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THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN AND

PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 8, 2017

Serial No. 115–94

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells, Acting Assistant Secretary, Acting Special 

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bureau of South and Central 

Asian Affairs , U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 9

Mr. Gregory Huger, Assistant to the Administrator, Office of Afghanistan 

and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development ................. 18

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells: Prepared statement ............................................. 11

Mr. Gregory Huger: Prepared statement ............................................................... 20

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 50

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and chairman, 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and written responses 

from: 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells ............................................................................. 52

Mr. Gregory Huger ............................................................................................... 54

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and written responses 

from: 

The Honorable Alice G. Wells ............................................................................. 57

Mr. Gregory Huger ............................................................................................... 59

(1)

THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN 

AND PAKISTAN: OBJECTIVES AND 

RESOURCES 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Deutch, 

Ranking Member Sherman, each for our opening statements, I will 

then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We 

will then hear from our witnesses. And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record, and 

members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for 

the record subject to the length limitation and the rules. 

I would like to remind audience members that disruption of committee proceedings is against the law and will not be tolerated, although wearing theme shirts while seated, seated in the hearing 

room, is permissible. Holding up signs or standing up during the 

proceedings is not. Any disruptions will result in a suspension of 

proceedings until the Capitol Police can restore order. 

Thank you, Mr. Police Officer. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for such time as she may consume. 

Finally, the third time is the charm. After running into hurricanes from Mother Nature and an emergency tax reform retreat 

the first two times that we scheduled this hearing, I am glad that 

we can all finally convene this important and timely hearing. I 

thank our witnesses for their patience and their willingness to 

work with us and coordinate our schedules so that we can make 

this hearing finally happen. So without further ado, we will officially kick off our budget hearing for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 

an effort to examine the new strategy the President announced 21⁄2

months ago. 

What I think many of us are interested in hearing is exactly 

what the details are in this strategy—how it will be implemented, 

2

what are the benchmarks for measuring success, how the President 

intends to use the resources available to implement this new strategy. What I did hear when the strategy was rolled out was a clear 

and decisive message that the United States is resolved to win, to 

defeat terror, and that we will not focus on artificial timelines for 

withdrawal. I think that is the approach we should be taking reversing our previous message to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and others 

that they can simply wait us out, because we had already predetermined when we would leave. But we haven’t seen or heard how we 

plan on doing this. 

We do know that this comes with an undefined and open-ended 

financial commitment by the United States as we saw earlier this 

week when the administration sent up an amendment to the budget request for additional resources to support 3,500 more troops. I 

don’t see how we can defeat these groups without the support of 

Pakistan. I know the President put an emphasis on Pakistan needing to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, to order, to 

peace. But the strategy was lacking on details on how we are going 

to get Pakistan to reverse course. 

Pakistan needs to quit hedging its bets and get fully on board 

with the U.S. and Afghanistan. But the strategy was short on details on exactly what tools we will use and how to convince Pakistan that its interests aligned with what we aim to achieve in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the correct move. 

Following her trip to Pakistan with Secretary Tillerson, Ambassador Wells, welcome to you, stated that the administration ‘‘laid 

out some very specific expectations of how Pakistan can help create 

the conditions that would help bring the Taliban to the table.’’

I hope to hear some of those specific expectations, not just on 

bringing the Taliban to the table, but to address the use of Pakistan territory as terror safe havens. I support the President’s determination to integrate all elements of American power—diplomatic, 

military, economic, and political—to protect our interests and 

achieve our objectives, particularly when it comes to leaning on our 

partners and allies to share the financial burden and to provide 

more troops. A safe, secure, and stable Afghanistan, free from terror groups is in all of our interests. 

The United States should not be relied upon to bear the full burden. Others must contribute to our mutual success. But right now, 

I don’t see that willingness from our partners, especially when it 

comes to contributing more troops to NATO’s mission, and I think 

the administration hasn’t quite gone into detail on how we can get 

the support. I am also concerned that the new strategy isn’t as 

clear when it comes to our commitment to Afghanistan’s future and 

the U.S.-Afghan relationship. 

Since the year 2002, we have made a concerted effort to support 

and empower women in Afghanistan. And in recent years, we have 

seen that support start to be realized. Dr. Bera and I had the honor 

and privilege to host first lady Ghani, former First Lady Bush, and 

members of the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council for a meeting with 

our committee members and members of the Caucus for Women’s 

Issues last week in the Capitol. 

What we heard was that the United States has helped build a 

foundation for women and girls that has improved their lives. But 

3

now, what we need is to take that to the next level, to build on previous successes achieved in large part to the work of the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council, help them scale up and meet long-term 

challenges. Women will have an important role to play in Afghanistan’s future, and I hope to hear how our new strategy will leverage that to achieve even greater success. 

The President clearly defined winning as attacking our enemies, 

obliterating ISIS, crushing al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from 

taking over Afghanistan, and stopping terror attacks against America. But what is the strategy in which to do this? What is our plan 

for addressing the growing Iranian influence in Afghanistan? We 

didn’t hear anything in the new strategy regarding Iran’s military 

and financial support for the Taliban, or of Qatar’s continued support for the Taliban, and likely other terror groups in the region. 

The President also said that we will work with the Afghan Government only as long as we see determination and we see progress; 

that our commitment is not unlimited and our support is not a 

blank check, and the American people expect to see real reforms. 

I am not sure that these are both on the same timeline, and I am 

not sure that we can achieve our goals without supporting the Afghan Government. I am also greatly concerned with what I see as 

a dangerous and tragic retreat when it comes to our counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 

The President’s request for fiscal year 2018 was nearly half of 

our actual expenditure on these operations in 2016. ISIS, al-Qaeda, 

and so many others finance their operations, in large part, through 

their illicit activities, most notably through the money they raise 

from drug trafficking. We cannot just defeat these terror groups 

kinetically. We need to take out their revenue streams. 

Without a commitment to counter narcotics, I don’t see how we 

can totally defeat these groups. There are ideas in this new strategy that many of us can fully support, but we need to hear details 

on how we will achieve our objectives, and we need to know what 

benchmarks the administration is going to use to measure success. 

I hope to hear some of that from our patient panel today, and 

how the President’s budget request will be leveraged to achieve our 

goals and fulfill this new strategy. 

And with that, I turn to the ranking member of our Middle East 

Subcommittee, Mr. Deutch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and thanks, 

Chairman Yoho, for convening this important subcommittee hearing. Thanks, of course, to our witnesses here today from State and 

USAID, whom I fear are undervalued, underfunded, and underutilized in the current administration. 

Sixteen years. For 16 years, Americans soldiers have been sacrificing their lives in Afghanistan to secure the future of that country 

and to protect our citizens at home. Too often we forget this very 

simple truth, that while we sit here in comfort, our young men and 

women are risking everything for us. Just this weekend, we were 

sadly reminded of this when a Green Beret, Sergeant First Class 

Stephen Cribben, husband, son, and father of two, was killed in 

combat operations South of Kabul. This sacrifice, though, includes 

not just our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, but, also, our 

4

diplomats and our public servants bringing hope and opportunity 

through the critical work in the State Department and USAID. 

Yesterday, we held a hearing in this room on democracy and governance promotion in the Middle East. We cannot secure Afghanistan’s future and an effective relationship with Pakistan that roots 

out terrorism and empowers civil society without these efforts. 

We went into Afghanistan 16 years ago in order to remove alQaeda, who had been provided safe haven under brutal Taliban 

rule, and we have since made tremendous gains in decimating alQaeda’s core infrastructure and helping Afghans reclaim their 

country. We have seen great strides to improve democratic governance, promoting women’s rights, better maternal and child 

healthcare, and increased access to education. Under the oppressive Taliban rule, before 2001, less than 1 million Afghan children 

were in school, and almost none of them were girls. Today, more 

than 9 million children are in school, and over 40 percent of them 

are girls. 

And USAID, which has already spent billions to promote the governance, economic growth, and access to education, just announced 

another $75 million project to print and distribute 135 million approved textbooks for grades 1 through 12 to all public schools in 

Afghanistan. The Afghan people are profoundly grateful for these 

efforts, and so are the members of this committee. 

In August, the Trump administration finally unveiled its strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia aimed at maintaining these 

gains and ultimately bringing the war in Afghanistan to a close. 

Today, we have a critical opportunity to hear from the administration witnesses how that strategy will be implemented and what it 

means for the future of our relationships with Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. I hope our witnesses can also help explain the motivation 

and potential impact of this administration’s alarming 40 percent 

decrease in the budget request for these two countries from last 

year. 

In his well-scripted strategy speech, President Trump said, ‘‘The 

men and women who serve our Nation in combat deserve a plan 

for victory, they deserve the tools they need and the trust have 

earned to fight and to win.’’ I agree. 

But the very next day, Secretary Tillerson seemingly contradicted the President by saying that while we may not win on the 

battlefield, neither will the Taliban. And while winning the war in 

Afghanistan has always been an amorphous target, I would have 

hoped for a clearer explanation from this administration after its 

intensive strategy review. 

What is clear to me is that we are facing a very real risk of backsliding in Afghanistan. The last few weeks have been particularly 

tough with a number of brutal attacks, including a deadly shooting 

at a TV station in Kabul this weekend by an ISIS affiliate. 

U.S. defense officials have plainly described the current fight 

against the resurgent Taliban as a stalemate. The most recent 

SIGAR report shows that U.S.-backed Afghan Government maintains control or influence over just 56 percent of the country’s 400 

districts, and that around 10 percent of Afghan civilians reside in 

areas under militant control or influence. 

5

So where do we go from here? There are those who believe that 

the only way to achieve a stable Afghanistan is through an 

unending American military presence on the ground. Others advocate for the immediate withdrawal of every last American troop. 

But serious security experts, I believe, understand a third way. The 

U.S. should continue supporting and strengthening the Afghan national defense and security forces to ensure that it can one day 

function independently of foreign assistance. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Chair notes a disturbance of committee 

proceedings. The room will be in order. I formally request that 

those disrupting the committee stop the disruption. The committee 

will suspend while the Capitol Police restore order. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Officer. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized to continue. 

Mr. DEUTCH. The ANDSF must ensure that it can one day function independently of foreign assistance and U.S. leadership on the 

ground. Meanwhile, we need to create conditions on the ground 

that can bring about a negotiated political settlement where the 

Taliban understands that it can never win power through its military. But any political settlement cannot come at the expense of 

the human rights and basic dignity of the Afghan people. Ultimately, for this to be successful, the Afghan Government must become accountable for its own future. A stable Afghanistan will require continued patience and consistent resources from Congress. 

Achieving success in Afghanistan will not be quick or easy, but we 

owe it to the Americans and Afghans who have sacrificed so much 

get this right. 

I look forward to exploring with our witnesses how the U.S. can, 

in fact, get this right, and address the ongoing challenges in Afghanistan from Taliban insurgency, terrorism, corruption, economic 

stagnation, and narco trafficking, as well as Pakistan’s role in preventing terrorist groups from establishing safe havens. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now I am pleased to yield 5 minutes for his opening statement to the chair of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee, Dr. 

Ted Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Good morning. And I thank Chairman emeritus RosLehtinen for spearheading this hearing. And it is nice to know that 

you are going to looking down upon us as these hearings continue. 

Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to make up one of the United 

States’ most complex foreign policy and security challenge. And 

sadly, in the 16 years of our conflict in Afghanistan, the broad 

strokes of this situation are strikingly unchanged. Though the previous administration attempted to bring a symbolic close to the 

combat mission in Afghanistan, in reality, America’s longest war is 

still ongoing. American soldiers are still fighting and dying in Afghanistan, and the cancer of the Taliban and terrorist groups is 

metastasizing. Pakistan is still seen as both a key to resolving the 

conflict and shelter for our enemies. 

While he is no support of unending wars in the Middle East and 

South Asia, President Trump observed in his speech that the consequence of a rapid exit and both predictable and unacceptable. In 

announcing our new national strategy for the conflict, the PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:54 Jan 23, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\110817\27513 SHIRL
6

dent laid out an important truth that should have guided our policies all along, that despite the enormous cost, we can’t leave without resolution. Doing otherwise would create a vacuum filled instantly by terrorist threats, not just to the United States, but to 

the free world. Our new strategy must include civilians as well as 

military efforts to secure a lasting victory in Afghanistan and for 

the Afghanistan people, and a sustainable relationship with Pakistan. There are many important questions to be answered about 

how the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development will work within the new strategy and contribute to 

its eventual success. The administration has proposed reconsolidating the special representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

back into the bureau of the South and Central Asia. 

I hope Ambassador Wells, the acting head of both offices, will 

share her thoughts whether this will increase operational efficiencies, and contribute to more region-wide strategic thinking. I 

am particularly interested in hearing more about whether this administration will tolerate Pakistan’s aiding and abetting of terrorist 

groups within its borders. Pakistan has been one of the largest U.S. 

foreign assistant recipients in the post-911 period. But despite giving tens of billions of dollars in counterterror assistance over the 

years, terrorist organizations continue to operate with impunity in 

Pakistan. 

We have seen some promising signs that this administration will 

no longer put up with Pakistan’s friendliness toward terror groups, 

and I hope to hear this new posture is reflected throughout the 

budgetary planning. A broader question is how reduced resources 

will be redirected and whether the administration’s reduced focus 

on nation-building, which the President mentioned in his speech, 

plays into foreign assistance budgeting for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The administration’s budget for these two countries reflect 

substantial cuts, even to accounts which have a strong nexus to defense and security, including INCLE, NADR, and FMF. 

So I thank the witnesses for joining two subcommittees today to 

share their knowledge on these and other important questions, and 

for working with us on scheduling to hear this hearing. And I look 

forward to their testimony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Yoho. 

I now will recognize members for their opening statements, starting with Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and Chairman Yoho, and Ranking Member Deutch, and Ranking Member 

Sherman, for holding this joint subcommittee hearing exploring the 

President’s Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thank you to our 

witnesses for being here today to discuss this critical set of issues. 

For 16 years, the United States military has been deployed to 

South Asia in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. 

Since the beginning of military operations in October 2001, our Nation’s objectives have evolved several times creating more and more 

uncertainty as to the future of Afghanistan and America’s role in 

that country’s continuing challenges. Most importantly, since October 2001, nearly 2400 American lives have been lost in military operations. We owe it to the brave men and women and their families 

who have made the ultimate sacrifice to clearly define what our 

7

Nation’s role is in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This includes a clear 

explanation of the President’s plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

detailing the strategy and mission, and what it will take in terms 

of resources and personnels to achieve the objectives set forth in 

that mission successfully. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as they can 

help inform this process. And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. 

Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would hope that we are going to be doing 

things differently to achieve a different outcome. We have been 

there for 16 years. I have spent a lot of time in Afghanistan over 

my life, and been involved in its policy. Madam Chairman, we have 

had the wrong policy. Obviously it hasn’t worked. And unless we 

are—for example, we mentioned going to hold Pakistan more accountable. Unless we are going to eliminate poppy production, 

which we have not done, all of this time there—Taliban are still 

making their money, hundreds and millions of dollars off opium 

production. We have not stopped that. We had the ability to do so. 

There are a number of things that needed to be done. We have 

written a constitution and foisted upon the people of Afghanistan 

that is totally contrary to their culture. And while it is important 

for us to defeat the forces of radical Islam, including the Taliban, 

either we do these other things right instead of just relying on the 

military, we are doing a great disservice to the people of Afghanistan and the people of the United States. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Dr. Bera of California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

You know, along with the chairwoman, as she mentioned, last 

week, we had the ability to meet with First Lady Ghani and First 

Lady Laura Bush to discuss some of the problems that are facing 

women and girls in Afghanistan but also to discuss some of the 

successes. One thing I think we can be proud of as a Nation is that 

investment in a generation of girls. By USAID’s own statistics, 

USAID has helped support 3.5 million girls in school and has 

helped increase the number of female health workers in Afghanistan. You know, in 2002, only 25 percent of the health facilities had 

a female health worker. In 2015, 85 percent do. That is something 

we can be proud about. As a few of my colleagues have indicated, 

though, as we start to change our mission in Afghanistan, we have 

got to look at regional partners. And it would be difficult for us to 

think about budgets with Afghanistan and Pakistan without talking about India as well, and India’s ability to create some stability 

in the region. 

I look forward to the testimony and look forward to thinking 

about India’s role in that region. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Kinzinger is recognized. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And to the 

guests, thank you for being here. It is going to be a good hearing. 

I just think—Michael Waltz, who is a friend of mine, he was a 

Green Beret in Afghanistan, who wrote a good book. He made the 

8

point that at the moment, the prior administration announced a 

surge in Afghanistan but had an end date on it. He said at that 

point, the conversation he was having with the locals ended because they basically said, Look, we really like Americans, we like 

you here, but we know you are leaving now. And it really set our 

policy back quite a bit. 

I think this President coming forward and saying we are not 

going to be defeated in Afghanistan, people know that—I think we 

all know that we won’t be defeated on the battlefield. The only time 

we will be defeated is with our will, if that happens. And, look, Afghanistan is not going to be a smiley unicorn facility if we leave. 

It is going to be even worse, and we are going to see another 9/11 

type attack being planned. Unfortunately, we are finding ourselves 

engaged in generational war on terror that I think will last the rest 

of my life. I wish it was different, but it is the reality. 

So Madam Chair, I appreciate you doing this, and I look forward 

to all the great insights from our guests. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Ambassador Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank our esteemed chairman for organizing the 

hearing today. 

The President said in his August speech on South Asia that, and 

I quote, ‘‘We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens 

for terrorist organizations.’’ And he made clear that the U.S. would 

fulfill its mission in Afghanistan and give commanders the green 

light to target terrorist and criminal organizations. I welcome the 

President’s policy change on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and look 

forward to working with the administration on improving the U.S. 

security approach in South Asia. 

However, I believe that any policy and funding upheavals should 

include intentional inclusion of civil society organizations and serious reform of the IMET program with Pakistan to emphasize 

human rights and good governance. 

I thank you, and I look forward to your statements, and I thank 

the chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Madam Ambassador. 

Does any member wish to seek recognition? 

Seeing no other members seeking recognition, I am delighted to 

finally introduce our witnesses. Thank you for your patience with 

the rescheduling. 

We are delighted to welcome Ambassador Alice Wells, the Acting 

Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of South and Central 

Asian Affairs and the Acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Prior to serving in this position, she served as 

the United States Ambassador to Jordan, special assistant to the 

President for Russia and Central Asia, and Executive Assistant to 

Secretary of State Clinton. Thank you for your lifelong service, and 

we look forward to your testimony, Ambassador Wells. 

I am also delighted to welcome Dr. Gregory Huger, who serves 

as USAID’s Assistant to the Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Mr. Huger has served in various capacities within USAID, including Pakistan’s Deputy Mission Director, 

Afghanistan’s Senior Development Advisor in Regional Command 

9

East, and Mission Director for Ukraine and Egypt. Thank you for 

being here. We also look forward to your testimony. 

As I said, your written statement will be made a part of the 

record. And please feel free to summarize. 

We will begin with you, Ambassador Wells. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALICE G. WELLS, ACTING 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ACTING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE 

FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND 

CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS , U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador WELLS. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Chairman 

Yoho, Ranking Member Deutch, Ranking Member Sherman, and 

members, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the administration’s strategy for South Asia. 

At the top of my testimony, I want to recognize and thank the 

thousands of U.S. servicemen and women, diplomats, development 

specialists, intelligence professionals, and international partners 

who are working every day to enhance our collective security. I 

have submitted the longer written testimony for the record. But 

here today, I would like to emphasize a few points about our approach to the region. 

For Afghanistan, it is conditions-based. The President has made 

clear that our true presence will be driven by conditions on the 

ground, and not arbitrary timelines or troop ceilings, and that the 

ultimate goal is a political settlement that stabilizes Afghanistan 

and denies sanctuary to those who threaten us. The Taliban will 

come to understand that the United States has the resolve to deny 

them success on the battlefield, and their best option is a negotiated political settlement with the Afghan Government. The Afghan leadership has welcomed the President’s recommitment and 

recognizes that the strategy cannot succeed unless the Afghan government does its part. 

During the Secretary’s October visit to Afghanistan, President 

Ghani and CEO Dr. Abdullah briefed on the ambitious reform goals 

endorsed in the Kabul compact, including measures to fight corruption, promote the private sector, combat ghost soldiers and police, 

and ensure the integrity of the electoral process. Credible elections 

in 2018 and 2019 will demonstrate to the Afghan people and the 

Taliban that the central government represents the hopes and aspirations of all Afghans. Our rock-solid commitment to Afghanistan’s 

security provides the time and space for Afghanistan to build its 

political future. 

Our strategy is also regional in nature. A sustainable solution to 

the conflict in Afghanistan requires more than just a responsible 

and democratic Afghan Government. It requires the collective efforts of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the international community. 

To be economically healthy and politically secure, Afghanistan 

must be anchored in a region that respects territorial integrity and 

sovereignty, promotes government stability, and works toward economic prosperity. 

In October, we restarted the Quadrilateral Coordination Group 

convening Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States to 

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port among the region to increase pressure on the Taliban to come 

to the negotiating table. Pakistan, of course, is a central part of our 

strategy. On the one hand, it has suffered greatly from terrorism 

and has fought back against militants’ intent on undermining the 

Pakistani Government. We recognize the sacrifices that Pakistan 

has made in its progress against some of these terror groups. Pakistan has been a partner with us in the past when they helped decimate al-Qaeda, and Pakistan is cooperating with us in our efforts 

to disrupt ISIS. 

But we look to Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not a safe 

haven for the Taliban-Haqqani network and other groups seeking 

to destabilize the region. We have also called on Pakistan to use 

its influence to create the conditions that will bring the Taliban to 

the negotiating table. 

Pakistan’s support in securing the release of Caitlin Coleman; 

her husband, Joshua Boyle; and their three children from captivity 

showed what we can accomplish when we work in partnership. Indeed, a Pakistani officer was injured while pursuing the hostage 

takers. However, the fact that the Coleman-Boyle family was in 

Pakistani territory highlights that Pakistan still has much to do to 

meet its commitment to take action against all terrorists without 

discrimination. 

As long as terrorists continue to operate within Pakistan’s borders, they pose a threat to Pakistan’s own stability as well as to 

the security of American citizens and servicemembers in the region. 

Pakistan has said that it is committed to the war on terrorism and 

seeks a strong relationship with the United States. 

We look for tangible evidence that Pakistan is adopting an indiscriminate posture against groups that threaten the region’s stability, including the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e 

Tayyiba, and Jaish-e Mohammed. The Secretary conveyed specific 

requests on how Pakistan could make this happen. And he made 

clear that if Pakistan decides not to meet these requests, we will 

adjust our strategy accordingly. Pakistan has made important commitments to improve relations with Afghanistan. Afghanistan reasonably asked that the Taliban insurgents be forced to fight on Afghanistan soil without recourse to safe haven, respite, and regeneration in neighboring states. 

Finally, our strategy prioritizes the reduction of tension between 

India and Pakistan, which drives much of Pakistan’s security calculus. On his trip to the region, Secretary Tillerson encouraged 

India and Pakistan to keep channels of communication open. The 

region and the world looks to both countries to safeguard against 

a nuclear conflict in South Asia. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to a candid conversation today. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wells follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wells. 

Mr. Huger. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY HUGER, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. HUGER. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Yoho, Ranking 

Member Deutch, my Congresswoman from my home district in St. 

Louis, Congresswoman Wagner, members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me here to discuss the administration’s 

plans for USAID assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan under the 

South Asia strategy. It is an honor to appear before you with Acting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Ambassador 

Alice Wells, to discuss U.S. assistance that supports our national 

security. 

I want to begin by thanking, as the Ambassador did, the men 

and women who have served in the U.S. military and our civilian 

agencies and their families who served and sacrificed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the thousands of Afghan and Pakistani citizens who have served alongside us. 

As was said, I bring to this position, which I have held for 2 

months, experience within USAID and in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 5 years on the border, three of them based in Bagram covering eastern Afghanistan, and two of them working FATA and 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the consulate in Peshawar. 

In the 2 months that I have been in this position, I have had the 

opportunity to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan to meet our staff 

and many of our local counterparts, many of whom I have known 

for years. 

When I went to Afghanistan, I was the head of the U.S. delegation to the senior officials meeting, which was the Afghan Government meeting with representatives of 38 countries that support Afghanistan meeting to review progress over the year, since commitments to support Afghanistan’s development were made in Brussels. My takeaway from that meeting was that we do have a real 

partner in the national unity government. 

President Ghani was very articulate in his praise of the South 

Asia strategy. That was shared by his team as well as the representatives from the other countries attending the meeting. His 

focus was on shifting from donor assistance to private investment 

as a long-term solution for Afghanistan and, in that context, addressing corruption and the other impediments to the functioning 

of a market economy in Afghanistan, including, of course, security. 

He also, together with his wife, First Lady, emphasized the importance of the empowerment of women. And one-third of the conference was spent on that subject. 

My takeaway from my visit of last week to Pakistan, including 

visits to Islamabad, Peshawar, and Karachi was the strong support 

for the mainstreaming of FATA in a way that is not yet clearly articulated but which seems to be a priority for political parties, military, and the citizens more broadly. And I was very pleased to see 

the strong support in civil society for the effort to give resilience 

to communities to resist extremism, particularly among the youth. 

19

Now, in Afghanistan, and we will talk more about this, I am 

sure, we are focused on three points: Helping sustain the gains in 

health, education, and women’s empowerment; helping build 

stronger bonds between the government and the citizens through 

service delivery, credible elections, and reduced corruption; and 

through supporting increased private sector investment, particularly in the market areas of the larger urban areas, to create opportunity for the people and revenue for the government. 

In Pakistan, we are focused on three main points: First, normalizing the border area, stabilizing the border area, and that includes 

mainstreaming FATA in whatever way the Pakistanis decide to do 

it and reincorporating those people who have returned; the second 

is supporting communities to become resilient to violent extremism; 

the third is to support private sector investment to create opportunities for the youth bulge. 

Thank you for having me here. I am delighted to be here and 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huger follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to both of you for your 

patience and for being here. 

Ambassador Wells, it was reported last week that there is a proposal on the table to have the Office of the Special Representative 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the White House. The report also 

confirmed that the actual office had been dissolved at State with 

the duties and functions fully integrated into the SCA Bureau. 

Do you have any update on that decision? That would seem to 

many of us that State is no longer a key player when it comes to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Ambassador WELLS. I am not aware of a measure to move SRAP 

to the White House. But within the State Department, we have 

completed a reintegration, a combination of the South and Central 

Asian Bureau with the Afghanistan and Pakistan offices. And this 

has been an initiative that the State Department has sought since 

2016. It reflects very much this administration’s view that the answer to Afghanistan is a regional one that we have to look beyond 

the stovepipe of AFPAK and understand how the region as a whole 

is going to contribute to the stabilizing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Well, please keep us updated on 

any moves that way. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Bera and I were happy to host First Lady Ghani, First Lady 

Bush, and many members of the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council last 

week. And they expressed gratitude for the assistance from the 

United States, particularly with the investment that we have made 

together in women’s programs. But they suggested that we begin 

thinking about more long-term planning rather than implementing 

short-term programs. USAID has its Promote Program that recognizes the important role that women will have in Afghanistan’s future. With Promote now about halfway through its 5-year mandate, 

are we starting to plan for the next iteration using what we have 

learned to help inform the next stage when Promote ends for more 

long-term programming, Mr. Huger? 

Mr. HUGER. Yes, we are. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Poppy cultivation. A lot of us have discussed it. Up again last 

year. Eradication down drastically. Afghanistan produces about 75 

percent of the world’s opium. And not only does this cause a serious health crisis, but it also provides a great deal of funding for 

terrorists and incentivizes corruption and crime, yet the budget request for Afghanistan for the international narcotics control and 

law enforcement counter-narcotics effort was nearly cut in half to 

about $44 million, from the nearly $80 million in fiscal year 2016 

actuals. How can we justify this great reduction in the request for 

the international narcotics control and law enforcement counternarcotics program, while we know that production is up, and we 

know that terror groups fund their activities from drug trafficking? 

Ambassador WELLS. There is a relationship between drug production and security. And right now, the overwhelming majority of 

hectares of opium grown is under Taliban control or in contested 

areas. And so critical to our efforts to counter narcotics are going 

to be steps to resolve the essential conflict with the Taliban. 

The reason you have seen a decline in funding under INL for 

counter narcotics is because over the years, we have managed to 

33

build a capacity within the government of Afghanistan. We have 

stood up under the ministry of interior, a counter-narcotics police 

force. There are two specialized units that are also working in close 

coordination in training with the DEA. And so we want to see a 

shift, because we are not there for permanent nation-building. This 

is about building the Afghanistan capacity. 

I think in terms of strategy right now, the idea is not to go after 

the lowest person on the food chain, the farmer, but to go after the 

processing centers and the facilities that are the next level up, because it is critical to disrupt Taliban financing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I have another question 

about infrastructure projects, but we have Nikki Haley coming in 

at noon, so I will yield back the balance of my time and turn to 

Mr. Deutch, the ranking member. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Since 2001, the United States has provided over $100 billion in 

economic and security assistance to Afghanistan. Can you comment 

on what you believe are the most important outcomes of this aid 

in the areas of economic development, gender equality, human 

rights education, health democracy, the rule of law. What are the 

most important security accomplishments from this aid? What have 

we gotten for $100 billion? Both of you. 

Mr. HUGER. If I could begin answering from the USAID perspective. As you said in your introductory comments, the progress in 

education, particularly of girls, has been very important. Very difficult, but very important. And that is something that we will continue. 

The effort that Chairman Ros-Lehtinen mentioned in the Promote Program, which is focused on 85,000 women, who have at 

least a high school education, to help them play important roles in 

business, in civil society, and in government, has gotten off to a 

very good start. The infrastructure efforts that we have made, challenging as they have been, have produced a road transportation 

network that meets minimum requirements of the country, if maintained. 

We have made contributions to the production, distribution of 

electric power, and we have helped Afghanistan make significant 

gains in health. Where, though, there is a long way to go, health 

care is available to a very large number of Afghans when it was 

not before. 

These and many other concrete accomplishments are the result 

of our work in Afghanistan. It is definitely a work in progress. It 

is definitely facing opposition, but it is definitely worth continuing 

to achieve the outcomes envisioned in the South Asia strategy. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. 

Ambassador Wells, I am going to go a slightly different direction 

in my remaining time. 

I think it is safe to say that the members on this dais all agree 

that there is no purely military solution to the war and, therefore, 

reconciliation of some sort is also going to be needed. The President 

said, Perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that 

includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Can you tell us 

what that political settlement would look like from the administration’s perspective? And what would the key impediments to the 

34

Taliban seeking to participate in the reconciliation process be? And 

is there any way for the Taliban to be a part of this that wouldn’t 

jeopardize Afghani human rights? 

Ambassador WELLS. The administration has always said not preconditions to negotiations, but end conditions. And the end conditions have been a cessation of violence, a cessation of ties to terrorist networks, and respect for the Constitution, including the provisions for women and minorities. And that continues to be the 

case. 

You know, this is going to be—there is necessarily going to have 

to be an Afghan-Afghan conversation. President Trump was very 

clear that we are not there to micromanage how Afghans decide 

among themselves to live and to regulate their political life. And 

so, I think this has been a remarkably open approach by successive 

administrations, including the Trump administration. The impediments are, you know, foremost, the unwillingness to date of the 

Taliban to enter into negations with the Government of Afghanistan, whether privately or publicly. And so the challenge right 

now—the question is not whether we are prepared to support, you 

know, an Afghan-led and owned peace process. We are. And we 

have said that. And Secretary Tillerson has been quite explicit, 

that there is a role and a place at the table for moderate Taliban. 

And we look for them to join this process. 

You know, the task right now is how do we get the Taliban to 

the negotiating table? And there are two parts to that. There has 

to be increased military pressure. For the last 4 years, they were 

waiting for us to leave. You know, not unreasonably, given that 

that was the policy of the prior administration. But, second, there 

has to be political pressure and coordinated international pressure 

on the Taliban. And that includes ensuring that the Taliban political commission in Doha is doing its essential function, which is facilitating, you know, peace negotiations. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Dr. Yoho is recognized. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ambassador Wells, earlier this week, the President issued a 

budget amendment with respect to the DOD budget. It called for 

additional funding for troops. He made it clear that he will not talk 

about troop levels, but that we will ask our NATO allies and global 

partners to increase their troop levels to support us. Does NATO 

have the level troops it has deemed necessary for the Afghan mission? 

Ambassador WELLS. Our NATO partners have been interested in 

working with us to ensure the success of this South Asia strategy. 

Mr. YOHO. I am sure they are interested, but have they increased 

the level of commitment since the change of leadership in our country? 

Ambassador WELLS. We are confident that we are going to get 

increased levels of support from our NATO partners. 

Mr. YOHO. As of yet, you have not seen that? 

Ambassador WELLS. No. The process is ongoing, and we are confident that we are going to see that increased support. 

35

Mr. YOHO. Okay. You have answered my second question, too, 

then. 

Is the current request for $1.13 billion for Afghanistan and Pakistan enough to implement this new strategy that we have? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. We believe that the $780 million, approximately, for Afghanistan, is an appropriate sum that represents about an 18 percent reduction from our previous request, 

but continues to build out in the essential three areas that Mr. 

Huger identified as being the pillars of our approach. 

Mr. YOHO. And the normalizing and stabilizing border areas, resilient communities, and the private sector investments, you both 

agree that is where we need to focus on? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. From the State Department’s perspective, very much so. And from the President’s speech, the idea that 

this is not a blank check, that we need to help Afghanistan shift 

from a donor economy to a private sector fueled economy. 

Mr. YOHO. I am glad to hear you say it is not a blank check. You 

know, I have got in front of me—and, Mr. Huger, I am going to 

come to you. 

Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in post-9/11 period. Congress appropriated more than $33 billion in assistance from 2002 to 2016, including $10.5 billion in economic development, humanitarian aid. In addition, there was an 

extra $14 billion in CSF funding which is the Coalition Support 

Fund. 

When I look at that kind of an investment, you know, I always 

wonder what kind of return on an investment did we get? And so, 

I think one of the things that we can do is look at approval ratings. 

And it is interesting to me, with that kind of money that the American taxpayers have allowed to be spent by the people in government; in 2015, 22 percent people that were polled in Pakistan 

viewed the United States positively. Twenty-two percent. And I 

guess we should be excited about that, because that is up from 14 

percent in 2014. That is about where Congress is. That is according 

to the Pew Research. However, the thing I find interesting is 78 

percent of the Pakistanis polled view China favorably with only 3 

percent responding unfavorably. You said you have been in that region for 5 to 6 years. What are we doing to change our tactics to 

get a better response for the money that the American taxpayers 

are spending? 

Mr. HUGER. Thank you, Congressman Yoho, for the question, it 

is a very important——

Mr. YOHO. I am going to report this back to Lauren. 

Mr. HUGER. Yes, indeed. 

The focus of our strategy is in the national security interest of 

the United States and, going forward, to identify things that are 

also in the national security interest of Pakistan. It is not a popularity contest at a popular level where, from one month to the next, 

the polling would show what percentage of people love or hate us. 

It is about our national security, which is tangentially related to 

the popularity, but not directly. 

So our focus on helping secure the border, helping Pakistan, as 

it seems to want to do now, to find a way to mainstream that 

ungoverned space called FATA into the province of Khyber 

36

Pakhtunkhwa, or in whatever way they want to do it, is absolutely 

transformational from a historic perspective. Making that a success, and with it, helping to reabsorb or reintegrate 1.6 million people who were displaced by conflict from FATA and are now coming 

back, 85 percent are back, the rest will be returning, those are 

things that would make a different Pakistan. That is good for Pakistan. That is good for us. That is good for the region. So it is not 

a popularity contest. It is about national security of the United 

States and the countries where we are working. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate you. Ambassador Wells. 

Ambassador WELLS. If I could just add, you know, these polls 

capture something, and oftentimes it is a response to a policy issue 

that Pakistanis disagree with. But if you ask Pakistanis, where do 

you want to study? Where would you like to work? Where would 

you like to get medical care? I mean, the pull of America and the 

West is quite strong. And I think as we, you know, continue our 

engagement with Pakistan, it is really about how does Pakistan 

want to be a member of this international community and the expectations not only we hold, but our international partners hold in 

asking Pakistan to take these specific steps to combat terrorism. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Yoho. 

And we are so pleased that our subcommittees have been joined 

by the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Eliot Engel of 

New York. And I am very pleased to yield whatever time he may 

consume to him right now. 

Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I 

want thank you, and I want to thank Mr. Yoho and also Mr. Sherman, Mr. Deutch, for letting me participate today in making a 

statement. 

I wanted to ask Ambassador Wells a few questions. And, Ambassador, thank you for your service and for your time this morning. 

I want to talk about Afghanistan, because we are 16 years into 

the war there. After all that time, this conflict obviously remains 

our most important foreign policy priorities, and there is an enormous amount at stake, obviously, for our country, for Afghanistan, 

for the region. In August, President Trump announced his South 

Asia strategy at Fort Myer, Virginia. He told the world that we will 

win and that we will defeat them and defeat them handily. It was 

a lot of tough talk, but it really left me with more questions than 

answers, because we don’t know the details, we don’t know how 

this plan will bring the conflict to an end. And I want to just talk 

about that. 

You know, I voted for all the AUMFs back in 2001, 2002. And 

I am really very much chagrined that we are still operating on 

that. We should have this Congress attack foreign policy and do 

what is right, rather than relying on a Congress when I was here, 

but I would venture to say 80 to 90 percent of the members still 

here were not here back then. So I have some questions. 

Madam Ambassador, is the administration’s position that the 

war in Afghanistan will come to an end by military victory won on 

the battlefield? 

37

Ambassador WELLS. No. Victory is a sustainable political settlement that results in a stable Afghanistan whose territory is not 

used to threaten the United States and our partners. 

Sir, I had the opportunity to accompany the Secretary on his trip 

to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. And there I was able to see, 

you know, the impact of the strategy in each of those countries. For 

Afghanistan, it is a recommitment to that country, the knowledge 

that we are prepared to stay with them as they have to undertake 

what are very difficult and necessary reforms. It is telling the Pakistanis that we are not leaving, it is not 1989, that you need to 

count on our presence. And instead of hedging, you know, identify 

how to mediate the legitimate interests that you have in Afghanistan at a negotiating table. And in India, it is recognizing the role, 

positive role, that India can play in Afghanistan’s economic stabilization. 

And so, I found across, you know, the region, the strategy was 

extraordinarily resonant. And I do believe that after 4 years of 

counting us out, we have changed the dynamic, and we have 

changed the conversation, and we are going to see progress as a result. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Let me ask you this: Has the administration provided American troops in Afghanistan additional authorities beyond the train, advise, and equip mission essentially putting 

them back into more of a combat role? 

Ambassador WELLS. The mission is still a train, advise, and 

equip. I think both Secretary Mattis and the President have made 

mention to authorities being provided that will allow for more aggressive targeting. That is not really my area of expertise, so I do 

defer to my defense colleagues. But the number of troops, the commitment of our troops, and the ability of our troops to, you know, 

actively and aggressively assist the Afghan forces will make a difference. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, Secretary Tillerson said this is a war that will 

come to an end through a negotiated settlement. He said, We will 

not win, but the Taliban won’t win either. If that is true, why are 

we, then, sending more troops to Afghanistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. As Secretary Mattis testified, and I believe 

General Nicholson, the conflict has been stalemate, a stalemate 

generally in favor of the government, but a stalemate. And it had 

not—the Taliban have not yet been convinced that they are not 

going to win on the battlefield. And so the provision of additional 

forces to enhance the train, advise, and assist and to push it down 

to a lower level we believe is going to be quite significant in making a difference on the battlefield, along with the additional air assets that are being provided. 

And so, as I said at the outset, a key impediment to achieving 

a peaceful negotiated settlement is the unwillingness to date of the 

Taliban to engage directly with the Government of Afghanistan. 

We have to change that calculus of the Taliban using both military 

and political means. 

Mr. ENGEL. You mentioned earlier that the administration believes the war will come to an end through a negotiation. So let me 

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tiation, and why aren’t we more focused on touting a potential 

peace process? 

Ambassador WELLS. We remain very active in all of the regional 

architectures that have existed and have been developed to reinforce a message that supports a negotiated political solution. I just 

recently hosted a quadrilateral meeting with the Chinese, the Afghans, and the Pakistanis. I look forward to participating in the 

Heart of Asia Conference that is coming up; the Kabul process; 

there is an international contact group; there are a variety of diplomatic initiatives that continue to work very closely. But fundamentally, we need to get the parties to agree to talk to one another directly. And that involves changing the Taliban’s calculus. 

We also believe—I also believe that we need to improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan to see better cooperation between the two countries. And so we have been supportive of 

General Bajwa, chief of army staff’s recent visit to Kabul, his commitment to undertake specific initiatives with his Afghan counterparts. 

So on a variety of levels, bilaterally, trilaterally, and then larger 

international groupings, we are pursuing this effort, sir. 

Mr. ENGEL. I don’t believe that we should cut and run in Afghanistan. I don’t believe that we shouldn’t care about what happens 

there. Obviously, it is very important. But I think you can understand that many of us are worried about getting bogged down in 

a situation where we can’t get out and use it more and more as 

justification. And as the years go on and on, and we are still going 

back to an AUMF that is old and antiquated—and by the way, I 

said this under the previous administration and under this administration, I would say it under any administration—I do think Congress has to play a much more important role. We are a coequal 

branch of government, and we should be playing a more important 

role if, indeed, the effect of our policy is going to be to wear us 

down and keep us there in a war that we cannot win, that admittedly we cannot win. You know, what changes? What changes 5 

years from now, 10 years from now, 15 years from now? 

Ambassador WELLS. And I think the steps that the government 

of Afghanistan is taking and needs to take to enhance its 

inclusivity to make itself a more attractive partner to demonstrate 

that the central government is representative of all the Afghan 

people are critical. And so, both President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, 

when they met with Secretary Tillerson, discussed the Kabul Compact. The 200 Metrics that the Afghans themselves have developed, 

to be able to measure specific reforms across the fields of economics, governance, security, and reconciliation are an important symbol of the fact that with President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, we do 

have partners that we can work with in this effort at reform. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, and thank you, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We are honored by 

your presence and thank you for the questions. 

And I would like to recognize Ambassador Wagner to take over 

our part of the subcommittee—joint subcommittee hearing. 

Thank you, Ambassador. 

39

Mrs. WAGNER. [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes for 

questioning. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The American people have every right to be 

concerned when we are talking about putting more troops into Afghanistan, considering the fact that we have been there as long as 

we have, and been suffering casualties. The 2,400 dead does not include the wounded that we have had in Afghanistan, which is a 

tremendous cost to families across our country. And I think that 

it behooves decision-makers, if they are going to try to use military 

force as a political tool, achieving political ends, that we are also 

looking at what is necessary for that to succeed. Let me just know 

that I am not as great an expert as probably either one of you are, 

but I do have a long history in Afghanistan. And the Constitution 

of Afghanistan, as far as I can see, and people I know who are totally immersed in Afghan culture, are constitutionally foisted on 

these people is totally contrary to their culture, say, centralized in 

Kabul power when, in fact, Afghanistan has the most decentralized 

social framework of any country I know. I mean, it goes right down 

to the village level, village family tribal, and then provincial, and 

ethnic, and then way back up to Kabul. Are we going to be making 

any changes in the Constitution that so far has not succeeded? 

Ambassador WELLS. If I could start on the question of the use 

of military force. I agree with you, sir, it is—it is an awesome responsibility. The troops that are going in today are performing a 

very different function. It is a train, advise, and assist function. It 

is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like an answer to my question. 

Ambassador WELLS. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are we doing——

Ambassador WELLS [continuing]. On the Constitution——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Any reform of the Constitution 

and the way the government works? 

Ambassador WELLS. The Constitution is an Afghanistan document. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We foisted that on them. I was there when 

we did. 

Ambassador WELLS. And it was endorsed by Loya jirga, but underneath the Constitution, within the Constitution, there is the 

ability for the Afghan Government to amend its Constitution. It 

can follow its own Constitution——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are there moves to do that? Are there efforts 

to do that? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am not aware that there are efforts now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Obviously, the Constitution has not worked 

to create a better Afghanistan, because we are talking about sending more troops into Afghanistan. 

Let me ask this: Fifteen years ago, we developed a fungus that 

could be dropped from the air and would affect only the poppy 

plants, and would eliminate the poppy production for not only that 

year, but for 10 years, but would affect no other crop. Are you 

aware of that? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am not aware of the program. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are you aware of that? 

40

Mr. HUGER. No, sir, I am not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me note for the record, I have stated 

this publicly, stated in hearings like this. Obviously, our government has not been willing to stop the poppy production. That is a 

major source of revenue for those people who have been killing and 

maiming our American soldiers who have gone to Afghanistan. 

As far as Pakistan, let me ask you this about Pakistan. So you 

have stated Pakistan has been our partner? You had mentioned 

partner? 

Ambassador WELLS. In combating al-Qaeda, and currently in 

combating ISIS, we have worked closely with Pakistan and 

achieved significant results. Historically, you know the Cold War 

history. But more recently, there are elements of partnership, and 

then elements of extreme disagreement, which is the focus of the 

south Asia strategy today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note that in—when 9/11, which 

got us all involved in this, 9/11, I think there were two Afghans involved in 9/11, and the rest were Saudis, and it was planned in 

Pakistan. And, you know, we have had, as I say, suffering—the 

Pakistani people are suffering under their own government. And I 

think before we commit more troops to that part of the world, we 

should certainly seek changes in the way those areas are governed, 

or all we are doing is condemning more people to die and to be 

maimed. 

And, Madam Chairman, this is a very serious issue. And we 

know we are up against radical Islam. But we can’t just solve it 

by thinking—I don’t buy any of the reforms that you have been 

talking about are going to make any difference in Afghanistan, because you haven’t gone to the heart of what isn’t working. And if 

we just send more troops, we are going to have more dead bodies, 

and it doesn’t make sense to me. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Asia Subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, in private conversations with the 

Pakistani leaders, do they tacitly admit that at least elements of 

their government were aware where bin Laden was? Or do they 

stick to the talking point that, oh, we were looking for him, every 

element of the Pakistani Government was looking for him, we just 

couldn’t find him? 

Ambassador WELLS. Sir, I have never heard any Pakistani leader 

suggest that Pakistan knew where Osama bin Laden was located. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And they tend to suggest that they were looking 

real hard and they just couldn’t find him. 

Since 2001, we have provided over $100 billion of economic and 

security assistance to Afghanistan, not to mention the blood and 

treasure of fighting the war, and $20 billion of economic assistance 

and military assistance to Pakistan. I want to focus a little bit on 

human rights. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported over 700 people were disappeared, kidnapped, never heard 

of again. And that is just in 2016. Elements of the Pakistani government and military just see it as a good political tactic to cause 

their opponents to disappear. 

41

Ambassador, I would like to get you to focus on one particular 

incident. Two years ago, in November 2015, Sindhi leader Dr. 

Anwar Laghari was brutally murdered in Pakistan. The Pakistani 

Government has not been responsive to numerous inquiries about 

that murder, and he was murdered while he was conducting political activities. His perpetrators have not been brought to justice. 

Days before his death, he had sent a memorandum to the U.S. Government about human rights violations by Pakistani security 

forces. 

But now here is the new information. Just a few days ago, Dr. 

Anwar Laghari’s son, Asad Laghari, was found dead in suspicious 

circumstances, very possibly poisoned. I had met with Asad 

Laghari when he was in Washington. He was pursuing a master’s 

degree at Mehron University of Engineering and Technology at its 

U.S.-Pakistan Center for advanced studies in water. 

What is suspicious about this is that Asad Laghari’s death comes 

just weeks after I had, along with six other Members of this House, 

sent a letter focusing on human rights issues in Sindh. And that 

letter especially focused on disappearances, murders, extrajudicial 

killings. To what extent does the administration take up these 

human rights issues and disappearances with the Pakistani Government? And to what extent was the issue of human rights and 

disappearances in Sindh been raised at the recent visits to Pakistan by yourself and by Secretary Tillerson? 

Ambassador WELLS. So we regularly raise the human rights situation in Pakistan. As you know, our human rights report on Pakistan is quite candid about the—you know, the disappearances, the 

other abuses that we see, and that organizations inside of Pakistan, including journalists and human rights organizations themselves, document. And, so, this is a serious concern. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And did Secretary Tillerson bring this up directly 

and orally in his conversations? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am not able to comment on whether he 

brought them up directly, but I can assure you——

Mr. SHERMAN. How about you? 

Ambassador WELLS [continuing]. That we bring them up directly, 

the Ambassador and the consulate——

Mr. SHERMAN. Can I ask you to personally bring up, with highlevel Pakistani authorities, the November 2015 death of Dr. Anwar 

Laghari and the death just a few weeks ago of Dr. Laghari’s son, 

Asad Laghari? 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Shifting to Pakistan, any chance that the doctor who helped us, 

I believe his name is pronounced, Dr. Afridi, is going to be released? 

Ambassador WELLS. We continue to raise Dr. Afridi’s case in 

every high-level encounter, and we have not yet seen the Pakistani 

Government move to do so. As you know, we have withheld $100 

million in assistance as a result of his continued incarceration. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Not enough. Let’s do more. 

I was going to bring up, for the record, the issue of Ahmadi Muslims. Sorry for the mispronunciation, but I want to pick up on 

Dana Rohrabacher’s point. Is it the policy of the United States in 

42

Afghanistan to destroy poppy crops to the full extent that that can 

be done without destroying legitimate agriculture? 

Ambassador WELLS. The destruction of poppy crops is always 

sensitive, and our policy has always been to support the destruction of poppy crops in areas where local leaders agree to this strategy. For most local leaders, this is difficult because of who is impacted most directly, which is the local farmer. So, sir, I recognize 

the concern, its attention. But, at this stage, the overwhelming majority of poppy is being produced in Taliban-controlled and Talibancontested areas. The Taliban has become addicted to the drug 

trade, which is, you know, why we do need to go after the next 

higher level of drug——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, it is hard to go back to my district and say 

we died by the thousands to protect poppy farmers that are sending heroin to the United States, because that is the crop that they 

prefer to grow and we don’t want to be unpopular with them. 

Ambassador WELLS. But we are, sir, working very closely with 

the police forces, the counternarcotics police forces, and the two 

specialized units that we helped set up to target the next level up 

quite aggressively in order to try to——

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. So I say welcome to the witnesses, especially Mr. Huger, who hails from Missouri’s Second Congressional District and is a Priory graduate, and 

your daughters, a graduate of my alma mater. So, welcome, sir. 

The continued involvement of the Pakistan military in the civilian government is damaging to the country. Assistant Secretary 

Wells, my understanding is that the fiscal year 2018 request for 

Pakistan’s IMET account is five times the amount request for fiscal 

year 2016. Can you please explain this increase in IMET funding, 

what it will be used for, and what the figure is, please? 

Ambassador WELLS. IMET funding has been a useful tool for us 

to establish relations with members of the Pakistani military and 

through those training courses, to try to inculcate some of the values that we believe are essential to appropriate civilian military relations in any country, certainly in any democratic country. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I am glad you mention values, Ambassador Wells. 

Does the IMET program contain coursework on human rights and 

democracy? And I do have some concerns as to why it was increased five times the amount since fiscal year 2016. 

Ambassador WELLS. I would have to check on the number being 

a five times increase. I am sorry I can’t respond to that. But, traditionally, our IMET courses do have a very heavy component of rule 

of law, of respect for—you know, of how a military operates, and 

more time—respect for human rights. And so, yes, that is a critical 

component of many of our IMET programs. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I don’t believe that the program does include specific and vigorous coursework on human rights and democracy. So 

I would like you to——

Ambassador WELLS. I will take that back. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. To take that back and put forward 

some of the coursework. And I would also like an exact number and 

some reasoning as to why it was increased five times from—in 

2018 over fiscal year 2016. 

43

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ALICE G. WELLS TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ANN WAGNER

The Administration’s request for Fiscal Year 2018 actually decreases the level of 

funding for the IMET program in Pakistan to $3.5 million, or approximately 27 percent lower than the Fiscal Year 2016 level of $4.8 million. 

Since Fiscal Year 2010, the following IMET-funded programs for Pakistan have 

included human rights, democratic norms, rule of law, and/or civil-military cooperation in their curricula:

• Gender-Based Violence and Women’s Health; 

• Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights; 

• Legal Aspects of Defense Support for Civil Authorities; 

• Civil-military Responses to Terrorism; 

• Legal Aspects of Combatting Terrorism; 

• Military Judge Course; 

• International Law of Military Operations; 

• Military Police Basic Leadership Course; 

• Military Police Captains Career Course; 

• Judge Advocate Staff Officer course; 

• Operations Law; 

• International Military Law Development Program; 

• International Military Law; and 

• Military and Peacekeeping Operations Law.

Additionally, senior Professional Military Education (PME) programs, such as the 

war colleges, staff colleges, and National Defense University, all include democratic 

norms and human rights in their curricula. 

Mrs. WAGNER The administration’s funding request for the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Program would 

decrease the Afghanistan account by nearly 50 percent, and the 

Pakistan account by nearly 40 percent. My understanding is that 

this account is used to support criminal justice institutions and the 

judicial sector, fight corruption, and reform security forces. Assistant Secretary Wells, is this how this account was used in Afghanistan and Pakistan? And what gains does the administration hope 

to make by cutting this program? 

Ambassador WELLS. We have supported these programs for 

many years at significant amounts of funding and have to show for 

it, you know, specialized structures now, institutions that have 

been developed, counternarcotics police forces that have been stood 

up, special investigative units that are working in conjunction with 

our drug enforcement agency. And so the cut in funding also reflects the idea that having stood up these institutions, we are able 

to transfer now the responsibility to these host government agencies while continuing to work with them in partnership. 

Mrs. WAGNER. And you believe these institutions have, in fact, 

been stood up and are, in fact, fighting corruption and reforming—

and reformers have been put in place in the security sector? 

Ambassador WELLS. We have stood up these institutions. We 

continue to work with them and to mentor them. But the change 

in funding reflects a shift, again, toward shifting the responsibility 

to the host government. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I just want to make sure that we are shifting priorities, especially as I see IMET plussed-up over five times, that we 

are also shifting toward increased human rights and democracy 

programs at all levels. Thank you. 

44

Mr. Huger, is the administration intending to reduce the democracy and governance programs that we fund in these countries of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

Mr. HUGER. We are focusing our efforts on the points that I mentioned. Within them is—helped to reduce corruption and to have 

credible elections in Afghanistan, and to help Pakistan establish 

governance in the ungoverned area of FATA. FATA has had the 

Frontier Crimes Regulation since 1902 when the British established it. And there is significant will among the people in FATA 

to normalize their legal framework. So our emphasis on normalizing the border area will include helping the government establish 

local jurisdictions that can respond to the needs and desires of the 

population. 

So we intend to have a very significant focus on governance and 

Democratic elections in both countries. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Great. Thank you, Mr. Huger. My time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 

Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I have got some comments, and I am going to ask some questions. 

This war began in 2001. Now it is ongoing for roughly 16 years. 

That is the longest active military conflict in the history of the 

United States. Early on, the Taliban government was toppled, and 

al-Qaeda, to a very large degree, was destroyed. And, quite frankly, 

goals were achieved. Our American military won. 

Later on, Osama bin Laden was killed as a result of our presence 

in Afghanistan. Another goal was achieved, and America’s military 

won yet again. However, we have persisted in Afghanistan, despite 

those victories and achievements by our military. And the cost, in 

monetary terms, is estimated to be as low at $800 billion to $1 trillion, as high as $4 trillion to $6 trillion, when including ‘‘long-term 

medical care and disability compensation for servicemembers, veterans and families, military replenishment and social costs,’’ according to a study by Harvard economist Linda Bilmes. 

Moving on, in a more difficult part of the cost are lives lost and 

casualties incurred. We have had roughly—well, more than 2,000 

American military personnel who have lost their lives, roughly 

1,000-plus American contractors, civilians, who have been serving 

in this war zone who have also lost their lives. And we have had 

roughly 20,000 wounded American casualties, many of whom have 

come home with debilitating injuries. 

We had a protester at the beginning of this hearing, and I am 

going to make some comments about him. The protester’s remarks 

were about: How long are we going to stay in Afghanistan? And, 

quite frankly, in my judgment, those views reflect the views of a 

growing number of American citizens who grow justifiably weary of 

America’s treasury spent, American lives lost, and American men 

and women coming home horribly injured and permanently disabled. 

Earlier this year, on August the 21st of 2017, the President, in 

a speech, stated, ‘‘My original instinct was to pull out, and, historically, I like following my instinct.’’ Someone apparently persuaded 

45

President Trump to disregard his instinct, and, rather than pull 

out, we are now looking at a dramatic increase in our troop levels 

and ultimately our casualties and our costs. 

So I want to get back to one of the questions that was raised by 

an audience member. How long are we looking at before we can declare victory? We didn’t do it after we toppled the Taliban and debilitated al-Qaeda. We didn’t do it after Osama bin Laden was 

killed and justice obtained. Are you talking years? Are you talking 

decades? And at what cost? 

Ambassador Wells, in your judgment, are we talking years or are 

we talking decades? 

Ambassador WELLS. I am sorry, I can’t answer that question. But 

I would note, as the President said in his speech, that the reason 

he reverted was because he was convinced that the national—the 

threat to our own national security remained. And if you look——

Mr. BROOKS. Well, okay, I am sorry. That is not answering my 

question. But nonetheless, I am going to follow up on your comments. I am also familiar with his speech and he is talking about 

terrorists, correct? Please, for the record, state yes, not just nod 

your head. 

Ambassador WELLS. Yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Does that justify then us invading every single other country on the planet in which there are al-Qaeda or Islamic State forces? Is that the suggestion there, that that is the 

justification for still being in Afghanistan despite this already 

about being the longest active military engagement in the history 

of the United States? 

Ambassador WELLS. Sir, I think this is specific to Afghanistan’s 

role as being a launching pad for the attack on 9/11. 

Mr. BROOKS. But we have killed those people. 

Ambassador WELLS. Al-Qaeda continues to operate——

Mr. BROOKS. But al-Qaeda continues to operate in a dozen, at 

least a dozen, other countries in the Middle East, and in Africa, 

and in Asia. But let’s get back to Afghanistan more particularly. 

Is it your testimony that you have no judgment, no insight whatsoever, on behalf of this administration, that will help the American 

people ascertain how many more lives will be lost, how many more 

of our American troops will come home disabled, and how many 

more years we will be there, and at what great cost? You have no 

estimate whatsoever? 

Ambassador WELLS. So the judgment is that there are multiple 

terrorist groups operating in ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. That is not answering my question, Ambassador Wells. My question is, do you have a judgment as to the 

length of time—I am not asking for an explanation. I am already 

at the end of my 5-minute remarks. But do you have an estimate 

of the length of time and how much more cost there is going to be 

to the American people with this engagement in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador WELLS. The President’s strategy specifically does 

not attach a calendar to this commitment——

Mr. BROOKS. I understand the President——

Ambassador WELLS [continuing]. Because it will be conditionsbased. And so I am not able to answer you on how long this will 

take. 

46

Mr. BROOKS. So it could be decades? 

Ambassador WELLS. We would like to get to the negotiating table 

as soon as possible. 

Mr. BROOKS. It could be decades, and thousands more of American lives lost, tens of thousands more of American lives coming 

home disabled, and trillions of dollars spent that we don’t have, 

can’t afford to get other than by borrowing, and we can’t afford to 

pay back. Is that your testimony? 

Ambassador WELLS. We would like to get to the negotiating table 

as soon as possible. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Seeing no more members present in committee, I 

would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony here today, 

and I would declare the Joint Middle East and Asia Subcommittee 

hearing on the President’s Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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