1lS52l:F52lCSj--{istorica{ Monograph Series

MODERNIZING THE KING OF BATTLE

. 1973-1991

By Boyd L. Dastrup

Office of the Command j--{istorian

l1nited States J2Lrmy:Fie{d J2Lrti{{eryCenter and Schoof
u.s. Army Field Artillery Center and School Monograph Series

MODERNIZING THE KING OF BATTLE

1973-1991

by

Boyd L. Dastrup

Office of the Command Historian

United States Army Field Artillery Center and School

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

and

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C.

2003
94-44107

CIP

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Dastrup, Boyd L.

Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 / by Boyd L. Dastrup.

P. em. (Field Artillery Center and School Monograph Series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

L United States. Army. Field Artillery-History. 2. Persian Gulf War, 1991-

Artillery operations, American.

I. Title.

II. Series

UF403.D37 1994

358. 12'0973-dc20

First Printed 1994-CMH Pub 69-5-1

-
FOREWORD

To the 2003 Edition

During the two decades between the end of the Vietnam conflict and its first war

with Iraq, the United States Army resurrected itself as a powerful fighting force capable

of taking on the heavily mechanized armies of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

For Field Artillery, this meant a complete modernization. This process of redesign, with

all its vicissitudes, is the subject of this valuable study by Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup, the

Command Historian of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School.

Central to the Army's post-Vietnam renaissance was theintroduction of AirLand

Battle, a doctrine emphasizing aggressive tactics and "fighting deep" to impede the

enemy from effectively striking back. The United States sought the ability to "fight outnumbered and win" against the powerful Soviet bloc. Because conventional warfare in

Europe was not the only possible strategic scenario as the Cold \Var waned, the Army

also needed a force structure light and mobile enough to fight elsewhere in the world.

Competing demands between heavy and light forces had serious implications for Field

Artillery in terms of command, control, communications and the ability to deliver effective counterfire.

Operating under fiscal and manpower constraints, the Field Artillery successfully

adopted new doctrine, force structure, and weapons-especially the Multiple-Launch

Rocket System (MLRS)-that would enable it to fight across the full spectrum of conflict. The vindication of its modernization,efforts came in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

American field artillery delivered such effective supporting fire that the Iraqis dubbed

it "Steel Rain." There remained room for improvement, however. Target acquisition, for

example, suffered from a lack of unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance, a program that had been scrapped during budget battles in the 1980s.

Despite the emphasis on air power in modern warfare, recent events in Afghanistan

and Iraq have demonstrated that Field Artillery is still a vital component of the contemporary battlefield. The modernization of the King of Battle continues, and those

involved in this effort, as well as other interested parties, should benefit greatly from a .

careful reading of the historical background that Dr. Dastrup provides. This book was

first published in the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School Monograph Series. It

is now our pleasure to join with the Field Artillery Center and School to make the book

available .through the Center of Military History's distribution channels as well.

Washington, D.C.

5 June 2003

JOHN S. BROWN

Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Chief of Military History
u.s. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER AND SCHOOL

Major General John A. Dubia

Brigadier General Leo J. Baxter

Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup

Commanding General

Deputy Commanding

General-Training

Command Historian

U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School Monograph Series
TABLE OF CONTENTS

USAF ACS Page iii

Preface vii

Chapter I: Laying the Foundation: The 1970s 1

Chapter II: Fighting AirLand Battle 13

Chapter III: Field Artillery and the Light Forces 39

Chapter IV: Operation Desert Storm and the Field Artillery 55

Conclusion 63

List of Acronyms 67

Appendix A: Division Restructuring Study Heavy Division Artillery 69

Appendix B: Heavy Division 86 Division Artillery 70

Appendix C: Army of Excellence (AOE) Armored and.

Mechanized Infantry Division Artillery 71

Appendix D: Army of Excellence (AOE) Light Infantry Division Artillery 72

Appendix E:Major Field Artillery Weapons in 1991 73

End Notes 75

Bibliography 97

Index 111

ILLUSTRATIONS

A photograph section follows p. 33. All photographs are courtesy of the Field Artillery

Bulletin.

1. An Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle in launch position

2. A self-propelled MIlO 8-inch howitzer of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 13th 'Field

Artillery, at Fort Stewart, Georgia . .

3. A Multiple-Launch Rocket System of the 1st Armored Division

4. An M109A2/A3 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer of Battery A, 4th Battalion, 41st

Field Artillery, during Desert Shield

5. An M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer (Paladin) of the 2nd Battalion, 17th

Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Cover Photo: An Army Tactical Missile System being launched, courtesy of LTV

Missiles and Electronic Group Missiles Division

v

~
 
BOYD L. DASTRUP

Boyd Lawrence Dastrup, a native of Ogden, Utah, received his B.S. from Weber State

College, M.A. from Utah State University, and Ph.D. from Kansas State University_ Dr.

Dastrup has served as Center Historian for the Sheppard Technical Training Center, Sheppard

AFB, Texas, and is currently the Command Historian at the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center

and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He has written The U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College: A Centennial History (1982), Crusade in Nuremberg: U.S. Military Occupation,

1945-1949 (1985), King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery (1992),

and The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (1994).

vi
PREFACE

Over a period of almost twenty years, the Army aggressively modernized so that it could

fight effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict. Early in the 1970s, the Army shifted

its attention back to Europe after neglecting its forces on that critical continent through the last

half of the 1960s and the first part of the 1970s because of the Vietnam War. Much to its

dismay, however, the Army faced a numerically superior and well-equipped Soviet and Warsaw

Pact military force with the ability to defeat readily the armed forces of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) of which the United States was a member. Influenced by the dire

military situation in Europe as well as by the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 that had

convincingly demonstrated the high lethality and rapid attrition of modern weapons, the Army

stepped up its pace of modernization. For the field artillery as well as the Army as a whole,

this meant gearing for the intimidating challenge of a high-intensity conflict in Europe.

By the end of the 1970s, threats to the United States' national interests throughout the

world led the Department of Defense and Department of the Army to look beyond the narrow

European orientation increasingly to a global perspective. The Army no longer could focus

almost exclusively upon fighting in Europe but had to organize qnd equip light forces for

worldwide contingency operations. Faced with that requirement, the Army had to develop light

forces, including the appropriate field artillery, during the 1980s as it simultaneously modernized its high priority heavy forces.

In the midst of this extensive modernization effort, a quick succession of international

events shook up the U.S. strategic stance. The sudden disintegration of communism in Eastern

Europe in 1989, the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the reunification of Germany that same year, the signing of the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty

between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Noyember 1990, and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact

altered the political scene in Europe and simultaneously. reduced the threat of war on the

continent. The end of the Cold War and ensuing U.S. force reductions, coupled with the United

States' growing concern with the proliferation of modern armaments throughout the world and

the volatile Middle East, led the U.S. Army to abandon its strategy of forward deployment in

Europe backed by reinforcements in the United States that had existed for over forty years and

to shift to a new strategic posture of force projection primarily from the United States.

Just as this change in strategic reorientation was unfolding, Iraqi military forces in~aded

Kuwait in August 1990. Initially, the United States and United Nations resorted to diplomatic

and economic initiatives to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. When it appeared that they were

insufficient, the United Nations under United States leadership turned to military force. Ultimately, Operation Desert Storm of 1991, validating the modernization efforts, drove Iraqi

forces from Kuwait. During the ground war against Iraqi armed forces that lasted one hundred

hours, U.S. Army. field artillery matched and exceeded all expectations.

This monograph is the story of that aggressive U.S. Army program of the 1970s and

1980s to modernize the field artillery. Under pressure to support worldwide American national

interests, the U.S. Army transformed the field artillery by introducing new equipment, tactics,

doctrine, and organization.

I would like to thank Dr. L. Martin Kaplan, Mr. John L. Romjue, and Mr. Ernest

Dublisky for taking time to read and critique the manuscript. As a civilian and military officer,

vii
Mr. Dublisky worked many years in the U.S. Army Field Artillery School's Directorate of

Combat Developments and played a role in the modernization effort of the 1970s and 1980s.

I would also like to thank former commandants of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major

General Raphael J. Hallada, Major General Eugene S. Korpal, Lieutenant General David E. Ott,

General Jack N. Merritt, and General Donald R. Keith, for reading the draft manuscript and

offering, as participants in the process of modernization, their invaluable insights. Any errors

of fact are mine alone.

I would also like to thank Ed Stiles for producing the fine graphs and charts that

accompany the narrative and Donna Covert for helping reproduce photographs located in the

files of the Field Artillery Bulletin.

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D.

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Vlll
CHAPTER I

LAYING THE FOUNDATION: THE 1970s

The sobering possibility of fighting a high-intensity conflict in Europe and the unprecedented lethality of military weaponry that was starting to appear early in the 1970s prompted

the Army to speed up modernizing its forces. As a part of that intensive effort to improve the

Army's fighting capabilities, the field artillery rewrote doctrine, reorganized its force structure,

and started acquiring new weapons and equipment.

NEW DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATIONS

While the United States was involved in the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s,

the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact dramatically strengthened their armed forces. The Soviet

Union added five tank divisions in Eastern Europe, increased the number of tanks in its motorized rifle divisions, and introduced new tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled

artillery to give its ground forces highly mobile armored and motorized combined arms formations. Of equal importance, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact moved their military forces

closer to the borders of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to suggest the

adoption of a preemptive, conventional strike strategy. Modernizing equipment, adding new

units, and redeploying units represented a bold assertiveness and significantly tipped the balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in favor of the former) On the basis of,

this vast destabilizing military buildup, the Army, already weakened by the devastating and

demoralizing effect of the Vietnam War, occupied an unenviable p~sition early in the 1970s if

called upon to fight such an overwhelming threat as a vital part of NATO.2

For the Army the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 further underscored the necessity

of modernizing. Following American involvement in the Vietnam War, many Army officers

were discussing the changes in doctrine, organization, and equipment that were necessary for

success in a high-intensity conflict in Europe, but the Arab-Israeli War provided them a better

comprehension of modern warfare and gave rise to a sense of urgency to step up the pace of

modernization. While the fast tempo of the war led the Army to conclude that success in future

wars would depend upon the results of the first battles, the staggering materiel losses of

approximately fifty percent in two weeks of combat to both sides simultaneously highlighted

the tremendous lethality of modern conventional weapons beyond imagination. The destruc-
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

tiveness of antitank and air defense missiles and tanks was particularly impressive to Army

observers. Reflecting upon the war, the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School,

Major General (later Lieutenant General) David E. Ott (1973-1976), wrote early in 1976, "The

Oct Arab-Israeli War provided us a window into the future conflicts. The lethality and mobility

of modern weapons inflicted very high losses to both sides during short intense battles."3 If

the Arab-Israeli War - the perceived prototype of modern war - were any indication, the

Army faced an extremely dangerous future because the introduction of high technology to the

battlefield made war more lethal than ever before.4

Concerned about such a war in Europe, the Army set out with the firm determination

to build an effective ~ombat force and to overcome the debilitating influence of the Vietnam

War.5 The reformulation of doCtrine during 1974-1976 that was more suited to battlefield

conditions of the 1970s and the future played a key role in preparing the Army for war in

Europe and simultaneously led to a new edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in

1976. Written by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which was

established in July 1973 to oversee training and preparing the Army for war, the manual

acknowledged the great increase in the lethality of modern weapons and the numerical superiority of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and simultaneously outlined a concept for

fighting outnumbered and winning. According to the manual, the commander would organize

his forces into the covering force, the main battle area, and the rear area. The covering force

had the responsibility of inflicting heavy casualties to help reduce the force ratios, to conceal

the location of the main defensive positions, and to attempt to compel the enemy to reveal the

strength and direction of its main attack. When the opponent entered the main battle area, the

commander would orchestrate economy-of-force operations by maneuvering his forces to concentrate them at the right place and time to squeeze the most out of them and their weapons

and counterattack with direct and indirect fire weapons. This would force the enemy to mass

and make him more vulnerable to the Army's firepower.6

Confronted by such an intimidating threat in Europe and influenced by a sharp appreciation of the new lethality of modern weapons, the Army devised a cautious tactical doctrine,

commonly known as the active defense. It emphasized violent defensive actions of moving

from battle position to battle position and huge quantities of firepower at the expense of

maneuver and offensive thrusts. The destructiveness of the weapons of the 1970s and the

promise of those to be fielded in the near future would enable the defender to conduct successful operations against the attacker by destroying a major portion of its forces before turning to

the offense. If the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 were any indication of the future, the Army could

not sustain high casualties in the first battle of the next war and win against a numerically

superior and well-equipped foe. Surviving the first attack was paramount, and the active

defense would allow doing just that.? In describing the implication of the new FM 100-5, the

Commanding General of TRADOC, General William E. DePuy, wrote, "This manual takes the

Army out of the rice paddies of Vietnam and places it on the Western European battlefield

against the Warsaw Pact."8

Besides shifting the Army's attention back to Europe and serving as a capstone for an

entire family of. doctrinal manuals that would make a wholesale replacement of tactical doc2
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

trine, FM 100-5 served another valuable purpose. Repeatedly, the manual stressed that winning

was a major objective even though the Army would be fighting a numerically superior and

well-equipped Warsaw Pact military force. Such a rallying cry was critical given the recent

morale shattering experience in Vietnam in which the United States had suffered an ignominious strategic, if not a battlefield defeat, against a supposedly inferior opponent and given the

military situation in Europe. With such a strong emphasis on winning, FM 100-5 was pressing

to build confidence and create a positive attitude within the Army. A less assertive and

constructive approach would have been counterproductive and equally as important would have

done nothing to promote morale.9

To serve as a companion piece to PM 100-5, Operations, 1976, the U.S. Army Field

Artillery School, which was one of TRADOC's service schools and had the responsibility for

modernizing the field artillery, in the meantime, aggressively revised FM 6-20, Fire Supportfor

Combined Arms Operations, in 1974-1976. After extensive coordination with TRADOC's

other combat arms schools, field artillery officers serving in tactical units, and other Army

officers, the school published the manual early in 1977. Written for maneuver commanders,

their staffs, and fire support coordinators, the manual was the field artillery's capstone "How

to Fight" manual and the basic reference source for fire support planning and coordination.lO

Unlike previous editions of PM 6-20, this one was not a tactics manual. It furnished "the first

comprehensive treatment of the maneuver commander-fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)

relationship and [explained] how to integrate all fire support into combined arms operations,"

the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General (later General) Donald R. Keith

(1976-1977), explained in 1977.11

In mid-1977, just before the manual was officially published, General Keith wrote the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, Lieutenant General

(later General and Chief of Staff) Edward C. Meyer, about the manual's revolutionary consideration of fire support. General Keith pointed out:

This approach to illustrating fire support, the FSCOORD's role, and

his link with the maneuver commander's forces and fires, has proved to be a

best seller in the December 76 coordinating draft. It has been recognized as

a major step forward in the doctrinal literature effort to truly integrate fire

support and the FSCOORD into combined arms training and operations.12

As General Keith astutely noted, improved combined arms operations was a key for success in

Europe against a numerically superior opponent. The Army had to find a better way to fight

in order to place combat power at the decisive time and place and to impose its will upon the

enemy.

While the writing of doctrine moved forward, TRADOC became convinced that the

existing Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) that had been introduced early in

the 1960s was obsolescent and could no longer harness the combat power of modern weapons

even though it had been reorganized over the years. In view of this, TRADOC conducted the

Division Restructuring Study for a new heavy division in 1976. Through the study the Army

planned to design a division for the 1980s with the capability of optimizing the employment

of weapon systems scheduled to enter .the inventory in the near future.13

3
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

The study outlined a conceptual heavy division of three brigades, combat support units,

and combat service support units. To meet the increased demands for counterbattery fire to

neutralize or destroy enemy field artillery and other fire support systems that heavily outnumbered the Army's and NATO's, the study drew extensively upon the Legal Mix IV Study

conducted by the Field Artillery School earlier in the 1970s. The Division Restructuring Study

proposed forming a division artillery that would be made up of a target acquisition battery,

three direct support battalions (ninety-six 155-mm. howitzers), eight-gun batteries, and one

general support battalion of four batteries of four 8-inch howitzers each (sixteen). Such an

organization would improve target acquisition for counterbattery fire by providing each division

with a target acquisition battery, furnish more flexible fire support, enhance. firepower by

increasing the number of artillery 'pieces in the division from 66 to 112 howitzers, and upgrade

survivability. Equally as important, the restructured division artillery was consistent with the

new doctrine of exploiting firepower to win.14

Although the Division Restructuring Study's heavy division experienced mixed reviews

throughout the Army, support from Chiefs of Staff kept work on the project alive. In July 1976

the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Fred C. Weyand (1974-1976), and the Army staff

endorsed the study's heavy division in a briefing presented by TRADOC. Later in January

1977, Weyand's successor, General Bernard W. Rogers (1976-1979), approved using the 1st

Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, to test the study's conceptual heavy division in 1977-

1979.15

Besides outlining a drive for more firepower and a modernized division, the Division

Restructuring Study reflected the significant recent changes in division and corps artillery

missions, especially counterbattery doctrine. Many field artillerymen of the early 1970s argued

that corps artillery seemed to fight its own battle at times, while division artillery fought its

own. Both practices dated back to World War II. Corps artillery and division artillery did not

seem to coordinate their efforts effectively and acted relatively independently of each other.

For example, this occurred frequently in Vietnam where corps artillery simply "was not fully

responsive to division needs" and diluted fire support~ In the view of General Ott, placing all

cannon fire under the division would help make better use of cannon assets and would coordinate the corps' and division's battles better.l6

As field artillerymen noted, existing counterbattery doctrine had evolved from lessons

learned in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War and was. based on small frontages,

the linear disposition of enemy units, and a relatively static battlefield. However, corps and

division artillery organizations had not kept pace with the changes rendered by the technology

introduced during the 1960s and early 1970s. .The expected intensity of modern warfare, the

highly mobile and powerful enemy armored forces, the distance of the corps artillery commander from the battle, extended communications requirements, and the high density of targets,

especially field artillery, mortars, and rockets, stretched the field artillery's ability to furnish

counterbattery fire. Equally important, frontages had grown significantly larger since World

War II, while cannon ranges had not increased that much. This meant that cannon ranges could

not cover the new corps frontages. I?

4
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

Just as important, doctrine did not clearly designate any single agency with responsibility for counterbattery fire but based it on the premise that the most appropriate means available

would be employed. Corps artillery and division artillery were considered the only echelons

with the capability of providing effective counterbattery fire, with the corps having the overall

responsibility for the supervision and coordination of the fire, However, the direct support

battalion could also provide limited counterbattery fire if needed. This shared responsibility

among three echelons of command often produced confusion because command and control

was decentralized, and it simultaneously led some field artillerymen to insist. that the corps

artillery group had a vague role in combat.IS

As compelling as the above reasons were for revamping counterbattery work, "the real

selling point" for restructuring counterbattery and division and corps artillery missions hinged

upon fighting outnumbered, according to General Ott. In a badly outnumbered situation, there

would be times when counterbattery work had to be the top priority, and other times, such as

a threatened rupture of the defense, when close support would have the highest priority. In

either situation, General Ott recalled in 1993:

We would -need all the cannons involved in the highest priority battle.

To achieve this we needed a single manager of all cannon fire and it needed

to be someone close to the situation at hand. We [field artillerymen at the

Field Artillery School] suggested the division commander as the individual

best able to identify priorities and the division artillery commander as the

person to execute his directive.19

As General OU convincingly articulated, centralizing command and control even more would

permit the field artillery to manage its resources more effectively and help overcome the

numerical superiority of the threat. 20

On the basis of the defined enemy, modern combat, the requirement to manage fire

support better, and decentralized command and control of counterbattery fire, the Army had to

reform corps artillery and division artillery. Addressing the conditions of combat at the time

and the need for improved counterbattery fire, General Ott wrote in mid-1976 that the next war

"will take aU the combat power and skill we can muster. It will require the best use of available

tanks, air defense weapons, artillery, TAC air [tactical air], comnlUnications, engineers and

infantry to concentrate sufficient combat force ratios at the critical time and place." Division

and brigade commanders would have to survive deadly enemy artillery barrages while destroying large. numbers of tanks and mechanized vehicles at the same time. "Against this attacking

enemy, the commander will count on his tanks [and] TOWs [tube-launched, optically-tracked,

wire-guided heavy antitank missile systems] ... to knock out the motorized forces," General

Ott explained.21 In the meantime, the Army would have to suppress enemy artillery fire and

antitank guided missiles, harass attacking tanks with artillery fire, and attack antiaircraft defenses to permit the use of tactical air. In short, the field artillery would have to furnish close

support to the maneuver arms and concurrently suppress the enemy's field artillery. The key,

however, was combining the various fire support systems into an effective team.22

5

I
 
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

According to the Field Artillery School,. suppressing enemy artillery, including air defense artillery, at the appropriate time and place "may be the determining factors of whether

we win or lose that first battle."23 Heavy enemy artillery fire would prevent friendly maneuver

forces from moving, would simultaneously support advancing enemy units, and could render

some of the friendly antitank weapons ineffective, and it had to be neutralized for the Army

to win. If enemy field artillery was not suppressed, defeat would occur.

After months of studying the problems associated with counterbattery organization and

doctrine, the Field Artillery School and TRADOC recommended in 1976 moving the overall

supervision of counterbattery fire from corps artillery to division artillery. Essentially, this

involved placing the corps general support field artillery group in a reinforcing role to give the

division the first priority in the use of corps artillery fire and the authority to position corps

artillery units where the division felt that they could best contribute to the battle. Doctrine also

assigned the group the function of acting as an alternate division artillery headquarters or

assuming a direct support role to make it responsive to the needs of the division and habitually

associated the group and its assigned battalions with the division.24

Wanting the most efficient employment of field artillery, most division and corps commanders in U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR)

favored making counterbattery work a division responsibility. To designate the division's new

arrangement the Field Artillery School renamed counterbattery fire "counterfire" and the corps

field artillery group the brigade to bring the name in line with the designation of maneuver

units. As outlined, counterfire involved suppressing or neutralizing all of the enemy's indirect

fire systems. It optimized the employment of limited firepower assets to fight more effectively

by centralizing command and control, and it was directly responsive to the maneuver commander's

needs.25 Approved by the Army Chief of Staff on 30 April 1976, counterfire doctrine not only

moved the "counterbattery mission to division artillery" but also reorganized "target acquisition

and corps arty [artillery] assets to optimize field artillery fires for counterfire, air defense

suppression, and maneuver support missions."26

Although the new counterfire doctrine eliminated much of the ambiguity associated with

fighting enemy indirect fire systems, it did not hurt the corps artillery commander's ability to

influence the corps battle as many field artillerymen had feared. Organizationally, the brigade

would consist of a headquarters, a headquarters and headquarters battery, and a variable number

of attached battalions and could be tailored as required for flexibility. General Keith explained

. in June 1977, "It is not the intent of the new doctrine to have all of the FA [field artillery] assets

at the corps parceled out in every situation. By task organizing to meet a given tactical

situation, the corps commander can ... retain under corps control those cannon units required

to fulfill corps needs, be they brigades or battalions."27 The new counterfire doctrine simply

did not threaten the corps artillery commander's ability to carry out his mission and various

responsi bili ties.

The increased emphasis on the enemy's indirect fire systems as well as the drive to

improve the performance of fire support systems concurrently generated changes with forward

observation. On 25 June 1975 General Ott wrote General DePuy a lengthy letter that outlined

the necessity of reforming forward observation. Because of the growth in the size of the

6
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

battlefield, forward observer teams simply did not have the ability to provide observed fires

throughout the supported unit's sector. Moreover, the Army required a more effective method

of shifting and massing fires rapidly from mortars, field artillery, attack helicopters, and tactical

aircraft. On the basis of these needs, General Ott strongly advocated reorganizing the forward

observer team to take better advantage of the new technology that would be appearing and to

improve fire support further.28

Agreeing with General Ott, General DePuy directed the Close Support Study Group

(CSSG) that was formed on 29 July 1975 to examine ways of improving forward observation.

After careful consideration of the various options, the study group recommended creating a fire

support team (FIST) in its final report of 21 November 1975 that would transfer responsibility

for fire support coordination at the company level from the maneuver company commander to

the fire support chief. Called the FIST chief, the coordinator would handle all fire support tasks

for the company and would command, train, and supervise all. observers on the fire support

team, including 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortar observers. The study group also urged making the

fire support chief as well as battalion and brigade fire support sections organic to the supported

maneuver units. This would ensure that fire support experts would train with the maneuver

unit, would provide experienced fire support personnel at all times throughout the chain of

command, would increase the flexibility of the field artillery battalion,. and would coordinate

tactical air strikes, naval gun fire, field artillery, and mortars.29

Although the fire support team concept and the recommendation of assigning fire support sections to the maneuver elements were opposed by some senior field artillery officers

because of training considerations, the former Director of the Gunnery Department in the Field

Artillery School, Brigadier General Paul F. Pearson, explained the significance of the organization in mid-1976. It would permit the maximum indirect fire support because the chief would

pick the best weapon for the job and make the combined arms team more potent than before.

By giving the combat arms more effective coordinated support from the various fire support

systems to help compensate for numerical inferiority, the fire support team, which was implemented late in the 1970s, helped revolutionize fire support in the Army and complemented

moving counterfire from the corps to division.30

REARMING .AND .REEQUIPPING

THE FIELD ARTILLERY

As most field artillerymen understood, fighting in Europe on the modern battlefield

required more than rewriting doctrine and revamping organization. It also demanded acquiring

new field artillery systems (command, control, and communications; target acquisition; weapons; and support) to provide faster response, more flexible employment, better accuracy, and

more efficient use of resources. To make the FIST concept for the heavy division work

effectively called for a track vehicle that would provide the necessary communications and laser

designation capabilities to conduct all types of missions. As General Keith explained, the field

artillery wanted a Bradley Fighting Vehicle-based system, but there was no chance of getting

Bradleys until all of the infantry's and cavalry's needs had been satisfied. Unfortunately, that

7
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

meant waiting at least ten years. In view of this, General Keith decided in 1976 "to piggy-back

on ... M113-based Improved TOW Vehicle production" for the near-term with the intention

of getting a Bradley-based FIST vehicle in the future.3!

Meanwhile, the field artillery's interest in computerized gunnery heightened. The Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), adopted during the 1970s after years of development,

promised to revolutionize fire direction even more than the Field Artillery Digital Automated

Computer (FADAC) had done in the 1960s because it could be tied to other computers to give

sophisticated command and control to enhance fire support.32

As essential as automated fire direction was, General Ott made obtaining new target

acquisition systems the most important priority upon becoming commandant of the Field Artillery School in June 1973. In view of his experience in Vietnam, he thought that target

acquisition. was the weakest field artillery system. Given the threat, inadequate target acquisition was even more critical than in Vietnam. To help counter the Warsaw Pact's massive

artillery barrages, the field artillery introduced the ANffPQ-36 countermortar radar and the

AN/TPQ-37 counterbattery radar late in the 1970s after years of work to replace the ANffPS4A radar. The Q-36 and Q-37 radars located weapons by tracking a projectile's trajectory with

a radar beam and then providing the location automatically to TACFIRE by means of a data

link to compute firing data. In fact, the Q-36 and TACFIRE combination was so effective that

gun crews could shell an enemy mortar battery before its first rounds landed on friendly

positions.33

Work on remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) progressed at the same time. Although the

Army had experimented since the 1950s with various RPV programs for over-the-hill reconnaissance and target acquisition, the work never produced fully satisfactory or cost effective

systems. In view of the negative experience with RPVs in the 1950s and early 1960s, the

Army's interest in them was waning by 1966 just as the technology to produce a functional

unmanned aircraft was beginning to appear. Although work on RPV s continued after 1966, it

was fragmented and primarily oriented towards the development of technology rather than user

requirements.34

However, dramatic events soon jolted the Army out of its complacency regarding RPV s.

During the Vietnam War, the American experience with manned aircraft performing aerial

reconnaissance over North Vietnam demonstrated the difficulties of penetrating sophisticated

air defenses. Subsequently, the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 reaffirmed the low survivability of manned reconnaissance aircraft in conflicts in which highly-developed air defenses

existed. Along with these two wars, the Warsaw Pact's imposing air defenses with their ability

to prevent manned reconnaissance flights beyond the line of contact during the initial stages of

a war with NATO impressed the Army. This led the Army to abandon the notion that it did

not require a RPV and to start orchestrating a coordinated RPV developmental effort early in

the 1970s. The Army no longer had the luxury, as it had in the past, of relying on manned

aircraft, loitering near or over enemy territory for reconnaissance and target acquisition roles.

RPV s were vital because they were less expensive and vulnerable to hostile air defenses than

manned aircraft, because human lives would be spared, and because the field artillery could

acquire the locations of hostile indirect fire systems before they began shooting.35

8
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

In the meantime, the rise of precision munitions (often called precision-guided munitions) provided another reason for obtaining a RPV. In 1974 the Army Scientific Advisory

Panel Ad Hoc Committee on RPVs indicated that real-time target acquisition for field artillery

operations was imperative and that RPV s had a real potential for this as. well as other essential

uses. Reinforcing the panel's conclusion, the Field Artillery School enthusiastically defended

the target acquisition and laser designation role of a RPV. Without a RPV to designate targets

with a laser, the Cannon-Launched Guided Projectile, commonly known as Copperhead, an

early precision munition that was under development, would be limited to attacking targets

approximately one to five kilometers in front of friendly troops because of line-of-sight restrictions for laser-equipped ground observers. The real value of Copperhead was its ability to

destroy tanks and self-propelled artillery before they started moving and reached the ranges of

other antiarmor weapons. A RPV was critical for exploiting the capabilities of Copperhead. As

a result, the Field Artillery School actively campaigned for a RPV because it would permit the

field artillery to engage enemy armor with Copperhead projectiles before the attacking armor

could arrive in the close combat area.36

Based upon the need for over-the-hill acquisition and target designation requirements

and the high cost of employing manned aircraft against an enemy with strong air defenses, the

Army initiated the Aquila System Technology Demonstrator Program in December 1974 and

stopped work on other RPV systems. Equipped with television and laser systems to identify

targets for precision munitions, the Aquila also could detect enemy movements and gun positions. Although tests in the mid-1970s dictated making technological refinements before deployment, further testing by 1978 had proven the Aquila's ability to provide reconnaissance, to

acquire targets, and to designate targets for precision munitions at ranges and under conditions

where ground observers or manned aircraft could not operate. On the basis of such favorable

test results, the Army awarded a contract to the Lockheed Missile and Space Company in1979

for full-scale development of the Aquila with a completion date of 1981.37

Notwithstanding the significance of TACFIRE, the ANITPQ-36 and ANITPQ-37 radars,

and the Aquila, the Army also had to modernize munitions and weapons to stop a massed

Soviet and Warsaw Pact armor attack. Two primary options existed. First, the Army could.

increase the number of weapons. Second, it could develop field artillery munitions that were

more deadly than existing high-explosive fragmentation munitions that had not been improved

in hitting power or accuracy much since 1945. These weaknesses were critical because armored ve~icles had become more difficult to hit and destroy since World War II. The first

alternative would be expensive, but it would not resolve the field artillery's inherent inaccuracy.

Because of this, the field artillery would have to expend huge amounts of ordnance to destroy

targets and would have problems even hitting a moving target,38

Specifically, the Fire Support Mission Area Analysis Study of 1974 outlined the field

artillery's difficulties of hitting moving armor targets. In candid language it pointed out that

an average of fifty conventional high-explosive 155-mm. howitzer rounds was required to hit

a stalled tank at eight kilometers and that an even greater number of rounds would be needed

to destroy a moving tank. "If the field artillery is to have an indirect fire anti-tank [sic]

capability, it must have weapon systems that are relatively insensitive to error contribut~d by

9
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

target motion and to small target location errors," the study determined. After careful consideration the Army reasoned that qualitative improvements in munition accuracy had a higher

priority than increasing the number of weapons and employing high rates of ammunition because it would permit exploiting resources more efficiently and destroying armored vehicles

more effectively.39

Prompted by the success of precision munitions in the Vietnam War and Arab-Israeli

War of 1973 and recommendations in the Fire Support Mission Area Analysis of 1974, the field

artillery turned to such munitions to make qualitative enhancements in accuracy. Late in the

Vietnam War, the United States had employed electro-optical guided and laser-guided "smart

bombs" to give unprecedented accuracy and the capability of hitting a target, especially a highvalue one, with the first round. The former guided themselves to their targets by the means

of a small television camera in the nose that the operator (aerial or ground) locked onto the

target before releasing the bomb. The latter utilized a laser sensor to guide the bomb to a target

illuminated with low-powered laser energy from a laser-emitting device and an optical viewing

system aimed by the operator. However, it was the Arab-Israeli War in which precision

antitank munitions along with improved air defense weapons demonstrated their staggering

lethality really for the first time.40

During the late 1970s, the Army's first precision munition programs for field artillery

began producing results after years of research and development. First conceived in 1970,

Copperhead, a fin-stabilized projectile fired from a 155-mm. howitzer and guided to the target

by a laser designator from either an aerial or ground observer, began initial production in 1978.

During the flight of the projectile, the forward observer would designate the target with a laser

beam, and the Copperhead's electro-optical seekers would lock onto the target. However,

guidance only occurred during the final portion of the trajectory. For most of its flight,

Copperhead behaved like a conventional projectile by following a ballistic trajectory, but it had

the potential of destroying an armored target with one or two rounds.41

Another precision munition being developed during the mid- to late-1970s, the Senseand-Destroy Armor munition (SADARM), shot by the 8-inch howitzer, also promised to achieve

first-round accuracy and to decrease the number of rounds required to neutralize an armored

vehicle. Unlike Copperhead, SADARM would not need a laser designator to hit a target and

was, therefore, called a fire-and-forget munition or smart munition. As envisioned, SADARM

would contain three to four submunitions that would be dispensed above the armored targets.

A specially designed parachute would then open to stabilize each submunition, control the rate

of descent, and cause it to rotate. Each submunition would carry a millimeter-wave sensor and

a slug of metal. Upon detecting a target, the sensor would transmit an electronic impulse to

detonate the charge and send a slug hurling towards the target.42

Although SADARM and Copperhead were still in varying stages of development as the

1970s drew to a close, field artillery officers clearly understood their implications. Upon being

fielded, the munitions would provide pinpoint accuracy for the first time in the history of the

field artillery, the capability of stopping enemy armor without excessive ammunition expenditures at ranges beyond other antiarmor weapons, and unprecedented lethality with conventional

warheads that infantry, armor, and aviation would have difficulty rivalling. Yet, precision

10
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

munitions would be expensive, would require careful husbanding, and would take many more

years of development before they could be fielded.43

Modernizing field pieces, missiles, and rockets complemented work on precision munitions. Concerned with Soviet and Warsaw Pact field artillery with their greater ranges, field

artillery officers pushed to replace the towed M114 155-mm. howitzer of World War II origins

with the towed M198 155-mm. howitzer. Introduced in 1979 after eleven years of development, the M198 had a range of thirty kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles, which was

more than double that of the M114, and could be airlifted by a CH-47 Chinook helicopter or

carried by an Air Force C-130. In the meantime, the Army increased the range of the selfpropelledMI09 155-mm. howitzer from 18.5 to 23.7 kilometers in 1979 and boosted the range

of the self-propelled M110 8-inch howitzer from twenty kilometers to twenty-four kilometers

with most munitions and twenty-nine kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles by the 1980s.44

The appearance of new rockets and missiles accompanied the improved ranges with

tube artillery. During the 1970s, the field artillery) supplanted the Honest John rocket and

Sergeant missile, both introduced in the 1950s, with the Lance missile that was more mobile

than its predecessors and could carry a nuclear or high-explosive warhead, fielded the nuclear

Pershing lA, and started work on the nuclear Pershing II in 1975 in response to the introduction

of the Soviet SS-20 missile early in the 1970s.45

Perhaps, the most revolutionary aspect of modernizing weapons involved adopting a

totally new multiple rocket launcher. Although the Army had employed multiple rocket launchers

in World War II, they possessed relatively short ranges (five thousand yards) and were inaccurate. Based upon these deficiencies and. the appearance of more glamorous nuclear and

conventional ballistic rockets and guided missiles during the 1950s and 1960s, the Army did

little to improve its multiple rocket launchers and did not see them as essential weapon systems.

In view of this, World War II multiple rocket launchers were still in the inventory in the

1960s.46

Although a complacent attitude towards multiple rocket launchers existed, several factors late in the 1960s and early in the 1970s revitalized the Army's interest in them. Conducted

in the 1960s and early 1970s, numerous studies raised the necessity of a multiple r~cket

launcher to offset the enemy's firepower superiority and outlined a requirement for an allweather, conventional area fire support weapon system. Also, the Israeli Air Force lost thirtyfive aircraft to aggressive Arab air defenses during the first afternoon of the Arab-Israeli War

of October 1973, which was about one third of all of its aircraft losses during the war. To

neutralize Arab air defenses the Israelis then employed multiple rocket launchers effectively

and reduced their aircraft losses drastically during the remaining days of the war. Just as

important, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were introducing modern multiple rocket launchers with ranges between nine and thirty. kilometers.47

As convincing as these reasons were, only after a vigorous debate within the Army over

the merit of adopting a new multiple rocket launcher did the Field Artillery School initiate a

requirement for one - the General Support Rocket System (GSRS) - in March 1974. As

outlined by the school, the General Support Rocket System would neutralize and suppress the

enemy's indirect fire support and air defense systems by delivering a tremendous voiume of fire

11
Laying the Foundation: The 1970s

at long ranges. Such employment would free direct and general support cannon artillery for

close support missions. From General Keith's perspective, the system's chief value was

counterfire to break enemy field artillery's ability to wreak havoc with friendly maneuver

arms.48

Aware of the General Support Rocket System's potential, the Army took action to get

its NATO allies involved with development. Before the Army System Acquisition Review

Council of 1976 had even initiated engineering development of the system, General Keith and

General DePuy visited Europe in 1976 to seek participation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France in the program. After lengthy and involved negotiations the United States and the above countries reached an agreement. Besides each country

contributing funds to the system's development, the rocket system would be produced in Europe and the United States. As a part of this cooperative effort, the Army renamed the General

Support Rocket System the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 1980, the name already

established by its NATO allies.49

Even though new field artillery systems, such as the Multiple-Launch Rocket System,

were acknowledged as key elements of modernization, they did not rank high on the Army's

list of priorities. Influenced by constrained budgets, the Army decided at the end of the 1960s

and the beginning of the 1970s that an advanced heavy attack helicopter, a new utility helicopter, a heavy infantry antitank weapon, a service-wide digital tactical communications system,

improved conventional munitions, a new heavy tank, a new surface-to-air missile system, and

an integrated command and control and intelligence-gathering system were the most vital

acquisition programs for the years of 1975-1980. Of these "Big Eight" as the priorities were

known, only improved conventional munitions represented the field artillery. 50

Over the next several years, the Army fought to keep its developmental programs alive,

but shrinking military budgets forced adaptation. By 1974 the "Big Eight" had been reduced

to an advanced attack helicopter, a new. main battlefield tank, a mechanized infantry combat

vehicle, a modern utility and transport helicopter, and a versatile sophisticated air defense

system. These systems were identified as the "Big Five." This would make sure that sufficient

resources were allotted for development and procurement and that the systems would be available in adequate quantities at the earliest reasonable time at rational costs.51

Even though work on new field artillery systems continued, the Army did not see them

as being as vital as the "Big Five." According to Lieutenant Colonel Jack Goldstein of the

Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the "Big Five" represented a composite capability

that the smaller Army of the future had to have if it were to achieve a qualitative edge on the

battlefield. An absence of any of these would lower the overall effectiveness of the Army to

an unacceptable level, while a lack of new field artillery systems would not have the same

impact.52

The new field artillery systems, nevertheless, promised to help the Army to fight more

effectively even though they did not rate high on the priority list. Once the systems, doctrine,

and force structures were integrated so that they functioned together effectively, the field

artillery would be able to fight a high-intensity conflict better than it could have at the beginning of the decade and could continue playing a critical role in combined arms warfare.

12
CHAPTER II

FIGHTING AIRLAND BATTLE

During the late 1970s and the 1980s, modernizing the field artillery continued unabated.

Recognizing the inadequacies of the active defense doctrine that was not suited for fighting

Soviet and Warsaw Pact echeloned forces, the Army developed AirLand Battle doctrine and

had to introduce field artillery systems designed specifically to support the new doctrine.

DEALING WITH ECHELONED FORCES

Drawing upon his experience as commander of V Corps in the Federal Republic of

Germany in 1976-1977 as well as on General William E. DePuy's ideas, the Commanding

General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine. Command (TRADOC), General Donn A. Starry,

believed that actions taken so far to modernize the Army were insufficient even though he had

played a key role in rewriting the recently published doctrine. From General Starry's vantage

point, commanders had to do more than just defeat the Soviet's and Warsaw Pact's first

echelon. To be successful against the threat's echeloned and. numerically superior armored

forces, commanders had to see deep to disrupt or delay the second and third echelons before

they could join the first to help overpower the defense. For this to be accomplished, the Army

had to exploit all available surveillance and target acquisition systems to locate and track the

enemy's movements and detect its command, control, and communication centers. Simultaneously, the Army had to employ tactical air and long-range field artillery to attack the second

and third echelons before they. could reach the battlefield.!

By taking this approach General Starry acknowledged, as others at the time were also

doing, that the active defense, outlined in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1976, did not

adequately address a vital aspect of Soviet doctrine. The active defense helped to organize

battalions, brigades, and even divisions for the initial battle because it was designed to stop a

breakthrough attack, but it failed to deal with the second and third echelons that were a major

concern for the corps.2

By advocating a concept of attacking in depth, General Starry shared a serious concern

raised by others throughout the United States defense community. In the mid-1970s the Defense Science Board, the senior advisory body of prominent scientists, engineers, and managers

in the Department of Defense that served under the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and

13
Fighting AirlAnd Battle

Engineering, argued that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had to have an effec:-

tive long-range conventional weapon. It would prevent the Soviets and Warsaw Pact from

employing their follow-on forces effectively and overwhelming the defense. Concurrently, the

board advised the Secretary of Defense and United States military that it was technologically

feasible to develop a conventional weapon with the range of more than one hundred kilometers

and with the ability to attack the second and third echelons effectively to slow down and

weaken them before they arrived within direct-fire range of the main line.3

In the meantime, the Army and Air Force initiated programs to engage the follow-on

forces. While the Army was working on a Standoff Target Acquisition System to acquire

distant moving targets for its field artillery to attack, the Air Force sought an airborne radar

system to detect moving targets. As the Department of Defense's, the Army's, and Air Force's

programs suggested, a flurry of action was underway during the latter years of the 1970s to

counter the threat's echeloned forces. This effort focused not only on preventing from being

overpowered by a numerically superior enemy but also on avoiding nuclear holocaust. If

NATO could disrupt the second and third echelons and reduce their impact on the main battle,

the necessity of employing nuclear weapons could be reduced or even avoided.4

For the Army's field artillery, fighting the first, second, and third echelons concurrently

that eventually evolved into the close battle (often called central battle) and deep battle of

AirLand Battle, outlined in Field Manual 100-5, Operations (1982), had grave implications.

The field artillery had to provide fire support for units already fighting the close battle and

simultaneously conduct the deep battle by attacking the follow-on forces. Addressing the

importance of the latter mission, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School reaffirmed in 1979 what

many Army officers had already been saying for several years. It wrote that advancing followon echelons would overwhelm the defense at some point with sheer numbers, even though the

first echelon had been defeated, by closing before the defense could recover from its initial

engagements. Because of the potential adverse impact of the follow-on forces, disregarding

them would be foolish.5

Encouraged by the Defense Science board, the Department of the Army, and General

Starry, TRADOC started working to develop doctrine for reducing the blow of the follow-on

forces, as private industry labored to produce the requisite technology. In its Fire Support

Mission Area Analysis of January 1981, the Field Artillery School explained the importance of

interdicting the second and third echelons. Historically, interdiction meant interrupting the flow

of enemy combat power from the rear to the front lines by hitting lines of communication,

logistics, and replacements. For the most part, this kind of interdiction had a relatively low

payoff because of the. difficulty of finding deep targets and the inability to attack them in a

timely manner. Notwithstanding the existing limitations on interdiction because of the state of

the technology, the Field Artillery School insisted that interdiction was the only way to defeat

Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored forces.6

From the Field Artillery School's perspective, American and NATO forces had to shape

the close battle by interdicting the follow-on echelons with corps support weapon systems. In

"Battlefield Interdiction: Old Term, New Problem," Field Artillery Journal, January-February

1980, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Edward A.

14
Fighting AirLand Battle

Dinges, and Major Richard A. Sinnreich of the Planning Coordination Office/Modern Battlefield Techniques Committee in the school outlined the essence of interdiction or force generation as envisioned in the Fire Support Mission Area Analysis of January 1981. "In short, we

[the Army] must 'shape' the central battle," they wrote.? "By canalizing enemy forces as they

move into the division's area of influence, by opening or widening the gaps between successive

attacking formations, and by fixing or delaying the reaction of enemy reserves, interdiction can

help turn the attacker's momentum into a vulnerability."g To dispel any notion that the close

battle and deep battle were not complementary, General Dinges and Major Sinnreich emphasized, "We must stop thinking about the central battle. and force generation [deep battle or

interdiction] as if they were independent problems. There is only one battle, and everything

done to injure the enemy before he joins the fight will influence . . . the way that battle is

conducted."9 The Army had to develop an executable doctrine and the technology for fighting

echeloned forces so that NATO could fight on its own terms and win.

The Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, ~MajorGeneral (later General) Jack N. Merritt (1977-1980), also elucidated upon the importance of interdiction. Force

generation, he explained, "will concentrate on acquiring and attacking the second echelon

formations before they get into the main battle and become a force the division must worry

about." 10

. As the field artillery existed in 1979-1980, it required extensive reforms before it could

fight the deep battle effectively, and high-ranking field artillery officers knew this. The field

artillery needed longer range weapons; better target acquisition systems; precision munitions;

better command, control, and communications systems; and better organization to implement

emerging AirLand Battle doctrine. In effect, programs started earlier in the 1970s to modernize

the field artillery were moving the right direction, but they were not going far enough because

they did not provide an effective way to manage the second and third echelons ..J.l

Engaging the enemy's echeloned formations successfully underscored the necessity of

Army-wide force structure and material modernization efforts. Believing that the Division

Restructuring Study had been done too hastily, knowing that the evaluation of the Division

Restructuring Study division at Fort Hood by the 1st Cavalry Division in 1977-1978 had ~aised

serious concerns about its suitability. for modern combat, and agreeing with others within the

Army that the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) had to be abandoned, General

Starry initiated a new study of a heavy division. In the Division 86 Study Directive of October

1978, which formed a portion of the Army 86 effort for modernizing force structure, he tasked

TRADOC combat developers to design a heavy division with the capability of fighting the

close battle and the deep battle. To defeat Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies, the Division 86

Study sought to create a heavy division that integrated new and advanced materiel systems,

operational concepts, and human resources. Its solutions had to extend beyond increasing

firepower and be more innovative.12

After digesting the findings of the Division Restructuring Study of 1976-1978 and

considering several different heavy division designs, TRADOC finally settled on one. Approved by the Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer in August 1980, the new heavy

division would be manned by approximately twenty thousand personnel and have six tank and

15
Fighting AirLand Battle

four mechanized battalions in its armored version or five tank and five mechanized battalions

in its mechanized infantry version along with combat support and combat service support units.

The division's field artillery would be made up of three direct support battalions of selfpropelled M109 155-mm. howitzers (seventy-two howitzers divided into nine batteries) and one

general support battalion of self-propelled MllO 8-inch howitzers (sixteen howitzers divided

into two batteries) and one battery of nine General Support Rocket System (GSRS) launchers.

Along with the projected new munitions and target acquisition systems, Division 86 dramatically improved the field artillery's ability to furnish responsive fire support to the maneuver

forces. It increased the number and lethality of field artillery pieces (sixty-six to eighty-eight

howitzers) in the tablesof organization and equipment as compared to ROAD but had fewer

artillery pieces than the Division Restructuring Study division. Along with improved fire

support, Division 86 promised to provide enhanced command and control and better combined

arms operations than ROAD.13

With the realization that personnel resources upon which Division 86 had been based

would not exist in the 1980s and 1990s as initially forecast, the Army reexamined its heavy

division as a part of the Army of Excellence effort. During the midst of making the transition

to Division 86 organizations, the Army tasked TRADOC in 1983 to streamline Division 86 to

form Army of Excellence divisions by reducing the number of personnel spaces. Even though

the Army of Excellence reforms provided 2,300 fewer personnel for the heavy division, they

still gave the armored division ten maneuver battalions (six tank and four mechanized infantry

battalions) and the mechanized infantry division ten maneuver battalions (five tank battalions

and five mechanized infantry battalions).14

For the field artillery, the Army of Excellence reforms supplied the division with three

battalions of M109 howitzers (seventy-two howitzers divided into nine batteries) and one general support battery of nine Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers, formerly called

the General Support Rocket System. Because the MIlO 8-inch howitzer had a low-rate of fire

and low survivability, TRADOC moved it from the division to the corps and replaced it with

the MLRS that provided greater firepower and survivability. At the corps the MllO 8-inch

howitzer could still furnish nuclear missions as required. Army of Excellence reforms simultaneously signalled that future field arti]1ery systems had to be operated by fewer personnel than

their predecessors because the lean force structure would not support personnel intensive systems. As with the Division Restructuring Study and Division 86, the Army of Excellence effort

also built an organization around a weapon system rather than integrating a new weapon into

an existing organization as had been the practice for over two hundred years. This would make

the organization and weapon system more compatible than ever before and would utilize the

capabilities of the new weapons better.15

The Army of Excellence field artillery organization for the heavy division reflected

earlier recommendations to improve firepower, survivability, and the man-to-equipment ratio.

Supported by the Legal Mix V Study of 1978, conducted by the Field Artillery School, the field

artillery abandoned the six-gun battery in 155-mm. howitzer battalions and the four-gun battery

in 8-inch howitzer battalions in favor of an eight-gun battery for both weapons. This reorganization gave a direct support 1)-attalionthree, eight-gun batteries (known as the 3X8 battalion

16
Fighting AirLand Battle

force structure) rather than three, six-gun batteries (known as the 3X6 battalion force structure)

and expanded the number of tubes in a battalion from eighteen to twenty-four for a thirty-three

percent increase in firepower. Eight-gun batteries also allowed creating two, four-gun platoons

in each battery that could operate semi-independently to enhance survivability. In June 1986

the first field artillery units began converting to the 3X8 force structure with the last scheduled

for early 1993)6

As TRADOC was developing new doctrine and the various heavy division designs, the

Field Artillery School closely examined the field artillery's ability to provide fire support. In

a critical article in the Field Artillery Journal early in 1980, the school explained that existing

field artillery systems were nothing more than evolutionary products of World War II technology and could be improved only so much. Providing fire support as envisioned by AirLand

Battle involved. more than modifying existing weapons to give them longer ranges and more

mobility. The field artillery required totally new weapon systems as well as new command,

control, and communication systems; munitions; target acquisition systems; and support systems. If materiel solutions did not accompany organizational and doctrinal reforms, the field

artillery would be unable to support AirLand Battle effectively)7

Strategically, the rationale for modernization fighting Soviet and Warsaw Pact armed

forces had not changed since the early 1970s, but with AirLand Battle the pattern of

modernization had. AirLand Battle outlined a concept of how the Army would fight and served

as the basis for systems acquisition. Fighting AirLand Battle effectively required field artillery

systems with greater capabilities than existing modernization programs would produce and with

specific characteristics. In comparison, the active defense did not drive system acquisition in

the field artillery. It acknowledged the existence of new technology that was in varying degrees

of development and the need to integrate it with doctrine, tactics, and organization, but it did

not form the basis for obtaining new materiel.18

With the Vietnam War experience fresh in the minds of many field artillerymen, the

Field Artillery School pointed out in its Fire Support Mission Area Analysis of January 1981

the concurrent requirement to reorient thinking to support AirLand Battle. Overwhelming fire

support, the virtual absence of a counterfire threat, and the extreme sensitivity to fri~ndly.

casualties had turned the traditional relationship of maneuver and fire support (naval gunfire,

tactical air, mortars, and field artillery) on its head in the Vietnam War. Classic descriptions

of firepower opening the way for maneuver had given way during the war to locating the enemy

with the 'maneuver arms, especially the infantry, and then destroying it with indirect fire or

close air support. In many cases, indirect fire in Vietnam had replaced maneuver rather than

supported it. After being preoccupied with supporting a predominantly infantry force, the field

artillery faced the task of supporting heavily armored forces in Europe against a well-trained

and well-equipped opponent. Because of the threat's air forces, the field artillery also had to

"move, shoot, communicate and survive in a hostile and increasingly lethal air environment."19

As the Fire Support Mission Area Analysis also pointed out, restoring the field artillery

to its role as a supporter of the maneuver arms would be difficult. The appearance of more

lethal weapons, digital communications, .self-locating, self-loading, and self-aiming systems,

improved ground and air mobility, the proliferation of electronic sensors, multiple-source target

17

-

-
Fighting AirLand Battle

acquisition systems, automated data processing, and precision munitions during the 1970s had

led many Army officers to wonder whether the preeminence of firepower over maneuver was

a pattern of future warfare. Despite this reasoning by some Army and field artillery officers,

the Field Artillery School still saw field artillery in its traditional role of supporting the maneuver arms. Maneuver was still a critical aspect of doctrine.20

With this in mind and the need to overcome the Warsaw Pact's numerical advantage,

the Field Artillery School had to improve counterfire so that the maneuver arms could advance.

To deal with the huge numbers of enemy armored vehicles and aircraft, the Army was developing antitank and antiaircraft p'recision missiles. However, managing the enemy's indirect fire

systems with their large number of multiple rocket launchers and cannon systems and tactics

of massing huge quantities of firepower remained a significant obstacle to surmount. Aware

that improving the rates of fire of tube artillery would be impractical and that personnel figures

would decline in the future, the Army had to have weapons with high rates of fire for counterfire,

but they could not be personnel intensive systems. Billed as the Army's "most spectacular new

weapon system," the Multiple-Launch Rocket System, which had been under development

since the mid-1970s, therefore, occupied the "heart of our [the field artillery's] effort to redress

the counterfire problem" and was a top developmental priority for the field artillery and the

Army as the 1980s opened.21

As the tests during the latter years of the 1970s had indicated, the Multiple-Launch

Rocket System fulfilled its promise of being a survivable, highly mobile, rapid-fire, surface-tosurface indirect fire system. .With a launcher of twelve rockets, the weapon system had the

ability of firing all of its rockets within sixty seconds at a range of thirty kilometers. It could

also saturate an area of six hundred square meters with approximately eight thousand submunitions

and complemented tube artillery by destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing high-payoff, soft

enemy targets, such as field artillery, air defense artillery, personnel, and materiel. Compared

with a 155-mm. howitzer, one MLRS launcher, firing twelve rockets, was the equivalent of 3.6

howitzer battalion volleys. One battery of nine launchers, firing 108 rockets, was comparable

to thirty-three battalion volleys by tube artillery. The rocket system gave the field artillery an

unprecedented ability to mass huge amounts of fire on a target rapidly and accurately with

fewer people than any field artillery weapon system in the Army's inventory. Equally important, the MLRS was designed for hitting area targets arid rapid emplacement, engagement, and

displacement (shoot-and-scoot tactics) to protect it from hostile field artillery fire and had some

second echelon strike capability.22

After successful developmental testing the field artillery adopted the Multiple-Launch

Rocket System. In August 1982 the Field Artillery School received the first production models

for training. Seven months later in March 1983, the Army formed its first operational unit, a

battery of nine launchers. Following the deployment of a MLRS unit to the Federal Republic

of Germany in. September 1983, the Army fielded approximately three batteries a year between

1983 and 1987 to give it twenty-five batteries.23

Because the Multiple-Launch Rocket System only partially fulfilled the counterfire and

deep battle requirements, the Army, meanwhile, conducted the Enhanced Self-Propelled Artillery Weapon System (ESPAWS) Study of 1979. The study determined that tube artillery

18
Fighting AirLand Battle

systems had to be capable of continuous operations and possess high rates of fire to support

emerging AirLand Battle doctrine. Although the self-propelled MI09A2/A3155-mm. howitzer

would have better range and increased ammunition carrying capabilities than earlier MI09

models when modifications were completed in 1984, the Army still required an entirely new

system of howitzers, ammunition vehicles, and command and control vehicles. They had to

generate greater firepower at reduced personnel costs and have greater speed' to keep up with

the new armored vehicles (the Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle) scheduled for fielding early in the 1980s.24

Although costs led the Army to abandon fielding a new self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, the ESPA WS Study's disturbing conclusions, nevertheless, generated action to modernize

the MI09 howitzer once again so that it could support AirLand Battle and be in service through

the 1990s. A U.S. Army Materiel Command and TRADOC initiative, known as the Howitzer

Extended Life Program (HELP), began in 1980 and focused on improving reliability and adding

nuclear, biological, and chemical protection as mandated by Congress.25

In its efforts to find the appropriate howitzer for the division, in the meantime, the Army

chartered the Division Support Weapon System (DSWS) Special Study Group in 1980 to pick

up where the Enhanced Self-propelled Artillery Weapon System Study had left off. Upon

concluding its work, the study group issued the Division Support Weapon System Study in July

1983. It questioned the Howitzer Extended Life Program howitzer's maintainability and air

transportability, among other issues. Maintenance functions were still personnel intensive and

physically stressful. Moreover, the howitzer would require an Air Force C-5A for air transportation and would have to compete with other high-value assets for space on the aircraft.26

Like the Mission Element Needs Statement of 1980 and Fire Support Mission Area

Analysis of 1981, the Division Support Weapon System Study also found the Howitzer Enhanced Life Program howitzer's mobility to be unsatisfactory. During the 1960s and 1970s

when doctrine did not require field artillery to match the speed of maneuver vehicles, the MI09

had sufficient mobility. AirLand Battle coupled with the Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry

fighting vehicle, however, necessitated introducing more mobile field artillery to furnish'reliable close support. Without improved mobility. the howitzer could not keep up with the

maneuver forces. In strong language the study emphasized, "No improvement to tactical

mobility will result from HELP.,,27 In view of this, the Army had to obtain a new, more mobile

self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer.

The Division Support Weapon System Study outlined three options for acquiring such

a howitzer. The Army could obtain improved versions of the Howitzer Extended Life Program

howitzer, develop a new. self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, or adopt the self-propelled SP70

155-mm. howitzer being developed jointly by the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Federal

Republic of Germany. Even though none of the howitzers represented a quantum improvement

in capability, each choice offered sufficient promise to warrant development. Of the three

alternatives, purchasing a foreign howitzer and developing a new system were too costly. On

the basis of these findings, the DivisionSupport Weapon System Study proposed a less expensive two-part solution. The Army could continue improving the MI09to obtain an adequate

19
Fighting AirlAnd Battle

fire support system for the 1990s. Simultaneously, work should begin on a new self-propelled

howitzer with leap-ahead technology to replace the product-improved MI09 in the 1990s.28

In the meantime, the Army reached a similar conclusion. After conducting a cost and

operational effectiveness analysis in April 1983, the Army found product improvements to the

MI09A2/A3 to be the least expensive option, while purchasing the SP70 was the most exorbitant.29

Based on the Army's conclusion and the Division Support Weapon System Study'S twopart recommendation and directed by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, TRADOC initiated action

in 1984 to develop the Howitzer Improvement Program (HIP) howitzer, the fourth in a series

of product improvements to the MI09 and afollow-on to the HELP howitzer. The program

outlined upgrading the MI09 by including Howitzer Extended Life Program enhancements and

addressing deficiencies pointed out by the Mission Element Need Statement and Division

Support Weapon System Study to produce a howitzer with the capabilities of furnishing close,

continuous fire support at the turn of the century. Comprising the latest technology, the

Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer would reduce crew size, have the ability to stay

abreast of the maneuver arms, make small moves, quickly emplace, fire a number of missions,

and then displace rapidly to improve survivability. Aware that the Howitzer Extended Life

Program and the Howitzer Improvement Program were concurrent MI09 projects, the Army

Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell R. Thurman, combined the two early in 1985 so that only

one howitzer - the HIP howitzer - would be produced. In doing so, he acted harmoniously

with the Army decision memorandum of November 1984 that directed the aggressive procurement of the HIP howitzer. As a result, acquiring the Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer

became a high acquisition priority within the field artillery.30

As tests in 1989 with four prototype Howitzer Improvement Program howitzers revealed, the howitzer, which was typed classified the MI09A6 Paladin in February 1990, had

the capabilities of operating within a broad spectrum that ranged from semi-autonomous use of

a single howitzer to a group of howitzers. Normally, a howitzer would be deployed in a platoon

of four guns and operate three to fifteen kilometers behind the forward line of troops within a

position that was two square kilometers. Within the platoon the howitzers could be employed

in pairs. If conditions warranted, the howitzer could operate individually within a one square

kilometer position. The ability to disperse over a wide area and operate semi-autonomously,

freedom from wire communications and some of the survey requirements, and increased range

made the howitzer a significant improvement over the MI09A2/A3. Furthermore, the HIP

howitzer had greatly enhanced survivability because it could employ "shoot-and-scoot" tactics,

a capability already in the Multiple-Launch Rocket System.3!

While work on the Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer, moved forward, the Army,

TRADOC, and the Field Artillery School pressed to introduce a totally new self-propelled 155-

mm. howitzer. After exploring various options, combat developers in the school explained in

1984 that the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS) would replace the Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer sometime in the 1990s. This would satisfy the Army Vice Chief of

Staff's direction of 1984 and Division Support Weapon System Study's recommendation for

developing a next-generation, self-propelled howitzer. The decision of 1984 to acquire a new

20
Fighting AirLand Battle

self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer instantly made the Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer

an interim system because its replacement was already being conceived.32

With the need to reduce procurement and sustainment costs and crew size because of

a declining personnel pool and to overcome Soviet modernization activities, the Army examined the possibility of incorporating the Advanced Field Artillery System and other proposed

field artillery systems. (Elevated Target Acquisition System, Fire Support and Combat Observation Lasing System, and Rocket and Missile System) into a family of armored vehicles .. In

1984 the TRADOC Special Study Group Armor arrived at the conclusion that a family of

armored vehicles based upon commonality was feasible and highly desirable to cut costs. The

following year, the Armored Combat Vehicle Science and Technology Working Group at Army

level validated the findings of the TRADOC effort. The Defense Science Board 1985 Armor/

Anti-Armor Summer Study Report subsequently supported producing a family of armored

vehicles to fight on the turn-of-the-century battlefield. In light of these recommendations, the

Army formed the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force in 1986 under Major General Robert

J. Sunell to develop an armored family of vehicles based on commonality that would provide

sufficient combat effectiveness to defeat the projected threat, with the first vehicles projected

for fielding in the mid-1990s.33

With the evolution of the. Armored Family of Vehicles program after 1986, the field

artillery's part of the project changed. Budget restrictions forced the Army to cancel work on

the Elevated Target Acquisition System in 1988 and to move the Fire Support and Combat

Observation Lasing System and the Rocket and Missile System into Package II of the Armored

Family of Vehicles to keep work on these two vehicles in the technological base. In 1989 the

Army transferred management of the Armored Family of Vehicles program to the U.S. Army

Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity at Fort Leav~nworth, Kansas. As a part of

this change, the program. was renamed the Heavy Force M~dernization Program with six

systems (the Tank, Combat Mobility Vehicle, the Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Lineof-Sight Antitank Vehicle, the Armored Rearm Vehicle, and the Advanced Field Artillery

System-Cannon with its resupply vehicle, the Future Armored Resupply Vehicle-AmmunItion) .

being placed in the first package of variants for production.34

In 1988-1989 the Field Artillery School reemphasized the requirement for the Advanced

Field Artillery System-Cannon. Although the Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer would

make significant enhancements over the MI09A2/A3, the Advanced Field Artillery SystemCannon with its resupply vehicle would incorporate leap-ahead technology to address deficiencies in lethality, availability, survivability, mobility, agility, and tactical and strategic deployability.

In addition, the howitzer would. be served by four to six personnel, would have automated

loading to increase the rate of fire and reduce crew tasks, and would have automated resupply

to reduce personnel requirements, while the cannon would have a range of forty kilometers with

the new propellants under development. 35

As combat developers in the Field Artillery School explained, the Advanced Field

Artillery System-Cannon and its resupply vehicle would alter organization and tactic~. Because

of sophisticated technology, the cannon system would be able to defeat moving and stationary

enemy field artillery and armor of the leading and follow-on echelons and a variety of high21
Fighting AirLand Battle

value targets, such as air defense systems and engineer vehicles, and would be able to fight the

counterfire battle, the close battle, and the deep battle. Equally important, the weapon system

could operate as an individual firing unit, a platoon, or a battery because dispersion was critical

for protection from enemy counterfire and would help offset the threat's numerical advantage

in fire support systems.36

Although the Multiple-Launch Rocket System and new howitzers assured greatly improved fire support, they lacked the ability to offset the threat's firepower superiority alone

because of numbers and not capabilities. Although Copperhead was effective and gave the field

artillery the potential of hitting a moving armored target, it only partially fulfilled the need for

precision munitions. It required a line-of-sight for the laser designator to identify the target.

As a result, the number of laser designators available and their ability to get within the lineof-sight of a target determined the munition's utility.37

This deficiency reinforced the need for the Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition

(SADARM) that was already under development. Rather than pursuing an antitank role for

SADARM, the Army announced its intention in 1985 to employ the munition primarily in a

counterfire role and secondarily against other armored targets for close support, interdiction,

and suppression of enemy air defenses. Studies in 1987 reaffirmed the requirement for SADARM

for counterfire. The rapid growth in the quality and quantity of Soviet and Warsaw Pact selfpropelled artillery systems that were rapidly replacing towed artillery made their field artillery

less vulnerable to counterfire with conventional munitions.38

Yet, a dispute arose over the proper weapon to fire the munition. In April 1987 a cost

and operational effectiveness analysis indicated that the munition was a force multiplier and

that the combination of the 155-mm. howitzer SADARM and Multiple-Launch Rocket System

SADARM would furnish the most cost'-effective mix. However, an 8-inch SADARM that the

Secretary of Defense and Congress had directed the Army to develop would not improve

counterfire. The 8-inch howitzer had a slow rate of fire, took excessive time to emplace, and

had poor survivability when tasked to perform counterfire missions. If the Army exposed the

8-inch howitzer to large amounts of counterfire, its ability to survive to perform its nuclear

mission would be questionable.39

Based upon this line of thought, the Army and Field Artillery School encouraged stopping work on 8-inch SADARM. At an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 1987, they explained their intention of ceasing procurement of the munition even though

this position was contrary to guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Congress. Given the

logic of the argument against an 8-inch SADARM, the council approved limiting SADARM to

the 155-mm. howitzer and Multiple-Launch Rocket System.40 Coupled with Copperhead,

SADARM, upon being fielded in the 1990s, would furnish the field artillery with unparalleled

lethality and accuracy and the capability of first-round hits. However, both munitions' employment would be expensive and restrict their use to high-value targets.41

In the meantime, efforts to engage hard-moving targets of the second and third echelons

with field artillery to end the Army's dependence upon tactical air to deliver munitions at

targets up to one hundred kilometers had begun. In 1977 the Defense Advanced Research

22
Fighting AirLand Battle

Projects Agency requested private industry to outline a concept of a deep interdiction weapon

system that would compensate for NATO's numerical inferiority. This led the following year

to the initiation of the Department of Defense's Assault Breaker program to design surface-tosurface and air-to-surface missiles with the ability of carrying terminal-guided (precision)

submunitions or smart bomb lets for employment against follow-on forces. Upon reaching the

target, .the missile would release the submunitions to find the target and then destroy or neutralize it. As envisioned by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, such a missile

system would help disrupt the flow of the follow-on forces and delay their arrival at the main

battle.42

Assault Breaker development lasted about four years. During that time the contractor

actually fired ten Assault Breaker missiles. The final firing included five terminal-guided

submunitions. In that final shoot of December 1982, the target consisted of a company of main

battle tanks that were positioned nearly one hundred kilometers from the launch point. The

system performed well with each submunitionhitting a different tank to prove that a weapon

could be built with the capabilities of engaging armor formations at long ranges with

submunitions.43

Despite its success, the Assault Breaker program lapsed at the end of 1982 because of

costs, and other programs emerged to replace it. In light of the findings of the Fire Support

Mission Area Analysis and Corps Support Weapon System Study, the Army created the Corps

Support Weapon System program. As intended, the program would field a missile with nuclear,

biological, and chemical capabilities as well as Assault Breaker characteristics to replace the

aging Lance missile that was fielded in the "1960s.44

With the goal of eliminating a duplication of effort and saving money, the Department

of Defense soon merged the Army's Corps Support Weapon System Program with the Air

Force's Conventional Standoff Weapon System Program in 1982. However, the Army and Air

Force could not reconcile their divergent requirements. The Army wanted a missile with

sufficient propulsion for ground launch, while the Air Force desired an air-launched missile.

After investigating various candidates, the two services finally agreed in May 1984 to pursue

separate but complementary Joint Tactical Missile System programs.! The Army would develop

a short-range, ground-launched missile armed with terminal-guided submunitions. It would

strike at enemy forces that were not yet engaged and destroy enemy capabilities that would

have an immediate impact on the close battle. The Air Force, in comparison, would build a

long-range, air-launched missile that would carry terminal-guided submunitions.45

Following this decision, the Army initiated action to introduce its Joint Tactical Missile

System, renamed the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS or ArmyTACMS) in 1985,to

replace the Lance missile. The Army Tactical Missile System would be shot from a MLRS

launcher and would have a bigger payload, a better guidance system, and a longer range than

the Lance missile to permit hitting second and third echelon forces. Equally as important, the

Army Tactical Missile System would dispense terminal-guided submunitions over the target

area to attack the enemy armor. As announced in 1987, the Block I Army Tactical rv;t:issile

System for engaging soft targets (command posts, air defense artillery, surface-to-surface missile sites, and helicopter forward area rearming and refueling points) would be introduced early

23
Fighting AirLand Battle

in the 1990s. Later in the decade, a Block II missile with precision munitions for defeating

hard-moving targets (armored combat vehicles) would be fielded. Together, both blocks would

permit the field artillery to attack high-payoff targets, disrupt the tempo and efficiency of the

enemy's operations, and playa key role in AirLand Battle by allowing the Army to fight the

deep battle effectively.46

After several years of engineering and development, the Army tested the Army Tactical

Missile System at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico in 1989. Tests demonstrated that

the Block I missile was ready for operational testing early in 1990 with the Block II missile

being developed at a later date:47

Even though the Army hoped to employ the Army Tactical Missile System in conventional and nuclear roles, congressional legislation late in 1983 restricted it to carrying conventional munitions. In view of the fact that the decision left the field artillery without a modern,

tactical nuclear missile, the Army devised the Service Life Extension Program for the Lance

to lengthen the missile's life through the mid-1990s for nuclear missions. Although prolonging

the life of the missile was technologically possible, the costs of maintaining it would be

prohibitive, while obtaining spare parts would also become more difficult with the passage of

time.48

These problems led Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Thurman, to decide in 1986 to

replace the Lance with a weapon with better accuracy and greater range to deliver a nuclear

warhead. In the search for the missile, the Army explored the possibility of adapting a foreign

missile, modifying an existing missile, or. developing a new missile. Based upon an analysis

of three options, the Army rejected a foreign. missile because existing ones did not satisfy the

Army's requirement for an accurate, deep attack nuclear missile. It also meant changing force

structure and increasing the potential of inadvertently disclosing nuclear weapon design, employment, and control data.49

Employing an existing Army missile posed equally challenging questions. Insufficient

accuracy and range and the absence of nuclear certification and ballistic protection eliminated

the Army Tactical Missile System. The Army rejected the Lance with Service Life Extension

Program because it lacked survivability, had a limited range, was antiquated 1960s technology,

required too many personnel to operate, and was expensive to maintain. Concurrently, the

Army opposed employing the Patriot surface-to-air missile in a surface-to-surface role. Utilizing it involved expensive software modifications. Also, its lengthy reloading time, time at the

firing point, and limited range failed to satisfy the Army's requirements.50

Aware of the inability of foreign technology and existing American missiles to meet its

requirements, the Army opted to develop a new missile with nuclear capabilities. The Army

had no other choice because it required an organic means of influencing the battle beyond the

range of direct fire and direct support artillery. Even though close air support provided this

capability, the limited numbers of aircraft, response times, and time-on-station were insufficient

to ensure the timely engagement of all targets that might be found. In addition, the density of

air defense weapons in Central Europe restricted the use of air power against targets beyond

the line of contact. Also, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 demanded the withdrawal of the controversial Pershing II nuclear missile that had upset the

24
Fighting AirLand Battle

nuclear balance in Europe upon being introduced in.1983 to counter the Soviet SS-20 missile

and of the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile from Europe. The treaty also meant that a modern,

extended-range, nuclear-capable missile was essential. As a result, the Army decided to utilize

a MLRS launcher with a new nuclear missile to replace the Lance missile. The Office of the

Secretary of Defense subsequently concurred with the Army's findings and in December 1988

approved developing the Follow-on To Lance missile with fielding in the 1990s.51

Backed by the Army Vice Chief of Staff s guidance, the Field Artillery School began

writing plans for the Follow-on To Lance missile late in the 1980s. The missile would be a

corps weapon, provide long-range nuclear fires, and furnish the corps commander with a nuclear

capability to hit high-priority targets. Primary targets would be maneuver battalions, field

artillery units, and support units in static positions, while secondary targets would include

airfields, rail yards, and storage sites. Despite the missile's potential, it never got out of the

conceptual stage of development because of tactical nuclear disarmament developments in

Europe. II} response to this, President George Bush terminated work on the system in May

1990.52

Over the years, the concept of "system of systems" in which each field artillery system

would fit harmoniously together into one coherent fire support system confirmed that the new

weapons alone lacked the ability to fight the deep battle and provide counterfire without other

commensurate total system development. For effective fire support the field artillery required

better target acquisition and command, control, and communication capabilities. Even though

the Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 and Firefinder ANITPQ-37 radars were adopted in 1979 and were

more responsive and accurate than their predecessor (ANITPS-4A), both were too heavy, slow,

and large for rapid movement on the mobile battlefield envisioned by AirLand Battle.53

This situation caused the Army Vice Chief of Staff to direct TRADOC and the Field

Artillery School in 1984 to improve the Firefinder Q-36 to replace the Q-36 and Q-37 radars

in the 1990s. Through product improvements the Army outlined a plan to develop an enhanced

Firefinder radar with better target detection, mobility, and survivability and faster emplacement.

and displacement than its predecessors. Besides being able to locate enemy fires up to thirtysix kilometers in range, the radar would be able to pass target and command control data while

moving.54

Several years into development, Congress deleted $26 million from the Firefinder program for Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 because the Army could not ad~quately justify it. This

effectively halted work. In view of the pressing requirement for new radars for AirLand Battle

and strategic deployability, the Army was able to get Congress to reinstate someof the funds

for FY 1991. With the restoration of some money, the Army modified its plans of mounting

the radar on a five-ton truck for the heavy division and placing the radar on a trailer and towing

it with a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) for the light forces. Rather,

the Army chose to place the Q-36 on a trailer and tow it with a HMMWV. This would be less

expensive and provide a radar for both light and heavy forces.55

I

Other target acquisition systems encountered similar problems with funding. As the

1980s opened, the field artillery had ambitious plans for the Aquila RPV. Although trials

25
Fighting AirLand Battle

conducted from November 1986 through March 1987 demonstrated that the Aquila could

function in an operational environment, furnish timely intelligence, and provide target designation for precision munitions, they also pointed out critical problems. During the trials, the

Aquila failed to meet the standard for detecting moving and stationary targets. Based upon this

test and its own findings, the General Accounting Office sent a recommendation to the Secretary of the Army late in 1987 that production of the Aquila should be postponed until it could

satisfactorily detect targets. More work was required before fielding could take place.56

Before this could be done, spiraling costs and declining budgets influenced Congress to

restructure the military services' RPV programs in December 1987. To reduce costs Congress

stopped funding the Aquila and consolidated the military services' RPV programs. At the same

time, Congress created a joint program to develop a low-cost, expendable Department of Defense

family of unmanned aerial vehicle systems sometime in the 1990s. This occurred although the

Commandant, u.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987-

1991), fought to keep the Aquila program going. 57

As the field artillery struggled to introduce new radars and the Aquila, the Army worked

to acquire a new helicopter for fire support missions. Calls for a new scout helicopter had

arisen early in the 1970s when the Army began developing a concept for an advanced attack

helicopter to offset the numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat in Europe and to

rely upon high technology in the face of diminishing personnel. 58

In the October 1979 the Advanced Scout Helicopter Special Study Group identified the

requirement for a real-time information, reconnaissance, security, aerial observation, and target

acquisition/designation system with the ability to operate day and night in all kinds of weather.

Based upon those needs, obtaining the Advanced Scout Helicopter was mandatory. The following month, the Army System Acquisition Review Council concurred with the group's

assessment but recommended following a different course because that helicopter was too

expensive. The council advocated incorporating Advanced Scout Helicopter equipment into an

existing Army helicopter and in 1981 adopted the Army Helicopter Improvement Program

(AHIP) as a near-term solution, although some Army aviators disagreed by insisting that the

recommended solution would not meet their needs. In the meantime, work would continue on

acquiring a future family of light helicopters.59

After tests had proven that Bell Helicopter's OH-58D helicopter was better than Hughes

Aircraft's OH-6 helicopter, the Army directed the former to serve as the AHIP helicopter. As

planned, OH-58D helicopter would carry a laser ra~gefinder-designator for first-round fire-foreffect and for designating targets for. Hellfire, Copperhead, and other precision munitions.

Although the Army planned to obtain 578 OH-58D helicopters, only thirty-three would be

dedicated to field artillery fire support missions because attack and air cavalry units. had a

higher priority. 60

Following testing of the OH-58D in 1984-1985, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council reversed fielding priorities late in 1985. Test results did not support employing

the helicopter to lase targets for attack helicopter antitank missiles and to scout the battlefield

for air cavalry units. Howeyer, the test demonstrated the helicopter's ability to perform field

artillery missions satisfactorily. In view of this, the council directed limited production of the

26
Fighting AirLand Battle

aircraft for field artillery missions. This action saved the system from possible cancellation and

gave the field artillery top priority.61

Based upon this -new fielding priority, the Field Artillery School saw a bright future for

the Army Helicopter Improvement Program helicopter in its fire support role. The OH-58D

would give the aerial fire support officer the capability of shifting indirect fires rapidly around

the battlefield with an extremely high degree of accuracy and lasing targets for precision

munitions. Such capabilities would make the helicopter a critical system for a high-intensity

conflict in Central Europe, a mid-intensity conflict against a Soviet surrogate armored force,

and a low-intensity conflict against insurgency forces in the ThirdWorld.62

Although the OH-58D could fight at all levels of conflict, combat against Soviet and

Warsaw Pact forces provided the strongest reason for adopting it. As the Commanding

General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Lieutenant General Gerald T.

Bartlett, explained in May 1987, the OH-58D would enhance "the commander's ability to

execute AirLand Battle doctrine."63

A close look at the results of further OH-58D testing, budget cuts, Operation Prime

Chance in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88, and the decision to arm all OH-58Ds and reconfigure

some as multipurpose light helicopters undermined the field artillery's position. Testing between January and May 1987 validated the OH-58D's suitability for supporting attack and air

cavalry units and raised the question of retaining the field artillery role as the number one

priority. Also, from July 1987 through Jan.uary 1988, fifteen OH-58Ds from the XVIII Airborne Corps deployed to the Persian Gulf. There, they helped provide aerial cover for merchant

convoys in Operation Prime Chance and further confirmed the viability of the helicopter in an

aeroscout role.64

Nonetheless, the Field Artillery School's plans for the helicopter did not appear to be

jeopardized because the Army's Aviation Modernization Plan for FY 1988 called for purchasing477 helicopters. This number would satisfy fire support, attack helicopter, and air cavalry

requirements. In view of the pressing need for the helicopter for attack and cavalry missions,

the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama, nevertheless, warned the Field Artillery

School about its position on the OH-58D. In a blunt message in May 1988, the Aviation Center

wrote that attack and cavalry units had priority over division artillery and that all of the

helicopters should go to those missions.65 '

Budget cuts, not the Aviation School's stance on the helicopter, raised the specter of

revising priorities. In January 1989 budget reductions decreased procurement of the helicopter

to 207. On the basis of a purchase of fewer aircraft and a new requirement for an armed

multipurpose light helicopter for contingency operations identified in an operational needs

statement in mid-1988, the Army had to reexamine its distribution plans for the OH-58D. It

also faced the possibility of arming it. In June 1989 the Army, as a result, directed TRADOC

to develop an aircraft distribution plan and consider transferring OH-58Ds allotted for field

artillery missions to other ones.66

In September 1989, just a month before the field artillery was to complete the fielding

of its allotted OH-58Ds, the Army's revised fielding plan drastically undercut the fire support

27
Fighting AirLand Battle

mISSIOn. It removed OH-58Ds from all but one division artillery. Faced with the prospect of

losing seventy-five of the field artillery's eighty-one aircraft, General Hallada strenuously

objected. He argued that such action "would seriously degrade the Division commander's

ability to engage the enemy with indirect fires and maintain a current intelligence picture of the

enemy situation."67 A compromise was reached in September 1989 when the Aviation School

announced that the aircraft distribution plan would allocate 51 of the total 207 OH-58Ds to the

fire support role, 131 to air cavalry and attack units, and 25 to the training base/float.68

The Army's aviation modernization plan of September 1989 clearly gave the top priority to the air cavalry-reconnaissance mission. Because the Army had to balance its requirements and deficiencies within available assets, a consensus of senior Army commanders agreed

with the A viation School that the inability to see the battlefield at night was the greatest

aviation battlefield deficiency. Even though the future of the OH-58D for fire support remained

uncertain, the Aviation School pointed out the system's importance in this role. This mission

should influence the final decision on fielding priorities.69

With the appearance of another revised fielding plan in October 1989, the future of the

OH-58D as a fire support system reached its nadir. The plan threatened to redistribute all of

the field artillery's helicopters. Although the Field Artillery School strongly objected to this,

TRADOC responded that arming the OH-58D, using it as a multipurpose light helicopter for

contingencies forces, and cutting back the number to be purchased made fielding adjustments

imperative. In addition, the Army was also considering optimizing the use of scarce OH-58Ds

by examining the feasibility of expanding the system's combat role to include scout and armed

reconnaissance.70

The revised Army Helicopter Improvement Program plan of October 1989, approved by

the Secretary of the Army, reordered OH-58D priorities. The top priority now went to fielding

armed OH-58Ds to air cavalry units for armed reconnaissance, then to satisfying critical multipurpose light helicopter requirements for the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne Division, and then to allocating the remaining aircraft for division between corps target acquisition

reconnaissance companies and training commands. All field artillery OH-58Ds would be

supplanted by OH-58A/C model aircraft. With this division artillery lost its organic aerial

capability to lase over-the-hill targets. For the foreseeable future the field artillery would have

to depend upon anotherbranch's aerial assets for lasing over-the-hill targets. This meant that

it would also be restricted to lasing targets with ground observers unless future events caused

the helicopter to be employed in a field artillery role. The field artillery would still have

organic aerial observation, but it would not be state-of-the-art and capable of lasing targets for

precision munitions'?!

Budget cuts brought the field artillery's efforts to introduce modern target acquisition

systems to a standstill at the end of the 1980s. The field artillery lost the Aquila RPV, the OH58D, and critical target acquisition radars. Although new howitzers were in various stages of

development, budget reductions left target acquisition still weak despite determined actions

during the 1980s to eliminate deficiencies. Without new target acquisition systems, engaging

targets deep behind enemy lines would. be limited, would force the field artillery to rely upon

other sources for vital target information, and would seriously hinder the field artillery's ability

to support AirLand Battle.?2

28
Fighting AirLand Battle

To coordinate the employment of the weapons and target acquisition systems being

acquired, the field artillery also required effective" command, control, and communications

systems. Otherwise, the cohesiveness of the field artillery would be seriously eroded. At the

close of the 1970s, the field artillery had the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) for

command, control, and communications. The Fire Support Mission Area Analysis of December

1980 and the Mission Element Needs Statement of March 1981 pointed out that the system was

large, heavy, and based on obsolete 1950s and 1960s technology. Convinced of the requirement for improved command, control, and communications for the field artillery by these two

studies, the Army and the Department of Defense in 1981 approved developing the Advanced

Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to supplant TACFIRE and to be part of the

Army Tactical Command and Control System, a family of computers, peripherals, operating

systems, utilities, and applications software.?3

Shortly afterwards in 1984, the Army began serious efforts to acquire AFATDS. After

delays caused by software and technical problems and a Congressional funding cut, the TRADOC

Test and Experimentation Command Field Artillery Board evaluated the status of the AFATDS

program early in 1989 rather than in 1987 as originally planned. Analysis of the test results,

observations, comments by participants, questionnaires, and experience validated the AFATDS

concept. This optimistic assessment led General Hallada to write the Commanding General,

TRADOC, General John W. Foss, in July 1989 about AFATDS's ability to satisfy the Army's

need for automated fire support command, control, and communications and to recommend

entering full-scale development. Based upon.General Hallada's favorable recommendation and

test results, TRADOC, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, the Army System

Acquisition Review Council of July 1989, and the Defense Acquisition Board of September

1989 subsequently endorsed full-scale development.?4

Upon completion and fielding in the mid-1990s, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical

Data System would represent a complete departure from the Tactical Fire Direction System.

Whereas AFATDS offered distributive (decentralized) processing that used Army common

hardware and networking of computers and employed menus from which to pick tasks, TACFIRE .

depended upon centralized command and control, was a format-driven system, and was not

user-friendly. This taxed training because the operator had to memorize many formats and had

to use them frequently to remember them. As such,. the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data

System. was more user-friendly than itsancestor.75 .

Despite intensive efforts in the 1980s to obtain new field artillery systems to support

AirLand Battle, the Defense Science Board of the summer of 1988 reached striking conclusions

that field artillerymen had known and been advocating for years. Comparing the number of

Soviet and Warsaw Pact fire support systems to NATO's, the board found a shocking disparity

in firepower in favor of the former that represented "an extremely dangerous situation for the

alliance. "76

This situation loomed particularly critical for the field artillery. In fire support systems

the Warsaw Pact had an advantage of three to one and had developed concentration tactics to

achieve a local numerical superiority of ten to one in breakthrough areas. With suchan

advantage Warsaw Pact fire support could effectively shut down NATO's antitank forces and

29
Fighting AirLand Battle

neutralize its fire support. In view of this dire possibility, the Commander in Chief of U.S.

Army, Europe, General Glenn K. Otis, rated fire support as his command's number one deficiency and concern in 1987.77

To reverse the deplorable situation with the Army's field artillery, the board made

specific recommendations. The Army had to improve target acquisition by upgrading Firefinder

radars and by fielding an unmanned aerial vehicle. Concurrently, the Army had to speed up

the fielding of the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, had to expedite the introduction of the Howitzer Improvement Program howitzer, had to accelerate the fielding of

SADARM, and had to increase production of the Multiple-Launch Rocket System.78

From the Defense Science Board's perspective, the modernization of the field artillery

was proceeding too slowly, but this was certainly not solely the fault of the field artillery. This

unsatisfactory condition came as a result of years of insufficient funding and management

attention by the Army to this vital area of conventional warfare. Also, the inherent difficulties

associated with producing new technology had hampered modernizing the field artillery. As

a result, the Army found itself in a precarious position in 1988 because of decisions made since

1973 .that had persistently ranked field artillery developments low on the list of priorities. If

war broke out in 1988, although it was unlikely, NATO could not stop the onslaught of Soviet

and Warsaw Pact military forces because of inadequate fire support, especially field artillery.79

Prompted by the Defense Science Board's findings and its own apprehensions about

helping defend NATO countries, the Army stepped up production of the Multiple-Launch

Rocket System. In the fall of 1988, the Army Chief of Staff decided to expedite fielding the

system so that the 8-inch howitzer would beout of Europe by 1998, out of the active component by 2000, and out of the Army by 2013. To accomplish this meant purchasing eighty-seven

Multiple-Launch Rocket System launchers a year, which was almost fifty percent more than

planned in 1985.80

Aware of the difficulties that the field artillery would have supporting AirLand Battle

and defeating Soviet and Warsaw Pact fire support systems, the Field Artillery School amplified upon the reasoning behind the Army's decision of 1988 to increase the production of the

Multiple-Launch Rocket System. During the past fifteen years, the Soviet Union and Warsaw

Pact had introduced nineteen new fire support systems with more nearing production, while the

Army had added one new towed howitzer, one multiple rocket launcher, and one counterfire

radar. The results of this impressive rearmament by the Soviets and Warsaw Pact permitted

their armies to wage war in Europe as never before in history with technology that equalled or

surpassed in quality much of the Army's and NATO's equipment. Increasing production of the

Multiple- Launch Rocket System would help mitigate the difference.81

Supported by the Defense Science Board's conclusions and its own, the Field Artillery

School simultaneously urged speeding up the pace of modernization. In the Fire Support

MasterPlan of 1988, the school outlined ways to overcome the threat's fire support advantage.

Near-term solutions consisted of adopting systems with the greatest war fighting payoff, modifying existing systems where possible, and achieving greater force structure efficiency. Farterm solutions involved developing leap-ahead systems, staying ahead of the threat's research

and development cycle, and supporting future doctrine (AirLand Battle-:-Future). Without taking

30
Fighting AirLand Battle

these steps, the field artillery would be personnel int~nsive; have outdated cannons, rockets, and

missiles; have target acquisition systems with low survivability and limited abilities to detect

deep targets; and have 1960s command, control, and communications technology.82

The keystone of an effective modernization program revolved around developing "a

system of systems." Because of the threat's activities, the field artillery could not permit

modernization to slow down or be fragmented. This would be disastrous because it would

permit the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact to maintain their lead in field artillery systems and

could give the Army field artillery systems that might not function together effectively. To

prevent this the plan outlined a coordinated, prioritized effort to tie disparate developmental

projects into a rational modernization effort. 83

International events during the last two years of the 1980s, however, had the potential

of removing some of the urgency behind modernizing the field artillery and even preventing

it from continuing. After a decade of building up conventional forces in Europe by NATO and

the Warsaw Pact, the concentration of military forces in West and Central Europe in 1988 was

the highest ever known in peacetime and represented the greatest conventional destructive

potential ever assembled on the continent. The Warsaw Pact had three ti'mes more tanks and

field artillery than NATO and two times more armored troop carriers. Although NATO had

recognized that such extreme differences in conventional forces had existed for years, the

Warsaw Pact refused to acknowledge the situation until the late 1980s. Pressured by the need

to divert resources from military to urgent domestic uses, the Warsaw Pact finally expressed

a desire in 1988-1989 toreduce the amount of conventional forces in Europe. In fact, several

Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, announced plans to cut their military forces

unilaterally. Yet, these reductions would still leave the Warsaw Pact with a two to one advantage in tanks, field artillery, and armored personnel carriers. 84

Even though these actions represented a gigantic step toward reducing tensions and the

possibility of war, NATO and the Warsaw Pact needed to take additional steps to cut back the

high concentration of military forces in Europe and prevent domination by anyone country on .

the continent. In March 1989 Conventional Forces Europe Force Reduction negotiations that

were held by twenty-three NATO and Warsaw Pact countries led to an agreement to reduce

conventional forces, to abolish military disparities between the two alliances, and to eliminate

the capability of launching a surprise attack and initiating a large-scale offensive. Participating

countries established limits on military equipment and weapons by individual countries, while

the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to reduce their military' forces to 275,000 for

each.85

A decade that had started with a clear focus on what was needed for combat in Europe

and set modernization priorities ended ambiguously for the field artillery. Although the Conventional Forces Europe Force Reduction negotiations of 1989 did not mean that modernizing

the field artillery would come to a halt, they raised the serious question about future requirements and presented the potential of altering priorities. In 1990 the unification of Germany,

the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the incipient democratization of Eastern E'urope

further challenged the necessity of a large American military commitment in Europe. At the

same time, they questioned the justification for modernizing the field artillery even more than.

the Conventional Forces Europe Force Reduction talks had done.86

31
Fighting AirLand Battle

Without visualizing the requirement for a large military force to defend Europe in view

of international events there, Congress outlined a plan to reduce the Army's manpower and

budget between 1990 and 1994 even though a hostile world was still a reality. To offset the

projected personnel cuts, the Army turned to technology. The Field Artillery School explained,

"Selected technologies while expensive give a smaller force overwhelming capability the

smaller the force, the more important the technology." As the Army shrank in size, it would

have to depend more heavily on technology.87

Exploiting new technology, however, demanded effective doctrine and organization. In

the midst of the profound political changes occurring in Europe, TRADOC performed a series

of studies, collectively known as AirLand Battle-Future, to determine doctrine, organization,

equipment, training, and leader requirements for the future. Conducted between 1988 and

1990, the studies pointed out the emergence of a nonlinear battlefield, especially in Europe,

because gaps in lines would be created by using smaller forces to defend territory formerly

defended by larger ones. According to TRADOC commander, General Foss, long-range, precision fire from fire support systems would have to cover the gaps and destroy the enemy force,

while sophisticated technology would enable the Army to find and track the enemy. Fire

support would engage the enemy with destructive long-range fires to destroy him. Then, the

maneuver forces would attack the enemy's flanks and rear to avoid frontal assaults. From the

Field Artillery School's perspective, AirLand Battle-Future was tailored to take advantage of

the American superiority in fire support technology. 88

As envisioned during the latter years of the 1980s, long-range fires would become the

major killer on the battlefield. Once the long-range fires from Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems with their precision munitions, the Army Tactical Missile System, and other weapons

being developed had destroyed the enemy sufficiently to minimize casualties, the division's

direct support artillery would support the maneuver forces by delivering the final blows with

assistance from corps artillery. 89

Providing effective long-range fires on the nonlinear battlefield, however, rested upon

the continued modernization of the field artillery. The Army had to field the MLRS family of

munitions (Ground-Launched Tacit Rainbow, the MLRS Sense-and-Destroy Armor, and Terminal Guidance Warhead), the MI09A6 Paladin, the Advanced Field Artillery System-Cannon,

the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System, the Guardrail Common Sensor, the

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, and unmanned aerial vehicles. These systems

would give the field artillery the ability to reach deep into the enemy's territory to destroy

forces before they encountered friendly forces and to shape the maneuver battle. As one

combat developer in the Field Artillery School wrote, long-range fires would be a reality only

with the new technology. Fielding these new systems was critical because the key to success

on future battlefields was long-range, precision fires to destroy the enemy before committing

maneuver forces.90

As developments in the 1970s and 1980s suggested, modernizing the field artillery for

combat in Europe occurred in two compatible but successive waves. The first began when the

Army returned to Europe after fighting. in Vietnam and was significantly influenced by the

Arab-Israeli War of 1973. At that time the Army's modernization concentrated upon overcom32

-
Fighting AirLand Battle

ing the firepower and numerical inferiority caused by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military

buildup of the 1960s and early 1970s and sought in some instances to exploit systems that had

their genesis in the 1960s. For the field artillery this involved increasing the number of field

pieces in the division, restructuring division artillery, introducing high-technological weapon

systems to reduce personnel requirements, revamping counterfire responsibilities, and writing

new doctrine.

During the late 1970s, the push to decrease the effectiveness of the threat's follow-on

echelons led to the second wave of modernization. Under the banner of AirLand Battle, the

Army consciously determined to obtain materiel to support a particular way of fighting whereas

the first wave did not. This caused work to begin on the Howitzer Improvement Program

howitzer, the Advanced Field Artillery System-Cannon, and other field artillery systems that

were compatible with the accepted doctrine. Simultaneously, those developments influenced

the Army to upgrade or replace some systems that were just being fielded as part of the first

wave because they would not satisfy the demands of AirLand Battle doctrine. Although the

second wave was built upon the first, the former soon absorbed the latter to give the appearance

of only one push for modernization even though the record of two discrete if overlapping efforts

was clear.

33
An Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle in launch position
A self-propelled M 110 8-inch howitzer of Battery B, 1st Battalion,

13th Field Artillery, at Fort Stewart, Georgia

\
A Multiple-Launch Rocket System of the 1st Armored Division
* ,,'\

An M109A2/A3 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer of Battery A, 4th Battalion,

41 st Field Artillery, during Desert Shield.
An M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer (Paladin) of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field

Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
CHAPTER III

FIELD ARTILLERY AND THE LIGHT FORCES

As the Army pushed to introduce new doctrine, force structure, and equipment for

fighting a high-intensity conflict in Europe, it simultaneously pursued building light forces for

contingency operations throughout the world. This involved creating suitable organizations,

writirig applicable doctrine, and acquiring the appropriate equipment.

BUILDING A FORCE STRUCTURE

Although the possibility of fighting iow- to mid-intensity conflicts existed during the

1970s, the Iranian Islamic fundamentalist revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that same year encouraged the United States to broaden its strategic interests again

beyond a primary focus on Europe to a global perspective. Out of this emerged a quicker

preparedness to deploy military forces around the world and the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (the forerunner of the U.S. Central Command), composed of all of the

armed services, at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, for Persian Gulf contingencies. Convi,nced

that the Army would playa vital role in the new global orientation beyond its participation in .

the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force,. the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer,

and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General, General

Donn A .. Starry, met in September '1979. At that. time they discussed initial concepts for a

strategically deployable light division. By taking this step, they concurred that national interests had to be broadened, given recent international events, and were willing to enlarge the

Army's mission)

Based on this thinking, General'Meyer directed TRADOC to design a light division to

meet the Army's future strategic requirements. This tasking effectively reversed the trend

during the 1970s towards converting the Army's existing straight infantry active component

divisions, with some exceptions including the 82nd Airborne Division and 10lst Airborne

Division, to heavy ones for employment in Europe. Yet, unlike its heavy counterpart, the light

division would have to be prepared to fight anywhere in the world, which gave ,it a broad

mission.2

To satisfy the Chief of Staff's guidance, TRADOC set out in 1979 to devise three

different light divisions airborne, air assault, and infantry with the latter being "Infantry

39

i
 

-
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

Division 86," as a part of the Army 86 modernization effort to create divisions capable of

fighting in the 1980s and beyond. With its focus on the straight or nonmechanized infantry

division, TRADOC designed a "light" infantry division of 14,400 personnel late in 1979 and

early in 1980. The division consisted of three infantry brigades, an air cavalry attack brigade,

and support units and was to take advantage of future high technology to reduce personnel

requirements. Reflecting an European orientation, division artillery had three direct support

battalions of three towed M198 155-mm. howitzer batteries of eight weapons each and a

general support artillery battalion of M198s, self-propelled MIlO 8-inch howitzers, and Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).3 Because this division was too heavy and deviated too

much from the original concept of a light, deployable division outlined by General Meyer and

himself, General Starry rejected it.4

At General Starry's direction TRADOC subsequently designed another one. After

going through several different versions, TRADOC finally settled on a light division force

design late in 1980. With the understanding that the Army's end strength would increase in

the 1980s and 1990s, TRADOC developed Infantry Division 86 with 17,773 personnel, eight

motorized infantry battalions, two mobile protected gun battalions, and field artillery, air defense, antiarmor, and support units. The division's field artillery consisted of a headquarters

and headquarters battery, a target acquisition battalion, three direct support M198 battalions of

three batteries of eight guns each (seventy-two), and a general support battery of nine MultipleLaunch Rocket System launchers. Equally important, the division's field artillery would rely

upon precision munitions, the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), and the Battery

Computer System to make fire support responsive to the needs of the maneuver arms. As a

whole, the division would depend upon high-technological equipment to make it a potent

combat force to offset its small size. In doing so, it would satisfy General Meyer's guidance

for a deployable light division with the ability to kill enemy tanks and light armor and to

perform traditional light division missions.5

Although the Army conditionally endorsed Infantry Division 86 as the. objective light

infantry division in December 1980, the mission of fighting across the spectrum of conflict

(low-, mid-, and high-intensity) created a dilemma. To fulfill its deployability mission for

contingency operations throughout the world that would generally involve fighting in a low- to

mid-intensity environment, the division required light equipment, and that would restrict firepower. In comparison, fighting in a high-intensity conflict demanded firepower and heavy

equipment that in turn would hinder deployability. In short, the broad mission placed Infantry

Division 86 in an awkward position of trying to serve diverse functions and not being ideally

suited for any of them. Yet, as its organization and equipment, especially field artillery,

suggested, the light division was more appropriately organized and equipped for heavy division

missions in Europe than for light missions and was not strategically deployable.6

Notwithstanding Infantry Division 86's inherent contradictions, plans moved forward to

test it, using the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, as a "test bed." The High

Technology Test Bed, a united effort to test Infantry Division 86 by TRADOC, the U.S. Army

lVlateriel Development and Readiness Command, and U;S. Army Forces Command (which

commanded the 9th Infantry Division through I Corps) quickly went astray. Whereas TRADOC

thought that the test bed was to test Infantry Division 86 concepts and organizations and to

40
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

infuse high technology into the 9th Infantry Division, the division under, first, Major General

Robert M. Elton and, later, Major General Robert W. RisCassi understood that it was to come

up with its own high-technology light infantry division design unhampered'by Infantry Division

86 concepts. After General Meyer sided with the 9th Infantry Division's interpretation in April

1981 to resolve the dispute, the 9th Infantry Division's effort took its own independent course

supported by General Meyer and soon absorbed and submerged the Infantry Division 86 effort

to become the focus of light infantry division design until 1983.7

Influenced by the Army's personnel cap of 780,000 mandated by Congress, the growing

possibility of fighting low- to mid-intensity conflicts throughout the world, and a shortage of

Army aircraft, General Meyer's successor, General John A. Wickham, Jr., changed the direction of the light division effort upon becoming Chief of Staff in June 1983. After rejecting his

predecessor's high-technology orientation, he immediately set a new force design effort in

motion. A white paper of April 1984 summarized General Wickham's thinking by outlining

the requirement for a light division of approximately ten thousand personnel. The division had

to be equipped with light materiel for strategic and tactical mobility and had to have the ability

to fight anywhere and anytime. From bases in the United States, light divisions would be

deployed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Far East, the paper explained. The paper might have emphasized light operations, but the broad mission of fighting

across the spectrum of conflict still remained a vital aspect of strategic thinking. Yet, equipping

the division with light equipment to make it deployable would not make it suitable for highintensity conflict either. 8

At General Wickham's direction TRADOC designed a light division as a part of the

"Army of Excellence" effort. Lacking tanks, heavy equipment, and organic transport, the

division could be deployed on approximately five hundred Air Force C-141 sorties and provide

the Army with the versatility and strategic flexibility to deter Third World aggression that

Infantry Division 86 did not'offer. Specifically, the Army of Excellence light infantry division

was composed often thousand personnel, three maneuver brigades, division artillery, a cOl;nbat

aviation brigade, a division support command, and division troops that consisted of an engineer '

battalion, air defense artillery battalion, signal battalion, military intelligence battalion, military

police company, and band. Division artillery had a general support battery of M198 howitzers

(eight) aqd three direct support battalions of towed M102 10S-mm. howitzers (fifty-four). This

mix of field artillery was more strategically deployable than was in the Infantry Division 86

design but sacrificed firepower to accommodate the light division's mission.9

Aside from operations in less-developed countries, the Army of Excellence light division had the capability of reinforcing areas where the Army already had troops, such as in

Europe, if necessary. Light forces could augment heavy forces in terrain and scenarios, such

as cities, forests, and mountains, where they could be employed more effectively than heavy

forces. Even so, the Army preferred employing the division in low- to mid-intensity conflicts

because it was foot mobile and lacked heavy equipment for fighting armored forces. Although

deploying the light infantry division in a high-intensity conflict in Europe was not ruled out,

such action was not likely, at least in the mid-1980s, because combat there was stilf viewed as

clashes between armored forces and because supplementing heavy divisions with light ones was

only in the early stages of serious consideration in 1984.10

41

'
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

THE DILEMMA OF DOCTRINE

While TRADOC was designing different light divisions in 1979-1984, progressive thinkers

in the Army zealously pursued the possibility of employing elements of heavy divisions and

light divisions together on an European battlefield, even though the latter alone were no match

for heavy armored forces. In July 1982 the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division

(Mechanized), Major General (later General) John R. Galvin, wrote in Armed Forces Journal

that light forces could move quickly over strategic distances by air but that they were not the

first choice "to stand up" against enemy armor.ll However, from General Galvin's perspective,

trained and employed as a team, heavy and light forces possessed the inherent possibilities of

achieving new dimensions in' deploy ability, combat power, agility, and sustainability. In a

perceptive passage in that article, General Galvin noted, "If war comes [in Europe], we will

fight with the forces that we have, and with those we can mobilize. Under any conditions the

forces will be a heavy-light mix because that is what's available."12

As his article indicated, General Galvin clearly understood that heavy and light forces

had the potential of working together and that the Army had to develop doctrine to foster such

cooperation. The Army simply could not avoid writing doctrine for employing heavy and light

divisions together in Europe on the basis that it preferred to use light divisions in low- to midintensity conflicts in other parts of the world. A Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack would demand

committing everything available to stop it and would not permit the luxury of reserving the light

divisions solely for low- to mid-intensity employment. Yet, using heavy-light force combinations in Europe flew in the face of existing experience. Command post exercises with light

forces without troops conducted by the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) late in the 1970s had

demonstrated their limited utility in heavy force scenarios and challenged the validity of Galvin's

argument. 13

Several years later, in 1984, as the emphasis on strategic deployability for contingency

operations in Third World countries and light equipment continued to mount and after he had

assumed command of the VII Corps in the Federal Republic of Germany, General Galvin

reemphasized the need for heavy and light divisions to work together harmoniously. The

emergence of light divisions gave the Army the opportunity of reconsidering the question of

a heavy-light mix in Europe. Although many Army officers still discounted the utility of light

divisions in Europe, General Galvin staunchly opposed that position. By insisting that light

divisions had a role on the continent in armored warfare, he became one of the leading advocates of heavy-light mixes. After discussing various ways of employing light divisions in

Europe in an article in Infantry in the Summer of 1984, General Galvin concluded that they

would be excellent candidates for early deployment because they could rapidly reinforce the

heavy divisions already positioned in the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, they had to be

specially trained to work with heavy divisions.14

The Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), Major General Howard

G. Crowell, Jr., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), 3rd Infantry Division,

Lieutenant Colonel Jared L. Bates; shared similar thoughts. In the summer of 1984, they wrote

in Infantry that the development of heavy and light divisions abolished the traditional concept

of combined arms warfare of infantry, armor, and field artillery. Combined arms also meant

42

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Field Artillery and the Light Forces

heavy and light forces fighting as a team. Even so, Crowell, Bates, Galvin, and most Army

opinion conceded that light forces would have difficulties fighting in Europe against armored

and mechanized units unless they were properly augmented to strengthen their combat power

and sustainability. By advocating the use of light divisions in Europe, however, they pushed

to stem the drift towards employing them exclusively in low- to mid-intensity conflicts, as

many Army officers advocated, in their efforts to ensure the defense against a Warsaw Pact

invasion.I5

Despite increased attention focused on heavy-light mixes between 1982 and 1988, the

Field Artillery School moved cautiously to develop field artillery doctrine for such combinations. After all, using light units in Europe with heavy units was not readily accepted throughout the Army even though light forces had the mission of engaging everything from light

infantry to armor. As the former Commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major

General Raphael J. Hallada, recalled, heavy-light mixes evoked strong opposition from many

field artillerymen, especially those serving in combat units. For the most part,. they advocated

either heavy or light forces and did not want to combine them because of the great differences

between the two, while those who did support heavy-light mixes could not agree upon doctrine.

Thus, the school did not visualize any urgency to develop doctrine and even encountered active

resistance throughout the field artillery when it tried to open a dialog on the issue of heavylight mixes.I6

Realizing that field artillerymen lacked guidance for heavy-light operations, the Field

Artillery School, nevertheless, pursued action to produce the appropriate doctrine. A draft

paper on heavy-light forces in 1988-1989- the first real, concrete effort to formulate doctrine

for heavy-light operations by the school explained that the fire support coordinator had to

consider the limitations and vulnerabilities of each type of force as he planned. For example,

field artillerymen had to create a link between light and heavy artillery units. Because the field

artill,ery in the light division depended upon voice communications, light field artillerymen had

to be trained to use TACFIRE, or specialized liaison requests"had to be established. At the

same time, the fire support coordinator had to design a plan to distribute TACFIRE equipment

to key positions to facilitate sharing information between light and heavy divisions. Otherwise,

command, control, and communications would be difficult and perhaps would break down.I7 .

Upon viewing the great disparity between the fire support capabilities of light and heavy forces,

the Field Artillery School recognized that much work was required before the two could work

as a team.t8

The growing possibility of heavy-light operations simultaneously kindled a debate over

responsibility for counterfire, an issue that had been smoldering for several years. Acknowledging that the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union had numerical superiority in fire support systems and that heavy-light operations might be a reality, several Army general officers challenged placing the counterfire mission in the division.t9

Although the Commanding General, I Corps, Lieutenant General William H. Harrison,

accepted placing counterfire in the division, he concurrently pointed out the light division's

inability to perform the mission effectively. Adding a target acquisition detachment in each

light division as planned in the near future would provide some help by permitting the division

to identify targets. However, the ultimate solution would be to create a target acquisition

43

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Field Artillery and the Light Forces

battalion for the light division. Because of limited target acquisition assets in the light division,

the corps, especially those with light divisions, should have responsibility for counterfire. After

all, it had the capacity for this mission, according to General Harrison.20

Several other reasons bolstered General Harrison's position. First, the light division's

range of direct support artillery and its limited number of general support weapons would not

permit effective counterfire. Second, division artillery in his corps' light divisions and even

heavy divisions repeatedly turned over counterfire to the reinforcing brigade and conducted

close support.21

Written in the Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department in the Field

Artillery School in response to the General's argument, a fact sheet of 28 September 1988,

provided an explanation of why the light infantry division had few target acquisition capabilities. Although the fact sheet did not represent an official school position, it elucidated the light

division's requirement to be deployable to areas that would most likely involve a low-intensity

conflict where counterfire threats would be minimal. Consequently, long-range counterfire

acquisition capability would not be required. Also, eliminating counterbattery radars, movingtarget locating radars, and the targeting element from division artillery's tactical operational

center saved personnel spaces as well as weight. If these things were not done, deploying the

light division in five hundred Air Force C-141 sorties would be impossible. As the author of

the fact sheet carefully noted, the light division's primary function was to fight in low- to midintensity conflicts. Moreover, the light division did not have a vital role in a high-intensity

conflict even though some prominent Army officers advocated employing it to support heavy

divisions in Europe and even though its mission was to fight across the spectrum of conflict.22

Notwithstanding the cogent reasoning for restricting counterfire capabilities in the light

division as the fact sheet explained, General Harrison understood the light division's dilemma

and the inherent contradictions of its broad, sweeping mission. If heavy-light operations were

to become a reality, provision for counterfire in the light division had to be made. Otherwise,

the light division could be a drain on the corps' counterfire resources. At the same time,

improving counterfire capabilities in the light division had the potential of reducing the division's

deployability.23

The 3rd Infantry Division held a position diametrically opposed to General Harrison's.

In a letter to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the Field Artillery School in April

1988, the 3rd Infantry Division artillery commander, Colonel John J. O'Keefe, attached a

provocative issue paper. It stated that counterfire was inextricably tied to the scheme of the

maneuver commander and the division commander's intent. As such, the fire support coordinator of the division, the division artillery commander, had to orchestrate the counterfire battle

within the division's sector. "Any counterfire solution that places the division counterfire battle

solely [in] the hands of a headquarters other than that of the DIVARTY [division artillery]

Commander's contradicts clearly stated and time tested doctrine," the issue paper related. On

the basis of this line of thought, the 3rd Infantry Division artillery commander urged the school

to continue teaching that counterfire was a division artillery mission.24

Several months later, the3rd Infantry Division's new artillery commander, Colonel

Thomas W. Karr, wrote the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier

44
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

General (later Major General and Commandant of the Field Artillery School) Fred F. Marty,

about the dilemma posed by counterfire being in the division. Because the division's fire

support assets constantly changed in a recent field exercise, counterfire assets fluctuated. Even

though the division managed counterfire, with direct support battalions providing it as necessary, corps artillery furnished the bulk of counterfire when it. was available. This led Colonel

Karr to comment about the division's inability to come to grips with how the counterfire battle

should be fought. In light of this, using reinforcing corps artillery to execute the counterfire

mission was a viable option from the colonel's perspective. This would reduce the confusion

and delineate the responsibility more clearly. In other words, counterfire doctrine had to be

modified. Making it a division responsibility was not working.25

With pressure mounting to revise responsibilities for counterfire, the Field Artillery

School acted to defend its position. In March 1989 the' school explained that doctrine still

assigned-counterfire to the division because most of the threat's indirect fire systems were two

to ten kilometers beyond the forward edge of the battle, which was normally the division's

responsibility, and because the division had the organic assets to conduct counterfire. However,

the corps could influence the counterfire battle by attacking targets beyond the division's zone

and helping the division furnish counterfire by task organizing. Although establishing a command or a support relationship between division and corps artillery was permissible, it did not

relieve the division of its responsibility for counterfire.26

In response to further concerns from artillery commanders, the-school distributed a draft

white paper to the field for comments. By June 1989 remarks on the paper began flowing into

the school. One general officer vehemently supported positioning counterfire in the corps.

Taking a less doctrinaire approach, the Commanding General, III Corps, Lieutenant General

Richard G. Graves, advocated centralizing counterfire at the level that could most readily

respond. In other words, counterfire did not have to be a division responsibility. It could be

in the corps. This position harkened back to the pre-counterfiredays when counterbattery fire

was divided among three echelons of command and presented the potential of confusing command and control of the mission. Continuing, General Graves explained his intention of

centralizingcounterfire at the corps during the initial stages of an attack because the corps had

the ability to synchronize all fire support assets and had the intelligence gathering functio;s, to

name just a few reasons. Despite this dissenting voice, most commanders still endorsed positioning counterfire in the division.27

Some general officers, who responded to the draft white paper, especially liked the

concept of assuming the initiative on the battlefield. This involved massing fire on threat fire

support systems before they started firing. Corresponding with General Hallada, the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Major General (later General) John M.

Shalikashvili, wrote, "I don't think it [is] possible for the White Paper to overstate the importance of massing on the counterfire targets we do acquire, whether proactively [before they fire]

or through their own exposure by firing."28 Supporting the concept of being proactive in

Counterfire, General Harrison likewise pointed out that his corps could not let the enemy fire

first and that he was "firmly convinced that we will lose if we direct our counterfire in a

revenge or reactive mode only."29

45

-
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

After carefully considering the comments from the field, the Field Artillery School

published a white paper on counterfire in November 1989. The paper explained that counterfire

consisted of fires targeted throughout the battlefield to attack the total enemy fire support

system of mortars, helicopter forward operating bases, vector target designation points, field

artillery, rocket, air defense, and missile systems, and support and sustainment installations.

Because of the Soviets' and Warsaw Pact's overwhelming numerical fire support superiority,

friendly fire support had to attack with counterfire before the threat employed its fire support

systems. Otherwise, friendly forces would be overwhelmed and would be unable to respond. 30

With the debate raging over responsibility for counterfire, the school took action to end

the controversy. While the mission was shared by the division and corps, it might not be

equally shared. The location of targets and the capabilities of acquisition and weapon systems

determined ultimate responsibility. In most instances, the corps was accountable for the attack

at depth and deep counterfire, while the division executed the counterfire effort within its area

of responsibility.31

As the Field Artillery School's Counterfire White Paper of November 1989 indicated,

the corps and division had to fight the counterfire battle as a team. By taking this position, the

school backed down from its previous rigid doctrinaire stance in favor of one more flexible by

allowing the division and corps to share the counterfire battle. In doing so, the school accommodated the field artillery of the light division by recognizing its requirement for corps artillery

support. The light division lacked the systems to fight counterfire effectively, especially in a

high-intensity conflict, as the Army's training exercise, Centurion Shield 1990, reinforced. At

the same time, the white paper acknowledged the inability of field artillery in heavy divisions

to fight the counterfire mission alone because it also lacked sufficient numbers of appropriate

weapon systems.32

While the Field Artillery School labored to modify counterfire to fit the realities of

division artillery fire support, it also pressed to develop doctrine for light field artillery operations. During 1987, the school circulated a coordinating draft of Field Manual 6-20-50, Fire

Support for Brigade Operations (Light), to active and reserve units and published it in January

1990. Using input from light division field artillerymen, the school refined fire support for the

light forces. Like the fire support system in the heavy division, that for the light forces

depended upon mortars, tactical air, naval gunfire, field artillery, target acquisition systems,

munitions, and command and control systems and provided one of the most rapid means of

placing accurate fire on moving forces in a low-intensity conflict.33

Even with the publication of the manual, the role of field artillery in low- to midintensity conflicts remained ambiguous. Low-intensity conflicts presented the possibility for

field artillerymen to serve as advisors to train indigenous forces as they had done in Vietnam

or even to fight, while a mid-intensity conflict would actually mean employing units in combat.

As one particular writer in Field Artillery inApril 1990 suggested, the field artillery had to

address seriously its roles in low- to mid-intensity conflicts with light forces, examine doctrine,

and change it as needed. Although high-intensity conflict in Europe could not be ignored, even

with the Conventional Forces. Europe Force Reduction talks in progress, the Field Artillery

School had to develop doctrine for combat outside of Europe. It had to take a more balanced

46
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

approach to combat than in the past by writing doctrine that would permit fighting across the

spectrum of conflict, since each level posed different problems.34

EQUIPPING THE FORCE

. Creating light divisions also involved obtaining the appropriate weapons and equipment

If they were to function effectively. At a minimum, the weapon system for the field artillery

had to include a lightweight, long-range howitzer, improved munitions, and a highly mobile

prime mover. Based upon wargaming of towed 105-mm., 155-mm., and 5-inch systems at the

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,

the Field Artillery School concluded that a 105-mm howitzer was the near-term weapon of

choice for a direct support weapon. As the Field Artillery School wrote in 1985, however, the

light forces required lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzers for direct support for the long-term.

Unfortunately, the technology did not exist at the time to make a 155-mm. howitzer strategically and tactically mobile, while fiscal constraints prevented establishing a new 5-inch ammunition line for a 5-inch howitzer, even though it would be effective.35

This situation led the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development Command to

analyze eighteen American and allied towed 105-mm. howitzers for possible adoption. After

an extensive investigation that command narrowed the field to the towed M204 howitzer (a

soft-recoil weapon developed and type classified in the 1970s but never produced), a modified

towed M102 howitzer, and towed L1l8 and L1l9 British Light Guns. At the same time, the

new system had to be compatible with developmental dual-purpose improved conventional

munitions (DPICM) and high-explosive rocket assisted (HERA) projectiles and had to have

growth potentiaL It also had to have tactical and strategic mobility, had to be available, and

had to be cost-effective.36

Although the M102 was mobile, the Army and Field Artillery School questioned its

suitability for the new light division. During the course of 1984, the school explored the

possibility of retaining the M102. Addressing theM102's future, the Assistant Commandant,

U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Raphael J. Hallada, doubted its potential

for growth. Even though the weapon's range of 11.5 kilometers with conventional munitions

and 15.1 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles could be increased by lengthening the tube,

the piece still represented 1960s technology. On the basis of this, the Field Artillery. School

and Army" rejected the M102 for the light infantry division.37

The Army also challenged employing the M204 in the light division. Besides having

a soft recoil, the M204 had a single box trail with no trails extending to the rear and a range

of 14.3 kilometers. Although the range was superior to the M102's, theM204 weighed five

thousand pounds, was too heavy for strategic mobility, and often tipped over when it misfired.

These drawbacks caused it to be discarded in 1984 as a serious candidate.38

In contrast, the British light guns offered greater possibilities than the other two did.

Design work on the L1l8 had begun in 1965 with test and evaluation being conducted three

years later. With British Abbot Mark II ammunition the LU8 had a range of 17.2 kilometers.

Equally important, it weighed a little over four thousand pounds. Although the L1l8 demon47
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

strated its reliability and ease of operation during the British Falkland Island Campaign of 1982,

its inability to use American ammunition caused the Army to look at the L1l9, which the

British were employing for training at the time.39

Examination of the L1l9 in 1984 quickly revealed attractive characteristics. The piece

had a range of fourteen kilometers, weighed approximately four thousand pounds, and could

fire American ammunition. Rather than developing any of the other three howitzers, the Army

Chief of Staff approved further evaluation of the L119 because it had the longest range of the

three with the current stockpile of American ammunition, was available at low risk, had a

significant potential for growth, and was an inexpensive alternative. Based upon this reasoning,

the Army renamed it the XM119 in May 1984.40

From June to August 1985, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Board at Fort Sill tested the

XM119 to determine its suitability. Although the trials revealed the existence of some technical

problems, they concurrently demonstrated the XM1l9's ability to achieve the maximum range

requirement, its reliability, and its solid performance. The Field Artillery Board as a result

concluded that the XM1l9 satisfied the established standard with minor correctable qualifications. Based upon this, the Army classified the XM1l9 as the towed M1l9 105-mm. howitzer

and decided to buy over five hundred of them to replace the MI02 as direct support artillery

in light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions. However, technical problems with the

carriage and fire control system delayed fielding the howitzer until 1989.41

Although the Army planned to complement the M119 with the M198 for counterfire,

some Army circles envisioned the requirement for even more effective counterfire capabilities

in the light division. As early as 1982, the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) had documented

the requirement for a light multiple rocket system. Although the LTV Aerospace and Defense

Company proposed to build a candidate system in response, the Field Artillery School did not

visualize the need for such a rocket launcher in 1983. After all, the light division would be

primarily employed in contingency operations where the demand for counterfire would be low.

Without any support from the field artillery, work on a light multiple rocket launcher languished for several years.42

In concert with the growing interest in contingency operations as the Cold War waned,

the U.S. Army Missile Command outlined a requirement for a Low-Intensity Conflict Rocket

System in a draft white paper in 1989 that was based upon the 9th Infantry Division's Quick

Reaction Plan of 1985. Equipped with three direct support battalions of towed 105-mm.

howitzers and one general support battalion of towed 155-mm. howitzers, the 9th Infantry

Division (Motorized) lacked the capability of providing interdiction and counterfire and had to

rely upon corps artillery for a majority of its general support fire, which reinforced the argument of advocates, who wanted counterfire in the corps. Although the Multiple-Launch Rocket

System was fully capable of furnishing interdiction, counterfire, suppression of enemy air

defenses, and other vital missions as a corps artillery weapon, it did not have the strategic and

tactical mobility required by the light forces because it could not be carried in an Air Force C130 or transported by Army helicopters. As the U.S. Army Missile Command viewed the

situation in 1989, the light forces had an "urgent requirement for a combat multiplier weapon

system that possesses deployability, great tactical mobility, range, lethality, and surge capability

to accomplish their missions."43

48
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

While the U.S. Army Missile Command outlined its system, the Field Artillery School

began articulating its solution to the requirement for interdiction and counterfire capabilities to

support contingency forces. Early in 1990, the school also reaffirmed the contingency forces'

dependency on corps artillery to engage deep targets. Even though the corps could furnish such

support from the Multiple-Launch Rocket System and 155-Illm. howitzers, the availability of

aircraft for transportation could limit or even preclude employing these weapons during the

early stages of a conflict. This would force early deploying light divisions to depend upon close

air support, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and their own general support artillery for targets

beyond the range of their direct support artillery. Weather, enemy air defenses, and other

problems, however, made the availability of this type of support problematic and made a light

multiple rocket system a necessity.44

With this reasoning in mind, the Field Artillery School began the search for the right

light multiple rocket system to eliminate the counterfire deficiency in light divisions. One

option involved adopting foreign technology being used by American allies after making

modifications to improve commonality within American forces. Another one was to ask private

industry to produce a light version of the Multiple-Launch Rocket System by using a medium

weight vehicle as the carriage and a launcher that only fired six rockets rather than twelve as

the Multiple-Launch Rocket System did. This would permit keeping the Multiple-Launch

Rocket System family of munitions that the Commanding General of TRADOC, General John

W. Foss, and General Hallada deemed to be crucial to reduce costs and promote standardization.45

In April 1990 the Field Artillery School continued its push to obtain a light multiple

rocket system. After reiterating the Multiple-Launch Rocket System's lack of deployability,

General Hallada reaffirmed the need for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS),

as the school called its light multiple rocket system. At the same time, he launched efforts to

obtain one as quickly as possible.46

The drive for automated command, control, and communications for the light forces'

field artillery received equal attention to counterfire and a light multiple rocket launcher. Although

the light division had the Battery Computer System for technical data solutions and some digital

command, control, and communications, its automation clearly lacked the capabilities offered

by TACFIRE that was in the heavy forces. Aware of this deficiency and the Advanced Field

Artillery Tactical Data System's (AFATDS) fielding that was set for the late 1980s and early

1990s, some congressional committees expressed their concern.47

In 1985 House and Senate Appropriations. Committees directed the Army to prepare a

plan for providing interim automation to its light divisions. Dated 6 September 1985, the

Army's plan identified two options. The first involved providing two light divisions with

increased quantities of the Fire Support Team Digital Message Device (FIST DMD). Although

the device was originally produced for the fire support team in the heavy division, the Army

proposed using it in the division, brigade, and battalion fire direction centers in the light

division. The device would be tied to the Battery Computer System in the battery and Digital

Communications Terminal, a hand-held device used by forward observers, fire support teams,

battalion and brigade fire support officers, and battalion and division artillery commanders.

49

~
 
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

This alternative was a lost-cost, quick-fix solution because the equipment was already being

produced and could be fielded in the near future.48

The second option consisted of furnishing the light division with a Tactical Computer

Processor. The Army subsequently dropped it because it was too heavy and costly and was not

compatible with the Army Command and Control System scheduled for introduction in the near

future.49

Even though the Army only listed two options in its September 1985 plan, a third one

existed. Late in October 1983, Litton Data Systems and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized)

started work on Light TACFIRE in response to the Quick Reaction Program, dated 18 November 1982. The program established the need for an artillery tactical data system that had

enhanced decentralized operations, was mobile and deployable, and reduced sustainment training to replace battalion TACFIRE. The Light TACFIRE consisted of a Lightweight Briefcase

Terminal and peripheral equipment and was scheduled for fielding to the 9th Infantry Division

(Motorized) in 1988. Although commanders of the 82nd Airborne Division and 7th Infantry

Division expressed the need for Light TACFIRE in 1984 and 1985 and argued that the Fire

Support Team Digital Message Device failed to satisfy their needs, the Army decided in June

1985 against obtaining Light TACFIRE for other light divisions. A careful evaluation by the

Army determined that Light TACFIRE was too expensive for an interim system, could not be

realistically deployed until a year before the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System was

introduced, and lacked the potential for growth to meet the requirements of the 1990s without

a major and costly redesign.50

As a result of this decision and the one to abandon the Tactical Computer Processor, the

Army's plan for interim automated fire support in the light division at the close of 1985 ruled

out two of the three options. The Fire Support Team Digital Message Device, the Battery

Computer System, and the Digital Communications Terminal would provide low-cost upgrades

to the existing manual system by 1986 and would be a workable solution to the perplexing

problem of command, control, and communication. Full light division automation would come

when the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System was fielded in 1989.51

Criticism over the decision arose quickly when Senator Dan Quayle requested the General

Accounting Office to evaluate the Army's plan for furnishing interim automated fire support

to light and heavy divisions. In September 1986 the General Accounting Office explained,

"...the Army's plans call for using the FISTIDMD in a much wider role than for which it was

designed. The FIST DMD was designed for the FIST company level position, and subsequently procured for the command and battalion fire support. elements."52 By fielding the

equipment at battalion level and above fire direction centers and fire support elements, which

had much greater requirements than the fire support team, the Army would employ it in a role

for which it was not designed. As a result, the Fire Support Team Digital Message Device

might not have the capabilities to meet the light division's automation needs. The General

Accounting Office raised a valid concern and at the same time questioned the wisdom of the

Army's decision.53

In view of its perception of the inadequacy of the Fire Support Team Digital Message

Device for the light division, the General Accounting Office supported procuring Light TACFIRE,

50
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

even though it was more expensive, because it could perform more fire support missions. From

the General Accounting Office's vantage point, the Army had to chose between a low-cost

solution that provided limited increased capabilities in automated command, control, and communications and a higher cost one with a significant improvement in capabilities as its interim

system.54

Notwithstanding the General Accounting Office's position, the Army still persisted in

moving ahead in 1987 with its plan to give the Fire Support Team Digital Message Device, the

~attery Computer System, and the Digital Communications Terminal to the light divisions as

Interim solutions. Although this action was not ideal, the pressure for getting automated

command, control, and communications for the light divisions was great. Those needs were

receiving increased attention in light of the growing possibility of contingency operations

throughout the world. As a result, the Army could not sit back and wait, nor could it expend

huge Sums of money for an interim system when an objective system was being developed and

would be available within a few years. The service had to move as rapidly and effectively as

Possible to automate light divisions.55

Although the Army's decision to press forward with the Fire Support Digital Message

Device app{(ared to be' viable and reasonable, Congress did not relent in its effort to provide

the light divisions with Light TACFIRE. Influenced by the General Accounting Office's report

of September 1986, Congress passed Fiscal Year (FY) 1987 Continuing Resolution. It directed

the Army to subject Light TACFIRE to operational testing under the auspices of an independent

Department of Defense testing agency and to report the findings to the Senate and House

Appropriations Committee by June 1987. Based upon a test conducted from March through

April 1987 using the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) configured as a light division in an

Operational environment and other tests and swdies, the Army concluded that Light TACFIRE

was not operationally effective as the objective system. The Army also determined that Light

TACFIRE was inadequate as an interim system' even though it was an improvement over

manual methods. 56

As of the mid-summer of 1987, automating fire support in'the light division had stalled

and had become politically controversial, with Congress and the Army opposing each other's

solutions. In reality, neither the Fire Support Team Digital Message Device nor Light TACFIRE

seemed to provide' the answer without being improved. Yet, nothing else at' the time offered

a viable alternative. The Army had to decide between two unsatisfactory systems unless a

better option could be found.

On. the basis of the situation 'with automating fire support in the light divisions, the

Undersecretary of the Army directed an independent review committee to be convened to assess

the proper course of action. During a meeting held on 3-5 August 1987, the committee

Concluded that the Army should employ the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System and

not Light TACFIRE if the.tests'to determine the validity of the AFATDS concept and software

Were Successful and if AFATDS software could be fielded to light infantry divisions as soon

as Light TACFIRE. This motivated the Army to speed up AFATDS' s development with the

creation of a block approach to software acquisition. Block one would be designed for light

divisions to give them the capacity to operate in conventional and mid-intensity level conflicts

with fielding in 1990, while block two would provide software for corps and heavy divisipns

51
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

and furnish much of the objective AFATDS capabilities. Block three would be the objective

software and would be fielded in 1991. As the action of the committee indicated, the pressure

to adopt Light TACFIRE continued unabated and caused the Army to modify AFA TDS in

order to fend off the supporters of Light TACFIRE.57

Realizing that the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System was only in the conceptual phase of development and unproven, the Undersecretary subsequently indicated that

work on both Light TACFIRE and AFATDS would continue until the concept evaluation

program for AFATDS was completed in 1987. At that time a decision would be made whether

the Army would procure Light TACFIRE or AFATDS for its light divisions. This decision

applied even more pressure because it kept Light TACFIRE alive for fielding to light divisions

if AF ATDS failed. 58

Because some senators and congressmen thought that Light TACFIRE was not only a

short-term solution but also an inexpensive, long-term solution for automated fire support,

Congress persisted in pressing to introduce the system. In December 1987 Congress told the

Army todevelop an acquisition plan for Light TACFIRE. Four months later, the Chairman of

the House Appropriations Committee and the Army Vice Chief of Staff reached an agreement.

The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System would be fielded to the heavy divisions,

and Light TACFIRE would go to the light divisions until the former could be developed. Later

in 1988, Congress reaffirmed this agreement by directing the Army to purchase Light TACFIRE

as the interim system and provided the funding. With this guidance the Army awarded a

contract to Litton Data Systems for Light TACFIRE Briefcase Terminals.59

Directed by Congress, the Army modified its light division interim automation program

in 1988 and 1989. The Army decided to purchase a package of Light TACFIRE, Fire Support

Team Digital Message Devices, Digital Communications Terminals, and Forward Entry Devices with an initial operational capability of early 1990. The Forward Entry Device would

provide the same capabilities as the Digital Communication Terminal and would be part of the

Army Tactical Command and Control System. The Light TACFIRE Briefcase Terminal would

be fielded in the direct support battalion fire direction center, the division artillery fire direction

center, and the division main and tactical fire support element. The Fire Support Team Digital

Message Device, which had been improved by the contractors since the 1987 tests, would be

placed with the battalion and brigade fire support elements, while the Digital Communications

Terminal would be given to the forward observer, fire support team, battalion and brigade fire

support officers, and battalion and division artillery commanders. Rather than making a complete break with its 1985 plan, the Army merely made an accommodation to satisfy Congress

to make the best of a bad situation. The 1988-1989, plan blended the desires of Congress and

the Army into one plan so that both were satisfied.60

With the exception of work slowing down. with the Firefinder radar modifications, the

Field Artillery School experienced some success in equipping and organizing fire support for

the light forces. As the 1980s were drawing. to a close, new field pieces and equipment were

being introduced, while interim automated command, control, and communications systems

were being adopted just as contingency operations were being elevated in importance with the

collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the reduced threat of high-intensity

conflict in Europe.

52
Field Artillery and the Light Forces

,.--For the field artillery, contingency operations did not portend less serious conflicts. The

Field Artillery School and TRADOC pointed out that chemical weapons were proliferating and

that virtually every country would have some degree of sophisticated equipment. Although the

threat of a high-intensity conflict in Europe was diminishing in 1989-1990, the lethality of the

battlefield certainly was not. Even forces in low-intensity conflicts would have the capability

of employing highly sophisticated technology on the battlefield. A hostile world still confronted the Army, the Field Artillery School, and the field artillery.61

Notwithstanding the requirements of the future as seen by the field artillery, which was

in a state of transition as the 1990s opened, modernization of the arm for the heavy and light

forces experienced mixed progress during the 1980s. Whereas the field artillery had doctrine

and organization for fighting in Europe, materiel with the exception of a few systems, such as

the Multiple-Launch Rocket System, did not exist, due to budget cuts. In some instances,

bUdget reductions and the time required to develop a new system slowed down the acquisition

process so that systems that were initially intended to be fielded early in the 1990s, such as the

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, were behind schedule. In comparison, field

artillery systems to support the light forces were beginning to appear, while doctrine lagged.

Finally, even though many Army officers since the early part of the decade had pointed out the

need for doctrine for heavy-:light operations, that doctrine was even less defined than field

artillery doctrine for light forces as a result of the raging controversy over combining heavy and

light forces for combat operations.

53
CHAPTER IV

OPERATION DESERT STORM AND

THE FIELD ARTILLERY

In the midst of the Army's ambitious modernization effort, a crisis in the Persian Gulf

erupted when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990. The United States and United

Nations reacted rapidly to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression and to force Iraq to

withdraw from ,Kuwait. In the process, the Army had the opportunity of testing the results of

its modernization program in actual combat.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

Early on 2 August 1990, the first Iraqi military columns attacked the small, oil-rich state

of Kuwait after Iraq and Kuwait had failed to resolve their long-standing differences over oil

production and prices and other controversial issues. Equipped with Soviet- and Western-made

military technology, three Republican Guard divisions (two armored, the Medina and Hammurabi,

and one mechanized, the Tawakalna) invaded Kuwait. One division raced down the coastal

road to Kuwait City. One division moved to seize the inland oil fields, while the third division

rushed to secure Kuwait's border with Saudia Arabia. Although th~ emir of Kuwait and other

government officials escaped and eventually formed a government in exile, Iraqi military forces

rolled over scattered and ineffective Kuwaiti military opposition. By the time that the Iraqis

had completed their blitzkrieg, they were in a position to invade Sa~dia Arabia and seize

control of most of the Persian Gulf oil resources upon which the world depended so heavily.

For the Saudis an attack was a distinct possibility "because intelligence data at the time indicated

that the Iraqi .leader, Saddam Hussein, planned to dismember their country as well as Bahrain

and Qatar.1

The United States and the United Nations quickly acted to resolve the crisis. The very

day of the invasion, President George Bush froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and signed an

executive order that banned trade with them, while the United Nations demanded an immediate

and unconditional withdrawal. The following day, President Bush warned Iraq not to invade

Saudi Arabia and offered American assistance to the Saudi ruler, King Fahd, who accepted it

on 6 August 1990.2

55
Operation Desert Storm and the Field Artillery

To defend Saudi Arabia and compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, the United Nations

initiated Operation Desert Shield, a huge buildup of a multinational military force. On 6

August 1990 the United States began deploying the 1st :actical Fighter Wing and the 82nd

Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia and shortly thereafter dIspatched the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and several strategically located supply ships based at the United States facility at

Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. By November 1990 American ground forces in Saudia

Arabia complemented by air and naval forces included U.S. Marine units, the 82nd Airborne

Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 1st

Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Armored Division. All of these forces were complemented by

European, Arab, and African troops.3

Initially, the United States and United Nations planned to stay on the defensive. When

it became apparent that economic sanctions would not drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait,

they turned to Operation Desert Storm, a major military offensive.4

In November 1990 President Bush outlined his objective to augment Allied forces

already in the Gulf region with an additional two hnndred thousand American troops by transferring mechanized and armored units from Germany and the United States and by bringing in

more air and naval units. This led to shipping the VII Corps from Germany, the 1st Infantry

Division (Mechanized) from the United States, and other units and extended the call-up of

Reserve and National Guard units of all the services. By bolstering combat strength the

President gave the Allied forces the capability of waging an offensive war to free Kuwait.

5

THE WAR AND FIELD ARTILLERY

After Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw his forces from Kuwait by the IS January

1991 deadline established by President Bush and supported by Congress and the United Nations. Operation Desert Storm commenced with an aggressive air offensive early in the morning

of 16 January 1991. Lasting through 23 February 1991. the Allied air campaign systematically

crippled Iraqi war making capabilities and shaped the battlefield for the ground war that followed.6 .

On 24 February 1991, American and Allied ground forces struck. As the Allies threatened amphibious landings, assaulted with U.S. Marines supported by Saudi forces across the

eastern part of Kuwait's southern border toward Kuwait City, and conducted probes farther to

the west. the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps on the Allied extreme left flank penetrated deep into

Iraq to the Euphrates River Valley on the first day to isolate the enemy and prevent reinforcement. Meanwhile, to the west of the Marines, Arab coalition forces pushed beyond the Kuwaiti-Saudi border barriers to deceive the enemy into. believing that a frontal assault was

underway. As this was occurring, the U.S. VII Corps executed a massive Wheeling maneuver

north and east to encircle Iraqi forces as the U.S. Marine and Arab coalition drove up from the

south to Kuwait City. Within one hundred hours. Allied ground forces had liberated Kuwait.

7

During Operation Desert Shield from August 1990 through January 1991. the Total

Army deployed field artillery units from active and reserve components to Saudi Arabia to

support American and Allied maneuver forces. By the time that the deployments had been

completed. the Army's field artillery force consisted of forty-three battalions (l08 105-mm

56
Operation Desert Storm and the Field Artillery

howitzers,.-642 towed and self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers, 96 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, and 189 Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems with 18 of them being configured for the Army

Tactical Missile System). They were organized into seven. division artilleries and seven artillery brigades with two corps artillery headquarters providing command and control of corps

assets.8

The dramatic success of Operation Desert Storm highlighted fire support strengths as

well as weaknesses. Within months after the liberation of Kuwait, the Field Artillery School

issued "emerging observations" from the war in July 1991 on doctrine, organization, materiel,

training, and leadership in a report to the Director of the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. Based on interviews with participants and after action reports, the

observations offered critically needed perspectives on the field artillery's ability to provide fire

support and identified ways to make it more effective.9

As numerous commanders, participants, and observers noted, Operation Desert Storm

validated AirLand Battle fire support doctrine as it had evolved through early 1991. In an

article published in Field Artillery in April 1991, Colonel David A. Rolston, who had given up

command of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery in December 1990 after two

years in command and had become the Deputy Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery

School in January 1991, reaffirmed the value of massed fires. He wrote, "Training prior to the

deployment and the operation itself reinforced another tenet: don't dilute fire support by

'nickel and diming' the effort with fires on small and relatively insignificant targets. Hit the

high-payoff targets with massive fires."lO To be sure, this pronouncement reinforced the

necessity of massing artillery fires that had been learned over the years and offered no new

prescriptions for artillery fire. Equally important, it was consistent with the thinking of brigade,

division, and corps commanders, who stated in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm that

the massive use of artillery fires paved the way for the rapid victory. Fire support, especially

field artillery, "was used in Desert Storm to the maximum in order to minimize the number of

effective enemy units that our soldiers in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles had to take on at

close range."ll

Despite a significant Iraqi advantage in both numbers of tubes and range capability, the

field artillery's "system of systems" helped overwhelm the enemy. The integration of target

acquisition systems; command, control, and communication systems; and cannon, rocket, and

missile systems took away the enemy's ability to locate targets beyond the forward line off

troops and silenced all of the opponent's artillery that dared to fire. Massed artillery fires

provided timely support to the maneuver commander, furnished overpowering fire superiority,

and allowed the commander to exploit the effects of fires .. Rapidly moving artillery formations

were able to supply fires when and where the ground forces needed them the most. After

reading many after action reports from field artillery units that had participated in Operation

Desert Storm, the Director, Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department, U.S.

Army Field Artillery School, Colonel David A. Rolston, wrote the Director of the Center for

Army Lessons Learned in July 1991. He explained, "Our fire was so effective and demoralizing that the Iraqi soldiers gave it the name "STEEL RAIN."12

An article in Field Artillery in October 1991 reiterated Colonel Rolston's observation.

Coordinated fires of upwards to eleven battalions on enemy positions repeatedly proved to be

57
Operation Desert Storm and the Field Artillery

absolutely devastating. As a captured Iraqi artillery commander related, he lost only ten percent

of his field artillery before the ground war. During the initial phases of the ground assault, he

lost all of his remaining guns to massed indirect fire.13 In fact, in that short war, Army field

artillery units fired over 57,000 rounds with the MI09 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer shooting over 43,000.14

In the fall of 1991, Major Kenneth P. Graves of the S-3 (Operations) section, XVIII

Airborne Corps Artillery, also emphasized the impact of massed fires. Acting as the force

artillery headquarters in the western sector of the XVIII Airborne Corps for five American

artillery battalions, the 18th Field Artillery Brigade (Airborne) habitually massed the entire

brigade on targets, while the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery and 212th Field

Artillery Brigade usually massed at least three battalions on a target. Major Graves added, "On

the final day, the 18th and 212th FA [Field Artillery] Brigades and 24th Infantry Division

Artillery massed nine battalions in a devastating early morning preparation to destroy the

Hammurabi RGFC [Republic Guard Forces Command] Armored Division."15

Major Mark S. Jensen, a battalion operations officer in the 1I27th Field Artillery, a

Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) .unit, shared a similar experience with massed fires

in an article in Field Artillery in August 1991. During an artillery raid in February 1991, his

battalion engaged twenty-four targets at ranges between twenty-one and thirty kilometers. The

first ripple attacked 15 targets with .181 ro~kets, and the .second fired 106 rockets at 9 targets.

I I n e.ss than five minutes, the battalIon delIvered the eqUIvalent of seventy-one volleys from a 16

battalion of twenty-four cannons.

Counterfire simultaneously received critical acclaim for its performance. In October

1991 the Commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Fred F. Marty, pUblished an article in Field Artillery that reflected the conclusions of many field artillery personnel

and that was based upon his readings of after action reports. Firefinder radars rapidly identified

tar ets for counterfire and sent the data digitally or verbally to the guns. Cannon and MLRS

ass~ts then silenced Iraqi artillery by delivering "conVincing" fires)? That same month, an

article in Field Artillery exclaimed, "This 'proactive' counterfire destroyed the enemy's will to

fight, allowed maneuver forces to maintain the rapid pace of their attack and saved friendly

lives."18

Although emerging observations confinned that doctrine as a whole was effective, they

concurrently pointed out the existence of some critical weaknesses that required correction. For

example, doctrine through corps level was sound, while doctrine for planning and executing fire

support at the field anny and joint level did not exist. Until the latter stages of the operation,

no fully capable fire support element existed at Anny Central Command (ARCENT) because

tactics, techniques, procedures, and organizational guidelines did not exist to form one.19

Simultaneously, contr~versy over fire .support at echelons above corps often adversely

influenced joint (Army and AIr Fo~c~) operatIOns. Responsibilities and structure for planning

and executing fire support at the Jomt force level was not in doctrinal publications, which

allowed each service to view fire support from its own perspective and not incorporate the

other's. Also, Air Force and Anny fire support dOctrine often varied, especially over definitions of fire support coordination measures. The Army employed the fire sUPPort coordination

58
Operation Desert Stonn and the Field Artillery

line as a pennissive fire support coordinating measure that allowed Army. units to fire beyond

it without coordination, whereas the Air Force treated it as a restrictive measure that required

the Army to coordinate all surface-to-surface fires beyond the line. This situation hampered the

ability of corps and Army commanders to plan and conduct deep operations and even delayed

the processing of long-range missile fires at times because the line had two different and

conflicting meanings.20

The problems associated with joint fire support doctrine in Operation Desert Storm and

the difficulty of forming a fire support cell at Army Central Command led to several conclusions at the Field Artillery School. Army component and joint force headquarters had to

establish a staff element with responsibilities similar to a fire support cell at the corps, while

doctrine had to be written to guide fire support cells at echelons above corps. Equally important, the Army and Air Force had to develop joint doctrine to resolve interservice fire support

doctrinal conflicts, such as that with the fire support coordination line.21

Combat service support doctrine for nondivisional artillery units also caused problems

in the Persian Gulf. The area support concept for corps units, particularly field artillery brigades, did not provide the required level of support. During Operation Desert Storm, many

different combat service support units supported an artillery unit for only a short period of time

because of the rapid reallocation. of artillery between divisions and corps on the extremely

mobile battlefield. This generated confusion and frequently hindered adequate support. For

example, a light force oriented combat service support unit often had to support a self-propelled

MIlO 8-inch howitzer battalion. In other instances, because the combat service support unit

was not pushed forward fast enough, lines of communications between it and the supported

field artillery unit were extremely long, which in turn forced the artillery to depend upon its

limited organic haul capacity. As a result of this .situation, many field artillery units had run

out of or had almost run out of supplies when the cease fire was declared. To resolve this

problem the Field Artillery School advocated supplying nondivisional artillery units with dedicated combat service support.22

Other problems arose with doctrine as well as organization. -Given the importance of

the MLRS, a battery of nine launchers could be overworked, if not simply overwhelmed, by

the demands of supporting the entire division. Also, the changing relationship of corps field

artillery brigades with the division meant that the division could not count on having the field

artillery brigade's MLRS battalion when it was needed. To eliminate these two problems the

division required a battalion of twenty-seven MLRS launchers rather than a battery of nine

launchers. This would improve firepower, permit rotating fire missions among a greater number of MLRS launchers, and allow conducting maintenance and resting the crew.23 Besides

increasing the number of MLRS launchers in the division, the commander of the 1st Infantry

Division's artillery, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Michael L. Dotson, went as far as to

advocate making two additional cannon battalions organic to the division. This would provide

the division commander with sufficient fire support to conduct "most operations without further

augmentation."24

Although many field artillery officers at division level wanted more firepower than what

they had to perform their missions, some at corps level also pushed for additional firepower.

For example, the commander of the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel (later Brigadier

59

-

r
Operation Desert Stonn and the Field Artillery

General) Morris J. Boyd, pointed out in a memorandum a critical motivating factor. In April

1991 he wrote that "we can make up for a shortage of artillery by fOcusing what you do have

at the right place and right time, but it isn't easy."25 This implied that an extraordinary effort

on the part of field artillerymen was required to offset the lack of sufficient quantities of

artillery. Having more artillery to make the field artillery's job much easier was Boyd's . 1.. e 26 Imp ICltmessag .

In comparison, Operation Desert Storm provided a number of notable materiel ,successes. In its first Use in combat, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System decisively demonstrated

its ability to shoot, move, and survive and to inflict tremendous damage to the enemy's morale

and materiel. In fact, it was the "weapon of choice" to silence the enemy artillery in Counterfire

missions up to a range of thirty kilometers. In response to the weapon's perfonnance, the

Commander, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Colonel Floyd T. Banks, said, "It is a

great weapon system."27 The Commander, 1st Armored Division Artillery, Colonel Vollney

B. Com, Jr., supported this view when he explained that the system's accuracy and lethality

quickly established it as "critical part of our force artille,?, fir~power. In particular, we relied

on the MLRS as our pnmary counterfIre weapon, and In thIS role, we silenced all enemy

artillery that fired at us."28 Although the system was an incomparable area support weapon and

worked harmoniously with tube artillery, it lacked pinpoint accuracy to serve as a close SUpport

weapon and certainly was not a replacement for tube artillery.29

Although it was in limited production, the Army Tactical Missile System complemented

the Multiple-Launch Rocket System and tube artillery. Fired from a MLRS launcher, it furnished the corps commander with the ability to attack critical deep targets at ranges beyond one

hundred kilometers. Of the 102 Army Tactical Missile Systems sent to the Gulf all that the

Anny had available at the time approximately thirty were kept under the control of Army

Central Command to ensure that they were USed only against high-value targets. Limited by

the number of systems available and a supporting policy, the field artillery shot the Anny

Tactical Missile System at Scud missile and air defense missile sites, logistical bases, tactical .n . . 30 E

bridges, and gun and rocket artl ery POSItIOns. ven though precision sUbmunitions for the

system were still under de~elopment during the war, the existing warhead loaded with dozens

of dual-purpose antimatencI and anlIpersonnel bomblets destroyed every engaged target according to preliminary reports.

3t

Reflecting upon his brigade's employment of the Army

Tactical Missile System, the Commander, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel (later Brigadier

General) Jerry L. Laws, stated that the system perfonned better than anticipated and played a

critical role in defeating the Iraqi army}2

Also previously untested in combat, target acquisition systems executed their missions

well in the Gulf War. Despite some mobility problems, highly sensitive Firefinder radar

systems (Q-36 and Q-37) detected any type of object moving in a ballistic tr'\iectory through

the air. If the targeting process verified the existence of an actual target, such as an enemy

artillery unit, the artillery then fired at it. Such a capacity gave American field artillery a

distinct advan tage over Iraqi artillery, which had lost its target acquisition capabilities early

during the air war and could not determine the location of Allied artillery positions.33

Although Firefinder radm:s perfonned well in the eounterfire battle, the field artillery

still required the ability to acquIre enemy artillery before it fired. In the view of many, a

60

~

_

-
Operation Desert Storm and the Field Artillery

remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), also called an unmanned aerial vehicle (UA V), would have

satisfied this deficiency. Writing in the Field Artillery in October 1991, Colonel Corn explained, "One of the most effective target acquisition means used in the theater was the British

RPV."34 For the British, the system furnished outstanding real-time intelligence for artillery

target processing as well as maneuvering- capabilities that the American army, especially the

field artillery, lacked as a result of the death of the Aquila RPV program late in the 1980s. "If

I still had Aquila ... , it would have been in Southwest Asia, and the Army would be buying

it right now," exclaimed the Director, Target Acquisition Department, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Colonel Stanley E. Griffith, in July 1991.35

From these colonels' and others' vantage points, Operation Desert Storm substantiated

the requirement for a remotely piloted vehicle. "If we [the Army] had been able to send it [the

Aquila] over there [Southwest Asia], that would have been the hero of the war not GPS [Global

Positioning System]," Colonel Griffith asserted. as he assessed the potential impact of the

Aquila in the war.36 Based upon the success of the British RPV and the requirement for realtime intelligence and targeting, these officers and the Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department in the Field Artillery School argued for acquiring an unmanned aerial vehicle

for fire support missions as soon as possible.37

Another sy:stem, the OH-58D helicopter that the field artillery had also lost during the

latter years of the 1980s because budget reductions had decreased the number of helicopters to

be purchased also performed well in Desert Storm. Two senior field artillery commanders from

Fort Sill, who served in the Gulf, unanimously agreed about the system's importance for target

acquisition for field artillery. Looking back upon his unit's experience with the OH-58D,

Colonel Laws said, "It was superb, exceptional."38

Unfortunately, the helicopter was almost always used as a division aviation asset. For

the most part, OH-58Ds operated with AH-64 Apache helicopters to designate targets for

Hellfire precision-guided missiles.39 This practice limited the field artillery's opportunity for

employing them in a target acquisition role. Even so, the restricted but successful employment

of the OH-58D in fire support roles corroborated the requirement for having the helicopter

organic to division artillery where the division artillery commander could determine its deployment and have it at his disposal to acquire targets and lase targets for Copperhead munitions.40

As Operation Desert Storm indicated, the very target acquisition systems the OH58D and a remotely piloted vehicle that the Field Artillery School had worked so hard to obtain

during the 1980s but had lost proved to be critical. Unfortunately, someone else controlled

both systems and determined their employment.

Notwithstanding the problems just noted, the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Major General (later Lieutenant General) Barry R. McCaffrey, summed

. up the contribution of fire support to the quick victory over the Iraqis in the Field Artillery. In

moving prose, General McCaffrey said, "All of us appreciate the tremendous contribution of

the artillery. Our enormous success was due, in large part, to the artillery."41 Armor and

airpower might have appeared to be more dramatic and "glamorous," but the field artill~~y

played a critical role by permitting the other combat arms to maneuver and simultaneously

limited casualties. The field artillery was a vital member of the combined arms team.42

61

-

-
Operation Desert Storm and the Field Artillery

Although the General's comments directly addressed the field artillery's contribntion to

the victory in the Persian Gulf, they also provided insight into the modernization program of

the past two decades. Launchedearly in the 1970s in response to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact

military buildup and to an appreciation of the greatly increased lethality of modern weapons,

the effort produced the doctrine, force structure, and many of the field artillery systems employed in the Gulf War. Addressing the modernization program, the Commanding General, III

Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Brigadier General Howard J. von Kaenel, said, "The investment ...

in hardware, the investment in training and maintenance ... were totally justified and led to

the SUCcess... with a minimal loss oflife not just of American lives but enemy lives as well."43

General von Kaenel's remark pointed out the critical factor of training. Along with

introducing new systems, tactics, doctrine, and organizations, the Anny had dramatically improved its training since 1973. The traditional Army Training Program had prescribed the

number of hours to be devoted to each subject and task but had never really focused on the

quality of the training, and it was abandoned. In its place the U.S. Anny Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) developed a performance-oriented training program that required soldiers and units to perform to a prescribed standard. The program included the Anny Training

and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for unit collective training, Skill Qualification Tests (SQT)

for determining individual proficiency, a new literature program, and training extension courses.

Subsequently, the drive for force-on-force and live-fire exercises to make training mOre realistic

led to the creation of the National Training Center in 1982 at Fort IrWin, California; the Joint

Readiness Training Center in 1987 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; the Combat Maneuver Training

Center in 1987 at Hohenfels, Germany; and the Battle Command Training Program in 1987,

a five-day war fighting seminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Together, the various elements

of the program produced highly-trained soldiers and units.44

The vast field artillery modernization program designed with fighting in Europe in mind

paid valuable dividends in Southwest Asia early in 1991. The training, eqUipment, doctrine,

and organization that appeared after 1973 performed effectively and met expectations.

62
CONCLUSION

Once again focusing attention upon Europe after a long preoccupation with Vietnam

during most of the 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. Army, a major component of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) armed forces, confronted a numerically. superior and

well-equipped military colossus, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. In view. of the overwhelming

threat that it faced in Europe and the greatly enhanced lethality of modem weapons revealed

by the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Army had to modernize to survive on the modern battlefield. It had to rewrite doctrine, reform training, reorganize its force structure, and reequip with

state-of-the-art technology.

Written by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) during the mid1970s, active defense doctrine presented a means to fight outnumbered and win. It emphasized

employing liberal doses of firepower on the defense before turning to the offense. In harmony

with that doctrine and other work being done by TRADOC to design a heavy division for

combat in Europe, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School rewrote field artillery doctrine and

reorganized the field artillery so that it could apply its firepower more effectively.

Although new doctrine and force structures were imperative reforms, field artillery

systems (weapons; target acquisition; support; and command, control, and communications) of

the times severely restricted their impact. The field artillery was composed of 1950s technology, even though an incipient modernization effort was unfolding. The old technology was

pitted against the threat's technology that was superior in many cases. For that reason, the field

artillery had to initiate an extensive acquisition program to achieve technological parity, if not

superiority. However, unlike doctrinal and organizational reforms that could be accomplished

in a relatively short period of time, obtaining new technology would take years.

Although the modernization effort initiated early in the 1970s to remedy the Army's

unenviable position in Europe would enhance the field artillery's ability to fight, it had a serious

limitation. The active defense did not sufficiently consider the Soviet Union's and Warsaw

Pact's tactic of echeloning their armed forces to give. them the capability of overwhelming

NATO's defenses even if NATO had stopped the first echelon. Aware of the glaring weakness

'of the active defense, the Army had to revise its doctrine. During the latter 1970s and early

1980s, TRADOC replaced the active defense with Airland Battle doctrine that was specifically

designed for fighting echeloned forces and concurrently developed the Army of Excellence

corps and heavy division.

For the field artillery, supporting Airland Battle doctrine posed serious problems. It

required engaging the enemy's first and second echelons simultaneously, a capability that the '

63
Conclusion

field artillery did not have. In addition, doctrine described a highly mobile battlefield for which

existing field artillery was not suited. These critical deficiencies led to a new round of system

acquisition beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s to obtain field artillery systems that

could engage the second echelon and fight on a highly mobile battlefield.

Even though the Field Artillery School rewrote doctrine, revamped force structure, and

worked hard to introduce new systems, the effon to modernize the field artillery for a highintensity conflict in Europe failed to produce the intended reSUlts. The Commanding General,

U.S. Army, Europe, General Glenn K. Otis, identified fire support (naval gunfire, tactical air,

mortars, and field artillery) as his command's number one deficiency in 1987. Much to his

chagrin, acquiring new field attillery systems had not kept up with the Army's overall pace of

modernization. Since the early 1970s the Army had consistently ranked the acquisition of new

field artillery systems low on its list of priorities and had not funded or paid sufficient attention

to this critical combat ann. Along with the complexity of system acqUisition, that neglect had

limited the number of new field attillery systems that were available to suppon Airland Battle.

Only the towed MI98 155-mm. howitzer, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System, the ANfI1'Q36 and ANfTPQ-37 counterfire radars, and Tactical Fire Direction System were added during

the two decades of modernization. Of these major systems, only the Multiple-Launch Rocket

System had the required characteristics to fight on the deep, highly lethal, and mobile battlefield

envisioned by Airland Battle.

Even before steps could be taken to eliminate the deficiency by increasing production

of the Multiple-Launch Rocket System or by stepping up the pace of modernization, international events changed the political scene in Europe. The end of the Cold War, Which had fueled

the massive arms buildup in Europe, now raised the critical question about the necessity of

maintaining a large American military presence on the continent and simultaneously threatened

to stall modernization. As far as the Army, TRADOC, and the Field Artillery School were

concerned, the new political climate in Europe did not mean that modernization should come

to a halt. Threats to American national security still existed that justified the requirement to continue modernizing.

While the field artillery struggled to modernize for a high-intensity conflict, the organizing and equipping of light forces for contingency operations attracted increasing attention,

especially after 1979. Because of the ambiguous role of field artillery in low- to mid-intensity

conflicts and because of the debate Over heaVY-light operations, however, the field artillery was

still striving at the end of the 19805 to develop Suitable light-force doctrine. Yet, the fielding

of weapon systems and interim automated command, control, and communications systems for the .light forces was underway.

The modernization of the King of Battle had achieved miXed results as the 1980s drew

to a close. On the one hand, many critical systems for combat in Europe still had not yet

appearcd despite years of work, although dOCtrine and organizations were in place. That meant

that exploiting Airland Battle doctrine and the heavy division would he diffiCUlt. On the other

hand, vital systems to suppon low- an~ mid-intensity conflict were being introduced, although

the corresponding doctrine was still bemg debated. Notwithstanding this ambiguous situation,

the Persian Gul f crisis of 1990- 199 I suggested that the modernization effon of the 197Os and

1980s was not unproductive. The modernized field artillery systems that had been introduced

64
Conclusion

as well as the new doctrine performed as anticipated. Some systems, such as the Multiple- -----

Launch Rocket System, even surpassed performance standards.

Although a number of needed systems were in development in. 1991 and doctrine in

some instances remained unclear, particularly for low- to mid-intensity conflicts, the overall

modernization of the field artillery since the Vietnam War had achieved notable success. The

effort set the stage for revolutionizing American field artillery by high technology at the approach of the 21 st century.

65
AFAS

AFATDS

AHIP

ARCENT

Army TACMS

ARTEP

ATACMS

CALL

CSSG

DSWS

ESPAWS

FADAC

FAMAS

FDC

FIST

FIST DMD

FM

FORSCOM

FOV

FSCOORD

FY

GPS

GSRS

HELP

HHB

HIP

HMMWV

INF

MLRS

NATO

RGFC

ROAD

RPV

SADARM

SQT

TAB

TACFIRE

TRADOC

UAV

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Advanced Field Artillery System

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

Army Helicopter Improvement Program

Army Central Command

Army Tactical Missile System

Army Training and Evaluation Program

Army Tactical Missile System

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Close Support Study Group

Division Support Weapon System

Enhanced Self-Propelled Artillery Weapon System

Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer

Field Artillery Meteorological Acquisition System

Fire Direction Center

Fire Support Team

Fire Support Team Digital Message Device

Field Manual

U.S. Army Forces Command

Forward Observation Vehicle

Fire Support Coordinator

Fiscal Year

Global Positioning System

General Support Rocket System

Howitzer Extended Life Program

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

Howitzer Improvement Program

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

Multiple-Launch Rocket System

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Republican Guard Forces Command

Reorganization Objective Army Division

Remotely Piloted Vehicle

Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition

Skill Qualification Test

Target Acquisition Battery

Tactical Fire Direction System

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

67
Appendix A

DIVISION RESTRUCTURING STUDY

HEAVY DIVISION ARTILLERY

Ilii~tlXX

3135 (220-19-2896)

fliilllill

173 (33-2-138)

rii~tiilll

145 (5-5-135)

769 (51-3-715)

Ilj.

510 (29-3-478)

Source: TRADOC Division Restructuring Study, Phase I, The Heavy Division,

1 March 1977, E-1-11 E-1-12

69

-
Appendix

Appendix 8

HEAVY DIVISION 86

DIVISION ARTillERY

3516 I~IXX

72 -155mm HOW

16 - S" HOW

9 - MLRS

5-RPV

24 -155MMHOW

(3xS)

14 - FOV

rRJ

9-GSRS

16 - S" HOW

(2xS)

11- FOV .

5-RPV

3 - Q36

2 - Q37

14-NETTED

RADARS

3-FAMAS

70

Source: John L. Romjue, A Hislo of Arm 86 Division 86: The Davelo menl of the

Heavy Division, Vol I (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command, 1982), p. 116.
Appendix

Appendix C

ARMY OF EXCELLENCE (AOE)

ARMORED AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

"XXil!i1XX

TOE6.300J

lliflt'lll litilltiJ

TOE6~02J TOE~307J

155MMSP

TOE6.365J

";1

MLRS

TOE6.398J

Source: u.s. Army Command and General Staff College, Organizational and Tactical

Reference Data for the Army in the Field, June 1986, p. 9-4.

71
Appendix

Appendix D

ARMY OF EXCELLENCE (AOE)

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

xx

1373

1111_1101

424

RECAP

4 - FDC (TACFIRE)

54 - M102 HOWITZERS

3 - Q36 RADARS

246-HMMWV

25- TRK5T

3x6

72

Source: John L. Romjue, The Arm of Excellence: The Develo ment of the 1980s

Army (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), p. 158.
Appendix

Appendix E

MAJOR FIELD ARTILLERY WEAPONS IN 1991

System

M102 105-mm. howitzer

Ml19 105-mm. howitzer

M198 155-mm. howitzer

M109A2/A3 155-mm. howitzer

M109 155-mm. HIP howitzer

(Paladin)

M110A2 8-inch howitzer

Multiple- Launch

Rocket System

Lance Missile

Army Tactical

Missile System

Range

11.5 kilometers

with conventional projectiles

15.1 kilometers

with rocket-assisted projectiles

14.3 kilometers

with conventional projectiles

19.5 kilometers

with rocket-assisted projectiles

30 kilometers

with rocket-assisted projectiles

18.5 kilometers

23.7 kilometers

with rocket-assisted projectiles

NA

30 kilometers

with rocket-assisted projectiles

30 kilometers

91 kilometers

124 kilometers

Prime Mover

truck

truck

truck

self-propelled

self-propelled

self-propelled (

self-propelled

NA

self-propelled

Source: 1993 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill Annual Command History, pp.

125, 126, and 160; "Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update," Field Artillery, Dec

1990, pp. 49-55.

73
END NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and

the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute,

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), pp. 5-6; John L. Romjue, From Active

Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982 (Fort Monroe, VA:

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] Historical Office, 1984), p. 3; Draft

Training Circular 6-4-1, May 75, p. 1, U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), The Threat

Background Material File, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL) Archives, Fire Support

Research Center (FSRC), USAFAS.

2. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana

University Press, 1984), pp. 522, 526, 536, 573-78; Maj Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of

u.s. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), p. 43.

3. Maj Gen David E. Ott, "Counterfire," Draft Article, ca. mid-1976, Chronology of

Counterfire Doctrine Development/Evaluation File, MSTL Archives; Herbert, Deciding What

Has to Be Done, pp. 29-36; Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 3, 6-7;

Doughty, The Evolution of u.s. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, pp. 41-42; Interview, Dr.

Boyd L. Dastrup with Maj Gen (Ret) Eugene S. Korpal, former Cmdt, USAFAS, 24 Feb 92,

Historical Records and Document Collection (HRDC), Command Historian's Office, U.S. Army (

Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS); Maj Joseph A. Adelman, "Preparedness for

Counterfire,"unpublished Masters of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, 1984, p. 43.

4. Romjtie, FromActive Defense to AirLand Battle, p. 7; John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy,

and Anne W. Chapman, Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army

Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993 (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command

Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), p.43;Weigley, History of the

United States Army, pp. 584-86; Memorandum for Record, 1 Dec 75, PM 6-20 File, USAFAS,

Office of the Assistant Commandant (AC), MSTL Archives; Ltr, Lt Gen (Ret) David E. Ott to

Dastrup, 12 Feb 93, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Col Stanley Cass with Lt Gen David E.

Ott, Dec 79, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 46; Robert H.

Scales, Jr., et al, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington DC: Office

of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993), pp. 9-10.

75
End Notes

5. See Boyd L. Dastrup's King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field

Artillery (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Office, 1992) for a short perspective on

modernizing the field artillery during the 1970s. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, pp.

1, 5, 6, 101-02.

6. PM 100-5, Operations, 1 Jul 76, pp. 2-1 2-32; Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be

Done, pp. 36, 39, 79-85. TRADOC was created as a result of Operation Steadfast that was a

major reorganization of the U.S. Army in 1973. Operation Steadfast disestablished the U.S.

Army Combat Developments Command and the U.S. Continental Army Command, and established TRADOC and the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). TRADOC acquired

responsibilities for individual training, researching new techniques of land warfare, and developing doctrine, while FORSCOM gained control over U.S.-based operational units.

7. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, pp. 44-45; Weigley,

History of the United States Army, p. 578; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army

for War, p. 52.

8. DePuy, "Field Manual 100-5," Position Paper,Sep 76, Field Manuals File, USAFAS,

Office of the AC, MSTL Archives.

9. FM 100-5, pp. 1-1 1-5; Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, p. 7.

10. FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, May 77, preface; Memorandum, 1 Dec 75, FM 6-20 File, MSTL Archives; Ltr, Maj Gen Donald R. Keith to Maj Gen John

R. Thurman III, Cdr, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 May 77,

Field Manual File, USAFAS, Office of the AC, MSTL Archives. Rather than listing each

separate letter, please see FM 6-20 File and Field Manual File in MSTL Archives. Both contain

correspondence with division artillery commanders and others concerning the draft of FM 6-

20. One message went as far as to dispute that PM 6-20 was a true capstone fire support

document because of its inadequate discussion of close air support.

11. Ltr with Encl, Keith to Brig Gen Eugene Kelly, Jr., Cmdt, U.S. Army Intelligence

School, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, May 77, Field Manual File.

12. Ltr, Keith to Meyer, undated, Field Manual File.

13. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, pp. 21-22, 27-28; John L. Romjue, The

Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the

Command Historian, TRADOC, 1993), pp. 7-8.

14 TRADOC, Division Restructuring Study Phase I Report, Executive Summary, 1

Mar 77, pp. v, 1,5-9, 13-14, A6-AI2, MSTL Archives; Division Restructuring Evaluation, U.S.

Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Executive Summary, Sep 78, p. iv,

MSTL Archives; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, Combined Arms Center (CAC) , et ai, subj:

Reorganization Proposals, 081618Z May 76, HRDC; Lt Col Homer J. Gibbs, "A Report on

DRS," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 78, p. 36; john L. Romjue, A History of Amy 86:

Division 86, The Development of the Heavy Division (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical

Office, 1982), pp. 4-6, hereafter cited as Division 86; Ltr, TRADOC to See Distribution, subj:

Division Restructuring Study Concept Paper, 21 Sep 76, HRDc; Draft Concept Paper, ca. 1976,

Heavy Division Restructure File, MSTL Archives; Memorandum for Record, subj: Outline

76

-

-
End Notes

,.--

Concept Paper for Division Restructuring Study, ca. Sep 76, pp. 4-7, Heavy Division Restructure File, MSTL Archives; Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 93, HRDC.

15. Romjue, Division 86, pp. 7-10.

16. Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 93.

. 17. Fire Support Mission Area Analysis (FSMAA) (C), 15 Jan 81, p. 12, material used

IS unclassified, HRDC; Draft Ltr, Ott to Editor-in-Chief, Army Magazine, undated, Chronology

of Counterfire Doctrine DevelopmentJEvaluation File, MSTL Archives; "Towards Improved

Counterfire Capabilities," student paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1975, pp. 1-5, 7-13, Counterfire File, MSn Archives; Ott, "Counterflfe," pp. 4-5; Ltr, Ott t~

Dastrup, 12 Feb 93; Oral History Interview, Cass with Ott, Dec 79, pp. 63-64.

18. FSMAA (C), 15 Jan 81, p. 12, material used is unclassified; "Towards Improved

Counterfire Capabilities," pp. 15, 39, 51; Draft Ltr, Ott to Maj Gen John H. Cushman, Cmdt,

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, undated, AC, USAFAS File, MSTL Archives.

In June 1977, the Field Artillery School published a concept paper, entitled "The Field Artillery

Brigade" that described the corps artillery group's role as being vague and staffed it throughout

the field artillery community for review and comments. The concept paper was generally

received well except for the statement "... the role of the field artillery group has always been

vague." As might be expected, this statement stimulated a vigorous debate between the Field

Artillery School and corps artillery commanders in Germany. As far as the commanders were

e.oneemed, the group's role was not vague because its m~or mission involved augmenting the

fIres of the division. See Msg, Cdr, V Corps Artillery to Cmdt, USAFAS, 02081lZ Aug 77;

Ltr, Cdr, V Corps Artillery, to Keith, ca. Aug 77; Cdr, VII Corps Artillery, to Cdr, USAFAS,

031650Z Aug 77; Ltr, Cdr, VII Corps Artillery, to Keith, 15 Aug 77. The above letters and

messages are located in USAFAS, Cmdt, FA SectionlFA Brigade File, MSTL Archives.

19. Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 93.

20. Ibid.

21. Ott, "Counterfire," pp. 3-4.

22. Ibid., p. 4.

23. Briefing, subj: Counterfire, Jul 75, Counterfire Briefing File, MSTL Archives. ,

24. Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 93; Ur, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj:

Recommended Changes to TOE 6-40IH, Artillery Group, 3 May 77, HRDC; Col Edward R.

C~1eman, "Field Artillery Brigade," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 77, pp. 40, 51; PM 6-22,

DIvision Artillery, Field Artillery Brigade, and Field Artillery Assigned to Corps (Draft), Extract, May 77, pp. 4-1, 4-2, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Cass with Ott, Dec 79, pp. 62-65.

25 Ott, "Counterfire," p. 5; "Towards Improved Counterfire Capabilities," pp. 53-59;

Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Army, subj: Counterfire Decision Decision Memorandum,

Apr 76, USAFAS Counterfire Decision Memorandum File, MSn Archives; TRADOC, Division Restructure Study Phase I Report, Executive Summary, p. 13; Ltr (draft), Ott to Cushman,

undated; Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 93.

77

-
End Notes

26. Msg, DA to Cdr, TRADOC, 0720492 May 76, Counterfire Doctrine File, MSTL

Archives; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Recommended Changes to TOE 6-

401 H, Artillery Group, 3 May 77.

27. Ltr, Keith to Maj Gen J.R. Thurman, Cdr, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and

Fort Leavenworth, 11 Jun 77, Donald R. Keith Book 2, Doctrine File, MSTL Archives; Ltr with

Encls, Keith to Col Jack O. Bradshaw, Cdr, 1st Armored Division Artillery, 16 Jun 77, Donald

R. Keith Book 2 File, MSTL Archives.

28. Ltr, Ou to DePuy, 25 Jun 75, in Close Support Study Group Report, Executive

Summary, 21 Nov 75, MSTL Archives; Fact Sheet, subj: Close Support Study, 30 Mar 76,

HRDC; Oral History Interview, Cass with Ott, Dec 79, pp. 58-62.

29. Final Report, Close Support Study Group, 21 Nov 75, pp. 4-13, MSTL Archives;

Brig Gen Paul F. Pearson, "FIST," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 76, pp. 7-12; Legal Mix

V, Executive Summary, 30 Dee 77, pp. vii, 4-10, HRDC. Close Support Study Group (CSSG)

of 1975 was the first of four such studies. With the emergence of AirLand Battle, the fielding

of the Bradley fighting vehicle, the introduction of laser technology to combat, the Tactical Fire

Direction System, and numerous of other developments, TRADOC convened CSSG II in 1979

to address the impact of these changes. The group refined force structure and fire support

doctrine based upon experience gained since the first CSSG. In 1984-85 TRADOC held CSSG

III to ensure that fire support satisfied AirLand Battle requirements. CSSG IIIreaffirmed the

validity of the FIST chief, recommended fielding a fire support vehiele and organizing combat

observation teams to lase targets for precision munitions, and confirmed the need for fire

support officers to be located with the maneuver commanders. From late 1988 through early

1989, CSSG IV met to focus on fire support for the brigade and division since previous groups

had examined fire support for the company and battalion. Together, the four CSSGs played a

key role in modernizing the field artillery during the 1970s and 1980s. See U.S. Army Field

Artillery Center and Fort Sill Annual Historical Review for 1989, pp. 108-13, for more information on CSSGs, especially CSSG IV.

30. Pearson, "FIST," p. 7; Report, Close Support StUdy Group IT, 21 Nov 75, pp. 4-6;

Lt Col Joseph R. Simino, "Don't Forget Your FIST," Field Artillery Journal, Mar -Apr 81, p.

58; Final Draft, Close Support Study Group, Executive Summary, 12 Sep 75, History of the

Forward Observer.

31. Ltr, Gen (Ret) Donald R. Keith to Dastrup, 19 Jul 93, HRDC.

32. Maj Raymond Spigarelli and Maj Martell Fritz, "Here Comes TACFIRE," The

Field Artilleryman, Nov 69, P: 67; Maj Gen Charles P. Brown, "TACFIRE," Artillery Trends,

May 68, pp. 19-20; Eric C. Ludvigsen, "Lifting the Fog of War," Army, JuI72, pp. 31, 33; Eric

Ludvigsen, "Rebuilding for 1980s With An Eye on 2000," Army, Oct 82, p. 333; PM 100-5,

Operations, 1977, pp. 3-6, 3-7; Romjue, From Active Dejense to Airland Battle, pp. 6-8; Ott,

"Forward Observations," Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 75, p. 6; Col Leland A. Wilson and

Col Kenneth S. Heitzke, "ARTADS: The Computer on Future Battlefields," Army, Jun 74, p.

16; USAFAS, TACFIRE: The Tactical Fire Direction System, Reference Note, Apr 75, pp. 1_

2; USAFAS, Field Artillery Materiel De~elopment Plan, Aug 77, p. 11, MSTL Archives.

78
End Notes

33 Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Update, 18 Apr 79, p. 3, HRDC; Patrick F. Rogers,

"The New Artillery," Army, Jul 80, p. 31; Col William J. Harrison, "MALOR," Field Artillery

Journal, Mar-Apr 75, pp. 30-32; Memorandum for Record, subj: The Mortar Locating Radar

Development, History and Status, ca. 1973, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Cass with Ott, Dec

79, pp. 29, 30, 66, 79.

34. Col Sherwin Arculis, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, "Remotely Piloted Vehicles," Draft Article, pp. 1-10, RPV Historical Report File, MSTL Archives;

Disposition Form (DF), subj: Field Artillery Center Team Position on Unmanned Aircraft, 11

Sep 72, RPV and Field Artillery Center Team Position on Unmanned Aircraft File, MSTL

Archives; RPV Historical Supplement, undated, HRDC; DF, subj: Trip Report, 4 Feb 74,

USAFAS, Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) File, MSTL Archives; Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc., Final Report for Period Dec 74-Dec 79, p. 21, Aquila RPV

System Demonstrator File, MSTL Archives; DF, subj: RPVs and Drones, 9 Apr 74, RPV and

Drones File, MSTL Archives; U.S. Army Field Artillery School and Field Artillery Board,

Detailed Experiment Plan for Project Seeker, Jul 75, p. 1, HRDC; Briefing, subj: RPV NATO

Panel VI, ca. 1978, HRDC.

35. Ltr with Encl, USAFAS to Cdr, CAC, subj: RPV Operational and Organizational

Study, 8 Apr 77, RPV Operational and Organizational Study File, MSTL Archives; Msg, Cdr,

Army Materiel Command, to Cdr, Army Missile Command, subj: Mini-RPVs, 111954Z Jan

74, USAFAS, DCD File, MSTL Archives.

36. Msg, Cdr, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center (USAFAC), to Cdr, CAC, subj: MiniRPV, Jul 77, Donald R. Keith Book 2, Materiel Developments File, MSTL Archives.

37. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Update, 18 Apr 79, p. 3; David F. Schnebly, The

Development of the XMQMI05 Aquila Mini-RPV System, (Sunnyvale, CA: Lockheed Missiles

and Space Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 24-32; White Paper, subj: Aquila: A Case for Acquiring

Aquila and a Family of Payloads as a Combined Arms RPV, Mar 88, MSTL Archives; "Field

Artillery Test and Development," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 79: p. 47; "View from the

Blockhouse," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 79, p. 21; Benjamin M. Elson, "Mini-RPV

Being Developed for Army," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 Jan 80, pp.,2-3; "Field

Artillery. Test and Development," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec. 79, p. 35; Terrence D. '

Gossett, U.S. Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle Supporting Technological Programs, (Moffett

Field, CA: U.S. Army Research and Technology Laboratory, 1981).

38. J.B.~. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford: The Military Press, 1989),

p.306; FSMAA(C), Aug 74, p. 95, material used is unclassified.

39. Ibid.; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 306; Lt Col Charles L. Williams III,

"CLGP: The Smart Round," Field Artillery Journal, May-Apr 75, p. 29; Capt Joseph C.

Antoniotti and William J. Krondak, "Development of Precision Guided Munitions: A Field

Artillery Point of View," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 78, pp. 24-25; USAFAS, Operational

and Organization Concept for Copperhead, 1981-86, Jun 79, p. F8, MSTL Archives; Final

Report, Fire Support Team Force Development Experimentation, Executive Summary, AprMay 84, pp. 1-8, MSTLArchives; James F. Hall, "Precision Guided Artillery: First and Second

Generation Projectiles," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 81, p. 20.

79
End Notes

40. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 307; Legal Mix V, Final Report, 17 Feb

77, p. 1-1, MSTL Archives; Weigley, History o/the United States Army, pp. 584-85; USAFAS,

Operational and Organizational Concept for Copperhead, 1981-86, Jun 79, p. F8; Maj Michael

W. Hustead, "Fire Support Mission Area: Impact of Precision Guided Munitions," Field

Artillery Journal, May-Jun 81, pp. 19-20; Final Report, Fire Support Team Force Development

Experimentation, Executive Summary, Apr-May 84, pp. 1-8.

41. Ian V. Hogg, Artillery 2000 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990), pp. 109-10;

Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 307; Ludvigsen, "Rebuilding for 1980s With An Eye on 2000," p. 317.

42. Hogg, Artillery 2000, p. 109; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 308; Fact

Sheet, subj: SADARM Artillery Munitions, 1 Nov 85, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Generic

SADARM, 2 Jul 85, HRDC; Fact Sh~et, subj: SADARM, 3 Jun 86, HRDC; Hustead, "Fire

Support Mission Area," pp. 19-20; Comptroller General, Report to the Congress of the United

States, Decisions to be Made in Charting Future of DOD's Assault Breaker, 28 Feb 81, pp. 12-

13; Hereafter cited as Decisions to Be Made.

43. Hustead, "Fire Support Mission Area," pp. 19-21; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery

Update, 18 Apr 79, p. 13, HRDC; Hall, "Precision Guided Artillery," pp. 9-12; Report, HQ

TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity, subj: Restructuring of the Heavy Division, Phase I,

Aug 78, p. II, MSTL Archives; USAFAS, Field Artillery Reference Data, Jan 80, p. IV2;

Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 307-08. "

44. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Update, p. 11, HRDC; Truman R. Strobridge and

Bernard C. Nalty, "The Roar of the 8-Incher," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 80, p. 36; 1988

USAFACFS, Annual Historical Review (AHR), p. 129, HRDc; "M198 Production Rolling,"

Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 78, p. 15; Maj William Whelihan, "We've Got 30!" Field

Artillery Journal, May-Jun 79, pp. 9-12; Maj William Whelihan, 'The M198," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 78, p. 9.

45. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Update, pp. 11-12, HRDC; 1988 USAFACFS AHR, p. 18, HRDC.

46. Lt Col Allan R. Stem, "Do We Need A Multiple Rocket Launcher," Field Artillery

Journal, Jul-Aug 74, pp. 25-28; Comptroller General, Report to the Congress, The Army's

Multiple Launch Rocket System is Progressing Well and Merits Continued Support, 5 Feb 82,

p. 1; Jane's Artillery and Armour, 1979-80, pp. 528-29; Kenneth C. McDonald, "GSRS: More

Than The MRL?" Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 74, pp. 12-15; Merritt, "On the Move," Field

Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 79, p. 2.

47, Mary L. Corrales, "MLRS: The Soldier's System," Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug

80, p. 8; Col Charles J. Buel and Capt Gary R. Miller, "GSRS Status Report," Field Artillery

Journal, Jan-Feb 79, pp. 13-15; Jane's Artillery and Armour, 1979-1980, pp. 528-29; McDonald,

"GSRS: More Than The MRL?"pp. 12-15; MLRS Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (S), 17 Apr 80, p. 10, material used is unclassified.

48. McDonald, "GSRS: More Than The MRL?" pp. 12-15; Bailey, Field Artillery and

Firepower, p. 309; Buel and Miller, "GSRS Status Report," pp. 13-15.

80
End Notes

49. Ltr, Keith to Dastrup, 19 Jul 93, HRDC; "GSRS Renamed MLRS," Field Artillery

Journal, Jan-Feb 80, p. 58; "GSRS to go Standard," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 78, p. 64.

50. Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, p. 44; Lt Gen Robert

R. Williams, "Tight Budgets, Mission Challenge Force Planner," Army, Oct 71, pp ..80-85; Eric

C. Ludvigsen, "Army Weapons, Equipment: Looking for A Breakthrough," Army, Oct 71, pp.

122-37.

51. Scales, et al, Certain Victory, p. 20; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the

Army for War, p. 44; Lt Col Jack Goldstein, "The Army's Big Five: Irons in the Fire," Army,

May 73, pp. 18-23.

52. Ibid. Goldstein served as an executive officer to a group involved in the "Big Five"

when he was in the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Romjue'i From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 15,24-26; Scales, et ai, Certain

Victory, p. 14. Warsaw Pact military forces arrayed themselves in three imposing echelons of

armor, infantry, and artillery.

2. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, p. 97.

3. Maj Joseph C. Antoniotti, "Another Point of View: Attacking the Second Echelon,"

Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 86, p. 8; "Assault Breaker Program Underway," Field Artillery

Journal, May-Jun 80, p. 58; Scales, et ai, Certain Victory, p. 14.

4. Antoniotti, "Another Point of View," pp. 7-11.

5. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 32-37, 46; "FA Test and Development," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 80, p. 42; FSMAA, Executive Summary (C),

Extract, 15 Jan 81, pp. 9-11, material used is unclassified; Department of the Army, Field

Manual 100-5, Operations, 1982, pp. 7-5, 7-10, 7-13 7-17. See "Fire Support for Deep

Operations" by Maj Curtis L. Retzloff, Tactics and Combined Arms Department, USAF AS,

located in HRDC, for additional information on fighting the close and deep battles simultaneously. Field Artillery Division 86 Historical Report, Executive Summary, 1 Oct 1978-1 Oct

1979, MSTL Archives, and Field Artillery Division 86 Historical Report, Principle Report, 1

Oct 1978-1 Oct 1979, MSTL Archives, provide insights into fighting the second echelon.

6. FSMAA, Executive Summary (C), 15 Jan 81, pp. 9-11, material used is unclassified;

Brig Gen Edward A. Dinges and Maj Richard H. Sinnreich, "Battlefield Interdiction: Old

Term, New Problem," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 80, p. 14.

7. Ibid., p. 15.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.; FSMAA, Executive Summary (C), 15 Jan 81, pp. 9-11, material used is unclassified.

10. Maj Gen Jack N. Merritt, "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 79, p.

3.

81

-

I
End Notes

2. II. Ibid., pp. 2-3; Dinges, "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 80, pp. 1-

12. Romjue, Division 86, pp. 11-41; ROmjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare for War,

. 60; Romjue, The Army of Excellence, p. 8; Division 86 Final Report, Executive Summary,

~ct 81, pp. 1-13; TRADOC Division Restructuring Study, Executive Summary, I Mar 77, pp.

6, 11-14, A6-AII; TRADOC Division Restructuring Study, The Heavy Division, I Mar 77, pp.

15-18, 81-87.

13. Lt Gen Donald R. Keith, "The Comeback Trail: Challenges in Equipping the New

Army," Field Anillery Journal, Sep-Oct 80, pp. 25-29; Romjue, The Army of Excellence, pp. 10,49,50, 171-74.

14. Romjue, Division 86, pp. 42, 78-79, 111-16; Romjue, The Army of Excellence, pp.

14,23,24; TRADOC Division 86 Final Report, Oct 81, pp. 1-13,3-1 3-11.

15. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Depanment of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Ycar (FY) 82, p. 25; U.S. Army Center of Military History, Department of the

Army Historical Summary, FY 86, pp. 65-67; Col Robert S. Riley, "AOE: What is It?" Field

Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 85, pp. 46,48; Maj Ronald M. Ianowski, "AOE Force Structure and

CONOPS," Field Artillery, Oct 88, pp. 22-24; Legal Mix VI, Main Report (Extract), Ian 85,

pp. 13-14, HRDC; 1987 USAFACFS AHR, p. 86; Fact Sheet, subj: Echelon Above Corps

Transition Plan, 8-inch Tradeoff for MLRS, 4 Ian 88, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Ron

Janowski, Force Structure Officer, DCD, 8 Mar 88, HRDC.

16. 1987 USAFACFS AHR, p. 86, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Chris Klein, Organization and Personnel Division,DCD, USAFAS, 9 Feb 89, HRDC; Mark P. Gay, "The Field

Artillery in Support of Deep Offensive Missions," unpublished Masters of Military Arts and

Science Degree thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984, p. 173.

17. FSMAA, Executive Stnnmary (C), Extract, pp. 6-20, material used is unclassified;

"FA Test and Development," Field Artillery Journal, MaY-Jun 80, p. 42.

18. FSMAA, Exccutive Summary (C), Extract, pp. 6, 9, material used is unclassified;

Bill Rittenhouse, "Its Deeper Than You Think: Artillery Doctrine and Concept," Field Artillery

]ourntll, Ian-Feb 86, pp. 17-20. See Field Artillery Division 86 Reports of I Oct 1978-1 Oct 1979, MSTL Archives, for more information.

19. FSMAA, Executive Summary (C), Extract, pp. 2, 3, 6, material used is unclassified.

20. Ibid., pp. 1-6, material used is unclassified; Target Acquisition Department (TAD),

USAFAS, NSD White Papcr (S), Extract, Ian 90, material used nnclassified, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: 1989 AHR Comments, 12 Mar 90, HRDC; Col Anthony G. Pokorny,

"Mission Area Analysis: Shaping the Future Field Artillery Force," Field Anillery Journal, Mar-Apr81, p. 43.

21. Bruce Gudmundsson, "The MUltiple Launch ROcket System: On Time and Undcr

Budget," Case Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1987, pp. 5-7,

HRDC; Briefing, JapariJUS Staff Talks, subj: MLRS, 8 Nov 89, HRDC.

22. FSMAA, Executive Summary (C), Extract, p. 18, material used is unclassified;

"The Field Artillery Systcm of the Future," Field Anillery Journtll, Nov-Dec 81, pp. 35-36; 82

_
End Notes

"Bigger Wallop from Army Heavy Hitting Artillery," Army, Sep 83, pp. 28-29; Briefing, Japan!

US Staff Talks, subj: MLRS, 8 Nov 89, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj:

TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Field Artillery Tactical Data System (FA TDS) Quarterly

Report, 4 Oct 85, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 7 Apr 86, HRDC; "GSRS Contracts Awarded," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec

77, p. 55; Buel and Miller, "GSRS: Status Report," pp. 13-15.

23. "Bigger Wallop from Army Heavy Hitting Artillery," Army, Sep 83, pp. 28-29;

Briefing, JapanlUS Staff Talks, subj: rv1LRS, 8 Nov 89, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr,

TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 5 Oct 85, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to

Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FATDS Quarterly Report, 7 Apr 86, HRDC; "GSRS Contracts

Awarded," Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 77, p. 55; Buel and Miller, "GSRS: Status Report," pp. 13-15; Gudmundsson, "The Multiple Launch Rocket System," p. 17; Program Chart,

subj: MLRS, undated; Interview, Dr. Larry M. Kaplan, Assistant Command Historian, with

Maj John Nagle, Chief Writer, Rocket and Missile Division, Gunnery Department, 23 Jan 90,

HRDC.

24. Maj Roger A. Rains, "Readiness: The Field Artillery Takes Aim," Army, Mar 85,

p. 41; Lt Col (Ret)' Browder A. Willis, "HELP for the MI09 Self-Propelled Howitzer," Field

Artillery Journal, May-Jun 82, pp. 35-37; Decision Coordinating Paper, 155-mm. SP Howitzer,

(HIP), Nov 89, pp. 2-3, HRDC; Briefing, subj: 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer Improvement

Program, undated, HRDC; Pokorny, "Take the Tech," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 84, p.

21; Briefing, subj: Fire Support, Jan 88, HRDC.

25. Division Support Weapon System (DSWS), Main Report (SINOFORN WNINTEL),

Extract, Jul 83, pp. 4-16 4-17, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Decision Coordinating

Paper, 155-mm. SP Howitzer (HIP), Nov 89, pp. 3, 5-6; Willis, "HELP for the MI09 SelfPropelled Howitzer," pp. 35-37; "HELP Program Continues," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb

83, p. 47.

26. DSWS, Main Report (SINOFORN WNINTEL), Extract, Jul 83, pp. 4-2, 4-16, material used is unclassified.

27. Ibid., pp. 4-16 4-17, material used is unclassified.

28. Ibid., pp. 4-1 5-8, 10-1, material used is unclassified.

29. 1989 USAFACFS AHR,p. 148.

30. Rains, "Readiness: The Field Artillery Takes Aim," p. 41; Ltr of Agreement for

the 155-mm. Self-Propelled Howitzer Improvement Program, 6 Feb 84, HRDC; Memorandum

for Record, subj: Requirements Review Committee Mtg, 31 Jail 84, HRDC; Briefing, subj:

155-mm. Self-Propelled HIP, undated, HRDC; Memo, subj: HIP, 1 Nov 84, HRDC; Capt

James F. Janda, "Getting HELP and HIP," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 85, p. 20; Fact

Sheet, subj: HIP, 10 May 88, HRDC; Briefing, subj: HIP, 2 Feb 89, HRDC; HIP Survivability

Analysis (S), Executive Summary, 2 Jun 89, p. 1, information used is unclassified.

31. 1989 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 148-49.

32. Fact Sheet, subj: AFAS-C, 12 Sep 88, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AFAS, 15 Jul 88,

HRDC.

83

-

-

-

I
End Notes

33. 1987 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 66-67; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force Phase I Study Report, 20 Nov87, in AFV Task Force

Phase I Report, Vol I (S), 31 Aug 87, .material used is unclassified, HRDC.

34. 1987 USAFACFS AHR. p. 67; Interview. Dastrup with Paul Gross. Dep Dir, TSM

Cannon. DCD. 16 Feb 90, HRDC; USAFAS Program and Project Summary Sheets, 20 Jan 90,

pp. 5-6, HRDC; The United States Army Posture Statement FY 90/91, p. 77, HRDC.

35. Interview, Dastrup with Gross. 16 Feb 90; DF with Encls. subj: The Draft AFASC Annex to the AFV Required Operational Capabilities, 24 Mar 88, HRDC; Briefing. subj: FA

Test Bed Program. undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet. subj: AFAS. 15 Jul 88. HRDC; Col (P)

Richard W. Wharton, ''The Cannon Still the King on Battlefield," Army, Jul 89. p. 55.

36. Briefing. subj: FA Test Bed Program, undated; Appendix 12 AFAS-C. to Annex

D of the Operational and Organizational Plan for AFV, 18 Aug 88. pp. D-12-1 D-12- 3, HRDC;

Fact Sheet, subj: AFAS, 15 Jul 88.

37. Operational and Organizational Concept for Copperhead. 1981-86, Jun 79, Appendix F. p. F8; USAFAS. Operational and Organizational Concepts for Copperhead, 4 Jan 79. p.

15. MSTL Archives; Hustead. "Fire Support Mission Area," pp. 19-20; Final Report. Fire

Support Team ForceDevelopment Experimentation, Executive Summary, Apr-May 84, pp. 1_

8. MSlL Archives; Msg. Cmdt, USAFAS. to AIG 9113. subj: Copperhead. 112040Z Feb 85,

HRDC; Fact Sheet. subj: Copperhead Product Improvement Program (PIP). 6 Jun 86. HRDC;

Fact Sheet, subj: Copperhead. 6 Jun 86; Fact Sheet. subj: Copperhead Required Operational

Capability (ROC) and PIP. 6 Jun 86, HRDc; Fact Sheet. subj: Copperhead PIP, 29 Sep 86, HRDC.

38. Hustead. "Fire Support Mission Area," p. 20; Fact Sheet. subj: SADARM Artillery

Munitions. I Nov 85. HRDC; Fact Sheet. subj: Generic SADARM. 2 Jul 85. HRDc; Fact

Sheet, subj: SADARM. 3 Jun 86, HRDc; Interview, Dastrup with Capt Ben Shelton. Concepts

and Studies, DCD, 14 Mar 88, HRDC; SADARM Chronology, 14 Jul 87, HRDc.

39. Briefing, subj: SADARM, 19 Feb 1988, HRDc; StaffInput for 1987 USAFACFS

AHR, HRDC; Briefing. subj: AS ARC for SADARM Systems, 30 Nov 87, HRDc.

40. Interview, Dastrup with Shelton, 14 Mar 88; Staff Input, 1987 USAFACFS AHR;

Briefing, subj: SADARM Systems, 30 Nov 87; Fact Sheet, subj: SADARM Artillery Munitions. 2 Nov 87. HRDC. The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 also encouraged development

of the Non-Linc-of-Sight Missile System dUring the late 1970s and 1980s. However, budget

cuts in 1990 and the rising costs to produce the system caused the Army to stop development

on the system in November 1990. For more infonnation on the Non-Line-of-Sight Missile

System see the 1990 USAFACFS AHR, HRDC.

41. Antoniotti. "Another Point of View," p. 10; USAFAS, Project and Program Sum- mary Sheets, 31 Mar-3 Apr 92, pp. 12-2, 46-2, HRDC.

42. "Assault Breaker Missile Contract Award.ed ....Field Artillery Journal. MaY-Jun 81,

p. 18; Comptroller General. Report to Congress. Decisions to Be Made in Charting Future of

DOD's Assault Breaker. 28 Feb 81. pp. i-v. 1-4; hereafter cited as Decisions to Be Made;

Ludvigsen, "Rebuilding for 1980s with an Eye on 2000," p. 327.

84

_
End Notes

/"

43. Antoniotti, "Another Point of View," p. 8.

44. Capt Kent G. Sanderson, "Joint STARS Looks Deep to Win," Field Artillery, Feb

88, p. 25; Antoniotti, "Another Point of View," pp. 7-9; Dr. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Jockeying with JTACMS," Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 86, pp. 26-27; "Assault Breaker Program Underway," Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 80, p. 58; Decisions to BeMade, pp. 12-

16; FSMAA, Executive Summary (C), p. 19, material used is unclassified.

45. Sanderson, "Joint STARS Looks Deep to Win," p. 25; 1986 USAFACFS AHR, pp.

76-78; Briefing, subj: ATACMS, 1987, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Gregg Hutton,

Chief, TSM Rockets and Missiles, DCD, 11 Mar 88, HRDC; Goodman, "Jockeying with

JTACMS," p. 26; Ltr, JTACMS System Manager to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM JTACMS

Fourth Quarter FY 1985 Report, 23 Sep 85, HRDC; Army TACMS Required Operational

Capability (S), 17 Jan 88, p. 1, material used is unclassified, HRDC.

46. Briefing, subj: AT ACMS, 1987, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Hutton, 11 Mar

88; Fact Sheet, subj: Deep Fires, 28 Nov 89, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Army TACMS (Extract),

1989, HRDC; USAFAS, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 20 Jan 90, HRDC; TSM

Rockets and Missiles, Input for CG's Monthly Report, 12 Dec 89, HRDC; Army Tactical

Missile System Operational and Organizational Plan (S), Revision, 14 Sep 88, pp. 2, 3, and 5,

material used is unclassified, HRDC; Army Tactical Missile System Required Operational

Capability (S), Revision One, 17 Jan 88, pp. 1-3, material used is unclassified, HRDC; Fact

Sheet, subj: Army Tactical.Missile System, 22 Feb 89, HRDC.

47. Fact Sheet, subj: Army TACMS, 11 Jan 90, HRDC; Briefing, subj: ATACMS,

1987, HRDC.

48. 1988 USAFACFS AHR, p. 146; Department of the Army (DA), Follow-on To

Lance System Concept Paper (S), Extract, Mar 90, para 5, material used is unclassified, HRDC.

49. Ibid., paras 2, 6, material used is unclassified.

50. Ibid., para 6, material used is unclassified.

51. Ibid., paras 2, 3, 6, material used is unclassified. For more information see 1992

USAFACFS Annual Command History, pp. 22-27.

52. 1990 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 215-20; Briefing, subj: FOTL, 1988, HRDC.

53. TAD, USAFAS, NSD White Paper (S), Extract, Jan 90, material used is unclassified, HRDC; FSMAA, Executive Summary (C), Extract, pp. 14-15, material used is unclassified; "Major Field Artillery Weapons and Support Systems," Field Artillery, Dec 87, p. 61; Fact

Sheet, subj: Firefinder II Radars, 12 Nov 87, HRDC.

54. Briefing, subj: Firefinder Improvement Program, 1986, HRDC; Briefing, subj:

Firefinder Block II and III, 10 Jul 86, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder, 31 Dec 87, HRDC;

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Product Improvement Program, 4 Aug 88, HRDC; "Major Field

Artillery Weapons and Support Systems," Field Artillery, Dec87, p. 61; Fact Sheet, subj:

Flrefinder II Radars, 12 Nov 87, HRDC; 1987 USAFACFS AHR, p. 78; Fact Sheet, subj:

Firefinder Improvement Program, 13 Sep 89, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson,

TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 22 Feb 90, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Firefinder I and II Overview, 21 May 87, HRDC.

85

I
End Notes

55. Fact Sheet, subj: Impact of FY 90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II, 21 Sep 89,

HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block lIB Configuration Decision, 25 Oct 89, HRDc; Fact

Sheet, subj: Impact of FY 90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II, 14 Nov 89, HRDc; Fact

Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block II MaterieIChange, 20 Nov 89, HRDc; Fact Sheet, subj: Impact

of FY 90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II, 24 Jan 90, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Q-36

Improvement Program (Block m, 20 Aug 91, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Q-36

Improvement Program (Block II), 14 Ian 92, HRDC.

56. White Paper, subj: A Maturing of AquilaRPV Tactical Employment Doctrine,

Training, and Organization Based on Lessons Learned from Operational Test II, USAFAS, 23

Oct 87, HRDC; GAO, Report on Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its Potential Battlefield

Contribution Still in Doubt, Oct 87, pp. 7-8; Briefing, subj: RPV contribution, undated, HRDC;

Fact Sheet, subj: RPV Training on Mission Planning and Detection, Recognition, and Identification, 27 Jun 87, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Ongoing Aquila RPV Operational Testing (OT)

II at Fort Hood, Tx, 2 Feb 87, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila RPV Program Status, 3 Feb

88, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila RPV Program Status, 13 Apr 87, HRDC; Executive

Summary, RPV OT II, Jun 87, pp. ESI-7, ES9-22, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila RPV

Program Accomplishments and Status, 16 Sep 87,HRDC; Briefing, subj: Aquila Status, Jun

87, HRDC; Staff Input, subj: TRADoC System Manager, Aquila, 1987 Historical Report

Input, 20 Ian 88, HRDC.

57. Fact Sheet, subj: Status of RPV Battery, 21 Sep 89, HRDC; White Paper, subj:

Aquila, A Case for Acquiring Aquila and a Family of Payloads as a Combined Anns RPV, Mar

88, HRDC. See USAFACFS AHRs, HRDC, for 1985-89 for additional infonnation on the Aquila RPV.

58. LI Col R.A. Neuwien, "How You Got It and What You Got," U.S. Anny Aviation

Digest, Mar 82, pp. 6-10; "OH-58D Kiowa Scout Helicopter," Army, Aug 90, 54-56.

59. Ibid.

60. Ltr with Encls, Cdr, CAC, to Cdr, USAFAS, and Cdr, USAAC, subj: OH-58D in

the Field Artillery Role, 18 May 87, Annex A-I,HRDC; MajGen Ellis Parker, "This Vision

of LHX," U.S. Anny Aviation Digest, Dec 86, p. 5; Briefing, subj: To Provide Information on

the AHIP as It Pertains to Field Artillery, ca. 1987, HRDC.

61. Fact Sheet, subj: History of the Aerial Fire Support Division, 18 Feb 88, HRDC;

Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D/AFSO Field Status, 19 Dec 88, HRDc; Fact Sheet, subj: History

of AFSClProponency for Aerial Fire Support Coordinator Training, 23 Dec 86, HRDc.

62. Llr with Encl, Cdr, CAC, to Cdr, USAFAS, and Cdr, USMC, subj: OH-58D in the Field Artillery Role, 18 May 87, p. 1, HRDC.

63. Ibid.

64. 1989 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 39-40; Interview, Dr. Larry M. Kaplan with Maj

George W. Chappell, Chief, Aerial Fire Support DiVision, Fire Support and Combined Anns

Department (FSACAOD), DSAFAS, 15 Ian 91, HRDC.

65. Interview, Kaplan with Chappell, 5 Feb 90; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant (AC), USAFAS, subj: OH-58Ds in the Aerial Observer Role, undated, HRDC; Msg, Cdr,

86
End Notes

u.s. Army AViation Center, to AC, USAFAS, subj: Observer for OH-58D, 111730Z May 88,

HRDC. "Threat and Budget Changes Imperil Army Aviation Plan," Armed Forces Journal,

April 1990, indicated that the Army Aviation Plan for 1988 outlined procuring 477 OH-58Ds

during the next ten years. The following year, a revised plan indicated only 243 would be

procured.

66. Msg, Department of the Army to Cdr, TRADOC, et al, subj: After Action Report

VCSA AH-64 Program Review, 211135Z Jun 89, HRDC; Msg, Cmdt, FASCH, to Cdr,

USAAVNC, subj: OH58D Employment, 241300Z Ju189, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, USAAVNC, to

Cmdt, FASCH, subj: OH-58D Employment, 261833Z Jul 89, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, USAAVNC,

to AC, USAFAS, subj: Observer for OH-58D, 111730Z May 88, HRDC.

67. Msg, Cmdt, FASCH, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Revised OH58D Fielding and Employment Plan, 151815Z Sep 89, HRDC.

68. Msg, Cdr, USAA VNC, to Cdr, u.s. Army Armor School and Center (USAARM),

et al, subj: OH58D Deployment, 222300Z Sep 89, HRDC.

69. Msg, Cdr, USAANVC, to Cmdt, FASCH, et al, subj: Revised OH58D Fielding and

Employment Plan, 272245Z Sep 89, HRDC.

70. Msg, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, et al, Subj: OH58D Retrofit and Redistribution, 031250Z Oct 89, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cmdt, FASCH, et al, subj: Revised OH58D Fielding and Employment Plan, 041558Z Oct 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: OH58D Distribution, 16 Apr 90, HRDC.

71. Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D Fielding Status, 16 Apr 90, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj:

OH-58D Distribution, 16 Apr 90, HRDC; Interview, Kaplan with Chappell, 30 Jan 90; Msg,

Cdr, TRADOC, to Cmdt, FASCH, et al, subj: Revised OH-58D Fielding and Employment

Plan, 041558Z Oct 89, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, XVIII Airborne Corps, et al, subj:

MPLH for 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Requirements, 041410Z Oct 89, HRDC; Briefing, subj:

AHIP, 9 Nov 89, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, USAA VNC et al, subj: OH-58D

Deployment, 061742Z Oct 89, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Armed OH-58D,20 Dec 89, HRDC.

72. TAD, NSD White Paper (S), Extract, Ian 90, material used is unclassified; Memorandum for Record, subj: 1989 AHR Comments, TAD, 12 Mar 90, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup ,

with Jerry Shelley, Chief, New Systems Division, TAD, 4 Jan 90, HRDC; Ltr with Encls, Cdr,

CAC, to Cdr, USAFAS, and Cdr, USAAC, subj: OH-58D in the Field Artillery Role, 18 May

87, HRDC. Capt Clyde J. Sincere's "Target Acquisition for the Deep Battle," Military Review,

Aug 89, provide~ an interesting look into the future of target acquisition and the relationship

that must evolve between the intelligence and field artillery communities.

73. Ltr, GAO to Senator Dan Quayle, 19 Sep 86, HRDC; Discussion Paper, subj: The

Need for AFATDS, 11 Dec 87, HRDC; Army Modified AFATDS Program Plan, Executive

Summary, 30 Aug 85, p. 1, HRDC; 1990 USAFACFSAHR, p. 73, HRDC.

74. Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM AFATDS Second Quarter

FY 89 Report, 3 Apr 89, HRDC; Evaluation Report, AFATDS Concept Evaluation, Jul 89,

Executive Summary, pp. 1-8, 1-14, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: 1989 Staff Input

from Field Artillery Board to 1989 AHR, 14 Mar 90, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC,

87

'

c

I
End Notes

subj: TSM AFAIDS Third Quarter FY 89 Report, 30 Jun 89, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr,

TRADOC, subj: Letter of Transmittal: Report of the Concept Evaluation of the AF A IDS, 18

Jul 89, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: TSM AF ATDS Fourth Quarter FY 89 Report,

3 Oct 89, HRDC; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for AFAIDS, II Oct 89, HRDc; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Command and Control Systems, subj: AAE Decision Memorandum-AFAIDS, 21 Jul 89, HRDc;

Ltr, The Under Secretary of Defense to Honorable john P. Murtha, Chainnan, Subcommittee

on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, II Oct 89, HRDC; Ltr,

The Under Secretary of Defense to Honorable Daniel K. Inouy, Chainnan, SUbcommittee on

Defense, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, II Oct 89, HRDC.

75. Interview, Kaplan with Roy Pennepacker, TSM AFAIDS, 28 Jan 91, HRDc.

76. Ltr, David R. Heebner, Chairman, Summer StUdy on Countering Soviet Fire Support Systems, to Honorabl~ Frank C. Carluc:i III, Secretary of Defense, IS Dec 88, HRDC;

Memorandum for the Chamnan, Defense SCIence Board (DSB), subj: Tenns of Reference,

DSB Summer Study on Countering Soviet Fire Support Systems, undated, HRDc; Unclassified

Synopsis of Final Report of the 1988 Defense Science Board Summer StUdy on Countering

Soviet Fire Support Systems, undated, pp. 1-2, HRDc.

77. Memorandum for the Chainnan, Defense Science Board Summer Study on Countering Soviet Fire Support Systems, subj: U.S. Fire Support Enhancements, 28 Jun 88, HRDC;

Memorandum for the Chainnan Defense Science Board, subj: Tenns of Reference, DSB

Summer Study on Countering Soviet Fire Support Systems, undated, HRDc; Ltr, David R.

Heebner, Chainnan, Summer Study on Countering Soviet Fire SUpport Systems, to Honorable

Frank C. Carlucci III, Secretary of Defense, 15 Dec 88, HRDC.

78. End-of- Tour Oral History Interview, Dastmp with Maj Gen (Ret) Eugene S. Korpal,

Cmdt, USAFAS, 10 Ju187, HRDC; Maj Gen Raphael J. Hallada, "Fire Support Modernization:

A Major Step Toward Deterrence," Military ReView, Aug 89, p. 8.

79. Interview, Dastrup with Korpal, 10 Jul 87; Hallada, "Fire SuPPOrt Modernization,"

p. 8; Ltr, Heebner to Carlucci, 15 Dec 88, HRDC; Memorandum for Chainnan, Defense

Science Board, Summer Study On Countering Soviet Fire SuPPOrt Systems, subj: U.S. Fire Support Enhancements, 28 Jul 88, HRDC.

80. Briefing, subj: 8-inch Transition Analysis Echelon Above Division Transition, Nov 89, HRDC.

81. Memorandum for Chainnan, Defense Science Board Summer StUdy On Countering

Soviet Fire Support Systems, 28 Jun 88, HRDc. General Hallada's articles, "Fire Support

Modernization: A Major Step Toward Deterrence," Military RevIew, Aug 89, and "Multipronged

Counter to the Soviet Threat," Anny, Jul 89, are essential reading for understanding the Field

Artillery School's reasoning for more and better field artillery systems.

82. Hallada, "Fire Support Modernization: A Major Step Toward Deterrence," pp. 8-

13; Hallada, "Field Artillery Vision: Master Plan for Fire Support of the Future," Field Anillery, Feb 88, pp. 5-13; Hall ada, "Multipronged Counter to the Soviet Threat," p. 23; Fire

Support Master Plan, Executive Summary, 16 Sep 88, pp 18-20. Lt Col (Ret) Lowry A. West's,

88
End Notes

Lt Col (Ret) David J. Mooney's, and Col (Ret) AnthonyG. Pokorny~s"Field Artillery in the

21st Century," Military Review, Aug 89, furnishes an interesting, in depth look into the future

of the field artillery and AirLand Battle.

83. Hallada, "Fire Support Modernization," pp. 8-13; Hallada, "Field Artillery Vision,"

pp. 5-13; Fire Support Master Plan, Executive Summary, 16 Sep 88, pp. 18-20, HRDC.

84. U.S. Arms Control imd Disarmament Agency, Conventional Forces Europe (CFE)

Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1989, p. 1, HRDC; "European Security

Negotiations Open in Vienna," Department of State Bulletin, May 89, p. 33.

85. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, CFE Negotiations on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe, 1989, pp. 1-2; Interview, Dastrup with Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and

Studies Division, DCD, 23 Feb 89, HRDC; "European Security Negotiations Open in Vienna,"

pp. 33-34; USAFAS, Conventional Forces-Europe Force Reductions, Initial Overview and the

Field Artillery Perspective, 18 Sep 89, pp. 5-10, HRDC; USAFAS, Fighting at Parity in PostCFE Europe, undated, HRDC. In 1991 the Warsaw Pact officially dissolved, making the CFE

Treaty agreements academic and reducing the possibility of war in the. process.

86. Gen John W. Foss, "AirLand Battle-Future," Army, Feb 91, p. 20; Briefing, Gen

John W. Foss, sub]: Challenges for the Field Artillery, 26 Apr 90, HRDC; Draft Trends and

Implications for the U.S. Army's Future AirLand Battle, 30 Jan 91, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire

Support and AirLand Battle Future, 12 Feb 91, HRDC.

87. Draft Trends and Implications for the U.S. Army's Future AirLand Battle, 30 Jan

91, p. 7.

88. Fact Sheet, subj: AirLand Battle Future, 16 Apr 90, HRDC; Foss, "AirLand Battle

Future," p.24; Briefing, subj: Challenges for the Field Artillery, 26 Apr 90; C. William

Rittenhouse, "Fire Support on the Non-Linear Battlefield: .The Shape of Things to Come,"

Field Artillery, Oct 90, pp. 36-37.

89. Ibid., p. 38; Briefing, subj: Fire Support and AirLand Battle-Future, 12 Feb 91; C.

William Rittenhouse, "Operation FireS trike, " Field Artillery, Feb 91, pp. 33-37; Interview,

Dastrup with Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, DCD, USAFAS, 11 Feb 91, HRDC.

90. Rittenhouse, "The Shape of Things to Come," pp. 38-39; Rittellhouse, "Operation

FireStrike," pp. 33-37.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Capt Suzann W. Voigt, "Much Ado About Something," Field Artillery Journal, JulAug 86, p. 29; John L. Romjue, A History of Army 86: The Development of the Light Division,

the Corps, and Echelons Above Corps, November 1979-December 1980 (Fort Monroe, VA:

Historical Office, TRADOC, 1982), pp. 25-33; Lt Col Heinz A. Schiemann, "Fire Support for

the Light Division," Field Artillery, Oct 87, p. 19; Michael J. Mazarr, Light Forces and the

Future of u.s. Military Strategy (New York: Maxwell Macmillan Pergamon Publishing Corp.,

1990), pp. 9-10; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military I

89

~
 
17.

p.66.

End Notes

History of the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p. 583; Harry G.

Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell Publishing,

1992), pp. 87-88.

2. Voigt, "Much Ado About Something," p. 29; Romjue, A History of Army 86, pp. 25-

33; Schiemann, "Fire Support for the Light Division," p. 19.

3. Voigt, "Much Ado About Something," p. 29; Romjue, A History of Army 86, pp. 25-

33; Schiemann, "Fire Support for the Light Division," p. 19.

4. Mazarr, Light Forces and the Future of U.S. Military Strategy, pp. 11, 14; Romjue,

A History of Army 86, p. 34.

5. Romjue, A History of Anny 86, pp. 34-57; Romjue, The Anny of Excellence, pp. 16-

6. Ibid.; Scales, et al., Certain Victory, pp. 28-29.

7. Ibid.; Romjue, The Army of Excellence, pp. 16-17.

8. Scales, et al., Certain Victory,pp. 28-29; U.S. Army Chief of Staff, White Paper,

Light Infantry Division, Apr 84, pp. 1-5, HRDC; Eric Ludvigsen, "Elite Light Divisions Among

Major Focuses in '85 Army Budget," Anny, Apr 84, p. 36; Draft Heavy/Light Operations,

Considerations to Optimize the Capabilities of Both Units, undated, pp. 2-3, HRDC; Working

Paper, FSACAOD, USAFAS, Jan 90, p. 2, HRDC; U.S. Army Center of Military History,

Department of the Anny Historical Sum~ary, FY 86, p. 66; Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman,

Prepare the Army for War, p. 62; RomJue, The Army of Excellence, pp. 24-26.

9. U.S. Army Chief of Staff, White Paper, Light Infantry Division, Apr 84, pp. 1-5;

Ludvigsen, "Elite Light Divisions Among Major Focuses in ' 85 Army Budget," p. 36; Draft

Heavy/Light Operations, Considerations to Optimize the Capabilities of Both Units, undated,

pp. 2-3; Working Paper, FSACAOD, p. 2; U.S. Army Center of Military History, Department

of the Army Historical Summary, FY 86, p. 66.

10. Ludvigsen, "Elite Light Divisions Among Major Focuses in ' 85 Anny BUdget," pp.

35-36; Edwin W. Besch, "Are Light Divisions Too Light?" Anny, Feb 85, pp. 42-48; Romjue,

Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Anny for War, p. 62.

11. Lt Gen John R. Galvin, "The Heavy/Light Concept," Anned Forces Journal, Jul 82,

12. Ibid., p. 68.

13. Ltr, OU to Dastrup, 12 Feb 93, HRDC.

14. Lt Gen John R. Galvin, "Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission," Infantry, Jul-Aug 84, pp. 11-14.

15. Maj Gen Howard G. Crowell and Lt Col Jared L. Bates, "Heavy-Light Connection:

Division," Infantry, Jul-Aug 84, pp. 15-18; U.S. Army Chief of Staff, White Paper, Light

Infantry Division, Apr 84, p. I; Galvin, "The HeavylLight Concept," pp. 66-68; Galvin, "Heavy!

Light Forces and the NATO Mission," pp. 11-14. ,

90
End Notes

16.. Draft HeavylLight Operations: Considerations to Optimize the Capabilities of Both

Units, undated, p. 1; Comments by Hallada on draft manuscript, "Modernizing the King of

Battle: 1973-1991," p. 99, HRDC.

17. Working Paper, FSACAOD, USAFAS, Jan 90, HRDC; "On the Move," Field Artillery, Oct 87, p. 1.

18. Interview, Dastrup with Maj Robert Guenther, Fire Support Division, FSACAOD,

6 Feb 90, HRDC.

19. Ltr, Maj Gen Harold T. Fields, Jr., CG, 6th ID, to Hallada, 10 Jul 89, HRDC; Memo

for Hallada, subj: Counterfire Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Review, 30 Jun 89, HRDC;

Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, USAFAC, subj: Counterbattery Artillery, 121620Z Jan 88, HRDC;

Maj Thomas J. Costello, "A Counterfire Concept for Light Division," Field Artillery, Apr 89,

p.25.

20. Ltr, Harrison to Brig Gen James M. Miller, Cdr, I Corps Artillery, undated, HRDC;

Memo for Cdr, USAFAS, subj: Corps Target Acquisition Battalion, 15 Dec 88, HRDC.

21. Memo for Cmdt, subj: School Position on Counterfire, 15 Dec 88, HRDC; Ltr,

Harrison to Miller, undated, HRDC.

22. Fact S'heet, subj: Untitled, 28 Sep 88, HRDC.

23. Ibid.; Ltr, Harrison to Miller, undated.

24. Ltr with Ends, HQ 3rd Infantry Division Artillery to Director of Training and

Doctrine, USAF AS, 4 Apr 88, HRDC.

25. Ltr, Col Thomas W. Karr, Cdr, 3rd Infantry Division Artillery, to Marty, 21 Oct 88,

HRDC.

26. Msg, Cmdt, FASCH, to Cdr, I Corps, et ai, subj: Counterfire, Mar 89, HRDC.

27. Memorandum to CG, subj: Telecon with Gen (R) Livesy on the Counterfire White

Paper, 21 Jun 89, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Counterfire, 21 Apr 89, HRDC; Ltr, Lt Gen

Richard G. Graves to Hallada, 11 Jul 89, HRDC; Ltr, Maj Gen N. Krawciw, Cdr, 3rd Infantry

Division, to Hallada, 5 Jul 89, HRDC; Ltr, Gen (R) Donald R. Keith to Hallada, 19 Iun 89,

HRDC.

28. Ltr, Shalikashvili to Hallada, 19 Jun 89, HRDC.

29. Ltr, Harrison to Hallada, 26 Jun 89, HRDC.

30. USAFAS Counterfire White Paper, 1 Nov 89, pp. 1-5, HRDC; See Col Vollney B.

Corn's "The Co'unterfire Battle: Shoot First to Win," Army, Aug 89, pp. 39-41.

31. USAFAS Counterfire White Paper, pp. 2-5, 12, HRDC.

32. Ibid., p. 12; Col William G. O'Connor, "Heavy-Light Fire Support: Light Force

Ops, Centurion Shield 90," Field Artillery, Feb 91, pp. 11-12. See Brig Gen Fred F. Marty's

and Maj David P. Valcourt's "Counterfire: the Combined Arms Fight for Fire Superiority,"

Military Review, Aug 89, for an interesting discussion on counterfire doctrine as it existed in

mid-1989.

91
End Notes

33. "Shot Over!" Field Artillery, Oct 87, p. 2; FM 6-20-50, Fire Support for Brigade

Operations (Light), Jan 90, pp. ix, 1-1 1-3; Hallada, "On the Move," Field Artillery, Oct 87,

p. 1.

34. Lt Col John C. Merriam, "What Role for Artillery in LIC or MIC?" Field Artillery,

Apr 90, pp. 13-16.

35. "Looking for a Light Gun," Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 85, p. 17; USAFAS,

The Azimuth of the Field Artillery, 1985, p. 17, HRDC.

36. Ibid.

37. XM1l9 Howitzer Operational Test II, Executive Summary, Aug 85, p. 1-1, HRDC;

Interview, Dastrup with Steve Johnson, TSM Cannon, DCD, 22 Feb 90, HRDC.

38. Interview, Dastrup with Johnson, 22 Feb 90; XM204 Operational Test II, Executive

Summary, Aug 85, p. 1-1, MSTL Archives.

39. XM119 Operational Test II, Executive Summary, Aug 85, p. 1-2; Interview, Dastrup with Johnson, 22 Feb 90.

40. Ibid; XM1l9 Operational Test II, Executive Summary, Aug 85, p. 1-2; "Field

Artillery Equipment and Munitions: Changes for the 1990s," Field Artillery, Dec 88, p. 56.

41. Ibid.; XM119 Operational Test II Executive Summary, Aug 85, p. 1-3; Interview, Dastrup with Johnson, 22 Feb 90.

42. 1990 USAFACFS AHR, p. 209; Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

for Operations and Plans-Force Development with Encl (S), subj: Proposed Materiel Requirement Documentation for the HIMARS, 15 Aug 91, material used is unclassified, HRDC.

43. Draft White Paper, U.S. Army Missile Command, Advanced Systems Concept

Office, subj: Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System, 17 Jan 90, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Low

Intensity Conflict Rocket System, 9 Mar 90, HRDC.

44. Draft White Paper, U.S. Army Missile Command, Advanced Systems Concept

Office, subj: Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System, 17 Jan 90, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Low

Intensity Conflict Rocket System, 9 Mar 90, HRDC; Draft White Paper, subj: Light Artillery

Rocket System, 19 Mar 90, HRDC; Operational and Organizational Plan, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, 21 Dec 90, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Final Draft

Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS, 1 Aug 90, HRDC; Msg, Cmdt, FAS, to Cdr,

TRADOC, subj: MLRS for Contingency Forces, 101900Z Apr 90, HRDC.

45. Draft White Paper, subj: Light Artillery Rocket System, 19 Mar 90, HRDC; Operational and Organizational Plan. for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, 21 Dec 90,

HRDC;Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Final Draft Operational and Organizational

Plan for HIMARS, 1 Aug 90, HRDC; Msg, Cmdt, FAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: MLRS for

Contingency Forces, 10 1900Z Apr 90, HRDC.

46. Draft White Paper, subj: Light Artillery Rocket System 19 Mar 90, HRDC; Msg,

Cmdt, FAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: MLRS for Contingency Forces, 10I900Z Apr 90, HRDC;

Msg, Cdr, mADOC, to Cdr, USAFAC, subj: Alternative Chassis for MLRS, 301530Z Apr

90, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Capt James J. Waldeck, TSM Rockets and Missiles (RAMS),

92

-
End Notes

4 Feb 91, HRDC; Msg, Cmdt, USAF AS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: High Mobility Artillery

Rocket System Operational and Organizational Plan, 221700Z Aug 90, HRDC.

47. Ltr, Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, to Senator Dan Quayle, 19

Sep 86, in General Accounting Office, Fire Support System: Army's Plans to Improve Its Fire

Support Capabilities, Sep 86, hereafter cited as GAO Report, HRDC.

48. Ltr, Conahan to Quayle, 19 Sep 86.

49. Ltr, Conahan to Quayle, 19 Sep 86; GAO Report, p. 17.

50. Ibid., p. 11; Ltr with Enclosure, Asst Cmdt, USAFAS, to Maj Gen Donald S. Pihl,

Cdr, 9th ID, and Maj Gen Robert D. Morgan, Cdr, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics

Command, 7 May 87, HRDC; Ltr, Undersecretary of Defense to U.S. General Accounting

Office, 16 Jun 86, in GAO Report, pp. 34-35; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Command, Control,

and Communications, 7-10 May 91, HRDC.

51. GAO Report, pp. 11, 12, 13, 14.

52. Ibid., p. 15.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., pp. 18-21, 32, 33; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Command, Control, and

Communications, 7-10 May 91.

55. Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr,TRADOC, subj: TSM Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications (FSC3) First Quarter FY 87 Report, 5 Jan 87, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt,

USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3 Second Quarter FY 87 Report, 6 Apr 87,

HRDC.

56. Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3, Quarterly Report, 11 Oct 88,

HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3 Quarterly Report, 30 Jun 88,

HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3 First Quarter FY 88 Report, 1987,

HRDC; 1990 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 243-44.

57. Ibid., p. 244; Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS Program Status, 23 Oct 87, HRDC;

Discussion Paper, subj: The Need for AFATDS, 11 Sep 87, HRDC; DF,subj: AFATDS

Software 3 Block Fielding Approach, 21 Aug 87, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC,

subj: TSM FSC3 Fourth Quarter FY 87 Report, 30 Sep 87, HRDC;Memorandum for Cdr,

TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3 First Quarter FY 88 Report, 30 Dec 87, HRDC.

58. Ltr, TSM FSC3 to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TRADOC TSM FSC3 First Quarter FY

87 Report, 5 Jan 87, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3 Fourth Quarter FY 87 Report, 30 Sep 87; Ltr, Cdr, TRADOC, to Col Martell D. Fritz, TSM FSC3, subj:

TSM Report (2QFY87), FSC3, 26 May 87, HRDC.

59. 1990 USAFACFS AHR, pp. 244-45; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications, 7-10 May 91; End-of-Tour Oral History Interview, Dastrup with

~aj Gen Raphael J. Hallada, Cmdt, USAFAS, 29 Jul 91, pp. 8-9, HRDC.

60. Ibid.; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: TSM FSC3 Third Quarter FY 88

Report, 30 Jun 88, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, 8 Nov 88, HRDC; Memo for TSM FSC3,

7 Jul 89, HRDC; "View from the Blockhouse," Field Artillery, Jun 89, pp. 37-38.

-
End Notes

61. Interview, Dastrup with Bill Rittenhouse, 19 Mar 92, HRDC; Memorandum for

Record, subj: Maj Gen Marty's Comments on 1991 Draft Annual Command History, 20 May

92, HRDC.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD: Naval

Institute Press, 1991), pp. 36-40; John K. Cooley, Payback: America's Long War in the Middle

East (Washington: Brassey's Inc., 1991), pp. 192-93; Henry O. Malone, Jr., ed., TRADOC

Suppon to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study (Fort Monroe,

VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1992), p. 3.

2. Malone, TRADOC Suppon to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 2-3;

Friedman, Desert Victory, pp. 97-98; Interview, Dastrup with Brig Gen Howard J. von Kaenel,

former 82nd Airborne Division Artillery Commander, 28 and 31 Aug 92, p. 45, HRDC.

3. Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 2-3;

Friedman, Desert Victory, pp. 97-98; Interview, Dastrup with Yon Kaenel, p. 45; Association

of the United States Army (AUSA), The U.S. Army in Operation Desert Storm (Arlington, VA:

Association of the United States Army, 1991), pp. 7-8.

4. Cooley, Payback, p. 207; Scales, et ai, Certain Victory, p. 106.

5. Friedman, Desert Victory, pp. 97-98.

6. Ibid., pp. 169-96; Malone, TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp. 7-8.

7. Friedman, Desert Victory, pp. 108, 169-96, 214-36; Malone, TRADOC Suppon to

Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm, pp. 7-8.

8. Maj Gen Fred F. Marty, "FA on Target in the Storm," Field Artillery, Oct 91, p. I;

Memorandum for Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS,

subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 91, p. 1, HRDC.

9. Ibid.,pp. 1-2; Col David A. Rolston, "A View of the Storm: Forward Observations," Field Artillery, Oct 91, p. 4.

10. Col David A. Rolston, "Victory Artillery in Operation Desert Shield," Field Artil- lery, Apr 91, p. 24.

1I. Brig Gen (Ret) Paul F. Pearson and Gen (Ret) Glenn K. Otis, "Desert Storm Fire

Support: Classic AirLand Battle Operations," Landpower Essay Series, AUSA Institute of

Land Warfare, Jun 91, HRDC.

12. Memorandum for Director, CALL, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Obser- vations, 10 Jul 91, pp. 1-2.

13. Field Artillery Desert Facts," Field Artillery, Oct 91, pp. 2-3.

14. Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, with Encls, subj: Desert Storm Rounds Fired, 20 Aug 91, HRDC.

94
End Notes

15. Mal Kenneth P. Graves, "Steel Rain: XVIII Corps Artillery in Desert Storm," Field

Artillery, Oct 91, p. 52.

16. Maj Mark S. Jensen, "MLRS in Operation Desert Storm," Field Artillery, Aug 91,

p.32.

17. Marty, "FA On Target in the Storm," p. 1.

18. Field Artillery Desert Facts," p. 2.

19. Memorandum for Director, CALL, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, pp. 1-2, 10 Jul 91.

20. Fact Sheet with Attachment, subj: Lack of Published and Approved Joint Fire

Support Doctrine, 21 Sep 91, HRDC; Graves, "Steel Rain," p. 55; Maj Jay F. Grandin, "Fire

Support Coordination: It's a Time for A Relook," Field Artillery, Feb 92, pp. 19-23; Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned,

14 Aug 91, HRDC; Memorandum for G3, ARCENT, subj: Desert Shield/Desert Storm After

Action Report: Executive Summary, 26 Mar 91, HRDC.

21. Fact Sheet with Attachment, subj: Lack of Published and Approved Joint Fire

Support Doctrine, 21 Sep 91; Rolston, "A View of the Storm," p. 4; Memorandum for Director,

CALL, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, pp. 1-2, 10 Jul 91.

22. Fact Sheet with Attachment, subj: Area Support Concept Does Not Adequately

Support Corps Artillery Units, 21 Sep 91, HRDC; Memorandum for Director, CALL, subj:

Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 91, p. 2; Rolston, "A View of the

Storm," p. 4; Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Col Floyd T. Banks, Cdr, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, 24 Jun 91, p. 9, HRDC.

23. Col Vollney B. Corn, Jr., and Capt Richard A. Lacquemont, "Silver Bullets," Field

Artillery, Oct 91, p. 12; Interview, Dastrup with von Kaenel, 29 Aug 92, p. 22; Memorandum

for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: 1st Cavalry Division Artillery Desert Storm Lessons Learned, 14

Aug 91, HRDC.

24. Memorandum for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Artillery for the Heavy Division, 5 Sep

91, HRDC.

25. Memorandum for Record, subj: Thoughts on Desert Storm:. Doctrine, Tactics, and

Techniques, 20 Apr 91, HRDC.

26. Ibid.

27. Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Col Floyd T. Banks, Cdr, 212th Field Artillery

Brigade, Fort Sill, 19 Jun 91, pp. 7-8,HRDC.

28. Corn and Lacquemont, "Silver Bullets," p. 10.

29. Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Col Jerry L. Laws, Cdr, 75th Field

Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, 19 Jun 91, p. 13, HRDC; "Extended Range for MLRS Rockets in

the Works," Field Artillery, Apr 92, p. 39; Memorandum for Director, CALL, subj: Operation

Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 91, p. 3.

30. "Modernization Program Systems Prove Themselves in the Desert," Army, May 91,

p. 16.

95
p. 16.

End Notes

31. Ibid., p. 16.

32. Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Laws, 19 Jun 91, pp. 3-4.

33. Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Col David A. Rolston, former division artillery commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 25 Aug 92, pp. 4-5, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Col Stanley E. Griffith, Director, Target Acquisition

Department, USAFAS, 24 Jul 91, pp. 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 13-16, HRDC; Corn and Lacquemont,

"Silver Bullets," Oct 91, p. 13.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Griffith, 16 Jul 91, p. 20.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.; Memorandum for Director, CALL, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging

Observations, 10 Jul 91, p. 3; Memorandum with Ends for Director, FSCAOD, subj: USAFAS

Historical Document, 2 Jul 91.

38. Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Laws, 19 Jun 91, p. 10; Interview,

Dastrup and Kaplan with Banks, 19 Jun 91, p. 13.

39. "Modernization Program Systems Prove Themselves in the Desert," Army, May 91,

40. Interview, Dastrupand Kaplan with Banks, 19 Jun 91, p. 13; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Griffith, 16 Jul 91, p. 20; Col Freddy E. McFarren, et aI,

"Operations and Desert Shield and Storm: A Unique Challenge for the 18th FA Brigade

(Airborne)," Field Artillery, Oct 91, p. 46; Graves, "Steel Rain," pp. 54-55.

41. "Field Artillery Desert Facts," p. 3.

42. Ibid.

43. Interview, Dastrup with von Kaenel, p. 12.

44. Romjue, Canedy, and Chapman, Prepare the Army for War, pp. 21-36; Scales, et

aI, Certain Victory, pp. 10-12, 20-25.

96
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Briefing, subj: Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications, 7-10 May 1991, HRDC.

Briefing, subj: MLRS, 9 November 1989, HRDC.

Briefing, subj: 155-mm. Self-propelled Howitzer Improvement Program, undated, HRDC.

Briefing, subj: RPV Contribution, undated, HRDC.

Briefing, subj: SADARM, 19 February 1988, HRDC.

Briefing, subj: SADARM Systems, 30 November 1987, HRDC.

Briefing, subj: To Provide Information on the AHIP as It Pertains to Field Artillery, circa

1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheets

Fact Sheet, subj: AFAS, 15 July 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: AFAS-C, 12 Sep 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: AFATDS Program Status, 23 October 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: AirLand Battle Future, 16 April 1990, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila Program Accomplishments and Status, 16 September 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet,subj: Aquila RPV Program Status, 13 April 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila RPV Program Status, 3 February 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet with Attachment, subj: Area Support Concept Does Not Adequately Support Corps

Artillery Units, 21 September 1991, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Army TACMS, 11 January 1990, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Close Support Study Group, 30 March 1976, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Copperhead, 6 June 1986, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Copperhead Product Improvement Program, 6 June 1986, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Copperhead Product Improvement Program, 29 September 1986, HRDC.

101
Bibliography

Fact Sheet, subj: Copperhead Required Operational Capability and PIP, 6 June 1986, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Counterfire, 21 April 1989, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Deep Fires, 28 November 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder, 31 December 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block lIB Configuration Decision, 25 October 1989, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block II Materiel Change, 20 November 1989, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder II Radars, 12 November 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Improvement Program, 13 September 1989, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Product Improvement Program, 4 August 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Q-36 Improvement Program (Block II), 14 January 1992, HRDc.

Fact Sheet, subj: Generic SADARM, 2 July 1985, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: HIP, 10 May 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: History of AFSClProponency for Aerial Fire Support Coordinator Training, 23 December 1986, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: History of the Aerial Fire Support Division, 18 February 1988, HRDc.

Fact Sheet, subj: Impact of FY 90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II, 21 September 1989, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Impact of FY 90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II, 24 January 1990, HRDC.

Fact Sheet with Attachment, subj: Lack of Published and Approved Joint Fire Support Doc- trine, 21 September 1991, HRDC. ..

Fact Sheet, subj: Low Intensity Conflict Rocket System, 9 March 1990, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D/AFSO Field Status, 19 December 1988, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D Distribution, 16 April 1990, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D Fielding Status, 16 April 1990, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Ongoing Aquila RPV Operational Testing II at Fort Hood, Texas, 2 February 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Q-36 Improvement Program (Block II), 20 August 1991, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: RPV Training on Mission Planning and Detection, Recognition, and Identi- fication, 27 June 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: SADARM, 3 June 1986, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: SADARM, 1 November 1985, HRDC.

Fact Sheet; subj: SADARM Artillery Munitions, 1 November 1985, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: SADARM Artillery Munitions, 2 November 1987, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Status of RPV Battery, 21 September 1989, HRDC.

Fact Sheet, subj: Untitled, 28 September 1988, HRDC.

102
103

Bibliography

Oral History Interviews

Cass, Col Stanley, with Lt Gen David E. Ott, Dec 79, U.S. Army Military History Institute,

Carlisle Barracks, PA, HRDC.

Dastrup, Boyd L. with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, Directorate of Combat Developments, .USAFAS, 22 February 1990, HRDC. .

__ ' with Paul Gross, Deputy Director, TSM Cannon, Directorate of Combat Developments,

USAFAS, 16 February 1990, HRDC.

__ ' with Maj Robert Guenther, Fire Support Division, Fire Support and Combined Arms

Department, USAFAS, 6 February 1990, HRDC.

__ ' with Maj Gregg Hutton, Chief, TSM Rockets and Missiles, Directorate of Combat

Developments, 11 March 1988, HRDC.

__ ' with Maj Ron Janowski, Force Structure Officer, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAFAS, 8 March 1988,.HRDC.

__ ' with Steve Johnson, TSM Cannon, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAFAS, 22

February 1990, HRDC.

__ ' with Chris Klein, Organization and Personnel Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAFAS, 9 February 1989, HRDC.

__ ' with Maj Gen (Ret) Eugene S. Korpal, former Cmdt, USAFAS, 24 February 1992,

HRDC.

__ ' with Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Development, USAFAS, 23 February 1989, HRDC.

___ ' with Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Development, USAFAS, 11 February 1991, HRDC.

__ ' with Bill Rittenhouse, Concepts and Studies Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAFAS, 19 March 1992, HRDC.

__ ' with Col David A. Rolston, former Division Artillery Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 25 August 1992, HRDC.

__ ' with Jerry Shelley, Chief, New Systems Division, Target Acquisition Department,

USAFAS, 4 January 1990, HRDC.

__ ' with Capt Ben Shelton, Concepts and Studies Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAFAS, 14 March 1988, HRDC.

__ ' with Brig Gen Howard J. von Kaenel, former 82nd Airborne Division Artillery Commander, 28 and 31 August 1992, HRDC.

Dastrup Boyd L. and Larry M. Kaplan with Col Floyd T. Banks, Commander, 212th Field

Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, 19 and 24 June 1991,HRDC.

__ ' with Col Stanley E. Griffith, Director, Target Acquisition Department, USAFAS, 24

July 1991, HRDC.

__ ' with Col Jerry L. Laws, Commander, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, 19 June

1991, HRDC.
104

Bibliography

Kaplan, Larry M. with Maj George W. ChappelI, Chief, Aerial Fire Support Division, Fire

Support and Combined Arms Department,USAFAS, 5 February 1990, HRDC,

--' with Maj George W. ChappelI, Chief, Aerial Fire Support Division, Fire Support and

Combined Arms Department, USAFAS, 31 January 1991, HRDC.

--' M,y JOhn Nagle, Chief Writer, Rocket and Missile Division, Gunnery Department, USAFAS, 23 January 1990, HRDC.

--' with Roy Pennepacker, TSM AFA IDS, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAFAS, 28 January 1991, HRDC.

SECONDARY LITERATURE

,Books

Bailey, J.B.A. Field Artillery and Firepower. Oxford: The Military Press, 1989.

Cooley, John K. Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East. Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 1991.

Dastrup, Boyd L. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Anny's Field Anillery. Fort

Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Office, 1992.

Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of U.S.Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Fort Leavenworth,

KS: Combat Studies Institute, O.S. Army Command and General Staff ColIege, 1979.

Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The Warfor Kuwait. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Gossett, Terrence D. U.S. Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle Supporting Technology Programs.

Moffett Field, CA: U.S. Anny Research and Technology Laboratory, 1981.

Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976

Edition ofFM 100-5, Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.

Hogg, Ian V. Anillery 2000. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990.

Jane's Artillery and Armour, 1979-80.

Malone, Henry 0., Jr., ed. TRADOC Suppon to Operations Desen Shield and Desert Stann:

A Preliminary Study. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1992.

Mazarr, Michael J. Light Forces and the Future of U.S. Military Strategy. New York: MaxwelI

Macmillan Pergamon PUblishing Corp., 1990.

Millett, Allan R. and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military HistOly of the

United States of America. New York: The Free Press, 1984.

Romjuc, John L. A History of Army 86: Division 86, The Development of the Heavy Division.

Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Office, 1982.

--' From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-

1982. Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Office, 1984.
Bibliography

__ . Theftrmy of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army .. Fort Monroe, VA:

Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993.

Romjue, John L., Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman. Prepare the Army for War: A

Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993. Fort Monroe,

VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1993.

Scales, Robert H., Jr., et al. Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington DC:

Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993.

Schnebly, David F. The Development of the XMQM105 Aquila Mini-RPV System. Sunnyvale,

CA: Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc., 1977.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy Il: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell

Publishing, 1992.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press, 1984.

Dissertations and Theses

Adelman, Joseph A. "Preparedness for Counterfire," unpublished Master of Military Art and

Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984.

Gay, Mark P. "The Field Artillery in Support of Deep Offensive Missions," unpublished Master

of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,

1984.

Gudmundsson, Bruce. "The Multiple Launch Rocket System: On Time and Under Budget."

Case Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1987.

"Towards Improved Counterfire Capabilities." Student Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.

Unpublished Manuscripts

Ott, Maj Gen David E. "Counterfire," Chronology of Counterfire Doctrine DevelopmentJEvaluation File, MSTL.

Published Articles

Antoniotti, Maj Joseph C. "Another Point of View: Attacking the Second Echelon," Field

Artillery Journal, January-February 1986, pp. 7-11.

Antoniotti, Capt Joseph C. and William J. Krondak. "Development of Precision Guided Munitions: A Field Artillery Point of View," Field Artillery Journal, September-October

1978, pp. 24-29.

"Assault Breaker Missile Contract Awarded," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1981, p. 18.

"Assault Breaker Program Underway," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1980, p. 58.

105
Bibliography

__ ' "Lifting the Fog of War," Army, July 1972, pp. 30-34.

McDonald, Kenneth C. "GSRS: More Than The MRL?" Field Artillery Journal, SeptemberOctober 1974, pp. 12-15.

McFerren, Col Freddy E., et al. "Operations Desert Shield and Storm: A Unique Challenge for

the 18th FA Brigade (Airborne), Field Artillery, October 1991, pp. 42-48.

"Major Field Artillery Weapons and Support Systems," Field Artillery, December 1987, pp. 57-

67.

Marty, Maj Gen FredF. "FA on Target in the Storm," Field Artillery, October 1991, p. 1.

Marty, Brig Gen Fred F. and Maj David P. Valcourt. "Counterfire: The Combined Arms

Fight for Fire Superiority," Military Review, August 1989, pp. 37-43.

Merriam, Lt Col John C. "What Role for Artillery in LIC or MIC?" Field Artillery, April 1990,

pp. 8~16.

Merritt, Maj Gen Jack N. "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1979, pp.

2-3.

_'__ ' "On the Move," Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1979, pp. 2-3.

"Modernization Program Systems Prove Themselves in the Desert," Army, May 1991, pp. 14-

16.

"M198 Production Rolling," Field Artillery Journal, September-October 1978, p. 15.

Neuwien, Lt Col R.A. "AHIP: Your New Aeroscout, How You Got It and What You Got,"

U.S. Army Aviation Digest, March 1982, pp. 6-10.

O'Conner, Col William G. "Heavy-Light Fire Support: Light Force Ops, Centurion Shield 90,"

Field Artillery, February 1991, pp. 11-15.

"OH-58D Kiowa Scout Helicopter," Army, August 1990, pp. 54-56.

Ott, Maj Gen David E. "Forward Observations," Field Artillery Journal, July-August 1975, p.

6.

Parker, Maj Gen Ellis. "This Vision of LHX," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, December 1986, pp.

2-5.

Pearson, Brig Gen Paul F. "FIST," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1976, pp. 7-12.

Pokorny, Col Anthony G. "Mission Area Analysis: Shaping the Future Field Artillery Force,"

Field Artillery Journal, March-April 1981, pp. 43-47.

__ ' "Take the Tech," Field Artillery Journal, September-October 1984, pp. 20-23.

Rains, Maj Roger A. "Readiness: The Field Artillery Takes Aim," Army, March 1985, pp.

38-43.

Riley, Col Robert S. "AOE: What is It?" Field Artillery Journal, September-October 1985, pp.

46-50.

Rittenhouse, C. William (Bill). "Fire Support on the Non-Linear Battlefield: ,The Shape of

Things to Come," Field Artillery, October 1990, pp. 36-39.

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Bibliography.

__ ."Irs Deeper Than You Think: Artillery Doctrine and Concept," Field Artillery Journal,

January-February 1986, pp. 17-20.

__ ' "Operation FireStrike," Field Artillery, February 1991, pp. 33-37.

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Rolston, Col David A. "A View of the Storm: Forward Observations," Field Artillery, October

1991, pp. 4-6.

__ ' "Victory Artillery in Operation Desert Shield," Field Artillery, April 1991, pp. 23-25.

Sanderson, Capt Kent G. "Joint STARS Looks Deep to Win," Field Artillery, February 1988,

pp. 25-27.

Scheimann, Lt Col Heinz A. "Fire Support for the Light Division," Field Artillery, October

1987, pp. 18-24.

"Shot Over," Field Artillery, October 1987, pp. 2-3.

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pp. 58-60.

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pp. 23-28.

SpigareIIi, Maj Raymond and Maj Martell Fritz. "Here Comes TACFIRE," The Field

Artilleryman, November 1969, pp. 67-68.

Stern, Lt Col Allan R. "Do We Need a Multiple Rocket Launcher," Field Artillery Journal,

July-August 1974, pp. 25-28.

Strobridge, Truman R. and Bernard C. Nalty. "The Roar of the 8-lncher," Field Artillery

Journal, March-April 1980, pp. 30-36.

"The Field Artillery System of the Future," Field Artillery Journal, November-December 198 I,

pp. 35-36.

"Threat and Budget Changes Imperil Anny Aviation Plan," Armed Forces Journal, April 1990,

pp. 50-51.

"View from the Blockhouse," Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1979,pp. 17-21.

"View from the Blockhouse," Field Artillery, June 1989, pp. 37-41.

Voigt, Capt Suzann W. "Much Ado About Something," Field Artillery Journal, July-August

1986, pp. 28-30.

West, Lt Col (Ret) Lowry A., Lt Col (Ret) David J. Mooney, and Col (Ret) Anthony G.

Pokorny, "Field Artillery in the 21st Century," Military Review, August 1989, pp. 15-22.

Wharton, Col (P) Richard W. "The Cannon Still the King on Battlefield," Army, July 1989, pp.

53-56.

Whelihan, Maj William. "The MI98." Field Artillery Journal, January-February 1978, p. 9.

__ ' "We've Got 30!" Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1979, pp. 9-12.

109
Index

Conventional Forces Europe Force

Reduction, 31, 46

Conventional Standoff Weapon System

Program, 23

Corn, Col Vollney B., 60, 61

Corps artillery, 4-6

Corps Support Weapon System, 23

Corps, U.S.

I Corps, 40

III Corps, 45

VII Corps, 42, 56

XVIII Airborne Corps, 28, 56, 58

Counterbattery doctrine. See also

Counterfire. 4-6

Counterfire. See also Counterbattery

doctrine. 4-6, 18,43-46, 48, 58

Counterfire, White Paper, 46

Crowell, Maj Gen Howard G., Jr., 42, 43

D

Defense Acquisition Board, 29

Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency, 22, 23

Defense Science Board, 13, 14, 29, 30

Defense Science Board 1985 Armor/AntiArmor Summer Study, 21

Defense System Review Council, 26, 27,

29

DePuy, Gen William E., 2, 6, 7, 13

Dinges, Brig Gen Edward A., 14, 15

Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 44

Division artillery, 4, 5, 6

Division 86 Study, 15, 16, 39, 40

Division Restructuring Study, 3, 4, 15, 16

Division Support Weapon System, 19, 20

Divisions, U.S.

82nd Airborne Division, 28, 39, 56

101st Airborne Division, 39, 56

1st Armored Division, 60

3rd Armored Division, 56

1st Cavalry Division, 4, 15

112

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized),

56

3rd Infantry Division, 42, 43, 44

9th Infantry Division (Motorized), 40,

41,48

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized),

56, 57, 58, 61

Dotson, Col Michael L., 59

E

Echeloned forces, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20,

22,23,33

Elevated Target Acquisition System, 21

Elton, Maj Gen Robert M., 41

Enhanced Self-propelled Artillery Weapon

System (ESPAWS) Study of 1979,

18, 19

F

.. Field artillery and maneuver force

relation. See Fire Support Coordinator

and Fire Support Team. 3-7, 10, 11,

12, 17

Field Artillery Digital Automated

Computer (FADAC), 8

Field artillery systems. See individual

weapon by name and model;

Command, control, and communications systems by individual name and

model; Computerized gunnery;

Munitions, precision; and Target

acquisition radars. 12, 63

Field Manual. 6-20, Fire Support for

Combined Arms Operations, 3

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 2, 3, 13

Fire Support and Combat Observation

Lasing System, 21

Fire Support and. Combined Arms

Operations Department, 43, 57, 61

Fire Support Coordination Line, 57, 58

Fire support coordinatioI? ~easures, 57-59

Fire. Support Coordinator (FSCOORD), 3

Fire Support Digital Message Device

(FIST DMD), 49, 50, 51, 52
Fire Support Mission Area Analysis Study

of 1974, 9, 10

Fire Support Mission Area Analysis Study

of 1981, 14, 15, 17, 18,23,29

Fire Support Team (FIST), 7, 8

Force structure. See Army of Excellence,

Division 86, Division Restructuring

Study, Infantry Division 86, and

Reorganization Objectives Army

Division

Forward observation, 6, 7

Foss, Gen John W., 29, 32, 48

Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle, 21

G

Galvin, Maj Gen John R., 42, 43

General Accounting Office, 26~ 50, 51

General Support Rocket System (GSRS).

See Multiple-Launch Rocket System

(MLRS).

Global Positioning System (GPS), 61

Goldstein, Lt Col Jack, 12

Graves, Maj Kenneth P., 58

Graves, Lt Gen Richard G., 45

Griffith, Col Stanley E., 61

H

Hallada, Maj Gen Raphael J., 26, 28, 29,

42, 45, 47

Harrison, Lt Gen William H., 43, 44, 45

Heavy division. See also Army of

Excellence, Division 86, Division

Restructuring Study, and Force

structure'. 3, 4, 15, 16, 17

Heavy Force Modernization Program. See

Armored Family of Vehicles. 21

Heavy-Light field artillery operations, 42-

47,64

Helicopters.

AH-64,61

OH-58D, 26, 27, 28, 61

OH-6,26

Index

"High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

(HIMARS), 49

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled

Vehicle (HMMWV), 25

High Technology Test. Bed, 40, 41

Honest John rocket, 11

House and Senate Appropriation

Committees, 49, 50, 52

Howitzer Extended Life Program, 9, 19,

20

Howitzer Improvement Program. See

Howitzer, self-propelled, MI09A2/

A3. 20, 21, 30, 33

Howitzers, self-propelled,

8-inch, MIlO, 11, 40, 59

155-mm., Advanced Field Artillery

System, 20, 21, 22, 32, 33

155-mm., MI09A2/A3, 11, 16, 19,

20, 21, 30, 33, 58

155-mm., MI09A6 (Paladin), 20, 32

Howitzers, towed.

L118,47

L119, 47, 48

MI02, 41, 47

M114, 11, 16

M119,48

M198, 11, 40, 41, 48, 63

M204,47

I

Infantry Division 86. See Light division.

39, 40, 41

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty, 24, 25

Iraq, 55, 56

J

Jensen, Maj Mark S., 58

Joint (Army-Air Force) fire support

coordination, 58, 59

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC),

62

Joint Tactical Missile System. See Army

Tactical Missile System. 23 . 113
Index

K

Karr, Col Thomas W., 44, 45

Keith, Gen Donald R., 3, 6, 7

King Fahd, 55

Korean War, 4

Kuwait, 55, 56, 57

L

Laws, Col Jerry L., 60

Legal Mix IV Study, 4

Legal Mix V Study, 16

Light division. See Infantry Division 86.

39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49

Line-of-Sight Antitank Vehicle, 21

Litton Data Systems, 50

Lockheed Missile and Space Company, 9

Low-Intensity Rocket System, 48

LTV Aerospace and Defense Company,

48

M

Marines, U.S., 56

Marty, Maj Gen Fred F., 44, 45, 58

Massed fires.

importance in Persian Gulf War of

1991, 57, 58

McCaffrey, Maj Gen Barry R., 61

Merritt, Maj Gen Jack N., 15

Meyer, Gen Edward C., 3, 15, 39, 40

Missiles.

Ground-Launched Cruise Missile, 25

Follow-on To Lance, 25

Lance, 24

Pershing lA, 11

Pershing II, 11, 24

Mission Element Needs Statement, 20, 29

Modernizing field i artillery weapons. See

Howitzers, self-propelled; Howitzers,

towed; Missiles; and Rockets.

114

Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

Also called General Support Rocket

System (GSRS). 11, 12, 16, 18, 22,

23, 30, 32, 40, 48, 53, 56, 58, 59,

60, 63, 65

Munitions, precision. See. CannonLaunched Guided Projectile and

Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition

(SADARM). 9, 10, 11,22,23, 30

N

National Training Center (NTC), 62

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 1, 4, 8, 12, 14, 23, 29, 30,

31, 41, 63

o

O'Keefe, Col John J., 44

Otis, Gen Glenn K., 30, 64

Ott, Maj Gen David E., 2, 4, 5, 6, 7

P

Patriot Missile, 24

Pearson, Brig Gen Paul F., 7

Persian Gulf, 55, 63

Q

Quay Ie, Senator Dan, 50

Quick Reaction Program, 50

R

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 39

Regiments.

1/27 Field Artillery Regiment, 58

Remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). Also

called Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(UA V). 8, 9, 28, 61.

Aquila RPV, 9, 25, 26, 28, 61

Reorganization Objectives Army Division

(ROAD), 3, 15

RisCassi, Maj Gen Robert' W., 41

Rocket and Missile System, 21
Rockets. See also General Support Rocket

System (GSRS), High Mobility

Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS),

Low-Intensity Rocket System, and

Multiple-Launch Rocket System

(MLRS).

World War II, 11

1950s, 11

1960s, 11

Rogers, Gen Bernard W., 4

Rolston, Col David A., 57

S

Saudia Arabia, 55, 56

Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition. See

also Munitions, precision. 10, 22, 30

Service Life Extension program for the

Lance Missile, 24

Sinnreich, Maj Richard A., 15

Skill Qualification Test (SQT), 62

Soviet Union, 1, 11, 13, 14, 15, 26, 29,

30, 31, 33,42,52,63

Standoff Target Acquisition System, 14

Starry, Gen Donn A., 13, 14, 39, 40

Steel Rain, 57

Sunell, Maj Gen Robert J., 21

System acquisition. See specific weapon

system by name.

System of Systems, Field Artillery, 31, 57

T

Tactical Fire Direction System

(TACFIRE), 8, 9, 29, 40, 42, 49, 50

Tactical Fire Direction System

(TACFIRE), Light, 50, 51, 52

Target acquisition. See Remotely piloted

vehicles and Target acquisition

radars. 8, 9, 25-28, 30, 61

Target Acquisition Department, 61

Target acquisition radars, 8, 9, 14, 15, 25,

28, 58, 60, 63

Thurman, Gen.Maxwell R., 20, 34

Index

Training centers. See Combat Maneuver

Training Center, Joint Readiness

Training Center (JRTC), and National

Training Center (NTC)

u

U.S. Army Armament Research and

Development Command, 47

U.S. Army Aviation Center, 27

U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT),

58,59,60

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 47

U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat

Developments Activity, 21

U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), 6, 30,

42

U.S. Army Field Artillery School

(USAFAS), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16,

17, 18,21,27,28,30,32,42,43,

44, 45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 57, 59, 61, 63

U.S. Army Forces Command

(FORSCOM), 6

U.S. Army Missile Command, 48, 49

U.S. Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad

Hoc.Committee, 9

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC), 2, 3, 4, 6, 13,

14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 27, 29, 32, 39,

4~ 41, 42,~3, 62, 63

U.S. Army Training and Evaluation

Program (ARTEP), 62

V

Vietnam War, 1,2,4,8, 10, 17,32,65

vonKaenel, Brig Gen Howard J., 62

W

Warsaw Pact,!' 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15,

26, 29, 30, 31, 33, 42, 52

Weyand, Gen Fred C., 4

Wickham, Gen John A., Jr., 41

World War I, 4

World War II, 4

115