Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joshua D. Hershberger

Crain Schuette Attorneys

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of L.D.C. & J.C. (Children) and 

M.C. (Mother);

M.C. (Mother),

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

72A01-1709-JT-2204

Appeal from the Scott Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Jason Mount, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

72C01-1612-JT-15

72C01-1612-JT-16

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 72A01-1709-JT-2204 | March 21, 2018 Page 2 of 19

[1] M.C. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to L.D.C. and 

J.C. (collectively, “Children”). She challenges a number of the trial court’s 

findings and argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusions there 

was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal 

would not be remedied and termination was in Children’s best interests. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and L.C. (“Father”)1 are the birth parents of L.D.C. and J.C., born 

March 2, 2008, and February 2, 2009, respectively. In September 2013, 

Mother, Father, Children, and two older siblings, K.K.2 and Ja.C.,3 were 

traveling in a camper when the camper broke down in Scott County and was 

towed to a campground. On September 14, 2013, police were dispatched to the 

campground to address domestic violence between Mother and Father. Police 

arrested Mother on outstanding warrants in Benton and Jasper counties. Police 

arrested Father on the allegation the camper the family was using was stolen. 

The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Children and their older 

 

1 Father’s parental rights to Children were terminated in December 2016, and he does not participate in this 

appeal.

2 K.K.’s father received custody of K.K. after her removal from Mother’s care, and she lived with him in 

California at the time the termination hearing.

3 Ja.C. had been placed in a facility at the time of the termination hearing.
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siblings from Mother and Father’s care because the family was homeless and 

both parents had been arrested.

[3] On September 16, 2013, DCS filed petitions as to L.D.C. and J.C., alleging 

each was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). On October 25, 2013, 

Mother admitted Children were CHINS based on the family’s homelessness 

and her incarceration. On November 25, 2013, the trial court entered a 

dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in services, complete a 

substance abuse assessment and any recommendations therefrom; submit to 

random drug screening; complete a parental assessment and any 

recommendations therefrom; complete domestic violence services; maintain 

stable housing and income; visit with Children; and refrain from engaging in 

criminal activity.

[4] Mother was released from incarceration on May 18, 2014. During the Summer 

of 2014, Children were placed with paternal grandmother, where they remained 

for the rest of the proceedings. From May 2014 to July 2015, Mother and 

Children participated in therapy and visitation. In July 2015, Mother selfmedicated with synthetic marijuana because she could not afford medication to 

treat an ulcer. Despite this admission, services and visitation continued with a 

goal of reunification.

[5] From November 2015 to May 2016, Mother continued to comply with services 

and visit regularly with Children. During that time, Mother tested positive for 

synthetic marijuana three times and failed to report for fourteen drug screens. 
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At a May 2016 periodic case review hearing, the trial court ordered Mother to 

undergo a hair follicle drug test. Mother did not submit to that test, nor did she

submit to any drug screens between May 2016 and October 2016.

[6] In September 2016, Mother accepted a ride from two strangers who threatened 

to beat and rape her. Mother was using heroin during this time, and during an 

October 2016 visit with Children, Mother fell asleep while carving a pumpkin 

with Children. On October 13, 2016, police arrested Mother for possession of a 

syringe. On December 9, 2016, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Children.

[7] Mother was temporarily released from incarceration on December 20, 2016, 

and entered an inpatient rehabilitation program in Chicago. After Mother’s 

successful completion of the program, she returned to the Newton County Jail 

until her release in February 2017. Between February 2017 and July 2017, 

Mother was incarcerated two more times in two other counties. In the same 

time period, Mother completed two drug screens, which were negative, but 

missed twenty-seven drug screens.

[8] On February 16, 2017, and July 27, 2017, the trial court held hearings on the 

termination petitions. Mother presented evidence she started working three

days prior to the July hearing and lived with a friend who had room for the 

Children, though a portion of the house was uninhabitable due to a leak in the 

roof. The DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) and the Court Appointed 

Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified to Mother’s drug use, Mother’s lack of 
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stable housing and employment, and Children’s stability in placement with 

paternal grandmother. On August 29, 2017, the trial court issued an order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children.

Discussion and Decision

[9] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S., 

& B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh 

evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the 

juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a 

judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 

717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied

534 U.S. 1161 (2002).

[10] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In 

re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children, however, when 

evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 

at 837. The right to raise one’s own children should not be terminated solely 

because there is a better home available for the children, id., but parental rights 

may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 836.
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Finding Regarding Dismissal of the Petition

[11] As part of the findings in the order for termination4 of Mother’s parental rights, 

the trial court stated, “There exist no factors in I.C. 31-24-2-4.5(d)5 that would 

require or be the basis for a dismissal of the petition.” (App. Vol. II at 15) 

(footnote added). Mother argues this finding is clearly erroneous because it 

“omits the fact that [Children] have, since the summer of 2014, been in the care 

of their paternal grandmother, a ‘relative’ under IC. 31-9-2-107(c). Therefore, 

this factor could be the basis for the dismissal of this petition.” (Br. of 

Appellant at 23.) We disagree.

[12] Regarding DCS’s requirements when filing a petition to terminate parental 

rights, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(3) dictates:

If the department intends to file a motion to dismiss under 

section 4.5 of this chapter, the petition must indicate whether at 

least one (1) of the factors listed in section 4.5(d)(1) through 4.5 

(d)(3) of this chapter applies and specify each factor that would 

apply as the basis for filing a motion to dismiss the petition.

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d) states, relevant to this case: 

 

4 The trial court entered one order for both Children.

5 This citation is a scrivener’s error, as it should read, I.C. 31-35-2-4.5(d), which is the correct citation for the 

statute regarding dismissal of a termination petition.
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A person described in section 4(a) of this chapter6 may file a 

motion to dismiss the petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship if any of the following circumstances apply:

(1) That the current case plan prepared by or under the 

supervision of the department or the probation department 

under IC 31-34-15, IC 31-37-19-1.5, or IC 31-37-22-4.5 has 

documented a compelling reason, based on facts and 

circumstances stated in the petition or motion, for 

concluding that filing, or proceeding to a final 

determination of, a petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship is not in the best interests of the child. A 

compelling reason may include the fact that the child is 

being cared for by a custodian who is a relative (as defined 

in IC 31-9-2-107(c)).

(footnote added).

[13] “DCS is not required as a matter of law to dismiss a petition to terminate 

where the child is placed with a relative.” In re G.H., 906 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009). Additionally, we have held it harmless error when DCS does 

not file a motion to dismiss based on the fact the child is in relative placement 

when other factors support termination of the parent’s rights to the child. In re 

Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 

241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). As we will discuss infra, DCS presented sufficient 

evidence to support the findings and the findings supported the conclusions 

 

6 A person described in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(a) is one or more of the following: “(1) The attorney 

for the department. (2) The child’s court appointed special advocate. (3) The child’s guardian ad litem.”
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used by the trial court to terminate Mother’s rights to Children. Thus, any error 

in declaring there existed no factors that could justify dismissal of the petition 

under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d) was, at most, harmless. See Matter of 

A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 573-4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (Trial court’s erroneous 

finding including language regarding father’s sale of illegal drugs was “harmless 

when considered in conjunction with the other evidence presented.”). DCS 

was not required to dismiss the petition. See G.H., 906 N.E.2d at 252. 

Evidence, Findings, and Conclusions Regarding Termination

[14] To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof 

of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g 

denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must 

terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. 

[15] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s 

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. 

Reasonable Probability Conditions Would Not Be Remedied

[16] The trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for the child at the time of 

the termination hearing. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

Evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment to 

address parenting issues and to cooperate with services “demonstrates the 

requisite reasonable probability” that the conditions will not change. Lang v. 

Starke Cnty. OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. 

[17] When assessing a parent’s fitness to care for a child, the trial court should view 

the parents as of the time of the termination hearing and take into account the 

changes that have occurred during the proceedings. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 
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854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also 

“evaluat[e] the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the 

probability of future neglect or deprivation of [a] child.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 

509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. 

[18] Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that “she failed to appear or was 

unavailable for 27 tests for controlled substances.” (App. Vol. II at 18.) She 

argues the trial court did not acknowledge that she missed those drug screens 

because she was “hospitalized and incarcerated during part of this time, . . . 

[and there was a] difficulty of communication with DCS and the complication 

of geographical distance.” (Br. of Appellant at 24.) Mother’s argument is an 

invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, 

which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court does not 

reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[19] Mother also challenged the trial court’s Finding 30, which states:

30. The following day, October 13, 2016, Mother was arrested 

for possession of a syringe in Benton County, Indiana. 

Following that arrest, Mother was incarcerated until December 

20, 2016 before participating in an impatient [sic] rehab program 

until January 17, 2017. Thereafter Mother returned to jail for a 

short period of time and then has had no less than six changes of 

residence with a stay at the Kentland Motel, another 

hospitalization, a short time with friends in Illinois, short 

incarcerations in Lake and Benton Counties and living with 

friends as she testified to at the hearing of July 27, 2017.
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(App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother argues the finding is “clearly erroneous because it 

omits uncontroverted testimony about Mother’s change in residences.” (Br. of 

Appellant at 24.) Mother contends the trial court did not consider the fact she

maintained a residence at the same address for eight months prior to October 

2016, and that, but for her assault in September 2016, “Mother probably would 

have remained at the Kentland Hotel, contemplated a move to Milford and 

settled at [an address] in Kentland, Indiana for a total of two to three moves.” 

(Id.) Further, Mother asserts, “[b]eing hospitalized by a vicious assault should 

not be counted as nomadic behavior or characterized as ‘another 

hospitalization.’” (Id.) Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the 

evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re 

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the 

credibility of witnesses). Even if we were to agree with Mother that her 

hospitalization when she was assaulted should not be included as a change of 

residence that demonstrates her “nomadic behavior,” Mother does not 

challenge the trial court’s finding that between October 2016 and July 2017, 

Mother resided in Benton County Jail, at inpatient rehab, with friends in 

Illinois, in Lake County Jail, and with friends in Indiana, which is at least five 

locations in ten months. The court’s finding is supported by the evidence. 

[20] Additionally, Mother challenges Finding 33, which states:

33. The history of these Children has been prior DCS 

involvement with the filing of child in need of services actions in 

Benton County. Ongoing involvement by Mother in the criminal 

justice system and the use of controlled substances illegally. [sic] 
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Mother has been unable to maintain employment and housing in 

which to host her Children. Efforts at family therapy, while for a 

short period proved hopeful, have not been successful in dealing 

with Mother’s emotional and mental health issues and substance 

issues to any degree of consistency to cause the Court to believe 

that there is hope that conditions that prompted the removal of 

the [C]hildren can be corrected.

(App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother argues the trial court’s finding is not supported by 

the evidence because she had employment during the proceedings when she 

was not incarcerated. 

[21] During the termination hearing on July 27, 2017, Mother testified had been 

employed by Vanguard National Trailers since July 24, 2017. She also testified 

she worked at Lyons Production Incorporated for “a few months,” (Tr. Vol. II 

at 138), and at Mexico Lindo for four years. Mother testified she lost the job at 

Lyons when she was hospitalized. Mother offers no case law to indicate how 

this sporadic record of employment does not support the trial court’s finding 

that she was “unable to maintain employment[.]” (App. Vol. II at 18.) 

Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the 

credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 

(appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

[22] Except for those discussed supra, Mother does not challenge other findings 

related to the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability 

that the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal would not be remedied. 

Therefore, those unchallenged findings stand proven. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 
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N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (“Because Madlem does not challenge the findings 

of the trial court, they must be accepted as correct.”). Thus we turn to Mother’s 

challenges to the court’s conclusions.

[23] Mother challenges the trial court’s Conclusion 12,7 which states:

12. By clear and convincing evidence the allegations of the 

Petition concerning the Mother and Father are true in that there 

is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the 

removal of the Children or prevent reunification with the 

Children will not be remedied[.]

(App. Vol. II at 15.) 

[24] Regarding whether the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal would 

not be remedied, the trial court made unchallenged findings noting the family 

was homeless, as they were “traveling in a camper” at the time Children were 

removed from Mother’s care. (App. Vol. II at 15.) At the campground where 

their trailer was towed, police were called to address domestic violence 

involving Mother and Father, and Mother was arrested on an outstanding 

warrant. Father was later arrested, leaving Children homeless and without 

someone to care for them. These were the conditions that led to the Children 

being removed from Mother’s care. 

 

7 The trial court later reiterates this language in Conclusion 23. In that conclusion, the trial court states: 

“When viewed in their totality, the Court finds that the DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence 

that there is a reasonable probability that the circumstances that led to the removal of the Children will not be 

remedied[.]” (App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother does not challenge Conclusion 23.
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[25] Mother admitted Children were CHINS based on her incarceration and the 

family’s homelessness. Since that admission, Mother used illegal drugs on 

multiple occasions and did not complete services as ordered by the court. The 

trial court noted Mother visited Children while under the influence of drugs and 

fell asleep while carving a pumpkin. Mother did not maintain stable housing, 

as she moved between multiple residences when she was not incarcerated or 

hospitalized. 

Mother’s assertion that she had “stable housing, had cleared up all criminal 

offenses and had successfully completed an inpatient drug rehabilitation 

program,” (Br. of Appellant at 23-4), ignores her history of instability and 

dangerous life choices. Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the 

evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re 

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the 

credibility of witnesses). The trial court’s findings support its conclusion there 

was a reasonable probability that conditions under which Children were 

removed from Parents’ care would not be remedied.8

 See In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 

 

8 In addition to her contentions that DCS did not present sufficient evidence to support the findings and the 

findings did not support the trial court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability the conditions that 

resulted in Children’s removal would not be remedied, Mother argues “the Court did not specifically point 

out how the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to the well-being of the children, and DCS did not 

present specific evidence on this point.” (Br. of Appellant at 24.) DCS does not have to prove both

“reasonable probability” and “threat” because Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, 

such that DCS must prove either by clear and convincing evidence. Because the findings support the 

conclusion there was a reasonable probability the conditions leading to Children’s removal would not be 

remedied, we need not address whether the findings also support a conclusion that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children’s well-being. See In re L.S. 717 N.E.2d 209 (because Ind. 

Code §31-35-2-4 (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, court needs to find only one requirement to terminate 

parental rights).
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509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (While the trial court must consider the 

improvement made by a parent at the time of the termination hearing, it must 

also “evaluat[e] the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the 

probability of future neglect or deprivation of [a] child.”), trans. denied.

Best Interests of Children

[26] In determining what is in Children’s best interests, the juvenile court is required 

to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the 

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. 

A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with the 

parent’s current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental 

rights is in the best interests of the child. In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 990 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The recommendations of a DCS case manager and courtappointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that 

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in Children’s best interests. In 

re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

[27] Mother challenges Finding 34, which states:

34. The reports and the testimony of the CASA [Court 

Appointed Special Advocate] are received by the Court. The 

CASA recommends termination of the parent child relationship. 

While the interaction between CASA and Mother has been 

limited, the limitation does not discredit the observation of 

CASA of the condition of the [C]hildren in the placement of the 

paternal grandmother. The CASA and DCS note that the 

Children are well cared for and loved in the current placement. 
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The Children are progressing in their therapy and the paternal 

grandmother remains the only person who has provided the 

Children with any type of a stable home. They are happy and 

feel secure with [paternal grandmother].

(App. Vol. II at 18.) Mother argues the CASA in the case “received the case 

file less than a month before the termination hearing, never spoke to Mother 

prior to making a recommendation for termination and never visited Mother’s 

apartment.” (Br. of Appellant at 26.)

[28] In support of her argument, Mother cites In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014), trans. denied, where we held, when determining the best interests of 

the child, “the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by 

DCS and to consider the totality of the evidence.” Id. at 1005. Mother asserts, 

based thereon, “[a] finding concerning the best interest of the children requires 

consideration of the totality of the evidence, not just the case file and the 

condition of the children in their adoptive placement.” (Br. of Appellant at 26.) 

Mother is correct, and the trial court considered the totality of the evidence 

outside of the CASA’s testimony. Regarding the Children’s best interests, the 

trial court found:

16. After removal, the four children, including [L.D.C. and 

J.C.], related witnessing domestic violence between Mother and 

Father and also related that the Father had been physically 

abusive with them and used inappropriate discipline.

* * * * *
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20. During this period of time [the CHINS proceedings] the 

Children were also evaluated and there was great concern for the 

emotional state of [Children] to the extent that there was no 

direct unsupervised contact allowed between the Children and 

their parents. The review order of the hearing of March 14, 2014 

identifies the severity of the condition of the Children and their 

past experiences at that time. . . . 

21. In the summer of 2014 the Children were placed with 

[paternal grandmother] and have been in that placement 

continuously since that time. Further the grandmother has 

previously in past years been appointed and served as guardian 

for the Children under a Newton County guardianship and has 

served as caregiver for the Children throughout their lives.

22. The Children were previously the subject of child in need of 

services cases in Newton County (J.C. twice in 2008 and 2009 

and L.D.C. once in 2009) where issues of exposure to conditions 

similar to the events and family conditions that necessitated the 

present CHINS cases. The 2009 case involved the presence of 

drugs at birth of L.D.C. with the [C]hildren placed with [paternal 

grandmother] from August, 2008 until February, 2009 after a 

trial home visit was commence [sic] with the Mother, the Benton 

County case was closed on May, 2009. [sic] Mother participated 

in therapy, drug screening and supervised visitation. Mother also 

divorced the Father the first time during this time period.

23. Services were put in place for the Children and for the 

Mother following her release from incarceration in May, 2015. 

The findings were that the Children had been traumatized by the 

Father and by the exposure to the conflict within the family to 

the extent that the term “terrorized” was used to describe the 

degree of conflict experienced by the Children.

* * * * *
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29. On October 12, 2016 the Mother visited with the Children 

and was under the influence of a controlled substance. Her visit 

that day included an activity of carving a Halloween jack-olantern. Mother, while plunging a knife into a pumpkin, feel [sic] 

asleep during that activity. This event occurred in front of the 

Children and caused great concern and distress to the Children.

(App. Vol. II at 16-18.) The FCM testified, “[paternal grandmother] can meet 

[Children’s] needs. She’s had them in her care for several years and they are 

doing well in her care.” (Tr. Vol. II at 84.) The FCM further testified the last 

unsupervised visit Mother had with Children was Halloween 2015.

[29] Mother’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the 

credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 

(appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). 

We conclude the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that termination 

was in the Children’s best interests. See In re D.L., 814 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004) (termination was in child’s best interests based on Mother’s 

failure to maintain a drug-free lifestyle and maintain a stable source of income; 

child needed permanency and was doing well in foster care), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[30] We conclude any error in the trial court’s finding regarding Indiana Code 

section 31-35-2-4.5(d) was harmless because there existed additional sufficient 

evidence and findings to support termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

Children. Additionally, Mother’s arguments regarding specific findings are 
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invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, 

which we cannot do. Finally, the trial court’s unchallenged findings support its 

conclusions there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in 

Children’s removal would not be remedied and termination was in Children’s 

best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.

[31] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.