No. 258, August 2010 Strategic Forum 1

expertise on strategic issues. Revitalization 

in this follow-on phase would facilitate the 

adaptation of defense capabilities to regional 

issues such as disaster response, military 

support for police and other civil institutions, 

and subregional confidence-building. The 

process of reforming the IADB would require 

whole-of-government support from all OAS 

member states.

The Issue

Does the Inter-American Defense 

Board (IADB) have a future in an era 

of multidimensional security? Burdened 

by a mid-20th-century military structure 

and a tradition of U.S. leadership, lingering deep antimilitary discomfort within the 

Organization of American States (OAS), and 

severely shrinking financial and human 

resources, the Board, with its secretariat and 

27-member council of delegates,1 has not 

been functionally useful to the OAS or its 

own membership and is ripe for disestablishment. Perceived to be out of touch, inflexible, and difficult to control, the IADB would 

cease to exist if funding were denied or markedly reduced.2

To preserve this important multilateral 

channel for communication, military standard setting, confidence-building, and colThe Western Hemisphere’s delegations to the Inter-American Defense Board 

(IADB) should represent and be responsible 

to ministers of defense or their equivalents, 

rather than to the armed forces, as is the case 

in most countries in the Americas today. This 

breakthrough reform would bring the Board in 

line with democratic constitutional practices, 

strengthen Organization of American States 

(OAS) support for democracy, and help implement the 2003 Mexico City “Declaration on 

Security in the Americas,” which adopted a 

broadened multidimensional view of security. 

The reform could be accomplished without 

change to the March 2006 statutes and would 

bring the Board into the OAS General Secretariat associated with the Secretariat on 

Multidimensional Security. 

This small but pivotal step toward 

developing a genuinely collaborative civilmilitary working environment could improve 

OAS effectiveness, contributing to matters of 

multilateral security and defense at a time of 

imperiled public safety in many countries and 

increased transnational crime and violence. 

Starting from the above reform, this 

paper discusses improving IADB usefulness 

to the OAS and member states by modernizing its functions and broadening available 

 Strategic Forum No. 258

August 2010

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Reforming the Inter-American 

Defense Board

by John A. Cope

laboration, the Board must become more 

productive on defense and security issues, less 

threatening to diplomats, and clearly responsive to OAS direction. The existence of an 

international meeting ground for civilian and 

military officials is important for attenuating regional tensions as well as for strengthening hemispheric security cooperation and 

interoperability, processes in which the IADB 

must realize its full potential to contribute. 

A 21st-century Board should be rooted in the 

principles and priorities established 7 years 

ago in the “Declaration on Security in the 

Americas” and provide not only up-to-date 

technical expertise on current strategic and 

defense issues, but also planning capabilities in complex situations and a readiness to 

find ways to support civil institutions and law 

enforcement officials facing difficult domestic and transnational security problems with 

which no single institution or even nation 

can cope alone.

Background

The Inter-American Defense Board 

is the oldest international aggregation of 

armed forces in the world. With U.S. urging 

in 1942, the American Republics created the 

IADB to prepare for the defense of the hemisphere against external aggression from the 
Axis nations through the conduct of collaborative studies and recommendations of 

appropriate measures. After World War II, to 

maintain continental security and regularize hemispheric cooperation, the countries 

of the Americas adopted the Inter-American 

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) 

in 1947 and created the Organization of 

American States a year later. But the IADB 

was not explicitly recognized in either treaty. 

Through most of its 68 years, the region’s 

military leadership (including U.S. officers) 

kept the Board from subordination to the 

“political” organs of the OAS. Delegations 

also remained independent from their own 

diplomats at the organization. With little respect for military institutions in general, OAS officials have in turn limited IADB 

scope of action in regional affairs for fear 

the military would take over, belittled its usefulness, and desired to bring the Board under 

firm civilian control. In the process, OAS 

member states, led historically by Mexico, 

also tried to ensure that U.S. military influence at the IADB was restrained.

The advent of constitutional democracy 

in a post–Cold War world renewed attention 

to civilian control over the armed forces. The 

OAS community’s reaction in the 1990s was to 

create a Committee on Hemispheric Security 

of the OAS Permanent Council and question 

the IADB’s purpose and agenda in an era of 

democratic peace and bilateral confidencebuilding. In 2004–2005, a Secretariat for 

Multidimensional Security was created. Even 

so, it would take additional discussion to clarify the juridical and institutional relationship 

between the OAS and IADB. In a 2006 resolution, “Statutes of the Inter-American Defense 

Board,” the Board became an “entity” of the 

Organization under its charter. The document 

emphasized the principle of civilian oversight 

of the armed forces and made clear that in 

no case would the IADB have an operational 

role. For the first time, the statutes directed 

the Board to elect its own chair, vice chair, 

and other senior officials instead of accepting 

officers provided by the United States.3 That 

year, Brazilian Jorge Armando Ribeiro was the 

first elected chairman of the Inter-American 

Defense Board, which had been chaired by 

U.S. officers for 64 years. The 2006 resolution 

confirmed four tasks the IADB had accrued 

over time:

■ provide technical and educational 

advice and consultancy services on matters 

related to military and defense issues

■ offer to military officers and civilian 

officials advanced academic courses on military- and defense-related themes, the InterAmerican system, and related disciplines at 

the Inter-American Defense College (IADC)

■ promote cooperation between military 

and civilian officials of member states

■ provide technical advisory services on 

demining operations; managing, safeguarding, and destroying weapons stockpiles; the 

development of national defense doctrine and 

policy papers; transparency, confidence- and 

security-building measures in the hemisphere 

and other regions; humanitarian assistance 

in the case of disasters; and search and rescue operations.

Assessment

At no time in the region’s recent history 

have there been so many complex challenges 

and opportunities associated with defense 

and security, or with sovereignty and stability. The Organization of American States, 

hampered by its own shortcomings—exacerbated by ideological and geostrategic fissures 

among member states—faces the daunting 

task of becoming a more effective and influential multilateral forum. However, in this 

process of change, the OAS cannot afford to 

lose a professional voice on defense and military issues, which may happen soon if repairs 

are not made to the current relationship.

Beyond senior officials, most OAS staff 

members have little awareness of IADB activities (or those of the IADC). The Board’s 

2-mile physical separation from the diplomatic core of the OAS reinforces a Latin 

tendency not to interact with military organizations. Recent Brazilian leadership led the 

Board in an attempt to improve communication with the OAS by proposing a liaison 

arrangement with the General Secretariat and 

the Committee on Hemispheric Security and 

trying to interact informally with the OAS 

diplomatic community. Unfortunately, these 

efforts were met with little interest.

The reluctance of diplomats to tap the 

Board’s expertise, even when considering 

regional defense and security issues, and the 

IADB’s unwillingness to subordinate itself in 

practice to the Committee on Hemispheric 

Security of the OAS Permanent Council or 

the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, 

present a serious impasse. To make the Board 

a more useful entity of the OAS, the United 

States and other interested member states must 

address two closely related problems. The first 

is an institutional obstacle—the IADB’s exclusively military nature reinforces stereotypes, 

which hampers positive relations. Diplomats 

and civilian staff raised in antimilitary cultures tend to disdain uniformed officers. Most 

military men also remember less than harmonious relations and reciprocate by clustering 

with fellow officers and keeping OAS civilians 

at arm’s length. Perceptions and tensions are 

unlikely to change quickly, and their persistence obstructs opportunities for cooperation 

and usefulness. A new approach more in tune 

with the region’s democratization is necessary.

The second problem concerns the 

Board’s role in today’s multifaceted security 

environment. This issue has two dimensions. 

In reforming the IADB, member states must 

find ways to broaden the Board’s traditional 

defense/military mindset and widen its narrow perspective and capacity to make it more 

valuable to the OAS and to the member states 

themselves in today’s complex public security 

Colonel John A. Cope, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic 

Studies at the National Defense University, where he has held the Western Hemisphere regional portfolio 

since 1992.

OAS officials must be 

encouraged to accept 

the reality that civilmilitary relations in most 

countries have come a 

long way in a short time

No. 258, August 2010 Strategic Forum 2
No. 258, August 2010 Strategic Forum 3

military chiefs of delegations and the permanent representatives to the OAS would be 

strengthened by a defense ministry–to–foreign ministry liaison where both teams speak 

with one voice on policy issues. The shift also 

should facilitate the development of a constructive working relationship within the OAS, 

which could produce willingness by member states to increase funding and manpower 

support for a more engaged Board. A closer 

association between the IADB and Secretariat 

for Multidimensional Security, ending the 

IADB’s longstanding autonomy, is essential to 

addressing problems neither law enforcement 

nor the military can solve alone.

While each member state can change 

the leadership of its delegation independently, a way to solidify the institutional shift in how the Board is perceived 

could involve the IX Conference of Defense 

Ministers of the Americas in November 

2010. At the meeting, the ministers of 

defense and heads of delegations could take 

the following actions:

■ The 27 IADB member states would 

clarify officially that chiefs of delegation now 

represent the country’s minister of defense 

(or equivalent office) rather than the armed 

forces. (This action is a confidence- and 

security-building measure to improve coordination among defense ministers. It strengthens hemispheric relations and contributes to 

international stability, peace, cooperation, 

and security.7)

■ Member states would indicate their 

intention to have the IADB begin to work closely 

with the Secretariat for Multidimensional 

Security, recognizing it as the institutional link 

environment. It is also vital that the Board 

retain its advisory rather than operational 

functions. Equally important, OAS officials 

must be encouraged to accept the reality that 

civil-military relations in most countries 

have come a long way in a short time. 

It is important for diplomats and civilian 

officials to be willing to work with a new 

generation of military men and women as 

well as defense civilians.

Correcting an Institutional 

Anachronism4

The IADB structure evokes an earlier 

period in Latin American and Caribbean history when military institutions were largely 

autonomous and regularly played a significant role in politics. The legacy of civil-military tension still influences thinking and 

actions at both the OAS and IADB. Most delegations to the Board, including the United 

States, represent military authorities (for the 

United States it is the Joint Staff) and rarely 

consult with their own country’s diplomatic 

missions to the organization. By and large, 

the region’s military community still sees 

this unique body as its collective, albeit uncoordinated, voice inside the Inter-American 

System. While the region’s armies, navies, 

and air forces have long had their own conferences, none have tried to play the IADB’s 

broader integrating role.5

However, with the reemergence of democratic rule, the end of the Cold War, growing 

strategic independence among American states, 

and common multifaceted security concerns, 

should national delegations to the IADB continue to represent just the armed forces? Most 

(but not all) member states now have civilianled ministries of defense that oversee the armed 

forces. In practice, the military has adapted to 

changes at home and abroad, but the transformation of relations with polities and societies 

has been uneven. With an array of professional 

changes and civil-military interactions, some 

positive and some negative, there has been little 

interest in the activities of a defense board. Most 

governments consider it far away and inconsequential. With a few exceptions, even civilian 

defense officials have avoided possible confrontations with military leaders and maintained 

the status quo at the IADB.

healing relations between 

the IADB and OAS can 

begin by shifting official 

responsibility for 

national delegations 

from the prerogative 

of the armed forces to 

ministries of defense

This trend began to change by 2008. 

Defense ministers started to play a more 

assertive role in shaping national security policy and had engaged counterparts in 

such international fora as the Conference of 

Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA)6

and the newly created Defense Council of the 

Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). 

At VIII CDMA in 2008, for the first time, the 

ministers twice reached out to the OAS and 

IADB to improve regional defense mechanisms that could support civilian authorities 

responding to natural and manmade disasters and to assess other modalities of cooperation, such as serving as the secretariat and 

institutional memory for the CDMA process. 

This interest in the Board, albeit lukewarm, 

opens the way to reform.

Healing relations between the IADB and 

OAS can begin by shifting official responsibility for national delegations to the Board 

from the prerogative of the armed forces 

(usually armies) to ministries of defense, 

introducing a civilian identity. The change 

recognizes that matters of defense and security are part of the civil sector’s agenda and 

are no longer exclusively the domain of the 

armed forces. Civil power, informed by military advice, should decide how national 

capacities are shaped and employed. Times 

have changed: there now are well-informed, 

professional civilian defense cadres developing in most member states. The Board’s 

statutes accept a high-ranking officer or 

a civilian official as chief of delegation. 

Membership on the full delegation can be 

military, civilian, or mixed as the government desires. Several countries already have 

a civilian chief of delegation. The statutes 

call for the Board’s chair and vice chair to 

meet the same criteria as those established 

for a chief of delegation and stipulate that 

the IADB Secretariat and the Inter-American 

Defense College can be led and staffed by 

military officers and civilian officials.

A shift in IADB corporate military culture 

to an organization representing the broader 

perspective of defense ministers (or the equivalent in countries without military institutions) would reinforce the civil sector in its 

oversight of the armed forces better than the 

current OAS–IADB arrangement. In addition, 

the traditionally weak association between 
To help the OAS be more effective, the 

Inter-American Defense Board under civilian leadership must show that the defense/

military culture can adapt to today’s security environment and to the principles and 

priorities established in the “Declaration 

on Security in the Americas.” A proactive 

two-track strategy should be implemented 

after restructuring the Board. On the nearterm track, the IADB must broaden and 

strengthen its technical defense/military 

advisory capacity, the main area in which 

it can contribute to the OAS. On the second 

track, looking longer range, the Board must 

develop relevant and innovative ways, consistent with the statutes, to support civil institutions and public security officials in times of 

need and then standardize these procedures.

Professional Expertise Track.The 

2006 statutes define the purpose of the InterAmerican Defense Board as providing technical and educational advice and consultancy 

services on matters related to military and 

defense issues. What should this mean today? 

The scope of strategic concerns is broader in 

2010 than in 1942 and incorporates issues 

highlighted in the 2003 OAS Declaration as 

well as other contemporary security concerns. A partial list of today’s defense interests 

includes nonproliferation, cyber security, strategic communication, law of the sea, energy, 

climate change and the environment, illicit 

trafficking, disaster response, peacekeeping, 

human rights, women in the military, contact with indigenous communities, and professional education. The staff of the future 

Board should be a repository of information, 

but it is currently ill prepared to offer advice 

on most of these issues. The professional 

expertise track would require a rotating 

staff of military officers and defense civilians from member states who have expertise 

between the Inter-American Defense Board and 

General Secretariat of the OAS. This relationship creates a bridge for cooperation with the 

hemisphere’s ministers who are responsible for 

public security.

■ The ministers would announce their 

intention to nominate for chair of the Board 

in 2011 a civilian official from a member 

state with prior service at a senior level in a 

ministry of defense.

■ The ministers would accept the offer 

of the Secretary General of the OAS to 

host the institutional memory of the conference and have the IADB, as part of the 

Secretariat of Multidimensional Security, 

serve as its secretariat.

■ The ministers would restate their support for the continued development of professional civilian and military expertise within 

national institutions responsible for defense 

and security and the strengthening of the 

Inter-American Defense College.8

Extending the Reform

Of the 12 specific functions listed in the 

statutes, the Inter-American Defense Board 

currently engages in only 3: an annual 

10-month advanced defense course at the 

Inter-American Defense College; support for 

humanitarian demining efforts in the hemisphere; and, as requested at VIII CDMA, 

provision of technical advice for improving defense response capabilities in support 

of civilian relief agencies and humanitarian assistance organizations in the case of 

natural disasters. Several of the other functions are executed when required, such 

as advice on search and rescue and advisory services in developing national defense 

doctrine and policy papers. Contributing 

to the Board’s limited productivity is its 

undermanned military Sub-Secretariat for 

Advisory Services, which lacks regional 

diversity and professional expertise on many 

current defense and security issues. The college only has a limited capacity to assist. 

Consequently, the Board tends to wait until 

the OAS tasks, as with the natural disaster 

project, rather than proactively taking the 

initiative. It is not surprising that the political organs of the OAS perceive the IADB to 

be cloistered and unproductive.

The Board also suffers from a deeper 

region-wide problem: neither the council 

of delegates nor the institutions they represent have integrated, comprehensive, multilateral approaches to the many security 

challenges addressed in the “Declaration on 

Security in the Americas,” which member 

states endorsed in 2003. The OAS followed up 

that decision by creating the Secretariat for 

Multidimensional Security to address public security issues and assist OAS member 

states in their collective efforts to confront 

an increase in domestic and transnational 

crime. The civilian secretariat already has 

organized two meetings of a new conference of the Ministers Responsible for Public 

Security in the Americas (MISPA). The military Board has taken no action.

The IADB, it must be recognized, must 

function in a context of regional diversity 

and even controversy on how to approach 

defense and security. Countries have different models of cooperation (or lack thereof) as 

regards the approaches, legal standards, and 

instruments used in facing public challenges. 

There are two main schools of thought. Most 

of the larger South American nations recognize transnational threats but tend to want a 

clear differentiation between security/police 

and military roles. These states prefer to treat 

public security and defense as separate issues. 

Smaller Central American and Caribbean 

countries tend to view transnational threats 

as paramount and are less concerned about a 

whole-of-government response, but they often 

ignore the need for similar cooperation with 

neighbors. The United States tends to bypass 

doctrine in favor of pragmatic action, often 

minimizing the integration of civilian and 

military assistance components.

In almost all cases, governments tend 

to view collaboration between the armed 

forces and other security and police forces as 

a last resort. In practice, many countries are 

finding an absolute division between defense 

and security to be unworkable, particularly 

in violent urban areas. This pragmatic realization has yet to be translated into doctrine, 

a delay explained in part by civilian suspicions of military allegiance to democracy, 

concerns over human rights, and differing 

views of the proper roles of force, mitigation, 

and prevention.

the IADB must function 

in a context of 

regional diversity and 

even controversy on 

how to approach 

defense and security

No. 258, August 2010 Strategic Forum 4
No. 258, August 2010 Strategic Forum 5

on an array of strategic issues and can assist 

the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security 

and Secretariat of Multidimensional Security. 

The academic faculty at the IADC could also 

be chosen in part with an eye to becoming a 

source of knowledgeable support.

An equally important part of the professional expertise track is the need to find innovative ways to restore the confidence of the 

OAS and member states in the IADB. This 

involves improving the quality of its cooperation with the political organs of the InterAmerican System. The first step on this path is 

for the Board to agree on its subordination to 

civilian control and receive confirmation from 

the OAS of what it can do professionally to 

improve its usefulness. There are at least six 

tasks the OAS should ask the IADB to explore 

now, which stay within the intent of the 2006 

statutes. The six categories, with sample areas 

needing attention in each, include:

■ regional standards for military preparedness—disaster response and cyber 

security

■ technical best practices—attention to 

climate change and the environment, strategic communication, human rights training

■ interoperability—peacekeeping, disaster response, education

■ transparency—defense budgets, 

enforcement of military justice

■ legal considerations—law of the sea, 

border demarcation, energy

■ unique professional expertise—

demining, search and rescue.

If tasked to create regional standards 

for military disaster preparedness, for example, the Board might recommend a system 

in which governments “earmark” for a specific period of time those military capacities they would contribute in response to a 

major disaster, such as a field hospital and 

water purification units. It also might propose 

developing region-wide common operating 

procedures to prepare military forces to work 

effectively together in such technical areas as 

integrated communications or coordinated 

airport operations during natural disasters.

Even on such essentially technical matters, it is not enough for the Board to be proactive. A country’s diplomatic and defense 

delegations need to collaborate and be supportive at the political level in the OAS 

Permanent Council. In sum, the professional 

expertise track for improving the usefulness of a future civilian-led IADB suggests 

broadening defense knowledge in the Board’s 

secretariat and at the IADC to prepare the 

Inter-American Defense Board to address 

matters of current defense interest and be a 

repository of strategic and technical information for the OAS. This will require the 

adoption of a professional focus designed to 

build confidence at the OAS, improve cooperation among member states, and support 

the exercise of the organization’s influence 

in the Americas.

Defense and Public Security 

Track. The second follow-on track recognizes 

that defense and public security must be differentiated and that individual member states 

bring to them different approaches, legal standards, competencies, and instruments. While 

trying not to confuse the culture and missions 

of each, OAS Secretary General José Miguel 

Insulza is cognizant that these institutions 

sometimes must work together. In a 2007 

speech, he observed:

There exist today some threats to security, 

such as narco-trafficking and organized 

crime, among others, in which security 

functions can be complemented by the 

armed forces. The OAS is actually obliged 

to coordinate collective force to cooperate in confronting the new threats to continental security, especially in the countries 

most vulnerable.

9

To date, neither the OAS General 

Secretariat nor the Inter-American Defense 

Board has developed ways to discharge this 

important obligation.

Exploring how “to coordinate collective force to cooperate in confronting the new 

threats” to regional security is an area in 

which the Board can demonstrate its readiness to assist the OAS without threatening to 

dominate. The council of delegates could create a strategic civil-military planning group 

in the Board secretariat and task it to examine the different models of military support to 

civilian institutions and to propose options for 

cooperation in situations in which it makes 

sense for the military to support civil authorities and law enforcement officials to preserve 

internal security. Steps the group might consider include an exploratory dialogue with a 

wide range of regional experts and an examination of recent experiences in Mexico, Central 

America, several Caribbean states, Colombia, 

and Brazil. There also are best practices to be 

identified in discussion with the secretariats 

for the Conference of American Armies, InterAmerican Naval Conference, and System of 

Coordination Among American Air Forces. To 

make clear that the purpose of the planning 

group is not a military power play but an effort 

to strengthen civilian institutions and capabilities, the Board should work on these tasks 

with the Department of Public Security in the 

Secretariat for Multidimensional Security.

To improve its credibility, the new civilian-led IADB, working closely with the 

Committee on Hemispheric Security and other 

OAS entities, should show interest in public 

security–related discussions across the organization. The recent Brazilian liaison initiative 

should be resurrected. For its part, the Board 

cannot always wait to be asked to participate in relevant activities. It should advocate 

partnership. Additional topics for subsequent 

consideration for exploratory study by the strategic planning group, in collaboration with 

members of the Committee on Hemispheric 

Security, might include OAS contributions in 

whole-of-government security cooperation and 

the OAS’s strategic role in the global security 

environment (for example, cooperation with 

the African Union on counternarcotics issues).

Reform to Revitalize

The journalist James Fallows recently 

reminded us that the economist Mancur 

Olson’s “gospel of ‘adapt or die’ has spread 

a country’s diplomatic 

and defense delegations 

need to collaborate and 

be supportive at the 

political level in the OAS 

Permanent Council
from West Point to the corporate world . . . 

with the idea that rigid institutions inevitably 

fail.”10 The Inter-American Defense Board is, 

unfortunately, a rigid institution with a static 

mindset. Member states should rescue it from 

disestablishment; restore its viability, potential, and credibility; and revitalize its usefulness in the Inter-American System. While 

severe financial problems will play a key role 

in OAS decisions affecting the Board, a more 

professional, adaptable, and cooperative entity 

would demonstrate the IADB’s usefulness 

to the organization. There is a valid need 

for a nonthreatening, responsive multilateral channel for communication, confidencebuilding, and wide-ranging collaboration.

The Board will not be saved, however, unless its member states accept reality: the purely military nature of the IADB 

obstructs its usefulness at a time of imperiled public safety and continued transnational threats. The armed forces are no 

longer the premier voice in regional defense 

matters—this role has shifted to defense 

ministers. For the Board this means member delegations should represent their ministers, and the IADB should elect a civilian 

chair and work closely with the Secretariat 

for Multidimensional Security. The contemporary strategic environment requires a 

genuinely collaborative civil-military environment at the OAS to improve its effectiveness on defense and security issues. The OAS 

cannot afford to lose its source of professional advice. The IADB and IADC, however, 

need to upgrade the scope and quality of 

their expertise to address matters of current 

and future strategic importance. The Board 

needs a new direction—the traditional passive interpretation of its functions should be 

replaced with creative and timely initiatives 

in at least the six areas mentioned above. 

Today, it is essential for a proactive IADB to 

find ways to help the armed forces in the 

Americas work with civil authorities and law 

enforcement officials, who may be better 

attuned to today’s threats but still sometimes 

need professional military assistance.

Notes

1

 Seven Caribbean countries do not participate in the 

Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).

2

 Member states created a subordinate Inter-American 

Defense College (IADC) in 1962 to provide opportunities to military officers and, more recently, civilian officials (police and 

diplomats) to attend advanced academic courses related to military and defense issues, the Inter-American System, and related 

disciplines. The IADC is widely considered to be productive.

3

 Reflecting unique legal and resource idiosyncrasies, 

and by agreement among member states, the director of the 

Inter-American Defense College remains a U.S. flag officer 

who has actively promoted modernization of the curriculum. 

The deputy director is from another IADB member state.

4

 This subtitle is from the Chilean delegation to the 

IADB slide presentation, “La Junta Interamericana de 

Defensa en la Actualidad y la Necesidad de Romper Su 

Paradigma,” November 2009, slide 7.

5

 There is no grouping of joint staffs in the hemisphere.

6

 The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas 

began in 1995. Its eighth meeting was held in Canada in 

September 2008.

7

 Reflecting Article 5, “Declaration of Banff,” VIII 

Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, September 

5, 2008.

8

 Article 14.

9

 Speech by José Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of 

the Organization of American States, on the 65th anniversary 

of the IADB, March 16, 2007.

10 James Fallows, “How America Can Rise Again,” The 

Atlantic Online, January-February 2010, accessed at <www.

theatlantic.com/doc/print/201001/american-decline>.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

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opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

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contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

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any other agency of the Federal Government. 

Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

The Center for Strategic Research within 

the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, 

reports, briefings, and memoranda. The center 

conducts directed research and analysis in 

the areas of strategic and regional studies 

and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

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Director

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Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

No. 258, August 2010 Strategic Forum 6

the IADB should elect 

a civilian chair and 

work closely with 

the Secretariat for 

Multidimensional Security