The Honor able Ar thur J . Tarnow , United States Dist rict Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0257n.06 F iled: April 3, 2009 No. 08-3163 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT JOHN MILLER, JR., et al., P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,

v. CITY OF CANTON, et

al., De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Before: G IBBO NS and WHITE , Circuit Judges; TARNOW, Distr ict Judge. * JULIA S MI T H GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants John Mi ller, Jr., the Canton Poli ce Patr olman’s Association (“ Union”), a nd Steven Fow ler appeal the district c ourt’s g ra nt o f s umm ary jud g me nt in fa vo r of de fe nd ants -a

pp e lle e s the City

of Canto n ( the “ City” ), Sa fe ty D ir e c to r B e r n ar d H u n t, Ch ie f of P olice D e anM c K im m, Ro n a ld Sh an k , an d

G r e g o r y B o u dr e a u x. The plaintiffs a lleg e that the de fenda nts retaliated aga i n s t them for spea king out a g ainst rac ial dis c ri min a tio n w ith in t

he City of Canto n Po lic e De pa

rtme nt ( the “ De pa

rtme nt” ), in v iol a tio n o f t

he ir civil rig hts. Fowler

further alleg es that the de fenda

nts discriminated ag ainst him be cause of his race

. F or the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a ff

ir m th e g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt a s to a ll o f F ow le r’ s c la ims and Miller’s Title VI Iclaim, but we r ever se as to Miller’s remaining claims and remand for trial onMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

2 tho se c la ims

. I. BACKG ROUND Th is c a se ari se s o ut o f a lle g a tio ns of ra c ia l di sc ri min a tio n in

the De pa rtme nt. Mi ll e r i s a white police o ff

i ce r and served as pr esident of the U nion, the collective ba rg aining unit for the nonrankingmembers of

the De p ar t m en t
. Fowle r is a blac k police off icer and a me mber of the Union. A. John Miller and th e Union On August 4, 2004, Mill er a nd the Union issued a se ven-pa g e pre s s re l ea s e all eg ing that Chief of Police De an McK imm discriminated ag ainst black of fice rs. Acc ording to the press re lease , McKimm treate d black of fice rs di ffe rently from their white peers, t erminating black of fice rs more fr equently , disciplining blac k office rs more ha rshly , and over looking the a chieve ments of black of fi c e rs . T he pr e ss re le a se a lso a lle g e d that Mc Ki mm a bu se d his po sit ion to fa

vo r P ro Te c h A larm , a private sec urity

company owned by

his brother. F urther, the press rele ase repe atedly emphasized that Mc Ki mm’ s c on du c t vio late d nume ro us de pa rtme nta l ru le s a

nd re g ulatio ns , o pin ingthat “ it i s obvious that Truthfulness, and Integ rity are for e veryone but [McKimm] .” In conclusion, Mi ller

c a lle d o n th e City

to “ take the c or

re c tiv e a c tio n n e e de d, ” pr e suma bly to r e pla c e Mc Ki mm. The pre ss relea se was distributed dur ing the Pro Football Ha ll of Fame Fe stival, when many tou ri sts vis it Ca

nto n, and a ttr a c te d atte nti on

in l oc a l ne ws ou tle ts a s w e ll a s USA Today

. I n response , May or Jane t We ir

Cr e ig hto n h ir ed th e law f ir m of B a ke r, Du

bli ka r, B e c k, Wile y

& Mathe ws to conduct a n investigation of the alleg ations raised by the press re lease . Shortly there afte r, the fir

m issued its report conc luding that the a lleg ations o f ra ci al d iscrimination and rules violations wer eMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

3 unfounded but that the City “must addre ss the perc eptions of ra cial inequa lity .” Following the outside investigation, Safety Direc tor Be rnar d Hunt direc ted Interna l Affa irs ( “ IA ” ) t o c o n d

u c tani n v e s t i g a t i o ni n t o p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n o f D e p art m e n tr

u l e s b y M i l l e r . IA

re c omm e nd e d that H un t f ind that Mi lle r v iol a te d s ix de pa rtme nta l r

ule s in pr e pa ri ngthe pr e ss rele ase. Adisciplinary

hear ing be fore Hunt was he ld as requir ed by the collec tive barg aining

a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e Un ion and the City

. On Ap ri l 4, 20 05 , H un t r e le a se d h is r e po rt fi nd inga ll six rule violations and suspendingMiller without pay for sixt y day s, eff ective A pril 6, 2005 and ending on J une 28, 2005. Howe ver, on D ece mber 12, 2005, Hunt order ed the Ci ty to pay full back pay and bene fits previously

denied Miller. On Octobe r 10, 2006, M i l l er f iled a complaint with the Ohio Civil Ri g hts Comm ission (“O CRC ”) a

nd Equal Employ

ment Opportunity Commi ssion (“EE OC”) alleg ing that the City had reta liated ag ainst him “for pa rticipating in a protec ted ac tivity , in violation of Title VI I .” B. Steven F owl er Fowle r is one of f

our bl ac k o ff

i cers identified in the pre ss relea se as the ta rg et of dis c ri min a tor

y dis c ipl ina

ry a c tio n. Tw o c omp la int s le d to the dis c ipl ina ry a c tio ns tak en a g a ins t Fowle r–the fir st by

Prince Gray

arising out of Fow ler’s se x ual re lationship with Gray ’s wife , Wendy Gra y , and the se cond by

Z elma F erguson arising out of Fow ler’s a ctiviti es i n t h e Unizan B ank Bu i l d i n g. First, Prince Gra

y f il e d a p e r s o nnel complaint ag ainst Fowle r alleg ing tha t Fowler was having a sexual relationship with Wendy Gra y and abusinghis positi on as an of fice r to have Prince a

rre sted. An I A investig ation conclude d that Prince ha d been a rre sted but that Fowle r wa s not involved.Miller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

4 Ho we ve r, I A f

ound tha t disc ipl ina

ry c ha rg e s shou ld be su sta ine d be c a us e of F ow le r’ s in a

pp ro pr iate relationship wit h Wendy . Fowle r met Wendy when she filed a police repor t ag ainst Prince for domestic violence, and he subsequently eng ag ed in a personal relationship with her including ha ving sex wit h her on two occa sions. By taking advanta g e of a vulne rable complainant, F owler w as found to have br e a c he d the tr

us t pla c e d in him a s an of fi c e r, in vio latio n of e thi c a l sta nd ard s and the ru le

on de po rtme nt. Mo re ov e r, F ow le r l ie d to inv e sti g a to rs abo ut his re latio ns hip wi th We nd y , in violation of the rule on truthfulne ss. After a hea ring , Hunt suspended F owler w ithout pay for f ifteen day s beg inning on Apr il 19, 2004 and ending on May 14, 2004. Howeve r, on Mar ch 14, 2006, Hunt

rec onsidered his de cision, dismis sed the c h ar ges , and orde red the City to make F owler w hole by paying the fiftee n day s’ pay previously

withheld. S ec o n d , Zel m a F er gu s o n , t h e a dm i n i s t ra t o r o f afi rm b as edi nt h e U n i z an Ba n k Bu i l d i n g, complained that F owler c aused c haos in the building le adi n g to a two-hour loss of pr oductivity at the firm. F owler, dressed in his police uniform, told employ ees on va rious floors of the building that he wor ked private sec urity

at nig ht and wante d to s ee t h e floor plan dur ing da y time hours and inquired about the building ’s alar m sy stem and number of

employ ees. B uilding employ ees be g an to suspect that Fowle r was not in fac t a police office r and beca me afr aid, ca

using c haos that lasted

sever al hours. F owler a dmitted that he wa s inside the Unizan Ba nk Building , but he claimed that he h ad had a ne ar- miss accident with a w oman, Susan Crowther, e arlier that day and ente red the b u i l d i n g i no rd er

t o gi v e h er

a w arn i n g. An I A i n v es t i gat i o n d et erm i n ed t h at Fo wl er h ad n o l egi t i m at e re as o n t o b e i nt h e b u i l d i n g, but rather made up the story

in order to follow Crowther and ask her out on a date. While on patrolMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

5 Fowle r noticed Crow ther in her vehicle a nd followed h er u n t i l she par ked nea r the Unizan B ank Building . He then u s ed the Depa rtment’s L aw Enf

orce ment Assembly

Data Ser vice ( “L EADS”) sy ste m to ru

n Cr owt her’ s li c e ns e plate and de te rm ine he r n a me a

nd a dd re ss. F ow le r l ie d to g a in

e ntr y int o th e Un iza

n B ank B uil din g , w he re he loc a te d Cr ow the r in he r of fi c e and g a ve he r h is n a me and phone number. He a lso told C rowther that he knew

her na me and whe re she lived. Crowther did not give Fowle r her number, but he later called her and left a messag e on her answe ring machine. I A deter mined that Fowle r’s c onduct in and af ter the Uniz an B ank incident violated e ight de partment rules, including ly ing repe atedly to investigators about the incident. F urther, F owler likely violated Ohio law by

using the L EADS databa se for persona l, r ather than law enf orce ment, purposes a

nd by ly ing unde r oath at the arbitration. M cK i m m re co m m en d edt h at Fo wl er b e t erm i n at edfr o m t h e De p ar t m en t an d , af t er a h ea ri n g, Hunt ag ree d. Fowle r’s ter mination was effe ctive May 15, 2004. Howeve r, on F ebrua ry 18, 2005,

an a rb itr a tor re du c e d th e pe na lty

to a dis c ipl ina

ry su sp e ns ion

wi tho ut p ay , d

ue to F ow le r’ s p re vio us ly blemish-fre e re cord a

nd the opinion of Fow ler’s c aptain that he w as a “g ood office r” who should not be te r mi n a te d

. Co n s e qu e n tl y , th e d is c ip li n ar y s u s p e n s io n w it

h o u t p ay la s te d a

p p r o xim a te ly

nine

mon ths

. Also as a r esult of the Unizan B ank incident, Canton City Prosecutor F rank G . For chione ref err ed the matter

to an independe nt prosecutor to determine if c riminal char g es we re w arr anted. F o r c h io n e r e c e iv e d

the case from th e Ci ty

in F e b r u ar y 2 0 0 5 an d

s u b mi tt e d th e c a s e to K e it

h W. Warstler, Jr., of the Massillon L aw Depa rtment, in Ma

rch 2005. Warstler prese nted the case to the Stark County

Gra nd J ury , which indicte d Fo wl er on one count of Una uthorized Use ofMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

The a ppellate r ecor d does not reve al the disposition of the criminal ca se. 1 A t o r a l a r g u me n t, c o u n s e l f

o r M il le r c o n c e d e d th a t h is E E O C c o mp la in t w a s u n ti me ly

. We 2 there fore aff

irm the dismissal of his Tit le VI Iclaim as time-ba rre d. 6 Telec ommunications Equipment in viol ation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.04. 1 On Ap ri l 28 , 2 00 4, F ow le r f

ile d a c omp la int

wi th t he OC RC and EE OC a lle g ing that th e City suspended a

nd terminated him bec ause of his race . The OCRC found that Fow ler ha d not identified any white offic ers who w ere cha rg ed with violations simi lar to those for which F owler w as disciplined. Acc ording ly , the OC RC found t hat t he allegation was not supported by the evidenc e. On May 15, 2006, the EEOC issued F owler a rig ht to sue letter. C. P roce dural Hi story On A p r il 3 , 2 0 0 6 , th e p la in ti f f s b r o u g h t s u it in th e U n it e d St a te s D is tr ic t Co urt for the Norther n District of Ohio. They

asser ted claims of rac ial discrimination, retaliation, and violation of the ir ri g hts of fr e e do m of

sp e e c h a nd fr e e do m of

a sso c iatio n purs ua

nt to the F ir st a

nd F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nts to t

he Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit

uti on ; T itl e VI Iof

the Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of

19 64 , 4 2 U .S. C. § 2000e et seq. ; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 19 8 3; and the Ohio Civil Ri g hts Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01 et seq. The City moved for summary judgme nt on all claims and the matter was re fer red to United States Mag istrate Judge Patric ia A. He mann. The mag is tr a

te ju d g e issued a Re port and Rec ommendation (“R& R”) with re spect to Miller’s

and the Un ion ’s c la ims re c omm e nd ingthat th e y be dis mis se d. As a

thr e sh old iss ue , th e ma g istrate judge conclude d that Miller’s Title VI Iclaim was ba rre d by the statute o f l i m itations because he failed to ti mely file a complaint with the EEOC. As to the allege d First Amendment violation, the 2Miller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

7 mag istrate judg e found that the press rele ase did not constitute protec ted spee ch under the balanc ing test announce d in P ic k

e r in g v . B o a rd o f E d ucation , 39 1 U.S. 5 63 (1 96 8) . F ina lly , th e ma g istrate judge found that Miller established a pr im a facie case of re taliation but that no reasona ble juror

c ou ld c on c lud e that th e City ’s re a so ns fo r M ill e r’ s su sp e ns ion we re pr e te xtua l. I n a sepa rate R&R, the mag istrate judge rec ommended that all of F owler’ s claims be dismiss ed. The mag istrate judg e found that Fowler co u l d n ot establish a pr im a fa c ie case of dis c ri min a tio n. Simi larl y , F ow le r’ s c la im fo r re ta liatio n fa ile d a s a matte r o f l aw b e c a

us e he c ou ld

no t sh owthat th e City

pr oc ur e d h is i nd ic tme nt. On J anuar

y 9, 2008, the district court entered a final order adopting the findi ng s of fa ct and

c on c lus ion s o f l aw o f t

he ma g istrate jud g e and

dis mis sin g a ll c la ims with p re jud ic e . T his tim e ly appea l followed. II. STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW We re vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of su mma ry jud g me nt de novo

. Fieger v. U.S. Att’y Ge n. , 54 2 F .3 d 1 11 1, 11 16 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8)

. Th e City is e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt “ if

the ple a din g s, the discover

y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t a

nd that the movant is e ntitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 5 6( c ); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Towns end , 5 42 F .3 d 51 3, 52 2 (6t h Ci r. 20 08 ). Th is c ourt mus t

re vie w t he re c or d in

the lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to M ill e r a

nd F ow le r a nd mus t dr aw a ll r e a so na

ble in f e r e n c e s in th e ir f

a vor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1 98 6) ; Slusher v. Carson , 540 F.3d 449, 453 ( 6th Cir. 2008). The que stion is “whether the evidenc e prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whether it is so one-sided thatMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

8 one party must preva il as a matter of la w.” Vill. of Oakwood v. State Bank &Trust Co. , 539 F.3d 3 7 3 , 3 7 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986))

. III . F IR ST A M EN DM EN T C LA IM “A g overnme nt employ ee doe s not relinquish all F irst A mendment rig hts otherwise e njoy ed b y citizens just by

rea son of his or her

employ ment.” City of San Diego v. Roe , 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004). Th o s e r ig h ts , h o w e v e r , ar e s u b je c t t o li mi ts b e y o n d

w h a t t h e Co n s ti tuti o na ll o w s f

o r the g ener al public. See id. Consequently , to establish a prima facie c a se of re ta liatio n und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff eng ag ed in constitutionally protec ted spee ch; (2) the public employ er subjec ted the plaintiff to adve rse a ction; and (3) the adve rs e action wa s motivated by

the protec ted spee ch. Scarbrough v. M organ County Bd. of Educ. , 470 F.3d 250, 255 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6) ; Mi lle r v . A dm in. Of fic e of t heCou rts , 448 F.3d 887, 894 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citing Banks v. W

olfe County Bd. of Educ. , 330 F.3d 888, 892 ( 6th Cir. 2003)). A. Constitutionally Prot ect ed Speech To sh ow that a publ ic e mpl oy e e ’s sp e e c h is pro te c te d, a pla int if f m us t make tw o thre sh old showing s. First, the plaintiff must show that t he spee ch involves a matter of public c oncer n. Se c on d, the pla int if

f mus t sh ow that th e sp e e c h w a s ma de ou tsi de the du tie s o f e mpl oy me nt. I f b oth of these thr eshold showing s are m ad e, t h en we must balance the individual’s interest ag ainst the g overnme nt’s interest under Picke ring

.Miller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

9 1. Our a naly sis of whether

a public employ ee’ s speec h is pr otected beg ins w ith the “ threshold” question whether the s peec h involves a matter of public conc ern. Scarbrough , 4 70 F .3 d at 25 5; see Con nic k v . M y e rs , 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Hughes v. Region VII Area Age ncy on A ging , 542 F.3d 16 9, 18 0 (6t

h Cir. 20 08 ). Th is is a que sti on of law de te rm ine d by thi s c ourt de novo

. Hughes , 542 F .3 d at 18 0; Miller , 448 F.3d at 894. We must consider “ the content, f orm, and c ontext of a g iven statement” in de termining whether it involves a matter of public conce rn. Connick , 461 U.S. at 147- 48. Matters of publ i c co n ce rn i n clude “ any matter of political, soc ial, or other c oncer n to the community .” Id. at 146. Alleg ations of racial discrimination by a public entity

“inher ently ” involve a matter of public conc ern. Id. a t 14 8 n .8 ; see also Matulin v. Vill. of Lodi , 862 F.2d 609, 612- 13 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “alleg ations of i nvidious discrimination by a publi c employ er” based

on se x an d d isa

bil ity imp lic a te matte rs of

pu bli c c on c e rn ). So t oo do a lle g a tio ns of “ po ssi ble

corr uption in a police depar

tment.” Se e v . Ci ty

of E ly ria , 502 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Solomon v. Roy al Oak Twp. , 84 2 F .2 d 86 2, 86 5- 66 (6 th C ir . 1 98 8) ). I n th is c a se the City c on c e de s, as it must, that the press release involved a matter of public conc ern be cause it involved alleg ations of ra cial discrimination and public c orruption. 2. Additionally , we must deter mine at the threshold whether the public employ ee’ s speec h was made “ pursuant to his or her officia l responsibilit i es ” o r “outside the duties of employ ment.” Hughes , 5 4 2 F. 3 d

at 1 8 0 (q u o t i n g Garce tti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)) . I f the spee ch wa s

ma de purs ua

nt to th e emp loy e e ’s of

fi c ia l dutie s, the n th e pla int if f’ s F ir st A me ndme nt c la im mus tMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

10 fail. Hughes , 542 F.3d at 180. Her e, Mi ller was not doing what he was “ employ ed to do” whe n he issued the pre ss relea se. Se e Ga rc e tti , 5 47 U. S. at 42 1- 22 ; Hayne s v . Ci ty of Circ le v ill e , 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007). Rather, the press release fell out side of Mi ller’s official duties as a police office r. 3. B e c a us e Mil le r h a s pas se d both thr e sh old te sts , this c ourt mus t eng a g e in t he ba lanc ingte st set forth in Picke ring

. Ga rc e tti , 5 47 U. S. at 41 8; Hughes , 5 42 F .3 d at 18 0; Scarbrough , 470 F.3d at 255. We must deter

mine the prope r “ba lance betwee n the intere sts of the [employ ee], as a c itiz en, in commenting upon matters of public c oncer n and the interest of the [gove rnment], as an employ er, in promoting the eff

iciency of the public ser

vices it perf

orms throug h its employ ees.” Ga rc e tti , 547 U. S

. at 4 1 7 (q u o t i n g Picke ring , 391 U.S. at 568). The g overnme nt’s interests may be implicated wher e the speec h “impairs discipline by superiors or

harmony among co-w orker s, has a de trimental impact on close w orking relationships for which persona l loy alty and confide nce are nece ssary , or impedes the pe rfor

mance of the spea

ker’ s dut i es o r i n terfe res with the r egular ope ration of the enter prise.” Rankin v. M

cPhe rson , 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). The weig ht give n to the g overnme ntal interests var ies depe nding on t h e n ature of the prote cted spe ech. Connick , 461 U.S. at 150. The g ov e rnme nt mus t mak e a “ pa rt ic ula rl y str on g sh ow ing ” wh e re the sp e e c h “ su bs tanti a lly

inv olv e [s] matters of public c oncer

n.” Coc k re l v. Sh elb

y Co un ty Sc h. Di st. , 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) (a l t er at i o n i no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Leary v. D aeschne r , 228 F.3d 729, 737-38 (6th C ir. 2000)). H e r e , t h e p r e s s r e l e a s e s u

b s t an t i a l l y i n v o l v e d

m a t t e r s o f

p u b l i c c o n c e r

nb e c a u s e t h e “ v a s tm a

j o r i t y” of the press rele ase touched on issues of ra cial discrimination and public c orruption. Se e Le ar y , 228Miller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

11 F.3d at 737. Accor dingly , the City must “make a particula

rly strong showing that the employ ee’ s speec h interfe red w ith workplace functioning .” See id. I n this case, the City

cannot make the nec essar y showing

. The City

has not put any

evidenc e in the rec ord to support its claim that the press rele ase c aused disruption in the workpla ce. Rather, the City points to an internal re port , prepa red by Hunt, concludingthat the pre ss relea se wa s calculated

to cause disruption. Sum mary judgme nt is im proper , howeve r, whe re the g overnme nt’s interest rests on mere ly potential harm. Se e City of E ly ria , 502 F.3d at 493 (“O ther than [t he police chief ’s] own statement t o another office r t hat an F BI investigation would affe ct police de partment morale, the re is no evide nce t hat [plainti ff’ s] complaints to the FB Iactua lly impeded the police depar tment’s g ener al per formanc e and operation or affec ted l oy alty and confidence nece ssary to the depar tment’s proper

functioning .”); Solomon , 8 42 F .2 d at 86 6 (“ Al tho ug h [pl a int if f p oli c e of fi c e r’ s] state me nts dir e c tly

qu e sti on e d his su

pe ri or ’s wo rk pe rf

or manc e , no e vid e nc e wa s pr e se nte d th a t th is fo rm of dis loya lty

a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d th e pr op e r f

un c tio nin g of

the de pa rtme nt. ” ); se e als o M

atu lin , 862 F.2d at 614 (noting that, despite the defendants’ a rg uments that plaintiff police off icer ’s statements cr eate d a “la ck of trust” in the depar tment, the y failed to pre sent any evidenc e at tria l of disruption). Moreove r, the Safe ty Direc tor’s “conclusory repor t” i s insufficient to out weig h Miller’s First Amendme nt interests. Se e Me y e rs v . Ci ty

of Cinc inn ati , 934 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Ci r. 1 9 91) (finding assistant fire c hief’s “ controve rsial” spe ech r eg ardingaff irmative ac tion protected w here there was no e vidence of disruptive ef fec t “other tha

n the conclusory repor

t” prepare d by

Assistant Direc tor of Safe ty

afte r a hear ing)

. Her e, as in the cases cited, there is no evidenc e that the plaintiff’ s

s p ee ch ac tu al l y

d i s ru p t edwo rk i n g re l at i o n s h i p s o r a ff ec t edt h e D ep ar t m en t ’s p ro p er fu n ct i o n i n g.Miller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

Graham w a s anu np u

b l i s h e d c a s e t h a tc i t e d

e x t e n s i v e l y Brown v. C ity of Trenton , 867 F.2d 3 3 1 8 ( 6 th Ci r . 1989), and McM urphy v. City of Flushing , 802 F.2d 191 ( 6th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that speech “ calc ulated to cr eate division” is not protec ted. Neither of those ca ses is on point, however , beca

use in ea ch the c ourt determ i n ed that the officer s’ spee ch did not involve a matter of public co n ce rn. I n Br own , the cour t concluded that the office rs wer e “disg runtled” a nd abused the news media

to a ir their “g rieva

nces” about interna l depar tment functioning wher e ther e was “ no hint” of “a

ny brea ch of public trust.” 867 F.2d at 322. On these fa cts, the off icer s’ spee ch did not involve a matter of public c oncer n and the ba lance of intere sts tipped heavily in favor of the g overnme nt. Sim ilarly

in McM urphy , the c ourt c on c lud e d that the pla int if f of fi c e r “a c te d o ut o f s pit e and fr ustration . . . rathe r than for the purpose of

illumi nating matters of public conce rn” in that the plaintiff made thr eats, c alled the chief of police a “bac kstabbing son-of-a -bitch,” a nd posted vulg ar c art o o n s o n an i n t e r

n a l b u l l e t i n b o ar d

. 8 0 2 F

. 2 d a t 1 9 4

- 9 5

. H e r e , i t i s u n c o n t e s t e d tha t th e pr e ss rele ase involved matters of public c oncer n. Brown and McM

urphy are inapposite to a s ituation wh e re , a s h ere, th e of

fi c e r’ s sp e e c h invo lve d a matte r o f i nh e re nt p ub lic imp or tanc e . I t is a lso imp or tant to no te that the c ourt ’s thr e sh old fi nd ing that the sp e e c h d id n ot i nv olv e matte rs of pu bli c c on c e rn re nd e rs the su

bs e qu e nt Picke ring ba lanc ing in b oth c a se s dic ta . See M

iller , 448 F.3d at 895. 12 The Ci ty relies he avily

on Graham v. City of Me ntor , 118 F. App’x 27 (6th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that speec h “ca lculated to c reate division” may be unprote cted. To the extent that Graham is good authority , it is di stinguishable. I n Graham , the protec ted spee ch consisted of 3 of fi c e rs ’ a lle g ati on s th at the po lic e c hie f “ fi xed ” pa rk ingtic ke ts, se c ur e d lo we r f ine s f or fr ie nd s, improperly

took paid compensation tim e, and car ried a wea

pon though he was unqua lified to do so. Id. at 28-30. Thus the speech c oncer ned issues that, while important, we re le ss of a public c oncer n than thos e p re sented in this case . I n contra st, here the speec h at issue conc erne d matters of the h i g h e s tp u

b l i c c o n c e r

n

– a l l e g a t i o n s o f

r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o nb y a p u b l i c e mp l o ye r . C o n s e qu e n t l y, while the potential for disruption wa s found to be suff icient in Graham , a st rong er showing on the g overnme nt’s part is re quired he re. Weighingin Mill er’ s favor , the majority of the pre ss relea se wa s devoted to issues of pre ssing imp or tanc e –r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n in the po lic e de pa

rtme nt. Wei g hin g in t

he City ’s fa

vo r, the seMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

13 issues were prese nted i n a manner t hat per sonally attacke d McKimm. Although the persona l attacks

wer e unnec ess a

ry , they are simil ar to stateme nts that the police lieutena nt acted “ for his own pe rsonal g a in” and

that th e lie ute na

nt’ s a c tio ns we re “ an o bs tr uc tio n o f ju st ice ” an d “ tot a lly ridiculous”–st at em ents that we ha ve found to be protec ted. See Solomon , 842 F.2d at 864. An additional fac t give n g reat significa nce by the City is that the press re lea s e wa s t i med to coincide with the Pro Football Ha ll o f Fa m e Fe s t i val. The City contends that the timing reve als Miller’s mot ive to e mba

rr a ss t he City a t th e on e ti me of

y e ar i t e njo y e d to ur ist s. Dr awi ngthe re a so na ble infere nces in Miller’s f

avor, how ever , as we must, the tim ing c ould show Miller’s intent to attract

natio na l a tte nti on

to fo rc e the City to ad dr e ss the matte rs ra ise d by the pr e ss re le a se . Wei g hin g a ll t h e e v i d en ce , t h e C i t y ’s i n t er es ti nm ai n t ai n i n g l o y al t y wi t h i nt h e p o l i c e f

o r c e d i d n o to u t we i gh Miller’s intere st in ex posing r acia l discrimination by the City

. The City has cited no evidenc e that the p r e s s r e le a se ac tually

disrupted its effe ctiveness or otherwise impair ed wor

king r elationships, nor of any other int ere st that would justify restric ting Mil ler’s speech. Accor dingly , Miller’s spee ch wa s pr ote c te d b y

the F ir st A me ndme nt. B. Adverse Ac tion To proce ed to trial, Miller must also establish the adver se ac tion and causation elements of

a F i r s t A m e n dm e n t r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m . A dv e r s e a c t i o n m e an s “ an i n j u r y t h a t w o u l d l i k e l y

c hil l a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to e ng ag e in [the protec ted] a ctivity .” Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Mental H

ea l th Auth. , 4 43 F .3 d 4 69 , 4 78 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; see also Scarbrough , 470 F.3d at 255. Here , Miller was suspende d wi t h o u t p ay for sixt y day s from April to J une 2005. Although he was late r made whole in Dec ember 2005, a rea sonable jury could find that the loss ofMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

14 pay for sixt y day s would constitute a hardship to the averag e officer and would chill the exercise of First Amendme nt rig hts. C. Causation An adve rse a ction i s m o t i v at ed by protec ted spee ch if the spe ech w as “a substantial or motivating fa ctor” in the adver se ac tion. Hughes , 5 42 F .3 d at 18 1; Miller , 448 F.3d at 894. Put differ ently , a plaintiff satisfies the motivation element by showing that the adve rse a ction “was motivated at least in par

t” by the protec ted spee ch. Scarbrough , 4 70 F .3 d at 25 5; Nai r , 443 F.3d at 478. Her e, the City

does not contest that it took disciplinary action ag ainst Mill er b ec au s e o f the pr e ss r e le a se , a lth ou g h it

ma int a ins that th e c on te nts w ere no t pro te c te d. A r e a so na ble jur y c ou ld find that the C ity suspended Mil ler because of t he ex erc ise of hi s civil rig hts. There fore , Miller has made out a pr ima fac ie ca se of r etaliation under § 1983. I n sum, Mill er’ s speec h was prote cted unde r Picke ring , and a rea sonable jury could find that the City s u s p en d ed M i ller bec ause of the exercise of

his civil rights. Ther efor e, the City was not

e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt o n th is c la im. IV . R AC IA L D ISC RI M IN AT ION CL AI M Fowle r cla ims that the City discriminated ag ainst him in t hat the City trea ted him, as a blac k of fi c e r, mor e ha

rs hly tha n it tr e a te d w hit e of

fi c e rs a c c us e d o f s imi lar r ule vio latio ns . T his dis pa rate treatment is alleg ed to have violated Title VI I , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(a )(1) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), a nd Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). T his court applies the McD onnell Douglas/Burdine framework to discrimination claims arising under a ll three law s. Carter v. Univ. of Toledo , 34 9 F .3 d 2 69 , 2 73 (6 th Cir. 2003). Se e ge ne ra lly Texas De p’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 4 50 U. S. 248 (1 98 1) ; Mc Do nn e llMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

Fowl e r a ls o ar g u e d b e f

o r e th e tr ia l c o u rt th a t h e w a s r e p la c e d b y a w h it e o f f ic er. The 4 ma g istrate jud g e re

je c te d th is a

rg ume nt, and

F ow le r d id n ot p re se nt i t to thi s c ourt
. 15 Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McD onnell Douglas/Burdine , a plaintiff m akes out a pr im a fa c ie case of discrimination by

showing that: “1) he is a member of a protec ted class; 2) [he] was qualified for the job; 3) he suff

ere d an adve rse e mploy

ment decision; and 4) [he] was re place d by a per son outside the protec ted class or treated di ffe rently than similarly situated non-prote cted e mploy ees.” Newman v. Fed. Express Corp. , 26 6 F .3 d 40 1, 40 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 1) . A lth ou g h F ow le r c an ma ke ou t th e fi rs t three elements of a pr im a fa c ie c a se , he fa ile d to sh ow that he wa s tr e a te d dif fe re ntl y fr om s imi larl y situated white off

icer s. I n the district c ourt, Fowle r pointed to thr ee white office rs who he a lleg ed 4

wer e si milar ly

s it u a te d to h im

– Sam F r is o n e , G r e g G il mo r e , an d M ic h a e l L o mb ar d i. A t o r al argument befor e this court, howe ver, F owler c oncede d that these officer s wer e not similarly situated to him. I nstead, F owler pointed to Captain Veg a, Captain Ream, and Offic er My ers. Howeve r, as

c o u n s e l f o r F o w le r a c k

n o w le d g e d , th e r e is n o e v id e n c e in th e r e c o r d r e g ar d in g th e s e o f f ic e r s . We

are unable to find, ther efor e, that Ve g a, Ream, or My ers we re similarly situated to Fowle r and tre ated dif fe re ntl y fr om h im. B e c a

us e F ow le r f

a ile d to make ou t the fo ur

th e le me nt o f h is pr im a fa c ie case , his c la im f

or ra c ia l di sc ri min a tio n c ann ot s ur viv e the City ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. V. RETALIATION CLAIMS Mil le r a nd F ow le r e a c h c la im that the City re ta liate d a g a ins t th e m f

or sp e a kin g ou t a g a ins tMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

As indicated in note 2 s up ra , we a ffirm the dismissal of Miller’s Title VI Iclaim as time- 5 ba rr e d. We ana ly

ze his re ma ini ng c la ims br ou g ht un de r § 19 81 (a ) a nd § 4 11 2. 02 (I ) u sin g the same Title VI Iframework. 16 rac ial discrimination within the Depar tment, in violation of Title VI I , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a ); 42 5 U.S.C. § 1981(a); and O hio Rev. Code § 4112.02(I ). This court c onsiders re taliation claims broug ht p u r s u an tt o a l l t h r e e l aw s u n d e r t h e s a m e an a l y

t i c a l f r a m e w o r k a p p l i e d t o c l a i m s u n d e r

T i t l e V II. Noble v. Brinke r Int’l, Inc. , 3 91 F .3 d 7 15 , 7 20 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; Abbott v . Crown Motor Co. , 348 F.3d 53 7, 54 1 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 3) ; Dews v. A.B. D ick Co. , 23 1 F .3 d 10 16 , 10 21 n. 2 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 0) ; se e als o Litt le Forest Med. Ctr. of Akron v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n , 575 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ohio 1991)

. A pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation under Title VI I has four elements: (1) the pla intiff eng ag ed in activity

protec ted by

Title VI I ; (2) the de fend an t k n ew about this fact; (3) the def endant took adver se ac tion ag ainst the plaintiff; and (4) the protec ted ac t i v i t y an d the adve rse a ction wer e

causa lly connec ted. Ar e nd

alev . Ci ty

of M e mp his , 519 F.3d 587, 606 (6th Ci r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( quoting Nguyen v . City of Cl eve land , 2 29 F .3 d 5 59 , 5 63 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ); Russell v. Univ. of Toledo , 537 F.3d 596 , 6 0 9 (6 t h C ir. 2008). Protec ted ac tivity includes opposing any

employ ment prac tice that the employ ee r easona

bly believes to be discriminatory , “wh et h er o r not the cha lleng ed pra ctice ultimately

is found to be unlawf

ul.” J oh ns on v . U

niv . o f Cin c inn ati , 215 F.3d 561, 579- 80 (6th Cir. 2000) (c itation omit ted). For reta l i at i o n purposes, a

n adver se ac tion is any

action by an employ er “ that would have been materiall y ad v er se to a re asonable employ ee or job applicant,” me aning that the employ er action “c ould well dissuade a r easona ble worke r fr om making or supporting a

char g e ofMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

17 d is c r im in a ti o n . ” Bu rl in gt on N. & Sa nta FeRy . Co . v . W hite , 5 48 U. S. 5 3, 57 (2 00 6) ; Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc

. , 5 17 F .3 d 3 21 , 3 45 (6 th Ci r. 20 08 ). Ad ve rs e a c tio n is no t li mit e d to ha rm s “that ar e re lated to employ ment or occ ur at the w orkplac e.” Bu rli ng ton N. , 54 8 U .S. a t 57 . In th is respe ct, Title VII ’s anti-re taliation provision is broader tha n Title VI I ’s discrimination provision. Nisw ander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 529 F.3d 714, 720 ( 6th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff “e asily ” make s out a pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation. McClain v. NorthW est Cmty. Corr. Ct r. Judicial Corr. Bd. , 440 F.3d 3 2 0 , 3 3 5 (6th Cir. 2006) (c itation omit ted). Onc e the plaintiff has made out a pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation, the burden of production shifts to the employ er “ to articulate some leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son” for the adver se action. Dixon v. Gonzales , 481 F.3d 324, 333 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I f t he employ er satisfies this burden of produc tion, then the burden of production shifts back to the pl aintiff to show “that the pr offe red r eason w as not the true r eason f

or the e mploy

ment decision.” Id. (q u o t i n g Burdine , 450 U.S. at 256). The bur den of per suasion, howeve r, alway s rema ins on the pl aintiff. Mo rri s v . O ldh am Cou nty

Fi sc al C t. , 201 F.3d 784, 793 ( 6th Cir. 2000). A. Miller Her e, Miller has ma de out a pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation. First, the pre ss relea se wa s protec ted ac t i v i ty

in that Mill er r easona bly believed that McKimm was eng ag ed in ra cial discrimination. Second, the City knew about the press rele ase. Third, as has a lrea dy been show n, a six ty -day

suspensi o n wi t h o ut pay

could dissuade a

rea sonable wor

ker f rom making a cha

rg e of discrimination. Se e Bu rli ng ton N. , 548 U.S. at 70; Ra nd olp h v . O hio De

p’ t of Y ou th S e rv s. , 453 F.3d 724, 736-37 (6th Cir. 2006). F inally , the City admits that the re is a ca

usal conne ction betwee n theMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

18 pr e ss re le a se and the su sp e ns ion , altho ug h it ma int a ins that the re a so n it su sp e nd e d Mille r due to h is rule violations rathe r than the pr otected c ontent of the pre ss relea se. Be cause Miller has made out a pr im a fa c ie c a se of re ta liatio n, the burd e n o f p ro du c tio n s hif ts to the City

to c ome fo rw ard

wi th a le g iti mate , n on dis c ri min a tor y re a so n f or the su sp e ns ion . T he City does not dispute that it suspended Miller bec ause of his spe ech. The City argues, howe ver, that the

rea son for the suspe nsion w as Miller’s fa ilure to follow protocol rather than the content of the speec h. Miller has shown enoug h fac ts such that a re asonable jury could re jec t t h e City ’s explana t i o n as prete x tual and find that the c ontents of his speec h–his complaints of rac ial dis cr i m i n at i o n

–m o t i v at edt h e s u s p en s i o n . T h er ef o re , t h e C i t y

wa s n o ten t i t l edt o s u m m ary judgme nt

on Mil le r’ s r e ta liatio n c la ims

. B. Fowler As to F ow le r, his p r i m a f a c ie ca s e fails because he ca nnot show the requisite c ausal

connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity and th e i n d i ct m ent. A reasonable jury could find that F ow le r e ng a g e d in pr ote c te d ac tiv ity in that the Au g us t 4, 2004 pr e ss r e le a se ide nti fi e d h im b y name

a s a bl ack of fi c e r w ho re c e ive d unf

a ir tr e a tme nt b y

Mc Ki mm. F ur

the r, F ow le r t e sti fi e d at hi s de po sit ion

that he sp ok e ou t a t a May 5, 20 05 sp e c ia l me e tin g fo r b la c k o ff ic e rs to d isc us s p ro ble ms within the Depar

tment. As noted, t he City knew a bout the press re lease , though it is unclea r if the City was a war e of the May

5, 2005 meeting . We assume without d ec i d i n g t h at a re asonable jury

c ou ld f ind that th e City ’s tur

nin g ov e r e vid e nc e to t

he Canto n L aw D e pa

rtme nt w a s an a dv e rs e action, eve n though t h e ultimate decision to seek a n indictment belong ed to the indepe ndent prosec utor. Se e Do k

es v . J e ffe rso n Co un ty

, O hio , 61 F. App’ x 174, 178-79 (6th C ir. 2003). But seeMiller v. City of Canton

No. 08-3163

19 id. a t 181- 82 (G wi n, J., c on c ur ri ngin t he re su lt) ; Lentz v . City of Cl eve land , 410 F. Supp. 2d 673, 692-93 (N.D

. Ohio 2006). However, F owler c annot show a c ausal c onnection betwe en the pr otected activity and the indictment. Eve n if the City wer e awa

re of the May 5, 2005 specia l meeting , that meeting occur

red thre e months after

the City ref err ed the Unizan B ank matter to the L aw De partment in Febr uary 2005. There fore , Fowle r cannot show a causal conne ction betwee n the meetingand the indictment. See D okes , 61 F. App’ x at 179. As to the pre ss relea se, appr ox imately s i x months elapse d betwee n the pre ss relea se and the turning over of evidenc e to the L aw De partment. Where the protec ted ac tivity

and alleg edly

reta liatory ac t i o n ar e sepa rate d by six months, however, mor e than tempora l prox imity

must be shown to establish a ca usal conne ction. Clay v. United Parc el Serv., I nc. , 5 01 F .3 d 6 95 , 7 18 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; Hafford v. Seidne r , 183 F.3d 506, 515 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Fowle r, howe ver, ha s offe red no o t h er evidence of c ausation. B eca use F owler c annot show a

c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e pr ote c te d a c tiv ity and the a dv e rs e a c tio n, his pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation fa ils

. VI . C ON CL USI ON For the fo re going r easons, we aff irm the g rant of summar

y judgme nt as to all of Fow ler’s claims and a s to Mill er’ s Title VI Iclaim, re verse as to Miller’s cla ims br o u gh t u n d er 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 and O hio Rev. Code § 4112.02(I ), and r emand f or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.