GIANT II. 

From Bizerte harbor, Colonel Bertsch's 

small seaborne force had put out to sea 

that morning under sealed orders delivered to the flotilla commander. Though 

Bert,ch suspected that he was bound for 

the Rome area, he in fact knew only that 

his destination was point "FF" on an un-

"" Telg 7196, Marshall to Eisenhower or 

Smith, 3 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 352. 

4°Interv with Lemnitzer, 4 Mar 47; Sec also 

Tregaskis, Invasion Diary, pp. 101-102, and Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 239-42. 

known map (in actuality, a beach at the 

mouth of the Tiber River). If no one 

met him at "FF," he was to move on to 

"GG" (a point halfway between the mouth 

of the river and Rome) .41 

At AFHQ there was nothing else to do 

but wait until the time of the surrender 

broadcast announcements. At 1830, precisely on schedule, though no word had 

come from Badoglio in reply to Eisenhower's message, the Allied commander 

broadcast the news of the armistice from 

Radio Algiers: 

This is General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces. 

The Italian Government has surrendered its 

armed forces unconditionally. As Allied 

Commander-in-Chief, I have granted a 

military armistice, the terms of which have 

been approved by the Governments of the 

United Kingdom, the United States, and 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Thus I am acting in the interests of the 

United Nations. 

The Italian Government has bound itself 

bv these terms without reservation. The 

a~lllistice was signed by my representative 

and the representative of Marshal Badoglio 

and it becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the armed forces of the 

United Nations and those of Italy terminate 

at once. 

All Italians who now act to help eject the 

German aggressor from Italian soil will have 

the assistance and support of the United 

Nations. 

Radio Algiers then broadcast a survey of 

the negotiations to explain how the armistice had been reached. But no announcement came from Badoglio over Radio 

Rome. After waiting ten minutes, Eisenhower authorized Radio Algiers to broadcast in English the text of Badoglio's 

proclamation: 

41 32d AB Div in Sicily and Italy, p. 43; Sec 

also Telg A.277, MAC to AHQ Malta, 6 Scp 

43, °4°3/4/ 102 9. 
THE RENUNCIATION 

The Italian Government, recognizing the 

impossibility of continuing the unequal 

struggle against the overwhelming power of 

the enemy, with the object of avoiding further and more grievous harm to the nation, 

has requested an armistice from General 

Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the 

Anglo-American Allied Force. This request 

has been granted. The Italian forces will, 

therefore, cease all acts of hostility against 

the Anglo-American forces wherever they 

may be met. They will, however, oppose 

attacks from any other quarter. 42 

At Licata, Sicily, this broadca.,t sIgnaled the start of GIA:-.!T II. Fortunately, only minutes earlier Lemnitzer's 

pilot had brought his plane to ground. 

Sixty-two planes carrying paratroopers 

were already circling into formation to 

prepare to go to Rome when word of the 

cancellation came through. About the 

same time, the telegram sent earlier by 

AFHQ reached the division headquarters. 

As for Bertsch's seaborne task force, news 

of the cancellation reached the flotilla in 

. ," Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, Daily Report 

Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Wednesday, September 

8, 1943. 

509 

time to divert the force to the Gulf of 

Salerno and to a rendezvous with the 

AVALANCHE convoys.43 

The atmosphere was tense in Algiers, 

where General Eisenhower and his staff 

waited for Badoglio's voice over Radio 

Rome. Had the Germans already seized 

the Italian Government to prevent Badoglio from broadcasting? Could Ambrosio 

escape from the capital and make the 

announcement elsewhere? 

The questions were disturbing because 

the AVALANCHE convoys were fast approaching the Gulf of Salerno. When 

the ground troops landed on the following 

morning of 9 September, would they find 

Italian and German units embroiled in 

conflict? Or would they find them 

joined together in overwhelming numbers 

ready to oppose the amphibious landing? 

Unless the voice of Badoglio came over 

the air, the Allies would not know until 

the moment the assault troops went 

ashore . 

43Interv with Lemnitzer, 4 Mar 47; 82d AB 

Div in Sicily and Italy, p. 48; Telg A.288, MAC 

to CinC Med, 8 Sep 43, 0403/4/1029; 82d AB 

Div G-3 Jnl, 1-15 Sep 43. 
CHAPTER XXVII 

The Surrender 

Badoglio's Announcement 

On the afternoon of 8 September, General Roatta, the Army chief, drove from 

Rome to Monterotondo, his headquarters 

just outside the city. He found a message 

from Kesselring. Because air observation 

indicated an imminent Allied landing near 

Naples, Kesselring asked permission, in accord with protocol, to move the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division southward to meet the 

invasion. 1 

Suspecting that the request disguised a 

desire to move the division closer to the 

capital, Roatta stalled. It would be well, 

he replied, to defer the movement until 

the following morning in order to avoid 

any incident between the German troops 

and the Ariete and Piave Divisions north 

of Rome. When Rintelen telephoned and 

renewed Kesselring's request, Roatta 

yielded, though he limited the German 

movement to advance elements and, during 

darkness, to a certain line north of the 

capital. 

Later that afternoon Kesselring's chief 

of staff, \Vestphal, telephoned to confirm 

his appointment with Roatta for early that 

evening. Roatta said he would be waitmg. 

At 1800, Roatta received a telephone 

message from Ambrosio, who urgently requested Roatta's presence at a conference 

1 Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 318. 

with the King. Assuming that the conference would explore the methods of 

persuading General Eisenhower to postpone the armistice announcement, and 

hopeful of its success, Roatta felt it expedient to remain on good terms with the 

Germans a little while longer. He decided to stay in his office to meet with 

Westphal and sent his deputy, Generale di 

Corpo d' Armata Giuseppe De Stefanis, to 

attend the conference with the King. 

Actually, the meeting with the King 

was prompted by Eisenhower's message to 

Badoglio insisting that Badoglio keep his 

word and announce the armistice in accord with his agreement. The message 

had thrown the Italian Government and 

High Command into panic. Until the 

message arrived, at approximately 1730, 8 

September, an hour before the scheduled 

announcement, the Italians had assumed 

that the climactic moment would be postponed, an assumption based on the fact 

that Taylor and Gardiner had agreed to 

take Rossi to North Africa. To them, 

this had meant that AFHQ was willing to 

enter into new discussion of joint ItaloAllied plans. Certainly, therefore, it appeared that General Eisenhower would 

take no decisive action until he heard Rossi's "communication of fundamental importance." And Roatta would have a few 

more days to complete his preparations 

for the defense of Rome. 

Eisenhower's telegram had destroyed 
THE SURRENDER 

these illusions. The opening sentence alone 

left no room for misunderstanding: "If you 

or any part of your armed forces fail to 

co-operate as previously agreed I will publish to the world full record of this affair." 

This was precisely what Guariglia, the 

Foreign Minister, had feared when he 

learned that Castellano had put into writing Italy's willingness to surrender. \Vorst 

of all, Eisenhower had the power to frustrate any attempt to patch things up with 

the Germans.2 

Upon receiving the full text of the telegram, Badoglio summoned those most intimately involved in the armistice negotiations to assist him in presenting the 

problem to the sovereign. Attending the 

conference in the Quirinal Palace at 1815, 

8 September, fifteen minutes before Eisenhower's broadcast, were: the King; 

Acquarone, Minister of the Royal Household; Badoglio, Head of Government; 

Guariglia, Foreign Minister; Ambrosio, 

chief of Comando Supremo; Carboni, in 

his capacity as chief of military intelligence; Ammiraglio di Squadra Raffaele de 

Courten, Minister and Chief of Staff, 

Navy; Sandalli, Minister and Chief of 

Staff, Air Force; Sorice, ~1inister of War; 

De Stefanis, deputy chief of the Army 

General Staff and representing Roatta; 

Puntoni, senior aide-de-camp to the King; 

and, at Ambrosio's insistence, Major 

Marchesi, who was asked to attend because of his familiarity with the negotiations Castellano had conducted in Sicily, 

at which Marchesi had been present. 

Ambrosio opened the meeting with a 

short exposition of the military situation. 

The Allied armistice date, he said, had 

caught the Italians with their Army plans 

not quite complete. 

"Guariglia, Ricardi, p. 669. 

511 

Sorice, who knew little of the previous 

negotiations, and Carboni, who had followed the negotiations with great care, 

both agreed that the Allies had broken 

faith with the Italian Government by moving up the date of the announcement. 

Because of their brusque demand, Sorice 

and Carboni believed that the Allies deserved no consideration. Both urged rejection of the armistice, particularly since 

the German reprisals would be terrible. 

Carboni proposed that the King disavow 

Castellano's negotiations, if necessary dismiss Badoglio, and thereby indicate that 

the pledges given in Badoglio's name had 

not been authorized. Sorice thought this 

a good idea. 

In the discussion that followed, some 

generals appeared blind to every aspect of 

the situation except the impossibility of 

having the Italian armed forces face the 

Germans alone. Eisenhower's telegram, 

they maintained, was nothing but a trap 

to compromise them with the Nazis. 

Though not asked to speak, Major 

Marchesi felt that his presence at the 

signing of the armistice justified his comments. He rose and presented to the 

senior generals and statesmen a grim picture of the consequences in store for the 

Royal Government if it failed to keep its 

pledge. He explained the import of General Eisenhower's threat: if the Allies 

published the surrender documents, the 

government would have no chance of continuing the alliance with Germany. 

After Marchesi's remarks, Guariglia, 

scated at the King's left, rose to speak. 

He had not approved the way in which 

the military negotiations had been conducted, he declared, but at this stage it 

would be absurd to disavow them. Disavowal would leave Italy in the position 

of facing simultaneously the hostility of 
512 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

both the Anglo-Americans and the Germans. Ambrosio expressed agreement 

with this view. 

Thirty minutes had gone by when word 

arrived of a Reuters dispatch from London announcing the armistice. Carboni 

promptly proposed that the government 

issue an immediate denial. But a few 

minutes later, when the news came that 

Eisenhower himself was broadcasting a detailed statement of the armistice, the councilors' spirits sank to the nadir. Support 

for Carboni's proposal to disavow everything vanished. 

In Monterotondo, Roatta was conferring with Westphal and the new German 

Military Attache, Toussaint, on joint 

measures to meet the Allied invasion when 

the German Embassy telephoned. The 

American Government in Washington, 

the embassy spokesman revealed, had announced an armistice with Italy. Stunned 

by the timing of the announcement, Roatta had little difficulty convincing Westphal and Toussaint that he knew nothing 

of an armIstice. He denounced the 

broadcast from Washington as an AngloAmerican trick designed to embroil the 

Italians and Germans in warfare. 3 

Westphal and Toussaint departed immediately. Roatta decided to move his 

staff back to the Palazzo Caprara in 

Rome. Even before the Germans were 

out of the building, Zanussi alerted other 

members of the headquarters for the move 

and began to select papers to be burned. 

In the Quirinal Palace at the royal conference, Badoglio expressed no conviction, 

3 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 179-80; 

Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 318; II Processo CarboniRoatta, pp. 39-41; Albert Kesselring, Soldat bis 

zum ietzten Tag (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 

1953), pp. 242-45; Col. Karl Heinrich Graf von 

Klinckowstroem in MS #T-Ia (Westphal et ai.), 

ch. V, p. 9. 

even at that late hour, on what course the 

government ought to follow. He did no 

more than explain to the King the alternatives which he faced. The sovereign 

might disavow Badoglio's pledges, declare 

that Badoglio had contracted them without the King's knowledge, and accept 

Badoglio's resignation, which he, Badoglio, 

was ready to offer. Or, the King could 

accept the conditions on which General 

Eisenhower insisted, regardless of the 

conseq uences. 

Both alternatives were staggering. The 

Allies demanded complete and abject surrender. They refused to believe that the 

Italian Government was not a free agent. 

They shared none of their plans. They 

had avoided giving assurance of their 

readiness to occupy the country whose 

surrender they demanded. 

What the Italians were not aware of was 

the politico-military Allied strategy. They 

did not know that the Allies were assaulting the Italian mainland with limited 

means, in effect, a holding attack subordinate to a cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe. Overestimating the strength 

available to AFHQ for commitment on 

the Italian peninsula, they did not realize 

how vital the armistice was to the Allies. 

As for what the Italians could expect 

from Germany, there was only the grim 

prospect that the Germans would wage 

war to the bitter end. They expected to 

fight on the Italian peninsula and use it 

as the glacis of Fortress Germany. Yet 

they could not altogether conceal their intention to withdraw to the line of the 

northern Apennines. In this case, there 

was a basis at least for a slight hope that 

Rome might be spared the destruction of 

combat. 

Since Badoglio could not or would not 

make up his mind on what the govern-
THE SURRENDER 

ment ought to do, the King decided. It 

was no longer possible, Victor Emmanuel 

III concluded, to change sides once again. 

Italy was committed to the armistice. 4 

The decision made, Badoglio hastened 

to Radio Rome. At 1945, 8 September, 

an hour late, he read his announcement 

of the armistice, following exactly the text 

approved by AFHQ. The broadcasting 

station recorded the announcement and 

repeated it at intervals throughout the 

night." 

To the Italian people, Badoglio's armistice announcement came as startling 

news. His only other public statement 

had been his declaration on assuming office that the war would continue. The 

abrupt change itself was a shock, and the 

announcement gave little explanation-no 

indication of swift and harsh German reprisals, no suggestion that Germany had 

become the enemy, no guidance for the 

future. Badoglio merely acknowledged 

Italy's defeat, and this had been apparent 

for some time.s 

As for the armed forces, the radio 

broadcast offered no strong and definite 

instructions for the behavior of the few 

4 Chief sources for the Quirinal Palace conference are: Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, 

pp, 105-06; Carboni, L' armistizio e la difesa di 

Roma, pp, 30-31; Ii Processo Carboni-Roatta, 

pp, 38-40: Guariglia, Ricord;, pp. 704-06; Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 3 [2; Zanussi, Guerra e cataltrote, II, [79, Puntoni (Vittorio Emanuele 

III, pages 16[-62) incorrectly states that Roatta 

attended the conference, 

S Badoglio, M emor;e e document;, pp. 106-07, 

II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p, 40; Daily Report 

Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Thursday, SepttCmber 

9, 1943, gives the time of Badoglio's announcement as 1345 Eastern War Time, which was 

1945 B time, or Rome time, See also Telg W12 AFHQ to AGWAR, 43, 0100/4/4,1, 

TeJg, AFHQ to CCS, 36j, 9 Sep 43, 

0100/[2/\/65,I1. 

6 Bonom!, Diario di un anno, pp, 93-94; 

Maugeri, From the Ashes of Disgrace, p. 185, 

513 

hundred aircraft, the effective and powerful fleet, the sixty divisions of about 

1,700,000 men who, though woefully illequipped, still comprised a disciplined 

force, Without clear directives from a 

central authority in Rome, the military 

forces did not know what to do. The 

vague orders issued before the armistice 

had reflected Badoglio's indecision. He 

had not wished, and had not permitted, 

the armed forces to organize their plans 

and dispositions for real anti-German action. Hoping to the last to get an Allied 

guarantee to occupy Rome and protect his 

government, thereby gaining more time, 

Badoglio had refused to risk anything that 

might have brought a showdown with 

the Germans. 

Flight of the King 

and High Command 

At Monterotondo, as soon as Badoglio's 

announcement confirmed the news of the 

armistice, Roatta telephoned 0 B SUED 

headquarters twice to assure the Germans 

on his honor as an officer that when he 

had given his word to Westphal, he had 

known nothing of the surrender. 

Fifteen minutes later, Roatta issued an 

order to the three Italian corps defending 

Rome to man the roadblocks around the 

capital. German troops leaving the city 

were to be permitted to go; German columns moving toward the capital were to 

be stopped, All units were to "react 

energetically against any attempt to penetrate [into Rome] by force or against any 

hostile actions whatsoever." 7 

The order was defensive in nature. 

Though reports had come in that two 

Italian sentinels had been killed by Ger7 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 58; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastro/e, II, [85-86, 
514 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

man troops nearby, Roatta declined to order his forces to attack. He apparently 

hoped that the Germans would withdraw 

to the north. 

The initial reaction of the staff of the 

German Embassy to the news of the armIstIce encouraged this Italian hope. 

The announcement of the armistice had 

taken the Germans by surprise. Ambassador Rahn had had an audience with the 

King shortly before noon, 8 September, 

and though he attempted to discover 

some indication of future Italian policy, 

he had learned nothing. Embassy members burned papers in haste, made frenzied 

arrangements to evacuate civilians. About 

2 I 00, the Charge d'Affaires requested 

Italian armed protection, and Rahn took 

his embassy staff posthaste by special train 

to the northern border. For the first two 

hours after the armistice announcement, 

the German civilians seemed intent on 

escaping, the German military forces appeared to be trying to withdraw.s To 

expedite the hoped-for exodus, Ambrosio 

issued instructions around 2200 to let the 

Germans pass if they presented themselves 

at the roadblocks peaceably.9 

The King, his family, and Badoglio had, 

in the meantime, taken refuge for the 

night in the Ministry of War, which had 

a detachment of armed guards. Ambrosio 

also installed his office there. By 2300, 

Roatta had transferred the key members 

R Rudolf Rahn, Ruheloses Leben: Aufzeichn ungen und Erinnerungen (Du('sseldorf: Diedrichs Verlag, 1949), p. 229; Il Processo RoattaCarboni, p. 59; Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. 240: 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 189; Carboni, 

L' armistizio e la difesa di Roma, pp. 35-36; 

-Guariglia, Ricordi, p. 712. 

"Carboni, in L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma, 

page 36, gives the instruction presented him by 

Ambrosio to let the Germans pass. 

of his staff and set up his command post 

in Rome. 10 

Soon after midnight, in the early minutes of 9 September, Ambrosio issued the 

first order to the Italian military forces. 

Because Promemoria 2, the order drafted 

several days earlier for the forces in the 

Balkans, Greece, and the Aegean Islands, 

had not reached the various headquarters 

in Tirana, Athens, and Rhodes, Ambrosio 

repeated and reaffirmed the provisions of 

the earlier directive. He made one addition: "Do not in any case take the initiative in hostile acts against the Germans." 11 

Though the directive went to Roatta for 

his guidance, Roatta refused to transmit 

it to the Army troops under his command 

because he felt that the final prohibition 

contained in the addition was in conflict 

with his own Memoria 44, dispatched several days earlierY 

Ambrosio's order had not yet gone out 

when the rosy picture of German reaction 

to the armistice announcement began to 

assume dark shadows. Reports coming 

in to Comando Supremo and the Army 

revealed that German paratroop units 

along the coast near Rome had surrounded 

Italian batteries and had begun to attack 

strongpoints of the Piacenza Division. 

From Milan came a telephone call reporting a German attack and asking for instructions. Though these could have been 

nothing more than attempts by the Germans to secure their lines of withdrawal 

to the north, the movement of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division against the outposts 

10 Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, pp. 113-

I4; Il Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 58-59; Zanussi, Guerra e catastrole, II, 189. 

11 Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 217-18: Il 

Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 50. 

12 Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 332-33; Il Processo 

Carboni-Roatta, p. 50. 
THE SURRENDER 

of the Ariete Division seemed significant~~ 

and ominous, clearly not part of a northward withdrawal. Roatta then ordered 

the three corps in defense of Rome to close 

all barricades and oppose German moves 

with force. Not long afterwards, a telephone intercept between the German Foreign Office and the Embassy in Rome 

gave rise to greater alarm. The 2d Parachute Division, the message stated, was 

disarming adjacent Italian units; the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division was marching 

south on Rome; and both divisions were 

confident of successY 

Should, then, Roatta put into effect 

Memoria 44, the directive that had alerted 

each army headquarters in Italy and Sardinia for specified offensive operations? 

Carboni, De Stefanis, General Utili (Roatta's chief of operations), and Zanussi 

urged Roatta to issue the order. Roatta 

declined to take the responsibility since he 

would be contradicting and disobeying the 

latest Comando Supremo directive, but he 

put the question to Ambrosio. Ambrosio 

decided that such a serious decision needed 

the assent or concurrence of Badoglio. 

Badoglio could not be found. 

The result was that Memoria 44 was 

never put into effect.14 Badoglio's radio 

announcement, which had failed to launch 

the armed forces on an anti-German 

course, remained the determining guide. 

Having declined to resist the movement of 

German troops into Italy and having acquiesced in the movement of German 

troops to key positions, Badoglio now failed 

to authorize the attempt by Italian ground 

1" Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 190-91; Ii 

Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 59. 

14 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 190-91. 

In his postwar testimony, Badoglio affirmed that 

he was not asked whether to order the execution 

of Memoria 44. 

515 

forces to save themselves and their honor. 

The only effort toward this end was an 

order issued by Ambrosio at 0'2'20, 9 

September: 

The Italian Government has requested an 

armistice of General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. On the 

basis of the conditions of armistice, beginning today 8 September at 19: 45 hours, 

every act of hostility on our part should 

cease toward the Anglo-American forces. 

The Italian Armed Forces should, however, 

react with maximum deci~ion to offensives 

which come from any other quarter whatsoever. 15 

This directive too was strictly defensive, 

its limit precisely set, by inference at least, 

by the framework of Badoglio's announcement. As for Roatta, he too confined 

himself to ordering his troops to react 

against force if hostile German acts were 

verified. 1G 

Increasingly serious reports continued to 

pour into Rome-a concentric German 

attack against the capital, a 2d Parachute 

Division advance against the Granatieri 

Division south of the city, threats against 

strongpoints along the Via Ostiense and 

Via Laurentina, clashes north of Rome 

between the Ariete and 3d Panzer Grenadier Divisions, a movement in unknown 

strength north from Frascati, and about 

0330, notice from the XVII Corps at 

Velletri that the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division was marching from the Garigliano River area north along the Via Appia 

15 Order No. 11136463, 9 Sep 43, signed by 

Ambrosio, receipt acknowledged by countersignature [Generale d'Armata Italo] Gariboldi (commander, Eighth Army), IT 2. 

16 Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 333; Caracciolo di 

Feroleto, "E Poi," p. 159. One copy of Roatta's 

order is found in IT 2 as received at Territorial 

Defense Headquarters at Treviso, 0430, 9 Sep 43. 

No. 02/5651. 
516 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

with its forward point already seventy 

miles from the capitaJ.17 

The most dangerous threat was the situation arising from the clash of German 

paratroopers and the Granatieri Division 

south of Rome. To reinforce the southern defenses, Roatta at 0330 ordered two 

reserve groups of the Ariete Division to 

move from north of the city to the south, 

the separate bersaglieri regiment to move 

south as a reserve, and all antiaircraft and 

field artillery units along the right bank of 

the Tiber River to come into support of 

the forces defending along the Via 

Ostiense. 18 

Having taken these steps, Roatta spoke 

with Carboni. The latter estimated that 

a defense of Rome could last no more than 

twenty-four hours. Shortly thereafter, 

Roatta received word of German forces 

southeast of Rome engaged with Italian 

troops not far from the Via Tiburtina. 

Thus, the Germans were surrounding the 

capital, and the Via Tiburtina remained 

the only exit still open. Of an Allied 

approach to Rome, there was no sign. 

The sea south of Naples was filled with 

Allied ships; north of Naples, the sea was 

emptyY 

Shortly before 0400, Roatta reported 

the situation to Ambrosio. Meeting Badoglio soon afterwards, Roatta, in the 

presence of Prince Humbert and the 

King's senior aide, repeated his report. 

17 Il Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 59-60; 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastro/e, II, 192-94. 

1 R Il Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 60; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrote, II, 192 (which gives the time 

of sending the order as between 0200 and 0230). 

Raffaele Cadorna, in La riscossa: Dal 25 luglio 

alia liberazione (Milan: Rizzoli and Co., 1948), 

page 37, mentions receipt of the order and the 

beginning of his movement at °53°. 

19 Il Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 60-61; Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 321; Zanussi, Guerra e 

catastrote, II, 194-95. 

If the King and the government had any 

thoughts of escape, he added, they should 

move quickly. Only the Via Tiburtina 

remained open, and it too might soon come 

under fire. 

Badoglio reached a decision: the King 

and the government would leave Rome; 

the military forces defending the city 

would withdraw to the eastern outskirts 

and consolidate on positions near Tivoli. 20 

This was a sudden decision, even though 

the removal of the King and the government from the German threat had been 

discussed on earlier occasions. Castellano 

had mentioned the matter at Lisbon. 

Badoglio had directed his Minister of the 

Interior as late as the morning of 8 September to prepare a plan to evacuate the 

government from Rome; he had canceled 

the order that afternoon. 21 Similarly, the 

decision to withdraw the troops defending 

Rome to the Tivoli area east of the city 

was made on the spur of the moment. 

Ambrosio and Roatta had planned to defend Rome if the Allies landed a powerful supporting force within striking 

distance of the capital. But in the absence of immediate Allied support, Badoglio's decision made sense. It implied only 

a temporary change. Certainly the Allies would sweep northward quickly and 

seize the city. Within a week or two, the 

King and Badoglio would return. 

Now more than ever, the Italians depended on the Allies. Hoping to remove 

any residue of resentment that General 

Eisenhower might have, Badoglio sent a 

message about this time to AFHQ to ex20 Il Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 61; Roatta, 

Otto milioni, pp. 322-23; Zanussi, Guerra e catastro/e, II, 195-96; Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 114-16. 

21 Carmine Senise, Quando ero Capo della 

Polizia 1940-1943; Memorie di colui che seppe 

tutto (Rome: Ruffolo editore, 1946), p. 244. 
THE SURRENDER 

plain why he had delayed making his 

announcement broadcast: 

Missed reception signal agreed wirele~s and 

delayed arrival your number 45. He did not 

consent broadcast proclamation at agreed 

hour. Proclamation would have occurred as 

requested even without your pressure being 

sufficient for us pledge given. Excessive haste 

has however found our preparations incomplete and caused delay .... 22 

Having revealed to Roatta his decision 

to evacuate Rome, Badoglio now told 

Ambrosio, then went to see the King. He 

found Victor Emmanuel III listening to 

his aide, who was reporting Roatta's appreciation of the situation. The King 

quickly concurred in Badoglio's decision, 

and determined to take with him Badoglio, Ambrosio, and the chiefs of the militarv services.23 

Some time before 0500, the King, the 

Queen, Prince Humbert, Badoglio, and 

four military aides to the sovereign were 

readv to leave Rome. The King summon~d Ambrosio and directed that he, 

the three chiefs of staff, and the three service ministers depart Rome by way of the 

Via Tiburtina and plan to meet the King's 

party later that day at Pescara, on the 

Adriatic coast. Though Ambrosio protested that he could not leave immediately 

because he needed time to make final arrangements, the King insisted. 

To provide for the civil government of 

Rome and the country during the absence 

of the Head of Government, Badoglio left 

instructions with General Sorice, the Minister of War, to inform the civilian ministers of the King's and Badoglio's 

22 Msg 24, "Monkey" to "Drizzle," received 

0905, 9 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 371; 

Cf. Castellano, Come firmai, p. 187. 

"31l Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 61; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrofe, II, 196. 

517 

departure and to charge the Minister of 

the Interior, Umberto Ricci, with the task 

of heading a caretaker, skeleton government. Perhaps the Germans would permit the Italian civil authorities to carryon, 

for, with the exception of Guariglia, the 

civilian ministers had no knowledge of the 

armistice negotiations and no responsibility for them. The departing group con;-

prised those persons who were most dIrectly involved in the surrender and who, 

therefore, had most to fear from the 

Germans. 

Around 0500, five automobiles carrying 24 A b . the royal party left Rome. m roSlO 

returned to his office, notified the Navy and 

Air Force chiefs, Admiral De Courten and 

General Sandalli, that they were to leave, 

and made arrangements for warships and 

planes to meet the royal party at Pescara: 

After leaving a message for Generale dl 

Brigata Vittorio Palma to remain in Rome 

as Comando Supremo representative, Ambrosio, shortly after 0600, was ready to 

depart. Sometime during the night he 

had given Major Marchesi the diary and 

other compromising documents he had 

supposedly gone to Turin to get, ~nd had 

asked Marchesi to destroy them. 2

" 

Roatta, after receiving the royal command to leave Rome, though with no destination specified, decided to move his 

staff to Tivoli to keep in contact with the 

troops. He went back to his office in the 

Palazzo Caprara and, about 05 I 5, in the 

presence of Carboni and Zanussi, he wrote 

in pencil on a sheet of notebook paper the 

draft of an order to Carboni-turning 

over to Carboni command of the forces defending Rome and directing Carboni to 

.. 241l Processo Carboni-Roa/ta, pp. 62-63; Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, p. I 17. 

23 MS #P-058, Project #46, I Feb-8 Sep 43, 

Question 22. 
SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

withdraw those forces to the Tivoli area. 

Roatta read the order to Carboni and 

told him to have it typed for his, Roatta's, 

signature. 

After protesting that the order could 

not be carried out because the troops were 

already engaged and therefore could not 

break contact and withdraw, Carboni had 

a clean copy of Roatta's draft order prepared. When he brought it back for 

Roatta's signature, he found that the Army 

chief had gone.26 

Roatta, it turned out, had hastened to 

the Ministry of War around 0545 and had 

di-;covered Ambrosio ready and anxious 

to depart. After dashing back to the 

Caprara palace for a last look, Roatta 

joined Ambrosio, and the two officers left 

in the same automobile. Kot until they 

were safely out of Rome did Roatta learn 

that they were bound for Pescara, there to 

transfer to a plane or ship that would take 

them to southern Italy. 

Other key figures followed. Zanussi 

got out in an armored car about the same 

time. De Stefanis left about 0ioo, Utili 

approximately 08 I 5. General Sorice, Minister of \Var, remained. 

Guariglia, the Foreign :Minister, remained, too. He was busy all night long, 

giving instructions to representatives 

abroad and formally notifying GermanY 

that Italy had concluded an armistice with 

the Allies. He had received no message 

whatsoever on the decision of the government to leave Rome. 

In Roatta's absence his deputy, Dc Stefanis, just before his departure, sig-ned the 

order addressed to Carboni. It was ll1 

this fashion that Carboni, commander of 

"" 1l Processo Carboni,-Roatta. pp. 63-65: Z:lnussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 196-97. 199-200: 

Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 323, 327; C:lrboni, 

L'armistizio e fa difesa di Roma, p. 37. 

the A! otorized Corps, became the commander of aU the forces assembled for the 

defense of Rome. By now, however, the 

mission was changed. 

Roatta's intention was to concentrate 

these forces-except for the police and 

carabinieri units, which were to remain in 

the city to maintain order--in the Ti'voli 

area as a threat to the Germans, v,'ho 

\"vould by then, Roatta expected, have 

seized Rome. He therefore had ordered 

Carboni to move his headquarters to 

Carsoli near Tivoli and had instructed his 

own staff to set up its command post there. 

Carboni, however, had no clear concept 

of his mission. Assuming that he actually 

could gct those forces engaging the Germans to break contact and withdraw-a 

difficult maneuver--what was he then 

supposed to do? The withdrawal would 

perhaps spare Rome a bombardment by 

German planes and reprisals on the civil 

population. Perhaps that alone justified 

Roatta's order. But why Carsoli, unless 

the real purpose of the withdrawal and 

concentration was to protect the Via Tiburtina, the King's escape route? 27 

Carboni's chief of Colonel Sah'i, 

was bitterly critical of Roatta's order. 

He started to rail against it, but Carboni 

cut him short. Carboni directed Salvi to 

prepare orders to the division commanders for the withdrawal to the Tiv'oli area 

and asserted that he himself intended to go 

there immediately as ordered. 

After going to the Office of 'Militarv Intelligence Service to order certain documents destroyed, Carboni went home and 

changed into civilian clothes. He returned to the Palazzo Caprara to look 

once more for Roatta, went a second time 

~7 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 63-65: Roalta, Otto milioni, pp. 323-29: Zanussi, Guerra 

e catastrofe, II, 197-201. 
THE SURRENDER 

to his office in the intelligence bureau, 

then drove toward Tivoli. His son, who 

was a captain, and two other junior officers accompanied him. To avoid difficulties from Fa<;.cist or German elements 

along the road, Carboni's automobile bore 

diplomatic license plates. There were no 

incidents, and shortly before 0800, the 

party reached Tivoli.2R 

In Rome, Colonel Salvi, upon Carboni's 

departure, went to pieces. rrhough he 

prepared the detailed orders for the withdrawal to Tivoli, he did not issue them. 

Suspecting that Carboni was going to Tivoli not to set up a headquarters but to 

join the King in escape, Salvi tried to 

get Roatta's order revoked. At 0730 he 

went to General Utili, who would soon 

leave the capital, showed Utili Roatta's 

order, declared that Carboni was dead, 

and asked who ,,,,auld sign the orders to 

the division commanders. Utili suggested 

that Salvi get the senior division commander to do so. 

Salvi returned to his office and burst 

into tears. Embracing a captain who entered, he cried: "'\Ve are abandoned by 

everybody!" 'With tears streaming down 

his face, he told the commander of the 

Granatieri Division: "The cowards! 

They have all escaped and left me alone!" 

To e\'eryone he saw, he shouted that Carboni had gone off with the King and 

Badoglio. Though he managed to inform 

two division commanders bv telephone of 

the withdrawal movement, he appealed to 

them at the same time to get Roatta's 

order nullified. 

Salvi finally determined to call up the 

"" II Pracesso Carbani-Roatta, pp. 73-75: 

Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma. pp. 

37-38; Alfredo Sanzi. II generale Carboni e la 

difesa di Roma visti ad occhio nuda (Turin: 

Vogliotti editore, 1946), pp. 12:)-24. 

519 

senior division commander, Generale di 

Divisione Conte Carlo Calvi di Bergolo, 

the King's son-in-law, who commanded the 

Centauro Division. Carboni, Salvi said, 

could not be found; would Calvi di Bergolo take responsibility for the defense of 

Rome? Would Salvi, Calvi di Bergolo 

countered, put his statement and request 

in writing? Salvi declined. Calvi di 

Bergolo then said that he had no authority 

to assume command of the ;v/otorized 

Corps and that the order for withdrawal 

must be confirmed. 

Only then did Salvi issue, without equivocation, the order to withdra\\' to Tin)li. 

But by then, time had elapsed, making the 

maneuver infinitely more complicated. 

Furthermore, as the result of his antics, 

Salvi had disseminated distrust and 

mism in the minds of the troop commanders around Rome. 29 

Interpretations 

In North Africa, no one knew that the 

Italian Government had fled Rome. 

Having flown to North Africa with General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner, Rossi 

arrived at EI Aouina airfield at I905, 8 

September, forty minutes before Badoglio 

went on the air. The Allies took Rossi to 

Castellano, who asked him why he had 

come to AFHQ. To obtain a postponement of the armistice announcement, 

Rossi explained. Furthermore, he had 

documents to show why a postponement 

was necessary. His shock was genuine 

when he learned that Badoglio had confirmed the surrender. 

"" II Pracesso Carboni-Roatta. pp. 74-75. 

Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa di Rorna. p. 41, 

n. 9; Sanzi, II generale Carboni, pp. 135-37; 

Cadorna, I.a riscossa, pp. 37-38. 
520 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

The Allies then took Rossi and Castellano to Eisenhower. Rossi explained the 

difficulties of proclaiming the armistice at 

the same time that the Allies launched 

their invasion; he explained the advantages, both to the Allies as well as to the 

Italians, that would have been gained if 

the armistice announcement had been 

delayed. 30 

These arguments, and the "documents 

of fundamental importance," were by now 

an old story to the Allied commander in 

chief. From the first meeting with Castellano in Lisbon, the Allies had stipulated 

in accordance with instructions from the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff that the announcement of the armistice wa~ to precede the main invasion by a few hours. 

There had been no subsequent divergence 

from that condition. 

General Eisenhower listened patiently to 

Ros'ii despite the irritation he must have 

felt. 'When Rossi charged Eisenhower 

with "anticipating" the date of the armistice announcement because he distrusted 

the Italians, General Eisenhower, according to Rossi's later recollection, replied: 

"But we were enemies until two hours 

ago. How could we have had faith in 

you?" 

At the end of the discussion, Eisenhower 

sought to establish mutual good faith as 

the basis for co-operation. "If some mistake has been made," he said, "we 

ought now to accept the situation as it is." 

No more than a courteous statement recognizing the lack of complete Italian 

understanding of Allied plans, the remark 

was an invitation to look forward. The 

Italians interpreted the sentence as an admission of error, as conceding that Eisenoil Castellano, Come firmai, pp. 186-87; Rossi, 

Come arriuammo, pp. 160-61. 

hower had, in actuality, advanced the date 

of the announcement. 31 

All the Italians involved in the surrender negotiations believed that the Allies 

had "agreed to," "suggested," or "indicated" a specific time for the surrender 

announcement and had then advanced the 

date. But the Italians displayed a lack of 

unanimity on the date allegedly given by 

the Allies. Badoglio expected the time to 

be the 12th or 15th of September; Roatta 

the 12th, as did Zanussi; Carboni awaited 

the 20th or the 25th.32 

Prime Minister Churchill, speaking in 

the House of Commons on 2 I September 

1943, seemed to confirm the Italian belief 

when he said: "The date, which had 

originally been the 15th, was, however, in 

fact brought forward to the 9th-the 

night of the 8th and 9th." 33 In this 

remark Mr. Churchill was answering the 

charge, raised in Parliament and in the 

British press, that the Allies had been slow 

in taking advantage of Mussolini's downfall. Precisely what Churchill had In 

mind was not clear. Perhaps he was referring to the belief at AFHQ during the 

earliest stages of the AVALANCHE planning 

that shortages of landing craft appeared 

to make it necessary to have a longer time 

interval between BAYTOWN (the Strait of 

Messina crossing) and the assault landings 

at Salerno. 

Yet the only significant change in the 

Allied time schedule occurred between the 

preliminary planning in June and the final 

:J1 Rossi, Come arrivammo, p. 161; Castellano, 

Come firmai, p. 187. 

"" Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 103-

04, 10,), 138; Roatta, Otto milioni, pp. 300-:>0 I : 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 164, 166; Carboni. J/ armistizio e la difesa di Roma, pp. 25-26. 

33 Winston S. Churchill, Onwards to VictoT)': 

War Speeches, compiled by Charles Eade (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1944), p. 259. 
THE SURRENDER 

planning started in early August. In 

June, the earliest date for an invasion of 

the Italian mainland had appeared to be 

I October. In early August, when it 

appeared the Sicilian Campaign would be 

short, an earlier invasion date seemed 

feasible. 

The Allies decided on the timing for the 

Italian invasion before the Italians had 

521 

made significant contact with them. On 

9 August, AFHQ forecast AVALANCHE for 

7 September. On 16 August, three days 

before the first meeting with Castellano in 

Lisbon, AFHQ scheduled the Salerno invasion, AVALANCHE, for 9 September. 

No sudden change in schedule to surprise 

or take advantage of the Italians was ever 

made. 
CHAPTER XXVIII 

The Dissolution 

German Reaction 

Like the rest of the Gennans in Italy, 

Field Marshal Kesselring was surprised 

at the announcement of the armL'ltice. 

While Hitler and OKW had been basing 

their calculations on the likelihood of 

Italian betrayal and were concerned 

chiefly with Badoglio's SUSpICIOUS behavior, Kesselring and his OB SUED staff 

had been primarily concerned with the 

AIlies. 

Aerial reconnaissance reported on 5 

September that AIlied landing craft previously assembled between Mers-el-Kebir 

and Tunis were moving eastward. On 7 

September it was known that large numbers of landing craft had mm'ed out of 

Bizerte and entered the latitude of southern Calabria. Because these flotiIlas appeared too large for mere tactical landings 

in support of the British Eighth Army, 

Kesselring looked for an imminent major 

invasion of the Italian mainland. 

Where the AIlied troops would come 

ashore was the question. The bay of 

Salerno seemed a likely place, but so did 

the Rome area-Anzio and N ettuno, possibly even Civitavecchia. Though the 

Rome area might be too far from their 

airfields for the Allies to gamble on, and 

though the AIlies had until then displayed 

a conservative strategic approach, a landing near Rome was within the realm of 

possibility. So were landings near the 

northern ports of La Spezia, Genoa, and 

Leghorn, in Rommel's Army Group B 

area. Nor could Kesselring ignore Puglia, 

the heel of Italy, for within striking distance in eastern Sicilian harbors were assembled numerous AIlied landing craft. 

StiIl, the greatest concern was the possibility that the AIlies might land near 

Rome. The Rome area represented the 

German waistline-between the hip 

bulge fiIled by the six divisions of the 

Tenth Army and the overdeveloped bust 

containing Rommel's Army Group fl.l 

Rommel's forces in the north and Vietinghoff's Tenth Army in the south were 

strong enough to handle the Italian forces 

and at the same time offer effective opposition to an AIlied landing. But in the 

center, strong Italian units outnumbered 

Kesselring's relatively smaIl forces. Despite their smaller numbers, the Gennans 

might weIl be able to handle the Italians 

alone. But should the Italians join with 

Allied troops coming ashore near Rome, 

what chance would the Germans have? 

,\round noon on 8 September, the Allies delivered a heavy aerial attack against 

Frascati, where Kesselring's headquarters 

was located. The bombs wreaked havoc 

on the town, and several struck in the 

immediate area of the command post. 

Kesselring himself was uninjured--when 

1 Klinckowstroem in MS #T-1a (Westphal 

et al.), ch. V, pp. 3-5, 10; Westphal, H eer in 

Fesseln, p. 229. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

the last wave of bombers flew away, he 

crawled out from beneath the wreckage. 

But communications were disrupted except for one telephone line from General \Vestphal's bedroom which remained 

in contact both with OKW and with 

Kesselring's subordinate commands.!! Tbe 

Germans judged correctly that the air 

attack, obviously meant to interrupt 

the exercise of command, presaged an 

Allied landing. After directing certain 

German units to help rescue civilians and 

clear wreckage, Kesselring sent \Vestphal 

and Toussaint to keep the appointment 

made earlier with Roatta. 

While \Vestphal and Toussaint were 

with Roatta, Kesselring received his first 

intimation of the Italian surrender. JodI 

telephoned from OKW headquarters to 

ask OB SUED in Frascati whether the 

Germans in Italy knew anything about 

the capitulation. OKW had picked up 

an English radio broadcast announcing 

the surrender. One of Kesselring's staff 

officers, knowing that 'Vestphal and Toussaint were consulting with Roatta, phoned 

the deputy military attache and suggested 

that he put through a call to his chief. 

This was the telephone call that had come 

into Roatta's office. 

About an hour and a half after JodI's 

call, the German Em bassI' in Rome received Guariglia's formal message from 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Italy had 

surrendered to the Allies. The deputy 

military attache telephoned the information to OB SUED, and Kesselring issued 

the code word ACHSE, the ~ignal to take 

2 Jane Scrivener (pseud.), Inside Rome With 

the Germans (New York: The Macmillan Co .. 

1945), p. I; Klinckowstroem in MS #T-Ia 

(Westphal et al.), ch. V, p. 8; Kesselring, S oldat.. 

pp. 241-42: WestphaL Heer in Fesseln, p. 227. 

523 

the offensive against the Italian forces 

and seize Rome.3 

Since the armistice announcement Implied the close co-operation of Italian and 

Allied forces, the Germans expected an 

immediate invasion of the coast near Rome, 

including an airborne landing. The Germans acted with dispatch. Kesselring's 

fIrst task was to bring the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division from the area Immediately north of Rome to consolidate 

with the 2d Parachute Division, distributed for the most part south of Rome 

between the Tiber River and the Alban 

Hills. His major purpo~ was to seize 

control of the lines of communication and 

supply leading to the Tenth Army in the 

south, thereby securing the army's withdrawal route to the north. At the same 

time, Kesselring sent a detachment of 

paratroopers to seize Roatta and the Army 

staff at Monterotondo in a coull de main. 

i\ttacking adjacent Italian units immediately, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division advanced rapidly along the two highways, the Via Claudia and the Via Cassia, 

leading from Lake Bracciano into Rome. 

The 2d Parachute Division quickly overran some Italian defensive positions south 

of the city, the Piacenza Division making 

scarcely even a show of resistance. The 

paratroopers racing to ~lonterotondo had 

more trouble. They ran into Italian opposition, and, by the time they seized the 

Army headquarters the following morning, 

they found that Roatta and his staff had 

gone.4 

Klinckowstroem in MS #T -Ia ~W(",tphal 

et al. , ch. V pp. 9-10. 

4 Otto milioni, p. 321: Zanussi, Guerra 

e II. 200; II Processo Carboni-Roatta, 

pp. 79-80; Klinckowstroem in MS #T-Ia 

(Westphal et al.l. ch. V. pp. 10-11: Kesselring, 

Soldat, p. 255 Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa 

di Roma, p. 34. 
524 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Along with the combat, the Germans 

conducted a skillful propaganda campaign. Exploiting Italian confusion and 

lack of central direction, the Germans arranged local truces and appealed to the 

honor of Italian officers as former comrades for the prevention of bloodshed. 

They assured the Italian soldiers that the 

war was over and they might go home if 

they wished. The latter point of view 

seemed strangely similar to Badoglio's announcement of the armistice, and many 

Italians threw away their weapons and 

disappeared. 5 

Though all proceeded favorably during 

the early hours of 9 September, German 

concern over Allied intentions continued 

until daylight. Only after news of the 

Allied invasion at Salerno came did the 

nightmare of an Allied amphibious envelopment vanish. The Allies had then, 

the Germans sighed in relief, run true to 

form after all. Their landing on the Italian mainland was a methodical advance 

beyond Sicily and well within range of 

Allied air cover-not an employment of 

their command of the sea and air that 

would threaten the destruction of the 

Tenth Army in south Italy. The invasion at Salerno was not an operation designed to take advantage of Italian 

co-operation. Nor was it designed, from 

the German viewpoint, to exploit fully the 

surprise and uncertainty arising from the 

armistice announcement.s 

The Battle for Rome 

At Tivoli, where Carboni arrived around 

"Klinckowstroem in MS #T -Ia (Westphal 

et al.). ch. V, p. 13. 

'J Westphal, Heer in Fesseln, p. 230; Klinckowstroem in MS (Westphal et at.), ch. V, 

pp. 11-12. 

0800, 9 September, he found no orders 

waiting for him as he had expected. Nor 

could the members of the Army General 

Staff, who were establishing their headquarters at Tivoli, clarify the situation. 

General De Stefanis and Generale di Divisione Adamo Mariotti, immediate subordinates of Roatta, passed through Tivoli 

that morning en route to Pescara, but 

though they saw Carboni, they did not 

talk with him. Finding no message from 

Roatta at the carabinieri barracks, Carboni drove eastward along the Via Tiburtina in quest of a mission. At Arsoli, 

twelve miles beyond Tivoli, he learned 

that several automobiles containing highranking officers had passed through not 

long before. Deciding to return to Tivoli, 

Carboni dispatched two junior officers to 

find Roatta. After driving seven miles to 

Carsoli, they overtook the Army chief. 

They reported that Carboni was at Tivoli 

and that he had sent them to maintain 

communications between him and Roatta. 

Roatta listened but gave no orders. Leaving the problem of what to do with 

the forces around Rome to Carboni, 

Roatta-and Ambrosio--continued toward Pescara.7 

On returning to Tivoli around 1300, 

Carboni took command. His first act 

was to start the withdrawal to the Tivoli 

area of the two most reliable mobile divisions, the Ariete and the Piave. The 

Ariete Division had that morning given 

the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division a bloody 

nose at Manziana (on the Via Claudia) 

and at Monterosi (on the Via Cassia), 

when the Germans had tried to rush tank 

columns through Italian strongpoints 

which were protected by well-placed road 

7 Carboni, L' armistizio e la difesa di Roma, 

pp. 38-39; Il Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 75. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

mines and well-directed artillery fire. The 

Germans halted, regrouped, brought up 

infantry, and threatened an attack. During this interval, the Ariete and Piave 

Divisions withdrew, replaced in line by 

the Re Division. Unaware of the substitution, the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division 

commander maintained his threatening 

attitude but fore bore launching an attack. 

By the morning of 10 September, the two 

mobile divisions were in the Tivoli area. 8 

South of Rome the Granatieri Division, 

unlike the Piacenza Division which no 

longer existed, refused two appeals from 

the 2d Parachute Division for pourparlers 

to give the Germans the right of passage to the city. Exerting the strongest 

pressure against strongpoints guarding the 

Via Ostiense and the Via Laurentina, the 

paratroopers late in the afternoon knocked 

out several Italian artillery batteries. The 

Italians pulled back slightly but maintained a solid front. Carboni telephoned 

the division commander, Generale di 

Brigata Gioacchino Solin as, and encouraged him to continue his fight. 

Meanwhile, Carboni had been discussing with Calvi di Bergolo, the Centauro 

Dil;ision commander, the problem of what 

to do. Calvi di Bergolo suggested that 

the Italian forces move eastward along the 

Via Tiburtina toward the A vezzano River 

basin and into the Abruzzi Mountains, 

there to establish a redoubt. V chicles 

might be abandoned when they ran out 

of gasoline, but the units, Calvi di Bergolo 

recommended, should be maintained intact 

so far as possible. 9 

Calvi di Bergolo's suggestion did not 

impress Carboni. What did make an impression were two other developments that 

x Cadorna. La riscossa, pp. 38-46, 49. 

oIl Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 83. 

525 

afternoon. First, Calvi di Bergolo reported the erratic, disloyal behavior in 

Rome of Carboni's chief of staff, Salvi. 

This was discouraging, for the only explanation of such behavior was a disheartening situation in the capitaL Carboni aSked his Chief of Engineers, CoL 

Giuseppe Cordero Montezemolo, to serve 

informally as Salvi's replacement, an arrangement that continued even after Salvi 

appeared that afternoon at Tivoli. Second, a telephone call came from Generale 

di Corpo d' Armata Gastone Gambarra, 

who commanded the XI Corps in Fiume. 

Gambarra asked whether the order to 

put Memoria 44 into effect had been 

issued. At Carboni's direction, Montezemolo did not mention the lack of communication between Carboni's forces and 

Comando Supremo but said that on the 

basis of Badoglio's proclamation and in 

consequence of the German attack on 

Rome, Memoria 44 should go into effect. 

The puzzling and discouraging thing about 

all this was that Gambarra's question indicated that no Italian troops except those 

under Carboni were actively opposing the 

Germans. 10 

The Germans, meanwhile, continued 

their appeals to the Italian divisions to 

cease fighting their former comrades. 

These appeals had little effect on the 

Granatieri Division, which fought stubbornly and wellY But they did find a 

receptive audience in the C entauro Division, which had thus far taken no part in 

the fighting. According to the Germans, 

the initiative for a truce came from the 

Italians. An Italian lieutenant who had 

known \Vestphal in North Africa appeared 

10 Carboni, L'armistizio e fa difesa di Roma, 

p. 43· 

11 Klinckowstroem in MS #T-Ia (Westphal 

et af.), ch. V, p. 13. 
526 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

at Kesselring's headquarters to propose 

Italian capitulation. Westphal worked out 

the terms. 

According to the Italians, the more 

plausible account, the initiative came from 

the Germans. At 1700, 9 September, a 

German parlementaire, Capt. Hans 

Schacht, presented himsclf at the Centauro 

Division headquarters at Bagni Acque 

Albule, about twelve miles east of Rome. 

Schacht brought an oral appeal from General Student to the Italian division commander, Calvi di Bergolo. Student sent an 

expression of personal esteem for Calvi di 

Bergolo, a declaration of faith in the 

friendly attitude of the C entauro Division 

troops, and a request that Calvi di Bergolo 

treat his German troops as friends. 

\Vhether this constituted a demand for 

surrender, a request to let the German 

forces pass unmolested to the north, or an 

offer of honorable capitulation, was not 

clear. But Schacht, in any event, declared that "within a few hours the Germans will be unopposed masters of 

Rome." 12 

In reply, Calvi di Bergolo sent his chief 

of staff, Lt. Col. Leandro Giaccone, to 

Kesselring's headquarters to learn exactly 

what ternlS the Germans would offer. 

Whether Calvi di Bergolo was preparing 

to surrender or whether he was trying 

merely to gain time is not clear. 'Vhether 

Carboni knew of and approved Giaccone's 

mission in advance is not clear either. In 

any case, when Carboni learned of Giaccone's mission, he, as chief of intelligence, 

ordered Giaccone closely watched. 

Accompanied by a lieutenant as inter1" The German view is presented by Klinckowstroem in MS #T-ra (Westphal et al.), page 

13: the Italian "iew is in a statement made by 

Lt. Col. Leandro Giaccone, the Centauro's chief 

of staff, in It Processo Carboni-Roatta, page 8 I. 

preter, Giaccone reached Kesselring's headquarters at 2 100, 9 September. With 

Kesselring, 'Vestphal, and Student, he 

carried on a protracted discussion of eight 

points, four formulated by Giaccone, the 

others stipulated by Kesselring. Giaccone proposed that the Germans continue 

to recognize the open city status of Rome 

and evacuate the capital; that one Italian 

division and the police force remain in 

the city; that other Italian troops lay 

down their arms and be sent away on 

unlimited leave; and that the Italians be 

permitted to surrender honorably. Kesselring insisted on having German troops 

occupy the German Embassy, the Rome 

telephone exchange, and the Rome radio 

station; the Italian division permitted to 

serve in Rome was to have no artillery; 

he wanted the Italian officer designated as 

commander of the city to render a daily 

report to Kesselring; Italian soldiers, after 

their discharge from active duty, were to 

have the option of taking up military or 

labor service with the Germans. 

At the conclusion of the discussion, 

Kesselring said that the Italian situation 

was hopeles.'l. He said he was prepared 

to blow up the aqueducts and bomb the 

city if the Italians refused his terms. 

Giaccone said he thought the conditions 

were acceptable. He proposed, and Kesselring agreed to, a three-hour truce to 

start at 0700, 10 September. At the end 

of the truce, Giaccone promised, the I talian reply would be delivered. At 0 I 30, 

10 September, he and his interpreter 

started back to Tivoli. 

Giaccone reported to Calvi di Bergolo, 

who was quite uncertain what to do. He 

was disappointed and annoyed because 

the terms brought from Frascati comprised a surrender-quite different from 

Schacht's verbal message from Student. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

Yet Calvi di Bergolo could not overlook 

the difficult Italian situation, the unreliability of his own Centauro troops, and 

the impossibility of effectively opposing 

the Germans. 

Calvi di Bergolo sent Giaccone to Carboni. Though Carboni later said he refused the terms (and though Giaccone 

later said Carboni accepted them), Giaccone at 0530, 10 September, sent his interpreter back to Frascati with a message 

accepting the German conditions. He, 

Giaccone, would follow later. 

Whatever Carboni's precise words to 

Giaccone might have been, Carboni had 

no intention of surrendering. Still hoping 

for Allied support, from sea or from air, 

he wished to stall by talking with the 

Germans, intending to break off the talks 

at the right time on some pretext. He 

told Calvi di Bergolo of his aims but the 

latter would have no part in this scheme. 

Giaccone returned to Frascati, reaching 

Kesselring's headquarters at 0700, 10 

September. Carboni, meanwhile, ordered 

the Ariete and Piave Divisions, assembling 

near Tivoli, to attack the 2d Parachute 

Division in order to relieve pressure on the 

Granatieri Division. While the divisions 

prepared to execute the attack that afternoon, Carboni left Tivoli about 0700 and 

went to Rome with several of his staff 

officers. He went in response to a telephone call from Sorice, the Minister of 

War. 13 

On his way to Rome, Carboni noted 

that all seemed quiet north of the city, 

but on the south the German paratroopers 

continued to press closer to the city limits.14 

Sorice wanted to see Carboni because 

a peculiar situation had arisen in Rome. 

13 Il Proeesso Carboni-Roatta, pp. 81-90; Cadorna, La rise ossa, pp. 53-57. 

14 Il Proeesso Carboni-Roatta, p. 77. 

527 

Maresciallo d'Italia Enrico Caviglia, an 

elderly officer who had been a rival of 

Badoglio for years, had taken what 

amounted to de facto command of the civil 

and military forces in the capital and had 

become what resembled the head of a provisional government. 

During the spring of 1943, the King 

had considered Caviglia as a possible successor to Mussolini, but Caviglia had made 

no move to further the possibility.15 He 

had maintained his contact with the crown 

but had remained aloof from governmental 

matters until the summer of 1943, when 

he became increasingly concerned with 

what he judged to be Badoglio's mismanagement of affairs. His impatience with 

Badoglio's leadership had led him to arrange for an audience with the King. 

Scheduled to see Victor Emmanuel IlIon 

the morning of 9 September, Caviglia went 

to Rome on the 8th. While he was having 

dinner with friends that evening, he heard 

a recording of Badoglio's announcement of 

Italy's surrender. This confirmed his 

worst suspicions~Caviglia was certain 

that Badoglio had arranged to escape 

from Rome. But Caviglia never doubted 

the King and the high command. With 

faith that they would remain in Rome to 

meet the critical situation, Caviglia calmly 

went to bed. 

The next morning, 9 September, Caviglia discovered the greatest confusion in 

the city. Only the doormen were on duty 

at the Quirinal Palace~no guards, no 

carabinieri. No responsible official was 

at the Ministry of War. 

Caviglia's mounting concern was heightened when he met Generale di Corpo 

d' Armata Vittorio Sogno, a corps com15 Enrico Caviglia, Maresciallo d'Italia, Diario 

(Aprile 1925-Marzo 1945) (Rome: Gherardo 

Casini editore, 1952), pp. 392-414. 
528 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

mander stationed in Albania who had 

come to Rome in civilian clothes to receive 

orders from Comando Supremo. Sogno 

told Caviglia that he had looked in vain 

for Barbieri, commander of the Army 

Corps of Rome. Barbieri was not at his 

office. Carboni, Sogno had learned, had 

bcen placed in command of all the forces 

around Rome, but Carboni had disappeared. Sogno had been at Comando 

Supremo but had found not a single general officer. Roatta's office was empty. 

And Sogno had heard a rumor that the 

carabinieri and the service school formations had been dissolved. At the Palazzo 

Caprara, Caviglia ran into Colonel Salvi. 

His eyes red from weeping, Salvi declared 

he did not know where his commander, 

Carboni, had gone. After further efforts to find out what was happening, Caviglia made the painful discovery 

that the King had fled Rome in company 

with Badoglio and high-ranking officers. 

Shocked and depressed, Caviglia went 

back to the Ministry of War, where he 

met General Sorice.1G 

Sorice had been having no easy time. 

Badoglio had instructed him the previous 

evening, after deciding to leave Rome, to 

notify the civilian ministers of the government's move. Sorice was to inform the 

mlmsters to meet the King and his party 

at Pescara. But Sorice did not get the 

civilian members of the cabinet together 

until the morning of 9 September, when, 

meeting at the Viminale Palace, with 

Caviglia present, they were startled by 

the news of the departure of the King and 

Badoglio. The first reaction of the Minister of Propaganda, Carlo Galli, was to 

summon a notary public and make an 

official record of his complete igno1 () Caviglia, Diario, pp. 435-40; Ii Processo 

Carboni-Roatta, p. 89. 

rance of the armistice negotiations. When 

Sorice advised the Minister of the Interior, 

Ricci, that Badoglio had invested him with 

responsibility for the civil government of 

Rome, Ricci declined the honor. 17 

At this point, Caviglia stepped into the 

breach. He tried to send a telegram to 

the King for authorization to assume full 

powers in Rome during the absence of 

the Head of Government. But he could 

not learn precisely where the King was 

and undertook to act on his own responsibility, deriving his power from his prestige as a marshal of Italy.18 

Caviglia's first thought was to spare 

Rome and its population the devastation 

of battle. To that end, he felt it necessary to pacify the Germans. From Generale di Divisione Umberto di Giorgio, 

who seemed to have succeeded General 

Barbieri in command of the internal defenses of Rome, he learned not only that 

the Italian troops could not stand up to 

the Germans but also that the available 

supplies for the civilians were sufficient 

for only a few days. He made repeated 

attempts, but in vain, to get in touch 

with Carboni. He tried to negotiate with 

the Germans, but the German Embassy 

staff had gone and Kesselring's headquarters outside the city was hostile. To tranquilize the civil population, Caviglia had 

the Minister of Propaganda, Galli, issue 

bulletins over the radio and post billboard 

notices calling on the people to remain 

calm and assuring them that negotiations were being carried on with the 

Germans.19 

17 Senise, Quando era Capo della Polizia, p. 

249; Maugeri, From the Ashes of Disgrace, p. 

185; Guariglia, Ricordi, pp. 714, 717. 

1" Caviglia, Diario, p. 44 I; Ii Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 90. 

19 Caviglia, Diario, pp. 439-41. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

When the broadcasts and public notices 

appeared on the morning of 10 September, they undermined whatever spirit remained among the civil population and 

the troops. Carboni's plan for continued 

opposition to the Germans thus received 

a check even before Carboni could move 

over to the offensive. 

When Carboni arrived at Sorice's office in the Ministry of War that morning, 

he was ushered in immediately to see 

Caviglia. Out of respect to Caviglia, 

Sorice took no part in the discussion. 20 

Caviglia had never seen Carboni before, 

and even though Carboni, now in uniform, 

made a favorable impression, Caviglia 

was prepared to dislike him. Caviglia 

had not thought very much of the military 

articles Carboni had written for the daily 

press; Sorice had described him as headstrong and willful. And, finally, Carboni 

was a product of the Badoglio era of the 

Italian Army. 

Despite these handicaps, Carboni persuaded Caviglia of his competence and of 

the sincerity of his intentions. He briefed 

Caviglia on the military situation, explained how he had received from Roatta 

the order to withdraw his forces to Tivoli 

for no apparent reason, and indicated that 

he could not simply leave the troops in 

Tivoli indefinitely. He had insufficient 

fuel to move into the Abruzzi Mountains. 

He was therefore turning the Ariete and 

Piave Divisions back to Rome to fight to 

save the capital from the Germans. 

Still without authorization from the 

King for his assumption of quasi command, Caviglia expressed rather unclearly 

what Carboni construed as approval of 

Carboni's intention to continue the fight. 

20 Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma. 

0. 44; II Processa Carboni-Roatta, p. go. 

529 

Sorice agreed that Carboni's course of 

action was correct. 21 

Carboni then set up his command post 

in a private apartment in Rome-at 

Piazza dello Muse 7-which belonged to 

an employee of the intelligence bureau. 

Equipped with two telephones and with 

good observation of strategic streets, the 

apartment was well located for Carboni's 

purpose. There Carboni began to urge 

civilian resistance against the Germans and 

to direct the operations of the military 

units. 

Carboni approved General Cadorna's 

final orders for the Ariete Division's attack. 

He ordered Generale di Divisione U go 

Tabellini, the Piave Division's commander, 

who reported in person, to bring up his 

troops to support the hard-pressed Granatieri Division. He encouraged Generale 

di Brigata Ottaviano Traniello, the Re 

Division commander. He sent whatever 

separate units he could locate to reinforce 

the Granatieri Division, and he urged the 

division commander, General Salinas, to' 

hold out at all costs. 

As for getting the civilians to fight in 

defense of the city, four days earlier, on 

6 September, Carboni had secured and 

set aside 500 rifles, 400 pistols, and 15,000 

hand grenades for distribution to the population. Luigi Longo, leader of the Communist party, had taken charge of the 

distribution, and on 10 September Longo 

arrived at Carboni's apartment home 

command post. Carboni urged him to 

get civilian fighters to support the Granatieri troops south of the city. A little 

later, around noon, Carboni sent Dr. 

21 Carboni, L'armistizio e la difesa di Roma, 

p. 44; Caviglia, Diario, pp. 44:1-44; II Processo 

Carboni-Roatta, p. go; Sanzi, Generale Carboni, 

p. 224· 
530 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Edoardo Stolfi to tell the Committee of 

National Liberation that it was time to 

arm the population and to help the troops 

resist the Germans. The committee declined to take action, though a few individual citizens joined and fought with the 

military, particularly at Porta San Paolo. 

There was nothing in Rome on 10 September even resembling a popular uprising. 

The Romans were disillusioned, fearful, 

and tired of war. They had welcomed 

the armistice with joy. Wanting only 

peace, they preferred to listen to Caviglia's radio broadcasts and read the billboard announcements that were urging 

them to be quiet rather than to Carboni 

who offered only strenuous and dangerous 

adventure. 22 

Meanwhile, Giaccone and an aide had 

arrived at Frascati at 0700. Westphal met 

them. Giaccone stated that the Italian 

command had accepted the terms formulated the night before. He also complained 

that the Germans were not properly observing the truce, which was supposed to last 

for three hours, until 1000. Westphal at 

once dispatched two staff officers to accompany Giaccone's aide in order to ensure observance of the truce by the 

German units. 

At this point, around 0730, Kesselring 

appeared. He said that Italian resistance 

was altogether hopeless because the Allies 

had confined their invasion to Salerno, 

thereby leaving the Italian troops near 

Rome to stand alone. As a result, he 

presented a new set of terms-drafted by 

Westphal during the night-considerably 

"2 Carboni, L' armistizio e la difesa di Roma, 

pp. 44-45; II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 90-

92; Sanzi, Generale Carboni, pp. 149-50; 

Scrivener, Inside Rome With the Germans, pp. 

3-4· 

more severe. Undeniably, these conditions meant capitulation, nothing lesS. 23 

Giaccone discussed with Westphal the 

new terms in detail and with care. At 

1000 he departed for Rome, taking with 

him the surrender document in the German and Italian languages, both already 

signed by \\T estphal. Giaccone arrived at 

the Palazzo Caprara around noon, got the 

telephone number of Carboni's command 

post, and phoned Carboni about the outcome of his mission. 

Carboni ordered Giaccone to break off 

negotiations immediately. Replying that 

the situation was extremely delicate and 

serious, Giaccone requested an order in 

writing, or, he added, Carboni could make 

a direct and personal communication to 

Kesselring. Responding that the situation 

was indeed serious and delicate, Carboni 

declined to assume any responsibility. He 

recommended that Giaccone refer the 

problem to Sorice, the Minister of War. 24 

When presented with the problem and 

after listening to Giaccone's estimate that 

no other course existed except to agree to 

Kesselring's terms, Sorice did not feel up 

to the responsibility of making a decision. 

23 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 87-8fL 

The authors have followed the recorded testimony 

as given in the trial of Carboni, Roatla, Ambrosio, et ai., in which some, but not all of the 

relevant facts regarding the surrender were established. German postwar writings are less 

valid as evidence. Note, however, that both 

Kesselring and Klinckowstroem assert that General Calvi di Bcrgolo and Colonel Montezemolo 

appeared at German headquarters early in the 

morning of 10 September along with Colonel 

Giaccone. See Klinckowstroem in MS #T - I a 

(Westphal et al.), ch. V, pp. 13-14; Kessdring. 

Soldat, p. 255. The new set of terms may be 

found in II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 38-89. 

24 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, pp. 88, 92; 

Carboni, L' armistizio e la difesa di Roma, pp. 

46-47. Sanzi (Generale Carboni, page 157) 

states that it was General Calvi di Bcrgolo who 

called, not Giaccone. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

He suggested that Giaccone lay the matter 

before Caviglia, the highest ranking military person in Rome. Sorice had that 

day found out the whereabouts of the 

King, and he had sent a telegram requesting authority for Caviglia to become 

the government representative in Rome. 

But neither Caviglia nor Sorice ever received the King's reply, which was actually sent and which invested Caviglia 

with full powers "during the temporary 

absence of the President of the Council 

who is with the military ministers." 2;; 

Giaccone, after leaving Sorice, found 

Caviglia at the house of a friend. Soon 

after Giaccone's arrival, his commanding 

officer, General Calvi di Bergolo, appeared 

in search of Giaccone to learn the results 

of the second discussion with Kesselring. 

c\ll three officers discussed the problem of 

whether to accept the German demands 

and capitulate. Caviglia said he had no 

authority to capitulate because he had not 

heard from the King. But he added that 

if his assumption of authority had been 

confirmed, he would decide in favor of 

accepting the German ultimatum. He 

did not believe that the military situation 

permitted further resistance--and this 

despite his approval of Carboni's decision 

to resist. Caviglia advised Calvi di Bergala to send Giaccone back to Frascati 

to accept the German terms. 

The discussion was still under way when 

other guests were announced-Ivanoe 

Bonomi, Alessandro Casati, and Meuccio 

Ruini, politicans who were members of 

the Committee of National Liberation, and 

Leopoldo Piccardi, Badoglio's Minister of 

Industry. Caviglia received them and 

explained his views. Accepting his es-

~3 Caviglia, Diario .. p. 441; II Processo CarboniRoatta, p. 90; Roatta, 0 tto miLioni, p. 329; 

Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, II, 209. 

531 

tim ate of the military situation, for the 

marshal was an acknowledged military 

expert, they concurred in the wisdom of 

Caviglia's decision.26 

This decided, Calvi di Bergolo and 

Giaccone shortly after 1400 returned to 

Sorice at the Ministry of War, where Calvi 

di Bcrgolo telephoned Carboni and asked 

him to come over. Carboni arrived in a 

matter of minutes. 

the four officers argued over whether to 

accept Kesselring's terms. Sorice and Carboni declared them unacceptable and refused to sign the documents Giaccone 

had brought. Calvi di Bergolo and Giaccone insisted that they had no alternative 

but to accept, particularly in view of 

Kesselring's ultimatum. While the argument continued, machine gun fire sounded 

nearby. Upon investigation, they learned 

that German troops had made their wav 

to the Via dell'Impero. Without further 

ado, Giaccone placed his signature on the 

documents. 27 

Almost immediately afterwards, Caviglia arrived at the Ministry of War. Carboni was still arguing in favor of resisting 

the Gernlans on the basis that the Allied 

invasion would soon force the Germans 

to \·vithdraw north of Rome. Caviglia 

scoffed at the idea-such a belief, he said, 

was mere propaganda; the landings at 

Salerno could not free Rome. Only an 

Allied landing north of the capital, Caviglia said, could liberate Rome and northern 

Italy from German occupation. Carboni 

remained adamant. He refused to sign 

the capitulation papers. Saying that he 

knew the Germans well, he felt that they 

26 II Processo Carboni-Roatta. pp. 92-93; 

Caviglia, Diario, pp. 445-46; BOllomi, Diario di 

un anno, pp. 101-03. 

27 II Processo Carboni-Roatta, p. 93.: Carboni, 

L'armistizio e La difesa di Roma, p. 47. 
532 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

would not honor even the harsh terms 

that they were imposing. Calvi di Bergolo said that he trusted the German 

officers. He had faith in their honor, 

and he urged Carboni to speak directly to 

Kesselring and get his personal assurance. 

With some bitterness, Carboni said he 

would do nothing of the sort. Calvi di 

Bergolo's Centauro Division, he said, had 

stood by idly while the Granatieri, Ariete, 

and Piave Divisions had fought and fought 

with distinction. If Calvi di Bergolo had 

such faith in the Germans, let him take 

command of the city and responsibility for 

the armistice. The others agreed. 

Surprised by this turn of events, Calvi 

di Bergolo after considerable hesitation, 

acquiesced. Upon Calvi di Bergolo's responsibility then, Giaccone returned to 

Kesselring's headquarters with the surrender documents bearing his signature 

opposite that of \Vestphal. Giaccone 

reached Frascati at 1630, half an hour 

beyond the ultimatum's expiration but in 

time to save Rome from bombardment 

and the Italian troops from further combat. 2R 

Kesselring thus became, after two days, 

master of Rome. Playing his cards with 

great skill, he overcame more than five 

Italian divisions though he himself held 

only a pair, and in so doing he kept open 

his line of communications to the Tenth 

Army. By occupying Rome and dispersing the strong Italian forces in the area, 

he made possible a stubborn defense against 

the c\llies in southern Italy. 

In the meantime, the King and his 

party had reached Pescara on 9 Septem-

", II Pracessa Carboni-Roatta, p. 93; Caviglia, 

Diaria, pp. 446-47; sec also Pietro Pieri, "Rama 

nella prima decade del settembre 1943," Nuava 

Riuista Starica, vol. XLIV, NO.2 (August 1960), 

pp. 4 0 3-0 9. 

ber. That evening the monarch decided 

to continue the voyage by ship, and 

shortly after midnight, the party boarded 

a naval vessel and sailed to the south. 29 

During this time the King and his party 

were receiving only the vaguest kind of reports from the rest of Italy. Fighting 

seemed to be going on around Rome, and 

this caused concern. A message came in 

asking permission for Caviglia to assume 

full military and political power in the 

capital, and this caused puzzlementwhat had happened to Carboni and to 

Ricci? 30 For all the confusion, someone 

had nevertheless had the foresight to bring 

the radio and code for communicating with 

AFHQ. On the evening of 9 September, 

before the King and his party went aboard 

the warship, a message went out to the 

Allies: "\Ve are moving to Taranto." 31 

Around I 430, I 0 September, the royal 

party debarked at Brindisi. There the 

members of the government stayed, and 

Brindisi became the new capital of Italy. 

There was some talk among the generals 

of sending an officer to Rome by air to 

discover the extent and results of the 

fighting. But before an officer could depart, news came that Caviglia had arranged for a cessation of I talo-German 

hostilities. 32 

Dissolution of the Italian Armed Forces 

At La Spezia the main part of the Italian Fleet had escaped German seizure, 

Late in the afternoon of 8 September, 

the battleships Roma, Italia, and Vittorio 

29 II Processa Carboni-Roatta, p. 64; Badoglio, 

Memorie e documenti, pp. 118-19: Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrofe, II, 203. 

:'0 Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 329; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrofe, II, 209. 

:;1 Capitulation of Italy, p. 379. 

"" Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 330. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

Veneto had left the harbor, the Germans 

having been convinced by De Courten 

that the ships were steaming out to meet 

and destroy the Allied convoys movmg 

toward Salerno.33 Joined by crUIsers 

and destroyers from Genoa, the fleet on 

the morning of 9 September was sailing, 

in accord with Allied instructions, off the 

western shore of Corsica. The ships 

passed south of Corsica to pick up other 

vessels at Maddalena. That afternoon, 

German aircraft based on Sardinia attacked the fleet and sank the Roma (the 

commander, Ammiraglio Carlo Bergamini, 

and most of the crew were lost), and damaged the Italia. c\mmiraglio Romeo Oliva 

took command and turned the ships toward North Africa. At 0600, TO September, this fleet of two battleships, five 

cruisers, and seven destroyers met the 

Warspite, the Valiant, and several destroyers, which escorted the Italian ships 

to Bizerte. The same afternoon, the battleships Andrea Doria and Caio Duilo. two 

cruisers, and a destroyer, on their way from 

Taranto, reached :Malta. ~j 

The capitulation of the Italian forces 

around Rome to the Germans, rather than 

the surrender of the fleet to the Allies, 

proved to be the main pattern of Italian 

action. Paucity of materiel, declining 

morale, and lack of direction from Rome 

were the reasons why the half-million 

troops or more in north Italy and oc-

,,:I Kesselring, Soldat, p. 238: Westphal. Heer 

in Fesseln, pp. 226-27. 

:I" Klinckowstroem in MS #T-Ia (Westphal 

et al.), ch. V, p. 21, indicates that the attack w~s 

made by the Support Aviation Win" 4. In 

Rome. Supermarina seems to ha\'c believed that 

the attack was by Allied planes (Butcher, My 

Three }' ears With Eisenhower, p. 41:3). See also 

Morison. Sicil),--Salerno-Anzio, pp. 242-43: 

Basso. L'Armistizio del Settembre 1943 in Sardegna, 

pp. 41, 48: Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey. pp. 

562- 63. 

533 

cupied France seemingly vanished into thin 

aIr. Four divisions of Rundstedt's on 

WEST -in a series of police actions rather 

than military operations-rounded up 

the Italian Fourth Army in southern 

France and Liguria. Some units of the 

5th (Pusteria) Alpine Division resisted, but 

only briefly, at the :Mount Cenis tunnel. 

A few soldiers of the Fourth Arm)' in 

France accepted German invitations and 

volunteered to fight under German command. Some 40,000 Italians were taken 

prisoner and later sent north to Germany 

as labor troops.~:; 

In the Brenner area, the German 44th 

I nfantry Division, composed mostly of 

:\ustrians, redeemed the South Tyrol with 

avidity, overrunning General Gloria's 

XXXV Corps headquarters at Bolzano 

on 9 September, occupying Bologna the 

same day. The following evening, two 

thousand railway workers arrived from 

Germany and took over the major railroad 

centers in northern Italy.36 

At La Spezia, German forces disrupted 

telephone communications, then appealed 

to the Italian units to disband, the men 

to go home. The Germans surrounded 

the Italian XVI Corps headquarters 

(which had been in Sicily), fired several 

machine guns, then walked into the main 

building and captured the corps commander and his staff. Enraged by the 

escape of the Italian warships, the Germans summarily executed several Italian 

naval captains who had been unable to 

get their ships out of the port and who 

had scuttled their vessels. ~7 

The German takeover in northern Italv 

proved much easier than OKW had an-

"" See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 144. 

aH Rossi, Come arrh'ammo, pp. 260-61. 

:!7 Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 573; 

Rossi, Come arrivammo, pp. 258, 261. 
534 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ticipated. The initial reports showed such 

Italian confusion and paralysis as to make 

Hitler contemptuous and passionately 

vindictive. As early as 9 September, an 

order issued by Keitel on the treatment 

of Italian troops under German jurisdiction reflected Hitler's feelings. Commanders in France, northern Italy, and the 

Balkans, the order said, could accept 

Italians who were willing to fight in German units but had to take all others as 

prisoners of war for forced labor. Skilled 

workers were to be assigned to the armament industry, the unskilled to help construct a contemplated East Wall. Rommel put the order into immediate effect. 

His subordinate commanders took Italian 

troops into custody, disarmed them, and 

prepared them for transfer to Germany.3S 

In southern Italy, the armistice announcement had taken the Italian Seventh 

Army completely by surprise. Less than 

six weeks earlier, when Roatta had thought 

that the government might decide to resist 

the unwanted German reinforcements, he 

told the army commander, Generale di 

Corpo d' Armata Adalberto di Savoia 

Genova, the Duke of Bergamo, to react 

energetically in case of German violence. 

He had repeated the order to General 

Arisio, who had succeeded to the army 

command in August-telling Arisio to act 

against the Germans only if the Germans 

committed acts of open hostility. Beyond that, there was no warning, no indication-not even the transmittal of 

:<8 For text of the order, see Trials of War 

Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. la, Nuernberg, October 1946-April 1949 (Washington, 

1950), vol. XI, Doc. NDKW-898, pp. 1078-79. 

B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers 

(London: Collins, 1953), pp. 445-47. See also 

Caracciolo di Feroleto, "E Poi?" pp. 140-55, and 

Giuseppe Gariboldi-Farina, Follia delle Faile 

(Rome: Staderini, 1945), pp. 194-95. 

Memoria 44 to Arisio-to suggest that the 

government was thinking of changing 

course. 

In contrast to the developments in 

northern Italy and in the Rome area after 

Mussolini's overthrow, there had been no 

acute friction between Italian and German forces in the south. The armistice 

announcement humiliated the Italian generals, who, led by Arisio himself, freely 

turned vehicles, supplies, and facilities over 

to the Germans and voluntarily gave 

German troops the good coastal positions 

they occupied. Only the 9th (Pasubio) 

Infantry Division suffered from German 

aggression-the division was torn to pieces 

as the Germans rushed toward Salerno to 

oppose the Allies. Only one commander 

suffered, General Gonzaga of the 222d 

Coastal Division, who refused German 

demands that his troops be disarmed and 

was promptly shot. Only the 209th 

Coastal Division, stationed at Bari, remained intact. Except for this latter unit, 

a few elements of the 58th (Legnano) Infantry Division (in the Brindisi and Taranto area), a few units of the IS2d 

(Piceno) and I04th (M antova) Infantry 

Divisions in Puglia, and some unspecified 

coastal formations-the forces under the 

Seventh Army, three regular divisions and 

six coastal divisions grouped into four 

corps-were disarmed, the men permitted 

to go home.39 

39Vietinghoff III MS #T-Ia (Westphal et 

al.), ch. VI; Rossi, Corne arrivammo, pp. 257, 

277; Col. Gaetano Giannuzzi, L'Esercito vittima 

dell'armistizio, (Turin: P. Castello, 1946), p. 38; 

Nazi Conspiracy and ARgression, Office of United 

States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis 

Criminality (hereafter cited as Nazi Conspiracy 

and AgRression) (Washington, 1946), vol. VII, 

trans of Doc. L-172, p. 935, shows the Pasubio Division as definitely disarmed; Msg 477, 

Mason-MacFarlane to Whiteley, 15 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 503-04. 
THE DISSOLUTION 

In the Balkans, Greece, and the Aegean, 

the Italian ground forces, numbering more 

than 600,000 men, were with but few exceptions completely dissolved by 15 

September, having offered little aid to the 

Allies on the Italian mainland and even 

less resistance to the Germans. On the 

islands of Sardinia and Corsica, though 

the Italians outnumbered the Germans 

by more than four to one, they were 

unable to exert a positive influence on 

the war. The Germans evacuated their 

troops, numbering a division and a half, 

from Sardinia to the mainland where, a 

most welcome addition to Kesselring's 

forces, they participated in the battles 

south of Rome. A significant part of the 

Italian [84th (Nembo) Parachute Division 

went over to the German side and served 

actively with the German forces. 

The ineptness of the I talian ground 

troops and the passivity of Badoglio's 

government during the early and critical 

days of the Salerno invasion brought 

serious disappointment to AFHQ. During the afternoon of 10 September, General Eisenhower sent a message to 

Badoglio in the hope of galvanizing the 

Italians into action: 

The whole future and honor of Italy depend upon the part which her armed forces 

are now prepared to play. The Germans 

have definitely and deliberately taken the 

field against you. They have mutilated 

your fleet and sunk one of your ships; they 

have attacked your soldiers and seized your 

ports. The Germans are now being attacked by land and sea and on an ever 

increasing scale from the air. Now is the 

time to strike. If Italy rises now as one 

man we shall seize every German by the 

throat. I urge you to issue immediately a 

clarion call to all patriotic Italians. They 

have done much locally already but action 

appears to be uncoordinated and uncertain. 

They require inspired leadership and, in or535 

der to fight, an appeal setting out the situation to your people as it now exists is 

essential. Your Excellency is the one man 

that can do this. You can help free your 

country from the horrors of the battlefield. 

I urge you to act now; delay will be interpreted by the common enemy as weakness 

and lack of resolution. 40 

General Eisenhower also recommended 

that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill call on the Italian people 

to oppose fiercely every German in Italysuch OppOSItIOn, he explained, would 

greatly assist Allied military operationsY 

Accordingly, on I I September, Roosevelt 

and Churchill made public a letter to 

Marshal Badoglio, calling on him to lead 

the Italian people against the German 

invaders. They instructed Eisenhower to 

convey the message directly to BadoglioY 

These efforts to prod the Italian Army 

into activity were like beating a dead 

horse. Perhaps the Allies achieved a final 

wiggle when on I I September Roatta issued 

by radio a general order to all army commanders to consider the Germans as 

enemies. 43 On the same day, Badoglio 

informed Eisenhower that he had, the day 

before, ordered all Italian armed forces 

"to act vigorously against German aggression. For the Allies' edification, he 

included a final appeal for an Allied landing north of Rome and an airborne 

drop in the Grossetto area. 44 

40 Msg 443, sent both over "Drizzle-Monkey" 

and by naval channels, 10 Sep 43, 1657B time, 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 405-07. 

41 Telg W-g635 FREEDOM to AGWAR, 10 

Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 409-1O. 

42 Text of message in U.S. Department of Slate. 

United States and Italy 1936-1946: Documentary Record, p. 68; Telg 7473, President and 

Prime Minister to Eisenhower. II Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 414. 

43 Roatta, Otto milioni, p. 338; Zanussi, 

Guerra e catastrofe, II, 248. 

44 Radiograms, "Monkey" to "Drizzle," 1 1 Sep 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 428, 434. 
536 SICILY AND THE SURRE~DER OF ITALY 

By then it was too late. Only a few 

Italian commands were still functioning 

actively. Indecision, fear of the Germans, 

and lack of communication with commanders in the field had doomed the 

Italian Army. Not only did this inaction 

facilitate Kesselring's plans and permit 

him to give his whole attention to the 

Allied invasion at Salerno, but it also deprived the King and the Badoglio government of resources they might have used 

to gain a better bargaining position with 

respect to the Allies. 

ivfussolini 

Everything seemed to be going Hitler's 

way except for one thing, the rescue of 

~Jussolini. If Skorzeny, under Student's 

supervision, could locate Mussolini's prison 

and kidnap him, Hitler felt that he would 

have a good chance of restoring fascism in 

Italy and regaining an ally. Skorzeny had 

missed getting Mussolini by one day, when 

the Duce's captors had moved him from 

the island of Maddalena back to the Italian 

mainland just before Skorzeny could execute his planned raid. 

Shortly thereafter, however, Skorzeny's 

agents informed him that Mussolini had 

been moved to the Campo Imperatore on 

the Gran Sasso, a ski lodge completed 

shortly before the outbreak of the war 

and located on the higbest peak of the 

Apennines. No military map carried its 

location. Not even mountain climbers' 

charts identified the place. The only information that Skorzeny could get came 

from a German citizen living in Italy. 

He had once spent a holiday there, and 

he had a circular describing the hotel accommodations. This intelligence was 

hardly adequate for a military operation, 

so Skorzeny arranged to have a pilot fly 

him and his intelligence officer over the 

camp.4G 

On 8 September, while flying over the 

Gran Sasso in a Heinkel I I I plane, Skorzeny located the Campo Imperatore from 

the air and noticed a small triangular 

green area behind the hotel that might 

serve for an air landing operation. He 

and his intelligence officer tried to take 

pictures, but the camera built into the 

plane froze at 15,000 feet, and it was only 

with great difficulty that they managed to 

take some photographs with a hand 

camera. 

This air reconnaissance was responsible 

for Skorzeny's absence from f'rascati during the Allied air bombardment of Kesselring's headquarters. It was fortunate 

for him that he had left, for his quarters 

were badly damaged. As a result, he 

had to go to Rome to have his film developed. In the capital that evening, he 

pushed his way through joyous crowds of 

civilians who were celebrating the armistice, made known not long before by 

Badoglio's announcement. 

Before Skorzeny could go ahead with 

rescue plans, he needed confirmation of 

~Iussolinrs presence at the ski lodge on 

Gran Sasso. He induced a Gcrman staff 

doctor to visit the lodge on the pretext 

that it might be suitable for use as a convalescent home for soldiers recuperating 

from malaria. The doctor started out 

that night and returned the following day. 

He reported he had been unable to get to 

the lodge itself. He had reached Aquila, 

the nearest village, and from there had 

gone to a funicular station at the base of 

the mountain. A detachment of Italian 

soldiers guarded the station. A telephone 

.!c. This account of Mussolini's liberation is based 

largely on Skorzeny, Geheimkommando Skorzeny. 

pp. 127-5'9· 
THE DISSOLUTION 

call to the lodge disclosed that Italian 

troops stood guard there, too. vVhether 

M ussolini was at the lodge was uncertain. 

On the next day, 10 September, Student and Skorzeny discussed their problem. 

They felt they had to act quickly, for 

every hour that went by increased the 

possibility that the Italians might transfer 

Mussolini to Allied custody. Though they 

were not absolutely certain, they decided 

to act on the chance that Mussolini actually was at the lodge on Gran Sasso. 

Because the capitulation of the Italian 

troops around Rome that day made the 

2d Parachute Division available for the 

new mission, Student thought it best to 

send first a battalion of paratroopers into 

the valley at night to seize the funicular 

station. But a ground attack up the 

side of the mountain was impractical. 

The troops might sustain heavy losses, the 

attack would endanger Mussolini's life. 

A parachute drop in the thin air over the 

Gran Sasso was also dangerous. 'Student 

therefore decided to make a surprise attack on the top of the mountain with a 

company of glider-borne troops. He ordered twelve gliders flown from southern 

France to Rome. 

Detailed planning for the operation was 

completed on I I September. Paratroopers were to seize the cable car station in 

the valley and make a surprise landing on 

top of Gran Sasso. H-hour was 0600, 

12 September. To help persuade the 

Italian guards to give up Mussolini without resistance, Skorzeny induced an Italian general to accompany him.46 

Because the dozen gliders coming from 

France were late in arriving in the Rome 

area, Skorzeny postponed the operation 

for eight hours. The planes towing the 

4G Identified as General Soleti by Mussolini in 

Storia di un anno, p. 34. 

537 

gliders took off at 1300, 12 September. 

Though the paratroopers were well equipped with light arms, Skorzeny counted 

most on the element of surprise. He rode 

in the third glider in the hope that the 

men in the preceding two would have the 

situation well in hand when he arrived. 

But the two leading tow planes went off 

course, and Skorzeny's glider was the first 

to land. It crash-landed to earth less 

than fifty yards from the lodge. 

Piling out of the glider, Skorzeny and 

his men rushed to the hotel and scrambled 

to a second story window. Inside they 

found Mussolini. The Italian guards offered no resistance. Meanwhile four more 

gliders landed successfully on the little 

green area near the lodge. 

With Mussolini safely in hand, Skorzeny demanded the surrender of the Italian garrison. The colonel who appeared 

to be in command asked for time to consider. He withdrew, but he soon returned 

with a flask of wine and saluted his conquerors. By then, the paratroop battalion 

in the valley, after a show of force, was 

in possession of the funicular station. 

Skorzeny relayed a message to Studentby telephone to the valley, thence by 

scout car radio-advising that he had accomplished the first part of his mission. 

This message reached Student, but subsequent communications were interrupted, 

and Skorzeny was unable to consult with 

higher authority on the best way to remove 

M ussolini from the Gran Sasso. 

Wishing to get Mussolini to Hitler's 

headquarters as fast as he could, Skorzeny 

got in touch by radio with a small Storch 

aircraft flying overhead to observe the 

operation. He wanted the pilot, Captain 

Gerlach, to land on the mountain. With 

Italians assisting, the Germans cleared 

boulders from a short path to create a 
53R SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

THE "RESCUE" OF MUSSOLINI, 12 September 1943. 

runway. Gerlach brought his small craft 

down safely. But he was far from pleased 

at the prospect of taking off from the 

mountain top with so precious a passenger. Skorzeny's insistence on accompanying Mussolini increased Gerlach's 

take-off problem by adding to the weight. 

Skorzeny reasoned that if the little plane 

failed to get off the ground, he would not 

be around to explain his failure to an enraged Fuehrer. 

After a questioning glance at the little 

ship, Mussolini climbed into the Storch 

with Skorzeny and Gerlach. Paratroopers held the wings and tail of the plane 

as the pilot revved up the engine. Then, 

with much shaking and bouncing, the 

plane made its short run, barely cleared 

the rim of the escarpment, and leveled 

off only after a breath-taking drop below 

the mountain top. This was the last of 

the excitement. Without further incident, 

the plane proceeded to Pratica di Mare, 

where three Heinkel I I I aircraft were 

waiting to transport Mussolini to Germany. They took off at once, and shortly 

after 1930 that evening, M ussolini and 

Skorzeny were in Vienna. On the following day they flew to Munich; two days 

later, on 15 September, they were at 
THE DISSOLUTION 

Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia. 

Despite his dramatic rescue from the 

possibility of standing trial before the 

Allies, Mussolini was but a hollow shell 

of his former self. Eventually Hitler 

established him in power to govern that 

part of Italy under German control. 

There he served as Hitler's puppet and as 

the facade of a new government called 

the Italian Social Republic, which could 

not conceal the German military power 

that supported it. 

No more than a mere symbol of the 

final brief revival of fascism, Mussolini, 

until his death in April I945 at the hands 

of anti-Fascist partisans, nevertheless lightened Hitler's problems of holding central 

539 

and northern Italy. Spared the necessity 

of establishing a military government for 

the four-fifths of the Italian peninsula he 

occupied, Hitler, by rescuing Mussolini, 

also divided Italian loyalties. The Allies 

possessed one symbol of leadership in the 

King; Hitler held the other in M ussolini. 

The surrender of Italy achieved by the 

armistice of Cassibile was not much more 

than a paper capitulation, for the Allies 

had neither the Italian capital nor the 

administrative apparatus of government. 

What the Allies had was a symbol of 

sovereignty scarcely one whit more appealing to the Italian people than the discredited Duce. 
CHAPTER XXIX 

The Second Capitulation 

Mission to Brindisi 

At Brindisi, the King and his entourage 

found it difficult even to find accomodations and to organize a mess. Clearly the 

government was one in name only. Fourfifths of the country was under German 

control. The Allies on the Salerno beaches 

seemed perilously close to defeat. Yet the 

Badoglio government could claim some 

legitimacy because surrender had brought 

it Allied recognition as the government of 

I tall" 

Contact with the Allies, therefore, was 

of critical importance to the King and 

Badoglio. And fortunately, the royal 

party had the radio and code originally 

given to Castellano in Lisbon. This made 

it possible to communicate with AFHQ. 

But there were no real facilities at Brindisi 

for maintaining contact with the rest of 

the country-Radio Bari was so weak that 

its emis,ions scarcely reached Rome. 

After receiving from General Eisenhower on I I September the message from 

Roosevelt and Churchill urging him to 

lead the Italian people in a crusade against 

the Germans, Badoglio asked Eisenhower 

to send a liaison officer to help maintain 

close relations. 1 Eisenhower agreed and 

promptly selected for the post Lt. Gen. Sir 

Noel Mason-MacFarlane, the Military 

1 Msg 38, "Monkey" to "Drizzle," II Sep 43, 

Capitulation of Italy, p. 434: Badoglio, M emorie 

e documenti, pp. 123-24. 

Governor of Gibraltar. He directed Mr. 

Murphy and Mr. Macmillan, the Ameriican and British political advisers at 

AFHQ, to accompany Mason-MacFarlane, whose task would be the establishment of official contact with the Badoglio 

government. 2 

After expressing his pleasure over the 

choice, Badoglio suggested that Eisenhower and his staff meet with him and his 

military staff "to discuss further operations 

in Italy, a theater of war which we [ItaliansJ naturally know perfectly." 3 

The suggestion was not well received. 

Still grievously disappointed in the performance of the Italian Government from 

the time of the armistice announcement, 

Eisenhower was in no mood to confide his 

plans to members of that government. It 

seemed hardly logical, now that the Italian Fleet had surrendered and the Army 

had dissolved into virtual nothingness, for 

Badoglio to tell Eisenhower how to wage 

the war and for Eisenhower to listen. 

'\That seemed very clear was that "Castellano had been the moving spirit in military 

armistice," not Badoglio or any member of 

"Capitulation of Italy, pp. 440-41, also in file 

10,000/100/1; Msg 5646, AFHQ to TROOPERS, I7 Sep 43, 0100/4/4,II. See the nincpage typewritten account of the establishment 

and operations of the Allied Military Mission at 

Brindisi covering the period 3 Septembcr- 17 

Kovember 1943. 10,000/100/j6. 

:l Msg 46, "Monkey" to "Drizzle," 12 Sep 43, 

Capitulation of Italy, p. 453; Ltc Whiteley to 

~ason-MacFarlane, 13 Sep 43. 10,000/100/1. 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

Badoglio's cabinet. Why had Castellano 

brought the negotiations to a head? Probably, AFHQ speculated, "chiefly due to 

his treatment by the Germans who apparently ignored the Italians militarily and 

told them nothing about operations." 4 

But whatever the reason, it was of little 

import compared to the problem of gaining some benefit from the surrender. 

On the day when the Allies at Salerno 

were closest to defeat, 13 September, General Eisenhower wrote General Marshall 

to depict how hollow a shell the Allies had 

inherited as a potential ally: 

Internally the I talians were so weak and 

supine that we got little if any practical 

help out of them. However, almost on pure 

bluff, we did get the Italian fleet into Malta 

and because of the Italian surrender, were 

able to rush into Taranto and Brindisi 

where no Germans were present .... 

The Sardinian and Corsican situations 

show how helpless and inert the Italians 

really are. In both those places they had 

the strength to kick the Germans into the 

sea. Instead they have apparently done 

nothing, although here and there they do 

occupy a port or two. 

Badoglio wants to see me and has suggested Sicily as a meeting place. I am telling him he has to come here. He also 

wants to bring along some of his general 

staff but I can't make out what his general 

stafT can possibly be directing just now. A 

few Italian artillery units arc supporting the 

British Airborne Division in Taranto. Aside 

from that there has been some local battling 

throughout the peninsula. This has. of 

course, served to keep the Germans preoccupied, but there has been nothing like the 

dTeet produced that was easily within thl' 

realm of possibility." ' 

4 Telg 441. FAIRFIELD REAR G-2 for 

Strong. FREEDOM, 10 Sep 4:1. Capitulation of 

Italy, p. 412. 

" Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall. I:) Sep 43. Diary. 

Office CinCo Book VIII. pp. A-765-A-767. 

See also Telg 009. Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower. 18 Sep 43, ro,OOO/IOO/r. 

541 

Despite his low expectations, Eisenhower 

was not giving up in his effort to salvage 

something practical out of the surrender, 

and Mason-MacFarlane's mission to Badoglio's government was to be his 

instrument. Eisenhower defined MasonMacFarlane's task as the transmission of 

Eisenhower's instructions to the Italian 

Government; the collection of intelligence 

information; and the arrangements "for 

such coordinated action as the Italian 

armed forces and people can be induced 

to take against the Germans." MasonMacFarlane and his subordinates were to 

bear in mind "the extreme importance of 

inculcating in the Italian Government, 

armed forces and people, the will to resist 

and hamper in every way the German 

forces in Italy and the Italian possessions." 

Mason-MacFarlane received for guidance 

copies of the short military terms of the 

armistice and the long comprehensive conditions, but because the Italian Government had not yet officially received the 

latter, he was not to discuss the contents 

of the long terms. 6 

On the day that the mission established 

its first official contact, 15 September, the 

British Government proposed that the Allies secure Badoglio's signature to the long 

terms and asked for Eisenhower's views 

on the proposal. In reply, General Eisentl Instrs for Mil Mission with the Italian Government, 12 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 

460-61. General Taylor (82d AB Division) was 

the senior American representative and apparf'ntIy handled administration and communications. 

See Memo, AFHQ for Taylor. 12 Sep 43. sub: 

:--Jotes for Allied Mil Mission; Organizational 

Chart for Mission; and Ltr. Taylor to Whiteley. 

IS Sep 43. all in 10.000/100/1; see also Telg 

.,)84. AFHQ to FATIMA (MacFarlane Mission). 

25 Sep 43. and Telg 9907, AFHQ to FATIMA. 

26 S"p 43. both in 10.000 / 100/10; Decisions 

Made by CinC in Mtgs. Bizerte, 9 Sep-22 Scp 4:,. 

0100/4/168; Notes for Mason-MacFarlanf', I r, 

Sep 4:,. Io,000/roo/i6. 
542 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

hower acknowledged the desirability of 

obtaining the signature but recommended 

delay. He also urged strongly the omission of the unconditional surrender formula, for he still had hope of gaining some 

practical benefits from the capitulation.7 

For their part, the Italians were also 

disappointed. The members of the Italian Government had attributed extraordinary military capabilities to the Allies. 

They had entertained visions of an Allied 

landing in great strength near Rome. 

Thus, they felt that the Allies were responsible-at least morally-for the hasty abandonment of the capital. The Allies, they 

thought, had advanced the timing of the 

armistice announcement and had come 

ashore at the wrong place. "They all say 

we should have landed north instead of 

south of Naples," Mason-MacFarlane reported. "On this point I tell them they 

know nothing about it and to shut up." 8 

The impression made by the Italian 

Government prompted pity rather than 

confidence. The King appeared 

pathetic, very old, and rather gaga; 74 years 

old; physically infirm, nervous, shaky, but 

courteous, with a certain modesty and simplicity of character which is attractive. He 

takes an objective, even humorously disinterested view of mankind and their follies. 

'Things are not difficult,' he said, 'only men.' 

I do not think he would be capable of 

initiating any policy, except under extreme 

pressure, e.g. Mussolini's march on Rome 

7 Telg 4929, Gilmer to Smith. 15 Sep 43, and 

Telg 478, FAIRFIELD REAR to FREEDOM, 

16 Sep 43, both in Capitulation of Italy, pp. 501, 

5 26. 

R Msg 477. Mason-MacFarlane to Whiteley, 15 

Sep 43 .. Capitulation of Italy, pp. 503-04; see 

also Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane to Whiteley, 14 

Sep 43, and Diary Notes of Mason-MacFarlane 

Mission, 12-2 J Sep 43, both in 10,000/ I 00/ I; 

Diary Notes of Mason-MacFarlane Mission, 22 

Sep-4 Oct 43, 10,000/100/2. 

and the Communist threat, which led to his 

decision of 1920 [sic]; the hopeless state of 

the Fascist regime which led to his decision 

of July 25, 1943; the German threat to 

Rome, which led to his decision on September 9, 1943· 

Badoglio seemed 

old, benevolent, honest and very friendly. 

Said all the right things. A loyal servant 

of his King and country, without ambitions . 

. . . He is a soldier and clearly without 

much political sense, believing that he has 

the popular support at the moment and that 

it can all be concentrated in a military 

movement without a political side. 

Ambrosio was "intelligent and friendly," 

though "depressed and lacking in enthusiasm." Roatta was "a good linguist" and 

"the perfect military attache" but with 

questionable loyalty "to any cause that 

should show remote signs of becoming a 

lost one." Zanussi's "position in this 

rather dreary military hierarchy is rather 

low." 9 

The prospect of getting help from the 

Italians did not seem bright. All that remained of the Italian Army were: in 

southern Italy-the M antova Division near 

Crotone, the Piceno Division near Brindisi, 

part of the Legnano Division north of 

Brindisi, and some coastal formations; in 

Sardinia-four divisions in a "recuperative" stage; in Cephalonia and the Dodecanese-one division each. The rest of 

the Italian Army, according to Ambrosio, 

was "surrounded by the Germans and 

finished." I t could be "written off." Of 

the divisions in southern Italy, all had 

"hardly any motor transport left," their 

armament was "mostly 19 I 8" type, they 

9 Msg 477, Mason-MacFarlane for Whiteley, 

15 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 503-04. 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

had "practically no petrol," very little 

ammunition, and were "very short of 

boots." Except for the fleet, "the genuine 

military help we are likely to get," MasonMacFarlane estimated, "is going to be 

practically nil." 10 

As for the political side of the picture, 

the Brindisi group was hardly worthy of 

bcing called a government. It was important only because of its unchallenged 

claim to legality-"except for the Fascist 

Republican Party now being organized in 

Germany by Mussolini and his gang, no 

other Government has so far claimed 

authority." 11 

T he Long Terms 

While Mason-MacFarlane and the military members of his mission remained at 

Brindisi, the political advisers-Murphy 

and Macmillan-returned to report to 

General Eisenhower. On 18 September, 

after conferring with these men, Eisenhower informed the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff of the problem he faced at this juncture of the surrender developments. 

The chief question, as Eisenhower saw 

it, and one that would have significant influence on Allied military operations in 

Italy, was the status to be accorded the 

Badoglio government. Determination of 

the status of Italy would dictate all "executive action" in the military, political, 

10 Memo, Mason-MacFarlane for AFHQ, 16 

Sep 43; Telg I I, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 

16 Sep 43; and Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 20 Sep 43, all in 10,000/100/1; Msg 

5986, AFHQ to USFOR, I7 Sep 43, 0100/4/ 

4,II. 

11 Rpt of Macmillan, 17 Sep 43, Diary Office 

CinC, Book VIII, pp. A-790-A-796; see also 

Telg 548, Macmillan to Mason-MacFarlane, 22 

Sep 43, 10,000/100/2. 

543 

and propaganda spheres. Eisenhower 

had instructions covering support to be 

given to Italian units and individuals who 

resisted the Germans, and to this end he 

was planning to group three Italian divisions in the Calabria-Taranto area into a 

corps to be placed under British Eighth 

Army control for the purpose of defending 

ports, lines of communications, and vital 

installations; two or three divisions would 

become available in Sardinia, and Eisenhower contemplated using them for similar duties; Italian divisions in Corsica were 

collaborating with French forces landed 

there and conducting anti-German operations; two Italian cruisers were transportil!g troops and supplies from North Africa 

to Corsica "at considerable risk." Yet all 

this activity, though desirable and even 

necessary to the Allies, was inconsistent 

with the terms of the armistice, which 

called for the Italians to be disarmed and 

disbanded. Because Eisenhower would 

soon have to confer directly with Badoglio, 

he wished to be able to reassure him on 

a number of matters Badoglio was sure to 

raise, matters having "a profound effect 

on our military relations with Italy during 

the period of active hostilities." Instructions from the CCS, the dictates of military necessity, and his own judgment 

provided him the answers to most points. 

But these, Eisenhower found, were "not at 

all consistent with the provisions of the 

Long Term Armistice conditions" he was 

supposed to get Badoglio to sign. Badoglio, he had learned, did not understand the 

need to sign further terms, for additional 

conditions were illogical if the Allies expected active Italian co-operation in the 

war effort against Germany. Finally, 

drawing up an effective propaganda program to be addressed to the Italian people 

was impractical "until the government 
544 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

structure and the Italian status are clarified." 12 

His recommendation, Eisenhower continued, was to institute a new Allied policy 

toward Italy. Could the Allied governments consider giving the Badoglio administration "some form of de facto 

recogmtlOn . . . as a co-belligerent or 

military associate" provided the Italians 

would strengthen the national character of 

the administration; restore the former constitution and promise free elections after 

the war for a constitutional assembly; consider possible eventual abdication of the 

King in favor of his son or grandson; 

adhere to whatever military requirements 

the Allies might decide on; and accept an 

Allied organization in the nature of an 

armistice commission, but with a different 

title, from which the Italian administration 

could accept guidance and instructions? 

"Vhat prompted Eisenhower to make 

such a recommendation was the "hard 

and risky campaign before us." Italian 

assistance might spell the difference between complete and only partial success. 

Since he could defer a meeting with Badoglio for not more than ten days, he 

wished answers to his questions as soon as 

possible. And because he realized that 

his suggestion would "provoke political 

repercussions" and perhaps "arouse considerable opposition and criticism," he 

recommended that "the burden be placed 

upon us, on the ground of military necessity, which I am convinced should be the 

governing factor." 13 

12 Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 409, 18 Sep 43, 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 538-42; see also Ltr, 

Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 20 Sep 43, 

10,000/100/76; Telg 7074, Eisenhower to 

Mason-MacFarlane, 20 Sep 43.. 10,000/ 100/ I; 

Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 377, 22 Sep 43, 

01.00/4/3,111; Msg 8636, AFHQ to MIDEAST, 

23 Sep 43, 0100/4/4,11. 

13 Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 409, 18 Sep 43. 

After another day of reflection, General 

Eisenhower dispatched another message to 

the Combined Chiefs. There were, he 

said, only two alternatives: either to accept and strengthen the legal government 

of Italy under the King and Badoglio; or 

to sweep that government aside, set up an 

Allied military government over an occupied Italy, and accept the heavy personnel 

and administrative commitment involved 

in the latter course. He recommended 

very strongly the first line of action. As 

a cobelligerent, the legal government would 

have to declare war on Germany and on 

the Fascist Republican Government. It 

would thereby become the natural rallying point for all elements wishing to fight 

against fascism.14 

The first major indication of the effect 

of Eisenhower's recommendation came on 

2 I September, when Prime Minister 

Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, reviewed the war in the Mediterranean and revealed much of the Italian 

surrender negotiations. Justifying the 

conduct of the Badoglio government, and 

noting the threat of civil war arising from 

Mussolini's escape to Germany, he urged 

the necessity "in the general interest as 

well as in that of Italy that all surviving 

forces of Italian national life should be 

rallied together around their lawful Government. . . ." 15 

With the assent of his War Cabinet, 

Churchill on the same day telegraphed 

President Roosevelt. He recommended 

that the Allies build up the authority of 

the Brindisi administration and make it 

"the broadest-based anti-Fascist coalition 

14 Telg 502 , Eisenhower to Smith, forwarded 

to CCS, 20 Sep 43. NAF 410, Capitulation of 

Italy, pp. 544, 548; see also Memo, Whiteley for 

Mason-MacFarlane, 21 Sep 43, 10,000/100/1. 

15 Churchill, Onwards to Victory, p. 267. 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

Government possible." Rejecting an Allied status for that government, he felt 

that cobelligerency was sufficient. Yet he 

did not relinquish his wish for Badoglio to 

sign the full instrument of surrender. 16 

Churchill informed Stalin of his desires, 

perhaps as a bid in advance for Stalin's 

support should Roosevelt be reluctant to 

have the comprehensive surrender terms 

imposed. "I am putting these proposals 

also to President Roosevelt," Churchill 

wired the Russian, "and I hope that I may 

count on your approval." 17 

President Roosevelt was, indeed, reluctant. Yet he appreciated Eisenhower's 

need for a clear and firm directive. On 

2 I September, therefore, he sent Churchill 

his Vlews In a message that crossed 

Churchill's telegram to him. Except with 

regard to the long terms, the views of the 

two were similar. With Churchill's concurrence, consequently, Roosevelt on 23 

September laid down the basic policy for 

Eisenhower's guidance in dealing with the 

Italian Government. Eisenhower was to 

( I) withhold the long term armistice provisions until a later date; ( 2 ) recommend from time to time the relaxing of 

the military terms to enable the Italians 

to fight more effectively against the Germans; (3) permit the Italian Government 

to assume the status of a trusted cobelligerent in the war against Germany if 

that government declared war on Germany and if it promised to give the 

people the right to decide the form of 

government they wished, though not before 

the Germans were evicted from Italian 

territory; (4) merge the functions of the 

Allied military government and of the 

contemplated armistice control commission into an Allied commission under him1G Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 189-90. 

17 Ibid., pp. 192-93. 

545 

self, with the power to give guidance and 

instructions to the Badoglio government 

on military, political, and administrative 

matters; (5) make vigorous use of the 

Italian armed forces against Germany; 

and (6) inform the French military authorities of these new instructions to the 

"extent that you deem advisable." 18 

President Roosevelt also forwarded to 

Eisenhower the text of Churchill's views. 

And in response to Eisenhower's suggestions, slight modifications were made in 

the text of the long terms. Furthermore, 

invitations previously issued to the other 

United Nations governments to send representatives to discuss the signature ceremony were not to be renewed. 19 

Upon receipt of the Presidential directive, Eisenhower instructed Mason-MacFarlane to make arrangements for a formal 

conference between him and Badoglio. 

The conference, to take place no earlier 

than 26 September, was to be restricted to 

the five basic items of the presidential directive. The long terms were not to be 

discussed. Badoglio was to be informed 

that additional terms or instructions of a 

political, financial, and economic nature 

would be communicated to him from time 

to time. 20 

1R Telg 8432, Presidential Directive, 21 Spp 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 560-62; see also 

Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 190-91, and 

Memo, Hammond for Hull and Marshall, 20 

Sep 41, OPD 100.6 (OCS Papers). 

19 Revised Proposals for the Signature of the 

Long Armistice Terms, 21 Sep 41, Capitulation 

of Italy, pp. 563-64; see also Telg 550. Eisenhower to Mason-MacFarlane, 23 Sep 43, 10,000/ 

100/2. 

20 Telg 565, Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 24 

Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 583; see also 

Telg 7'14, AFHQ to Mason-MacFarlane. 20 Sep 

43; Telg 37, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 20 

Sep 43; and Telg 110, Mason-MacFarlane to 

Smith, 25 Sep 43, all in 10,000/100/1; Telg 57, 

Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 22 Sep 43. 

10,000/100/2. 
546 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Meanwhile, the naval members of the 

Mason-MacFarlane mission had worked 

out the disposition of the Italian Fleet and 

merchant marine. All ships were to 

continue to fly the Italian flag. The battleships were to go into a care and maintenance status. Cruisers and small craft, 

both naval and maritime, were to serve 

the Allied cause by acting in accord with 

instructions that Admiral Cunningham 

would issue to the Italian Ministry of 

Marine through a liaison officer attached 

to the Badoglio government.21 

About this time, Mr. Macmillan sent a 

personal message to Churchill. He said 

he thought it might be possible, if the Allies acted promptly, to secure Badoglio's 

signature to the long terms. With this 

estimate in hand, and with Stalin's support, 

the Prime Minister again urged President 

Roosevelt to agree to Badoglio's signing 

the comprehensive document. Informed 

of Churchill's action, Eisenhower instructed Mason-MacFarlane to suggest the 

29th of September as the day for his conference with Badoglio. By then, surely, 

the issue of the long terms would be 

settled.22 

President Roosevelt had pretty much 

had his way in the directive of 23 Septem21 Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, pp. 572-

73; see Telg, F.O. "Z" Ito CinC Med, 12 Sep 43, 

and Telg, F.O.T.A. to CinC Med, 16 Sep 43, 

both in 10,000/100/ I; Memo on Agreement of 

Employment and Disposition of the Italian Navy 

and Merchant Marine, No. Med 00380/ I 7D, 23 

Sep 43, 10,000/100/76; Telg 066, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 23 Sep 43; Telg 06 I, 

Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 22 Sep 43; 

Telg 560, Eisenhower to Mason-MacFarlane, 24 

Sep 43; Teig 583, Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 

2:J'Sep 43, all in 10,000/100/2. 

22 Memo, Macmillan for Smith, 25 Sep 43. and 

Telg 583, Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, both in 

Capitulation of Italy, pp. 585, 590; Msgs, Churchill to Roosevelt, 24 and 25 Sep 43, in Churchill, 

Closing the Ring, p. 194. 

ber, and he had placed a heavy mortgage 

on the postwar continuance of the Italian 

monarchy. Although the Prime Minister made no secret of his preference for 

monarchical government, he had concurred in Roosevelt's directive and had 

endorsed in the House of Commons the 

principle of free choice by the Italian people on their form of government at the 

end of hostilities. It was now the President's turn to defer to Churchill's enthusiasm in favor of the long terms. Late 

on 25 September, therefore, Roosevelt gave 

his assent to using the "long set of terms," 

if Badoglio's signature could be obtained 

quickly.23 

The final decision having been made, 

General Smith, AFHQ's chief of staff, 

decided to go to Brindisi himself, together 

with Murphy and Macmillan, and try to 

insure by careful preliminary discussion 

the smoothness of the Eisenhower-Badoglio 

conference. Instructing Mason-MacFarlane to arrange for his reception at Brindisi, Smith intended to have prelimmary 

talks with the Italians in preparation for 

the formal meeting, scheduled for the 

29th.

24 

By this time a rift had developed between the King and Badoglio. Victor 

Emmanuel III opposed the whole program 

that AFHQ presented, and the issue came 

to a head on 26 September, the day before 

23 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 25 Sep 43, 

in Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 194; Telg 8611, 

Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 25 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 593; Memo, Hammond to Stimson, 25 Sep 43, OPD 300.6 (OCS Papers). 

24 Telg 583, Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 25 

Sep 43; see also Telg 565, Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 24 Sep 43, 10,000/100/10; Telg 9780, 

Smith to Mason-MacFarlane, 26 Sep 43, and 

Telg I 18, Mason-MacFarlane to Smith, 26 Sep 

43, both in 10,000/ I 00/2; Telg 120, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 Sep 43, 10,000/100/ 

76. 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

General Smith was due to arrive at Brindisi. On that day the King asked to see 

General Mason-MacFarlane alone. 

In conference with Mason-MacFarlane, 

the King made known his opposition to an 

immediate declaration of war against Germany. He alone, the King said, could 

declare war, and then only if a properly 

constituted government upheld the declaration. The King did not feel he could 

declare war on Germany until he returned 

to Rome and constituted a new government. Otherwise, a declaration of war 

would be unconstitutional. Furthermore, 

the King was hardly in favor of letting 

the people decide the form of government 

they wanted. "It would be most dangerous," the King said, "to leave the choice 

of post-war government unreservedly in 

the hands of the Italian people." The 

King also wanted to know whether the 

Allies would insist on Badoglio as Prime 

Minister for the duration of the war. 

Mason-MacFarlane said he thought so. 

The King pointed out that it might be 

very difficult, in that case, to form a representative anti-Fascist government. The 

sovereign then stated his wish for Italian 

troops to be among the first when the Allies reached Rome. Mason-MacFarlane 

suggested that if the King desired to pursue 

these points, he should instruct Badoglio 

to raise them during the scheduled conference with Eisenhower.25 

The King did more than consult with 

Mason-MacFarlane. Writing in his own 

name directly to the King of England and 

to President Roosevelt, Victor Emmanuel 

III made known his wish for the immedi25 Telg 121, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 

26 Sep 43, Capitulation of Italy, p. 601; Telg 136, 

Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 Sep 43, 

10,000/100/2; Puntoni, Vittorio Emanuele I II, 

p. 173· 

547 

ate status of an allied power. President 

Roosevelt replied that he considered the 

request premature. Churchill, replying 

on behalf of his King, stated that there 

had never been any question of an 

alliance. 26 

Badoglio's position was quite different 

from that of the King. Badoglio saw 

clearly the necessity for Italy to declare 

war on Germany, not only to regularize 

the status of Italian soldiers who fell into 

German hands, but also as a prerequisite 

for improving Italy's position with the 

Western Powers. Though Badoglio urged 

the King to make the declaration of war, 

the monarch refused. The King feared 

"that the Germans, who now occupied 

more than five-sixths of Italy, would certainly be induced to barbarous reprisals 

against the population." And the King 

took comfort in the fact that Acquarone 

stood with him on this issue.27 

Victor Emmanuel III did not easily 

grasp the implications of his new role as 

titular leader of the anti-Fascist effort for 

which he had been cast by Churchill and 

Roosevelt. To Badoglio's chagrin, the 

first royal proclamation from Brindisi 

made no ackowledgment, implicit or 

otherwise, that significant changes had 

occurred-the sovereign issued the proclamation in the name of His Majesty 

the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor 

of Ethiopia. At Mason-MacFarlane's insistence, the monarch agreed to refer to 

26 Badoglio, M emorie e documenti, pp. 131-

32; Cf. Churchill to Roosevelt, 21 Sep 43, in 

Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 189. See also 

Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 379, 23 Sep 43, reel 

R-67-K; Telg, AFHQ to AGWAR, No. W-993, 

26 Sep 43, 0100/4/ 4,II. Copies of the letters 

from the President and from King George VI to 

Victor Emmanuel III found in 10,000/100/2. 

27 Badoglio, Memorie e documenti, pp. 133-

34· 
548 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

himself only as the King of Italy. But 

Victor Emmanuel III insisted stubbornly 

that he could not surrender his titles without an act of parliament and such an act 

could not be passed until a constitutional 

parliament was elected and assembled.28 

The Allied representatives at Brindisi 

had scarcely regained their equanimity in 

the face of this royal gaucherie when the 

King requested General Eisenhower to 

forward a message to Dino Grandi, believed 

to be somewhere in Portugal. Because 

Guariglia was in Rome, the King wanted 

Grandi to come to Brindisi to assume the 

portfolio of Foreign Affairs. According 

to the King, Grandi was a symbol of antiFascism, his presence in the Badoglio government would create a schism in the 

Fascist Republican ranks. Furthermore, 

Grandi could produce and develop an 

active pro-Allied propaganda program 

among the Italian people. 29 

Meanwhile, General Smith, accompanied by the two AFHQ political advisers, arrived at Brindisi on 27 September 

with copies of the long terms as most recently revised. Together with General 

Mason-MacFarlane, they had a lengthy 

conference with Badoglio that afternoon. 

Mason-MacFarlane presented two copies 

of the long terms document to Badoglio, 

reminding him that they were the additional conditions mentioned in the arml2S Telgs 104. Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 25 Sept 43; unnumbered, 25 Sep 43; 

and 124, 26 Sep 43, all in Capitulation of Italy, 

pp. 586, 594, 603. Cf. Churchill, Closing the 

Ring, p. 195· See also Telg 9525, Eisenhower 

to Mason-MacFarlane, 25 Sep 43, 10,000/ I 00/ I, 

and Telg 109, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 25 Sep 43, 10,000/100/2. 

29 Tclg 16 I, FATIMA to Eisenhower, 28 

Sep 43. Capitulation of Italy. p. 647; Summary 

of Visit by General Taylor to Italian Supreme 

Command, 28 Sep 43, and Telg 161, Taylor to 

Eisenhower, 28 Sep 43, both in 10,000/100/2. 

stice terms signed at Cassibile. The 

signature of the long terms, he said, was 

to be the principal item at the conference 

with General Eisenhower scheduled for 

Malta on the 29th. The preamble, as 

the marshal would note, had been 

amended. But the Allies required the 

signature, Mason-MacFarlane explained, 

for two basic reasons: to satisfy Allied 

public opinion and to avoid any possibility of later misunderstanding. General 

Eisenhower had the power to modify the 

application of the terms as he saw fit, 

Mason-MacFarlane continued. Already 

the Allies recognized the course of events 

had outdated some of the clauses. In any 

case, the Allies would apply the terms as 

a whole in the spirit of the declaration 

made by the President and Prime Minister. Badoglio agreed to discuss the terms 

with the King that evening and to meet 

again with the Allied representatives the 

next morning. 

General Smith then took up the other 

points on the agenda-the coming Malta 

conference with General Eisenhower, and 

the program for Italy as outlined by President Roosevelt in his directive of 23 September, which Mason-MacFarlane had 

discussed with the King the day before. 

In favor of declaring war on Germany, Badoglio appreciated Smith's arguments; i.e., 

a declaration of war would give Italian 

soldiers regular status, and would prepare Allied public opinion for future modifications of the armistice terms. Smith 

suggested that such modifications might 

include changes in Allied military government and return of the administration 

of Sicily to the Badoglio government. The 

marshal was willing to accept the status of 

cobelligerency for his country. As for 

broadening the royal government, Badoglio felt it could be done effectively only 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

after the King returned to Rome. But 

Badoglio did not want a specific commitment giving the Italian people the right 

to choose their form of government after 

the war. He suggested that the Italian 

leaders pledge only: "It should be understood that free elections will be held after 

the war." He did not think the King and 

his government ought to throw open by 

their own act the question of the monarchy. He doubted that the Italian people were adapted to a republican form 

of government. The monarchy, in his 

opinion, was necessary for maintaining the 

stability and unity of Italy.30 

The King remained stubborn. Though 

authorizing Badoglio to sign the long 

terms, he refused to declare war on Germany, to make a pledge to broaden his 

government, or to promise to permit the 

Italian people to choose their own form of 

government at the end of the war. He 

repeated his request for Grandi to serve as 

Foreign Minister. 

Nonetheless, his approval for Badoglio 

to sign the comprehensive surrender document was a significant step. As for 

Grandi, President Roosevelt had his own 

ideas of the type of man that Italy needed. 

On the day that Badoglio was meeting 

with Eisenhower at Malta, Count Carlo 

Sforza, a distinguished anti-Fascist politician who had fled Italy years before, got 

War Department clearance, at the President's instigation, to go to England, thence 

to North Africa, and General Eisenhower 

was so notified.31 

30 Memo by Robert Murphy, Brindisi, 27 Sep 

43, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 610-1 I. 

31 Msg W-9586, AFHQ to AGWAR, 9 Sep 

43, 0100/4/4,11; Telg 575, Eisenhower to MasonMacFarlane, 25 Sep 43, and Telg 155, MasonMacFarlane to Eisenhower, 28 Sep 43, both in 

10,000/100/2; Telg, Marshall to Eisenhower, No. 

8935, 30 Sep 43, Reel R-67-K; Memo, John J. 

549 

Malta 

The last act of the Italian surrender 

was anticlimactic. Aboard the British 

battleship H.M.S. Nelson, in Valetta harbor, Malta, around 1100, 29 September, Marshal Badoglio, accompanied by 

Admiral De Courten, Generals Ambrosio, 

Sandalli, and Roatta, and four officers of 

lesser rank, met General Eisenhower. The 

Allied commander had with him Lord 

Gort (the Governor of Malta); Admiral 

Cunningham; Generals Alexander, Smith, 

Mason-MacFarlane, and Maj. Gen. A. A. 

Richardson; Air Chief Marshal Tedder 

and Air Vice Marshal Keith Parks; 

Messrs. Murphy and Macmillan; and a 

number of lesser ranking officers. Badoglio and Eisenhower placed their signatures 

on the long terms. 

General Eisenhower then handed Badoglio a letter, which read: 

The tenus of the armistice to which we 

have just appended our signatures are supplementary to the short military anuistice 

signed by your representative and mine on 

the 3rd September, 1943. They are based 

upon the situation obtaining prior to the 

cessation of hostilities. Developments since 

that time have altered considerably the status 

of Italy, which has become in effect a cooperator with the United Nations. 

It is fully recognized by the Governments 

on whose behalf I am acting that these 

terms are in some respect superseded by 

subsequent events and that several of the 

clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also 

recognize that it is not at this time in the 

power of the Italian Government to carry 

out certain of the tenus. Failure to do so 

McCloy for Admiral Leahy, with draft of cable, 

1 Oct 43, OPD 300.6 Sec (OCS Papers); telg, 

Eisenhower to Mason-MacFarlane, No. 2580, 3 

Oct 43, 10,000/100/2; Puntoni, Vittorio Emanuele IiI, p. 174. 
550 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

ABOARD H.M.S. NELSON, standing off Malta, 29 September 1943. Officials present at the signing of the long terms surrender document are,jrom left: Lord Gort, Air Chiif Marshal Tedder, Marshal 

Badoglio, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane, General Eisenhower, and General Alexander. 

because of existing conditions will not be 

regarded as a breach of good faith on the 

part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the 

Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so. 

It is to be understood that the terms both 

of this document and of the short military 

armistice of the 3rd September may be 

modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of cooperation by the 

Italian Government indicates this as desirable.32 

32 The text is printed in U.S. Department of 

State, Treaties and Other International Acts, 

Thus, the Italian Government surrendered unconditionally, but in the hope of 

redemption. The Allies had wanted the 

conference to serve as the point of departure for charting the new course of cobelligerency. But the conferees did no 

more than discuss the program outlined 

in President Roosevelt's directive. The 

Series 1604, Armistice with Italy 1943 (Washington, 1947), p. 22. 

See further, file 10,000/ I 36/548, sub: Ltrs, 

Badoglio, Armistice; Telg 151, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 28 Sep 43, 10,000/100/2. 

The long terms of surrender remained secret 

until 6 November 1945. 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

Eisenhower-Badoglio conference was exploratory and reached no agreement. 

Still underlying the discussion was the 

frustration imposed by the obduracy of 

the King. 

Badoglio opened the plenary conference 

with a general statement conveying his 

own desire to see the formation of a government with a broad, liberal base. But 

he made no commitment. He stated that 

the King would determine the new members of the government. Declaring himself to be only a soldier, Badoglio said he 

could not advise the sovereign with respect 

to politicians. And to General Eisenhower's question whether the royal government would promptly be given a 

definitely anti-Fascist character, Badoglio 

avoided a direct answer. Eisenhower 

made it clear that the Italian Government 

would have to take on an anti-Fascist 

complexion before it could join the Allies 

in combat. Badoglio replied simply by 

saying that the King planned to invite the 

leaders of the political parties to take part 

in the government. 

At the King's direction, Badoglio renewed the request for Dino Grandi as 

Foreign Minister. Explaining that such 

an appointment would find no sympathetic 

response in Allied public opinion, Eisenhower made known the message he had 

received from Washington--the Americans desired Count Sforza to visit Brindisi 

in the near future. Badoglio said that 

the King had a distinct antipathy for 

Sforza because of Sforza's remarks about 

the monarch. 

Badoglio stated his own desire for a 

declaration of war against Germany as 

soon as the Italian Government returned 

to Rome. He added that until then he 

personally considered the Italian forces to 

be in a de facto state of war with the 

551 

Germans in Corsica, Dalmatia, and elsewhere. Eisenhower again urged an immediate declaration of war and said he 

would turn over to Badoglio the administration of Sicily and other liberated areas 

if his government took such a step. The 

marshal would make no commitment. 

Under Italian law, he said, only the King 

could declare war. 

Toward the end of the conference, venturing the hope that General Eisenhower 

considered him a complete collaborator, 

Badoglio asked to be initiated into Allied 

plans. He requested that Italian troops 

be permitted to participate in the entry 

into Rome, an event expected, not only by 

the Italians but by the Allies as well, to 

take place in the near future. Eisenhower 

was evasive on sharing military plans with 

the Italians, but he promised a token participation of Italian troops in the liberation 

of the capital if Italy declared war on 

Germany and co-operated with the Allies. 

In conclusion, General Eisenhower expressed his thanks to Badoglio and said he 

hoped that great good would come from 

the meeting. In reciprocating, Badoglio 

referred to the situation prevailing in 

19 I 8, when the Italians, he said, gave the 

decisive blow to the Germans-operating 

with the Italian Army had been three 

British divisions and one American 

ment, and all had co-operated closely to 

bring about the German defeat.33 

:l:J Robe~tD. Murphy, Notes of the Conference Aboard H.M.S. Nelson in Valctta Harbor. :\:falta, II a.m .. > September 29, 1941, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 658-59; see also Telg 1647, 

Phillips to Mason-MacFarlane, 30 Sep 43. and 

Telg 192, :Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, I 

Oct 43, both in 10,000/100/2; Memo, McCloy 

for Leahy. 30 Sep 43; Telg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 

426, 30 Sep 43; and T elg 9081, Marshall to Eisenhower, I Oct 43, all in OPD 300.6 Sec (OCS 

Papers); Msg, AFHQ to CCS, NAF 43 I, :,0 

Sep 43, 0100/4/4,11; Ltr, Badoglio to President 

Roosevelt, 20 Nov 43, 10,000/ I 36/854. 
552 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

On that day, 29 September 1943, Allied troops were at the gates of Naples, the 

Germans were withdrawing to the Volturno River and trying to establish a defensive line across the Italian peninsula. 

\Vith the Germans retiring northward, 

with the Allies having established two 

armies on the Italian mainland (Clark's 

U.S. Fifth and Montgomery's British 

Eighth), the prospects for advancing rapidly to Rome appeared to be good. The 

Allies did not yet realize the extent to 

which the Germans could use the Italian 

winter weather, the Italian terrain, and 

the skill of their own outnumbered troops 

to deny the Allies, and incidentally the 

Italians, quick entry into the capital. 

Crossing the Strait of Messina had been 

easy, securing a beachhead at Salerno 

more difficult. But no one could foresee 

the bitterness ahead of the fighting at the 

Volturno and the Sangro Rivers, on the 

approaches to the Liri valley, along the 

Rapido and Garigliano Rivers, in the 

shadow of Cassino, and in, the Anzio 

beachhead. No one could anticipate the 

expenditure of men and materiel that 

would be necessary before Rome fell to Allied arms. Least of all the Italians, who 

on 13 October 1943 finally declared war 

on Germany. 

Epilogue 

What had the Allies gained by the surrender of Italy? A cobelligerent of doubtful value if judged in terms of material 

military resources-the Army was virtually 

ineffective; the Air Force was obsolete; 

only the Navy and merchant marine made 

substantial contributions to Allied power. 

The surrender had eliminated a ground 

force of tremendous size that, even though 

ill-equipped and low in morale, had confounded and troubled Allied planners and 

intelligence experts. Had the Italian 

Government not surrendered before the 

Salerno invasion, the Italian units manning 

the coastal positions along the Salerno 

beaches, acting in concert with the Germans, perhaps might have increased Allied 

casualties. U nIess, to take the opposite 

viewpoint, the Germans were relieved by 

the surrender because they no longer had 

to bother even to be polite to an ally of 

dubious worth. Did the Germans, therefore, resist the Allies more effectively without the Italians? \Vas this perhaps at 

least part of the reason why the landings 

at Salerno were more difficult for the Allies than those made on the beaches of 

Sicily? 

What the Allies really achieved by the 

Italian capitulation was an enormous psychological victory, not only in the eyes of 

the world, but, more important, for the 

fighting man. One of the three major 

enemy powers had fallen to the combined 

weight of joint Allied arms, and this gave 

increasing hope that the end of the confEct would not be far distant. 

This had been brought about by military diplomacy. Not a new phenomenon, 

this particular performance showed great 

ingenuity and unusual perception. A military command and staff had played the 

role of the diplomatist with considerable 

skill. 

If the Allies were taken in during the 

negotiations by their belief that the I talian Government was eager to change 

sides in the war, it was because the Italian 

representatives-D' A jeta, Berio, Castellano, 

and Zanussi-all of them, had misrepresented, perhaps unwittingly, the desires 

of their government. Though Churchill 

credited the King and Badoglio with the 

initiative in Mussolini's downfall and the 
THE SECOND CAPITULATION 

subsequent switch to the Allied side, the 

real motivation was a desire to choose the 

lesser of two evils-to be crushed by Germany or to be redeemed by the Allies. 

"If the Germans would [only] attack 

[us] ," Badoglio had said late in August, 

"the situation would have a solution." 

Along with his fear of German armed 

might was the question of honor. "We 

cannot, by an act of our own will," Badoglio had said, "separate ourselves from 

Germany with whom we are bound by a 

pact of alliance." Only a German attack 

could relieve Italian pangs of conscience 

and make it easy to go over to the Allies 

and "turn for aid to our enemies of yesterday." 34 

As late as 3 September 1943, the day 

Castellano signed the armistice at Cassibile, 

the German naval attache in Rome was reporting to his superiors: "In higher circles 

the opinion prevails that ever since he 

assumed office, Badoglio has been trying to 

bring the war to as favorable a conclusion 

as possible, but only with Germany's consent, for Badoglio takes Italy's honor as an 

Axis partner very seriously." 35 

34 Bonomi, Diario, p. 82. 

350NI, Translation of German Naval Staff 

Operations Division War Diary, pt. A, vol. 49 

(September, 1943), p. 37. 

553 

The King, too, felt this way. Despite 

the fears he expressed of German reprisals 

on the Italian population, he was also 

motivated by the desire to be a man of 

honor. Even after the Germans had destroyed most of the Italian Army, he refused to take the ultimate step of breaking 

with his former ally. And only as the result of continued Allied pressure, when his 

government was practically a prisoner of 

the Allies, did he make his final capitulation and declare war on Germany. 

The campaign on Sicily that led to the 

capitulation of Italy proved several things. 

Like the invasion of North Africa, the Sicilian landings showed that Axis-held 

Europe was vulnerable to amphibious and 

airborne attack. It demonstrated the superiority of Allied weapons and equipment. 

It illustrated the resourcefulness and skill 

of the German foot soldier, who, despite 

numerical and technological inferiority, 

demonstrated once again the fundamental 

importance of terrain and its use in a 

struggle between ground forces. It gave 

the American field commanders in Europe 

experience, and particularly with respect 

to the British ally, a maturity not achieved 

before. Most of all, the Sicilian Campaign, by making possible the Italian surrender, marked a milestone on the Allied 

road to victory. 

Appendix A 

COMPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES ON D-DAY, 10 JULY 1943 

3d Division 

7th Infantry 

loth Field Artillery Battalion 

Company G, 66th Armored Regiment 

I battalion, 36th Combat Engineer Regiment 

3d Ranger Battalion 

2d Battalion, 15th Infantry 

Platoon, Cannon Company, 15th Infantry 

Company B, 3d Chemical Battalion 

Battery B, 39th Field Artillery Battalion 

I battalion, 36th Combat Engineer Regiment 

15th Infantry 

1st and 3d Battalions 

Company H, 66th Armored Regiment 

39th Field Artillery Battalion 

30th Infantry 

4 I st Field Artillery Battalion 

Company I, 66th Armored Regiment 

Company C, 3d Chemical Battalion 

I battalion, 36th Combat Engineer Regiment 

Floating Reserve: Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division 

66th Armored Regiment (-3d Battalion) 

41st Armored Infantry Regiment (- 1st Battalion) 

Company B, 82d Reconnaissance Squadron 

14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

1st Division 

FORCE X 

1st Ranger Battalion 

4th Ranger Battalion 

1st Battalion, 39th Combat Engineers 

3 companies, 83d Chemical Battalion 

I battalion, 53 I st Engineer Shore Regiment 

26th Combat Team 

26th Infantry Regiment 

5 th Field Artillery Battalion 

33d Field Artillery Battalion 

6 batteries of antiaircraft artillery 

I battalion, 53 I st Engineer Shore Regiment 

I medium tank platoon, 67th Armored Regiment 

16th Combat Team 

16th Infantry Regiment 

7th Field Artillery Battalion 

6 batteries of antiaircraft artillery 

I battalion, 53 1st Engineer Shore Regiment 

I medium tank platoon, 67th Armored Regiment 

45th Division 

I80th Infantry 

17 1st Ficld Artillery Ba ttalion 

Company C, 2d Chemical Battalion 

2d Battalion, 40th Engineers 

I79th Infantry 

160th Field Artillery Battalion plus I battery 

self-propelled howitzers 

Companies A and B, 2d Chemical Battalion 

3d Battalion, 40th Engineers 

I57th Infantry 

I58th Field Artillery Battalion plus I battery 

self-propelled howitzers 

753d Medium Tank Battalion 

5 batteries of antiaircraft artillery 

I st Battalion, 40th Engineers 

SEVENTH ARMY FLOATING RESERVE 

2d Armored Division 

Combat Command B 

67th Armored Regiment (-) 

82d Reconnaissance Squadron (-) 

17th Armored Engineer Battalion 

78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

I st Battalion, 4 I st Armored Infantry 

Regiment 

18th Infantry 

32d Field Artillery Battalion 

I Engineer company 

540th Engineers 

2 Antiaircraft artillery battalions 
Appendix B 

THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 

I. General Eisenhower should be instructed to send two Staff Officers, one 

U.S. and one British, to Lisbon at once 

to meet General "C." 

2. The communication to General "c" 

should be on the following lines: 

a. The unconditional surrender of 

Italy is accepted on the terms stated in the 

document handed to him (Armistice 

Terms for Italy as already agreed. These 

do not include political, economic, or financial terms which will be communicated 

later) . 

b. These terms did not visualize the 

active assistance of Italy in fighting the 

Germans. The extent to which the terms 

will be modified in favor of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government 

and people do, in fact, aid the United 

Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations, however, state without reservation 

that wherever Italian forces or Italians 

fight Germans, or destroy German property, or hamper German movement, they 

will be given all possible support by the 

forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile 

bombing will be restricted to targets which 

immediately affect the movement and operations of German forces. 

c. The cessation of hostilities between 

the United Nations and Italy will take 

effect from a date and hour to be notified 

by General Eisenhower. (NoTE.~General Eisenhower should make this notification a few hours before Allied forces land 

in Italy in strength.) 

d. Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the Armistice immediately 

it is announced by General Eisenhower, 

and to order their forces and people from 

that hour to collaborate with the Allies and 

to resist the Germans. (NoTE.~As will 

be seen from 2 c above, the Italian Government will be given a few hours' notice.) 

e. The Italian Government must, at 

the hour of the Armistice, order that all 

United Nations' prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans shall be immediately 

released. 

f. The Italian Government must, at 

the hour of the Armistice, order the Italian Fleet and as much of their merchant 

shipping as possible to put to sea for Allied 

ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to Allied bases. Any ships 

or aircraft in danger of capture by the 

Germans must be destroyed. 

3. Meanwhile there is a good deal that 

Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action 

must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines which should 

be suggested to him: 

(i) General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the 

Germans knowing. 

(ii) Minor sabotage throughout the 

country, particularly of communications 

and airfields used by the Germans. 

(iii) Safeguard of Allied prisoners of 

war. If German pressure to hand them 
THE QUEBEC MEMORANDUM 

over becomes too great, they should be 

released. 

(iv) No Italian warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to insure that all 

these ships can sail to ports designated by 

General Eisenhower immediately he gives 

the order. Italian submarines should not 

be withdrawn from patrol as this would 

let the cat out of the bag.1 

(v) No merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, 

if possible, be sailed to ports south of the 

line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort 

they should be scuttled. All ships must 

be ready to sail for ports designated by 

General Eisenhower. 

(vi) Germans must not be allowed to 

take over Italian coast defenses. 

( vii) Make arrangements to be put in 

force at the proper time for Italian form<l.tions in the Balkans to march to the 

coast, with a view to their being taken off 

to Italy by United Nations. 

1 Before the message was transmitted to General Eisenhower some purist deleted the italicized words and substituted the clause, "reveal 

our intentions to the enemy." 

557 

4. General Eisenhower's representatives must arrange with General "C" a 

secure channel of communication between 

Italian headquarters and General Eisenhower. 

(NoTE.-In view of the urgency of the 

matter, a warning order should be sent to 

General Eisenhower that instructions as to 

how he is to deal with peace-feelers are 

being concerted between the President 

and the Prime Minister, and that in the 

meanwhile he should hold two Staff Officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon 

immediately on receipt of these instructions 

to meet General "C," who must leave 

Lisbon on the night of the 20th at the 

very latest. He should also make the necessary transportation arrangements with 

London for entry into Portugal.) 2 

2 CCS 3 I I, sub: Italian Peace Feelers, I7 

Aug 43, QUADRANT Conf Book, pp. 141-44. 

With the one change in phraseology which is 

noted, the memorandum was sent to Eisenhower 

as No. 50 (FAN 196), 18 August 1943, Capitulation of Italy, pages 90-92. Churchill prints an 

incomplete text in Closing the Ring, pages 105-

06. Most of the memorandum is printed in 

translation by Castellano, Come firm ai, pages 

110-12. The full title of the Quebec Memorandum is Aide-Memoire To Accompany Conditions of Armistice, presented by General 

Eisenhower to the I talian Commander in Chief. 

See 10,000/ I 36/584. 
Appendix C 

SHORT (MILITARY) TERMS IN GENERAL EISENHOWER'S POSSESSION 

ON 6 AUGUST 1943 

I. Immediate cessation of all hostile 

activity by the Italian anned forces. 

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to 

deny, to the Gennans, facilities that might 

be used against the United Nations. 

3. All prisoners or internees of the 

United Nations to be immediately turned 

over to the Allied Commander in Chief, 

and none of them may from the beginning of the negotiations be evacuated to 

Gennany. 

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian 

fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as 

may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament 

to be prescribed by him. 

5. Agreement that Italian merchant 

shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the 

needs of his military-naval program. 

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and 

of all Italian territory, both islands and 

mainland, to the Allies, for such use as 

operational bases and other purposes as the 

Allies may see fit. 

7. Immediate guarantee of the free use 

by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports 

in Italian territory, regardless of the rate 

of evacuation of the Italian territory by 

the Gennan forces. These ports and 

fields to be protected by Italian anned 

forces until this function is taken over by 

the Allies. 

8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of 

I talian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever 

areas in which they may now be engaged. 

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all 

its available anned forces to insure prompt 

and exact compliance with all the provisions of this annistice. 

10. The Commander in Chief of the 

Allied Forces reserves to himself the right 

to take any measures which in his opinion 

may be necessary for the protection of the 

interests of the Allied Forces for the 

prosecution of the war, and the Italian 

Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in 

particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over 

such parts of Italian territory as he may 

deem necessary in the military interests of 

the Allied Nations. 

I I. The Commander in Chief of the 

Allied Forces will have a full right to propose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization. 

12. Other conditions of a political, 

economic and financial nature with which 

Italy will be bound to comply will be 

transmitted at a later date.1 

1 The italicized phrases were deleted from the 

short terms prior to their presentation to General 

Castellano at Lisbon. See Summary of Armistice 

Terms, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 69-70. 
Appendix D 

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS (LONG TERMS) SIGNED ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1943 

Instrument of Surrender of Italy 

WHEREAS in consequence of an armistice dated the 3rd September, 1943, between the 

United States and the United Kingdom Governments on the one hand and the Italian 

Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United 

Nations on certain terms of a military nature; 

And whereas in addition to those terms it was also provided in the said Armistice that 

the Italian Government bound themselves to comply with other conditions of a political, 

economic and financial nature to be transmitted later; 

And whereas it is convenient that the terms of a military nature and the said other 

conditions of a political, economic and financial nature should without prejudice to the continued validity of the terms of the said Armistice of the 3rd September, 1943, be comprised 

in a further instrument; 

The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of the 3rd September, 1943, 

are the terms on which the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their 

military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not 

assist these Powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments. 

These terms have been presented by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-inChief, Allied Forces, duly authorised to that effect; 

And have been accepted by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government. 

l.-(A) The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally. 

(B) Italian participation in the war in all Theaters will cease immediately. There 

will be no opposition to landings, movements or other operations of the Land, Sea and Air 

Forces of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Command will order the 

immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against the Forces of the United Nations and 

will direct the Italian Navy, Military and Air Force authorities in all Theaters to issue 

forthwith the appropriate instructions to those under their Command. 

(C) The Italian Supreme Command will further order all Italian Naval, Military 

and Air Forces or authorities and personnel to refrain immediately from destruction of or 

damage to any real or personal property, whether public or private. 

2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces, wherever they are situated 

and of all such forces of Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian-occupied territory. 

3. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to secure airfields, port facilities, and all other installations against seizure or attack by any of Italy's 

Allies. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to insure Law and 

Order, and to use its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with 

all the provisions of the present instrument. Subject to such use of Italian troops for the 

above purposes, as may be sanctioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, all other Italian 

Land, Sea and Air Forces will proceed to and remain in their barracks, camps or ships 

pending directions from the United Nations as to their future status and disposal. Exceptionally such Naval personnel shall proceed to shore establishments as the United Nations 

may direct. 
560 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

4. Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will within the periods to be laid down by the 

United Nations withdraw from all areas outside Italian territory notified to the Italian Government by the United Nations and proceed to areas to be specified by the United Nations. 

Such movement of Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will be carried out in conditions to be 

laid down bv the United Nations and in accordance with the orders to be issued bv them. 

All Italian officials will similarly leave the areas notified except any who may be per~itted to 

remain by the United Nations. Those permitted to remain will comply with the instructions 

of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 

5. No requisitioning, seizures or other coercive measures shall be effected by Italian 

Land, Sea and Air Forces or officials in regard to persons or property in the areas notified 

under Article 4. 

6. The demobilisation of Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces in excess of such establishments as shall be notified will take place as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 

7. Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries and transports will be assembled as 

directed in ports to bc specified by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will be dealt with 

as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. (NoTE.-If at the date of the Armistice 

the whole of the Italian Fleet has been assembled in Allied ports, this article would run: 

"Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries and transports will remain until further 

notice in the ports where they are at present assembled, and will be dealt with as prescribed 

by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.") 

8. Italian aircraft of all kinds will not leave the ground or water or ships, except as 

directed bv the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 

9. Without prejudice to the provisions 14, 15 and 28(A) and CD) below, all merchant 

ships, fishing or other craft of whatever flag, all aircraft and inland transport of whatever 

nationality in Italian or Italian-occupied territory or waters will, pending verification of 

their identity and status, be prevented from leaving. 

lO. The Italian Supreme Command will make available all information about naval, 

military and air devices, installations and defences, about all transport and inter-communication systems established by Italy or her allies on Italian territory or in the approaches 

thereto, about mine fields or other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and such other 

particulars as the United Nations may require in connection with the use of Italian bases, 

or with the operations, security or welfare of the United Nations Land, Sea or Air Forces. 

Italian forces and equipment will be made available as required by the United :\"ations 

for the removal of the above-mentioned obstacles. 

II. The Italian Government will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material 

showing the locations of the same. Subject to such use as the Allied Commander-in-Chief 

may make of it, the war material will be placed in store under such control as he may direct. 

The ultimate disposal of war material will be prescribed by the United Nations. 

12. There will be no destruction of nor damage to nor except as authorised or directed 

by the Gnited Nations any removal of war material, wireless, radio location or meteorological stations, railroad, port or other installations or in general, public or private utilities 

or property of any kind, wherever situated, and the necessary maintenance and repair will 

be the responsibility of the Italian authorities. 

13. The manufacture, production and construction of war material and its import, 

export and transit is prohibited, except as directed by the United Nations. The Italian 

Government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material. 

14.-(A) All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other craft, wherever they may 

be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be 

made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. 

Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. Crews will remain on board pending 
APPENDIX D 561 

further instructions regarding their continued employment or dispersal. Any eXlstlllg options to repurchase or reacquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold 

or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war will forthwith be exercised and the 

above provisions will apply to all such vessels and their crews. 

(B) All Italian inland transport and all port equipment will be held at the disposal 

of the United Nations for such purposes as they may direct. 

15. United Nations merchant ships, fishing and other craft in Italian hands wherever 

they may be (including for this purpose those of any country which has broken off diplomatic 

relations with Italy) whether or not the title has been transferred as the result of prize court 

proceedings or otherwise, will be surrendered to the United Nations and will be assembled 

in ports to be specified by the United Nations for disposal as directed by them. The Italian 

Government will take all such steps as may be required to secure any necessary transfers of 

title. Any neutral merchant ship, fishing or other craft under Italian operation or control 

will be assembled in the same manner pending arrangements for their ultimate disposal. 

Any necessary repairs to any of the above mentioned vessels will be effected by the Italian 

Government, if required, at their expense. The Italian Government will take the necessary 

measures to insure that the vessels and their cargo are not damaged. 

16. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication, shore or afloat, under Italian control whether belonging to Italy or any nation other 

than the United Nations will transmit until directions for the control of these installations 

have been prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian authorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of intercommunication as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may direct. The Allied Commander-in-Chief 

may, at his discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations. 

17. The warships, auxiliaries, transports and merchant and other vessels and aircraft 

in the service of the United Nations will have the right freely to use the territorial waters 

around and the air over Italian territory. 

18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian 

territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the 

United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will thereupon withdraw from 

such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commanderin-Chief. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of article 4 above. The 

Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allies of all 

airfields and Naval ports in Italy under their control. 

19. In the territories or areas referred to in article 18 all Naval, Military and Air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all 

transport and all inter-communication installations, facilities and equipment and such other 

installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by the U nited Nations will be 

made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel 

required for working them. The Italian Government will make available such other local 

resources or services as the United Nations may require. 

20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United Nations 

will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred 

to in article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue of proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial and public 

services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief 

unless otherwise directed. 

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in 

articles 18 to 20-

(A) Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations 

will have the right of passage in or over non-occupied Italian territory, and will. be afforded 

all necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions. 
562 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

(B) The Italian authorities will make available on non-occupied Italian territory all 

transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander-inChief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems 

and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power stations and public utility services, oil 

refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as 

United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities. 

22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to 

the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders 

given by the United Nations. 

23. The Italian Government will make available such Italian currency as the United 

Nations may require. The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies withdrawn free of cost to the United 

Nations. The Italian Government will take such measures as may be required by the United 

Nations for the control of banks and business in Italian territory, for the control of foreign 

exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade 

and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters. 

24. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with 

or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied 

by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorisation of the Allied 

Commander-in-Chief or designated officials. 

25.-(A) Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied 

by any such country, will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials 

and members of the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces accredited to or serving on missions 

with any such country or in any other territory specified by the United Nations will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United 

Nations may prescribe. 

(B) The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral 

diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down 

regulations governing the procedure for the methods of communication between the Italian 

Government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications 

emanating from or destined for the representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory. 

26. Italian subjects will pending further instructions be prevented from leaving Italian 

territory except as authorised by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will not in any event 

take service with any of the countries or in any of the territories referred to in article 25(A) 

nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose of undertaking work for any such country. 

Those at present so serving or working will be recalled as directed by the Allied Commanderin-Chief. 

27. The Military, Naval and Air personnel and material and the merchant shipping, 

fishing and other craft and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied 

by any such country, remain liable to attack or seizure wherever found in or over Italian 

territory or waters. 

28.-(A) The warships, auxiliaries and transports of any such country or occupied country referred to in article 27 in Italian or Italian-occupied ports and waters and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of such countries in or over Italian or Italian-occupied 

territory will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving. 

(B) The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such 

country or occupied country in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will be prevented from 

leaving and will be interned pending further instructions. 
APPENDIX D 563 

(C) All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied 

country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions. 

(D) The Italian Government will comply with any instructions given by the Allied 

Commander-in-Chief concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal, utilisation 

or employment of any of the above-mentioned persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property. 

29. Benito Mussolini, his Chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having 

committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands 

of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will 

be complied with. 

30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSN), 

the Secret Police (OVRA), all Fascist organisations will in so far as this is not already 

accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander-inChief. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the United 

Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching. 

31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will in so far as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons 

detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved 

from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian Government 

will comply with all such further directions as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give for 

repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom. 

32.-(A) Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations 

and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or 

otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will not be removed and 

will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt 

with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms. 

(B) Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, 

detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and 

relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. 

(C) The Italian Government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct 

to safeguard the persons of foreign nationals and property of foreign nationals and property 

of foreign states and nationals. 

33.-(A) The Italian Government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitutions, deliveries, services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument. 

(B) The Italian Government will give to the Allied Commander-in-Chief such 

information as may be prescribed regarding the assets, whether inside or outside Italian territory, of the Italian state, the Bank of Italy, any Italian state or semi-state institutions or 

Fascist organisations or residents in Italian territory and will not dispose or allow the disposal, outside Italian territory of any such assets except with the permission of the United 

Nations. 

34. The Italian Government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament, demobilisation and demilitarisation as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 

35. The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents 

required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, 

records, plans or any other documents or information. 

36. The Italian Government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and 
564 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander-inChief for the same purpose. 

37. There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general 

directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 

38.-(A) The term "United Nations" in the present instrument includes the Allied 

Commander-in-Chief, the Control Commission and any other authority which the United 

Nations may designate. 

(B) The term "Allied Commander-in-Chief" in the present instrument includes the 

Control Commission and such other officers and representatives as the Commander-in-Chief 

may designate. 

39. Reference to Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces in the present instrument shall be 

deemed to include Fascist Militia and all such other military or para-military units, formations 

or bodies as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may prescribe. 

40. The term "War Material" in the present instrument denotes all material specified 

in such lists or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the Control Commission. 

41. The term "Italian Territory" includes all Italian colonies and dependencies and 

shall for the purposes of the present instrument (but without prejudice to the question of 

sovereignty) be deemed to include Albania. Provided, however, that except in such cases 

and to such extent as the Cnited Nations may direct the provisions of the present instrument shall not apply in or affect the administration of any Italian colony or dependency 

already occupied by the United Nations or the rights or powers therein possessed or exercised by them. 

42. The Italian Government will send a delegation to the Headquarters of the Control 

Commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities. 

43. The present instrument shall enter into force at once. It will remain in operation 

until superseded by any other arrangements or until the voting into force of the peace treaty 

with Italy. 

44. The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate 

effect if Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled or, as an alternative, the United 

Nations may penalise contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such 

as the extension of the areas of military occupation or air Qr other punitive action. 

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the Control 

Commission will prevail. 

Signed at Malta on the 29th day of September, 1943. 

BADOGLIO 

MARSHAL PIETRO BADOGLIO, 

Head of the Italian Government. 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 

General, United States Army, 

Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force. 
Bibliographical Note 

This volume has been written on the 

basis of extensive research in the voluminous mass of documentary material held 

by the World War II Records Division, 

National Archives and Records Service 

(NARS), Alexandria, Virginia, supplemented by collections of documents held 

at the Federal Records Center, GSA, 

Kansas City, Missouri; the Division of 

Naval History, Department of the Navy, 

Washington, D.C.; the Archives Branch, 

U.S. Air Force Historical Division, Air 

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; and the Office of the Chief of 

Military History ( OCMH), Department 

of the Army, Washington, D.C. This 

official material has been further supplemented by the private papers of Generals 

Eisenhower, Smith, Ridgway, and Gavin; 

by General Lucas' diary; by interviews 

with Allied and Axis leaders; by published 

histories and memoirs; and by detailed 

comments by persons to whom the manuscript was presented for review. 

The Allied Force Headquarters 

(AFHQ) records constitute the most important single collection of records used in 

the preparation of this volume. The collection consists of reports, messages, correspondence, planning papers, and other 

material on all phases of Operation 

HUSKY and the subsequent campaign in 

Sicily. According to a 1945 bilateral 

agreement, most of the original documents 

in the AFHQ collection were sent to the 

United Kingdom. Microfilm copies of 

these documents were made and are located in NARS. The remainder of the 

original documents came to the United 

States, and they, too, are located in NARS. 

The latter group contains the records of 

the Allied Screening Commission (Italy), 

the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Headquarters (except the Target Analysis 

Files), the Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing, the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force, the 

Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, 

the Mediterranean Air Transport Service, 

and the records of Allied Military Government, the Allied Commission (Italy), and 

other Allied control commissions. 

A large number of the microfilm documents in the po&<;ession of NARS have bee: 

photo-enlarged and arranged in file folders. Both the microfilm and the photoenlarged documents are organized by job 

and reel number, as well as by a file classification. "\There the authors have cited a 

document seen on a microfilm reel, the 

job number and the reel number are given, 

i.e., job IOC, reel 138£. Where the cited 

document was seen in a folder of photoenlarged documents, the catalogue number 

and the folder number are indicated, i.e., 

0100/ I 77. The original documents 

of the various Allied air commands deposited in NARS are in files prefixed 

with the catalogue numbers 0401, 0403, 

0406, and 04°7; of the Allied Control 

Commission, with the catalogue number 

10,000. Use of these records is greatly 
566 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

facilitated by two finding aids: Kenneth 

W. Munden's Analytical Guide to the 

Combined British-American Records of 

the Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

in W arid War II, prepared in 1948; and 

a more detailed three-volume Catalogue 

of the Combined British-American Records of the Mediterranean T heater of 

Operations in World War II. Both of 

these items are in NARS. 

Two collections subsidiary to this larger 

one are the Smith Papers and the Salmon 

Files. The Smith Papers, a collection of 

documents and books belonging to Gen. 

Walter B. Smith, has been given to the 

Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 

When last used by the authors, it was split 

between N ARS and the Army War College 

Library, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

Of particular importance in this collection 

is the file designated Capitulation of 

Italy-a bound file of copies of telegrams 

and other documents relating to the Italian surrender. A microfilm copy of this 

file is part of the AFHQ collection. The 

Salmon Files, stored in OCMH, consist of 

a body of papers and other materials collected at AFHQ by Col. Dwight E. Salmon. 

The records of the Operations Division, 

War Department General Staff (0 PD ) 

are of the utmost importance for determining Allied strategic planning and deClSIOns. These records, described in detail 

in Federal Records of W arid War II, vol. 

II, Military Agencies (prepared by the 

General Services Administration, National 

Archives and Records Service, The National Archives, Washington, 195 I) fall 

into four main categories: 

( I) The official central correspondence 

file ( 0 PD ) , arranged according to the 

Army decimal system; 

( 2) The message center file, arranged 

chronologically in binders; 

(3) The Strategy and Policy Group 

file, arranged according to the Army decimal system and identified by the letters 

"ABC" (American-British Conversations) ; 

and, 

( 4) The Executive Office file, an informal collection of papers on policy and 

planning compiled in the Executive Office 

of OPD, primarily for the use of the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD. 

The latter two collections were of particular importance to this volume. The 

ABC file contains an almost complete set 

of papers issued by the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subcommittees. The file also contains the 

important studies on plans and strategy 

developed by the Strategy Section of the 

Strategy and Policy Group. The Executive file contains many documents which 

cannot be found elsewhere in Department 

of the Army files. This file was informally arranged after the war and assigned 

item numbers to permit easier identification. The entire OPD collection of 

records is in NARS. For additional information on the OPD collection, see the 

bibliographical note in Maurice Matloff, 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II (Washington, 1959), p. 557. 

The files of the Office of the Chief of 

Staff were of limited value to this volume. 

Arranged according to the Army decimal 

system, the files are not large in comparison with the AFHQ or OPD collections. 

But they do contain some papers that 

cannot be located elsewhere in the Department of the Army collection. These 

files, like those of OPD, are located in 

NARS. 

Interviews and comments on the manuscript of this volume are in OCMH. 

Other files and documents which were 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

of importance for the planning, strategy, 

and high policy are: 

( I) AFHQ Chief of Staff Cable Log, 

which was brought up to date daily by the 

secretary of the general staff. It contains 

typewritten paraphrases of cables addressed 

to General Eisenhower or sent in his 

name which his subordinates felt he should 

see. This log is presently a part of the 

Smith Papers. 

('2) Commander in Chief Allied Force 

Diary, deposited in Eisenhower Library, 

Abilene, Kansas. On this diary, see the 

bibliographical note in Forrest C. Pogue, 

The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 

1954), pp. 559-60. 

(3) NAF-FAN messages. These are 

the messages between General Eisenhower 

and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They 

may be found in several locations, one of 

which is the AFHQ files. 

(4) The official dispatches of General 

Eisenhower, General Alexander, and Admiral Cunningham. These dispatches 

may be found in the AFHQ files, and in 

other groups of the files mentioned above. 

In addition, parts of the Alexander and 

Cunningham dispatches have been published in the London Gazette. 

The campaign in Sicily has been reconstructed largely from the records of the 

units involved, supplemented by records 

in the AFHQ G-3 collection, and from 

published materials. U nit records include 

journals, war diaries, after action reports, 

field orders, situation reports, and, at the 

higher levels, combined situation and intelligence reports and operations instructions. The records vary from unit to unit, 

from excellent to poor. They comprise a 

special collection of combat operations records for W orId War II in records of 

The Adjutant General's Office, in NARS. 

567 

If one remembers that the Sicilian Campaign was the first serious action for many 

of the American units involved, the fact 

that the records for Sicily are not as 

good as those maintained later in the 

war is not surpnsmg. In general, the 

II Corps G-3 Journal and the 1st 

Division G-3 Journal are the best unit 

records available. The after action reports of all units are usually skimpy and 

provide little detailed information. The 

information in the unit records has been 

amplified and clarified in the light of the 

authors' interviews and correspondence 

with participants. 

Details concerning the activities of the 

British Army have been largely taken from 

two published accounts: Nicholson, The 

Canadians in Italy, and Montgomery, The 

Eighth Army: El Alamein to the River 

Sangro. Another valuable source of ~nformation on British operations is the collection of AFHQ daily G-3 reports. 

For the activities of the Allied air forces, 

the authors have relied heavily on two 

studies: USAF Historical Study 37, 

Participation of the Ninth and Twelfth 

Air Forces in the Sicilian Campaign, 

and USAF Historical Study 74, Airborne 

Missions in the Mediterranean. In addition, the official Air Forces historyCraven and Cate, eds., Europe:-TORCH 

to POINTBLANK-is valuable. 

Morison's Sicily-Salerno-Anzio has 

proven indispensable in presenting the activities of the U.S. and British naval forces 

in Sicilian waters. This published volume 

has been supplemented by an unpublished 

ONI pamphlet which covers the same general material. 

The account of German and Italian 

operations has been based principally on 

four groups of sources: (I) Italian wartime records captured first by the Ger-
568 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

mans and subsequently by the Allies; (2) 

German wartime records captured by the 

Allies; (3) Foreign Military Studies written by former German officers between 

1945 and 1954 under the auspices of the 

Historical Division, Headquarters, United 

States Army, Europe, 1954; and (4) 

Italian and German publications. 

Groups (I) and ( 2 ) are located in 

NARS, and in the Classified Operational 

Archives of the Department of the Navy, 

(referred to in the footnotes as COAl 

Navy). The Italian records consist of 

Italian documents captured by the Germans after September 1943 and catalogued 

by them under the designation AKT ENSAMMELSTELLE SUED. This collection was later captured by the U.S. Army 

and redesignated as the Italian Collection. 

The collection is incomplete and not fully 

catalogued. Its most valuable item for 

the Sicilian Campaign is IT 99a, b, and c, 

a narrative written within and upon an 

order of Comando Supremo during the 

operations in Sicily. The narrative is 

based on daily reports from the front. 

Situation maps, copies of messages and 

orders, and intelligence estimates are included as annexes. 

The collection of captured German 

documents contains three series of particular value. These are the war diary of 

the German Armed Forces Operations 

Staff (OKW IWFSt, KTB) reporting the 

developments on all fronts as well as considerations and decisions influencing these 

developments; the German Army High 

Command daily reports (OKH, Tagesmeldungen) giving very brief summaries 

of operations on all fronts; and the reports 

of the Commander in Chief, South 

(Oberbefehleshaber Sued) to higher headquarters giving the situation in his area 

two or three times daily and one intelligence survey per day (OB SUED 

M eldungen). Also contained in (2) are 

records of the German Navy. They provide insight into the German decisions on 

the highest level through minutes of conferences in Hitler's headquarters (ONI, 

Fuehrer Directives and ONI, Fuehrer 

C anferences) , and also serve to corroborate 

information garnered from secondary 

sources. 

The manuscript collection mentioned 

under (3), now in OCMH, provides narrative descriptions of the entire campaign 

as well as reconstructions of activities down 

to divisional and lower level. They were 

written from memory by former German 

officers who participated in the action, 

and, generally, give an accurate picture of 

the events. These manuscripts serve as an 

excellent supplement to the documentary 

evidence, although caution must be exercised in regard to dates and to biased 

VIews. 

Among the published works (4), Gen. 

Emilio Faldella's La sbareo e fa difesa 

della Sicilia served as the one, outstanding 

source covering the entire campaign in 

Sicily. General Faldella, Sixth Army 

chief of staff, wrote his book with the full 

approval of the Italian Army Historical 

Office. As the chief of that office assured 

Mrs. Bauer during several lengthy personal 

interviews in Rome, Faldella's book may 

be considered authoritative and will probably be fully corroborated in the official 

Italian Army history now in preparation. 

Faldella's most recent publication appeared too late to serve this volume; it 

does not, however, contain information 

materially changing the narrative. 

Personal interviews in Rome by Mrs. 

Bauer with Generals Guzzoni and Faldella, 

with the commanding generals of two of 

the Italian divisions that fought on Sicily, 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

and with the director and members of 

the Italian Army Historical Office provided valuable supplementary information, 

while similar interviews with Admiral 

Pavesi, the commander of Pantelleria, 

and with Admiral Fioravanzo, the direc569 

tor of the Italian Navy Historical Office 

were invaluable in reconstructing the 

events connected with the fall of Pantelleria. 

Otherwise published works are listed 

only in the footnote citations. 

AAF 

AAR 

AB 

ACCOLADE 

ACHSE 

ACV 

Admin 

Adv 

AFHQ 

AGF 

AGp 

AGWAR 

AK 

ALARICH 

AP 

ARCADIA 

Arty 

AT 

AVALANCHE 

BARCLAY 

BARRACUDA 

BAYTOWN 

Bd 

Sr 

BRIMSTONE 

BUTTRESS 

CAD 

CC (A, B, C) 

CCAC 

CCS 

CENT 

Chem 

CHESTNUT 

Glossary 

Army Air Forces 

After action report 

Airborne 

Seizure of the Dodecanese 

German plan to take over the control of Italy 

Auxiliary aircraft carrier or tender 

Administrative 

Advance 

Allied Force Headquarters 

Army Ground Forces 

Army group 

Adjutant General, \,yar Department 

Cargo ship 

Occupation of northern Italy by Rommel's Army 

Group B if Italy collapsed politically. 

Transport ship 

U.S.-British staff conference at Washington, December I 94 I -January I942 

Artillery 

Antitank (gun) 

Amphibious assault, Salerno, Italy 

Plan to induce the Axis to give priority to maintaining and reinforcing its forces in sou~hcrn France 

and the Balkans 

Plan for a sea and airborne assault on Naples. 

Canceled. 

Invasion of the Italian mainland opposite Messina 

Board 

British, branch 

Plan for capture of Sardinia 

British operation against toe of Italy 

Civil Affairs Division 

Combat Command (A, B, C) 

Combined Civil Affairs Committee 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Code name for beaches at Scoglitti 

Chemical 

Four airborne missions sent by Montgomery in an 

effort to aid his army in Sicily with airborne troops 
572 

CIC 

Conf 

CORKSCREW 

COS 

Cositinreps 

DCofS 

DIME 

ENTF 

Exec 

FA 

FAN 

FATIMA 

FBIS 

FIREBRAND 

FO 

G-I 

G-2 

G-3 

G-4 

G-s 

GANGWAY 

GIANT I 

GIANT II 

GMDS 

GOBLET 

GSUSA 

HARDIHOOD 

HUSKY 

Instr(s) 

Intel 

JIC 

Joss 

JP 

IPS 

JWPC 

Kampfgruppe 

KONSTANTIN 

KOPENHAGEN 

LCI 

SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Counter Intelligence Corps 

Conference 

Operation against Pantelleria, Italy, mid-June 1943 

British Chiefs of Staff 

Combined situation and intelligence reports 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Code name for beaches in Gela area 

Eastern Naval Task Force 

Executive 

Field Artillery 

Symbol for messages from Commander III Chief, 

Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff 

Mason-MacFarlane Mission 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

Invasion of Corsica, 1943 

Field order 

Personnel section of division or higher staff 

Intelligence section of division or higher staff 

Operations section of division or higher staff 

Logistics and supply section of division or higher staff 

Civil affairs section of division or higher staff 

Plan for an unopposed landing in Naples. Canceled. 

Plan for an air landing and drop along the Volturno 

River. Canceled. 

Plan for an airdrop near Rome. Canceled. 

German Military Documents Section, Alexandria 

Invasion of Italy at Cotrone. Canceled. 

General Staff, U.S. Army 

Aid to Turkey to induce her to enter the war 

Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 

Instructions 

Intelligence 

J oint Intelligence Committee 

Code name for beaches in Licata area 

Joint Planners (British) 

Joint Staff Planners (U.S.) 

Joint War Plans Committee 

German combat group of variable size 

Reinforcement of German troops in the Balkans and 

Greece 

German plan for seizure of the Mt. Cenis Pass (part 

of Plan ACHSE) 

landing craft, infantry 
GLOSSARY 

LCI(L) 

LCM 

LCT 

LCVP 

LEHRGANG 

LST 

Ltr 

MAC 

Min 

Med 

MEF 

MIDEAST 

MINCEMEAT 

MTB 

Mtg 

MUSKET 

MUSTANG 

MVSN 

NAAF 

NAAFTCC 

NAF 

NARS 

NASAF 

NATAF 

OB SUED 

OCMH 

OKH 

OKM 

OKL 

OKW 

OPD 

Opns 

OSS 

landing craft, infantry (large) 

landing craft, mechanized 

landing craft, tank 

landing craft, vehicle and personnel 

573 

Evacuation of German troops from Sicily to the 

Italian mainland, 11-17 August 1943. 

Landing ship, tank 

Letter 

Mediterranean Air Command 

Minutes 

Mediterranean 

Middle East Forces (British) 

Middle East 

Cover plan in connection with HUSKY to induce 

the Germans to believe that Allied objectives were 

Sardinia and the Peloponnesus 

Motor Transport Brigade 

Meeting 

Projected landing on heel of Italy near Taranto, 

1943 

Plan for an overland seizure of Naples after initial 

landings in Calabria. Canceled. 

Fascist Militia 

Northwest African Air Forces 

Northwest African Air Force Troop Carrier Command 

Symbol for messages from the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force 

National Archives and Records Service 

Northwest African Strategic Air Force 

Northwest African Tactical Air Force 

Oberbefehlshaber Sued (Headquarters, Commander 

in Chief South) 

Office, Chief of Military History 

Oberkommando des Heeres 

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed 

Forces High Command) 

Operations Division 

Operations 

Office of Strategic Services 
574 

OVRA 

Prov 

Rcd 

RCT 

Reinf 

ROUNDHAMMER 

ROUNDLP 

S-3 

SIEGFRIED 

SIM 

Sitrep 

SLEDGEHAMMER 

SNOL 

SOC 

Stato Maggiore Generate 

(Comando Supremo) 

Stato Maggiore Regia 

Aeronautica (Su peraereo ) 

Stato Maggiore Regio Eser.cito 

(Superesercito) 

Stato Maggiore Regia Marina 

(Supermarina) 

Sum 

Tel 

Telg 

Tk 

'I/O 

TORCH 

TRIDENT 

VULCA::\, 

WDCSA 

WDGO 

WFSt 

WNTF 

SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

I talian Secret Police 

Provisional 

Record 

Regimental combat team 

Reinforced 

A cross-Channel operation, intermediate in size between SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP 

Various 1941-43 plans for a cross-Channel attack in 

the final pha~es of the war 

Operations section, regimental or lower echelon 

German plan for occupying the southern coast of 

France (part of Plan ACHSE) 

Servizio Informazione Militari (Military Intelligence 

Service) 

Situation report 

Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in 1942 designed either to take advantage of 

a crack in German morale or as a "sacrifice" operation to aid the Russians 

Senior naval officer, landings 

"Seagull"; single-engine Navy scout-observation 

(VSO) land plane or seaplane, biplane 

Italian Armed Forces High Command and General 

Staff 

Italian Air Force High Command and General Staff 

Italian Army High Command and General Staff 

Italian Navy High Command and General Staff 

Summary 

Telephone 

Telegram 

Tank 

Table of Organization 

Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942 

International conference in 'Washington, May 1943 

Operation against the Germans holding out on Cape 

Bon 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

War Department General Order 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (German Armed Forces 

Operations Staff) 

Western Naval Task Force 
Basic Military Map Symbols* 

Sytnhols within a rectangle indicate a 111ilitary unit. within 

a triangle an observation post. and \\"ithin a circle a supply 

point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Arrno[cd COIl1I11<1llCl 

Army Air Forces 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast ;\rtillcry 

Ca\'aln',llors(' 

Ca\'aln', \lechanizerl 

Chemical ,Varlare Sen icc 

Enginecrs 

Infantn 

\ledical Corps 

Ordnance Department 

Quarh'rnlC1stcr Corps 

Signal Corps 

Tank DcstrO\Tr 

Transportation Corps 

\"ctcrinar) Corps 

~ 

I<=)) 

El 

~ 

[2J 

~ 

[]] 

EE 

IT] 

C8J 

EE 

[[] 

[9J 

CTI 

ITO) 

[mJ 

~ 

Airborne units arc designated hy c()n1binin~ a g-ull wIng 

symbol \vith the ann or service symbol: 

Airborne Artillery 

Airborne' Infantry 

*For cornplclc li .... ting of s: mhob in u~c durinq- tile \'"odd \'"ar II prrioti. sec 

F1\'1 21 ::W. dated (ktoher 19 .. 1-:L frorn which th('se arc taken. 
576 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or 

above the r('ctang\c, .rianglc, or circle inclosing the identifying 

ann or sefyicc sYIllbol indicate the size of Inilitary organization: 

Squad • 

Section •• 

Platoon ••• 

Company, troop, battny, Air Force flight 

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron I I 

Regiment or group: combat team (with abbn'viation CT following idl'ntifying numeral) I I I 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force 

Wing X 

Division or Command of an Air Forc(' XX 

Corps or Air Force XXX 

Army XXXX 

Group of Armies 'f'XXXX 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the left of th(' symbol indicates th(' 

unit designation: that to the right. the designation of the parent 

unit to which it brlongs. Letters or numbers abo\"[' or brlow 

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lin('s: 

Company A, 137th Inf~iI1try . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . A~137 

8th Fidd Artillery Battalion ~8 

Combat Command A. I st Armored Division AI~II 

Observation Post. :!3d Infantrv 

Command Post. 5th Infantrv Di\'ision 

Boundarv bl"lween 137th and I :lRth Infantrv 

Weapons 

\!lachine gun 

Gun 

Gun battery 

Howitzl'l" or I'vlortar 

Tank 

Self-proprllcd gun 

A23 

~5 137 

-111-

138 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The War Department 

Chief oj Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 

Strategic Planning jar Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 

Strategic Planning jor Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 

The AT779' and Economic Mobilization 

The Army and Industrial Manpower 

The Army Ground Forces 

The Organization oj Ground Combat Troop!; 

The Procurement and Training oj Ground Combat Troops 

The Army Service Forces 

The Organization and Role oj the Army Service Forces 

The Western Hemisphere 

The Framework oj Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The Fall oj the Philippines 

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive 

Victory in Papua 

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction oj Rabaul 

Seizure oj the Gilberts and Marshalls 

Campaign in the Marianas 

The Approach 10 the Philippines 

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines 

Triumph in the Philippines 

Okinawa: The Last Battle 

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Ajrica: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

Sicily and the Surrender oj Italy 

Salerno to Cassino 

Cassino to the Alps 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel Attack 

Breakout and Pursuit 

The Lorraine Campaign 

The Siegfried Line Campaign 

The Ardennes: Battle oj the Bulge 

The Last Offensive 
57H SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

[JJKislim! 5;ujijiort oj Ihe Armies, tril//IIII' [ 

LOKistiml Su/)/)ort oj the Armies, Volume 11 

The Middle East Theater 

'the Persian Corridor al/d llid to Russia 

The China-Bllrma-India Theater 

Stilwd/'s 1\lissioll 10 China 

Slilwell's Command Problems 

'time Rlins Oul in CHI 

The Technical Sen'ices 

'the Chpmical Vl/m[rliP Snvice: ChKallizinKjor War 

Thp Chemiml Wmjare ,)'enlice: From J~abomtory 10 Field 

'thl' Chnniml lNmjarp Snvice: Chemimls in Combat 

'the Corjis ojEIIKinpen: 'troojJs ([lid l:'quijnllnzl 

'the COIt)S ojEllgi IlfWS: Thl' \V17r AK([inst jajJan 

'the Cor/)s oj EIlf.,rinef'rs: Thl' War AKainst GermallY 

The (;or/)s oj }~'Ilgillens: Alilitary Construction ill Ihe Unitrd States 

T'he ,v[pdim! f)ejJartmnzt: Ilwpilalizatio/l alld Evac//ation; Zonl' oj llltprior 

The JV1edical Dej}([rlment: IHediml Snvice ill the Meditnmnean alld Millor 

'thmtl'rs 

The Aledim! f)ejJartml'llt: iHediml Servicl' ill the h'uro/)IYUI Thmler o/O/Jf'mtiolls 

The Ordllal/ce f)e/HlrtItlPllt: Planning ;\tunitio/lsjor Hi'//' 

T!!I~ Onlrzrwc( DejJartmf'llt: Proruremnzt and Sut)j)ly 

The Ordlla II ce DejJartment: On H('{[chhmd ([nd Balllejront 

The Quarterllzastn Cmt)s: Or!{fmizatioll, SUj)j)!)', and Services, Volume J 

The Quartermastn COIjiS: Organization, SUj)/)lv, and S'ervices, \Iolume [f 

'the QuartemUister COIt)s: OjJrmtiolis ill the nyU' Agai IIstjajJan 

T'lzr Quartermaster CO/ps: OjJf'mtions in the ni'lr Against Germany 

Thp ,)'igl1([l COIPS: The ElIlergmn; 

'the Si,rsna! CO/jJs: The 11'sl 

The Sif.(lw{ Cml)s: The 01ltrome 

The TramjJortation CorjJs: Responsibilities, Olgal/izalior!, (llId OJ)('rations 

The Trall5portatio/l Corps: Movements, Training, and SUj)j)(Y 

The Tramj)()rtation COIt)s: Operations Oversms 

Special Studies 

Chronolof!;Y: 1941-1945 

1Hilitm)' Relations HrtWl'fII the ['nited States and Canada.' 1939-1945 

Rearming the Frellch 

Three Battles: Arnaville, AltuzlO, and Schmidt 

The lV(nnfn :s Army CorjJs 

Civil Af/air;s: ,"'oldiers Become GOVl'rrzolS 

Buying Aircmft: J\;latrrlel Procu mnl'll t for the Arm)' Air FortFS 

The Employment oj Negro Trooj)S 

Ala nha/lan: The U.S, Army and the Atomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

The lVar A.gainst Germany and [taZy: iHeditrrranean and Adjrunzt Arms 

The lVrlrAgainst Germany: Europe and Ad/acl'Ilt Areas 

The War Against jaj)(Jn 
Index 

A-36's: 120, 120n, 261,342,344,346,401,403 

Abbio Priolo: 165, 166 

Abruzzi Mountains: 525,529 

Acate (Dirillo) River: 97,99, 100, 101, 117, 118, 

135, 135n, 142, 143, 164, 171, 190, 206, 208 

Acate River valley: 155, 187 

ACCOLADE: 436 

ACHSE, Plan: 287-88,291,307,473,523 

Acqualadrone: 414 

Acquarone, Duke Pietro: 41, 42, 43, 264, 265, 

266, 268, 281, 441 454, 466, 479, 480, 511, 

547 

Adrano: 235,319,327,341,357 

Adriatic ports: 24 

Adriatic Sea: 13,45,54 

Aegean Islands: 12,17,32,492,514,534 

Aerial bombardment. See Air attacks, Allied; Air 

attacks, Axis. 

Aerial navigation, Allied: 423-24 

Aerial photographs: 99, 101,493,536 

Aerial reconnaissance. See Air reconnaissance, Allied; Air reconnaissance, Axis. 

Aerial resupply missions: 101,344 

AFHQ. See Allied Force Headquarters. 

Africa. See North Africa. 

Agira: 233, 319 

Agrigento: 86, 125, 192, 194, 200, 202, 209, 224, 

226-30, 235, 238, 418, 419 

Air attacks, Allied: 23, 72, 110, 136, 197, 205, 

240, 269, 296, 29~ 299, 342n, 344, 346, 352, 

379, 382, 385, 400, 401, 402, 438, 439, 447, 

473, 477, 501 

against Frascati: 522-23 

on friendly forces: 195, 403 

on Messina Strait: 410. 411-12 

and Palermo advance: 320 

on Pantelleria: 70-72 

on Rome: 24-25,250,278,279,292,442 

and Sicilian invasion: 54, 58-59, 83, 88, 106-

07, 111 

in Troina battle: 339, 342 

Air attacks, Axis: 89, 159, 174, 177, 318n, 362, 

403,518,533 

Air bases, Allied: 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 25 

Air forces, Allied: 157,175-76,177-78,278,320, 

382. See also Air plan, Sicilian invasion. 

and air support failure: ·121 

and evacuation of Sicily by Axis: 379, 380-81 

Air losses, Allied: 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 218, 

423 

Air losses, Axis: 46-47, 189, 189n, 240, 243 

Air operations, Allied: 5, 6, 12, 14, 17, 59, 70, 

261, 320, 378, 379, 380-81, 420. See also 

Air attacks, Allied; Air support, Allied; Airborne operations, Allied; Airdrops, Allied. 

Air patrols, U.S.: 120n 

Air plan, Sicilian invasion: 106-07, 421. See also 

Air operations, Allied. 

Air power, Allied: 15,21,59, 106,213,320,460-

61 

Air power, Axis: 32, 106. See also Air losses, 

Axis. 

Air proteetion, Allied. See Air support, Allied. 

Air raids. See Air attacks, Allied; Air attacks, 

Axis. 

Air reconnaissance, Allied: 155, 325, 331 

Air reconnaissance, Axis: 46, 110, 120, 473, 522, 

536 

Air support, Allied: 69, 106, 260, 261, 262, 320, 

343, 421, 494, 506. See also Air attacks, 

Allied. 

for D-day landings: 119-20 

in Monte Cipolla action: 399, 401, 405 

for Seventh Army: 107,421 

Air Support Command, U.S., XII: 107,320,401, 

402,421 

Airacobras (P-39's): 261 

Airborne drops. See Airdrops, Allied. 

Airborne operations, Allied. See also Air operations, Allied. 

in Italian mainland invasion: 477-78, 482, 483. 

See also GIANT II. . 

in Sicilian Campaign: 269-270, 553. See also 

Airdrops. Allied. 

and Allied antiaircraft disaster: 175-84 

British missions: 115, 117.218,380 

and corridor to Sicily: 175-76 

D-day: 115.117-19 

evaluation of: 156-57,423-25 

FUSTIAN: 218 

tactical planning for: 88-89,92-94_,101-02. 

485-89. 498-99 . 

Airborne operations. German: 204, 424 

Airborne Training Center, Fifth Army: 424 

Airborne troops, British: 92. liS. 117. 121, 380, 

423. 

See also British Army units. Division, 1st Airborne. 

Airborne units, U.S.: 478, 480, 498-99. See also 

Parachute Infantry units, U.S.; Paratroopers, 

U.S. 

Division, 82d: 91, 93, 94, 98, 102, 152n, 230, 
580 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Airborne units, U. S.-Continued 

Division, 82d-Continued 

231, 245, 249, 252, 305, 422, 424, 477, 505, 

508, 509. See also Ridgway, Maj. Gen. 

Matthew B. 

in GIANT II: 489, 498 

importance of, in Sicily: 92 

Battalions 

80th Airborne Antiaircraft: 498, 499 

307th Airborne Engineer Battalion: 498 

Aircraft, Allied: 73, 107, 117n, 147n, 175, 411n, 

418. See also Air losses, Allied; individual 

types of planes. 

attack friendly forces: 195 

attacked by friendly antiaircraft: 175-84, 218, 

423 

Aircraft, Axis: 83, 166, 177n, 212, 320, 360, 403, 

457,513,533. See also Air losses, Axis. 

Aircraft carriers, U.S.: 69, 261 

Airdrops, Allied: 207, 218, 380, 535. See also 

Airborne operations, Allied; GIANT II. 

and Allied antiaircraft disaster: 176, 177-78, 

179, 182 

planning for: 88-89, 93-94 

Airfields: 67,69,73,107 

Italy: 47, 261, 439, 440, 457, 460, 468, 478, 

483, 486, 486n, 494, 500, 502, 505, 522 

Centocelle: 486, 488, 498 

Cerveteri: 488, 489, 498 

Foggia: 437,471 

Furbara: 488, 489 

and GIANT II: 485, 486, 488, 489 

Guidonia: 486, 488, 498 

Littoria: 486, 488, 498 

Magliano: 486 

Sicily: 52, 53, 53n, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 

64, 66, 80, 83, 84, 89, 91, 96, 98, 107, 108, 

135,261,320 

Biscari: 96,98,100,141,147,206,220 

Catania: 204,216 

Comiso: 96, 98, 100, 141, 142, 156, 189, 

189u, 320 

Gerbini: 216 

Licata: 99, 320 

Ponte Olivo: 98, 100, 101, 135, 147, 164, 

165, 174n, 185, 187, 320 

AK's: 105. 105n. 

ALAR/CH, Plan: 50-51, 75, 213, 241, 282, 283, 

284, 288, 291 

Albania: 24,32,453,491 

Albermarles, British: 115 

Alcamo: 253, 255 

Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G: 10, 23, 

55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 89, 91, 94, 108, 

197, 200, 201, 201n, 206, 207, 209n, 222, 

224, 231, 234-35, 235n, 248, 257, 304n, 319, 

378, 379,406.412,417,420,421,474,476, 

477,478, 484, 485, 489, 507, 549 

Alexander, General-Continued 

directives: 209-10,230,234-35,245-46,303-04 

and Seventh Army: 209-11, 230, 235-36, 245-

46, 304, 422-23 

on U.S. troops: 56, 210n, 211, 422 

Alexander, Maj. Mark: 117 

Alexandria: 52 

Alfieri, Ambassador Dino: 242, 243, 286 

Algiers: 56,102,108,421,437,463,509 

Algiers Conference: 23-25, 61-62, 436 

Alimena: 233, 301 

Allen, Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa: 95, 99, 

108, 136, 139, 158, 159, 165, 173-74, 174n, 

185, 222, 223, 231, 249, 302, 311-12, 313, 

320, 331, 333, 340, 342, 343, 346, 347, 348, 

426 

and Nicosia attack: 314 

and Troina action: 336-37,338,339,341 

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ): 5, 8, 11, 

22n, 55, 56, 66, 67, 68, 176, 183, 206, 258, 

259-60, 262, 263, 274, 275, 278, 427, 429, 

431, 436, 437, 440, 44~ 449, 459, 480, 489, 

494, 495, 496, 498, 502, 502n, 503, 504, 505, 

508, 510, 512, 513, 516-17, 519, 520, 521, 

532, 535, 540, 541, 546. See also Eisenhower, 

General Dwight D .. : Planners, Allied, AFBQ. 

Alpine passes: 370 

Alps: 3,12,16,30 

Ambrosio, Generale d' Armata Vittorio: 36n, 38, 

44, 45, 51, 78, 281, 282, 285, 287, 289, 293, 

294, 296, 368, 451, 452, 458, 460, 462, 470, 

471, 482, 48~ 490, 491, 493, 494n, 497, 503, 

506, 506n, 509, 512,514,516,517,524,542, 

549 

absence from Rome: 494,495,496 

and armistice negotiations: 441, 453, 454, 455, 

464,465,466,467,479,480,481,510,511, 

515 

and Axis command structure: 472-73 

as Comando Supremo chief: 35-36 

at Feltre conference: 242, 243, 244 

and German military aid to Italy: 47-49, 74, 

74-75 

and German troop movements into Italy: 290, 

291,292,372,373 

and Mussolini: 41-42, 212, 214. 215, 240-41. 

263, 264 

at Tarvis conference: 370 

Ammunition, Italian: 81,298,480,500 

Ammunition supply, U.S.: 398, 399,403, 486 

Amphibious operations, Allied: 436,491,501 

Italian mainland: 535, 542. See also Salerno 

landings. 

against Naples, planned: 260, 261-63 

Axis speculation concerning: 493-94, 500 

scheduling of: 490 

Sicilian Campaign: 161n, 237, 380, 411, 412, 

421, 553 
INDEX 

Amphibious operations, Allied~Continued 

Sicilian Campaign-Continued 

air protection for: 119-20,261,262 

Axis anticipation of: 45, 64, 84, 86-87 

at Bivio Salica:406, 407, 413-14, 415 

D-day: 120, 121, 123-46 

improvements and techniques in: 103-05 

in San Fratello action: 348, 349n, 352, 

357,360,361-63,366-67 

tactical planning for: 53-54, 58, 59, 60-63, 

66, 88-89, 91-92, 96-100, 103-07, 135-

36,406,408,413-14 

Task Force Bernard: 388-97, +0+-405 

Amphibious truck. See Dukws. 

Amphibious warfare: 104-05. See also Amphibious 

operations. 

Anapo River: 91,92 

Ancon: 108, 177 

Ancona: 470 

Andrea Doria: 533 

Andrus, Brig. Gen. Clift: 313,331,336,339 

Ankcorn, Col. Charles M.: 141, 142, 145, 190, 

206,208,209,219-20,321,415 

Antiaircraft, Allied: 102, 131, 175-84, 185, 218, 

423,499 

Antiaircraft defense, Axis: 47, 74, 76, 79, 82, 117, 

117n, 263, 284, 375-76, 380-81, 412, 485, 

·186, 488-89 

Anti-Fascists, Italian: 40,42, 263, 264, 265 

Antitank companies, U.S.: 160,167,188 

Antitank defenses, Italian, on Sicily: 79 

Antonescu, Ion: 40,239 

Amio: 522,552 

Apennines: 213,215,368,439,442,497,512 

Appian Way: 500 

AP's: 105. 10Sn 

Aquila: 536 

ARCADIA Conference: 2 

Arisio, Generale di Corpo d'Armata Mario: 84. 

471,534 

Arezzo: 470 

Armed Forces Command, Sicily: 76 

Armistice, !talo-Allied: 25, 539. See alsO' Surrender of Italy. 

announcement of: 447,448,459,465,467,474, 

475, 476, 479, 489, 490, 491, 492, 494, 495, 

496,499, 501, 503-04, 505-08, 508-09, 513, 

515,516-17,519-20,522,523,524 

British-American discussion of: 269, 271-74, 

275-78 

Eisenhower's draft: 270-7 L 276 

Italian discussion of: 465-68,479-81 

negotiations: 451-65,474-79 

orders and directives following: 514-15 

renunciation moves by Italy: 501-02, 506-07, 

510-12 

signing. See under Long terms; Short terms. 

Armistice, Italo-Allied~Continued 

terms. See Long terms; Short terms. 

581 

Armistice, Italo-German. See Capitulation; Truce. 

Armistice control commission, Allied, proposed: 

544,545 

Armored force, German: 169. See alsO' Tanks, 

German. 

Armored support, U.S.: 129, 135, 146, 153, 158, 

159, 163, 174n, 418. See also Tank units, 

U.S.; Tanks, U.S. 

Armored units, U.S.: 155, 226, 226n, 363, 478, 

480. See also Combat Commands; Tank 

units. 

Division, 1 st Armored: 96 

Division, 2d Armored: 94, 97-98, 158. 174n. 

230, 231, 245, 253, 254, 255, 305, 306n, 418, 

422. See also Combat Commands. 

characterized: 95-96 

landing of: 157-58 

and Palermo strike: 252 

Regiment, 67th Armored: 159, 174n 

Army, U.S. 

and Air F orees: 106 

infantryman's performance: 417-18 

Army, Fifth, U.S.: 15,67,68,262,482,498,505, 

5:,}2 

Army, Seventh, U.S.: 89, 92, 101, 102, 108, 135, 

176, 185-201, 205, 206, 230-36, 275, 304, 

304n, 308, 309, 320, 380, 390, 401, 406, 408, 

414, 4lin, 422. See also Patton, General 

George S., Jr. 

Agrigento as objective of: 224, 226 

and air support: 107, 421 

and Allied antiaircraft attack disaster: 176-82 

Axis counterattack on. See Counterattacks, Axis. 

composition of: 57, 94-96 

and Eighth Army: 89,91.206-07,209-11,234-

36, 388-89, 413-14 

landings of: 123-46, 158-62 

and Palermo advance: 244-54 

performance of: 206,417-19 

and Messina peninsula drive: 304, 319, 388-

89, 41 420 

tactical for: 89,91. 96-100, 209-10, 245-

46. 

Army Ground Forces: 424. See also Ground forces, 

Allied. 

Army Groups, Allied 

15: 56.89,119,195,210,319 

18: 56 

Arnold, Lt. Gen. Henry H.: 3 

Arsoli: 524 

Artillery superiority, Allied: 73 

Artillery support, Axis: 127, 128, 131, 133, 137. 

139, 159, 188, 196, 198, 199, 228, 230, 255, 

300, 301-02, 313, 317, 318, 321, 325, 333, 

337, 338, 339, 340, 343, 353, 402, 516 
582 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Artillery support, U.S.: 129, 135, 146, 153, Li8, 

159, 160, 163, 167n, 168, 170, 187, 199, 222, 

224,226-27,230,232, 302n, 313, 313n, 317, 

317n, 321, 322, 330, 337, 339, 346, 348, 352, 

353. See also Field artillery units. 

evaluated: 418 

at Monte Cipolla: 389, 393-94, 396, 397, 399, 

400 

in Troina battle: 331,333,334,340,342 

Arzew: 105,493 

Assault, Allied. See Amphibious operations. 

Assault plans: 125, 135-36. See also Tactical planning, Allied; Tactical planning, Axis. 

Assoro: 248 

Athens: 514 

Atlantic Wall: 76 

Augusta: 54, 58, 61, 89, 91, 92, 111, 123, 163, 

191, 240. See also Naval Base A ugusta-Syracuse. 

Austrians: 533 

AVALANCHE. See :-.Iaples; Salerno; Salerno landings. 

Avola: 92 

Axis. See Feltre conference; I talo-German alliance; 

Strategic planning, Axis; Tactical planning, 

Axis. 

B-17's: 376,379,411,412 

B-24's: 376 

B-25's: 412 

B-26's: 412 

Baade, Col. Ernst Guenther: 82,236,375-76,381 

Badoglio, Mario: 299 

Badoglio, Maresciallo d'Italia Pietro: 29, 31n, 268, 

271, 273, 276, 281n, 291, 293, 295, 295n, 306, 

371, 373, 440, 441, 445, 449, 454, 455, 458, 

459, 460, 462, 465-66, 468, 470, 473, 475, 

476. 483n, 494, 495, 496, 499, 504, 505, 514, 

515n, 519, 520, 522, 524, 525, 528 

and American mission to Rome: 501-02 

and armistice negotiations: 443, 444, 447, 448, 

453,454,455,466,467-68,483,484, 506-07, 

50H, 510, 511, 512-13, 515. 516-17, 543, 546. 

548-49 

described by Mason-MacFarlane: 542 

and Eisenhower: 535, 540, 541, 543, 545, 546. 

549-51 

and evacuation of Rome: 516,517,528 

and Germany: 284-85,547,548,551,553 

and GIANT II: 502, 503 

government of: 264-65, 266-67, 272, 275, 278, 

281, 283, 296-99, 368, 369, 453, 469. 472. 

482, 483, 484, 485, 490, 491, 493, 503, 506, 

507, 508, 535, 536, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 

547, 548, 550. See also Armistice, 1taloAllied. 

and Hitler: 283,286,287,292,294--95,470,497 

Badoglio, Maresciallo d'Italia Pietro~Continued 

ineffectualness of: 464, 5IL-13, 515, 527 

at Malta conference: 549-51 

and Mussolini: 43, 282 

reassurances to Germans: 284-85 

Bagni Acque Albule: 526 

Bailey's Beach: 141, 144 

Balearic Islands: 46 

Balkans: 4, 6, 7,8,9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 23, 24, 

27, 29, 32, 34, 35, 38, 45, 46, 47, 49, 65, 

213, 259, 261, 271, 298, 370, 436, 437, 438, 

439,447, 451, 452, 453, 457, 463, 472, 473, 

491,492,514,535 

Barbieri, Generale di Corpo d' Armata Alberto: 

289, 528 

Barcellona: 408, 413 

Bardonecchia: 442 

BARCLAY, Plan: 65 

Bari: 16 

Barnett: 177 

BARRACUDA: 448 

Barrafranca: 198, 231-32, 233 

Barrage balloons, Allied: 110 

Bastianini, Giuseppe: 39,41,239,242,243 

Battleships, Allied: 89 

Battleships, Italian. See Italian Fleet. 

Bauer, Mrs. Magna: 170n 

Bay of Naples: 261 

BAYTOWN: 260,440,448,482,483,490,520 

Bazookas: 137, 137n, 167, 171, 172, 188,396 

Beach parties: 160, 393. See also Shore parties. 

Beaches. landing. See also Beachheads. 

Salerno: 262, 482, 499, 505 

Sicilian: 97, 104-05, 161n, 169, 177, 256. See 

also Blue Beach; Blue Beach 2; Green Beach; 

Green Beach 2; Red Beach; Red Beach 2; 

Yellow Beach; Yellow Beach 2. 

closing of: 159,161 

at Monte Cipolla: 393 

quality of: 99, 141-42, 144-45 

Beachheads, Allied: 123, 163, 202, 211. See also 

Beaches, landing. 

in Italy, 552 

Monte Cipolla: 393, 397, 398, 400, 402 

Seventh Army (Sicily): 99,206 

defined: 96-97 

securing: 185-200 

1st Division: 164, 173 

Beatty: 168, 168n, 179 

Belice River: 245, 252 

Bergamini, Ammiraglio Carlo: 533 

Bergamo. Duke of. See Gpnova. Gpnerale eli Corpo 

d'Armata Aelalberto di Savoia. 

Bergengruen, Col. Hellmut: 157 

Bergolo, Generale di Divisione Conte Carlo Calvi 

di: 519,525,526,527, 530n, 531, 532 
INDEX 

Berio, Alberto: 298, 368, 369, 374,441,443,444, 

552 

Bernard, Lt. Col. Lyle A.: 352, 360, 363, 388n, 

399, 402, 403-04. See also Task Force Bernard. 

Bertsch, Lt. Col. William H., Jr.: 499, 508, 509 

Bianco: 344 

BiazzoRidge: 169,172,173,175,189,418 

Billings, Lt. Col. William H.: 131 

Biscari: 100, 142, 143, 149, 154, 168, 169, 189, 

208. 217, 419 

Biscayne: 108, 123, 133 

Biviere Pond: 117, 136, 177 

Bivio Gigliotto: 222,223 

Bivio Salinl: 413,414,415 

Bizerte: 102. 105, 108, 498, 505, 506, 507, 508, 

522, 533 

Black-market operations: 79 

Bloody Ridge: 321, 353, 418. See also Santo 

Stefano. 

Blue Beach: 125,133,136,158,159 

Blue Beach 2: 145-46, 161 

Blue Line: 98 

Board, lst Lt. Oliver P.: 133n 

Boise: 139, 139n, 150n, 177, 185 

Bologna: 288,451,533 

Bologna conference: 452-53 

Bolzano: 289, 290, 29:3,442,533 

Bomber groups, German: 214,243 

Bombers, Allied: 376 

heavy: 376, 379, 381 

light: 320,376 

medium: 376 

Bombers, British. See Wellington bombers. 

Bombers. U.S.: 107, 250. See also Aircraft. Allied: 

Air attacks, Allied; 8-17'5; B-24'5; 8-25's; 

B-26'5. 

Bompietro: 302, 303 

Bond. Lt. Col. Van H.: 333, 334 

Bonin. Col. Bogislaw von: 374 

Bonomi, I vanoe: 268, 531 

and anti-Fascist parties: 42 

and Mussolini's overthrow; 42, 43, 264, 265 

Bottai, Giuseppe: 40 

Bowen, Col. John W.: 136, 153, 179, 313, 314, 

336,338, 339. 340, 341, 343 

Bowman, Maj. C. C.: 180 

Bradley. Lt. Gen. Omar N.: 101, 108, 178-79, 

189-90, 206, 231, 235, 305, 311, 314. 

316, 318, 323, 331, 336, 343, 349, 361. 

388,389,390,406,415,422 

career of: 94 

and Erma: 246.248.249 

and Highway 124: 210,222.223 

and logistical problems: 103 

~nd Messina drive: 319-20,413-14 

and Patton slapping incidents: 428, 429 

583 

Brady, Lt. Col. Brookner W.: 125 

Brenner Pass: 50, 289, 290, 298, 370, 371, 372, 

373, 442, 453, 460, 469, 472, 533 

Brenner railway line: 290 

Brest-Li tovsk: 34 

Briatore, Maj. Alberto: 494, 494n 

Bridgeheads: 253,341,352 

Bridges: 252, 253, 301, 316, 317, 318-19, 385. 

See also Ponton causeways. 

Dirillo: 101 

Lentini: 207,218 

Palma River: 193 

Ponte Grande: 91. 92, 117 

Primosole: 207, 218 

Rosmarino River: 362 

swing, over Tiber: 486 

BRIMSTONE: 4, 6n, 258. See also Sardinia. 

canceled: 260 

debated: 5-6,7,8,10 

plans for: 67, 260 

Brindisi: 481. 505, 532 

Allied-Italian discussions at: 545-49 

Mason-MacFarlane mission to: 540-43 

British Air Force. See Desert Air Force: Royal Air 

Force. 

British Army units: 

Army. Eighth: 46, 57, 60, 92, 98, 11 0, 117, 141, 

197, 200, 201n. 22~ 246, 248, 259, 275, 30~ 

312n, 319. 380. 387, 417, 417n, 421, 422, 

437,482,483,505,522,543,552 

and Catania drive: 218-19 

D-day landings of: 120-23 

and Messina drive: 234-35, 304, 319, 388, 

389,414.416,420 

and Seventh Anny: 89,91.206-07,209-11, 

234-36. 388-89, 413-14 

tactical planning for: 58,89,91 

Army, Twelfth: 57 

Corps. 5: 68. 258, 260 

Corps, 10: 57. 68, 258, 260 

Corps, 13: 57, 91, 92. 123, 191, 207, 216. 

248, 304. 319, 374. 483 

Corns, 30: 57,91. 123, 190-91,207,219.220. 

224, 235, 244-45, 248. 249. 302. 304. 311, 345 

Division. 1st Airborne: 91,93, 108,505 

Division. 1st Infantry: 70,72 

Division, 5th Infantry: 91. 92.121,123,248 

Division. 46th Infantry: 259, 260 

Division. 50th Infantry: 91. 92. 191, 219. 248. 

357,412 

Division. 51st Highland Infantry: 91-92, 123. 

190.207.208,209,220,224 

Division, 78th Infantry: 92, 248, 259. 260, 30·4. 

319, 341, 357, 374, 382. 385, 386. 387. 406. 

412,413 

Brigades 

1st Airlanding: 91, 218 

4th Armored: 414 
584 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

British Army units-Continued 

Brigades-Continued 

23d Armored: 207, 208, 224 

231st Independent: 91,123 

British Broadcasting Corporation: 389, 490, 496, 

503-04, 504n 

British Chiefs of Staff: 2,19,436,449 

at Casablanca: 8-10 

and global war strategy: 6-7 

on Naples attack: 262 

at QUADRANT Conference: 438-40 

at TRIDENT Conference: 20-23 

British Defense Committee: 274 

British Foreign Office: 273,276 

British Government: 296-99, 445-46, 462. See also 

Churchill. Winston S. 

British Joint Planners: 4. See also Planners, British. 

British Joint Staff Mission: 277 

British Middle East Command: 436 

British Navy. See Naval Task Force, Eastern; Inshore Squadron. 

British War Cabinet: 12,276,277,279,544 

Brolo: 396,400,401,403,418,419,426. See also 

Monte Cipolla; Naso ridge. 

Allied assault on: 401 

German defense of: 393,396-97,398 

landings. See Monte Cipolla, amphibious end 

run at. 

Brolo River: 394, 396, 398,400,402,403,408 

Bronte: 374 

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan: 8, 10, 21, 22. 

23,436,439 

Brooklyn: 131, 131n 

Browning, Maj. Gen. F. A. M.: 88, 175, 176 

Buck: 131, 131n 

Bulgaria: 40, 44 

Burma: 258 

Butcher, Comdr. Harry C.: lin 

Butera: 169,170,220 

BUTTRESS: 16,67,68,258,260,262,448 

C-47's: 101-02,115,178, 183n, 488 

Cabo de Bueno Esperanza: 445 

Cadorna, General: 529 

Caio Duilo: 533 

Cairo, Egypt: 61 

Calabria: 53,67,68,76, 110,203,214,215,244, 

259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 282, 368, 375, 378, 

413, 414, 416, 452, 469, 471, 473, 522. See 

also BA YTQWN. 

Calboli, Marchese Giacomo Paulucci di: 239 

Caltagirone: 86. 98, 136, 148, 172, 173, 202, 203. 

206,207, 219, 222, 223, 224 

Caltanissetta: Ill, 192, 197, 200, 226, 231, 233, 

246 

Calvert: 142, 143 

Campbell, Sir Ronald Hugh: 297, 298, 442, 444, 

445, 446, 449, 455, 458n, 459, 461, 462 

Campo Imperatore: 536 

Campobello: 79, 98, 99, 125, 155, 191, 192, 195, 

196, 196n, 197 

Campofelice: 246,300,318 

Canadian units: 91, 92, 100, 163, 189, 248, 301, 

319,331,342n 

Division, 1st: 91, 123, 156, 190,206, 207, 224, 

231,233,234,248,300,319 

in Troina action: 341, 343 

Canaris, Admiral Wilhelm: 287 

Canicattl: 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199,202,206, 

226 

Cannon, Maj. Gen. John K.: 474,485 

Cannon companies, U. S. 

15th Infantry: 195 

16th Infantry: 160,170-71,188 

26th Infantry: 166 

179th Infantry: 208 

Cape Bon: 66, 107 

Cape Calava: 309,408 

Cape d'Ali: 414 

Cape Orlando: 345,352,401,402,403 

Cape Passero: 1 17,218 

Capitulation, Italian: 530-32, 533-34, 539. See 

also Armistice; Surrender. 

Capizzi: 315,330 

Caprara. See Palazzo Caprara. 

Carabinieri. See Italian Army units, Carabinieri. 

Carboni, General di Corpo d'Armata Giacomo: 36, 

41, 266-67, 289. 466, 489, 496, 500n, 503, 

504,515,516,520,526 

and American mission to Rome: 500, 50 I, 502 

and armistice negotiations: 454, 455, 467, 479, 

480.494, 494n, 511, 512 

and capitulation to Germans: 527, 530. 531-32 

and Castellano: 454, 467n, 479 

and Caviglia: 529 

and evacuation of Rome: 517, 518, 5 I 9, 524, 

525,527,528 

and GIA:-.1T II: 494, 495 

Cargo vessels, Allied: 262 

Caronie Mountains: 53,97,309,348,352 

Carriers, British: 262, 269 

Carroll: 145 

Carsoli: 518, 524 

Casa Biazzo: 169 

Casa del Priolo: 150, 165, 168, 185-89 

Casa San Silvestro: 196, 197 

Casablanca Conference: 19. 52. 53, 94, 417, 420 

strategic planning at: 1-3, 7-11 

and unconditional surrender formula: 11-12 

Casati, Alessandro: 265, 531 

Casazza crossroads: 414-15 

Cassibile: 121,319,482,483,484,498,505 

Cassibile conference: 474-79,479-80,492 

Cassino: 552 

Castel Judica: 223-24 

Castel San Angelo: 131 
INDEX 

Castelbuono: 316 

Castellammare d~l Golfo: 255 

Castellano, Generale di Brigata Giuseppe: 36, 264, 

266, 296, 297, 297n, 368, 373, 446n, 451, 

455n, 465, 483n, 493, 494, 496, 497, 500n, 

501,503,504,511,516,519,520,552 

and armistice: '165-68,474,475,476,477,478, 

480, 482, 483, 484, 4R:'l, 505-06, 506-07, 

and Carboni: 454, 467n, 479 

coup d'etat plot of: 41,42 

and Italian mainland invasion: 489, 490 

and military collaboration with Allies: 459-60, 

485-86,488,489,490-91,495 

peace mission of: HOn, 440-42, 444-46, 447, 

454,455-61,462,463 

and Zanussi: 455,462,463,474,478-79 

Castelluccio, II: 185 

Castelvetrano: 235,252, 253 

Castle Hill: 185 

Casualties, Allied 

British: 417, 552 

U.S.: 135, 13i. 144. 146. 159, 172, 181-R2, 

182n, 188-89, 193-94, 208, 255, 314, 321, 

323, 342, 343-44, 357, 358, 398, 403, 404, 

406,415,417,419,552 

Casualties, Axis 

German: 71,200,223,255,341,347,385,398, 

417 

Italian: 127,128,152,170,197,200,216,223, 

22~ 341, 385, 398,417 

Catania: 54,58,61,63,64, 86,89,91,92, 111, 

191, 202, 209, 210, 211, 214, 215, 218, 223, 

233, 235, 248, 260, 307, 308. 319, 357, 380, 

420, 422, 437 

Catania plain; 53, 164, 191, 207, 216, 304 

Cattaro: 491 

Causeways. See Ponton causeways. 

Cavallero, Generale d'Armata Vgo: 29, 30n, 33, 

34, 35, 36, 472 

Caviglia, Maresciallo d'Italia Enrico: 264, 530, 

531,532 

and capitulation to Germans: 531 

and Carboni: 529 

as head of government: 527-29,531 

Cefalu: 246,302,305 

Centuripe: 341 

Cepha10nia: 542 

Cerami: 320,325,327,328,329,331 

Cerami River: 328 

Cesaro; 327, 343, 345, 346, 357, 374, 382 

Chemical battalions. motorized, U.S.: 96 

CHESTNUT missions: 380, 380n 

Chetniks: 37 

Chiaramonte GuIfi: 190 

Chiefs of Staff. See British Chiefs of Staff; Combined Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. 

Chierici, Renzo: 42 

585 

China-Burma-India Theater: 261 

Chirieleison, Generale di Divisione Domenico: 

164, 169 

Christian Democrats: 42 

Churchill, Winston S.: 1, 6, 10, 11, 12, 16n, 258, 

269,275,279,287,440, 440n, 535, 540, 547, 

552 

at Algiers Conference: 23-24 

on Badoglio government: 544-45 

and Italian armistice: 271-73, 276, 277, 442-

43, 444, ·446-47, 544, 545, 546 

strategic views of: 4,23-24,67,436,437 

at TRIDENT Conference: 19-21 

Ciano, Count Galeazzo: 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 

42,43,264,267,268,283,297 

Ciano Papers: 34n 

Civil Affairs Division: 26, 26n 

Civil war, Italian, possibilities of: 25, 544 

Civilian ministers, Italian: 517,528 

Civilians. See also Morale. 

German: 514 

Italian: 505, 528, 536 

and armistice: 271,272,513 

Eisenhower's peace broadcast to: 275 

and Rome bat tic : 528-30 

Sicilian: 77, 193, 194, 208, 254, 255, 331, 333. 

347 

Civitavecchia: 468. 522 

Clark, Lt, Gen. M~rk W.: 8, 15, 55, 67, 260, 269 

Cochrane, Lt. Col. Clarence B.: 143,168,317 

Codes. Allied: 504n. See alsCl Radio communication, Italo-Allied, secret. 

British diplomatic: 296 

for GIANT II: 499-500, 502 

Colle del Contrasto: 315 

Comando Supremo: 31, 32. 33, 39, 45, 46, 47, 

49,50,51, 71, 73-74, 75, 76, 77, 78,82, 110, 

163,212,214,216,242, 242n, 266, 281, 282, 

286, 289, 290, 346, 368. 369. 371, 372, 373, 

375, 378, 471,472,479,483, 491, 492, 493, 

495, 514, 5 El. 525, 528, See a/so Ambro~io: 

Generale d' Armata Vittorio; Italian High 

Command. 

under Ambrosio: 35-36 

growth and importance of: 29-30 

liaison with Germans: 78 

and Mussolini's overthrow: 263 

and Promemoria I: 491 

and Sicily's defeat: 240, 241 

and troop movements: 288 

Combat commands. U.S. 

A, 2d Armored Division: 98,99, 108, 125, 192, 

194, 196, 199, 200, 253, 254 

attacked by friendly planes: 195 

and Canicatti capture: 199 

composition of: 194n 

Naro captured by: 194 

B, 2d Armored Division: 158,171,254 
586 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Combat loaders, U.S.: 258 

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1, 10-11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 

25, 27, 53, 58, 63, 66, 67, 88, 258, 259, 260, 

261-62, 271, 272, 273, 277, 278, 280, 417, 

420, 436, 437, 449, 462, 505, 506, 520, 543 

and I tali an armistice: 26, 507-08 

and Naples assault planning: 269-70 

organization and membership of: 2, 2n 

at QUADRA;'>;T Conference: 439, 440 

and Quebec Memorandum: 447-48 

and resources for Eisenhower: 258-59 

and Sicilian Campaign preparations: 52, 54-56 

at TRIDENT Conference: 19-23 

Combined Civil Affairs Committee: 26, 26n, 273, 

274,277,448 

Comiso: 100,141,142,164,217,418 

Command, Allied: 82, 502 

air: 107,320 

for Sicilian Campaign: 10-11,54-55,56,420-21 

Command, Axis: 307n, 453, 469 

air: 32-33,241 

chain of: 27-28,483-84 

German-Italian relationship in: 32-34, 48-49, 

50,78-79,307,308-09,369,371,471 

in Sicily: 82,211-12,378 

structure, OKW proposal: 472-73 

unification plan: 241-42 

Command, German: 27,33-34,236,283,298,523. 

See also Command, Axis; Commander in 

Chief South; Oberkommando des H eeres; 

Oberkommando der Krief!.5marine; Oberkommando der Luftwaffe; Oberkommando der 

Wehrmacht. 

Command, Italian: 29-30, 76, 78, 214, 530. See 

also Comando Supremo; Command, Axis; 

I talian High Command. 

Command, U.S. Air Force. See Air Support Command, XII, 

Commandant Messina Strait: 82 

Commander in Chief South: 33, 33n. See also 

Kesselring, Feldmarschall Albert. 

Commandn in Chief West. See Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von. 

Commandos: 91, 207, 218, 260, 380, 416, 417. 

See also Ranger Battalions, U.S. 

Committee of National Liberation: 530, 531 

Communications, Allied, 175-84, See also Codes; 

Radio communication, Italo-Allied. 

Communications, German: 154, 163, 341, 447, 

460. See also Telephone communications, 

German. 

Communications, Italian. See Radio communication, Italo-Allie'd; Signal communications, 

Italian; Telephone communications, Italian. 

Communications, U.S.: 206, 340. See also Radio 

communication, U.S. 

Communist party, Italian: 42 

"Comprehensive Instrument." See Long terms. 

Coningham, Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur: 379, 

380, 381 

Conolly, Rear Adm. Richard L.: 100, 105, 108, 

123,125,131,133 

Conrath, General der Fallschirm-truppen Paul: 

81, 148n, 165-66, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 

173n, 187,204,216,387,412 

and Axis counterattack in Sicily: 148-49, 153-

54, 164, 172, 173 

Kesselring's criticism of: 157 

withdrawals of: 190, 205, 223-24 

Convoys, Allied: 88, 106, 108, 110, 476, 482, 

493, 498, 503, 509, 533 

Convoys, U.S.: 258 

Cookson, Col. Forrest E.: 141, 143 

Corleone: 235 

Corley, Lt. Col. John T.: 165 

Corps, U.S. 

Provisional: 230, 245, 249, 250, 255, 300, 305 

I Armored: 56, 57, 94 

II: 56, 57, 60, 99, 100, 103, 103n, 135, 144, 

206, 210, 222, 230, 244, 245, 246, 249, 300, 

304, 305, 309, 311, 319, 325, 348, 349, 380, 

421,429 

boundaries of: 244, 245 

front: 220, 222 

tactical plans for: 97, 98, 99 

VI: 57 

Corregidor: 70 

Corsica: 8, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22n, 23, 24, 65, 

67, 203, 258, 284, 438, 459, 460, 463, 471, 

473, 481, 493, 535, 541, 543, 551. See also 

FIREBRAND. 

Cosenza: 372 

Counterattacks, Axis: 147-50, 153-54, 163-73, 

196, 197-98, 202, 204, 211, 212, 220, 222, 

307, 308, 314, 317, 324, 339, 340-41, 342, 

344, 363, 366 

Counterespionage service, Italian: 368 

Courten, De, Ammiraglio di Squadra Raffaele: 

511,517,533,549 

Cover plans. See BARCLAY, Plan; MINCEMEAT. 

Craig, 1st Lt. Robert: 196n 

Crandall, Maj. Robert W.: 348 

Crawford, Lt. Col. Joseph: 152,165,187 

Crawley, Lt. Col. Marshall L., J r.: 194 

Crete: 9,12,424,491 

Croatia: 32,37,445 

Cross-Channel invasion (OVERLORD): 1, 4, 5, 8, 

10, 14, 17,18,20,21,46,88,258,262,437, 

438,439,512 

American position on: 3,435-36,437, 438, 439 

British position on: 437,439 

date set: 22 

and Mediterranean operations, debated: 3, 6, 7, 

11,20-22,435-36,439-40 

scale of: 15 

strength for: 8-9 
INDEX 

Cross-Channel invasion-Continued 

TRIDENT Conference, discussion of: 20, 21 

Crotone: 16, 67 

Crown council: 297 

Cruisers, Allied: 72,100, 147n, 320, 419n, 505 

Cruisers, Italian. See Italian Fleet. 

Cummings, 1st Lt. Julian W.: 133n 

Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew B.: 10-11, 23, 

55, 61, 62, 63, 91, 107n, 182-83, 183n, 320, 

378, 379.420,421, 507, 546, 549 

Currier, Col. D. C.: 427,428,429 

Cyprus: 6 

D-day, Sicilian invasion: 57. See also- Amphibious 

operations, SiciEan Campaign, scheduling invaSIon. 

D'Ajcta, Marchese Blasco Lanza: 297, 297n, 299n, 

368,370,374,441,442,444,461,552 

Dalmatia: 32, 445, 551 

Dammer, Maj. Herman W.: 228 

Daniel, Lt. Col. Darrell M.: 301, 313 

Danube area: 239, 436 

Darby, Lt. Col. William 0.: 96, 136, 152, 169, 

185, 185n, 190,252,253,255 

Davidson, Rear Adm. Lyal A.: 320, 349, 352, 

399,401,402,403 

Deann, Captain: 474 

Decarli, Col. Paolo: 494 

Defeatism, Italian: 39,44,73,283 

Defenses, Axis. See also Fortifications, Axis; Sicily, 

Axis defenses on. 

on Pantelleria: 69-70 

on Sicily: 54, 75-76, 77, 79-80, 83-87, 126-

27,163,217 

Defilades: 195,196,328 

Delia: 192,197,199,200 

Demolition, Axis: 110, 289, 348, 382, 387, 406, 

410,418,497 

Demolition. U.S.: 129 

Dempsey, Lt. Gen. Miles C.: 61 

Denholm, Lt. Col. Charles L.: 152,188 

Denno. Capt. Brycc F.: 187-88 

DeRohan. Col. Frederick].: 343 

Desert Air Force, British: 107-08,412,421 

Destroyers. Allied: 505 

Destroyers, Italian: 533 

Destroyers. U.S.: 72. 100. 129, 131, 168n, 177, 

258, 318,320,393,419n 

Diary of the Office of the Commander in Chief: 

lin 

Dick. Commodore Royer: 474. 485, 486, 506n 

Dieppe raid: 95 

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John: 2n. 5, 59, 88, 89 

Directives, Allied 

Alexander's: 209-10, 230, 234-35, 245-46, 

303-04 

Roosevelt's, on Italy: 545,548 

587 

Directives, Italian. See Memoria 44; Orders, Italian; Pro memoria I; Promemoria 2. 

Dirillo River. See Acate River. 

Dittaino River: 223,341 

Divisions, Allied: 8-9, 54, 57. See also Airborne 

units, U.S.; Armored units, U.S.; British 

Army units; Infantry Divisions. U.S. 

Divisions, Axis: 53, 54. See also German Army 

units; Italian Army units. 

Dodecanese islands: 9, 15-16, 18,64,436,542 

Doenitz, Grossadmiral Karl: 27 

Doleman, Lt. Col. Edgar C.: 359, 360, 361 

Don River: 35 

Donnafuga ta: 156 

Doolittle, Maj. Gen. James: 99,379 

Drop zones (Sicily): 88, 93, 101, 117-19, 157, 

177, 179, 182,218 

Dukws: 89, 104, 160, 170,363,393,396,398,403, 

408 

Durazao: 491 

Duvall, Maj. Everett W.: 127,229 

E-boats, Axis: 70 

Eagles, Brig. Gen. William W.: 254, 360, 361, 

416,417 

East, Sgt. Jesse E., Jr.: 144n 

Eastern Front, Axis: 213 

Ecole Normale: 56 

Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 96, 305-06, 333, 

336,347,385 

Eden, Anthony: 19, 269, 276, 437, 443, 446, 447, 

448, 449 

Eisenhower, General Dwight D.: 5, lin, 15, 17, 

22, 25, 52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 62, 66, 67, 68, 88, 

94, 96, 108, 176, 182, 206, 206n, 236, 261, 

262,269, 304n, 421, 423, 427, 436, 437, 442, 

444, 446, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 475, 477, 

478,489,494,499,501,502.503, 506n, 509. 

5!.'i. 516. 547. 548. See al,o Allied Force 

Headq uarters. 

on airborne divisions: 425 

at Algiers Conference: 23. 24 

broadcasts to Italians: 270,275,278,508,512 

and command structure: 10-11, 420 

and Italian armistice: 270-71, 272, 273, 274, 

275-77, 447, 448. 449, 450. 462, 463, 464-

65. 475, 484. 504, 505, 506. 507, S08, 510-

II, 520, 535, 541-42, 543-44. 545, 546, 

549-50 

on I taly's weaknesses: 540-41 

at Malta conference: 549-50, 551 

and Mason-MacFarlane mission: 540, 541 

and Pantelleria question: 69-70 

and Patton slapping incidents: 429, 430, 431 

and strategic planning: 3, 14, 258, 259, 260 

EI 'Alamein: 1, 35 

Elba: 471 

Elections, Italian: 544, 546, 549 
588 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Elena, Queen of Italy: 517 

Enfilade: 317, 328, 353 

Enfilading fire: 340, 359, 360 

Engineer support, U.S.: 128, 131, 136, 154, 165, 

168, 169,253,255, 301 

excellence of: 418-19 

in Gela fighting: 152 

Engineer units, U.S.: 352, 393, 394, 396, +13. 

See also Shore parties. 

Brigade, lst Special: 103,256 

Regiments 

20th Combat: 256 

39th: 137 

540th Shore: 256 

Battalions 

10th: 408 

307thAirborne: 175 

Engineers, German: 362-63,406 

England. See Great Britain. 

English Channel: 6. See also- Cross-Channel invasion. 

Enna: 63,97, 110, 120, 164, 172, 191, 197,200, 

205, 207, 211, 224, 244, 248, 249, 300, 301, 

302,422 

Enna loop: 231,233,234,235,244,246,248 

Ens, Col. Karl: 198, 336, 337, 339 

Equipment, Allied: 73,131,159,174,486,553 

Equipment, Axis: 73, 81, 377,410,474. See also 

Materiel, Axis. 

Escort carriers, Allied: 16, 262, 269 

Escort craft, U.S.: 320 

Etna line: 315,319,324,327,342,352 

Etter, Maj. Charles B.: 428 

Evacuation of Rome, Italian: 516-19,527-28 

Evacuation of Sicily, Axis: 324, 380, 382, 385, 

416n, 452 

Allied failure to stop: 378-79,409-12,414,421. 

See also Monte Cipollo. 

and Italians: 410,416 

operations for: 375-78,409-10,414-15 

plans and debate: 306-07,368,369,374-75 

schedule for: 410,412,413, 413n, 416, 469 

FaldelIa, General Emilio: 77-78, 78n, 170n 

Farello: 98 

Farinacci, Roberto: 40,464 

Fascist Grand Council: 44, 267-68, 283, 286, 460 

Fascist Militia: 76,445 

Fascist Party, Italian: 268, 281, 283, 285. See 

also Fascist Grand Council. 

Fascist Republican Party: 543, 5+4, 548 

Fascists, Italian: 28,30,39,50,445 

Badoglio government threatened by: 472 

and Mussolini's overthrow: 42, 263-64 

and surrender movemen t: 40 

Favara: 226, 227 

Favarotta: 191, 195 

Federzoni, Luigi: 40, 268 

Feistritz pass: 472 

Feltre conference: 242-44, 263, 282 

Ferry barges, German: 376,377 

Ferrying service, German: 82, 82n, 237 

and evacuation of Sicily: 306,375,376-77,378, 

409-10,411 

ferry barges: 376,377 

Ferrying service, Italian: 53-54, 237, 378, 410 

Feurstein, General der Gebirgstruppen Valentin: 

284, 290, 372, 373 

Ficarra: 396, 398 

Ficuzza River: 208 

Field artillery units, U.S.: 393-94, 399. See also 

Artillery support, U.S. 

Group, 5th Armored: 129n 

Regiment, 77th: 227 

Battalions: 418 

5th: 160,166,188, 188n 

7th: 150, 150n, 160, 167, 167n, 187, 188, 

l88n, 3I3n, 333n 

9th: 195, 195n, 416 

10th: 129,227 

14th Armored: 199, 199n 

26th: 255 

32d: 170, 188, 188n 

33d: 160,166,185, 313n 

34th: 255, 305 

37th Parachute: 179,180 

39th: 195, 195n, 196 

58th Armored: 352, 402, 403-04 

62d Armored: 194n, 199, 199n 

78th Armored: l74n 

158th: 181n, 220 

160th: 208 

171st: 154, 160, 160n, 165, 168, 181n, 31in 

189th; 173, 31tn 

319th Glider: 499 

376th Parachute: 175,255 

Fighter plane factories, German: 439 

Fighter planes, Allied: 102, 107, 110, 119, 261, 

320,376,479,482,486 

Fighter planes, Axis: 151n, 240 

Fighter-bombers, Allied: 107, 320, 344, 376. See 

also A-36's; P-38's; P-39's; P-40's; P-51's. 

Fighter Wings, U.S. 

31st: 320 

33d: 320 

64th; 320 

Finland: 27 

Fire control parties: 401,403 

FIREBRA:-iD: 258 

Fiume: 473 

Fiumicino: 486 

Flak. See Antiaireraft defense, Axis. 

Flint, Col. H. A.: 330, 331, 333, 336, 337, 339, 

340, 341, 344 
INDEX 

Floating reserve, V.S.: 99, 100, 125, 136, 155, 

158, 159, 174 

Florence: 439 

Floresta: 386 

Flotillas, Allied: 522 

Flying fortresses, U.S.: 72,278 

Force 141: 56-57,58-59,68 

Force 343: 57, 58, 60-61. See also Corps, U.S .. I 

Armored. 

Force 545 (British task force): 57,58,60-61 

Force X, U.S.: 136-39 

Formia: 479 

Fortifications, Axis: 54, 75-76, 79, 126-27, 131, 

253. See also Defenses, Axis. 

France: 27,45,46,47,48,51,492,545. See also 

Cross-Channel invasion; Southern France; 

Vichy France. 

Francofonte: 205,215 

Frascati: 442,515,522 

Fredendall, Maj. Gen. Lloyd: 94 

Free French: 14. See also Goums (4th Moroccan 

Tabor). 

Freeman, Lt. Col. L. G.: 181 

French forces: 543. See also Free French. 

French Morocco: 15. 55 

French Northwest Africa: 1, 3~4. See also North 

Africa. 

Fries, Generalmajor Walter: 157,352,414 

at Monte Cipolla: 396-97, 398,404,405 

in San Fratello ridge action: 357-58 

and Tusa ridge counterattack: 321-23 

Fuehrer Conferences: 45n 

Fullriede, Col. Fritz: 197,199,200,313,315 

Funicular station: 536, 537 

Funston: 143 

Furiano River: 352,353, 358, 359, 360, 382 

Furnari: 409,413 

FUSTIA:If: 218, 219n 

Gaeta. 479, 500 

Gaffey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.; 96, 158, 252, 254 

Gaffi Tower: 127, 129 

Gagliano: 315, 328, 329, 331, 338, 339, 341, 342, 

343, 344 

Galli, Carlo: 528 

Gambarra, G('nerale di Corpo d' Armata Gastone: 

525 

Gangi: 233,301,303,312 

GANGWAY: 260 

Garda: 469 

Gardiner, Col. William T.: 499, 500, 501, 502, 

504,510,519 

Garigliano River: 552 

Gas. German threat to usc: 458 

Gasoline: 253, 480, 486, 500, 502 

Gavin, Col. James M.: 94, 101, 118, 136, 173, 

175, 255 

Gavin, Col. James M.-Continucd 

and Axis counterattack: 168-69,172 

and D-day paratrooper landings: 119 

589 

Gay, Brig. Gen. Hobart R.: 235, 246, 246n 

Ge1a: 58,59,64,86,89,91,97,98,99, 100, 107, 

117, 119, 120, 125, 135, 137, 155, 159, 163, 

166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 177, 185, 192,204, 

205,226, 256n, 418, 419,422 

Allied assault on: 136-39 

Axis counterattack at: 148-53, 164, 165, 166, 

170 

Gela-Farello landing ground: 135, 139, 158, 176, 

177,179,182 

Gela River: 97,99, 135, 136 

Genoa: 14,44-2,445.459,473,522 

Genova, Generale di Corpo d'Armata Adalberto 

di Savoia: 534 

George VI, King: 547 

Gerbini: 63 

Gerlach, Captain: 537,538 

German Air Force (Luftwaffe): 37,69, 74n, 78n, 

110, 163, 213, 333, 360, 537, 538, 361-62, 

389, 458, 474. See also Oberkommando der 

Luftwaffe. 

Second: 33, 78n, 83, 204, 214 

Second Air Fleet: 375, 376 

X Flief,;er Korp.r: n 

XI Flieger Korps: 284 

Support Aviation Wing 4: 533n 

German alliance. See I talo-German alliance. 

German Army: 50, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 163, 

173, 190, 197, 198, 199-200, 241, 243. 245, 

259, 261, 285, 288, 290 307, 341, 369, 445, 

473, 477, 478, 482, 486, 491-92, 509, 522, 

523, 530, 552. See also German Army units; 

Reinforcements, Axis; Reserves, German. 

in Casa del Priolo action: 187-89 

command. See Command, Axis; Command, German; Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. 

evacuation. See E\'[tC'u<ltion of Sicily, Axis. 

foot soldier: 553 

glider-borne troops: 537 

ground forces: 47, 48, 369 

and Hitler: 28,29 

<lnd Italian Army: 30, 32, 36,47-48,410,497, 

513-14,525,534,535-36. See also Command, 

Axis. 

Italian equipment and personnel taken over by: 

410 

and Italian railway transportation: 288 

in Italy: 213, 282, 287-88, 289, 290-94, 293n, 

368, 369, 371-72, 451, 452, 469, 4i7, 492. 

See also Occupation of Italy, German; Troop 

movements, German. 

in Sicily: 64, 74,75,203.204.212-14,215-16. 

217. 237, 242, 243. 244, 263, 30R. See also 

Evacuation of Sicily. Axis. 

and Rome battle: 524-25,528,531-32 
590 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

German Army-Continued 

and truce with Italy: 525-26 

German Army units 

DB SUED: 33n, 78, 82, 371, 442, 470, 473, 

513,522,523 

DB WEST: 51, 290, 533 

Army Group B: 241, 275, 282, 284, 290, 293, 

371-72, 373, 442, 452, 469, 470, 472, 473, 

497, 522 

Ann)', Tenth: 470, 471, 522, 523, 524, 532 

Corps 

Deutsches Afrika Korps: 32 

II SS Panzer: 284,451 

XIV Panzer: 51 75, 82, 203, 204, 213-

B, 237, 240, 341, 368, 371, 376, 

45::, 469. 470 

XVII: 515 

LXXVI Panzer: 75, 203, 374, 413, 452, 

470 

Division, Hermann Goering: 48, 51, 74, 74n, 

79, 121, 136, 142, 147, 155n, 157n, 163, 166, 

169, 198,205, 208, 210, 215, 217, 219, 220, 

237, 244, 301, 319, 324, 345, 374-75, 378, 

382,387,405,414,416 

and Allied advance to Yellow Line: 190, 

191 

in counterattack: 154, 164-65, 170, 171-

72n, 172, 185, 187, 188 

in evacuation of Sicily: 412 

Kesselring's criticism of: 157 

organiza tion of: 64, 148-49, 164 

stationing of: 64,75,81,86,87 

withdrawal of: 202-03, 223 

Division, 1st Parachute,' 111, 203, 204, 212-13, 

2B, 216, 2IB, 286, 306. 376.113, 452, 471 

Division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf 

Hitler: 294,442 

Division, 2d SS Panzer "Das Reich".' 294· 

Division, 2d Parachute: 283, 284, 286, 293, 

293n, 442, 451, 452, 470, 485, 492, 515, 523, 

525, 537 

Division. 3d Panzer Grenadier: 75, 214, 215, 

283, 284, 442, 451, 452, 470, 481, 485, 500, 

510,514-15, 521,52:) 

Division, 15th Panzer Grenadier (Sizilien): 51, 

64,81, 84, 86, 87, 125, 147, H7n, 150, 155, 

165, 192, 195, 202, 203, 204, 204n, 223, 224, 

233, 237, 244, 301,307, 308, 315, 319, 324, 

331, 341, 345, 346, 352, 357, 376, 378, 382, 

385, 391, 393, 398, 399, 409, 410, 413, 515 

Division, 16th Panzer: 51, 74-75, 203, 2H+, 368, 

452 

Division, 24th Panzer: 472 

Division, 26th Panzer.' 203, 284, 293n, 289, 

290, 293, 451 

Division, 29th Grenadier: 75, 203, 204, 

213, ~14-15, 216, 237, 211, 263, 282, 300, 

German Army units-Continued 

Division, 29th Panzer Grenadier-Continued 

307, 308, 315, 319, 321 323, 324, 345, 346, 

366. 376, :>78, 380, 3H6, 409, 413 

in evacuation of Sicily: 405 

at Monte Cipolla: 391,404,405 

pursuit of: 406,408 

at Tortorici line: 382 

Diuision, 44th Infantry: 283, 288, 290, 291, 292, 

293,372-73,442,481,533 

Diuision, 60th Panzer Grenadier: 290, 294 

Division, 65th Infantry: 294,442 

Division, 71st Infantry: 442, 469, 472, 481 

Diz;;sion, 76th Infantry: 263,282,294,442 

Division. 90th Panzer Grenadier: 51, 471 

Division, 94th Infantry: 442 

Division, 305th Infantry: 282, 283, 2H8, 

290,291,293, 294,412 

Division, 715th Infantry: 294 

Kampfgruppen: H8n 

Ens: 84, 86, 147n, 

231, 233, 301, 319, 

342, 345 

198,200,202,217, 

336, 337, 339, 

Fullriede: 84, 86, 87, H7n, 192, 198, 199, 

217, 233, 301, 313, 315, 319, 324, 336, 

340, 342, 343 

Koerner.' 84, 86 

Neapd: 84, 84n, 86,87,192 

Schmalz: 86, 120, 123, 147,148, 163, 17ln, 

191, 203, 204, 205, 215, 216, 219, 223, 

422 

Ulieh,' 300,316,317,318,320,322 

Brigade Doehla,' 442 

Regiments 

3d, 1st Parachute Division: 204 

15th Panzer Grenadier: 398,399 

29th Artillery: 393 

71 sl Panzer Grenadier: 322, 382, 388, 399, 

404-

lO.f.th Panzer Grenadier. See German Army 

units, Kampfgruppen, Ens. 

1291h Panzer Grenadier. See German Army 

units, Kampfgruppen, Fullriede. 

Battalions 

1 st, 71 st Panzier Grenadier Regiment: 393, 

397 

2d, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 231 

'2d. 71st Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 363, 

365 

3d, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment: 321 

215th Tank: 84n, 148n, 171n 

alarm units: 368 

antiairC'f3ft units: 243, 290. 372, 393. 397, 486 

artillery battalions: 322, :)82 

coastal defcnse units: 393, 396, 398 

divisions: 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 64,7'1,75,87,244, 

282, 286, '1+5, 497 

divisions. mobile: 1-71 
INDEX 

German Army units· Continued 

field artillery units: 399, 402 

paratroop units: 514. Sn also Paratroopers, 

Gennan. 

patrols: 358, 500 

reconnaissance units: 205, 205n 

service troops: 357 

German Embassy, in Italy: 514, 515, 523, 528 

German High Command: 213,464. See also Command, German. 

German Navy: 474. See alw Ferrying service, 

German. 

German War Documents Project: 35n 

Germany: 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 37, 45, 46, 

73,512. See also German Hitler. 

defeat of, Allied planning for: 3, 6, 17, 21, 

23, 262, 435-36. See also Cross-Channel invasion. 

and Italian armistice announcement: 513, 522 

and Italian mainland invasion: 522-24, 552 

and Italy. See Italo-Gerrnan alliance; Occupation of Italy, German. 

and Russia: 464. See also Russo-German campaign. 

Gestapo: 460 

Giaccone, Lt. CoL Leandro: 530n 

and capitulation to 530,531,532 

and truce with Germany: 530,531 

GrANT 1: 477, 498 

GrANT II: 490, 492, 498, 504, 506, 508, 509 

and Italians: 485-86,488, 489, 494, 495, 501, 

502, 505 

planning of: 485-89, 494,498, 505 

purpose of: 477-78 

Giarrantana: 190. 207 

Gibb, Lt. CoL Frederick W,: 337,344 

Gibraltar: 3,45,52,463 

Giorgio, Generale di Divisione Umberto di: 528 

Giraud, General Henri Philippe: 14,67 

Giuriati, Captain: 505 

Glider troops, British: 92, 423 

Gliders, British: 92,93, 108, 115, 117, 120, 219n 

Gliders. German: 537 

Glori~, Gpnerale di Corpo d'Armata Alessandro: 

288,290,292,293,371,372,373 

GOBLET: 16, 67, 68, 258, 260, 262 

Goebbcls. Joseph: 49,283,28,,) 

Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 27, 33, 34, 

47,83,243 

Gonzaga, General: 534 

Gorham, Lt. Col. Arthur: 150-52, 171, 188 

Gort, Lord: 549 

Goums (4th Moroccan Tabor): 96,98, 305, 314, 

330. 333, 337, 338, 340, 343 

Gozo: 119 

Grammichele: 98, 206, 222, 224 

Gran Sasso: 536,537 

591 

Grandi, Count Dina: 40, 42, 264, 283,460 

as foreign minister, King proposes: 54,8, 549, 

551 . 

and Mussolini's overthrow: 267-68 

peace mission of: 268 

Granieri: 208 

Grant, Maj. Walter H.: 139,313 

"Grasshoppers": 13311, -1- 18 

Great Britain: 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 22, 92. See also 

British Chiefs of Staff; British Government; 

Churchill, Winston S.; Planners, British. 

Greece: 12, 17,24,29,31,32,35,45,46,64, 

110, 261,437,445,453,491,514,535 

Greek rebels: 38 

Crppn Beach: 125. 131, HI. 144, ]61 

Green Beach 2: 136.142,144,145,159,160 

Green West: 125,131 

Grenades. See Hand grenades; Rifle grenades. 

Grottacalda: 2] 7 

Guariglia, Raffaele: 265,275,282,369, 371,444, 

461, 479,480,483n, 511, 517, 523,548 

and evacuation of Rome: 518 

negotiations with Allies: 295-97, 298, 

,454,455,465,466,479,480 

Guerrilla operations 

Balkan: 447 

Italian: 472 

Guingand, dc, :'\faj. Gen. Francis: 61 

Gulf of Catania: 61 

Gulf of Gela: 52,61,63,64,89,96,123 

Gulf of Gioia; 26D 

Gulf of Noto; 61,62,64,89,91 

Gulf of Salerno: 262,448, 449, 509 

Gun lighters, German: 376 

Guns, German: 224, 263, 393, 500 

and evacuation of Sicily: 37:)-76, 375n, 377 

20-mm.: 402 

J iO-mm.: 376 

210-mm.: 214 

Guns, Italian: 75,133 

antiaircraft: 489 

antitank: 79,152,251,485 

artillery pieces: 81, 126, 138, ISO, 152, 169, 

223,382,4]0 

captured by A.mericans: 138, 150, 152, 169 

Guns, U,S.: Su lIi10 Howitzers. 

antiaircraft: 399 

antitank: 154n, 171. 173, 478, 485, 4·98 

103, 158, 331, 363, 365, 396, 

75-mm,; 

IS5-mm.; 337,400,401 

Guzzoni, Generale d'Armata Alfredo: 78, 79, 83, 

81,86.87, J09, 170, 172, 173, 190, 191, 197-

98. 202. 203, 20+. 204n, 205, 21+, 215-16, 

219, 233. 237, 238, 307, 319, 3-1-5, :H6. 374, 

375, :n8 
592 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Guzzoni, Generale d'Armata Alfredo---Continued 

and command relationship in Sicily: 77-78, 

307-09 

and Nicosia loss: 315 

and Sicilian invasion: 110-11, 119, 120, 147, 

163, 16-1-65 

Half-tracks, German: 396 

Half-tracks, U.S.: 173, 195-96, 251,402 

Hall, Rear Adm. John L.: 100,108,136,159 

Hamburg: 292 

Hand grenades: 317, 321, 404 

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T.: 5 

HARDIHOOD: 436 

Harris, 1st Lt. William J: 156 

Harrison, Capt. Willard E.: 178 

Headquarters, Allied: 421, 498. See also Allied 

Force Headquarters. 

Heidrich, Generalleutnant Richard: 377-78 

Heintges, Lt. Col. John A.: 128,193,229 

Herzegovina: 491 

Hewel, Walter: 287 

Hewitt, Vice Adm. Henry K.: 89, 108, 320, 379-

80 

Hickey, Col. Lawrence: 107n 

Highway, coastal. See Highway 115. 

Highway, east coast. See Highway 114. 

Highway, north coast. See Highway 113. 

Highway 113 (north coast): 207, 238, 255, 300, 

304, 308, 309, 316, 320, 353, 367, 378, 380, 

386,388,396,405,408,413 

characterized: 348 

difficulties of: 309 

Highway 114 (east coast): 191, 207, 219, 235, 

248,375,380,416 

Highway 115 (coastal): 92, 121, 123, 131, 133, 

135, 138, 141, 143, 149, 151, 165, 168, 171, 

172, 187, 191, 194,226, 229, 231, 233, 252, 

255,309,316-17,391,398,399,405 

Highway 116: 309, 382 

Highway 117: 97,135,139,149,152,153, 165, 

169, 185, 206,222, 231, 245, 248, 309, 314, 

315,321,322 

Highway 118: 226 

Highway 120: 233, 238, 301, 303, 304,309, 313, 

314, 323, 328, 341, 343, 345, 346, 382, 385 

difficulties of: 309 

terrain around: 325 

Highway 121: 233, 235, 245, 246, 248, 249, 300, 

304,319,341 

Highway 122: 198,226,227,229,230,231,232, 

246, 248 

Highway 123: 155,191,192,195,196,198 

Highway 124: 190, 191, 198, 205, 206-07, 207n, 

208, 209, 210, 222, 223, 224, 233, 422. See 

also Yellow Line. 

Highways, Italian. See Via entries. 

Hill 123: 164 

Hill 132: 164 

Hill 171: 357,358 

Hill 300: 165 

Hill 316: 228 

Hill 333: 228 

Hill 335. See Tusa ridge. 

Hill 432: 232 

Hill 504: 232 

Hill 643: 156 

Hill 673: 359,360,361,362 

Hill 825: 313,314 

Hill 851: 329 

Hill 921: 314 

Hill 937: 313,314 

Hill 962: 313-14 

Hill 1006: 329,330,344 

Hill 1030: 327-28 

Hill 1034: 329,330,336,337,344 

Hill 1035. See Monte Basilio. 

Hill 1056: 336 

Hill 1061: 328, 329 

Hill 1140: 328 

Hill 1209: 333-34 

Hill 1234: 328 

Hill 1321: 330 

Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich: 38 

Hinds, Col. Sidney R.: 194, 199 

Hitler, Adolf: 3,28, 31n, 32, 33, 33n, 39, 41, 46, 

47,48,51,74,75,78,79,82, 111,203,212, 

237, 263, 275, 282, 285, 288, 290, 291, 

293, 296, 308, 368, 370, 371, 374, 443, 460, 

471,472,522,534 

and Badoglio: 283,286, 287,292, 294-95,470, 

497 

and defense of Italy: 49-50,452,469-70 

and evacuation of Sicily: 306, 375 

at Feltre conference: 242-44 

and Italian treachery threat: 37, 49-50, 286-87, 

473, 497 

and Mussolini: 27, 29, 30, 34, 38, 215, 239, 

240, 241, 242, 283, 536, 539 

secret orders of: 214 

and Sicily: 213,214,240,241,243 

strategic views of: 35,213 

Hoare, Sir Samuel John Gurney: 40, 268, 441, 

446,446n, 458 

Holy See. See Vatican; Vatican City. 

Hood, 1st Lt. R. F.: 195 

Hopkins, Harry: 19 

Horses: 348, 348n 

Hospi tal ships, Allied: 110 

Hospitals, Seventh Army: 419 

15th Evacuation: 426 

93d Evacuation: 427-28 

House of Savoy. See Monarchy; Victor Emmanuel 

III. 
INDEX 

Howitzer units, U.S.: 125, 144, 168, 172 

Howitzers, U.S.: 150n, 160, IG7, 172-173, 402, 

403 

75-mm.: 187-88 

105-mm.: 129n, 187, 188 

Hube, General der Panzertruppen Hans Valentin: 

51, 74,82,213,214,215,236,318,319,357, 

379, 385, 388 

and command relationship in Sicily: 307-09 

and evacuation of Sicily: 342, 374, 375, 376-77, 

378, 381-82, 413, 416 

and Nicosia loss: 315 

phase lines of: 324-25, 345, 378, 406, 409, 412, 

414 

in Troina action: 341, 345 

Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.: 56,347,413 

Hull. Cordell: 448 

Humbert, Prince: 283,287,306,371,468,516, 

517 

Hungary: 15, 40, 44, 298 

HUSKY, defined: 4 

Iberian Peninsula: 3,17. See also Spain. 

Infantry Battalions, U.S. 

1st, 7th Infantry: 126, 127, 128, 226, 228, 415 

1st, 15th Infantry: 195, 196,352, 353, 357, 358 

1st, 16th Infantry: 152, 154, 165, 168, 171, 187, 

338, 339, 341 

in Casa del Priolo action: 188-89 

casualties: 189 

1st, 18th Infantry: 187,302-03 

1st, 26th Infantry: 139, 185, 231-32, 301,313, 

314 

1st, 30th Infantry: 359-60, 361, 401-02, 404 

1st, 39th Infantry: 336, 337 

1st, 41st Armored Infantry: 159 

lst, 157th Infantry: 145, 156, 208, 220, 321, 

322,416 

1st, 179th Infantry: 144 

1st, 180th Infantry: 142-43. 154-55, 155n. 

160n, 165,318 

2d, 7th Infantry: 358,365 

and Agrigento drive: 228-29 

D-day landing of: 127-28 

2d, 15th Infantry: 125, 131, 195, 352, 353, 357, 

358 

2d, 16th Infantry: 152, 154, 165, 166-67, 171, 

338 

in Casa del Priolo action: 187-89 

casualties: 189 

2d, 18th Infantry: 185, 187,302-03 

2d, 26th Infantry: 185, 187, 232, 301, 313, 337, 

344 

2d, 30th Infantry: 352 

2d, 60th Infantry: 386 

2d, 157th Infantry: 144, 145, 321, 322 

2d, 180th Infantry: 143, 165, 168, 222, 317, 

318 

Infantry Battalions, U .S,-Continued 

3d, 7th Infantry: 229 

D-day landing of: 128-29 

593 

in Palma di Montechiaro advance: 193-94 

3d, 15th Infantry: 200, 352, 353, 357, 358-59, 

360, 361, 366, 409 

in Favarotta area action: 195. 196 

in San Fratello action: 358 .' 

3d, 16th Infantry: 314,338,339 

3d, 26th Infantry: 165,166,232,301,302,313. 

314,337,344 

3d, 30th Infantry: 197,199,200,359,360,361, 

401,402,404 

3d, 39th Infantry: 333, 334 

3d, 41st Armored Infantry: 194 

3d, 157th Infantry: 208,321,322 

3d, 179th Infantry: 144, 155-56, 208 

3d, 180th Infantry: 155, 155n, 165,321 

landings of: 143-44 

in Pettineo ridge action: 318 

Infantry Divisions, U.S. 

Ist: 57, 94, 98. 100, 101, lOR. 117, 135-

36, 139, 141, 143, 155, 156, 158, 159, 164, 

165, 167n, 169, 170, 170n, 172, 173, IN, 

174n, 175, 179, 185, 190, 197, 200, 206, 210, 

222, 231, 232, 233, 244, 245, 246, 248, 

249, 301, 302, 304, 305, 311, 312n, 314, 

316, 319, 320, 323, 324, 325, 327, 329, 330, 

331, 336, 338, 340, 343, 352, 406, 408, 412, 

417,418,422 

command changed: 347 

logistical planning for: 120 

in North Africa campaign: 95 

tactical plans for: 99-100 

in Troina action: 341, 347 

3d: 94-95, 96, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108, 135, 

155, 170, 174, 191, 192, 197, 198,200, 201, 

206, 224, 230, 231, 249, 254, 305, 323, 

349, 352, 382, 388, 399, 400, 405, 406, 

408,413,418,422 

in British task force: 59-60 

Licata assault plan: 123, 125 

logistical planning for: 102 

at Naso ridge: 391 

relieves 45th Division: 319-20, 348 

in San Fratello action: 348, 353 

tactical plans for: 60,97,98,99 

9th: 94,98,230,231, 320,330, 331, 333, 336, 

343,347,374,382,393,406 

arrival in Sicily: 305-06 

characterized: 96 

36th: 57 

45th: 94, 99, 105, 108, 117, 119, 123, 136, 

142, 165, 172, 173, 206, 210, 222, 224, 230-

31, 232, 233, 244, 245, 248, 249, 254, 300, 

304, 305, 311, 316, 318, 349, 422 

accomplishments of: 323 

~haracterized: 95 
594 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Infantry Divisions, U.S.-Continued 

landing of: 139 

logistical planning for: 102 

relieved by 3rd Division: 319-20, 348 

and Santo Stefano: 321,322,323 

tactical plans for: 98, 100 

104th: 347 

Infantry Regiments, U.S. 

7th: 125, 131, 133,192,200,227, 228-29, 230, 

360, 361, 365, 367, 388, 389, 391, 399, 402, 

404,406,413,414,415,416 

15th: 155, 192, 195, 199, 200, 352, 357, 358, 

361,389,408,413,414 

16th: 149, 150, 151, 151n, 152, 154, 154n, 

156, 160, 165. 169, 173, 174, 206, 222, 

231,232,249,302, 303, 311, 324, 329, 330, 

331,336,337,338,339,341,344 

in Casa del Priolo action: 187, 188-89 

D-day objectives of: 136, 139 

in Nicosia action: 314,315 

18th: 98, 136, 160, 171, 208, 222, 223, 231, 

248, 249, 302, 312, 321, 329, 330, 331, 333, 

338,339,341,342,343,344,413 

landing of: 158-59 

in Nicosia area action: 314 

26th: 139, 149, 153, 158, 165, 166, 185, 187, 

206,222,231,232,301,303 

Gela landing: 136 

in Nicosia area action: 311-12, 313, 314 

in Troina action: 331, 333, 336, 337, 338, 

339, 340, 341, 343-44, 345 

30th: 125, 133, 193, 199, 200, 357, 358, 359, 

360,363,365,366,401,408,415 

39th: 96,98, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 305 

at Randazzo: 385-86 

in Troina action: 329-30, 331, 333, 336, 

338, 339, 340, 341, 342-43, 344, 347 

47th: 343,347,382,385 

41st Armored: 159, 171, 194 

60th: 343, 345, 385, 386 

66th: 95 

157th: 142, 155, 156, 189, 190, 206, 208, 222, 

224, 233, 249, 300, 316, 318, 320, 321, 323, 

408,415,418 

in Bivio Salica landing: 415 

D-day landings of: 141, 142 

Mazzarino move: 232-33 

and Messina drive: 413-14 

and Vizzini: 219-20 

1;-9th: 141,142,155,165, 173, 189, 190,205, 

206, 208, 220, 222, 224, 300, 316, 348,418 

atComiso: 189 

D-day landings of: 144 

180th: 141, 149, 155, 155n, 160, 168, 172, 189, 

190, 206, 208, 220, 222, 249, 300, 316, 317, 

320 

Infantry Regiments, U.S.-Continued 

and Axis counterattack: 165 

landings of: 142-43 

Infiltration, German: 341, 342 

"Innocuous" (code word): 500,502 

Innsbruck: 31n 

Inshore Squadron, British Navy: 380,387 

Intelligence, Allied: 46, 56, 64, 72-73, 245, 261, 

270, 324, 325, 347, 378-79, 449, 541. See 

also MINCEMEAT. 

Intelligence, Axis: 45, 46, 65, 73, 109, 447, 454, 

458, 486. See also Italian Military Intelligence Service. 

Internees, Axis: 456n, 457 

Invasion targets, Axis speculation on: 45-46, 48, 

203. See also MINCEMEAT; Strategic planning, 

Allied. 

Ionia Sea: 45 

Iraq: 6 

Ismay, General Sir Hastings L.: 23 

Italia: 532, 533 

Italian Air Force: 28,29,46-47,83,459-60,474, 

492, 552 

Italian armistice. See Armistice, Italo-Allied. 

Italian Army: L8, 41 163, 197, 241-42, 245, 

272, 288, 307, 370, 373, 470, 471, 480, 488, 

491-92, 501, 509, 515, 522, 523, 524, 540, 

545,547,553. See also Italian Army units. 

command. See Comando Supremo; Command, 

Axis; Command, Italian. 

dissolution of: 524, 534-36 

and evacuation of Sicily: 410 

General Staff: 524 

and German Army: 30,32, 36,47-48,410,497, 

513-14,525,534,535-36. See also Command, 

Axis. 

ground forces: 32, 47, 369, 445, 482, 515, 535, 

552 

ground organization: 240, 243 

infantry: 150-51 

and Memoria 44: 481, 515 

military collaboration with Allies: 441, 445, 

446, 447, 456, 457-58, 464, 465, 466, 473, 

475,476,477,482,484, 485-86, 490-91, 492-

95, 505, 535, 541, 542-43, 544, 551. See 

also Military information. 

morale: 239-40, 241, 261, 270, 285, 451, 529, 

533, 552 

organization and command of: 29-30 

performance of: 64, 239-40, 259 

and Rome: 464,516,517-18,519,528,529-30, 

531,532 

shortages: See Shortages, Italian. 

and truce with Germany: 525-26, 531-32 

weakness of: 30,47,48,80-81,542-43 

Italian Army units 

Army Group East: 491 
INDEX 

Italian Army units-Continued 

Armies 

Second: 289,481 

Fourth: 286, 288, 289, 370, 451, 453, 

472,481. 533 

Fifth: 481 . 

Sixth: 63, 64, 76, 80, 

148, 191, 192, 202, 

237, 309, 346, 378 

Seventh: 481. 534· 

Eighth: 32, 290, 481 

Corps: 513 

83, 84, 86, 110, 

214, 216, 223, 

Corpo d' Armata di Rome: 289, 492 

Motorized: 289, 480, 484, 489, 492, 493, 

49:), 500, 519 

XI: 525 

XII: 63, 84, 119, 149-50, 196, 197, 237, 

238, 308, 315 

XVI: 63, 84, 86, 119, 120, 147, 148, 149, 

163, 164, 170, 172, 223, 237, 533 

XV ll: 289, 492 

XXXV: 289, 533 

Divisions: 63, 282, 457, 46,4, 476, 513, 542-43 

Re: 492,495,525 

2d (Tridentina) Alpine: 372 

4th (Cuneense) Alpine: 372, 373 

4th (Livorno): 47, 63, 81, 84, 86, 87, 111, 

136, 147, 149, 152, 163, 164, 165, 169-

70, 185, 192, 198, 202, 203, 205, 211, 

217,222,223,237,242 

5th (Pusteria) Alpine: 533 

6th (Alpi Graje) Alpine: 372 

7th (Lupi di Toscana) Infantry: 472,488, 

492, 495 

9th (Pasubio) Infantry: 534 

10th (Piave) Motorized Infantry: 266, 

289, 485, 492, 493, 510, 524, 525, 529, 

532 

12th (Sassari): 289,485,492 

21st (Granatieri): 289,492,515, ,'j16, 525, 

529, 532 

26th (Assietta): 63, 80,84, 87, 125, 197, 

238, 358, 366, 382 

28th (Aosta): 63, 80, 84, 86, 87, 87n, 125, 

197, 238, 315, 324, 330 

54th (Napoli): 63,80,84,86,87,111, 

120, 123, 163,205,209,211,422 

58th (Legnano) Infantry: 534, 542 

I03d (Piacenza) lvlotorized: 63n, 289, 492, 

514,523,525 

W4th (Mantova) Infantry: 534, 542 

I05th (Rovigo) Infantry: 372 

131st (Centauro) Armored: 289,485,492, 

525, 526, 527, 532 

135th (Ariete) Armored: 266, 289, 298, 

485, 492, 493, 495,510, SIS, 516, 524, 

525, 529, 532 

Italian Army units-Continued 

Divisions-Continued 

152d Piceno: 534, 542 

184th (Nembo) Parachute: 535 

206th Coastal: 142 

207th Coastal: 126,163,191,192,196 

209th Coastal: 534 

220th Coastal: 492 

221st Coastal: 492 

222d Coastal: 534 

Brigade, XVIII Coastal: 136, 142, H7 

Groups 

Mobile Group E: 149, 151n, 152, 164 

Schreiber: 233, 301 

Venturi: 191,195, 196 

Regiments 

29th In/antr)': 363 

177th Bersaglieri: 191,492,516 

antiaircraft units: 485, 488, 516 

carabinieri: 492, 518, 527, 528 

595 

coastal units: 80, 83, 84, 87, 120, 125, 137, 

13B, 149n, 157,212, 214, 238, 289, 30Q, 

379, 

battalions: 79, 128 

divisions: 534, See also Italian Army units, 

Divisions, 

depot 'mils: 289 

mobile units: 83, 84.86,87,125,142,147 

patrols: 416 

police uni ts: 518 

service school troops: 492, 528 

Italian Cabinet, Badoglio's: 265, 266, 281 

Italian diplomatic corps: 468 

Italian Fleet: 17, 45, 46, 52, 54, 89, 269. 272, 

369, 372, 442, 459, 468, 474, 475-76, 482, 

494,505,506,532,540,541,543 

disposition of: 546 . 

escape from Germans: 533 

inadequacy of: 82 

Italian government. See Badoglio government; 

Caviglia; Mussolini. 

Italian High Command: 77, 462, 494, 503, 510, 

527, See also Badoglio, government of; Monarchy, 

Italian mainland invasion: 73, 240-41. 278, 295, 

435, 437, 438, 439-40, 441-42, 446, 

458, 459, 462, 463, 465, 466, 467, 473, 

498, 522 

airborne operations. See GIANT II. 

and armistice: 474, 475, 476, 482, 491, 492, 

499,508-09,512 

German preparations for: 469-71,523-24 

Italian co-operation with, See Italian Army, 

military collaboration with Allies. 

landings for. See Amphibious operations, Allied, 

I talian mainland; Salerno landings, 
596 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Italian mainland invasion-Continued 

plans and debate: 12, 14, 16, 17, 18-19, 23, 

24,67,259,261-63,269 

scheduling of: 478,479,488,489,490,491,492, 

493,495,496,499,520-21 

strategic planning for: 68, 259-63, 269-70, 440, 

449,512. See also BARRACUDA; BAYTOWN; 

BUTTRESS; GANGWAY; GOBLET; MUSKET. 

Italian merchant marine: 546,552 

Italian Military Intelligence Service: 494, 495, 

496, 499 

Italian military mission: 489, 494, 505-06 

Italian Navy: 28, 29, 45, 46, 505, 552. See also 

I talian Fleet. 

I talian Riviera: 12 

I talian secret service: 470 

I talian Social Republic: 539 

Italian War Ministry: 29,288, 290,514,518,527 

I talians. See Civilians, Italian. 

Italo-German alliance (Pact of Steel): 27, 31, 40, 

267, 295n, 306 

under Badoglio: 281,284,285,553 

termination question: 38-40, 41, 43, 44, 263, 

264,265,282,297,374,474 

Japan: 1,2,4,5, 11, 16,21 

Jeeps: 253 

Jeffers: 139, 139n, 179-80, 180n 

Jefferson: 144, 145 

J eschonnek, Generaloberst Hans: 83 

Jodi, Generaloberst Alfred: 27,37, 211, 212, 287, 

294, 295, 306, 307, 368, 453, 460, 470, 523 

defense views of: 213,214,215,452 

and Hitler: 375,497 

unified command plan of: 241, 242 

Johnson, Col. Charles R.: 125,195,352 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. U.S.: 2, 3, 4, 11, 20, 25, 

26, 277, 279, 436, 437, 449, 462. See also 

Joint War Plans Committee. 

at Casablanca: 7-8 

at QUADRANT Conference: 438-39 

and strategic planning: 5, 6, 7-8, 9-10, 18-19, 

21-22 

Joint Staff Planners: 2n 

Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 2n 

Joint War Plans Committee: 25,435 

Julian Alps: 442, 472 

Junctions. See Road junctions. 

.T unker 52's: 488 

Junker 88's: 177 

Kairouan: 102 

Kaye, Orin W., Jr.: 504n 

Kean, Maj. Gen. William B.: 429 

Keerans, Brig. Gen. Charles L., Jr.: 181 

Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm: 27, 31n, 50, 

282,291,294,295,452,534 

Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm-Continued 

at Feltre conference: 243-44 

at Tarvis conference: 369,370 

Kennan, George F.: 455,459 

Kesselring, Feldmarschall Albert: 33n, 35, 36, 50, 

51, 78, 78n, 79, 83, 204n, 211, 223, 236, 

240, 263, 283, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 

307, 368,369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 458, 497, 

530n, 536 

on Allied invasion targets: 46 

and Badoglio government: 284-85, 286 

and capitulatiop of Italy: 530,531,532 

as Commander in Chief South: 33-34 

and counterattack in Sicily: 163 

and evacuation of Sicily: 374-75 

headquarters bombed: 522-23 

on Hermann Goering Diuision failure: 157 

and Italian mainland invasion: 510, 522, 523 

Italian sympathies of: 470-71,473 

and Italy's defense: 74,75,451,452 

and military aid to Italy: 48,74-75 

and occupation of Rome: 470,532 

and Sardinia: 74,75,471 

and Sicily: 74-75, 86, 87, 203-04, 212-13. 

214-15,237 

and truce with Italy: 526 

Keyes, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey: 94, 176, 198, 199, 

200, 201, 206, 226n, 230,235, 245, 249, 251, 

252,254,389,390,414,416 

King, Admiral Ernest].: 3,6,7,8,10,21 

Kirk, Rear Adm. Alan G.: 100,108,139,161 

Kisters, Sgt. Gerry H.: 331 n 

Kittyhawks: 261. See also P-40's. 

Klessheim conference: 38, 39 

Klinckowstrocm, Col. Karl Heinrich Graf von: 

530n, 533n 

Kobes, Maj. Frank J., Jr.: 352,357, 358 

Komosa, Capt. Adam A.: 180 

KONSTANTIN, Plan: 241,282 

KOPENHAGEN: 283-84 

Krause, Maj. Edward C.: 168, 169, 172 

Krueger. Lt. Col. Walter: 399,402,404 

Kuehl. Chaplain Delbert A.: 181 

Kuriate Islands: 115 

Kursk: 213 

La Bouzarea: 56 

La Marsa: 236 

La Spezia: 82,294,369,464,468,473,481,522, 

532. 533 

Labor Democrats: 42 

Labor unions, Italian: 39 

Lampedusa: 70, 72, 73 

Lampione: 70,72 

Landing craft, Allied: 16,66,70,72, 103-04, 143, 

144, 159, 160, 161, 259, 260, 320, 362, 406, 

419, 449, 493, 505, 520, 522. See also LCI's; 

LCT's; LCVP's; LST's. 
INDEX 

Landing craft, Gennan: 376, 377 

Landings. See Amphibious operations. For landings of airborne troops. see Airborne operations: Airdrops. 

Lanza, Lt. Galvano: 464-65,467,474,500,501 

Laurentiis, Col. Augusto de: 196,229-30 

LCI's: 103, 108, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, ]36, 

158, 159, 320, 363, 393, 499 

LCM'S: 100-lOin, 161n 

LCT's: 103, 105, 108, 119, 123, 129, 131, 320, 

393,396,499 

LCVP's: 103, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 159, 161n, 

363, 393, 394 

Leahy, Admiral William D.: 2n, 7, 21, 259 

Leese, Lt. Gen. Oliver: 61-62, 63, 207, 224, 248, 

249, 342n 

Leghorn (Livorno): 215,460,473,522 

LEHRGANG. See Evacuation of Sicily. 

Lemnitzer, Brig. Gen. Lyman L.: 56,485, 508, 509 

Lentini: 191,216 

Leonardi. Contrammiraglio Priamo: 240 

Leonforte: 207, 233, 248, 300, 307 

Lewis, Col. 'Harry L.: 499 

Liberal Party, Italian: 42 

Libertyships: 100-lOin, 174, 177 

Libya: 32 

Licata: 58,59,63, 79, 86,89,91,96,97,98,99, 

107, 110, 120, 131, 13:3, ]63, 165, 179. 191, 

192, 196, ]97,226,240,256, 256n, 422, 508, 

509 

as Allied objective: 99 

assault on: 123,125,131,132,133 

Liwdia Eubea: 206. 208 

Liebenstein. f'regattenkapitaen Gustav von: 374, 

376,409,410,411 

Light divisions, U.S., proposed: 424 

Lightnings: 261. See also P-38's. 

Linosa: 70, 72, U8 

Liri valley: 522 

Lisbon. See Castellano, peace mission of; Zanussi, 

peace mission of. 

List, Gcncralfeldmarschall Wilhelm: 33n 

List Oberbefehlshaber Suedost: 33n 

Livorno. See Leghorn. 

Ljubljana: 373, 469 

Ljubljana-Tarvis pass: 469,472 

Loesch Film: 3511 

Logistical operations, Allied. See also Maintenance, Allied; Shipping. Allied; Supplies, 

Allied. 

floating supply reserve: 102 

for Sicilian Campaign: 7,89,102-03,420 

Eighth Anny: 92 

and GIANT II: 486, 489, 500 

Palermo as center of: 256 

and railroad lines: 256-57 

Lombard plain: 14 

Long terms: 26,273-74, 276, 277, 447, 449, 461, 

597 

Long terms-Continued 

462, 463, 464, 465, 467, 474, 484, 543, 545, 

546, 548, 550n 

modifications in: 545, 548 

QUADRANT agreement on: 448-49 

signing of: 548, 549 

text of: 559-64 

Long Toms. See Guns, U.S., 155-mm. 

Longo, Luigi: 529 

1,ST'5: 103, 105, 108, 119, 123, 125, 126, 127, 

128, 133, 136, 159, 160, 161n, 320, 360,361, 

362,363,389, 389n, 393,499 

Lucas, Maj. Gen. John P.: 206n, 235, 236, 426, 

427,427n,430 

LuftflottenkommandO'. See German Air Force, 

Second. 

Luftwaffe. See German Air Force. 

Lyle, Capt. James B.: 138, 170 

Machine guns, Allied: 150, 152, 170, 177, 179, 

340,365,393,398,402,404 

Machine guns, Axis: 126-27, 131, 133, 137-

38, 139, 143, 144, 150, 183, 325, 334, 338, 

344, 357, 396, 400, 533 

Mackensen, Hans Georg von: 242, 283n, 284, 

287, 288, 289,473 

Macmillan, Harold: 449,474,476,478,540,543, 

546,549 

McGinity, Capt. James: 119, 143 

McGrigor, Rear Adm. R. R.: 320, 380. See also 

Inshore Squadron, British Navy. 

Maddalena: 468,470,475,533 

Maddox: 147 

Madonie Mountains: 214 

Madrid: 65, 444 

Maintenance, Allied: 91,102, 102n 

Maletto: 385 

Malpertugio River: 316 

Malta: 52, 54, 61, 92, 107, 108, 110, 115, 118, 

119,421. 494, 533,541 

Malta Command, RAF: 107 

Malta conference: 548,549-51 

Manfredi, Contrammiraglio Giuseppe: 255 

Manhart, Lt. Col. Ashton: 352,359,361 

Manziana: 524 

Maps, Allied military: 459 

Marchesi, Maj. Luigi: 482, 490n, 500,511,517 

Marciani, Generale di Divisione Giovanni: 238, 

254 

Mariotti, Generale di Divisione: 524 

Marras. Generale di Corpo d' Annata Efisio: 

286, 287, 296, 369 

Marsala: 11 0, 255 

Marsala naval base: 238 

Marsala River: 255 

Marshall, General George C.: 3, 14, 21, 69, 70, 

109,259,273, 275-76, 279,437,438,541 
598 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Marshall, General George C.-Continued 

at Algiers Conference: 23, 24 

and Sicilian Campaign: 9-10, 66 

strategic views of: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9-10, 17, 22, 

435-36, 437, 439-40 

"Martin, Major," and Operation MINCEMEAT: 

64-65 

Mason, Maj. Gen. Stanhope B.: 155n 

Mason-MacFarlane, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel: 540-43, 

545,546,547,548 

Materiel, Axis: 306, 374, 377. See also Equipment, Axis. 

Mazzarino: 93,202,203,222,223,231,233 

Medal of Honor awards: 196n, 230n, 331 n, 347 

Medical Corps, U.S.: 419 

Medical units, U.S.: 498 

Mediterranean operations, Allied: 3, 4-5, 6, 7, 

8, II, 14, 18-19,20-22, 23,66-67, 73,258-

59, 262, 278, 435, 436, 438, 439,440. See also 

Italian mainland invasion. 

Mediterranean operations, Axis: 27,31 

Melilli: 202 

Memoria 44: 481, 491, 514, 515, 515n, 525, 534 

Memoria 45: 491n 

Mers el Kebir: 493 

Messina: 82, 164, 191, 207, 207n, 231, 243, 245, 

246, 248, 257, 259, 260, 327, 346, 387, 405, 

422,423 

drive for: 210, 234-35, 300-04, 308, 319, 388, 

389,406-17,420 

and Sicilian invasion plans: 53,54 

Messina peninsula: 210, 234, 408. See also Messina, drive for. 

Messina Strait: 13, 22, 52, 82, 89, 214, 236, 263, 

440,449, 552. See also BAYTOWN. 

Allied bombings of: 409-10,411-12 

antiaircraft defense of: 376 

and evacuation of Sicily: 378,379 

traffic regulation across: 237 

Middle East: 5,67,92 

Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.: 95,108,141,155, 

161, 169, 173, 206, 209, 232, 232n, 249,300, 

316,318,320 

Mihailovitch, General Draza: 37, 261, 445 

Milan: 288,442,514 

Military collaboration. See Italian Army, military 

collaboration with Allies. 

Military diplomacy: 278, 552. See also Armistice, 

Italo-Allied, negotiations; Rome, American 

mission to. 

Military government for Italy, Allied plans concerning: 19, 26, 258, 272, 276,457,544,545, 

548. See also Occupation of Italy. 

Military information, from Italy to Allies: 445, 

459-60, 463, 476, 505. See also Order of 

battle, German. 

Military Intelligence Service, Italian. See Italian 

Military Intelligence Service. 

Military party, Italian: 41 

Military police, U.S.: 419 

Millar, Capt. Walter K.: 399,400,404 

MINCEMEAT: 64-65 

Mine fields: 251,253,255,316,344,353,399 

Mine sweepers, U.S.: 147,318 

Mines: 137, 158, 159, 224, 316, 321, 329, 348, 

352,362,382,385,387,401,402,410,524-25 

Ministers, Italian: 517, 528 

Mirto: 389 

Mistretta: 321,322 

Mobile reserves, Axis: 80,83,84,86,87,451 

Mobilization, U.S.: 5 

Modena: 442 

Modane: 442 

Modica: 190 

Molinero, Generale di Brigata Giuseppe: 254 

Mollarella Rock: 131 

Monacci, Generale di Brigata Ettore: 410 

Monarchy, Italian: 19, 25, 40, 41, 42, 50, 242, 

269, 272, 281, 440, 464, 475, 476, 546, 549. 

See also Victor Emmanuel III, King. 

Monrovia: 108, 158 

Montanari, Franco: 444,446,455,457,460,461, 

474,478,482 

Montaperto: 228-30 

Monte Acuto: 328, 333, 334, 339, 340, 342, 343 

Monte Barbuzzo: 363, 365 

Monte Barnagiano. See Hill 962. 

Monte Basilio: 329, 333, 336, 338, 339, 340, 343, 

344, 345 

Monte Bianco: 329, 338 

Monte Camolato: 340, 343 

Monte Canella. See Hill 825. 

Monte Caolina. See Hill 937. 

Monte Castagna: 339, 340 

Monte Cipolla, amphibious operation at: 391-405 

Monte della Guardia: 185 

Monte di Celso: 340 

Monte Femmina Morta: 330 

Monte Lapa: 185 

Monte Pelato: 328, 339, 343 

Monte Pellegrino: 329, 342, 346 

Monte Salici: 329 

Monte Sambughetti: 314 

Monte San Fratello: 352,353,357,359,366 

Monte San Gregorio: 329 

Monte San Mercurio: 343 

Monte San Silvestro: 338, 339, 342 

Monte Scimone. See Hill 1321. 

Monte Sole: 131 

Monte Stagliata: 340 

Monte Timponivoli. See Hill 1209. 

Montc Zai: 185 

Montenegro: 32,491 

Monterosi: 524 

Monterosso Almo: 206, 208, 220 

Monterotondo: 373,510,512,513,523 
INDEX 

Montezemolo, Col. Giuseppe Cordero: 525, 530n 

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L: 55, 

58-60,61,62,89,91,92,206-07, 207n, 209n, 

210, 218, 219, 222, 224, 231, 235n, 236,248, 

304, 304n, 319, 380, 387, 389, 411, 414, 416, 

420, 421, 422. See also British Army units, 

Army, Eighth. 

Moore, Lt. Col. Roy E.: 126, 229, 230 

Morale 

Axis: 73 

German: 325, 342, 405, 460 

Italian: 64, 68, 70, 71, 73, 80, 216, 239-40, 

241, 259, 261, 270, 285, 451, 529, 533, 552. 

See also Defeatism, Italian. 

U.S.: 314 

Moroccans. See Goums. 

Morocco. See French Morocco; Spanish Morocco. 

Mortar support, Axis: 137, 139, 321, 325, 330, 

334,337,344,357, 358 

Mortar support, U.S.: 96, 139, 152, 166, 169, 

170, 171, 228, 317, 344, 393, 398, 399, 400, 

401,402,403-04,408 

Mostaganem: 94, 493 

Motor boats, German: 213,376 

Motor rafts, Italian: 378, 410 

Motor Transport Brigades (MTB's): 320 

Motor transportation, Italian: 486 

Motorcycles, German: 396 

Motta: 321,323 

Mount Cenis pass: 284,294,442,472 

Mount Etna: 53, 207, 210, 218, 235, 246, 248, 

304,307,319,345,378,387,422 

Mountain Training School, German: 284 

Mountains, Sicilian: 245, 309, 348, 352 

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis: 206 

Mules: 348, 348n, 352, 359, 393, 398, 399 

Munich: 442, 469 

Munitions, Italian: 500, 502 

Murphy, Lt. Col. Preston J. C.: 145, 156, 220, 

321 

Murphy, Robert D.: 463,474,476,477,478,540, 

543, 546, 549 

MUSKET: 16,67,260-61,262 

Mussolini, Benito: 24, 25, 31, 35, 36, 51, 52, 73, 

74,78,203,213, 242n, 242-43, 244, 271, 272, 

278, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 

291, 295, 296, 297, 368, 417, 440, 445, 452, 

454, 460, 464, 470, 492, 500, 520, 543, 544, 

552 

on Allied invasion plans: 45-46, 47, 48 

cabinet changes by: 39 

Goebbels on: 49 

and Hitler: 27, 29, 30, 34, 38, 215, 239, 240, 

241, 242, 536, 539 

and Italian Army: 29, 32 

overthrow of: 40-42, 50, 263-64, 266, 267-69, 

270, 274, 282, 306 

popularity diminishes: 39, 44 

Mussolini, Benito--Continued 

rescue of: 536-39 

and Sicilian Campaign: 211, 212, 214 

and surrender: 34,39-40,41,51,215,239 

MUSTANG: 260 

Mustangs: 261. See also A-36's. 

599 

Naples: 14, 16, 67, 68,259, 368, 440, 452, 471, 

473, 552 

assault planned: 260, 261-63 

bombing of: 278 

Naro: 98, 155, 192, 194, 196, 197,199,200 

Naro River: 226,227,228 

Naso ridge: 388, 389, 391, 393, 394, 398, 399, 

401, 402, 404, 406. See also Monte Cipolla. 

Naso River: 394, 396, 398, 403,404 

Naval Base Augusta-Syracuse: 120, 121, 211, 212 

Naval Base Messina: 120,237 

Naval bases, Axis, on Sicily: 79 

Naval blockade: 23 

Naval bombardment: 133. See also Naval gunfire 

support. 

Naval convoys. See Convoys, Allied; Convoys, U.S. 

Naval fires. See Naval gunfire support. 

Naval forces, Allied: 88. See also Naval operations, Allied; Naval Task Forces. 

Naval forces, Axis: 33n, 73,82 

Naval gunfire support, Allied: 106, 111, 120, 129, 

131, 137, 139, 150, 150n, 151, 152, 154, 

167, 167n, 170, 171, 173, 174, 352, 353, 401, 

402,419n 

c-xcellence of: 419 

friendly planes fired at: 175-76, 178-79, 182-

83, 183n, 218 

at Monte Cipolla: 398, 400, 401, 403 

Naval operations, Allied: 420. See also Amphibious operations, Allied; Naval gunfire support; Naval support; Seaborne operations. 

and evacuation of Sicily by Axis: 378, 379-80 

and Pantelleria assault: 69, 70, 72 

in Sicilian invasion: 59, 88, 89, 100, 103-06, 

108,110-11,129,131 

N a val salvage parties: 161 

Naval support, Allied: 320, 380, 382, 405, 419. 

See aim Naval gunfire support. 

Naval Task Forces 

Eastern: 89 

Western: 89,100, lOOn 

81 (Hall's): 100,136,159 

85 (Kirk's): 100, 139 

86 (Conolly's): 100,123,133 

88 (Davidson's): 320, 349, 352, 362,399, 401, 

402., 403 

Naval vessels, Allied: 108, 110, 119, 177, 258, 

317-18, 485, 486, 488, 516. See also Naval 

gunfire support; Naval operations; individual 

names of ships and individual types of ships. 
600 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Naval vessels, Axis: 376,377, 411n, 457, 472, 474. 

See also German Navy; Italian Fleet; Italian 

Navy. 

Navy, U.S.: 69. See also Naval Task Forces. 

and Air Forces: 106 

and Allied antiaircraft catastrophe: 175-76, 

182-83 

and Sicilian invasion: 10. See also Naval gunfire support; Naval operations. 

Nazi party: 30, 298, 472 

Nelson: 549 

Netherlands: 6, 44 

~ettuno: 522 

Neville: 143 

~ew Guinea: 425 

Newspaper correspondents: 390, 429, 431 

Nice: 288, 290, 442, 472 

Nicoletta ridge: 353, 358-60 

~icoletta River: 353, 358 

Nicosia: 207,233,235,309-15,319,324,327,336, 

374 

Night fighting: 165, 173 

Night flying: 93, 101, 117, 157, 175, 177-80, 181, 

424 

Niscemi: 100, 101, 117, 135, 136, 139, 153, 165, 

174,187,188,206,217,222,419 

Nocera: 477 

Nolan, Lt. Col. R. W.: 143 

Normandy invasion. See Cross-Channel invasion. 

North Africa; 1, 3-4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 29, 32, 33, 

34, 35, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 61, 64, 65, 66, 92, 

93, 94, 95, 96, 107, 177, 213, 256, 257, 419, 

421,422,473,482,498,519,553 

North African Air Force Troop Carrier Command: 424 

Northwest African Air Forces Troop Carrier Command (NAAFTCC): 93, 175n 

Northwest African Strategic Air Force (NASAF): 

108,379,380,411, 411n, 412 

Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF): 

102, 107,379,380,411, 411n, 412 

Norway: 3, 4, 27, 45, 436 

Novara di Sicilia: 386, 413 

"Nye, Archie": 64, 65 

Oberbefehlshaber Sued. See Commander in Chief 

South. 

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM): 27, 

33n 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) : 27,83 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW): 27, 29, 

30,32,33, 36, 37, 38,46,47,48,49,50,51, 

65, 74, 75, 78, 82, 157n, 203, 240, 241, 244, 

263, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 

292, 293, 294, 368, 371,372, 373, 374, 375, 

452, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 497, 522, 523, 

533-34 

Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH): 27,32 

Occupation of Italy 

Allied: 12, 17-18,448. See also Military government. 

German: 283-84, 297-98, 372, 448, 464. See 

also ACHSE; ALA RICH; KONSTANTIN; 

KOPENHAGEN; SIEGFRIED. 

OKH. See Oberkommando des Heeres. 

OKL. See Oberkommando der Luftwaffe. 

OKM. See Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine. 

OKW. See Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. 

Oliva, Ammiraglio Romeo: 533 

Oliveri: 409 

Operations Division (OPD) : 3 

Oran: 94,95, 102, 108,493,498 

Order of battle, German: 297,298,444 

Order of battle, Italian: 463 

Orders, Allied. See Directives, Allied. 

Orders, German 

for evacuation of Sicily: 374n, 374-75 

Hi tler' s secret: 214 

on I talian troops: 534 

Orders, Italian. See also Directives, Italian. 

postarmistice: 514,515 

Roatta's: 513-14, 517-18, 519, 535. See also 

Memoria 44. 

Orizaba: 158 

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele: 281n 

Osborne, Sir D'Arcy Q.: 42, 296, 297, 441,455, 

462, 483 

Ostia: 476 

OVERLORD. See Cross-Channel invasion. 

P-38's: 120, 120n, 194, 261,412 

P-39's: 261 

P-40's: 73,261 

P-40 fighter groups: 107 

P-51's: 342 

Paccassi, Flight Officer J. C.: 179 

Pachino peninsula: 52,61,62,63,91, 123, 163 

Pack Train. See Provisional Pack Train. 

Pact of Steel. See Italo-German alliance. 

Palazzo Caprara: 500,502,512,517,518 

Palazzolo Acreide: 111,164-65,170,172,205 

Palermo: 53, 54, 58,60, 76, 196, 201n, 224, 226, 

226n, 230, 233, 234, 238, 245, 256, 256n, 300, 

304,320,399,401,403,417,418,423,506 

drive for: 235-36, 244-54, 246n 

surrender of: 254 

Palermo naval base: 238 

Palestine: 6 

Palma, Generale di Brigata Vittorio: 517 

Palma di Montechiaro: 98,99, 192, 197,235 

Palma River: 129 
INDEX 

Pantelleria: 52,63,107,119 

Allied assault on: 69-73 

fall of: 72,73-74,75 

Parachute Infantry units, U.S.: 424 

Regiment, 504th; 94,175,176,177, 181n, 181-

82, 185, 250, 255, 498, 499 

Regiment, 505th: 94,115,117,139, 142,157, 

175, 182,418,498,499 

D-day landings: 117-18,119 

in Trapani action: 255 

Battalions 

1st, 504th: 175 

1st, 505th: 118, 150 

2d, 504th: 175 

2d, :)lYlth: 117.119,142,1')6 

2d, 509th: 406 

3d, 50+th: 9+, 101. 115 

3d, 505th: 119, 142, 144, 16B 

376th Field Artillery: 175, 179,255 

456th Field Artillery: 144 

Parachute landings. See Airdrops. 

Parachute task forc(', U.S.: 98, 136 

Parachutes: 92, 93 

"Parallel war" concept: 30-32 

Paratroopers, British: 218-19, 219n, 260. See also 

British Army units, Division, 1st Airborne. 

Paratroopers, German: 204, 218, 500, 514, 516, 

523,525,527,537 

Paratroopers, U.S.: 92,93, 101, 102, 106, 110, 

136, 139, 154, 155, 165, 167, 185, 187, 423, 

508, 509. See also Airborne units; Parachute 

Infantry units. 

and airdrop failure: 156-57 

and Allied antiaircraft disaster: 175, 176, 177-

78,179,181, 181n, 192 

Biazzo Ridge stand: 168-69,172-73 

D-day operations of: 117,118-19,142 

in Piano Lupo drive: 150, 152 

Parks, Air Vice Marshal Keith: 549 

Party of Action, Italian: 42 

Passive resistance, Italian: 447 

Passo Pisciero: 205 

Patrols, U.S.: 155,156,170,187,193,198,217, 

233, 254, 304, 321, 329, 330, 346, 347, 365, 

386, 404 

Patti: 408 

Patton, General George S., Jr.: 55, 56, 94, 108, 

158, 159, 169-70, 174, 174n, 175, 176, 189, 

197, 199,200, 201, 205,206, 206n, 209, 231, 

245, 246n, 252, 253, 257, 349, 380, 390, 391, 

406, 408, 412, 421, 423. See also Army, 

Seventh, U.S. 

and Agrigento drive: 224 

and Alexander: 210, 211, 235-36, 245-46 

and Messina drive: 304,305,388-89,413,414 

and Palermo: 224, 226, 226n, 235-36, 244, 254 

performance as commander of Seventh Army: 

425-26 

Patton, General George S., Jr.-Continued 

rearrangement of forces by: 230-31 

slapping incidents: 426-31 

601 

and tactical planning for Sicilian campaign: 

59,60,91,96,97,98,105-06 

Pearl Harbor: 2 

Pelagian Islands: 70, 73, 75 

Peloponnesus: 64, 65, 203 

Perry, Col. Redding L.: 158, 174n 

Pescara: 517,518,524,528,532 

Petain, Marshal Henri: 464 

Petralia: 245-46,301,302,303,304,305,311 

Pettineo: 318,321 

Philadelphia: 178, 393, 398, 399, 403, 403n 

Photographs. See Aerial photographs. 

Piano Lupo: 101, 119, 135, 136, 139, 150, 153, 

154, 156, 164, 168, 169, 171 

Piazza Armerina: 97,98,164, 192, 198,217,248 

Piccardi, Leopoldo: 531 

Pietraperzia: 198, 217, 232, 233 

Pillboxes, Italian: 133, 139, 141, 143, 144, 251, 

253, 353 

Pincer movements, U.S.: 125, 131, 133, 156, 189, 

341 

Piper L-4's: 133n, 418 

Piramo: 399 

Pisa: 15,470 

Pizza Spina: 316-17 

Planes: See Aircraft, Allied; Aircraft, Axis; and 

by name and desi!!,nation. 

Planners, Allied. See also Force 141. 

air: 120 

AFHQ: 13,1+,16,65-66,258,259-60 

CCS: 258-59, 425 

tacticaL for Sicilian Campaign: 53, 54·, 63, 64, 

65-66, 88 

Planners, British: 4, 436 

and armistice terms for Italy: 25-26 

strategic: 15-16,18,19,21,258,259 

Planners, U.S.: 

Army us. ~avy, Sicilian invasion: 106 

for GIANT II: 488-89 

logistical, for Sicilian Campaign: 102 

tactical, for Sicilian Campaign: gg 

strategic: 17-19, 258, 259 

Planning. See Assault plans; Strategic planning, 

Allied: Strategic planning, Axis; Tactical 

planning, Allied; Tactical planning, Axis. 

Plans. See Air plan; Assault plans; Tactical plan. 

Platani River: 245, 250. 

Ploesti oil fields: 14 

Po valley: 15,45,50,371,439 

Poggio del Moro: 345 

Poggio Lungo: 133,197 

Point Braccetto: 141,144,145 

Point Branco Grande: 141, 145 

Point Camerina: 141 

Point San Nicola: 127 
602 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Point Zafaglione: 144 

Pola: 294,370,473 

Polack, Col. Fritz: 393,396, 397, 399-400 

Ponte Dirillo: 100, 118, 119, 135,141, 142, 143, 

164, 168, 172, 173 

Ponte Grande: 121 

Ponte Olivo: 61,96,117,135,136,174,200 

Ponton causeways: 105, 159-60, 174n, 408 

Pope Pius XII: 40, 283 

Port Defense "N," Palermo: 196, 254 

Port-Lyautey: 95 

Port Said: 52 

Porta San Paolo: 530 

Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles: 11 

Portella di Reccativo: 233,249, 300, 301 

Porter, Ellis: 504n 

Porter, Lt. Col. Ray W., Jr.: 325 

Porto Empedocle: 110, 209, 224, 226, 228, 230, 

235, 256, 256n 

Ports 

Adriatic: 24 

Italian: 67,68,457 

Sicilian: 53, 54, 58, 63,89, 96-97, 98, 110 

Postumia-Ljubljana gap: +36 

Pozzallo: 97 

Pratica di Mare: 286 

Prichard, Lt. Col. Leslie A.: 352 

Priolo: 123,202 

Prisoners of war, Allied: 447, 454, 468. See also 

Casualti~s, British: Casualties, U.S. 

Prisoners of war, Axis: 255, 323,419, 456n, 457, 

468. See also Casualties, Axis; Casualties, German; Casual ties, Italian; Prisoners of war, 

German; Prisoners of war, Italian. 

Prisoners of war, German: 168-69, 173n, 342, 394. 

See also Casualties, Axis; Casualties, German. 

Prisoners of war, Italian: 139,223, 228,253, 314. 

See also Casualties, Axis; Casualties, Italian. 

return of, promised: 270, 275 

of Germans: 533, 534 

Procyon: 178 

Promernoria I: 491 

Promemoria 2: 491, ·192n, 514 

Propaganda. See also R"clio broadcasting, Allied; 

Radio broadcasting, Italian. 

Allied: 293, 543-44 

Germ"n: 524 

I tali"D; 239-40, 548 

Propaganda officers, Allied: 505 

Provisional Corps. See under Corps, U.S. 

Provisional Mounted Troop: 343 

Provisional Pack Train: 343. See also Mules. 

Prunas, Renato: 297,455,461 

Psychological warfare: 272, 275. See also Propaganda; Radio broadcasting, Allied; Radio 

broadcasting, Italian. 

"Puddle-jumpers". See Piper L--1's. 

Puglia: 244, 263, 232, 368, 452, 471, 473, 522, 

534 

Punta delle due Rocche: 133 

Pun toni, Generale di Divisione Paolo: 264, 266, 

511 

QUADRAKT Conference (Quebec) 

Long terms agreed on: 448-49 

and strategic planning: 435-36, 437, 438-40 

Quebec Memorandum: 447-43, 457, 475, 431, 

556-57 

Quebec telegram: 457-58, 460, 461 

Queen Mary: 19 

Quirinal Palace: 511, 512, 527 

Rabat: 94 

Radar: 32, 107 

Raddusa: 224 

Radio Algiers: 503-09 

Radio Bari: 540 

Radio broadcasting, Allied: 278, 508-09. See also 

British Broadcasting Corporation; Eisenhower, broadcasts to Italians. 

Radio broadcasting, Italian: 488, 513, 515, 516-

17, 528, 529, 530. See also Radio Rome. 

Radio communication, Italo-Allied, secret: 459, 

461, 466-67, 478, 490, 495-96, 503, 504, 

505, 532, 535, 540 

Radio communication. U.S.: 176, 189, 399. 400, 

401,404,499-500 

Radio Rome: 508,509,513 

Radio stations, Axis: 71 

RAF: 107 

Ragusa: 91,96,98,100,156,189,190 

Rahn, Rudolf: 473,483,497,514 

Railroads 

Italian: 24-25,283,291,293,412,533 

Sicilian: 256-57, 309 

Railway Operating Battalion. U.S., 727th: 256 

"Raimondi, Signor": 441. 444. See also Castellano, 

Generale di Brigata Giuseppe. 

Ramsey, Vice Adm. Sir Bertram H.: 89 

Randazzo: 207,345,346,378,393,404,418 

and Axis evacuation of Sicily: 382, 385, 386 

bombing of: 385, 385n 

Ranger Battalions, U.S.: 95, 100, 165, 220, 252-5:1 

and Axis counterattack: 169-70 

and Gela assault: 136,137-39,152-53 

1 st: 96 

3d: 96,125,200,227,391 

in Green Beach assault: 131-32 

in Montaperto drive: 228 

4th: 96 

Rapido River: 552 

Ravenna: 15,445,459 

Reconnaissance, German: 148, 398. See also Air 

reconnaissance, Axis. 
INDEX 

Reconnaissance units, U.S.: 107, 192, 194, 201, 

224, 228, 229, 230, 235, 250-51, 253, 304, 

312-13,498 

Battalion, 82d: 174n, 254 

Squadron, 91st; 311,314,330,331 

Red Beach: 125,133, 141, 161 

assault on: 125-31, 143 

characterized: 126-27 

Red Beach 2: 136, 143, 158, 159, 160 

Reese, Pvt. James W.: 344, 344n 

Regalbuto: 307,319,341, 342n 

Reggio di Calabria: 16,214,237,260,483 

Regimental Combat Teams. See Infantry Regiments, U. S. 

Reinforcements, Axis: 54,64, 65, 74-75, 203, 204, 

212-13, 216, 237, 242, 243, 244, 263, 282, 

289, 290-94, 293n, 308, 368, 369, 372, 373, 

442,451,452,462,477,492,534 

Reporters. See Newspaper correspondents. 

Reprisals, German: 513 

executions: 533,534 

threatened: 445,453,458,464,467,547 

Reschen Pass: 373 

Reserves, German: 237, 294,477. See also Mobile 

reserves, Axis; Reinforcements, Axis. 

Reserves, Italian. See Mobile reserves, Italian. 

Reserves, U. S.: 97-98, 136, 187, 200. See also 

Floating reserve. 

Resources, Allied: 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 25, 258-59, 261, 

262,278,436,437,439,449 

Revel, Grand Admiral Paolo Thaon di: 42, 43 

Rhodes: 44,514 

Ribbentrop, Joachim von: 35n, 36-37, 283, 283n, 

369, 371 

Ricci, Umberto: 517,528,532 

Richardson, Maj. Gen. A. A.: 549 

Richthofen, Feldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr von: 

78, 78n, 241, 295 

Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.: 93, 94, 101-02, 

108, 182, 254-55,498, 508 

on airborne forces: 157, 424 

and Allied antiaircraft disaster: 175-76, 179, 

184 

and GIANT II: 485, 486, 488, 489, 498, 499 

Riesi: 192,193,197,198,199,200 

Rifle grenades: 317 

Rifle support, Axis: 133, 137-38, 139, 144,343 

Rifle support, U.S.: 1:l0, 152, 317, 340, 402, 40~ 

Rifle units, U,S,: 189, 344-45, 361, 363, 365, 

366, 393, 394, 396, 397, 400 

Rintelen, General der Infanterie Enno von: 32, 

33, 33n, 36, 49, 51, 74, 211n, 282, 284, 285, 

287, 291, 292n, 369, 372, 452, 471, 472, 473, 

510 

on I talian armed forces: 48 

in Italy: 32, 33 

peace moves of: 291, 292-93, 294-95 

Riviera: 472 

Rizzo, Franco Babuzzio: 296 

Road junctions: 

Bompietro: 313 

highway: 209, 222 

Maletto: 385 

Piano Lupo: 150, 151, 152, 188 

Y: 135 

603 

Roadblocks: 79, 101, 185, 196, 200, 201, 206, 

228, 233, 249, 255, 'lOG, 301, 348, 365, 513, 

514 

Roads, Italian. See Via entr;,;s. 

Roads, Sicilian: 53, 100, 101, 135, 141, 149, 195-

96, 208, 211, 226, 23:~n, 245, 249, 301, 318, 

336, 3:1f)-4n, 401, '~18-19. See also Highway 

entries. 

Butera: 152 

in C:mciGlttl area: 198-qq, 200 

Cesaro-San Fratcllo: 352-33,357 

to Messina: 207 

Niscemi-Piano Lupo: 154,164,165,166,168 

north coast. See Highway II :'" 

Ponte Olivo-Mazzar,,,c: 206 

Santa Croce Camenna .. V:ttoria: 142 

Roatta, Generalc di Corpo d'i\rmata Coman dante 

Designato d'Arm.'lla Mario: 47, 76, 77, 79, 

214, 215, 242, 263, 275, 281, 282, 285, 286, 

287, 288, 290, 29:), 294, 368, 372, 373, 374, 

441, 452, 455, 458, 460, 462, 466, 479, 490, 

491, 491n, 494n, 500, 501, 514, 520, 523, 

528, 529, 534, 542, 549 

at Bologna conference: 452-53 

and Castellano's missicm: 4.13-54 

and defense of Italy and Rome: 289, 451, 492, 

493,510, 513-h. 515, 516 

and evacuation of Rome: 517. :l18, 524 

and German relations: 289, 503, 510, 512, 

513-14 

and Italian mainland )))Vas!on: 19:,-9·1, ·195, 

496, 502, 503 

orders and dirc~I',es: 513-14, 515, 517-18, 

519 .. ~;l:), See ulJ M QOlur;a 44. 

[(ohert [(01. ali' 177 '7'1 

Rocca di Mania: :' 'l, .. ,I ". ~,,\ 

Roccella River: :,00 

Rocket launchers. See B;lzuok:'ls. 

Rodt, Generalmajor Eberhard: 81, 84, 192, 196, 

198, 217, 233, 301, 313, 315, 324, 341, 

342, 3·t5, 346, 352, 382. 38:;-H7, 3ilil. 401, 

405 

Roe: 129 

Rogers, Col. Arthur R.: 125, 357, 358, 361, 401, 

408 

R(Jllla: ~,32-33 

Rome: 14, 24, 38,68, 71, 72,441,442,444,448, 

449, 452, 458, 467, 472, 484, 499, 500, 501, 

502,503, 505, 512, 513, 514, 515 

and airborne operation by Allies. See GIANT II. 

American mission to: 499-502, 503-05 
604 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Rome-Continued 

battle for, Germans and Italians: 524-32 

bombing of: 24-25, 250, 278, 279, 292, 442 

defense of: 289,464,480,492,493,510,513-14, 

516,524-32. See also Memoria 44. 

evacuation of: 516-19,527-28 

German occupation of: 532 

German threat of seizure of: 283, 284, 285, 288, 

289, 298; 368, 372, 442, 451-52, 453, 464, 

470,476,481,515-16. See also ACliSE. Plan. 

and Italian mainland invasion: 437, 440, 473, 

474,475,477-7~ 522, 531 

liberation of: 551,552 

as open city: 278-80, 373,469 

Rommel, Generalfcldmarschall Erwin: 4, 32, 35, 

49,50,51, 226n, 241, 242, 282, 283, 284, 285, 

371-72, 442, 452, 453, 460, 469, 472, 497, 

522, 534 

Rooks, Maj. Gen. Lowell S.: 15, 24, 67, 236, 262, 

440,485,486,503,504, 504n, 506n 

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: 1, 3, 11, 12, 19, 20, 

23, 40, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 

279, 287, 435, 442,443, 444, 446,447, 456n, 

458, 461, 462, 507, 535, 540, 544, 547, 548, 

549, 550 

and Italian armistice: 274, 276-77, 448, 449, 

545, 546 

and strategic planning: 4,7,437,438 

Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Theodore: 158,313,339,347 

Rose, Brig. Gen. Maurice: 125,197,199,253 

Rosmarino River: 363, 365, 366, 367, 388 

Rossi, Generale di Corpo d' Armata Carlo: 84, 

242n, 369. 441, 452-53, 465, 490, 491, 494, 

494n, 495,496, 500, 501, 505, 510 

and armistice announcement: 503, 504, 519-20 

and GIANT II: 495, 496, 503 

ROUNDHAMMER: 437. See also Cross-Channel invasIOn. 

ROUNDUP: 3, 5. See also Cross-Channel invasion, 

Rowan. See Robert Rowan. 

Royal Air Force, Malta Command: 107 

Ruini, Mellccio: 531 

Rumania: 8, 12,40, 44, 298 

Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von: 283, 

284, 288,472-73 

Russia. See Russo-German campaign; Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Russo-German campaign: 22, 23, 32, 35, 45, 46, 

241,244,417,435,445,458 

Sabotage, Italian: 447, 497 

St. George's Hotel: 56 

Salemi: 255 

Salerno: 262-63, 368, 449, 452, 465, 471, 482, 

498, 500, 503 

Salerno landings: 482, 505, 509, 520, 521, 522, 

524, 530, 531, 535, 536, 540, 541, 552. See 

also I tali an mainland invasion, 

Salonika: 445 

Salso River: 97, 99, 232, 233, 245 

Salvi, Col. Giorgio: 500,518,519,525,528 

Sampieri: 176 

Samuel Chase: 108 

San Fratello: 349-67, 374, 380, 382, 388, 393, 

418,419 

San Gregorio: 344 

San Marco d'Alunzio: 365, 366 

San Michele di Ganzeria: 202 

San Nicola Rock: 127 

San Oliva Station: 128 

Sandalli, Generale di Divisione Aerea Renato: 492, 

511, 517, 549 

Sangro River: 552 

Santa Caterina: 233, 246, 248 

Santa Croce Camerina: 142,156 

Santa Ninfa: 255 

Santa Teresa: 412,414 

Sant'Agata: 352,363,365 

Santo Stefano di Camastra: 214, 307-08, 321-23, 

348, 352, 360 

Sanzi, Alfredo: 530n 

Sardinia: 6,7,8,9,12,14,15,16,17,18,19, 22n, 

23, 24, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 67, 73, 

74, 109, 110, 203, 239, 258, 259, 283, 284, 

438, 453, 459, 460,463, 464, 471, 473, 481, 

493,494,506,515, 535, 541, 542, 543 

defenses of: 75, 76 

invasion plan. See BRIMSTONE. 

and MINCEMEAT: 64, 65 

Sarno: 477 

Savannah: 137, 137n, 170 

Scaletta: 414 

Schacht, Capt. Hans: 526 

Schaefer, Lt. Col. Irving 0.: 144 

Schaefer, Lt. Col. William: 142, 143, 155, 155n 

Scheel. See Vietinghoff gennant Scheel, Gener"l 

der Panwrtruppen Heinrich von. 

Schmalz, Col. Wilhelm: 12'3, 147n, 148, 191, 

204,216,219,240 

Schmundt, Generalmajor Rudolf: 287 

Schreiber, Generale di Brigata Ottorino: 197-

98,200,217 

SCliW ARZ. Operation: 452 

Sciacca: 251 

Scoglitti: 97, 98, 100, 141, 143, 144, 161, 165, 

177, 256n, 418, 419 

Scordia: 207 

Scorza, Count Carlo: 39,267,549,551 

Scout planes: lSI n 

Seaborne operations, Allied: 259, 498-99, 500, 508, 

509. See also Amphibious operations, Allied. 

Second Front, Axis: 240-41,242 

Senger und Etterlin, Generalleutnant Fridolin 

von: 82, 148, 163, 170, 172, 173, 203, 204, 

205,214,215,223,237,309,375 
INDEX 

Senise, Carmine: 39 

Serradif aleo: 233 

Sfax: 92 

Shelly, 1st Lt. M. C.: 181 

Sherman, Col. Harry B.: 125,129,227,401 

Ship-to-shore operations: 100, 105 

Shipping, Allied: 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 60, 62, 

73,105,159,177,320,473,486 

Shipping, Italian: 485 

Ships. See Naval vessels, Allied: Naval vessels, 

Axis. 

Shore parties, U,S.: 161, 170n, 171, 401, 403. 

See also Beach parties; Naval salvage parties. 

Shore-to-shore operations: 100, 105 

Short (military) terms: 273, 274, 276, 277, 447, 

448, 449, 461, 462, 465, 541, 549, 558 

negotiations over: 455-59. See also Cassibile 

conference. 

QUADRANT discussion of: 448, 449 

signing of: 483, 484, 501 

Shortages, German: 37 

Shortages, Italian: 37,81, 298, 457, 459-60, 480, 

485, 500. 502, 542-43 

Shorter bridgehead line. See Tortorici line. 

Shubrick: 137, 137n, 152 

Sicily: I, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 33, 44, 45, 46, 

47, 48, 49, 50, 73, 75, 269, 275, 282, 283. 

284, 295, 459, 465, 473, 498, 499, 508, 541, 

551. See also Evacuation of Sicily, Axis. 

Axis defenses on: 66, 75-77, 79-80, 83,84,86-

87,126-27.163 

geographical features: 52-53. See also Terrain, 

of Sicily, 

strategic importance of: 52.213 

SIEGFRIED: 284 

Signal communications, Italian: 79-80, 163 

Signal Corps. U.S.: 419 

Signal units, U.S.: 498 

Signals, U.S.: 195 

Sillian Pass: 373 

Simelo River: 207, 218, 219, 223, 224, 385, 393 

Skorzeny, Capt. Otto: 284, 285, 286, 368, 452, 

470, 536, 537 

Sladen, Lt. CoL Fred W., Jr.: 359,360,361 

SLEDGEHA:>fMER: 3n 

Slovenia: 32 

Small arms support, Allied: 154,170 

Small arms support, Axis: 169,300,318,321,330, 

338,344,358,402 

Small craft, Italian: 546 

Small craft, U.S.: 160,379 

Smith, CoL George A.: 159, 303, 341 

Smith, Maj. Gen. Walter B.: 11,24, 444n, 455n, 

485,546, 547, 549 

and armistice negotiations: 455, 457, 457-58, 

458n, 459, 460, 462. 463, 474, 475, 476, 

478,482,483,484,548 

Smith, Maj. Gen. Walter B.-Continued 

and Italian mainland invasion: 489,490 

Smoke screens: l:H, 401 

Smythe, CoL George W.: 343, 382, 385 

Snipers: 321,400 

Socialist Party, Italian: 42 

SOC's: 147n 

605 

Sogno, Generale di Corpo d' Armata Vittorio: 

527-28 

Soleri, Marcello: 43 

Soleli: 53'7 

Solinas, Generale di Brigata Gioacchino: 525, 529 

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.: 8 

Sommatino: 192,197,199,200 

Sorice, Generale di Brigata in Riserva Antonio: 

282,511,517,518,527,528,529 

and armistice renunciation: 511 

and capitulation to Germans: 530, 531 

Sousse: 70 

South Tyrol: 373,533 

Southern France: 4, 12, 15, 17, 22, 32, 45, 46, 65, 

67, 435, 436, 438, 439, 472. See also France. 

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl: 182,379 

Spadafora: 413,414,415 

Spain: 5, 8,43,45,46, 55, 65 

Spanish Morocco: 55 

Sperlinga: 301,312,314,336 

Spitfires: 107,261,339,340 

SS agents: 492 

Stalin, Marshal Joseph: 11, 34,35,458, 545, 546 

Stalingrad: 1,34,37,213,372 

Stark, Admiral Harold R.: 2n 

State Department, U.S.: 19, 26, 269, 273, 279, 

449 

Stalo Maggiore Generale. See Gomando Supremo. 

Stata AI aggiore Regia Aeronautica (Superaereo): 

29,491 

Stato Maggiore Regia Marina (Supermarina): 

29, 33n, 71, 72, 11 0, 491, 533n 

Stato Maggio Regio Esercito (Superesercito): 

29-30.49, 77, 216, 281, 307n, 369 

Steamboats, Italian: 378 

de, Generale di Corpo d'Armata Giuseppe: 292,510,511,515,518,524 

Stephenson, Lt. Col. Edward F.: 144 

Sternberg, Lt. CoL Ben: 185 

Stimson, Henry L: 437,438 

Stolfi, Dr. Edoardo: 529-30 

Storch aircraft: 537-38 

Strait of Gibraltar: 82 

Strait of Messina. See Messina Strait. 

Strategic planning, Allied: 1-26, 66-67, 258-63, 

268-69, 278, 435-40 
606 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Strategic planning, Axis: 34-35,37-38,213,368 

Strength, Allied: 8-9, 53, 107, 203, 212, 262, 

417n, 421, 424, 425, 468, 474, 475, 477,479, 

512 

Strength, Axis: 32, 47, 48, 53, 63, 64, 226-27, 

238, 301-02, 449, 458, 459, 477, 500, 501, 

513,535 

Strikes, Italian labor: 39 

Strong, Brigadier Kenneth D.: 455, 455n, 459, 

460,462,463,474,485,506, 506n, 507 

Student, Generaloberst Kurt: 157n, 284, 285, 286, 

368, 452, 526, 536, 537 

Submarines, Axis: I, 37, 38. 70, 73, 82, 213 

Suez Canal: I 

Supcraereo. See Stato Maggiore Regia Aeronautica. 

Superesercito. See Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito. 

Supermarina. See Stato Maggiore Regia Marina. 

Supplies, Allied: 54, 63, 131, 146, 160, 161, 174, 

258-59, 311, 348, 352, 420. See also Logistical operations. 

Supplies, Axis: 37, 47, 77, 79, 82, 445, 452, 469, 

477 

Supplies, Italian. See Shortages, Italian. 

Supply ships, Allied: 256 

Supply trains: 348 

Surprise. See Tactical surprise. 

Surrender of Italy: 25-26, 39-40, 273, 275, 448, 

477,482, 496, 499, 523, 552. See also Armistice, Italo-Allied; Capitulation, I ta!ian; U nconditional surrender, for Italy. 

Surrender of Sicily: 25 

Susan B. Anthony: 178 

Swanson: 45 

Sweden: 45 

Swing, Maj. Gen. Joseph M.: 175, 176, 423, 425 

Swingler, 1st Lt. H. H.: 119, 173 

Switzerland: 43 

Syracuse: 53,54,58,61,89,91,92,97,111, 120, 

123, 163, 164, 203. See also Naval Base 

Augusta-Syracuse. 

Tabellini, Generale di Divisione U go: 529 

Tactical Bomber Force: 107 

Tactical planning, Allied (Sicilian Campaign). 

See also Assault plans. 

air operations: 59. See also Air plan. 

airborne operations: 88-89,92-94, 101-02,485-

89, 498-99 

Allied armies' missions: 209-211, 235, 236, 245-

46,319,420,422-23 

for amphibious operations: 53-54, 58, 59, 60-

63,66,88-89,91-92,96-100, 103-07, 135-36, 

406,408,413-14 

basic plan and modifications: 58-63, 206-07, 

209-11, 248-49, 419-20, 422-23 

ground operations: 58-59, 60-63, 89-101, 135-

36, 141-42,421-23 

Tactical planning, Allied-Continued 

for Messina drive: 234-35, 245, 246, 248, 319, 

413-14 

naval operations: 59,89,100,106 

for ~icosia attack: 314 

for Palermo drive: 234-36, 244-46 

for Troina attack: 333-34, 336-37 

Tactical planning, Axis. See also ALARlCH, 

Plan; Feltre conferencp: KONST ANTlN, 

Plan. 

to block Allied advance: 192 

for counterattacks in Sicily: 147-49, 164-65, 

170, 172, 196, 197-98 

and dual command: 307-09 

for Sicily's defense: 83-87,120-21,212-14 

withdrawal and defensive lines: 202-03 

Tactical surprise: 65-66, 70, 102, 106, 120, 322, 

366, 396, 537 

Tag!iavia, Lieutenant: 504,505 

Tangier: 298 

Tank destroyers, U.S.: 499 

Tank units, U.S.: 102, 160, 194, 199, 352, 408. 

See also Armored units. 

at Monte Cipolla: 393, 394, 396, 397 

Corps: 95 

Battalions 

70th Light: 232,314 

753d Medium: 233,314,318 

813th Tank Destroyer: 499 

Tanks, British: 219 

Tanks, German: 75,164, 165, 166, 167, 168,223, 

232,344,399,401,500,524-25 

in Brolo action: 402-03 

in Casa del Priolo action: 187 

in counterattack in Sicily: 154, 166-67, 168, 

170,171,17In 

losses: 171-72n 

Mark III: 148, 149n, 167, 171n 

Mark IV: 148, 149n, 167, 171n, 363, 485 

Mark VI (Tigpr): 148, 148n, 154, 171n, 172, 

187, 188,298 

Tanks, Italian: 230n 

in Gela counterattack: 150, 151n, 151-52 

Renault: 151n, 363 

Tanks, U.S.: 99, 131, 136, 158, 159, 174n, 179, 

188, 197, 199, 208, 253, 306n, 397. Seg also 

Armored units; Tanks units. 

light: 232,253,301,302,314 

M3: 129n 

M7: 129, 129n 

medium 194,314,363 

Taormina: 33, 111,163,412 

Taranto: 67,260,262,481,505,532,541 

Tarvis: 472 

Tarvis conference: 287, 294, 298, 369-71, 373, 

451,452,472 

Tarvis pass: 373,442,472 
INDEX 

Task Force Bernard: 352, 360,361,363,380, 38Sn, 

393-405 

Task Force X, U.S.: 254-55 

Task forces. Allied: 58. See also Task Force 

Bernard; Force 343; Force 545; Naval Task 

Force entries. 

Task forces, Italian: 78 

Taylor, Lt. Col. Earl A.: 144, 155-56 

Taylor, Brig. Gen. George A.: 136, 139, 152n, 

187, 188,336,339 

Taylor, Brig. Gen. Maxwell D.: 486, 489, 499, 

500, SOOn, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 507, 510, 

519, 541n 

Taylor. Myron C.: 40 

Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur: 11,13,15, 

22n, 24, 55, 59, 61, 62, 88, 182, 278, 378, 

379, 420, 549 

Telephone communications, German: 410, 515, 

523 

Telephone communications, Italian: 147,148,189, 

533 

Termini Imerese: 300 

Terrain. See also Beaches, landing. 

Italian: 259, 552 

of Sicily: 97, 100, 101, 135, 154,208,245,250, 

302, 305, 309, 322, 324, 348, 358, 359, 360, 

387, 389, 401-02, 408, 553. See also Yellow 

Line. 

of Monte Cipolla area: 393 

of San Fratello area: 352-53 

of Tortorici line: 382 

around Troina: 325-29, 339 

Terrana Creek: 135 

Terranova: 399,400 

Thessaly: 453 

Thunderbirds. See Infantry divisions, U.S., 45th. 

Tiber River: 485, 486, 488, 498-99, 500, 508, 

509,516 

Timberlake, Brig. Gen. Patrick W,: 485 

Tinley, Maj. Philip C.: 336,337 

Tirana: 514 

Tittmann, Harold: 296,443 

Tivoli: 516,517, 51B, 519, 524,529 

Toffey, Lt. Co!. John]" Jr.: 253, 255 

Tomasello. Col. Michele: 416 

TORCH. S;e North Africa. 

Torpedo-bombers, Italian: 399 

Torpedo plane squadron: 214 

Torrelta, Della: 265 

Tortorici (shorter bridgehead) line: 345, 345n, 

378,382,391,404 

Toulon: 472 

Toussaint, General del' Infanterie Rudolf: 473, 

512, 523 

Trabia, Lt. Galvano Lanza di: 454 

Train ferry, Italian: :378,410 

Generale di Brigata Ottaviano: 529 

: 105 

607 

Transportation. See Ferrying service, German; 

Ferrying service, Italian; Railroads. 

Transports, air, Allied: 115 

Transports, U.S.: 161,177 

Trapani: 110, 111,254,255 

Treasury Department, U.S.; 26 

Tremestieri: 416 

TRlDExT Confen:nce: 6, 19-23, 24. 66, 258, 268-

69,436,437,438,448 

Trieste: 473 

Tripoli: 4,57.107, 49B 

Traina: 207,320,323,352,418 

battle of: 331-47 

defense of, U.S. ('stimatcs: 325, 32B, 331, 333, 

337 

terrain characteristics: 325-29, 339 

Traina River: 337,338,340,343 

Troop Carrier Command: 157, 176, 182, 498, 

SOB 

Troop Carrier Groups 

314th: 179 

316th: IBO 

Troop Carrier Wings, U.S. 

51st: 92, 115 

52d: 93,101,115,157,175, 182n, 424 

Troop carriers. Allied: 101-02, 108. See also 

C-47's. 

attacked by friendly antiaircraft: 175, 176. 177-

80,181-84,218 

failure of: 157,423,424 

Troop movements, German: 372-73, 442, 472, 

492, 510, 514-15. See also Evacuation of 

Sid\y; German Army. in Italy; German Army, 

in Sicily. 

Troop movements, Italian: 373. See also Evacuation of Sicily; Withdrawal, Italian to Tivoli. 

Troop transports. See Transports. 

Troops, Allied. See also Army, U.S., entries; British Army units: Corps, U.S.: Infantry entries; 

Divisions, Allied; Task force entries. 

airborne: 10 

in North Africa: 9 

Troops, Axis. See German Army; German Army 

units; Italian Army; Italian Army units. 

Troops, British: 72, 89. See also British Army 

units; Glider troops, British. 

Troops U.S.: 56, 89, 210n, 211, 422. See also 

Army, Seventh, U.S.; Corps, U.S.; Infantry entries. 

Truce, !tala-German: 525-27, 530. See also Capitulation, Italian. 

Trucks, German: 290 

Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., Jr.: 98, 99, 103. 

108, 125, 129n, 133, 155, 192, 197, 198, 199, 

200, 206, 226n, 227, 229. 235, 254, 357, 358, 

361, 363, 366, 388, 389, 402, 405, 406, 40B, 

415,416,426 
608 SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY 

Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., Jr.-Continued 

and Agrigento drive: 224,226-27 

career of: 95 

and Messina drive: 414 

and Monte Cipolla: 389-91,399,401,404 

and Naso ridge link-up: 389, 390 

and San Fratello action: 348, 349, 352, 357, 

358,360 

Tucker, Col. Reuben H.: 175, 179, 182 

Tunis: 46, 49, 269, 505 

Tunisia: 5, 8, 9, 34, 48, 56, 60, 61, 64, 92, 107, 

175,275,488,498 

Tunisian Campaign: 8, 10,20,46,55,88,374 

Turin: 288,442,494,517 

Turin-Lyons railway: 442 

Turkey: 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 43, 44, 

436 

Tusa ridge: 318,321,322 

Tusa River: 318,321 

Tyrol. See South Tyrol. 

Tyrrhenian coast: 67 

Tyrrhenian islands: 14 

Tyrrhenian Sea: 45 

Ulich, Col. Max: 318,322 

Unconditional surrender: 239,277,279,298,447, 

448,449,458,460,462 

British view: 12 

for Italy: 11, 12, 19, 25, 39, 44, 51, 269, 271, 

273, 274, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 464, 

484,512,542,550. See also Long terms. 

Roosevelt's demand for: 11-12,19 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 

21, 26, 29, 38, 44, 47, 464. See also RussoGerman campaign. 

and I taly's peace efforts: 34, 38 

and strategic planning: 3-4,23 

Unit of fire. See Logistical operations, Allied; 

Maintenance, Allied. 

United Kingdom. See Great Britain. 

U stica Island: 500 

Utili, Generale di Brigata Umber to : 293, 440, 

441,515,518,519 

VofV'sformation: 101,117,175 

Valetta Harbor: 549 

Valguarnera: 233 

Valiant: 533 

Vandervoort, Maj. Benjamin H.: 168,169 

Vassallo, Major: 482 

Vatican: 40,41,274,278-79,283,468 

Vatican City: 24, 26, 296, 475 

Vehicles, German: 37, 320, 365, 398, 451. See 

also Tanks, German. 

V!-'hicles, Italian: 493,525 

Vehicles, U.S.: 252, 409. See also Dukws; Halftracks, U.S.; Tanks, U.S. 

Velletri: 515 

Venturi, Colonel: 191 

Verlet, Capt. Guido: 340 

Via Appia: 515 

Via Cassia: 523 

Via Claudia: 523 

Via dell'Empero: 531 

Via Laurentina: 515, 525 

Via Ostiensc: 515,516,525 

Via Tiburtina: 516,517,518,524 

Vichy France: 32 

Victor Emmanuel III, King: 28, 29, 270, 271, 

273, 281, 283, 285, 286, 287, 297, 298, 306, 

369, 371, 373, 440, 441, 453, 464, 467, 468, 

474, 477, 483, 484, 493, 513, 514, 518, 519, 

529, 532, 536, 539, 540, 544, 548, 552. See 

also Monarchy. 

and armistice: 441, 457, 466, 480, 510, 511, 

512-13,549 

and Badoglio government: 453,481 

and Caviglia: 527,531 

described by Mason-MacFarlane: 542 

and evacuation of Rome: 528 

and Germany alliance: 553 

and Government of Italy, postarmistice: 544, 

546-48, 551 

and Grandi: 548, 549, 551 

and Mussolini's overthrow: 42-44, 239, 264, 

265, 266-68 

peace efforts of: 239 

power of: 267,281,547-48 

and war declaration against Germany: 547, 

549 

Vietinghoff gennant Scheel, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich von: 470, 471 

Villa San Giovanni: 376 

Villach-Klagenfurt: 373 

Villafrati: 300 

Villa rosa : 248, 249 

Vitetti, Leonardo: 371 

Vittoria: 100, 141, 142, 155, 163, 164, 168, 172, 

418 

Vittorio Veneto: 532-33 

Vizzini: 96, 172, 202, 205, 207, 208, 209, 215, 

219,220,224 

Volturno River: 477,552 

VULCAN: 66 

War criminals: 272,274,276 

War Department, U.S.: 279 

War Plans Division: 3 

Warlimont, General der Artillerie Walter: 37, 50, 

369,371,375 

W arspite: 533 

Wasten, Lt. Col. Charles N.: 426 
INDEX 

Watkinson, Mr.: 299 

Waybur, 1st Lt. David C.: 230n 

Weapons, Allied: 553. See also Guns, U.S.; 

Weapons, U.S. 

Weapons, German: 376, 377,476. See also Guns, 

German. 

antitank: 377 

automatic: 358 

Weapons, Italian: 476,529. See also Guns, Italian. 

Weapons, U.S.: 485. See also Guns, U.S.; Howitzers, U.S.; Mortars, U.S. 

Weapons support, U.S.: 361, 394. See also Artillery support, U.S. 

Weather conditions, and Sicilian invasion: 89, 

108,115,123,125,139 

Wedemeyer, Maj. Gen. Albert C.: 16n, 235,436 

Wehrmacht: 27,473. See also German Army. 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstag (WFSt): 27, 368 

Weichold, Vice Adm. Eberhard: 33n 

Weizsaecker, Ernst von: 293 

Welles, Sumner: 279 

Wellington bombers, British: 278, 376, 379, 410, 

411 

Westphal, General der Artillerie Siegfried: 78, 

375, 503, 510, 512, 513, 523, 525-26, 530 

White, Col. I. D.: 158 

Whiteley, General J. F. M.: 440 

Wiart, de, Lt. Gen. Sir Adrian Carton: 454, 461, 

463 

Williams, Brig. Gen. PaulL.: 175n, 182 

Wilson, General Sir Henry Maitland: 64,436 

Withdrawals, Axis. See also Promemoria 2. 

German, in Italy: 470,552 

609 

Withdrawals, Axis-Continued 

Italian, to Tivoli: 516-19,524-25,529 

in Sicilian Campaign: 202-03, 205, 216-17, 

217n, 219, 223-24, 233, 234, 238, 245, 314, 

315,325,345-46,357,366,404,405. See also 

Evacuation of Sicily. 

Wood's Hole beaches. See Green Beach; Red 

Beach ; Yellow Beach. 

World War I: 30,551 

Wyman, Col. Willard G.: 347 

Yates, 1st Lt. Ralph J.: 416 

Yellow Beach: 125,133,141,144,158,159,161 

Yellow Beach 2: 136,142,144,145 

Yellow Line: 98,99, 185-201, 206, 207, 208, 222, 

223 

York, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 187 

Yugoslavia: 15,17,24,37,38,261,445 

Zanussi, Generale Addetto al Capo di Stato 

Maggiore Giacomo: 440, 441, 453, 467, 477, 

480,484,506, 512, 515, 517, 518, 520, 542, 

552 

at Cassibile conference: 474,475,476,478 

and Castellano: 455, 462, 463, 474, 478-79 

peace mission of: 454-55,461-65,466,467 

Zappulla River: 382,388, 389, 401 

Zeitzler, General der Infanterie Kurt: 294-95 

Zingales, Generale di Corpo d' Armata Francesco: 

84 

ZITADELLE: 213 

Zuckerman, Professor S.: 70n 

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