I n s i d e t h i s 

i s s u e :

International 

Dialogue at 

APCSS

2

Japan-U.S. 

Legal Memos 

2

Trilateral 

Legal Talks

3

Freezing 

Maritime 

Zones 

3

Belt and Road 

Contracts 

4

U.S. Rescue at 

Sea

5

Distortion of 

UN Resolution 

5

DPRK 

Launches 

6

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Legal Vigilance Dispatch

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

I s s u e 6 , W i n t e r J A N U A R Y 2 0 2 4

S p e c i a l 

p o i n t s o f 

i n t e r e s t :

 Robust legal 

engagement 

continues 

 U.S. supports freezing 

maritime zones

 PRC survey ops and 

BRI contracts raise 

legal concerns

 DPRK defies 

UNSCRs

C

hinese flagged survey 

vessels are reportedly 

conducting marine data 

collection on an unprecedented 

scale. Marine data collection is 

an umbrella term for various 

types of collection activities in 

the maritime domain. According 

to a new study released by the 

Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS), a 

fleet of 64 Chinese survey 

vessels conducted hundreds of 

thousands of hours of 

operations globally over the last 

four years. Over 80 percent of 

those vessels demonstrated 

suspect “dual-use” behavior or 

linkages to the People’s 

Republic of China’s (PRC’s) 

geopolitical agenda. 

Reporting shows that the 

PRC uses its survey vessel fleet 

and marine data collection for 

military purposes; to advance 

excessive claims; to obstruct 

coastal states from exploring 

and exploiting natural 

resources; and to uncover 

ancient shipwrecks as supposed 

evidence of the Chinese 

Communist Party’s preferred 

historical narratives and its 

debunked assertions of 

“historic rights” within the 

dashed-line claim. 

To be clear, the United 

States and other countries 

conduct marine data collection 

for a broad range of peaceful 

purposes, such as studying 

climate change and marine life. 

For military requirements, the 

United States employs naval 

auxiliary vessels to conduct 

marine data collection 

consistent with high-seas 

freedoms guaranteed to all 

nations by international law. 

In some cases, the PRC may 

be pursuing similarly peaceful 

purposes, but the immense scale 

of the PRC’s marine data 

collection, its “dual-use” 

objectives, and a pervasive lack 

of transparency make it difficult 

to discern the true nature of the 

activities in question. This 

uncertainty is particularly 

apparent when the PRC’s 

survey vessels operate in 

foreign exclusive economic 

zones (EEZs). 

The PRC’s activities in 

foreign EEZs blur distinctions 

between the different types of 

marine data collection, 

obfuscating the ability of coastal 

states to identify legal 

transgressions and take 

meaningful action. This 

approach also reflects a doublestandard—i.e., the PRC 

purports to restrict foreign 

activities in its EEZ, yet 

seemingly operates with 

disregard for the sovereign EEZ 

rights of other nations. 

Addressing questions 

surrounding the PRC’s marine 

data collection requires 

applying the appropriate legal 

framework. Not all marine data 

collection is treated the same 

under international law. Article 

56 of the U.N. Convention on 

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 

grants coastal states the 

exclusive right to explore, 

exploit, conserve, and manage 

living and non-living resources 

in their respective EEZs. 

Moreover, marine scientific 

research, which are those 

activities undertaken to expand 

scientific knowledge of the 

marine environment, is subject 

to coastal state consent in the 

EEZ under Article 246 of 

UNCLOS. 

There is considerably less 

regulation of other types of 

marine data collection 

conducted beyond the territorial 

sea. UNCLOS does not define or 

prohibit hydrographic surveys 

(activities to obtain information 

for the making of navigational 

charts and for safety of 

navigation), military surveys 

(non-commercial marine data 

collection for military purposes), 

and operational oceanography 

(the routine collection of ocean 

observations), provided such 

activities are carried out 

lawfully and with due regard for 

the rights of the coastal state. 

The PRC’s extensive and 

dubious marine data collection 

activities merit further scrutiny. 

The USINDOPACOM legal 

office is keen to work with allies 

and partners to uphold the rule 

of law and oppose unlawful 

marine data collection. 

China’s Marine Data Collection Under Scrutiny 

In 2023, the Chinese survey vessel, Xiang 

Yang Hong 10, operated extensively inside 

Vietnam’s EEZ near Vanguard Bank and oil 

drilling initiatives. Photo by globalsecurity.org. 
P a g e 2

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Asia-Pacific Center 

Hosts Dialogue on 

Rules-Based 

International Order

More than 150 fellows from 11 

countries participated in the IndoPacific Orientation Course (IPOC) 23-

3. IPOC 23-3 was hosted by the 

Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) in 

Honolulu, Hawaii from 14-17 

November 2023. 

DKI APCSS is a U.S. Department 

of Defense institution that addresses 

regional and global security issues 

through multinational executive 

education programs and workshops. 

Its mission is to build resilience, 

shared understanding, and networked 

relationships and institutions in 

support of a free and open IndoPacific. 

IPOC 23-3 was a milestone event 

for DKI APCSS as its largest ever inperson course. International 

participation ensured a diversity of 

perspectives and contributed to rich 

discussion. Of note, CDR Liam 

Connel, a U.S. Navy judge advocate 

assigned to DKI APCSS as a military 

professor, led dialogue on the rulesbased international order (RBIO). 

The United States has defined RBIO 

as “the system of laws, agreements, 

principles, and institutions that the 

world came together to build after two 

world wars to manage relations 

between states, to prevent conflict, and 

to uphold the rights of all people.”

CDR Patrick Jackson, an IPOC 23-

3 attendee, remarked that “it was 

refreshing to engage with allies and 

partners regarding the meaning and 

significance of the rules-based 

international order, its basis in the 

United Nations Charter and the 

Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights, and indicators showing the 

positive impact that it has had on the 

world post-World War II.” 

The next IPOC is scheduled as a 

mobile course and will take place in 

Japan from April 15-19, 2024. 

Senior legal advisors from Japan Joint Staff and USINDOPACOM finalize a 

bilateral legal memo in December 2023. 

Series of Bilateral Legal Memos Reflects 

Ironclad Japan-U.S. Alliance

Legal advisors from the Japan Joint Staff (JJS) and United States 

Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) routinely collaborate on 

bilateral memos crafted to support interoperability and promote legal transparency. Bilateral memos on Air Intercepts, North Korea’s 

Ballistic Missile Program, the PRC’s Maritime Militia, and Maritime 

and Air Warning and Exclusion Zones are accessible on the USINDOPACOM legal office’s webpage. 

As the series of bilateral memos produced by JJS and USINDOPACOM continues to grow, the two legal staffs are becoming increasingly integrated and adept at collectively navigating complex legal 

terrain. JJS-USINDOPACOM combined legal analyses embody a 

shared commitment to preemptive planning, risk mitigation, and 

unified action to uphold the rule of law and preserve peace and stability. 

“Our bilateral memos stand as a testament to the strength of the 

Japan-U.S. alliance while epitomizing the depth of collaboration, 

trust, and commitment between two stalwart allies,” said Commander Sara Neugroschel from the USINDOPACOM joint operational law 

team. 

RADM (Ret) 

Peter 

Gumataotao, the 

Director of DKI 

APCSS, speaks to 

IPOC 23-3 

participants. Photo 

provided by DKI 

APCSS. 

Additional 

information 

about DKI 

APCSS and IPOC 

is available here.
Annual Trilateral 

Legal Talks held 

at Camp Smith, 

Hawaii

From 4-5 December 2023, the Office 

of the Staff Judge Advocate, 

USINDOPACOM, hosted senior legal 

staff from Japan and Australia for the 

second annual Trilateral Legal Talks. 

Senior representatives at the talks 

included Colonel Junji Shinagawa, 

Legal Affairs General, Japan Joint 

Staff; Group Captain Chris Taylor, 

Director Legal, Joint Operations 

Command (Australia); and Captain 

Dom Flatt, Staff Judge Advocate, 

USINDOPACOM. 

The talks focused on emerging legal 

challenges, solidified shared 

understandings, and bolstered legal 

interoperability. Significantly, this 

round of Trilateral Legal Talks 

preceded Exercise Keen Edge 2024. 

Keen Edge has historically been a 

bilateral, command post exercise 

between the Japan Joint Staff and 

USINDOPACOM. This year, the 

Australian Defence Force will 

participate in Keen Edge for the first 

time. Trilateral participation in Keen 

Edge 2024 will provide important 

opportunities for the three legal staffs 

to apply and rehearse the lessons 

learned during the Trilateral Legal 

Talks. 

The talks culminated in a trilateral 

statement. The statement noted the 

shared commitment of the senior legal 

advisors to building legal consensus 

and increased interoperability through 

continued legal collaboration. Such 

efforts are consistent with the core 

pillars of USINDOPACOM’s counterlawfare program, which focuses on the 

promotion of adherence to 

international law and the rules-based 

international order alongside likeminded countries. 

U.S. Supports 

Freezing Maritime 

Zones as Seas Rise

Sea-level rise due to climate change 

threatens coastal communities 

worldwide and poses an existential 

threat to low-lying Pacific Island 

States. The U.N. Convention on the 

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) did not 

address the effect of diminishing land 

territory caused by sea-level rise on 

long-established baselines and 

corresponding maritime zones. 

Rising seas mean that islands that 

could once sustain human habitation 

may become uninhabitable, rocks may 

become low-tide elevations that are 

underwater at high tide, and low tide 

elevations may disappear entirely. The 

resulting landward contraction of 

coastal baselines, and by extension to 

coastal state territorial seas (TTS) and 

exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 

derived from those baselines, would be 

catastrophic to low-lying island 

nations. As international law in this 

area continues to develop, many 

countries recognize a need for “legal 

stability.” 

For its part, the United States is 

leading from the front, having 

announced a new policy in 2023, which 

supports “maintaining [lawfully 

established] baselines and maritime 

zone limits” and not challenging “such 

baselines and maritime zone limits 

that are not subsequently updated 

despite sea-level rise caused by climate 

change.” 

In addition, at the U.S.-Pacific 

Islands Forum Summit in September 

2023, President Biden announced that 

sea-level rise driven by climate change 

should not cause any country to lose its 

statehood or its membership in the 

United Nations, and that sea-level rise 

should not diminish the maritime 

zones on which island nations and 

other coastal states rely for food and 

security. 

Consequently, the United States is 

working with Pacific Island States 

toward the goal of lawfully 

establishing and maintaining baselines 

and maritime zone limits. For more 

information and analysis, please see 

the corresponding USINDOPACOM 

TACAID. 

P a g e 3

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Front Row: Group Captain Chris Taylor, Captain Dom Flatt, and Colonel Junji Shinagawa

Back Row: Commander Marc Lawrence, Commander Sara Neugroschel, Captain Koichi

Ishii (Left to Right).

Admiral Aquilino, Commander of 

USINDOPACOM, poses with Pacific Island 

leaders from Fiji, Nauru, and Tuvalu at 

USINDOPACOM’s International Military Law 

and Operations Conference (MILOPS), 

August 2023. Photo by MCC Shannon Smith. 
P a g e 4

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

U

nder the guise of “win-win” 

cooperation, the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) 

uses exploitative infrastructure 

contracts for its Belt and Road 

Initiative (BRI) projects. BRI 

contracts often include overly 

broad default clauses for reasons 

as vague as “actions adverse to the 

PRC.” Violating such clauses may 

allow the PRC to seize the 

borrower nation’s public 

infrastructure, national resources, 

territory, and Gross Domestic 

Product (GDP) revenue unrelated 

to the loan project. Such terms are 

contrary to global norms and 

potentially unlawful. 

BRI contracts often infringe on 

the rights of developing nations 

because they do not respect 

developing nations’ special status, 

as defined by the World Trade 

Organization (WTO). The WTO’s 

General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade (GATT) states that 

members should seek 

transparency. It also requires 

members to engage in open and 

predictable policies. The WTO 

further requires members to grant 

“special and differential 

treatment” to developing nations. 

These requirements amounts to 

favorable treatment on a variety of 

terms, including safeguarding 

trade interests, 

longer term 

periods, and 

dispute resolution 

support. 

The PRC flouts 

these obligations 

in many ways, 

including four 

specific tactics 

described in this 

piece. First, BRI contracts 

typically prohibit borrowing 

nations from disclosing debt 

details to its citizens, public 

interest groups, and international 

organizations. This practice is 

neither transparent nor open and 

predictable. 

Second, BRI contracts often 

prohibit borrowing nations from 

seeking debt-relief or advisory 

guidance from relief agencies, 

international organizations, or 

other governments, which is 

unfavorable to 

borrowing nations. 

Third, BRI 

contracts usually 

require that any 

disputes be 

resolved by 

Chinese courts, 

without the 

involvement of non

-Chinese 

mediators, lawyers, or arbiters. 

Fourth, BRI contracts generally 

require that high percentages of 

the borrowing nation’s GDP be 

deposited as collateral in Chinesecontrolled bank accounts rather 

than neutral third-party accounts. 

Under customary international 

law, these exploitative contract 

provisions may in some cases be 

deemed “unconscionable.” An 

unconscionable contract is 

unenforceable if its terms are so 

extremely imbalanced that they 

remove any meaningful bargaining 

power from one of the parties. 

Accordingly, the PRC’s 

enforcement of BRI contracts to 

seize borrower infrastructure, 

national resources, or territory 

could be tantamount to infringing 

on the internal affairs of sovereign 

states, in prohibition of Article 2(7) 

of the United Nations Charter. 

International scrutiny of BRI 

contracts mitigates risk of 

manipulation and influence over 

sovereign decisions and 

infrastructure. See 

USINDOPACOM’s TACAID for 

more information. 

BRI borrowing nations are depicted above by year of joining. Many are developing nations in Africa. Graphic by Council on Foreign Relations. 

Under customary 

international law, 

these exploitative 

contract provisions 

may in some cases 

be deemed 

unconscionable. 

China’s Exploitative Belt and Road Contracts
P a g e 5

U.S. Rescues 

Chinese Nationals 

at Sea 30 Miles off 

Guam 

The U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, 

and Guam first responders rescued six 

Chinese nationals from a 23-foot 

recreational vessel on 6 January 2024. 

The vessel was located 30 miles offshore 

of Guam and issued a distress call when 

it began taking on water. 

The rescue effort reflects the United 

States’ unwavering adherence to a duty 

under international law to render 

assistance to persons in distress at sea. 

The duty to render assistance comes 

from international treaty obligations, 

customary international law, U.S. 

government policy, and longstanding 

U.S. military ethos and maritime 

tradition. This duty also exists 

independent of geopolitical tensions and 

extends to any person encountered at 

sea, regardless of nationality.

The rescue effort occurred amid a 

growing trend of Chines nationals 

attempting suspected illegal entry into 

Guam via maritime means. In August 

2022, Guam established a multiagency 

task force to address this issue. The task 

force’s efforts have led to criminal 

charges for two Chinese boat captains in 

the Superior Court of Guam. 

In addition, U.S. Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI) arrested 14 Chinese 

nationals in September 2023 following 

an attempt to pay an undercover agent 

in the Commonwealth of the Northern 

Mariana Islands to illegally transport 

the 14 individuals to Guam. The U.S. 

District Court for the Northern Mariana 

Islands is handling the case; two of the 

Chinese nationals have already pled 

guilty to a conspiracy to transport illegal 

aliens. 

PRC’s Distortion 

of UN Resolution 

Cited in Nauru 

Decision to Drop 

Taiwan 

Recognition 

On 15 January 2024, two days after 

Taiwan’s free and fair presidential 

election, the Republic of Nauru severed 

diplomatic ties with Taiwan and 

officially recognized the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC). This marked 

the second time that Nauru has cut ties 

with Taiwan, having done so previously 

in July 2002 before reestablishing 

relations in May 2005. The U.S. State 

Department described Nauru’s action as 

a “sovereign decision,” but “nonetheless 

a disappointing one.” 

A media release by the Nauru 

government cited UN General Assembly 

Resolution (UNGAR) 2758 as the basis 

for switching recognition. Nauru’s 

reference to UNGAR 2758 is troubling 

because it reflects the PRC’s frequent 

distortion of the 1971 resolution as 

illustrative of “universal” consensus on 

its “one China principle” – i.e., the PRC’s 

view that Taiwan is “indisputably” part 

of the PRC. 

In fact, UNGAR 2758 only addressed 

the question of China’s representation at 

the United Nations. As noted by Laura 

Rosenberger, Chair of the American 

Institute in Taiwan, at a press 

conference following Nauru’s decision, 

UNGAR 2758 “did not make a 

determination on the status of Taiwan; 

does not preclude countries from having 

diplomatic relationships with Taiwan; 

and does not preclude Taiwan’s 

meaningful participation in the UN 

system.” Ms. Rosenberger added, “It is 

disappointing to see distorted narratives 

about UN [General Assembly] 

Resolution 2758 being used as a tool to 

pressure Taiwan, limit its voice on the 

international stage, and influence its 

diplomatic relationships.”

Much like the United Nations 

General Assembly, the majority of the 

international community maintains “one 

China” policies that do not take an 

affirmative stance on Taiwan’s status, 

notwithstanding the PRC’s contrary 

claim that its “one China principle” is an 

“international norm” supported by 

history and law. As an example, the 

United States regards the PRC as the 

sole legal government of “China” (which 

is not defined) and “acknowledges,” but 

does not endorse the PRC’s position that 

Taiwan is part of China. In addition, the 

United States does not recognize Taiwan 

as a state or its authorities as a national 

government, but also does not take a 

position on Taiwan’s ultimate status.

The PRC’s distortion of UNGAR 2758 

is characteristic of its legal warfare 

efforts to isolate Taiwan on the 

international stage and influence 

sovereign decisions concerning relations 

with Taiwan. “The PRC often makes 

promises in exchange for diplomatic 

relations that ultimately remain 

unfulfilled,” said Matthew Miller, a U.S. 

State Department spokesperson. “We 

encourage all countries to expand 

engagement with Taiwan and to continue 

to support democracy, good governance, 

transparency, and adherence to the rule of 

law.” 

The U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and Guam 

first responders rescued six distressed 

PRC nationals from this vessel on 6 Jan 

2024, 30 miles offshore of Guam. Photo 

by The Guam Daily Post.

Graphic by USINDOPACOM J06. 

Analysis on UNGAR 2758 by the 

German Marshall Fund is here.

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

What is Legal Vigilance?

Legal vigilance refers to the monitoring and assessment of the 

legal environment. Maintaining legal vigilance ensures the United 

States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and its allies and 

partners are able to identify threats (including “legal warfare” by 

the People’s Republic of China), integrate across the combined 

joint force, and implement action to uphold the rule of law. 

The Legal Vigilance Dispatch is an informal, non-comprehensive 

survey of open-source information on the legal environment. Unless otherwise noted, content is produced by the USINDOPACOM 

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) and does not necessarily 

reflect official positions of the U.S. government.

In addition to identifying threats in the legal environment, the 

Legal Vigilance Dispatch highlights cooperative efforts by the 

United States and its allies and partners to uphold the rule of law. 

USINDOPACOM OSJA is committed to building legal partnerships and working with allies and partners to preserve peace and 

stability in the Indo-Pacific. If you have comments, feedback, or 

vignettes to share, please contact us.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Joint Operational Law Team

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Camp H.M. Smith

Hawaii, United States

Phone: (808) 477-6378

Email: indopacom.j06.oplaw@pacom.mil

Web: www.pacom.mil

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific

P a g e 6

The Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea’s (DPRK) purported satellite 

launches use ballistic missile technology

in violation of international law, as 

transmitted in multiple unanimously 

approved United Nations Security 

Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). 

From 2006-2018, the UN Security 

Council (UNSC) adopted 20 resolutions 

on the DPRKs ballistic missile and 

nuclear programs. Collectively, these 

UNSCRs prohibit the DPRK from 

conducting ballistic missile and nuclear 

tests; require the DPRK to suspend and 

abandon all activities related to its 

ballistic missile and nuclear programs; 

and ban the DPRK from any type of 

launch that uses ballistic missile 

technology. UNSCRs are binding 

international law pursuant to the 

United Nations Charter. 

Since 1998, the DPRK has conducted 

eight attempts to launch a satellite into 

orbit, including its most recent attempt

on 21 November 2023. Attaching a 

satellite to a rocket that uses ballistic 

missile technology does not excuse the 

DPRK from its obligations under 

international law. The UNSCRs ban the 

use of ballistic missile technology, 

regardless of the payload. The 

technology behind the DPRK’s recent 

satellite launch attempts was reportedly 

developed for an intercontinental 

ballistic missile. 

Although the UNSC has convened to 

address recent launches, oppositional 

stances by Russia and the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC), both UNSC 

permanent members, preclude 

consensus or issuance of new UNSCRs. 

Moreover, the transfer of ballistic missiles

from the DPRK to Russia and subsequent 

use by Russia against Ukraine embodies a 

continued and flagrant disregard for 

UNSCRs that were unanimously 

supported by Russia and the PRC.

As noted by a U.S. State Department 

official following a DPRK ballistic 

missile launch over the territory of 

Japan in October 2022, “The failure of 

the PRC and Russia to fully and 

completely fulfill their obligations ... has 

only, we fear, emboldened the DPRK in 

undermining the UN Security Council, 

the international rules-based order and 

global non-proliferation regime.”

The DPRK’s violation of multiple 

UNSCRs undermines international 

safety norms, compromises the global 

non-proliferation regime, destabilizes 

the security environment, and ferments 

risk of miscalculation and escalation 

between nations. The USINDOPACOM 

legal office is committed to working with 

allies and partners to uphold 

international law and the UNSCRs at 

issue. For more information, see 

USINDOPACOM’s TACAID and the 

USINDOPACOM-Japan Joint Staff 

bilateral memo. 

DPRK “Satellite” Launches Violate Multiple UNSCRs 

May 2023 shows what the DPRK says is a 

launch of a Chollima-1 rocket carrying the 

Malligyong-1 satellite. The Chollima-1 

rocket has been linked to banned ballistic 

missile technology. Photo released by DPRK.