### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 599 -CR

P hillRa ij e Ri an , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 06- 1562 -K 26 , HO NORAB LE B ILLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant Phil l Raije Rian guilty of three counts of sexual assault of a child for whic h it assessed prison ter ms of ten, thirteen, a

nd ten y ear s, respe ctively , with a
rec ommendation of probation o n the third count only
. See Te x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 2 2. 01 1 ( Wes t Supp. 2008). Appellant conte nds that the t rial court abused its discre tion by order ing the sentenc es to run consec utively

and by ref using to hold a he aringon her mo tion for new tr ial. She further
c on te nd s th a t the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y ov e rr uli ngthe mot ion

to s up pr e ss h e r r e c or de d o ra l st a te me nts to th e p o li c e . F in a ll y , a

p p e ll an t c o n te n d s th a t he r tr ia l c o u n s e l r e n d e r e d in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e . We
overr ule these c ontentions and aff irm the convictions.2 BACK GR OUND Ap pe lla nt, wh o wa s for

ty -o ne , an d he r t

wo c hil dr e n, a g e s f

our a nd tw o, liv e d a c ro ss the str e e t fr om the c omp la ina nt, K. B .C. , an d his famil y . K. B .C. , who wa s si xtee n, ba by sat and did
e rr a nd s f o r a p p e l l an t , an d

t h e t w o b e c a m e f

r i e n d s . D u r i n g t h e s u m m e r o f 2 0 0 6 , t h i s fr ie nd sh ip beca me a r omance . The evidenc e shows that, on three differ ent occ asions, appellant e ng ag ed in ora l sex wit h K.B .C. by

putting his penis in her mouth. Se e id . § 22.011(a) (2)( C). K. B .C. ’s mot

he r s us pe c te d th a t he r s on was havin g a

se xua l r e latio ns hip wi th appellant, a

nd she re ported he r suspicions to the Wil liamson County Sheriff’ s office . Dete ct i ves J ohn Foster and Dennis Gar rett spoke to K.B.C. on September 11, 2006. After

first denying that he
and a pp e lla nt ha d be e n se xua lly int imate , K. B .C. tol d the de te c tiv e s a bo ut the or a l se x ac ts a

nd a lso d i s c l o s e d ana c to f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h a p p e l l an tt h a tt o o k

p l a c e a ta

h o t e l i nT r a v i s C o u n t y. Th e fo llo wi ngda

y , F os te r a

rr ang e d f or K. B .C. to m a ke a re c or de d tel e ph on e c a ll t o
a pp e lla nt. Duri ngthi s c a ll, K. B .C. a tte mpt e d with ou t suc c e ss to have a pp e lla nt ac kn ow le dg e the ir
se xua l ac tiv iti e s. Sub se qu e ntl y , K .B .C. ha d a fa c e -t o- fa c e c on ve rs a tio n w itha pp e lla nt t hat w a s a lso
re c or de d b y F os te r. Duri ng thi s conve rs a tio n, a pp e lla nt tol d K.B .C. that “y ou c an k ill us ” and “ I ’l l do 25 y ear s.” On September 14, Foster

and Ga rre tt went to appellant’s house in the ear ly afte rnoon. They told appellant what K.B .C. ha d said and asked her if she would be w illing to discuss the matter at the sher iff’s of

fice . Appellant agr eed to do so. Be fore leaving the hous e, the of fice rs discover ed that they had a flat tire on their car , and they left appellant alone for fiftee n minutes w hile they put on the spare . Appellant, with her two children, then followed the de tectives to the sher iff’s of ficeThe e ntire interview was video- rec orded. O ur summary of the interview is ba sed on the trial 1 court’s w ritten finding s and our own vie wing of the video. 3 in her own ve hicle. V i ctim’s service s personne l watche d the childre n while appe llant was questioned in an intervie w room.

Foster beg an the inter

view by telling a ppellant that t he door was unlocked a nd that she was fre e to leave a

t any time. Appellant was g iven a cup of water, a nd she wa s provided water 1 throug hout the questioning. D uring the first hour of the interview , appellant insisted t h at she had ha d n o s e xua l c on ta c t w ithK. B .C., and that th e a c c us a tio ns a g a ins t he r w e re a ttr ibuta ble to h is mot he r’ s d isl ike of

he r. To thi s e nd , a

pp e lla nt d e sc ri be d at le ng th h e r v ariou s encount e rs wi th K.B .C.’s mother. After about an hour, Foster and Gar rett beg an to pre ss appellant to tell them the truth. Foster told a

ppellant, “I don’t want y ou leaving here without you understandingwhat’s g oing on, okay ? And I

don’t want y ou to leave he re w ithout me under standing what’s g oing on. I need y our side. I cannot he lp y ou, this man [ Gar rett] cannot help y ou unless Ihave the truth. And y ou have not be en truthful.”

A tt h i s p o i n t , a

p p e l l an tw i t h dr e w f

r o m h e r p u r s e t w o b u s i n e s s c ar d s f r o m ana t t o r

n e y, h an d e d th e m t o th e o f

f ic e r s , an d s a id , “ H e s a id if y ou h a v e an y p r o b le m w it

h [K
. B
. C. ’ s mo th e r ], have the m ta lk to me . An d he sa id do n’ t sa y any thi ngun til the y

ta lk t o me , b ut whe n you c a me to the door, I wanted to come with y ou.” At this point, the office rs re minded appellant that she was fr ee to le ave whene ver she wanted, and the que stioning continued. Afewminutes later, af ter a ppellant ag ain insisted that she had d o n e n o t h ing wrong , Gar rett aske d, “The n why

would y ou g et an attorney ? ” Appe llant replied, “ To protec t my babies,” adding that she had consulted the attorney for4

the purpose of

g etting a restra ining or der a g ainst K.B.C.’s mother . Gar rett aske d appellant why

the attorney had tol d her not to talk to the pol ice, and she responded, “He di dn’t. He sa id if y ou have any problem with [K.B.C.’s mother].”

Appellant then a sked to use the restroom. Foster replied, “ You ca

n g o whene ver you want,” but a sked appe llant if she could wait, saying, “ We’re on a roll rig ht now and we ’re g etting some honest answe rs from you.” The interview continued for a nother five minutes, when appe llant
a g a in a sk e d to us e the re str oo m. T he of fi c e rs a g re e d, and

e ve ryon e le ft

the int e rv ie w r oo m. A t th is point, the interview ha d been g oing on f or an hour

and ten minutes. About two minutes lat er, the office rs ca

n be hear d outside the interview room, looking for appellant. Foster say s, “She’s g one.” Gar rett re plies that appellant’s pur se is still in the interview r oom and sugg ests that she mig ht be chec king on her children. Eventually , the detectives rea liz e that appellant a ccide ntally went to the
me n’ s r e str oo m.

After appellant a

nd the two detec tives returne d to the interview r oom, Foster a sked he r, “ Di d you

c he c k in to a

ho te l roo m w ith[K. B .C. ]? ” Ap pe lla nt p a us e d a nd sa id, “ Yo u k

no w w hat, that’s g oing to sound too bad. I think in that case may

be y ou should call that attorney cause that’s g onna so un d— .” F os te r s a id, “ Wel l, I ’m no t go ing to c a ll a n atto rn e y . I

thi nk it’ s ti me fo r you

to start beinghonest.” Appe llant r eplied, “Well, the y said if I had any problem with [K.B.C.’s mother] for you to call them.” F oster re sponded, “ I ’m not having a proble m with [ K.B .C.’s mother], I ’m having a proble m with y ou.” Appellant said, “Well then, I need to c all the attorne y . I ’m not try ing to be rude .” F oster said, “ No,” a nd beg an to play

one of the rec orded co n v er s ati ons from the p r e v i o u s d ay.5 The two off

icer s cont i n u ed t o urg e appe llant to tell them the truth reg ardingher relationship wit h K.B .C., and appellant repeatedly answe red that she was a fra id to do so. Foster asked a ppellant, “Did [K.B.C.] ask y ou to perfor m oral sex o n h i m ? ” Appe llant answer ed, “I ’m afr aid. I can’ t ans we r t h at
. I ’m afr aid.” Appe llant expressed the fe ar that she would lose her
c hil dr e n, say ing“ Ido n’ t w ant t o tr a de [K. B .C. ] fo r my kid s. ” F os te r tol d he r, “ Yo u’ re no t g oin g to be do ing that.” Ap pe lla

nt re pli e d, “ Ye ah, bu t I he ar, lik e e ve ry bo dy ’s be e n te lli ngme ho rr or sto ri e s, that it doe sn’t matter that we ’re in love and that they ’re g oing to totally just put m e in prison.” When
a pp e lla nt c on tin ue d to e xpre ss h e r c on c e rn s a bo ut h e r c hil dr e n, Ga

rr e tt p ro mis e d h e r t

hat sh e wo uld be g oing home with her c hildren, “100 pe rce nt gua rante ed.” L ater , Gar

rett told appellant, “ You’re walking awa

y from this room today

with y our childre n, trust me.” F oster g ave a ppellant a similar
assura nce: “ [Y] ou’re g etting in that c ar and y ou’re taking y our kids home.” At anothe r point in the interview, G arr ett asked a ppellant, “Why

do y ou think y our kids will be taken a way for the r est of y our life? ” Appe llant answer ed, “I don’t know Texas law.” Gar rett re sponded, “Well, we do.” Foster told appellant that he c ould not help her if s h e did not tell him the truth. Ap pe lla nt r e sp on de d, “ Ho w a

re y ou g onna he lp me ? I ’m sc re we d. ” Ap pe lla

nt t old the de te c tiv e s, “[I ]t ’s killing me be cause I ’m not g onna leave here unti l I tell y ou the t ruth.” Eventually , afte r about an hour a nd forty minutes of question i n g, ap p el l an t told Foster and G arr ett that she had “ kissed [K. B .C. ] the re .” She a lso a c kn ow le dg e d h a vin g se xua l in te rc ours e wi th K .B .C. a t th e ho te l.

The questioning by the detec tives lasted a total of two hours, but a ppellant re mained in the interview r oom for anothe r ninety minutes a fter the offic ers lef t. During a portion of this time, appellant wa s alone while she prepa red a written statement a

nd made a cell phone call to a f riend.6

Appellant wa s also interviewe d by a child protec tive service s worker . After the questioning ended, Foster went to a mag istrate, who issued a war rant for a ppellant’s ar

rest. F oster executed the war rant in the interview r oom, three- and-a -half hour s after the questioning beg an. A video rec ording of the entire thre e-a

nd-a- half hours w as introduce d for r ecor d purposes, but onl y an edited ve rsion of the two-hour inter

view, endingwith appellant’s a dmissions , was shown to the jury
.

ADMISSION OF STATEMENT I n three points of error, appellant contends that the trial cour t erre d by overr uling he r motion to suppress her rec orded oral statements to the detec tives. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppr ess is r eviewe d for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon , 2 06 S.W. 3d 58 7, 59 0 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2006). This me ans that the ruling will be upheld if it is reasona bly supported by

the re cord a

nd is corre ct u n d er any

applicable leg al theory
. Id
. T h e t ri al co u rt i s t h e s o l e t ri er o f f ac tan d j u d ge
o f th e c r e d ib il it

y o f th e w it n e s s e s an d

th e w e ig h t t o b e g iv e nth e ir te s timony
. Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W. 3d 85 3, 85 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Gu zm an v . S tate , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 97 ). We g ive a lmo st c omp le te de fe re nc e to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o f t he his tor ic a l f

a c ts, but we re view de n o v o t he trial c ourt’s application of the law to those fa cts. Car mo uc hev . S

tate , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Ap pe lla nt u rg e s th a t he r o ra l st a te me nts we re ina dmi ssi ble fo r t hr e e re a so ns : be c a

us e she wa s denied he r right t o counsel unde r the Te x as Constitut ion, beca use she wa s denied he r rig ht to c ouns e l un de r t

he F if th A me ndme nt, and

be c a us e the state me nts we re inv olu ntary . We w ill addre ss eac h contention in turn.7

Article I, Section 10

Ar tic le I , s e c tio n 1 0 o f t

he Te xas C on sti tut ion

g ua ra nte e s th e ri ght to c ouns e l in
c ri min a l pr os e c uti on s. Th is r ig ht d oe s n ot atta c h, ho we ve r, un til fo rm a l c ha rg e s are br ou g ht. Mc Cam br idge v . S

tate , 778 S.W .2d 70, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Appellant acknow ledg es in her brief that she was not f

ormally char g ed until after

the questioning had ende d and the state ments at iss ue ha d b e e n ma de . F or thi s r e a so n, a

pp e lla nt’ s c on te nti on

that sh e was den ied he r s tate
c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o c ouns e l mu st n e c e ssa ri ly fa il. Fif th Amen dment

The F ifth Amendment g uara ntee ag ainst self-inc rimination c ontains an implicit right to counsel during custodial interrog ation. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966). When a suspec t in custody

asser ts the rig ht to counsel, all interrog ation must cease until counsel is provided or until the suspect per s o n al ly reinitiates the c onversation. Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) . Appellant conte nds that she was in c ustody when she made her inc riminating or al statements, and that she made two reque sts f or counsel that wer e disreg arde d by the office rs. The trial cour t co n cl u d ed that appellant was not in custody at any time during her que stioning by the detec tives and wa s fre e to leave up until the moment sh e was a rre sted on the wa

rra nt. The
co n clus ion that appellant wa s not in custody is subject to de novo re view by this Court. H

e rre ra
v . S tat e , 241 S.W .3d 520, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

A per son is in custody if, under the circ umstances, a rea sonable pe rson would believe that he r f re e do m of

mov e me nt w a s r e str a ine d to the de g re e a sso c iate d w itha fo rm a l arr e st. Sta ns bu ry v . Ca lif or nia , 5 11 U. S. 31 8, 32 2 ( 19 94 ); He rre ra , 2 41 S.W. 3d a t 52 5; Do wth itt

v . S tate ,8

931 S.W .2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The initial determination of c ustody depends on the objective c ircum s t an ce s of the interr og ation, not the subjective view s of the police or the per son being questioned. Sta ns bu ry , 5 11 U. S. at 32 3; Do wth itt , 931 S.W .2d at 254. The subjec tive views of the police office rs re g ardingcustody may become rele vant if t h ose views a re c onvey ed to the suspect, but onl y to the extent that the officer ’s subjective vie ws would aff ect a rea sonable pe rson’s understandingof her

fre edom of a ction. Ho us ton v . S tate , 185 S.W. 3d 91 7, 92 0 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 2006, pet. re f’d) . Station-house questioning doe s not, in it self, constitute c u stody for Miranda purposes. Do wth itt , 931 S.W .2d at 255. Police conduct during the course of an interrog ation may
esca late an initially

voluntary

inquiry into custodial interrog ation. Id
. Appellant acc epted the detec tives’ invitation or request to g o to the sheriff ’s offic e to answer questions reg ardingher a lleg ed sexual contac t with K.B .C. A ppellant ac knowledg es that she we nt to the sheriff’ s office voluntarily and that the initial questioning by t h e detectives wa s noncustodial. Se e An de rso n v. Sta te , 93 2 S.W. 2d 50 2, 50 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). She c on te nd s, ho wev er, th a t th e int e rr og a tio n b e c a me c us tod ia l w he n h e r r e qu e sts fo r c ouns e l ( a ssumin g that is what they wer e) w ere not honored. B ut the office rs had no oblig ation under the Fif th Amendment to honor those re quests if appe llant was not in custody
. See O regon v. M athiason , 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1 97 7) . App e lla

nt’ s argume nt i n su

pp or t of he r c on te nti on is a fo rm of bo ots tr a pp ing : sh e a sse rt s that she wa s in c ustody beca use she was not a llowed to spe ak to the lawy er, and that she w as entitled to s pe a k to the lawy e r b e c a use sh e was in cust od

y . App e lla

nt d oe s n ot r e fe r u s to any a uth or ity holding that a

person’ s reque st to speak with counsel, in and of itself, transfor

ms a noncustodial interrog ation into a custodial interrog ation under the Fifth Amendment. We believe that the pr oper9

question under Sta ns bu ry

is whether a

rea sonable pe rson in appellant’ s position would have believed that her fre edom of movement wa s restra ined to the deg ree associate d with a forma l arre st when the office rs dec lined her sug g estion that they ca ll her attorne y

and, later , when they

continued to question h e r a f t e r s h e t o l d t h e m t h a ts h e n e e d e d

t o c a l l t h e a t t o r

n e y. Ap pe lla nt w a s n e ve r p hy sic a lly

re str a ine d o r t old

tha t sh e wa s und e r a

rr e st. Th e on ly evidenc e eve n sug g esting that appellant wa s in cu s t o d y at the time she g ave the office rs the attorney ’s business ca

rd wa s Foster ’s st at em en t, “I don’t want you leavinghere without y ou understandingwhat’s g oing on, oka y ? And I don’t want you to leave he re w ithout me understanding wh a t’ s g oin g on .” Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d th a t th e se state me nts “ did no t me an th a t [a

pp e lla nt] c ou ld not leave,” but that instead t hey “re prese nted Detective Foster’s objectives for the interview, or what he desire d to acc omplish during the non- custodial interview of [appellant].” We a g ree with the trial court that a

rea sonable pe rson would not have unde rstood the offic er to be saying that she was unde r
arr e st o r i ts f

un c tio na l e qu iva le nt. The trial c ourt found, and the rec ord conf irms, that the door to th e interview r oom was unlocked while a

ppellant was be ing que stioned. Appellant wa s repe atedly told by the offic ers that
s h e w a s f r e e to le a v e a t an y ti me . A p p e ll an t w a s a ll o w e d to le a v e th e in te r v ie w r o o m to use the restroom—a

ppare ntly without supe rvision, a s the video shows that the detec tives briefly lost track of he r a nd bel iev ed tha t sh e ha d le ft the bu ild ing . A lth ou g h a pp e lla nt h a d th e a tto rn e y ’s bu sin e ss
car d and her

cell phone, she never

attempted to call the attorney either from the interviewroom, from the hallway

outside the interview r oom, or from th e b athroom. In fac t, even a fter the questioning
e n d e d an d a p p e l l an tw a s a l o n e i nt h e i n t e r v i e w r o o m , s h e c a l l e d

a f r i e n d b u tn o tt h e a t t o r

n e y.For the same rea son, the offic ers’ failure to advise appe llant of her r ights be fore or duringthe 2 course of the que stioning did not rend er her state ments inadmissibl e. See M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.22, § 3 (West 2005). 10 We h old that un de r the c ir c ums tanc e s sh ow n b y thi s r e c or d, a

re a so na ble pe rs on

in appellant’ s position would not have be lieved that her fre edom of mo v em en t was re strained to the de g re e a sso c iate d w itha

fo rm a l arr e st at the tim e sh e wa s be ing qu e sti on e d b y the tw o d e te c tiv e s. Be cause appellant wa s not in custody , she had no Fifth Ame ndment rig ht to counsel and the of fice rs
w e r e n o to b l i g a t e d

t o s t o p qu e s t i o n i n g h e r

w h e ns h e a s k e d

t o s p e a k t o h e r a t t o r n e y. 2
V olu nta rine

ss Appellant conte nds that h er re corde d statements to Foster and Ga rre tt were involuntary

under two diff

ere nt theories. Se e Ou rsb ou rn v . S tate , 2 5 9 S. W. 3 d

1 5 9 , 16 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that statement can b e i n v o luntary under thre e diffe rent theor ies). First, she c ontends that her statements wer e involuntary under the Due P ro cess Cl ause. U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd . X I V. Se c on d, sh e c on te nd s tha t the state me nts we re inv olu nta ry un de r a rt ic le 38 .2 2, se c tio n 6
. Tex . Co de Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 3 8. 22 , § 6 ( Wes t 20 05 ). Th e vo lun tari ne ss require ment applies to both custodial and noncustodial statements. State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W .3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

A c on fe ssi on

is inv olu nta ry un de r the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e on ly wh e n th e re is o ff

ic ia l,
coer cive c onduct of such a nature that any

statement obtained the reby was unlikely to have be en the p roduct of an essentially fre e and unc onstrained c hoice by its maker. A lv a r a d

o v . Sta te , 912 S.W .2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Statements that have been f ound to be involuntary11

under the Due Process Clause i nvolve t he crucial element of pol ice overre aching and involve fa ct
scena rios in which the suspec t was subjecte d to threats, phy sical a b u s e, o r extended periods of interrog ation without rest or nourishment. Se e Ou rsb ou rn , 259 S.W .3d at 170-71 (c ollecting case s). Ab se nt c oe rc ive po lic e a c tiv ity , a state me nt i s n ot inv olu

nta ry wi thi n the me anin g of

the Du e Pr oc e ss Clause eve n if it was not the produc t of a mea ningf ul choice by

the speaker. Id
. at 17 0 (c iting Colorad o v . Co nn e lly , 479 U.S. 157 (1986)). Ar tic le 38 .2 2, se c tio n 6 pr ov ide s th a t on ly vo lun tary

state me nts may

be a dmi tte d in evid en ce. The statute wor ks in tandem with article 38.21, w hich provides that a n acc used’s state me nt may be us e d in e vid e nc e a g a ins t him “ if it a pp e ars that th e same wa s f re e ly and vo lun tari ly made without compuls i o n or per suasion.” Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 38.21 (West 2005). Claims of involunt arine ss under th es e s t atut es ca n be, but nee d not be, pre dicated on police
overr eac hing of the s ort require d under due proce ss analy sis. Ou rsb ou rn , 259 S.W .3d at 172. Under article 38.21 and 38.22, section 6, courts may consider, in a ddition to any alleg edly coer cive c onduct by the po lic e , f

a c tor s su c h a s the su sp e c t’ s y ou th, int oxic a tio n, me nta l r e tard a tio n, or oth e r d isa

bil ity that would not raise a

fede ral due proce ss claim. Id . at 172-73. To deter mine the voluntariness of a confes s i on or other statement, all of the circ umstances surr ounding its ac quisiti on must be considere d. W y att v . S tate , 23 S.W .3d 18 , 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). After making its finding s of fac t, the trial court c oncluded that a ppellant’s
s t at em en t s t o t h e d et ec t i v es we re v o l u n t ary . On ce aga i n , we ar e b o u n d b y t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of historical fa ct and c onsider only whether the cour t properly applied the law

to those fac ts. Id
.12 A p p e ll an t c o n te n d s th a t h e r o r a l a dmi s s io n s to th e o f f ic e r s w e r e c o e rce d and inv olu nta ry fo r se ve ra l re a so ns . F ir st, sh e c on te nd s th a t sh e wa s n ot p e rm itt e d to us e the re str oo m. Th e re c or d s ho ws tha

t w he n a pp e lla nt f ir st s a id s he ne e de d to use the re str oo m, F os te r a sk e d h e r i f she could wa it because they wer e “on a

rol l .” Appe llant ag ree d to wait, only to ask ag ain a f

ew minutes later. This time, appellant was allowed to g o to the restroom without further dela y . We find
no thi ngin t

his re c or d th a t c ou ld r e a so na bly be c on sid e re d p oli c e ov e rr e a c hin g of the so rt that w ou ld rende r a state ment involuntary in either the due proce ss or statutory sense. Ne xt, a pp e lla nt ur g e s th a t he r s tate me nts we re inv olu nta ry be c a us e the de te c tiv e s d id not allow her to c all her attorney . The re cord r efle cts that appel l an t fi rs t gav e the of fice rs the
a tto rn e y ’s bu sin e ss ca

rd and a sk e d the m to c a ll. L a te r, re luc tant to an sw e r F os te r’ s q ue sti on a s to whether she che cked into a hote l with K.B .C., appellant said, “I need to call the attorney . I ’m not trying to be rude.” Fos t er s ai d , “N o ” and beg an to play a re corde d telephone c all. I t is unclear whether Foster was say ing, “No, y ou may

not call the lawy er” or “N o, y ou are not being rude,” and the trial cour

t did not make a findingof fa ct with reg ard to this. We have a lrea dy

held t h at appellant was not in custody . As the trial cour t found, appellant c ould have lef

t the interview room at any time and ca lled the attorne y on her c ell phone. Appellant also c ould have c alled fr om the restroom d u ri n g t h at brea k in the questioning, w hich prec eded he r incriminating statements. And the stre ng th of appe llant’s desire to speak to the attorne y must be considere d in light of he r fa ilure to ca ll the attorney even a fter she was lef

t alone i n the interview r oom. I f appe llant felt constra ined from calling the attorne y in the detec tives’ pre sence , the re is n o e vid e nc e of

c oe rc ive c on du c t by

the de te c tiv e s o f s uc h a

natur e that a

pp e lla nt’ s st a te me nts13

w e r e u n l i k e l y t o h a v e b e e n t h e p r o d u c t o f an e s s e n t i a l l y f

r e e an d u n c o n s t r a i n e d

c h o i c e . S i m i l ar l y, there is no evidence that appellant’ s frustrated desire to speak with the attorney p ro d uced in he r a state of mind that would re nder he r later statements i nvoluntary within the meaningof ar ticles 38.21 and 38.22, sec tion 6.

Appellant fur

ther a rg ues that her

incriminating oral stateme nts were involuntary beca use F oster and G arr ett repe atedly assure d her that she would be a llowed to le ave the sherif f’s office and g o home with her children afte r the questioning ended, when in f act she was a

rre sted and jailed. The tria l court found that at the time the office rs made th o s e st atements to appe llant, they believed that she and her children would in f act be g oing home afte r the intervie w. This finding of fac t is supported by

Foster ’s testimony

and is binding o n t h i s C o u rt . Appellant also c ites the detec tives’ statements to the ef fec t that appellant had no rea son to fea r l osing c ustody

of her children if she admitted eng ag ing in sex ual activiti es wit h K.B .C. The trial cour t made no finding of fa ct as to whether

the offic ers a ctually

believed this to be true
. A promise in itself does not ne cessa rily rende r a statement involuntary as a matter of du e pr oc e s s , b u t

i ti s a f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r

i na p p l yi n g “ t o t a l i t y

o f t h e c i r c u m s t an c e s ” an a l y sis
. 41 Geor g e E. Dix & Robert O. D awson, Te x as Prac tic e : Cri mi na l P ra c tic e & Pr oc e du re § 13.193 (2 d ed
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Ar izo na v . F ulm ina nte , 499 U.S. 279, 285-88 (1991)) . A promise will rende r a stateme nt involuntary

under a rticles 38.21 and 38.22, se ction 6 i f it was positive, made or sanctioned by

someone in authority , and of such an influential nature that it would cause a person to speak untruthfully
. Ma rti ne z v . S tate , 127 S.W .3d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). I n Alvarez

v . Stat e , th e d is tr ic t a tt o r

n e y ’ s p r o mi s e to th e s u s p e c t th a t h e w o u ld b e a ll o w e d to g o home af ter14

g iving a statement, whe n in fac t he was a rre sted, was he ld not to be the p ri m ar y i ncentive f or the defe ndant to confe ss, and thus it did notrende r the c onfession involuntary . 649 S.W .2d 613, 620-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). I n Go nz ale s v . S tate , a n o ff ic e r’ s p ro mis e to t

he su sp e c t th a t he would be a llo we d to g o h ome a ft e r s ig nin g his state me nt, wh ic h h e wa s a llo we d to do , w a s h eld no t to be of suc h an influential nature a s t o cause the suspect to spea k untruthfully . 4 S.W .3d 406, 414 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.).

I t is difficult to be l i eve that Foster a nd Gar rett truly thought that a

ppellant had no
re a so n to fe ar l os ingc usto dy of her chil dr e n a s a re su lt o f h e r s e xua l r e latio ns hip wi th K .B .C. Howe v er , t ri ck ery

or dec eption does not make a statement involuntary

unless the method was calc ulated to produc e an untr uthful confes s i on or wa s offe nsive to due proc ess. Cre age r v . S tate , 952 S
. W
. 2 d 852, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We are satisfied that the detec tives’ promises and
a s s u r an c e s to a

p p e ll an t d id

n o t c o n s ti tute p o li c e c o e r c io nr e n d e r in g a p p e ll an t’ s in c ulpatory state me nts inv olu

nta ry in the du e pr oc e ss se ns e . We are a lso satis fi e d th a t th e se a ssu ra nc e s w ou ld
n o t h av e ca u s ed appellant to falsely confe ss to eng ag ing in or al sex with K.B.C. Although the office rs’ a ssuranc es may

have a llay ed some of a

pp e ll a nt’ s f ear s reg ardingthe potential conse quence s of her admissions, we do not be lieve that the wer e such a s to render those admissions involunt ary under a rticles 38.21 and 38.22, se ction 6. Refer ring to her stateme nt to the detec tives, “[I ]t ’s ki lling me beca use I ’m not g onna leave here until I tell you the truth,” appellant argues that she believed that she would not be a llowed to leave the interviewroom until she had told the truth as Foste r and G arr ett saw, that is, until she confe ssed to eng ag ing in se x ual ac tiviti es with K.B .C. The trial court found, on the other hand, thatAcc ording t o t h e m o t ion for new trial, the State had of

fer ed appe llant a seve n-y ear probate d 3 sentenc e in exchang e for

a guilty plea. 15 this statement showed that appe llant was “try ing to wor

k up the ne rv e . . . and over come he r hesitancy to admit her g uilt . . . .” Consider ing the totality of the c ircumstance s, including a ll of the circ umst an c e s c it e d

b y a p p e ll an t a n d d is c u s s e d

a b o v e , w e c o n c lu d e th a t a

p p e ll an t’ s r e c o r d e d

oral statements during the noncustodial police que stioning on September 14, 2006, wer e fr eely

and voluntarily

made. We h old tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr by ov e rr uli nga pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss her r ecor ded ora l statements. I ssues three , four, a nd five a re ove rruled.
CUMU LATION ORDER AND MOTION F OR NEW TRIAL After the jury returne d its punishm ent ver dicts, the State moved that the sente nces be cumulated. The motion was g rante d over a ppellant’s objec tion. Subs equently , ap p el l an t filed a motion for new tria l as k i n g t h at the cour t order a new tria l as to punishment or, alternatively , set aside the c umulation order, a nd reque sting a hear ing. I n the m otion, appellant urg ed that the St ate, by re qu e sti ngthe c umu latio n ord e r wit ho ut pr ior no tic e to the de fe ns e , vind ic tiv e ly so ug ht t o p un ish he r f or de c lin ingthe State ’s pl ea barg a in o ff e r a nd fo r e xer c isi nghe r r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l. In 3 two issues, appellant c ontends that the t rial cour t abused its discretion by

order ing that the sentenc es b e s erv edco n s ec u t i v el y

an d b y o v erru l i n g h er

m o t i o nfo r n ew t ri al wi t h o u tco n d u ct i n g a h ea ri n g. A trial cour

t abuses its discretion in denying a hea ring on a timely

motion for new trial if the motion raises a matter outside the r ecor d upon which re lief could be g rante d. Flores

v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—Austi n 2000, no pet.). Appe llant argues that she wa s16

e nti tle d to a

he ari ngin thi s c a se in or de r to fu rt he r de ve lop he r pr os e c uto ri a l vi nd ic tiv e ne ss c la im. We disa g ree beca

use the State’s motive f

or reque sting the cumulation order does not af fe ct the validity of the orde r. I t is undisput ed that the tria l court wa s statutorily authorized to cumulate the thre e sentenc es in this cause. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 3.03(b)( 2)(A) (West Supp. 2008). Section 3.03 does not condition the trial cour t’s authority to c umulate sentenc es on the filing of a motion by the State. The task of

cumulating sen t en ce s i s assig ned exclusively to the trial court. Be e dy

v . S tate , 250 S.W .3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Whatever the State’s motivation in movi ng for the sentenc es to be cumulate d, the dec ision to have the sentenc es run c onsecutively was the tria l court’s alone. Fur

ther, a defe ndant does not ha ve a due proce ss r ight to a dvance notice that the sentenc es
m ight be cumulated. Mi lls lag le v . S tate , 1 5 0 S
. W
. 3 d 7 8 1 , 7 8 4

- 8 5 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s t i n 2 00 4, pe t. dism’d, untimely

filed). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a he aring on appellant’ s motion for new trial. I ssue one is over ruled. Appellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt’s orde r imposing what is, in effec t, a twenty -three -y ear

prison term followed by a ten- y ear

period of pr obation was, unde r the circ umstances, outside the zone of r easona ble disag ree ment. But a

bsent an E i ghth Amendment disproportionality

claim, which a

ppellant does not make , the cour t of criminal appe als has held that
a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to c umu late se nte nc e s is un a ssa ila ble on a pp e a l:
Sub je c t on ly to a ve ry lim ite d, “ e xce e din g ly ra

re ,” and so me wh a t a mor

ph ou s E ig hth Amendment g ross-disproportionality revie w, a punishment that f alls wi t h i n the leg islatively

presc ribed ra

ng e, and that is based upon the jury ’s (or trial court’s, in a bench tr ial) informe d normative judg ment, is unassailable on a ppeal. The same thing is tru e fo r t

he dis c re tio na

ry de c isi on wh e the r t o c umu late se nte nc e s.17

Ba rro w v . S

tate , 2 07 S.W. 3d 37 7, 38 1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) ( fo otn ote omi tte d) ; see also Be edy , 25 0 S.W.3 d at 110
. I ssu e tw o, by wh ic h ap pe lla nt co nte nd s tha t the c umu latio n ord e r w a s a n a bu se of the trial c ourt’s discre tion, is overruled.
INEF F ECTIVE ASS ISTANCE Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s th a t sh e wa s de nie d he r fe de ra l and state c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o
e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l at he r tr ia l. Ap pe lla nt ac kn ow le dg e s tha t the Te xas C on sti tut ion is
no m o re p ro t ec tive of the rig ht to counsel than the Six th Amendment. Se e He rn an de z v . S tate , 98 8 S. W.2 d 7 70 , 7 72 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); He rn an de z v . S tate , 7 26 S.W. 2d

53 , 5 7 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1986). The ref

ore, w e will revie w appellant’ s contention under the Six th Amendment standar d enunciated in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Appellant must show that her trial attorney s made such se rious err ors t hat t hey wer e not func tioning ef

fec tively as counse l and that these e rror s prejudice d her de fense to such a de g ree that she wa s deprived of a fa ir trial. Id
. I n revie wing a claim of ineffe ctive assistance , we must indulg e a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fe ll within t he wide r ang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance. Jack son
v . S tat e , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). To overc ome this presumption, an alleg ation of ine ff e c tiv e ne ss m

us t be fi rm ly foun de d in the re c or d a

nd the re c or d mu st a ff

ir mativ e ly demonstrate the alleg ed inef fec tiveness. Ma lle tt v . S

tate , 65 S.W .3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). This burden is made mor e diffic ult when, as in this cause , the issue was not ra ised by motion for new trial and ther e is no rec ord foc used on the motives behind trial c ounsel’s ac tions. Id
.

Ap pe lla nt cont end s tha t he r t

ri a l atto rn e y s w e re ine ff e c tiv e in t

hr e e re sp e c ts. First, she c omplains that they failed to ti mely object to K.B .C.’s testimony reg ardingthe extraneous18

a c t of se xua l inte rc ours e that oc c ur re d in Tr a vis County . In f

a c t, a pp e lla nt’ s le a d c ouns e l no t on ly did no t ob je c t to K. B .C. ’s te sti mony , h e c ro ss- e xami ne d K .B .C. a bout th e inc ide nt. I t w a s o nly during De te c ti v e F o s te r ’ s te s ti mo n y th a t c o u n s e l o b je c te d th a t th e T r a v is Co u n ty in c id e n t w a s an inadmissible ex trane ous offe nse under rule 404(b) . Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). The trial court ove rruled t h e o b j e c t i o no nt h e g r o u n d

t h a ti tw a s n o tt i m e l y. Notwithstanding rule 404, evidenc e of other crimes, wrong s, or acts co m m i t ted
a g a ins t th e c hil d w ho is the a lle g e d vic tim of a se xua l a ssa ult is a dmi ssi ble fo r i ts b e ari ngon the state of mind of the defe ndant and the c hild and on the re lationship between the defe ndant and the c hild. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.37, § 2 (West Supp. 2008). Thus, even a timely objection to the
e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e wo uld

have pr op e rl y

be e n ove rr

ule d. Couns e l wa s not ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto timely object. Se e Ex

pa rteW hite , 160 S.W .3d 46, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Next, appellant contends t h at h er attorney s were ineffe ctive bec ause the y did not object to the admission of State’s e x hibit 8, the reco rding s of her conver sations with K.B.C. on September 12, 2006, on the g round of untimely notice. The rec ord re flec ts, however , that befor e the State offe red the exhibi t in evidence , defe nse counse l cross-e x amined both K.B .C. and Foster reg ardingthe content of

these conver sations. Moreove r, when the State offe red the exhibi t, the trial court ag ree d to delay its ruling on the admis sion of t he ex hibit to g ive counse l more time to listen to t he re c or din g s. Th e fo llo wi ng da y , whe n the State re of

fe re d the e xhibi t, a

pp e lla nt’ s atto rn e y

sa id that he had no objection. At the very least, there is no basis in this rec ord for co n cl u d i n g t h at the defe nse wa s prejudice d by counsel’s f

ailure to objec t to the admission of ex hibit 8.19 F in a ll y , a p p e ll an t c o n te n d s th a t h e r a tt o r n e y s w e r e in e f

f e c ti v e “ in fa il in g to r e a li ze that th e se se nte nc e s c ou ld b e c um ul ate d w ith ou t pr ior no tic e by the pr os e c uti on

and in f a ili ngto
a dv ise Ap pe lla

nt t hat th e se nte nc e s c ou ld b e c umu late d. ” As e vid e nc e su pp or ti ng thi s c la im,
a pp e lla nt c ite s tr ia l c ouns e l’ s w ri tte n r e ply to the State ’s re sp on se to t he mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. I

n th is
unsworn re ply , appellant’ s lead trial c ounsel stated: [T] he S tate did not indicate that it would see k to stack the sente nces in the e vent of a convic tion. Rather, the State c o n tra - indicated that it would seek to stack by of fe ri nga ple a de a l of pr ob a tio n/d e fe rred adjudi c a tio n. Con se qu e ntl y , d e fe ns e co u n s el did not advise defe ndant of the possibility that the sentenc es could be stacke d, thus ex posing he r to a s i gn i fica ntly g reater potential punishment than she wo uld have be e n e xposed to ha d s he e le c te d to re je c t a ple a of fe r a nd g o to tr ia l in a ca se whe re stac king the sentenc es was not an option for the State. Thus, the State’ s failure to provide such notice inadver tently mi s le d d e f e n s e c ounsel, and thus assumed c on sti tut ion a l di me ns ion s, ult imate ly de pr ivi ngde fe nd ant o f d ue pr oc e ss. Appellant ar g ues that if she ha d been advised by counsel that the sentenc es on the thre e counts mig ht be cumulate d, she could have made a better -in fo rm ed decision reg ardingwhether to acc ept the State’s plea of

fer
. Appellant’s br ief implies, a lthough it doe s not e x plicitly state, that she would have
acc epted the of

fer ed p l ea b ar gain if she ha d known that her sentenc es on ea ch count c ould be cumulated. B ut assert i o n s of fa ct in an appe llate brief that are not supported by the re cord do not constitute evidenc e that may be conside red on a

ppeal. Mc

Do na ld v . S

tate , 6 4 S. W. 3 d

8 6 , 8 9 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). S imilarly , counsel’s unswor n pleadingdoes not constitute evidenc e. Se e Pe ra le

s v . S tate , 226 S.W .3d 531, 536 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. re f’d) . The
rec ord bef

ore us is inade quate to de termine what trial counsel told or did not tell appellant reg arding20

her pote ntial punishment ex posure, or the ef fec t that this advice or lac k of advice m ight have had on her de cision to refuse the State’s prof fer ed plea barg ain. Ap pe lla nt h a s n ot d e mon str a te d th a t he r t ri a l c ouns e l r e nd e re d c on sti tut ion a lly inadequate assistance . I ssues six and seve n are overr uled. The judg ments of conviction ar e af firmed.

__________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 11, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh