[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-12716

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:96-cr-00064-SDM-TBM-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

LARRY M. MYERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(July 25, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, HULL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM: 

On March 15, 1996, a Middle District of Florida grand jury returned a 

thirteen-count indictment against Larry M. Myers and ten others for multiple 

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offenses. Myers was charged in four of the counts: Count One, conspiring, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to mail threatening communications, to influence 

officers and jurors, and to obstruct justice; Count Two, conspiring, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 372, to prevent, by intimidation and threats, officers of the United 

States from discharging their duties; Count Four, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876, 

delivering a threatening communication by mail to a Hillsborough, County, Florida 

judge for purpose of extorting a cessation of judicial actions; Counts Twelve and 

Thirteen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, attempting to obstruct justice in a case 

pending in the Northern District of California. Myers became a fugitive and 

remained at large until he was arrested in Arkansas on August 5, 2011. 

Myers stood trial on February 6, 2012, before the District Court in Tampa, 

Florida. On May 14, 2012, the court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 

60 months on Count One, 72 months on Count Two, and 78 months on Counts 

Twelve and Thirteen. He now appeals his convictions, raising two issues: (1) 

whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Myers to 

testify about his theory as to why he, as a “Sovereign Citizen,” was not obligated to 

pay federal income taxes, and (2) whether the court erred in denying his motions 

for judgment of acquittal.1

 We find no merit in either issue and therefore affirm.

 1

 Myers brief raises a third issue, whether the court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

evidence. We do not address the issue because he withdrew his motion to suppress and the court 

therefore did not rule on it. 

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We review the District Court’s rulings on admission of evidence for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. DuBose, 598 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2010). Under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard, we must affirm unless we find that the court has 

made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard. Id. “A 

district court’s erroneous admission of evidence does not warrant reversal if the 

purported error had no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient 

evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.” United States v. Fortenberry, 

971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the 

court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading 

the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Myers’s testimony 

because the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by its 

potential to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Although Government witnesses testified that Myers had not regularly paid his 

taxes and that Myers referred to himself as a sovereign, Myers was not charged 

with tax evasion or any crime that related to citizenship. As such, the proffered 

testimony regarding his beliefs on taxation and citizenship had little to no bearing 

on the conspiracy and obstruction charges in this case. Thus, its probative value, if 

any, was slight. Moreover, the court found that such testimony would confuse the 

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jury because this case was not about Myers’s beliefs on taxation and citizenship, 

but about his actions regarding the conspiracy and obstruction charges. 

Furthermore, Myers’s proffered testimony was likely to mislead the jury as 

it did not explain why he was innocent of any of the offenses with which he was 

charged. Therefore, because the probative value was slight and the possibility of 

confusing and misleading the jury was great, the court did not make a clear error of 

judgment in limiting Myers’s testimony pursuant to Rule 403. DuBose, 598 F.3d 

at 731. 

We review the denial of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for 

judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 826 (2011). In considering the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, 

with all inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor. Id. 

Moreover, we will affirm the conviction if, based on this evidence, a reasonable 

jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The 

facts do not need to “exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” United 

States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007). Rather, the jury is free to 

choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. United States v. Williams, 

390 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, where, as here, the defendant 

testifies, the jury is free to disbelieve his testimony and to consider his statements, 

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along with other evidence, as substantive evidence of guilt. United States v. 

Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, in this case, the evidence 

Myers’s flight to avoid arrest was admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt 

and thus guilt. See United States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1992). 

Myers absconded from Florida after being indicted in this case in 1996 and 

remained a fugitive in Arkansas until 2011. As stated above, the jury could 

consider this evidence as evidence of his guilt. See Blakey, 960 F.2d at 

1000. Also, Myers testified on his own behalf, was provided the opportunity to 

explain all of his actions, and made several statements denying his guilt. He 

specifically denied knowingly and willfully conspiring to threaten government 

officials and knowingly and willfully conspiring to obstruct justice. The jury could 

consider his denial of guilt in deliberating over the elements of the charged 

offenses. See Ellisor, 522 F.3d at 1272. Moreover, while Myers argues that the 

evidence was also consistent with a theory of innocence, we have held that, to 

uphold a conviction, the facts do not need to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 

of innocence, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the 

evidence. See Tampas, 493 F.3d at 1298. With these principles in hand, we turn 

to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Myers of the charged offenses.

Count One. Conspiracy to convey threatening communications by mail and 

using threats or intimidation to obstruct justice.

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To sustain a conviction for conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the 

Government must prove (1) an agreement among two or more persons to achieve 

an unlawful objective; (2) knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement; 

and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agreement. United States 

v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003). The existence and participation 

in a conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence and inferred from 

concert of action. United States v. Guerra, 293 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the evidence demonstrated that Myers knowingly participated in a 

conspiracy to mail threatening communications to public officials with the intent to 

obstruct justice. As required for his conspiracy conviction, Myers entered into an 

agreement with others to achieve an unlawful objective. See Hasson, 333 F.3d at 

1270. Myers testified that he signed letters that were drafted by a codefendant, and 

the evidence showed that other individuals signed at least one of the documents 

labeled as an “indictment.” Thus, there was evidence that two or more persons 

participated in the offense. Second, although Myers testified that he did not read 

most of the letters that he signed, the evidence demonstrates that he knowingly and 

voluntarily participated in the agreement. He repeatedly acknowledged that he had 

signed the arrest warrants and other documents bearing his signature. Moreover, 

he testified that he had edited at least one of the letters that was mailed, thus 

evidencing that he had read and comprehended the context of at least one of the 

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threatening communications. Finally, there was an overt act in furtherance of the 

agreement, because the letters were actually mailed and received by public 

officials. The use of the words “militia” and “treason” in several of the documents 

indicate that the documents were calculated to intimidate recipients and to obstruct 

justice. Further, Myers’s possession of bomb-making materials, books on how to 

create explosives from those materials, and possession of numerous weapons is 

further evidence that Myers intended to carry out potentially violent acts and act on 

his threatening words. Even though Myers offered legitimate reasons for his 

possession of the weapons and chemicals, the jury determines credibility and can 

choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. See Gamory, 635 F.3d at 

497; Williams, 390 F.3d at 1323. 

Count Two. Conspiracy to impede certain officials in discharging the duties of 

their offices by intimidation and threat.

A charge of conspiracy to prevent by intimidation a judicial officer from 

discharging his official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 372, requires the 

Government to prove that the defendant conspired to prevent, by force, 

intimidation, or threat, any officer of the United States from discharging his 

official duties. 18 U.S.C. § 372. 

Here, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Myers’s charge for conspiracy to 

prevent by intimidation a judicial officer from discharging his official duties, in 

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violation of § 372. Myers’s threatening communications were sent to judges, U. S. 

Marshals, and other public officials in an effort to prevent by intimidation the 

judicial officers from discharging their official duties. For instance, Myers sent 

several documents, in his capacity as a “Militia Volunteer” and “Constitutional 

Common Law Enforcement Officer,” seeking the release of the two defendants

during a 1994 tax fraud case. He also mailed letters to the U.S. Attorney’s office, 

which purported to be arrest warrants for the jurors in that trial. Further, in a 

separate incident, he signed letters “indicting” judges and threatening to arrest 

judges and other public officials in Florida. 

Count Four. Delivery of a threatening communication by mail for purpose of 

extorting a thing of value.

To convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 876, the Government must prove 

that the defendant mailed, with intent to extort from any person a thing of value, a 

communication “addressed to any other person and containing . . . any threat to 

injure the person of the addressee or of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 876(b). 

The evidence was sufficient to convict Myers under § 876, because he

sought a thing of value through mailed communications by asking for the release 

of the defendants in the 1994 tax-fraud case and for the judge to cease and desist 

trying the defendants. Although he contends that the letters he signed were not 

threatening, several witnesses testified that the letters were perceived as 

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threatening, and the letters caused the Marshal’s Service in the tax-fraud trial to 

institute increased security measures. Myers signed several of the letters in his 

capacity as a “Militia Volunteer,” and several of the letters stated that not adhering 

to the instructions would be considered treason, the penalty for which was death by 

hanging. Moreover, a letter indicting several judges in Florida warned that a 

physical arrest at a home or workplace by the militia could result in a dangerous 

confrontation. 

Counts Twelve and Thirteen. Corruptly endeavoring to obstruct justice.

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the Government must establish 

(1) that a judicial proceeding was pending; (2) that the defendant had knowledge of 

the judicial proceeding; and (3) that the defendant acted corruptly with the specific 

intent to influence, obstruct, or impede any juror or officer of the court in that 

judicial proceeding in its due administration of justice. In United States v. Aguilar, 

the Supreme Court described the interplay between these three elements as a 

“nexus” requirement—“that the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or 

logic with the judicial proceeding.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 

115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). “[I]f the defendant lacks 

knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding,” as opposed 

to some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court’s or 

grand jury’s authority, “he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.” Id. 

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Here, there was also sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under §

1503. The evidence adduced at trial shows that Myers was aware of the 1994 taxfraud proceeding as he signed several threatening communications that were sent 

to parties involved in that case. Moreover, he acted with the intent to influence, 

obstruct, or impede that judicial proceeding, as evidenced by the content of his 

communications, which asked the judge in the tax-fraud trial to cease and desist in 

the proceedings, and sought the arrest of jurors when the parties did not adhere to 

the cease and desist order. 

AFFIRMED.

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