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57–094 PDF 2010

FOREIGN VESSEL OPERATIONS IN THE 

U.S. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 

(111–122) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

June 17, 2010 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

TOM GRAVES, Georgia 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York, Vice 

Chair 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Cook, Rear Admiral Kevin, Director of Prevention Policy, United States Coast 

Guard .................................................................................................................... 5 

Matsuda, David T., Acting Maritime Administrator, Maritime Administration 5 

Weakley, Jim, President, Maritime Cabotage Task Force ................................... 50 

Weaver, Warren, Manager of Regulatory Compliance, Transocean .................... 50 

Wells, Ken, President, Offshore Marine Service Association ............................... 50 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 61 

Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California ................................................................... 63 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Cook, Rear Admiral Kevin ...................................................................................... 67 

Matsuda, David T. ................................................................................................... 73 

Weakley, Jim ............................................................................................................ 81 

Weaver, Warren ....................................................................................................... 85 

Wells, Ken ................................................................................................................ 190 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Cook, Rear Admiral Kevin, Director of Prevention Policy, United States Coast 

Guard: ...................................................................................................................

Reponse to request for information from Hon. Cummings, a Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland: .......................................

Regarding the Offshore Installation Manager .................................... 10 

Regarding the Master of Deepwater Horizon and the Offshore Installation Manager ............................................................................. 11 

Response to request for information from Hon. Mica, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Florida ..................................................... 29 

Response to request for information from Hon. Yong, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Alaska: .....................................................

Regarding Mobile Offshore Drilling Units ........................................... 16 

Reradring drydocking requirements of Mobile Offshore Drilling 

Units .................................................................................................... 22 

Weaver, Warren, Manager of Regulatory Compliance, Transocean, response 

to request for infromation from Hon. Taylor, a Representative in Congress 

from the Sate of Mississippi ................................................................................ 90 

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(1) 

FOREIGN VESSEL OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. 

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 

Thursday, June 17, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:22 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

We convene today to examine the extent of the commercial activities conducted in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ, and particularly in the Gulf of Mexico, by foreign-flagged vessels. 

Given that this is our subject, the first thing we obviously want 

to know is how many foreign-flagged vessels are operating in the 

EEZ. Unfortunately, while the Coast Guard has knowledge of the 

number of foreign-flagged, mobile, offshore drilling units operating 

in the gulf because such vessels must undergo a Coast Guard inspection before they can operate in our waters, the Coast Guard 

cannot tell us exactly how many foreign vessels are operating today 

on our Outer Continental Shelf. We lack this knowledge because 

most foreign vessels are not required to report their arrival on our 

OCS, despite the enactment by Congress in 2006 of a provision in 

the SAFE Port Act directing the Coast Guard to finalize within 180 

days a rulemaking requiring notice of arrival on the OCS. Like far 

too many rulemakings required from the Coast Guard, 4 years 

later, this one is still not done, a situation, ladies and gentlemen, 

which is simply, simply and tragically unacceptable. 

That said, even though we don’t know how many foreign vessels 

are operating on the Outer Continental Shelf, we know that they 

are there, and, therefore, we also want to understand today the 

various laws and regulations that govern their operations. Foreignflagged vessels, including MODUs, are subject to the laws of their 

flag states and to applicable U.S. laws and regulations. We will examine today how these various regulations overlay one another, 

and whether they truly create a safety regime for foreign-flagged 

vessels, including MODUs, which is equal to the safety requirements U.S. flag vessels must meet. 

We will look in particular at the Deepwater Horizon, a MODU 

that, of course, was drilling a well in the United States seabed, but 

that was registered in the Marshall Islands by a firm that had relocated from the United States to the Cayman Islands and then on 

2 

to Switzerland, primarily, we can assume, to avoid the payment of 

United States taxes. 

Before the Deepwater Horizon was registered in the Marshall Islands, it was registered in Panama. We want to understand from 

Transocean why it moved the Deepwater Horizon’s registration, 

and we want to understand the operating regulations that applied 

specifically to this MODU. 

Additionally, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, also known 

as OCSLA, requires that most vessels, rigs, platforms or other vehicles or structures working on the OCS be manned or crewed by 

citizens or permanent residents of the United States. 

There are statutorily authorized circumstances under which vessels, rigs, platforms and vehicles operating on the OCS can be exempted from this requirement. For example, if a vessel, rig or platform is more than 50 percent owned by citizens of a foreign nation, 

or if an insufficient number of Americans are available to perform 

required work, vessels on the OCS can be exempted from employing Americans. 

Information provided to the Subcommittee by the Coast Guard 

indicates that since January of 2008, the Coast Guard has granted 

52 employment exemptions to vessels and rigs working on the 

OCS, covering nearly 6,700 employees. We will examine the types 

of positions covered by such exemptions, and the firms receiving 

these exemptions and the reasons for the exemptions. 

Frankly, given our extensive economic crisis and unemployment 

rate that is still at 9.7 percent, I find it hard to believe that there 

were no Americans available to perform these 6,700 jobs, particularly in the Gulf Coast. And we want to understand in particular 

how and why exemptions based specifically on claims of insufficient 

American labor are granted. 

As Members of the United States Congress and the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, it is 

our duty to strengthen the U.S. flag and the U.S. maritime industry wherever possible. I look forward to working with my colleagues to seize the opportunities that exist in the Gulf of Mexico 

to do just that. 

Eleven families continue to grieve the loss of their loved ones, 

and that grief will remain with these families forever. What are 

now estimated to be potentially millions of gallons of oil continue 

to flow every day from the Macondo well site following the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. Against this background, it is imperative 

that we take a critical look at the legal and operational regimes 

governing the production of resources on the OCS to identify and 

close what I suspect are wide holes in some aspects of our regulatory oversight. 

We can never again assume, as we too often have in the past, 

that the worst-case scenario is not a possibility, or that just because something hasn’t gone wrong in the past, it won’t in the future. As chairman of this Subcommittee, I am committed to ensuring that a tragedy like the Deepwater Horizon never happens 

again. The first step towards achieving that goal is ensuring that 

our regulatory requirements become and remain equal to the technologies we are employing to explore for and produce natural reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:00 Dec 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57094.0 KAYLA
3 

sources. Eleven men died, and the Gulf Coast is now literally 

drowning in oil because that has not been the case. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I have said it many, many times. This is 

our watch. We are on the Earth at this moment. It is our duty to 

safeguard our environment. It is the Coast Guard’s duty to guard 

the coast. And I think we can do better. 

With that, I recognize our distinguished Ranking Member Congressman LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our panelists. 

Under international and domestic law, the Federal Government 

exercises wide authority over the activities vessels can carry out in 

the U.S. waters. Under this patchwork of laws and conventions, we 

have reserved certain maritime activities exclusively for the U.S. 

fleet, while others, including international cargo movement, large 

cruise ships operating in U.S. ports, are dominated by foreignflagged vessels. In all cases, the Coast Guard is responsible for ensuring the compliance of these vessels with U.S. safety, security 

and environmental laws, regardless of the vessels’ nationality. 

However, some in the maritime community have expressed concerns about the service’s vigilance in carrying out this mission, especially on the Outer Continental Shelf. 

Maritime trade is a critical component to our Nation’s economy, 

but in recent decades, the number of vessels operating under U.S. 

flag has plummeted. Many vessel owners have chosen to reregister 

under foreign flags of convenience because it often results in reduced operational costs and smaller tax burdens as compared to 

vessels registered in the United States. The Subcommittee had 

scheduled a hearing to examine the status of U.S. overseas fleet, 

but we had to postpone it. I hope, Mr. Chairman, we will be able 

to reschedule this hearing so we can examine conditions that are 

acting as disincentives to registering under U.S. Flag. 

As I said, the Coast Guard enforces safety, security and environmental laws on all vessels operating in U.S. waters; however, I am 

concerned the service has not fulfilled their statutory mandate to 

extend the 96-hour advance notice of arrival requirements to vessels traveling to points on the Outer Continental Shelf. As a result, 

we have an incomplete view of what vessels are operating in U.S. 

waters and what activities they are carrying out. In this day and 

age, this is simply unacceptable, and I urge the Coast Guard to finalize this rulemaking as soon as possible. 

The United States has sovereignty over all living and nonliving 

resources found within its Exclusive Economic Zone, and we have 

exercised this authority to exclude foreign interests from accessing 

U.S. fisheries. Some in the maritime community have called for 

similar Americanization of other activities in U.S. waters, including 

the operation of offshore oil- and gas-drilling rigs. 

While I support a strong U.S. merchant fleet and believe there 

may be some merit to this proposal, I believe the Subcommittee 

should undergo a thorough review of the impact that this may have 

on commerce, the maritime industry, as well as the ability of the 

Coast Guard to absorb yet another mission at the same time the 

administration is proposing to recklessly slash the service’s operating budget. 

4 

I am disappointed that no one from the Customs and Border Protection is here to provide testimony on the Federal Government’s 

interpretation of the Jones Act. And while the Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing the Jones Act, Customs and Border Patrol 

is responsible for determining what qualifies as coastwide trade. 

Therefore, it would have been helpful to have a witness from Customs and Border Patrol here today to answer questions about the 

administration’s interpretation of the Jones Act. 

Lastly, while this side of the aisle still has yet to see a legislative 

proposal to address the oil spill, I look forward to working with the 

chairman and to develop commonsense amendments that will provide results. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here again today. And, 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. I think the privilege of pulling minerals off an American sea bottom ought to be reserved for an American-owned, American-built, American-crewed 

vessel. I think we would have a heck of an easier time enforcing 

the law, seeing that our fellow citizens, if they make a mistake, pay 

up, and, above all, seeing that the revenues are distributed as they 

should be. When those taxes are paid, they ought to be paid to the 

American Treasury, not to that of the Marshall Islands. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Taylor. 

Let me just say to the Committee, I had two discussions today, 

one with Secretary Napolitano, and one with Mr. Price of Appropriations, and our efforts to—Mr. Price has assured me that they 

are working very hard with the administration to restore the cuts 

that we are so concerned about and getting additional funds so that 

the Coast Guard can effectively address the issues in the Gulf 

Coast. And I just wanted to—I know all the Members of the Committee were concerned about that, and I just wanted to make you 

all aware of that. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I am late. I 

was interested in just the comments you said about funding the 

Coast Guard. We have neglected the Coast Guard all these years 

as far as getting the money to this agency. I have been here many, 

many years, and we keep plying and asking them to do missions 

without properly funding. We don’t have the Coast Guard, I mean, 

the ice-breaking capability. We have charged them with oil spill responsibility. We have tried to do what we should have done, but 

we didn’t do it the way we could have done, and that is to have 

the adequate amount of money for you to do the job. 

I will ask some questions later on concerning flagged vessels. 

This is a deep concern to me about vessels operating in the gulf 

and other areas that should not be operating because they’re not 

American flagged. And I will bring those questions up later. 

But this is an agency I think needs strong support from this Congress, and shame on us if we don’t do it. 

I yield back the balance. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

5 

Our first panelists will be Rear Admiral Kevin Cook, Director of 

Prevention Policy, United States Coast Guard; and the Honorable 

David T. Matsuda, Acting Director, Maritime Administration. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being with us. 

Rear Admiral Cook, we will hear from you now for 5 minutes. 

I am sorry. Just a moment. I apologize. I didn’t see Mr. Coble. 

Mr. Coble, did you have an opening statement? 

Mr. COBLE. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

All right. Rear Admiral. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL KEVIN COOK, DIRECTOR OF 

PREVENTION POLICY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; AND 

DAVID T. MATSUDA, ACTING MARITIME ADMINISRATOR, 

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION 

Admiral COOK. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

LoBiondo, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my written statement entered into the record. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Admiral COOK. I am pleased to be here with the Acting Maritime 

Administrator to discuss foreign-flagged vessel operations on the 

United States Outer Continental Shelf. 

Before I get to the specific subject of today’s hearing, I would like 

to echo the condolences expressed previously by my fellow Coast 

Guard members who recently testified. As you know, the Coast 

Guard involvement with Deepwater Horizon started at its earliest 

hours with the search and rescue. My heartfelt sympathies go out 

to the members of the 11 families who so tragically lost their loved 

ones in the explosion on board the Deepwater Horizon. 

Additionally, I wish to express my admiration for the crew of the 

Damon B. Bankston, the U.S.-flagged offshore supply vessel operated by Tidewater Marine, who stayed in close proximity to a very 

dangerous situation to save so many lives. 

As the Coast Guard’s Director of Prevention Policy, one of my 

primary responsibilities is to oversee the inspection program for 

vessels, offshore facilities, and Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, or 

MODUs, in the requirements to comply with applicable U.S. and 

international safety and security laws, regulations and policies. To 

ensure the safety and security of units operating on our Outer Continental Shelf, the Coast Guard coordinates with various Federal 

agencies, such as the Maritime Administration, the Customs and 

Border Protection, Minerals Management Service and other organizations like the American Bureau of Shipping. 

The bulk of the Coast Guard’s compliance oversight is carried out 

through annual safety and security inspections conducted on all 

U.S. and foreign-flagged fixed and floating production platforms, 

mobile offshore drilling units and other vessels, as applicable. 

Foreign-flagged vessels are permitted to operate on the Outer 

Continental Shelf and are inspected to standards equivalent to U.S. 

Vessels. The primary difference between U.S. Coast Guard inspections of U.S.-flagged vessels versus foreign-flagged vessels, including MODUs, is that for U.S.-flagged vessels, the Coast Guard is responsible for carrying out the inspections, tests and surveys in 

6 

order to issue the statutory certificates. For foreign vessels the flag 

state or recognized organization, such as the Classification Society, 

working on behalf of that flag state is responsible for carrying out 

the inspections, tests and surveys. 

The Coast Guard examination carried out on foreign-flagged vessels is of sufficient breadth and depth to verify proper crew training, competence and competencies; that is, a satisfactory safety 

management is in place, and overall the foreign-flagged vessel’s 

equipment and material condition are maintained and operated in 

compliance with applicable international and flag state standards, 

as well as domestic regulations, thereby ensuring an equivalent 

level of safety as compared to U.S. vessels. 

The scope of the Coast Guard port state control examinations 

carried out on foreign-flagged vessels exceeds current international 

guidelines for port state control. These type of examinations include inspection and equipment tests and emergency drill requirements beyond those ordered by other countries. When a Coast 

Guard examination reveals questionable equipment, systems or 

crew competency issues, the Coast Guard expands the port state 

control exam as necessary to determine whether a deficiency exists 

or not. That scope of the expanded examination is not limited, and 

the Coast Guard may require additional tests, inspections or crew 

drills to the extent deemed necessary. When deficiencies are found, 

the Coast Guard mandates corrective action, depending on the severity, and may detain a vessel, restrict operations until that deficiency is completed. 

Currently there are thousands of vessels engaged in the Deepwater Horizon spill response. Some of the vessels are foreign. Of 

particular note, the foreign drill ship Discoverer Enterprise, a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel, has been the primary drill ship recovering the liquid flowing from the damaged well since the installation of the top hat. A U.S.-flagged MODU, Q4000 is now assisting 

to incinerate oil beyond the Discover Enterprise’s capacity to recover that oil. The Liberian-flagged Toisa Pisces and Great Britainflagged Loch Rannoch are currently making preparations to assist 

in the ongoing recovery operations. These two vessels have been 

employed because of the unique characteristics they maintain, specifically dynamic positioning systems, which will enable them to remain on station to conduct response operations, yet be rapidly able 

to cease operations and move safely in the event of a hurricane. 

The Coast Guard remains committed to maritime safety and security on the Outer Continental Shelf through continuing inspections of U.S.-flagged vessels and those foreign-flagged vessels subject to our port state control requirements. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. And I will 

be happy to answer any questions you have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Acting Maritime Director Matsuda. 

Mr. MATSUDA. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

LoBiondo, and distiniguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for the invitation to testify today. 

President Obama said the BP oil spill in the Gulf Coast is the 

worst environmental disaster in our Nation’s history. From the 

start of this crisis, the Maritime Administration has supported the 

7 

ongoing relief effort and monitored the impact on the maritime industry. We activated our internal command center and provided 

personnel to assist at the United States Coast Guard’s National Incident Command Center. We also participate in the Interagency Solutions Working Group and the various maritime transportation 

system recovery units in the Gulf Coast. 

Fortunately, as you can see on the graphic here, this spill has 

not significantly impacted the Nation’s maritime transportation 

system. Most of the traffic you see going to the Port of New Orleans has simply gone around the spill area. Commerce and trade 

continue, but operators are keeping a watchful eye to avoid the 

fouled gulf waters. 

Before I continue, I would like to take a moment to also express 

my condolences to the families of the 11 Deepwater Horizon crew 

members who did not survive the explosion. We mourn their loss 

and, like our sister agencies, we are working diligently to make 

sure this type of incident never occurs again. 

The MARAD family was also affected by the tragedy that overwhelmed the Deepwater Horizon. Two graduates of the United 

States Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, New York, Darin 

Rupinksi and James Mansfield, were on board. Both are heroes. 

Their stories are detailed in my full written testimony, which I will 

submit for the record with your permission, sir. 

I want to emphasize the Administration is committed to making 

certain that every asset possible is available to address this catastrophe. As Admiral Cook mentioned, among the first vessels to respond to the distress call of the Deepwater Horizon was the Damon 

Bankston, a vessel that was built in the United States, is registered in the United States, and is crewed by United States 

mercahnt mariners. 

Since the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, many more U.S.- 

flagged vessels have responded to the crisis. As of last week, 77 

percent of the vessels providing oil spill source control in the gulf 

are U.S.-flagged. For example, take the U.S.-flagged Joe Griffin, operated by Edison Chouest Offshore of Galliano, Louisiana. The ship 

carried the extremely large cofferdam containment structure that 

was lowered in the early attempt to cover the leak last month. 

During the current situation in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.-flagged 

vessels have been used in every situation where U.S. vessels and 

crew are available. 

While there are foreign-flagged vessels operating in the gulf, 

none appear to be operating in violation of the Jones Act. As you 

know, the Jones Act requires that cargo being transported between 

U.S. ports must move aboard vessels that are U.S.-flagged, U.S.- 

built, U.S.-owned, and largely crewed by U.S. merchant mariners. 

However, we are aware that in some situations, especially in energy exploration activities, only a few companies in the world operate the kind of vessels that might be needed. When this happens, 

it is, of course, prudent for the vessel operators to apply for a Jones 

Act waiver. 

The Jones Act can be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security, through U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In order to 

verify that no U.S. vessels are available for a certain job, U.S. Customs and Border Protection relies on our agency to first survey the 

8 

U.S. industry. Recently a company tried to hire specialized foreignbuilt barges to assist in the U.S. oil-spill response. But when the 

company requested a waiver of the Jones Act, the Maritime Administration performed a quick survey and located many comparable 

U.S.-flagged vessels that were available. This information was relayed back to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

The law also allows the Coast Guard’s Federal on-scene coordinator to make an exception to the Jones Act in the aftermath of 

an oil-spill like we are dealing with here. This exception process is 

designed to allow immediate attention and processing of requests 

for oil-spill response vessels. Again, once an exception request is received, the Maritime Administration immediately surveys the industry for U.S. mariner and vessel availability. 

In closing, I would like to commend, once again, the work of our 

Nation’s unassuming merchant mariners. The U.S. Merchant Marine has capably served as the Naval and military auxiliary service 

in the time of war, and the Jones Act has helped ensure that we 

have a Merchant Marine capable of responding to national emergencies in our coastal waters. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to respond to any questions you and Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you both very much. 

Admiral Cook, under U.S. law or regulation, when a dynamically 

positioned MODU, such as the Deepwater Horizon, is drilling a 

well with the riser pipe down and in contact with the sea floor, is 

it classified as a point in the United States for purposes of the 

Jones Act? And are there any instances in which a dynamically positioned MODU could be drilling a well with the riser pipe down 

and in contact with the sea floor when it would not be a point in 

the United States for purposes of the Jones Act? 

Admiral COOK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know Mr. Matsuda made 

the point that CBP administers that, but it is—to my knowledge, 

there would not be a time when we have contact with the bottom, 

permanent contact like that with the riser, where you wouldn’t be 

considered a point or place in the U.S. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So then—so your answer is no? 

Admiral COOK. The answer is yes, that when you are fixed to the 

bottom, that you would be considered a point or place in the U.S. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Then is a dynamically positioned MODU drilling 

a well with a riser pipe down and in contact with the sea floor underway, or is it not underway at a time it is conducting such a 

drilling operation? 

Admiral COOK. When you—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me say it again, because I am asking you 

this for a reason. I want to make sure we are clear. We need some 

clarity from the Coast Guard on certain—and this is consistent 

with some Jones Act issues, and we want to make sure what the 

Coast Guard’s interpretation is. 

Is a dynamically positioned MODU drilling a well with a riser 

pipe down, and in contact with the sea floor, underway, or is it not 

underway at the time it is conducting such a drilling operation? 

Admiral COOK. It is considered not underway, and, in fact, the 

lighting and requirements are like a fixed facility. 

9 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what was the last part of what you just 

said? 

Admiral COOK. The lights that they show for navigation are as 

if they were a fixed facility. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So then if—the vessel must necessarily then be 

under the command of a licensed captain; is that correct? In other 

words, when would it be required to have a licensed captain in 

charge? 

Admiral COOK. In U.S. regulations? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. 

Admiral COOK. It would have a captain, and typically the captain 

would be required to have the OIM, Officer Offshore Installation 

Manager, endorsement, and so that they would also be the one in 

charge of drilling. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, let me make sure I understand this. An offshore installation manager was in charge of the Deepwater Horizon 

at the time of the accident on April 20; is that right? Do you know? 

Admiral COOK. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Somebody was? 

Admiral COOK. The offshore installation manager. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you know who that was? 

Admiral COOK. I don’t know by name. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you will get that to me; will you not? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

10 


Insert offset folio 26 here 57094.026
11 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And did that individual have a master’s license 

with the OIM endorsement, or were the master function and the 

offshore installation manager function performed by two separate 

people on the Deepwater Horizon at the time it was drilling at the 

well site? 

Admiral COOK. It was performed by two separate people. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you will give me both of those names? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

12 


Insert offset folio 27 here 57094.027
13 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. I am going to ask you one more, and 

then I want to let the other members of the panel ask you some 

things. 

Now, just to be specific, although the Coast Guard regulations 

are silent with regard to MODUs that are on station and drilling 

while utilizing a dynamic positioning system, 46 CFR 15.520(d) 

specifies that, and I quote, a self-propelled MODU other than a 

drill ship must be under the command of an individual who holds 

a license as master endorsed as OIM, end of quote. 

And 46 CFR 15.420(e) specifies that, and I quote, a drill ship 

must be under the command of an individual who holds a license 

as master. And when a drill ship is on location, the individual in 

command must hold a license as a master endorsed as OIM, end 

of quote. 

In contrast, 46 CFR 15.20(f) specifies, and I quote, that a nonself-propelled MODU must be under the command of an individual 

who holds a license or endorsement as OIM, end of quote. 

Are these specific requirements regarding the master positions 

for MODUs, drill ships and non-self-propelled MODUs the same 

under the Marshall Islands regulations? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Chairman, the Deepwater Horizon was accepted under international certificates under the IMO MODU 

Code, okay? There are provisions where Marshall Islands MODUs 

could be accepted based on an equivalent regulation. So there are 

actually three schemes. One is a U.S. regulation, one is a country 

which comes forward and proves that their regulations are equivalent, and three, which is purely the international certification 

through the IMO MODU Code Safety of Life At Sea Conventions. 

And so Marshall Islands prescribes their manning in concert with 

the Safety of Life At Sea Convention, and then they have additional guidance that requires extra watch folks. 

So is it exactly equivalent? It is not word for word equivalent. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. It is not what? 

Admiral COOK. It is not word for word equivalent, but it achieves 

the same purpose. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it either is the same or not the same. I am 

just trying to figure out what the significance of Marshall Islands 

is as compared to the U.S. 

Well, let me ask you this. Based on what we know about the 

manning requirements for a self-propelled MODU under U.S. flag 

and under the Marshall Islands flag, do the requirements of these 

two flag states require manning levels that provide an equivalent 

level of safety? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, they do. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And does anything you have learned about manning or any other aspect of the Marshall Islands regulatory structure lead the Coast Guard to be reassessing whether the Marshall 

Islands regulations provide an analogous level of safety to those required of U.S. vessels and MODUs? 

Admiral COOK. The analagous—or the certification that they 

were equal is still being recognized. And we are also in the background working on an update to subchapter N that will incorporate 

the things like dynamic positioning, which you have mentioned 

14 

were silent on, and at that time we will go ahead and do a lineby-line comparison to make sure that we are not missing anything. 

But the regulations are believed to be equivalent. And we have 

also been very active with the International Maritime Organization 

in furthering the international codes, which in this case apply to 

MODUs, but in other cases apply to chemical tankers or liquefied 

gas carriers. 

So our goal is to always make whatever regulatory regime ends 

up impacting the U.S., we want that to be equivalent so that we 

all have the same level of safety. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, just one other thing. How can—it just 

doesn’t sound like it is the same, well, because I thought a master 

was to be in control at the time of the accident under U.S. law. And 

when this accident happened a master was not in control; is that 

right? 

Admiral COOK. While they were drilling, right. The OIM was in 

charge. When they went to the emergency phase, the master then 

was in charge. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But that is not the same, though, is it? 

Admiral COOK. That is not the same person. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, it is not the same requirement as is done 

in the U.S. 

Admiral COOK. In the U.S. we have a master that has the OIM 

endorsement, so it is the same person. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. I will come back to you because I think 

there—it sounds like there is a difference, although you—maybe we 

are not speaking the same language here. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield 

my time to Mr. Young of Alaska. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo. 

Admiral, how many drill ships are U.S.-flagged working in the 

gulf? 

Admiral COOK. Sir, right now there are nine working in the gulf. 

We have 37 that maintain active certification that could be drilling 

elsewhere or with the industry term ′′staffed,′′ ready to be employed. 

Mr. YOUNG. Now, are those equal to the New Horizon, or are 

they the shallow-water ones that are drill rigs? 

Admiral COOK. Those are mobile offshore drilling units. 

Mr. YOUNG. But when you say offshore, there is a difference between 1 mile down than the ones that drill at 250 feet, 300 feet, 

500 feet. Are these rigs flagged rigs that are self-mobile, that are 

capable of drilling offshore in the deep waters? 

Admiral COOK. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. They all can do that? 

Admiral COOK. Some of them are. They move, and then they are 

jacked up. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, none of the jacked rigs can work offshore at 

1 mile deep, and you and I know that; is that right? 

Admiral COOK. Right. 

Mr. YOUNG. What I am looking for is how many—because the 

chairman alluded to the Marshall Islands flagging, and there are 

numerous reasons why it was made in Korea, flagged in the MarVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:00 Dec 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\57094.0 KAYLA
15 

shall Islands, supposed to meet all the requirements. How many 

American modes, if you call them whatever you want to, operate 

in that deep water that are American-flagged? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Young, I will have to get back to you on the 

record. 

[The information follows:] 

16 


Insert offset folio 28 here 57094.028
17 

Admiral COOK. But I will tell you that the Q4000, which is a 

U.S.-flagged MODU, is on scene and is now right next to the Discoverer Enterprise, which is the ship recovering the oil. The Q4000 

has a burner skid on it, and that is burning off excess oil that the 

Discoverer Enterprise can’t use. So that is an example of a U.S.- 

flagged MODU. 

Mr. YOUNG. My interest—it is not your problem. You have to certify and everything else just how many rigs we have, because most 

of the rigs now that are on moratorium will have to leave those waters because they are not American-flagged. They will go to Brazil 

or China or Cuba or somewhere else to drill. And I am interested 

in a Jones Act drill that can drill deep water in the future and not 

some foreign-flagged type operation. 

The other issue I was going to ask you about, Admiral, I have 

a deep concern because all this period of time we have a lot of 

American Jones Acts vessels down there that are sitting idle. And 

the supply ships that are not Jones Act vessels come to shore and 

take supplies and supply the rig, and that is against the Jones Act. 

And the Coast Guard, so far, has not enforced that regulation. Are 

you aware of what I am talking about? 

Admiral COOK. Yes. Any time we are aware, we do work with 

CBP to try and follow up on that. 

Mr. YOUNG. But I will inform you, and I have talked to some of 

the people in the Coast Guard, I have been bringing this to your 

attention for many years that this has been a circumvention of the 

Coast Guard Jones Act enforcement, because what they do is they 

supply supposedly stuff to the rig, they’re not Jones Act vessels, to 

a rig that could be a Jones Act rig. But then they will go to shore 

and pick up products and food and supplies for the rig, and that 

puts my Jones Act vessels out of work. 

And I am hoping that you understand, and you ought to know 

this, too, if you don’t, because this is wrong. I mean, it is just absolutely creeping up over the years where the Jones Act is not being 

enforced. And I am a big Jones Act person, always have been, because I believe in an American fleet. So I think you have been neglectful in that arena. You heard me say I support the Coast 

Guard, but I don’t want them to keep chipping away and keeping 

our Jones Act fleet from not operating, which, very frankly, the 

work is not there. 

I have 58 seconds left. Again, on the spill, I am not excited about 

a foreign vessel, although saying we have it available, we are not 

paying for it, the oil company is paying for it. But I would suggest 

if you allow one in under a waiver, that when we get a domestic 

vessel that is on site, comes into the site, that you eliminate the 

foreign vessel, that they should not continue to operate. Do you understand what I am saying? 

Admiral COOK. I understand. So that the waiver would be for a 

period of time until a U.S. flag could fill that role. 

Mr. YOUNG. And in that waiver making it specific that I am from 

Holland, or I am from Nigeria, and I go in and that ship is working 

there, and I get a ship out of Newport or out of Galveston that 

comes in. That foreign vessel, that is when it ceases operating so 

we can get the American vessel in operation. You can do that? 

Admiral COOK. I can bring that message back, sir. 

18 

Mr. YOUNG. I would suggest you do that. I think that would be 

a good idea for the Coast Guard. Put it in the waiver. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you, both of you, for coming here. 

And, Mr. Matsuda, it is always good to see you again in your 

support throughout all of our districts. 

My questions are going to be primarily focused on the Jones Act, 

which seems to be of much discussion of everyone these days. In 

your opinion, do you believe that the Jones Act was originated to 

deal in normal situations, you know, interstate commerce moving 

back and forth cargo? Do you believe the rules were really intended 

for in times of disaster, as we are at this point? 

Admiral COOK. I think that when you look at the actual waiver 

provision, that it is a national defense waiver that has to be obtained to the Jones Act provisions, so I would say that it may not 

have been envisioned for a spill response scenario, but certainly 

something which endangers our national security, which environmental disasters, I think, can be brought into that category. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And how long does it typically take to do a 

waiver? Is it something—you know, a vessel turns in their requests. How many days is it? How many hours is it? Weeks? 

Months? 

Mr. MATSUDA. I can speak to that. The Maritime Administration’s portion of surveying the industry currently, in our agreement 

with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, can take as long as 

48 hours. Usually, it is much faster. I can tell you that the one 

waiver request we received so far for this spill we got back within 

the same day. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. And how many waiver requests have been submitted? Just the one since the spill occurred? 

Mr. MATSUDA. Well, they would be submitted directly to Customs. And now the National Incident Commander has requested 

that all requests for waivers be filtered or started directly through 

them. But we have so far only seen one request. And frankly, we 

did a survey and found that there were many U.S.-flagged vessels 

available for that purpose. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. But when you look at the news, and you 

see the situation of what is going on there, and I plan on being 

there on Monday, it seems to me—I understood that the reason 

why the waiver was not met was because there were other available ships, vessels. Well, then, where are they, and why aren’t they 

there? 

Mr. MATSUDA. If I understand your question, the actual requirement for a response vessel is going to be given by the National Incident Commander. They work with BP to determine what vessels 

are needed and what kind of vessels. If they come with a foreignflagged ship, they will need—well, if they need a Jones Act waiver 

because it is a foreign-flagged ship, and they are going to be operating either within coastwise trade or within three miles of the 

coast, then they will need a waiver. But otherwise—— 

19 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Let me be more specific to you. My question is 

you have told us and what we have read in the material says that 

with the waiver that was submitted, the reason why it was not 

granted was because there were other American vessels, which 

clearly we all—and I agree with my colleagues, we all would prefer 

that we are supporting American-made vessels and crew and so on. 

But my question is if they turned in the waiver, if it was denied 

because there were other vessels, then are the other vessels performing the work? 

Mr. MATSUDA. It would depend on the kind of vessel. If there is 

a need for that specific vessel then, like I said, it would be run 

through the waiver process to see if there is first a U.S.-flagged 

vessel. If there is no need for the vessel, then it is going to be idle. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, okay. We just had a briefing, the Senate 

and the House, with Admiral Allen, and I have got to tell you from 

what I have seen so far, and I haven’t been there in person, but 

I will be there on Monday, it seems like to me it is needed. I mean, 

I see pictures of oil everywhere, you know, animals that are soaked 

in it. I mean, it doesn’t seem, in my opinion—now, I haven’t physically seen how many vessels are out there, but it seems to me that 

there is a need. 

So I guess what I would like to ask on behalf of this Committee 

is, one, if you could get us the number; and if you could do the 

same time frame of less than 48 hours, how many waivers have 

been requested; have they been denied; if they have been denied, 

have other vessels been put out there; and to really determine is 

that all that we need. 

Now, the Admiral said that there are a lot of vessels, but different vessels have different capabilities. And so someone may say, 

hey, I want to come out and help, but they may not necessarily 

have that capability. But it just seems from looking at it that there 

are other skimmer boats and other things that could be done. 

Mr. MATSUDA. Ma’am, I will take your request. Certainly I think 

Customs and Border Protection will probably be the best place to 

get the waiver information, or from the National Incident Commander. But, I am happy to pass along that request as well. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would now like to 

yield to Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the gentleman from New Jersey. 

Admiral, several news reports have suggested that the administration has rejected offers of foreign-flagged skimmers that could be 

used as part of the response. Has the administration, in fact, 

turned away offers of skimming vessels or equipment? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Coble, no offers of qualified skimmers have 

been turned away. 

Mr. COBLE. Say it again. 

Admiral COOK. No offers of qualified assistance have been turned 

away. 

Mr. COBLE. Okay. Let me go a step further, speaking about skimmers. Has the administration reached out to the domestic fleet to 

bring in all skimming assets that might be available? 

20 

Admiral COOK. There has been a continuing effort, and it has 

been most recently ramped up again this week, where we have also 

gone out to the U.S. Navy, who has provided skimmers since the 

very beginning, but has some additional ones at installations 

around the country, and we are going to the commercial oil spill 

response organizations, which are part of the response network 

that is in place in every port throughout the country. 

Mr. COBLE. How many skimmers, Admiral, are actively skimming on a daily basis? And if you don’t know, you could get that 

to us? 

Admiral COOK. I brought the information sheet in case we had 

any questions regarding this. The total number of skimmers is 447. 

Mr. COBLE. Four hundred forty-seven? 

Admiral COOK. Yes. 

Mr. COBLE. Admiral, does the Jones Act create an impediment to 

the employment of foreign-flagged skimming vessels? 

Admiral COOK. It is a factor, but I would not call it an impediment, because foreign-flagged skimmers can be—they are treated 

as oil spill response vessels. And if they are operated outside of 3 

miles, they are not impacted by the Jones Act. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, let me ask another question regarding 3 miles. 

Do skimmers operating beyond the 3-mile limit require a coastwise 

endorsement? I am thinking no, but I don’t know that. 

Admiral COOK. They do not because they are not going from 

place to place. They are just on the waterway, whatever waterway 

that is. In this case, you know, the Gulf of Mexico. 

Mr. COBLE. And finally, does the Jones Act create an impediment 

to the employment of foreign-flagged skimming vessels? 

Admiral COOK. Not an impediment outside of 3 miles. But if you 

come within 3 miles, then the Federal on-sea coordinator would 

have to determine that those skimming vessels were needed and 

there was not a U.S. skimming capability that could be used. And 

the State Department would have to verify that should a reciprocal 

development occur where U.S.-flagged skimmers could be used in 

that foreign country, that that reciprocal arrangement exists. So it 

is an impediment inside of 3 miles. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. 

Mr. Matsuda, did you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. MATSUDA. No. I would agree. We are familiar with the procedures used, and we can tell you that from our perspective they 

work very well, very quickly, and it helps maintain a policy of preserving a U.S. Merchant Marine. 

Mr. COBLE. Admiral, thank you both. 

Don, do you want to ask anything? 

I will yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Alaska. 

Mr. YOUNG. There is a provision in the law concerning movement 

of valueless material that has to be a Jones Act vessel; is that correct? And what they skim—and one of the reasons we are having 

so many problems, we have got 447 skimmers out there. This is 

very difficult oil to skim. You see the vision on the shore because 

it coagulates as it gets close to shore. If we could do it right next 

to the shore, we would be a lot better off. But is the valueless provision in law applied to what is skimmed, because there are so 

21 

many barrels of water versus actual barrels of oil—is there any 

value to it? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Young, I really don’t have the background to 

comment on a legal basis of whether it is valueless. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, get that back to us, because—I am 

after American-flagged ships is what I want. And I don’t like foreign-flagged ships in my waters or our waters. So remember that 

phrase. Under the dredging concept they had to be Jones Act vessels; if they were collecting, and it was valueless material, we made 

them Jones Act vessels. 

Now, if they are collecting this oil, and although it has water in 

it, is this considered valuable or nonvaluable? If it is nonvaluable, 

then they still should be—they shouldn’t be allowed to collect it. It 

should be American-built ships. So get that back to me. 

[The information follows:] 

22 


Insert offset folio 29 here 57094.029
23 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I will reclaim and yield back. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Just one real quick question, Mr. Taylor, just one very quickly. 

When I was in the Gulf Coast about a week ago, Admiral, I saw 

a lot of the local folks. They would take a boat. They would have 

two boats, and they would have the boom attached to each boat, 

and they would create, like, a horseshoe, and they were corralling 

the oil to be burned. Does the Jones Act come—I mean, let us say 

they are within the 3 miles situation. Does the Jones Act apply 

there at all? 

You are familiar with what I am talking about, right? And there 

was a lot of that kind of activity and a lot of— and they were saying that a lot of the local fishermen really were trying to get to do 

some of that kind of work. And I was just wondering, how does 

that apply, just following up to Mr. Young’s questions. Just curious. 

Would you have that information? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Chairman, we would have go to CBP. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But you know what I am talking about, right? 

Admiral COOK. Absolutely, in situ burning. And if we viewed it 

from a helicopter, it would look like a horseshoe, so that the activity would be going on, and it would be—the work would be generated by the two vessels. But I don’t know whether that would be 

considered for Jones Act. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To Mr. Coble’s point, I would guess if the roles were reversed, 

and this spill was off of North Carolina rather than Mississippi, 

Alabama and Florida, and a significant number of the gentleman’s 

fishermen were out of work as a result of that spill, I would guess 

that those fishermen would take great offense that a vessel from 

overseas was brought in to do the work that they were capable of 

doing. 

Now, I don’t have a problem if there is a need for greater skimming capacity, but that points to the fact that apparently when we 

passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990—and I think the gentleman 

was on the Merchant Marine Committee then, I know Mr. Young 

was—we obviously didn’t do a good enough job of putting aside the 

money for American-flagged vessels to do this if we have to go overseas to fill this need. 

But my point is, Admiral, the vessel was inspected in the Marshall Islands. It was built in Korea. I am just curious, how long did 

it take the Marshall Islands Coast Guard to show up and provide 

help for that vessel when it caught on fire? And how long did it 

take for the Korean Coast Guard to show up when this rig caught 

on fire? 

Admiral COOK. Well, Mr. Taylor, I mean, you certainly know it 

was the U.S. Coast Guard that was there. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Now, wait a minute. It is Marshall Islands-flagged, 

built in South Korea. The taxes go to Switzerland, so I guess the 

Swiss Coast Guard showed up to help when this vessel caught on 

fire, right, and to rescue those people out of the water? Was it the 

Swiss Coast Guard out there coordinating all this, flying overhead, 

organizing the skimmers? 

24 

Admiral COOK. It was just the U.S. Coast Guard, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Just the U.S. Coast Guard. So the country that 

didn’t get to build the rig, the country that did not inspect the rig, 

right? The country that does not get the taxes from the rig, is— 

in the event of a default by BP gets all the bill, all of the grief, 

didn’t get to build it, didn’t inspect it. 

Let’s go to another point. I understand the kids from the Merchant Marine Academy just took their Coast Guard licensing test 

last week, and it is 4 days, a very tough test. I think 70 percent 

of the kids passed, which meant 30 percent of the kids, after 4 

years of studying, did not pass at least the first go-round. 

I am just curious, if that 30 percent that didn’t pass showed up 

with a note from the Marshall Islands that said they had passed 

their third mates exam, would you sign off on it? Would you give 

them a third mates license based on the fact that they got a note 

from the Marshall Islands that said they passed the third mates 

exam? 

Admiral COOK. Congressman Taylor, we invest as heavily as we 

can in the development of international standards, and if someone 

on a Marshall Islands-flagged ship presented a Marshall Islandsflagged third mate license, we would accept it. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am just curious. Given the amount of corruption 

around the world, what guarantee do you have that that license in 

the Marshall Islands or Panama or any of these other countries 

where a great many vessels are registered—what guarantee do you 

have that they actually performed those safety inspections before 

United States Coast Guard signed off on them? 

Admiral COOK. Well, our goal is to go on board and do a 

verification so that we check certain things so that we can develop 

a sense of whether the vessel is being maintained in concert with 

international requirements. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But what is your degree of certainty that the necessary fire prevention took place on that vessel, or did you rely 

solely on the signature of someone you have never met on an inspection that you did not witness that may or may not have taken 

place that resulted in the lives—— 

And, again, I am not blaming you, Admiral. I am not blaming the 

United States Coast Guard. I am questioning a policy where the 

United States Coast Guard signs off on an inspection you did not 

witness, of someone you never met, who may not even exist in the 

first place, that probably could have been bought for a bribe in a 

third-world country. 

What degree of comfort would you have in having your child or 

someone you cared about serving on that vessel? 

Admiral COOK. Well, sir, I think the Deepwater Horizon is certainly a terrible incident. But when you look at the safety records 

across the board, I think that there is some reason to have confidence that the Coast Guard’s Port Safe Control Program is sound. 

Whether there can be exceptions— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Did they do as good a job on that inspection as your 

people would have done? 

Admiral COOK. I think they are enforcing equivalent level of 

standards; and the American Bureau of Shipping, in fact, was the 

25 

classification society that was actually performing the inspections 

on behalf of the Marshall Islands. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Did they do as good a job as your people would have 

done? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You may answer the question. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. Please answer the question. 

Admiral COOK. To the extent that we can verify the compliance, 

it was as good a job. We weren’t there, like you said. So we don’t 

have actual knowledge. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just for clarification’s sake, are the inspections 

that the Coast Guard conducts before issuing a certificate of compliance to a foreign-flagged MODU and an inspection that the 

Coast Guard conducts before issuing a certificate of inspection to 

a U.S.-flagged MODU, are they identical? 

Admiral COOK. They are not identical. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How are they different? 

Admiral COOK. They are different in that, if it were a U.S. flag, 

we follow the U.S. regulations and apply those regulation by regulation. To the extent that we have been able, and we have been 

very successful in getting those types of standards replicated 

through international instruments, the foreign-flagged certificate 

demonstrates that they are built and maintained through an international standard, and then the Coast Guard verifies that we do 

in fact believe that they are being maintained to that. 

We put the crews through drills, firefighting and lifeboat drills. 

We run through all of the records. We do spot checks on engineering things. We check their steering systems, physically move them. 

We double-check the bridge equipment. 

So those are the kind of things that are done as a verification. 

And then, as I said in my opening comments, if there is a reason 

to suspect that something is not being maintained, then all bets 

are off and we can dig as deep as we want across the board. But 

it is a verification examination. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. 

Mica be allowed to sit on the Committee. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Without objection. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And I yield my time to Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

I appreciate you convening this hearing on an important topic. 

I think most of us here would like to see that every ship that operates in the economic zone have an American flag, American staff, 

and American built. From a practical standpoint, though, according 

to the report given to us by the majority staff, 37 flagged U.S. vessels and 57 foreign-flagged offshore vessel units engaged—these are 

offshore drilling units—engaged in activity in the Outer Continental Shelf. 

I guess the Coast Guard also reported there are 38 U.S.-flagged 

and one foreign-flagged floating facility, platform, engaged. I guess 

a floating platform is also considered a vessel; is that correct. 

Admiral COOK. Correct. I think it is commonly known as a floating production and storage. 

Mr. MICA. But do you conduct the inspections also of those platforms? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, we do. 

26 

Mr. MICA. It doesn’t sound like that is a big problem, because it 

sounds like we would have one out and one foreign. But the majority of the offshore drilling units are in fact foreign-flagged vessels. 

Is this staff report correct? 

Admiral COOK. Those are the statistics I have as well. 

Mr. MICA. I have seen a couple of reports of how many are deepwater and how many are in shallower water. Do you have any idea 

how many are operating of the 57 foreign vessels? 

Admiral COOK. Thirty of the 57 are on MMS leases right now. 

Mr. MICA. Thirty of the 57? Okay. Well, and are they all production? Because the Horizon was not a production. It was exploration. 

Do you know? 

Admiral COOK. I don’t have that breakdown, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. It is nice to want to have them all American flagged, 

and I would support that if we could. 

I am just wondering what kind of disruption—and I don’t think 

you are prepared to answer that question. I don’t know if our Acting Administrator—do you have any idea what it would do if we 

imposed a mandate that they all be U.S. flagged, particularly with 

these mobile offshore drilling units? 

Mr. MATSUDA. Well, I can tell you that it certainly spurs the U.S. 

shipbuilding industry and not just for those units themselves but 

also the supply vessels. 

Mr. MICA. If we were to do that, we probably couldn’t do it overnight. You don’t build the ship overnight. And we can’t get rid of 

these foreign drilling units overnight. So I am just trying to—what 

we have got to do is find a practical way if we are going to do this. 

And then does the Coast Guard—I guess it wouldn’t require any 

more or less capability. You still have the same number of vessels—would that be right, Admiral—and you are conducting the 

same type of inspections. 

Admiral COOK. Well, if they became all U.S. flagged? 

Mr. MICA. Your operational inspection is no different for a foreign vessel as opposed to a domestic U.S.-flagged vessel under the 

Jones Act? 

Admiral COOK. They achieve an equivalent result, but the U.S. 

flag is more time-intensive. 

Mr. MICA. You are spending more time looking at the U.S. than 

you are at the foreign? 

Admiral COOK. We have to verify more things with the U.S.- 

flagged. 

Mr. MICA. You would know initially about the U.S. flagged more 

because you were there—you set the standards for construction. 

You were there along the way. But maybe we have a problem here 

that if we don’t have enough inspection of the foreign-flagged vessels—— 

I mean, well, first of all, one of the concerns is that we have 

missed the mark somewhere with the Horizon. And I don’t know 

that to be the case. It is just assumed because we have had this 

disaster. And I would support all U.S. flagged. I have no problem 

with that. 

I can’t do that overnight without some disruption. I don’t know 

how many are production. We estimate maybe half are production, 

27 

or maybe more, but you can’t take them out of service and not have 

a replacement. So we will have to build some. 

In the meantime, I still have a body of vessels that are foreignflagged, and I am being told that there may be a different level of 

inspection for them, or maybe I am just assuming it from what you 

said, than there is for a U.S. flagged vessel. I know we got a different process to get there with a U.S., but I wouldn’t imagine any 

lesser standard of inspection by the Coast Guard for a foreign 

versus a domestic Jones Act flagged rig or drilling unit. 

Admiral COOK. Congressman, part of the issue is that the flagged 

state are most typically a classification society like the American 

Bureau of Shipping, acting on behalf of a flagged state, goes on 

board a regular series of inspections and does a lot of the trips of 

equipment and overfeeds and verifies different electrical issues so 

that those tests are done before we arrive. 

Mr. MICA. But the Horizon itself, was there a different level of 

inspection for the Horizon, a foreign-flagged vessel versus another 

flagged equivalent? You are saying there would be a greater inspection and attention to detail to the American-flagged than there 

would to the foreign. 

Admiral COOK. I would say the Coast Guard spends more time 

on the U.S.-flagged because other inspection regimes assist in the 

foreign flag. 

Mr. MICA. The other part of this would be the problem we had 

was not with the vessel so much in the Horizon case but it was the 

actual drilling. You don’t oversee the drilling. That would be the 

MMS; is that correct? 

Admiral COOK. That is correct. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. So they were asleep at the switch. 

But we don’t know—well, we know why it sank. At least 

anecdotally we know that the Horizon sank because of the explosion, fire, et cetera, weakened structure like any vessel would, but 

we don’t know in fact that it was any less maritime or marine capable or there was some defection in it in your inspection of the 

vehicle that somebody missed, do we. 

Admiral COOK. No. We assume that it wasn’t. 

Mr. MICA. It appears, too, from the preliminary investigation 

that the gas exploded, caught the rig—the floating platform, which 

you inspect, burnt, went down. But the ultimate problem was in 

the drilling. MMS inspections, or whoever did the drilling, did not 

comply with adequate means to stop that from occurring; is that 

correct? 

Admiral COOK. We don’t have the complete answer, Congressman, but there are a joint investigation between the Coast Guard 

and MMS ongoing. 

Mr. MICA. Saturday, I got—it was marked urgent. It was an email. It was from a United States-flagged major company. I won’t 

give their name here. But from one of their top executives. 

He says that we want to help. Like other Americans—well, we 

have both assets and expertise to do so. We’ve been present at the 

incident command site since the early days following the disaster. 

We have offered more than a dozen American vessels, Jones Act 

qualified in parenthesis. They are currently in the Gulf to help in 

28 

the cleanup, including especially configured emergency response 

platforms as summarized in the document. 

Let me paraphrase it. It just says they have been waiting to hear 

from DHS, they have been waiting to hear from Coast Guard, they 

have been waiting to hear from Customs or Border is also involved 

in this. They have not heard from anybody. They said they have 

dozens of vessels, and there are basically scores of Americanflagged vessels that have not been called into service. Do you know 

anything about this or why they wouldn’t be used? 

Admiral COOK. If I could make two comments, Congressman. 

First, there are 2,930 vessels of opportunity, boats that have 

been hired by BP that aren’t otherwise typically involved in any operations that would be anything like BP would conduct. And those 

are involved in setting boom, helping with skimming, those kinds 

of thing. 

Mr. MICA. Is BP employing foreign vessels? 

Admiral COOK. What I would like to say, though, Congressman, 

if I could after the hearing get that information from you, I will 

take it back and see if I can’t break it free. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I will submit a copy of the letter I sent 

earlier in the week; and I was astounded to get this over the weekend that we have American-flagged vessels, cleanup vessels waiting 

there. So I did send a letter. I got a copy here to Secretary 

Napolitano and asked her to look into it. 

[The information follows:] 

29 


Insert offset folio 30 here 57094.030
30 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Oberstar. I’m sorry. Chairman Oberstar. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for holding the hearing and 

the work that you have invested in following this issue and in preparing for this hearing and for your superb management of the 

Coast Guard Subcommittee. 

I want to make a few sort of framework statements, observations. 

The flagged states are responsible for ensuring vessels under 

their flag are in compliance of the law of the flagged state and of 

the international laws of the International Maritime Organization. 

So they are responsible to ensure that recognized organizations 

carry out inspections and comply with the law. 

Some of those flagged states set relatively low standards. I made 

this first observation in the first hearing we had 3 weeks ago. That 

is why vessel owners such as BP register their vessels in those 

third flag states. Lower standards, lower costs to operate, lower 

pay for their personnel on board the vessels, in this case, the mobile offshore drilling unit, and a more relaxed and less rigorous enforcement of safety laws aboard that vessel. 

We have been very concerned ever since the outset of this tragedy about reports that this vessel may not have been properly 

maintained, that it wasn’t properly overseen, that there was disagreement between BP and Transocean, BP, a British company, 

Transocean, a Swiss company, registered in that great maritime 

Republic of the Marshall Islands with so much maritime expertise. 

We lost a lot of lives fighting over the Marshall Islands in World 

War II. That doesn’t make them a maritime nation. 

These reports led us to these concerns which led us to this hearing that Mr. Cummings is conducting. 

Recently, I observed a representative of the Marshall Islands 

Maritime Administration testify at the Joint Investigation Board 

that they have approximately 2,200 vessels under their flag, 2,200 

vessels. The United States at the end of World War II was the 

world’s greatest maritime Nation. We had 5,500 American-flagged 

vessels. We had 25 million deadweight tons of shipping. Today, we 

have 94 ships under U.S. flags that engage in foreign commerce. 

And our Outer Continental Shelf is subject to operational drilling 

by vessels flagged under the Republic of the Marshall Islands? How 

can they manage the responsibilities under international law effectively with a registry maintained out here in Reston, Virginia? Who 

verifies that the organizations in the Marshall Islands, the ones 

that they recognize to do the work, are doing it properly? 

And what we want to learn through—want to explore through 

this hearing is the role of the Coast Guard in inspecting foreignflagged vessels. 

So the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf, exclusive economic zone, 

foreign-flagged vessel operating with a drill rig owned by another 

foreign-flagged company and yet the environmental and economic 

losses are borne by Americans. 

The Coast Guard has reported in response to our questions that 

60 percent of the mobile offshore drilling units are foreign-flagged 

operating in our exclusive operating zone. 

31 

My view after this tragedy is that we need to Americanize the 

vessels operating in the U.S. economic zone, and I noted with some 

delight Mr. Mica’s support for such an initiative, and we have actually talked about this at our most recent hearing a week ago. 

But the question is, what capability does the Coast Guard have 

now to do all those inspections and what capability does the Minerals Management Service have, trained personnel, to understand 

the operations as our FAA does of aviation matters, commercial 

aviation? They set the standards. They certify the repair stations. 

They certify the maintenance personnel. Does the Coast Guard 

have a certified capability of personnel to take over such responsibility, and how long will it take to develop the expertise within the 

Coast Guard to do so? 

Admiral COOK. If I understand your question correctly, would the 

Coast Guard have the expertise to take over the functions that are 

currently performed by the Minerals Management Service? 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. 

Admiral COOK. Obviously, we would have to invest in people and 

training in order to accomplish that new field for us. I know the 

question has generally been out there about if we made everything 

U.S.-flagged we would assume that the business opportunities 

would drive things to essentially the same level of number of vessels. 

Right now, it would be a challenge to identify exactly what that 

additional workload would be, but that is something we would have 

to study in detail. We would have to look at the different programs 

that the Coast Guard has. Some are straight inspection. We also 

have ones where we use classification societies even on U.S.-flagged 

to assist us. It is called an alternative compliance program. 

And then we would also be looking at the capacity in the shipyards, because we would be very much involved in shipyard-type 

inspections, even in the dry dockings that occur after the ships are 

built. 

So I think a wide range of things. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think the Coast Guard is the best in the world 

at this, at this responsibility, of overseeing, setting the standards, 

inspecting, ensuring that qualifications are met and vessels are 

seaworthy; and yet you really don’t have—this whole arena of deepwater drilling has developed only in the last decade. And all of the 

attention of previous oil spill liability legislation—and I have been 

engaged in it since the Torrey Canyon and the Amoco Cadiz in the 

1970s—has been directed at vessels, tankers. Now we have a vessel 

that is not a tanker. It is a drilling unit, and it is a vessel. It can 

move on the water surface from place to place. 

But operating at a 5,000-foot depth is not something that the 

Coast Guard is particularly trained and skilled to deal with. It 

wasn’t in your job description, frankly, although it was in the Minerals Management Service, and they handled it poorly, and they 

didn’t develop skills and expertise. In fact, in May of 2008, in documents we uncovered at the Minerals Management Service, they 

issued an exemption from a ′′blowout scenario requirement′′ for 

Outer Continental Shelf actions in the Gulf in their notice to lessee, meaning British Petroleum. So their exploration plan did not 

32 

include an analysis or a response plan for a blowout of the wellhead. 

They also filed a further statement saying it was ′′unlikely that 

an accidental surface or subsurface oil spill would occur from the 

proposed activities.′′ The Minerals Management Service took them 

at their word. Said that is fine. We trust you. You are big guys, 

multimillion dollar corporation. You don’t have to file a response 

plan. 

Mr. Chairman, you have the Coast Guard Authorization Bill approaching conference. Our staff are meeting with the Senate staff 

working out the differences in the two versions. We have a very 

strong marine safety section in the House-passed bill. It has been 

a bipartisan agreement. Mr. LoBiondo was part of these discussions, Mr. Mica; and you, Mr. Chairman, you led the way on this. 

This would be an opportunity for us to include in concurrence 

with the Senate new authority for the Coast Guard to develop the 

capability to do this kind of inspection and develop the expertise 

and recruit the personnel and we would have to provide the authority for additional funding for that additional personnel to do 

these things. You would be able to handle that kind of work, 

wouldn’t you, Admiral? 

Admiral COOK. However, it would turn out, we would trust in 

your judgment in that. But I think we would make sure it was a 

seamless marriage between the drilling activities and the vessel activities so that we don’t create an opportunity for a safety or an environmental issue. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Correct. And you certify or approve the certificate 

of operation of the vessel master, don’t you, the Coast Guard? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, we do. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. But there is no such certification for the drill 

master on board that vessel and that person, that vessel master 

that you have certified. There is no similar certification for that 

drill master, is there? 

Admiral COOK. There are requirements, training requirements. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. No stamp of approval as we do with A&P mechanics for aviation or as you do in the maritime sector. And I 

think raising that standard is vitally important for the future safety in these drilling operations, especially when there is no capability to send a human to that depth which is below the depth of 

which our nuclear submarines can dive to fix things when they go 

wrong. We have seen we have remotely operated vehicles that are 

limited in their ability to fix a failure. 

Admiral COOK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. Last point, coming back to the question Mr. Mica 

raised. 

There are 2,900-some vessels—when I was at the command center in Robert, Louisiana, the Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service and all of the other associated agents plus BP said 

they were hiring vessels as quickly as they could to do the cleanup 

and the skimming, but they needed the certification, needed to be 

sure they had the training and the proper equipment on board 

their vessels to do the work that they were paying them to do. 

33 

Now, is there a problem of certifying vessels that are available 

for hire to do the skimming and cleanup work in the Gulf? Are vessels presenting themselves for Coast Guard approval? 

Admiral COOK. They are, and we are using vessel examiners 

from our Coast Guard auxiliary to assist us. They are trained examiners for fishing vessels and other vessels, which aren’t quite as 

complex as tankers and such. So they are assisting us in that, and 

I think we are meeting all of the needs. 

Mr. OBERSTAR. So you are processing these as fast as you can but 

making sure that they are capable of doing the work that they 

would be contracted to undertake. And BP is paying them? 

Admiral COOK. We are ensuring that they have the right safety 

equipment, life jackets, fire extinguishers, those kinds of things. 

And if there is specialized training that needs to be done, that is 

being done by BP. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just very quickly on a follow-up to Chairman 

Oberstar’s question. How many Coast Guard personnel are currently fully qualified to inspect MODUs? 

Admiral COOK. We have 69 personnel that have the MODU 

qualifications. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And where are they? Where are they stationed? 

Do you know? In the Gulf? 

Admiral COOK. The majority of them are in the Gulf. Some of 

them may be in rotational assignments. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Cook, is 69 enough? 

Admiral COOK. If I could just digress a little bit and build on 

something Chairman Oberstar was talking about. 

As you know, we have been trying to build our marine safety 

competency and had gotten lower than we really thought was acceptable, and I believe our marine safety improvement program is 

on a good trajectory. One of the things that we have added is a center of expertise for the offshore industry. It was just stood up this 

year. So it is still in its infant stage. 

One of the very first things that we did—and this is well before 

Deep Horizon—is sign out what we call a joint task analysis, which 

is a top-to-bottom review of the training that goes into all the mobile offshore drilling inspectors. And that is currently under way. 

We have added additional training capacity at our training center 

in Yorktown because we would like to have more inspectors even 

for the current workload. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Bottom line is you don’t have enough to do what 

you need to do right now? 

Admiral COOK. Right. We are doing some improvisation to make 

it all work. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Something you said earlier in your testimony 

about help that has been offered—and correct me if I am misrepresenting what you said. But no offer of assistance has been turned 

away; is that what you said? 

Admiral COOK. The term that I said was no ′′qualified′′ offer. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. No qualified offer. 

What I am having a hard time understanding is this is not jiving 

with public reports, printed reports. And somehow this is not adding up in my mind. I mean, we are hearing that there are more 

34 

either American-flagged vessels or more state-of-the-art technology 

vessels, that offers have been made and we have basically said we 

are okay. We don’t need you. Something isn’t meshing here. Because I don’t know—nobody said we are okay, but somehow the response was they weren’t needed. And if you look at what is going 

on, even from a nonprofessional eye, that just doesn’t jive. 

Admiral COOK. I could submit for the record the examples of 

what has been accepted from international. 

But one of the issues is that, of course, that the spill has continued and it has evolved, and I have used the term it is a siege. So 

there could have been decisions made at different points along the 

way where a specific resource didn’t appear to be needed and, if it 

is needed now, it will be reevaluated and asked for. 

But I could give you an example with just skimmers. I think all 

of us—if you haven’t been associated with pollution response equipment, you hear skimmers, you are thinking of probably a boat with 

a skimming capacity and maybe a belt that brings oil up from the 

surface. Well, skimmers are also the small cylindrical things that 

are floated in the water inside of a boom and they suck just 

through a hose. There is no boat associated with it at all. 

So when we hear the word ′′skimmer,′′ sometimes it conjures up 

an image of a boat that would maybe be capable of carrying three 

or four people, where in other cases it is simply a device that would 

simply be in the water. So that type of thing sometimes could be 

misrepresented. 

I don’t want to confuse anyone. There is a true sense of urgency 

on getting all of the right equipment down to the Gulf. We want 

to preserve as much of the Gulf Coast as we can from further impact on this environmental disaster. So every effort is being made 

to capitalize on offered equipment. 

Mr. MATSUDA. If I could add as well. We are aware of a number 

of offers by the U.S. industry and others who have vessels available 

that are not skimmers but could be converted to skimmers within 

a certain time period. I know that many of these have come across 

as offers as skimmers, but in actuality, they need a little work. 

But, again, the requirement has to come from the National Incident Command Center. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I know. But the frustrating part for us is when 

we hear from what we believe are credible sources, in my case from 

the maritime sector, the U.S. maritime sector, that there is more 

capacity available to help with this disaster that is not being utilized, and it is hard to connect the dots in our minds with the magnitude of the disaster that we are facing, why we would not be utilizing all available assets to help remedy what is going on. 

And I understand your answers. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I hope you would convey to the Customs and 

Border Patrol, I don’t know what the right word is, how outrageous 

it is for them not to be here. It is an insult to this Committee. It 

is an insult to you. And these gentlemen are being put on the rack 

to answer questions the Custom and Border Patrol has responsibility for. And I don’t know what we can do to get them in here, 

but I just I think it is totally unacceptable. 

But I thank you, and I yield back for now. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, and I will jump on that. 

35 

Congresswoman Brown. 

Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for us going to the Gulf 

Coast, because I learned quite a bit. 

I just finished meeting with the Florida National Guard, and we 

are in an emergency mode. We need skimmers. My understanding 

is Louisiana has 300 and we have 30. And the National Guard and 

the Governor’s office has been trying to locate them. And there are 

small boats I guess. But we need the big ones. And I understand 

they are available in other countries, including Mexico and Norway. 

What is the process for the State to utilize these vessels from 

other countries? And I have some pictures of some of them. They 

are big. We are talking about protecting Florida coasts. 

Admiral COOK. Well, Ms. Brown, earlier, I cited my information 

sheet that I brought here that we carry around with us every day 

to make sure that we know what the right number of items are 

that are responding to this. 

So, in Florida, it shows that there are 110 skimmers. And again 

they can be various sizes, and I understand what you are saying. 

You want big skimmers ready to go. 

Some internationally accepted skimmers, Norway recently—— 

Mr. BROWN. You said it is 110 skimmers. Are you saying they 

are working? Because the Coast Guard just indicated to me we 

have 30, meaning the Coast Guard. But we don’t have enough, 

whatever we are seeing. 

Admiral COOK. I can’t say whether they are all being employed 

right now. But I know there are 110 allocated to the State of Florida. 

Ms. BROWN. You were beginning to read something. 

Admiral COOK. I was just trying to sort through this—and forgive me, because it is not all about skimmers. 

But these are international offers, examples of offers that have 

been accepted. Mexico’s offered two skimmers. Norway’s offered 8 

skimming systems. 

And then earlier I had commented that, although the Navy supervisor of salvage has been an on-scene partner with us from the 

beginning providing skimming, we have also reached out to the 

Navy or some of their installations or bases around the country to 

see if they could free up some additional skimming. And there is 

a full court press now with the oil spill response organizations who 

have equipment in other ports other than the Gulf Coast, and I am 

trying to make arrangements to free up some of them contractually 

so that they are not bound to the area that they are in and they 

could be applied to the Gulf. 

So we hear you, and I hope we can get it. 

Ms. BROWN. The problem that I have is the time frame. Because 

this has gone on for—they tell us on television how many days— 

but the question is what is the process in order for the State to 

take advantage of these skimmers from other countries, the big 

ones? 

Admiral COOK. The best way to do that is work through our incident command posts so you work all the way up to the unified command which is in Louisiana, but you do have an incident command 

post stood up over in Key West. It was just recently moved from 

36 

St. Petersburg. And we also have one in Mobile, if you are talking 

about the Panhandle. 

There is a considerable concentration of people and equipment, 

but the main thing is that they are linked into the command and 

control structure all the way up to the incident commander. Make 

your needs known through them, and that is the fastest way to get 

it. 

Ms. BROWN. Can you give me that information in writing who 

are the contacts so I can make sure that my State is not given the 

runaround? This is something that we need. This is an emergency. 

Admiral COOK. We will follow up with you, ma’am, yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am sitting here and listening very carefully, 

and I am trying to make sure that—as you know, whenever I talk 

about the Coast Guard, I talk about two things, a culture of excellence as opposed to mediocrity and being effective and efficient. 

And I tell you when I listen to your dialogue here with Congresswoman Brown and you said we are trying to make arrangements, 

I gotta tell you, it gave me a not-good feeling. Because what is happening, and I am trying to make sure that we fully sense—first of 

all, I support the Coast Guard a million percent. But I want to 

make sure that we fully sense the urgency of this moment. 

We have a window of opportunity to save our beaches, save some 

of our birds and fish and wildlife, and I am just wondering whether 

there is that sense of urgency. And I think this is what Ms. Brown 

is talking about, Congresswoman Brown, that sense of urgency that 

it doesn’t—sometimes it doesn’t seem like folks are moving with 

that idea that they have got to act not today but yesterday, 55 days 

ago. 

So I am just wondering, you know. When you say something like 

we are trying to make arrangements, I hate to say it but that is 

not good enough. 

We are a can-do Nation. And when you have a situation where 

somebody—and I have gone to the ceremonies where members of 

the Coast Guard have done heroic things, and they acted like that 

because they knew that if they didn’t act at that moment that that 

moment would never come again and somebody’s life might be lost. 

In this instance, we have people’s livelihoods being lost, their opportunities to keep their businesses open. I mean, it is just so 

much. 

And I just—I guess you know I am not trying to beat up on you, 

but you are the Coast Guard now. You are sitting in front of me, 

and you have got certain responsibilities I know. And I mean and 

if I were you, if I were you, I would be saying to Congresswoman 

Brown not, you know, you go up to the command and you go up 

here, you go up there. You say, look, I am going to take that back. 

I am going to deal with that. I am going to jump on that today. 

Understanding that you are not going to necessarily be able to accomplish everything she wants, but that is how we do it in the 

Coast Guard. 

And so I am just wondering whether that sense of urgency is 

there. I think that when we hear the frustration of the American 

people—and that frustration comes from that. Is there that sense 

of urgency. Do we feel it? Do we understand it? Do we understand 

it? It is like we gotta act right now. Not tomorrow. 

37 

Because when you say arrangements—arrangements means that 

you have got to negotiate something. So that may be 30 or 40 days 

from now. By then, I don’t know what the situation might be in 

Florida. 

I am not just talking with regard to Congresswoman Brown. I 

am talking about to these governors and to these the 

congresspeople and the people that are looking for the Coast Guard 

to act. Because they come to me. They come to me and they say, 

Cummings—I am talking about Members of Congress—what is 

going on with the Coast Guard? And I keep saying, they are giving 

it their best. They are doing everything they are supposed to do. 

And then when I hear you talk about arrangements, it is kind of 

frustrating, to say the least. 

You may comment. 

Admiral COOK. Thank you, Chairman; and thank you for your 

continual support of the Coast Guard. 

And I apologize if I came across in a bureaucratic sense, because 

that sense of urgency is very real in the Coast Guard. I have had 

several meetings with our new commandant, and there is no one 

who feels that it is more urgent for the Coast Guard than he. We 

are moving patrol boats down to help organize more of these vessels of opportunity. We are helping with skimming and moving 

boom. We are moving aircraft down to make sure we are first on 

scene to spot oil as it is coming near the beach so that skimmers 

can be directed to that oil before it impacts the beach. So I think 

we have the message. 

And, you know, I came here with a mindset of addressing the 

Deepwater Horizon, the Outer Continental Shelf activity. So maybe 

in that sense I was in a mode that was transmitting some of the 

regulatory aspects and those things. But please don’t misguide that 

for a lack of passion and a lack of commitment. And it is urgent 

for the Coast Guard, and we are up to the task. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, number two, effectiveness and efficiency, 

two of my colleagues from my State, Senator Cardin and Senator 

Mikulski, were down in the Gulf Coast last week, last Monday; and 

one of the things that they were so disturbed about—and I recall 

seeing some of this when Congresswoman Brown and I were down 

there 2 weeks ago, 2-1/2 weeks ago—they said that they saw a lot 

of a boom that had not been tended. I mean, as a matter of fact, 

it had been left out there. Nobody came to take care of it. 

They were very, very upset about that and they were so upset 

that they apparently got a hold of some higher-ups and said, well, 

where is the coordination—— 

Let me tell you why I ask you that, and then we will go to Ms. 

Richardson. 

I say to my staff, when I see one problem, that means there are 

probably a lot more that I didn’t see. And so I am just wondering— 

you know, I am again going back to effectiveness and efficiency. 

Are we looking at things like that? Is that just putting stuff out 

saying, okay, there it is. It is out there. Or are we tending to that 

boom and other things there? 

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, just 30 seconds. 

My understanding is that the booms are okay, you know, but the 

skimmers is like catching almost 40 percent of the oil. So it is very 

38 

effective, and that is why we want them. Better than the booms. 

Booms give us mental comfort, but it is not as good as the skimmers because you have people attending to it or maybe not. But 

they seem to think it is better. 

Admiral COOK. If I could follow up to both comments. 

Mr. Chairman, part of the rationale for getting more boats, more 

helicopters, and additional people—and some of those people may 

not be Coast Guard, they may be National Guard who are activated 

in addition to the ones that are currently activated—is to get the 

presence so we discover all of the problems before they are not reconcilable. 

So to answer your question, if you see a problem, there are probably more problems. I would agree with you. But we want to be the 

ones who discover it, direct it, and keep the coastline safe. 

And then, as far as Congresswoman Brown’s comment, that is 

correct. The more we can identify the oil while it is still on the 

water and intercept it there, the more we can ensure the environmental integrity of the shoreline. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am going to go to Mr. Mica and then to you, 

Ms. Richardson. 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, I think the Coast Guard has done a great 

job. The Coast Guard, at least I found in my line of questioning, 

sir, you said you do inspect vessels both foreign, American-flagged. 

A little bit concerned that it doesn’t appear that we have enough 

attention to the foreign-flagged vessels. I am not sure that was the 

case, but that was the indication that I got. 

Sounds also like you are strained on your resources. At least it 

appeared from the question Mr. LoBiondo had asked that you were 

able to do your job but it was using all of the resources available; 

is that sort of correct? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, sir. You know, we have limited ability to 

sustain a surge. 

Mr. MICA. And one comment you made said that you were down 

in some of your capability, but you were trying to ramp that up. 

I am not familiar with all of the different ranks in the Coast 

Guard, but do you have any like a second lieutenant magician? You 

know, like that level but a magician in the Coast Guard. 

Admiral COOK. No magicians. 

Mr. MICA. I didn’t think so, because it would probably take one 

to comply with what has been going on, what has been proposed 

for you to do. 

Now, first of all, you had nothing—you did your job. It appeared 

that the vessel was not the problem. It was the drilling. 

So what this hearing is doing is really trying to set the stage to 

solve a problem which we don’t have which is to, again, Jones Act 

the entire American zone. I have no problem with that. I am proAmerican. I want the ships flagged in the U.S., built in the U.S., 

but that is being added on to the oil spill. 

The problem with the oil spill was the failure of the inspections, 

MMS. The problem with the oil spill was BP not being monitored 

in its work or giving a permit without putting the criteria in that 

required it to do its things. 

What stuns me—and I ask you the question if you have any magicians in the United States Coast Guard is because, first of all, if 

39 

we increased—we right now have 25—this is the Democrat staff’s— 

25 deepwater well active rigs in the Gulf. The Obama administration approved 33 since they took office. Wouldn’t it take quite a few 

more assets to monitor some of those assets? Now that would take 

a magician to do that when you submit in February a budget that 

cuts your personnel by 1,100 ships, helicopters, aircraft. 

So, again, in announcing not only that they had done this, this 

is what they had approved, but I have got the New York Times 

March 31 headline that said they were approving even more drilling in the Gulf. That was their policy. The President came out with 

it before the spill. So it would take a new position called second 

lieutenant magician in the United States Coast Guard proposing 

this is policy, giving you the assets to do the job, dramatically increasing your workload, and then cutting your resources to do it. 

So do you see, sir, why I suggest you need that grade of magician. 

Admiral COOK. I do, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Well, it is not a very good point, but I wanted to make 

it. 

You guys are doing a good job with what we have given you. We 

appreciate it. You are getting drug into another issue which is part 

of a bigger debate. And I will get back with you on the Americanflagged vessels that are available. I know you don’t have total say 

over who comes on board, but we have some of those skimmers and 

others that could be used, and we want to get them engaged as 

soon as possible. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me be very clear. Nobody is asking for anybody to be a magician. Under no circumstances. And there is nobody, nobody in this Congress that stands up for the Coast Guard 

more than this chairman. 

But, at the same time, again, every organization as we saw in 

with Deepwater—not Deepwater Horizon but Deepwater—we have 

to pursue excellence in everything we do. Period. And it is not 

about a magician. It is about making sure that we take the resources that we do have and use them effectively and efficiently. 

And before our chairman came in, I had announced that I spoke 

to Secretary Napolitano and I spoke to Chairman Price, Subcommittee of appropriations that deals with the Coast Guard. They 

assured me that they are going to make sure that the funding is 

restored that was taken out of the budget, and that they are going 

to get some additional money to take care of the needs that they 

will now have in trying to address this issue. 

And that was, by the way, a bipartisan effort on all of our part. 

Because it wasn’t a question of assessing blame. It was being about 

the business of making sure that the Coast Guard had every single 

thing it needed to accomplish what it had to do. 

So. With that, Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I may not be as 

nice and polite as you just said that. 

Listening here today reminds me of when President Bush said to 

FEMA Administrative Brown, you are doing a good job. I am actually here to say the more I listen the more disappointed and concerned I am becoming. 

40 

According to my notes, you guys had an exercise, a spill of national significance, exercise conducted on March 24 and 25 of 2010. 

That was just about 3 months ago. You mean to tell me that you 

can’t answer the questions to us of how many skimmers exist when 

you supposedly had a national exercise that I would think would 

have included knowing this information? I mean, this is basic MBA 

kind of work. 

So this is my request that you would give to this Committee: 

How many skimmers do we have? How many are assigned? How 

many have been offered, when, and where? How many have been 

received and accepted, and how many are available and where? 

That means includes the Coast Guard, private, National Guard, 

foreign. 

I mean, you have got to know what you have to do something, 

and I don’t understand why you don’t have that database to know 

where your resources are that you can utilize. 

Do you want to respond. 

Admiral COOK. Well, Congresswoman, we have a State-by-State 

breakdown as far as location of the skimmers. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So answer the question. How many do you 

have in total? How many are you using? 

Admiral COOK. The total is 447. And that is for the four States. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. The four States. You have—in the entire 

United States we have 447 skimmers. 

Admiral COOK. We have 447 available in the Gulf for this. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. No. My question is, how many skimmers do we 

have in the United States? How many? 

Admiral COOK. I don’t have that answer. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay, do you see my problem and your problem? You have got to know how many you have. It is not just the 

four States. Hell, you can take them from California. Take them 

from wherever. We need them. Why are we just looking at the four 

States? This has been 56 days. They had plenty of time to get 

wherever they needed to be. 

So my request, again, is how many skimmers do we have, how 

many are we using, how many have been offered, where are they 

from, how many have been in fact received of what has been offered, how many are available and where? And that is not restricted to the four States. That is to the Coast Guard, the National 

Guard, private, foreign. Who has it? So that if we can use it, we 

should use it. 

And I just want to say, sir, with all due respect, Rear Admiral, 

you have chosen a profession to serve, and I am grateful for that, 

not just today because we had the spill, for probably your career 

has been 20-plus years and we are thankful. But this kind of thing 

is what we work towards. And in my opinion of being on both 

Transportation and Homeland Security, it is inexcusable not to 

know what you have, especially 55 days into it. And we need that, 

because if we have got to help you, if we have got to say repeal— 

you know, there should be no hindrance of Jones Act, whatever it 

is you need us to do, we want to do it. But we can only do it if 

we know what resources are available. 

I have a minute and 15 seconds. 

41 

Based upon that exercise, why weren’t we prepared for this? Because that is why we spend the money to do these exercises. 

Admiral COOK. Ms. Richardson, we did the spill of national significance exercise. And when you are dealing with the spill from a 

vessel, no matter how large it is, it is a known quantity, even if 

you lose the entire contents of that vessel. 

In this case, we have a well that continues to put out more oil 

and, as you see, it either changed in character or our ability to assess the oil has changed. But we realize it is a significant amount 

of oil each and every day. So that the finite limit associated with 

a ship which really the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, I think was really 

focused on that, is now being contorted by a well that continues to 

produce oil every single day. So it is a magnitude issue. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So I would only suggest that you knew the 

Deepwater Horizon was there before this happened 60 days ago, 

right? 

Admiral COOK. We did. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So it might have been helpful if we were going 

to do a national level exercise we would do an exercise that could 

meet at its highest point of what could potentially be a problem. 

Because, as I said, the more I learn about this, the more I don’t 

understand how no one thought that this would happen. To me, it 

seems a very reasonable expectation. 

But, as I close, Rear Admiral, I just want to say thank you for 

your service. For all of those who are working with you, we thank 

you. We just need to get this done. And I don’t have the confidence 

and a lot of the American people do not have the confidence that 

all of the things that need to be done are being done. And we cannot rely upon BP or anyone else. We have got to use our resources 

to get this done. And it has got to have been done yesterday and 

not ′′we are still trying to negotiate or free up.′′ We need it now, 

and if there is anything I can do to help you do that, you don’t hesitate to let me know. 

Admiral COOK. Yes, ma’am. I understand. 

Sir, if I can just quickly—and this isn’t in any way to be argumentative. In 2002, the spill of national significance event was on 

the Gulf Coast; and, ironically, Admiral Allen as the Atlantic area 

commander was the commander at that time as well. So we do try 

and choose venues that we think are reasonable, and I would have 

to say, that in this case, we did not imagine this much oil. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you this quick one question. Did we 

do like an all call? Did the Coast Guard do like an all-call for skimmers? In other words, have we done anything like that, saying to 

the world we need skimmers or do you feel like there is already 

enough down there in the Gulf Coast? I mean—I know this is a 

very unusual situation, and I was just curious. 

Admiral COOK. Prior to this week, the calls have been more targeted, looking for specific skimmers and trying to meet the needs. 

But we realize that we need more. So, going on—and, in fact, I 

have been at work each of the last two nights until 10 o’clock on 

that particular issue of skimmers. And we are doing an all-call, allcalls out to the Navy. 

42 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so that I can understand that—and thank 

you, Mr. LoBiondo. We are going to come to you. But I think this 

is so very important. 

So, when you say an all-call, exactly what does that mean? I 

mean, does it go out to the maritime community? Is there some 

blast e-mail that goes out? I mean, how does that—if you know. 

Admiral COOK. We started with direction from Admiral Papp to 

go out to all of our captains of the port and work with—and, you 

know, I don’t want to throw in a bunch of terms that end up making this seem—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, you don’t have to do that. Just keep it real 

simple. 

Admiral COOK. They have committees that are standing in each 

port that are made up of various stakeholders, including the 

States, locals, and federals. And they have a contingency plan for 

oil spill response. There are oil spill response organizations, 

OSROs, which are qualified by the Coast Guard, and those entities 

have equipment. 

There are response plans required for every facility, like an oil 

terminal, or a ship coming in. They contract with those OSROs to 

make sure that equipment can be available if they have a spill in 

that port in that time frame. 

So there is equipment throughout the country. It is tied up in requirements, commercial requirements—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, I understand. I’m talking about—but I 

would assume the all-call would be for people who might be available. 

Because I have to tell you—and I have said this in many speeches—of all the positions that I have held in Congress for my 15 

years, I can tell you that the maritime community is probably the 

most—and dealing with maritime issues, when it comes to issues 

of keeping the water clean and things of that nature, one of the 

most cohesive communities I have ever seen. 

And I know there are a lot of people, not just in the maritime 

community, but others who want to make this work. As a matter 

of fact, I had a meeting with Mr. West down there in Port 

Fourchon, and one of the things that he said is that they are determined—and he deals in, of course, supplying to the rigs and things 

of that nature, and he works with the oil industry. But he said that 

one of his major concerns was to make sure—and their concerns 

was to make sure that they did everything in their power to help 

address this issue. 

And so, there are a lot of people that are out there. I just want 

to make sure that we are calling on them. 

And then I assume that BP would end up with the expense for 

this. Is that right? Since they are responsible for the cleanup under 

the Oil Pollution Act. Is that right? 

Admiral COOK. Right, because these would be skimmers that the 

Federal on-scene coordinator says we need. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Uh-huh. We might have to take the money out 

of the fund, but then BP would have to pay us back. Is that right? 

Admiral COOK. We have no reason to think BP wouldn’t support 

contracting them now. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Fine, fine. Thank you very much. 

43 

Mr. LoBiondo? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Admiral Cook, in the SAFE Port Act of 2006, 

Congress required the Coast Guard to update regulations to extend 

requirements that vessels submit a notice not less than 96 hours 

before arriving at a point on the Outer Continental Shelf. To date, 

no final rule has been issued. 

Can you tell us why the service has failed to comply with this 

law for nearly 4 years and when you will complete the rulemaking? 

Admiral COOK. Congressman, there was some thought that that 

rule should be wrapped in with some other ongoing rulemaking, 

and it has been decided that it should be alone. Notice for proposed 

rulemaking was published and closed out in November of 2009. 

And the final rule is done and being administered through the system right now. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So, in terms of timing, what do you believe that 

might be? 

Admiral COOK. It is actively being considered within the review 

process as a completed, final rule. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Or is it fair to say it might be stuck in the Secretary’s office? 

Admiral COOK. You know, it is in our administrative process—— 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Stuck somewhere. 

Admiral COOK. I mean, sir, there are ones where I could say, you 

know, something was delayed and it seemed like it was stuck. This 

one is on its way, very much on its way. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if it is appropriate, 

but maybe through your status as Chair of the Subcommittee, you 

might be able to urge someone to get back to the Committee with 

a timetable or, in fact, the final product. I think enough time has 

passed and it is something we need. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. If the gentleman would yield, we will have a letter to the appropriate people tomorrow, inquiring as to where the 

rule is and the urgency of getting that rule out. I was kind of surprised that the rear admiral didn’t know exactly where it is. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yeah, I mean, if it is stuck somewhere, we need 

to know where it is stuck, and we need to then—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Get it unstuck. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. —work to get it unstuck. But if we don’t know 

where it is stuck, though—okay. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Rear Admiral, did you want to say anything else 

about that? 

Admiral COOK. I believe it is ready to be released, sir. So—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You said ready to be released? 

Admiral COOK. I believe that it is. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Rear Admiral, do me a favor—— 

Admiral COOK. You know in your experience, sir, it is difficult—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I know, I know. I understand that. 

Admiral COOK. —to get the final—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I understand that. But at least—I understand 

that all of that is not in your control. I got that. But I want to be— 

I mean, something that pertains to what you do, I would hope that 

would you get us that information as fast as you can. In other 

words, exactly where it is. 

44 

Admiral COOK. Okay. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Go ahead. You want to tell me something? 

Admiral COOK. It is a—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You keep saying—it sounds like it is almost out 

the door. I just want to know what door. 

Admiral COOK. Well, I think the administrative review process 

between the agency and the Department is a seamless corridor 

there. So—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We will talk afterwards and we will figure it out, 

and we will get the appropriate letter to the appropriate people and 

hopefully get the appropriate response in a short period of time. 

Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I want to go back to the line of questioning about the 

equivalency of had that vessel been an American-flagged vessel and 

the appropriate level of Coast Guard inspection and had that been 

a foreign-flagged vessel. So walk me through this. 

If that had been an American-flagged vessel, how often, by law, 

would it have had to have been dry-docked for a full Coast Guard 

inspection, which I am guessing would include the actual use of all 

the firefighting equipment, review of the pumps, review of literally 

from top to bottom of that vessel? How often does that happen for 

a U.S.-flagged vessel? 

Admiral COOK. Well, we go out every year for the firefighting. 

And then what we do is also, during the course of the year, we lay 

out the compartments so that, during the different visits over the 

course of a year, we crawl the entire inside of the—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. And refresh my memory. How often does that vessel 

have to go into dry-dock for a full hull inspection? 

Admiral COOK. I will have to get back to you on the record for 

that, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is my understanding it is every 2 years. Okay? 

So what I am having a little—— 

Admiral COOK. Typically, it is twice in 5 years. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Twice in 5 years. So I am having a little trouble 

with—going back to your saving it was an equivalent level of safety, when I read that the Deepwater Horizon had not had a drydock inspection since 2006 and wasn’t due until 2011, that sounds 

like a 5-year center, rather than two on a 5-year center. Was I 

reading that correct? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, you are. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Now, again, not being smart, but steel is steel, rust 

is rust, corrosion is corrosion. What I can’t figure is that somehow 

that foreign-flagged vessel was less likely to suffer corrosion and 

structural failure on the span of 5 years than an American vessel 

is on 2 years. 

Again, I know folks in the industry. I know that your people go 

into that rating because they really do want to do a good job. They 

want to crawl through that vessel, they want to find something 

wrong, because they don’t want that vessel to be unsafe. And they 

are doing it, apparently, every 2-1/2 years. 

So how can you call a 2-1/2-year inspection cycle equivalent to a 

5-year inspection cycle when we both know that somehow the laws 

of corrosion aren’t suspended for a foreign-flagged vessel? 

45 

Admiral COOK. In either case, in a foreign- or a U.S.-flagged 

ship, we also allow things like underwater inspection in lieu of drydocking, where the entire outside is videotaped and reviewed so 

that we can look for any anomalies. 

So, in terms of a dry-docking, you know, there are things that 

are done to allow the dry-docking period to be 5 years. You can 

take a look at the 2-1/2-year mark. And those type of accommodations can be extended to both foreign- or a U.S.-flagged. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Are U.S. standards too strict? 

Admiral COOK. No. In every case, what we are aiming for is to 

either bring international standards to U.S. standards or, if for 

some reason the international standards are better, then we would 

adjust our own. 

But I think, to answer your question, the U.S.-flagged standards 

are not too strict. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Then, if U.S. standards are not too strict, are the 

foreign standards that you were signing off on too loose? Because 

they are not equivalent. 

You are not going to convince me that a 2-1/2-year standard is 

the same as a 5-year standard in anybody’s book. You are not going 

to convince me that the people from the Marshall Islands doing 

that inspection are inspecting that vessel as rigorously as your people, particularly when the Marshall Islands is a heck of a long way 

from the Gulf of Mexico. 

So let’s go back to your statement. Are they really equivalent? 

Because I don’t believe that they are, but I will give you an opportunity to convince me otherwise. 

Admiral COOK. Well, sir, just succinctly, the point of our inspections are to be able to ensure the U.S.-flaggeds are safe. And then 

we also go onboard foreign. And we leverage the different inspections that are going on on behalf of the flag state or by the flag 

state itself, and we verify that the level of safety is acceptable for 

service to the U.S. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, Admiral, should we outsource the inspecting 

of drilling rigs? Should we outsource it to the Marshall Islands, if 

they are that good? 

Admiral COOK. No, sir, I don’t think we should. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But you have effectively done that when you sign 

off on their inspection. You have outsourced it. 

Admiral COOK. I would say we outsourced it if we didn’t do a 

very rigorous verification and ensure that the level of safety that 

Marshall Islands has signed off to is being maintained on that vessel. 

And we also invest a lot of time, energy, talent, working through 

the International Maritime Organization, to put every piece of 

backbone we can into the international agreements before they are 

finalized and deployed worldwide. 

So we are very true to the goal of trying to ensure an equivalent 

level of safety. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But, again, you correct me if I am wrong. You all 

are relying on a certificate, signed either by someone from the Marshall Islands or their designee, that the requirements that you normally enforce were enforced. You have, in effect, outsourced your 

responsibility. 

46 

Now, it may be a bad law that we need to change. But is it not 

true that you outsourced your responsibilities? 

Admiral COOK. Congressman, I don’t want to be argumentative, 

but I just can’t agree that we have outsourced our responsibilities, 

because—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. So you did that inspection, not the Marshall Islands? 

Admiral COOK. We validated that the vessel was up to acceptable 

standards through taking their certificates and then verifying it 

through our inspection. 

Mr. TAYLOR. You took their word. You took their word. Yes or 

no? 

Admiral COOK. Trust but verify, sir. We took their word and did 

a verification. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you this. Does the Marshall Islands 

do inspections, to your knowledge? 

Admiral COOK. They use recognized organizations like ABS. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So they don’t do any inspections, right, to your 

knowledge? 

Admiral COOK. No, they are not doing inspections to issue their 

own certificates. Right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so, in light of what has happened here, do 

you—I mean, have there been any discussions with regard to what 

you might—now, following up on Mr. Taylor’s questions, in light of 

what has happened here, where we have the most catastrophic environmental incident that has happened to our country and continues to happen, have there been discussions as to what you all 

might do with regard to making sure that these standards are 

being met? 

I mean, have you all said, ′′You know what? We are not even 

going to discuss it, because we know that everything is excellent 

with the Marshall Islands′′? I mean, have there been any questions 

that have arisen as to how our United States Coast Guard will deal 

with Marshall Island-flagged ships with regard to inspections and 

the adequacy thereof and the reliance on their word and how we 

verify? Has there been any of that, or have you all just said, ′′You 

know what? We got it, it is already done, it is fine, everything is 

okay′′? 

Admiral COOK. Mr. Chairman, we continuously review the performance of flag states across the board on not just MODUs but, 

you know, the other types of vessels that we allow in on our port 

state control programs. 

And Marshall Islands, I don’t have the exact statistic in front of 

me, but they are a very reasonable performer. We have certain flag 

states that are, kind of, repeat offenders, and they become targeted 

for additional inspections. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. 

Admiral COOK. And it is a risk-based regime, so we are continually assessing each flag state for their performance. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so, if we can trust the foreign-flagged states, 

why do we do the CVE inspections for cruiseships? Why is that? 

47 

Admiral COOK. We have so many U.S. passengers that are going 

onboard the foreign ships that we felt like we wanted to have more 

of a presence onboard those foreign ships. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And in light of this catastrophe and the fact that 

so much harm is being brought to our country, I mean—and I understand, that makes sense, to look at the cruiseships. This doesn’t 

say to you, well, maybe—say to the Coast Guard, maybe we need 

to do a little bit more here? I am just curious. 

Admiral COOK. Well, we have those kinds of discussions, sir. We 

are interested in, certainly, the outcome of the investigation, as 

well. We don’t know whether there is going to be implications to 

the maritime inspection regime or if it will all be about the drilling. 

So I think it is premature to go to a CVE type of arrangement for 

MODUs. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. LoBiondo? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. No more questions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Then let me just finish with two or three more 

things. 

You said a little bit earlier—I had asked you about how many 

of our Coast Guard folks were qualified to inspect the MODUs, and 

I think you said 69. Was that the number? 

Admiral COOK. If I said 69, I meant 89. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How many? 

Admiral COOK. Eighty-nine. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay, 89. How many of those people—these are 

the ones that are qualified, is that right? They have been trained? 

Admiral COOK. Yes. They have an inspection qualification for 

mobile offshore drilling units. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. And how many of those are actually in 

those positions right now? I understand you have them qualified, 

but I want to know how many are actually doing that right now. 

Admiral COOK. I don’t have that exact number. I can get back 

to you on the record, sir. Some of those people, you know, are rotated into oversight assignments where they are not actually doing 

inspections. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This is very important, because Mr. LoBiondo 

had asked you—and I know he really meant it, and he is absolutely 

right. He was asking about what more do we need. 

And, see, when you tell me that it is 89 that are qualified, I 

know and we all know that the Coast Guard is overtaxed and we 

have folks who have to do all kinds of jobs. And so, when you say 

89, 89 could mean 30 that are actually doing the job. It could mean 

50. But if we don’t know and if you don’t know, there is a problem. 

And so, could you get us that information as fast as you can? 

And, number two—and I don’t see how you can answer this question without the information that I just asked you in the last question—is there a need for Congress to make it possible for you to 

have more people trained to be able to inspect these MODUs? 

Admiral COOK. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, we appreciate 

any support that is provided. We are, on our own, through some 

of the billets that were provided in earlier years, I think mostly a 

lot through your leadership and Chairman Oberstar, we have addressed some of the shortcomings in the marine safety program. 

And, like I said to Mr. LoBiondo, we have applied some of those 

48 

to a center of expertise that would be a point of synergy to further 

develop the program. 

But it is premature to say exactly how many inspectors we might 

need, but we are doing that job task analysis, which we think will 

be very insightful, will enable us to know what the additional 

training load needs to be to get us the right amount of inspectors. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. This is my last question: Admiral Cook, the 

OCSLA required that, within 6 months after September 18, 1978, 

the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall issue regulations which require that any vessel, rig, 

platform, or other vehicle or structure which is used at any time 

after the 1-year period beginning on the effective date of such regulations for activities pursuant to this subchapter be manned or 

crewed by citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted 

to the United States for permanent residence. 

However, there are circumstances under which vessels, rigs, platforms, and vehicles operating on the OCS can be exempted from 

the requirement that they employ only Americans. For example, if 

a vessel, rig, or platform is more than 50 percent owned by a citizen of a foreign nation or if an insufficient number of Americans 

are available to perform required work, vessels on the OCS can be 

exempted from the requirement that they employ only Americans. 

Information provided to the Subcommittee by the Coast Guard 

indicates that, since January 2008, the Coast Guard has granted 

52 exemptions, covering nearly 7,000 employees. 

Were most of these exemptions based on a lack of sufficient number of Americans to perform the required work? And how does the 

Coast Guard assess whether there is not a sufficient number of 

Americans to perform a specific type of work? 

Admiral COOK. Okay. The process involves submission to the 

Coast Guard—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wait, let’s go back. Why don’t we deal with the 

first question first. Were most of these exemptions based on a lack 

of sufficient number of Americans to perform the required work? 

Admiral COOK. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. Now go ahead. 

Admiral COOK. Okay. And some of those are only good for 1 year. 

So it is 7,000 in number; it may not be 7,000 in positions. 

But the way it is done is the company submits the information 

to the Coast Guard, and they have evidence of having advertised 

for the job or whatever outreach they have done. That information 

is packaged up, sent to the Department of Labor. The Department 

of Labor validates it. And if they agree, they send us back what 

is called an advisory determination. And then that gives us the 

permission to issue a letter authorizing that company to hire someone that is not a U.S. mariner. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what are the firms that receive the majority 

of the employment exemptions? And what are the types of positions 

that are most commonly exempted? 

Admiral COOK. The most common exemption is for the galley or 

catering folks. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What kind? 

Admiral COOK. The catering—the food service people. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Food service? 

49 

Admiral COOK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Wait a minute. You mean people to serve food 

and prepare it? 

Admiral COOK. Right. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you know why that is, why we can’t find people to serve food and prepare food? Because I have a lot of them 

in my district. I mean, I am sure they pay a reasonable amount 

of money. I am just curious. 

Admiral COOK. We don’t know for sure. We speculate that somehow they can make an equivalent living without having to go to 

sea, and they choose not to put in for those jobs. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Even if they are unemployed. Does your assumption still comes with that? I am just curious. 

Admiral COOK. Well, I can’t answer that, sir. The sea life is arduous for some people. But there may be another barrier. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. How many of the vessels operating on the 

Outer Continental Shelf are exempt from employing Americans because they are more than 50 percent owned by citizens of a foreign 

country? 

Admiral COOK. Could you state your question again, sir? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Sure. How many of the vessels operating on the 

Outer Continental Shelf are exempt from employing Americans because they are more than 50 percent owned by the citizens of a foreign country? Would you have that information? 

Admiral COOK. No. What I have is the number of exemptions requested. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. You can get that for me. We will get you 

a note, a letter, with additional questions, all right? 

And just one last question: What are the firms that receive the 

majority of employment exemptions? 

Admiral COOK. I will have to get that back on the record for you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you know whether they are the same firms 

coming back over and over again? 

Admiral COOK. Yes, because many of the positions are the same 

year after year. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Let me just say this as we close out this panel—did you have 

something else, Mr. LoBiondo? 

Let me just say this. I want to make it very clear that I have 

the—I saw what the Coast Guard was doing down in the gulf coast. 

And I think they are doing a great job. 

But let me say this. I think it is important that that job be done 

as effectively and efficiently as possible. And I really mean that. I 

think effectiveness and efficiency is number one—and urgency, and 

urgency. 

And I just hope that—I pray to God that we can get this thing, 

this oil—stop this oil from coming up out of the bottom of the ocean 

and that we can help people get back to their regular way of life, 

because there is a lot of pain being suffered right now. 

And, again, we want to thank the Coast Guard for all that you 

do. And we also thank you, Acting Maritime Administrator 

Matsuda. Thank you. 

We will now hear from the next panel: Warren Weaver, manager 

of regulatory compliance, Transocean; Mr. Ken Wells, president, 

50 

Offshore Marine Service Association; and Mr. Jim Weakley, president of Maritime Cabotage Task Force. 

I thank the gentlemen for waiting so long. We really appreciate 

it. 

Mr. Weaver, we will hear from you first. 

TESTIMONY OF WARREN WEAVER, MANAGER OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE, TRANSOCEAN; KEN WELLS, PRESIDENT, OFFSHORE MARINE SERVICE ASSOCIATION; JIM 

WEAKLEY, PRESIDENT, MARITIME CABOTAGE TASK FORCE 

Mr. WEAVER. Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member LoBiondo, 

and other Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the 

opportunity to speak with you today. 

My name is Warren Weaver. I am the manager of regulatory 

compliance for Transocean, Limited. Transocean is a leading offshore drilling contractor with more than 18,000 employees worldwide and more than 4,500 employees in the United States. 

I have been with the company for more than 35 years, including 

more than 13 years in rig-based assignments. I am a former OIM 

unrestricted able-bodied seaman and lifeboatman and have a number of certifications relating to offshore rig operations and management. As manager of regulatory compliance, my focus is in assisting rig management with regulatory questions concerning class, 

flag, and international maritime organization and licensing. 

The safety of our employees and crew members and compliance 

with regulations is of utmost importance. And the loss of lives on 

the Deepwater Horizon on April 20th is devastating to Transocean. 

As requested by the Subcommittee, I am here today to address 

certain maritime aspects of Transocean’s operations, including the 

flagging of our rigs. 

Transocean operates 139 drilling rigs in 29 countries around the 

world. Less than 10 percent of Transocean’s fleet is located in the 

Gulf of Mexico. There are approximately 37,000 vessels in the 

world, and less than 1 percent of those vessels are U.S.-flagged, or 

roughly 220 vessels. Approximately half of the global vessel fleet 

fly under the flags of Panama, Liberia, and Marshall Islands. 

Transocean’s mobile offshore drilling units, or MODUs, are constructed, classed, and certified for worldwide service. As rigs complete work under existing contracts, the MODUs will move into 

other locations somewhere else in the world. Transocean’s operations of its MODUs strictly follow the laws and regulations in 

each of those 29 countries in which it operates, including the 

United States, and international standards, regulations, and codes 

applicable under IMO. 

Nearly all of Transocean’s MODUs are flagged outside the 

United States. The reasons for this are strictly logistical. Foreignflagged MODUs that operate in U.S. waters meet or exceed all 

functional standards for U.S.-flagged MODUs. There is no material 

difference in terms of functionality or safety. The Deepwater Horizon rig complied with U.S. and international regulations. 

A number of inspections are performed on foreign-flagged vessels 

and were specifically performed on the Deepwater Horizon. The inspection certifications fall into three categories: U.S. Coast Guard, 

flag administration, and class society. 

51 

Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard has a program called 

QUALSHIP 21, which recognizes and endorses the most rigorous 

and proactive foreign-flagged nations. The Marshall Islands, where 

the Deepwater Horizon was flagged, is one of those QUALSHIP 21 

nations. 

The offshore exploration and production industry is global. To 

maintain maximum flexibility to move these MODUs to various locations around the world as the industry requires, foreign flagging 

is preferred. 

Foreign flagging of MODUs has nothing to do with relaxed manning or safety standards. As the company has advised other congressional committees, foreign flagging does not convey any tax 

benefits. Foreign flagging does not reduce or diminish the required 

inspections and surveys. 

Transocean remains deeply committed to the safety of our people. 

Transocean’s operations meet all industry and legal standards, and 

we will continue to do so as the industry continues to evolve as a 

result of this tragedy. 

I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I have 

submitted my full testimony to the Committee, and I look forward 

to answering any questions you may have. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Mr. Ken Wells? 

Mr. WELLS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. My name is Ken Wells. I am president of the Offshore 

Marine Service Association. OMSA is the national trade association 

for the U.S.-flagged vessels that carry the supplies and personnel 

out to offshore energy projects, including the offshore supply vessel 

whose crew saved 115 survivors of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 

More than 60 years ago, our industry was born when fishermen 

and shrimpers began using their small boats to supply the needs 

of the first offshore projects. Today, their sons and grandsons run 

some of the most sophisticated offshore vessels in the world. In the 

future, we look forward to meeting the needs of the new alternate 

energy sources, like wind and hydropower. 

In the interest of clarity, we do not operate drilling vessels. That 

is a very different type of vessel involving very different types of 

operations. And, for that reason, my comments refer to not MODUs 

but, rather, the other foreign-flagged vessels that work offshore. 

OMSA-member vessels are part of the Jones Act fleet, meaning 

U.S.-flagged vessels with coastwise endorsements. By law, our vessels are owned by Americans, crewed by Americans, and built in 

American shipyards. Flying the American flag means we are inspected and boarded with regularity by the U.S. Coast Guard. We 

must comply with safety, security, labor, environmental, and tax 

laws. 

We fly the American flag proudly. But please understand it can 

be expensive to operate a U.S.-flagged vessel and compete with foreign vessels that do not have to meet the same standards as our 

vessels. 

That is why we have the Jones Act. It provides the capital security that has allowed our member companies to build more than 

260 new offshore vessels in American shipyards over the last 3 

52 

years. It has allowed our members to create 100,000 American jobs 

ashore and at sea. 

But we see the Jones Act being eroded. And despite the urgings 

of Congress, we don’t see the Department of Homeland Security 

doing very much about it. 

Today, we know there are 85 foreign vessels working in our offshore energy sector on a regular basis. An additional 60 foreign 

vessels were in the gulf and have departed over the last few 

months. We know that because, 2 years ago, we hired a full-time 

investigator to track those vessels. 

We took that step because we realized that Customs and Border 

Protection and the Coast Guard lacked the fundamental tools to 

adequately track foreign vessels. Four years ago, the SAFE Port 

Act directed the Coast Guard to require foreign vessels to report 

their locations and purpose when they work in our offshore waters. 

But DHS has still not finalized those regulations. 

So what have we found? Many security and safety concerns that 

I have touched on in my written testimony. We have also found 

what we believe to be a number of Jones Act violations. We found 

CBP’s field units to be generally responsive and willing to investigate. But those cases, including two that are now more than a 

year old, appear to have disappeared once they reached headquarters, and DHS has been unresponsive on their status. 

Another area of concern is whether these foreign boats are paying U.S. taxes. The IRS answered last year when it issued an industry directive which states, and I quote, ′′Our analysis indicates 

that a significant number of foreign vessels permitted to work in 

the OCS do not comply with U.S. filing requirements.′′ We understand the IRS is now preparing a second directive that questions 

whether foreign vessels are paying withholding taxes on their foreign workers, as well. 

The last area I would like to discuss concerns DHS’s apparent reluctance to properly interpret the Jones Act. For many years, we 

have been troubled that CBP has incorrectly interpreted the Jones 

Act as allowing foreign vessels to transport large items of cargo offshore for installation. 

This came to a head in late 2008 when BP made a request to use 

a foreign-flagged vessel to transport a blowout preventer and a 

valve structure known as a Christmas tree to an offshore location. 

In its request, BP described that cargo with the arcane term, 

′′equipment of the vessel.′′ They claimed that was not covered by 

the Jones Act. CBP agreed at first. But after we pointed out that 

that was not part of a vessel’s equipment, like a life raft or an anchor, but rather a seven-ton piece of oil field equipment which 

would be installed on the wellhead for the life of the well, CBP took 

another look and told BP it could not use a foreign vessel to transport it. 

Better yet, CBP followed up with a proposal to address several 

of its conflicting interpretations in a way that restored the clear 

meaning of the law. You will recall that Members of this Committee supported CBP’s action and urged CBP to finalize that proposal. 

But then a funny thing happened. Opponents of the Jones Act 

urged DHS to withdraw the proposal, and DHS did. CBP withdrew 

53 

the proposal in mid-September, saying it would be reissued in the 

near future. But instead, 6 months later, DHS stuck the proposal 

into an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, almost guaranteeing it would drag on for years. 

It now appears stuck in limbo. The future development of our industry hangs in the balance, and DHS has been completely unresponsive. It has left us frustrated and concerned about our government’s willingness to uphold our fundamental laws or maintain 

American jobs. 

In the interest of time, I will stop there and thank you for allowing us to submit the statement. And I will be pleased to answer 

questions. Thank you. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Jim Weakley? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. My name is James Weakley. I am president of the 

Lake Carriers’ Association and a former Coast Guard inspector. 

Today, however, I am also testifying on behalf of the Maritime Cabotage Task Force, a broad-based U.S. maritime coalition assembled 

to promote American cabotage laws. 

Our American-owned, American-built, and American-crewed vessels operate under strict and extensive U.S. Coast Guard standards 

governing construction, maintenance, crewing, and operations. 

These regulations are the world’s most effective and demanding. 

Our fleet is in the hands of hardworking American men and 

women who have a personal stake in our national security, economy, and environment. 

International safety and environmental protection standards are 

issued under several conventions by the International Maritime 

Organization, a branch of the United Nations. Government responsibility for oversight and enforcement is vested in the registering 

nation, which is the nation whose flag the vessel flies, called its 

flag administration. Many flag administrations take their responsibility seriously. However, oversight and enforcement varies dramatically. 

A flag administration used by vessel operators to avoid government regulations, taxes, and other costs is often referred to as a 

′′flag of convenience.′′ Many of the foreign-flagged vessels competing 

with American sailors in the international trades are loosely regulated, often unsafe, and frequently crewed by poorly trained personnel. Some are even ′′ships of shame,′′ paying extremely low 

wages, few benefits, demanding inhumane schedules, under inhumane conditions. 

The U.S. Coast Guard conducts port state control inspections on 

targeted foreign-flagged vessels to reduce the presence of substandard ships in U.S. waters. Higher-risk vessels are more likely 

to be inspected in or near a U.S. port to determine whether they 

pose a hazard to the port or the environment. The Coast Guard can 

deny, detain, or expel from U.S. waters a substandard vessel to ensure the safety, security, and environmental protection. 

While there is a robust American-flagged presence in the Gulf of 

Mexico, foreign mobile offshore drilling units and support vessels 

routinely perform industrial tasks on the Outer Continental Shelf. 

Flags of convenience commonly used by these foreign vessels inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:00 Dec 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\57094.0 KAYLA
54 

clude the Marshall Islands, which registered the Deepwater Horizon, Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Singapore, and Malta. 

As of last month, the Coast Guard’s port state control program’s 

list of flag administrations with a detention ratio higher than the 

industry average included Panama, Malta, and more. 

Additionally, many of the previously named countries are relatively small, never visited by vessels they register, and lack national inspection infrastructure to ensure the vessels flying their 

flag meet international standards. 

Also, the nature of the resource development work in the Gulf of 

Mexico and its proximity to other countries allows some of the foreign-flagged vessels engaged in this work to avoid calling on U.S. 

ports, which complicates our port state control inspection and its 

effectiveness. 

Are American-flagged vessels generally safer than flag-of-convenience ships? For the many reasons I have explained, the answer is 

yes. 

Additionally, American vessels provide important economic benefit to our Nation. According to a recent study by 

PricewaterhouseCoopers for the Transportation Institute, the U.S. 

domestic maritime industry generates $100.3 billion in gross economic output, $45.9 billion in value added, $29.1 billion in wages, 

and $11.4 billion in Federal, State, and local taxes. A significant 

portion of this economic activity takes place in the coastal waters 

of the Gulf of Mexico. 

We hope that this Committee will consider these factors as it 

considers its response to the Deepwater Horizon spill. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. Weaver, I believe—correct me if I am wrong—in your testimony, that you say that the Deepwater Horizon was registered in 

the Marshall Islands for purely logistical reasons? 

Mr. WEAVER. Chairman LoBiondo, yes, our foreign-flagged units 

are registered in foreign flags so they—excuse me. They are registered with foreign flags so we can move them readily around the 

world. 

As you know, other places of the world incorporate similar labor 

laws as the United States. We use U.S. citizens in the United 

States. We have to use foreign nationals when we are working in 

foreign national countries. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, it is just a little curious to me that, if it 

is purely logistical reasons, Marshall Islands or Western Pacific, 

something like 2,000 miles away from the gulf and nowhere near 

any offshore oil-drilling operations. 

Do your vessels ever operate in the Marshall Islands or near the 

Marshall Islands? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, the Marshall Islands registry—International 

Registries, Incorporated, has offices in Reston, Virginia. Most of 

their staff is run by former U.S. Coast Guard employees. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I understand that, but I am getting back to this ′′logistical′′ word that has me a hung up a little bit. 

Mr. WEAVER. Well, for a U.S.-flagged unit working overseas, we 

use—for a U.S.-flagged MODU, we have to have—the master has 

to be a U.S. citizen onboard the unit. 

55 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. And you continue to assert that this has 

nothing to do with tax or regulatory situations or costs? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, it has nothing to do with taxes. And other committees have been told this from other areas. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Weaver, in your opinion, what would the impact of prohibiting foreign-flagged vessels from participating in offshore exploration, production, and transportation activities be? 

Mr. WEAVER. I could speak with—I mean, as far as the MODUs 

go. I don’t know about the transportation. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. As far as the MODUs go. 

Mr. WEAVER. But the MODUs, the large percentage of the offshore MODU fleet is foreign-flagged. So if you were—if those were 

excluded, is that the proper question? 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, if we prohibited foreign-flagged vessels 

from participating in offshore oil exploration, then you are saying 

we wouldn’t be able to do it. 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t think you could ramp up the needs that you 

would have right away. I am not a professional in the industry to 

speak on that. But there could be other options, if they so desired. 

There are cases where you could dual-flag units. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Wells or Mr. Weakley, I know that you said 

you don’t operate the mobile offshore drilling units, but do you 

want to venture a stab at answering that question? If we were to 

prohibit foreign-flagged vessels, what would that impact be? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. Well, sir, if I would use the analogy from the fisheries industry, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act actually reclaimed that resource from the foreign fishing fleets off our 

coasts. And they did that, in a way, by initially restricting the flag 

of the vessels. Today, we see a robust U.S.-flagged, U.S.-built fishing fleet. 

I think the model is set. I think it can be done. I think Americans should benefit from the resources in the American Exclusive 

Economic Zone. We can build these ships. We can crew these ships. 

It is our oil. Taxes ought to be paid based on the profits to the 

United States Government, and the wages should be preserved for 

American citizens. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Weakley and/or Mr. Wells, under the Jones 

Act, only a U.S.-flagged vessel with a coastwise endorsement may 

provide any part of the transportation and merchandise by water 

between points in the United States. 

What is your view if the Federal Government is enforcing the 

Jones Act as it were written and intended by Congress? 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, sir. 

That would be precisely what we would be looking for. Our goal 

is to put Americans to work on the water, to put Americans to 

work in our shipyards. And our view is that the law is very clear. 

The law on its face should be very clear. And we think that it 

should be enforced, as you have said, the way Congress intended. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. But it is your opinion, in your capacity, that the 

Federal Government is not enforcing it. Am I interpreting that correctly? 

Mr. WELLS. They are not enforcing it effectively. They are not 

acting on cases that are brought before them. And they are not acting on interpretive matters that are pending. 

56 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Just one last one, Mr. Chairman. 

Along these same lines, are there enough Jones Act-qualified vessels to meet the demands of the OCS? And what do you say can 

be done to increase the number of qualified vessels to meet the 

growing demand? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. I would say that they are. And if there is an increase in demand, we will certainly build them. And once they are 

built, we will crew them. The best way to do that is to retake our 

Exclusive Economic Zone from the foreign ships out there taking 

our oil. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Weaver, I want to follow up with you in my line 

of questioning to the Coast Guard. Going back to what the admiral 

had to say, two dry-dock inspections over the span of 5 years 

versus one every 5 years, do you think that is equivalent? 

Mr. WEAVER. The requirement is two dry-dockings in 5 years, 

none to exceed 3 years. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Same for the Marshall Islands? 

Mr. WEAVER. Same for the Marshall Islands, an IMO regulation. 

It is in the IMO MODU code. And that is the requirement. 

Mr. TAYLOR. When was the last dry-docking of the Deepwater 

Horizon? 

Mr. WEAVER. I would have to get back with you on that. I am 

sure we have the information, but I don’t have it with me right 

now. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So you are absolutely certain it was within 2 years 

of the accident? 

Mr. WEAVER. Excuse me? 

Mr. TAYLOR. You are absolutely certain it was no more than 2 

years from the date of the accident? 

Mr. WEAVER. It is twice in 5 years and not to exceed 3. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But you don’t know the exact date. 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t know the exact date. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Do you know where it occurred? 

Mr. WEAVER. Excuse me? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Do you know where it occurred, the dry-docking? 

Mr. WEAVER. Where it would do it? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The most recent dry-docking of the Deepwater Horizon, where did that take place? 

Mr. WEAVER. Offshore. 

Mr. TAYLOR. In which country, sir? 

Mr. WEAVER. United States. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Do you know which shipyard? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, we don’t go to shipyard. We use underwater in 

lieu of dry-docking for these vessels because we can’t fit in any dry 

docks. 

The divers do the external hull inspections. Other components 

are examined no differently than a dry-dock. That is how the mobile offshore drilling units, the semi-subs are used. They use underwater in lieu of dry-docking, which is a dry-docking equivalency. 

And those are done twice in 5 years and once every—I mean, not 

to exceed 3. Excuse me. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Do you remember the name of the firm that you 

hired for that purpose? 

57 

Mr. WEAVER. American Bureau of Shipping carries out our drydocking in accordance with their rules and regulations and the 

IMO rules and regulations. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

The chairman has asked me to provide you with a couple of questions. And so, in his absence, I am going to read these. 

The Deepwater Horizon was an MODU that was dynamically positioned; is that correct? 

Mr. WEAVER. Correct. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Was it classified under the law of the Marshall Islands as an MODU or as an MODU DPV? 

Mr. WEAVER. It is under schedule MODU which is a DP mobile 

offshore drilling unit. 

DPV is for mobile offshore units and drill ships. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So which manning requirements apply for it? The 

DPV? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, the schedule A. 

Mr. TAYLOR. A certificate of inspection provided by the Coast 

Guard for United States MODU with dynamic positioning indicates 

that when a MODU is on location with fully operational dynamic 

positioning, the crew complement must include a master with an 

OIM endorsement, a mate with BS/BCO endorsement, two ablebodied seamen, one ordinary seaman, one chief engineer, one assistant engineer MODU certified, and two oilers. 

What were the specific Marshall Islands manning requirements 

for the Deepwater Horizon when it was on location drilling with 

full operational dynamic positioning? 

Mr. WEAVER. The schedule A on location requires an OIM barge 

supervisor, two BCOs, I think two ABs, and one ordinary seaman. 

And then it requires a maintenance supervisor. 

I would have to actually look at the schedule to get into the exact 

details. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So what about the chief engineer? 

Mr. WEAVER. A chief engineer is only required—it also can be 

substituted for moves of more than 72 hours by a licensed maintenance supervisor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Is that under U.S. law or Marshall Islands? 

Mr. WEAVER. These licenses we hold are U.S. Coast Guard licenses endorsed by the Marshall Islands. These are U.S. mariners 

that were on the Deepwater Horizon. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How about an assistant engineer? 

Mr. WEAVER. Who was on board? 

Mr. TAYLOR. On board at the time of the accident. 

Mr. MORRIS. We can get you the information on who was on 

board. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Was there an assistant engineer on board at the 

time of the accident? 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t know. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How many oilers were on board at the time of the 

accident? 

Mr. MORRIS. I don’t know that, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you provide that for the record? 

Mr. WEAVER. Yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am going to ask you the same question. 

58 

You are a vessel exploiting the mineral resources of the United 

States of America. That vessel was made where? 

Mr. WEAVER. It was built in Korea. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And it was licensed where? 

Mr. WEAVER. You mean what flag does it fly on? Initially, it was 

flagged with Panama; and now it is flagged with Marshall Islands. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And its corporate headquarters for the organization 

is where? 

Mr. WEAVER. In Switzerland. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So the combined resources aiding in the cleanup 

and recovery of the people who jumped overboard, recovery of those 

who lost their lives, tell me what has been the total response of the 

Korean government so far. 

Mr. WEAVER. I have no idea. 

Mr. TAYLOR. They got to build the ship. They obviously made 

some money on it. 

Mr. WEAVER. The Korean shipyard built the ship, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How about the Marshall Islands? What has been 

their participation so far? 

Mr. WEAVER. Their participation I believe has been in investigations, and that is as far as I know. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Are they out there cleaning up the oil? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, sir. Not that I know of. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How about the Swiss where you pay your corporate 

taxes. Their participation has been what so far? 

Mr. WEAVER. I do not know, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would it be safe to say that the combined total of 

all of them is not one vessel out there, not one person out there 

participating in the cleanup? 

Mr. WEAVER. I know we—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. I have been out there several times. I haven’t seen 

anyone from any of those countries out there. 

Mr. WEAVER. We have three other vessels out there to take care 

of the spill. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, this is from the chairman, did officials in the 

Marshall Islands ever visit the Deepwater Horizon when stationed 

in the Gulf of Mexico? 

Mr. WEAVER. The Marshall Islands goes through an annual inspection—yearly. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Let us clarify. I am going to ask the question again. 

Did officials from the Marshall Islands ever visit that vessel in the 

Gulf of Mexico? 

Mr. WEAVER. The registry assigns individuals to carry out the inspections. Certified marine inspectors are sometimes a classification society such as ABS, American Bureau of Shipping. 

Mr. TAYLOR. No one from the Marshall Islands visited those vessels; is that correct? 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t have the information specifically if Marshall 

Island people have been on the Deepwater Horizon. 

Mr. TAYLOR. So, again, it was delegated out to the American Bureau of Shipping; is that correct? 

Mr. WEAVER. As far as my knowledge would go, I don’t know if 

their individuals have ever carried out the inspections other than 

ABS or one of their licensed—I don’t know their license—— 

59 

Mr. TAYLOR. To your knowledge—again, this is the chairman’s 

question—has Transocean sought from the Marshall Islands any 

exemption to any Marshall Islands safety regulations? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Wells, I am curious. I don’t think to this—even 

60 or 50 days into this we have any idea of the economic damage 

it has done to seafood, tourism. We know about the loss of 11 lives. 

We know of a lot of lives devastated by this. I am just curious, how 

much money do you think Transocean saved when they bought that 

rig in Korea? 

Mr. WELLS. I don’t know the answer to that, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Do you want to give me a rough idea on that? 

Mr. WELLS. Not on my life, sir. I have no idea, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Weaver, when they bought the Deepwater Horizon, did Transocean try to manufacture with an American manufacturer? 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t know, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Could you get back to me on that? I would be curious how much money they saved when they went over to Korea instead of an American shipyard. 

How much money in taxes do you think Transocean saves by registering that vessel in the Marshall Islands and having their corporate headquarters in Switzerland instead of the United States. 

Mr. WEAVER. If I could go back to my opening statement. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

I understand, Mr. Weaver, you are an international company, 

but you happen to have been pulling mineral wealth out of the seabeds of the U.S. territorial waters. 

Mr. WEAVER. We don’t take ownership of the minerals. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But you were sure working in the U.S. territorial 

waters. 

Mr. WEAVER. Right. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Weaver, are you familiar with an inverted corporation? 

Mr. WEAVER. Excuse me? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Are you familiar with the term ′′inverted 

corporation′′? 

Mr. WEAVER. No, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. It is a term where companies, often in the offshore 

oil business, will see to it that whatever profits would have been 

made by something like the Deepwater Horizon are more than gobbled up by the note paid to the parent corporation on a mortgage 

on, say, that drilling rig. And since the United States of America, 

since most countries do not charge taxes on foreign investments, 

money made overseas, it is a very clever way of not only paying 

taxes in the country where you are pulling out the minerals, then 

you don’t pay taxes in the host country as well. 

I am just curious. Is Transocean what they would call an inverted corporation so that, in effect, they don’t pay taxes anywhere? 

Mr. WEAVER. I can’t answer that question, sir. But in my opening 

statement I said, as the company has advised other congressional 

committees, foreign flagging does not convey any tax benefits. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But an inverted U corporation does, sir. 

60 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t know. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, from the chairman, I understand that you 

currently have 14 rigs operating in U.S. waters. Have you completed recently required tests on all of the blowout preventers you 

have on those rigs, and what were the results of those tests? 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t have that information, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. What would be a reasonable amount of time 

to expect that information from your corporation? 

Mr. WEAVER. We will have to ask the appropriate people to provide that information. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How about if we ask for 2 weeks or less and you 

get back to us. 

Mr. WEAVER. We will get back to you with something. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How many drilling rigs does Transocean own, and 

where are they currently flagged? 

Mr. WEAVER. Transocean currently owns 139 drilling rigs. Ten 

percent of the rigs are located in the Gulf of Mexico, and we are 

located in 29 different countries around the world. We are currently flagged with Liberia, Marshall Islands, Panama, Vanuatu, 

one swamp barge with Indonesia, one Australian unit, one U.S.- 

flagged drill ship. And I am sure I am missing a few coming from 

my memory. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. The chairman would like to know, were the 

fire drills on the Deepwater Horizon performed every Sunday? 

Mr. WEAVER. I don’t know. They were supposed to be performed 

weekly. We can find out. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you please? 

Because the question was—his concerns were if they were done 

on a regular, announced schedule, that you might have varying levels of competency at the time of the drill, varying levels of concern 

and, obviously, varying levels of quality performed with the drill. 

Mr. WEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, gentlemen, thank you for being with us. 

In this absence of the chairman’s return, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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